Imprimatur.  
Ex aed. Lond. Oct. 3. 1664. Tho. Grigg, R.P.D. Episc. Lond. à sacris domesticis.   

Lex Pacifica: OR GOD'S OWN LAW OF Determining Controversies Explained and asserted, in A SERMON Preached at Dorchester, at the Assizes holden there for the County of Dorset, August 5. 1664.  
By JOHN MARTIN, Rector of Horsey's Melcombe.  James 3.18. 
— The fruit of righteousness is sown in peace of them that make peace.  
LONDON, Printed by J. G. for Richard Royston, and are to be sold by John Courtney Bookseller in Salisbury. 1664.   

To the Honourable, Sir Matthew Hale Knight, Lord Chief Justice of His Majesty's Court of Exchequer; and Sir John Archer Knight, one of His Majesty's Justices of the Court of Common Pleas; Judges for the Western Circuit: And To the Right Worshipful, Thomas Freke Esquire, High Sheriff of the County of Dorset; together with the Right Worshipful, His Majesty's Justices of the Peace in that County.  
My Lords and Honourable Gentlemen,  
'tIs not any fond Conceit (bred and encouraged from your acceptance of this Discourse) that hath made me entitle the Respect of it to so Honourable and numerous a Partage. The public Address of it (had I esteemed myself wholly free) must have directed itself (the duty of a Chaplain obliging me) only to Master Sheriff; whose noble and prudent Deportment in the face of his Country, cannot but justify as well as challenge a property of Homage from others, besides his known Dependants. But as by Master Sheriffs command (the only Person, I think, that could have set me that task) I became (at first) engaged to the Pulpit; so can I not think myself acquitted from that obligation, by preaching a maimed Sermon to so Reverend and Judicious an Auditory.  
We read of Mephibosheth, that When tidings came of Saul and Jonathan out of Jezreel, that his Nurse took him up, 
2 Sam. 4.4.  and making haste to flee, he fell, and became lame. The like misfortune (a truth which every one than observed not) happened unto this Discourse, by the haste I made upon strict commands to shorten your trouble, (though the tongues of Gainsayers may (sometimes) as hastily be fled from, as the swords of Philistines) this Discourse became lame; and I knew no better remedy for its halting, (at least not other satisfaction of Master Sheriffs last Injunction) than to present it to my Honourable and Learned Auditors upon its legs: which, if not so clean and becoming as Orators may expect, nor so firm and sinewed as Divines may require; yet may they be fit enough to go of an errand of Charity to my Christian Brethren, and to bring home your pardon for this (but) necessary piece of boldness in,  
My Lords and Honourable Gentlemen, Your meanest and humblest Servant, JOHN MARTIN.   

Lex Pacifica: Or Gods own Law of Determining Controversies explained and a sserted.  Deut. 17.12. 
— And that man that will do presumptuously, and will not hearken unto the Priest (that standeth to minister there before the Lord thy God) or unto the Judges; even that man shall die, and thou shalt put away the evil from Israel.  
THat there might be (for this time) some alliance betwixt the Bench and the Pulpit, I have read for my Text this recapitulatorie branch of one of Moses Laws; of that kind, Divines have commonly styled, the Judicial Laws: The Scripture by a Metonymy calls them Judgements, because they are such Laws as God himself appointed unto the Jews, to be dispensed out in Acts of legal Justice; for Judgement is the Act of justice in particular cases, 
a De Justit. & Jure, lib. 2. c. 29. Dubit. ●● n. 4. Idem Aut quin. & Sot. & all i  per modum causae praecipientis & obligantis, says a Lessius: as flowing from a cause, commanding and obliging to the exercise of such Acts.  
Reduceable they are unto four heads. First, such as instructed the Magistrates in their duty towards the People. Secondly, such as taught the People their duty towards the Magistrates, and of one man towards another. A third sort informed them, how to demean themselves towards Strangers. And a fourth kind directed them in the Domestic duties of their private Families. The Division duly considered, shows the excellency of the Jewish Policy, in that the body of their Laws extended to all the Eminent parts, and orders of Society.  
The Obligation of these Laws (as delivered by Moses) is by Divines usually affirmed, not to reach unto us Christians: the reason is, because they are Positive Laws; and Positive Laws, though given by God himself, oblige only that People unto whom they are given; it being the sole prerogative of Innate Law, (that is, of the Law of Nature) to lay a common Obligation upon all Mankind.  
But forasmuch as that same is an undoubted truth which Tertullian speaks in his book of Single marriage, 
De unis nuptiu, c. 7.  [qua adjustitiam spectant, non tantùm reservata permaneant, verùm & ampliata;] Christians are not only bound to equal, but to exceed, all others in matters of justice and honesty, (agreeable to our Saviour's [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] in Mat. 5.17.)  
And being these Laws have ever been had in great veneration in the Church of Christ, wise and virtuous Princes having made them their Pattern for Laws, as appears by the Preamble to our own King Alured's. Saxon Laws: 
S H. Spelman, circa an. Chr. 887. in Concil. Britan.   
And forasmuch as Divines have recourse unto these Laws, in debates, and for resolution of many weighty points, as of Marriage within prohibited degrees, payment of Tithes, Usury, and some others; there be these three Corollaries that depend thereon.  
First, that many of these Judicial Laws are Conclusions, evidently deduced from the Law of Nature; and are very apposite and suitable to Ecclesiastical and Civil Government, as well now amongst Christians, as formerly amongst the People of the Jews; and  
Secondly, that for that reason, such of them as shall be by Supreme Authority judged fit, may be assumed, either among the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (as 
d In praesat. ad Collect. Canon.  Antiochenus styles them) the Divine Canons of the Church, or the Decreta Comitiorum (as we term them) the Statute-laws of Civil Government.  
And thirdly, that such of them as shall be so re-invested with the force of Law, will be reducible to that kind of Laws, which some Divines have rightly styled 
e Suarez de leg. l. 3. c. 14. n. 4.  [leges partim declarativae, & partim constitutivae] laws partly declarative, and partly constitutive: declarative, in respect of the matter of them, as having been the subject of some former Law; and constitutive in regard of their present power to oblige, imprinted on them by the Authority and will of the Lawgiver. The Obligation of which Laws, that it is in the conscience of the Subject (and by consequence a sin not to obey) no man without affronting Nature and Religion can deny.  
And upon this foundation, I shall by God's assistance superstruct a disquisition of these three Particulars, as the heads of my following discourse.  
First, what the tenor and purport of this Judicial Law is, of which we treat.  
Secondly, whether this Law may be revived by supreme Authority. And  
Thirdly, whether there be not either formally or equivalently, the like Law in this Church and State in which we live.  
In the prosecution of these, I shall crave leave to follow the Counsel of Epicurus in 
f Diog. Laert. lib. 10.  Laertius [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,] not to present you with the Flowers of Rhetoric; to be more careful to garnish the Dish, than to season the meat; especially for such an Auditory, whose parts and callings must needs furnish them with abilities, to concoct far more solid matter and learning than can be expected from my very Ordinary skill and capacity.  
First then, concerning the tenor and purport of this Judicial Law.  
