There is lately published an Introduction to the Art of Logic, very useful for young Scholars and others, and hath found very good entertainment in the world already, and is sold by Tho Passenger at the three Bibles on London-Bridge, and Benjamin Hurlock over against St. Magnus' Church.   

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ART OF Rhetoric.  
Composed for the benefit of young Scholars and others, who have not opportunity of being instructed in the Latin tongue; and is very helpful to understand the figurative expressions in the holy Scriptures.  
Published for a public Advantage.  
By John Newton, D. D.  
London, Printed by E. T. and R. H. for Thomas Passenger at the three Bibles on London-Bridge, and Ben. Hurlock over against St. Magnus' Church▪ 1671.   

To the Reader.  
OUr English Schoolmasters, being now furnished with convenient helps, for the instructing of their Scholars in Grammar, Arithmetic, Geometry, Music and Astronomy; I come to these two liberal Arts, which are in themselves the most sublime and difficult; This of Rhetoric, and the other of Logic. These are the Arts and Sciences of which Children are the least capable, and therefore I have reserved them for the last place; and for this reason it is I suppose that Logic is generally looked upon, as a noli me tangere, an Art by no means to be taught in schools, but must be altogether reserved for the University; but for as much as Rhetoric is permitted the Grammar Master without control, and that it is so nearly allied to Logic, as that it cannot be attained (the Oratorical part especially) without some knowledge of it, let me without any further dint of argument, beg thus much favour of thee, whoever thou art into whose hands these Tracts shall fall, not too severely to prohibit a small System, a short introduction to Logic to bear Rhetoric company, if it be but to complete our English Academy (of which this is the sixth part:) Perhaps the advantage that our young students shall reap, by being instructed in this science before they smell the University air, may make thee compensation for thy indulgence. Tell me I pray thee, is it not reasonable that the terms which Rhetoricians use, being borrowed from other Arts, especially from Logic, should be explained; and if this which cannot be fairly denied, will but be granted me, I will not fear their being slighted, for their homespun garments in which they are clad; for I persuade myself, that none will be against their speaking English, but such illiterate Schoolmasters, who being sent to the University before they were fit for it, and compelled for want of maintenance, very quickly to forsake it again, do think it a disparagement to them to teach English, when yet alas, it is many times very little, very little indeed that they understand of other Languages, nay and it were well if they did understand the Rules for reading and writing of their own; all others, if they are not already, will easily be persuaded to believe, that it is no impossible thing for a man to be an Orator or Rhetorician in any language, and that the precepts of Rhetoric may be best taught and practised, in men's native tongue, as much conducing to and facilitating their learning of them, in a strange one; but in what language soever the precepts of this Art are first taught, me thinks it is an unreasonable task, that is that is imposed upon young Lads at School, not much unlike the burden, that the Egyptian taskmasters laid upon the children of Israel, when they required of them such a tale of Brick, and yet would allow them no straw. I thought it hard myself, that I should be commanded to make a Theme before I had any other instructions for framing there of than what Clark's Formulae or Farnabie's Rhetoric did afford me: As for the Oratorica▪ part of Butler's Rhetoric like terra incognita▪ and 〈◊〉 is well if it be otherwise 〈…〉 and then for matter, what were 〈…〉 helps, Tulli●s sent 〈…〉 P●u●ners Symbols, and Lie 〈…〉 for as for History or Morality▪ we were perhaps taught five or six leaves in Justin, as much in Sallust, Lucius Florus, and Caesars▪ Commentaries, and were able to give as good an account at last, of these Authors in reference to the matter of which they have written, ●s if we had never seen the books, or heard of their names▪ now from these books thus throughly read and understood, or rather neglected and scarce known, I cannot but smile yet, and I persuade myself that many school boys now do even laugh in themselves, that they can in their exercises of this nature put such palpable cheats upon their Masters, and their Masters either not seeing them, or not in the least take notice of them: but they have more cause, did they but understand it, to lament their loss of time, and the great cheat that their Masters put on them: for a lad having a Theme or sentence given him, runs presently to Clark's Formulae, Farnabie's Index Rhetoricus, and there seeks for some Exordium, of half a dozen lines or more, and thence transcribes with very slender alteration so much as he thinks convenient for that time; how much to his present purpose; he doth as little care as understand; and for his next part, the narration of his sentence in other explicatory words, he so little understands how to do it, that setting aside the form for that purpose, which is also transcribed from those books, you hear but little of it; to find matter for confirmation is all his trouble, now for a Wit's commonwealth, and if he find any thing there, all his care is to translate it Grammatically true; as for the rest, these forms Reusner's Symbols and Licosthenes, are the books that must enrich him, and if he can but insert two or three phrases, that he did collect from his late lectures, he is a diligent boy, and has done his Tax▪ roundly, when alas if the lad did but see his own exercise in his vulgar tongue, he would laugh at himself for writing so many words, and those none of his own neither, and all to so little purpose; and can we expect that ever this should be amended, unless you respite these exercises, till lads are acquainted with the Rules of invention, have read and digested some good Histories and moral discourses, and have furnished themselves with matter from their own reading, and have been instructed how to dispose of it in his paper books, that he may know where to find whatever he hath formerly read of any subject; and whether this may not be more speedily done in every one's native language, and to as good purpose, as in a language with which they are not acquainted, is I think very worthy thy consideration. A lad would surely much sooner understand what is sense, by reading books in his native language, than in any other whatsoever, and intelligibly read more at a time also, so that in this way of education, besides the knowledge that young Lads might have, in those useful Sciences of Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, and Astronomy, they might have much more true and solid knowledge, in this of Rhetoric also, than now they have, though their time at School is wholly spent in the exercise of it, and the getting of a few Latin and Greek words and phrases; and were they but thus prepared for these languages, by a competent and a well grounded knowledge in their own, and their affections engaged to the love of learning, by that skill in the sciences which they have 〈◊〉 might attain, what I pray would be wanting save only words, and with what wonderful ease might that defect be supplied; how throughly acquainted with the Rules of the Latin and Greek Grammars, without torturing and tormenting themselves with a useless endeavour to repeat orderly the rules in those Grammars by heart; the prescriptions of Pliny in his Epistle to his friend Fuscus, Epistol. lib. 6. Epist. 7. will surely be sufficient to manifest: His words are, Utile in primis, ut multi praecipiunt, ex Graeco in Latinum, & ex Latino vertere in Graecum: Quo genere exercitationis, proprietas splendorque verborum, apta structura sententiarum, figurarum copia, & explicandi vis colligitur. Praeterea imitatione optimorum, facultas similia inveniendi paratur: & quae legentem fefellissent, transferentem fugere non possunt. Intelligentia ex hoc & judicium acquiritur. And for evident proof of learning these tongues, without the horrible toil of Grammar, I will mention Queen Elizabeth of blessed memory, who as her Tutor Mr. Aschum tells us (in the second book of his Schoolmaster, page 50.) never took Greek or Latin Grammar in her hand, after the first declining of a Noun and a Verb, but only by this double translating of Demosthenes and Isocrates daily without missing every forenoon, and likewise some part of Tully every afternoon, for the space of a year or two, did attain to such a perfect understanding in both the tongues, and to such a ready utterance of the Latin, and that with such a judgement, as that but few in both Universities, or elsewhere in England, were to be compared with her: so than an English School, where Children might be instructed in the sciences would not only send them forth with all the useful accomplishments for any Trade, but further those, that are intended for the University or any learned profession, in the getting of the Latin and Greek tongues also.  
And having said thus much for bringing all the sciences into English, some account may be reasonably expected concerning this of R 〈…〉 orick with which I present thee now, of which I must say, as my learned Mr. William Dugard in his Rhetori●es Elementa, Animadvertendum est Quaestiones hase, maximam partem, ad Caroli Butleri Rhetoricam, quae vulgo in Scholis teritur, formari; the truth is, the form and Method of this our Rhetoric, in respect of Elocution, some examples only excepted, is the same with Butler, and as for invention and disposition, I have very much followed the first part of that excellent piece of Oratory, which Michael Radau hath published under the title of Orator Extemporaneus, from whence I might have taken much more than I have, but that I was afraid of being too prolix and over burthoning my young English Rhetorician: if this which I have done shall find acceptance, I may be persuaded, if God shall lend me life, and it be thought necessary, more fully to explain these precepts with variety of examples; this in the mean I here recommend to thy perusal; and for the desire I have to contribute 〈…〉 ething towards the removal of that burden which is in this science imposed on children, am very willing to endure thy censure and judgement, be it never so severe against me. And do therefore rest, thine in the Lord.  
John Newton.   

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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ART OF Rhetoric.  

CHAP. I.  
Of the Art of Rhetoric in the General.  
RHETORICR is the Art or faculty of eloquent and delightful speaking.  
And this eloquent and delightful speak 〈…〉 g, is that which we usually call Oratory: The difference therefore between a Rhetorician and an Orator is this; the Rhetorician delivers precepts and directions for this eloquent speaking, and the Orator doth put these precepts and directions into practice.  
In this Art of Rhetoric then or in these precepts and directions for Oratory, three things must be considered.  

1. The Matter about which it is conversant.  
2. The End for which it serveth.  
3. The Means by which that end may be attained.   
The Matter or Subject of this Art or faculty is any thing whatsoever which may be discoursed or questioned; any Theme or Case.  
A Theme is an infinite Question in which an inquiry is made in the general concerning the Thesis or Position; as, whether it be fit to wage War.  
A Case is a Question confined to persons and times, in which a particular inquiry is made concerning the Hypothesis or matter in dispute; as, whether it be fit for England to wage War with the Dutch.  
2. The End or Ends for which Rhetorich serveth are these.  
1. To tickle and delight the ears o● ●he Auditors that they may be willing to ●ear that which is intended to be delivered.  
2. To inform their judgements, and by strength of argument to beget a belief of ●hat which is spoken.  
3. To move the affections and beget 〈◊〉 willingness either to do themselves, or to 〈…〉 ssist in the actions of others, or to justify ●hat which is said or done.  
Lastly, The ways and means by which ●hese ends may be attained, are three, Nature, Art, and Practice.  
Natural abilities do much conduce to ●he attaining of this excellent faculty; for ●hey that are naturally ingenious, and have 〈◊〉 good memory will easily attain to this Art of eloquent and delightful speaking; ●ut where Nature is defective, more care ●nd diligence must be used, that the de●ects of Nature may be in part at least supplied by Art, whose best companion is 〈◊〉 general knowledge of things, which i● a ●oung Student have not as yet attained ●nto, it is at least necessary, that he should perfectly understand the Theme or case propounded, or else the Rules of Art will 〈…〉 and him but in little stead; for how ●hould he dispose of Matter before he hath it? And in vain do we speak of Use and Practice, where Knowledge which must furnish us with Matter, and Art which must teach us to dispose of it, are both wanting. But natural abilities being presupposed, and matter acquired by diligent reading and observation; I shall here show how those natural endowments may be by art improved, and the prepared matter so disposed and ordered, as that they may make way for Use and Practice.   

