An Introduction TO THE ART OF Logic: Composed for the use of English Schools, and all such who having no opportunity of being instructed in the Latin Tongue, do however desire to be instructed in this liberal Science.  
By John Newton. D.D.  
LONDON, Printed by E.T. and R.H. for Thomas Passenger at the Three Bibles on London Bridge, and Ben. Hurlock over against St. Magnus' Church. 1671.   

TO THE Worshipful HENRY MILBERNE Esq Recorder of Monmouth.  
SIR  
IT is now twenty years and more, since first I thought that we in England were infinitely out, in our way and Method of educating youth; and although I did attempt something (in the time of our late toubles) toward the redress thereof; yet must I acknowledge that my conference with you, hath not only riveted me in my former persuasion, but much animated and encouraged me to reassume my former attempt. And though I find my proposals to be much slighted and contemned in general; yet till some persons of worth and learning, shall by force of argument convince my judgement, I shall not easily be persuaded to desist; but shall hope that there may be yet found some to join with you in giving encouragement to such an Honourable undertaking, as is the teaching of youth all the sciences in their own Tongue: An introduction to the last and highest of them, the Art of Logic, I here tender the world under the Patronage of your name, to let it know as well your zeal for your Country, as my gratitude for the many favours I have received from you: and if at last I can persuade some few to give their children such education in their own tongue, (before they attempt any thing in other languages) as may in some good measure fit them for all employments both by Sea and Land, God shall have the Glory, they and their Country the profit; and I in that shall think myself abundantly satisfied for all the pains that I have yet, or shall hereafter undertake; and the rather, because I hope thereby to make it appear, how much I am▪  
Sir Your faithful Servant to command John Newton.   

TO THE TEACHERS OF ENGLISH.  
YOu are they to whom this Nation is beholding for the first foundation of all literature; by you are all our youth first cultivated and instructed not only in Letters and Morality, but in the Principles of Religion also; and I could heartily wish, that your encouragements were more suitable to your indefatigable pains, great worth, and honourable calling: But alas! I cannot but be deeply sensible not only of the mean reward usually given to you, but also of the great scorn to which you are too often liable: but let not this discourage you, in these your pious, as well as honourable undertake, but let it rather heighten your spirits and increase your courage, not only patiently to undergo all those unjust contempts, that are by foolish men thus rudely cast upon your persons; but also to scorn the scorners; and to this purpose let me entreat you, for the glory of God, the edification of his Church, and the good of your Country, to look a little further than the bare teaching of children to read: be not so forward and willing to quit you of those tender plants, by sending them to Latin Schools (for their further instruction and greater advantage as you perhaps may think;) for your parting with them so very early, doth not only hinder their cheerful progress in the Latin and Greek tongues, but for ever debar them from all opportunities of getting that knowledge in Writing, Arithmetic and Geometry, which would capacitate them for those callings, to which the meanness of their parents fortunes doth and will enforce thousand thousands of them. Let your industry therefore prevent their being sent either to them that shall do them no good at all, (I mean the Latin master,) or yet to those, that are only skilled in the dexterous use of a Goose quill: for as for Arithmetic, to the shame of that whole society, there are very few that are able to teach a child so much as is required to compute the quantity of a glass window; so that you need not despair of gaining so much yourselves, as will enable you to do that work as well as they; and as for writing, the world doth swarm with so many excellent copy-books, that it is no hard matter for you to make it appear, what a useless creature a bare penman is, I mean such an one as is neither able nor willing to teach children to read, nor that which they chiefly profess the art of Arithmetic. Nor will the Theory or Practic of vocal music be any impossible thing for you to undertake; but this accommodation would certainly ensue, that all congregations would perform the part of their devotions to God with far greater harmony than now they do; all Cathedrals would be better furnished with Queristers and singing-men, and all churches with far more fitting parish-Clarks: yea, and such helps there are for Astronomy also, that you may with wonderful ease have a competent knowledge in that noble science. Would you therefore but take upon you (as easily you might,) the teaching of these things, your Scholars would not only proceed with great delight, but the visible profit that would thereby accrue to them, and the whole nation, would certainly remove very much of that scorn and contempt under which you now groan. And now to complete this work, and to confine the Latin master to those children only, that are intended for some learned profession, acquaint those that are under your tuition with the Elements of Rhetoric, and not of Rhetoric only, but also of Logic. These two Sciences have such a natural dependence on one another, that they are not fit to go asunder, and therefore as my Rhetoric is ready for you, so here I now present my Logic to you as the seventh and last part of an English Academy; the which I have composed from those well known and yet received compendiums of this art, which have been heretofore published by the late learned Prelate Bishop Saundersou, Mr. Airy, Mr. Smith, Burgersdicius, and others; and do believe that the teaching of all these Sciences in the English tongue, would make an increase of knowledge in our land to an admiration, and exceedingly further all those that are intended for learned professions, in the attaining of the Latin and Greek tongues, or of any other language: but do with all know how hard a matter it is to persuade the world, from their wont and received practice: and therefore I shall only wish well to the things that I have propounded, and leave them to be more or less made use of by you, as you shall be persuaded in your own minds.  
J. Newton.   

The First Book OF THE ART of LOGIC.  

CHAP. 1.  
Logic is an Art which conducteth the mind in the knowledge of things.  
In this Definition two things are to be explained.  

1. The name of the thing defined.  
2. The Parts of the definition.   
For the first of these, Logic hath its name from this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifieth speech, and according to Aristotle, speech is twofold, internal, and external. Internal speech he calleth that which is conceived in the mind: And that he calleth external, which is expressed by words; now Logic hath its name from both these kinds of speech but chiefly from the internal, which is the reason or ratiocination of the mind, whereas the external speech is but the interpreter of the internal.  
This word Logic may be taken two ways.  

1. For the Habit which is gotten by precept and practice.  
2. For the Systeme of Logical precepts, by which that habit may be more easily acquired.   
And this definition of Logic doth bessute with it in the first acceptation; though I shall here speak of it in the second; namely as it is taken for the Systeme of Logical precepts.  
The parts of this definition are two, the Genus and the differentia; the Genus or general name here given to Logic is Art not a manual art, or handicraft trade but an internal and mental art; for the mind hath its artificial workings as well as the body, as is manifest even in Poetry.  
The difference or particular name, by which it is distinguished from other arts will be best conceived by considering three things; the End, the Offices and the Object thereof.  
The last and principal end of Logic is, the knowledge of things, and its chief Offices by which this End may be attained, are these three.  

1. To define things that are obscure.  
2. To divide things that are general and universal.  
3. To reason concerning things dubious.   
And the matter or Object about which it ●reateth, is, all that we can possibly either conceive in our minds, or utter with words; but the manner how this matter is to be considered, is not as things are in their own nature, but ●s the Instruments of Logic may be applied unto them.  
The parts of Logic therefore are these two; Thematical and Organical.  
The Thematical part is that, which treateth of Themes with their various affections, and second notions, as of the matter of which Logical Instruments are composed.  
The Organical part, is that, which treateth of those Instruments, and their composition.   

CHAP. II. Of Simple and Compounded Themes.  
A Theme is any thing propounded to the understanding that it may be known.  

1. To know is to form a conception or notion of the thing proposed: And a Notion is the representation of a thing in the understanding.  
2. Notions are of two sorts Primary or Secundary.  
3. A Primary Notion is that which represents the thing as it is in itself.  
4. A Secundary Notion is that which together with the first Notions represents the manner how the mind doth either understand a thing, or explain its own understanding unto others.  
5. Themes are either Simple or Compound.  
6. Simple Themes are such Themes as are apprehended without any composition of Notions; as a man, a house.  
7. Compounded Themes are such, as are understood by two or more Notions, being joined together in the affirmation, or in the negation of a thing, as a man doth run.  
8. A Simple Theme is either universal, or particular.  
9 An universal Simple Theme is that which in its own nature may be spoken of many in one and the same respect, and that univocally and without any ambiguity, as, a man, a horse, a plant.  
10. A Particular or Singular Theme is that which in its own nature can be spoken of no more than one, as, Socrates Plato; for though the names of Socrates and Plato may be given to many, yet that is by way of imposition, not of their own nature; names as names are naturally spoken of no more than one.  
11. Singular Themes are called individuals, because they cannot be divided into any more of the same name and nature.  
12. And Individuals are of two sorts.   
1. Such as are certain and determinate; the which may be expressed three ways.  

1. By a proper name, as Alexander, Paul; which signifies some certain and determinate particular.  
2. By a Pronoun Demonstrative; as this man.  
3. By Circumlocution or Paraphrase, as the Apostle of the Gentiles, that is, Paul.   
2. Such as are uncertain and indeterminate, which doth indeed express a particular thing, but this or that indefinitely, as some man.  
3. An Universal simple Theme, otherwise called a Predicable, may be spoken of two ways.  

1. By declaring what a thing is, and then it is spoken of such things as do differ; either 

1. In Species, and is called Genus, as a living creature, colour; or  
2. In number only, and is called Species, as a man.    
2. By declaring what kind of thing it is, of which it is spoken, and that either, 

Essentially, and is called Difference: or  
Accidentally, and that either  
Of necessity, and then it is called a proper Accident: as the Risible faculty in man, or  
Not of necessity, and then it is called a common or simple Accident, as white.      

CHAP. III. Of Genus and Species.  
A Genus or General may be taken two ways.  

1. Civilly, and then amongst Grammarians, it noteth the distinction of Sex; but amongst Orators it is taken for a Multitude which had their beginning from some one; thus the Romans are said to be the Genus or race of Romulus: or else it is taken for that one from whence that multitude had its beginning; thus Romulus is the Genus or person from whence the Romans had their rise.  
2. Logically, and then it is Universal, which is spoken of many that do differ in the Species, by declaring what a thing is; and thus taken, it is either   
Supreme, and so a Genus as that it cannot be a Species; and of this sort there are ten Generals or Predicaments; or  
Subaltern; and so a Genus, in respect of those things which are contained under it, and a Species in regard of that, under which it is itself contained, as a living creature.  
2. A Species also may be taken two ways.  

1. Civilly as it is used amongst Orators, and so it is taken for the external form, and beauty of the body.  
2. Logically, and so it is an Universal, which may be spoken of many, that differ in number only, by declaring what a thing is. The Genus in this definition is this word Universal, the rest of the definition is put for the difference, in which by these words, spoken of many by declaring what a thing is, Difference and Accident, whether proper or common, are both excluded; and by these words differing in number only, Genus is excluded also.   
3 A Species is either  

Subaltern, that is species of one and Genus of another; or  
Most Special, that is so a Species, as that it cannot be a Genus, as a Horse, a man.   
4. The Canons or Rules of Genus and Species are these following.  

1. Every Genus must have two or more Species.  
2. Nothing can be said of the Genus, which may not be also said of every Species; and the Species is conserved in every Individual.  
3. Every Genus and Species may be alike predicated of all that are under them.    

CHAP. IU. Of Difference.  
DIfference is threefold.  

1 Common which is some separable Accident that doth distinguish one thing from another, as white, to walk, and doth belong to the fifth predicable: It is called Difference as it makes to differ, and an Accident because it is inherent.  
2. Proper, which is either an inseparable Accident, in the fifth predicable, or a proper Accident in the fourth predicable, as Quantity, Risibility.  
3. Most proper, by which one thing doth differ from another essentially: and this is that Difference which belongs to this third predicable.   
In which we are to consider three things.  
First what this Difference is, and it may be defined three ways.  

1. Difference is an universal, by which one Species is essentially distinguished from another: thus Rationality doth distinguish a man from a beast.  
2. Difference is an Universal, according to which a Species doth excel its Genus: because a Species doth in its essence contain such differences as the Genus in its essence doth not contain. Thus man by reason of his Rationality doth excel a living creature in General, which is the Genus of man.  
3. Difference is an universal, which may be spoken of many differing in Species or number, and declaring essentially what kind of thing it is of which it is spoken. And this is the definition of difference, as it is a predicable.   
Secondly, we are to consider how many fold this difference is, the which is either 1. Divisive, by which the Genus is divided into its several Species; as by rational, and irrational, a living creature is divided into a man or a beast.  
2. Constitutive, which doth essentially constitute some Species, and this is two fold.  

1. Generical, which doth constitute some remote Species but not the next, for the next is the Genus; thus sensibility in respect of man is a Generical difference constituting first a living creature and remotely man. And this is always spoken of many differing in Species or number.  
2. Specifical, which doth constitute the nearest Species; as rationability doth constitute man.   
3. We are to consider its properties which are six.  

1. Every difference is, an Essential part of its Species, and of every individual of which it is spoken.  
2. Every Difference is Divisive, in respect of its superior, and constitutive in respect of its inferior.  
3. Every difference is in nature before its Species, and is the internal cause thereof.  
4. No difference is directly in the predicamental order, but indirectly only and collaterally.  
5. Every difference is immediately spoken of one, viz. its Species, and mediately of many.  
6. No difference is spoken of that Species of which it is the difference, by way of more and less.    

CHAP. V. Of Proper and Common Accidents.  
AN Accident is taken two ways.  

1. For all that which is not of the essence of the thing: and thus a man in respect of an house may be called an Accident, because he is not of the essence of an house, but so it is not taken here.  
2. For that only, which is inherent in some subject, and this is two fold, Proper and Common.   
1. A proper Accident is that which is convertible with his Species, perpetually inherent in every of them, and in no other; and this doth constitute and belong to the fourth predicable.  
It may be other ways defined, thus  
A proper Accident, is an universal, which may be spoken of many differing in Species or number accidentally, and of necessity declaring what kind of subject it is of which it is spoken: and thus risibility is spoken of man. And this is two fold.  

1. Generical, which flows from the essence of the subaltern Species or highest Genus, and this is always spoken of many Species.  
2. Specifical, which floweth from the essence of the lowest Species, and this is spoken of one Species only, and many individuals.   
2. A Common Accident, is that which is not convertible with his Species; and this doth constitute and belong to the fifth predicable; and may be otherwise defined three ways.  

1. A common Accident, is an universal, which may or may not inhere in the subject, without the destruction of the subject, as man is the subject of whiteness, but the not being white doth not presently make him not to be a man.  
2. A common Accident, is such an universal as is neither Genus, Species or Difference, no nor proper to the subject, though it be always inherent in it.  
3. A common Accident, and an universal, which may be spoken of many, differing in Species or number; accidentally declaring what kind of subject it is, of which it is spoken inconvertibly, and thus whiteness is a common accident belonging to man.   
A common Accident is twofold.  

1. Separable, which may be actually separated from the subject in which it is inherent; thus whiteness may be separated from man.  
2. Inseparable, which cannot be actually separated from the subject in which it is inherent, but only in the mind or understanding; thus blackness is inseparable from an Aethiopian, though in speaking of one, I am not always bound to consider his blackness.   
The Canons or Rules are these, 

1. Every Accident is in some Subject, and always inherent in it.  
2. Every Accident, if it be separated from the Subject in which it once was, perisheth.  
3. No Accident can pass from one Subject to another.  
4. Some accidents may be more or less in a subject, but not all.  
5. Every accident is in nature after his subject.  
6. Whatever is inherent in a subject is an Accident.     

CHAP. VI Of the Antepredicaments.  
COncerning Simple Themes we are to consider two things.  

1. The several ranks or orders to which all Simple Themes may be reduced, and in which they may be ranked and placed.  
2. The way and means by which they are or may be interpreted.   
The particular Orders to which all Simple Themes may be reduced, are otherwise called Predicaments, of which we are to consider three things.  

1. The Antepredicaments, which are first to be learned, because the knowledge of them conduceth much to the understanding of the Predicaments themselves.  
2. The Predicaments, which are ten Orders to which, as is said, all Themes must be reduced.  
3. The Postpredicaments, which must be handled after the Predicaments, because the perfect knowledge of the Predicaments cannot be attained without these.   
I begin with the Antepredicaments, the which are three in general; and seven in special, to wit, three Definitions, two Divisions and two Rules.  
The Definitions are of Aequivocals, Vnivocals, and Denominatives.  
Aequivocals are such things as have their name common to many. But the reasons for which it is applied to many are divers; as that Domestic living creature is called a Dog, and a certain Star in the Heavens is called a Dog; now the name Dog is common to both, but the domestic creature is called a Dog for one reason, to wit from barking; the Star is called a Dog, for another reason viz. the Anology that it hath to a Dog. So a living man and a painted man agree in the common name of men, but the reasons for which they are so called are divers.  
The common names which for divers reasons are given to the several things signified by them, are called Aequivocating Aequivocals, and the things expressed by those names, are called Aequivocated Aequivocals, thus a man is an Aequivocating Aequivocal; a living man and a painted man are Aequivocated Aequivocals.  
Aequivocals are either such as are.  

1. By chance, of which no reason can be given for their being called by that common name, or  
2. By counsel, of which some reason of dependency or similitude may be given for their being called by that common name, as a living man and a painted man, and those are Synechdochically called Aequivocals by Analogy.   
Of both which these Canons are to be observed.  

1. Aequivocal words if they be not distinguished, and taken in one sense, are of no use in any science.  
Every Ens or Entity in respect of the ten Predicaments, is a common Analogous' thing.  
3. Every Analogous' thing put by itself is to be taken in the most common signification.   
Vnivocals, are such things as have a common name, and the reason for which it is applied to many, is one and the same in them all; thus the name of a living creature is common both to man and beast.  
The common names which are for the same reason attributed unto many are called Vnivocating Vnivocals. And the things expressed by these names are called Vnivocated Vnivocals; thus a living creature is an univocating univocal; and a man, a Bull, a Lion are univocated Vnivocals.  
Denominatives are such words, as being of near affinity in sound and signification, d● differ in termination; as Justice and Just.  
In every Denomination there are three things.  

1. The Form denominating; and that is some Accident in the Abstract, which is inherent in the subject; as Justice.  
2. The Subject Denominated, and that is a substance in which the form is inherent, as Socrates.  
3. The Denominative, and that is some Accident in the Concrete, which is predicated of the subject, and riseth from the form, as Just.   
The Form Denominating, and the Denominative, as Justice, and Just, in reference to 

The Word 

Agree in the beginning.  
Differ in the end.    
The signification 

Agree in the thing, &  
Differ in the manner.      
The use of these Definitions, is, that the form of predication Aequivocally, univocally and Denominatively may be the better known.  

1. Aequivocal predication is in reference to the name, but not in reference to the defini-nition, and thus every ens or entity is predicated of in the ten predicaments.  
2. univocal predication is in reference to the name and definition both; thus superiors are predicated of the inferiors of the same predicament.  
3. Denominative predication, is to be predicated in the Concrete, as an Accident is predicated of its subject, thus the Accidents in ●he nine last predicaments are predicated of the substances in the first.   
The Divisions belonging to the Antepredicaments are two, one is of words and the other of things.  
A Word is either Simple or Compound.  
A Simple Voice or Word is threefold.  

1. In respect of the sound only, when one word doth signify many things, as a Dog, and every aequivocating aequivocal.  
2. In substance and signification, when more words than one, are used to express one thing as a living creature, for an Animal.  
3. In sound and substance both, when one word doth express one only thing, as a man, an Animal.   
A compounded voice or word is also threefold.  

