OF THE French Monarchy: AND Absolute Power.  
And also A TREATISE Of the Three States, AND Their POWER.  
Deduced from the most Authentic Histories, for above 1200 years: and digested: This latter,  
By Mat. Zampini de Recanati, LL. D.  
LONDON, Printed in the Year MDCLXXX.   

A DISCOURSE Concerning the French MONARCHY AND ABSOLUTE POWER.  
WHen the Roman Empire went to wrack, all the Provinces were drained, all the Inhabitants fit for Arms carried away for Recruits to support it: By these means the Provinces were left exposed to the violence and invasion of Strangers, which gave occasion to the many turns and changes in these parts of the world. Thus the Saxons or English became Masters of Britain, and the French (another people of Germany) took that opportunity to advance beyond their borders, and push on their advantage till they got possession of all the fair Territory; and the very name of Gauls was swallowed up by them; and henceforward Britain and Gaul began now to be called England and France.  
As with us grew several distinctions (from our situation) of Northfolk, Southfolk, Eastsex, Southsex; so the French were divided into Eastrians and Westrians: The Country where the former lived, by some corruption was named Austrasia, and this other Newstria; till such time as the Danes growing troublesome to their Neighbours, part of them overran England, and another Band of them that they called Northmen, subdued France; and after much bustle seated themselves in Newstria, which from thence took the name of Normandy.  
How long these French, after they were thus transplanted retained their Germane liberty, I shall not now examine; only I found some of their Authors look askew upon the Court of Rome on that occasion; they had complained that their Language grew Italianized, their manners Italianized: But when the Pope came to keep his Court at Avignon, new Phrases and new Forms crept also into their policy. Than came in fashion those Letters du propre monuement, etc. which that man of Morals, Monsieur Pi●rach could so ill digest.  
●e hay les mots de puissance absolüe,  
De plain powoir, de propre mowement;  
Aux Saints decrets ils ont premierement,  
Puis a nos loix la puissance tollüe.  
The Pope first employed them to tender the Laws of the Church of no effect.  
Their Champions for Absolute Power ●cknowledge, that the King is tied to ●orms; that his Commands will not move ●ut in the proper Channel; that the King's letters have not any force or virtue ●nless they be undersigned by a Secretary of State; nor his Letters Patents, unless they be so signed; and than sealed by the Chancellor, who has it in his power to cancel them, & who seals them not without the advice of one or two Masters of the Requests assisting at the Seal; & who is, as it were, a severe Controller of the King's orders, edicts, wills, commands, & grants. But say they— ni du● Pape mesme n'ont aucune vertu si elles no font signeés par le greffier, 
Baracane defence de la Monarchy, Fr. p. 409.  Secretaire, ou dataire seelées par le seelleur, Gardesaux ou Chancellier, quoy pour cela? C'est ordre a esté sagement establi par tous les Princess ' & seigneurs, tant spirituels, que temporels, pour se garantir des surprinses & obvier aux faussetez. Il est plus malaise de contrefaire deux' seings, & falsifier un seau, que d'en contrefaire un seulement. Le secretaire d'estat, ou de la coronne ne signera jamais aucunes letters, si le Roy ne luy commande; & les letters, qui suivant les Ordonnances du Roy, doivent estre signeés par un secretaire d'estat, ne passeront point au seau, si elles ne sont munies du seeing du Secretaire, & si elles sont contraires a la ●olunté du Roy, exprimeé par ses Edicts & Ordonnances, le Chancellier ne les se●llera point, que premierement il n'en ●ye averti le Roy, tout cela en un mot ●end au service du Roy: Et de le vouloir ●enverser contre le Roy, c'est tourner la ●umiere en tenebres, convertir le feu en glance, & mettre la terre par dessus le ciel. Neither have the Letters of the Pope himself any virtue, if they be not signed by the Clerk, Secretary, or Dators; and sealed by the Sealer, Sealkeeper, or Chancellor: What of all this? This order has been wisely settled by all Princes and Lords as well spiritual as temporal, to secure them against surprises, and to prevent forgeries; it being more difficult to sergeant two Signing and one Seal, than if there were but one hand to be forged. The Secretary of State shall never sign any Letters unless the King command him, and they shall never come to the Seal, unless they be fortified with the signing of the Secretary; and if they be contrary to the Kings Will expressed in his Laws, the Chancellor shall never seal them, till he has advertifed the King thereof. All this, in a word, is for the King's service; and to count this a lessening of the King, is to turn light into darkness, fire into ice, and to set earth above heaven.  
Than for the power which the Parliament seems to exercise in approving or refusing any public Acts, Grants, Orders, Officers, etc. made by the King: This makes no Argument against his Absolute Power, the same Doctor tells us; Qu'il est necessaire qu'elles soient solennellement reconues, enregistrees, & publieés, pour eviter les obreptions, subreptions, & surprinses qui pourroient escheoir en l'impetration des letters, des officés, & des autres; & mesmes pour vuider les oppositions qui peuuent estre formeés par ceux qui y pretendont quelque interest. Auquel le Roy n'entend deroger, si n'en est fait express mention dans icelles; & pour ces causes tells letters sont presenteés ou Parliament, avant que les pourveus des Offices entrent en l'exercise ou iovissance d'iceux, & quant le Parlement juge, y avoir eu de la subreption & obreption ou de la trop grande importunité en l'impetration d'icélles, & que l'execution en seroit prejudiciable au service du Roy & du public, i'll refuse de les enregistrer, & donne advis au Roy des causes du refus, fondeés sur son service, d'ont il est bien aise, encore que quelquefois il face semblant a l'impetrant d'icélles en estre marri— That it is necessary they be solemnly approved, recorded, and published, to avoid obreptions, surreptions, surprises, and all the fraud and foul practice that might have been used in obtaining those Letters, Offices, or other Grants; as also to avoid the oppositions of those who pretend some right or interest, which the King intends not to prejudice, unless express mention be made thereof; and for these causes such Letters are presented to the Parliament, before any who have the grant of Offices, are admitted to the exercise or possession of them. And when the Parliament judges that any fraud or foul means had been practised, or too great importunity used in obtaining them, and that the execution of such Grants might be prejudicial to the service of the King and of the Public, than d●es the Parliament refuse to 〈◊〉 them, and makes the King acquainted 〈◊〉 the causes of their refusal founded upon his service; whereat he is right glad, though sometimes to him who had the Grant, he makes a show as if he were vexed.  
All agreed the matter of fact, but how the King is thus bound, and how this tye lies upon him they want language soft enough for an occasion so tender: It has always so been, de toute l'ancienneté, says one; antiquâ consuetudine, says another; their Kings have always had the wisdom to submit to these forms, says Baracave: the modesty says du Tillet, the good Nature says P'asquier, une debonnaireté, a goodness familiar to 'em, to reduce their wills under the civility of law Some call it a magnanimity Royal and becoming a King, and a glory beyond that of conquering Nations. Bodin (from the Civilians) ascribes it to their humanity. See id tamensenatu probante fieri humanum est, says Theod●sius; which Baldus interprets, non tam necessitatis quam humanitatis: and to their Majesty; Digna vox est Majestate regnantis legibus alligatum principem se ●rofiteri; to do otherwise would be a Levi●● and Vanity, as he citys it from the Senator in Livy Levius est & vanius sua decre●a tollere quam aliorum: Others venture to ●o a little farther, they says Pasquire, who ●nder the pretence of an Absolute Power, ●ould flatter the Kings to be above law. ●n lieu de leur gratifier dirent en un ob●cur language, que les Roys n'estoyent ●oint hommes, ains lions, qui par le moy●n de leur force s'estimoyent avoir Com●●andment ●ur les hommes. Instead of saying a grateful thing say be craft that King's ●re not men but lions, who think by their ●●ight to have the command over men. says ●●u Tillet, Si leur puissance absolve n'yest ●egleé, elle devient dissolüe: If it be not regulated, their power is not absolute but dissolute: And a Spanish Treatise ●f Politics, 
Iron de santa Maria.  with twenty ap●robations before it, affirms: ●i el monarca sea quien fuere, se ●esoluiere por sola su cabeça, sin ●cudir a su conseio, o contra el parecer ●e sus conseieros, aunque acierte en so resolution, sale de los terminos de la mo●arquia, y se entra en los de la tyrannia. If a Monarch whoever he be, shall 〈◊〉 his own head resolve any thing without the advice of his Council, or contrary to the opinion of his Counsellors, though right in his resolution; h● breaks out over the bounds of Monarch● into Tyranny.  