CHAP. II.  
Of Invention.  
THE Rules of this Art or Faculty of Rhetorical and delightful speaking are commonly reduced unto five heads, Invention, Disposition, Elocution, Memory and Pronunciation.  
The first of these is Invention, in which we must consider three things; First, what we are to invent; Secondly by wha● Arguments we may confirm the matter invented: Thirdly, from what Topickes o● general heads, those Arguments may b● raised.  
And First, we are to consider what it is that we are to invent; and the thing or matter which we are to invent or find out, is the scope and purpose, of the intended Oration; that is, we must propound some certain proposition, to which we mean to direct our speech; and of those several propositions which may be raised from the Subject propounded, we should still make choice of that, which is most agreeable to the sentence given, most suitable to the present occasion, most profitable, and that which the Auditors may probably best apprehend. But now a days our Orators do much labour to find out some acute proposition, and that proposition is so stilled, which under some Allegory doth express a simple and a received truth: as in this expression; I would advise you to set the Camp in order: the meaning is, I would advise you to prepare for War: such propositions are not to be found fault with; but yet we must take heed of affectation, yea and of lightness too, because gravity doth become an Orator; though young students may do well to pitch upon the most plain and obvious propositions; and such easy arguments as are most pertinent to the matter in hand; and after they can do this tolerably well, they may be degrees aspire higher.  
Secondly, When you have resolved upon your proposition, than you are to bethink yourself of some Arguments by which that proposition may be confirmed: for an argument is a probable reason brought, to persuade the Auditors of the truth of the Proposition.  
I call it a probable reason, because arguments are of two sorts; some are certain, evident and necessary, and these are convincing: as, that Peter is not a beast, because he is induced with reason; others are probable carrying with them some show of truth; that is, they seem to be true either from the general received opinion, or for the similitude that they have with the truth, or from the event; and these are the Arguments, which an Orator should chiefly inquire after; not but that he may also use such are Demonstrable and undeniably true: but because he many times hath to do with such propositions as cannot be demonstrated, or if they can, yet he useth probable arguments for the most part, because he is to speak to such, as will be more easily persuaded by such arguments, as come within ●heir own sphere, which they can easily fathom, than by such as are Demonstrative and beyond their apprehension.  
Thirdly, in Invention, we are to consider the several Topics or common places, from whence these probable Arguments may be invented or raised; and these are of two sorts; intrinsical, and extrinsical: those are called Intrinsecal, which are comprised in the matter which is propounded of what kind soever it be; and all matter is comprised in one of these three kinds of Cases or Causes, Demonstrative, Deliberative, and Judicial.  
The Demonstrative Case so called, because it doth Demonstrate the Nature of the Subject propounded. And is used either in the Commendation, or Condemnation or persons, actions, or things. When it is used by way of commendation, it is called an Encomium or a Penegyrick: and when it is used by way of condemnation, it is called an Invective, if against some eminent Person, it is called Philippick.  
The 〈…〉 eliberative Case is so called, from the deliberation or consider 〈…〉 n that should be taken before advice be given.  
The subject matter in this case, is every contingent thing; every thing which is in our own power.  
More particularly, if it be a public ●ase there are five things in which according to Aristotle, deliberation is required.  
1. In public taxations. 2. In making of War and Peace. 3. In the guarding of Countries. 4. In importation and exportation of goods. 5. In the dispensing or not dispensing with Laws.  
But in private cases the particular matters in which we should deliberate, cannot be assigned, beacuse of the great variety; there being nothing concerning ourselves or families, in which deliberation is not convenient, if not necessary.  
The Judicial case may be so called, from the delivering of our Judgement or opinion of the matter propounded, whether for or against, whether by way of Accusation, or by way of Defence. And the heads from whence Arguments may be raised in these several kinds of cases are ei●her such as are common to them all; or such as 〈…〉 e peculiar to each kind: I will here speak of such general ways of inventing Arguments from the very matter propounded, as are common to all three cases or causes; and they being well understood, the Ingenious and Judicious Orator will need no direction for each several kind of causes in particular.  
The Topics or Heads for invention in the General are these following.  
1. Definition. 2. Division. 3. Notation. 4. Conjugation. 5. Genus. 6. Species. 7. Similitude. 8. Dissimilitude. 9 Contraries. 10. Opposites. 11. Comparison. 12. Causes. 13. Effects. 14. Adjuncts. 15. Antecedents. 16. Consequents. All other Topics from whence Intrinsical or Artificial arguments may be raised, are contained in these or may be derived from them.  
The first of these Topics I call Definition. And, Definition is a speech explaining or declaring what a thing is. The parts of a Definition according to the Logicians are these two 1. The Genus or general name; that is, a name that doth agree with the thing defined, and also with several other things besides. 2. The Difference or 〈…〉 ticular name, that is, a name which doth only agree with that which is defined; for example, Man is a living Creature endued with Reason. But such Definitions are seldom used by Orators, because they afford but little matter for an Oration; but other ways of Defining things, which may be called Descriptions rather, and such are these that follow.  
One way of Defining things, much used by Orators, is, to describe it by the parts thereof, which may be sometimes large and yet elegant: of this way we have an example in Causinus, who doth describe a Butterfly in this manner. A Butterfly, saith he, is a small Animal, seldom seen in Cities but very frequently in the fields; it is of a full, tender, soft, and flexible body, growing smaller and smaller to a little length, on which a dispersed gentle down doth neatly shine; there stand out as it were extended Horns, small as thrids, between which a pleasant light of his shining eyes doth sparkle; but a special wonder is in his Wings, far beyond the bulk of his little body, they are bedecked with flowers, adorned with Purple, shine like Gold, and glitter with stars; being poised with these, he ●●ies as it were with Oars into the air, disporting himself, and cleaving almost to every stalk: sometimes he sucks the juice of leaves with his most delicate trunk, sometimes he sweetly reposeth amongstdelightfull odours, other while with a renewed flight he soars aloft and escapes the hands of insulting boys, drawing in the air six hundred Meanders.  
A Second way by which Orators do define or rather describe things, is by such effects, as do proceed from the four causes, and this way doth as it were open a gate to a large field; only you must take heed, that you reckon not every minute or small matter for an effect; according to this way Saint Ambrose doth describe drunkenness to be an incentive of madness, the fomenter of lust, and the poison to wisdom.  
A Third way is by similitude; but not according to the usual way of expressing them, by the particle, As: but by bare affirmation omitting the usual way of comparison: for example: What is our life? It is a market in which we buy and sell; in which one deceiveth another, and in which every one doth mind his own business; and hath a care of his own wealth: it is a Comedy, in which every one doth act his own part, this man the part of a King, and that of a peasant.  
A Fourth way is by Synonomie, as thus▪ What else is a Lily, but an ornament to th● Earth, the glory of Plants, the very eye of Flowers, the Jewel of the meadows and Star of the Fields, adorning the Earth, a● the Stars do Heaven; giving as great a lustre to other flowers, as the Jasper stone doth to Gold, and as much delighting the eye as the Sun the world.  
A Fifth way is by those causes by which effects are produced; as the Material, formal, efficient and final causes. For example, the Edifice which Daedalus hath raised with his own hand, of strong and hewed stone, in a round form, is not only fortified against the injury of weather; but hath also so much gracefulness in it, that it easeth the mind of all care, yea and filleth it with delight; it is so neatly built, that you would think it Heaven upon Earth.  
A Sixth way is by negation; when we first show what a thing is not, and then what it is: Thus Babusius L●b. 3. Epigr. doth describe a Friend.  
A Friend is not a bare voice, or empty nutshell, but a Friend is known by his affection and behaviour, by his words and actions.  
A Seventh way is by adjuncts and proprieties; Thus our blessed Saviour is called, The Assertor of humane liberty, the master of Sanctity, and absolute perfection, the everlasting fountain of all virtues. Thus Solomon is described: Solomon that great miracle and Oracle of humane Wisdom, the Master or Tutor of the World.  
An Eighth way, is first to describe the thing Ironically according to the opinion of some, and then to explain the same, as in truth it is, or at least according to your own thoughts and apprehensions of it.  
The Second Topick for Invention is Division, or Distribution of the matter propounded into its parts; thus the life of Man may be divided, into Infancy, Childhood, Youth, middle age, old-age.  
Arguments may be raised from the parts unto the whole, three ways. 1. By affirming that of the whole, which may be affirmed of all the parts; as if you would prove the whole Fabric of a Huse to be defective; you may divide the house, into the walls, the roof, and floors; and show the defects in each of these.  
2. By denying that of the whole, wh〈…〉 may be denied of all the parts; as if you were to show the inconvenience of sending Children to travel: you may enum● rate the several places adjoining, and show the inconveniencies that may be i● sending them to any of those places; a 〈…〉 suppose to France, Spain, or Italy, and by consequence any whither else.  
3. By making an affirmation of one particular part, omitting or rejecting the rest; as thus, either he loves me or hates me, for there is no third or mean; but he doth not love me, therefore he hates me.  
This Topick may be elegantly used by way of Interrogation, Repetition, Subjection, Preterition, and Apostrophe. An example whereof, may be this excellent description of a Garden, as it is set forth by Drexelius in his Nicetas. There was, saith he, a most pleasant Garden as it were a Paradise, the smiling Trees stood with their leaves budded, which with a delightful odour made the shadows graceful, the gentle motion of whose boughs made a sweet whistling noise, amongst these a murmuring Rivulet, clearer than any Crystal, with running streams which did smoothly glide, disturbing the pebble stones with its singing waters: so that the motion thereof was almost a Musical harmony. On either side were flowers, with Zephyrus' copious family; on the one hand the silver Lilies from the green bank did smile (upon you) on the other the purple Roses did glitter, from an other part the Daffodils white as Snow or Ivory, were set off with the Hyacinths red as blood, yellow as gold; most pleasant gales of wind breathing from every part.  
The Third Topick is Notation, or Etymology, which is the interpretation of the word, showing as well the original thereof, as the signification: as a Senate is so called because of convention of the Seniors, that is of old men. Etymology is more frequent amongst Grammarians, than Orators, yet sometimes there may be an occasion for it amongst them, even for ornament and sweetness sake.  
The Fourth Topick is Conjugation: and Conjugation is either when one word ●ath various end, as Knife, knives; or when several words do come from, or are derived from one primitive; thus beautiful and beautifullness are both derived from beauty. From this Topick we argue thus, If piety be a commendable quality, than he that is pious is worthy of commendation.  
Conjugation and Notation differ in this; Notation explains the word; Conjugation shows its derivation and various termination.  
The Fifth and Sixth Topics are Genus and Species: now that is called Genus, which doth comprehend several things under it which are really different from one another. And that is called Form or Species, which may with other things be referred to one common Genus: And thus this word (Art) is a Genus in respect of the seven liberal sciences, as Grammar, Rhetoric, etc. And these sciences Grammar, Rhetoric, etc. are the forms and Species which are contained under this Genus or general term (Art.)  
The first of these Topics namely that which is called Genus, doth many times afford the Orator plenty of matter; for by this means a finite proposition, that is a proposition that is confined to the circumstances of time, place and such like, is reduced to an infinite, and hath all those restrictions taken from it. From these Topics we may argue two ways.  
1. That which is spoken of the Genus may sometimes be also spoken of the Form or Species; as thus, if virtue be to be embraced, than Temperance ought to be embraced also.  
2. That which is denied of the Genus, may be also denied of the Species; as thus, if no liberal Art be necessary for a Soldier; then Rhetoric is not necessary for him.  
The seventh Topick is Similitude; and similitude is the comparing of two or more things together, which are in themselves divers, but do agree in some particular. For Example, a shadow and Glory are in themselves very different things: but yet they agree in this, that the shadow doth accompany the body, and glory virtue. And hence Tully saith, that Glory is the shadow of virtue. Similitude may be collected, either from words, actions or fable●; nay there is scarce any thing which may not in some particular be compared with another, sometimes it is used for to prove, but most commonly for illustration.  
The eighth Topick is Dissimilitude; and Dissimilitude is the disagreeing of two or more things in some particular; from this Topick we argue thus: that which agreeth with one thing that is unlike, doth not necessarily agree with another; & that which doth not agree with some one thing, may yet agree with some other particular: For Example Idle Citizens care not what mischief doth befall the Commonwealth; therefore the more generous and public spirited men, must endeavour to keep the Republic from danger.  
The ninth Topick is from Contraries; and those things are said to be contraries, which cannot both at the same time agree with one and the same thing: thus no man can be said to be wise in that thing, in which he is a fool.  
Contraries are distinguished into four ranks or kinds: Adverse, Privitive, Relative and Contradictory; in these several kinds of contraries we are wont to argue either by way of affirmation or by way of negation.  
In those Contraries which we call adverse, we argue rightly, if we deny that of one thing or person, which we affirm of another, as thus; there is no safety in War, all men do therefore desire peace.  
In those Contraries, which are Privative, we argue rightly, when one privative is denied of that person, of which another is affirmed, as thus: you wish me poverty, because you envy my prosperous and wealthy condition.  
In Relative contraries, we argue rightly, when one is inferred from the relation which it hath unto the other; for example, ●f you be a Scholar, pray tell me who is your Master.  
In Contradictory contraries, we argue rightly, when one being denied, the other is affirmed, or the contrary; as thus, He is just, he is not just.  
The tenth Topick is from such things as are opposite to one another: And they are said to be opposites to one another, which can never agree together: as wrath and friendship; from which sort of Topics, the way of arguing is, to deny that of one opposite which is affirmed of the other; as thus, If Peter have a mind to kill Paul, surely he can have no love for him.  
In the use of these Topics we must consider how things that are contraries, unlike or opposite, do differ from one another. Those things are said to be contrary, which cannot agree with one another; things that are unlike do not disagree, but are divers; but in things that are opposite, when one of the contraries is expressed, we are to answer it by the effect of the other; as thus, to love and to hurt; for to hurt doth proceed from hatred, and hatred is contrary unto love.  
The eleventh Topick is Comparison, and Comparison is the comparing of one thing with another. This is either equal or unequal.  
Equal comparison is; when two equal 〈…〉 things are compared together. As thus; he hath deceived thee, therefore he will deceive me also▪  
Unequal comparison is two ways, first when we argue from the greater to th' 〈…〉 less: As, God spared not the Angels than 〈…〉 sinned, how then shall he spare man?  
Secondly, when we argue from the less to the greater: As, he will not let one sin go unpunished: much more will he therefore punish 〈◊〉 multitude of sins.  
Comparison doth differ from Similitude; in that two things are compared together in respect of some third; but in Similitude there is no respect unto a third, but 〈…〉 to one another only: as thus, It is lawful 〈…〉 for M. Antony to defend Clodius; why may not Tully then defend Milo? Here the comparison is between Tully and Anthony, but it is in respect of a third, that is, in respect of Defence. But in this, As they that are sick, think all things loathsome, though never so sweet; so they that are wicked cannot relish the best Societies: Here the sick in body are compared to the sick in mind, that is to the wicked, but not in respect of a ●hird, but in respect of their own corrupted tastes.  
The twelfth Topick is from the cause 〈…〉 s of things: And that is said to be a cause, from whence a thing may in any sort be said to be produced.  
We commonly reckon four sorts of causes, Efficient, Material, Formal and Fi 〈…〉 all.  
The efficient cause is that which maketh a thing: Thus the Sun causeth or maketh the Day; to this may instruments and all other things be referred, which do only assist in the making as well as those which make the thing: as a Pen is an assistant in writing. From this cause we argue thus: If the cause be denied, we deny the effect; if the cause be granted, we grant the effect also: if it be praised or dispraised, we praise or dispraise the effect also.  
The Material cause is that of which a thing is made, or is employed in; as money of Gold, and an Orator about every matter or thing. From this cause we argue thus; If matter be afforded, there may be such an effect, and the goodness or the badness of the effect depends upon the goodness or the badness of the matter.  
The formal Cause is that by which the thing is what it is, or that by which it is distinguished from other things. Thus a Ship and a Timber house do differ by the divers disposing of the parts. In this cause we argue from the excellence or the meaness of the form; the more excellent the form is, the better is the thing, and any deficiency in the form doth make it the worse: and every thing should be proportionable to his form: and hence a man should aim at immortal things, because his soul (which is his form) is made immortal.  
The final cause is that for which a thing is made: and the end for which we do any thing, is generally one of these three, because it is either honest, profitable or delightful. From this cause we argue according to these Axioms. Such as the end is, such are the things that are done to that end. If the end be good or bad, the things referred to that end are good or bad also.  
The thirteenth Topick is from the Effects, and those are said to be Effects which are produced by their causes. From these we argue either by inferring the cause, the effect being granted, or by denying the cause, the effect being denied; or by commending the cause, if the effects be good, 〈…〉 r by condemning it, if the effects be bad: ●nd these heads drawn from the causes and ●ffects, do afford great plenty of matter ●or discourse.  
The fourteenth Topick is from the Adjuncts, and those are said to be adjuncts, which are joined with the thing, but not of necessity; to wit, such as are joined to persons or things. Tully reckons up twelve of the first sort, viz. Of the Person, as the Name, the Nature, the Habit, the Fortune, the Life, the Affection, the studies, Counsels, Actions, Chances, and Speeches. The Adjuncts of a thing are commonly six. Place, Time, Occasion, Manner, Faculty, and Instrument; but some there are which do reduce them to these seven.  
Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando.  
In English thus,  

First ask, Who, What, and Where, and then,  
What Aid, with Why, and How, and When.   
Quis, who, doth signify the quality of the Person, in which there must be considered his nature, sex, age, nation, kindred and estate, in respect of his body, mind and fortune.  
Quid, what, importeth an enquiry after the nature of the thing, as whether it be of importance or not; whether great or small; noble or ignoble.  
Ubi, where, denotes the place.  
Quibus auxiliis, with what aid, notes an enquiry concerning the person, that joined with him in that action, or other instruments by which it was effected.  
Cur, why, denotes the final cause, with what intent or to what end it was done.  
Quomodo, how, shows the manner of doing it, as namely with what ease, or how hardly.  
Quando, when, notes the time in which it was done, and this head doth many times afford great plenty of matter.  
The fifteenth and the sixteenth Topics are the Antecedents and the Consequents. Those are called Antecedents, which go before the thing; as, you made him tremble, therefore he is sensible.  
They are called consequents, which do necessarily follow the thing; as, he that is thrust through the heart must needs die. From the Antecedents we argue thus. The Antecedent being granted, the consequent must needs follow; as, he is wounded in the heart, therefore he will die. But from the Consequents we argue thus: If the consequent be affirmed, the antecedent is affirmed; as, It is a great gash, therefore it was a great blow that made it; if the Consequent be denied, the antecedent is denied also; as, he is not dead, therefore he is not wounded in the heart. And these are the Intrinsecal or Artificial Topics from whence arguments may be raised on any Theme or matter propounded. For illustration sake, I will show you, how, from these Topics, a matter for an Oration may be raised from this Theme or proposition, Clodius laid snares for Milo.  

The Praxis.  
Every Theme or proposition doth consist of three parts, a Subject, a Predicate, and a Copula. That is called the Subject, of which we speak; The Predicate, that which is spoken of the Subject; and the Copula is some Verb which joins the subject with the predicate. In this proposition Clodius is the Subject, because it is of him that we are to speak, to lay snares is the predicate, because that is the thing which is said of Clodius.  
Now therefore if you would find out arguments on this Subject, Consider well, which is the Subject, and which is the Predicate in your proposition: Then take the Subject and go through every Topick: first go to Definition, and ask what it is, what is the nature of it, and how it is distinguished from other things. Then go to Division, and see into how many parts the Subject may be divided; and so forward from Topick to Topick. And still observe to yourself every argument, which doth by this means arise from the Subject, and apply it to the Predicate, so shall you easily see, whether it doth fully confirm your proposition; and when you have done with the Subject, take the Predicate, and run through the several Topics, with that also; but if the matter require it, and that you judge it more convenient to take the whole proposition, than Subject and predicate apart by themselves, you may in that manner run through all the heads of Invention, but stay not too long upon any one, for if matter offer not itself in one head go to another, for every head perhaps may not afford matter, at least not such as is apt and fit. But if you would know whether your argument or matter be drawn from the Subject or the predicate, put it into the form of Syllogism, and if the Major be most certain, you may conclude, that the argument is drawn from the Predicate, but if the minor be most certain, it is then drawn from the Subject. When you have found your arguments which prove the proposition, you must reduce them also into the form of Syllogism, consisting of three propositions; The Major, Minor, and Conclusion; and then in the same manner as hath been showed, you must seek out arguments to confirm every proposition, if need be: to which purpose, Similes, Examples, Apothegms, sentences and such like are very serviceable and aught to be had in readiness. But for the more easy finding out of convenient matter you must consult such books which are written upon the subject in hand, among the rest Polyanthea, Theatrum vitae humanae, Feltham's Resolves, and such like.    

