Imprimatur, Apr. 17. 1678.   

REMARKS Upon a Late Disingenuous DISCOURSE, Writ by one T. D. Under the pretence DE CAUSA DEI, And of Answering Mr. john How's Letter and Postscript OF GOD'S PRESCIENCE, etc.  
Affirming, as the Protestant Doctrine, That God doth by Efficacious Influence universally move and Determine Men to all their Actions, even to those that are most Wicked.  
By a PROTESTANT.  
LONDON, Printed and are to be sold by Christopher Hussey, at the Flower-de-luce in Little-Brittain. 1678.   

REMARKS Upon a Late Disingenuous Discourse WRIT By one T. D. etc.  
OF all Vocations to which men addict themselves, or are dedicated, I have always esteemed that of the Ministry to be the most noble and happy Employment; as being more peculiarly directed to those two great Ends, the advancement of God's Glory, and the promoting of Man's Salvation. It hath seemed to me as if they who have chosen, and are set apart for that Work, did, by the continual opportunity of conversing with their Maker, enjoy a state like that of Paradise; and in this superior, that they are not also, as Adam, put in to dress and keep a Garden; but are, or aught to be, exempt from the necessity of all worldly avocations. Yet, upon nearer consideration, they likewise appear to partake of the common infelicities of Humane condition. For, although they do not, as others, eat their Bread, in the sweat of their brows (which some Divines account to be, though in the Pulpit, undecent,) yet the study of their brain is more than equivalent; and even the Theological Ground is so far under the Curse, that no Field runs out more in Thorns and Thistles, or requires more pains to disincumber it. Such I understand to be those peevish questions which have overgrown Christianity; wherewith men's minds are only rend and entangled, but from whence they can no more hope for any wholesome nourishment, than to gather Grapes from Thorns, or Figgs from Thistles. And (if I may so far pursue the Allegory) this Curse upon Divinity, as that upon the Earth, seems to have proceeded also from tasting that forbidden Fruit, of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil. For, in general, many Divines, out of a vain affectation of Learning, have been tempted into Inquiries too curious after those things which the Wisdom of God hath left impervious to Humane Understanding, further than they are revealed. And hence, instead of those allowed and obvious Truths of Faith, Repentance, and the New Creature, (yet these too have their proper weeds that pester them,) there have sprung up endless Disputes concerning the unsearchable things of God, and which are agitated by men, for the most part, with such Virulence and Intricacy, as manifest the Subtlety and Malice of the Serpent that hath seduced them. But, more particularly, that very Knowledge of Good and Evil, the disquisition of the Causes from whence, and in what manner they are derived, hath been so grateful to the Controversial, Female, Appetite, that even the Divines have taken of it as a Fruit to be desired to make them Wise, and given to their people, and they have both eaten, at the peril of God's Displeasure and their own Happiness. Whereas that second Chapter of Genesis contains the plain History of Good and Evil, and (not to mention so many attestations to it of the Old and New Testament,) what other Comment needs there, for what belongs to Good, than that, jam. 1. 17. that it is from God only, That every Good Giving, and every Perfect Gift descendeth? And, as to Evil, that also of St. james, is sufficient conviction, cap. 1. v. 13, 14. Let no man say, when he is tempted, I was tempted of God; God cannot be tempted with Evil, neither tempteth he any man: But every man is tempted, when he is drawn aside by his own lusts and enticed. Or that of the same Apostle, cap. 4. v. 1. From whence come Wars and Fightings among you? (and even that Logomachia, I fear, with which this question is vexed,) Come they not hence? even from your lusts that fight in your members. And there is no examining Christian but must find both these Truths evidently witnessed by his own Conscience.  
Nevertheless, the Theologants of former and later times, not content with what is held forth in Scripture, have attempted to clamber and palm up higher, by the Philosophy of that School where each of them hath first practised, and have drawn God's Prescience and Predetermination, upon this occasion, into debate; arguing upon such points as no man, unless he were Prior and precedent to the First Cause, can have the Understanding to comprehend and judge of: and most of them do but say and unsay; and while in words they all deny God to be the Author of sin, yet in effect, and by the manner of their reasoning, they affirm it; I therefore, being both apprehensive of the danger in such Arguments, and more particularly conscious of mine own weakness, shall not presume to interpose my Opinion in the differences about this matter, further than to say; That if men by this fancied opening of their Eyes, have attained to see more clearly, and acknowledge the wickedness of their own Actions, it resembles the modesty of our First Parents, discerning their Nakedness: But, if men shall also assert a Predeterminative Concourse of God to our Evil, it seems to have too much of Original Perverseness, and of that fallen shortness of Reason, whereby they would have found a Nudity in the Creator, and did implicitly reject their fault upon him, for the Serpent that He had made, and the Woman that He had given.  
But, if any man there be that can reconcile this Controversy, and so many more that arise out of it; (for all the most important Doctrines of Christianity serve on the one side, and all the fiercest questions of Religion on the other, depending for Truth and Falsehood upon the success of this Engagement,) if he can extinguish all those Ill Consequences, Dull Distinctions, and Inconsistent Notions, which have been levied in this quarrel, and reduce each Party within the due limits of Scripture and Saving Knowledge; such a person indeed deserves all commendation. And such an one I thought I had met with, nor yet see reason, notwithstanding all the late attempts upon him, to alter my Opinion; in a Book entitled; The Reconcileableness of God's Prescience of the sins of Men, with the Wisdom and Sincerity of his Counsels, Exhortations; and whatsoever other means He uses to prevent them. In a Letter to the Honourable Robert Boyl, Esquire; and in a Postscript to the late Letter of the Reconcileableness of God's Prescience, etc. by John How, the Author of that Letter.  
Yet there was one passage in the close of his Letter, p. 154. which seemed, as I thought; to lay open to censure; where he asked pardon, as having huddled it up mostly in the intervals of a troublesome long journey. It seemed a piece too well elaborate to have been perfected amidst the hurry of the Road, the noise of Inns, and the Nausea of the Packet-boat. And how could he hope, after saying this, in so captious an Age as we live, to escape some Reflection? but that at least men would inquire whether he went by Stage-coach, or on Horseback; both which are professed enemies to Meditation and Judgement? (for it is propable he had not that ancient accommodation of Horse-litters, wherein, without any impediment to their thoughts, men traveled with all the privacy and equipage of a Closet,) whether he had not lost his way, or fallen among Thiefs, and how he found himself after his Journey? with all the questions that men are subject to at their arrival home, and which even when asked in civility, yet are troublesome. He might, had it not been for the jogging, have remembered how unfortunate most Writers have been in such excuses, and what advantage ill-natured men have taken to misinterpret them. So he that apologized for using a Foreign tongue, was told, that no man had prohibited him his Native Language in his own Country. Others, alleging that they had at the same time a Fit of the Stone, Gout, or other Distemper, have been taxed, as lying under no obligation of publishing their Infirmities, but who might however, have cured themselves of that of Writing. And he that pretended to treat at once of a Serious, while he was amused with a more Comfortable Importance, was advertised, that he ought therefore to have so long abstained either from the one or the other. But, in earnest, this confession of Mr. How's, is so far from any such Arrogance, that it rather argues his modesty. For, if some can even in Riding name all the contrary motions, till they have by memory played out a Game at Chess, (which was first invented as an emblem of Predetermination) why should it be more difficult, or less allowable, to one of Mr. How's abilities, in the interruptions of travel, to give a Mate also to that question? The worst therefore that can be said of him, in allusion either to his Letter or his Journey, is— at poterat tutior esse domi. Yet seeing this was the greatest fault that I remarked in reading him over, I would not pass it by without notice, lest I might have cause to suspect myself of a Partiality, which I desire not that others should exercise in mine own particular.  
But for the rest, whereas the things considerable in all Discourses are the Subject, the End, the Reasoning, the Method, and the Style; I must profess that, as far as I understand, I have met with few manual Treatises, that do in all these respects equal it. For the Subject, it appears in the Title, than which there was none of greater dignity to be handled, or of greater use, if rightly explained and comprehended. And no less is that of Predetermination, which he only treats of collaterally, and upon which therefore, in hope to find him less prepared, he hath been attaqued, as in the Flank, with most vigour. His End was most commendable, being to make the Paths straight, and remove those stumbling-blocks which the asperity of others had laid in the way to Heaven; to rectify men's apprehensions concerning God, and leave them without pretence for negligence in their Duties, or despair of performance; much less for despite against the Creator. His Arguing then is plain and solid, for Evidence, rather than Dispute; nor does he either throw the Dust of antique Distinctions in the eyes of his Readers, to blind them; or yet raise the Spectres of ancient Authors, or conjure their venerable Names, to fright men out of their senses and understanding; but declares against all the Prejudice or Advantage by such proceeding, as unlawful Charms, and prohibited Weapons in the Controversy. His Method thereafter is direct and coherent, his Style perspicuous and elegant: So that it is in short, a Manly discourse, resembling much, and expressing the Humane Perfection; in the Harmony of Language, the Symmetry of Parts, the Strength of Reason, the Excellency of its End, which is so serious, that it is no defect in the similitude with Man, that the Letter contains nothing in it suitable to the property of Laughter.  
All which put together, and although it does, and must every where partake also of Humane Imperfection, it might have been hoped capable of that civility which men, and especially Learned men, but most of all Divines do usually, or should allow, to one another. That it should not be made ridiculous, being writ in so good earnest; nor assaulted, being so inoffensive; much less that it should be defaced, mutilated, stabbed in so many places, and the Author through it, which is even in writing a kind of Felony. Yet this hath been its misfortune in a Rencounter with an immodest and hectoring Discourse, pretending to the Title, De Causa Dei: Or a Vindication of the Common Doctrine of Protestant Divines concerning Predetermination, viz. The Interest of God, as the First Cause, in all the Actions, as such, of Rational Creatures, from the Invidious Consequences with which it is burdened, by Mr. John How, in a late Letter and Postscript of God's Prescience; by T. D. By which first Letters, seeing it appears that he desires to pass Incognito, I will so far observe good manners, as to interpret them only The Discourse, heartily wishing that there were some way of finding it Guilty, without reflecting upon the Author; which I shall accordingly endeavour, that I may both preserve his, whatsoever, former Reputation, and leave him a door open to Ingenuity for the future. But The Discourse justifies itself, as if it had been typified by Paul's withstanding Peter to his face, when he came to Antioch, (so easy is it to patronise humane Passions under the pretence of the Cause of God, and Apostolical example) T. D. p. 23. whereas it rather resembles in the Bravery, though not in the Occasion, that Exploit of Peter's Matth. 26. 51, 52. for which our Saviour, though done in his defence, rebuked him. adding, They that take the sword, shall perish by the sword: And the taking the Pen hath seldom better success, if handled in the same manner. I therefore, having had the leisure to read it over, and thereby the opportunity of a second Caution, how the unruly Quill is to be managed, have thought that I could not at present render a better account of that time to my self or others, than by publishing these Remarks; that, as Mr. How's Letter may serve for a Pattern of what is to be imitated, so The Discourse may remain as a Mark (the best use it can be put to) of what ought to be avoided in all writing of Controversies, especially by Divines, in those that concern Religion. The nature of this matter would admit of no better method, than that the Errors observable should be distinguished under several Heads, to each of which the particular Instances are referred. The first Article that I prefer against the Discourse, is;  

Its Trifling and Cavilling about Words, when they affect not the Cause.  
First Instance. Mr. How, on purpose to prevent any such idle Practice, had in the last page of his Postscript, plainly summed up the constant sense both of that and his Letter which he would abide by. That God doth not by an Efficacious Influence universally move and determine Men to all their Actions, even those Actions which are most wicked. Here was the Subject ready stated, against which, if any thing, The Discourse ought to have directly applied. But, instead of that T. D. p. 1. It saith, Mr. How gives us his sense in various terms, and such as seem repugnant to each other. One while that which he denies, is a Predeterminative Concurrence, and Predeterminative Concourse; another while, 'tis Predetermining Influence, and a Determinative Influence, and Efficacious Influence. This is the same in T. D. as if Its concurrent Wherrymen, p. 27. after they had taken in their Fare, should be long pulling off their Doublets, and then carry a man to another Stairs than they were directed. The one shows that they had but little heart to their labour; the other, that they know not the River, unless perhaps they have a design, if they can find a place convenient to rifle the Passenger. For Mr. How had expressly pitched upon that one term of Efficacious Influence. But, as for those other repeated by The Discourse, they were such as Mr. How found in the Controversy, not of his own making, nor therefore is he accountable for them: But, however, it was his Ingenuity to mention them; and having done so, to bind himself to a point, to one Word of the most certain signification, as a place where any adversary might always be sure to speak with him. Yet It, to find out matter for Discourse, and to show Its great Reading, tells us, as if that were the business, what Strangius saith, and what Doctor Twisse concerning Predetermination and Concourse; and again, what Strangius, of the Difference between Concourse and Influence, p. 2. and saith that, as for those two Phrases, Predeterminative Concurrence, and Predeterminative Concourse, they are in effect, Contradictie in Adjecto. And so let them be, upon condition that not Mr. How, (as The Discourse would have it) but the first Inventor my be bound to answer for it. For the truth is, the Brothers of Dispute do usually so handle their matter, and refine so far, till they want at last either words to express their meaning, or meaning to express in words. And so it hath faired with these Imaginers of the Predeterminative Concourse or Concurrence. 'Tis very well that this Scene of Debate lies in Oxford (or London) for, upon these terms, it would be impossible at Newmarket, where Prae and Con run their heats, to decide any Match without sending for a Judge to the next University, and it is less difficult for Pro and Con, or for Con, and Non-con, to set their Horses together. Yet suppose, as the Discourse affirms, that this Predeterminative Concourse or Concurrence had been words of Mr. How's own choosing; whereas he on the contrary rejects them for that of Efficacious Influence, the Impropriety however therein had not been greater, than of that Phrase which T. D. p. 25. uses, and hath right to, Simultaneous Concourse, which is, if I mistake not, as much as to say, Conconcourse.  