1. In respect of the sound only, as when more words than one are used to express one only thing, as a living body for an Animal.  
2. In substance and signification, when one word expresseth divers things, as a Dog is one word, but hath divers significations, as every aequivocating aequivocal hath.  
3. In sound and substance both, as when they are divers words, and these divers words do signify more things, as these words a learned man, do signify the substance and the quality.   
Things are either Universal or Particular, and both of them are either substances or accidents.  

1. Universal substances are spoken of the subject but are not in it, as a man is predicated of Socrates and Plato, but inhereth not in any subject.  
2. Particular substances are neither predicated of the subject, nor inherent in it, because they are individual substances, as Socrates.  
3. Universal accidents are both predicated of, and inherent in their subjects, as Whiteness is spoken of this, or that Whiteness, and may be inherent in a man, or a wall, or a ship.  
4. Particular accidents are not predicated of any subject, but are inherent in some, as this whiteness is in Socrates.   
A Subject is either of inhesion or predication.  
A Subject of inhesion is that in which some accident doth inhere; thus a wall in respect of whiteness is a subject of inhesion, and accidents only are capable of such a subject.  
A subject of predication, is that of which any thing is predicated essentially: and so every inferior thing is the subject of his superior; every universal substance as well as every universal accident, is capable of such a subject.  
A thing may be said to be inherent in a subject eight several ways.  

1. Perfectively, as a part is in the whole, and thus a hand may be said to be in a man.  
2. Comprehensively, as the whole is in its parts, and thus a man may be said to be in all his members.  
3. Potestatively, as a Species in its Genus, thus man may be said to be in an Animal.  
4. Actually, as a Genus in its Species, thus an Animal may be said to be in a man.  
5. Authoritatively, as a King in his Kingdom.  
6. Eminently, as a thing in the end thereof, and thus virtue may be said to be in happiness.  
7. Circumscriptively, as a thing in its place, thus Socrates may be said to be in a house.  
8. Inherently, as an Accident in its Subject, and thus heat may be said to be in fire.   
Of these several ways we are here to understand the last only, to wit of Inhesion, as heat is in fire, or as an accident in its subject.  
The first Antepredicamental rule is this: Whatever may be spoken of the predicate, may be spoken of the subject of that predicate also; as whatsoever may be spoken of an Animal, may be spoken of every sort of Animals, as of men, beasts, and such like.  
The limitations of this rule are many, but the most considerable are these three.  

1. That you proceed not from words t● things, that is, from words of the first, to words of the second intention: whence it follows not: Animal is a Genus, A man is an Animal, therefore man is a Genus.  
2. That you pass not from one side of the predicamental order, to the othr, and hence it doth not follow; Man is an Animal, an Animal is rational or irrational, therefore man is rational or irrational.  
3. That you proceed not from the concreet to the abstract; and hence this doth not follow; A man is just, Justice is a quality therefore a man is a quality.   
The second Antepredicamental rule hath two parts. The first is this; subaltern Generals have the same Species and differences; as a body and an Animal have the same differences.  
The second part is this: Generals not Subaltern have not the same Species and differences; as substance and quality.  
They are said to be subaltern Generals, whereof one is essentially contained by the other; as an Animal and a Body.  
And they are said not to be Subaltern Generals, where the one is not essentially contained of the other; as an Animal and a science.  
The chief use of this Rule is, to prevent the confounding of the Predicaments, and to distinguish things between themselves, that do belong to divers predicaments.   

CHAP. VII. Of the Predicaments in General.  
THe particular orders or predicaments, to which all simple Themes may be reduced are ten, of which some are more principal some less.  
2. The more principal predicaments are the first six; and these are of two sorts; one of substance and the other of accidents.  
3. Predicamental ranks or Orders of Accidents are of two sorts. 1. Absolute as the predicaments of Quantity, Quality, Action an● Passion, 2. Relative as the Predicament of Relation.  
4. The less principle predicamental ranks o● orders, are these four: When, where, situation, and Habit. And in these ten predicament are all to be ranked, which can be predicated or spoken of any thing, Directly, Collaterally, or by Reduction.  
First then, Directly and primarily, ever supreme Genus, or every thing of which th● supreme Genus may be predicated essentially may be placed in the predicamental scale and thus all Generals, Specials, and Individual are placed in them.  
Secondly, Collaterally or sideways; and so some things are placed in the predicamental order, which are not spoken or predicated o● the supreme Genus, but yet do divide the Generals and constitute the specials, and thus essential differences only are there placed.  
Thirdly, indirectly or by Reduction: thu● Matter and form are in the predicament o● Substance; a point and unity in quantity, and a proper accident is in the same predicament with its Species.  
The Canons or Rules are four.  

1. All words of Ambiguity or doubt, at least before they be distinguished and limited, with all feigned and impossible things, are excluded the predicamental order.  
2. Every real finite, simple and univocal thing is in some predicament, directly, collaterally or by Reduction.  
3. Individuals are in some predicament, not for themselves, but by reason of their Species.  
4. No one and the same numerical thing, can be in divers predicaments, either in one respect or in divers.    

CHAP. VIII. Of Substance.  
A Substance is a thing subsisting of itself, and it is either first or second.  
2. The first substance is a singular substance, or a substance that cannot be predicated of its subject; as Alexander, Bucephalus.  
3. The second substance is an universal substance, or a substance which may be predicated of its subject, as a man, a horse.  
4. The first substance is chiefly and properly a substance, and among the second substances, every one is by so much more a substance, by how much it is nearer to the first.  
The Rules or Properties are six.  

1. A Substance is not in its subject. This agreeth to every substance, and to every substance only, but not only to those which are completely so, but to the differences and parts of substances also.  
2. A Substance is univocally predicated of those things of which it is predicated. This agreeth to all second substances and their differences, and no other, for the first substances are not predicated of any subject.  
3. Every first substance, doth signify some particular thing.  
4. A substance, as it is a substance, is not contrary to another, but as it hath accidents or qualities: thus fire and water are contrary, not as they are substances, but in reference to their qualities of heat and cold. etc.  
5. A Substance, as it is a substance, is not varied by degrees, or receiveth not more and less, but the variance or comparison is in respect of accidents; as a wise man and a fool, an old man and a child: one water hotter than another; these differ in qualities not in substance.  
6. One and the same numerical substance, is capable of contrary Accidents. As water may be now seething hot, and anon as cold as Ice.    

CHAP. IX. Of Quantity.  
HItherto we have spoken of the predicament of Substance, those of Accidents now follow; and first those that are absolutely so; as Quantity, Quality, Action, and passion.  
2. Quantity is an absolute Accident, by which a thing is said to be great, in bulk or number.  
3. And hence quantity may be said to be twofold, continued or dissevered.  
4. Continued Quantity is that, whose parts are joined together by a common term.  
5. Dissevered Quantity is that, whose parts are not joined together by a common term, and this is nothing else but number.  
6. Continued Quantity, is either successive, whose parts consist in succession; and than it is time: or permanent, as magnitude, and place.  
7. Every Magnitude is either, a line, a superficies or a body.  
8. A line is a Magnitude which can be divided but one way; the limit whereof is a point, for every line is made, continued, and bounded with a point.  
9 A Superficies is a Magnitude which may be divided two ways; the term or limit thereof is a line.  
10. A solid or body, is that, which may be divided three ways, namely by length, breadth, and thickness, whose term or limit is a superficies.  
11. Place is that which measureth something beside the subject in which it is, namely the thing which is placed; this seems to be referred to a superficies: for, Place (according to Aristotle lib. 4 phys. cap. 14) is the superficies next to the body that is contained in it.  
The Canons or Rules are three.  

1. Nothing is contrary unto Quantity in itself, but in reference to its Qualities only; thus winter is contrary unto summer, in respect of heat and cold.  
2. Quantity cannot receive more or less. As one house is not more or less a house than another; though one be a greater house than another.  
3. Things may be said to be equal or unequal, in respect of Magnitude or greatness.    

CHAP. X. Of Quality.  
QUality is an absolute accident, by which it is simply and determinately declared wh●● kind of thing that subject is, of which it is the quality.  
2. Quality is the most copious of all the predicaments; and it is of two sorts, Patible or Impatible.  
3. An impatible quality, is such a quality, as doth not cause any passions in the senses, or any way affect them: and this is either innate or acquired.  
4. An acquired quality, is such a quality, as is begotten by labour; and this Aristotle maketh the first species; and this is either hardly removed from the subject, and is called a habit, as virtue: or easily removed from the subject, and is called disposition, as a disposition unto virtue.  
5. An innate, or inbred quality, is such a quality as is natural, and this Aristotle maketh the second species; this maketh the subject apt and fit for action, and is some natural faculty or power, as risibility is a faculty naturally belonging unto man.  
6. A Patible quality, is such a quality as doth affect the senses and causeth passion in them: and that either, by itself or by accident.  
7. A Patible quality affecting the sense by itself, Aristotle maketh the third species, and is that which either affecteth the body or the mind.  
8. A Patible quality which doth by itself affect the body, is either such a quality as cannot be easily moved, as whiteness or such a quality as may be easily removed, and is some passion of the body, as blushing.  
9 A Patible quality which doth of itself affect the mind, is also either hardly removed, as inveterate anger, or easily removed; as some sudden passion of love, or hatred.  
10. A Patible quality which doth affect the senses, or causeth passion by accident, Aristotle maketh the fourth species, and this is external proportion, either in things natural, and then it is the form of the thing, or in things artificial, and then it is the Figure.  
11. To the first species of quality, do all the habits of the body belong; as health, sickness, and all kind of diseases; and all infused habits, as faith, charity, and the gift of tongues; with all disciplines, whether of arts or sciences both speculative and practical, as Logic, Geometry, Physics, Metaphysics, and Divinity, and all both virtues and vices.  
12. To the second species of Quality belong all faculties proceeding from the essential forms of all substances; as the faculty of willing, speaking, laughing in man, of neighing and running in a horse; and the virtue of herbs, metals and stones; all occult qualities, as sympathy, and Antipathy, and all influences of celestial bodies, the temperament of the body and disposition of the mind, and such like.  
13. To the third species of quality belong all objects of sense, as of seeing, tasting, smelling, hearing and feeling.  
14. To the fourth species of quality, belong all Mathematical figures, with all natural and artificial forms of bodies.  
The Canons or rules of quality are three.  

1. Qualities only admit of contrarieties; as heat and cold; the contrariety of qualites is most discernible in the third species, sometimes in the first, but not so frequently in the second and fourth.  
2. Qualities do admit of degrees, asf more and less; but this doth not belong to all qualities.  
3. Things in reference unto their qualities may be said to be like or unlike.    

CHAP. XI. Of Action.  
Action is an accident, by which a subject is said to be doing: and that by one of these three ways.  

1. By some intrinsic quality; as fire by its beaten acts in the water.  
2. Instrumentally, as he that effects some thing with a sword or gun, or such like.  
3. By the very formality of action, and so it is to be taken in this predicament.   
2. Action, as it is taken in this predicament is twofold immanent or transient.  
3. An immanent action is that, which doth not cause any real change in the thing that suffers, as understanding, s●ght.  
4. A transient action is that, which doth occasion a real change in the thing that suffers, as heat, cold etc.  
The Canons or Rules of Action are three.  

1. Action doth admit of contrariety.  
2. Actions are capable of more and less. These two rules are not proper unto actions in respect of themselves, but by and for their qualities, by means of which the Agent acteth: nor are they agreeable to every action: and this is most proper unto action.  
3. Every action doth of itself infer passion.   
5. Passion is an accident by which the subject is called patient; or, it is the effect and a certain reception of action: for every passion is received not so much by the condition of the agent, as by the disposition of the patient.  
6. Passion is either transmutative or intentional.  
7. A transmutative passion, is that which maketh some real alteration in the patient; and answereth unto a transient action.  
8. An intentional passion, is that which terminateth the action without any real alteration in the patient; and this answereth to an imminent action.  
The Canons or Rules of Passion are three.  

1. Passion doth admit of Contrariety:  
2. Passion admitteth of more and less; both these are to be understood, as in the predicament of action hath been declared.  
3. Passion is of itself and immediate inferred from action: and this is is most proper unto passion.    

CHAP. XII. Of Relation.  
HItherto we have spoken of such predicaments as are absolute accidents, come we now to that which is respective, namely relation.  
2. Relation is a respective accident, by which one thing is predicated of another, or by some way may be referred unto another.  
3. Relation is twofold, intentional or real.  
4. Intentional Relation is that by which some second intention is referred to another; thus Genus and species, the cause and the caused, the subject and the accident, are things that are related.  
5. Real relation is that by which the thing itself is referred unto another; and this twofold.  

1. Accidental, when one thing is referred not in respect of its essence or nature, but only by Accident, as possessor and possession.  
2. Essential, when one thing is referred unto another according to its nature and essence, as Father and Son, Master and servant.   
6. In every Relation, two things are required, the subject and the term.  
7. That is called the subject, which is referred unto another, and that the term, to which the subject is referred.  
The subject is called the Relate, and the term is called the Correlate.  
9 The relate and correlate are mutually referred to one another; and that by a double relation; in which reciprocation, that which is the subject of one relation is the term of the other, and the contrary.  
10. In like manner that which is the relate in one relation, is the correlate in the other; and the contrary.  
11. Every relate or respective is founded in some absolute predicament; as equality in quantity, likeness in quality, Paternity in action.  
12. Relates and Correlates, as they are such, are both together in nature and knowledge, and so do mutually put or take away one another, as well in being, as in knowing.  
13. Relates are taken two ways.  

1. Materially for those things with which the Relations do agree: as a father is taken for the man begetting, the Son for him that is begotten; and so they are not together in nature, for the father, as a man, must needs be before the son.  
2. Formally, for that very relation which is in the subjects, by which the terms are mutually referred to one another; as the father to his son, and so they are in nature together.   
14. Knowledge and knowable are taken three ways.  

1. Both Actually, thus that is called knowledge, by which we actually know a thing; that knowable, which is actually known; and so they are in nature together.  
2. Both potentially as that is called knowable, which may be known; and that knowledge, which we may know: and so also, they are in nature together.  
3. One Actually and the other potentially; and so knowledge is taken for that which we actually know, and knowable for that which may be known, and so they are not both together in nature.   
The Canons or Rules of Relates are three.  

1. Relates admit of contrariety. A Relate is not contrary to its Correlate; but one Relate is contrary to another: yet not in respect of themselves but in respect of their subjects. This rule therefore doth not hold in all, but in such relates only, which have contrary foundations or subjects; thus a friend and an enemy are contrary, because the foundations of friendship and enmity, to wit, wishing well and wishing ill, are contrary.  
2. Relates are capable of more and less: this rule also holds in respect of the subject or foundation; and therefore in those relates only, which have a changeable subject or foundation. For when the subject or foundation is varied, the Relation is intended or remitted. For example, unequal things are made more or less unequal, when Quantity, which is the subject of inequality, is in one of the two, more or less.  
3. Relates are convertible; that is, every Relate is referred to its reciprocal Correlate; as a master is the master of a servant, and a servant is the servant of some master.    

CHAP. XIII. Of the four last Predicaments.  
HItherto I have spoken of the principal predicaments; the less principal now follow and they are four, When, Where, Situation, Habit.  
2. The Predicament When, is an Accident, by which finite things are said to be in time, past, present, or to come. The words belonging to this predicament, make answer to such questions, as are made by this word, When, as to day, to morrow, yesterday, and the like. The properties thereof is, to accommodate time, to persons, things or Actions.  
3. The Predicament where, is an Accident, by which things finite are said to be in some place; where, is not the place itself, but notes the manner or circumstance of place, and maketh answer to such questions as are made by this word where; as at home, within, without, in this or that Country, etc. The property thereof, is to accommodate place, to persons, things, and actions.  
4. The Predicament of Situation is a certain Ordination of parts and generation, or, a placing of parts in Generation: to make up situation a threefold habitude is required.  

1. Of the parts of some whole among themselves.  
2. Of the parts of some whole unto that whole.  
3. Of the parts and the whole in reference to place.   
Yet every ordination of parts is not site or situation, but that only which they have in the whole by Generation. The property thereof is to be the nearest assistant unto substance of all the extrinsical respective accidents.  
All gestures and positions of body belong to this, as standing, sitting, walking, etc. Not as they signify these actions, but as they signify the position and order of the parts in the whole, or in some place.  
5. The predicament of Habit, is an accident by which some garment, or something like a garment, is put about, hanged upon, or any other way joined to a body. The body having it, is a substance; the thing habiting is always some artificial form belonging to the fourth Species of Quality. The Application of this to it, is that which maketh this predicament; The property thereof is always to be inherent in many, in the habit, and in him that hath it, but in divers respects; for it is in the body that hath it, as in a subject, in the habit or thing framed, as in a cause.  
To this belong all kind of garments, whether they be such as are used for necessity, as shoes for the feet, and clothes for the rest of the body; or for distinction, as a Mitre, a Gown whether for Divines, Lawyers or Citizens; or for ornament, as rings, Jewels, Deckings, and the like.   

CHAP. XIV. Of Opposition.  
HAving done with the Antepredicaments, and the Predicaments themselves, the Postpredicaments now follow, and they are four.  

Opposition, Order, Motion and Manner of having.   
2. Opposition is such a repugnancy of two simple terms, as neither the one can agree with the other, nor both of them with a third, after one and the same manner.  
3. One of the opposites is either opposed to, one or to many; those oppositions, where one is opposed to many, are called Disparates; as a man and a horse, of which Aristotle in his Logic makes no mention, nor are they to be reckoned amongst the kinds of opposition.  
4. Those oppositions where one is opposed to one, are either of a thing and a thing, or of a ●hing and not a thing.  
5. Opposition of a thing and a thing; is either Relative or Contrary.  
6. Relative opposition, is between the relative terms, as the relate and his correlate: for though the relates do mutually depend upon one another, in reference to their simple being, yet are they opposed to one another in reference to their being in a subject: as father and son, but this is the least kind of opposition: The conditions belonging to these are set down in the Predicament of Relation.  
7. Contrary opposition is between contrary ●erms: And these are called contraries, that being contained under the same Genus, are at the greatest distance between themselves, and mutually expel one another, from the same subject, that is capable of them; as heat and cold.  
8. Contraries are of two sorts, mediate and immediate.  
9 Immediate contraries are such as admit of no medium between them, but the one of them is always in the subject, that is capable of them, as like and unlike, health and sickness.  
10. Mediate contraries are such as do admit of some medium; so that though one be expelled it is not necessary that the other should be in that subject, from which the first is expelled, as white and black.  
The Canons or Rules of Contraries are these following.  

1. True contrariety by itself is not to be found but in qualities by themselves, and absolutely taken.  
2. Contraries in the highest degrees, canno● be in the same subject; so what is hot in the highest degree cannot be cold at all; but in remiss degrees they may both be in the same subject.  
3. One of the contraries being remitted, the other is intended or heightened and the contrary: for every subject capable of two contrary qualities, must needs be filled up with the whole possible latitude of one of them.   
11. Opposition of a thing and not a thing, is either privative or contradictory.  
12. Privative opposition, is between Habit and privation. And Habit is the presence of a thing in a fit subject; but privation is the absence thereof: as sight is a habit, blindness, privation.  
The Canons or Rules are three.  