And here if my Obligation to discourse of this particular Law, would permit me to speak of Laws in general, amongst many other things, that might be said, I should not omit to take notice of the opinion the Heathens themselves had of the Sacredness, and of the Necessity of Laws. Of the Sacredness of Laws, in that the prime Heathen Lawgivers endeavoured to persuade the people that their Laws were of Divine extraction; Amongst the Greeks, Minos feigned to have received his Laws from Jupiter; Lycurgus, his from Apollo; and Zaleuchus, his from Minerva; as 
g Strom. lib. 1● p. 352.  Clemens Alexandrinus tells us: and for the Romans, Numa Pompilius his famed addresses to the Goddess Egeria for instructions in making of Laws, are notorious to all; Foreseeing belike the importance of that truth, the 
h Curtius' l. 8.  Historian acutely observes, as the reason why the Persians were wont to deify their Kings; Majestatem imperii salutis esse tutelam; their opinion of the Necessity of Laws is inferred from their conceit, that 
i Euseb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. vid. Sca. Animad. p. 19  Phoroneus, whom they fancied to be the first Lawgiver, was likewise the first man; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (as 
k Lib. 32. 1. Phoron●us Moist Antiquior 300. an. Sic Euseb. & Aug. docent; cum tamen proecess●●unt regna Assy●. Argyv. Egypt. sed Regna legibus priore. Liv. l. 3. Just. l. 1, etc.  Nonnus calls him) as if all that lived before him had not been men for want of Laws; (what think you would they have thought of them, who will not live like men under just Law?)  
But the due regard of method having confined me within narrower bounds, I shall in as few words as conveniently I may, endeavour fully to explain this Law, by insisting on these four particulars, or integrant parts of Law. 1. Interdictum. 2. Censura. 3. Sanctio. 4. Ratio finalis legis.  
The 

1. Interdict.  
2. Censure.  
3. Sanction, and  
4. Final Reason of this Law.    
1. The Interdict of this Law is this, That if it happened, either through the ambiguity of words, or exception of cases, that there arose any doubt of the extent, or meaning of any Judicial, or Ceremonial Law, in inferior or local Courts of Judicature, the Question was to be brought before the great Sanhedrin, or Council of Jerusalem: and there a definitive Sentence being made, all both Judges and Litigants were bound under pain of death, not to reject and contradict the same; but it was to be put upon Record, as a Rule in such cases for the future.  
To make this more plain, we will suppose a Case that may be easily conceived to arise, out of the Law of their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or second Tithing, Deut. 14.22. The words of the Law are these, [Thou shalt truly tithe all the increase of thy seed, that thy field bringeth forth year by year.] Upon this Law it might be doubted, whether by a direct consequence drawn from this Law, the Jews were not bound to pay unto the Levites, in their first tithing, the tenths of all such things as grew in their Gardens. The reasons of which doubt may be, First, for that prudent men might conceive, that the Law intended no more, but a fit maintenance for the Priests and Levites; unto which such small things would but little conduce; and therefore that they were not included in the Law for Payment of Tithes. And secondly, because by the uncertainty of their estimation, they might raise contentions betwixt the Priests and the People; or occasion unnecessary scruples in men's consciences, and thereby introduce that post humous way of expiating involuntary Sacrilege by Mortuaries, as amongst us. And thirdly, because the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the Law, which is rendered a field, is sometimes (though but seldom) found to signify a Garden.  
Now if the great Sanhedrin at Jerusalem should determine, that the Jews were bound to pay Tithes of those minute things which grew in their Gardens, the People were obliged by virtue of this Law in the Text, to submit their practice unto that Decree; and if upon pretence of error therein, some 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 some contumacious Doctor (as the 
l Grot. ad Loc.  Jews called him) the same with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in the 
m Can. 16.  Apostles Canons, should factiously oppose the same, such a one was (by this Law) to be put to death.  
This Council at Jerusalem was the same with that the Text styles [the Priest, or the Judge] for in the ancient state of that Government (as 
n Lib. de Prin. constit.  Philo and 
o Advers. Ap. lib. 2.  Josephus tell us) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Priests had the hearing and determining of all controversies, in the ordinary way of Judicature; which course (as 
p In Chron. O 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, idem Baron. ex Phil. l. 2. de Temp. De hujus libri authoritate vid. Baron. ad An. Ch. 1. p. 83. n. 20 Plant. & add An. Chr. 32. p. 143.  Eusebius notes) was observed among them, (though not without some mixture of the Laity) till the reign of Herod the Great: in whose time the Sceptre being about to departed from Judah, (the authority whereof had been till then preserved in this Sanhedrin, and the Assamonaei; and 
q p. 10. n. 15.  Baronius in his Apparatus shows you how) Herod, I say, upon reasons of State slew them all but one, and substituted a Council of Proselytes in their stead.  
Let no man think that the Tribe of Levi, either took too much upon them, or had too much conferred upon them, by this honour of Judicature; it was no more than the Heathen-world bestowed upon their ignorant and Idolatrous Priests; for the Ethiopians, 
r Lib. 17.  Strabo; for the Egyptians, 
s lib. 14.  Aelian; for the Persians, 
t In chron.  Eusebius; for the Athenians, 
u Lib. 14. Ant.  Josephus; for the Gauls and Britain's, 
x Lib. 6  Caesar; for the Romans, 
y Lib. 2 d legib.  Cicero, are authentic witnesses.  
Nor was the Impostor Mahomet wanting to the reputation and advantages of his Religion by the like design: whose Priests always sit with the secular Magistrates; their Alcoran or Scripture (after the manner of the ancient Councils) lying before them; as if all were done by an infallible rule, and the judgement were Gods.  
But it almost exceeds belief, in what veneration and power that Order of men was in this Land, for some hundreds of years after this Nation had received the Faith; and that not by any precarious favour of Princes, or by an ignorant fondness of the People; but established their honour was by Law; by which every Priest was accounted Thani rectitudine dignus, as appears by the 
a Can ult. de Wer●gildis, i. e. cap tum aestimati●nibus. Vid. S. H. Spelman in epist. ad Reg. Jac. ib.  Laws of King Ethelstan; (a respect, which I shall neither arrogantly, nor unseasonably communicate unto vulgar ears.) The reason whereof is not only that which our learned Antiquary gives us in his English Councils [Quip sub his saeculis apud ipsos solum esset literarum clavis, etc.] because the learning of that age was wholly ignorssed by some of the Clergy; the Priest being the Oracle of the People, as the Bishops were of the King and Kingdom: but there is another, and (perhaps) a stronger reason to be collected out of those words, in one of King 
b Si quis arrogans pro Episcopi justitia e●●ndare noluerit, Episcopu● Regi notum faciat. Rex au●ë constringat mal●facto en, ut emendat, cui soris secerit, scil. pr●mum Episcopo, deind sibi, & sic erunt ibi duo gladii, & gladius gladium juv●b●t. H●veden. Annal. par. post. Hen. 2. p SIXPENCES. n. 50. Edit. Savil.  Edward's Laws [& gladius gladium juvabit] from the reciprocate assistances of the temporal and spiritual swords: Christians then believing, that there was as much credit to be given unto those, as to any other words of our Saviour, Mat. 18.18. [Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in Heaven, and whatsoever ye shall lose on Earth shall be loosed in Heaven.] But this honour and power, together with the immunities of the Church, sub Normannicis Regibus nutare coepit, says that 
c Sir H. S. ib.  Author; and in the Council of Clarendon under Henry the second, they received a grievous wound: which hath more or less continued bleeding ever since: and 'tis to be feared would have done so, till the spirits of all Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction had been clean exhausted, if Experience (which is sometimes the Mistress of wise men, as well as of fools) had not bound up the wound with a probatum est, No Bishop, No King.  
