AN IDEA OF HAPPINESS, IN A LETTER TO A FRIEND: Enquiring Wherein the Greatest Happiness attainable by Man in this Life does consist.  
By JOHN NORRIS, Fellow of All-Souls College in Oxford.  
— Sollicitis vitam consumimus annis,  
Torquemurque metu caecâque cupidine rerum,  
Aeternisque Senes curis dum quaerimus aevum,  
Perdimus, & nullo votorum fine beati,  
Victuros agimus semper, nec vivimus unquam.  Manilius Lib. 4. 
LONDON, Printed for james Norris at the King's Arms without Temple Bar, M.DC.LXXXIII.   

SIR,  
THO' you have been pleased to assign me the Task of an Angel, and in that Respect have warranted me to disobey you; yet since a considerable part of that experimental Knowledge which I have of Happiness is owing to the Delight which I take in your virtuous and endearing Friendship, I think 'tis but reasonable I should endeavour to give you an Idea of that, whereof you have given me the Possession.  
You desire to know of me wherein the greatest Happiness attainable by man in this Life does consist. And here, tho' I see myself engaged in a work already too difficult for me, yet I find it necessary to enlarge it: For since the greatest Happiness, or Summum Bonum of this Life is a Species of Happiness in general, and since it is called (Greatest) not because absolutely perfect and complete; but inasmuch as it comes nearest to that which indeed is so, it will be necessary first to state the Notion of Happiness in General, and then to define wherein that Happiness does consist which is perfect and complete, before I can proceed to a Resolution of your Question.  
By Happiness in the most general Sense of the word, I understand nothing else but an Enjoyment of any Good. The least Degree of Good has the same Proportion to the least Degree of Happiness as the greatest has to the greatest, and consequently as many ways as a man enjoys any Good, so many ways he may be said to be happy: neither will the Mixture of Evil make him forfeit his Right to this Title, unless it either equals the Good he enjoys, or exceeds it: And then indeed it does; but the Reason is, because in strictness of Speaking upon the whole Account the man enjoys no Good at all: For if the Good and the Evil be equal-balanced, it must needs be indifferent to that man either to be or not to be, there being not the least Grain of good to determine his Choice: So that he can no more be said to be happy in that Condition, than he could before he was born. And much less, if the Evil exceeds the Good: For than he is not only not happy, but absolutely and purely miserable: For after an exact Commensuration supposed between the Good and the Evil, all that remains over of the Evil is pure and simple Misery; which is the Case of the Damned: And when 'tis once come to this (whatever some men's Metaphysics may persuade them) I am very well satisfied, that 'tis better not to be than to be. But now on the other side, if the Good does never so little outweigh the Evil, that Overplus of Good is as pure and unallayed in its Proportion, as if there were no such Mixture at all; and consequently the Possession of it may properly be called Happiness.  
I know the Masters of Moral Philosophy do not treat of Happiness in this Latitude; neither is it fit they should: For their Business being to point out the ultimate End of Humane Actions, it would be an impertinent thing for them to give any other Idea of Happiness than the highest: But however this does not hinder but that the General Idea of Happiness may be extended farther, even to the Fruition of any Good whatsoever: Neither is there any reason to find Fault with the Latitude of this Notion, since we acknowledge Degrees even in Glory.  
In this General Idea of Happiness two things are contained. One is some Good, either real or apparent, in the Fruition of which we are said to be in some measure or other happy. The other is the very Fruition itself. The first of these is usually called Objective Happiness, and the latter Formal. Some I know divide Happiness into these as distinct Species; but I think not so artificially: For they are both but constituent Parts, which jointly make up one and the same Happiness: Neither of them are sufficient alone, but they are both equally necessary. That the last of these is a necessary Ingredient, I think no doubt can reasonably be made: For what would the greatest Good imaginable signify without Fruition? And that the former is likewise necessary is no less certain: For how can there be such a thing as Fruition without an Object? I grant 'tis not at all necessary that the Object be a real substantial Good; if it appear so 'tis sufficient.  
From this Distinction of real and apparent Good, some have taken occasion to distinguish of Happiness likewise into two sorts, real and imaginary: But I believe upon a more narrow Scrutiny into the matter, 'twill be found, that all Happiness, according to its Proportion, is equally real; and that that which they term Imaginary, too well deserves the Name, there being no such thing in Nature: For let the Object of it be never so Fantastic, yet it must still carry the Semblance and Appearance of Good (otherwise it can neither move the Appetite nor please it, and consequently be neither an Object of Desire nor of Fruition;) and if so, the Happiness must needs be real, because the Formality of the Object, tho' 'twere never so true and real good, would notwithstanding lie in the Appearance, not in the Reality: Whether it be real or no is purely accidental: For since to be happy can be nothing else but to enjoy something which I desire, the Object of my Happiness must needs be enjoyed under the same Formality as 'tis desired. Now since 'tis desired only as apparently good, it must needs please me when obtained under the same Notion. So that it matters not to the Reality of my Happiness, whether the Object of it be really good, or only apprehended so, since if it were never so real, it pleases only as apparent. The Fool has his Paradise as well as the wise man, and for the time is as happy in it; and a kind Delusion will make a Cloud as pleasing as the Queen of Heaven. And therefore I think it impossible for a man to think himself happy, and (during that Persuasion) not really to be so. He enjoys the Creature of his own Fancy, worships the Idol of his Imagination, and the happiest man upon Earth does no more: For let the Circumstances of his Life be what they will, 'tis his Opinion only that must give the Relish. Without this Heaven itself would afford him no Content, nor the Vision of God prove Beatific. 'Tis true, the man is seated at the Springhead of Happiness, is surrounded with excellent Objects; but alas, it appears not so to him; he is not at all affected with his Condition, but, like Adam, lies fast in a dead Sleep in the midst of Paradise.  
