THE Present State OF EUROPE BRIEFLY Examined and found Languishing, Occasioned By the Greatness of the French Monarchy: For Cure whereof a REMEDY (From former Examples) Is humbly proposed to His Royal Highness William Henry Prince of Orange, And to the GREAT CONVENTION Of the LORDS and COMMONS Now Assembled at Westminster. Wrote upon Occasion of the House of Common's Vote to raise 800000 l to Equip a Fleet for the Year 1671, moved thereunto by the Pretended March of the French Army towards the Marine Parts of Flanders.  
By THOMAS MANLEY, Esq  
LONDON: Printed for Richard Baldwin, near the Black Bull in the Old-Baily. MDCLXXXIX.   

READER,  
IT is now Seventeen Years since these Papers were Framed and intended for Public Consideration, but the unhappy Temper of our Counsels, and the Malignity of the Public Licenser prevented their Appearance till this Juncture.   

The State of Europe briefly Examined and found Languishing, etc.  
THE present designs, and puissance of France both by Sea, and Land, being at once both the Wonder, and Dread of Europe, hath possessed me with so many sad Reflections on that Subject, that I who am but dust, and ashes, and dwell in the shades of Obscurity, cannot refrain to form, and meditate how Barrs may be put to such approaching Dangers, especially since the honour, safety, and welfare of our Prince, and Country ought to be the bent, and study of the most retired Subject.  
The present State of Europe I might fitly resemble to the Body of a Man, wherein all the Members either languish, or are viciously affected; some through self-mischiefs, others oppressed by their Fellow-Members. Spain, (heretofore the great Pretender to the Western-Monarchy) droops through her own Follies, whereof if she expire, a Jury will undoubtedly find her a Felo de se, whilst her Neighbour Portugal, instead of holding her sick-head, and pitying her case, is ready on all occasions to knock out her Brains. Italy and Germany are troubled with one Disease, through the windy humours of her many, and ambitious Princes, whose continual Jealousies fill them with frequent Gripe, and Disquiets: England and Holland are desperately bruised through mutual buffet, to which France cunningly looked them on, intending, like Simeon, and Levi, to suppress these Shechemits, when sore, and unable to resist; all which Mistakes and Calamities have been to France as so many Indulgent Nurses to feed, and pamper her, who like unruly , trespass most on that Neighbour whose Fence is lowest, and Quarry best without fear of impounding, whereby (like the Head in a Body Rickity) she grows to an unproportionable, and dangerous bigness, whilst her erring Neighbours (like the Members) wast, and languish; of whose sudden, and prodigious growth I will not now insist on, (which yet is none of the least dreadful considerations) nor tell how our Cromwell seemed a Dictator there, nor record how 6000 English Red-Coats was, at that time, more essential than Humanity, and Protection to an oppressed King of the Blood of France; for now the Scene being altered by the admirable Conduct of a Prince, whom therefore his Subjects ought to reverence, I cannot but observe how Christendom, instead of a generous Resentment, and defence of the Oppressed, Shrinks, and Faints at every undue seizure made by that haughty Monarch, as if they fancied such softness could secure their own Peace, or charm an ambitious Conqueror into Modesty, or put a stop to his Career, whose utmost end is the Western-Monarchy, whereunto, with spread Sails, he now apparently hasteneth; whereas they ought rather to be powerfully persuaded that such tameness must at once enable, and encourage him to devour them also.  
What Prudence can justify such procedure? can Time and Patience repair the Mistakes? or may such easy Conquests glut his Appetite, or possess him with Compassion to spare the rest? or does not rather one Conquest beget a Stomach, and ability to more, and greater? who can suppose the seizure of Lorain will immerge him in Ease, and Voluptuousness? or his Successes in Flanders serve as an Atonement to secure the rest? must not these unrevenged Conquests rather be as so many prosperous Gales to transport him to greater Achievements? Seeing the like drousiness in relation to Christian Princes gave occasion formerly to the growth of the Ottomon Greatness, and is like still to add to his Triumphs; and as an Historian observes in the like case of the ancient Britain's, Dum singuli pugnant universi vincuntur.  
