THE CHARGE OF SCHISM CONTINUED: BEING A Justification of the Author of Christian Blessedness for his Charging the Separatists with SCHISM, notwithstanding the Toleration.  
In a Letter to a City-Friend.  
LICENCED, Decemb. 8. 1690.  
LONDON, Printed for Samuel Manship at the Black Bull over-against the Royal Exchange in Cornhill, 1691.   

SIR,  
THE Information you give me concerning the great Clamour that is made by some in the City against our Friend the Author of Christian Blessedness, for continuing the Charge of Schism at this time against the Separatists from the Church of England, I am the more ready to believe, because I find he meets with a great deal of the like Treatment in the Country, as far as the Sphere of my Acquaintance or Intelligence reaches. I can hardly put my Head into any Company, but where I hear him either Passionately railed at by Popular uneducated Tongues, or gravely Condemned by those of more sober and improved Understandings; who, though no Enemies to his Person, have yet but little Charity for his Cause. Nay, several who know nothing at all of the Book, and so cannot directly and expressly condemn it, do yet show how ready they would be upon occasion to do so, by declaring their Judgements against the Proposition maintained in it.  
For I find 'tis a thing generally taken for granted, that the Dissenters are now no longer under the guilt of Schism, however they might be charged with it before. For, say they, the Tables are now turned. They have now an Authentic Patent for their Separation, and may divide from you by Authority. And therefore let your Indictment run never so high, and be otherwise never so well proved, their Liberty will be their immediate Discharge. For, Sir, you must know that the Toleration is generally supposed to lay all in Common, to put the Church and the Conventicle upon a square, and to acquit those that Separate not only from the Penalty, but from the Fault of Nonconformity.  
This Notion, I perceive, has found entertainment, not only in Vulgar Heads, (who seldom think distinctly about any thing, but confound all things, whose Difference is not to be felt and handled,) but also among those of good Natural sense, and who have taken a Turn or two of Scholastic Education, and understand something of the Measures of Reason and Consequence. Particularly I find this Conceit passes very current among Ladies and Gentlemen, who, for want either of Leisure, or Ability, or Attention, seldom examine things to the bottom, but judge according to Outside and Appearance.  
But this I do not so much wonder at, when I observe that Men of professed Study and considerable Learning are carried away with the same Fancy, which I find gets ground every day; and let me tell you, Sir, among some others, besides those whose Interest is concerned to have it true. I find some of these begin to talk very oddly and untowardly in this matter, and not according to their usual Clearness, and accuracy of Judgement, which they still retain in their other Discourses. But as for the Interested Parties, they catch at this Popular Plea of the Toleration with all the greediness imaginable, and insist upon it mightily, (an Argument, by the way, that they distrust their other Defences,) and are become downright impatient of the Charge of Schism, and think themselves not only highly Affronted, but greatly Wronged and Injured whenever they are taxed with it, and as you know, Sir, are very angry with our Author for continuing the Charge. What? Charge us with Schism at this time of day, Now we are in Favour, Now the Government smiles upon us, Now we have the Law on our Side? etc.  
How far they have the Law of their Side, will be better understood from what is to follow. In the mean time I with that some of those who are so incensed against our Author, and so free in their Censures upon that part of his Book, would have took the Courage to appear against him in public, which would have been a much fairer and more manly way than either to rail at him in Corners, (which, by the way, are as little sought for by Charity as by Truth,) or to pester him with Scurrilous and abusive Letters without Names. This argues their Fear to be as great as their Malice, and that they diffide either to their Cause, or to their Skill in managing it. The truth is, they ought for their own Credit, as well as in Justice to the Author, either to have Suppressed their Resentments, or to have Vented them in Public. Which if they had done, I dare undertake they should not have been disappointed of an Adversary.  
But it seems they have thought fit to make use of another Method, which though not equally declarative of their Sense, yet with the help of a little Spelling and Collating things together may serve to pick out enough of their Meaning. For as far as I can gather from what I observe, and from what I hear, the Sum of all that they say against our Author (bating impertinent Cavils and Foul-mouthed Reflections) may be reduced to these three Heads:  

1. The Falseness of his Charge.  
2. The Uncharitableness of it.  
3. The Unseasonableness of it.   
Which Treble Censure is grounded upon one Common Argument, because, say they, the Dissenters are Now, by Virtue of their Toleration, upon Equal Terms with the Church.  
But, Sir, in the First place, how can that be, when One is Established, and the Other only Tolerated? Is not Establishment more than Liberty? If by Liberty here were understood Allowance or Warrant to act (which is the highest Sense of the word that the Persons concerned stand for) it would yet fall much short of Establishment, which does not only Allow or Permit, but Enjoin and Require. Much more than if Liberty here be found (as I believe it will) to signify only a Capacity of acting without Punishment. Liberty of Allowance is much short of Establishment, much more Liberty of Impunity. And how then are the Church and the Dissenters upon Equal Terms?  
Some therefore, who better understand what they say, choose to express themselves thus, That the Dissenters have as much Authority for their Liberty, as the Church has for her Establishment. Which implies not Absolute Equality, but only Equality of Proportion. Now this I readily admit. But what then? Therefore they are not guilty of Schism in Causelessly dividing from her Communion. I interpose the Term (Causelefly) not without reason. For if they say they have sufficient Cause for dividing from us, than they no longer stand to their Plea of Toleration, but put their Cause upon another Issue, which I think has been already sufficiently examined and exposed. But that which they stand for now by the nature of their Appeal, seems to be this, That they are not guilty of Schism, because of the Liberty they have by the Toleration, which must therefore be supposed to excuse them from Schism, though they Causelessly divide from us. For if they had just Cause for their Separation, than they would be excused from Schism without a Toleration, which then need not be pleaded. But this is the Plea that is now generally insisted upon for their discharge from Schism, which must therefore be understood with this Supposal, though they do Causelessly divide from the Communion of the Church. This therefore is the true and explicit State of their Plea.  
The Dissenters have now as much Authority for their Liberty as the Church has for her Establishment; And therefore they are not guilty of Schism in Causelessly Separating from her. Now this Consequence I utterly deny, and Affirm that such Separatists are as much guilty of Schism now, after the Toleration, as they were before.  
To make this Clear, we must, in the First place, distinguish between the Law itself, and the Sanction of the Law. By the Law itself here I understand the bare Simple Proposition, wherein either the doing or the not doing such a thing is enacted. By the Sanction of the Law I understand those External Motives which are proposed and solemnly annexed by the Lawgiver to his Law as an engagement to Obedience, that is, Rewards and Punishments. These Sanctions, though they are sometimes made a part of the Law, as when we say the Penal Part by way of Contradistinction to the Preceptive; yet properly speaking, they are no part of the Law at all, but only Accessories or Appendices prudentially added to it, as Expedients for the better enforcement of Obedience. The Law if self is wholly completed in the Proposition, from which the Sanction is as much distinct as the Hedge is from the Enclosure, or the Ground which it encloses.  
This Distinction naturally leads us into another, as being dependent upon it. For if the Sanction be a distinct thing from the Law, than we must also, 2dly, distinguish between the Abolishing of the Sanction and the Abolishing of the Law, and between the Suspension of the Sanction and the Suspension of the Law, and much more yet between the Suspension of the Sanction and the Abolishment of the Law. If the Law and the Sanction were one and the same thing, yet the Suspension of the Sanction could not be an Abolishment of the Law, because Suspension is not Abolishment. Much less than can the Suspension of the Sanction be an Abolishment of the Law upon the Supposition of their Difference. These things therefore ought carefully to be distinguished.  
From the Distinctions premised, this Conclusion will necessarily arise, That the Directive or Preceptive part of the Law may still remain in force, though the Penal part (I speak according to Common use) be removed, whether it be by Abolishment or by Suspension. For since the Preceptive and the Penal part are supposed to be wholly distinct, 'tis impossible that a Change made in the One should at all affect the Other, unless you could suppose some Connexion or other to intercede between them. As for instance, the Soul and Body being supposed to be Substances really distinct, 'tis impossible that a Change in the One should at all affect the Other, unless there were such a Law of Connexion between them, that Certain Thoughts in the Soul should raise Certain Motions in the Body, and that Certain Motions in the Body should occasion Certain Thoughts in the Soul, which is what we call the Vital Union between Soul and Body. In like manner say I concerning the Preceptive and the Penal part of the Law, that upon Supposition of their real distinction 'tis impossible that a Change in the One should at all affect the Other, unless there should happen to be such a declared Connexion between them by the Will of the Legislative, that upon the Ceasing of the One, the Other also should Cease; or unless the Nature of the thing infer the Necessity of it. Neither of which may be pretended in the present Case, as I shall have Occasion to show in the Process of this Argument. At present I suppose it, and do therefore say that the Preceptive part of the Law may, and will still remain in force, though the Penal part (which is distinct from it) be removed.  
Whence it will further follow, that the Preceptive part of the Law does at present actually remain in full force. For all that a Toleration does or can do, is only to remove the Penalty, where there is an Established National Church. It is not there a Liberty of Allowance, but only a Liberty of Impunity. I say where there is an Established National Church. For indeed where there is no Legal Establishment for the Public Exercise of Religion, a Toleration would be a Liberty of Allowance, (I mean as far as the State or Civil Law can give an Allowance in this matter;) but where there is such an Establishment, there it can only be a Liberty of Impunity. There it only suspends or takes away for a time the Penal part, which will not excuse from transgressing against the Preceptive, which, wherever there is a National Establishment, still Lives, Breathes, Speaks, Commands, and Obliges too under Sin, though not under Civil Penalty.  
Every one knows, that has either Read or Thought any thing about the Nature of Laws, that a Toleration is very much short of a Dispensation. But now a Dispensation does not Abolish the Precept of the Law, much less than may a Toleration be supposed able to do it. Indeed a Dispensation does some way affect the Preceptive part of the Law, and that is it whereby it exceeds a Toleration. It is indeed a present Suspension of it, not an absolute through Suspension, but a Suspension with relation to such a particular Person or Action, in respect of which, the present Course of the Law is interrupted. But now a Toleration does not so much as affect the Preceptive part of the Law, it has no manner of effect upon it, much less can it Abolish it, or Null the the Obliging force of it. All therefore that it can do is only to remove the Penalty.  