The Sum of this Argument is this; Good is in the same manner the Object of Fruition, as 'tis of Desire; and that is not as really good in its own Nature, but as 'tis judged so by the Understanding: And consequently, tho' it be only apparent, it must needs be as effectual to gratify the Appetite as it was at first to excite it during that Appearance. So long as it keeps on its Vizor and imposes upon the Understanding, what is wanting in the thing, is made up by an obliging Imposture, and Ignorance becomes here the Mother of Happiness as well as of Devotion: But if the man will dare to be wise, and too curiously examine the superficial Tinsel-Good, he undeceives himself to his own Cost, and, like Adam, adventuring to eat of the Tree of Knowledge, sees himself naked, and is ashamed. And for this reason I think it impossible for any man to love to be flattered: 'Tis true, he may delight to hear himself commended by those who indeed do flatter him; but the true Reason of that is, because he does not apprehend that to be Flattery which indeed is so; but when he once throughly knows it, 'tis impossible he should be any longer delighted with it. I shall conclude this Point with this useful Reflection, That since every Man's Happiness depends wholly upon his own Opinion, the Foundation upon which all envious Men proceed, must needs be either false or very uncertain. False, if they think that outward Circumstances and States of Life are all the Ingredients of Happiness; but uncertain however: For since they measure the Happiness of other Men by their own Opinion, 'tis mere Chance if they do not misplace their Envy, unless they were sure the other Person was of the like Opinion with themselves. And now what a vain irrational thing is it to disquiet ourselves into a dislike of our own Condition, merely because we mistake an other Man's?  
Thus far of the Notion of Happiness in General; I now proceed to consider that Happiness which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (as Plato speaks) sound and entire, perfect and complete. Concerning the general Notion of which, all men, I suppose, are as much agreed as they are in the Idea of a Triangle. That 'tis such a State then which a better cannot be conceived: In which there is no Evil you can fear, no Good which you desire and have not: That which fully and constantly satisfies the Demand of every Appetite, and leaves no possibility for a desire of Change; or to sum it up in that comprehensive Expression of the Poet, 
Quod sis esse velis, nihilque malis.  When you would always be what you are, and (as the Earl of Roscommond very significantly renders it) do Rather nothing. This I suppose is the utmost that can be said or conceived of it, and less than this will not be enough. And thus far we are all agreed. For I suppose, the many various Disputes maintained by Philosophers concerning Happiness, could not respect this general Notion of it, but only the particular causes or means whereby it might be acquired. And I find Tully concurring with me in the same Observation, Ea est beata vita (says he) quaerimus autem non quae sit, 
Lib. 3 de Fin.  sed unde. The difficulty is not to frame a conception of a perfectly happy State in the general, but to define in particular wherein it consists.  
But before I undertake this Province, I think it might not be amiss to remove one Prejudice, which because it has gained upon myself sometimes in my Melancholy Retirements, I am apt to think it may be incident to other men also. It is this, Whether after so many Disputes about, so many restless endeavours after this state of perfect Happiness there be any such thing or no. Whether it be not a mere Idea, as imaginary as Plato's Commonwealth, as fictitious as the Groves of Elysium. I confess, this suspicion has oftentimes overcast my mind with black thoughts, damped my Devotion, and as it were clipped the wings of my Aspiring Soul. And I happened to fall into it upon a serious reflection on the nature of Fruition in the several Periods and Circumstances of my life. For I observed according to my Narrow experience, that I never had in all my life the same thoughts of any good in the very time of the enjoying it as I had before. I have known when I have promised myself vast Satisfactions, and my imagination has presented me at a distance with a fair Landscape of Delights, yet when I drew nigh enough to grasp the alluring Happiness, like the Sensitive Plant it contracted itself at the touch, and shrinked almost to nothing in the Fruition. And though after the Enjoyment is past, it seems great again upon reflection as it did before in expectation, yet should a Platonical Revolution make the same Circumstances recur, I should not think so. I found 'twas ever with me as with the Traveller, to whom the ground which is before him, and that which he has left behind him seems always more curiously embroidered and delightsom, then that which he stands upon. So that my Happiness like the time wherein I thought to enjoy it, was always either passed or to come never present. Methought I could often say upon a Recollection, How happy was I at such a time! Or when I was in expectation. How happy shall I be if I compass such a design! But scarce ever, I am so. I was pretty well pleased methought while I expected, while I hoped, till Fruition jogged me out of my pleasing slumber and I knew it was but a Dream. And this single Consideration has often made me even in the very pursuit after Happiness, and full career of my Passions, to stop short on this side of Fruition, and to choose rather with Moses upon Mount Nebo to entertain my fancy with a remote Prospect of the Happy Land, then to go in and possess it, and then repine. How then shall man be happy when setting aside all the Crosses of Fortune, he will complain even of Success, and Fruition itself shall disappoint him!  