Remarkable then was the former Policy of these Western-Princes, when, with the hazard of their Ease, and Lives, they maintained the power of Christendom in an equal Balance, dexterously throwing their Arms into that Scale which appeared lightest, knowing they secured thereby their own Peace, and Government: On this account England, and France are thought to have wisely fomented the revault of the Low-Countries, and were, in effect, as fond, by that means, to lessen the Grandeur of Spain (who then Alarmed Europe, as France does now) as if they themselves had made new Conquests; hence it was that Philip the Second, by way of requital, and our Elizabeth (to whose Ptudence, and Memory we own our remaining Glories) threw Oil, and not Water into the long Troubles of France; with which Council the same Philip was so transported, judging it the best expedient to improve his grand design of the Western-Monarchy) that to carry the War into France he apparently (but not wisely) neglected his own Affairs in the Low-Countries; thereby spoiling a most sovereign Antidote by an unseasonable application. Nor was the costly attempt of 88 any thing but carrying Fire into an Enemy's Kingdom, the better to extinguish the Flame made by that Foe, in his Country; Kingdoms (like Houses, in a dreadful Fire) being best secured by blowing up the next dangerous Neighbour: Hence the French are supposed (by no Fools) to have been both the Midwife, and Nurse to our late Scotish, and English Wars; begot the several costly Wars between us and Holland. Contained, and fostered the revaults both in Catelonia, and Portugal, and of late assisted that King both with Men, and Money.  
Cromwell, indeed, was an unparalled Sinner against this ancient Kingcraft, when postponing the general tranquillity to his own wretched Humour and Interest, he assisted France, at such a time, that all the World judged her too powerful for her Rival Spain, who then lay drooping under her own Wounds and Follies, in relation, principally to the ill Conduct of her Treasure, which alone will founder the strongest Empire; and had this Nation no other Crime to charge on that ill man, (who, like the greatest Mortals, must, living or dead, be exposed to the severest censure of the people) it were alone sufficient to render him an impolitic and hateful person to all Generations: Whereas on the contrary, we own great Reverence to the Wisdom of His Majesty in espousing the Triple Alliance, and entering generously into other Leagues in order to secure the Peace of Christendom: But yet, I humbly conceive, 'tis not enough for a cheap, sure, and lasting Peace, so long as the Balance remains so unequal between the two great Pretenders; and France, through her Military Grandeur, continues so Armed, Able, and daring to give perpetual Frights, and Alarms to the whole Neighbourhood; whereby Peace, through a just, and necessary Jealousy becomes as costly as War itself, consuming those that are suspicious of her, and the daily motions, and buzzings of her Armies oblige the Neighbours, with Sword in Hand, to an Eternal Watchfulness, least unawares the blow be given; which continual bend inevitably must draw so many dreadful weaknesses on the parties concerned, as must, at length, without a Miracle, improve both the Designs, and Glories of that Prince, which is so obvious to all considering Men, that some of his own Subjects have had the vanity of late, to boast even in this Kingdom, what Charge their King would put us unto by marching his Army (mighty, and in perpetual Pay) yearly near our Coasts, before really he would attack us: and certainly great must the advantage be which France hath now over us (whereby in Estimate may be taken of our decay even in the midst of Peace) if when the humour possesseth that daring Monarch (whose Armies like Birds of Prey are always on the Wing) to move towards us either in pretence, or reality (which by the event is only determinable) we must equip, at least our Fleet, at six or seven hundred thousand Pounds Charge to prevent the mere fear of an Invasion; and when we are wearied, and consumed by so many fruitless, yet necessary Arming, and laid to slumber after so many false Alarms, who can but easily foresee what dreadful Effects may ensue? wherefore I conclude with that great State's man Cicero, Pace suspecta tutius Bellum.  
But suppose, that whilst the United Provinces, and Spain maintain their Posts, we were able both to resist his Attempts, and bear the Expense, yet 'tis fierce deniable, but if he devour those Countries by Peicemeals, and pluck up that glorious Commonwealth by the Roots (which, without effectually Assistance, infallibly he will) we must also receive a Law from him; for what can then keep us, with the rest of Christendom from Subjection to that Crown? since we already see the very clap of his Wings beget Amazement: Join the Power, and Riches of Holland to him, and all the known World must bow to his Sceptre.  
Again, should France attempt, and reduce us to severe Terms whilst our Neighbours stand with their Arms across, it would only expedite their Confusion, and draw on them a more certain Conquest.  