I speak not this, as if I thought it either convenient, or necessary, that the Clergy should concern themselves in matters of civil Judicature: (Pity it were that so active and learned a Gentry as this Nation is wont to produce, should betwixt doing nothing, and doing ill (which would be the certain consequent of that other design) degenerate from the worth and lustre of their Ancestors!) that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or power of self-Government, which the Primitive Church did exercise (and for which, some men of late did so much struggle and contend,) though it cannot be denied to be lawful, yet was it cumbersome, and in many cases uneffectual.  
It could not stand with the Reputation of the Church of Christ to make appeals unto the Heathen Emperors, as the 
d Bulls. [ex Eu seb.] Synod Antioch. in P●●●●. n.  Council of Antioch was fain to do, under the affronts they received from Samosatenus the Heretic, after they had deprived him. Nor have the Popes themselves been wholly exempt from the like exigents, as appears by one instance for all, by the supplicatory Epistle of Pope, 
e Voel. tom. r. p. 213 & B●●. ad A●. Chr. 419.  Boniface to the Emperor Honorius; in the case of Schism, between the Popes themselves. So unuseful, if not unsafe, will be St. Peter's Keys, (though hanging at the Pope's own girdle) if they should lock up Caesar's sword.  
The sober and learned Clergy of this Church must needs know, that the Spiritual Jurisdiction stands in need of the temporal power: and that the Mitre is only safe, under the shadow of the Crown. Happy than it is for us, that Ecclesiastical Dominion can derive itself into the same fountain from whence descends the temporal authority: and that (like 
f Ps. 85.10.  Righteousness and Peace) the two Jurisdictions, can kiss each other in the Arms of Sovereignty: that among us, 'tis all one to be our King, and to be the Defender of the Faith: that the Sword is joined to the Word, and the Judge to the Priest.  
This Constellation of Power, as it is a Prognostic of security and happiness, to men of temperate spirits; so will it prove a terrible Omen, to such as despise Dominion, and leave their heady practices to the Censure of just Laws, which are the true Standard whereby to measure the crimes of Offenders; and not the Opinions of Ignorant and prejudicated men; which leads me to the second integrant part of this Law, Censura Legis.  
2. Such hath been the policy of Satan, that taking advantage of the ignorance, prejudice, interest, and vices of men, he hath sent some sins up and down the world like spies, with false names, that might not cause men to distrust and avoid them; they were not only carnal but spiritual wickednesses, which have wandered about in this disguise, compassing the world like him whose emissaries they are: not only pravae, but Piae frauds have on all hands cheated men of their precious souls; stellicidia mellis de Lebacunculo venenato, as Tertullian speaks, the Devil having poisoned the Limbecks from whence men hoped to have sucked most sovereign Elixirs: and dealt with the world as Praxiteles the Statuary in 
g Clem. Alex●d 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 29.  Posidippus did with the foolish Heathen, made his own Darlings to be worshipped by men's fancies, instead of a Deity.  
But as the judgement of God is according to truth in punishing sinners; so are the sins of men exactly recorded by Him in his Doomsday-book, at the approach of those everlasting burn. Drunkenness will not then be called good fellowshp; nor uncleanness a trick of youth; nor cheating a trick of wit; nor pride, decency, nor oppression, self-preservation; nor Rebellion, honesty; nor faction, Godliness; nor Sedition, standing for the truth; nor superstition, devotion; nor Sacrilege, reformation.  
How light soever it may seem to some in these days to reject the just commands of our Lawful Superiors in Church and State, yet ab initio non fuit sic: and how it came to pass, that that which was so grievous a crime among the Jews (Gods own people too) should be transformed into an heroic Virtue among Christians, will want some Oedipus to untie the knot.  
The Scripture itself bears witness of the heinousness of this Sin, allotting it a place among sins of the first magnitude, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  sins of presumption: [Qui autem superbierit nolens obedire] So the vulgar reads the Text, and before that the Septuagint (after the * original) [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.] and therefore 
h 22. q. 86.9.3.  Aquinas doth rightly define contempt to be [nolle subjici legi] not to submit one's self to just Law, and so 
i Suar de legib. c. 28. n. 13.  peccare ex contemptu, est peccare ex voluntate non se subjiciendi alteri, to be guilty of the sin of contempt is wilfully to refuse to submit ourselves to them that have a just and lawful authority over us.  
This sin is first brooded and hatched in the understanding; when that person, or his authority to whom we ought to submit, is less esteemed than he, or that aught to be: next it descends into the inward affections and passions of the mind; and there grows and strengthens itself, from a desire and contrivance of opportunities to express it, and to invite others to the same attempts: and lastly, it comes out, and shows itself to be a fiery flying Serpent, ready fledged and prepared for action; and discovers as much by Overt acts, as the Law calls them; whereby this pride and malice of the heart becomes discernible to all.  
A Sin it is, that of all others, carries with it the greatest provocation both with God and Man; 'tis not (always) so much the thing that is done, as the mind 
k Tunc non peccati species, sed peccantis intentio pensat. D. Bern. l. 1. de precept. & disp. c. 14. v. 27.  wherewith it is done, that gives unto this sin its true estimate and size. When God made Saul King, there were some that brought him no presents, 1 Sam. 10. the Exchequer 'tis like complained not for want of them; yet the Holy Ghost calls those men, sons of Belial; as having an eye upon the venom that lay in their hearts; they did it not, because they despised him. We read of one that not long after the commandment for observing the Sabbath was given, had gathered sticks upon that day; and was therefore, by God's especial appointment, stoned to death, Num. 15. the fact was but small, but his pride was great; he did it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 too, out of presumption, and so fell under their 
l Caninius disquis. c. 7.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 their judicium animarum (as the Jews called it) for he that despised Moses Law was to die without Mercy, as the Apostle tells us, Heb. 10.28. and 'tis the Sanction of this Law [even that man shall die] which is our third particular.  
3. Laws have generally in them a double power; directive and coercive: the first describes and appoints the duty, the second determines the punishment to be suffered, if the duty be not performed. Upon this follows a 
m Dr. Sanderson praelect. 6.  double obligation of the Subject by Law: the first is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Obedience; the second is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Subjection: the former we commonly style active, the later, passive obedience: active obedience is doing the duty; passive obedience is submitting to the punishment, if we do it not.  
The first Positive Law that ever was made in the world had these two, the directive and coercive parts. Gen. 2.17. [Of the Tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat] there's the directive part: [for in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt die the death] there's the coercive part.  
