AN IMPARTIAL INQUIRY INTO THE Nature of Sin.  
In which are evidently Proved Its POSITIVE ENTITY or BEING, The true Original of its Existence; The Essential Parts of its Composition,  
By 

Reason,  
Authority, 

Divine,  
Humane, 

Ancient,  
Modern,— 

Roman.  
Reformed.        
The Adversaries Confessions and Contradictions;  
The Judgement of Experience and Common sense;    
Partly Extorted by Mr. Hickman's challenge, partly by the Influence which his Error hath had on the Lives of many, (especially on the Practice of our last and worst Times,) But chiefly intended as an Amulet to prevent the like mischiefs in time to come.  
To which is added An Appendix; in vindication of Doctor HAMMOND; with the concurrencey of Doctor SANDERSON; The Oxford Visitors impleaded; The Supreme Authority asserted; together with divers other Subjects, whose Heads are gathered in the Contents.  
After all A Postscript concerning some dealings of Mr. BAXTER.  
By THOMAS PIERCE Rector of Brington.  
LONDON, Printed by R. N. for T. Garthwait, at the little North-door of Saint Paul's Church, 1660.   

To my Reverend Friend Mr. I. B. at his lodging in Saint Paul's Churchyard.  
Sir,  
THe Face of Things in our British World, which the giddy Phaeton's of the Times had lately confounded into a Chaos, doth not only seem so strangely, but so miraculously altered, since the Book I now send you was first engaged in the Press; that had not the Stationer and the Printer put it wholly out of my power, (before your Letter of good news was so much as written) I had laid my Sponge upon several passages and expressions, which however they are of eternal verity, were yet much fitter when they were Penned, than now they are come into the Light. For then I took it to be a Time, wherein 'twas proper to engage in a Defensive war. But now I hope it is a season, wherein the Lamb shall lie down by the Wolf in peace, and the once-affrighted Kid commend the neighbourhood of the Leopard. Then I thought it was a Time, 
Isa, 11. ●▪  in which the enemies of God, and of his Anointed, (both King, and Church,) were to be conquered into obedience by dint of Argument and discourse. But now I hope the Time is coming, in which the enemies I speak of will face about, and turn Friends. Or if they are backward to reconcilement, and will not forgive us for having suffered, as fearing our Sufferings have been greater than they think we are able to forgive; I think our noblest way will be, to confute their fears with our moderation; and so to pull them in to us by cords of Love.  
I know there are certain Ciniflones, who blow the Coals of Dissension with greatest Fierceness, when they see them most likely to be extinguished. They represent the suffering Party as men that breathe nothing but vengeance, and therefore not to be trusted with old Enjoyments, but still to continue the suffering Party; And so because they have been injured for some years past, to be Incapable of Justice for time to come. But if there are here and there a few, who lose the benefit of their sufferings by their Impatience, as I am not able to excuse them, and think them punished with their sin; so must I hold those other men (the envious Cole-Blowers I spoke of) to be more incapable of excuse, in that they charge on so many thousands the indiscretion perhaps of Twenty or Thirty persons, who peradventure do only SAY that they are some of the King's Party. For the Rule to measure His Party by, must be the Nature of their affections; which so far as they are differing from what they are known to be in Him, so far themselves must be known to be none of His. And His are Fatherly affections, as we may judge by his choice to lose the Benefit of his Right for so long a Time, rather than force his way to it by foreign Help.  
And truly (Sir,) I can say it as a very great Truth, That as when our David w●s even hunted, and forced to fly into the 
2 Sam. 15., 23, 28.  Wilderness, it seemed a kind of Disloyalty for us to prosper, (at least so far, as to dwell a● Home,) And all our comfort was even this, that we were not guilty of being safe, (at a time when it was difficult to be safe and Innocent, both at once; so now that we hope he is returning to his Jerusalem in peace, and his people with joy to their ancient Loyalty and Allegiance, I am not able even to wish, much less to use my least endeavour, that our Enemies may suffer as heavy things as they Inflicted. I wish them deprived of nothing else, but what will kill them if they retain it. I wish them Health, and prosperity, and perfect Liberty of conscience, as well as of person, and of purse. But (more than these) I wish them Loyalty from this time forward; I wish them unanimity and uniformity in Religion; I wish them the Grace of Restitution to every person whom they wronged; I do not wish with Saint 
* 1 Cor. 5.5.  Paul they may be delivered up to Satan for the destruction of the flesh; but that their spirits may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus. And so I hope I may boldly say, I wish them no worse than I wish my self. For I earnestly wish, and make it my prayer to God Almighty, that I never may prosper in any ill course, either by error of Judgement, or guilt of Practice. More than this (I thank God) I do not wish to my greatest enemies, and less I cannot wish to my dearest Friends. I wish our David may prove the Centre, for our Affections to meet and concentre in, from the most opposite points of the whole circumference. Whatever our Distances may have been, (and still may be as to some opinions,) I wish at last we may unite, and be one in him; And so Remember how we agree in Love and Loyalty to our Sovereign, as to forget how we differ in other things. All the Revenge that I desire, is that of Joseph towards his Brethren; who▪ though they had stripped him of his clothes, and cast him cruelly into the pit, and cheaply sold him to the Ishmaelites, (Gen. 37.) yet he requited them no worse then with food and raiment. Nay casting his Arms about their necks, he suffered his love to run out into tears and kisses. (Gen. 45.) If we look backward, I must profess, I have been many times engaged in such pen-combats as now I publish. But looking forward I suppose, that I shall run with the Foremost to Love and union.  
Some may otherwise conjecture, by what is said in my Appendix, at such a Time. But 'tis for want of Consideration, that my whole performance was both extorted by the Adversary, and dispatched by myself, and also committed unto the Press, before I could hear of any Endeavours to reconcile the Pens of dissenting Brethren, or but to make a cessation of such like Arms. Sure I am, I am as ready as any one of my Brethren, to sacrifice any thing to Peace, excepting righteousness, and truth, the love of God, and his glory. I shall be willingly bound up from ever speaking, or writing, or enjoying any place in the Church of God, (if my Superiors can but imagine how that maytend to the public good) rather than lay the least Block in the way of unity; which now is attempting a return to such a Babel as ours hath been.  
But (besides) my contention will be believed to have been such, as mine Adversary in time will applaud me for, when he shall find my Rudest twitches were but to snatch him from a Precipice. As soon as Mr. Hickman shall be convinced, that though for a sinner to hate God, and to murder men, are as positive entities, as any actions to be imagined, yet they cannot but be reckoned among the worst sorts of sins, and therefore cannot (without impiety) be said to be any of God's creatures, or God himself, (which yet Mr. Hickman hath often taught,) I say as soon as he shall discern, not only how dangerous and sinful, but how irrational and senseless his error is; he will as heartily thank me even for this very Book, as I would thank that man who should pluck a thorn out of my eye. Besides that my aim in what I have written, hath been the same with that of the most moderate Doctor Sanderson; For (to express it in 
* See his Ex. cellent long Preface before the second Edition of his fi●st Se●mons S. 24.  his words) I have not written against the moderate, but only the Rigid-Scotized-thorow-paced Presbyterians. Of them Mr. Hickman can be but one. And even with him I am as ready to be upon just as good Terms, as with my neighbour Mr. Barlee I long have been. Let him only forbear to wound me in the Apple of my eye, nay in the tenderest part of my very soul, by dishonouring God, and his Anointed, (long before whose restauration, (which is but hoped whilst ● am writing,) I had sent my Vindication of his Supremacy to the Press, and which had certainly been as public, as now it is, though the Republicans had prospered in their Career:) Let him, I say, but do that, and my work is done. If I shall ever again appear, in the behalf of any one of the five controverted points, it will be likeliest to be in Latin (as being the Scholar's Mother-tongue) and only in order to reconcilement.  
Now that the God of peace and unity will make us at unity and peace within ourselves, enlightening our heads with that knowledge which is the mother of humility, and inflaming our hearts with that zeal which is according to such a knowledge, and thereby making up our breaches as well of judgement as of charity, (or at least of charity, if not of judgement,) that we may all be held together by the bond of unity in the truth; shall be as heartily the endeavour, as it is the frequent and fervent prayer, of  
Your meanest Brother and Servant in our Lord and Master jesus Christ. THOMAS PIERCE. Brington, May 2. 1660.   

A PARAENETICAL PREFACE Showing the purpose of the Author, with the Necessity of the Work; Representing its usefulness in all Times, but more especially in these; with some Praeparatory Advertisements, making the whole the more manageable to the less Intelligent of the people.  
Christian Reader,  
IF thou shalt ask in curiosity, why I happen to come so late to this Discharge of my Engagement, (to which I stood by my Promise so long obliged;) Know that my several Praeengagements with several Books of Mr. Baxter, together with several interventions both of sickness, and journeys, and other Impediments unavoidable, do conspire to give thee the Reason of it. For these did keep me from the thought of what I have brought to a conclusion, till somewhat after the beginning of this last Winter. Besides that at the end of my Autocatacrisis, (which I conceive more useful than all my Controversies besides, and upon which I bestowed the greatest labour, that it might put a full end to the whole Dispute) I made a promise to my Readers of what I had purposed within myself, that if I returned to any Dispute in any kind whatsoever, as it would fall out Cross to my Inclinations, so I resolved to do it only at times of Leisure. That whilst my hours could be spent in my chief employment, I might not lose too many of them in my least necessary Defences. For though I remember I am a 
* Ezek. 33.7, 8. & ch. 34.3, 10▪  Shepherd, and bound as well to defend, as to feed the Sheep; yet it cannot but be (to me) an unpleasant Game, to tire myself in the hunting of Wolves and Foxes.  
But after the Reason of my lateness, I am to render another Reason, why I betook myself at last to the present service. I saw the flock was endangered by several Vermin, and partly driven out of the Fold too; Nay the great Master-shepherd was himself assaulted by their Inventions, by whom he was slanderously reported to be the principal cause of their going astray. 
* See the pages and lines cited, from Zuinglius, Calvin Barrhaeus, and D. Twisse, with the Editions of their Books, in my first ch. of this Treatise, Sect. 2. p. 3.4  Some I found teaching, (and that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in broadest Terms, That God is the Author of Injustice, the Author of Adultery, the Author of the evil of sin, not only the Author of the sinful work itself, but of the evil intention too; (In a word) The Author of all th●se things, which we affirm to come to pass by his mere permission, (and not at all by his appointment.) 
† Deus homines ad suas pravas Actiones incitat, seducit, jubet, indurat, trahit, deceptiones immittit, & quae peccat●● gravia sunt efficit. Pet. Vermil. Mart. Florent. (edit▪ Tigur. 1561.) in Jud. c. 3. v. 9.10. & 11. fol. 56. pag. 1. lin. 7. etc.  Others I caught in the Act of teaching, That God doth incite, or stir men up to wicked actions, that He seduceth, commandeth, doth make obdurate, draws, sends in deceits, and effects those things which are grievous sins. Of which I now give an Instance from Peter Martyr in my Margin, because he was the most famous and learned Calvinist of Florence. In so much that Doctor Whitaker did most ingenuously confess (when he▪ answered Campian) that 
* Si Calvinus aut Martyr, aut quisquam nostrûm affirmet, Deum▪ esse Authorem & Causam peccati, non repugno quin simus omnes horrendae Blasphemia scelerisque rei. Whitak. in Respons. sua ad octavam Rationem Campiani, (edit. Genev. 1610.) in Tom. 1. operum suorum, pag. 33. col. lin. 34. etc.  if Calvin, or Peter Martyr, or any other of that Party, affirms God to be the Author and cause of sin, they are all of them guilty of the most horrid Blasphemy and wickedness. And yet when the Florentine I spoke of had put the Question, (in the page preceding his above cited words,) An Deus causa sit peccati? whether God be the cause of sin? he presently called it, Quaestionem non dissimulandam, and professedly held it in the affirmative▪ A third sort I found there were who taught, That 
* Mr. Archery Comfort for Believers. p. 36, 37.  God is the Author not of those actions alone, in and with which Sin is, but of the very pravity, Ataxie, Anomy, Irregularity, and sinfulness itself which is in them; yea that God hath more hand in men's sinfulness, than they themselves.] These were publicly and in Print, the very words of Master Archer, a Presbyterian Minister of London in Lombard street; who went over into Holland with Thomas Goodwin, (Oliver Cromwel's Ghostly Father, and the present usurper of the Presidentship in Magdalen College,) by which Goodwin he was commended for 
† Mr. Thom. Goodwin's Apologetical Narration, subscribed by Phil. Nye, Will. Bridge, Jer. Burrows, & Sidrach Simpson▪ Licenced by Charles Herle (printed by R. Dawlman. 1643.) p. 22.  as precious a man as this earth bears any. In Holland he was Pastor of the Church of Arnheim, as we are told by Mr. 
* Mr, Edward's his Antapologia (edit. 1646. pag. 160.  Edward's, his loving Friend too. His book he was pleased to Entitle, [Comfort for Believers in their Sins and Sufferings,] for fear Believers should be afflicted with the sinfulness of their sins, which God himself is the Author of, and more the Author (in his opinion) than they can be. Yet his Book with this Doctrine was even printed by Authority, cum Privilegio, (when Presbyterianism was up) with the Licence and approbation of old Mr. Downham, who was empowered to such things by the-world-knows-whom. It was the Doctrine of Mr. Knox, the great Introducer of Presbyterianism in Scotland) That the wicked are not only left by Gods suffering, but 
† See him cited by Dr. Heylin in his Hist. Quinquart. part. 3. ch. 16. p. 5.  compelled to sin by his power. p. 317. And again he saith, we do not only behold and know God to be the Principal cause of all things, but also the Author appointing all things. p. 22. It is also taught in 
* Mr, Edward's his Antapologia (edit. 1646. pag. 160.  another Treatise, (at first written in French, but after published in English) That by virtue of God's will, all things were made, yea even those things which are 
* A Brief Declaration of the Table of praedestinati. on. p. 15. ibid. p. 6.  evil and execrable p. 15. Another takes upon him to 
† Ibid. p. 6.  prove, That all evil springeth out of God's Ordinance. And his Book is Entitled [Against a Privy Papist] as 'twere on purpose to betray the Protestant Name into Disgrace. But now at last Mr. Hickman outgoes them All, if they all are but capable to be outgon. For the most execrable and heinous of all the sins to be imagined, is the devil's hating Almighty God. Which though Mr. Hickman doth confess to be the worst of all actions, 
See the words in his Book of the 2. Edition (which Edition) I use in all I cite from this Author) p. 93. lin. penult. ult.  and again essentially and intrinsically evil, (p. 94. lin. 2.) evil ex genere & ob●ecto, (ibid. lin. 9) and such as no kind of Circumstance can ever make lawful (ib. lin. 17.) yet he grossly calls it The work of God, as all other positive things are. (p. 96. lin. 8.) will't thou know (good Reader) what may lead him to such a Blasphemy? Thou must know his principle is this Verbatim, [It belongs to the universality of the FIRST CAUSE to PRODUCE not only EVERY REAL BEING, but also the positive MODIFICATIONS of Being's. (95. l. ult. & p. 96. lin. 1.) And this he gives for the very Reason, why The Action of hating God (spoken of just now) is the work of God.  
Now that this is a Principle (or a Doctrine) whose every consequence is a crime, I cannot better convince the Calvinists, than by the confession of Mr. Calvin. For when the very same Doctrine, which I suspect to have been brewed by the Carpocratians, was freshly broached by the Libertines, (breaking in, with Presbytery, to help disgrace our Reformation, just as the Gnostics to the discredit of Christianity itself,) Master Calvin called it 
‖ Joh. Calvini Tractatus Theologici etc. (edit, Genev. 1612.) in Libertinos. c. 4. p. 436. col. 3 lin. 50. & ib· p. 437. col. 1. lin. 14.  An Execrable Blasphemy; not only once, but again and again too. And what was that which he declaimed so much against in that stile? was it that God was said plainly to be the Author of sin? no such matter. It was only for saying it in aequivalence. It was for saying another thing, from whence God might be inferred to be the Author of sin. It was only for saying, God worketh all things. This was called by Mr. Calvin, An Execrable Blasphemy. And his Reason for it is very observable. For (saith he) 
* Ex hoc Articulo, [Deum sc. omnia operari] Tria admodum horrida consequi, quorum primum hoc est. nullum inter Deum et Diabolum discrimen fore. ib. c. 13. p. 445. col. 2. lin. 63.  from this Article, [God worketh all things] Three things do follow extremely frightful. First that there will not be any Difference between God and the Devil; 
‖ Ipsum à se abnegari oportet, & in Di●bolum tr●nsmutari. ibid. cap. 14. pag. 447. col. 2. lin. 42.  Next, th●t God must deny himself; Thirdly, that God must be transmuted into the Devil.] A greater Authority than Calvin's no man living can produce against his followers of the Presbytery (some few Episcopal Antiremonstrants being unjustly called Calvinists, there being a wide gulf fixed between them and Calvin,) And I have cited him so exactly (as few or no Writers are wont to do) that if an enemy will not believe me, he may consult Mr. Calvin with expedition, and make his own eyes bear witness for me.  
Next considering with myself, how that a lesser Blasphemy than This, is called Railing against the Lord, (2. Chron. 32.17.) and that a Doctrine less devilish, is broadly said by the Apostle to be the doctrine of Devils, (1 Tim. 4▪ 1●) That it is God blessed for ever, against whom the children of transgression do open a wide mouth, and draw out the Tongue, (Isa. 57.4.) the tongue which reacheth unto the heavens, (Psalm. 73.9.) and whose talking is against the most high, (v. 8.). That our common enemies of Rome do object these things to the Reformation, as if (forsooth,) they were our Protestant and common sins; Nay that the Lutherans themselves will rather return unto the Papists from whom they rationally parted, than live in communion with the Calvinians, for this one Reason, because the Calvinians seem to worship another God, to wit, a God who is the Author and cause of sin; I say considering all this both with the causes and the effects, I confess my heart waxed hot within me, and though for a Time I kept silence, yea even from good words, yet (as the Psalmist goes on,) it was pain and grief to me. I often called to mind that pertinent saying of Saint Peter, (1 Epist. c. 4. v. 14.) and then concluded within myself, If God on their part is evil spoken of, 'tis the fitter that on ours he should be glorified. If all his works are commanded to speak well of him, in all places of his Dominion, (Psal. 103.22.) I could not have answered it to my self, should I still have been guilty of keeping silence; much less to Him could I have had what to say, under whom I am entrusted, and that with souls. Since he describes a good Shepherd, by his readiness to lay down his life for the sheep, I durst not be such a Lasche, and unfaithful servant, as not to offer up my oil, or shed a little of my Ink, where I should think my dearest blood were too cheap a sacrifice.  
Finding therefore that Doctrine, which is so execrable and heinous as hath been showed, sucked in greedily by the Ranters in these our days, breaking in upon the Church (which is God's Enclosure as well as Spouse) even at that very gap, which some had purposely made to cast out Bishops, and obedience, and whatsoever was Christian, besides the name; I also considered who they were, who took upon them the Tapster's office; and drawing out the very dregs of this deadly wine, boldly gave it instead of drink to the giddy people. Mr. Hickman seemed to be the boldest and the busiest officer of them all; and the more popular he was thought, I thought him the fitter to be encountered. For if his Favourers come to think, That God is the cause and the producer of every real being (not excepting the cursing or hating God) They have nothing to defend them from being Libertines. Or if they come to be persuaded that sin hath no real being (but is a nonentity, that is, a nothing) they must needs be Carneadists, for aught I am able to apprehend. And when they perfectly are either, (to wit Carneadists or Libertines,) I know not what can secure them from turning Atheists. It was observed by Peucerus (in his Epistle before his Chronicon) that there are three sins especially which have a tendency to the changing of States and Empires; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Impiety, Injustice, unbridled Lust. The Church is ruined by the first, the secular policy by the second, and private families by the third. Each of these must needs reign when thought to have nothing of Reality, or (if it hath) to be God's own offspring. The late Cromwellians and the fanatics were clearly transported by the latter. For having 
† Wisd. 2.11.  called their strength the Law of justice, they constantly ascribed to God's decree, and appointment, and 
* Reader, Compare the non-se●●e with the impiety of the expression, and mark how little they understand, what the word providence doth import.  All working providence, whatsoever vile practice they found they were able to bring about. Their Declarations and Petitions, their Remonstrances and news Books, their Congratulations and Addresses, both to the old and young Tyrant, did ever run in Mr. Hickman's and Hobbs his strain. Regicide, and Sacrilege, and all manner of Usurpations, (being not only Real, but positive entities) were still ascribed to the working and will of Go●.  
But Mr. Hickman's true opinion must not be judged of by his word●, unless his opinion (like his words) doth often vary and shift itself to the two extreme parts of his contradictions. Whether 'tis really his opinion, that that is no sin, which is intrinsically 
a p. 93, & 94.  evil, because he saith it is good and the 
b p. 96.  work of good; or else that that is a sin which is God's own work, because he saith it is an 
c p 93.94.  action, and hath a 
d p. 96.  positive being; wh●ther 'tis really his opinion, That for Ammon to ravish his sister Tamar could not possibly be a sin, because an action; 
2 Sam. 13.  or that a hatred of God himself cannot possibly be a sin, because a Quality; we can but guests by his plainest words, though the Searcher of hearts doth know his meaning. For one while he seeks to persuade his Readers, that sin is nothing, but a privation; And he doth it by producing such figurative expressions from certain Authors, as by which it is said, that sin is 
e p. 77.  nothing. (As 'twere on purpose to let us know what he means by a privation.) Another while he saith, that 
f p. 96.  all things positive are good and from God, and yet that the 
g p. 93, 94.  action of hating God is intrinsically evil, which notwithstanding he confesseth to be a 
h p. 96.  positive thing. Another while he saith, That the first 
ii p. 103.  sin of the Angels was a 
ii p. 103.  proud desire to be equal with God. Where sin is praedicate in recto of proud desire; which proud desire he will not deny to be a Quality, and so to have both a Real and a positive Being. And yet another while he saith, That whatsoever hath a 
kk p. 95.  real (he doth not say only a positive) being, God himself doth 
kk p. 95.  produce, as the first cause of it. So that one of these two must needs be really his opinion, (but which of the two I leave him to say) either that sin is God's work; and that God produced in the Angels their proud desire; Or else that sin hath no real being, but that conscience and sin are Ecclesiastical words. By the first, he is a Libertine, by the second, a Carneadist. And whether he who is either will not laugh at the Psalmist (in his heart at least, or in his sleeve) for believing such a thing as a Reward for the Righteous, I shall leave it to be judged by the considering Reader.  
What should move him to assert the most contradictory things, as that sin is something, and nothing; an action, and no action; Not a quality, yet a quality; That the hating of God is a sin, and no sin; That God is the cause, and the Creator, yet not the Author of every act, And yet the Author of every act which is but positive or real; I am not able to imagine; unless he writes as he is moved by the present necessity of his affairs, or is carried away with the jesuits Doctrine of probability, concerning which I shall speak in my consideration of Mr. Baxter.  

Some preparations, for the less Intelligent of the People.  Now to fit the plainest Reader for the perusal of my Book, and to make the positivity of the very worst sins become visible to the blind, very easy to the unlearned, and to the obstinate, undeniable▪ I will supply him (in Antecessum) with several Hints and Mem●nto's of several forms and ways of arguing, upon which he may enlarge as occasion serves. I. It is the property of Qualities (Quarto modo, and so of nothing but qualities) to denominate their subjects either like or unlike. And so those sins must needs be qualities, which will be granted to give such a denomination II. The positive belief (in sensu composito) that there is no God, must needs be granted (even by all) to be a positive entity or being, But 'tis so wholly a sin, as that 'tis nothing but a sin, to have a positive belief that there is no God; Therefore that which is so a sin as to be nothing but a sin, must needs be granted (even by all) to be a positive entity or being. III. Sin properly so called is a transgression of the L●w. And so is the act of the hating of God, which yet is granted to have a positive being. IV. A simple conversion is to be made betwixt sin, and any action against a negative precept; for every such action must be a sin, and every such sin must be an action. V. If something positive may be a sin, then may a sin be something positive; but something positive may be a sin, witness envy, pride, lust, malice. VI To hate God is an Action, and therefore positively something. But 'tis a sin to hate God. Ergo. VII. God forbids in the Decalogue those positive acts, [coveting, stealing, bearing false witness;] and those are sins which God forbids in the Decalogue; therefore those positive acts are sins. VIII. In this true proposition, [It is a sin to hate God] sin is predicated directly of a positive action; therefore that action is a species of sin. IX. There is a numerical identity or sameness betwixt a demonstrative and a determinate Individual; as betwixt this man, and Mr. Hickman, when pointed out with a finger. Such an Identity there is betwixt this sin, and the Devils hating of God, when 'tis the thing so pointed out. X. That very phrase, [an act of sin] implieth sin to be a compound, which hath an act, as well as an obliquity. So that if sin is sinfulness, (which is the pleasure of Mr. Hickman,) than sinfulness is a compound, and hath an act. XI. The very word peccare, to sin, imports an action, so does malefacere, to do wickedly, as much as benefacere, to do well. And therefore this is the stile of the holy Scriptures, 
* joh. 5.  They that have done evil, shall have a resurrection to damnation, and 
† Rom. 2.6.  God will render to every man according to his Deeds. 
* V●rs. 9  Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that doth evil. XII. 'Tis false in extremity, and nonsense in the worst degree, because it implies a contradiction, to say the sin is the mere repugnance of the act to the law, without the act which is repugnant. Or that the sin of hating God is a deflection from the Precept, without that hating which is the sin. XIII. 'Tis so far from being false, to call it a sin to blaspheme, (which is a positive entity) that it is blasphemy to deny it. This is a proof from plain experience. XIV. A part of nothing can be the thing, of which it is but a part; for then the part would be the whole; which does imply a contradiction. And so the formal part of sin cannot possibly be the sin; but the sin must include the material also.  
This doth prompt me (Gentle Reader) to prepare thee also for those evasions, with which the Adversaries of Truth will pretend to answer what thou shalt urge. 1. If therefore when thou provest a sin is positive, they shall only answer concerning sin quatenus sin; Remember to tell them of their Fallacy, à Thesi ad Hypothesin, or à dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid. 2. If again when thou sayst, some sins are actions, (such as those which God forbids us to put in being,) they shall answer that sins of omission are not; put them in mind of that other fallacy, A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. 3. If when thou arguest by an Induction of such particulars, as in the Instance of hating God, they shall answer that hating is not evil in it self; and good, as fastened upon sin; Tell them strait of their Fallacies, A rectè conjunctis ad malè divisa, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. For the Argument is of hating, as having God for its object; And so to answer of hating, without an object, is an Intolerable impertinence, dividing the Act from the Object, which were only considered in conjunction; much more is it impertinent to talk of hating, as 'tis objected upon sin; for that i● a transition à genere ad genus. God is not sin, nor is it a sin to hate sin, but the sin of hating God, is that to which they must speak in a compound sense. Hold them punctually to this, and they are undone. 4▪ If they take upon them to prove (acting the part of the opponent) that the formal part of sin is a mere privation, therefore the sin is a mere privation; tell them first of their fallacy, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. For the Antecedent might be true, and yet the sequel extremely false. Tell them next there is a Fallacy of Ignoratio Elenchì; For the question is of sin, not of a portion, or part of sin. They are passed all Remedy, who, when the Question is, whether it r●ines, do only answer that the staff does not stand in the corner. Tell them over and above, that the formal part of some sins (as of the Devils hating God) is a positive Repugnance to the Law of God; and so again there is the Fallacy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, barely to say, and not to prove the universality of the thing, can amount to no more than only the begging of the question, Mr. Hickman must confess he is the worst of Blasphemers, if there is but one sin that is a positive entity; because he saith that All such must be either 
** p. 7. l. 8, 9 p. 79. lin. 5  God's creatures, or 
** p. 7. l. 8, 9 p. 79. lin. 5  God himself.  
This also prompts me to reflect upon the Mischievous effects of his sad Dilemma. For if God is said to be the cause of that positive entity or action [Adam's eating forbidden fruit,] And the cause of that Law, [Thou shalt not eat it,] he is said to be the Author or cause of that sin, which was his very eating forbidden fruit. I have therefore taken the greater pains in my following Treatise, both in 
* Se e my whole fourth chapter, and compar● it with my citations from D. Go●d, and D. Hammond. p. 103.  vindicating God from being the Author of such effects, and in charging them wholly upon the freewill of man, 
* See c. 5. p. 92. to p. 104.  showing how the sinful agent is alone the cause of the sinful act; to the end I might convince and convert my Adversary even in spite of his own perverseness, and disabuse his followers or abettors notwithstanding their partiality and praepossession. That when they exert any such real and positive actions, as the hating of God, the ravishing of virgins, the kill of Kings, the committing of sacrilege, the coveting and seizing their neighbour's goods, they may be forced to declare (with Coppinger and Hacket in the Star-Chamber) the works are evil, and from themselves, (unless they will take in the Devil too) not good, and from God, as 
* Ubi supra. and also p. 82.  Mr. Hickman no less irrationally, than blasphemously saith.  
That there are 
‖ Exod. 20, 5. Rom. 1.30.  haters of God who is Love itself, God hath told us by Moses, and by Saint Paul. And according to the importance of the original word, they are 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  hated by God who are haters of him. How we ought to be affected towards them that hate God, the Psalmist tells us by his example. 
‖ Psal. 139 21.  Do not I hate them O Lord that hate thee? yea I hate them with a perfect hatred. Who they are that hate God (by way of eminence) our Learned Doctor Stearn hath taken the Liberty to say. I shall content myself at present to show the place in my 
* Ut eorum implacabilis adversus Deum inimicitia innotescat, etc. De animi Medela. c. 17. p. 283.  Margin, and to observe, Mr. Hickman is therein intimately concerned. I do not hate Mr. Hickman, but do love him so well, as to wish him better. Yet of the Doctrine which he delivers, and pleadeth for with so much vehemence, [That every positive thing is good, and either God, or his creature, I have industriously discovered my perfect hatred. For the Hellish murder of Gods Anointed (of ever Blessed and glorious Memory) was as positive a something as any action to be produced. And all the plea of those Deicides who sought to justify the Fact, was the use they made of this Fatal Doctrine. They ever imputed unto God, (irresistibly willing, or unconditionally decreeing, and effectually overacting his people's spirits) whatsoever unclean thing they were 
a Act. 13.18, & 14.16.  suffered in. What was really but the patience, they called the pleasure of the Almighty. 
b 1 Pet. 3.20. 2 Pet. 3.9.  His passive permission, they styled 
* See Master JENKINS his Petition to the Titular Parliament A. D. 1651▪ and compare it with the Assembly-men's Confession of Faith, ch▪ 3. Artic. 1. which saith that God did unchangeably o d●in whatsoever comes to pass. From whence the Murder of the King was concluded God's Ordinance by them that wrought it. And Mr. jenkin's was heard to pray at Black friars [O Lord we know that all things come to pass by thine APPOINTMENT.]  appointment. What he had every where forbidden, they gave him out to have predetermined. What was a sin not to be expiated, They called an expiatory sacrifice. They gave out God to be the Author of all that he suffered them to commit, the favourable approver, of whatsoever he 
‖ Jer 5, 27.  condemned them to prosper in. In a word, they told the people, that God was delighted in those impieties, which with much long suffering he but endured▪ 
Rom. 9.22.  And then I think I was excusable for being impatient of such a Doctrine, as (to the Ruin of three Kingdoms) I saw reduced into practice for divers years.  
How impartial I have been in the maintaining of the Truth, I shall evince in the following papers by my Reply to Mr. BARLOW, the Reverend Provost of Queen's College in Oxford, my very learned and loving Friend. To certain Reasonings of his in his second Metaphysical Exercitation, (which I am careful to tell my Readers he printed twenty years ago, that by refuting those Errors which he asserted in his youth, when a stranger to me, I may not prejudice that Friendship which I desire may be preserved and improved betwixt us, nor take from the honour which is due to his Riper years,) I have replied so much the rather for these three Reasons. First because Master Hickman is very guiltily beholding to Mr. Barlow's Book, for the considerablest part of his own collection. He having stolen from that treasure whatsoever hath the Appearance of strong, or handsome; (I mean as much as concerns the positivity of sin.) Next that the Adversaries may grant, That if their Cause hath miscarried under the management and Defence of such a Person as Master BARLOW, it sure hath wanted nothing but Truth, and not ability to support it. Last of all Mr. Barlow, (so great was his Candour, and love of Truth,) was pleased to give me his Free Assent, that I should persecute Error where ere I found it. To differ in judgement, Incolumi licuit semper amicitiâ; and therefore he is far from falling out with himself, (much less with me,) if he very much differs at this Time of his maturity (like Melanchtho●, and Bishop Andrews, Doctor Sanderson, Master Hales, and almost All the great Scholars the world hath bred,) from what he was in his greener years.  
And now (Good Reader) I am resolved, rather to part abruptly from thee, than to detain thee any longer with such Praeliminary Discourses. I hope it will appear by the following Catalogue of Authors, (at least by as many as will be granted to be the best) both that I am far from being singular in what I own as the greatest truth, And that in case thou hast insensibly taken up a vulgar Error, thou needs not think it a discredit to lay it down.   

A note of such as are used in the following papers, for the proving, or approving of these three things. 1. That the most and worst sins have a positive Entity, or Being. 2. That each of these is complexum quid, and to be taken concretiuè, as consisting of a material and formal part. 3. That the whole of sin is the production (not of God, but) of men and Devils.  


A  
Athenagoras. A.D. 155  
Athan●sius. A.D. 325  
Apollinarius. A.D. 364  
S. Ambrose. A.D. 374  
Augustinus. A.D. 914  
Anselmus. A.D. 1082  
Alexand. Alensis. A.D. 1240  
Aquinas. A.D. 1270  
Aureolus. A.D. 1303  
Alv●rez A.D. 1322  
A●machanus. A.D. 1378  
Amicus.  
Ariaga.  
Apologist for Tilenus.  
A Dola.  
Alstedius.    


B  
S. Basilius. A.D. 372  
S. Bernardus. A.D. 1112  
Bonaventure. A.D. 1271  
Mart. Borrhaeus. A.D. 1560  
Xystus Betuleius. A.D. 1563  
Beza. A.D. 1590.  
Bellarminus. A.D. 1600  
Bp. Bramhall.  
Dr. Rob. Baronius.  
Burgersdicius.  
Baxter.    


C  
Clemens Alexand. A.D. 204  
Cyprianus A.D. 250  
Cyrillus Hierosol. A.D. 365  
Chrysostomus. A.D. 398  
Calvinus. A.D. 1560  
Cajetan. A.D. 1600  
Cameracensis.  
Capreolus.  
Casaubon.  
Chalom.  
Confessions of Advers.  
Bal●haz. Corderius.  
Cumel.  
Cicero.  
Chemnitius.    


D  
Dionysius Areop. A.D. 70  
Durandus. A.D. 1305  
Bp. of Damascus A.D. 1611  
Claud. Devillius. A.D. 1611  
Diotallevius. A.D. 1611    


E  
Epiphanius. A.D. 376  
Episcopius. A.D. 1618.    


F  
Fulgentius. A.D. 500  
Dr. Field.    


G  
Gregor. Nazianz. A.D. 364  
Greg. Nyssen. A.D. 374  
Greg. de Valentia. A.D. 1580  
H. Grotius.  
Dr. Goad.  
Io. Gerhardus jenensis.    


H  
Hieronymus. A.D. 375  
Hemmingius. A.D. 1580  
Dr. Hammond.  
H●fenrefferus. A.D. 1600    


I  
Irenaeus. A.D. 180  
Ignatius. A.D. 99  
justinus Martyr. A.D. 150  
Fl. Illyricus. A.D. 1574  
Fr. junius▪ A.D. 1602  
Dr. jackson.    


K  
K●ckermannus A.D. 1604  
Bp. of Kilmore.    


L  
Lactantius. A.D. 317  
Lombardus. A.D. 1360  
Lessius.  
Bp. Lesley,  
Cardinal de Lugo.  
Polycarpus Lycerus.    


M  
Macarius. A.D. 330  
S. Max. Martyr. A.D. 650  
Melanchthon. A.D. 1540  
Greg. Martinus. A.D. 1604  
P●. Marnixius sanct. Aldegongius.  
Medina.  
Fran. de Mayron. A.D. 1310    


N  
Nannius.    


O  
Origen. A.D. 224  
Ockam. A.D. 1320  
Bp. of Osorie.    


P  
Prosper. A.D. 433  
Parisiensis Magis. A.D. 1347  
Petrus Vermilius Martyr. A.D. 1562  
Piscator. A.D. 1620  
Dr. Prideaux.  
The Protestant Divines in their dispute against the Papists of Original sin.    


R  
Ruffinus. A.D. 390  
joannes de Rada.  
Remonstrants of the low Countries.  
Guliel. de Rubione.  
D. Reynolds.    


S  
S. Scripture.  
Salvian. A.D. 417  
Stepha●us Episcopus Parisiens. D.D. A.D. 1270  
Scotus. A.D. 1300  
Suarez. A.D. 1613  
Sohnius  
A Sot●.  
Dr. Sanderson.  
Dr. Stearn.    


T  
Theophilus Patriarcha. Antiochenus. A.D. 170  
Tatianus Assyrius. A.D. 170  
Ter●ullian. A.D. 203  
Theophylact. A.D. 931  
Timplerus.  
Dr. Twisse.  
Trent Council.    


V  
C. Vorstius, A.D. 1611  
Vasquez,  
Ger. Vossius▪    


Z  
Huld. Zuinglius. A.D. 1520    

Detestanda & abominanda opinio est, quae Deum cujusquam malae v●luntatis, aut malae actionis credit Authorem. Augustin. in Resp. ad Artic. 10. falso sibi impositos▪ p. 868.  
*** Quod Talis actus non solùm praecise ratione alicujus priv●tionis, sed etiam per se aliquo modo malus sit, est communis sententia Doctorum. LESSIUS de perfect. Divinis. l. 13. c. 26. num, 176.    

The general Contents of the several Chapters.  

CHAP. I.  
THe Introduction to an account of what hath passed from the beginning. The first occasion of the Dispute. The removal of a most wilful and groundless slander. The continuation of the Account. Seventeen Arguments to prove the positive Entity of Sin. Mr. Hick's interesting himself in an other man's Province. His laying the foundation of perfect Libertinism and Rantism: Occasioning 16 other Arguments for the positive Entity of sin. His Title page impertinent to his Book. A brief and general account of his whole Book. A Building made up of nothing, but one long Entry, and three back Doors. Mr. Hick. turns his back upon 14. Arguments at once. Nine more at once he passeth by without Answer. His promise of justifying the Schoolmen doth end in passing them over without regard. His widest back Door of all, at which he makes a most shameful and foul escape from the thing in question.   

CHAP. II.  
THe thing in Question from the beginning was Sin properly so called. How Mr. Hick. was frighted from it, in spite of S. Paul and Dr. Reynolds. Sin a Concrete: and so confessed by Mr. H. a little after he had denied it. The positive Act proved to be the sin of cursing God: Mr. H. (though challenged) not attempting to disprove it. No imaginable difference betwixt the positive Act of lying with Bathsheba, and the Adultery which was the sin; Sin confessed by Dr. Twisse to include a positive Act. The same is confessed by Mr. Whitfield and Mr. Barlee, and (in lucid intervals) by Mr. H. himself: who writes against his own knowledge: and as much against his own interest. 1. By the grossness of his own Falsehood and Tergiversation. 2. by inferring that Virtue hath no positive Being. 3. by arming the Atheist against himself, in proving that God hath no positive Entity. 4. by putting it out of his power to deny he is a Brute, till he renounce his Transition à Thesi ad Hypothesin. The stone at which Mr. Hick. hath not stumbled only, but fallen, past all recovery. The true state of Sin (specified) as it differs from either part of Sin, and from Sinfulness itself. Mr. Hick. gets nothing though we should grant him his Reduplication, but rather looseth all he gapes at. Nay proves himself a Carneadist or Libertine. That Sin is positive and concrete may be concluded from Bonaventure.   

CHAP. III.  
MR. Hick's chief strength from Mr. Barlow's youngest writings. Why first encountered. An account of Dr. Fields Reasons for the positive Entity of sin. The first Reason: the second Reason. The first Reason was never answered. The second answered by Mr. Barlow in his younger years. The Answer showed to be invalid in 5 Respects. 1. by its granting what it pretendeth to deny. 2. by implying a contradiction. 3. by being offensive to pious minds. 4. by offending against the Rules of sense. 5. by the twofold unfitness of the Simile alleged. Gulielmus de Rubione vindicated by way of Reply to Mr. Barlows Answer. Mr. H's answer proved vicious in 3 respects. 1. by such a gross Fallacy, as by which he is proved no man, but either a beast or somewhat worse. 2. by such a shifting from the Question, as proves him convinced of maintaining a gross error. 3. by Blasphemy expressed, and Contradiction employed. A third Reason taken from H. Grotius amounting to the same with jacobus Almain. Mr. Barlows Answer; proved faulty in 7 respects. The words of Capreolus make for me. Mr. Barlows plea out of Hurtadus proved faulty in 6 Respects. The Act of Hating God now, and of sin hereafter, unduly taken to be the same Act. A Denial of Positivity betrays its Owners to deny a Reality in Sin. A fourth Reason out of joannes de Rada. Mr. Barlows answer proved invalid in 4 Respects. A 5 Reason out of Aquinas. A Reply to the Answer of Mr. Barlow, proving it faulty in 3 Respects. Mr. Hick. contradicted by his Masters and himself too. A sixth Reason is taken out of Franciscus de Mayron, and divers others. Not answered by Mr. Barlow. A Seventh Reason alleged by several Authors, partly cited by Dr. Field. Mr. Barlows answer proved faulty in 5 Respects. An eighth Reason gathered out of Fran. Diotallevius: confirmed by a ninth Argument, leading the Adversary (Mr. Hick.) to the most horrid Absurdities to be imagined. A tenth Argument or Reason out of Cardinal Cajetan. A 11th Argument collected from Episcopius. A 12th and 13th Argument urged by Dr. Stern in his Animi Medela. A 14 Argument out of D.R. Baron his Metaph. The arguments backed by the Authority of the most discerning: by the explicit and implicit Conf●ssions of the Adversaries. By ten several Confessions of Mr. Hick. himself.   

CHAP. IU.  
MR. Hicks Distinction of the positive Act of Hating God, and its obliquity, frees him not from making God the Author of sin. Proved first out of his mouth. Secondly by Reason. Thirdly by Authority in conjunction with Reason.   

CHAP. V.  
THe Positive Entity of Sin made undeniable from Scripture. God is the fittest to be Judge of what is properly called Sin. Confirmed by the Concurrence of Ancient Fathers. The confession of Vossius for the greatest part of them. Apollinarius by name, and the greatest part of the Orientals, as Jerome witnesseth. Augustin held the propagation of the soul; and Original sin to be a positive Quality. The several ways of reconciling such Writers unto themselves, who plainly holding the positivity of sin, do sometimes seem to speak against it. An Accident opposed to Res simpliciter. The Manichaean Heresy occasioned some figurative expressions. Substantia expressed by Natura, Aliquid, and Res. Substance called hoc aliquid by all the Followers of Aristotle. All the Fathers grant sin to be an Act, and the work of our Will. How unhappily some men confu●e the Manichees. How the Sinner is able to give the whole being unto his sin. How they that deny it must submit to the Manichees, or worse. The Concurrence of the Learned, both Ancient and Modern, for the Affirmative, That the sinful Agent is the sole Cause of the sinful Act. The power to Act is from God, but the vicious Action is not. Melancthon's distinction of the first Cause sustaining, but not assisting the second in evil Actions.   

CHAP. VI  
AN Account of those things which Mr. Hick. calls his Artificial Arguments. Of twelve things answered, but 4 replied to. A rejoinder to the First: to the Second: to the Third: to the Fourth. His second Argument Artificial. How largely answered. His remarkable Tergiversation without the shadow of a Reply. His offers of Reason Why all things positive are from God, or God himself, and primarily none from Men or Devils. The Infirmities of the First. Of the Second: by which he is proved (out of his mouth) to be the worst of Blasphemers. Of the Third, wherein he makes God the Fountain of the Essence of sin. Of the Fourth, wherein he ascribeth unto God, what God ascribeth unto the Devil. His third Argument Artificial. The positive Importance of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, not considered by Mr. Barlow. The like Importance of Peccatum, proved by Reason and Experience. His Fourth and last Argument. A short account of those Shifts, which pretend to be Answers to some few Arguments. Of Sins being called the works of the Devil. His Concessions and Contradictions about the Habit of Drunkenness His Concessions and Contradictions about the positive filth of Sin. His Concession and Tergiversation concerning Blasphemy and Atheism, etc. His Remarkable Forgery of an Argument in his Adversaries name. His stupendious Impertinence and supposal of Grace in Hell; or Some privation besides All. Of Sins working Concupiscence. Mr. Hicks Answer absurd in 8 Respects. Of the efficient Cause of Sin. Mr Hicks Conviction and Confession in despite of his whole Enterprise. Of Sins being Nothing, if no Effect. Mr. H's vain attempt to prove Knavery to be Nothing. The Cause of punishment. Mr. H's Denial of any positive Damnation, unless he thinks it no punishment to be Damned.    

The Contents of the APPENDIX.  

Touching his Epistle Dedicatory.  
MR. Hickman his Flattery and Condemnation of himself. His Wilful falsehood. His Self contradiction, and Confession of having written against his Conscience. Dr. Hammond vindicated from Mr. H. His several falsifications. His confounding the things, which he once distinguished. The sad Effects of the Calvinian Schism. Mr. H's sauciness and irreverence to Dr. Hammond, added to all his wilful Forgeries. His scurrilous usage of Dr. Taylor, and its occasion, Original sin. The dissatisfaction of Episcopal Divines. Dr. Tailor's error on the right hand, extremely better than the heresy of Presbyterians on the left. Mr. H's preferring Calvin to the 4. Evangelists. The way to stop a Papists mouth. Mr. H's sense of his Scurrility, with his desire never to mend. His new sense of his Carnality. And malignity to the Episcopal Government.   

Touching his Book-like Preface to the Reader.  
THe first Page of his Preface proves all that follows to be but the fruits of his Revenge. His frivolous exception to Heathen Learning. The Heathenish nature of his own. A new Discovery of his stealths, with their aggravation. His mistake of justice for Drollery. The Calvinian Tenet renders all study useless. The King's Declaration forbidding its being preached. No good Arguing from evil custom. The Lord falkland's judgement against Calvin's. Mr. H's Inhuman and slanderous Insinuation. How much worse in Himself, then in any other. It's odiousness shown by a parallel case. His Profession of Cordial Friendship, with its effect. His Sacrilegious Eulogy bestowed on them of his way. The Doctrine of the Church of England Vindicated, with BP. Laud, and BP. Montague. Of Mr. H's Impertinence, implying Presbyterians to be Idolaters. The Archbishop cleared as to what he did against Sherfield. An Impartial Narrative of the case. The Doctrine of St. john concerning Antichrist. Original sin assented to, as taught in the Article of our Church. Loyalty a part of our Religion. An account to the Reader of the Method observed in all that follows. BP. Tunstall, and BP. Hooper out weigh Tyndal, etc. The 17th. Article 2 ways for us. So the Liturgy, and Homilies, and Nowells Catechism, which Mr. H. produceth against himself. It was not the Church of England that put the Calvinists into preferments. ArchbP. Bancroft an Anticalvinist. Dr. Richardson, and Dr. Overal both public professors, and most severe to the Calvinian Doctrines. Dr. Sanderson no less, since his change of judgement. Persecution is not a mark of error in those that suffer it. Mr. Simpson cleared from his censors, as to falling from Grace, and Rom. 7. Barrets Recanting an arrant Fable. BP. Mountagues vindication▪ Mr. H's confession. That men follow Calvin in their younger, and Arminius in their riper years. The causes of it given by D. Sanderson. Of Dr. jackson's Act Questions, and Dr. Frewin's. Of K. james and BP. Montague. K. james his conversion from the Calvinian errors. A change of judgement in some Divines who were sent to Dort. Mr. H's sense of the University, and his unpardonable scurrility of the late Archbishop. Universal Redemption, held as well by K. james, the late Primate of Armagh, and BP. Dav●nant, as by Arminius. Mr. H. grants the whole cause, but does not know it. His opposition to the Ass mbly men's Confession of faith. Mr. H. proved to grant the whole caus● at which he rails, and so to be a Calvinistical-Arminian. Confirmed by Du Moulin, Paraeus, and Dr. Reynolds. Confirmed further by Dr. Twisse. And by the Synod of Dort. His scurrilous usage of Dr. Heylin shows the length of his own ears. His concluding Question childishly fallacious.   

Touching the Remnant of his Book.  
HIs Self condemnation, and Contradiction. The Calvinists draw their own consequences from their Tenet of Decrees. How Mr. H. is their Accuser, and how his own. How as an Hobbist, and an Arminian. How in striving to clear, he condemns himself; and confesseth his making God to be the Author of si●. His own thick darkness touching the darkness in the Creation. How he makes the most real things to be entia rationis. How he obtrudes a new Article of Faith. And makes it a point of omnipotence to be able to do evil. He proves his own sins to be positive entities, by ascribing his rage to his sobriety. His slanderous charge against Mr. Tho. Barlow of Queen's C. in Oxford. His foul Defamation of Dr. Reynolds. His self contradiction, and blind zeal, as to Dr. Martin. The nullity of a Priesthood sinfully given by Presbyterians. The Recantations of some who were so Ordained. Mr. H's disappointment by Dr. sanderson's change of judgement. A vindication of BP. Hall, BP. Morton, BP. Brownrig from Mr. H's slanderous suggestion. The perfect Amity, and Communion of all Episcopal Divines, for all their difference in judgement as to some controverted Doctrines.  
Mr. H's confession of his Ignorance, an Incapacity to understand the points in controversy. His confessed insufficiency to maintain the chief Articles of the Creed. Yet his conceitedness of his parts is not the less. His way to make a Rope of sand whereby to pull in the Puritans. His sinful way of defending Robbery by adding a manifold aggravation. His slanderous insinuation against the two houses of Parliament, to save the credit of the visitors in sinning against their own commission. His disparagement of the visitors in his endeavours to assert them. The work he makes with Hypochondriacal conceits.   

Touching the supreme authority of the Nation.  
HE adds Railing to his Robbery, and treasonably misplaceth the Supreme power of the Nation. The two Houses vindicated from his gross Insinuation, an d the supreme power asserted by 19 Arguments. and by very many more, for which the Reader is entreated to use the works of judge jenkin's.   

Touching the Visitors of Oxford.  
HOw Mr. H. became one of my uncommissioned Receivers. In what sense he may be called my Receiver and usufructuary. How the Assembly-Presbyterians became Abettors of Sacrilege, and Praevaricators with the Bible. Mr H's confounding possession and right, and making no scruple of many Robberies at once. His wilful bitterness sadly reflecting upon the Visitors. And as much on the Lords, and Commons, worst of all upon the King; in excluding whom he beheads the Parliament. How he and his Visitors have acted against the two Houses, and withal against the supreme power of the Nation.   

Touching Mr. H's no skill in Logic.  
A Transition to the discovery of his no skill in Logic. His Insultation added to hide or bear up his Ignorance. Concerning the subject of an Accident. Of Subjectum ultimum & ultimatum. Of an Inseparable Accident. Of the substantial Faculties of the soul. By whom they are held to be its essence. Of his granting what he denies, whilst he denies it: and giving up the whole cause.    

A Postscipt touching some Dealings of Mr. Baxter.  
THe Synagogue of the Libertines fitly applied to Mr. Baxter. Hi● Railing on K. james, and BP. Bancroft, on BP. Andrew's, and Dr. Sanderson, for their justice to the Puritans. His confession of his own wickedness again confessed by himself; though but in part. His prodigious falsifying the Common prayer. His denial of that confession which he confessed a little before. His Perjury and Rebellion proved out of his own words. His playing at Fast & lose with his integrity. His Time-serving and fawning upon his Sovereign Richard. His rejoicing in our late miseries, etc. His charging upon God all the villainies of the times. His Fl●tte●ing m●ntions of Old Oliver, as tenderly careful of Christ's cause. His being Access●ry to the most Parricidial Act, the murder of G●ds anointed. The seven ways of partaking in other men's sins. His being an Incendiary in the war, and Encouraging many thousand to rebel, proved out of his confessions. His denying the Supremacy of the King which yet he allowed the two Cromwell's. His confession that Rebellion is worse than Murder, Adultery, Drunkenness, and the like; and that he may be called a Perfidious Rebel by his consent, if the supremacy was in the King.  
HIs denying the Supremacy of the King, which yet he allowed the two Cromwel's. How he is proved by his concession to be a rebel. His being a Traitor to the two Huses which he had set up above the King, by setting Richard above them, when they disowned him. And by owning Cromwel's junto for a full and free Parliament. He is evinced out of his mouth to have been perjured over and over. His charge against the Lords and commons, and his setting aside the King, more than the houses ever did. His most Notable contradiction about the houses ruling without the King. His New Miscarriage against Grotius and the Episcopal Divines. He is proved to be a Jesuit by as good Logic as he useth. The Jesuits Doctrine of Probability. Popery common to Thomas Goodwin with some noted Presbyterians. Mr. baxter's Puritanism as well in Life, as Doctrine. His additional falsehood. The Original of Puritanism among professors of Christianity. Our English Puritans characterized by Salmasius one of the learnedst of the beyond Sea Protestants. Mr. Baxter declared by Gods Anointed to be a factious, and schismatical person. His double injury to Mr. Dance. His unparallelled bitterness against Episcopacy and our Church 7. ways rebuked. The Conclusion giveth the reason of the whole procedure which Mr. Baxter.   

CHAP. I.  
§. THat the Christian Reader may discern, with his greatest ea●e and convenience in every kind, 
The Introduction ●o an Account of wh●● hath passed from the beginning.  how the whole Case stands betwixt my Adversary, and me; and may be thereby enabled (without the trouble of dive●ting to many pages of several Books, unless as his patience and leisure serves him,) to pas● an exact and a speedy Judgement, upon the matchless Adventures of this fresh Combatant; the unsufficiency of his Performance●, when he pretends to Answer; and his gross Tergiversa●ions, when he declines it; How commonly he aims beside the mark, and affectedly mistakes the Thing in Question; How he is fain to tickle himself, on purpose to get into a laugh●er; and how constantly his laughing doth prove to be in the wrong Place; How well he justifies me, and my whole proceeding, whilst he solemnly contradicts and condemns himself; How he happens to glory and triumph most, when his overthrows fortune to be the greatest; How he calumni●tes the Father's, in their justification, as some in the world have been killed in their own Defence; How without all Cause (but what his Principles and his Displeasu● have shaped out to him) his poisoned Arrows have been sho at my s●lf, and o●hers, which yet have lighted on his own head, and on the heads of his Predecessors, whom he hath vilified in ze●l, and exceedingly disgraced in mere good will; (confessing that to be Blasphemy, which the m●st eminent Presby●erians have taught expressly, and in Print, n●t only by consequence, and in private,) I say, that the Reader may be qualified to take up all at one g●asp, at the least expense that is possible of time or m●ne●▪ I shall prepare him with an Account of what hath passed f●om the beginning; and I shall do it with as much Brevity, as I shall find will consist with Tru●h and Clearness. Nothing shall hinder me in my Dispatch, but the Removal of a most Desperate and Groundless slander, with which our Actor made his entrance into the Theatre, that it might lie as a block in his Readers way. And to preserve the most heedless from stumbling at it, I think it my duty to give them warning.  
§. 2. I had endeavoured in my Notes (which I was forced to make Public) to prevent the danger, 
The first occasion of the Dispute.  by demonstrating the deadliness of certain Doctrines, which the most eminent Presbyterians had preached to us from the Press; [to wit, That All things come to pass by God's appointment and Decree. That men do sin by God's Impulse. That God commandeth to do 
† Maleficium●s ●s the word.  evil, and compelleth obedience to such Commands. That he makes men Transgressor's. That Adultery or Murder is the work of God the Author, etc.] These and multitudes of the like, (which I produced ou● of their writings in my 
* Chap. 3. p. 128. to pag. ●36.  Defence of the Divine philanthropy) were not the issu●s of my Invention, or only horrible Consequences unduly deduced out of their Doctrines, (as M. Hickman hath dared to affirm, in despite of God, and his own conscience, and in a flat contradiction to all men's eyes,) but the words of M. Calvin, and of a man greater than he, Hulderi●us Zuinglius, whose example in Helvetia M. Calvin imitated in France. And how their Followers go before them, in asserting God to be the Author of all the wickedness in the wo●ld, as I have plentifully showed in my Autocatachrisis, so shall I show in a greater measure, if M. Hickman shall adventure to make it needful. Even the worst of those exp●essions are very publicly confessed, by D. Twisse, and M. Barlee, (a●d divers others of their way) to have been written by those Great ones, on whom I charged them. And I speak it to the praise of their ingenu●y; who rather chose to excuse (at lest à tanto) what was so g●ossly derogatory to the glory of God, then to deny what is ●o visible to all men's eyes.  

The Rem●vilt of a most wilful and ground less slander.  But the Rhapsodist adventures beyond all possible expectation; and dares to tell us in effect, That when we read the p●inted works either of Zuinglius, or Calvin, of Borrhaeus, or D. Twisse, There is not any such thing, as we clearly see lying before us; That what we read, is not written; And that the things which I transcribed from some of the Authors whom he admires, were the 
* Epist. Deed▪ pag. 2.  mere chimaeras of my Brain, though near an hundred years printed before I came into the world. Had I fathered mine own fancies upon one or more of his Predecessors, (as M. Hickman hath had the confidence to 
† Epist. Ded. pag. 4.  tell the Lecturers of Brackly) I should not have thought myself fit to live. And by so much the more it becomes my Duty (as well as Interest) to clear the innocence of my dealing in this particular, although I know not how to do it without the ruin of my Accuser in point of fame▪ The shortest way to this end, will be by Noting the very lines, as well as the words, and the page's, and the Editions of the Books, from whence the Reader may take a specimen, whereby to judge of the whole Heap. 
a Zuingl▪ in Serm. de Prov. (edit. Tigur. August. 20. 1530) c. 5. fol. 364. p. 1. lin. 28 etc.  Numen ipsum AUTHOR est ejus quod nobis est INIUSTIA.— Cum Deus Angelum Transgresso●em facit, & hominem, Ipse tamen Transgressor non constituitur, ut qui contra legem non veniat. (ib. lin. 4●.)— 
b Ib. cap. 6. fol. 365. p. 2. lin. 35.  Quod Deus operatur per hominem, Homini vi●io vertitur, non etiam Deo.— 
c Ib. lin. 40.  unum atque Idem Facinus, p●ta Adulterium aut Homicidium, in quantum Dei AUTHORIS, MOTORIS, ac Impulsoris OPUS est, crimen non est.— 
e lb. fol. 366● p 1. lin. 11. Doct. Twisse●efends ●efends the worst of this, vin. gra. l. 2. part 1. p. 37. col. 1. lin. 17.18. edit. Amsterd. 1632.  Mov●t Deus Latronem ad occidendum innoce●tem, etiam ac imparatum ad mortem.— ●mpellit Deus ut occideret. (ib. l. 35.) p●rmitto, Latronem coactum esse ad pe●candum. (ib. l. 18.) Impulsore Deo trucidavit Lat●o. (ib. l. 21.) movet & impellit usque dum ille occisus est. (ib. lin. 25.)  

f Calvin. Inst. (edit. Genev. 1637) lib. 1. c. 18. Sect. 3. fol. 70. p. 1. l. 10.  Satis apertè ostendi, Deum vocari eorum OMNIUM AUTHOREM, quae isti Censores volunt otioso tantùm ejus permissu contingere. Voluntas Dei rerum omnium Cansa— Rep●obos in obsequium c●git. (ib. §. 2. fol. 69. p. 2. lin. 23.26.) Idem Facinus Deo, Satanae, homini assigna●i, absurdum non est. (ib. l. 2. c. 4. f●l. 95. p. 2. lin. 20.)— 
g Lib. 3. ca●. 23. Sect. 6. fol. 324. p. 2. lin. 8, 9▪ from the bottom.  frust●a de Praescientiâ lis movetur, ubi constat Omnia ordinatione potius & Nutu evenire.— Hic (i. e· peccator) justo Illius (i. e. Dei) impulsu agit quod sibi non licet. (l. 1. c. 18. §. 4. fol 71. p. ●. lin. 24.)  

Martin. Borrhaeus stuggardinus in P●oph: Esataeoracula. &c (edit Basil. 1561.) in cap. Esa. p. 259. lin. 50.  Al●ter malorum satan, quam Deus, sive de malo quod in culpâ, sive de co quod in po●na cernitur, loquamur, AV●OR judicatu● esse.  

i D Twiss vin. Gra. l. 2. part. 1. p 36. col. 2. l. 15.  Fatemur Deum non modo ipsius operis peccaminosi, sed & Inten●●onis malae AV●HOREM esse etc.  
I can and will (if r●qui●ed) produce a multitude of the like, not only out of the same, but out of many other Writers, (as well Popish as Presbyterian) who are Enemies ●o Us of the church of England. But this may suffice for my present purpose, and ●or hundreds of the same strain, I refer to my Papers already published; wherein when all my ci●ations were to ex●ct, that ev●n an Enemy accused no more than on, (of which I proved him also a false Accuser,) certainly nothing but M Hickman, nor M. Hic●man himself, without a conscience s●●red with an hot 
† 1 Tim. 4.2.  I●on, could have reported them (even in P ●nt) as the mere chimaeras of my brain. Which being considered and compared both with the candid 
* Necess. Vin. c. 3 p. 13● to p. 136 cited at large in my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. c. 3. p. 180. etc.  Acknowledgements of M. Barlee (whom I must therefore prefer by many degrees, as well in this, as in other points,) and with what I exhibited to the eyes, of the most obstinate Antagonist who will but 
† See self condemnation exemplified▪ c. 3. pag. 140, 141, 142. etc.  look, concludes M. Hickman the worst of sinners, if such a sinner is the worst who is the willful●st. 'Twas from the naughtiness of the Heart, not from the windiness of the Spleen, that so unparallelled a Boldness must needs have risen. Had not the Doctrine which I condemned been worse than those, which yet were Doctrines of 
* 1 Tim. 4.1.  Devils in the Apostle's language or had they not been written as with a Sun beam, for clearness; and for duration, as with the point of a Diamond; wherewith they were registre● by their Authors in an Indelible Record) M. Hickman had been capable of some excuse. But to deny matters of fact after the manner that he hath done, is as if Absalon should have sworn that he never polluted his Father's Concubines, after his having lain with them upon the top of the house, both in the sighed of the Sun, 
2 Sam. 16.22 which compare with 2 Sam. 12.11, 12.  and in the sight of all Israel. It were easy to write a volume (and indeed it is hard, to be so abstemious as not to write one,) in displaying the monstrous Nature of so Incomparable a Slander, as that with which M. Hickman b●gan his Book. Hoping to season, and to imbue his unwary Readers, with such a prejudice of me, and of all my writings, (in the fi●st fou●e pages of his Epistle) as might make them mine enemies at all adventure. But having he●d up this Lantern, whereby his weaker-eyed Brothers may see the dimensions of his threshold, wh●ch he had purposely erected to make them stumble into his house, I forbear to say more, till occasion serves. And hoping he will be warned by this Discovery, to betake himself to better courses, in whatsoever he shall publish f●om this time forwards, I immediately proceed to pursue the ●enor of my Account.  
§. 3. M. Barlee, not denying, 
The continuation ●f the Account.  (such indeed was his ingenuity) but excusing those Doctrines which I had censured▪ (such was his favour to his own party) alleged that Sin h●d not a po●●tive Entity, as having no efficient c●●se; 
See his words and page's cited Philan. c. 3. S. 28 and c. 4. S. 21. pag. Seventeen Arguments to prove the positive Entity of sin.  so that though God is affirmed to have decreed, determined, and willed ●în, yet he is not concluded the Author of it  
§. 4 To this I returned a Confutation, in my Defence of th● Divine Philanthro●ie chap. 3 §. 8 p. 110. to p 116. And again in the same Book, chap. 4 §. 21. p. 20▪ 21 The former consi●ting o● seventeen Arguments drawn out at length, I gave the Reader in Epitome, in the third chapter of my Au ocatachrisis §. 15. p 145. to 147. The latter consisting of 7. particulars, I shall content myself, for the present, 
M Hickman's inte●●essing himself ●n another man's province.  to ref●r my Reader thereunto.  
§. 5. In stead of a reply, w●●●h I expected from Mr. B. I found him assisted by Mr Hickman (whom he was fitter to assist) to hurt his cause with an assertion, that every posit●●e thing is good. 
See the words and pages cited 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ch. 3. p. 150, 15●, etc.  And that the●e is ●ot any medium betwixt God and his creature. And (so by consequence▪) that if sin is something positive, or a positive entity, 〈◊〉 must be ●ne of God's creatures, or God himself.  