And this is the true Difference, and perhaps the Only one that can be assigned between a Dispensation and a Toleration. A Dispensation does, for the present, and to some intents and purposes, bind up or suspend the Preceptive part of the Law, and interrupts the Authoritative and Obliging Power of it, and thereby makes it not only consistent with Impunity, but with Innocency to act against it. For it makes the Law as no Law with respect to the Person or Persons dispensed with, and for the time while they are dispensed with. But now a Toleration does not pass any such Effect (indeed not any at all) upon the Preceptive part of the Law. It neither strikes it, nor is levelled at it. All the Execution that it does, or is designed to do, is upon the Penal part, which indeed for the time is wholly removed by it. So that a Dispensation does as much exceed a Toleration, as an Abrogation does a Dispensation. In that a Dispensation does do no more than Suspend the Preceptive part, it falls short of an Abrogation, which Absolutely and Universally removes it. And in that it does so much, it exceeds a Toleration, which only takes off the Penalty, without so much as touching either the Substance or the Virtue of the Law.  
And though this be clear and plain enough by the Evidence of its own Light; yet, I confess, 'tis some satisfaction to me, and it may be more so to others who set a greater value upon Authorities than I do, to find so great and so well-approved a Judge of the Abstract and general Reason of Law as the Celebrated Suarez to be of the same Judgement with me in this matter. For, says he, in 
Lib. 6. cap. 11. p. 386.  his Book De Legibus, speaking of the Effects of a Dispensation of a Humane Law, Dispensation plus est quam Permissio, & Permissio proprie sumpta & secundum Communem usum, non est Dispensatio. Aliquando enim permittere non aliud significat quam voluntarie non impedire, quod non est Dispensare. Nam Deus permittit Peccatum, in quo non Dispensat. Aliter vero permittere significat idem quod sinere impune operari malum, ut in Republica dicuntur aliqua peccata permitti; Et quando id fit ex decreto Legis, dicitur permissio esse Legis effectus. Illa vero non relaxat Legem, quandoquidem non excusat Culpam, quam propria Dispensatio tollit. Et ideo neque illa dicetur Dispensatio. A Dispensation is more than a Permission or Toleration (for 'tis all one, both as to the import of the word, and Suarez's constant way of using it) and a Permission properly taken, and according to Common use is not a Dispensation. For sometimes to permit signifies no other than voluntarily not to hinder, which is not to Dispense. For God does permit Sin in which he does not Dispense. Sometimes again to permit signifies the same as to suffer the doing of an Evil with Impunity, as some Sins are said to be permitted in a Commonwealth. And when this is done by virtue of a legal Decree, than such a Permission is said to be the Effect of the Law. But this does not relax the Law, in as much as it does not excuse the Fault, which a proper Dispensation takes away. And therefore neither may this be said to be a Dispensation.  
Suarez here distinguishes of a twofold Sufferance or Toleration; the Suffering an Evil to be done, or the bore not hindering the doing of it, and the Suffering it to be done with Impunity. And both these he sets below a Dispensation. The former kind of Toleration is the least that can be imagined, and indeed is so little as to be consistent with the strictest Kind or State of Government that is. All Governors do Tolerate at this rate, even God himself, who, as He says, does permit or not hinder the committing of Sin. The latter kind of Toleration is a degree above the former, as adding to it the doing with Impunity. And this indeed is too much to consist with the Strictness of Government, and therefore is not used in every Kind or State of it. Neither God nor Man do always Tolerate after this manner. For indeed it is a Relaxation of the Government, not as to the Legislative, but only as to the Executive part of it. But though it be so much greater than the former sort of Toleration, yet it is also at the same time as much less than a Dispensation, in that a Dispensation does, in some respects, wholly suspend even the very Obligation of the Law, which a Toleration does not so much as Relax, or any way Affect, but only Suspends the Penalty annexed to the Transgression of it. So that though it be some Mitigation of the Government, and thereby exceeds a bare simple Permission, yet it is no Abatement of the Law, and therein falls short of a Dispensation.  
The short of this matter is, All Permission may be considered either as of Right, or of Fact. Permission of Right is the same with a Dispensation, which disarms the Law of its present Authority and Obligation, and makes it no Fault to do otherwise than is Commanded. Permission of Fact is twofold, either the bare suffering or not hindering the doing of an Evil, which may be called a Simple Permission. Or the suffering it to be done without Punishment, which is a Toleration. This Latter Permission, though it be greater than the immediately preceding, yet 'tis as much less than the First, as reaching no higher than the Sanction, whereas that puts a present restraint upon the very Power of the Law.  
This I take to be a true and distinct Idea of a Toleration, both as it is in its own proper nature, and as it stands in relation to other Changes that concern the Administration of the Law. From whose Authority and Obligation it does not in the least diminish, but only lays a restraint upon the Execution of it. It does not divest the Law of any part of her Sovereignty, but only Sheaths up her Sword of Discipline; it does not Silence her Voice, but only Stays her Hand. In short, there is nothing more nor less in it, than a Suspension of the Penal part of the Law.  
This is all that it can do, and perhaps more than it ought. For I believe there aught to be no such thing as a Toleration, and that 'tis more than either the Church or the State can rightfully grant. For not to insist upon that Trust which seems to be reposed in them, to defend and secure both Unity of Faith and Unity of Worship; if there ought to be a Toleration, than there ought to be no Establishment, (for to what purpose is an Establishment, whose Order must never be executed?) But 'tis a strange thing if Human Laws may not be allowed to oblige to the same thing to which the Divine Law is acknowledged to Oblige, that is, to Ecclesiastic Unity. Which because required by the Divine Law, ought also to be required by Human Laws, and consequently there ought to be no such thing as a Toleration. And besides, those that say there aught, seem to me to be guilty of a Contradictory, Self-inconsistent Proposal, and not rightly to understand what they would have. For if they will have Liberty of Conscience granted to any, then certainly the Supreme Authority of the Nation must be allowed this Liberty. And then let us suppose (as well we may) that he thinks himself Obliged in Duty and Conscience to use the Power that is in his hands to suppress all Religions but the true one, that is, all but that which he himself conceives to be true. And what then will become of the Toleration? Nor ought the Magistrate to be blamed for so doing. For having once allowed in general that every Man ought to have Liberty of Conscience, you ought not to think it hard that the Magistrate assumes this Liberty of acting according to his Conscience, though by doing so he restrains and hinders yours, as he certainly will in case he make use of the same Liberty. So that Absolute and Universal Liberty of Conscience is a downright, contradictory, inconsistent Supposition; which one Consideration, by the way, is sufficient to overthrow all that a Late Author has pleaded in its behalf.  
But I shall pursue this no further, as being only a Digression from my Present Concern. What I stand for now, is this, That a Toleration, when it is granted, implies no more than only a Removal of such Penalties as the Law would otherwise inflict upon those who Disobey it. That it does not either Abrogate, or Suspend, or Dispense with the Law, but only bridles and reins up the Execution of it. All which is to be understood with the forementioned Condition, where there is an Established National Church.  
And this (notwithstanding the Toleration) is the present Case in England, where there is a Church Established by the Law of the Land, and invested with several Temporal as well as Ecclesiastic Rights and Privileges, where the Public Liturgy stands Authorized by several Acts of Parliament, where Articles of Religion and Constitutions and Canons Ecclesiastical are also Confirmed by the same Authority, where the Acts of Uniformity remain unrepeal'd as before, and where even the Dissenters themselves are all required to pay Tithes to the Public and Legallyappointed Ministry. Which is also a plain and certain Argument that they are required to attend upon it, and conform to it. For is it imaginable that the Laws should Oblige them to Contribute their part to the Support and Maintenance of that Worship, to which they do not enjoin them to Conform? This would be against the very Supposition of an Establishment, and would place the Church and the Conventicle upon an equal ground indeed, that is, it would make neither of them Established, but both only Tolerated. But they confess the Church to be Established, and so indeed she is as much as ever; and therefore the only Change made by the Toleration is, that the Penal part of the Law is, for the present, laid aside. As for the Preceptive, that stands where it did, and Obliges under Sin, though not under Civil Penalty.  
And if so, than those who now divide from this Church Established by Law, which Law does also require their Communion with it, are true and proper Transgressor's against the Law; and if they do it Causelessly, are also guilty of the Breach of Church-Unity, that is of Schism, notwithstanding any Public Order for the not inflicting the Punishment otherwise due to them for so transgressing. This cannot excuse them either from Disobedience to the State, or from Schism in the Church, with whose Establishment they are still Obliged to Conform as far as Lawfully they may, though not accountable to the Law for their Nonconformity. Thus the Jews were justly taxable with disobedience to their Law in the matter of Arbitrary Divorce, though for some Prudential Reasons tolerated in the Practice of it by Moses their Chief Magistrate. The Effect of which Toleration (as our Saviour himself expounds it) was not Innocency, but only Impunity.  
Against what has been hitherto discoursed, I know but of one Objection that a Man would not be Ashamed to Urge, or Impertinent to Answer, or that deserves the Expense of Ink and Paper. But there is another which I must first take in my way, because 'tis thrown upon me, and is very loud and importunate for Satisfaction, which must therefore, I think, be given it for quietness sake.  
In the first place than it is pleaded, that this is no Ordinary Toleration. That it is not a bare Supine Neglect to animadvert, a kind of Drowise fit, or Nodding of the Government, no, nor a designed and deliberate Connivance only, nor yet a Private act of Indulgence declared by the Will and in the Name of the Prince alone; But that 'tis an Indulgence granted and settled by an Act of the whole Legislative, by the joint Concurrence of King and Parliament, that 'tis a Toleration by Law, by the same Law upon which the Church itself is erected, and by which it stands. This is the Common Popular Objection, and there is not a Woman, or a Shopkeeper, but what is Big with it.  
Now I grant the Dissenters that they have a Toleration settled by Law, and that therefore this is no Ordinary Toleration, and I know they are not a little puffed up with it. And by the way, Sir, 'twould make even a very grave Man smile to see how those Men who have been hitherto such Despisers and Vilifiers of a National Establishment, are now lifted up with the Conceit of a National Liberty. Of what advantage this may prove either to themselves, or to the Nation, or to the general Interest of Religion, I leave to wiser Heads to Conjecture, and to Time to show; but in the mean while I fancy this their Plea, from the Extraordinariness of the Toleration, will do 'em but little service. For 'tis the unhappiness of this Objection that it proceeds upon a wrong State of the Question. The Question is not concerning either the Kind or the Degree of the Authority, but concerning the Nature and the Extent of the Grant; not by what they are Authorized, but to what, whether to act Allowedly and with Innocence, or only Unrestrainedly and with Impunity? And to what purpose then do they insist upon the Greatness of the Authority?  