And this melancholy reflection bred in me a kind of suspicion, that for all that I knew it might be so in Heaven too. That although at this distance I might frame to myself bright Ideas of that Region of Bliss; yet when I came to the possession of it, I should not find that perfect Happiness there which I expected, but that it would be always to come as 'tis now, and that I should seek for Heaven even in Heaven itself. That I should not fully acquiesce in my condition there, but at length desire a change. And that which confirmed me the more in this unhappy Scepticism, was because I considered that a great number of excellent Being's who enjoyed the very Quintessence of Bliss, who were as happy as God and Heaven could make them, grew soon uneasy and weary of their State and left their own Habitation. Which argues that their Happiness was not perfect and complete, because otherwise they would not have desired a change, since that very desire is an imperfection. And if Happiness be not complete in Heaven, sure 'tis impossible to be found any where else.  
Before therefore I proceed to define wherein perfect Happiness does consist, I think it necessary to endeavour the removal of this Scruple which like the flaming Sword forbids entrance into Paradise. In order to which, I shall inquire into the true reason why these Sublunary good things when enjoyed do neither answer our expectations, nor satisfy our Appetites. Now this must proceed either from the nature of Fruition itself, or from the imperfection of it, or from the Object of it, or from ourselves. I confess, did this defect proceed from the very nature of Fruition (as is supposed in the Objection) 'tis impossible there should be any such thing as perfect Happiness, since 'twould faint away while enjoyed, and expire in our embraces. But that it cannot proceed thence, I have this to offer, Because Fruition being nothing else but an Application or Union of the Soul to some good or agreeable Object, it is impossible that should lessen the good enjoyed. Indeed it may lessen our estimation of it, but that is because we do not rightly consider the nature of things, but promise our selves infinite Satisfactions in the enjoyment of finite Objects. We look upon things through a false Glass which magnifies the Object at a distance much beyond its just Dimensions. We represent our future enjoyments to ourselves in such favourable and partial Ideas which abstract from all the inconveniencies and allays which will really in the event accompany them. And if we thus over-rate our Felicities beforehand, 'tis no wonder if they balk our Expectations in the Fruition. But than it must be observed that the Fruition does not cause this Deficiency in the Object, but only discover it. We have a better insight into the nature of things near at hand, then when we stood afar off, and consequently discern those defects and imperfections which like the qualities of an ill Mistress, lay hid all the time of Courtship, and now begin to betray themselves, when 'tis come to enjoyment. But this can never happen but where the Object is finite. An infinite Object can never be overvalued and consequently cannot frustrate our expectations.  
And as we are not to charge Fruition with our disappointments but ourselves (because we are accessary to our own delusion by taking false measures of things) so neither is the Vnsatisfactoriness of any condition to be imputed to the Nature of Fruition itself, but either to the imperfection of it or to the finiteness of the Object. Let the Object be never so perfect, yet if the Fruition of it be in an imperfect measure there will still be room for Vnsatisfactoriness, as it appears in our enjoyment of God in this Life. Neither can a finite Object fully satisfy us though we enjoy it never so thoroughly. For since to a full satisfaction and acquiescence of mind 'tis required that our Faculties be always entertained and we ever enjoying: it is impossible a finite Object should afford this satisfaction, because all the good that is in it (being finite) is at length run over, and then the enjoyment is at an end. The flower is sucked dry, and we necessarily desire a change. Whenever therefore our enjoyment proves unsatisfying, we may conclude, that either the Object is finite, or the Fruition imperfect. But then how came the Angels to be dissatisfied with their Condition in the Regions of light and immortality, when they drank freely of the Fountain of Life proceeding out of the Throne of God, 
Revel. 26.  with whom is fullness of Joy, and at whose Right hand are Pleasures for evermore. Here certainly there is no room either for the finiteness of the Object, or the imperfection of Fruition. And therefore their dissatisfaction can be imputed to no other Cause, than the Nature of Fruition in general, which is to lessen the good enjoyed, as was supposed in the Objection. This I confess presses hard, and indeed, I have but one way to extricate myself from this difficulty, and that is by supposing a State of Probation in the Angels. That they did not immediately upon their Creation enjoy an infinite Object, or if they did, yet that 'twas in an imperfect measure. For should it be granted that they were at first confirmed in Bliss and completely happy both in respect of Fruition and Object as we suppose they are now, I cannot conceive it possible they should be dissatisfied with their condition. This being repugnant to the Idea of Perfect Happiness.  
Since then this dissatisfaction must be derived either from the imperfection of the Fruition, or the finiteness of the Object, and not from the Nature of Fruition in the general, to infer the possibility of perfect Happiness, there needs no more to be supposed then the existence of a Being full fraught with infinite inexhaustible good, and that he is able to communicate it to the full. There may be then such a thing as perfect Happiness. The possibility of which may also be farther proved (tho' not explicated) from those boundless Desires, that immortal Thirst every man has after it by Nature: Concerning which I observe, that nothing does more constantly, more inseparably cleave to our Minds that this Desire of perfect and consummated Happiness: This, as Plato pathetically expresses it, is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the most excellent end of all our Endeavours, the great Prize, the great Hope. This is the Mark every Man shoots at, and tho' we miss our Aim never so often, yet we will not, cannot give over; but like passionate Lovers take Resolution from a Repulse. The rest of our Passions are much at our own Disposal; yield either to Reason or Time; we either argue ourselves out of them, or at least outlive them. We are not always in love with Pomp and Grandeur, nor always dazzled with the glittering of Riches; and there is a Season when Pleasure itself shall court in vain: But the Desire of perfect Happiness has no Intervals, no Vicissitudes, it outlasts the Motion of the Pulse, and survives the Ruins of the Grave. Many Waters cannot quench it, neither can the Floods drown it: And now certainly God would never have planted such an ardent, such an importunate Appetite in our Souls, and as it were interwoven it with our very Natures had he not been able to satisfy it.  