1. Habit and privation are about the same subject. And hence privation cannot properly be, but in that subject which is capable of the Habit; a man therefore may be said to be blind, but a stone cannot.  
2. Privative opposition requires determination of a certain time; neither can privation be spoken of a subject, but after the time that by its nature and fitness it might receive the habit; as none can be said to be bald, until the time that according to nature, they should have hair.  
3. From privation to habit there is no regress naturally, the privation being perfect; that is, such as doth take away the act, and next beginnings of habit, and leaveth nothing in the subject but the remote beginnings thereof; thus he that is once quite blind, cannot ordinarily and by natural means ever see again.   
13. Contradictory opposition is between contradictory terms. And those things are said to be contradictory, which are expressly contrary as affirmation and negation: as a thing and not a thing, a man and not a man.  
The Canons or Rules are two.  

1. Contradiction is the first of all oppositions, and so the measure of all the rest: for in every opposition there is virtually included a contradiction; and the opposition is to be thought so much the greater, by how much it cometh nearer to a contradiction.  
2. Between contradictory things, there is no medium; neither of abnegation, or of the subject, (and therefore one of the contradictory things is affirmed of a thing, and not a thing) nor of participation, or of the form.    

CHAP. XV. Of Order, and of that which is said to be together, before, or after.  
ORder is that, according to which some thing is said to be before, or after another thing, or together with it.  
2. A thing may be said to be before or after another five several ways. 1. In time. 2. In nature. 3. In disposition, or order. 4. In honour. 5. In Causality.  
3. That is said to be first in time, that is the most ancient; thus Romulus was before Cato, and the City Pergamus before that of Rome.  
4. That is said to be first in nature, which cannot be reciprocally affirmed in consecution of existence; as, there is a man, therefore there is a living creature, but it doth not follow, there is a living creature, therefore there is a man; a living creature therefore is in nature before a man, and every Genus before its species.  
5. That is said to be first in order or disposition, which is nearest the beginning: Thus the Exordium in an oration is said to be before the proposition, the proposition before the narration, the narration before the confirmation, the confirmation before the refutation, the refutation before the conclusion; and in every science or discipline, that is first which is put in the first place, and thus letters are before syllables.  
6. That is said to be first in honour or dignity, that is the most worthy; thus a King is before his Subjects, a Father before his Son, a Master before his Servant, Gold before Silver, and Virtue before Gold.  
7. That is said to be first in Causality, which is any way the cause of another's existence; thus the Sun is before Light.  
8. So many ways as a thing may be said to be before another, it may also be said to be after.  
9 So many ways as a thing may be said to be before another, it may be also said to be together with another; but two of the ways are more usual than the rest, together in time, and together in nature.  
10. They are said to be together in time that are existent at the same time.  
11. Things may be said to be together two ways primarily and secundarily.  
12. They are said to be primarily together in time, which begin to be at the same time, and they are said to be secundarily together in time, when the one begins to be, before the other doth cease to be; thus Aristotle and Plato are said to be cotemporaneous, or together in time; though Plato was born before Aristotle, and did also die before him.  
13. Things may be said to be together in nature two ways; first simply and absolutely, and then in respect of some third.  
14. Things are said to be together simply and absolutely, which are reciprocally together, according to the consecution of existence, but so that the one is not the cause of the others existence. Thus the relate and correlate are together in nature; and two effects depending upon the same next cause, as risibility and docibility in man.  
15. Things are said to be together in respect of some third thing, which under the same Genus are in division opposed to one another; thus a man and a beast are said to be together in nature, not simply and absolutely in respect of themselves, but in respect of a living creature, for a living creature is predicated of them both together, and not of one first, and another after. In this a Synonymous Genus is distinguished from a homonymous or aequivocal Genus; because this is not predicated of its several species together, but of one first, and another after.   

CHAP. XVI. Of Motion.  
COncerning Motion, four things are to be considered. 1. The Praecognita. 2. The Definition. 3. The several kinds. 4. The Rules belonging to it.  
2. The Praecognita are either such as concern the definition, or such as concern the division thereof.  
3. The Praecognita concerning the definition of motion, are three. 1. The subject in which it is. 2. The two terms from which, and to what. 3. The measure, or instant time, and from these three every motion must be defined.  
4. The Praecognita concerning the division of motion, or the several kinds of it, are also three.  

1. Motion is taken two ways, viz. either generally for any mutation, whether it be in time, or in an instant, and thus it comprehendeth Generation and Corruption; or specially for some mutation which is made and measured by time, & thus it comprehendeth these four species, augmentation, diminution, alteration and location, and not Generation & Corruption.  
2. Motion as it is divided here, is motion generally taken, and as it comprehendeth all these mutations.  
3. Motion, although it be put as a postpredicament, yet it is also in a predicament, but in a divers manner; it is in the predicament of position as it is in its own nature, but here as it is taken in reference to its terms, from which, and to what.   
5. Motion, in the general is thus defined. Motion is a mutation made in the subject, (viz. either in the first matter, or in the body) from one term to another, either in time, or in an instant.  
6. Motion is twofold instantaneous or successive.  
7. Instantaneous motion is that, which is made in an instant, and this is Generation, or Corruption.  
8. Generation is an instantaneous motion, which causeth a mutation, either in the first or second matter, as in the subject, by the privation of form as the term from which, to another form as the term to which, the motion is made.  
9 Corruption is an instantaneous motion, which maketh a change in the same matter from a substantial form to the privation thereof, or from a thing to not a thing.  
10. Successive motion, or motion that is made in time, is either a motion to quantity, to quality, or to place.  
11. Motion to quantity, is that, whose terms are in quantity, and this is either augmentation or Diminution.  
12. Augmentation is such a motion, as maketh a successive mutation in the body, from a less quantity to a greater.  
13. Diminution is such a motion, as maketh a successive mutation in the body, from a greater quantity to a less.  
14. Motion to quality, otherwise called alteration, is a successive mutation from one contrary quality to another.  
15. Motion to place, or local motion, is such a motion, as maketh a successive mutation in the body, by removing it from one place to another.  
The Canons or Rules to be observed, are these five following.  

1. Every motion is distinguished by its own term to which it is made, considered formally: for although that Augmentation and Diminution are to quantity, yet the motion of the one is to a less, and the other to a greater quantity.  
2. Some motions are distinguished by their measure, as Generation and Corruption are distinguished from the rest, for that they are effected in an instant, whereas all other motions are performed in time.  
3. Some motions are distinguished by the subject, as Generation and Corruption are in the first matter, other motions in the body.  
4. Rest is privatively contrary to all motions in the term from which it moves: for, rest is the privation of motion, viz. of subsequent motion, though it be the perfection of the precedent.  
5. Those motions are adversly contrary, whose terms are adversly contrary; for the motion from white to black, is contrary to the motion, from black to white.    

CHAP. XVII. Of the manner of Having.  
A Thing may be said to be had eight several ways.  

1. In reference to habit and disposition; and so it is referred to the predicament of quality.  
2. In reference unto quantity; and so it is referred to the predicament of quantity.  
3. In reference unto Garments and other things which are about the body, or whole; and so it is referred to the predicament of Habit.  
4. In reference to the having of a thing, in or upon some part; as to have a ring upon a finger, and other things which are about the parts, and thus it is also referred to the predicament of habit.  
5. In reference to the part of a thing, as to have a hand, and this is referred to substance.  
6. In reference to a vessel, as to have wheat, and this is referred to the predicament Where.  
7. In reference to a possession; as to have a house, and so it is referred to the predicament of Relation.  
8. The last manner of having is the having a wife; and this according unto Aristotle, is the most improper manner of all. And this shall suffice to be spoken of simple Themes, whether singular or universal; and of the several predicamental ranks or orders, to which all simple Themes may be reduced, and in which they may be ranked and placed.    

CHAP. XVIII. Of a Proposition.  
I Come now to speak of compounded Thames And a compounded Theme is by some called an Enuntiation by others a Proposition.  
An Enunciation, or a Proposition is an indicative, congruous and perfect oration signifying true or false without any ambiguity.  
Concerning which we are to consider the parts, the kinds and the affections.  
The parts of a proposition are two, viz. either the parts signing, or signed.  
The parts signing are simple terms, and those are called Simple Terms whose parts can signify nothing, when they are separated from the whole, or no such thing as they did signify, when they were all joined together, and these are either Categorematical or Syncategorimatcal.  
1. Categorimatical or significative terms, are such simple Terms as do by themselves signify something perfectly, and these are either Nouns or Verbs.  
A Noun is a simple term or word, which doth signify some certain thing without distinction of time; as, a man, a horse.  
A Verb is a simple term which doth signify something with some distinction of time past, present, or to come, as, he runneth.  
2. Syncategorimatical or consignificative terms are such simple terms, which of themselves do not signify any certain thing, or constitute a proposition, but being joined with other words are significative, to express the manner of such a thing; and such are all words which serve to express the quantity of a proposition, as all, none, some etc. all Adverbs, Conjunctions, Prepositions and Interjections.  
The parts signed are Compounded Terms, or such as do signify the same thing being separated from one another, as they did signify when they were joined together; and these terms are otherwise called Orations, and an Oration is either imperfect or perfect.  

1. An Imperfect Oration is that which leaves an imperfect sense in the mind of the hearer; as, a rational creature, a learned man.  
2. A perfect Oration is that which leaves a perfect sense in the mind of the hearer; and this is either not enunciative; that is, such an oration as doth not express whether a thing be true or false, of which there is no use amongst Logicians; or enuntiative, that is such an oration, as doth express whether a thing be true or false; and this may be either with ambiguity, when some word is ambiguous; as there is a Dog in Heaven; or without ambiguity when there is no word ambiguous; as in this proposition, a man is a living creature. The signed parts of a proposition are these three, the subject, the predicate, and the Copula.   
Place this between the 52 and 53 pages, and blot out the four first lines of the 53 page.  
those are either categorematical, or syncategorematical as was showed before.  
The parts signed are three, the subject, the predicate, and the Copula.  

1. The subject is all that which precedes the Copula in the proposition, as, man is a living creature; there this word man is the subject.  
2. The Predicate is all that which is spoken of the subject, as, man is a living creature; there these words living creature, is the predicate.  
3. The Copula is the principal verb joining the predicate to the subject: and every proposition is some person of this verb substantive [I am] or of a verb adjective as in this proposition, Socrates lived at Athens.   
But here two things must be observed. First, That the subject doth not always preceded, and the predicate follow the Copula in order of the parts or terms, but in sense or construction; as in this proposition. Hard is the way to virtue. Where the way to virtue is the subject, and this word hard the predicate.  
Secondly it is to be observed that a proposition may be either explicit or implicit.  
1. Explicite, in which the three parts, the subject, the Predicate, and the Copula are expressed, as in this proposition, a man is a living creature.  
2. Implicit, in which all these three parts, the subject the predicate and the Copula are not expressed, but some of them employed, as, I walk. And may be resolved by turning the verb into a participle and using some person of this verb [I am] and thus this implicit proposition, I walk, is turned into this, I am walking; in which all the parts of a proposition are expressed.  
As for the several sorts or kinds of propositions we must know, that a proposition is distinguished three ways, viz: 1. According to its Substance, Quantity, and Quality.  
1. According to its substance or parts of which it doth consist; and so it is either, Categorical or Hypothetical.  
1. A Categorical proposition is that which doth consist of one subject, one predicate, and one Copula, and therefore the matter thereof are simple terms; as, a man is a living creature. And this is either Pure or Modal.  
A pure categorical proposition is, when the predicate is purely affirmed or denied of the subject, without expressing the manner of Affirming or denying.  
A modal Categorical proposition is that in which, besides the subject, predicate and copula, we add some modification to show how the predicate is in the subject. (but of these afterwards.)  
2. A Hypothetical which doth consist of two Categorical propositions joined together by some conjunction; as, if a man be a living creature, than a man is a body.  
Secondly. A proposition may be distinguished in respect of its quality; and so first, it is affirmative or negative, and again it is in respect of quality, true or false; but if it be asked of what quality a proposition is? it must be answered, that it is either affirmative or negative. An affirmative proposition is that in which the predicate is affirmed of the subject.  
A Negative proposition is that in which the predicate is denied of the subject, as a man is not a stone, and this is the formal quality of a proposition.  
The material quality is that by which it is said to be either true or false.  
That is a true proposition which doth agree with the thing, as, a man is a living creature; a man is not a stone. And that is a false proposition, which doth not agree with the thing, as, a man is a stone, a man is not a living creature.  
And because the matter of a proposition may be sometimes necessarily true, sometimes manifestly false, and sometimes neither plainly true nor altogether false, the quality of a proposition in respect of the matter about which it is made, is threefold.  

1. Necessary, when the predicate doth so agree with the subject from the nature of the thing, as that it cannot possibly be otherways; as in this proposition, man is a living creature.  
2. Imp●ssible, when the predicate is so repugnant to the nature of the subject, as that it cannot be as it is affirmed; as in this proposition, a man is a stone.  
3. Contingent, when the predicate hath such an indifferent relation to the subject that naturally it doth neither agree with it, nor yet is repugnant to it; as in this proposition, a man is learned.   
In necessary matter, affirmative propositions are always true, negative false; as, a man is a living creature, is true; a man is not a living creature, is false.  
In impossible matter, affirmative propositions are always false, negative true, as, a man is a stone, is false; a man is not a stone, is true.  
In contingent matter, propositions whether affirmative or negative, are neither always true nor always false; for either of them both may be true or false; as, a man is learned; a man is not learned.  
Thirdly, a proposition may be divided in respect of its quantity, into an universal, particular, indefinite and singular.  
An universal proposition is that, which hath a note of universality added to a common or an universal subject; as, every man is a living creature.  
A particular proposition is that, in which a note of particularity is added to an universal subject; as, some man is a living creature.  
An indefinite proposition is that, in which no note whether universal or particular is put before the universal subject; as, a man is learned.  
A singular proposition is that in which the subject is singular, whether it be a proper name, as Socrates is a Philosopher; or, whether it be a common name with a note of singularity set before it, as, this man is learned.  
For the better understanding of that which hath been said we must observe.  

1. That a note is not a part of a proposition but the sign of quantity in some proposition.  
2. That some notes are universal; 1. Affirmative; as, every one, always, whensoever. 2. negative; as, none, no body, never. Some particular; 1. Affirmative; as, a certain man, some body, sometimes. 2. negative; as, not every one. Some singular; as all pronouns Demonstratives which design some certain; as, this, he, and this world all, when it is taken collectively not distributively, as, all the fingers are five.  
3. That an indefinite proposition in necessary matter is equal to an universal; in contingent matter it is equal to a particular: And the matter of a proposition is then said to be necessary, when the subject cannot be without the predicate, and then it is said to be contingent, when the subject may be without the predicate; as in this proposition, a man is learned; the matter is contingent; but in this, a man is living creature, the matter is necessary; for he cannot be a man except he be a living creature.   
According to this threefold division there ariseth a threefold question concerning a proposition.  

What a proposition is it? To which it must be answered, Categorical or Hypothetical.  
2. Of what quality is the proposition? To which it must be answered, Affirmative, or Negative.  
3. Of what quantity is the proposition? To which it must be answered, Universal, Particular, Indefinite, or Singular.    

CHAP. XIX. Of the Opposition of Categorical Propositions.  
PVre categorical propositions, as they have reference to one another, have these three affections.  

1. Opposition.  
2. Aequipollency.  
3. Conversion.   
Opposition is the repugnancy of two Categorical propositions either in quantity alone, or in quality alone, or else in quantity and quality, in which there is the same subject, the same predicate, and the same copula; as in these, every man is just: no man is just.  
Hence it is apparent that these five conditions are required that any proposition may be said to be opposite.  

1. That they be two different propositions; and therefore these are not opposite, a man is a living creature, a man is a living creature; for these are not two but one, not differing or repugnant, but the same.  
2. That they be different either in quantity or in quality or in both these; therefore these are not opposite; some man is learned; not every man is learned; for they differ only in their words but not in quality nor in quantity.  
3. That both propositions have the same subject and the same predicate; therefore these propositions are not opposite. A man is white; a man is black; for though these simple terms white and black, are in themselves opposite in sense and reality of the thing; yet they are not opposite in respect of the form of opposition, which is required in propositions, because they have not both the same predicate.  
4. That both propositions be ad idem, or to the same thing; these propositions therefore are not opposite. A Blackmore is white, viz, in respect of his teeth. A Blackmore is not white, viz, in respect of his body.  
5. That they be opposite in respect of the same time; otherways they are not opposite; as S. Paul was at Rome, and S. Paul was not at Rome. In reference to distinct times both propositions may be true.   
These conditions being observed there are four ways by which two propositions may be said to be opposite to one another, Contrarily, Subcontrarily, Contradictorily, Subalternally,  
Two propositions that are Contrarily and Subcontrarily opposite are opposite only in quality; and such as are subalternately opposite, are opposite only in quantity. And such as are contradictorily opposite, are opposite both in quantity and quality.  
Opposition by way of contrariety is the repugnancy of two universal propositions in quality; as, every man doth run, no man doth run. And these in a contingent matter may be together both false, but cannot be both together true.  
Opposition subcontrarily is the repugnancy of two particular propositions in quality; as, some man doth run, some man doth not run; and these in a contingent matter may be both together true, but cannot be both together false.  
Subalternate Opposition is the repugnancy of 2 affirmative or 2 negative propositions in their quantity; as, every man doth run; some man doth run; some man doth not run, no man doth run.  
Contradictory opposition is the repugnancy of two propositions both in quality and in quantity; so as that if one of them be affirmative the other shall be negative; if one be universal the other shall be particular; as, every man is learned, some man is not learned.  
Hence it is apparent. 1. That every proposition is opposite to some proposition or other. 2. That every proposition which is opposite to another, is opposite, either by way of contrariety, subcontrariety, subalternation, or contradiction; all which may be easily apprehended from the following Scheam.  
Every man is learned. Contrariety No man is learned. Subalternation Contradiction 
 Contradiction Subalternation. Some man is learned. Subcontrariety. Some man is not learned.  
And thus it hath been showed what opposition is, and how many ways one proposition may be opposite to another; come we now to the rules to be observed in such propositions as are any way opposite.  
1. Such propositions as are opposite by way of contradiction, have these four Rules or Canons.  

1. Contradictory propositions are the greatest, because they are repugnant both to quantity ●nd quality.  
2. Contradictory propositions can never be ●oth true, or both false, if but one be true the ●ther must be false; as, every man is just, ●●me man is not just.  
3. Every proposition of what quantity or quality soever it be, it is opposite unto one, and but to one, by way of contradiction.  
4. In every legitimate disputation, a contradictory proposition is always concluded by the Thesis of the respondent.   
And here observe that contradictory propositions are of two sorts, viz. 1. Either such as have a common subject; and such are those of which we have hitherto spoken; or, 2. such as have a singular subject, and which are two singular propositions, having the same subject and the same predicate, but one affirmative, and the other negative: as, Socrates is learned, Socrates is not learned,  
2. The laws of such propositions as are opposite by way of subalternation, are two.  

1. If the universal or subalternating proposition be true, than the particular or subalternated proposition is also true, and the contrary; as, if this be true, every man is learned, this is also true, some man is learned.  
2. If the particular or subalternated proposition be false, the universal or subalternating proposition is also false, but not the contrary; as if this be false, some man is learned; this shall be also false, every man is learned.  
3. Propositions which are opposite by way of contrariety have this only rule, that they can never be both together true, but they may be both together false, viz; in a matter that is contingent; as these are both false, every man is learned, no man is learned.  
4. Propositions that are opposite by way of subcontrariety have one rule, namely this, that they may be both together true, but cannot be both together false; as these be true, Some man is learned, Some man is not learned.   
And thus much concerning opposition or the first affection of Categorical propositions.   

