A PLEA FOR LIBERTY, In Vindication of the COMMONWEALTH OF ENGLAND: Wherein is demonstrated from Scripture and Reason, Together with the consent of the chiefest Politicians, Statists, Lawyers, Warriors, Orators, Historians, Philosophs, and the example of the chiefest Republics, a Commonwealth of all Politic States to be the best. Against SALMASIUS, and others.  
By a Friend to Freedom.  
Printed in the Year 1655.   

To the READER.  
THough my broken speech can add nothing to the worth of this Treatise; yet I judge it my duty to utter some few words concerning it. I know, Truth in all ages hath had many enemies, some men ask what it is, and some contradicting and opposing. And surely that truth which crosseth most the vanity, glory, and pride of this world, is most opposed by the men of this world, in whom the Prince of the power of the air worketh. Yea, and any truth which in former ages hath not appeared unto the sons of light, but hath been under a cloud, (the Sun of Righteousness, in whose light Saints see light, being pleased not to make the cloud flee away) is seen, and scarce clearly seem, but by few, who are of the day, and not of the night. Hence is it that many who are light even oppose such a truth. No wonder then though the truth spoken of here be so much opposed, seeing it not only crosseth the vanity of a vainglorious age, but also hath been so long overclouded. Howsoever it is very necessary to be known. Doubtest thou whether it be lawful for thee to submit to the present Government, the Power of the King being in thy apprehension absolute without the bounds of Law; or the Kingly Government being the choicest and best, (and so not be altered) far better than a Commonwealth; or it being unlawful to resist the King and decline his Authority? Thou shalt find these things fully and largely cleared from arguments of all sorts. To the Law, and to the Testimony of the Spirit of Truth, that complete rule, they are brought. In the balance of Reason they are weighed. But if that shall not suffice thee who eyest much the examples of Politic Governments, and say of men. These arguments also are to be found here. You shall find that even certain of your Poets, Kings, Lawmakers, Historians, Orators, Philosophers have said so, as saith this Treatise. And that this Government is neither newfound out, nor usurped, nor bad and dangerous; but by example of the first and best, the oldest, sweetest, and most to be desired, and by lawful practices of old, far from usurpation. But if thou imaginest that thou art engaged by the League and Covenant to stand for Monarchy; and so canst not take a contrary Engagement. That case also is answered and cleared here. I counsel thee who doubtest, to search whether the things which are laid down in the Treatise as truths be so or not. That is Nobility indeed. O! if the sons of men could learn to be Berean-like, more noble than those of Thessalonica. Shut not thine eyes, stop not thine ears at the seeing and hearing of things of such use and concernment.  
But possibly (courteous Reader) thou art fully persuaded in thy mind of the truths spoken-of in this Book; and therefore apprehendest it to be useless, or born out of due time. Well, but art thou so full of knowledge, and so clear in the thing, that thou canst not receive any more. Be not received. It may be, thou shalt receive greater information therein if it pleaseth thee diligently to weigh and consider. D●st thou engage thy life estate, name, o● pains 〈◊〉 way or other in defence of that truth which here by arguments is defended, thou shalt do well to inform thyself well, and to strengthen thyself with good and sound grounds, that with the better and cleaner conscience, or greater courage thou mayest go on thy way? Moreover, if the Book had come forth when first it was written, thou couldst not but have said, it had been born in the due time. But hitherto it hath been hindered. Yet I suppose it is born in a due time, if we look upon the greatest part of men. And if the spirits of men, chief of such as know not this truth, were so framed as in moderation, impartiality, and simplicity to read the Treatise, they should rejoice at the birth thereof, and say it is very seasonable: Yea, and find more perhaps in it then in others of that same nature. They would see the adversaries of these truths discomfited and overthrown by their own weapons in which they so much glory; even by Reason, the testimonies of men, and that of all stations and conditions; and example of the most refined Policies and Governments. And what obscurity or obstrusness is in the Book, it is because of such boasters; whose mouths the Author judged expedient to stop with arguments of that kind; and so to beat them from that place in which they thought their strength did lie.  
I have no more to add, but do again wish that without prejudice, malice, envy, hatred, selfishness, in moderation and sobriety, thou wouldst peruse the Treatise: and I dare say thou shouldst receive more good thereby then possibly thou in the least expectest. And for thine ease I have written the heads of it, as so many Assertions, or Conclusions. I leave thee, and it, to the disposal of Him who ruleth all things in the Army of Heaven, and among the Inhabitants of the Earth, whose Kingdom and Dominion are everlasting, in whose hand the hearts of the most mighty are, as the rivers of water; and He turneth them whithersoever he will. And do remain,  
Thy ingenuous wellwisher, DAVID PIERSON.   

ANAGRAM. MONARCHY, and DEMOCRACIE, described under the names of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, alone; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, desirous of reigning; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an Ass, and the upper part of an Asse-mill; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ancient.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, People; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, most strong; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, best; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, right; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, judgement.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. He MilstONe. like weighs-down and grinds the state,  
The people poor Asslike enslaveth, and  
He Reigns alone, and Hath an AnCIEnt date.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. People Do rule, Electing who command.  
MOst strong and best he's, and from Clear debate  
Makes Right Appear, and Causeth judgement stand.  
And if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 best Doth signify,  
Thu is, me thinks, Pure ARISTOCRACY.   

THE CONTENTS Of the whole BOOK.  