This Spaniard took his notion from that passage in Livy, where he gives a● account, how the last Tarquin was the fir●● of their Kings that without advising wit● any other than a Cabal of his Domestick● make peace and war, made and broke League● and Alliances, and governed all of his own head, never consulting the Senate and People, as the custom of his Predecessors ha● always been, having first by practices lessened the number of the Senators (that nothings but the Rump of a Senate remained) to make them the more contemptible. Quo contemptior paucitate ipsâ ordo esset, minusque per se nihil agi indignarentur, hi● enim Regum primus traditum a prioribus morem de omnibus senatum consulendi solvit; domesticis consiliis rempublicam administravit, bellum, pacem, foedera societates per se ipse cum quibus voluit injussu populi & Senatus fecit diremitque.  
But I have digressed from the French or rather from Bodin, who concerns us nearer; having set up for a new discoverer in Politics: He would persuade us that Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, Hali●arnassaus, Cicero, Sr. Tho. Moor, Cardinal Contarini, Machiavelli, and who not, were all in a wrong way— Et quoni●m haec disciplina maximos in republica ●umultus ac perturbationes ciere potest, ●ccuratius vobis est ac subtilius explican●a. Their Doctrine tended to Sedition ●nd disturbances in the Commonwealth, ●herefore he will handle it with the greater accuracy and subtlety: And what will be ●he consequences of Bodin's new learning? Certainly it must either make Monarchy short lived, by debauching it into tyranny; or else it must (as Mr. Hobbs ●ho sees farther, and who writes En●lish, clears the matter) to establish this tyranny, banish all human Learning ●nd fear of God out of the world.  
There have been in all Nations Pens, ●s well as Voices, servile and mercenary; and such wretches, as that by Virgil damned to Hell.  
Vendidit hic auro patriam, dominumque potentem  
Imposuit, leges fixit pretio atque refixit.  
Who make and unmake Laws, shuffle and betray both their Laws and Reason, that they may impose this dominum potentem, this Lordly despotic power, to the enslaving of their Country.  
But whether the love of Novelty corrupted Bodin, or that he knew no better I examine not: But though our English Politicians have followed him over hedge and ditch, without ever making use of their own eyes or understanding; other people do not overmuch admire him; the Scaligerana are too sharp upon him; but that 
(a) Charomonte.  Italian does him reason, Il Bodino huomo di molta lectura, ma di confusa & turbida doctrina, impugnando da per tutto quasi la politica doctrina d'Aristotele: Bodin (says he) a man of much reading, but confounded and blundered in his Notions, contradicting Aristotle at every turn.  
Now Bodin would have us believe that ●●●here can be no such thing as a mixed Com●●on-wealth, nor will he allow be any ●●nore thann three sorts of Commonwealths. Nam si rerumpublicarum for●●as bonorum ac malorum finibus, aut vir●●utibus ac vitiis metimur, infinitas esse com●●eriemus: And a little after he says, non ●●uae cuique extrinsecus accidunt intueri o●●ortet.  
By the way we may note, that the ●●ertues have by the most been reckoned ●●o be four, others have reduced 'em all ●●o Prudence, Sincerity, and Patience; so ●hat Commonwealths might have been distinguished by their virtues, without making such an infinite number of them; and to make several forms from their several ends, will certainly prove not so very  and accidental, but a real and essential difference. So thought the Ancients all who writ of Politics before Bodin; therefore if a single Person governed for the good of the Public, that was called Monarchy; if a few governed for the Public Good, that they called Aristocracy; if the People governed for the Public Good, that was Democracy; and these were counted three sorts of good Commonwealths. But if a single Person governed for his own particular good, that they would not call Monarchy but Tyranny; if a few governed for their particular profit, that they would not call Aristocracy but Oligarchy; if the People governed for the advantage of the Rabble, and not for the common benefit, this they would not call Democracy, but Oclocracy, or the misrule of the Rabble. The Greeks I say, who coined these words, made that the currant meaning of them.  
There are Authors, who to make short work, divide all Commonwealths into Monarchy and Polyarchy: Either, say they, one governs and that is Monarchy; or more than one (not matter whether few or many) govern, and than it is a Poliarchy. They who love the division into two, might better say that all government is either for the Governors good, and that is Tyranny; or for the good of those that are governed, and this is a Polity or Commonwealth. But these ●●e sick men's dreams; may show however ●●at the End is more material than the ●umber of those that govern, and consequently justifies the Ancients, who di●●nguishing the Commonwealths from ●●eir End, reckoned six several kinds of ●●●ple Commonwealths, as afore has ●●en declared. And human Actions are 〈◊〉 distinguished; the same Action may 〈◊〉 virtuous or vicious according to the ●●d: Give a Wench money to debauch ●●r, and give it her to relieve her neces●●ies; this is charity, this a virtue, but ●●e other is a kind of a deadly sin: 'Tis ●●e End makes the difference, a difference not accidental and , as ●●din suggests, but real and essential.  
And as high Justice great upon the ●●rders of wrong and oppression, high ●●urage is near to rashness, liberality to prodigality, etc. so does Monarchy stand ●●on the brinks of Tyranny, Aristocracy easily slips into Oligarchy, and De●●ocracy into popular disorder: Therefore the wiser Statesmen having observed ●●is corruption so ordinary and familiar to the simple Commonwealths, have by art endeavoured of the three good Commonwealths, to compound a mixed one that might not be subject to the same frailties and decay; to temper Monarchy and give it that balance and counterpoise by the mixture of the other Commonwealths with it, which might keep i● steady, and preserve it from tottering into Tyranny, which is its ruin. But al● these matters together with the growth● the decay, and changes of Governments are described by that companion of th● great Scipio Polybius, so accurately and philosophically, that I cannot forbear to set down the whole passage, which is t● this effect. That, Man is naturally civil and disposed to love company, and not (a● they would persuade us to believe, wh● say the State of Nature is a State of War● more a beast than those that walk on fou● feet, than the Bruits themselves that go i● Flocks and Herds; and in like manner 〈◊〉 the strongest Boar, and the strongest Bull 〈◊〉 always the Captain of the rest; so in these companies of men, he amongst them wh● was most hardy to encounter dangers, an● had most of bodily strength to overcome ●●em, had the rest for his followers: And ●●ence it was that so many Nations had ●●ch their Hercules, and that so many ●●ne to be called by that name: And in ●●ose rude times these were the first sort of ●●ings.  
But by conversing together this rudeness ●●aring of by degrees, and men by little ●●d little coming to be somewhat more po●●●t, to have something of consideration, ●●d the use of their reason, and to under●●●nd Justice and honest dealing, and to see 〈◊〉 advantages that Prudence and a wise ●●●d had over raw uncultivated strength, not ●●ly in deciding Controversies and admini●●ing Justice, but even in providing against and repelling of dangers. He there●●●e now, who was most eminent for wisdom ●●●d justice, drew most eye upon him, and 〈◊〉 him all ran and submitted their differences to his Arbitration, his advice they ●●●k, and his direction they followed on all ●●●asions either of difficulty or danger; and ●●ese were called the Wise Men, and these ●●●re the true and proper Kings.  
Now the Son, who had his Education under such a virtuous, wise Father, and had been present with him when affairs of the greatest importance had been debated and by common presumption better capacitated to govern, than any of a stranger Family: The Son, I say, succeeds his Father in this Kingly Government, no man envying him the dignity; nor did these King's differ from other people in their manner of living, there was no pomp or show, or an● badge of the Authority Royal, but the woode● Sceptre which Homer describes, (which perhaps was like our Constables Staff● and with this the Authority was hande● down from Father to Son, till in tract o● time some young man came in place, wh● giving ear to some lose companions abo●● him, would not longer be content with th● plainness and ordinary fare of his Ancestors but gives himself over to riot and excess setting his mind on gorgeous Apparel, o● Trains and Trappingss, on Feasting an● Revels: By these new modes he loses th● hearts of his Subjects, draws envy upo● him; that Reverence paid to the Sceptre i● the hands of his Progenitors, now turns i● to contempt, and he still running headlong after his vain pleasures and flaunting pernicious courses, not heeding the duty of his place, grows a burden to the people; and instead of being their refuge, their relief and support, rides and galls their necks, and makes their lives bitter: So that how to throw of the yoke is now their only care; and matters being thus ripe, or the young Prince with his Comerades hastening on his fate by some outrage or rape upon Wife or Daughter of some considerable Subject, some of the most eminent amongst the people conspire together and put an end to his Life and Tyranny.  
