THE NATIONS ADDRESS TO THE Committee of Grievances in Parliament, For the Taking Off the CORPORATION OATH, IN Behalf of all Cities, Towns-Corporate, Aldermen, Bailiffs, Burgesses; as also of Sheriffs, Lord Lieutenants, and Deputy Lieutenants of Counties, Ministers, and all others concerned for the Repealing those Acts, which impose the Oath following. The OATH. I A. B. do swear, That it is not Lawful, upon any pretence whatsoever, to take Arms against the King. And that I do abhor that Traitorous position, of taking Arms by his Authority, against his Person, or against those that are Commissionated by Him, in pursuance of such Commissions. And that I will not, at any time endeavour any Alteration of Government, either in Church or State. IN this Oath, we have the Matter, and the Form of Words, that is the Substance, and Composure: And there are Three Parts of it. The first Part is not consistent with Judgement: The Second with Truth: The Third with Righteousness. I will take up the Last part First. And I will not endeavour any Alteration of Government. There is no Government on Earth so perfect, that it has need of Laws, like the Medes and Persians. Government may be considered in the Administration, (according to Politics) or the Constitution. The Word Government is set down here indefinitely, without Distinction. Alteration of Laws, and so Government in the Adminestration, is as necessary many times upon emergent occasions, to the Body Politic, as the fresh Air is to the Natural. This Oath was once brought in to the Parliament, to have been made common. It were a thing not Righteous, a destructire thing, to have such an Engagement laid on persons in such a capacity: It were injurious, to have it laid on any Freeholders', or Free-Subjects, as we are. The Constitution of our Nation, as Parliamentary, is such, that no Law can be Established or Repealed, but it must pass the House of Commons; and so the whole Body concur in their Representatives to every Alteration of (or in) the Government which is made, if it be Legal: No House of Commons, but is Chosen by the People. Every Englishman is intended to be here present, either in Person, or by Procuration; and the Consent of the Parliament is taken to be every Man's Consent, says Sir Thomas Smith, De Rep. Angl. l. 2. c. 2. Nay, while the King, Consilio & Consensu Baronum Leges olim imposuit Universo Regno, by the Counsel and Assent of his Barons, did give Laws to his whole Realm, Consentire inferior quisque visus est in persona Domini sui Capitalis pro ut hodie per Procuratores Comitatus, every Inferior seemed to consent in the person of his Chief Lord; as now they do by their Burgesses, and Knights of the Shires, says Sir Henry Spelman. This is so true, that in this sense it is, that the Laws are said to be Quas vulgus elegerit, Which the People shall choose. Now, then, if every Free Subject hath a Fundamental Liberty to Choose Knights, and Burgesses; and accordingly to inform them of their Grievances, and Petition them for Redress, and in them, as their Representatives, do consent to the Alteration of Government and Laws, (if there be any pass) as profitable to the Nation: How can such an Oath be imposed on him, That he will not endeavour any Alteration, as this? Is not Choosing Burgesses; informing them, Petitioning them, Acting and Legally Consenting in them, to this end, An Endeavour; and that as much as can be in their Place and Calling? And no more than an Endeavour in their Place and Calling, was Sworn in the Covenant. It is true, that New Laws was made, and Old Repealed, without Alteration of the Constitution, but not without Alteration of Government, because Government takes in both the Administration and Constitution. Let us suppose the word Government confined only the Constitution. This is the Constitution of the Government in the State, which is a Legal Monarchy; and this indeed we are so far bound from endeavouring to Alter, (now we are constituted a Commonwealth) that I think it not alterable by the King himself, and Parliament (though it might be so little a while since, when they were a Convention) because the Supreme Power, for the Administration, must be supposed, in all Communities, to be derived from, and held by the Constitution. But as for Government in the Church; We are to know, and to acknowledge the Constitution itself hereof, is but a Law of the Administration, in Reference to the State. And consequently, when all Laws for the Administration are liable to the Regulations of Parliaments; the great Question will remain, How these men, who are Presbyterian, or Independent, in their Judgement, and think Episcopacy against the Scripture, can be denied the Endeavour only before mentioned (which consists but in Choosing Representatives, and doing no more than the Constitution allows) in order to the Prosecution of what they think themselves obliged to in Conscience, both by Oath and the Word of God? Is not the Foundation Liberty of the whole People, and ourselves with them, here in danger? Judge ye, that are Wise; and what an Anointed Plot 〈◊〉 had here in the Nation, that an Allegiance in effect, should be Sworn to the Bishops, as well as to the King, by such Impositions? For the Words then (or Form,) I wonder at this Rigour in the Compiler, that a man must Swear, Not to endeavour any Alteration. Had it not been enough to be Engaged, not