SECT. I.  
THe Power of the King, as it commandeth just and lawful things, is absolute, and in such a notion cannot belaw fully contraveened. pag. 2  
The King hath not a Power above Law, and a Prerogative Royal to dispose upon things according to his pleasure, whether with, or against Law and Reason. p. 6  


SUBSECT. 1.  
The Jewish Sanhedrin had power over the Kings of Israel, and Judah. p. 11  
Because of extraordinary Heroicism and gallantry of old, some were of a simply vast and absolute power, and in nothing subject to Law. 29  
The first erecters of Kingdoms, and planters of Colonies were of an absolute power, altogether unsubject to Law. 34  
Personal endowments and extraordinary gifts have drawn-on People to devolve an absolute and full power, without all reservation, upon some men. 40  
Conquering Kings in old were of an absolute power. 47  
Usurping and tyrannous Kings in old had an absolute power. 47  
Except for some of these causes, there was never any King so absolute, but his power one way or other, according to Law, was restricted. Ibid.    


SUBSECT. 2.  
The wicked Kings of the Jews had an arbitrary power both over Religion, and the People of GOD. 120  
The tyrannous and usurping Kings of the Jews, in all probability had an arbitrary power over the Republic. Ibid.  
The good Kings of the Jews, because of personal endowments, had exemption and immunity from Law. 121  
The Kings of the Jews, de jure, had no arbitrary and uncircumscribed power. 125     

SECT. II.  
Royal Power, ectypically, is the choicest of Governments. 135  
Monarchy, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is the best Government. 136  
Monarchy, demotically, in respect of the disposition of people, is the choicest Government. Ibid.  
Kingly Government, consecutively, in respect of its fruits and consequences, may be hic & nunc, the best of all Governments. 138  
Regulated and mixed Monarchy, per se and in itself, is the sweetest Government. 140  
Monarchy, consecutively, in respect of the fruits and effects it may and doth produce, simply & absolutely, is of all Governments most dangerous, and least to be desired. 141   

SECT. III.  
Democracy arightly constituted, simply & absolutely, is the sweetest Government, and most for the good of the People. 152  
Moses before the counsel of Jethro, had a Kingly power. 155  
After the accomplishment of Jethroes counsel, and the institution of the seventy Elders, neither Moses, nor any of the Judges had a Kingly power. 157  
No man by Nature, in a formal and antecedent way, is born subject to Government. 165  
Nature per accidens and in a secondary way, intendeth Government. 169   

SECT. iv  
It is not lawful to resist the King, as King, nor the Kingly power, as the Kingly power. 171  
It is lawful and commendable to resist the tyranny of the King, and the abuse of his power. Ibid.  
Kingly Government may very lawfully be declined, that one better may be setup. 180   

SECT. V  
We are tied by League and Covenant, to maintain and espouse Christ's interest, absolutely, notwithstanding any thing may ensue thereupon. Ibid.  
By no Oath, or Covenant can we be absolutely tied to espouse the King's interest, and preserve Monarchy involably. Ibid.    

A SURVEY of POLICY; OR, A Free V●NDICATION of the COMMONWEALTH of ENGLAND.  

PROEM.  
COURTEOUS READER,  
I Beseech thee judge of me impartially; Do not imagine I speak my mind more freely than is pertinent: Let me tell thee, my freedom is upon a good account; I may hold my face toward Heaven, and say, what I speak it is from the simplicity of my spirit: My record is from on high, I do not speak from a biased principle, and if I do so, shall not my Lord try it out? Why, I pray thee, wilt thou stumble at my freedom in expressing my mind against Kingly Government, in behalf of that which is popular? Verily, I desire thee, not to cleave to my judgement implicitly: Yet would I have thee duly examining without prejudice, what I speak, and embrace that which is good: wilt thou learn so much of that which the world calls Scepticism, as to suspend thy judgement a little, and not sentence against me at the first. Be not wedded to thine own opinion, but try all things, and hold that which is good. Do thou kindly embrace any thing which is of GOD in this Book. I do ingenuously profess, I shall forthwith be of thy judgement, if thou show me better grounds, enforcing the contrary of what I maintain: Well, the main subject in hand resolveth upon this Question,  
Whether or not is the Commonwealth of ENGLAND an usurped power?  
These Questions being put aside, that follow, it is easily answered.  

1. Whether or not, is the power of the King absolute?  
2. Whether or not, is Royal Government the choicest of Governments?  
3. Whether or not, is a Commonwealth the best of Governments?  
4. Whether or not, is it lawful to resist the Royal Person, and decline the Royal Authority?  
5. Whether or not, doth the Covenant tie us, to preserve Monarchy inviolably?   
Of these as followeth.   