The same (if greater be the same) Trifling and Cavilling about Words that affect not the Cause, it is to say, T. D. p. 2. As for that latter Phrase, Influence, which Mr. How makes equipollent with the former Concourse in these words, Post. p. 29. I here affect not the Curiosity to distinguish these two Terms, as some do; I had rather he should hear Strangius again than me, blaming his not affecting that Curiosity of Distinction: and then It citys Strangius de Vol. Dei, lib. 1. c. 11. p. 59 assigning the difference between them. This is a trivial litigation about words, where the thing intended is sufficiently understood (or rather is intelligible) and, whether it be said Influence or Concourse makes no more to the business, than the Impropriety objected to Predetermining, or previous Concourse, which any indifferent Reader can see to have been spoken generally, of a priority of the supposed Influence on God's part, not in Time, but in Nature and Causality. Strangius, indeed, writing a large Treatise concerning that Subject, distinguished all the Terms more accurately: But Mr. How, it being there done to his hand, and writing on the by only two or three pages, had not the space or the occasion to enlarge upon them. And it is an Infirmity which Mr. How, I observe, is much subject to, that he seldom useth any notional Terms or Distinctions, where he can make men comprehend him better without them: And at that indeed he hath a singular faculty. His very saying that he affected not, there, the Curiosity to (distinguish those two Terms, as some do, shows it: But withal, that he was not ignorant of them, and that he also could distinguish when he saw reason, and in time and place convenient. The Discourse might with more cause have accused him of Ambiguity, and raised scruples about his Curiosity: for that is taken in many several significations. As for example; sometimes it is used for a commendable Exquisiteness in things considerable, and worth the labour. Otherwhiles it is described, Quoties plus Diligentiae quam oportebat impendimus rebus, vel Nostris, vel Alienis. Nostris, quam minima quaeque disquirimus & nullius frugis: Alienis, quum de rebus caeterorum occultioribus non satis cum pudore perscrutamur aut interrogamus. So not Strangius, nor Doctor Twisse, but Cicero. Which, that I may do equal right to the Discourse in translating Latin, is to say, That is called Curiosity, when men use an impertinent Diligence in things relating to themselves or others: To themselves, when they are busy about every trifle, and what is of no moment: To others, when they exercise a scrutiny, or ask questions beyond modesty, concerning their private Affairs. And I had rather It should hear Cicero again, than me blaming It for this latter sort of Curiosity. Reperiam multos, vel innumerabiles potius, non tam curiosos, nec tam molestos quam Vos estis. That is; I could find many, or rather innumerable men, neither so Troublesome, nor so Curious as You are. And Quintilian explains it further. Est etian quae Parergia vocatur, supervacua, ut sic dixerim, Operositas: Ut a diligent Curiosus, & a Religione supestitio distat, i. e. There is also that which is called Parergia, a superfluous and laborious Nicety; as a Curious man differs from a Diligent, or Superstition from Religion. But besides all this, Curiosus signifies an Informer: in which sense, I suppose, both Mr. How, and T. D. would be loath to accept it. Yet perhaps I may gratify them in the Authority or Quotation. Suet. Aug. c. 27. Name & Pinarium, Equitem Romanum, quum Concionante se, admissa turba Paganorum, apud Milites, subscribere quaedam animadvertisset, Curiosum & Speculatorum ratus, coram confodi imperavit. Which Text, if a little helped in the translating, might serve them to notable purpose: But however so it is, that, taking the Knight to be a Spy and an Informer, he caused him forthwith to be slain in his presence. And lastly in the Code, Tit. de Curiosis & Stationariis: Curiosus is a Postmaster, if Mr. How be disposed at any time to take another long troublesome journey, and do not disaffect also that Curiosity. It had been much more to the purpose to have learned these several acceptations of Curiosity, than to have exercised it in the worst sense, in such needless disquisitions, when a question stated in other terms was in expectation every minute to be disputed.  
But to say that in those words: I here affect not the Curiosity to distinguish these two Terms of Concourse or Influence, as some do, was to make the latter Phrase Influence equipollent with the former Concourse is gratis, or rather ingratiis dictum, and ought not to have been but upon consultation first with Mr. How, to have had his concurrence; no nor then neither. For should Mr. How be never so much of opinion, as he seems otherwise, that they are Equipollent, yet it can never be true that these words do infer it. As suppose that I should say, I affect not here the Curiosity to distinguish betwixt the Candour and the Acuteness of The Discourse in this particular, do I therefore think them Equipollent, or that one of them hath not the stronger ingredience? though indeed there is little of either.  
Another (for this hath been too pregnant to say a second) Instance to the same Head is where The Discourse, p. 26. tells us; It is an unaccountable inadvertency, (for to salve his honour, so I will call it, rather than a slip of judgmemt) to produce Cursing and Swearing for instances of Actions downright, or for the substance of them Evil, etc. This indeed is Curiosity in the highest degree of perfection, if (for I must be aware too of such exactness) there be degrees of Perfection. And an heavy Charge it is, which I know not whence it could light upon Mr. How, but that the Curious are likewise given for the most part to be Censorious, where they have no reason. For Mr. How Post. p. 33, 34. examining an Argument used by some for God's Predeterminative Concurrence to Wicked Actions, because there are no Actions of Man on Earth so good, which have not some mixture of sin in them, etc. (see Postscript, p. 32.) saith, This Argument must be thus conceived. That if God concur by Determinative Influence to the imperfectly good Actions of Faith, Repentance, Love to himself, Prayer, therefore to the Acts of Enmity against himself, Cursing, Idolatry, Blasphemy, etc. And is it not a mighty consequence, if to Actions that are good quoad Substantiam, therefore to such as are in the Substance of them Evil? We ourselves can in a remoter kind concur to the Actions of others. Because you may afford yourself your leading concurrence to Actions imperfectly good, therefore may you to them that are downright evil? because to Prayer, therefore to Cursing and Swearing? and then ruin men for the Actions you induced them to? You'll say God may rather, but sure he can much less do so than you. How could you be serious in the proposal of this Question? For this Argument had been proposed by way of question, and I have on purpose set down Mr. How's answer at length, that it might be evident, without further brangling, how little, I mean how no, cause there was for this Animadversion upon him, speaking expressly of such Cursing and Swearing only as is Evil Quoad Substantiam. For certainly those Acts of Enmity against God himself, which Mr. How there enumerateth, Cursing, and then Idolatry, Blasphemy, etc. are, and were so understood by him, and by all but such as take care to the contrary, as much Evil in themselves as that Adultery which The Discourse itself owns to be so, p. 72. because no end or circumstance can make it good. So that this ado is made for Mr. How's not saying Profane Cursing and Swearing: indeed a very heinous and notorious omission: even as it would be for a man, so often as he uses the words And or The, not to distinguish or tell his Reader, that he intends And in an Exegetical sense, or The in an Emphatical; or whether in their ordinary capacity. How unaccountable soever this Inadvertency were in Mr. How, it is well The Discourse did, not call our Saviour to account, Matth. 5. 34. for forbidding Swearing in general terms, nor St. james, cap. 5. v. 12. for the same as to Swearing, or c. 3. v. 9, 10. because the same Apostle does not there descant upon Cursing more distinctly, and add Profane to its Character. But had the Discourse done so, it would have been obvious to every man, that the Pen deserved the same Brand which is set upon the Tongue in that Chapter. I wonder how in this Lyncean perspicacity It oversaw a more remarkable error of Mr. How's about Actions in their Substance Evil; where in the same pages, 33, 34. he writes it Qoad Substantiam, which could not be Mr. How's Inadvertency; for in that Paragraph he also spells Consequence and Qestion in the like manner, and therefore must by the same Consequence as that of Cursing and Swearing, have been a slip of his Judgement. But, had It continued to be so unmercifully accurate, Mr. How might perhaps have told It it's own; where p. 27. It mentions that Evil Act of Adam 's eating a Tree (for I see we are all mortal) which is a Phrase of very hard Digestion. Other proofs of this Head I reserve till further occasion, two or three instances upon each, being like so many Witnesses sufficient for Its Conviction. The second Article follows.   

It's Ignorance and Confusion about the Matter that is in Controversy.  
First Instance. The Discourse, p. 3. saith; The Ambiguity of Mr. How 's Phrases removed, and the sense of them being brought to a certainty, I assert the Contradictory to his Proposition: the term Efficacious suiting well enough if Mr. How intent by it an Infallibility of the Event, or the certain Production of those Actions which God hath and Influence upon. Now, for the better understanding of this, it is fit to observe that Mr. How's Proposition is this; God doth not by an Effecacious Influence universally move and determine Men to all their Actions, even those Actions that are most wicked. They that assert the Contradictory, must therefore affirm that God does: and much good may it do them. But The Discourse in the words before cited, capitulates that Mr. How should by Efficacious intent Infallibility, etc. It might almost as well have said Transubstantiation, which we shall meet with, p. 35. hereafter.  
Now it is indeed fit that a Respondent should gratify his Opponent as far as may consist with Civility and Safety. But here arises a Case of Conscience; Whether a man may give another leave, that desires it, to speak Nonsense. I say no. For Nonsense and Idle words are of the same notion. But if he be one that I have no power over, and whom I can by no amicable means hinder from speaking Nonsense, I, after having used all good endeavours, am excused. But here the Case is stronger, where one shall not only take the Liberty himself, but oblige me too to speak Nonsense. To this I say, that to the best of my understanding, I never will, nor aught to do it in respect to any man. Yet no less a favour, or favours, doth The Discourse demand of Mr. How, in requiring that the term Efficacious may be expounded by Infallibility, that is, in effect, the most potent Influence by no Influence: For what Influence hath Infallibility upon the Actions of another, or upon any thing? And this, if it should yet obtain it of Mr. How, yet would consist as ill with his own following words, or Certain Production; wherein he more than implies that Infallibility and Certain Production are all one: whereas a man may certainly and infallibly know what he never produces, and some too, we see, produce what they never understand. But if The Discourse shall still opiniatre in this matter, let It, to try how well it suits, strike Efficacious, for experiment, out of the Question, and insert instead of it, Infallibility and Certain Production, and then see if there be any sense in it or Grammar.  
Second Instance. The Discourse, p. 9 pretends to give a Definition of Predetermination. Predetermination, It saith, is thus defined; A Transient Action of God, which excites every Creature to Act. Now it is generally known, that the two most perfect Creatures in all Logic, are a Demonstration and a Definition. How good The Discourse is at the first shall afterwards be remonstrated. But as to a Definition, it always consists, as being a Dialectic Animal, of a Body which is the Genus, and a Difference, which is the Soul of the thing defined; but this will in neither of these appear to be Perfect or Rational. For the Genus here is Action, and yet a few lines below It saith, that Predetermination is to be conceived of per Modum Principii, under the Notion of a Principle, or Cause of the Creatures Acting, but Concourse only per Modum Actionis. Predetermination was but even before under the Genus of Action, and now of Cause: so that The Discourse hath been very liberal indeed of Body to the Definition, having given it two rather than fail, though commonly we account such births to be Errors of Nature, and monstrous. Had the Discourse interposed some pages, it might have only argued a default of Memory; but this inconsistence at one sight, and before ItsIts Pen could be taken off, shows that defect not to have been, as with some persons, recompensed in Judgement. And then for the Difference that is assigned in this Definition, it happens here, as usually where there is most Body, that there is least Soul. For there is nothing else left to be the Difference, but, whereby God excites every Creature to Act. If this be all, The Discourse might indeed very well say, p. 7. that Mr. How would be forced to grant Predetermination; for how could he possibly avoid it, when the Antagonist defines it in Mr. How's own words? who saith, Postscript, p. 45. In reference to sinful Actions; by this Influence God doth not only sustain men who do them, and continue to them their natural faculties and powers whereby they are done; but also, as the first Mover, so far excites and actuate those powers, as that they are apt and habile for any congenerous Action, to which they have a natural designation, and whereto they are not sinfully disinclined. Whereby God Excites the Creature to Act, saith The Discourse, whereby God Excites and Actuates those Powers to, etc. saith Mr. How very fully here, and in all other places to the same sense; so that if The Discourse either understood Mr. How or It self, either It's own Definition, or the common Question, what place was there left for arguing, unless to debate for Debates sake? Usually when both parties say the same thing, there is an end of the discourse, but however of the Dispute: There is as far as I see, no doubt to be made but Mr. How, as he hath, will grant this Predetermination even without being forced, but yet upon condition, and it is but reasonable that The Discourse will retract Its own foregoing words, p. 5. This Act of God is called Predetermination, because it limits the Creature to this Action rather than to that. This indeed will serve The Discourse for argument either of Discourse or Dispute with It self; being Definition in effect against Definition to prevent monstrosity, supplying hereby two Souls to the two Bodies. But till It be better agreed with it, and can come to a clearer understanding with It self, no third person needs or can be interessed in the Contest further than as a Spectator of some strange sight for his money, like the double Child from Sussex.  