And all eyes being now turned upon these as their deliverers, the Government and Conduct of all Affairs is committed to their charge and direction. Thus rises an Aristocracy, and thus we see Monarchy first corrupted into Tyranny, and the next change from thence in course of Nature is to an Aristocracy.  
And these men eminent for wisdom and virtue satisfied with the honour of the charge and trust reposed in them, above all things studied to serve the public; but afterwards their Sons coming to succeed, who had not that stock of discretion and sobriety; but degenerating or forgetting the virtue that preferred their Ancestors, begin to Lord it over the people without other regard than of their particular lust. And thus the Aristocracy being corrupted into an Oligarchy, the people are provoked by a general insurrection to rescue the Sovereignty out of their hands.  
And now the people will neither trust so great a charge with a single Person, nor with any few, they come to their last only and yet untainted hope founded upon themselves, and contrived a form of popular Commonwealth, and they themselves took the public affairs under their charge and protection; and thus was constituted a Democracy.  
And because all Governments are good and successful at the beginning, so long as the men were alive, who had felt the oppression and tyranny under the two former kinds of Governments, they were content and glad with their present condition, and liberty seemed sweet and precious to 'em above all treasure. but this Generation being spent and their virtue with 'em, a new People succeeded, and the Laws are now trampled under foot: Licentiousness, Faction, and Disorder turn all things upside down, and they clash together so long till some one over-●opping the rest, all are brought under the Command of one Master; and so about a●ain from Monarchy to Tyranny, from Tyranny to Aristocracy, from Aristocracy to Oligarchy, from Oligarchy to Democracy, from Democracy to the Rule of the Rabble, ●nd thence back to Monarchy. This is the ●ound that all Governments run, this is the ●ourse, the order, and oeconomy of Nature; 〈◊〉 that any turns or change of Government ●ay easily be foreseen.  
Wise Statesmen observing these changes ●nd corruptions in all simple Commonwealths to be so constant and certain, and ●nding the mischiefs that attend so frequent revolutions; they set their brains at work 〈◊〉 contrive some model of Government that ●ight be steady and durable, which they saw ●ould not be any simple and uniform Commonwealth: It remained therefore that they ●ixed the virtues and good properties of the ●hree good Commonwealths, and so temper'd them together that no room might be ●●ft for those vices, that, like worms, breed in the very core of all simple Commonwealths and destroy them.  
They joined the three States of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, and wrought them together into one Body Politic.  
This model of Government had the Spartans' from the prudence of Lycurgus, and the Romans were brought to it, made wise by dear-bought Experience: And this is the Government that all civil Nations have affected, and from hence grows that notion of the three States, which we hear so much of in most Nations of Europe, though the meaning thereof is not every where understood.  
This is the Doctrine of Polybius, and this was the general sense of mankind, till Bodin comes forth with his new Heresy in Politics, and denies that there can be any such thing as a mixed Commonwealth. To prove this, he rambles into a many stories to show that a King cannot alien or divide his Sovereignty amongst his Favourites: 'Tis questionless a trust that cannot be assigned over, but all this relates to another point, and touches not the mixture in the Original and fundamental constitution of a Commonwealth, Et ut Corona, si in parts distracta, aut aperta fuerit, nomen omittit; As the Crown would loose its name, he says, if pulled ●n pieces. This is common to many other things, a Rose, a Prickle, if pulled ●n pieces, would loose their name; and ●his being no particular flower of the Crown, does not illustrate or make much ●o the business. In another place he says, Monarchiam autem individuam esse opor●ere diximus, quia si dividatur, Monarchia ●on sit; ea est enim unitatis inviolabilis na●ura, ut omnem omnino refugiat partitio●em; ut enim Corona— Monarchy must ●e indivisible, such is the nature of Unity ●hat it cannot be by any means distributed; ●s the Crown— which comparison he ●gain repeats. But his Argument is not ●etter, than with us, should we from ●he nature of the number five persuade, ●here cannot be seven or eight Cinque Ports; or in France argue, that the Ad●ocates Cap cannot be square, because ●tis called Bonnet round: Words are a ●●rt of  that are not always exactly shaped to the Thoughts that wear them. Another Argument he would bring from a Saying in Aristotle against Plato, that two extremes would make no good mixture: Nam si nihil optimum ex duobus extremis existere posse confiteatur, quid fert tribus inter se confusis? which is as strongly urged, as should he say, if Dover and Calais cannot come together, how shall the Sea make any intercourse and correspondence betwixt them?  
But because these Reasons seem a little too metaphysical, he would make the matter plain by Examples; and with a strange confidence suggests that neither the Spartan nor the Roman were mixed Commonwealths: And it is no wonder if he found some passages in Historians to prove them either Monarchies, Aristocracies, or Democracies, as he had a mind. Plato says, that he knew not by which of these Names to call the Spartans' And Aristotle to the same effect; and that this shows the mixture to be perfect and accurate: And Polybius speaking o● both the Spartan and Roman, tells us ●●at the 
(a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  three States had ●●e Sovereignty so equally sha●●d amongst them, that even ●●ose who lived under the Government could ●●●t well pronounce in the main, whether the ●●●wer was in the People, in the Nobles, 〈◊〉 in the Monarchick State.  
In the Spartan, the Kings, the Senate, ●●d the People, by their Representatives ●●e Ephori; in the Roman, the Consuls, ●●e Senate, and the People, by their Re●●esentatives the Tribunes, made the ●●ree States of the Commonwealth.  
But that we may return to France, ●●ere Bodin swaggers, and would make 〈◊〉 Capital to accounted that of France a ●ixt Monarchy as some had done; ●ho reckoned the Aristocracy to consist 〈◊〉 the Peers, and the Democracy in that ●hey call the Third State. Machiavelli believed it a mixed Monarchy, and to that ●emper imputes all its greatness and duration. Seissel who writ expressly on the Monarchy, affirms the same thing with ●●any more that writ both before and ●●nce Bodin.  
He says there is not the lest shadow of an Aristocracy in the Peers,— Parium qui sic appellantur, quod inter se qu●dem pares sunt, non autem principi, ut n●mis rustice nonnulli opinantur. TRhey ar● one another's Peers, he says, and not Peer● to their Prince as some too clownishly imagine.  
Caesar called the Army under his Command, Commilitones or Fellow-Soldiers and it would have been a little blunt i● them to have called him Fellow-soldier again; but whoever shall look back i● History to the Original of these Peer● may found that they were in the beginning the King's Peers, though at this day th● distance is very plain. Du Huillant speaking of Hugh Capet, tells us, that he— n'estant si grand guerrier que bien entendu aux affairs, caut et advice, i'll 〈◊〉 voluit proceder par cautels & douceurs si qu'ayant affaire à grand seigneurs● manda tous les gowerneurs des Provin● ces de son royaume à ce qu'ils vinssen● verse lui, pour le consciller au gowernement, regime & administration de so● noweau estate, leur faisant entendre qu● totalement il vouloit dependre de leu● conscil & avis; voire les tenir pres da 〈◊〉, come ses amis, freres, & pareils en ●●issance & Autorité;— not being so ●●ch a Warrior as a wise and wary Person, 〈◊〉 would proceed soft and fair, so that ha●●ng to do with great Lords, he sent to all ●●vernors of Provinces within his King●●m, that they might come to him to advice ●●out the Government, and Administration 〈◊〉 his new State; letting them to under●●●nd that he would wholly depend on their ●●unsel and Advice; and keep them about 〈◊〉 Person as his Friends, Brothers, and victuals in Power and Authority. He tells 〈◊〉 further, that some of the cunningest a●●●ngst them, seeing Hugh, from a Mayer ●●the Palace to be made King, did the same; ●●d set up for themselves within their Governments, making themselves Lords, ●●kes, and Counts Proprietors; whereas ●●●re they had been only Governors, viz. ●●●e Duke's governors of Provinces, and 〈◊〉 Count's Governors of Towns, and those ●●●les of Dukes and Counts that formerly ●●re given to the Governors for the time ●●ly, became now Hereditary and desceneded 〈◊〉 Posterity. Pasquiere gives the same account of the Peers at large, and th● President Fauchet employed by Henry th● Third to revise the Antiquities of Fran●● and who writ since Bodin, tells us: Males urays fondateurs de l'estat Fronca●ont este ceux de la maison de capet; le● quells de leur gré, ou contraincts par 〈◊〉 noblesse, de laisser en heritage, & sa● l'hommage, les duchez & comtez aup● ravant tenus à vie (car on ne trowe poi● certainement quand & pourquoy ils 〈◊〉 sont faites hereditaires) amoindrie● ceste debordeé puissance des ancie● Roys, de fair toutes choses a leur app●tit, & comme ceux de Lacedemon ●●eeurent les Ephores, pour controlleu● de leur authorité, ceux-cy establire● & asseurerent les plus grands seigneu● Ducs, Comtes & Pairs de la cour 〈◊〉 France, pour tenir le grand Parliament audience & general Justice de tout● les doleances du peuple; & les Jugemen● des Seneschauz & Baillifz, & juges inf●rieurs donnes en grandes causes, car 〈◊〉 commencement de ceste derniere famine le, il n'y avoit comte, voire signeur chastellain dependant nüement du Roy, q●● ●●●●pensast avoir autant de puissance en ●●●●erre, que ces noweaux Roys.  