I come now to show wherein this perfect Happiness does consist, concerning which I affirm in the first place, that it is not to be found in any thing we can enjoy in this Life. The greatest Fruition we have of God here, is imperfect, and consequently unsatisfactory. And as for all other Objects they are finite, and consequently though never so fully enjoyed cannot afford us perfect satisfaction. No, 
Job 28.  Man knoweth not the price thereof: Neither is it to be found in the Land of the Living. The Depth saith, it is not in me, and the Sea saith, it is not in me. The Vanity of the Creature has been so copiously discoursed upon, both by Philosophers and Divines, and is withal so obvious to every thinking man's experience, that I need not here take an Inventory of the Creation, nor turn Ecclesiastes after Solomon. And besides, I have already anticipated this Argument in what I have said concerning Fruition. I shall only add one or two Remarks concerning the Objects of Secular Happiness, which are not so commonly insisted upon, to what has been there said. The first is this, that the Objects wherein Men generally seek for Happiness here, are not only finite in their Nature, but also few in number. Indeed could a Man's Life be so contrived, that he should have a new Pleasure still ready at hand assoon as he was grown weary of the Old, and every day enjoy the Maidenhead of a fresh Delight, he might then perhaps, like Mr. Hobbs his Notion, and for a while think himself happy in this continued Succession of new Acquisitions. But alas, Nature does not treat us with this Variety. The compass of our enjoyments is much shorter than that of our Lives, and there is a Periodical Circulation of our Pleasures as well as of our blood. 
— Versamur ibidem atque insumus usque. 
Lucretius.   
Nec nova vivendo procuditur ulla voluptas.  The Enjoyments of our Lives run in a perpetual Round like the Months in the Calendar, but with a quicker Revolution; we dance like Fairies in a Circle, and our whole Life is but a nauseous Tautology: We rise like the Sun, and run the same Course we did the day before, and to morrow is but the same over again: So that the greatest Favourite of Fortune will have Reason often enough to cry out with him in Seneca, Quousque eadem? But there is another Grievance which contributes to defeat our Endeavours after perfect Happiness in the Enjoyments of this Life. Which is, that the Objects wherein we seek it, are not only finite and few; but that they commonly prove Occasions of greater Sorrow to us than ever they afforded us Content. This may be made out several ways, as from the Labour of Getting, the Care of Keeping, the fear of Losing, and the like Topics, commonly insisted on by others; but I wave these, and fix upon another Account less blown upon, and I think more material than any of the rest. It is this, that altho' the Object loses that great appearance in the Fruition which it had in the expectation, yet after it is gone it resumes it again. Now we when we lament the loss, do not take our measures from that appearance which the Object had in the enjoyment (as we should do to make our sorrow not exceed our Happiness) but from that which it has in the reflection, and consequently we must needs be more miserable in the loss than we were happy in the enjoyment.  
From these and the like Considerations, I think it will evidently appear that this perfect Happiness is not to be found in any thing we can enjoy in this Life. Wherein then does it consist? I answer positively, in the full and entire Fruition of God. He (as Plato speaks) is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the proper and Principal End of Man, the Centre of our Tendency, the Ark of our Rest. He is the Object which alone can satisfy the appetite of the most Capacious Soul, and stand the Test of Fruition to Eternity. And to enjoy him fully is perfect Felicity. This in general, is no more than what is delivered to us in Scripture, and was believed by many of the Heathen Philosophers. But the manner of this Fruition requires a more particular Consideration. Much is said by the Schoolmen upon this Subject, whereof in the first place I shall give a short and methodical account, and then fix upon the Opinion which I best approve of. The first thing that I observe, is, that 'tis generally agreed upon among them, that this Fruition of God consists in some Operation; and I think with very good reason. For as by the Objective part of Perfect Happiness we understand that which is best and last, and to which all other things are to be referred. So by the Formal part of it must be understood the best and last Habitude of Man toward that best Object, so that the Happiness may both ways satisfy the Appetite, that is, as 'tis the best thing, and as 'tis the Possession, use, or Fruition of that best thing: Now this Habitude whereby the best thing is perfectly possessed must needs be some Operation, because Operation is the ultimate perfection of every Being. Which Axiom (as Caietan well observes) must not be so understood as if Operation taken by itself were more perfect than the thing which tends to it, but that every thing with its Operation is more perfect than without it.  
The next thing which I observe, is, that 'tis also farther agreed upon among them, that this Operation wherein our Fruition of God does consist, is an Operation of the Intellectual part, and not of the Sensitive. And this also, I take to be very reasonable. First, Because 'tis generally received that the Essence of God cannot be the Object of any of our Senses. But Secondly, Suppose it could, yet since this Operation wherein our Perfect Happiness does consist must be the perfectest Operation, and since that of the Intellectual part is more perfect than that of the Sensitive, it follows that the Operation whereby we enjoy God must be that of the Intellectual part only.  
