DISCOURSES UPON Cornelius Tacitus.  
Written in Italian by the Learned marquis Virgilio Malvezzi.  
Dedicated To the Serenissimo Ferdinand the second Great Duke of Thuscany.  
And Translated into English, by Sir Richard Baker, Knight.  
LONDON, Printed by E. G. for R. Whitaker, and Tho. Whitaker, at the King's Arms in S. Paul's Churchyard.   
1642.   

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE WILLIAM Lord Viscount Say, and Seal, Master of his Highness' Court of Wards and Liveries, and one of his Majesty's most Honourable Privy Counsel.  
Most Honoured Lord,  
I Should not have the boldness to present this book unto your Lordship, if (besides the great service I owe you) the Argument of the Book did not invite me to it: for consisting of Politic Discourses and considerations of State; it is most fit to be presented to Counselors of State; amongst which I knew not whom better to present it to, then to your Lordship: and no less than the Argument of the Book, the Author thereof invites me to it; for being a learned Lord of Italy, none more fit to entertain him then some learned Lord of England; of which number this Kingdom affordeth none more eminent than your Lordship: I must not speak so much as I think, for offending the modesty of your ear; but I may boldly speak so much as all the world sees; that nature and Art have joined together, to make you perfect in your place, which is to be a faithful Counsellor to the King, and a loving Patriot to your Country: for both which, if I should not myself acknowledge an obligation to you, I might worthily be thought, unworthy to be accounted, which I specially desire to be,  
Your Lordship's humble and devoted servant,  
RICHARD WHITAKER.   

TO THE SERENISSIMO FERDINAND the second, great Duke of Thuscany, my most gracious Lord.  
SEeing to nothing I am more bound, then to serve your Highness, I cannot consequently have any greater desire than to be accounted your servant: that as the benefits which our House continually receiveth, are publicly known; so the marks of my devotion may publicly appear; which after dedicating myself to your Highness, I cannot better manifest, then by offering these Discourses; which are so far unequal to your greatness, and to what I owe you, that it may well appear to be rather done for confession of my debt, then for satisfaction of that obligation, which as it can only receive abatement from your commands, so commands coming from so great a Prince, will have force again to make it the greater. Vouchsafe then to honour me with commanding me, thereby to make me the more obliged: and be pleased to accept these weak labours, with looking upon the value which your Heroical Name gives them. And upon the weight which my devotion puts upon them, with which I wish to your Highness all those felicities; which as you give manifest proofs to merit, so by the divine goodness you shall happily obtain: And so I present you the most humble Reverence,  
Of Your Highness' most devoted servant,  
VIRGILIO MALVEZZI.   

To the Reader. That young men may be good writers, in the Politics: and why Cornelius Tacitus gives so great contentment to them that read him.  
IN antiquis est sapientia, & in multo tempore prudentia. If it be true, as true indeed it is, which the holy Text by the mouth of Job intimates, that only old men are wise, certainly it is in nothing more true, then in things which belong to action. Whereupon the Queen of Saba hearing the most wise Solomon, although by the answers he gave to her questions, she found he was deeply seen in the secrets of Philosophy, and in the mysteries of Divinity, yet she made no show of wondering at it: but when she found him endowed with no less excellency in things belonging to action, than she broke forth into words of astonishment. Major est sapientia & opera tua, quam rumor quem audivi. Beati viri tui & beati servi tui, qui stant coram te semper, & audiunt sapientia mtuam. Showing thereby, that it is no great marvel, for a young man to be excellent in things of contemplation: the marvel is, if he be excellent in matters of action: seeing those require only, sharpness of wit, which easily grows in verdant spirits; these, soundness of judgement, which gets not maturity but by long experience: and for this cause Aristotle excluded young men from active Philosophy: and a regard also to this had the Author of the Trivial saying, That young men may be good Mathematicians, but not good Philosophers. I therefore may justly be taxed with overgreat boldness, to take upon me to speak in matters of Action, being so young a man as I am, when it were fitter I should stand to learn of others, then to put myself forward to be a Teacher. And for this (as S. Gregory well observes) our Lord Christ, in his childhood, though he had taught and confounded the Doctors, yet by all means would have his mother find him harkening to them, as to learn of them. The consideration of this would have stayed me from undertaking such a work, were it not that I detest so much the name of idleness, that for avoiding of that, I rather venture to incur the blame of too great boldness. Publishing these my discourses, which in one course of the Sun have had their beginning, increase and finishing; and God grant, that in the same year, after the order of nature, they have not also their decrease, and abolishing: and that in coming to the light, they begin not (like their Author) from darkness, and then tarry in darkness still. Yet it is true, that I have ways enough, to descend myself from such calumniations. And first, as to this particular objection, that young men are not fit for action; we must know, that all action is preceded by contemplation, which is the action of the mind and understanding, seeing a thing cannot be in the will, till it be first in the understanding; according to that well known rule, Nihil volitum quod non sit praecognitum. As for example, before it be determined to strike battle, it is deliberated in counsel, which is nothing else, but to contemplate whether the action be good or bad. And this Sallust showeth us, where he saith, Nam & priusquam incipias consulto; & ubi consulueris, mature facto opus est. And therefore to execute and do a thing well, it is needful to have gotten a habit in the action, which habit growing from many acts often iterated, requires an experience which cannot be had without length of time, and oftentimes, not without a temper in the affections. Now for contemplating an action, there need not so many things; but as he that is to execute a thing, cannot do it well if he have not the habit; and the habit he cannot have but by doing many Acts: so he that is to contemplate an action that is to be done, must necessarily have a knowledge of that action, which we may call a habit of the understanding; and if that arise from many acts iterated, this also is produced by many acts contemplated; and produced it cannot be, if there be not a knowledge of the things that have happened in the World: and such knowledge cannot be had, without reading of Histories, seeing a young man by reading of Histories, can come to know more, than a man of a hundred years old; because the one hath but feene and heard the accidents only of his own time, the other hath read all the principal things that have been done from the beginning of the World to the present time. I conclude then, that in those things wherein contemplation and action belong both to the same; in those ordinarily a young man cannot be fit; but where contemplation is not joined with action, there he may be most fit. And therefore one that hath read Histories ought not to be blamed if he take upon him to write of things belonging to action, seeing affection cannot hinder him from speaking the truth, nor want of experience from finding it out. And this opinion of mine is no way differing from that of Aristotle: who saith, That young men are no good hearers of moral Philosophy, because action and contemplation in moral Philosophy are not distinct, but joined together; and therefore said that he who contemplates well, and operates otherwise, cannot have the name of a good moralist: so as, Aristotle excludes not a young man, as one that cannot contemplate well, but as one that cannot operate well, by reason of impediment of affection and want of habit. As to that other objection, that young men should always stand to hear and learn of others: I suppose I shall be excused by any that have observed in Plato, that they sufficiently reap profit by speaking, who while in speaking they show their ignorance, give occasion to others to correct them: and this also is my desire, so as the correction come from the hand of Socrates. Besides, I am not without hope of commendation for my judgement, if not in the form at least in the matter; if not in the composition, at least in the choice. Rather indeed, seeing an ill-favoured Image, is yet well valued, if wrought in a Diamond: I am out of doubt, that these my Discourses shall be valued by reason of the Author, from whom I take their matter; Cornelius Tacitus, an Author so famous, and so highly esteemed through all the World, and especially in these our times; and the matter such, that I am enforced to seek out the causes whereof in truth there may be found many: part taken from the things he relates; part, from the manner of his relating them. The things he relates are actions of Princes, and from thence the first benefit we take, is that we learn many profitable things, as living in an age, where all the World is governed Princes. Where in other times, as when in Italy there were many Commonwealths; we see, that expert Politicians, laying aside Tacitus, gave themselves to write Discourses upon Livy, who will always be more esteemed of by men that live in a Commonwealth: as he, that showing the ways how Rome came to be a free State, and how it grew great, will be a means of learning many excellent instructions. But now that we are under Princes, there is no doubt, but the greatest content will be, to learn things of this nature; as the conditions of Princes, the cunning of Courtiers, and such like. All this Tacitus expresseth, where he makes comparison between the Histories of others, and his Annals. Igitur ut olim plebe valida vel cum Patres pollerent, noscenda vulgi natura, & quibus modis temperanter haberetur, senatusque & optimatum ingenia qui maxime perdidicerant, callidi temporum, & sapientes credebantur; sic converso statu, neque alia rerum quam si unus imperitet, haec conquiri tradique in rem fuerit, quia pauci prudentia, honesta ab deterioribus, utilia ab noxiis discernunt, plures aliorum eventis docentur. Secondly, the continual slaughters of principal Senators, the fall of Courtiers, the violent deaths of Princes, and such like; are things, from which the first delight we can take, is this, to know how much we are bound to our Lord God, that we are borne in so much better times, secure of our lives, of our goods and honours. This delight Cornelius Tacitus had, when considering with himself, the difference, that was between the times of those Emperors of whom he writ, and the times of Trajan and N●…rya he said, Rara temporum faelicitate, ubi sentire quae velis, & quae sentias dicere licet. Another is, that finding their tragical accidents, they work in us the like effect, as a Tragedy is wont to do: which is to purge, (as one calls it) the affections of terror and compassion: as it happens in a soldier, who being used to see wounded, and dead men, is never moved by any accident, either to pity or affrighting. He therefore that shall read in Tacitus, so many deaths, banishments, imprisonments, and other cruelties, will never for every light occasion, be either moved with terror, or with compassion. Or else, as others conceive, these accidents moving us to terror or pity, will purge our minds from such passions: as for example, when we read, that Nero through lust and cruelty, came to a miserable end; this by terrifying us, will make us resolve, to the end we may not incur the like misery, to keep ourselves from the like qualities. And this effect Tacitus made account his Annals would work in us, as he writes, Exequi sententias haud institui nisi insignes, per honestem, aut notabili dedecore, quod praecipuum munus Annalium reor, ne virtuces sileantur, ut quae pravis dictis factisque ex posteritate & infamia metus sit. To these may be added, that speaking of bad Princes he can do no less than always to blame them; a thing which (as in another plaee I shall show) not only makes the Writer be held for truer, but makes the Readers pleasure be the greater, as taking it for a praise to himself, to be free from those vices, which he sees blamed in others. In regard whereof, Tacitus saith, Obtrectatio & livor pronis auribus accipiuntur. And thus much concerning the pleasure that is taken from the things he relates. Then concerning the pleasure that is taken from his manner of writing: it consists first in his Laconic stile, which is so much more pleasing than the Asiatic, as clean Wine is then that which is mingled with water. Secondly, it gives great satisfaction, not to lose time, in reading many lines, with little instruction. Thirdly, his very obscurity is pleasing to whosoever by labouring about it, finds out the true meaning; for than he counts it an issue of his own brain, and taking occasion from those sentences, to go further than the thing he reads, and that without being deceived, he takes the like pleasure as men are wont to take from hearing metaphors, finding the meaning of him that useth them. But because Tacitus in saying, that his Annals have little pleasure in them, Caeterum ut profutura, it a minimum oblectationis afferunt, shows to be contrary to this any opinion: It is therefore to be known, that for as much as concerns the present, there may two kinds of pleasure be taken from a thing; one of the senses, another of the understanding: as we may say in Music, there are two pleasures may be taken: one from the goodness of the voices that sing, another from the goodness of the songs that are sing the first is taken by the sense of hearing, whereof the sound is object: the second is taken by the understanding, which finding the Composers cuming in making of Descants, and helping of discords, takes great delight. The first pleasure is common to all that have ears: the second, of such only as understand it. The like happens also in painting, where one kind of pleasure is taken from the daintiness of the colours, and the beauty of the picture: and another, that is taken from the due placing of the parts, and resemblance of the Muasbles and of this, the pleasure is so much the greater, in that it cannot be taken but by one of understanding, who therefore takes delight in another's cunning, because by it be discovers his own. Thus when Tacitus saith, that his Annals are little pleasing; he means, in the pleasure which is taken by the sense: and this appears plainly, by the words he adds, where giving the reason, why other Histories are more pleasing than this, he saith, Nam situs Gentium, varietates Praeliorum: Clari Ducum exitus, retinent ac redintegrant legentium animos. This difference of pleasure, Seneca expressed, when he said, that Virgil affords one kind of pleasure, being read by a Humanist: and another, being read by a Philosopher. I conclude then, that Tacitus is an Author exceeding pleasing; specially to those, who studying the Histories with understanding, little care whether the Latin be as good as that of Caesar.  
It remains to advertise the Reader of these my Discourses, that finding Hebrew or Greek Texts cited in Latin, he may be pleased to conceive I did it, to avoid cumbering the Leaves with allegations: seeing if they had been brought in the foresaid Tongues, they must have been again translated, for their sakes that understand not those Tongues. I should, I know, have done more conformable to custom; if I had cited them in Italian rather than in Latin: but this also I avoided, that I might not take away the force of sense, which the words bear in that Language.  
Lastly, I will not stand to contest with those, who have a custom to be always blaming: because he that shall deal so with these my weak Discourses, will find himself much deceived in his opinion: for wherein he thinks to differ from me, he will directly agree with me; seeing I have printed them to no other end but to make my self known a servant of the Serenissimo the Grand Duke; who out of his benign nature, will be pleased to accept that little which a servant is able to present unto him. Withal I advertise, that to blame a Book, may be the work of understanding men: but to blame the Authors of Books, the work of none but malignant men: That I leave to every man's liberty: This, I conceive, he deserves not, that is not conceited of his own wisdom.   

The Contents of the several DISCOURSES.  
Discourse the first. 
OF the divers forms of government that Rome had: and how it happens that Cities for the most part have their beginnings under Kings, rather than under any other form of government. p. 1  Discourse second. 
How the City of Rome came from being governed by Kings, to be a free State: and the difference is between a beginning and a cause. p. 8  Discourse third. 
A Parallel between the conspiracy of Marcus Brutus against Caesar, and that of Lucius Brutus against Tarquin: whereby we may see, why the one brought in liberty, and the other tyranny. p. 21  Discourse fourth. 
That the power of a few cannot consist in any number, better than three. p. 25  Discourse fifth. 
Of what kind of discord the Author intends to speak. p. 28  Discourse sixth. 
Whether an external war with the enemies of the faith be the best means to hinder discords among Christians. p. 30  Discourse seventh. 
What is the fittest time to proceed in discords with the enemies of the faith. p. 45  Discourse eighth. 
What discords conserve States, and what corrupt them. p. 60  Discourse ninth. 
Of concordant discord: and how it ought to be managed for the good of Cities. p. 61  Discourse tenth. 
How hard and dangerous a matter it is to write Histories: when the easiest time is to find writers: and which of them deserve most credit. p. 67  Discourse eleventh. 
From whence flattery proceeds: how many kinds there are of it, and which of them is hurtful to a City. p. 81  Discourse twelfth. 
What things holp Augustus to the Empire, and what means he used to maintain it. p. 91  Discourse thirteenth. 
How Princes may get the people's love: how a private man ought to make use of the people's favour; and what part it hath in bestowing the Empire. p. 99  Discourse fourteenth. 
How the Donatives which are given to Soldiers are profitable to raise a man, and to maintain him in the Empire: and when it is that Military discipline is corrupted by them. p. 107  Discourse fifteenth. 
How much it imports a Prince for getting the people's love, to maintain plenty, by what means scarcity happens, and how it may be helped, and how a Prince may make use of it. p. 113  Discourse sixteenth. 
What kind of ease it is that Tacitus speaks of, and how it may be reconciled with some places in other Authors. p. 121  Discourse seventeenth. 
That City's subject to another City, better like the government of a King than of a Commonwealth, and that every City would gladly have their Lord to live amongst them. p. 125  Discourse eighteenth. 
What means a Prince may use with safety to set them in a way, that are to succeed them in the government. p. 137  Discourse nineteenth. 
That old men are apt to be carried away by women, and of what age a Prince should be. p. 145  Discourse twentieth. 
That to maintain and suffer Magistrates to continue, although without authority, is a matter of great moment. p. 155  Discourse twenty one. 
That Tiberius was part good, and part bad: how it happened that he fell not into dangers as Nero did. Whether it be good to be brought up in the Prince's house: and finally, how their secret vices may be known. p. 159  Discourse twenty two. 
How much it imports a Prince to be chaste. p. 168  Discourse twenty three. 
How and when the government of women is odious. p. 171  Discourse twenty four. 
That at one and the same time to make known the death of the Prince, and the assumption of the successor, is a thing very profitable for States that stand in danger. p. 179  Discourse twenty five. 
That those men who possess the State of another, are but in a dangerous condition, as long as any of the former Lords line remain alive: and what course is to be taken, to free themselves from such danger. p. 183  Discourse twenty six. 
A Parallel between Tiberius and Solomon. p. 189  Discourse twenty seven. 
That it is a dangerous thing to obey Princes, in services of cruelty and tyranny. p. 190  Discourse twenty eight. 
That Princes ought not to reveal the secrets of their State, and how it happens that oftentimes men are drawn to speak some things which ought to be concealed. p. 198  Discourse twenty nine. 
How Princes should make use of Counsel. p. 204  Discourse thirty. 
How Princes ought to make use of Magistrates and Officers p. 210  Discourse thirty one. 
Why Tiberius made a show he would not be Emperor, and that to make Princes discover things they would have concealed is dangerous. p. 219  Discourse thirty two. 
What course a Prince should take to secure himself from Generals of Armies: and what course Generals should take to secure themselves from the Prince, and from a Commonwealth. p. 329  Discourse thirty three. 
Of Succession and Election. p. 347  Discourse thirty four. 
Whether Tiberius did ill, in causing Augustus his will to be read: and why Augustus in the third place, made many his heirs that were his enemies. p. 354  Discourse thirty five. 
That corrupt Commonwealths, have need of a Monarch to reform them. p. 357  Discourse thirty six. 
Why the City of Rome from a Regal power under Romulus, recovered liberty under Tarqvinius, and from the Regal power of Augustus was never able to shake off servitude. p. 363  Discourse thirty seven. 
That to elect a wicked successor, ●…by to get glory to himself, is a beastly course. p. 371  Discourse thirty eight. 
That a Prince should be both loved and feared. p. 378  Discourse thirty nine. 
Whether an Aristocracy or a Monarchy be the more profitable for a City. p. 388  Discourse forty. 
That it is a great help for attaining a Kingdom, to have a wife of the Blood-royal: and in what danger a Prince is that hath none but daughters. p. 408  Discourse forty one. 
Whether it be better to refuse dignities, or to seek after them. p. 425  Discourse forty two. 
That it is easier to pass from one extreme to another, than from an extreme to the middle. p. 433  Discourse forty three. 
That Germanicus could not carry himself in such sort as to keep Tiberius from suspecting him: and that he refused the Empire for fear of death, and not out of goodness. p. 434  Discourse forty four. 
That it is a hard matter to settle the insurrection of an Army. p. 442  Discourse forty five. 
That what kind of affairs it is fit to carry their wives with them. p. 444  Discourse forty six. 
Whether Germanicus did well to grant so many things to the Army being in mutiny, what other course he might have taken: lastly, that in diversity of times, and upon diversity of occasions divers courses are to be taken. p. 448.  Discourse forty seven. 
That Tiberius did well not to stir from Rome. p. 460  Discourse forty eight. 
That to punish seditious Soldiers by the Soldiers own hands, is very profitable, and that Ministers for the most part, in punishing exceed their limits. p. 469  Discourse forty nine. 
Whether an Army be apt to rebel, that consists of one Nation only, or that which consists of many. p. 475  Discourse fifty. 
That to pass from one extreme to another is dangerous, and how it happens, that successors commonly take courses, differing from their predecessors. p. 477  Discourse fifty one. 
What course is to be used in demanding peace, and when it is fit time. p. 482  Discourse fifty two. 
With what cunning Tiberius introduced and augmented the Law of treason. p. 491  Discourse fifty three. 
Whether it be good, that Officers should continue in their places, and why this course was observed by Tiberius. p. 497    

Vrbem Romam a principio Reges habuere.  
CHAP. I.  

Of the divers forms of Government, that Rome had: and how it happens, that Cities for the most part, have their beginning under Kings rather than any other form of government. The first Discourse.  
THe Almighty God, understanding and comprehending himself infinitely; in as much as the understanding himself, proceeding from himself, returns into himself: joineth together by an admirable circulation, the beginning with the end.  
The Angelical spirits as they have a twofold contemplation, so they cause a twofold motion: For by contemplating of God, their own knowledge returning in an acknowledgement of its original: they move the Heavens circularly, in a like motion to that of the first mover, from East to West: and by contemplating of themselves, they cause another circular motion contrary to the former, from West to East. And seeing all mortal things are influenced by the motions and light of the Heavens. It follows necessarily, that they all follow the heavenly influences with moving in a circle. What marvel then, if the government of the City of Rome, (as here in few words is delivered by Tacitus) have had its circular motion; passing from a regal government, begun by Romulus; to a popular or free estate under Brutus; and from that, to an Aristocratical government under Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar; under Lepidus, Anthony, and Augustus; and then at last, with a wonderful circulation returning again to a government Monarchical, as it was at first. Whereupon the Prophet Ezekiel, not without great mystery, showing us in his first vision, four beasts, which in the opinion of many, are figures of the four Empires of the World; he sets before every one of them a wheel; to intimate in what a circulation they are turned about. And this circulation or alteration, though I cannot say, it is inalterable; yet I may truly say, It is so natural, that even Aristotle himself, discoursing upon the passages of Rule and Dominion; foresees and observes that as a Philosopher; which Tacitus as an Historian, relates here of Rome. Et ob hoc forsan Rex ab initio repertus est; quod difficile erat viros plures excellenti virtute reperiri, praesertim cum tunc civitates parvae forent. So Tacitus here, Vrbem Romam a principio R●…ges habuere. Aristotle goes on, Sed cum postea contingeret, ut plures pari virtute reperirentur, non amplius tolerarunt Regem; sed commune quiddam quaerentes, resp●…blicas constituere: So Tacitus here, Libertatem Lucius Brutus Instituit. Aristotle proceeds, Cum verò deteriores facti, lucrum sibi quaererent, ex gubernatione rerumpublicarum; Paucorum hine potentiam exortam fuisse, credendum est: Honorabant enim Divitias. So here we see, from whence the power came which Pompey, Crassus and Caesar had; and from whence also the Triumvirate of Augustus. Aristotle again, Ex his verò in Tyrannides transiere. So Tacitus here, Lepidi atque Antonii arma in Augustum cessere.  
But for as much as Aristotle shows, that from the end of one circulation another begins; while pursuing this Argument, he saith, Ex Tyrannis rursus ad Plebem: he that will consider in Rome, those forms of government, which for their small continuance, I have omitted; shall find plainly, that even in those also, there hath been a manifest circulation: For after the Regal under Romulus; it came to be a free estate under Brutus; from that, to be a government of a few under the decemviri: lastly, to be in the hand of a tyrant, under Appius Claudius; after whose death she recovered again her liberty; and then passing under the Power of a few, settled at last in a Tyranny under Augustus: and if there happened afterward no new circulation, the reasons thereof shall be showed in another discourse.  
But conceiving it to be the fittest course for examining of these revolutions, to proceed by showing the causes of them; thereby to make men the better see that the events of former times have not been casual, and happened by chance; and also the better be able to prevent the like accidents that may hereafter happen; I will therefore make my beginning at the Power Regal; with which, it ought not to seem strange, that Rome at first was governed; seeing it hath been the like in the foundings almost of all Cities: as both Sallust witnesseth, Igitur Initio Reges; nam in terris, Nomen Imperii id primum fuit: and Justin, Principio rerum, Gentium, Nationumque Imperium penes Reges erat: and also Aristotle, Fuerat enim antiqua civitatum gubernatio paucorum & Regia: and besides these, there are many examples in the holy Scripture, that show it, to have been so: Cain, before the flood, was founder of the first City that ever was in the World; and he, as S. Austin writes, was a King; as also his successors: likewise after the flood, the great City Babylon was scarce built; when Nintrod, (as the Scripture saith) Coepit esse Potens in terra.  
There being therefore no doubt of the case: having so many and great authorities to confirm it; the next thing is, to search out the causes; amongst which, the first may be taken from the first founding. For Cities are sometimes founded by one alone; and he a Private man; as Rome, by Romulus: sometimes by one alone, but he a Lord of other Cities, as Constantinople by Constantine: oftentimes by many joining together; and those many, either all of one Country; who for shunning of danger, assemble themselves into one City: as the Athenians did at Athens: or else such as quite leave and forsake their ancient habitations; which may happen, either in time of peace; when men are forced by the great overswarming of people to seek new dwellings; as the French did, when they built Milan: or else in time of war; when men flying from a Country wasted; retire themselves into fresh places: and this may happen, under some one that is Head or Chieftain; or without Head: without a Head, as Venice; under a Head, as Lavinium, Padova, and Athens: the first, built by Aeneas: the second, by Antenor; the third, by Theseus'.  
Now a City which is built by one alone, whether he be a Private man, or a King; is no sooner founded, but it comes presently to be under a Power Regal: Those again that are built by many joining together: whether it be, that they fly, by reason of war; or whether it be, that in peace, to enlarge themselves, they seek new countries: These also fall presently under the power Regal; because these things cannot well be done, but where there is a superior, that is Head; as Milan did under Bellovisus; Milan under Antenor; Lavinium under Aenaeas; and Athens under Theseus.  
But if a City happen to be built by many that are equals and have no chief amongst them: in this case only, it may be that Cities have not their beginning under Kings: of which, there may be many occasions. First, when the end was not first public to build a City; but rather for private commodity; where menmight place their persons and goods in safety: which in other places by reason of wars they could not do; and in case of such danger, many building houses, now one and then another, have thereby made as it were a Village, and at last a City. Which having been built insensibly and by fits, is therefore not governed by Regal power; which it would have been, if it had been built at once by a number of people united together: a thing impossible to happen, where there is not a Head: as Plato in his Dialogue of Laws hath learnedly taught. And therefore Venice having been founded in the foresaid manner; hath been able to begin; is and will be able to maintain itself a free City; there concurring together with the wisdom of him that built it; the valour of him that governs it. Secondly, this may happen through the condition of those, who without a Head join together to the founding of new Cities, for if they be pious and religious; of quiet dispositions, not greedy of command, and such as have had their education in a Commonwealth, where they have learned rather to content themselves with equality, then to aspire to sovereignty: there is no doubt but they will rather set up a free estate, than a Regal; as it was at the founding of Venice. Thirdly, it may happen by reason of their weakness who were the founders; amongst whom there being none fit or worthy to be a King, they are all Commanders. For this reason (though falsely) Tarqvinius speaking to the Thoscans and Veientanes, would have it, that the City of Rome was become a Republic: Se Regem augente bello, Romanum Imperium a Proximis scelerata Conjuratione pulsos eos inter se, quia nemo Vnus satis dignus Regno visus sit, parts Regni rapuisse.  
These are the occasions by which it happens, that sometimes Cities in their beginnings are not governed by Kings: but because it is a thing that seldom hapens, we may well say; that the first reason, why the greatest part of Cities, in their beginnings, are governed by Kings, is their founding: which without a head, can ill be done. A second reason we may take from the Inhabitants; who in the beginning being but few; are apt to tolerate the Regal Power: an instruction that Aristotle gives, Propter paucitatem enim hominum, non crat magmis memerus mediocri●…; itaque pauci cum essent, multitudine & Institutione; magis ferebant ab aliis gubernari: and this certainly Livy meant when he said; that if Brutus had deposed any of the first Kings, while the multitude was yet unfit to bear any other government than the Regal; the Commonwealth had thereby been Endangered. Dissipatae res nondum adultae Discordia forent, quas fovit tranquilla moderatio Imperii, eoque nutriendo perduxit, ut bonam frugem libertatis, maturis jane viribus ferre possit. A third reason and like unto this, may be taken from the difficulty to find many in the first founding of a City, that are of ability and fit to govern: for which reason perhaps, Aristotle saith, Rex ab Initio repertus est, quia difficile erat, viros plures excellenti virtute reperiri. And so much the more, the City being then, (as Lucius Florus saith) in her childhood; and consequently, wanton and given to pleasures; and therefore had need of such a schoolmaster as a King is, to keep them in awe; whom liberty else would soon corrupt. And to this purpose it is that Livy speaks, and that of the liberty of Rome. Quid enim futu●…m fuit, si illa Pastori●…m convenarumque plebs transfuga ex suis populis, sub tutela Inviolati Templi, aut libertateni aut certam impunitatem adepta, soluta Regio metu, agitare caepta esset Tribunitiis procellis. No man therefore ought to marvel, that our Lord God, in the time of the Mosaical Law, never gave to the Hebrews a Commonwealth, as long as either immediately by himself; or else by the means of Kings or Judges, he governed them in fear, under severe laws; where of when men came to be more perfect, he abated the rigour; as Saint Austin excellently expresseth, saying, Deus Hebraeis diversa pro qualitate temporis, imposuit Praecepta; erant enim sub lege quast puert sub Pedguogo incluse: and therefore Saint Paul saith, Sub lege custodiebamur in Christo, nutriens nos tanquam parvulos sub rigore & Diseiplina. The last reason is, because a City in its Beginning hath need of Laws, which may better be given by one alone, then by a multitude; where of Aristotle gives the reason, Quia Vnum nancisci & paucos facilius est quam ●…ltos qui recfe sentiant, & possint leges condere, & jus constituere.  
Now having showed, that not without just cause, the City of Rome was in its beginning governed by Romulus: it will not be amiss, to examine the situation of the City, and therein to show the Founder's wisdom in the building it. First therefore the scite of a City, (according to Aristotle) ought neither to be too remote from the sea; nor yet too near it; to the end, that by too much remoteness, it be not deprived of many commodities, which the Sea is wont to bring in; and by too great nearness, it be not exposed to the danger of sudden assaults. Secondly, It ought to be in a good air; as the thing, which of all other, can most annoy us; being continually, not only about us, but taken into us. Thirdly, it ought to be in a place of plenty; without which, there can never accrue any greatness to a City. Fourthly, it ought to be in a place, easy for carriage and bringing in of commodities. Fiftly and lastly, it ought to be in a place of advantage for assaulting its neighbours: and difficult itself to be assaulted. Now that Rome was situated according to these rules of Aristotle, is related by Livy, where he saith: Non sine causa Dii hominesque hunc urbi condendae locum elegerant, saluberrimos colles; here he shows the goodness of the air: Flumen optimum quo ex Mediterraneis locis fruges advehantur. Here he shows the facility of carriage, either by Land or Water. Mare vicinum ad commoditates; nec expositum, nimia propinquitate ad pericula classium externarum Nationum: Here he shows a nearness to the sea in respect of profit: and a remoteness, in respect of danger. Italiae Medium ad Incrementuan urbis natum unice: Here he shows the difficulty for being assaulted, by people far off, being in the midst of Italy; and by people near hand, by reason of its own strength. We may therefore conclude: that a City built to grow great, cannot possibly have a more excellent situation, (according to Aristotle) than Rome had.   

Libertatem Lucius Brutus Instituit.  
How the City of Rome came from being governed by Kings, to be a free State; and what the difference is between a beginning and a cause. The second Discourse:  
HAving showed the causes for which the City of Rome, was in her first beginning governed by Kings: I conceive it to be no less necessary, to make inquiry how it happened, that leaving that kind of government, it came under Brutus, to be a free State: and seeing, of the causes that may be alleged, (setting them aside that are supernatural) some are Philosophical, and some Political; these consisting in the things done; those in the order of number, and influences of the Heavens; I say first, speaking as a Politician; There are many of opinion, that this alteration of government in Rome, was caused by the ravishing of Lucretia, by Sextus Tarqvinius: which opinion Aristotle seems not much to decline; while speaking of the causes, by which Monarchies and States come to be changed, he omits not to name for one, the lust and lasciviousness of the Prince: which (as he shows by many examples) have been the cause of change in all kinds of Commonwealths and Monarchies. Others may say, that this change of government in Rome, proceeded from this, that Tarqvinius had taken away all authority from the Senators; and had by devises procured the utter abolishing of the Senate; which also was the cause, that the Monarchy of Rome, passed afterwards from the house of the Caesars, into that of Galba. The cause likewise of the change in Syracuse, from a Monarchy to a popular State; when Hieronymus not following the steps of his grandfather Hieron; devested the Senate of all authority; and was therefore by conspirators most miserably slain. For as the stomach, which is the seat of natural heat; as long as it hath in it any little nourishment, leaves the body in peace and quiet; but if it be altogether without, it than draws nourishment from the head, and thereby oftentimes destroys the body: so if the Senate have but some little authority left it, it than rests satisfied and contented; but if it be wholly deprived of all authority, it than turns head upon their head, and falls upon the Prince; and oftentimes becomes the ruin of the City. And even this is one reason, that Octavius Augustus, after the death of Caesar, was able to continue in his Empire; because he left to the Senate, part of that authority which Caesar had before abolished; at least had plotted to abolish.  
By the examples hitherto brought, I conceive it may be gathered, that these were the true Political causes, why the City of Rome, changed its regal government, to a free State; but because to say but this, would be to confound beginnings with causes; it is necessary to expatiate a little; that so returning back, I may leave no man uncapable of this truth.  
We must therefore know, that between a beginning and a cause, there is great difference; not speaking of them either Philosophically, or Theologically; although in each of them, it might easily be showed. In Theology; because the Father is the beginning of the Son; and the Father and the Son, the beginning of the Holy Ghost; yet neither the Father is cause of the Son, nor the Father and Son cause of the Holy Ghost, as Thomas Aquinas doth learnedly demonstrate. In Philosophy; seeing Aristotle in his Physics; and in his books of Generation and Corruption, shows manifest difference, between beginnings and causes. But because Aristotle in distinguishing them, takes them not always in the sense that we take them; and oftentimes also confounds them; as in his Metaphysics; where he shows that a cause and a beginning, are as Ens and Vnum; which are convertible one with the other; and in another place affirms, that all causes are beginnings: and in Divinity likewise the Greek Fathers mingle oftentimes in the Persons of the Trinity, the causes with the beginnings: as Saint Gregory Nazianzen and others: we therefore in this place, will forbear to speak of them, either Philosophically, or Theologically; but will frame our Discourse, by way of actions; showing into how great errors those men have run, who confound causes with beginnings: a thing which Tacitus is not guilty of, who in his History saying; Struebat jam fortuna in diversa parte terrarum initia causas Imperii; shows plainly he knew that a cause and a beginning were not both one thing.  
We may therefore take causes to be those that are in the understanding; beginnings, those by whose means, that which is in the understanding is put in execution. And so a cause comes to be, the first in the intention; and the last in execution; a beginning, the last in the intention; and the first, in execution.  
This, Polybius well understood where he saith, Causae omnibus in rebus primae sunt; Principia verò ultima causarum: equidem ita existimo, Principia dici Primas omnium actiones in rebus quae judicatae as deliberatae sunt; causas verò quae judicium deliberationemque praecedant. And thereupon excellently well he saith, That the cause of the second war of the Carthaginians with the Romans, was the indignation of Amilcar Hannibal's father: who, though he were not overcome by Land of his enemies the Romans, yet the Carthaginian Forces being put to the worse by them, he thought it his best course to make peace, and to lay down Arms for the present, reserving in his mind a perpetual indignation; which cncreased afterward by their threatening of war, at such time as the Carthaginians distracted with other discords, and thereby not able to withstand them, lost Sardinia. Whereupon, Amilear incensed with a new indignation, had an intention to make war upon them, many years before Hannibal passed into Italy. These were the causes of the war: but the beginnings of it were afterward the siege of Saguntum: and Hannibal's passing over the River Hiber. So you see, the beginnings were not at the same time; but were long before preceded by the causes.  
To roturne now to our purpose, concerning the alteration of States: it is seldom seen, that the cause and the beginning happen both at one time. The cause that moved Caesar, to change the State in Rome; was an impatience of equality; which being borne and bred with him, was hastened in him, by the threatening of his enemies, pressing him to give over his Consulship, and to give an account of what he had done; a thing of great difficulty and danger in Commonwealths, as was seen in the case of Scipio, of Furius Camillus, and others. But the beginning was his passing over the river Rubicon. So likewise the change which the Israelites made in the time of Samuel, from Judges to Kings; had a beginning divers from the cause; there being in their hearts sometime before a desire of Kings, through an impatience of liberty, (as writers hold) which afterward took beginning from the injustice of the sons of Samuel.  
The cause then that Rome came to be a free State, was Romulus, and the Citizens growing to perfection. Romulus, because he being sole King, made such laws and ordinances in the State, that showed he had more regard to prepare the Romans for liberty, then to establish the Monarchy to his successors: seeing he reserved to himself no other authority but to assemble the Senate; nor other charge but to command the Army in time of war. It may be said then, that either Romulus showed but small sign of wisdom, to make ordinances contrary to himself; whereof being afterward aware, he meant with a greater error, to take from the Senate that authority, which being now established, was soon after, the cause of his death. Or we may say, and better, that Romulus as having no children, had no desire to leave Rome under a Regal government; and the City having none in it, but imperfect men, he had no power to leave it a free State; until by being governed first by one alone, they should learn to be able of themselves to hold that, which to come to know, they needed first, to be guided by a King. Just as swimming masters use to do; who bear a hand over them they teach, until such time as they grow able to govern themselves; and then they leave them at their own liberty. This made Tiberius (as Dion reports) praise Augustus so much: though not without flattcry: saying, he had imitated those Physicians, who barring their Patient, the ordering of his own body; they first restore the Body to health, before they allow him the ordering of it. Insomuch, that after the death of Romulus, the people not yet grown to perfection, there was not one man that once spoke of liberty; but all agreed to desire a King. Regem tamen omnes volebant (saith Livy) libertatis dulcedine nondum experta. It was not thus at the time of the Tarquins; for the people being then grown to perfection, there was in the City good store of Common wealth's men; fitter to govern, then to be governed. And so came up this government most agreeable to nature; which is (as the Philosopher saith) that he be commander of others who is wiser than others. And therefore Numa Pompilius needed no guard to safeguard his life; seeing governments that are natural, are a guard to themselves. From hence it was, that our Lord God, the first time he gave a King, (as the holy Scripture saith) Non erat similis ei in Israel; meaning to show, that he is not worthy to be ruler over others, who is not wiser than others. There being then in those times, such excellent men in the City of Rome, as aught rather to give then to take laws from the Tarquin's; they had in them, an ardent desire, to obtain that liberty in possession, which they had now prevented with merit. And therefore it appears, that Junius Brutus, even from his youth, had this intention: for going with the sons of Tarquin to the Oracle, to ask which of them should be Lord of Rome, and the Oracle answering; he that first should kiss his mother, he presently kissed the Earth; and yet he knew not then, that Tarquin should ravish Lucretia. Now if this injury only had been the motive to Brutus, certainly then, as the injury came from a particular person; so the revenge should rather have been taken upon that particular person, then upon the power Regal; and yet we see the contrary happened: for Brutus in the oath which he caused his confederates to take, made this one part, not to suffer any to reign; not only not the Tarquin's, but not any other person whatsoever. Nec illos nec alium quemquam regnare Romae passurum. A manifest argument, that he had more desire, to abrogate the regal Power, then to vindicate the adultery. So much more, as the conspirators addressed themselves against the dignity rather than against the life of the offender. The cause then of this alteration in the state of Rome, was the Citizen's spirits being grown to such perfection, that they could no longer tolerate Kings: and this no sooner than they were arrived at such perfection. In sign whereof, I consider amongst so many Kings as Rome had; how only Tully Ostillus, the predecessor of Tarqvinius superbus, had the intention to make it a free state, which certainly had taken effect, if his death had not prevented it. Ac tam moderatum Imperium, tamen quia Vnius esset, deponere eum in animo habuisse, ni scelus liberandae patriae consilia agitanti interemisset. Which because we cannot ascribe to the only goodness of Tullus; seeing Numa Pompilius, a better man perhaps then he, never had any such thought: we must needs say, that Numa seeing the Citizens unfit for a republic, set them in a way to that perfection, to which arrived under Tullus. It should be an easy matter, for such Citizens to conserve that liberty, which under a good Prince they had received. And here experience shows that, which Aristotle speaking naturally, knew well in matters politic; for assigning the cause, why Power regal changeth oftentimes to a free State, he allegeth no other reason, but the passing from imperfection to perfection: saying thus, Sed cum postea contingeret, ut plures pari virtute reperirentur, non amplius tolerarunt Regem; sed commune quiddam quaerentes, respublicas constituêre.  
Moreover, that the ordinances of Romulus had not been sufficient, if with it there had not concurred a perfection in the Citizens; will be easily conceived, if we consider the case of Moses who was blamed by Jethro for ruling himself alone: I do not believe it was, for that he did not judge well; or for that, he took too great pains: but rather, for that he showed not to be more intentive to strengthen his own power, then to prepare for others the goodway; of which this was the chief and first foundation; Vt non aliter ratio constet quam si uni reddatur. And therefore, he appointed them a Senate, which by their authority, might serve to set the people in a way to know their own good; showing them the way, with which being once acquainted, he might leave them afterward to walk in it of themselves: in such sort, that Moses no less than Romulus directed the Israelites the way to liberty; but they, never attaining to know the way, as never coming (I speak not in matters of Religion) to that perfection, to which the Romans attained: as these could not endure Kings; so those had no will to live in liberty; for although they met with the same cause, extrinsecall; yet they had not the same cause, intrinsecall; which Moses well knew, when perceiving his death to approach, he made his prayer to God, that he would provide them a leader, to the end, that as sheep not knowing the way, if it be not showed them by a shepherd, they might be by him directed. Provideat Dominus Deus spirituum, omnis carnis, hominem qui sit super multitudinem hanc; ut possit exire & intrare ante ●…os, vel introducere, ne sint sicut oves sine ductore. And he that will more plainly see their imperfection, let him consider, that in the long absence of Moses, they never demanded any other leader; there being none amongst them sit to govern them; but only desired, that Aaron would make some Gods, Facnobis Deos qui nos pracedant. Whereupon for all the many beginnings the Israelites had, from which they might have taken occasion, to erect a Commonwealth; yet they never did it: because as causes be not sufficient, if with them there concur not beginnings; so beginnings a●…e of no force, if they come not accompanied with causes; and causes availenot neither, if they be not good. The death of Caesar was a beginning from which a Common wealth might have been erected; but because it was grounded upon a cause that was not political, proceeding rather from the hatred and spleen against the Prince, then upon any mature judgement, or judicious counsel; it was not therefore sit, to bring them to a be free State. So when the Senators killed Romulus; they had by that a beginning of liberty: but it happening upon the same occasion, as that of Caesar, they hardly had so much brain to agree among themselves to choose a King. So as when there concur not causes, beginnings oftentimes are left unpursued: that I cannot but say, if Lucretia had been ●…avished by Romulus; yet Rome for all that had never gotten liberty. It behoves therefore to take great heed, when there be occasions first, not to give the least cause of a beginning: and therefore the Ifra●…, being moved to demand a King, upon a very great occasion, namely their unfitness to suffer liberty; they took for a beginning a most weak cause, namely the old age of Samuel; and yet for all he could do, in showing them the burtheus of tyranny; telling them as a Prophet, that instead of a King, they, should have a tyrant; he could never persuade them to leave demanding a King. And therefore David, after his great sin, knowing he had given the people great cause to rebel, avoided all occasions, from which they might take never so weak a beginning; and for this cause forbore to punish Joab, though provoked to it by just indignation; and left the revenge of it, to his successor. Whereupon we may believe, that Tarqvinius Superbus, and his son showed little discretion, seeing so many worthy men desirous of liberty; that they would give them occasion of beginning it: The one by taking away all authority from the Senate; and other, and that more heinously, by ravishing Lucretia: considering that the insolency of the sons, makes always the Prince himself odious, as Guicciardine relates of John Bentivoglio. And hereof we have a like example in the holy Scripture, of Hemor Hevaeus Prince of the Sichemites; who lost his Kingdom, through the ravishment his son Sichem committed upon Dyna the daughter of Jacob and Lea: whereof the holy text in Genesis saith; Egressa est autem Dyna filia Leae ut videret mulieres regionis illius; quam cum vidisset Sichem filius Hemor Hevaei, Princeps terrae illius, adamavit eam, & rapuit, & dormivit cum illa; vi opprimens virginem: and in the end of the Chapter, Arreptis duo filii Jacob Simeon & Levi, patris Dynae gladiis; Ingressi sunt urbem considenter: Interfectisque omnibus masculis Emor & Sichem pariter necaverunt; & depopulati sunt urbem in ultionem stupri. Thus the cause which gave the Romans occasion of a beginning, if we consider it of the son's part, may be conceived to be this; that he was the first, that had ancestors in such height of greatness; a thing that commonly puffes up men, and makes them proud; as Galba said speaking of Nero, Si ante oculos Nero, quem longa C●…sarum serie tumeutem; and therefore the first that arrive to any height of greatness; they always endeavour to shun contempt; but their successors, while they give themselves to pleasures, in that very time, they make themselves contemptible; and give occasion to others to oppress them. Which Aristotle expressly teacheth us, where he saith, Plerique eorum qui Dominationes adepti sunt, eas usque ad extremum conservaverunt; sed qui ab illis susceperunt, confestim ut ita dixerim, perierunt omnes; in voluptatibus enim viventes efficiantur facile contemnendi; ac multas perhibent occasiones opprimendi sui. This was the very cause of altering the Principality of the Acheans (as Polybius relates) for that Principality having had beginning in the virtues of Tisamenes, the son of Orestes; It had ending in the vices of the successors of Ligius, Postea vero molest far Regnum coeperunt, quia filii ligii non jam legitime, sed per Tyramtidem Provinciam gubernarent.  
And this is so true, as both Aristotle affirms, and is confirmed by experience; that the first purchasers of a power, do for the most part maintain it; and that in their successors it commonly vanisheth; that I cannot choose but make a little digression, to show the reasons of it: The first is, because they who acquire any thing with labour, account and love it as an issue of their own: and therefore use as much diligence in keeping it, as they took pains in getting it; from whence it is, as Plato intimates, that those men are commonly the greatest lovers of riches, who by their own industry have been the getters: and therefore our Lord God in Esay, promising infinite contentments and exaltations to his people, in giving the reason of this so great happiness; he saith, Dominabitur ●…ui qui fecit te. A second reason, and perhaps a better is, because they who first acquire an estate, must needs do it by way of some eminency; either of subtlety, or wit, or force, or such like; wherein excelling others, they show themselves in that kind, to be more virtuous than others, as Aristotle in the first of his Politics saith; that to overcome, is not without virtue; and seeing Empires are easily kept by those arts, by which they are acquired, Nam Imperi●… facile iis artibus retinetur, (saith Sallust) quibus à principio partumest; it will be an easy matter, for him that hath acquired it, seeing he must necessarily acquire it by way of virtue, by the same way to maintain it. Whereas his successors very seldom succeed him in virtue; and easily lose that, for the getting whereof, they have taken no pains. A third reason is, because he who riseth first to a power, contents himself with every little authority; as Aristotle saith, Contigit autem hoc maxim, post mutationes rerum publicarum: Non nine statim mutantur; sed contenti sunt ab initio homines, parva concessione potentiae: Whereupon it ought not to seem strange; but rather it is ascribed to the Prince, for a great favour, that which oftentimes he grants for his own security; and all that, wherein one hath more power than others, yet arrogates no more to himself then others; is received of subjects, as so much given them. Where the successors commonly have more pride and less virtue, than their predecessors: and think not themselves Princess, if they raise not their own authority by depressing of others; as Hieronymus did in Syracuse; and as feroboane when he said, Grossior est minimus digitus meus, dorso patris mei. And this is so much more distasteful to subjects, to see themselves more restrained by him, that hath less worthiness; that it seems to invite them to conspiracies; as to the one, and the other of those before mentioned, it happened. A fourth and last reason is, because those men who come newly to a power, are commonly suspicious of losing it again; and therefore doubting their own children, they are contented to see them plunged in vices; and estranged from the love of the subjects; whereupon, they coming afterward to the Principality, cannot choose but run a hazard.  
But to return from whence I digressed; the cause why Tarqvinius used such cruelty to the Senate, which made them so much desire liberty; was in my opinion, because Ancus Martius was preferred before him; and thereupon conceiving great indignation against the Senators & people; & coming afterward to the government; he meant to be revenged upon them with bridling them a little. And such men should never be made Emperors, as from whom there can be nothing expected, but effects of cruelty. An instruction which Cornelius Tacitus gives us; while discoursing of the causes, why the Romans speaking of a successor to Augustus by reason of his approaching death, would not have Agrippa Postbumus, mentions this as the chief, Trucem Agrippam & Ignominia accensum: For Tiberius being preferred before him in the life-time of Augustus; and having suffered banishment in the Island of Pianosa; he was full of spleen and indignation; which no doubt he would have showed, if he had ever come to be Emperor. For this very cause also Otho misliked the election which Galba made, and was doubtful of Piso; Ingenio trucem, & longo exilio efferatum.  
The Beginning then of the change of government in Rome, to speak as a Politician, was the lasciviousness of Lucius Tarquin; and the pride of his father: but the causes were, the ordinances of Romulus, and the perfection of the Citizens.  
But to speak of the causes as a Philosopher; we may assign two; answerable to that which Aristotle relates to have been the opinion of Plato; one from the influence of the Heavens, the other from numbers. As for the first of these; by reason of the uncertainty of the years, and perhaps of the Art, I take not upon me, with any probability to discourse; and therefore passing to the other, which is number: Plato saith, that the number of seven, hath great operation in the changes of Commonwealths, which may first be observed in the Commonwealth of our body; wherein from seven to seven there is a contival change; and there want not examples hereof in all kinds of government; as we may see in Esay, in feromy, in Damel, in Saint Matthew, in the Sabbatisme, in the Monarchy of Cain, & in so many other places; that we must needs believe this number to bear a great sway in changes generally, as by others before me hath been observed; yet considering it as to my purpose, it hath not perhaps by any been observed but now by myself, that to the foresaid causes of the change of government in Rome, this of the number of seven may also be added, seeing after seven Kings, (as every one knows) it came to be a free state; yet I mean not that numbers can enforce, but only incline, as instruments of that Almighty God, who Omnia posuit innumero, pondere & Mensura.   

A Parallel between the conspiracy of Marcus Brutus against Caesar, and that of Lucius Brutus against Tarquin: whereby we may see why the one brought in liberty; the other, tyranny. The third Discourse.  
HAving showed Rome at last came to be a free state, by means of the conspiracy of Lucius Brutus against the Tarquin's; I conceive it necessary to examine, why the conspiracy of Marcus Brutus against Caesar, having been moved with the same intention, yet wrought not the same effect; and no better way to come to know it, then by comparing them together.  
Many things are wont to concur in favour of an action; whereof some are antecedents, and give it as it were birth; other are concomitant, and give it nourishment; others again are subsequent, and procure it strength.  
The action of Brutus in kill Tarquin, was aided by the three foresaid things, to make Rome a free state; First the ordinances of Romulus, which tended rather to bring in liberty, then to preserve a Monarchy: then the aptness of the Citizens, who now grown fit of themselves to govern, could no longer endure to be governed by others; and lastly the insolency and proud tyranny of Tarquin, so extremely distasteful to all the Citizens. Thus Romulus set them in a way; the perfection of the Citizens made them fit; and the insolency of the Tarquin's made them desirous. Now if we look upon the action of Marcus Brutus in killing Caesar; we shall find there were all the three causes too; but because they were contrary, they therefore brought forth a contrary effect. The first was the domination of Cinna, of Sylla, of Pompey and of Marcus Crassus: who set the City in a way, and made it pliant to tolerate Monarchy. The second was the imperfection of the Citizens, which was grown so great, that where Rome had sometimes been a City much honoured for virtue; it was now become through evil custom, most abominable. Thirdly, there concurred the great clemency and goodness of Caesar; with which he had gotten and tied unto him the hearts of the people; so as, instead of the ordinances of Romulus, to set them in a way of liberty; there preceded here the ways of Marius and others, to lead them into servitude. In stead of perfection of the Citizens, which made them fit to live a free people; there concurred here imperfection, which made them good for nothing but to live in bondage; and where in the one there concurred the cruelty and Pride of the Tarquin's, to make them desire liberty; in the other, there concurred the affability and clemency of Caesar, to make them content with servitude.  
Now again if we come to speak of the causes concomitant, there were three things concurred in aid of the conspiracy against the Tarquins. First, the ravishing of Lucretia; sufficient of itself, as a public injury, to cause a public insurrection. And therefore Virginius speaking against Appius Claudius, who would have ravished his daughter, said to the people, with a purpose to set them in commotion; Illis enim quoque filias, sorores, conjuges esse; sed quo impunitior sit, eo effraenatiorem fore, aliena calamitate documentum datum illis cavendae similis injuriae. Secondly, the just indignation of Lucius Brutus against Tarqvinius. Thirdly, his acquainting the people with his intention: letting them know the causes that moved him; and so, they having a part in the conspiracy, could not choose but approve it; and having a part in the danger, not choose but maintain it. Thus the adultery committed with Lucretia, gave a colour to the conspiracy: the just indignation of Lucius Brutus, set a gloss upon the Author; the communicating it to the people, made them a party in the cause, and facilitated the action. Now in the fact of Marcus Brutus against Caesar, there concurred the many favours and graces which the Prince had always showed to all; the many benefits which Marcus Brutus had received, the murder committed in the Senate, without the people's knowledge; and where the ravishing of Lucretia; gave a colour to the banishing of the Tarquins; the favours of Caesar discovered the ill intention of the conspirators; and where in the one, the offence done to Lucius Brutus, set a gloss of praise upon the author: in the other, the benefits bestowed by Caesar, set a blot of ignominy upon Marcus Brutus, and made him hateful to all the people: and where the Commons being made partakers of the conspiracy against the Tarquins, conceived it was done for the public good; here the Commons knowing nothing of the matter, conceived it was done for private profit. Lastly, if we look to the things subsequent; we shall also in them find great contrariety. For after the death of the Tarquins, first, there followed an easing the people of taxations; and a maintaining them in plenty, to the end they might taste the benefit of liberty; secondly, they put to death those Noblemen, that had been adherents to the Tarquin's; to the end they might be made sure for making innovation. Thirdly, they extinguished the whole race of the Tarquins, to the end they might be out of fear, of the States ever coming to any of them again. And thus they secured themselves from the people, from the Nobility, and from the blood Royal. Now after the death of Caesar, all things were clean contrary: First, where in that case, the benefit of liberty was made appear to the people: Here Antonius with a most eloquent Oration, reading Caesar's Will, wherein he had given a great Donative to the people; made them sensible, how much more it would be for their profit to have a Prince. Secondly, where in that case, the partakers were all put to death; here, they were all left living. Thirdly, where in that case, there were Armies levied against the line of the Tarquin's; to the end, they might never be able to recover the government: here, Armies were levied in aid of Augustus, to the end, he might more easily make himself Prince. Let no man therefore marvel, if where the intention was equal, yet the success was not equal; by reason of the difference, and inequa lity of the accidents. I have omitted in this discourse some other differences, that were between these two conspiracies; meaning to speak of them in another place.   

Pompeii Crassique Potentia cito in Caesarem, Lepidi atque Antonii arma in Augustum cessere.  
That the power of a few cannot consist in any number better than in three. The fourth Discourse.  
THe Commonwealth of Rome, leaving the government of one, and passing by the number of two, where it stayed a while under Marius and Sylla; settled at last in the number of three: the first time under Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey; the second time, under Anthony, Lepidus and Augustus. Which how much better it was, then to have stayed in two; every one may know, that will but consider, either Philosophically, or Theologically, or Politically, what great force there is in the number of three, for the conservation and union of things. Indeed Aristotle had no better way to show the necessity of the Materia Prima, than this; seeing there being a form and a privation which are two; it was never possible they should be united together, but in a third: in which, and by which they might be conjoined. Also the school of Theophrastus, contented not itself, to deliver for Principles, Radical moisture, and Natural heat; knowing, that two alone are destructive; but he added a third; that is, salt and cold, and dry; to the end, that with cold he might associate Radical moisture; and with the dry, Natural heat; and consequently make a perfect union of the three, that is Salt, Sulphur, and Mercury. It is therefore no marvel, if Divines also make a Trinity in the Deity, not only a Father and a Son, but also a Holy Ghost: who (as many of them say) unites the Father with the Son; and it is very convenient, that from that Essence which is one, there should come three, a child of unity. Again, if we examine it Politically why three should be conservative; we shall find it manifest of itself; because if one of the three should aspire to be sole Prince; presently the other two would join and oppose, and utterly frustrate his design. And if two of the three should grow at variance, the third would either by interposing reconcile them; or standing neuter, as only a looker on, they would grow friends of themselves; for fear least the other should reap the benefit of their victory. And therefore Aristotle found fault with Plato for making a Commonwealth to consist of only Prince and People, and consequently of only two forms: saying it had been much better, to have made it to consist of three; which yet to many seems a Paradox; because as multiplying of good, makes a more good; so multiplying of evil, makes always a more evil. And why then would he rather have three corruptions then two? for no other cause as I conceive, but that he would plainly show he knew the number of three to be conservative; and the number of two, destructive; there being nothing that more ruins Cities, then to be divided into two without a third; as Aristotle in many places shows: and praising that City for the best, which is full of middling sorts of men; for no other cause, but because there are in it the three; that is, rich, poor, and of a middling rank; and shows that where these are not, it is impossible a City should continue. To come then to a Monarchy, it was of necessity, that the number of three should be destroyed; and to destroy three, It was of necessity, either by increasing it to bring it to four; or by abating it, to bring it to two; just as the apostate Lucifer, would have done to divide and destroy the heavenly Monarchy; when leaving the circumference founded upon the divine Centre, he framed another higher Circle founded upon the centre of himself, bringing the one to two; which because it could not continue, he was therefore cast into Hell: where seeking again to destroy the Divine Monarchy, by bringing it to two; he persuaded Eve to eat the forbidden fruit. We may say then, that as long as the number of three stood firm in Crassus, Caesar, and Pompey, So long the government came not to be a Monarchy; but as soon as Crassus died, and that the number came from three to two, there presently grew dissension between Caesar and Pompey, till Caesar at last made himself sole Emperor. Likewise in the Triumvirate of Augustus, none of them was so hardy as once to stir: but Lepidus being gone out of the three, there fell discord between Mark Anthony and Augustus; who by the death of the other, remained sole Emperor. It is therefore no marvel that the Jews, seeing the government of Judges was to come to two, under the sons of Samuel, demanded a King; considering that two and four which proceeds from the same root, is no less a child of the devil; then three and one which is the root of it, is the child of God. And therefore God blessed not the second day; and in the creation, the Holy Ghost by the mouth of Moses, makes mention of three things; the Heaven, the Earth, and the waters. Which perhaps moved Plato in his Timaeus, to make three Elements, three and one being union; two and four, dis-union.   

Cuncta Discordiis civilibus fessa, nomine Principis subimperium accepit.  
Of what kind of Discord the Author intends to speak. The fifth Discourse:  
BEing by occasion of this passage, of necessity to speak of discords; and oftentimes to commend them, though with some distinction: I cannot omit to explain my meaning; which is, that where I affirm, discords fit to be fomented; I mean always amongst the enemies of the Christian faith; amongst whom discords are of such benefit, that the Prophet Abacuch in express terms saith: Fluvios scindes terrae; which S. Hierome expounding saith, Reges terrae adversum populum tuum dimicantes divides & disperges. For in holy Scripture, by Rivers oftentimes are meant Kings: because as rivers watering the fields in fit time and place, make them fruitful; or otherways with unseasonable overflowing, destroy them: so Kings with the sweetness of justice, increase; or otherwise, with unmeasurable cruelty, overthrew the Kingdom. The Prophet therefore desires, that the Princes of the Earth may be divided, meaning such Princes, as make a God of earthly things; to the end, that by such division, they may more easily be overthrown: there being nothing more hurtful, not only to the good, but even to the wicked themselves, than the concord of the wicked. As S. Austin declares it, where he saith, Sicut multum nocet discordia inter bonos; ita valde dolendum est, quando mali pacifice vivunt; quando vero discordant, tunc mundus aliqualiter tranquillatur: Nam sicut concordia malorum contraria est concordiae bonorum; ita optandum est, quod boni pacem habeant, & mali discordes sint: nam per discordiam, mali aliquando optimi efficiuntur; cognoscentes quid sint, & quid erunt. From these words it may be clearly gathered, that it is as great a good to put discord between the wicked, as to preserve union between the good: and therefore Abraham in his Sacrifice, divided the Goat and the Ram, but the Turtledove and the Pigeon he divided not: of which Saint Austin speaking saith; that by this, the Holy Ghost would intimate, that carnal men should be divided between themselves: but good and spiritual men should be kept in unity: of whom the Prophet Esay speaking, after he had said, Et fluent ad eum omnes gentes he adds, Non exercebuntur ultra ad praelium: as if he would say, that between the good, there shall be always peace. And therefore the Dove returning into the Ark, brought in her mouth an Olive branch; to show, that the peace between good men ought to be perpetual: as the leaves of the Olive which are never dry; or as the Oil which gets by time, not less perfection, but more purity. Let peace therefore be kept amongst the good, and let discord be raised amongst the wicked; imitating the discretion of Physicians, who divide and cut off corrupt members: but preserve and keep united, the sound. Whereupon our Lord God in S. Matthew, hath left written: Non veni mittere pacem, sed gladium: which place S. chrysostom expounding, saith: Quia videlicet praecipua singularisque Pax tunc praestatur; quando quod tabo vel sanie corruptum est abscinditur, at que projicitur, quando factiosa & improba pars repellitur aut omnino destruitur: sic certe coelis terra conjungi potest. Name & medicus hoc modo reliquum corpus conservat facile; si quod reduci ad sanitatem non potest, ceciderit atque abjecerit, & militiae Dux ad solvendam militum conspirationem, alterum in alterum concitat So did God in the Tower of Babel: So did S. Paul in the conspiracy plotted against him; and this may suffice for declaration of my meaning.  
Now as to our purpose; seeing discords may be divided into internal, & external: Internal, between Citizens of the same City: External, between one City & another: because it is a subject no less large than difficult; I will divide it into four discourses: In the frist, I will handle whether an external war with the enemies of the Christian faith, be the best means to hinder internal discords amongst Christians. In the second, in what manner, and at what time discords should be raised with the enemies of our faith, for our most advantage. The third shall show, what discords they are, that serve to uphold the forms of states. In the last I will show, that by reason of our imperfection, there is necessary a certain discord, which may be called a Concord.   

Whether an external war with the enemies of the faith, be the best means to hinder internal discords among Christians. The sixth Discourse.  
ARistotle in his Politics seems to think, that fear may be a great means to uphold Commonwealths; where he saith, Conservantur autem Respublicae non solum ex eo, quia procul sunt a periculis, sed etiam interdum, quia propinquae sunt; homines enim formidantes, vigilantius intendunt ad reipublicae custodiam: Itaque oportet eos, qui rempublicam salvam esse volunt, formidines quasdam ut caveant neque dissolvant, quasi nocturnam quandam custodiam reipublicas observationem. Whereupon, many are persuaded, that a foreign war is the only means to maintain peace at home. And Sallust having an eye to this, saith, Metus bostilis in bonis artibus civitatem retinebat And the Romans as long as they had Carthage for an opposite, were free all that while from civil war; and therefore Scipio Nasica, accounted the wisest man of his time, and as such chosen by the City, to have the keeping of the Mother of the Gods in his house, as the Oracle had commanded; gave counsel that by no means Carthage should be destroyed, Timens inf●… animis (saith S. Austin) hostem securitatem: & tanquam pupillis civibus tutorem necessarium videns esse Terrorem: and in a manner with the same words hath Livy intimated the same conceit, Disciplina erat custos infirmitatis, qua inter validiores optime Timor continet. And therefore the Athenians (as Plato relates) never attained to greater perfection, then when the Persians assailed Greece. But yet this Rule, as many other in the Politics, though it be sometimes good; yet is not to be trusted always and in general: for a Politician in this case must do as a Physician: apply to one complexion one medicine; and to another, a divers; and oftentimes to the same Patient; in diversity of diseases, diversity of medicines: and more than this, to the same Patient in the same disease, apply divers medicines according to diversity of times. And therefore Vindicianus the Physician (as S. Austin relates) having given a medicine to a sick friend of his, at that time it healed him; but after some years the same man falling again into the same disease; and using, without farther counsel of his Physician, the former medicine, it did him no good; whereat marveling and ask Vindicianus the cause, he answered, Quod non intellexerat videlicet●… illi aetati jam non hoc se fuisse facturum: and the reason is, because we must not so much consider, that the person which useth the medicine is the same; as that the time is divers; and if the diversity of time be of so great moment; of what moment is the diversity of individuals? We may therefore conclude with Aristotle in many places of his Ethics; that in things belonging to particulars, there cannot be given any Rule universal.  
I will therefore distinguish men, and consequently Cities; seeing Cities are nothing else, but a communion of men assembled together to live well, as the Philosopher defines them: afterward, I will divide the times: and lastly, the forms of states.  
Of men, some are quiet, some turbulent, some addicted to Merchandise, some to study: so of Cities, whether by any power of the Air, or of the influence of the stars, some one is full of sharp wits, fit for merchandizing; others of stout spirits, fit for Arms: some have ordinances which lead them in a way of peace; others, of war: sometimes they are both by nature and art of so strong a situation, that in regard of their difficulty to be assaulted, they are altogether careless of Military profession.  
In this last case, it will be an easy matter to maintain peace at home, to which they are either called by nature, or aided by art; and especially if the inhabitants shall give themselves to such exercises, which keep men from dissensions. But if the Citizens be of stout natures and imperfect, (I mean not in essence; for I well know by divinity, that every creature, in its essence is perfect,) it will then be necessary there should be fear: and this S. Austin meant when he said, Infirmis animis hostem securitatem: and there is good reason for it; for if they fear to be overcome of an Enemy, they will strive to overcome their own will; and take for a master, the fear of virtue. And therefore our Lord God, when he gave Joshua the Land of Promise; as he had promised to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob: yet he destroyed not all enemies, but left a part of the Land in the power of the Philistines: and others, mentioned in the Book of Joshua; and this he did, as knowing that the Imperfection of that people, whom the Holy Ghost by the mouth of Moses, calls Gens durae cervicis; could not better be upheld and kept, then by the fear of enemies. And this the Holy Ghost expresseth likewise in the book of Judges; where speaking of those Nations which remained in the Land of Promise, he saith, Hae sunt Gentes, quas dereliquit Dominus ut erudiret in eyes Israelem. It is therefore no marvel, that our Lord God, knowing the weakness of Ada●…, as soon as he saw him fall into the imperfection of sin; to the end he should not commit the like error again, presently put him in the midst of discords and enmities: when he said to the serpent, Inimicitias ponam inter te & mulierem, & semen tuum & semen illius: and for this cause it is, that he hath left to the Catholic Church so great adversaries, as himself expresseth in S. Matthew; In sign whereof, he would not suffer the servants to pull up the Tares, but would have them to be let to grow with the Corn; lest plucking up the one, they should withal root out the other. Now for those Cities, where the Citizens are given to merchandise, they by all means aught to shun war, as being things of very different nature, to stand in the shadow writing Bills of account; and to endure heat and cold, fight in the field; as S. Thomas teacheth us where he saith, Est otiam Negotiationis usus contrarius quamplurimum exercitio Militari; Negotiatores onim dum umbram colunt, a laboribus vacant; & dum fruuntur delitiis, molleseunt aninto; & corpora redduntur debilia ad labores Militares inepta.  
But if Cities be so form with Laws, that they have better means to make resistance in war, then to conserve themselves in Peace; in this case, it will be necessary to have war with foreign Nations, to maintain peace in their own Nation; otherwise it will run a manifest hazard to be ruined, as it happened to the Lacedæmonians, of whom Aristotle saith, Ad partem enim virtutis tota ordinatio illarum legum contendit, scilicet Bellicam; haec autem utilis ad victoriam consequendam; Itaque salvi erant bellum gerentes; peribant vero, rerum potiti; quoniam nec oti●…n agere, nec quicquam aliud exercere sciebant praestabilius, quam rem Militarem. And therefore the City of Rome which was form by Laws and Ordinances, to enlarge itself, and grow greater by war; no sooner laid down Arms with Enemies, but it took them up with friends; that having none at last with whom to contend, it contended with itself; and became overthrown by its own forces. And therefore Livy saith, Nulla magna civitas diu quiescere potest; si foris hostem non habet, domi invenit, ut praevalida corpora ab externis causis tuta videntur, sed suis ipsa viribus onerantur. But if they have Laws and Ordinances to live in peace, their best course is to hold them to peace.  
The second division we brought before, was of times; which may be divided into two: One, wherein war hath been but of late: the other, wherein peace hath been long: if peace hath been long, why should we take any other course, and not continue peace still? but if our case be the former, it will then be ne cessary to maintain at least some face of war; be cause as all habits whether of body or mind, are hard to be left; so spirits once grown fierce with war, when they want means to exercise their fierceness upon enemies with honour, will hardly be kept from using it upon friends though with shame. Thus it fell out (that I may keep me to Tacitus) amongst the Suevians and the Cherusci, people of Germany; who after the departure of the Romans, being secure from foreign enemies, they then, out of the custom of waging war, and desire of glory, turned their Arms upon their friends at home: and therefore Tacitus saith, Sed Suevi praetendebantur auxilium adversus Cheruscos orantes; nam discessis Romanorum, ac vacui externo metu, gentis adsuetudine, & tunc aemulatione Gloriae, arma in se verterant. So the Romans most stout and warlike from the time of Scipio Nasica until the birth of our Saviour, being in a manner quiet abroad, were in continual war at home; and the peace which they came to at last was under a Prince; where of Tacitus saith, Post haec Pax quidem, sed cruenta: because it was under Augustus, who finding the City tired with discords, made himself sole Lord: whereupon S. Austin speaking of those times saith, Eaque libido dominandi quae inter alia vitia generis humani immoderatior inerat Populo Romano postquam in paucis potentioribus vicit, obtritos fatigatosque caeteros etiam jugo servitutis oppressit. And this of may be rendered many causes: the first is, because in Cities used long to war, the people, at least great part having no other occupation, give themselves to be soldiers; and if they fail of that employment, they must necessarily either starve for want of victuals, or else stir up discords and seditions; that so under one side or other, they may get a living. Et ex civili praelio (saith Tacitus) Spem majorum praemiorum. Not being possible, that soldiers accustomed to gain by war, should be content with peace, as Dion excellently observed in Caesar; and therefore Livy saith, Mercenarii milites pretia militiae casura in Pace, aegrè ferebant. Whereupon Solomon, seeing that the greater part of his people having in David's time been accustomed to continual war, and had not any other trade of living, would of necessity be forced to die for hunger, he therefore, though now in peace, would not disband them, but kept them still in Arms; as it is written in the Book of the Kings; knowing there is nothing, that sooner makes men Rebel, then to have their Trade taken from them, by which they gain their living: and therefore when S. Paul spoke of destroying the Temple of Diana in Ephesus; those Silver-smithes who lived by making such Images, presently rose up in Arms, and were ready to have killed him. So also it was, when S. Paul healed the woman possessed; because Magnum quaestum faciebat Domino suo: from hence it is, that it will always be impossible to break the Uscocchis, from using piracy; seeing they have no other trade, by which to live. The second cause may be taken from the Nobility; who will easily be moved to raise discords in time of peace; by reason of a habit, which as it is produced by many Acts iterated, so it necessarily produceth iterated acts, and also by reason of that desire of greatness, which always accompanies the Nobility; and again, by reason of the scorn it takes at equality, and much more at servitude: which is so much harder to be endured, as superiors, in peace are harder to be dealt with. Revocante Nobilitate (saith Tacitus) cur in pace durius servitium?  
Having now divided Cities and Times; It remains, that we divide the forms of States: which as to our purpose are of three sorts; Monarchy, Optimacy, and Popular. The Commonwealth of the Optimates, either hath under it many Cities and Kingdoms, as Rome and Carthage had; and at this day, Venice hath; or they have but some few Cities, as the Athenians, the Spartans' and others: or lastly, they have but only one City; as Pisa in times past: and Lucca, and many free Cities at this present. The first form of Commonwealth, which is that which hath Kingdoms under it; either it useth to wage war with its own Arms, as the Romans; or with foreign Arms, as the Carthaginians: if it use and be able to wage war with its own Forces, then either we speak of war far off, as of the Romans with the Carthaginians; or of war in their own state, as of the Romans with the Tuscans. If the case be of war far off, waged with their own Forces, this will be the Treacle of civil discords. First, because those who are likely to move them, may under colour of honours, be sent to the wars abroad, and spirits that are warlike, are willing enough of themselves to go where there is fight, though without any such colour. Thus it was with the Romans, (as Livy relates) who sending forth the hottest spirits of their youth to the wars abroad, they in the mean time remained quiet in Rome. consuls educta ex urbe Juventute, tranquilliorem caeteram turbam fecerunt. And even by this way, not only all fear of civil discord will be taken away; which only proceeds from unquiet spirits; but also all suspicion of any rebellion in the subject Cities: as well because they will be weakened both in men and money, by levying Auxiliary soldiers: as also because they will be kept in awe by an Army in the field. But it must be here observed, that they make not then too dangerous a war, where their whole Forces must be employed, for then the subject people will be apt to rebel; as the Thuscanes, who seeing the Romans busied in a war with their whole Forces, they then fell to rebel.  
Now if we speak of a war near home, either it is some slight war, or else some war of moment. If but a slight war, it ought to be nourished with all endeavour; as the Romans did with the Genovese, making use of that war, as of a Military school; but if it be a war of moment, and near the State, it ought to be avoided by all means possible. The reason is, because the Cities that are subject to a Commonwealth, do all with an ill will bear their yoke: in confirmation whereof, Tacitus saith, Neque Provinciae illum rerum statum abnuebant. As long as Hannibal made his war far off from Rome, although he obtained many victories, yet not so much as any one Castle, (as Polybius relates) rebelled against Rome: but when he got his victory at Trasimene, and by consequence not far from Rome, all at once rebelled: and yet for all the overthrows they had had in Sicily, in the firm Land, and at Sea, they never made the least sign of revolt. The like happened to the Venetians, after the overthrow they received at Geradada. It is therefore no marvel, that Agathocles being besieged in Syracuse, and not able to endure the siege; when by reason of his tyranny every one rebelled against him: No marvel I say, that not able to endure the war in his own state, he removed it to the Carthaginians in Africa; as knowing, that City's subject to Commonwealths, do with an evil will endure their yoke: and his enterprise took effect as he desired. These Commonwealths therefore, by all means possible ought to shun a war near home.  
But where the custom is to wage war with foreign Arms; there all kind of war, whether near home, or far off, is to be shunned. Because mercenary Arms are insatiable, licentious, and for the most part, either they never finish a war; or once finished, they cannot be gotten away again, without destroying and making spoil in the Country. Or else with mutinies put the Cities in danger. It was a good invention, which Glisco General of the Carthaginian Army in afric used; after the war was ended with the Romans; for knowing the ill condition of a mercenary Army, he thought to send the soldiers home to Carthage, by little and little: in such sort, that the first might be gotten home to their own houses, before the others should recover the City; a judicious conceit, but which seldom takes effect: because oftentimes the soldiers perceive it, and will not be divided; as it happened with the Swissers in times past: and sometime, though they be divided, yet it hath no good issue: as it happened to the Carthagenians, whose Cities all at once rebelled; and Carthage itself was not far from losing. And in truth, they then perceived, how dangerous a thing it is, to wage war with mercenary forces; whereupon for this cause, when Scipio afterward came into afric; they knowing themselves to be no matches for the Romans, to be able to wage war at their own home, Suant plebem imbellem in urbe (saith Livy) Imbellem in agris esse, mercede parari auxilia. These Commonwealths therefore ought rather to keep themselves from discord, by employing their Citizens in merchandising, in governments and Offices, and by not suffering the quiet spirits to grow turbulent, north turbulent to stay in Cities, where the people ought to be kept without Arms: Imitating herein, the Carthagenians rather then the Romans.  
Now if we come to speak of those Common wealths, that have but few, or but one City under them; in this case they ought by all possible means to seek to preserve peace, as the Swissers, the Lucchesi, and such others do, being very obnoxious for such, to become a prey to the more potent, as it hath always happened to the Athenians, to the Lacedæmonians, and the Genovesis. From hence it is, that the King of France, to preserve the Commonwealth of the Swissers, hath always procured to quench that fire, which some have endeavoured to kindle for their ruin. And if any object, that the Commonwealth of Rome, when it was yet but little, not only maintained itself, but grew greater by the means of war; I answer, that in that time the States in Italy were not great, as now they are; and from hence may be drawn a reason, why the Athenians, and the Lacedæmonians were never able to get further than their first bounds, without endangering their state; and Rome was able to make itself Lord of a great part of the World; and it is, because the one were environed with two mighty adversaries; the other, with many, but weak ones.  
Lastly, to give a general rule; all those Commonwealths whose ordinances tend rather to conservation then augmentation; aught to use any other means to keep themselves from discords at home, rather than war.  
It remains to speak of a Kingdom, which is either settled and natural; or else dangerous and new: if we speak of that which is natural, I account that to live in peace as well abroad as at home, is both necessary and easy, especially in our times, wherein Cities and Kingdoms are without the least blemish of tyranny, all governed by Princes just and pious: and this the rather ought to be done, because in peace, the wits of men are cultivated; their manners refined, good Arts flourish, merchandising is less dangerous, and plenty of all things easily maintained. And therefore in Esay it is said, Conflabunt glaclios suos in vomeres; which means nothing else, but that peace causeth the earth to be manured, and riches easily to be increased. Whereupon the Ancients feigned, that the God of riches was nursed by peace.  
Now to Kingdoms that are new, and not well settled, every thing is dangerous, whether it be of peace or war; but war, perhaps less; as bringing with it but one danger: which is, that the Army being in the hand of a General, the Empire seems to be in his power. As Tiberius doubted, that Germanicus potius vellet accipere quam expectare Imperium. But than it brings with it many benefits, not only in favour of the Prince, but of the subjects also. On the Prince's behalf, because he by sending forth to the wars, the most potent and stout spirits, may himself in the mean time remain secure at home. And therefore King Ferdinand kept always some little war abroad, to the end the Nobility should not mutiny in Spain. And Henry the second had counsel given him to keep the French busied in some war, to the end they might not mutiny in France. And this rule ought always to be observed, where the people have not lost their stoutness of courage. On the Subject's behalf, because while such stout spirits live in peace; they are apt to seek, as having no other means, their own security, by the death of the Citizens. And this Tacitus means, where in the first of his Histories he saith, Sub Tiberio & Caio & Claudio tantum pauci adversa pertimuere. Again, it is well that cruel men, such as tyrants use to be, to the end they may leave the Citizens in peace, should have war with strangers abroad, upon whom to wreak their cruelty. From whence it comes, that this race of men is more cruel in their age, then in their youth: and therefore oftentimes in the holy Scripture are likened to Lions; which, as Aristotle relates, in their old age enter into Cities and make spoil of people: and this proceeds (saith he) because through weakness of body, and defect of teeth, not being able in the fields to follow the chase after beasts; they enter into Cities, and prey upon men: so tyrants, when weakened with age, they can no longer quench their thirst of blood upon enemies in war; they then for exercise of their cruelty fall upon their friends in peace. So did Herod the great, and many others, of whom Histories are full.  
But to return to our purpose: peace after war is much more dangerous; because leisure gives time to think, thinking takes notice of subjection; and stoutness gotten in war, breeds a desire to free themselves by any bad way whatsoever. In regard of this, Solomon coming to be in Peace, after a long war which his father had, made many warlike expeditions, as appears in the Book of Kings: and to this it seems David exhorts, where in the Epithalamium he made, he saith, A●…cingere gladio tuo super f●…ntur tuum potentissime. Where it is to be noted, that Faemur oftentimes is taken for pleasures: as though he would say, Couple Arms with pleasures; stand not slumbering in idleness; so many writers interpret it: and perhaps in regard of this, Augustus would never be without some little war in Germany; rather for these reasons, quam cupidine proferendi Imperium vel istud ob praemium. And Tiberius upon the same ground, was well pleased that troubles should rise in the Eastern parts; Caeterum, saith Tacitus, Tiberio haud ingratunt accidit; turbari res orientis, ut ea specie Germanioum suetis legionibus abstraheret; novisque Provinciis impositum, dolo simul & casibus objectaret.  
Last; a Popular state ought always to procure peace; for if there be war, either the people go forth to fight; and then the Nobles in the mean time, will have means to change the state; or else the Noble men go, and then having an Army in their hand, they are able to make alterations at their pleasure. Whereupon Isocrates in his oration of peace saith, that a popular state is strengthened by peace, and by war, ruined.  
But having showed in this my discourse, that to many Commonwealths it is not good to have war: to the end I may not descent from that place in Aristotle alleged in the beginning, I now say, that Aristotle commends not fear as a thing fit always, but sometimes; and doth not specify what kind of fear it is ●…meanes. For understanding whereof, we must know, that Commonwealths oftentimes are endangered by too much security: as the City of Rome ran headlong into hazard, for want of fearing. Which useth to happen from two occasions: one from the inveterateness of the danger: the other, from the greatness and power of them that are offended. Rome at the time when it was freed from the tyranny of Tarqvinius was not great; and being near to danger, it stood in fear: being grown suspicious, partly for the father's name called Superbus; and partly for the son's house built higher than ordinary (weak causes God knows.) But when the City was grown into greatness; and forgot the danger by reason of inveterateness; it than left fearing, and afforded such beginnings; that gave Caesar advantage to bring it in subjection. So the Florentines extinguished the name of liberty in Pisa; and used great diligence at the beginning to prevent rebellion; as standing in fear, as well for the freslmesse of the offence, as for the smallness of their Forces: but after some years, Florence being grown greater, and the offence through time forgotten, they began to leave fearing; and as not fearing, rebelled under Charles the eighth, which was in a manner the ruin of Florence. Seeing then when Cities are without fear, they live without foresight; it is profitable for Commonwealths (as Aristotle in that text saith) that some such accident should happen, as may teach them the danger of security: and therefore the Rachiensi (as Polybius relates) while they lived inconsiderately, suspecting nothing; they were upon the point of losing their City to the Slavonians; but having repelled them; it was afterward a great good unto them, as that which made them stand in fear; Vt per negligent●…m in periculo fuerant & urbem & Patrios lares amitendi; per fortitudinem nihil mali perpessi, in posterum p●…ius suis rebus consul●…t. And in truth, if we consider the accident which of late years happened in Venice; the prudence with which those Senators managed that disorder, and the good ordinances made for preventing the like hereafter: we cannot but say with Aristotle, that the accident proved to the City of Venice, of great benefit. Lastly, I conclude, that they who will not be in war actually; at least let them make a show to be in it potentially; Ostendite modo bellum & pacem habebitis; videant vos paratos ad vim, jus ipsi remittent: and therefore Augustus was never without an Army, upon the frontiers of enemy Nations; and Solomon also did the like.  
Thus it stands sufficiently proved, when external discords, or to say better, foreign wars are profitable: that is, speaking of men and Cities, if they be turbulent and imperfect, and have laws tending to war; to such, they are profitable, or rather necessary. But if their laws be tending to peace; or if the people bemild and gentle, and by reason of their strong situation, accustomed to peace, or merchandising: in this case, there is no inconvenience, but they may live quictly and without war. Then as concerning times, we have showed, that in times when war hath been lately, it will do well; but not so, when there hath been long peace. Then as concerning states we have proved that Commonwealths that are potent, and able to wage war with their own Forces, shall do well to maintain a war far off, but not near home. But if they be not able to wage war without foreign Force●…, they shall then do well to embroil themselves with no war at all, either near or far off. And as for Commonwealths, that are but petty ones and of small power; it is best for them, to look to their own safety. Then for Kingdoms that are well settled, we have liked well of peace: for them that are dangerous, of war. Lastly, that a popular state take care how to live.   