These two parts of Law, have respect to that twofold Power, which is in every man's soul; the Understanding, and the Will: the Understanding is the Card and Compass, the Will holds the Rudder, and steers the course of men's actions: that directs, this executes. Now because the Will is a free power, and may choose to do or not do; therefore the coercive part of Law is added, to restrain the Will from evil, in doing contrary to the rule of Law; for if the Will had no freedom in her actions, all the Laws of God and men, were (at best) impertinent. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. as Origen truly speaks, and with him two great Fathers of the Church in his 
n Ch. ●1.  Philocalia: and St. Cyril of Alexandria, of as good authority as any, says as much in his sixth Book de Adoratione in Spiritu & veritate.  
If this were not true, with Reverence to your Lordships be it spoken, you would return from your Circuit with sins upon your consciences, of the same colour with your Robes; I mean sins of blood, Scarlet sins, as the 
o Isa. 1.18.  Prophet calls them: it being utterly unreasonable, and therefore unlawful, to punish any man for doing that which he had no power to avoid. A consequence so inevitable; that some fanatics in the close of the late troubles, foreseeing the force of it, refused to assist in their Councils of War, because they would not concur in that man's punishment, whose actions (as they conceived) were no more contingent and free, than the motion of a stone, tending to the centre of gravity. The effect of which pernicious error, was most acutely foreseen by a great Statesman of ours, for almost an age since; as the late Reverend and learned 
p Part. 1. c. 6. s. 12.  Author of the Quinque-Articular History will inform you.  
This coercive part of Law belongs to vindicative justice, and appoints the punishment due to the breach of each particular Law; which is not always to take its measure from the fact materially considered, but in conjunction with the will, and other faculties of the soul. Intentio est quae dat praecipuam formalitatem in actibus moralibus, (say the 
q Aquin. 12 a. q 72 1.8. c. 3 a. q. 88.4: 1 m.  Schoolmen;) the intention gives the formality to the sin; and so creates that difference the 
r c. quu a. Dist 10.  Gloss observes, betwixt non parere and contemnere; of great importance with Casuists, in stating the nature and kinds of offences against Law, in foro interiori, or in the conscience: for in foro exteriori, or the public tribunal, there the Law judges of the intention by the fact, and not of the fact by the intention.  
The formality of the sin we speak of, stands in the [nolle obedire] in the Text; enough to exact the greatest punishment, especially from such a Lawgiver, who hath absolute Sovereignty over men's lives. Ego o●cidam, & ego vivere faciam, says God, Deut. 32.39. I kill, and I make alive; that is, say 
* V Soto. de just. & jur. l. 4. q 2. a. 3.  Expositors, I have the sole original right and authority of taking away man's life; and therefore Magistrates cannot take away the lives of Malefactors; or expose the lives of their Subjects to the hazard of just wars; as having absolute Dominion over men's lives; but as conservators of the Peace, and public good. And upon this ground it is, that it is injustice in them, to make Laws, that have punishments annexed unto them disproportionate to the offence committed, especially in the excess; and from hence it is, that we account it but 
s Quoties poenam mortis imponebat transgressoribus alicujus legis, materiam ill●us legis suisse gravem, & de se susficientem ad peccatum mortale, significat. Scot in 4. d. 1. q 6. Sic Aug l. 2. de Bapt c 6.  reasonable, to conjecture what is the quality of the crime, by the nature of the punishment inflicted upon offenders; the crime here is contempt, the punishment's death: gravis poena, sed ad vitandum periculum omnium gravissimum, saith the learned and experienced 
t ad locum.  Grotius; a great punishment, but 'tis inflicted for prevention of the greatest mischief in the world: you will believe him, if you please to reflect upon the fourth and last integrant part of this Law; the Ratio finalis legis; the end why God made this Law, and secured it from the approaches of the foot of pride, by so severe a punishment; and that was, for prevention of Schism; expressed here Antonomasticus, [the evil;] and thou shalt put away the evil from Israel.  
4. Schism in the proper notion of it seems to me to be a thing not known to the Heathen world. 
u Serm 11. de verb. Domini.  S. Augustine (indeed) and 
x Lib. count. Gent. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc.  S. Athanasius tells us of many bloody quarrels that happened amongst them concerning their Idolatrous worship, but methinks there should be no Schism, (at least not properly any) where there is neither truth nor Church. But with Sedition, the younger Sister of Schism, (for Schism seems to be as old as that bloody quarrel betwixt Cain and Abel) the Heathen were so well acquainted, that Thucydides gives this true Character of the Monster, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that she it is that hath brought forth mischiefs of all shapes and sizes in the World. And Schism cannot but be thought so much the more Superior to Sedition, in the production of mischiefs; by how much the more fierce all quarrels and contentions are, that spring out of different opinions in Religion: and further, dissensions of this kind have, above all others, the strongest appetite of propagation. Agressours in factions of religion, labouring to have their names and opinions serve to that same end as Zisca, when he died, appointed for his skin; who being Leader of the Taberites (a faction in Bohemia) commanded that a Drum should be made therewith, (as Dubravius and others tell us) that something of Zisca might still be heard to sound, in the Ears of his followers, and their enemies.  
I shall not burden your patience by prosecuting the common place of Schism with infinite authorities out of the Fathers, setting forth the grievousness of this sin: it was the due consideration hereof, that made 
a 22 e q 39.2.3 m.  Aquinas to affirm Schism to be the greatest of all sins against our Neighbour; and that not only respectu circumstantiarum, in respect of the many circumstances and accidents that attend it; but likewise respectu speciei, in regard of its own nature; because it is the most contrary to Charity, and the love of our Neighbour; for it is contra spirituale bonum multitudinis, as he speaks; it is against the spiritual good of a multitude: so that we may say of Schism, as the 
* 1 Sam. 18.7.  Women of Israel sang of David; if other sins (like Saul) kill by thousands; Schism (like David) kills by ten thousands at a time. The Apostle in his Epistles calls it Heresy; and if noscitur ex sociis be a good Topick, you may judge what kind of sin it is, by the company amongst which you will find it, Gal. 5.19. 
b D Prescript. adv. Haret. l. 1 c 6.  Tertullian says, that word comes from a Greek Verb signifying [to choose] so that he makes Schismatics and Heretics to be such as will choose for themselves. The true definition is, 'tis a voluntary departure from the government of our lawful Superiors, and a refusal to communicate with our fellow-members, with a design of drawing followers after us. This is that poisoned Arrow which the Romanists would fain dart into the sides of the Church of England, and therefore make the formal reason of Schism to consist in a voluntary departure from the Pope, as being Christ's 
c Bell. lib. 2. de Ro Pont. c. 12  Vicar here on earth: but non haeret lateri lethalis arundo; we are yet to be convinced that the Pope is Christ's Vicar here on Earth, though we will not deny him to be St. Peter's successor in Rome. And as for our voluntary departure from a dependency on that Church, we have done no more, but asserted that just right we had to govern (and by consequence to reform) ourselves, by the 28. Canon of the fourth General Council: wherein 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, equal privileges with Rome, were granted unto Constantinople, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (for so 
d O 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Alex. Arist. in Synops. Can. 28.  Alexius Aristinus truly abbreviates that canon) because the seat of the Empire was transferred from Rome to Constantinople: how much rather do the like equal privileges belong to us, who have not only translated the seat, but the Empire too, (I mean of ourselves) from that City, of whose vast Dominion this Island was sometimes a part? But I return.  