CHAP. III.  
Of the Sharpness and ingenuity becoming an Oration.  
SUch is the Curiosity of this age in which we live, as that it is grown weary of these plain and ordinary ways, and requireth or expecteth in the very style something more than ordinary; insomuch that now a days he is not worthy the name of an Orator, that knows not how to brandish an Oration, by some sharp and witty flourishes. And therefore, that we may comply with the present times, we will also speak something of that sharpness or ingenuity, with which an oration should be adorned.  
And first I will show you what is meant by sharpness or ingenuity: as Material sharpness then, is the meeting of two lines or sides in one point: so Metaphorical sharpness is the concourse, or disagreeing concord, of the subject and the predicate in an Oration. Or thus, Sharpness is an agreeing discord, or a disagreeing concord, that is, we are then said to speak smartly or wittily, when the predicate and subject of an oration, do agree with one another in one part, and disagree in another.  
This sharpness or acuteness is threefold, unnatural, preternatural, or natural.  
Unnatural sharpness is, when two things agree that are in themselves unlike, opposite and contrary, or any way differing; or when there is a different application of the subject and predicate; as thus: 
The fire doth scorch and burn, and oftimes flame,  
Yet see, cold blasts do now come from the same.   
It is against nature that cold should proceed from fire. Yet seeing that many by that means have defended their chastity, and restrained the heat of lust, it is fitly said, that cold proceeds from fire.  
Preternatural sharpness is that, which is not indeed against nature, but yet is very unusual: as, Martial: 
Deliciae populi quae fuerunt Domini.   
Natural sharpness is that which doth aagree with the nature of the thing; as Martial: 
Impensis vitam Principis annumeres.  It is the King's grace that you are alive. As if he had said thus, You are beholding to the King for your life; whereas naturally, it becomes a King to preserve the lives of his subjects.  
The best of these three is that which is called unnatural, because it begetteth great admiration.  
The ways by which this disagreeing concord between the subject and the predicate may be made, are chiefly four:  
1. By annexing to the subject a disagreeing Epithet; as, an innocent ruin: a confused order.  
2. By annexing to the subject another disagreeing substantive. as, The Sun is a fountain of light.  
3. By a Catacresis either in the Adjective, in the Substantive, or in the Verb. First in the Adjective; as, a brazen forehead, meaning shameless.  
In the Sustantive, as if you call Alms, an holy rain, or a golden shower of piety.  
In the Verb, as thus; the waters made the Soldiers valiant and compelled them to fight: that is they were the more courageous, because being near the Sea it was impossible to fly.  
4. When the predicate is both affirmed and denied of the subject in a different sense; as the Poet speaking of a Virgin that lost her beauty to preserve her chastity said: And then she thought herself most beautiful, when she had lost her beauty.  
Matter in which to exemplify these several ways of making an agreeing discord between the subject and the predicate in a proposition may be had first from the Logical Topics of Definition, Division, etc. for there is none of them so barren from whence with a little consideration you may not collect something that is smart and ingenious. Biderm.  

Quid facimus? glaciata gelu si Lympha negetur,  
Ex oculis haustas funus habebit aquas.   

What shall we do? if th' water be by frost congealed,  
Our eyes shall water for the funeral yield.   
Where he showeth that tears are the waters proper for or becoming funerals. To run through all the Topics would be tedious, only observe, that the chief for this matter, are these, Final causes, effects, adjuncts, contraries and opposites: for hence it will be easy to find something consentaneous and dissentaneous to the subject.  
Secondly, Matter may be had from some Paradox, or some unusual speech.  
And unto this head may those be reduced, which are drawn from pleasant jests: as,  
First from Metaphors; as if one seeing a horse with an ill favoured mouth should say, the Horse laughs.  
2. From a Paronomasia: as, Eminent men of great note, are now adays most subject to imminent dangers.  
3. From the Etymology of the name:  
4. From some rare and pleasant story.  
Thirdly, From some lesson of Morality.  
Fourthly, From some Ambiguous word.  
Fifthly, From some Trope and Figure in Rhetoric, especially from some Metaphor, Allegory, Catachresis, Metonymy, Prosopopoea, etc.  
And now though these directions, for the finding out of something in a proposition that is smart and ingenious are in themselves good, yet methinks they are not clear and perspicuous enough; here therefore I will set down what Horatius P. Mathias Sarbievius hath more plainly expressed by way of Praxis, though much to the same purpose.  
The first Praxis is, when some magnitude, bulk, majesty, authority, largeness, or destruction is fitly applied to any thing, in a doubtful sense; and is indifferent whether it be taken really or Morally. Thus Seneca, Epist. 66. saith, that Scaevola being-lame and unarmed, made war, and with that lame hand he overcame two Kings.  
The second Praxis is the contrary unto this, when a thing is diminished either in quantity, or estimation, and in a doubtful sense.  
The third Praxis is when this Sharpness doth actually contain the cause, or doubtfully insinuate some truth of a contrary effect.  
The fourth Praxis is from the ambiguity of some word or sentence, as when it doth in truth signify one thing, but it is intended to signify another. Thus when Julius Montanus was repeating his verses, and having described the rising of the Sun, and began to describe the manner of his setting, one of the company would have gone his way; and being asked the reason, said, Could I hear him any longer than from Sun-rise, to Sunset?  
The fifth Praxis is, when that is applied to an inanimate thing, which is proper to a thing that hath life, yet so, as that the sense and meaning is understood, by some action of the thing of which we speak, being applied to something of a contrary nature. Thus Pliny speaking to one, that went to plough, after he had gotten the victory in battle, saith: The earth rejoiceth to show itself to one that is victorious, and being tilled by a conqueror, she waxeth proud with her early fullness of princely fruits. And thus Saint Augustin upon these words of Christ, I am the true light, saith, Rise then thou sluggard, the way itself doth come unto thee, and rouzeth thee from sleep, rise and walk.  
He also speaketh acutely, who applieth natural things to things artificial.  
Thus the Poet, of one that had a long nose, saith,  

Si tuus ad Solem statuatur nasus, hiante  
Ore, bene ostendet dentibus hora quota est.   

Hold open your mouth, your nose to th' Sun direct,  
So will your teeth the hour of th' day detect.   
The sixth Praxis is, when that which doth agree with real persons, is applied to those that are not real. So he in Plautus, Our hands have eyes, and think they see. But this way is most pleasing, when in one and the same thing, the application is both true and false: such is that of Augustus Caesar, when he said, that he had two nice daughters, which he was compelled to bear with; the one was his daughter Julia; and the other the common wealth.  
There is yet another way of Inventing that which is sharp and witty; that is by comparing the matter with the Oratorical heads and Topics: this may be done three ways.  
First, by comparing the matter in hand with every topic severally; by considering what the thing is which we are to speak, what the Parts, the Genus, Species, adjuncts and the rest. Thus doth that Prince of Roman Eloquence, deride the consulship of Vatinius, by reckoning up the parts of the year in which he was not Consul: There happened, saith he, a wonderful thing in the year of Vatinius, for while he was Consul, there was neither Spring, nor Autumn, neither Summer nor Winter.  
Secondly, by comparing one head of the matter in hand, with another different head of the same thing: as the definition of the thing with its adjuncts, or of the effects with the Causes. Thus Valerius Maximus by comparing the Material cause with the Formal, that is by comparing the body with the soul, finds out this smart commendation of Lucretia: Lucretia, saith he, that mirror of Roman chastity, whose manlike courage was by an evil mistake of fortune, confined to a female body.  
Thirdly, by comparing the Topics of one order, with other Topics of the same order, as definition with definition, cause with cause etc. as for example, The King whom Mutius Scaevola could not conquer by his armed hand, he made to fly, by setting his hand on fire. Here the acuteness lies, in comparing of one cause with another, that is his armed hand, with his hand in the flames. And thus much concerning Invention.   

CHAP. IU.  
Of Disposition.  
DIsposition is the orderly placing of those things which are Invented. It is two fold.  
First, Natural, in which things are discoursed in that order in which they were done, or in which according to nature, they should be done: as if you were to commend a person, you should first begin with his childhood, next his youth, and so to the other degrees of his age.  
The second way is Artificial, which doth either for delight, or profit diversely mingle and confound the matter, putting that in the end which should be in the beginning, and the beginning in the end, that so he may both delight the Auditors and hold them in suspense; which in an unexpected event doth not a little please and delight the hearers. Thus doth Virgil do in his Aeneades, in which he speaketh of Aeneas his voyage into Italy, but not in the same order in which he began: thus doth Barclay in his Argenes, and thus do all that write either Comedies or Tragedies.  
The Orator then having resolved of his proposition, must first consider of what Nature it is, whether single or consisting of several parts, and which of the parts should be first handled, which next.  
Secondly, He must choose some few of the best arguments he hath invented, and place some solid argument in the beginning, those that are less forcible in the midst, reserving still the best and most convincing argument for the conclusion; because the Auditor at the first being greedy of knowing must be prepossessed and convinced, but in the end he must be strongly confirmed and forced.  
And the most persuasive arguments are those, which proceed from the Definition, Distrubution, Genus, Causes, and Effects of the thing discoursed of, for these explain the nature thereof: The less forcible arguments are such as are collected from some trivial adjuncts and conjectures.  
Thirdly, He must Logically dispose of these reasons and arguments, first into Syllogisms, and then consider how to enlarge them in an Oratorical manner.  
Fourthly, He must consider into what parts his Oration should be divided. Concerning the two last, I will a little enlarge myself: And  
First, of the Logical Disposition of those reasons and arguments which are invented, by way of Syllogisms, and the enlarging of those Syllogisms in an Oratorical manner.  
A logical argumentation is the disposition or explication of the argument, which when it is perfect doth consist of three parts, of which that which is put in the first place, Logicians call the Major, Rhetoricians the Proposition: That which is put in the second place, philosophers call the Minor, Orators the Assumption: That which is put in the third place, is by Logicians called the conclusion, by Rhetoricians the complexion or inference. And these three propositions, when they are regularly placed, are called a Syllogism, which must be framed from that proposition, and cause or reason, which was before invented.  
For example, the proposition was, That Clodius is justly put to death: the Argument or reason given for it is, because he was a treacherous person. Now then form your Syllogism thus: Take this cause and join it with the predicate of your proposition, saying, Every treacherous person doth deserve to be put to death: and this is your Major. Then take the subject of your proposition, and join that with the given cause and say, Clodius was a treacherous person; and that is your Minor: then bring in the proposition itself, saying, therefore Clodius deserveth death, which is the conclusion, and maketh up the whole Syllogism. The like may be done in any other; but always, consider, with what reasons, examples, sentences or similitudes your Major or Minor may be again confirmed, especially if they be in themselves weak & but probably true; for if they be certain, they are not then to be proved, but handsomely expressed. This done, consider how these Syllogisms may be handled Oratorically; the which besides many others may be effected nine several ways.  
The first and most usual is so to place the parts of the Syllogism, as Logicians do, that is the Major first, and the arguments by which it may be proved. The Minor next with the arguments for that; And lastly the Conclusion.  

Example.  
Imagine that some King through ambition of reigning had killed his brother Prince; And so make this proposition, The King ought to be deposed; The Reason, because he is wicked: place this Logically thus: We ought not to endure a wicked man in the Kingdom; The King is awicked man; Therefore he is not to be endured in the King doom. The Reason of the Major is; because otherwise we shall blemish our reputation among foreigners, by whom we have been always esteemed honourable, and promoters of virtue, but shall now be cal●ed patrons and servants of wickedness. The Reason of the Minor is, that he through ambition having deceitfully killed his brother, hath been injurious to nature and to ●s: This proposition, may Rhetorically be ●hus handled.  

The Major.  
Have we the Citizens of N. now at length made such progress in the love of wickedness, as that we are not ashamed to see the power of our lives and liberties put ●nto the hands of a desperately wicked person? Shall we now any longer honour the Prince in wickedness, or wickedness in the Prince? till we ourselves are reckoned among the wicked.   

The Reason of the Major.  
Ah woe is me! O Citizens of N. Ah th● glory of our name, bought with the bloo● of our Ancestors, which we have so ras 〈…〉 prostituted, through our own inadvertency! That we who were formerly reput●● the patrons of virtue, should now be reckoned the servants of wickedness. Wha● will be said by the bordering, what by th● more remote nations? Behold (shall the● say) the men for whose virtuous acts th● world itself was too narrow; who coul● embrace nothing, nor do any thing, bu● what was contained within, or did no● exceed the bounds of virtue: behold them now so far fallen into naughtiness, that laying aside all modesty, they are no● ashamed to adore wickedness in th● Throne. And what is the guise of the re●● of the Citizens? What is the reputation of the nobles? if by their approbation baseness doth thus triumph in the highest plac● of dignity. Certainly they cannot but love wickedness, who do not only permit it, bu● also honour it.   

The Minor.  
Had our King gloried in a wicked act 〈…〉 ommitted upon one of the meanest of his Subjects; he might perhaps have had ●ome small pretence for his cruelty, though ●t had been accomplished with bloody ●ands.   

The Reason of the Minor.  
But to be so inhumanely enraged against ●he Prince his brother, who was settled in ●he Kingdom by our free and general consent, what is it but to proclaim a War against us and nature itself, and by this one impiety, to offend the tribunals of all Nations.   

Approbation.  
Truly, if we do well, in judging of the day by the morning, we may be no false Prophets, in foreseeing, what kind of Nero he will prove to us, who begins to feed his cruelty with the blood of his own relations, and hath there made an entrance to his cruelty, where others have ended theirs. Awake therefore O ye generous progeny of all virtue, and if you have any respect to your 〈◊〉 based name, or the glory of your Nation▪ depose that wicked person from th● Throne; let it be heard in the world, let 〈◊〉 be known to all posterity, that wickedne 〈…〉 might be in the Kingdom, but could no● go unpunished, no not in the Prince.  
2. The second way of Rhetorical arguing is to put the Minor with the Reason's thereof in the first place, the Major next and the Reasons thereof, and lastly the Conclusion.    

Example.  
Let the proposition be the contrary to the former, Namely, That the King ought not to be deposed, or put to death, for any heinous offence committed by him. The Reason is, because in so doing, we shall blemish our own reputation. Place it Logically thus. We who are Citizens ought not to blemish our own reputation; but if we depose the King or put him to death, we shall blemish our own reputation; Therefore we ought neither to depose the King, nor put him to death. The Reason of the Major is, Because Reputation is the public treasure, and noble patrimony of a Common wealth, which we all ought highly to regard. The Reason of the Minor is, Because that 〈…〉 itherto we have been famous, for that 〈…〉 e never did depose our Prince or put 〈…〉 in to death, and this honour we shall now 〈…〉 se, if we do either.  
The Approbation, Because our Ancestors 〈…〉 ave also had wicked Princes; and yet 〈…〉 ey did let them alone. And this proposition may be Rhetorically handled in this 〈…〉 inner.  

The Minor.  
I Wish O Citizens of N. that they who through accursed and disloyal boldness, ●ave by their cruel suffrages decreed to 〈…〉 ob the Prince not only of his Throne, but also of his life, would but consider the consequence of it in after ages: I would have ●hem consider that our ●ame shall be more stained by their rashness, than it could have been by a patient submission to his cruelty.   

The Reason of the Minor.  
For hitherto it hath been our peculiar honour that our natural Princes, have been ours, not more by their birthright 〈◊〉 than by our affection; neither hath the world ever heard, that our hands have been stained with the blood of any of our Princes: which as it is our peculiar honour above other Nations; so 〈◊〉 ought to be our great study to continue it. But now if we should lay wicked hand● on our Prince, shall we not fall headlong from the glory of our reputation? And be with the rest deservedly hissed at for parricides for ever?   

The Approbation.  
Or, look back upon your Ancestors, and let it be your care to tread in their footsteps: Whose Kings although they were Heroes, yet they were also men, and that they were all of them free from vice, or that none of them did burden the Throne with wickedness, doth seem to me unlikely; yet they rather endured the wickedness of their Prince, than to make themselves wicked by deposing them; and were willing to exceed in submission, rather than in fury.   

The Major with the Reason.  
Why then shall we degenerate souls ba 〈…〉 should our fame? Why shall we cruel wretches 〈…〉 ffer men to hatch cruelty against the come 〈…〉 on-wealth? We who in honour are come 〈…〉 elled to have a principal regard unto our 〈…〉 lory, as being our public treasure, and 〈…〉 e most noble patrimony of our Kingdom, 〈…〉 and aught, one with his arms, and another ●ith his good works, another with Justice, ●other with Clemency ever maintain it, 〈…〉 s the great Magazine of our honour.   

Conclusion.  
The King hath acted wickedly against ●is brother, let not us act wickedly against ●he King, neither let posterity deride us, for committing one wickedness, to be revenged of another; let us have regard to ●hat proverbial speech of wise men, If a King he good, obey him, if evil, endure his wickedness with patience.  
The Third way of arguing Rhetorically is to put the Conclusion in the first place with the Major or Minor added thereunto, by the particles, for, therefore, for this cause, etc. And if any argument follow 〈…〉 sometimes we find the conclusion repeat 〈…〉 and sometimes not: but if the Oration b 〈…〉 short, as most of our common oratio 〈…〉 are, the Conclusion is repeated at last, bu● in other words.    