If it be said, that this is no Mistaking the State of the Question, but an Inferring the thing denied, viz. Liberty of Allowance, from the Greatness of that Authority whereby this Solemn Toleration is granted: I Answer, that then the Inference is grossly False and Illogical. 'Tis certainly a very pleasant way of Arguing, to infer the greater extent of the Grant from the Greatness of the Authority whereby it is made, as if a Lesser Grant might not be the Effect of a Greater Authority.  
Suppose that instead of Moses, God himself had been the Author of the Toleration concerning Arbitrary Divorce among the Jews. This Toleration was indeed given by Moses without any Divine Commission for it, as far as appears. But suppose it had been given by God himself. It will be readily granted that such a Toleration as this would have been of much greater Authority than the other, indeed of the greatest in the World. But would it therefore have been to any higher Purpose or greater Effect? No, that does not follow. Moses his Toleration reached as far as Impunity, and a Divine one would have reached no further. It would not have produced any other Effect, though perhaps it might have been a further Security and Establishment of the same. Though the Authority itself be Greater, yet the thing granted by that Authority may be the same that is otherwise granted by a Lesser; and if there be nothing else in the Business but only a greater Degree of Authority, it must and will be so. And thus 'tis in the Case before us. Though a Toleration by Act of Parliament be of greater Authority than a Toleration by the sole Will and Pleasure of the Prince, yet it is not to a greater Effect. And though the Dissenters have now as much Authority for their Liberty, as the Church has for her Establishment, yet 'tis only for Liberty, that is, (as appears by what has been said) Impunity.  
When therefore 'tis pleaded that this is no Ordinary Toleration, 'tis plain that there is a double meaning in the Proposition. It may be understood either as to the Authority of it, or as to the Effect of it. If as to the Authority, that indeed is true, but nothing at all to the purpose, as being beside the State of the Question. If as to the Effect, that I affirm and have shown to be false. The Effect of this Toleration reaches not an Inch further than that of a less Solemn One would have done; perhaps, considering some particular Restrictions whereby it is qualified, not so far. But to be sure it cán extend no further, the greatest Effect of both being only Exemption from Punishment. So that you see this Objection is quite disarmed, and indeed is too weak and empty to abide any longer Trial.  
The truth is, I should not have kept it so long under Examination, were it not for the Popularity of it, and that great Noise that is made about it. 'Tis not its Moment, but its Importunity that has procured it so full a Hearing. For indeed in itself it is weak and silly enough. Though yet I think it is the Best by much that is used, or that the Men I am dealing with have Invention enough to urge. But I will be so kind to them, for once, as to put a Better Objection into their hands; and if they think I do not propose it enough to their advantage, let them take it and manage it themselves.  
You may please to remember, Sir, that a little further backward, speaking of the Distinction that is between the Sanction of the Law, and the Law itself; I said 'twas impossible that a Change in the One should at all affect the Other, unless there were a Connexion between them, arising either from the declared Will of the Legislative, or from the Nature of the thing itself.  
Now in this I may seem to have laid a Foundation for a very strong Objection. For it may be pleaded that there is such a Connexion, not from the Will of the Legislative declaring such a dependence between the Law and the Sanction, that upon the Ceasing of one, the other also shall Cease: This, I suppose, will not be pretended, nor do I see any room for such a Pretence. But from the very Nature of the thing itself so requiring.  
For it may be said, that although the Sanction of the Law be, as we have shown, a Distinct thing from the Law itself, that is, the Penal part from the Preceptive, yet it is Essential and Necessary to the Obligation of it. And therefore that which removes the Sanction, does also by Consequence remove the Obligation of the Law; And consequently since a Toleration (as is acknowledged) removes the Sanction of the Law, it does also by Virtue of that remove the Obligation of it, the Latter not being able to stand without the Former, any more than the Body is to live without the Soul.  
I confess if the Sanction of the Law were necessary to the Obligation of it, then notwithstanding all the real Difference that is between them, that which takes away the Sanction, would also unhinge the Obligation, as that which takes away the Soul destroys also the Life of the Body; and consequently the Toleration, by taking away the Sanction, must of necessity be allowed to take away the Obligation too. In this there can be no great Difficulty, or Dispute. All the Question will be concerning the Leading Proposition, whether the Sanction of the Law be necessary to the Life and Obligation of it. Here will be the last Pinch of the Difficulty, as will be better discerned, if we Analyze the Argument, by Casting it into a Logical Form and Order; wherein it will appear thus:  
If the Toleration takes away the Sanction of the Law, it also takes away the Obligation of it.  
But according to you it takes away the Sanction of the Law;  
Therefore it takes away the Obligation.  
The Consequence is denied, and thus proved;  
That which takes away the Sanction, takes away the Obligation:  
Therefore if the Toleration takes away the Sanction, it also takes away the Obligation.  
The Antecedent is denied, and thus proved:  
If the Sanction of the Law be Necessary to the Obligation of it, then that which takes away the Sanction, takes away the Obligation.  
But the Sanction is Necessary, etc.  
Here the Consequence is granted, but the Minor is denied;  
Which was the Head and Knot of the Objection, and whose Truth comes now to be Examined.  
It is a Common Question among Moralists, Civilians, and Casuistical Divines, Vtrum Sanctio Paenalis sit de Essentia sive de Ratione Legis? Whether a Penal Sanction be of the Essence or Reason of the Law? By which, I suppose, they do not mean, as the terms seem to import, whether it be of the inward Form and Constitution of the Law, (for 'tis plain that it is not;) but whether it be a Necessary Condition to the Obligation of it, the same thing that is now under Consideration.  
I do not remember that Suarez takes any notice of this matter, which I cannot but wonder at in a Person that undertakes a just and adequate Account of the Nature of Laws, and who often descends to the discussion of Points of much lesser moment. Though what his Judgement was in the Case, may be sufficiently Collected from what he discourses 
Lib. 1. c. 20. p. 53.  concerning the several ways whereby Laws may suffer a Change. Among which I do not find that he has any Mention of the Removal of the Penalty, which he could not have omitted, if he had thought that the Sanction of the Law was necessary to its Obligation. For then the Removal of it would have caused either an Abrogation or a Suspension in the Law, as is urged in the Objection. But the Question is not so overlookt by Others; and they generally answer in the Negative, that the Sanction is not Necessary to the Obligation of the Law. I say generally. For I know there are some few that say that it is Necessary, and that the Law is but a mere dead Letter, a Body without a Soul, if it have no Sanction. Nay there are some that advance one step higher, and say that the Sanction is not only necessary to the Obligation of a Law, but that it derives its whole Obligation from the Sanction.  
That the Latter of these Assertions is not true, is, I think, as certain as I would desire any thing to be. For I consider, that if the Law derived its whole Obligation from the Sanction, than these grand Absurdities (not to mention any other) would unavoidably follow.  
First, That any Law would Oblige, let the Matter of it be never so wicked and unjust, or the Authority whereby 'tis made never so incompetent, provided it were armed with a sufficient Sanction. For the Sanction being supposed to be the only Fountain of Obligation, that being present, and in such measure as is requisite, the Obligation must needs follow, as every Effect does upon the Being of its entire and adequate Cause.  
Secondly, It would also follow, that no Law could oblige constantly, unless it were backed with the greatest Penalty that is absolutely possible. For since the Law is supposed to have all its Obligation from the Penalty, then where there is the greater Penalty, there will be the greater Obligation; and consequently if the Case should so happen, that a Man should threaten me if I do not transgress the Law, with a greater Punishment than the Law does in case I do, I am then discharged from the Obligation of the Law, (as being under a greater Obligation) and may innocently transgress it, though it were the Law even of God himself. Which at one blow would strike off the constant Obligation of the whole Jewish Law. For the Law of the Jews being ratified and confirmed to them only by Temporal Penalties, and those not always the greatest, even of the same Kind and Order; if a Jew should happen to be tempted to transgress the Law (as he easily might) by a greater Punishment than the Law would inflict upon him for transgressing it, upon this supposition, that the Law receives its Obligation from the Penalty, it would follow, that he would be released from the Obligation of his Law, which I think is Absurd enough. But to this I further add:  
Thirdly, If the Law be to receive its Obligation from the Sanction, than we must suppose it therefore to Oblige, because it makes it Reasonable or Eligible for a Man to do so or so that he may avoid such a Punishment, for that is all the engagement to action that the Sanction can be supposed to add. But if this be all, this is not to Oblige in Duty, but only in Point of Prudence, which indeed is not properly to Oblige at all, since otherwise all rational Inducements would be Laws. Indeed the Proposal of a Penalty may be a good Ground of Persuasion why a Man should do so as the Law directs. But it can be no more, it cannot lay an Obligation upon the Conscience, or make it Sin to do otherwise. It may move, determine, and in some Cases secure the Choice, but it cannot Oblige the Will.  
To say therefore that the Law Obliges by and from the Sanction, is in effect to say that it does not Oblige at all, since than it could Oblige only by way of Persuasion and rational Inducement, which indeed is not strictly and properly to Oblige. The truth is, upon this Supposition the most Excellent Law of the most Sacred Authority in the World would Oblige no otherwise than the Demand of a Thief upon the Highway. The Thief bids me Deliver, or he'll Pistol me. The Law bids me do thus, or I shall be Punished. I yield up my Money to the Thief, to avoid being Pistoled; and I yield my Obedience to the Law, to avoid being Punished. 'Tis possible here that the Motive of Action in both Cases may be the same, viz. the avoiding of Evil. But I hope nobody will be so Gross as to say, that the Obligation in both Cases is alike too; that the Law Obliges no otherwise than the Command of a Thief when he comes to Rob me. And yet this must be said, if it be true, that the Law has its Obligation from the Sanction; for then 'tis plain, that all its Obligation comes to this, That it makes it reasonable and eligible for me to do such an Action to avoid such an Evil, and so does the Thief.  