But now whereas the Intellectual part of man (as 'tis opposed to the Sensitive) is double, viz. That of the Understanding, and that of the Will, there has commenced a great Controversy between the Thomists and the Scotists, in which Act or Operation of the Rational Soul the Fruition of God, does consist, whether in an act of the Understanding, or in an act of the Will. The Thomists will have it consist purely in an act of the Understanding, which is Vision. The Scotists in act of the Will, which is Love. I intent not here to launch out into those Voluminous Intricacies and Abstrusities, occasioned by the management of this Argument: It may suffice to tell you, that I think they are both in the extreme, and therefore I shall take the middle way and resolve the perfect Fruition of God partly into Vision and partly into Love. These are the two arms with which we embrace the Divinity, and unite our Souls to the fair one and the good. These I conceive are both so essential to the perfect Fruition of God, that the Idea of it can by no means be maintained if either of them be wanting. For since God is both Supreme Truth and infinite Goodness he cannot be entirely possessed but by the most clear knowledge and the most ardent love. And besides, since the Soul is happy by her Faculties, her Happiness must consist in the most perfect Operation of each Faculty. For if Happiness did consist formally in the sole operation of the Understanding (as most say) or in the sole operation of the Will (as others) the Man would not be completely and in all respects Happy. For how is it possible a Man should be perfectly Happy in loving the greatest good if he did not know it, or in knowing it if he did not love it? And moreover these two Operations do so mutually tend to the promotion and Conservation of one another, that upon this depends the perpetuity and the constancy of our Happiness. For while the Blessed do 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Face to Face contemplate the Supreme Truth and the infinite Goodness, they cannot choose but love perpetually; and while they perpetually love, they cannot choose but perpetually contemplate. And in this mutual reciprocation of the actions of the Soul consists the perpetuity of Heaven, the Circle of Felicity.  
Besides this way of resolving our Fruition of God into Vision and Love, there is a Famous Opinion said to be broached by Henricus Gandavensis, who upon a Supposition that God could not be so fully enjoyed as is required to perfect Happiness, only by the Operations or Powers of the Soul, fancied a certain Illapse whereby the Divine Essence did fall in with and as it were penetrate the essence of the Blessed. Which Opinion he endeavours to illustrate by this Similitude. That as a piece of Iron red hot by reason of the Illapse of the fire into it appears all over like fire, so the Souls of the Blessed by this Illapse of the Divine Essence into them shall be all over Divine.  
I think he has scarce any Followers in this Opinion, but I am sure he had a Leader. For this is no more than what Plato taught before him, as is to be seen in his Discourses about the refusion of the Souls of good men into the Anima Mundi, which is the self same in other terms with this Opinion. And the truth of what I affirm may farther appear from an expression of that great Platonist Plotinus, (viz.) that the Soul will then be Happy when it shall depart hence to God, 
Enn. 6. lib. 9 cap. 10.  and as another and no longer herself shall become wholly his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 having joined herself to him as a Centre to a Centre.  
That such an intimate Conjunction with God as is here described is possible, seems to me more than credible from the Nature of the Hypostatic Union, but whether our Fruition of God after this Life shall consist in it, none know but those Happy Souls who enjoy him, and therefore I shall determine nothing before the time. This only I observe, that should our Fruition of God consist in such an Union or rather Penetration of Essences that would not exclude but rather infer those Operations of Vision and Love as necessary to Fruition, but on the other hand, there seems no such necessity of this Union to the Fruition, but that it may be conceived entire without it. And therefore why we should multiply difficulties without cause, I see no reason. For my part I should think myself sufficiently happy in the clear Vision of my Maker, nor should I desire any thing beyond the Prayer of Moses, 
Exod. 33.18.  I beseech thee show me thy Glory.  
For what an infinite Satisfaction, Happiness, and Delight must it needs be to have a clear and intimate perception of that Primitive and Original Beauty, Perfection and Harmony whereof all that appears fair and excellent either to our Senses or Understandings in this Life is but a faint imitation, a pale Reflection! To see him who is the Fountain of all Being, containing in himself the perfection, not only of all that is, but of all that is possible to be, the Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, the first and the last, which is, and which was, 
Rev. 1.8.  and which is to come, the Almighty! To see him of whom all Nature is the Image, of whom all the Harmony both of the visible and the invisible World is but the Echo! To see him who (as Plato divinely and magnificently expresses it) is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. The immense Ocean of Beauty, which is itself by itself, with itself, uniform, always existing! This certainly will affect the Soul with all the pleasing and ravishing Transports of Love and Desire, Joy and Delight, Wonder and Amazement, together with a settled Acquiescence and Complacency of Spirit only less infinite than the Loveliness that causes it, and the peculiar Complacency of him who rejoices in his own fullness, and the Comprehensions of Eternity. We see how strangely our sense of Seeing is affected with the Harmony of Colours, and our sense of Hearing with the Harmony of Sounds, insomuch that some have been too weak for the enjoyment, and have grown mad with the Sublimate of Pleasure. And if so, what then shall we think of the Beatific Vision, the pleasure of which will so far transcend that of the other, as God who is all over Harmony and Proportion exceeds the sweetest Melody of Sounds and Colours, and the perception of the Mind is more vigorous quick and piercing then that of the Senses? This is Perfect Happiness, this is the Tree of Life which grows in the midst of the Paradise of God, this is Heaven, which while the Learned dispute about, the good only enjoy. But I shall not venture to Soar any longer in these Heights, I find the Aether too thin here to breath in long, and the Brightness of the Region flashes too strong upon my tender sense; I shall therefore hasten to descend from the Mount of God, lest I grow giddy with speculation and lose those Secrets which I have learned there, the Cabala of Felicity.  