Example.  
In a Gratulatory speech for some kindness received: of which the proposition is 〈◊〉 I owe you many thanks: The Reason, Because 〈…〉 you have given me a preferment, and hav● passed by others who were my competitors.  
Place it Logically thus: He who hath gotten a preferment from one who hath passed by others his competitors, he oweth the Don 〈…〉 many thanks; But I have gotten such a preferment. Therefore, etc. Rhetorically thus.  

Beginning with the Conclusion.  
Most gracious Sovereign, The thank 〈…〉 which I owe unto your Majesty, for the preferment, which you have bestowed upon m● are such as cannot be expressed by words; much less can they ever be requited by me 〈…〉 and I am necessarily enforced to take up the words before your most gracious Majesty, which Socrates once used to Plato; who when he had nothing to give him which was answerable to his kindness cried out, O Plato accept of Socrates. And seeing your kindnesses to me have far transcended them of Plato to Socrates, and also that I myself cannot be a recompense sufficient for the kindness of a King, I do here devote myself and all that I have to your Majesty in token of gratitude.   

The Major.  
Ought not he to account himself highly engaged to obedience, on whom the King of his own mere inclination, hath conferred that honour, which many near him have in vain expected, and for which many have in vain petitioned?   

The Reason of the Major.  
Certainly his favour is heightened by the expectations and petitions of others, and one bounty becometh two when he that hath it, is adorned with a much desired honour, and in being thus adorned is preferred before all his Competitors. It is not unknown to any, what men, how much deserving of your Majesty, and of their country, have made great suit for this dignity both by themselves & others; with whom, if I should come in competition, I could be hardly any way compared: but your most gracious Majesty, most bountifully supplying the imperfections of my actions with your own benign charity, hath always looked upon me, as one that hath devoted himself to you, and the Commonwealth.   

The Conclusion repeated.  
What shall I now promise, but earnestly to endeavour that you may never have occasion to think, that you have placed your kindness on an ungrateful soul? I do therefore most humbly lay down myself and my endeavours, all that I have, and all their endeavours, at your Majesty's feet, to be ordered according to your will and pleasure: be pleased to command us, and you shall find our lives to be of less value to us than your injunctions.  
The Fourth way of Arguing Rhetorically, is to put the Major with the Reasons thereof in the first place; Secondly the Conclusion, and Thirdly the Minor: Fourthly, if it seem necessary, the Conclusion may be repeated in other words.    

Example.  
If you would congratulate the arrival of some King's Ambassador, or any great Person: you may make this proposition: We ought to rejoice in your coming to us: The Reason; Because you are a great person. Place it Logically thus: We ought to rejoice, at the coming of a great Person. But you are a great person. Therefore, etc. Rhetorically thus, beginning with the Major.  
The stars cannot appear without rejoicing the inanimate world; nor great persons without affecting the souls of men, N. N. Nature hath given them this, that they cannot be, but they must be profitable.  

The Reason of the Major.  
Virtue hath imposed this most beautiful necessity, That great men can be no where, but where they may show favour and clemency to those that are under them.   

The Conclusion.  
Would to God you might this day see thoroughly into all our souls, yea even of Momus, you might there behold Love and Fear, Joy and Sorrow, desire and eloquence, wrestling together in our hearts, with no ordinary conflict: for when we salute you as our great Guest we cannot well tell, whether our fear should love, or our love fear your Excellency; whether our joy should sorrow its straitness, or our sorrow joy your appearance; whether our desires should speak, or our Eloquence wish: Oh that we were wholly joy, wholly love, wholly desire, wholly Eloquence, that we might here in your presence, express our affections towards you as we ought.   

The Minor with the Approbation thereof.  
The truth is, that not only the Nobleness of your birth, singular wisdom, sweet carriage, and behaviour, and your other inestimable virtues, do make you great in our eyes: but we also reverence your greatness, because you are so in the judgement of the whole Kingdom; which having those beams of honour on your person, hath published to the world, that you are her Star. Our King hath greatly esteemed you in making you not only of his privy Council, but Arbitrator of it, when he hath again and again declared you worthy to accompany him, not only in Germany and Britain, but even in all the parts of his own Kingdom, that you might here and every where, be esteemed great. And all our borders will for ever own your greatness, because you have condescended to show your illustrious presence and noble soul in our mean confines: all of us being sensible, that great men do augment their greatness by their condescensions.    

The fifth way of arguing Rhetorically.  
Sometimes the Major is omitted, and the Reason of the Major with its Approbation is put in its place; Then the Conclusion; afterward the Minor with the proof thereof, and lastly the conclusion is repeated.  

Example.  
Let the proposition be: You ought not greatly to lament the death of your friends. The Reason is: because death is a common evil: place it Logically thus: We ought not greatly to lament a common evil; but the Death of our friends is a common evil; Therefore etc. The Reason of the Major is, because a common evil cannot be eschewed; you may handle it Rhetorically thus.  
Wise men do agree that what cannot be avoided, ought patiently to be endured.  
The Approbation: That so in not feeling it, it may appear to us, as if it did not particularly concern us.  
The Conclusion: We then do certainly ill, to give ourselves over to grief for the departure of our friends, and in some sort to bury our joy, in the same grave with them.   

The Minor.  
For this evil doth not concern, assault, or befall one only person; but it conerns all alike, it overfloweth all.   

The Reason of the Minor.  
For all things on which we live, whose life we enjoy, in the use of which we are delighted, are bound to the same Condition, are all subject unto death.  
Confirmation. Morover our soul doth inhabit but an infirm and weak cottage, which doth in itself consist of adverse and contrary elements, and from without itself, is assaulted with many and great dangers. To which purpose Seneca saith well, that we are deceived, when we look on our death, as if it were to come; a great part thereof is past, and this very time which we live is death.   

The Conclusion repeated:  
Divide then that grief among all men, which you have engrossed to yourself from the common bitterness of fortune; we all run the same fate, and must all endure it; think not then that you do well, in giving yourself up to too much to grief.    

The sixth way.  
Ofttimes the Major is omitted, and the Minor only with the Approbation thereof, and the Conclusion, are mentioned. This argumentation is called an Enthymem, of which the first part is called the Antecedent, the other the consequent. And you may place them as you please, the Antecedent first and then the Consequent, or on the contrary.  

Example.  
Let the proposition be: Youths are not to be bridled with rigid discipline. The Reason: Because they are not the better for rigour, but the worse. Omitting the Major, place it Logically thus: Youths are worse for the rigour of discipline, therefore they ought not to be kept under a rigid Discipline. Oratorically thus.  
You err greatly if you think that a youth may be improved by severity and fear of discipline; for though they may by an austere carriage seem to be reclaimed, yet really and indeed, they become thereby the more dissolute: Go to experience, and you shall find them, to be commonly the worst of all others, who have passed their youth under the most severe discipline. As a torrent may for a while be stopped by an overthwart bank, but while it stops, it is but gathering its more strong flood, by which when the bank is broken, it doth redeem the length of its cessation, with its more raging flux: so youth being bridled under cruel pressures, after it is once freed from those laws by which it was restrained, it doth become the more violently insolent; and drowneth the Soul in the pursuit of those Siren snares from which it was before debarred: for we always desire forbidden fruit, and to enjoy what we cannot obtain. This disease of the soul is best cured by indulgence: for as O vid excellently describes such tempers.  

Quod licet ingratum est, quod non licet acrius urit.  
— Ipsa potestas  
Semina nequitiae languidiora facit.   

We loathe what's lawful, what not, we desire.  
The power of doing, doth put out the fire.     

The Seventh way:  
Cicero directeth Herennius, first to place the exposition or the thing to be proved; Secondly the Reason or Reasons; Thirdly the Approbation: Fourthly the exornation or illustration, from the Contrary, or from Example, Similitude, Testimony or Sentences etc. Fistly the Complexon in which all is summed up, this is the most easy way, and most 〈◊〉 for extemporary speeches.  

Example.  
Let the proposition be: A little knavery and wantonness doth not hurt a youth. The Reasons. Because they cannot presently be thereupon accounted bad. For a man cannot be always good; And the clearest day hath some clouds: The Approbation. And those who are now old men, were wanton when they were young. The Exornation from Testimony: A certain Poet said, He depriveth the year of the Spring, who would not permit a youth to be wanton. From Sentences; And every age ought to have that behaviour, which is most agreeable thereunto. From the Contrary. It is unseemly for an old man to behave himself like a youth: Therefore it is also unseemly for a youth to behave himself like an old man. From Similitude; For if Ale be not mad when it is new, it is never good when it is stale. This you may handle Rhetorically thus.  
Exposition. What great matter is it if a youth be somewhat waggish, for a little while? The Reasons: Do the Spaniards therefore drink water, because they tempt their Wine? or doth one fair day, make a Summer? And what man is wise at all times? The clearest day hath ever had some clouds. Why do we then so scrutinously reprehend the very lest fault in a youth, and (if I may speak freely) all that lewdness in them, which in ourselves we called but waggery. What if they Crown the streets with their friendly concourse, or pull one another by the hair in jest; or weary their arms with a kind Wrestling, and are not always among the prophets, not always toiling at their books, but sometimes give themselves to dancing, laughing, and jesting; what other things, I say, are these but the sports of youth; and keeping themselves in action, till age and experience, lead them to more noble employments. Unless then they disguise their faces like melancholy persons, unless their eyes be for ever condemned to the Earth that they may there tell all the stones and atoms of dust, unless they hang their heads upon their shoulders, and become devotionary ghosts; they must be thought worthy of banishment to Gyarus and T●ale.   

The Comprobation.  
Oh rigid Catoes, fit to be Judges of Manlius' laws, either you have forgotten, your own youth, or you might from the former indulgencies of your own folly, learn to connive for a while at ours; neither durst you by violating the privileges of our youth accuse nature when (as the Poet saith well) to deprive youth of their maggery, is to deprive the year of its spring.   

From Testimonies:  
Every age hath its proper limits; and it is as necessary that the behaviour of persons should be suitable to their years, as for garments to be fitted for the body.   

From the Contrary.  
And if we may deride a youthful old man, why may we not by the same rule detest the behaviour of the aged in those that are young? And what cruelty is it in the morning of age to exact the noondays gravity, and when the twilight of wisdom doth scarcely appear, you require the sageness of the perfect day. You give your Horses, and Bullocks liberty, to exercise their irregular capering; and are you so blind, that what you see to be natural in other creatures, you cannot see to be so in your own children. And (that I may speak with all mildness) be pleased at least to take a sober draught of this truth, even out of a Barrel of Ale; unless the Ale when it is new do fill the Air, the Cellar, the barrel, with a malapert hurly burly; it will when it is old be neither healthful for the body, nor pleasing to the Palate. And hence an exhortation might be made, to take well and bear with the wantonness of youth.    

The Eighth way of arguing Rhetorically.  
The Eighth way is by Induction; now Induction is a speech, which from undoubted premises, doth infer some one conclusion.  
In this we must observe two things.  
First, That the things premised be certain.  
Secondly, That what is inferred have some resemblance to the things premised. This way of arguing is most familiar unto an Orator, and doth most excellently set forth a matter. Causinus saith, it sweetly instills matter, and is in proving delightful: and if the things inferred be many, it affords a large field for discourse.  

Example.  
Let, the proposition be this. A man should be commended from what he is, and not from what he hath. The Reason: because a Ship, and a Sword, and a square are commended from what they are and not from the ornaments that they have. Seneca doth thus handle it Rhetorically.  
We call not that a good Ship which is painted with curious colours or which hath a gilded head, or a stern overlaid with Ivory, or which is loaded with the riches or revenues of Kings; but that which is stable, strong and sound, to bear through the raging Billows of the Sea, which is easily governed by the Helm, is able to bear a gale of wind, and is withal a nimble sailor. We call not that a good sword which hath an embroidered belt or a scabbard set with Jewels, but which hath a sharp edge and point, to hew in pieces all that standeth in its way. The goodness of a thing is not in its beauty, but in its fitness for that use for which it properly is. Therefore in a man also we are not to regard how much he ploweth, how much he lets out on usury, by how many he is courted, in how magnificent a bed he lieth, in how rich a Cup he drinketh, but how good he is in himself etc.  
To this way doth that also of the Scythian Ambassadors in Quintus Curtius appertain, proving to Alexander, that he ought not too much to trust to his greatness and fortitude, by an Induction thus: What, say they, know you not that great trees grow along time, and in an hour are cut down: he is a fool that covets the fruit and considereth not the height of the tree, on which it grows: the Lion hath sometime been the food of small birds; and rust doth consume the strongest steel: there is nothing secure from being destroyed, even by the most contemptible instrument.    

The Ninth way of arguing Rhetorically, is to argue from Example.  
Now an Example is an imperfect Induction, or arguing from one Similitude to another. And is done two ways especially.  
First, Explaining a thing by a Protasis and an Apodasis; so this proposition, A General should be a lover of learning, as Julius Caesar was, is thus handled. The more famous that Julius Caesar was in his victories, the more did he exercise his learning; and with the same hands he scattered those Palms in his Books, with which he won them from his enemies. Who then can deny, but learning is well becoming the most warlike Prince or Emperor? Nay if he despise not the best counsel that can be given him, if he mean to arrive to the perfect perfection of a good Prince, he will labour for learning with all his might, etc.  
Secondly, We argue from Example, when after the relation we presently add some reasons, either by way of approbation or disallowance, as we are wont to do in other parts of the oration; but after the reasons given we apply the thing to the matter in hand, showing in what it doth or doth not agree. This daily practice is very ancient; but observe that the use of Examples is very graceful (and the same may be said of Sentences, Apothegms, Hieroglypicks, etc.) when by that either in the beginning or in other parts of the Oration we express the same thing, which we should otherwise have done in our own words.  
For Example, I would say: O ye Judges ye ought to take heed, that ye ascend not the Tribunal for hope of reward: I would do this by Example; Agathoeles, when he went to give Judgement, was wont to say, Let us go to a Golden harvest. Then I would add the reason which I 〈…〉 old have added to my proposition, 〈…〉 amely it is a wicked thing to endeavour 〈…〉 o grow rich by other men's wicked 〈…〉 ess.  
Afterwards I would more fully prove 〈…〉 and enlarg it. Or instead of this exam 〈…〉 le, I might have used this sentence: They that are entrusted with the government of the common wealth, should not 〈…〉 o to the administration of Justice, as 〈…〉 hose that go into a Fair or market. And to this sentence, may be added 〈…〉 ome reasons▪ and arguments to prove 〈…〉 he reasonableness of that assertion. But you must be always careful, that the ex●mple or sentence may bear the same sense with the thing, that is in that place to ●e explained.    

CHAP. V.  
Of the parts in an Oration.  
WHen by the former directions yo 〈…〉 have put the invented matter, i 〈…〉 to a certain order; then consider of ho 〈…〉 many parts your Oration shall consist. 〈◊〉 tells us that an Oration ought general 〈…〉 to consists of these five parts.  

1. Exordium.  
2. Proposition.  
3. Narration.  
4. Confirmation.  
5. Peroration.   
As for Confutation it is comprised in Confirmation. But all these parts, are not always necessary; for the ingenious Orator, may as he shall see it convenient, sometimes omit the Narration, sometimes the Exordium, sometimes the Peroration or Conclusion; yea & the Confirmation is many times scarce discernible; as when the things propounded are certain, there is more need of 〈…〉 rnament than proof, as in Gratulatory Orations and the like. As for the placing of these parts, their natural order is that 〈…〉 which we have named them 1. The Exordium, 2. The Proposition, 3. The Narration, if it be not thought fit to omit 〈◊〉. 4. The Confirmation; and lastly the Per 〈…〉 ration.  
Of each of these I will here set down some few directions; and first for Exordiums.  
An Exordium is as it were the door of the Oration, in which the Orator doth prepare the minds of the Auditors for that which is to follow: and this is commonly done by one of these three ways; by bespeaking their favour; by making them docible; or by begging their attention. The favour of the Auditors is bespoke either from the person of the Orator, from the persons of the Auditors, from the persons of the Adversaries, or from the subject matter of the discourse. The Orator may bespeak the favour of the Auditors, in respect of himself, if his gesture and deportment be suitable unto theirs that are his Auditors, and express himself modestly. And in respect of the Auditors, if he show how well they have deserved of the Common wealth, of him, and other men. And in respect of the Adversaries, if he modestly show wherein they 〈◊〉 faulty and render them to the Auditors inaxcusable. And lastly in respect of th● matter in hand, if he say, that it is som● excellent, necessary and profitable thing.  
Secondly, the Orator may be said to make the Auditors docible, if he clearly explain the thing of which he is to speak, and how he purposeth to enlarge upon i●  
Thirdly, the Attention will be quickened if he saith, that he intends to speak of som● great and wonderful thing, and some thing that is delightful, necessary, and very much concerns his Auditors, & c  
An Exordium may be said to be faulty, or not so commendable. First, if it be vulgar or common, that is, such as may be used in many if not in all cases. Secondly, if it be long and tedious, not proportionable to the length of the Oration. Thirdly, if it consist of some different matter, not suitable to the other parts of the Oration. Fourthly if it effect not that which is required or expected.  
And that is said to be a good Exordium, which is neat and elegant, fit for the purpose, making the Auditor docible and well affected, and from which the access to the proposition is not violent and for●ed, but easy and agreeable. Though Tully ●oth very much insist on this, that all Ex 〈…〉 diums should be such, as will afford an 〈…〉 asia and proper access unto the propo 〈…〉tion; yet practice which is the best master, ●nd a diligent observing, what manner of Exordiums others make to their Orations, will afford the best directions; but yet Rhetoricians are wont to prescrbe some ●ertain forms according to which, begin●ers may exercise themselves in framing ●heir Exordiums aright: the chiefest of them ●re these following.  