Third Instance. The Discourse citys Mr. How, Postscript, p. 41. for having there said concerning God's exciting Man to act those foregoing words that I come last from mentioning. But those words are not p. 41. but 45. and the mistake in the citation is probably any an error only of the Printer's. Though indeed in that page 41. Mr. How with much perspicuity declares the same Sense and Opinion which he gives in other expressions, p. 45. For p. 41. he saith, It hath been the care and designment of the Divine Wisdom so to order the way of Dispensation towards the several sorts of Creatures, as not only, not ordinarily to impose upon them what they could not be patient of, but so as that their powers and faculties might be put upon the exercises whereof they were capable, and to provide that neither their Passive capacity should be overcharged, nor their Active be unemployed. But the words repeated and excepted against are to be found in his p. 45. and upon them it is that, The Discourse six this unreasonable and ill interpretation and censure; If by Exciting and Actuating the powers he means that God reduces them to Act, he hath taken a large jump from Durandus to Twisse: and so goes on to prove that ill-favoured and worse conceived suggestion. It ought sufficiently to have prevented this usage that Mr. How 's Letter, p. 43. hath said, That which hath too apparently had greatest actual efficacy with many in asserting Predetermination, hath been the authority of this or that man of reputation, and the force of that Art of imputing a Doctrine already under a prejudicial doom to some or other ill-reputed former Writer, I profess not to be skilled in the use of that sort of Weapons. And therefore, not being himself the Aggressor, but challenged and defied by another, he ought to have had the choice of them. What signifies Durandus here, but to call a man ill names instead of coming to the Point? and what Dr. Twisse, but to wear mail, or bring a second when Mr. How comes naked and single? It is not what this or that man, but what Truth saith that is to he regarded: what liberty soever The Discourse here takes to the contrary. It can by no means be made true, that Mr. How by these words, God as the first Mover so far excites and actuates those powers, as that they are apt and habile for any congenerous Action; professes himself of Doctor Twisse 's opinion, no more than that he is of Durandus 's after having thus declared his own as clearly as it is possible for any man's meaning to be minuted or explained. For Durandus holds only a mere Conservation of the Faculty, Doctor Twisse a Predetermination. But Mr. How, to avoid Durandus on the one hand, saith, that in reference to sinful actions (for of these is the Question) God doth not only sustain men who do them, and continue to them their natural faculties and powers (which was all Durandus pretended to) but also so far Excites and actuates those powers as that they are apt and habile for any congeeruous action, etc. whereas, if he would have spoke with Doctor Twisse, he must have said, but also excites and actuates those, powers determinately to this or that action, which would have differed the whole breadth of Heaven from Mr. How 's Hypothesis. And certainly such an actual influence as Mr. How describes, added to the Natural Faculty, is, if men look near, very distinguishable from mere Conservation of that Faculty on the one, and Predetermination on the other side. For a Faculty conserved, as a Faculty, in Actu Primo, (as men call it) includes no such hability and present promptitude in itself to Action, as Mr. How proposes; since than it could never suffer a Privation of it but what were irrecoverable. Whereas common experience shows Faculties may be sometimes unapt for Action, and may be supposed always so, if every moment when they act they be not rendered apt by a superadded Influence, which may habilitate them for Action, without Determining them to This or That. So that all the Confusion herein objected to Mr. How, is to be referred to that Head upon which I have charged it; and the great jump is no more than what brainsick Passengers, being carried alongst by the Wind and Sea, in the heaving of their Vessel imagine of the Trees and Steeples. For he is still in the same place, but no man knows whither away The Discourse may be driven, or what part It is bound to, and whether it do not sail without Steerage, Compass, or Anchor.  
A Fourth Instance of Its Ignorance and Confusion about the matter in Controversy, is Its varying, and that so often and so materially, the Terms of the Question. First of all, It told us that It asserted the Contradictory of Mr. How's Proposition; which must be therefore by undertaking to prove (as was said formerly) That God doth by Efficacious Influence universally Move and Determine Men to all their Actions, even those Actions that are most Wicked. T. D. p. 3. yet immediately after having joined Issue upon this, It hath a second device, p. 4. and better likes Strangius his state of the Question, viz. Whether God does Determine or Predetermine all Creatures to all and each of their Actions. And then Thirdly, p. 5. It tells us more fully what the Question is, and how Its Predetermination is to be understood, explaining it thus (though not fully enough) viz. an Act of God's by which he limits the Creature to this Action rather than to that. Such an Act The Discourse hath granted at last, and 'twere to be reasonably expected, that, after having transformed the Question thus oft to Its own understanding and convenience, this Contradictory at least to Mr. How's Proposal should be adhered to as far as it goes, and maintained: For otherwise what occasion was there, or what employment is there left for this Spirit of Contradiction? unless to rattle through the Air, make vain Apparitions, or in a calm day on a sudden to stir up a Tempest. But if this be The Discourses Anti-proposition, I that intermeddle not as an Opinionist either way, but endeavour only to comprehend as far as I can Its meaning, shall for that purpose put a Case in ItsIts own terms.  
Suppose a man to meet with some afflicting calamity which tends to provoke, among other his Passions, that of Aversion or Hatred. He considers this or that man may have contributed to his calamity: He considers also that God may have had an hand in bringing it upon him: He considers, perhaps, (and is yet Undetermined, till God at least Determine him) whether to put forth one Act of Hatred toward this man, or another, toward that man, or another, toward God, or whether only to hate the Evil itself that afflicts him. (For it cannot be that he should Hate this man by the same Act of Hatred with which he Hates another man, nor can he Hate God by the same Act whereby he Hates either of them, or the afflicting Evil that hath befallen him.) At last he is limited to this rather than another Action, and apprehending with that profane person, 2 King. 6. 33. Behold this Evil is from the Lord, what should I wait for the Lord any longer? He pours out his Hatred against God himself. The Question now is, who limits him to this Action rather than to another? shall we say it is God? The Discourse, holding the Affirmative, must say it is God. This is indeed a dreadful representation of the Case, but a true one.  
Nor is it therefore to be wondered, the Question being so frightful, that The Discourse starts and runs away from it so often; and after all this, p. 9 would forget that Predetermination is an Act by which God limits the Creature to this Action rather than that, and undertakes to define it, exclusively to those words, (for the Definition includes the whole nature of the thing defined) no more but a Transient Action of God which excites every Creature to Act. And yet Fourthly, Considering that the Cause required no less; after taking breath, and comforting Its spirits, The Discourse returns again in part to the Question, telling us in the bottom of the same page, 9 That it is in plain words whether God does Move men to all their natural Actions, and so to one rather than another. And thus now we have a fourth State of the Question, but yet very different from the First; the Affirmative of which was undertaken to be defended. In short, the main Controversy is about Determining; but this Fourth Question does not so much as mention it either in word or in sense. For the Determining in Mr. How's Proposition imports and is so expressed, not only a Moving men, but an Efficacious Moving them. (There are many Motions which may be Ineffectual.) Nor only a moving them to This Action rather than to That, but also to do this Wicked Action (for of such is the Controversy) rather than forbear it. What kind of practice is this? It is a worse thing to adulterate Truth than Mony. The Terms of the Question are the Standard. But at this rate no man can know what is Meum or Tuum, which is his own Hypothesis, and which his Adversaries, while what he issued in currant sense and weight is returned him Clipped or Counterfeit. But the observation of this manner of dealing hath put me upon another thought much differing, and which at first perhaps may seem something extravagant.  
The Camel is a beast admirably shaped for Burden, but so lumpish withal, that nothing can be more inept for feats of Activity. Yet men have therefore invented how to make it danse, that, by how much unnatural the spectacle might appear more absurd and ridiculous. It's Keeper leads it upon a Pavement so throughly warmed, that the Creature, not able to escape nor abide it, shifts first one foot, and then another to relieve itself, and would, if possible, tread the Air on all four, the ground being too hot for it to stand upon. He in the mean time traverses and trips about it at a cooler distance, striking some volunteer Notes on his Egyptian Kit, like a French Dansing-Master. But, knowing that his Scholar is both in too much pain, and too dull to learn his measures, he therefore upon, frequent observation accords a tune to its Figure and Footing, which comes to the fame account. So that, after daily repeating the Lesson in private, they seem both at last to be agreed upon a new Arabic Saraband. Having thus far succeeded, he tries next whether what he taught by torture be not confirmed by custom, and if a cool Hearth may not have the like effect. The Camel no sooner hears his Fiddle, but, as if its ears burned with the music, and its memory were in its feet, the Animal bestirs forthwith it's long legs, and, with many an Antic Motion, and ill-favoured Coupe, gratifies the Master's patience and expectation. When he finds, upon constant experiment, that it never fails him, he thenceforward makes it public, and, having compounded with the Master of the Revels, shows it, with great satisfaction to the Vulgar, every Bartholomew-Fair in Grand-Cairo. I would not too much vex the similitude, but was run upon this by a resemblance it hath with some, who, not being framed at all for Controversy, and finding the Question too hot for them, do, by their flinching and shuffling from it, represent a Disputation, till it is grown habitual to them, and they change ground as often, and have the fame apprehension of the sound of an Argument, as the Camel of an Instrument.  
And yet the Discourse hath a Fifth loose Foot to clap on at need, as if Four had not sufficed to prevaricate with, p. 11; where It exercises ItsIts uncouth nimbleness in syllogizing: but never was any thing more ridiculously awkward. Mr. How had, Letter p. 35. mentioned an argument used by those who hold the Affirmative of Predetermination; That it necessarily belongs to the Original and Fountain-Being to be the First Cause of whatsoever Being, and consequently that what there is of Positive Being in any the most Wicked Action; must principally owe itself to the Determinative Productive Influence of this First and Sovereign Cause, otherwise it would seem that there were some Being that were neither Primum, nor a Primo. This was as plain and distinctly laid out as possible, but must for sooth be cast into a Logical Figure, where the officiousness argues the fraud, as of those who make false Plate imbezilling part of the Metal, and yet make the Owner pay moreover for the Fashion. This is the Discourses Syllogism. All Positive Being's are Effects of the First Cause. All sinull Actions (for, It adds, this is our limitation) are Positive Being's; Ergo, All sinful Actions, as Actions, are Effects of the First Cause. So that here, by a Syllogistical Legerdemain, that term so essential in their Argument, as cited by Mr. How, the Determinative Productive Influence of the First and Sovereign Cause, is cleanly conveyed away out of sight; the Proposition undertaken to be maintained, that God doth by an Efficacious Influence universally Move and Determine Men to all their Actions, even those Actions that are most Wicked; or, as It lately varied, Limits Men to This Action rather than to That, is turned out of doors by its own foster-father, the keeping of it being grown it seems too chargeable; and all now that is inferred is only that all sinful Actions, as Action, are Effects of the First Cause. And what is that to the purpose? If Mr. How must neither be allowed the use of his own Weapons, nor upon the Ground which they both were agreed on, it appears that his Challenger, notwithstanding all ItsIts bravades, had no design, or but little disposition to meet him. The whole of this may in a just sense be granted without prejudice to Mr. how's Cause. For it matters not that they are Effects, unless it be also said and proved that they are Effects produced by God's Determinative Influence. Yet how much Powder is spent without doing the least execution! First a Categorical, than an Hypothetical Syllogism fired at him, then forces him to distinguish, which is among Disputants next to crying quarter, but will not give it him; runs him through with three Replies to his Distinction, and leaves him dead upon the place. While the Proposition is all this while untouched, Mr. How is out of Gun-shot, and his Adversary (if one that only skirmishes with himself, deserves to be called so) is afraid to take aim, and starts merely at the Report of his own Musket. Thus hath The Discourse Five several times altered the Property of the Question; which is my Fourth Instance of Its Ignorance and Confusion about the matter in Controversy; unless it ought to be interpreted as an argument rather of a strong brain, after so many times, and suddenly turning round, not to have fallen down senseless.  
A Fifth Instance to the same Head, Mr. How, Letter, p. 36, 37. had said, It seems infinitely to detract from the Perfection of the Ever Blessed God, to affirm that he was not able to make a Creature of such a Nature, as being continually sustained by him, and supplied with power every moment suitable to its Nature, should be capable of acting, unless what he thus enables he determine (that is, for it can mean no less thing, impel) it to do it also. To this The Discourse replies p. 15. If we should take liberty of judging things by their appearanee at first sight, without giving ourselves the trouble of a strict Disquisition (take whether you will, the Liberty or the Trouble, only talk not so magisterially) we night easily be seduced into an imagination that it does no less infinitely detract from the Divine Perfection to affirm; that God was not able to make a Creature of such a Nature, as that it might continually sustain itself, without a supply of power every moment from God. For that opinion seems to tie God to a shorter Tedder (how trivial and irreverently spoken!) than an ingenious Artificer who can raise an Edifice that shall last many years without any need of his help for reparations. Compare now these two together, and mark what this Reasoning of The Discourse amounts to. Mr. How conceives (else it were very hard) that a Creature may Act, being enabled by a continual supply of power from God every moment. Therefore quoth It, A Creature may Be, without being sustained or supplied from God any moment. But this perhaps was only to show how ingenious. ItsIts first apprehensions, and how candid are Its first inclinations; and whether It were easily seduced Itself, or had a mind to seduce others, It likes this conceit so well that It cannot yet let it go, but subjoins immediately; And this I the rather take notice of, because I find it the sentiment of the most acute Suarez, etc. But, whereas others find their second Thoughts to be the more judicious, It's judging thus at First Sight, seems more accurate than Its Second Seeming: They, ib. who deny God's immediate operation in every action of the Creature, (which Mr. How seems to do in his Answer now under discussion) will doubtless be compelled to deny that the Creature does depend immediately upon the Actual Influence of God. So It quotes the most acute Suarez. Met. Disp. 20. This is a most exemplary and Primitive Charity, whereby The Discourse hath sold all its own acuteness to give it to the poor Suarez; so that it hath reduced itself to that desperate and utmost dulness, as herein to say, They who deny what Mr. How seems by this Answer to do, that is as much as to say, They who suppose with Mr. How that a Creature may act being enabled by God every moment, without being impelled, (which he above, and always modestly asserts) will doubtless be compelled to deny that the Creature depends immediately upon the Actual Influence of God, which is tantamount in sense, which useth to be the meaning, as to say, It seems to be denied that the Creature does depend, because it is affirmed to depend. Ought not Bills to be put up for men affected with so peculiar a distemper? I cannot in the whole Common Prayer find any that is proper for this occasion.  