And now (Sir) I come to consider your Question (viz.) Wherein the greatest Happiness attainable by man in this Life does consist. Concerning which, there is as great variety of Opinions among Philosophers, as there is among Geographers, about the Seat of Paradise. The learned Varro reckons up no less than 288 several Opinions about it, and yet notwithstanding the number of Writers who have bequeathed Volumes upon this Subject to Posterity, they seem to have been in the dark in nothing more than in this, and (excepting only a few Platonists who placed Man's greatest End in the Contemplation of truth) they seem to have undertaken nothing so unhappily, as when they essayed to write of Happiness. Some measure their Happiness by the high-tide of their Riches, as the Egyptians did the Fertility of the Year by the increase of the River Nile. Others place it in the Pleasures of Sense, others in Honour and Greatness. But these and the like were Men of the common Herd, low grovelling Souls that either understood not the Dignity of Humane Nature, or else forgot that they were Men. But there were others of a Diviner Genius and Sublimer Spirit 
Queis meliore luto finxit praecordia Titan.  Who had a more generous blood running in their Veins, which made them put a just value upon themselves, and scorn to place their greatest Happiness in that which they should blush to enjoy. And those were the Stoics and the Peripatetics who both place the greatest Happiness of this Life in the Actions of Virtue, with this only difference, that whereas the former are contented with Naked Virtue, the latter require some other Collateral things to the farther accomplishment of Happiness, such as are Health and Strength of Body, a Competent Livelihood, and the like.  
And this Opinion has been subscribed to by the hands of eminent Moralists in all Ages. And as it is Venerable for its Antiquity, so has it gained no small Authority from the Pen of a great Modern Writer (Descartes) who resolves the greatest Happiness of this Life into the right use of the Will, which consists in this, that a Man have a firm and constant purpose always to do that which he shall judge to be best.  
I confess, the Practice of Virtue is a very great instrument of Happiness, and that there is a great deal more true satisfaction and solid content to be found in a constant course of well living then in all the soft Caresses of the most studied Luxury, or the Voluptuousness of a Seraglio. And therefore I have oftentimes been exceedingly pleased in the reading of a certain Passage in that Divine Moralist Hierocles, where he tells you, that the Virtuous Man lives much more pleasantly than the Vicious Man. For (says he) all Pleasure is the Companion of Action, it has no Subsistence of its own, but accompanies us in our doing such and such things. Hence 'tis that the worse Actions are accompanied with the meaner Pleasures. So that the good Man does not only excel the wicked Man in what is good, but has also the advantage of him even in Pleasure, for whose sake alone he is wicked. For he that chooses Pleasure with Filthiness, although for a while he be sweetly and deliciously entertained, yet at last through the Filthiness annexed to his enjoyment, he is brought to a painful Repentance. But now he that prefers Virtue with all her Labours and Difficulties, though at first for want of use it sits heavy upon him, yet by the Conjunction of good he alleviates the labour and at last enjoys pure and unallayed Pleasure with his Virtue. So that of necessity that Life is most unhappy, which is most wicked, and that most pleasant which is most virtuous.  
Now this I readily submit to as a great truth, that the degrees of Happiness vary according to the degrees of Virtue, and consequently that that Life which is most Virtuous is most Happy with reference to those that are Vicious or less Virtuous, every degree of Virtue having a proportionate degree of Happiness accompanying it, (which is all, I suppose, that excellent Author intends.) But I do not think the most Virtuous Life so the most Happy, but that it may become Happier unless something more be comprehended in the Word (Virtue) than the Stoics, Peripatetics, and the generality of other Moralists understand by it. For with them it signifies no more but only such a firm 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or habitude of the Will to good, whereby we are constantly disposed, notwithstanding the contrary tendency of our Passions to perform the necessary Offices of Life. This they call Moral or Civil Virtue, and althongh this brings always Happiness enough with it to make ample amends for all the difficulties which attend the practice of it: Yet I am not of Opinion that the greatest Happiness attainable by Man in this Life consists in it. But there is another and a higher sense of the Word which frequently occurs in the Pythagorean and Platonic Writings, (viz.) Contemplation and the unitive way of Religion. And this they call Divine Virtue. I allow of the distinction, but I would not be thought to derive it from the Principle, as if Moral Virtue were acquired, and this infused (for to speak ingeniously infused Virtue seemed ever to me as great a Paradox in Divinity, as Occult qualities in Philosophy) but from the nobleness of the Object, the Object of the former being Moral good, and the Object of the latter God himself. The former is a State of Proficiency, the latter of Perfection. The former is a State of difficulty and contention, the latter of ease and Sincerity. The former is employed in mastering the Passions, and regulating the actions of common life, the latter in Divine Meditation and the Ecstasies of Seraphic Love. He that has only the former is like Moses with much difficulty climbing up the Holy Mount, but he that has the latter is like the same Person conversing with God on the serene top of it, and shining with the Rays of Anticipated Glory. So that this latter supposes the acquisition of the former, and consequently has all the Happiness retaining to the other, besides what it adds of its own. This is the last Stage of Humane Perfection, the utmost round of the Ladder whereby we ascend to Heaven, one Step higher is Glory. Here then will I build my Tabernacle, for it is good to be here. Here will I set up my Pillar of Rest, here will I fix, for why should I travail on farther in pursuit of any greater Happiness, since Man in this Station is but a little lower than the Angels, one remove from Heaven. Here certainly is the greatest Happiness as well as Perfection attainable by Man in this State of imperfection. For since that Happiness which is absolutely perfect and complete consists in the clear and intimate Vision and most ardent Love of God, hence we ought to take our Measures and conclude that to be the greatest Happiness attainable in this State, which is the greatest participation of the other. And that can be nothing else but the unitive way of Religion, which consists of the Contemplation and Love of God. I shall say something of each of these severally, and something of the unitive way of Religion which is the result of both, and so shut up this Discourse.  