This is that sin which God designed this Law to prevent, as a most intolerable evil: for without a power to determine Controversies, that should arise amongst a seeking and scrupulous party, it is not in the power of man to do it. And being therefore that it is God's manner, 
e Grot. ad lo●.  res humanas conservare modis humanae naturae congruentibus, to conserve the affairs of men, by ways & means agreeable to man's nature; and being that others besides the State and Church of the Jews, are liable to the like distempers and confusions; we may reasonably conceive it, not unfit to be examined, whether this Law may not be revived by Supreme Authority; which is my second Disquisition.  
2. The Respect of the directive part of this Law, is all that we inquire after; for, as for the coercive part thereof, we reinforce it not; hoc nunc agit in Ecclesia Excommunicatio, quod agebat tunc interfectio: Excommunication among Christians (saith 
f Quaest. sup. D ut. lib. 5. c. 38.  S. Augustine) in many cases commutes for temporal death under the Law; and let this be one of them.  
But for the directive part of this Law, why it may be revived by Supreme Authority, there be these Reason's producible, and fit to be soberly weighed by all that have a true Christian temper of mind in them.  
1. First, because the same thing was put in practice by the Apostles themselves, for prevention of the same evil, Acts. 15. for certain men which come down to Antioch from Judaea, having taught the Brethren and said, except ye be circumcised after the manner of Moses ye cannot be saved; the Apostles and Elders came together for to consider of this matter, v. 6. And having made a Decree concerning the point in controversy; how religiously it was observed, not only by Christians of that Age, but for more than 300 years after, 
g In Apolog. c. 9  Tertullian in his Apology, 
h Contr. Cells. lib. 8.  Origen against Celsus, 
i Eccle. Hist. l. 5. c. 1.  Eusebius, 
k Catech. 4.  Cyril of Jerusalem, 
l Epist. 154. ad Public:  St. Austin, and 
m Ep. 79. ad Nic.  Leo will inform such as please to inquire.  
2. Secondly, because the following Councils did never doubt of the like power in themselves, as oft as they came together, for determining questions of faith, or practise. I shall only instance in the 6. 
n Apud Balsam.  Canon of the third General Council; which pronounceth an Anathema on whomsoever should 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (which 
o In Synop. Can. conc. Ephes. c. 4.  Aristinus reads by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 
p 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ib. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Balsamon expounds by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) should but hesitate or doubt of, as well as oppose the Decrees of that Council.  
Now the Council of Ephesus we all know, met for determining a dispute about the person of Christ: for 
p Vide Cyril. Alex. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Nestorius had affirmed and taught, that the blessed Virgin was not the Mother of God, but of Christ: from whence a duality of persons must needs be inferred to be in the Son of God; and by consequence, that there was not a Trinity, but a Quaternity of Persons in the Divine nature. The Council did (as they needs must) determine against Nestorius; which determination though undoubtedly true, yet because it was a consequence drawn from Scripture, by the mediation of humane understanding, and the Council did so severely oblige all the Church to receive it, it must follow, that the Council had a full assurance of her power to define matters in controversy; and to oblige the members of the Catholic Church not to reject her determinations, under the pain of Anathema. The argument is of such weight in the judgement of the great 
q Bel de Conc. lib. 2.6.4.  Cardinal, that he sticks not to conclude an Infallibility of the Church from thence. I stretch it no further than to infer à majori ad minus, that, if there were a power in the Church, that under so grievous a punishment, could exact the reception of her Decrees in points of Faith; much more may the same Authority require obedience to her determinations in smaller (because practical) things.  
3. A third reason is; because it is absolutely necessary, that all public Societies, whether Ecclesiastical or Civil, be furnished with all necessary means to preserve themselves from those evils, which are apparently destructive of all governments: which evils are such as do inevitably produce discord, divisions and separations amongst the members of the same community; the only Remedy whereof, is an Authority and Power in the Governors, to hear and to determine all Controversies, and to bind the contending parties to acquiesce in their determinations.  
Not as if I thought, that a man were bound to believe every thing to be true, or best, that should be so determined: for this great Council of the Jews were not infallible, nor needed so to be; as appears by that Offering which God appointed to be offered, when the Congregation had trespassed through ignorance, Leu. 4.13. But, that the members of Church or State may be bound non contra agere; not to do that which is contrary to a definitive sentence.  
It is sufficient that in materia probabili (the common subject of humane Laws) there be a moral certainty in our Superiors, of the truth or goodness of what is thus defined: which is enough to oblige Inferiors to obedience; the Casuists rule holding good in this point [Sires sit dubia, praesumendum est pro Legislatore;] reason, modesty and humility, nothing dubiè (and that must be demonstratively) appearing to the contrary, will (at least) admonish us, to think the judgement of the Lawgiver the best and truest.  
4. A fourth Argument is; because it is a thing unreasonable to affirm or imply, that Government under he Gospel should be left in a worse, and inferior condition to the state of it under the Law; 
r 2 Cor. 3.8.  St. Paul having advanced the ministration of the Spirit, above that of the letter; that is, the Oeconomic of things under the Gospel, above that they had under the Law; of which things Government cannot be understood to be so inconsiderable a part, as to be excluded from having any share in that Evangelical Prelation; which yet must inevitably follow; if the same diseases remaining in the body politic, the Governors thereof should be debarred the use of the like Remedies: I mean, if Christians shall be (at least) as liable to faction and Schism, as any Jews whatever; and yet the highest authority amongst them, be not allowed sufficient means to prevent, and restrain men from Innovations.  
Add hereto, how ridiculous a thing it must needs appear to be, that men concerned in Government, should frequently meet, and consult about making of Laws, for such as had armed themselves against all force of Authority with this Principle, viz. that they were bound to receive no Laws, further than should stand with their own good liking and approbation. By which means it must come to pass, that it would be the task of the Magistrate, not so much to contrive Laws that might promote Truth, Peace, Justice and Virtue amongst men, as so to model his Laws, as might best secure, both himself and them from contempt.  
Ob. It may (perhaps) be objected, that there is a wide difference betwixt that God imposeth, and what men enjoin.  
Sol. To this I answer first, That it is to be observed, that God doth in this Law bind the Jews to follow, not what he himself, but what their lawful Superiors (the Priest or Judge) should define; to whom likewise he had not promised any infallible assistance, but on the contrary, had left them to the best use of their reason, which at best may err: and when actually it did err, yet were the Jews bound to follow, and not to dispute, the (but) erroneous determinations of that Council that sat in Moses Chair.  
And secondly, That the Law of God doth not exceed the just Law of the Church or State, in respect of the obligation, though it doth so in respect of its stability; the reason is, because the obligative force of Law, is from the essence or nature of Law, and is the necessary effect of Law. The Lawgiver doth not give to Law its essence, but its existence; he may choose to make this or that particular Law, but when he hath made a Law, that Law hath its force from its own specifical nature; for, that Law should bind, is quid aeternum & immutabile, it is an eternal and immutable, because it is an essential property of Law.  
5. Lastly, The revival of this Law is not opposite to Scripture, nor is the Scripture an adequate rule for all such things as are to be done by us in our several places and callings; from whence it must needs follow; that the multitude must stand in need of direction and determination, either from themselves, or from others, in many particular cases.  