CHAP. XX. Of the Aequipollency of Categorical Propositions.  
AEQuipollency is the equivalency of two propositions in sense and signification, though they differ in words, by virtue of this word of negation, [not] being either set before the sign and subject, after the sign, and subject, or, both before and after, in which there is the same subject and the same predicate; as, some man is learned, not every man is learned; whence it is apparent that to a true aequipollency these conditions are required.  

1. That they be two propositions.  
2. That these two propositions have the same sense, so as that both of them be affirmative, or both negative, both true or both false, and both of the same quantity.  
3. That they differ in words though not in sense.  
4. That they be made equivalent by virtue of this word of negation, [not] so that these propositions, a man is learned, a man is knowing, are materially equivalent, viz. equivalent in the sense, but not formally, and as we understand aequivalency in this place.  
5. That this word of negation [not] be either set before the sign and the subject, or after the sign and the subject, or both before and after.  
6. That both have the same subject and the same predicate.   
Cateoorical proprositions are as many several ways made aequipollent as this word of negation [not] may be severally placed; and that is three; for this word of negation [not] may be set,  

1. Only before the sign and subject, and then it makes two contradictory propositions to be equivalent; as, not every man is learned, some man is learned  
2. Only after the subject and sign of quantity, and then it makes two contrary propositions to be equivalent; as, no man is not learned, every man is learned; this holds if the first be negative.  
3. Both before and after the sign and subject, and then it maketh two subalternate propositions to be equal; as, not every man is not learned, some man is learned; all which are fully expressed in these Distiches.   
If after sign and subject this [not] be,  
Contraries then, make Aequipollenoie.  
Only before make contradictories,  
But 'fore and aft ' are subalternants guise.   

CHAP. XXI. Of the Conversion of Propositions.  
COnversion is an apt mutation of the whole subject, into the place of the whole predicate, and of the whole predicate into the place of the whole subject, keeping the same quality, but sometimes changing the quantities; as, every man is a living creature, some living creature is a man.  
In conversion we are to consider the proposition to be converted, which is that, whose terms are to be transposed, and this is the first; as every man is a living creature.  
Then we are to consider the proposition converting, into which the other is to be converted, and this is the latter; as some living creature is a man.  
This conversion is threefold.  

1. Simple, in which the predicate is changed into the place of the whole subject, and the contrary, keeping the same both quality and quantity; as no man is a stone, therefore no stone is a man. In this conversion an universal negative, is turned into an universal negative, and a particular affirmative into a particular affirmative.  
2. By accident, in which the whole predicate is changed into the place of the whole subject, and the contrary, keeping the same quality but changing of the quantity; as, every man is a living creature, therefore some living creature is a man.  
In this conversion an universal affirmative is turned into a particular affirmative, an universal negative into a particular negative.  
3. By contraposition, in which the whole subject is changed into the place of the whole predicate, and the contrary, keeping both the same quality and quantity, but the finite terms are made infinite; as, every man is a living creature, therefore every thing that is not a living creature, is not a man. In this conversion an universal affirmative is turned into an universal affirmative, and a particular negative into a particular negative; but this is the most useless, and indeed no conversion, because the terms are changed, which in a true conversion, is not to be admitted.   
But that this concerning the terms may be made more clear; we must observe, that these terms are said to be. Finite, before which this word of negation [not] is not set; as, a man, Infinite before which this word of negation [not] is set; as, not a man, not a stone, not learned.  
The Rules for conversion are four.  

1. If the proposition to be converted be tru●, in a legimate conversion, the proposition converting is also true, and the contrary; as if this be true, every man is a living creaure, this is also true, some living creature is a man; but not on the contrary: for this is not true, every man is learned, and yet this is true, some man is learned.  
2. Every proposition cannot be converted every way, but every proposition may be converted some way; this proposition therefore cannot be converted by simple conversion; every man is a living creature; for then the proposition converting should be false: that therefore it may be known, what propositions may be converted this, or that way, these verses are to be considered.   
E. E. I. I. conversion simple make.  
A. I. E. O. of accident partake,  
A. A. O. O. for Contraposits sake.  
In which the four letters A. E. I. O. are thus to be understood. A. signifies universal affirmative. E. universal negative. I. partiular affirmative; and O. particular negative: according to these Distiches. 
A. affirms, E. denies, both universal are,  
I. affirms, O. denies, but both particular.   
The first verses show, that E. is to be converted into E. and I. into I. by simple conversion; that an universal negative into an universal negative etc. so likewise A. into I. and E. into O. to be converted by accident and lastly A. into A. and O. into O. by contraposition.  

3. That the whole predicate be changed into the place of the whole subject, and the contrary.  
4. That we beware, that imperfect terms be not taken for such as are entire. This proposition therefore; a certain tree is in the field, is not thus converted, therefore a certain field is in the tree; but thus, therefore a certain thing in the field is a tree. Some man doth see one that is blind, is not thus to be converted, therefore some one that is blind doth see a man, but thus, therefore some thing seeing one that is blind is a man. Every old man was a boy, is not thus to be converted, therefore a certain boy was an old man, but thus, therefore a certain person which was a boy is an old man.   
And thus much concerning the affections of pure Categorical propositions.   

CHAP. XXII. Of Modal Propositions.  
HItherto we have spoken of such Categorical propositions, as are pure, and without modes; it remaineth now that we speak something of such categorical propositions as are called modal, the which are thus defined.  
A modal proposition is (as we defined it above) that in which, besides the subject, predicate and Copula, we add some modification to show how the predicate is in the subject; as in this proposition: it is impossible that a man should be without reason.  
The division of modal propositions is taken from the diversity of the modes, which respect either the matter or the form of the proposition.  
Such modes which respect the matter, that is, the subject and the predicate without connexion are twofold,  

1. Such in which the mode affects the subject only, as he which doth easily learn is ingenious; where facility is the qualification of the learner.  
2. Such in which the mode affects the predicate only, which doth more frequently happen.   
And this is twofold,  

1. That which respects the time signified; as, Peter was here a long while.  
2. That which respects the thing signified; as, a horse runneth swiftly, of which sort are these, it is a holy thing, it is eight, it is sweet, etc. which if they be resolved into nouns, do make the predicate itself; as, to worship God is a holy thing, that is, to worship God is piety; and in this manner the rest may be resolved.   
Secondly, other modes respect the form or the connexion of the terms, to which especially the definition of a modal proposition doth agree, and is twofold.  

1. Principal, in which the moods are affected with some primary manner, such as are these four. 

1. Necessary, and is defined to be that, which is and cannot be otherwise; as, a man must needs be a living creature; and hath the force of an universal affirmative.  
2. Contingent, and is defined to be that which is and may be otherwise, or may not be, as, perchance it may rain to morrow; and hath the force of a particular affirmative.  
3. Impossible, which is defined to be that which neither is, nor can be, as it is impossible that a man should be a beast; and hath the force of an universal negative.  
4. Possible, which is defined to be that which is not, but may be; as it is possible that roses may flourish again, and hath the force of a particular negative.    
2. Less principal, in which the modes are affected in a secundary manner, and may be reduced to the four first. 

1. Probable, and may be reduced unto Contingent.  
2. True, and is referred to necessary.  
3. Easie, and is contained under possible.  
4. Difficult, and is included in impossible.     
That this may be the better conceived five things must be considered.  
1. That the modification of a proposition doth consist in two things.  

1. The saying, which is the whole Categorical proposition; which supplies the place of the subject only; as, it is possible that water may be warm.  
2. The manner, which supplies the place of the predicate, in what part of the propoposition soever it be set.   
2. In every modal proposition the manner of the modification is the most principal, and doth the office of the copula.  
3. No other modes or manners but the formal are in Logic to be regarded; that is, such as respect the connexion of the terms.  
4. The four modes respect the four differences that are in things.  
Now things may be said, 

1. Always to be; with which agreeth this, necessary to be.  
2. Never to be; with which agreeth this, it is impossible to be; and this, never to be actually, as, an Infinite number; or, never to be either actually or potentially, as, an irrational man.  
3. Sometimes not to be, but also may be; and with these agreeth this, it is possible to be.  
4. Sometimes to be, but also may not be; and with these agreeth this, it is contingent.  
5. That the four modes may be distinguished, two things are required.    

1. That they respect the same time, otherwise the same thing may be both possible and impossible; as, It is impossible for one that fitteth to run [that is while he sitteth]; but if it be referred unto another time, it is possible.  
2. That they be referred to the same subject; as, whilst I see Socrates running, Socrates of necessity must run. But if it be referred to the liberty of Socrates, than it is contingent, for he may and he may not run.   
The quantity of modal propositions as it hath reference unto the [dictum] or [saying] is altogether the same with pure Categorical, and is the material quantity; but as it hath reference to the mode, that is universal which hath an universal mode, as necessary or Impossible.  
That is particular, which hath a particular mode, as possible or contingent, and this is the formal quantity; as, it is impossible that any man should be a stone; the which is particular in reference to the [dictum] or [saying,] and universal in respect of the mode.  
In like manner the quality of modal propositions, as it hath reference to the saying, is the same with pure Categorical; and as it hath reference to the mode, that affirmeth which hath an affirmative mode, viz. necessary or contingent; and that denies, which hath a negative mode, viz. possible or impossible. But if respect be had to the whole modal proposition, that is negative in which the mode is formally denied, and that affirmative in which 'tis not denied; as this, It is impossible that a man should not be a living creature, is negative in respect of the saying, and negative in respect of the mode, but in respect of the whole proposition it is affirmative.  
Every true modal proposition is necessary, every false, impossible; and between these there is no mean.  
In the necessary mode, that proposition is true, whose matter is necessary; false, whose matter is impossible, or contingent.  
In the impossible mode that proposition is true, whose matter is impossible, and that is false, whose matter is necessary or contingent.  
In the contingent mode, that proposition is true, whose matter is contingent, and that is false, whose matter is necessary or impossible.  
In the possible mode that proposition is true, whose matter is necessary or contingent, and that is false, whose matter is impossible,  
The Opposition and Aequipollency of modal propositions, Logicians have expressed by these fictitious words, Purpurea, Iliace, Amabimus, Edentuli; The four syllables of every of these words do signify the four modes, the first syllable in every word doth signify the possible mode; the second syllable, the contingent mode; the third syllable the Imp●ssible mode, and the fourth syllable the necessary m●de.  
As for the four vowels which are in these words, A. notes that the dictum and the mode are both affirmative V. notes that they are both negative; E. notes that the mode is affirmative and the dictum negative; I. noteth that the mode is negative, and the dictum or saying affirmative, according to these verses.  
V, both denies. A, both affirms: but I,  
Destroys the mode; E, dictum doth deny.  
Which being premised the whole matter may be easily understood by the following Scheam.  

Pur not possible not.  
Pu not contingent not.  
re impossible not.  
a necessary.   

A possible.  
ma contingent.  
di not imp●ssible.  
must not necessary not.   

not possible. I  
not contingent li  
impossible. a  
necessary not. ce   

possible not. E  
contingent not. den  
not impossible not. tu.  
not necessary. li   
In which scheam those are aequip●llent, which are contained in any one word, but those at the bottom, top sides and opposite Angles, are in the same manner opposed, as hath been showed concerning the opposition of pure Categorical propositions; therefore, Purpurea, and Iliace, are contraries; Amabimus, and Edentuli are subcontraries. Purpurea and Edentuli are contradictories; and so are Iliace and Amabimus; Purpurea and Amabimus are subalterns, and so are Iliace and Edentuli.  
As for the conversion of modal propositions I willingly pass them by, as being unwilling to give my Reader the trouble of that, which will not requite his pains.  
To these modal propositions those may be reduced, which are called exclusive, exceptive, and reduplicative,  
An exclusive proposition is that in which an exclusive particle is found, as, only, alone, and the like; as, man only is rational.  
And it is exclusive either of the predicate or the subject. Exclusive of the predicate is that, which by a sign of exclusion put between the subject and the predicate doth exclude other predicates from the same subject; as, the Eliments are only four; and this is called a proposition excluding the extreme.  
Exclusive of the subject is that, which with an exclusive particle set before it, excludes or shuts out other subjects from participation with the same predicate; as, only man is rational: and this is absolutely called an exclusive proposition.  
A Proposition excluding the extreme is expounded by taking away the sign and removing from the predicate any other number or thing, as the case shall require; as this, the elements are only four, is thus expounded, the elments are four and no more.  
A proposition exclusive of the subject, though it may be otherwise expounded, yet is it more simply done by the universal affirmative of the transposed terms; as this, a man only is rational, is thus expounded, every thing that is rational is a man, and so of the rest; mutatis mutandis.  
An Exceptive proposition is that in which there is an exceptive particle; as, except, besides, unless, and such like; as, every living creature besides a man is irrational.  
In every legitimate exception, the term excepting must be of a larger comprehension than the term excepted, that it may be distributed.  
This is expounded by two exponents, the first of which ought to be of the same quantity and quality, with the exceptive in the subject of the excluded term; and the other of divers quantity and quality, in which the subject is the excepted term, and the predicate the same with the exceptive; as, every living creature besides a man is irrational, is expounded by these, every living creature, which is another from a man is irrational; And, some man is not irrational; and thus may any other be expounded.  
A Reduplicative proposition is that, in which there is found some reduplicative particle; as, according to, in respect of, as far forth as, and such like; as, man is rational, and this is called, a Restrictive or a limitative proposition.  
Reduplication is twofold.  

1. uniform, which is also called simple or specifical, when the reduplication is by the same name; as, in this, man as man is rational: and this reduplication is not used, but in an essential predication, where the predicate so agreeth with the subject, as if it were the very subject itself.  
2. Not uniform, or compounded, when the reduplication is made by divers names, whether it be of the Genus, and so is called Generical; as in this, a man, as he is a living creature, is sensible; or of the part, and is called partial or Synechdochical, as in this, a man in respect of his soul is immortal; or of the Accident, and is called Accidental; as, Socrates, as he is a Philosopher, doth dispute.   
A reduplicative proposition is expounded by four exponents; the first of which exponents, doth attribute the principal predicate to the subject. The Second doth attribute the reduplicative predicate to the subject. The third doth attribute the principal predicate to the subject, by way of universality. The fourth is a causal inferring the principal predicate from the reduplicative; as this, a man, as he is a living creature, is sensible, may be expounded by these several exponents thus.  
1. A man is sensible; and a man is a living creature, and, every living creature is sensible. And, because something is a living creature, that something is sensible. In like manner may all other reduplicative propositions be expounded, whether negative or aff●rmative.  
But the whole matter may be more readily done, and no less commodiously, if it be expounded by a simple exposition by the help of one causal only; thus the former proposition, a man as he is a living creature, may be thus expounded; because a man is a living creature, therefore he is sensible.   

CHAP. XXIII. Of Hypothetical propositions.  
HItherto we have spoken of Categorical propositions, come we now to Hypothetical.  
An Hypothetical proposition is that, which doth consist of two Categorical propositions joined together by some conjunction; as, man is a living creature; and, a man is learned.  
Hypothetical propositions are of three sorts, conditional Copulative, and Disjunctive.  

1. A conditional or Hypothetical proposition strictly taken, in which several categorical propositions are joined together by a conjunction conditional; as, if it be day, than the Sun doth shine; to this may that which is called a causal proposition, be reduced; such as is this, because the Sun doth shine it is day; and also this, the Sun doth shine, therefore it is day; and note that the first Categorical proposition is called the antecedent, and the second is called the consecuent, because it followeth from the former.  
2. Copulative, in which several Categorical propositions are joined together by a Conjunction copulative; as a man is rational, and, a beast is irrational. To these, those propositions are referred, which are called adversative; as, Socrates, though he is not an Orator, yet he is a Philosopher; and comparative; as, Socrates is as learned as Plato; and significative of Place, as, where Socrates doth read, Plato doth dispute; and significative of time; as, while Socrates doth read, Plato doth dispute.  
3. Disjunctive, in which several propositions Categorical are joined together by a conjunction disjunctive; as, either it is day, or it is night.   
A conditional proposition is, 

1. True, when the Antecedent doth prove the consequent; as, if it be granted, that it is day; it followeth, that the sun doth shine; therefore the antecedent being granted, the consequent must of necessity be granted also.  
2. False, when the antecedent doth not prove the consequent; but the antecedent being granted, the consequent doth not necessarily follow; as, granting that a man is a liv●ng creature, it doth not follow, that he is learned: this conditional proposition is therefore false, if a man be a living creature, than he is learned.    
A Copulative proposition is, 

1. True, when both parts thereof are true: as this is true, a man is a living creature, and a man is rational, for both the parts thereof are true.  
2. False, when either one or both the parts are false; as this is false, a man is a living creature, and irrational, for the latter part is false, namely this, a man is irrational.    
A disjunctive proposition is, 

1. True, when one or both of the parts are true, as this is true, either it is day, or it is night; for one of the parts is true, though the other be false.  
2. False, when both parts are false; as this is false, A man is either a tree or a stone, for neither of them is true.    
Hypothetical propositions have not properly either quantity or quality, but what they have from their Categoricals; neither have they such oppositions and Aequipollencies which Categorical propositions have: they are capable but of one only kind of opposition, and that is Contradictory; and this is made by putting the particle of negation, in the first part of the Hypothetical proposition; and therefore this, if Socrates doth run, he is a living creature, is contradictory unto this, if Socrates doth not run, he is a living creature. And thus it is also both in Copulative, and in disjunctive propositions.    

The Second Book OF THE ART of LOGIC.  

CHAP. I. Of Definition.  
HAving done with the first part of Logic, namely that which treateth of Themes both simple and compound, with their various affections: come we now to the second called the Organical, or that which treateth of Logical instruments, and their composition.  
2. Logical Instruments are these four▪ Definition, Division, Syllogism and Method.  
3. Definition is the explication of the thing which is defined; and this is either nominal or real.  
4. A Nominal Definition is that which showeth the signification of the name; whether it be by giving the Etymology thereof; or by expressing it by some other Synonymous word more generally known.  
5. A real Definition is that which showeth what the thing is: and this is twofold, perfect imperfect.  
6. A real & a perfect Definition is that which doth explain the thing by essential attributes; whether they be such as constitute the thing; and than it is a Definition of the substantial form, which doth most exactly explain the nature of its species; as, a man is a rational living creature: Or such as do partly constitute the thing, and partly produce the same necessarily; and than it is a Definition of the accidents, and this is threefold.  

1. Formal, which consists of the Genus, and the subject of the accident; for the subject of the accident is as it were the form; as, Thunder is a noise in the clouds.  
2. Causal, which doth demonstrate the nature of the thing defined, and it is the next cause of the accident, either efficient or final.  
3. Both formal and causal, which showeth the Genus, subject, and cause of the thing defined; as if an Eclipse of the Moon be thus defined, it is a privation of light in the Moon, by the interposition of the earth. The Genus is privation, the difference or form is the subject, viz. the Moon; and the efficient cause is the interposition of the earth.   
7. A real but imperfect definition, otherwise called a description, is that, which explains the nature of the thing, by certain accidental attributes; it doth consist of a Genus or something which doth supply the place of a Genus, and of proper and common accidents, which supply the place of the difference; as, a man is a living creature that is risible, hath two feet.  
And because our knowledge begins from the accidents, therefore this kind of description is most in use with all.  
The Canons or Rules are; 

1. In every science, you are to begin with the definition of the name thereof.  
2. A description may be suitable as well to the substantial, as the accidental part of any thing.  
3. A Species only is defined by a formal definition.  
4. An accident only is defined by a causal definition, or by a formal and a causal both.  
5. A definition consisting of the form and cause both, doth differ from a Demonstration in the disposition of the terms only.  
6. Every descriptive definition whether formal, or formal and causal both, is an oration.     