But the true Founders of the French ●●●●●e, were these of the House of Capet; 〈◊〉 of their own accord, or compelled by the ●●●●●ility, left them their Dutchies and ●●●●nties formerly held for life only in inheritance saving the homage, (for it is not ●●●●ainly known when or wherefore they were ●●●●e hereditary) and lessened that unbrid●●●● power of the ancient Kings to do all ●●●●gs according to their appetite, and as 〈◊〉 of Sparta took the Ephori for Con●●●●ers of their Authority, these settled and ●●●●●ed the greatest Lords, Dukes, Counts, 〈◊〉 Peers of the Court of France, to hold 〈◊〉 great Parliament, Audience, and gene●●● Justice of all the grievances of the Peo●●● and appeals from the Judgements of 〈◊〉 Seneschals, Baylies, and inferior Judges ●●●●n in great causes: For at the begin●●●● when this Family Reigned, there was ●●●●r a Count, nor so much as a Lord of a ●●●●e depending barely on the King, who ●●●●ght not that he had as absolute power 〈◊〉 in his own Land, as these new Kings. ●●●●onfirm this he adds, how the Kings Hugh and Robert, writing to Audeber●● Count of Perigueux, to raise the Sieg●● before Tours, and twitting him with th● Demand, who made him Count? Il 〈◊〉 fit difficulté de respondre, ce n'est vo●● Roys; ains ceux qui vous ont fait Roy●● He did not stick to answer, 'twas not y●● Kings, but those who made you Kings.  
And whoever considers the circumstances of Hugh Capet's coming to th● Crown, and the great power the Pee●● exercised till upon the occasion of th● Holy War and other practices they we●● reduced and brought to the Crown, ma● well conclude: That 
(a) Pasquiere.  〈◊〉 toute ancienneté en for● d'Aristocratie conjoynte avec la Monarchy, furent introduits les douze Poi●● sur lesquels nos Roys ne s'estans reserv●● que la Soweraineté & homage, sem●● que par leur conscil (come d'un anci●● Senate) see menassent les affairs. Fr●● all Antiquity were introduced in the form● an Aristocracy joined to the Monarchy, 〈◊〉 twelve Peers, over whom the King reserving only his Sovereignty and Homage, 〈◊〉 affairs of State seem (as by an ancient 〈◊〉 nate) managed by their advice.  
And when scarce the shadow of the ancient Peerage remained to them, they ●etain'd the Precedence, and had place be●ore all Princes of the Blood, till the late Ordinance, Anno 1576. to the contrary.  
And 'tis 
(d) Baracave.  said there was ●n Order of Parliament also ●nno 1295. whereby it was declared ●hat they were called Peers for being one another's Peers, and not the King's Equals.  
What Bodin would conclude from ●hose forms, quia sic nobis placuit, and Rex vobis dicit, may be answered in the words of Dr. Baracave, where (in another occasion) he says, this is not like ●he sic volo, sic jubeo, noted by the Satirist. Qu'importe●t il de dire, ainsi nous playst, & tel est nostre plaisir, ou dire & ●our cause, sans exprimer la cause? Les Cours des Parlemens disent en leurs arrests, & pour cause sans en rendre la cause ●our monstrer la Soveranieté.  
What more is it, says he, to say we are 〈◊〉 pleased, and such is our pleasure; than to say, And for a Cause, without expressing the Cause? The Courts of Parliament say in their Orders, and for a Cause, without rendering any cause; to show the Sovereignty. The Parliament, it seems, have their forms too to show their Sovereignty, nor is the Argument of Bodin from the form of directing their Letters, of more force: How should they writ but, Au Roy nostre souuerain seigneur, Regi Domino nostro supremo? Is not this the ordinary civility of Europe? 'Tis true that when 
(e) Suetonius.  a Poet had called Augustus Caesar, Dominus; he set out a Proclamation that none might presume to call him any more by so proud a Title, nor could the modesty of his Successor Tiberius bear it.  
Yet as their Majesty and real Greatness declined, as the Empire began to sink, the froth and flattery came above; so that it was lawful to call Domitian both Lord and God; and his Successors were not satisfied till complemented in the abstract with your Everlastingness, your Eternity, your Divinity, etc. And when the wooden Eagle was split in two, that Chip of the Eastern Empire broke ●ut into blossoms to a miracle, with the Porphyrogenitoes and Despots, were blown about the Sebastocrators, Panhypersebasti, Protonobilissimypertati, etc.  
But amongst the Romans, these Titles so fierce and glorious after they had been worn a while at Court, descended to the City and Country; and even came so ●ow, that Martial could say of the mighty Dominus, 
Quod voco te dominum, noli tibi Cinna placere,  
Saepe etiam servum sic resaluto meum.   
The French words, Sire, Seigneur and Sieur have run the same fortune; and the ●alling a man Sir, or Monsieur, or Mon●eigneur, or My Lord twenty times, will ●ot amount to a Recognizance of any subjection: nor can the Compliment ●ass any Domination or Despotic Right ●ver us.  
If Seigneur and Dominus will not do, ●he word Souverain will not help them; ●eing commonly used in France for any Superior: as, Sovereign of the Accounts, Sovereign of the Treasure, Sovereign of the Forests, Sovereign Judge, Sovereign Bailiff, etc.  
And now having said so much concerning the direction of these Letters, I shall add nothing in answer to Bodin, touching the Subscription: all agreeing, that where the Letter gins with Seigneur, of course, it must end with Treshumble and Tresobeissant Serviteur.  
And that their proceed with the King are by way of Petition, is no more than is done even in Poland: where Bodin makes the Government an Aristoeracy.  
It is a Rule, Quae ex adulatione, vel indulgentiâ conceduntur non debent trahi● in exemplum. Besides, of all people, this is the worst Argument with the French; who are so well known to affect soft words, and gentle forms on all occasions possible. It is not their fashion, like the Justice of Arragon, to accost their King with a Nos qui valemos tanto como vos, y podemos mas que vos, vos elegimos rei con estas é y estas condiciones, entra vos y nos un que manda mas que vos, i e. We who are as good men as you, and can do more than you, choose you King on such and such conditions; there is one betwixt us and you, who commands more than you.  