I will not therefore doubt but as the Safeties of us and our Allies are floating in one common bottom, and fortified by Mutual Interests, (the only true Cement of Leagues) so our joint Designs, when once put into Action, will be vigorously pushed on till the Balance of Christendom be reduced to its proper Standard. And whereas it must be granted that no Conquests can satiate, Bonds tie, nor Leagues charm this great Pretender, whereby the Milky ways of Peace may felicitate Europe, without the costly, and terrible Guards of Armies, so long as the Odds remains so unequal, and this Mighty Hero (Armed and Victorious) is able thus to affright the World, Hector his Neighbours, impose upon the Weak, and on every feeble Pretence ransack their Countries without revenge; nothing remains justifiable by the just Rules of Policy, but with the joint Arms of all Parties concerned (which indeed is all Europe) attack this Illustrious Man upon the very first just Provocation, and by dint of Sword carry the War into his own Bosom; and from the Example of wise Princes, make his Country at once both the Seat of War and Desolation; whereof the Romans in the War of Carthage, are a puissant Instance; whereas on the contrary, the States, and Princes of Europe, Italy especially, neglecting of late to Assault the Turk powerfully before Candia, are now justly expecting him, with horror and amazement, at their own doors: He that fights in his Enemy's Country, does in effect fight at his Enemy's Cost, and when Peace is clapped up, leaves his Enemy, for that Age, Poor, and Miserable, as we have, not long since, beheld in poor Germany: The French K. therefore commonly makes himself the Assailant, maintaining half his Wars at his Adversaries Charge, by fight in their Countries; where, if he receive a Blow, has his own unharrassed Kingdom either to receive, or recruit him; and our Heroic Elizabeth (who knowing that Virtue and Justice were the only Ligaments of her People's Love, governed her Affairs with miraculous Wisdom and Housewifery, made her Payments sure to a Proverb, and was accordingly adored) studied by all Arts imaginable to fight her Enemies on their own Soil, whereby at once she imprinted thereon the terrible marks of Desolation, and preserved her Country as proper Fuel wherewith on all occasions to consume her Adversaries. Nor was her Sister Mary intentionally her inferior in this particular, when the loss of Calais (which in her hand was so ready an Inlet to assail either of the great Pretenders, as common Interest directed) was supposed either to have occasioned, or hastened her Death. For this reason all our Kings from the glorious Edward the Third, to Queen Marry, being 210 Years, with infinite care and cost, preserved Calais against all Comers, as a Sacred Jewel of the Crown; however a sort of new Policy seems of late to have been introduced. He that fights out of his Country, seldom ventures any thing besides an Army; but he that is assaulted, and beat upon his own Dunghill, commonly loseth that with the Victory, or at least suffereth ten thousand Calamities, besides the usual terrors of Invasion: Whereof the Sweeds Descent into Germany, by virtue of her King's Courage and Alliances (such as I drive at) is a wonderful Example; wherein a puissant Emperor (armed and victorious as France is now) was courageously set upon, and after a fierce War of sixteen Years, and the death (as is supposed) of three hundred thousand Germans, torn to pieces by so many eager Confederates, (whereof France was none of the small ones) who by the deep Counsels of those mighty Oracles, Richelieu, and Oxenstern (guided peradventure by a Divine hint) pursued this Method as the likeliest way to chastise and humble that haughty Family, who otherwise, possibly, would by piece-meals, or drowsy Peace, have swaggered, if not subdued Europe. Let brave Princes for the common safety of Christendom, repeat this Counsel on another Theatre, the Scale may soon be turned, and France most justly be chastised with her own terrible Scourge forty years after; otherwise it must be a long, and unlucky War managed by France on the Soil of other Princes to make her miserable so long as she enjoys Peace at home; allow her that, and she may tug hard with Christendom; like Spain, who by virtue of the Domestic Peace, contended, in effect, with all Europe for eighty years, and put them shrewdly to their Trumpets: Nothing more, than Peace at home, enables a Prince to manage Wars abroad; he than that will humble his Enemy, must throw Wild fire into his Bosom, carry the War into his Country, and strike home at the Head, and Heart.  