CHAP. II. Of Division.  
DIvision is the resolving of the whole into parts.  
And this is either of some ambiguous word into its several significations: or of the whole into its parts.  
2. Now the whole, is either simple or aggregate.  
3. Division of the whole, simply and properly so called, is threefold.  

1. Universal into its subjective parts, or of the General into the specials; as to divide animal into man and beast.  
2. Essential, which resolves the whole into essential parts, and this is either of a species into its Genus and difference, or of some spefical nature into its matter and form; as, a ●an into soul and body.  
3. Integral; which resolveth the whole in●o integral parts, and this is the division of some individual, either into its sensible or material parts.   
4. Division of the aggregated whole into ●s parts, and by accident is four fold.  

1. When the subject may be divided by its accidents; as, men are learned or unlearned.  
2. When an accident may be divided by ●ts subjects; as, Fevers are in the spirits, or in the humours, or in the solid parts.  
3. When an accident may be divided by accidents; as, good is either profitable, honest ●r pleasant.   
5. When things may be divided by their ●bjects; as, sight by colours, hearing by ●ound.  
6. When causes may be divided by their ●ffects, and the contrary; as; Heavenly heat ●s from the Sun, and Elementary from fire.  
The Canons or Rules are these.  

1. An ambiguous word must be explained before it can define any thing.  
2. Unless the ambiguity be explained in the beginning, the error will be afterward the greater.  
3. In the simple dividing of the whole, t●● members dividing should be equal to, and agreed with the whole.  
4. The members dividing should be disjoined, from one another.  
5. Division doth consist of as few members or parts as the nature of the whole will bear.  
6. In any Division the whole must be of a larger extent than any one of the parts.    

CHAP. III. Of a Syllogism.  
A Syllogism is an oration in which some things being taken for granted, something else not granted before is proved or inferred from them: and this is twofold, perfect or imperfect.  
2. A perfect Syllogism is an argumentation, in which from two premises disposed rightly, and according to rule, some conclusion doth necessarily follow; as, every man is an animal, every thing that hath reason is a man, therefore every rational thing is an animal.  
3. A perfect Syllogism is twofold, Categori●l and Hypothetical.  
4. A Categorical Syllogism is that in ●ich all the propositions are categorical; and ●●is is also twofold, Common and Expositor  
5. A common categorical Syllogism is that in which the Medium is a common name; 〈◊〉 every sound may be heard, every voice is a found, therefore every voice may be heard.  
6. An Expository Categorical Syllogism is that in which the Medium is a singular ●●me; as, Sorates is learned, Socrates is an Athenian, therefore some Athenian is learn●●.  
7. An Hypothetical Syllogism is that in ●hich one or more of the propositions are Hypothetical; as, if Socrates be a man, he is an animal; but Socrates is a man, therefore he 〈◊〉 an animal.  
8. To make a common Categorical Syllo●sm two things are required, matter and ●rm.  
9 The matter of a Syllogism is either remote or next.  
10. The remote matter of a Syllogism is ●hat matter of which it is remotely made, ●s the three terms in every proposition, call●d the major extreme, the minor extreme, and the middle term or argument.  
11. The major extreme, is that which is in the major proposition, and in the conclusion, but never in the minor.  
12. The minor extreme, is that which is in the minor proposition, and in the conclusion, but never in the major.  
13. The middle term or argument, is that which is in the major and minor propositions, but never in the conclusion.  
14. The next or immediate matter of a Syllogism, is that of which the Syllogism is immediately made; as, the three propositions, of which the first is called the major, the second the minor, and the third the conclusion.  
15. The form of a Syllogism, is the right disposing of the matter both next and remote; and this comprehendeth two things figure and mode.  
16. A figure is that which shows how the middle term may be fitly placed, which may be done three ways, or by three figures.  
17. The first figure maketh that which is the subject in the major proposition to be the predicate in the minor.  
18. The Second figure maketh that which is the predicate in the major proposition to be the predicate in the minor also.  
19 The third figure maketh that which is the subject in the major proposition to be the subject in the minor also, according to these distiches.  
Both sub and prae doth the first figure use,  
Twice prae the next, the third twice sub I muse.  
20. A Mood is the disposing of the propositions according to quantity and quality.  
21. There are nineteen Moods, of which some are perfect, some imperfect. In the first figure there are nine, Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio; and these four are perfect: Bara●ipton, Celantes, Dabitis, Fapesmo, Fricesmorum, and these five are imperfect. In the second figure there are four Moods, Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco; and in the third figure there are these six, Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison: the Moods ●n both these figures are all perfect, and are so many words of art, which serve only to denote the quality and quantity of every proposition, by help of the vowels which are in them; A. E. I. and O. And how the quantity and quality of a proposition may be known by these vowels hath been showed before.  
22. And these directions are sufficient for the placing of the middle terms, and the right disposing of the two first propositions in a syllogism called the premises; the third proposition or conclusion may be inferred from them by help of these moods two ways, to wit, directly or indirectly.  

1. Directly, when the minor extreme or term is the subject in the conclusion; and the major term the predicate: and thus the conclusion is inferred in four moods of the first figure and in all the moods of the second and the third figures.  
2. Indirectly, when the Major extreme is the subject in the conclusion, and the Minor the predicate; and this is the five last modes of the first figure only, according to these verses.   
All the nineteen directly do conclude,  
Except of figure first, the last five moods.  
The Canons or Rules concerning the matte● and form of a common Syllogism.  

1. From true premises rightly disposed a tru● conclusion is rightly inferred.  
2. A Syllogism consisting of pure negatives, o● pure particulars in the premises, no universal can be rightly inferred.  
3. The conclusion is always inferred from th● more unworthy or weaker parts: and an affirmative is always more worthy than a negative, ●nd an universal than a particular.  
4. In every Syllogism there must be three terms and no more; and four terms may be either expressed or employed in using a doubtful word; for every doubtful word is a double word.  
5. Every Syllogism either is in the first figure, or may be reduced thereto.   
Examples of the universal moods, in which the conclusion is directly inferred in the first figure.  

Bar Every animal is sensible.  
ba Every man is an animal,  
ra Therefore every man is sensible.   

Ce No animal is a stone,  
lafoy Every man is an animal,  
rend Therefore no man is a stone.   

Dam Every colour is visible,  
ri Some quality is a colour,  
●i Therefore some quality is visible.   

Fe No vice is placed in the middle,  
ri Some habit is a vice,  
●o Therefore some habit is not placed in the middle.   
Examples in the second figure.  

Ce No rich man is poor,  
sa Every covetous man is poor,  
re Therefore no covetous man is rich.   

Ca Every animal is mortal,  
mes No Angel is mortal,  
tres Therefore no Angel is an animal.   

fes No animal is a plant,  
ti Something that hath life is a plant,  
no Therefore something that hath life is not an animal.   

Ba Every man is an Animal,  
ro Something that hath life is not an animal,  
co Therefore something, that hath life is not a man.   
Examples in the third figure.  

Dam Every virtue is difficult,  
rap Every virtue is honest,  
ti Therefore something, that is honest, is difficult.   

Fe No stone doth live,  
lap Every stone doth naturally descend,  
tun Therefore something which doth naturally descend, doth not live.   

Di Some man is a thief,  
sa Every man is a rational creature,  
mis Therefore some rational creature is a thief.   

Dam Every man is a living creature,  
ti Some man is wise,  
si Therefore some body that is wise is a living creature.   

Bo Some Animal is not rational,  
car Every animal is mortal,  
do Therefore some mortal is not rational.   

Fe No severity is pleasing,  
ri Some severity is good,  
son Therefore, something that is good, is not pleasing.    

CHAP. IU. Of the Reduction of Syllogisms.  
SOme Syllogisms which do naturally and evidently conclude are perfect and need no Reduction, such are those that are made according to the four first moods of the first figure, but all the rest are imperfect, and are to be reduced to these four; and the third proposition or conclusion in these Syllogisms form according to these four moods, doth depend upon two rules; the one is called Dictum de omni, spoken of all; the other Dictum de nullo, spoken of none.  
2. A thing is then said to be spoken of all, when that which is universally affirmed of the predicate is also affirmed of all his subject, and upon this rule are these two moods, Barbara and Darii, founded.  
3. A thing is then said to be spoken of none when that which is universally denied o● the predicate is also denied of all the subject and upon this rule are these two moods, Celarent and Ferio founded. Hence it appear why all the other moods are to be reduced to these four, because the conclusion is s● naturally inferred in them, and because they ●re founded upon these rules.  
4. And, Reduction is the declaration, or manifestation, how the conclusion in any imperfect mood, is inferred from the premises by reduction to some perfect mood, or some other part of ●he contradiction.  
5. Reduction is twofold, Direct or Indirect.  

1. Direct reduction is, when some Syllogism of the second or third figure is reduced to some Syllogism of the first, by converting one or both of the premises, or by transposing them, or by conversion and transposition both.  
2. Indirect reduction is, when we compel the adversary to confess some absurd or Impossible thing.   
6. The manner how both these kinds of Reduction must be performed, will be easily understood by considering the Consonants in the beginning and middle of those Moods, which are to be reduced to the moods of the first figure.  
7. The Consonants in the beginning of the Moods are these four, B. C. D. F. and show unto which mood of the first figure, every mood of the second and third figures is to be reduced, namely to that, which doth begin with the same letter: all the imperfect Moods therefore which begin with B, must be reduced to Barbara; those which begin with C, to Celarent, Those with D, to Darii, and those with F, to Ferio.  
8. The consonants to be observed in the middle of the Moods are these four. S. P. M. C. and show by what instrument the reduction is to be made, whether by Conversion, Transposition, or Deduction to some absurd or impossible thing. S, showeth that that proposition in which it is sound must be converte● by simple conversion. P, noteth that the proposition must be converted by accident. M▪ noteth that the premises must be transposed that is, the Minor into the place of the Major, and the Major into the place of the Minor. C, noteth that the Reduction must b● made by some absurd or impossible thing.  
According to these distiches, 
The letter S, Simple conversion notes,  
But P, for Accident doth spend its votes.  
The letter M, doth Transposition use,  
C, notes that you th' apponent must abuse.   
9 Indirect reduction, or reduction by bringing the adversary to some absurdity hath pla● only in these two Moods, Baroco of the second figure, and B●cardo of the third; and to reduce these two moods, two things must be observed.  

1. If Baroco be to be reduced, the Minor proposition must be contradictory to the Conclusion: if Bocardo, the Major proposition must be contradictory to the Conclusion.  
2. If Baroco be to be reduced, the Major shall still be the same; but if Bocardo the Minor: according to these distiches.   
The Major keep Baroco to reduce,  
And keep the Minor for Bocardo's use.   

CHAP. V. Of an imperfect Syllogism.  
AN imperfect Syllogism is a Syllogism that hath some defect, either in the number of the premises, in the disposing them, or in the inference from them; and is fourfold; 

1. Enthymem.  
2. Induction.  
3. Example.  
4. Sorites.    
1. An Enthymem is an imperfect Syllogism, inferring the conclusion from some one proposition only; as, a man is a living creature, therefore he hath a soul.  
In which these three things are to be observed.  

1. In an Enthymem the first proposition is called the Antecedent, the other the Consequent.  
2. If the Predicate be in the Antecedent and conclusion, the Minor is wanting; If the subject be in the antecedent and conclusion the Major is wanting.  
3. An Enthymem is a perfect Syllogism in respect of the firm proof, and imperfect in respect of the evidence of the conclusion, one of the premises being understood, but not expressed.   
2. An induction is an imperfect Syllogism, in which from many singulars some universal conclusion is inferred; as, this man is a living creature, and that man is a living creature, and so of the rest, therefore every man is a living creature.  
In an Induction, four things are to be observed.  

1. By singulars we are not only to understand Individuals, but less universals; Specials in respect of Generals, and all integral parts in respect of the whole.  
2. If the enumeration of all the singulars be not full, the conclusion will be false.  
3. Induction is the most convenient instrument to find out arts.  
4. An induction may be reduced to an Hypothetical Syllogism. If Peter be rational, If Socrates, etc. then every man is rational; but Peter & Socrates, etc. are rational, therefore. etc.   
3. Example is an imperfect Syllogism, in which from one or more singulars, we infer another particular; as, Catiline was punished for making sedition, therefore this seditious fellow should be punished.  
In an Exemplary Syllogism, four things are to be observed.  

1. An Exemplary Syllogism is an imperfect induction.  
2. In every Exemplary Syllogism there are four terms, and therefore cannot be immediately reduced to a perfect Syllogism.  
3. An Exemplary Syllogism is but of little force to prove a thing, but of great force to persuade.  
4. In an exemplary Syllogism this general rule is much observed in the inference; that, like doth agree with like.   
4. Sorites is an imperfect Syllogism, in which, from four or more premises, we infer a conclusion, in which the first subject is joined with the last predicate; as, Socrates is a man a man is a living creature, a living creature is a body, a body is a substance, therefore Socrates is a substance.  
And in this kind of Syllogism, three things are to be observed.  

1. A Sorites containeth as many Syllogisms, as there are terms between the subject of the first proposition and the predicate of the last.  
2. A Sorites may be resolved into Syllogisms of the first figure.  
3. A Sorites is in use only, in such terms as are necessarily subordinate, in a causal or a predicamental subordination. This way of arguing, is grounded upon the first Antepredicamental rule.   
And thus much concerning a Syllogism in the General, and the several kinds, or forms thereof.   

CHAP. VI Of the first Definition and Praecognita of Demonstration.  
I Come now to speak of a special or Material Syllogism, as it is restrained to certain conditions of matter.  
2. A Special or Material Syllogism, is of three sorts; Apodictical, Dialectical, and Sophistical.  
3. An Apodictical Syllogism otherwise called a Demonstration, may be defined two ways, either from the end, or from the matter of demonstration.  
4. From the end of Demonstration an apodictical Syllogism may be defined. Demonstration is a Syllogism begetting knowledge, or making to know.  
5. Demonstration among Geometricians, is a Delineation by Diagrams, in which, the truth of their propositions is exhibited unto the eye: but amongst Logicians it is sometimes taken for every certain and clear proof; and here it is strictly taken for a scientifical Syllogism.  
6. The Genus in this definition is Syllogism, in which it agreeth with Dialectical Syllogism. The difference is taken from the end, which is Science.  
7. This word Science may be taken three ways, largely, strictly, and most strictly.  

1. largely, for every cognition or true assent.  
2. Strictly, for firm and infallible assent.  
3. Most strictly, for the assent to such propositions, as are known by causes and effects: for firm and infallible cognition is either by sense, and so we know that the sun doth shine at noon; or by understanding, as when the question is concerning universal propositions, concerning the truth of which sense is not able to judge; but, the cognition of universal propositions is attained by, or without a Syllogism.   
8. Cognition is begotten without a Syllogism, when full assent is given to a proposition for the clearness of it in its self without any proof. Thus we know that the whole is greater than any part thereof; that God must be worshipped, and such like. This kind of Cognition, Aristotle calls Intelligence, and saith it is distinguished from Science by this, that Science doth proceed from ratiocination: but for as much as reason may be brought from several heads, that cognition is here called by the name of Science, which is begot either by the cause or by the effect. And this is the most strict acception of Science, and proper to this place.  
9 Or thus, Science is a certain knowledge of conclusions, to which we assent, for our preceding knowledge of the premises: and the praecognita in every science are these three, the subject, the affection, and the cause, by which it is demonstrated that the affection is in the subject.  
10. The Question to be demonstrated is composed of the subject and the affection. The premises by which the Question is demonstrated, are made, first, by joining the cause with the effect, and then by joining the cause with the subject. In all these two things are to be considered, the precognitions, which precede the demonstration, and the conditions, which are to be observed in the demonstration itself.  
11. The Precognitions are two. 1. That the thing is. 2. what it is?  
12. In these precognitions, the things which are evident and obvious unto all, are so in the understanding only; but the things which are not so evident, but that they may be unknown, are expressed in the very beginning of sciences.  
13. And if being delivered the learner doth presently believe them, they are properly called fuppositions; but if the learner either doubt of them, or be of another opinion, they are called postulata, or things to which an assent is requested.  
14. The first of these precognitions, viz. the Quod sit, That the thing is, includeth two things. 1. That the thing sougt hath a being, or a true existence, and this answereth to the Question, Is there such a thing? 2. That the thing sought is the true predicate in a subject.  
15. The other of these precognitions, namely, the Quid sit, What it is? doth also include two things. 1. The name, or what the signification of the name is. 2. The nature of the thing, that is called by that name, so that from these two precognitions four questions do arise; of which two are simple and two compounded.  
16. The simple questions are those which do equally agree, to accidents and to substances. The first is made concerning the essence or existence by ask An sit? whether it be or not? The second maketh inquiry concerning the nature of it and asketh, Quid sit, What it is?  
17. The compounded questions chiefly agree with accidents: the first asketh, whether the predicate be in the subject? as, whether man be risible? The other asketh, why the predicate is in the subject? as, why is man risible?  
18. Of these four questions the third hath such reference to the fourth, as the first hath to the second; for then in simple terms when we know they have being, we ask what the things are? and in propositions, when we know they have a being, we inquire, why they are?  
19 After these precognitions and questions the three praecognita are next to be considered; namely the subject, affection, and cause.  
20. The subject is a simple term, or less extreme in the demonstration, concerning which, some accident is demonstrated by its next cause; as, a man; concerning whom we must both know, that he is, and what he is? First that he is, or otherwise we seek the knowledge of him in vain, for there is no knowledge of a thing, that is not; and then we must also know, what he is, not only in respect of his name but also of his nature, for that must be the medium of the demonstration; and we must know the medium, at least confusedly, before we can infer the conclusion. The precognition of the things existence is called the Hypothesis; of its nature, the Definition.  
21. Passion is a proper Accident which is demonstrated of the subject by the proper cause, it is always the greater extreme which is predicated in the conclusion; as, Risibility; the which is necessary to be foreknown in respect of the name, what it is? though not in respect of its nature; and that it be considered how it is inherent; for seeing it supplies the place of the subject, it is in some sort called a substance. Arist. lib. 1. post. cap. 27. but it is not foreknown, That it is, for that is the thing inquired after, and which we are to find by demonstration.  
22. A Cause is that, by which the passion or affection is demonstrated of its subject, and is always the Major proposition of the demonstration; as, Every rational animal is risible; that being known, the conclusion is virtually known also, as being virtually contained in it; but yet it is not actually known, till the Minor be assumed; which being known, the Conclusion, though after in nature, yet is known at the same time also. What the cause is, cannot be foreknown, because it is a compounded proposition; and what a thing is, is only of uncompounded; but it ought to be known, That it is, or hath a true existence, or else the Conclusion cannot be inferred from it.   