By Contemplation in general (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) we understand an application of the Understanding to some truth. But here in this place we take the word in a more peculiar sense, as it signifies an habitual attentive steady application or conversion of the Spirit to God and his Divine Perfections. Of this the Masters of Mystic Theology commonly make fifteen Degrees. The first is Intuition of Truth, the 2 is a Retirement of all the Vigour and strength of the Faculties into the innermost parts of the Soul, the 3 is Spiritual Silence, the 4 is Rest, the 5 is Union, the 6 is the hearing of the still Voice of God, the 7 is Spiritual Slumber, the 8 is Ecstacy, the 9 is Rapture, the 10 is the Corporeal Appearance of Christ and the Saints, the 11 is the Imaginary Appearance of the same, the 12 is the Intellectual Vision of God, the 13 is the Vision of God in obscurity, the 14 is an admirable Manifestation of God, the 15 is a clear and intuitive Vision of him, such as St. Austin and Tho. Aquinas attribute to S. Paul when he was rapt up into the third Heaven. Others of them reckon seven degrees only, (viz.) Taste, Desire, Satiety, Ebriety, Security, Tranquillity, but the name of the seaventh (they say) is known only to God.  
I shall not stand to examine the Scale of this Division, perhaps there may be a kind of a Pythagoric Superstition in the number. But this I think I may affirm in general that the Soul may be wound up to a most strange degree of Abstraction by a silent and steady Contemplation of God. Plato defines Contemplation to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Solution and a Separation of the Soul from the Body. And some of the severer Platonists have been of Opinion that 'tis possible for a Man by mere intention of thought not only to withdraw the Soul from all commerce with the Senses, but even really to separate it from the Body, to untwist the Ligaments of his Frame, and by degrees to resolve himself into the State of the Dead. And thus the jews express the manner of the Death of Moses, calling it Osculum Oris Dei, the Kiss of God's Mouth. That is, that he breathed out his Soul by the mere strength and Energy of Contemplation, and expired in the Embraces of his Maker. A Happy way of Dying! How ambitious should I be of such a conveyance, were it practicable? How passionately should I join with the Church in Canticles? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
1 Ver. 2.  Let him kiss me with the Kisses of his Mouth.  
But however this be determined, certain it is, that there are exceeding great Measures of Abstraction in Contemplation, so great, that sometimes whether a Man be in the Body or out of the Body, he himself can hardly tell. And consequently the Soul in these Praeludiums of Death, these Neighbourhoods of Separation must needs have brighter glimpses and more Beatific Ideas of God, then in a State void of these Elevations, and consequently must love him with greater Ardency. Which is the next thing I am to consider.  
The love of God in general may be considered either as it is purely intellectual, or as it is a Passion. The first is when the Soul upon an apprehension of God as a good delectable and agreeable Object joins herself to him by the Will. The latter is when the motion of the Will is accompanied with a sensible Commotion of the Spirits, and an estuation of the blood. Some I know are of Opinion, that 'tis not possible for a man to be affected with this sensitive Love of God which is a Passion, because there is nothing in God which falls under our imagination and consequently (the imagination being the only Medium of conveyance) it cannot be propagated from the Intellectual part to the Sensitive. Whereupon they affirm that none are capable of this sensitive passionate love of God but Christians who enjoy the Mystery of the Incarnation whereby they know God has condescended so far as to clothe himself with flesh, and to become like one of us. But 'tis not all the Sophistry of the old Logicians that shall work me out of the belief of what I feel and know, and rob me of the sweetest entertainment of my Life, the Passionate Love of God. Whatever some Men pretend who are strangers to all the affectionate heats of Religion, and therefore make their Philosophy a Plea for their indevotion, and extinguish all Holy Ardours with a Syllogism; yet I am firmly persuaded that our love of God may be not only passionate, but even Wonderfully so, and exceeding the Love of Women. 'Tis an Experimental and therefore undeniable Truth, that Passion is a great Instrument of Devotion, and accordingly we find that Men of the most warm and pathetic Tempers and Amorous Complexions (Provided they have but Consideration enough withal to fix upon the right Object) prove the greatest Votaries in Religion. And upon this account it is, that to heighten our Love of God in our Religious Addresses, we endeavour to excite our Passions by Music, which would be to as little purpose as the Fanatic thinks 'tis, if there were not such a thing as the Passionate Love of God. But then as to the Objection, I Answer with the excellent Descartes, that although in God who is the Object of our Love, we can imagine nothing, yet we can imagine that our Love, which consists in this, that we would unite our selves to the Object beloved, and consider our selves as it were a part of it. And the sole Idea of this very Conjunction is enough to stir up a heat about the Heart, and so kindle a very vehement Passion. To which I add, that although the Beauty or aimableness of God be not the same with that which we see in Corporeal Being's, and consequently cannot directly fail within the Sphere of the Imagination, yet it is something Analogous to it, and that very Analogy is enough to excite a Passion. And this I think sufficient to warrant my general division of the Love of God into Intellectual and Sensitive.  
But there is a more peculir Acceptation of the Love of God proper to this place. And it is that which we call Seraphic. By which I understand in short, that Love of God which is the effect of an intense Contemplation of him. This differs not from the other in kind, but only in degree, and that it does exceedingly, in as much as the thoughtful Contemplative Man (as I hinted before) has clearer Perceptions and livelier Impressions of the Divine Beauty, the lovely Attributes and Perfections of God, than he whose Soul is more deeply set in the Flesh, and lies grovelling in the bottom of the Dungeon.  