His laying the foundation of perfect Libertinism and Ran●ism.  § 6. Hence it was that I endeavoured to convince Mr. H●ckman of his impiety; to show him the blasphemies and absurdities, in which his friend and himself were at once involved; and to ami●ote his Readers, against the venom thus laid before them. My way to do it was by evincing, that sin is positively something; (which is the English of positive entity) whereby 'tis proved that there is something, which though positive and real, cannot be attributed to God, as the maker of it; because he cannot be possibly the maker of sin. And it was high time indeed, to make this matter apparent to him, when I had found a public Preacher delivering this as the scope of the first Article of the Creed, That God is the M●k●r of All Things Real, p. 113. (cited and confuted in my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 167.) Insomuch that if sin is something Real, it is a part of his 
† Note M. H. ascribes every real Being to the first cause producing it, p. 95, 96.  ●reed, to believe that God is the Maker of it. And if it is nothing but a word, (in his opinion,) then will he say when he hath sinned, (with Solom●ns 
* Prov. 30.20.  Who●e,) That he hath done just nothing. And for nothing, it is impossible, that God should sentence his Creatures to Fire and Brimstone.  
§ 7. Now to the Arguments aforesaid, which were no f●wer than seventeen, 

Occasioning 16 other Arguments for the positive entity of sin.  
See the Arguments at large in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. c. 3. p. 148. to p. 166.   I also added some sixteen more, whereby to illustrate, as well as prove, ●he positive Entity of sin. As first from the words of S. james, L●st having conceived bringeth forth sin, jam. 1.15. which h●ving explained, I thence inferred, That Sin is the production of man's own will, seduced by lust, and consem●ng to it, and rendered evil by so consenting. Second●y from the expressions of the eminentest Authors by him asserted, who teach that God doth effic●re peccata, and not only Will, but work Sin, and that he hath a hand in effecting sin. Those very Blasphemies implying a positive entity of sin. 3. From Cain's killing Abel, and David's lying with Bathshebah, which being actions, are positive en●ities; and yet are ●ins too, as being a murder and an adultery. 4 From experience and the confession of the Adversary, that what is privative of one thing, is also positive of another. 5. From the necessity of its being complexum quid, confessed also by M. Hickman. 6. From the meaning of Bonum Metaphysicum, as comprehending res, & aliquid; and as signifying no more, then ens in ordine ad appelitum; whereas it is only the moral good, which is opposed to the thing in Question. 7. From the positive entity of a Lie, which is therefore verum, as much as bonum Metaphysicum, and yet hath no more of real goodness, then of real truth in it. 8. From the positive being of Satan's pride, and of Petronius his Inventions, together with those of the Presbyterians. 9 From the difference or distinction betwixt a negative and positive Atheism. 10. From sins being divided into actual and habitual 11. From the positive filthiness of flesh and spirit, of which a man is deprived, when God by his grace is pleased to cleanse him. 12. From the Importance of the word privative, which may be predicated of sinners, as well as of sins. 13. To harden our own hearts, to consent unto Temptations, and to destroy ourselves by such consent, are granted by all to be positive things. 14. Sin is spoken of as such, throughout the Scriptures. 15. It is confessed by M. Hickman, and by the men of his way, that sin is a compound which doth consist of a material and formal part, whereof the one being granted to be a positive entity, both together cannot be less. 16. Betwixt the act of ha●ing God, and the sin of hating God, which is the act of ha●ing God, there cannot he the least difference, because itself cannot be different from itself: for that would imply the very grossest of Contradictions. ☜ But the A●t of hating God is confessed by Master Hickman to be a positive entity. And so he yields the whole Cause, in spite of all his endeavours to make resistance.  
§. 8. But yet he endeavours a Resistance, as far as a Title-page can do it, 
M. Hick's Title page is impertinent to hi● Book.  which doth not really belong to any book in all the world, much ●ess to tha● which he unhappily called his. For it p●etends [a justification of the Father's and Schoolmen from their being self condemned for denying the positivity of sin. And yet it p●etends to be an Answer to so much of my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as doth relate to the fo●esaid opinion.] H●re are several things, which prove him wilful in his Impostures. For well he knew, I had not written against the Fathers or Schoolmen; much less against them as self-condemned; much less yet for denying the positivity of sin. I writ indeed against Himself and M. Hobbs; but they a●e hardly so much as sons, much less Fathers of the Church. And though I writ against others also, yet neither of th●m was a Schoolman, much less a Father. I writ against them as self-condemned, because I proved out of their writings that they asserted the very Doctrines, which 
* See Introduct. p. 7. and compare it with c. 3. p. 140.141, 142.  themselves had confessed to be blasphemous. So that unless our justificator is thicker of sense and understanding then all men else, (which his perusal of M. Mo●●ice forbids his Readers believe) his prevaric●●ions must needs be wilful.  
§. 9 After the promises of his portal, I find his building is nothing else, 
A brief and general account of M. Hickmans' whole book.  but a very long Ent y, and three Back-doors. As if the former were intended ●or the Amusing of his Readers, whilst the latter might serve for his own escape. His Entry hath such an unseemly length, that little less than a whole hour will serve hi● Readers to Travel through. And if their patience will but serve them, as far as the End of so long a passage, (in hope at last to meet with something whereby to disprove the positivity of sin,) they will be able to find nothing, besides the mentioned Back doors, at which the F●●●h●r e●capes from the Thing in Question. As if he were conscious to himself of having rashly undertaken to prove a dangerous falsehood, (to wit) that sin hath no positive being, he spends almost his whole book upon a multitude of subjects b sides the purpose; rather huddling up a Volume from whatsoever he thought pretty, and durst purloin from some English Authors, then taking the ●ou●age to treat of that, to which his Title-page confesseth he stands obliged. Observe (good Reader) the strangest Answerer of Books, that in all thy life thou hast read or heard of.  
§. 10. His Volume consists of 175. pages. 65. of these are spent in an Epistle, and Preface to all that follows, 
A Building made up of nothing, but one long entry, and 3 Back doors.  wherein there is not one syllable so much as offering to disprove the positivity of sin. Then there begins a fresh reckoning up of pages. And though he takes upon him again, (as in his Title-page he had done) to prove that sin hath not a positive Being, yet he immediately flies out (for 48. pages together) talking of Bishops and Presbyteries and other subjects of Evasion, (I will not say in a phrenetick, but in a very idle manner,) before his misgiving heart serves him to make a show of some proof of the Thing in Question. And thus he hath made an easy shift to fill up two parts of three of his Tedious Rhapsody, with more than an hundred such fragments and ends of stuff, as serve to prove nothing at all, besides his fearfulness to discourse of the matter in hand, and his gift of impertinence above the rest of mankind, and also the lightness of his fingers to supply the heaviness of his invention. For after 113 pages (65 being of that which he calls his Preface, and 48 of that which he calls his Book,) I find him using these words. [Having removed the Rubbish, we may now come at the Question.] Yet goes he not many steps farther, (in a pretended preparation to his design) when strait he digresseth to 
* Beshrew M. Barlee. p. 60.  curse M. Barlee, to talk of the Calvinists, and Arminians, (by the old assistance of M. Prin,) and to speak for Puritans by such an admirable Impertinence, that he is fain at last to use these words— [The Reader will pardon me (who can scarce pardon myself) for this excursion. 
Pag. 67. ] yet no sooner doth he confess than he commits the same trespass, even by making a new excursion to my dispute with Doctor Reynolds, to a Fable of Aesop, and to a gross falsification of the Learned and Reverend D. Hammond, (which in due time and place I shall demonstrate to be such in a high Degree.) At last indeed he speaks something, les● impertinent then before, although impertinent also, as shall be showed. Insomuch as his Readers may well admire; how he could venture to call his Book by so extravagant a Title, as did least of all relate to the subject matter of his Discourse, unless he thought that his Readers would look no farther.  
§. 11. But having showed his long Entry, I conceive it high time that I discover his Back-doors, 
M. H. turns his back upon 14 Arguments at once.  at which he maketh his foul escapes from the principal Duties Incumbent on him. First, when it lies upon him to answer to my 17 Arguments, (of which he confesseth he took some notice, p. 100) He talks a little to three of them, (for I cannot say truly, he answers one,) and having hastily done that, he escapes me thus.— [As to the rest of his Arguments (which were no fewer than 14.) they are partly such as I have met with before, and partly such, as others upon whose expressions they are grounded, are more concerned in than myself. p. 105.] This I call a Back door, at which he makes an escape which I say is foul; because he had boasted in his Title-page, his having Answered so much, as doth relate to the opinion of sin's positive entity. And yet he sneaks from those Arguments, by which that opinion was clearly proved; alleging no reasons for it, but what are pretended by every sneaker. He thought it a shame for him to say, [I have not any thing like an answer to the 14. Arguments remaining] And therefore worded the matter thus, [they are partly such as before I met with, and they concern not me so much as others.]  
§. 12. Next when it lies upon him to answer the 16 Arguments besides, 
Nine more at once he passeth by without answer.  (of which I lately made mention § 7.) he does not so much as make a show of giving answer to more than seven, (of which anon I shall take due notice,) but sneaks (without leave) from the other Nine: insomuch that his Readers might have believed there were no more than those seven, if they had not now met with my Information. This was therefore an evasion without a Postern.  
§ 13. But how does he justify the Schoolmen, 
His promise ●n justifying the School men doth end in posting them over without regard.  of which his Title-page made a boast? truly much after the rate of his other dealings. For he passeth them all by, with the common shift of a Paralipsis, [I might strengthen my opinion from the Schoolmen, p. 59] without producing the words of so much as one. And is not this a Backdoor, at which to make a most shameful and foul escape? There is not a Boy in the Grammar-school, but may dispute at this rate, without the looking into such Authors, as M. Morice and M. Prinn, from whom I thought Master Hickman had learned more wit, than to compile a whole Book in Tergiversation to his Title. And yet the foulest of his dealings is that which follows in my account. For  
§. 14. When at last he undertakes to handle the Question under debate (after his having been impertinent throughout one hundred and thirteen pages) he affirms the Question to be this, Whether moral evil, as such, 
His widest Backdoor of all, at which he makes a most shameful and foul escape from the thing in Question.  be a privation. p. 48. Then (saith he) we understand by the particle [as] sin considered abstractly from that either act, habit, or faculty, in which it is, and to which it gives denomination. pag. 49.  
This is the widest Backdoor of all, at which he studiously shifts from the thing in Question; in which because he makes use of as gross a falsehood as can be named, I am sorry I cannot be less severe, than to prove him a deliberate and wilful sinner. Had there been any such Question in all my Book, (to the least part of which he at least pretended to give an Answer, he would gladly have cited my words and pages. And so his fault had been sufficient, if he had only not known that I had said any such Thing; But since I can prove that he knew the contrary, his crime is infinitely greater, and can argue no less than a seared conscience. Here than it is, that I must show (in mine own Defence,) how much he hath written against his own light, and how much against his own Interest; as having put it in my power, (by an argument ad hominem) to prove M. Hickman an arrant brute Beast; rather a Hors● or a Mule, then either a Man or a Woman▪ which I shall prove so convincingly merely by using his own Logic, as he shall not be able to deny it, without renouncing his whole cause. Again he hath written against his Interest, as having granted implicitly, what he explicitly denyeth; and implicitly denying, what he had several times granted in plainest Terms: to wit, that the Question to be discussed, is, Whether the thing which is called sin hath a positive Being, or no positive Being. Not how, or by what means, or in respect of what, it hath such a Being. Not reduplicatiuè, whether The sin of hating God, quatenus a sin, hath a positive Being; or whether quatenus an action; (for to hate God is confessed to be at once a sin, and an action too,) But whether the sin of hating God (which is an action as well as a sin) hath a positive being, yea, or no. To demonstrate that this is the Thing in Question, and ever was from the beginning of all our Difference, And then to demonstrate the sad estate which M. Hickman hath put himself into by his Reduplication, (his foisting in the word [as] against all dictates of sense and reason, and the whole procedure of our Debate) will so open his Eye●, as to stop his mouth too. And therefore this shall be the Theme o● a second Chapter.   

CHAP. II.  

The thing in Question from the beginning, was sin properly so called. See Diu. Phil. c. 3. p. 110. etc. and c. 4. p. 42, 43.  §. 1. I Made it appear from the beginning of my Discourse on this subject, that though according to the propriety of Logic speech, a sin and a sinful act do sound as the Abstract and the Concrete, yet so far do they differ from other Conjugates, as to admit of different Predications. For though we cannot say, a whited wall is whiteness, or that whiteness is a whited wall; yet we may say very truly, that a sinful Act may be a sin, and a sin m●y be a sinful act. For cain's killing Abel, was a sinful act, and therefore a sin, because a murder. Whether we say it is a sin, or a sinful 
* Note that D. Field calls sin of commission an evil Act, and also saith 'tis merely positive: as shall be showed c. 3. Sect. 2.  act, to hate God, it matters not amongst men; and all will say it comes to one, in the account of God, as well as in the stile of his holy Penmen, with whom there is nothing more common, then for sinful Acts to be called sins. Hence I affirmed that sin itself is a Concrete, in respect of sinfulness, which is its Abstract. Of which opinion was D. Reynolds, when he entitled one of his Books, The sinfulness of Sin. And he had great reason for it, when he had found S. Paul speaking, of 
* Rome 7.13.  sins being made exceeding sinful.  
§. 2. But M. Hick. seeing clearly, 
How M. Hick. was frighted from it, in spite of S. Paul and D. Reynolds.  that if any sin were granted to b● a concrete, and the same with the sinful act, it must be also granted to have a positive Entity or being, (and prove him guilty of that Blasphemy, That it must needs be God's creature, or God himself,) was so scared out of his wits, or at least out of his Conscience, as to say that sinfulness is synonymous with sin, and that sin is so perfectly an Abstract, that if he conceive not of it as an Abstract, he cannot conceive of it as sin. p. 53, 54. without regard to S. Paul Rom. 7.13. and then much less to D. Reynolds, whom he inferreth to have written touching the sin of sin, or the sinfulness of sinfulness, supposing both to be synonymous, and sin so perfectly an abstract, as hath been said. Nay without any regard to his blessed self, when he saith that sin doth not siginfie abstractly. p. 100  
§. 3. But though sin is an Abstract in respect of the sinner, 
Sin a concrete▪ and so confessed by Master Hickman a little after he had denied it.  (viz. Abstractum physicum) yet in respect of sinfulness (which is abstractum metaphysicum) all will confess it to be a concrete, (M. H. alone being excepted in his intemperate Fits, who yet in Times of sobriety will 
* Note, he confesseth, that the hating of God is Complexum Quid. p. 95. that it hath a material an formal part. pag. 94. that it is an Action, ibid.  confess what I would have him,) and such I proved it to be, by proving an Identity, betwixt the sin, and the sinful Act. For the transgression of the Law is confessedly an Act: and sin (by definition) is the Transgression of the Law. Nor will the Adversary deny, that the Act of sinning is a sinful Act. For being a Transgression, it must needs be an Act, and being such an act, it must needs be sinful. The act of consenting to a Temptation, which is sin in its bir●h, is punctum indivisibile, and hath not any Dimensions to make it capable of a Division; and so it must needs be the sin of consenting to the Temptation, as well as it is the sinful act.  

The positive act proved to be the sin of cursing God. Master Hickman (though challenged) not attempting to disprove it. See 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. chap. 1. p. 11, 12.  §. 4. Farther yet, when in pursuit of the Controversy, it lay upon me to show, how the determination of a man's will to the forbidden object, was equally a sin, and a positive being; and what an Impiety it would be to entitle God to so foul a thing; I made a challenge to M. Hickman (as well as others,) to give an instance in some particular, how the act and the obliquity might so be severed or distinguished, as he might say which is Go●'s part, and which is Satan's. When a man doth curse God, (Leu. 24.15.) which is the Act of that sin? and which is the sin, that is not the Act? or which is the obliquity of the act o that sin? M. Hickman did not attempt an Answer; and sure I am he was not able. For if the cursing of God is a whole sin, it is an act of sin, or an obliquity of an Act, or both together, and that either separably, or inseparably. 1. if only an Act, where then is the obliquity? 2. if only an obliquity of an Act, where is the Act? (for all the whole sin is the cursing of God, neither more, nor less, 3. if both together, and separably, let him make that separation. 4. if both are inseparably together, he must confess, that sin hath a positive being, and that himself hath made God to be the Author of sin.  

No imaginable difference betwixt the positive act of lying with Bathsheba, and the Adultery which was the sin.  §. 5. In a word, I made appear, what I meant by the word sin, by the instances which I brought whereby to prove it the same with the sinful act. There being no difference (no not so much as in imagination) between David's lying with Bathsheba, and his Adultery, or between his Adultery, and his sin. (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 82.) His lying with Bathsheba was his action, which action was his sin, (p. 84.) And again, I discern no difference between the same evil action, and itself; as between David's lying with Bathsheba, and his Adultery. (ibid.) Nor indeed was it possible that I should have spoken any otherwise, when the Thing spoken of was not half of sin, but the whole; not the formal part, (as they phrase it) but the very complexum, as M. H. himself calls it, (p. 95.) For actual sin of commission cannot otherwise be sin, than as it is an act of sinning; nor an act of sinning any otherwise, then as it is a sinful Act.  
§. 6. That this was meant in our Dispute, I have largely proved. And that we ought to mean this, 
Sin confessed by D. Twisse to include a positive Act. Vind. Gr. l. 2. par. 1. 〈…〉 p. 155.  I prove by the judgement of D. Twisse, who saith, that Fornication denoteth sin, not only according to its Formality, as it is sin, but also according to its materiality, as it is an Act. His words in Latin are justly these. Fornicatio notat peccatum, non tantùm secundum Formale ejus quà peccatum est, sed & secundum materiale ejus, quà actus est. Now because M. Hickman doth boast so much of D. Twisse, as one whom none durst undertake in the Arminian Controversies (p. 106.) I will farther insist upon his Authority, whereby to prove the true Importance, and together with that, the positive entity of sin; which that Doctor doth assert by unavoidable Implication, whilst he saith that [
* Omne peccatum definite consideratum & secundum certam speciem, duo Com. plectitur; Actum Naturalem,— & Actus Turpitudinem, sive cum lege Dei Repugnantiam. E. G. Furtum Omne duo notat, viz. actum surripiendi res alienas, & actus hujus deformitatem, quatenus lege divin● nobis interdici●ur etc. Vin. Gra. l. 2. part. 1· p. 155.  All sin, being definitely considered, and according to its certain species, doth include two things, the natural act, and the turpitude of the Act, or its repugnance with the Law of God. He gives his instance in the sin of theft, which he affirms to signify, as well the A●t of taking away what is another's, as the deformity of the Act, in as much as God hath said, th●u shalt not steal. The like instances he gives in the sins of Murder and Adultery; which as it slatly contradicts what is said by M. Hick. of sins being a mere abstract, and the same with sinfulness, (pag. 53, 54.) so it proves ●e whole sin to have a positive entity, by ascribing no less to a part of sin. It being impossible for a part to have more of entity than the whole. And if M. Hickman shall dare to say, that a Repugnance to the Law may be theft, without stealing; or that stealing may be the sin of theft, without a repugnance to the law (so as one part of sin may be concluded to be a sin,) I forbear to say what will follow, that he may not accuse me of bitter Language.  
§. 7. No, 'tis so absolutely imp●ssible, (as implying a contradiction) that a man should be guilty of a Repugnance to any Law, 
The same is confessed by M. Whit. and M. B. and (i● lucid Intervals) by M. Hickm. himself.  without the doing of that thing which the law forbids; And by consequence so impossible, that that alone should be the sin, which is affirmed by D. Twisse to be but the formal part of it; That as M. Whitfield and M. Barlee do acknowledge a material, and ●orm●ll part, making up one and the same sin, so M. Hickman doth say as much, when the necessity of his affairs compels him to it (p. 94, 95.) how contradictory soever to what he had said a little before (p. 53, 54.) when brought to a distress of another Nature. And accordingly in his Title-page, he held us in hand that he would prove, there cannot be any positivity of sin, (not of the formal part of sin.) Again at the end of his long Preface, when he pretends (at least) to come to the Thing in Question, he sets down his Thesis in these express words,  

Who writes against his own knowledge. Look forwards on c. 6. Sect. 14, & 15.  ☞ That sin hath not a Positive Being, pag. 1. No mention hitherto of any reduplication, sin as sin, or sin abstractly considered from act, or habit. And indeed he knew it to be impossible, to consider the sin of hating God, abstractly from the act or habit, since the Act of hating God, is the sin, as well as the Act; and the habitual hatred of God, is as well the sin, as the habit. He confesseth it an action to hate God, and an action so intrinsically and essentially evil, because evil antecedently to any positive Law, and evil ex genere & objecto, that no circumstance can make it lawful. p. 94. And as impossible as it is, to consider the same thing abstractly from itself, so impossible it must be, to consider the sin of hating God, abstractly from the Act of hating God. Thus M. Hickman hath written against his own light. But (which will grieve him most of all)  
§. 8. He hath also written against his Interest. For first he confesseth (by the means of his prevarication) what he so stomachfully denied, 
And as much against his own interest.  and vainly pretended to refute too, to wit, That sin hath a positive being. 
I. By the grossness of his falsehood and Tergiversation.  I say he confesseth it in equivalence, and that much more to his disadvantage, then if he had said it in downright Terms. For why should he shamefully fall away from his first Engagement, which was to prove that sin hath no positive being, (p. 1.) but that he was inwardly convinced, he had undertaken a thing impossible? If he did not sin for sins sake, nor think it a credit to be caught in the Act of Falsehood, why should he publish so gross a Forgery, as he knew would be detected by every Reader, who should but thoroughly peruse either his book, or mine, but that he thought it would pain him less, to lie in the frying pan, than the Fire? If sin (in his opinion) hath no positive Being in any sense, or respect, (whether as a Quality, or as an Action, or as complexum quid, made up of a material and formal part,) why at last will he needs consider it, as merely abstracted from Act, or habit, and not without such abstraction? when yet it is impossible that the hating of God should be so considered? Let him show how that sin can be abstracted from that act which is that sin, or how it can be considered as so abstracted; or else let him confess, he dares not dispute of the thing in Question, unless he may consider it, as it is impossible to be considered; which is not to dispute of the thing in Question, but by an unmanlike Tergiversation to acknowledge the prevalence of the Truth, at the very same time that he reviles it.  

II. By inferring that virtue hath no positive being.  §. 9 Again he hath opened a wide Gate to the greatest absurdities in the world, in proving that sin hath no positive Being, because it hath none as abstractly considered from act, or habit. For according to this Logic, one may prove that nothing hath a positive Being. No virtue (we may be sure) as well as no vice. For (to clear it by an example) as the act or habit of hating God, hath no positive being, abstracted from the act, or habit; so the act or habit of loving God, hath no positive being, abstracted from the act, or habit. He confesseth it is an action, to hate God; and that the hatred of God is a quality, he will not deny. Nor can ●e possibly say more for the positive being of loving God, or of the love which we have of God, which can have no being at all (neither positive nor privative) if abstracted from all either act or habit, that is, from itself.  

III▪ By arming the Atheist against himself, in proving that God hath no positive Entity.  §. 10. If M. Hickman's method were allowable, he would strengthen the hands, as of all evil doers, so of the Atheist in particular; who may prove to M. Hickman (though not to any man else) That God himself hath no positive entity (which is as much as to say, there is no God,) as abstractly considered from his Existence, or from all manner of substance, corporeal, and incorporeal. For the sin of hating God, without the act of hating God (which is the sin) is simply nothing in the world. And sure it cannot be a Question, whether simply-nothing hath a positive being. Yet this is the best that can be made of M. Hickman's skill in stating Questions.  

IV. By putting it out of his power to deny he is a Brute, till he renounce his transition ● these ad Hypo●hesin.  §. 11. Or admit a sin can be something, abstracted from all manner of 〈◊〉 or habit: yet the Question still would be, whether such sin hath a positive being, yea, or nay, in any respect whatsoever. Not whether it hath it reduplicatiuè, as sin; that is so wretched a Transition à Thesi ad Hypothesin, as by which I will prove that Master Hickman is a Brute. For sure the Animal M. Hickman cannot possibly be a man, reduplicatiuè, as an Animal; (for then every Animal would be a man as well as he) I say he cannot be a man, as abstractly considered from the principle of reason; And being not a man, but yet an Animal, he must needs be a Brute, by all confessions. But M. Hickman will say, The Question is, whether he is a man, or no. Not, whether he is such, with the restrictive particle [as] joined to Animal. And I say the very same touching the business we have in hand. The Question is, Whether sin hath a positive being (witness his own mouth, p. 1.) not with any restrictive [as] in conjunction with an abstraction from act or habit. If M. Hickman be granted to be a man, it will be a new Question, how he comes by his manhood, whether from his material or formal part, which yet (by the way) are both essentials of his Being. And sin being granted to have a positive being, it matters not how, or 
* Note, it cannot be here meant, whether it hath it from God or man, it being Blasphemy to say it can be from God, which is the crime in M. H. I now oppose.  from whence it hath it, whether from its material or formal part, (to use the words of D. Twisse) which are both essentials of its Being what it is, and no more can it exist without the one, than the other. But if the word [as] must needs be used, than sin as synonymous with sinful act, hath been ever the subject of my Discourse, as by all my Instances and proofs may very sufficiently appear. And whether sin hath a positive being, as sin, or as an action, or as a quality, (for 'tis confessed that to hate God, is a sin, and an action, as that the hatred of God, is a sin, and a quality,) is a thing so easy to be determined, that 'tis not worthy of a Dispute. But if M. H. will needs dispute it, let him fairly confess, 'tis a second Question; in the doing of which, he must yield the first.  
§. 12. From all this it follows, 
The stone at which M. H. hath not stumbled only, but fallen, past all recovery.  That when it is said by M. Hickman, (p. 49.) my not distinguishing betwixt the sinful act, and the sin of the act, is the stone at which I have all along stumbled; he does but dissemble the sense he hath of his unhappyness, and by playing the Brave, make the best of so bad a matter. For he knew very exactly, that I had proved an Identity betwixt the sin of killing Abel, which was the act of murder, and the act of killing him, which was the sin of murder. That the act of hating God is the sin of hating him, and ● converso. And so I must thank M. Hickman for whipping himself thus upon another man's back. For this apparently is the stone, at which he hath stumbled, and fallen headlong, and bruised himself as shall be showed his making a distinction without a difference. As, betwixt the act of hating God, which is granted to be the sin, and the sin of that act, which is granted to be that very act of hating God. For to hate God is ¹ a sin, ² a whole sin, and ³ nothing but a sin: to which three clauses I challenge M. Hickman to make some Answer. That, if he thinks there is something in hating God, which is not sin, but very good, as being one of God's Creatures, (which he sufficiently intimates, by distinguishing the sin of the act, from the sinful act, as if the very act of hating God were not a sin,) the world may know him to be a Libertine, without the protection of his disguise. Had he foreseen that challenge, to which I called for his Answer, in my Letter to Doctor Heylin, (pag. 266.) I had not met with an occasion for this last Section.  
§. 13. But because he seems in this place to use the word sin for sinfulness; 
The true state of sin (specified) as it differs from either part of sin, and from sinfulness itself.  I will first entreat him to remember, how sin is taken in holy Scripture, by D. Twisse, by M. Whitf. by M. Barlee, and by himself, (as I have showed in this chapter, §. 1.6.7.) Next I will help him to understand, what is the sinfulness of sin, and wherein it lies.  
It is granted (I think) by 
* See Aquinas in particular, 1.2 quaest. 75. art. 1. & art. 2.  all, that sin is that whole or complexum, which doth consist of two parts, material, and formal, so as neither part singly can either be, or be conceived to be a sin. And it is granted (I think) by all, that the material Part of sin is positive; it being an action, or quality, (and when a quality) an act, or habit, as hath been showed. The only privative Part of sin (mark the emphasis which lies on Part) is the defection from the Rule, which yet is founded in a positive act, of which the other is only a superadded relation, unavoidably resulting by the positive acts application to the Rule. Thus I think we are to speak, if we may rightfully distinguish the two parts of sin, which D. Field will not allow, nor indeed is it possible, so to distinguish the one from the other, as to entitle God to the one without the other; and that I suppose is the Doctor's meaning. But now for the abstract of this concretum, it is that which resulteth from both united▪ For after the manner that inequality doth arise from the Relation of a Bicubitum to a cubit, so the sinfulness of a sin (to wit of the action of hating God, or of Cain's killing Abel,) doth arise by resultance from these two things, [God's forbidding it to be done, and its being done when thus forbidden.] so then. The positive action of hating God, (as the material part) which carries with it a defection from the rule of God's Law, (as the formal part) is that complexum or whole sin, which I have proved and shall prove to have a positive being. The mere defection from the rule, or 
* Note, that D. Field hath affirmed this very repugnance to be a positive thing. l. 3 c. 23. p. 120. and hath said that sins are positive acts (p▪ 119.) not obliquities of the acts.  repugnance to it, (without the action of hating God) is not the sin, but the formal part only. The mere action of hating God (without its defection from the rule, which for once I will suppose, docendi gratiâ,) would not be the very sin, but the material part only. But the sin (as I said) is both united, viz. The action of hating God in a repugnance to, or defection from the rule of God's law: whereas the sinfulness of this sin, (that is, the abstract of this concrete) is not both parts united, (for then it would be concrete, and so Identical with sin) but that which resulteth from both united. As the humanity is not the man made up of a body, and a rational soul, (any more than the man is either of the two▪ without the other,) but that which only resulteth from both united, whereas the man is both united.  
§. 14. But now (for a while) let us admit, 
M. Hickman gets nothing though we should grant him his Reduplication, but rather looseth all he g●pes at.  that the Question were of moral evil, as such. It would then be comprehensive of all moral evil. For à qua●enus ad omne valet consequentia, by his own confession p. 85. what than mean's he by a privation, when he saith that sin or moral evil, as such, is a privation? unless he means a mere privation, and nothing else, he speaks not against the positivity of sin; which even they who do assert, do also hold there is a want of such a rectitude as is due; but they say there is something besides that want. As in walking to kill a neighbour, there is something positive, besides the want of a good end, to which the walking should be directed. And if any thing could be due to the hating of God, to make it good, (as nothing can be) there would be an action, besides the want of that due, as M. Hickman confesseth p 94. Nay in saying that that action is essentially evil, (ibid.) he confesseth the very action to be the sin. And taking sin in the right sense for complexum quid, (as he confesseth (p. 95.) we may allow him his own way of stating the Question to his undoing.  

Nay proves himself a Carneadist or Libertine.  §. 15. Again he is ruined by his preservative, as may appear by this Dilemma. Does he think that privation is a thing real, or only nominal? something, or nothing? If nothing, then for M. Hickman to filch and plunder, is but a sin, and therefore nothing in his opinion, and so is a Carneadist. If something, than he thinks it God's Creature, or not his creature. If his creature, than he thinks that God is the Author of sin; and so he must think that sin is good, or not good; if he thinks it to be good; he will scruple to commit it. If not good, he thinks that God can create what is peculiar to the Devil, (as Master Calvin inferreth against the Libertines.) If he thinks it not God's Creature, though something real, than he must eat up his former saying, viz. That it belongs to the universality of the first cause, to produce every Real Being. pag. 95.  
§. 16. I shall conclude this Chapter with the Concession of Bonaventure; 
That sin is positive and concrete may be concluded from Bonaventure, in lib. 2. sent. didst 32. quaest. 1.  that the sin of Concupiscence imports two things, to wit an appetite, and an excess of that appetite. In which excess he confesseth there seems to be a Position, though he endeavours by a simile (which does not run upon all its feet) to make it seem a privation rather. Which however it may infer, yet it cannot wholly be, without implying a contradiction. And if either of the two is something positive (the act of the appetite itself, or the excess in the act, 
Concupiscentia duo dicit (secundum id quod est) Dicit enim appetitum; dicit nihilominus in actu, appetitus excessum. etc. ●pud Voss. Pel. Hist. p. 217. ) sure that which consisteth of both together, (I mean concupiscence,) cannot be less, then either of them.   

CHAP. III.  
§. 1. HAving hitherto cleared, 
Mr. H.'s chief strength from Mr. Barlows youngest writings. Why first encountered.  and (in the doing of that) accidentally proved the thing in question, I might immediately proceed to show the littleness of the Tricks in which our Gamester is wont to deal; but that I think it incumbent on me to effect that first which is most material, and of which most Readers do stand in the greatest expectation; to wit the proving by such convincing and cogent Arguments, that sin (which is properly so called) hath a positive Being, as to put a conclusion to the whole Controversy; and that by enabling the weakest Reader, to stop the mouth of the strongest that shall oppose him. And because I cannot but have observed (what hath also been observed by many others) that whatsoever is thought strong in Mr. H.'s Rhapsody (by such as are partial to his Adventure) he hath taken after his manner, (that is dishonestly, without the citing his Author so much as once, to whom he was beholding extremely often,) from an Exercitation de naturâ mali, which had been penned and printed more than 20. years ago by my very good Friend Mr. THOMAS BARLOW, who (I conceive) at that time could be but n wly Master of Arts, (though now the learned and Reverend Provost of Queen's College,) I shall begin with that instance, of which ● verily believed I had been the first urger, ' ●●ll since I found it in Dr. Field, and in other writers of great Repute, whom I have now consulted on this occa●●on. I m●an that, which is drawn from the Sin of hating God, (and by consequence from all other sins of commission, whereof this one is the fittest Instance,) to which Mr. Hickman pretends an answer (though without the will, and consent, yet) by the assistance of Mr. BARLOW. The insufficiency of the Answer I intent to show by my Reply. Which being done, I shall submit it to the consideration of Mr. Barlow; That if he approves of my Reply, he may may make me glad with the knowledge of it; and that if he doth not, he may show me the reason of his dislike. I suppose his judgement may now be altered, from what it was in his younger years. If not, I shall desire to discuss the matter rather with Him, who is able to tie me the hardest kno●s, and to show me my Error in case I err, then to contend with ●uch a Trifler as Mr. Hickman appears to be, who is fitter to betray then maintain his Cause.  

An account of Dr. Fields Reasons for the positive entity of sin. l. 3. of the Church. ch. 23. Edit. 2. p. 119.120.  §. 2. That the sin of hating God is nothing more than a sin, and that it hath a positive being, I have so often proved (mine own way) in my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (besides what I have done in my Letter to Dr. Heylin, and in the sections of the foregoing Chapter,) that I suppose it high time, to show how others have proved it, as well as I. Both that the greatness of their Authority may help prevail with some men to accept of reason, and that I may take an opportunity to speak mine own sense in their Vindication.  
I will the rather begin with Dr. Field, because He, 
* Doctu●, siquls alius, Ecclesiae nostrae scriptor Richardus Field Exer. 2. p. 71. Edit. 2.  if any other, (saith Mr. BARLOW himself who doth oppose him) was a learned Writer of our own Church, which he hath studiously defended against the Papis●s. First 'tis his peremptory assertion, That the sin of Commission, which is the doing of that the creature is bound not to do, is merely positive.  
HIs first Reason for it is this. As the affirmative part of God's Law is broken, 
The first Reason.  by the not putting that in being, which it requireth, so the negative is violated precisely, by putting that in being, which it would not have to be.  
Again he saith a little after, That sin of commission is an evil act; and that there are some evil Acts, which are not evil ex fine & Circumstantiis, but ex genere & objecto, which are therefore denominated evil (not by 
* Note, that he who commits such sins, i● denominated evil in part by passive denomination, (for that he wonteth that orderly disposition which should be in himself) though chiefly indeed by active denomination etc.  passive denomination, as if they wanted some Circumstances, that should make them good, but) by active denomination, because no Circumstances can make them good, and because by way of contrariety they deprive the sinner of that orderly disposition, that should be found in him, and some other of that good, which pertaineth to him. As it appeareth in the acts of injustice spoiling men of that which is their own, (which Mr. Hickman cannot endure to hear of) and i● the acts of blasphemy against God, or the hate of God, in which the sinner as much as in him lieth, by attributing to God what is contrary to his Nature, or denying that which agreeth unto the same, maketh him not to be that which he is, and hating him wisheth he were not, and endeavoureth to hinder what he would have done.  
NOw (saith the Doctor a little after) That that sin of Commission which is an evil ex genere & objecto is not denominated evil passively, 
The 2. Reanson.  from the want of rectitude due unto it, it is evident, in that no rectitude is due to such an Act. For what rectitude is due to the specifical Act of hating God? or what rectitude is it capable of? This he urgeth against Those, who affirm the act itself, in the hating God to be very good; and the deformity of the Act to be only evil; which deformity they fancy to be the want of a rectitude which was due to that act. not at all considering, that there cannot be 
* Notandum, S. Patres interdum malitiam peccati explicare per privationem ●oni, non quod debeat inesse ipsi actui peccati, sed quod debeat inesse homini operan●i, etc. L●ssius de perf. Diu. l· 31. cap▪ 16. & Corder. p. 596.  possibly any such thing, as a right hating of God, or a rectified injustice; these things implying a contradiction in adjecto. Yet such absurdities they will swallow, rather than confess, (what yet they find, saith D. Field,) that some sins are positive Acts. pag. 119. Nay the Doctor advanceth farther, and certainly farther than he needed, if not farther than he ought, (I am sure much farther than I have done) That in the si● of commission specifically considered there is nothing but merely positive, and the deformity that is found in it is precisely a positive Repugnance to the Law of God: which he doth not say upon his own account only, but farther backeth it with the Authority, and concurrent Judgements of many eminent Schoolmen, and great Divines, (many more than M. Hickman so much as attempted to produce) whose names and words shall be seen anon.  
§. 3. To the first Reason of the two, which the most learned D. Field (as the learned M. Barlow does once more call him, 
The first reason was never answered.  p. 74.) was pleased to give for his asserting the positive entity of sin, M. Barlow doth not make any answer; nor doth he take the least notice, that there was any such thing; though as it is his first reason, so I conceive to be his best too: which I shall probably show when occasion serves, especially if I chance to be put in mind.  
To the second Reason his answer is, That no rectitude is due to the hatred of God, 
The second an●swer'd by Mr. Barlow in his younger years.  in as much as it is limited to such an object, to wit God. But (as he saith a little before, to which he here refers his Reader,) 
* Sicut Ambulatio per se sumpta potest esse bona; Sic odium Dei per se sumptum po●est esse bonum: & per consevens▪ ipsum esse actus non erit per se malum. pag. 74.  The hatred of God being taken by itself may be good, and so by consequence the being of the act shall not be evil per se. Just as walking is good of itself, though walking to kill or commit adultery cannot be made good by any Circumstance.  
§. 4. To this Answer I reply in the behalf of D. Field. first, 
The answer showed to be invalid in five respects.  That it granteth the very thing which it pretendeth to deny, and which alone was the thing that D. Field contended for, to wit, that no Rectitude can be due to the hatred of God, which is no longer the hatred of God, 
I. By its granting what it pretendeth to deny.  than the hatred is limited to such an object, to wit God. So what is urged by D. Field is exactly yielded by M. Barlow, and I appeal unto himself, whether it is not as I have said. For the Doctor's words are, [what Rectitude is due to the specifical act of hating God?] now it cannot be the specifical act of hating God, unless the act be limited to that very object: and when it is, 'tis fully granted, that nothing of Rectitude or goodness is due unto it.  
Secondly I reply, That when he saith, 
II. By implying ● contradiction.  the hatred of God being taken by itself, may be good, he flatly contradicteth what he had said a little before, to wit, that the hatred of God remaining, it cannot be possibly made good by any circumstance whatsoever. And the subject of the Dispute being the hatred of God, it must needs remain till it is taken away; And being taken away, there is nothing of it to be disputed, no kind of thing, either good or evil.  
Thirdly, It is an uncouth sentence (to say no worse) which affirms any goodness in hating God, 
III. By being offen●sive to pious minds.  let the hating God be taken in what sense it can be. For 'tis acknowledged by all, to be Intrinsically evil, evil ex genere & objecto, so as nothing to be imagined can make it otherwise then evil. And to say that that can be good in any notion, which is confessedly good in none, is to add impiety to contradiction. For the hatred of nothing, excepting sin, can be morally good. And therefore to say, that the hating God (in any sense) can be good, is to imply that the hating God is (in some kind of sense) the hating of sin.  
Fourthly. It is far from good sense, 
IV. By offending against the rules of sense.  to say the hatred of God being taken by itself, that I would gladly think it an error of the Press, if I did not find it so often used. However I am confident his meaning was, That Hatred being taken by itself (without relation to God) may be good. For the hatred of God cannot possibly be taken by itself, so as hatred may stand without relating to the object to which 'tis joined; for then the hatred of God, were not the hatred of God, which would be an express contradiction. And his meaning being granted to be so different from his words, as hatred taken without God for its object, must needs be from the expression of hating God, I then profess it to be true, but not at all to the purpose. For 'tis affirmed by D. Field, that no rectitude can be due to the hatred of God: not that it cannot be due to hatred, either considered in itself, or in relation to any object which is not God.  
Fifthly, The simile taken from walking of itself, and walking to kill or commit adultery, 
V. By the twofold unfitness of the ●●mile alleged.  is very halting in two respects. For 1. walking by itself hath no proportion with the hatred of God, whatever it might have had with hatred by itself. The hatred of God, being rather represented, by walking to kill or commit adultery. 2. The Doctor spoke of such acts, as are evil ex genere & objects, so as nothing of circumstance can make them good; and are denominated evil by active denomination: from which walking of itself is as wide as Heaven from North to South.  
And thus▪ I have vindicated the Doctor, for the love of the Cause which he asserteth, (not from the learned M. Barlow who now is Provost of Queens in Oxford, and I am confident doth condemn the aberrations of his youth, but rather) from M. Barlow, who was but newly Master of Arts, and junior even to M. Hickman, who yet hath nothing any otherwise to be vouchsafed a Confutation, than as he hath thought it worth stealing out of so young a man's Essays, as M. Barlow was when he was Metaphysic Reader: from whom, as I descent, without the least diminution of solid Friendship, so I have not expressed it without his leave.  
§. 5. To the Argument urged by GULIELMUS DE RUBIONE (which was the same in effect with Doctor Fields,) M. Barlow thus answers, 
GULIELM. de RUBIONE vindicated by way of reply to M. BARLOW'S answ.  (p. 73.) That the 
* Odium Dei est malum solum ob defectum objecti debiti, nam si terminaretur ad peccatum, esset bonum. pag. 73.  hatred of God is only evil through the defect of a due object: for that ha●red would be good, were it terminated on sin.  
But I reply to this Answer, That the hatred of God, being an act determined upon an object, can have no other object then what it hath, (for if it be the hatred of any thing else, then is it no longer the hatred of God) much less can it be terminated on the hatred of sin; the hating God rather implying the love of sin: if by the hatred of God he means nothing but hatred, (in which case the word ●od must be blotted out) then 'tis quite beside the purpose, as hath been showed; for 'tis not hatred per se, much less hatred of sin, which was said to be so evil that no circumstance advenient can make it good; but rather the contrary, the hatred of sin is so good, as that it cannot be made evil. And therefore the hatred of God being the term in the Argument proposed, should also have been the term in the Answer pretended.  
Whereas it is added to his answer, that the hatred of God is not taken aggregately, or by way of connotation, when 'tis said it may be good by the position of the due circumstance (p. 73.) I also add to my reply, that though hatred can (per se) yet hatred of God cannot be possibly so considered; for it implies a contradiction. Hatred there being the Act, and God the object, and both together the Aggregate: which whilst it is, it cannot be but what it is. If by hatred of God, he means hatred of nothing, or of sin, than he must say what he means, and not the contrary to what he means; which when he shall say, 'twill prove to be nothing to the purpose.  
§▪ 6. That which follows in M. Barlow's Answer, is so fully expressed by M. Hickman, that I will set down his words, and then discover the infirmity of them [The hating of God is complexum quid, and must not be spoken as of one: The vital action of hatred is a thing positive, but the undue referring or terminating of that act to such an object which is altogether lovely, that's the sinfulness of the action, and not positive, but privative. p. 95. In evil works there are two things considerable, the works themselves, and their pravity. The works themselves (we doubt not) are positive and from God, as all other positive things; but their pravityes add no new entities to them, etc.]  
To show the Ails of this Answer, I will proceed by these degrees. 
M. Hickman● answer proved vicious in three respects.  First it labours with the Fallacy, à benè conjunctis ad malè divisa, for the sin of hating God doth so inevitably import the whole complexum, viz. that very act in conjunction with that very object, 
I. By such a gross Fallacy, as by which he is proved no m●n, but either a beast, or somewhat worse.  that it cannot so much as be conceived to be the sin of hating God, when the act is supposed to be divided from the object. To show him the fruit of his Distinction, I will put the case into other colours. Let him prove he is a man, by the best medium that he can use, and I will prove (ad hominem) he can be none; For man is complexum quid, and must not be spoken of as One: there is something in him material, and something formal. The Animal is one thing, the Anima rationalis is quite another. And M. Hickman being either without the other, may be a Brute or an Angel, but not a man. And being for certain not an Angel of light, he must (if an Angel) be one of darkness. This is every way as pertinent, and as tolerably applied, as what is spoken by M. Hickman against the positive being of hating God. If this Coin is not currant, let him not pay it to other men. And if it is, 
II. By such a shifting from the Question, as proves him convinced of his maintaining a gross error.  let him accept it when it is paid.  
Secondly, He so shamefully flies from the thing in Question, to that which he knew neither was, nor can be, as to discover the mean opinion which he really hath of his own Tenet, and to prove his Book written, against nothing so much as his own conscience. 1. He knew it was not the Question, whether hatred, without relation to God as its object, is a sin, or whether any thing, without hatred, is the sin of hating God. But he knew (by what I had said in my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) that the thing in Question, was the hating of God in sensu composito. For I had said in the plainest terms, That to hate God is a sin, or a sinful act, (two expressions for one thing.) That the sinfulness consisteth neither in God without hating, (for he is purity itself) nor in hating without God, (for hatred in itself is a thing indifferent, and apt to be good as well as evil, God himself hating sin with a perfect hatred) but in the union and application of that act to that object. As the nature of man consists not in a body only, nor only in a soul, but in the union of the one with the other. (p. 13.) 2. He knew it could not be a Question, whether hatred is a sin when taken per se, without an object; or whether the pravity of hating God can be any thing at all, without the act of hating God; or whether there can be possibly any act when there is none. And yet his answer is as impertinent, as if one of these had been the Question.  
Thirdy, In saying such works, as the hating God, 
By Blasphemy expressed, and contradiction employed.  are from God, which the Scripture calleth the works of the Devil, he speaketh Blasphemy. And in saying, the sin of hating God is complexum quid, which must not be considered of as One, he contradicts his other sayings, that sin and sinfulness are the same, that is, a mere abstract, and which cannot else be considered as sin. So that here I must ask him a second time, (and challenge him to give me a Categorical Answer) can the hating of God be conceived to be a sin, or can it not? when he answers, I will reply. But for his Blasphemies, and self-contradictions, let him read my letter to Dr Heylin, p. 265. to p. 270.  
§. 7. Having insisted thus largely on my Reply to those Answers, which appear to show us the very utmost, that can be pleaded in the defence of so gross an Error; and having detected the obvious Fallacies, in which the whole force of the answers lieth; I shall study to be the briefer in all that follows, without the least fear of being thought to be obscure by my plainest Reader. To Dr. Field his 2. Reasons above recited,.  
A Third Reason may be added from 
* Quaedam mala sunt etiam citra legem, & posit● ac manente ejus obligatione, procurare ut aliquis contra L. faci●t, naturaliter malum est, etc. Grot in Luc. 22.22.  HUGO GROTIUS who saith that some things are evil without the Law; 
A 3 REASON taken from H. GROTIUS amounting to the same with jacob. Almain.  and that the Law being, & continuing to oblige, it is naturally evil to procure any man's acting against the Law, or to make a Law to the contrary, and therefore repugnant to the Nature of God. From whence there follow 2. things, (1.) that some whole acts are immutably evil, and (2.) That they cannot have any being from the Almighty. JACOBUS ALMAIN giveth an instance in the hating of God and in Adultery, and saith they could not but be forbid.  
To whom 'tis answered by Mr. Barlow, that if God did not forbid theft, it would not be a sin, and that he may dispense with his Law, as when he said to Abraham go kill thy son.  
But I reply, 1. That he speaks not to the Instances brought by jacobus Almain. It had been ill to hate God, had it been possible that God had not forbid it. 
Mr. Barlows Answer. p. 66.  2. Theft is not of those things which are only evil because forbidden, (as the eating swine's flesh among the Jews) but of those other things which are only forbidden for being evil. 
Proved faulty in 7. respects.  And therefore, 3. It was not possible, that God should never have forbidden all manner of injustice, of which theft is one species. 4. God did not say to Ab●aham, Go kill thy son, but go and offer him up; which he also did, without killing. 5. Had he done it, he had not dispensed with his Law, which only forbiddeth such a kill, as ipso facto becomes a Murder; not such as ipso facto becomes a sacrifice, else a thief could not be hanged for the fulfilling of one Law, without the breach or dispensation of another. The prohibition of murder comprehends not killing by commission from God, who may as lawfully take away isaack's life by Abraham's hand, as by a Fever. 6. If the act of stealing, or hating God, be affirmed to be good, and so a positive entity, abstractly considered from Gods forbidding; it must be granted to be such when it is forbidden, I mean a positive entity, although not good, and so the Answer destroys its end. Mr. Barlow's words are, si illud mandatum abfuisset, idem numero actus horrendum fuisset homicidium (p. 66.) Had it been murder, it had been sin, (for murder cannot but ●e sin) and so we have his confession, that sin may be a positive act. But 7. It does imply a contradiction, to say the same numerical act can be forbidden, and not forbidden, which I therefore leave to consideration.  
§. 8. What Mr Barlow calleth a concession in his behalf, 
The words o● Capreolus make for me▪  I call an argument against him, viz. That if God could produce that act [of hating God] in respect of the substance of the Act, than it would not be evil: but (say I) that act is proved by me and others, (yea and confessed by Mr. H.) to be wholly, because intrinsically and essentially evil, evil ex genere & objecto, and antecedently to the Law, therefore it cannot be God's production, for all its having a positive Entity. This I retort to Mr. B. his p. 66, 67. and it pincheth Mr. H. more ways than one.  
§ 9 Whereas it is said, 
Mr. Barlows Plea out of Hurtadus proved faulty in 6 respects. Answer.  (p. 67.) that if the man that hates God whilst yet in's wits, shall continue to hate him being mad, the act remains, but not the obliquity, because the act, to be sinful, must be rational and free.  
I deny that any man can hate God or love him without the use of reason, but I further return six things, 1. That for a man to hate God, is the greatest madness in the world 2. That if he is not so altered, but that he continues to hate God, he is not altered so far, but that he continues to be a sinner in hating God. 3. Whilst he continues to be a man, he continues to have freedom and rationality enough to sin by. 4. This Argument would prove (if it had real force in it) that not only all infants, but some adult● are in a state of Impeccability. 5. It would follow from hence, that the goodness of a virtuous act doth not consist in the substance of it, because it would then become impossible, that the substance of the act should continue without the goodness. Whereas it is said in this Evasion, that the Act of hating God may remain in substance, without the presence of its obliquity. But (6.) to answer yet more expressly to his reason taken from Rational and free; I say the sinfulness of the act is one thing, and the sinfulness of the agent is quite another. The obliquity alone, or the sole contrariety of the act to the Law (in conjunction with the act from which it cannot be disjoined) is enough to constitute the sinfulness of the act. But the Liberty of will and use of Reason, are required only to the sinfulness of the agent. Which yet again is no otherwise, then in respect unto God imputing or punishing, according to the Equity, [or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] of the second Covenant. For though otherwise considered, (without the Equity of the Gospel) sins of ignorance are sins, and Original sin which is born with us is our sin still.  
§. 10. And whereas it is added a little after, that if with the very same act wherewith he now doth hate God, 
The act of hating God now, and of sin hereafter, unduly granted the same act.  a man should afterwards hate sin, the same act for substance would be morally good; (p. 67,) I reply that this supposeth an impossibility, and confutes itself with the contradiction which it implies. To hate God one day, and to hate sin the next, are so far from being the same act numerically that Dr. Field doth rightly make them to be specifically distinct. And the supposing them to be One was to me at first such an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that I admired how Mr. Barlow could so impose upon himself, until I duly considered his want of years, when he engaged himself for so great an Error.  

A denial of positivity be●ray's its owners to deny a reality also in sin.  §. 11. The two arguments which follow, to prove that sin hath a real being, whereof the one is urged by FERRARIENSIS the other by GREGORY ARIMINENSIS, I forbear to prosecute (as I might) because they do not prove the positive but only the real being of sin; which Mr. Hickman grants, though 'tis denied by M. Barlow, (p. 69.) or rather it was denied by him, when he was newly Master of Arts. For that he should still be so much mistaken, is more than can enter into my thoughts. And therefore unless he shall friendly invite me to it, I will not meddle with the Infirmities of the two next pages. But only observe how the belief, that sin hath no positive, is apt to pass into a Belief, that it hath not so much as a Real being. And indeed by the same figure, that sin is called a mere privation, it is also called a mere nothing. The reason of which I shall show anon.  
§. 12. ANd so I pass to a fourth Reason, 
A fourth Reason out of JOANNES de RADA.  why the sin of hating God hath a positive being. Because this sin is intrinsically evil, (as Mr. B. objects against himself out of JOANNES de RADA) and therefore not only evil through some privation, because (saith he) it is impossible, that any privation should be intrinsecal to a positive act. And Gulielmus de Rubione doth press it thus. A positive act which is so evil, that no kind of circumstance can make it not evil, is not evil for any defect or privation, but precisely for the substance of the act. (p. 71.)  
To the Argument of RADA. Mr. Barlow thus answers▪ That such an act is called intrinsically evil, 
Mr. BARLOW'S Answer.  not because its obliquity is of its nature and essence, but because by the law of nature it is evil of itself, without the addition of a positive Law; or because it is evil ex genere & objecto, and not only for the want of some circumstance. p. 73.  
But I reply. 1. It implies a contradiction, 
Proved invalid in 4. respects.  to affirm its being intrinsically evil, and at once to deny it essentially evil: for ratio formalis, and ratio intrinseca, are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with Philosophers; and M. Hickman hath dropped a good Confession, that the action of hating God is essentially evil. (p. 94.) 2. That it is evil of itself, antecedently to any positive Law, evil ex genere & objecto, is a concession whereby to prove it essentially evil. 3. No part of this answer pretends to prove that it is not indeed intrinsically evil, but only quarrel's about the reason, why the act is so called 4. It doth not speak to the chief thing of all, [that no privation can be intrinsecall to a positive act] and so it seemeth by silence to give consent.  

A fifth Reason out of AQVINAS. 1. p. q. 48▪ art. 1.  §. 13 MOral evil is proved to be a positive thing, because vice is set against virtue, by an opposition of contrariety, (as Aristotle saith, L. Cat. c. 10. §. 1.) for each term of such opposites must needs be positive, because they are both predicamental species: which things are so true, that they are granted by M. Barlow (p. 80.) who therefore endeavours to elude the Argument, by saying the same thing, which I have often replied unto: to wit, that in respect of their material signification, virtue and vice are opposita contrariè, but not in respect of their formal signification.  
To which I reply, first (as before) that this is the old fallacy à rectè conjunctis ad malè divisa, 

A Reply to the Answer of Mr. BARLOW, proving i● faulty in three respects.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Dionys. Areop. de Diu. No. c. 2▪ S. 2. p. 492.   and so a flat transition à thesi ad hypothesin. And if it be put into Syllogism, there will be found to be unavoidably, an Ignoratio Elenchi. The Question being of sin or vice in senses composito, and the Answer only considering it in senses diviso. Secondly, Vice cannot be vice, nor be imagined so to be, without its material, as well as formal significatum: for without the act of hating God, the sin or vice of hating God (which is the act) cannot be so much as supposed to be, much less to be repugnant to any law, wherein its formality is said to consist; for that would imply a contradiction. And thus the Answer (or rather evasion) doth so far forsake, as indeed to nul the thing in Question. Thirdly, supposing the vice to be taken from the Act or habit, of hating or hatred, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Idem ib. c. 4. S. 18. p. 572. look forwards on c. 5. S. 4▪ num. 5  (by its having sin for its object,) it must be granted to be a virtue, and therefore not opposed to virtue, by any kind of opposition; which M. B. observes to be replied by Ferrariensis. To which although it is rejoined by the same Ferrariensis, yet the rejoinder is nothing else, but a gross return to the old fallacy just now discovered in the Answer, and so is equally refelled by every part of my Reply.  
By the way I note one good confession, 

M. Hick. contradicted by his Masters▪ and himself too.  
Virtue & vi●ium si sumantur concretiuè sunt con●ra●ia, & species positivae. Aquin. l. 3. contra Gent. ●. 8.   (and from the words of Aquinas) that vice as well as virtue may be taken for a concrete; whereas M. Hickman was fain to say, that sin (or vice) is so perfectly an abstract that he cannot conceive it to be sin, unless he conceive it as an Abstract, and that he is to seek what vox abstracta is, if sin be not such. (p. 54.) It may very well be, that he is to seek: for he elsewhere confesseth, that sin is complexum quid. And if he thinks that abstractum doth signify complexum, he is a small Latinist indeed, if he doth not, he is a self-contradictor.  
§. 14. A Sin of commission is proved to have a positive being, 
A sixth Reason is taken ou● of FRANCISCUS de MAYRON an● divers others.  because it necessarily requireth some positive act, whereby to become a perfect sin of commission, which as it is granted by M. Barlow, so it seemeth to be also confirmed by him, p. 84. where he approveth that of Suarez. (Metaph. tom. 1. disp. 11.) Malum simpliciter est illud quod est in se malum; hoc est caret aliquo bono sibi ipsi debito, ad modum perfectionis propriè: quale est omne peccatum, praesertim commissionis. For if every sin of commissi on is not simply evil only, but wholly too, (as that must needs be, which doth career omni bono sibi debito, and though I deny the supposition, that any good thing can be due to sin,) then the positive act (without which it cannot be) must needs be morally and simply evil; It being the Sin of commission, which is spoken of in both places; not any action or quality, which is no sin at all; so as the ordinary shift, of flying from the Act of hating God, (which is the sin of commission, and so the subject of the Discourse) to the act of hating, without relation to any object, (which is no sin at all) or with relation only to sin, (which makes it a high moral good) is foreseen and prevented by what I now say.  
What is said by M. Barlow of the threefold difference betwixt a sin of omission, and commission, 
Not answered by M. Barlow.  (p. 86.) concerneth nothing that I know, excepting those words which he frames to himself in his objection (p. 82.) In hoc SOLUM distinguitur peccatum omissionis & commissionis, quia omissio dicit nudam carentiam actus: at commissio necessario requirit actum. The word solùm is very strange. And if he found it in GULIELMUS DE RUBIONE, as it is more than I know, so I am not concerned to make inquiry. It is sufficient for me, that my Argument, being unanswered, needs not the help of a Reply. I hasten therefore to another way of eviction.  
§. 15. THat is properly a sin, which is forbidden by the Law. 
A seventh Reason alleged by several Authors, partly cited by D▪ Field.  But the positive act (of Adultery theft, or hating God) is forbidden by the Law. And therefore the Act so forbidden is very properly a sin; we commonly say it is a sin, to do this, or that, (as to hate God, and to love the world) because God hath forbid us to do the one, and the other.  
To this it is answered by Mr. Barlow, (who not producing any Author for the objection, 
M. B.'s Answer.  and putting in the word Formaliter, (p. 82.) may seem to have adapted the Argument for an Answer,) That the Act precisely taken is not forbidden as a positive Act, (as in Murder, merely to kill, is not forbidden, quoad esse physicum; (for then it should not be lawful to kill a malefactor, who is justly condemned to be put to death,) but as it recedeth from the Rule of right reason, and is subjected to the privation of that rectitude which is due. pag. 86.  
But I reply, 1. That this is the old fallacy so often mentioned; 
Proved faulty in 5. respects.  for an act without reference to a negative precept of the law, is not an act which is forbidden, nor pretended by any to be a sin, much less of commission, which alone was the act spoken of in the Argument; and so instead of an answer, we have only an escape from the thing in Question. 2. It is affirmed by Aquinas, (1.2 q. 71. Art. 6. and q. 72. art. 6. (That Austin put two things in the definition of sin, to wit, a material, and formal part; that is, a positive act, and its repugnance to the Law, witness his citation p. 85.) And what is this but to say, that sin is totum essentiale? which it cannot be, without one of its two essentials; so that the Answer doth offend against the Answerer himself, by considering the one without relation to the other, notwithstanding his Acquiescence in St. Austin's Definition. 3. The Answer doth not deny that the positive act is forbidden, and so a sin; but only speaks of that thing, in respect of which it is forbidden. And to this it may easily be replied, that as an 
* Note, that this is spoken of such acts as are not evil antecedently to the Law.  act is not morally evil, without relation to the Law which doth forbid it; so an act hath nothing of moral goodness, without Relation to the law which doth command it, or to the Council which doth commend it. And again as no act can be a sin, without repugnance, to the Rule of right Reason; so can there be no such repugnance, without an act. 4. It is not all kill, but killing properly called Murder, which is forbidden by the Law, (which commands the kill of the Murderer, and thereby makes it an act of justice.) And therefore that should have been the instance; for all such kill is forbidden by the Law, and such alone doth belong to the adequate subject of our Discourse. 5. To hate God is a sin, and a positive act, to which (it hath be●n proved that) no kind of rectitude can be due. And it had naturally been evil, though it had never been forbidden: which yet it could not but have been, because the not forbidding of it, had been repugnant to God's nature. For though the act of hating God could not be from Eternity, yet this proposition is aeternae veritatis, and might truly have been spoken from all eternity, that it is evil to hate God. 
* See Dr. STEARN on this subject, in his Animi Medela, l. 2. cap. 15. p 271. ad p. 278.  Therefore this and the like acts were forbidden by the Law, even because they were evil; and are not only evil, by being forbidden by the Law which yet those men do presuppose who will have every thing good that hath a positive being, and nothing simply evil, but an abstracted repugnance unto the Law: not considering the difference betwixt the breach of a positive and moral Law; betwixt a jews hating God, and his eating swine's flesh. The latter, which was evil because forbidden, was after the Law, for that very reason. But the former, which was forbidden, because 'twas evil, was such (in order of Nature) before the Law. The want of heed to which thing I have the rather desired to remove, (by insisting on it a second time) because I think it is the parent of many errors.  

An 8. Reason gathered out of FRAN. DIOTALLEVIUS.  § 16 HAving thus done with my Reply to the several Answers of M. Barlow, I now proceed to another Argument, which I lately gathered out of FRANCISCUS DIOTALLEVIUS, and which is the fitter to succeed the immediate Argument going before, because it will make for its Confirmation.  
Evil works (saith this Author, who for strength and accuteness gives place to none) are 
* Opera mala, & opera nobis à Deo vetita synonyma sunt.— In nostrâ potestate relinquitur vias no●tras ex nobis malas facere quod non contingeret, si Deus non permitteret modo, sed efficaciter etiam faceret ut.  synonymous with works which are forbidden by God Almighty.: who hath left it in our power to make our ways evil; which yet could not be, if he did not only permit, but efficaciously make us to 
† faceremus quod vetet etc. Diotall. opus●. Theol. pag. 83, 84.  do the thing that he forbiddeth. Now the thing that he forbiddeth, will be confessed not to be this, [That when we act what he forbids us, we do not suffer to come to pass, that formal obliquity annexed to all such acts, by the repugnance which they have to the Law forbidden them,] But the thing forbidden to us is this, [That we do not produce the positive being of that act, with which the moral obliquity is inseparably annexed.] The former cannot be the thing; because the law being given, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, we cannot possibly hate him, without a repugnance unto the law, which by commanding our love, forbids our hatred. The latter therefore must be the thing, which we are forbid to put in being. And which is properly our work, though a positive entity, because it is absolutely impossible, that God who forbids us the act of hating him, should make that act, which he thus forbids the making of; or that (by acting us with his power which is irresistible) he should make us to do, what he forbids us the doing of. But (to return to Diotallevius) when it is said, Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife, the meaning of it cannot be this, [Beware, that whilst thou pro●ucest the free act of concupiscence, the moral obliquity do not follow it, (for alas! it cannot but follow.) The meaning therefore must needs be this, [see that thou abstain from that free act of concupiscence, because of that obliquity which is inseparably annexed. Or determine not thy will to that object, which makes the act become contrary to the rule of right Reason.] And so he concludes it to be the Judgement of the whole 
* Quare Concilium vult, Deum permissiuè solùm concurrere, ad liberam Arbitrii creati determinationem ad producendam ipsam actus mali Entitatem. Id. ib,  Council at Trent, (which in matters of this Nature must needs be of great consideration,) That God's concurrence is only permissive to the free determination of the created will, in producing the very being of the evil act. And God's permission is so distinguished (both by 
† Aug. in Enchir. c. 96. Durand. in p. d. 46. q▪ 5. Aqu p. p. q. 19 art. ult. Greg. p. d. 46, & 47. q. 1. art. 1. Scotus in 1. d. 47. q. 1. S.  Fathers and Schoolmen) from his effection or operation, as to signify no more, than the negation of an impediment or cohibition. Scotus calls it the negation of the divine positive act, which by consequence is not a positive act. And it is not an action (saith Diotallevius) but the negation of an impediment, in respect of that operation, which doth depend upon our free determination. From whence it follows, that he who hates God (be he man, or devil) is the sole cause of that act, which for that reason also is wholly sin.  
§. 17. THis is farther confirmed by an Argument leading ad absurdum. 
Confirmed by a ninth Argument, leading the Adversary (M Hick.) to the most horrid absurdities to be imagined.  For if God does concur to the positive act of hating God, not only permissively, by not hindering it, but physically too, by praedetermining the will of the Sinner to it, than he absolutely waileth the actual hating of himself; which of all absurdities is the greatest. And again, when man is forbid by God to hate him, and when God does grievously complain, and threaten to punish with Hell fire, the man that doth not obey his prohibition; It cannot choose but follow, that if he absolutely willeth the positive act which he forbiddeth (to wit, the sinners hating of him) he willeth and nilleth the same thing, and after the very same manner, which is a blasphemous contradiction. And thus it is proved to Mr. Hickman, (to whom alone I am henceforth speaking) that the sin of hating God hath a positive being, because that quality or action which hath a positive being is clearly proved to be a sin. And it is proved to be a sin, by being proved to be a Thing which is not made or produced, but only suffered or permitted by God Almighty to come to pass. And only made or produced by them that hate him.  

A tenth Argument or Reason out of Cardinal CAJETAN. in 1.2. q. 79. art. 1. et 2,  §. 18. CAIETAN proves the positive Entity of sin, because (saith he) it consisteth, as well of a conversion to an object contrary to the object of virtue, as of an aversion from the law. And hence (saith the Cardinal) there is in sin a double nature of evil, the one arising from the object, the other from the not observing of the law: the first is positive, the second privative. The first inferreth the second; for it cannot be that a man should hate God, but that in so doing he must break the law; because it is simply and intrinsically evil, so that to do it, is a sin. And as this is observed by D. Field in confirmation of his Doctrine, (l. 3. c. 23. p. 120.) so I find the same Cardinal 
* Idem. ib. q. 18. art. 5.  elsewhere saying, that in moralibus pars subjectiva mali est malum; and est in moralibus malum dupliciter. Implying the whole sin to be a concrete; not a repugnance to the law without an act, which doth imply a contradiction.  
§. 19 THe most acute EPISCOPIUS doth implicitly thus argue, 
An eleventh Argument collected from EPISCOPIUS. part. 1. l. 4. c. 11. p. 380 col. ●.  although by way of paralipsis. As an act commanded by the law is the virtue itself, or ordination of the will unto the law; so the act forbidden by the law is the vice itself, or inordination of the will against the law. And as the act of virtue doth not contain or connote any real thing positive superadded to the act, which may be called ordination; so the act of vice doth connote nothing privative, superadded to the act, which may be called inordination.  
§ 20. DOctor STERN (a very late, 
A 12. and 13. Argument urged by Doctor STERN in his Animi Medela l. 2. c. 16. p. 280, 281.  but Learned Writer) doth briefly urge six Arguments, to prove that sin may have a positive being; four of which I praetermit, because I have already showed them, as long since urged by other men; though otherwise urged by him than others, and perhaps in some places to more advantage. The other two I shall mention, as not yet touched.  
First (saith he) a Nonentity may be morally good, and therefore an entity may be morally evil. 
Non-esse, Bonum moraliter esse potest, proinde & esse potest esse moraliter malum— Antec. probatur; quia pura omissio actus prohibi●i, licet fit merum non-ens est moraliter bona. pag. 280.  The Consequence is evident, both by the Rule of opposites, and because there is not more repugnance betwixt Obliquity and Entity (as obliquity is taken or mistaken by the adverse party) then betwixt goodness, and Nonentity. The Antecedent is proved, because a mere omission of a forbidden act, although a Nonentity, is morally good.  
Again, the Schoolmen do hold a twofold punishment, 
Schola constituit poenam duplicem, etc. ib. pag. 281.  the one of sense, the other of loss; whereof the latter is the wages of an aversion from God, as is also the former of a conversion to the Creature; so that if sin were nothing but mere privation, the poena sensus would be inflicted without all justice, under the notion of Revenge for a conversion to the creature.  
§. 21. AGain it may be thus argued, (and out of BARONIUS his Metaphysica Generalis) That which hath not a positive entity cannot be the cause of any thing. But sin many ways is the cause of something. 
A fourteenth Argument out of BARONIUS his Metap. Gen. Sect. 5. p. 54.  For 1. it is the cause of punishment; and (2) one sin is the cause of another. A vicious act is the cause of a vicious habit. A vicious habit is the cause of vicious actions. And a natural propension to evil (which Baronius calls original sin) is said by him to be the cause of all the vicious actions o● our will.  
'tis true, he answers this argument; but his answer may be refuted by my Replies to Mr. Barlow; and by what Baronius grants; (of which anon▪) as the Reader will find, if he makes a trial.  