CHAP. VII. Of the Conditions to be observed in a perfect Demonstration.  
A Demonstration is to be considered, either in the respect of the matter, or in respect of the form.  
2. In respect of the matter, one kind of Demonstration showeth, why the predicate is inherent in the subject; and that, 

1. By an immediate intrinsical cause, and this is either the before demonstrated matter, or form, or affection of the subject.  
2. By an immediate extrinsical cause, and this is either final or efficient by some transient action.    
3. Another kind of Demonstration in respect of the matter, showeth that the predicate is inherent in the subject, and that either by the effect, or by some remote cause.  
4. A Demonstration, in respect of the form, is to be considered, 

1. In quantity, and so it is universal or particular.  
2. In quality, and so it is affirmative or negative.  
3. In the manner of the proof, and so it is either an ostensive demonstration, or a demonstration reducing to some impossible thing.    
5. In the first of these kinds of demonstration called the demonstration Cur sit, why a thing is, the conditions to be observed do partly belong to the question, partly to the cause or medium of the demonstration, and partly to the premises.  
6. Every question doth not admit of the first and most perfect kind of demonstration, called why a thing is? but such a question only as is true, and hath a certain and immutable cause of its own truth.  
7. The conditions to be observed in the premises of a demonstration, are absolute or relative.  
8. Those are said to be absolute conditions, which are suitable to the premises considered absolutely and in themselves; and those are said to be relative conditions, which are suitable to the premises in reference to the conclusion.  
9 The absolute conditions are two, the first is, that the propositions be necessarily true and reciprocal: The second is, that they be immediate or first.  
10. Demonstrative propositions must be true (for that which is false cannot be known) ●nd they must be necessarily so, for from propositions not necessarily true, no necessary inclusion can be inferred, unless by chance or ●ccident, and they must be necessarily true in the ●ighest degree, that is, they must be recipro●l. For they contain the next cause of the predicate, which is such as that it is reciproca●d with its effect.  
11. A proposition is said to be immediate, ●o ways. 1. In respect of the subject, ●hen there is no more immediate subject between the predicate and the subject; as, a ●an is rational, a man is risible. 2. In re●ect of the cause, when no more immediate ●●use doth intervene between the predicate, ●nd the subject; as, that which is rational is ●●sible; a man is rational.  
12. In a most perfect demonstration, where ●●e middle term is the material or formal in●rnal cause of the subject, and efficient of the ●●fect by emanation, the major proposition 〈◊〉 immediate in respect of the cause, but not ●f the subject, as that which is rational, is ●sible: The conclusion is immediate in respect 〈◊〉 the subject, but not of the cause; as, a ●an is risible: The minor is immediate in re●●ect of the cause and the subject both; as, a ●an is risible.  
13. In a most perfect demonstration, wher● the middle term is not the internal cause of th● subject, though both the major and conclusion be immediate, yet the minor is not immediate in respect of the cause. This happen in every chief demonstration from the external cause; as also where we proceed from one affection predemonstrated, to the demonstration of another; such as are all mathematical demonstrations for the most part; a● Zab. de medio demonst. c. 7.  
14. The relative conditions to be observed in reference to the conclusion are three first, that the premises be the cause of the conclusion; secondly, that they be before; thirdly▪ that they be more known than the conclusion  
15. The premises may be said to be th● cause of the conclusion, as the medium is th● cause, why an affection is not only the cau●● why the conclusion is known, but the cau●● why it is true: and as the medium is before a● affection, not in time but nature, so the tru●● of the premises is first in nature, before th● truth of the conclusion. Lastly, as the medium is more known than an affection, not b● a confused knowledge and in respect of us but by a distinct knowledge, and according to nature: so are the premises more know● than the conclusion; because we by reason 〈◊〉 the premises receive the conclusion with full assent of mind, we must needs assent to that more than to the premises; for according to Aristotle, That for which another is such as it is, must needs itself be more such. Lib. 1. post. cap. 2.  
16. Premises are of two sorts, Axioms and Theses.  
17. An Axiom is a proposition of whose ●ruth no body can be ignorant, the signification of the words being known.  
18. A Thesis is a proposition, whose truth doth not sufficiently appear by knowing only the signification of the words, but by the judgement of the senses, or any other declaration; and it ●s either a Definition or an Hypothesis.  
1. A Definition is that, by which we show what a thing is. An Hypothesis is that, by which we show whether the thing be or not.  
20. The medium of a demonstration ought to be the next cause of the predicate; and that either efficient or final; and the efficient either internal or external.  
21. A cause may be said to be the next either absolutely, or in his own kind; here it is understood to be the next absolutely, that it is such a cause as doth produce the effect, and without which that effect cannot be: For as much as there are four kinds of causes, and in every kind some one the next, of the four next causes, there is but one, that is the next absolutely.  
22. Moreover it is required that this next cause should be the cause of the predicate, but it is necessary that it should be the cause of the subject also; for the question is not, whether there be a subject? for this is supposed; but whether there be a predicate, or whether it be inherent in the subject?  
23. This next cause must be either the efficient or the final; for when the predicate is an accident it hath neither matter not form properly so called. The final cause is used in those things, which are made for other; such as are mediums and natural instruments; actions also and habits, if any such can be demonstrated. The efficient cause is used in all the rest. Sometimes it falls out that the next efficient cause is also the form o● matter of the subject, and these kind of demonstrations are indeed the most excellent but do not make a different species of themselves, but these things will be more clearly understood by the examples following.  
1. 

Every rational creature is capable 〈◊〉 knowledge,  
Every man is a rational creature,  
Therefore every man is capable of knowledge.    
In this demonstration the medium, rational, is the internal efficient cause of the predicate, and form of the subject.  
2. 

Every terrestrial thing doth sink in water,  
Ebon is terrestrial,  
Therefore Ebon doth sink in water.    
Here the medium is the internal efficient cause, and matter of the subject.  
3. 

Whatsoever doth consist of matter and form hath three dimensions.  
Every body doth consist of matter and form,  
Therefore every body hath three dimensions.    
Here the medium is the internal efficient cause of the predicate, and both the form and matter of the subject.  
4. 

That which hath three dimensions, will not admit of another body in the same place, with itself,  
But every body hath three dimensions,  
Therefore etc.    
Here the medium is the internal efficient cause of the predicate, and propriety of the subject.  
5. 

That which by the interposition of the earth cannot be enlightened by the Sunbeams, doth suffer an Eclipse of the Sun-light,  
But the Moon, the earth being interposed cannot be enlightened by the Sunbeams,  
Therefore the Moon etc.    
Here the medium is the external efficient cause of the predicate.  
6. 

Whoso is made for the contemplation of Heavenly things, aught to have his countenance lift up,  
Man is made for the contemplation of Heavenly things,  
Therefore etc.    
Here the medium is the final cause of the predicate.  
24. Sometimes it so comes tO pass, that one and the same question may be demonstrated both by the efficient and final cause so you may demonstrate that a living creature doth sleep, either because the common ●ense is overcome by vapours, and that the ●assage of the external senses are obstructed, and this is a demonstration from the ●ficient cause; or that the animal spirits may be refreshed and strengthened, and this is a demonstration from the final cause.   

CHAP. VIII. Of an Imperfect Demonstration or the Demonstration, What.  
HAving hitherto spoken of the principal Demonstration, or the Demonstration ●hy? the next is the less principal, or the ●emonstration What? and which leaveth an imperfect knowledge, and is twofold; the ●ne is from the effect, the other from a remote ●ause.  
The first of these collecteth the cause from ●ome sensible effect; for example 

Every thing that is risible is rational,  
Every man is risible,  
Therefore every man is rational.    
Here the medium is the next effect, and the predicate is the cause of the conclusion.  
2. The second of these demonstrations collecteth the effect from some remote cause▪ for example. 

That which hath not a sensitive soul doth not breath,  
A Plant hath not a sensitive soul,  
Therefore a plant doth not breath.    
3. A Demonstration from the effect may be affirmative in Barbara, and sometimes negative, though seldom, in Camestres.  
4. A demonstration from a remote cause i● negative, very seldom affirmative, and consequently is restrained to the third figure i● Camestres: for example. 

Every risible thing is an animal,  
No Tree is an animal,  
Therefore no Tree is risible.    
5. Demonstration from the effect 〈◊〉 more excellent than from a remote cause.  

1. In respect of the form, the one being affirmative in Barbara, the other negatif in Camestres.  
2. In respect of the matter for in the one the propositions are most necessarily true, and differeth nothing from the most perfect Demonstration, but in placing of the terms, and begetteth a perfect knowledge not simply, but in its kind: but the Demonstration from the remote cause is made of less necessary, and not immediate propositions, nor doth it beget a knowledge that is perfect in its own kind, and ●n which the mind may rest satisfied; yet both of them are so perfect, that they are either of them sufficientl to beget such a knowledge as to give us satisfaction of the being, or not being of a thing.    

CHAP. IX. Of Demonstration in respect of th● form, and of the Affections o● the most perfect Demonstration.  
HItherto we have spoken of the tw● kinds of demonstration in respect 〈◊〉 the matter; we are now to speak of them i● respect of the form.  
2. The form of a demonstration is partly discerned from the quantity, partly fro● the quality, and partly from the manner 〈◊〉 the proof.  
3. The form of a demonstration in respect of the quantity is universal or particular:  
An universal demonstration is that, i● which an affection is demonstrated of the fi● adequate and universal subject by an immediate cause; as when we demonstrate risibility i● man, by his rationality, and all the most perfect demonstrations are of this kind, W● a thing is so. And a Demonstration provin● from the effect, That a thing is, is of th● kind also.  
A Particular demonstration, (not so called ●s if the terms were particular) is a demon●ration in which an affection is demonstrated ●om an inadequate and a less universal subject, or ●om one part of the first subject only; as, when ●e demonstrate a man to be sensible, by his ●nsible soul.  
The form of demonstration in respect ●f quality, is affirmative or negative.  
An affirmative demonstration is that, in ●hose conclusion the predicate is affirmed of ●e subject, which happens in all demonstrations, accept the particular, which is sometimes ne●tive.  
A Negative Demonstration is that in whose inclusion the predicate is denied of the subject; as, 

Every thing that breatheth is an animal.  
A wall is not an animal,  
Therefore a wall doth not breath.    
And this doth often come to pass in the ●emonstrate That, from a remote cause; it may ●so happen in all other demonstrations ●ough very seldom, and that by consequence only: for an affirmation is before negation, both in reference to the thing, and ●ur knowledge of it.  
5. The form of a demonstration in respect of the manner of the proof, is either ostensive, or by reduction to impossibility.  
An Ostensive Demonstration is that, in which the conclusion is evidently and directly inferred from former and more known premises, etc. Of which sort are all the before named kinds of demonstration.  
A Demonstration by reduction to impossibility is, when from granted premises we prove th● conclusions to be therefore true, because thei● contradictories are apparently false; for example, 

Every rational thing is risible,  
Every man is rational,  
Therefore every man is risible.    
Here if the major be denied, we may reduce the respondent to an absurdity b● taking the contradictory of the major thus, 

No rational thing is risible,  
Every man is rational,  
Therefore no man is risible.   Which conclusion being manifestly false, we infer that the major in the former syllogism, 〈◊〉 well as the conclusion were both true; or th● the two contradictories are together, true or false; and this kind of Demonstration is the meanest of them all.  
But here we must observe, that an universal contrary proposition, is rather to be taken, than a particular contradictory; both because particular propositions have no place in demonstration, as also because contrary propositions in necessary matter, stand in the place of contradictory. Zabarel. lib. 1. post. c. 22. sect. 176.  
And thus having done with the kinds of demonstration; I come in the next place to speak of the affections of the chiefest and most perfect demonstration, and they are chiefly three, Analysis, Regressus, and Conversion into a Definition,  
1. Analysis is the resolution of effects into their first causes to beget a perfect knowledge thereof; for when there is a certain chain and subordination of efficients, and effects, although the latter may be demonstrated by the former, yet the mind is not satisfied in that, but inquireth further for the cause of that effect also, and so forward, to the first cause which is the form of the subject, of which no cause can be given, and in which alone the mind is satisfied; as, if Augmentation in all things living were demonstrated by nourishment, and that again by the vegetative faculty, and that by the soul.  
1. Regressus is the reciprocation of the cause and effect by demonstration: which effect we do reciprocally demonstrate by that cause, by which the said effect was itself demonstrated: this affection or power is called Regressus, because after our understanding hath proceeded from la kind of confused and experimental knowledge of the effect, as nearer to sense, to the ●ike confused knowledge of the cause; and hath ripened that knowledge by often meditating on, and comparing of the cause to the effect, till it come from a confused to a distinct knowledge: than it returns from that distinct knowledge of the cause to the like distinct knowledge of the effect. Progress is therefore made by the demonstration That, and by an after demonstration, and hath respect unto the confused knowledge of the cause by the effect. But regress is by the demonstration Why, and by a former demonstration and hath respect unto the distinct knowledge of the effect by the cause, and differs from that vicious demonstration, which they call a circle in three things.  
1. In the form; for a circle doth from the premises demonstrate the conclusion, and from the conclusion put into the place of the Major and the Minor simply converted, it doth again demonstrate the Major; then again from the same conclusion put into the place of the Minor, and the Major simply converted in the place of that, it doth demonstrate the Minor: which any one, that will, may experiment by this instance. 

Every rational thing is resible,  
Every man is rational,  
Therefore every man is risible.    
But in regress we only demonstrate the minor, from the major simply converted, and the conclusion put into the place of the minor. And so there will be a natural predication in every proposition, the which is not in a circle.  
2. In the Matter; for the matter of a circle or middle term, is uniform in both the demonstrations, seeing it is the next cause of the major extreme, proving why a thing is; but in regress the effect doth first demonstrate, that there is a cause, then after consideration had about the cause, the cause doth demonstrate why there is an effect.  
3. In the end; for in a circle the same thing is both beginning and end, seeing it proceeds from a cause distinctly known, to a cause distinctly known, and returns from this to that; but in regress, the end is a distinct knowledge of the effect, and the first progress is from an effect confusedly known to a cause to be confusedly known; but from a cause confusedly known, consideration being had, we come to the distinct knowledge of the cause, and from that once habituated and radicated in the understanding, we return to the distinct knowledge of the effect.  
3. Conversion of a demonstration into a definition is, when from the terms of a demonstration, the definition of a proper accident is framed by transposition. And the definition of a proper accident is twofold.  

1. Partial; and that is either,  
Nominal, which consists of a Genus and a subject; as, an Eclipse in the defect of light in the Moon.  
Causal, which is the middle term in the most perfect demonstration, showing, why there is an effect; as, an Eclipse is the interposition of the Earth.  
2. Total, which being made of the nominal and the causal both, doth consist of a Genus, a subject, and the next cause; as, an Eclipse is the defect of llight in the Moon, by reason of the interposition of the earth.  
A nominal definition is the conclusion of the of the demonstration: A causal is the beginning: A total is an entire or whole demonstration, differing in nothing from it, but the placing of the terms: for the thing defined is the greater extreme, the lesser extreme the subject, and the cause the middle term.    

CHAP. X. Of a Topical Syllogism in the General.  
HItherto we have spoken of a demonstrative Syllogism, whose matter is necessary, and the end a perfect knowledge: come we now to a dialectical or topical Syllogism, whose matter is probable and contingent, and the end, opinion.  
2. In a dialectical or topical Syllogism, we are to consider of Problems, Propositions, and the invention of arguments.  
3. A Problem or Question, is the thing of which it is probably discoursed, and the conclusion of a Syllogism already made. But that this Problem may be dialectical, two conditions are required.  

1. That it be profitable either to life, and then it is called a moral Problem; as, whether pleasure be good? or to knowledge, and then it is called a Physical or a natural problem; as, whether the world be eternal? or to some thing that is subservient unto these, and then it is called a Logical Problem; as, whether division be a Syllogism?  
2. That it be doubtful, in which either the common people do dissent from wise men; as, whether riches make men happy: or the common people descent among themselves; as, whether usury be lawful; or the wise men descent among themselves; as, whether the heart be the most noble part of man.   
4. The parts of a Problem are the two terms of subject and predicate. As concerning the subject I give no directions, because a dialectical Syllogism is not restrained to any certain subject. But the Predicates according to Aristotle are four, Genus, Definition, Accident proper and common. He adjoineth difference to Genus, if it be more comprehensive than the species, or to definition if it be reciprocated with the species: if the species chanceth to be attributed in any Problem, it is reduced to Genus.  
5. Dialectical Propositions ought to be certain, at least probable and not Paradoxes.  
6. That is said to be probable, which not being absolutely true, doth rather seem to be true, than false. There are five degrees of probability; for that is said to be probable which seemeth to be true, either to all, to most men or unto wise men, and that either to all of them, or to the most, or to the wisest of them.  
7. That is said to be a Paradox, which is true, though contrary to the vulgar opinion.  
8. For the invention of arguments, we are to consider common places and rules.  
9 A place is a sense or common note, by whose help an argument is found.  
10. A Rule or Canon is a proposition containing the reason of the consequence in a dialectical Syllogism.  
11. Arguments are of two sorts, artificial and inartificial.  
12. Artificial arguments, are such as from the consideration of the parts of the problem, are not found but by rules of art.  
13. Inartificial arguments are such as are found without any help of art, and these are nothing but testimonies.  
14. Several men do reckon the order of these heads or places severally. Aristotle reduceth all heads to the four predicates mentioned before; some for the more plainness and distinction, reckon up twenty and five; and this number some contract to thirteen; others to ten; and perhaps they may without any inconvenience be reduced unto seven.  

1. The Cause and the Effect. 2. The subject and the Accident. 3. Dissentany and Comparison. 4. Conjugates and Notation. 5. The whole and its parts. 6. Genus and Species. 7. Definition and Division. In every of these places, I will in the proposed order show you the Canons to be observed, and the restrictions of them.    

CHAP. XI. Of the Topics from the Cause and the Effect.  
THere are four kinds of Causes, efficient, material, formal and final; there are several sub-divisions of them, but these following are the most convenient to our purpose: as, 1. Into total, as Gold is the cause of money, the Sun of the day; and partial; as, timber in the cause of a house; nature of learning. 2. Into a cause actually, as, a builder is the cause ●f an house; and a cause potentially, as, an architect may build an house. 3. Into a re●ote cause, as, a feast may be the cause of ●●ckness; and the next cause, as, crudity in ●he stomach is the cause of sickness. 4. Into 〈◊〉 cause simply and by itself; as, the Sun is ●he cause of light; and a cause by accident, as, ●he Sun of blindness.  
The Canons or Rules of this Topick are ●hese.  