Fourthly, If the Law Obliges purely in Virtue of the Sanction, than 'twill follow, that the Law will Oblige no further, than the Sanction reaches; Consequently it will not Oblige the Supreme Magistrate, who is acknowledged not to be subject to the Sanction of the Law. But this is more than the greatest Sticklers for Prerogative will allow, and indeed is against the general Sense of the greatest Masters of Law, whether Common or Civil, who generally yield the Supreme Magistrate to be under the Directive, though not under the Coercive Power of the Law. And if so, than the Preceptive does not Oblige by Virtue of the Coercive, since 'tis allowed to Oblige where the Coercive does not reach.  
Fifthly, This Hypothesis of the Law's receiving its Obligation from the Sanction, will, in the Consequence of it, make all Laws purely Penal, that is, such as do not oblige Absolutely, to the Fact, but only Conditionally, either to the Fact or to the Penalty; and which therefore are equally satisfied either by doing what is Expressed, or by suffering what is Entailed upon the Omission of it. For if the Law be supposed to Oblige by Virtue of the Penalty which it proposes, than its Obligation comes to this, That I must do such a thing, because otherwise I must suffer such a Punishment; which is as much as to say, that if I do not such a thing, I must suffer such a Punishment; which will again at last be resolved into this, that either I must do so, or suffer so; which though it Obliges me Disjunctively, leaves me at full Liberty as to the Determination of my Choice. Which expresses the true Form and Nature of a pure Penal Law. But I suppose it will not be said that all Laws are purely Penal. For then there would be no Sin but only where the Penalty is declined or resisted; the Consequence of which again would be, that all the Sin that is in the World would only be against Human Laws; and that there would be no such thing as Sinning against God, because the Divine Justice can neither be evaded nor resisted. Which is a Consequence that would make strange Alterations, and introduce as strange Confusions in the System of the Moral and Intellectual World.  
Sixthly and Lastly, If the Obligation of the Law proceeded from the Sanction, than 'twould follow, that I am therefore Obliged to do, because I must Suffer for not doing: But this is so far from being true, that the Reverse of it is so. For I must therefore Suffer for not doing, because I was Obliged to do. For I must Suffer, because I Sinned, otherwise my Suffering would be unjust. And I could not Sin if I were not under an Obligation; which being thus Pre-supposed and Antecedent to the Necessity of undergoing the Penalty, (which is what I call the Sanction,) cannot possibly be founded upon it, or proceed from it.  
This last Argument proves not only that the Law does not derive its whole Obligation from the Sanction, but also that no Part or Degree of it is thence derived. For if the whole Obligation be (as is supposed) Antecedent to the Penalty, then 'tis plain that no part of it is or can be derived from it. To which I further add, That the End of the Sanction is to move and engage Men to pay that Obedience to the Law which they owe. 'Tis indeed one of the forcible and violent ways of recovering a Debt, a Debt which Men owe to the Law, and which, if they did not owe it, could not be justly exacted from them under a Penalty. Here then is Duty and Obligation supposed (in Order of Nature at least) as Antecedent to the Sanction, and to which the Sanction is to serve as a Means to the End. And therefore 'tis most certain (if there be any thing so in the Measures of Reasoning) that the Law does not derive its Obligation, nor any Part or Degree of it from the Sanction. And this I take to be Virtually at least contained in those well-known Words of the Apostle, Wherefore ye must needs 
Rom. 13.  be Subject, not only for Wrath, but also for Conscience sake. There is, I know, some Dispute concerning the Meaning, and concerning the Extent of the former Clause; but whatever be meant by Subjection here, and how far soever it is to extend, this in the mean time is certain, that this Subjection, whatever it be, is by the Apostle pressed from a double Principle, Wrath and Conscience, which he plainly distinguishes one from another, as two different Grounds and Inducements to Subjection. Ye must needs be subject not only for Wrath, but also for Conscience; that is, not only to avoid Punishment, but also out of a Sense of Duty and Obligation. Which being here made not only a distinct, but a further degree of Argument for Subjection, 'tis plain that in the judgement of the Apostle the Obligation of the Law is not from the Sanction; because if so, he need only have said, Ye must be subject for Wrath, which would have been sufficient as including the other. But whereas he makes a Contradistinction between them, 'tis evident that he that is subject only for Wrath, is not subject for Conscience; and consequently that Obligation in Conscience does not proceed from Wrath, but from some other Principle.  
If it be then demanded, Whence does the Law receive its Obligation? I answer first, that 'tis enough for my present purpose to have shown that it does not receive it from the Sanction. But if a more positive Answer must be given, I say that the Law has its Obligation from the Authority of the Lawgiver, who by virtue of his Authority has a Right to be Obeyed, and to exact Obedience by Punishments in all his just Commands.  
And this they will at length be driven to acknowledge, who derive the Obligation of the Law from the Sanction. For when they say that the Law obliges by and from the Sanction, they must be understood to mean if their Sense be drawn out more at length, that the Law obliges me to do so, because it obliges me to suffer for not doing so: But pray how comes the Law to oblige me to the Latter, to suffer for not doing so? Is this by virtue of any other Sanction? But so we might run on to Infinity. It must be therefore by something else. And what should that be but the Authority of the Lawgiver? And if this be thought sufficient to Authorise the Sanction, why should it not also Authorise the Law?  
If it be further asked, whence has the Lawgiver his Authority? I answer, If he be a Creature, he has it from God, whom I suppose to be the sole Fountain of all Power. But if the Lawgiver be God, he has it Originally and Independently in himself. But whether it be by the more Super-eminency of his Nature, as some say, or by the Benefit of Creation, as others, let them dispute that abound with more leisure than I do, and want better employment.  
But though the Sanction does not give the Law its Obligation, or any part of it, may it not however be necessary to it? Yes, if made so by the Will of the Legislator (as I said before) Establishing such a Connexion between them, that upon the Ceasing of the One, the Other also shall cease. But not in any wise from the Nature of the thing. For if it be of itself Necessary, it must either be as a Cause, or as a Condition. That it is not Necessary as a Cause, we have sufficiently proved already, by showing that it has no part in effecting or producing the Obligation of the Law. If therefore it be Necessary, it must be Necessary as a Condition. But that it is not, I will now briefly show.  
By a Condition I understand that, which though it has no Causal influence upon the Effect, yet it so determines the Efficient Cause to act, as that without it it will not act. As for instance, the opening of a Window, though it be not the Cause of enlightening the Room, (for it does not Efficiently enlighten it,) yet 'tis the Condition of it, as being that without which the Sun will not enlighten it. Or to come somewhat nearer home, the Promulgation of a Law, though it be not the Efficient Cause of its Obligation, yet it is the Condition of it, as being that without which the Law will not oblige. Now the Question is, Whether the Sanction of the Law be in this sense necessary to the Obligation of it?  
To which I answer, By no means For since the Obligation of the Law is supposed to owe its Birth not to the Sanction of it, but to other Causes (which has been proved already) there can be no manner of reason pretended why the Sanction would be a Condition necessary to the actual obliging of it, but only as it may be esteemed a Sign that such a Proposition is the Will of the Legislator. For the Law having its whole and full Authority within its self independently on the Sanction, needs only a public Sign that 'tis indeed the Will of such a Power to make it actually Obliging. If therefore the Sanction be necessary, it must be necessary as a Sign. But that end being already sufficiently answered and satisfied by the Promulgation of the Law, it cannot pretend to any such necessity, and therefore to none at all. And accordingly we see, that even a solemn Promulgation itself, when it ceases to be necessary as a Sign, ceases absolutely to be necessary, as appears in the Instance of the Law of Nature; which because it may be and is otherwise known, than by a solemn Publication of it, renders that Circumstance wholly unnecessary.  
The sum is, if the Sanction be necessary, it is necessary as a Public Sign, that being the only thing supposed to be further wanting, where the Law is otherwise sufficiently Authentic. But it is not necessary on that Account, because of the Promulgation, which fully and directly serves to that End. And therefore it is not at all necessary.  
But may not the Sanction be necessary as a Sign, where the Law is not promulgated? To this I answer, First, That the Fate of the present Cause is not concerned in the issue of this Question, our Laws being sufficiently promulgated. But suppose it were concerned, it need fear no danger from it. For the Question proceeds upon a contradictory Supposition. It supposes the Law to be promulgated and not promulgated at the same time. For if the Sanction be necessary as a Sign, than it must make the first discovery of the Law, which till then must not be supposed to be known. And yet it must too, and that before the Sanction can pretend to be a Sign. For the Sanction cannot pretend to that Office till 'tis known; and it cannot be known till after the Law is known. For to know the Sanction, is to know that such a Penalty is by the Law annexed to such an Action, which presupposes the Law to be known. And how then can the Sanction be necessary as a Sign, where the Law is not promulgated? The very Supposition implies a Contradiction. Whence I further conclude, That 'tis impossible that a Sanction should ever be necessary as a Sign to the Obligation of the Law; which as it received not its Obligation from it, so it may and will oblige without it, since from what has been discoursed, it clearly appears that it is no way necessary to the Obligation of the Law, either as a Cause, or as a Condition.  
I say, to the Obligation of it. For I do not deny but that a Sanction is very necessary to the Enforcement, and better Success of the Law; and that therefore 'tis very expedient that all Laws should have their Sanctions; partly that by them the greatness of the Obligation may be rated and estimated (it being the general Prudence of Lawgivers to annex greater Penalties to more concerning and important Precepts) and partly that by them Men might be the more easily and securely contained within the Limits of their Duty; which without some Penal Restraint every little appearance of Interest would tempt them to transgress.  
And yet even this is only an Accidental Necessity, introduced by the badness of the World. For were Men as they should be, Wise and Good (which till the Millennium I despair to see) they would discern and be satisfied of the Reason and Equity of the Law; and that alone would be a sufficient motive to Order and Obedience. But when they are either so stupid as not to see the good end of the Law, or so profligate as not to regard it, then comes in this Expedient of the Sanction, arming the Laws with Penalties whereby they may be enabled to revenge themselves upon those unconsidering disingenuous Persons that do them violence.  
And indeed, considering the great and general Bruitishness and Degeneracy of Men, how very alienated they are not only from the Life of God, but even from that of Natural Reason too, 'tis very fit it should always be thus; and that all Laws, as well as those of Mount Sinai, should have their Thundrings and Lightnings to awake and alarm the Passions of such Men, who having lost their Reasons, have now nothing else to be taken hold by. But this, I say, only proves a Sanction necessary to the better Enforcement, and not to the Obligation of the Law.  