They first way.  
First, propound some proposition or protasis, by which an easy access may be made to the proposed matter. Secondly, Add some Reason or Confirmation, to which if you will some refutation may be annexed, for he that confirmeth truths, hath also the liberty to refute falsehoods. Thirdly, Add some confirmation of the reason. Fourthly, make some particular inference or conclusion, to which some reason may be also added, and thence an access to the propositon.  

Example.  
Let the proposition be this. I will (before you my Auditors) defend my good nam● which wicked men have hurt. To this you may make your entrance thus. There is nothing which Malice doth not violate, nothing which it will not gnaw with the teeth of slander, or make nauseous with the black venom of contumelious sarcasmes. To this bas● work it hath not a little advantage by the ill nature of this age wherein we live, in which men are so unmanly, as not only to contemn th● works of virtue, but even to oppress what ever is done by the rules of honesty; if otherwise they cannot, they will at least do it with a mist of scurrilous and scoffing language. And shall not we at last, by our indulgence to vice so much increase the family of Momus, as that in the end, we shall all be ashamed of honesty: if we can even yet tamely behold and suffer the most wicked crime to be committed with applause and led in triumph, and virtues to be condemned to banishment, nay to flouts and hatred. I have been unwilling to be the first raker in this kennel, but the storm which hath again and again beat upon my head with renewed waves, hath quite wearied my patience, and I doubt that I shall wrong good men in any 〈…〉 her sparing the bad. For now they do not 〈…〉 ade my fortunes, which in itself were a 〈…〉 serable thing, they do not raze my walls and 〈…〉 uses which were mischievous enough, 〈…〉 ey do not gape after my life and safe 〈…〉 which were more than inhuman; but 〈…〉ving set upon my good name, my honour and 〈…〉 utation, which is to a good man far dearer 〈…〉 an his life; they strive to overwhelm this 〈…〉 i'th' whole burdens of reproaches. Therefore 〈…〉 at this audaciousness of wicked fellows, 〈…〉 ay be by you most prudent Auditors at once 〈…〉 ppressed, be courteous to me this day, and 〈…〉 andidly hear what I have to say for my 〈…〉 lf.    

The second way.  
First understand the proposition well, of which you intent to speak, then draw from thence some general reason, which may contain the most material thing in the proposition; then amplify, and adorn this reason, with Sentences, Examples, Similitudes, etc. then bring in the proposition itself, as some particular assumption of that general discourse.  
For Example, suppose you were to mak● an Exordium to a funeral Oration, upon the death of some noble man, according to these directions, you might perform it in this manner.  
This is a lesson so well known to all that all must die, that he would surely b● thought to be beside himself that shoul● but think himself immortal. For men alas! like running waters may not always continue in one place: one da● thrusts out another, one year devoureth another, and one wave overwhelmeth another: And like as earthen vessels a 〈…〉 quickly broken and easily shivered into many pieces; so are our body's soo● dissolved, and quickly reduced to earth from whence we were taken; we may be killed with too much joy, we may be oppressed with too much sorrow, we may die praying and fall down laughing; we may be throttled with a hair, or strangled with a fly. And thus on a sudden we are and we are not 〈◊〉 alive to day and dead to morrow, and every hour we hasten nearer and nearer our end. There needs no other or farther testimony to prove the assertion, than that the many instances of mortality which so daily and so hourly happen that it is hard to turn our eyes from them; yea even this sad occasion of our present meeting shows us, that whatsoever difference there is or may be in our way of living, in this there is none, in this we are equal, the certain uncertainty of our dying: If either wealth or honour, if either Friends, or Physic could vanquish death, or prevent the grave, we had not met this day to lament the death of this Honourable person; we had not seen this spectacle of mortality, but death alas respects no persons, will have no denial unto his summons, whether it be in the evening of our days, when our hoary hairs may seem to proclaim us as fit for his stroke, as the corn is for the sickle, when white for the Harvest; or whether he come in the morning of our life, when our bones are full of marrow and our blood runs briskly in our veins, which is his case whose funeral obsequies we are now to perform. As a green Apple is sometimes rudely pulled from off that tree on which it grew, so was this branch cut down, before he had lived one half of the age of man. He was indeed born of noble and unspotted Parents, but as if that wisdom were not tied to years, his discretion did adorn his birth more, than his birth him, etc.   

The third way.  
First, Propound some opinion contrary to your own, either with or without a reason for it. Then Secondly, Deliver your own opinion, with a reason or two, or without any reason also. Thirdly, Deliver the contrary reason, if it shall be necessary, and so come to your proposition; that is, propound something in your preceding words, from whence you may infer your proposition either plainly, or obscurely. Let the proposition, for example, be: Wisdom is most suitable to Noble men: That you may deduce this, first lay down the contrary opinion, namely, There are many think that Wisdom becometh none but common people. The Reason of this contrary opinion. Because N●ble men are born for the Wars, not for the Schools, and have their commendations from their estates. Your own proper opinion: This is an evil opinion and to be confused. The Reason and answer to this contrary opinion. Because it is mischievous to the world. Access to your proposition. I will therefore show that Wisdom is most proper for a Noble man.  
The Topics or heads from whence matter for an Exordium may best be had, the most famous Rhetoricians have reduced unto these.  
First, An enumeration of causes, when the Orator shows the causes which moved him to speak: as if he were to commned some Noble person; he might begin his Exordium thus: You need not wonder that I should speak in the commendation of this worthy person; these reasons have induced me (and here lay down the reasons) Therefore I shall speak, etc.  
Secondly, The Adjuncts of the Person, either of the Orator himself, or of the Auditor, or of him of whom you are to speak:  

Example of the first.  
If you were to praise some body, you might thus begin. To express the just praises of this person, there should be indeed a more skilful Orator than myself, but yet I thought myself obliged thereto, not only for my affection to him, but also to express my gratitude, for the many favours which I have received from him.   

Example of the second.  
Although my weakness might command me silence, yet courteous Auditors, the wont candour which you have showed to others doth both invite and encourage me to speak; Therefore etc.   

Example of the third.  
Though the things to be commended in this person, are so many and so great, that they would require a Demosthenes or a Tully to set forth his worth; yet I will endeavour, etc.  
Thirdly, The Adjuncts of place. Example; If I had considered the dignity of this place, I should not have undertaken, to speak unto you this day (and here show the Reasons) but I considered more your humanity, and the necessity of the thing; and therefore. etc.  
Fourthly, The Adjuncts of Time; as thus: The time requires, that I should speak this day unto you, (here show the reasons.)  
Fiftly, The Adjuncts of person, time, manner and place together.  
Sixthly, The opinions and affections of men, for men do either rejoice, or are sad, or angry, etc. And according to these or the like passions or affections you may find matter for an Exordium.  
Seventhly, Some passions with which the Orator himself may be affected, as anger or grief or admiration, or gratitude, etc.  
Eighthly, The difficulty of the thing of which you are to speak.  
Ninthly, Contradiction or Accusation: Example; if you would contradict another, you may say; I like not this man's opinion, because, etc. and here show the reasons. If you would accuse another you may say: It is not for ill will to you or any mind to do mischief which hath persuaded me to accuse you, but the love I have to the common, for Justice sake, and for necessity.  
Tenthly, Preterition; as thus: I could speak of many things, but because I will not tyre you with them, I will only mention one or two.  
Eleventhly, You may find matter for an Exordium, from what hath either been said or done before; as if you were to accuse some person, you may say: This is not the first time that this person hath been thus accused, found guilty, and yet born with, but now it cannot be sure thought fit, that he should be born with any longer.  
Tweluthly, Comparing and opposing opinions and persons: as suppose you were to speak for peace; you might say: Many are for War and shedding of blood; But I believe that we can have no greater blessing than the blessing of Peace. Or if you would compare persons, you may do it thus: Some worthy and learned men have heretofore spoken of this subject, with whom I am in no wise to be compared; but because the matter concerns the Common wealth, I also will speak freely, etc. This for Exordiums.  
The second part of an oration is the Proposition. And the Proposition is that part of the Oration in which the Orator doth briefly deliver the sum of the whole matter of which he intends to speak, and bespeaks the hearers attention if need be. Sometimes it doth immediately follow the Exordium; sometimes it follows the Narration; in what place soever it be put, it must be short and clear, and fit for Confirmation.  
And here it is to be observed first, that a Proposition may de delivered two ways.  
First, Openly, when the Orator doth plainly declare the matter of which he means to speak.  
Secondly, Darkly, when the matter of his Oration is sufficiently known before hand, or may easily be discerned from the content, or when the thing to be proved is not laid down as a distinct part from the Exordium, but is insinuated as a member thereof annexed, and further to be proved afterwards.  
Secondly, it is to be observed, that when a proposition is longer than usual, it ought to be divided into certain parts, that so the Orator may the more fully explain the matter, and the Auditor the better remember it.  
Narration is another part of an Oration, by which a relation is made of the matter or thing done. And this is either a distinct part of the Oration, and then for the most part it doth immediately follow the Exordium, that the Proposition with the Confirmation thereof may be collected from it. Or else it is joined with the Confirmation, which is to be done in such Orations which assume the explanation of the thing done to prove the matter in hand; for example: if you were to prove that some valiant person, had been a Soldier in some war; it is necessary that you should declare, what the particular actions were, in which he showed his valour.  
But now in that Narration which is made a distinct part of the Oration, the thing done must be briefly and simply declared without any exaggeration: and in such a Narration as makes way for confirmation the things done may be illustrated, with great neatness of language with, sentences and figures; & some discourses may be made concerning the worthiness of the action, with some amplification from similitudes and comparisons: In a word, where ever you make a Protasis from any History or Fable, and afterwards make an application thereof, there you must make your Narration, and this may be in any part of the Oration, even in the Exordium: but these kinds of Narrations are most useful in such Orations as are in commendation or discommendation of persons, in which it is necessary to declare their virtues or their vices.  
That your Narration may be such as it ought, you must observe,  
First, that the known matter must be briefly declared; the matter unknown more largely.  
Secondly, that there be in it some apt sentences, and that it express the manners of men, as their pride, covetousness, and the like; and to this purpose an Hypotyposis, or prosopopoea and such like figures are useful, to wit, when some persons are introduced in their melancholy or studious mood, or speaking something which doth declare and manifest what their natural inclinations are.  
Thirdly, that it be plain & clear. And that it may be so, you must avoid all circumlocutions, the reckoning up of a multitude of things, and making large Catalogues of persons, with frequent and long perentheses and useless digressions.  
Fourthly, that it be probable. And that it may be so, you must have a care, that the circumstances of time, manners, place and person be all suitable; besides some testimonies may be briefly named, unless the person from whom the Narration is made be well known, and of good credit. But if any thing be mentioned, not altogether probable, some admonishment must be made thereof, either by adding the cause, as, a Covetous man throws away his wealth because he saw his life in danger; or, a Fox despiseth grapes, because they are out of his reach, Or by confessing the improbability, if nodefence can otherwise be made, and that either plainly thus; It is wonderful if we may believe the Poets: or with some compensation thus; It is strange, but yet it is true: or by naming some witnesses thus; I know not the reason, but thus it is affirmed by very sole-●men. Or by desiring the Auditors that they would at present admit the thing, which afterwards you will prove more fully.  
Fiftly, that all the things declared, may ctend to the end propounded and that the confirmation may easily follow thereupon. Moreover in declaring any thing let the Orator chiefly observe, the persons, matter, time, place, manner, and cause, which do almost happen in all cases; but yet all these circumstances are not always necessary to be expressed, but as many of them only, as the Orator in his discretion shall think fit.  
The Fourth part of an Oration is Confirmation; and Confirmation is as it were the very heart and soul by which an Oration may be chiefly said to live: or it is the chief part of an Oration in which the arguments are produced by which we would prove our proposition, & refute or answer the contrary opinion of our adversary, if need require. What is necessary in this behalf, may be collected from what hath been already said. Seeing that Confirmation doth consist of the arguments that are invented, and the right disposition of them, both which have been fully enough declared before. Thus much only I will add, that the Orator in Confirmation may do well to remember, First, to name those Arguments in the beginning of his Confirmation, and also in the conclusion which carry with them the greatest weight, and those of least concernment in the midst. Secondly, to take care, that his Oration may still gather strength; and this will be done, if the following words be still more significant than the former, and that the affections be most moved in the very close thereof. Thirdly, let him take care, that all his Arguments do fully prove his proposition. Fourthly, that he urge not his arguments in one and the same manner and form, but that he use variety of figures, and propound them sometimes by way of Syllogism, sometimes in an Enthymem, sometimes ommitting the Major, sometimes the Conclusion, as he thinks it most convenient. Fiftly, let him find out the Crinomenon, use fit Transitions Sentences, Digressions and Amplifications. And the Crinomenon is that proposition in the Argumentation, whether General or Particular, in which the whole, strength doth lie, and that being proved, the whole matter seemeth to be proved also: this therefore the Orator must especially declare and confirm.  
Here then observe, 1. That the Crinomenon is sometimes the same with the proposition of the whole Oration; and then the greater variety of arguments may be found to prove the proposition. For Example, let the proposition be this; I will show you that a King ought to love his subjects and the Common wealth. The first argument is; Because the head ought to love the members; The King is the head, the subjects are the members: Therefore etc. The second Argument is; Every one ought to love his patrimony. The common wealth is the King's patrimony: Therefore etc. Here you see that several arguments may be brought to confirm the proposition, because the Crinomenon is the same with the general proposition of the Oration.  
Note 2. That the Crinomenon is sometimes different from the General proposition in the Oration, and then there is but one principal argument in the whole Oration, which we must endeavour to confirm and amplify. Moreover this Crinomenon may be discovered, if you put your principal Arguments into a true Syllogistical form; for the Minor in the syllogism is sometimes the Crinomenon, as in the first argument of the Oration, which Tully made for Milo. He that is a Traitor deserves tobe killed, Claudius was 〈…〉 Traitor: Therefore; where the Major: is certainly true, the Minor only is to be proved; this therefore Tully endeavours to do throughout that whole Oration.  
Sometimes the Major is the Crinomenon, as Tully in his Oration for Sextus Roscius. No Son would kill his father, but for some great cause; Sextus Roscius is a son: Therefore. In this Syllogism the Minor is undoubtedly true, and therefore the Major only is to be proved, for in that is the whole force. Sometimes the Crinomenon is in the Major and Minor both. For example, He killed Roscius that was advantaged by his death: but the death of Roscius was advantageous to Capiton; Therefore. Here the Major and the Minor are both to be proved. In the reading therefore, and in the composing of Orations, the Crinomenon must be regarded. But when the General proposition hath several parts, there are several Crinomenons to be regarded.  
2. As for Transitions, it is by them that the arguments for confirmation have a dependence on one another, yea and the several parts of the Oration also. And a Transition is a kind of speech by which we express what hath been said in few words, and briefly show what yet remaineth to be spoken. It is either perfect or imperfect. That is a perfect Transition which repeats the things spoken, and infers the things that are to be said: as if you should say; Enough hath been said concerning the necessity of Arms; let let us now see what advantage may come from them. An imperfect Transition is when we do not revoke the things that are spoken, but only proceed to the things that are to be spoken, with these or the like expressions. But now, furthermore, add to this, and such like. And note also that one argument doth then properly follow another, when in the end of one argument, such a sense thereof is given, as will easily open away of speaking and arguing further.  
3. Sometimes the Orator may declare the argument by way of Sentence, and this may be twofold, plain or obscure.  
A plain Sentence is the declaration of the truth in few words. Or, it is an universal speech concerning the good that is to be done, and the evil that is to be eschewed; concerning God, religion, providence, and other things belonging to the life and manners of men. For example;  