The Arguments back● by the Authority of the most discerning.  §. 22. Now besides these Arguments thus largely urged, and that from many more Authors, than Mr. Hickman hath named for his opinion, I shall exhibit a larger Catalogue (but with a lesser expense of time and paper) of such eminently learned and knowing men, as have justified my judgement with the authority of their own, and of whom (unawares) I have undertaken a justification. I will begin with those Writers, with the concurrence of whose opinions Dr. Field thought fit to credit his.  
§. 23. ALVAREZ saith, 
a Alvarez. l. 6. de auxiliis div. Grat. disp. 44.  the sin of commission is a Breach of a negative Law, which is not broken but by a positive Act. Aquinas also saith, 
b Aqu Quaest 2 de malo art. 2. ad. 4.  that though in a sin of omission there is nothing but a privation, yet in the sin of commission there is some positive thing. 
c. Idem. 22. q. 10.5. ad 1.  Nay he saith more plainly (what Dr. Field doth not observe) that the ratio formalis of sin is two fold, whereof the one is according to the intention of the sinner. 
d. 12. q. 77.6.0  And that it consisteth essentially in the Act of the freewill. He also infers it to be an accident, whilst he 
e 12. q. 74.1.0.  saith that every sin is in the will, as in its subject. And very often, 
f. 12 q. 71 6. c. & passi●. alibi.  that in every sin there are two things, whereof the one is a quality or action, and so the whole sin must have a positive being. Farther yet it is consequent to the opinion of Cajetan, (
g Greg. de Valent. Tom. 2. d. 2. q 13. punc. 3 art 5.  saith Gregory de Valentiâ) that sin, formally as sin, is a positive thing, which he expressly also affirmeth in primam. 2 dae. q. 71. art. 6. Some hold (saith 
h Cumel dis● var. ad primam & 1.2. p. 104.  Cumel) that the formal nature of sin consisteth in some positive thing, to wit, in the manner of working freely with a positive repugnance to the rule of Reason, and the law of God, 
i Ockam. l. 3. sent. 12.  Ockam saith further, that the very deformity in an act of Commission is nothing else but the act itself (viz. actus elicitus) against the Divine Law. And these are cited by Dr. Field. l. 3. c. 23. p. 120.  
§. 24. To these I add many more, which partly were not, and partly could not have been observed by Dr. Field. 
k Lessius de perfect. divinis, l. 13. cap. 26. num. 176.  LESSIUS saith that an evil act is in som● sort evil even according to its Physical Entity. Nay upon this passage of C. VORSTIUS, Omne ens quà ens bonum est, 
l C. Vorst. Amica Colla●io. p. 141 Sect 64.  Piscator himself hath this note, (and it is a note of exception) At vitiosa illa qualitas in nobis, unde oriuntur actu●lia peccata, bona non est. The learned 
m Matth. Hafenrefferus in Loc. Theolog l. 3. Stat. 2. p. 246▪ 247.  Professor of Divinity in Academiâ Tubingensi affirms Original sin to be an accident, as the opposite member to substantia; and calls it the accident of a substance; and compares it to the image of God in man, which (he also saith) was not a substance, but an Accident. And that will be yielded to have a positive being; especially if he means as Piscator did, that that accident is a Quality. Another 
n Doctor Prideaux in Fascicul. Controu. c. 3. p. 100, 123.126.  learned Professor in Academiâ Oxoniensi, by saying Concupiscence is a sin, inferreth that sin to be a positive entity, which concupiscence will be granted by all to be. And if it is with consent, it is an actual sin; if without consent, it is an inbred Rebellion of the flesh, against the law of God. He also takes it to be an accident, by ascribing to it subjectum quo, & subjectum quod: because by entering at the flesh, it did infect the spirit. 
o Dr. GOAD in his disput. of the Necessity and contingency of events 2. Arg. for Thes. 1.  Dr. GOAD, who was sent to the Synod at DORT, whilst he was speaking (in that Tract which some do call his Retractation) against an ordinary Calvinian distinction, which he conceived to make God the Author of sin, expressly used these words. Might I here, without wa●dring, discourse the nature of sin, I could prove sin itself to be an action, and confute this groundless distinction that way. The tract is a Manuscript, but divers have Copies as well as I. And sure the world must enjoy it, if not by other men's care at least by mine.  
That Great Divine Dr. JACKSON, (who was withal a great Philosopher, and inferior to none for skill in Metaphysics,) doth not content himself to say of original sin, 
DR. JACKSON l. 10. p. 3024.  that it is not a mere privation, but also defineth it to be a positive Renitency of the flesh or corrupt nature of man against the spiritual law of God, 
ch. 10. p. 3028.  especially against the negative Precepts, etc. And as he highly commends Illyricus, (for an extraordinary writer,) so he vindicates his notion, by explaining his true sense of Original sin, which if the Dr. took by the right handle, Mr. Barlow took it by the wrong, in the latter part of his 2. excercitation. It was the 
q See ILLYRIGUS his aim made apparent by Dr. JACKSON l. 10. c. 1 2. p. 3035, 3036.  business of Illyricus (saith Dr. JACKSON) to banish all such nominal or grammatical definitions, as have been mentioned out of the Precincts of Theology, and to put in continual caveats against the Admission of abstracts, or mere relations, into the definition of Original sin, or of that unrighteousness which is inherent in the man unregenerate. The Judicious Doctor doth also tell us, (and who could tell better than he?) that 
r Austin. and Melanchthon, (as well as Aquinas) say as much in effect as Illyricus did. ibid.  St. Austin, Aquinas, and Melanchthon, do say in effect as much as Illyricus, if their meanings were rightly weighed, and apprehended by their Followers. Nay Calvin and Martyr, and many other good writers, 
* ib. ch. 13. p. 3036.  consort so well with Illyricus in their definitions of sin in the unregenerate, that they must all be either acquitted, or condemned together. Illyricus himself explains his meaning, by producing the definitions of Original sin, not only given by 
s Calvinus & Martyr ●pud Ilyr. lib. cui Titulus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 140.141. ib.  Calvin and Martyr, but explained by themselves into Illyricus his sense. In so much that Dr. jackson, (ranking Calvin and Martyr with Illyricus) doth affirm them to 
* p. 3037.  make original sin to be the whole nature of man, and all his faculties, so far forth as they are corrupted. Yet still their meaning was no more than the Scripture means, when it saith, the old man, and the body of sin, thereby expressing (most briefly) all the works of the flesh, all unhallowed desires, and vicious habits, which are contrary to the law or spirit of God. For so I gather from Dr. I. p. 3039. where he also gives notice: that Illyricus his book was commended to him, upon very high terms, by the Reverend Dr. Field than Dean of Gloucester.  
§. 25. Next for the Reverend DOCTOR HAMMOND (who ever occurs to my Remembrance, when I hear or speak of judicious, Hooker, or Dr. jackson,) he hath prov●d, as well as taught, 
D. Hammond of Fundamentals▪ p. 182.  that the Act of sin is not separable from the obliquity of that act, (the act of Blasphemy from the obliquity or irregularity of blasphemy,) the least evil thought or word against an infinite good God being as crooked as the rule is strait, & consequently he that predetermins (or makes) the act, must needs predetermine (or make) the obliquity, so far is the act of sin (which is granted by all to have a positive being) from being one of God's Creatures, (as Mr. Hickman feareth not to say) that ●o all acts of sin saith Dr. Hammond) God doth not so m●ch as incline, 
ibid. p. 183.  and the Devil can do 
* So Aquinas. 1.2 q. 80. art. 1. Resp.  no more than persuade any man. For his demonstrating of these, and other things, (as that the men of that way which Mr. Hickman walks in do unavoidably make God the Author of sin) confued the latter part of his 16▪ Chapter of Fundamentals. And now for the Reverend Dr. SANDERSON, 
u Dr. SANDERSON in his Sermon on 1 Tim. 4.4.  he hath abundantly inferred the positive entity of sin, even in that very Sermon which he preached in his younger years, before he changed his judgement as to the 5. points in controversy; I mean that Sermon, which Mr. Hickman would have wrested to serve his turn. For the Doctor there teacheth (as St. Paul doth to Timo●hy, 1 Ep. c. 4. v. 4. that every creature of God is good. And therefore to hate God, which is an action intrinsically evil, can be none of God's creatures, in his opinion; though it hath in the Devil a positive being and existence: for that there is goodness in hating God, 
Ibid. p. 278.  is the sole opinion of Mr. Hickman and his Instructers. 2. Common reason taught the Manichees (saith Dr. S.) that from the good God could not proceed any evil thing, no more than Darkness from the Sun's Lustre, or gold from the scalding of the fire. But the positive act of hating is wholly evil, 
ibid. p. 279, 280.  and so a sin notwithstanding its having a positive entity. 3. God hath imprinted some steps and footings of his goodness upon the Creatures (saith Dr. S.) but in hating God there cannot be any such; therefore he hold● it to be a sin, 
ib. p. 281.  though a positive entity. 4. Look upon the workmanship, and accordingly judge of the workman (saith Dr. S.) but we cannot judge of God, by the positive being of hating God; therefore he holds it to be a sin, although it hath a positive being, 
ib. p. 281.  5. Doctor S. saith, we must not blame God's creatures, or say why was this made? or why thus? what good doth this? or of what use is that? it had been better if this or that had never been, or if it had been otherwise.] But there are many positive entities, which we may blame; as Blasphemy, pride, hypocrisy, hating of God; and we may very well say, why did David contrive the murder of Uriah? and why thus treacherously? what good did that murder of so loyal a subject? of what use is the Devils hating God? it had been better there had been no such thing: therefore those are all sins, as well as positive entities, in the opinion of Dr. SANDERSON.  

VASQVEZ in pr. 2. disp. 95.  §. 26. VASQVEZ enquiring into the formal part of sin divides his Disputation into thirteen Chapters. The subject of the first is the opinion of Cajetan, that the moral obliquity doth consist in ratione 
* Cajetan. in 6. art. & poste● art. 5 q. 18.  positiuâ. The subject of the third is the opinion of sundry modern Writers, that it consists of a privation and something positive besides. The subject of the fifth, is to show how they vary and disagree among themselves, who are against its positivity about the assigning of that privation, in which they suppose it to consist. In the tenth he gives the judgement of subtle 
† Scotus in Quodlibet. 18. art. 1.  Scotus, that obliquity sometimes is positively contrary to Rectitude. Then adds his own in these words. Ego tamen existimo, omne peccatum commissionis, sive fiat defectu circumstantiae debitae, sive habeat circumstantiam contrariam, semper esse peccatum ex relatione extrinsecâ oppositionis & inconvenientiae, cum Naturâ rationali: Vtroque autem modo actus contrarius est. In the eleventh Chapter he answers t● the Authorities alleged for its consisting in mere privation. In the twelfth he answers to the Reasons offered for that opinion. In the thirteenth he considers, what was the Judgement of Aquinas in this affair, which though at first he seemingly conceives to be somewhat doubtful, (Aquinas speaking in divers places as if he had been of divers minds too) yet he proves his true Judgement to have been this, That sin according to its Formality hath a positive being. [Affirmat malum in moralibus esse differentiam Actus moralis, 
Aquinas in pr. part. 2. q. 48. art. 1. in sol. 2.  non quâ ratione est privatio debiti finis, sed quatenus est entitas quaedam & positivum, cui privatio conjungitur. Idem docuit 3. contra Gent. c. 9 Praeterea in hac primâ secundae q. 18. art. 5. ad 2. & q. 72. art. 1. affirmat, species peccatorum non ex priva●ione, sed ex ordine ad objecta desumi. Eo quod privatio per accidens se habeat cum peccato, objecta vero per se. cum igitur supra q. 19 art. 1. dixit malum & bonum esse per se differentias actus, in ratione actus, Intelligi debet, non de malo quod in privatione consistit, (quia privatio non potest essentialiter & per se in actu aliquid constituere,) sed de malo positivo. Quare ex hac parte aut nostrae, aut Cajetani sententiae favet.  
Our late Apologist for Tilenus (who is very much considered by knowing Readers) hath so far asserted the positivity of sin; and so baffled M. Hickman, 
The learned Apologist for Tilenus in his Preface to the Calvinists Cabinet unlocked p. 23. to the end.  even upon some of his own Grounds; that instead of some Answer, which M. Hickman by promise had obliged himself to give, he hath given no more than a Tergiversation.  
That MEDINA held sin to have a real, positive, absolute Entity; 
Medina in 1.2. q. 71. art. 6. Vasquez in 1.2. q. 95. cap. 9▪ Timplerius apud Rob. Baron. Met. Gen. Sect. 5. p. 60. Durand. & ADol●.  And that Vasquez would have it to be a positive Relation; M. Barlow did acknowledge in his dissent from both, Exer. 2. p. 53, 54. Timplerus held sin to have an efficient cause per se, and so by consequence a positive being. Reprehending Suarez, for allowing it no more than an efficient per accidens. Durandus & A Dola are acknowledged by Churchman, (as Mr. Hickman is conceived to style himself in that Pasquil,) to deny God's concurrence to sinful acts, and by consequence to hold the positive entity of sin. Three Reverend Bishops have prefixed their approbation of what is asserted by Doctor Stearn, in his Animi Medela; of which I have given an account §. 20. And though I have not a convenience to examine the Truth of what is told me, 
Ariaga. Amicus. Cardinal de Lugo.  yet it is told me by a person of great repute for integrity, That Ariaga, Amicus, and Cardinal de Lugo, do ex prosesso assert the positive entity of sin. 

1. The Bishop of Damascus.  
2. Clau▪ Devillius.  
3. Emanuel Chalom▪ in approb. pr●fixis opuse Theol. Fr. Diotall.   I am sure the Bishop of Damascus, and Claudius Devillius appointed to censure Books by the Archbishop of Lions (Claudius de Bellieure) and Emanuel Chalom, his Vicar General, (An. Dom. 1611.) did very highly approve of what was taught by Diotall●vius of A●iminum, concerning sins having a positive being; from whence I groundedly conclude them to have been of that judgement. Mr Hickman confesseth he cannot deny, but that our Protestant Divines, 
The Protestant Divines (indefinitely) in their Disputes against the Papists.  in their Disputes against the Papists, do make a positive as well as privative part of original sin▪ (pag. 85.) and though he labours to salve the matter with a distinction of positive (out of Maccovi●s) yet that appears to be a shift, (and a shameful one too) by what I have cited from Doctor jackson and other Writers of greatest Note, and by what I shall cite from the Fathers also, (Chap. 5. §. 3.) as well as from some of the learnedest Moderns,) Chap. 5. §. 4.  
Last of all the REMONSTRANTS do say expressly, 
* REMON. in Exam. cens. c. 7. p. 85. A.  Culpa est actus hominis, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. A very short, but an important Instance.  
§ 26. The case in hand is so clear, that I need no other proof, 
By the explicit and implicit confessions of the Adversary's themselves.  than the confessions of those on the other side. For sure that Truth is irresistibly praevalent, which is submitted unto by such, as do most endeavour to oppose it. Doctor Robert BARON was one of the learnedst of those men, who were engaged (by education) to deny what they felt, and had a daily experience of; to wit, the positive being of sin. But yet he was forced to 
* 
ROB. BARON in Met. G●n▪ de naturâ mali; p. 49, 50.  
Resp. verum quidem esse illud quod afferitur in Argumento, Ipsam pos●●ivam Entitatem vitiosae actionis esse quid non appetibile, sed fugibile.— quia cum ea entitate positiva inseparabiliter connex● est quaedam Disconvenientia etc.   confess it to be a very great Truth, That not only the privation annexed to the vicious habit, but even the habit of vice itself, the very positive entity of the habit of luxury, and the positive entity of a vicious action, is not quid appetibile (or good) but fugible, (or evil.) An instance was given (from the objection) in the action of lying with a beast; which very action he confesseth to be quid execrabile. And though he saith that such an entity becomes a sin, by reason of a Disconvenience which is inseparably annexed, yet he doth not (by that) deny the positive entity of the sin, but only saith how it comes to be a sin, which all men say, as well as he, who affirm the most professedly its positive being. It being granted to be impossible for any action to be a sin, without some kind of disconvenience, as to the rule of right reason, and to the perfect nature and will of God. He also 
* Ib. p. 56, & 59  ascribeth, unto the will of man, a real efficacy and production of the effect. And farther saith that 
† Ib p. 57 Ens positiv●m est quod ponit aliquid in ea re cui attribuitur, ib. p. 64.  sin original is a natural propension of the will to evil. Nay giving the definition of ens positivum, he saith it is that which puts something in the thing to which it is attributed. And whether sin doth not do that, I leave the Reader to judge by his own experience. In a word he joins with Timpler, in refuting the vulgar Error (which hath imposed so much on Mr. Hickman) of sins having only a 
* Ib. p. 58.  deficient cause, and smartly showeth the absurdities, to which it leads.  
§. 27. Mr. Barlow also doth seem to have implicitly confessed the positive entity of sin, 
Mr. Barlow exer. 2. p. 75.  by acknowledging that God (in the sin of hating God) is merely positive in terminating the act of hatred, and does not actively excite the act. 1. If his meaning is only this, that God is passive altogether, and the sinner alone active, 
Deus Op. Max. se solum passiuè habet actum odii terminando; non active eum excitando. ib▪  in producing the act of hating God, than he grants the very act to be the creature of the creature, and not of God; which he cannot grant possibly, but by granting also, that the act itself (although positive) is wholly evil; Because he every where saith, (in terms equivalent to these,) that God is active in the production of every thing that is good. 2. If his meaning is precisely, That God is only passive, (so as merely not to hinder, but to suffer, or to permit,) whilst the sinner doth determine his will to hate God; Then he grants that Act of determining the will to a thing forbidden to be the mere production of the Creature, and by consequence a sin, for the reason now mentioned. And in granting that act which hath a positive being to be a sin, he must needs g●ant a sin to have a positive being. One of these two things I suppose he must mean, (a●d which of the two, it matters not;) because though he saith a little before, That 
* Deus Opt. Max. potest esse causa, vel occasio moralis, & objectiva malitiae in actu odii ad eum terminati etc. ibid.  God may be the cause of the very pravity (or obliquity) in the act of hating God, (which he certainly doth wish he had never said) yet he explains his meaning (of the word cause) to be nothing but a moral or objective occasion of that obliquity: which proves his sense to be only this, That God is altogether passive, (the conditio sine-qu●●on,) in the creatures determining his will to sin, (which determining of the will is a sin also) and in producing that act, which is intrinsically evil, and so the sin of hating God. If I have hit his right meaning, I have my end; But if I have not, I shall be glad to be told another, which may agree with the context as well as this which I have given▪ besides he confesseth (with Hurtado de Mendoz●) that in the exercis● of the will there is a positive act (p. 63.) such as is the act of willing sin. And that to will sin is sin, I know he will not deny.  

By numerous confessions of Mr. Hick. himself.  §. 28. But now Mr. Hickman, out of all measure confesseth the thing that he denies, I mean the positive being of sin. For 1. he confesseth it a sin, to hate God, which he also confesseth to be an action, and so to have a positive being. (p. 93, 94, 95.)  
Again 2. the first sin of Angels he supposeth to have been a proud desire to be equal unto God. (p. 103.) Now that pride and desire are both in the predicament of Quality, and have as positive entities or beings, as any qualities to be named, is so vulgarly known to every youngster, that Mr. Hickman dares not sure deny it, for fear the youngsters should fall aboard him, which he professeth to fear in another place. They might well fall aboard him for calling proud desire, an action, (p. 103. lin. 13.) as a little before he called hatred (p. 95. l. 17.) but that it is likely they know him too well, to think it much that a Thistle should bear no Grapes. I shall not therefore insist upon his no skill in Logic, (whilst again and again he takes a quality for all action, and a positive entity for a privation, unless he purposely writes against his own enterprise in calling a proud desire a sin,) but only pluck him by the ear, as Cynthius did Tityrus, and admonish him for the future not to act the ultracrepid●st, by taking upon him to be a Scholar and a School-Divine, when he was mimically ordained to be no more than a Lay-preacher. Could any man but Mr. Hickman have entitled his Book against a truth● which he was forced to acknowledge, whilst he meant to deny and disown it only?  
3. He doth not only acknowledge, that the act or habit of any sin hath a positive being, but further adds (beyond all example) That the privation itself is an evil Quality, (p. 56.) even that privation, which is called by some the formal part of sin; and is said by himself to denominate the act, or the habit, evil. Nor will a quasi superadded serve to do him a good turn. For let him call it an action, or any thing else, to which an Epithet may be added; he will still imply it to have a positive being. And whilst he saith [an evil quality] he implies the privation, which he so calleth, to be a concrete. Not remembering his famous saying, that he cannot so much as conceive of si●, unless as perfectly an abstract, (p. 54.) and that sin is synonymous with sinfulness itself. (p. 53.) Again he seems here to speak of an external denomination, as if he were not aware of what he was afterwards to say concerning the action of hating God, That it is intrinsically and essentially evil, not merely through the want of some Circumstance, (p. 94.)  
Again he saith, 4. That in hating God, the terminating of that act to that object is the sinfulness of the action. (p. 95.) Now we know it is an action, for the will to determine or fix an act upon an object, and so (according to Mr. Hickman) sinfulness itself hath a positive being, even whilst he saith it is but privative.  
5. He goes but one line farther, when he saith in plainest terms, that moral goodness and evil are rather modi entium than entia. (p. 95.) whereby he yields me as much advantage as I can wish to my whole cause. For when sin or moral evil, is allowed as much entity, as moral goodness, and moral goodness as little entity as sin; It must either be his Tenet, that sin hath also a positive being, or that goodness hath none at all. If the first, he at once betray's his whole cause: and withal makes God to be the Author of sin, (for he saith, He is the Author of all positive beings.) if the second, he must needs deny God to be the author of goodness, or lose the benefit of the shift, by which he would seem not to make him the Author of sin.  
6. Again, If the evil works themselves be positive, (which he confesseth p. 96.) there needs no more to be added by him. For that there is also some privation, none is concerned to deny, whilst what is positive in sin is so fully yielded.  
7. He grants as much as a man can wish, p. 102. viz. That man is the efficient cause of the evil of the Action. And the youngsters Argument against it, holds as much against good, as evil actions. See his Confession, p. 103.  
8. That the deficient cause is reducible to the efficient, the cause of the action per se, of the vitiosity per concomitantiam, he confesseth p. 103.  
9 Farther yet he confesseth, that sin in Scripture doth not signify abstractly, but that it signifies our faculties which do lust against the working of the spirit. p. 100 much less will he deny the very lusting itself to be a sin; which is as positive, as the faculties, to which the lusting is ascribed.  
Nay 10. he confesseth that a sin is an action, if he is not unpardonably impertinent, p. 102. for an account of which, see forward chap. 8. §. 24.   

CHAP. IU.  
§. 1. BUt Mr. H. being convicted of (what himself doth acknowledge) the greatest Blasphemy, 
Mr. H's distinction of the positive Act of ha●ing God and its obliquity frees him not from making God the Author of sin.  to wit, of making God to be the Author of sin, by bluntly affirming he is the Author of whatsoever is found to have a positive being, (by name, of that very action of hating God p. 95.96.) hope's to lessen the odium which cannot but lie on so foul a Doctrine, by putting his Trust in the common shift. I mean by making such a distinction betwixt the Act and the obliquity, as to entitle God unto the first, and the sinner only unto the second. That action of David, his lying with Vriah's wife, (which in Scripture is called Adultery) He saith is positive and from God, and therefore one of God's Creatures; And thus he saith over and over, 
look forwards on Ch. 5. S. 3.  (p. 79.82.95.96.) But the pravity, or obliquity, (which he calls the evil quality that doth denominate the Action) he is content to fasten upon MAN TOO, (ibid.) Now it remains that I endeavour to make him ashamed of so lewd a Refuge, as doth but serve to encourage (by giving shelter and protection) not at all to extenuate his great Impiety.  
§. 2. For first (to condemn him out of his mouth) he speaks a while after without the Vizor of this Distinction, 
Proved first out of his mouth.  whilst he saith (it doth belong to the universality of the first Cause to PRODUCE not only EVERY REAL BEING, but also the real positive. MODIFICATIONS OF BEING'S p. 95.] Now that the very repugnance of the Act to the ob●ect hath at least a Real (if not a positive) Being Mr. Hickman doth many times acknowledge, as when he ranks it with Moral Goodness in affirming both to be Modos entium. p. 95. 
the Field of 3. c. Church l. 23. p. 120.  That profound Divine and subtle Disputant, Dr. Field, allows nothing to be in the sin of hating God, but what is positive. The very Deformity that is found in it is precisely (saith he) a positive Repugnance to the Law of God. And his reasons for it are such as Mr. Hickmans' Teachers are puzzled at. But letting that pass, Mr. Hick. is convicted of the crime alleged in the Indictment, if the Repugnance hath nothing more than a real Being: nor dares he say, it hath no being at all; for that were to cast the whole Adultery upon God, by affirming Him to be the producer of all that is positive, or Real in it, (they are every one Mr, Hickmans' words) and to acquit the Adulterer from having any share in it, whereby he also doth infer him to be but Titularly such.  
§. 3. But secondly let us suppose, the man had never charged God in so gross a manner, 
2. By Reason.  as to entitle him to the production of all things Real; Yet his shift will not save him from being found to make God the Author of sin. For when he saith that Action of hating God is from God, he means it is from him as the mediate, or the immediate cause. If as the mediate, so as to move the second cause to be immediately the cause of such an action, it follows then that the 2. 'Cause being subordinate and determined by the first, to that Numerical and particular Action, which hath its specification from the influx of God, either the action of hating God cannot possibly be a sin, or not imputed as a sin to the second Cause (thus acted by the first, as hath been said;) But whatsoever it is, must rest upon God, as its Cause, and Author. If Mr Hick. (for an escape from this impiety) shall rather say it is from God, as the Immediate Cause, his case will then be so much worse, as it is worse by some odds to make God a sinner, then only the cause of his Creatures sin. Now besides that God is said to make the action which he forbids, (and at the Instant that he forbids it,) we know the obliquity to the action is so inseparably annexed, that the Author of the One must needs be the Author of the other, the inseparability is granted by Baronius (§. 5. p. 50.52.) and not denied (I think) by any. But I am truly so much in pain, whilst Mr. Hick. makes it my duty to expose him thus to public view, that I will only refer him to the several parts of my ' 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for the applying of this to his Distinction, and choose to show him the Danger of it, out of other men's writings: partly that Reason may not be slighted, for want of Authority to commend it; and partly to show him I am no sharper, than the necessity of the Case doth make it needful: Because no sharper than other men, who yet are famous for moderation. I will begin with Dr. Field, and the great Divines by him alleged; and then proceeding to Dr. Goad (one of the Synodists at Dort) to Dr. jackson, and Diotallevius, 
l. 3. c. 23. p. 12●  and other valuable Writers, I will conclude with Dr. Hammond, whom nothing but love to the truth of God, and perfect zeal to his Honour, could make to utter the least word that looks like sharpness to a Dissenter.  
§. 4. This distinction (saith Dr. Field) will not clear the doubt they move, 
3. By Authority in conjunction with Reason. Durand. l. 2. d. 37. q. 1.  touching God's efficiency and working in the sinful Actions of men. Whensoever (saith Durand) two thins are inseparably joined together, whosoever (knowing them both, and that they are so inseparably joined together) chooseth the one, chooseth the other also. Because though haply he would not choose it absolutely, as being evil, (and by the way no sinner doth so choose sin) yet in as much as it is joined to that which he doth will, neither can be separated from it, it is of necessity that he must will both: The case appeareth in those actions, which are voluntary and mixed; As when a man casteth into the Sea those rich commodities, to save his life, which he would not do, but in such a case. Hence it followeth that the act of hating God, and sinful deformity, being so inseparably joined together, that the one cannot be divided from the other, (for a man cannot hate God, but he must sin damnably) if God doth will the one, he doth will the other also.  

Suarez Metaphys Tom. 1. d. 22. Sect. 4. p. 522.  §. 5. This of Durand is confirmed by Suarez, who saith, He shall never satisfy any man that doubteth, how God may be cleared from being author of sin, if he have an efficiency in the sinful actions of men, that shall answer, that all th●t is said touching God's efficiency and concurrence, is true in respect of the evil motions of men's wills materially considered, and not formally, in that they are evil and sinful. For the one of these is consequent upon the other. For a free and Deliberate act of a created will, about such an act, and such circumstances, cannot be produced but it must have deformity annexed to it.  

●umel Disput. var. ad, primam & primam▪ 2. p. 104.  §. 6. There are some operations or Actions (saith Cumel) that are intrinsically evil, so that in them we cannot separate that which is material from that which is formal; as it appeareth in the hate of God, and in this act ☞ when a man shall say and Resolve, I will do evil, so that it implies a contradiction, that God should effectually work our will to bring forth such actions, in respect of that which is material in them, and not in respect of that which is formal.  
§. 7. And this seemeth yet more impossible (saith Dr. Field) if we admit their opinion, 
Dr. Field. ubi supra.  who think, that the formal nature and being of the Sin of commission, consisteth in some thing that is positive, and in the manner of working freely, so as to repugn to the rule of Reason, and L●w of God; so that it is clear in the judgement of those great Divines, that if God hath a true real efficiency in respect of the substance of these sinful actions, he must in a sort produce the deformity, or that which is formal in them.] And again the Dr. saith, If God doth determine the will of man to work repugnantly to the Law, he must needs move and determine it to sin; seeing to sin is nothing else, but to repugn unto the Law, (p. 125.)  

Dr. GOAD in his Disput. of the Necess. & Cont. of events, &c▪ 2 d. Arg. for Thes. 1▪  §. 8. It's a hard case (saith Dr. GOAD) when they have but one frivolous distinction to keep God from Sinning. — And then he confutes the evasion thus.— That which is a principal ●●use of any action, is a cause of those concomitants which accompany that action necessarily. This Rule is most certainly true. Therefore if God by his Decrees do force us to do those actions which cannot be done without sin, God himself (I am afraid to rehearse it) must needs be guilty of sin.— He gives an Instance in Adam's eating the forbidden fruit. And I will gratify my Reader with a Transcript of it, because the Doctor's Disputation's is not commonly to be had. If God decreed that Adam should unavoidably eat the forbidden fruit, seeing the eating of that fruit which he had forbidden must needs be with a gr●ss obliquity, I do not see (saith the Doctor) how this Distinction will justify God. For Adam sinned because he ate that fruit that was forbidden; But they say God decreed that he should eat that fruit which was forbidden, necessarily & unavoidably; The Conclusion is too blasphemous to be so often repeated. The Reader may see (as the Dr. goes on, by which 'tis plain he intended his Disputation for the Press) how well that common distinction holds water. Yea if this nicety were sound, man himself might prove that he committed no murder although he stabbed the dead party into the heart. For at his arraignment, he might tell the Judge, that he did indeed thrust a dagger into his heart, but it was not that which took away his life; but the extinction of his natural heat and vital spirits. Who seeth not the wild frenzy of him that should make this Apology? yet this is all our Adversaries say for God. They say his Decree was the cause that Adam took the forbidden fruit and put it into his mouth, and eat that which he had commanded he should not eat; yet they say he was not the cause of the transgression of the Commandment▪ etc. But let us hear Dr. jackson also. 
Doctor JACK●SON in exact. Collect. Book. 10. c. 5. p 3011 3012.   
§ 9 The Hypothesis, for whose clearer Discussion these last Theses have been praemised, is this; [Whether it being once granted or supposed, that the Almighty Creator was the cause either of our mother Eves desire, or of her actual eating of the forbidden fruit, or of her delivery of it to her husband, or of his taking and eating it, though unawares; the same Almighty God must not upon like necessity be acknowledged to be the Author of all the obliquities which did accompany the positive acts, or did necessarily result from them] This is a case or Species Facti which we cannot determine by the Rule of Faith: It must be tried by the undoubted Rules of Logic, or better Arts. These be the only perspective Glasses which can help the eye of Reason to discover the truth or necessity of the consequence; to wit, [whether the Almighty Creator, being granted to be the cause of our mother Eves first longing after the forbidden Fruit, were not the cause or Author of her sin.] Now unto any Rational man that can use the help of the forementioned Rules of Art (which serve as prospective Glasses unto the eye of Reason) that usual Distinction between the Cause or Author of the Act, and the Cause or Author of the Obliquity which necessarily ensues upon the Act, will appear at the first sight to be False or Frivolous: yea, to imply a manifest contradiction. For Obliquity or whatsoever other Relation, can have no cause at all, besides that which is the Cause of the Habit, of the Act, or Quality whence it necessarily results. And in particular, that conformity or similitude which the first man did bear to his Almighty Creator, did necessarily result from his substance or manhood, as it was the work of God undefaced. Nor can we search after any other true Cause of the First man's conformity to God, or his integrity, besides him who was the cause of his manhood, or of his existence with such qualifications as by his creation he was endowed with. In like manner whosoever was the cause whether of his coveting or eating of the Tree in the middle of the Garden, was the true cause of that obliquity or crooked deviation from God's Law, or of that deformity or dissimilitude unto God himself which did necessarily result from the forbidden Act or Desire. It was impossible there should be one Cause of the Act, and another Cause of the Obliquity or Deformity whether unto God's Laws or unto God himself. For no Relation or Entity merely relative (such are obliquity and deformity) can have any other Cause, beside that which is the cause of the (Fundamentum) or Foundation whence they immediately result. It remains then that we acknowledge the old Serpent to have been the first Author; and Man (whom God created male and female) to have been the true positive Cause of that obliquity or deformity which did result by inevitable Necessity from the forbidden Act or desire, which could have no Necessary cause at all▪] and more to this purpose p. 3013. etc.  
§. 10. Diotallevius doth also prove, that they who make God the Author of the positive act of hating God, 

Diotall. opus●: Theol. p. 84.57 101.  
Nullâ ratione potest Deus efficere, ut ad entitatem. Actus intrinsecè mali liberè eliciti non sequatur malitia moralis; quia implicat contradictionem, ut Actus intrinsecèmalus, v. g. actus ●dii. dei libere eliciatur & malus non sit, seu malitiam formalem conjunctam non habe●●● etc.   do make him the Author of the obliquity, Because (saith he) God himself cannot effect (what doth imply a contradiction) that the moral obliquity of an Act which is intrinsically evil and freely exerted by the creature, shall not follow (or rather attend) the positive entity of the act, which is such as hath been said, and so exerted. For it implies a contradiction, that an act intrinsically evil, (to wit, the act hating God) should be freely exerted, and yet not evil, or that it should not have a moral pravity conjoined with it. 2. They who hold all positive entities to be effected by God himself, must needs believe him to be the cause, as much of the worst, as of the best actions in the world; both because hating is as positive, when it is fixed upon God, as it can possibly be, when it is fixed upon the Devil; And because an obliquity is as unavoidable to the one, as rectitude or conformity can be possibly to the other. 3. If an immediate working of the formal obliquity, be required to make an Author of another's sin, than neither Man, nor Devil, (in persuading another to do wickedly) can possibly be the Author of it: because they are not any otherwise the causes of the obliquity, then by tempting to that act to which the obliquity is annexed. And for the very same reason, no creature could be the cause of any such sin within himself; because he doth not produce the moral obliquity of the act, but by producing the act to which the obliquity is annexed. 4. When we do absolutely and simply inquire after the cause of another man's sin, we do not inquire after the cause which immediately reacheth to the obliquity of the act, but after the inducing or moving cause, by which he is led to such a voluntary act, whose object is repugnant to the rule of Reason. (That is the method of Aquinas, De malo, quaest. 3. art. 1. & 3. & 1.2. q. 75. per totam) from whence it follows, that if God doth induce us efficaciously to an aversion from himself, and so to a hatred of his Divinity; it is every whit as true, that he is the Author of our sin, as that he induceth us efficaciously to that aversion and hatred which is intrinsically evil. And therefore Mr. Hickman must recant the first, or contentedly smart for the Impiety of the second.  
§. 11. Doctor STEARN is very severe, (and upon very just ground) to the use that is made of the same Distinction. 
Dr. STEARN de Animi Medelac. 11. p. 248, 249.  For he doth not content himself to say, that to be the cause of the action from which the obliquity cannot be separate, is to be the very cause of the obliquity itself, because the obliquity is annexed to the entity of the Action, and th●t in a manner unavoidable; Nor doth he only add this, That man himself is no otherwise the author of his sin, then as he is author of that action to which the obliquity is annexed; But he saith yet farther, [
* Proinde, si Deus est sciens malitiam esse ab actione Inseparabilem, & volen●, ipsam suo concursu producat, non t●ntum non immunis erit à malitia, verum etiam illius magis erit reus, quam ipse homo: utpote qui raro vel nunquam de malitia annexa cogitat, &c, ib. p. 249.  That if God, wellknowing the absolute inseparability of the obliquity from the action, doth willingly produce that very action; he is so far from being free from the obliquity of the action, that he is môre guilty of it, than the man himself, in whom that action is ●o produced; as who does seldom or never think of the obliquity annexed, quam Deus nunquam non cognoscit & animadvertit. Nay he chargeth the Adversaries with a higher blasphemy than that, even with making God more guilty than the devil; which how they can answer, let them consider whom it concerns. I shall only, for the present, subjoin his words. Immo, Daemons hominem ad peccandum tentantes, minori jure Authores peccati sunt censendi, quam Causa Libera Actionis illam producens, & non tantùm sciens malitiam esse illi annexam; Name Daemons non producunt Actiones quibus malitia est annexa, sed tantum solicitant, etc.— multo itaque magis Malitiae reus est, qui sciens & volens non tentat aut solicitat, sed actionem reipsa producit, cujus malitia (ut ab ea prorsus inseparabilis) ipsi quam clarissimè patet. What kind of Adversaries they are, whom the Doctor thus handles, and how much Mr. Hickman becomes concerned, he gives us to know by his two instances, in Twisse, and Zuinglius.  
§. 12. A whole College of Remonstrants, (men of renown for their piety and learning too) thought fit to shame the common subterfuge by these two ways of Argumentation. 
A whole society of Remonstrants in defence. Sent Remonst. circà prim. de praed. art. p. 254▪ Quandocunque causa superior & omnipotens ita inferiorem & impotentiorem movet, ae de. terminat, ut ea sic mota non possit non peccare, tum sane jure so. per. & omnip. causae tot● pec. cati culpa tran. scribetur. etc.  1. Whensoever a superior and omnipotent cause doth so move and determine the inferior and impotent, that it being so moved cannot choose but sin, Then must the guilt of that sin be wholly transferred on the superior and omnipotent cause. But according to those men, who affirm the positive acts of all the very worst sins to be the creatures and works of God, the inferior cause is so moved by the omnipotent and superior, as that it cannot choose but sin; Therefore according to those men, the sin is wholly to be transferred on the superior cause. 2. When two causes do concur to one action, (to wit the action of hating God) whereof the one act's freely, and the other of necessity, then must the cause which acts freely sustain the whole fault of its coming to pass. But according to the men aforesaid, God acts freely in the producing of such an action, (which M. Hickman reckons amongst God's creatures) and the inferior cause of necessity; Therefore according to those men, God sustains the whole fault of its coming to pass. And we know in the whole fault is included the obliquity, as well as the act.  

The Apologist for Tilenus in praef. Epist.  §. 13. The Apologist for Tilenus, doth make this Answer to the distinction. 1. That man doth seldom or never entertain sin, or consent to it, with a design to oppose himself to the divine Law, but to enjoy his Pleasure, and satisfy his appetites. 2. He supposeth that a man should consent to sin, with such a set purpose to oppose Gods Law. And then infers, that (according to Mr. H.'s Doctrine) that consent, and that purpose (being positive entities and acts of the soul) are from God and of his production, from whence it follows, either that man doth not sin when he commits such an act; or that the fault is imputable to God, who is (called by Mr. Hickman) the first cause of that Act. I wonder when Mr. H. will give that Author a Reply.  

Dr. Hammond▪ of Fundamentals ch. 16.  §. 14. But after all, and above all, I commend to consideration the words of the Reverend Dr. HAMMOND, who having showed how those Doctrines (which are commonly called Calvinistical) are so noxious to the practice and lives of men, as to be able to evacuate all the force of the Fundamentals of Christianity; 
p. 156.  (those I mean by him forementioned. 
p. 180. ) And coming to speak of the Distinction betwixt the act and the obliquity, which the Assertors of those Doctrines have commonly used as an Artifice, 
p. 178.  for the avoiding of those consequences, by which their Doctrines are rendered odious; at last proceeds to make it appear, [
p. 182.183.  That this is no way applicable to the freeing of God" from being the Author of that sin, of which he is said (by those men) to predetermine the act. For 1. Though a free power of acting good or evil, be perfectly distinct and separable from doing evil, and therefore God, that is the Author of one, cannot thence be inferred to be the author of the other, yet the act of sin is not separable from the obliquity of that act, the act of blasphemy from the obliquity or irregularity of blasphemy, the least evil thought or word against an infinite good God being as crooked as the rule is strait, and consequently he that predetermines the act, must needs predetermine the obliquity.  
Nay 2. if there were any advantage to be made of this distinction in this matter, it would more truly be affirmed on the contrary side, that God is the author of the obliquity, and man of the act, for God that gives the rule, in transgressing of which all obliquity consists, doth contribute a great deal, though not to the production of that Act, which is freely committed against that rule, yet to the denominating it oblique; for if there were no Law, there would be no obliquity; God that gives the law that a Jew shall be circumcised, thereby constitutes uncircumcision an obliquity, which, had he not given that law, had never been such; But for the act (as that differs from the powers on one side, and the obliquity on the other) it is evident that the man is the cause of that.]  
To conclude this Chapter. It is a thing so undeniable, that the Author of the act of hating God, must needs be the Author of the obliquity, that as the men of the Church of England affirm man to be the Author and the sole author of both, and God of neither, so the rigid Presbyterians (as well as Papists) affirm God to be the Author, not only of the act, but of the obliquity of the Act. Witness Mr. Archer (so much commended by Thomas Godwin) in his Comfort for believers p. 36.37. Mr. Whitfield also, and Mr. Hobbs, Occam in sent. 3. q. 12 (cited by Dr, Field p. 128.) and Mr. Hickman in effect, when he saith that God is the Cause of all Being's, p. 78. and p. 95. and Pet. Mart. in 1 Sam. c. 2.   

CHAP. V.  
v.. 1. THE positive entity of sin is so clear from Scripture, 
The positive entity of sin made undeniable from scripture.  and from the writings of all the Fathers both Greek and Latin; that as Mr. Hickman hath not attempted to give us Scripture for his opinion, so the FATHERS are very few, whose very figurative speeches do look that way. And their meaning is so conspicuous, by what the same Fathers say (before and after,) that if he drank out of the Fountains, 
Psal. 115.4. & Psal. 135.15▪ Idolum hoc loco (Inquit Beza, ad 1 Cor. 8.4.) sumitur pro simulachro ad Numen repraesentandum afficto. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1 Cor. 8.4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 1 Cor. 1, 28 1 Cor 7.19. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Isa. 41.24.  as I see he hath done out of several Cisterns, I admire the greatness of his delusion: His performance being no better, than mine or any man's would be, who should prove that an Idol hath not a positive being, (although the work of men's hands, and made of Massy Gold or silver) because it is said by the Apostle, an Idol is nothing in the world. Or that the Planters of Christianity had not only no positive, but not so much as a Real Being, because it is said by the same Apostle, that God hath chosen the things that are not, to bring to naught things that are. Yet this ad hominem, is a strong way of arguing; very much stronger than Mr. Hickmans', by how much that of the Scripture is the greatest Authority in the world. Now though it is said by the Holy Ghost, that Circumcision is nothing, that the foreskin is nothing, that wicked men are of nothing, that every man is but vanity, yea and altogether lighter than vanity itself, (which will be granted by all the world to have positive beings) yet doth he not say in any one text, That sin is nothing in the world, or that Blasphemies and Rapes have no positive being; 
1 john. 3.8▪  but on the contrary, sins are said to be the works of men and devils. And now to prevent any exception to the propriety of the word,  
§. 2. Those are properly called sins, 
God is fittest to be the judge of what is properly called sin.  which God himself in his written word doth commonly call by that name. And how many things are there that have positive entities or beings, (by the very confession of Mr. H. and all that are of his way,) of which wickedness and sin are found to be predicated in scripture? As for example, For the man to lie with the Master's wife, joseph called a great wickedness, and a sin against God. To take another man's wife, 
Gen. 39.9. & carefully compare it with vers. 7. Gen. 20.9. ● 2 King. 17.21  was called a great sin by King Abimelech. And jeroboam, in driving Israel from following the Lord, is said to have made them sin a great sin. David's sin is called a deed, that is, an act or fact 2 Sam. 12▪ 14. If St. Paul had not thought that some sins are actions, and that other sins are qualities, 
Rom. 7.5. Rom. 6.12.  he would not certainly have told us of the motions of sins, and the lusts of sins. The motions of sins which were by the Law, did work in our members to bring fruit unto death. (Rom. 7.5.) So in the 7. verse of that Chapter, he expresseth sin by lust, as lusting by coveting. And yet so far is the Apostle from ascribing those positive things to God, that speaking there of wilful sin (in the person of a Carnal unregenerate man) the doing that which he would not do, 
Rom. 7.20.  he doth not add (like Mr. Hickman) It is not I that DO it, but GOD that DOTH it in me. No, his words (on the contrary) are justly these, It is no more I that do it, but SIN that dwelleth in me. That I may not be overlong in so clear a case, I fain would know of Mr. Hickman; whether those works of the flesh which are manifest (saith the Apostle), and set in opposition to the fruits of the spirit, 
Gal. 5·19, 26, 21.  (and by an opposition of contrariety too, Gal. 5.17.) I say I would know of Mr. Hickman, whether those lusts of the flesh are not properly called sins▪ And whether Adultery, Fornication, Uncleanness, Lasciviousness, Idolatry, Witchcraft, Hatred, Variance, Strife, Seditions, Heresies, Envyings, Murders, Drunkenness, Revellings, and such like, have not real and positive beings. He will not sure deny this, because he knows that these things are either qualities or actions. Nor can he deny they are sins, because they are set in a contrariety to the Fruits of the spirit, and because it is added presently after, that they which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God. And (as I take it) they must be sins▪ for which the Doers are to suffer the loss of heaven, which is waited on with the pains of Hell too. When judas said, I have sinned, in that I have betrayed innocent blood & Cain complained that his sin was greater than he could bear, meaning the kill his brother Abel; who sees not that sin is predicated in Recto of two such actions, as are granted by all the world to have positive beings? It is but dipping into the Scripture, to find abundance of such examples.  

Confirmed by the Concurrence of Ancient Fathers.  §. 3. 'Twere easy to write ● just volume, in showing the concurrence of Ancient FATHER'S; and even the least that I can show (with a desire of Brevity) will be more than Mr. Hickman was able to wrest to his seeming interest. I cannot better begin, then with the great ATHANASIUS, whom several men's misapprehensions have helped to speak for their judgement, against his own. 
* Athanasius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, p. 3  First he delivers his true meaning, when he useth the expression of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 applied to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And therefore with the Apostle, he first applies it unto Idols, which had as positive beings as those that made them: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Next he sets down the reason, 
† 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 5.  why he useth that expression, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; and his reason is, because they are not from him who is indeed the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but from those free and depraved Agents, who revolting from their maker made them Idols or Gods of their own invention: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 4▪ where the lusts of the flesh (which he calls the body) are given as Instances of the sins, to which the creature was now descended, and by much repetition had made 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 4▪ ibid.▪ p. 5.  habitual. After this he asserteth the opposition of contrariety 'twixt vice and virtue, thereby proving the positivity as well of the one as of the other. And giving examples of those actions, as well as qualities, which man is able to produce by being a voluntary Agent, (abusing the Liberty of his will to 
** 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. pag. 5.  desires and lusts of his own 
** 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. pag. 5.  forging) he names the committing of Adultery, Murder, Rebellion, Blasphemies, Comumelies, Perjuries, plundering, Beating, Gluttony, Drunkenness, which though granted by all the world to be positive things, are affirmed by that Father, to be the wickedness and sin of the soul of man; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; p. 6. And to make it yet more undeniable, that he opposeth his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to the excellent Creatures of God himself, (whom he often calls the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪) and not to all that hath a positive being, 
† 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pag. 5.  He sets Concupiscencies or Lusts in opposition to the Creature; that is, the creatures of wicked men in opposition to those of God.  
Then showing the power of the soul to incite the members of the body, and 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p 6.  of herself to excite herself, he saith (in the 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p 6.  concrete) she formeth evil unto herself. And so he proceeds to show the error of certain Grecians, who held sin to have a substance, (and not to be a mere accident) A substance created by a God too, whom they would have to be coeternal with the Father of Lights, and the maker of sin as a second Nature, which from all eternity was collateral with the First. (First in Dignity, though not in Time.) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 6. which shows Mr. Hickman the strange Impertinence of what he citeth from Athanasius, p. 76. not only quite beside, but (as I shall show when I come thither) against his purpose. For the Father, having proved against those heretics, 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; p. 7.  That there is one only God, and that evil is a thing temporal, not derived from God, but from the voluntary creature endued with liberty of will, goes on (for several whole pages) to speak as much for my purpose, as I can wish him. He shows the folly of their distinction, who so endeavour to put a difference betwixt the act of h●ting God, and the sin of hating God, (which they call the obliquity of the act) as to affirm the first to be from God, and therefore good; the other evil, and from the Creature, 
† 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 7.  whereas 'tis impossible (saith the Father) that good and evil should be so inseparably together. For what he 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 7. Note, this ☞ is a Confirmation of the whole 4. chapter.  saith of a good and an evil God, is as true of a good and an evil act, and in a sense as cogent as that he speaks in; for it implies a contradiction, that one and the same should be a good and an evil act too, to wit, that the a●t of hating God should be no less a good A●t, as being from God, than it is an evil one, as having an obliquity which is from m●n. I say such a mixture of good and evil, in one and the same numerical act, must needs be absolutely impossible and contradictory, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And is not that an unchristian Fabric, which hath no better a Buttress whereon to lean? But I must hasten to other Fathers, before, and after Athanasius.  
DIONYSIUS the AREOPAGITE, how much soever he lived before the great Ath●n●sius, 
Ad quinti seculi ultima vel sexti initia pertinent quae Dionysii Areopagitae nomine laudantur. Dallae, us de confirmatione. p. 203  I thought the fitter in this place to follow after, the more conducible I thought it for the finding out his right meaning; of which at first I began to doubt, because I found him so much mistaken by so learned a person as Mr. BARLOW, to whom Mr. Hickman is beholding pag. 56. It's true he useth such expressions, as I lately showed and explained in A●hanasius, (and Master Barlow saith in what pages, though Mr. Hickman doth not.) But he useth the very 
** 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Dionys. Areop. de Diu. Nom. c. 4. p. 574.  same of God himself in some places, whom yet I hope Mr. Hickman will not thence conclude a mere privation, or a Nonentity. 
** 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Dionys. Areop. de Diu. Nom. c. 4. p. 574.  God (saith Dionysius) is deprived of essence. Nay 
† 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Idem de mystic● Theolog. c. 5. p. 45, 46.  He is neither a substance, nor a spirit, nor any thing of the things that are, or exist: shall an Atheist now say, that Dionysius was of his mind, and urge the letter of these words to bear him out? No, Mr. Hickman will tell him, the words are spoken in a sublime and figurative way, and must be explained by the context, to yield the Author's true meaning. The very same shall I say in the other case, That when the Father saith of sin, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he must be so understood, as Aquinas understood Austin, denying the 
* Look forwards on S. ●. num. 8.  act of sin to be anything; opposing that act (being an accident) to res simpliciter, which is substantia. And accordingly Corderius does render 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by substantia, not by essentia, much less by entitas. What gave occasion to Dionysius to speak of evil in that stile, holy Maximus tells us in his Scholion upon the place. For Dionysius having said, that that which is 
* De Divin. Nom. cap. 4. Sect. 18. pag. 570.  not doth desire that which is good, [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] and again a few leaves before, that there is a will in that which is not: 
† S. Maximus in locum jam ci●. p. 617.— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc.  Maximus tells us that the words being spoken against the Manichaeans, he must largely explicate what is meant by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and why the thing that is evil is called that which is not: of which, as I have spoken in the praecedent paragraph, so I shall speak once for all in the 5. § of this Chapter, Number 9 But if the Question is to be carried by words and phrases, even so the very truth will be found to rest on my side. For the 
† 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ib. pag. 618.  Ancients (saith holy Maximus) did express the same thing by the word matter, and extreme turpitude, which is expressed also by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or that which is not: and thence forwards when he speaks of things that are not, (meaning evils) he 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. ib. pag. 620.  explains himself presently by things material. In a word, Dionysius does give the reason, why that which is evil is said not to be, even because it is more remote from God, then that which is not in being. For that I conceive must be the sense of the Greek, (what ever was thought by the Translator, who seems not to hit the Father's meaning.) 
† Dionys. Aretina▪ op. de Diu. nom. c. 4. p. 571, 572.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Which how many several ways it makes against Mr. Hickman, the indifferent Reader is left to judge. So clear to me is the meaning of that figurative Writer, that he saith of the sinner (not only of the sin) that he is 
† 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ib. p. 575.  not in being, so far forth as he is a sinner, and desires nothing that is. Had Mr. Hickman prepared himself for the Reading of the book (if at least he ever read so much as a page or line of it) by reading the general observations prefixed to it by Corderius, in particular, 
* 
Baltha. Cord. observ. Gen. 8. p. 21.  
Baltha. Cord. observ. Gen. 8. p. 21.   that of his making God to be the position and 
* 
Baltha. Cord. observ. Gen. 8. p. 21.  
Baltha. Cord. observ. Gen. 8. p. 21.   privation of all things, [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] I think he could not have swallowed so great an error. That something is positive, as well as privative in sin, 
Note his Implying the activity of sin, whilst he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, p. 317.  Dion●sius (or whoever is the Author of that book, which is thought unduly to wear his name) hath sufficiently inferred by his answer given to this Question, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; to which he answers, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (pag. 580.) and again, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. (p. 584.)  
But I have dwelled so long upon these two Fathers, that I must study to be brief in those that follow: and that by satisfying myself with one or two instances out of each. The force of which I shall not show, (as I have hitherto done) but modestly leave to my Readers judgement. I shall only propose to consideration, whether those qualities or actions are not worthily called sins, of which the word sin is wont to be praedicate in recto. And whether that which is granted, to be a true proposition, (by all the world,) can possibly lose of its Truth, by the attempts of so gross a Fallacy, as à dicto simplicitèr ad Dictum secundum Quid.  
CLEMENS ALEX. storm. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. edit. Commel. pag. 219. & edit. Paris. p. 511.— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Here to sin is by such an action to pollute the Title of man, and is said to be placed (or to consist) in the action or operation, not substance, or essence; and this is the ground, why it is not the work of God. So afterwards sin not brought to repentance is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 5. p. 281. And though elsewhere he calls sin a variation from right reason, yet there is added a 
* Idem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 39 l. 39  positive entity of each, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. (But I am ready to break my promise, almost as soon as I have made it.)  
CYRILLUS HIEROS. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. edit morel. p. 30. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
HIERONYM. in Malach. c. 3. p. 284. A. Nequaquam levia putemus esse peccata, perjurium, calumniari viduam, & opprimere alienigenam, quae male sicio & veneficiis & adulterio comparantur.  
BASIL. in Hex. Homil. 2. p. 19 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
CHRYSOST. in 1. ep. ad Cor. c. 6. Hom. 16. p. 167. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉;  
ATHENAGORAS in Legat. pro Christianis. p. 35. c. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
ANSELMUS super 2. ad Hebr. Peccatum est vel facere vetita, vel non facere jussa.  
JUSTIN. MART. Q. & Resp. ad Orth. p. 419. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Sanct. THEOPHILUS ad Autolychum lib. 3. p. 125. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
TERTULLIAN. de Poenit. p. 375. Porrò peccatum, nisi MALUM FACTUM, dici non meretur. Nec quisquam benefaciendo delinquit▪— 
Ibid. p. 376.  cum Deum grande quid Boni constet esse, utique Bono nisi Malum non displiceret, quòd inter CONTRARIA sibi nulla Amicitia est.  
MACARIUS in Hom. 15. p. 100 c. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ (having spoken before of Adam's disobedience.)  
Hom. 24. p. 137. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Hom. 38. p. 204. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉— And long before (Hom. 3. p. 15. A.) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉;  
LACTANTIUS in Instit. l. 2. c. 7. p. 102. Dupliciratione peccatur ab insipientibus; primum quod Dei opera Deo praeferunt; deinde quod elementorum ipsorum figuras humana specie comprehensas colunt.  
— 
* l. 5. c. 18. p. 315▪  Haec facere, peccatum est.— 
† ib. c. 19 p. 316. ib. l. 6. c. 10. p. 349.  Nesciunt quantum sit nefas, adorare aliud, praeter Deum.  
Si libido appetit thorum alienum, licet sit mediocris, vitium tamen maximum est.— 
* ib. c. 17. p. 364.  Cupiditas inter vitia numeratur, si haec quae terrena sunt concupiscat, etc.  
— 
† ib. c. 20. p. 371.  Recens natos oblidere, maxima Impietas, exponere & necare, duplex scelus. See much more l. 5. c. 9 p. 299. especially c. 20. p. 319. So whilst the Blasphemy of Marcus the Magician, and his Followers, or their positive speaking against the honour of God's essence, is called an Impiety by 
* IRENAEUS adv hares▪ l. 1. c. 13. p. 94. ●▪  IRENAEUS, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 above all Impiety, he unavoidably implies the positive being of Impiety, which (I hope) M. Hickman will not affirm to be good; or say impiety is one thing, and sin another.  
AMBROS. de Cain & Abel. lib. 2. cap. 9 fol. 260. Quanto gravius pec●ato ipso, ad Deum refer Quod f●ceris? There the positive fact is said to be a sin, though the ascribing it to God (which is done by Mr. Hickman) is said to be worse than the sin itself; that is to say, ● greater sin.  
CYPRIAN. de Eleemosynâ, 1. Serm. p. 179. Coarctati eramus, etc. nisi iterum pieta● Divina subveniens,— viam quandam tuendae salutis aperuisset, ut Sordes postmodum quascunque contrahimus Eleemosynis abluamus. compare this with Daniel 4.27.  
— 
* ib. p. 452.  Quia voluntas non erat in culpâ, providit Deus generali Damnationi remedium, & suae sententiam Justitiae temperavit, haereditarium ONUS à sobole removens, & misericorditer ablutione & unctione medicinali corruptionis primitivae Fermentum expurgans.  
ORIGEN. ad joan. 2. in Cat. pat. Gr. p. 77. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉— 
* ib. p. 95.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
AUGUSTINUS Confess. c. 11. Talis motus (nimirum voluntatis) Delictum atque peccatum est.— 
* Id de lib. Arb. l. 2. c. 10. apud Author. Anim. med. p. 258.  Metus ille Aversionis, quod fatemur esse peccatum, vide quò pertineat, etc.  
SALVIAN. l. 4. p. 128. Furtum in omni quidem est homine malum Facinus; sed damnabilius ab que dubio, si Senator furatur aliquando. Cunctis Fornicatio interdicitur, sed Gravius multò est, si de Clero aliquis, quam si de populo fornicetur. Ita & nos qui Christiani Catholici esse dicimur, si simile aliquid Barbarorum Impuritatibus facimus, Gravius erramus. Atrocius enim sub sancti nominis professione peccamus— quanto minori peccato illi per Daemonia pejerant, 
Ib. p. 237.  quam nos per Christum? Quanto minoris Res Criminis est, Jovis nomen, quam Christi etc. The force of this last testimony may be learned by Mr. H. from Dr. Field. [It must not be said, that God is the original cause, that man hath any such action of will as is evil ex objecto, for if he should Originally and out of himself will any such act, he must be the author of sin, seeing such an a●t is intrinsically evil, so that it cannot be separated from deformity. p. 125, 126.] after this let Salvian speak— Nil ad Deum pertinens Leve ducendum est; 
Idem l. 6 p. 207.  quia etiam quod videtur exiguum esse Culpa, Grande hoc faciebat Divinitatis In●uria.  
EPIPHANIUS adv. Haer. l. 1. Tom. 3. p. 265. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
ib. p. 671. ib. p. 585.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc.— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
ib. p. 587. p.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc.— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
ib. p. 588.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. More instances may be seen p. 281.548, 549. And [to sin] is expressed at every turn, by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. All importing the positivity of sin.  
BERNARDUS de modo bene vivend. Serm 37 p. 1281. Superbia est R●●ix omnium malorum. Superbia & Cupiditas in tantum est unum malum, ut nec superbia sine cupidita●e, nec cupiditas sine superbiâ esse possit.— Quid est omne peccatum, nisi Dei Contemptus, quo ejus praecepta contemnimus?— 
* Idem in Serm de vervis s●p●entiae, p. 1702.  Luxuria flagitium est, Avaritia spiritualis nequiti●, unde illud vitium corporis, istud Animae, viz. quia nullum est peccatum, quod ita inquinet corpus, sicut Luxuria,— similiter super omne peccatum, avaritia inquinat Animam; unde & Idolorum servitus dicitur.  
Nor do I see how 
* BASIL▪ Homil. 1. in Psal. HIERONYM. l. 2. adv. Pelag. ATHAN. Orat. con. Gent. & de eti▪ Chris●i incar p. 58. AUGUST. confess l. 8 c. 5 THEM. ALEX. Paedag. c. 3. p. 162 D. ib. l. 2. c. 1. p. 143. THEOPHYLACT. in Rom. 1.13.  those Fathers, who say that an habit of sin is gotten, by the custom of such acts as are avoidable of themselves, can be imaginable not to hold the positivity of sin; or to hold that such acts can be imputable to God, which they affirm the Creature might have avoided. Evitabilium Actuum consuetudine censent generari in homine habitum vitiosum, so Ger. VOSSIUS in Hist. Pelag p. 215.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  

* GREGORY. NAZIAN▪ Orat. 40. pag. 13.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so he calls Idolatry 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Orat. 38. p. 620.  

† TATIANUS Assyrius in Orat. cont. Graecos. p. 164.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  

* PROSPER de vi●â Contempt l. 3. c. 2 p. 254.  Initium omnis peccati superbia— non solùm peccatum est ipsa, sed nullum peccatum fieri potuit, potest, aut poterit fine ipsâ, siquidem nihil aliud omne peccatum, nisi Dei contemptus est, quo ejus praecepta calcantur; which compare with Ecclus. 10.13.  
FULGENTIUS ad Monim. l. 1. p. 275. so also p. 302 Si initium peccati requiritur, nihil aliud nisi superbia invenitur,— quae tùm initium sumpsit, cum Angelus adversus Deum elatus, per concupiscentiam (quae est radix omnium malorum) volens usurpare etc.— mala opera, hoc est, Peccata, praescisse tantum; non etiam praedestinasse: quia ibi non opus Dei esse dicitur; 
ib. p. 311.  sed judicium. Ideo in peccato opus Dei non est— sine operante Deo malus operatur.  
LOMBARDUS l. 2. d. 2. Dist. 40. c. Opera ipsa peccata sunt, ut furta, stupra, Blasphemiae,— sunt nonnulli actus, qui peccata sunt— & mala per se— quaerimus quis Actus peccatum sit,— dignosces quis Actus sit Peccatum,  

The Confession of VOSSIUS for the greatest part of them.  In lieu of producing more Antiquity in words at length (which would increase my Readers trouble) I shall insert the confession of Learned VOSSIUS, 
* Plerique Veterum ita loquun●ur. quast peccatum originale censeant esse aliquid positivum, sive habitum, sive alium Qualitatem. Histor. Pelag. l. 2. par. 3 209.  That the greatest part of the Amients do so speak, as if they thought Original sin to be something positive, (to wit,) either a Habit, or some other Quality. I call it the confession of GERARD VOSSIUS, because I find it is none of his own opinions, that Original sin is something positive, whatever he speaks of actual sins. And I think his confession to be of the greater consideration, because of his being so very conversant in Ancient writers, and because or his ability to understand their true meaning, and lastly of his unwillingness to understand them against himself. Nay when he speaks of those Ancients, who were otherwise minded, he takes their meaning to have been, (not so much that this sin was a mere defect of Original Righteousness, 
Potius habi●ualem à Deo aversionem etc. ibid. p. 210. Aliqui, uti corpus à corpore formatur ita animam st●tuunt ab animâ accendi etc. p. 211.  as) that it was rather an habitual aversion from God, proceeding from the defect of Original righteousness.  
They that held it to be a quality, could not otherwise hold it (in his opinion) then by holding also that the soul was begotten with the body, and sin begotten with the soul; or that the spirit being created was at least infected by the flesh, some thought that the soul was as it were kindled by the soul in generation; and that the Leprosy of sin in children's souls, was by infection from the leprosy with which their parents▪ had been infected. Of which Opinion was TERTULLIAN, 

APOLLINARIUS by name, a●d the greatest part of the Orientals, as JEROM witnesseth.  
RUFFINUS & AUGUST. apud eundem Voss ibid.   APOLLINARIUS, and the greatest part of the Eastern Fathers. [Quomodo corpus ex corpore, sic animam nasci ex animâ, TERTUL. Apoll. & maxima pars Orientalium autumavit, uti scribit Hieronymus ad Marcellinum & Anapsychiam, Epist. 45.] RUFFINUS also and AUGUSTIN are cited for it. But because of the latter 'tis said by VOSSIUS, that he durst not publicly avow, what was privately his opinion; His words are the worthier to be observed.  
For thus he writeth to OPTATUS, se neque legendo, neque orando, neque ratiocinando, invenire potuisse, 

AUGUST. Epist. 157. held the traduction of the soul; and original sin to be a positive quality.  
Affectio quaedam mala qualitatis, & morbidus affectus Carnis, AUG. dicitus l. de. Nupt. c. 31.  
Adversus julian. lib. 5. cap. 3. see him also cited by Aquinas for making Original sin an H●bi●. 1.2 q. 82. art▪ 1 He also calls sin malam qualitatem, l. 6. contra I●l. c. 7.   quomodo cum animarum Creatione peccatum Originis defendatur. And for more to this purpose the Reader is referred to other places, as Epist. 28. ad Hieronymum, Lib. 10. in Genes. ad lit. cap: 23. & lib. 1 Retract. c. 1. Nay even then when he is doubtful of the souls extraction, (whether created or begotten,) he still adheres to his opinion, that it is infected by the flesh with some positive Quality, as wine grows sour by being put in a sour vessel. And VOSSIUS himself doth so explain him. Haec enim mens est verborum Augustini, [profecto aut utrumque vitiatum & exhomine trahitur, aut alterum in altero, tanquam in vase vitiato corrumpitur, ubi occulta justiti● divinae legis includitur. Quid autem horum sit verum, libentius disco, quam dico, ne audeam dicere quod nescio.] It seems he doubted whether the soul were ex traduce, or not; although, unless it were ex traduce, he knew not how to defend Original sin. But that he concluded it had a positive entity, appears as by all that hath been spoken, 

De peccat. mer. & Remiss. l. ●. c. 16. in julian. l. 4. c. ult.  
Georgius SOHNIUS tom. 11. loc. de p●cc. Orig. & Philip. MARNIXIUS Sanct. ALDEGONDIUS.  
Ger. Voss. ubi. supra. p. 214.215.216.   so by the motus bestialis, & bestialis Libido by which he expresseth the sin of Adam.  
§. 4. As the most of the Ancients, so the most eminent of the MODERNS, have held the soul to be ex traduce, and Original sin a positive entity, two of which number are commended by learned Vossius (but just now cited) for men of Excellency and Renown. And Vossius himself, in divers places, doth sufficiently ass●rt the positivity of sin: not so much when he saith of Original sin, that it inclines the mind to vicious acts, so that it may, and is wont to be called a Habit; as when he saith of its effects, (which ar● Actual sins) that they are grown over the soul as a spiritual Rust▪ that carnal Concupiscence is wholly vicious, as being a deflextion of the appetite from the Law of its Creation, from whence ariseth a disposition and propensity to Rebellion; that Morally vicious Acts are freely drawn out from that propensity; that by the custom of such a●ts there is engendered in the sinner a vicious Habit. cum affectus sic effraenis lascivit, ut rationis imperium antevertat, plurimùm adversus rationem insurgat, ac (nisi diligenter à ratione valletur) facile aurigam rationem curru excutiat: In graviori tentatione semper sit superior nisi ratio speciali juvetur Dei Judicio.  
2. And as they who affirm the propagation of the soul so also they, who deny that God doth concur to the act of sin, do eo ipso hold sin to have a positive being: such as LOMBARD, BONAVENTURE, ALEXANDER ALENSIS, ASOTO, DURAND, AUREOLUS, the learned ARMACHANUS, and others cited by Dr. STEARN in his Animi Medela, p. 256, 257. And though the Master of the sentences doth seem to some not to define which is truest, (the negative or the affirmative of G●ds concurrence to acts of sin, but leaves the Reader to judge of both tenets, (to Dist. 37.) yet he is cited by CAMERACENSIS (l. 1. q. 14.) for the defence of the Negative. Because according to his opinion, God doth only permit those evils which are sin, (as saith our learned Dr. FIELD, p. 128.  
3. HEMMINGIUS (the Scholar of Melanehthon and known to be of his mind) defineth sin, in general, 
Nicol. HEMMINGIUS i● opusc. Theol. Cl●ss. 1. c. 8. de peccato. p. 355▪ 356.  by disobedience against God, and affirms Disobedience to import four things in holy writ, Defect, corruption, inclination, and action. Original sin he defines to be a propagated corruption of humane nature, in which there is a material and formal part. The Material (saith he) containeth, 
Duo sunt observanda in peccato originali, materi●le & formale, materiale est in ment defectus,— In cord concupiscentia, p. 356.  both a defect in the intellect, and a concupiscence in the heart. In the fall of Adam there was a concurrence of these 8. sins 1. A doubting the truth of God's word. 2. A loss of faith, or incredulity. 3. Curiosity. 4. Pride. 5. Contempt of God, 6. Apostasy. 7. Ingratitude. 8. A murdering of himself, and his posterity. And is expressed in Scripture by divers names: Concupiscence, Flesh, the old man, the Law of sin, sin dwelling in us, Rebellion, the law of the members, and sometimes sin without any epithet. 
* De actuali peccato dicendum est, quod rectè definitur esse cogitalum, dict●m, factum, omissum, pug. nans cum lege Dei. Se●, peccatum actuale est omnis actio pugnans cum lege Dei, cum in ment, tum in voluntate, & cord, tum in membris externis. p. 358.  Actual sin he defines to be something done, omitted, said, or thought, fight with the law of God. (Or as he puts it in other terms) Actual sin is every action committed against the Law, both in the Intellect and the will and in the heart, and the outward members. Thus that Regius Professor, famous for learning and moderation.  
4. GREGORY MARTIN of Silesia, 
GREGOR. MARTINI apud K●ckermannum in si●●. log. part. 2. p. 653, 654▪  stating the sin of our first parents, 
Lapsus accipitur pro actu hominis, qui vi●iosus si●, & quo aliquid malè agit, aut in alterum committie.— aquipollent lapsus primorum parentum, & peccatum, aut Reatu● etc.— Nos priori modo sumimus peccatum, prout est actio, ut patebit p. 654.  begins to expound the word Lapsus, which he saith importeth a vicious act, with which a man does any thing ill, and is the same with peccatum. Then coming to speak of the term original sin, he professeth to take the word for the positive act of eating the fruit which was forbidden. And so the expression of Original sin (he faith) doth also include an actual. From the importance of the word, he comes to speak of the thing signified. Which first he consider's as to its Genus, which he saith is Action. It's genus rem●tum is actio hominis. It's immediate genus, is actio vitiosa, & privativa. Mark good Reader; he doth not say 'tis a mere privation, but a privative action. Positive in one respect, as 'tis an action; though privative in another, as destroying the Agent from whence it is. Take that excellent Logician in his own expressions of himself.— Vidimus nomen, Genus secundo loco considerandum est, quod vel remotum, actio hominis; Propinquum actio hominis vitiosa; proximum Actio vitiosa, destr●ens ipsum agens, seu privativa. upon this I lay the greater weight, because the judgement and approbation of another great Methodist and Logician, even KECKERMAN of Dantzick, adds credit to that of this wise Silesian.  