To which if any one shall yet think it necessary, I shall only further press him with one sensible Absurdity, which perhaps may signify more with some Apprehensions, than an abstracter way of reasoning. It is this, That upon this Supposition it would follow, that if God himself should impose any Command upon a Creature, without annexing a Penalty in case of Disobedience, he would not be able with all his Authority and Divine Supremacy, to oblige that Creature. And will any Man, can any Man have the Impudence or Impiety to say so?  
Suppose that when God gave that Command to Adam, concerning the not eating of the Tree of Knowledge, he had not added that other Clause (which was the Sanction of the Law) In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die. Will any Man presume to say that Adam would not have been obliged by that Divine Command, but might have tasted of the forbidden Fruit without Sin? He must have but very little reverence for the Majesty of God, and as little sense of the sacredness of his Authority who would adventure to say so. And yet thus he must say if it be true (what is contended for by some) that the Sanction is necessary to the Obligation of the Law. For whatever is necessary to the Law as such, is necessary to every Law, whether Human or Divine. He therefore that holds the necessity of the Sanction to the Obligation of the Law, must say (if he will be consistent with himself) that the Command of the Great God would not have obliged Adam in case there had not been a Penalty annexed to it. If he does not say so, I should smile at his Inconsistency; and if he does, I should tremble for his Impudence and Irreverence.  
But from a Supposition to descend to a Matter of Fact, what will such a one say to the Tenth Commandment, to which (as the Author of the Christian Blessedness has rightly observed) there was no Sanction annexed. Will he say, that this Precept stood as a cipher in the Decalogue, without passing any Obligation upon the Jews? This indeed would make much to the honour of the Divine Wisdom; and represent God as a very notable Lawgiver, to Usher in a Law with so great Solemnity, and afterwards write it with his own fingers upon Tables of Stone, when it could signify nothing but only the filling up of a Number. And yet this, as absurd as it is, he must say, that will make the Sanction necessary to the Obligation of the Law. If this be true, than the Tenth Commandment did not oblige. But it seems the great Apostle was of another Judgement, when he 
Rom. 7. 7.  said, I had not known Sin but by the Law: For I had not known Lust, except the Law had said, Thou shalt not Covet. It seems then that Lust was a Sin, and that by virtue of the Tenth Commandment, which is here alleged by the Apostle to prove it so, which therefore did oblige, since without Obligation, as well as where there is no Law, there can be no Transgression. If it be said, that although the Tenth Commandment had no Temporal Sanction or Civil Penalty annexed to it, like the other Nine, yet it had an Eternal Sanction, namely the Rewards and Punishments of a future Life, and that 'twas by virtue of that Sanction that it became Obligatory. I answer, that this could not be any Sanction to the Jews, to whom it was not plainly revealed, though, it be now to us Christians who have a full and express Revelation of it. A Sanction not Published is no Sanction, as much as a Law not published is no Law; that is, to any real Effect or Purpose of Government. Indeed of the two, Publication seems more necessary to the Sanction than to the Law. For oftentimes the natural and inward Reasonableness of the thing may in a great measure supply the place of an Express Law, as it did for a long time before there was any Express Law given; but now Punishment is a more Arbitrary thing, and that depends more upon the Will of the Governor; and therefore unless there be an Express Declaration of it, as there will be no certain ground of expecting it, so there will be little or no influence derived upon Men from it. Which makes it absolutely necessary that the Sanction should be expressly declared and published, otherwise it will neither have the Nature nor the Effect of a Sanction.  
It may indeed be the secret intent and purpose of the Lawgiver to inflict such a Punishment for such an Offence; and perhaps in some Cases this may be justly done without declaring beforehand that he will do so; and this may be said to be the Sanction of the Lawgiver; but unless this be openly and plainly declared, it can be no Sanction of the Law, nor can it be a Sanction to those that are to be governed by it.  
If God in his first solemn intercourse with Adam, after the Precept given him, had reserved that other Clause to himself, In the day that thou eatest thou shalt die; or had communicated this his Will and Purpose to an Angel, or to any other Being, but not to Adam himself, could this have been said to have been in any respect a Sanction to Adam? No certainly, because not manifested to him whose concern it was. Nor for the same reason could the other be said to be a Sanction to the Jews.  
It must therefore either be said that the Tenth Commandment did not oblige the Jews (which I think would be an intolerable Assertion, and withal expressly against the sense of the Apostle, declaring Lust to have been a Sin by virtue of that Commandment) or that it obliged them without any Sanction, and consequently that the Sanction is not necessary to the Obligation of the Law: Which is the thing that I plead for.  
If it be said, that though the Sanction be not necessary to the Obligation of the Law in general, nor consequently to the Obligation of all Laws; yet it must be necessary to the Obligation of Human Laws, because Human Laws do not oblige under Sin, and therefore must oblige only under Penalty, and that therefore such Laws without a Sanction will not oblige. I answer, first, That this Objection proves a great deal too much; for upon this Supposition the Law would not oblige to Action even with a Sanction, for it would not so oblige at all. But we suppose here the Law to have such an Obligation, and say that the Sanction is not necessary to it, and consequently that the removal of the Sanction does not remove the Obligation. Our present Argument therefore is not concerned in this Objection. We are here enquiring what Alteration the Toleration has made in the state of things, by removing the Sanction of the Law, whether it has thereby removed the Obligation too? We say it has not, but that if the Law had any Obligation before, it has so still, because the Sanction is not necessary to it. But whether it had or no, belongs not to our present Consideration (which is only concerning the Effects of the Toleration) but to the Absolute Merits of the Cause.  
But however, since it happens to come in my way, this I say further, That it is not at all necessary that Human Laws should be purely Penal, because they are Human, and consequently that 'tis not necessary that all Human Laws should be so. For whenever they are purely Penal, 'tis acknowledged that they oblige to Punishment, otherwise they would oblige to nothing; which is the same as not to oblige at all, and consequently would be no Laws. But how come they to oblige to Punishment, but only by the Will and Intention of the Lawgiver invested with competent Authority? And if by that he could oblige to Punishment, then by the same, had he so pleased, he might have obliged to Action. For this is a most unquestionable Rule, That he who can oblige to Punishment, can also, if he pleases, oblige to Action; nay much rather, it being a much greater thing to oblige to Suffer, than to oblige to Do.  
Human Laws therefore are not necessarily to be supposed purely Penal as they are Human, nor consequently ought all Human Laws to be so esteemed. 'Tis not from the different Authority of the Law, but from the different Intention of the Lawgiver, that any Law becomes purely Penal. 'Tis therefore by mere Accident that Human Laws are any of them purely Penal, and not from the Specific Nature of the Laws themselves, which for any thing that is in their proper Natures may oblige in Conscience, as well as any other Laws. And that they do so oblige (unless where 'tis otherwise expressed or insinuated in the Form of the Law) is most certain, the Law of God requiring us to obey the Laws of Men, where they are not contrary to the Law of God. But I need prosecute this no further, since the Excellent Bishop Sanderson has given the World sufficient Satisfaction in this Point, in those judicious Discourses of his, de Legum Humanarum Obligatione in Conscientia.  
If it be further urged (which I think is the last Reserve of this Objection) That the Removal of the Law does involve the Removal of the Sanction; and why then will it not hold as much the other way, that the removal of the Sanction should remove the Law? To this I answer, That there is a great Disparity in the Case: The Sanction is made purely for the sake of the Law, whom it is to guard and defend, and so serves to it as the Means does to the End; and consequently if the Law be abolished or suspended, etc. the Sanction must needs fall in proportion with it. But now the Law is not made for the sake of the Sanction, but for the good of those who are to be governed by it. And therefore though the removal of the Law removes the Sanction, yet it does not therefore follow that the removal of the Sanction should in like manner carry with it the removal of the Law. To which, after all I might add, That 'tis impossible that the whole Sanction of Human Laws should ever be removed. For since the Law of God requires Obedience to the Laws of Men wherever it may be lawfully paid, and threatens those with the Punishments of another Life, who are disobedient to public Order and Government in this, though the Human Sanction should be taken away, yet the Divine Sanction would still remain; and as long as that does remain, the whole Sanction cannot be said to be removed. This I might say for a Reserve, and I do not see what Answer can be made to it; but I think my Cause is otherwise so well grounded, that I need not insist upon this Plea.  
From the whole course of this Argument (which I believe has received no damage by the management) it fully and clearly appears, that the Sanction of the Law is not only a thing really distinct from it, but also no way necessary to its Obligation; and therefore that the removing of the Sanction does not imply or involve the removal of the Law, and consequently that the Toleration by removing the Sanction does not remove, no nor so much as interrupt the Obligation of the Law, to which the Sanction has been shown to be not at all necessary. Which I think breaks the Neck of the Objection, and he had need be a very skilful Artist that shall set it again.  
Well, but suppose (which you see is not the Case) that the Law which enjoins Conformity to the Religion and Church established, were by the Toleration perfectly removed, and the Preceptive part of it taken away as well as the Penal; yet neither upon this Supposition (which is indeed a very great Concession and Abatement) would a Toleration excuse those from Schism who would be guilty of it without it.  
For Sir, these Men are to consider, if they have not already considered it, that we do not derive the Grounds of Obligation to Ecclesiastic Communion only from the Authority of the Civil Law (though that must be allowed to add a considerable weight to the Obligation) but also and chiefly from that of the Divine Law; which I conceive to be as Positive and as Express in requiring Unity and Conformity of Worship, as in requiring any Religious Worship at all.  
The necessity of this is by S. Paul pressed upon the Ephesians, from the Unity of that 
Ephes. 4. 3, 4, 5, 6.  Body whereof they were Members, from the Unity of that Spirit which was to them the Common Principle of Life and Action, from the Unity of that Hope to which they were called, from the Unity of that Lord to whose Service they were all devoted, from the Unity of that Faith which they all professed, from the Unity of that Baptism whereby they were grafted into the Church of Christ; and lastly, from the Unity of that God who was the Father of them all, who was above all, and in them all. Every one of which Heads of Argument might justly deserve the Consideration of a particular Discourse, but that I am willing to suppose my Reader so apprehensive, as not to want to have things laid out to him more at large.  