Nemo mortalium omnibus horis sapit;  
No man is wise at all times.   
An obscure sentence is a particular speech deducted from a general, the circumstances of persons, time and place being added thereunto; as thus; It cannot be, O Peter, that thou shouldest be always wise.  
These Occult sentences are to be very frequently used in any part of an Oration, for they do adorn it much, and are very taking with the Auditors: Plain sentences may be also used, but these do best become old men and such as have experience; and are chiefly to be used in grave matters.  
4. Digressions are oft times and very gracefully used in Confirmation: in which something is touched upon, which seemeth little to the purpose, but yet doth serve to illustrate the matter in hand. And this may be done either briefly, and then there needeth no transition; or else more largely, and then the Orator must recall himself, as from a long and a by-path to his present purpose.  
The Orator may use Digressions, when he is to speak of universal and common things, as, of vices, virtues, slavery, liberty, life, death and such like.  
As suppose one were to prove, that it were not fit to thrust a learned man out of a City, he might make his digression on the praise of learning, showing as well the necessity as the profit of it. Expositions of things done and descriptions of places, persons, customs and such like, may be handsomely used in digressions.  
5. Amplification is a speech, which doth augment that, which being nakedly related would seem small and trivial, by describing of it by adjuncts and circumstances. It is twofold, of words and things.  
Amplification of words, is that by which the matter is augmented by the choice of words, and manner of speech. And a speech may be augmented from one word several ways.  
1. By the addition of fit Epithets; thus Tully doth amplify and enlarge this one word War saying, that it is an horrible and a villainous war, and full of all wickedness.  
2. By the use of suitable Adverbs; as, you may justly and deservedly praise him.  
3. By definition or description; as, the hands of wicked and pernicious men, in stead of murderers.  
4. By Notation; as, the golden mouthed Chrisostom.  
5. Synonomies, when many expressions are used which carry the same sense; as, this conjunction of minds, this conspiring together in one, this most pleasant society of life, in stead of friendship.  
6. By Paraphrase; as, this saying of the common people he minded us of a long time since, in stead of this, it is a common saying; or thus, it was that season of the year when the earth puts on her most gorgeous apparel to entertain the sun, for, it was in the spring.  
7. By Enumeration of parts, when the parts are expressed instead of the whole; as, instead of saying, this valley is set forth with all the embellishments that low ground is capable of, one may say: The rich fields of corn and green meadows lie in several divisions intercheckered like great beds of flowers, and fresh glass pots in a large garden. The cornfields look as if the roots which were hid in them complained, that by mistake of their own strength, through a great desire of being fruitful, they had sent forth more stalks than they could well support, and the overladen ears increased that oppression; the sweet grass grew up so thick in the meadows, that it seemed to be straightened for want froom, and yet crowded closer to make way for those-fragrant flowers of all sorts which grew up with it; and these mingling their various colours as they best fitted the several greene's which they found there, made a show like a rich carpet, where grass was the ground, rarely made up with beautiful Embroideries of flowerwork.  
8. By the commemoration of causes, 〈◊〉 the antecedents and consequents of things as: Thou hast done what thou canst to destr 〈…〉 this city with the sword, and with arms, a 〈…〉 with the terror of an army, and the wickedness 〈…〉 of Consuls, and by besieging the most fortifis 〈…〉 Temples, by prepossessing the Judges, by overawing the Courts of Judicature, at home and a broad.  
Amplification of things is, when the matter itself is increased and confirmed wit 〈…〉 grave sentences: yet it is form indifferently from the same places from whence the arguments are taken, seeing there are many definitions or descriptions of one and the same 〈…〉 thing: as history is the witness of times, th' 〈…〉 light of truth, the memory of fashions, th' 〈…〉 messenger of antiquity, the mistress of behaviour.  
2. When many consequences are reckoned up; i. e. those things which may presently or hereafter follow: as if the proposition were; Many mischiefs may follow for want of due consideration.  
This may be amplified in this manner. What are the consequences of inconsideration? By this means the opportunity of advancement is neglected, the present possession of goods is utterly lost, together with our own lives and the common safety of all.  
3. When many causes are reckoned up: as if the proposition were this; Never do that of which you shall have cause to repent you afterwards. Which may be amplified in this manner.  
When you do that which is to be lamented, you act inconsiderately, than which there is nothing more foolish: you are overcome with passion, than which there is nothing more imprudent: you foresee not what may follow, than which there is nothing more dangerous: you restrain not your unruly lusts, than which thereiss nothing more indecent.  
4. When many effects are reckoned up; as, let the proposition be, Antonius did the Romans many mischiefs. Which may be thus Amplified. The Romans bewail the loss of three armies, which Antonius destroyed. They stand in need of wise men, and those Antonius hath deprived them of. Their Authority and reputation is much weakened and impaired, and that they may thank Antonius for.  
5. When many similitudes are brought: for example sake, let this be the proposition.  
If small faults be not corrected, they will hardly be mended when they are greater. Which you may amplify in this manner: Extinguish those sparks of wickedness, unless you purpose to be consumed; stop up those fountains, unless yo● mean to be overflowed with those violent waters; take Physic in time, if you fear the approach of some mortal disease. For as fire which is kindled by small embers, doth many times destroy whole Cities: as a River is by the droppings of small springs increased to such a heap of waters as overfloweth the whole land: as light distempers do occasion great diseases, and sweep away whole families: so the vices of young men, unless they be timely suppressed, will be more and more rooted in them, until they have bereft their minds of all virtue and common honesty.  
Confutation is a part or kind of Confirmation, in which we answer all objections: it doth either preceded or follow confirmation, or may be here and there used in all the parts of the Oration. And these objections may be either all answered together, or those first, which are first made, and then the latter; or those first which are most material, and the rest may fall of themselves; or the weakest first, that they being avoided, the strongest arguments may be somewhat weakened. And the manner of doing this, is by showing, that the Adversaries allegation is either false, impossible, uncertain, or impertinent and the like: and because this part of an Oration is full of heat, and sometimes of fury, it doth admit of Dialogisms or conferences, Ironies, illusions, interrogati●ns, execrations, and other like vehement figures and affections.  
These objections are sometimes rejected with great scorn, sometimes eluded not so much by strength of argument, as by voice and gesture.  
The Adversary is sometimes vexed with chiding; sometimes pressed with Questions, and the dint of all his arguments sometimes blunted with the like objections: sometimes there is no answer given to that which he requireth of us; sometimes the answer is not given presently, but first suspended for a long time.  
Peroration or Conclusion is the last part of an Oration, in which the Orator should very much endeavour to set an edge in the minds of his Auditors, and incline them to be of his side; and here he should therefore use such figures, as are most proper to move the affections; it doth chiefly consist of two parts, Enumeration and Amplification.  
Enumeration is required, that the chief arguments more largely opened in the former discourse may be briefly and clearly repeated in a new form of words. Amplification desires, that this repetition may be made, by some serious expressions, adorned with sentences and figures. This part of the Oration ought therefore to be more exactly composed; because by this the Orator is commonly the more or less valued; for this the Auditors do best remember, and from hence do pass their judgements of us.     

CHAP. VI  
Of Elocution.  
OF all the parts of Rhetoric, Elocution in my judgement is the most excellent, for that it is but to little purpose to have a good invention, and an excellent way of methodizing or disposing of arguments, unless we can also express them in apt and fitting words, and handsomely adorn them with Tropes and Figures. In the wording therefore of an Oration care must be had, that the words thereof be first plain and significant, and then neat and elegant, and hence this part of Rhetoric may be thus defined.  
Elocution or the garnishing of speech, is an 〈…〉 rt by which the speech is beautified with the e 〈…〉 gancy of words and sentences.  
And this is performed two ways, by the ●ine manner of words called a Trope, or by ●he fine frame of speech called a Figure.  
A Trope is such an Elocution or manner of speech, as doth change the signification of a word into a different signification from the natural.  
In a Trope two things are to be considered.  

1. The Affections.  
2. The Kind's.   
The Affections of a Trope are 4. 


Catachresis  
Hyperbole  
Metalepsis  
Allegoria.     
Catachresis is a harsh and unpleasant change of a word; as namely when one word or name is put for another, not by any proper relation, but by a kind of force. He threatens me a good turn. Enoch was translated, that he should not see death.  
Hyperbole is a very false relation of a thing, or a more bold excess of a Trope, which doth exceed belief, either by augmentation or by diminution. Note, that though an Hyperbole doth vary from the truth, yet doth it not deceive us through fiction or such variation.  
An Hyperbole is twofold 


Auxesis, or  
Meiosis.     
An Auxesis is, when for augmentation sake or Amplification, we interpose a more vehement expression, in his proper place; as when we say, Magnificent for Liberal, Cruel for Severe, Sacrilegious for Wicked.  
A Meiosis, or a Tapinosis is when for extenuation sake we use a milder or more favourable expression, than the matter requireth: as when we say a Flatterer is a courteous and an affable person.  
A Metalepsis is that which containeth many Tropes in one expression; as when we by an improper speech, signify, first that which is improper, and by that improper speech perhaps another, and so forward till we come to that which is proper, making way for transition by interposing a mean degree; as All the City was moved. Math. 21. 10. where the City is put for Jerusalem, by a Synecdoche Generis: and Jerusalem for its inhabitants, by a Metonymy of the subject.  
An ALLEGORY is the continuation of a Trope, as where many Tropes of the same kind are joined together: as put on the whole armour of God. Ephes. 6. 11. He shall be as a Tree planted by the rivers of water. Psalm. 1.  
In an Allegory observe to end with the same kind of Trope with which you begin, or else the inconsequence will be absurd.  
The several kinds of Tropes are these four.  

1. A Metonymy.  
2. An Irony.  
3. A Metaphor, and  
4. A Synecdoche.   
A Metonymy is a Trope of the Cause to the effect, of the subject to the adjunct: and the contrary, of the effect to the cause, or of the adjunct to the subject.  
4. There are four kinds of Causes.  

1. The Efficient cause, by which a thing is.  
2. The Material cause, of which a thing is made.  
3. The Formal cause, by which a thing is what it is.  
4. The Final cause, for which a thing is: of which the two first only belong to our present purpose.   
A Metonymy of the Cause is twofold, 〈…〉 at is, of the Efficient or of the Material Cause.  
A Metonymy of the efficient Cause is, when the Author or inventor of any thing is put for those things which they have effected, or of which he is Author, as Mars for war, Vulcan for fire, Neptune for the Sea, Ceres for bread, Bacchus for wine, Venus for love, Livy for the History written by Livy, Virgil for the poems or works composed by Virgil.  
And thus the instrument is also put for the thing effected by it. As the tongue for speech, the hand for writing, the sword for slaughter, Arms for war.  
A Metonymy of the Material Cause is, when the name of the matter is put for the effect; as Brass for brass money, Silver for Silver money, Gold for goldcoin: they worshipped wood and stone; i. e. Idols made of wood and stone: the iron entered into his soul, i. e. fetters.  
A Metonymy of the effect is, when the efficient cause is signified by the effects: as Victory is by nature proud and insolent; that is, it maketh men proud and insolent. Pale death; which, maketh pale.  
Note. That is called the effect which dependeth upon the efficient cause.  
Thus Wickedness is put for the ungodly 〈…〉 r of wicked actions, the work for the  
Quas meruit poenas jam dedivillud opus.  
The work hath received that punishment which it did deserve; that is Ovid the Author of the work.  
A Metonymy of the Subject is, when the proper name of any subject is made to signify the adjunct.  
Note. That is said to be a Subject, in which a thing may be any way said to be or adhere.  
There may be a Metonymy of the subject these nine several ways.  
1. When a Subject is put for an inherent accident; as, Curii for Victory, Curius being the name of a certain victorious Captain.  
2. When the thing containing is put for the contained. As the Cup for the drink in the Cup, the purse for the money.  
3. When the place is put for the inhabitants; as, The City for the Citizens. They smote the city with the sword, i. e. the men in it.  
4. When the place is put for the things done in the place; as, Psal. 68 29. Because of thy Temple at Jerusalem; where by Temple is understood the holy exercises and divine worship used in the Temple.  
5. When the possessor is put for the thing possessed by him; as, Joel, 3. 20. Judah shall be inhabited for ever: where Judah the Son of Jacob is put for the Land of Jury, which was promised to his posterity and by them possessed.  
6. When the Captain is put for his army; as, Annibal is conquered, that is, Annibal's army.  
7. When a Patron or advocate is put for his client; as, The cause will go against the Attorney General, that is, against his client.  
8. When a thing which is done in time is put for the time in which it was done; as, Harvest for Summer, Job. 32. 7. I said days should speak, and multitude of years should teach wisdom, i. e, the aged who have seen many days.  
9 When the name of the thing signified is put for the sign; as, Ovid. Fast: 1. vers. 201.  

Juppiter angust a vix totus stabat in aede:  
Inque Jovis dextra fictile fulmen erat.   

In narrow court, Jove could scarce upright stand,  
And held an earthen thunderbolt in's hand.   
Virg. Eclog. 3.  
Orpheaque in medio posuit, sylvasque sequentes.  
In the midst he set Orpheus and the woods f●llowing, that is, the carved images of Orpheus and the woods.  
A Metonymy of the adjunct is, when the adjunct is put for the subject. Gen. 31. 53. Jacob swore by the fear of his father Isaac, i. e. by God whom Isaac feared.  
There may be a Metonymy of the adjunct eight several ways.  
1. When the names of virtues are put for good men, of vices for wicked, and of many other things for the persons to whom they belong, or to whom they may be called Adjuncts; as, on this side modesty contendeth, impudence on that; where modesty is put for modest men, and impudence for impudent men.  
2. When the thing contained is put for the thing containing; as, Psal. 11. 7. The righteous Lord loveth righteousness, i. e. righteous men.  
3. When the adjunct of the time is put for the subject. Thus the night is put for sleep, which is usually taken in the night. Ephes. 5. 16. The days are evil, i. e. the hearts and conversations of the men of these days are evil.  
4. When the Sign is put for the thing signified; as, The Sceptre for the Kingdom, a gown for peace, Arms for war.  
5. When the thing placed is put for the place itself: we sought thee in all books, that is, in bookseller's shops.  
6. When the Antecedent is put for the consequent; as, pray hear, meaning, pray observe.  
7. When the consequent is put for the antecedent; as, He is buried, instead of, he is dead.  
8. When one Concomitant is put for another; as, Annibal stayed there, that is the Army of Annibal.  
An Irony is a Trope from one opposite to another; or, in which we speak by contraries.  
An Irony may be perceived three ways 1. by the manner of pronunciation; 2. by the person; 3. by the nature of the thing: for if any of these do differ from the words, it is clear, that the intention doth differ from them also. 
Opposites are of two sorts, 


Unlike, or  
Contrary.     All things of different natures are said to be unlike: as, A man, a Stone, a Book, a Dog; and therefore one particular thing, may be equally opposed to many things.  
All things are said to be contrary to one another that are of contrary natures: as light and darkness, heat and cold: and therefore one particular thing may be equally opposed to another particular.  
An Irony of a thing unlike is, when any thing is spoken of one person and understood of another: whether it be affirmed of both, or denied of one, as, Virgil Eclog. 3.  

Tum credo cum me arbustum videre Myconis,  
Atque malâ vites incidere falce novellas.   

Sure 'twas when I in Mycon's ground was took,  
Pruning his vines with an unwelcome hook.   
Where Menalcas naming himself mean Dametas. Denied of one, as, Ovid Metam. 13.  