Nor are the ill Humours, which, peradventure, may be found in every Country, the meanest Argument to excite an Invasive War; since poor Germany received the deepest Wounds from his own Weapons, and France by her Arbitrary Government, and Intolerable Impositions (to omit the natural fickleness of her People, the oppressed Hughenots, and the lofty, and never dying Pretences of the House of Conde) hath probably prepared combustible matter wherewith at any time to consume herself, when once, especially her Neighbours, with powerful Arm, bring Flames unto it, which otherwise (as we have there often seen within this thirty years) is, in effect, as soon extinguished as begun.  
Why then does Europe slumber, and meekly suffer such dangerous Clouds to increase, and impend, till of themselves they break about their Ears? Our common Safeties invocate our common Arms to assail this Lion in his Den, pair his Claws at least, and abate his fierceness, and instead of expecting him in ours, attack him vigorously in his own Country on the next just Provocation, since nothing is more certain than that delays, and softness fortify the Danger, and improve that, which, in Prudence, is now resistable, into a folly to withstand: 'Slight distempers, at first despised, prove oftimes deadly; whereas to meet with a Disease,  it come to the Crisis, is a probable means to ascertain the Cure, and Venienti occurrite Morbo may be as choice a Maxim in Government, as Aphorism in Physic. Pax queritur bello was a shrewd Motto of a bad Man, and aught, more justly, on this occasion, to be wrote in Capital Letters on all the Confederate Standards of Europe: In fine, he that sees not an absolute necessity of embracing speedily a Confederate War to abate the Edge of this Illustrious Pretender, hath either not duly weighed the Danger, has some vile, and by-ends, Bedlam mad to introduce some Heresy, or is resolved to truckle. Tanti Religio potuit suadere malorum.  
I should tremble to sound a Trumpet to War (which is always accompanied with fearful Circumstances) did I not from my Soul believe that a Supreme Peace, like an incurable Gangreen, would create greater Calamities, and introduce both a certain War, and the hazard of a total Subversion; for, if whilst we become mere Spectators of our Neighbor's Losses, and Calamities, this Prince, either by force, or subtlety improve his Dominions, we can expect no other favour but the miserable satisfaction either to be last devoured, or shamefully imposed upon; which sounds so dolefully in every freeborn Ear, that to prevent it, nothing can be esteemed too dear; whereas a speedy Arming of all the Confederates may not only repel, but force the Infection into his own Bowels, and make him experimentally feel those Miseries, which, merely to aggrandise his Name, and Kingdom, he has incompassonately brought on others; whereof I may not doubt, when I consider how one of His Majesties three Kingdoms by the proper Virtue of her Kings (which were truly Heroic) and the slender help of some one Confederate, hath more than once made terrible Impressions in France, and turned up even the Foundations of her Government; for which those brave Princes will be eternally celebrated, whilst the Memory of the Slothful, and Voluptuous perish, who by forgetting their own, and their Nation's Honour, have taught their own, and future Ages to forget and dishonour them; so true is it, that that Prince who Reigns without Honour, lives in Contempt, and Danger, and has his Tomb, at last besmeared with Reproaches.  
Men cannot be wanting for so honourable, and necessary a War, whilst these three Kingdoms enjoy Peace at home; nor Money, (the Soul of War) if prudently managed; since the Issue of such a War must, with the Divine Blessing, secure the Subjects in their Beds, and establish such a Peace as may be a lasting Happiness to the Christian World; they will therefore certainly tear open their Breasts, and give the King their Hearts, and with them their Hands, and Purses, whilst with Cato they esteem nothing too dear for the Peace of the Commonwealth, according to the Dutch Motto, Defend us, and spend us.  
And although we must not expect a cheap War, yet certainly it cannot be dearer than a watchful, suspected, and languishing Peace; since if His Majesty maintain; for his share, maintain 14 or 15 thousand Foot, and 4000 Horse, the pay whereof will not exceed five hundred and thirty thousand Pounds per Annum, nor go beyond a yearly Tax of 10 pence in the Pound; a Sum, which otherwise (with much more) must be yearly spent in watching a seeming Friend that he become not a real Enemy, and yet not be able to prevent it at last. Nor needs this Treasure be exported in Specie, (which by all imaginable ways ought to be avoided as part of our Life-blood) but the value thereof transported in the Growths, and Manufactures of England, (besides Clothes for the Soldiery) which either His Majesty's Ministers may there expose to Sale, or our Confederates be obliged to answer quarterly at a certain Rate; being assured the Sweeds maintained that long War in Germany without drawing any Silver out of their Dominions, but contrariwise enriched their Country with the choiceth Spoils of their Enemies, as by woeful experience we have found the Scots wisely to practise upon us.  