to endea- any Alteration of the Substance of our Government, Episcopacy in the Church, and Monarchy in the State; but it must be, Not Any Alteration? It were well, that we were so absolutely perfect. And again, must we not at any time endeavour any Alteration? What if times should turn, and we be in a Confusion, as in Cromwell's time, and immediately after? What if any such like chance, or changes come? Must these Men be bound up, that they cannot endeavour to render back this Government, that we have? No, not the King, and the Bishops, if the Iniquity of the Times should put them out; for they have Sworn, they will not at any time endeavour any Alteration of Government, in Church or State. Sirs! The Matter of this Obligation, being against the Fundamental Freedom of the Subject and Parliament, and the Words you see, so ensnaring, and that against the Duty all own to the public good; I offer it to you to consider, in the first place, whether this last Part be according to Righteousness? For the Middle part of the Oath. Here is a Position of Taking Arms by the King's Authority, against any Commissionated by him, which must be Sworn to, as Abhor and Traitorous. There is a Case, that hath been always in the Mouths of the Understanding, Refusers of this Oath and Subscription. Suppose some Writ Sued out, and comes to the Sheriff's Hands, and suppose persons come to oppose the Execution, by the King's personal Command or Commission, and he thereupon raises the Posse Comitatus upon them; I will ask here, Whether the Sheriff act not herein by the King's Authority? I think it cannot be denied. By the King's Authority is all one, as by the Laws; and if he can Act so Justificially against any, for all their Commission, and the Law will bear him out; How is this Position in this Case Traitorous, and to be Abhorred? It were hardly now to be imagined, that it could be the intent of any Parliament in England, to advance the Personal Will, or Commission of the King above Law, which is to make his power Despotical, and not Royal, Non est Rex (says Bracton) ubi Dominatur voluntas non Lex: He is no King, that Governs by his Will, and not by Law. And how it should come to pass therefore, that he should enjoin this Position indefinitely (without exception of this Case at least) to be Sworn to, as altogether Traitorous, I can never methinks wonder enough. What if any Soldiers should come with a Commission under the Seal, to raise Money without an Act of Parliament; and by virtue of such Commissions, Seize our Goods, Rifle our Houses, and Ravish our Wives? May not the People, or our inferior Magistrates, or the Sheriff for the County, withstand such Violence? May not the Constable alone, from the Justice to keep the Peace, raise the Neigbourhood, and do it? If he may, or the Sheriff may, it must be in the Name of the King, or by Authority of the Law, and then there is some Case or Cases, where Arms or Force may be raised by the Authority of the King, against such as are Comssionated by him, though not against his Sacred Person. Nay, what if a Prince should go to ravish a Virgin, and she catches up the next Weapon, or Instrument that is at hand, to defend her Chastity; would such a Sacredness as that, make this Act of hers to be sinful, that is so Virtuous in itself? Suppose again, that Papists or fanatics should either by Power or Surprise at any time; get, a King in their Hand (as the Duke of Guise once dealt with the French King) and prevail with him, for fear of his Life to grant Commissions under his Hand and Seal, destructive to the Church and State; must the Nation be Remediless in this Case, and the King and Kingdom ruined by these Commissions? Nay, What security hath the Nation, that a Lord Keeper may not prove Traitor to his King and Country, and under the Broad-Seal grant Commissions to Disband his Majesty's Lifeguard, deliver up the Navy, or Seaport Towns, seize on the Tower, and all places of Strength? In what a Condition were the King and Kingdom brought, if the Subject's Hands be bound up by an Oath not to resist, or take Arms against the Executiers of such Commissions, suppose but so long as till they understand his design, seeing by that time the Nation be past recovery? And who is there now, that will not be offended at the Sense, and turned at the Horror of these sad Consequences, into which such Tests and Injunctions (if not now seasonably Retrenched) may lead our Posterity? As for the Form thereof, the Words, I abhor this Traitorous Position, they are Harsh. The word Abhor especially was a Word of interest and passion, a cooler word as I disown, or disallow, might have served. Some of the most Gravel of the Nonconformists were much scandaized at that Word. A Man may say a thing is unlawful in his Conscience, when he cannot say, according to Truth, I abhor it. Well Sirs! When these words, Abhor and Traitorous, are so harsh in the Composure, and when such Cases as , and others may be put as to the Position in the Matter of it: I offer it in the next place, to Consideration, whether the Middle part of the Oath be according to Truth? For the First Part, we have a large Assertion roundly Sworn. The Oath runs not only, that it is not lawful to take Arms against the King, and that it is not lawful on any pretence, but on any Pretence (or Cause) whatsoever. The Grammatical literal Construction of that Word seems to insinuate no less, than that this Proposition must be held without Restraint or Limitation. Among the most eminent Authors, which have wrote of the Power of Princes, and Established it against Resistance in their Writings on this Subject: I suppose they are few or none to be leveled above these Three, Barclay, Grotius, Arnisaeus; and we shall find, that they have all their restrictions or Cases of Exception, in the maintenance of this Tenet. And how could any learned Justice formerly be very earnest in punishing a Refusor, when if the matter was but scanned, th●●eason why he refused, would be found only, because he ha● Read more than some others that yielded their Submission. 