FRANCO BURGERSDI●IVS in Institut Meta. l. 1. c. 20. p. 122 123, 124. Hine sequitur, malum bono potius esse contrarium, saltem quoad proprias forma●, qu●m privatiuè op●oni.  5. A late professor of Philosophy in the University of Leyden, and a great Aristotelian, saith, that evil includes ens, and adds a real relation to it, after the manner that Good doth. And this he affirmeth of every evil. [Malum ergo omne, simili modo quo bonum, includit Ens & Enti addit Relationem realem, quâ, quod malum dicitur, ita se habet ad aliud, ut illi inconveniens atque adversum sit.] To which he adds, that those relations are contrary, and have contrary affections; from whence it follow's, (as he goes on.) that good and evil are opposed, rather contrariè, than privatiuè, and that according to their proper forms too. Convenientia & inconvenientia, being no less contrary, than equality and inequality. His reason is, because a thing is not said to be evil to any one, for being only not convenient, but in as much as it is adverse, or affirmatè inconveniens (p. 123.) To the objection which he foresees, he answers thus. This is the nature of immediate contrariety, that one extreme is inferred from the negation of the other. And he means, by Inconvenient, whatsoever is positively adverse to that which is convenient.— licet inconveniens, & adversum sit positiuè quicquid non est conveniens, etc.— All which doth strengthen my Reply to Master BARLOW'S Answer to Aquinas. (for which look back on chap. 3. §. 13.) He concludes with a caterum, actiones sunt malae per se; Habitus, quatenus ex hujusmodi actionibus orti sunt, quae rationem culpae habent. p. 126. If BETULEIUS had not been of the same opinion, he would not have used that proposition, wherein sin is praedicate of that which will be granted by all to be a positive entity. Racha fratri imprecari, peccatum est. (Betuleius in Lactant. l. 6. c. 16.)  
6. I forgot (till just now) to note the Doctrine of Mr. CALVIN, 
CALVIN, Instit. l. 2. c. 1. S. 8. fol. 75. opera in nobis profert, quae Scriptura vocat opera carnis, quali● sunt Adulteria, furta, etc. quicquid in homine est, aut ut breviûs absolvatur, totum hominem non aliud ex seipso esse, quam concupiscen●iam.  who saith that sin original doth bring forth in us those works of the flesh, Gal, 5.19.) which he also calls sins, though positive entities. Nay he saith our whole nature is quoddam peccati semen; that sin hath a force and an operation; that the whole man of himself is nothing else but concupiscence.  
7. It is observed by ALSTED, that as the Hebrews call original Jezer hara, plasma malum; so peccare, 
johan. Henr. ALSTED. in Lex. Theol. c. 8 Cicero. in 3. paradox. peccare, est tan. quam limites transilire, junius in l. de pec. Adami primo, q. 1. c. 2. p. 92. Bellarminus apud Alsted. ubi supra.  to sin, doth signify nothing but an action; not omission, or absence, or mere privation. And as Cicero defines it, by leaping over the hedge which the law doth set us; so accordingly by junius, it is derived from * pecucare; because a sinner, like a stray sheep, doth leap over mounds. And Bellarmine saith, that evil surpasseth good in this respect, that it aboundeth more in expressions; for to signify an Action, we have peccatum, crimen, delictum, scelus, facinus, flagitium, culpa, erratum. And after all we have vitium, which peculiarly signifies an habit; whereas to signify an action, or an habit of virtue, we only use the word virtue.  
8. CHEMNITIUS speaking of the sin against the holy Ghost, 
CHEMNITIUS in Harm. Evang. c. 59 p. 792. Gerhard, in Har. Eu. p. 70.  reckons up six Ingredients in it, whereof the most if not all, have a positive being. And GERHARD does the like by the sin of Peter, who abjured his Saviour no less by his works, then by his words; adding perjury to cursing; and both, to lying. Whence he notes the fruitfulness of sin, for which 'tis called the Devil's net, Prov. 5.22.  
If I shall now add GROTIUS, who is instar multorum (although but one, 
GROTIUS de Ver. Chr. Relig. edit. Lugd. 1633 p. 27, 28▪ ) no knowing Reader will look for more. He, in setting forth the verity of Christian Religion, to all the nations of the world which have a praejudice to the Gospel, takes special care to let them know, that when God is said to be the universal cause, or the cause of all things, it is only meant of those things that are good, or of all those things which are endued with a subsistence, and are commonly known by the name of substance; 
* Nihil enim prohibet, quo minus ipsa, quae subfistunt, deinde causae sint accidentium, quales sunt actiones. This is the judgement also of Prosper and Austin. lib. sent. ex August. pag. 444.  which substances are the causes of certain accidents, such as are actions; And therefore God is thus freed from being the original cause of sin. So that 'tis clearly his opinion, that sins of commission at least are Accidents, even because they are actions, which will be granted by all to have a positive being.  
§. 9 And this doth prompt me to show the way of reconciling the words unto the meaning, 
The several ways of RECONCILEING such Writers unto themselves, who plainly holding the positivity of sin, do sometimes seem to speak against it.  and of proving undeniably what must be the true meaning of certain Writers, whom some men's prejudices and praepossessions have unhappily tempted them to mistake.  
1. When they say that all entities are good, they only speak of all those, which are the works of God's creation, or unavoidably produced by natural Agents, so as the origin of their being is duly imputable unto God; which all our voluntary actions cannot possibly be. For  
2. When it is said in the common Axiom, That the cause of the cause, is the cause of the ●ffect, it is meant of causes which are physically and essentially subordinate. (as saith the Learned BISHOP OF DERRY in his Reply to Mr. Hobbs.) It is meant of such effects; 
Bish. BRAM. HAL'S Reply mihi p. 105.  as do follow their cause by an antecedent necessitation. But the case is quite otherwise when the effects do not follow by a necessity of nature, but by the intervention of humane liberty. (for which I have the suffrage of Dr. Stearn.) Again 3. it is meant of such effects, 
Anim. Medel. p. 270.  as proceed from such second causes, as transgress not the order they ought to have upon the first. (and for this I have Aquinas 1.2. q. 79. art. 3. When God is said to work all things, (Eph. 1.11.) it is meant in the same restrained sense, in which it is said by S. james, that every good and perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, (jam. 1.17.) Implying the contrary to be from below, as coming up from the Father of Lies. And therefore  
4. When it is said, 
In what sense God is said to be Almighty, see LOMBARD l. 1. dist. 42. F, G.  That God is the Maker of all things visible, and invisible, (in the Nicene Creed) it is explained in the COLLECT for Evening Service, [O God from whom all holy desires, all good counsels, and all just works do proceed etc.] It is not set thus, (as Mr. Hickman, and the Libertines, it seems, would have it) O God from whom are all desires, holy and unholy; or from whom are all counsels, good and evil; or from whom are all works, just and unjust. I say Mr. Hickman would have it thus, because he saith, the very work of hating God is from God, pag. 95, 96. nay he saith that every positive entity is either God, or from God (p. 75.) and from him as his Creature, (p. 79.) Nay that every real Being is produced by the first cause, that is by God, (p. 95.) Now it is granted by all the world, That all thoughts, words, and actions, all desires, counsels, and works, have either a positive, or a real, (and indeed a positive) being. Which being is not diminished by any addition of good, or evil. For to hate God, is as real, and as positive a thing, as to hate the Devil.  
5. When it is said of God, that he can do every thing, (job. 42.2.) and that to him all things are possible, (Mat. 19.26.) it must needs be meant with a Restriction of all things that are good: because there are Texts which say the contrary, to wit, that he cannot do every thing; as that he cannot deny himself, 2 Tim. 2.13. and that all things are not possible to him; as that it is impossible for God to lie. Tit. 1.2. In a word, It is no truer, that God can do all things, (meaning things that are good,) then that he can do nothing, which argues uncleanness or imperfection. I may say to Mr. Hickman, as the ancient Fathers were wont to do unto the Heretics, 
See correct copy. p. 22, 23. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  (Austin to Faustus, and Origen to Celsus, and Isidore to the Sceptic, God can do all things, that is, all things that become him; yet cannot do any thing that is evil, because he cannot not be God. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Or as the Reverend Bishop Bramhall to Mr. Hobbs, (p. 93.) God is said to harden the heart, not causally, but occasionally; that is, by Gods doing good the sinner takes an occasion of doing evil. And as this is a good consequence, [such a thing is from God, therefore it is righteous;] so this consequence is as good, [such a thing is unrighteous, therefore it cannot proceed from God.] We must not therefore thus argue, A Lie is no real thing, because it is Impossible for God to cause it; but rather thus, because it is impossible for God to cause it, therefore all things real are not from God. And therefore  
6. When it is said of sin, that it is nothing, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Dionys. Areop. Peccatum est nihil▪ Aug. de lib. Arb. l. 1.  or not in being, that it hath no essence, or is not amongst the things that are, (as Dionysius the Areopagite, and others speak,) me thinks the very extremity of the literal falsehood, should have convinced Mr. Hickman that they are figurative expressions. And no more to the support of his sinking cause, than it would be to that Atheist's, who should dispute against the veri●y, because against the wisdom and power of God, by citing the words of our Apostle, [The foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men. 1 Corinth. 1.25.] how many blasphemies might be broached from the many 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or seeming contradictions of holy Scripture, if by rational distinctions we might not be suffered to reconcile them? As it is said by Saint Paul, 
Rom. 1.20▪  that the invisible things of God are clearly seen, (and being so are very visible;) and as it is said by the Comedian, hoc aliquid Nihil est; so I may say with great reason, hoc nihil est Aliquid. This nothingness of sin is something positive. And I will prove that Mr. H. himself is nothing, at least as well as he proves that sin is nihil positivum, nothing positive. For M. Hickman is a man, who thinks himself something. And St. Paul hath said it, [If a man think himself something, when he is 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ Being nothing, he deceiveth himself. Gal. 6.3.  nothing, he deceiveth himself, Gal. 6.3.] Mr. Hickman cannot be ignorant, that generation and corruption are two species of motion; whereof the first is defined to be motus à Non esse, ad esse; the second to be motus ab esse, ad Non esse. But would he not be thought a prodigious Disputant, who should write a Book of ten sheets, to prove that Generation is a creation out of nothing, and so that the Generant is a God? or that to die, is to be annihilated, and so that there is not a Resurrection? Yet those two definitions will bear him out to M. Hickman, however ridiculous he would be to all men else. But as the meaning is, that corruptio est motus ab esse tali, ad non esse Tale; so something positive, simpliciter, may be said to be nothing secundum Quid. And in this very sense those words are spoken by the Psalmist, Mine age is nothing in respect of thee, Psal. 39.5. But to make it yet more apparent,  
7. By whom can the writings of the FATHERS be better explained then by themselves? If then the very same Father who saith at one time, that 
* Peccatum nihil est, inquit Bernard. in annum. B. Mar. S●rm. 1. p. 123.  sin is nothing, doth also say at another, that 
† Quid est omne peccatum, nisi Dei con●emptus, quo eju● praecepta con●emnimus 〈◊〉 l. de mo: 〈◊〉 viv. Sir. 37. p. 1281  Sin is no other thing then a contempt of God, (an example of which is in my Margin) 'tis plain that the former proposition must be explained by the latter▪ the like example I showed out of Scripture, and out of the writings of ATHANASIUS, in the first and third Section of this present Chapter, and the like may be showed of all the rest, by the several citations of the third and fourth Sections. So what is said by AQUINAS and his Followers amongst the SCHOOLMEN, must of necessity be explained by such conspicuous assertions as these that follow▪— 
a AQVIN. in 1.2. qu●st. 75. art. 1.  omne quod fit, habet Causam, sed peccatum fit: est enim dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum, contra legem Dei— 
b ibid.  Dicendum, quod peccatum est Actus quidam inordinatus: & ex parte actus potest habere per se causam.— 
c ibid. ad 1.  Peccatum non solum significat ipsam privationem Boni, quae est Inordinatio; sed significat actum sub tali privatione etc.— 
d ibid. ad 3.  nihil habet rationem mali, antequam applicetur ad Actum.— 
e ib. art. 2.  Ipse voluntatis actus, praemissis suppositis, jam est quodd●m peccatum.— 
f ib. ad 2.  Pe●catum consistit principaliter in actu voluntatis.— Peccatum nominat ens & actionem cum quodam defectu. Thus frequently and plainly doth Aquinas assert the positive entity of sin, and therefore by this we must explain him, and reconcile him unto himself, whensoever he seems to say the contrary; or at least accuse him of contradictions. So he saith of original sin that it is 
* Sicut aegri●udo corporalis— all. quid habet positivum▪ Ita etiam peccatum originale— non est privatio pura, sed est quidam corruptus Habi●us. Idem. 1.2. q. 82. ar●. 1. ad. 1●  not a mere privation, but a corrupt Habit, comparing it to a bodily disease, which hath something 
* Sicut aegri●udo corporalis— all. quid habet positivum. Ita etiam peccatum originale— non est privatio pura, sed est quidam corruptus Habi●us. Idem. 1.2. q. 82. 〈◊〉. 1. ad. 1●  positive, as well as privative.  
8. It must be carefully observed in ANCIENT WRITERS, 
An accident opposed to Res simpliciter. Se● Prosper's scent. ex Aug p. 444.  that because an accident cannot exist without the subject of Inhaesion which is substantia; and because substantia is ens per se subsistens; they do often take res to signify a substance, and express an accident by nihil, or non existens; meaning, non per se subsistens. Which as I have hinted by some examples already given, so now I will make it undeniable by one taken out of Saint AUSTIN. Who 
* Augustin de persect. Justitiae non longè à pri. lib. in resp. Ratiocin. 4. to 7.  saith of the very act of sin, (which is acknowledged by all to have a positive being) that it is not any thing. Actus peccati non est Res aliqua. To which Aquinas makes Answer, 
† AUGUST. nominat ibi Rem id quod est Res simpliciter, sc. substantiam sic enim actus peccati non est Res. AQV. in 1.2. q. 79. Art. 2. ad. 1. GREG. NYSS. Hom. 5. in Ecclesiasten, p. 417. opposeth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as that is explained by substan●ia, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  that by res he means substantia, which is res simpliciter; not intending to deny, that it is an Accident, which (with Aquinas) is res secundum quid. And therefore GROTIUS (in imitation of the Ancients) opposeth such accidents as actions are, to things which have a true subsistence. Cum diximus, Deum omnium esse causam, addidimus, eorum, quae ve●è subsistunt. Nihil enim prohibet, &c (ut superius paulo cit.) so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is opposed to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by Maxim. on Dionys. p. 317.  
9 Again it must always be carried in mind, that all those expressions of the Nonentity of sin were taken up in opposition to SCYTHIANUS, and MARTION, 
The MANICHAEAN heresy occasioned some figurative expressions.  and the following crew of the MANICHAEANS, who ascribed to evil a being of itself, and by itself, and that eternal, no less then God. 
* TERTUL. advers. Mar. l. 1. c. 1. & 23. & 26. HIERON in N●hum. c. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  Nay duos Deos adfert (saith Tertul. of Martion) tanqnam duas symplegadas naufragii s●i. Scythianus (before Manes) composed four books, in which he asserted two distinct, and coequal principles of 
† 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. EPIPHANIUS l. 2 tom. 2. Haer●s. 45. seu 55. pag. 619. B. D.  things, to wit, of white and black, of moist, and dry, of body and soul, of heaven and earth, of just and un●ust, of good and evil. Now however this Heresy is very worthily exploded by all true Christians, yet right may be done upon a very wrong ground. And so it is, if all the ground be the Nonentity of sin, which yet the Fathers did only use (by a 

Ex omnibus Physico●um, sive Metaphysicorum terminls obseuris, nulli explicatu digniores, quam 〈◊〉 duo, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Meric. Casaub. de verb. usu. p. 134.  
Manichaus having expressed Substantia by Natura, Aliquid & Res.   catechresis) in opposition to that substance, or self-subsistence, which that many-headed-sect ascribed to evil. And this I say in justification of the Fathers and Schoolmen, from those mistakes of their meaning, by which the mistakers would make them fall from a great error into a greater. It being worse (of the two) to think that sin hath no being, or that God is the Author, (if it hath any) than to think that good and evil did proceed from two fountains, and both eternal.  
10. I am exceedingly confirmed in what I say touching the Fathers, and their acception of the word nature, res, and aliquid, by what I find to be the judgement of learned VASQVEZ, whose words I think worthy to be inserted somewhat at large. [Observandum est (inquit) Patres fere omnes, 
* VASQUEZ. Disp. 95. c. xi.  Doctrinam Manichaei, obiter, aut ex professo, refutare voluisse, qui ass●rebat substantiam aliquam in se & ex se malam esse; omnem autem substan●iam naturam appellabat, & aliquid, & rem. (sicut Aristoteles in Categor. c. de substantiâ, omnem substantiam dixit esse hoc aliquid. 
As Aristotle himself by Hoc aliquid. ) Quare nomine Naturae quoties S. Patres disputant cum Manichaeo de hac re, non com●le●tuntur operationem & accidentia, (quae- aliquam habea●t naturam,) sed solam substantiam, secuti sententiam Aris●otelis, 
Whom the Ancients followed in their expressions. Not including Accidents in the word nature. But granting ●in to be an act, and the work of our will.  (2, phys. c. 1. &▪ 5. Metaph. c. 4.) qui solùm materiam & formam naturam, appellat▪ Immo ex his proprie solùm formam, materiam autem mataphori●è tantùm. Contendunt igitur Patres, nullam esse naturam substantiae malam, quatenùs substan●ia & natura est; De actu verò non loquuntur. Concedunt enim malum esse opus arbitrii nostri, & actum. Sicut Augustinus l. de perfect. iustit. qui ratiocinatione 4. quaerit, quid sit peccatum, Actusne, an Res. Quia ●i res est (inquit) habeat Auctorem; & si Auctorem habet, jam alter erit auctor, quam Deus, alicujus rei. Quod si hoc impium est, necesse est dicere, peccatum esse actum, non rem. 
An example taken out of S. AUSTIN. — Patres non tam curarunt propriam rationem vitii & peccati in genere moris exprimere, quam per aliquid conjunctum nobis magis notum eam desc●ibere. Quare cum per boni privationem peccatum definierunt, non sunt ita intelligendi, quasi sit ipsa essentia & ratio formalis peccati, sed quia est necessario peccato conjuncta, & Christianis maximè nota. Multò enim faciliùs per negationem intelligimus.  
11. To this let me add (what does just now occur to my present purpose) That substantia with many FATHERS, as well as with GROTIUS and other MODERNS, 
Why ens many times is used only for substantia.  hath often carried away the name of ens; because ens is Analogum, (as every smatterer in logic knows, though Masters in it sometimes forget,) and the common Rule is here verified, Analogum per se positum pro famosiori stare praesumitur. Whosoever therefore is found to say, Peccatum est non ens, must be known to mean that it is not substantia, unless he be one who dares add, that it is not an accident. And so if any is found to say, that every finite en●ity is produced by God, he must be charitably concluded to understand every substance, unless he shall dare to add also, That God produceth as well the worst, as the best of actions. It being granted by all the world, that the former are accidents, no whit less than the latter.  
12. Some perhaps, in good earnest, 
How unhappily some men confute the MA●NICHEES.  do think the best way to confute the Manichees, is by saying that sin is nothing real, Because, denying it such a being as Manes gave it, and yet allowing it a being, (although not that) it must needs have a being either from God, or some Creature. If they shall dare to say from God, they sadly fall into the Blasphemy, which Manes (or rather Scythianus) devised his principle to avoid. If they say from some creature, they make that creature a kind of Creator, in making it able to give a being, where God himself doth give none.  

How the sinner is able to give the whole being unto his sin.  But (omitting that this last were the safest error, if it were any) these men do not consider, that God was able to make a creature with such a light of understanding, and such a liberty of will; as to be fitly left 
* Ecclus. 15.14  in the hand of his own counsel; and to be a self-determiner, to this or that object which lies before him; And so to be an Artificer of such unclean works, (by abusing the liberty of his will,) as could not by any possibility have been produced by his Creator. God made man upright, but he hath 
* Eccles. 7.29.  found out many inventions. And if it be in the power of man, to give being unto any thing, most easily may he be thought to give Being unto s●n; sin itself being no more, than what is displeasing to God Almighty; and no where else to be imagined, much less to be, but in the voluntary actings of created Agents, in contrariety to the law which they receive to act by. That so it is, is very evident, by the negative precepts of the Almighty, whereby he forbids us to give a being to this, or that, which he tells us he hateth the being of. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife, is as much as to say, thou shalt not put such a concupiscence in being. And yet to covet another man's wife, is as positively something, as to covet his own; and more positively something, than not to covet another man's; though that is the vice, and this the virtue.  
13. They indeed who deny this natural freedom of the will, 
How they that deny it, must submit to the MANICHEES, or worse.  must either yield to the Manichees, or else do worse, as hath been showed. But this being granted, there needs no new principle (as the Manichees dreamt) for the production of what is evil. For he that may do good (by ma●king use of that Talon which God hath given him) hath eo ipso the power to do the contrary, unless he is irresistibly and unavoidably good, which no man is, on this side heaven. Now since both the habits and acts of sin, are as positive as the habits and acts of virtue, (and equally reducible to the species of Quality, and that there needs no other power for the production of the former, than what is given us, whilst it is given us to be truly free agents; It will be fit to make it appear, that I have not only my private, but public reason also for what I teach.  
§. 6. DIONYSIUS the AREOPAGITE, 

The concurrence of the Learned, both ANCIENT and MODERN, for the Affirmative, That the sinful Agent is the sole cause of the sinful Act.  
DIONYS. AREOP. de Coelest▪ Hiera●. c. 1. p. 1.2.   who refells the two principles in the Manichaean sense, doth set them up, and assert them in the sense of the Scripture. Affirming God to be the principle of every thing that is good, and the Devil on the contrary of every thing that is evil: to wit, the evil of sin, which is evil properly so called. He asserts the first in these word● of Saint Paul, (Rom. 11.36.) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. which he explains by the Restriction thought fit to be added by Saint james, (c. 1. v. 17.) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 etc. he affirms the second in these terms— 
* De Diu. Nom c. 4. sect. 18. p. 570. cum quâ confer. p. 571.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Yet (3.) the 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ibid. p. 574.  power to sin (though not the act of sin itself) he rightly affirms to be from God; which power is innocent, as in Adam and the Angels before their Fall▪ who could never have sinned, if before they actually sinned, they had not had the power to sin. But for the exertion of that power into act, that being evil 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 etc. pag. 577▪ & pag. 578.  cannot possibly proceed from so good a fountain.  
IGNATIUS in ep. ad Magnes. p. 53. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
JUSTIN. MARTYR. in Apolog. 1. pro Christ. p. 35. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. see him especially in Quaest & Resp. add Orthod. p. 396. & 436.  
TERTUL. contra Martion. Lib. 2. cap. 5, 6. Suae po. testatis invenio hominem a Deo constitutum lapsumque hominis non Deo, sed Libero ejus Arbitrio deputandum.  
ATHANASIUS (de anima humana loquens) in orat contra Gent. p. 5.— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
ib. p. 7. — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
* Neque ullam ej●s substantiam esse, Petrus Nannius interpretatur p. 8.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And very much more to this purpose p. 9.37. & 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  de Incar. verbi dei p. 57, 58.  
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 58.  
AUGUSTIN. Retract. l. c. 9 per totum. Malum non exortum nisi ex libero voluntatis Arbitrio,— Quid opus est queri unde iste motus existat, quo voluntas avertitur ab incommutabili bono ad commutabile bonum, 
Deu● non est causa ejus, quod homo sit deterior. Idem apud Aqu. 1.2. q. 79. Art. 3.  cum eum non nisi animi & voluntarium, & ob hoc culpabile esse fateamur, etc.  
Quae tandem esse poterit ante voluntatem Causa voluntatis? Aut igitur voluntas est prima causa peccandi, aut nullum peccatum est prima Causa peccandi.  
Non ergo est cui rectè imputetur peccatum, nisi voluntati, voluntas est quâ & peccatur & rectè vivitur.  
NAZIANZ. orat. 40. p. 671. apud. D. Barl. p. 52. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vide D. D. Hammondi, Annot. in 1 Cor. 8.4.  
FULGENTIUS apud Aqu. 1.2. q. 79. art 3. Deus non est ultor istius rei, cujus est Actor.  
PROSPER▪ in senten. ex Aug. p. 444. Iniquitas per ipsum facta non est, quia Iniquitas nulla substantia ●st. Mark h●s Reason, and the two things which it implies. 1 That iniquity is an Accident, and 2. Such, as is not from God; and therefore elsewhere he saith, 
Idem in lib. de ingratis. p. 573.  that the sole cause of evil deeds is the liberty of the will— ad quam solam male gesta recurrunt.  
CLEM. ALEX. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 167. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
ib. p. 169.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And so in the place above cited (§. 3) he saith all substances have their production from God, but not all Actions or operations, unless when they are good. The Original of the evil he 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Idem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 219.  im●putes to freewill. And thus he disputes against them, who feigned another creator even of substances, beside the only true God. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
CYRILLUS HIERO. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 30. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, citing that Text Eccles. 7.30. And that of the Apostle Ephes. 2.10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And after in the same page, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and a little after, p. 34. speaking of the Devil, and applying to him that of Ezek. 28.12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
ib. p. 34.  he adds, it was very well said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
AMBROSE de Cain & Abel. l. 2. c. 9 fol. 260. H. Qui peccatum suum ad quandam (uti Gentiles asserunt) Decreti aut operis sui Necessitatem referunt, Divina arguere videntur, quasi ipsorum vis Causa Peccati sit.— sed quanto gravius Peccato ipso, ad Deum refer quod Feceris, & Reatus tui invidiam transsundere in Authorem, non Criminis, sed Innocentiae?  
EPIPHANIUS l. 1. To. 3. Haeres. 36. p. 266, 267, 268. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Nothing can be without God except sin— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Idem l. 2. tom. 1. Haer. 64. p. 587.  and more to this purpose p. 265.588. yet (saith he) God doth not hinder men from sinning (by violence or force upon their wills) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, p. 671.  
AUGUSTIN. de civet. Dei, l. 5. c. 9 Malae voluntates à Deo non sunt, quia contra naturam sunt, quae ab illo est.— Sicut omnium Creaturarum Creator est, ita omnium potestatum dator, non 
* Mala voluntas Peccatum dicitur metonymicè, se● Lombard. l. 4▪ dist. 50. A.  voluntatum: where by the will, he means the action of the will.  
§. 7. That God gives only the power to act what he forbiddeth, and that no more is meant by those Fathers, 
The power to act is from God, but the vicious action is not.  who say that all things in some sort do come from God, (still implying the act itself to be solely from the creature when it is wholly against God, as the act of hating God is confessed to be,) I have already made apparent by divers instances recited. And Doctor Stearn hath done it by divers others, (An. med. l. 2. p. 256, 257.) of which I shall mark but three or four.  
ANSELMUS de concord. Praed. & Praesc. Nulla Res habet potentiam ullam volendi aut faciendi nisi illo Dante.  
AUREOLUS in 2. D. 37. Neque ego video quod dicunt, omnis actus est à Deo (dato quod sit positivus) nisi fortè conservando potentiam quae elicit, & naturam actus elicitivam.  
ALEXANDER ALENSIS part. 2. q. 100 Adjuvat ipsum ad actionem in quâ est malum; quia dat Potentiae, sive Libero Arbitrio, quòd possit operari.  
RICHARD. ARMACHANUS l. 17. Quaest Armen. c. 3. Nec Deus attingit hoc modo actiones immediatè ad actum, seu effectum productum, sed ad agens immediatum ipsius effectus; puta intellectum, aut voluntatem. — Si quis poterit ex sacris Scripturis probare hanc cooperationem divinam, cum omni agente creato; erit mihi mirandus, & libenter probationem illam acciperem; quoniam hoc facere me nescire fateor.  
LESSIUS de Perf. Diu. l. 11. c. 3. Hac ratione, Creaturae possunt dici instrumenta respectu Dei, & Deus omnia per illas operari; omnia (inquam) bona, non mala, quae Deus non intendit, neque ex perfectione virtutis à D●o insertae, sed ex defectu Creaturae sequuntur.  
DURANDUS 2. D. 37. Action's non procedunt à Deo, nisi secundùm indifferentiam ad bonum & malum. Deus enim non est causa actionum liberi arbitr●i, nisi quia liberum arbitrium ab ipso & est, & conservatur; sed liberum arbitrium in esse cons●rvatum, adhuc est indifferens ad eligendum Actum bonum v l malum, nec determinatio ejus ad malum, est à Deo. Actus enim malus naturam bonam sed imperfectè bonam (cujus Author Deus est) non necessariò sed liberè sequitur. Naturae itaque imperfecte bonae, non De● (qui Deus est non volens iniquitatem) imputandus est. (vide Anim. Med. l. 2. p. 270.)  
FULGENTIUS de Praedest. ad mon. l. 1. p. 251. Sicut ergo peccatum in eo non est: ita peccatum ex eo non est. Quod autem ex eo non est, opus ejus utique non est. Quod autem nunquam est in opere ejus; nunquam fuit in Praedestinatione ejus.— Peccatum, homo, non ex praedestinatione Divina; sed ex voluntate sua, malè concupiscendo, coepit, & malè operando, perfecit. But I return f●om this Ancient, 
p. 302.  to other Writers more modern.  
MELANCHTHON, de cau. pec. p. 48. Diabolus pater: id est, primus fons, & causa mendacii. Discernit autem Christus mendacium à substantia: quasi dicat, substantiam quidem habet Diabolus aliunde acceptam.— Habet autem proprium quiddam Diabolus, non à Deo acceptum, videlicet mendacium: id est, peccatum, quod libera voluntas Diaboli peperit. Neque haec inter se pugnant,— substantiam à Deo conditam esse & sustentati, & tamen voluntatem Diaboli & voluntatem hominis causas esse peccati. Quia voluntas abuti libertate sua potuit, seque à Deo avertere.— Primus Author peccati est Diabolus. 
ib. p. 49, — Haec mala non sunt res conditae à Deo, sed horribilis destructio humanae naturae. 
ib. p. 50. — Voluntas libera Evae propriè & verè erat causa suae actionis, ac sponte se avertit à Deo.— Quia peccatum ortum est à voluntate Diaboli & hominis, nec factum est Deo volente, sic erant conditae voluntates, ut possent non peccare. Est autem causa contingentiae nostrarum actionum Libertas voluntatis. (p. 51.)— Imò Ecclesia Dei, 
ib. p. 53.  cum sciat Deum verè, seriò & horribiliter odisse libidines Neronis, nequaquam dicet eas aut necessariò accidisse, aut volente Deo accidisse.— Deus est essentia— volens justa, casta, non volens pugnantia cum suâ ment, injustam crudelitatem, incestas libidines, etc. 
ib. p. 55, 56. MELANCHTHONS' Distinction of the first cause sustaining, but not assisting the second, in evil actions. — Deus adest Creaturis, non ut Stoicus Deus, alligatus causis secundis, ut moveat simpliciter, sicut movent secundae: sed ut agens liberrimum, susten●ans naturam, & suo consilio aliter agens in aliis.— Sic agit Deus cum voluntate, sustentans & juvans ordine agentem: Sed non juvans ruentem contra ordinem, etsi eam sustentat. Sic enim condidit voluntatem Evae, ut esset liberum agens, quod posset tueri ordinem, aut deficere. Sit igitur haec crassa solutio: secunda causa non agit sine prima, scilicet sustentante. Hoc universaliter verum est: sed non semper adjuvante. Non enim adjuvat prima effectum, quem non vult. Est igitur voluntas Evae immediata causa sui actus, cum avertit se à Deo. And again, Sed Christianis necesse est discernere bona & mala. Secunda non agit sine prima, scilicet sustentante: sed multa facit prima causa praeter secundas, quia est agens liberum. Et secunda, libera: ut voluntas Evae vitiose agit sine primâ adjuvante, quia talis facultas est libertas. And again, Adest Deus suo operi, non ut Stoicus Deus, sed verè ut liberum agens, sustentans creaturam, & multa moderans. This shows the meaning of MELANCHTHON, when he saith in one place (in compliance with the vulgar) that original sin i● nihil privativum, which according to the Rule of aequipollence in Logic, must needs be tantamount to aliquid positivum. And this he shows to be his meaning, by saying it is that which requires a subject; that it is an 
** Vitium originis est ipsarum partium hominis inquinatio & confusio (ib. p. 49.) accedunt motus— qui sunt res positive, etsi sunt motus errantes, & quaedam ordinis Confusio etc. p. 50.  Inquination and confusion of the man; which confusion he explains by wand'ring 
** Vitium originis est ipsarum partium hominis inquinatio & confusio (ib. p. 49.) accedunt motus— qui sunt res positive, etsi sunt motus errantes, & quaedam ordinis Confusio etc. p. 50.  motions, which he also saith are things positive. And he illustrates it farther by a ship that is tossed with wind and tempest, as well as destitute of sails and oars. By the former confusion he means original; and actual sin by the latter: giving his instance in Nero's 
† 53. He also saith (in collat. Wormat.) Peccatum vel est defectus, vel inclinatio, vel actio pugnans cum lege Dei.  lusts, which he denyeth to have been by the will of God, they having been sins, though positive entities. By which Mr. H. may understand his misapprehensions of Melanchthon p. 68 besides his forgetfulness of the proper task he hath set himself, which is not to prove that some sins are privative, but that no sin is more than a mere privation.  

Defence. sent. Rem▪ circa 1. de praed. art. p. 250.  The REMONSTRANTS call it a blasphemy, to say that no creature can either do more good, or f●wer evil acts, than now he doth. And yet that this is the sequel of Master Hickmans' Doctrine, the Apologist for Tilenus hath well evinced.  

M. BAXTER of judgement. p. 151, 152.  Mr. BAXTER himself (it just now comes into my memory) doth frequently ascribe a self-determining power to the Free will of man, however Biased by habits. And though himself hath printed as blasphemously as the most, in charging God with the causing of evil, (which, two lines after, he calls a truth,) yet he trounceth some of his brethren, for holding God the determiner of the will in every sin, as the first efficient immediate physical cause. And also saith of Freewill, that 'tis a high self-determining principle, the great spring of our actions. (of judgement. pag. 152.) But Mr. B. (as many others) is produced by me in no f●● place; I not observing any order either of dignity or of time, but giving to every one a place, as he meets my memory, or my eye.  
The words of GROTIUS deserve great heed, 
GROT. de ver. Chr. Rel. p. 27, 28.  whilst he saith that the liberty of a man's will is not vicious, but able by its own force to produce a thing that is vicious; that is an action; meaning that a vicious action (as the action of hating God) is merely from the sinner (man or Devil) and not without impiety to be ascribed unto God, either as a mediate, or immediate cause. And though I cited some part of his words before, yet (not to fail of his inten●) I shall entreat my Reader to weigh the whole. Neque ab eo, quod diximus, dimovere nos debet, quod mala multa evenire cernimus, quorum videtur origo Deo adscribi non posse, ut qui perfectissimè, sicut ante dictum est, bonus sit. Nam cum diximus, Deum omnium esse Causam, addidimus, eorum quae verè subsistunt. Nihil enim prohibet, quominus ipsa, quae subsistunt, deinde causae sint Accidentium quorundam, quales sunt actiones. Deus hominem & mentes sublimiores homine, creavit cum agendi libertate, quae agendi libertas vitiosa non est, sed potest suâ vialiquid vitiosum producere. Et hujus quidem generis malis, quae moraliter mala dicuntur, omnino Deum adscribere auctorem nefas est. p. 27, 28.  
LYCERUS vindicating God from the very same calumny, 
POLYCAR. LYCERUS in Harm. Evang c. 103. p. 1460.  with which Mr. Hickman hath not feared to asperse him, saith that the Devil did pecc●re ex semetipso, (according to our Saviour joh. 8.44.) that he alone is pater & fons malorum, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the first inventor of evil things: to which he accommodates that of Austin, Quomodo Deus pater genuit filium veritatem, sic Diabolus lapsus genuit quasi filium mendacium.  
God is said to be omnipotent, not because he can do all things (saith LOMBARD out of Augustin) but because he can do whatsoever he will; 
PET. LOMBARDUS l. 1. dist. 42. p. 248▪ D. E. F. Omnipotens est, ●o● quod possit omnia facere, sed q●ia potest efficere quicquid vult. etc. vide August. Enc●i●▪ cap. 96. in fine tom. 3.  who cannot will to do any thing, but what is good. But there are some things (saith he) which God cannot do, 
v. Ar●ic. condemn. & excomm. à Stephan● Paris. Epis●. & per Magistros Parisienses. ad calcem Lomb. p. 953, 967, 969.  to wit, those things which are unjust, sunt alia quaedam quae Deus nullatenus facere potest, ut p●ccata. (p. 247.) Non potest Deus facere injusta p. 248. These following Doctrines, [quod voluntas hominis ex necessitate vult & eligit, & quod liberum Arbitrium est potentia passiva— & quod necessitate movetur ab Appetibili,— item quod dignitas esset in causis superioribus posse facere peccata, Item quod al●quis faciat aliquid omnino, ut Deus vult ipsum facere volu●tate Beneplaciti quod talis peccet, etc.] were condemned with an Anathema, by the Bp. of Paris and all the Professors of Divinity in that university A. D. 1270. & 1341. together with the Blasphemies of joannes de Mercurio of the Cistercian order, that God is in some sort the cause of the sinful act; 
ibid. p. 971. col. 1, & 2.  And that whatever is caused by the will of the Creature, is so caused by virtue of the first cause. And that God is the cause of every mode of the act, and of every Circumstance that is produced. All which are the Blasphemies asserted as Necessary truths by Mr. 
† p. 79, 95.96. etc.  Hickman, & accordingly do call for a condemnation.  
Bp. BRAMHALL shows it to be his judgement, whilst he censures Mr. Hobbs for saying, 
Bp. BRAMHAL in a reply to T. H. Animadv. p. 94.95  that God wills and effects, by the second causes, all their actions, good and bad; and saith it implies a contradiction, that God should willingly do what he professeth he doth suffer. Act. 13.18. & Act. 14.16. Then he thus states the matter. God causeth all good, 
id. ib. p. 97.  permitteth all evil, disposeth all things both good and evil.— The general power to act is from God, (in him we live move and have our being,) this is Good. But the specification and Determination of this general power to the doing of any evil, is from ourselves, and proceeds from the free will of man— it is a good consequence; 
ib. p. 101.  This thing is unrighteous, therefore it cannot proceed from God.  

Diotallevius in Opusc. Theol p. 103. p. 2. q. 80 〈◊〉▪ 1. ad 3.  Thus Aquinas and others are also expounded by Diotallevius, not to mean that God is any cause of the evil act, but that he doth not withdraw his necessary support from the will, which abuseth its liberty in determining itself to the evil act, and so that God is only the condition without which we cannot do evil, not the cause by which we do it. And so saith 
* Greg in 2. d. 34. & 37. q. 1 art. 3. ad 8. & 12. C●preol▪ ib. q. 1. art. 3. Scotus in 2. d 37. q. 2 Suarez in opusc. l 2. de concursu Del ad actus malos. c. 3.  Aquinas, Licet Deus sit universale principium omnis intentionis motus humani quod tamen determinetur voluntas humana ad malum consilium, hoc non esse à Deo, sed ab ipsâ, again he saith, non à motione divinâ sed à disp●sitione humanae voluntatis oriri, ut malae potius action●s quam bo●ae sequantur. He also 
* Greg in 2. d. 34. & 37. q. 1 art. 3. ad 8. & 12. C●preol▪ ib. q. 1. art. 3. Scotus in 2. d 37. q. 2 Suarez in opusc. l 2. de concursu Del ad actus malos. c. 3.  citys for his opinion what I have cast into the Margin; and of which the result is this, D●termi●ation●m ad produc●ndam hu●●s actus en●itatem esse à voluntate humanâ, non autem à Deo, & Deum ita nolle anteceden●er, ut haec entitas sit; ut eam e●iam esse patiatur, suum concursum non subtrahendo: si conditio id exigat ex Creaturae libertate opposita. p. 92.93.94. mark how it is expressed by Dr. GO AD.  
God made Adam able to be willing to sin, but he made him not to will sin,— that he chose death, 
Dr. GO AD at the end of his Dispt. Ms.  it was by the strength of his will given him by God, but God did not bind him to choose death, for that were (a contradiction) a necessitated choice— if the Nature of a voluntary Agent be well observed, this point will be most evident.] And now the judicious Dr. Hammond will be the fittest to shut up all.  
He that first gives the Law, and then pre●etermines the Act of transgressing (the disobedience, 
Dr. HAMMOND of Fundamentals ch. 16. p. 183, 184.  the doing contrary to) that law, that first forbids eating of the tree of knowledge, and then predetermines Adam's will to choose and eat what was forbidden, is by his decree guilty of the Commission of the act, and by his Law the cause of its being an obliquity: And indeed if the obliquity, which renders the act a sinful act, be itself any thing, it must necessarily follow, that either God doth not predetermine all things, or that he predetermines the obliquity; and Regularity bearing the same proportion of Relation to any act of Duty, as obliquity doth to sin, it cannot be imagined that the Author of the sinful Act, should not be the Author of the obliquity, as well as the Author of the pious Act is by the disputers acknowledged to be the Author of the regularity of it.  
To conclude this Chapter in the words of Dr Reynolds, 
* Dr. ED. REYNOLDS of the sinfulness of sin. p. 212. in 4to.  Let not any man resolve sins into any other original, than his own Lusts.   

CHA P. VI  

An account of those things which Mr. H. calls his Artificial Arguments.  §. 1. HAving bestowed so much paper on what is thought of most moment, I shall need spend but little in the dispatching of those flies, to which Mr. H. gives the name of Arguments Artificial p. 69. The first he confesseth was Mr. Barlees. [If sin as sin be a positive entity, than it is a thing in itself good. For 'twas added by Mr. B. but now substracted by Mr. H.) every positive thing is good.  
Sect. 2. To this I answered 
‛ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ch. 3. p. 10. ●o p. 153.  many things (of which Mr. H. replieth only to a few,) As 1. That if sin is a thing positive, he seeks to prove (by this Argument) that sin is good. 2. That I had proved sin a thing positive, in my two last sections; which continuing firm and not disproved, evinceth the force of his Argument to serve for nothing, but only to prove that sin is good. 3. That a thing which is privative in one respect, is also positive in another. As that which is privative of life and sight, must needs be positive of Death, and blindness. 4. That Mr. B. himself did grant as much, in confessing the efficient cause of sin, and saying, there may be something of positive in a privation. 5. That in saying sin is privative, he confesseth it is not a mere privation, because a privation is but the abstract of privative; and what is most positive in one case, may be privative in another. 6. That sin is not conceivable, unless as a concrete, (which hath something positive as well as privative) there being no kind of difference betwixt David's lying with Bathshebah, and hi● Adultery with B●thshebah, at the time of her being Vriahs' wife. 7. That bonum Metaphysicum hath quite another signification, then bonum morale, to which alone we oppose sin, or malum morale, 8. That a Libertine, a Ranter or a Carneadist will be glad to introduce an opinion that sin is good, by calling it bonum Met●physicum, and confounding that with bonum morale. 9 That the subject of Metaphysics is ens quatenus ens, real illud, not omnimodo positivum quatenus positivum, and so (in one sens●) it comprehendeth Res & aliquid. 10. That bonum metaphysicum doth not signify good in English, as Canis astronomicus doth not signify a dog in our english streets and apprehensions. 11. That Dr. Twisse was betrayed into one of his worst errors [that it is better to be tortured to all eternity, than not to have a real being] by not considering this very thing. 12. That a lie is verum, as much as sin is bonum Metaphysicum; because it hath a positive being, which proved the Argument to be impertinent at the best.  
§. 3. Now Reader observe, what an incomparable confuter I have to deal with. 
Of 12. things answered bu● 4. replied to.  There are but four things of twelve, on which his courage would serve him to try his teeth; which finding also to be too hard, he does as lepidly nibble at them, as the tame creature did at the Thistles, which made Philemon so full of laughter. For to the first he thus replies. The design of the argument is to fright Mr. P. out of his sad opinion concerning the positivity of sin, by bringing him to the grand Absurdity, of saying sin is good p. 70.  
But I rejoin. 1. 
A rejoynde● to the first.  That my answer was designed to fright Mr. Hick. from his opinion concerning Gods being the Author of all things positive, nay of all things 
† See his pag▪ 95, lin. ult,  real too, (neither Blasphemy, nor Buggery, nor hating God, being excepted,) by bringing him to the grand Absurdities, of saying God is the Author of the greatest wickedness in the world, and withal of saying, the greatest wickedness is good, 2. He cannot bring me to saying that sin is good, but only he can say he designed to bring me; which shows the folly of his design too. For. (3.) as I said that Bonum amongst the Heathen Metaphysicians, did not signify good in our English acception of the word, any more than malum which is latin for an apple, can signify evil in a Translation, (though malum is latin for evil too,) so I shall make it undeniable by appealing even to them who are partial to him; whether we can properly say in English, That it is good to hate God, or good for Mr. Hickman to lie with a beast, 
☞  because they are actions which have positive entities, and therefore are Bona Metaphysica in Mr. Hickmans' Dialect. Nay in very broad English Mr. H. will tell us that they are Good, and from God, if he dares say twice, what he hath said too often, by saying, once (to wit, in his pages 95, 96▪) 4. I told him Aristotl●'s phrase [of every entity being good] should rather have been rejected as unsound and unsafe, (and so returned to that Heathen from whence it came) then have been used by a Christian to prove it good to hate God. And accordingly Dr. Stearn doth somewhere deny that metaphysical Axiom to be of universal truth; for when it was urged that the Act of hating God must be good, because ens & bonum convertuntur, he called it the begging of the question, as well he might. 5. Mr. H. saith theMaxime is, ens & bonum convertuntur, (not quatenus positivum) and so ascribes an equal goodness to the formal obliquity, (which is ens) as to the Act itself to which the obliquity it annexed. 6. 'twere easy to prove to Mr. H. that the greatest Lie is as true, as the truth itself because it is Aristotle's Maxim, and as generally received as that he urged, ens and verum convertuntur. 7. I had told him whilst it was time, that if by good, he means bonum morale, (as to be pertinent he must) he must also prove parricide, incest, witchcraft, or Rebellion, (a thing neither better nor worse than witchcraft,) either mere privations of being, or moral good things. For according to his dreaming, they must be nothing, or 2. no sins, or 3. moral virtues, or 4. sins and moral virtues too.  

To the 2●.  §. 4. He replies to the third, by a full Concession p. 70.71. But conceiving it a disgrace to stick at nothing, he wholly passeth by my answer, and only quarrels my Illustration, which yet in one sense he doth approve too. That sense was mine; and as pertinent it was, as whatsoever similitude he hath stolen from Mr. Morice, what I said of darkness, he confesseth to be a truth, and with a [But it is very vulgar.] p. 71. As if the Sun were the worse, for being an every day spectacle. He thought his axiom the better, for being vulgar; and gave it this commendation, that it is commonly received, p. 70. when he impertinently saith that darkness cannot be felt (p. 72.) he should have excepted the Egyptian, and that of his own apprehension, which is now so palpable to every Reader. 2. I gave an instance in the transgression of the Law, which I said was sin, and yet a thing positive, as well as privative, to wit, privative of virtue, and positive of vice. To this Mr. H. was deeply silent; and so hath yielded my answer, without the offer of a reply, that what is privative in one case, is also positive in another.  
§. 5. He replies to the 8t. Mr. P. hath deserved his humble thanks who bestows a positive entity on sin. p. 72. 
To the 3 d. ] For this crude speech, I first refer him to the third and fourth part of my rejoinder to the first part of his Reply, §. 3. I only add for his Instruction (of which he proves his present want) that Carneades spoke in a moral sense, when he took away the difference 'twixt right and wrong. And Mr. Hickman hath done the same. For if God is the Author of that positive act, [the devil's hating God] as Mr. Hickman affirmeth him to be, (p. 96.) then the Devil doth nothing but what is right, as all must be which God himself is the Author of.  
§. 6. His Reply to the ninth, hath been already spoken to, in the third and fourth part of §. 1. of this Chapter. 
To the 4 th'.  I only add, that if the positive action of hating God is so intrinsically, essentially, and wholly evil, as he hath liberally confessed (p. 94.) It will be hard for him to show, where lies its goodness in any sense; much less in theirs, who when they describe metaphysical goodness, per ordinem ad appetitum, understand it primarily with relation to the Divine will; yet so they do saith Mr. Hickman p. 74. Could the man have contrived a greater unhappiness to himself? He confesseth a little after, that a thing is not good, because desired; therefore sin may be desired, and yet not good: when he adds, it is desired, because it is good, he should have said, because it seems so. And yet the Devil desireth evil, because it is evil. Or if it seemeth good to him, it doth but s●em so; odisse Deum est fugibile secundum se totum; and Mr. Hickm●n must say, how it bonificates a subject in which it is, who affirms it to be good and the work of God; not I, who confute him for so affirming.  
Sect. 7. His second Argument (he tells us) was in his Letter to Mr. Barlee to this effect. 
His second Argument artificial.  If sin be a positive entity, than it is either God, or from God. p. 75.] mark, Reader; he doth not say, it was in these words, (he is it seems ashamed of them) But to this effect only. Whereas in Mr. Barlee the account is thus given 
* See the place cited in my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. c. 3. p. 154. & examined till as far as P▪ 1●6▪ , [If sin is a positive entity, it is God. For (as a learned friend of mine wrote to me not long since) what ever positive thing is not from God, is God.] But how does [he mean, it is from God? He tells us plainly (p. 79.) It is from God, as his creature; for so he explains what he meant by that other passage, There is no medium betwixt Deus and creatura.; whereby he is so far from understanding, That the action of hating God is the creature of the sinful depraved creature, (man, or Devil) that he often scoffs at it, as a ridiculous conceit. And expressly saith of all such actions, as have a positive being, (though never so intrinsically and essentially evil, as that of lying with a beast, of hating, blaspheming, and cursing God.) That they are FROM GOD, as well as the CREATURE. p. 82.] speaking of the creature, by whom such villainies are committed.  
§. 8. To show him the state of his affairs by this so▪ desperate adventure, 
How largely answered.  I spent no less than twelve pages. And first I objected the Devil's pride, or proud desire to be equal with God, (which Mr. Hickman supposeth to have been the first sin, p 103.) which will be granted by all the world, (Mr. Hickman not excepted) to have a positive being. And yet it being the very filthiness of the fil●hiest spirit, All the world will also grant, that it was none of God's creatures. And if not so, then Mr. Hickman will have it God; which is as horrible a blasphemy, as the wit of Hell could have invented. It would be tedious to the Reader, should I here Epitomise what I opposed to this Argument. And therefore I must refer him unto the place before cited.  
§. 9 How now doth Mr. Hickman defend himself? 
His remarkable Tergiversation, without the shadow of a reply.  Doth he deny the Devil's pride to have a positive being? no such matter. Doth he deny it to be God, by calling it one of God's creatures? no, not a syllable comes from him touching the one or the other. Doth he take the third course, and deny it to be his creature, by asserting it to be Him? no, that is too intolerable, to be expected from the evil one. What then doth he resolve on, to help himself at this pinch? Doth he confess he was hasty, and inconsiderate, and so crave pardon from God, and men? No, it seems he is too stomachful, and too rigid a Presbyterian. But what at last doth he say then, if he doth neither accuse, nor excuse himself? Truly he saith never a word, but sleeps-over the Business, hoping that few or no Readers would see that part of my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or examine what answer he might attempt to make to it. For the better amusing of his Readers, he begins with a fault which he finds in Cajetan, (though he doth not say where,) than he steals a witty passage (word for word) from Mr. Goodwin, as far from the purpose as it was possible, (and though the passage is not, yet the impertinence is his own;) Next he skips to the Trichot●mie, which I had told him he was to know, for the distinguishing of God, and God's works, from the works of the Devil, 1 joh. 3.8. To which his Reply is briefly this, [If I must, there is no remedy, (p. 76.) And yet, against this, he will give me his Reasons, and saith he will do it without fear; whether not without wit too, it now comes to be examined.  
§ 10. His first Reason is, 
His offers of Reason, why all things positive are either from God, or God himself, and primarily none from men or devils.  Because he finds that those who had to do with the Manichees and heathen Philosophers, building their Argument upon this Basis, Omne ens est vel primum, vel à primo; and that malum is therefore not caused by God, because it is not ens, but non ens, as they commonly call that which is but a privation▪ p. 76.] to which he adds five passages for example, p. 77, 78.  

The infirmities of the first▪  First for his Ignorance of the Fathers, and his gross mistake of their meaning, and what Absurdities he incurs by such mistaking, I have abundantly showed in the former Chapter; where I was willing to consider it once for all, that I might not repeat one thing too often, whereby to delay, and distract the Reader. I shall only here add, 1 that 'tis apparent by the confession of Mr. Hickman that if his Testimonies are valid, as to their literal importance, they serve to prove the Nonentity (that is, the nullity) of sin; which Mr. Hickman (with ● bare forehead) hath not hitherto asserted, whatever he hath done by way of equivalence and consecution. And if they are figuratively spoken, when they say that sin is nothing (which is but nonens in English) why not figuratively spoken, when they say, that sin is a privation? especially when there are testimonies out of the very same Writers, not only for the reality, but positivity also of sin? 2. The little Greek he produceth, hath so very many faults in so very few lines, (not observed in his Errata) that I conceive he did he knew not what, with an implicit Faith in the skill of others, from whom he borrowed at second hand; which I believe so much the rather, because I find his own Authorities do overthrow the very error for which he b●ings them. Witness the 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Athan. contra Gentes. mihi p. 6. c.  words of A●hanasius, which prove that sin hath no substance, in opposition to those Greeks, who contended that sin had a subsistence of itself; whereas to the having a positivity, there is nothing more required then that it be some kind of Accident. Witness also those other words, affirming no evil thing (positive or privative) to proceed from God, who being the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, gives occasion to the expression of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; which evil things may be called, as not derived from him, who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. So when it is said by St. Austin, ex uno Deo esse omnia quae sunt, he explains his meaning to be of all good things, and of none besides, because he presently adds, & tamen non esse peccatorum auctorem Deum. And if, when Austin doth elsewhere say, Peccatum nihil est, he means according to the letter, that sin is nothing in very deed, first 'tis a gross contradiction to what he saith in other places: and secondly, 'tis the worst of his many Errors. 3. The meaning of Aquinas I have 
* Look b●ck on ch. 5. ●. 5. num. 7.  elsewhere showed. And yet if I say (with Dr. jackson) that Aquinas and his followers have sometimes spoken u●excusably concerning God, I shall but speak to the dishonour of Popish Writers, by whom the rigid Presbyterians have been unhappily corrupted in these affairs. Lastly whereas he saith, that heathen Philosophers did see this, (giving an instance in Salustius, and no one else,) a man that shall affirm the eternity of the world, may urge Aristotle for it, and say the Heathens themselves discerned this truth. Thus I say a man may argue, who can find in his heart to argue no better than Mr. Hickman. But be it that a heathen is of the Presbyterian judgement, the Christian Fathers and Schoolmen are still of mine, unless when they speak in such a manner against me, as to speak as much against themselves too.  
§. 11. His second Reason is, because he knows no other way of defining what ens primum is, but this, 
Of the second.  that it is such a Being, which is not from any other being, and which is the cause of all the Being's that are p. 78.  
First I observe from these words, that the Libertine advanceth more and more to a clear discovery of itself. 
By which he is proved (out of his mouth) to be the worst of Blasphemers.  For if he thinks that any sin (as hating, cursing, blaspheming God) hath any being in the world, he professeth to believe that God himself is the cause of it. And the cause is the Author of any being. And so he is caught in the act of that very crime, which himself had confessed to be the worst of all blasphemies, and which is the Quintessence of all blasphemy, saith Theophilus 
p. 171.  Churchman, which is thought to signify three men, of which number Master Hickman himself is one, in the rational conjectures of all I meet with. If he thinks that sin hath no being, and by consequence that it is nothing, than his words are most impertinent, and prove him besides a mere Carneadist. Secondly, In saying God is the cause of all beings, merely because he is the first, he seems to think there is but one way of priority, whereas a Freshman in Logic could have told him there are five. Is it not enough that God is the first of all Being's, and was from eternity without beginning, whereas all things else began to be, and so was before the being of sin (and of all things else) in four respects, but he must also be before it as the ●ause of its being? Thirdly, It may suffice to the defining of ens primum, to say it is that, which alone did neve● begin to be, or that, than which there is nihil prius, and which praecedeth all others, as much as eternity praecedeth time. Or if the word cause must needs be added, let it be said he is the cause of all good things that have a being, whether naturally and necessarily, or voluntarily acting. But not the cause of those acts or actions, which cannot but argue in the causer either wickedness and guilt, or imperfection.  

Of the third. Wherein he makes God the Fountain of the Essence of sin,  §. 12. His third Reason in effect is but the same with the second, as the second is the same with what he called his second Argument p. 77. And so I refer it for its answer both to the Section before going, and to what I have said in my whole fifth Chapter, especially to §. 5 an● 6. Only I add my observation, that whilst God is by him affirmed to be the fountain of all essences, (p 79.) who yet ascribeth one essence unto sin, whilst he saith▪ the action of hating God is essentially evil (p. 94.) he affirms God to be the fountain of all the sins in the world, and that not only of the act, but of the very essence of sin itself. And because he seems to stumble most at the common axiom in Philosophy, 
Mr. Barlow in his exercit. 2. de naturâ m●li, p. 45.72  which is found urged by Mr. Barlow, several times upon one account, [to wit, that the cause of the cause, is the cause of the effect] I will first send him back to what I have said in Answer to it, chap. 5. §. 5. num. 2. Next I will set him down (at large) Aquinas his Answer unto the same. 
Aquinas 1.2. q. 79. Art. 1. ad 3.  [effectus causae secundae procedens ab eâ, secundum quod subditur causae primae, reducitur etiam in causam primam. Sed si procedat à causâ media, secundum quod exit ordinem causae primae, non reducitur in causam primam. Sicut si minister faciat aliquid contra mandatum Domini, hoc non reducitur in dominum, sicut in causam. Et similiter peccatum quod liberum arbitrium committit contra praeceptum Dei, non reducitur in Deum, sicut in causam.  
§. 12. His fourth pretended reason is most ridiculously pretended; He believes no medium, because (forsooth! 
Of the fourth▪ Wherein he ascribeth unto God, what God ascribeth unto the Devil. 1 joh. 3.8▪ ) Mr. P. hath not been able to find any; for whereas I told him the works of the Devil are a medium, (he saith) I could not sure but think he would distinguish in blasphemy, lying, &c, betwixt the vital act and its deficiency etc. p. 79.] The folly of this being discovered throughout my whole fourth chapter, and in the beginning of this sixth, (and I may say throughout my fifth too) but most expressly in my third chapter §. 6. (which is too long to be here repeated) I shall only here observe two things. 1, His affirming the act of Blasphemy to be from God, (as he doth expressly lin. 13, 14.) Next, his denying those things to be the works of the Devil, to which the Scripture hath given that Name. He denies it here partly, and partly pag. 96. what yet the Scripture asserteth plainly 1 joh. 3.8. But more of this Reason in the following Section▪ For  
§ 13. After five pages of impertinence, 
His third Argument artificial▪  he argues thus. If a thing be therefore sinful because it wants some perfection that it ought to have, and cease to be sinful when it hath all the perfection which it ought to have, then is sin a privation; but a thing is therefore sinful, etc. Ergo, pag. 84.]  
As this is also taken from Mr. Barlow (but no more acknowledged by the Taker, than all the rest, 
* Look back on c. 3. S. 2. ● 3, 4, 5, & 7▪ ) so an Answer to it is given in my Reply to Mr. Barlow, in vindication of Dr. Field: who having proved that there are acts, to which no rectitude can be due to make them perfect, (as the act of hating God) had such an answer from Master Barlow, as I showed to be invalid in five respects. And in each of them Mr. Hickman is equally concerned. But yet I add, 1. that this makes against those sins only, which are only sins because forbidden, not at all against those, which are only forbidden for being sins. (of which I have spoken ch. 3. §. 6.) That something may be evil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is affirmed by Saint Basil, as he confesseth. And that the action of hating God is intrinsically evil, we have his word, p. 94. But 2. This only proves that some sins are privative, not that sin is a 〈◊〉 privation. And what is privative of one thing, is also positive of another; (as hath been showed §. 1. and 4.) 3. Doctor Field and others have often told him, of a positive repugnance to the Law of God. And when it was said by himself (pag. 79.) he could derive the irregularity from corruption, and the Devil's Temptation, he did not say, it was not positive, unless nothing can be so, that is f●om corruption and the Devil. A man may thus make him confute himself, of the vital acts, speaking, and Blasphemy, or lying, he saith the former is from God, the latter from the Devil; and yet the Blasphemy is as positive as speaking can be, because it is speaking to God's dishonour: and so at once in opposition, and yet according to Mr. Hickman (who is often Antipus to himself) there are some things positive▪ which are neither God, nor from God, but from corruption and the Devil's temptation,  
§. 14. What he is wi●ling to infer from the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (p. 85.) which he saw urged by Mr. Barlow in no less than 
The positive importance of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, not considered by Master Barlow, Ex●r. 2. pag. 39▪ 51.65.  three places, I shall show to be faulty in six respects. 1. He seems not to have known (what Mr. Barlow well knew, but considered not) that [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] in composition hath a threefold importance, and thence is called by three names, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, And that the Law is transgressed, by him who adds to it, or goes beyond it. 
Qui 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ☞ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dicit, qui scortationem, qui fur●tum dicit, duo semper dicit, materiale & formale. Alsted. Lex. Theol▪ c. 8. p. 233.  2. By this way of arguing, he might endeavour to prove God to be merely privative, because he is said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Infinite; that is, without any bounds, or terms of being. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dicta ex 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ut observat. Alst ex Fran. Iu●io.  And Dionysius the Areopagite delights to tell us what he is, by telling us what he is not. (as hath been showed chap. 5.) 3. What St. john hath expressed by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, others commonly do express by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, each of which I now see in the same page of Athanasius, who also puts 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as an instance of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. (contra Gentes pag. 4.) 4. There is nothing commoner in the N. T. then for words compounded with [α] to have a positive signification in one respect, as well as a privative in another. As Rom. 1.30.31▪ we find 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to import Rebellious; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, covenant-breakers; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, implacable; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, cruel; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is foolish; but so as foolish signifies unreasonable actions; as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth malice and mischief against Christ, Luk. 6.11. and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, those that were guilty of brutish practices. Tit. 3.3. (v. D. H. in locum.) so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Damascene is positively liberal, and used as an Epithet of God. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, positively confident; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a positive sorrow. The word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom. 1.28. does not only denote a man, who goes without a reward, but that is positively opposite to every thing that is good, as Doctor Ham. observes upon the place (Noteh.) 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in aequivalence is the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Vocabulum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quo hic utitur Johannes significat quicquid fit contra legem. Hemm. de viâ vitae. p. 554.  which with the learnedest Remonstrants is actus hominis: (as hath been showed ch. 3. §. 25.) And so it is with Hemmingius, who saith the word [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, unrighteousness,] which is used by Saint john, doth signify (in concreto) whatsoever thing is done in a contrariety to the Law. And accordingly I observe in the most Judicious Doctor Hammond, that he takes the 
* D. H. Ham. in Fundamen. c. 16. p. 183.  Transgressing of the Rule to be a positive thing, a doing contrary to God's commandment, from whence ariseth the obliquity of any act. 6. Nay Mr. Hick. implies as much, in the simplicity at least of his understanding, (which one Mr. Bagsh●w was so ignorant, ●s to believe he had expressed by a simplicity of heart) whilst he confesseth that pravitas, malitia, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
† See the positive instances of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom. 1.29.30▪ 31. ●  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, import the same with peccatum. p. 54.  

The like Importance of peccatum, proved by reason and experience.  §. 15. And that peccatum doth import (concretively) both a positive Act, and an obliquity (or inordination) may be made undeniable from the origin of the word, as well as from the Authors by whom it is used, 1. Pecco is a verb active, peccare, an action, (just as much as malefacere.) Peccatum clearly comes from the passive voice of that verb; even as much as benefactum from the passive voice of benefacio; 
Peccare significat Actionem tantùm non etiam omissionem. Alsted ubi Supra.  multa peccantur, legitur apud Cic. 1. Off. And peccare is a Transitive, Plant. Bacched. 8.29. And peccatum is sometimes a passive participle, Terent. in prol. Eunuch. 27. And accordingly 'tis said by all kind of writers, (as well by our Enemies, as our Friends,) that sin connoteth two things, whereof the one is material, the other formal. Not Aquinas only, and all his followers, but Dr. Twisse, and all his; do affirm 
* Omne. peccatum DUO connotat. Dr. Twisse. Vin. Gra. l. 2. par●. 1. p. 155. Matthaeus vero & Marcus monstrant, quod materia Peccati in Sp. Sanctum sit contemptus Christi & Evangelii Hemming. ubi supra. p. 554▪  all sin to import 2 things, sins of Omission not excepted. And Hemmingius saith that the matter of the sin against the holy Ghost, is a contempt of Christ and h●s Gospel; which he also saith is demonstrated both by St. Matthew and St. Mark I hope Mr. H, will not say, that the contempt of the Gospel being positive, is very good and from God; which yet he must, or he must sing his Recantation. In a word, It can no more be proved that sin▪ is a privation and nothing else, from the saying of St. john, that sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or the Transgression of the Law (1 john 3.4.) then that Christ himself is not positive, from the tropical saying of St. Paul, that Christ was made sin (2. Cor. 5.21.) or that darkness is as positive as iron, because the Angels were delivered▪ to chains of darkness 2 Pet. 2.4. And whether it is not indeed a sin (without any such figure, or catachrestical way of speaking) to ravish Virgins, and lie with beasts, to hate God, and to love the Devil, (which are confessedly as positive, as any actions that can be named) I appeal to the usage of the word Sin, in the common experience of all mankind.  