1. The cause being granted, the effect cannot be denied; and, if the cause be taken away, the effect is taken away also; as, if the Sun shine, it must be day, if the Sun doth not ●hine, it is not day; the former part of this Canon hath four limitations.   
1. In a remote cause; as, he that drinks wine is not always made drunk. 2. In a cause that is obstructed in its operation; as, heavy things do not always descend, because they may be hindered by some thing that holds them up. 3. In a cause by accident; as, he that diggeth in the earth doth not always find gold. 4. In a cause not sufficient of itself; as, he is not always learned that is industrious; nor that ground always fertile, that is well tilled; because to both these more is required.  
The latter part of this Canon hath three limitations. 1. In a cause by accident; as, he that doth not dig into the earth may find a treasure. 2. In a cause that may, but is not; as, a building may stand, though the Architect be dead. 3. As oft as the effect may be produced by divers causes; as, Socrate● may die, though he doth not drink poison.  
2. The effect being granted, the cause is also granted, and the effect being taken away, the cause is taken away also. The first part of this Canon hath three limitations. 1. In an effect by accident; as, a treasure may be found though the earth be not digged. 2. In an effect that doth remain after the cause; as, the house may remain, though the builder be dead. 3. In an effect that may be produced by divers causes; as, a man may die, though not by poison. The latter part hath also three limitations. 1. In an effect by accident; as, a man may dig in the earth, and not find a treasure. 2. In an effect which was, but is not; as, a building may be destroyed though the builder be living. 3. In an effect produced by a free agent; as, there may be a Physician although he doth not cure any disease.  
3. Such as the cause is, such is the effect, and the contrary; as, if the tree be good, the fruit will be good, and the contrary; both parts of this Canon have two limitations. 1. In aequivocal causes and effects; as, the draught may be beautiful though the painter be deformed. 2. In a material cause, for some thing that is extrinsical; as ice is not fluid because water is so.  
4. That for which any thing is such, is much more such itself; as, the air being hot by reason of fire, doth argue that fire is much hotter than air.  
This rule faileth. 1. Where both are not such; as, wine which maketh a man drunk, is not itself more drunk, because drunkenness cannot be said to be in wine. 2. Where it doth not receive more and less; as, a father is not more a man than a son, although he be the cause why the son is a man; for humanity doth not receive more and less. 3. In a cause not sufficient of itself; as, a Master which maketh his scholar learned, is not always more learned than his scholar; for by his ingenuity and industry it sometimes so comes to pass, that the scholar is more learned than the master.  
5. The cause is in nature before the effect; as, reason before risibility; and this never faileth; for a final cause in which it only seems to fail, although it be in act and execution after the effect, yet it is before it in the intention of the agent, for which only reason it is the cause.   

CHAP. XII. Of the Topics from the Subject and the Accident.  
WE do not here take the subject for substance in which the accident is inherent, or accident for that which doth precisely and adequately adhere to the substance; but subject is here taken for all that, to which any thing not belonging to its essence is attributed: An accident is here taken for every such attribute; as, number is the subject of equality, that is, it is an accident of an accident.  
An accident may be divided many ways, and so may a subject, for an accident is 1. either proper or common. 2. Separable or inseparable. 3. Inherent or internal, and adherent or external. 4. And chiefly it is either accidental, as weariness doth accompany a fever, a pale Moon, rain, and all prognosticating signs: Concomitant, as an Eclipse of the Fullmoon, and consequent, as, a day, to the twilight; signs and circumstances do also belong to this Topick.  
The Canons or Rules are five.  

1. The subject being granted, the proper accident is also granted; and being taken away the proper accident is taken away also, and the contrary; as, if he be a man, he is risible, and the contrary; and if he be not a man, he is not risible, nor the contrary. This rule never faileth by reason of the reciprocation of the subject and the proper accident.  
2. The subject being granted, the common accident is also granted, but not the contrary; as if it be snow, it is white; but if it be white it is not therefore snow. The first part of ●his rule faileth in separable accidents; as if ●t be water it is not therefore cold. And the ●atter part faileth; 1. In a proper accident, ●he first way; as, if there be knowledge there ●s a man; 2. In an individual accident; as ●f there be this whiteness, there is snow; because an accident doth not change its sub●ect.  
3. A common accident being taken away, ●he subject is taken away, but not the contra●y; as, if it be not white, it is not snow but yet there may be white, though there be no snow. The first part faileth in a separable accident, the latter in a proper accident, the first way; and in an individual accident and subject, as in the former rule.  
4. The thing being granted, the circumstance of time and place is granted, and the circumstance being taken away, the thing is taken away; as, if Milo did kill Clodius, than Milo was living and present; if he was neither living nor present he did not kill him. This rule never faileth in any requisite circumstance, necessarily.  
5. The antecedent, concomitant, & consequent being granted, the consequent, concomitant and antecedent for every exigence is also granted; to wit a concomitant in being, an antecedent in being, or that hath been, a consequent in being, or that will be, and being taken away the other is taken away also; as, if there be an Eclipse there is a full Moon; if there be a birth there was a conception; if there be a twilight, the Sun will rise. This rule faileth; 1. In a thing not cohering necessarily; as he which is a Philosopher, must not of necessity be therefore poor; and if there be a Comet, it doth not follow there must be war. 2. In things cohering necessarily, if there be not a mutual necessity; for though it be true, that if there be an Eclipse there is a Full Moon; yet it doth not follow that if there be a Full Moon there must always be an Eclipse; yet these things not necessary are of great force to beget belief, especially if many of them shall be joined together in one. Hence Astrologers, Physiognomers and Orators do highly value this Topick, in questions of fact especially.    

CHAP. XIII. Of the Topics from Dissentany and Comparison.  
DIssentanies are either Opposites or Disparates; as, a Horse and a Bull. There are four kinds of Opposites, of which, Book I. Chap. 13. Comparisons are either in respect of quality, as like and unlike, or in respect of quantity; or also of degrees, as equal and unequal; and whatever may be said to be more or less and equal. All which have their several Rules or Canons.  
Concerning Relative opposition the Canon is, One of the relates being granted, the other is granted also, and one being taken away, the other is taken away also; as, if there be a son there is a father etc. This rule faileth; 1. In accidental relations, as it being granted that there is something knowable, it doth not follow that there is a knowledge of it. 2. If it be understood of the same subject; as, he which is the father of this man may not not not be at all, but it is impossible, that he should be the son of him, of whom he is the father.  
Concerning contrary opposition the Canons are these following.  

1. One of the contraries being granted the other is taken away; as, if water be warm, it cannot be cold. This rule faileth in remiss qualities, for the water which is hot to six degrees, is cold to two; because the remission of quality is always by admission of the contrary.  
2. One of the contraries being taken away, the other doth remain; as, if water be not dry it is moist. This rule faileth 1. In mediate contraries; as, Honey is neither white nor black, but yellow. 2. In an uncapable subject, as, a soul is neither white, nor black, nor hot, nor cold.  
3. Contraries have the same Genus and subject; as, if white be a colour, black is a colour also; if love be a concupiscible faculty, so is hatred. This rule never fails.  
4. Contraries have contrary causes, effects, properties, and next subjects; as, if grief be to be avoided, pleasure is to be followed; and if cold congeals, heat dissolves. This rule faileth; 1. in the predications of a Genus or a Generical affection; as, because whiteness is a colour or visible, it doth not follow that blackness is not a colour. 2. If the nature of the subject will not bear it; as, because health is agreeable to living creatures, it doth not follow that diseases are agreeable to things without life, but rather the contrary. 3. In causes by accident; for if a good man doth love and defend his children, it doth not follow that a wicked man must therefore hate and destroy his, because to love his children, is not so much from virtue, as nature. 4. In causes whose action is determined by the disposition of the matter; for cold doth not therefore soften dirt, because heat doth make it hard.  
5. The contrary of a greater good is a greater evil, and the contrary; as, because that health is better than riches, therefore sickness is worse than poverty. This rule faileth where one of the good things is included in the other, or supposed by it; as, it is more advantageous to be a Philosopher than to know letters; but yet of the two, Philosophy may be best spared.   
The Canons of privative opposition are these two.  

1. The habit being granted, privation is taken away, and the contrary; as, if a man doth see, he is not blind; if he be blind, he doth not see. And this rule never faileth.  
2. The habit being taken away, privation is granted, and the contrary; as, he doth not see, therefore he is blind. He is not blind, therefore he doth see. This rule faileth; 1. in an incapable subject; as, a stone doth not see, and yet it is not blind 2. In a capable subject, before the time in which it is capable, and therefore though a whelp doth not see, until it be nine days old, yet cannot it be said to be blind.   
Of contradictory opposition there is one only never failing Canon, One of the contradictories being granted, the other is taken away, and one being taken away the other is granted; as, if a wall be white, it cannot be said, to be not white; if it be not white, it cannot be said to be white.  
The Disparates have but one Canon, One of the Disparates being granted, the rest are taken away; as, if Socrates be a man, than he is neither a bull nor a stone. This rule faileth in accidents, when they are attributed unto subjects in the concrete, for the same mess may be white and sweet.  
The Canons of like and unlike, proportional and unproportional are these.  
Like and proportional do agree with like and proportionals; dislike and unproportional do agree with dislike and unproportionals; as, if Plato be mortal, Socrates is also mortal; if the eye directs the body, than reason should direct the mind. This rule faileth unless it be understood reduplicatively, that is of like as like; for every like is also unlike, or else it could not be like, but the same; and hence a Crow cannot be said to be rational, because a Blackmore is so, and so of the rest: And here the respondent (if he do except against the arguments founded on this Canon) must show in what the things propounded are like or unlike.  
Probable propositions, and things compared among themselves, are said to be more and less and equal. The Canons concerning comparison of things are general or special.  
The general rules are these.  

1. That which is such by nature, is more such than that which is so by participation; as, the Sun is lighter than the air.  
2. That which is by itself is more so, than that which is by accident.  
3. That which is more remote from the contrary, is more than that which is nearer; as, the air is colder under the Poles, than under the Tropic.  
4. That which makes more, is more than that which maketh less; as, fire vehemently heating.  
5. That in which the cause is more inherent, is more than that in which it is less; as, a young man is stronger than an old.  
6. That to which the definition or the mean is more agreeable is more than that to which it is less; as, that which doth more conduce to the end, is more profitable, and many more which do all fail, unless there be a restriction of the rest being like; for terms of comparison do almost exceed one another mutually and are exceeded.   
Special rules concerning that which is more or less good are these.  

1. The more good things there are in any subject, the better it is; as, peripatetic felicity, is better than the Stoic.  
2. The more it is good to, the better; as, Justice is better than fortitude.  
3. That which is desired for itself, is better; as, peace is better than war.  
4. That which is in itself good is better: as, good laws are better than evil manners.  
5. That which is more durable, is better; as, virtue is better than beauty.  
6. That which is solitarily good is better; as, a competency is better than great riches.  
7. That which hath the more noble object, is better; as, Divinity is better than Physic.  
8. That which leads to perfection is better than that which serves for necessity; as, seeing is better than feeling.  
9 That which is the nearer to the end is the better; as, the Harvest is better than seedtime.  
10. That which tends to the more noble end is the better; as, Liberal Arts are better than Mechanical.  
11. That which is the more like the better is better; as, Brass is better than Led. And many more of this kind Lib. 3. Aristotle's Topics. All which are to be understood with this limitation, that all other things be answerable.   
The Canons of the Probability of propositions are these.  

1. Of such propositions, which are equally such or not such; if one be such, the other is, if the one be not such, neither is the other; as, honour and riches do both seem to conduce alike to happiness; if honour therefore do not make a man happy, neither do riches; if meat be necessary to maintain life, drink is also necessary.  
2. If that which seems more to be such, be not such, that which seems less to be such is not such; as, all that like Maevius, do not like Homer.  
3. If that which doth less seem to be such be such, then that which doth more seem to be such is such also; as, if he that is guilty of theft deserves to be hanged, he that is guilty of Sacrilege, doth much more deserve it.    

CHAP. XIV. Of the Topics concerning Conjugates, and Notation.  
THey are properly called Conjugates which for the affinity of signification have also an affinity in the voice or sound; as just, justice, and justly; some Conjugates are only nominal, some real and some both, and do comprehend Denominatives under them, and are either substantives, where one is a Noun Substantive, abstracted from the subject; as, justice, just; or an Adjective, where they be both Denominatives, or Concretes which show the form in the abstract; as, just, justly. Notation, or Etymology, is the explication of a word by the original thereof; as, a Consul from counselling the commonwealth.  
The Canons or Rules of Conjugates are,  

1. That to which one of the conjugates doth agree, the other doth agree also; and the contrary; as, if Socrates be just, he will do justly. This rule faileth 1. In those which are nominal Conjugates only; for if Socrates drink wine, it doth not presently follow, that he is a wine-bibber, that is, a drunkard. 2. When we argue from one or some far actions, that there is a habit, and therefore it doth not follow, that Socrates is just, because he hath done some things that are just. 3. When we argue from the power to the act, as, Socrates is risible, though he do not laugh at present.  
2. If one of the Conjugates may be predicated of one, the other may be predicated of another, and so also negatively; as, if whiteness be a colour, white shall be a thing coloured. This rule faileth 1. In those which are nominal conjugates only; as it doth not follow that wine is an evil thing, because wine-bibbing is so: 2. In arguing affirmatively, from the concretes to the abstracts, where the predication is not by itself; as, it doth not follow that whiteness is sweetness, because something that is white (as milk) is sweet.  
3. In arguing negatively from the abstracts to the concretes; as, because no whiteness is sweetness, it doth not follow that nothing that is white, is sweet.   
The Canons of Notation are two.  

1. That which doth or doth not agree to notation, doth, or doth not agree with the thing noted; as, if the study of wisdom be to be preferred before the study of the military art; Philosophy is also to be preferred before the military art.  
2. That of which the thing noted is predicated, notation is also predicated, and the contrary; as, if there be a solstice, the Sun doth stand; if there be no holy thing taken away, there is no Sacrilege.   
The Topick from notation is more delightful than forcible, and the Canons thereof do fai● very often; as, 1. If the notations be too much strained; as, it doth not follow tha● Thomas Perseval is therefore wiser than other men, because he doth perceive all. 2. If in argumentation a true notation or etymology be no● taken in a true manner; as, it doth not follow that Socrates doth teach or instruct his pupils because he is a teacher, for he is indeed called a teacher from teaching, or because he ought to teach; not because he doth always actually. And by several other ways, which a diligent observer may easily understand.   

CHAP XV. Of the Topics from the Whole and his Parts.  
THe whole and its parts are relations.  
The whole is that which is composed by the union of all the parts; as, a man: The parts are those which are united in the whole; as, the head, the breast, the legs. The essential parts of an essential whole are matter and form. The integral parts of an integral whole are those which differ so in their situation, as that one part may be separated from another; as the parts of a house are, the foundation, the walls, the roof. An Homogeneal Integer or whole is distributed into Homogeneal or similary, parts, of which every one hath name and definition of the whole; as, every part of water is water. An Heterogeneal whole is distributed into Heterogeneal or dissimilary parts, which have distinct names and natures from the whole; as, the parts of a man are the head, hands, feet, etc. Parts may be considered either every one single by its self, or all of them jointly and together.  
The Canons or Rules are these.  

1. The whole being granted, the parts are granted also; as, if there be a house, there is a foundation.  
2. If the parts be taken away, the whole is taken away also; as, if there be no foundation, certainly there can be no house; both these rules fail, 1. In equivocal parts, and parts so called improperly; as, it doth not follow, that he is not a man, because he hath neither hair nor nails. 2. In a whole, that is lame in some part not simply necessary: as he may be a man, though one of his fingers or hands be cut off.  
3. The whole being taken away, the parts are also taken away; as if there be not a house, there is not a foundation.  
4. The parts being granted, the whole is also granted; as if there be a foundation, walls, and roof, there must be a house. Either of these rules fail, when the parts are taken by themselves; as, there may be a foundation, though there is not a house as yet.    

CHAP. XVI. Of the Topics from Genus and Species.  
TOpically Genus and Species are not always taken as in the predicables: for here Genus is every essential predicate; whether it be a Genus, properly called the predicate of some species or individual: as animal is spoken of man, or of Socrates; or a species spoken of individuals, as man of Socrates; or whether a Generical or specifical difference be spoken of the inferior Species, which it doth constitute; as, sensibility of man; rationality of Socrates.  
In like manner by Species here, we do not only understand that which is properly so called, which is immediately under his Genus, but a specifical difference, and also an individual itself; and whatsoever is subjected to something superior, in that particular in which it is subjected, is called by the name of Species.  
The Canons or Rules of Genus and Species, are 

1. If the Genus be taken away, the Species is taken away also; as, if there be not an Animal, there is neither man nor beast, nor reasonable creature.  
2. The Species being granted, the Genus is also granted; as, if there be a man or something that is rational, there is an animal. These rules hold always.  
3. What doth or doth not agree to the Genus, doth also agree or not agree to the Species; as, if an animal be sensible, a man is so; if it be not incorporeal, neither is a man. This rule faileth 1. In a material or simple supposition, for neither is man a Genus, because there is an animal, or not a Species, because there is not an animal. 2. In those things which do agree or not agree in part only and not universally; as, neither is a man irrational because some animal is so, or not rational because some animal is not rational.  
4. What doth or doth not agree to a Species, doth or doth not agree unto its Genus. This must be explained two ways. 1. What doth or doth not agree to any Species, doth or doth not agree to its Genus in part; thus are Syllogisms in the third figure; as, if man be rational, or not fourfooted, certainly some animal is rational, and some animal hath not four feet. 2. What doth or doth not agree to all the Species, doth or doth not agree to all the Genus: hence inductions are form; as, if a man, a horse etc. be sensible, or are not immortal; certainly every animal is sensible, and no animal is immortal.     

CHAP. XVII. Of the Topics from Definition and Division.  
DEfinition, Topically taken, doth comprehend not only every essential definition, but every, perfect description of a thing also, and every convertible predicate, as the constitutive difference and proper accident. But division is so taken, as in the second book of Logic is expressed, Chap. 2.  
Definiton hath this only Canon. The definition being granted or not granted, the thing defined is also granted or not granted; and the contrary; as, if there be a rational creature, there is a man, and the contrary; if there be not a man, there is no rational creature, nor on the contrary. This rule faileth in those things which agree to the definition or the thing defined as a definition or thing defined; for if a rational creature be a compounded speech, it doth not follow that there is a man, otherwise it is always true; for 'tis founded in their mutual reciprocation.  
Division hath this only Canon also: One or other of the dividing members being taken away, the other is taken away also, and one being granted, the other is also granted; as, if this animal be not a brute, it is a man, if it be a man, it is not a brute. This doth always hold in every good division; for it is founded upon these two Canons of a perfect division. 1. The members do take up the whole that is to be divided. 2. The dividing members are contrarily distinct and opposite, so that they can neither agree nor be confounded.   

CHAP. XVIII. Of the Topick from Testimony.  
WE are now to speak of inartificial arguments, or such as are void if not against the rules of art. These contend not with strength of reason, but authority: and are drawn from Testimony or Witness.  
Testimony or Witness is either, 

Divine 

By Revelation, as the Scriptures, Dreams and Visions etc.  
By operation, as the judgements of God, miracles, experiences of God's justice, power, and providence; and unto this the Testimony of nature may be referred.     

Humane 

Proper, as the Testimony of the senses. 

Common 

Public, as Customs, Laws, Monuments etc.  
Private; as, Confessions, Wills, Oaths, Compacts, the judgement of Authors, and such like.          
Some Testimonies are more firm than others, concerning which many Canons or Rules might be given; some of the chief are these which follow.  