Another Instance (for they do so multiply on me in reading, that I forget to number them, and yet they are so signal in their kind, that they are not to be omitted) is p. 96. and onwards: the vain attempt to reconcile God's Predetermining by Efficacious Influence to Wicked Actions with his Wisdom and Sincerity by the same Mediums that were used by Mr. How to reconcile his Prescience of them, yet this is undertaken to be done from p. 96. for several pages forward, and with the same confidence which is always necessary to such as promise impossibilities. But it is in the mean time an high contempt of all other men, and presumption of ones own Understanding that can embolden to such an Argument. Who is there, unless Adam gave him his Name, but sees the difference between having an Influence upon Men's Wicked Actions, and having no Influence, which Prescience, as such, cannot signify him to have hat foreknows? But nevertheless Mr. How hath expressly enough asserted and explained the Influence God hath on all Humane Actions.  
For further Instance, see what The Discourse saith, p. 61. and so along, struggling to bring the immediate Concourse, which Mr. How speaks of and avows, under the same prejudice with Predetermination, which he disclaims and argues against: For all that idle endeavour might have been saved and prevented by a small supplement of Understanding or Memory. For Mr. How always distinguishes (and so might any ordinary capacity for him, should he have trusted either that or men's common Ingenuity) between Concurring, though never so Immediately, by an Influence which doth but Enable to an Action, and by that which doth Determine to it, or impel. If any man do but carry this about with him, as Mr. How does thorough his whole troublesome Journey, it is a certain remedy against all Galling, at least by this Argumentation.  
One thing I could not but remark here, p. 61. of The Discourse in passing, how jovial It is and buxom, which is just the humour of Tyrants, bloodily cruel, and yet at the same time full of dissoluteness and laughter. I will pause a little with the Readers leave, and try my skill what answer I can excogitate for Mr. How, which will not be a common friend to us both (pleasant) as we have been hitherto one to another, and I hope shall remain notwithstanding this Public Contest. Dear Damon, doubtless. But I perceive not that Mr. How hath yet had any Contest with you, nor, if I can persuade him, is he likely to have for the future, but will avoid you for several reasons. Is this your friendship? what then and how terrible is your Malice? The Ancient Contests of Friendship, and which made some pairs so illustrious, were which of them should die for the other, not which should cut the others throat. The utmost that I have observed upon such Public Contests, or that I think a man is bound to in Christianity, hath been to pardon such a Friend, and bid him do his office. Here is to be seen or played T. D. indeed, or Amity a la Mode. But go on, This Distinction is an open Friend to us, and to which therefore upon all fit occasions we pay our respects. This is pretty, and most softly said, as if it were by the Great Mogul lying upon a silken-bed, and leaning upon Cushions. And besides, 'tis a new Invention, being the first time this that ever I heard of a man that contracted Friendship with a Distinction; but most wise men, (and so I think should Mr. How,) have been used to distinguish with whom they contract it. To proceed, speaking of Determination and Concurrence, these are the words; But that it waits a fitter time to speak out Her mind, She could say that She conceives not how She can compel the Will, etc. (of this compelling the Will, I shall have occasion also to speak out my mind hereafter). What use was to be made of a She in this place, I cannot well Imagine. At last The Discourse grows perfectly wanton. If immediate Concurence thinks Herself disobliged to satisfy an inquisitive Curiosity as to the Modus or manner how She joins with the Creature in an Action to which Sin does necessarily adhere, etc. What would a man think of this? A Female! An Immediate Concurrence! What sport were here prepared for that which is by our Moderns called Wit, but is no more than the luxuriant sterility of Land, nor broken up or manured! In the mean time, if The Discourse be really at so much ease, as It would seem by this way of talking, 'tis but a security of understanding, like that of Conscience wherewith guilty persons confirm and deceive themselves for the present.  
I shall now come to the last Instance of this Article. Not that I want abundance of more, or might not produce the whole Book in evidence, but because it were time that I came to some period: And lest The Discourse should think I avoided ItsIts main strength, I shall there examine It, where It pretends to no less than Demonstration. For never was there thing so dreadfully accoutred and armed Cap-a-pe in Logic, Categorical and Hypothetical Syllogisms, Majors, Minors, Enthymems, Antecedents, Consequents, Distinctions, Definitions, and now at last Demonstration, to pin the basket: Terms that good Mr. How as a mere novice is presumed to be unacquainted with, and so far from being able to endure the rattling of The Discourses Armour, that as those Roman Legions once bragged, even the sweaty smell of Its Armpits would be sufficient to rout him. But some Creatures are as safe by their weakness, as others by their strength, from being meddled with by a considerable Adversary. I that cannot boast of any extraordinary faculty for Disputation, nor yet confess myself void of common understanding, am therefore the most proper perhaps to try the force of this Demonstration; and whether The Discourse be not therein as feeble, as it was lately short in Definition. It p. 25. quotes Mr. whither, Postsc. p. 28. that he does really believe God 's Immediate Concourse to all Actions of his Creatures both Immediatione Virtutis & Suppositi, yet not Determinative to Wicked Actions; then The Discourse proceeds: We shall adventure a Demonstration that it implies a Contradiction for God to make a Creature that can Act without Predetermination, i. e. applying it to Action and to one rather than to another Action. And 'tis this, That such a Creature would be but Ens Secundarium, a Second Being, not (Causa Secunda, a Second Cause, or, (which is all one) God should be but Ens Primum, not Causa Prima, the First Being, not the First Cause, which it proves thus; 1. If God does concur only by Simultaneous (an elegant term of The Discourse's own production) Concourse, and not by Predetermination, or Previous Motion, than God cannot be the Cause of the Actions of the Creatures, as they proceed from them: But the Consequent is absurd, and It presumes Mr. How will not own it. What Mr. How may do, being thus hard put to it, I will not undertake: but surely there was never any thing affirmed with less truth or sense than The Discourse here doth, that God should be the Cause of the Actions of the Creatures, as those Actions proceed from them. One would think the Creatures themselves should be the Causes of the Actions as they proceed from them; (for how otherwise are they Causes at all of those Actions?) and God the Cause of those Actions as they proceed from him. Now how they proceed from him Mr. How hath sufficiently shown his own conception of it, viz. as they are done by a sufficient Influence, which God Immediately affords to enable the Creature to do them, not to Determine it thereto. And is not God to be entitled a Causa Prima as well as Ens Primum, in reference to what is done by his Influence in the way before expressed? Whereas, if God be the Cause of the Actions of the Creatures, as those Actions proceed from Them, the Action must be done by his Influence alone, and then he should not be Causa Prima, because then there were no Causa Secunda. But this was only sure The Discourses Demonand the next that follows it-stration.  
Mr. How had, as before cited, Postsc. p. 28. avowed God's Immediate Concourse to all Actions of his Creatures, both Immediations Virtutis & Suppositi. Upon which Concession of his It argues thus (with this prelusory vaunt, p. 26. He is twice killed that is killed with his own Weapon, so that no less than sudden Death is to be expected in the case.) If there be an Immediate Concourse, than there is a Predetermination or putting the Creature upon Action before it Acts: or else the Creature is the First Mover of itself to Action. This is so unimaginably dull an argument, that really it requires a proportionable dulness in the Reader, or an extraordinary acuteness to comprehend it, and how it should be deduced from Mr. How's Concession of Immediate Concourse. For the argument so put receives not the least strength, not any, from that Concession of Mr. How's, but rather from his Non-concession, and that he hath not yielded enough, and as much as The Discourse would have him, which pretends that Immediate Concourse alone is not sufficient to exclude the Creature from being the First Mover of its own Actions. For, whether Immediate Concourse be granted, or not granted, the case is all one as to this argument while so much is not granted whereby an account may be given how God and the Creature join in one individual Action rather than another, as The Discourse would have it, p. 27. if Mr. How could have been persuaded to be thus Demonstrated out of this Reason.  
The Illustration of Its plausible Consequence, as 'tis called p. 27. may perhaps be noted, and shall hereafter in its due place, but the Demonstration carries the Bell away, and I must yet follow its tinkling. And thus it goes on p. 27, 28. An account how the particular Actions of any rational Creatures Will come to be Determined, upon the exclusion of Predetermination, I know none can be given. And how is thus proved? for sure to affirm it is not Demonstration. Why, thus. Not by Chance: (unless this saying so be an Instance that it may in some cases) no body dreamed of any such thing but this was put in, I suppose, only for more harmony, & to run Division. A good slight it is, by proving first a thing which no man denies to make it more credible that the argument upon the Subject in Controversy will be as cogent. For the Question is upon Its Second Member, Not by the Creatures Self-determining Power, and here The Discourses main strength comes upon trial. For that, as such, is indeterminate as to the Acts to which we conceive it must be some way or other Determined. Admirably good! so it is indeed till the Creature, as Mr. How conceives, have Determined itself: and so it will be too if God be to Determine it, Indeterminate till he have Determined it. But if the Creature do Determine itself (which if it never do, how does The Discourse call it a Self-determining Power?) than I hope it is not Indeterminate. So that the whole stress of the Cause which was to prove that the Creature (so Influenced and Actuated by God Immediately for any congenerous Action, as Mr. How hath expressed it) cannot Determine itself, is left in the lurch, and no Demonstration hath been given hitherto, but of that Confusion and Ignorance with which I have charged The Discourse in this Article, about the matter in Controversy.  
But It argues further, p. 28, 29. and, with the same Demonstration, from a second Concession (it were methinks more ingenuous, to call it a Declaration or Assertion) of Mr. How's of God's Immediate Concourse and Predetermination to the Production of Good Actions, and the necessity thereof, pretends to infer the Necessity of God's Immediate Concourse and Predetermination likewise to all (that is, even to the most Wicked) Actions. But this beside the ridiculousness, is so odious an undertaking, that any pious man, should he be superior in the contention, would repent of his Victory; I shall here wave it; but if The Discourse pride itself herein, I give It the Joy as It deserveth.  
This Demonstration I had assigned as the last Instance of this Head; but I think I may be dispensed with to add another, it being an Act of Charity. For there are yet behind six Aricles more, some of them of a more criminal and heinous nature than those two that hitherto I have insisted upon.  
1. ItsIts Falsifications and Fictions of what Mr. How hath not said.  
2. ItsIts Injurious Perverting of what he hath said.  
3. ItsIts Odious Insinuations concerning what there is no colour to object against.  
4. ItsIts Insolent Boasting and Self-applause upon no occasion.  
5. ItsIts Gross Absurdities, Inconsistencies, Self-contradictions, and Unsafe Expressions.  
6. The Wrath and Virulence of It 's spirit. And oftentimes it chances that one and the same Instance is applicable, and may be reduced to several of these Heads. But therefore, as oft as I can impute any thing which might receive an higher accusation to Its Ignorance, Confusion or Dulness (which it is lest in any man's self-determining power to remedy) I rather choose to state it upon this more innocent account. And that hath been the Cause which hath swelled this Head beyond equality: my intention, being to be briefer on those that follow. I say therefore, that it is out of Charity that I here attribute Its Indifference between the Modus of God's Prescience, and God's supposed Predetermination to Wicked Actions to It's stupidity rather than any other Article, or make a new one for it on purpose. The thing is thus.  
Mr. How Letter, p. 47, 48, 49, 50. had, taking notice of an Argument which some use from God's Prescience for his Predetermination, said, among other things, very piously; This supposed Indetermination of the Humane Will, in reference especially to Wicked Actions, is far from being culpable of inferring that God cannot therefore foreknow them, etc. And after, upon consideration what others had endeavoured towards explaining or perplexing this matter, modestly adds, For my own part, I can more easily be satisfied to be ignorant of the Modus or Medium of his Knowledge, while I am sure of the thing, etc. It cannot therefore be so affrightful a thing to suppose God's Foreknowledge of the most Contingent Future Actions well to consist with our Ignorance how he foreknows them, as that we should think it necessary to overturn and mingle Heaven and Earth rather than admit it. But The Discourse, p. 32, 33. signifies, and then by quoting some of these words would confirm it, that we need not be more solicitous, and are no more concerned to satisfy ourselves of the Modus of Predetermination to sinful Actions, so as to separate them from the sinfulness of them, (for to hold the Conclusion is with It Demonstration) than about the Modus of God's Prescience of them. Which must argue (whatever else) a palpable shortness of discourse to think there is no odds betwixt a thing so plainly revealed in the Word of God as his Prescience is, and so agreeable to all rational apprehension, and a Notion so altogether unrevealed as this universal Predetermination yet appears, and so contrary if not to the whole scope and design of Divine Revelation, yet to all common understanding and genuine sense of right Reason. But whensoever there shall be so clear proof made that there is such a thing as The Discourses Predetermination, as may soon be brought of Prescience, when it shall be as duly stated among the Divine Attributes, then, and not till then ought men to practise the same devout resignation of their reasoning about it, as Mr. How hath laudably done in that of Prescience: but in the mean time it may be handled not as Causa Dei, but Causa Hominis, it is lawful to plead against it, and not to pay men's belief, but to afford their Charity to its abetters.  