SECT. I.  
Whether or not, is the power of the King absolute?  
THe Court-Parasits, and Nation of Royalists, do plead much for an arbitrary and illimited power to the Royal Person. But in this matter we do freely offer our judgement.  
ASSERT. I. The power of the King, as it commandeth just and lawful things, is absolute, and in such a notion cannot be lawfully contraveened.  
It is made good, firstly, from that which Solomon saith,— for he doth whatsoever pleaseth him. Where the word of a King [is, there is] power, and who may say unto him, What dost thou? Eccl. 8. These words by Writers are diversely expounded. (1.) Some expound them concerning the absoluteness of the King's power, whether in things lawful or unlawful, good or bad. And in this we find none more willing than Salmasius the Humanist, Defence. Reg. cap. 2. (2.) Others again who are no friends to absolute and unlimited Monarchy, do interpret the words, not the jure, but de facto Regis, i. e. they opinionat, that Solomon doth not speak here of the power of Kings, which according to Law and Reason doth belong to them, but concerning the absolute way of governing, which one way or other, is conferred upon Kings, whether by usurpation or tyranny, or by a voluntary and free subjection of the people to an absolute and arbitrary power in the Kingly Person. Yet (3.) I do choose a way distinct from either of these. And I expound the words concerning an absolute power in the King, in things lawful and honest. This I make good from the Contexts. 1. The Preacher saith, I [counsel thee] to keep the King's commandment, and that in regard of the oath of GOD. Now, what power the Holy Ghost here giveth to Kings, is such a power, whose ordinances he exhorteth to obey, and that under an obligation, being tied to obey it by a lawful oath, the oath of GOD. But we cannot obey the unjust Acts and Ordinances of an arbitrary and illimited power. Unless you will say, that it is lawful for us to sin against the LORD, and to do the will of man rather than the will of GOD, which is contrary to that which is spoken, Act. 4. and 5. Yea, as afterward is showed, arbitrary Monarchy invested with a boundless power, to do both good & evil, is sinful and unlawful. And therefore we cannot tie ourselves by the oath of GOD to maintain it. Sure we are, we can not lawfully swear, to maintain and obey a sinful and unlawful power. Unless you may also say, that we may lawfully engage ourselves by oath and Covenant, to maintain and obey the ordinance of Satan. 2. He speaketh of such a power which is not for maintaining vice, and allowing that which is evil, but for correcting and punishing of evil-doers. Be not hasty to go out of his sight, (so do knaves who hate the light) stand not in an evil thing: Why? for he doth whatsoever pleaseth him, etc. Would the Holy Ghost say, ye must not dare to do evil, and withdraw yourselves preposterously from the King's presence; for he hath a power conferred on him, that cannot be contraveened in executing justice on malefactors. And therefore if ye transgress, be sure the King will punish you. So then this manifestly holdeth out to us, that the Holy Ghost speaketh in this place, of such a power in Kings, which exerciseth good, and performeth that which according to the Law of GOD, is incumbent to the Kingly power to do. But sure I am, illimited Monarchy, whose power is also to do evil, can spare the malefactor, and punish the righteous. The Holy Ghost speaketh of a Kingly power, that produceth contrary effects. 3. The Holy Ghost subjoineth, Whose keepeth the commandment, shall feel no evil thing. Then, this must be a just and lawful commandment; otherwise obedience to it would bring forth death, Rom. 6. But sure we are, this cannot be spoken concerning a boundless and arbitrary Regal power: for as Solomon here speaketh of the Regal power, so he speaketh of the effects thereof, and of our obedience thereto. And as we find, he speaketh only of good effects; so he only speaketh of an obedience and subjection thereto, which according to the oath of GOD, and in conscience we are tied to perform. But as we cannot lawfully give up our oath of Allegiance to boundless and arbitrary Regal power, so there is a vast dis-proportion between it and the effects of that power which Solomon speaketh of here. Solomon speaketh of a power which only produceth good effects. But arbitrary Monarchy is in a capacity of producing both good and bad effects.  
Secondly, we establish the point from reason itself; the Kingly power, as it produceth good effects, not only in itself is the Ordinance of GOD, but also it executeth the purpose of GOD both on good and bad. But as the Ordinance of GOD cannot be contraveened; so it is laid on us as a necessary duty, to subject ourselves for conscience sake to him who executeth the purpose of GOD, according to the prescript of GOD'S will, Rom. 13. So then, in such cases as GOD can not be contraveened, no more can the Kingly power be withstood, but what it enacteth according to equity & reason, should absolutely be obeyed. In this sense the Holy Ghost commandeth obedience and subjection, not only to Kings, but also to all other Rulers, Tit. 3. 1. Pet. 2. Kings and all Magistrates in this sense are called Gods, GOD'S Deputies and Lieutenants upon Earth, Ex. 4. and 22. Ps. 82. feeders of the LORD'S people, Ps. 78. the shields of the Earth, Ps. 47. nursing Fathers of the Church, Is. 49, Captains over the LORD'S people, 1. Sam. 9 Their Throne is the Throne of GOD, 1. Chr. 19, their judgement is the judgement of the LORD, 2. Chr. 19 The Land lieth under great judgement when it wanteth them, Is. 3. Who then dare adventure in such respects any way to contraveen the Kingly power, and to decline his authority? for so, there is a divine sentence in his lips, his mouth transgresseth not in judgement, his Throne is established by righteousness, righteous lips are his delight, and he loveth him that speaketh right, his wrath is as messengers of death, but in the light of his countenance is life, and his favour is as a cloud of the latter rain, Prov. 16. In such cases his wrath is as the roaring of a Lion, but his favour is as due upon the grass; he sitteth in the Throne of judgement, scattering away all evil with his eyes, scattering the wicked, and bringing the wheel over them: So mercy and truth preserve him and his Throne is upholden by mercy; Yea, his fear is as the roaring of a Lion, so that he who provoketh him to anger, sineth against his own soul, Prov. 19, and 20. Upon these grounds, and in these respects Solomon exhorteth us, to honour the King, Proverb. 24. and not to strike Princes for equity, Prov. 17. Therefore the Kingly power, as it is in itself, and as it executeth the purpose of the just LORD of Heaven and Earth, according to the LORD'S good will and pleasure, neither his power, nor the just Acts thereof, can be any more contraveened, than the power of GOD, and that which he commandeth to be performed: for so the King's power is GOD'S power, and what he doth, is according to divine authority. And in these notions we hold the Kingly power to be absolute: for so, as his power in such respects can not be contraveened, in like manner he may lawfully execute every thing that is good and expedient, with a full and vast power, according to Law and reason. So the power of the King of kings is vast and absolute, not because he may do both justly and unjustly, according to his pleasure, but because he may do every thing that seemeth good in his eyes, according to justice.  