What is the fittest time to proceed in the discords with enemies of the faith. The seventh Discourse:  
THis sentence of Tacitus standing good, Cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa, nomine Principis sub Imperium accepit: many grow to believe, that because discords made the way easy for Augustus to make himself Emperor of Rome, therefore every one may easily make advantage of the dissensions of others. But because they neither consider the diversity of persons, nor distinguish the times, nor are acquainted with the causes; they therefore oftentimes deceive themselves, determining these things absolutely and in gross, which are not to be admitted but with distinction. To find out therefore the truth in this matter, indeed weighty and worthy of consideration, I say, that discords may be either internal between Citizens, or external between Cities of one Province: if between Citizens, than sometimes they are between Nobles and Nobles, oftentimes between Nobles and Plebeians, and many times between Plebeians and Plebeians. If they be between Cities, it happens that sometimes they be equal, sometimes unequal; likewise he that aspires to be a Lord, either is a stranger, or Citizen: if a stranger, either he is stronger than the others, or weaker; and either he hath intelligence, or hath none: if a Citizen, either he is chief of a faction, or not.  
These heads I shall endeavour to examine; beginning with the stranger; who by civil discords aspires to make himself Lord; understanding by civil discords, not those only which are between Citizens of the same City, but between divers Cities of the same Province, as Plato understands them, where he saith, that if Grecians contended with Grecians, it was a sedition, and not a war; showing plainly, that such a one ought to be called a civil discord.  
I say then, (to return to my purpose) that such stranger, either hath intelligence with one part of the Citizens, or he hath not; if he have intelligence, then is the time: so did Germanicus, when he assaulted the Cattis, a people in Germany; Nam spes incesserat dissidere hostem in Segestem, & Arminium: whereupon, having Segestes on his side, it was an easy matter to prosper in his enterprise; and of such cases Histories are full.  
But if this stranger have no intelligence, either it is in the beginning of the discords; or when they are inveterate: and thereby one or other of the sides, wasted and spent; if it be the beginning, it will do no hurt, but good: so it happened to the Tuscans, and the Veientanes; so to the Athenians, while Agis approached their walls; so to the Sabines, and the Prenestines against the Romans. Of whom Livy saith, Nam in spe ventum erat, discordia intestina Rem Romanam dissolvi posse. But in truth it was but ill advised of them; and in such a manner, as while they sought the death of the sick Roman state; they applied a medicine that restored it to health. Whereupon Livy infers, Sed externus Timor maximum concordiae vinculum, quamvis infestos suspectosque jungobat inter se animos. And therefore Aristotle saith, Cogit enim in unum communis metus; etiam eos qui p rius erant inimicissimi. And this will the rather happen, if they be enemies naturally; either through long wars between them; or else through diversity of Ay re; which consequently produceth diversity of tempe ratures: from whence ariseth diversity of customs, and these would rather die a thousand deaths, then come to be in subjection to their enemies. Whereupon it was seen in the beginning of Charles the fifth; that while the Kingdom of Spain rose up in Arms, and strongly mutinied against their own King; France seeing it, and having recovered Navarre, brought their Army upon Spain, and presently they came to concord. The best way therefore will be, to take another course, (I mean always against infidels) which is, to let them waste themselves; imitating the worm which gnaws in wood in such sort, that afterwards it is easily broken; so discords should be fomented in enemies countries, that afterward more easily they may be overcome; but yet staying time, that the wood be first consumed, that so at one blow it may be broken. In regard whereof, David saith, Quasi tonerrimus ligni vermiculus qui octingentos interfecit, impetu uno: in as much, as having by little and little, and by secret ways weakened his enemies, he afterwards easily as wormeaten wood broke them at one blow. Whereupon I conceive, that the Romans are therefore by the Holy Ghost, called a Worm in Ionas; where he saith, Et paravit Deus Vermem, ascensu diluculi in Crastinum; & perc●…ssit haederam, & exaruit: this place being meant, (as Robert Abbot with many other writers interprets it) of the destruction of Jerusalem, by the Romans under the Empire of Vespasian, who having prepared a siege against Jerusalem, and understanding there were discords risen amongst them, he delayed the enterprise, Obsidionem Hierusalem distulit, ratus ejusmodi civilibus discordiis facilius Judaeos consumptos deleri, quam armis Romanorum: and after a while, assaulting the City, he destroyed it. I observe moreover in that Chapter of Ionas, that the sun came not first upon the Prophet's head; but the worm that dried up the gourd, so also we must dry up our adversaries with discords, and then set upon them with our Armies. This Coriolanus meant, when he appointed his soldiers to spoil the fields of the Plebeians; but to leave the fields of the Senators untouched; which he did not do for any hatred to the people, but out of a further reach, by this means to foment their discords. The importance of this, the ancient Romans knew well; who after the first war in Sicily, seeing the Carthagenians, I may say their natural enemies, in a great straight, through the revolt of the Cities of Africa, and the rebellion of their own Army, yet never for this made war upon them; which would rather have brought concord to their enemies, than victory to themselves: but letting them tyre and weary themselves with their own discords, they then set upon them so wearied, and without shedding of blood, made themselves Lords of all Sardinia with increase of Tribute.  
But in case they would not stay so long, till the enemy might try out himself: they should then do well to bring with them in their Army, some person of the blood; and that hath pretention in the state; but yet so, as to do it without forcing. When Charles the eighth had intention to make war upon Bajaset the great Turk, because he knew how vain a thing it were to believe that a Kingdom, in Religion, in customs and in language different, should receive him; he therefore took with him the brother of Bajaset: and the like did Situlces King of the Thracians; and Osman Bassa by the commandment of Amurath, going to destroy the King of the Tartars, took with him Islan brother of that King; and it succeeded well; whereupon (as Argentone relates) Lewis the eleventh stood in fear of the league, only because they brought his brother along with them. But if the discords be inveterate, and the Citizens through them grown weak, it is then always time to assail them; and there can be no doubt of victory. Thus Greece was easily overcome by any stranger that took this opportunity.  
And thus much concerning discords, of Citizens between themselves; or of Cities that are under one Lord; in which it is sufficiently showed, how a stranger ought to carry himself: Now we will show, what course he ought to take, with other Provinces or Cities that are in discord between themselves. These Cities than are either of equal force, or of unequal; if of equal, then ought he to foment both sides: and thereby they coming at last to be unequal, he shall then take part with the weaker side; but yet so, as not to weaken himself: as Croesus in Justin teacheth us, who aiding the Babylonians against Cyrus, he so much weakened his own Army, that after the taking of Babylon, he also himself was easily overcome. And therefore he saith, Ibi fortuna prioris praelii (that is of Babylon) percussum jam Croesi exercitum nullo negotio fudit. The matter therefore must be so carried, that if the contrary side happen to be Conqueror, yet you may be able to maintain the war yourself: if conquered, it will then be easy for you to make yourself Lord both of the one and the other. For it is not fit when a man may have need of his money and his Forces in defence of himself, that he should rashly waste them in the service of another. Such was the counsel (as Thucydides relates) that Nicias gave the Athenians, while he dissuaded them from the war in Sicily; there being no discretion, to unclothe 〈◊〉 self, to clothe another. Which is so true, that it is written by the Holy Ghost in Ezechiel, while speaking of the four beasts, he saith, Sub 〈◊〉 autem pennae eorum rectae alterius ad alterum: and this as S. Gregory interprets it, intends to express the aid that is due from a man to his neighbour. It follows after, 〈◊〉 duabus alis velabat corpus suum; to show, that for aiding of others, it is not fit to dismantle ourselves.  
To return to our purpose, in that we spoke of before: that is, what way is to be held in aiding the weaker side: a better example cannot be given then that of Philip King of Macedon, who seeing the Cities of Greece at variance between themselves, he fomented the weaker side: and after he had wearied the one and the other, he brought them both under his Dominion. Philippus Rex Macedonum (saith Justin) libertati omnium insidiatus, dum contentiones civitatum alit, auxilium inferioribus ferendo, victos pariter victoresque subi●… Regiam servitutem coegit. According to this advice, Ferdinand King of Spain fomented so well the discord between Francis King of France and him of Arragon; that weakening the one, and oppressing the other, he made himself Lord of the Kingdom of Naples; without wasting of either soldiers or money; a Kingdom gotten before by the King of France with so much blood. This also many Writers attribute to the Venetians, who calling Lewis the twelfth into Italy, hoped by this means to make themselves Lords of many Cities in Lombardy and Romagna; with this conceit, Lewis il Moro, called in Charles the eighth King of France; but this man endangered himself unhappily; and the other were not far from absolute ruin. Upon occasion whereof, I cannot omit to show their error, who make doubt, that a third man should enjoy the benefit of their victory, and what remedy there is for it. Secondly, how it happened that Ludovico Sforza by raising discord between the King of France, and them of Arragon, lost his state; when Philip by raising discord between the Grecians, and also Ferdinand King of Spain, got so much by it. Concerning the first, there can no better counsel be given, to two, who striving together, have a third looking on, to set upon the winner, then to persuade them to peace; or else juridically to hear their differences: but because, this seldom or never hath place amongst Princes; and war oftentimes for many occasions either cannot or will not be avoided: therefore I cannot better deliver my opinion, then by showing the example of Metius, who being upon the point of striking battle with Tullus Hostilius, and knowing that which side soever was victor, must needs (not having to fight with sheep) exceedingly weaken itself with loss of soldiers; whereby the Tuscans who were equal in Forces to the one and the other, and by this loss of men should remain the stronger, might take occasion to draw the victory of the conquering side to themselves; he invited Tullus Hostilius to a parley: and with these reasons persuaded him to put the fortune of the victory upon a few, that not only the Victor might be out of danger, but might also have it in his power, to oppress the Thuscanes; which proposition Tullus accepted; and though there be many that blame him for it, yet I think, they mean it in some other case; because it is not likely, that a warlike spirit as Tullus was, if he had not certainly known the manifest danger of falling to be a prey to the other, would ever have consented to such a duel; which in the case of another, is never without blame, being a thing unworthy of a valorous Captain, to lay the fortune of many upon a few; but as this case was, I find no other error in Tullus Hostilius, but that he would hazard the whole Army upon three men; but if the condition had been, to fight with one squadron of Foot, and another of Horse, I could not then but have commended it: and the reason is, because by such a fight it would plainly have appeared, which of them in a set battle would have had the victory, there concurring in it, the skill of the Captain, and part of all parts of the Army; which have the same proportion with one another, as the whole hath with the whole; according to the vulgar rule, Eadem est ratio totius ad totum, quae est partis ad partem: But in the case of Tullus, one of the Armies might be inferior to the other, in Horse and Foot and Captain; and yet have three braver men in any of these kinds in it, than the other.  
Concerning the second Point, Ludovico Sforza did well, for securing himself in the State of Milan, to move the King of France; but he did not well afterward, to move him against the Aragonesi; for he ought (at least if he could; and if he could not, he should not then have meddled in it at all) to have made use of the King, as an aid in peace, but not as a Captain in war: and so was the counsel which Phaneas the Etolian gave: that they should call in Antiochus and make use of him as an Umpire, but not as a Captain: Phaneas (saith Livy) Reconciliatore pacis, & disceptatore de iis quae in controversia cum populo Romano essent, utendum potius Antiocho censebat quam duce belli. And therefore Ludovico Sforza had not done ill to call in the King of France, as for his purpose to make himself free Lord of Milan, if it had been in his power to make him return again: but seeing the case required to make use of him in war, now it was his ruin: because to seek to rise by the discords of others, is not a work for an inferior, but either for an equal, or a greater. Whereupon to Philip King of Macedon, and to Ferdinand King of Spain, it proved well; but to Lodowick Sforza, it brought utter ruin; and to the Venetians exceeding danger; although he with indiscretion set forward his own destruction; these with judgement, freed themselves from the danger. And therefore in the foresaid case, he that is inferior in Forces ought to seek always rather to extinguish, then to kindle fire. Amurath the great Turk was minded to make war upon the King of Polonia; between whom lay the state of Petrasco Prince of Pogdania; and he, as a wise man, knowing the damage he might sustain, either by having his Country wasted with the Great Turk's Army; or after the war ended, by wholly losing it, as lying in the mouth of the Polack; he so treated with them, that he made them friends. But many Cities in Italy, not observing this rule, whilst they fomented discords between Pyrrhus and the Romans; remained, after the war ended, a prey to the Romans. So the French, when Hannibal came into Italy, perceived though too late, they had exposed their Country as a Prey to his Army. So the Etolians calling in Antiochus to make war upon the Romans; were themselves the first a prey to the Romans, as it had been foretold them. But although we have showed by the example of Croesus, that it is not good in discords, so to aid one side; as to weaken one's self: yet is not this rule to be observed, where one is so much too strong, that the other without great aid is not able to withstand: because in this case to abandon a friend, would be a strengthening of the enemy; as the Corfuans in Thucydides excellently showed, in the Oration they made to the Athenians, whereupon the Rhegini fearing the Army of Pyrrhus' King of the Epirots; the Romans came with great Forces to their aid; but the end was, they became Lords over them. Which they of Corfu, not observing in the discords of Durazzo, and denying them aid, were cause that they yielded themselves to the Corinthians, and consequently increased the Forces of their enemies. But Germanicus carried himself with great judgement in aiding Segestes; knowing, if Segestes were overthrown, his faction would join itself with Arminius; and consequently the Forces of his enemy be increased. This the Campans declared, demanding aid of Rome; Si defenditis, vestri; si deseritis, Samnitum erimus. Capuam ergo & Campaniam omnem vestris, an Samnitum viribus accedere malitis, deliberate. So as this is a lesson which men should learn, to give present assistance to their friends that need it; otherwise they cannot avoid being a prey to others: and this is delivered by S. Matthew in a Parable; where they not coming that were invited to the marriage, others were called that stood in the streets.  
It is therefore to be observed, when we make other men's case our own, that our power be more than theirs: because else, either they will be hindered from getting victory; or getting victory be kept from being masters of the victory; it is not therefore for Princes or Cities that are weak, to make war; which are to call in one more powerful than themselves to their aid: for by this, they do but procure a stronger enemy: The Campani oppressed by the samnites, put themselves into the hands of the Romans, and so increased their Forces: and for this cause perhaps it is, that Lucca continues a Commonwealth.  
Having showed, that we ought with all our Forces, to aid the weaker side; when of itself it is not able to subsist: it is to be observed, that in doing it, we make not show of such preparation, as may make our friends suspicious of us: which Philip King of Spain not observing; whilst under pretence of aiding the King of Scots against the Queen of England; he prepared so great a Fleet, that the Scots might easily perceive, that Fleet was not meant for resisting of England; but for making himself Lord of Scotland. Into this error also the Athenians ran; who under colour of aiding the Catanesis against the Syracusans, meant to make themselves Lords of Sicily, and therefore came with so great an Army (as Justin saith) Vt iis terrori essent in quorum auxilia mittebantur: whereupon they failed of their purpose, by reason it was easy for the Lacedæmonians, to put a suspicion of this into the Sicilians heads. And therefore Vitiges being within Ravenna, besieged by Delisarius; and hearing by the Ambassadors of the King of Austrasia, that he offered to aid him with fifty thousand French; astonished at so great a succour, put himself into the hands of Justinian. Therefore weak Cities ought not to go in quest after war; because they are like, either to be overcome of their enemies, or to be in servitude to their friends; seeing they who call to their aid a greater power than their own, may be said to lean upon the point of a Spear, or upon a broken Reed; upon which, he that leans, is like to find rather death than aid. And therefore our Lord God, speaking in Esay to his people, who had called the Egyptians to their aid, Ecce confidis super baculum arundineum, confractum istum, super Aegyptum: cui si innixus fuerit homo, intrabit in manum ejus; & perforabit eam; sic Pharao Rex Aegypti omnibus qui confidunt in co. Which Aratus Head of the Achaeans knowing, refused to receive the aid of Antigonus. Verebatur enim si forte Rex victoria potitus, Cleomene ac Lacedaemoniis superatis ad extremum aliquid novi contra Rempublicam Achaeorum tentare. And if these Cities find a necessity to make war for their own defence, or otherwise, and that not able of themselves, it behoves them to call in, others to their aid: they shall then do well, to call in more than one; so the Pisans did against the Florentines, who aided by the Venetians, by Lodovico Sforza, by the Genovesis, and by the Senesi, went a long time dallying, and kept them all off from getting to be Lords over them.  
I cannot omit to advertise, when one gives aid to another, and the case stands so, that their Forces being joined, they are able to resist, or else not: that in this case, he ought to come with all his Forces; that if one resist not, the other may: and in this was the error of the Campani, in aiding the Sedicini, who therefore were both of them ruined. Campani magis nomen ad praesidiunt sociorum quam vires cum attulissent: fluentes luxu obduratis usu armorum in Sidicino pulsi agro, in se deinde molem 〈◊〉 belli verter●…nt: and if the Romans had not aided them, they had been in manifest hazard of destruction. And therefore I cannot commend the course which the Athenians took in a battle of the Corfuani with the Corinthians; in which having brought a squadron of Galleys in aid of the Corfuans, they gave order, not to come into the fight, until they should see them routed; there is no doubt, but that if the Athenians had come in to fight in the beginning of the battle, the Corfuans had got the victory: but staying, as their commission was, and not giving aid to their friends in time; they added reputation to their enemies, and lessened their own Forces; so as either they should not have offered their aid at all; or they should have given it in the beginning.  
Let us now come to a Citizen that aspires to make himself Lord of his own Country, being held by infidels; in which, if the discord be between the Nobles and the Plebeians, it is a hard matter to compass: yet in this case, it is better he should make himself head of the people; who have both more will and power then the Nobles, as being a greater number; and though they be of inferior rank to the great ones: yet it is with them as with Bulls; who suffer themselves to be mastered, because they know not their own strength. Which Manlius well knowing, speaking to the people said, Quousque tandem ignorabitis vires vestras? It happens also for want of judgement, and scarcity of money; but all these things are helped by making some great man Head, that is wise and rich; the people being like sheep where one leaps, the other follows. And this Moses knew, when being told by God, of his own death, he prayed him to provide his people a Leader, that they might not be as sheep without a shepherd, Ne sint sicut oves sine ductore; the people therefore are more able; and the more able, if they have a Head.  
It remains to show, that the people are more willing; and more easily persuaded to raise a Plebeian to the Principality, than one of the Nobility: First, by reason of the hope, which every one naturally hath of new things, specially the common people; therefore Sallust saith, Sed omnino cuncta plebs novarum 〈◊〉 study, Catilinae incoepta probabat. Secondly, because the people envies not the inequality of Honours; but the inequality of Riches; and this is the reason why it was never seen, at least very seldom, that one Noble man helps to raise another Noble man to the Principality: and this Aristotle knew when he said, Nam multitudo quidem graviter fert inequalitatem patrimoniorum; praestantes viri honorum oequalitatem. Whence it is no marvel, if after the death of Romulus; the Nobles found no way to make a King: and if it had not been for the people, it had scarce been ever done. And Livy speaking of this saith, Et esse igitur aliquod caput placebat, & nemo alteri concedere in animum inducebat. It is therefore best, the discord being between the Plebeians and the Nobles; (I mean always as I said before, as far as may be done with a good conscience) to make himself Head of the people; which yet is not without great danger, and very fallacious, as I shall show in another discourse upon those words, Et ad tuendam Plebem Tribunitio jure contentum. If the discord be between Nobles and Nobles; then he that would make himself Prince, either is head of one part, or not; if not, he ought then to procure the concord of them that are 〈◊〉; because their discord will be a cause, he can have but one side in his aid; and that but weakly 〈◊〉 where, if they be made friends, by this 〈◊〉; they will both of them remain, as it were obliged to him; and perhaps will do it the more, because they cannot but think it a great matter, for one man to hinder the proceeding of their enemies, who will therefore afterwards without any other regard, run headlong to aid him, not caring what he be. This my opinion will be sufficiently proved by the example of Caesar; who seeing Pompey and Crassus at variance, wrought so with them, that he made them friends; as knowing, that to his purpose, for making himself Prince, this discord of theirs would be a great impediment. But if he be head of a Faction, then is the time to make himself Lord securely; because having half the Nobility of his side, if he can withal get the favour of the people, he will undoubtedly be able to get the Empire. And so is this place of Tacitus of which we speak, to be understood; that Augustus in the dissensions of the Pompeians and the Caesareans, of whom he was Head, made himself protector of the people: that there were dissensions between them, is seen by that he saith, Cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa; neque Caesareanis partibus nisi Caesar Dux reliquus: and that he had made the people his friend; is known by those words, Et ad tuendam Plebem, Tribunitio jure contentum.  
The sum of all I have said, is this: If a stranger in a civil discord, seek to make himself Lord: (I mean by civil, that which is between Cities and Persons that are under the same Dominion) if he have intelligence with them; either it is in the beginning, and then he shall not stir, but rather be a means of concord; especially between those that are naturally enemies; between whom it behoves him to foment discords: to the end, that being weakened, his way may be easy; or else assaulting them with Arms, be sure to have in his Army one of the blood, but yet without power; although in another discourse I shall show that this is a weakness: or else it is, when discords are inveterate; and consequently the Citizens wasted: & then every thing is like well enough to succeed. We have also showed, that a stranger who seeks to get the Dominion of Cities, which are at war under divers Lords; aught to foment the discords, if they be of equal power, so far as that they may come to be unequal, and then to take part with the weaker; yet no further, then only that they may be able to resist their enemies; always being careful, that the aid be not so great, as to weaken him that gives it; unless, when without excessive aid, they cannot prosecute the war; and that there be danger, lest they fall into their enemy's hands; for than it behoves to make it his own cause: but all in such sort, that he give no cause of suspicion to his friends. I have said also, that it is no small skill, to foment discords, and that no man ought to make use of a great power, for his interest in war but only in peace; when he is not offorce sufficient to be able to send it away again. And as for those, that lie between greater Princes that are at variance; let them, as Laurence de Medici did, use means to make them friends. Weak Cities, in my opinion, should never intricate themselves in any war; and where there are two, that stand in fear of a third; if they will follow my counsel, they shall never lead forth all their Forces. Now if he be a Citizen, who in the discords of the City, seeks to make himself Lord of it; let him know it will be hard to compass, when the discord is between the Nobility and the people; but in this case, the best way is, if he can, to make himself Head of the Commons. If again the discord be between the people amongstthemselves, it is then almost impossible: but easy, when it is between Nobles and Nobles; especially if he be Head of a Faction; and if not, then to stand neutral.   

What Discords conserve States, and what corrupt them. The eighth Discourse:  
THus than we see, that of those three distinctions, there is one proper for conserving the Prince; that is, the discord between the Nobility and the Commons; as sufficiently hath been showed.  
Now the state of the Optimates (to return to our purpose) is easily preserved, so long as there grows no discord between Nobles and Nobles: because, as we have said before, the dissensions of the Nobility rest upon two Heads; whereof the one soon prevailing over the other, brings it within his power to make himself sole Lord; so much the rather, because in a State of Optimates there is always discord between the Nobility and the Commons; and so much, that the people ill brooking the Senate, will rather be willing to have a King. We must therefore know, that in a State of Optimates, as the dissension between Nobles and Nobles, is very hurtful; so that between the Nobility and the people is very profitable, and greatly fortifies and upholds it, so long as there concur not with it, discord between the Nobles. The reason is, because the people being at variance with the Nobles, it will be a cause, that they standing united, will not incur the danger before spoken of. Thus we see, the Romans after the expulsion of the Tarquins, continued easily in their government; because in that time there was perpetual discord between the Nobility and the People. In which discords when the people came to be oppressed, the Nobles fell into Factions, and then the City in a few years came to be a Monarchy.   

Of concordant discord; and how it ought to be managed, for the good of Cities. The ninth Discourse.  
THere is nothing more profitable for the concord and good government of a City, than a discord between the parts: a City being a body composed of many parts, as our body is of 〈◊〉 four Elements. And as in this, if it be well Organised; in such sort, that all the four Elements be in a due proportion, there will then need no discord to maintain it, there being none that seeks its own destruction: and therefore it sweetly enjoys a quiet rest: so in a City, there will be no unquietness, if all the parts be equal; I mean not equal, simply; for it were not fit, that all in a City should be equal in dignity and riches; being necessary, some should be rich and some poor: but equal in such manner as it is in the body, whose good consists in this, that all the members be equal: for there are two kinds of good, (as saith S. Thomas) one, the good of the whole; and the other, of the parts: and likewise two natures; one universal, the other particular: the good of the whole consists in the entirity, and in the distinction of the parts: and therefore it is better for a man, to have a Head, Feet, Hands, and the other members, then that all should be Head: but the good of the part, should be more good and perfect, if it could attain to the degree and perfection of the superior part; and therefore the Foot should be more Noble, if it were a Head; but the body should not be more perfect, if it wanted a Foot: so in a City it is sit, there should be Plebeians; and the equality that is required, aught to be Geometrical and not Arithmetical; and where this is, a City shall not need dissension, to make it be well governed; but because as Galen in his Method, speaking of bodies that are in health, simpliciter, and absolutely, saith, This symmetry of humours consisting In Puncto is very hardly found; and found impossible to be kept: as also Hypocrates speaketh of those bodies, that are in the height of healthfulness, Neque enim in melius verti, neque diu sistere valent; reliquum est ut in deterius dilabantur: so also a City, is either never found in such a symmetry of parts; or if at any time found, never long continues. And therefore Tacitus speaking of such a composition saith, Laudari facilius quam evenire: vel si evenit, haud diuturna esse potest.  
It is of necessity, that in the body, there be predominant either cold or heat; or dry or moist: if cold be predominant, there is heat to oppose it; if dry, the moist: so in a Commonwealth, all things must be reduced to equality; for not only they which overtop others, but they also that are in misery, are dangerous: in like manner, as it happens in buildings, which come to decay, as well by stones that stand too far out; as by those, that stand too far in: and therefore the Mason always measures the walls and fits the stones; not by cutting them away, but by setting them in the right place: and thus our Lord God would have it be done in his holy Church; and therefore when Ezechiel saw it in the top of a mountain, he stayed not long, but there came a man of mettle like brass. Et F●…niculus lineus in manu ejus: the Septuagints read it, Funiculus cimariorum in manu ejus: where S. Gregory interprets it, after my meaning; and Aristotle also knowing this, gives counsel, when one part in a City is oppressed, and another oppresseth; that then the Magistrates should relieve the part oppressed, and reduce them to equality.  
There are three things that may bear sway in a City; either the power Regal, or that of the Nobles, or the Authority of the People: if the Regal Power be predominant, than the people who are many, must oppose it; because one and many are contraries: and and perhaps for this it is that Plato saith, that a Commonwealth should be framed of two ingredients; a people, and a King; because the people alone being many, may be a bridle to the King; and the King alone to the people. If the Nobility be predominant, than the people, as being directly contrary to the Nobility, must be opposed against it: whereupon, as we said before, as long as the City of Rome used this opposition, it could never be destroyed by the Nobility: In this regard, Sulpitius called a squadron of the youth, the Senators Treacle, as opposed against them.  
If the people be predominant, than the Nobility must be set against them; and as when cold is predominant in a body, if another cold should be set to strive with it, it would instantly, Ipso facto, destroy the body: So when the people is predominant, if the people should be set against them; or when the Nobility is predominant, the Nobility should oppose it; the Commonwealth presently would go to wrack; as it fell out in Rome. But not only, when the like is opposed against the like, both a body and a Commonwealth may be ruined; but as well also if a contrary be opposed, and not in a due manner: and therefore Galen saith, that contraries may be of three sorts: that is, Greater, lesser, and equal. It is a greater contrary, when to a distemper hot in two degrees, a remedy is applied cold in three degrees: a lesser contrary is, when to a distemper hot in two degrees, a remedy is applied cold in one degree; the equal is, when to equal heat, equal cold is opposed; which being so, saith Galen, the cure of a distemper must not be by a greater contrary; because this not only takes away the distemper, but introduceth the contrary: as if to a distemper, hot as two; a remedy be applied, cold as three: this indeed will take away the heat, but then in place of it, bring in a distemper cold in one degree. Neither also is a cure to be made with a lesser contrary, because this would not reach to take away the distemper: but the cure must be made by an equal, which cannot introduce a contrary, but only reduce the distemper to a due proportion. And thus is it to be done in Cities: for if the people grown two degrees above their rank, should have the Nobility opposed in three degrees: this would not only take away the predominancy of the people, but would bring the Nobility one degree out of just proportion: and the contrary will happen, if it should be less: and therefore in the Commonwealth of Rome, as long as the people were able to counterpoise the power of the Nobles; although it were in discord, yet it continued and kept itself free: but after the death of Tib●…nius and Caius Gracchus, when this contrary became unable to withstand the Nobility, the Commonwealth presently was endangered; as well for the inability of the people's opposition, as for that it gave occasion to raise discord amongst the Nobles. That the contrary in this case was not fit and able, Sallust showeth where he saith, Caeterum Nobilitas factione magis pollebat; Plebis vis soluta atque in multitudinem dispersa, minus poterat. Besides the Nobles themselves opposed not well, in opposing Sylla to Crassus; and worse, in opposing 〈◊〉 to Anthony: because as the opposition the people made was too weak,: so the opposition of the Nobility was too strong; and was therefore the 〈◊〉 of the Commonwealth. That contrary therefore which with discord shallbe opposed to him, that exceeds proportion, aught to be such, as to have no greater power, nor other end, but only to reduce the other to his due place; but yet with ways befitting a Christian: for I like not that course of Tarqvinius Superbus, which he intimated by cutting off the heads of the Poppies (an invention used by many, and related also by Aristotle) For in the commonwealth of the body, what worse evil, than the gout in the feet or hands? yet to heal it, I never saw the foot or the hand cut off; but purgations applied to bring them to their natural temper. Being in all evils better to oppose the beginning, then be forced to 〈◊〉 off the part, by letting it run to a Gangrene or Convulsion. For as this oftentimes brings death to the whole body; so in a Commonwealth, the dismembering of a Citizen that is grown out of order, is occasion oftentimes of the ruin of the State; as it fell out in Caesar.  
I am to advertise, that I intent not to put division between men and men, but between men and the actions of men; for as the first is extremely ill, so the second is as good. And therefore the Prophet saith, Nun qui oderunt te Domine Oderam; & super inimicos tuos tabescebam; and of this kind of hate, Christ spoke when he said, Non veni mittere pacem, sed gladium in terra. Whereupon it being an evil action, for one to exceed his degree and thereby seek to oppress the City; it ought to be hated, and to seek to bring him to proportion; but that done, the hate then must be laid aside; and therefore all the holy Fathers agree, that to know what 〈◊〉 is good, and what bad, there is no better way than this, to look if the action ceasing for which they hate, they also cease to hate; otherwise it appears, they hated the person, and not the action. Secondly, it must be observed, when I show, that for Cities to be well governed, it is necessary there should be discord: I mean not that kind of discord which is destructive, a discord in the whole; but that which is a discord in a part; and in the whole, a concord: in like manner, as the Heavens turning with one motion from East to West; and with another from West to East, they are discordant in the parts; but in conservation of the whole concordant. So not without a great mystery of nature, that is of God; the Planets by whose influence he governs earthly things, are by their Maker so placed in the heavenly Orbs; that one contrary stands neighbour to another: to the end, that with an harmonious discord, they may have a concordant influence, for the good of the Universe. From hence it is, that Jupiter is next to Saturn; because Saturn being old and dry, an unfortunate Planet, it was necessary he should be allayed with the goodness of Jupiter, who with heat and moisture, in an admirable manner opposeth him. So unfortunate Mars is tempered with fortunate Venus, (to speak in the terms of Astrologers) who alleys the malignity of Mars, in such manner, as we see oftentimes, the choler of a man, to be mitigated with the sweetness of a woman. In like sort (to descend lower) if the Elements were not discordant, there would arise no alteration, and consequently no generation: so if the parts in Music were not discordant, there would be no harmony. The parts therefore are discordant; the Heavens, discordant; the Planets, discordant; and all for conservation of the Universe. Whereupon, and it is the doctrine of Aristotle; as from the contrariety and discord of the Elements, ariseth the peace of the Universe: so from the opposition in the parts of a City, (I speak in the sense I said before) there ariseth the conservation of the whole. Which perhaps Plato meant, when by the mouth of Socrates he said, that the profit of a City consists not in concord.   

Sed veteris Reipublicae Prospera vel Adversa claris Scriptoribus memorata sunt: temporibusque Augusti non defuere decora ingenia; donec gliscente adulatione deterrerentur. Tiberii Caiique & Claudii ac Neronis res, florentibus ipsis, ob metum falsae: postquam occiderant, recentibus compositae sunt.  
How hard and dangerous a matter it is to write Histories: when the easiest time is to find writers and which of them deserve most credit. The tenth Discourse.  
THe words of Tacitus abovecited, give me occasion of two discourses; one, concerning the writing of Histories: the other, concerning flattery. Concerning the first, I intent to show the difficulty it brings with it, what danger Historians undergo: of whom it is easiest to write, and in what time. As for the difficulty, it may grow either in regard of him that reads, and is not interessed; or from him that reads, being interessed: or lastly from the times, in which one writes. Beginning then with the general, that is, of him who reads, and is not interessed; there is no doubt, but the Historian with such a one, will find some difficulty, to be thought a true writer. Seeing he must necessarily relate actions; either worthy of praise, or worthy of blame: if of blame, it is attributed to malice; if of praise, it is received with envy: because as Thucydides saith in the person of Pericles, in the oration he made to the people of Athens, at the funeral pomp of those that were slain in war; The praises of the dead if they be heard by friends, never seem enough; if by strangers, so long as they go no further than possibility, they are received with patience, but if they pass that bound, they are then as fabulous, either scoffed at, or else envied. This case, Sallust translated out of Thucydides, where he saith, Arduum videtur Res gestas scribere; primo quia facta dicris exaequanda sunt; Dein quia plerique quae delicta reprehenderis, malevolentiae & invidia dicta putant; ubi de magna virtute atque gloria bonorum memores, quae sibi quisque facile factu putet, aequo animo accipit; supra, vel●…ti ficta pro falsis duoit. It is therefore true, that between these two extremes, that writer shall always be more believed, and be held in better account, who in blaming shall discover the vices and defects of others; then they who in praising, shall make their virtues too resplendent; because a reader, takes blame, in itself for a praise; if at least he have not himself those vices for which one is blamed; and praise he takes for blame, if he find not those virtues, for which the Historian extols him. Besides, to blame being always with danger; and to praise, rather with benefit; he who blameth, will be always taken for a man free and sincere; and he that praiseth for a flatterer. To this perhaps Tacitus had an eye, when he said, Obtrectatio & livor pronis auribus accipiuntur; quip Adulationi foedum crimen servitutis; malignitati falsa species libertatis inest.  
The second difficulty is caused by persons interessed; which are either Princes, or Commonwealths: if Princes, either they are virtuous, or vicious: if vicious, let the History be written either of his life, or of any others that is like his, it will be taken, as if by relating the faults of others openly, his own faults secretly be cast in his face. This by Tacitus is learnedly expressed, where he saith, Reperies qui ob similitudinem 〈◊〉, aliena malefacta sibi objectari putant. So likewise if the virtues of some other Prince; or of his own ancestors shall be praised; he will take it, as an upbraiding to him his own vices, and thereupon be moved to indignation and envy; and for default of virtue in himself, will with an ill will hear the praises of another. Etiant gloria (saith Tacitus) ac virtus infensos habet; ut animus ea propinquo diversa arguens. Which our Lord God meaning to show by the mouth of Ezechiel saith, Fili hominis, ostend domui Israel Templum, ut confundantur ab iniquitatibus suis, & metiantur fabricam, & erubescant ab omnibus quae fecerunt. And S. Gregory expounding this place, saith that the Temple of God is then showed in confusion, when the actions of a just man are showed to a wicked; and our Lord God, to show that wicked men cannot abide to hear the life of good men spoken of, saith, Vt ostendat Templum, he saith not, Vt videant Templum, meaning to show, as S. Gregory expounds it, Sponte sua considerare nolentibus, rectorum opera narrare; These therefore with an evil will, hear the praises of others; which Tacitus knowing, forbore to write the life of Agricola, a good man, in the time of wicked Emperors, but stayed till Trajan's time, as having seen manifest examples, of many writers, that lost their own lives, without any benefit to those of whom they writ, by being themselves slain, and their books burnt, while under wicked Princes, they would publish their Histories of such persons: and therefore he saith, 〈◊〉 cum Aruleno Rustico, Paetus Thrasea Herennio Senecioni, 〈◊〉 Helvidius laudati 〈◊〉, Capital fuisse; no que in ipsos 〈◊〉 Authores, sed in libros quoque saevitum.  
But greater danger an Historian in curs, if under a wicked Prince, he dare write his history, because, either 〈◊〉 his vices, he shows himself a manifest slatterer, and no wise Historian, who without truth, (as Polybius saith) is as unprofitable, as a man without eyes; or else writing the truth, he shall in so doing, make his own grave.  
But say, he writes under a good Prince, either he must relate the actions of the Prince himself, or of his house; if of himself living, the Historian can never avoid suspicion: and it is not enough to say, that under such praiseworthy Princes, there will be no need, to part from truth, because there are few men that do not conceive their own actions to be greater than they are, or at least that desire not, others should think them so: whereupon, when they find, that an Historian relates them not, in such a height as they conceive, or desire that others should; no doubt, they will think he blames them, as not sufficiently praising them.  
Now if under a virtuous Prince, they write the History of his family, there grows another difficulty of great moment; which is, that a great part of the Cities and Provinces having been sometime Commonwealths, & from Commonwealths become Kingdoms; seldom without shedding the blood of the Citizens, and oftentimes of the Princes: the relating these things under a Prince, now Lord of the City, whether he be good or bad, is dangerous: first, on the part of the Citizens, who reading the death of their ancestors; or their greatness in the time when it was a Commonwealth: by the one, they are stirred up to hate, by the other to desire: and taking into their consideration, that greatness in which they were, and those injuries which they suffered; because they cannot revenge these, nor regain those, but by the death of the Prince, they are oftentimes drawn to make cruel conspiracies. Secondly, on the part of the Prince, who in reading such Histories, seeing continually before his eyes, those Citizens, whose fathers either killed or at least conspired against his ancestors; seeing he cannot believe they should love him; he will hardly be induced to love them, knowing well, that things which are tolerated, by force, when occasion happens to remove that force, will never be tolerated.  
To this may be added another difficulty, on the part of the Citizens: who love not to hear the disgraces of their ancestors related in Histories; and are thereby moved to indignation: this Tacitus meant, where he saith, At multorum qui Tiberio regnante, poenam vel infamiam subiere, Posteri manent. And oftentimes Tacitus himself forbears to speak of such; as he did of those who suffered disgraces under Nero, of whom he saith, Quos fato perfunctos, ne nominatim tradam, Majoribus eorum tribuendum puto.  
Again to relate the wars, which these Princes or their Ancestors had with others; how dangerous it is, Crescentius Cordus may be an example; who for praising Brutus and Cassius, was forced miserably to end his life, as the said Tacitus relates. It is true, this useth not to happen, but under wicked Princes, as Tiberius was. For Augustus, as the said Tacitus relates; made rather a jest, than took indignation at any such things: and thus much concerning a Prince.  
Now in writing Histories under a Commonwealth; there appear again a thousand difficulties: First, if he make relation of their beginnings, he shall make himself odious to all in general, and to every one in particular. To all in general, because all things having but weak beginnings, men like rather to hear the History of the Commonwealth, in its virility, then in the weakness of its infancy. To particulars, because hearing relation made of the beginnings of their Houses, which commonly are but mean, they cannot read such Histories with any patience; at least, not with liking: and therefore in some Cities, such writings have not been admitted. This conceit Titus Livin●… expresseth to the life; where he saith, Et legentium plerosque (speaking of himself, who writ the beginning of Rome) haud dubito, quin primae Origines proximaque Originibus, minus praebitura voluptatis sint, festinantibus ad haec nova, quibus jampridem praevalentis populi vires seipsas conficiunt.  
Moreover, if they write of wars; not only they incur the same danger we spoke of before, under a Prince; in too much praising those, with whom the war hath been held: but besides, in this kind, it is easier to offend in a Commonwealth, which consists of many; then in a Kingdom, which consisteth but of one. Whereupon, it seems to be more easy to write the truth of one alone, then of many; but withal more dangerous, because the hatred of private Citizens may be shunned; but the hatred which comes from the public person of the Prince, and reacheth to life and goods, are impossible to be shunned.  
It is therefore dangerous to write under a Prince, whether he be good or bad; and whether the History be of the Princes own actions, or of his ancestors; and whether in foreign war, or in war at home. And it is dangerous likewise to write under Commonwealths; not only to write of their beginnings, but in other times also.  
It remains to show, whether it be more easy, to find Historians under a Kingdom, or under a Commonwealth.  
The Prince may be a tyrant, and living; the Commonwealth may be corrupt, and continue: and while it continues, hardly will any Citizen, out of love of his Country, be drawn to disclose those things, which ought to be kept secret; and as little whilst a Tyrant lives, will any man register his disorders for fear: Whereupon not without cause, the most wise Solomon in his Proverbs saith, Nomen impiorum putrescet, not Putrescit; because in the time present, his stinch is not smelled; or to say better, none will be so bold, as to discover it; and if in the one, or the other, an Historian be found so hardy, as to write, he will certainly flatter. And therefore Tacitus saith, Tiberii Caiique ac Neronis res florentibus ipsis ob metum falsae.  
Also Historians take no care of those that come after, but consider only their own interest: and knowing how much trouble they endure, that in such times can but live, when they hold their peace; they are out of heart for writing of Histories, and though they should have a will to do it, yet they could have no means, as not being informed of public affairs, which being done only by the Prince, and out of his Element, he neither understands them, nor meddles in them, nor regards them: all which, Tacitus took into consideration, when he said, Postquam bellatum apud Actium, atque 〈◊〉 potestatem ad unum conferri pacis interfuit; magna illa ingenia cessere; simul veritas pluribus modis fracta; primum inscitia reipublicae ut alienae; mox libidine assentandi, aut rursus Odio adversus Dominantes; ita neutris cura posteritatis, inter infensos & obnoxios.  
But if this tyrant Prince be dead, and the tyranny altered: also if a corrupt Commonwealth shall be abolished, and in place of it, shall come a Prince; in this case, there will not want Historians, but yet not without some doubt of truth. On the part of the Commonwealth now abolished, by reason of flattering the new Prince; on the part of the Prince now dead, by reason of the hatred that is borne to a tyrant: and to this Tacitus had an eye, when he said, Postquam occiderunt, recentibus 〈◊〉 compositae sunt: saying in another place, that Historians who write of tyrants, write many things through hatred, which are not true.  
If lastly we speak of writing Histories under a wel-governed Commonwealth, or under a Prince that is a Monarch; in this case, it will be easy to find writers good store: and therefore Tacitus saith, Sed veteris Reipublicae prospera vel adversa, claris Scriptoribus memorata sunt; where we must observe, he saith, veteris: to signify that he means the Commonwealth, in those first times, when it was not corrupt. And as to the purpose, concerning a good Prince, he adds, Temporibus Augusti non defuere decora ingenia. Where also we see, he speaks of the first years of Augustus, which were indeed his best: and therefore our Tacitus writ only the latter time of Augustus, which was his worst, and consequently more hard to find Writers that had written truly. So also did Acchias, who writing the History of Solomon, omitted the beginning of his reign, as being the best; and began at his declining. According then to Tacitus, there will be writers good store, both under a Commonwealth, that is well governed; and under a Prince, that is well disposed: but in my opinion, more under the good Prince.  
First, because of the greater profit; for a Prince will take more notice of a Writer that relates particular actions; then a Commonwealth will do, for relating universal: and here is to be noted, a difference between the Records of a Prince, and of a Commonwealth. The Records of a Commonwealth, Intensive (give me leave to use this word) being in my opinion less than of a Prince: the reason is, because as it is in the Proverb, He that serves the public, serves no body: for the benefit being received of none as proper, is little regarded, and therefore little recompensed of the public; whereupon we see Joseph received a greater reeompence for the benefit he did to Pharaoh, then ever we read given by any Commonwealth. But Extensive, I hold it more profitable to serve under a Commonwealth; because the memory of a benefit done to a Prince, as being a particular person, dies with him: but the memory of a benefit done to a City, continues as long as the City continues; and not only towards him that did it, but to his posterity also: where of we have a clear example in the foresaid Joseph; who Intensively was rewarded by King Pharaoh, beyond measure, being more King than Pharaoh himself. But Extensively, it proved more hurt than benefit, his successors being put to slavery by him, whose grandfather with all his people, Joseph had preserved before from famine. This reason by me alleged, is written by the Holy Ghost in Exodus, where he saith, Surrexit in terra Rex novus, super Aegyptum, qui ignorahat Joseph, & ait ad populum suum; Ecce populus Israel multus & fortior nobis est; Venite, sapienter opprimamus eum. And therefore, (as I shall show in another place) men more esteeming a present profit, than a future, will be moved rather to write of a Prince, then of a Commonwealth.  
Secondly, by reason of less danger, because an Historian in praising a Prince, hath nothing else to think of; and being indeed a good Prince, he may praise him truly; and therefore Tacitus discoursing of such Princes, breaks out into these words, Rara temporum faelicitate, ubi sentire quae velis, & quae sentias dicere licet. But in a Commonwealth (as I said before) it is impossible to write so, but that amongst so many, some or other will be blamed; and oftentimes the Hate that grows from one, proves more hurtful, than the love of all the rest proves beneficial; because these hold themselves not much obliged, as counting it but their due; the other conceive an irreconcilable hate, as counting it a wrong.  
Thirdly, Historians will more willingly write the deeds of a Prince, then of a City; because men take more pleasure to praise such as are above their own rank; envy, as every one knows, being properly amongst equals: and therefore in Commonwealths, every one looks rather to be praised himself, then to praise others: whereupon Sallust, not without cause lamenting the scarcity of Writers that Rome had, saith, At populo Romano nunquam ea copia fuit, (that is of Writers) quia prudentissimus Negotiosus maxime erat; Ingenium nemo sine corpore exercebat; Optimus quisque facere quam dicere, sua ab alis benefacta laudari, quam ipse aliorum narrare malebat. And thus much concerning the persons under whom, and of whom an Historian writes.  
Now concerning the time, there may be given three kinds of Historians: some, who relate things happened in their own time; some, things done time past; and others, things to be done in time to come. They who relate the Accidents of time past, without having had any former relation, are called Prophets: as Moses' writing of the Creation of the World; so many who have written of things to come, are called Historians; as Esay, who hath written as well of our Church; as if he had written of things past; Ita enim Vniversa Christi (saith S. Hierom) Ecclesiaeque mysteria prosecutus est, ut non putes eum de futuro vaticinari, sed de praeterito Historiam texere.  
But leaving those who write with such Authority, that of their truth there can be no doubt, our discourse shall be of the other; and because (as we have said) many write of the times past; others, of their own times: and of these, some are such as have been present at the things they relate; and others have them only by relation: there being great difficulty in all the 〈◊〉, it is requisite, that together with the difficulty, we should also examine, which of them is most worthy to be credited.  
They then who relate things which themselves have seen done, may easily be drawn to vary from the truth; as moved with passions, sometimes of hate, sometimes of envy, and sometimes again of love; and therefore Plutarch counts it a business of great difficulty and this perhaps Livy means, when speaking of such Writers, he saith, Etsi non flectere à vero; solicitum tamen efficere possunt. And Polybius to give the greater authority to his History, labours to show that the story of the first war of the Romans with the Carthagenians, written by Fabius Pictor a Roman, and by Philo a Carthaginian, was by those Authors, each of them in favour of his own Country, stuffed with lies. And indeed it is not unlike, but they might vary from the truth, and yet out of no corrupt affection; but that each of them writ as he believed, though not as it was; seeing things to which men are affected, seem always, in the good, greater; and less, in the evil; according to that rule of Aristotle, Intus existens prohibet Extraneum: and therefore to an eye, looking through a green Glass, every thing seems green. So to the palate offended with choler, every thing tastes bitter: and therefore David made his prayer to God, to keep him as the Apple of his eye, Custodi me Domine ut pupillam oculi: which as it hath in it no colour, and therefore sees things as they are; so he desired to be without affections, that he might know the truth of things. Whereupon it appears, we may conclude, that they who write of their own times, and have not the virtue of the apple of the eye; may easily vary from the truth; not only by malice, but sometimes also by ignorance; it being impossible, that a man should be an eyewitness of all he writes; and should be present at all Actions and Counsels in such manner, as not to need the information of others; and even those who are present at any action, do seldom all of them agree in the relation.  
On the other side, it appears there is more credit to be given to an Historian that writes of his own time, and of those things at which he hath himself been present, then to others; seeing they are forced to stand to that which is left them by the ancients, either written in History, or preserved in memory, as Plutarch well observes. And because it is seldom, but there is more than one Writer of the same History: and for him that will relate them, he must necessarily make use of those, who have formerly given the information: it is an easy matter, in such a number of writings, for an Historian to be confounded; and be able but as a blind man, to give advertisement of things, whereof he is himself to be advertised. Besides, those first writings or memories of which this Historian makes use: they also, may have been written, out of affection.  
Lastly, there are not wanting reasons to prove, that he who writes a History of his own time; though he have them but by relation, is the more worthy of credit; because in such, the difficulties that are found in the others, are abated; seeing, by not having been present, and had no part in the actions they relate; they are also void of those affections, which make Historians speak less truth: and by writing of their own time, they are not tied to stand to the books of others, who never agree with one another. And therefore the holy fathers, from this difficulty have drawn an Argument to prove the truth of the Gospel; because four Writers agree in all points. Neither by this example is my opinion abated, but rather strengthened; it being necessary, that to make four men write agreeingly in all things, there must be one only to instruct them all, which is the Holy Ghost.  
But neither is this kind of Historians without difficulty; rather as I conceive, in greater than any other: as partaking himself alone of all those difficulties, which we in the two first observed; because although he be not present at the things, yet he is present at the time; and this hath force to stir affection even in those that are not near the time, as every one finds by experience in himself. Secondly, he who gives the information, may be moved by some passion himself; and then he will the less care for writing a lie, when he hath his intent, and the blame another's. Thirdly, if he take more than one to give him information; he will fall into the same difficulties, as he that writes Histories of the times past: seeing it is seldom seen, that two agree in their relation; and oftentimes, one alone is contrary to himself.  
And thus there is difficulty we see in all manner of times, and of Writers; whether they write of the time past, or of their own times; and whether they write by relation from others, or as eye-witnesses themselves.  
For resolution, we may conclude, that more credit is to be given to those things, which are related by Historians that have been eye-witnesses of things done in their own time, so long as the Writers be honest men. Whereupon we give more credit to the Histories of Argentone, relating accidents, at which he was himself present, than we do to Jovius, who writ by relation from others, when himself perhaps was all the while at his Bishopric. Yet I say not, that Jovius is not worthy of credit, seeing it is not my profession to lay blame upon any. This Argentone hath made us know this difference, while interlacing the Histories of Lewis the eleventh with those of England; he useth much cunning to make us believe him; as one that was not present at the things done: and therefore for the most part, names the persons who gave him information: that from the greatness and credit of his informers, he might win credit to his own writings. And this was the very case of S. Luke, who writing in his Gospel the life of our Saviour; because he had not himself been present, therefore to procure himself credit, at his very beginning he saith, he had it by relation from persons that were present. Sicut tradiderunt nobis, qui ab initio ipsi viderunt, & ministri fuerunt sermonis: but when he was to write the Acts of the Apostles, at which he had been present; then without making any Promise or Proem: he begins with saying, Primum quidem sermonem feci de omnibus, O Theophile: and this for no other cause, but because he knew, how much a History hath more credit, when things are written by one that hath seen them. It is no marvel then, that S. John, for gaining himself credit saith, Ego vidi, & testimonium perhibui, quia hic est filius Dei. And therefore it was Gods will, that the Apostles should bear witness of him, Et vos testificamini de me, quoniam ab initio mecum estis. And S. Peter in the Acts, when he would persuade the resurrection of Christ to be believed, saith, Qui simul edimus & bibimus cum illo. Whereupon S. chrysostom, considering why S. John names himself, where he saith, Sequebatur autem Petrus, & alius Discipulus, gives the reason in these words, Et sui meminisse coactus est, ut intelligas ea, caeteris diligentius, quae in Principis aula facta sunt enarrare, utpote quia aderat.  
As for the objection made before, it is plainly cleared, if the Writer be an honest man. For in a good Historian, there are two things required; an ability, and a will: and one of these parts he that writes of things himself hath seen, hath certain in him more than others; which is, that he is more able to write the truth, than any other; and as for the will to do it, it cannot be wanting in him, if he be honest: and if he be not honest, than no doubt another that writes of times past may be worthy of more credit than he.   

Donec gliscente Adulatione deterrerentur.  
From whence flattery proceeds: how many kinds there are of it, and which of them is hurtful to a City. The eleventh Discourse.  
COncerning flattery, there have been discourses morally written, by infinite writers; and in such manner, that they have given cause rather to admire them, than left any place to add any thing unto them. I therefore, as I use to do, will handle it as a Politician, briefly, and yet perhaps in such a way, as hath not been done by any. Showing first, that Princes themselves are the cause of flatterers. Secondly, how many kinds of flatterers there are. Thirdly, in what the essence of flattery consists. And lastly, which of them are hurtful to Cities.  
Concerning the first, it is in common experience, that flatterers are the ruin of Princes; and yet it is easy to show that Princes are themselves the forgers of this their ruin; because if they were furnished with virtue and goodness; flatterers could find no matter in them to work upon: and so, either there would be no flattery at all, or at least not hurtful. And therefore those wise virgins who stood waiting for the Bridegroom by night, having Oil for themselves; which in the Scripture, is often taken for praise, Oleum 〈◊〉 nomen tuum: as Lyranus interprets it, they needed not procure from others the Oil of flattery. Et Oleum peccatoris non impinguet caput meum: so as Princes themselves being the cause of flattery, and not the Subjects; all the fault of it, aught to be laid upon them. Whereupon it is no marvel, that in the Acts, while Herod making an oration to the people, was flattered of them, calling his voice the voice of a God; suddenly an Angel struck him, and he was eaten up of worms. Statuto autem die, Herodes indutus vestitu Regio & sedens super Tribunal, concionabatur ad Illos: populus autem clamabat, vox Dei: statim autem illum percussit Angelus Domini: what fault was it in Herod, that the people applauded him, calling his voice, the voice of God? and yet he was strooken, and not the People. We may say then, that our Lord God by this example would show, that Princes themselves are more cause of the people's flattery, than the subjects are; which, as a Pen, writes such things, as he that moves it draws; of which, it is but the instrument, and no efficient cause.  
Before I come to the other two heads; that is, how many kinds of flattery there are; and which of them be hurtful to a City: I am forced to premise a little doctrine, of which I shall have use, in the explication of the one and the other.  
We must therefore know, that flattery is a moral action: one of its contraries being friendship, which is a moral virtue; and because contraries, (as witnesseth the Philosopher) are all under the same genus; as white and black under colour; therefore flattery also must be under the genus of moral actions: of which there are many so bad, that nothing can make them good, as adultery, and such like. This opinion was held by the master of the sentences; by the authority of S. Austin, where he saith, Bonum est continentia, malum est luxuria, inter utrumque indifferens, ambulare; capitis naribusque purgamenta projicere, sputis rheumata jacere, hoc nec bonum, nec malum est; sive enim feceris, sive non feceris, nec justitiam habebis, nec injustitiam. Thirdly, an action may in his own nature be good; yet so as by means, it may become bad: as to fast, to pray, to sacrifice, and the like. Qui enim de rapina Deo sacrificium offerunt (saith S. Austin) idem facit, ac si filium in conspectu patris victimet. Lastly, an action may be given, which of its own nature is bad; and yet by some other cause, may become good. Murder is a wicked thing, yet Elias in killing the false Prophets did a good work, and showed himself zealous of the honour of God.  
Those actions then which are subject to alteration, may receive it from three things: first, from the object; a carnal act performed with a wife, is good; but if with another man's wife, is wicked. Secondly, from the circumstance: the Sacrifice which Saul made, because it wanted the due circumstances, was not accepted of God. Thirdly, it may receive this alteration from the end; that is, from the intention: but because the end may comprehend under it, both the object and the circumstances; therefore we must know, that it may be considered three ways: First, as it is an object, that terminates the act; and than it is called an intrinsical end. Secondly, as it happens to some act, as a circumstance. Thirdly, as it is in nature of a cause, and then it is called, Cujus gratia: when therefore we say, that an action may receive goodness or badness, from the end; we mean it the third way.  
The action in which flattery consists, is such as may receive alteration, from the intention, or from the object; or from the circumstances. What action of its own nature more adulatory, then to feign one's self crook-backt, with one that is crook-backt; as Plato's scholars did? or to stammer with one that is stammering, as Aristotle's did; or to fiegne himself wry-necked, with one that is so, as the Courtiers of Alexander the great did? or to feign one's self poor blind, with one that is poor blind, as the flatterers of Dionysius did? It is indeed the greatest kind of flattery (as Plutarch accounts it) that can be; and yet these and the like actions, Saint Paul did, as he writes himself; with the Jews, he feigned himself a Jew; with those that are weak, to be weak: and in short, with all, he feigned himself all. Et factus sum Judaeis tanquam Judaeus; ut Judaeos lucrare iis qui sub lege sunt, quasi sub lege essem; cum ipse non essem sub lege; ut eos qui sub lege erant lucrifacerem; iis qui sine lege erant, tanquam sine lege essem; cum sine lege Dei non essem; sed in lege essem Christi, ut lucrifacerem eos qui sine lege erant: factus sum infirmus infirmis; ut infirmos lucrifacerem: omnibus omnis factus sum, ut omnes facerem salvos. See here, that act, which of its own nature, was most adulatory, being used by S. Paul, became virtuous and beneficial; and the reason of this can proceed from nothing, but from the intention; because as those other were moved, with their proper interest; So S. Paul was moved with the zeal of God. Vt Judaeos lucrarer, ut eos qui sub lege erant lucrifacerem, ut omnes facerem salvos. For there cannot a better way be found, to reduce men to the right way, then to counterfeit to be such as they are: And even so, do many Physicians use to do; who oftentimes having a patient troubled with a melancholic humour in the brain; in such sort, as that they think themselves to be earthen Pots: they also feign themselves to be such, to the end, that they taking meat, their patient also by their example may take meat, and not die with hunger, out of a conceit that earthen pots could not eat. And in this manner oftentimes they heal their patients; and feigning themselves to be fools, have cured them of folly. Thus also did S. Paul, who circumcised Timothy, with a purpose to take away circumcision; whereof Saint chrysostom speaking, saith, Vide opus, circumcidit, ut circumcisionem tolleret. Not without cause therefore did Marcus Tullius blame Cato, that would not flatter the people with counterfeiting their fashions, thereby to get the Consulship; and have freed his Country from the imminent tyranny of Julius Caesar. And the rather, it being a thing commended of God himself, Cum perverso perverteris: that is, with wicked men, one must feign himself wicked, to reduce them to goodness.  
This Act, which in S. Paul received alteration from the end, may also in the contrary receive alteration from the circumstance; and was used therefore by S. Peter, who when he went to Antiochia, was hindered by S. Paul himself, Et in faciem restiti quia reprehensibilis erat: although the Act of S. Peter was the same, and done with the same intention that S. Paul's was; yet by reason of one circumstance, which was, that by his example, the Gentiles were drawn to Judaise, he deserved reprehension.  
To come then to the second head, which is, how many kinds of flattery there are: I say first, there may be an Act of its own nature exceeding good, and yet be apt to become a flattering act: as, to praise a man for something he hath done, to the end he may with more boldness reprove him afterward, is a good act: and therefore S. Paul knowing that the Corinthians, for the love they bore to certain persons, were fallen into schism, at first, he praiseth them, where he saith, Gratias ago Deo meo, semper pro vobis in gratia Dei, quae data est vobis in Christo Jesus; quia in omnibus divites facti estis in illo, in omni verbo & in omni scientia, sicut testimonium Christi confirmatum est in vobis, ita ut nihil desit vobis impulsus gratiae: certainly a greater praise than this, he could not possibly give; but he adds afterward, Obsecro vos fratres per nomen Domini nostri Jesu Christi ut id ipsum dicatis omnes, & non sint in vobis schismata; see here, after his praising them, how sharply he reprehends them. The contrary happens when one praising a man, speaks the truth, but with an ill intention; for it is then true flattery: and such, a Prince should never endure to hear. And therefore S. Paul, passing with many others by a place, where stood a maid possessed with a devil; and hearing himself praised by that devil for a servant of God, he made him hold his peace, driving him out of the maids body. Factum est autem euntibus nobis ad orationem, puellam quandam habentem spiritum Pythonem obviare nobis, quae quaestum magnum praestabat Dominis suis; Divinando, haec subsecuta Paulum & nos, clamabat dicens: isti homines servi Dei excelsi sunt, qui annuntiant vobis viam salutis: hoc autem faciebat multis diebus: dolens autem Paulus, & conversus spiritui, dixit; praecipio tibi in nomine Jesu Christi, exire ab ea, & exiit eadem hora. There is no doubt, but the devil in praising Saint Paul and his companions said the truth; but because he did it not with a good intent, but to the end, that another time he might tell a lie, and be believed; therefore S. Paul made him go forth of the maid's body. And so ought it to be done to those, who sometimes speak the truth; but to the end, that another time they may more securely flatter. That such kind of praising is flattery, may easily be proved. For either it must proceed from friendship, or from mildness, or else from flattery. But it proceeds not from friendship, because a friend never praiseth out of interest; nor it proceeds not from mildness, because he by Aristotle is defined to be mild, who exceeds in his praises to give contentment; and differenceth him by this from a flatterer, who praiseth for his own interest. So as we truly and upon good ground take this to be flattery; the rather being defined by S. chrysostom, Adulatio est quando quosdam colit quispiam, non propter quae colere oportet, sed ad captandun terrena; where this word Colit stands in place of the Genus; as being common both to a friend, and to him that is mild: and these words Ad captandum terrena, stand in place of the difference; in which the essence of flattery consists.  
Secondly, there may be an action, which of its own nature, is neither good nor bad, but from divers causes may receive a divers form. And it is where virtue is indeed and truly in a Prince, but is increased and made greater in the praising it. The liberality that was in Tiberius being celebrated by the Senators more than was cause; not to the end, he should increase it for the public good; but to the end, to make him privately the more their friend, was flattery, which could not be so called, if it had been done for the public good. And therefore when Metellus was extolled for the great valour and prowess he had showed in managing the war; because it was done to the end, he should continue, and hold on his course, as he did, was no flattery, but a good act, and so recorded by Historians.  
Thirdly, there may be an act, of its own nature bad and flattering; yet capable to become good from the intention: and it is when a Prince is praised for those virtues and conditions which are not in him, but which should be in him, so long as he is not guilty of the contrary vices.  
Fourthly and lastly, there may be an act, I will not say, essentially flattering; but which seldom and very hardly can change its nature; and it is, when a Prince is praised for a virtue, being stained with the contrary vice; as to call one merciful, that is cruel.  
It remains to show, which of these kinds is hurtful to a Prince, and consequently to the subjects. Concerning the first, seeing flattery consists of two things; an action, and an intention: as being an action, it is transient; as being an intention, it is imminent; as being an action it is good, as an intention bad: lastly, as an action it is founded in the merit of the Prince, in which it passeth away; as an intention, it is founded in the ill quality of the actor, in whom it remains; so as it cannot be hurtful to the Prince but by accident; when it is done, as to make an introduction, but hurtful to him that useth it: who thereby shows himself a wicked man, and an interessed flatterer. For there is this difference between moral acts and works artificial, as Aristotle saith, that works of art pass away in the matter; and remain not in the workman; but acts of virtue remaining in ourselves, require a goodness in the actor; which is of small importance in works artificial. But although in this, there appear no great hurt, yet it will be always good to imitate S. Paul, in discarding such persons: or rather to imitate our Lord Christ, who being flattered of the devil, (as Theophilact interprets it) when in Saint Luke, he said, Scio te qui sis, sanctus ille Dei: he instantly rebuked him, Et increpavit illum dicens; obmutesce & exi ab eo.  
The second way that may either hurt, or profit a Prince, is taken from the object; for this praise is about an object, either good or bad: I mean, he whose virtues are extolled, is either virtuous and just as Metellus was, or vicious and wicked as Tiberius was. In the first case, it doth well, and was therefore very profitable to the Commonwealth: but in the second case, I like it not; in regard whereof, S. Gregory saith, Injustus audita lande sua polluitur, justus purgatur: pavet enim si talis non ostenditur, qualis ab hominibus putatur.  
The third way is a little more difficult; yet as it is easy to be known, and hard to be done; so it can do but small hurt, to a City or a Prince. For if he shall believe there is such an opinion had of him; he will endeavour so to carry himself, that his actions may answer that opinion, if not to attain to that for which he is praised, at least to hide the contrary. And for this perhaps Varro (as S. Austin relates) said, that it is profitable for a City, to flatter Princes, with making them believe, they are Sons of the Gods; because finding such an opinion had of them, either they will believe themselves to be such indeed; or at least believing themselves to be accounted such, they will endeavour to do nothing, that may be unworthy of Sons of the Gods. Nevertheless, (to return to our purpose) this way also receives goodness from the object; seeing, if we deal with bad Princes, it is no good course, to make them think, those virtues to be in them, whereof they have not any spark; because, either they will believe that they are such; and then will never endeavour to be such; or at least, finding there is such an opinion had of them, they will content themselves with having the name. But on the other side, if we have to do with a good Prince, it cannot be but very profitable; seeing although he should not believe himself to be such, nor had in such account; yet finding such virtue to be universally praised, he would for meriting the praise, apply himself to it: and much more, if he believe such an opinion to be had of him, for fearing of going less. Therefore S. Austin saith, Gratias 〈◊〉 tibi uberes, quod nos laudas tanquam tales simus: magnopere enim hortaris ut tales esse cupiamus. With this intention he conceives in another Epistle, that Cicero praised Caesar for clemency, Talem esse ostendebat Principem qualem illum fallaciter predicabat. So as from this kind of flattery, there will grow no hurt, but rather good: and the more, if the flatterer meaning to praise a Prince for something that is not in him, he praise him not for some vice; for this would rather provoke him to anger, to hear those vices attributed to him of which he is not guilty: and which are so much better known, as they are less like.  
The last way also may be either good or bad. The Senate of Rome understanding that Macrinus the most cruel man in the World, was chosen Emperor, presently determined to give him the name of Pius; which was not done without great judgement and mystery: & it did some good (though he accepted not the name) to mitigate in some part his cruelty. But chose, when Nero afterward having killed his mother, and an infinite number of Senators, found himself applauded, and the name of a valiant man given him; it drowned him altogether in a flood of vices. Seque in omnes libidines effudit: and a little after, Postquam cuncta scelerum pro egregiis accipi videt, exturbat Octaviam, and so following. From these two contrary, at least unlike effects; I am moved to search out the reason, why the one of them, should be profitable rather then hurtful; and the other be the ruin of so many Citizens? To which I say, that this Act may receive alteration, either from the circumstance, or from the object. From the circumstance, seeing this praise may either be given for a virtue, far different and contrary to a vice with which the Prince is tainted: or it may be given for a virtue, which is near to that vice. If in the first case, we call one that is cruel, merciful; as it is easy to be known, so it will do more good than hurt; because this is rather a modest admonishing the Prince, than an impudent praising of his vices; but in the second case, to call one that is cruel, and a murderer of his Senators and Citizens, by the name of a valiant man, and a freer of his Country; as it is a flattery hard to be known, so it is both to Prince and City most pernicious. Of the first sort, was the case of Macrinus: of the second, that of Nero. As concerning the object, he whom we praise for a virtue, either is stained before, being Prince, with the contrary vice, as Nero was: or else he comes but newly to be Prince, as Macrinus did; if he were stained before, it can do no good, although the praise be for a virtue most remote from the vice; but if he come but newly to be Prince, it may then do some good.  
I will not omit (though this be not the proper place for it) to advertise, that a flatterer is a person, of whom a Prince ought to stand in fear; seeing two sorts of men may be his ruin: either, they that are too free; who using their freeness in dispraising their Lord, must needs give him cause to be afraid; or else they, that are too wary, who concealing their thoughts, are apt to make conspiracies; and the flatterer being of this sort, a concealour of his thoughts, gives the Prince just cause to fear him. And therefore Tiberius an understanding man, neither liked those that flattered too much, nor those that spoke too freely; unde Augusta & lubrica Oratio, (saith Tacitus) sub Principe qui libertatem metuebat, adulationem oderat. And in another place, speaking of flattery, he saith, Quae, moribus corruptis perinde auceps si nulla, & ubi Nimia est.   