There was one called Antipheron, whose name therefore seems rather to have been given him by the people from a natural defect they observed in him than by his Godfathers: He had a peculiar shortness of sight, but which turned him to account, and saved him the expense of sending to Malamocco or Lambeth to the Glass-house. He needed not so much as contemplate himself in Polyphemus his mirror, the water. He carried his Looking-glass always with him, the next Air supplied all, and served him not only to breath, but to see his face in, without any danger of staining or breaking it. A great convenience thus to be able every minute to blow himself a new Looking-glass. But how happy were it, if, what the shortness of his sight, the dulness of men's minds could have the same effect, to object to them continually their own Image, and make it unnecessary for others to represent them. Then might The Discourse also have excused me from this labour, and upon reflection with itself, have discerned its own unfitness and ignorance to manage this or any other Controversy.  
For want of such an immediate inspection on Its own defects, ItsIts natural undistinctness seems to perceive faults in others, and to find a mote in their eye, neglects the Beam in ItsIts own. It overlooks so gross a practice as in its p. 47. to translate out of Strangius into English Doctor Twisse's Argumentation about the same Prescience of God of future Contingencies, undertaking still to demonstrate, p. 46. (that is the word) that this Foreknowledge depends upon the Divine Decree, while in the mean time It never gives us, though the Book was in Its hand, Strangius his full and articulate answer to it in the same place, lest any man should know of it; but, to conceal it's own disability for any reply to it, challenges Mr. How to answer Doctor Twisse's irrefragable Argument over again. But p. 16. in Mr. How It can find two unpardonable faults in a man of Learning and Ingenuity.  
First, Anticipation, For, he having Letter, p. 36, 37. said, unless he Determine (that is to say, for it can mean no less thing, Impel,) that is the word accused, the Creatwe to do it; this is made so heinous, that I thought at first it had been the Anticipation of the Revenue, but, when all comes to all, I see it is nothing but the explaining a word of less obvious import by another more obvious: and nothing is more usual in The Discourse itself, and among men of Learning. And The Discourse itself adds here in the same minute Impelling, i. e. Compelling (for that is Mr. How 's sense of the term, as will appear ere long) which is methinks as early, and a more perverse Anticipation than Mr. How is unpardonable for, by how much It does by these last words own that Impel, unless it signify Compel, is allowable, but affirms that in Mr. How's sense it is Compel, as will appear ere long, which is moreover false, and therefore I will be so subtle as to take out my pardon in time for calling this Anticipation; for indeed that which neither is, nor ever can appear, ere long or short (as for Mr. How, to mean Compel) cannot be Anticipated.  
But the second unpardonable fault of Mr. how's is his immodest begging the Question: And wherein? I may well call it so (quoth The Discourse) because he knows we neither can nor will grant his Argument without ruining our Hypothesis. This is all the proof assigned of his begging the Question. I do indeed confess that Mr. How was much to blame in urging an Argument to the ruin of their precious Hypothesis; but I think it falls not under that Predicament of begging, though this does of robbing the Question: and however his crime is more excusable, because, in common probability, Mr. How, having writ his Letter and Postscript before The Discourse replied to him, might be ignorant that it was Its dear Hypothesis. For my part I take the very first Title of the Book de Causa Dei, to be more notoriously guilty both of Anticipation and Begging the Question, than that Mr. How could have any thing upon either account herein justly imputed or objected to him.  
The third Artice of which I shall Catalogue some, it being endless to enumerate, all the Instances.   

It's many strange Falsifications & Fictions of what Mr. How hath not said, and then discoursing of them as if they were said.  
As for a first Instance. In its Epistles, p. 10. Mr. How is accused of having denied God's Immediate Concurrence to all Actions, because Letter p. 36. he says (not, as The Discourse citys it, it sufficiently salves, but) it may well be thought sufficiently to salve the rights (and privileges, omitted) of the first Cause that no Action can be done but by a power derived from it, which, in reference to forbidden Actions, intelligent Creatures may use or not use as they please. Is any thing said here that implies any denial of Immediate Concurrence? Why may not that Power derived be Immediate to the Action? Is any thing said to the contrary, or which accords not well with what is pretended to be said ex opposito? But, to make this Accusation good, It conceals another passage in the very same Paragraph. Besides that it seems infinitely to detract from the perfection of the Ever Blessed God, to affirm he was not able to make a Creature of such a nature, as, being continually sustained by him, and supplied with power every moment suitable to its nature, should be capable of Acting, unless whatsoever he thus enables he Determine it to do also. So that the charge is founded merely upon Mr. How 's not having used the express word Immediate Concurrence in that sentence, and in concealing disingenuously what he had expressed, and what fully includes Immediate Concurrence in the sense that he afterwards asserts and explains it, Postsc. p. 28. to be both Immediatione Virtutis, and Suppositi to all Actions, though not Determinative to Wicked Actions. Although it would be something ridiculous to say, that The Discourse read one part of this with Its eyes shut, and the other part with Its eyes open; yet 'tis more false that Mr. How did there, or any where else deny God's Immediate Concurrence; and 'tis the best excuse of which this (otherwise Forgery) is capable.  
Second Instance. It feigns in the same p. 10. that Mr. How hath Postsc. P. 39 affirmed Predetermination to all Actions. It were strange if he should, but pretended to be proved by these his words, The Active Providence of God about all the Actions of Men, consists not merely in giving them the natural powers, whereby they can work of themselves, but in a real Influence upon those powers. This is (to speak the most softly, and indeed more softly than the thing will admit) an unking Interpretation, after what Mr. How hath been quoted to say in my former Instance: but especially, if The Discourse can or would be pleased to consider (after ItsIts invidious and deceitful generality in citing Letter, from p. 32, to 50. and the Postscript, without assigning one word) that Mr. how's asserting here of God's real Influence upon men's natural powers does not at all imply that Predetermination, which he there all along opposes. For can there be no Influence but such as is Determining? He hath shown there both may be and is. How often is there such Influence by the operation of Common Grace as doth not Determine?  
Third Instance. In the same p. 10. Because Mr. How hath Letter, p. 32. said, Some Actions of the Creatures are in themselves most malignantly wicked, and Letter, p. 46. Intrinsically Evil; therefore It, falsely enough, reproaches him to have by these words denied that all Actions have in them a Natural Goodness: Whereas Mr. How here speaks of Actions as they are Morally Evil or Wicked, that is, as specified by direction to an undue Object. Is not such a specifying Direction Intrinsecal? Is not the specification of every thing Intrinsecal to it? And so are not such Actions truly said to be Evil in themselves which so specified can by no Circumstances be made good. But Postsc. p. 36. (which is produced to argue him of Inconsistence) he owns that there is not any Action so sinful, but hath some natural good as the subtract matter thereof, abstractly and physically considered, (and yet so they can never be produced by God or Man, but concreted with their Individuating Circumstances; nor doth the Affirming the one, infer the Denial of the other. If it did, The Discourse itself hath done the same thing, p. 72. Thus some Actions are said to be in themselves Evil, when they are Evil in regard of their Object, etc. Thus the Hatred of God and Adultery are in themselves Evil, etc. But I suppose 'twould judge it hard dealing to say that hereby It denies (though it be an hard saying to affirm) that natural good which is the substrate matter thereof, and which always at a dead lift It, hath recourse to.  
Fourth Instance. From Mr. How's having Letter, p. 33. said, Nothing is more apparently a simple and most strictly natural impossibility, than not to do an Action whereto the Agent is Determined by an Infinite Power. It Epist. p. 11. hath the ridiculous grossness to charge Mr. How with there affirming that Predetermination forces the Will; as if nothing could make a thing naturally impossible to a man but force: he cannot make a new Sun: but what force hinders him? This is indeed Force, or rather Fraud; for otherwise it is impossible to deduce it. But whether of them be used against a chosen adversary, makes it seems no scruple in a Conscience diverted with Disputation.  
Another Instance. It calumniates Mr. How, p. 87. to have asserted the Positivity of Sin, and there calls it, the foundation of his Hypothesis, proceeding with great pains to disprove it borrows one Argument, to lead him with, from the most Learned Dr. Barlow, the now renowned Bishop of Lincoln, urges the Minor, than the Major, and draws up a whole Process, as if it were in the Spiritual Court, against him, and T. D. were become his Chancellor. There is none in England, nor especially Mr. How, as I imagine, but would reverence the Authority of that Excellent Person in all points of Learning or Controversy. But The Discourse is too bold to make use of his Power without his Commission, in a Case where Mr. How hath not said one word to affirm such Positivity.  
A further Instance. With the same Truth that is Falsehood It feigns, and that often, that Mr. How by God's having Irresistible Influence upon the Will means God's Forcing of the Will unto the most Wicked Actions. As for example, p. 39 from Mr. How's, p. 40. Irresistibly, that is in his sense Forcibly. Whereas Mr. How there objects to his Adversaries, their holding such an Irresistible Determination of the Will, but Forcing of it no where. Yet at what expense of Learning, and with how much loss of Ink and Ingenuity does The Discourse argue that the Will cannot be forced! which Mr. How, having denied that Irresistible Influence must of necessity disown for its further absurdity, had he thought his Adversaries guilty of it. But he appears to have been far from imagining it of them, nor could any but The Discourse have imputed it to him as his sense, that God does by Force whatsoever he does Irresistibly. What Law of Reason is there, or how can The Discourse justify such a Falsification but by Custom?  
If that shall be a sufficient Plea, It will never want Instances further to warrant the Practice. As in this following (Forgery I may not call it, having to do with such exactness, but) Rasure, Mr. How, having been upon the Argument of the Will of God concerning those that perish, had Letter p. 12. said, The Resolve of the Divine Will in this matter, was not concerning the Event, what he shall do (i. e. abstractly and singly, as these next following words show) but concerning his Duty what he should, and concerning the connexion between his Duty and his Happiness. Hereupon what does mean The Discourse? p. 116. It refers to those words of his, p. 112. and recites a further passage of his Letter, p. 115, 116. to argue them of repugnancy these to the former, but to that purpose conceals Mr. How's last Clause, but concerning his Duty what he should, and concerning the Connexion between his Duty and his Happiness, which being taken in, as it ought, there could have been no pretence of Inconsistency. And it adds that Mr. How's Answer Letter. p. 116. that Imperfection is no way imputable to the Divine Will merely for not Effecting every thing whereto it may have a Real Propension, is no Answer to the Objection: upon this strange pretence, that, a Real Propension of Will is no Will, as if it were a thing impossible that Propension should be either Habitual or Actual.  
So also for continual Instance. The Discourse p. 118, 119. feigns a Question to have been proposed by Mr. How, Whether it be fitting for God efficaciously to overpower all men into a compliance with the overtures he makes to them in Common: and then It creates also an Answer for him; It is not fit for God to overpower men without making any overtures to them at all; and, to make a song of three parts, judicially decides: the Answer is not fitted to the Question. I must confess that upon some former experiments I doubted of the Rectitude of Its Judgement, but I was not wary enough to suspect a Falsehood, which must be so notorious, as that there should be no such Question or Answer. But in good truth none there is that I can find of Mr. How's mark. The Question no where in Terms, but the Answer neither in terms nor sense, nor any thing like it. So that The Discourse is not to be allowed in any Court either as a Competent Judge, or a Legal Witness, but may deserve to be tried for this as a Criminal before any Logick-tribunal. Nor needs there any other Evidence against it for Conviction, than those very words of Mr. How, that It there hath cited. Grace sometimes shows itself in preventing exertions, and in working so heroically as none have beforehand [in the neglect of its ordinary method] any reason to expect. Letter p. 138. Now look back upon the supposititious Answer, to whom God makes no overtures at all; Then compare Mr. How's words in the neglect of its ordinary methods: And now let any man judge of the Honesty of such an Adversary. For can they be said to neglect God's ordinary methods to whom he makes no overtures at all? Nor is the second scheme of Its Question and Answer which immediately follows any whit better, but guilty of as perfect Forgery as the first, and so ill contrived, that it neither agrees with the former, nor with the Book, though pretending to be a true Copy.  
And an Instance it is of the same Fraud to feign, p. 119, 120. that Mr. How in his Letter hath, abstractly from the more fit course that God hath taken, determined the unfitness of God's giving grace and salvation to all men.  
All that Mr. How hath said therein amounts only to assert the course which is not taken to be less fit, and that God doth from the perfect rectitude of his own nature, take that course which was to be taken most wisely, and do that which was most congruous and fit to be done, Letter p. 149. What can better become us than to judge so of the ways that God hath pitched upon, and wherein we have God's own choice to precede and be a guide to our judgement?  
I shall conclude this Article with Its quotation, p. 44. out of Dr. Manton's Comment on james 1. 13. p. 101. as if that Learned Divine had affirmed the disputed Predetermination by those words. Many who grant Prescience, deny Preordination, (viz. quoth The Discourse, the Decree whereof Predetermination is the execution, so I understand him) lest they should make God the Author of sin; and It forsooth understands him so, but I hope without any obligation to better and sincerer judgements. For what one word is there here that can imply that Preordination to be executed by the way of Predetermination? It is no wonder if Mr. How be not secure while yet living, when those that are at rest cannot escape so notorious a practice. This is the same as to cut off a dead man's hand to subscribe with it to a Forgery. There needed no less it seems than Doctor Manton's good name, which is like a precious ointment, to give a better odour to those putid suggestions and expressions of Protestantism grown of late weary of itself, etc. bestowed on Mr. How on this occasion. And yet (for it made me curious) there are Witnesses above exception that also Dr. Manton consented with Mr. How in this point, and expressed a great sense of the danger of the contrary Opinion. And whensoever The Discourse signifies its doubt of it, I will undertake to make out their Evidence.  
The Fourth Article that naturally succeeds the former Falsifications.   

It's vain, but most injurious Attempts to pervert what Mr. How hath said.  