In this sense, I confess, Salustius his Author saith very well, Impune quidvis facere; id est, Regem esse. Indeed, the King may do every thing that is just and equitable, according to Law and Reason, and deserveth not to be punished therefore. This is the same which Solomon saith, Eccl. 8. v. 3. and 4. compared with Prov. 17.26. Albeit we may put such a  construction upon these words, yet do we doubt much if Salustius his Author's meaning be such. Indeed, I take him to be of Aristotle's opinion, who saith concerning the King,— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Pol. l. 3. c. 12. The Law also saith concerning the King,— Tanta est ejus celsitudo, ut non posset ei imponi Lex in Regno suo, Curt. in consol. 65. col. 6. ad F. Petr. Rebuf. notab. 3. repet. L. un. c. Omnia sunt possibilia Regi, Imperator omnia potest, Bald. in Sect. F. de no. for. fid. in F. & in 1 Constit. C. col. 2. Chass. cattle. glor. mun. part 5. consid. 24. All these go no other ways (saith our learned Countryman) but thus, The King can do all things, which by Law he can do, and that holdeth in him, Id possumus, quod jure possumus. Lex Rex, q. 26. ass. 3. This is a very quick and noble gloss. But for myself, as I judge their meaning to be nothing such, so I am indifferent, whether it be so, or not. No question, there be many who do plead for absolute and arbitrary Monarchy, beside the Nation of Royalists. And those, to whose temper absolute Monarchy doth most relish, we find, to be attended with these qualifications. (1) They are merely heroic and ambitious. So were the Giants before the Flood, Gen. 6. Beros. Antiq. l. 1. Nimrod after the Flood, Gen. 10. Bern. Antiq. l. 4. and all the rest of the great Heroes, Arist. pol. 3. c. 10. (2) They are merely tyrannous and cruel. So we find that Pharaoh had an arbitrary power over the People of Israel, Exod. 1 and 5. Nabuchadnezzar had the like power over his Kingdoms, Dan. 2. and 3. By virtue of Ahasuerus absolute power, Haman was licenced to exercise tyranny on the People of the Jews, Est. 3. We might allege many examples to this purpose: But the point is most clear in itself: for those who are of a tyrannous disposition can endure no Law, but their will: Otherwise, they could never get their tyranny exercised. (3) Those whom we find chief pleaders for absolute Monarchy, are either concerned therein themselves, as Alexander M. and M. Aurelius, and such like; or else Flatterers and Court-Parasites, as Lyricus Rom. Virgil, and such like. And of this sort we find none more violent in this matter, than Dr. Fern, Hugo Grotius, Arnisaeus, Spalleto, etc. whose footsteps, with his ful-speed Salmasius doth trace. But although men by way of flattery and by-respect, may act and plead for arbitrary Monarchy; yet let me tell you, I do not imagine, but they may act and plead for it through simple error and delusion. And so I conclude, that Aristotle, Xiphilin, Sallust, and the foresaid Lawyers do much run this way, though they be more moderate in the matter then the rest. And as afterward is showed, we find the Talmudick and Rabbinick Writers this way somewhat inclining to the lawless and arbitrary power of absolute Monarchy.  
Assert. 2. The King hath not a power above Law, and a Prerogative Royal, to dispose upon things according to his pleasure, whether with, or against Law and Reason.  
Firstly, Such an arbitrary and vast power is repugnant to the first Institution and Scripture-mould of Kings. According to the Holy Ghost's way of moulding the King, he is thus qualified. (1) He is an Elective King, chosen by the People, in subordination to God. Thou shalt in any ways set [him] King over thee, whom the LORD thy God shall choose— Deut. 17. (2) A Brother-King. and not a stranger-King [One] from amongst thy Brethren shalt thou set King over thee: thou mayest not set a stranger over thee, who is not thy Brother. Ibid. (3) He must not tyrannize over the People, by Levying Forces, and by strength of hand, drawing them into Egyptian slavery.— He shall not multiply horses to himself, nor cause the People to return to Egypt, to the end that he should multiply horses: forasmuch as the LORD hath said unto you, Ye shall henceforth return no more that way. Ibid. These words properly, and in their emphatic sense, can import nothing else, but a discharging of the King by Forces and Armies to tyrannize over his People, that bringing them into bondage, and upon their ruins he may not strengthen himself, and multiply his Forces. So the King of Egypt did with the People of Israel, whileas they were in Egypt, under his tyrannons' yoke. (4) Not a Lecherous King, given to women, for drawing him on into temptation. Neither shall he multiply wives to himself, that his heart turn not away.— Ibid. (5) Nor Covetous, given to enrich himself, and to build-up his own estate upon the ruins of his People.— Nether shall he greatly multiply to himself Silver and Gold. Ibid. (6) But he must be a King, acquiring the Scriptures of GOD, meditating on them his whole life-time, thereby learning to fear the LORD, to observe his Commandments, and to practise them, that he may be humble and lowly, not turning aside either to the right-hand or to the left. And it shall be, when he sitteth upon the Throne of his Kingdom, that he shall write him a Copy of this Law in a Book, out of [that which is] before the Priests the Levits. And it shall be with him, and he shall read therein all the days of his life, that he may learn to fear the LORD his God, to keep all the words of this Law, and these Statutes, to do them: That his heart be not lifted up above his Brethren, and that he turn not aside from the Commandment, to the right-hand, or to the left,— Ibid. Here▪ from we draw this Argument:  
The power of him is not Arbitrary, and beyond the bounds of Law; whose power according to the Law and Word of GOD is Regulated and kept within the bounds of Law.  
But the power of the King according to the Law and Word of God, is Regulated and kept within the bounds of Law:  
Ergo, the Power of the King is not Arbitrary, and beyond the bounds of Law.  
The Major cannot be denied, unless men will be so bold, as to deny a Regulating and squaring of their Acts and Institutions according to the Word and Law of God. Sure I am none will deny it but such as will contradict Scripture itself, and decline it as the rule and pattern of their Actions: The Minor is manifest from the Text above Cited.  