I know it will be Objected, that we are in an untoward pickle to begin a War, after so many hideous Calamities, grievous Impositions, and universal fall of our Rents, occasioned by a thousand Follies; and why shall we throw off Peace a moment sooner than we must needs lose her, seeing with the loss of her, our Trade must be miserably interrupted?  
To which I answer, That were the continuance of Peace, and Trade to be always at our Option, and that probably, the power of no Neighbour could ever part us, he were beyond the Cure of Hellibore that would propose War in their stead; but seeing the Case is quite contrary, Peace, and Trade were better suspended for some years, with probable hopes to enjoy them plentifully afterwards, then after a short enjoyment, to humour an unreasonable fondness, lose them and freedom eternally. Not but that I am powerfully persuaded, that the very commencement of such a War, may be so far from interrupting our Trade a moment, that it may be, at once, the only means to enlarge ours, and beat the French out of hers: Whereas we now plainly see, how during this present uncertain Peace, she dilates her Commerce, and thrives on the Ocean; which with the very first approaches of a Confederate War, must in all probability vanish; whilst the Dutch and We have thereby so many advantages both to beat her out of Sea, and increase our own Navigation and Traffic. This is certain, such a War cannot prejudice us, by hindering our Trade with her; it being notoriously known that our Commerce there, is, at once, mischievous to us, and strangely advantageous to her, whether you respect the open, or clandestine Traffic: First, in the Quantity, by the vast overbalance of her Commodities. And Secondly, in the Quality of them; those which she receives from us, being such as are necessary, and useful to her, and infinitely disadvantageous to us, as our Wool, etc. whilst we import nothing thence but what we were a thousand times better to be without; and such as if we consume them not, must, in effect, perish on their hands, to the infinite prejudice of her King, and People, as we know they now suffer by the Dutch late prohibition of Brandy, Salt, etc. and which, to gratify our ill tutred Humours, and Appetites, subdue our Rents, corrupt and impoverish our Nobility and Gentry, destroy our Manufactures, and snatch the Bread out of the Mouths of our Artificers, and by consequence increaseth our Poor, and render us the most vain and luxurious Creatures in Europe.  
And although I cannot magnify our present condition, and fitness for War, yet certainly 'tis safer enterprising her abroad (as shaken as we are) with the help of powerful Confederates (whose Shoulders may bear part of the burden) whilst there remains fresh hopes of Victory, than slumber in a dangerous Peace, till invincible Mischiefs awake us, our Neighbours subdued, our Trade expired, War brought to our Doors by a triumphant Enemy heightened by Conduct, and Successes, and Cockpit Law against us; hoping now by a reasonable Army, (such as the Nation may maintain in Pay, and Courage) and the joint Force of Confederates, to reduce the Scale, and confirm that Peace which thrice their numbers, and triple Charge at another time cannot procure; and of all Evils the least is always to be chosen.  
If I be asked what Assurance can Princes have of Alliances, since all Ages afford untoward Instances of foul play therein, to the Ruin, commonly of the most sincere, and daring?  
Not to distinguish between the dissimulation of the South, (where under the Name of Prudence, and Circumspection, Falsehood, and Frauds are daily reverenced) and the sincerity of the North, (where most of our Alliances are:) Nor debate the difference between Leagues commenced by Revenge, Passion, or some frivolous Capricio, (which are no sooner patched together then rend asunder) and those led on by the exact Rules of common Safety and Government (whose results are immortal) I answer, That honourable Leagues hold commonly Inviolable until the several Fundamental Interests of the Confederates are secured: Now 'tis almost impossible that any Princes true Interest can be secured whilst France remains so Mighty, and Rampant: Let a League hold till her swaggering Fit be over, her Nails pared, and she reduced to terms of Modesty, and good Neighbourhood, and then let the Allies fall off as they please: I know in all Leagues of this nature, differences from several little Interests have risen, how far it has been safe, or necessary to weaken the common Enemy; wherein some have always been fiercer for a total Subversion than others, as in the miserable Case of Germany, wherein nothing would satisfy the Sweed, and French, but dividing the very Carcase of the Imperial Eagle, whilst the rest of the Confederates were contented to cut off her Beak, and Talons; yet they all agreed in this, that she was to be reduced and weakened: But suppose that Allies should prove false when once a War is commenced, what would it do else but at once hasten the ruin of them all? And in the mean time instruct the deserted Prince to yield to larger terms, outbid the Apostates, stoop to the Pretender, (who, as a generous Conqueror must pity such) and with him, in revenge, set upon the perfidious, and make them eternally repent such unworthiness, unless safe Counsels in the mean time present.  