As for a First Instance, where p. 45. It represents Mr. How's words; Letter p. 29, 30. to imply an affirmation of a Foreknowledge of Christ's Death antecedent to God's Decree concerning it. The words are these (which It ushers in with (Let us hear if our patience can hear this exercise, whether Mr. How 's gloss upon Act. 4. 28. doth not corrupt the Text. If they had known they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory.) That is, God foreseeing wicked hands would be prompt and ready for this tragic enterprise, his sovereign Power, and wise Counsel concurred with his Foreknowledge, so only and not with less latitude, to define or determine the bounds and limits of that malignity than to let it proceed unto this execution. What common sense or ordinary ingenuity could have found less in these words than that Mr. How doth therein at least profess the Foreknowledge and the Decree to have been sunul & seniel, which is far from affirming the Foreknowledge to be antecedent? But Mr. How had moreover, immediately before these words cited, said; It was a thing which God's Hand and Counsel had determined before to be done. But this The Discourse conceals, lest It self should be detected of such a wilful perversion, and the better to make Doctor Twisse's censure (which otherwise had been nothing to the business) take place upon Mr. How p. 46. Those jesuitical dictates of the foreseen Determination of the Humane will before God's Decree, are not the Dictates of Divines Disputing but Dreaming. There was not any colour in Mr. How's words for any such imputation; though I doubt not that Mr. How believes God's Decree in this case to be but suitable to that Agency which he every where supposes him to have in things of that nature.  
A Second Instance of the same dealing is upon Mr. How's Assertion, Postsc. p. 28. of God's Immediate Concourse to all Actions of his Creatures. For p. 55. thence It pretends that it follows, and that Mr. How implies that God affords men a leading Concurrence to Actions downright Evil. And yet Mr. How had but Postsc p. 29. explained and limited that concession, saying, The Concourse or Influence, which I deny not to be Immediate to any Actions, I only deny to be Determinative as to those which are Wicked. Agreeably to what he saith also Postsc. p. 45. n. 9 But that limitation The Discourse takes not any notice of, pretending not to understand a difference between inducing men to Actions which God will reward, and to those for which he will ruin them. And upon this presumption it falls into the usual fit of boasting vaingloriously over Mr. How. For where Perversion may go for Ingenuity, Insolence may also pass for Reason.  
I cannot but observe also how in pursuit of this Subject, because Mr. How Postsc. p. 35. cited Luk. 6. 9 with Hosea 13. 9 to show the difference, and how much more agreeable it was to the Nature of God to induce men by Determinative Influence to Imperfectly good Actions which yet lead to Salvation and Blessedness, taen to such as are downright Evil, and tend to their ruin: It hereupon p. 58. frames a Chain of Syllogistical Argumentations, all of ItsIts own devising, which yet It hath the face to father upon Mr. whither. I call it the rather a Chain, because I remember to have read of one who had so singular a faculty of linking one Lie artificially upon another, that they called him at Rome by a new Nickname Catena: and the dexterity of The Discourse, in almost as sinister a quality, might pretend to the same denomination. The Samoiedes wear Guts about their necks, but swallow them at last down their throats. The same natural Links serving them first for ornament, and then for nutriment: and were The Discourse obliged to eat ItsIts own words, and feed upon ItsIts own Chain of Syllogisms, 'twere a diet, though slender and unclean, yet fit enough for a Barbarian. There is nothing can be more savage and inhuman, than to personate Mr. How here arguing, If it be unlawful for Man to destroy Life, than it is unlawful to God. And then, as if it were a form Dispute, and wherein Mr. How maintained the Affirmative, It denies the Antecedent, the Consequent, and the Connexion of ItsIts own (not, as is pretended Mr. How's) Enthymeme, and laboriously proceeds to disprove the whole Argument thorough the several members. Let but any man have recourse to that place of the Postsc. p. 35. and consider whether there be any colour thence to suppose that Mr. How intended there, or gave any occasion for such arguing; and whether all the Blasphemies or Heresies that ever were invented, might not be imputed to him with as much reason. I find myself so concerned hereat (not in behalf of Mr. How, but of all common morality among mankind) that I think fit to repress myself, and rather leave the Crime to any Readers, or to The Discourses own Censure; for, notwithstanding this and all ItsIts other Errors, I conceive It yet to have some intervals both of Understanding and Conscience.  
But a most undecent thing it was for It to trifle in a matter so serious, and it had been far more becoming to have given a clear account of It's own Belief in this point, than to have forged arguments for others, create shadows for It self to sport with, and to act in one personage the Cause, the Judge, the Witness, the Plaintiff, and the Defendant. After all those To and Fro 's, Up and Downs of so many tedious pages that It obliges us to, if we will go along with it thorough this particular, might I not in recompense crave leave to be solemnly and soberly answered upon two or three Questions arising upon this debate for my own better information? First, whether It do not conscientiously believe that God doth punish men for doing Actions which in such and such circumstances he hath forbidden them to do? Next, whether it be not manifest that according to Its opinion God must Determine men to those Actions in those circumstances, that is in the same circumstances wherein they are done? And lastly, whether that Determining Influence can be withstood? If It once affirm all these, as I see no tolerable evasion endeavoured, but that It holds them all pro confesso, how can It with all It's Logic and Metaphysics extricate Itself from maintaining that absurdity that God ruins men for what he hath induced them to, that is not simply to destroy life (as It vainly strives to shift off the business) but to destroy it upon such terms? And then how frivolous will all those Answers, p. 55. and so forward appear to Mr. How's argument mentioned on a former occasion, Postsc. p. 33. 34. We ourselves can in a remoter kind concur to the Actions of others: Yet it doth not follow that because we may afford our Leading Concurrence to Actions imperfectly good, that therefore we may afford them to afford to those that are downright Evil; because to Prayer, therefore to Cursing and Swearing, and then ruin men for the Actions me have induced them to: You'll say, God may rather, but sure he can much less do so than you. Now The Discourse calls this (and would blame it upon that account, as comparing God and the Creature) Mr. How's argument a Pari: But it is methinks a Fortiori, and therefore more reverend. If a well-natured man would not do so, it is much more disagreeable to God's Nature.  
In all these things Mr. How (and 'tis that makes me like him the better) declares his own sense plainly however, while the other never speaks out, unless to give ill words, and seems to search not for the Truth, but merely for Contention.  
The last Evidence of this Article shall be where It p. 111. takes occasion to say Mr. How p. 106. professes his dislike of the common distinction of Voluntas Beneplaciti & Signi, in this present Case [viz. to explain how God Wills the Salvation of all, and yet only of some] under which such as coined, and those that have much used it, have only rather (I doubt not) concealed a good meaning, than expressed an ill one. Thus far it quotes Mr. How, but there stops and saith, the rest is not worth the trouble of transcribing; but I therefore suspect the more that that it worth it, and out of some cunning fetch omitted, and shall the rather take that trouble upon me. It seems, I confess, by it's more obvious aspect, too much to countenance that ignominious slander, which profane and atheistical dispositions would fasten upon God and the course of his procedure toward men, etc. as though he only intended to seem willing of what He really was not; That there was an appearance to which nothing did subesse. And then why is the latter called Voluntas, unless the meaning be, he did only Will the Sign, which is false and impious? etc. But upon the former quotation out of Mr. How, wherein he only excepts against the Distinction in the present Case, and signifies that a good meaning was intended by it; The Discourse p. 116. represents him as meaning the same thing with Dr. Twisse (who also notes the impropriety of the latter member Voluntas Signi, as improperly called a Will, and only signifying Man's Duty) and blaming himself yet in blaming him: When Mr. How had in plain words approved the meaning of the Distinction. The gentlest imagination a man can frame to himself hereof, is that It's own brain was perverted before Mr. How's intention.  
The Fifth Article is,   

It's Odious Insinuations concerning what It hath no colour to object or except against.  
Of this I shall give three Instances in one Paragraph. T. D. p. 103, 104. where It pretends first to be at a strange loss for an Antecedent to a Relative in Mr. How's Letter, p. 67. Neither yet was it necessary that effectual care should be taken they should actually reach all, and be applied to every individual person. The loss is indeed a strange one, and I condole it. For It hath herein suffered great damage of Eyesight, Understanding, Memory and Ingenuity, very sensible disasters, and with great difficulty to be repaired. Mr. How's immediate words in the foregoing period were that the Divine Edicts should be of an Universal tenor as they are, the matter of them being of Universal concernment, and equally suitable to the common case of all men. Now add to these words as it follows in that place, Neither yet was it necessary they should actually reach all, and then say whether any man else would not have seen that the They here was Relative to the Divine Edicts: beside that the whole Tract of the foregoing Argument leads and refers continually to them. But then, when after a long loss It hath, casting about even to Postsc. p. 35. and 40. out of love to Mr. How 's person and the Truth, hit it at last to be the Divine Edicts of which possibly Mr. How meant it, yet than It suggests from those words of his, Neither yet was it necessary (that is to the purpose Mr. How was speaking of, the Vindicating of God's Wisdom and Sincerity, as any sober Reader will easily see) as if they were thought not at all necessary. If this be candour, what is blackness? It is as much as to say, that, unless it be necessary for the Vindication of God's Wisdom and Sincerity to provide that every man should have a Bible and read it, it is no way necessary for man's salvation.  
The Second Instance in the same Paragraph is to quote Mr. How Letter, p. 69. And thus how easily and even naturally (by Messengers running from Nation to Nation, some to communicate, others to inquire after the tidings of the Gospel) would the Gospel soon have spread itself through the World? and hereupon to suggest as if Mr. How thought the seeds of the Gospel were in men by nature. Unless Understanding and Wilful Ignorance be the same thing, no man could have avoided the sense of the word Naturally here, to be, easily, and of course. But if that term had been intended in the strict sense (though the mollifying of it by that particle, even, shows it was not) how could the Inquiry after a thing new, and said to be of common concernment, be Natural, although the thing itself were not?  
And the Third is; Whereas Mr. How had, Letter, p. 75, 76, 77. enumerated many Instances of God's Clemency and Bounty to Men in general, and added that, they might by these understand God to have favourable propensions towards them; and that though they have offended him, he is not their implacable enemy, and might by his Goodness be led to Repentance, that hereupon The Discourse p. 104. having nothing to allege against any particular of what is there said, brings in Mr. john Goodwin to have writ somewhat of the like import in his Pagans Debt and Dowry; and the like quotations it citys afterwards from Mr. Hoard, which is all for spite, but nothing to the purpose. Could It have laid down an Antithesis to any thing that Mr. How here said, 'tis probable it would have gone that way to work, and not have used this Pagan invention of baiting Mr. How in the skins of others; or daubing him over with pitch to serve for Torchlight, and put out the light of the Gospel. But 'tis more probable It would have proceeded both ways; for ItsIts Zeal for the Truth seems not greater than Its Animosity against Mr. How, whencesoever it arises. But It durst not adventure to say that Mr. How hath made Mr. john Goodwin's ill use of this notion. Had there been any such thing, The Discourse seems not in humour to have past it over, and that calumnious figure of Meliora Spero, hoping the best of him, but suggesting the worst, would have been changed to a plain accusation. If It would have dealt fairly, here was the proper place to have spoken out, and have told us distinctly Its own opinion in so weighty a matter. Does it know what God (though most unobliged) might do to furnish such with what might be sufficient, if they seriously desired such mercy at his hands? Will It think It self bound to tear Rom. 2. 4. out of Its Bible, because john Goodwin hath cited it? Or, will It adventure to be the Heathens Compurgator at the day of Judgement, that they have no more considered the tendency of the Divine Goodness?  
These indeed would have been worthy Achievements, and proper to one of so great enterprise; but to throw upon Mr. How an undeserved obloquy of other men's names in this manner, how base a thing, was it? considering besides how ItsIts own name (though hitherto studiously concealed,) might in the vicissitude of humane affairs, serve men hereafter for a more infamous quotation.  
I shall add no more than p. 108. It's citing Mr. How's Letter, p. 89, 90. That which God's declarations do amount to is, etc. that, if they which finally perish, neglect to attend to those external discoveries of the Word, etc. they are not to expect he should overpower them by a strong hand, and save them against the concontinual disinclination of their own Wills, upon which It saith, I am not able to make sense of the last words, for I understand not what overcoming by a strong hand (in a sinner's case) God can make use of that leaves the Will under disinclination to Satvation. What reason or occasion do Mr. How's words give for making this puzzle? Could it not understand that some men are so unreasonable as to expect Salvation, while yet at the same time they are disaffected to the means of it? And that some, because they dislike the ordinary means, please themselves with an hope that God will at last cast use some extraordinary, to overcome that disaffection?  
The Sixth Article.   

It's most unseemly and insolent boastings and self-applauses upon no occasion.  
Yet therefore the more frequent, as his kill Mr. How with his own weapon, p. 26. in Its Argument about Mr. How's two Concessions, the vanity whereof as to the first I have before noted: And now as to what he brags of against the second as a Triumphant Evidence, I shall no less show Its impertinency. The Argument is ItsIts own, p. 30. If it be the Indetermination of the Power to Individual Actions that makes an Excitation of them, to one rather than to another, necessary. Stay here: It takes this for granted, and as it is in itself destitute of strength, so It leaves it very unkindly without any proof or assistance to shift as well as it can. Whereas It knows that 'tis said on the opposite part, That it is not Indetermination merely (which the Self-determining power of the Will can remove) but aversion to good Actions (which gracious Habits do lessen, but not remove) that makes God's holy Determining Influence necessary. Now let it go on, and the possibility of Action contained in the Powers that makes the reducing of that possibility to Action no less necessary to good Actions: If there be any sense in this, it is very recondite, and would require a spirit that can discover hidden treasure; Can Possibility of Action make Action necessary? It must be as false as it is true, that an Argument can be drawn from Power to Act, affirmatively. Indeed, should it have said, where there is only a possibility of Action, that possibility must be reduced to Action, before there can be any Action, it were true, but than it is one of these things that are Nimus vera, and which it is ridiculous to put into any proposition, much more where it is to no purpose. As here it is manifestly to none; for we are still left as uncertain, as if no such thing had been said, what it is that must reduce that possibility to Action. But that it should be added no less necessary to good Actions, is beyond the power of Witchcraft to understand what it should mean here. Doth it pretend to be discoursing with any one that thought Determination to good Actions less necessary? I thought its present part was to oppose one that said it was more necessary. And yet this most insignificant Scheme of Discourse is shut up with a Quod erat Demonstrandum, and with the Phantastry of claiming to it evidence equal to what the Apostles words carry, Rome, 11. 36. For it was to those words that My. How's Letter, p. 62. gave those lofty Epithets of Triumphant Evidence, which The Discourse cavils at, and borrows, with no mind to restore them, to adorn the street-pageantry of this pitiful Argument.  