His 4th. or last Argument  §. 16. His last argument (as he calls it) is very rare. Original sin is not positive, ergo sin as sin is not positive; p. 8●] First for the manifold Absurdities (as well as guilt into which he falls by his reduplication [sin as sin] I briefly refer to every part of my second chapter, especially §. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12▪ etc. Next for what he saith of Original sin, I refer to all I have produced from the Ancient Fathers, and learned modern Divines, (who held it to be a positive quality) in the third and fourth Sections of the fifth Chapter of this Book, and also in the 3. Ch §. 23. But (thirdly) as I never yet said, so neither a● I concerned to say, that all sins are positive, It is enough that some are, and those the worst to be imagined. Nay Mr. H, must be concluded a strange kind of Blasphemer, in saying all things positive are either God's Creatures, or God himself, although there were but one sin that had a positive being, such as was the Angel's pride, and the Devil's hatred of God Almighty or the lusts of the Devil Joh. 8.44. Yet now to speak more of Original sin, as that doth signify the proneness of the will to evil, after the image of Adam's will, (from after the time of his Depravation) it must needs be also positive, to wit, a conversion to the creature. And why might not Adam acquire (by his sin) the image of Satan unto himself and offspring too, as well as 
† p. 88  sin-away the Image of God? 
Bellè dicunt Scholastici in omni Peccato considerari terminum à quo, & ●d quem. Omne namque peccatum est defectio à Creatore ad Creaturam. Als●ed lex. Theol. c. 8. p. 232.  But this is not that, upon which I am obliged to lay a stress. Nor shall this be the subject of new disputes, whether a man doth beget a man, as much as a Horse begets a Horse. It may be argued for ever on either side; but I believe, with greatest force, for that part of the question to which St. Austin was most inclined, and all that is said by Mr. H. doth but help to disprove Original sin, for which Pelagians and Socinians may chance to thank him. I know St. Paul held that the whole of man doth consist of three things; Body, Soul and Spirit; concerning which Dr. Hammond hath a most profitable Discourse, with a Reference to which I will shut up this Section. 
A short account of those shifts, which pretend to be Answers to some few Arguments.  (see his Annotation upon 1 Thess. 5.23.)  
§ 17. Having seen his Reasons, let us see what he saith to some few of mine; or rather how guiltily he sneaks from the whole duty of a respondent p. 90. For though he knew what I had said 
† 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ch. 3. p. 156. Mic. 6.16. Gal. 5.19. Col. 1.21. Eph. 5 11. Heb 9.14. 1 john 3.8. Rev. 9.20.  
Of sins being called the works of the Devil.   to wit, that Sins in Scripture are called works, (works of Darkness, works of the flesh, works of men's hands, and works of the Devil,) as it were on purpose to show that they are positive things; yet he passeth by that, (as if the word works had been of no consideration) and only nibbles at my saying, That that was positive that Christ came to destroy, concealing also from his Reader, what I had cited from St. john, of Christ's being manifested in the flesh, that he might destroy the works of the Devil. 1 john 3.8. nor taking notice of what I said about vacuum vacui implying locatum, as the privation of a privation implieth position by all confessions. I showed it implies a contradiction, to say an habit is a privation, because it is called by a Catachresis, the privation of a privation, when after a loss it is recovered; from hence I argued, that if the works of the Devil (which are also called the Lusts of the Devil Joh. 8.44.) had been mere privations, the destruction of them could have been none. But Mr. H's very weakness doth serve him here instead of strength, for not considering that Death is said to be capable of destruction (1 Cor. 15.16.) by the same catachrestical way of speaking, whereby it is said in other places to have a body, and a sting, (and so I might prove it, at least to him, to have a positive entity) he urgeth his ignorance for a proof, that of a mere privation there may be properly a privation. How much better might I prove that death itself hath a positivity, from Rev. 21.8. where to be burning in a lake of fire and Brimstone is expressed by the name of the second death. But the work of the Devil is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly so called, and therefore positive. The words of St. john are even literally true, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1 Joh. 3.4. and lusts are qualities, john 8.44.  

His Concessions and contradictions about the habit of Drunkenness  §. 18. To the Argument which I urged from sins habitual, or habits of sin, (such as Drunkenness in a man who is seldom sober,) it seems he knew so exactly that no good answer was to be given, as to resolve to supply it with mere scurrility, and impertinence p. 91. He is fain to say that I intended a Sorites, or rather seemed to intend it, that he might seem to have something at which to nibble. But no such thing as a Sorites was any more in my thoughts, then in my mention. And therefore this is so vile a practice, as may be used by any Atheist, who hath a mind to calumniate any passage of any writer. It i an easy thing to say, that such an Author makes a face as if he intended this, or that, which we have reason to believe he could not possibly intend. But what saith the Rhapsodist to my Argument, 
* Autocatac●▪ ch. ● p. 161.  that vices are habits as well as virtues, and therefore positive Qualities, as well as Virtues? He doth not deny that some sorts of vices indeed are Habits, for he cannot think, that an act of Drunkenness is a vice, and that an habit of Drunkennenss is none at all, nor can he think it impossible to be habitually drunk,) and that an habit is a thing positive, he is so far from denying, that he affirms it, he pr●fesseth not to doubt of it (p 92.) so that now there is no question, whether Drunkenness, when an habit, is positive or not. But whether or no it is a sin, or whether it is not from God, in Mr. Hickman's judgement: one of the two (we are assured by himself) is his opinion, he having taught expressly, that all things positive are either from God, or God himself. Nay he plainly enough affirms the habit of drunkenness; as he professeth not to doubt the positivity of the habit. And he does both within the compass of 7. or 8. lines. 
p. 94.  But he denies that this habit is a fit instance of habitus in post praedicamentis, yet that is a Quality, and so is this; as I will make him to confess by putting the case in another colour▪ for he confesseth it is an action for the Devil to hate God. And that an action implies a quality, he will be hissed by the youngsters, if he denies; (this being one of the 4. things, which are required to every action.) And as the habit of hating God is as much a sin as the habit of drunkenness can be, so it serves as f●●ly to evince the thing that I am proving. If he means vice by vitiosity, (as sin by sinfulness (p. 53.) then he doubts whether that is positive which he saith he doubts not to be an habit; and being an habit, he as little doubts of its positivity. If he means that vitiosity is the abstract of vice, he contradicts what he had said, p. 53 unless he thinks he may distinguish betwixt the vice and the sin of Drunkenness. If he makes a separation of the habit of drunkenness (which he will have to be from God, as being positively something) from the obliquity of the habit, which he expresseth by vitiosity, than he incurs the several dangers, which my whole second Chapter doth warn him of. So great and many are the distresses into which this Meddler betrays himself.  
§. 19 I had said (in my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, p. 163.) 1. There must be something positive to make a man positively foul, 
His Concessions and contradictions about the positive filth of sin  2. Which foulness suffers a privation, when the man is cleansed of his filth.] The truth of the first Mr. H. confesseth in words at length. p. 93. and the truth of the second he doth not question; for he doth not speak a word to it. What then doth he do for an answer to me? Why, it goes for an answer, to call me Rector; and for a jest, to add Ridiculous. The text which I cited from Rev. 22.11. (let him that will be filthy be filthy still) he found misprinted, Rom. 22.11. on which he fastens, as an occasion to show his deep knowledge, that there are not so many Chapters in that Epistle. (Nor did the Printers Apprentice suppose there were.) He saith I did not offer at any other proof, when yet he knows I also added the words of God to the people Israel, I have purged thee, 
Ezek. 23.13.  and thou wast not purged, therefore shalt thou not be purged from thy filthiness any more. p. 262. from whence I made this observation, that (as the filth of sin is many times so ingrained, that after Gods own cleansings the habitual sinner remains unclean so) the fil●h which is positive is man's own Creature, whereas the cleansing which is privative is God's own work. To this Mr. H. doth not answer one syllable, but falls to his old trade of begging, (what he was sure to be denied) the thing in Question. And yet he is somewhat more bashful then at his ordinary times. Only saying what may be said, not what he dares affirm for truth [we may make the spiritual filth to consist in the want of that Nitor Gratiae, which either was, or should be in the soul. p. 93.] But 1. he contradicts what he had said a little before, unless he will deny that they are positively foul, who are not purged, though God doth purge them, because they are grown so inveterately and habitually foul, that as soon may the Ethiope change his skin, or the Leopard his spots, 
jer. 13.23.  as they do good, who are accustomed to do evil. 2. He makes God (if not the only, yet) by far the chiefest cause of the greatest filthiness to be named in men or devils, whilst he makes it to consist in a mere want of grace, which 'tis impossible for us to want, but as God doth withhold or withdraw it from us. 3. He makes not any the least difference, betwixt not-blessing (which is one kind of filthiness) and cursing God (which is another.) betwixt Ammon's not loving, and his ravishing and his hating his sister Tamar. 4. To hate God, is an Action, by his acknowledgement; which however it be attended with, yet it is also somewhat more, than a want of Grace. which although there are men who do wholly want, yet the Devils are more filthy, in whom the hatred of God is more habitual. And even of those very men, in whom is wanting a Nitor gratiae, their filthiness is the greatest, who draw iniquity with 
* Isa. 5.18▪  cords, and sin as with a cartrope. 5. Whilst he speaks [of a want of Grace, which either was, or should have been in the soul,] he implicitly makes God the sole delinquent, in the latter part of his disjunctive; as if he thought there were a case, wherein God did not do, what he should have done; unless there can be grace, and not of God. But 6. It is not so much the want, or absence, as the resisting of grace when it is present, by which the filthiness of a sinner becomes exceedingly more filthy. The jews were 
† Mat. 11.41.  filthier than the Ninevites, not because they more wanted, but more abused the grace of God; because they sinned against greater light, and against more means of grace, to abstain from sinning. The 
* Mat▪ 25.30▪  unprofitable servant was to be cast into outer darkness, not for having no talon, but for wrapping it in a napkin. All which M. H. is now to take into consideration.  
§. 20. To what I argued from actual sins, such as lying, 
His concession, & tergiversation concerning blasphemy, and Atheism, etc.  blaspheming, and positive believing there is no God; etc. he returns just nothing, besides his back. Hostibus hic tergo, non forti pectore notus. And yet as if he were proud of such an unmanlike tergiversation, he steals a passage from M. Morice, that he may glory in his shame with the better Grace. And though he had found me often urging that devilish sin of hating God, yet he talks of supposing my Instance to be made in the very worst, and most intrinsically evil of all actions, even that of hating God. p. 93. hoping his Readers would believe, he had given my Argument some advantage. But how many Blasphemies, contradictions, and other absurdities of remark, this piteous creature hath committed in what he saith of this subject, I have sufficiently discovered in my printed letter to Dr. Heylin, (p. 265▪ 266. to p. 271.) To which I have added divers things in several parts of my present enterprise which as I must not repeat, (without a reason to excuse me for so unnecessary a labour,) so it is every whit as needless, as it is easy to add more. I have enough in his concession, that to hate God is an action, and such an action as is essentially and intrinsically evil, evil ex genere & objecto, and antecedently to the Law; I say, in this I have enough, whereby to prove him most clearly his own Refuter. And yet I add, that if the undue referring of hatred to God be not positive, but privative, (as he unskilfully saith p. 95.) then hatred, being positive, doth cease to be positive by being fastened upon God, (as Mr. Hickman must needs infer, unless he denies the hatred of God to be a sin,) and yet the fastening it on God is as positive, as the fastening it on the Devil.  

Hi● remarkable forgery of an Argument in his Adversaries name.  §. 21. After this, having itch to steal a discourse from Mr. Barlow, concerning several grounds of Difference betwixt the sins of omission and commission; And knowing not how to bring it in (either by head or by shoulders) by way of answer to any argument which he had seen in my writings; thought fit to forge such a syllogism, as might be suitable to his purpose, and (setting a bold face upon it) to tell the Reader that it was mine. (pag, 97.) I stood amazed, for some time, at his resolution; especially when I saw him making as good as a profession of such impiety. For although he had directly laid his child at my door, and pronounced me the father without Reserve, yet few lines after he confesseth in effect that it is his own. For he confesseth he does but suppose, that if my words were reduced to mood and figure, they would appear in such a Form as he hath now represented, (p. 97.) But lest his Readers should see my words concerning sins of omission and commission, by being directed to the page where I had spoken of that subject, he strait creates an ignis fatuus, whereby to lead them out of their way. For he saith my words are p. 167. whereas in all that page there are not only no such words, but no occasion or hint for so lewd a Fiction. The only place (for aught I know) wherein I used any such terms, as sins of omission and commis●ion, (but without any likeness to what he forgeth) was pag. 146▪ And there my words were precisely these. If sins of omission (as not praying and not giving alms, etc.) had but a deficient cause, yet sins of commission (as cursing and Sacrilege, etc.) have a cause efficient with a witness. It's true I said in another place, (p. 162.) that whilst M. Hickman denies sin to be something positive, he seems to make no difference betwixt a simple negative, and a privative properly so called. And again, confounds a privation properly so called, with a thing called privative secundum quid. He makes no difference betwixt not blessing, and cursing God. &c, where first I say not, he makes no difference, but that he seems to make none; meaning none, as to the point of its positivity. And as to the force of my Accusation, he hath not uttered one word in his own defence. Nay he hath proved his gross mistake of a simple negative, for a privative properly so called. And so he proves I had used him with two much candour.  
§. 22. Of all the Texts which I had brought, 
His stupendious impertinence, and supposal of Grace in Hell; or some privation besides All.  for the proving of sins being something positive, (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, p. 163.) He wilfully passeth by the rest, and shows his impertinence upon one, in which the force of my Argument did least consist, unless as it relates to the next text after, of which M. Hickman would take no notice. My Argument was, that as we read of great and little sins in comparison, so we read (in proportion) of greater and l●ss●r damnation. Mat. 23.14. Luk. 12.48. Now 'tis so evident in itself, and so acknowledged a thing amongst the men of all parties, that all the Damned souls in hell are wholly destitute of Grace, and that of those who have a total privation of it, some shall have fewer, and s●me more stripes, some a lesser, and some a greater damnation; that I thought Mr. Hickman could not choose but understand me; but being convinced of the truth, which yet he resolved to abjure, sought to hide his conviction by this incomparable Impertinence; [That he would answer if he could guests where the vein of proof did lie; and if he may guests, it lies in this, that there can be no degrees in a privation. p. 99] In which words, '●is hard to say, how many ways he is unhappy. 1. He cannot guests wherein the force of the proof doth lie, and yet he will answer for all his ignorance. But 2. he will not answer neither, unless he may have leave to forge the thing, to which he conceives he can give an answer; if he may make a man of clo●ts, he will adventure (on that condition) to strike at it; when he hath done. 3. He either thinks there are degrees even of total privations, of which some are privations of no more than all grace, but others of all and some too; or else 4. of those that are damned in hell, he thinks that some have more grace, some less, or some none at all, some less than none at all. Because some have a greater, some a lesser damnation. For my Inference is this; That of those that are wholly deprived of grace, some are greater sinners than others, and more tormented. Whose sin by consequence must be something, besides a whole privation of grace. It was indeed for want of Grace, or by resisting Grace given, that Ammon lusted after fi●st, 
2 Sam. 13, 14.  and secondly loathed his sister Tamar; But besides that want or privation of Grace, there were some positive effects which were damning sins. 1. He lusted after, 2. He dissembled with, 3. He violently defiled, 4. He hated his injured sister. It is not through a want of Grace, but abundance of wilfulness, that some do 
Act. 7.51.  resist the holy Ghost, and depart from grace given. And sure besides the privation of Grace, there is that in some sinners by which they are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Rom. 1.30. Matth. 10.15. Luk. 10.14, & 24.  inventors of evil things. In a word, there is some thing positive (above the total privation of Grace) by which it shall be more tolerable in the day of judgement for one reprobate, than another. So Mr. H. aims purposely beside the mark, unless he thinks there is Grace in hell.  
Sect. 23. I having argued that sin is s●id to work in the Sinner all manner of concupiscence, 
Of sins working Concupiscence. Mr. Hickmans' Answer absurd in 8. respects.  (Rom. 7.8.) & perfectius est agere, quam esse; Mr. H. saith, that in such speeches sin signifies not abstractly and formally, but it signifies our nature and its faculties, as under corruption, etc. p. 100] Here is work for a volume, if I could think it not below me to pursue Mr. H. in all his follies. First I note his Confession, that sin doth signify something positive, concretively and materially, and that in Scripture. Next his self-contradiction, in that he had said (p. 54.) sin is so perfectly an abstract, that if we conceive not of it as an abstract, we cannot conceive of it as sin. 3. His virtual denial, that sin and sinfulness are synonymous, (which yet he affirmed p. 53.) unless he thinks our very nature may be said to be sinfulness itself, or that our nature and our faculties are mere privations, which yet he cannot say soberly, because he absolutely denies, that sin doth signify abstractly. 4. Dr▪ Hammond (who knew best the true importance of the Text) thought fit to paraphrase it to us, by customary sins, not by nature and faculties, as Mr. Hickman. 5. By this he justifies Dr. jackson and Flaccius Illyricus, whom before at (adventure) he did so liberally condemn. 6. In saying that the faculties by reason of privations, do l●st against the working of the spirit, (ibid.) he implies that lusting to be a sin (without a figure) and yet implies it (as much) to be something positive. 7. If he quarrels with me and others, for expressing the hatred of God by sin, which is positive, but not good; how hath he railed in effect at the blessed Apostle, for expressing that by sin, which he confesseth to be good, as well as positive, and therefore good because positive? 8. Let sin be taken for nature and its faculties, (as he desires) yet concupiscence is not, which sin is said to bring forth. And that concupiscence as it is positive, so one selfe-contradictor will hardly deny it to be a sin.  
Sect. 24. To prove the efficient cause of sin, I argued thus in the first place. 
Of the efficient cause of sin. Mr. H.'s conviction, & confession in despite of his whole Enterprise  If man is the cause of sin, and not efficient, he is the material, formal, or final cause; if the deficient is none of these, (as none will say it is) it is no cause at all. If sin hath no cause, it hath no real being, much less can it be the cause of punishment: and so God is inferred to punish men without cause, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, p. 145.] Now comes the Answer of Mr. H. as much for my interest as I could wish. [Rather than we will seem to be too much frighted, we will say, that man is the material or subjective cause of the Action: such a material or subjective cause, as evil can have. p. 102.  
To which I reply, 1. That Mr▪ H. did either intent to speak to the purpose, or else (for fear of that) he speaks industriously beside it.) if the first, he fully grants that sin is an action, and so a positive being, if the second, he is convinced of sinning against his own Light; and effectually confesseth he cannot answer: when the Question is of the cause of sin, why does he answer touching the cause of the Action, if he does not believe it to be a sin? and if he believes it to be a sin, why undertook he in his Titlepage to prove that sin is a mere privation? Here I leave him to be hist by the Colledge-boyes, for having written, as if he had written, on purpose to make himself the object of scorn and laughter. Nor is it fit it should go better with such as write against God, as the cause of all sins, because of all actions, acts, and habits. 2. That here by action he means sin, one would believe by what he saith in his second clause, as an explication of his first,— cause of the Action, such a material cause as evil can have, if he means, it can have none, why did he yield a material caus●? if he means it can have any material cause, ex quâ or in quâ, than he confesseth it hath a cause, which is not merely deficient, if ex quâ, it is a concrete; if in quâ, an accident, if either, positive. It hath besides materiam circa quam, and so a threefold subject, constituens, recipiens, occupans subjectum. As for his confession (which next ensues) of the efficient cause of sin,) which must needs be meant by the evil of the action) and how again he falls into the youngsters hands, I have long since showed, Chap. 3. Sect. 28. num. 7. so ill he prospers with stolen goods out of Robert Baronius, which he would certainly have cited Baronius for, had he so well understood it, as I hope he now doth. For how he builds up my cause upon the Ruins of his own, by what he saith of the first sin, a proud desire to be equal with God (p. 103.) I have largely showed ch. 3. Sect. 28. Num. 1.  
25. To my 2. Argument, that where there is no efficient, there is no effect, that is, there is nothing; 
Of sins being nothing, if no effect. Mr. H●ckmans vain attempt to prove knavery to be nothing.  and so (according to mine Antagonist) men are either not damned, or damned for nothing (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 145.) He is so far from the courage to frame an answer, that he dares not be so honest as to repeat my words fairly; but tells his Readers of my inference, without a syllable of of my premises from whence my inference was drawn; for fear his Readers should discern, how conscious he is of his disability, and how resolutely bend on Tergiversation, which he had nothing to keep from being seen, but an easy boast, so that still I am to ask, 1. How that is an effect, which hath no efficient; and 2. How that can be something, which is effected by nothing; and 3. How nothing can be the cause of a man's damnation. To these 3. things he should have answered, had he been able: but nemo tenetur ad impossibile, and so he thinks he hath a privilege to be impertinent what is meant by nihil, applied to sin (in one case) and to substance itself (in another) I have abundantly informed him throughout my fifth Chapter, especially §. 1.3. and § 5. num. 6. etc. But since he shows himself a se●ker, he shall not fail to find my meaning. My meaning is, that (p. 104.) God will punish impenitent sinners with damnation, both for not having in their faculties, Habits, and Actions, what should be in them; And also for having that, which should not be in them. He will not therefore damn infants, for their merely not-having original righteousness in the root; (for he accepteth according to what a man 
* 2. Cor. 8.12.  hath, not according to what he hath not,) but he will damn those adulti, who work unrighteousness, and continue such working unto the end. To this I add 2. things. 1. That no wilful sinner, who is liable to wrath can so omit that which is good, as not to commit that which is evil. 2. That God will punish such sinners, not only for having something in their actions and habits which they should not have, but for having such habits, and for exerting such actions; or for putting those things in being, which God would not have, and forbids to be. 3. There is a positive abnegation of God, Tit. 1.16 and so Mr. Hickman doth deny him. So did they also, who forsook God, and followed Baalim. 1 King. 18.18. And therefore that passage, which Mr. Hickman took from Dr. Robert Baron, without so much as saying, by your leave Sir, (as an Anonymous writer is known to say) cannot stand him in any stead. For a man cannot not pay the money which he owe's, without detaining or keeping back the money which he should pay. And however none payment is a negative thing, (not a privative, as Mr. Hickman heedlessly supposeth) yet the knavery and deceitfulness, which is the cause of nonpayment will be granted by all to be something positive. And so Mr. Hickman saith very well, I could well enough bear his being punished, for not paying me my arrears, (and bear it I will when that day comes) and for 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Hesiod▪  usurping a Possession, to which he hath not a better right, than Ahab had to Naboths vineyard; as I shall usefully demonstrate, when I come to that subject. Let nonpayment be what it will, yet usurpation, and violence, obduration, and obstinacy, resolving to be rich, and hastening to it by any means, are positive entities with a witness. And now we see how his principles are run out into his practice. For whilst he pleads against amendment and restitution, by saying that nonpayment is no positive entity, and that I know not how to place it in any predicament of beings, doth he not wipe his mouth (with the lewd woman in the Proverbs) and confidently say, he hath done no wickedness? 
Prov. 30. 2●.  Let the shopkeepers beware how they lend to such a Logician, lest he tell them, nonpayment is no positive entity, nor in any predicament of beings, and therefore not to repay, is a thing of nothing. But then they may serve him in such a manner, as Zeno served his saucy man, (whose 
* Satis perspicuè intelligent, nequaquam Stoicas opiniones in Ecclesiam invehendas esse.— Zenonis servus dicebat se injust● plecti, quia fato coactus esset peccare, Melanch●hon. in loc. come. pag, 54  like opinion debauched his practice) even keep him in Bocardo, (or some such prison) and tell him that non-releasement is no positive entity, nor doth he know how to place it in any predicament of beings. So much for his impertinence pag. 104. by which he hath made it very pertinent for me, even to speak out of order concerning that, to which I have designed a peculiar place.  
§. 26. I had said that sin is the cause of punishment, 
The cause of punishment. Mr. H. denial of any positive damnation, unless he thinks it no punishment to be damned.  and therefore positive, because the cause cannot have a lesser being than the effect.] In stead of this, Mr. Hickman obtrudes these words upon me. Sin is a punishment, but punishment is a positive entity, ergo, p. 105.] Had he spoken my words, he would probably have cited my pages also. A thing, which he seldom thinks safe for him to do. And yet he saith of the punishment of sense, ('tis well he speaks of it at all, although he gives no reason for it) that it is not positive, if we consider that in which the evil of that punishment formally consisteth] It seems the man is of opinion; that because he takes sin to be a mere nonentity, the punishment of it can be nothing, but a privation of life, added to the loss of the joys of heaven; and what is said of those torments which are inflicted upon the Reprobates, (made to be firebrands of hell) he conceiveth (with some of the Heathen, Diodorus Siculus, and his peers,) to be but [Hypothesin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] a fabulous Mormo, or Bugg, whereby to fright such silly babes, as we Praelatists and Arminians are thought to be, for being so simple as to suffer the loss of all in this world, rather than hazard a greater suffering of somewhat more than a loss in the world to come. This (I say) is his opinion, for aught I can guests at his opinion, by his expressions if he did steadfastly believe, there is an infinite pain in Hell, besides the total privation of bliss and glory; why would he say it is not positive? if he thought the very evil of that unspeakable punishment doth not consist in that infinite pain; why did he not tell us what it is, wherein he supposeth it doth consist? If (besides the mere absence or want of pleasure) the pains of hell are not positive, and the worst evil of punishment to be imagined; I will say to Mr. Hickman (as Bishop Bramhall to Mr. Hobbs,) Reddat mihi mimam Diogenes. And had I not 
* ☞ See D▪ sanderson's 4. Reasons for his rejecting the way of Doct. Twisse, in Doctor Hammond's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 12, 13.  reason to withstand Dr. Twisse, in his withstanding our Blessed Saviour, by asserting it to be better, to be eternally damned, then reduced to nothing? Yet Mr, Hickman is very angry with my resisting that Doctor, in whose behalf he rails at me, but nothing else. p. 106. At least he makes as if he were angry, that so he may take that occasion to slip the neck of his Credit out of the very same collar, in which he hath sense enough to see that his cause is strangled.   

An Appendix.  
§. 1. HAving done with the main subject, upon which Mr. Hickman should have spent his whole Book, but upon which he was careful to speak the least, (as if he were conscious to himself of speaking sinfully of sin, whilst he saw he was to speak, as either a Libertine on the one side, or a Carneadist on the other,) I must now, in a large Appendix, review his Book from the Beginning, and show him the wickedness or the folly in many particulars of the whole, of which he hath not been yet admonished. And I must do it so much the rather, that he may not say I have only stuck upon his sick and sore parts, of which he worthily 
* p. 108.  complains in the Tail of the Body of his Discourse.  
§. 2. I begin with his Epistle to the Lecturers of Brackley; 
Mr. H. his flattery and condemnation of himself.  wherein having premised by a significant implication, That he, and such as he is, are some of the worthiest men alive, pag. 1. and yet implicitly too confessing, They are not worthy to live, p. 2. (I having proved out of their writings, that they are guilty of such a whole, the half of which (saith Mr. Hickman) makes them worthy of death,) he proceeds from his self-flattery, and from his self-condemnation, to do me the honour of being slandered in the same breath with Doctor Hammond, who must not look for better usage than God himself, from such an Advocate and Patron of all impiety, as teacheth the action of hating Good, to be God's own creature, or God himself.  
§. 3. To begin (in his order) with his calumniating myself, he first tells his Brethren, 
His wilful falsehood.  that what I charged his Masters with were the mere Chimaeras of my brain. But how much to the shame both of him, and them too; I have already made apparent in the beginning of my Bo●k. By which I leave it to be judged (and even by them of his own Sect) whether it is not as wilful and as malicious, as it was an unoccasioned and groundless slander. If he examined my citations, I have proved to his own, and his Readers eyes, that he is guilty of a studied and a deliberate wickedness. But if he examined them not at all than it appears that he was resolute to write as bitterly as he was able, without resolving to consider whether his writing would be found to be right, or wrong.  
§. 4. Nor doth he content himself with this, but adds a cast of his virulence (though not more impious, 
His self-contradiction, and confession of having written against his conscience.  yet) much more obvious to the discovery of the Reader; to wit, That God's being the Author of sin does necessarily follow on an opinion which I maintain, p. 3. But does he o●fer at any proof, or at any thing else to supply its place? no, nor so much as tells his Brethren, what opinion he means of my maintaining. Nay he afterwards confesseth He thinks it no way consistent with the ingenuity of a Scholar, or of a man, to charge me with Blasphemy: nay that he cannot, without perfect affront to his conscience, return me Blasphemer for Blasphemer. (Book p. 4.) If this is reconcileable with what he saith of me in his Epistle, Than whatever I have said against Calvin and the rest, must be affirmed by this Rhapsodist to be no accusing them of Blasphemy. But who is a Blasphemer, i● he is not, who maintaineth an opinion from which the wo●st of all Blasphemies (Reader, they are his own words) doth unavoidably follow? we see the greatest of all memories is exceedingly too l●ttle for a man of his Trade. For not remembering in his Epistle, what he had written in his Book, he hath railed it out against me, to no better purpose, then to his own self-condemnation. For if in his Book p. 4. he had any truth in him, or ingenuity, he must needs confess he had none at all whilst he was writing to the Brackleians, and boldly committing that very crime which he had called a perfect affront to his conscience, and inconsistent with the ingenuity both of a Scholar and of a man. It now appears (to do him right) that all hi● Rhapsody was not stolen; for his self-contradictions are all his own.  
§. 5. His next irreverence is the mor●, 
Dr. Hammond. vindicated from Mr. H. his several Falsifications.  for being showed to the most learned and truly Reverend Dr. Hammond, from whom he pretendeth a Citation, which hath no truth in it, but is injurious in 4▪ Respects, for the better elu●cidating of which, I shall first transcribe Mr. Hickmans' words. [The privativenesse of moral evil is not a monster h●tched under the wings of a few Disciplinarian Zelots; not a perfect phantasy, a mere Scholastical Notion, as Dr. Hammond is pleased to call it, Fundam. p. 178.] First it is to be observed, that all these words (from monster, to notion) are printed in the s●me letter, which doth discriminate Citations from Mr. Hickmans' own text; so a● no one Reader who looks no further, and is not fore-armed with that distrust, with which the writings of such a Gamester are of necessity to be read, can escape the error of apprehending that all that passage is Dr. Hammonds, and withal to be met with, in the page there cited; whereas in all his public works, in which I hope I am as perfect as any man of my memory (which I confess is none of the greatest) is like to be, there is not any such word, as Monster hatched under the wings of a few disciplinarian Zelots. Nay I am certified by the Doctor, (in his answer to my request, that he would search his own Memory,) that no such expression hath ever passed from his tongue▪ much less from his Pen, on any occasion whatsoever, much less on this. But on this I lay no weight, because it is no other than an implicit Falsification. His 2. fault is more gross, whilst he citeth the page, and misreporteth the words of that Reverend Doctor. In lieu of [School-notion] Mr. Hickman forgeth him to have written [a mere Scholastical Notion] where 'tis plain the word [mere] is a mere interpolation; whereby to intimate an enmity betwixt the Doctor and the Fathers, of which there had else been no appearance. For a Father may say that, which is withal a School-notion, though not a mere Scholastical notion. But neither should I have mentioned this, which in a man of his practice is to be reckoned a Peccadillo, if it had not stood betwixt me, and his third misrepresentation, which seems to me of greater weight and yet to receive some increase by those additions. I say it is his third injury, that he groundlessly fastens the Doctor's censure to the abovesaid privativenesse of moral evil. Upon which it was so far from having been fastened▪ by the Doctor, that he neither used any such words, nor any other which can bear any Analogy with such; unless the privativenesse of sin doth import no more with Mr. Hickman, then doth the nonentity, or nothingness of it; which as it will prove him a Carneadist, so it is the most that he can plead, to that with which I now charge him. That Reverend Doctor having but mentioned the perfect Fantasy of some, that sin is a Nonentity, (that is) a nothing. So that now (good Reader) thou knowest the meaning of Mr. Hickman, whensoever he asserts the privativity of sin. He means 'tis Nothing, or a Nonentity, or else he wilfully prevaricates, as well with thee, as with Dr. Hammond.  

His confounding the things which he once distinguished.  §. 6. I thought the man had made a difference, betwixt a simple negative, and a Privative; especially when the l●tter is not a want of all being, but only of a Rectitude or conformity to a rule: else why did he distinguish (when it was suitable to his need) betwixt a negative, and a privative Nothing? Besides, privativenesse being but a word of relation, referring to somewhat that it had, but lost, or should have had, but missed of having, (that I may gratify him for once with this distinction) And Relation being but an Accident Adveniens enti in actu existenti, It follows that that which is privative in relation to something of which it is so, may have a positive being preaexistent to that privation, in order of nature if not of time. Thus in every Transmutation, and in corruption more especially, there is a privation of a form, but not of all; for as one goes out, another enters. Night succeeds Day, as Satan's image doth Gods. And what if the last be a privation in respect of that which was before? can it possibly argue no entity of the action, by which the Image was introduced, or of the Image itself abstractly taken? I wish Mr. Hickman would mind his Grammar, and know that privo is a verb active, as much as pono; as privare, no less than ponere, is an action properly so called; and by consequence privatio, just as much as positio is. Thus the killing an innocent Christ (which was we know, the sin of murder) however 'twas a privation (in one respect) was yet as positive an action, as the most lawful execution of the blaspheming thief, which (in one respect) was a privation also: yet the murdering of Christ was neither a nullity, nor was it produced by God himself, as Mr. Hickman hath said that every real being is.  
§. 7. But there remains a fourth thing, 
The s●d effects of the Calvinian Scheme.  of which our Rhapsodist is to be told, to wit, that the error on which Reverend Dr. Ham. affixed that Character [a perfect fantasy and School notion] was not simply and merely this, [that sin is nothing or a non entity, but together with this addition ● so that all things may be predetermined by God and yet not sin. Fundam. p. 178, lin. 23. where showing the tricks of those men, by which they would hide the ill consequences of the Doctrine which they teach, (to wit, that all manner of things were predetermined by the Almighty,) he mentioned this as the first, [That sin is but a nonentity, a nothing;] so that all things (forsooth!) might be eternally predetermined, and yet not sin. Thus they are Libertines, or Carn●adists, or both by turns, (do what they can,) so long as they adhere to the Calvinian Scheme. But Mr. H. omitted what he found of most weight. 
Mr. H●'s sauciness and irreverence to Dr. Ham▪ added to all his wilful forgeries▪   
§. 8. Whilst I am on this subject, I mean the clearing of Dr. Hammond, from this Falsificator, I shall annex to his Epistle, a parallel passage out of his Book, where speaking of the positiveness of sins of omission, he saith [it is so STRANGE, that they also should be positive, that he knows not whether ever it were asserted by any, but Cerberus, alias Champneys, Mr. Dukes the keeper of the great Ordinary at Hell in Westminster, Mr. P. and (whom he would not join with such company) the Reverend and learned Dr. Hammond. p. 69. Here, for brevity's sake, I shall but make these demands, 1. With what colour of excuse this can be said of Dr. Hammond (or indeed of Mr. P.) who never spoke of this matter by word or writing, more than what hath been showed in my former sections? whereas sins of Omission have not been specified, so if they had, it had not followed, that either I, or Dr. Hammond, had ascribed to such a positivity. 2. Why the man should invent such ugly names, as Cerberus (importing the Dog of Hell) and next to that, the keeper of Hell, to join with a Doctor of so much eminence in the world, not more for his Learning, then for the holiness of his life, 3. Whether calling him the Reverend and Learned Dr. and expressing to him a seeming tenderness, is not a bitterness o● Jeer, and so a horrible aggravation both of the falsehood and the sauciness, which I have noted in my first and second Quere? yet this is the meek spirited man, who complains that he is used with too much sharpness, and exhorts his Brethren very demurely, to let their moderation be known unto all men.  

His scurrilous usage of Dr. Taylor and its occasion, Original sin.  §. 9 Having done with Dr. H. He begins afresh to ease himself on Dr Taylor. Whom having taught in what manner he should have Entitled his Book, (Not Deus, but) Pelagius, or Socinus justificatus, (p. 4▪) He immediately lets fly (in as known a falsehood as could be spoken▪) That the Dr. would bear us in hand, he only quarrelleth with the Presbyterian Notion of original sin] whereas it is clear that Dr. Taylor in his Deus justificatus, extends his Quarrel (though very civilly) even to those whom he owns as his Friends and Brethren, sons (with himself) of the very same mother▪ the Church of England. Let Mr. Hickman read, and hold from blushing if he is able, whilst he beholds the Transition the Doctor makes in solemn manner (p. 54.) from his Presbyterian, to his Episcopal Opponents, whom he worthily calls his Dearest brethren. That he denies Original sin, he very plentifully denies, and saith he cannot but confess that to be, which he feels and groans under, and by which all the world is made miserable. p. 12. But now suppose him a flat denier of that Catholic Doctrine, which is taught by our Church, of Original sin. And let us consider what it was which made him err in this point: whether it was not his contemplation of the horrible consequences and Tenants, which Presbyterians are accustomed to superstruct on that Doctrine. As (for example) that all being dead in Adam, there was yet no remedy for the far greater part, no not in the sufferings and satisfaction of Christ, see how rightly the Doctor gathers the odious consequential Blasphemies, in the former part of his enterprise, (as far as p. 54.) from what is taught by the Presbyterians. Of he also confesseth his brethren's Opinions to be free, and such as (if they were all agreed) he would not move a stone to disturb. p. 56. The Presbyterians therefore are to be blamed, for whatsoever error he may have published in this particular; And not at all the Church of England; which by liberally allowing, that Christ hath died even for all who were dead in Adam, directs the only both pious and unquestionable way, of making good the Ancient Doctrine of Original sin.  
§. 9 Had Dr. Taylor indeed affirmed (what is but forged by Mr. Hick-man, 
The Dissatisfaction of Episcopal Divines.  too unintelligent a thing to pass a judgement in such affairs,) that he was not opposed but by Presbyterians, his own letters would have confuted him (as now they do Mr. Hickman) which he directed to the Right Reverend, my Lord of Rochester. But as it is, the result is this. That Doctor Tailor in one point is of a singular opinion, or way of speaking, in which the other sons of the Church of England do avow their sorrow and dissatisfaction▪ who are the only men that can lay sure grounds, whereon to plead with Dr. Taylor to good advantage.  

Dr. tailor's error on the right hand, extremely better than the heresy of Presbyteri●ns on the left.  §. 10. I am one of the meanest (though not I hope the least obedient) of all her children. And though I am well enough qualified, for the clearing this learned Doctor from the calumny and falsehood of his Reviler; yet am I too much a junior, to undertake his conviction, as to that which I conceive he hath said amiss. But (with a Praefiscinè be it spoken to so acute and eminent an Author, who I conceive hath only erred for fear of erring,) I think it better to insist upon the end of Christ's Death, then to define what would have been, had he never died. Concerning the wisdom of God's oeconomy in the disposal of All things, I think the best way to judge, is to judge as God judgeth, and is revealed to have done in his written Word. We are assured by revelation, that Christ was given for all in Adam, or for all who are born from Adam: which had he not decreed to have done as he hath revealed, we have no measure of judging, what should have been the just consequence of Adam's sin; or whether, any besides Adam, should have been concerned in it. We cannot know God's counsels, but by words or deeds revealed to us. Had Christ been given, but not for all, in particular not for Heathen infants, I think we can as little gue●s, what should become of those Infants, as what the other world had been; if God, in stead of This, had created That.  
By this I am willing to make it known to Mr. Hickm●n and his Abettors, both how much I descent from the Doctor's error on the right hand, and how much more I join with him, against their Heresies on the left.  

M. H.'s preferring Calvin to the 4. Evangelists.  §. 11. The man of scorn goes on to teach us, how unfit he is for a Divine, or to be so much as a lay-Preacher, were he in terrâ Corteriali●, where no-ordaining is to be had. For speaking of us, and the Presbyterians, in relation to our Ten●ts of God's Decrees, he saith we befriend them in giving the people occasion to think, that they only are the men, who would contend for the Faith once delivered to the Saints, p. 5.] See how little he understands that easy Text in St. jude. If Calvin's Doctrine in point of Decrees, is the faith delivered to the Saints, of which Saint jude spoke, than it must not only be truth, but the whole divine Truth delivered to us as we are Christians. And so farewell (by this Logic) to the four Evangelists, who have nothing of the Faith that was once delivered to the Saints; But welcome john Calvin, who hath it all. For the whole Doctrine of the Gospel is meant by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Judas 2. And unless Mr. Hickman did take it too in that sense, how does the affixing the assertions upon Calvin and his following Presbyterians (p. 3. and 4.) give any occasion to the people, to think that they are the ONLY MEN? It is no wonder, if Bishop Hooper (one of the first of our holy Martyrs, who suffered from the Papists for our Religion, as others have done from the Presbyterians,) did express these men by the name of 
* See the Quinquar●icularian History, part. 3. c. 16▪ p. 2.  Gospelers, as having found out another Gospel, than what had been written by the four Evangelists, (to use the words of Sir Edwin Sandys.) Our Gospelers (said Bishop Hooper) are better learned then the holy Ghost.— over every mischief that is done, they say it is Gods will. And what prodigious stuff it is, which Mr. Hickman calls the Faith which was once delivered to the Saints, I leave to be judged by the words, and lines, and pages, which I h●ve showed from Mr Calvin and other Writers. Had an Angel from heaven taught such a Gospel, Saint Paul had set him packing with an Anathema Maranatha.  
§. 12. Bishop Carleton saying, 
The way to sto● a papist's mouth.  [some take it for a sign of such as are looking towards Popery, etc. p. 5.] gives leave to others, to take it otherwise. When a thing has two handles, one may take it by the right, as well as another by the left. As I, and my Betters are wont to take it; Our disclaiming the Doctrines of Presbyterians is the way to stop a Papist's mouth; who hath nothing to accuse the Protestants of, but what the Presbyterians have introduced; and that in a perfect opposition to the true Protestant religion.  

Mr. H.'s sense of his scurrility, with his desire never to mend.  § 13. In the eighth page of his Epistle (for the sixth and the seventh are filled with one large Transcript, verbatim taken from Mr. Prin, without acknowledging the Author from whence he took it,) he appears to be conscious of his scurrility, by which he supposeth he hath departed from that meekness of spirit, which is required in a Minister. But he desires his Brethren to think it as lawful as they may (as if he were acting zeal of the land in his Address to Rabbi Buisy) to put some vinegar into his ink, and so to continue in his departure from Christian meekness, (supposing he cannot fall totally, much less finally from Grace,) or else in meekness of spirit, to call me Bolsec, and Fevardentius, and what he plea●eth. But here I arrest him with one mild Question whilst he is furious. Was my saying that their speeches could be no less than Blasphemous, who said that God was the Author and cause of sin, A making their Graves amongst Blasphemers? or a proving by their pages, lines and words, where they had made their own Graves? Perhaps they thought their speeches innocent. And thence I censured th●ir speeches, not the thoughts they had of them. Suppose the Author of a Dispensatory sha●l put a Receipt into his Book, which I know hath poisoned som●, and is as likely to poison others; will my giving a timely warning to beware of that medicine, be censured as the making that Author's Grave among murderers? It will it seems by Mr. Hickman, but who can help it? I plainly proved to Doctor Reynolds, That for all I said of Blasphemous Doctrines, I had not only Doctor Whitakers, but Mr. Calvin's good leave. And so Mr. Hickman (unawares) hath railed it out against both. But if Bolsec is reform, I hope he will do the less hurt. And that he is so in earnest, Bathyllus tells us.  
§. 14. He falls again to confession, p. 9 that 'tis hard for him not to exceed his bounds; 
His new sense of his carnality.  whereupon he prays his Brethren, to give him a call unto repentance. And compares them to the old Puritans, as to the exercise of their patience. But who were the old Puritans? were they such as took upon them to ordain Ministers at Brackley? or such as took joyfully their neighbour's goods? if so, he said ill, That the world was not worthy of such inhabitants. The Apostle applying the words to them, who suffered the spoiling of their own.  
§. 15. The malignity which he concludes with against Episcopal Government, 
And malignlty to the Episcopal Government.  which yet he holds to be better than none at all, (and none at all hath been the Government which they have hitherto set up) doth only serve to put us in mind, in how many respects they have been perjured, as well in swearing, as forswearing their Scotish Covenant. They may be said to be Reformers of Episcopal Government, (and if they please, of Regal too) as the Heretic Marcus was said (by many women, and few men) The 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Iren. l. 1. c. 8. p. 68  Reformer of all that had gone before him. But what kind of Ministers he ordained, and after what an enormous manner, and how he Reform the women's Purses to fill his own, would be tedious to tell upon this occasion. They that will, may consult Epiphanius, Haeres. 34. And especially Irenaeus, lib. 1. cap. 9 My observation is chiefly this, That he was reckoned a great Reformer.   

An Appendix for Master Hickman touching his Preface to the READER.  
§. 16. Having gone over the main of Mr. Hickmans' Dedicatory Epistle, I now proceed to his preface, his tedious preface to the Reader. On which I shall make the shortest strictures that I am able, until I meet with such things as do call for length. And because Doctor Heylin hath unanswerably spoken to the Historical part, both in his Certamen Epistolare, (wherein he Refutes it ex professo) and in his Quinquarticular History, (wherein he virtually Refutes it, though not by name,) I shall not therefore say more to that, than is omitted by Doctor Heylin, or at least omitted for aught I am able to remember.  

The first page of his Preface proves all that follows to be but the fruits of his revenge.  § 17. He tells his Reader in the beginning, 1. how much he had been taken with (I know not what) rich vein of Rhetoric, which (he saith) he saw running through all my writings which he had seen. 2. That he hath not mentioned my name without those prefaces of Respect which are due to a Scholar. 3. That notwithstanding his being debased to the Dunghill of Doltisme, he is not so much as tempted, to detract from my Credit and Reputation, etc. p. 1.] If this hath any Truth in it, than there is no truth at all in the far greatest part of his whole performance. For Mr. Baxter himself, in all his Kiderminster-stuff, is a puny Railer in comparison. Not only all the ill language which he was able to invent, but even all that he was able to filch from others, he hath made it his business to throw upon me; and all for no better Reason, than my asserting God's honour, to the disgrace of those men who have rai●'d against him.) I am so ignorant in his eyes, p. 72. And he espies such a darkness upon the face of my understanding, p. 71. that from thence you may discover how he respects me as a Scholar. And rather than detract from my Reputation, he only chargeth me with downright impudence, p. 47. with ridiculousness, and malice, and a Treatise dirty enough to justify all the ugly brats of the Wildest Sectaries, that G. C. hath midwived into the world. p. 13, 14.  
But (not to transcribe a great part of Master Hickman's Rhapsody, by giving in a full Catalogue of all his calumnies and rail) It shall suffice me to observe, how all the rest of his pages do run Antipodes to his first. And how big of rancour, he must confess himself to have been, when nothing could ease him but the delivery of such an unnatural revenge, as could not be whelped without the torment of such a self-contradiction. For first to profess so much respect, and so much tenderness of my Credit, (as hath been showed;) and to profess himself farther, 
* Pref. p. 6.  A cordial friend to my person; nay (after that) to declare, that he 
† Book p 1.  disliked the sharpness of Mr. Barlees stile; And yet after all, (nay in the midst of all this,) to behave himself in such noysomwise, as if he had licked up the 
* See Epist. before Hist. Qui●quar. p. 6.  Vomits of all his Brethren, on purpose to cast them up again, and all at Me; (for what he do●s to the Church of England and to her persecuted Children, I take as done unto myself, and with a greater indignation, then if it were done to myself alone,) this is so very much his misery, as well as it is his Misdemeanour, that to discover it as I have done, is all the punishment I intent him.  
§. 18. To what he saith of my Reputation, 
His frivolous exception to Heathen learning.  acquired amongst the young Gallants, by putting the good Greek and latin of the old Philosophers into as Good English in my Practicals, (p. 2.) I only answer four things.  
1. That the Prophets and the Apostles were no Heathen Philosophers, from whom my practical Divinity hath been derived. 2. But after my reasonings out of Scripture, I reason also out of the Heathen, to serve the turn of such 
* See my reasons for the use I make of th● Heathens in my sinner impleaded, par. 1. ch. 1. Sect. 5.  Professors, as Mr. Baxter, and Mr. Hickman, who live undaunted and shameless in some kinds of sin, at which a wellbred Heathen would Blush, or tremble. And I would make them strive to be better than they are, by their scorning to be worse than their inferiors. 3. My use of Heathen learning is no more than may be justified by the practice of Dr. Reynolds, who hath translated more of them then I have done, and this I speak to his honour, because the more he abounds in his Humane learning, the liker h● is to immortal Grotius. Nay the great Apostle St. Paul in his Sermon at Athens, 
See Bp. Andrew's his defence of using the Heathens in our writings; in his Sermon of Imaginations. p. 31.  citeth Aratus (a Heathen) in matter of Doctrine. Acts 17.28. And in matter of life, he citys Menander, a 
* Note, Reader, that Menander● Comedy is of Thais the famous Harlot, out of which St. Paul ha●h cited that saying to the Corinthians. See Grot vot. pro, Pa. p. 116.  Comedian, 1 Cor. 15.33. And so in matter of report, he urgeth the words of Epim●nides, or Callimachus, Tit. 1.12. The names of jannes' and jambres he is concluded to allege from the jewish Talmud, 2 Tim. 3.8. Besides, Heathen learning is pleaded for by Ancient Fathers of the Church, as by Clemens Alexandrinus Strom. 7, By St. Basil in a set Treatise, how the heathens, are to be read. By Gregory Nyssen in the life of Moses, (who by the way, was well skilled in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, Acts 7.22. that is to say, in Heathen learning.) And so again by St. Austin, de Doctrinâ Christiana, 2.40. All which Mr. Hickman might have learned from Bp. Andrews; to whom I send him somuch the rather, because from thence he may learn the Presbyterian imaginations, and because being in English he will be the surer to understand it. I could else have showed him in 
* Justin. Martyr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ex edit Sylburg. 1593. p. 7. ad p. 29.  justin Martyrs own words, How he elaboratly pleadeth for Christianity itself, out of the Heathen Philosophers and Poe●s too; and how he fetcheth a kind of Gospel (as St. Augustine, after him, hath also done) out of the Sybillian Oracles. I could tell him how Clemens of Alexandria did 
† 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Clem. Alex. storm. 7. p. 669. B.  professedly defer the use of Scripture, till he had fitted his Readers for its reception. And that the very best parts of the Father's writings (both of the Eastern and Western Church) are those that are fullest of Heathen Learning.  
But I proceed to my fourth Answer; that my sinner Impleaded is fuller of Scripture, then humane learning. That my chiefest use of this latter, is in my very first Chap. That Mr. Hickman betrays the depth of his Ignorance in Greek, whilst he thinks I translate whatsoever he seeth in my Margin, which for the far greatest part, I only accommodate, and apply. And what I really Translate, I ever own the Translating of; directing my readers by my Margin, where the Original is to be found. Nor can I possibly be blamed, (unless Mr, Hickman has any Peers) if I make some Philosophers to speak as good English, as Greek, and Latin.  
§. 18. 'tis true indeed that Mr. Hickman hath given no proof of his Humane learning, 
The Heathenish Nature of his own.  but only of stealing other men's, which is inhuman. I cannot find him translating, and honestly citing the Philosophers Greek or Latin; But chiefly trading in English Writers, out of whom he compiles what he thinks is most Pretty, (in both senses of the word, as Dr. Heylin hath observed in his 
† See it prefixed to his Hist. Quinquar. A. 3.  Epistle to the Reader) Which having done he makes public, without a fear that his Larcin's will come to light. Had the man been a Fox, he would have preyed afar off, in Greece or Latium; not where every one may snap him who has the skill to read English. But if he thinks it no sin to steal, (like the Heathens in 
* Polyb. l. 4. p. 285.  Polybius) because to steal is an action, and so a positive entity; which he professeth to think no sin can be; yet methinks he should esteem it a great unhappiness to be Caught; For fear his Auditors should suspect, if he shall Preach against stealing, that he steals the very Sermon rebuking stealth.  
§. 19 How, and whence he hath borrowed (without a thought of Restitution) whatsoever can ●e thought to be smart, or handsome, I have already set out in order, 
A new Discovery of his stealth.  by way of Letter to Dr. Heylin, when having promised to discover from whom he stole his little all on the thing in Question, (I mean, against the positive entity of sin,) I am content in this place to be as good as my word. His strength is taken chiefly from my learned Friend Mr. BARLOW, but partly too from Dr. Robert Baron, a learned Scot, Neither is cited (so much as once) for any one syllable of the whole. But how they ought to have been cited, if Mr. Hickman had not desired to pass for a kind of Metaphysician, let it be judged by this parallel, which is as short as I can contrive it.  
Mr. Hickman. M. Barlow. The privative nature of sin may be thus— evicted. If a thing be therefore sinful, because it wants some perfection that it ought to have, and cease to be sinful when it hath all the perfection which it ought to have▪ than is sin a privation; but a thing is therefore sinful, etc. Ergo, etc. Book. 2. Edit. Arg. 3. p. 84. l. 16. etc. Malum esse privativum rationibus evinco,— si res quaevis, quae est mala, sit ideò praecisè mala, quia caret aliquo bono sibi debito; & ideò non sit mala, quia non caret aliquo bono sibi debito; tum malitia formaliter erit in carentia seu privatione boni. At ideò res est mala, &c, Et per consequens, etc. Ratio 2. p. 42. l. 5. à fin, etc. If sin, as sin, be a positive entity, than it is a thing in itself good. The consequence— Ens & bonum convertuntur. Arg. 1. p. 70. l. 4. etc. Si malitia aliqua esset ens positivum,— tum est bonum,— Ratio est, quia bonitas est passio entis reciproca. p. 44. l. 21. etc. Ratio 5▪ This positive being of sin, is it a finite and participate being? If not, etc. p. 78. l. ult. etc. Impossibile est, ut sit entitas aliqua finita, & creata, etc. Ratio 3. p. 55. l. 5. à fin. etc. ad 10. lineas. vid. & p. 54. l. 19 etc. Ratio 3. & p. 56. l. 23, etc. If sin be a positive entity, than it is either God, or from God, etc. Arg. 2. p. 75. l. 4, etc. Si— ipsa malitia esset ens— positivum, tum— vel erit, etc. Ratio 6. p. 45. l. 9 etc. ad 16. lineas. vid. & p. 73. l. 2. etc. If original sin be a thing positive, 'tis either the soul itself, or some of its faculties, or some accident or adjunct agreeing, etc.— but none of all these, Ergò, etc. Arg. 4. p. 87. l. 18. etc. for 20. lines. Si praeter privationem—, entitas aliqua esset malo originali intrinseca, tum entitas illa vel erit ipsa natura vel ejus adjunctum aliquod accidentale. At ex his nullum— dici possit. Ergò, etc. ita porrò ad 4. lineas. Ratio 1. p. 58. l. 23. etc. Vid. & p. 59 l. 7. etc. ad 19 lineas. Vide etiam p. 90. l. 6. etc. Such actions are called intrinsically evil, both because they are evil antecedently to any positive Law, and because they are evil ex genere & objecto, and not merely through the want of some circumstance: for a Scholar to walk, etc. so on for 7. lines. p. 94. l. 6. etc. Actus illi dicuntur intrinsecè mali, quod talis malitia ipsis inest ablatâ omni lege positiva▪— non solùm sunt mali ex defectu circumstantiae alicujus, sed ex genere & objecto,— ut ambulare, etc. Sic deinceps ad 5. lineas. Exer. Metap. 2. Edit. 2. p. 73. l. 12. etc. Sins of omission and commission are sufficiently distinguished, notwithstanding—: omission will be the transgression of an affirmative precept, commission the transgression of a negative precept. Secondly, they differ in respect of their immediate foundation, the fundamentum proximum of a sin of commission is some act or habit: but these are not the fundamenta proxima of a sin of omission. Answ. p. 98. l. 1 etc. Differunt [malum omissionis & commissionis] tamen. 1. Quòd omissio omnis sit legis affirmativae violatio, commissio praecepti negativi. 2. Differunt, quia malum omissionis in ipsa anima rationali, etc. immediatè fundatur, non in actu aliquo aut habitu.— (l. 20.) Malum autem commissionis— in actu aliquo aut habitu, in quo tanquam fundamento proximo & immediato consistit. Sol. p. 83. l. 11. etc. Vid. & p. 64. l. 22, etc. Because covetousness is a privation of liberality, as it puts a man upon honest spending, prodigality is a privation of liberality as it doth incline a man to avoid superfluous spending. Answ. p. 99 lin. 3. etc. Avaritia dicit privationem liberalitatis, in quantum liberalitas inclinat ad sumptus necessarios, prodigalitas verò dicit privationem liberalitatis, in quantum à superfluis sumptibus liberat. Sol. p. 82. l. 13. etc. vid. & p. 81. l. 5. à fin. etc. That there can be no degrees in a privation,— is a mere mistake. Among privations some are greater, some less, with relation to that form unto which they are opposed:— that may Physically be accounted the greater privation which removes more degrees of the form—: if we reckon morally then we may also calculate the degrees of privation, etc. on for 3. lines. Ans. p. 99 l. 4. à fin. etc. Dico quòd privatio potest habere magis & minùs— Ratione termini privati; boni sc. quod tollit. Sic ut illam— majorem dicimus, quae majorem subjecti perfectionem tollit; sic in naturalibusilla caecitas, etc. Et in moralibus illud vitium est majus quod bonum morale majus tollit. Sol. p. 79. l. 16. etc. There is a punishment of loss, which scarce ever any man said was positive. There is a punishment of sense, and this— is no other way an evil—, than as it doth deprive us of some perfection of which we are capable. So on for five lines farther. Answ. 105. l. 3. etc. Hoc [poena damni] (nullo quod sciam dissentiente) est solùm privatio— (p. 50. l. 6.)— poena sensus est s●lùm homini malum in quantum privat hominem perfectione debita. Sol. p. 47. l. 19 etc. Vid. & p. 50. l. 15. etc. & p. 78. l. 23. ad 5. lineas, The hating of God is complexum quid, etc. on for 6, lines. Ans. p. 95. l. 14, etc. Vide p. 73. l. 4. à fin. etc. ['tis not] a relatio rationis, which is affirmed by Vasquez but against all good reasons, etc. Pag. 83. l. 5. à fin. etc. See p. 95. l. 3. à fin. Quòd non sit relatio rationis,— quod velle videtur Vasquez in 1.2. q. 95. cap. 9 etc. p. 53. l. 4. etc. Dionysius Areopagita's testimony, p. 56. l. 13. etc. see in p. 40. l. 12, etc. The testimonies of Dionies. two Greek Scholiasts Maximus, & Pachymera, ib. l. 22. etc. & l. pen. etc. See in pag. 40. l. 22, etc. & l. 29. etc. Gregory Nyssen's testimony, p. 57 l. 5. etc. See in p. 41. l. 13, etc. Athanasius' testimony, p. 76. l. 4. à fin. etc. See in p. 55. l. 9 etc. Greg. Arimin. a noble Schoolman. p. 85. l. 10. etc. compare p. 58. l. 5. à fin. etc. with Gregor. Arimin. nobilior Scholasticus. p. 19 & 124. p. 53. l. ult. & p. 30. l. 14, etc. Mr. Hickman. Rob. Baronius in Metaphysica Generali. How many men have been imprisoned for not paying sums of money which they did owe? p. 104. l. 19 etc. Apud homines debitor incarceratur ob non solutam summam pecuniae, quod negativum quid est. §. 5. p. 54. l. 5. etc. Suppose the first sin of Angels, to have been a proud desire to be equal unto God: the cause of this proud desire was the will of the Angel. But it was of the vitiosity of the Action— only the cause per accidens, & per concomitantiam. Nor doth the vitiosity of the effect always suppose a vitiosity in the cause; though it always presuppose an imperfection in the cause. And where the cause itself is vicious, its vitiosity is not the cause of the vitiosity of the effect: for vitiosity of itself neither can effect, nor be effected: but the vicious cause, taking together the being, and the supervenient privation, is the cause of the vicious effect, taking it in like manner for the being, and the superadded privation. p. 103. l. 9 to l. 20. Supponamus primum malum culpae in Angelis fuisse vitiosam volitionem aequalitatis cum Deo, causa efficiens hujus vitiosae volitioni● fuit— ipsa voluntas Angelica. Verùm— per accidens & per concomitantiam quandam producta est ea vitiositas.— vitiositatem effect● non semper praesupponere vitiositatem in causa. (p. 59 l. 4. etc.) Non— ergò volumus vitiositatem causae per se efficere vitiositatem effecti: quia vitiositas causae per se nihil operari potest; vitiositas verò effecti per se produci non Potest; sed tantum asserimus Causam vitiosam, prout includit ens & privationem enti superadditam producere effectum vitiosum, sumendo similiter nomen effectûs vitiosi, prout includit ens aliquod & privationem enti superadditam p. 61. l. 12. etc.  
Haddit Mr, Hickman been Heir apparent to Dr. BARON and Mr. BARLOW, 
With their Aggravation  (as sure I am he is to nei●her) he should have waited for the Decease as well of the second, as of the first. 
Nulla fides pietasque viris qui Castra sequun●ur. Lucan.  For how liberally soever a man intends towards his child, he seldom puts off his shoes, till he goes to bed. Nor will any, but such Vermin as are Followers of a Camp, (not at all to fight, but to prey and plunder) strip a man of his clothes, before the breath is out of his body. Dr. ROBERT BARON indeed is dead, and knows not what is done to him. But I hope Mr. BARLOW is both alive, and live-like; and so 'tis too soon for Mr. Hickman, to 
* Note the Rule in the civil Law, that he who steals or purloynes another man's writings, or bonds, or the like, is liable to an action of theft etc. Digest. 47.2.27. &. 32. cited by Dr. Zouch in his C●ses of civil law. p. 95.  take his goods into possession. If Mr. Hickman shall deny, what is become so proverbial for Notoreity, and excuse himself by an older proverb, that many times good wits do jump, (which being true when Mr. H. doth knock his head against a post, can have no truth here, even for that very Reason,) A man may fitly say to him, as I have heard Sr. Thomas More once said to Gallus in a Tetrastick; (Although what Gallus had done in verse, as Mr. H. hath done in prose, was many centuries of years, before Sr. Thomas was yet in being.)  
Vatibus idem animusque, & vere spiritus idem,  
Qui fuit Antiquis, est modo (Gall) tibi.  
Carmina namque eadem, versusque frequenter eosdem  
Quos fecere illi, Tu quoque (Gall) facis.  
Now because that great and good man was no Philosopher of the Heathens, Mr. Hickman will not be angry at it, if I try to put his good Latin into almost as good English.  
Thou (Gallus) hast the same both spirit and mind,  
With them that writ in time of yore.  
For when thou writest Verses, oft I find  
Thou writ'st the same they writ before.  

His mistake of justice for drollery.  §. 20. Whereas Mr· Hickman adds further, (p. 2.) that I abused Mr. Barlee with drollery, as handsome as ever dropped from the pen of of Ben johnson in his polemicals,] I thank him as much as if I did, but I do not accept of his Commendation, of which how ambitious Himself hath been, we see by other men's Drollery, to which he hath put his own name. Vindicative justice is such a necessary Virtue, as without which it is impossible for humane society to subsist. Which if Mr. Hickman will needs call Drollery, I must needs assure him he shows his ignorance of the word. My doing of justice on some offenders, in vindication of God and Man, I own as a Duty incumbent on me. And in particular this last which I have done upon this Compiler, I take to be such, as could not safely have been omitted. For Diagoras turned Atheist, upon his seeing a Plagiary escape unpunished.  
§. 21. He saith, he reckons me unfortunate in choosing the tremendous mystery of reprobation for my first public essay. 
The Calvinian Tenet renders all study useless.  p. 2.] Not that he thinks me to be unfortunate indeed, but because his fingers itchy to be stealing a passage from Mr. Hales (on 2 
* Note that that Sermon was long since Printed, before reprinted in the Remains. of Mr. HALES.  Pet. 3.16. concerning Eccius his saying, that he chose to speak of Reprobation as an Idoneous subject, in quo juveniles aestus exerceret, which Mr. H. knew not how to introduce with any fitness, unless he might say I was unfortunate in making choice of that subject. But was not the Refuting of irrespective reprobation, (and of the horrible Blasphemies deduced from it by its Assertors) a subject fit for my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or first endeavours when if that Tenet is once swallowed down, all further study is rendered useless, (that I may not say pernicious too?) And when no more then common Reason, improved a little by Philosophy, is required to refute it upon the principles supposed? And when in the principles I speak of, all who have read our Church Catechism are very sufficiently instructed? Whether so, or not so, let it be judged by them, who have read me at least as they were running, and not by him, who will not read me. As Mr. H. professeth he neither hath, nor will (p 3.) though he professeth the contrary in other places. For which and other Contradictions, I leave him wholly to their lash, who bid him go forth and be a Preacher, though not a Priest, especially for his saying I was unfortunate in any thing; because by using that word, he hints the falsehood of his own and his brethren's Doctrine, That whatsoever comes to pass was foredetermined by an absolute unconditional decree, importing the Necessity of all events. Which doctrine must needs be false, if I was unfortunate in my choice; and as false, if I was fortunate. But if he will have the Doctrine true, than it was clearly the will of God (even according to his own and his brethren's Doctrine) that I should make it my first endeavour, to comfute their doctrine of Reprobation.  
§ 22. What he saith next of Bp. Montague's visitation. 
The King's declaration forbidding its being preached.  (p 3.) and of his Majesty's Declaration, which was not intended as a two edged sword (p. 4.) is many ways to my Advantage. For 1. the end of that Bishop's inquiry in his Episcopal visitation, was to silence the Doctrine of irrespective Decrees. And the same was the end of my... Next that aught to have been the end both of the one, and the other, because Mr Hickman doth now confess that even that was the end of the King's Majesty's Declaration, to which we thought it our Duty to yield Obedience 3. The two edged sword is strangely joined by Mr. Hickman, with a charitable design to settle peace, or stop mouths. 4. Whilst he saith it was designed to stop the mouths of the Orthodox, he means by Orthodox, those men, who taught (as since the Assembly men have done) that all things are ordained by God; and so the murdering of the innocent, as well as the punishing of the guilty. And why (forsooth!) were they Orthodox, but because Authority had designed to stop their mouths? How much rather may Independents bestow on themselves the name of Orthodox, whose mouths were designed to be stopped by the Presbyterians? 5. The very truth of it is this: That Declaration was intended to stop Discourses on either-side, any farther than our Church had given a Rule whereby to teach, both in her Catechism, Liturgy, Homilies, and Articles, whose contrariety indeed to the way of Calvin had very good reason to put a muzzel upon his follower's mouths, whensoever they were opened to God's dishonour. And this I am able to make apparent by an eminent Person now living from whom I had the following story, that when a Preacher came to Court, and had put in his Text to the Clerk of the closet than Bp. of Hereford, [why will ye die O house of Israel?] One of the Chaplains (now a Bishop) was sent to give him a timely warning, not to have any thing in his Sermon against the King's Declaration. And he undertaking that he had not, was permitted to preach before his Majesty.  

No good Arguing from evil custom.  §▪ 23. What he saith of the Lord Falkland his speech in Parliament, speaking in favour of his party in one respect, but quite against them in another, (p. 5.) hath no other force in it, then that he either thought what he spoke, and so that he had not yet seen his error, or that at least by his displeasure to some of the Bishops then in power, he was induced to declaim in General Termes, without the addition of any proof, or of any thing else to supply its room. And so I could tell of another Lord, who would have (proved I cannot say, but) persuaded only that the Oath in the Canon against Popery and innovations (of which Presbyterianism was not the least) was someway against the King's Supremacy. But wise men knew what these things meant, as well as what the words signify. And let it be noted by Mr. H. that the Doctrine which he opposeth was then confessed by the Lord Falkland (in the very same speech) not to be contrary to Law, and had nothing but custom to plead against it. (Not proving whether the Custom, were good or evil.) And of what importance it is in RELIGION, to draw an Argument only from Custom let it be sadly weighed by Them, who do at any time press for a Reformation. Down goes Presbytery (if yet I may imply it was ever up) as far as the speech of that Lord hath any force or strength in it.  
§. 24. But now that the Reader may be informed of the disinteressed judgement, 
The Lord falkland's judgement against calvin's  which that most learned and noble Lord professed to have of those points, I will lead him to his Reply to the Romanists Answer, in vindication of what he had written against the pretended infallibility of the Church of Rome. My Lord (in his pages 108, 109.) speaking of the great controversy betwixt the Dominicans and the Jesuits, which was debated and heard before Pope Clement, and of the many days spent in examining what St. Austin thought, his Lordship adds these words concerning Austin and his Ancestors. And for Austin, [He thought so variously concerning it, that he scarce knew himself which: whereas all the Ancients that I could ever meet with (as his Lordship goes on) were with the jesuits with an unanimous consent.] Whatever that Lord might think, or say, in any other time, or place, here he shows us his most avowed, (and I have reason to believe) his ripest judgement.  