Again, it may be objected, that Peace ought to be preserved as long as may be, in hopes that this busy, and dangerous Prince may expire e'er his haughty Designs are accomplished, and the Affairs of France fall thereby into the hands of an Infant, or a lazy and effeminate Prince, (that is worse than a Child) accompanied (as commonly) with corrupt, faithless, or factious Counsellors, and Flatterers, the Vermin of Court, and Plague, and Ruin of Crowns and Sceptets, whereby (without the hazard of a War) her huffling, and prosperous condition (as frequent examples tell us) may be rendered languishing enough.  
I answer, That that which may be, may not be, and either this active Prince, who is now but 32, may live (without a powerful Confederacy) to give Europe a woeful conviction of the Folly of such lazy Counsel, or leave a Successor to tread in his glorious Steps, till that be accomplished, which all but Frenchmen aught to abhor, whatever their Religious Persuasions are; and what wise man will expose, even his little private Affairs to such a Risque, when safer Remedies are at hand.  
If it be said, That in case our Neighbours think fit to invade us, we have store of sampson's to give them Warlike Entertainment, whereby we may defend our own without concerning ourselves in Affairs abroad.  
I answer, First, This is clearly against the practice of our renowned Ancestors, and of all wise States in all Ages, who have chosen to fight their Enemies on an Enemy's Soil at any rate, rather than suffer the Terrors and Desolations of an Invasion, though the Enemy should have perished all on the spot. Secondly, There is a Moral Impossibility to maintain England otherwise then in a languid and frightful condition, were her sampson's twice as many, should France (whilst we slumber) reduce the Spanish, and United Provinces, and annex the greater part of Germany to his Flourishing and Mighty Kingdom; Acquisitions whereof he has too fair a Prospect. Thirdly, I dare affirm, that nothing but invincible Necessity, or ill Counsel ever disposed a Prince to receive an Enemy into his own Bowels instead of seeking him abroad, for which I humbly offer these Reasons.  

1. The Assailants both in their own, and their Enemy's Opinion (which in War, works mighty Effects) have commonly the Reputation of being the better Men, merely because they have the courage to seek the Enemy at his own door.  
2. The Invador seldom ventures any thing besides an Army, which ten to one is exceedingly strengthened (especially if his usage, or pay be good) by either Malcontents in Church, or State, or Necessitous Persons, to whom Novelty is welcome, and all Governments alike; a Reason which made Lycurgus' fear to see a Beggar, or a voluptuous Person, who rides Post to Poverty, dwell in Sparta.  
3. The assailed Prince, in case he has not a standing Army, and mighty Treasure, is, by an Invasion cast into ten thousand straits in procuring Moneys, and raising Men, when he should be fight the Enemy, or securing the Country; whilst the people instead of taking Sword in hand fly with their amazed Families before the Enemy they know not where, cursing the Follies of the Government which have undone them, whilst Invasions seldom leave other Counsellors but Fear and Revile, whose Results are always wild and preposterous.  
4. If a Prince has not a Treasure of his own, he shall scarce command the Purses of his Subjects upon an Invasion, when they are busier in concealing their Money to supply their own wants in the day of Calamity, then expend it in defence of the Public, which their fond hopes insinuate may either be saved without it, or fears suggest is past recovery with it, as was clearly seen in the loss of Constantinople, when taken by Mahomet the Great; unless the Subject has an egregious Reverence for the Government, and Counsels of the Prince, as the Results of his Justice, and Virtue, whereof the great Queen Elizabeth in the attempt of 88 is a Glorious Instance.  
5. Soldiers are generally observed to be most warlike, and managable farthest from home, when freed from the Cares and Addresses of Wives and Families.  