Another Instance may be It's Jovial rant, p. 37. What is now become of Mr. How 's thin Sophistry, and collusive Ambiguity? etc. It is necessary to read upon this occasion from Its p. 32. l. 12. at least to p. 37. l. 14. for it is too long to insert here such a parcel of stuff, but there you may have it. ItsIts business here is to defend the Predeterminers Opinion against the charge of God's necessitating men to sin, and of attempting to alleviate it by God's being above Law, but Man under it. Let me conjure any Reader by the most potent charms of persuasion, by all that is ridiculous in Its whole Book, or in mine, but to peruse at leisure how miserably those points are there along managed. It owns at first that it is an hard Province to answer to all the Objections, then softens it, as fire mollifies clay, and at last, after having confessed and begged, comes off with that glorious exaltation over Mr. How's thin Sophistry. It were needless to exemplify all the like passages, where it arrogates Commendation to itself beyond what any friend, and vilifies Mr. How below what any other enemy would offer at both equally undeserved.  
The Seventh Article.   

It's very gross Absurdities, Self-contradictions, and Inconsistencies, to which may be added divers unsafe Expressions, not a little reflecting on God and Religion.  
As first p. 18. It discourses concerning the security of good Angels by God's determining Influence, which no man that I know will quarrel for, and by which I doubt not it supposes their Immutability, but p. 20. speaking of Man, It saith, that God made him Mutable (and how could he do otherwise, unless he should have made him a God?) what then, doth it conceive that the good Angels are Gods? Such like was Its absurdity, p. 27. of the necessity of Predetermination, because God's Immediate Concourse could not determine Adam's Will. Than which, what can be more notorious? the Controversy being, Whether God doth determine Men to Wicked Actions, but ItsIts Argument to this Effect; That, if God do not determine Men to such Wicked Actions by Concourse, he doth it, as elsewhere it calls it, by Precourse. Whereas it should have known the thing denied by Mr. How to be, that God doth by Efficacious Influence determine to them at all. And so ItsIts Argumentation there signifies only that if God do not detertermine to them, he doth determine to them.  
A third Instance is where p. 40. Mr. How having Letter p. 17. 47. said that the Argument from the pretended Impossibilty of God's foreknowing Sinful Actions, if he did not determine the Agent to them, will not infer, that if he determine not to them, he cannot foreknow them, but only that we are left ignorant of the way. It collects thence p. 41. (and thinks Mr. How hath much overshot himself) that he universally denies our knowledge of the way how God foretells future Contingencies. Whereas Mr. How Letter p. 35. stated their Argument in express words, that it were otherwise impossible God should foreknow the Sinful Actions of men, and here 47. only saith, the Argument infers so much and no more, as to Wicked Actions, yet It makes this an universal denial as to all Actions: Hereby it is easy to judge, which of the two is the better Archer, or came nearer the mark, which shot home, and which over.  
That for a Fourth is what you please for to call it, p. 70. but a pretty innocent thing of the like nature Irresistible Imports, It saith, A Relation of the Action of the Agent to some resistance, which is pleasant, by how much impossible to imagine how that which cannot be resisted imports that which is resisted.  
But this p. 76. is a most refined absurdity, while in the same place It taunts Mr. How for gratifying his own unscholastick homour. Something is said to be Impossible respectively, as if a man will fly that he should have wings. But this among duller men hath hitherto been thought an instance of what is quite contrary, to wit, of Hypothetical Necessity. And if It should find It self hereafter obliged to fly from Its adversary, I suppose that It would think a pair of wings to be pertinent and highly convenient, if not necessary.  
I have before upon occasion, and in passing, noted how he undertakes to prove that there are no Actions of free Agents Evil in themselves, when nevertheless it had p. 72. affirmed the hatred of God and Adultery to be in themselves Evil.  
Such is that too elsewhere touched, p. 63. where it citys Mr. How, Postsc. p. 36. intimating that some Actions are Evil quoad Substantiam, that is, morally Evil or Wicked; and It would have it to be a Contradiction to own that any such have natural good in them. How wisely? As if it were not possible for the same Action to be morally Evil, and naturally Good. Or did It never hear of the Substance of an Act in the moral sense? And doth not a forbidden Action use to be called Evil in the Substance of it? When, if the Action be not forbidden, but commanded, and only the undue manner or end forbidden, as in ItsIts own Instance of almsgiving for vainglory, it is said to be Good, quoad Substantian? It is to be wondered that it summoned not here it's Logic to prove that an Action hath no Substance; but that would have spoiled Its Learned Note that follows, where Mr. How, Postsc. p. 36. to the Question, Is there any Action so sinful, that hath not not some natural Good as the substrate matter thereof? Answers, True, and what, shall it therefore be inferred, that God must by a Determinative Influence produce every such Action whatsoever reason there be against it? One might better argue thence the necessity of his producing every hour a new World, in which there would be a great deal more of Positive Entity, and natural Goodness. It hereupon undertakes p. 65. to prove that there is as much Entity and natural Goodness in a sinful Action, as there would be in Myriad of Worlds, should God create every hour a new World; and saith, that to deny this were unworthy a Philosopher: and ItsIts proof is, If Substantia non recipit magis & minute, or if Ens & bonum sit convertibile, than an Action hath as much Entity as a World.  
But how much doth It reflect upon God and that Religious sense which we ought to cherish of him, p. 27. when it makes God to have determined Innocent Adam's Will to the choice of eating the fruit that was forbidden him? This seemed so horrid at first, that It self startles a little at it, interposing in a Parenthesis (suppose before the Prohibition passed upon it) and yet, because It's cause required no less, and appetite gathers with eating, it takes courage afterward to assert God's Predetermination of Adam's Will to the Act of eating, which was not till after the Prohibition: and to Illustrate (as it pretends) so black a thing, it parallels God's moving him to that Act rather than to another, with a Writing-Master's directing his Scholar's hand. If the Cause be not to be defended upon better terms than so, what Christian but would rather wish he had never known Writing-Master, than to subscribe such an Opinion; and that God should make an innocent Creature in this manner to do a sorbidden Act, for which so dreadful a vengeance was to ensue upon him and his posterity?  
No less pregnant with impious absurdity is it to assert p. 29, 30. the equal necessity of Predetermining Influence to Wicked Actions as to Good; and that dangerous Insinuation, p. 19 that God's promises convey no right to them to whom they are made, For, 'tis a ruled case, it says, in the Schools, that God cannot properly be said a Debtor to his Creatures; and then adds of ItsIts own, no not when he hath passed a Promise to them, and pursues this so far as to say, if he should (to suppose an Impossibility) which, considering what follows had been therefore better omitted, break his word, he would be but Mendax, non Injustus, and puts it too in English, a Liar, not Unjust. What dispensation have some men to speak at this rate, or what dangerous points do they run themselves upon, and their Readers? I remember there is a Picture before that Ruler of the Case his Book with this Addition, bene scripsisti de me Dive Thomas. But let God be True and Just to his word, and every man (that saith otherwise) a Liar.  
For the last I shall only transcribe a few lines of its idle Harangue, p. 35. in which I know not whether the malice against Mr. How, or irreverence towards our Saviour do predominate thorough the whole absurdity. We might also observe upon his Rhetorical Amplifications of his Argument, that he seems to be no ill-willer to Transubstantiation: for if the natural notions of God's Goodness should be infinitely dearer to us than our senses, I see not why the notion of God's sincerity that he means as he speaks, should not challenge a share in our Endearments, and so why hoc: est corpus meum, should not assure us that the bread is transubstantiated, though our senses, etc. join in a Common Testimony against it. Viciously and wantonly said, as if God, wheresoever he speaks in a figure, were guilty of Insincerity.   

The Eighth and last Article against The Discourse, shall be The Virulence of Its Spirit.  
Whereof one Instance may fuffice, p. 122. where, closing the Book, It saith, that Mr. How 's Doctrine opens a wide door for Atheism, and reckons him by strong Implication, among those who acknowledge God in Words, but deny him in Deed: Whereas, what is it that Mr. How hath denied, but that God doth determine men by Efficacious Influence to those very Actions which he forbids, and for which he will punish them?  
But I spare my hand, The Discourse all along boiling over, foaming, frothing and casting forth the like expressions, which I refrain to enumerate, that I may not incur the fate of him that stirs the Indians Poison-pot, who when he falls down dead with the steam and stench, they then throw the doors open, and dip their Arrows.   

I Should now therefore have concluded, were there not something yet in Its Prefatory Epistle so fordid, that I reserved it for behind, as the most proper place it could be applied to. Nor shall I therein only have marshaled it according to Its dignity, but do hope moreover, as the Head of the Viper is a specific against Its Venom; so to find out a Remedy against the Book in the Preface; wherein it shows so peculiar a malice and despite to Mr. How, and insinuates the same to the Reader, as requires a particular Preservative. And, had I not already been at the pains of the foregoing Remarks, here was, I see, a more compendious occasion, but sufficient to have administered me the same observations. For all the other faults that I have objected against the bulk of The Discourse might as easily have been discovered in Its Preface, as a good Physiognomist can by the Moles in the face assign all those that are upon any other part of the body: But among them all ItsIts superlative Dulness is here especially the more manifest (as usually happens in such cases) by how much It endeavours most at Acuteness and Elegancy; so palpable, that even It self could not be wholly insensible of it: but p. 3, 4. feelingly confesses both in Latin and English, that in reading Mr. How's Letter and Postscript, Obstupuit steteruntque Comae; and a double Astonishment under which It laboured: This doubtless it was, like the disaffections derived from the Head to the Nerves, which propagated that horrid stupidity that I have already noted thorough Its whole Treatise. But that Quality is here so exalted, Nature it seems, having given It that Torpor for a Defence) that in touching it thus lightly, I perceive a numbness to strike up thorough my Pen into my Faculties, and shall therefore point at some particulars, rather than adventure to handle them.  
Mr. How had in passing, Postsc. p. 22. glanced upon an improper redundance of words used by a former Adversary. The Divine Independent Will of God; as he might with good reason take notice of it, being as much sense as to have said the Humane Dependent Will of Man. But hereupon The Discourse p. 9 having for revenge turned over his whole Letter and Postscript to find out the like absurdities, highly gratulates It self in three Instances, but all of them curtailed from the coherence to make for the purpose. One Letter p. 42. In which sense how manifest it is that the perfect (all this omitted) Rectitude of God's own holy gracious Nature (is an eternal Law to him omitted.) The second; Letter p. 59 God satisfies himself in himself, and takes highest complacency in the perfect Goodness, Congruity, and (all this omitted) Rectitude of his own most holy Will and Way; and for these Mr. How is arraigned upon a Crime, by a Greek word of Law called Pleonasme. The third is Actions Malignantly Wicked (which The Discourse saith is the same as Wickedly Wicked) Postscript p. 22. and 32. as It quotes, but is in Letter; 32. and here, It leaves out also the word most, which would have spoiled the exception taken against it; for what Mr. How there saith is, even those Actions that are in themselves most malignantly wicked. Are there not some Actions, some Men, more malignantly wicked than others? Or will The Discourse apply ItsIts old end of Latin here— aliquando bonus dormitat Homerus to Paulus, Rom. 7. 13. sin, exceedingly sinful? It was time therefore in all reason to conclude this exercise with saying; But these are childish Criminations, unfit to be bandied from hand to hand by sober persons; owning It self at once to have been guilty herein of an Intemperate, Inept, and Unmanly kind of procedure.  
Neither can I pass by unregarded that new Invention of rearing up Pillars to men's Infamy; but which have sometimes, and may now also, turned to the disgrace of the Architect. It cuts out p. 10, 11. several Lines here and there, out of the whole Letter and Postscript, to post them up in Columns, and Mr. How upon them as a common notorious Self-contradicter: Whereas, if any man will take the pains to restore those sentences to their first situation and coherence, (as I have formerly done) there will not be found the least Inconsistency in them: But if this Practice be allowable, there is not any Chapter in the Bible out of which It may not with the same integrity extract either Blasphemy or Nonsense; though I am far from suspecting The Discourse of such an undertaking. For indeed It assigns the True Reason, (and fit to be inscribed over the Portico) non est ingenii mei hosce nudos dissolvere, and as faithfully translates it; I have not the wit to untie these knots, which is now the third public Confession of of Its stupidity, in the Preface. Yet will I not do It the affront to ascribe it either to ItsIts Modesty, Ingenuity, or Self-Conviction; for It intended them doubtless all to the contrary. Only the same Dulness, that first occasioned It's errors and mistakes, did likewise lead It to these ominous expressions, and like those that discern not the Back from the Edge, to wound It self in cutting at the Adversary.  