The power of this Parliament, in allowing or refusing the Acts of the King, is the same in effect as what we call the Negative Voice. And sometimes, when the Kings would hardly be denied, the Parliament have much valued themselves for their resolution in opposing them. Thus they overcame Lewis the Eleventh, 
a Pasquier.  whose wilfulness and Opiniâtreté was particularly noted by Historians) and made him promise to importune them not more, nor sand Letters to them that were not the Commandment Royal; which they interpret, Just Commands. As, an volunté du Roy, is meant, To the Laws. The most memorable instance that I have met with, of the Parliament's Authority in this kind, is that in Henry the Third's time; when he wrote to the Governor d'Angoulmois, to put the Town into Monsieurs hands; the Governor desires to be excused: the Duke de Montpensier is sent, and the Gates are shut against him; than is sent an Herald of Arms, to declare them Rebels and Enemies, unless they obeyed. And at the request of the Attorney General, the Parliament order the Inhabitants to appear in person at a day certain; they sand their Deputies. It was insisted upon, that they should be heard before the Privy Council: but they demanded to be heard in Parliament. Where, when they came, it was urged that they might not be allowed Council, but speak for themselves, being charged with High Treason. The Deputies insisted that, on the contrary, they had done the King good Service; and that, for their part, they had no Charge to pled otherwise than by the mouth of their Advocate. Which being granted, they made choice of Pasquier. And the sum of their Plea was, Que l'ancien ordre de ceste Monarchie portoit que iamais trefue de telle importance, iamais paix n'avoit esté executeé, qu'au prealable elle ne fust verifieé & emologuee en ceste cour avecque grande maturite de conseil que cestecyne l'ayant esté, nous avions just occasion de nous excuser, & dispenser de l'ouverture que l'on demandoit. Ceste exception estoit elle bonne & vallable? Quant a moy ie n'en feray jamais nul doute, voz registres en font foy, l'usage est tel, & la loy generale de la France. i e. That the ancient course of this Monarchy was so, that never Truce of this importance, never any Peace was executed, but that, in order thereunto, it was first allowed and recorded in this Court, with great maturity of Counsel. That this for the delivering up of Angoulesme, not being so recorded, we had just reason to excuse ourselves, and to dispense with the opening of the Gates demanded of us. Is this Exception good and sufficient? For my part, I shall never doubt it. This your Records can testify, this is the Custom and Common Law of France.  
The Authors that writ in Latin call their Parliaments, Sacrum & Sacrosanctum ordinem, A Sacred and Divine Constitution; Quid tertium & arbitrum, A third Party, and Umpire betwixt Prince and People: Si tribunitiae potestati, aut Ephoris Lacedemoniis compares non aberres, says Matherel: Their Power may be compared to that of the Tribunes, or the Lacedaemonian Ephori. Du Haillan, says they, are truly a Roman Senate, cest un urai Senate Romain, representant une majesty secourable aux bons, & espowantable aux mawais attendu qu'elles ont cognoissance en derniee resort, & sans apple non seulement de toutes matieres' civiles & criminelles, mais aussi de toutes lettres royaux; entre antres des graces & remissions, pour juger de la civilité ou incivilité d'icelles. It is a true Roman Senate, representing a Majesty giving succour to the Good, but terrible to Evil-doers; in as much as they have cognizance, and give Judgement without Appeal; not only in all Civil and Criminal Causes, but likewise of all the King's Letters: amongst the rerst, those of Graces and Pardons; to judge whether they be lawful or unlawful. Pasquier, on this occasion, tells us, Their Parliament is not like the Pope's Officers, to judge of the Fraud or Surprises only, but to determine whether the King's Grants be just and reasonable, or no. and du Hallan affirms, Ceste form de proceder est si ancienne en ce Royaume, qu' un Prince, quelque depraué que il soit, auroit honté de la rompre, comme eussi ses fuiets & serviteurs craindroient a le lui conseiller. This form of proceeding is so ancient, that any Prince, however depraved, would be ashamed to break it; nor would any of his Servants or Ministers dare to advice him thereto. And in another place, Sont tellement inveterees, que pas un roi n'entreprend d'y deroger, & quand il le voudroit fair, on n'obeiroit point á son commandment. A practice so settled that no King would undertake to derogate from it: nor if he should, would any obey his Commands. But Quotations of this kind are endless.  
The French reckon several Particulars wherein their King's Power is restrained; as that, He cannot altar their Coin. He cannot turn out of place the Magistrates of the Kingdom, till their Cause be heard and approved in Parliament.  
He cannot pardon a Criminal without the Parliament. Regi capitatis paenae renittendae, & abolendi criminis sine parlamenti auctoritate jus non sit, in hoc regno. Criminosus deferens litteras remissionis aut abolitionis, sive pardonii debet incarcerari, & suas literas offer Parlamento, etc. Boerius decis. Burdegal. 65. Don't en y a sowent de condamnez & executez avec leurs graces. Le Roy, p. 376.  
He cannot alien any part of his Demean, nor any part of his Kingdom.  
Nor can he dispose of the Succession; that not being Patrimonial or Hereditary. Sed sola lege & consuetudine regni, as their Lawyers speak. Or Lege Regiâ, according to the new Cant in Bodin.  
Another of these they call Laws of the Kingdom, or Fundamentals, is their Salic Law, for excluding Females from the Crown.  
And farther, to prove the French King a Civil King, he is not in his Great Seals represented as the Emperors and other Kings, in Armour, on Horseback, or with a naked Sword in hand, like Conquerors; but he is pictured, sitting on the Bench in a long Robe, with Justice in his Right Hand. En habit de Roi Justicier.  
In like manner, for the Sovereignty of ●e Parliament, we may observe, that ●hen all other Officers, upon the death 〈◊〉 their King, are in mourning Weeds, ●ese, in the midst of the Obsequies, appear in their Robes of Scarlet; to show, ●at though the Kings be mortal, yet the Majesty of the Crown survives in the Parliament.  
And from hence, perhaps, may be ●awn the true reason of that saying in France, that their King is Immortal, and ●at he never dies. There being little ●●ound for the sense that Bodin would ●●ve it from the Succession; seeing that ●esides the many interruptions by Ba●ards that have reigned, and those great●● Changes from the Merovingians, to ●e Charlians; and from the Charlians, 〈◊〉 Hugh Capet's Line; their Kings, till of ●●te, never computed the beginning of ●●eir Reign from their Predecessors De●●ase, but only from the time of their ●wn Coronation. So that in Bodin's ●●nse, it has not been from any very an●●ent date that their Kings have been immortal.  
May be, in imitation of the Vestra 〈◊〉 ternitas of the Roman Emperors, son● more bashful Frenchman having vent read to call their King immortal; oth●● Frenchmen, not understanding th●● cramp word, got it interpreted. An● that the King never dies was a pret●● song amongst them. But in what sen●● this could be, all were in the dark; t●● at length, a cunning man arose, an● made it out most plainly: as Bodin h●● done.  
By what has been said, the Fren●● Monarchy may seem sufficiently tempered with a mixture of the other State● Yet, after all, it cannot be dissemble● that the Peers at this day are not th●● King's Fellows or Equals, as at their Original Institution. Nor are these (no●● called) Parliaments the same thing wit● the old Parliaments under the Merovi●gians or Charlians; whe●● 
(g) Carpento bubus tracto, etc. Tritenhemius.  by the Team of Royal O●● en was drawn along in a Wagon his hairy Majesty, to th● place appointed for that August Assembl●●  
Than were the states called, and consulted on all great occasions. Yet these ●●re the Victorious; the Clovis, the charlemagne, the Kings that extended ●●eir Dominions over Spain, Italy, Dal●●tia, Sclavonia, Hungary, Poland, and ●●ught even Germany, with their Title 〈◊〉 Emperor, to the French Crown.  
But what if those mighty Warriors ●●uld not call the States? that, possick, in those days of Honesty and true policy, was a point not more thought on, ●●n was the Crime of Parricide by the 〈◊〉 Legislators.  
In the old Historians we found there ●●re several names for this Assembly; 〈◊〉 Conventus Statuum, Curia, Placitum, ●●lamentum.  
The many wars occasioned many Par●●, or Meetings, to treat of Peace. ●●m this Parley, or Parliament, as the ●●nch word it, these Assembleys are cal●● Parliaments.  
Sometimes they were called Curia, or 〈◊〉 Court: and because those Kings ●●re not ordinarily seen by the people, ●●e in this Court, afterwards the Phrase ●●going to Court came to signify the going to the King's Palace, or place of R●fidence.  
They were also called Plactium, fro● whence Hotoman thinks, when the Kin● Edicts came to be writ in the Mothe● tongue, the ignorance or malice of so●● Clerks deduced that ordinary from 〈◊〉 Car tel est nostre plaisir, for the Lat●● Quia tale est nostrum placitum.  
And those weighty Affairs, and public business, which were commonly 〈◊〉 served for this Assembly of the States, 〈◊〉 be there treated on and debated, ca●● afterwards, from thence, to be call● Matters of State; as also, the Phrase 〈◊〉 sitting in State, and the Chair of St●●● from the Golden Throne on which 〈◊〉 Kings wereplaced in these Assemblies.  