Postquam Bruto & Cassio coesis, nulla jam publica arma Pompeius apud siciliam oppressus, exutoque Lepido, interfecto Antonio, ne Julianis quidem partibus nisi Caesar Dux reliquus; posito triumviri nomine, consulem se ferens & ad tuendam plebem Tribunitio Jure contentum, ubi Militem donis; Populum, annona, cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit.  
What things holp Augustus to the Empire, and what means he used to maintain it. The twelfth Discourse.  
COrnelius Tacitus not only in these words, but also in a good part of the first Book, entreating of Augustus, labours to show what means he used to attain the Empire; and what to uphold him, having attained it. And my meaning is to follow his course, and punctually to examine all things: dividing my Discourse into two parts: the first, to show the ways which Augustus used to attain the Empire; the second, the ways by which he maintained it.  
The ordinary ways, as experience and men teach us, to come to a Principality, are either by fortune, or by virtue, or by wickedness, or by craft, or by election; or lastly by succession.  
Augustus then came to the Empire by fortune; which holp him three ways: the first, that when Brutus and Cassius who were his enemies were dead; and that Lepidus and Antonius his partners in greatness were extinguished; he only remained of the Caesarian faction: and therefore Tacitus speaking in what manner fortune aided him, saith, Postquam Bruto & Cassio caesis; nulla jam publica arma, Pompeius apud siciliam oppressus; exuto Lepido, Interfecto Antonio, ne Julianis quidem partibus nisi Caesar Dux reliqu●…s: and so following.  
This only aid of fortune, is the ablest way to raise one to a Principality: and therefore Pericles, (as Plutarch in his life relates) by this only means became Prince of Athens, Postquam Aristides vita decessit, Themistocles exulatum abiit, Cimonem bella, plerique citra Graeciam detinuere, ibi demum Pericles populo se dedit.  
But thisalone did not serve Augustus, but fortune in another manner gave him assistance: for the stoutest Citizens, being part banished, and part slain in battles, it was an easy matter to attain the Empire without any let. This second aid of fortune, Tacitus expresseth, where he saith, Insurgere paulatim, munia Senatus, Magistratum legumque in se trahere; nullo adversante, cum ferocissimi peracies, aut proscriptione cecidissent.  
Not less apt than the first, is this aid, to make a change in States; seeing the people of Tarantum, only because the greater part of the Nobility were dead in war, was easily able to change the state: whereupon Aristotle saith, Contingit vero quandoquidem id, (the change of the State) per fortunam, veluti apud 〈◊〉; cum superati praetio a Lampigensibus Nobilitatis magnam partem amississent.  
But fortune not content with this neither gave Augustus another aid also, to make himself Emperor: which was, that he found the Commonwealth wearied with discords, and the Provinces oppressed by Magistrates; which Tacitus describing saith, Cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa, nomine Principis sub Imperium accepit: and of the Provinces he adds, Neque Provinciae illum rerum statum abnuebant, suspecto Senatus populique Imperio, and that which followeth.  
This way was the only cause that brought Visconte to be Lord of Milan; and Bentivoli to be Lord of Bologna.  
Yet fortune by all these ways had not power herself alone, to bring Augustus to the Empire; though (as we have showed) each of them of itself were apt to do it: but secondarily there concurred with them his own valour, which he showed in so many battles: and lastly, in that Naval fight; by means whereof he came to be Emperor. And although this alone had been sufficient to bring him to the Empire, as was seen in Vitellius, who by getting the victory only in one battle against Otho, made himself Lord of Rome; yet Augustus, besides fortune and his own virtue, brought himself forward by desert, as having enlarged the Roman Empire, Mari Oceano, haud amnitibus longinquis septum Imperium: by this way have many come to be Princes, as Saturnius, and others. And Aristotle himself approves it, where he saith, Praeterea ob beneficia accepta Reges Creavere. Which Saint Thomas expounding, saith, Vel quia pugnavit contra 〈◊〉 pro illis, vel invenit artem aliquam iis necessariam.  
But besides fortune, virtue, and merit, Augustus brought himself forward by wickedness and perfidiousness also, which aided him two ways: First, by making use of those arms to oppress his Country, which he had received to defend it, Arma quae in Antonium caeperat contra Rempublicam versa: and indeed, there cannot be a greater wickedness, then when benefits are turned against him of whom they are received: and therefore our Lord God meaning by the mouth of Esay, to show the ungratefulness & wickedness of the Hebrew people, saith, Filios enutrivi, & exaltavi, ipsi autent spreverunt me, Where the Chaldee paraphrase saith, Tulisti de auro meo, atque de Argento meo, quae dedi tibi, & fecisti tibi Imagines Masculinas. This way was also followed by Hiero the Syracusan, who employed that Army to oppose the Commonwealth, which he had received to defend it.  
But neither did this wickedness of Augustus serve his turn, in committing so many murders, as Tacitus describes where he saith, Pietatemerga parentem & tempora Reipublicae obtentui sumpta. And again, Cassii & Brutorum exitus paternis 〈◊〉 datos: deceptos post Antonium Tarentino Brundusinoque faedere: & nuptiis sororis illeptum, subdole affinitatis poenas mortis exolvisse. But not only this wickedness, with so many other causes spoken of before, concurred; though this alone were enough to bring a man to a Kingdom; as it did Agathocles the Sicilian, and Cleomenes the Spartan and many others; a way unworthy to be imitated not only of Christians, but even of Barbarians: But besides all these, that which aided Augustus was craft and policy: for being called in by his own Citizens, and they divided into Commons and Nobility; The Commons by reason of oppression by the great ones: the Nobles by reason of common diffension, desired rather to have a King and be safe, then to have liberty, and be in danger: So as Augustus, Ad tuendam plebem, took upon him the dignity of a tribune; and to be aided by the Nobility, advanced them in honours and riches, who Novis ex rebus aucti, tuta & praesentia, quam veter a & periculosa mallent. For safety is so sweet a thing, that the people liked better of servitude with safety, than of liberty with danger. And therefore the Israelites finding that the Canaanites were a valiant Nation, were ready rather to turn back into Egypt and be slaves; then to stay in Canaan and be in danger. As it happened also in Exodus, when they saw Pharaoh coming, Nunquid non erant Sepulchra in Aegypto, quando sedebamus super ollas 〈◊〉? And therefore the Romans having driven out the Kings, doubted lest the the people, if the Tarquins should make war upon Rome, would not to resolve, rather to receive the tyrant again, and live in peace; then continue in liberty, and be still in danger. Nec hostes modo timebant (saith Livy) sed suos met ipsos cives, ne Romana plebs, metu perculsa, receptis 〈◊〉 urbem regibus, vel cum servitute pacem acciperet. And here is to be noted, that men will always be more moved with private interest, then with public profit; and that every one had rather be a slave and rich, then to be free and poor. Whereof I will bring one example out of Dio: Caesar having before him the Army of Scipio, caused Letters to be carried into the enemy's Tents, wherein he friendly promised the Soldier's honours and riches, and to the Countrymen, to save their goods untouched; and by this means, he drew them all to come to his side: on the contrary, Scipio also being forced to use the same device of sending Letters into Caesar's Camp, persuaded them to be of his side, in defence and for the good of the Commonwealth; putting them in mind, of the great benefit of liberty: for all which persuasions, there was not a man that would offer to go from Caesar; whereby we may plainly see, that ordinarily men prefer profit before honesty. And where it may be objected, that people infinite times make insurrections only for their liberty: it is easily answered, if we consider that under that name of liberty, they always think, or are made believe, there is great profit to be had: and therefore they desire liberty, not as an end, but as a means to another end.  
But to return to our purpose; besides so many causes alleged, concurring in favour of Augustus; this of election also is to be added: that he was chosen by the Senate, by the people, and by the Soldiers; by which means infinite others have obtained the Roman Empire: and so it happened amongst the Grecians, so the Pope, so the Kings of Polan, so the Emperor in our times, by this means only of being elected, attain their Principalities.  
Lastly, it may be also said, that he came to be Emperor by succession, as being the next of kin to Caesar, to whom by right of succession, besides his being made his heir by his Will, the Empire belonged.  
We may then say, that Augustus came to be Emperor, neither by fortune, nor by wickedness, nor by policy, nor by merit, nor by election, nor by succession, but by all of them together; seeing each of these, (as I have before showed) being apt of itself to raise a man to the Empire, certainly all of them concurring in Augustus could not choose but effect it.  
And thus much for his attaining the Empire; now for holding it, thus gotten: we say, that an Empire may be held, either from the Nobility, or from the people, or from the Soldiers; and that either by love or by force. With the people it is held by procuring of plenty, and that the poor be not wronged by the rich; there being nothing that makes a Prince more beloved of the people, than to keep them safe from the insolency of great men. And therefore the Holy Ghost meaning to show the cause, why all Nations should serve that King, saith, Omnes Gentes servient ei, quia liberavit pauperem à potente: and a little after, Et honorabile Nomen eorum coram illo. S. Hierome reads it, Et pretiosus crit sanguis eorum coram illo, That is, they shall hold the honour of the King in great account, and shall not leave unpunished whosoever shall imbrue their hands in his blood; as was seen in the conspiracy against Caesar. This therefore Augustus knowing, took upon him the power of a Tribune, Et ad tuendam plebem Tribunitio jure contentunt: and suffered them not to be in want, knowing that safety without plenty is little esteemed: and therefore he saith, Populum annona.  
Now for Noble men, they are of two sorts; stout, and timorous. In the stout, there is no trusting, being men that extremely scorn a servile condition; and consequently extremely hate a tyrant. And therefore it was necessary, Augustus should send such into banishment or to the wars; and they once dead, he then remained secure and without fear of any new hatred. To the timorous and quiet are to be given honours; for a Gentleman hath no other end, but honour: and of these, the Prince ought to make use in peace; and as for war he need not fear them: therefore Tacitus saith, Caeteri Nobilium quanto quis servitio promptior opibus & honoribus extolluntur: ac Novis ex rebus aucti, tuta & praesentia quam vetera & periculosa mallent. Where it is to be observed, that by caeteri he means, those only that were not stout: there following, without any words between, Cum ferocissimi per acies ant proscriptione cecidissent.  
Augustus then did well, to advance many of the Noble men, above the others; & especially those, that showed themselves most ready to do him service. First, to the end, that such example might draw others to the like servitude, thereby to gain the like honour. Secondly, to the end that seeing honours attained to under a Prince, which could never have been attained in a Commonwealth, they might the better be contented with such a State; and therefore Aristotle amongst the means for conserving a Kingdom, forgets not to speak of this, where he saith, Atque eos viros qui aliqua in re honorabiliter se gesserint honorare; ita ut non existiment unquam se magis honorari in civitate degentibus potuisse. Thirdly, Augustus did well, to advance many great ones above others, because as where equality is, a Kingdom there is hardly raised, and liberty easily maintained: so where there is inequality, a Kingdom there is easily preserved: and therefore a Prince is to be commended, that removeth many from equality; to the end there may be seen a certain proportion, and not one to be unequal, and all the rest equal. The reason of this, in my opinion, is, because when only one is seen unequal, all the rest will have a desire to reduce him to equality, and by some means or other to rid him away; but when there are many unequals, the inferiors not only will never be moved to conspire against the Prince, because they should never by this means come to equality: but also they will not suffer any other to do it, resting satisfied in this, that as themselves have many unequals, their superiors; so those have the Prince unequal, and their superior: and in this at least they shall be equal, that they are all of them inferior to one.  
But because obedience is hardly found, especially in new states, if there be not force concurring; whereupon the Throne of Solomon, which by Writers is taken for obedience, was compassed about with twelve Lions; seeing they who desire to be obeyed, ought together with generosity, have force also to make them be obeyed; and therefore the holy Ghost in the mouth of Solomon saith, Sicut Turris David, collum tuum; quae aedisicate est cum propagnaculis; mille clypei pendent ex ea; omnis armatura fortium. This Tower hath so many defences, because it is put for a figure of obedience; meaning to show, that they who desire to preserve obedience, have need of all sorts of Arms to defend it: for these causes, Augustus knowing this, and having an Army in his hand, able to make him be obeyed by force, if need should be, he made the Soldiers sure to him, by donatives of which they are most greedy: whereupon it may be said, that Augustus maintained his Empire, neither by the Nobility, nor by the people, nor by the soldiers; neither by love, nor yet by force, but by all of them together.   

Et ad tuendam plebem Tribunitio jure contentum, ubi Militem donis, Populum annona, cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit.  
How Princes may get the people's love: how a private man ought to make use of the people's favour; and what part it hath in bestowing the Empire. The thirteenth Discourse.  
AS safety is not enough to give the people satisfaction, if it be not accompanied with plenty: and therefore the Israelites, though they lived safe under their leader Moses, yet when plenty failed, they desired again the servitude of Pharaoh: so neither doth plenty give satisfaction, if it be not accompanied with peace, as was plainly seen in that people; for when those men returned whom Joshua had sent into the Land of Promise, to make known the fruitfulness of the Country, yet when they heard there were in it great store of Giants, only for this, they liked better to stay in the Wilderness in peace, then to go to a Land flowing with Milk and Honey with war: the desire of living quietly prevailing more with them, than the enjoying of plenty.  
Three things then are required in a people, to make them absolutely happy: safety from being oppressed by those at home; peace with those abroad; and plenty. Whereupon our Lord God meaning to show the happiness in which his people should live, expresseth these three things by the mouth of his Prophet Esay, where he saith, Sedebit populus meus in plenitudine pacis, here is peace: In Tabernaculis fiduciae, here is safety: In requie opulenti, here is plenty. Such a like happiness Tacitus shows that Rome had; or to say better, the people of Rome under the Dominion of Augustus; where he saith, Et ad tuendam plebem Tribunitio jure contentum: see here, by making himself protector of the people, he made them safe from oppressors at home: Vbi populum Annona, see here, plenty: Cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit, see here the safety from foreign enemies, which is peace; for by the word Otium in this place (as I shall show in another discourse) he means nothing else but peace.  
But because many gather from this place, seeing Augustus obtained and maintained his Empire by the love of the people; that therefore this is the true way, for all others to rise from a private man to be a Prince; and the rather because a place in Aristotle confirmed by many examples seems to concur in this opinion, where he saith, Et profecto antiquorum Tyrannorum plurimi ex popularibus hominibus facti sunt; I shall be forced in discoursing of this matter, to proceed with distinction, as finding many places directly contrary to this; and particularly in the foresaid Tacitus, who in another place shows, that the people's favour is rather a ruin than a fortune to great men; where in the third of his Annals he saith, Breves & Infaustos Rontani populi amores.  
I say then, that he who is in the people's favour, either he hath a mind to make himself Prince, or he hath not: if he have no such mind, he shall do better to avoid those demonstrations with safety, which without any benefit makes him run into danger; seeing a good intention is not sufficient, where it is equally dangerous, to have such imputation, whether wrongfully or justly, as Tacitus well saith, Si objiciantur etiam insontibus, periculosa: because Princes, as soon as they see the people's favour inclining to another, presently have him in suspicion; and therefore David began to be hated of Saul, as soon as he knew the people loved him: whereupon in the book of the Kings, the holy Spirit saith, Posuitque eum Saul, supra viros belli, & acceptus erat in occulis Vniversi populi, maximeque in 〈◊〉 famulorum Saul: and a little after, Non rectis ergo oculis, Saul respiciebat David, a die illa & deinceps.  
Likewise when the mystical David, Christ, was seen to the Jews, to enter triumphantly into Jerusalem on Palme-sunday, with great applause of the people, they presently began to conspire against him: The like happened to Germanicus, whose case was much like that of Aristobulus; both of them being gracious with the people; young men of goodly presence, both; both of them next to the Crown; under most cruel tyrants, Herod the great, and Tiberius Nero; both of them for the same causes put to death by fraud: one bewalled counterfeitly of Herod; the other, feignedly of Nero; by whom in truth they came to their deaths. Of these then, it may be said, Breves & 〈◊〉 populi amores.  
But if he that is in the people's favour, have an intention to make himself Prince, we must then distinguish: for either the people's favour towards him grows out of a discontentment towards the Prince; or it comes out of anger arising from some sudden accident: if in the first case; he that will make use of their favour, if he be able to hide it, which is a difficult thing, shall do well to wait for some good occasion: seeing he may assure himself, that as discontentment increaseth by little and little, and is nourished in minds once discontented; so it is hard, or rather impossible, it should vanish on a sudden: and therefore if he stay for a good beginning, where there hath preceded a good occasion, as I have showed in another discourse, there can be no doubt of having good success. Prince's therefore must take heed, they give the people no such occasions; which are so much more dangerous, as they are less violent: because in such cases, men are not moved with every light wind; but waiting for a fit opportunity, they then show their minds when they see they have power to do it, with the ruin of the Prince. And there needs no other proof of this, than the examples of the Aragonesi, and of Ludovico Moro. But if the people be moved to aid him, out of choler, this, as it is less dangerous for the Prince; so to him that would make use of it, it is more difficult: First, because when the beginnings are not preceded by fit occasions, as hath been showed in the like cases, it seldom takes any good effect: And therefore when the people would have risen against Tiberius, only out of choler, because he had taken from them that small authority they had; this insurrection not being preceded by mature judgement, there was none would take upon him to be Head; and so the enterprise came to nothing Secondly, because the occasion which is founded upon choler, will soon cease, and is never able to continue; and as it grows cool, makes men repent them of what they had done. And you cannot say, that having provoked the Prince with choler, there is now a necessity to follow that Head for fear; with whom, partaking in fault, they partake also in fortune; for this is directly the overthrow of the business, because having provoked the Prince's mind with their insurrection, and knowing they may please him again with killing their Head, they will easily be drawn to murder him. Nevertheless, he that will make use of the people's favour, for rising to any honour, which he thinks is his due, let him give them no time to think of the matter, but once persuaded, let him suddenly venture. Don Antonio of Portugal, finding he had the people's favour, instantly without delaying any time, made use of it, and it took effect. So Bardanus called in by the Parthians, that would drive out Gotarze, went about it with all suddenness; and having gotten possession, knowing the inconstancy of that people, he suddenly fortified all the principal places of the Country. It is therefore no marvel, that Caius Cassius gave counsel to seize upon the Kingdom suddenly, knowing the Parthians to be fickle and inconstant; and this suddenness ought the rather to be used, because for the most part, a people in insurrections is drawn to do things, which though good, yet are repugnant to their Genius: and therefore if time be given them, they soon perceive their error, and thereupon repent, and put presently their repentance in execution. The Soldiers of Nero's guard, were with great cunning persuaded to give their consent to his death; but when they had time given them to perceive their error, they suddenly turned to take revenge, and it took effect. Miles Vrbanus longo Caesarum Sacramento 〈◊〉, & ad destituendum Neronem arte magis & impulsu, quam suo ingenio traductus: and that which followeth. Another example we have in the second of Tacitus his Annals; where speaking of Vonone, whom Tiberius at their desire had sent to the Parthians, he saith, that at first they received him with great applause, Et accepere barbari Laetantes prout ferme ad nova imperia; but those people thinking afterward of the matter, though he were a King of good conditions, and profitable for them, yet, because he came from the Emperor of Rome, and consequently contrary to the Genius of that Nation, they first repented them, and afterward expelled him. Mox subiit pudor degeneravisse Parthos petitum alio ex orbe Regem; and that which followeth. This than may pass for a general rule, always when either through eloquence, or threatening, or reward, or any other cunning, a man is induced to do a thing against his genius, seeing it depends upon his will, it is like to last no longer than he hath time to think upon it: and therefore the best course in such cases, is so to manage the business, that having once persuaded him, it be not left in his power to repent, as Bardanus did, by fortifying himself presently. So Jehu who in the life of Joram, was accepted King by God's appointment, seeing the good inclination of the people towards him, and knowing that if he gave them time he should never persuade them to set upon their natural Lord, he went instantly to find out Joram, and slew him. This reason is taken into consideration by Abulensis, where he saith, Quia totus vigour Jehu erat in hoc, quod populus concorditer adjuvare illum volebat: si tamen differret opus ad aliquantulum tempus, forte animi virorum tepescerent, & nollent insurgere contra Dominum suum antiquum. But the contrary of this being done by Julius Campitolinus, and Spurius Aemilius in Livy, both the one and the other were forsaken of the people, and they run themselves into no small danger. For the people indeed are never able to continue long in dissensions, having trades which they must necessarily follow to get their living; which Aristotle considering, is of the mind, that there cannot be a better kind of people in a City, then that which consists of Husbandmen; because being forced to attend their occupation, they are not able to stay long in seditions. He therefore that will make use of the people, for the purpose aforesaid, let him dispatch it, and do it so speedily, that they may have no time given to repent them.  
I cannot omit here to examine the reason, why the people oftentimes do good actions upon the sudden, and such as upon mature deliberation they would not do; and forbearing for brevity's sake, certain reasons which every one of himself may easily conceive, I only say, that this proceeds from the weakness of their understanding; It being their custom, either to do nothing that is good, or else to do it upon the sudden; because as Aristotle saith, All weak things come soon to their accomplishment and height: seeing nature, which is moved by the intelligences, and by God, bestows little time upon the growth of base things, as is seen in Pompions, and other Herbs of small moment. Another reason may be taken from the said Aristotle, who speaking of the Ancients who made the first principles contraries, saith, Quasi a veritate ipsa coacti; whereas S. Thomas learnedly shows, that as a stone of its own nature descends downward, and fire ascends upward; so the understanding naturally follows the better appearance: and therefore weak understandings, if they do at any time any good thing, they must do it naturally, and consequently upon the sudden; for if they have time to think upon it, than the counsel which they give, or the action, which they do, will be no longer natural but Artificial; and therefore weak understandings are not perfected by deliberation, but rather confounded, and by this means would oftentimes go astray. This then is the Philosophical and Real reason, why many having done something that is good, do afterward by thinking upon it, and deliberating, spoil and overthrow it.  
For resolution therefore, and to make the fore-alleged passages to agree, I say, that the people are not the whole cause of raising one to a Royalty, but only concur as a cause in part; neither yet the people together with the Nobility, sufficient to make an alteration, where there are Soldiers; and therefore not without cause Tacitus saith, Breves & infaustos populi Romani amores: because the City of Rome was never without Praetorian soldiers. Of this there is a plain example, in the whole siege of Nola, in Livy; and to speak of our own times, in Verona, where the people having a mind to rise in favour of the Venetians, yet because the soldiers of the King of France and of the Emperor were within it, they were not able to do any thing of moment. We may therefore conclude, that the people alone can never be an absolute means to raise a man to a Principality, if it be not upon a sudden, and that there be no Soldiers in the place; for against them there is no good to be done, although they should have the Nobility to assist them: but the people together with the soldiers, may easily raise one to the Empire, and when Tacitus saith, Breves & infaustos populi Romani amores, he means it of the people alone; but in this present place, he speaks of the people and soldiers together; which plainly appears, because having said, Et ad tuendam plebem Tribunitio jure contentum, he adds, Vbi militem donis: showing he well knew, that together with the people, the soldiers must concur. And Aristotle differs not from Tacitus, nor yet from my opinion, but rather confirms both the one and the other: seeing, where he gives a reason, how it happened, that in ancient times the favourites of the people came to be Lords, he saith, that the same man who was powerful with the people, was also Leader of the Army; and so, had both people and soldiers of his side. And adds withal, that whosoever of late time hath attempted any thing, relying only upon the people, hath never brought his purpose to any good pass: A manifest argument, that the people concur as a cause in part, if the soldiers join with them: Vetustis quident temporibus (saith he) quando idem erat potens in populo ac Bello, Dux, Popularis Respublica in Tyrannidem mutabatur, & profecto antiquorum Tyrannorum plurimi ex popularibus hominibus facti sunt: causa autem cur tunc fierent, non autem nunc, illa est, quod qui tunc in populo maxime poterat, ex iis erat qui bello 〈◊〉.   

Ubi Militem donis.  
How the Donatives which are given to soldiers are profitable to raise a man, and to maintine him in the Empire●… and when it is that Military discipino is corrupted by them. The fourteenth Discourse.  
THere are two things chiefly that move men to follow the wars; Acquiring of honour, and increase of riches; and both these are in Donatives: for Donatives, as to the thing itself, is an increase of wealth; and coming from the Prince's hand, as a testimony of the soldier's valour, they are an increase of Honour. It is therefore no marvel that Augustus, not only at his entrance into the Empire, but even from his childhood, used with Donatives to win the soldier's love, seeing they are able to corrupt the wisest and best men; as our Lord God in Exodus hath left written, Nec accipies munera quae etiam excaecant prudentes & subvertunt verba justorum. Whereupon not without cause, S. John in the Apocalypse, calls them by the name of Witchcraft, where speaking of Rome under the figure of Babylon he saith, Quia mercatores tui erant Principes terrae, quia in venesiciis tuis erraverunt omnes Gentes. Where S. John intends to show, according to the opinion of some, that Rome by means of gifts, as it were with sorcery, had drawn the greatest part of the world, to the adoration of Idols. Tiberius therefore knowing what power there is in them, when Junius Gallus had moved in the Senate, that Gifts and Honours should be bestowed upon the soldiers of his Guard, he sharply reproved him (saith Tacitus) veluti coram rogitans, quid illi cum militibus esset, quos neque ditu Imperatoris, neque Praemia nisi ab Imperatore accipere par esset.  
Yet the introduction of Donatives was to the Commonwealth of Rome of exceeding great damage. First, they have been, (as I shall show in fit place) in great part the cause, why the City of Rome, freed once from tyranny by Lucius Brutus, was never afterward able, being oppressed by the House of the Caesars, to recover its liberty; the Donatives having put the election into the soldier's hands, and they, not to lose so great a gain, would always rather have an Emperor for their private profit, than a Commonwealth for the public benefit. Secondly, because having an Army in their hand, on which the election and safety of the Emperors depended, as men greedy of money, they were moved to stand for him who offered most, in such sort, that at last they came to set it, at who gives more: and because as Aristotle in his Politics well observes, when Honours are bestowed in a City, in regard of riches, it is an easy matter for every Plebeian to become Honourable; and therefore no marvel that Elius Pertinax an Ostlers son, came to be chosen Emperor.  
It is therefore a clear case, that these Donatives were the ruin of the City of Rome; from whence also may be inferred, that they were hurtful to the Prince, whose profit depended upon the welfare of the City. But because the contrary happens where tyrants govern, I shall be forced to examine, whether the introduction of Donatives were for the Emperor's benefit, or no. Many approve the affirmative part, as moved not only by the said place of Tacitus, where he showeth, they were to Augustus a special help; but by the example also of Caesar, who by this means, both obtained and maintained the Empire. And it avails not to say, that he was there slain, because seeing one man's indignation was enough to make a Prince be murdered; the difference that may be taken from the ones well, and the others ill governing, for conserving the Empire, ought not to be taken from a violent death, but rather that death being revenged, and the ancient successors replaced in their states: I see not, how there can be a greater sign, of proceeding with judgement for his own security, being able even after his death, with his only name, to procure his revenge, and to settle the Empire in his own family; a hard matter oftentimes for the best Princes to obtain, who yet have the favour of God, to die a natural death. This example therefore, (to omit many others, of which Histories are full) is an evident proof, that Donatives to the Soldiers, were profitable to the Roman Emperors, not only to attain the Empire, but also to maintain them in it. Nevertheless, for the Negative part, there want not examples to the contrary, not only of Otho, but of infinite other Emperors, who by giving excessive Donatives, lost the Empire.  
For resolution, we must proceed with distinction; either he that comes to the Empire, is the first that brought in Donatives, as Caesar the dictator, and Octavius Augustus were; and then not only they help to attain, but also to maintain the Empire: and therefore Tacitus intimates it as a praise to Augustus, where he saith, Vbi Militem Donis; or else he is not the first, but finds it a custom brought in before, and then as it may be a good means to attain the Empire; so it is a certain ruin for maintaining it. The reason of this difference is, because the soldiers not being accustomed to receive Donatives; the first time it is given them, they acknowledge it as a gift of the Prince's bounty, and account themselves obliged for it; and more than so, not knowing whither they should receive the like from others, they endeavour to uphold him in the Empire, hoping hereafter to have those things by merit, which the Prince at this time hath given them of courtesy. But if they have been accustomed to have Donatives, and it hath been a use amongst them, then, where in the first, they acknowledged them the only bounty of the Prince, and received them as gifts of grace; now accounting them as debt, they take them as rewards of due, which if it be denied them, it than causeth an implacable hatred against the Prince, and at last, his ruin; and if it be granted them, yet this increaseth not the soldier's love, who count not themselves beholding to the Prince for them, but as fellows accustomed to have money without pains, they spend it frolickly, and that spent, they expect new Donatives; which if a Prince may satisfy a while, yet he cannot hold out to do so long, but that at last he must be fain to deny them; and when this happens they presently fall to choose a new Emperor of whom they may receive it; and this hath been in Rome, the ruin and death of many, as every one may read and see. We may therefore conclude, that Donatives to the soldiers are very profitable to all for attaining the Empire, but that the introduction of Donatives for them that were not the first, is very pernicious for maintaining them in it. And Galba having already attained the Empire, and knowing this, openly made it known, that he meant to give no more Donatives to the soldiers, as resolved to take away so great an abuse, Accessit Galbae vox, pro Republica, honesta, ipst anceps; legi a se Militem, non emi, but it had an unhappy issue: First, because (as I have showed in another Discourse) the Soldiers were against their genius induced to abandon Nero; and therefore it had been fit, with the same cunning to have held them in, and not have suffered them to be conscious of their error, Miles Vrbanus longo Caesarum Sacramento imbutus, & ad destituendum Neronem, arte magis & impulsu, quam suo ingenio traductus, postquam neque dari Donativum sub nomine Galbae, and that which follows. Secondly, having gotten no reputation amongst the soldiers, and by reason of his age, being apt to be contemned, he should rather with liberality have gotten their love, than through covetousness have procured their hate. Non enim ad hanc formam (saith Tacitus, to not giving donatives to Soldiers) Caetera erant; invalidum senem; and that which follows. Thirdly, if he would not give donatives himself; yet at least, he should have taken order, that no other in his prejudice, should have given them; which because he did not do, he therefore with his avarice was by Otho's liberality easily oppressed. Quoties Galba apud Othonem epularetur, cohorti excubias agenti, viritim centenos 〈◊〉 divideret, quam veluti publicam largitionem Otho securioribus apud singulos praemiis, intendebat, adeo animosus corruptor ut Cocceio Proculo speculatori de parte finium cum vicino ambigenti, universum vicint agrum sua pecunia emptum, dono 〈◊〉 per: focordium 〈◊〉. Fourthly, to take away a custom so 〈◊〉, he should have contented himself in the beginning, with only moderating it, especially, seeing he might have obtained his purpose, with any small donative, Constat potuisse conciliari animos (faith 〈◊〉) quantulacunque parci senis liberalitate; 〈◊〉 antiquus vigour, & nimia severitas, cui jam pares non 〈◊〉. By which words we may plainly see, that Tacitus blames not his severity, but the excessiveness of it: whereupon Vespasian who knew as much as Galba knew, took a better course, and had his intent. For moderating only the donatives of the soldiers, he left them not altogether without hope of having some; & by this means, he preserved himself in the Empire, and yet corrupted not the soldiers: Ne Vespasianus 〈◊〉 plus civili bello 〈◊〉, quam alii in pace, egregie 〈◊〉 adversus militarem largitionem, eoque exercitu meliore.  
If any should now inquire, whether donatives to the soldiers corrupt Military Discipline, or no? I would briefly answer, That rewards uphold it, but that donatives corrupt it: and the reason is, because donatives being such as are given without cause, the soldier may always by the same right demand them; and whilst he stands waiting for this aid from the Prince, he becomes idle and good for nothing. But rewards given for some notable service, cannot but for such service he demanded, and that soldiers should endeavour to do such services, is a matter of great profit to Military difcipline. And therefore Caesar, with Reward, made his Soldiers more valorous, and Otho, with donatives corrupted them.   

Populum Annona.  
How much it imports a Prince for getting the people's love, to maintain plenty, by what means scarcity happens, and how it may be helped, and how a Prince may make good use of it. The fifteenth Discourse.  
ABove all things for winning the people's love, a Prince must take care there may be plenty; in regard whereof, Caesar ordained two Aediles, whose employment was only to this purpose. Also Augustus knowing of how great importance this is, (as Tacitus relates) amongst other secrets of his government, had always a great jealousy of Egypt, from whence all the Corn for maintenance of plenty in Rome, came; and indeed both the one and the other understood it rightly, because, as the want thereof is apt to cause insurrections amongst the people, as was often seen amongst the Israelites against Moses, who if God had not mightily protected him, had oftentimes for this only been in manifest danger: so on the contrary, the only plenty of things is enough of itself to raise a man to the Empire; As was seen at Rome, when the City was so oppressed with a dearth, that the Citizens chose rather to die in the water of Tiber, than to stay upon the Land, and be starved with hunger. And he that will see an example of this, may consider how our Lord Jesus Christ, having fed a multitude that followed him in the Wilderness, he had presently the acclamations to be a King, or a Prophet, Illi ergo homines (saith S. John) cum vidissent quod Jesus fecerat signum, (that is of the bread and fish he gave them) dicebant quia hic est vere Propheta qui venturus est in mundum, Jesus ergo cum cognovisset, quia venturi essent ut raperent eum, & facerent eum Regem, fugit interim in montem; but they another time, desiring to eat, asked him bread, Domine semper da nobis panem bune; and he at that time denying to give them temporal bread, the multitude, which before when he gave them meat, had called him a Prophet, and would have had him for their King, now they call him a Carpenter's son, for no other cause, but because he denied them corporal bread, when he meant to set them at Gods own Table: Murmurabant ergo Judaei die illo, quia dixisset ego 〈◊〉 panis 〈◊〉, qui de Caelo descendi, & dicebant nun 〈◊〉 est 〈◊〉 Joseph cujus nos novimus patrem & matrem? For there is no such happiness to the people, as to have wherewith to fill their bellies. Whereupon as S. chrysostom observes, in making mention of the miracles and stupendious Acts of Moses, they omitted all other, though far more marvellous, and mentioned only that of Manna, Patres nostri 〈◊〉 Manna in deserto.  
A Prince therefore must of necessity, either maintain plenty, or else leave his Principality, and specially one that comes newly to the Empire, as Augustus did. And therefore Esay, Prophesying of one whom the Israelites should require to accept the Kingdom, shows that if they knew him not able to maintain plenty, they should not accept him, In domo mea non 〈◊〉 panis nolite constituere me Regem super vos. Being assured, he could never hold his Principality with dearth, as it happened to Prometheus' King of the Scythians, who not being able to maintain his people in plenty, by reason the Land was overflowed with the River 〈◊〉, he was cast into Prison; and because Hercules turned that River into the Sea, and made the Country fruitful, the fable came up, that an Eagle devoured the liver of Prometheus, and that Hercules freed him.  
Having showed, that Augustus in the beginning of his reign, won the people to him by procuring of plenty, it will be necessary to show, how dearths happen, and by what means they may be helped, and how far the Prince is faulty in them.  
A dearth may happen first, from the barrenness of the soil, as it happened to the Israelites in the Wilderness.  
Secondly, It may happen, for want of Husbandmen to till the ground, which if it were tilled, would be very sufficient and have to spare, as in times past, it happened in Mesopotamia, and in our time would often happen in the Sea coasts of Sienna, if the care of the Serenissimo the great Duke did not supply the want of Husbandmen.  
Thirdly, it may happen through abundance of people, and smallness of Territory, as in ancient time it would have happened at Rome, and would in our time at Florence, if the one had not then had the Countries of Egypt and Sicily for a Granary, and the other had not now a gracious and provident Prince for a purveyour.  
Fourthly, it may happen through the sterility of the season, and of the year, as particularly this year 1621.  
Fifthly, many times there are Husbandmen and land enough to till, but is not tilled, either by reason of war, or for some other cause, as it happened at Rome not long after the banishment of the Tarquins; the people (as Livy relates) by reason of dissensions with the Senate, refusing to till their grounds, in such sort that they wanted not much of dying for hunger.  
Lastly, it happens oftentimes, either by reason of a siege, as in Jerusalem, where mothers did eat their own children; or through incursions of enemies, as in Athens all the time of the civil war.  
And although in none of these cases, any just blame can be laid upon the Prince, yet it is his part to use all means, with money, diligence and power, to make resistance against fortune, nature, and all accidents whatsoever.  
In the first case, I shall not need to trouble myself to show, how a dearth may be helped in desert places; seeing he might well be accounted a man without brain, that would build a City, in a Country altogether barren: and though it were so with the Israelites, yet their Tabernacles were for passage and not for habitation.  
If it should happen in the second case, that is for want of men, where there is Land sufficient; here the Prince must induce men to marry, and draw in strangers to dwell in the Country; the first will take effect, if the course of Lycurgus be observed, who seeking to make the City of Sparta populous, allowed great exemptions to them that begot children, or else if disburthening them of taxes, (as the Duke of Parma at this day doth in his State of Castro) he shall give occasion, that gathering wealth, they may endeavour to have children to whom to leave it; and by this course, he shall be able to draw strangers also to come and live there. For men run willingly even with danger of their lives, where they see there is certain & present profit to be had, never having a thought of a future and uncertain death. Whereof we have example in the State of Milan, where in some places the air is so unwholesome, that few of the inhabitants ever come to be forty years old; yet in these places, men growing rich, although they see this example daily before their eyes, yet they choose rather to dwell there, than in other places of wholesome air. Another course also may be taken, for this inconvenience, by drawing thither, a foreign Nation, as Antiochus did, who causing two thousand families of Jews to come and dwell in the Countries of Mesopotamia and Babylon, (as Josephus relates) assighed them Land to till, and places where to build, and then exempting them for ten years from tribute, he lastly gave order, they should have so much Corn given them, as might serve them to live, till their own should be reaped.  
And lastly, those who dwell in such air, and in such Countries, should indeed, have no other burdens laid upon them, but only the burden of bringing up their children, Pauperes satis stipendit pendere (saith Livy) si liberos educent. But notlling prevails so much to make a place populous, as the Princes living there: and so 〈◊〉 Hostilius did; and we have experience of it at Petiglidho, where whilst the Orsini that were Lords of it, kept their residence, it was infinitely fuller of people than it is at this day, under the 〈◊〉 the great Duke of Thuscany, though governed by him, with admirable justice and clemency; of so great importance is the presence of their natural Lord, that many times men had rather have a tyrant, that should live amongst them, than a good Prince, that should be far of.  
Another way is no wadaies used by Princes for peopling such places, and it is, by confining some petty delinquents thither; because, if they live, they increase the number of the inhabitants; and if they die, the Prince receives no loss by it. This invention whether good or bad, is yet most ancient; and we have an example of it in Tacitus himself, Actum & de 〈◊〉 Aegyptiis 〈◊〉 pellendis, factunque 〈◊〉 consultum, ut quatuor millia libertini generis, & superstitione infecti, queis Idonea aetas, in insulam Sardiniam 〈◊〉, coercendis illic latrociniis, & si ob gravitatem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vile damnum.  
If the defect grow in the third case, that is, from smallness of Territory, where the people are many, the remedy here used, hath been to send forth Colonies; so Pericles did, to help a dearth that was at Athens. In this case Plutarch in the life of Numa, gives a counsel, which is, that in such a City, care must be taken that Trades be in account, and that idle persons be punished; but the best course of all will be, that the Prince spare no cost to fetch Corn, where it may be best had; so a thousand times did Tiberius, and so Nero, who not regarding the great charge he had been at by Sea, nor the great loss he had in Tiber, with infinite expenses, provided that the price of Corn might not be raised. This course was notably followed, by the Serenissimo Cosmo, second great Duke of Thuscany, who by the way of Livorno, and other places, procured at his infinite charges, a perfect plenty; and sometimes out of his own purse, hath kept of Alms six thousand persons. I forbear to say, that many years together, he spent of his own, to keep down the price of Corn, above a hundred thousand Crowns: An act that exceeds any act whatsoever of the Ancients, seeing that which moved them, was their own interest, and matter of state; but that which moved him, was only the office of a Prince, and the zeal of a Christian.  
In the fourth case, provision will be made from other Countries, by such ways as have been showed.  
In the other two cases, where dearth may happen by reason of wars, caused by sieges, and by incursion of enemies, the Commonwealths of the Swissers, have found out an excellent way, who in places under ground, have in store for many years, all things belonging to victuals, and also to Trades; which course, with great prudence, the Commonwealth of Lucca hath taken to imitate.  
But above all, the Prince must take heed, that he be not himself a cause of the dearth, by making merchandise, and by engrossing, nor yet by suffering others to do it, for then the fault will be laid upon the Prince, and the Subjects will have just cause to complain. Likewise, that when the people are in want, he continue not feasting, and feed upon dainties, as showing to take little care of his Subjects misery; a thing most pernicious to Princes, who should always take such part as the people do, thereby to encourage them the more contentedly to bear their labours. This in the old Testament our Lord God teacheth us; who when the Israelites were in the Wilderness, and like Shepherds dwelled in Tabernacles, he also would dwell in Tabernacles himself; afterward when changing their course, they entered into war under their Judges and Kings, and their Army used Tents, he also would then dwell in Tents too; and when David desired to build him a Temple, he would not suffer him, until such time, as there being peace under Solomon, every one might dwell in his own house, and then he was contented to have a house also built for him. All this is expressed in the Book of Kings, where he saith, Neque enim habitavi in domo ex die illa qua eduxi filios Israel de terra Aegypti, usque in diem hanc, sed ambulabam in Tabernaculo & in Tentorio per cuncta loca, quae transivi cum omnibus filiis Israel. But because this course was not imitated by Augustus, who when the people died in the streets for hunger, himself made a sumptuous banquet, where (as Suetonius relates) the guests sat in form of Gods and Goddesses, and he in shape of Apollo, the people infinitely distasted it, and was moved to great indignation. Auxit caenae rumorem, summa tunc in civitate penuria, ac fames, acclamatumque postridie est, frumentum omne Deos coniedisse.  
But if he shall be no occasion of the dearth, and much less show himself to rejoice at it, he may then convert it to his own profit, either by getting of money, or increasing his authority, or otherwise by winning the love of his people. Pharaoh King of Egypt, by means of a dearth and joseph's counsel became Lord of all Egypt, Emit igitur Joseph omnem terram Aegypti, vendentibus singulis possessiones suas, prae magnitudine fantis, subjecitque eam Pharaoni, & cunctos populos suos, a novissimis terminis Aegypti, usque ad extremos fines ejus; which purchase was not distasteful to the people, for the cause aforesaid; but rather they accounted themselves obliged to the King for it, saying, Salus nostra in manu tua est, respiciat tantum nos Dominus noster, & laeti serviemus Regi. Whereupon I conclude, that when a great famine was in Rome, and the Senators had fetched Corn from Sicily, then had been a fit time to take the authority from the people, which they had usurped. This, Coriolanus in Livy well knew, whose conceit yet was not approved of others; not because it was not sufficient being used with less violence, to take away that authority, but because it was not sufficient to maintain it, seeing the Senators having a purpose to augment the Commonwealth, and consequently to make use of the people's Arms, they might conceive, that those Magistrates who had left their authority in time of dearth, would afterward, the dearth ceasing, resume it again by force.  
A dearth then thus managed, will be a means to get the Prince, both authority and riches, and the love also of his Subjects. As we see in Herod the great, who being a Prince the most hated of his people that ever any was; yet only by relieving them with Corn, in a time of dearth, he made himself beloved, obliged, and freed from a thousand dangers.   

Cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit.  
What kind of ease it is that Tacitus speaks of, and how it may be reconciled with some places in other Authors. The sixteenth Discourse:  
IN these words Cornelius Tacitus shows us, that Augustus by means of procuring ease, got himself the love of all men. And because, he as a new Prince, ought rather to have sought how to maintain himself in his Empire; then how with his own danger to procure delights to his Subjects; it seems, he might for this be reproved, there being a precept of Aristotle in his Politics, where teaching the true way that a Prince ought to take, for maintaining him in his State, he persuades this specially, not to keep the people in ease, and gives us for example the Kings of Egypt, who to the end their people should not stand idle, caused so many Pyramids, and Mausoleums to be built, as Pisistratus the tyrant built the Olympus, and Polycrates a thousand Fabrics about Samos, Haec enim omnia (saith Aristotle) fuerunt instituta ad otium & quietem populorum tollendam, ut illi quotidianis molostiis occupati, vacare non possent ad consilia contra tyrannos ineunda. And there is reason for it, as is said in Ecclesiasticus, Cibaria & Virga & Onus Asino, Panis & Disciplina & opus servo, operatur in disciplina & quaerit libertatem, jugum illorum curvat collum, & servum inclinant operationes assiduae servo malevolo tortura, & compedes, mitte illum in operationem ne vacet; multam enim malitiam docuit otiositas. And so much more might Augustus be blamed for it, seeing (as we have showed before) he maintained the people in plenty; and now if to plenty be added case, it cannot choose but be the ruin of any City whatsoever. Haec fuit iniquitas Sodomae, (saith Ezechiel) Abundantia panis & otii.  
And again, because this ease assigned by Tacitus came presently after a war, his fault may be the more, there being a passage of Aristotle in his Politics, where he saith, That the Lacedæmonians passing from war to ease, incurred great danger.  
Thirdly, there is a place in Livy also, that crosseth this of Tacitus, where he saith, that Tarqvinius Priscus, after his fight with the Latins returning to Rome in peace, kept the people in continual and laborious exercises, of which Livy saith, Majore inde animo Pacis opera inchoata 〈◊〉 quanta mole gesserat bell a, ut non quietior populus domi esset, quam militiae fuisset.  
To reconcile then these four Texts, it must be showed, that neither of them is repugnant to another, but that all of them agree together. First, I distinguish of ease, which, as to our purpose, is of two kinds; ease, which is a desisting from any action at all; and ease, which is contrary to war; because war being a violent action, those soldiers which are in peace, although they have other exercises, yet are said to be at ease; seeing desisting from war, they desist from that violent action, which is proper to them. In this sense Aristotle once took ease, where speaking of the Lacedæmonians, he saith, Splendorem enim veluti ferrum, per pacem amittunt; causa hujus est legis positor, qui non ita instituit, ut in otio stare possint.  
By means of this distinction, this place of Tacitus is reconoiled with the first place out of Aristotle; seeing 〈◊〉 by ease here, means not an ease contrary to all action; for Augustus both with sports and plays, and buildings, held the people in continual work, insomuch that he could boast, he had made Rome a City of Marble, which he found but of Brick; but he means it of that ease which is contrary to war. And this is plainly seen, because having said before, Cuncta discordiis civilibus sessa, he presently comes in with this very word, Cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit. Thus Aristotle agrees with him exceeding well, in that Text, where he likes the people should be held in action but not in war: and indeed in such actions, as debase men, and are worse than ease. So dealt Pharaoh with the Israelites, putting them to make Brick, and other most base works. Whereupon it is said in Exodus, Praeposuit i●…aque eis Magistros operum, ut affligerent eos operibus; and a little after, Oderant filios Israel Aegyptii, & assligebant eos, & invidentes eye, atque ad amaritudinem perducebant vitam eorum, operibus duris luti & lateris, omnique famulatu.  
But to this resolution, that place of Livy before cited is most contrary, wherespeaking of Tarqvinius Priscus, he shows, that returning from the wars, he held the people in hard and cruel labours. For answer whereunto we must distinguish, that the Princes are either in terms of getting more, or else but of keeping that they have already gotten; if to get more, than it is necessary to hold the people in hard labours, to the end they may not lose courage, and be embased in their spirits. And therefore no marvel that Tarqvinius Priscus teacheth us to hold the people in hard labours, seeing the Romans at that time had no other end, but to enlarge their Empire. But if the Prince have no aim at augmentation by new acquests and stands not so much in fear of external enemies, as of friends at home, he then ought to let the people enjoy a negotious ease, of buildings, and plays, and such like things. And this made Augustus take this course, because he aimed not at all, at any amplifying of his Empire, as from many places in Tacitus may be gathered, and particularly from that place where in the first of his Annals he saith, Bellum ea tempestate nulnum, nist adversus Germanos, abolendae potius injuriae, ob 〈◊〉 cum Prisco Varo exercitum, quam cupidine proferendi Imperii. And in another place where he saith, Consilium coercendi intra terminos Imperium, whereby we see, he was minded rather to restrain, then to enlarge the Empire.  
Lastly, it remains to reconcile that other place of Aristotle in the second of his Politics, where by the example of the Lacedæmonians, he shows, that after war, to be left to live at ease, is a dangerous thing.  
For Resolution whereof, I say, that the passing from war to ease, is then dangerous, when men return from a short war, and in which they have had the better; because they that get victories, by reason of the pride which victory brings with it, are apt in Cities, to raise commotions. So it fell out amongst the Lacedæmonians, and so a thousand times it hath been like to fall out amongst the Romans, whereof, in the whole first decade of Livy we may see examples. But when men come from a war bloody and long; then they love and are glad of peace. Whereupon in our case the Romans coming from an infinity of civil wars, in which to win was no better than to lose; and being now weary, as is gathered by the words, Cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa, they became not only desirous, but apt also to tolerate ease.  
It is now sufficiently proved, that Tacitus, or to say better, Augustus is no way discordant either from the precepts of Aristotle, or from the examples of Livy, but that with great judgement, he undeavoured to win every one with ease.  
Lastly, it is necessary to reconcile Tacitus with himself, who in this place praiseth ease, and yet afterward examining the causes of the tumults in Germany, he saith, Habebantur per otium; as though ease were the cause of those rebellions. To which I briefly say, there is great difference between the ease that is in a City, and the ease that is of soldiers in war; because the end of a City, is to live in peace, whereof the ease spoken of before is a companion; but the chief end of soldiers at the wars, is to fight, to which ease is contrary and an enemy: and so the soldier with ease, and the Citizen by war, are deprived of their ends, and consequently in short time run into danger.   

Neque Provinciae illum rerum statum abnuebant, suspecto Senatus Populique Imperio ob certamina Potentium, & avaritiam Magistratuum: invalido legum auxilio, quae vi, ambitu, postremo pecunia turbabantur.  
That City's subject to another City, better like the government of a King, than of a Commonwealth, and that every City would gladly have their Lord to live amongst them. The seventeenth Discourse.  
COrnelius Tacitus in these words makes us know, that the Provinces subject to the people of Rome, liked better the government of a King, than of a Commonwealth, as it happens generally to all Cities that are subject to another: So Guicciardine relates of Cremona, that it liked better to be under the King of France, than to be governed by the Commonwealth of Venice. And hereof we have a manifest example in Pisa, which being sold by Gabriel Maria Visconte, to the Commonwealth of Florence, there was scarce one Citizen that would tarry in it. But more than in any other, we may see the truth of this, in the Lycians, who having tried what it was to live under a King, and under a Commonwealth, they called the servitude of that, in comparison of this, liberty. Neque miserabilis legatio Lyctorum, qui crudelitatem Rhodiorum quibus ab Lucio Cornelio attributi erant, quaerebantur fuisse sub ditione 〈◊〉 eam Regiam servitutem, collatam cum praesenti statu pnaeelaram libertatem visam: Non publico tantum se 〈◊〉 imperio, sed singulos injustum pati servitium.  
Of these points we will speak, first in particular of Rome, then in general give the reasons; Lastly, we will show, that every City would we glad to be under a particular Prince, and one that should dwell amongst them.  
Concerning the first; all those changes of State, which come from a worse, must needs be welcome; from whence it is, that after the expulsion of the Tarquins, liberty was so pleasing, Et ut laetior esset (saith Livy) proximi Regis superbia fecit. That in our case, the Commonwealth was corrupted even to the worst degree, is sufficiently expressed by Tacitus in the foresaid words. First, by reason of the discord of the great ones; one of which factions there was a necessity to follow, and that overcome, all than remained at the discretion of the other. Secondly, by occasion of the Magistrates, who sought rather to satisfy their avarice with money, than to take care for the executing of justice. Thirdly, because the laws had now no more place, as being easily corrupted by force and money. Just cause therefore had the Provinces, to be glad of the government of Augustus.  
But because this liking of a subject City, to be rather under a Prince than under a Commonwealth, (as we have said before) is a common liking of all Provinces and Cities that are under another, It will be necessary to search out the reason, why it is so. And for a first reason, 〈◊〉 certain politioian brings this, because Commonwealths are more durable than Kingdoms; and being more durable, there is less hope to shake off their servitude, and are therefore the more hated. Secondly, because Commonwealths having no other care, but to make themselves greater, and others less; they endeavour only to weaken the subject Cities, and to strengthen their own body; a thing which Princes care not to do: and for this, he brings the example of the Samnites, who as long as they were of themselves, maintained war with the Romans a hundred years; a manifest sign, they were then a strong people; but afterwards falling in subjection to Rome, they became most weak, and of no force.  
But because the first of these reasons is false, and the second follows no less in Kingdoms than in Commonwealths, (with leave of so great a man) I have conceived perhaps a better reason, and it is, because the Provinces and Cities having been at war, and by reason of the war, grown to hate one another, and that hatred in process of time become natural, as it was between the Romans and the Carthaginians, between the Pisanes and the Florentines, and others; it happens, that being overcome, they are held in subjection by their natural enemies; which subjection is so much the more distasteful, as being between persons that are equal: and from hence it is, that so gladly men seek to shake of the yoke. So, many times did Pisa, so Spain with the Romans, who doubting the like of Greece; as knowing by their continual rebellions, that they il brooked their subjection to the Commonwealth of Rome, they destroyed many Cities, and at last Corinth.  
But if it happen that this Commonwealth fall into the hand of a Prince, there is no doubt but the other Cities and Provinces will be glad: a principal reason is, because where these served, and those ruled before with inequality, now under a Prince, they both serve equally; and coming to be commanded, by persons much their superiors, the Dominion is so much less hated, as the person is greater that commands; and therefore we see, that Pisa which under a Commonwealth was always in rebellion, now that it is under a Prince, hath lived, and doth live, and is like to live, in most quiet peace; it is true indeed, there concurres the graciousness of the Prince that sweetens all things. Another manifest example we have in the Roman Histories; and it is, that Spain, as long as the City of Rome was a Commonwealth, was continually in rebellion; nor could ever be quieted, till the said City came into the hand of a Prince under Augustus. I omit the example of the Philistines, who never left warring with the Israelites, from the first day (I may say) they entered into the Land of Promise, until they were settled in a Regal government under David.  
To come to the third head: not only Cities and Provinces cannot abide to be under the rule of a Commonwealth; but neither do they like to be under a Prince that is a stranger, and that dwells not amongst them; which Prince may either be of different customs and language, as the King of Spain to Naples and Milan; or of the same customs and language, but of divers Provinces, as the King of France to Burgundy and Britain; or else of the same Province, the same tongue, and the same customs, as many Princes of Italy, to many Cities.  
In the first case, they are not well brooked, but tolerated with an ill will: First, by reason of the difference of customs, which is able to make a Prince odious, though he be not a stranger: whereupon Tacitus speaking of Ven●…ne given to the Parthians to be their King, shows, that because he was of different customs from the Parthians, though of better than theirs, he was with ignominy expelled the Kingdom. Accendebat dedignantes & ipse diversus â Majorum institutis, raro venatu, segni equorum cura, quoties per urbem incederet, lecticae stamine, fastusque erga patrias epulas, irridebantur & Graeci Comites, ac vilissima utensilium annulo clausa, sed prompti aditus, obvia comitas, ignotae Parthis virtutes, nova vitia, & quia ipse majoribus aliena perinde odium pravis atque honestis. For the very same reason, the Goths took it ill, that Amalasunta caused Attalaricus to be brought up in the Roman customs, although they were better than their own. And therefore Isabel Queen of Spain, by her last Will, left Ferdinand her Husband to be Governor of Castille, for so long time, until Philip who was to succeed, being a stranger, might learn the customs of the Spaniards. And for this cause, the Jews at the coming of the Messias, were troubled together with Herod, and liked better to be in subjection to one of their own customs, though a stranger as Herod was, than to the Messias that was of different, though better customs; although they knew by the words of Moses, Prophetam suscitabit Dominus de medio fratrum tuorum, that he should be their own Countryman, of which S. chrysostom gives the reason, Fuerunt isti turbati, quia injusti non possunt gaudere de adventu justi.  
Secondly, because difference of Language is a most odious thing; and this out of his singular providence God foreseeing, and meaning to hinder 〈◊〉 enterprise, to make himself a Monarch, he confounded the Tongues, and thereby easily gave a stop to their proceeding. On the contrary, when our Lord meant that his Apostles should make some fruit of their labours, he would not have them preach in a strange Tongue, and therefore gave to every one of them, all Tongues, that so more easily they might draw men to receive the Faith. And the Romans knowing, what advantage there is in this, compelled all their subjects, when they spoke in the Senate, to speak in the Roman tongue. And Rabsaces, knowing of how great importance, the likeness of Language is, to win the love of the people, to the end the Israelites might the willinger receive the government of Senacherib, though Sohna the Jew, out of a contrary end, prayed him to speak in the Syriack tongue, Loquere lingua Syriaca ad servos tuos; yet he an understanding man (as is written in Esay) Clamavit Lingua Judaica; whereupon Esay, in another place, showing the hate and fear, which the City of Jerusalem had of the King of the Assyrians; amongst other causes, names their differing in language, Populum impudentem non videbis, populum alti sermonis, ita ut non possis intelligere disertitudinem linguae ejus.  
Thirdly, when to difference of customs and language, there is added remoteness, it will add no doubt a great degree of distastefulness. First, because they will be more obnoxious to the dangers of war. And therefore the Tribe of Dan, seeing Lais to be far off from Sydon, which had then the government, attempted to bring it in subjection, and it took effect. And that this was the cause that moved them, may be gathered from words in the Book of Judges; Euntes igitur quinque viri venerunt Lais, videruntque populum habitantem in ea absque ullo timore, juxta consuetudinem Sydoniorum securum & quietum, nullo eye penitus resistente, magnarumque opum & procul a Sydone, atque a cunctis hominibus seperatum. And that by this means, they easily made themselves Masters of it, is written also a little after, where he saith, Sexcenti autem viri tulerunt sacerdotem, & quae supra diximus, veneruntque ad Lais ad populum quiescentem & securum, & percusserunt eos in ore gladii, urbemque incendio tradiderunt; nullo penitus ferente praesidium, Eo quod procul habitarent a Sydone. So it happened to the Saguntines, who being far remote from the Romans their confederates, were destroyed before they could be aided. And therefore the Armenians standing in doubt of this, put themselves into the hands of Mithridates, and revolted from the Romans. So the people of Syria desired to live under the government of the Parthians, as being near unto them, and neighbouring upon them. Secondly, because people that are far off, must of necessity be governed by a Deputy, who by reason of the Prince's remoteness must have great authority given him, and consequently may at his pleasure, contrary to the Prince's meaning, play the tyrant over them. For all those things that have motion from another, and a motion of their own besides, how much they are less near to the first mover, so much they are more able to move their own way. From hence it is, that the Moon, being of all the Planets the farthest off from the Primum mobile, is moved faster in her own motion, and slower in the diurnal motion, than any of the other. The contrary whereof is seen in Saturn, which being near to the Primum mobile, hath the slowest motion, and makes the least resistance.  
Yet in the second and third case, they will more easily be tolerated; although as well in this as in that, there is a general rule that seems to cross it; which is, that every City would gladly have a Prince that should be resident amongst them, and also be a native of their City. That one of the same Nation and City is most acceptable, is plainly seen, because the people for the most part waves justice, and regards not so much the general good, to choose the worthiest; as their private benefit, to choose the nearest. And therefore the Prophet Esay saith, Apprehendet enim vir fratrem suum Domesticum patris sui, & dicet; vestimentum tibi est, Princeps noster esto. Where S. Thomas observes well, that every one seeks to make him King, that is nearest, and not him that is best. Indeed this respect of nearness is of special force; as we may see in David, who being chosen King, was followed only by the Tribe of Juda, Sola autem domus Juda sequebatur David. So Abimelech was more willingly received of the Sichemites, than the sons of Jerobeam, when he said unto them, Simul considerate quod Os vestrum & Caro vestra sum, They were all presently moved to say to him, Frater noster es. The Milanesi exposed themselves to a thousand dangers, out of a desire they had, to be governed rather by one of the Sforzi, then by the King of Spain or France. And the Faentines chose rather a bastard of Manfredi, then to be under the Church. So the Armenians (as is said before) subjected themselves to 〈◊〉, and revolted from the Romans. Finally, we have a notable example of this, in the life of Aratus, to whom it was imputed. as a great fault, that he would rather call to his aid, Philip King of Macedon, then put his Cities into the hands of Cleomenes a Spartan. Quod si omnino (saith Plutarch) Cleomenes injustus fuerit, atque Tyrannicus, tamen Heraclidarum genere, patria 〈◊〉 suisse, & quidem iis qui rationem aliquam Graeciae Nobilitatis 〈◊〉, Spartanorum obscurissimum potius, quam primum inter Macedonas Ducem deligendum fuisse. Whereupon our Lord God, meaning to give the man Regal power over the woman, to the end it might be tolerated with more contentment, made her of a rib of Adam. And to conclude, in Deuteronomy, he commanded his people, they should not choose a stranger to be their King.  
But because this my opinion is full of difficulty, seeing oftentimes a City desires to be governed rather by a stranger then by one of their own Citizens, it will be necessary to use distinction; either it is the first time a Kingdom is erected, or else they have been used to Regal power before: if it be the first time, they will then rather choose to serve a stranger, than one of their own Citizens: First, because knowing the Citizen's beginning they are apt to scorn him. So it fell out with the Israelites, the first time they had a King, for being most desirous to see who it should be, when they saw it was Saul, they scorned him. Num salvare nos poterit iste? & despexerunt eum. Secondly, it happens often by reason of factions that are in the City; for such desire rather to be governed by a stranger, as a man indifferent, then by a Citizen that is an enemy. Seeing such a one coming to the government, would certainly fill the City with blood and slaughter. Whereupon Livy saith, Cum pars quae domestico certamine inferior sit, externo potius se applicet quam civi cedat. A third reason is drawn from envy; for an envious man endeavours always to obscure the worthiness of his Countrymen, as lying more in envies way then a stranger, whereof S. Hierome saith, Propemodum naturale est semper, cives civibus invidere; invidia autem est, tristitia de aliena excellentia, ut est proprii boni diminutiva. Bonum autem absentium non 〈◊〉 nostra, quia non confert eyes, Ideo non invidemus, bona autem praesentium conferunt bonis nostris, & comparatione excellentiae eorum, ostenditur parvum esse bonum nostrum, & hoc est illud Diminui. And of this we have the example of our Lord Christ, who being persecuted by his Countrymen, was invited by Abagarus a foreign Prince, that would have made him in part King with him in his City. A third reason may be this, that Countrymen know a man from his infancy, when there is yet no virtue in him, and thereupon consider him but as such a one still; where strangers that come not to know a man but in his perfection, cannot, nor know not how to consider him other then as such. So the said S. Hierome saith, Quia cives non considerant, praesentia viri opera, sed fragilis ●…ecordantur Infantiae. It is therefore no marvel, that the Florentines chose rather, to be governed by a French man, then by one of their own Citizens. Our Lord God, knowing how difficult a thing it is, to choose at the first time, ones own Countryman to be Prince; In the old law, to the end the Israelites having a desire to have a King, and not yielding one to another, might not subject themselves to a stranger, he made a law, they should choose none to be their King, but only an Israelite, Non poteris alterius generis hominem in Regem facere, quod non sit frater tuus; But because he knew, it would be a hard matter for them to agree upon the choice at the first time, he therefore made that election himself, Eum constitues quem Dominus Deus tuus elegerit de medio fratrum tuorum. And when lastly he came to choose him, to the end he might be less envied, he took a course, that causeth least envy, and that was by Lot. But if the people have been accustomed before to a Regal subjection, in this case they will rather like to be governed by one of their own Country then a stranger; and so much the more, if some of his family have been Governor before; there being then no place for either envy, fear, or for equality. It is therefore no marvel, that Caesar was but ill beloved, and was slain, and that 〈◊〉 lived quietly, and had the love of all men, seeing Caesar raised his House from equality; and Augustus found it in superiority, in which the dictator had left it: whereupon when I consider how it happened, that our Lord God would at the first time make a King by election, and afterward would have it to go by succession in David; I cannot conceive a better reason than this, that he knew after the first time, the election of a King would be without difficulty.  
In this particular, let every one be of what opinion he please; but for this other point, I do not think it will be denied me, that all Cities and Provinces like better to be governed by a particular Prince, that dwells amongst them, then by any other how great soever he be. For this cause it was, that the Spaniards were not well pleased when Charles the fifth was made Emperor; and were ready to rise, because they feared he would leave dwelling in Spain, and make his residence in Germany. This desire was the cause, that the Persians, to have a King in their own Province, set up Cyrus against Astyages, who resided in Media; and out of this desire the Britons covenanted with the King of France, that his eldest son coming to the Crown, his second son should be Duke of Britain; whereof there can be no other reason, but the desire to have a particular Prince, that should dwell amongst them, as being indeed of special benefit to the people. First, because living amongst them, he spends those Revenues in the Country which he draws from the Country. Secondly, because of the greater care the Prince hath of them; and because of the people's nearness to their Lord's ear, to whom they can present their suits in their own persons; without wasting themselves in journeys, and lying at Inns. Lastly, because if the Prince being Lord of many Provinces, reside in one of them; the other must be fain to be governed by Deputies of that Province. The Emperors of Rome residing in Italy, governed all the Provinces by Italians, a thing most distasteful to all the people; because to one that is not grieved to be subject to a Prince that is a stranger, yet it grieves him to be governed by men of a Province that is a stranger: as many people that are content to be subject to the King of Bohemia, yet refuse to be subject to the Kingdom of Bohemia. And the King of France, after many times losing Genova by this means, at last he resolved to govern it by Genuesi. So in Milan he made Trivultio Governor, wherein though he erred, yet the error was in the Individual, and not in the Species; as putting the government into his hand, that was Head of a Faction. But if the Prince be resident in the Province, though he be a stranger, yet with better liking he will be tolerated; because such commonly not only govern the places where they reside, but all other places subject to them, by Citizens of that Country where they reside. The King of Spain, residing in Spain, governs all his subject Kingdoms by Spaniards, a thing which not only wins love to the Prince, but profit also to the Province. To this may be added, that those people shall always receive more favours, who are near to the Fountain from whence those favours come, than they shall do that are further off; seeing, (as S. Thomas learnedly observes) how much a thing is nearer to its beginning, so much it partakes more of the effects of that beginning. And for this cause Dionysius Areopagita saith, that the Angels as being nearer to God than men are, do therefore partake more of the divine goodness than men do.  
I cannot omit to advertise, that all the difficulties before spoken of, are easily allayed, after the first heats are once passed, as oft as there is found a prudence and graciousness in the Prince, which is indeed of marvellous great moment, as was seen in the Romans, who though they hated strangers, and were resolved to have no stranger be their King; yet when 〈◊〉 (a stranger) was propounded to them; in regard of his eminent virtue, they accepted of him. Whereof Livy saith, Romani veteres peregrinum Regem aspernabantur, and a little after, Audito nomine 〈◊〉, patres Romani, quanquam inclinari opes ad Sabinos, Rege inde sumpto, videbantur, tamen neque se quisquam, nec factionis suae alium, nec denique Patrum aut civium quenquam praeferre, illi vero ausi ad 〈◊〉 omnes 〈◊〉 Pompilio Regnum deferendum decernunt. Whereupon it is no marvel, if at this day many Provinces and Cities, whereof some have a Prince that lives far off; and some, a Prince that is a stranger, of customs and language different; yet they all live in great contentment, only through the just government of him that rules them. I desire therefore that this discourse of mine may be received, as of the times past, my purpose being to search out the reasons of things have formerly happened; and not expressly or tacitly to tax any Prince, Commonwealth or City, nor so much as any particular person: For above all things, I abhor slandering, and specially of those to whom as superiors I owe Reverence.   