Nec in his quisquam damnatus & exul.  
None of these were either hanged or banished.   
Where Ulysses accusing Ajax tells him that none of his kindred were either hanged or banished; thereby intimating that some of Ajax's generation were, to wit, his father Telamonius, and his Uncle Peleus, for killing of Phocas.  
An Irony from the contrary is, when one contrary is signified by another; as, 
O Salve bone vir curâsti probe.  
O thou art an honest man, thou hast done very well:  meaning that he was a very rogue and had been very careless.  
Paralepsis is a kind of Irony, by which we seem to pass by or take no notice of such things which yet we strictly observe and remember.  
The forms of this figure are these; I let pass, I am silent, I omit, I will leave out, I say not &c. as thus, I say nothing of your licentious life, incestuous marriage, or your being perjured in such a cause, etc. Where in a kind of elegancy we seem to pass by those crimes, which we do more eminently remember.  
Apophasis is a kind of Irony, by which we deny to say or do, which yet we speak with greatest earnestness, and do with all our might; as, nor will I mention these things, which if I should, you could not I am sure, deny them. This figure differs from the former, in nothing but the manner of speaking.  
A Metaphor is a Trope by which we ex press ourselves by a word, which is of like signification, with that we mean. There is nothing in the world, of which there is not another thing to which it may be resembled; and therefore there is nothing from whence a Metaphor may not be deducted; as, Princeps caput Reipublicae, The King is the head of the common wealth.  
There are eight sort of things especially, from which a Metaphor may be deduced.  

1. From sacred and holy things; as, One man is a God to another.  
2. From the Heavens; as, Virgil the sun of Poets.  
3. From the Elements; as, The fire of envy; the flood of eloquence and Rhetoric.  
4. From Meteors; as, The lightning of an Oration.  
5. From Minerals; as, Golden ages; an Iron breast.  
6. From Vegetables; as, The flower of nobility.  
7. From living creatures; as, England is the eye of Islands; Orators do bark not speak.  
8. From Artificial things; as, Appion is the Cymbal of the world, so called for his much talking.   
And hence are these expressions, To file a writing, to polish an oration, to rip or unsow friendship.  
Synecdoche is a Trope, by which a part is put for the whole and the contrary; i. e. the whole is put for a part.  
A part is twofold. 


A Member, or  
A Species.     
A Synecdoche of a Member is, when by a member the whole is signified. As the Roof for the house, the sword's point for the sword itself, a General for his Army, the soul for a man.  
Thus the singular number is put for the plural; as, The Roman was victor in battle, meaning the army of the Romans.  
Note. That the singular number is a part or member of the plural, not a distinct nature: especially considering that every multitude doth consist of unities, as of so many particulars.  
A Synecdoche of the Species is, when the Species is put for the Genus; as, when Aristides is put for a just man, Croesus for a rich man.  
Thus we put an infinite number for a great number; as, you may bring six hundred such; Six hundred, one species or sort of a great number, for a great number in the general.  
A Synecdoche of the whole is, when the whole is put for a part.  
The whole is either an 


Integer, or  
A Genus.     
A Synecdoche of an Integer is, when an Integer is put for a member; as, His Army was so great as that is drank the rivers dry: meaning a great part of the water in the rivers.  
Thus the plural number is put for the singular; as, Cicero to Brutus; we deceived the people and seemed Orators: When the Orator spoke of himself only.  
A Synecdoche of the Genus is, when the General is put for the Special; as, a man for Catiline, Virtue for fortitude, Poet for Homer or Virgil, Orator for Demosthenes or Tully. Mark. 16. 15. Preach the Gospel to every creature: meaning mankind only, and not any other creature.  
Hitherto of Tropes the first kind of elocution; the second kind of elocution is by Figure.   

CHAP. VII.  
A Figure is a kind of Elocution by which the form of a speech is changed from its right and plain use.  
A Figure is either of 


A Word, or  
A Sentence.     
A Figure of a word is that, by which an Oration or speech is composed of words aptly and sweetly suitable to one another. And this consists either in the Dimension or Repetition of sounds or words.  
A Figure in the Dimension of sounds is the sweet number of sounds in a sentence.  
Number is either Poetical or Oratorical.  
A Poetical number is that, which is confined to a perpetual observation of certain spaces.  
A Number Poetical is either Rhyme or Meter.  
Rhyme is a poetical number containing a certain number of feet, without any regard to the quantity of the Syllables whether long or short. But here many times there are several sentences joined together in which the last Syllables are like; as,  

Dare to be true: nothing can need a lie:  
A fault that needs it most, grows two thereby.   
A Meter is a poetical number consisting of certain feet, of which the last foot hath the last Syllable indifferent or common, that is, long or short.  
In this kind of Poetical number, there is a liberty granted for a certain Metaplasm or transformation of a word, namely when there is something wanting in it, or when there is too much, or when there is something changed.  
There are four kinds of Metaplasms.  
1. By Elision or taking away something from the end of a word, in the scanning of a verse.  
And this is either, Synalaepha or Ecthlipsis.  
Synalaepha is an elision or striking out of one vowel before another in divers words; as, 'tis, for it is.  
Ecthlipsis is when the letter m with his vowel is taken away, because the word following beginneth with a vowel; as, Syncer' est, for Syncerum est.  
2. The second kind of Metaplasm is by adding something to, or deducting something from a word: and of this there are six kinds.  
Prosthesis, Aphaeresis, Epenthesis, Syncope, Paragoge, and Apocope.  
Prosthesis is the adding of a letter or Syllable to the beginning of a word.  
Aphaeresis is the taking away of a letter or a Syllable from the beginning of a word.  
Epenthesis is the putting of a letter or Syllable into the middle of a word.  
Syncope is the taking away of a letter or Syllable from the middle of a word,  
Paragoge is the putting of a letter or syllable to the end of a word.  
Apocope is the taking of a letter or syllable from the end of a word.  
3. The third kind of Metaplasms is by dividing and contracting of words, the one is called Diaeresis, the other Synaeresis.  
Diaeresis is that which maketh two syllables of one.  
Synaeresis is the contracting of two syllables into one.  
4. The fourth kind of Metaplasms is by changing something in a word, and of this there are five kinds. Tmesis, Metathesis, Antithesis, Diastole and Systole.  
Tmesis is that which divides the parts of a compound or simple word by putting another word between them.  
Metathesis is the transposition or misplacing of a letter in a word.  
Antithesis is the putting of one letter for another.  
Diastole is that which maketh a short syllable long.  
Systole is that which maketh a long syllable short.  
Oratorical number doth indeed consist of feet, but not of any certain number of feet, but of as many or as few as the Orator pleaseth. And although for testimony or delight he may sometimes recite the verses of others, yet must he not make verses, when he writeth prose. He should not make the beginning or the end of a verse to be either the beginning or end of prose. But a greater care is to be had of the close than either of the beginning or middle of a speech, for in that the perfection of number doth chiefly appear; but these things will be better understood by the practice of the meanest Orator, than the precepts of the most skilful.  
What the Figure of a word is, in the Dimens' on of the sound thereof, hath been showed: now followeth the Figure of a word in respect of the repetition thereof.  
And this is twofold, Like, or Unlike.  
A Figure of a word in the repetition of like sound is either with or without intermission.  
Repetition of like sound without intermission is either an Epizeuxis or an Anadiplosis.  
An Epizeuxis is, when a like sound is repeated in the same sentence without intermission, and that either a part or a whole word.  
An Epizeuxis or repetition of the part of a word is either in the beginning or in the end of a word.  
An Epizeuxis or repetition of a whole word may be in the beginning, middle, or end of a sentence; as, Ezek. 21. 9, 27. A sword, a sword is sharpened etc. I will overturn, overturn, overturn it. And thus David bewaileth the death of his son Absalon in 2 Sam. 18. 33. O my son Absolom, my son, my son Absolom; would God I had died for thee, O Absolom, my son, my son.  
An Anadiplosis is, when a like sound without intermission is repeated in divers sentences, that is when it ends one and begins another; as, in Dr. Donne's Poems, Page 210.  

If then, why I take not my leave she ask,  
Ask her again, why she did not unmask?   
And in the use of this Figure there is sometimes a Climax; as when an Anadiplosis is continued with many degrees. Pro Milon: Nor 〈…〉 did he only render himself to the people, but to the Senate: nor to the Senate only, but to the public Garrisons and Armies: nor to these only, but even to him, with whom the Senate hath 〈…〉 ntrusted the commonwealth. Ad Heren: What hope of liberty now remaineth; if it be lawful for them to do what they please, and that they can do what is lawful, and dare do, what they can, and actually do, as múch as they dare, and you like whatever they do? Wherein we thought each line, each word, each syllable breathed out the passions of a clear and candid soul. Howels Ep. 3. Epist. 18.  
Repetition of like sound but with some intermission is either in the same or in divers places.  
Repetition of like sound with intermission in the same place is either an Anaphora, or an Epistrophe.  
An Anaphora is, when a like sound is repeated in the beginning of sentences; as, 
By art of sails and oars Seas o'er divided;  
By art the Chariot runs; by art love's guided.   
Ovid de Arte amandi. lib. 1. Garm. 3. and 4. 'Tis safe and frequent, fraud through lov 〈…〉 frame.  
'Tis safe and frequent, but deserveth blame 〈…〉  
Ovid de Arte amandi. lib. 1. page 197.  
An Epistrophe is, when a like sound is repeated in the close of sentences; as, 2 Cor 〈…〉 11. 22. Are they Hebrews? so am I: are the 〈…〉 Israelites? so am I: are they the seed of Abraham? so am I  
From an Anaphora and an Epitrophe joined together is made another figure call 〈…〉 Symploce; which is, when a like sound 〈◊〉 both in the beginning and the ending of several sentences; as, Can the host of heave 〈…〉 help me? can Angels help me? can these inferi 〈…〉 our creatures help me.  
Repetition of like sound with intermission, i● divers parts or places, is either an Epanalips 〈…〉 or an Epanadoes.  
An Epanalipsis is, when a like sound is repeated in the beginning and ending of the 〈…〉 same sentence; as, In sorrow was I born, and I must die in sorrow. 1 Cor. 3. 21, 22. All things are yours, whether things present, or things to come, all are yours.  
An Epanodos is, when the like sound is in the beginning and ending of divers sentences, an Anadiplosis coming between; as, Parthenia desired above all things to have Argalus; Argalus feared nothing but to miss Parthenia. Isaiah 5. 20. woe unto them who call good evi', and evil good; who put darkness for light, and light for darkness; who glory in their shame, and are ashamed of their glory.  

Whether the worst, the child accursed,  
Or else the cruel mother?  
The mother worst, the child accursed,  
As bad the one as th' other.   
Hitherto of the Figure of a word repeated of like sound, now follow two figures more made by the repetition of sounds somewhat unlike, Paronomasia and Polyptoton.  
Paronomasia is, when a word being changed in a letter or a syllable, it is also changed in sense and signification; as, Though you advise me to repent, I have not grace to follow your advice. Eminent men of great note, are now a days most subject to imminent dangers. 'Tis not so tedious to me as to others, to be thus immured, because I have been enured and habituated unto troubles. Howels Epist. 1. Volu. sect. 6. Epist. 50.  
A Polyptoton is, when words of the same 〈…〉 original are reiterated but with some variation, whether it be in mood or tense or person or number or any other; as, Vanity 〈◊〉 Vanities, all is vanity. Deceiving and being deceived. The Lord when he visiteth, in visiting will visit you.   

CHAP. VIII.  
HItherto of a figure in reference to word 〈…〉 A Figure in reference to a sentence is a figure which affecteth the whole sentenc 〈…〉 with some motion of the mind.  
A Figure in reference to a sentence is either 〈…〉 in absolute reasoning, or in reasoning Dialogue-wise  
Logismus or absolute reasoning is, when a sentence is composed without any talking with other supposed.  
And this is either E●phonesis, a recalling of one self, Apostrophe or Prosopopeia.  
Ecphonesis is a figure in reasoning, expressed or understood by an Adverb of exclaiming: it is a very great instrument o 〈…〉 moving the mind, and affections of those 〈…〉 whom we speak.  
1. By way of Admiration; as, Oh the wonderful clemency! or, Oh happy people that are in such a case!  
2. Derision; as, Mark 15. 29. Ah thou ●hat destroyest the Temple and buildest it in three days.  
3. Wishing; Psal. 14. 17. O that the salvation of Israel were come out of Zion.  
4. Detestation; as, Rom. 7. 24. O wreathed man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?  
5. Reprehension; as, O Foolish Galathians who hath bewitched you etc. Gal. 3. 1.  
6. Indignation; Act. 13. 10. O full of all subtlety and mischief, thou child of the Devil, thou enemy of all righteousness.  
7. Love; as, Psal. 84. 1. O how amiable are thy Tabernacles, thou Lord of hosts.  
8. Exultation; as, 1 Cor. 15. 15. O death where is thysting, Oh grave where is thy victory?  
9 Commiseration and Grief; as, Luke 13. 34. O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, which killest the Prophets etc. How often would I have gathered thy children together, etc.  
12. Epiphonema is also a kind of exclamation, which is wont to be added to the end of the narration or explication of a matter. Thus the Psalmist having highly se 〈…〉 forth the glorious excellency of the name oh 〈…〉 God, in Psal. 72. shuts up his praise with this acclamation; Blessed be his glorious name for ever, and let the whole earth be filled with his glory.  
Recalling of one's self is, when something is called back: and it is as it were a diminution of the over hastiness or heat of speech 〈◊〉 and this is either Epanorthósis or Aposiopésis.  
An Epanorthósis is, when something preceding is called back by correcting it: as, I had one only young man to my Son; ah! what have I said? I had? yea I had: it is new uncertain whether I have or not.  
An Aposiopésis is, when the close of a sentence begun is stopped by keeping in a part which yet is understood; as, you rogue, if I live. Heb. 3. 11. To whom Isware in my wrath, if they enter into my rest; i. e. they shall never enter into my rest.  
Hitherto of perfect and absolute reasoning by way of exclamation and revocation. Now followeth that which is in Apostrophe and Prosopopoeia.  
An Apostrophe is, when a speech is directed to another, than was by the speech itself at first intended.  
And this may be done divers ways.  
As when a speech is directed  
1. To God. 2. To Angels good or bad.  
To men in their several ranks, whether 〈…〉 sent or present, dead or alive, as Ad 〈…〉 rsaries or friends, to the present Auditors, 〈◊〉 one's self. 4. To brute creatures, and 5. 〈…〉 o things inanimate.  
A Prosopopoeia is, when in our Oration, 〈…〉 e suppose another person to be speaking. 〈…〉 and by this figure, God, Angels, men dead 〈◊〉 alive, the heavens, earth, sea, and such 〈…〉ke are brought in speaking, hearing, etc. 〈◊〉, Josh. 24. 27. Behold this shall be a witness 〈…〉 to us; for it hath heard all the words of the 〈…〉ord which he hath spoken unto us.  
A Prosopopoeia is either imperfect or perfect.  
An Imperfect Prosopopoeia is, when another's 〈…〉 eech is lightly declared and as it were by 〈…〉 he by; as, Psal. 11. 1. David brings in the wicked as saying unto his soul, flee as a Bird 〈…〉 unto your mountain.  
A perfect Prosopopoeia is when in our own Oration the whole fiction of another person is plainly declared; as, Prov. 8. Wisdom 〈…〉 ryeth at the Gates etc. Unto you, O men, I 〈…〉 all, etc.  
A Figure in reasoning Dialogue-wise is, when a sentence is composed in form of a conference; this consisteth in Question an 〈…〉 Answer: of which kind of reasoning the 〈…〉 are two parts Hypophora and Anthypophor 〈…〉  
But Dialogism or reasoning by Questio 〈…〉 and Answer is twofold, Consenting and Dissenting.  
Dissenting is when ones answer doth impugn or cross the objection.  
A Figure of a dissenting Dialogism is either Deliberation or Occupation.  
Deliberation is either an Aporia or an Anacoenósis.  
An Aporia is a deliberation with ou 〈…〉 selves; as, Philip. 1. 22. But if I live in 't 〈…〉 flesh, this is the fruit of my labour: yet what 〈…〉 shall chose I know not; for I am in a strai 〈…〉 between two, having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ, which is far better: nevertheless to abide in the flesh is more needful for you etc.  
An Anacoenósis is, a deliberation with others; as thus, what shall I say? what think you? if it had been your own case, would you have done otherwise?  
Occupation is when we prevent another's objection and give an answer to it ourselves. This Dialogism therefore from the former part is called a Prolepsis, from the latter a Prosapódosis.  
A Prolepsis or an Hypophora propounds the objection; as, Isaiah 37. 23. Whom hast thou reproached, and blasphemed? And against whom hast thou exalted thy voice, and lifted up thine eyes on high? even against the holy one of Israel.  
A Prosapódosis or an Anthypophora answers the objection; as, Rom. 6. 15. What then? shall we sin because we are not under the law, but under grace? God forbid.  
A Prolepsis for the most part hath a Prosopopoeia joined with it, and is therefore either oblique or direct.  
An Oblique Prolepsis is that which hath an imperfect Prosopopoeia joined with it.  
A Direct Prolepsis is that which hath a full Prosopopoeia; as, some one may say, is this then your Discipline? Do you thus instruct youth?  
A Figure of Consenting Dialogism is, when one's answer doth admit of the objection expressed or understood: yet so, as that from thence the inconsequence of the objection may be showed, if need be.  
But this is either an Epitrope or a Synchoresis.  
An Epitrope is when any one's fact is freely permitted. This is twofold Serious or Ironical.  
Serious permission; as, Take this Church plute, seeing thou hast need, for 'twas thy Ancestors gift.  
Ironical permission; as, Eccles. 11. 9 Rejoice O young man, and let thy heart 〈◊〉 thee, etc. And walk in the ways of thy heart, etc.  
A Synchoresis is when some word or deed is forgiven; as, let him be sacrilegious, let him be a thief, let him be the vilest person in the world; for all that he is a good Governor. James 2. 19 Thou believest that there is one God, thou dost well: the Devils also believe and tremble.   