Barclay the royalist, distinguisheth between the Office and power of the King; and so the man endeavoureth to elude our Argument thus: The Office of the King (quoth he) is set down Deut. 17. and the King's power is spoken of, 1 Sam. 8 where (saith he) an Arbitrary power is conferred upon the King, and laid upon his shoulders. But this distinction serveth not for his purpose: For either the power of the King is according to the Word and Law of God, or not. If it be, then as the Office of the King is regulated, in like manner his power also is kept within the compass of Law: For his Office spoken of, Deut. 17. admitteth bounds, and is kept within marches. That which is spoken concerning the King, Deut. 17. in terminis doth subject the King to Law, and taketh-away Arbitrarines in his Government: So than that which is spoken of the King, 1 Sam. 8. doth either contradict that which is spoken, Deut. 17. or else it giveth him no power and liberty of governing above Law at random. If it be not, than it is not a Divine but a diabolick power. Moreover, what the King doth according to his power, either he doth it by virtue of his Office, or contrary to it. If by virtue of his Office, Ergo, the Kingly power cannot be absolute, unless his Office be also absolute: for so the exercise of his power dependeth from his Office. In such a case he can do nothing according to his power, but what he hath Authority for from his Office: But his Office, Deut. 17 is not absolute, but Regulated according to Law. If contrary to it, Ergo, it is not the King's Office to exercise an absolute power, and consequently the King's Authority is not absolute. Furthermore, either the King, as King, is absolute, or not. If he be absolute as King, Ergo, the Royal Office is absolute: For the King is formally King by virtue of his Royal Office. If not absolute as King, than we gain the point: For so it followeth, that the Kingly Government in it-self is not absolute and illimited; and if the Kingly Government in it-self be not of a vast and absolute extent, we Demand, in what notion the Authority of the King is Arbitrary and illimited? Either ab intrinseco, i. e. As it is essentially a Kingly Authority, or ab extrinseco, i. e. according to some cadent and accident of the Regal Office. If the former, ergo the Office of the King it-self is absolute, which is not only repugnant to that, Deut. 17. but also to that which Barclay confesseth himself. If the latter, ergo the King, as King, and according to his Office is not absolute: for, quod convent rei accidentaliter, ei non convenit formaliter. Then we demand, if the King, as King, be not absolute, whether, or not, he be absolute as he is a Judge, or as he is a Man? If as he is a Judge, ergo all Judges no less than Kings, are of an absolute and Arbitrary power, which Royalists themselves do altogether deny; yea, they make the King essentially different from other Judges under this notion, because the King's power is absolute, and theirs is not. And consequently, seeing according to the Doctrine of Royalists, the King is essentially differenced from other Judges as he is absolute, then nolint velint, the King, as King, is absolute. Thus the Gentlemen do contradict themselves. If as he is a Man, ergo all men, let-be Kings, are of an Arbitrary and boundless power; but sure I am, no royalist will say so.  
Next to Barclay in-steppeth Salmasius on the floor, as one minding to cut the knot, if he cannot lose it: This Gentleman labourreth (though in vain) to reconcile that of Deut. 17. with that which is spoken of the King, 1 Sam. 8. The Israelites (saith he) did not seek from God one King only, but a change of the government by Judges, and in stead of that, they required a Regal Government: But (quoth he) the Prophet to dissuade them therefrom, propounded to them these incommodities which ensue upon the Kingly government; this the Prophet calleth jus Regum, which I (quoth he) call the Arbitrary licence, which is granted as a lawful power to those who govern after a Kingly manner. This jus Regum (saith he) the Grecians translate it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Whereby is understood a just and reasonable way of carry-on matters. And the Jews in this place, call it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifieth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: For the Septuagints translate this Hebrew word sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Now this pertaineth to the office of some man; and albeit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth differ from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, yet some small difference being between them, the one is taken for the other, Defence. Reg. cap. 2.  
Ans. This Gentleman is so far from losing the knot of the difficulty, as that he toeth it a great deal faster than it was before: And he must give me leave to say, that he mistaketh the state of the question in hand. The Question is, whether or not that which is spoken 1 Sam. 8. is repugnant to that which is spoken concerning the King, Deut. 17. This Royall●st denyeth the one place to contradict the other; and he rendereth no other reason for it, but because the Prophet 1 Sam. 8. calleth absoluteness and Arbitrary licence in the Royal Person, 〈◊〉 R●gum. Now the man espieth not the lightness of his own inference which is this:  
The Prophet 1 Sam. 8. calleth Arbitrary power jus Regum:  
Ergo that which is spoken of the King 1 Sam. 8. is not repugnant to that which is spoken of him, Deut. 17.  
Whereas this man should prove the consequence, he doth nothing but playeth upon the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Well, I desire him to learn this much, in his probation of the Antecedent he standeth by that, which maketh the contradiction between these places the more apparent. We have showed already, and he himself doth not deny it, That the holy Ghost, Deut. 17. subjecteth the King to Law, and disclaimeth Arbitrary Power in him. And yet this Gentleman will have the holy Ghost, to allow and cry-up (1 Sam. 8.) absolute power in the King. This he not only saith, but he also endeavoureth to prove from the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it is translated and taken by some, both in Greek and Latin. But I pray you, Friend, what is this, but to prove a contradiction upon yourself? Let it be so, that the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is so taken, as you will have it, (the contrary whereof we shall demonstrate) yet shall you never reconcile these two places together, but thereby you enforce the more a contradiction between them. And consequently, according to your way, the consequence is so far from being deducible from the Antecedent, that contrariwise it is directly repugnant to it. So then, my Friend, albeit I should grant you all that you would have, yet you have this to prove, That though the holy Ghost, Deut. 17. crieth down Arbitrary Government in the King, and 1 Sam. 8. proclaimeth it, and alloweth the same in the King, yet notwithstanding the holy Ghost doth not contradict Himself, and neither of the places is repugnant one to another. Prove this, — Et eris mihi magnus Apollo. And whereas you only prove the Antecedent, you do nothing but beat the air, and proceed ab ignorantia elenchi.  
Secondly, It is repugnant to the power, which the holy Ghost in Scripture hath conferred upon inferior Judges. It is clear from the Book of God, that the Lord investeth inferior Judges with power to execute judgement on all, without respect of persons, and commandeth them to do so. And consequently they are invested with power, to execute judgement on Kings themselves. But if the power of the King were absolute and above Law, than that power which the holy Ghost in Scripture conferreth on inferior Judges, is altogether unlawful, and in vain.  
Royalists start much at this Argument. They talk much against it, and I wots not what. Because Salmasius speaketh most against it, we shall firstly begin with him. This man plainly denieth, inferior Judges to have any Authoritative power over Kings. But because he is very large upon this matter, and for preventing tediousness to the Reader, we shall therefore handle the whole substance of that, which he replieth and objecteth against this Argument, in a following Sub-section.  