Caeterum Augustus subsidia dominationi Claudium Marcellum sororis filium admodum adolescentem: Pontificatu & curuli Aedilitate Marcum Agrippam ignobilem loco, bonum Militia, & victoriae socium geminatis consulatibus extulit, mox defuncto Marcello generum sumpsit, Tiberium Neronem & Claudium Drusum privignos Imperatoriis nominibus auxit.  
What means Princes may use with safety to set them in a way, that are to succeed them in the government. The eighteenth Discourse.  
IT is plainly seen, that Augustus to the end the Senators nor any other, should ever hope to reduce Rome to its ancient form of government, held this for a special Maxim of State, to advance his nearest kindred; and to set some one of them in the way for managing the Empire, that so making him privy to all affairs, making him known to the fouldiers, making him beloved of the people; and lastly, making him favoured of the Senators: both he after his death might have his way made to come to the Empire; and on the contrary no hope might be left for any to attempt any thing against the life of the Prince, being propped up with so many Pillars. And therefore, Vt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 insisteret, he raised Marcellus, he advanced Marcus Agrippa; and after them, Tiberius Nero, 〈◊〉 Drusus, 〈◊〉 and Lucius' sons of Agrippa; and lastly, would have Tiberius to adopt Germanicus and 〈◊〉 to be his successors. And accordingly, 〈◊〉 advanced to the Consulship, and other honours, 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉; and after them Caius Caesar. Whereupon by the example of such great men, this course perhaps may be thought worthy of imitation, as well for securing one's self from danger, as also for lessening in part the burden of those great labours, which so great a dignity brings with it: so much the more as we have in Cornelius Tacitus, a manifest example of Sejanus, who by no other means was stopped in his course, but only by the number of successors Tiberius had ordained; and this stopping, as in conspiracies it useth, was cause at last, that the Prince discovered all his practices. But because of the other side, the desire of rule blinds the minds of the most inward and domestic friends; It seems to be no safe course for a Prince, whilst he lives himself, to give any great authority to successors. For Invidia Regni (as Livy saith) etiant inter Domesticos infida omnia atque infesta 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 caused his son to be elected King, but this served not his son's turn, who thereupon would have killed his father. So Absalon meant to do, and when with safety he might have expected the Kingdom, after the death of his old father David, he would rather with wickedness prevent it, and run 〈◊〉 allong into 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 etiam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (saith 〈◊〉 upon another occasion) tarda cum securitate praeniatura, vel cum exitio properant. And therefore Selim being assumed into part of the Empire, by his father Bajaset, could not stay to expect it with peace, but sought by the death of his father, to make himself sole Lord. And the like intention had Mustapha towards Sultan Solyman, and thereby lost his life. Finally, this advancing of his successors, had but ill luck with Augustus; for Tiberius (as is commonly conceived) caused him to be poisoned: and with Tiberius it proved not much better, who also towards the end of his life, had the kindness of Caius Caesar, to help him to his death. For resolution, it may be said, that where a State is quiet, accustomed to pass by succession, in children legitimate; there it is in no wise sit, to take them into part of the Empire, there being no cause, with ones own danger, to take away hopes where there are none, or to seek for props where no part threatens ruin. But on the other side, when the State is in danger, not accustomed to live under a Prince, and is apt to rebellions; in such case, it may do well, to call him that is to succeed, to be a cosort in the Empire. To this purpose it seems the example tends, which Tacitus relates of Augustus: he caused Tiberius to be called Filius, to show he was his successor; Collega Imperii, to enter him in managing affairs; Censors Tribunitiae Potestatis, to make him gracious with the people; Omnique per exercitus ostentatur, to make him beloved, and known to the soldiers.  
Nevertheless having considered a little better of this matter, I have altered my opinion, concerning the last; and as to the example of Augustus, though it proved well for his successor; to bring him to the Empire, yet it proved but ill for his own person: for by this means, he became as it were a servant to 〈◊〉, who finally caused him by his own wife to be poisoned.  
I therefore conceived, the better course would be, to advance the managing of the Empire; not one alone, but many; because, by this means, not only he shall make himself secure from those of the City; but from those also of his own Family. This lesson I learn from Aristotle in his Politics, where he saith, Communis vero custodia omnis Dominationis unius est, neminem unum prae caeteris magnum facere, sed plures, nam se invicem custodiunt: being an excellent remedy against the insatiableness of men, to afford them some one, upon whom they may vent their ambition, without turning it against the Prince. For this cause perhaps, the ancients invented the name of fortune; to the end, that men falling into any great disaster, should not turn their anger against God, but lay the fault upon the false Deity of fortune. And in truth there is none hath more need to make use of this invention than Princes; because naturally, men seeking to rise above their degree; when they have another like to themselves, they may turn their practices against him, and not attempt any thing against the Prince, as they would do, if they had not some upon whom to work, and vent their ambition. This good fortune happened to Tiberius, for when Sejanus would rise above his degree, first he had Drusus against whom to turn him; and afterward the sons of Germanicus, in oppressing of whom, he lost so much time, that all his practices came to be discovered. To this opinion of mine, the course of Augustus was not contrary, but it seems he followed it as long as he was able; seeing Tacitus relates, that he advanced not Marcellus alone, but together with him Marcus Agrippa; and when Marcellus died, he left not Agrippa alone, but joined with him Tiberius Nero, and Claudius Drusus; and when Drusus died, he yet left not Tiberius alone, but brought forward Caius and Lucius: and although when both these died, he left Tiberius alone; yet it cannot be said, he did well in doing so: and therefore Tacitus maketh an excuse for him, that he did it by reason of age, Nan●… senem Augustum adeo devinxerat, ut nepotem unicum Agrippae 〈◊〉 in insulam Planasiam projiceret: in which if he had done well, Tacitus had not needed to make his excuse: and even Augustus himself perceived at last his error, as he that always held it for a maxim of State, not to have only one, but many upon whom to lean, Vt pluribus munimentis insisteret: whereupon at last, the poor old man opening his eyes, and seeking to provide for it in a time, when he had done better to dissemble it, having overslipt his time so long, he made show to call Agrippa Posthumus home, Et inde spem fore (saith Tacitus) ut penatibus avi redderetur. And the making that show, was a hastener of his death. Also Philip after he had put Demetrius to death, he perceived his error to let Perseus stay alone; whereupon he meant to bring in his familiar friend Antigonus, for a counterpoise, giving out, he should succeed him in the Kingdom, but was prevented by death. Therefore Tiberius also considering this, advanced not Germanicus alone, but Drusus with him, Seque tutiorem rebatur, utroque filio legiones obtinente: knowing well, it would be impossible they should ever join together in any attempt against him. Quia arduum & difficile est, eodem loci concordiam & potentiam esse: whereupon he was secure he should always have them of his side. And when Germanicus died, he left not Drusus alone, but brought in Sejanus, whereof Drusus infinite times complained, Crebro quaerens Incolumi filio adjutore Imperii, alium vocari. And when Drusus was dead, and Sejanus left alone, Tiberius was then in no small danger; which he perceiving, had determined to bring in Nero son of Germanicus; but afterward being secured of the fall of Sejanus, he put him to death; and than Caius Caesar remained alone. Whereupon Tiberius finding himself in the same strait, in which Augustus was when Tiberius was left alone; although he knew the danger, and that it was no safety for him, that all favour should be cast upon one; yet being old, and illbeloved of all, having thoroughly considered, what course he might best take to secure himself from Caius Caesar; he could find none, as I conceive, but such as would rather be a course to hasten his death; and therefore in that case he showed himself much wiser than Augustus: and although Cornelius Tacitus attribute it to another matter, where he saith, Consilium cui impar erat sato permisit: which was to make choice of another successor; yet I, without taxing his opinion, would think that he forbore this new election, lest coming to the ears of Caius Caesar, it might put him upon some practice to procure his death, as he himself had done before to Augustus; and the rather as knowing himself to be exceeding weak, Reputante Tiberio publicum sibi odium, extremam aetatem, magisque fama quam vi stare res suas.  
But because Augustus and Tiberius knew well, how much it imported, to have more successors than one: yet each of them was brought at last to have but one, and could not help it: it will be fit to think upon some way, how a Prince that is brought to such a strait, may both enter such a successor in affairs of State, and yet secure himself from domestic dangers. As for the entering him, and setting him in a way; it will be easily done, by putting him into those steps, which himself passed to attain the Empire: and by this way, the House of Austria at this day maintains itself in the Empire. An instruction of Augustus, and afterward followed by Tiberius, who coming to the Empire by means of the Tribuneship, they also used to make their successor's Tribunes. Id summi fastigii vocabulum Augustus reperit, ne Regis aut dictatoris nomen adsumeret, ac tamen appellatione aliqua caetera imperia praemineret: Marcum deinde Agrippam socium ejus potestatis, quo defuncto 〈◊〉 Neronem delegit, ne successor in incerto foret: sic cohiberi pravas aliorum spes rebatur, simul modestiae Neronis & suae magnitudini fiebat, quo tunc exemplo Tiberius Drusum summae rei admovet. The difficulty than consists only in securing himself against his successor, being too potent; and the best way, that I can learn out of Histories is this; not to suffer him together with the dignity, to get the love and affection of the Subjects. This Augustus put in execution, until he was blinded by his wife's entreaties. For when he demanded the Tribuneship for Tiberius, under colour of excusing him, he laid open all his ill conditions, thereby to make him odious. Etenim Augustus paucis ante annis, cum Tiberio Tribunitiam potestatem a Patribus rursus postularet, quanquam honora oratione quaedam de habitu cultuque & institutis ejus jecerat, quae velut excusando exprobraret. To what end should Augustus demand honours for Tiberius, and himself dishonour him? but only to this, that as by means of the dignity which could not be denied him, he meant to settle in him the succession, so by means of making known his vices, he meant to make him odiou●… and thereby secure himself, that he might never be able through the people's favour, to contrive any plot against him. Tiberius also made use of this course, and therefore caused Drusus to be present always at the sports of the Gladiatours; to the end, that by showing himself delighted with the sight of blood, he might be known to be of a cruel and bloody disposition, and consequently be of all men hated. Whereupon Tacitus discoursing upon the reasons, why Tiberius himself would not be present at them; amongst other, he mentions this, where he saith, Non crediderim ad ostentandam saevitiam movendasque offensiones concessam filio materiem, quamquam id quoque dictum est. Another time, when Tiberius saw Germanicus and Drusus contesting with the Senate, he wonderfully joyed at it; as well because their contention was about disparaging a Law, as because of the hate they incurred by it, Laetabatur Tiberius, cum inter filios ejus & leges Senatus disceptaret.  
Having commended the course, for a Prince to design more than one successor, by whom to be supported, there must care be taken to hold the balance even between them, otherwise he shall expose himself to manifest danger; in regard whereof, Augustus never brought Tiberius openly forward until such time as he was left alone, Drusoque pridem extincto, Nero 〈◊〉 ex privignis erat, illuc cuncta vergere, and that which followeth. So Tiberius as long as Germanicus lived, used them with great equality: but after Germanicus death, he then discovered his love to Drusus. Tiberius' Drusum summae rei admovet; incolumi Germanico, integrum inter Duos judicium.  
But because it is a most difficult thing, to observe this equality, and to carry an even hand, as that which was in Christ accounted a matter of admiration, that he so carried himself toward his Apostles, that they could never know which of them he favoured most, every one thinking himself to be the man, whereupon they often contended which of them should be the greatest; it is fit to consider, to which side the Prince ought rather to incline.  
For resolution whereof, I conceive, that a Prince (as indeed he can do no less) shall do well to favour the weaker party, for by means of his favour he shall make him stronger than the other; and yet shall not need to doubt him, as being of himself the weaker. So did Tiberius, who if ever he showed any spark of partiality, it was to Drusus.   

Nam senem Augustum devinxerat adeo, ut nepotem unicum Agrippam Posthumum in Insulam Planasiam projiceret. And a little after, Nulla in praesens formidine, dum Augustus aetate validus, seque & Domum & pacem sustentavit: postquam provecta jam 〈◊〉, aegro & corpore fatigabatur.  
That old men are apt to be carried, away by women, and of what age a Prince should be. The nineteenth Discourse.  
THe old age of Augustus (as we may conjecture by these two Texts, which for more conveniency I have joined together) brought forth in the City of Rome, many evil effects: First, by suffering himself to be ruled by his wife Livia, who with no small subtlety persuaded him to discard Agrippa Posthumus, and to leave Tiberius Nero his successor in the Empire. Secondly, because through old age, he was no longer able to govern the City, his family, or himself.  
By occasion then of the first, we will examine, whether it be true, that old men are apt and easy to be led away by women; and finding it to be so, we will show the reason: and by occasion of the second, it will be fit to examine, at what age a Prince is fittest to govern.  
Concerning the first, there will need no great labour to show by examples and by reason, that the wives of old men may obtain of them whatsoever they desire. Adonia the son of David had made himself King in his father's life; and by reason of age, as being the eldest, it was his due, as Solomon himself confessed, whilst denying a favour, which his mother in behalf of Adonia requested of him, he said, Ipse enim est frater meus major me; yet how easily did Bersabee persuade her old husband David to put by Adoniah, and to make her son Solomon his successor? whereof the holy Scripture in the Book of Kings saith, Ingressa est itaque Bersabee ad regem in cubiculo, Rex autem senuerat nimis. And seeing the holy Scriptures have never a word that hath not some mystery in it, we may well gather by these words Rex autem senuerat nintiss, were written to intimate, that the suit of Bersabee was much facilitated by the old age of David. Another example in the book of Kings we have of Solomon, who in his old age was so led away by his Concubines, that most perfidiously leaving the true worship of God, he set up Images, built Altars and Temples unto Idols, whereof the holy Spirit in the said Book gives the reason saying, that Solomon being now grown old, was easily drawn away by women, Cumque jam esset senex, depravatum est cor ejus per mulieres, ut sequeretur Deo●… alienos.  
The effect than is manifest: it remains that we show the cause why this should happen in old men, and not in young. And first, it may be attibuted to length of time: for as a stone, though never so hard, is mollified and broken by often falling of water, so the long suits of women accompanied with their dalliances and allurements, are able to penetrate the hardest heart: and therefore Job saith, Lapides excavant aquae, & alluvione paulatim terra consumitur; whereof Saint Gregory makes the like interpretation, as I do here of the example of Solomon, Videamus qualiter lapides excavant aquae: & alluvione paulatim terra consumitur. Solomon quip immoderato 〈◊〉, atque assiduitate mulierum ad hoc perductus est, ut qui prius Templum Deo construeret 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 etiam perfidiae substratus, Idolis construere Templu non 〈◊〉. Sicque factum est, 〈◊〉 ab assidua carni●… petulantia, usque ad mentis persidiam perveniret. Quid it aque aliud quam aquae excavarunt lapidem? & alluvione paulatim terra consumpta est; quia surrepente paulatim infusione peccati, terra cordis illius ad consumptionem defluxit.  
A second cause is, because in old age by reason of weakness, the virtue of resisting feminine allurements fails, which in youth by reason of vigour are easily resisted. This cause Cajetan means, when speaking of Solomon he saith, Quamvis mulieres junctae fuerint Salomoni juveni, non tamen diverterunt a juventute ad cultum Deorum, sed in Senectute paulatim emollitus est animus ejus, crescente amore, & deficiente virtute.  
A third cause I would allege myself, and it is, That all love is founded upon some interest, either good or bad: and seeing that of women can never be founded upon virtue, by reason of the incapacity of that sex; it happens oftentimes to be founded either upon beauty or upon profit: For in women commonly there are two desires; or to say better, two affections: one of rule, the other of lust; and when these fail, than also their love ceaseth. From hence it is, that seeing an old man, can never believe (unless age hath taken away his brains) that women can love him for beauty; it follows necessarily, he must believe they love him for profit; of which if there be no hope, neither can he hope, they will ever love him. And therefore when he knows he cannot satisfy their affection one way, by reason of the weakness of his age, he must of necessity seek to satisfy it the other way, and consequently agree to all their desires. And therefore no marvel if Tacitus say, that Augustus grown old, was led away by women.  
Concerning the second point, before we come to examine which is the best age in a Prince, for governing his people, we must take notice, that in men there are four ages: old age, childhood, youth, and consistence, or middle age. Thus Hypocrates distinguisheth them, which for the present shall pass, without questioning the truth of the distinction. Secondly, it must be noted, that I speak not of Princes that are by succession; for they have their officers and Deputies, by whom they may always govern well; but I speak of Princes that are by election, and particularly in Kingdoms that stand in danger; into which, many by reason of age have fallen.  
In this case, it is not well, that a Prince should be in his childhood; whereupon our Lord God, by the mouth of the Prophet Esay, threatening the destruction of Jerusalem, after saying, Ecce enim Dominator Dominus exercituum, auferet a Jerusalem, & a Juda, validum & fortem, & virum bellatorem, omne robur panis & omne robur aquae, Judiceni & Prophetam, Ariolum & senem: he saith, & dabo pueros Principes eorum, by whose government, how great disorders were to grow, is showed in the process of that Chapter, and therefore Solomon in Ecclesiasticus cries out, Vae tibi terra, cujus Rex est puer.  
The reason of this is, because in a Governor, there are four things required: the first is knowledge and prudence, whereupon Solomon considering himself to be but a child, prayed not to God for Riches or Honour, nor yet for long life, but for Wisdom to be able to judge rightly, saying, Ego autem sum puer parvulus, & ignorans egressum & introitum meum. Et servus tuus est in medio populi quem elegisti, populi infiniti qui numerari & supputari non potest, prae multitudine. Dabis ergo servo tuo cor docile, ut populum tuum judicare possit, & discernere inter bonum & malum. Whereupon S. Gregory makes a good observation; that in holy Scripture, Princes and Prophets are called Videntes, Seers, as those that have need of Prudence and Knowledge, that being to lead the blind, they be not blind themselves; for than will Cities go to wreck; and easily be destroyed; as Esay saith, Omnes bestiae agri venite ad devorandum, Vniversae bestiae 〈◊〉, speculatores ejus caeci omnes.  
The second thing required in a Prince is fortitude, to be able to bridle the people, and to bear the weight of the Sceptre. And therefore Solomon in Ecclesiasticus saith, Noli 〈◊〉 fieri Judex, 〈◊〉 valeas virtute irrumpere iniquitates; ne fortè extimescas faciē Potentis, & ponas scandalum in 〈◊〉 tua. And Job speaking of the burden that lies upon Prince's shoulders, saith, Sub quo curvantur qui portant orbem, which S. Gregory upon that other place of Job, Ecce Gigantes 〈◊〉 sub aquis, expounds saying, Gemero sub aquis means nothing else, but to be oppressed with the weight of Subjects, taking waters for people, as the Angel in the Apocalypse delivers, Aquae multae, populi multi: Whereupon not without great mystery our Lord God, meaning to make Peter Prince of the people, he called him first to walk upon the water.  
Thirdly, Princes ought more to regard the common good of their subjects, than their own private profit; that they may not be like those, of whom the Prophet Sophony speaketh, Judices ejus lupi 〈◊〉, non relinquebant in Mane: but like to the Apostle Paul, who saith, Non quaero quae vestra sunt, sed vos.  
Fourthly, there is required Experience, Qui non est tentatus quid scit? saith Solomon in Ecclesiasticus, Et qui non est expertus parva recognoscit. And therefore the Ancients have a fable, that Phaeton having taken upon him to guide the Horses of the Sun, was thrown down headlong. In as much then, as a child through defect of age, can neither have knowledge, nor experience; and through weakness of body, can neither be strong nor constant: and finally, through time spent in pleasures, will more regard his own interest, than the people; there can be no doubt of his unfitness to govern others, who without doubt is not well able to govern himself.  
The other age contrary to this, is old age; in which as a thing most odious, men commonly are subject to contempt: Ipsa aetas Galbae (saith Tacitus) & Irrisui & fastidio erat. And a little after, Precarium sibi Imperium, & brevi transiturum. But besides their being contemned, oftentimes they govern ill, because (as Aristotle writes in his Politics) Habet etiam intellectus suam 〈◊〉, that the understanding also hath its old age; seeing by weakness of natural heat, and want of radical moisture, they generate naughty blood, from which consequently arise naughty spirits, which passing to the Heart, and from the Heart distributed to the senses, makes them they can but ill 〈◊〉 their office. And therefore in old men, we see the senses are always weakened, as the Philosopher saith, 〈◊〉 nostra intellectio ortum habet à sensu; the understanding making use of the senses to understand by: insomuch, that they being grown old, it may reasonably be said, the understanding is grown old: whereupon 〈◊〉 meaning to show, that Camillus though grown old, was yet able to govern, saith, He had all his senses perfect, Sed vegetum 〈◊〉 in vivido pectore vigebat virebatque integris sensibus.  
A Prince therefore should not be old, as well because such are apt to be contemned; as because, becoming a child again, he will govern ill: whereupon not without cause, Tacitus speaking of Augustus, saith, Postquam provecta jam senectus, aegro & corpore fatigabatur; and that which followeth. And Galba knowing this, and meaning to help these inconveniences of old age, he adopted Piso, saying, Et audita adoption desinam videri senex, quod mihi unum objicitur. And our Lord God meaning to furnish his Captain Moses, with all the parts required in a Prince; to the end, that through old age, he might not be contemned, nor through want of understanding come to govern ill; suffered not his senses, nor yet his flesh to grow old with years, but preserved them in a flourishing state, Non caligaverunt oculi ejus, saith the Scripture, and this opinion all Writers follow.  
It remains, to show, which is the fitter age, of youth, or the consistent age: for Resolution whereof, I say briefly, that if a Prince be to attend the wars, it is then better he should be young; as well for the labours of the body, as for the vigour of blood, which grown cold in old men, were never able to perform those things, which are required in a warrior. Whereupon we see, that many great Captains, who in their youth have done admirable acts; in their old age, have lost many advantages, through weakness of spirit; as it happened to Metellus, in the war against Sertorius in Spaino, (as Plutarch relates.) And therefore Moses showed great judgement, who amongst the Elders he had chosen, having two young men, Eldad and Medad, he caused them to stay in the Army; showing thereby, that in matters of war they should be young men. And our Lord God meaning to aid the Maccabees in a battle against their enemies appeared in the form of a young man upon a white Horse.  
But if we speak of Princes, that are to judge the people in peace; in this case, the age that inclines to old age, is certainly fittest; in sign whereof our Lord God who in the Canticles, as being a Bridegroom appeared in form of a young man, Comae ejus sicut elatae palmorum, nigrae quasi Corvus, when afterwards he appears as a King and Judge of Daniel, and in the Apocalypse, he comes described with grey hairs, Caput autem ejus & Capilli erant candidi, tanquam lana alba, & tanquam Nix; and this is for as much, as for the most part is wont to happen.  
But because the contrary of this is often seen, that some man in his youth governs much better than in his age; I cannot omit in this place to advertise, that canitieses or whiteness by age, consists not so much in hairs or in years, as in the whiteness of the thoughts: whereupon, in the Canticles, the Bridegroom saith to the Bride, Vulnerasti cor meum, in uno oculorum tuorum, & in uno crine colli tui, and S. Luke, Sed & capilli vestri numerati sunt; and S. Gregory upon Job, expounding that place of Deuteronomy, Levitae tenentur radere pilos carnis suae: expounds it, id est, cogitationes superfluas.  
He then shall be accounted old, and to have grey hairs, that is full of white thoughts; whereupon Solomon saith, Senectus venerabilis est, non diuturna, neque annorum numero computata, cani autem sunt sensus 〈◊〉 & aetas Senectutis, vita Immaculata. When our Lord God would have Moses to choose persons that should assist him in judging the people, he said not, Choose out seventy old men; but, seventy whom thou knowest to be old: where it plainly appears, that he speaks not of the old age of the body, for that every one is able to know; but of the old age of the mind, and so S. Gregory expounds it in those words, Congrega mihi septuaginta viros Israel quos tu nosti quòd Senes populi sunt. While he saith, In quibus senioribus, quid aliud, quam senectus cordis requiritur, cum tales jubentur eligi, quod senes esse sciuntur? si enim senectus in eyes corporis quaereretur, a tantis sciri poterant, a quantis videri ●…dum vero dicitur, quos tu nosti, quod senes populi sint, profectò liquet, quia senectus 〈◊〉, non corporis eligenda mintiatur. For an old man that is grey by reason of years may be a child in regard of conditions; and therefore Esay saith, Puer centum annorum moriatur; whereupon it follows not, to say, a Prince is young, therefore he will govern ill; a Prince is old, therefore he will govern well; because it oftentimes happens, that the same man, is in youth, old; and in age, young; as Solomon who in his youth governed divinely well, both himself and his state, but afterwards in his old age, he overthrows himself, and consequently his subjects. So Nero in the beginning of his youth, governed with so great prudence, that he is rather to be imitated, then that he can be surpassed: but in process of time, he so perfidiously carried himself, that sparing neither his schoolmasters, nor his mother, nor finally himself, he cast himself, and (as much as he could) the state into absolute ruin.  
It will not then be from our purpose, to search out the reason, how it happens that many in their youth govern well; and in their old age, become cruel; and throw themselves headlong into vices. First then, I say, it happens by reason of age, which (as we have showed before) of its own nature, causeth contempt; and the Prince doubting this, and thinking to remedy it with cruelty, plungeth himself in it, to show there is valour in him: so did Tiberius who in his youth endeavoured by all means to hide his acts of cruelty; but in his old age, changing opinion, he was never well, but when he was talking of them, and when he could say something to make it appear, that he was cruel; for no other cause, but that he thought this the only way to keep him from contempt. Whereupon, if the Senators had known this reason, they would never have marvelled to hear him recite his acts, & the death of his nephew Drusus: and although Tacitus ascribe this to his great confidence, where he saith, Penetrabat pavor, & admiratio callidum olim & tegendis sceleribus obscurum, eo confidentiae venisse, ut tanquam dimotis parietibus, oftenderet nepotem sub verberibus Centurionis, inter servonum ictus extrema vitae alimenta frustra orantem; yet I hold, he did it rather in the sense aforesaid, and I conceive that Tacitus in substance understood as much himself.  
Secondly, this is wont to happen, because in the beginning men are not secure in their states, and therefore seek by good means to make themselves secure; but once secured, they then yield themselves wholly to be governed by sense: and therefore David when he had vanquished his enemies, and made himself secure in his Kingdom, he then committed the adultery with Bersabee, and the slaughter of Urias, whereof S. Bernard speaking saith, Sapiens David, sapiens Solomon fuit, sed blandientibus nimis secundis rebus, alter ex parte, alter ex toto desipuit.  
Thirdly, because a Prince in old age, hath either gotten him a good name or a bad: if a good, then conceiving that whatsoever he doth, can never take away the good name already gotten, he easily runneth into vices; if bad, then despairing in so short a time, as being now old, to remove that bad name, he thinks it all one what he doth; and thereupon contemning fame, would be content the World might end with himself. So did Herod the great, who gave order that as soon as himself should be dead, a great number of Noblemen, that were then prisoners should be slain. And Nero was contented it should be thought, that he grieved for nothing so much, as that he had not the whole World in his hand, enclosed in a glass, that he might cast it to the ground whensoever he should die. But if a Prince be young, although he have gotten the name of a cruel man, yet hoping in time he may redeem it and get a better, he will not easily plunge himself in vices.  
Fourthly, this is wont to happen, when Princes are but of little judgement; because as when of themselves they are prudent, they always govern better in the third age; so when of themselves they want discretion, they govern better in their youth, than afterward; seeing in that age, it is no disgrace to suffer themselves to be guided by men of ability; as was seen in Nero, who in his youth was contented to be advised, and to follow the counsel of Seneca, Burrhus and Corbulo, but coming to a riper age, either they take a liberty no longer to regard the advice of good Counselors, or else they count it a shame to be a Prince upon props: or lastly they are instigated by others, through hate they bear to the greatness of those able Counselors. All these things concurred in Nero: for first he rejected the reverence of his schoolmasters, seque in omnes libidines effudit: and then there wanted not instigatours, who told him it was a shame, Certe finitam Neronis pueritiam, & robur juventae adesse, exueret Magistrum, satis amplis Doctoribus instructus Majoribus suis. So as, having no brain himself, nor harkening to them that had, he came in a short time to utter ruin. So the Emperor Constantinus Sestus, was contented at first to be ruled by his mother Irenea, but growing elder, he cast her off, and came to be stark naught. And Rabbi Solomon saith, that as long as Nathan the Prophet, who was Salomon's schoolmaster lived, Solomon took no strange woman to be his wife: and this opinion is followed by Abulensis.   

Domi Res tranquillae: eadem Magistratuum vocabula.  
That to maintain and suffer Magistrates to continue, although without authority, is a matter of great moment. The twentieth Discourse.  
I Have always heard it resolved, that when a City changeth from being a Commonwealth, to be a Kingdom, it should do well, to leave if not the same authority, yet at least the same Magistrates. And the same I have found written in all Politician Authors; and for authority, they allege this place of Tacitus, Eadem Magistratuum vocabula: where he shows; that Augustus changed all things in Rome, but only the name of Magistrates: and they give this reason, that seeing it is only a bare name, much in show, and little in substance, the Prince can lose nothing of his own Right by it; and yet by this means he shall be sure to get the love of his people, who are fed with such vanity.  
This opinion, held, written and observed of every one, contains in it two things: one, that as to the Prince, the leaving of Magistrates is of great profit: the other, that as to the subject it is a mere vanity, and serves only to puff up the people.  
Although this opinion be general and entered in such sort into men's conceits, that there seems to be no contending against it; yet it may be lawful for me to deliver what I think of it; seeing I seek not to be believed, by any other strength, then by that of reason. I say then, I could never come to know, that this leaving the name of Magistrates, is any weakness, but have always accounted it a matter of great moment; for proof whereof, we must know, that as all other kinds of state, so a Commonwealth also consists of two things; that is, of matter, and of form. In a Monarchy, the form is the Prince; and the City is the matter. In a Commonwealth, the form is the Magistrate that rules; and the thing that is ruled is the matter. From hence it is, that when these two things do not meet and join together, a City cannot be said to be free: whereupon, if it should be without any Prince, and should withal be without any Magistrates, it could not be called a Commonwealth. The Armenians after the death of Ariobarzanes, being unwilling to serve his successors, remained without any Lord; but having no form of a Commonwealth, they were never the more free. Whereof Tacitus speaking, shows he knew that well, which I said before, where he saith, Ariobarzano morte fortuita absumpto, stirpem ejus haud toleravere, tentatoque foeminae imperio, cui nomen Erato; eaque brevi pulsa, incerti solutique & magis sine Domino quam in libertate, profugum Vononem in Regnum accipiunt. If then the Prince taking away the matter, which is the City, shall leave the form, which are the Magistrates, he shall give not only a vain contentment, as those men say, but also a great hope to recover liberty: of which they should be out of hope if the Prince, together with the authority, should also take away the Magistrates; seeing although they should be without a Prince, yet they should be ne'er the nearer for being in liberty, but rather would never be quiet, until they had a King again, as it fell out with the Armenians: and if they should agree to have a Commonwealth, it would never be durable; as was seen in Florence after a driving out of Petrus de Medici: and therefore the Romans had great fortune to find a form made to their hands; for the Kings being expulsed, they had then nothing else to do, but only in their stead, to make two Consuls. This thing both Romulus and Tarqvinius, Caesar and Nero knew to be of great moment, who endeavoured all they could to extinguish the Senate. And indeed, those Provinces that have been without Magistrates, have never been able to come to liberty, as was seen in the Assyrians, and is at this day seen in the Persians, and in the Turks, and others. For it is an easy matter for an image of wax, if it be broken, to be renewed again, so long as the form by which it was framed remains entire; seeing with one only action, the new form will be taken away, and the old will be introduced: but if together with the Image, the mould also should be taken away; it would then be very hard to return it to the old form; as requiring two actions, one to break the form that is of new; and the other, to renew the form that was before.  
Moreover, this only appearance of Magistrates, besides that it facilitates the recovery of liberty, causeth also a desire of liberty, which if it do no other hurt, at least it puts them in mind of a Commonwealth, a thing to Princes most pernicious: and lastly, it gives occasion to the principal men to assemble together without suspicion; and therefore, if I be not deceived, Julius Agricola told Tacitus oftentimes, that the taking away these apparences of liberty, had been very useful for hindering the rebellions of the Irish. Saepe ex eo audivi, legione una & modicis auxiliis debellari obtinerique Hiberniam posse. Idque etiam adversus Britanniam profuturum, si Romana ubique arma, & velut è conspeetu libertas toleretur.  
Thus in my opinion it is sufficiently proved, that to leave the names of Magistrates, although without authority, is not a puffing up, or a vanity that blinds the people; but indeed a matter of great moment, for regaining of liberty. Yet I blame not Princes that take this course, and especially those that are at this day, who having no doubt of their people, aught to allow them, not only the names of Magistrates, but also Magistrates with some authority: and as little do I like, that a man coming new to a Kingdom, should take this course; only I put them in mind, that all they who have gone about to extinguish Magistrates, have either been 〈◊〉 or banished, except only Cleomenes.   

Tiberium Neronem maturum annis, spectatum bello, sed vetere atque insita Claudiae Familiae superbia, multaque indicia saevitiae, quanquam premantur erumpere: Hunc & prima ab infantia educatum in domo 〈◊〉, congestos Juveni Consulatus, Triumphos ne iis quidem annis, quibus Rhodi specie secessus exulem egerit, aliquid quam Iram & simulationem & secretas libidines meditatum.  
That Tiberius was part good, and part bad. How it happened that he fell not into dangers as Nero did. Whether it be good to be brought up in the Prince's House: and finally, how their secret vices may be known. The one and twentieth Discourse.  
TAcitus discoursing of the successors of Augustus, whilst he lays open the virtues and vices of Tiberius shows us also, the capacity and incapacity that was in him for succession in the Empire: his capacity was first, by reason of his ripeness in age, being such as in our former discourse we required in a Prince, than his ability in Military affairs; and the long experience he had, being brought up in Augustus his house, and employed continually in State businesses; and seeing Princes ought to be able both to govern the people in peace, and to rule them in war, I know not any man could be fitter for the Empire then Tiberius.  
On the other side, Tiberius was proud, cruel, and lascivious; and seeing a Prince ought to govern with mildness, to have care of the subjects lives; and above all, rather to defend their honour, then oppress it: there is no doubt, but Tiberius was more uncapable of such a dignity then any other; because as being proud, he could never be pleasing in his government: and as being cruel, he was readier to destroy his subjects then to preserve them: and lastly, as being lascivious, he was likelier to dishonour his Citizens, then to do them honour and thus, as there were in him all those virtues that make a Prince admirable; so there were in him all those vices that make a state miserable. And because for the most part, the good is overborne and suppressed by the bad; we may justly say, that Tiberius was altogether uncapable of the Empire, his Experience being obscured by his pride; his valour in war, by his cruelty in Peace; and lastly his ripeness in years, by his greenness in lustfulness.  
Tiberius yet together with his many vices, had also some virtues, and therefore was not wholly good, but part good; nor wholly wicked, but part wicked: and this is the cause why he continued peaceably in his Empire, which Nero did not, because Nero had many vices, and never a virtue; Tiberius though he had many vices, yet withal he had some virtues; and a vice can never hold out long, if it be not founded upon some virtue. A lascivious man, if he have not some temperance, will never live ten days to an end: a Thief, if he use not some means in his robbing, but will be stealing day and night, secretly and openly, he will quickly make his own Gallows. Therefore Saint chrysostom saith, Talis est natura mali, ut non consistat nisi virtuti cuipiam 〈◊〉. Nam mala non habent naturam, ut ex se possint subsistere; nisi 〈◊〉 aliquid a virtutibus ceperint. And Aristotle having an eye to this, where teaching the way how to maintain a tyranny, saith, that a tyrant ought at least to be part good, and part bad, Insuper moribus talis esse, ut recte se habeat ad virtutem, vel semibonus quidem sit, & non malus, sed semi-malus. This was one of the causes why Nero being cruel, ruined himself, and Tiberius being cruel, kept himself safe; because Nero was a cruel beast, and Tiberius a cruel man. He killed men, out of greediness of the blood of others; and this only for security of himself: the one used his cruelty foolishly, and the other politicly; or rather we may say, wisely; Est enim quaedam Prudentia falsa (saith S. Thomas) vel per similitudinem dicta, cum enim Prudens sit, qui bene disponit ea quae sunt agenda propter 〈◊〉 bonum finem, ille qui propter malum finem aliqua 〈◊〉 congruentia illi fini, habet falsam prudentiam, in quantum illud quod accepit pro fine, non est vere bonum, sed secundum similitudinem sic dicitur aliquis bonus latro; and that which follows.  
But having said, that in Tiberius there was virtue as well as vice; but that Nero was all vice: for which some man with no small colour of truth may reprehend me, seeing in all Histories we find, that Nero was perhaps more virtuous than any other of the Caesarean family: I therefore think it necessary to advertise, that all virtues are not virtues in a Prince; But rather many a one, no better than a vice. Poesy, Music, Painting, and all those Sciences and Arts which depend upon sharpness of wit, a Prince having need to procure himself a soundness of judgement, and not a subtlety of brain, for contemplating of those things which consist only in Idea; therefore in these and such like, a Prince ought to content himself with a mediocrity of knowledge; not for his own practice, but only to enable him to taste the pleasure from them that do practise them. Sunt enim quaedam e liberalibus scientiis, (saith Aristotle) quas usque ad aliquid discere honestum sit, penitus vero sese illis tradere, atque usque ad extremum 〈◊〉 velle, valde noxium est. Philip King of Macedon, hearing his son Alexander play excellent well on an instrument, reproved him, saying, It is a shame for a Prince to play so well; it is only fit for him, to be able to take delight, when he hears them do it, that make it their profession. And seeing this delight cannot be taken without being intelligent of the Art, therefore this censure of Philip seems not much different from my opinion; that a Prince, if it be possible, should know all Arts and Sciences, but not practise them. Nerva composed verses, and finding it a profession not fit for a Prince, he gave it over, Sed cohibet vires (saith Martial speaking of him) ingeniumque pudor. Seeing then Nero was virtuous and excellent in these kinds of Arts and Sciences, in which it is not for a Prince to be too conversant; we may justly say, that he was vicious in virtues; a thing which 〈◊〉 happens to those that are too greedy of getting knowledge. Whereupon Tacitus commended Agricola, that he could bridle this greediness, Retinuitque quod est 〈◊〉, ex sapientia modum. For this desire to know more than is fit, is neither Politically, nor Morally, nor Theologically good, Quemadmodum omnium 〈◊〉 (saith Seneca) sic literarum etiam intemperantia laboramus. And S. Paul, Noli sapere plusquam sapere oportet, sed sapere ad sobrietatem. That which Tacitus calls, To hold a mean in studies, Seneca calls, to be temperate; and S. Paul, to be sober.  
It comes into my mind, now that we are in this di gression, to give another reason, why Tiberius maintained himself in the Empire, and Nero perished in it: and it is, that Nero scorned fame, and Tiberius much esteemed it. And if a Divine should object, that the contemning of fame in this world, is a necessary virtue in all good men; I would answor, as it is true, that to contemn worldly fame, is one of the best things a Christian can do; so it is one of the worst things a Heathen or a wicked man can do; because there will be no vice or villainy, which he will not dare to do, if he regard not fame; as was seen in Nero, who not regarding fame, left no wickedness unattempted.  
But to return to our purpose and principal intent, which is, to show the meaning of that place in Tacitus, upon which we have undertaken to discourse; I say, that many from that text, make it a rule, that one who hath been brought up in the Prince's house, should not be made Prince, because of Tacitus his saying, Hunc & primum ab infantia 〈◊〉 in domo Regnatrice: and their reason is, because in such places he learns to be proud and insolent.  
First, I do not think, that Tacitus mislikes a successor should be brought up in the Prince's House, neither that he makes it a cause of pride absolutely; because not only it is commendable, but in a manner necessary, that Princes should be brought in their Houses to whom they are to succeed; seeing, that though a Prince be of the same state, and of the same blood Royal which ought to succeed in the Crown; yet if he should be brought up any where but in his own house, it would be cause enough to make him odious to all his subjects. And therefore Tacitus saith of Vonone, that although he were of the blood Royal of the Parthians, yet because he had been brought up in Rome, his subjects would not endure him, Quamvis Gentis Arsacidarunt ut externum aspernabantur.  
They therefore deceive themselves, who favouring either brothers or sons of the great Turk, have a hope to settle them in the Ottomane Empire: for though they be of the blood Royal, yet they will always be accounted strangers, and thereupon rejected. Whereof continually we have heard and seen examples, no other good having ever come of it, but that it hath showed the Christian piety of those Princes, who in zeal to God, have given shelter to such persons.  
Secondly, he being commonly of an intolerable carriage, who from a servant comes to be a master, as well because he passeth from one extreme to another; as because, to be a servant abaseth the spirit; as was seen in Tigranes, of whom Tacitus saith, that he therefore lost his Kingdom, Cum advenit Tigranes a Nerone ad capessendum Imperium dilectus, Cappadocum ex Nobilitate, Regis Archelai nepos, sed quod diu obses apud urbem fuerat usque ad servilem patientiam dimissus, neque consensu acceptus. And therefore our Lord God, would not that his Captain and Leader of the Israelites, Moses, should be as others were, a servant to Pharaoh, but would have him bred and brought up in the King's house; and for this it was, that the Parthians expelled Vonone, Si mancipium Caesaris, tot per annos servitutem perpessum, Parthis Imperitet.  
Thirdly, because being in some part raised above equality, as they are, who live in Prince's houses, they are with less envy of the subjects, taken to be their Prince. Whereupon Servius, although (as some think) he was the son of a bondwoman; yet because he had been brought up in the Prince's house, he was accepted for King. The Lacedæmonians also, when they wanted a King, they took Laconicus, only because he had been brought up in the King's house.  
Fourthly, because in such places, there is no doubt but they may better learn how to govern, and be set in a way of managing affairs: and therefore Dion in the life of Adrian, would have a special regard to be had of this, in choosing a Prince: and our Lord God, meaning to fit David, for being a King, made him in Saul's life time, to go to live in the King's Palace; to the end, he might learn the customs of a King, and be made to know the degree, before he took it; where if suddenly upon Saul's sin, he had been made King, he should have come unknown to all the people.  
It is not therefore to be found fault withal, that he who is to rule others, should be brought up in his house that rules; neither in my opinion had Tacitus any such meaning; or to say better, he whose words Tacitus reports.  
For they do not simply and absolutely find fault with Tiberius his education in Augustus his house, neither yet, that he had so great dignities and honours conferred upon him; for these did rather prepare him to govern well, then to make him proud; but the fault they find is this, that in his youth, and whilst he lived in the Prince's house, he was raised to so many and to such a number of Offices. The fault therefore was not, that he was brought up in the Prince's house, but that he had so many offices and honours bestowed upon him; and this neither not so much, as the unseasonableness of them. And therefore Tacitus saith not simply, Congestos consulatus & honores, but Congestos Juveni consulatus. Which is very manifest, for seeing Tiberius had also in his mature age, great offices and honours, Tacitus must needs be understood to speak of those which he received in his youth, apt to make men grow proud, as in another place he excellently shows, in the person of Tiberius; for the sons of Germanieus being much honoured by the Pontifex, who in his prayers to their Gods, made mention of them together with Tiberius, he forbade him saying; that young men grow proud by receiving honours before their time. Movit ne quis in post●…runt mobiles adolescentium animos, praematuris honoribus ad superbiam extolleret. And thus much concerning his pride.  
Secondly, Tacitus taxeth Tiberius with cruelty, which though he endeavoured all he could to hide, yet he could not keep it from appearing. From whence we may know, there cannot be a worse nature, nor a worse Prince, than he who having in him the vice of cruelty, strives for some ends to hide it, seeing having once gotten his intent, with heaping upon himself much hatred, he after makes his greediness of blood appear the more, by flushing it out all at once, (at lest if he do not as Cleomenes did) and where if he had not hid his vice, every one might have known, upon what to work and consequently few should have needed to fear. Now that he hides it, and men cannot penetrate into the Prince's mind, it gives occasion for all in general to fear. The Senators therefore of Rome, seeing Otho dissemble his vices, were much displeased at it: Otho interim (saith Tacitus) contra spem omnium, non deliciis, neque desidia torpescere; 〈◊〉 voluptates, dissimulata luxuria, & cuncta ad decor●…nt Imperii composita; coque plus formidinis afferebant, falsae virtutes, & vitia reditura. Yet it is to be understood of those who dissemble; but for a certain time, as Otho would have done, and as Nero did; but if we ask, which is the better Prince, of him that being cruel desires to use his cruelty covertly, or he, that is openly cruel, I hold directly, that this is the worse; for, using his cruelty openly, either he knows not his vice, or he cares not what men say of him: if he regard not what men say of him, there cannot a worse thing be; if he know not his vice, he comes to be a cruel fool; where he that hides it, shows that both he knows his vice, and also desires a good report: whereupon it follows he cannot so often put his cruelty in execution; for than he should be a more fool than the other, to think that an act often repeated, should never be perceived; and if any one object that this must needs be the worse, as joining to the vice of cruelty, the vice of craft: I answer, that this man's government will be so much better, as it is less distasteful, to be governed by one that is crafty, then by one that is a fool: whereupon the Senators of Ronie never feared Tiberius so much, as when they saw him give over his dissembling: and therefore Tacitus in another place saith, Penetrabat pavor, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & tegendis sceleribus obscurum, eo confidentiae venisse, ut tanquam dimotis 〈◊〉 ostenderet nepotem, sub verberibus Centurionis inter servorum ictus, extrema vitae alimenta frustra orantem. But it is so hard a matter to hide a vice that is natural; and to hide it so, as that no sign of it may appear; that almost all they, who have had a purpose to dissemble; in short time have been discovered. So it happened to Philip, so to the Emperor Domitian, so to Sylla, to Tiberius and to Nero; and finally, to Theodotus King of the 〈◊〉: being a thing impossible, though there be a habit gotten of dissembling, to cover a vice that is natural. In regard whereof, Plutarch saith of Philip, Insita a natura vitia adscititium habitum vicerunt, paulatim foris superhibuerunt, & ingenium Regis deterere. Whereupon our Lord God in S. Matthew, meaning to teach us to know such kind of men, saith, we must observe well their deeds, Attendite a falsis Prophetis qui veniunt ad vos in vestimentis Ovium: and to show us the way how to know them, it follows, A fructibus eorum cognoscetis eos, where Theophylact adds, Nam licet ad tempus simulent, successu tamen temporis producuntur. I will not forbear to bring another pregnant way, which Galen teacheth us, to come to the knowledge of these dissimulations, who saith, that if a virtue be natural, as (for example) mildness, whether the provocations be great or little, yet they will not move a man to choler; but in all occasions, he will show himself constant; but if it be feigned, then perhaps in light occasions he may hide it; but in great, it will violently break out and show itself: and therefore Tacitus meaning to show the dissimulation of Tibernes useth these words, Multa indicia saevitiae, quanquam premantur erumpere: where this word 〈◊〉 shows, that not upon light, but upon great occasions, it discovered itself with violence. Thirdly Tacitus blames Tiberius for luxury; of which head, I intent to speak in the following discourse.   

Ne iis quidem annis, quibus Rhodi specie Secessus exulem egerit, aliquid quam Iram & simulationem, & secretas libidines meditatum.  
How much it imports a Prince to be chaste. The two and twentieth Discourse.  
LUxury is a much greater vice, than cruelty; this taking away the life only of the subjects, that the honour: and chastity on the contrary, is so profitable both to the acquiring, and to the conserving a Dominion, that every one (though of an ill nature, and a worse intention) that aspires to a Principality, will yet take care, if not to be chaste, yet at least to seem so, and to hide his vice of lust until he have attained and be settled in the Empire. Whereupon Daniel speaking of Antichrist, saith, Deum patrum suorum non reputabit, & erit in concupiscentiis foeminarum: which place is translated in these words, Et concupiscentiis mulierum non subjacebit. Writers therefore interpret, that Antichrist knowing of what importance chastity is for getting a Kingdom, will counterfeit himself to be so, thereby to get himself love, and to bring him forward, and finally to make him Emperor. But after he hath once gotten the Empire, he will then no longer hide his filthy concupiscence, but making himself a prey to vices, will show himself to be truly their child.  
This profit Tiberius Nero knew, and therefore strove all he could to hide his lust, Et secretas libidines meditatum; but when he had once gotten whither he aspired, and had set sure footing in the Empire, he then suffered himself to fall headlong into all kinds of vices. It is not therefore enough, to counterfeit to be such, before a man comes to his greatness, as that wicked one did, and as this impious one will do; but a Prince must truly, both in the beginning, in the middle, and in the end not only show to be, but be in truth and sincerely free from lust: first, for zeal to God, and then for his own good and the States: on his own behalf, because there is nothing that more ruins a Prince, then to be abject, base, and despised: Nothing that more upholds him, than Majesty, Gravity and Reverence; and because Princes that are given to Just can never have any of these respects, It is therefore necessary they should keep themselves chaste. In consideration of this, David after his adultery committed with Bersabee, taking notice of his error, prayed to God and said, Red mihi laetitiant salutaris tui, & spiritu Principali confirma me. As though he should say, O Lord God, I forgot that I was a King and a Prince, through the concupiscence of the flesh, into which most miserably I am fallen; I humbly pray thee, that from henceforward, thou wouldst confirm in me the spirit of chastity, that so I may return to be a King & a Prince: and this is so true, that by the figure Antonomasia, chastity is called Gravity, and Majesty; and therefore S. Paul writing to Titus saith, In omnibus teipsum praebe exemplum bonorum operum; In doctrinà, in integritate, in gravitate. S. Hierome in his Comment upon that place, instead of gravitate, reads castitate; for the same word, which in Greek signifies Gravity and Majesty, signifies also Chastity: and therefore, as Gravity and Majesty are necessary for a Prince, without which he should not be a Prince; so Chastity also is no less necessary: and as it is impossible that Majesty and lust should be in company together, Non bene conveniunt, nec in una sede morantur, Majestas & Amor; so it is impossible that Majesty and chastity should not be together, which only of itself is able to make Princes be reverend. Which S. Paul in the foresaid Epistle shows where he saith, Vt qui ex adverso est Revereatur, nihil habens malum dicere nobis. Seeing chastity is reverenced even of her enemies.  
On the part of the Subjects, there is no doubt but the chastity of the Prince, is of great consequence for their good: First, in regard of his example, seeing Cities, and consequently the Citizens, alter as they see the Prince alter: and therefore when Dionysius the Tyrant, sent for Plato to teach him Geometry, all the City and Palace was presently full of dust, every one seeking with all diligence to be a Geometrician. And Saint John in the Apocalypse, meaning to express the changes, which are made in Cities, through the change that is in Princes, describes one and the same horse, to be sometime red, sometimes white, and sometimes black, which happened by the diversity of their riders, according to whom it changed colour. By the horse, (as the greater part of Writers say) is signified the Empire of Rome; and by those that road upon it, the Emperors; according to whose vices the Empire changed, and in nothing more than through chastity; seeing the Prince may by violence violate the honour of his Subjects, if he be not chaste. In which regard S. Paul saith, Obsecro orationes fieri, pro Regibus, & pro omnibus qui in sublimitate sunt constituti, ut tranquillam vitam agamus in omni pietate & castitate. Where he plainly shows, that the chastity of the Subjects depends upon the chastity of the Prince, while he saith, let us Pray for Kings, to the end we may live chastely.  
Chastity therefore is profitable for the Subjects, and necessary for him that will rise to honour; in sign perhaps whereof, S. John in the Apocalypse, makes the Virgins appear on the top of the Mount: as though he would say, that chaste persons can easiliest rise to great degrees, who in the Scripture oftentimes are figured by Mountains. Let Princes therefore be far from lust, and as (according to the opinion of Hugo the Cardinal) they have the Name of God in common to them with Virgins: so also let them have chastity in common to them with Virgins, but yet in such a manner as Princes are able to have it; for so they shall the better discharge their Office, to the honour and glory of God; which is the thing above all they ought to have before their eyes.   

Accedere Matrem muliebri Impotentia, serviendum Foeminae.  
How and when the government of women is odious. The three and twentieth Discourse.  
FOr declaration of this place of Tacitus, where he seems to make it an odious thing to be governed by women: we will first show, in what things it is, that women's Dominion over men is odious; and then, what Authority Princes should allow women in the government.  
To begin with the first: I say, that women may bear rule three ways; the first, themselves alone directly. Secondly, themselves alone indirectly. Thirdly, themselves together with their sons, husbands, or other men.  
The first way of bearing rule; that is, directly and properly consists in the acts of jurisdiction, as in judging; to which there being required great knowledge, great prudence, and inflexibility: it is not possible, that women, by reason of the weakness of their understanding, can in any degree be fit: and therefore in the law, there is a prohibition against that Sex. And indeed there is no example found to the contrary, but only that of Deborah, who in the old Testament is numbered among the Judges; and judged the people of Israel, with so great prudence, that she hath left of herself an eternal memory. But yet this case can be no bar to our assertion; seeing it may easily be answered, that Deborah gave not judgement of her own brain, but gave answers to questions in manner of a Prophetess, saying only that which was revealed to her by God.  
The second way of bearing rule, less proper and indirect, is nothing else, but to have a power to command; which by accident also may happen to women, who being daughters of Princes, may succeed their father in the State. Although the power of commanding may seem proper to the man, and no way common with women; yet seeing the possessing of riches, is equally common to the man, and to the woman; and that it oftentimes happens that the jurisdiction follows the riches, and the thing possessed; it may also happen, that as the woman is partaker of the riches, so she may be also of the jurisdiction to them annexed.  
A third way, is to command in company with men; and themselves, not have the command alone; as many times, Wives with their Husbands, Mothers with their Sons, and Grandmothers with their Nephews; which oftentimes may be, and oftentimes is, but whether well or ill, shall be showed hereafter.  
It is therefore clear, that a woman cannot bear rule directly and properly; that is, in that kind of ruling which is called judging: but yet may in that which is said to be commanding; and especially in the third way, with sons and other men.  
As to the second point, whether the Dominion of women be odious, or no; we may distinguish it thus: either we speak of women alone, and by themselves: or else of women accompanied with men. If we take it the first way, there is nothing more odious, nothing more abhorred of men, then to be commanded by a woman, as being a thing repugnant to reason; contrary to God's commandment, and most contrary to the law of nature. Our Lord God said to the woman; Sub viri potestate eris. Aristotle saith, that naturally the more perfect bears rule over the more imperfect; and the better over the worse: whereupon the woman (as Aristotle in a thousand places witnesseth) being more imperfect than the man, and being by Pythagoras placed in the number of evils, and man of good, it would certainly be a monster in nature, that the perfect should be servant to the imperfect, the good to the evil; and especially that sex being (I say not always, but for the most part) void of prudence and of valour; full of pride; and fuller of lust; and consequently most unfit to govern: of whom Tacitus saith; Non solum imparem laboribus sexum, sed si licentia adsit, saevum, ambitiosum, potestatis avidum. The government therefore of women; when they rule alone, not only is odious, but is also most miserably administered: neither can the example of Deborah (whereof I spoke before) be justly objected; but rather I may myself make use of that example, in confirmation of my own assertion; for if she governed well, it was because she was a Prophetess; and if her government were not odious; it was because a man commanded: for our Lord God, being willing the Israelites should be ruled by a woman; and knowing that by reason of their natural imbecilities, they are not fit to rule, he infused into Deborah a Prophetical spirit, and meaning she should be received without distaste, knowing how distasteful a thing it is to men to be governed by women, he appointed her Barak for a companion in the government; to the end, that commanding by his assistance, it might not be thought, as of herself alone, the command of a woman.  
I will here forbear to speak of infinite Kingdoms and States, that by the government of women have been utterly overthrown, of which all ancient and modern Histories are full; as well, for that it is a thing so well known, as for that it is not much to our purpose. For when Tacitus saith, Serviendum foeminae, he means not, that a woman should command alone, either as Judge or as Princess; but he means the third way, together with men, seeing he speaks of Livia, who having been the cause of Tiberius his coming to the Crown: it might be doubted, whether she also were not to govern, as well as he. That which we are to examine is this, what authority ought to be given in such cases, by men to women; and whether their government in this sort be odious or no? For answer whereto, we must proceed with distinguishing, either we speak of States not well settled, where the men are stout and warlike; or else of States, that live quietly and in peace, and are governed by a Prince secure. If we be in the first case, I am absolutely of opinion, that the Dominion of women is most odious; and therefore Semiramis, as knowing this, durst not venture to take upon her the Empire, openly; Haec (saith Justin) nec immaturo puero ausa tradere Imperium, necipsa Imperium palam tractare, tot ac tantis gentibus vir patienter uni viro, nedum foeminae parituris. And the reason of this is nothing else, but that those Subjects being stout and warlike, would never have consented to be governed by her, if they had known her at first to be a woman. Which we may well think, seeing with these very subjects, it was enough for Sardanapalus that he had but the likeness of a woman, to make him despised, and afterward be slain. Indignatus tali foeminae (saith Justin of him in the person of Artabanus) tantum virorum subjectum, tractantique lanam ferrum & arma portantes parere. And this is the case, which Tacitus means when he saith Serviendum foeminae; showing, it would be odious in a warlike people, as the Romans were, and dangerous in a new Prince as Tiberius was, to govern in company of a woman.  
Now if we ask, what authority should be given to women in such cases, I say, they should not be suffered to intermeddle in matters of judgement, nor of the state, themselves alone; not so much for their incapacity, as for the contempt they are apt to fall into, though they should govern never so well. And therefore the Roman Emperor Alexander, a man most just, and furnished with all the qualites of a good Prince; yet because he suffered his mother to meddle in matters of State, though she did it with great prudence and justice, he fell in short time into contempt, and finally of the Soldiers was miserably slain. In truth a singular example to show, that warlike minds can never endure the government of women, and that their honour is the Prince's disparagement; which Tiberius (a wise man) knew, and could say, Moderandos foeminarum honores: and Tacitus, no less wise than he, giveth the reason of it saying, Muliebre fastigium in sui diminutionem accipiens.  
Yet they must not altogether be left without honour, but some authority it is fit they should have, especially such as are the cause of the Princes coming to the Empire. And therefore the wise Solomon, who through the good means of his mother Bersabee with old David, was assumed to the Royal dignity, not only honoured her exceedingly, but would have her sit with him upon his Throne; as is written in the Book of Kings, Venit ergo Bersabee ad Regem Salomonem, ut loqueretur ei pro Adonia, & surrexit Rex in occursum ejus, adoravitque 〈◊〉, & sedit super Thronum suum, positusque est Thronus matri Regis, quae sedit ad dexteram ejus. But yet I cannot find, in holy Scripture, that ever she gave judgement, or spoke in counsel, or gave audience in affairs at any time. The authority and honour therefore that is to be allowed to women, in States that are not secure, ought not to be immediately in themselves, but by assistance of their husbands. And this counsel David gave to Solomon, in the Psalm Eructavit, speaking to his Bride, where he saith, Filia Tyri in numeribus, vultum tuum deprecabuntur: Where he saith not te, but vultum tuum, that is, thy husband; meant by the word countenance, as Theodoret and S. Basil interpret it. He than that is to be resorted to, and to be sued unto, must be the man, and not the woman; and the honours that are done to the women, aught to pass by the way of their husbands: and therefore it is said in Esay, 〈◊〉 invocetur nomen tuum super nos. This course Tiberius took most notably, who when his mother made any suit in his name, he presently granted it; and more than so, he many times at the suit of Livia required those things of the Senate, which without blushing he could not have asked; but when it was moved to give her honours immediately without passing by the means of Tiberius, he then presently opposed it, saying, Moderandos foeminarum honores.  
But if we speak of those Princes that live securely in peace, and are well settled in their states, as at this day many are in Italy; then, either those women that should govern together with the men, are in judgement and understanding fit for it, or else they are altogether unfit: if unfit, it may then be enough for them to look to matters at home, and Domestical affairs; but if fit, I cannot then think any thing more just, or more convenient, or more profitable to a Prince, then to call such women of his blood, to bear a part of the burdens of government; both because by their experience and prudence they may assist the Prince as much as any other; and also because by reason of their own interest, and the singular affection they bear to their husbands, their sons or nephews; there can be none found, that with more sincerity and faithfulness, and without any by-respects, will help them to bear so great a burden, as a Kingdom is; and so much more, as they are always like to be partakers as well of the dangers, as of the profits of the Prince. A thing which is not found in strangers, and such as are mercenary, whose profit oftentimes looks another way, and is divided from the Prince's profit. Whereupon S. 〈◊〉 upon that place of Esay, Pater filiis notam faciet veritamet: saith, Non revelatur servo veritas, quia servus nescit quid faciat Dominus ejus, sed nec Mercenarius rapitur ad contemplandam veritatem, quia propriam quaerit utilitatem. And therefore Augustus a most wise Prince, had often conference with Livia, Numa Pompilius with Aegeria, Cyrus with Aspas●…a Tarqvinius with Tanaquill, and Justinian with his wife Theodosia. Prince's therefore ought not to despise the counsels of women of their blood, but to hold them in great account; whereof, in my opinion there is in Genesis a Golden Text: Sara having spoken to Abraham to send away Agar and Ishmael, it seems he was not very willing to give credit to the words of a woman; which God knowing, said unto him, Omnia quae dixerit tibi Sara, audi vooem ejus. Moreover, when our Lord God made the woman, he said, Faciamus ei Adjutorium simile sibi: and why then should we seek after other helpers, and not take those who are made of purpose for our aid? According to this my opinion was decided the controversy in Tacitus, between Valorius Messalina and Caecina, where it was concluded, that in governments which stand in danger, it is not fit to bring in women; but very fit, in governments that are peaceable and secure. In which I say more, that a Prince who is young, cannot do better, than not only to be counselled (a thing in part also fit, where States are dangerous) but to suffer himself also to be governed by women. Theodatus King of the Ostrogothes, in the beginning of his Reign carried himself, with great moderation, as long as he agreed with his wife, but when he left to follow her advice, he filled with injustice all his Kingdom. The Emperor Constantinus Sestus, never governed well, but when he suffered his mother Irene to direct him. And Solomon never run into disorderly courses, as long as his mother Bersabe●… lived; of whom he scorned not to be taught, as himself in the Proverbs saith, Filius fui patris mei, tenellus & Vnigenitus coram matre mea, & docebat me atque dicebat, suscipiat verba mea cor tuum, custodi praecepta mea, & vives. And therefore S. chrysostom upon S. John saith, Nihil potentius muliere bona ad instituendum, & informandum virum, quodcunque voluerit, neque tam leniter anticos, nec magistros patietur, ut conjugem admonentem atque consulentem, habet enim voluptatem quandam admonitio uxoria; cum plurimum amet cui consulit, multos possum afferre viros asperos & immites, per uxorem mites redditos & mansuetos. Who knows not, that Tiberius never plunged himself so much into all kinds of wickedness, as after his mother's death? And the reason which all men allege to prove women unfit for government, is of no force; of force I know in general; but that in particular, women should not be as fit as men, I hold it a great folly to think; having myself, although but young, not only found written in Histories, but seen in experience, many women able to have governed the whole World: and to these the frailty of their sex, is so far from being a hindrance, that rather they are worthy of the more praise, for overcoming natural defects, with supply of virtue.   

Vix dum ingressus Illyricum Tiberius, properis matris literis excitur, neque satis compertum est, spirantem adhuc Augustum apud urbem Nolam, an exanimem repererit, acribus namque custodiis domum & vias sepserat Livia, laetique interdum 〈◊〉 vulgabantur, donec 〈◊〉 quae tempus monebat, simul excessisse Augustum, & rerum potiri Neronem, eadem fama detulit.  
That at one and the same time, to make known the death of the Prince, and the assumption of the successor, is a thing very profitable for States that stand in danger. The four and twentieth Discourse.  
THere is nothing makes me more believe, that Tiberius had given order to his mother to poison Augustus, than his very being far off from Rome, at the time of his death; an invention followed by all those, who by such means have taken away the life of great personages. So did Piso, after he had (as is said) poisoned Germanicus: so did Lodowick Sforza, who knowing that his Nephew had taken poison, and could not long be living, he would not stay in Milan, but went to Piacenza to the King of France. The cause, as I think, why they do so, is to the end the World may not suspect they had any hand in their deaths; and although, they cannot but think, that men of understanding will suspect them the more, yet this is nothing to the Prince, who seeks but to a void the heat of the people, who without any judgement, are carried through love or hatred, to do such things, as men of judgement would never do.  
Tiberius was then in Slavonia, when his mother sent him word of Augustus his sickness; who (as may be thought) was dead before Tiberius came to Nola; yet he oftentimes gave forth, he had good hope of his speedy recovery; and this he continued so long, till he might be provided of things needful for accomplishing his purpose; and that done, he at one and the same time, with one and the same voice, made known the death of Augustus, and his own assumption to the Empire.  
We have in Tacitus another example very like to this, of Agrippina the mother of Nero, who upon certain words she heard Claudius utter in his Wine, that he meant to give the Empire to Britannicus, she poisoned him; and being dead, she gave out there was good hope of his amendment, until she had made ready all things needful for making Nero Emperor. The words of Tacitus are these, Vocabatur interim Senatus; votaque pro incolumitate Principis consuls & Sacerdotes nuncupabant, cum jam exanimis vestibus & fomentis obtegeretur, dum res firmando Neronis Imperio componuntur. Jam Agrippina velut dolore victa, & solatia conquirens, tenere amplexu Britannicum, veram Paterni oris effigiem appellare, ac variis artibus demorari, ne cubiculo egrederetur. Antoniam quoque & Octaviam sorores ejus attinuit, & ounctos aditus custodiis clauserat, erebroque vulgabat, ire in melius valetudinem Principis, quo miles bona in spe ageret, tempusque prosperum ex monitis Chaldaeorum attentaret. Tunc medio diei, tertio ante Idus Octobris, foribus Palatii repente deductis, Comitante Burrho Nero egreditur. I have related these words of Tacitus at large (as not able at this time to discourse upon them:) to the end, that every one may see, what devices Agrippina used at the death of Claudius to bring Nero to the Empire. The very like course to this, was taken by Servius Tullus, in company of Tanaquill the wife of Tarqvinius Priscus, who seeing her husband wounded so dangerously, that he was upon the point to die, she shut the Court gates, and gave out that the wound was but light; and that in a few days they should see the Prince abroad, but that in the mean time, he had commanded Servius Tullus to take his charge, and to be obeyed as himself in person: by this device, Servius getting possession of the Royal authority, was able in few days so to settle himself in the Empire, that it was an easy matter, at one and the same time, to make known that Tarqvinius was dead, and that himself was Emperor. Which fact Livy relating, saith, Servius cum trabea & lictoribus prodit, ac sede Regia sedens, alia decernit, de aliis consulturum se esse Regem 〈◊〉, itaque per aliquos dies, cum jam expirasset Tarquinius celata morte, per speciem 〈◊〉 fungend●… vicis, suas opes sirmavit, tum 〈◊〉 palam facta, ex comploratione in Regia orta, Servius praesidio firmo munitus, primum injussu populi, voluntate Patrum Regnavit. Also Arius Aper, after he had secretly in a litter slain Numerianus the son of the Emperor 〈◊〉, gave out in the Army enquiring where he was, that for an infirmity in his eyes, he kept him out of the wind, intending first to accommodate his own designs, and then to publish Numerianus his death; and if his plot succeeded not, that was long of other occasions. It is therefore no marvel that Tiberius following the course of Servius, was able to attain his end, as well as Servius, especially having many things to help him, which to the other were wanting.  
This therefore is an excellent way, secure and worthy of imitation, in Kingdoms that are not well settled, and where the people are desirous of change; for to suffer no Interregnum, but in one and the same time, to make known the death of the one, and the assumption of the other, is the only means to hinder innovations. The reason of this, in my opinion is, because as Wax is more apt to take a form, when it is without any, then when it hath a form before, seeing in the first case there needs but one action, which is to imprint a new form; where in the second case, there need two: first to take away the old form, and then to bring in a new, which certainly is double as difficult: and therefore a certain Philosopher, would be doubly paid, when he took one to teach, that had been taught before, because he must take double pains: first, to remove the false Images imprinted in the fantasy; and then to bring in the true: so a City (to return to our purpose) being a matter that cannot consist without a form, it will be more easy to bring in it a new form, if it have none before, then if it have; and therefore if Tiberius had made known the death of Augustus, before his own assumption to the Empire, the City had remained without a form, & consequently with small difficulty, either the Senate or the people, or the soldiers might have brought in another: but coming at one and the same time, to know both the one and the other, the Empire seemed rather to change Prince, than form. Our Lord God knew the Israelites to be a people, Durae cervicis, apt to rebel, and desirous of innovations; and therefore he called Moses up to the Mount, to the end they might not know of his death, before they knew Josua the son of Nun to be his successor. We may therefore conclude, that this course of Tiberius is not to be blamed, especially taken to a pious end.   

Primum facinus Novi Principatus fuit Posthumi Agrippae caedes; quem ignarum Inermemque quamvis firmatus animo Centurio aegre confecit. Nihil de ea Re Tiberius apud Senatum disseruit: Patris Jussa dissimulabat, quibus praescripsisse Tribuno custodiae adposito, ne contaretur Agrippam morte adsicere quando●…ue ipse supremum diem explevisset.  
That those men who possess the state of another, are but in a dangerous condition, as long as any of the former Lords line remain alive: and what course is to be taken to free themselves from such danger. The five and twentieth Discourse.  
Tiberius' apprehended, he could never live securely in the Empire, if he made not away Agrippa. For he being of the line of Augustus, and nearer to the Crown then himself, a sierce man and of beastly conditions, would always be a refuge to the soldiers and people of Rome, whenfoever they should fall into distaste of their Prince: and the rather for that he being a violent man, and without judgement, would never have stood upon danger, but not fearing death itself, would have ventured upon any occasion. And these are the men, who though but private men, are to be feared of all: and therefore Pomponius stood in fear of Titus Manlius, Et quod haud minus timendum erat (saith Livy) stolide ferocem viribus suis cerneret.  
This course of Tiberius hath for the most part been followed by all Princes and Commonwealths in the changes of State, when from one line it passeth to another, the new always extinguishing the old, as though without this course, they were never able to live in peace. So the Romans, as long as the race of the Tarquins continued, were never without war. And this is one of the causes I alleged, why the conspiracy of Marcus Brutus against Caesar, had not so good success, as the conspiracy of Lucius Brutus against the Tarquins; because in this, they destroyed not only the line of the Tarquins, but all those that were of the name: where in that of Caesar, they only cut down the tree, but left the root behind; from which sprung up Augustus, who receiving nourishment and aid from those very men that had killed his uncle, in a short time he grew to be so great a Tree, that he crushed them to pieces, that went about to cut him down. For this very cause, in Egypt, in Cappadocia, in Soria, in Macedonia, and in Bythinia, they often changed their Kings, because they took no care to extinguish the line of the former Lords, but only to get their places. And therefore Bardanus in Tacitus is justly blamed, who instead of extinguishing Gotarze the former Lord, stood losing his time, in besieging the City.  
But these and a thousand other examples, (which for brevity I omit) it may be held for a maxim of State, that whosoever gets a Kingdom from another, he ought to root out the whole line of him that was Lord before.  
But this rule cannot be thus left, without some aspersion of impiety: and therefore, for resolution, I think best to distinguish; because if we speak of a Christian Prince, that hath gotten the state of another, who is enemy of the faith, he may justly do●… as best pleaseth him, by any way whatsoever to take them away, that can pretend to the State; yet not so neither, unless he find them so obstinate in their ●…ect, that there is no possible means to remove them from their error; and so much our Lord God himself, by the mouth of the Prophet Samuel, appointed Saul to do to Amalech, 〈◊〉 ergo vade & percute Amalech, & demolire Vniversa ejus, non parcas ei, & non concupiscas ex rebus 〈◊〉 aliquid, sed interfice a viro usque ad 〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉 atque Lactantem.  
But if we speak of a Christian Prince, that by force gets possession of a State, from one of the same faith let him never go about to destroy the line of him that possessed it before; for, besides that it is a thing unworthy of a Christian, it seems to me, to be rather their invention, who meaning to live wickedly, would be glad to have no bridle, for if a Prince shall carry himself lovingly towards his Subjects, using them as children, and not as servants, he need not be afraid of any whomsoever. For this cause, the Senators of Rome, having driven out the Tarquins, had more 〈◊〉 to govern the City, as fathers, then to extinguish the line of him that had been Lord, which was indeed incomparably more for their good: as in the second book of the first Decad of Livy, every one may see.  
Rather, many times it is better to bestow honours upon them, from whom a state is taken, and to leave them a part, thereby to retain the rest more securely. So did Cyrus, who having taken Lydia, and dispossessed Croesus, who was Lord of it before, he left him at least a part of his patrimony, and gave him a City to be his own. And indeed if he had done otherwise, he might easily have lost all: therefore Justin saith, Craeso & vita, & patrimonii parts & urbs Barce concessa sunt, in qua 〈◊〉 non Regiam vitam, tamen proximam Majestati Regiae degeret. And then shows the benefit that comes by it, where he saith, Haec Clementia non minus Victori, quam victo utilis fuit: quip ex Vniversa Gracia, cognito quod illatum Craeso bellum esset, auxilia veli●…t ad 〈◊〉 extinguendum incendium 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Craesi 〈◊〉 apud omnes urbes erat, ut passurus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bellum Gracia fuerit, si quid crudelius in Craesum consuluisset. If the King of France had done thus, when Ferdinand of Arragon would have yielded up the Kingdom of Naples to him, if he would have left him but Lord of Calabria, perhaps he had not lost both the one and the other: and in truth, it had been his best way to have done so, at least for so long time, till he might have made himself sure and firm in the Kingdom of Naples: and then for the other, he might have taken it from him again at any time. So did David, who took away half of the substance which Saul had given to Mephibosheth; and gave it to his servant Siba, for a doubt he had, lest he should desire his father's Kingdom. This interpretation Procopius made of it, when he said, Vt substantiam 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 ipsius dejiceret, ne Regnum affectaret, alias enim illum qui adversus Dominum suum mendacium dixerat, quem punire potius debebat, nequaquam participem cumeo fecisset.  
Alexander the Great, when he waged war with Kings far off from Macedonia, he not only when he had overcome them, never sought to extinguish their line; but which is more strange, to them from whom he had taken a Kingdom, he restored the same Kingdom again. A great act of Magnanimity, and which may and aught to be used, in the like case to that of Alexander Magnus; that is, when Countries far remote from the Seat of the Kingdom, and in customs, jaws, habit and language very different, are easily overcome; and so much the rather, when the war is waged, more for desire of glory, then for getting of ground; seeing it is always better, to seek to hold that by a way of clemency, which by a way of force can never be held.  
But in case it be feared, least leaving the former Prince, in the Countries taken from him, he should practise to make a revolution; he may then have states given him to govern in other places: So Cirus did, who having overcome the Medes, and deprived Astyages of his Kingdom, he would not leave him in Media, and yet would not deal hardly with him neither, but he made him Governor of Hyrcania, and although Justin say, it was done, because Astyages himself had no mind to return to the Medes; yet to my understanding, it is more likely, that Cyrus did it as fearing, lest he who had procured his nephew's death, to bring himself to the Kingdom, being now deprived of it, would never be quiet, when any fit occasion should be offered to him.  
Another way there is, which others have used, and it is, to keep such about themselves, and to hold them in esteem of Kings: so Herod the great had begun to do with Aristobulus, and with Hyrcanes, but the cruelty of his nature made him fall at last, to take the same course that others do. This counsel therefore, was much better followed by David, who leaving Saul's patrimony to Mephibosheth the son of Jonathan, he held him always about himself in great honour, and all succeeded exceeding well.  
And in case all these courses seem to be difficult; either, through the undaunted spirit of him that was Lord before, or by reason of the extraordinary affection the people bear him; in this case, the best course is, to send them into banishment for some long time, as the Pope did in Bolognia.  
But to return to our purpose: Tiberius not without cause stood in fear of Agrippa, which is plainly to be seen by this, that not only Agrippa, but one only servant forging and taken upon him his name, was like to have raised no small insurrection in the people and Senators of Rome; and because Tiberius could not put this Agrippa to death, without incurring an exceeding blot of cruelty, he therefore had recourse, to that remedy so much used by Princes; which was to feign that Augustus had commanded it. So also did the Emperor Adrian, who would have it believed, that all the murders he committed were done by his predecessors command; which not only abates the hatred and name of being cruel, but converts it also into piety, as done for executing the will of the dead. And yet in this there would be no blame, if such murders were committed out of zeal of justice, out of which zeal, David being willing that Joab should be punished for two murders, and Semei for the injury he had done him; to take away the hatred, that for this might fall upon Solomon, he commanded him at the time of his death to do it; to the end, that he afterward putting it in execution, might seem rather (as in this indeed he was) a just King, and a pious executor of the will of his deceased father, than a cruel Prince.  
But because Ludovico Moro, taking to him that state, which belonged not to him, by means of his Nephew's death, hath much resemblance to Tiberius; I am willing to show it a little more clearly, by a Parallel. Augustus' being dead, Tiberius succeeded in the Empire, and caused Agrippa Posthumus to be put to death, to whom the succession of right belonged. Ludovico Moro succeeded in the Duchy of Milan, and caused (as it is believed) John Galeozzo, the true heir, to whom that Duchy of right belonged, to be put to death. Tiberius' doubted, that because Augustus was gone to visit Agrippa, he would appoint him to be Emperor. Ludovico Moro feared, that because Charles the eighth was gone to visit John Galeozzo, he would make him Duke of Milan Tiberius would have it believed, that he was elected by the Senate, and not through the wickedness and plots of his mother Livia. Ludovico Moro would have it believed, that he was made Duke of Milan by the people, for the good of the state, and not through his own villainies. Tiberius' made a show, as though he were unwilling to take upon him the Empire, Moro also dissembled the like. In one only thing they differed, that to the one it proved safety; to the other, ruin; and it is, that where Tiberius as soon as he came to the Empire, he presently put Agrippa to death; Ludovico stayed so long from putting his nephew to death, that he was forced, for putting it in execution to call in the King of France, to his manifest and utter ruin.   