But when Hugh Capet ascended 〈◊〉 Throne, new measures and new Policy came in play. He was no Fighter, n●● cared for enlarging of Territories; b●● had a notable head for Kingcraft, a●● sought on the best terms to settle 〈◊〉 Crown in his Family. To that end, 〈◊〉 Bishop of Laon, (who had betrayed in●● his hands the King and Royal Fami●● 〈◊〉 thither for shelter) and the other ●●hops and great Lords, that had done, 〈◊〉 might to do him good Offices, were ta●● in to be his Peers, and share with ●●m in the Administration of the Go●●nment.  
Now, by this new Model, the Ari●●cracy, or Nobles, gained very much. ●●t a great blow was given by this innovation to the Democratical or Popular ●●●te. For these Peers, besides their paricular interest in the Nation, were in appearance a competent Council for the management of all the extraordinary bu●●ess and Affairs of State, whereby the parliament was not so necessary as formerly. And Capet finding in the people ● hanckering still for the old Race of ●●arlemane, was well content to be dis●●●ced withal from calling that Assem●●; save that for securing the Successi●● he was feign to keep them in humour, 〈◊〉 that he had prevailed with them in 〈◊〉 life time to Crown his Son Robert ●●●g.  
The same jealousy caused Robert in 〈◊〉 life time, to do the like for his Son, Henry the first. And Henry also, for 〈◊〉 Son Philip the first. And now one mig●● have thought the Succession fixed. Y●● Philip dying without having made 〈◊〉 same Provision for his Son Lewis 〈◊〉 Gross, Lewis was put to his shifts to g●● crowned: and was feign to take up wi●● a kind of an unusual Bishop, to do t●● job for him in hugger mugger.  
Whereupon, he grown wise du●● not trust the States for his Son Lewis 〈◊〉 Young; but put him in possession of 〈◊〉 Throne e'er he left the World. A●● this Lewis did as much for his Son Phi●●● the Second. Till now, after some hu●● dreads of Years discontinuance, all E●ction-right was pretty well forgotte●● This however, set the Court a fencing against the States; and the Court thought itself better at ease without them.  
Nor was this concerning the Succe●● on the only Tie upon the Kings to con●●nue a good understanding with the Stat●● but the Peers were often at variance wi●● the King, and put him hard to it. And 〈◊〉 these distempers in the Kingdom no 〈◊〉 medy was found effectual but an healing ●●arliament. These were the Umpire betwixt King and Peers; and generally de●●ded in favour of the Crown.  
By which partial Arbitrements, and 〈◊〉 the advantages made of the Holy ●ar, when the Peers Adventurers died 〈◊〉 the Expedition; some without Heirs, ●●me without other than Females, or ●●ales under Age. So that the Pairyes 〈◊〉 Escheat, by the Salic Law, or by 〈◊〉 way of Guardianship, came to the ●●rown.  
By which means, the Power of the ●eers being at an end, and the Equality ●●oken, there remained no farther occasion for Arbitrations, and the sacred Authority of Parliament quite vanished.  
So that now, without much danger, 〈◊〉 Experiments might be improved, ●●d new projects of Government set on ●●ot. Accordingly, the old Parliament 〈◊〉 to be laid aside; and in their room, a ●●ect knot of men to have the States bu●●ess committed to their Trust and Con●●●ct.  
And these, for their better countenance, must be called a Parliament also. whatever Power and Authority had bee● exercised by the States, is now usurpe●● by this young Senate; and presently 〈◊〉 new House is built for them, and the● are fixed at Paris. Where, after a litt●● while, they became so overlayed wi●● business, that one Parliament was 〈◊〉 sufficient; but two were constituted f●● the better Expedition.  
And indeed, having opened the do●● for all Civil Causes to come before the●● it was necessary to draw out from the● Parliaments a Detachment for State-A●● fairs: and these had the name of th● Close, Privy, or Great Council. When● by this Parliament in a little time degenerated to a mere Court of Judicatures as afterwards that Privy Council, b●● permitting Causes to be heard befo●● them, gave occasion for the business 〈◊〉 State to be removed to a particular ●●bal.  
But this Parliament I say, ●●ing a new Creature, was tossed, a●● turned into a thousand several Shap●● and Figures, e'er it came to any dura●● Consistence. One while it was to 〈◊〉 half-yearly, another while without discontinuance; than half of it the one half ●ear, and the other half Parliament the ●her half year; to the end, that what ●e King's Ministers could not get to pass ●ith the one, might be carried in the o●●er: thus rendering the Authority of the ●●urt 
(h) Pasqniere Res.  A Demy-illusoire, 〈◊〉 a manner Illusory, 〈◊〉 But upon the Pope's coming to settle his Court at Avignon, these ●●ovations and abuses fell in like a tor●●nt, both upon church and State.  
Not long before, the Kings, as St. ●●●wis, under a shady Tree, in person, ●ard all appeals, and determined the ●●uses of their Subjects, and were themselves the Chief Justices.  
Now the Canonists so infected the ●●●tion with their tricks and subterfuges, ●●eir Quillets and Chicancery, and set 〈◊〉 an itch of wrangling and vexatiousness amongst them, that Courts could 〈◊〉 be erected fast enough for them; 〈◊〉 in a short time, a third part of the ●●●ple, one way or other, got thereby Employment.  
A few years before, this King, Philip the Fair, had been excommunicated, his Subjects freed from their Obedience, and his Kingdom given away to the Emperor, by Boniface. Yet now Clemen● the fifth and he so well agreed, upon hi● coming to Avignon, that, as my Author says, Fraternisans en conseils, collogueing together, they not only made goo● booty of the Templars, destroying the● by consent, for no greater quarrel, 〈◊〉 supposed, than their Richeses. But th● Pope gave leave to the King to levy 〈◊〉 tenth upon all the Clergy; and th● King, in exchange, was to connive 〈◊〉 the Pope's Apostolic Indults, Grace's E●pectatives, Tenths, First Fruits, Procur●tions, Mandates, monitorials, Executo●●als and Laudable Customs.  
These inventions and wit of the Minister's at Avignon raised an Emulation 〈◊〉 those at Paris, and they wonderred 〈◊〉 found in words so strong a Charm, th●● the Pope thereby could work such wonders, and ride over all the Fences of Re●son, Law and Custom; and that for the● strange feats, the de proprio motu, 〈◊〉 Authoritate absolutâ were all sufficient.  
Whereupon the Courtiers at Paris ●●ll also arm the King's Letters with ●●ese new Spells, and sand them out up●● adventures. But however Canonical ●●d currant they had proved with the churchmen, to the Lay people, this de ●●oprio motu, and Authoritate absolutâ, ●●re uncouth Phrase, and Barbarous La●●●, which they could not where meet ●●th in Classical Authors, nor understand. Wherhfore, when about these times, ●●on occasions for money, the Laity were ●●adredth penny, and the fiftieth penny; ●●n with Fortification money, Equiva●●ts and Loans; than with yet the more ●●eadling terms of Aids, Subsidies and ●●vertions, so it happened, that, let 〈◊〉 Imposers call them what they would, 〈◊〉 people had one name for them all; 〈◊〉 crying out a Maletoult, knocked the collectors on the head, with as little ●●uple as ordinary Robbers.  
All the great Wars of former days, ●●●der the Merovingians and Charlians, 〈◊〉 for a long time under the Capets, had been maintained at the King's prope●● Charges: so frugal had been their wa●● of living, and the Demean of the Crow● so large.  
But now was no subsisting without Levies upon the people; and these we●● stubborn and unwilling to be impose● upon, when no Law or Custom could b●● shown to oblige them.  
This plunge raised again from th●● dead the old-fashioned Parliaments And in one of their first Assemblies, 〈◊〉 was by all declared, that. no Imposition could be laid upon the people without their consent. Wherhfore it being the●● part, they took care to relieve the neo●●sities of the Crown. And on this a●● count there was occasion to assemb●● them several times.  
But these were not now to be call● the Parliament, but the Assembly of t●● States; nor yet to meddle with Sta●● Affairs; those weighty matters bei●● now Parliament-business: and there 〈◊〉 another Parliament in Ordinary for th●● purpose.  