CHAP. IX.  
Of Secundary Figures.  
TO these Primary Figures of words and sentences there may some secundary figures be added in both kinds.  
The Secundary figures of a word are eight.  

1. Ellipsis.  
2. Pleonasmus.  
3. Asyndeton.  
4. Polysyndeton.  
5. Hyperbaton.  
6. Zeugma.  
7. Antithesis.  
8. Graeeismus.   
An Ellipsis is, when some necessary word, to express the passion, is omitted in the construction; as, Isaiah 1. 13. I cannot iniquity, that is, I cannot bear iniquity.  
A Pleonasmus is, when there is some word in an oration, more than it seemeth to need; yet doth emphatically and eminently express some vehemence and certainty; as, I saw it with these eyes. And that which hath not such an Emphasis is idle and vicious.  
An Asyndeton is, when in a number of words, a conjunction copulative is omitted, either through haste, or vehemence of speech; as, By thy folly and wickedness thou hast lost thy substance, thy good name, thy friends, thy parents, and offended thy Creator.  
A Polysyndeton is, when for gravity sake, more conjunctions are used than seem needful, but not without some Emphasis; as, overmuch sleep also, and wine, and banquets, and queaus, and baths enervate and enfeeble the body and mind.  
An Hyperbaton is a Transposition of words from the right order of construction, into some more neat and compact form, for elegancy and variety sake; as, Ephes. 1. And you bath he quickened who were dead in trespasses and sins.  
A Zeugma is, when some verb or adjective but once expressed in a sentence, is supposed to be referred to several others of divers genders, numbers or persons, agreeing with that which is nearest; as, lust overcometh modesty, boldness fear, and passion reason.  
This is threefold.  
Prozeugma, when this common word is set in the beginning; as, For neither art thou he, Catiline, whom shame could at any time call back from dishonesty, fear from perils, or reason from madness.  
Mesozeugma, when in the middle; as, what a shame is this, that neither hope of reward, nor fear of reproach could any thing move him, the persuasion of his friends, nor the love of his Country?  
Hypozeugma, when in the end; as, the foundation of freedom, the fountain of equity, the safeguard of wealth, and custody of life is preserved by law.  
An Antithesis is, when the things opposed do answer one another; as, Flattery procureth friendship, truth hatred.  
A Graecismus is when the proper Idiom of the Greek is used in another speech or language; as, Edm. Spencer Chap. 13. For not to have been dipped in Lethe lake, could save the son of Thetis from to die; that is, Achilles.  
To these may be added  
An Hyperologia or an Hyteron Proteron, when that which in the natural order should be first spoken, is brought in last; as, he is in health and alive, for, he is alive and in health.  
An Antiptosis, when one case is put for another.  
An Hypallage, when two words do commute or change cases with one another; as, Thou hast hid their heart from understanding, Job 17. 4. that is, thou hast hid understanding from their heart.  
The Secundary figures in a sentence are ten.  

1. Parrhésia.  
2. Erotesis.  
3. Parenthesis.  
4. Parathesis.  
5. Periphrasis.  
6. Synonymia.  
7. Hypotyposis.  
8. Praemunitio.  
9 Transitio.  
10. Rejectio.   
Parrhesia is a free and a bold speaking of such things in their presence whom we should fear or reverence, as are displeasing or may provoke them to envy.  
And this is either when we confidently acknowledge and defend a fault not proved against us, or when we boldly upbraid and rebuke others, for faults by them committed.  
Erotesis is a manner of speech, whereby we either,  
1. Demand a question; as, How oft shall ●ny brother sin against me, and I forgive him? till seven times? Matth. 18. 21. Or when we  
2. Earnestly affirm and reprehend; as, O faithless Generation! how long shall I be with you? how long shall I suffer you? Mark 9 19 Or when we  
3. Vehemently avouch the contrary, whether the interrogation be affirmative or negative; as, can the blind lead the blind? shall they not both fall into the ditch? that is, the blind cannot lead the blind, they shall both fall.  
Parenthesis is the interposing of one or more words of perfect sense, within another sentence, for the perfecting thereof; without which interposition, the sense would yet be perfect and entire.  
Concerning which, two rules are observable, viz.  
1. That the interposition should neither be long, nor frequent, because it will render the sentence obscure.  
2. That one Parenthesis be but seldom inserted within another; as, Are they ministers of Christ (I speak as a fool) I am more; 2 Cor. 11. 23.  
Parathesis, is a figure of construction, whereby one substantive is for declaration and distinction sake added unto another in the same case; as, the river Isis, or the river Wye. Judas saith unto him, not Iscariot. John 14. 22.  
Periphrasis, is the explication of a thing by more words, which may be expressed by one.  
This figure is principally made four ways.  
1. When some notable enterprise, ones native country, or some strange sect or opinion, is put instead of the proper name; as, The writer of the Trojan war for Homer.  
2. In Etymology, when the cause or reason of a name is unfolded; as, a man studious of wisdom, for a Philosopher.  
3. In Annotation, when by certain marks or tokens something is described; as, Anger is a vehement heat of the mind, which brings paloness to the countenance, burning to the eyes, and trembling to the parts of the body.  
4. When a thing is described by definition; as, the art of speaking eloquently, for Rhetoric. An oppressor of the laws and liberties of the people, for a Tyrant.  
Synonymia or Palilogia, is a heaping together of many words of one signification; as, Wisdom in a poor man lies as a thing despised, rejected, oppressed, buried and utterly extinct.  
Hypotypoois is a figure by which a whole matter is particularly and orderly expressed, as that it seems to be represented unto ocular inspection; as, It is a place which now humbling itself in fallowed plains, now proud in well husbanded hills, marries barren woods to cultivated valleys, and joins neat gardens to delicious fountains, etc.  
Praemunition or preparation is, when we presuppose what may be said by way of defence for those, whom we intent to reprehend or reprove.  
Transition is that by which the parts of an oration are joined together. And this is  
1. Perfect, by which is declared what hath been spoken, and what remaineth to be said; as, hitherto we have spoken of tillage and Astronomy, now we will treat of etc.  
2. Imperfect, by which is declared either what hath been said, or what remaineth to be spoken.  
This may be done eight several ways.  

1. By something that is equal or parallel; as, Those are most pleasant, nor are these less delightful.  
2. By something that is unequal; you have heard very sad things; but I shall now tell you sadder things than these.  
3. By something that is like.  
4. By something that is contrary; These things he did when he was young; hear now his virtuous progress in his elder days.  
5. By something that is divers; as, you have heard of his behaviour, I will now inform you of his learning.  
6. By preoccupation; as, We will now hasten to the rest, only give me leave to add this one thing.  
7. By reprehension; Why should I dwell on this subject; I hasten to that which is the cause of all.  
8. From some consequent or relative; as, you have heard what I have done for him; hear now how he hath required me.   
Rejection is, when we defer a thing to some other time or place, or wholly reject it as absurd and impertinent, and by no means to be admitted of; as, But of Luculus I will speak in some other place: and I will speak so, as that my speech shall not falsely accuse him, or yet derogate from his just praise.  
And thus much concerning Elocution. As for Memory and Pronunciation, which are the other two parts of Rhetoric, I purposely omit them, as being natural endowments, which may be better improved by constant practice, than by any precepts which can be given.  
Laus Deo.    

An Alphabetical Table in which the Tropes and Figures which are of a Greek Original are interpreted and explained.  

ALlegoria, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, inversion or changing, when one thing is propounded in the words, and another in the sense; it comes from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aliud, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dico, to speak otherwise than we think.  
Anacoenosis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, communication, it comes from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 communico.  
Anadiplosis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, redup ication; it is derived of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 again a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to double.  
Anaphora, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, relation; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to bring again, or to rehearse.  
Anthypophora, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, subjection; it comes from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to object or oppose a contrary sentence.  
Antiptosis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the putting of one case for another; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a case.  
Antithesis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, opposition, set or placed against; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 contra, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pono, to put against.  
Aphaeresis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a taking a way; it comes from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, aufero.  
Apocope, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, abscissio, a cutting off; it comes from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, abscindo.  
Apodioxis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, rejection, or expulsion; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, rejicio, to reject or expel.  
Apophasis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, negation or denying, it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nego to deny.  
Aporia, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, addubitatio doubting; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ambigo, dubito, animum pendeo, to be of a doubtful mind or not to know what is best to be said or done.  
Aposiopesis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, reticentia a holding one's peace; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 after and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, obticeo to be silent.  
Apostrophe, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, aversio, a turning away; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 verto to turn.  
Asyndeton, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, inconjunctum disjoined; it is also called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, dissolutum; an oration in which the copulative particles are omitted; it is derived from the privative particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 colligatus, bound together, and that is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ligo to bind.  
Auxesis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, augmentum an increasing; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (for which we now use 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) because it doth increase a matter or thing by amplification.   

C.  
Catachresis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, abusio, abuse, it comes from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, abutor, to abuse, or from the preposition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, contra against, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 use.  
Climax, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, gradatio, gradation or climbing by steps; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 acclino to bend towards, or incline to.   

D.  
Diaeresis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, divisio, division, it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, divido, to divide; it is also called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dissolutio dissolution, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dissolvo to dissolve.  
Diaestole, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, extension, or dilation, a figure whereby a syllable, short by nature, is made long; it comes from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 extendo, praet. med. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and being compounded with the preposition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   

E  
Ecphonesis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, exclamation or crying out; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 exclamo to cry out.  
Ecthlipsis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, elisio, a striking out; it comes from the verb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 elido.  
Ellipsis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, defectus, defect or want; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, deficio, to lack, or want.  
Epanalepsis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, resumtio, a taking back; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 after, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 again, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, accipio, to take; from whence comes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 acceptio a taking.  
Epanadoes, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, regressio, regression, a turning back; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 again, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ascensus, an ascending or climbing up; which is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sursum upwards, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a way.  
Epanorthosis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, correctio, emendatio, correction or amending; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 corrigo, to correct or amend.  
Epenthesis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, interpositio, interposition, or putting in between; it comes from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, interpono, to interpose.  
Epiphonema, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, acclamation, or a shooting out of the voice; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, acclamo, to cry out or shoot forth the voice.  
Epistrophe, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, conversio, a conversion, or turning to the same sound; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 prope near to, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 verto to turn or change.  
Epitrope, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, permissio, permission, derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, permitto, to permit or grant.  
Epizeuxis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, adjunctio, a joining together of the same word or sound, derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 conjungo, to join together.  
Erotesis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, interrogatio, interrogation or questioning; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, interrogo to question.   

G  
Graecismus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, immutatio Graecorum, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 graecus, a certain King from whom that Country was called Greece.   

H  
Hypallage, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, immutatio, a changing; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 muto, to change.  
Hyperbaton, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, transgressio, transgression, or a passing over, derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, transgredior to pass over.  
Hyperbole, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, superlatio, a passing of measure, or bounds; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, supero to exceed.  
Hypophora, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, objectio, an objection; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, objicio, to object.  
Hypotyposis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, evidentia, & illusstratio, illustration, when a thing is so expressed in writing, that the figure thereof may seem to be delineated; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, represento, to represent, to delineate by figure, or to draw the lively effigies of a thing.  
Hysterologia, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, dictiopraepostera, a preposterous speech, when that is spoken last which according to order aught to have been first, it is otherwise called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, postremum primum, the last first; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 postremus the last or hindmost, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 verbum a word or speech.   

I  
Ironia, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, simulatio, irrisio, mocking or counterfeiting; from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dico, from whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, simulator, which speaketh otherwise than he thinks; and hence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈…〉 staken for dissimulation, whereby one thing 〈…〉 s thought and another spoken.   

L  
Logismus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, cogitatio, musing or thinking; it comes from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 praet. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   

M  
Meiosis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, imminutio, diminution or extenuation, it comes from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, minuo, to diminish.  
Metalepsis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, transumptio, a taking from one to another; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, transumo, to take of or from another.  
Metaphora, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, translation, it comes from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 transfero to translate.  
Metaplasmus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, transformation, or a changing from one shape to another; it comes from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, transformo, to transform.  
Metathesis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, transpositio, transposition; it comes from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, trans over or beyond, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pono to put.  
Meeter, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, mensura, a measure or verse consisting of the measures of co 〈…〉 feet, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 comes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and by taking away 〈◊〉 it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Metonymia, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, transnominatio, a change of names, it comes from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which in composition signifies change, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●omen a name.   

P  
Paragoge, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, productio, a making long; it comes from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, produco, to draw in length, to prolong.  
Paralipsis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, praeteritio an overpassing; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to pretermit or leave out.  
Parathesis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, appositio, apposition or a putting of one thing to another; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 appono.  
Parenthesis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, interposition, or an inserting between; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 insero, to interpose or cast between.  
Paranomasia, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, agnomination or likeness of words; derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which in composition signifies amiss, or with some alteration, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nomen a name.  
Parrhesia, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, licentia, liberty or boldness of speaking, it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 licence and liberty.  
Periphrasis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, circuml●cutio, a speaking of many words when few may suffice, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 circumloquor to utter that in many words which may be spoke in few.  
Pleonasmus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, redundantia, superfluity; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 redundo ●o abound superfluously.  
Polyptoton, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, variatio casuum, a ●hange of the termination or case, and it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, variè, variously, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈…〉 adens falling or ending.  
Polysyndeton, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, variè et multipliciter conjunctum, diversely and many ways soyned together; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈…〉 multùm very much, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, conjunctus ●oyned together.  
Prolepsis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the anticipation, or prevention of an objection; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 prae before, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 capio, to take, praet 〈…〉 s. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and with the preposition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Prosapodosis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, redditio, a giving again, it comes from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, reddo to restore.  
Prosopopoeia, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, fictio personae, the feigning of a person, it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, persona, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 facio vel fingo to make or feign.  
Prosthesis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 appositio, a putting of one letter to another, it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 appono to put or add unto.   

R  
Rhetorica, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Rhetoric; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, dico, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being out of use, fut 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 praet. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Atticè 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, praet. pas. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and thence comes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Rhyme, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, meeter or such a number as is in music; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by changing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 into 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that comes from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 traho to draw or allure.   

S  
Symploce, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, complexio, complicatio, an agreement of words in a sentence, it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, complico, connecto, to wrap or couple together.  
Synaloepha, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, vocalium commixtio, a mingling together of vowels, a bringing two syllables into one; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 simulungo to anoint together, metaphorically used for commisceo to mingle together, in unum contrabo to contract in one.  
Synchoresis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, concessio, granting of an argument; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 concedo togrant.  
Syncope, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, concisio, a cutting away, it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 concido to cut in pieces.  
Synaeresis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, contractio, a contraction, it comes from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in unum contraho to contract into one.  
Synecdoche, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, comprehension, derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, comprehendo vel un à excipio, to comprehend or take together.  
Synonymia, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nominis communio, a partaking together of a name, or divers words signifying one and the same thing; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 simul together and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nomen a name or word.  
Systole, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, correptio a shortening.   

T  
Tapinosis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, humiliatio submission, it comes from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 humilem reddo, to be humble, or to submit,  
Tmesis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sectio, divisio, a section, a dividing; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 seco to cut praet. pass. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, from whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   

Z  
Zeugma, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, junctura, a joining or coupling together; it is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 jungo to join or couple.   
FINIS.