SUBSECT. I.  
Salmasius his Opinion concerning the Power of Inferior Judges, examined, and refuted.  
THat we may in a methodick and square way, handle his opinion, and conveniently meet with these things which he replieth against our second Argument, we shall lay down his mind in these Propositions.  
Propos. 1. The Jewish Sanhedrin had no power over the Kings of Israel, and Judah.  
That he may establish this Proposition, he taketh this way to prove it: Firstly, The people of Israel (saith he) did seek a King to reign over them, after the manner of the Nations. But all the Kings of the Nations in these times were absolute, and not subject to Law: Ergo. The Proposition he proveth from 1. Sam. 8. The Assumption he taketh for granted, saying, that the Assyrians, whose Monarchy was at that time, when the Israelites sought a King to reign over them, did not restrict their Kings within the bounds of Law. Therefore Artabanus Persa much commendeth that Law, whereby the Persians enacted, that the King should be honoured as the image of GOD. Plut. in vit. Themist. And Claudianus saith, that they gave alike obedience to cruel and tyrannous Kings. Yea, Otades calleth Monarchy, that to which every thing is lawful, unpunishably. Herodot. lib. 3. Then seeing the Persians succeeded to the Medes, and the Medes to the Assyrians, who reigned at that time when the Israelites did seek a King to reign over them, it appeareth that as the Persian Monarchy, so likewise the Assyrian and Median Monarchies, were of an absolute and arbitrary power. And Homer (who lived, as some imagine, about that time when the Israelites sought a King from Samuel to reign over them,) saith, that Kings are from Jupiter, and those do reign who get authority from the son of Saturn. Whom he also calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, divine Kings, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 trained up by Jupiter. Therefore Kings in Homer's time, were not subject to Law. Defence. Reg. cap. 2. and 5.  
Ans. Both the Propositions of this Gentleman's Argument seem very strange to us. As for the first Proposition we do not deny it: for the people of Israel said to Samuel,— Now make us a King to judge us like all the Nations, 1. Sam. 8. But it doth not follow, Ergo, make us an absolute King, as the Nations about us have. 1. Because Moses, Deut. 17. by the Spirit of prophecy foretelleth their seeking of a King after the manner of the Nations. But it is evident, that Moses there doth only prophesy of their seeking a King after the manner of the Nations, i. e. that as the Nations about had Kings over them, so they might have a King over them in like manner: for both Deut. 17. and 1. Sam. 8. the words are general. In neither of these it is said, Make us an absolute king after the manner of the Nations. The words admit a twofold sense; and so they may either signify, As other Nations have Kings, so make us a King. This sense we allow; or, as other Nations have absolute Kings, so make us an absolute King. This sense we deny; And so, this is a fallacy, either ab Homonymia, or à figura dictionis. (2.) We may as well conclude from these words, after the manner of the Nations, that the people of Israel did seek a nonabsolute and regulated King: for at that time there were Kings of the Nations, who were regulated according to Law. We read, that Priamus was not only withstood by his own subjects who did steal Helena, but also what he did in the matter of Helena's away-taking, was according to the advice and counsel of Senators, whom Paris with his Complices did over-awe, Dict. Cret. de bello Tro. lib. 1. And it is observable, that Agamemnon and Palamedes, though the Kings of Kings were subjected to Law. So story Dictys Cretensis, Dares Phrygius, Homer and Aristotle. Which was at that time, when the Jews did seek a King to reign over them. Yea than the Egyptian Kings were subjected to Law. Diod. Sic. Rer. Ant. l. 2. c. 3. And it is also evident, that at this time the Athenian Monarchy was not absolute. So Heraclid. de polit. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Diod. Sic. lib. 5. c. 5. Moreover, we do not imagine, but there were many other Monarchies at that time, which were not arbitrary and of an illimited power. We might prove this at length; if it were not both tedious and needless. But Salmasius himself acknowledgeth, that then all the Kingdoms of the Orient were of a limited power, regulated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And for proof of this he citeth Aristotle, pol. lib. 3. c. 10. and 11. (3.) The people of Israel did seek a King under very fair pretences. They not only alleged, that Samuel was unfit because of his years, to govern them, according to Law and reason, but also they pleaded for a King from the tyranny of Samuel's sons, and their non-governing according to justice and equity. Then tell me, would they ever have sought a King, that he might govern them according to his pleasure, whether to tyrannize over them, or not? Thus they should not only have palpably contradicted themselves, but also they should have cut off from themselves these pretences, whereby they urged their purpose in seeking a King. (4.) To say, that the people of Israel did seek an absolute King, is to militat directly against these ends which they propounded to Samuel, and set before their eyes in seeking a King. The ends are three. 