So it is not intended these sho●●● trouble their heads, unless asked, with ●ther considerations; than only in order ●●o the laying some Tax on the people. Yet the old Ancestrel Virtue would now ●nd than be boiling up in the breasts of ●●ese States; and they be fancying themselves as full of Power and Sovereign Authority as the old Assemblies so famed 〈◊〉 History. But the Doleances, the Grie●●ances were not to be insisted on, when ●●nce the Mony-Affair was adjusted: so ●●ey were still sent home, till need for another Tax. But, what was yet more grievous, provision was made that the imposts should be at an end after a cer●in time: but when the Collector's ●and was once in, they gathered on, in 〈◊〉 much that what was designed for Temporary, became Perpetual.  
To prevent which mischief, the States, 〈◊〉 the Reign of Charles the Fifth, now abundantly wise, granting a Tax, ordain●●d that none of the King's Officers ●ould finger the money: and the King ●as sworn solemnly, that he would not ●●use any of it to be employed to other ●ses than the War it was given for. The Commissioners, Assessors, Collecto●● Receivers were all chosen by the State● and sworn upon the holy Evangelis●● not to convert it to other ways, a●● Command from the King notwithstanding. And if any Officer from the Ki●● should attempt to force them, than th●● to call the Posse of their Neighbour's 〈◊〉 help them to make resistance. Yet● found not that all this swearing and cau●● on stood them much in stead, the T●● was continued, and the Commissioners that from their being chosen by t●● people, were called Esleus, retain t●● name of Esleus to this day.  
Unless upon these occasions for mo●● the Court at Paris shown lesle and l●● disposed to convene this Assembly; ha●●ing possibly learned that sort of policy a●● from Avignon: where nothing beg●● to sound so harsh to their ears, as t●● talk of calling a General Council.  
However, that their Authority on t●● account of State Affairs might not gro●● quite obsolete and forgotten, upon fo●● great Exigencies, when it could not w●● be avoided, they have been summone●● and have exercised their old Soveraign●●y, even in these days.  
As when under Philip the Fair, and Charles the Sixth, they condemned and cast of the two Popes; Boniface the Eighth, and Benedict the Thirteenth. And when they decided betwixt Edward the Third of England, and Philip Valois, to whether of them belonged the Right of Succession to the Crown of France, when they topped upon us with their Sa●ick Law. And when King John of France was taken Prisoner, and carried ●nto England. When Francis the First would have aliened part of his Dominions, etc.  
Lewis the Eleventh was so averse from ●alling this Assembly, he would not be persuaded to it, till a Civil War (which was called, The War for the Public Good) obliged him. And 
(i) Hist. l. 5. ca 18.  Comines tells us, that ●ome Courtiers would have ●ade it High Treason to mention the Calling of them. But Comines was not ●f their humour; he, against the Vogue ●f his Fellow Courtiers declared, that no Prince could take a Farthing from any Subject without their consent: an● that England, by reason of the frequent Parliaments, was the best governed Nation in the World.  
In short, The Gauls, as Caesar's Commentaries teach us, had their Toti● Galliae Concilium; which, after the P●nionion and Panaetolion of the Greeks' Budaeus would have called Pancelltico●● as from them; Camden that of the English, Pananglicon.  
Whether the French coming to sett●● amongst the Gauls, to tender themselves more easy to them, chose to goven them in their own way; or that the● also brought along with them from G●many this Model, it appears not. Th●● is certain, the Kings of the two form●● Lines did, bonâ fide, govern with th●● advice and direction of that great Councils in all things.  
Hugh Capet by his Constitution of th●● Peers, made the Authority of that an●●ent Assembly in a manner useless, unle●● by accident, that it served to balanc●● and be the Umpire betwixt the King's and their Peers. But than the Peers ●●●ming to be reduced, the Court of Rome 〈◊〉 Avignon taught the Courtiers at Paris ●●w Forms and new Politics: And General Councils being run down, and ●●ade out of fashion in the Church, the ●●ate must sympathise with it; and af●●r some mouldings, and some little ad●●ess, is brought also to walk on the same ●●igh Ropes, without that counterpoise which was want to preserve it sted●●● and secure. The old name of Par●●ment remains, but no longer to be re●●ted fundamental and essential to the ●●ommonwealth; only a prudent Con●●tution. And it was now from the wisdom, or else the debonnaireté of suc●●eding Princes, that they always sub●●itted their Wills and Edicts to be exa●●ined, and approved or rejected by that dissembly.  
And now our Writers of the times are ●●r maintaining that the Government ●●as never otherwise, but the King's ●●ower always absolute and unlimited. Which need be no wonder, since the ●●me Gentlemen affirm the Merovingians, Charlians and Capets, to be all 〈◊〉 Branches from the same Stock, again the concurrent Authority of so ma●● hundred Years; and when in truth 〈◊〉 pet was not so much as of French Ext●●ction, but descended from Witich●● the Saxon.  
But it was not conceivable how t●● Absolute Powers, as that of the Chur●● and State could agreed together in 〈◊〉 same place; therefore a check was fou●● for that of the Pope: for upon any cla●●ing of Interests, the Parliament and 〈◊〉 University did always manfully opp●● the Pope's Encroachments, and ass●● the Liberties of the Gallicane Chur●● In so much that Pasquier on this occas●● resembles the Sorbon to the Tribunes old Rome.  
And yet so long as the temporal Pri●● should assume an absolute Power, 〈◊〉 Papal interest would be certain to preuss in the end. A mixed monarchy is a ●●lance to itself, and needs to Foreign Authority to interpose: but under 〈◊〉 unlimited Power, where the Prince accountable to none but God, whith●● should the discontented fly? whither ●●ould the oppressed resort, but to God's ●●gents and Plenipotentiaries; to God's ●●icar, the Pope his Apostolic Majesty, ●●r Redress? He can curse and throw ●●out his Thunder, and free the Subjects from their Obedience, etc.  
And in this the Pope has the better ●●nd of the staff; for by setting the tem●●oral Princes above all the ties of Hu●●ane Policy, and Civil Prudence, he ●●ot only withdraws their Subjects from ●●em, but even makes their temporal ●●overaignty truckle to his Spiritual: for ●●e Soul and Eternity are of more consequence and value than any man's mor●●l body. And whenever a Contest ●●appens, the Spirituals are sure to have ●●e upper hand.  
When the Jesuits came in with their ●●eca obedientia, that other barbarous ●●rase to enslave the World withal; ●●ey intended their Doctrine for the ●●ppe's service only; for at the same time ●●ey reproached such of the Roman Religion as scrupled to own that the Pope ●●d power to give away the Kingdom of France, or any other Kingdom at pleasure: and called them all Calvinists, who could not be through paced Jesuits.  
But, to be even with them, and to avoid all strife betwixt the Spiritual Absolute, and the Temporal Absolute Power, Hobbs takes the only true politic Measures. he, for quietness sake, thrusts the whole Nation of Spiritual Being's out of the World: and that the Sovereignty might be indivisible indeed, he allows not so much as Divisum imperium cum Jove— not, not that Jove himself should rival his Leviathan.  
He found'st his Politics upon his Physics; therefore, in the first place, we are to believe that there is nothing in the Universe but mere Body; neither are we to think, to reason or to fancy aught of a future State, of Souls to be saved, nor to have the fear of God before our eyes; for than (as he calls it) we shall be frighted with Spirits into Rebellion.  
And that we may not be inclined to these vain imaginations, he fairly prescribes, that the people may not be suffered to read (he names not Calvin and Beza, but) Aristotle, Plato, Seneca, Cicero; nor the Greek and Latin Histories; nay, all Greek and Latin are pestilent and dangerous; and thus the Universities are the very Core of Rebellion.  
Nor is this any Paradox, or sally of his particular wit; 'tis what Machiavil, and before them Aristotle had taught us, that to preserve an Absolute Power, all public Schools must of necessity be put down. Thus we see how much the Papal Tyranny is supported by their Inquisition. Thus in Turkey are Letters discountenanced. And in Moscovy it suffices, that God and the great Duke have all the knowledge to themselves.  
And it is not enough that the people be no wiser, but they must not be permitted to be so good-natured as  that Herd together. Their Morals must be corrupted, and their course of Honesty and fair dealing must be broken, jest it might produce a mutual trust and correspondence amongst them; which in the end would be pernicious to the Commonwealth.  