That the Nature of this Seraphic Love may be the better understood, I shall consider how many degrees there may be in the Love of God. 
Lib. 2. de monachii, cap. 2.  And I think the Computation of Bellarmin is accurate enough. He makes four. The first is to Love God proportionably to his Loveliness, that is, with an infinite Love; and this degree is peculiar to God himself. The second is to Love him, not proportionably to his Loveliness, but to the utmost Capacity of a Creature, and this degree is peculiar to Saints and Angels in Heaven. The third is to love him not proportionably to his Loveliness, nor to the utmost capacity of a Creature absolutely considered, but to the utmost capacity of a Mortal Creature in this Life. And this (he says) is proper to the Religious. The fourth is to love him not proportionably to his Loveliness, nor to the utmost capacity of a Creature considered either absolutely or with respect to this Life, but only so as to love nothing equally with him or above him. That is, not to do any thing contrary to the Divine Love. And this is absolute indespensable duty, less than which will not qualify us for the enjoyment of God hereafter.  
Now this Seraphic Love which we here discourse of is in the third degree: When a Man after many degrees of Abstraction from the Animal Life, many a profound and steady Meditation upon the Excellencies of God, sees such a vast Ocean of Beauty and Perfection in him, that he loves him to the utmost Stretches of his Power. 
Cant. 2.3.  When he sits under his shadow with great delight, and his fruit is sweet to his Tast. When he Consecrates and Devotees himself wholly to him, and has no Passion for Inferior Objects. When he is ravished with the delights of his Service, and breaths out some of his Soul to him in every Prayer. When he is delighted with Anthems of Praise and Adoration more than with Marrow and Fatness, and Feasts upon a Hallelujah. When he melts in a Calenture of Devotion, and his Soul breaketh out with fervent Desire. 
Psal. 119.  When the one thing he delights in is to converse with God in the Beauty of Holiness, and the one thing he desires to see him as he is in Heaven. This is Seraphic Love, and this with Contemplation makes up that which the Mystic Divines Style the unitive way of Religion. It is called so because it Unites us to God in the most excellent manner that we are capable of in this Life. By Union here I do not understand that which is Local or Presential, because I consider God as Omnipresent. Neither do I mean a Union of Grace (as they call it) whereby we are reconciled to God, or a Union of Charity whereof it is said, 
Jo. 4.16.  he that dwelleth in Love dwelleth in God and God in him. The first of these being as common to the inanimate things as to the most Ecstasied Soul upon Earth. And the two last being common to all good men who indeed love God, but yet want the excellency of Contemplation and the Mystic Union. The Union then which I here speak of is that which is between the Faculty and the Object. Which consists in some Habitude or Operation of one toward the other. The Faculties here are the Understanding and Will, the Object God, and the Operations Contemplation and Love. The result of which two is the Mystic Union. Which according to this complex Notion of it that I have here delivered, is thus most admirably represented by the excellent Bishop Taylour. It is (says he) a Prayer of quietness and silence and a Meditation extraordinary, 
The great Exemplar pag. 60.  a Discourse without variety, a Vision and Intuition of Divine Excellencies, an immediate entry into an Orb of light, and a resolution of all our Faculties into Sweetness, Affections and Stare upon the Divine Beauty. And is carried on to Ecstasies, Raptures, Suspensions, Elevations, Abstractions and Apprehensions beatifical.  
I make no doubt but that many an honest Pious Soul arrives to the heavenly Canaan who is not fed with this Manna in the Wilderness. But though every one must not expect these Antepatists of Felicity that is virtuous, yet none else must. Paradise was never open but to a State of Innocence. But neither is that enough. No, this Mount of God's presence is fenced not only from the profane but also from the Moderately virtuous. 'Tis the Privilege of Angelical Dispositions, and the reward of eminent Piety and an excellent Religion to be admitted to these Divine Repasts, these Feasts of Love. And here I place the greatest Happiness attainable by Man in this Life, as being the nearest Approach to the State of the Blessed above, the Outer Court of Heaven.  
These (Sir) are my thoughts concerning Happiness. I might have spun them out into a greater length, but I think a little Plot of ground thick-sown is better than a great Field which for the most part of it lies Fallow. I have endeavoured to deliver my Notions with as much perspicuity and in as good Method as I could, and so to answer all the ends of Copiousness, with the advantage of a shorter Cut. If I appear singular in any of my Notions 'tis not out of an industrious affectation of Novelty, but because in the composing of this discourse (the Meditation of a few broken hours in a Garden) I consulted more my own experimental Notices of things and private Reflections than the Writings of others. So that if sometimes I happen to be in the Road, and sometimes in a way by myself, 'tis no wonder. I affect neither the one nor the other, but write as I think. Which as I do at other times, so more especially when I subscribe myself  
Sir, Yours most affectionately. I. N. Allsouls College Apr. 18. 1683.  
FINIS.   

Books Printed for James Norris, this present Year, 1683.  

MAssinello, or a satire against the Association and the Guildhall Riot, 4o  
Eromena, or the Noble Stranger, a Novel. 8o  
Tractatus Adversus Reprobationis Absolutae decretum Nova Methodo & Succinetissimo Compendio adornatus; & in duos Libros Digestus, 8 o— This in Latin is Writ by the same Author of the Idea of Happiness, and these Books are Translated by the same Author out of Greek and Latin into English, (viz.)  
Effigies Amoris, or the Picture of Love Unveiled, 12o  
Hierocles upon the Golden Verses of the Pythagoreans, 8o