〈◊〉 begin with Barclay, that is, William Barclay, a Scot and Coun●elolr to the French King: who writes against Buehanan, Boucher and other Monarchomachists, as he calls them. This learne● Man endeavours to make his Prince to be above the who●● People; that consequently no Arms can be taken against him: Nevertheless, when he comes to put some pressing Cases, he thus limits him. Quid ergo nulline casus insidere possunt, quibus populo in Regem arma capere jure suo liceat? Nulli certe quam diu Rex manet. What then? Can there no Cases happen wherein▪ It is lawful for the People to take Arms against the King by right? None certainly, so long as he remains a King. There are Cases indeed he accounts, in which a King doth, exuere personum Regis, or Dominatu se exuere, put off the Person of a King; and particularly (l. 3. ch. 16.) he mentions two: Si regnum alienet: si Rem-publicam evertere conetur. If he go to Alienate his Kingdom: If he go to overthrow the Commonwealth. Let us come to a Grotius, and first quote him in his Judgement of Barclay, lest you may think else I mistake him. Barclaius (says he) Regis imperii licet Assertor fortissimus huc tamen descendit, ut populo, & insigni ejus parti jus concedit se tuendi adversus immanem sevitiam. Barclay, though the most strong Assertor of Kingly Government, does come to this, that he Grants a right to the People, or an Eminent part of, them of defending themfelves against intolerable Oppression. For himself therefore, after he hath asserted this Tenet, Summum imperium tenentibus jure resisti non posse, That the Higher Powers may not lawfully be resisted from Scripture, Antiquity, Authority, and Example, to as much purpose perhaps as any, he descends to put Seven Cases; wherein he does, Leorem monere, warn his Reader, Ne punet in hanc legem delinquere eos qui reverà non delinquunt, Lest he mistake some for Delinquents in this matter, that are none. It will be too long, and needless to mention, those Cases. For Arnisaeus, he hath wrote three Learned Books of Politics; De jure Majestatus. De Doctrina Politica. De Authoritate Principum in Populum semper inviolabili, seu, Quod nulla ex causa subditis fas sit contra legitimum Principem arma sumere. That the Authority of Princes over the People ought to be inviolable; or, That it is lawful for no cause to take up Arms against our lawful Prince. Here than we have our Tenet; but as to the stating it, he is forced to distinguish. There is Rex, and there is Tyrannus; a King, and a Tyrant: And there is Tyrannus in Titulo, and Tyrannus in Exerictio; A Tyrant in Title, and a Tyrant in Practice: And this he comes to in the issue, that Tyraunus in Exercitio, as Tyrant in Practice does, Exeidere de jure, & si Hereditario, fall from his Right, though Hereditary. Truditur Resublica Principi in cum finem (says he) ut illi profit in salutem omnium, a quo si prorses disciverit, etiam de potestate cadit, quam non alio sine sibi commissam habebat. The Commonwealth is delivered to the Prince, that he should rule over it for the common Safety; from which if he depart altogether, he falls even from the Power itself, which was committed to him only for this End. By such Testimonies as these, I would convince the Compilers of such Declarations, if they be alive, and any others that are yet of the same Spirit, with some Resentment and Shame, that when a temperare Sense and Meaning of them is such, as some good men have not stuck at; yet are they so Composed in termiis, as renders them not to be endured. For the Form then yet of the Words. I A. B. do Swear, That it is not lawful, etc. Here is an Oath to the Matter of a Proposition questioned, to the Determination of a point of Conscience, and that diversely decided. An Oath should he to a Matter of Fact, and cannot be taken but to that whereof we are certain. To require of Men therefore to Swear to the Verity of a Doctrine, is not according to Judgement, being a thing impossible, because no man is infallible. Now then, Sirs! When here is such an Erratum in the Composure, as the want of the Words, I believe, or the like, I Swear that I hold, or believe that it is not lawful, etc. and so material an Exception, as the Judgement of the most Learned comes to, against the Substance in Terminis, of the first part of the Oath, which yet hath gone down ordinarily, without Chewing; I humbly offer it, in the third place, to be considered, how this Oath can be taken in Truth o● in Judgement. An Oath must be taken in Judgement, Truth, and in Righteousness. The First part is not according to Judgement; The Second not according to Truth; The Third not according to Righteousness. London: Printed for R. Hayhurst in Little-Britain, 1689.