Let no man think much that I have said, that the Scripture is no adequate rule for particular actions; for if this were not true, it must follow (as the late 
s Dr. Sanderson Praelect. 4. Sect. 14.  Reverend and Learned Bishop of Lincoln observes) that such as never had the Scriptures, never had any rule for particular actions; which is not only contrary to experience, but to that of the Apostle, Rom. 2.15. where he tells you, that the Heathens who had not that Law which God gave unto the Jews, did govern themselves in particular moral actions, by that Law which was written in their hearts.  
A principal but not an adequate rule of moral actions, we must acknowledge the Scripture to be; and therefore, as the Law of nature (by reason of its generality) doth stand in need of a supply, which it hath from the determination thereof, by particular humane Laws; so the Scripture, by reason of its generality (though not for that reason only) doth stand in need of a supply, from particular rules of particular actions.  
For in moral actions these two things are to be considered; First, The principal rule by which they are to be governed; together with the principal end unto which they are to be directed; and so the Scripture is a rule of all our moral actions, directing us to do all that we do in Charity, for edification of our Brethren, and for the Glory of God. The second thing, is that immediate and adequate rule, whereby the action we are about to do, is to be governed; and this (as it is not necessary that it should, so) the Scripture doth not prescribe; but, as in things left unto our own choice, we govern ourselves by that rule we esteem best, or good: so, as we are members of the Church or State, Reason cannot but tell us, that in particular actions, our understanding as well as our will, may stand in subordination to such as have a right and authority to govern us.  
Dissenters will easily be convinced by an instance in both. These Reverend and Honourable Persons (my Lords the Judges) have for performance of their duty, this rule of doing it from Scripture, Deut. 1.16. [Hear the causes between your Brethren, and judge righteously between every man and his Brother] this is the Principal rule of that action their Lordships are now upon; but the form, manner, time, place, yea the very rule of judging righteously between every man and his brother, is not prescribed in Scripture, but by the Laws of this Land, unto which their Lordships hold themselves bound to conform, as the adequate and immediate rule of their consciences, in administering justice in this Nation.  
The like instance I shall crave leave to give in a matter of exceeding great concernment to us, as we are members of this Church, and own obedience unto his Majesty's Ecclesiastical Laws. It is the command of our dear Saviour, our Lord and Master Jesus Christ, that the Sacrament of the Lords Supper be received often, in remembrance of his most precious death and passion, and for the actual application of the benefits thereof unto the worthy Receiver; and that this be done with such reverence and preparation, as becomes so holy and dreadful a mystery; but the gesture, time, place, manner, and other circumstances, are not prescribed by Scripture, but left in the power of the Church to determine (who hath the standard and rule of decency in her hands) nisi fortè tantum Sacramentum minùs deceat ordo, quàm confusio; unless that Sacrament be the only thing that is best set out by disorder and confusion, as 
t de Rom. Pont. l. 4. o. ●●.  Bellarmine smartly (if justly) replies upon the Centuriators; and the Apostle himself hath confuted with Judgements from Heaven, 1 Cor. 11.30.  
Ob. But here it will be objected, That if this be granted, Christian liberty would be no more but an empty name; and thousands of good Christians must hold themselves bound to submit unto such Laws, as are not agreeable to their particular consciences, which were to lose the fairest Jewel in the Crown of Reformation.  
Sol. To this I say, God forbidden but that every good Christian should have a due regard unto such things, as lie in common unto the whole profession, as Liberty and Conscience do; but we must remember, that non plus nomini, quàm veritati tribuendum, that we do not sacrisice truths to titles, and things to names.  
Liberty is a word that the whole world (in a manner) first learned from Luther, as that which dropped from Heaven into his arms; though many of his words and actions (applauded and imitated both then and since) could not be warranted by his very large Commission. I mean it not so much of his burning the Corpus Jur is Canonici in the public Marketplace, in token that he had set all the world free from Laws (which he did thereby as truly, as Xerxes bond the Hellespont, when he cast a chain therein), but rather of his contemning and reviling the Civil Magistracy, on whom in his book de potestate seculari, he bestows this Character, sunt communiter maximè fatui, & pessimi Nebulones super terram; which amongst other worse (if there could be worse) expressions, rendered him obnoxious amongst his enemies, to that sharp invective in the Diet at Worms [Exlex homo, leges ipsas omnes damnat, etc.] and made his friend 
u Con. Gesn. in universal. biblioth.  Gesner doubt what would become of that prodigious liberty; faxit Deus, says he, ne contentione & impudentiâ oris, obsit Ecclesiae suae. Yokes of unjust servitude may sometimes be broken, but Christians must not fling the Pieces of them in the face of supreme authority.  
But as for Christian liberty, I shall say in one word, that it is best known by its contrary, and that is, by that Spirit of bondage which was in the unconverted Jews; so that Christian liberty is no more but a freedom from the burden of the Ceremonial, and the curse and rigour of the Moral Law; from the guilt and from the Law of Sin; from the fear, and from the power of Death. This I take to be all that can be found in the Scripture, which is the Christians Magna Charta, the great conservatress of his Liberty. Laws therefore that preserve Order and Decency, and keep men from falling into sin (the only vassalage of a Christian) can by no means infringe, but rather advance Christian Liberty.  
As to the later part of the Objection that concerns private conscience, supposed in some to be oppressed by such Laws, to which others may as innocently as willingly submit, I answer, that it may justly cause all sober men to suspect, that there is some error and fascination in that opinion; Conscience of late, having justified the Jews miraculous Fable of their Manna, namely, that it had the taste of that which every one best liked; flesh to one, fish to another, and fruit to a third.  
Certainly men ought to be very jealous over the importunities of their Consciences against public Laws, when they shall reflect upon the miserable delusions of those Miscreants amongst us, who having besmeared themselves with the blood of their King, should dare publicly to justify (in the very face of Death and Judgement) so grievous a Crime, from the dictates of their private Conscience, and their following of God, as they termed it. Which last blasphemous expression will not suffer me to leave you unacquainted with that remarkable Caution for all in Authority, which fell many years since, from the Divine Pen of that incomparable 
x In praefat. Sect. 8.  Hooker, Impossible (saith he) it is, that ever the wit of man should imagine, what will grow out of such errors, as go masked under the Cloak of divine Authority, till time have brought forth the fruits of them: for which cause it behoveth Wisdom to fear the sequels thereof, even beyond all apparent cause of fear.  
But to speak something that may comport with the remainder of my time concerning this Objection.  
This maxim must first be laid down, as an unquestionable Truth, viz. 
y Suar. de Leg. l. 1.  Contra omnem rectitudinem est, bonum commune ad privatum ordinare, seu totum ad partem propter ipsam refer. Lawgivers judge what is fit for the common good; and unreasonable it were to stoop that unto private interests and respects. Supposing then that some Laws may appear contrary to some particular men's Consciences; What shall be done? obey contrary to their judgements, or disobey those Laws for conscience sake?  