6. The Prince assailed had need stand right in the Opinion of his people in relation to his Religion, Treasure, and Government; for if they (who in all Disasters will be Judges in spite of Fate) have once lost all Sentiments of Veneration, and Confidence of him through Mis-govovernment, they soon grow to despise and naciate all his Actions, Distrust, and preindicate his Counsels, invocate the Ghost of some glorious Ancestor, and are easily won by the next Comer.  
7. The Prince assailed doth not only on a Battle or two venture his Country, wherein if he be beaten, he is certainly Conquered, but if he subdue the Aggressors, he has only their Carcases to atone for the devastation of his Country (the certain effect of Invasion, and next to a Conquest, the business of an Enemy) which hastens Barbarity, and a certain Carelessness, and opens an easy way to the next comer; as it fared with this Island in relation to the Danes, Saxons, and Normans, whose Conquests and Pressures made way one for another; so true is it, that Poverty weakens the hands, and intimedates the hearts of mankind, and also renders Country's not worth keeping.  
8. 'Tis the fundamental Interest of Princes to keep the Balance even, which is not to be done without Confederacies, & warring upon the growing and dangerous Monarch, it being certain that Armies, Fleets, and Fortresses (though highly valuable in their kind, and without which Kingdoms are defective) secure a Country not half so safe, or cheap as parity of strength among Neighbouring Princes.  
9 A Prince, who with his sampson's intends only his own defence, without regard had of his Neighbour's Peace and Safety, may one day fall without the help or pity of his Neighbours, as the Excellent Sir Philip Sidny observes, he that only stands on his own Defence, stands on no Defence.   
For these Reasons a Kingdom abounding with Sampson's ought therefore to encounter the Philistines in the Philistines Country to prevent their marching into Canaan; since every Prince, by the plain Rules of Discretion, ought rather to humble the thriving Monarch by making his Country the Theatre of War, (whereon is acted nothing but Horrors, and fearful Representations) then see his own even with Victory, a Field of Blood and Desolation  
Lastly, If from the doubtful event of War it be alleged that Peace even on any terms ought to be maintained.  
I answer, That from the uncertainty of War there remains to us as much hopes of success, as fear of miscarriage, but from a Supine Peace we have only a certain assurance to be subdued at last, without the least rational hopes to escape; for let France extend her Conquests and Triumphs, whilst we bask and wantonnize in Peace, and no imaginable softness and compliance of ours can oblige her, till she has justly branded us with some hateful marks of Subjection; this sort of Peace being like a Mercenary Woman, enchanting at first, but ready enough at last to betray us to a thousand Mischiess, when once her vile ends are accomplished: And the better to represent this Danger, we must consider what inclinations France has to us, when during the late Dutch inglorious attempt at Chatham (whereunto by our own nakedness and prostitution they were invited, and by what else I know not) she was upon the point of Invading us with a Royal Army, though Affairs seemed not then ripe for so high an Attack; which if she had nevertheless performed, what dreadful Effects must have ensued, I leave them to judge, who, (with myself) either saw our strange Consternation upon the Attempt of a weak, yea and modest Enemy in June 1667, or ever beheld a powerful Army in an Enemy's Country; and although peradventue we might have destroyed them, yet if they had stood but two months to an end, and harrassed four or five Counties, it had been far less Charge to the Nation (besides our dishonour and hazard of our Navy, and Naval Stores) to have born the Expense of an Offensive War so many years together: Nor must we imagine this haughty Design of France (where the easy Conquests of England, and her drooping Condition is lately exhibited in print) is otherwise then wisely deferred till she is become our Rival at Sea, and Flanders subdued; for both which she now bids fairly, unless by some Potent Confederacy she be happily prevented: And when in our weekly Audiences I read of the French Growth, and Marine Preparations especially, (which our Glorious Queen though Friend enough to Henry the Fourth, abhorred to suffer, knowing the consequence to be such which by Experience we now find) and yet see the World inclined to slumber; I cannot discern whether we are warned to a generous Resistance, or to prepare our Necks for the Yoke: In the mean time the Ghost of that renowned Woman (who yet loves her Country even in the shades of Death) reproves us for suffering these French thus to increase at Sea; and from her profound Experience recommends to us Justice, and Thrift in Public Treasure, (as the main Pillar of the Government) and War in the great Pretenders Country; (as the best Expedient to keep Peace at home) from which Rules the Prince that swerves must end Ingloriously, and be content to be hard censured by Posterity; however out of fear he may escape his own Generation.  
FINIS.