1. Testimony in the negative is of no value, for it doth not follow that it is not so, because Aristotle hath no where made mention of it. This rule faileth, 1. In those things which are not to be commanded without a certain authority; as because it is not in the Scriptures, therefore it is not to be believed; nor is it a capital crime to swear rashly, because no law hath made it capital. In those things in which an author either should or hath promised, to discourse perfectly; as, Aristotle lib. 1. Metaphys. where he promiseth to enumerate the several species of quantity, yet makes no mention of place; is not place therefore one Species of Quantity?  
2. Divine Testimony is of infallible truth; as, Christ is the Messiah, because; the Scripture saith it. This Rule never faileth.  
3. The Testimony of sense is surely to be believed; as, fire is hot, because sense showeth it to be so. This rule faileth when a reason can be showed, that the senses are deceived; as, a staff is not therefore crooked, because it seems so when it is in the water.  
4. An artist is to be believed in his own art; as, a perfect birth may be in seven months; as Hippocrates affirmeth. This rule failerh; where others as skilful, or more skilful do think and affirm otherwise: as there are no Ideas, though Plato affirm it, because Aristotle doth oppose it. 2. Where sense or reason doth contradict; as Snow is not black, though A●axagoras doth say it; nor, 〈…〉 of an elementary nature, though Aristotle doth affirm it; because the one is contrary unto sense, and the other unto reason.  
5. The Testimony of many is to be received, before the Testimony of a few; as it is more probable, that there is an element of fire, because many think so, then that there is not, that being the opinion but of a few. This rule faileth 1. When the fewer are the wiser; as, virtue is to be preferred before riches, because the wiser sort do think so. 2. Where the fewer in number do give the strongest reasons; as, Logic is an art rather than a science, though they are the fewer number that think so, because it appears to be so by most firm and strong Arguments.  
6. The Testimony of the Ancients is to be preferred before the testimony of the neoterics; which is especially to be received in things belonging to piety and good manners; for in things of art and ingenuity, the ancients without doubt are much outdone by men of later years; it being easier to add something to things already invented, than to find out new inventions,    

CHAP. XIX. Of Fallacies in the General.  
HItherto we have spoken of a true Syllogism, as it consists either of necessary or probable matter; it remaineth now that we speak of a Sophistocal Syllogism.  
A Sophistical Syllogism, is a captious argumentation, which is seemingly only or apparently true or probable, but is indeed deceitful. And the Ancients did call those Sophisters which endeavoured to obtain Glory by disputation, and that by five ways or means especially by forcing the respondent, 

1. To Redargution, which is the denial of something that was before granted, or the concession of something that was before denied. When the respondent is forced to contradict himself.  
2. To something that is false; as, when he admits of something that is apparently known to be so.  
3. To something contrary to common sense; as, when he admits of some proposition, that is contrary to the common received opinion.  
4. To some Solecism; as when he admits of some thing contrary to the rules of Grammar; or,  
5. And lastly, to some trivial and vain thing; as when there is a vain and useless repetition of the same thing.    
These fallacious ways of arguing, Aristotle hath well referred to these two heads, to Fallacies in words, or in things: Of Fallacies in words he reckons five. Ambiguity, Amphibolie, Composition, Division and Figure of a word: Of Fallacies in things he names seven; Accident, Of a thing spoken after a sort to a thing spoken simply, Ignorance of the argument, A false or wrong Cause, Consequent, Begging of the question, and, An ask of many questions.   

CHAP. XX. Of Fallacies in Words.  
ALL Fallacies in words arise from some Multiplicity that is in them; and the multiplicity that is in words, is either Actual, Potential, or Fantastic.  

1. Actual, when a word without variation hath many meanings; as, in Aequivocation, and Amphibolie.  
2. Potential, when a word being altered in the pronunciation, hath many meanings; as in Composition, Division, and Accent.  
3. Fantastic, when a word doth really and indeed signify but one, and yet doth seem to signify many things, as in the figure of a word.   
A Fallacy of Aequivocation, or homonymy, is when some simple word is diversely taken in the several propositions of the same Syllogism; and this may be three ways.  

1. When one word is applied to several things; for example, 

Every Dog doth bark,  
The Dog star is a Dog,  
Therefore the Dog star doth bark.    
2. When a word properly signifying but one thing is by Analogy or Metaphor applied to another; as if one would prove that water hath feet, because it runs, or the meadow a mouth, because it smiles.  
3. When there is some ambiguity in respect of the accidents of the parts of speech according to Grammar; as, if one would prove that he which is sitting doth stand, because he did rise.   
In these Fallacies there are four terms; and may be resolved by showing the several significations of the ambiguous word.  
A Fallacy of amphiboly is when some sentence is doubtful by reason of the construction, and this may be three ways.  

1. The construction of the words being the same but under a divers habitude; as, if one would prove this to be Aristotle's book because he made it.  
2. By changing the order of the construction; as; thus, 

That which one doth see is true,  
But you saw Thomas drunk,  
Therefore it is true that Thomas was drunk    
3. When a sentence hath both a proper and a Metaphorical sense; as thus, 

They which laugh have mouths,  
The Meadows do laugh,  
Therefore the Meadows have mouths.     
And to this belong all proverbial speeches, and may be resolved by showing the ambiguity of the sentence.  
A Fallacy of composition, is when such words are joined together which should be disjoined; and the contrary unto this is a Fallacy of division; when such words are severed which ought to be joined together; both of these may happen four ways. 1. When the dictum in a modal proposition may be put for its whole self, or for a part of its self: as for example, It is possible for him that is sitting to run; the which proposition is false if taken together, for while he doth sit, he cannot actually run; but being disjoined it is true, for he that doth now sit, at another time may run. 2. In Hypothetical propositions, whose parts are joined by some conjunction copulative or disjunctive; as, two, and three are even and odd, but five are two and three, therefore five are even and odd. 3. When some word in a sentence may be joined to divers things; as for example; 

He that may now be truly said to be born, is born in this hour;  
But a man that is threescore years old may now be truly said to be born;  
Therefore a man that is threescore years old is born in this hour.    
4. When two things are taken severally in the premises, and conjunctly in the conclusion, and the contrary; as thus; 

This dog is a father,  
And this dog is yours,  
Therefore this dog is your Father.    
In these there are four terms, and are resolved by separating the divided sense from that which is compounded; and showing which of them is true and genuine, and which not.  
A Fallacy in Accent, is when one and the same word or sentence doth signify divers things, by reason of the different accent or manner of pronunciation; and this may be four ways. 1. By making a wrong pronunciation, a long syllable for a short; or the contrary. 2. By the divers writing, without a diphthong or aspiration; as thus, They that could pronounce Shibboleth were safe from the Gileadites, but the Ephramites could pronounce Shibboleth, therefore they were safe. 3. When one word is made of two, or two of one. 4. By changing the manner of the pronunciation, as, thus; He that saith well done, doth acknowledge the action to be good; But he that derides another, doth say, well done! Therefore he that derides another, doth acknowledge the action to be good. In these also there are four terms; and they are solved, by showing the reason of the divers accent or writing.  
A Fallacy of the figure of a word, is when for some similitude and likeness of words, that doth seem to agree to one thing, which is proper to another. But these Fallacies have the least show of probability, and therefore are but rarely used, and are many of them solved by saying that the words are indeed like, by reason of some accidents, as, sound or termination; but not in substance sense or signification.   

CHAP. XXI. Of Fallacies 〈◊〉 Things.  
FAllacies in things are seven.  

1. A Fallacy of accident, when that which agreeth to one of the terms in a Syllogism only by accident, is attributed unto another as if it were essential. This happeneth, 

1. When we argue from the accident to the subject, and the contrary; for example, That which causeth drunkenness is to be removed; But wine is the cause of drunkenness; Therefore wine must be taken away. 2. When the Genus of the supposition is changed, the material into the formal, the simple into personal, and the contrary; as thus, An animal is a Genus, a man is an animal, therefore a man is a Genus. 3. When we argue from the Superior to the Inferior and the contrary; as if we would prove that rationality is convertible with living creature, because it is convertible with man. These are solved by distinguishing that which agrees with any thing of itself, from that which doth so by accident.    
2. A Fallacy from a thing spoken in some respect to a thing spoken simply; and this is when from the mean term disposed with limitation, or after a sort with both or either of the extremes, a conclusion is inferred simply and absolutely true. And this may be three ways. 1. When the limitation added destroys the term to which it is added; as, Socrates is a dead man, therefore he's a man. 2. When the limitation added, doth signify a part; as a Blackamoor hath white teeth, therefore a Blackamoor is white. 3. When the limitation aded, doth signify some notable circumstance of time, place, person, and the like; as, It is fit to cast the merchant's goods into the Sea, for the preservation of the men in the ship; therefore it is fit to cast the merchant's goods into the Sea. These are solved by distinguishing that which is simply and absolutely so, from that which is so in some respects only.  
3. A Fallacy from ignorance of the argument, and this is, when either the state of the question is quite turned or wrested; or the adversaries conclusion is not directly opposite to our Thesis, according to the Canons of lawful opposition. This happeneth if the disputation, 1. Be not to the same thing; as, Socrates is rich, if he be compared with Codrus, poor, if compared with Croesus, therefore Socrates is both poor and rich. 2. If it be not so in reference to the same; as, no Blackamoor is white, every Blackamoor is white in reference to his teeth, therefore a Blackamoor is and is not white. 3. If it be not taken in the same manner; as Socrates doth run freely, Socrates doth not run freely, therefore Socrates doth and doth not run. 4. If it be not in reference to the same time; as, The faithful under the law did believe that Christ was to come, The faithful under the Gospel do not believe that Christ is to come, but that he is exhibited, Therefore the faithful do and do not believe that Christ is to come. All Fallacies may in some sort be reduced unto this of ignorance of the argument, even as all opposition may be reduced to contradiction. These are solved by showing the defect of the contradiction, in some of the four mentioned conditions.  
4. A Fallacy from that which is not the cause for the cause. And this is when that is brought for the true cause, which either is no cause, or else a cause only by accident, or not like unto the effect. This happens 1. When that which is not the true cause is brought for the true; as if one would prove such a war to be a cruel war, because of the appearance of a Comet. 2. When that which is the cause by accident is brought for the true; as if one would prove that the use of wine is to be forbidden because it maketh men drunk. These Fallacies are very useful in such Syllogisms which drive the respondent to something that is impossible; and they are solved, by denying the false cause, and showing the true.  
5. A Fallacy of the consequent; and this is, when that is inferred from the antecedent as the consequent which yet is not the consequent. This happens as often as the rules of conversion, or conditions of Syllogisms are not observed. And these are solved by showing the weakness of the inferences, either from the rules, or from some other inferences of the same form, which are infirm.  
6. A Fallacy from begging the question; and this is when that is used for the mean which is not granted, or is different from that which is sought, but as much unknown. This happeneth many ways. 1. When the thing sought is taken in the same terms; as thus, every man is rational, every man is a man; therefore every man is rational. 2. When the thing sought is expressed in words, Synonymous or equivalent; as if one would prove that a shilling is the twentieth part of pound, because twelve pence is so. 3. When the question is proved by that which is as much or more unknown; as, Heaven is immovable, because the earth is movable. 4. When the propositions do mutually prove one another; as, if one would prove that fire is the hottest, because the thinnest; and then again that it is the thinnest because the hottest. It is solved by showing the vanity and folly of such arguing.  
7. A Fallacy of ask many questions; and this is, when many questions or conclusions are confounded in one. This may be two ways. 1. When the same predicate is sought from divers subjects; as, is the Earth, Sea, or Heaven. 2. When divers predicates are sought from one and the same subject; as, is man, a living creature, and a stone. These are solved not by answering in one answer to all the parts of the question together, but distinctly to every one.   
And thus much concerning a Sophistical Syllogism.   

CHAP. XXII. Of Method.  
I Am now to speak of Order or Method which is the fourth and last Logical instrument. And, Method is the disposing of things belonging to the same matter or subject, so, us that they may be best understood, and easiest remembered.  
2. That the limitations of this Definition may be observed; such things must be premised which do conduce to the knowledge of those that follow; or those things at least must be spoken of first, which are more easy to be understood than the rest.  
3. Method is twofold, Natural or Arbitrary.  
4. A natural Method is that in which the order of nature and our distinct knowledge is observed. Some controversy there is here amongst writers, whether in the writing of any subject, it be fit to speak of those things first, which are first in nature; or those things with which we are best acquainted. And I think that for the most part, we are best acquainted with that which is first in nature; but if any time it happens otherwise, than I concur with Zabarel, that those things are to be spoken of first, which come first under our cognizance, and not those that are first in their own nature.  
5. In a natural method all the parts ought to be Homogeneal. We ought not in a natural method to mingle one science with another, as Ethics in a treatise of Geometry, or Geometry in a treatise of Ethics. This must be strictly observed in all precepts which belong to the essence of any science; but in the commentaries or expositions of any precepts, we may make use of any other science as well as of that, of which we write or speak; as in writing of Physic, we may repeat something of Logic, or in writing of Ethics we may make use of something in Physic.  
6. In a natural Method, we must speak first of Generals, and then of Particulars; and as we proceed from one thing to another, every part must have a dependence on that which was last spoken of, by some apt translation. This dependence or connexion must be in this or the like form. And this shall suffice to be spoken of this thing; the next in order to be spoken of is etc. How much such forms do help the memory, is very had to be believed.  
7. A Natural Method is either Total or Partial.  
8. A Total Method is that in which a whole sience is methodically ordered or disposed. And this is either Synthetical or Analytical.  
9 A Synthetical or Compositive Method is that, which begins with the first and most simple principles, and so proceeds to those which do arise from, or are composed of these first principles. And according to this Method we are to write or speak of all speculative arts.  
10 An Analytical or Resolutive Method is that which begins with the end, and so proceed still lower and lower till we come to the first an● most simple beginnings. And according t● this Method, we are to write or speak of all Practical arts.  
11. A Partial Method is that, by which any part of any art or science is methodically ordered or disposed: Or by which any particular Theme or Subject, is handled by itself. In this Method we are to consider, that as it is a part of a Total Method, it ofttimes so falls out, that in handling a part of some science, we ought to observe the Analytical Method; if the whole science be to be handled in a Synthetical, and the contrary; that is, in such a science in which the whole is too handled in an Analytical Method, a part thereof must be handled in a Synthetical. As for example, if we were to write of all Physics, we must write in a Synthetical Method, but if we were to write of that part which concerns a living body, it were fit to observe the Analytical Method, beginning first with the actions, which are the ends of life; then proceeding to the causes and principles which are the faculties of the soul, the temperaments and the Organical parts of the living body; And as some particular Theme or Subject is to be handled by itself, we are to consider; That in simple Themes we are first to explain the name, by showing the Etymology, and explaining the words that are Synonymous thereunto either in the same or in other languages, if it may any thing conduce to the explanation of the Theme propounded: next to the name we are to consider the nearest Genus and Causes; and if the Theme be an accident, the Subject and Object also; and hence the Definition thereof must be composed. To the Definition we must add the adjuncts and effects etc. But in compounded Themes first the question must be rightly stated, and then the proper and genuine sense must be infirmed by good reason and proof, of ●hese things I have already spoken more at large in my Art of Rhetoric.  
12. An Arbitrary Method is that which not regarding the natural order is fitted for such a confused knowledge as may be most taking with the people or suit best with their capacities. If we are to speak to sober, judicious & knowing men, there is no question, but that we ought to speak of things in their natural order; but if we have to do with the common sort of people, and such as are guided more by sense than reason, we are to consider of their capacities, and to speak of things not as they are in their natural order, but as they are or may be best apprehended by them.  
And thus much concerning Method, which is the fourth and last Logical Instrument; and with this I shall conclude these my Logical Precepts.  
Soli Deo Gloria.  
FINIS.    

Books sold by Thomas Passenger at the Three Bibles on London-Bridge.  
A Mirror or Looking-glass for Saints and Sinners, showing the justice of God on the one, and his mercy towards the other. Set forth in some thousand of examples by Sam. Clark late Minister of Bennet-Finck London, in 2 volumes; in folio.  
Royal and Practical Chemistry, by Oswaldus Crollius, and John Hartman, faithfully rendered into English, folio, price 10. s.  
God's revenge against murder, by John Reynolds, containing thirty Tragical stories, digested into six Books, newly reprinted, folio, price 10 s.  
Lord Bacon's Natural history, folio, price, 8 s.  
Sandy's Travels, containing a description of the Turkish Empire, of Egypt and the Holy Land, of the remote parts of Italy, and Islands adjoining, folio, price 8 s.  
Markham's Masterpiece.  
Roman Antiquities, by Tho Godwin, quarto, price 2 s. 6 d.  
The famous History of the destruction of Troy, in three books, quarto, price 3 s.  
Valentine and Orson, price 18 d.  
Etymologicum parvum, by Francis Gregory, octavo, price 3 s.  
Chemical essays, by John Begumis, price, 18 s.  
Spiritual Antidotes against sinful contagion, by Tho. Dolittle, price 18 d.  
Pools Dialogue betwixt a Papist and a Protestant, twelve, price bound 1 s.  
Monasticon Favershamiense; or a description of the Abbey of Faversham, octavo, price bound 18 d.  
The Christians Crown of glory; or Holiness the way to happiness, octavo, price bound 18 d.  
The path way to health, price bound 18 d.  
The complete Academy, or Nursery of compliments, bound 1 s.  
The book of knowledge in three parts, price 10 d.  
The book of palmistry in octavo, price bound 18 d.  
The Wise Virgin, being a narrative of Gods dealing with Martha Hatfield, price bound 18 d.  
The pilgrim's port, or the weary man's rest in the grave, in twelves, price bound 1 s.   

Books Printed for, and sold by Ben. Hurlock, over against St. Magnus' Church on London Bridge near Thames-street.  
Mariner's Magazine, folio, price bound twelve shillings.  
Newton's Logarithms, folio, price bound 10 s.  
Norwood's tryangles, quarto, price bound 4 s.  
Collins Sector on a quadrant, quarto, price bound 3 s. and 6 d.  
Collins plain scale, quarto, price bound 4 s.  
Seaman's companion, quarto, price bound 2 s. 6 d.  
Safeguard of Sailors, quarto, price bound 2 s. 6 d.  
Geometrical Seaman, price bound 2 s.  
Petiscus doctrine of tryangles, quarto, price bound 5 s.  
Phillip's advancement, quarto, price bound 3 s. 6 d.  
seaman's Kallendar, quarto, price 1 s. 4 d.  
Seaman's practice, quarto, price 1 s. 4 d.  
●mans Dictionary, quarto, price 1 s. 4 d.  
●amans glass, quarto, price, 1 s.  
Seaman's secrets, quarto, price 1 s.  
Complete ship wright, quarto, price 1 s.  
Complete Modellist, quarto, price 6 d.  
Pilots Sea mirror, quarto, price 1 s.  
Mathematical Manual, octavo, price bound ● s. 6 d.  
Mariner's compass rectified, octavo, price bound 2 s.  
Norwoods' Epitome, octavo, price bound 1 s. 6 d.  
Saints anchorhold, twelves, price bound 1 s.  
Newtons' Institutions in twelves, price bound 2 s. 6 d.  
Newtons' Tables in twelves, price bound 2 s. 6 d.  
Newtons' Geometrical Trigonometry in twelves, price bound 1 s.  
Carpenter's Rule in twelves, price bound 1 s.  
Mariners divine Mate, twelves, price bound 6 d.  
Seamories' Architecture, quarto, price bound ● s.  
Salionstals navigator, quarto, price 1 s. 4 d.  
Pathway to sailing, quarto, price 10 d.  
●●w shining light, quarto, price 1 s. 4 d.  
〈◊〉 Quadrant in octavo, price 6 d.