1. To judge them. 2. To conduct them. 3. To fight for them, and defend them from their enemies. These three particular ends do abundantly evidence, that they did not seek a King to govern them, after the manner of the Nations, whether according to Law, or contrary to it, but that they sought a King to govern them, only according to Law and reason. I am sure, the second and third end imply no less. And if you say, that the first end may take along with it a judging, whether according or contrary to Law, we do easily obviate this difficulty. (1.) Because you shall not find in Scripture, where judging is taken for an act of injustice and tyranny. And the Holy Ghost in Scripture expoundeth judgement, calling it justice, 2. Sam. 8. (2.) Had the people of Israel sought a King to judge them, whether according to justice or injustice, than their arguments whereby they enforced their purpose in seeking a King, had been altogether useless. Samuel haply might have said to them, I see now ye do prevaricate in this matter, your profession is altogether vain, in declaring yourselves sensible of my weakness and inability for judging you according to justice and equity, and of the corruption and iniquity of my sons, in perverting righteous judgement. Away (might Samuel have said) this is nothing but words. Whereas ye seek a King to judge you, whether according to Law or not, ye contradict your own profession, and give yourselves the lie to your face. Yea, Salmasius himself doth acknowledge, that they did not seek a King to tyrannize over them, and to rule contrary to Law and reason, Def. Reg. c. 2. But mark how the man straightways giveth himself the lie: For (saith he) they did not deprecat nor abominat an unjust King, wicked, violent, ravenous, and suchlike as use to be among the Nations, though most wicked, Ibid. We demand at this Gentleman, whether or not they did positively seek such a King as that, to reign over them? If he affirm it, than they sought a tyrannous King to reign over them. And so he belieth himself. If he deny it, than it followeth, that in even-down terms they sought no King but one who would judge them in righteousness. But this royalist will have them positively to seek an absolute King to reign over them. Then tell me, how can this agree with these pretences whereupon they sought a King, to wit, to reform their Commonwealth, and to banish corruption out of Judgment-seats? and because Samuel was not able to perform this (as they alleged) therefore they sought a King. But Samuel might have said to them in seeking an absolute King, ye seek a remedy worse than the disease. Such a King whom ye seek, having power to govern at random, according to his pleasure, will not be a fit man to redress the enormities of your Estate. He may well aggravat the burdens under which ye now groan, but he will not lessen them, and ease you of your burden. Be sure, ye will get few or no good Kings, but ye will have many bad, who having a vast power, will make you groan under their yoke. So then (might Samuel have said) ye can no ways pretend a sense in you of the want of the exercise of righteous judgement, and of corruption and enormity in the Judges. Ye scorn yourselves to enforce your purpose therefrom in seeking a King, whenas in seeking an absolute King, ye forthwith give yourselves the lie, and undermine your own grounds. Again, if positively (as is manifest from these ends above-written) they sought no King to reign over them, but such who would govern them according to Law and reason; then is it more than apparent, that positively they sought a regulated and nonabsolute King to reign over them: for, as governing according to judgement and righteousness, is done according to Law and reason, so it can never absolutely be performed, unless the governing power be absolutely hemmed in by Law, and regulated thereby. Now, the absolute ends which the Israelites did set before their eyes in seeking a King, do resolve upon governing according to judgement and righteousness. And I would fain know of this man, how he can conclude this consequence,  
The people of Israel did seek a King, to govern them according to judgement and righteousness:  
Ergo, they did seek an absolute King, and did not deprecat the greatest of tyrants.  
Verily the consequence, at least virtually, is repugnant to the Antecedent: for, in so far as they seek a just and righteous King, fit to govern them according to Law and reason, in as far they abominat an absolute King, one in a capacity of tyrannising over them. Thus you see, that the people of Israel do neither positively nor negatively, seek an unjust and tyrannous King to reign over them.  
We hasten now to the Assumption. And we observe, that the man contradicteth himself in it: for he saith not only, cap. 5. but also cap. 2. that there were many Kings of the Nations at that time subject to Law. And for proof of this, he citeth Aristotle, Pol. l. 3. c. 10. and 11. Diod. Sic. l. 2. But as a man awaking out of his wine he recalleth to his memory, what hath escaped him, and laboureth to correct it. And so he addeth, that though Diodore storieth, that the Kings of Egypt were subjected to Law, yet do we never read (saith he) that ever any of them was cut-off and beheaded by the inferior judges. And though Aristotle (quoth he) saith that all the Oriental Kings did govern 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, yet notwithstanding they did rule with an absolute power, though more remissly than did other Kings. Def. reg. c. 5. & 8. Albeit this man doth not admit a plenary and full subjection of Kings to Law, yet nevertheless he is constrained by force of example, to acknowledge, that Kings were some way or other kept under the power and reverence of Law. And he cannot deny but Diodore storieth of a most wonderful subjection of the ancient Egyptian Kings to Law. He telleth us, that they were subjected to Law in their eating and drinking, lying and rising: yea, in preserving their health they were restricted to Law. And which (saith he) is more admirable, they had not power, to judge, to gather Money together, nor to punish any through pride or anger, or any other unjust cause. And yet (saith Diodore) they took not this in an evil part, but thought themselves happy to be subjected to Law. I trow, this is far from Salmasius his cui quod libet licet. He will have the King above Law, not subject to any Law. But the Egyptians will have their Kings under the Law, and subject to it. And though this immodest man doth say, That the Egyptians notwithstanding did not cut-off any of their Kings, yet catcheth he nothing thereby. (1) Because the Egyptian Kings, as Diodore telleth us, were most observant of the Laws. Therefore he saith, Plurimi regum, the greatest part of their ancient Kings lived blamelessly, and died honourably. Rer ant. l. 2. c. 3. But I believe that Law cannot strike against the innocent. 