For answer hereto, give me leave to say, first, That there is no contrariety betwixt a 
z Soto de Just. & Jur. l. 1. q. 6. art. 4.  just Law, and a good Conscience. That Law is undoubtedly a just Law, in which there is a concurrence of the justice of these four causes of Law, wherein the whole of it doth consist; That is to say, the justice of the final, efficient, formal, and material causes of Law. 1. It must be for the common good. 2. The Lawmaker must have a true legislative power. 3. The matter of the Law must be good, at least indifferent. And 4. lastly, It must have the right form of Law, i. e. it must be a rule of rectitude for humane actions. Such a Law doth necessarily oblige them to whom it is given; nor can it possibly be contrary to a good Conscience; because such a Law is conform to right reason, as right reason is conform to the Law of Nature; and the Law of Nature to that eternal Law in the mind of the Divine Essence.  
Let me give an instance or two. This is the Law of Nature, and to this right reason is conform, viz. That men live temperately. This Principle considered by the Lawmakers, they judge it fit to make a Law, prohibiting the eating some kinds of meats, as of flesh in the Spring or Lent, that thereby (amongst other reasons) Christians might show their temperance; which is not only an abstinence from excess in the Quantity of all; but, in regard of the Quality of some meats, as appears by Daniel's fast, in the 10. of that Prophecy, vers. 3. Such a Law as this, cannot be contrary to a good conscience, because it is appointed for the practice of a noble Virtue, to wit, Temperance.  
Again, as to the case in hand. This is a rule in the Law of Nature, That such as are Governors of others, use all prudent means to prevent Sedition and Schism in the Church and State. Now if Lawgivers are morally assured, that this cannot be done, without defining some things under dispute amongst their Subjects, and exacting from all a submission unto that rule, which they shall prescribe by Law, and shall thereupon enjoin an uniformity of practice unto all the community, such a Law cannot be contrary to a good conscience; the reason is, because the submission thereunto is an actual exercise of the Virtues of humility, obedience, charity and sobriety. So, that unless to practise even Cardinal Virtues, be contrary to a good conscience, There is no contrariety betwixt a just Law, and a good conscience.  
2. I answer secondly, That it is the opinion of many learned men both 
a Halensis, Ant. Henr. Carthus. Vasq, etc.  Divines and Canonists, That he that submits unto a just Law, though contrary to his own judgement, is not thereby guilty of sin. The reason I conceive to be, because no man is guilty of sin, in doing of that, which God expressly commands him to do. Now it is Gods express command, that Subjects obey their lawful Governors, not only for fear of wrath, i. e. punishment, but likewise for conscience sake, i. e. that by their obedience they might avoid the guilt of sin, Rom. 13.5. which obedience of Magistrates, it is impertinent for any one to say he performs, that refuseth to obey the just Laws of such as God hath placed in authority over him.  
Some (indeed) have thought, that there is a middle course to be taken in this case, and that willingly to submit to the penalty of the Law, is sufficient to discharge charge the conscience from all guilt of disobedience. The reason of this assertion is, because there is this rule in the Law [Et si non potest infligi poena sine causâ, potest tamen sine culpâ] there may be no fault for which a punishment may be inflicted, but there must be some cause.  
This I acknowledge to be the judgement of some excellent Divines; but withal, it is to be observed, that they confess it holds true, only in that sort of Laws which the Canonists term [Leges purè poenales] Laws purely penal; but it extends not unto [Leges mixtae poenales] Laws of a mixed nature.  
But, as those Laws which are purely penal, are very few, as appears by that Character of them which 
b Quoties per verba legis poenalis non declaratur sufficienter proprium praeceptum obligans ad actum, vel omissionem ejus, praesumendum est, esse legem purè poenalem. Suar. de Leg. l. 5. c. 4 n. 9  Suarez gives us; so are they not such Laws of which we now treat; for these are both moral and penal; and in this case, to undergo the punishment, doth not discharge the Conscience from the guilt of sin: the reason is, because there is a double obligation in every such Law; it binds either to do, or to omit some moral act; and it binds likewise to undergo the punishment, if that act be not done, or omitted, according to the appointment of Law. For it is a true rule, that omnis praeceptio obligat ad culpam; every just command of our lawful Superior, leaves a guilt upon the conscience of him that refuseth to obey.  
Now this is an hard case you'll say. So hard indeed, that I solemnly profess, that it cannot sink into my understanding, that our merciful God ever intended, that men should be reduced into such horrible perplexities, as this case imports: for nulla est necessitas delinquendi, quibus una est necessitas non delinquendi, saith 
c De Coron. Mil. c. 11.  Tertullian; and the case may be such, that a man may not be able to suspend his action; and then, sin he must whether he do, or not do as he is commanded.  
However I shall not be peremptory and Magisterial in a point of such infinite importance (as by the erroneous doctrines and imaginative practices of men, the same is now become) veris nitimur & verisimilibus non contradicimus, as the great Historian speaks. Reliance I would have only on Truth; but things so likely to be true, as that first opinion is, I shall not contradict. If obedience unto God's command, be a good Warrant against all; methinks it should be so, against ourselves; and that upon these two or three considerations, which I shall humbly offer unto all such Christians, who, as themselves complain that they have tender consciences; so their brethren have not had cause given them to complain, that they have had hard hearts.  
1. First I shall desire every such Christian to consider, whether it seems not unreasonable to affirm, That there is in the soul of man a power, invested with a capacity of binding the Will, from obedience of just Laws, because the end of all Government is hereby wholly frustrated and taken away; which is the preservation of peace, virtue, and love in the whole community (whether of Church or State) by an uniform obedience of the same Laws, from the obligation whereof, conscience is supposed to set all men equally free; and thereby to become the great Palladium of Sedition, Heresy, Treason, and what not; whereof I wish there were no argument to be summoned against the Gain-sayers, from fresh experience of these evils.  
2. Secondly, there must needs follow from thence, an odium not only upon all such Laws, as such men shall esteem unjust (how just soever they be) but also, upon the very persons of Princes, and of all inferior Magistrates, that shall put such Laws in execution. And what think you will become of that Prince (if means and opportunity should offer themselves) who shall be esteemed a Persecutor of his People for conscience sake?  
3. Lastly, I shall leave it to the consideration of the learned, whether the opinion of 
d In Pra●egom. ad P. Soto.  Brentius, viz. That the Magistrate hath power to bind the conscience in cases that concern Religion; and yet that his subjects must not submit thereto, without approbation of their own judgement; whether this opinion (I say) doth not interfere, and is of most dangerous consequence to the Peace and prosperity of Church and State; which yet is that same opinion, which hath taken (by what means I know not) too strong and deep rooting in the minds of many men, otherwise good and virtuous persons.  
For conclusion of this point. Seeing therefore that 1. The Apostles themselves have defined matters in debate and controversy in the Church, for prevention of Schism; And 2. That National and General Councils have done the like, as conceiving themselves duly impowered and obliged thereto. 3. That it is necessary unto all Governments whatsoever, to be furnished with all means that may preserve them from certain ruin and destruction. 4. That things that concern humane Affairs, are not under the Gospel, in a condition inferior to that which they had under the Law. 5. That the revival of this Law is not contrary to Scripture, nor the Scripture an adequate rule for particular actions. And lastly, That liberty and conscience duly considered, receive no prejudice by this Law of defining points under debate, and thereby imposing an end unto controversies:  
I conclude, That this Judicial Law (as to the directive part of it) may be revived by Supreme Authority; and in the  
Third and last place, I humbly conceive it to be of force in this Government, as a fundamental thereof; and that for these two or three reasons, which I shall mention in a word, and so disburden your patience.  