A Parallel between Tiberius and Solomon. The six and twentieth Discourse.  
SEeing in these Discourses, and particularly in the next before, we have spoken of Tiberius, and brought also many examples of Solomon, I have thought it no unfit curiosity, to compare them together. Tiberius was borne of Livia, who was taken by Augustus from Nero. Solomon was borne of Bersabee, who was taken by David from Urias. Bersabee was with child, (although by David) when he took her to wife; Livia also was with child, when she went to be married to Augustus. Augustus had many near of kin to whom to leave the Empire, as Agrippa for one. David had his son Adoniah, to whom by right of age, as being the elder, the Kingdom belonged. Finally, Augustus grown old, at the suit of Livia, appointed Tiberius to be his heir: and David grown old, at the persuasions of Bersabee, ordained Solomon to succeed him. Solomon being come to the Crown, killed Adoniah, to whom the right of it belonged: Tiberius being come to the Empire, caused Agrippa to be put to death, who was rightful heir of the Empire: Both the one and the other governed with great judgement in the beginning; but at last, Solomon losing Bersabee, and Tiberius, Livia; both the one and the other plunged themselves into all kinds of lustfulness. Whereupon there rebelled against Tiberius, Sejanus the dearest servant he had: and against Solomon, Jeroboam the most inward friend he had. Tiberius' used to speak darkly: Solomon also used the like speaking, as may be seen by his Parables and Proverbs.   

Nuntianti Centurioni ut mos Militiae: factum esse quod imperasset, neque imperasse seize, & rationem facti reddendam apud Senatum, respondit. Quod postquam salustius Crispus particeps Secretorum (is ad Tribunum miserat codicillos) comperit; metuens ne reus subderetur, juxta periculoso, ficta seuvera promeret, monuit Liviam, ne arcana domus, etc.  
That it is a dangerous thing to obey Princes in services of cruelty and tyranny. The seven and twentieth Discourse.  
SAllust had taken order, and provided all due means for putting Agrippa Posthumus to death, by the commandment of Tiberius; but he desirous to show he had no hand in the fact, denied to the Centurion who was the executioner of it, that it was done by any command of his; saying, that for what he had done, he must give account, not to him, but to the Senat. Which Sallust seeing, and doubting least the mischief might fall upon his head; Veritus (as Justin saith, speaking in the person of Arpagus in the like case) 〈◊〉 infantis necati ultionem, quam a patre non potuisset, a ministro exigeret: he began to counsel Livia, Ne arcana Domus, ne consilia amicorum, ministeria militum vulgarentur.  
The conceit of Tiberius was good, that he would have, (as I imagine) the Centurion go to the Senate to tell them, he had executed the Commandment of Augustus about the death of Agrippa; but yet that of Sallust likes me better: because there is no likelihood it would ever be believed, that Augustus appointed the death of a Nephew, for security of a son in law: seeing as he could get nothing by it, so he might lose much; because the Prince showing he cared not to have his death known, there is no doubt but men would talk of it with more boldness: from which talk, there oftentimes grow ill affections against the Prince; whereas, if Tiberius had passed it (as he did) in silence, it would not have come to many men's ears, & they that would have heard it, would have kept it secret, as knowing how dangerous a thing it is, to discover & talk of that which Princes would have to be concealed. Besides, if he made it be told in the Senate, he did by such feigning more incense the minds of all men; seeing doing it, without telling it, he had used but force, but telling it withal, he used craft; and because it grieves inferiors more, when they are overcome by craft, then when they are oppressed by force: consequently, they would have taken greater indignation for the death of Agrippa, if to the force there had been added this craft, to make the Senate believe such tales, as one would not look should be believed of Children. And therefore we see the Roman Nobility took it ill at Nero's hands, that he would go about to make them believe, that the shipwreck of his mother was a thing happened by chance; and that she had sent Agerinus to kill him, which were all but foolish devises, to cover his most nefarious fault. Yet I say not, if Tiberius had used that cunning before spoken of, that he had been ere the more in danger by it; seeing they who understand these tricks, are men of brain, who as they have judgement whereby they discern such subtleties of the Prince; so by the same judgement they know how to hide them, by making a show that they believe them. And upon such men it is that the people, (the Prince's only fear) cast their eyes, and believe verily all that to be true, which they see wise men make a show to believe: as one that looks only upon the bark of things, discerns not that which is true, from that which is feigned; whereof, we have an example in Tacitus, in the fore-alledged case of Nero, in which, although the chief men had taken distaste to be mocked with those foolish inventions of Nero, yet they all made show to believe it when it was told them. Miro tamen certamine Procerum, decernuntur supplicationes, apud omnia Pulvinaria. Herod was much afraid, if he should cause Saint John to be beheaded, lest the people would make some insurrection; whereupon he found this trick, to bind himself by oath; thereby to make the people believe, that it was against his will he put him to death, but that he was tied by oath; and it succeeded well with him, for the chief men, both out of interest and out of fear made show to believe him; and the people believed him indeed: yet in this present case, when together with securing themselves from the people, they may also avoid the distaste of the Senate; this opinion of Sallust likes me better.  
But be it how it will, this is a clear case, which we may gather from this place, that those Officers who have served their Lords, and been their instruments in cruel and tyrannical executions, have come themselves at last, for the most part to a miserable end. And this happens for divers reasons.  
First, because oftentimes they surfeit of them, and knowing their own villainies, in which many times they go so far, that Neque peccata, neque Remedia pati possunt, as Livy saith, they feel themselves torn in conscience, which is always gnawing, Sicut vestimentum sic comedet eos vermis, & sicut lana, sic devorabit eos tinea; a misery which for the most part happens to tyrants. And this Plato teacheth us, as Tacitus speaking of Tiberius relates, Ad●…o Facinora atque flagitia sua ipst quoque in supplicium verterent. Neque frustra Praestantissimus sapientiae (that is Plato) firmare solitus est, si reoludantur Tyrannorum mentes, posse aspici laniatus & ictus; quando ut corpora verberibus, ita saevitia, libidine, malis consultis animus dilaceratur. As was seen also in Nero, who after he had killed his mother, was continually affrighted in his mind, as fearing the wagging of every leaf. And Alphonsus of Arragon had always apparitions before his eyes, where he thought he saw those Lords, whom he had put to death. So the King Theodoricus, having put Boetius and Symmachus to death, when the head of a great Fish was served to his table, he thought he saw the head of Symmachus threatening him; wherewith affrighted, he cast himself upon his bed, and died. So Poets feign, that Oresies having killed his mother, was tormented by the Furies: whereupon the Ancients, seeing these tyrants standing always in continual terror, Sonitus terroris semper in auribus illius; & cum pax sit, ille insidius suspicatur: have conceived that such men were frighted with the Ghosts of those whom they had killed. Seeing therefore these Princes cannot hinder a thing done, from being done; they desire at least to have them taken away, who having been their instruments, do with their presence refresh the memory of the villainies they have committed: So Tacitus saith, speaking of Anicetus whom Nero employed to kill his mother. Levi post admissum scelus gratia, dein graviore odio, quia graviorum facinorum ministri, exprobrantes aspiciuntur. And therefore Tiberius used often to rid away those servants, whom in such villainies he had employed. And that his cruelty might not want work, in their places he supplied still others; which 〈◊〉 relates where he saith, 〈◊〉 ministros ut praeventi ab aliis nolebat, ita 〈◊〉 in eandem operam recentibus, veteres & pergraves afflixit.  
Secondly, they oftentimes put to death such servants; specially whom they have employed in murdering any of the blood Royal: and the reason is, lest having now imbrued their hands in Royal blood, they should 〈◊〉 stick to murder them too. So Perseus put him to death, who had been his instrument in kill Demetrius; so Otho all those who had been his ministers in killing of Galba.  
Thirdly, this happens sometimes for securing of Princes, that their villainies may not be known: for when they have done them, and can find no other way to hide them, they then lay another upon them; as David did, who to cover his adultery, committed a murder; and therefore they put all those to death, who have any hand, or have any knowledge of their faults: so did Bassianus the son of Severus, who having caused his brother Geta to be killed, caused also Letus that had been his Counsellor, and all other that were acquainted with it, to be slain. Perseus also standing in fear of the Roman Army, appointed Niceas to cast all his Treasure into the Sea; and Andronides, to burn the Navy: but afterward, being sensible of his cowardice in showing such fear, and ashamed of it; to the end it might not be known, he caused both of them to be put to death.  
Fourthly, it often happens that such servants run a hazard, because a Prince having used them, in the executing a thousand cruelties and tyrannies, through which they come to be odious to all the City; he hopes that by putting those servants to death, the odiousness shall be turned upon them●… as whereby the subjects shall be made believe, that those cruelties were committed without their consent. So Valentinus used to do, who having employed 〈◊〉 d'Orco, with great cruelty to extinguish the factions of Romagna; after most tyrannically, he had made himself Lord of it, and had obtained his purpose; not without bringing upon himself the infinite hatred of all his subjects; at last he cut in pieces that miserable minister of his, to the end, the hatred of his subjects might be turned upon him: and the like did Tiberius to Sejanus, and of such examples Histories are full. Rather indeed, tyrants engross to themselves such fellows, to the end, that when the scores of seditions shall be cast up, they may excuse themselves, and make the people wreck their anger upon the servant.  
Fifthly, such servants run a hazard; because the foundation upon which they build their Lord's favour is soon ended: the cause of their favour, being only the hatred that is borne to another, which ceaseth as soon as he is dead; and consequently the affection ceaseth, which was borne for putting the murder in execution: so much Tacitus intimates, speaking of Plancina, who after the hatred to Germanicus was ended, was herself in danger, Vbi odium & Gratia desit, jus valuit.  
But these ways never bring forth any good effect to a Prince: First, because it is false, that they can ever cancel the remembrance of such villainies out of their minds; seeing their own conscience is too great a witness against them. Whereupon, although our Lord God, (as Theodoret saith) took away the life of that son of David, which was borne in the adultery with Bersabee, that it might not remain a shame to him, for the ●…inne he had committed, Vivus erat futurus argumentum sceleris ac iniquitatis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Regis qui erat, & Propheta, curant gerens Dominus, non sinit eum vivere: yet it served not to remove the gnawing of his conscience: as he saith, Peccatum moum coram me est semper. Secondly, this is no sufficient way to keep their crimes from being known, Nihil occultum quod non reveletur, neque coopertum, quod non sciatur. And if it be not known at other times, at least it shall not be hidden at the day of judgement. Thirdly, it is no fit way to make the people believe, that the cruelties executed by servants, were done without the Prince's consent; and although it have sometimes succeeded well, yet this hath not been because the people believed it, but (as I said before, upon the place of Justin) because when the people cannot wreak their anger upon the Prince, they will for the present upon his ministers, and afterward when time serves, upon the Prince himself: as it happened to Valentinus. Sometimes also, the people make a show to believe that the villainies committed, were done without the Prince's consent; to the end, that to preserve this good opinion of himself, he may, after the death of such ministers, give over his cruelty: and lastly, it saves them not from being slain; for if they be not by them, they are by others, and oftentimes by themselves, as it happened to Otho.  
This way therefore doth no good at all, and is the worst wicked course that can be imagined, being nothing but a mere multiplying of villainies. It is true, if a Prince should employ a servant to kill a delinquent, and so both of them should juridically deserve death; in this case, he should commit no error, in putting also the servant to death; but herein, he should imitate our Lord God, who oftentimes makes use of the wicked to punish the wicked; and they once punished, he then as a loving father, having corrected his child, casts the rod which was the instrument of correction, into the fire; and more than this, he oftentimes punisheth those whom he hath used for executing his anger, Vae Assur; virga furorismei, & baculus ipse est, saith the truth in the mouth of Esay. So our Lord God made use of the King of the Assyrians, and of his Army, to punish the people of Israel, for their sins; and that done, he punished also the Assyrians themselves, in such sort that he destroyed them all. There is no doubt but our Lord God did it all with exceeding great justice and providence, punishing justly those Assyrians, who besides their being a most perfidious people, they fell upon the Israelites (as Theodoret expounds it) not for any zeal of executing God's justice, but only for the hatred they bore to that Nation.  
To return to our purpose, I conclude that Sallust had an excellent brain, not to suffer the cause to be brought before the Senate, which if it had been there agitated, and Tiberius not discover himself, all the mischief would have lighted upon him, and they would have been revenged upon the servant, when upon the Prince they could not. So it happened to Piso, who having been employed by Tiberius to kill Germanicus, and the cause brought before the Senate; Tiberius shifted it off from himself, and it fell to Piso's lot to suffer for it. Not without cause therefore did Sallust: Monuit Liviam, ne arcana domus, ne consilia amicorum, ministeria militum vulgarentur.   

Monuit Liviam ne arcana domus, ne consilia amicorum, ministeria militum vulgarentur.  
That Princes ought not to reveal the secrets of their State; and how it happens, that oftentimes men are drawn to speak some things which ought to be concealed. The eighth and twentieth Discourse.  
ALI States, whether they be Commonwealths or Kingdoms, have certain foundations, or as we call them secrets, by which they govern themselves, both for conservation and augmentation. And therefore they endeavour in such sort to conceal them, that they may not be known to any but their successors. So did Augustus, in giving instructions to Tiberius; so did David, acquainting Solomon with them at the time of his death: so finally did Charles the fifth, teaching them to Philip the second when he renounced the Empire: for if these secrets by which they govern, should be publicly known, it would be a great advantage against them, for losing their states. And therefore Sosybus, understanding that Cleomenes the Spartan, was informed of all the most inward secrets of Ptolomey, would not suffer him to go out of Egypt, for fear (as Plutarch relates) he should raise some sharp war in that Kingdom, whereupon finally he put him to death. We may see also, that the Romans never were in greater danger to be overthrown, then when by Coriolanus, their own Citizen, & consequently acquainted with all their secrets, they were assaulted. This precept was so well observed by the ancient Roman Commonwealth, that though we have all the Histories of those times, yet to this day we know not, otherwise then by some conjecture, by what means it was, that they maintained their government, and augmented it.  
Justly therefore did Sallust advise, Ne arcana domus vulgarentur: that is, that those secrets of State, upon which the Empire is founded, should not be made known to any but to the Prince. And Solomon in his Proverbs observes as much where he saith, Coelum sursum, terra deorsum, & cor Regis inscrutabile.  
But because oftentimes men overshoote themselves, in discovering the secrets of their mind, it shall be our work in this Discourse, to show what policies are wont to be used to make men reveal their secrets; and then, what remedy there is for it, which consists indeed in only the knowing them, as it is in snares, which if they be known, are easily avoided.  
Secrets than are either discovered of ones own accord, or else one is drawn to discover them, by some other. The first case may happen by many occasions: First, out of a certain vanity, that is commonly in all men, to show they are privy to the secrets of Princes; and this is most seen in women and young men: and thus the conspiracy of Catiline came to be discovered. Secondly, it may happen through drunkenness, which is apt to disclose any secret, how great soever, as it happens at feasts. And therefore Solomon would not have Kings to drink Wine, Noli regibus O Lamuel, noli regibus dare 〈◊〉, quia nullum secretum est, ubi regnat Ebrietas: there being this nature in Wine, that it makes those things be laid open, which should be hidden: as we see in No, who no sooner drunk Wine, but he laid open those parts, which he should have hidden. And this is one reason why the Ancients painted Bacchus naked; thereby to intimate that Wine discloseth secrets. Thirdly, it happens oftentimes through hatred and indignation, which they, to whom secrets are imparted, conceive against the Prince: whereupon, they knowing the danger of this, as soon as they find they have discontented one in whom they had confidence, either they poison him, or some way or other bring him to his end. So dealt Ptolemy (as we said before) with Cleomenes, certainly a most wicked course. Fourthly, secrets oftentimes are disclosed out of hope of reward; so did Elvidius the freed man of Scevinus, who acquainted Nero with a conspiracy against him, only out of hope to be well rewarded. Nam cum secum servilis animus praemia perfidiae reputavit. Lastly, this happens sometimes through fear of punishment. And therefore Cifrone (as Philip Cominaeus relates) when he saw himself carried to die, would then reveal to the Duke of Burgundy, the treason which the Count of Campobasso had plotted against him. And thus much concerning the revealing of secrets of one's own accord. And though it may seem to be in our own power to hold our peace, (as Tacitus saith) Si tam in nostra potestate esset, oblivisci, quam tacere; yet many times a man is alured, and in a manner forced to discover his mind; a thing which may many ways be done. First, by Rhetoric and Eloquence, which moving the affections, and stirring up the peccant humour of him whose secrets we desire to know; he without perceiving it, is easily transported, to reveal what ever is in his breast. This cunning was used by Sejanus against Nero, and against Agrippina also, when Agrippinae quoque proximi inliciebantur pravis sermonibus tumidos spiritus perstimulare. Whereupon, it is no marvel, that Latiaris finding the peccant humour of Sabinus, easily drew him to tell him at full his discontentment. Igitur Latiaris jacere fortuitos primum sermons (feeling him first a far of,) mox laudare Constantiam, quod non ut caeteri florentis domus anticus, afflictum deferuisset, simul honora de Germanico, Agrippinam miserans disserebat. Another way the foresaid Latiaris used, and it was to feign a confidence, with making Sabinus believe, he was his true friend, and pretending to be of his mind, in those dangerous things which he would not have communicated to another, iique sermones tanquam vetita miscuissent, speciem arctae amicitiae facere. And this is an easy way, by entrusting some secret to a man, whose mind we desire to know, as Tacitus plainly expresseth, where he saith, Nihil eorum Vitellianos fallebat, crebris ut in Civili transfugi●…s & exploratores cura diversa sciscitandi, sua non occultabant. Thirdly, men are oftentimes drawn to discover secrets, by being asked upon a sudden, because the understanding operating naturally, and not having time to operate with art, must needs either answer that which is the truth, or be silent and say nothing, or lastly entangle itself. Whereupon 〈◊〉 who loved none of his qualities better than his 〈◊〉; yet being asked upon the sudden could not hide the displeasure he had taken against Asinius Gallus, of whom, perculsus improvisa interrogatione paululum reticuit. As likewise interrogations often multiplied, confound secrets in the mind, and therefore Tiberius in the death of Piso, Crebrisque Interrogationibus exquirit, qualem Piso diem supremum noctemque exegisset atque illo pleraque sapienter, quaedam inconsultius 〈◊〉. The same way also he used with Syllanus, who Creberrime Interrogabatur. Fourthly, oftentimes men of themselves, and against their will discover secrets, either by their voice, or by some motion not usual, or by some cast of their eyes, and other exterior signs, by which the secrets of the heart are often discovered: Tiberius knowing this, to the end he might not make appear the secret contentment he took at the death of Germanicus, would not show himself in public: Tiberius atque Augusta publico abstinuere, inferius Majestate sua rati, si palam lamentarentur, arm omnium oculis vultum eorum scrutantibus, falsi intelligerentur. By this way the conspiracy of Scevinus came to be known, Simul affluentibus solito Convivium initum servorum charissimi libertate, & alii pecunia donati, atque ipse moestus, & magnae cogitationis manifestus erat, quamvis laetitiam vagis sermonibus simularet. Fifthly, it is easy to draw a secret from one's mouth, by ask him, not with doubtful, but affirmative words; thereby seeming to know that, which he desires to know: so dealt our Lord God with Eve, who to the end she should not deny her sin, omitted as a thing known, that which he would have had her to confess, saying, Quare hoc fecisti? and so not enquiring of the fact, he asked of the cause: and this he did (saith Abulensis) not for any need he had to use this way, for knowing the truth, but only for instructing of us.  
These than are the ways by which secrets oftentimes, are voluntarily and of ones own accord disclosed; either out of vanity, or through drunkenness, or through hatred, or for hope of reward, or for fear of punishment; and sometimes also a man is drawn to disclose secrets, by Art, that is, by moving the affections, and by finding out the peccant humour, and by entrusting his own secrets, or by ask questions upon a sudden, or by reiterating interrogations, or by means of some motions and actions of the body; or lastly, by feigning to know it already.  
Prince's therefore must be well advised, to whom they impart these secrets; that they intrust them not to such, as may afterward voluntarily discover them; and servants to whom they are imparted, must be very vigilant, that they be not drawn from them by any cunning.  
But although ordinarily and for the most part, secrecy be a commendable thing, yet not commendable in all things, seeing to hold one's peace, or to deny in some cases, is not only unprofitable, but pernicious, as making some act or accident, to be more and with worse circumstances published, which would not be if it were confessed freely. Into this error fell Vitellius, In hunc modum etiam Vitellius apud milites disseruit, praetorianos nuper exauctoratos insectatus, a quibus falsos rumores dispergi, nec ullum civilis belli metum asseverabat, suppresso Vespasiani nomine, & vagis per urbem militibus, qui sermones populi coercerent, id praecipuum alimentum famae erat. And in another place, of the same Vitellius, he saith, Fractis apud Cremonam rebus, nuntios cladis occultans, stulta dissimulatione, remedia potius malorum, quam mala differebat. Quip Confitenti, consultantique supererant spes viresque, cum e contrario, laeta omnia fingeret, 〈◊〉 ingravescebat. Mirum apud ipsum de bello silentium. Prohibiti per civitatem sermons, eoque plures, ac si liceret vera narraturi, quia verebantur, atrociora vulgaverant. More wisely did Galba carry himself, when, Ne dissimulata seditio in majus crederetur, ultro asseverat quartam & duodevicesimam legiones, paucis seditionis authoribus, non ultra verba ac voces errasse, & brevi in officio fore. But yet, if one would desire to have some accident to be kept secret and concealed, there is no better way, then immediately and by himself to give out false rumours, and to spread reports contrary to the truth, as Scipio did, to whom when Ambassadors came from Syphax, he searing lest by concealing their message, the army would grow jealous, and suspect something, suddenly called them to counsel, where with a cheerful countenance he told them that Syphax had sent to solicit him to come into Africa: and although the truth was, that he sent rather a threatening message; yet his readiness and resolution prevailed so far, that the Army did verily believe it to be as he said. And thus it ought to be done as often as the discovery of a secret may be hurtful, as it was in this case; but when concealing may be prejudicial, as it was with Vitellius, a contrary course must then be taken.   

Monuit Liviam ne arcana Domus.  
How Princes should make use of Counsel. The nine and twentieth Discourse.  
BY occasion of Sallust, who without being required by any, put forward himself to give Livia counsel, either I cannot, or I like not to forbear the delivering my own opinion, or that at least, which best likes me, concerning the counselling of Princes. Where, I will first show how necessary it is for Princes to have counsel. Secondly, the ways that are used in it. And lastly, delivering my own opinion, I will (as my custom is) endeavour to prove it, with reason, and with Authorities. And beginning with the first, I say, that nothing is to Princes more necessary, then to be counselled; whereupon David, though as being a Prophet himself, he had no need of another Prophet, yet our Lord God, gave to him as to a Prophet-King, another Prophet to be his Counsellor. And therefore not without mystery, it is said in Ecclesiasticus, (as a certain Writer observes) Surrexit Nathan Propheta in diebus David: as though by these words In diebus David, he would intimate, the need that Princes have of Counselors. Also Moses, though himself most wise, yet followed the counsel of Jethro: and Solomon was not without counsellors; and even God himself, when he made man, by saying, Faciamus hominem ad imaginem & similitudinem nostram, would seem to take counsel; no doubt for our instruction, that we should do nothing without counsel. And David speaking of our Lord God said, Glorificatur in consilio sanctorum, Magnus & terribilis super omnes qui in circuitu ejus sunt. And our Lord Jesus Christ, to show of how great importance counsel is, to counsel himself, as in Saint John where he saith, Vnde ememus panem? and in another place, Quid tibi videtur Simon, Reges terrae a quibus accipiunt Tributum vel censum, à filiis suis, an ab alienis? and Peter answered, Ab alienis. Also the Apostles, though instructed by the Holy Ghost, yet oftentimes made use of counsel; as Saint Paul, who went as far as Jerusalem, to take counsel of Saint Peter and Saint John. It is then most evident, and which none is so blind but sees, that all men have need of counsel, whether they be learned or ignorant; yet with this distinction, that the Learned make most benefit, and have least need; the ignorant have most need, and make least benefit.  
But as it is necessary for a Prince to have counsel, so it is hard for a Writer to show the way he is to hold in being counselled, as being a thing in ancient time very diversely used, and with great variety observed.  
The first way hath been to take no counsel at all, but to do all things of his own head; so did Charies the eighth, and many others. And this they do, as conceiving, that to ask counsel of another, shows want of judgement in ones self; and that by this means a Prince makes himself inferior to him that gives him counsel, than which there is nothing to Princes more distasteful.  
Others doubting to commit some error, by doing all things of themselves, and for the reasons aforesaid, not willing to be counselled by others, have therefore neither taken any counsel of others, nor yet done any thing of their own head: which quality, Writers attribute to the Emperor Maximilian, who refusing to be counselled by any, used to give out what it was he went about; and then listened to hear, whether it were liked of, or no; and if it were, he then put it in execution; if not, he would then alter it of himself. But in truth this was no good way, nor fit to be followed, because while he sought to avoid disparagement, by showing himself to be less judicious than others, he fell into that which disparaged him more, by showing himself to be mutable and inconstant. Which being once known, every one could then tell, not only how to counsel him, but also how to reprehend him, nothing being worse, then to subject ones self to the debatings of the common people. And Emilius knowing this, while he was passing with his Fleet to Larissa, and hearing that this course was much murmured at by his followers, he called the Rhodians to him, and demanded of them, whether the Haven of Patera, were of capacity to hold his whole Fleet, and they answering, no; he thereupon took occasion to return, and not to go thither; and this he did, to the end, that altering his course upon so good a colour, they that had murmured, might not take heart to give him counsel.  
Others have used another way quite contrary to the first, and I doubt is at this day more used than is fit; and it is, to give ear and hear what every one says, and to take any man's counsel, that will give it; which thing (be it spoken with others leave) seems to me, not only to be subject to confusion, but also to contempt; because every one will then pretend to counsel the Prince, who hearing continually such diversity of opinions, must needs be confounded in himself, and despised of others: whereupon in the Histories of Tacitus, when it was debated to send Ambassadors to Vespasian, Elvidius Priscus was of mind, that men of great wisdom and judgement should be sent, who might help the Prince, with good advices; but Marcellus Epirius was of another mind, as knowing it to be a most distasteful thing, to give a Prince counsel without being required. Whereupon although Plato commend Cyrus for giving leave to any of his subjects to speak his opinion in any thing that was to be done; yet to me it seems a thing dangerous for him that gives it, and more for him that takes it. And therefore Claudius harkening once to counsel in this manner, was confounded, not knowing what he should do, turning himself sometimes to one man's counsel, and sometimes to another's, Ipse modo huc, modo illuc, ut quemque suadentium audierat: and at last finding his error, he called a counsel.  
A Prince therefore in my opinion, ought always to have about him him, a Band of experienced men; In quibus sit veritas, & qui oderint avaritiam; by truth is meant wisdom, which (according to the Philosopher) is nothing else but a knowledge of the truth; and by covetousness are understood all vices; because as the Scripture saith, Avaritia est Principium omnium malorum: if then they have wisdom, they will be able to give counsel; and if they be free from vice, they will give it. but yet, I hold it not fit, that at their own pleasure, without being called by the Prince, they should fall a counselling; which perhaps Sallust knowing, was the cause he durst not give Tiberius' counsel, about the death of Agrippa, Sed monuit Liviam, ne arcana domus; consilia amicorum, ministeria militum vulgarentur: an arrogancy not sufferable in a servant, to presume to give his master counsel, without being called. And who knows but this presumption in Sallust, might be the cause of his fall? seeing he was out of the Prince's favour before he died, as Tacitus relates. Amasias' being reproved by the Prophet answered, Nunquid Consiliarius regis es? by which it appears, that those Kings used not to be counselled but by their Counselors.  
But if it be arrogancy in a servant to give counsel not being asked, it as is much indiscretion in a Prince, not to ask it. This is that I would have Princes to do, have always about them a Band of choice counsellors, to ask their advice in all his affairs: so did Nerva, so Solomon teacheth to do, when in his Proverbs, he saith, Gloria regum est investigare sermonem; that is, a Prince ought not to stand expecting he should be counselled, but rather it is fit he should go and seek after counsel.  
After a Prince hath heard the opinions of his counsellors, it may be doubted whether he ought to deliver his own opinion; and when, and in what manner he should do it. As far as I can judge, I think it not fit he should deliver his own, either first or last, or in the midst. For if he do it first, all the rest will presently consent; and if he do it last, every one will come about to his opinion: as it happened to Henry the third, who (as Historians relate) deliberating about the death of the Duke of Guise, called four to counsel, of whom when two had spoken their opinions, the King had scarcely heard them out when he delivered his own, clean contrary to theirs: whereupon the two that were to speak after, presently fell to be of the King's opinion; and the two that had spoken before, retracting their former advice, consented to that the King had determined; which determination was the ruin afterwards of France, and of the King himself. So in Spain, when it was deliberated about making peace between Henry the fourth King of France, and the King of Spain; after Il Moro had spoken, and the King's son being present replied the contrary, all the rest came presently to be of his opinion: Whereupon, not without great judgement, Cneius Piso in Tacitus, when Tiberius would deliver his opinion in a certain cause, said, Quo loco censebis C●…esar, si post omnes, vereor ne imprudens dissentiam, si primus, habebo quod sequar. Therefore Tiberius another time commanded Drusus that he should be the first to deliver his opinion.  
The Prince therefore should be silent, and finding his Counselors of different opinions, let them debate the matter between themselves, that he may see who gives the best reasons; so he shall avoid contempt, by not suffering himself to be counselled, without ask it; and he shall not be flattered, if concealing his own opinion, the truth is made manifest, by l●…tting them debate it between themselves: and lastly, he shall show himself more learned and more wise than the other, if of himself without any others direction intervening, he shall determine the matter. All these things (in my opinion) are comprised in that place of Ecclesiasticus, Audi tacens simul & qu●…rens; how can he be still, that asks and hears? but only as I have explained it; to ask counsel in all things, to hear counsels, and in hearing them to be silent; and after, of himself to determine as reason adviseth. In this regard the ancient Poets feigned that Jupiter took counsel to be his wife; meaning to show, that it is necessary for Princes to be counselled; and after, that his wife being great with child, he swallowed her up, and became himself great with child in his head, and at the due time was delivered of Pallas, which is wisdom; to show that counsel would be ruminated in the mind, and that a Prince ought not to suffer his counsellors to be delivered themselves; but aught by swallowing them up, to make that to be his own issue which was another's.  
That a Prince ought to determine of himself, and ought not to determine of himself; that is, determine with counsel is the best, of those that are given him, and so not of himself; seeing the counsels are other men's: and yet of himself, seeing the determination proceeds from his own judgement: I conceive, it is sufficiently expressed in the book of the Kings, where Solomon saith, Dabis ergo servo tuo cor dooile; having said before, Da mihi sapientiam. For explanation of which passage, we must know, that understanding can have no knowledge of things, but such as either it invents of itself, or learns of others. To the finding them of itself, is required a sharpness of wit, and being found, a judgement to choose the good, and refuse the bad: and lastly, a memory to retain that which is imprinted. To the learning them of others, is required a perspicacity, which is all one with docility, & makes the understanding apt to apprehend those things which are taught by others. There is required also judgement, to discern good things from bad; and lastly, a memory to retain them. So as the memory is as the matter of the one and the other, the judgement as the Form of them both, and perspicacity and acuteness are as the differences. Solomon desires Wisdom, but not with acuteness to invent things; that is wisdom which consists in the sharpness of wit, but he desires wisdom together with docibleness; that is, wisdom and perspicacity, which is all one with docibleness: perspicacity, to be able to understand rightly the opinions and reasons of his counsellors; and wisdom, that is judgement, to be able to discern the good from the bad. Solomon therefore shows, that a Prince ought not to care for inventing of his own head, but to content himself with having docibleness, to understand things invented by others; and wisdom to know the truth, and to discern the good from the bad. And therefore he saith well, Da mihi sapientiam: and after, Dabis ergo servo tuo cor docile: Where we must observe, that though he say, The Heart, and not the Understanding, yet he means the same thing; seeing those faculties, which Galen attributes to the understanding, many others attribute to the heart: and in holy Scripture itself, the heart oftentimes is put for the understanding: as in Esay it is said, Excaeca cor populi hujus, & aures ejus aggrava, & oculos ejus claude, ne sort videant oculis suis, & auribus suis audiant, & cord suo intelligant.   

Neve Tiberius vim Principatus resolveret, cuncta ad Senatum vocando. Eam conditionem esse Imperandi, ut non aliter ratio constet, quam si uni reddatur.  
How Princes ought to make use of Magistrates and Officers. The thirtieth Discourse.  
SAllust counsels Tiberius, to take heed that he remit not so many causes to the Senators, as thereby to weaken his own soveraighty, there being nothing so proper to a Prince, as to be sole Commander. A counsel worthy to be well considered, by occasion whereof, it will be ●…it to discourse: First, how Princes ought to order the remitting of causes to the Senate, or to other Officers; and than whether they should take the administration of all things into their own hands.  
It seems a thing impossible, that one man alone can by himself be able to judge all causes, which Jethro, Moses' father in law, considering, and seeing him to take the reckonings of all the people of Israel, without assistance of any; and wondering at it, he said, Vltra vires tuas est, negotium; solus illud non poteris sustinere.  
For Resolution then, either we speak of giving Authority to a Senate, or else of committing causes to other Officers. If we speak of the Senate, either the causes are great and weighty, or else but of small moment. If they be great, then ought the Prince to reserve them for himself to determine: if slight, and of small value, he may do well to remit them to the Senate, that so he may please them with a show of liberty, without any prejudice to himself. This Tiberius well understood; and therefore when the subject Provinces made suit for the continuance of certain Franchises, he remitted them to the Senate; to the end, that being matters of small moment, the Senate might determine of them as they pleased; which Tacitus expresseth where he saith, Tiberius' vim Principatus sibi firmans imaginem antiquitatis Senatui praebebat.  
Secondly, the affairs that are handled, are either such, as deserve reward and grace; or else such as are odious, and deserve punishment and censure. If they be such as deserve reward, the Prince ought to determine of them himself: but if they be odious and deserve punishment, he ought then to shift them of from himself and leave them to the Senate; or if he cannot to the Senate, at least to other Officers. Honours autem (saith Aristotle) ipsemet tribuere debet; poenas & animadversiones per alios infligere, per Magistratus 〈◊〉 & per judicia: So Simonides in Xenophon adviseth Hiero: so Simonides in Dio, Augustus. Our Lord God when he punisheth, he doth it by the ministry of others, Immissiones per Angelos malos: whereof Saint chrysostom speaking saith, Igitur quando servare oportet, per seipsum hoc facit, ita 〈◊〉 in salutem generis Humani, & 〈◊〉: tunc inquit, 〈◊〉 Angelis, congregate facientes iniquitatem, & projicite in Camino, de justis vero dicit, non sic; sed qui vos suscipit, suscipit me, & 〈◊〉, ligate illius manus & pedes, & 〈◊〉 in tenebras exteriores: videillic servos qui 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 autem beneficiis opus est, seipsum Benefactorem vocat. Venite Benedicti Patris 〈◊〉, percipite 〈◊〉 vobis regnum, quando loquendum cum Abraham, ipse adest, quando in Sodoma 〈◊〉, servos mittit, & iterum: euge serve bone & fidelis, supra pauca fuisti fidelis, supra multa te constituam; & tunc ipse benedicit; 〈◊〉 autem 〈◊〉, non ipse, sed servi 〈◊〉. By this, you may see, that a Prince ought to have no hand in punishments, but leave all such distasteful things to Officers.  
It was handled in the Senate to take order for restraining of luxury, which was now grown excessive, and beyond all measure; and because there was scarce a man in the whole City free from this vice, it was a thing exceeding 〈◊〉, as Tacitus shows, where he saith, Nec ignoro in conviviis & circulis incusari ista, & modum posci, sed si quis legem sanciat, poenas indicat, iisdem illi civitatem verti: splendidissimo cuique exitium parare, nentinem 〈◊〉 expertum clamitabunt. Tiberius therefore finding of what nature the cause was, would not determine itself, but cast it upon the Senate, as Tacitus in his person saith, Si quis ex 〈◊〉 tantam angustiam vel 〈◊〉 pollicetur, ut 〈◊〉 obviam queat, hunc & 〈◊〉, & exonerari laborum meorum partem fateor, sin accusare vitia 〈◊〉 dein cum gloriam ejus rei 〈◊〉 sunt, simultates 〈◊〉, ac mihi 〈◊〉, Credit P. C. me quoque non esse offensionis avidum: Which the Senate perceiving they also remitted the cause to the Aediles: and so it vanished.  
In this point, there is no Kingdom better governed, then that of France, which leaves all matters to the Parliament, that might any way make the King distasted; and matters of most importance, the King himself in his Privy Counsels determines. And thus much for giving Authority, and remitting causes to the Senate.  
Now if we speak, how a Prince ought to serve himself, of his Officers; I say generally, that the less he doth by their ministry, the better; whom he should use as instruments to execute, and not as principals to deliberate. For between the governing reason, and the things that are governed, there may intervene another reason, two ways: one, when it supplies some thing which was wanting in the governing reason: for example, If it have not ordered and provided all things, but left some to be ordered by the inferior reason, which it takes notwithstanding by means of the superior reason providing: and in this manner, the inferior reason is a means, and intervenes as a reason to the disposition of the government. Secondly, the inferior reason may be a mean in the government, as a servant, and not as reason: that is, that the principal reason, dispose all things how small and particular soever; and then give the execution to the inferior reason, as to a servant. In the first way our Lord God did not serve himself, of the inferior reason; for he provided every thing, great, small, universal and particular: but in the second way he serves himself in the government of humane reason, yet not as humane but as ministerial. And this is the doctrine of Cajetan: whereupon if it be true that Kings are called Gods, Ego dixi Dii estis, & filii Excelsi omnes; then ought they as far as they are able, to imitate the Great Maker and Governor of all things: that is, to determine all things they are able to determine; and leave the execution to their Officers. But if a Prince shall leave it to his ministers, to determine, and provide things necessary for the state; he shall not then make use of his ministers, as ministers; but rather as of reason, which is nothing else, but as of King.  
Let a Prince therefore leave to his ministers, such things as are proper for ministers; and such as for their smallness, need not the understanding of a Prince; and though he be able to do such things of himself, yet by all means let him leave the care of them to his ministers; for therefore in the Scripture we see all things of small moment were done by Angels: it was an Angel that appeared to Agar, they were Angels that destroyed the Tower of Babel, Angels that burned Sodom, an Angel that showed the way to Eleazar: but great things were always done by God himself, as the delivering of the Hebrews out of Egypt, the giving the Land of Promise, to Abraham, Isaak, and Jacob: and the reason why our Lord God would do●… thus, (say Writers) was, to the end, lest if the Hebrews had received such great benefits from Angels, they might have thought, that all their good came from them, and consequently have adored them as Gods. So likewise, if a Prince shall suffer his ministers to bestow great things upon the people, they will be ready to take the minister for Prince, as from whose hand they receive all favours. Our Lord Jesus Christ, going to raise Lazarus, was able no doubt, of himself to remove the stone from the grave, seeing he was able to raise one that had been four days dead; but because it was so small a matter, he would not do it himself, but said to the Jews, Tollite 〈◊〉 lapidem, whereof Saint Austin saith, Sed quia ab hominibus fieri poterat, homines facere praecepit: quae autem Divinae virtutis erant, sua potentia demonstravit. So also, a Prince ought to commit such things to servants, which are proper for servants; and do such things himself, as are proper for a Prince.  
And yet to this opinion of mine, the counsel of Jethro is no way discordant: for though I grant, that a Prince cannot do all things of himself; yet I deny not but he may do all things of himself, that are of importance: for so we may find did Moses, if the words be well considered, Constitue ex eis Tribunos & Centuriones & Quinquagenarios, & decanos, qui judicent populum omni tempore; quicquid autem majus fuerit, referant ad te, & ipsi minora tantum judicent. See here, how Jethro shows plainly, that a Prince ought to do all things himself, that are of weight; which is so true, that if he do otherwise, he shall show himself not only ignorant and irresolute, but by preferring his servants, he shall give them occasion, from getting authority, to get into the Kingdom itself, and set him at naught; seeing there is no readier way to make one's self King, then by drawing all businesses of the Kingdom into his hand. And therefore Sejanus knowing this to be the only means for attaining the Empire to which he aspired, used many devices to work himself into affairs; so much, that at last he got Tiberius to go live in the Country; to the end that the Emperor being out of Rome, all matters might pass through his hands alone. And indeed Tiberius was by this very near to have lost at once both life and reputation; but that perceiving at last his error, he would ever after, not only dispatch businesses himself, when he was in health, but even when he lay dying.  
The like art and cunning was practised by Assan Beglerby of Greece, and prime Favourite of 〈◊〉 the Great Turk, who persuaded him not to stir out of the Seraglio, making him believe, there were plots laid to kill him if he came abroad; which, Amurath sillily believed, and kept himself up 〈◊〉, leaving Assan in the mean time to manage all affairs alone, whereby he had a fair field to play the tyrant at his pleasure; and the State had soon been ruined, and with the State the Prince, if Amurath at last perceiving his error, had not gone out of the Seraglio, and provided in time for all things necessary. No man knew this better, than Lewis the eleventh, King of France, a Prince no less judicious than valiant, in peace and war admirable; who took so much pleasure to dispatch affairs of his Kingdom himself, that it may be truly said, he died dispatching business.  
Many opposing this opinion, allege, that Princes are not Hackney men nor Porters, to kill themselves with labour: but (with reverence I speak it) I yet hold, that either Princes must leave their States, or else must be content to labour for the subjects good. In figure of this it is, that in Esay the 〈◊〉 power is laid upon the shoulders, where he saith, Dabo clavem domus David super 〈◊〉 ejus. Likewise in the old law, besides the twelve precious stones, wherein were written the names of the twelve Tribes, which the high Priest bore in his Rational upon his breast; there were also in two stones, engraven six names apiece, which by God's appointment he carried upon his shoulders: by which was intimated, that it is not sufficient to have the subjects in his breast; that is, to love them: but he must also carry them upon his shoulders, that is, endure any labour for their good. And for this only cause perhaps, a Prince in Deuteronomy is likened to an Ox, that should not be dainty and given to rest; but apt to labour, and to carry the yoke upon his shoulders.  
Two things remain to be advertised: the one, that when I say, a Prince ought to do all principal things himself, I mean not things of the Law, which consist in the judicial part, where only particular things and of private interest are handled; and have nothing to do with the main of the state; but I mean it in the deliberative part, where public matters of the Kingdom are handled, and such businesses, in which consists the foundation of the state: and therefore with good reason is by Aristotle preferred for the judicial part.  
Secondly and lastly I advertise, that this my discourse is not meant of Princes that are unfit; for as those Princes that are judicious, cannot do worse, then to suffer themselves to be ruled by their ministers; so those that are of little judgement cannot do better than to do all things by faithful and prudent ministers, as Nero in his beginning did under Burrhus; Seneca and Corbulo, men fit to have ruled the whole World; and whom as long as he employed, his state was so managed, that justly a wise Emperor said; no Prince, how judicious and wise soever, could possibly govern better then Nero at his beginning did: but as soon as he left to be ruled by those worthy men, it may as truly be said, No Prince how foolish and wicked soever, could possibly govern worse than Nero did.   

Nam Tiberius cuncta per Consules incipiebat, tanquam vetere Reipublica, & ambiguus Imperandi.  
Why Tiberius made a show he would not be Emperor, and that to make Princes discover things they would have concealed, is dangerous. The one and thirtieth Discourse:  
Tiberius' after the death of Augustus, as though he were doubtful to take upon him the Empire, as a burden too heavy for his shoulders, made a show he would restore it to the Commonwealth, See in parten●… onerum vocatum a Divo Augusto, experiendo didicisse, quam arduum, quam subjectum fortunae, Regendi cuncta onus. But to the Praetorian soldiers, he gave watchwords as Emperor, Signum Praetoriis cohortibus ut imperator dederat. Lastly, he made it be spread in the Army, that he was already elected Emperor by the Senate. Dabat & famae, ut vocatus electusque potius a Republica videretur, quam per uxorium ambitum, & senili adoptione irrepsisse. And because these were three ways, all of them (in my opinion) used with great mystery, I will search into them a little narrowly.  
First then, Tiberius made a show he would restore liberty, whereof one reason Tacitus allegeth, where he saith, Postea cognitum est, ad introspiciendas Procerum voluntates, inductam dubitationem: as though he would say, He was moved to do thus, thereby to see whether the chief men either desired liberty, or otherwise distasted his Dominion; to the end, that coming to know every one's mind, he might work his own ends, and security accordingly.  
This reason, if Tacitus bring it as a popular reason, may pass; but if he bring it as the true intention of the Prince, it is very unlikely, as not at all suiting with Tiberius' subtlety: and if it be Tacitus his own invention, it comes far short of his great wit. For two kinds of Noblemen may be considered in the Senate: The one, of men eminent for judgement and valour; the other, of men little experienced, and less witted. If Tiberius had any doubt or fear, it could be of none but of those eminent men: for, as for their est, either they will never dare to attempt any thing against the Prince; or if they attempt, never succeed. And for this it is we said before, that Augustus had great luck to find the City full of such men, Cum ferocissimi per acies, aut proscriptione cecidissent. I say then, that if any were moved to lay himself open and discover his mind, upon Caesar's words, It must needs be, they were of those of little judgement; because men, I say not of great, but of any mean understanding, would never be brought to believe, that a man so greedy of the Empire, and that by plots and wiles had procured his own mother's death, and the death of Augustus himself; would after attaining it with so much labour relinquish it again, and restore them to liberty. So that, if Tiberius by this means did discover the mind of any Senator, it must needs be of those, of whom as he could justly have no fear; so it should be absurd, without any benefit to take revenge. For this cause, Marcus Lepidus gave counsel in the Senate, that Lutorius should not be put to death, VitaLutorii in integroest, qui neque servatus in periculum Reipublicae, neque interfectus in exemplum ibit. Studia illi ut plena vaecordiae; ita inania & fluxa sunt. Nec quidquant grave ac serium ex eo metuas, qui suorum ipse flagitiorum proditor, non virorum animis, sed muliercularum adrepit.  
It is not therefore likely, that Tiberius a man so wise, and of so great judgement, would ever be moved upon such slight grounds, to cover his intention; we must therefore look out some other reason, that may be more likely.  
There were two things, of which Tiberius might be afraid: First, of the Senate, lest not brooking his government, they should rise in Arms against him: secondly, of Germanicus, lest having a powerful Army in his hand, and withal the favour of the people, he should with a little danger, prevent a succession that was uncertain. To meet therefore with both these difficulties, he feigned in the Senate and with the people, that he was unwilling to be Emperor; to the end, that if the Senators should make any demonstration against him; the people might believe they were not moved to it for the public good, but only for their private hatred; seeing to seek to kill a Prince that would reftore liberty, is a sign they love not liberty.  
I would therefore construe it, that when Tacitus said, Vt introspiceret Procerum mentes; he meant, that Tiberius, before he declared himself to accept the Empire, desired to see first, whether any in the Senate made any opposition, that so (as I have said before) by using the name of liberty, he might the better prevent such mischief; and the rather, as not having omitted any other essential things, for strengthening of himself, as I shall show hereafter.  
The second reason, why Tiberius was moved to such feigning, is set down by Tacitus in those words, Cansa praecipua ex formidine ne Germanicus in cujus manu tot legiones, immensa sociorum auxilia, mirus apud populum favour, habere Imperium quam expectare mallet: Tacitus then saith, that Tiberius feigned to be unwilling to accept the Empire, because he doubted Germanicus would pretend u●…to it: in truth, he that should take these words in an ordinary sense, must needs make it one of the poorest reasons that can be given; for what hath the not accepting the Empire to do with Germanicus? rather insteast of helping him, it would be his greatest hurt, seeing the irresolution of Tiberius might encourage Germanicus to attempt many things which he would not have done, if he had known him to be Emperor, and Tiberius himself, being aware of this, writ Letters to the Armies, as being Emperor already; Literas ad exercitus tanquam adepto Principatu misit. And if any shall say, that he spoke in such terms, because he was ashamed to call himself by a name, which might easily be taken from him, I say, that this would have been a most dangerous vanity, because I conceive that Tiberius seeing the love of the people to Germanicus proceeded only from a hope they had, (as Tacitus in another place shows) that if he came to the Empire, he would restore the government to the Commonwealth: he knew, that by making them the same offer, he should both diminish the people's love to Germanicus, and also abate his own hatred, which the name of a Prince brings with it; and yet by this not deprive himself of that authority which should strengthen him. From hence it is, that to the soldiers he gave the sign of being Emperor; as well because, if occasion were they should defend him; as also because he knew they loved a Prince better than a Commonwealth, under which they are deprived of Donatives, and driven out of the City. Whereupon he might doubt that if they should find Tiberius unwilling to accept the Empire, and so fear the restoring of liberty, they should thereupon he moved to choose another Emperor. Asinius Gallus finding Tiberius at this ward, to make him speak plainly, whether he meant to be Emperor, or no, asked him what part of the Empire it was he desired, making as though he believed really that he meant not to be sole Emperor, a thing which brought him to his ruin; seeing Princes speak many things which yet they would not have others to take as they are spoken. Caesar was by some called King; and though he were well pleased with it; yet he said, he would not be called King, but Caesar; and yet when the Tribunes upon these words of his, prohibited any to call him King, he took it in so ill part, that from that time forward, he put them out of office. The reason of this is, because they who take these courses, it seems would either put the Prince to a necessity, of losing his authority, or else to lay open his intentions, which is a thing most odious. Whereupon another time, Tiberius complaining, he thought himself not secure: Asinius Gallus pressed him to tell of whom it was he stood in fear, promising they should be all put out of their offices; and he Eo acrius accepit, recludit quae premeret. The same Gallus at another time, as it were seeking how to make the Prince offended with him, gave counsel, that Magistrates should be new chosen every five years; and that the Legates of Provinces, who had not yet been Praetors, should by having such legation, be the next admitted to the Praetorship, and that the Prince should be tied every year to name twelve Candidates: which counsel no doubt did Altius penetrare, & arcana Imperii tentandi, seeing it restrained the Prince's authority, and limited it to a certain time, and to a determinate number; and privileged the Legates of Legions to attain to the Praetorship without other election or dependence upon him, which much distasted Tiberius: and therefore, pretending that this counsel of 〈◊〉, tended only to enlarge his own authority, he refused it. To be short, when Princes are not willing to be understood, it is fit to make show of not understanding them; it being a dangerous matter, to enter into the search of Prince's secrets: Abditos Principis sensus, & siquid occultius parat exquirere, illicitum, anceps, nec ideo assequare.   

Nusquam Contabundus nisi cum in senatu loquebatur; Causa praecipua ex formidine, ne Germanicus in Cujus manu tot legiones, Immensa sociorum auxilia; mirus apud populum favour, habere Imperium quam expectare mallet.  
What course a Prince should take to secure himself from Generals of Armies: and what course Generals should take to secure themselves from te Prince; and from a Commonwealth. The two and thirtieth discourse.  
Tiberius' beginning to suspect Germanicus, that having the love of the Army, he would rather take the Empire, then expect it; We by occasion of this, will first discourse, of the doubt, which a Prince, or a Commonwealth may have, to stand subject to Generals of Armies; Secondly, of the danger such Generals stand in, of falling into the suspicion of them they serve: by which oftentimes is caused their death; and how they should carry themselves to avoid it.  
Concerning the first; there is no doubt, but a General having once gotten Reputation, oftentimes puts the Prince whom he serves in danger: which commonly happens; First, because they are not rewarded according to their merit; as it happened to Ferdinand King of Spain; who having never rewarded the great Captain, might well fear he would take it in scorn; and thereupon seek to right himself; by procuring to himself the state. Secondly, It may happen by reason of the insolences; which victory commonly brings with it; as it happened to the Thebans, who having made Philip of Macedon, their General; he, after the victory gotten, took away their liberty. Thirdly, It may happen through suspicion; which the Commonwealth or Princes take of them that serve them; which suspicion once perceived by the General; he must necessarily put another in danger, to secure himself; because to seek to justify himself in such suspicions, is for the most part, in vain; as may be seen, under a Prince, in Corbulo; and under a Common wealth, in Scipio Africanus. The very same happened to the Romans, who threatening Caesar, about bringing in his account of managing the Army; and showing a suspicion they had of him; were cause, that he took this fear of theirs, for a beginning to make himself Lord of Rome; which, when no foreign Force was able to bring it into servitude, was by their own forces easily oppressed.  
I am persuaded the danger is so manifest, which Commonwealths, or Princes incur by occasion of Generals; that every one knowing it sufficiently of himself, will never look I should stay to prove it, either by Examples or by reasons; and especially seeing there are few Histories, that are not full of such accidents.  
But having said, that this danger proceeds from three occasions; It is necessary to examine every one of them. Concerning the first, which was the ingratitude of the Prince: It will be easy to remedy that, by recompensing him that serves; for by this means, he shall have no cause, to seek to have all by force; when he may have a part with love. It is true, a Prince in rewarding such, should not do it, by giving them Cities or goods; in the places where they have waged war; for either, they are Conquerors of the whole Country; and then by possessing goods there, they will take occasion after the victory, to make themselves the Lords; or else not conquering the whole Country; the contrary part will still be growing: and then they, not to lose the reward given them, will either proceed slowly in the war; or else turn to that side that hath the better. This Guicciardine attributes to Prospero, and Fabritius Colonna; who having been rewarded by the King of France, with Dukedoms, and Castles in the Kingdom of Naples; when they saw the Aragonesian side get the better; they went and took pay of Ferdinand. Therefore Princes shall do well, to reward them in other states, where they have not warred; and where their reputation is not in Fame: and thus I have known it many times done in our time. Also they shall do well, not to put them into choler; although faulty perhaps in other things; so long as it is not in matters essential, and proper to their places. So did David with joab; bearing with many Insolences and murders committed by him; to the end he should not fall into choler, and make Insurrection.  
Concerning the suspicion, which the Prince may show to have of a General; and which is wont to be followed with rebellion; It will be an easy matter to remedy that, if the Prince will not fall to suspect for trifles; which is the quality of base persons; as Isocrates intimates in his Euagoras; or else, if suspecting him, he conceal his suspicion, till he remove him from the Army; So did Domitian with Agricola: So did Tiberius with Germanicus, who removing him out of Germany, sent him into afric with Cueius Piso. And this, the Queen Teuca (in Polybius) not observing, was cause that Demetrius her General in Slavonia, understanding that the Queen was by his Adversaries incensed against him, and fearing her Indignation; he sent to Rome to deliver into their hands, the City, the Army; and all he had under his charge.  
The third cause alleged before, was the pride and reputation which victory brings with it: for remedy whereof in particular, and of the rest in general: there have been advertisements given by many, in divers manners.  
The first way is, for a Prince to go himself in person; and for a Commonwealth to send thither, their Principal Magistrate; so the Turk in times past, hath used to do; to go himself in person; So the Commonwealth of Rome used to do; sending forth the Consul or dictator. But in truth, in this way, the Remedy seems to me, more dangerous than the evil, because if the Prince go himself in person; he must be sure to have always the victory; for otherwise if he lose, he will either be slain or taken prisoner: If ●…aine, as was Charles of Burgundy, what hinders but the victor may enter upon the State, at least make spoil of it? If taken prisoner, as was Francis King of France, and Syphax King of Numidia; I see not, but his State will be as much in danger; and therefore of this man's State, it was easy for Massinissa to get possession: and for the other, his Repuration, and state and life were all Endangered. We may then conclude, that this way of encountering disorders, is a dangerous way.  
A second way is, every year to change the General, as the Ancient Romans used to do; and as at this day the Commonwealth of Venice, in their Maritime Navy useth to do. But yet in this way also there may infinite disorders happen: First, if the Army chance to mutiny, which is commonly the Correlative of an Army; In this case, a man new come, not beloved, not feared, will be little fit to appease such tumults. Secondly, they that make war in this manner, are like to do but little good, because the Soldiers can have no confidence in such a one: and it is the confidence in their Captain, that for the most part, is the cause of victory. For confirmation whereof, we may see in Livy; that the same Army, which under other Captains was always beaten, when it came to be commanded by Furius Camillus, had always victory: and this, by reason of the great confidence, the Soldiers had in him. Thirdly there appears another danger, not inferior to any; and it is, that when a General knows he shall be changed at the year●…s end: either he will not with any great heat begin that, which he knows he cannot finish; or else beginning it, and impatient that another should be companion of his victory, he will rashly, and precipitantly hazard both the Army and himself; which hath been the cause, that the Romans have lost whole Armies: as it happened at Trebia against Hannibal; where Cornelius the then Consul, to the end he might have all the glory himself; unadvisedly struck battle with Hannibal, and was with much danger to the commonwealth, utterly defeated, of whom Livy saith: Stimulabat & tempus propinquum Comitiorum ne in novos Consules differretur, O occasio in se unum vertendae gloriae!  
But granting this Captain should have made a good beginning, and have prepared a fair way for victory, yet certainly when he hears a successor is to come, though he praecipitate not himself as Cornelius did; at least he will do all he can to hinder, that another shall not rcape the benefit of his labours, or otherwise will not stick to make any shameful Peace; as Marcus Attilius did, who having beaten the Carthaginians by Sea and land; and upon the point of obtaining a Complete victory; yet when he heard another Consul was to come into afric; to the end, the fruit of his labours should not be reaped by him, he presently fell to a Trea●…ie of peace. So Scipio, one time by occasion of Tiberius Claudius, another time, of Cneius Cornelius, precipitated the victory with making peace. Ferunt postea (saith Livy) Scipionem dixisse, Tiberii Claudii primum Cupiditatem; deinde Cnei Cornelii fuisse in mora; quo minus idbellum exitio Carthaginis finiretur. There be some, that have hindered their successors from victory, by overthiowing of purpose all that themselves had well begun; such a one was Quintus Metellus; who having very near subdued Spain, when he heard that Pompey the Consul, was to come in his place, he disbanded all his Soldiers, gave all his provision of victuals to the Elephants, and broke up the Army; So also in Numidia, hearing that Marius was to come his successor; he endeavoured all he could to mar the Enterprise.  
Others again, although their predecessors have done nothing to hinder them; but have endeavoured to leave them the victory, in a manner prepared; yet to the end all should be attributed to themselves, have refused to make use of the ways and courses their predecessors had used. Whereupon our Lord Christ, when he would do the Miracle of wine, he rather made use of water, a thing already created, then of any new matter; whereof Saint chrysostom saith, It was a manifest argument, that he who made wine of water, was the same God, who had made water of nothing. Nam si ipsi Deo contrarius Opifex fuisset: non utique alienis usus esset Christus ad propriae virtutis demonstrationem. And Saint Ambrose speaking of the first miracle, which Christ did on the Sabbath, saith; Et bene Sabbatho coepit, ut ipsum se ostenderet Creatorem, qui Opera Operibus intexeret; & prosequeretur Opus quod ipse jam coeperat. And thus when a General is changed, the Instruments also, and all other things are changed with him: and therefore Cneius Pompeius being sent Successor to Lucullus in Asia; altered all that Lucullus had done, for not only it is the nature of men, that succeeding another in any office, they will seldom follow their predecessors courses, but in this case, there is another reason for it also; to the end, It may not be thought, that getting the victory, they get it more, by their Predecessors carriage then by their own; and therefore no marvel, that Drusus took contrary courses in Germany, to those which Germanicus before him had begun. I conclude then; These Generals to whom a successor is sent, are either needy of glory: or else they have gotten glory enough: If they be needy, they will then precipitate the Army and themselves to get it; as Cornelius did with Hannibal at Trebia: if they have glory enough already, they will then endeavour to make a Peace, that they may not hazard their Reputation with a successor, as Corbulo did, when he heard of one that was to come in his place. Corbulo meritae per tot annos gloriae, non ultra periculum faceret. But there are two oppositions, may in this place be made, which I cannot omit, & I ought not to shun: The first is, that the Romans changed their Generals every year, and yet they always got the victory, as in the first Decad of Livy may be seen. The second, that the Venetians, men of so great valour and prudence, that they may serve for an example to all the world; have always taken this course, and always it hath succeeded well.  
To these reasons it is no hard matter to give an answer. And first, for that of the Romans, it may be said, that this happened through the weakness of their neighbouring Nations, with whom they had war. Secondly, and perhaps better; that although in the Roman Army, they sent yearly a New Consul: yet there were many others in the Army, who had been Generals themselves before: a thing which at this day, is not possible: seeing every one thinks scorn to go a private Soldier: not only if he have been a General; but if he have been but only a simple Corporal before. Thirdly, the wars they had then, were at the gates of Rome; & were such wars, as were finished, I say not in one year; but oftentimes, in one day. But when they came to have wars far off, and that lasted long; they than suffered their Generals, to continue many years; and grow old in their places. From hence it was: that at one and the same time, having war with Hannibal in Italy; and with Asdrubal in Spain, they very often changed their Generals in Italy, but Cneius Pompeius that was their General in Spain, they never stirred. So as when they had to do against Powerful Armies, in places far off, they were then forced, to send a Scipio Africanus, or a Caesar, or some such, as knowing how much it importeth the main of the war, to have one sole commander.  
As to the Particular of Venice, It is no marvel, that they in their Fleets at Sea, do every year change their Generals, seeing the war, and the General's Office, end both at once, because actions at Sea, are begun and ended all at one time; but when they make war by land, they change not then their Generals every year, as in Histories may be seen. Lastly, in the Commonwealth of Venice, one reason there is; and in Rome there was; which makes the matter, the less dangerous: and it is, because that Commonwealth hath so many in Sea matters so expert and excellent, that they might easily change their General every day without any danger; which I cannot say ever happened to any other then to the Commonwealth of Rome, and to that of Venice; and the reason is, because in these Commonwealths, men of valour are rewarded.  
A third way to secure a Prince from his Generals of Armies, is to send Persons of trust, & of his own blood; as Tiberius did, in sending Drusus and Germanicus: but neither doth this course like me; First, because Princes have not always, of their blood, that are fit to be Generals. Secondly, although they have, yet it seems to me so much the more dangerous, as the Army is in a man's hand of more Power, and specially one, not far from the Crown; and for this cause, Ludovicus Sforza, chose rather to leave the Castle of Milan, in the custody of a stranger: who afterward betrayed it, then of his own brother. And it avails not to say, he is a near kinsman, seeing as I have elsewhere said, Jnvidia Regni etiam inter Domesticos infida omnia facit: there being few, qui malint expectare quam accipere Imperium. And therefore Jsocrates in his Oration concerning the Government of a Kingdom, saith, that a Prince should bestow the highest Honours upon those of his blood, but the solidest Honours upon those that love him. When Vespasian was made Emperor; his Son Domitian had the honour: but Mucianus, the Authority. Caesar Domitianus Praeturam cepit, ejus Nomen Episrolis Edictisque praeponebatur; Vis penes Mucianum: by all means, there was care taken to order it so, that he might not usurp the Empire. The like course Otho took: Profecto Brixellum Othone, honour Imperii penes Titianum fratrem, Vis ac Potestas penes Proculum Praefectum. If afterward it succeeded well with Tiberius, It was because, Vterque filius legiones obtinebat.  
A fourth way is, when a General hath gotten Reputation by some victory; then presently to remove him before he grow too famous, and use him in the wars no more. So did Pharaoh by Moses; when employing him against the King of Aethiopia, he no sooner got the victory in a battle, but he presently called him back into Egypt. So did Anthony with his Captain Ventidius; after he had overcome Pacorus. So did the King of Spain in calling home Gonsalvus. But neither doth this course like me: for either the victory will make an end of the war, and then there will be no need of calling him home: and yet the Prince not without danger: seeing one victory alone, if it be final, will be sufficient to get the General a Name, and make him presume. And if that one victory end not the war, the Prince than that takes this course, will have little will to proceed any further, for the reasons before alleged. and if by ill luck, Fortune should chance to turn: he will be forced, with shame and danger, to send the same General again; as the King of Spain would have done, after the defeat at Ravenna, for if the French had followed the victory, which was hindered by the death of the General, the King of Spain had determined to send Gonsaluo again into Italy.  
The last remedy which hath been invented, to prevent this danger, specially in Commonwealths, is to join two Generals together in the Army: So the Romans used often times to do, So the Carthagenians, So finally the Athenians; yet I cannot satisfy myself, that this is a good way; First, because it is commonly the overthrow of the action: as was seen by the King of France, in the Kingdom of Naples, by the Duke of Urbine, and by the Cardinal of Pavia, in the Pope's Army, by Marcus Varro, and by Paulus Aemilius amongst the Romans, whereof in all Histories, there are Examples.  
Secondly, this way is not sufficient to take away the danger, we speak of, as was seen in Augustus, who although he had two companions Hircius and Pansa, joined with him, yet could not they hinder him, from getting into his hand, the Army of both the one and the other, having first by devises, put them both to death; as Tacitus intimates, where he saith; Caesis Hircio & Pansa, (sive hostis illos, seu Pansa veneni vulnere effusum; ●…five milites Hircium & machinator doli Caesar abstulerant) utriusque copias occupavisse.  
Thus for a Prince to go himself in person, is dangerous, to change his Generals every year, is not commendable, to send one of his own blood, not safe; to remove a General after getting a victory, worst of all; lastly to make more Generals at once than one, of little benefit, and consequently, how to avoid this danger, is very difficult. The best counsel I could give, should be that which Augustus gave to Tiberius; Consilium Coercendi intra terminos Imperium, and in brief, as much as may be, to avoid wars: and therefore Tiberius knowing these difficulties, although he heard of the Rebellion of the Grysons, yet he made no show of it, because he had no mind to send thither any person of reputation: Dissimulante Tiberio damnum, ne cui bellum permitteret. But because it is impossible, but that occasions of war will sometimes happen; I should like well, in such case, that a Prince being doubtful of his General, should go himself to be near the Army; but not to be in the Army; or if in the Army, yet he should never expose himself to danger, unless the main of the state depended upon it. This, Charles the fifth King of France knowing, (for which hewas called Charles the wise) would be himself in person in the Army; but when the battle was to be fought, he then attired a servant of his, in his own Armour, and by this means, the Army had the benefit of the Prince's presence, without the Prince's danger. Pyrrhus also put his Armour upon another, finding how fain the Romans were to kill him. David, as long as matters were in manifest danger, thought it necessary to fight himself in person. But if the presence of the Prince can do no more good, or else, if having lost a battle, he have Forces 〈◊〉 to renew his Army, in this case, a Prince should not do well to go in person, and therefore David, in the like case, saying, Egrediar & 〈◊〉 vobiscum, the people answered; Non exibis, 〈◊〉 enim fugimus, non magnopere ad eos denòbis pertinebit; 〈◊〉 media pars ceciderit de nobis, a non satis curabunt, quia 〈◊〉 unus pro decem millibus computaberis. Otho therefore showed little Judgement, and had ill counsel, when deliberating about a battle against Vitellius, he let it be known, that he meant not to go himself in person, seeing when the main of the business is at stake, the Prince ought then to go himself, because, if his Army should be lost, he were as good be lost himself, as was seen in Otho; for he staying behind, and not going in person in the Army, both abated the courage, and also the number of his Soldiers. Their courage, because they looked for him, Militibus ut Imperator pugnae adesset poscentibus, Their number, because he retained many companies for his own Guard, and though Tacitus, in that oration which Otho made, seem to show, he had forces enough to renew the Army, and that he killed himself only because he would not do the Commonwealth so much hurt, yet I cannot believe, that a man so wicked as Otho was, would ever be so Compassionate, and take such pity of the Commonwealth:  
A Prince than ought to go himself in person, when either the danger is such, that if the Army be lost, the whole state is lost: or when it is such, that joosing the battle, the Prince cannot do better, then to die: seeing there is no doubt, but it is a great encouragement to the Soldiers, to see their prince amongst them, as it happened in the battle at Tarus, where the only presence of the King, was the cause, they got the victory, whereupon, it is no marvel, that the Israelites going upon a difficult action, and hearing that our Lord God, their chief Prince would not go himself, but would send an Angel to be their General; Et mittam 〈◊〉 tui Angelum, ut eiiciam Chananaeum, & Amorrhaeum, & Ethaeum, & Pheresaeum, & jebusaeum, & intres in terram fluentem lacte & melle, Non enim ascendam tecum, that the people hearing themselves thus vilified, made the greatest demonstrations of sorrow that could be, Audience autem populus sermonem 〈◊〉, luxit; & nullus ex more indutus est cultu suo: so as, if the Lord God did not go himself, the people could have no heart to undertake that Enterprise.  
But if the state of the Prince, though that Army be lost, be able in any sort to defend itself, in this case the Prince shall do well, not to go himself in person; but shall set only One General over the Army, and himself not to be far off, but so, as in occasion of certain victory, he may remove into the Army; This Joab teacheth us, when he advised David, to come into the Camp, being now in his power, to take the City of Rabbat, to the end, the glory of the Action might be david's, and therefore in the second of the Kings, he saith: Misit joab nuntios add David, dicens, Dimicavi adversus Rabbath, & capienda est Vrbs aquarum. Nunc igitur congrega reliquam partem populi, & obside Civitatem, & cape eam; ne cum a me vastata fuerit Vrbs, Nomini meo ascribatur Victoria. Maharbale left by Hannibal to Oppugn Saguntum, left the Oppugnation in good terms; and then stayed for Hannibal's coming. Strataque omnia (saith Livy) recentibus ruinis, advenienti Annibali ostendit. In this manner, a Prince shall fully secure himself, from any General, whose Reputationi growing only from the victories he hath gotten, the Prince shall convert all that Reputation upon himself: and therefore joab said; Ne ascribatur Nomini meo Victoria.  
But if the Prince be not willing to be himself in such actions, he may yet with his only being near, prevent all inconveniences, by employing one General still: and himself in no danger; imitating herein Moses, who sending josua against the 〈◊〉: would not be himself far off; Egressus pugna contra Amalech, & ego stabo in vertice collis. This course was a great help to Philip the second, with the Duke of Alva. From hence it is, that as long as the Romans had war near home, they never doubted any General, of their Army, but when they had war far off, the Senate no more than the Prince, not being able to follow the Army, they then began to doubt, and a while after, it fell out as they doubted; as it is in daily experience, that Princes, in war near home, never make any doubt of their Generals. Moreover, if he be not in the Army, he is sure to be safe: and this I hold to be the most principal thing that can be, because it would be much, if a Prince carrying away, (as the Proverb is) the Hide, although he should lose his whole state, and all his Army, should not be able to find means, to come afresh upon the enemy; as was seen in Massinissa, in jugurtha, and in Ludovico Moro, until he was taken prisoner: and would to God we might see no Examples of it, in our times. Howsoever, whether Princes be in the Army, or be not, they shall do well to look to their own safety.  
It is then clear that a Prince should have but one General, and himself not to be far off: as we may learn from our Lord God: who not only is near, but in Essence, in Presence, and in Power, is in all things: and having made use of Michael the A●…changell, as his General in the first battle, as it is written in the Apocalypse; Factum est 〈◊〉 magnum in Coelo, Michael & Angeli ejus 〈◊〉 cum Dracone, & Draco pugnabat & Angeli ejus, & non valuerunt, neque locus inventus est eorum amplius in Coelo: He will make use of him also in the last, as may be gathered from Daniel: In tempore autem illo (speaking of Antichrist) Consurget Michaell Princeps magnus: qui stat pro filiis populi sui, & veniet tempus quale non fuit ab eo, ex quo Gentes esse coeperunt usque ad tempus illud. And thus much concerning a Prince.  
Now Commonwealths in this point have greater difficulties. There is a Politician that counsels, they should send of their own Citizens: and he instances in Venice, who making their Generals, Bartholomew of Bergamo, and Nicholas Orsino Count of Pitigliano, that were strangers, they lost at Vayola in one battle, all they had gotten with infinite labours, in eight hundred years; and another time (saith he) they were fain to put Carmignola (another foreign General) to death. I lay no blame upon this opinion, but yet I commend rather, that commonwealths should employ such strangers to be their Generals, with whom, for their own security, they may send a pair of the 〈◊〉 Senators, that they paying the Soldiers, may not suffer the Soldiers love to be cast all upon the General, and representing the Senate, not suffer any thing to be done without their consent. This way is at this day used: but is not new, as that which was known in the time of the Carthagenians, as far as I can find by Polybius: who shows, that Xantippus their. Captain, would not strike batraile with the Romans, until he had 〈◊〉 their leave, who were sent by the Carthaginian Senat. Xantippus accept â a Ducibus Carthaginensium potestate, pugnandi copiam ●…ostibus facit. The Example of the Romans in opposition to this, is of no force; because that was an Age, not greedy of Dominion; but when it cameto be so, they then too well perceived, how dangerous it was to put an Army into the hand of a Citizen, as was seen in Marius, in Sylla, in Caesar the dictator: in Anthony, in Augustus; and in a thousand others. So also it would have been in Pompey, if he had gotten the victory of Caesar, Pompeius occultior (said Tacitus) non melior. Secondly, it avails not to say, that the Venetians were forced to put Carmignola to death, seeing the Romans also caused Scipio, when they had banished him, to be put to death: and it was their ruin, they could not do as much to Caesar: being a much harder matter, when a General is to be put to death, to put it in execution, if he be a Citizen, then if he be a stranger, because a Citizen hath always a Faction in the Senate, that will defend him: and therefore in Rome, there was never any General put to death, where a stranger as having none to stand for him, will easily be oppressed, as I shall show hereafter. Thirdly, the example he brings of the defeat the Venetians had at Vayola, is of no●… force, seeing there are none that make war, that have not sometimes defeats; and who ever had more than the Romans? who though their Generals were always Citizens, yet in three Defeats they had, one at Trebia, another at Cannae, and another at 〈◊〉, they lost all they had, (I may say) but only the City of Rome, which Hannibal after his victory, at Cannae, might have taken also, and would not. And if there were nothing else to make me be of this Opinion, yet the Example at this day, of the Commonwealth of Venice, a City full of such excellent men, would persuade me to it.  
We have now showed, the best course that Princes or Commonwealths can take, to secure themselves from their Generals: It remains to show, what course Generals may take to secure themselves, from Common wealths & Princes. And because we have said, that a Prince may doubt them, either because they have not been rewarded, or by reason of the Glory they have gotten, or through suspicion, which oftentimes Princes and Commonwealths do vainly conceive; I say.  
The first of these is easily to be avoided, if the General shall show himself to be without interest; and not to care for any thing but the honour, for by this means he shall keep the Prince from any jealousy in this behalf, and shall not precipitate himself into danger.  
As concerning the second, of Glory, they shall do well to imitate the Allmaines: who (as Tacitus relates) used to attribute all the praise of their great achievements, wholly to their Princes. And this precept a General may observe, either by requiring the Prince to come, when he sees a victory is certain, as joab did, or if the Prince cannot come, then to cause his name to be called upon in the Army, and to erect Trophies to him; and therefore Germanicus knowing this, after he had subdued many Nations of Germany, in the Title he published of them, made mention only of the Prince: and of himself said nothing at all. Debellatis inter Rhenum Ablimque nationibus, exercitum Tiberii Caesaris, ea Monumenta Marti & jovi & Augusto sacravisse. De se nihil addidit, metu invidiae, an ratus 〈◊〉 facti satis esse; and indeed there is nothing more pernicious to Generals, then to ascribe victories to themselves. This was it, that brought Saul to hate David, in his victory of the Philistine Giant: and it is indeed a great Vanity, where there are manifest deeds, to puff them up with words. It was many times said to our Lord Christ, Daemonium hahes, and he answered; Daemonium non 〈◊〉; another time, when he had heased a blind man, and it was said unto him Daemonium habes, he made no 〈◊〉 at all, because the work he had done, answered for him, that he had not a devil; where therefore there are great works, it is needless to add words.  
The greatest difficulty of a General, is to keep himself from being suspected, for this hath be●…ne the undoing of an infinite number of worthy Captains; amongst whom, speaking of Princes, was Corbulo; One of the greatest soldiers, the Romans ever had; and speaking of Commonwealths, paulus Vitelli, a famous Captain of his time, who only upon suspicion, was by the Commonwealth of Florence, beheaded.  
A general then may incur danger, in two things, in sulpition, and in death; To prevent suspicion, be cannot do better, then to use severity in the Army; following the example of Hannibal rather than of Scipio, and therefore Corbulo in his Beginning, while he used Discipline, Incurred no danger. To this may be added, that which we spoke of before, which is, to shun all vain glory, but because it is sometimes impossible, not to incur suspicion; the best instruction I can give in this point, is to advertise, in which of the two Services, is the greater danger.  
I say then, that strangers shall run more hazard, by serving a Commonwealth, then by serving a Prince; and subjects shall run more danger, by serving a Prince, then by serving a Commonwealth; an example whereof, we have given in paulus Vitelli; who being a stranger, and serving a Commonwealth, lost his life. This made Xantippus, who was general of the Commonwealth of Carthage; assoon as he had gotten one glorious victory against the Romans, to leave the Army, and return home. The reason of this distinction, is in my opinion, plain, because Generals under a Prince; either they have friends to defend them, or they have not: if they have not, than they lie open to calumnies without any defence; if they have, then will the danger be the greater; because the Prince's suspicion will be the greater, to see them have such friends and adherents in the City; where if the General be a stranger; there can be had of him no such suspicion. Now, if it be in a Commonwealth; the stranger having few adherents will be little defended from the blows of calumnies: where the Citizen having his faction to protect and assist him; will easily avoid the danger, at least of life. And this is the reason Polybius brings; why Xantippus, after the victory he had gotten, left the Army: where he saith, Nam praeclara facinora, & res a quocunque egregiè gestae, magnam plerumque invidiam, & graves Calumnias conflare solent, quiqus Cives quidem affinium ac amicorum multitudine freti, facile resistunt hospites vero omnis praesidii expertes, utroque malo quam celerrime conteruntur. And where under a Prince, to have Citizens to defend him, is a dangerous thing; the suspicion increasing with the defence; under a Commonwealth, it is a benefit, to have part of those, to take his part, that may deliberate; and therefore in the Commonwealth of Rome; when they have not been able to answer the Accusation; yet they have been able to scape death; in such sort, that for any misadventures in battles, or for any suspicion of the people or of the 〈◊〉; I never could see any that incurred danger: where under a Prince, there may be found a thousand examples.  
Above all, Generals must take heed, they take not courses, against the nature of him they serve; for in so doing, they may be sure, they shall never be well thought of for what they do; and besides, with their own danger, they shall breed a jealousy in them they serve. This had happened to Alvianus at Geradada; if he had not been taken Prisoner; because being in the service of a Commonwealth, so advised and wary in all their affairs, he by giving battle so precipita●…tly, showed he knew not, at least, observed not the nature or them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And therefore Corbulo (as Tacitus relates) venturing upon hazardous attempts, under Claudius a timorous Prince; not only was blamed for it; but was fain, with little honour to himself, and much 〈◊〉 of the Prince, to leave the Army, and withdraw himself: Corbulo semina rebellionis praebebat; ut laeta apud pleros que, it a apud quosdam Sinistra fama. Cur hostem conciret? adversa in Rempublicum casura, cum prospere egisset; formidolosum paci; virum in signem & ignavo Principi praegravem. Ideo Claudius adeo novam in Germanias' Vim probibuit; ut referri praesidia cis Rhenum juberet.   