Mr Hickmans' inhuman and slanderous insinuation.  §. 25. Now comes the practice of an arrant Bigot in Presbyterianisme, who saith that [If whilst I have b●en throwing stones (that is writing controversy) my children have wanted their bread, or have been fain to take it divided to them by a more unskilful ha●d th●n mine own; Then have I put something upon my Doomsday Book, which he wishes, I may have Time to take off by Repentance. p. 5, and 6.] Here he intimates to his Reader with a barbarous [If] a thing as false, as it is malicious. And I will punish him only by saying, what is a great and known truth. That I have been as constant a we●kly Preacher (and sometimes more than weekly too) since I writ what I have published, and all the time that I was writing, as any Presbyterian within my knowledge; and more than some whom I could name. When indeed I have been vehemently sick (for it is not all sickness that hath excused me) my flock hath been fed by some other shepherd. When I have sometimes been Absent, I have seldom preached the less for that, but sometimes the more, and somewhere always where need hath been. If to avoid shifting turns with neighbour-Minist●rs (the cheap and lazy trick of the Presbyterians) I have been at the charge to maintain a Br●ther for my Assistance, (that whether sick or absent, I may not be wanting to my Flock) what hurt have I done to such covetous worldlings, as (rather than be at that cost for their people's good) will make a scandalous shift, and put their money into their Pockets? I think 'twere happy we had a Law, whereby to compel them to use Assistants, who spread out half their matter thinly, and call it a Sermon in the morning, the other half being reserved to be spread as thinly, and so to be called a second Sermon after noon. So mine Host in Livy branched out his Porket, that his Guest's might not grumble for want of a second, and third course. And children are pleased with a couple of sixpences, when they will not be content with a single shilling. Alas, the difference is as great (I mean in one and the same man) betwixt Sermon, and Sermon, as betwixt Gold in the ingot, and in the leaf. Nothing is commoner with Preachers, then to thrust up m●ny Sermons into one, or to beat out one into many. And whereas it is hinted by Mr. Hickman that I have fed my flock by a hand unskilfuller than mine own; Let it suffice that I am not so selfconceited, as to flatter myself with his opinion. My Assistant was very much fitter to teach the people their Christian duty, than Mr. Hickman or his peers can be in haste. Fitter (I say) from after the time of his conversion, whatever he might have been whilst he was yet a Presbyterian. But he hath long since left the world; and well it had been for Mr. Hickman, if he had not thus rakeed in an honest man's Grave; But that he had rather looked inward, and laid to heart the common Rule, [Qui alterum incusat probri, etc.]  
For if it is true, 
How much wo●se in himself, then in any other.  wh●t I have heard from many men of good credit, (and what I have partly read in print too) that Mr. Hickman at the same time possessed three Livings at once, (and had not any right to either) to wit an excellent Fellowship in Mag. Coll. besides the Parsonage of St. Towles, 
Therefore thou art inexcusable O man;— for wherein thou judgest another thou condemnest thyself: for thou that judgest dost the same things. Rom. 2.1. It's odiousness sh●wn by a parallel case.  as it's vulgarly called (enough to keep a worthy man who has wife and children) and also the Vicarage of Brackley, (where his neglects of his children are most notorious (if I may call them his, which by another kind of Plagium he seized upon,) then is he of all others, the unfittest creature in the world, to tell his Readers- (by intimation) of my omissions towards my Flock, which are very well known to have been none.  
Nor will it advantage him now to plead, that he spoke with an [if,] and that his inference is true, upon his bare Hypothesis, or supposal. For then without offence to him, I may also bespeak my Readers thus, [That if Mr. Hickman is very ordinarily drunk, and if he is given to swear fearfully by fits, and if he is a great- striker when intoxicated with rage; Then hath he put something on his Doomsday book, which I wish he may have time to take off by Repentance.] ●his I speak with an [if] and my supposal being granted, my Inference cannot but be true. But I abominate these courses, and have only showed him, (as I have done his brother Baxter) that their Trade is as easy, as 'tis inhuman.  
§. 26. In his next ensuing words, (p. 6.) he does distinguish my opinion, 
His profession of cordial friendship, with its effect.  (to which he is an enemy) from my person, (to which he saith he is a cordial friend.) And yet in the next words to those, he does not equally distinguish betwixt the persons and opinions of those Beyond-sea Divines, of whose opinions (I hope) I may use as hard speeches, as Mr. Hickman hath used of mine, and yet be no less their cordial friend. We have seen Mr. Hickman his cordial friendship towards me. But I was never so unmanlike, as to exercise the like upon his Divines; whose pages and very lines I have laid together with their words; whilst heaven and earth are called to witness, what they have said against God, as well as what (in that case) I have duly said against them.  

His sacrilegious Eulogy bestowed on them of his way.  §. 27. In that he adds of his precious Divines, that they are scarce to be equalled by any now alive, or to be excelled by those in any Calendar, ibid.] he hath spoken most unhappily, (to say no worse.) For 1. he knows in some Calendars, Mr. Fox his Martyrs are recorded. And was it not much more excellent to die for Christ; then to write for irrespective decrees of sin, and damnation? Besides, 2. He either knows, or aught to know, that all the saints are in the Calendar, Novemb. 1. so is Michael the Archangel, and (as our Collect understands it) All the the Angels of heaven, on September 29. John Baptist, the Virgin Mary, (who is no less than 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Mother of God, in the expression of the Greek Fathers) Nay Christ himself, and the holy Ghost, and the Father too upon Trinity Sunday, are either by name, or in equivalence, at least in some Calendars. Thus he commit▪ a spiritual whoredom, by Idolising Mr. Calvin, and other men of his sect, yet has the heart (more than once) to accuse another of partiality.  
§. 28. Whilst he talks how he will show, 
The Doctrine of the Church of England vindicated, with Bp Laud and Bp. Montague.  not that the Remonstrant but the contra-Remonstrant opinion hath been the Doctrine of the Reformed Church of England (p 8.) he talks unskilfully enough for a man of his own Breeding, for 1. The Remonstrants and their Opponents are much too young, to denominate the Doctrine our Church espouseth; to that here he speaks as a parach●onizer. But 2. I do not pretend that in every point, the Remonstrants agree with the Church of England; our Church having avoided to define in some things. 3. That they agree in some things, is as manifest as the Sun, by what our Article saith of the death of Christ, and the falling away of the Regenerate. And if in every other point they do not speak the same thing, yet they are infinitely liker to one another, than either can be to their common Enemies. And 4. I am sure, Our Church is favourable in nothing to the contra-Remonstrants against the Remonstrants. But 5. If the Remonstrants in some things do adhere too much unto Arminius, wherein the Calvinists and Arminius do but too much agree, as I have elsewhere showed of some points and am able to show of others also,) it is no wonder if our Church doth stand at a distance from both together. And so 'tis a very gross Fallacy (whether by ignorance or craft, it comes to pass, I do not say,) To make the Doctrine of our Church, and the Doctrine of the Remonstrants (though the most Orthodox men of the Belgic Churches) to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Aequivalents, in our Account. I can manifest a difference, whoever else will say he cannot. And holding fast mine Antagonist to the precedent limits of my Discourse, or of the Terms I use in it, I shall proceed to answer his next assertion, first, by denying his prooflesse and helpless saying, [that the countenancing of Arminianism (as that is a Nickname for the doctrine which we embrace with the Church of England) is no older than Bishop Laud and Bishop Montague] and for a proof of my Denial, I refer him to Dr. H.'s Certamen Epistolare, but more especially to his Quinquarticular History. 2. By affirming, that if Bp. Laud and Bp. Montague did more eminently than others, give great Encouragement and Countenance to what hath been commonly called Arminian, the meaning of it is only this; that they would not suffer those Doctrines which were exceedingly remote from what was owned by our Church, and in some things contrary to what our Church had defined, to pass with freedom for the Doctrines of the Church of England, when they were nothing but the mistakes of particular men in the English Church.  

Of Mr. H.'s Impertinence implying Presbyterians▪ to be Idolaters.  §. 29, But what hath Arminianism to do with the words of the Homily against the Peril of Idolatry (p. 9) that Mr. H. should be so giddy, as to make that an Argument for his position? does he think that Arminius and the Remonstrants were as really Idolaters, as the same Arminius and his Followers are very well known to be Presbyterians? As Presbyterians they might be such, if we believe Bp. Andrews, and Dr jackson; but as Anti-Calvinians, they could not be so.  

The Archbishop cleared as to what he did against Sherfield.  And as little force hath that Homily, to prove that Archbishop L●ud was no obedient son of the Church of Enland, (unless because he was a Father) in that he put Mr. Sherfield to so much cost, and a disgraceful acknowledgement of ●is fault, and caused him to be bound to his good Behaviour, ibid.] For Sherfields' fault was no less than a public Riot, even breaking of Church-windows in a private Caprice; such as in which (if he had pleased) he might have broken the Bishop's head too. To disallow of pictures, is one thing; and to break them, is quite another. It was decreed at Frankford, by no less than 300 Bishops at once, that images are neither to be broken nor worshipped. And Dr. Hammond himself (who is least liable to the suspicion of showing any favour to what is Popish) saith in his Treatise concerning heresy, 
See Dr. Ham. of Heresy p. 126.  [that we indeed in this matter approve of the Doctrine of the Frankford decrees, as that is summed up in * those few words.] It is so generally known that the I●onomachi were Heretics, who fell to work in the days of old (almost 1000 years ago) as Mr. Sherfield hath lately done, That I thought Mr. Hickman might at least have heard of it. And pity it is that any Christian should so far imitate, and gratify, both the mahometans, and the jews. I have taken some care to inform myself rightly of Sherfield's business, and of the windows at Sarum of which he would needs be a Reformer. And by the favour of a Friend (having no acquaintance there myself) I have an account from such a person, as cannot easily be deceived in that particular, and cannot possibly design to deceive another. The truth of the Story is briefly this.  
§. 30. In a Parochial Church of that City, 
An Impartial narrative of the case.  there was painted in a window the history of the Creation. And in each day's work there was added the figure of an old man. The glass might be of the colours mentioned by Master Hickman (from Mr. Prin.) the proportions were small, and so obscurely described, that very difficult it was to discern the History. Few did ever observe, or appear to take any notice of it; so far it was from giving scandal to weaker persons. Many old Bibles have the like in the two first chapters of Genesis. Nay the like may be seen in an Impression at Geneva. (let Mr. Hickman mark that) It was a calumny raised against the excellent Archbishop, that he justified the picturing of God the Father, by that of the Ancient of days in Daniel, (which Mr. Hickman perhaps invented, and pretends no more for it, than a simple Hearsay.) when he only chastized the presumption of Sherfield; not knowing what mischiefs to Church and State such public riots might one day end in, if private persons of their own heads might be suffered to Reform in such a manner. 'Tis true the vision in Daniel might be described agreeably to daniel's Narrative, that is, by the shape of an old man. What is presented to the mind, and ear, by words and letters, may also by pictures be represented to the eye. But to picture an old man in the History of the Creation (wherein there is not the least mention of any such thing) is to falsify the History; And I profess (for my part) to abhor it, as much as Mr. Sherfield can be imagined to have done. Yet would I not take his riotous course, whereby to testify my resentment; but humbly complain to just Authority, and so amend one fault, without the making of another. Concerning the wisdom and Piety of Archbishop Land: I cannot better convince a Hickman, then by the words of Bishop White; who (if a Bishop at least can be) is thought a very good man by the Presbyterians. 
Bishop White in his Epistle Ded. before his Treatise of the Sabbath. p. 22, 23.  This Bishop speaking of a great scandal, withdrawing many from conformity, Your Grace (saith he) in your Metropolitical visitation, hath begun a good work, in taking this into your religious consideration, and you have endeavoured a Reformation. God Almighty vouchsafe to give a blessing, and good success to your pious intention, and that by your Grace's Authority, this scandal before mentioned may be removed out of the Church.  

The Doctrine of S. john concerning A●tichrist.  §. 31. After one or two more of his empty hearsayes of Bishop Lindsey and his Chaplain, (too contemptible to be named) he inveighs against them who do not think the Pope Antichrist (p. 11.) how ill soever, they think and say of him besides. That some indeed of our Church have thought and taught him to be Antichrist, is very certain. But it does not thence follow, that 'tis the Doctrine of the Church. They that Attribute it rather to Simon Magus and the Gnostics, have no less then S. john for their Authority. Saint john saying plainly, that Antichrist (when he was writing) was already in the world, 1 Joh. 4.3. which compare with what is said, 1 Joh. 2.18. and 22. What is said in the Act for the subsidy, of the Clergy, as I have not convenience to examine, so should I be sorry to find it in contradiction to Saint john. And if the matter were to be carried by the votes of men who are greatly learned, I know not what can be greater, than Hugo Grotius, and Dr. Hammond.  

Original sin assented to, as taught in the Article of our Church.  §. 32. What he adds against Dr. Taylor (pag. 12.) Dr. Tailor alone is concerned in, unless he thinks that That Doctor is the whole Church of England. Let it suffice Master Hickman, that the Doctrine of original sin in the ninth Article of our Church, is without any scruple assented too; not only by myself, (who have given a public proof of it,) but by every other man of my particular acquaintance. What he saith of the Religion, which was sealed by the blood of our English Martyrs, (ib.) should suffice to conjure up the very blood of his Feet into his forehead. The best of our Martyrs having been Bishops; and such as partly composed, or partly admired our English Liturgy; and such as taught the very Doctrines, which now are nicknamed Arminian, and such as never would put asunder, what the Holy Ghost hath joined in the very same Text, (1 Pet. 2.17.) Fear God, Honour the King. And I will hold Mr. Hickman so wise for once, as to think a word sufficient for him. But when he adds that his Religion hath been defended (or fought for) by the swords of soldiers (ibid.) I shall tell him too in one word more, 
Loyalty a part of our Religion.  That those are very unfit weapons for the defending of a Religion, where God himself allows nothing but Prayers and Tears to guard it with. The Church of England teacheth none to call their strength the law of justice; or to fight for Religion with breach of Loyalty. We leave such practice to three sorts of men; the Turkish, Popish, and Presbyterian. Our English Martyrs were none of that number.  
§. 33. Christian Reader, I am now arrived at that part of. Mr. Hickmans' Preface, 
An account to the Reader of the Method observed in all that follows.  (p. 13.) wherein Doctor Heylin hath ex professo taken him up. See his Certamen Epistolare, part 2. pag. 150. §. 26. from which place forwards, he hath so fully and effectually performed his enterprise, as to have given a supersedeas to what I had otherwise detained thee with, and am in some measure prepared for in my Adversaria. And therefore partly not to weary thee with that enormity of Length, into which I foresee I shall infallibly grow, if I pursue a Fugitive 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (as I have hitherto done) and partly not to do what is done already, and by one of the exactest Historical hands, and especially because I am no way concerned in a very great part of the tedious Preface, as well as because that I alone am left to speak, to the remaining parts of the Book itself; I shall resolve to say no more than thou dost probably expect, and hast reserved a patience for. But if I here and there add, what is not observed, (at least not said) by Dr Heylin; I hope the fault will be such, as will deserve its own pardon.  

Bp. Tunstal and Bp. Hooper outweigh Tyndal, etc.  §. 34. If that were true which he saith of Tyndal, etc. (p. 13.) yet besides the five things which are returned by Dr. Heylin, (p▪ 152, 153.) I can requite him with Bishop Tunstal in King Henry the eight's days, and Bishop Hooper a little after, who both abhorred that Doctrine, which Frith and Tyndal are urged for; and wrote against it to better purpose, than these were able to write for it. The seventeenth Article which he urgeth (p. 15.) is proved two ways to make apparently for us▪ 
The seventeenth Article two ways for us.  1. By the phrase of God's choosing in Christ 2. By the care which is enjoined, that we receive God's promises as they be generally set forth to us in holy Scripture; which why did Master Hickman so very fraudently conceal in his recital, but because his heart told him 'twas quite against the whole Frame of Calvinistical Decrees? See Dr. Hammond's Fundamentals, p. 146.  

So the Liturgy and Homilies, and Nowells Catechism, which Mr. H. produceth against himself.  §. 35. 'Tis very remarkable (p. 16.) that he pretends the Common Prayer and Homilies are for his turn, but is not able to cite a word. And Dr. Heylin makes it appear (as Bishop Overal long ago) that all is destructive to his pretensions. What a rare Argument hath he urged, p. 18? From Doctor Nowell being Prolocutor in Queen Elizabeth's time; He concludes the Articles of the Church to be Calvinistical. And then to manifest how ignorant he is in these points, he citys a passage from Nowel's Catechism, which he hopes is for his interest, though it is as visibly against it, as can be wished. For whereas it is said, [They that be steadfast and constant in this Faith, were chosen and appointed, and (as we term it) predestinated to this so great felicity, p. 19] It is inferred unavoidably, That God did choose or predestinate to life eternal the steadfast, stable, and constant in the Faith. Which is as much as Arminius did ever desire to have granted, whereby to prove the Decree to have been respective, to wit, respective of that steadfastness and constancy in the Faith, (which imports perseverance unto the end) without which it is confessed, God chooseth none. It being impossible for God (even because he is perfect) to predestinate or choose a person so qualified (as is expressed by Doctor Nowell) with out respect to the qualification. So that Nowell was an A●minian, or Arminius a kind of Nowellist, (no matter which,) and Master Hickman understands not what 'tis really to be either. H● could not else so often write (after the manner that he doth) either quite beside, or against his purpose.  
§. 36. To his Question, (pag. 19) how came the Church of England to dispose of her places of greatest influence and Trust to such as were of a contrary persuasion, 
It was not ●he Church of England that put the Calvinists into preferments  if she consented to the opinions commonly called Arminian?] Doctor Heylin's answer is most sufficient, p. 170. etc. But yet I add five things. 1. Our Church in all things was not one way, or other, (there lies a fallacy in Arminian, which we disown,) and so she was not (in particular) for irrespective decrees. 2. The Church taken collectively (as when we say the Church of England) or used to signify the Doctrine, never disposed of preferments. But they were ever disposed of (to the better, or to the worse,) as men corrupted with interest and evil principles have been more or less prevalent with those in power, (as of late the Independents disposed of all from the Presbyterians, witness the Deanarie of Christ-Church from which Doctor Reynolds was ejected, and the Conscience-stretcher of England (if the song speaks truly) preferred before him. And yet whilst I am writing, 'tis vice versâ a like case. Qui colour albus erat etc. does it follow they were both in the right by turns? no, the wisest men say, they were both Usurpers.) 3. They could not be Arminians, who lived before Arminius was alive. 4. If calvin's Doctrine was that of our National Church, whilst his Followers prevailed in point of Number, and for that very reason, (as Mr. H. now argues) than the contrary to that was her Doctrine too, when the nicknamed Arminians did as much prevail, by his own confession (p. 4.) The absurdity of which will make Mr. H. renounce his Logic. 5. Since he boasts of his number, I shall probably name ten of worth and eminence on this side, for every single man of Note, which he names on that, not that I favour such ways of arguing, but merely because I would convince him, by that which he chooseth to make his own. I shall publish (if it be needflul) an ample Catalogue of the Orthodox, on whom such places have been conferred in the Church of England, as will be granted to have been (ever) of greatest influence and trust. But I abstain (whilst it is needless) out of that reverence which I bear unto peace, and prudence.  

Archbp. Bancroft an Anti-Calvinist.  §. 37. If Archbishop Bancroft had hated that which is called Arminianism as the shadow of Death, (which Mr. H, pretends p. 20. he would not have showed such a hatred to Mr. Calvin and his Followers. Nor would he have published the confessions both of Coppinger and Wigginton, touching their publishing their Pamphlet of Predestination, to prepare the way to their intended murder and Rebellion; 
Bancrof●s Dang. Pos. l. 4. ch. 10. p▪ 161, 162.  even by laying the blame of their lewd attempts upon the absolute decree of the Almighty, which is inferred by that desperate Doctrine to give a fatal necessity to all events, and I therefore call it a desperate Doctrine, because it was called so expressly by Bp. Bancroft himself, in the famous Conference at Hampton Court.  

Dr. RICHARDSON & Dr OVERAL both public Professors and most severe to the Calvinian Doctrines.  §. 38. Whilst he saith that in Cambridge there was one Dr. Overall, who was suspected a little to Arminianize ibid.] He is unhappy in 2. respects. For 1. If he means one, as opposed to more, (and not by way of contempt, as some have taken it) than he must know that Dr. Richardson was one of the Divinity Professors in Cambridge, a very eminent Anti-Calvinist, and commonly called by those men, the ●at Arminian. For he lay very heavy on all such men, as Calvinized in Disputation. Dr. Sibbs in particular was so baffled by him, that he thereupon preached on 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the Clergy. 2. So far was Dr. Overal from being coldly, or but a little, what Mr. H. calls Arminian, that it is hard to name any, more averse to the Calvinists in point of Doctrine, as well as Discipline. For not to speak of his Exposition of the Genuine mind of the Church of England in the 5. Controverted points, (which is as cross to the Calvinists as can be wished,) his large Epistle to Hugo Grotius doth so inveigh against the Tenent of unconditionate Decrees (as well of saving as damning men) that he reckons it one of those opinions, 
* Sententiae quae exalterâ parte sic aftr●unt Decretum Dei absolutum, gratiamque efficacem, ut tollant voluntatem salutis conditionatam & gratiam sufficientem, nullo modo in Ecclesiâ Dei ●●rendae sunt aut tolerandae ut quae pugnent cum bonitate Dei & Philanthropiâ; cum naturâ hominis aut modo actionis humanae; cum verbo revelato t●m in lege quam in Evangelio, Deoque aut simulationem & mendacium, aut malitiam & Iniquitatem, aut crudelitatem & Injustitian affingant; Hominibusque aut securitatem carnalem, aut desperationem adferant, multaque similia Absurda & inconvenientia secum attrahant. IO. OVERALLUS ad Hug. Gro. Maii. 16, 1613. p. 279, 280.  which is by no means to be endured in the Church of God, as not consisting with the Goodness and love of God to mankind, with the nature of man, and with the nature of humane Actions, with the revealed word of God both in the law and in the Gospel; in a word, 'tis an opinion, (as the Dr. goes on) which doth not only lead men to carnal security and despair, and carries along with it many other the like absurdities. But it [affixeth or forceth on God himself either counterfeiting and lying, or malice and iniquity, or cruelty and injustice.] such an Anticalvinian was the most learned Dr. Overal; with whom our late Primate of Armagh did most happily profess his full concurrence.  
§. 39 But I am challenged to name any one Doctor of the chair who was placed in Oxford, 
Dr. SANDERSON no less, since his change of Judgement.  and not a Calvinist ibid.] And I am ready to name one who was instar omnium, equal to all that went before, if not superior in all respects; even the eminently moderate and most learned Dr. Sanderson, who though he was not before the time of the late Archbishop, yet he is more to be considered then all that were; because for many years together he had ever 
* See Dr. sanderson's letter accorded with by Dr. Hammond. p. 10. & 11.  acquiesced in the sublapsarian way, and yet upon great and mature deliberation, having all his 5. schemes in his eyes at once and comparing them duly with one another, He soon discerned a Necessity of quitting the sublapsarian way, (in which till then, he did acquiesce) as well as the supralapsarian, which he could never fancy, so that the whole of Mr. Calvin, as a sub, and supralapsarian, (for he is both by fits, as Dr. Sanderson observes, and Dr. Twisse confesseth,) was rejected by him when he was ripest and most impartial which though I knew a good while since, by a letter received from himself, (that I might not doubt of my intelligence,) yet had I not spoken of it here (how much soever for the honour and interest of my cause) had not his change been made public by his consent.  

Persecution is not a mark of Error in those that suffer it.  §. 40. He saith, As many as trod the Arminian path, were wont to be suppressed and censured, so soon as they began to discover themselves, p. 21.] First, if this were true, it were a very impertinent and pitiful way of arguing. For we know there was a time, when the Eastern Churches were overspread with the prosperous heresy of the Arrians, as the Western were in great measure with that other Heresy of the Donatists, whilst the Orthodox were suppressed by those▪ and these. And what objection can it be to the Spouse of Christ, or her children, that in adherence to his Gospel they have borne his Cross too? But 2. It is false, which he so confidently affirmeth, and that without exception too. For did not Mr. Harsenet Discover himself at Paul's Cross (as may appear by his Printed Sermon, after which he was preferred from one Dignity to another, first to the Mastership of Pembrook-Hall, and after that to the Archbishopric of York? Let Mr. H. reflect upon what I told him (§. 36.) and retract the rashness of his expression.  
Sect. 41, 
Mr Simpson cleared from his Censors as to Falling from Grace, and Rom. 7.  Of Mr. Barret and Mr. Simpson I shall the rather speak in particular, because Dr. Heylin does refer them to his General Answer (p, 175.) And 1. I observe in Mr. Hickman, that he does not name Mr. Barrets Doctrines, for which the censure was passed on him▪ perhaps he was ashamed to name them. For if they were such as Mr. simpson's, that the commission of a great sin doth extinguish Grace for a time; 'tis plain the Censurers themselves were much more worthy of public Censure. For when our Article saith expressly, that the child of God may fall away, by what sin may he fall, if not by a great one? (But of this I have spoken in My whole third Chapter to Mr. Baxter,) And then for what he spoke of Rom. 7. It must be meant in all reason of committing great sins too, (in consent with that which he spoke before,) and so they came not home to the business, who understood it only of a regenerate man according to St. Austin in his Retractations. For there that Father is of opinion, that St. Paul in that Chap. did not speak of great sins, but only sins of infirmity, which that it really was an error, and a gross error too, and what betrayed that Father to it, Mr. Hickman may see though he look no further, than Dr. Hammonds Review of his Annotations; especially p. 131. compared with p. 127. where he saith (what doth carry sufficient evidence of its truth in the forehead of it) that this indeed is all the difference to be assigned betwixt a regenerate and an unregenerate man, that in the one the Spirit, in the other the Flesh is victorious, that is, the will of the one is led by the spirit, and the will of the other by carnal Dictates.  
Sect. 42. Now concerning the Recantation supposed to be made by Mr. Barret, 
Barrets Recanting, an arrant fable  besides what is said by 
* Hist. Quinquar. p. 3. ch. 19 p. 72.73.  Dr. Heylin to show its improbability, and the Letter (by him produced) to Dr. Goad; I have another letter of Barrets, copied out from his own hand and directed to Mr. Chatterton, the Master (at that time) of Emanuel College, wherein he saith expressly, that he would not perform the Retractation required of him. And he gives such reasons, as are too long to be here inserted; which I therefore defer till some other season, when I may fitly publish that, with some other things not hitherto extant. I have also been informed of some ejected Masters of Colleges, that having diligently sought, they could not find any such thing. So that for aught I yet see, that Recantation is but a Fable. Nor can I wonder at such inventions of a Puritan faction, when I consider their Forgeries concerning Hampton-court Conference, till Doctor Barlow had put them to shame and silence.  

Bp. MONTAGVE'S vindication.  § 43. To his following Impertinencies I shall speak very briefly because they are extremely such, p. 23. etc.] 1. As Bishop Montague's Adversaries did indeed object (against him) his Dissent from the Doctrine of the Church of England, so to their shame (if they had any) he freed himself from that charge. Master P●m's Report to the House of Commons, is no proof at all, that he was censured by the Parliament. And the Order of that House in the behalf of the Articles, was not hurtful to him who opposed them not, but understood them better, and declared as much for them, as the Commoners could do.  

Mr. Hickman's confession, That men follow C●lvin in their younger, and Arminius in their riper years.  §. 44. To Mr. Hickmans' rare Question p. 28. [How comes it to pass, that those who now follow Arminius, did heretofore follow Mr. Calvin?] I thank him for the occasion to make this Answer, That the older men gr●w, they grow the wiser and more impartial. To what end do men study both men and books, but to discover the mistakes of their giddy youth? Is it not fit that the aged Bishop of Winchester, should understand things better than young Mr. Andrews? But he was a Bishop, and one who lived at such a Time, when it was safe to leave Calvin, as King james (his Great Master) had also done.  
And therefore to satisfy Mr. Hickman, Let the Question be put of Dr. Sanderson; 
The causes of it given by Dr. SANDERSON.  whose change of judgement was never published, until the last and worst times, whilst yet the Followers of Calvin had power to 
* See Inquifitio Anglicana, and other accounts given of the Triens at Westminster  persecute their opponents: why did he follow the way of Calvin in point of Doctrine (I mean his sublapsarian way) before he considered and compared it with other ways, and at last forsook it after such consideration? The very Question suggests the Answer which in all reason is to be made; And may suffice for a general answer to the far greatest part of Mr. Hickman's long Preface. Observe (Good Reader) the most Ingenuous Confession of that so eminently learned and holy man. [
† See Doctor Hammond's Pacifick Discourse of God's Grace and decrees, p. 10.  Giving himself to the study of practical Divinity, (he saith) he took up most other things upon trust.] And this he did so much the rather, because Calvin (at that time) was not so wholesomely suspected, as (blessed be God) he since hath been. But (to express it in the words of the Judicious Doctor Sanderson) 
* ibid. p. 9  The honour of Calvin's name gave Reputation to his very errors. And if so great a Scholar as he did take up opinions upon trust, and was carried down the stream of the common errors, his weaker brethren could not choose but be swept away with so strong a Torrent.  
§. 45. But they were far from being such, whose Questions in the Act Mr. Hickman reciteth from Mr. Prin, 
Of Doctor IACKSON'S Act Questions and Doctor Frewein's.  as he hath done the greatest part of his tedious Preface. For Doctor jackson might well acknowledge all lost in Adam, when he supposed a Recovery of all in Christ. And here it is observable, that Mr. Hickman hath not stolen fairly. For Mr. Prin expressed very honestly, what his juggling Transcriber thought it his Interest to conceal. It was the very first of the Doctors three Questions, An Peccatum originale contineat in se aliquid positivi. And this was held in the affirmative. The other Act-questions were Doctor Frewin's, the now-Right Honourable and Right Reverend Father in God, the Bishop of Coventry and Litchfield, whom I am never able to name, without a preface of honour and veneration: Who if he did once Calvinizare, (as Bishop Andrews, and King james before the times of their conversion,) let it suffice that his latter judgement is much preferable to his former. It is no more to the disparagement of Doctor Goad, and Master Hales, and Daniel ●ilenus (the Synodist at Dort) and Doctor Potter, and Doctor Godwin, and Melanchthon himself, and the late Primate, that as soon as they saw, they forsook their errors; than it could be to Saint Paul, that though as long as (in comparison) he was a child, he spoke as a child, 
1 Cor. 13.11.  understood as a child, and thought as a child, yet when he grew to a perfect man, he put away childish things. And hence Mr. Hickman may take the reason, why I parted with those opinions I first embraced, which now he reproacheth me withal (p. 29.) though more to my honour than he imagined. But he must know that by the first of the three last Questions, [An praedestinatio ad salutem sit propter praevisam fidem.] he seems to be ignorant of the difference betwixt the foresight of Faith, and Faith foreseen; as betwixt ex, and propter; a condition, and a cause; secundum praescientiam Fidei, & propter fidem praescitam. And so he is like the vain janglers of whom Saint Paul speaks to Timothy, that they desired to be Teachers, understanding neither what they said, nor whereof they affirmed. 
1 Tim. 1.6, 7.   
§. 46. Of Lambeth Articles, that they were caused to be suppressed by Queen Elizabeth, 
Of K. JAMES and Bp. Montague.  See Doctor Heylin his Examen Historicum p. 164. That King james before he died was an Anti-Calvinist, appears by the Conference at Hampton Court, and by his great approbation of all that was preached by Bishop Andrews, which was as opposite to Calvin, as light to darkness, and by his high esteem of B●shop OVERALL, who was wont to call the Calvinists, The Zenonian Sect, and by his singular favour to Bishop Montague, whom he employed in composing his Apparatus and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and whose Appeal he adorned with his Royal Patronage and Protection. (which yet he could not have done, if he had not been that which they call Arminian.) That Bishop Montague was encouraged by the special Direction of King JAMES, to Dedicate that Book to his Royal self, is most apparent to every man, who wil● but read his own words in his Dedication.  
If any Reader can yet be ignorant of King james his deliverance from that captivity, 
King james his conversion from the Calvinian errors.  into which he had been l●dd by his first and worst Teachers, let him peruse that Epistle with which the learned Tilenus' Senior did dedicate his Book to that learned King; even his 
* Vid. Epist. Ded. praefix. No●is seu Animadvers. Danielis Tile●i in Canon. Syn. Dord.  Book of Animadversions upon the Synod of Dorts Canon. There the Reader will be informed, how Tilenus his Paraenesis had pleased that King; who gave a proof of his special liking by his special command to have it Printed. How a little after that, the King invited him by a Letter, to come over into England, and here to try the effects of his Royal Favour. How his Majesty took care, that care might be taken by other men, Not to blaspheme with the Puritans in making God the Author of sin. How he assented to Tilenus, whilst he inveighed against the Error of irrespective decrees, especially that of Reprobation. A more impious error then which, he said a 
*— S● coacto immundorum spirituum concilio, eorum princeps Diabolus à paredris suis Angelis, sive singulatim, sive per satyram rogatis sententiis, quonam commento odium hominum adversus Deum vehementius incendi, atque intendi queat, etc.—  Synod of Devils was not able to invent. Thence he styled it the Horrendum illud Calvini decretum; and professed to see nothing throughout the whole Calvinian Scheme, which did not either flow out of Zeno's porch, or from the Tables of the Destinies, or from the stinking Mephitis of the Manichees. By all which it is apparent, that Mr. Hickman is unexcusable as far as his 38. page; where he grows less guilty, though guilty still.  
§. 47. That some of our Divines did change their judgement, 
A change of judgement in some Divines who were se●● to Dort.  notwithstanding their employment at the Synod of Dort, will not (I think) be denied by any, who hath not the forehead of a Hickman. For Mr. HALES his conversion is known to most, (as Tilenus his to all,) and Dr. GOAD'S to very many. That Bp. DAVENANT was at last for Universal Redemption, I have long since 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ch. 3. p. 103.104.  proved, and more than once, what hath been said by Bp. Hall against the tenant of absolute or irrespective reprobation, I have elsewhere at large informed my Readers. 
Diu. pur. Def. ch. 4 p. ●29.  That Dr. WARD and Bp. DAVENANT were of opinion, that all Infants by Baptism are freed from the guilt of Original sin, and in a state of Salvation, (implying some to fall totally and finally too, because there are some, who die Impenitents being men, notwithstanding being Infants they were Baptised,) Mr Gataker hath assured us by divulging of their Epistles. If I would pass over to France, I could tell him of Famous Moulin, who had an interest in the Synod, (although not there,) and yet was exactly an Arminian, as to the point of Reprobation; and accused as such, by Dr Twisse, so was Camero, Amyrald, Testard, and D●ille, as well accused by Spanhemius, as by other followers of Calvin, for passing over to the Arminians in the point of General Redemption: but to speak of such as these, is to pay Mr. H. in more than full measure.  

Mr. H.'s sense of the University, and his unpardonable scurrility to the late Archbp.  §. 48. To Mr. H.'s two Questions proposed in one breath, [what thinks Mr. P. of the University of Oxon? did not she know the Opinions of the Church of England? p. 46.] I briefly answer; First, that whilst she had the privilege of enjoying a Real University, (which she enjoyed until the year 1648.) I think as well of the University as when she burned the Book, and condemned the Doctrine of the great Calvinist Paraeus, who sowed those Presbyterian seeds of the late prosperous Rebellion, of which such fellows as our Compiler enjoy the harvest. To the 2. I answer by way of Interrogation, Did not the Church of England so much as know her own mind, when she commanded Erasmus his learned Paraphrase to be had in such honour throughout the Nation, as to any Piece of Calvin was never given? how came the prayers of Erasmus to have a place in our public Liturgy, from King Henry the 8. days unto these our own, if all our Church was fermented with calvin's Leven? The University of Oxford knew well her Doctrines, especially then when she was most of all knowing, which was in the time of the late Archbishop; in the vilifying of whom, Mr Hickman hath shamed his own dear Faction. For whilst he calls him an evil instrument (p. 48.) he makes himself an example of Puritanical Petulancy and passion, whereby the men of his Faction will grow more vile. And whilst he saith they were never well, till they had 
* ☞ N●te the breeding of a lay-preacher ordained at Bra●kly, towards the Primate of all England, whom Chamier allows to have been a prince.  spewed out his Grace as an evil instrument (ibid.) he implies his Faction was deadly Drunk: so indeed were the Jews, when they were sick of Christ, and thought they could not recover till they had spewed him out of the earth. But as Titus Vespasian came about 40. years after and cured those Jews of all Diseases; so if our Pharisees will be patient but half that time, they may perhaps meet with that, th●t will stop their spewing.  
§. 49▪ Now I come to the objection, which Mr. H. confesseth doth lie against him, 
Universal Redemption, held as well by K. james, the late Primate of Armagh, and Bp. Davenant, as by Arminius.  [the Church of England is for Universal Redemption; The Calvinists that are Anti-Arminian are against it. p. 48, 49.] To which he answers two ways, First, by a confession, that King james gave it in charge to the Divines sent to Dort, Not to deny that Christ died for all; and that this was affirmed by Bp. Usher, (for so he calls the late Primate,) who also said, That he gave in his own judgement to Dr. Davenant for universal Redemption; and accordingly it was one of Bp. Davenants conclusions, 
* Mors sive Passio Christi, ut universalis causa salutis humanae Deum patrem ipso facto oblationis eatenus reddit pacatum & Reconciliatum Humano Generi, ut verè nun● dicatur paratus quemvis hominem recipere in gratiam, simul ac in Ch●istum crediderit. Neminem tamen, saltem ex adultis, praedicta Christi mors in statum gratiae actualis, Reconciliationis sive salutis, antequam credat. These the words of Bp, Davenant, by Mr. H.'s confession praef. p. 50.  that the death or Passion of Christ as the Universal cause of man's salvation, doth so far appease and reconcile God the Father to Mankind, by the very fact of his Oblation, that he is truly now said to be ready to receive every man into Favour, as soon as he will believe in Christ, notwithstanding the aforesaid death of Christ restoreth no man (no man at lest who is come to ripeness) into a state of actual favour, Reconciliation, or salvation, until he actually believes.] No man (saith the Bishop) no not any of the elect, before he is qualified by faith; meaning that faith which worketh by love, an Universal obedience to the commandments of Christ. But by the offering of himself upon the Cross, the Bp. saith that he made God appeased and reconciled (observe the word) not only to the Elect, but indefinitely to all Mankind; and that as an Universal cause, not only of salvability, but (saith the Bp.) of salvation. Arminius never said more, no nor ever so much, for aught I am able to remember. Nor was ever so much said by the Church of England, as that Christ reconciled his Father to Mankind, ipso facto by the oblation of himself, [ut Vniversalis causa Salutis Humanae,] as the Universal cause of mankind's salvation. but I suppose by Salvation, he only meant Salvability, or no more by cause then meritorious. And then indeed he doth no more than Arminianize with the Church of England, (as Mr. Hickman is wont to phrase it.) It being the Doctrine of our Church, 
* In the COMMUNION BOOK, after the act of Consecration.  that Christ by his own oblation of himself once offered made a full, perfect and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world. And again more fully, 
† In the 31. ARTICLE of the 39 See Mr. Clerk's martyrology, part 2. in the life of Dr. Preston, p. 129. to p. 134. for a partial account of the dispute between Dr. Preston, Dr. White, & Mr. Montague  that the offering of Christ once made is that perfect redemption, propitiation, and satisfaction for all the sins of the whole world both Original and Actual. So exactly opposite to the Calvinists is the Church of England in her belief.  
This doth prompt me to tell the Reader (if he knows it not, or hath forgot it) that at a conference held about the Books of Bp. Montague, One of the Lords made it his motion, that the Doctrine of the Dort Synod (as to the points we speak of) might be received into the Articles of the Church of England. But this was opposed by Bp. White, and even for this very reason, because our Church in her public Catechism, doth teach her children to believe, (what is denied by the Synod of Dort) Christ died for us and for all mankind. Why Bp. Chappel (before Bp.) did refuse an excellent place in Ireland, because he would not subscribe to Dam man, (alluding merrily to Damman, who had the office of Scribe in the Synod of Dort) And how at last he became one of the Bishops of that Church, by the advantage of that Canon, (procured by the power of Archbishop Land in Intuition of Bishop Chappel) That a man was qualified for preferment in the Church of Ireland, without subscribing the Irish, if he would but subscribe the English Articles, is so very well known to many men, that Master Hickman himself perhaps hath heard it.  
§. 50. Master Hickman's second Answer is by a proofless affirmation, and even in that his heart fails him; 
Mr. H. grants the whole cause but does no● know it. His opposition to the Assembly-men's confession of FAITH.  so as he clogs it with an [almost a word which saves many a lie, (as the proverb is amongst country people.) Reader, take notice, that these are all his own words, [I am almost as confident, that to grant him universal Redemption, is to grant him ●ust nothing at all] Thus what he forged of Dr. Heylin he fully verifies in himself, (if he is really the meaning of Theophilus Churchman.) For he is an unhappy Writer, and mars every thing he meddles with, p. 1.] To grant me that which was denied, by Mr. Calvin, and his followers, to grant me that which the Remonstrants were even persecuted for by those of Dort; To grant me that for which Spanhemius accused Amyrald as an Arminian; and for which the notorious Triers have deprived so many of their rights; is to grant me just nothing, saith our Automachus. But what now will he say to save the credit of his Assembly men, whom he can never reconcile to the Lord Prima●e, or Bishop Davenant, or to himself? Let him read and be ashamed of the public confession of their faith, chap. 8. Art. 5. & 8. especially the last. Where Redemption is so far from being held to be universal, that 'tis extended only to them, to whom it is certainly and effectually applied, and who are effectually persuaded by the Spirit of Christ, to believe and obey, etc. Now can it be thought by Mr. Hickman that all mankind hath Christ effectually applied, as is there expressed? if so he is (it seems) for universal salvation, of which the Arminians never dreamed; they were never so vo●d of sense and reason. If not so, 'tis evident, how ill he thinks of his Assemblers, and how little he can comply with their Novel Creed, unless he is a kind of Gnostick, and so can side with all by turns.  

Mr. H. proved to grant the whole cause at which he rails, and so to be a calvinistical Arminian.  §. 51. His Answer is not so ridiculous, but that his reason is somewhat more. Take it too in his own words [For what though Christ did so far die for all as to procure a salvation for all, upon the conditions of Faith and Repentance? what's this to the absoluteness of Go●'s Decrees? etc. pag. 49.] But that the world hereby is made my witness, that the man is indeed a mere Compiler and a Rhapsodist, and is excessively ignorant of these affairs, I would permit my inclinations to follow their bent upon this occasion. Had the Reverend Dr. Reynolds said such a thing, I should gladly have spent a little Volume in his Conviction. But no such words could have proceeded from so intelligent an Adversary. Such as he cannot but know, how 
* See Doctor SANDERSON'S two Reasons, why his soul so much abhorred, and why he was forced to forsake the Sublapsarians. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 14, 15.  inconsistent this is with irrespective decrees, that Christ should die for all mankind, and so as to procure their salvability; or so as to make satisfaction for all the sins of all the world, as well actual, as original; or so as to make God appeased and reconciled to all mankind. How, I say, can this be, (which yet is granted by the Lord Primate, and Bishop Davenant,) if God decreed from all eternity to reject or reprobate the greatest part of mankind, either without respect to their very creation (as Doctor Twisse) or to their fall in Adam's loins, (as the common Supralapsarians) or to any the least of their Actual sins? (as the Sublapsarians do hold and teach.) They that were absolutely reprobated cannot possibly be saved, or have a salvability procured for them. And so they imply a contradiction, who holding the absolute decree of Reprobation, do also hold that Christ procured a capability of salvation to all mankind. (But of this I have 
* In the Appendix to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Confirmed by the conf●ssions of Du Moulin, Paraus, and Dr. Reynolds.  spoken to Dr. Bernard, p. 159.)  
Besides, I will prove by three as great men, as Mr. Hickman probably can name of the Anti-Arminians (for so at least they are called by their Disciples and themselves) That Mr. Hickman hath now granted, what Dr. Twisse doth call the Arminian Cause. For 'tis confessed by Du Moulin, in the letter which he sent to the Synod of Dort, and by Paraeus the Professor of Theology at Heidleburgh, (whose judgement was much regarded by the Synod of Dort too) and by Doctor Edward Reynolds by unavoidable implication, That if Christ died for all, so far as to procure salvation for all upon condition, than God decreed he should procure it upon condition for all. (without which condition he did not procure it for any one.) Peter Moulin's words are these. 
* Act. Synod. D●rdr. part. sess. 143. p. 339  Non est dubium, quin ob quam causam Deus damnat, ob eandem damnare decreverit. Damnat autem reprobos ob peccata actu commissa. Luunt enim poenas in Inferno, non solum peccati Originalis, sed & actualium omnium. Unde & inaequalitas poenarum. Ergo & Deus eos damnare decrevit ob eadem peccata. Nihil enim obstat quo minus Deus considerans hominem jacentem in corruption & pravitate naturali, eundem quoque consideret pollutum iis peccatis quae per istam pravitatem naturalem est commissurus. And again. 
† Ib. p. 340.  Deum quenquam destinasse ad poenam aeternam sine confideratione Impoenitentiae aut incredulitatis, nec dicimus, nec sentimus.— Impoenitentia antecedit ordine Reprobationem. Now this is downright 
* Vin. Gra. lib. 1. part. 1. sect. 4. Digr. 6. cap. 1 pag 92. who yet confesseth as much as makes himself Arminian too. lib. 1. p●rt. 1. pag. 77. See P●ilan. cap. 3. pag. 124.  Arminianism, saith Doctor 
* Vin. Gra. lib. 1. part. 1. sect. 4. Digr. 6. cap. 1 pag 92. who yet confesseth as much as makes himself Arminian too. lib. 1. p●rt. 1. pag. 77. See P●ilan. cap. 3. pag. 124.  Twisse, who could better judge of Arminianism, then young Bathyllus. 
Confirmed further by Dr. Twisse.  Now let Paraeus his words be weighed, that we may see if he doth not also conspire professedly with the Arminians; (as Dr. Twisse expressly affirms of Moulin)  

† Paraeus in Explic. Dubior. c. 9 ad Rom. p. 880.  Justus Judex non aliam decernendae sententiae, aliam exequendae causam habet, sed unam utriusque, nempe capitale sl●gitium. And again he saith, 
* Ib. 82. col. 2.  Deum posse uti jure suo absoluto in Reprobis ad interitum ordinandis, abstinuisse tamen. And yet again. 
† Ib. p. 887. Col. 1.  Propter quod Deus in tempore aliquos reprobat à gloria, propter id etiam Reprobare à Gloria olim decrevit. And accordingly 
* In proof to the corrept. cor.  Doctor Reynolds thought fit to prove (as well he might) that God decreed from eternity to permit sin in time, because in time he doth permit it. And so by consequence he must grant, that God decreed to reprobate in respect or intuition of actual sins, because he reprobates in that respect and intuition. So farewell to Master Calvin, and the Synod of Dort. 
And by the Synod of Dort.  Welcome the men that are called Arminians. And if we allow Doctor Twisse to have known the Doctrine of Arminius, Then the Synod of Dort was unawares Arminian too. For they decreed to Peter Moulin the 
† Statutum est, pro accuratissimo eo judicio & consensu in Doctrinâ gratias esse agendas. Sess. 144. pag. 348.  solemn thanks of the Synod, for his most accurate judgement and consent in Doctrine. And how the very same Doctrine which he presented to the Synod hath been affirmed by Doctor Twisse to be jesuitical and Arminian, I have largely showed in 
* See Divine philanthropy defended, ch. 3 p. 124, 125. His scurrilous usage of D. Hey●in shows the length of his own ●a●s.  another Treatise. Now then let Mr. Hickman himself be Judge, who hath contended with his own shadow; and what a shame it is for him, to have railed so much at Arminian Doctrines, to which (when he hath done) he is fain to yield.  
§. 52. To his slanderous insinuation concerning a Book of Doctor Heylin's, which he affirms to have been burnt by the hand of the common Hangman, as (he saith) he is informed, (p. 53.) Doctor Heylin himself hath made his own Answer. I only here observe, what shift is made by this zealot to revile an aged and Reverend Divine, without the least fear of the execution which the Bears made upon the Boys, who made a mockery of Elisha his Reverend Baldness. But what they did was less unexcusable. For they were little young Bo●es who wanted teaching. But this great Boy is a Boy of years too; and professeth (with the Gnostics) to be a teacher of others, a guide of the blind, and an instructor of the foolish (Rom. 2.19, 20.) Those children in years reproached the Prophet with what they saw, and were sure of, to wit, his bald head. But this child in manners and understanding makes use of a slander to show his virulence. And hath no more to excuse him, then that he Herd it, which is possibly as false as the Fact itself. But be it so that he heard it; what would become of such creatures, as Mr. Hickman and Mr. Baxter, if other men should put in print whatsoever they hear of their misdemeanours? the best of it is, he hath gotten no more by his printed hearsay, then only to make the world know how much his ears are too long. Nor do I wish him his deserts; for than I am sure, they would be shorter.  
§. 53. To his concluding Question (p. 54.) I briefly answer three things. 1. Dolus versatur in generalibus. 
His concluding Question childishly fallacious.  2. There is the fallacy plurium interrogationum: some are true, and some false. And by those that are true, no advantage accrues to the Calvinian cause. 3. Some learned men there will ever be, of both the opposite persuasions. And therefore the Doctrine of our Church is to be judged of by her Liturgy, Homilies, and thirty nine Articles. In which, as very many things are clearly for, so there is nothing that I can meet with against the Doctrines which I assert,  
§. 54. Having done with his Preface, 
His self-condemnation and contradiction.  I come to the Remnants of his Book. Where setting out with his dislike of Mr. Barlee's sharp stile, (as if the privilege of railing had been bequeathed to Mr. Hickman by the proprietary in chief,) and presently falling on Mr. Goodwin in such a sharpness of style, as he dislikes in Mr. Barlee, his elder brother, (for which I see 
* See his Preface to his Tract of justification.  Mr. Goodwin hath long since made him an example, (he next arrives at a profession, [that he never had perused my Defence of the Divine philanthropy, nor ever would he pursue it, except he could find some hours, which belong neither to night nor day. p. 3] yet besides his 
Pref. p. 1,  Profession of having been conversant in my writings, and the use he makes of my expressions as his own, he frequently citys the words and pages even of that very Book, and farther avows he hath read it over, (p. 101.) Next he quarrels with Mr. B. for printing part of his private letter; which if it had not been done by his own consent, he might have told me of it in time, either by word or by epistle; or have conveyed it to me by them, in whose common acquaintance he saith we meet. He is a dull Malefactor, who is not provided of some excuse, and therefore such as Mr. Hickman may find out many. But how his wit will hold out to reconcile the contradiction betwixt ●he fourth page of his Book, and the second of his Bookish Preface, I am not qualified to guests at so great a distance.  

The Calvinists draw their own consequences from their tenet of Decrees.  §. 55. At last he falls upon a point, which had been very material, had it not failed in one Circumstance, I mean the truth. For telling a story of the Lutherans (which he had read in Bp. H●ll) he misapplyes it by saying, This is the case of the Calvinists. They hold an absolute decree of reprobation, hence it follows, says Mr. P.) That God is the author of sin (p. 5.) No hence it follows (say the Calvinists faithfully cited by Mr. P. as to their words and pages and very lines,) that God is the author and c●use of sin. It was not I who drew the consequence, (though I might rationally have done it, as well as they▪) But it was I who observed by whom it was drawn. Even by them who have contended for their fanciful decrees. I have made this so clear, in all my papers and particularly in this, (Ch. 1. §. 2. p.) that I wonder with what forehead Mr. H. can say I find a forehead, tosay the Calvinists m●ke God the authorof sin. Indeed when they h●ve said it in plainest terms, they sometimes say they never said it; and thence I condemned them for so much self-condemnation. This the Reader may witness for me, as by viewing other parts of my Autoca●risis; so particularly the preface, or Introduction, p. 7.8. And Changed 3. p. 140.141, 142. Now that I am railed at, by such a mouth as Mr. Hickmans', upon no other ground, than my reproving him and others, for their often railing at God himself is a great addition to my contentments; 
2 Chron. 32.17.  And whilst Mr. H. continues either to be what he hath been or to say what he hath said concerning God, I hope I shall not be so unhappy, as ever to have his good word.  
Sect. 56. Had I met with such Blasphemies in any writings of Bp. Abbot, or other men of our Church, 
How Mr. H. is their accuser.  I should have taken that course which the Rhapsodist tells me had been the wisest (p. 6) But having met with none such, methinks the man should excuse me for my innocent desires to do no wrong. Such English writers as I found guilty, I very liberally named, and as impartially condemned. But our Divines at Dort, as well as those that are named by Mr. H. were for an Index expurgatorius; and so have justified me, in my severity to the Doctrines which they condemned, Mr. H. is therefore a very strange Person, in advising me to pass by the guilt of some beyond the sea, and to charge it on some at home, who (for any thing I know) have ever been clear from that offence: or if he means no more than this, that some of our English Anti-Arminians have blasphemed as much as foreign Calvinists have done let the Reader take notice that Master Hickman himself is their Accuser.  
§. 57 That argument of his, [if sin is a positive entity, either God is the Author of it, or it is God, 
And how is own. ] He now confesseth to be his own; but only adds, that the jesuits do use it as well as he p. 7.] I have often noted the affinity betwixt the Jesuits & Presbyterians. But why Mr. H. should help my parallel, I cannot guests. Nor do I think that that Argument was ever used by any jesuit, unless Mr. H. himself is one; or unless it weredone to debauch the Presbyterians, as well in that, as in other points, whereby to lay a new odium upon the Protestant name.  
§ 58. What he saith of my Agreement, in one particular at least, 
how an Hobbist, and an Arminian.  with Mr. Hobbs (p. 8.) he might as easily have said of Dr. Iack●on, or Dr. Hammond, or Dr. Field, or any other, who holds that the Author of the obliquity or sinful act must needs be the Author of the sin, and of the obliquity; and by consequence that our Adversaries who hold him the author of the one, conclude him so of the other also. And I have made it undeniable that there cannot be any difference betwixt the act of hating God, and the sin of hating God; because that act is that sin. Mr. H.'s device may be thus retorted. He agrees with Mr. Hobbs in the Stoical Doctrine of Decrees, in which he knows I descent from both, would the Reader think that I am a Hobbist for dissenting from Mr. Hobbs., and Mr. H. an Anti-Hobbist for agreeing with him? so Arminius holds God to be the Author of the act, when the act is sinful. Mr. H. agrees with Arminius, as much as I differ and descent which of us two is the Arminian, let others judge. And how many things more one might prove Mr. Hickman, at such a Presbyterian rate of arguing.  

How in striving to clear he condemns himself, confesseth his m king God to be the Author of sin.  §. 59 It was not (as he pretends p 9) for his mere oversight in Metaphysics, that I made him an example of Autocatacrisis; but for holding forth a Doctrine, which Himself had confessed to be Blasphemous: was not that to condemn himself? what I said of a man in Print, who obtruded this sense upon an Article of the Creed, [that God is the m●ker of all things real] he knows I meant of an other, in whom I read the words printed, yet I might very well have said it of Mr. Hickman himself, who also hath printed his own belief, that it belongs to God to produce ev●ry real being p. 95. And hence he plainly now confesseth, that positive and real are not all one. (p. 10.) he must co●fesse he makes God to be the author of sin, though sin ●hould be but a mere privation if it is but something real. And yet that it is more than a mere privation, himself hath also confessed, by confessing that it is privative, (pag. 95.) if he knows the difference between the two conjugates, and thinks the concrete to be more than the abstract. Thus he is every way guilty, and self-condemned too. He beareth witness against himself with every whit as much truth, as with calumny and Falsehood against his neighbour.  
§. 59 He saith the darkness in the creation (Gen. 1.2.) was such, as no wise man will call positive, 
His own thick darkness touching the darkness in the creation.  yet all will say that it was real. p. 10.] If he thinks that darkness a mere privation, than first he confesseth that a mere privation is a thing real; and so that God is inferred to be the Author of sin, although supposed to be no more than a mere privation. Next he contradicts the text, by which it appears there was a darkness antecedent to the light. When the light was created, it was divided from the darkness, (vers. 3.) so as the night and the day were reciprocally privative of one another. But thirdly, be it so, that that darkness was a privation, (though not of that light, which was not yet in facto esse) It is sufficient for me, that what is privative of light must needs be positive of darkness, whatever that darkness be said to be. Which if it was not created by God Almighty, Mr. Hickman should tell us how it came to have a being (Gen. 1.2.) if he does not think it was eternally of itself, and run the hazard of being thought as mad as Manes.  
§. 60. Having said that Privations are real things, he presently adds, that they are ranked among Entia rationis; 
How he makes the most real things en●ia rationis.  And why so? not because they do not antecedere operationem intellectus: but because they are conceived of otherwise then they be. p. 10.] First by this he ranks God amongst his entia rationis, when He is (more than any Creature) conceived of otherwise then he is. 2. He supposeth Reason to be here a false judge. 3. He intimates a confession, that if Reason judgeth rightly, and not otherwise of the thing then indeed it is, to wit, that privation is privation, (not positive Blackness) it shall then be no longer ens rationis, but ens real. And by necessary consequence, that it is but an error to think it otherwise. Thus he clearly makes God to be the Author of all things real, and so of all sins, which he confesseth to be real, even whilst he denies that he ever said it.  
§. 61. But he asks, why this is called an obtruding a new Article on the Church? 
How he ob●rudes a new Article of Faith.  pag. 11.] To which I answer two things. First, that his B●other with whom I dealt, as with a person of his conspiracy, did thus expound the first Article of the Nicene Creed; 2. He who argues in such a manner, as to conclude the Gainsayer either an Atheist, or somewhat worse, (and even so doth Master Hickman, who saith that sin, if it is positive, is either Go●'s creature, or God himself,) doth implicitly make a new Article of Belief.  

And makes it a point of omnipotence to be able to do evil.  §. 62. The profession which he makes before the Register within him, to which he pretends to owe more reverence, then to affronted it with a wilful lie. (p. 11.) he seems to make for no other end, then to 
* Comp●re his words p. 11. with corr. copy, p. 1.  steal those words out of my Notes, and to use them ambitiously as his own. For why should the privativeness of sin be fittest to reconcile God's purity and omnipotence? Why will not the way of Saint Austin and Lombard do it as well? Or rather why should God's purity be thus nefariously employed to stand in need of a reconcilement with his Omnipotence? Let it be granted that God is able to do whatsoever is pure and perfect; as well as unable to do the least, that is contrary to both; And all is well upon every side. What need he be able to contradict himself? Or have power to do that, which is contra●y to power as well as to purity and perfection? yet such would be the power to produce a sinful or wicked action, such as the action of hating God.  

H● proves his own sins to be positive entities, by ascribing his rage ●o his sobriety.  § 63. He reckons up some phrases out of my Autocatacrisis, which though softer than he deserved, were severer it seems than he could patiently endure▪ And to excuse his fit of Rage, into which he proves he was cast through that temptation, he saith I used him so severely not only upon a small, but upon no reason at all. p. 14.] As if his making a neighbour guilty of sin's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and his making God himself the principal cause of all wickedness, were not any the least reason for a Deportment as I had shown. Thus Vedelius did nothing to provoke the anger of the Remonstrants, how much soever he had sweated to prove them Atheists. And Mr. Hickman is such a gentle inoffensive Creature, that though he calls them the ugly brats of the wildest sectaries which G. C. hath midwived into the world (p. 14.) he hath injured no man, provoked no man. He professeth, in the same breath, He utters not the words of passion, but sobriety, p. 14. And thus the tame Creature hath meekly proved, That All his sins are positive entities, what ever he saith of other men's. For sobriety is a virtue, whose positive entity he allows. And notwithstanding the sad character which is fixed upon railing in 
* 1 Tim. 6.4. 2 Pet. 2.11.  holy Writ, Mr Hickman tells us 'tis his sobriety: whereby his Readers are left to guess, what scurrility he had used in a fit of passion, whose very words, of sobriety are so outrageous. As for his virulence towards myself, I pass it over for this reason, That he may know my severity is but the executing of justice, not for his bitterness to me, but to God himself; whom he hath charged as the cause of all the villainies in the world, which do fall under the Genus of Quality or Action. Whereas the worst he hath said of me, is even infinitely better. And though I must paradigmatize him for his blaspheming the God of heaven, yet I must do it so clearly in that behalf, as not to return him railing for railing. 
1 Pet. 3.9.   
Sect. 64. From his volley of bitter words discharged at once against me, 
His slanderous charge against Mr. Tho. BAR●LOW of ● in Oxford.  he proceeds to calumniate Mr. BARLOW, the Reverend Provost of Queen's College, (p. 16.) whom he forgeth at least to have used this Argument, [If sin hath a positive or real being, and is not caused by God, it is God himself.] that is to say, If sin is not nothing, it must be God, or God's creature. But when and where did Mr. Barlow thus argue? not in private betwixt him and Mr. Hickman; for I was told by Mr. Barlow, what makes me know it to be impossible. Not publicly and in print; For I cannot find it in his exercita●ions. It is therefore a very enormous thing, to steal abundance from Mr. Barlow without the citing of any page where the matters really are to be found; And yet to cite him thus by Name, for that which never fell from him, by word or writing. Hence the Reader may judge of this man's Religion. His commendation of Mr. Barlow, (i● such it can be, whilst he bestows it,) I very readily grant him to my advantage. For Mr. Barlow hath a better opinion of me, than I have of my self. And I can yield him a greater deference, than he can think is due to him. Nor will he assert his own Judgement, without a submission to other men's, (Doctor JACKSON, and Doctor FIELD, to name no more) who are more his Seniors, than he is mine. Sure I am, that my Learned Friend can never be pleased with a Commendation, which is ushered into the world with so foul a calumny.  

His foul defamation of Dr. REYNOLDS.  §. 65. And as little can Doctor REYNOLDS take any pleasure in the mockery, which Master Hickman doth mix with his vindication. I did but make it a Question, whether he were not in judgement an Episcopal Divine, how much soever accounted a Presbyterian, (the reason of which Question I shall allege in due time) and yet I am said by Master Hickman to have branded Doctor Reynolds with the suspicion of being an Hypocrite, and that he could not be in earnest of that Party, whom he hath owned in praying, in preaching, in covenanting. p. 17, 18.] to which I answer by these degrees. 1. In all my writings, there are not found any such words; Had there been, Mr. Hickman would not have feared a citation. 2. Time was when Doctor REYNOLDS did own the King and the Bishops, both in his Praying and Preaching too; as may appear by two of his printed sermons, for obedience and conformity to those that were Rulers at that time, both Ecclesiastical, and Civil. So that in judgement he is now, what he was twenty years ago, unless he hath turned with the times, and with those that turned them. But of this he is accused by Mr. Hickman, who makes him one of the Covenanters; whether truly, or falsely, I cannot tell. If truly, he disgraceth that learned man. If falsely, he wrongs and defiles himself. 'Twere very strange that Doctor Reynolds, who had taken the oaths of allegiance and supremacy, subscribed the thirty nine Articles, sworn obedience unto his Ordinary, lived conformably in the Church, and preached for it from Press and Pulpit, should swear to extirpate those very things, which he had sworn to assert. It is much more likely that Mr. Hickman owed him a spite, and could not hold from giving it vent, though he had nothing to excuse him for such Impertinence. He might have written against the positivity of six, without reviling Dr. Reynolds, as a person that had sworn so lewd a Covenant. A thing the less credible, because he hath declared to divers Friends▪ (whom I can name if need require) That the order of Bishops in his judgement, was of D●vine Institution. And if the Question shall yet be asked, I dare adventure a Discretion he will readily say, yes. But Mr. Hickman it seems is careless, whom he calumniates in his passion; And therefore Doctor Reynolds may the more easily forgive him.  
§ 66. To his blind and bitter zeal against the licensing of a Book, 
His self-contradiction, and blind zeal, as to Dr. Martin.  which is Entitled [An Historical Narration etc.] p. 18.19. I am able to return him this gentle Remedy. The Learned and Reverend Doctor Martin did avow and justify (in the House of Lords) his licensing that worthy and useful Book. And Master Maynard much urging that 'twas Arminian, on which he insisted before the Lords, The Doctor told them he thought it strange, that That shoul● be called an Arminian Book, wherein there was not one person either named, or concerned, who had not been dead before Arminius was alive. Whereupon his Accuser was as much disappointed, as Mr. Hickman must needs be when he reads the story of that affair. But his self-contradiction is most prodigious. Because in one and the same page, and at few lines distance, he saith the book was unlicensed, which yet he confesseth to have been licenced by Mr. Martin Bp. laud's Chaplain. And what credit can be due to his following proofless affirmations, who calls learned Champneys by the name of Cerberus? Or what shall we think of his tongue and conscience, who calls Tilenus an Aethiopian, a scribbler, impudent, and a poor fellow? (p. 21.) If he treats his superiors and betters thus, I wonder how his equals can endure to come within his Breath. yet in the very next page, he commends himself for Candour and moderation, and his cordial affections to Episcopal Divines, for never vilifying the parts and pains of any Prelatist, because such. And then to show us his skill in books, he saith he had rather be the Author of calvin's one book of insti●utions, then of all that ever were made by Grotius (p. 23.) whereby he owns Mr. Calvin in the worst of those things I cited from him; and gives me reason to believe, that he never read the Books of Grotius, but takes up his anger upon trust, as he hath done the materials which fill his volume.  

The nullity of a Priesthood sinfully given by Presbyterians.  §. 67. He next resolves to spend some pages in another way of Impertinence, and Tergiversation. It seems not caring what course he takes, whereby to patch up a little volumn; and yet to stave off his Readers from what he took upon him to prove, to wit, that sin hath no positive being. His little project is briefly this; first, to say how much he hath read in Dr. Taylor, and Dr. Hammond; and secondly to add upon that occasion, (so dexterous he is at the contriving of a transition) that if Presbytery be a crime, he must needs say he hath learned it from Episcopal men. p. 23. etc.] will you know his Reasons? The first is this; The Primate and Dr. Holland were of opinion, that a Presbyter and a Bp. differ in degree only; not in order. But neither doth he attempt a proof, that this could make him a Presbyterian, Or that the Primate and the Dr. did ever think any such thing, much less that they said it either in earnest or in ●est. I am sure the L. Primate thought our Presbyters unexcusable, for taking upon them the Bishop's office to ordain. But he had mercy for the French Protestants, because he thought it necessity, not choice, which kept them from Episcopal order, see the Letter of Peter du Moulin the son sent to a Scotchman of the Covenant, who proves his Father to be clearly for the order of Bishops. Chamier affirms them to be (of right) elected Princes. Their Church would have Bps. but are not suffered. The second reason is that Bp. Andrews ordained a Scotchman Bishop, never made Priest but by Presbyters, which he would not have done, had ordination by Presbyters been unto him a Nullity p. 23.24] But 1. he brings not any proof that there was ever any such fact. 2. From Fact to Right no good Argument can be drawn 3. Bp. Andrew● might be ignorant that the Scotchman had received any such mock-Ordination 4. Or he might think the man had invincible Necessity to help excuse him, which yet I take to be most improbable; much less that he could fancy the common Rule had place here▪ Quod fieri non debet factum valet. And therefore (5) my chiefest answer to it is this, that the story proves nothing (supposing truth to have been in it) but what is against Mr. Hickmans' interest, for it only proves that such a man who had been sinfully dubbed into a Titular Priesthood▪ and was therefore no real Priest, in the opinion of Bp. Andrews, might yet per saltum be made a Bishop. Because in his being made a Bp. he is ipso facto made a Priest. And so 'tis granted as well of Timothy and Titus, and the rest in their time, that they were consecrated Bishops, without the receiving of previous orders▪ Others having first been D●acon●, were immediately assumed into the order of Bishops. So Linus, who was St. Paul's Deacon as Anacletus and Clemens, who were St▪ Peter, succeeded both those Apostles in the Bishopric of Rome. 
The recantations of ●ome who were so ordained.   
Having thus satisfied Mr. H▪ as to the case of his Scotch●an ordained per saltum by Bp. Andrews, I shall tell him that there are Divers, who having been dubbed by Presbyterians (for without an abusive way of speaking they durst not say they had been ordained) were so sensible of the crimes of Schism and sacrilege in the thing, that they made their Recantations to several Bishops within my knowledge; and solemnly renounced such Ordinations; and after that, have been ordained by the Bishops themselves. I am unwilling to name the men, that I may not occasion their persecution. But Bishop Morton is out of their Reach, and so I am free to make it known what he hath done in this kind. The reader may judge by this Taste, whether Episcopal men could ever teach Mr. H. his Presbyterianisme.  
68 He produceth a passage from one of the first Printed Sermons of the learned and Reverend Dr. SANDERSON, 
Mr. H▪ 's Disappointment by Dr. sanderson's change of judgement▪  concerning God's concurrence with subordinate Agents (p. 29.) which he hoped some shallow Readers would think conducing to his end, of making the people to believe, that God himself is the Cause of the wickedest actions in the world, because the wickedest actions have not only a real, but a positive being. But besides that that passage of God's concurrence (to the sustentation of the Creature) is nothing at all in itself to Mr. Hickmans' purpose, I have the leave and consent of that most learned and pious person, to communicate as much of his Letters to me on this occasion, as I conceive may tend to his vindication, and with all to the advantage of peace and truth.   