Accordingly the Christian Church is always represented by Figures that express the greatest Unity, not only between that and Christ, but also between Fellow-Christians. This is said to be that One Body into which we are all Baptised by One Spirit, and which is said to be fitly joined together and compacted. This is that Spiritual House built upon the Foundation of the Prophets and Apostles, Jesus Christ himself being the Chief Cornerstone, in whom all the Building, fitly framed together, grows into an Holy Temple in the Lord. 'Tis represented also as one Flock, under one Shepherd Jesus Christ, whose last and most Solemn Prayer was for the Unity of the Church; which must therefore be supposed to be highly agreeable to the Mind and Will of God, otherwise our Saviour would not have prayed for it so earnestly and with such Solemnity. Though I question very much whether this Solemn Prayer of Christ will be fully heard and answered till the Glorious State of his Millennial Reign upon Earth. However, in the mean time 'tis most certain that 'tis the Great Duty of us all to endeavour after that State of Unity which our Saviour prayed might be among his Disciples. Hence it is that Schism is Condemned as a Work of the Flesh, and those that Separate are said to be Sensual, not having the Spirit; and Christians are admonished to mark and shun them that cause Divisions, and are withal Commanded to mind or think one and the same thing, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to stand fast in one Spirit with one Mind, to walk by the same Rule, to be joined together in the same Mind, and in the same Judgement, and with one Mind and Mouth to glorify God the Father, with a World of Precepts and Exhortations to the same purpose, which every one may find that does but open the Bible.  
Now what can all this signify? Nothing certainly less than this, That the Unity of the Church is so Sacred a thing, that it ought to be preserved by all Lawful means, and that no Separation ought to be made in it without absolute and evident Necessity. In one word; that where 'tis Lawful to Communicate, there 'tis Sinful to Separate. Which is more expressly delivered in that Apostolical Canon taken notice of by the Author of Christian Blessedness; If it be possible, as much as lies in you, live peaceably with all Men. This takes in the whole Latitude and Capacity of Society, the State as well as the Church; in both which, by virtue of this Precept, Peace and Unity is to be maintained as far as is Possible, and therefore without question on as far as is Lawful. And if the Peace of the State is to be preserved as far as is possible, then certainly much more the Peace of the Church.  
Since then the Scripture is both so frequent and so express, I might say also so earnest and passionate in inculcating the Necessity of preserving the Unity of the Church, and in Condemning all unnecessary disturbances of it; it is most certain that the Divine Law, without the Confirmation of the Civil, is a sufficient Obligation to Church-Unity, wherever it may Lawfully be held. Every Christian Church that proposes Lawful terms of Communication has, by the Law of God (though the Civil Law be silent in the case) an undoubted Right to the Conformity of all that are within the Pale of her Establishment, who cannot withhold it from her without incurring the Gild of Schism, which, according to the general sense of the Christian World, is nothing else but an unnecessary Separation; and then is Separation unnecessary, when Communion is lawful. The Argument in Form is,  
Whoever separates unnecessarily, is guilty of Schism:  
But whoever separates where he may lawfully Communicate, separates unnecessarily;  
Therefore whoever separates where he may lawfully Communicate, is guilty of Schism.  
The Minor Proposition is plain by its omn Light, since there can no Moral necessity be pretended for not doing what may Lawfully be done. And the Major Proposition is clear by the Light of Scripture, which presses and enjoins the Peace and Unity of the Church to the very utmost degree of strictness, even as far as is possible. Whence the Conclusion necessarily follows, That whoever separates where he may lawfully Communicate, is guilty of Schism.  
This is so clear and evident, that the most moderately affected in Point of Church-Unity and Conformity could never shut their Eyes against the Light of it, though they endeavoured to wink never so hard. Particularly Mr. Hales, a very Free, and for the most part, Judicious Writer, and one very remarkable for his Moderation, especially as to all Church-matters, and who writes of Schism with all the tenderness imaginable, handling it as if he were feeling the Edge of a Razor: And yet after all his Endeavours to reduce it into as narrow a compass as he could, by making as few guilty of it as might be, he could find nothing to justify Separation but only Sinfulness of Communion. As may appear from several Passages that occur in his Tract of Schism. For, says he, Page 195. For the further opening the Nature of Schism, something must be added by way of difference to distinguish it from necessary Separation; and that is, that the Causes upon which Division is attempted, proceed not from Passion, or Distemper, or Ambition, or Avarice, or such other Ends as Human Folly is apt to pursue, but from well-weighed and necessary Reasons; and that, when all other Means having been tried, nothing will serve to save us from guilt of Conscience, but open Separation. So that Schism, if we would define it, is nothing else but an unnecessary Separation of Christians from that part of the visible Church of which they were once Members. Again, says he, Page 198. Unadvisedly and upon Fancy to break the Knot of Union between Man and Man, especially among Christians, upon whom, above all other kind of men, the tye of Love and Communion does most especially rest, is a Crime hardly pardonable; and that nothing Absolves a man from the guilt of it, but true and unpretended Conscience. Again, says he, Page 209. What if those to whose care the execution of the Public Service is committed do something unlawful, etc. yet for all this we may not separate, except we be constrained personally to bear a part ourselves. The Priests under Eli had so ill demeaned themselves about the daily Sacrifice, that the Scriptures tell us, they made it stink; yet the People refused not to come to the Tabernacle, nor to bring their Sacrifice to the Priest. For in these Schisms which concern Fact, nothing can be a just Cause of refusal of Communion, but only to require the execution of some unlawful or suspected Act. Again, says he, Page 215. Why may I not go, if occasion require, to an Arian Church, so there be no Arianism expressed in their Liturgy? And again, Lastly, Page 227. speaking of Conventicles, says he, It evidently appears that all Meetings upon unnecessary occasions of Separation are to be so styled; so that, in this sense, a Conventicle is nothing else but a Congregation of Schismatics.  
From these and other like Passages any one may be satisfied that Mr. Hales, with all his Moderation, could not but see, that where Separation is not necessary, there Communion is; and that to depart from the Communion of a visible Established Church, with whom you may lawfully Communicate, is to be guilty of Schism. And so much seems to be granted even by the Author of the Letter of Toleration, who defines Schism to be an ill grounded 
Page 86.  Separation in Ecclesiastical Communion, made about things not necessary.  
'Tis true indeed, by things not necessary, this Author means (as he afterwards explains himself) things not expressly contained in the Rule, making him a Schismatic that separates from a Church, because that Church does not require what the Scripture does not. But this will come to one and the same thing. For why is he a Schismatic that makes a Separation from a Church for not requiring more than is expressly contained in Scripture, but only because he might Communicate with that Church notwithstanding this her frugality and reservedness, and consequently his Separation was unnecessary? This is the thing into which the Schism of such a Separatist must be at last resolved. And then for the same reason, why is not he as much a Schismatic that separates from a Church, that does require more than the Scripture expressly contains, provided it be not contrary to the Rule of Scripture, since with this Church he may also lawfully Communicate, and therefore has no Necessity for his Separation? 'Tis the unnecessity of the Separation that in both Cases makes the Schism. So that this Notion of our Author, though at first sight it seems to offer somewhat New, resolves itself, at long run, into the Old Common Notion of Schism, which has all along obtained in the Christian World.  
wherever therefore there is no necessity of separating, there the Church has a Right to Communion, which to withhold from her is Schism, or else there is no such thing as Schism in the World. This Right the Church of Rome had before her falling into her gross Corruptions, and this Right the Church of England and all other Churches have that are Reformed from them. And this Right every Lawfully Constituted Church has by virtue of the Divine Law, which is her Original Charta, and which of itself lays upon all Christians a sufficient Obligation to Church-Unity, though there should be no Civil Authority to back and enforce it.  
For indeed, unless it were so, how could there be such a thing as the Sign of Schism in the Apostles Times, and in the more Primitive Ages of the Church? There was then no Civil Law to Oblige Christians to Church-Communion; so far from this, that the Edge and Point of the Civil Sword was turned directly against it. The State and the Church than not only moved in two Different, but in two Opposite Spheres. And yet we find that in those early times the Sin of Schism was as much condemned, and Schismatical Persons as deeply branded as in any of the after Ages. Nay more indeed, because of the singularity and strangeness of the Crime. Punished indeed they could not so well be, for want of the Concurrence of the Civil Sword; which was not then in a Christian hand, but they were censured and condemned, and according to the Apostle's Admonition, those were marked and avoided that caused Divisions.  
And therefore though we should allow the Present Toleration to Silence the Civil Law, whereby Conformity is enjoined, (which yet from the Premises appears to be far otherwise,) yet since the Divine Law requiring all possible Unity, stands uncancelled, (for sure the Toleration won't be pretended to reach that;) those that make Caufeless and unnecessary Divisions, will still be guilty of Schism, notwithstanding the favour of the Toleration, which I am afraid will prove but an indifferent Plea for Separation at the Last day to those that have no better.  
What then, you'll say, is the Effect of a Toleration? Or what can be supposed to be the just and reasonable intent of it? I answer; As to the Effect, it cannot release at all from any preceding Obligation. It does not release so much as from the Obligation of the Civil Law, whose Penalty it only suspends, much less does it release from Obligation to the Divine Law, with which it has nothing to do, and upon which it has no manner of Effect. It does not therefore discharge any from Obligation to Conformity, who would not be discharged without it. All indeed are actually eased by it; that's an universal and indifferent Effect, but none are discharged or unobliged.  
Then as to the Intent of it, all that it can be reasonably intended for is to ease those few from Penalties, (for I doubt they are not many,) who are so unhappy as really and sincerely to be persuaded in their Consciences that 'tis not Lawful for them to join in Communion with the Church of England. Though the Toleration does actually Ease all indifferently, yet 'tis for the Ease of such only that a Toleration can be justly or reasonably intended, whose Condition indeed would be as pitiable, as I am afraid it is rare.  
But even here the Toleration has no other Effect than barely to Ease them. If they are withal released from any Obligation, 'tis not by Virtue of the Toleration, but by Reason of something else, namely their unhappy Judgement and Persuasion in thinking our Communion unlawful; which however in itself false and erroneous, must be allowed to bind in Conscience while 'tis their Misfortune to be under it. This is the thing that releases from Obligation, whenever there is any Releasement; The Toleration only Eases them from suffering the Penalty of Nonconformity. And 'tis for their Ease only that it can be reasonably intended.  