Dabat & Famae, ut Vocatus Electusque potius a Republica videretur; quum per uxorium ambitum; & senili adoptione irrepsisse.  
Of Succession and Election. The three and thirtieth Discourse.  
BY occasion, that Tiberius would rather have it be thought he was chosen Emperor, by the Senate, then by Augustus; we think fit, to examine these points; when Election is good, and when succession; and lastly, which of them is the better.  
To begin with the last; because upon this, the other depend; there are many of opinion, that Election is the better; which (they say) may be proved by Examples & by reasons. By examples, because of all the many Emperors that Rome had, if any were ever good; they were those, that came in, by Election: and if we look into the holy Scripture; we shall find, that the Judges came no sooner to be by succession, but they ended in the sons of Samuel; and the Regal Dignity assoon as it came to be by succession, presently became a Tyranny, beginning in Solomon; and Increasing in Roboam; who were not Elected, as Saul and David were. Then again by reason, it may be proved; because Election is in our own power: where succession is in the power of Fortune, which, though it may sometimes give a good Prince, yet it cannot continue to do it so long, but that at last (as Aristotle observes) It will give a had, who alone is enough to overthrow all the good, his Predecessors had done. To this may be added, that successors are always full of domineering pride, which makes them believe, they are greater than ever their Ancestors were; and having had no part, nor labour in acquiring the Kingdom, they little care for conserving the Kingdom; and lastly, having honour and glory enough; they trouble not themselves for getting of more; where he that comes in by Election, will by the same virtues with which he hath attained the Empire, be able also to conserve the Empire; and seeing he hath perhaps but little glory by his Ancestors, he will endeavour to get glory by himself.  
On the other side, there want not reasons to prove, that succession is the better: and the first is taken from Aristotle, who in his Politics, speaking against Plato shows: how different and much greater the love is, that is borne to things which are our own: whereupon a successor having the Kingdom as his own, and one that is chosen, having it but as lent; It must needs be believed, that a successor is likely to make the better Governor: Men commonly not having so great care, of things which they have but for term of life; as of things in which they have inheritance, and may leave them to their Heir. To this may be added: that the conditions of those, who come newly to their greatness; (as Aristotle speaking of the Commonwealth of the Chalcedons saith) are evermore intolerable, as a Poet saith, Asperius nihil est humili cum surgit in altum. Moreover they who come in by Election, as not having had education in the Prince's house, can have but mean information of the affairs of state; where if sons succeed, as no New Dignity accrues unto them, so no occasion of growing proud befalls them; and being trained up and acquainted with affairs: as they themselves will be better able to govern; so both People, and Nobility will be willinger to be governed by them; the People, as having been accustomed to obey their Fathers; The Nobility, as being far removed from Equality: we may add further; that succession takes away all occasion of discords, which in Election, must needs fall out; and falling out, It is impossible, a person of any goodness should be chosen, or if a virtuous person happen to be chosen, yet having been contested against, by some part of the Electours, he cannot choose but bear them grudges; and hardly be able to govern as a King should do.  
For resolution, I say; that Election and succession, be it good or bad, may be considered either with regard to the Prince, or with regard to the people. If to the Prince; then the question is, which of them is the more available either for his security, or for his Reputation.  
Beginning then with Reputation, there can be no doubt, but it is more honour to a Prince to be Elected, then to succeed: seeing this comes by Fortune, without any merit in the successor; the other comes by merit which is wholly in him that is Elected. This Galba understood; when adopting Piso, he said, Generari nascique a Principibus fortuitum, nec ultra aestimatur, adoptandi judicium integrum; & si velis eligere, Consensu monstratur.  
As for security; I hold it safer to succeed, then to be chosen, because he that is Elected, is either chosen by the Prince, or by the People, or by the Senat. If by the Prince, he will want many of those graces, which make a successor secure: as the merits of his Father: which saved Solomon from utter ruin, and the being of the blood Royal, hath been a cause of preserving many in their states. Besides this, he will have many things in his disfavour; as, that he is but newly risen up from Equality, and divers other. If we speak of those that are Elected by the People, I cannot deny but they will have the people of their side: but then consequently, they will have the Nobility against them: and so of the one sort, they are like to be hated; and to the other sort, obliged; and being never able to satisfy so much, as the obligation requires, in short time there will follow, with a general hatred, their own particular ruin. Lastly, if he be Elected by the 〈◊〉; he is like to have the people his enemy, and be sure to be himself a slaue to the Nobility, whereupon, we may conclude, that Election is the more Honourable; and succession the more secure.  
Concerning the last point; which is, whether of the two is the more profitable to Cities; Election or succession; I say, that if the Prince choose him, and be the elector, either he is a good Prince, or a bad; if a good, he cannot choose but make a good choice, and consequently will be better for the City, than succession 〈◊〉 that being certain, and this uncertain, and therefore the Election of Antoninus, was better than the succession of Marcus Aurelius: and yet Marcus Aurelius was no less virtuous than Antoninus. But if the Prince be bad; no doubt then, but choosing a successor, he will choose one stark naught, and therefore it was thought that Augustus chose 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 deterrima sibi gloriam quaerens; as Dio and Tacitus say; and not only for getting themselves glory, as in this case, but sometimes they will do it, out 〈◊〉 sympathy of Conditions, in which regard, Otho speaking of Galba, who had chosen Piso, as 〈◊〉 a man as himself, said; Ac ne quo saltem in successore Galbaespes esset; accersit ab exilio, quem tristitia & avaritia sui simillimum 〈◊〉, whereupon, in this respect, it is better a Prince should be by succession, then by Election, seeing at least, it will be put into the hand of Fortune, and such a one like to succeed, as a better were not like to be Elected. With this opinion of mine, agrees that which Capitolinus in the life of Messalina relates, as a Common Proverb: sapienter electi Principes sic agunt; per Imperitos electi, sic pereunt. If again the Election be made by the soldiers, as oftentimes was done at Rome, in this 〈◊〉 likewise, succession will be better than Election: because soldiers make Election only for their profit; and of 〈◊〉 to make the like profit, of another, they murder one assoon as they have chosen him: So saith 〈◊〉, in the life of Galba; Et 〈◊〉: libidine que 〈◊〉 Imperatore veluti Clavum Clavo expellebant; 〈◊〉 vero palatium 〈◊〉 domus breviori temporis spatio quatuor Imperatores excepit, militibus tanquam in Scena, modo introducentibus aliquem, modo educentibus. If lastly the Election be by the people, either they are at variance with the Nobility, or Not: if they be at variance, no doubt they will then make choice of a Factious person; one of a turbulent spirit, and an enemy to the Nobles; as they did in the choice of Tribunes in Rome, at the time when there was dissension, between the Nobility and the people; and though there were no discord between them; yet I could never like of Election by the people, who being for the most part corrupt, and little able to discern who is good, and who is bad; and apt to value men by riches, and not by virtue, cannot choose but make a most unworthy choice. Neque enim Illis (saith Tacitus) judicium aut veritas. But if the Senate be at concord with the people, than no doubt, the Election will be excellent, as being made by a number of understanding men; and therefore we see, that Numa Pompilius who was thus chosen, proved one of the best Kings, the Romans ever had: there concurring in his Election, the choice of the Senate, and consent of the people. It is true, such Election is hardly made; because few would like to 〈◊〉 another to that degree, which he aims at himself: And if any man should object, that it proves well in Venice, where the Election of their Duke, is always made by the Senate, I would answer (taking no notice of the kind of that Dignity) that this happens, because that Election is made by most understanding men; who aim more at the Commonwealth's profit, then at their own. But if the Senate or Magistrate, that is to make the Election, be itself corrupt: we may then expect a choice between good and bad; because a very good one, they would not choose, for fear lest out of his preciseness, he should reform many things to the undoing of the wicked; and a very bad one, they would not choose, for fear lest he should be the undoing of the Kingdom. To which purpose are those words of Tacitus; Exoptimis periculum sibi, expessimis dedecus publicum metuebat.  
I here advertise, that neither the Reasons alleged at first, nor yet this last, are in any opposition to the Kingdoms that are at this day, whereof the greatest part goes by succession; for there is great difference between speaking of times, in which were Tyrants; and times in which are civil Princes; who have so many Counsels, so many orders and Consultations, that it is impossible, but they must govern well. No man therefore aught to take my Discourse as a taxing of Princes in these times; but whether it be Election, or succession, I hold that way always to be best in a City, which hath formerly been used.  
Lastly for resolution of those Arguments which in the beginning were brought against Election: (Those against succession being tacitly already answered) I say, that either we speak of choosing a private man to be Prince; and then those difficulties will bein force; or else we speak of choosing one, who is already mounted to the height of a Prince; and then those difficulties will be laid asseepe: and this we see notably observed at this day, in places of Election; as in creation of the Pope, which can never fall upon a person, that is not first a Cardinal, It being fit, that one should first come out from Equality, before he should rise to the highest degree of superiority, and that he should first be taken into part of affairs, who is to come afterward to govern the whole. So likewise in Election of the Emperors; we see always Princes of such blood to be chosen, that coming to the Empire, they seem not to come to any new greatness.  
Tiberius therefore (to come to our purpose) having been chosen by Augustus, that was a Tyrant, had reason to have it believed, that he was chosen by the Senate, rather than by old Augustus, Comparatione deterrima, or per 〈◊〉 ambitum: but if Augustus had been an excellent King; I believe he would then have rather had it thought, that he was chosen by the Prince. So did Solomon, who coming to the Crown after David, would have it known, that he was made successor by his father: Vt notum fiat universo Populo Regem eum a Patre Declaratum.   

Nihil primo Senatus die agi passus, nisi de supremis Augusti; cujus Testamentum inlatum per virgines Vestae, Tiberium & Liviam haeredes habuit. Livia in familiam Juliam; Nomenque Augustae adsumebatur. In spem secundam, Nepotes Pronepotesque. Tertio gradu Primores Civitatis Scripserat, plerosque invisos sibi, sed Jactantia gloriaque ad Posteros.  
Whether Tiberius did ill, in causing Augustus his will to be read; and why Augustus in the third place, made many his heirs that were his Enemies. The four and thirtieth discourse.  
ONe of the first things that Tiberius did in the Senate; was the causing Augustus his will to be read; where Livia and himself were made his heirs in the first place: In the second, his Nephews; and grandchildren. In the third place: the principal men of the City; many of whom were known to be his enemies. In this, there are two things we may wonder at; one that Tiberius would have this will of Augustus to be read openly; the other, that Augustus had set many in his will, that were his Enemies.  
Beginning with the first, I say; that Tiberius not belonging to Augustus by any respect of blood; but only by being his Son in law; to be preferred by Augustus' will, before Agrippa Posthumus, that was his Nephew, to whom by Right of kindred, the Empire belonged; It seems that in true politic consideration, Tiberius did ill, to cause a thing so odious to be published, which he ought rather, if it had been possible, to have hidden: as was seen in Claudius, who by his Testament making his Son in Law, Nero his heir; and preferring him before Britannicus, his true and legitimate Son; Agrippina a subtle woman, after the death of Claudius, would not suffer his will to be read; lest the people should mutiny; to see a son in Law preferred before a Son: ay estamentum tamen haud recitatum, Ne antepositus filio privignus, Injuria & Jnvidia animos vulgiturbaret. By this example related by the same. Tacitus, we must necessarily say, that one of them, either Agrippina or Tiberius did ill: or else we must be driven to show some difference between these two cases: which may be, and is in many things. First, because Britannicus was Claudius his Son; and Agrippa, Augustus his Nephew, but by the line of women. Secondly, because Agrippa was far off; and perhaps dead, when Augustus his will was read; Britannicus was living, and present there in Rome: and so by his presence, might have given occasion to the people, of making in 〈◊〉, which Tiberius needed not to fear: and lastly Tiberius was a man of ripe age, experienced in the wars, and conversant in affairs of state, where Nero was but a child, & had hitherto given no proof of himself at all; and besides, it caused much less envy, to see a Son in Law of so excellent qualities, preferred before a Nephew rude and foolish, and full of Indignation; than it would have done to see a rude Son in Law, preferred before a Son of so great expectation: and because to be made heir by the former Prince, is a great help for being accepted by the Subjects, as by the Example of Solomon and others, I have elsewhere showed; Tiberius knowing, that those things would be no trouble to him, which to Nero would have been pernicious; he therefore did very wisely and with great Judgement, to make it known to all men; that Augustus by his will had left him his heir.  
The other Error which was intimated in the beginning, consists in this: that Augustus in his will, naming many of his enemies to be his heirs; seemed by this as it were to encourage them to oppose those of his own blood; that so they might come to that, of which his will had given them a hope. And it would not be reasonable to say, that he was moved to do it; (as at this day in some places is used) as not thinking he should die; to the end, that they seeing themselves made his heirs, might not longer be his opposites, but rather be tied to be at his service; an invention which hath no other effect, but to make him that useth it, be known for a man of little brain, with prejudice to his Posterity. This reason therefore is in itself of little strength; and squares not with Augustus, seeing his will was made in secret, and of as little strength is that Reason which Tacitus brings, in these words, jactantia Gloriaque apud Posteros; which is, that Augustus did it to get himself glory in aftertimes, as much as to say, that he preferred public profit, before private hatred, and that he made no reckoning of the injuries done him; no doubt a great Glory; but yet not such, as was worthy of Augustus his Consideration.  
We may say then, that Augustus not without great cunning took this course, to secure both himself and his successor: seeing, that if any were likely to conspire against the Prince: it was those principal men whom he named in his will; whereupon by this demonstration of affection, he thought to bind their hands: because believing the Prince did truly love them, (men being apt of themselves to believe they deserve to be loved) and more, to believe those demonstrations, which being made in a jast will, seem to be far from flattery, they could not choose but lay away all hatred: and though they should be suspicious, though aware of the devise, yet they should have no means to conspire against the Prince, seeing the people, they might be sure, would be against them: as they who looking to the appearance of things, take no notice of fictions, and hate ungratefulness; and this was it, that spoiled the conspiracy of Marcus Brutus; because the people understood that he was adopted by Caesar to be his son, and named in his Testament, and for him to conspire against him was such an ingratitude, that they were easily persuaded to take revenge; so much is that accursed vice detested.   

Non aliud Discordantis patriae remedium, quam ut ab uno regeretur.  
That corrupt Commonwealths have need of a Monarch to Reform them. The five and thirtieth Discourse.  
IF Agis the Spartan had known the foresaid reason brought by Tacitus in excuse of Augustus, he would certainly have attained the end he aimed at; which was to restore his Country to the first Ordinances and laws that the most wise Lycurgus had made: but his fault was, that he sought to do that by many, which he was to have done himself alone: which Cleomenes perceiving, and advised by the wife of Agis, whom after his death he took to wife himself, and having heard her a thousand times relate the case of her deceased husband, he came to know, that Non aliud patriae Discordantis remedium quam ut ab uno regeretur; whereupon (though wickedly) he put down the Magistracy of the Ephori, and easily brought the City to such terms, that within a few days, he was able, without any fear of the Citizens, to leave his Country, and go●… person to the war: and if the City in the mean time ran a hazard; it was not by any default of Cleomenes, but for want of money, as Plutarch witnesseth, where he saith; Quemadmodum exercitatione robur membrorum adepti Athletae, spatio temporis opprimunt at que superant agiles, artificiososque; Ita Antigonus magnis opibus instructus, his que bellum reficiens, defatigavit tandem superavitque Cleomenem, vix habentem, unde tenuiter 〈◊〉 mercedem, civibus alimenta suppeditaret: and therefore was forced to give him battle, where if he could have stayed but only two days, Antigonus must of necessity have returned back, into Macedon, and Cleomenes had remained Lord of all Greece.  
It is therefore held by all Experienced Politicians, for an infallible Rule, that not only for the founding of Commonwealths, but also for the Reforming of them; the Government of one alone is necessary; and this, Romulus knowing, (though wickedly as for the Act) killed his brother, and was cause of the death of his Companion. So Cleomenes (as we have said before) desiring to reform his Country of 〈◊〉, which was at the last Cast of Ruin; no less wickedly than Romulus, killed all those that might oppose his Power, and gave them new laws and new ordinances for reformation of the City. And not unlike to these was Hiero the Syracusan, who seeing his Country in a near degree of ruin; was forced to make use of those Arms to make himself Lord of the Country, which he had received for defence of the Country. It is therefore no marvel, that Augustus seeing Rome so full of Discords, so much degenerated from the ancient laws and customs, and so deeply plunged in a thousand kinds of wickedness, did imitate Romulus in being the cause of his Companions death; did imitate Cleomenes, in putting many Senators to death, that might have opposed his greatness; and lastly did imitate Hiero the Syracusan; in turning those Arms against the Commonwealth, which he had received of the Commonwealth, to defend it against Anthony; as knowing well, that to rectify the City and reduce it to reformation, there was no other way, but only for himself to govern alone. For having a purpose to set up an Aristocracy; he was first, (as Aristotle in his Ethics teacheth us) to bow the staff the contrary way to make it afterward straight; and if in doing this, he used violence, it was, because it was impossible to do it otherwise. And therefore Plato in his book of laws, saith; that it is impossible to pass from the Government of a few, to a good Commonwealth: because it is seldom seen, that they who are in authority, will yield to any of their fellows to reform them; where Plato showing the difficulty of reforming a Commonwealth; showeth withal, that it must be done, by reducing the government into one man's hand. And if Augustus afterward, did not pursue his purpose; and left not the City in liberty; it was, because he saw the Citizens were not fit for it; as Galba, in the oration he made at the Adopting of Piso said: Imperaturus es hominibus, qui nec totam libertatem; nec totam Servitutem pati possunt; and 〈◊〉 this cause it was, that Augustus made himself sole Lord; Non aliud Discordantis 〈◊〉 remedium, quam ut ab uno regeretur; and therefore he gave them half a liberty; leaving a great authority in the Senators; and not a little in the people; which Tiberius afterward took away, and he put them in half a servitude, being himself superior in all causes. The like conceit had Galba, when he made himself sole Lord of the Empire; as in the foresaid oration, every one may see. Augustus therefore is no more to be reproved, than Cleomenes, and Galba, and Hiero are, and if his purpose took not effect, it is not to be attributed to his fault, but to the ill fortune of his successor; seeing as long as he lived himself, till he came to his decrepit age; he maintained the City in great quiet, and the whole world in Peace, Nulla in praesens formidine, dum Augustus aestate validus, seque, & Domum, & Pacem sustentavit. And if to Romulus there had succeeded Tarqvinius Superbus, and to Augustus Numa 〈◊〉; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 think the City of Rome had in her beginning been ruined; and after by Augustus been restored. And as after him the City of Rome fell to a Tyrant, and the power of the Caesars ended in Nero, so also the Power of Romulus ended in Tarqvinius Superbus, the Power of Cleomenes, in himself, that of Hiero, in his nephew Hieronymus, and finally, that of Galba, presently after his death, fell to a Tyrant: and all these Powers, except that only of Cleomenes, came to ruin by wicked successors. The reason, why these men's power was not able to hold out long; and to conserve their Cities in tranquillity, is by some assigned, to the accommodations, which either are so ordered, that all the parts of the City rest contented, and then it will last; or else the Accommodation 〈◊〉 founded upon the Person, who by his authority makes it apt to continue, and then it will last no longer, then while he lives, or at most, till it fall into the hands of a wicked successor, this, in my opinion, David knew well, when in a Psalm he said, Deus judicium tuum Regi da, & 〈◊〉 tuam filio Regis; as though he would say, it is not enough for the continuance of an empire, that the first King be good; but it is necessary, his successors be good also, and then it is like to last a long time. 〈◊〉 cum sole, & ante lunam, in Generatione & Generatione; but because after Solomon, there followed a wicked successor, the Kingdom was in part dissolved. So the Kingdom of Romulus succeeded well with him, because there came after him Numa Pompilius, who by giving good laws, filled it with Religion, but afterwards in Tarqvinius Superbus it came to ruin. So also that of Hiero came to nothing, through a wicked successor. So the reformation which Augustus made of his Country, succeeded ill to him, because there came after him a Tiberius, a Caius, a Claudius, and lastly a Nero, who abrogating Laws & Religion, it could not choose but come to ruin. The reformations therefore are ill founded, and never last long, that are founded upon the Authority of one, seeing the City is eternal, & the Prince mortal; but then are reformations like to continue, when they are founded upon those that receive them. Wherein, for another reason, I would help myself with a doctrine of S. Thomas, where he saith, That when a form comes to be perfectly received of the matter, although the Agent that introduced the form, be removed, yet the form remains in the matter still; if Fire be introduced in Wood by another Fire, though the agent be removed, yet the Fire remains in the Wood still; but when a form is introduced unperfectly, or to use the word of S. Thomas, Inchoative; there, If the Agent be removed, either it lasts but little, as water that is heated; or else goes wholly away with the agent, as the enlightening the air, by the departing of the Sun. So likewise when a Prince hath perfectly introduced good Ordinances in the matter of a City; although he die himself, yet they will still remain: but if they be introduced but unperfectly, that is, not fully established; then certainly, either they will last but little, as water heated, or with his death that introduced them, will die also, as the enlightening of the Air.  
To return to our purpose, I said before, that the City of Rome was not capable of liberty: and therefore that Augustus was not too blame, for not giving it liberty; that it was not capable, is manifest, seeing in process of time, the Empire coming into the hands of such persons as more regarded the good of their Country, than their own dignity; such as Trajan, Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius, and others were: if they had known that it had been for the good of the City of Rome, to have had liberty, they certainly would have given it.  
I have been willing to give examples of Hiero, as being indeed most like to Augustus. For he being a Citizen of Syracuse, had in his hand an Army for defence of his Country; and by devises cut them all in pieces that were not for his turn: and afterward, with those very Arms he made himself Lord of Syracuse, in which government he raised not himself above equality, ruling with much prudence, and contents of the Subjects; as also he enlarged the Dominion of Syracuse: and lastly intended to leave it in liberty, but that he did it not, there were two impediment; the first, because the City was not fit for it: and therefore Livy saith, Syracusaeque cum breve tempus affulsisset, in antiquam servitutem reciderant. And in the same book, speaking of the people of Syracuse, he saith, Aut servit 〈◊〉, aut superbe dominatur, Libertatem quae media est, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 modice, nec habere sciunt. A second impediment were the women, who through desire of rule, wrought so with him, that he left his Nephew Hieronymus his successor, a most perfidious and cruel man, and far differing from the conditions of his uncle. Augustus likewise was a Citizen of Rome, and had in his hand an Army, for defence of his Country; when he put all those to death, that were able to oppose him, and then turning those very Arms against his Country, he made himself 〈◊〉 Lord; in which government he used great equality, showed great prudence, enlarged the Empire, and lastly had a purpose to leave it in liberty, whereof he had often speech with 〈◊〉 and Agrippa; and if he left it not in liberty, it was long of two things: one, because the City was not capable of liberty, Non 〈◊〉 discordantis 〈◊〉 remedium, quam ut ab uno regeretur: and as Galba said of the Romans, Nec totam libertatem, nec totam servitutem pati possunt. A second cause was Livia, who having besotted the old man Augustus, persuaded him to leave Tiberius his successor, a cruel man, and one that was no more of kin to Augustus his conditions then to his blood, as Tacitus shows where he saith, 〈◊〉 Tibero morum via. And thus it appears that Augustus and Hiero were very like; but yet in one thing they had very unlike fortune; for the Empire of Augustus ended not in himself, but was continued in Tiberius, who also was able to elect a successor after him; but with Hiero it was not so, for his Kingdom ended in his Nephew Hieronymus, who was miserably slain. And the reason of this, is because Tiberius in company of many vices had some virtue, (as I said before speaking of Nero) but Hieronymus, without any virtue, had all the vices of Tiberius.   

Non aliud discordantis patriae remedium quam ut ab uno regeretur.  
Why the City of Rome from a Regal power under Romulus recovered liberty under Tarqvinius, and from the Regal power of Augustus was never able to shake off servitude. The six and thirtieth Discourse.  
TO make that be better understood, which we said before; that the City of Rome in the time of Augustus, was not fit to receive liberty; I conceive it will be a good help to examine the reason, why from the Regal power of Romulus, it came to liberty under Tarqvinius; and afterward from the Regal power of Augustus, it was never able to free itself from servitude.  
The first is a general reason, and brought by all Writers: that is, the imperfection and corruption of the Citizens. For liberty, (as I shall show in my Discourse of Optimates) requires men perfect, and not corrupt, at least so many as may be enough to make a Senate. But surely, this reason, (with leave of the many great men that allege it) may be of some force to prove that the City of Rome under Augustus, was not capable to receive liberty, but it is of no force to prove, that from the Regal power of Augustus, it might not as well recover liberty, as it had done from that of Romulus. Seeing the City of Rome was never so full of imperfect men, in the time of Augustus, as it was in the time of Romulus, when there was in it indeed a nest of the scum of the most wicked men, that were in all Italy. We may say then, that both the one and the other of these Kings had an intention to set his Country in liberty, (as of both of them, in divers discourses, I have made it appear) but neither of them in his life time, put this intention of theirs in execution. And the reason is, because when men are imperfect, and not fit to tolerate liberty, it is impossible that in the life of one Prince alone, they can be brought to perfection, in such sort, as to be made fit to receive it; but this must be wrought by the continuance of many good successors, who may all of them intend to prepare the Citizens for it: and because it was thus with Romulus, therefore after him the Romans obtained liberty; but being not so with Augustus, who had many wicked successors after him therefore the City after him continued always in most, miserable servitude.  
A Second reason, was the slaughter of Caesar: which not being sufficient, to reduce Rome to liberty, was therefore sufficient to make the Regal power unalterable. For Augustus making himself Lord of the Empire by force; was able by the same force to secure himself in it, the rather under the Excuse of Caesar's slaughter; and the corrupt times of the Commonwealth, which served him for Engines to put many things in execution, that fortified his Power. Pietatem erga Parentem (saith Tacitus) & tempora reipublicae obtentui sumpta; whereupon, the best Political instruction, that in like cases can be given, is this; that when a Family hath lost the authority it once had in a City; It is better to yield it up with love, then to strive by force to recover it with danger: for this hath been the cause, that many Cities relapsed under Princes, have never after been able to recover liberty; a relapse in all things, being always worse than the first Evil: and of this there want not examples, if there were need to bring them.  
A third reason, and of importance is, because the Election was come into the hands of the Soldiers; who by reason of the gains they made: and of the unmeasurable Donatives that belonged to them, at the Coronation of Emperors; would never be brought to give their consent for the introducing of liberty, in which it is wont, to be the first lesson, He that labours not shall have no pay: and so much more, as Commonwealths that are good, need no such guard.  
Fourthly, I conceive it to be of some moment, that after the death of Nero in whom the house of the Caesars ended; yet Rome was not then reduced to liberty: seeing Galba being chosen, every one of those great ones, might begin to hope, that it might be their turn at some time or other, to come to the Empire; and consequently very likely, they were not much discontented with that form of Election: and so much, (in my opinion) did Galba himself express, in the speech he made to Piso, when he said, Sub Tiberio & Caio & Claudio unius familiae quasi haereditas fuimus: Loco libertatis erit, quod Eligi coepimus: & finita Juliorum Claudiorumque domo, optimum quemque Adoptio Jnveniet: as if he would say, Now that the line of the Caesars is extinct, everyone may hope to attain that degree; which hope I conceive, may be the cause, that those potent men, in whose hands it is to alter states, like best of that form, in which the first degree they can hope to attain, is that of Excessive greatness: and from hence perhaps it was, that Caesar the dictator, was never much troubled with the Conspiracy of Catiline, but rather excused and defended it, as less caring for the City's liberty, then that it should come under the Power of one alone, which Power he doubted not in time to attain to himself.  
Fifthly, the greatness of the Roman Empire, was itself, (in my opinion) a great cause, It could never return to liberty, because at the time of the 〈◊〉, being but in low estate, it was more reasonable, they should desire Equality: which in small things is easily borne: and because else, they must have passed a thousand difficulties: as the subduing of Rival Commonwealths, the Conquering of Enemy Princes, and the like, where in the time of Augustus, the City being grown great, & become mistress of the world; her Ryvalls spent, and all things at Peace and quiet; it was not now easy to support Equality: and therefore from that time afterward, there was no contesting but for the Empire, and a man will easily hazard both life and reputation, where the reward that may be gotten by it, is both great and secure, but where the reward is but little, full of toil and danger; there men are contented and glad to have company: and therefore Brutus brought Rome to be a Commonwealth; whereupon we see in our times, that (Venice excepted) all other Commonwealths are of no great moment, and all this (as I conceive) Tacitus very lively expresseth, where he saith; Vetus ac jampridem Jnsita mortalibus Potentiae Cupido, cum 〈◊〉 magnitudine adolevit, erupitque. Nam rebus modicis Aequalitas 〈◊〉 habebatur, sed 〈◊〉 subacto orbe, & aemulis urbibus Regibusve excisis, securas opes concupiscere vacuum fuit, prima inter. Patres plebemque certamina exercere. Modo turbulenti Tribuni, modo consuls 〈◊〉, & in 〈◊〉 ac foro 〈◊〉 Civilium be llorum. Mox è 〈◊〉 infima Cajus Marius, & nobilium saevissimus Lucius 〈◊〉, Victam armis libertatem, in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Post quos Cneius 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉, non melior, & nunquam postea nisi de principatu quaesitum.  
A sixth reason may be taken from the Ordinances and laws of the Romans, which though at the first times of the Commonwealth they were good, yet in process of time they became naught, It being not possible, and indeed not sit, to make a law, that is simply and at all times good, as it happens with Physicians, who cannot prescribe meats that are simply good for all, seeing respect must be had to temperatures, and bodies in health simpliciter, (to use Galens word) that if a meat could be found good for all diseases; that meat simply should be naught. It is necessary therefore that laws should have conformity, with the men; and with the times, whereupon the law of Moses being given to one People, was not simply good; but contained in it many precepts, repugnant to our Christian Policy; and if any man object, that the law given by Christ our Lord in the New Testament, is simply good I answer, that this Law was not given to one particular people, but to all the whole world: Ite per universum mundum, Praedicate Evangelium omni Creaturae, saith our Lord in Saint Matthew. Now the Laws and Ordinances of the Romans, were all intended for increase of Dominion, and consequently for war: whereupon it is no marvel; if that City, having now attained to Peace, and no more need of Augmentation, but only of Conservation, became uncapable of receiving liberty; and being bred and accustomed to getting, having now nothing more to get, they all endeavoured by the same Arts to get the Empire.  
Seventhly and lastly, I have drawn a reason of excellent Doctrine from Aristotle in his Philosophy, for knowledge whereof, it is to be known, that living bodies have naturally a Term and bound beyond which they cannot go; as witnesseth the Philosopher in his Books of Animals: where he saith; Perficiendi cujusque animalis certa est magnitudo; tum ad majus, tum ad minus, quem terminum non supergrediuntur, ut vel majora, vel minora evadant; and in his Physics he saith: Quod impossibile est, carnem aut os, aut aliquid aliud, quantumcunque magnitudine, aut in majus aut in minus; and finally in his Books de Anima he saith; Natura autem Constant ium omnium Terminus est, & ratio Magnitudinis & Augmenti; by which authorities it is manifest, that all Natural things, have a certain bound which they cannot exceed; and this happens because nature hath made them for their proper operations, which they cannot execute but under a certain and determinate greatness: seeing therefore a Commonwealth is nothing but a body consisting of many bodies, and ordained to the intent to live well; It ought to have a due greatness, fit to maintain itself; which greatness if it exceed, it will not be able any longer to exercise its operation, in regard whereof Lyvie saith; Donec ad ea tempora pervenerunt, ut magnitudine propria Laborarent; whereupon as long as the City of Rome stayed within its certain bound, so longit maintained itself a Commonwealth; but after it exceeded this greatness; it than fell into the hands of Kings, and could not otherwise have subsisted. This, Tacitus in the mouth of Galba meant, when he said: Si immensum imperi●… Corpus stare ac librari, sine Rectore posset, dignus er am a quo Respublica inciperet. The body then of the Commonwealth, was grown so vast and great; that it was not able to suffer liberty: for although to possess much, be commonly good; yet it is not always good for every body: as we see in wrestlers; whose Constitutions, (as witnesseth Hypocrates) have no greater Contestation, then with their own goodness; as being full of so many good humours; that through the excess of them, they are not able to exercise their due operations: and therefore necessarily must either break or be evacuated. And this happens not only in bodies, but as well also in Kingdoms and Commonwealths: Trajan by subduing an infinite number of Provinces; had so enlarged the Empire, that it was come Ad Maximum quod non; to a pitch above the proportion of a Monarchy; and perceiving the danger of it; he had recourse to the Remedy prescribed by Hypocrates; Quocirca statim bonum habitum solvere oportet, and giving some of those Provinces Freedom; he Evacuated (I may say) the Empire; like to this was the counsel of Augustus (cited by us before) Addideratque Consilium Coercendi intra terminos imperium. Likewise in Commonwealths, I think none will deny; but that the Swissers, the free Cities, and Lucca, the only Commonwealths (after Venice) that are at this day in the world, have for no other cause held out so long, and maintained themselves to this time; but because they have not arrived to that bound, of Maximum quod non magnitudinis; and their little Greatness hath been their defence, and made them great. Also to the Venetians, it hath been no small help for preserving them in liberty: because they have not exceeded the bound, of Maximum quod Non: And therefore the Image in Daniel, assoon as it came to have a head of Gold, was struck by a stone falling from the mountain, and cast down to the ground. This Image, by many writers, is taken for the Empire, which having Feet of Earth, no sooner come to have Heads of Gold, but they presently fall; seeing the Circulation of this world, is founded upon Ascending and Descending, and that which is the end of Ascending, is the beginning of Descending, as Aristotle learnedly teacheth: where he speaks of a Circle; because humane powers are like to shadows, which never continue at one stay; as job excellently saith: Et fugit velut Vmbra, & nunquam in eodem statu permanet; and in another place, Elevati sunt ad modicum, & non subsistunt, where S. Gregory citing that place of the 72. Psalm, Deiecisti eos dum allevarentur, and that of Saint james, Quae est Vita Vestra? Vapour est ad modicum parens, and expounding that place of the Prophet Esay, Omnis Caro Foenum: Carnalis Gloria dum nitet cadit; dum apud se Extollitur, repentino intercepta fine terminatur. Sic namque aurarum flatu in altum stipula rapitur, sed casu concito ad Ima revocatur. Sic ad Nubila fumus extollitur, sed repent in nihilum tumescendo dissipatur. Sic ab infirmis, Nebula descendendo se erigit, sed exortus hanc solis radius, ac si non fuerit, abstergit. Sic in herbarum superficie, nocturni roris humor aspergitur: sed diurm Luminis subito calore siccatur. Sic spumosae aquarum bullae inchoantibus fluviis excitatae, ab intimis certatim prodeunt, sed eo celerius diruptae depereunt, quo inflatae citius extenduntur. Cumque 〈◊〉 ut appareant, Crescendo peragunt, ne subsistant. I cannot bring a better example, in conformity to this Doctrine, then of Venice; which was never in any great danger: but when it was at the greatest, as drawing then near to the bound, of Maximum quod Non; whereupon, if it had not been for the strength of its situation, (as Historians say) assisted with the great Prudence of the Senators, and with the great valour of the Citizens, in defending Milan, It had utterly come to ruin. And therefore Augustus seeing, Non aliud Discordantis patriae remedium, quam ut ab uno regeretur, made himself Emperor, wherein notwithstanding Christians must not imitate him, whose duty it is, to set Religion before Country and life, and Commonwealth and all: rather suffering death, then be drawn to commit any wickedness: and rather than imitate Augustus; follow the course of Marcus Aurelius, who though he saw his Country upon the point of losing, and himself also, through the wickedness of his Companion, yet he took all things patiently, and would not put him to death, though it was in his power to do it. For Conclusion I say, that a Prince ought not to govern his Country by force: although force be sometimes necessary for correcting of Errors: as Sallust teacheth where he saith; Name Vi quidem Regere patriam, aut Parents, quamquam & possis & delicta corrigas; Importunum tamen est.   

Comparatione Deterrima sibi Gloriam quaesivisse.  
That to Elect a wicked successor, thereby to get glory to himself; is a beastly Course. The seven and thirtieth Discourse.  
BY that which Tacitus and Dio relate, many conceive, that Augustus made choice of Tiberius, whom he knew to be a proud and cruel man, to be his successor; to the end, that the ill conditions of Tiberius so much differing from his own, might turn to his Glory. I cannot indeed deny; but that a worse successor, is apt enough to make a less evil Predecessor be thought a good one: which Galba well knowing, speaking of Piso said; Nero a pessimo quoque desiderabitur. Mihi ac tibi providendum est; ne etiam a bonis desideretur. He seeing, that if a wicked Prince, should come after Nero; his errors would be converted, to the others Glory; and this is so true, that the holy Spirit, in the mouth of Ezechiel said, that the wickedness of the Hebrews, before the coming of our saviour; made the people of Sodom and Samaria to seem Just, which could not certainly happen, but long of the Comparison, Vivo ego dicit Dominus Deus, (these are the words of Ezechiel) quia non fecit Sodoma soror tua, ipsa, & filiae ejus, sicut 〈◊〉 tu, & filiae tuae, and a little after; Et Samaria Dimidium peocatorum tuorum non 〈◊〉, said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sceleribus tuis, & justificasti sorores tuas in omnibus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quas operata es; Ergo tu 〈◊〉, & porta confusionem tuam, quae vicisti sorores 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 agens ab 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sunt a te. And he that would see a passage more like to that of Tacitus; let him read those words in Jeremy, where he saith: justificavit animam suam aversatrix Jsrael, 〈◊〉 praevaricatricis judae.  
But yet this way of acquiring Glory, attributed here to Augustus, is not to be imitated, not only of Christians, but not so much as of impious Barbarians: seeing there are better and director ways, (I mean not, to govern well, but speak only of a successor) because, if they have children to succeed them in the Kingdom, there will Glory enough accrue to the father, if he give them good education; whereby they may come to prove good: This Solomon affirms in his Proverbs where he saith, Filius sapiens 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or as others read it, Filius sapiens Gloria patris, that is, a wise son is the honour and Glory of his Father, and keeps him alive, after he is dead: and therefore it is said in Ecolesiasticus, Mortuus est pater ejus, & 〈◊〉 non est mortuus, 〈◊〉 enim reliquit sibi post se; and therefore Princes need not desire, their successors should be worse than themselves, seeing they may hope for more glory by them, if they shall be better, and therefore David took great Joy to hear, that Solomon was like to be greater, than himself had ever been: Sed & Solomon sedet super Solium Regni, & Jngressi servi ejus, benedixerunt Domino nostro Regi David dicentes: Amplificet Deus Nomen 〈◊〉, super 〈◊〉, & magnificet Thronum ejus super thronum tuum: rather indeed, a wicked suecessour is a Prejudice to a good Prince. Therefore writers say, that Marcus Aurelius had died a happy man, if he have not left Commodus his successor; for this cause, many of the Ancients (as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) were of opinion, that Children living, might make their dead father's unhappy: in such sort, that he who living was happy, yet could not be called happy, if after his death, he had ill 〈◊〉 and were unfortunate in his children.  
To give therefore his successors good education, is a matter of much honour to Princes, and in case they prove not to have those virtues which are required in a Prince, he must not suffer Paternal piety to prevail with him, but wholly abandon, and utterly does inherit them of the royal dignity; (though as Aristotle saith) it be hard for a father to do.  
This Plato expressed in his Common-weath, who ordained, that they should be Princes, who in their Nativity had Gold mingled with Earth, meaning, that if their Sons had together with Earth, either Iron or brass in them, they should not then be admitted to the Kingdom. Qua propter ipsis Principibus, & Primo & maxim Deus praecepit, ut nullius rei majorem curam custodiamque 〈◊〉, quam natorum, ut dignoscant quid ex quatuor his potissimum illorum animis sit immixtum; & si quis ex ipsis nascatur 〈◊〉, aut serreus, nullo pacto misereantur, sed honorem illi naturae convenientem, tribuentes, interopifices vel agricolas mittant: and therefore Moses was contented, that our Lord God, should choose josuah, of another Tribe, to be his successor, rather than his own Son. In consideration whereof, Saint Hierome saith, Moses amicus Dei, cui 〈◊〉 ad faciem 〈◊〉 locutus est, potuit utique successores Principatus filios suos facere, & Posteris propriam relinquere dignitatem: sed extraneus de alia Tribueligitur jesus, ut sciremus Principatum in populos non sanguini deferendum esse, sed 〈◊〉; and this is the true way for acquiring of Glory: so much more, as it is more repugnant to Natural affection.  
And if it happen that in default of children, he be to choose a stranger for his successor, what better can he do, to get himself glory, then to choose a person of prudence and virtue, in whom, his judgement in choosing may appear? and if the Prince living be good; it will increase his glory, that he hath chosen another that is good: if bad, it will lessen his own ill name, to have chosen a good successor. So it happened to Adrianus, (as julius Capitolinus and Spartianus relate) because Antoninus Pius succeeding him by way of Election, and knowing that the Senate meant to burn all the Acts of Adrianus, as to whom they were deadly enemies, for the many slaughters he had committed of the Nobility, he out of his goodness, pacified the Senate: placed Adrianus amongst the Gods, and erected a Temple to his Name. Igitur nec ipse (said he) Princeps vester ero, si omnia Acta ejus in quibus est Adoptio mea, rescinditis. This Glory Galba sought after, when adopting Piso, he said, Vt nec mea Senectus conferre plus Populo Romano possit, quam 〈◊〉 Successorem.  
Thus a Father receives honour, by a good Son, and Predecessors, by good successors; whereupon, that great Orator, who spoke in praise of Philip King of Macedon, could not find avy greater praise, then that of his son: Hoc tibi unum sufficiat, te filium 〈◊〉 Alexandrum.  
Tacitus therefore is not to be blamed, as he, that allegeth not his own opinion; but relates it only as the opinion of others: for as for himself, he shows rather, he thought Augustus worthy to be blamed for it; and he had reason, because, though a Prince by choosing a wicked successor, make his own actions to seem good; yet this is so far from making him praiseworthy, that it brings him more dishonour, as being a concurrent cause, of all the Evil his successor doth.  
Let not men therefore blame Tacitus, at all adventure, but consider, that all that which Tacitus saith; it is not Tacitus that saith it, neither the things he relates, are they all to be imitated, no more than all those things which Moses relates, who relates a thousand villainies of the Hebrews: seeing it is the part of Historians, to speak of all things, whether good or bad: the good, to the end we may follow them; the bad, to the end we may avoid them; and this, saith Tacitus in the third of his Annals, is the end of an 〈◊〉: Exequi sententias, haud institui, nisi in signs per honestum, aut notabili dedecore, quod praecipuum munus Annaliumreor, Ne virtutes sileantur, utque gravis Dictis Factisque ex posteritate, & Infamia metus sit.   

Tiberioque etiam in rebus quas non occuleret, seu Natura, sive adsuetudine, suspensa semper & obscura verba, and a little after: At Patres quibus unus metus si intelligere viderentur, in questus, lachrymas vota, effundi.  
That a Prince should be both loved and Feared. The eight and thirtieth Discourse.  
FRom the obscure speaking which Tiberius used, the senators conceived no little fear, and wished, the Prince would speak in such a manner, that he might be understood.  
I cannot in truth blame Princes, for speaking obscurely: seeing vulgar and too open speech abase th' them, and make them vilified: the rather because I see our Lord Christ, (as Saint Matthew, and Saint Mark 〈◊〉) solitus erat loqui in parabolis, and Solomon, for the most part, used to speak Riddles; whereupon, it may justly be said of Princes, who lay themselves open to all men's view, that which Solomon saith, in the Canticles: Oculi tui Columbarum, absque eo quod intrinsecus latet, that is, the eyes being beautiful of themselves, appear more beautiful, when they are shadowed & covered with some Feathers; and so the Discourses of Princes, will be so much the fairer, as they are in some part, covered with a little obscurity; and therefore Solomon in his Proverbs, commends much this kind of speaking, where he saith; Mala aurea in lectis Argenteis, qui loquitur verbum in tempore suo.  
But because the obscure speaking of Tiberius was not to this end, but only ut intro spiceret Procerum mentes: it neither aught, nor can be praised; being in truth, the fashion of a Tyrant, and through which, those Principal Senators remained full of fear, who were governed before by Augustus with so much love; upon occasion whereof, we will make this discourse, what carriage a Prince should use, to make himself, to be both loved and feared.  
It hath been debated in times past, whether a Prince ought tobe loved 〈◊〉 feared of his Subjects, or whether loved and feared both at once, yet no writer hath been found so void of Judgement, as not to know, that nothing is to a Prince more profitable, then to be loved and feared both together, but that they think it a very hard, and almost impossible thing they should meet together. So as many have liked, he should rather make himself be loved, then be feared. I therefore will endeavour to make it appear, that a Prince shall not do well, to make himself only to be loved. Secondly, that he shall not do well, to make himself, only to be feared; and lastly, that he ought 〈◊〉 one and the same time, to make himself, be loved, and feared, both together: showing, that not only this is easy to be done, but impossible that a Prince should be good, if he couple not together these two Extremes.  
Concerning the first, this is certain, that if love come not accompanied with fear, the Prince in short time, will grow into contempt: which Moses understanding, who had not perhaps his equal in mildness, yet after, for the love he bore the people, he had prayed our Lord God, Aut deal me de libro vitae, aut parce populo huic: when he came down from the mount, he caused many thousands of them to be out in 〈◊〉, thereby showing, that together with the love of the Prince, there should be severity, which begetteth fear. Therefore Saint Austin saith, Estote misericordes, pensantes quantum Moses misericordia floruit propter populum, pro cujus salute petiit deleri de libro vitae; & quando iterum zelo rectitudinis; cum obtinuisset Veniam, ait ad populum, Ponat vir gladium super femur suum, Ecce quod vitam omnium cum sua morte petiit, paucorum vita cum gladio destruxit. Intus igne amoris, & foris accensus Zelo justitiae & severitatis; where it is plainly seen, that a Prince ought not only to be loved, but to be feared also: seeing love alone of itself, is cause of contempt: and therefore job said: Si quando ridebam adeos, non credebant; & Lux vultus mei non cadebat in terra, that is, his Gravity was so great, that though he laughed, yet they stood with fear and reverence: where we must weigh those words; Lux vultus mei non cadebat in terra, which according to another sense, in the Hebrew, is rendered in Latin, Lucem vultus mei non abiiciebant: that is, they despised not my mirth. So as, Fear is so necessary, that Domitian, although terrible to the Senate, as governing with fear, yet after his death, he was wished for again of all men, seeing with that fear, he kept his own officers in awe; whereupon it happens sometimes, to be worse for a Prince, with too much mildness, to make himself be loved, and therefore the Kingdom of France, under Charles the simple, and Charles the gross, was (as an Author writes) most miserable, on the contrary, at the end of Francis the first, it was a flourishing Kingdom, although they were mild; and he a sharp and terrible King; afterward again, in the time of Henry his son a most gentle Prince, the treasury was all wasted: Pertinax and Heliogabalus with their mildness, had brought the Empire almost to ruin, when afterward Severus Africanus, and Alexander Severus raised it up again, with incomparable Severity. It is not therefore enough for a Prince to be loved, but he must be feared also.  
Concerning the second point, which is, that fear alone is pernicious to a Prince, is easily proved: first, from that place in Genesis where No with his sons going out of the Ark, our Lord God said unto him, Tremor & Timor vester sit super cuncta Animalia terrae: as though he would say, you must make yourselves be feared of beasts, not of men. And therefore Moses coming down from the Mount, with a horny splendour, and finding that it made his face strike the people into fear, he covered it with a veil; whereby he shows plainly, that a Prince ought not to make himself only to befeared. This also our Lord Christ shows, who amongst the first precepts he gave his Apostles, gave this for one, that they should carry no Rod with them; where S. Ambrose well observes, that a Prince ought to govern more with love than fear. And in another place he saith, David Rex, cum omnibus aequabatsuam militiam, fortis in praelio, mansuetus in Imperio; Ideo non cecidit, quia charus fuit 〈◊〉, & diligi a subjectis quam timeri maluit. Timor enim, temporalis tutaminis servat excubias, nescit diuturnitatis custodiam. And therefore it is said in the Psalm, Memento Domine David, & omnis mansuetudinis ejus. Whereupon S. Bernard upon those words of the Canticles, Dilectus meus mihi, & ego illi qui pascitur inter Lilia, amongst those Lilies where the Spouse feedeth, reckons gentleness and love, by which he reigned. Specie tua (saith the Prophet) & pulchritudine tua, intend prosperè, proceed & Regna.  
Therefore love alone is not good, because it causeth contempt; and fear alone is not good, because it begets hatred. This the Ancients meant to signify, by the Fable of Jupiter, who at the Frogs desire to have a King, gave them a Block, and he not stirring, the Frogs despised him; whereupon Jupiter changed their King, and gave them a Stork; but he eating them up, they hated him more than they despised the other: by this they meant to show, that a King should not be so gentle, to have more of the block then of the man; nor yet so severe, as to resemble a beast, in sucking the blood of his Citizens. A Prince therefore ought to join the one with the other; which how easy and necessary it is, may easily be known, if we distinguish fear into two kinds: one, a fear which is but a reverence, as a filial fear is, whereof, the holy Text in Job saith, Vir rectus timens Deum. The other, a fear which is a terror; and this is that fear which Adam had, when he heard the voice of our Lord God, Adam ubies? and he answering said, Vocem ●…uam Domine audivi, & abscondime & timui, quia nudus essem. Secondly, we must distinguish of men; that some are perfect, and some unperfect; which is common also to all Cities, whether great or small.  
I say then, that if the men be imperfect, it is fit to make them fear; not the filial, but the servile fear: and therefore Esay saith, Sola vexatio tantum dabit intellectum auditui: and Jeremy, Per omne flagellum, & dolorem erudieris Jerusalem. And Solomon in his Proverbs saith, In labiis sapientis invenitur sapientia, & virga in Dorso ejus, qui indiget cord: by the Rod is meant fear; and by Ejus qui indiget cord, are meant the wicked; who are said to be without heart; as Osee the Prophet saith, Factus est Ephraim, quasi Columba seducta, non habens cor. With these men therefore, it is fit to use a Rod of Iron to make them fear, being the only means to return the heart into its place. The Ninivites had removed their hearts out of their proper places: and our Lord God, with his Rod, Ad quadraginta dies & Ninive subvertetur, brought them again into their right places. Because (as Aristotle in his Physics saith) Every thing that is made, proceeds from its like; but every thing that is borne, from its contrary. Quodlibernon non fit a quolibit, sed a suo contrario. So to beget love, where it is not, we must not use Love, but its contrary, which is fear; and as in Generation the Contrary departs, when the thing is generated; so when Love is once generated, the fear departs, whereupon Saint Bernard and Saint Austin, Compare fear to the Needle, and love to the Thread, because the Needle brings in the thread, and having brought it in, departs away. A Prince therefore ought to make himself be feared, even with Servile fear, by the wicked.  
It remains to show, how a Prince ought to carry himself, towards men that are good and perfect, but having showed before, that love alone begets contempt, and fear hatred, it is fit, he make himself be loved, and feared, both at one time; but not with that servile Fear, which for the most part is cause of Rebellions, as was seen at the time, when our Lord God appeared to the Jsraelites upon the Mount; which begetting in them a great fear, there followed a Rebellion; but with that f●…are, which is a virtue; For knowing of which fear, it is to be known, that fear may have two objects; the one is, some terrible mischief; the other is the Person, who hath power to do the mischief; as Saint Thomas saith: and because our purpose is not in this place, to speak of the first object, but only of the second; as speaking of a Prince; I say, that he may be considered, in as much, as he hath power to hurt, or in as much, as he hath will to hurt: if we consider him, in as much as he hath will to hurt, in this manner, he ought not to make himself be feared; but leave the subjects to fear him of themselves; So our Lord God would be feared, and not be feared; So Saint Paul to the Philippians saith, Cum metu & tremore vestram Salutem Operamini: See here, Saint Paul would have us to fear, not of God, that is, that God hath not a will we should be saved; for, Deus vult ommes homines salvos fieri, but he would have us to fear, lest our actions be such, as to provoke our Lord God to anger. Therefore in the mouth of the Prophet Esay he saith, Fear not, Saint Paul saith, we must fear, Esay saith, we must not fear, therefore Esay means, that we must not fear God's will, and Saint Paul means, that we must fear our own works. So a Prince ought not to carry himself in such manner, that there be fear of his will, because his will should always be for the good of his subjects; but that there be fear in the subjects, of their own works.  
Again, if we consider the Prince, the second way, that is, in as much as he hath power to hurt, in this sense, he ought so to carry himself, that his Person may be feared, because he that hath power to punish, must have (as Saint Thomas saith) such eminent authority, as can hardly be resisted, for if it may easily be resisted, it will be no cause of fear. And therefore oftentimes, though there be no fear of mischief from One in eminent authority, yet the Reverence that is borne to eminency, is justly called Fear: So in Saint Luke, accepit autem omnes timor, & magnificabant Deum. So also that place of Saint Paul is to be expounded, Reddite omnibus Debita: cui Timorem, timorem; cui vectigal, vectigal; and he that will be feared in this manner, must do some great and wonderful things; that men admiring them, may acknowledge his eminency above others; whereupon our Lord Christ, struck a fear into the Jews, when they saw him do such great miracles: Repleti sunt timore, dicentes, quia vidimus Mirabilia hodie. And the subjects, though good, need not be greeved to fear the Prince in this manner; this being a virtuous fear, which was in Christ also towards his father; as witnesseth Saint Thomas in the foresaid place, Alensis, Bonaventure, Gabriel, and with them the whole School of Divines. So as a Prince ought to make himself universally to be loved, and generally to be feared: in confirmation whereof, S. Gregory saith, Talis debet esse dispenfatio Regiminis, ut his qui praeest, ea se circa subditos mensura moderetur, quatenus & arridens timeri debeat, & Iratus amari, ut eum nec nimia laetitia vilem reddat, nec immoderata severitas odiosum. And in another place, weighing those words of Job, Cum sederem quasi Rex, circumstante exercitis, eram tamen moerentium consolator. S. Gregory exhorts a Prince to do, as the Samaritan did, who poured into his wound, that was hurt upon the way, Wine and Oil, Vt per vinum inordeantur vulnera, per oleum faveantur. And the Psalmist saith, Virgatua, & baculus tuus, ipsa me consolata sunt: The Rod serving to strike, and the staff, to defend. This also was expressed in the Ark, in which, together with the Table of the Law, was put the Rod with the Manna, there being necessarily required for observing the Law, love and fear. In sign whereof, our Lord Christ in his transfiguration upon the Mount Tabor, appeared in the midst, between Elias, who to move men, wrought by fear; and Moses, who wrought all by love. And therefore in the Scripture, when the qualities of a Prince are spoken of, always with beauty to make him be loved; there is joined, Power, to make him be feared. Whereupon in Salomon's Epithalamium, after he had praised the Bridegroom for his Beauty; speciosus prae filiis hominum; he praiseth him also for his strength; Accingere gladio tuo super faemur tuum Potentissime. So in Genesis in the Benediction of Juda, and in Deuteronomy, in the Benediction of Joseph: Quasi primogeniti Tauri, pulchritu●…o ejus; corn●…a Rhinocerontis cornua illius. And in the second of Kings, Saul & Jonathas amabiles & decori in vita sua, & Aquilis velociores, Leonibus fortiores. And of God himself the Prophet saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est, indutus est Dominus fortitudinem & praecinxit se: and in the Proverbs, Fortitudo & decor indumentum ejus: and in the 28. Psalm, Dilectus quemadmodum filius unicornium; that is, though as beautiful, he is worthy to be loved, yet as powerful also he deserves to be feared.  
A Prince than ought to make himself be feared of wicked men, with a servile fear, and this he shall do if he duly punish them for their faults; and he ought also to make himself be feared of good men, with a reverential fear: and this he shall do, if he give proof of his valour, by doing great actions: (as I have showed before) which justly make a Prince be feared with reverential fear. And because above all things, he ought to procure the love of his subjects; we must know, that never was any Prince so good, whom some of his subjects did not hate; nor ever any so bad, whom some of his subjects did not love: as may be seen in Tarqvinius Superbus, whom some of the principal youth of the City so much loved, that they made a conspiracy in his behalf. So Nero (as Galba witnessed) had many that loved him; Nero à pessimo quoque desiderabitur. And this happens by reason of sympathy of conditions; there being in all Cities, whether little or great, some men that are warlike, and some peaceable; some that are ignorant, and some learned; some that are good, and some bad: whereupon seeing a Prince must of necessity be either good or bad; warlike, or peaceable; ignorant, or learned; it will follow, that if he be learned, he shall be hated of the ignorant; if he be warlike, of the peaceable; if good, of the bad. And this is the work of contraries, whose nature being to destroy one another, it is as impossible that one of these should love the other, as it is impossible, that one should love his own destruction.  
The second difficulty, which makes it hard for a Prince to procure himself to be beloved, is justice; which if it be not duly administered, it makes a Prince odious to all good men; and if it be duly executed, either in civil or criminal causes, it will be an occasion every year to get him the hate of many, and even of those that are good, there being few men that like of justice, when it goes not on their side. These many then, whose hatred the Prince is like every year to incur, being multiplied many years, must needs at last make a mighty number; and from hence, (as I conceive) may be drawn an excellent reason how it happens in governments, that the first year for the most part Governors are well beloved; the second year, they are hated, and the third year detested: as every one looking into it, of himself may see.  
Yet a Prince amidst all these difficulties, must not be discouraged: First, because he need not care much to be loved of any, but only of the good: to which purpose Galba said, it needed not trouble them, to see Nero beloved of the wicked; but this was a matter that needed regard, to give no occasion, he should be wished for again of the good: Nero a pessimo quoque desiderabitur: Mihi ac tibi providendum est, ne etiam a bonis desideretur. Secondly, the end of a Prince, is as of an Orator, or of a Physician, who being to introduce a form in another, and not having it in their power to do it, yet they have discharged their office, if they have applied fit means to introduce it: no better a Physician is he that heals, than he that heals not; nor any better Orator he that persuades, than he that persuades not; so long as they use the fittest means, he to heal, and this to persuade. So for our purpose, seeing love is in him that loveth, in such manner, as honour is in him that honoureth: a Prince shall have performed his charge, and done as much as he need to do, as long as he hath used all fit means, to procure his subjects love, by doing good to all, by maintaining them in plenty, by showing himself far from cruelty, by defending them from their enemies: and finally, by making it appear, that he loves them exceedingly; seeing this is a sure rule, He that will be loved, must love.   