Doctor Sanderson's Letters, etc.  
1. As to the passage in the fifth Sermon ad Populum, p. 278— 9 the Doctor saith, That as he did as well at the time when that Sermon was preached, as at all other times before and since, utterly detest; so the thing principally intended and purposely insisted upon in that whole passage was to root out of men's minds the seeds of that horrid Blasphemous opinion, that God was the Author, or efficient cause of sin.  
2. He saith, That the occasion which led him to that discourse being the handling of that 1 Tim. iv. 4. Every Creature of God is good: the Inference thence was natural and obvious, That therefore whatsoever was evil cou●d be no creature of God, was none of his making, nor could he (in any tolerable sense) be said to be the Author or cause thereof.  
3. He saith, That if in the Explication, or prosecution of that Inference he should perhaps have let fall some such improper, incommodious, or ambiguous phrase or expression, as a caviller might wrest to a worse construction than was meant (a thing not always to be avoided in popular discourses, especially where the matter treated of is of grea● nicety, or of a mixed consideration between Metaphysical and Moral:) it had yet been the part of an ingenuous Reader, to have made the main scope of the discourse the measure whereby to interpret such phrases and expressions, rather than by a malign interpretation to extract such a sense out of the words, as it is certain the Author (unless he would contradict himself) could not mean.  
4. He saith, That upon as district a review of every period and clause in that whole passage, as seemed requisite for his concernment in the present debate, he hath not observed any phrase or expression, which is not consonant to his main scope therein, or whereof Master Hickman (without injury and violence to his true meaning) could serve himself in any of those three points: wherein (as far as he can judge, having never seen Mr. Hickmans' Book) he conceiveth the difference betwixt Master Pierce and his adversaries to lie. viz. 1. God's predetermining of men's wills and actions. 2. The positive entity of sin. 3. God's concurrence to the sinful actions of men.  

☞ Note that this Section shows his meaning in the seventh.  5. For the first of which, the Doctor saith, That he is so far from believing, that God predetermineth the will to evil actions, that he dares not (without farther assurance than he can yet find warranty for) affirm positively, that God at all physically determineth any man's will either to good or evil. It being hard (to his seeming) to suppose such a determination without destroying the nature and liberty of the will. Nor doth he find himself obliged to say or believe; That God hath predetermined or eternally decreed all actions, events, and things; if any more be understood thereby then this, viz. That God ab aeterno knowing all both future and possible things, hath eternally decreed to permit the creature to act (that is, not to withhold from it the concurrence of that his power without which it could not act,) in such sort, as that the event, which he foresaw future should certainly come to pass; and the event foreseen as possible but not future, should certainly not come to pass.  
6. For the second (the positive entity of sin) although taking a real entity as opposite to mere nothing, even sins of omission also may be said to have a real entity, as all privations and other Entia rationis have: yet the chief contest being about sins of commission (as appeareth, both by the distinction, so frequently used in this controversy, between the act and the obliquity; and by the particular instances, the hating of God, the murdering of an innocent, the ravishing of a woman, etc.) the sins of omission set a side as less pertinent to the present debate, he saith he wondereth with what pretence, or by what subtlety of distinction, any man, 
☜  that acknowledgeth a sin of commission so to consist of an act as the material part, and the obliquity of the said Act as the formal part, that if either of both be wanting it cannot be a sin (for without supposal of an act there can be no obliquity, and an act without obliquity is no sin; and acknowledgeth withal the one part (viz. the material) to be a positive entity; can deny the totum compositum to be a positive entity. It seemeth to be all one, as if a man should deny Socrates, consisting of a body and a soul to be ens quantum, because his soul (his formal part) is not ens quantum. For no more can the accession of the obliquity to the presupposed Act whereunto it adhereth, make that act cease to be a positive entity, than the infusion of the soul into a body that hath dimensions can make that body cease to be a quantitative entity. The Doctor acknowledgeth that in a sinful action the act may be Metaphysically abstracted (abstractione praecisionis, and per primam operationem intellectus) from the obliquity; that is to say, it may be considered precisely as it is a motion of the creature, or an exercise of that natural power wherewith God hath endued the creature, without considering at the same time the object about which it is conversant, the end whereunto it is directed, or the circumstances appending: And that the Act so abstractedly considered, hath a distinct essence of its own, whereby it essentially differeth from them, (otherwise the act and the object, should be the same thing.) But yet for as much as no such act can de facto (in regard of actual existence extra intellectum) be really abstracted from those things, without which (though extrinsical to its essence) it cannot exist, and by the occasion whereof it first becometh morally good or evil, (for no act is morally evil in its own abstracted essence, nor otherwise a sin, then as is vitiated by the coexistence of some undue object, end, or circumstance:) it must necessarily follow, that the totum compositum, the vitiated act and that is the 
* Note that the Concrete, or vitiated Act, is here denominated the sin. And the sin said to be a compound, consisting of two parts, act and obliquity; not separately, but jointly.  sin, act and obliquity jointly together) is a positive real entity, and morally evil. A positive real entity, from the existence of the act: and morally evil, from the coexistence of those aforesaid vitiating relations, which are accidental to the act, as to the essence of it, but by adhering to it make it formally a sin.  
7. For the third point (God's concurrence to a sinful action) the Doctor thinketh that what he hath now last said, will sufficiently clear from misconstruction, not only that phrase of actuating the power (p. 279.) if Mr. Hickman have hoped for any advantage to his cause therefrom; but that other short passage also (pag. 29.) wherein is acknowledged the effectual concurrence of Gods will and power with subordinate agents in every, and therefore even in sinful actions also. Especially if the two Texts of Scripture quoted in the margin (viz. Act. xvii. 28. and Esa. x. 12.) be withal taken into consideration. For it is manifest, that by the concurrence signally grounded upon those two Texts there cannot rationally be understood any other concurrence, than such as is according to the importance of those texts, which from Act. 17. is briefly this. As whilst we have any being, we have it by virtue of that his concurrence, which if he should withdraw or withhold from us, we should cease to be; & so long as we live, we live by virtue of that his concurrence, which if he should withdraw or withhold from us, we could not live: so, as oft as we act and move a hand or a foot or a thought, we act and move by virtue of that his concurrrence, which if he should withdraw or withhold from us, we could not act or move hand, foo●, or thought. That is to say, we cannot actually exercise any of those natural powers God hath endowed us withal, without that generalis 
Note the distinction of Mel●nch●hon, The will doth act, Deo sustentante, non adjuvante God sustaining the faculty, but not assisting the choice.  concursus causae universalis (as the Schoolmen call it) which hath such an influence upon all the motions of inferior subordinate agents and second causes; that if God be pleased at any time to withhold from them that concurrence, although the natural power remain, the same it was still, yet can they not exsert or actually exercise that power to the producing of any effect. As when God withheld from the fire Dan. iii his concurrence, it could not put forth that natural power it had of burning, so as to have any operation upon the bodies of the 3. young men, that were cast thereinto. If an ungracious son should be so wickedly disposed as to cut his own father's throat, he could not take the knife into his hand, nor move his arm to do that foul deed, if God should withhold his concurrence thereunto, and not suffer him to exercise his natural power of reaching out his arm to cut. In which horrible and sinful act all the concurrence, imputable to God at the most is, but the affording (that is to say, 
* Note his exposition of the word affording, by not withholding, and the word general added to influx and the locomotiv● faculty, which is common to us with Beasts, as distinguished from the will, which is common to us with Angels.  the not withholding of) that his 
* Note his exposition of the word affording, by not withholding, and the word general added to influx and the locomotive faculty, which is common to us with Beasts, as distinguished from the will, which is common to us with Angels.  general influx into the loco-motive faculty of his creature, without which he could not exercise that faculty so far as to stretch out his hand to cut, which act so far forth only considered, and no farther, doubtless is no sin, for then every stretching out of the arm to cut any thing should be a sin, according to the old Logical axiom, Quicquid convenit quatenus ipsum, convenit omni. But the applying of such an act to an undue object, referring it to an undue end performing it in an undue manner, or with undue circumstances, (by any of which obliquities it becometh a sin) proceedeth wholly and solely from the corrupt will of the inferior agent, and not at all from God, which, as it layeth the whole guilt of the sin, or moral act upon the actor, so it clearly acquitteth God, (such his concurrence to the natural act or motion of his creature as aforesaid notwithstanding) from the least degree of any agency or efficiency therein.  
8. He saith, That what he hath here declared concerning these two last points, as it is axactly agreeable to what his judgement then was, when the two Sermons, wherein the passages quoted by Mr. Hickman are found, were preached: so it is his present opinion still, which he hath therefore somewhat the longer insisted upon; not only for that it seemeth to be the consentient tenet of the best Schoolmen, grounded upon discourse of reason, and the Authority of St. Augustin, and other of the ancient Fathers, and no way (in his apprehension) derogatory to the holiness, goodness, wisdom, or majesty of God: But also because the due consideration of it might prove (if it were by some able hand distinctly, clearly, and intelligibly set down) a probable expedient toward the reconciling of some differences among Divines held at a greater distance than perhaps they needed to have been, for want of a right understanding between the dissenting parties. For the Doctor professeth himself, (and he well hopeth he is in most things not much further from the truth for so doing,) as on the one side extremely jealous of extreme opinions, till they have undergone a severe trial; so on the other side very inclinable to embrace middle and reconciling opinions, where there appeareth not pregnant evidence of reason to the contrary.  
9 Lastly to conclude this whole business, so far as he apprehendeth himself concerned; he saith, he is not unwilling the world should know, that having from his younger years (as his Genius led him) addicted himself mostly to the study of the moral and practical part of Divinity; but especially having (for fear of approaching too near to the Ark of God's secret counsels) kept a loof off from meddling (more than needs must) with those more nice and intricate disputes concerning Gods eternal decrees, the cooperation of God's free Grace, and man's freewill, etc. He contented himself for sundry years to follow on (as most others did) by a kind of implicit credulity, in the Sublapsarian way, as the than most trodden path; until having a just occasion, (A.D. 1628.) to make a little farther inquiry after the truth in those questions, upon due search he saw a necessity of receding from that way in some things: a more particular account whereof is given in a narrative lately printed with his consent, which if well considered, ought (he thinketh) in reason and charity to excuse him from the necessity of justifying every syllable or phrase that might slip from his tongue or pen, in any thing by him spoken or written before that year, and whilst he was very little (or rather nothing at all) versed in the study of those Questions.  
Now since I have proved undeniably, that the question was from the beginning (betwixt my adversaries and me) whether any kind of sins (plainly meaning whole sins, not the formal part of sin, which cannot possibly be the sin of which it is but the formal part) have a positive being; And since it is said by Dr. SANDERSON, that the positive acts above mentioned, [murdering and ravishing of men, women,] are (so in the concrete) horrid sins; nay in the plainest terms to be imagined, that a sin of commission doth consist of two things, an act and an obliquity; and since it is said by Mr Hickman, that it belongs to the universality of the first cause to produce (not only every positive, but every real being, and (not only so, but also) the positive modifications of beings, (p. 95. It is apparent that Doctor SANDERSON is as much for my cause, and as much against Mr. Hickmans', as either my heart can wish, or my cause require. For though he conceiveth that the act may be considered, without considering the object about which it is conversant, (in which case it cannot possibly be considered as a sin,) yet he declares that the Act of sin cannot possibly exist without the obliquity, any more than the obliquity without the Act. And farther yet, he doth affirm (towards the end of his sixth paragraph) both that the vitiated Act is the very sin; and that the sin which is the vitiated act, is not only a real, but a positive entity. I have published this happy concurrence with me, not only in his sense, but (according to his desire) in his own manner of expression. 
A vindication of Bp. HALL., Bp. MORTON, and Bp. BROWNRIG from Mr. H.'s slanderous suggestion   
§. 69. I now go on to discover his wilful Calumny, not so much against me, as against Bp. HALL., Bp. MORTON, and Bp. BROWNRIG; whom though he knew to be Bishops of the Church of England, yet he reckons them them with the men of the Kirk, or Consistory, or their Adherents here in England, (whom I had charged with swearing the Scottish Covenant, and making God the Author of sin) who had done dishonours unto the Protestant name. p. 31, 32.] For if the Reader will consult my Au●ocatacrisis, chap. 2. p. 61, 62. he will see I only spoke against the Papists and Presbyterians, (in words at length, and by name,) and that upon no lesser motive or provocation, than their making God the Author of sin. So that now Mr. Hickman must either prove, that those excellent Prelates were Presbyterians, or Papists, or such at least of their adherents, as have been known to make God the Author of sin; Or if he cannot prove this, (as I know he cannot) he must make some amends for so foul a slander.  
§. 70. The request he puts up to the Episcopal Divines, who close with such as he is, in the present contest, 
The perfect ●mi●y and communion of all Episcopal Divines, for all their difference in judgement as to some controverted Doctrines.  (p. 31.) renders him yet more criminal in two respects. First because there are none of the Episcopal Divines, who ever closed with the Hickmanians, in saying that sin, if it is positive, is either God's creature, or God himself; or that our English Presbyterians have any power to make Priests. (For this, and that, (he must confess) is the present subject of our contest) Next because he calls their Brethren, Arminian Ardelio's, by whom they must expect to be last devoured. By which he would intimate to his Readers, (if I am able to understand him) That we design the Doctrines they call Arminian as the condition of our brethren's Communion with us: which as it hath ever been far from us, (we most joyfully communicating with all the Fathers and sons of the Church of England, how much soever in some points they may differ from us) so of all men living Mr. Hickman's party should least accuse us, whilst 
* Quis tulerit Gracchos de seditione querentes?  themselves are as guilty, as we are Innocent in this respect. For they are known to be the men, who fasten the character of 
† See the Rd. D. GAUDEN his Hi●ra Dacrua, ch. 29. p. 384.  sanctified to their opinions, and have made them the test by which they admit, (or reject) their Betters, to any places of trust in the English Church. Witness all the partialities and inquisitions of the Triers. Whereas the men whom they call Arminians have never required any more than the subscription of the Articles, which are called by Mr. Rogers, our English Creed. And which, as they have not, in particular, defined all that is debated on either side, so they do not (like the late Triers) ●i●t and winnow such persons as come before them; But together with truth, do provide for unity and peace too. In a word. Our Prelates and Prelatists, how much soever Anti Calvinian, do not cast out of their communion, any Calvinist that desires it, upon the account of his being a Calvinist. But the Calvinists in Holland are very well known to have made a schism; plainly dividing from the Remonstrants, and setting up schismatical Congregations. Now to communicate with such is a different thing, from our receiving to our communion such as differ in those points. Concerning that Schism, Master HALES his LETTERS have told us somewhat; And his Treatise of that sin hath told us more. And more than that I could give account of, if this were a season for such prolixity.  

Mr. Hickmans' confession of his ignorance and incapacity to understand the points in controversy.  § 71. He next proceeds to tell the world (without any colour of Coherence, or the least Formula Introducendi) That he hath spent more Time in reading Authors pro and con about these points, than ever he intended to d●, ●. 32. And reason good. For he confesseth his gross Ignorance and Insufficiency, after all the reading of which he tells us. 'Tis strange he should meddle in the Doctrine of God's Decrees, and the manner of the Spirits working Grace in the hearts of the Elect, since in the midst of all his meddling, he professeth them to be matters so very mysterious, and his understanding to be so dark, that he can scarce hope ever in the world to be freed from all scruples about them, p. 33. It seems he is not over-confident, that the Decrees of Election and Reprobation are Absolute; or that Grace in the Elect is irresistibly wrought; for all his railing at the Arminians, and his partial adhering to the Calvinians. Let him talk what he will of his holding this, or that Tenet; and let him render what reasons he thinks most specious; we will believe his own confession, that he is Sceptical and Scrupulous, and finds his understanding too dark to reach them.  
§. 72. 
His confessed insufficiency to maintain the chief Articles of the Creed.  Again he confesseth his inward conviction of his own insufficiency to do the work of a Divine, whilst he saith of those Articles of the Christian faith [The Trinity of the persons, and the hypostatical union of the two Natures,] that he never thought himself able to vindicate those Mysteries from all the subtle Arguments and Niceties of unbelieving Sophisters. ibid.] 'Twould be a sad time for Christianity, if it had no better champions and propugnators than UNBELIEVERS are able to baffle, and put to silence, and so to shame. Yet this is the man, who by a schismatical ordination takes upon him to be a Preacher, nay a Pastor of Christ's flock, (even denying our very Bishops to be of an order higher than he, much less such Priests as the Bishops have lawfully ordained,) who yet confesseth he is not able to defend the Flock from Wolves, or Foxes, no not the Articles of our Creed from the attempts of unbelievers.  
§. 73. Nor may we think his two confessions are the effects of modesty or meekness. 
Yet his conceitedness of his parts is not the less.  For (to secure himself from that suspicion) He first premiseth his opinion of the former points, That the greatest Scholars will never be able fully to satisfy their own, or other men's reasons about them, p. 52.] Hence it appears that Mr. Hickman may verily think himself one of the greatest Scholars in the world, (I do not say that he does) notwithstanding the confession which he hath made of his Disability. Nay it is probable that he does too; because he infers (with a monstrous arrogance) the greatest Scholars are not able, from the sensible Non-ability which he discovereth in himself. As if Mr. Hickman's understanding were the measure of what may be understood, by the learnedest of mortals on this side heaven. If he is not past cure, and will but seek for a Remedy, let him read the Full Accordance betwixt Dr. Sanderson and Dr. Hammond, wherein he will find how those Doctors have fully satisfied themselves; And then he may learn from common fame, that they have fully satisfied others also.  

His way to make a rope of sand, whereby to pull in the Puritans.  §. 74. There is nothing worth notice in his next two Stories, besides his form of bringing them in. For having told us that he hopes by the free Grace of God to be acqui●ted at the last day, he immediately adds (to introduce a new Section) That to this end he will relate two Historical passages. p. 34. And then to lengthen his Rope of Sand, he adds a saying of Doctor Sanderson concerning 
* See (concerning Antichrist) Bishop Montague's Appeal ch. 5. p. 140. and Examen. Hist. p. 253, 254.  Antichrist, Another of King james against the Arminiars in the Low-countries, (for they were all Presbyterians, and displeasing unto the King;) Another of Viscount Falkland against some Bishops (without a Name) and my Lord of Strafford; A fourth of Bishop Carleton against the Puritans, as Disquieters of the Church about their conceived Discipline. These are called by Master Hickman The honest Puritans, (p. 41.) as if he consented to the Distinction which had been made by King james, betwixt the Puritan Knaves, and the Knaves Puritans. If there were any such Idle-sots as were seen to stagger in the streets, they were as loathsome in my opinion, though not so dangerous to the public, as that first sort of Puritans of which I spoke. And yet that Puritan is a sot too, who being dry in respect of wine, is 
* Ebrius sacrilegio qui resipuit à vino▪ apud Authorem nescio quem.  Drunk with sacrilege. Which, as it minds me to refer him to what I have said on this subject to Mr. Baxter, so it affords me a fit Transition to the following subject of his Digression. For  
§. 75. So far is this Rhapsodist from thinking it needful to repent of his crying sin, 
His sinful way of defending Robbery by adding a manifold Aggra●vation.  or else from thinking that Restitution is any necessary part of a true Repentance; that he adds Railing to his Robbery, and slander to his Railing, and Treason too unto his slander. Which I shall show in that Order, in which I find them committed, and brought to light too.  
First, whereas I had complained, 
His Slanderous insinuation against the two Houses of Parliament, to save the credit of the Visitors in sinning against their own Commission.  and (Dr. Reynolds is my witness I did it justly, in so much that himself hath joined with me in the complaint,) that I suffered the loss of my best possession, (not for any the least crime of which I had any way been guilty, but) for being secretly suggested to be the Author of some Books, which (to this very day) I could never hear named; and though I earnestly desired to hear myself accused, that I might know for what I suffered, and if not my Accuser at least my Accusation, and be heard speak for myself, yet Dr. Reynolds professed to me in private he could not obtain that justice for me; Mr Hickman expresseth this just complaint (which I am able to prove just, to any competent Judges who will but hear me,) by my throwing I know not what fiery darts not only at him, but at the far greater part of heads and Fellows of Colleges in Oxon; at the Visitors, and at the two Houses of Parliament (p. 44.) Now that his Readers may clearly see how great a violence he hath offered to truth, and Candour, and how he hath blurred the two houses with a most scurrilous suggestion, I shall furnish them very briefly with a perfect Narrative of the Case. I was permitted to appear no more than once before the Visitors, when they only entertained me with this one question, [Whether I could submit to their Visitation, or acknowledge they were my rightful Visitors? My Answer was not Categorical, either one way● or other. But as I really wanted, so I modestly besought them to give me time, wherein to consider that weighty question; that so my answer might be rational, which it could not be, if it were rash. For being then newly returned out of France, I had not studied the matter of right. And as I would not be perjured for fear of Ruin, so would I not rashly incur my ruin by such a fear of being perjured, as was not very well grounded. They did not deny what I desired, and that I thought was to yield it to me. But they met a little after, to pass a sentence of condemnation (by a most absolute decree) upon me and others; and proclaiming my banishment, before I was summoned to give my answer, (for which I concluded they gave me time) they used the violence of the Soldiers, to put their decree into execution. Now is it likely that the two Houses would Authorise them to destroy me without a cause? not only unconvicted, but unaccused, and unheard? (for that they suspected me the Author of I know-not-what-books which were never named, I was privately informed by Dr. Reynolds, who was not able to tell me what Books they meant.) Could the two Houses Authorise them to break the Law of the Land in Magna Charta, and to act in contradiction to the Petition of Right? I rather think that the Visitors did sin against the very r●le, to which the two Houses had tied them up in their commission. A Nicodemus was able to ask, [doth our Law judge any man before it hear him, and know what he doth? John 7.51.] And as Festus said unto King Agrippa, It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die, 
Acts 25.16.  before that he which is accused have the Accusers face to face, and have licence to answer for himself concerning the crime laid against him; so with greater force of reason (since the Romans than were Heathens, which we are not,) I may say to Mr. Hickman from Magna Charta, and the Petition of right; It is not the manner of the English, 
See the New Discoverer discovered ch. 6. p. 131.132.  in the two Houses of Parliament, to dispossess any man, of whatsoever estate or condition, of his land, or Tenement, his freehold, or liberties or free Customs, without his being brought to answer by due process of Law, and by the Lawful judgement of his P●eres.] And this may serve as well for theirs, as for mine own Vindication.  
Next for the far greater part of Heads and Fellows of Colleges in Oxon, 
His disparagement of the Visitors in his endeavours to assert them.  against whom he accuseth me to have thrown some darts, (ibid.) He knows I never made mention of them. And if he means that my case was also the case of all others who suffered with me, he wrongs the Visitors extremely, by concluding them worse than indeed they were. For they did not cast out the greatest part of Heads, and Fellows out of their rights, until they had given their final answer. I hardly know any (besides myself) who were deprived of their places for being so circumspect only and modest, as to desire a little respite before they answered, that so their answer might be unpassionate, and after a due deliberation. I know the sufferings of all the rest were illegally inflicted, as well as mine, (as may appear by the case of the University, which was sent in a letter to Mr. SELDEN, and of which I may give account towards the end of this subject▪) but what I speak against the Visitors was in reference to the case, of which I had a peculiar knowledge.  
Thirdly he plays upon himself by telling some stories of distraction, and Hypocondriacal conceits, 
The work he makes with Hypochondriacal conceits.  as if he were willing that his Readers should suspect me infected with his Disease; And talk as oddly of me, as they do commonly of him. But he is strangely unfortunate in this adventure. For he discovers himself afresh to be a second hand-Historian, in citing an Author he never read. He would else have known (had he consulted Laurentius, as well as named him,) that there are 
* Mel●ncholiae differentias triplici discrimine assignant Authores: prima proprio cerebri vitio obtingit; secunda per consensum totius corporis cujus universa temperies totusque humor est melancholicus; ultima ex hypochondriis ●uscitatur. i. e à visceribus in ipsis contentis, potissin●um ab E●ate, Liene & Mesen●erio. etc. Vide Laurent. de Melancholia Differentiis cap. 4.  three sorts of melancholy, where of the first doth happen by the mere distemper of the Brain; The 2. by a consent of the whole body; the third is raised up from the Hypochondres, that is, from the entrails contained in them especially from the liver, the spleen, and the Mesen●erie. The first is simply called Melancholy; the last with an addition of the Epithet Hypochondriacal. The first exagitates the patient without intermission, the last affords him some times of truce. The three instances produced do all belong unto the first, not at all unto the last, to which alone Mr. Hickman had the unskilfulness to apply them, p. 46. And Laurentius (besides) doth add no less than fourteen, of which there is not so much as one referred to Flatus Hypochondriacus, which by the Greeks is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; but are widely different in two respects, to wit, in respect of the Original seat, and of the manner of the delirium which is produced. So that poor Mr. H. at once hath laid himself bare, and put a rod into my hand for his due correction. Did he think that Hypochondria were things residing in the brain? or was he as sick as the Italian Footboy, and fancied the brain was in the bowels? His own conceit was more likely to be Hypochondriacal than mine, when he reproached me with a distemper, from the very suspicion of which I was ever free; and with which if my Body had ever been affected in any measure, (as I bless God for it, it never was,) Mr. Hickman should not have been so barbarous, as to have sported his Readers with my disease, which had been honest and helpless too, had it ever invaded my Hypochondres, as much as Fame hath affirmed it to have had dominion over his own. I never was so inhuman, as to upbraid my greatest enemy with any such bodily indisposition; and have rather afforded my utmost help. But since Mr. Hickman (unprovoked) could not abstain from objecting a sickness to me, and such a sickness as I have ever (by the blessing of God) been exempted from; it is his own fault only (though my misfortune) that I am forced to expose him in this point also. And for the future I do beseech him, not to meddle in matters of which he hath not any knowledge; nor to have so little mercy upon himself, as to scourge his guilty self upon an innocent man's back; but rather to conceal his great infirmities, or only reveal them to his Physician, and apply himself to the means of cure. I might (in favour and mercy to him) have prompted his Readers to believe, that it was but his splenative Conceit, which made him say in his Epistle (wherewith he dedicates his collection) that the Doctrines printed before my birth, were the mere chimaeras of my brain. For which prodigious Adventure he is not capable of excuse, unless his flatulent Hypocondres made him a kind of Pythagorean, so as to fancy a transmigration of Calvin's soul into my body. I am sure Pythagoras is reported to have thought himself to be Aethalides, the son of Mercury; and that Aethalides being dead, he became Euphorbus; and that Euphorbus being departed, he passed also into Hermotimus; and that Hermotimus dying, he lived in Pyrrhus the Fisherman; And after Pyrrhus his decease, he again survived in Pythagoras. Sure 'twere better for Mr. Hickman to think that my soul was once in Calvin, or Zuinglius, or Dr. Twisse then to call their writings the mere chimaeras of my brain, or wilfully to deny what hath been read by thousands, and may be seen in those Writers by all Mankind who can but read them. The former (I say) were so much better than the later, by how much better it is, to be sick, then sinful. And so 'twere charity to imagine (if that were possible to be done) that this was one of Mr. Hickman's Hypochondriacal conceits.  
§. 76. It may be taken for one at least, 
He adds railing to his robbery, and treasonably misplaceth the Supreme power of the nation.  that he should charge me with Impudence against the Supreme Authority of the Nation. p. 45. For if he deals sincerely, as well as simply, he hence infers the Oxford Visitors (Mr. Cheynel, and Mr. Wilkinson, and such like things,) to have had the Supremacy, in his opinion. They alone being the men, by whom I complained I had been injured, in their Transgressing the Prescriptions of those that sent them. And loser's (by a Proverb) have still had liberty to complain. I did but modestly hope, Mr. Hickman would pay me my Arrears, when again and again he tells his Readers I am impudent, p. 45. and 47. so impudent I am as to own my Right; though not so simple, as to expect it. And it is strange that Mr. Hickman should thus revile me, for only presuming to hope well of him, or for refusing to dissemble what was so visibly my due. So when the owner in the Parable sent for fruits of his Vineyard, the Husbandmen abused his several Messengers, 
M●r. 12.23.  as well as sent them away empty. I will not say of Mr. Hickman that he is impudent, because his manners are none of mine, but I must needs admire the strange nature of his modesty, when he denied a matter of 
* Look back on c. 1. S. 2.  Fact, however attested by all men's eyes.  
Sect. 77. If he means the two Houses by the Supreme Authority of the Nation, 
The two Houses vindicated from his gross insinuation, & the Supreme Power asserted by 19 Arguments.  (as he seems to do▪ pag. 47.) he contradicts the fundamental Laws of the Land, the Canons of the Church, the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, and implicitly censures all the Members of the House of Commons (by whom the Visitors were sent, in the year 1648.) as guilty of wilful perjury, when they 
* See M. Prin his true and perfect Narra●ive. p. 46.  took those oaths b●fore they sat, or could sit, as members in the House of Commons. 1. The members of Parliament did even swear, in taking the Oath of Supremacy, [That the King's Highness' is the only Supreme Governor of this Realm, and of all other his Dominions, and Countries, as well in all Spiritual and Ecclesiastical Things or Causes, as Temporal.] 2. The King was ever acknowledged in the Prayers of the Clergy before their Se●mons, to be the Supreme Head and Governor, in all Causes, and over all P●rsons, Ecclesiastical, and Civil. Nor may we think that the Clergy were either taught o● commanded to lie to God in their Public prayers. Nay, 3. he was utterly testified, and in conscience declared, as well by the members of Parliament, as by other subjects upon oath, to be not only the Supreme, (which shows that none can be above him) but Solus Supremus Moderator, (as Dr. Sanderson observes) the Sole and Only Supreme Head and Governor▪ which shows that none can be so besides him, or that none can be equal to him. 4. In the general judgement of knowing men, and of Dr. 
† Supremam hanc Potestatem▪ quam Majestatem, vel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dicim●s, etc. D● obl●gat. conscient. Praelect. 7. ●. 258.260,  Sanderson in particular, The King's Supremacy is imported by the stile of Dread Sovereign, and Sovereign Lord, and that of Majesty; expressions used by the two Houses of the late long Parliament, in their h●mble Petitions and addresses unto the King; (nor need I here tell my Reader, what an humble Petition is set to signify) and as well in the most solemn establishment of Laws, as in actions and forms of Jurisdiction. 5. Magna Charta was first granted (in effect by King john, and confirmed (with that Title) by Henry the third, 
a 9, Hen 3. See D●. L●gbain's Review of ●he Covenant. p. 88▪ etc.  of his mere free will; and so the liberties of the subject cannot with reason be presumed to lessen the King of his Supremacy. 6. Other Statutes which have the force of Acts of Parliament are known to be directed as private Writs, with a Teste Meipso; And the common stile of most others is found to run in this strain, [The King with the advice of the Lords at the humble Petition of the Commons, wills this, or that▪] so the form of passing Bills is still observed to be this, L● Ro● le veult, The King will have it. And s●it faict comme il est desiré, Let it be done as it is desired; plainly speaking by way of Grant, to something sought or petitioned for. (From whence by some it hath been gathered, that the R●ga●ion of Laws does rightly belong to the two Houses; but the Legislation unto the King; That their Act is Preparative, his only jussive.) 7. That Supremacy of Power which the Law hath invested the King withal, is not only over all particular persons, but also 
b 1. Eliz. c▪ 1.  over all states; which all the subjects of this Realm, and the Members of Parliament in particular, are bound by oath both to acknowledge, and to maintain. And which they grant to be his Due, when they desire him 
c Exact. col. p. 5. & p. 738.  to protect them in their privileges, and call him always in their Acts Their only Sovereign Lord, or their Royal Sovereign. 8. The King's Prerogative (as well as Magna Charta) is proved (by judge 
d Lex Terrae. p. 5 (bound up with his work●.  jenkin's) to be a principal part of the common Law; and Royal Government a Law fundamental. Nay, 9 It is proved, (by the same most learned and pious judge) 
e Ibid. p. 8.7. Ed. ●. S●at. ●t large, f. 42,  That the Supreme power even in time of Parliament, was declared by both Houses to belong unto the King. 10. The King's Supremacy hath been proved by so many Arguments out of Bracton, (as may be seen in Dudley Diggs, The Reasons of the University of Oxford, judge jenkin's, and the like,) that I shall only translate some few short passages into English. 
f Bracton. l. 4▪ c. 24. Sect. 1.  The King (saith he) hath power and jurisdiction over all who are within his Kingdom, and none but Herald 
e Ibid. Sect. 5.  Every one is under the King, and he under God only. He hath no Peer (or equal) with his Kingdom, m●ch less is inferior unto his subjects. 
h Ib. l. 3. c. 7. l. 5. c. 3. sect. 3▪ the Defal●is.  God alone is his superior, and to God alone is he accountable. In a word, 
i Ib. l. 2. c. 24. sect. 1.  The things that concern jurisdiction and Peace, or are annexed to peace and justice, do belong to none but to the Crown, and the Kingly Dignity; nor can they be separated from the Crown, for as much as the Crown consisteth in them. 11. The King's supremacy is evinced from the Nature of all his subjects Tenors, 
See M. Dudley Diggs of the unlawfulness of taking up Arms &c▪ p. 80, 81.  they holding their Lands of him in Fee. Whi●h though it gives a perpetual Estate, yet is it not absolute but conditional; as depending on the acknowledgement of superiority, and as being forfeitable upon the non-performance of some duties, on which supposition it still returns unto the King. For the breach of Fidelity is loss of Fee. In short, it is agreed among the most learned in the Law, ●, That the King alone hath such a property in all his Lands, as Lawyers are wont to call Ala●dium, because he doth hold in his own full Right, without any service, or payment of Rent, because from God only. 2. That subjects of all Degrees do hold their Lands ut Feuda, in the nature of Fee, which implies Fealty to a Superior. 12. The Oath of Allegiance hath the force of another Oath of Supremacy. For Legiancy is defined to be an 
k Ibid. p. 82.  obligation upon all subjects to take part with their Liege Lord against all men living, to aid and assist him with their bodies and minds, with their advice and power, not to lift up their arms against him, nor to support in any way those that oppose him. Now as no 
l Du●renus in Comment d● Cons●ed. Feudorum c. 4. n. 3. apud eundem.  Liege Lord can acknowledge any Superior, and though bound to some duties, is not bound under pain of Forfeiture; so subjects on the other side are Homines Ligii, all Liege-men, owing him Faith and Allegiance as their Superior; Which Faith if they violate▪ He is enabled by the Law (as being the Fountain of jurisdiction, saith Master Diggs,) to seize upon their Goods and Lands, and to destroy their persons too. Whereas if He fail in the discharge of his duty, he is not subject to any Forfeiture by any Law of the Land I could ever hear of; and Mr. Diggs hath challenged all the world to name any. Doctor Sanderson also affirmeth, That if a King who is Supreme should do the things that are proposed 1 Sam. 8. and Rule as a Tyrant, by no other Law then his own hearts lust, 
m Etsi non esset 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nec peccato careret apud Deum; esset tamen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nec deberet á populo coerceri; dicique propterea mereretur, abusus quidem ille potestate su●, sed tamen suâ. De Leg. Hum. Caus. effic. Prael. 7. p. 260.  he would yet be unaccountable on this side Heaven, however liable to the wrath of the Sovereign judge of all the World. For however such a Tyrant may abuse his power, yet the power is His which he abuseth; and who shall say unto the King, what dost thou? Eccles. 8.4. (a Text produced by the late King, of most blessed Memory, against his own most unnatural and Blood Triers.) 13. There is an ancient Monument (saith Mr. Diggs, p. 83.) which shows the manner of holding a Parliament before the conquest. [The King is the head, the beginning, and the end of the Parliament, and so he hath not any equal in his Degree.] This I cite to anticipate Mr. Hi●kman's possible objection. 14. The King by Law hath just power, 
n 33. H. 8. c. 21.  to pass acts of Parliament by his great Seal; to grant out Commissions of Oyer and Terminer for the holding of Assizes; 
o 28. Ed. 1. c. 8,  to adjourn the Term to whatsoever place he pleaseth; 
p 27 H. 8. c. 24.  To make justices of Peace, which wholly depends on his will and pleasure; 
q 27. H. 8. c. 24. Confessed also Ex. Col. p. 270. 715.90●  To pardon Delinquents and Malefactors, (a privilege, by law, estated solely in the King,) To choose his Officers, to protect all persons, to coin money, to make leagues with foreign Princes, to dispose the Militia, to call and dissolve Parliaments, And to be (in one word) Le dernier Resort de la justice.. 15. In the thirty seventh Article of the Church of England, The King (or Queen) is declared to have the chief Power in this Realm of England, etc. to whom the chief Government of all Estates of this Realm, whether they be Ecclesiastical or Civil, in all Causes, doth appertain And this called the Prerogative which hath always been given to all godly Princes in holy Scripture by God himself, that they shall rule all Estates, and all Degrees— Ecclesiastical or Temporal, and restrain with the Civil sword, the stubborn and evil Doers. 16. And accordingly in the Canons by law established in the Church, A Supreme Power is declared to be given by God in Scripture to the sacred order of Kings, which is there also declared to be of Divine Right. And that for any person or persons to set up, maintain, or avow, in any their said Realms respectively, under any pretence whatsoever, any Independent co-active power, either Papal, or popular, (whether directly, or indirectly) is to undermine their great Royal office, and cunningly to overthrow that most sacred ordinance, which God himself hath established; and so is treasonable against God, as well as against the King. (This I earnestly recommend to Mr. Hickman his consideration, and that which follows in the Canon, viz.) That for subjects to bear Arms against their Kings, offensive, or defensive, upon any pretence whatsoever, is at the least to resist the powers, which are ordained of God: And though they do not invade▪ but only resist; 17. Saint Paul tells them plainly, They shall receive to themselves damnation. The most excellent Recognition which was made by both Houses in the first year of King james, is so worthy to be written in Letters of Gold, and so needful to be riveted in the hearts and memories of the people, who desire to have a conscience void of offence towards God, and men, that I think I shall deserve many an honest man's thanks, (who hath either never known, or hath forgot what once he knew) by inserting some part upon this occasion.  
The King is our only rightful and lawful Liege Lord and Sovereign, 
1. Jac. c. 1. 9 Ed. 4. fol. 8.  we do upon the knees of our heart adnize constant Faith, Loyalty, and Obedience to the King and his Royal Progeny, in this high Court of Parliament; where all the body of the Realm is either in Person, or by representation: we do acknowledge that the true and sincere Religion of the Church is continued and established by the King. And do recognize, as we are bound by the law of God and man, the Realm of England, and the Imperial Crown thereof doth belong to him by inherent birthright, and lawful and undoubted succession, and submit ourselves and our posterities for ever, until the last drop of blood be spent, to his rule, and beseech the King to accept the same as the first fruits of our Loyalty and Faith to his Majesty and his posterity for ever; and for that this Act is not complete nor perfect without his Majesty's assent, the same is humbly desired.  
This proves (saith Judge jenkin's) 1. 
* See his works, p. 23, 24.  That the Houses are not above the King; 2. That Kings have not their titles to the Crown by the two Houses, but 3. by inherent birthright, and 4. That there can be no Statute without his express assent; and so 5. It destroys the Chimaera of the King's virtual being in the Houses.  
18. The King's Proclamations heretofore to several purposes were of no less force than Acts of Parliament. 
31. H. 8. c 8. & 34. H. 8. c▪ 23.  And the ground of it was, that the 
* See the Preface to that Act. 31. H. 8.  supremity of the Regal power is given by God. And however that Act was indeed repealed by the meek concession of King Edward the sixth, yet the Reason of the Repeal is recorded to have been this; 
t 1. Ed, 6. c. 12.  A willingness in the King to gratify his people, up●n trust that they would not abuse the same, but▪ rather be encouraged with more faithfulness and diligence to serve his Highness. So when Charles the First passed a Bill for the continuance of the long Parliament indefinitely, it was upon their promise, 
u Exact. Coll. p. 203.  that the gracious favour of his Majesty expressed in that Bill should not encourage them to do any thing, which otherwise had not been sit to be done. And so good is the Rule in the Civil Law, Cessante causa, cessat Lex, That the Lords and Commons even of that very Parliament did 
w Ib. p. 876.  declare it to hold good in Acts of Parliament.  
19 When 'twas declared by 
x 1. Ed▪ 5. ●. 2.  all the judges and Sergeants of Law, [that it cannot be said the King doth wrong] it was by a Periphrasis, A Declaration of his Supremacy. For the meaning of it must be, (say the greatest Lawyers) That what the King doth, in point of Jurisdiction, he doth by his judges who are sworn to deal legally between the King and his people. So as the Judges may be questioned for violation of Law, but the King is unaccountable, and on his person or power no Reflection is to be made.  
§▪ 78. Thus I have given such an account of the proper subject of Supremacy, 
And by very many more, for which the Reader is entreated to use the works of judge jenkin's.  as my Notes of Observation suggest unto me at this time. I gathered my Notes more especially (for my private use and information, that I might know what Party I ought to own, in these times of Trial and Temptation,) partly out of the Papers which passed betwixt the King, and both Houses of Parliament; partly from the writings of Mr. Prin, Mr. Diggs, judge jenkin's, and Dr. Langbane; partly out of the Book of Statutes, though I have not time to consult them much. Many more Arguments I could urge out of the works of judge jenkin's, but that I find them too many to be transcribed in this Appendix; and withal I consider, that book is cheap, and little, and (I hope) easily to be had which makes me choose to refer my Readers to his whole Lex Terrae, from page 8. to page 63. I have been so convinced by all put together which hath been said, as I cannot but conclude with the most Learned and moderate Doctor Sanderson, 
y Apud nos Anglos saltem quid potest aut certius constare, aut liquidius, (nisi siqui in sole meridiano caecutire malint, quam uti oculis,) quam ad unam serenissimam Majestatem Regiam Supremam trium istorum Regnorum Potestatem pertinere? ubi supr●, pag 260.  That at least, amongst us here in England, there can be nothing more certain or conspicuous, (unless we will not use our eyes, but rather choose to be blind at noon, by stoutly winking against the Sun,) then that the power of these Three Kingdoms doth only belong to his Serene and Supreme Royal Majesty. This is said by that great and judicious Casuist, in his stating the obligation and efficient cause of humane Laws. After which, if Mr. Hickman shall yet contend, that the Oxford Visitors were commissioned by the Supreme Authority of the Nation, though by the two Houses only, (not only without, but against the pleasure of the King) I will only refer him to certain Notes on the Oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance, in a late-Printed Book which is thus ●ntitled. [The Resurrection of Loyalty and Obedience, out of the Grave of Rebellion]  
§. 80. 
How Mr. H. became one of my uncommissioned Receivers.  But I printed (saith Mr. Hickman) as if I had right to two Fellowships; and asks, how else he is but one of my receivers? p 46.] To which I answer, 1. That for any thing I know, Mr. Hickman succeeded him that succeeded me. And my words of him were these, that for aught I know, he may be in possession of mine own fellowship, etc. Or 2. If he did not succeed my successor, but that his Robbery is immediate, not once removed; I will give him an Answer to chew upon out of the Digests. 
Digest. 47.2.21 Sect. 4. for wh●ch s●e D●. Z●uch his Cases and Questions▪ p. 92.  [When a number of men do jo●● their strength to steal a piece of Timber, (or any thing else which is another's,) which none of them singly could have carried away; Ulpian saith, that each of them severally, as well as all of them jointly, is liable to an action for the double value of the thing.] And so when the right of a Society is invaded by a Society, (which was our case in Magd. College, when almost all were at once bereft by men of violence,) all may require their right of all, and every man from every man. For every man by partnership is an Accessary to all that have done the wrong, as well as principal in part, and indefinitely; and so responsible to all who receive the wrong, or do require a reparation. I could prove to Mr. Hickman, that he is guilty of the Visitor's sin, by accepting the spoils of their injustice. But I am ready to pardon, though not to dissemble my being injured.  
§. 81. I had but said by such a figure as is allowable in Scripture, 
In what sense he may be called my Receiver and Vsufructuarie.  [It seems the Visitors made him one of my Receivers and Usufructuaries] when taking my words by the wrong handle, he pretends that His is the ususfructus. p. 46.] But 1. he knows I there added, That my legitimate Successor they could not make him, which is a proof that what I spoke, was of what they did, not aught to do; And a Facto ad Ius no good Argument is to be drawn. The Visitors made him my Receiver, as they made their 
* Wisd. 2.  strength the law of justice; Or as Lambert made Cromwell the King's Receiver. 'Tis easy for one man to be m●de an other man's Receiver, and yet (by a Proverb) to be as bad as the thief that made him. The sons of violence and rapine made one another what they pleased, as opportunity and power was in their hands. So it was said by Doctor Heylin, that Mr. Hickman had made a Book; But he presently added, [As unhappy Boys do make Knives, when in very deed they do but steal them.] 2. Had he been made my Receiver by my consent, he must have given me an Account, as the person to whom his Receipts were due. 3. He confesseth An usufructuary doth want the Title, and cannot pretend he hath Ius ad Rem. So that now in the same sense, in which he pretends to the Ususfructus, he doth implicitly confess I am proprietary in chief; and I may very well summon so saucy an officer to a Reckoning. When Doctor Heylin said of Mr, Cheynel, that he was the usufructuary of the rich Parsonage of Petworth, the English of it was usurper, 
Exam. Hist. p. 130.  and nothing else. For 'tis a Rule (as I remember) in the Civil Law, Potest proprietas esse Maevii, Vsusfructus Titii, & tamen usus Sempronii. And even where the ususfructus is duly settled (as most unduely in Mr. Hickman,) it is but jus in re, by his confession. And ususfructus is defined by Ius Alienis Rebus utendi fruendi, saluâ rerum substantiâ. So the Propriety is mine who have jus ad rem. The Visitors could not, by doing wrong, either take away my Right, or confer upon another what they could never take from me. To be out of possession is so far from being a prejudice to my Right, That God's Anointed himself hath been as long out of his; 
How the Assembly Presbyterians became Abettors of sacrilege, and prevaricators with the Bible.  whose Right hath yet been always greater (at least by one Title) than any subjects.  
§. 82. But Mr. Hickman is well satisfied that he wants nothing at all, but a Right and Title to his possession. pag. 46. And the taking that for a small defect, may very probably be the reason why the Assembly Annotators on the English Bible did seem to think it no sin, to be God's and the Church's Vusufructuaries, in such a figurative sense as in which Mr. Hickman may be called mine. For 'tis observed by Dr. Gauden (and many others) that in 
* See his Hiera Dacrua ch. 21. l. 3. p. 333. 334. and weigh the passage with the professions of these men.  every place through the Bible, where the word and Spirit of God signally commands them to brand the sin of sacrilege with a black mark, as one of the Devil's hindmost Herd, the Presbyterian Expositors do so slily and slightly pass it over, as if they had neither seen nor smelled that foul beast; as if there were no gall in their pens, no Reproof in their mouths, no courage in their Hearts against this sin; they scarce ever touch it, never state it, make no perstrictive or invective stroke against it; which could not be (saith the Observator) their Ignorance, or inadvertency, but the cowardice, cunning, and Parasitism of the Times; in which they were content, for some Presbyterian ends, to connive at sacrilege in those good Lords and Masters, whose charity they hoped (yea Doctor Gauden professeth he heard of them profess they expected) would turn all that stream, which Bishops, ☜ Deans, and Chapters enjoyed, to drive the Presbyterian Mills, to keep up the honour of Ruling and teaching Elders.— These soft fingered Censors (saith the Reverend Doctor a little after) very gently touch that rough satire of sacrilege, where 'tis expressly put in the balance with Idolatry, and overweighs it, as more enormous. Thus far that Learned and moderate man, whom perhaps the Annotators may charge with impudence (as Mr. Hickman does me) and that against the two Houses too, on whom they probably will bestow the Supreme Authority of the Nation; It being a Grace which Mr. Hickman was pleased to grant them. 
M. Hickman's confounding possession and right, and making no scruple of many Robberies at once.   
§. 83. Whereas he saith that my being married doth evacuate and nullify my Title to all Academical Enjoyments, (pag. 46, 47.) first I must tell him that I was single, when I was cast out of my Fellowship (which was my Freehold) and some years after did so continue, even till after I was presented to the rectory of Brington, my enjoyment of which he seems to envy▪ (ibid.) And so I hope he will acknowledge my Arrears are due to me till then; Nor can he with any Truth, that I ever pretended to any more. 2. I am not sure my being married can null my Title, until Doctor Oliver and the true Fellows shall so declare it; and wise men have thought, that by their good leave I am Fellow still, till by a lawful Election they put another into my place. For Thomas Goodwin (we know) is a most scandalous usurper, so as the Rhapsodist himself can be hardly worse. And so my modus habendi may still be optimus, as Mr. Hickma●'s is pessimus in the very worst sense too. For I have an Academical enjoyment by Right, Mr. Hickman only by usurpation▪ I am warranted by Ulpian to say I have it, though many years together I have not held it. Name & eum Habere dicimus qui Rei Dominus est, aeque ac eum qui Rem Tenet. 3. And it was strange that Mr. Hickman could think me incapable of my own (at Magdalen College) by my having enjoyed a single Parsonage, whilst (at the very same time) he thought himself capable of things which were none of his, even a Fellowship in the College, a Vicarage of Bra●kly, and a Parsonage at Saint Towles too, and all by no other title, than what the wickedness of the Times could bestow up●n him. So Mr. Tombs the Arch-Anabaptist could be qualified by the Times to be 
* Mr. Baxter of Infant's Church Mem. p. 202, 203.  Parson of Rosse, and Vicar of Lempster, and Preacher of Bewdly, and Master of the Hospital at Ledbury; All which he was somewhat fitter for, then Mr. Hickman, if but capable of something, by being lawfully ordained. Whereas Mr. Hickman having been only made a Minister, (not a Priest, or a Deacon, as 
† Exam. Hist. part. 1. p. 158, 159.  Doctor Heylin doth well distinguish) and made a Minister no otherwise, then as the Friar's Pork was made Pickerill, cannot be capable of the least, much less of two or three Livings. And perhaps in time he may say as much, if he will read Doctor Hammond upon the Ordinance of the two Houses for the ordination of Ministers Pro Tempore, Printed at Oxford 1644. For which that Great Author was never yet accused of being impudent, though what he writ was against the two Houses.  
§. 84. Because he knows I never said, 
His wilful bi●●erness sadly reflecting upon the Visitors.  I was suspected by the Visitors to be the Author of a Libel, (which words the man was resolved to use) he tells his Reader that my words might look l●ke such an Affirmation▪ p. 47.] whereas before he confessed my words were no other, then that I was secretly suggested to be the Author of some books, which to this very day I could never hear named. (p. 44.) were all things Libels which were written for the cause of the King and of the Church, or were any way displeasing to those men's Palates who came to Visit? Or is it lawful to ruin men upon bare suspicion? Was this for the credit of the Visitors, or them that sent them? Be it so that I was suspected, (as any other man might be,) I was as innocent as the morning, in which I was told by Dr. R●y●olds of such suspicion. And that he told me as a secret, not according to the vote of his guilty Brethren, who never charged me with aught, no not so much as a suspicion. Much less did they dare to let me know my Accuser, for fear I should prove him a false Accuser, and spoil the trade they then were driving. Much less yet would they endure that I should have the least trial, (fair, or foul;) because they were conscious of the nothing, that they were abl● to say against me. Their dealing with me, in that affair, puts me in mind of what I read in an English book, 
* See Mr. howel's sober inspections on the long Parliament. p. 156.  [There was nothing so common in those Times, as a charge without a● Accuser, a sentence without a judge, and a condemnation without a hearing.] But I was condemned without a charge too; And it seems by no Judge that will own the Judgement. For  
§. 85. Mr. Hickman is fain to say, that I was turned out of my Fellowship, not by the Visitors, 
And as much on the Lords and Commons.  but by the Committee of Lords and Commons, for non-submission to the Authority of Parliament, in visiting the University. p. 47.] To which I answer, 1. That my Answer to the Visitors was judged rational and modest by Doctor Reynolds, who therefore told me it was impossible I should be banished only for that; but rather for being at least suspected to have written some Books; but what books they were▪ or why I was suspected the Author of them, he either could not, or woul● not tell me. 2. Mr. Hickman lays the whole fault on the Lords and Commons, which I ascribe unto the Visitors, transgressing the Commission by which they sat. For would the Lords and Commons undo an Orphan for being modest, and conscientiously desirous to gain some time, to the end he might not answer but upon due consideration? This would justify Philanglus in the book above mentioned, when he said 
* Vbisupra.  That many were outed their Free-holds, Liberty, and Livelyhoods, before any examination, much less conviction; and that the order of a Committee was commonly made to control the fundamental Laws of the Land. I rather think that the Visitors did return a false answer, and so abused the Lords and Commons, than that persons of so much honour would be the authors of such a fact, as Doctor Reynolds (although a Visitor) so much abhorred, and never would give his consent unto. But Mr. Hickman doth acknowledge that the two Houses may do amiss; for he dares not undertake in all things to acquit them. p. 48.  

Worst of all upon the King; in excluding whom, he beheads the Parliament.  §. 86. But why doth he call it the Authority of Parliament, which he confesseth at other Times to be no more than two Houses? A Parliament without a King (much more against him) is a contradiction in adjecto. Well said Judge jenkin's, [
* See his works. p. 49.  The legs, Arms, and Trunk of the body, cannot be above the Head, nor have life without it.] So that supposing the King to be but one of the 3. States of which a Parliament doth consist, He is a part, and that the highest. But in truth (saith the 
† Id. ibid.  learned Judge) The King is none of the three estates, but 
* COOK, their Oracle, in his Chap. of Parliam. fol. 1. apud eundem.  above them all. The three estates are the Lords Spiritual, the Lords Temporal, and the Commons. And so Mr. Hickman is unexcusable in beheading the Parliament, by excluding the King from his Royal Birthright.  
§. 87. Again Mr. Hickman proceeds to ask, 
How he and his Visitors have acted against the two Houses and withal against the supreme Power of the Na●ion.  [Is it not Impudence to say, that the Visitors authorized by the two Houses, under the broad Seal of England, could not make me his legitimate successor? p. 47.] To which I answer, 1. that the Visitors were never authorized by the two Houses to condemn me without some little hearing, or to huddle up their sentence and Execution, without Accuser, or witness, or accusation, face to face. 2. The two Houses could only make an Ordinance, not an Act of Parliament, which is a Law) as the Houses themselves have oft confessed. And 
* Ibid. p. 195, 197.  Laws are the things which bind the people. Nay 3. If any statute shall be made against Magna Charta, (and so against Bishops provided for by Magna Charta, and confirmed by thirty two Acts of Parliament; or against any man's right without a trial according to Law; 
Ib. p. 62.  It is by Law declared null. 42. Ed. 3. ch. 1. But it seems Mr. Hickman is like Oliver Cromwell, whose foul-mouthed byword was wont to be, 
* See M. Prins Perfect Narrative, p. 58.  Magna Charta, Magna Farta. Nay 4. It is resolved in 
† Plowden. f. 388, 389. Cook. 8▪ Reports. f. 118. Hobards Reports. p. 85, 86, 87. apud eundem. p. 34.  Law Books, that if an Act of Parliament refer to, or confirm a thing which is not, (as for a man to be a judge or witness in his own case,) or a thing that is misrecited, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, there the common Law shall control, and adjudge such an Act to be merely void. Now we who were of the Dispersion through the Avarice and Revenge of the cruel Visitors, did find those Visitors in very great part, at once our judges, our juries, our Executioners, and our Heirs. Had they dealt sincerely with us, and bid us plainly leave our Fellowships, because they had Sons, and Nephews, or other good friends to be cared for, (as the Fox was sincere, when he bid the Cock come down from the Tree, alleging this reason, that he was hungry,) I should not have used them as now I do, though I use them better than they did me. But their pretending to Reformation, and justice too, did make their sin exceeding sinful. 5. The Broad Seal which he speaks of is called by Judge jenkin's, 
* p 35.  a Counterfeit Seal. And the Counterfeiting of that he 
† p 37-& 45.  proves High Treason. Last of all I will add, that we were taught in our Catechism, by our common mother the Church of England, that we are bound by God in the fifth Commandment, to honour and obey (not the two Houses, but) the King, not the two Houses and the King, but the King and his ministers. Saint Peter accordingly commanding us to Submit ourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lords sake, instructs us to do it to the King as 
* 1 Pet. 2.31.  Supreme, and unto Governors as sent by him. Now were the Visitors really sent by him? Or were they not flatly sent against Him? Whether so, or so, Let it be judged by the Case of the University; the most material part of which shall now become my next Section.  
§. 88 The only question which is by these men proposed to every single person in the University, 
The case of the University of Oxford A.D. 1648. & The sad Dilemma all its members were put to, either to be perjured, or destroyed.  is, Whether we will submit to their Visitation, or to the power of Parliament (as they call it) in this Visitation.  
That without the Personal Consent of the King to this Commission, (as far as it respects the University in General, and us as members thereof) we cannot now submit to any Visitation, without incurring the guilt of manifold perjuries▪ In reference to our University oaths, we have long since given an Account by way of Plea to these men: That our particular Local, or Collegiate Statutes, (which define us particular Visitors in our particular Colleges) bind us (under the same most evident perjury) to submit to no other Visitation, but that which the Statutes of each have defined, hath been also the Plea of the Heads of our Colleges, in the name of their several Societies. And for this, and nothing but this, that is, (in plain words) because they have (with all civility to the two Houses, and to the persons sent by them) refused to incur that damning sin of perjury, (which hath already helped to bring such heavy judgements upon this Nation) the Governors of the University are displaced, and some imprisoned, and Master Reynolds a V●si or put into the office of Vicechancellor, and into the D●anary of Christ Church,) two places of the greatest dignity, and powe●) one of the greatest profit in the University. And in like manner the Heads of the Colleges, and the Prebendaries of Christ-church have many of them already fallen under the same punishments, (and the rest expect their turns) and several of the Visitors also are put into their places. And now the slaughter hastens to the door of every of the ancientest, or youngest Student, Fellow, Scholar, Commoner, or other member of the whole University, and the speed is so great, the pursuit so vehement, that four whole Colleges have been in one day summoned to appear before them, without any delay, to give positive Answer to this one Question, Whethey will submit, or n●. By this 'tis apparent to us, that as the state of things now stands, we have an easy, though unhappy choice proposed to us, viz. Whether we will prefer the preservation of our Estates, or of our Souls by admitting perjury or ruin. (And in the making of the choice God hath given the whole University such an uniform constancy, and contempt of the world, that we hear not of above three men that have considered their profit so much, as to yield this submission) And that it may be also apparent to all others, that this is the choice, I shall give you the plain words of our Oaths, by which we are withheld from submitting, that the Honourable Houses may judge, if they please, whether it be probable that conscience hath by us been hypocritically pretended to destroy ourselves, as it hath sometimes been made use of by others for their visible advantages. Thi● I shall set down first as far as our obligation is founded in our Oaths to the University, and then to our several Colleges.  
The Oath of the University to every man is this. 'tis jurabis te observaturum omnia Statuta, Libertates, Privilegia, & Co●suetudines istius universitatis. Thou shalt Swear to observe all the Statutes, Liberties, Privileges, and customs of this University. The Scholar answers, juro, I swear, and this he renews, and repeats as often as he takes any degree in the University. From hence we conclude, that for any man wilfully to betray any one of the Privileges, or Liberties (as well as to break the Statutes or customs of the University) can never be excused from the guilt and charge of downright Perjury; for which we must be banished the University, if ever we be called to account for it by any just power. And that one of our Privileges is, that we be visited by none but the King, or those that are sent by Him, as we are verily persuaded, so have we never heard ●f any other title, or pretention of any (which is thought even by our enemies to have any show of Ground in our Charters, or Customs against our Plea) save only that of the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Metropolitan; to which our Answer is so clear, and punctual, (viz. that in the vacancy of the Archbishops Sea, all power that can be thought to belong to him, must needs be acknowledged to devolve to the King the fountain of his power, and so the Archbishop having been long dead, this power of Visiting us (if any such belong to the Archbishop) must now needs be only in the King) that we profess never to have heard of any word of satisfaction that hath been offered to this enforcement of our Plea, but are rather told that the Commission for this Visitation coming under the name of our Sovereign Lord Charles, etc. is a Commission issued out by the King; which as it seems to us an acknowledgement of the truth of all our pretensions; so is it the imposing upon us the belief of that which we know to be otherwise, having certain knowledge that the King never consented to the issuing of this Commission, and so having no excuse of ignorance, in case we should yield submission to that Visitation (as proceeding from him) which is acknowledged by all to involve us in Perjury, if it come not from him. To this we may add one obligation more, that as 'tis one of the Universities Privileges to be exempt (without all controversy as long as the Archbishops Sea is vacant) from all power but that of the King, so 'tis one of the King's Privileges and preeminencies to have this full, and (at this time) sole power over us. And then that branch of the Oath of Supremacy that obligeth all Subjects in these express words, [to assist, and defend to our power all Privileges, and Preeminencies, and Authorities granted, and belonging to the King's Majesty, or annexed to the Imperial Crown of this Kingdom] doth certainly bind us to defend this, as far as it is in our power to do it.  
For the obligations of College Statutes which name us particular Visitors, and exclude all others from that employment, I shall shorten your trouble, and yet not fail in giving you, and all men a perfect satisfaction, by setting down a few plain words out of some of them. In the Statutes of New Coll. Magdalen Coll. Corpus Christi, and St. John's (in each of these without any considerable alteration) these are the words; Statuimus, ordinamus, & volumus, ut liceat Duo Episc: Winton: Dioc: qui pro tempore fuerit, & nulli alii, nec aliis, etc. per se, vel suum Commissarium specialem, quem duxerit deputandum (praeterquam per Cancellarium Vniversitatis, seu ejus Commissarium generalem, seu procuratores Univers. Oxon. etc. ac praeterquam Custodem, aut aliquam personam nostri Collegii, aut alios quoscunque in Vniversitate per unam quind●nam anno proximo cum visitationem praecedente Students, etc. per quos, aut ipsorum aliquem haec nolumus qu●m●dolibet exerceri) ad Collegii hujus visitationem liberè accedere, & Custodem ac alios singulos socios, etc. nostri Collegii in Sacellum ejusdem convocare.  
From whence these few things are distinctly concluded by the Statutes of those Colleges. 1. That the Bishop of Winchester by himself, or some body deputed by him is the only lawful visitor of those Colleges; and all other person or persons in direct words (nec alii nec aliis, & praeterea nemini) are excluded by the Statutes. 2. That it is not lawful for the Bishop himself to depute any of those persons which are there excepted, viz. the Chancellor or Vicechancellor, or Proctors of the University, the Warden or Precedent, or any person of the said Colleges, or any Student in the University, that hath been commorant there fifteen days in the year preceding the Visitation; by which exception all th●se men, which have lately been the only actors in this business (having now resided ('tis to be supposed studied) here for some time, and now one named, and by them reputed to be Vice chancellor, others to be Governors of particular Colleges) are made utterly uncapable of that employment. I shall not need to mention any more, it being clear that these men are not deputed by that Bishop, and as clear, that if they were deputed by him, they are not qualified according to the Statutes, but expressly excluded by them. Now what is thus ordained by those statutes, every member admitted into those Colleges, is by Oath obliged to observe, and not only involved in perjury if he do not, but where other penalties are not named (as in this matter there are not) is liable to the pain of perjury, that is, deprivation of all benefits of his College; which is now become the punishment of none but those who will observe them.  
Besides these Oaths which particularly and directly look to the grand ma●ter of the Visitation, There be many other branches of our Oaths Academical, and Collegiate, which are most nearly concerned in the present transactions. The Statutes of the University, to the observing of which our oaths distinctly bind us, prescribe the manner of Election of Proctors, (of calling and meeting in Convocations, etc.) And therefore whensoever Proctors have been removed by the KING, the University Statutes have taken place in appointing the Successors; and those (as the Vicechancellor also) are obliged to take Oaths, for the discharge of their places according to statute. But all is now done directly contrary to all this. And therefore herein no sworn member of the University can think fit, without professing despite to Conscience or reputation, to join with them. And so in particular Colleges, the Statutes are punctual, that after the departure or a motion of any Governor, the Fellows must proceed within such a time to the election of a new, and he and none but he shall be reputed Warden, President, etc. who shall be chosen by a major part of the Electours. And then he that is chosen must take several Oaths particularly to govern according to Statute, before any of the muniments of the College may be delivered up to him, or before he enter upon the Government, to act any thing in it. And this is established by several positive statutes, to the observing of which, all members of Colleges are precisely sworn. And it is evident and acknowledged that no man can be made Dean or Prebendary of Christ's Church (nor ever was since the foundation of the Church) but by the KING'S personal consent, and nomination under the Privy Seal, and Broad Seal, by which he is installed; And to him that is thus possessed of that Deanary, every Student of that Church is by plain words of the Oath of his admission, bound to perform due obedience etc. All which being now most clearly violated by not only Sequestering, but removing the former, and putting in new Governors by force, without Election, or taking of Oaths to the Colleges, it follows that no sworn member of any College can acknowledge any such Governors without wilful un-execusable Perjury. The only thing that hath yet been offered to us to answer the Force, and urgence of all this Plea (and at the presence of which, all mention of our Oaths must vanish presently) is the pretended Sovereign power of the two Houses to make and abolish Laws and Obligations; which having interposed here, is consequently said to quit us of all these engagements, which formerly lay upon us. But this is so far from removing our scruples, that it is itself a scruple much more hard to us to digest, than the former. For by our having taken the Oath of Supremacy, we have acknowledged that to be only in the KING; and by our education in this Kingdom, have been brought up in a firm belief (grounded on the known Laws and Customs thereof) that the power of enacting, and repealing of Laws belongs not to the two Houses exclusively, but to the KING ' with the consent of the two Houses; and we do now profess, never to have heard any thing to the contrary, before these times: nor since these times, sufficient to alter our judgements in this particular. And therefore whatsoever question be made of this truth by other men, yet we, whose hearts assure us, that we make no question of it (and consequently acknowledge, that we do not yet conceive ourselves to be freed from any one branch of any of these Oaths) cannot imagine what colour it is possible for the Tempter to put upon this required submission, by which to persuade us, that it might be reconcileable with a good Conscience now, or with any degree of excuse to God or men, or of quiet and tranquillity within our own breasts at the hour of death, in case we should, on such terms as these, submit to this Visitation. And as I think I might safely appeal to any Divine in the world as to a Confessor, or Casuist for the stating of this Question, Whether it were lawful for us to submit, supposing our many Oaths confestly bound us to the contrary, and that we are verily persuaded, that those Oaths are in full force upon us, and as confident that the two Houses could not dispense with them, nor take off the obligingness of them; So would I likewise appeal to any man living that ever pretended to assert either the Liberty of Conscience, or propriety of goods, Whether we ought in this case to be turned out of our free hold, to the utter undoing of so great a multitude for no other crime but this of not submitting, when that is nothing else but the following the dictates of our Consciences informed and regulated by the known Laws of the Land. Having given you this short view of our state, which (as 'tis told us assuredly by the Visitours) is suddenly to bring a perfect vastation on this University, I cannot but think it my duty to the public (which is now so disabled from meeting in a body, that it cannot make any formal address to you) to lay this representation before you, and to desire by your assistance it may yet be resumed into consideration, Whether it will be for the honour of Christian Religion, or of the Protestant Profession, that our bare demurring or refusing to submit ourselves to the grossest and most unquestioned perjuries, should be voted by your Committee to be an high contempt of Authority of Parliament, and such punishments assigned thereto, which if inflicted impartially, must necessarily leave no one Scholar of what quality soever in this University (which is of age to have taken Oaths of admission to the University, or to any particular College) which shall not appear to all men avowedly and confestly perjured and liable to all the shame and penalty, that by Law belongs to that crime, whensoever any man shall be willing to prosecute it against him. We hope this representation may produce some other counsels; if not, we shall most cheerfully perish in our integrity.  
To conclude. 1. That as many Earls and Barons as could stand about the King's Throne, at his Coronation, did lay their hands on the Crown on his Royal Head, protesting to spend their blood to maintain it to Him and his lawful Heirs. 2. That those Lords were cast out of their House by the Commons, as they had joined with the Commons to cast out the King; 3. That the Bishops were acknowledged to be one of the Three States, even by those very Houses which cast them out; 4. That Both the houses, without the King, had but a disputable Authority, even with some of their own Minions; 5. That the Oxford Visitation, was null and void; Doctor Heylin hath proved to Master Fuller in his Examen Historicum, pag. 203.251.264.265. etc.  
§. 89. Having now dismissed those weighty subjects, 
A transition to the descovery of his no skill in Logic.  in which it concerns every person to be sufficiently instructed, I am arrived at that part of the Filcher's Volume, wherein he comes to the Quaestion, concerning the positive Entity of sin. Of which whatsoever the man hath said, (whether out of Mr. Barlow, or Doctor Baron,) I have considered at large in the 6. Chapters of my Book, to which I have added this long Appendix. Yet because there are still some things remaining, which though not to the purpose, may yet be usefully discovered, I will discover them as fully as shall be needful, and in as few words as can be shished.  