But as for those who are satisfied of the Lawfulness of Communicating with the Established Church, (who I fear make the greatest part of those that separate from it,) they are still obliged under pain of Sin, though not of Civil Chastisement, to Communicate with it. And if they do not, 'tis not a Toleration, or Act of Indulgence, though granted by the highest Power upon Earth, that can excuse them from the Sin of Schism, at least before God. Nor do such Men deserve the favour of a Toleration.  
And now, Sir, from the Measures laid down, it plainly appears, that if the Separatists from the Church of England were guilty of Schism before the Toleration, (which, whether they were or no, depends upon other Grounds, and is not now to be disputed over again,) they are as much guilty of it now, there being no Change made by the Toleration as to the Preceptive, but only as to the Penal part of the Law. Which may suffice to clear the Author of Christian Blessedness of the first Imputation laid against him, that of a false Charge.  
The two others will be more easily, and more briefly dispatched.  
The next thing therefore for which our Author is blamed is the Uncharitableness of his Charge. This indeed is a heavy Censure, and aught to be well-grounded, or else it will recoil upon those that make it. But I think there has been that said upon the former Objection, that will scarce allow any room for this.  
For if the Author's Charge was uncharitable, it must be either because of the Matter of it, or because of the End and Design of it. Not certainly upon the account of its Matter, because that appears to be true; for the proof of which, I appeal to the Reason and Argument of the preceding Discourse. And if they fix the Uncharitableness of it upon its End and Design, they themselves will bring their own Charity in question by judging so severely of the Intentions of the Author, which they cannot be supposed to be privy to.  
For how can they pretend to know the Author's Thoughts and Designs? Did he ever Communicate his Intentions to them? Or will they Judge by Inspiration, and pretend to the Gift of Divining and Conjecturing, as well as of Praying by the Spirit?  
I that am intimately acquainted with the Author, and know more of his Principles and Sentiments, Thoughts and Intentions, than any of those that take the Liberty of Censuring and Condemning them, do verily believe that in his continuing the Charge of Schism upon the Separatists, he intended nothing against Charity, but rather the greatest Charity and goodwill.  
I know 'tis his most deliberate and well-assured Sense, that if ever there was or can be such a Sin as Schism in the Church of Christ, they of the Present Separation are truly and deeply guilty of it. And since it came fairly in his way, he thought himself obliged in Charity to reprehend them from it, not knowing what good effect a Candid and Rational Admonition might have upon those (for he had Charity enough to hope there might be some such) who were not quite overrun with the Humour of Opposition, nor armed Cap-a-pee with Prejudice. And being withal in the mean time assured of the Duty of Fraternal Correption; and how much that concerns every Christian (as being the Duty even of 
Leu. 19 17.  a Jew) in any-wise to rebuke his Brother, and not to suffer Sin to lie upon him.  
And if I may have leave to divert a little from the Defence of my Friend to my own Justification, I think I may safely say that I am now in Prosecution of the very same Charitable Design. For though I acknowledge myself to have had some regard to the Reputation of my Friend, which I think has suffered without Cause; and which to Assert and Vindicate, I take to be a very Innocent Design; yet I can say (as far as I know the inward Springs of my own Actions) that the Principal End and aim of this Undertaking was to further that great and dear Interest of Christianity, for which our departing Saviour so earnestly and so solemnly prayed to his Father, the Interest of Ecclesiastic Unity. To further this, I say, is my main Design, both by awakening the Consciences of those who by the Favour of the Government striking in with their own Natural humour of Contradiction, may be tempted against the inward Sense and Light of their Minds to transgress against the great Christian Obligation to Public Order and Unity of Worship, and by undeceiving and disabusing others, who by the Impunity of the present Toleration may be so far imposed upon as to fancy themselves released from any such Obligation. Both which, I think, are very Good, very Charitable, and very Christian Designs.  
But to return: I think, Sir, there appears now to be as little reason for taxing our Author with Uncharity as with Error. For his own part, I believe he is Conscious to himself of neither. But if he is Guilty, I dare say he would be glad to be Convinced, that so he might Rectify the One, and Repent of the Other. For the present he thinks there is so little occasion for either, that if he had not only Charged our Separatists with Schism, but with the most unjust and unreasonable Schism that ever was made in the Christian Church, he thinks it would have been no Slander. And he has Commissioned me to say that he is ready against any Opposer to make it good.  
But though the Author's Charge was neither False, nor Uncharitable, yet was it not something Unseasonable? So indeed some say, who say neither of the other. Nor is this an inconsiderable Exception, if true. For as every thing is Beautiful in its Season, so is Season the Beauty of every thing, and there is nothing Beautiful out of it. Actions Materially good, and wherein we mean well, are oftentimes utterly spoiled merely by being Mistimed. But why, I pray, was this Charge so unseasonable? What, because the Separation was grown very wide, and by reason of the relaxation of the Government growing still every day wider; because some were invited to it (as they are to other Sins) by Impunity, and others began to make that a Plea for its Lawfulness; because it began to set up for one of the Court-fashions, and was growing to be not only a Privilege of the Saint, but the Accomplishment of the Gentleman; because some used their Liberty as a Cloak for their Maliciousness, and almost all as an Opportunity to serve the Interest of their Cause; because, lastly, that Church and State which were so lately rescued from the Jaws of Popery, were now in as Critical a Point of Danger from the Encroachments of the Separation; was it therefore out of season to Charge the Separatists with Schism? Now I always thought that the most proper Season to admonish Men of their faults was when they were most Rife and Epidemical, and when they had most Temptations and Opportunities of committing them; and when the Commission of them would threaten the greatest Danger and Mischief.  
This has been generally thought the most proper Season of Admonition by all wise Men in all other Matters, and why not in this? 'Tis the necessity of Admonition that at any time makes it seasonable; and then there is most need of it, when the Manners and Ways of Men are most disorderly and irregular. The more corrupt therefore and degenerate the Age, the more seasonable is the Reproof, And indeed, if the general prevalency and fashionableness of Vice be enough to make Admonition unseasonable, 'tis now high time, considering the Moral state of the World, that not only all Writing, but all Preaching too were laid aside. But this I suppose is a consequence which those that blame our Author's Charge as unseasonable will not admit; whence it follows (whatever in partiality to their own concern they may be induced to say) that even by their own measure it was not really unseasonable.  
But 'tis further said, that this was a Treatment altogether unexpected and unlooked for. They expected now as much favour from the Pulpit and the Press, as they found from the Government; and that there should now be no other Discourses about them, but such as were Healing, Complying, and tending to Moderation, and not to have the old business of Schism revived again. This was as much contrary to Expectation, as to Inclination and Humour; and was it not enough to vex any body to be so disappointed? That it was enough, the Event shows; but whether it ought to be, may admit more question. But I'll tell you a Story.  
While Thcodora poffessed the Empire of Constantinople with her Son, who was 
Causin's Holy Court, part 3. pag. 435.  yet in minority, one named Methodius, an excellent Painter, an Italian by Nation, and Religious by Profession, went to the Court of the Bulgarian King, named Bogoris, where he was entertained with much favour. This Prince way yet a Pagan, and though trial had been made to Convert him to the Faith, it succeeded not, because his Mind was so set upon Pleasures, that Reason could find but little access. He was excessively pleased with Hunting; and as some delight in Pictures to behold what they love, so he appointed Methodius to paint him a piece of Hunting in a Palace which he had newly built. The Painter, seeing he had a fair Occasion to take his opportunity for the Conversion of this Infidel, instead of Painting an Hunting piece for him, made an exquisite Table of the Day of Judgement. Wherein he represented that great Solemnity with all its Circumstances of Terror.  
In the end, the day assigned being come, he drew aside the Curtain, and showed his Work. 'Tis said, the King at first stood some while pensive, not being able to wonder enough at the strange Sight. Then turning towards Methodius, What is this? said he. The Religious Man took Occasion thereupon to tell him of the Judgements of God, of Punishments and Rewards in the other Life; wherewith he was so moved, that in a short time he yielded himself to God by a happy Conversion. Now whether this Device of the Painter was unseasonable or no, or whether the advantage of the Design and of the Event would excuse the Disappointment, I leave to the Reader to judge.  
And thus, Sir, having fully cleared my Friend from the treble Indictment laid in against him, by showing his Charge of Schism to have been neither false, nor uncharitable, nor unseasonable, I shall now, for a Conclusion of all, address myself to the Dissenters in a word or two, concerning their Behaviour under the present Toleration. Not what it is, or has been (for that is well enough known) but what it ought to be.  
Some, it may be, who are not all over Argument-Proof, moved with the Reason of the foregoing Considerations, may be ready to ask of me, What would you then have us to do, or how shall we behave ourselves under the present state of Things? It seems indeed to be as you say, That the Relaxation of the Government makes no Change in the Obligations to Conformity; but if we should lay down the Separation, and come over to the Church, what are we the better for the Toleration? And is it reasonable that there should be a Toleration, and we not the better for it? What, was the Toleration granted, not to be enjoyed? Is it like the Tree of Paradise, good for Food, and pleasant to the Eye, and withal planted within our reach, and yet not to be meddled with? Shall we be so unkind to ourselves, as not to embrace an opportunity of Ease and Liberty? Or so ungrateful to the Government, as not to make use of that Privilege of Indulgence which the kindness of our Superiors has vouchsafed us? What would you have us do?  
I answer in one word, Do now as you ought to do before. For since the Toleration (as has been proved) makes not any the least Alteration in those Obligations to Church-Unity that are derived either from the Law of the State, or from the Law of God, but all things as to that stand now in the same posture as they did, 'tis plain that your Behaviour also aught to be the very same now that it ought to have been before the Toleration. If the Points of the Compass stand now as they did then, without any Declension or Variation, 'tis plain that you ought to steer the same Course now, as you ought then. If you ask what that is? I answer,  
First, Lay aside as much as possibly you can all manner of Prejudice that may arise either from Natural Temper and Complexion, or from Education, or from long Custom to a contrary way; or from blind Regard to the Authority of some Men, for whom, perhaps, you have had a more early than just Veneration; or from Humour, or from Passion, or from Interest, or from whatever else may bride and corrupt the genuine native Sense of our Minds. For unless the Scale hang even, 'tis to no purpose to weigh any thing in it.  