Vnum esse Reipublicae Corpus, atque nuius animo Regendum.  
Whether an Aristocracy, or a Monarchy be the more profitable for a City. The nine and thirtieth Discourse.  
ASinius Gallus having too sharply spoken to Tiberius, and finding his own error, and the Prince's indignation; meant with a flattering speech, to cover the one, and pacify the other: and therefore showed, that for an Empire to be well governed, it was necessary it should be governed by one alone. And because from this place of Tacitus many gather, that he held the government of a Monarchy to be better than that of optimates: I conceive it to be no digression from our purpose, that I show first, according to my understanding, the truth of this question; and then declare, how this place of Tacitus must be understood. And herein, no man need to marvel, that I vary from the opinions, or to say better, from the approved opinions, of many excellent men, as though I meant to vilify them; but I desire they would take into consideration, the River of Rho●…e, which although it seem by his course, as though it meant to drown the legitimate sons of the Celti, yet indeed it exalts them, and gives a true testimony of their legitimate birth to all that see it. So it will be no small matter, if I with my weakness, can make the others worth appear the greater.  
To come then to the matter: It is commonly held, and all men almost are of opinion, that a Monarchy is the better. For proving whereof, there being two ways; one, Authority: the other, Reason: in each of these, there will not be wanting means sufficient to make it plain. In considering authority, the first that present themselves, are the holy Fathers, S. chrysostom, Justin, Athanasius, Gyprian, S. Hierome, and finally S. Thomas in many places. Secondly, come Philosophers, natural and moral: Plato, Aristotle, Sen●…ca, Plutarch, Herodotus, and finally amongst Poets, Homer.  
If we come to reasons, there present themselves an infinite number: and first, if we consider profit, we shall find, (as S. Thomas saith) that a more profitable government cannot be found, then that of a Monarch; seeing the profit & welfare of that which is governed, that is, of Cities and Provinces, consists in nothing but in conserving of unity, which we call peace: at which, they who govern must chiefly aim: and seeing there is no government so fit to preserve peace, as that of a King, we cannot choose but give it the name, to be the better, and the more profitable. Because peace consists in nothing but unity, which certainly is better had in one, who is by himself one, as a King is; then in those that are many, as Optimates are: as we see, 〈◊〉 thing which is hot of itself, is a more efficient cause of heating, then that which is but hot by accident, the state of Optimates being never good, but in as much as they who govern it, approach by accidental union, to be one.  
But laying profit aside, and entering into consideration, which of them is most natural, who sees not, that a Monarchy is the most? seeing nature governs and moves all the parts of our bodies, by one only which is the heart: likewise the sensitive soul is governed by the rational; and Bees naturally are governed by one that is King: and if Artificial things be so much the better, as they imitate nature; and the Artificers work be so much the perfecter, as it holds similitude with nature; then certainly, must every one needs yield, that in the multitude of governments that State is the best, which is governed by one alone.  
Again, if we look upon experience, we shall find, that in a house, there is but one Master; in a flock, but one Shepherd; and in the old Testament, the Israelites were always governed by one alone, whether under Kings, or under Judges.  
But laying also this aside, and coming to examine the power: who sees not that a Monarchy is far more potent than an Aristocracy, considering that of the four Empires and powers of the World: that is, the Assyrians, the Persians, the Grecians, and the Romans; only one of them was under Optimates.  
Then if we consider order: where is it more found, then in a Monarchy? where every one is subject, but he only that rules the rest; there being no order between equals, but only between superior and inferior.  
If then we consider duration and stability, this certainly is most found in the government of one alone, seeing Omne Regnum in se divisum desolabitur: and every one knows, that division falls out more easily in an Optimacy, then in a Monarchy: as experience hath made it manifest in the Monarchy of Ninus, which continued without interruption, a thousand two hundred and ninety years. If then we consider, which is furthest off from discords, we may take example in Rome, which was never without discords, but when it was under Kings.  
But laying all these considerations aside, it will be proof enough of this assertion, to consider the similitude, that is between the government of God, and that of a Monarch, because as he rules all the World, so a King rules all his subjects.  
By these reasons it might be concluded, that a Monarchy, as being most profitable, most natural, most potent, most durable, most orderly, most free from discords, and finally most like to the government of God, should without comparison be better, than a State of Optimates. But seeing there are many difficulties in the question, I hope I shall have leave to examine the truth of it a little better. And where it may be discoursed of in two senses; the spiritual, and the temporal: In the spiritual, it cannot be denied, against Calvin and other heretics, but that a Monarchy is the best kind of government that can be given: and of this there needs be no disputing, being as clear as the Sun, both by authority of Scripture, by determination of Counsels, by consent of the Church, and finally by the common opinion of all the Fathers, such a Monarchy having been instituted by our Lord Christ himself.  
But in the second case, which is, considering it in the temporal sense; I hold the Question may hold disputation, and be handled politically: where we shall not find, all the reasons that were in the former: because a King, as a King, may err a thousand times a day: but the Pope, as Pope, can never err, as being assisted by the Holy Ghost. Whereupon, as it is undoubted, that in the spiritual, there cannot a better government be then a Monarchy: so in the Temporal, every one may be left to take which side he likes best. The first question being between an Israelite, and an Egyptian, was consequently easily determined by Moses; but the second between the Israelite, and the Israelite, was very hard to be determined. And therefore as 〈◊〉. Gregory Nyssen well observes, by killing the Egyptian, Moses ended that strife, but for the strife between the two Israelites, he was never able to accord them. So the strife, which we had with Heretics may easily be determined, by killing them with the holy Scripture, but with strifes that grow between ourselves, are left to every one's free liking: and therefore very hardly can be ended.  
He than that would hold an Aristocracy to be better than a Monarchy, might easily prove it by reason, and by authority. By reason, because (as S. Thomas saith excellently well) that government is the best, and the most profitable, that can best procure the unity of the Citizens: whereupon we must necessarily confess, that an Optimacy is the best; for seeing that an univocal riseth not but from an univocal; and that the unity of the Optimates is more univocal to that unity which is required in the people, than the unity of a Monarch is; therefore also it is more fit, and able to produce it: for, the unity of the Prince, is an unity of person, and of end: unity of person, as much as to say unity of number: as being one alone, unity of end, because all his cares are directed to one sole end, which is the good of his subjects; but the unity of the Optimates, is an unity of end, in plurality of persons, I say plurality, but not disunion; because the Optimates being many persons, cannot have unity of number, but agreeing in the end which is the good of the City, in this they are one. And the unity of subjects ought to be an unity of end, in plurality of persons: so as by this, it manifestly appearing that the unity of the Optimates is more univocal with that of the people, than the unity of the King is; therefore consequently it must be granted, that it is more able to produce it. There being two things necessary to generation, (as Cajetan saith) first, the distinction of that which is generated, from that which generates: the second, that there be a similitude in nature, between the one and the other, because, that which Generates, intends to introduce a thing like to itself, and therefore (saith he) where there is more Identity and similitude in nature, between that which Generates and that which is generated, there the generation will be perfitter, and more easy, and from hence it comes that the Univocal generation is more excellent than the Equivocal, and therefore, seeing the Identity, between the unity of the Optimates, and that of the People, is more than the unity of the Prince, and that of the People; it follows, that the generation shall be more noble, more perfect and more easy, and the more, seeing that unity of a King, which is unity of number, is rather contrary to the union we speak off, because as one in number is a denying of more parts; So unity in number, is an affirming of more parts, rather that one, which is of number, is the ruin of a City; as Aristotle proves strongly against Plato, where he saith; Atqui constat, quod ea si procedat, ut una fiat magis Civitas non erit. Est enim Civitas multitudo qu●…dam, secundum Naturam, quae dum fit una magis Domus erit ex Civitate, & homo ex Domo. Vnam enim magis Domum censemus esse quam Civitatem, & hominem unum quam Domum; quare etiamsi posset quis●…iam am hoc facere, tamen non esset faciendum, 〈◊〉 perimit Civitatem. So as, a City should not make itself one in number, but in discipline, as the said Aristotle saith, Oportet cum Civitas sit multitudo, per Disciplinam communem facere. And although, to show that the unity of a King is better, then that of Optimates; It might be said, that the unity of number shows Perfection; God being one by reason of Perfection: and many holding, that in every sort of Angels, there is one chief: as that which concerns their Perfection; yet I could easily answer with Saint Thomas: that one as it implies Negation, adds nothing to the Perfection of being; and if we take one as excluding other things, and as in its formal sense, it signifies to be alone and solitary: This of itself expresseth no Perfection, but rather many times imperfection, because in God, the being alone by Essence, proceeds from Perfection; but if he should be one in Person, it should be an imperfection. So as one, if you take it for solitary; signifies not so much Perfection, as imperfection.  
But if we come to consider the naturalness of this government; we cannot then have a better thing, to make it manifest, than the government of our body, which accordingto the doctrine of Plato (with the consent of Aristotle) is governed by nature Aristocratically, with three faculties, The sensitive, the Animal, and the Vital; the sensitive consisting in the Brain, which is the Beginning of all the sinews; the vital, in the heart, the beginning of all the Arteries; The Animal in the Liver, the Fountain of all the veins: whereupon every member containing Arteries, Nerves and veins, they consequently are governed by three, by the liver, by the heart, and by the brain; and therefore that Doctrine of the heart, which is brought in opposition, is false, which Aristotle in his works of Physic, hath many times confuted. And their Reason, to say a house is governed by one alone, is of no force: which rather is a reason that makes for us, seeing that, as nature, amongst things that are unequal, as those in a house are, hath ordained the Government of one alone, so between those that are Equal, as it is in a Citt●…y, there should be an Optimacy, which by 〈◊〉: in the first of his Politics, is plainly Intimated. Neither is it of any force to say, that Bees naturally are governed by one alone, or that the sensitive soul is governed by the Rational, or that a Flock is guided by one Shepherd, seeing the King of the Bees (as Pliny saith) is much greater than any of the other bees, & the rational faculty is so much more noble than the sensitive that hardly there can be assigned any proportion: & finally, the shepherd is so beyond comparison superior to the flock, that it is most reasonable & indeed most natural, he should command; and therefore when in a City, there is any one found, so much superior to all the rest, as the King of the Bees is in greatness to the other Bees; or so much in Nobleness, as the rational faculty is to the sensitive, or so much in ability, as the Shepherd is to the flock, than such a one in all reason should be King; as Aris●…otle grants where he saith: Quicunque igitur distant tantum quantum Animus a corpore, & homo a bestia, per hunc modum se habent: having said before, Hic imperans, illa vero parens. And in another place he saith, if any one in a City, be found so much excelling all the rest, as Jupiter excels men, that man by right should be made King: Sed siquis excellat virtute, quid de eo sit faciendum? Non enim dicendum est, ut talis vir sit de civitate pellendus: atqut neque gubernationi aliorum, talis vir erit subjiciendus, perinde enim est, ac si qui Jovem Gubernare velint. This very thing God meant to show, when he gave to man the rule over beasts as Solomon Interprets it, when ask wisdom, to the end God should give it him, he said Et sapientia tua constituisti hominem ut Dominaretur; as though he would say, as thou hast showed, in giving Regal Dominion to man, that he who will govern others, should in wisdom be as much superior to his subjects, as a man is to Beasts: so you are bound, having made me King over so many People, to give a like proportion of wisdom, as not able otherwise to deserve to be a King.  
With this supposition than we may grant, that the government of a monarch is the better, as whereof we have an example in the Pope: but this is to handle the question Secundu quid: for if we handle it simpliciter; we denyit.  
If we come to consider the Power, which is required for Augmentation, I then verily think there is none so ignorant, but that he knows, how much an Optimacy is fitter for augmenting, than a Monarchy, whereof we have Example in Athens, which, assoon as it freed itself from the Tyranny of Pisistratus, It presently grew to be of inestimable greatness. And if you will not stand to this Example, then take Rome, which was no sooner freed from Kings, but that it came to so great greatness, that it could not be oppressed but by itself. And it avails not to say, that of the four Empires, one only was a Commonwealth, that is, that of the Romans, and that the other three were Monarchies, as that of the Assyrians, of the Persians and of the Grecians, because if this reason were of any force, It would prove, that a Tyranny is the best government of all, seeing it is then a Monarchy, when the subjects are used, as Children, and not as the Persians and Medes did, and at this day, the Turk, who useth his subjects as servants, or to say better, as slaves.  
In coming to consider duration; I care not to prove, that Optimacy continues longer, than Monarchy, seeing this would not serve to prove my intent that therefore it is better, for duration as Aristotle saith, increaseth not goodness, and therefore one white thing, that continues longer than another, is not thereby whiter than the other; but rather the best things of this world, as they are hard to find, so being found, they are soon lost, as Galen faith of bodies, that are come to the height of health; and Tacitus, the like of states; whereupon it is no marvel, that the Monarchy of the Assyrians continued longer, than any Commonwealth ever did, which happened, because Tyranny held a proportion with that People, seeing People that are 〈◊〉, are necessarily to be governed by a Monarch, and not by Optimates. And therefore our Lord God, always governed the Israelites by one alone, because that rude people was not able to suffer Liberty, as liking better to live under a Tyrant, as they made appear, when they demanded a King of Samuel; for though he threatened them, they ●…hould have a Tyrant, yet this made them not give over their demand. So when the Senate of Rome granted liberty, to Paslagonia and Cappadocia; the Cappadocians saying they could not live without a King, the Senate was fain to send them Ariobarzanus, to be their King; whereof Livy saith, Barbari quibus pro legibus semper Dominorum Imperia fuerunt, quo gaudent, Reges habeant; and Aristotle speaking of this shows, that they were by Nature made to serve; Obidenim (saith he) quia magis aptae sunt Natura ad serviendum Nationes barbarum quam Graecorum; & eorum qui in colunt Asiam: quam eorum qui Europam, per serunt servile Jugum aequo animo, & ob hoc Tyrannica sunt 〈◊〉 Regna. And therefore from hence, there can no argument be drawn, that Monarchy, is a better government than Optimacy, seeing (as Aristotle saith) although one Form of Commonwealth be in itself better; yet for some people, another that is not good, may be more profitable. There might also be brought another Reason, why Tyrannies are of longer Continuance, than Aristocracies, a Reason, which hath been intimated, by a certain Author; and it is because they are more hard to be surprised, because where all are servants, there can be none to lend a hand, to let in strangers, as hath been often done in France, in England, and other places: which will always happen, and hath often happened to Monarchies, because such Princes hold their subjects rather as Companions, then as slaves; and therefore in this point, the Turk stands secure; and if Alexander Magnus overcame Darius, it was his own Act. It is indeed true, that as Monarchies are more hardly taken then Commonwealths; so more easily they are held, where commonwealths are easily taken, (all the subject Cities being male content, & consequently ready to assist strangers; but being taken, they are hard to be held by reason of the name of Liberty; which makes them apt every minute to fall into rebellion. Tyranny then is the most durable of all kinds of states, and if the reason above alleged were of force it would prove it also to be the best, which no man that hath brains will say. But let us come to consider the order of Optimates; which is the same, that is in an I●…strument of Music, order so much commanded by all the Holy Fathers, and by all Philosophers; where many Divers sounds make but one sound, of which order, Saint Chrisostome in admiration saith Et est videre mirabilem rem: in multis unum: & in uno multa. And then, if they will consider, the unaptness it hath to Discords, let him take the City of Venice for an example, which for many ages together, hath never had any. And it avails not to say, that where many are, they may be at odds between themselves, but one cannot be at odds with himself, for I answer with Aristotle, Quod studiosi viri sunt omnes ut Ille unus. And the Example of Rome is of no force, because when the Discord entered between the Nobility and the People, It was not then an Optimacy but a mixed Estate: and by reason of the predominating Element, might be called a Popular state, and if ever it were an Optimacy, it was in the beginning, in which they lived in exceeding great concord, until the state came to be corrupted, rnd here we must advertise, that when we compare a Monarchy with an Optimacy, we compare them in their perfection, and not in their corruption: because it is of the Essence of an Optimacy, that all in it should be good men, for else we should dispu●…e Aequivocally.  
But to let many other things pass, who knows not that a City will be better governed by Optimates; then by a Monarch? seeing the most virtuous, Governs best, and a King being but one virtuous, and the Optimates many virtuous, seeing many know more than one, although that one, in some thing may exceed those many, as Aristotle excellently shows in his Politics, yet if you grant that the Optimates be all virtuous men; you must withal grant, that they are able to govern better, than any King whatsoever; and the rather, because a King deserves then most praise, when he is governed himself by good counsellors, and consequently in as much as he is ruled by many, in the manner of Optimates. So our Lord God appointed Moses, that he should rule by the counsel of jethro. And this me thinks might serve to make men capable, that an optimacy is better, than a Monarchy, yet there is a further Reason: For not only an Optimacy may Govern bet●…er, as being more virtuous; but as being more than a King, who not being able himself alone, to govern all the state, Solus illud non poteris sustinere; he must of necessity commit it to officers; and who knows not, 〈◊〉 how much more love and justice the people are governed, by the Lords themselves being virtuous, then under a King by officers that are strangers; they governing their own, and these another man's; and therefore Aristotle speaking against Plato saith; that Propriety, a thing being one's own●…, is a special cause of love, and makes the greater care be taken of it, Nam de propriis maxime Curant homines; and if men (as he shows) use little diligence, in things that are common; they will use much less in things that are neither common nor proper: as we see it daily, (though it be but a homely instance) that a husbandman will till land better, that is his own possession, then that which he is hired to till; as in that, regarding his own particular profit; in this; the Common: in the one, the present only, in the other, the present and the future both. And if it be answered, that a King may have good officers; I say, that when we grant the government of a King, to be good, we 〈◊〉, that he be good himself; but it follows not, that a good King must necessarily have good Officers, seeing it is not a thing essential to him: and though we should grant it to be essential, yet it is not constituent, but only consequent; though I rather think it is neither one nor other; but for the present, let it it be as it will: This is most certain, that in Optimacy, for all to be good, is both essential and constituent; for otherwise (as I have said) we shall but labour in Aequivocals.  
Also secrecy gives an Optimacy right to be preferred before a Monarchy: for proof whereof, the example of only the Venetians may suffice, who (as Guicciardine relates) have always kept their counsels secret: a thing which Princes cannot do; who being to consult with persons, not interressed in the affairs that are handled, can never be sure, but that they may reveal them. And though none of these reasons were sufficient to win persuasion to this opinion, yet this certainly must needs be sufficient, to show, how much the government of God, is more like to an Optimacy, then to a Monarchy: and this will be easily showed, because our Lord God operates Immediatione virtutis; and is, in all things, I●…diatione suppositi: to which kind of operating and being, the Optimates approach nearer, than the Monarch; who must of necessity make use of Officers, as not able being but one, to be himself in all places: whereby it often happens, that a State is more governed by the Officers virtue, then by the virtue of the Prince. But the Optimates being many, may all together do that of themselves, which a Prince doth together with officers, and may govern the State by their own virtue, and consequently operate Immediatione virtutis: yet I mean it, in the manner, that a second cause can operate: knowing well, not only in Theological verity, but also in Philosophical doctrine, that all virtue proceeds from Heaven: as Aristotle in his Meteors teacheth us, where he saith, Oportet hunc mund●…m inferiorem, superioribu●… lationibus esse contiguum: and therefore in a certain manner, the government of Optimates is more like to that of God. And it avails not to say, that our Lord God is but one alone, that governs the whole world; because in him is one Essence, indeed one Will, one Soul, one Intellect only; but then in three Persons really distinct, in three Suppositi, in three Hypostases, in three Substances; (as substance is distinct from Accidents, which are In alio tanquam in subjecto.) And finally in three Subsistences, as subsistence signifies Essentiam per se subsistentem: which three Persons, do in such sort govern the universe, that although the works of Creation be attributed to the Father, the works of Wisdom to the Son, the works of Love and Grace to the Holy Ghost; yet all the three concur equally in all works ad extra, which are common to them all. The Universal therefore is governed by three Persons with one will alone: and the Divine Unity, is an unity of end in plurality of Persons, such as we have showed the unity of Optimates to be. And this is that unity, which our Lord Christ, desires should be in us, as being like his own, as he showeth in S. John, where he saith, Pater Sancte serva eos in nomine tuo (speaking to his Father) quos dedist●… mihi 〈◊〉 sint unus sieuti & nos. And a little after, Non pro eis rogo tantum, sed & pro eis qui crediture sunt per verba 〈◊〉, in me; 〈◊〉 omnes 〈◊〉 sint, sicut tu Pater in me, & 〈◊〉 in te. So this is a clear Text, and by every one interpreted to be meant of that unity, which ought to be in all the faithful, which our Lord God would have to be like the unity of the Divine Persons: and as in them there is a real distinction of persons in unity of Essence; so in the many faithful, there ought to be one Spirit, one love, one will. They than that have plurality of persons in one will, are in that manner one, as the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost are, as in the Gospel our Lord Christ expounds it.  
And now who is he, that by the force of so many reasons, will not confess, that an Optimacy, as being more profitable, more Noble, more potent, more natural, more secret, more concordant: and finally more like to the government of God, is far a better kind of state than Monarchy.  
As for authorities, I commonly make no great reckoning, but only of those which I am bound to believe, by commandment of the holy Church; other authorities must convince by reason: and this leave S. Austin gives me, where he saith, Neque quorum libet disputationes quamvis Catholicorum & laudatorum hominum velut Scripturas Canonicas habere debemus; ut nobis non liceat, salva Honorificentia, quae●…illis debeatur hominibus, aliquid in eorum scriptis improbare, atque respuere, si forte invenerimus quod aliter senserint, quam veritas habet, divino adjutorio, ut ab aliis intellecta ●…nobis. Talis ego sum in scriptis alionum, quales volo esse intellectores meorum. And in another place he saith, Sacrae Scripturae est adhihenda fides, alios autem Scriptores licet nobis impugnare. But because it becomes not my youth and weakness, to stand in defiance with so many excellent and worthy men; I will endeavour to make it appear, that some of the Authors cited before for the contrary, spoke not in our sense; and that some of them speak of our side; some of them irresolutely, and some again, with passion.  
Beginning then with the holy Fathers, I say, they spoke in another sense, meaning it of the spiritual Monarchy: and though many times they speak generally, which may reach as well to a temporal Monarchy, yet this they did to the end, that Heretics seeing it granted them, in the government of Cities, an Optimacy to be better than a Monarchy, should not from hence take occasion to affirm the like of the spiritual Monarchy, And this is a course, that hath been much used by the holy Fathers, who sometimes have not yielded to things most clear and evident, only because they would not give heretic's occasion, by ill interpreting them, to make simple people incline to their opinions. It is a matter clear and evident, and granted by all Divines, that in God there are three Hypostases, and yet many of the holy Fathers, and particularly S. Hierome, have not been willing to grant it; for no other reason, but least Gatholicks granting three Hypostases, heretics should thereupon make simple people believe, that in God there were three Essences: and this interpretation is made of it, by all the Doctors upon S. Thomas.  
Leaving then the opinion of these Fathers, who speak in another sense, let us come to Philosophers: where I cannot but account my assertion safe; having Aristotle, Plato, and Pythagoras of my side. And it availos not to say, that Aristotle in his Ethics understands it one way; and in his Metaphysics another: seeing Aristotle when he speaks of the same things in divers Books, speaks of them diversely; and Arts and Sciences consider oftentimes the same things, and yet not in the same manner. A Philosopher and a Physician, both of them consider the same body; but a Physician considers it as it is capable of healing, and a Philosopher as it is capable of motion. So as I never make reckoning of the authority of Aristotle; but in places, where he handles Ex professo; because many times, he discourseth in one manner morally in his Ethics: and in another manner diversely in his politics; so in his Rhetorics, he speaks of felicity in one manner, and in his Ethics in another. In his Physics he discourseth as a Philosopher one way, another way in is Problems. The authority then of Aristotle in matters Political, must be taken from his Politics; where I am much deceived, but he is of my opinion: though all men cite him for the contrary; I know not how he could possibly speak more plainly, then where in his Politics he saith, Si ergo plurium Gubernatio bonorum autem virorum omniae Optimatium dicitur, unius autem Regnum, optabilius esset civitatibus ab optimis Gubernari, quam a Rege. And in a thousand other places, whereof some are cited here and there in my Discourse; and other, every one may look out of himself, being all so clear that they have no need of my interpreting them. It is true indeed, that once he was transpoted to say, that the Regal government is the best of all; because a Tyranny is the worst: but he spoke then in Idaea, meaning if there could be found one as much superior to others, as God is to men: and therefore in another place, where he leaves his Idea, and comes to Fact, he saith, that all Kings are tyrants: seeing there cannot any one be found, so much superior to others in goodness, as that he should be worthy to command alone. Non fiunt nunc amplius Regna (saith Aristotle) sed si qua fiunt, Monarchiae, & Tyrannides magis sunt; Ob id quia 〈◊〉 spontanea Gubernatio est, ac Majorum proprie, & plurimi pares sunt, neque usque adeo praesellentes, ut ad magnitudinem, dignitatemque 〈◊〉 gradus se possint attollere. And then that reason, which Aristotle brings, 〈◊〉 bona pessima, is false; and is not to be understood as men commonly take it. To prove it to be false, is easy: seeing not only Plato, but Aristotle himself saith, that the government of Optimates, is better than the popular: yet in the second of his Politics he saith, that the worst forms of government, are a Tyranny, and a Democracy; so as if that reason were true, the corruption of Optimates should be worse than that of the people. Besides I should always hold, that the corruption of an Optimacy is worse than that of a Monarchy; seeing an evil is so much worse as it is multiplied: specially, being impossible that those few should ever be in concord. And in truth, this reason may be strongly fortified by example; seeing in the government of Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus, and in that of Lepidus, Anthony, and Augustus, both of them comprised under the worst form of a few, assigned by Aristotle; the Commonwealth of Rome, was more torn and wasted then under Nero, or any other Tyrant whatsoever. Then again, the proposition is not so to be understood, but thus, that an evil will appear so much worse, as a man hath been accustomed to a greater good, as it would be a greater evil, to a Prince who hath always lived deliciously, to be cast into prison, or into servitude, then to a Husbandman that hath been used to digging and hardness; because in the Prince is corrupted a greater good: but in Genere entis, the same evil is all one, to a Husbandman, and to a Prince. Thus much by way of digression.  
To return to our purpose. As concerning Plato, although he be alleged for the contrary, yet seeing he is but wavering, and speaks diversely; sometimes, as in his Dialogues of a Commonwealth, that an Optimacy is the best; and sometimes as in his Dialogues of a Kingdom, that a Monarchy is the best: and oftentimes, that a government mixed of People and Tyrant is the best: we shall do well to waive his words, and have recourse to that he showed in de eds, as better expressing men's minds than words. And Plato being asked of Dio, how a Commonwealth might best be governed, he found fault with Monarchy, and counselled him to bring in Optimacy: by which it appears, that this indeed, was his very opinion. Now for Pythagoras, we say, The Pythagorans endeavoured all they could, to bring into Italy the government of Optimates: and if it succeeded not, yet that happened not for want of judgement, but of forces. Then for Plutarch, if he understood it otherwise, we may say he had reason, as being the Schoolmaster to an Emperor; and therefore should have showed himself very simple, to blame a Monarchy. As for Homer, he no doubt is most fit to be brought in proof of that, which I myself in another Discourse, have resolved; which is, that an Army indeed, should be governed by one alone, the Verse which is commonly alleged out of Homer, being spoken by Agamenmon to the Army. And lastly, Herodotus also had reason to conclude, that amongst the Persians, a Monarchy was a fitter government than an Aristocracy; because the Persians were a rude imperfect Nation, as we have showed in another place.  
But because the most of the Arguments, brought against my opinion, are taken out of a book of S. Thomas, entitled, De Regimine Principis: I desire men would take notice, that I go not about, to impugn the Doctrine of that Saint, of whom I have made choice for my Advocate with God, and for my Master in all Sciences: but the truth is, that book is none of S. Thomases, as is easily proved, seeing in that book many persons are spoken of, which lived not till long after S. Thomas his time, as in the 20. Chapter of the third Book, De Regimine Principis, it is said, that Adul phus succeeded Ridolphus Count of Habspurg in the Empire, which happened in the year 1292. full eighteen years after S. Thomas was dead; and in many other places, which for brevity I omit. But let the book be whose it will, there is nothing in it against my opinion; seeing he means only, that a Monarchy is the better, where the people are imperfect: and this is no more, than what I have said myself. As in his fourth book, and eighteenth Chapter he saith, Quaedam autem Provinciae, sunt servilis naturae, & tales Gubernari debent Principatu Despotico; Includendo in Despotico etiam 〈◊〉 qui autem Virilis animi, & audacia Cordis, & in Confidentia suae Intelligentiae sunt; tales regi non possunt, nisi Principatu Politico; communi nomine extendendo ipsum ad Aristocraticum. This Text sufficiently shows the Authors opinion; and it differs not from mine.  
As for the authority of Tacitus, before alleged; it is easily answered, if we consider, that he speaks not those words as his own opinion: but by the mouth of Asinius Gallus, who having offended the Prince before, meant afterward by flattering words to pacify him.  
In the last place I advertise, that I counsel not People to change their government, though it be not an Optimacy; but rather, I like that every Country should keep the form of government they have; Ferenda Regum Ingenia (saith Tacitus) neque usui Crebras mutationes; and in another place, Vlteriora mirari, Praesentia sequi: bonos Jmperatores Voto expetere, qualeseunque tolerare, because to alter the form of government, is a mischievous thing: not only when it is good; but even when it is bad; whereupon it is better to endure a Tyrant, then to rise up against him: for if he should prevail, he would grow more cruel, as having been provoked; and if he should be put down, there would grow a thousand differences about ordering the government: and oftentimes he, that was the forwardest to put down the Tyrant; would be the readiest to be Lord in his place, and would then govern the more cruelly, for fear to be put down, as his Predecessor was. And this is his Doctrine, that made the Book De Regimine Principis. Let People therefore keep that form of government they have, and remember that notable Aphorism of Hypocrates, Consueta longo tempore, etiamsi deteriora, Insuetis minus molesta esse solent.  
Lastly I advertise, that governments would be proportioned to the Nature of the People; and therefore in some places a Monarchy may do well, where an Optimacy would not; whereupon, we see many Cities in 〈◊〉, as Perugia, Florence, Sienna, Bolonia, & others, which never were in peace, till they came to be under a Prince.   

Nec ideo Iram ejus lenivit pridem in visus, tanquam ducta in matrimonium. Vipsania Marci Agrippae filia; quae quondam Tiberii uxor fuerat; plusquam Civilia agitaret.  
That it is a great help for attaining a Kingdom, to have a wife of the blood Royal: and in what danger a Prince is, that hath none but daughters. The Fortieth Discourse.  
HAving at this time, no conveniency to Discourse upon all the Books of Tacitus: I am forced to take all occasion, though never so small, to handle those things, which more properly would be treated of in another place; I shall therefore desire my reader, that if in these Discourses, I open many Sentences of Tacitus, which might fitter be opened somewhere else; it may be rather attributed, to defect of occasion, then to want of Judgement.  
This Passage of Tacitus, in which Tiberius showed himself doubtful of Asinius Gallus, that Plusquam Civilia agitaret, as having taken one to wife, that had been his wife before: gives me occasion, first to show there is great reason to suspect such, as get them wives of the blood Royal; as being a special help for attaining the Empire, and having attained it, to maintain it. Secondly, to show the danger a Prince is in, that hath none but Daughters; and lastly to show the course he ought to hold, that would secure himself in these cases. Saul had reason to doubt David, having taken his daughter Micholl to wife, and knowing this important point of state; he sought by a thousand impertinencies to free himself, but being forced at last to give her to him, the Scripture relates, that he then began to sea re David exceedingly, whereupon it is said, Deditque ei Saul Micholl filiam suam, and it follows, Michol autem diligebat eum, & Saul caepit timere David. The most wise Solomon who also knew this danger, when Bersabee unadvisedly asked Abisac the Shunamite for Adoniah, answered, Quare postulas Abisac Shunamite Adoniae? Postula ei & Regnum; and as he denied to Adoniah his wife, So Tiberius denied to Agrippina her husband, whereof Tacitus speaking, saith; Caesar non ignarus quantum ex Repubitca peteretur, ne tamen offensionis aut metus manifestus foret, sine reponso, quanquam Instantem reliquit. Likewise the same Tiberius knew, that when Sejanus demanded Livia, who had been the wife of Drusus, it was as much as to demand the Kingdom, and therefore denied her to him, saying Falleris enim Seiane si te mansurum in 〈◊〉 Ordine putas, & Liviam quae Caio Caesari, mox Druso nupta fuerat, ea ment acturam ut cum equity Romano senes●…at. It is no marvel also, if ●…itellius showed to be afraid of Dolabella, as being in the same case Tiberius was with Asinius Gallus, having taken her to wife, who had been his wife before; Vitellius metu & odio (saith Tacitus) quod Petroniam uxorem ejus mox Dolobella in matrintonium accepisset, vocatum per epistolas, vitata Flaminiae viae celebritate, divertere Interamnam, atque ibi Jnterfici jussit. And therefore Phalti showed great judgement, who when Micholl married before to David, was given him by Saul, yet he never touched her, but (as Rabbi Solomon saith) laid a sword between Micholl and himself, when he was in bed with her, to keep him from touching her: and indeed it was well he did so, seeing no sooner was Saul dead, but that David, not thinking himself King, if his wife were married to another, said to Abner, Non videbis faciem meam antequam adduxeris Micholl filiam Saul.  
This therefore is a special help, for attaining a kingdom; & our Lord God, although he be able of himself, to accomplish whatsoever he pleaseth; yet as willing to make use of second causes; he caused David, to the end he might more easily attain the Crown, to which he was designed Abaeterno; and to which Samuel had anointed him, to take to wife adaughter of Saul's. And Solomon who was all wisdom and prudence, shows it us himself and finally the most subtle Sejanus, having an intent to get the Empire, knew this way to be, if not necessary, at least most profitable.  
Thus my intention is proved by Examples, but because there is more force in Reasons to move the understanding; and therefore Philosophers never speak, but they bring their reason; I have therefore sought out one, which I have found, me thinks, in Aristotle, in his Books of generation; where speaking how Elements are transmuted, hesaith: In Elementis habentibus Symbolam qualitatem, facilior est transitus. As the Earth which is cold and dry, is more converted into water, which is cold and moist; then into air, which is hot and moist; as agreeing with that in one quality, of cold; and disagreeing with this in both: So in our case, the attaining to a Kingdom, being in a private person, a transmutation more difficult than that of the Elements, it will more easily be attained, where there is one symbolising quality, then where there is none.  
He therefore is more likely to attain the Empire, who being himself a private man, shall have a wife of the blood Royal; then he, that both himself and his wife are of private estates.  
A Second Reason (omitting Philosophical, to come to a Political) is, that people bearing affection to their Prince, more easily suffer themselves to be governed, as long at there remains in the Kingdom any spark of his blood. Darius' a man of exceeding great Judgement, coming from a private man to be a Prince; for confirming him in the Empire, took to wife a daughter of Cyrus; as knowing, of how great importance it was, to have a wife of that blood, which had been King before; where of justin saith; Principio igitur Regni Cyri Regis filiam Regalibus nuptiis Regnum firmaturus in matrimonium accepit; ut non tam in extraneum translatum, quam in familiam Cyri reversum videretur. The like consideration had the sons of Tigranes; and if with them, it had not good success, this happened upon other occasion; and therefore good cause had Tacitus to marvel, where he saith; Nec Tigrani diuturnum Jmperium neque liberis ejus, quanquam sociatis more externo in matrimonium Regnumque. This brought Demetrius to be King of Macedon; that he had Fila to wife, who was daughter to the old King Antipator.  
From this passage now spoken off, with good consequence comes in, the second: that a Prince is in great danger, who hath none but daughters: seeing if he marry them, he can never be secure, that his son in law will not take the Kingdom from him: for the facility, we have showed to be by this occasion.  
To meet with this danger, many have taken divers courses: the first hath been to marry them to mean men; and such, as may have no thought of coming to the Empire, before the time; because such a one seems rather likely to be assistant to the Prince, in his affairs; seeing he may justly hope for more faithfulness from a Son in law, then from strangers; and need not make doubt of a person, that is not of any Noble Lineage. This conceit was in Augustus; and Tacitus expresseth it in the Person of Tiberius; At enim Augustus filiam suam Equiti Romano meditatus est. Mirum hercule, si cum in omnes Curas distraheretur; Immensumque attolli provideret, quem Conjunctione tali super alios extulisset Cajum Proculeium, & quosdam in sermonibus habuit; Insigni tranquillitate vitae, nullis Reipublicae negotiis permixtos.  
This indeed would be no ill course, so long as those persons of mean condition, be not of a spirit to aspire to the Empire, such as those named by Tiberius were, in whom, those words of Tacitus are to be considered: Tranquillitate vitae: as though he would say, a man free from audacious & haughty though●… and such may safely and without danger be advanced to honour. Whereupon Aristotle in his Politics, meaning to teach, what kind of men may safely be raised & made great, he saith, 〈◊〉 si quem extollere oporteat non 〈◊〉 cum qui sit moribus 〈◊〉 hujusmodi homines aptissimi sunt, ad invadondu circa 〈◊〉. And if Augustus gave her afterwards to Agrippa, Ignobilem loco bonum Militia, & victor●… socium this happened because he could not choose but fear Agrippa; whereupon he was forced, either to put him to death; a thing most scandalous not only in a Christian, but even in a Heathen; or at least to put him in some certain hope of coming to the Empire. This, Dio in the mouth of Moecaenas teacheth us, who speaking of Agrippa saith, that when a Prince makes a servant too great, and advanceth him too highly, giving him excessive and unlimited authority, he hath then no way to secure himself, but either to kill him, or by some match to make him his kinsman.  
Cyrus also followed this course, who married: his sister to Sibares, a person of most base estate: & as he took the same course that Augustus did, so it was upon the same occasion that Augustus had, whereof Justin saith, Sybarem Caeptorum quem juxta nocturnum visum ergastulo liberaverat comitemque in omnibus rebus habuerat (all one with those words (Victoriae socium) Persis praeposuit, sororemque suam ei in matrimonium dedit. And because Galba took not this course with Otho, which Cyrus took with Sybares, and Augustus with Agrippa; It lost him the Empire, as in the first book of Tacitus Histories, is to be seen.  
But yet in truth, this course seems to me both very dangerous, and very uncertain, because although he to whom their daughter or other of their blood is married, be himself a man ignoble and of little spirit, yet he may have a son, that may resemble his grandfather more than his father. Astyages was of this opinion, and put it in practice, doubting the future husband of his daughter, and no less, the nephew that should be born of them: Neque Claro 〈◊〉 (saith Justin) neque civi dedit filiam, ne paterna maternaque nobilitas Nepotis animum extolleret: sed de gente obscura tunc temporis Persarum Cambysi mediocri viro in matrimonium tradidit. And see how vain his conceit was; seeing of her was born Cyrus, who in few years took the Kingdom from his grandfather Astyages by force.  
Again this course takes ill success oftentimes, through the haughtiness of the women, who though married to men of mean spirits, and quiet dispositions, yet stir them up, and provoke them to do things which of themselves they would never do, or at least, not do so soon. Tullia the daughter of Servius was one of these, who impatient to wait upon succession, forced in a manner her husband Orontes Tarqvinius, to enter upon the Kingdom, with the death of her father; thinking it but fit, that being borne of the Blood-royal, she should be able both to give and to take away the Kingdom at her pleasure, whereof she oftentimes complained, Ipsa Regio semine orta, nullum momentum in dando adimendoque Regno faceret. Thus Tarqvinius by the instigation of this infernal fury, got possession of the Kingdom: and it made Servius no whit the safer, that he had married his daughter to Orontes Tarqvinius, a man (as Livy reports) of a mild and peaceable disposition, Mitis ingeniiIuvenem.  
To be brief, the daughters of Kings, either cannot, or know not how to live in a private estate. And therefore Damarata the daughter of Hiero King of Syracuse; and married to Andromadorus, with such violence instigated her husband, that she forced him extremely against his will, to take possession of the Kingdom; which Livy showing, where he allegeth the reason, why Andromadorus was moved to seize upon the Kingdom saith, Qui fessus tandem uxoris vocibus, monentis nunc esse tempus occupandi Regnum.  
A second way used by some, for freeing themselves of this danger, hath been to make such women to enter into Monasteries, or to spoke after the custom of the Ancients, into Temples; and so remove them from their husbands and sons, of whom there might be fear: to the end, that they in such places observing chastity, the Princes might live secure from the one and the other. This course was followed by Amulius, who having driven out Numitor, and killed his son; he made his daughter who only remained, under colour of honour to become a vestal Virgin, thinking by this means to secure himself, both from her, and from any whom she should marry, and from any sons that should be born of her: where of Livy 〈◊〉, Fratris filiae Rheae Silviae per speciem honoris cum vestalem vestal●… legisset perpetua virginitate spem partus adimit. But neither did this course do Amulius any good: for of her were borne Romulus and Remus, who deprived him of his Kingdom.  
I find therefore another way perhaps better: and it is to keep these women at home with him, of whose husbands or sons there may be any doubt, bearing many Princes in hand, he means to marry her to them; but in the mean time, not to bestow her upon any: for by this means, not only they shall be safe from any danger of their own, but from any also that may arise by enemies, either foreign or at home: seeing out of this hope, every one will be ready to defend them; and where by marrying her, they might have one defendor indeed, but him with danger, now holding them all at a bay, they will have many defendours without danger. This course was notably put in practice by the Duke of Burgundy, who (as Argenton relates) having one only daughter, he Promised her to the Duke of Guyenne, and to Nicholas Duke of Calabria, and to Philibert Duke of Savoy; and finally, to Maximilian Duke of Austria: and (as Argentone verily thinks) never meant to marry her to any at all, as long as himself lived. And in truth, if this Duke had carried himself as wisely in other things as in this, he had never so foolishly overthrown himself, as he did.   

Quip Augustus supremis sermonibus cum tractaret, quinam adipisci Principem locum suffecturi abnuerent, aut impares vellent; vel iidem possent cuperentque: M. Lepidum dixerat capacem, sed aspernantem; Gallum Asinium avidum, at minorem: L. Aruntium non indignum, & si casus daretur, ausurum.  
Whether it be better to refuse Dignities, or to seek after them. The one and fortieth Discourse.  
AMongst the last secrets of State, with which Augustus before his death acquainted Tib●…rius, he propounded three for the Empire, in a ●…verse manner: One that desired it, but was unworthy: Another that was worthy, but despised it: A third able to discharge it, and if occasion served, would attempt it: Of which three, when Augustus died, there was none left living but Marcus Lepidus, who was the man that was worthy of it, but despised it. Omnésque praeter Lepidum, variis mox criminibus struente Tiberio, circumventi sunt. We shall not need to examine which of these would have done best, in the case proposed by Tacitus, but rather consider the like persons in a Dignity or Office, which the Prince should give. We will therefore examine, First, which is best; either to deserve an Honour, and despise it; or else not deserving it, to seek it. Secondly, whether he that deserves aught to stay till the Prince offer it; or else put himself forward by some honest ways to obtain it.  
Concerning the first: It seems, that as to desire Honours, of which one is not worthy, is a presuming of himself, and as an act of Pride, is worthy of blame; So not to accept those Honours, of which a man is worthy, as being an act of Humility, is exceedingly to be commended.  
But if I shall speak my mind freely, I conceive that he is more to be blamed, and commits a greater error; and deserves the Prince's displeasure more, who refuseth Honours out of contempt, than he that seeks them without merit; because the one by desiring them, shows he holds them in great account; the other by slighting them, shows he makes no reckoning of them. Whereupon, as contemning is odious to a Prince, and valuing pleaseth him; so more distasteful must he needs be, that being worthy rejects an Honour, than he that seeks it, and is not worthy: And this is Saint Chrysostom's Doctrine, where he saith, Quare judicio quidem meo, qui istos despiciunt, contem●…ntque, multo sceleratiores, & pejori supplicio digni fuerint, quam fuerit Dathan unà cum suis omnibus. 〈◊〉 enim, tametsi Principatum ad se non spectantem sibi vindicabant; tamen miram quidem de eo Principatu animo opinionem ●…onceperant: Id quod declaravit, ingens rei concupitae studium. And a little after: Neque enim perinde est ad despicientiae rationem subducendam, honorem aliquem indebitum appetere, & tot tantaque bona fastidire: verum facinus hoc tanto est illo gravius, quanto inter se dissident intervallo, Fastidium & Admiratio. So as he not only incurs the Prince's disliking, but deserves also his reprehension; seeing he that seeks a Dignity without desert, comes within compass of being proud by admiring; where he that deserving it despiseth it, is as proud as the other, if not more, as counting himself worthy of greater honours; and while he despiseth honours equal to his merits, he falls into as great a degree of presumption as the other, and is guilty of contempt besides. This David understanding, although he knew he could not fight with Goliath in armour, yet (as Robert Abbat observes) to the end he might not seem to despise the honour the King offered him; he put on Saul's Armour, and tried whether he could use it. Accinctus ere go David gladio ejus super vestem suam, coepit tentare si armatus posset incedere; non enim habebat consuetudinem, dixitque David ad Saul, non possum sic incedere: and so he laid away those Arms thorough impossibility, which if he had laid away through contempt, it might have made him odious. Marcus Fabius, when the Senate offered him the honour of Triumph, refused to accept it, and thereby got the greater glory: whereof Livy speaking, saith, Adeo spreta in tempore gloria, interdum cumulatior redit: where the word In tempore is to be noted; as though he would say, if he had refused it at some other time, he might be thought to refuse it out of pride, as accounting the honour too little for his merits: whereupon see (as Dio relates) that Caesar never refused any honour the Senate offered him, to the end they might not think him proud.  
Another error also he falls into, that despiseth a Dignity conferred upon him; and it is, that he shows himself unfit for it: so much Plutarch makes Numa Pompilius tell his father. And Junius Blaeus, when the great men who hated Vitellius, went about to make him Emperor, and he refused it; for so doing was thought unworthy.  
Concerning the second: Whether he that is worthy of a Dignity, and despiseth it not, ought when occasion is offered, then to seek it, or else to stay till it be offered.  
In this case, I distinguish of Offices, which may either be of Honour, or of Danger: In this last case, there is no doubt, a man ought not to stay till his Prince require him; but finding himself fit for it, he ought to offer himself; because Princes oftentimes in such cases, would have their Subjects to understand their thoughts, without further expressing. Our Lord God had a purpose to send one to threaten the Israelites, a perfidious Nation, and that used to stone and kill the Prophets, but not willing to impose the charge of this message upon any; he seemed as though he knew not whom to employ: as it is written in Esay, Quem mittam, aut quis ibit nobis? Then Esay knowing perhaps by a Prophetical spirit, that this was an employment of danger, stayed not to be required, but readily offered himself, saying, Ecce ego, Mitte me: Where besides the reason alleged before, there may an excellent lesson be learned, either little known, or little used now adays in Courts: and it is, that Esay offering himself, spoke in general, Ecce ego, mitte me; as though he would say, Send me whither you please, I am ready to go: But on the contrary, I have seen men offer their service unto the Prince, as if they would put a halter about his neck, standing upon terms; If you will bestow upon me such or such an honour, I will then serve you: and when offices are to be bestowed, set themselves down for one of the chiefest; a fashion much used, but with little judgemen●…: because by so doing, they manifestly show they seek to serve themselves, and not the Prince. The obedience of Abraham was not of this sort: who, when our Lord God commanded him to go out of his Country, saying, Egredere de terratua, & de domo Patris tui, & veni in terram quam monstravero tibi; presently without ask whither he should go, he put himself on his journey. So also it is written in the Apocalypse, where Saint John speaking of the Elect, saith, Et sequuntur agnum quocunque ierit. Whereupon the Prophet compares himself to a beast, Vt jumentum factus sum apud te, A beast carries that which his owner lays up on him, and doth that which his owner pleaseth; he is not ashamed if he carry Earth, and he grows not proud if he carries Gold: So ought the Servants of Princes to do, go whithersoever they command them: carry Earth, or carry Gold; that is, go in employments great or small, as occasion is offered. This is the conceit of Saint Gregory, upon occasion of that place of Esay, Ecce ego, mitte me: and although he apply it to Preachers, yet I conceive it may not unfitly be applied to our Discourse.  
But to return to our purpose, and come to the second case proposed before, and is a little more difficult; which is, if occasion be presented of bestowing an honour, whether a man ought to offer himself, and seek it; or otherwise stay and wait till the Prince appoint him?  
Every one perhaps (at least the greatest part) will think it better, he should be required: First, because it is a sign of less ambition. Secondly, because when a Prince, of himself puts a servant in any employment, he is bound to defend him in it; if in any thing he should err. Thirdly, by the example of Moses, who when God said, he would make him Leader of his people; not only he stayed to be required, but he also refused it: And in truth I was once of opinion, that from hence might be gathered the reason why Esay (not being required) offered himself; and Moses being required, refused; and it is, because Esay knew he went in an employment of danger, and Moses in an employment of honour: whereupon it seems that we also, in some o●…casions should stay to be required, and in some other offer our service.  
Yet notwithstanding all these reasons, I should always hold the contrary: and for the first reason, that it is less ambition; I know not what ambition can be greater, then to desire an honour, to deserve it, and yet look to be required.  
As for the second reason, which is, That the Prince is bound to defend him, if he commit any errou●…: I am easily able to prove the contrary, both by reason and example. Saul the son of Cis sought not after the Kingdom of Israel, but sought after his Father's Asses; and meeting with Samuel, who had much talk with him about the Kingdom, he showed himself wholly averse from it: and if it had not been that God commanded him expressly by the mouth of Samuel, he would never have suffered himself to be anointed King. Moses also in like manner feeding his sheep, without the least thought of governing the Israelites: when God commanded him to undertake it, yet with great importunity he opposed it. So likewise Eli the Priest, not only sought not to be judge over the people, and the Priesthood, but was indeed not capable in regard of his Family: whereupon after some repulse he accepted it. Yet neither Saul, nor Moses, nor Eli, were the more excused of God, for having offices put upon them without their own seeking: but the first committing a notable error, after the victory of Achab, was by our Lord God (by the mouth of Samuel) deprived of his Kingdom, which was transferred upon David; and finally brought to a miserable end. And Moses, when water failed, had condign punishment, being denied to gather the fruit, which in so many years, and with so much sweat and labour he had sowed. And lastly Eli, for too much bearing with the faults of his Sons, was by our Lord God severely indeed, but yet justly punished.  
These men therefore if they err, not only will not be excused, but will perhaps become more odious to the Prince, and be more severely punished for their doings. Whereupon our Lord God, (as Origen observes) when Saul left to govern after his Commandments, denied that he had made him King; and therefore he saith in Osea, Ipsi regnaverunt, sed non ex me; Principes extiterunt, & non cognoul. The reason is, because they who are thus chosen, not only err in prejudice of themselves and their office, but in prejudice also of the Prince's discretion; who shows little judgement to make choice of a person that is not fit for the charge: and so, he that should be a Protector to defend the error of another, shall need a protection himself for his own error. So as the Prince will have no place to say, that his Servant erred through ignorance, because by saying so, he should presently show himself of little judgement, to employ a man whom he did not know; and therefore the Servant must needs show he hath committed errors of malice, and consequently to have done the Prince dishonour; at which the Prince must needs take greater indignation: and all these things being not found in him, that hath an Honour, or Office, upon his own requiring it, makes him more easily excused by the Prince, who errs in an employment himself hath sought for, than him, who of the Princes own motion is elected; and is therefore more obliged to demean himself well in it.  
Concerning the third reason brought of Moses, I say that we are not in his case; seeing Moses refused the Dignity, not only because it was a place of Honour; but because, and the more, because he thought himself not fit for it: and this is not that we speak of, presupposing a fitness always. That he knew himself not to be fit is apparent; where he saith, Quis sum ego ut vadam ad Pharaonem, & educam filios Israel de Aegypto? as though he should say, I am a worm, unfit for so great a dignity, which afterwards he shows again in Exodus; where answering God, he saith, Obsecro Domine, Non sum Eloquens: as though he would say, this is an employment that requires an Eloquent man; and as for me I can scarce speak: whereby it manifestly appears, that Moses refused it not for the greatness only of the dignity, which certainly he esteemed highly; seeing in those words, 〈◊〉 quem missurus es, he shows it was an office fit for the Messias; but for this rather he refused it, because he knew himself unworthy, and not proportioned for such a place.  
Whereupon, the reason why Esay offered himself without being required; and Moses being required, excused himself, and jeremy would not have preached to the Hebrews, in my opinion is this; because Esay could not say, he was unfit; seeing, although at the first, till an Angel had purged him with a coal, he stood mute, bewailing his inability to speak; Vae mihi quia tacui, quia vir pollutis labiis ego sum: yet after he heard the Angel say, Et auferetur iniquitas tua, & peccatum 〈◊〉 mundabitur; as thinking himself now fit for any employment whatsoever, since he had his lips touched with a coal: that is, since he had God in his mouth, he made no stay, but offered himself presently. And Moses also, after he heard he should have this coal in his mouth, Et ero in ore tuo, he never offered to make any reply to God. So jeremy at the first said, A, A, A, Domine Deus; Ecce nescio loqui, quia puer ego sum; but when he heard God say, Ne timeas à facie eorum, quia tecum ego sum, ut eruam te, dicit Dominus. Et mifit Dominus manum suam, & tetigit os meum, & dixit ad me; Ecce dedi verba mea in ore tuo: he also finding that coal in his mouth, prepared himself to perform the employment which was commanded him. And now I conceive the reasons alleged to the contrary, are sufficiently answered; whereby it is manifest, that it is better to seek a dignity not deserving it, then deserving it to despise it: And again, that it is better, when one deserves it, and despiseth it not, to offer himself, then to have it put upon him.   

Nihil in vulgo modicum, terrere ni paveant, Vbi pertimuerint, impune contemni.  
That it is eafier to pass from one extreme to another, then from an extreme to the middle. The two and fortieth Discourse.  
SEeing Virtue is situate and consists in the midst, no marvel if the ignorant multitude, leaving one extreme, instead of coming to the middle, go to the other extreme: whereupon Averro said exceeding well, that a Coward becomes sooner bold, then valiant; Facili●… est à superabundantia ad defectum venire; & ab hoc ad iilam, quam ad medium. And a little after, Timidus enim facilius aliquid audax operabitur, quam forte. It is therefore no marvel, if the people pass from Timidity to Boldness; seeing it passeth also from base servitude to proud domination: Aut servit humiliter, (saith Livy) aut superbo dominatur; Libertatem quae media est, neque spernere satis, neque habere sciunt. It may be said by some, that I contradict myself; having said in another discourse, that it is a most difficult thing to go from one extreme to another, without passing by the middle first. And besides, a Text in Aristotle may be brought for it; where he saith, Medium est in quod continue mutans prius devenit quam in ultimum: For answer whereunto, we must know that there are two middles; one which is Secundum Mutationem; (give me leave to use these terms) and in this, it is more easy to go from one extreme to the middle, then from one extreme to another: and this is that which Aristotle means in his Physics, and I in my other Discourse. The second middle is called Per Abnegationem, and it is the middle, which is between Excess and Defect; and in this, it is more easy to pass from one extreme to the other, then from one extreme to the middle: and this is the midst, I mean in this Discourse.   

Faustis in Germanicum ominibus, & si vellet imperium promptos ostentavere.  
That Germanicus could not carry himself in such sort, as to keep Tiberius from suspecting him; and that he refused the Empire for fear of death, and not out of goodness. The three and fortieth Discourse.  
GErmanicus being invited by the Legions in Germany, while they were in mutiny, to take upon him the Empire; not only was displeased with it, but in great choler refused it; by occasion whereof, I conceive it fit to examine, whether this act of Germanicus were done out of goodness, or out of fear.  
All Authors for the most part are of this opinion; that he refused the Empire, as one that was most free from any such ambition; seeing, having the love of the people, as by a thousand Demonstrations was apparent; and withal an Army in his hand: It seemed an easy matter for him to have made himself Emperor, if he had affected it; and in truth, he showed partly his good intention, seeing, when it was offered him by the Army, he not only came down from the Tribunal in a great chafe, but also fell presently into praises of Tiberius: Tunc à veneratione Tiberii orsus, flexit ad victorias triumphosque Tiberii, praecipuis laudibus celebrans, quae apud Germanias illis cum legionibus pulcherrima feeisset. An excellent course in truth, and used also by Saint Paul, and Saint Barnabas, who having done a miracle in Lystra; and seeing the people ready to offer sacrifices to them, as to jupiter and Mercury; Vbi audierunt (as is written in the Acts) Apostoli Barnabas & Paulus, conscissis tunicis suis, exilierunt in turbas clamantes & dicentes: Viri quid haec facitis? & nos mortales sumus, similes vobis: and then fell presently to preach Christ jesus.  
Yet looking a little narrower into this Fact of Germanicus; I am of opinion, he did it more for fear, than love; there being no doubt, but that men, although assured of succeeding in an Empire, yet to make that present which is future, they will not stick to hazard their very lives; a small present pleasure, being always a stronger motive, than a much greater that is future: And the reason is, because the will which hath good for its object, in such manner, as the external senses have theirs, is not moved with any, but that which is present. But it may be said unto me, that the future also may be present, In esse cognito, & objectivo; to which I answer, that this Abstractive presence hath not the like force as the Intuitive hath; seeing the Intuitive even in future things is much more perfect than the Abstractive is; whereupon those Divines who hold, that future things are not present with God, but only In esse cognito; affirm, that the having them in esse cognito, is as much with him, as for us to have them present; and therefore this knowledge in God they call intuitive, grounding it upon a doctrine of Aristotle, in his Books De Anima; where he saith, if the Species of things could be conserved in such manner as they are, our sight would never be altered, although an object far off were made to be present. Indeed, that which is good, or true, or appearing so, and is present, doth so much the more forcibly move, then that which is future; that many men for things present, which are not truly good, but only in appearance, lose the eternal good of the beatifical vision. So as it is no marvel, if many men, though in other things wise, have been content with a doubtful end to prevent a secure succession; as Absalon, and infinite others, of whom Histories are full. Whereupon I cannot choose but think, that if Germanicus could have come securely to be Emperor, he would never have been so angry at the Soldier's invitation: but because he knew it was not without infinite difficulty to be effected, he therefore showed himself averse from harkening to it. And it avails not to say, he had the Army of Germany in his power; seeing there wanted not Legions and Armies in Hungary, in Sclavonia, and other places, that would have stood for Tiberius; and this no man knew better than Germanicus, as appears; where speaking to the mutinous Army, he said, Non mihi uxor aut filius Patre & Republica cariores; sed illum quidem sua Majestas, Imperium Romanum caeteri exercitus defendant. And of as little force is the second reason, for his being beloved of the people; seeing when there are Soldiers in a City, the people are able to do little: as it happened to the people of Tarentum, who favoured the Carthagenians; to the people of Vicenza, who favoured the Venetians; to the people of Milan, who favoured Francisco Sforza; and whereof there may be found a thousand Examples.  
Many other difficulties Germanicus should have met with; and this amongst others is not of least moment, that Augustus Caesar had declared Tiberius to be his Successor; in which consideration, Bathsheba used means that David should declare Solomon for his Successor; knowing, that whomsoever he should name, though he were not the eldest, yet should be accepted. Verumtamen Domine mi Rex, in te oculi respiciunt totius Israel, ut ni dices eis quis sedere debeat in solio tuo post te. Which words Hugo Carenfis thus expounds; Ille quem volueris regnabit post te, & hunc quafi Regem sequetur populus, & non alium. Besides, Tiberius had gotten the hearts of the Praetorian Soldiers; and to make a Prince be accepted, it is a matter of great importance to come accompanied with the guard of the deceased King: and therefore the Holy Scripture in the Book of Kings, reckoning those up who went with Solomon, makes mention of the Captain of the Guard with his Soldiers. D●…scendit Sadoc Sacerdos, & Nathan Propheta, & Banaias filius jehojadae, & Cerethi, & Pheleti: Whereupon David said a little before, to Sadoc and Banaia, sending them to Solomon; Tollite vobiscum servos Domini vestri; meaning they should take with them the Soldiers of his Guard. To all these difficulties may be added the knowledge Germanicus had of Tiberius; to be a man of excellent virtue, and of singular wisdom; Maturum annis, spectatum bello; which things all together, made the difficulty so great, that I cannot choose but believe, Germanicus refused the Empire, as Claudius Pompeianus did, when it was offered him; Sed ille recusavit, quia Imperatorem Pertinacem videbat. So Scipio the Carthaginian, when he was proclaimed King by the Army of Spain, would not accept it; Quia Rome intolerabile nomen Regium erat. It is therefore no marvel, that Germanicus entered into choler upon it; seeing to ascend to the Empire, is a thing that requires two extremes; either to show himself desirous, and at the same time to be near at hand for procuring it; or else, to show himself wholly averse from it, not only in effects, but in desire; because they who stand far off in effects, and near hand with desire; easily in a little time come to ruin. Esse privatis cogitationibus progressum, (saith Tacitus) & prout velint plus minusve, sumi ex fortuna imperium cupientibus nihil medium inter summa aut praecipitia. Christ our Saviour was as far from desiring to be a worldly King, as could be; and therefore being called to be a King by the people, he presently got himself far off from the multitude, because his hour being not yet come, in which he meant to expose himself to die; he knew it stood him upon, to avoid such appearance: and more (as Robert Abbat observes) our Lord Christ never spoke of his being a King, till the time of his Passion; knowing that the very name of a King carries death with it. If Germanicus had done thus, after he had quieted the mutinies of the Army; had returned to Rome, and had left the Legions behind, that had called him Emperor, he had then freed Tiberius from suspicion; who understanding the inclination of the Army, could not choose but be in continual fear, lest the Empire should be taken from him: Whereupon, knowing the danger he stood in, he was not willing that Germanicus should conquer Germany; lest having once made himself Lord of that Country, he should do as Caesar did, having conquered France. Seeing victorious Armies are formidable and invincible things, and in this case the more; Germanicus being much more like to Caesar, then to Cato; the one, (as Sallust saith) aspiring to the Empire; the other, desirous to preserve the Commonwealth: between themselves, both like and unlike; like in Age, in Eloquence, in nobleness of mind; and finally in glory: but unlike in this, that Caesar made himself famous by his services and courtesies; Cato by sincerity and holiness of life: Caesar got him a name, with being gentle and merciful; Cato by being severe and stern. He by giving, by helping, by pardoning, came to be famous: This by finding fault with Donatives, and by not pardoning any, nor so much as himself, came to be adored: Cato was the scourge of the wicked; and Caesar, the refuge. Caesar was commended for affability, and Cato for constancy; and because Caesar aspired to the Empire, and Cato was always a good Citizen; we may therefore say, that the manners of Cato ought to be imitated of those that are not ambitious; and the manners of Caesar, of those that are: and therefore seeing Germanicus (as may be gathered by his life) had all those manners and fashions of Caesar; I cannot but conclude, but that his ambition was to aspire to the Empire. So as indeed, he was not well advised to take such courses, and give Donatives to the Soldiers; Quibus nisi ab Imperatore, neque praemia accipere par esset, as Tacitus in the second of his Annals saith: where we may see, that Tiberius knew well of what great importance Donatives are to corrupt the Soldiers. Secondly, Germanicus was not well advised, to procure the applause of the Legions, with such artifice as he did; and then manage it only with courtesy and love, which perhaps I should not blame, if he had been Lord of Rome: but seeing not only he was not Lord, but was suspected of him that was Lord; he should not have used the Soldiers with such plausibleness as he did. And it avails not to say, that if he would do any good in Germany, it behoved him to procure the love of the Army, seeing he might have done as much good with fear, as he did with love; and never have put the Prince into jealousy: and Generals in war proceed and prosper, as well with the one as the other. Scipio Africanus prospered with love, and Hannibal with fear. The course of Scipio will always do well, where the Commander is Prince; at least, if he can avoid contempt; a companion oftentimes of mildness: and indeed, Scipio by his mildness fell so far in contempt, that if at last he had not turned his course to a way of fear, he had been in danger to be utterly undone.  
I have the more willingly used the example of Scipio in this case, because indeed in many things he was most like Germanicus: As Scipio was sent into afric, where his father had managed the war before; so Germanicus was sent into Germany, and might follow the steps of his father Drusus, who had been there before. Scipio was a young man of most goodly presence, and Germanicus a young man of most beautiful aspect. The one, and the other, of most pleasing carriage towards confederates; towards friends & enemies. Against Germanicus the Legions in Germany rebelled, upon the death of Augustus; against Scipio the Armies in Spain rebelled, upon the false report of his death: both of them took the same course for reducing the Armies to obedience, and both of them were blamed for it: Germanicus by Tiberius, as a corrupter of the Army; Scipio by Fabius Maximus, for the like; Natum eum ad corrumpendam Disciplinam arguere; sic in Hispania plus propter seditionem militum quam bellum amissum. Each of them was more able to commit no errors themselves, then to correct the errors committed by others. Both of them victorious in battles; and as Scipio at last made the Senate suspect he meant to make himself Lord of Rome; so Germanicus made Tiberius suspect he meant to make himself Emperor of Rome. To Scipio the Army offered the Empire, and he refused it; to Germanicus also the Army offered it, and he with great indignation likewise refused it. Scipio after all his victories died in exile, through the ungratefulness of the Senate; and Germanicus died out of Rome, through the ungratefulness and practices of Tiberius. To the one and the other was sent a Successor, to the end they should not finish the war: and if Germanicus were in this not well advised, as I have showed before; and perhaps had a meaning to make himself Prince; certainly Scipio was not much better advised; of whom that Tribune in Livy saith, Dictatorem 〈◊〉 consuli non legatum in Provincia fuisse, neque ob aliam rem eo profectum, quam ut id quod Hispaniae, Galliae, Siciliae, Africa jampridem persuasum esset hoc Graeciae, Asiaeque; & omnibus ad Orientem versis regibus gentibusque appareret; unum hominem caput columenque Imperii Romani esse. These are not ways for men to use, that have no other end then to be good Citizens; rather, their courteous carriage towards the Soldiers, was done with a mind to make use of them in the City; as Livy in another place shows: Scipionum nomini auspiciisque omnes assuetos quos secum in patriam ad meritum triumphum deducere velitis, quos consulatum petenti, velut si omnium communis agatur honos, ad futuros speret. It is therefore no marvel to see so great likeness between these two Captains, seeing Germanicus took Scipio for his example to imitate; as may be seen in the voyage he made in Egypt: Sine milite incedere, pedibus intectis, & pari cum Graecis amictu; Publii Scipionis 〈◊〉, quem eadem factitavisse apud Siciliam, quamvis flagrante adhuc Poenorum bello, accepimus. Yet in matter of fortune they were something unlike; for Scipio was able to settle, and I may say to finish his victory, which Germanicus was not suffered to do: but if the war which the Romans had with the Carthagenians, had been Ob amissum cum Quintilio Varo exercitum, potius quam cupidine proferendi Imperii; as that of Germanicus was; I make no doubt but Scipio would have been as little suffered to finish the war, as Germanicus was. Now if we ask which of them deserved most praise, and was most worthy of commendation; I account Germanicus so much worthy of more, as he was able in so great virtues to be like Scipio, in a time so unlike; and under a Tyrant Prince: and though by a little unadvisedness he fell to be suspected of Tiberius, yet he is more to be excused then Scipio was; seeing a Tyrant Prince is sooner put into suspicion, than a well-governed Commonwealth. And therefore Corbulo (as Tacitus relates) being hindered by a Letter from Claudius, for going forward with his enterprise; called the ancient Roman Captains happy: Jam Castra in hostili solo molienti Corbuloni hae litterae redduntur; ille re subita, quamquam multa simul offunderentur, metus ex Imperatore; contemptio ex Barbaris; ludibrium apud socios; 〈◊〉 aliud prolocutus, quam beatos quondam Deuces Romanos.   

Periculosa severitas, flagitiosa largitio: seu nihil militi; seu omnia concedentur, in ancipiti Republica.  
That it is a hard matter to settle the Insurrection of an Army. The four and fortieth Discourse.  
BEing a little after to examine the ways, how to settle and compose the Insurrection of an Army; I will in this place, by occasion of this Text, only say, That to grant them all their demands, is dangerous; because they will make it but a step to make greater demands. The janissaries made an Insurrection against Amurath the Great Turk, demanding the head of Ebraim Beglerbey of 〈◊〉; and the Great Turk's entirest friend: and when Amurath gave consent to their demand, they then fell to demand a thousand other extravagant things; and put the Great Turk into no small danger. On the other part, to grant them nothing they demand is as bad: as that, which exasperates them in such a degree, that they can hardly be ever pacified after; as in the case of Galba was seen. All this we have now said, is expressed in Polybius, by a most excellent similitude; whose words as most worthy to be read, I have thought good to set down at large, as they are translated into Latin, Si quis haec recte intueatur (he speaks of the 〈◊〉 Army being in mutiny) non dubitet affirmara 〈◊〉 modo corpora hominum, & quaedam in illis ulcera, ita 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ut sanari nullo modo possint, sed id longe magis humanis animis accidere; ut enim in ulceribus evenit, ut si illis medicamentum curandi gratia adhibeas, ulcus ipsum vi medicaminis augescit, si vero curam ejus negligas, long sua ipsius natura extenditur, neque prius definite, quam omne subjectum corpus corruptum labefactumque 〈◊〉; ita animis quoque consimiles interdum morbi ac tabes accidunt, ut nullum ex reliquis ani●…libus homine 〈◊〉 atque efferacius fiat, cui si interdum veniam aut impunitatem aliquam concesseris, aut aliter benignitate cum prosecutus fueris, id omne dolum fraudemque existimans, deterior 〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉 beneficum long magis infidus; 〈◊〉 vero te contra opposueris, nihil est adeo durum, crudele, nefarium, quod non facile aggrediatur, laudem 〈◊〉 temeritatem temeritatem existimans, donec ad extremum omnino, efferatus animus humanam naturam exuat.   

Eo in metu arguere Germanicum omnes; quod non ad superiorem exercitum pergeret; ubi obsequia, & contra rebelles auxilium, satis superque missione & pecunia & mollibus consultis peccatum; vel si vilis ipsi salus, cur filium parvulum, cur gravidam conjugem inter furentes, & omnis humani juris violatores haberet? Illos saltem uno & Reipublicae redderet.  
In what kind of affairs, it is fit to carry their Wives with them. The five and fortieth Discourse.  
UPon this passage, there are two Discourses seem to offer themselves: The first, whether it be fit for Governors to carry their Wives with them, and consequently whether Germanicus did well, to have his Wife and Children in the Army. The second, how insurrections of Armies may be quieted.  
Beginning with the first, I say, that Officers may be sent by the Prince, in three kinds of employment: in governments, in war, or in Embassages. If they go to be Governors, it is then a fair course, and far from being dangerous, as was agreed upon in the Senate, in favour of Valerius Messalina against Caecina, that they might take their Wives with them: Neque enim ut olim obsideriurbem bellis, aut Provincias hostiles esse. But yet in my opinion, it is fit in this matter to proceed with distinction, because if we speak simpliciter, I should think it better, they should not lead their Wives with them, as those who for the most part can do little good, by reason of their unskilfulness in affairs, and may do much hurt by reason of their avarice and pride; whereupon as Caecina well said, there seldom came any appeals against the Governors of Provinces, for oppressing the people, but they were more against the Women than the men, Cogitarent ipsi quoties repetundarum aliqui arguerentur, plura uxoribus objectari. To this may be added, that by reason of their weakness, they give ear to the most wicked of the Province, they keep a Court of themselves, give audience, divide Tribunals, and cause a thousand other errors, which by the foresaid Caecina are well expressed, His statim adhaerescere deterrimum quemque Provincialium, ab his negotia suscipi, transigi, duorum egressus coli, duo esse Praetoria, and that which follows: whereupon I have reason to believe, that the ancient Romans made the Laws, that it should not be lawful for Governors of Provinces, to carry their Wives with them, not so much for the danger they incurred, by being in Countries of little safety, as least the people newly come under the Roman Empire, should through the avarice and pride of the Women be provoked to rebel. The reason that Valerius brings to beat down that of Caecina, is this, that to charge Women for doing ill Offices in a Province, is but a weak argument, seeing it is their Husband's fault, who allow their Wives to take more upon them than is fit: Frustra nostram igna●…iam alia ad vocabula transferri, nam viri in eo culpam, si foemina modum excedat: and therefore Sara in the holy Scripture knowing this, when Agar contested against her with proud terms, she complained not of her, but of Abraham, as knowing it to be the men's fault, if their Wives grow insolent. This reason makes a fair show, but it cleareth not the difficulty, seeing it makes no matter, when a Province is ill governed, whether it be long of the Man, or of the Woman, so long as it is done; whereupon I should think it better, to provide for things before they be done, according to the advice of Agricola, who Officiis & administrationibus potius non peccaturos, quam damnare cum peccassent: then to watch with danger when they shall be done; and consequently, if it may be, to leave their Wives at home: and the rather, seeing Princes commonly send persons of age to be Governors, and consequently easy to be led by their Wives, as in another Discourse is showed: yet it is true, as I said before, that I would make an Exception to this Rule, when Women are judicious and very wise, for then no doubt, they may be of great assistance in the Government. The other reason which Valerius brings, that Wives are a recreation to their Husbands, and make them the better able to bear the labours of their Government, is a mere mockery, seeing men that take upon them such charges, should have no thought but of the Prince's service, nor take pleasure in any thing but in discharging their places.  
But be it as it will, it imports us little for the present: this at least is clear, that in employments of war, it is never fit to carry their Wives with them, and therefore the Romans (as Caecina reports) would have them when they went into foreign Countries, where there was danger of war, to go always without their Wives, Haud enim frustra placitum olim, ne foeminae in socios, aut gentes externas traherentur, inesse mulierum comitatui quae pacem luxu, bellum formidine morentur: Therefore as Aristotle saith well, speaking against Plato, Women in the wars are good for nothing but to be a let, and reckoned inter impedimenta, which is then the more to be observed, when they go with an Army that may be likely to mutiny, and therefore when the Army of Germany fell to mutiny, Germanicus at last perceived what a mischief it was, to have Women amongst seditions: and who knows but he forbore to use discipline and force against them, only for the women's sake? We may then conclude, it was not well done of him, to carry his Wife with him in the Army. Our Lord God, Maker and Governor of all things, knew the Israelites would rebel against Moses, whereupon having made him his Captain General; and he upon the way with his Wife Sephora, God met him, and threatened to kill him. Cumque esset in itinere, in diversorio occurrit Dominus, & volebat occidere eum: which Saint Austin interprets thus, that God made this show, because Moses led his Wife with him, as not being convenient, when a man goes about great affairs, he should be troubled with Women, and therefore he saith, Forsitan in hoc loco possum intelligere quod displicuerit Deo, quare Moses tanta mirabilia fact●…rus, uxoris impedimentum secum ducere vellet in Aegyptum.  
But if now he go upon Embassage, then if the Women be but mean of understanding, let them never be carried, as those that may do much hurt; but if they be discreet and wise, it will do well to take them along, as those that may do much good, because one of the chief things an Ambassador is to look to, is to understand and find out secrets, and none fitter to find them out than discreet Women, seeing oftentimes, either Senators in Commonwealths, or Princes in their Kingdoms, or their Officers and Secretaries, discover unadvisedly to their Wives many secrets of State, which they afterward being in company with Ambassadors Wives, (to show their intolligence in great matters) easily blab out again, and are apt to reveal, and in this manner in some Courts of Italy, matters of great consequence have been bolted out by some discreet Ambassadors. And how came Tiberius to know that Augustus went to visit Agrippa Posthumus in the Island of Pianosa, but by this means? For Augustus having Fabius Maximus in his company, he unadvisedly told it to his Wife Martia, and Martia as unadvisedly told it to Livia, and Livia to Tiberius, which was the cause of Fabius his death, and as it is thought of Augustus his too. Quip rumour incesserat, paucos ante menses, Augustum electis consciis, & comite uno Fabio Maximo Planafiam vectum, ad visendum Agrippam, multas 〈◊〉 utrinque lachrymas, & figna cha●…itatis, spemque ex eo fore, ut juyenis penatibus uvi redder etur. Quod Maximum uxori Martiae aperuisse, illam Liviae, C. Navum id. Caesari.  
We may then conclude, that men's secrets come easily to be known by the means of Women, and therefore Tyrants (as Aristotle saith) allow oftentimes great Authority to Women, to the end, they may reveal their Husband's secrets.   