His insultation added to hide or bear up his ignorance.  90. I had said then an Accident is not the subject of an Accident, And that some Accidents are not separable from their subjects of Inhaesion, as Risibility from a man. Then which there are not two greater Truths, either more ordinarily known, or more generally granted amongst Logicians. But so profound was the Ignorance of Mr. Hickman, or so implacable his Rancour, and so incomparable his boldness, that he summoned all those who had any respect for Mag. Coll. to blush at my Ignorance in those particulars, which commonly Freshmen are wont to know, (pag. 51.) If here he spoke against his conscience (which is the likeliest of the two) I wonder how he durst do it, unless he hope that no Scholars would read his Book. But if it was his mere ignorance, which is not so likely, though it is possible, he then was destitute of skill even in Logic, which he last came from, as well as in Divinity, at which he is not yet arrived. And so it is hard for me to judge, whether the sinner or the Sciolist hath the greater share in him. Fo● mark the Judgement of Aristotle, as well as that of the Complutenses, and all the Thomists.  

Concerning the subject of an Accident. Collegium Compl. in Aristot. Dialect. Disp. 12. the substan. quaest. 5 p. 419, 420.  Haec est expressa Doctrina Aristotelis. (4 Metaphy●. Text. 14.) Accidenti non est accidens, nisi quia Ambo eidem accidunt. Estque receptissima inter Thomistas. Pro quâ videri possunt Ca●etan. 2. p q. 77. art. 2. A Soto in 4. dist. 10. quaest. 2. art. 2. Mas. Sanch. l. 5. quaest. 11. Bergom. in Concordantiis D. Thomae. dub. 20. & alii.  
Fundamentum est, quia omne Accidens definitur per proprium & immediatum subjectum cu● inhaeret. Sed semper definitur per substantiam▪ ut ex Aristotele patet. Ergo semper substantia pertinet ad proprium & immediatum subjectum Accidentis.  
Confirmatur primò: quia quaelibét forma, seu actus immediatè attingit propriam materiam, seu potentiam, ut patet inductione: said in propriâ materiâ, seu potentiâ a●cidentium semper includitur substantia, ergò semper accidentia immediatè attingunt substantiam. Probatur Minor: quià accidens dat propriae materiae esse secundum quid, ergò requirit, & supponit in illâ esse simplicitèr.  
Confirmatur secundò: quia ideò in sententiâ D. Thomae materia prima non est integrum & immediatum subjectum quantitatis, aut alterius accidentis (& idem est de formis materialibus) quià non habet propriam subsistentiam: sed nullum accidens habet propriam subsistentiam, ut patet; ergò nullum accidens potest esse subjectum integrum & immediatum alterius. Yet in a flat contradiction to all this Authority and Reason too, Master Hickman tells us that an Accident may be the immediate subject of Inhesion to an Accident. (p. 51.) As if he had never so much as tasted of Aristotle's Well, or hardly dipped into a system. For even thence he might have learned, that 'tis the propriety of substantia Quarto modo, to be the subject of Accidents.  
§. 91. Nay as if he had studied to talk exactly like an Idiot, 
Of subjectum ultimum, ●t ultimatum.  he presently adds that only substance can be the ultimate subject of an Accident (ibid.) whereas on the contrary it is held by all the world to be subjectum ultimum, not ultimatum, which an Accident may be by my good leave. So that either he was ignorant, how ultimum differs from ultimatum; or else he conceived that substance signifies an Accident; or else he was wholly of my opinion, even whilst he so much railed against it. When I said that an Accident is not subjectum Accidentis, I meant ultimum, (as all the world hath ever meant) not ultimatum, (as Master Hickman;) but mentioned neither, because 'twas needless. And so Master Hickman hath no excuse for disgracing himself in this public manner. Of one hundred Authors, I will convince him but with one, whom he pretends to admire, but (I am confident) never read.  

Crak●nth●rp de Accident p. 33.  Subjectum ultimum cui accidentia omnia inhaerent, quodque accidentia sustentat, est vel substantia illa quae est summum genus, vel aliqua species, aut individuum illius. Differentiae quidem substantiales, etiam & unum accidens potest esse alterius subjectum, sedut Logici vocant, ultimatum. (therefore Mr. Hickman is no Logician) Nunquam autem sunt accidentia aut esse possunt ultima accidentium subjecta, etc.  
Nay there are who are of opinion, (and 
* Hurtadus de Mendoz● Phys. Disp. 6. subs. 2. Greg. de Valent. 2. dist. 12. q. 2. art. 1. Marsilius' 4. q. 9 art. 2. ibid.  men of renown) that Accidens is neither subjectum quod, nor quo; not ultimum, nor ultimatum. That Quantity is no way receptive of Qualities, said in materia esse unam potentiam ad quantitatem, aliam verò distinctam ad qualitatem; in quâ potentiâ, & none in quantitate, Capreolus subjicit qualitates, saith Hurtadus; who professeth he is driven to this opinion:  
§. 92. To his denial that Risibility is an Inseparable Accident, 
Of an Inseparable Accident.  (which if a Freshman should deny, he would be hist out of the Schools) I shall not need say any more than this, That 'tis a quality and so an Accident; that 'tis Accidens proprium, and so 'tis accidens; That 'tis proprium quarto modo, and so inseparable. For omni, soli, semper & convertibiliter subjecto convenit. Master Hickman denies it to be an Accident Inseparable, because forsooth 'tis a propriety. As if he should say, it is not, because it is, and cannot possibly be otherwise. The cause of his miscarriage must needs be this, that he knows not the difference betwixt a praedicable and a predicament. Because Accidens and Proprium do make two predictables, he thinks that that which is proprium, (as Risibility) cannot therefore be Accidens; forgetting that accidens is divided into proprium, & commune, and so does make a twofold praedicable. Now let the Visitors consider what Reformation they have made, when a titular Fellow of a College and a titular Master of Arts is found not fit to be a tolerable Pupil, whilst he stands in need of such Logic Lectures. Is not Cicero a name, because it is a proper name? Or is not Mr. Hickman so much as a man, because he is not a learned man? no nor an animal, (by his reasoning) because not Animal irrationale. The blackness of a Crow he will grant to be an Inseparable accident, but not the Crow's crocitation; because the later is not less, but more inseparable than the former. I will not say, blush, but pity him all ye, that have any respect for Magdalen College.  
§. 93. He goes to prove that an Accident may be the subject of Inhesion to an Accident, 
Of the substantial faculties of the Soul.  because fides is either in Intellectu or in voluntate. (p. 51.) And thus he takes it for granted that these are accidents, which are known by all Scholars to be substantial faculties. Aristotle calls the Intellect a part of the soul. A part I say, not as if it had quantity, but secundum rationem, as he explains his own words. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Aristot. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. mihi p. 1416  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Ochamus, Gregorius Ariminensis, Gabriel Biel, 
By whom they are held to be its very essence.  Thomas Garbiu●, Bonaventura, Parisienses, & complures alii, (inquit 
* Berigardus. Circulo quinto de anima facult. sive potentiis.  Berigardus,) dicunt animae facultates esse ipsummet ejus essentiam, quae prout variis in organis obit varia munera, ipsa quoque diversis ●acultatum appellationibus nuncupatur.  
Ostendi, inquit Hurtadus, 
† Hurtadus de Mendozâ de Anima Disput. 4. Sect. 4.  Gratiam imitari Conceptus Naturae, ac propterea esse in substan●îa animae. Fides est in Intellectu, id est, in Animâ, ad efficiendos actus intelligendi: sub quo conceptu Anima est Intellectus. This comes home to Mr. Hickman's Instance. Nay Hurtadus is of opinion, that no vital faculty is accidental. Sed esse adaequatè idem vel cum animâ, si est spiritualis, vel cum toto composito, si materialis. Ita Greg. Arimin. Henr. Gandavensis, Gab. Biel, & universa Nominum schola quibuscum consentiunt 
* Pat. Conimbricense● 2. de Anima c. 3. q. 4 artic. 1. Durandu● 2. dist. 3. quaest 5.  non pauci.  
Saint 
† August. lib. de sp. & anima. c▪ 2. & 8.  Austin saith, that those Faculties are the Soul itself as existing in several parts of the body. And again, Anima est intellectus, Anima est m●moria, & Anima est voluntas. And again, 
* Tom. 9 Tr. 15. in Joh. apud Hu●t. ubi supra.  Intellectus non est aliquid aliud quam Anima; sed aliquid animae est Intellectus, quomodo non aliquid aliud quam caro est oculus, sed aliquid carnis est oculus, etc.  

† Bernardus in serm. 11. supra cantica apud eund. Stahlius reg. Philos. Tit. 16 de Regulis subjecti & accidentis.  In animâ Tria intueor, Rationem, Memoriam & Voluntatem, & haec Tria eandem esse animam.  
N●c dissentit Scotus cum suâ scholâ, quem adducit Pat. Valentia pro eadem sententiâ, (inquit Hurtadus.)  
Videtur ea sententia, quod facultates animae sint secundum Rem ipsa substantia Animae, alterâ longè proba●ilior.  
'Tis true that some Confuted men are of another mind, but they 
** Hurt. de Mend. ubi supra.  confess that their opinion cannot easily be proved and (as I said before) they are 
** Hurt. de Mend. ubi supra.  confuted. However, for their sakes, (though 'tis likely Mr. Hickman doth not know with whom he errs) I hold our Malefactor the more excusable.  
§. 94. But he is utterly unexcusable, when he saith that sin is not acknowledged by any to be Complexum Quid, 
Of his granting what he denies whilst he denies it, and giving up the whole cause.  except by Complexum, we mean Complexum ex genere & Differentiâ. p. 53.] For first that '●is complexum quid, is so acknowledged by all, (by Doctor Sanderson in particular who is himself a great many) that till I heard of one Mr. Hickman, I heard of no man, that e'er denied it. Next he affirms what he denies, by saying it is complexum ex genere & differentiâ; more than which, he could not possibly have said for my advantage. For first Mr. Hickman is but Animal rationale, if we grant him the most that he can desire. And what is Animal Rationale, but only genus & differentia? Next he clearly here confesseth the positive entity of sin; (though 'twas more than he knew, until I told him,) For every good Definition must be ex genere & Differentiâ. And every thing must be considered as under some species when so defined. And 'twill be granted by all the world, that all the species in the world must needs imply their individuals to be positive Entities. Which whensoever we say of sins, we must needs understand it of Individuals. Such as Murder, Adultery, Pride, and Filching. And, any otherwise understood, then as an Individual man, Mr. Hickman himself hath no positive entity. And yet he is not a sin, but only a very great sinner.  
O the praevalence of Truth over the Advocate of Error! For as 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Philo Judaeus pag. 499-  Balaam was overruled to bless that people, against which he intended to pour out Curses; so whilst our Rhapsodist endeavours to plead for error, the 
* Compare this Section with his Ten Conf●ssions. For which look back on ch. 3. Sect. 28. p. 52, 53, 54.  truth drops out at his Finger's ends.   


A POSTSCRIPT Touching some late Dealings OF Master Baxter.   

A POSTSCRIPT Touching Mr. Baxter, condemned out of his own Works, and proved excellently scandalous in Life and Doctrine.  
§ 1. HAving concluded with Mr. Hickman, 
The Synagogue of the Libertines  I should gladly have ended my Readers Trouble, but that I find Mr. Baxter hath dealt with Me, and my Writings, as the Synagogue of the Libertines once dealt with Stephen, and his Oration; when having nothing to Answer in the Defense of their Rebellion, or for their Murder of Gods Anointed which 
a Acts. 6.9.  Stephen had laid unto their charge, they were so 
b Acts 7▪ 54.  cut to the heart, (as S. Luke tells us the story) that they gnashed upon him with their Teeth. But finding him still to use the Liberty of his Tongue, they were transported with greater Fury; and so impatient of his words, that 
c Verse 57  that they stopped their ears, and ran upon him with open mouth: and (with violent hands) disputing him out of the City, they flung their arguments at his head; Arguments as hard as the hardest 
d Verse 58.  stones, that He might not fail of a Confutation.  
§ 2. That Mr. Baxter is near of kin unto the Synagogue of the Libertines, 
Fitly applied to Mr. Baxter.  I have 
e See the New Discoverer Discovered. Ch. 3. Sect. 1. p. 61, 62, 63, 64. where Mr. Baxter's words and pages are set at large.  evinced out of his writings in my New Discoverer Discovered. Where I have showed in what degree he hath strengthened the hands of Evil Doers, and encouraged the people in all the Villainies to be named; even by striving to persuade them (with all the Artifice he could use) that if a man be once Regenerate, Sanctified, or Godly, it is not Murder, or Adultery, or Drunkenness, or Incest, or Idolatry, or Perjury, or the denying of Christ himself, that can make him otherwise then a sanctified and Godly man. Now Mr. Baxter (it seems) resolving not to Answer my Book, and yet not able to let it alone, hath rather chosen (once or twice) to gnash upon me with his teeth, and to show he was cut unto the heart, and to fling some stones (Railing and Calumny) at my Head, than to be thought by his Disciples to have offended, or so little stomachful as to Repent.  

His railing on K James and Bp. Bancroft.  § 3. For first in his Pamphlet of Self-denial, (a 
f 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is derived fr●m 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And is used by Atheneus [lib. 18.] for an Incendiary, a Boute-few, a setter of things into combustion.  Pamphlet properly so called) he saith [a Rogers, a Stubb, a Pierce,] not for any other end (that I am able to conceive) then to give himself Ease by a little vent. To express a sharp Writer 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by [a Rogers, a Stubb, a Pierce] can amount to no more than the bare showing of his Teeth, when besides his own Lip, there is nothing Bitten. From this he could not abstain in his very Dedicatory Epistle, (p. 11.) Nor waded he farther into his preface then p. 17. when another sharp pang did thus inspire him. [If Fits-Simon, and other Jesuits, and Bp. Bancroft, and Dr. Peter Heylin, Mr. Thomas Pierce, and other such among us are to be believed, what an abominable odious sort of people are they (the Puritans) and especially the Presbyterians, who are (the greatest part of them) intolerable, hypocritical, bloody men.] Now to what purpose was all this, (not so much against Me, whom he ranked with Bishop Bancroft, as against that excellent Archbishop, whom he ranked with the Jesuits) but to discover to all the world whereabouts his shoe wringed him? Archbishop Bancroft was a most wise, and a most pious Metropolitan; whose learned Books have been railed at but never answered. Certainly He, and Dr. Heylin are as eminent for the Truth of their several Narratives, as any humane Historians that ever writ. I have vindicated the Former, beyond the power of a Baxter to contradict me. The Later hath vindicated Himself in his Certamen Epistolare; by which Mr. Baxter was too much baffled, to think of making a Reply. Fitz-Simons was a jesuit, with whom Mr. Baxter doth too much cotton. Nor doth he answer one word to my 
New Discov. Discov. ch. 5. p. 98, 99  Allegations. Concerning the Puritans I spent a whole Chapter, (not a Line of which hath ever been answered by Mr. Baxter) wherein I showed they were as Odious to King james, and Bp. Andrews, Dr. Sanderson, and the like, as to Arch-Bp. Bancroft, or Mr. Pierce. And whatsoever he saith of Me, for speaking severely of the Puritans, doth plainly reflect upon the King, and upon all the greatest Persons, both for piety and learning, Archbishops and Bishops, and Reverend judges of the Land, whose pungent Characters of the Puritans I fairly 
Ibid. from p. 1●3. ●● p. 117.  cited.  
§ 4. But suppose Bp. Bancroft, and Dr. Heylin, 
On Bp Andrews and Dr. Sande●son for their justice to the Puritans.  and Mr. Pierce are three Jesuits, (or as little deserving to be believed, yet Dr. Sanderson is confessed by Mr. Baxter himself, to be both a Moderate and learned Protestant. And He hath so preached against the Puritans (as well from the Press, as from the Pulpit, that I cannot think of any person (unless King james, or Bp. Andrews, 
See that Preface of Dr. Sanderson, Sect. 17, a●d 18. ) who hath branded that Faction with deeper marks. Not only in his Preface to the Second Edition of his Sermons, where he placeth us in the middle betwixt the two extremes, Papists and Puritans and shows how the Puritans have extremely promoted the Popish Interests, nay how 
i See the Reverend Dr. Hammond his pacific Discourse, etc. p. 8. l. ult.  Libertinism itself had overspread the whole Face of the Land, by the means of Fiery Turbulent Presbyterians; But in the latest of all his writings, (set out indeed by Dr. Hammond, yet with his own special liking and Approbation,) He sharply speaks of some books against the Liturgy and Ceremonies, by giving them the Name of Puritanical Pamphlets with a juster Epithet than which he could not easily stigmatize them: And the most Learned King james (in his Meditations on the Lord's Prayer) doth piously give a special caveat, that we do not make God the Author of sin, as certain 
k Cavendum ne cum Pur●tanis ●uibusdam Deum faciamus Autorem pecca●i. vid. epis●. Ded. Dan. Tilen. pref. Notis su●s in Canon. Synod Dordr.  Puritans are wont to do. Of this his Majesty was minded by that Acute and Learned Frenchman Daniel Tilenus in his excellent Epistle to that wise King, after their happy valediction to the Calvinian Doctrines. Those I hope were no Jesuits Fellows, and may deserve to be Believed, if they affirmed of the Puritans (which Mr. Baxter happily confesseth to have been mostly Presbyterians,) that they were Hypocritical and Bloody men. Only here Mr. Baxter must be taught to distinguish of Presbyterians. For with them that are Moderate I have ever had communion and very affectionate commerce, (as many of them can witness for me) But I am ready to consent to what I find said by Dr. Sanderson, [
l See the last page of the most learned Dr. sanderson's most incomparable preface.  Such is the Obstinacy and Madness of the Rigid, Scotized, through-paced Presbyterians, that it is vain to think of doing any good upon them by Arguments, till it shall please God to make them of more humble and Teachable Spirits.] These are pungent but very True, yea very Necessary expressions. They could not else have proceeded from that Exemplary Divine, whom hardly any hath ever excelled (if we behold him in his latest and wipest years) for Piety, Meekness, and Moderation. Had Baxter railed at Me alone for my impartiality to the Puritans, I might have passed it over in peace and silence. But since 'tis apparent he wreaks his malice upon the Reverend Dr. Sanderson and the Right Reverend Bp. Andrews, and all the other great persons whose words I used, (striking really at Them, although through Me, as Darius (in Horodotus) was bid to run at Patizitham 
m 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Herodot. in Thalia. c 78. p. 194.  through Gobrias sides) I could not in Conscience let him escape without some useful Animadversions.  
§ 5. He adds in the Margin of the same page, [That I had answered his Expectation, 
His Confession of his own wickedness again confessed by himself▪ ●hough but in p●rt.  and from his own Confession, (not knowing him myself) had drawn his picture, that he is proud, lazy, false, an Hypocrite, unjust, etc.] But why for this am I called Bolsec, in the words nex● after, since I was only his Echo, and did but resound his own Confessions? Not his Auricular confessions, (for he had made none to me,) but his Confessions even in print, and in words at length. Mr. Owen had framed a charge against him, that he was proud, selfish, and Hypocritical; Mr. Baxter sub dio (in open Court) pleaded Guilty to the indictment. It was not certainly my Fault, that I cited his Pages as well as Words, that all his favourers might find I had neverwronged him. Nor could I possibly know him better, then by an abundance of his Own both words and works. Of which how faithful an account I have given the Reader, I leave to be judged of by them, who will compare my citations, as well as read them. Never should I have taxed him either with pride, selfishness and Hypocrisy; but when he had owned all three, I had nothing to do to contradict him▪ I could never have thought him lazy, (whom I found a Polypragmatick) nor so faulty in the discharge of his pastoral Office as he professed himself to be, if he had not avowed it in very plain English, both in his sheet against the Quakers, and in his Saints everlasting Rest. From both I cited his words and pages. And lastly for his injustice, in usurping the Right of Mr. Dance, I never so much as heard of it, until he told me. Nor was it without his own entreaty, that I demonstrated to him his great Injustice. Let his Followers but consider my whole Chapter of Sequestrations, and I shall hope they will be wary how they are led by his example. Nay in his Postscript to his True Catholic, he makes an open Confession of one part of his Confession, though not of All. He saith He is aware of Hypocrisy within him. p. 315. And Hypocrysy (as I take it) must needs denominate an Hypocrite, after the measure that Hypocrisy doth dwell within him. 
His prodigious falsifying of Common Prayers.   
§ 6. But he 
a Postscrip. at the end of his True Catholic p▪ 315.  saith, he may have my own Consent to tell the world, that there is no truth in me. ibid.] See the desperate wickedness of this Pretender to Reformation, without so much as any colour of Common Honesty. For when, and where did I consent that he should tell the world so gross a Falsehood? And yet he saith, he doth perceive he may have my consent to rail and slander. But how doth he perceive it? Is it by any thing he hath read in all my writings? Or by any kind of Message which I had sent him? No, he contents himself to say, [It is my ordinary Confession in the Book of Common prayer, ibid.] Does this Professor believe there is a God, or a Devil? A Heaven, or a Hell? Or (believing all four) does he conclude he is Regenerate, and cannot cease to be such by any Sin to be imagined? Were it not for This or That he could not wilfully publish so le●d a Fiction. For first, in all the Common prayer there are not any such words. Next, I might use the Common prayer, and yet not All. Thirdly, the words that are likest to it, are expressly taken out of S. john, and are only Hypothetical. If we say that we have no sin we deceive ourselves, and there is no Truth in us. (1 John 1.8. Insomuch that Mr. Baxter is just as bad as that Fellow, (of whom King james doth somewhere speak in his Basilicon Doron) who sought to prove out of the Psalmist, There is no God, because it is said by the Prophet David, The fool hath said in his heart there is no God. Nay fourthly, we are only commanded to use some One of those many Sentences in the Beginning of the Liturgy; which a man may do for many years, without so much as once repeating what Mr. Baxter doth seem to allude unto. And 'tis more than he knows, if ever I once used it in all my Life. But fifthly, let us suppose there were indeed such a Confession categorically made in the Common prayer. Mr. Baxter is old enough to have known (what Mr. Hooker and others might have taught him, having not read it in S. Jerome, a Latin Father,) That the Priest, in public prayer, is the Mouth of the people unto God; as he is, in public preaching, God's Mouth unto the people· And so Confession is to be made in such General Terms, as may well become the Congregation. To which as the Priest doth address himself with a [Dearly beloved Brethren] so doth he beseech them (in the Conclusion) to keep him Company in the Devotion, saying after him what he speaks, with a pure heart, and humble voice. But it seems Mr. Baxter cares not what he 
b jude 13.  foams out, although it be his own shame, if he may ease himself for a time by aspersing the person with whom he deals.  
§ 7. Having confessed again in print his printed Confession of his Hypocrisy, 
His denial of that Confession which h● confessed a little before.  (p. 315.) He yet professeth he is so far from proclaiming himself an Hypocrite, that he will imitate Job in holding fast his integrity. p. 318.] 1. It seems he either understands not the rule of Conjugates, and believes he hath the privilege to keep his Hypocrisy, without the danger of being an Hypocrite; or else when he came to p. 318. he forgot what he had said, p. 315. or else he thinks, that to publish his Sins in print, is nothing near so much as to proclaim them; or else he is desperate, and careless, what becomes of his reputation; or else he thinks it no Disrepute, to print such shameful Self-Contradictions. 2. After public Convictions of his Pride and selfishness, Hypocrisy and Impatience, (for he somewhere also confesseth he is of a pettish Disposition, as I have somewhere showed in my New Discoverer Discovered,) He talks of imitating job in holding fast his Integrity. Mr. Dance his Living cannot be called his Intrgrity, which yet alone is the Thing that he hath ever held fast since first he held it. As for Loyalty, and Obedience, Professions, and Principles, Oaths, and Covenants, Those are things he hath played with at Fast and Loose. Which I proceed to make apparent by these following Degrees.  
§ 8. First he hath printed a Confession. 
His perjury and Rebellion proved out of his own words. See his holy Commonwealth Pr●f. p▪ ●▪  [That our old Constitution was King, Lords, and Commons, which we were Sworn, and Sworn, and Sworn again to be faithful to, and to defend.] These are all his own words in his preface directed to the Army, 1659.  
Next he hath printed a Confession, That after several changes of Government, 
Ibid. p. 10.  [we had a Protector governing according to an Instrument, made by God knows who. After this we had a Protector governing to the humble petition and Advice, and sworn to both.]  
Thirdly, he printed a Confession, that his Protectors came not in till after these four changes, (which I pray the Reader to observe, that thou mayest see in the Conclusion how the Hocus of Kiderminster hath juggled with God, and his own Conscience, and how his juggling is brought to Light by his own Discovery.) 
Ibid. p. 9 ●nd 10.  1. The King withdrawing, (mark his words) the Lords and Commons ruled alone. 2. Next this, we had the minor part of the House of Commons in the exercise of the Sovereign power,- Regality and a House of Lords being cast off. 3. Next this we had nothing visible but a General and an Army. 4. Next this, we had All the whole Constitution and Liberties of the Commonwealth at once subverted: Certain men being called by the NAME of a Parliament, and the Sovereign power pretended to be given them, and exercised by them, that never were chosen by the people, but by we know not whom. Such a fact (he confesseth) as never King was guilty of since Parliaments were known. 5. & 6. There came a Protector, and a Protector, of whom I noted his Confession in my second Observation.  

His playing at fast and loose with his Integrity.  Having praemised these Confessions, which prove the Titular Protectors to have been the greatest of all USURPERS and so the guiltiest Malefactors in all the Kingdom; Let us consider Mr. Baxter in the holding fast of his Integrity of which he boasteth. Let us observe how he defended, and was faithful to the King, Lords and Commons, to which he was Sworn, and Sworn, and Sworn again, by his Confession. Alluding I suppose to those three Oaths; that of Allegiance, that of Supremacy, that of the Scotish and English Covenant. Wherein He Swore to be faithful and obedient to his Majesty's person and posterity, to assert and defend them with the utmost of his power, that is to say, with Life and Fortune. He swore the two first with one hand upon the Bible, the third with hands lifted up to the most high God. After which I cannot tell whether he entered into the Engagement to be true and Faithful to that which followed without the King and house of Lords; but that he did as bad or worse, I shall prove out of his writings by what now follows.  
§ 10. First he dedicates a book to Protector Richard, wherein he plays the Parasitaster in a most loathsome manner. The style in which he directs his Flattery, 
His tim● serving and fawring upon his Sovereign Richard.  is To his Highness Richard Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland and Ireland. After which he begins to cog with the man in these words. 
a Five Dispu●. of Church Gou. and worship Epist. Dedic. per totam.  These papers are Ambitious of Accompanying those against popery into your Highness' presence, for the tender of their service.— I observe the Nation generally rejoiceth in your peaceable entrance upon the Government.— Many are persuaded you have been strangely kept from participating in any of our late bloody contentions, that God might make you an Healer of our Breaches, and employ you in that Temple-work, which David himself might not be honoured with.— This would be the way to lift you highest in the esteem and love of all your People, and make them see that you are 
b Ma●k how this suits with the Assemblies Confess. of faith that all things whatsoever are ordained by God.  appointed by God to be an Healer and Restorer, and to glory in you, and to bless God for you as the instrument of our chiefest good.— My earnest prayers for your Highness shall be,— that you may rule us as one that is Ruled by God. That you may always remember you are Christ's, and your Peoples, and not your own. Your zeal for God will kindle in your Subjects a zeal for you. 
c Compare this with his Confession, that was no Parliament, which yet had a better pretence then Richard.  Parliaments, Ministers will heartily pray for you, and praise the Lord for his mercies by you, and Teach all the people to love, honour and obey you. I crave your Highness favourable acceptance of the tendered service of a Faithful Subject to your Highness— Richard Baxter.  
In another Epistle to the same Richard, to whom he dedicates another book, 
Hi● rejoicing in our late miseries etc.  he fawns and wags the tail, and catches at favour by these expressions. 
d Key for C●tholick● Epist. De. per totam.  You have your government, and we our lives, because the Papists are not strong enough. Pope Pius V. in his Bull against our Queen Elizabeth, saith, we will and command that the Subjects take up Arms against that Haereticall and Excommunicated Queen. Whether such 
e Note the Presbyterian agreement with the Pope in excommunicating Kings K. Charl●s might be fought against, but Mr. Richard must not.  Opinions as these should by us be uncontradicted, or by you be suffered to be taught your Subjects, is easy to discern.— We desire you that you would not advance us to temporal honours, or dignities, or power, nor make us Lord Bishops, nor to abound with the Riches of this World: these things agree not with our calling.— Give not leave to every Seducer to do his worst to damn men's Souls, when you will not tolerate every Tratior to draw your Armies or People into Rebellion. If you ask who it is that presumeth thus to be your Monitor, It is one that Rejoiceth in the present happiness of England, and earnestly wisheth that it were but as well with the rest of the world: and that honoureth all the 
f Note his cha●ging upon God all the Villainies of the times.  providences of God by which we have been brought to what we are, and he is one that concurring in the common hopes of greater blessings yet to these Nations under your Government, was encouraged to do what you daily allow your preachers to do, and to concur with the Rest in the Tenders (and some performance) of his service.— That God will make you a healer and preserver of his Churches here at home, and a successful helper to his Churches abroad, is the Earnest prayers of your Highness faithful Subject Richard Baxter. 
His Flattering mentions of old Oliver, as tenderly careful of Christ's c●u●e.   
After this in a Third Epistle, directed to the Army, He calls the powers that were last laid by (meaning either Richard, or the Corrupt minority of the Garbled House, but I rather suppose the Former) 
g Ded●c. epist. or pref. before his Holy Commonwealth p. 6  The best governnours in all the world that have the supremacy, whom to resist or depose is forbidden to Subjects on pain of Damnation. In what respect he affirmeth those powers the best, he explains by 
h ibid.  Wisdom and holiness conjunct. And of the same he saith, 
i ibid. p. 8.  shall the best of Governors, the greatest of mercies seem intolerable? O how happy would the best of the Nations under heaven be, if they had the Rulers that our Ingratitude hath cast off! 
k ib. p. 25.  Again he tells them, his book was written, whilst the Lord Protector, prudently, piously, faithfully, to his immortal honour, did exercise the Government. Nay (speaking, I am sure, either of Richard or the Rump, but I think of Richard) he saith 
l ib p. 484.  he is bound to submit to the present Government, as set over us by God, and to obey, for conscience and to behave himself as a loyal Subject towards them. Nay his Reason for this is yet more monstrous; first partially to Richard, he saith [
m ibid.  A Full and Free Parliament hath owned it, and so there is notoriously the Consent of the People, which is the Evidence that some Princes had to justify the best Titles.] Next maliciously to the King, his only rightful Sovereign Lord, he saith, [
n bid.  That they who plead Inheritance and Law must fetch the Original from Consent.] Lastly that nothing might be wanting to speak him a timeserver in grain, He said to Richard concerning Oliver (the bloodiest Tyrant in all the World) 
o Epist. Ded. (before his Key for Cath) p. 8.  That the Serious endeavours of his Renowned Father for the Protestants of Savoy had won him more esteem in the hearts of many that fear the Lord, than all his Victories in themselves considered.] To which he added [We pray that you may INHERIT a tender Care of the Cause of Christ] plainly implying the Tyrant Oliver to have been Tenderly careful of the Cause of Christ, and so becoming by such Cajolrie a most eminent partaker in all his villainies▪ Yet this is the man that stands near 
p ibid. b. 17.  Eternity, (as he boasteth of himself and therefore unfaithful Man-pleasing would be to him a double crime.  
§ 11. 
His b●ing Accessary to the most parricidial act▪ the murde● of Gods Anointed.  Having praemised his fearful daubing with the titulary Protectors, whom he confessed to have Governed according to an instrument made by God knows who; and according to the humble petition and advice (made by all the world knows whom, to wit a most illegal and Criminal sort of Traitors, nicknamed a Parliament;) And with that having compared (though not so fully as I intent) his malicious disowning the Lords Anointed, whom he had sworn and sworn and sworn again to be faithful unto and to defend, (against all such usurpers as Oliver 
q See the preface to the Essay for the good Ol● Cause.  Ale-seller, and Richard were known to be) I shall now observe in how many respects, Mr. Baxter comes to be 
r 1 Tim. 5.22. Re●el 18.4.  partaker of other men's sins, besides the hideous and frightful nature of his Own. I mean the sins of both the nominal Protectors, and of that sort of men who had set them up. To which end it will be useful, briefly to reckon the several ways, whereby a man may be Accessary, when another is Principal in a transgression.  
1. By Consent and Approbation, so Saul was guilty of Stephen's death Act. 8.1. So the Gnostics were guilty of sins committed by other men, 
The s●ven ways of partaking in other men's sins:  because they had pleasure in those that did them. Rom. 1.32.  
2. By Counsel and advise, so Achitophel was guilty of Absalon's Incest and Rebellion, 2. Sam. 16.23. So also Caiphas had a hand in the blood of Christ, joh. 11.49.  
3. By Appointment and Command, so Pharaoh and Herod are said to have slain the little children they never touched. Exod. 1. and Matth. 2. So David is said to have slain Vriah the Hittite, though with the hand, as well as the Sword of the Children of Ammon. 2. Sam. 12.9.  
4. By Comm●nding, Defending, or Excusing the Fact or the Malefactor. Woe be to you that call evil Good, that put darkness for light, and bitter for sweet, Esa. 5.20. Woe be to them that sow pillows to all Armholes, and make Kerchiefs upon the head of every stature to hunt souls. Ezek. 13.18.  

Such were Mr. baxter's Pri●●es Oliver and R●chard.  5. By any kind of participation of any illgotten Goods, whether gotten by Rapine, or kept by fraud, and unjust Title. Of this saith the Psalmist, when thou saw'st a Thief thou consentedst with him, and hast been partaker with Adulterers. Psal. 50.18. Thy ˢ Princes are Rebellious and Companions of Thiefs; every one loveth gifts and followeth after Rewards. Isa. 1.23.  
6. By too much Lenity and Connivance, which harden's a sinner by Impunity. And therefore Ahab was threatened, for the unjust Mercy he showed to Benhadad, with a sentence of Death without Mercy; Because thou hast let go out of thy hand a Man whom I appointed to utter destruction, therefore thy life shall go for his life, and thy people for his people. 1. Kings 20.42. This was the sin that broke Eli's Neck. 1. Sam. 3.13. and 4.18. The Magistrate is made to be God's Revenger, to execute wrath upon him that doth evil. And he ought not to bear the sword in vain. Rom. 13.4.  
7. By unseasonable silence and Neglect of the Christian duty of reprehension. For this is a sin against those precepts, Levit. 19.17. Isa. 58. 1. Ezek. 3.17. and 33.7.  
Now by how many of these ways Mr. Baxter hath been Accessary to the Murder of One King, and to the exclusion of another, and to the debauching the people's souls by his scandalous writings and example, I leave to be pronounced by the Intelligent Readers. Who, that they may judge the more exactly, shall do well to compare his signal Confessions above recited, both with his flattering and blessing the Old and Young Cromwell, And with his other Confessions which now ensue.  
§. 12. 
H●s being an incendiary in the W●rr, and encouraging many thousands ●● rebel proved out of his confessions.  He confesseth he was moved to engage himself in the Parliament Warr (Holy Commonwealth, p. 456.) And yet 2. That the Disorders which on both sides were unexcusable, were no just cause to cast the Nation into a Warr. (p. 474.) Nay, 3. That he would have engaged as he did, (which was against his natural King and Liege Lord) if he had known the Parliament (he means the 2. Houses) had been the beginners, and in most fault. p. 480. Nay 4. that the war was not to procure a change of the constitution, to take down Royalty and the house of Lords, but clean contrary. p. 482. (why then did he fawn upon both the Cromwel's?) 5. That all of them did rush too eagerly into the heat of Divisions and war, and none of them did so much as they should have done to prevent it. And that himself in particular did speak much to 
t Though here he confesses he was a Cokblower and encouraged thousands to Rebel, yet he da●es not repent, p. 486.  blow the coals, for which he saith he daily begs forgiveness of the Lord. (p. 485.) Nay 6. That he encouraged many thousands to engage against the King's Army: And is under a 
u Mark the tenderness of his Conscien e first he sought against his King, & then considered if lawfully.  self-suspition whether that engagement was lawful, or not, yea that he will continue this self suspicion, (p. 486.) Nay 7. he confesseth what he is, by solemnly making this Declaration, That if any of us can prove he was guilty of hurt to the person of the King, or destruction of the King's power, or changing the Fundamental Constitution of the Commonwealth, taking down the house of Lords without consent of 
x Note that by one of the 3. estates he must mean the King or the Bishops  all three States, that had a part in the Sovereignty, etc. He will never gainsay us if we call him a most perfidious Rebel, and tell him he is guilty of far greater sin than Murder, Whoredom, Drunkenness, or such like. Or if we can solidly confute his grounds, he will thank us, and confess his sin to all the World. p. 490. Here than I challenge him to make good his promise. For I have proved him as guilty, as any Rebel can be imagined, in divers parts of this Postscript. And his grounds I have confuted in my Appendix for Mr. Hickman §. 78, 79. If he thinks not solidly, let him answer it if he is able.  

His Denying the supremacy of the King, which y●t he allowed the two Cromwell's, whereby he is proved by his Confession to be a R●bell.  §. 13. What his chief Ground is upon which he goes (whilst he speaks of the King as of a Rebel to the two Houses) I easily gather from these words, which I find in his preface 
x Note that by one of the 3. estates he must mean the King or the Bishops  to the same book. To this question [did not you resist the King?] His answer is Verbatim, thus 
y Pref. p. 23.  Prove that the King was the highest power in the time of divisions, and that he had power to make that war which he made, and I will offer my Head to justice as a Rebel.] He here implicitly confesseth, the King was once the highest power and implies he lost it by the Divisions. But that he never could lose it, and that demonstrably he had it, I have made it most evident in the Appendix of this book, which concerns Mr. Baxter as much as Mr. Hickman, at least as far as I have proved the Supremacy of the King (§ 78.) which both the Houses of that Parliament, did swear to acknowledge and to assert. However, if his Supremacy had been a Disputable thing, yet whilst the most learned of the Land, both judges and Divines did assert it in books which were never answered, Mr. Baxter should have stayed for the decision of that dispute, before he resisted that power, for the resisting of which (for aught he knew) he might be damned, Rom. 13.4. Besides when he knew 'twas no sin to abstain from fight against the King, and that fight against him was a damning sin, (if it was any) in the judgement of such persons as BP. Hall, BP. Morton, BP. Davenant, BP. Brownrigg, D. Sanderson, D. Oldsworth, & thousands more, he should have taken the safest course, and rather have strained at a Gnat, then have swallowed a Camel. In a word, That the war was begun by the two Houses, and only followed by the King in his most Necessary Defence, hath been proved too often to be excusably denied. And that our Law doth declare it to be high Treason, to seize the King's Ports, Forts, Magazine of war, to remove Counsellors by Arms, to Levy War, to alter the Law, to counterfeit the broad Seal, to adhere to any state within the Kingdom but the King's Majesty, to imprison the King until he agree to certain Demands. Unanswerably proved by the most excellent Judge jenkin's, from page 37. as far as page 77. That the power of the Militia and of making war is by Law in the King, yea that All Authority and jurisdiction Spiritual and Temporal is derived from the King, therefore none from the Houses, The same Judge hath evinced p. 20. and 8. and 13. I exhort Mr. Baxter to read the works of that Learned person, and either to baffle all that Law, and to confute that mighty Lawyer, or else to declare he hath been worse than either a Drunkard, or an Adulterer, and offer his head as a Rebel, according to his present promise. I would not exhort him to the later, but that I think it the way to obtain his pardon  
§. 14. Whilst he saith that his Protector was set over us by God, and owned also by a full and free Parliament (ibid. p. 484. lin. 2.) he does not only falsify against a known matter of fact, 
His being a Traitor to the Houses which he had set above the King, by setting Richard above them w●en they disowned him.  (All the considerable persons in the Land having been utterly against him) but he grossly gives the lie to the Secluded Members, (whom he had called the first s●rt of the best Governors in the Land,) and to both the Houses of that very Parliament with whom he engaged against the King. In stead of proving this at large (which is not fit for this Postscript) I will refer him to the perusal of Mr. pryn's True & perfect Narrative. And to The True State of the Secluded Members Case, in Vindication of themselves. From thence he may see how he hath Trespassed against them. Besides that a Parliament cannot be full, without the King (who is the Head) and House of Lords (who are the shoulders) never was any full Body made up of legs with an Addition of some other Inferior Members. 
And for owning Cromwell's Iu●to for a full and free parliament.  But Squire Cromwell was not the King, nor was the pack of Mechanics an House of Lords, nor is it less than high Treason, to set up either with those pretensions, yet this was done by Mr. Baxter; let him deny it if he is able. Again a Parliament cannot be Free, unless the Commoners are chosen by all the people who are qualified by law to give their suffrage. Whereas no loyal Man was allowed by Cromwell to give a voice at those Elections; and no honest Man could safely do it. For besides the danger of provoking a proud Usurper, Squire Cromwell had no more right to send out Writs for an Election of Parliament Men, than any Porter or Scavinger in all the Kingdom, Nay he had less rather than more, by being Son to so guilty and foul a Tyrant. Richard's Issuing out of writs was a most Treasonable Fact; And could that make a Parliament full or free, for which the maker by Law might be hanged at Tyburn? Let Mr. Baxter now consider in how many respects he is obnoxious; both to the wrath of God, for all his Perjuries and Time-serving; to the wrath of God's Anointed, (whose Restauration is not impossible, though somewhat remote from the eye of flesh) for all his Treasons, and 
* Note his ungodly Resolution to take that for granted, which was visibly false, (viz. that the King would have ruined the Representatives of the Nation, and its whole security (Holy Com. wealth, page 480. section 19)  slanders; To the wrath of the two Houses (before they were Garbled by the Army and Oliver Cromwell) by setting up, to their destruction, a pack of flattering Cromwellians, and affording them the name of a Full and Free Parliament. Lord! to what times are we reserved, when such a Creature may pass for a godly brother, and be entrusted with people's souls?  
§. 16. Whilst he saith [The old Constitution was King, 
He is evinced out of his mouth to have been perjured over and over▪  Lords, and Commons, which we were sworn, and sworn, and sworn again to be faithful to, and to defend, Praef. p. 9 he either implies there was since a new Constitution, and then he must show by whose Authority it was made, or else he must confess he spoke and acted against his conscience, when he clawed the Cromwell's and their Abettors, as hath been showed. And he must name by what power he could be absolved from his three oaths, or else acknowledge to all the world, he is a perjured, perjured, perjured person. For where was his Faithfulness to the King, (to which he was sworn, and sworn, and sworn,) when he confesseth he encouraged so many thousands to fight against him? and when he acknowledged Mr. Cromwell to be his Sovereign; And set over him by God too, who did but suffer and permit (that is, not hinder,) the Prince of Darkness to set him over us. (Is Mr. Baxter qualified for the Priesthood, being not able to distinguish betwixt Permission and approbation, sufferance and appointment, or betwixt God's patience, and the Activity of Satan?) How again did he defend the Lords and Commons of the Long Parliament (in conjunction with the King, or divided from him,) when he asserted Cromwel's juncto to be a full and free Parliament? yet he knows what it was, which he was sworn to defend.  

His charge against the Lords and Commons, and his setting aside the King more than the houses ever did.  §. 17. Whilst he saith [The King withdrawing, the Lords and Commons ruled alone, ibid.,] he first gives the lie to the Lords and Commons; who in their Addresses and Declarations did own the King to be their Sovereign, and called themselves his humble subjects, (Mr. Baxter himself could say no more to Mr. Cromwell) They protested against the thought of ever changing the Government, or lessening his Majesty's just Prerogative, but their Intention was to make him the greatest Prince in Christendom; They confessed that without him they might not Rule, and therefore used His Name to give countenance to their Actions. I could write a volume on this occasion, were it not fitter to refer unto several volumes already written. Let Mr. Baxter write less till he hath read more, and let him read the writings of the most learned Doctor Hammond, both against the Ordinance of the Lords and Commons for abolishing the Liturgy, and against taking up of Arms under colour of Religion against the lawful Magistrate. Let him read Judge jenkin's against Master Prin's first writings, and let him read the latter writings of Mr. Prin against himself; Let him read Mr. Diggs, and Doctor Langbane, The Regal Apology, the excellent observations upon Aristotle's Politics, and many more such books, then do occur to my memory whilst I am writing. Next in saying the King withdrew, he doth unreasonably imply the King's withdrawing from the Government; why else doth he add, the Lords and Commons ruled alone? which, as it is a most senseless and a most traitorous insinuation, so it seems to be the Reason why the man makes so ill use of Grotius, whom he doth either not understand, (as indeed Mr. Baxter is a very small Latinist, and not a small, but rather no Grecian,) or wilfully mistake, and most unpardonably misapply. As the Heretics have ever abused Scripture, not only beside, but against its meaning.  
§. 18. Whilst he adds of the Lords and Commons, 
His most Notable contradiction about the Houses ruling without the King.  [That though they ruled alone, They attempted not the change of the species of Government, ibid.] first he implies a contradiction; for he confessed the Constitution to have been King, Lords and Commons, which species of Government must needs be changed, if the two later do Rule alone or without the Former. Does Mr. Baxter think there is a Monarchy without a Monarch? Or, that the two Houses can make a Monarchy without a single person to Form and Head them? Or that it is no contradiction, to Rule alone, and not alone? Or does he mean that the Lords and commons did only intend to depose the King, and set up some other (Richard or Oliver,) in his stead, that so the species of Government might still remain? Or does he not know what species signifies? One of these five things must needs be the reason of his miscarriage; But which of the five, let him determine.  
§. 19 Whereas I had showed him his guilt, and folly, 
His new Miscarriage against Grotius and the Episcopal Divines  in accusing (not only Grotius, but) in general Terms our Episcopal Divines, and in particular Doctor Taylor, nay Bishop Pierce, and Bishop Wren, whereof not one (for aught he knows) is of Grotius his mind; He now so juggles with his Readers, as to alleviate the matter in two points, and grossly to falsify in a third, 1. He saith he did intimate, what he knows he expressed in broadest wise. 2. He saith he did intimate they were addicted to Popery▪ when he cannot but know he had called them Papists. 3. He saith he only spoke this of Grotius, and all that are of his mind, when he knows he spoke it of a multitude, whose minds he knows not. Nay I told him (what he confesseth) That the Prelatists are not agreeable to Grotius, in that for which he was most suspected; to wit, his thinking that the Bull of Pius Quintus may (for peace) be subscribed in a commodious sense. Yet could not Grotius have turned Papist, for all those Reasons which I rendered in my Defense of Grotius, to which Master Baxter doth here turn Tail▪ Neither acknowledging his guilt, (of which I am sure he is convinced) nor making a show that he is Innocent, unless he thinks it sufficient to beg the Question. To my great Number of Arguments, he hath not so much as brought one answer; to my great number of Answers (against his old Arguments) he hath not given so much as the least Reply; And lastly for his Forgeries or Falsifications of the Text, or his false translating▪ the words of Grotius, (whether weakly or wilfully let others judge) the man is left destitute of all Apology or Excuse.  

He is proved to be a Jesuit by as good Logic as he useth.  §. 20. But because he relents only by halves, and continues stomachful in affirming, that (if we are not quite given up to Popery) we are too much inclined, and addicted to it; I will a little be pleasant with him, and prove himself to be a papist (yea a jesuit if he will, 
* See my Appendix to New Disc. Disc. sect, 5. p. 170. to 174. ) by adding now a fifteenth Argument (to the number of fourteen which I had plied him with before; whereof not one is answered by him,) which at lest ad hominem will prove to be of sufficient force. He that espouseth and puts in practice the Jesuits Doctrine of Probability, must needs be a jesuit (and so a Papist) by Mr. Baxter's way of Argumentation; But Mr. Baxter hath done the former, for o●ght I am able to apprehend) and therefore he cannot but be the later, by his own way of Argumentation. The Jesuits Doctrine of Probability is most briefly expressed in these four Rules. I will set them down in my Authors own words.  
1. Lors qu'ily a differentes opinions probables sur quelque point, 
The Jesuits Doctrine of Probability. chez les provinciales. p. 73, 74.  Toutes les deux opinions sont egalement seures en conscience. Quamcunque duarum viarum primò diversarum homines inierint, rectà tendunt ad superos. Escobar. Theol. moral. Tom. 1. in prael. cap. 3.  
2. Il est permis de choisir l'opinion la m●ins probable & la moins seure.  
3. Une opinion est probable, lors qu'elle est appuyeè d'une raison ou d'une autoritè considerable & iln'est pa● necessaire, que ces deux conditions soient jointes ensemble, l'une ou l'autre suffi●ant. (Note that the former they call an Intrinsical, the later an extrinsical probability.)  
4. Selon le sentiment general des Casuists, une opinion est probable, & peut estre communement suivi sans crainte, lors qu'elle est soustenue pa● quatre Auteurs graves. Mais pleusiers enseignent que l'Autoritè d'un seul suffit.  
Now if Mr. Baxter did not believe, That an opinion is probable, when 'tis supported by a Reason without Authority, or by an Authority without a Reason; And that he may with a good conscience choose to follow which he pleaseth of two opinions, or both by turns, or (if he please) ●he less probable of the two; what could move him to publish so many contradictory Doctrines, as I have showed out of his writings? Or how could he hope for any pardon for so many contradictory actions, as I have cited out of his Life, and public practice? I will leave him to be examined by my New Discoverer Discovered, by several things in this Postscript, compared with the Rules above recited. If he shall say he was not guided by the Jesuits Doctrine, he will be found to be by so much the more Incapable of Excuse. For the more wilful a sinner is, he cannot choose but be the worse. And how extravagantly he argues that I am Popishly affected, because I have evidently proved that Grotius never turned Papist, Let him read (and ●lush) in my Appendix directed to him. §. 4. p, 167, 168.  
I am sure some of his Brethren are more like Popish than any Grotius, 
Popery common to Thom. Goodwin with some noted Presbyterians  or any English Prelatist within my knowledge. For Thomas Goodwin anointed a sick Gentlewoman with oyie. And in the Church at Arnh●im (where Mr. Archer himself was a kind of Pastor) Anointing the sick with oil was a standing ordinance for the Church members. And upon the propounding with what ●yle the unction was to be made, o●le of olives was resolved to be the fittest for that use. All this is said by one of the Brotherhood, 
* See his Antapologia, p. 29.  Mr. Edward's; who also tells us of a Gentleman in that Church, (precedent Laurence is thought to have been the man.) who propounded (saith my Author) that singing of Hymns was an ordinance, which is, that any person of the congregation, exercising his own gifts, should sing an Hymn in the Congregation, the rest being silent. But it was more like Popery, that 
* See Dr. Roger Drakes letter to M. Love p. 7.  Doctor Drake should desire Mr. Love to pray for him, (not whilst on earth, but) when in heaven. And when Mr. jackson (the Presbyterian Minister) had confessed a thing from which he afterwards recoiled, (affirming it was true, but refusing to swear it as a witness, the Lord Pres.— (as they called him) said openly in the Court,— well▪ jesuits' and Priests, they say, you are none, but you are their Brethren [pag. 52. Loves Trial.] Nor do I really think that Mr. Baxter is a jesuit, though I have proved him to be such, according to the Logic in which he deals. I also proved he was an * Heathen, by an Argument ad hominem beyond exception; of which, 'tis well he is so cunning as not to make the least mention.  

Mr. Baxter's Puritanism as well in life as Doctrine.  §. 21. He concludes his postscript (as I shall mine) with the odious part of the puritanism of his Life, of which (he saith) he hears little from me, but his own confessions, and his possessing a sequestration, (for he was loath to call it another man's Living,) concerning which, he answers nothing, (not any one word to all my Chapter) but only saith he might answer, if the love of Mr. Dance restrained him not. p. 329] In which parcel of Expressions there are observable particulars, to which I shall return these following things.  
1. Though I insisted pretty largely on many points of his practical Puritanism, 
His additional Falsehood,  as all will say who will but read my New Discoverer Discovered, (and therefore this is one of his many falsehoods,) yet now I hope in this Postscript he will find a supply of my former merciful defect, at which he must not be angry, because he hath made it thus needful for me.  
2. The first and worst Puritans (at least in Christendom) were the Followers of Marcus, 
The original of Puritanism among Professors of Christianity.  that monstrous Heretic. And Mr. Baxter (as near as any) hath written after that Copy. Those Ancient Heretics made Account they were so pure and 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.—  perfect▪ and under such an Incapacity to fall from Grace and God's favour, that they might live in any course of the greatest sin, without the least fear, because without the least danger of being damned. 
†— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. etc. Iren. advers. Haer. l. 1. c. 9 p. 72.  For by the Benefit of Redemption they had a privilege of Impunity for all their sins, which was not indulged to other Mortals; And in the midst of all their villainies they were protected with such an Helmet, as they had read of in Homer's Iliads, And by that (as by a screen) they were made invisible to the judge. Now whether Mr. Baxter does hope to hide himself from God; (as Pallas in 
* Homer· Il. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Irenaeus ubi supra.  Homer from the discovery of Mars, or as Gyges went invisible by the privilege of his Ring,) or is carried away by the vehement strength of his opinion, That being once godly he must be always avoidable, and though God cannot but see, yet can he not punish his impieties with pains eternal; whether he sticks to his famous Doctrine, That a man must be a 
† See the pages exactly cited with the word●, in my new Dis. Disc. c. 3. sect. 1. p. 61, 62, 63. etc.  greater sinner than David was in his Murder and Adultery, Peter in his perjury and denial of Christ, Lot in his Drunkenness and Incest, and Solomon in his Idolatry, before he can be said to be notoriously ungodly; sure I am I have evinced, he is as scandalous in his life, as in his Doctrine; Because I have proved the King's Supremacy, and that in respect of the two Houses, even of that very Parliament under which Mr Bax●er doth seek for shelter. And having proved him to have been a 
* See his Confession in his Holy Common wealth. pag. 490▪ lin▪ 9, 10.  perfidious Rebel (Reader 'tis his own expression) by having proved the very thing upon which he confesseth he must be such, and gives the world 
† He hath promised neve▪ to gainsay it, on the hypothesis spoken of.  leave to say, He is worse than a Murderer, an Adulterer,, a Drunkard, and the like, (still I speak his own words,) I think I need not add more concerning his Puritanism of Life.  
Before I leave this sub●ect, (which yet I will never leave finally, 
Our English Puritans caracterized by Salmasius, one of the learnedest of the Beyond-sea Protestants.  whilst Mr Baxter shall be so daring as to continue a public Advocate for the worst of Hypocrites, whose Rebellions, Murders, Schism, Sacrilege, have evinced them to be such by many an ocular demonstration,) I will add the character which Salmasius hath given of our Puritans, who yet was a friend and Patron to them, until he was converted by seeing their usage of the King. 
* Defence. Reg. c. 10.  Belli isti sane Puritani sub Regno Elizabethae prodire è Tenebris ORCI, & Ecclesiam inde turbare primùm coeperunt.— persuadent sibi, se posse cujuslibet sceleris es●e Affines, & tamen sanctitatem in medio sceleris Actu retinere. (In English thus) Those goodly Puritans did first come forth from the dark pit of Hell under the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, And thence began to disturb the Church.— 
† How nearly this toucheth Mr. Baxter, see the whole third Chapter of my New Disc. Disc.  They persuade themselves, that (being once sanctified) they may engage in any villainy, and yet, in the very act, retain their sanctity.  

Mr. Baxter declared by God's Anointed to be a factious and schismatical person.  3. It were Puritanism enough, if he had only invaded his Neighbour's goods, and Entitled God's service to his Impiety. If he shall say he is established by any Ordinance of the two Houses, (which without the King cannot possibly be a legal and Rightful Parliament) I shall first refer him for satisfaction to my whole Chapter upon the subject, (against which he hath not off●rd one word of Answer.) Next I shall tell him that the two Houses were bound to keep Magna Charta, and not to break it; And so they were told by his Sacred Majesty, in his Printed Proclamation against the oppression of the Clergy by the Insurrection of Factious and Schismatical persons into their cures, etc. wherein he said 1. That by the great Charter of England, no Ecclesiastical Possession may be sequestered but by the Ordinary. 2. That what ever was pretended, men of learning and piety were dispossessed for their Loyalty▪ 3. That he straight charged and commanded all his 
* Quaere, whether M. Baxter was not the King's subject, as much as cromwells.  subjects, as well Ecclesiastical as Temporal, not to presume to intermeddle in that affair,— notwithstanding any sequestration, or pretended orders, or ordinances, or other command whatsoever, of one or 
* Quaere, whether the King, and his learned judges with him, did not know his Right, as well as Mr. Baxter. His double injury to Master Dance.  both Houses of Parliament. 4. That if any should presume to transgress this command, he did hereby declare them to infringe the good old Law of the Land, and to assist 
* Quaere, whether the King, and his learned judges with him, did not know his Right, as well as Mr. Baxter. His double injury to Master Dance.  a Rebellion against himself. Let Mr. Baxter mark that, and read the whole Proclamation, to be seen in Bibliotheca Regia §. 3. p. 324.  
4. By saying he could say I know-not-what-of Master Dance, if love did not restrain him, he does maliciously imply that Mr. Dance is as scandalous as himself, or at least somewhat near it. Whether a drunkard, or a swearer, he leaves the Reader to suspect. There is no worse slandering an Innocent man, than by such a Paralypsis as here is used. Was it not enough, for Mr. Baxter to seize on his neighbour's goods, but he must slur his good name too? 'Twas ill done of Antinous, to eat Ulysses his meat, and to beat him too into the bargain, 
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Homer: Odyf. 17. —  But Mr. Baxter ought to chew upon Ulysses his Answer thereupon, and if he can digest it, 'twill do him good. 
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§. 22. I should here have concluded with Mr. Baxter, 
His unparallelled bitterness against Episcopacy and our Church seven ways rebuked.  but that in casting back my eye upon his p. 299. I find him railing at others, somewhat more than at myself. He saith that commonly the whole Kennels of swearers and drunkards, and scorners at godliness (so he ever calls hypocrisy) and such like, were continued in the communion of the Prelatical Church; to which he adds (page 300.) The scandalous Rabble are eager for prelacy, and their mode of Government and w●rship.] To which I answer 7. things. 1. what he saith is but gratis dictum; as proofless, as it is false; and yet no falser of the 
* He means (●y that word) the constant sons of the Church of England.  Prelatical, then true of the Presbyterian party. 2. If it were true, (as it is not) it would hold an objection against our Saviour, for admitting judas to his Sacrament, as Publicans and Sinners to his converse. 3. Neither drunkenness, nor swearing, no nor murder, nor adultery, (if Mr Baxter himself may be believed) is so bad as Rebellion. And he may fitly consider, what men are admitted to his Communion. 4. That his way of Government and worship hath been followed by swearers, and perjured persons, yea incestuous and murderous, and parricidial, I have proved undeniably in my Discovere● Discovered. 5. He forgets the foul fact with which he had charged the Presbyterian Assembly of Divines, when he said, 
* Key for Catholics▪ page 416.  [That The Assembly had put down Prelacy, for which a Convocation had form●d an oath to be imposed on all Ministers but a little before.] Nothing can put down the right of that, which is of divine Institution. No 
† ☞ Note, that in the 42 of Edw. 3. the first chapter doth enact, that if any statute be made to the contrary, it shall be holden for null. And see judge jenk. p. 62.  not a full and free Parliament, much less the two Houses without the King; much less the Assembly against the King. O wonder of wickedness! what a company of inferior and obnoxious Ministers put down the Order of their Superiors? It was treason for them to sit, after his Majesty's 
* Consult Biblio●heca Regia for it, sect. 3. p. 328.  Proclamation, [Inhibiting the Assembly of Divines and others, summoned to Westminster by an ordinance of both houses of Parliament; what a dismal character the King did fasten upon that Ordinance, and upon the Divines then Assembled, as men of no Reputation or Learning, and Preachers of Rebellion, etc. I wish that all men would read by having recourse to the Proclamation. 6. He passeth by the sin of Sacrilege, (which the 
† See his Majesty's Concessions at the ●sle of Wight. ib. p. ●57.  King proved to reign in the Presbyterians, and so he falls, with his Assembly men, under the lash of Dr Gauden. [As 
* See Doctor Gauden's Hiera Dacrua, c. ●1. p. 334.  if they were Chaplains, at once serving the Lord, their Bellies, and the Times, as partaking of the Table of the Lord, and the Table of Devils; They rather cherish than crush this Cockaetrice; fearing to seem but lukewarm Reformers, if they damped some of their good Master's zeal, by justly damning this darling and damnable sin of Sacrilege; which puts on the form not only of godliness and Reformation, but of thrift and good husbandry, to save the public purse the necessary expenses of a Civil war; which in some men's desires, as I believe it had never been begun, but only to destroy the Government of the Church, and confiscate those Revenues, so (all things computed) I no less believe that the secular purse hath had but a dear pennyworth of those Church-Lands, at so vast a charge as hath attended the war, first commenced by Presbytery against Episcopacy▪] 7. All the prime of the Nobility, Gentry and Clergy, the King himself, and his Ancestors, all former Parliaments, and Magna Charta, are very eager for Prelacy. Are these a scandalous rabble with Mr. Baxter? No, the Rabble was such, by which Prelacy was decried, though the Gates of Hell shall not finally prevail against it.  
I will add no more of those men (the sons of violence and Rapine) than what was said by Ulysses concerning the ill natured Antinous, who took possession of his house, 
Hom. Odyss, 17.  laid siege unto his wife, forbid him to enter his own doors, added Railing to Robbery, and Blows to Railing, 
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§ 23. Christian Reader, 
The Conclusion.  I am sensible of being tedious by my prolixity. And therefore will end with an Account of my vindicative justice to Master Baxter, however some of his Fautors may call it cruel.  
As Mr. Baxter is a man, I truly love him, though I spare him not at all as a Malefactor. 'Tis plain I love him, because I labour for his conversion. For I could wish him no greater punishment, then to be still what he is. But to spare the Malefactor, were a twofold Cruelty; as well to himself, as his weaker brethren. It were a cruelty to himself, because as long as he prospers, he 
* Eccles. 8.11.  will not mend. It were a cruelty to his Brethren, who live indulgently in sin by his Example. To make him Contemptible unto such, as do bless themselves in their Rebellions, through the Authority they ascribe to his books and Practice, I take it to be as good (I mean as charitable) a work, as I can set my Heart or my Hand unto. For he confessed he blowed the coals of all our National Combustions; And those I may call the Devil's bonfires. It was the very worst thing in jeroboam himself, that he made Israel to sin. It is for this very Reason, that the Devil himself is called Satan. And so Mr. Baxter hath been avowedly an Epidemical Disease to his native Country; For, he professeth to have encouraged many thousands to engage their force against their Sovereign. And that (in the judgement of 
* Ad quartum actum, & ultra, in ho Dramate desultando, f●igultientes Presbyteriani spectati sunt,— Quinam alii merito R●gis Occi●i crimine notari magis debuere, quam qui viam ad eum occidendum munierunt? Illi sunt, qui nefariam illam securim cervicibus ejus inflixerunt, non alii. Salmas. Defence. Reg. c. 10.  Salmasius himself) was to have the highest hand in the blackest murder of the best King. Now the fewer Admirers this man shall have, (by the blessing of God upon my endeavours,) the fewer men's sins he will be answerable for. And let him kick whilst he will, my charity bids me consult his cure. No sinner can be more scandalous, than a sinner in Print. That Mr. Baxter hath been such, in a greater measure than Paraeus, (whose Book was burnt by the Hangman●t ●t the command of King james, and again (at the appointment of the whole 
† Praevidit eas quas nunc Britania sentit, Calamitates inde orituras. G●ot. vot. pro pace. p. 49.  Oxford University,) I have evinced in my former and later papers upon the subject. Saint Paul himself thought it a duty, to 
* 2 Thes. 3.14.  shame such Sinners for their Amendment; And by him I was persuaded to think it mine. When a man hath taken pains to let me know that he is blind, I hold it a duty to make him see, or at least to make him see that he sees just nothing; for fear he run against the wall, and break his forehead, or from a precipice, and break his neck. There is nothing so dangerous as for a Baiard to be Bold, upon a fansifull presumption of being quick sighted.  
I very well know that Master Baxter, if he is not converted, will be imbittered against me by what I say. But I leave it to the Prudentialists to be deterred with such Mormo's, who dare be lazy and afraid to serve their God, and their Generation; And even censure their Brethren who dare not fear to serve both. Besides, I am armed by that of Seneca, Quosdam esse Tales, ut pulchrius sit ab His vituperari, quam laudari. And when I consider that Mr. Baxter hath licked up the spittle of the Cromwell's, and preached them up unto the skies, thereby becoming a partaker of their very worst sins, whilst he hath railed (on the contrary) as well at the King as at the Bishop●, and at all that is really Great or Sacred; I think it my Happiness and my Glory, not to have my Name slurred with his commendations.  
FINIS.    

The Typographical Errata the candid Reader will be pleased either to pardon or to Correct.  
In Praef. p. 2. l. 5. in marg. r. Borrhaeus. p. 7. l. 22. for good, r. God. p. 14. l. ult. r. needst.  
Pag. 3. l. 18. r. Injustitia. p. 4. l. 6. in marg. after cap. r. 28. p. 5. l. 13. in marg. after, pag. r. 20, 21. p. 7. l. 5. r. appetitum. ib. l. 26. r. be. p. 11. l. 1. in marg after promise, r. of. p. 13. l. ult, in marg, r. and. p. 22. l. 24. after so. r. he. ib. p. 9 after will r. not. p. 26. l. 26. after conceive r. it. ibid. l. ult. in marg. r. consequens. p. 27. l. 35. after is r. so. p. 37. l. 24. deal and. p, 40. l. 22. r. forbidding. ibid. l. 34 in marg. r. vetat. p. 44. l. ult in marg. after 12, r. 4. p. 45 (l. ult. in marg. after 3024. r. chap. 9 p. 47. l. 30. after hating r. God. p. 49. l. 3. in marg. after sol. r. 2. p. 54. l. ult. r. c. 6. p. 56. l. 1. in. marg. after of, r. the. ibid. l. 2. in marg. after. l r. 3. ib. l▪ 3. in marg. r. c. 23. p. 57 l. 22 r. thing. p. 76. l. 1. in marg. r. p. 137. p. 77. l. 4. in marg. r. verbis. ib. l. ult. in marg. r. p. 671. p. 78. l. 34. in marg. r. aliam. ib. l. 3. r. of. p. 8. l. 5. r. 2. dist. p. 83. l. 30. after original r. sin. p. 84. l. 1. after an r. evil. p. 85. l. 19 r. unto. p. 88 l. 4. in marg. r. annum. p. 90. l. 7. r. Catachresis. p. 104. l. penult. r. p. 150. p. 106. l. 18. r. is p. 137. l. 18. after of, r. which. p. 144. l. 21. r. sybilline. p. 145. l. ult. in marg. r. stealths. p. 146. col. 2. l. 30. d. ad 10. lineas, & id genus reliqua. p. 149. col. 2, l. 31. r. q. 9 p. 153. l. 8. r. endeavour. p. 159. l. 7. r. so. p. 178. l. 4. r. such. p. 203. l. 29. r. p. 32.   

Errata in the Postscript to Mr. Baxter.  
Pag. 2. l. 4. in marg r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ib. l. 11. in. marg r. Boutefeu. p. 4. l. 29. r. Patizitha. p. 5. l. 14. for and r. or. p. 8. l. 4. for. tor. by. ib. l. 8. for the r. thee. p. 9 l. 21. in marg. after that, r. that. p. 10. l. 15. r. Traitor. p. 15. l. 30. after Demands, r. i●.