Secondly, When you have thus truly devested yourselves of all Prejudice, and reduced your Judgements to an even poise, then apply yourselves seriously and deliberately, impartially and sincerely, soberly and in the fear of God to consider and examine the State and Constitution of our Church, and the Terms of her Communion, whether they are lawful or no. But be sure you do not this by advising only with Books of your own way, or by consulting only with Guides of your own Party and Persuasion (for this would be to fall back into your old Prejudice again) but by a free and indifferent recourse to the Writers and Leaders of both Sides, by considering and weighing what is offered by the learned and excellent Defenders of the Church, as well as what is said by the Advocates for the Separation, and by trying and judging all according to the infallible Rule of Scripture, and the Eternal Truth of God shining forth in your own Souls. And if,  
Thirdly, After your most impartial and sincere Endeavours rightly to inform yourselves according to the best use of your Faculties and Opportunities, it be still your unhappiness verily to be persuaded in your Consciences, that the Communion of the Church of England is unlawful (which though I cannot deny to be absolutely possible, seems yet as hard to me for a considerate Man really to believe, as to believe Transubstantiation) yet I say, if you should be invincibly determined to such a Persuasion, in the Name of God abide where you are, and make use of the Toleration, and enjoy the Benefit of it with Peace and Satisfaction of Mind. I would not for a World persuade you to Communicate with the Church of England (as excellent as she is) against the real Sense and Persuasion of your Consciences. For the following of which you can never be accountable, provided it be not your fault that you are of that Persuasion. But if,  
Fourthly and Lastly, You are Convinced of the Lawfulness of holding Communion with the Church; (and to be free with you, I cannot but think that most of you are, if you would confess the truth;) then I pray consider seriously with yourselves what tolerable Account you will be able to render either to God or Man for continuing a Separation in that Church where even according to your own Judgement and Confession you might lawfully Communicate. Or how you can be said to preserve the Unity of the Catholic Church, or that Communion of Saints which you profess to believe, if you separate from the Communion of a Visible, Established, National Church, of whose Lawfulness you are satisfied, and from whom therefore you need not separate. Consider whether this be not a Causeless dividing, dis-uniting, and dismembering of the Body of Christ, a high Violation of that Public Order and Decency which he has required in his Church, and as great a Breach of the Christian Peace, as you can possibly be guilty of in the Peace of the State: In one word, consider whether this be not all that which both Scripture and the best Antiquity represent, and so severely condemn under that one Emphatical word, Schism.  
And do not think to salve all at last, by taking Sanctuary in the Toleration. This, you see, stands Neuter, leaves the State of the Question as it found it; and does not at all interpose for your relief, but leaves you to stand or fall by the Absolute Merits of your Cause.  
These therefore alone you ought to consider and inquire into, viz. Whether you can honestly and safely Communicate with us or no? And if you find you can, then 'tis most certain that you ought. The Law of God and the Law of Man (for the Toleration you see evacuates neither) do still oblige you to it; and if you do not, though the Government excuses you from the Penalty, yet neither that nor any thing else will excuse you from the Sin of Schism. The short is, that which will justify such a Separation as this, will justify any, and then there will be no such thing as an Obligation to Church-Unity, and consequently no such thing as Schism in the World. And I desire never to reduce an Adversary to a greater Extremity than when he is forced to deny the very Being and Possibility of the Sin of Schism, that he may prove himself to be no Schismatic.  
This, Sir, is all I think necessary to say upon this Occasion; and I think I have said nothing but what I have well thought and considered, and what is my real Judgement, and what will stand the Test, whether of Charity or of Truth. I have viewed and reviewed what I have written; and I must needs declare, that I cannot discern the least flaw in the Argument of this Discourse, nor do I fear the Severity of the most Critical Eye or Hand. However, if any one of the Learned among the Diffenting Party thinks the Argument of this Discourse may be Answered, and withal thinks himself sufficiently qualified for the Undertaking, (for I declare beforehand that I shall not think myself concerned to take notice of every impertinent Scribbler,) I fairly and freely invite him to it; and withal do promise him, for his better encouragement, that he shall find me either Able to Defend what I have written, or Willing to Submit.  
Farewell.  
POSTSCRIPT Concerning MODERATION.  
I Think it very proper and seasonable, in a word or two, to rectify another very Popular Mistake, wherewith I find most Common Persons, and some others are imposed upon. It is concerning Moderation, whose Notion I perceive to be generally as much abused as that of Toleration, and to as ill a purpose.  
Moderation, without question if rightly understood, is a most excellent thing, as signifying,  
I. In general, such a temper of Soul, and such a government of all a Man's Thoughts and Desires, Words and Actions, as may steer the course of Life in the middle way between the Extremes of Defect and Excess, so as to be always affected in Proportion to the Greatness or Goodness of the End, and to the Necessity or Usefulness of the Means.  
Or as signifying more particularly with relation to the Body, such a due and well-proportioned conduct of it, and regard to it, as becomes a Creature that is neither a mere Animal, nor a pure Spirit, but partakes of both Natures, and therefore ought not so to be addicted to the interest of the Body, as to neglect the Spiritual Life; nor yet so devoted to the Life of the Spirit, as to forget he is in the Body. This way being as much too High, as the other is too Low, and the way of Man lying in the Middle.  
Thus understood, without all doubt Moderation is a most excellent thing, and will have an universal and uncontested Approbation. And thus it is generally understood in all other Cases, but only when it relates to Church-Conformity. And then by Moderation is usually meant either an Indifferency of doing what the Church prescribes, or a doing it by Halves, or a total Omission of it.  
And accordingly he is accounted a Moderate Man, who either is indifferently affected to the Constitutions of the Church, and is little concerned whether he Conforms to them or no, and accordingly stands ready and disposed with or without reasonable Occasion to admit of Alterations, or who Conforms by halves, or who does not Conform at all.  
All these in their several orders and degrees, go commonly for Men of Moderation; and I believe many for the procurement of that specious Title, are tempted to appear so disposed, designing nothing at all worse by it, than only the Reputation of Moderate Men.  
But let such as run away with this Notion, take this Consideration along with them, if they are not in too much haste, That 'tis not all manner of Moderation that is justly to be commended, nor this of theirs in particular. For the right Estimation of which matter, I desire the following measures may be considered.  
If the Object of our Moderation be not already either by Nature or Constitution fixed and stated in a due measure, but is to receive its measure from our Moderation, than Moderation, as it signifies an indifferency of Mind, may have both Place and Commendation. As suppose in the instance of Pleasure, which because an indeterminate Object, and of indefinite Latitude, capable either of Excess or Defect, leaves room for the Exercise of Moderation in us, which is then a good and laudable thing.  
But if the Object be already either by Nature, or by positive Constitution fixed and stated in a due measure, and is not to receive that measure from our Moderation, than our Moderation has neither Place nor Commendation: As in the Instance suppose of Virtue; which being already supposed to be in the Mean, leaves no room for Moderation in us, nor would Moderation then be a good or laudable thing. Nor was it ever thought a Commendation of the love of Virtue to say it was Moderate or Indifferent.  
Now to apply this to the present Case. If the Order of the Church of England were not already constituted in a state and temper of Moderation, than indeed Moderation in Conformity might pretend to some Excellency and Commendation; but if it be already in such a state and temper, than there is neither Room for it, nor Excellency in it. But rather on the contrary, to be moderately affected to Conformity, will then be as great a Commendation as to be a moderate Lover of Order and Reason, and all that's good. And they that like this Commendation, 'tis fit they should have it.  
Before therefore Moderation in Conformity be made a commendable Character, and before Men of this Character be so much cried up and sought after as the fittest Persons to be employed both in State and in Church-concerns, it ought to be made appear, that the Constitution of the Church is in itself Immoderate.  
This indeed is slily and indirectly insinuated by all those that raise such Clamours about Moderation. But they ought, if they would deal fairly, directly to prove it; and indeed wholly to insist upon it, and not impose upon the Prejudice and the Ignorance of the People by the specious and plausible Name of Moderation. For unless it be first proved, that the Church in her Constitution is Immoderate; 'tis plain, that Moderation on our parts has no room; and that all the Noise and Stir that is made about it, is but mere Sophistry with ill Design.  
But now whether the Constitution of the Church be really Immoderate, I refer those that desire to be satisfied to what has been from time to time written in her Defence and Justification, particularly to an excellent Book very Honestly, and, as I think, very Learnedly written by Doctor Puller, called, The Moderation of the Church of England.  
FINIS.   

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The Gallant Hermaphrodite: an Amorous Novel. Price 1 s.  
Injured Lovers, or the Ambitious Father; a Tragedy: Acted by Their Majesty's Servants at the Theatre-Royal: by William Mounfort, Com.  
Comical Revenge, or Love in a Tub, as 'tis now Acted at Their Majesty's Theatre: by Sir G. Etherege.   

BOOKS Written by the Reverend Mr. J. Norris, M. A.  
A Collection of Miscellanies; consisting of Poems, Essays, Discourses and Letters, in Octavo, large: Price 4 s.  
Theory and Regulation of Love; a Moral Essay, in Two Parts: to which are added, Letters Philosophical and Moral, between the Author and More, in Octavo. Price 2 s.  
Reason and Religion, or the Grounds and Measures of Devotion considered, from the Nature of God and the Nature of Man, in several Contemplations; with Exercise of Devotion applied to every Contemplation, in Octavo. Price 2 s.  
Reflections upon the Conduct of Human Life, with Reference to the Study of Learning and Knowledge: in a Letter to the Excellent Lady, the Lady Masham: To which is annexed a Visitation-Sermon, by the same Author. Price 1 s. 6 d.  
Christian Blessedness, or Discourses upon the Beatitudes of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ: written by Jo. Norris, M. A. and late Fellow of All-Souls College in Oxford: To which are added, Reflections upon a late Essay concerning Human Understanding: by the same Author, in Octavo. Price 3 s.  
Artificial Versifying: Or, A new way to make Latin Verses; whereby any one of ordinary Capacity, that only knows the A, B, C, and can count Nine (though he understands not one word of Latin, or what a Verse means) may be plainly taught (in as little time as this is reading over) how to make thousands of Hexameter and Pentameter Verses, which shall be true Latin, true Verse, and good Sense; the Third Edition, wherein the old Structure of Hexameters is quite taken down, and in its place a more compact one raised. To which is adjoined a new model of Pentameters, never before published, by the same Hand of Jo. Peter. Price 6d.  
A Discourse of Courage; wherein it is made known, according to Truth, and the real Nature thereof. In 4 to Price 4ds.