'Tis agreed also, that Courage is not a virtue for Subjects, under this sort of Government; 
(k) Hobs.  The lesle they dare, the better it is, both for the Commonwealth, and for themselves. Thus the Persians' were qualified for the better Subjects, when an hundred Freeholders of Greece were want to beaten ten thousand of them.  
Plato had the notion of making a Government happy by a King-Philosopher; and Hobbs certainly (for these parts of Europe) pursues an Idea as unpracticable: endeavouring to make the Subjects all Asses.  
Some, for want of better Topics, draw an Argument from Antiquity, that Monarches were absolute before they were limited. But the same reason will hold likewise against all Laws; for in those days that Kings were without Limits, the Subjects were without Laws, till Experience and Evil Manners taught the World by Civil Prudence and Art, to preserve nature in its primitive perfection and integrity.  
Some would set Monarches above all human caution and policy, by virtue of some Expressions in old Poets: as in Callimachus, that Kings are from Jupiter; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Which may be answered by that of Aratus, cited by St. Paul, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. We also are his Offspring.  
Homer tells us that Jupiter gave Agamemnon the Sceptre and the Laws. But Homer may be interpreted by Homer. When first he had occasion to mention that Sceptre, he explains the matter thus: says he, Vulcan, as a curious piece of his Workmanship, gave this Sceptre to Jupiter. Jupiter gave it (as Kings give a white Staff to a Treasurer or Chamberlain) to Mercury. Mercury gave it to Pelops. Than Pelops left it in succession to Thyestes. Thyestes left it to Atreus; and Atreus left it to Agamemnon. So we found a thing may be said to be given in several senses.  
For the Laws that accompanied the Sceptre, Hom. tells not whether he meant the Legislation, or the Execution of the Laws; but Aristotle may inform us, that when Agamemnon assumes to himself any absolute Power, he speaks as a General in the Field, and not as King of Lacedaemon.  
Others there be, who having stumbled on some Metaphor, or Poetical Simile, where God and the King are compared together, think it may as well hold good in Politics; and never leave straining, till they drive it through all the incommunicable Attributes; nor is there any end to their Frenzy. Some of the Emperors have checked their Flatterers with that Verse in Homer.  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉;   

I am no God, why dost thou liken me to the Immortal.   
But of the two (say these Antipolititians) an absolute Monarch is more like to God than a limited.  
Which might be true, if Goodness did as necessarily accompany their Greatness. The Heathens, in their Notion of God, placed Goodness before Greatness, optimus maximus. Now the business of Policy is to Tack Goodness to Power; it gives a Monarch the power to do all the good whereof his nature is capable. But these are not content, unless he had the power likewise of doing evil; which is to be unlike God, and which power cannot be affirmed of God without Blasphemy. Lucifer, and those other unhappy Angels had that power, and sunk beneath the burden: Is there more perfection of Nature in an earthly Monarch? or is there some promise, or prophesy to support him under the weight, that he shall not thereby plunge downright into Tyranny, and so loose that bright and Godlike resemblance, which distinguished him from other men? In effect, by making a Monarch unlimited, instead of Deifying, they make him a Devil.  
For the Texts of Holy Scripture so often applied on these occasions, few that are ingenuous can urge them; and few that have sense, but discern the Sophistry and abuse. One may there found the Tribe of Judah, but not a word of the Merovingians or Charlians. And if there were some temporal Monarchy to be established from Scripture, the Pope most certainly would have it all. It was Christ that said, To me is given all the power in heaven and upon earth. And who can make out their pretensions from Christ, by such a long Chain of Succession, but the Pope? What though Christ said, My Kingdom is not of this world; by is not, is meant, is not yet; that is, not till Constantine's time: and than comes the Pope into full possession of all, both Spiritual and Temporal Dominion. It was not said, Cum hâc Petrâ, but Super hanc Petram.— But leaving these hocus-pocus Arguments to the Jesuits, it may only be here remembered what long ago Demosthenes observed concerning Philip of Macedon; that, to serve a turn, the Roguie Priests made, even the Oracles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to Philippize.  
But indeed, this Divine Right may be a Hercules amongst the Jesuits, when backed with the Inquisition. And we may allow Monarches to be Gods, for want of better, in Hobs' State of Ignorance and Atheism. As in Asia, Alexander passed well enough for the Son of Jupiter Hammon.  
The Politics of France say, that The French Government has nothing of the Barbarian or Despotic in it; but is of that kind which is called Oeconomick, where the King has an Absolute Power in his State, as a Father has in his Family. Which Notion is very much in vogue of late; but how they found this Absolute Power in a Family, is not easily to be imagined: take the most simple Family, as Hesiod describes it; a Man, and his Wife, with the Ox, their faithful Servant; yet it is a sort of mixed Government: there is sensibly an Aristocracy in it; the Wife is the Man's Fellow, his Peer, his Mate, his Consort, in all Civilised Nations; and shares the Government so far as capable by her Education: sometimes has more than her share; and than it is called Gynaecocracy, or Woman's Rule. Amongst the Barbarians indeed, as well in Aristotle's time, as now, the Wives were in the nature of Servants, but nothing there is to be called Oeconomy, but all Barbarity.  
Besides, in this case, there is such a thing as a Divorce, which may set the woman on her own legs again, and so the good man be deposed, if he chance to be impotent, and cannot answer the ends of Marriage. And yet Marriage is of Divine Right.  
Neither needed the Lawmakers in all Ages have taken care to encourage young men to Matrimony, if such a goodly Dominion were to be got by it.  
Than upon the Account of Children, Bodin indeed would not stick, even, with old Saturn, to eat his Offspring; but in this horrid Doctrine few, I hope, are his followers. Potestas patria debet in pietate, non in atrocitate consistere, say the Civilians.  
Moses compares the Office of a King to that of Parents; not by reason of any Absolute Power, but of the Charge. 
(a) Numb. cap. 11.  Why layest thou (says he to God Almighty) the burden of all this people upon me? have I conceived all this people? have I begotten them?  
Thus have I answered whatever I could judge has by any body been materially urged for this African Monster, this Demigorgon of Absolute Power. Which seems plainly inconsistent with either Nature or Policy, Reason or Religion, Civility or Humanity. And it is not without good ground that its Champions despair it ever should obtain with us, so long as Greek and Latin, and the Classic Authors pass free from the Inquisition: or till such time as the Great Turk indeed threatens us from the Neighbour-shoar; or some new Tamberlane, with an Inundation of Barbarism overwhelms us.  
But to entangle the matter, and make the notion of mixed Monarchy seem, as it were, a little absurd; these Assertors of Absolute Power, with much ignorance, or much sophistry, so contrive to divide the Sovereignty, that each share does in effect imply the whole: whenas there may be found several ways without any of that pretended difficulty. Bodin grants that the Constitution may be Monarchical, and the Administration Aristocraticalor Popualr. Which goes very far towards the overthrowing of all his Systeme; and, certainly, is a contradiction of what he so laboured to maintain: for this was always accounted a dividing of the Sovereignty.  
Thus in the Roman Commonwealth, the Power was in the People, and the Execution in the Consuls (which Office of the Consuls, Polybius calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Kingly and Monarchical) add to these the Authority of the Senate, and than we have the several Powers of the Three States in the Roman Commonwealth; The People commanded, the Senate consented, and the Consuls executed.  
In like manner, where Monarchy is predominant, after the Modern Style, the People may be said to desire or petition, the Nobles to consent, the King to have the Conduct and Command of the Executive Power. Shall not than the Monarch have his Elbows at liberty, but sit idle till the People and Lords, with their Desires and Consents, have concerted matters for him? No such restraint follows; all the Laws and Customs of a Nation are qualified with the desire of the People, and consent of the Nobles ' and all the ordinary Power requisite for the good and support of the Government is also implicitly so qualified at the Monarch's discretion, till something in particular appear expressly to the contrary. Upon this Account the French say that, Mandement Royal, & Volunte du Roy; The King's Commands, and the King's Will, are not his Personal Will, and his Personal Commands; but those that accord to Justice, and to the Laws: of which (that remnant of the Peers and Popular State) the Parliament are Judges. Therefore his Will & Commands come always before them to be examined, and there to be emologated and approved e'er they take effect.  
FINIS.