Satis superque missione & pecunia & mollibus consultis peccatum.  
Whether Germanicus did well to grant so many things to the Army being in mutiny, what other course he might have taken; lastly, that in diverfity of times, and upon diverfity of occafions divers courses are to be taken. The six and fortieth 〈◊〉.  
Germanicus returning from collecting the taxes, found the Legions in mutiny, demanding that the veteran soldiers might have leave to go home, and to have their pay increased, and also to have the Legacy left them by Augustus, and he to quiet them, yielded to many of their demands, for which he was by many much blamed, as in the words here alleged appears. By occasion whereof, we purpose to examine what courses are fit to be taken, when Armies are in Rebellion.  
I say then, that all mutinies and insurrections require not one kind of Remedy, but according to the divers times in which they happen, to the divers occasions upon which they happen, and lastly, to the di vers Captains under whom they happen, a divers remedy is to be applied. For if the General be a man of whom the Army stands in awe, he may expose himself to any danger without any danger, and have all things succeed well. The Macedonians in Afia, being quite tired with the War, and far from their Coun●…ry, fell to mutiny under Alexander Magnus, standing upon the like terms as they in Germany did, where Cicatrices ex vulneribus, verberum notas exprobrant, so here, Omnes fimul missionem postulare coeperunt, deformia or a cicatricibus, canitiemque capitum ostentantes: whereupon Alexander calling the soldiers together, to hear him speak, no sooner ended his speech, but he thrust into the midst of those infuriated beasts: and caused the most insolent of them to be taken, and not a man of them durst offer to make resistance, Defiluit deinde (saith Quintus Curtius) frendens de Tribunali, & in medium armatorum agmen se immifit, notatos quoque qui ferocissime oblocuti erant, fingulos manu corripuit, nec ausos repugnare, tredecim asservandos custodibus corporis tradidit, quis crederet saevam paulo ante concionem obtorpuisse subito metu? & cum ad supplicium videret trahi, nihil ausos graviora quam caeteros. And thus this brave Resolution in a General of whom they stood in fear, sufficed to pacify this great insurrection. But if a Captain be only loved and not feared, let him never put himself upon such adventure, or think in such sort to cement the matter, for it will undoubtedly be his death; whereupon we see that Germanicus though he exposed himself to no danger, yet was not far from losing his life, as by reading Tacitus we may perceive. And the reason of this difference is, because as Choler overcomes Love, so Fear overcomes Choler, which (as Aristotle saith) being with hope of Revenge, as far as is possible, that Hope is taken away by Fear; and in the place of it enters Sorrow, as Avicen excellently shows in his Book De Anima. And for this cause also it happens, that more Armies mutiny under Captains that are loved, than under Captains that are feared, as was seen in the Army of Alexander the Great, and in that of Annibal, Captains that were feared, the contrary in the Army of 〈◊〉, and in that of Scipio, Captains that were loved.  
It is very clear, that Germanicus was never able to take any of these violent Resolutions, yet I commend not the course he took to pacify the mutiny of his Army, by yielding to them in so many things, because being suspected of the Prince, any course had been fitter for him than this, by which he corrupted military discipline, and by giving of his own, he as it were bought the Army, and therefore where Tiberius heard, in what manner he had pacified them, it troubled him not a little; Nuntiata ea, Tiberium laetitia curaque adfecere, gaudebat oppressam seditionem, sed quod largiendis pecuniis & missione festinata, favorem militum quaesivisset, bellica quoque gloria Germanici augebatur. And so much more as there wanted not other ways to have appeased the sedition, and the first way for him being so well beloved, had been that which in matters of love is of such force, and that is, by making them jealous he would leave them, and go to some other Army, showing how little he regarded this mutinous Army; and in truth, if any notice might have been taken of such conditional propositions, I verily think, the sedition by itself only would have been appeas●…d; and there are two things that move me to think so; One, the Example of Alexander the Great, who in a mutiny making show as though he regarded not his Macedon soldiers, by taking Persians for the Guard of his Body, and doing them other Honours, all the Macedonians prostrated themselves, and in most humble manner sued unto him, whereof Quintus Curtius saith, Postquam vero cognitum est, Perses ducatus datos, barbaros in varios ordines distributos, atque Macedonica iis imposita nomina, se vero ignominiose penitus rejectos esse, non jam amplius conceptum animis dolorem perferre potuerunt, sed concursu in Regiam facto, interiori duntaxat retenta tunica, arma ante januam, poenitentiae signum projecerunt, ac prae foribus stantes, intromitti se, sibique ignosci suppliciter atque flentes orabant, utque Rex suppliciis suis potius saturet se, quam contumeliis, ipsos nisi venia impetrata, non discessuros. See here the fruit of jealousy. The second thing that makes me believe, this way would have succeeded well with Germanicus, is the Example we have, in the very mutiny itself of the same Army, wherein when the granting them so many things, would not yet pacify the sedition, than Germanicus (not to this end, but to set them out of danger) was sending away his Wife and Children, to be out of the reach of this tumultuous Army, which the soldiers perceiving, and thereupon growing jealous that any other strange people should keep their Captain's Wife safer than Roman Legions; to the end, he should not send her away, they presently grew quiet, Sed nihil aequè flexit (saith Tacitus) quam invidia in Treveros; orant, obsistunt, rediret, maneret; pars Agrippinae occursantes, plurimi ad Germanicum regressi. And if the departing of his Wife only could prevail so much, what jealousy would they have had at the departing of their beloved Captain? certainly, without making them any other promises, this alone would have pacified the sedition: and in case this jealousy alone had not been sufficient, he might then have gone to the other Army, and sent messengers to let them know, that if they delivered not up into his hands the heads of the Rebellion, he would come and cut them in pieces good and bad, a thing which without doubt would have done much good, as was seen, when at last he was forced to use such terms with his soldiers under Caeciva, At Germanicus quanquam contracto exercitu, & parata in defectores ultione, dandum adhuc spatium ratus, si recenti exemplo 〈◊〉 ipsi consulerent, praemittit literas ad Caecinam, venire se valida manu, ac ni supplicium in malos praesumant, usurum promiscua caede. This once heard by the soldiers, they presently cut them all in pieces that were guilty of the mutiny: and if this way yet would not have been sufficient, seeing this tumult was grown out of idleness, and he was not willing to use violence, he might have taken the other Army, and put himself in the way to go against the Enemy; this course Caesar took, who when the Army in France rebelled, he took one Legion which he specially favoured with him, and gave leave to the mutinous Legions to go home to Rome, which once seen, there was not a soldier that left not presently his mutinying & followed him: a most easy way, for if any thing hinder an Army that is in mutiny (I mean not out of hatred) from pacifying and appeasing, it is a fear they have to be punished, which fear ceaseth as soon as they are taken to go against the Enemy, every one hoping by some notable deed to cancel the blot of their Rebellion, and therefore as soon as those first Legions were quieted, they presently demanded to be led against the Enemy: Puniret noxios, ignosceret lapsis, & duceret in hostem. Whereupon we see that after such mutinies, Armies commonly show more valour than at any time before, as Livy shows in a thousand places; and this Germanicus knew full well, who after the slaughter the soldiers of Caecina had committed, led them presently out against the Enemy. Truces etiam tum animos cupido involat ●…undi in hostem, piaculum furoris, nec aliter posse placari Commilitonum manes, quasi si pectoribus impiis honesta vulnera accepissent; sequitur ardorem militum Caesar. And further, if Germanicus were not willing to depart from the Army, being in mutiny; yet the mutiny, having been caused by a sudden motion, he needed not have been so hasty, to seek the appeasing of so new a mutiny, but might have given the Soldier's deliberation; and then reason taking place, he might without doubt have quieted them at his pleasure. Our Lord Christ in a parable, would not have the tares to be rooted out with the corn, as long as it was in blade and green; but appointed to stay, till they were dry; and then dividing them, cast the tares into the fire: so should he do with Armies that are in mutiny, that seeks to preserve them, and not to destroy them all.  
He had another excellent way, and most worthy for a General to follow; and it was, to threaten, that whosoever did not follow him, should be counted a Rebel; and as a Rebel, should be proceeded against; a way of exceeding great force, and especially in tumults, where there is not a head; and where they are all equally stub borne, and every one fears for himself, as was seen in Saul; who being declared King, was yet not followed, but only of some few; whereupon, an occasion falling out for relieving the City of Jah, to the end the whole Army should follow him, he caused two Oxen to be cut in pieces, and be spread about all the borders of Israel; threatening, that whosoever did not follow him, should have all his herds of cattle cut in pieces, as those Oxen were: Quicunque non exierit, & secutus fuerit Saul, & Samuel; sic fiet bobus ejus: and where the Israelites before would not all follow him, now out of fear of the particular punishment, there was not a man that did not follow him. Invasit ergo (it follows in the holy Text) Timor Domini populum, & egressi sunt quas●… vir unus. Now that it had been easy for Germanicus, by taking this course, to have quieted the tumult, is very evident; seeing Menius, only by this course, brought one of those Legions to return back into their Quarters; where finding a particular punishment was designed, where before they had a purpose to kill him; now every one readily was content to follow him: Raptum vexillum ad ripam, & fi quis agmine discessit pro desertore fore, clamitans, reduxit in Hyberna turbidos; & nihil ausos.  
Germanicus also might have used another excellent way; and it is, he should have caused some trusty Centurion or Soldier, to declare to this mutinous multitude, the danger into which they were fallen, and the error they had committed; for such people commonly give credit to men of such rank, as was seen in julius Arufpex; who showing to the people of Germany the danger they should incur, by rebelling against the Romans; he easily quieted them, though he had julius Valentinus that opposed him. At julius Aruspex 〈◊〉 primoribus Remorum vim Romanam pacisque bona dissertans; & sumi bellum etiam ab ignavis, strenuissimi cujusque periculo geri; jamque super caput Legiones, sapientissimum quemque reverentia, fideque; juniores periculo ac metu continuit, & Valentini animum laudabant, confilium 〈◊〉 sequebantur. So Cerealis also speaking to the Treviri after that manner, appeased them; as by the process of that Oration he makes in Tacitus, may be seen. The very same manner Drusus used with the Legions of Illyricum; employing one Clement a Centurion, in grace with the Soldiers, for his means to pacify that sedition. Accitur Centurio Clemens, & 〈◊〉 qui alii bonis artibus grati in vulgus; in Vigiliis, stationibus; custodiis portarum se inserunt; spem offerunt; metum intendunt. And that this way would have been available also to Germanicus, is evident; seeing Caecina making use hereof, with two of those Legions; he so wrought them, that they spared not to punish the chief of the sedition.  
Another way also he might have used; and that was, to have pretended himself their Captain in the Sedition: or if not himself, (which in many respects was not fit for Germanicus) at least, to have caused some other principal man to feign himself to be of their opinion; and all other remedies failing, I suppose this might have stood Germanicus in great stead; because men commonly give great credit to their counsels, who are interessed in the matter, as believing they speak sincerely. For this cause, David caused his trusty friend Chusci the Arachite, to feign himself of Absaloms' side; to the end he might hinder the counsel of Achitophel, and it happily succeeded. So Gamaliel standing amongst the Priests, was a means to save Peter's life. Spurinna being in Placentia, for defence of that City; and seeing the Soldiers bend to fight with the Vitellians, who far exceeded them in number, and in all advantages; 〈◊〉 himself to be of their opinion: seeing them in such a tumult, and thereupon leading them forth, he easily made them see their error, and perceive the danger; and showing them good reasons, he reduced them to obedience. Fit 〈◊〉 alienae comes Spurinna; primo coactus, mox velle 〈◊〉, quo 〈◊〉 authoritatis inesset confiliis, si seditio mitesceret. And a little after, Ipse postremo Spurinna, non tam culpam exprobrans, quam ratione ostendens, relictis exploratoribus, caeteros Placentiam 〈◊〉 minus turbidos, & imperia accipientes. The Nolani also, seeing the people bent to take part with Hannibal, feigned themselves to be of the same opinion; and by this means gained time till Marcellus came: Vbi Senatum metus accepit, si palam contra tenderent, resisti multitudini concitatae non posse; clam 〈◊〉 dilationem mali inveniunt: placere enim sibi defectionem ad Annibalem simulant. This in truth is an exquisite way, when a peo ple cannot be mastered, then to second them; because, being not suspected, they may do much good: an example hereof we have in the first book of Tacitus, of that Clement the Centurion; who speaking to the Army, said not, do you, and say you; but let us do, and let us say; thereby to show he was interessed as well as they; Quanquam filium Imperatoris obsidebimus, quis certaminum finis? Percennioni & Vibuleno sacramentum dicturi sumus?  
Seeing then Germanicus had so many ways, available to appease the Insurrection, and he made use of the worst; I cannot but think he was either very unadvised, or very malicious.  
Having now distinguished the Captains; it remains (for performance of my offer) to distinguish the occasions and the times. The occasions then, may in part be just, or wholly unjust: Of the first kind, are want of Pay, want of Victuals, and such like; and in such insurrections, it is necessary, if he can, to give the Soldier's satisfaction; if he cannot, to show at least that he is not any cause of the want: and if it be in default of Victuals, the Captain shall do well to eat in public of the same meats that others eat; to show, that he himself suffers as well as the Army: This way hath often been used, and always with good success. The occasions that are unjust, are wont to happen, either out of some sudden anger, upon denial of some particular demand; or else out of hatred, and a resolution not to serve. In the first case, it is no doubt, more easy to pacify an Insurrection, then in the second; because hatred is much more durable and incurable, than anger is; as that which grows from a more durable occasion then anger doth: that growing out of a habit, and this out of passion; and as a passion passeth away sooner than a disposition, or a habit; so anger is sooner passed over and gone, than hatred: Besides, it is also much the worse, because 〈◊〉 wisheth an enemy evil, as it is evil; where he that is angry wisheth an enemy evil, but not as evil: but Sub ratione boni, (to use this term) esteeming the evil to be just, as being vindicative; and seeing it is manifest, (according to Saint Thomas) that to wish evil under the colour of good, hath less evil in it then to wish evil simply: it follows, that hatred is not only of more continuance; but of a worse condition also then anger is. In the first case then, that is of anger; a valiant Captain shall either by temporising, or else by bold opposition, which is indeed more becoming a generous spirit, easily appease them. The Legions in Germany, under Flaccus Ordeonius, were in mutiny, and would kill the Captain for putting a Soldier in prison: whereupon Vocula, Legat of a Legion, being a bold and courageous Captain, gave order the prisoner should be put to death; which so affrighted the Soldiers, that they were presently quiet: for indeed, it is the nature of common people, if they fear not others, they will make others fear them; but if they fear, they will be as quiet as Lambs; and a child may beat them: according to that place of Tacitus; Terrere ni paveant, ubi pertimuerint, impune contemni. And sometimes they love a man the better for making them fear, as admiring the greatness of his spirit: whereupon we see, that those Legions, after that Vocula had put the Soldier to death, would have him to be their Captain: Conscendit Tribunal Vocula (saith Tacitus) mira constantia; prehensumque militem ac vociferantem duci ad supplicium jussit. Et dum mali pavent, optimus quis que jussis paruere. Exin consensu Ducem Voculam poscentibus, Flaccus summam rerum ei permisit. Another time those Legions mutinying again, took that Flaccus Ordeonius and bound him; but upon the coming of Vocula, they presently unbound him: and Vocula meaning to punish this disorder, forbore for a time, till their choler were over; by which means the day following, he eafily put to death the Authors of the mutiny. Is postera die, authores seditionis morte affecit; tanta illi exercitui diverfitas inerat, licentiae patientiaeque.  
But if the occasion grow from hatred, and from a resolution to serve no longer; I then see not any way there is to pacify it: because if they demand Pay, or such like, they do it to this end; that being denied it, they may have colour for their insurrection; and to grant them that which they demand, is to give them occasion to ask afterward things impossible. This very thing happened to Flaccus; who having sent certain companies of Batavians towards Rome; and they by the way receiving Letters from Civilis, fell to demand a thousand impertinencies: of which, when Flaccus had granted them a part; they than took occafion to demand far greater. jisdem diebus, Batavorum & Caninefatium cobortes, cum jussu Vitelli in urbem pergerent; missus à Civile nuntius assequitur. Intumuere statim superbia, ferociaque & pretium itineris Donativum, duplex stipendium: augeri equitum numerum, promissa sanè à Vitellio postulabant, non ut assequerentur, sed causam seditioni. Et Flaccus multa concedendo, nihil aliud effecerat, quam ut acrius exposcerent, quae sciebant negaturum. The like befell the Carthagenians, whose rebelling Soldiers finding many of their demands granted, they became more insolent than before: for it is not always true, that Humility is opposite to Pride; but sometimes, and particularly in this case, Humility makes the Pride the greater: such men thinking, that whatsoever is granted them, is not granted them out of humanity, but out of fear; and thereupon taking heart, they grow to demand far greater matters. This, those Senators in Livy meant to infer, when they said, Certum habere majores quoque si divinassent, concedendo omnia, non mitiorem in se plebem, sed asperiorem; alia ex aliis iniquiora postulando, cum prima impetrasset. And Tacitus also, when in the life of Agricola, he saith, Nihil profici patientia; nifi ut graviora, 〈◊〉 ex faoili tolerantibus imperentur. Whereupon against such, there is no better way then to show teeth; (as the Italian Proverb is) which is, to be rough with them: seeing it is easy for one to make himself be feared, if from being vilified before through mildness; he suddenly, contrary to expectation, alter his countenance, and look big.  
There is another way also that may be used; and it is, to go gaining of time so long, till all things needful may be provided; and then, to cut them all to pieces: seeing, (as I said before) that to quiet such, is a thing impossible. He that would now see a manifest example of the difference that is between an Army, that mutinies out of hatred, and a determinate will; and an Army that mutinies upon some other occasion; let him look upon Vocula, who two several times found it easy to appease a sedition, grown in the Army out of anger; but the third time, when out of a determinate will and hatred they rebelled, and meant to run to the Enemy; he then seeking to quiet them, was instantly by them slain. And thus 〈◊〉 concerning the occasions.  
Now for the times; either they are of peace, or of great enterprises that are in hand; or of the Enemies approaching. In the first, there want not ways; seeing they can never do much hurt. In the second, though it seems hard, yet it is but easy; and the best way is, to make a show, not to regard them. The Soldiers of Augustus' foreseeing a war which was like to be against Anthony, (as Dio relates) desired leave to be excused from the service; not because they would be so indeed, but because they meant to hold Augustus (as the saying is) to hard meat, and make him grant what they demanded, for fear they should leave him; and he as crafty as they, finding it not fit, for a Captain to submit himself to the Soldier's wills, answered them, They had reason to ask leave, and gave it them; retaining only those that had served in the wars ten years: and thus by slighting those other, and showing he cared not whether they stayed or no; There was not a man went from him, but all stayed with him. The last time is of all the hardest, or rather is impossible; and that is, when they are in face of the Enemy: and in this case, the best way is, to seek to quiet them by any means, though never so bad, and by granting them all they demand; whether it be just, or unjust. The Romans having their Enemies at hand, and being at variance with the people, who retired to the Hill Aventine, and would not stir a foot against the Enemies, unless they might have their demands granted: the Senate resolved to satisfy them howsoever, and therefore granted all they demanded; Eam per aequa, per iniqua, reconciliandam Civitati esse.   

At Romae nondum cognito, qui fuisset exitus in Illyrico; & Legionum Germanicarum motu audito; trepida Civitas incusare Tiberium.  
That Tiberius did well not to stir from Rome. The seven and fortieth Discourse.  
ALthough the City of Rome, when they heard the Armies of Pannonia and Germany were in sedition, openly complained of Tiberius; and blamed him, that he would not go in person to appease those tumults; yet Tiberius for all that, was resolved not to stir from the City: which resolution, though it succeeded well with him, yet it is not necessarily to be commended; seeing oftentimes a Council not very advised, hath yet through the favour of fortune, had admirable success; and on the contrary, a mature deliberation, an unhappy issue. So as, seeing wise men ought not to judge of Deliberations, which are subject to Accidents, by only the understanding: It is no marvel 〈◊〉 some imagine, that Tiberius understood not this, who would stay in Rome, when the Armies were in such confusion. Seeing in Insurrections, the authority of a Prince, and specially when he is 〈◊〉 bello, is able to prevail much: Nothing in such cases being of greater moment than Majesty, by means whereof, notonely Augustus, (who by one word speaking, appeased a great Sedition) but infinite others have had in tumults happy success. Yet notwithstanding all this, I am of opinion, that in so great a man as Tiberius was, the Deliberation was not less advised, than the success was happy; seeing (as Tacitus saith) if he had gone, he must of necessity have gone to one Army, before he went to the other; and by so doing, should have showed himself partial, the only way to have lost their love to whom he went last as in the process of Tacitu●… his Histories is often to be seen. To this may be added the danger; that if the Army by his coming should not have been quieted, there had been afterward no other refuge: And therefore for my part, I should think it the best course, when rebellions a●…ise, to send thither some such person, that if he be slighted, another greater may be sent, and not to show the uttermost at first. This is made plain to us by our Lord God in Saint Matthew, where in a Parable he saith, that a Father of a Family, seeing the husbandmen of his Vineyard suffering all things to go to wrack, and having none to send to them but servants and his son: at first he sent servants, and them they killed and stoned; and then at last he sent his son, which was the last refuge in this case, as Tiberius was in ours: Whereupon he saith, Pater familias Dominus Vine●… 〈◊〉 servos ad Agricolas, qui ex illis alios occiderunt, alios lapidaverunt; Novissime autem misit ad eos filium suum, dicens, Reverebuntur filium meum; hoc est ●…nim ultimum refugium. Thus our Lord God sent first his Prophets, to pacify the Rebellion of men; of whom when part were slain, and part despised, he came at last himself in person. It is therefore the best course, to try first all other ways, before a Prince expose himself amongst Rebels; for if he should be slighted, there then remains no further refuge. Quod aliud sub●…dium, fi Imperatorem sprevissent? and therefore Galba had counsel given him, to try the minds of the Praetorian Soldiers, being in mutiny, by some other: Nec per ipsum Galbam cujus integra authoritas majoribus remediis servabatur; and so much the more, because the Prince being away, the Soldiers perhaps will bear respect to his Ministers; as fearing otherwise, lest the Prince may seek to be revenged: but if the Prince go himself in person, and be killed; what fear can they have of any to revenge it? whereupon it is written in Saint Matthew, Hic est 〈◊〉, venite occidamus eum; & occupemus haereditatem 〈◊〉. To this may be added, that if Tiberius had gone himself to these Armies, he must have been forced to cut in pieces the whole Legions: for if the Army in Germany should have stood upon such terms with him, as it did with Germanicus, he must for his honour's sake have made them resent it in a very great degree; and could never have condescended to many things which Germanicus granted: Majus enim quid à Principe expectatur: seeing there are many things tolerated by Generals of Armies, which if the Prince were there himself, would never be tolerated. Whereupon, when Moses prayed God that he would be the Armies Guide into the Land of Promise; He answered him, I will send an Angel to be their Guide; for if I should go myself, and the Army happen to rebel, I should be forced utterly to destroy them. Non enim ascendam tecum, quia populus durae cervicis est; ne forte disperdam te in via: and therefore Princes oftentimes should avoid such encounters, that they may not aggravate their Subjects faults. And for this, Germanicus said, he would send away Agrippina from the Army, lest her death should be the more grievous for aggravating the Soldier's fault. And jeremy, when the Synagogue went about to kill him; seemed to grieve for nothing so much, as that his death should aggravate their offence. Cognoscite, quia fi occideritis me, sanguinem tradetis contra vosmetipsos. Lastly, if there were no other reason for it, this one would much prevail with me: that a Prince come newly to his State, and but ill beloved of all, should upon no occasion stir out of the City, and specially in his beginning; seeing the presence of the Prince is of greatest force to hinder Rebellions. Whereupon it is no marvel, that Pistoia rebelled against Aguccio of Fagivola, as soon as they saw him gone out of the City. And likewise Florence against Charles the King of France his brother. And the people of Israel fell one time to mutiny, for no other cause, but because their Leader Moses was gone from them, being called up by our Lord God into Mount Sinai. If then the people of Israel so much bound to Moses, and after so many years, who had freed them from the bondage of Egypt, had nourished them with Manna in the Wilderness, had made water flow out of Rocks, and many such like benefits; yet only because he was gone up to Mount Sinai to speak with God for their good, could find in their hearts to rebel: what would have been done against a Tyrant, a perfidious man, an enemy of the City; and in the beginning of his Empire, if he had gone into Germany to pacify those tumults? and so much the more, as not having any trusty person to leave behind him in his stead, for the Senate was his enemy; his mother repented that ever she holp him to the Empire: and as for the Traitor 〈◊〉, what trusting was there to him? And indeed, if there had been any whom he might have trusted, it would have done him no good; no more than it did Moses to leave Aaron in his place. Also Abimelech Prince of the Sichemites, going out of the City, in the beginning of his Empire, left in it his assured friend Zebull, yet it did him no good; for no sooner was he gone, but the people mutinyed, and made Gaall their Prince; as plainly appears in the Book of Judges. So as we may conclude, Tiberius should have hazarded himself exceedingly if he had lest, and thereby lost the City of Rome: which he knowing (saith Tacitus) Fixumque Tiberio fuit, non amittere caput Imperii. For, having the Senate and people his enemies; These for taking away their Liberty, Those for taking away their Authority; and then the Armies in mutiny, and calling upon Germanicus to be Emperor, he might well think, that if Germanicus had once seen him out of Rome, he would never have refused the Empire in choler. To this I add, that though Tiberius had been sure of the City of Rome, yet he had no reason to put himself into the hands of the Army; which having intended to kill the Legates, and Germanicus himself; plainly showed, they had cast off all respect and reverence. Ne in colluvione rerum Majestatem suam contumeli●… offerret.  
As for the reasons before alleged, they are of 〈◊〉 forces to say, that Majesty is able to appease tumults. Ire ipsum & opponere Majestatem imperitoriam debuisse: for Majesty when it is not accompanied with force, runs always a hazard; at least, for the most part, as was seen in the Prophets, who came unarmed; which the Roman Soldiers well perceived, in a discord they had with the people: In which Livy saith, Huic tantae tempestati cum se consules obtulissent, facile experti sunt, parum tutam Majestatem fine viribus esse: seeing (as he saith a little after) there is not a more weak thing than Majesty is, when it is alone. Nihil contemptius, neque infirmius, si fint qui contemnant: Yet I say not but that Majesty may do some good at a first brunt, before it be sound to be nothing but a shadow without substance, consisting only in opinion. I do not therefore marvel that the Emperor Rodolphus passing in his Coach to the Army that was in mutiny, without staying a jott, in manner of a lightning, was able to quiet it. For so also it succeeded well with Caius Fabius, who passed from the Capitol to the Mount, where he meant to sacrifice, through the French Army, in habit of a Priest; seeing it was done in so short a time, and upon such a sudden, as they had not space to take notice of it: Whereupon we see, that Ferdinand of Arragon, going forth amongst the people in a tumult, suddenly appeased it; but then upon consideration of this reason, he presently returned into his Castle. And for this it was, as I conceive, that when Drusus had quieted the Legions of Illyricum, he would not stay the coming of the Ambassadors; but instantly went away to Rome: Whereupon those old Senators, who at the first taking of Rome, stayed in their houses in their Senators Robes, were by the majesty of their persons for a little time defended; but it was not long ere the French perceived that this majesty of theirs was without any power, only in opinion; so as they began at first to scorn them, and at last to kill them.  
It may therefore be concluded, that to trust to Majesty without force, is a dangerous business; and therefore Tiberius' meaning tacitly to answer the objection, said, Majestate salva, cui è longinquo major reverentia; meaning to show, that Majesty doth not the like good near hand, as it doth a far off; seeing the further it is off, the greater it grows; the nearer it comes, it grows the lesser. This was plainly seen, when Scipio and Lucius Quintius standing in competition for the Consulship, it was given to Lucius Quintius, for no other cause but this: whereof Livy saith, Accedebat quod alter decimum jam prope annum assiduus in oculis hominum fuerat: quae res minus verendos magnos homines ipsa satietate facit. And of this, besides Examples, there may be given Philosophical reasons: The first, because reverence to a man far off, must needs grow from Fame; and Fame cannot come, but it must needs pass by the mouths of many; so as the first mouth which begins to relate it to another, always adds something out of love and affection to him, whose actions he relates: and the second mouth when it comes to his turn, cannot relate again, without adding something of his own; and so that other to another, In infinitum. Seeing we consift of parts that have a natural instinct, never to return things in the same manner they receive them, without imparting something of theirs: so the stomach converts the meat into Chylus; the liver, the Chylus into blood; and so from hand to hand: Whereupon, not without cause it is said of Fame, that it increaseth as it flies, like a snowball falling from a hill; which, though little at first parting, yet every place where it passeth adding snow unto it, It grows at last to a huge bigness; and this greatness it gets by removing far off from its beginning.  
Another reason, if I be not deceived, may be drawn from the conception of the understanding, as being able to form in itself a conceit of things, more or less perfect, than it is itself; If of things more perfect, than it forms a conceit more imperfect; as while it conceives God: If of things less perfect, than it forms a conceit more perfect; and therefore in God's understanding, all things are in such a manner, as he himself is. In understanding, material and sensible things are much more perfect than they are in themselves: the understanding being more perfect, because spiritual; whereupon all Philosophers hold, that the pattern of a House is more perfectly represented in the understanding, than the fabric of the House itself is in existence: so as by this reason, it is plain, that a thing is greater contemplated than seen: And so it follows, That the Majesty which is contemplated, as represented only to the understanding; is greater than that which is beheld, as presented to the sense. Whereupon the Prophet Esay, meaning to show, who they are would follow Christ most; saith, Et qui non audierunt contemplati sunt: as though he would say, that they were most like to admire the Majesty of Christ, who had neither heard him, nor seen him, but only contemplated him. Plato therefore spoke not idly when he said, That love increaseth by remoteness, in regard of the Idea. And Aristotle said well, That when men are not known, they are reverenced; and when known slighted: which was found true in Saul; who when at first he was chosen King, the people desired infinitely to see him; and assoon as they saw him, they began to despise him.  
It is therefore manifest enough, that remoteness is an increase; and by the contrary, that nearness is a diminisher: For the vulgar sort, of whom we now speak, judgeth things according to sense, from without and in the bark; so as coming to have those things to be present, which they conceived to be great; and not judging them answerable to their expectation, they quickly grow to contemn them, and count all but fables they had heard of them: Therefore our Lord God knowing that this race of people stands only upon apparences, he gave them Saul to be their King; which Procopius relating, upon those words; Foenitet me quod constituerim Saulem, saith, Saulem elegit propter egregiam staturam; non quod ipse qui omnium est Opifex, tanti eam faoeret: sed propter populum, qui ea quae sensibus apparent pulchra, tantum inspicit, & admiratur.  
This also may happen through men's defects, as well in their minds as bodies; seeing there is no man so perfect, but he hath some defect or other; which Fame carries not abroad, but Nearness discovers. No marvel therefore that the common people of Rome, seeing Galba not to be so handsome a man as Nero, began to despise him: which happened also to Lewis the eleventh. With good reason then, and notably well did Tiberius make answer to the objection of the City; Ire ipsum, opponere Majestatem: by saying, Majestate salva; cui è longinquo major Reverentia.   

De sententia legati statuunt tempus, quo seditiosissimum quemque & seditioni promptum 〈◊〉 invadant. Tunc signo inter se dato, irrumpunt contubernia, trucidant ignaros.  
That to punish seditious Soldiers, by the Soldiers own hands, is very profitable, and that ministers for the most part, in punishing exceed their limits. The eight and fortieth 〈◊〉.  
AS soon as Germanicus had punished the heads of those Legions that were amongst the Cauci, those other Legions, which were governed by Cacina, went away to the Vbijs, whereat Germanicus taking great indignation, was preparing to 〈◊〉 them by force, who thus voluntarily had revolted from him; yet he would first send letters to Caecina, advertising him, that if the soldiers did not themselves punish their seducers, he would come upon them with his Army, and kill both good and bad together; when they who were free from the contagion heard this, they determined between themselves (yet with Caecinaes' consent) to kill all those soldiers that had any hand in the Rebellion, and after the sign given for the Execution, they fell with great confusion to cut in pieces, as well good as bad, in such sort, that Germanicus coming to the Camp, with tears reproved them, for so severely executing his will, and passing their bounds.  
By occasion of this passage, there are many things that offer themselves to be discoursed of; the first, what the occasion was, why in the former Rebellion, only the Heads were punished, and in this were punished all that any way were guilty of it; secondly, whether this way of punishing by their own Companions be good. Thirdly and lastly, by occasion of these soldiers, who in punishing their Companions, far exceeded the command given them; we will see whether this happen not also in the Officers of Princes, and why for the most part, they punish more, and reward less than they are commanded.  
Concerning the first, there was great reason why these should be more severely punished than the other, because having their Example before them, they yet persisted in the same rebellious courses, as Tacitus shows in these words, At Germanicus quanquam contracto exercitui, & parata in defectores ultione, dandum adhuc spatium ratus, fi recenti exemplo sibi ipfi consulerent. But seeing their Example did not mend them, they were justly punished more than the other. So God punished Lamech more than Cain, and yet Lamech had not killed a brother, but only because he was not amended by the others Example, and thus Theophylact upon Saint Matthew expounds it in those words, Vt veniat super vos omnis sanguis justus, qui effunditur super terram, à sanguine Abel justi, usque ad sanguinem 〈◊〉, whereupon this Author saith, super judaeos illos, qui tunc erant, dicit, veniat omnis sanguis injustè effusus, plus enim punientur quam patres sui, nam neque post tanta exempla emendati fuerunt, sicut enim Lamech post Cain, plus enim punitus fuit; licet non interemisset fratrem, eo quod non fuisset ad exemplum Cain emendatus. Good reason therefore had Germanicus to have them be more punished, who were not amended, by having an Example before their eyes, so Scipio Africanus did, and many others: but because chose, the first of●…entimes are more punished than the second, as was seen in Ananias and Saphyra, in the Acts of the Apostles; in the Deluge, in the subversion of Sodom, & infinite many in our time, who committing the same faults, yet have not the same punishments, (I speak not of the Eternal) I wouldtherfore make distinction, either it is the same party that commits both faults, and then the Law is, he should be more punished, for the second time offending, or else they are several pa●…ties, and then, either of faults committed against some new Law, and then the first are more to be punished than the second, to the end there may grow no abuse, and that the Law with more care may be observed, or else we speak of faults committed against a Law already established, and then the second is more to be punished than the first; in regard of the Example he hath before him. To come finally to the particular of these Rebellions; if the first time, the fault be severely punished, it will be a cause, that hardly it will be committed the second time; but if by ill fortune, it be committed, and they rebel the second time, there will be then little hope to quiet them; because the fear to be punished, as at the first time, will hinder them from quiching; and if in the first insurrection there be not used an excess of rigour, it will be an occasion, they will easily make insurrection the second time; but yet it will be easy then to quiet them, as it happened to Scipio.  
Concerning the second, to punish the seditious by the soldiers own hands, is occasion of many laudable effects. First, the hatred goes always against them that act the punishment, and therefore when the Army now quieted, would have Germanicus to punish the offenders, he answered, Ipfi exequerentur; whereof Tacitus a little after showing the reason, saith, Nec Caesar arcebat, (meaning that had done the slaughter) Quando nullo ipfius jussu, penes ●…osdem saevitia facti, & invidiaerat.  
A second reason is, that seeing all the seditious cannot be punished, but only the Heads; unless he should destroy the whole Army, it seems that if the base sort be not punished, it will give them means to be able, and occasion to be ready upon every light distaste to mutiny again, which by punishing the Heads by the proper hands of the multitude, will be remedied and prevented, because they will find none afterward forward to incite them, when they see such an Example of their ungratefulness towards them them that incited, and were their Heads before, and of themselves, they will be never able to make any innovation, Nihil ausuram plebem principibus amotis.  
Thirdly, because the General by this means will remove the hatred which might grow by such slaughters, from himself to the soldiers; this way John Bentivoglio in Bolonia took, when being advertised by his Adversary Duke Valentine, that many of the principal of the City had a meaning to receive him into Bolonia with an Army, which perhaps Valentine did, to the end that Bentivoglio might shed the blood of his Nobles, and thereby make the Heads of them his Enemies, and finally be murdered by them, but he giving credit to what Valentine writ, caused his son Hermes and the greater part of the young Nobles of Bolonia to go and commit those slaughters, to the end that they imbruing their hands in the blood of Bentivoglio his Enemies might run the same fortune with himself, and consequently never after abandon their Prince, because if he should chance to be driven out, they might be sure themselves to far no better; so as Bentivoglio made that a means to make himself secure, which Valentine intended should have made him odious. Herod fearing John the Baptist, and meaning to put him to death, invited to supper all the principal men of Galilee, to the end that they also might have a part in the slaughter, and thereby be tied to defend him, if there should be need, of which the holy Text in Saint Mark saith, Herodes autem metuebat Johannem, sciens eum virum justum & sanctum, & custodiebat eum; & audito 〈◊〉, multa faciebat, & libenter eum audiebat; & cum dies opportunus accidisset, Herodes natalis sui coenam fecit, Principibus, & Tribunis, & Primis Galileae, and that which follows. A pestilent course, because as well in the case before as in this, there was a most cruel and unlawful Execution. But if (as in our case we presuppose) there should be an occasion deserving death, I then conceive, it would not do well, unless execution of the slaughter were conferred upon their own companions; And thus did Moses, who almost just in the same manner as Caecina did, punished his people when they rebelled against him, or rather against God, in worshipping the golden 〈◊〉, for he caused the Tribe of Levi, to enter into the Camp, and to go from one end to the other, forward and backward, and cut them all in pieces whom they found to have upon them a certain mark, which what it was I will not at this time stand to speak of; Si quis est Domini, (saith Moses) jungatur mihi; congregatique suntomnes filij Levi ad eum, quibus ait, Haec dicit Dominus 〈◊〉 Israel, Ponat vir gladium super faemur suum, ite & redite de porta usque ad portam, per medium castrorum, & occidat unusquisque fratrem & amicum, & proximum suum: and therefore the way which Caecina used in the Rebellion was a good way.  
Fourthly, those Soldiers which were no partakers in the Rebellion are the gladder, if they can wash their hands in the blood of the offenders; Laetabitur justus, cum viderit vindictam, manus 〈◊〉 lavabit in sanguine peccatoris. Whereupon in that first sedition, when the Soldiers had killed them that were guilty, as though that slaughter were their own absolution, they rejoiced; Gaudebat caedibus miles, tanquam semet absolveret.  
It remains to show whether it be true, that Officers in execution of punishments use to exceed their commission: and that it is true, is plainly showed by Saint John in the Apocalypse, where a voice saying to the seven Angels, Ite & effundite septem phialas irae Dei interram: they went and poured them out, not only upon the land, but upon the rivers also, upon the fountains, upon the sea, and even upon the sun: upon the same occasion, in another place of the Apocalypse, an Angel cried aloud to four Angels, to whom power was given to hurt the Earth and the Sea, saying, Nolite nocere terrae & mari neque arboribus: he needed not have said, arboribus, seeing those Angels had power to hurt but only the Earth and the Sea, he therefore cried so (as a Writer observes) because he saw those Angels interpreted the power given them to hurt, in too large a sense, as meaning to hurt not only the Earth and the Sea, but the trees also; or perhaps he doubted, least as Officers interpret always too largely the power given them to inflict punishments, so they should interpret too narrowly, the power given them to bestow benefits; whereupon he thought it not enough to say, Nolite nocere terrae & mari, and therefore added, neque arboribus: so also in Esay, our Lord God commanded that the Israelites should be humbled by the King of the Assyrians, and he intended to destroy them, God commanded him to tread upon them, and he went about to put them all to the sword.  
This therefore is an ordinary thing with Officers to restrain favours, and enlarge punishment, which grows upon this, because as building their fortunes upon the Prince's treasure and honours, they think every thing lost to themselves which is given to another, and therefore always interpret favours narrowly, and punishments largely, as well to second the Prince in his anger, and make him the more gracious to themselves, as taking to heart the wrongs that are offered him, as also to make the delinquents faults seem greater than they are; to the end, the Prince seeing them so cruel to them, that so perfidiously had wronged him, may take notice how faithful they are in his service, and how much they resent his injuries.   

junctoque Ponte tramittit duodecim millia E legionibus sex, & viginti socias cohortes, octo Equitum Alas, quarum 〈◊〉 seditione intemerata modestia suit.  
Whether an Army be apt to rebel, that consists of one Nation only, or that which consists of many. The nine and fortieth Discourse.  
BY occasion of auxiliary Soldiers, (which for any thing can be gathered from the forealleaged words of Tacitus) stood always quiet, and kept themselves in good order, when the Roman Legions oftentimes sell into seditions; jam drawn to think, that Armies composed of divers Nations, are less apt to be mutinous than those which are all of one Nation; having a manifest Example thereof in the Army of Hannibal, which being composed of an infinite number of Nations, differing in Language, in customs, in Religion, yet they never mutinyed nor rebelled, although they had a thousand times occasion, by the many wants they suffered, which Livy wondered at, saying, Quip qui cum in hostium terra, per annos trede●… jam procul à domo, varia fortuna bellum gereret; exercitu non suo civili, sed mixto ex colluvione omnium gentium, quibus non lex, non mos, non lingua communis, alius habitus, alia vestis, alia arma, alii ritus, alia sacra, alii prope dii essent, ita quodam uno vinculo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ut nulla nec inter ipsos, nec adversus ducem seditio 〈◊〉. The reason of this is, because being of divers language, they do not so easily accord, and if one part should happen to mutiny, it is easy to oppose it with another, which either through emulation, or some other cause, can seldom times be brought to agree together; besides it happens, because if one of those Nations chance to mutiny, and abandon the Army, yet the Army will not be much weakened by it, as a thousand times hath been seen in Flanders in the King of Spain's Armies, and other places. When Hannibal meant to pass into Italy, the Carpetani forsook him, and he making show he had given them leave, made no matter of it, and his Army was not thereby weakened, where if his Army had consisted of one Nation, he had never been able to pass into Italy. And this Ludovico Il Moro found, against whom when his Army rebelled, which consisted all of Swis●…ers, he was forced to 〈◊〉 his state, and be taken prisoner.  
But if by ill fortune an Army consist●… of divers Nations happen to mutiny, as it is hard to happen; so if it happen, it is impossible to appease it, of which the Carthaginians had a notable experience, when having an Army of that sort, they wanted not much of losing their whole state, and Carthage itself. The reason is, because there cannot be speeches made to the whole Army when it consists of divers Languages, as there might be if it consisted but of one.  
An Army then, if only one Nation, is more apt to mutiny, but is withal more easy to be quieted; an Army of divers Nations is less apt to mutiny, but if it mutiny, is impossible to be quieted: moreover, it is to be known, that as such Armies seldom grow tumultuous against their Commanders, so amongst themselves, there grow tumults often, and of these cases Histories are full, their being always discord where there are divers Nations. Rebe●…ca being great with child by Isaak, and having in her womb Jacób and Esau, she felt a great striving of these two sons, which put her to much pain, whereof complaining to our Lord God, he answered, 〈◊〉 gentes sunt in utero tuo, & duo populi ex ventre tuo 〈◊〉 as though he would say, Marvel not if they strive together, seeing they are two divers Nations, which thou hast in thy body.   

Alia Tiberio morum via, sed populum per tot annos molliter habitum, nondum audebat ad duriora vertere.  
That to pass from one extreme to another is dangerous, and how it happens that su●…cessours commonly take courses differing from their predecessors. The fiftieth Discourse.  
TO pass from one extreme to another without coming to the middle, not only is dangerous, but in many things is held impossible, as in motion, in such manner that some Divines deny, that Angels can move from one extreme to another, without passing by the middle, so as Hypocrates with good reason in his book of Aphorisms, mislikes the passing from a surfeit to a diet; and yet a surfeit is bad, a diet good, but the passing from a surfeit to a diet is most dangerous, whereof Aristotle in one of his Problems, brings Dion●…sius the Tyrant for an Example, who in the siege of his City, forbearing to eat and drink as he was wont, by this passing from Intemperance to Temperance, he fell into a Leprosy. What is worse than a corrupt Commonwealth? What better than a regal Government? yet he that hath gone about to pass from the one to the other, as it were at one jump, either it hath not been successful; or it hath not been durable: whereupon we see that Musicians will not make a passage from a Discord (as a seventh) to a perfect Concord, as a fifth, without passing first to a sixth, and when they mean to make good a second they go to a third, and not to an eighth. By 〈◊〉 degrees the Commonwealth of Rome came to a 〈◊〉 all power; for from a Democracy, it passed to an Oligarchy; from that, to the Government of One; and this One not willing to make that jump contented himself to be called Dictator, for if he had been called King, he had run a manifest hazard, as was plainly seen, when Antonius would have put a Crown upon his head; and indeed Cicero said, that Anthony's tongue calling him King, was more the occasion of Caesar's death than Brutus his dagger. After him comes Augustus, and Caesar having passed from one extreme, it was now easy for him to pass toward the other extreme, and therefore he was able after taking upon him the tribunitial dignity, to take upon him also that of Emperor; but he came not full out to the other extreme, seeing he carried himself as a companion, an equal, and as it were a Citizen with the rest, at least in show; as leaving some authority to the people, and deliberating in a manner of all things with the Senate. After Augustus came Tiberius, and he was able fully to reach the other extreme; but yet not all at once: For, first he raised himself from equality; then he took from the people that little authority they had; and then lastly would be feared, and acknowledged for Prince. Alia Tiberio morum 〈◊〉 sed populum per tot annos molliter habitum, nondum audebat ad duriora vertere.  
Augustus then, a Prince of that Prudence, as every one knows, not only ordained new sports for recreation of the people; but he in person would be present at them. Tiberius on the contrary, an excellent man, full of all the State wisdom that can be in a Prince, was 〈◊〉 from delighting in the sports; yet durst not take them quite away. Whereupon, it should seem to him that would consider these things to the full; that one of them did do well the other ill: seeing of two contraries, when one is good, the other must needs be bad. Yet, I am of opinion that both of them did well; and if they had done otherwise, they would have met with difficulties. For, as for Augustus, there was reason, that the people, who for so many years had been toiled with continual wars, should be refreshed with some recreations; as Augustus did, by ordaining of sports, and himself oftentimes to be present at them; that he might not at first show that inequality, from which but a few days before he had been raised: But because, as after a cruel Prince, if there come another that is cruel; he easily, by reason of the people's hatred, runs a hazard: So if after a Prince so mild, that rules only with love, there come another Prince of like nature, he easily falls into contempt, and thereby stands in hazard of his state. It was therefore necessary, that Tiberius, to make a complete settling of his power, should use a little rigour; and differing from Augustus, should show how much a Prince differs from a private person, by getting himself not only love, but fear also; which cannot well be maintained by him that carries himself mildly, and suffers himself to be often seen. Tiberius then, being to use a divers manner, he could not in those beginnings, Ad●…duriora vertere; seeing (as I have said) that passing from one extreme to another, is extremely dangerous, and was it that ruined Galba; for the people and the Soldiers being accustomed to the bounty of Nero, finding themselves upon a sudden restrained, could not endure it; Nocuit antiquus rigour: & nimia severitas cui jam pares non sumus: and therefore they who conspired the first time against Nero, meant to make Piso Emperor; a man that favoured sports and pleasures exceedingly: Idque pluribus probabatur, qui in tanta vitiorum dulcedine, summum Imperium non restrictum, nee perseverum volunt. The City of Ferrara was accustomed under Duke Alphonso of glorious memory, to live in delights and sports; and therefore when it came into the hands of Pope Clement the eighth, a man of singular prudence, and never enough to be commended; he would not upon the sudden restrain the people, but leaving them their delights, maintained them with sweetness in the Vigils, and Turneaments, and other generous Exercises.  
But that Tiberius, Successor of Augustus, was unlike to his Predecessor, is no marvel; seeing it is commonly so, and in all times hath ever been so. Numa Pompilius was most differing from Romulus. David a warlike man, had for his Successor Solomon a peaceable man. To Moses a Lawgiver, succeeded Josua a warrior. I forbear to bring modern Examples, as a thing odious; and look, that every one should of himself consider, that he who in a government succeeds another that is cruel, is commonly merciful; and he who succeeds one that is grown odious to the people, makes himself commonly odious to the Nobility. And this is so true, that I think it more needful to seek out the reason, then to doubt the effect; and although the search of it be difficult, yet I would say first, that every one having a certain inbred desire to outgo his Predecessor, which is a thing easier to be done, in matters wherein, he either excelled not, or did ill, they betake themselves to a contrary course. Whereupon, if Numa Pompilius would have gone about to exceed Romulus in war, he had never attained it; but to excel him in Religion, which by his Predecessors was little esteemed, was easily done. Drusus also going into Germany, if he would have meant to exceed his Predecessor Germanicus in glory of Arms, it would not perhaps have succeeded with him; but to exceed him in craft and stratagems, 〈◊〉 easily succeeded. From hence it is why many believed (as Plutarch relates) that Tiberius Gracchus, seeing he could never be able to exceed Fluvius Posthumius in glory of war, sought to get himself fame by peace; and by bringing in new Laws among the people.  
Secondly, Princes and Governors have before their eyes a political passage, which is held for an infallible rule; that Governors ought to imitate their Predecessor in things commended, and not to imitate him in things distasted: and so much Nero in Tacitus promised to do. And therefore a Prince, finding that his Predecessor had made every one his enemy through cruelty; he too much desiring to avoid the like, ende●…vours by all means to win their love with mildness; into which he transports himself, sometimes so far, that to avoid hatred, he falls into contempt.  
Thirdly, Princes and Governors carry a certain envy towards their predecessors, and desire to be more beloved than they: whereupon for example; if the predecessor were beloved of the Nobility, he will seek to be beloved of the people, by being their 〈◊〉. First, because the people will be gladder of his coming to be Prince, than the Nobility will be; as those that cannot look for more at this Prince's hands, than they had at the others; and consequently cannot choose but show some passion, at either the death, or at the departing of the predecessors: which how odious a thing it is to a new Prince 〈◊〉 teacheth us; where he shows, that after the death of Augustus, the Senators made show to have no less joy in the new Prince, than they had in the old: At Romae ruere in Servitium consuls, Patres, Eques: quanto quis Illustrior, tanto magis falsi ac festinantes, vultuque composito; ne laeti excessu Principis, new tristiores primordio lachrymas, gaudium, quaestus, Adulationes miscebant.  
Secondly, because it is more easy to content the part oppressed, than the part advanced; as every one knows: and thus much for this.   

Simul Segestes ipse ingens visu, & memoria bonae societatis impavidus; verba ejus in hunc modum fuere.  
What course is to be used in demanding Peace, and when is the fit time. The one and fiftieth Discourse.  
SEgestes boldly and without any fear, being brought before Germanicus, with great confidence delivers his Speech; though it might be doubted, he had a hand in the death of Varro, and of the three Legions that were with him: and because this place of Tacitus contains in it many Arguments of Discourse; I will first examine, when it is a fit time for men to seek friendship with their Enemies, and in what manner they ought to excuse themselves; and though I may seem to go astray from this place of Tacitus, yet I will not omit to explain the words it contains; that we may see why Segestes speaking of himself, spoke with great boldness: and coming afterward to speak of his son, with great humbleness craves pardon. Pro juventa & errore filii, veniam precor. Wherein we may see, how men that desire to clear themselves of any thing laid to their charge, aught to treat for procuring of Amity.  
Such men therefore, either they have committed some fault, or they have not: if they have committed any fault, either they were at first friends, and afterwards are become enemies; or else they have been always enemies. If they have been always enemies, either they have been Principals, or but Adherents. Beginning then with the last; if these enemies that desire to become friends, were only Adherents; they may then do it, by abandoning their friends in danger without any cause given them; but then withal, they must do it with much blushing, or else will never be accepted. Seeing he becomes for ever odious to the world, whosoever is stained with such a blot; as was seen in Bernardino Corte of Pavia; who being left by Ludovico Moro, to keep the Castle of Milan, rendered it up to Lewis the twelfth; and finding himself afterward blamed for it of the French themselves; he died with grief. I cannot forbear to relate an example of hatred that is borne to Traitors; which Guicciardine reports in the person of Bourbon, whom the King of Spain employed, to require a Captain to deliver up his Palace to the King of Spain; who answered, he could not deny the King; but that assoon as Bourbon was gone out of it, he would set it on fire, as a place infected, and unworthy to be inhabited by men of honour. It is true, that this answer, in my opinion, contained under it another mystery, which I cannot now examine, as being out of my road; and therefore will leave it for the Reader to consider it of himself. This at least is a clear case; that Traitors are odious even to those, in whose favour they have done the Treason; whereof many reasons may be given. And first, a reason taken from the danger they incur, who keep such fellows about them; and are like to do as much to them as they have done to others: seeing a man that is grown infamous, cannot do better, then to make a gain of his infamy; as the Lawgiver said, speaking of Harlots. Secondly, because Obligation is a heavy burden, which men willingly disburden themselves of, assoon as they find any little colour likely to do it: A Prince therefore being obliged to one for becoming a Traitor for his service, pays him willingly with becoming ungrateful for his reward; and thinks the hatred that is borne to Traitors is colour enough for it. A third reason may be taken from the pleasure men seem to take, in overcoming rather by Force, than by Fraud; and therefore oftentimes they kill the Traitors. So the Sabines did to the daughter of Spurius Tarpeius, who had opened to them the Castle of Rome: Seu ut vi capta Arx videretur. So the Romans taking the Fortress of Tarentum, by the treason of the Brutii; put them all to the sword Brutii quoque multi interfecti, seu per errorem, seu vetere in eos infito odio; seu ad proditionis famam, ut vi potius atque armis captum Tarentum videretur. Fourthly, they are so odious, that they are always in danger, in regard of the Example; for if Princes should make much of them, and hold them in any account; they should give an Example to encourage others to do the like to themselves: This reason Livy also allegeth in the foresaid case of the Sabines; Seu prodendi Exempli causa, ne quid usquam fidum proditori esset.  
Lastly, Segestes saith of such, Nam proditores etiam iis quos anteponunt invisos: and in truth, these reasons are so clear, that I should marvel there could be any Traitors; if it were not for the force which particulars have to darken an understanding, that is clear in universals.  
Secondly, this may happen for some ill usage from them, to whom he adheres; and in such case, he may speak without blushing: but yet he ought not to stain his honest parting with taking reward. And so much Indibile did, when passing with his Soldiers from the Carthagenians to the service of Scipio; he rather excused himself for abandoning his friends; then expected thanks for the aid he brought. Whereof Livy saith; Propiorque excusanti tranfitionem, ut necessariam; quam glroianti eam velut primam occafionem raptam. Saire enim transfugae nomen execrabile veteribus 〈◊〉 novis suspectum esse: neque enim se reprehendere morem hominum, fi tam anceps odium causa non nomenfaciat: Meri●…a deinde sua in Deuces Carthaginenses memora●…it avaritiam contra corum superbiamque, & omnis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in se, atque populares. Itaque corpus duntaxat suum ad id tempus apud eos fuisse: animum jampridem ibi esse, ubi jus ac f●… crederet coli: se id Scipionem orar●…; ut tranfitio ●…bi, nec fraudi apud eum, nec honori fit. Likewise segestes in his speech to Germanicus, amongst other principal things he saith, this is one; that he had not left his friends to get reward; Neque ob praemium, sed ut me perfidia exolvam: but because, knowing Peace to be more profitable, he advised those people to give over war: and Anthony, who by means of his faction prevailed, thought the contrary; therefore for his own safety, and that he might not be oppressed, he had left that side, and was come to the Romans. The very like to this doth Livy relate of Appius Clausus, who advised the Sabines not to enter into war with the Romans; and finding he was not able to withstand the ●…action, which persuaded the contrary, he went away to Rome; Cum Pacis ipse Author, à turbatoribus belli premeretur, nec par factioni esset; ab lacu Regillo magna clientium comitatus manu, Romam transfugit.  
Thirdly, it may happen by his being dead, to whom he adhered; and then, though the case may seem more difficult, yet it is more easy; at least, if he can make it appear, that he adhered to the other, more for love to him, then for any hate to the contrary side; and in such case he may speak boldly, and the more boldly the better. Herod the great had followed the fortune of Antonius until his death, not for any hate he bore to Augustus, whom he never knew, but for the love he bore to Mark Antony, from whom he had received benefits, after whose death he feared not to present himself before Augustus, to whom he spoke with a gravity becoming a King, and by this means was received of Augustus into a firm league of friendship: the reason of this is, because the cause of their enmity being ceased, which was the love to the person now dead, and the profit growing by him, they will think to have them hereafter their true friends: as conceiving they will be the same to them as they were to the other before, whereupon we read in Tacitus that Otho seeing how faithful Celsus had been to his enemy Galba, took him out of the hands of the Soldiers, by putting him in prison, and then gave him a charge, and held him as his special friend, and Celsus served him as faithfully, as he had served Galba, Celsus constanter servatae erga Galbam fidei crimen confessus, exemplum ultro imputavit, nec Otho quasi ignosceret, sed ne hostis metum reconciliationis adhiberet, statim intra intimos amicos habuit, & mox bello inter duces dilegit, manfitque Celso velut fataliter, etiam pro Othone fides integra & infoelix.  
Such then as these shall not need to make any excuses, but only show the love they bore, and the faithfulness they used towards their friends now dead, and that they did nothing for any hatred they bore to this side, but for the love they bore to the other; out of this respect I conceive it was, that Caesar pardoned all those that had borne Arms against him, saying, that they who had taken part with Pompey out of friendshiphaddone him no wrong: to these things may be added, the force that a free confessing hath (not only in this case, but in all other) to procure one's pardon; and the Reason is, because one cannot voluntarily confess an error, but he must withal at the same time commend and praise him to whom he confesseth it; seeing no man would willingly confess an error, if he did not hope it would be pardoned: and out of such hope he grows confident, and falls to praising the Prince for his clemency; things of great force to move one to pardon: whereupon not without mystery, the word Confiteor in the holy Text signifies not only to confess, but also to praise: and we see that our Lord Christ, who being without sin needed not to make Confession to his Eternal Father, yet notwithstanding he said, Confiteor tibi Domine coeli & terrae; which means nothing (as Saint Austin and all the Fathers expound it) but, I praise thee Eternal Father, Lord of Heaven and Earth. We may justly say then, that this word Confiteor signifies as well To praise, as to confess, seeing in confessing, one is praised. And thus much for Adherents.  
Now concerning a Principal: if he have been always an Enemy, either it is in time of war, or in time of peace; if in war, either he is superior, or inferior; if superior, either he knows he is able to hold out, or else he doubts he is like to go down: if he know he be able to hold out, he ought not then to seek after amity; and therefore the Romans meaning to destroy Carthage refused peace: but if he doubt himself, and find difficulties in it, he shall then do well to accept of peace, if it be required. This made Lutatius the Consul (as Polybius relates) after he had overcome the Carthaginians by sea, not to refuse peace when it was offered him by Amilcar, because he found there were many difficulties yet remaining, before he could get an absolute victory; rather if he stand in doubt he shall come to be inferior, he shall then do well, not only to accept of peace, if it be required, but to require it himself: it is true, it is an hard matter to persuade men against reputation, whereupon we see, it succeeded not well with Hanno, when after the defeat the Romans had at Cannae, he counselled the Carthaginians to demand peace, whose counsel was rejected, not so much for his being of a contrary faction to that of Hannibals, as for the reputation. I cannot therefore but account the Senate of Venice to be full of men of great wisdom, who after the victory the Christians had gotten in a naval battle, yet taking into consideration the depth of things, they made a peace with the Turk, accounting it less evil for the conservation of their State, to live in peace, than to be turmoiled with war.  
But if such a one be inferior, either he knows he is like to be inferior still, or else he is in hope to get the better; if thus, not only he ought not to seek for peace, but not to accept it, if it be offered. Perseus' having overcome the Romans in battle, by the advice of his friends demanded peace, but the Consul denied it. So Pyrrhus after he had won the first battle demanded peace, and was denied it. But if he be inferior, and hath no hope to get the better, he shall do well not to stay to the last, seeing as long as he hath any strength left, he may demand peace with the more boldness, and make the better conditions: so Hannibal before his last battle demanded peace of Scipio, with great majesty; where if a man stay till he be at the last cast, he must come as a suppliant, and ask with submission, and be fain to take what conditions he can get, and it is great foolery to go to ask pardon, with boasting of his merits, and standing upontermes. And this our Lord Christ expressed in the Parable of the Pharisee and the Publican; where the Publican humbly ask pardon for his sins was heard, and the Pharisee not, because instead of humbling himself, he boasted of himself, saying, Deus, gratias ago tibi quia non sum sicut caeteri hominum, raptores, injusti, adulteri, velut etiam hic Publicanus, jejuno bis in sabbato, decimas do omnium quae possideo. The reason of this saying is, because when one confesseth his errors he makes himself judge, and consequently him his advocate, to whom he confesseth, where he that speaks with insolence makes himself his own advocate, and consequently him judge to whom he speaks; whereupon how much it is better for a delinquent to make him he hath offended to be his advocate than his judge, so much it is better to ask pardon with humility than with boasting: and therefore, when after the Romans had entered Afia, and had gotten some victories, an Ambassador coming to Scipio from Antiochus, to demand peace; he was answered by Scipio, Quod Romanos omnes, quod me ad quem missus es ignoras minus miror, cum te fortunam ejus à quo venis, ignorare cernam; Lyfimachia tenenda erat, ne Chersonesum intraremus; aut ad Hellespontum obfistendum, ne in Afiam trajiceremus, fi pacem à sollicitis de belli eventu petituri eratis, concesso vero in Afiam tranfitu, & non solum fraenis, sed etiam jugo accepto, quae disceptatio ex aequo cum imperium patiendum fit, relicta est? And finally he gave him this counsel, Nuntia meis verbis, bello abstineat, pacis conditionem nullam recuset. For this cause the Etolians did ill, to speak so boldly after they were brought to the last cast, and that they would not accept of such conditions of peace as the Romans offered them, seeing it is a mere foolery to stand upon terms with a Conqueror, as they at last perceived, when the Consul bringing out his Forces, they were glad to humble themselves, and abate their boldness; Tunc fracta Phaneae ferocia Aetolisque aliis est, & tandem cujus conditionis essent, sensere, & Phaneas se quidem, & qui adfint Aetolorum scire facienda esse, quae imperentur. There is therefore in such cases no better course than to lay conditioning aside, and to put one's self into the victor's hand, who no doubt will remit the more when he finds it is left in his power to do it: so Alorcus counselled the Saguntines to do, that seeing they had now no hope left, they should rather put themselves into the victor's hand, than stand upon conditioning; Haud despero, cum omnium potestas ei à vobis facta fit, aliquid ex his rebus remissurum: which when the Saguntines would not do, they were all put to fire and sword.  
I cannot omit by way of digression, to speak of a custom the Romans had; which at first sight seems to have been a great error, and it is, that they offered the same conditions of peace in the uncertain beginning of a War, as after they had gotten an absolute victory; as by the answer of Scipio to the Ambassadors of Aniochus may appear, Romani ex his quae in deorum immortalium potestate erant, ea habemus quae dii dederunt, animos, qui nostrae mentis sunt, eosdem in omni fortuna gessimus, gerimusgque neque eos secundae res extulerunt, nec adversae minuerunt; ejus rei, ut alios omittam, Annibalem vestrum vobis darem testem, nifi vos ipsos dare possem: posteaquam Hellespontum trajecimus, prius quam castra regia, prius quam aciem videremus, cum communis Mars, & incertus belli eventus esset; de pace vobis agentibus, quas pares paribus forebamus conditiones, easdem nunc victores victis ferimus. This way of doing served, it seems, to no other purpose, but to encourage their Enemies, to cement their fortune, till they should be brought to extremity, and I make no doubt but that Antiochus having before him the Example of the Carthaginians, would never be brought to accept conditions of peace till he was brought upon his knees with the War. To take away this difficulty, it would not suffice to answer, as Scipio said, that it came from generousness of spirit, that they altered not for fortune, seeing little praise can be given to such a dangerous and prejudicial Generousness, and therefore I should rather attribute the cause to too great a greediness of getting that which is another's; seeing the Romans made war with Antiochus, and with the Carthaginians, as thinking they could not be quiet, if the one were Lord of this side the mountain Taurus, and the other were possessed of Africa, and this being their motive, there is no doubt but the War would neverend, till they had triumphed both over Africa, and over Asia: Whereupon when War is waged with such people, we must make account either to get the victory, or otherwise to be absolutely destroyed: and therefore when Samuel meant to show Saul, that God intended to root out his House, to the end he might know he would not pardon him till he were utterly destroyed, he called our Lord God by the Name of Triumpher, Porro Triumphator in Israel non parcet: as though he would say, as they who fight to triumph, do not pardon till they have utterly destroyed their Enemies, so O Saul, will our Lord God do with thee. But to return to our purpose, if they who would come to amity were friends before, and are afterward become Enemies, they must then come with blushing and with great humbleness, at least if they can show no just occasion, but let them not then stay till they come to extremity, for than they will never be accepted: therefore the Capuans did ill, not to open their Gates to the Romans within the time given them; for when they were come to extremity, it availed not then to open their Gates, but all of them were miserably put to the sword.  
The last case is of him that demands amity, and comes to excuse himself, as having never committed any fault, always really been a friend, and never done them any wrong; and such an one may, or rather must speak boldly. Such a one was Segestes, who speaking of himself, Memoria bonae societatis impavidus, never asked pardon. Such than may speak with confidence, and aught to be harkened to of the Prince with patience: and this way was a great help to Terentius in Tacitus, who being accused for having had friendship with Sejanus, he confessed it boldly, showing not only that he was his friend, but that he had laboured much to come to be so, as seeing him a Companion of Caesar in his Consulship, a Kinsman, an inward friend, and a stay of the Empire; and this constancy of his prevailed so far that not only he was pardoned, but his accusers also were ill entreated. Saul must pardon me, if I think him in this case, a more Tyrant than Tiberius, seeing when Abimelech the Priest was accused for giving David meat, and the sword of Goliath, and was charged for it by Saul, he made the like answer as Terentius did, Et quis in omnibus servis tuis sicuti David fidelis, & gener Regis, pergens in imperium, & gloriosus in domo tua. But the boldness and innocency of Abimelech was not so great, but the cruelty of Saul was greater, who for this cause put him to death; certainlya most perfidious act, seeing as I have said, and say still, He that is innocent & comes without fault, both aught to speak with boldness, and aught to be heard with patience: and herein Princes should imitate our Lord God, who takes pleasure in such disputes, as S. Austin witnesseth in his exposition of those words in the Psalm, Jucundum fit ei eloquium meum; which he reads thus, Suavis fit ei disputatio mea; and then saith, Ostendit Propheta suavem Deo esse disputationem, & argumentationem gratam, quae post peccatorum poenitentiam fit, cum eo pias querelas proponendo & irae illius refistendo viriliter: so Job spoke, pretending to be innocent, Ad Omnipotentem loquar, & disputare cum Deo cupio; and a little after adds, Quis mihi tribuat ut cognoscam & inveniam illum, & veniam usque ad solium ejus, ponam coram eo judicium, & os meum replebo increpationibus, ut sciam verba quae mihi respondeat. And therefore Esay having in his first Chapter said, Lavamini & mundi estote; he adds, Venite & arguite me; which Saint Gregory interpreting, saith, Ac fi patienter dicat; recta agite, & animad verfionis meae motibus non jam per deprecationem gemitus, sed per fiduciam authoritatis obviate: whereupon after Job had said, Taedet animam meam vitae meae, with great confidence he adds, Dicam Deo, Noli me condemnare; as the foresaid S. Gregory in a thousand places excellently observes: with good reason therefore Terentius spoke boldly to Tiberius, rather as disputing than as entreating; with good reason Segestes in our case showed he did not fear, seeing neither the one nor the other had committed any fault: whereupon there was no just cause that Tiberius should not accept Terentius for his friend; and Germanicus, Segestes.   

Vt quibus initiis, quanta Tiberii arte, gravissimum exitium irrepserit, dein repressum fit; postremo arserit, cunctaque corripuerit, noscatur.  
With what cunning Tiberius introduced and augmented the Law of Treason. The two and siftieth Discourse.  
PErsuaded by the foresaid words of Tacitus, in which he shows what cunning Tiberius used to bring in the Law of Treason; I have much mused in what that cunning consisted, seeing neither Tacitus declares it, but would have us gather it out of the History ourselves, neither can I think, I have fully apprehended his meaning, I will therefore only say that little which my weakness hath been able to conceive of it, that some stronger brain may thereby the more easily find out the truth.  
First than it might be said, that he used this cunning, when being asked, An judicia Majestatis redderentur? He answered, Exercendas esse leges. The cunning consists in this, that being asked in a particular which concerned only himself, he answered in a general, which concerned the profit of the whole City; as though he should say, for as much as concerns me, which is the particular of Treason, I make no reckoning, nor require any to be made; but as much as concerns the Law, I would have that to be observed, seeing it is of great importance, that Laws be not abused: and in confirmation of this his will, he granted pardons to all those who at that time were accused of any crime, and consequently with great sweetness gave a beginning to a most bitter thing; because by his pardoning the Law was set on foot, and he brought it in, with such a kind of clemency, that it remained ever after in the Prince's power to take it away again.  
But in the introducing this Law by Tiberius, his cunning may perhaps be better considered another way; for understanding whereof, we must take into consideration, two cases that are in Tacitus; the first, is in this place, where Falanius and Ruberius being both of them accused, Falanius for placing amongst certain priests of Augustus one Cassius a Buffone; Ruberius for violating with perjury the name of Augustus; Tiberius with divers ways colouring their error, cleared them both; Scripsit consulibus, non ideo decretum Patri suo coelum, ut in perniciem civium is honour verteretur, Cassium histrionem solitum inter alios ejusdem artis interesse ludis, quos mater sua in memoriam Augusti sacrasset: nec contrareligiones fieri, quod effigies ejus, ut alia numinum fimulachra, venditionibus hortorum, & domuum accedant: Jusjurandum perinde ●…svimandum, ac si Jovem fefellisset. Deorum injurias diis curae. It was not long after, but Marcellus was accused for speaking ill of Tiberius, whereat though he seemed a little angry, yet he suffered him notwithstanding to be acquitted. The second case we are to consider, is written in the second Book of his Annals, where Apuleia Varilla being accused of Adultery, & for speaking scandalous words of Augustus, of Tiberius and of Livia, he gave sentence, that for what she had spoken against Augustus she should be punished, but for what she had spoken against himself, he would have no matter made of it, and being then asked by the Consul, whether she should not be punished for the words spoken in disgrace of Livia, for that time he made no answer, but the day following he desired in his mother's name, that the words against her, might be no prejudice to Apuleia.  
Now if these cases be well underst●…od, we shall easily discover the cunning of Tiberius, which consisting in the way of introducing and enlarging the Law, hath need to take in a former consideration; and it is, that the Law of Treason, as concerning the name was in use also in the time of the Commonwealth, but contained not the same Heads, he only being then intended to fall into this crime, who practised any thing against the Commonwealth, either by raising of Armies, or by making seditions amongst the People, never making reckoning of words, nor of such small matters, but only of heinous things, as Tacitus in this place delivers.  
To come then to our purpose, Tiberius being asked, if he would have the Law of Treason to be observed, answered, the Laws must be observed, as though he would say, he would have them in use, as they were in the time of the Commonwealth: whereof he gave a proof in the first case, where Augustus and Livia, and himself being injured, he pardoned all: and so you see the birth of the Law. Afterward in the second case, where himself and Augustus and Livia were injured, where in the first he had said, Deorum injurias diis curae; speaking of Augustus: in the second, he would have Apuleia for the words she had spoken against Augustus, to be punished; for the injury done to himself and Livia, he pardoned her: and so you see the growth of the Law: in confirmation whereof, Tacitus hath these words, Adolescebat intercalex Majestatis. And here is to be considered, that Tiberius' meaning to begin the growth of the Law of Treason, would not begin it, with making it be observed in his own case, but in the case of Augustus, requiring that boldly for another, which without blushing he could not have required for himself: and so much more in this case, as the demand was coloured with paternal piety, and therefore obliged the Senate the more, to punish them also who should use any such words against himself. Finally, there passed not much time, but by means of this Law, not only they were punished who committed crimes against the Prince, but it came to that pass, that to every petty fault, and though but against a private person, they gave the name of Treason, that so they might have colour to inflict capital punishment at their pleasure, as in a thousand places of Tacitus his Books is written.   

Id quoque Tiberii morum ●…uit, continuare Imperia, ac plerosque ad finem in iisdem exercitibus aut jurisdictionibus habere.  
Whether it be good, that Officers should continue in their Places; and why this course was observed by Tiberius. The three and fiftieth Discourse.  
Tiberius' (by as much as these words of Tacitus show) used not to change his Officers, whereby it happened, that oftentimes they died in their charge; but because Tiberius had many particular occasions that made him observe this custom, which in other Princes are not usual; We will first speak of it in general, whether it be a good course; and then in particular; and lastly we will give the reasons of all.  
Concerning the first, We cannot proceed without distinction: when the question is therefore, whether it be good to continue Officers, We may either mean it of Officers of War, or of those of Peace: If we speak of Officers in War, either it is in a war where the Prince desires to make new Acquests; or else in a war which he makes only for reputation, or some other small interest. If he make it, with a purpose of enlarging his Dominion, I cannot then commend the change of Officers, so long at least as there is no demerit in the Captain; (and this, for the many reasons I have showed in a Discourse before:) but if he have no other end, but only to continue the war, he may then change them as he pleaseth: whereupon we see, that Tiberius himself making war in Germany for Reputation only; Potius quam cupidine proferendi impenii: changed his General, calling home Germanicus.  
If we speak of Officers in Peace; either they are mean places, which can neither bring honour nor damage to the Prince, or some middling places; that have other Officers above them; or else they are chief & Principal places, that have none above them; and in these (to begin with the last) to continue the same men, is in a manner necessary (so long at least as they carry themselves worthily) as well because they are better acquainted with businesses; as also because it is a hard thing to find men able to discharge such places: and lastly, because if they should be removed; to exalt them, is impossible; they being now at the highest; and to abase them, is dangerous: whereof in the Book of Kings we have a notable Example in jeroboam, who rebelled against Solomon (as some Rabbins interpret; and very well in my opinion) only for being put in an Office meaner than that he had before: For where before, he was collector of the Tributes, of the Tribes of Manasses and Ephraim, he was now made overseer of the building of Millo, a much inferior place than the other. In this case therefore it shall do well to use the custom of Tiberius, to continue them in their places, during their lives: provided that they be not made hereditary, as in some Kingdoms hath been done, with much detriment to the Prince.  
Again, if we speak of middling places; to suffer them to continue, without hope of being changed, brings forth commonly many evil effects. The first is because all men labour for advancement, and their aim is always at principal places: endeavouring so much the more to do good service, as they know it to be a means to raise them higher; there being no doubt, but he will serve better, that hath advancement for his end, than he that hath only conservation for his Object: as we see, that young men eat more than old, because the end of these is only to conserve themselves; but of the other, to augment themselves. And therefore Sinan the Primovisior General of the Turk, against the Persians, knowing he could rise to no higher Dignity than he had already, was willing to hearken to Treatyes of peace, and pursued the war but coldly. Whereupon Benhadad (as in the sacred Text is written) had good counsel given him, that where in his army he had Two and thirty Kings, he should put in their places as many other valiant men, because They being at the highest, would never strain themselves much to fight, as knowing they could rise no higher: where other men to get advancement, would bestir themselves with greater vigour. This reason Abulensis brings in these words. Amove Reges fingulos ab Exercitutuo, & pone pro eis principes. For confirmation of this I have now said, the Example of Sejanus (in my opinion) serves very fitly, who as long as he had any hope to be advanced higher, he continued a good servant, and an excellent counsellor to his Prince: Quia Seianus incipiente adhuc potentia, bonis confiliis notescere volebat, but as soon as he was got to such a height that he could not hope to rise any higher, he then fell from his good service, and plunged himself in manifest villainies. This reason Tiberius understood well, and therefore when Sejanus was grown to a mighty height of greatness, to the end he might have occasion to continue his good service, made a show he would yet raise him higher, Ipse quid intra animum volutaverim, quibu●…adhue necessitudinibus immiscere te mihi parem, omittam ad praesens refer. Id tantum aperiam, nihil esse tam excelsum, quod non virtutes istae, tuusque in me animus mereantur. This is an excellent way, and aught to be observed with those who hold the prime places. Those therefore that are in middling places, should not be continued still, but have hope given them, that by their good service they may rise higher. Otherwise, besides the reasons alleged, there would follow another inconvenience, that when they of the chief places die, the Prince should want others to put in their rooms; and consequently should be driven, to go begging in foreign parts for principal Officers: who not being acquainted with businesses, and little affectionate (unless for their own ends) to the Prince; they were like, (in my opinion) to do but ill service, as neither knowing, nor being known. Whereupon the Apostles, being make make an Election, did not use this manner, Oportet ex his viris qui nobiscum sunt congregati, in omni tempore: and as it follows. To this may be added, that Princes should continue meaner Officers in their places, but to make them fit for greater. This course the Venetians have always used, and it was the ancient custom of the commonwealth of Rome, that when by the death of Senators there were places void, they would fill them up out of the ranks next below them: an excellent course certainly; for their carriage being continually seen in less matters, It may easily be gathered what good service they are like to do in greater. From hence it was, that Fabius Maximus knew, that Titus Ottacillus was no fit man to govern an Army; Titi Ottacilli in minore re experti operam tuam sum●… haud sane cur ad majora tibi fidamus, documenti quicquam dedisti: But though I like well the changing of Officers, yet I like not they should be changed often. First, because it is the property of them that are to leave a place, to burn (as the Proverb is) their Cabins; not so much for any hatred or envy they bear to their Successors, as for their own benefit: Whereof we have an example in Saint Matthew; where he relates, that one had been possessed with a Devil many years, and never found any hurt by the evil Spirit all that while; but when the Devil perceived he was to go forth of his body, he then fell to tearing him in most cruel manner. And just so it is with some that are in offices; if they think they shall stay any while in their places, they do not then so suddenly fall to fleece the Subjects; but if they find they shall shortly leave them, they then begin to use extremities. And therefore the Officers of Galba, (as Tacitus reports) doubting they should stay but a small time in their places, by reason of the Princes old age, fell to fleecing: Jam afferebant vaenalia cuncta 〈◊〉 liberti. Ser vorum manus subitis avidae; & tanquam apud senem festinantes. But seeing it is necessary sometimes to change them, (as we have observed before) whether the change be sooner or later; the best course is to do it upon a sudden; that they may not do as Farmer's use to do, when they are to part with a Farm, who to make the greater Vintage in their last year, care not how barren they make the Vines for the year following.  
Now if we speak of those mean places, which bring some profit to the Officers, without any danger to the Prince, as some Magistrates that serve for show, with little substance; in these the changes should be often; as well to the end, many may come to partake of the profit, as also thereby to get the love of all. And this differs not from the opinion of Tiberius; who when the Senate would have persuaded him to make a Magistrate, that continued in his place but one year, to continue in it five; he would not grant it. Grave moderationi suae tot eligere, tot differre; Vix per fingulos annos offensiones vitari; quamvis repulsam propinqua spes soletur; quantum odii fore ab his, qui ultra Quin quennium projiciantur. I know well, that this was not the meaning of Tiberius; but yet the sentence he gave may serve for my purpose. It remains to show, why Tiberius would never be drawn to change those he had once put in Offices: The first reason which Tacitus allegeth, is set down in those words; Tedio novae cura, semel placita pro aeternis servavisse: that is, Tiberius finding it a trouble to make new Elections, was willing to continue the old; but seeing Tacitus tells not why it should be a trouble, it seems to be but a cold reason which he brings: we may therefore rather say, that (as other Authors relate) Tiberius had in such manner used cruelty against any that had any virtue in them; that unless he should place men in Offices, that were unfit, he had much ado, and hardly could find any: and therefore no marvel, having once found some, if he were afterward loath to remove them. To this may be added (as Tacitus a little after saith) that though he saw many great wits in the City, that would have been able to discharge such Offices; yet he, standing in fear of such men, chose rather to let them die in idleness, as seeking to put men in places, to which they were only equal: Neque supra; that is, such as should not be good at making Innovations: of which sort of men, there is in all places great scarcity; and therefore when he once found such a one, he was never willing to change him; as by whom he might have good service done him; and that without danger. And this is an Exception to the Rule I made before; when they who are employed are but equal to their employment, and cannot hope to be employed in any greater business; not for default in the Prince, but of ability in themselves. Again, it put him to the more trouble, as having a most acute wit; and consequently a wavering judgement, as Tacitus shows us in those words: Vt callidum ejus ingenium, ita anxium judicium; a thing which always happens to such persons, because being men that know much, they pierce into all difficulties; and consequently hardly resolve upon any thing, finding the darkness of difficulties even in the light itself: as Moses, the first time that God called him, having yet but a gross brain, thought every thing Light; but the second time, when his brain was purged, he thought every thing Darkness. The last reason, which Tacitus brings, (for the other to my seeming, are but confirmations of the first) is set down in these words; Quidam invidia, ne plures fruerentur; that is, Tiberius would not change his Officers, because he would not have many to be enriched by them. This conceit I cannot believe, that either Tiberiut, or Tacitus had; but that it is a mere idle fancy of the vulgar: seeing amongst the chief Precepts that Aristotle gives to Tyrants, this is one; Not to suffer Riches to be reduced into few hands: And besides, we may give the words a fitter exposition; which is, That T●…berius having very few friends, if he should change his Officers often, he should be forced at last to bring in some that were his enemies: Whereupon out of very envy, lest any enemy of his should grow rich, or get reputation; he was never willing to change his Officers often: which, when at last he could not avoid, but had placed in the Provinces certain of his enemies, he would never suffer them to go to their charge, but kept them always near about him, a course which many Princes take with their enemies; as by a thousand Examples (which for brevity I omit) may easily be known: wherein it happens to Princes, contrary to that of private men; for these are safest, when their enemies are furthest off; but Princes, when they are nearest: and to this purpose are those words of Tacitus; Quae baefitatione postremo eo provectus, ut mandaverit quibusdam Provincias, quos egredi urbe non erat passurus. I should not give this sense to this place, if my interpretation were not made good by a passage in Suetonius; where he saith, Vnum & alterum consulares, oblatis Provinciis, non ausus à se dimittere, eosque adeo detinuit, donec successores, post aliquos annos praesentibus daret.  
I conclude then, that Tiberius did well to continue Officers in their charges; as well for the scarcity he had of fit persons, as also, and more, because he used to employ men that were only equal to the businesses: Other Princes shall do well to avoid all extremes.  
One only thing remains to be advertised; that when I commend the course, not to change Officers often; I mean it should proceed from the Princes own will, not thinking it fit he should bind himself to let them stay in their places any determinate time; as three years, or five, or more; without leaving himself a power to remove them: For this would be to the Princes great prejudice; which Tiberius considering, made the fore-alleadged answer to Asinius Gallus; Grave moderationi sue, and as it follows: whereby we may plainly see, that though Tiberius did not like to change his Officers often; yet he liked well to have it in his power to change them often.   
FINIS.