1. First, because the state of this Church and Commonwealth ought no more to want any of those means, which are necessary to her preservation, than any other Church of Commonwealth in the world; and therefore God having declared, that a power of defining matters in debate, was necessary to the being and flourishing of his own Church, and Kingdom amongst the Jews; the Government of this Church and State, cannot be reasonably thought to be divested of that power.  
2. Secondly, because the Crown of this Realm is an Imperial Crown; the same which Vulcatius Gallicanus calls 
e See Casaubon. not. in Vul●. Gall. n. ●0. p. 199.  Imperium justum; which implies, that as it is independent from any other but God alone; So it cannot be conceived to want any thing that belongs to an absolute and independent Government; and therefore is inseparable from such a power we speak of; there being inherent in this Crown, not only a temporal, but an Ecclesiastical Dominion, such as our 
f At. 37.  Church affirms to have been in the Kings of Judah; and which was likewise in the Roman Emperors, as appears by that title of Pontifex Maximus derived unto them, together with the Empire; and which was retained by Constantine and his successors, until 
g Z●sim. l. 4.  Gratian's time, who first of all devested the Imperial Crown of that title, and thereby opened a way for Maximus to bereave him of his life. Let Princes think on that bloody but witty conceit of 
h Baron. ad an. Christ. 383.  Symmachus (the Heathen Praetor of Rome) and then consider, what it is to part with Ecclesiastical Dominion [Si Gratianus nolit esse Pontifex Maximus, brevi erit Maximus Pontifex.]  
3. My third and last reason is founded in equity; because the subjects of this Realm have not only an interest in making those Laws whereby they are governed, but likewise a right to interpret those Laws when made; if becoming doubtful, by reason of some ambiguous clauses, or expressions therein: For although interpretatio Legum ordinariè Reverendos Judices Regnique sapientes spectat, etc. (as saith Judge 
i I● Praesat. ad lib. 4.  Cook) though the expounding of the Laws doth ordinarily belong to the Reverend Judges and Sages of this Realm, yet in case of greatest difficulty and importance, to the high Court of Parliament. In which Court of Parliament, the people of this Nation having their Representatives, it must follow; that Equity will oblige them to stand to their own Act; as being done in that Great Council, wherein are both the Priest and the Judge; and from which lies no Appeal. A doctrine (surely) which now deserves a better regard, than when it was (for many years together) the Palpit-aphorism of three Nations.  
I shall conclude with a special direction of a few words to all, as their Places, Callings and Opinions, may be duly thought to concern them, in the design of this Discourse; which the Searcher of all hearts knows, to be the product of that sincere love, which I have unto all my Christian Brethren, and unto the peace and welfare of that Church and State in which we live.  
And the words shall not be mine, but they shall be the words of the wise, which (I trust) will be as goads, and as nails fastened by the Masters of assemblies. 
Eccl. 12.11.   
1. And first for such as are Dissenters from this point; I shall leave upon their thoughts that mild and pious exhortation of the judicious Hooker, in his Preface to his unanswerable Treatise of Ecclesiastical Policy.  
The best and safest way for you my dear Brethren (says he) is, to re-examine the cause you have taken in hand, and to try it even point by point, argument by argument, with all the diligent exactness you can, to lay aside all gall of bitterness, and with meekness to search the truth. Think you are men, deem it not impossible for you to err: sift impartially your own hearts, whether it be force of reason, which hath bred and still doth feed these opinions in you. If truth doth any where appèar, seek not to smother it by glozing delusions, acknowledge the greatness thereof, and think it the best victory when it doth prevail over you. Far more comfort it were for us (so small is the comfort we take in these strifes) to labour under the same yoke, as men that look for the same eternal reward of their Labours; to be joined with you in indissolvable bonds of love and amity. To live as if our persons being many, our souls were but one; rather than in such dismembered sort, to spend our few and wretched days, in a tedious prosecution of wearisome contentions, the end whereof (if they have not some speedy end) will be heavy on both sides. Experience hath made the Prophecy observable.  
2. For these honourable Gentlemen whose concernment in Church and State are now allied, and twisted by his Majesty's favour, unto one and the same common end, to be procured and advanced by the same common trust of power; of which I may say as Alexander in 
k L. 10.  Curtius did of his marriage with Darius his Daughter; that it was done by him, ut hoc sacro foedere omne discrimen victi & victoris excluderet; I shall only mind you of that advise the late Wise and Pious 
l ΕΙΚ. ΒΑΣ. p. 238.  King gave unto his Son, his Majesty that now reigns. Let nothing seem little or despicable to you in matters which concern Religion and the Church's Peace, so as to neglect a speedy reforming and effual suppression of Error and Schisms; which seem at first but an hand-breadth, by Seditious Spirits, as by strong winds, are soon made to cover, and darken the whole Heaven. I press you not to extremities: God forbidden! Neither prudence nor Charity allow such courses; the State of this Church resembles that in St. Austin's time; and therefore we may all say as 
m Lib. count. Donat. c. 20.  he did; Non tamen ideo Ecclesiam negligimus; sed toleramus quae nolum us, ut perveniamus quo volumus.  
To you (my Lords the Judges) I shall conclude, with an humble desire that your Lordships will be pleased to reflect upon a few words of the Oracle of the Law; I shall give you them in his own language out of that excellent 
n Ib in Prafat. A Prince ought not to suffer his Laws to become a laughingstock: And woeful experience hath often taught (which I myself have sometimes observed) that m●ny of those men that have strained their wits, and stretched their tongues to scandalise or caluminate these Laws, had either practised or plotted some heinous crimes; and therefore hated because they feared the just sentence and heavy stroke.  Preface, to the fourth Book of his Reports. Non debet Princeps ferre suarum legum ludibrium. Quin & saepius docuit misera & luctuosa experientia (quod aliquando ipse etiam observavi) multos qui in id, ingenii nervos omnes intendêrunt, linguasque exacuêrunt, ut legibus hisce scandalum aut calumniam imponerent, nefarium aliquod crimen aut commisisse, aut fuisse machinatos, ideoque leges odisse, quia justam censuram, & gravem plagam metuêrunt. My Lords, 
* 2 Kin. 9.11.  You know the man and his communication.  
Let me add but a word more. Amongst the Jews God made 
o Exod. 21.29.  this Law, That, If an Ox were wont to push with his horn in time past, and it hath been certified to his owner, and he hath not kept him in, and he hath kill d a man or woman; the Ox shall be stoned, and the owner also shall be put to death. The words (my Lords) have a tropological sense; 'tis obvious, and I shall leave it to your Lordship's wisdom to apply it.  
And lastly (that I may knit both ends of my discourse together) I shall conclude to, and for all, in the words of Holy David, Psalm. 19 Lord keep thy servants from presumptuous sins, lest they get the Dominion over us, so shall we be undefiled, and innocent from the great offence.  
THE END.