It's Dulness therefore, or as it is expressed p. 8. the consciousness of It 's own disabilities, being so oft attested under Its own hand, and to which, if necessary, It might have another Thousand Witnesses, I shall not further palls my Reader on this Subject, but return rather from this digression to my first design of obviating that in the Preface, which hath all the marks upon it of Malice, except the Wit wherewith that vice is more usually accompanied. Of that the very Title is an Argument. De Causa Dei, or a Vindication of the Common Doctrine of Protestant Divines concerning Predetermination, etc. from the Invidious Consequences with which it is burdened by Mr. John How, in a late Letter and Postscript of God's Prescience. By T. D. Who would have thought that T. D. should have become the Defender of the Faith, or that the Cause of God were so forlorn, as to be reduced to the necessity of such a Champion. It seems much rather to be the Fallacy of Non Causa pro Causa, and usurped only the better to prepossess against Mr. How such, Readers as would be amused by the Frontispiece. The Cause of God Turn I beseech you It's whole Book over, and show me any thing of that Decorum with which that should have been managed. What is there to be found of that Gravity, Humility, Meekness, Piety or Charity requisite to so glorious a pretence? (Graces wherewith God usually assists those that undertake his quarrel, and with which Mr. How on all occasions appears to be abundantly supplied.) But a perpetual eructation there is of humane Passions, a vain ostentation of mistaken Learning, and a causeless Picking of Controversy.  
To that Title, under which Mr. How is so injuriously proscribed, succeeds forsooth an Epistle Dedicatory, To the Reverend Mr. John How, Author of the late Letter and Postscript of God's Prescience. An additional Civility and Compellation invented by The Discourse only for greater mockery. And a manyfine words It bestows upon him at first, to miscall him presently with the more Emphasis, praises the Author, and then the Book; but no otherwise then, as a person to be degraded is brought forth in public attired in all his Formalities, to be stripped of them again with further Ignominy.  
Nay, even Mr. Boil himself cannot wholly escape Its Commendation: which I do not object as if any thing could be well said of him that is not due to his merit. But there are a kind of Sorcerers that praise where they intent to do most mischief. And the Occasion, the Place, the Manner, the Person that gives the Commendation make always a difference, and cause a great alteration in that matter. Nor is it less here. For, Mr. How having taken the Pen on this Subject, as The Discourse also observes, upon that honourable Gentleman's command, the officious mentioning of Mr. boil p. 1. seems as if It had a mind too to try his mettle; or at least would reproach him for having employed one so unfit for the service, and that was to be so shamefully (or rather shamelessly) treated for his performance.  
But the sum of all ItsIts Malice, whereby It endeavours to outlaw Mr. How, not only from Mr. boil's patronage, but from all Protestant protection, is to represent him under a Popish Vizard. As p. 2. Old Popish Arguments dressed up A-la-mode. An averment of the Old Popish Calumny. An Affidavit of a Pontificial Accusation. Trampling p. 4. on the Venerable Dust, which was sometimes animated by truly heroic souls, and bore the names of Zuinglius, Calvin, Beza, Penkins, Pemble, Twisse, Davenant, Ames, etc. Then p. 12. still objects to him the opinion of Durandus, though Mr. How had in his Postscript so fully vindicated himself against it, that his first Accuser hath let it fall out of perfect ingenuity. Draws a parallel between his and the Papists Arguments against Predetermination. And p. 13. erects another pair of Columns to that purpose, betwixt which Mr. How is to look out as thorough a Pillory. Afthis p. 14. saith, the point under debate between It and Mr. How, is a stated Controversy between the Papists and Protestants. Gives Itself a little pleasure mixed with disdain, that because there was no Smith to be found throughout all the Land of Israel, he was fain to go down to the Philistines to sharpen his Axe and his Mattock, 1 Sam. 13. 19, 20. Imitates Bradwardins Piety, therefore intituling Its Book de Causa Dei, the Cause of God being that which It designs to secure from the impetuous Assaults of its ' Adversaries, among which It is heartily sorry Mr. How should be numbered as to this instance. This kind of proceeding does argue rather the strength of Malice, than of the Cause. For although we live under a rational jealousy always of Popery, yet whatsoever is said by any Author of that persuasion, is not forthwith therefore to be clamorously rejected. Have not there constantly been among them, men fit to be owned for Holy Life, Good Sense, Great Learning? And in many points we agree with them, and shall in all, whensoever Our Eyes shall be shut, or Theirs shall be opened. The Discourse had indeed done something to the purpose, could It have shown the Doctrine of Predetermination to be one of those Discriminating Causes upon which we have made a separation from that Church, that it is an Article of Faith in which our Creeds differ, and that it were a fit Test to be imposed upon them in order to their more speedy Conviction.  
Which last, if It can bring about for them, so that they may be acquitted upon Renouncing this Doctrine imputed to them, (instead of the Transubstantiation, (which Mr. How too escaped so narrowly.) I presume they would, notwithstanding all the Popery, take it for an high obligation. For indeed, whereas The Discourse affirms this of Predetermination to be a stated Controversy betwixt the Papists and the Protestants; the Papists against, the protestants for it; there is not through ItsIts whole Book a more notorious Falsehood. For this Debate arose first among the Papists, some of them being of one, others of the contrary Opinion; so that the Controversy was stated betwixt themselves. But that which is now T. D' s. was first the Dominican Doctrine; and I wonder therefore the less if It continue herein the Dominican Spirit. Since, and from that original, the same Argument hath indeed been also diffused among the Protestasts, and they likewise have differed about it with one another; but it was never taken, in holding it either way, to be the Protestant Character. The Predeterminative Concourse is not to be found in any Confession of the several Reformed Churches; But this matter hath been left entire to every man's best Judgement, and one Party is as much Papist in it as the others What two men of equal Capacity can argue against Predetermination, but they must have the same Apprehensions in some measure, in matters so obvious? and it ought not to be improved to either's prejudice, no more than for two to speak the same words in discoursing of one subject. Charron, whose Wisdom, p. 1. Bradwardine, whose Piety, p. 14. and especially, Caesar Borgia, whose Chalk, p. 15. T. D. makes use of, were none of the best Protestants: And yet I am far from taxing It therefore of Popery, or giving myself a little pleasure mixed with disdain, that it was fain to go down to them to sharpen ItsIts whither or ItsIts Mattock. Let It rather solace It self in that Lordly posture of mind; nor will I envy It; especially, seeing to take that satisfaction in a thing which. It makes so Criminous, is the only Joy of which I think the Evil Spirits are capable.  
And as to ItsIts saying, p. 2. that Mr. How a vers the Old Popish Calumny, that by the Protestant Doctrine God is made the Author of Sin. And p. 4. that he tramples upon the venerable dust, etc. of Zuinglius, Calvin, Beza, Perkins, Pemble, Davenant, Twisse, Ames, etc. it proceeds from the same malice, and may therefore receive the same answer: For I have shown, first, that this Predetermination is not the stated Doctrine of Protestants, nor hath there yet any General Council of them been held, where T. D. hath presided: but if there should at any time hereafter, It is so unhappy and singular in expressing Its sense, in this matter, that I much fear lest the Plurality of Votes should affix the dangerous Greek name to Its Religion. And as to those Worthies whom It citys by rote, It draws them indeed within the reach of both Old and New Calumny, by pretending they were of Its Opinion; whereas one may safely affirm at adventure, that they were all of them too well enlightened to have ever thought or spoken after Its manner. What it may have extorted from them by Necromancy, I know not; but they had not the happiness to have read Its De Causa Dei in their life-time: Nor do I think that Death corrupts men's Minds as their Bodies. Of these, whom The Discourse enumerates, Calvin and Beza, have been reproachfully charged by Bellarmine and other Romanists, as making God the Author of Sin, but yet there is not to be found in all their works an assertion of God's Determinative Concurrence. How far some of the rest of them have taken scope on this subject, I have no obligation here more than The Discourse, to particularise: neither did Mr. How name any man, as being the fairer way by much, arguing only against the Opinion. But seeing T. D. hath made bold with Bishop Davenant, I will ask no better: For that truly venerable, dust, which It hath stirred will fly in T. D. eyes; if I be not mistaken. Dissert de Predestinatione & Reprobatione, it is thus, Deus, Agens ex Deoreto Praedestinationis, operatur haec priora (scil. Fidem, Sanctitatem, Perseverantiam) per Influxum Gratiae Efficacis, As ex Decreto Reprobationis nihil agit quo Deterior efficiatur Reprobatus— That is, for it is well worth the translating: God, acting according to his Decree of Predestination, works these things in the first place, (to wit, Faith, Holiness, and Perseverance) by the Influence of Efficacious Graces; but, according to his Decree of Reprobation he acts nothing by which the Reprobate should be made worse. Methinks, as T. D. will have the Bishop to be of It's, so, in all reason, It should be also of the Bishop's Opinion, and if It intends no more, as Mr. How no less than is here said, I cannot see why there might not be an end of The Discourse, and of this Controversy.  
But however, I hope that I may have done a good work, if upon sight of these unexpected remarks, Mr. How, though fitted doubtless for a much better and fuller Reply, would deliberate before he makes this Adversary so considerable as to blot Paper on Its occasion. Let It, in the mean time, venditate all Its Streetadages, ItsIts odd ends of Latin, ItsIts broken shreds of Poets, and ItsIts musty lumber of Schoolmen. Let It enjoy the ingenuity of having unprovoked fallen upon a person, whose parts It acknowledged, for whom It had such an Affection, with whom It had so many years Academical Society, and so long friendship: but whom It now must number among God's Adversaries. Let It value It self upon these things: for all these considerations do heighten the Price of an Assassinate. But may Mr. How still continue his Sobriety, Simplicity, and Equality of Temper: glorifying God rather in the exercise of Practical Christian Virtues, than affecting the honour of a speculative Question. But if he had a mind to be Vindictive, there is no way to despite the Adversary more sensibly, than, as clamorous women, by giving them no answer. Till men grow into a better humour, and learn to treat of Divinity more civilly, they are unfit for conversation.  
Another, I see, who is now his Third Aggressor, hath already assaulted him, though less barbarously, in a Letter to a Friend, etc. Yet even he introduces his Book with job 13. 7. Wilt thou speak wickedly for God, and talk deceitfully for him? What shall Mr. How do in this Case? Is the Bible therefore to be turned into a Libel? and shall he search the Scriptures to find out a Text equally cutting? He need not go far, were he of that mind, to retaliate. How easy were the parallel betwixt Iob's three Friends (to whom those words were spoken) and three such comfortable Gentlemen! And why may not Mr. How neck them as well out of job, c. 12. v. 3, 4. But I have understanding as well as you; I am not inferior to you; yea who knoweth not such things as these? I am as one mocked of his neighbour, who calleth upon God, and he answereth him. The just upright man is laughed to scorn. Or, if he would be yet severer, the same, chap. 13. v. 4, 5. will hit them home. But ye are Forgers of Lies; ye are all Physicians of no value. O that you would altogether hold your peace, and it should be your Wisdom. And then at last, to determine the whole Dispute, He might conclude with job 42. 7. The Lord said to Eliphaz the Temanite, My wrath is kindled against thee, and against thy two Friends; for ye have not spoken of me the thing that is right as my servant Job hath. After all which, what more seasonable, in order to Reconciliation, than the verse following? Go to my servant Job, unto offer up for yourselves a burnt offering, and my servant Job shall pray for you (for him will I accept;) lest I deal with you after your folly, in that you have not spoken of me the thing that is right, as my servant Job hath. But the Word of God is not so to be turned into the Repraach of Man, though the Allusion may seem never so happy; nor have I instanced thus far, otherwise than to show the frivolousness, though too usual of that Practice.  
But therefore I would advise Mr. How, though not to that excusable sullenness and silence, with which some have chastised the World for having used them unworthily; nor to that tacit contempt of his Adversaries, in which he were hitherto justifiable; yet, that, having made a laudable Attempt, of which several good men are it seems not capable, he would, for peace sake, either wholly surcease this contest, or forbear at least till they have all done. For it is more easy to deal with them all than single; and, were they once embodied, come to a consistence among themselves, or had agreed who should speak for them, they had right to his Answer. But until then, Mr. How is no more obliged in whatsoever is called Honour, Reason, or Conscience, than if every hair of T. D. that stands an end, should demand particular satisfaction. It is the same for a Divine, as he, to turn Common Disputant, as for an Architect to saw Timber, or cleave Logs, which, though he may sometimes do for health or exercise, yet to be constant at it, were to debase and neglect his Vocation. Mr. How hath work enough cut out of a nobler nature, in his Living Temple, in which, like that of Solomon, there is neither Hammer, nor Axe, nor any Tool of Iron to be heard, 1 King. 6. 8. nothing that can offend, all to edify. And this I heartily wish that he may accomplish: But therefore, as he hath not hitherto sought, so that he would avoid all Contention; lest, as David, for having been a man of blood, was forbid to build the Temple, 1 Chron. 22. 8. so he, as being a man of Controversy.  
As for myself, I expect in this litigious Age, that some or other will Sue me for having Trespassed thus far on Theological Ground: But I have this for my plea, that I stepped over on no other Reason than (which any man legally may do) to hinder one Divine from offering violence to another. And, if I should be molested on that account, I doubt not but some of the Protestant Clergy will be ready therefore to give me the like Assistance.  
FINIS.    

ERRATAS.  
PAge 8. l. 14. lie, p. 24. l. 11. speculatorem, p. 36. l. 5. actuates, p. 38. l. 7. leave out, any, p. 43. l. 6. port, p. 82. l. 15. Articles; last line Epistle, p. 87. l. 2. substrate; p. 88 l. 21. load; p. 9 l. 10. me, p. 95. l. 1. the, p. 100 1. 18. then.