'Tis iniquity to kill a man, who deserveth not death. Diodore telleth us of three things, which made the ancient Egyptian Kings to walk closely, and keep themselves within bounds. Firstly, their ways were narrowly hedged-in by Law. Secondly, they were always attended with the Sons of the Noble and Chief-Priests, whose eyes were always fixed on them. Thirdly, Kings that walked not straightly, as nothing was proclaimed in their life-time to their praise, but to their discredit; so in their death they wanted the honour of solemn and sumptuous burials, which were given to good Kings, after their death. The fear of this, hedged-in their ways, and made them stand in awe. (2) We deny not, but Diadore in that same place insinuates, there were many evil ancient Egyptian Kings. Yet we say not, tyrannous, as Salmasius would have it: for we do not think, that though many of their Kings were wicked in themselves, they got liberty to tyrann ze over the People. The Egyptian Laws were more strict than that they would dispense such a liberty to any of their Kings. Diodore saith, they were tied to the Law no less than private men. And withal he saith, their Judges were most impartial, and could not be bought-by, either by favour or gain. Which maketh us imagine, that they hemmed-in the ways of the most dissolute King amongst them, and did not give him liberty to tyrannize over the People. Therefore it is very observable that Amasis' getting power in his hands, did tyrannize over the Egyptians: Whose tyranny the Egyptians did tolerate, so long (as Diodore saith) as they wanted the opportunity of punishing him, till Actisanes King of Ethiopia came down into Egypt. And then (saith the story) the Egyptians called to mind old quarrels against Amasis, and falling from him to Actisanes, they unkinged him, and setup Actisanes in his room, who governed them most gently and amicably. Rer. ant. l. 2. c. 1. (3) Let it be so, many of the Egyptian Kings in old did tyrannize over them, and they, notwithstanding, were not punished, and cut-off by the People and inferior Judges. What then? That will never conclude their unwillingness and unreadiness to execute judgement on their tyrannous Kings, but that they wanted opportunity and power to do such a thing. So it went (as is said already) with the People and inferior Judges under Amasis' tyrannous yoke. But so soon as they got the opportunity, they verified the old Maxim, Quod differiur, non aufertur. Yea, Diadore telleth us, That the People did withstand the Priests and those, who withheld honourable and solemn burials from the bad Egyptian Kings in old. Which affordeth us matter to aver, That if the inferior Judges in Egypt did not execute judgement on their wicked and tyrannous Kings, it was not because they were unready to do so, but because the People were refractory thereto. No question, they would much more have withstood the offcutting of their Kings, than the want of solemnities at their death: for what is it, I pray you, that draweth People on to act and engage for their Princes, but because they take them up in the notion of half-gods, and far above the teach of ordinary men? Whereupon they conclude, that both their Persons and Authority are altogether inviolable. They dote so much upon them, that they think they should in no terms be resisted, far less cut-off and punished according to their deserts. This, daily experience teacheth. Therefore the People of Egypt would far more have withstood the inferior Judges in cutting-off their Kings, then in denying them sumptuous and stately burials for their offences. (4) It is easy to be learned from Diadore, that the Egyptians esteemed the want of honourable burials to their Kings more than any punishment could have been inflicted upon them. Know this, they were a most superstitious People, tainted with a world of blind zeal. And withal (as Diadore stor●eth) the fear of the want of honourable and solemn burials provoked their Kings to live circumspectly, and keep themselves within bounds. Whereupon we conclude, That both King and People, thought no punishment more capital, and more hurtful to the King, than the want of an honourable burial. And so the inferior Judges imagined, that in withholding from tyrannous Kings sumptuous and stately burials, they executed more judgement upon them, then if they should have brought them to the Scaffold, and cause strike the heads from them. Therefore if Salmasius shall not admit the third Reason, (which though it be true in general, yet not in this particular case, as is most probable, though not demonstrative) he must needs confess, that the Praetors of Egypt, not only in their apprehension, but also in the up taking both of the King and People, acted more against some tyrannous King or other, in depriving him of an honourable and sumptuous burial after his death, than the Representative of England did in bringing King Charles to the Scaffold, and causing his head to be cut-off.  
As for that which Salmasius saith, alleging that Aristotle saith, that the Oriental Kings in old did not simply govern 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according to Law. Well, let it be so. If they were any ways subjected to Law, as Aristotle in even-down terms confesseth they were, it is far from Salmasius his cui quod libet licet. Qui legibus solutus est. Yea, and (which is more) Aristotle saith, That the very government of the Heroes was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according to Law, and in some things their power was determinat, and not absolute. This is far from Salmasius his mind, who will have the King to be of an infinite and illimited power. The man would have a care, that he do not speak blasphemy and knoweth not of it. I take infinacy in power to be only proper to GOD. And 'tis not good to abuse it, in applying it to the creature. Howsoever, I hearty subscribe to what Aristotle saith concerning the Oriental Kings. I do not think but in old, as namely, in, and about the days of the Heroës, Kings, as Gods, were adored by men. But Salmasius must give me leave to say, that even then Kings were punished by the People. We read how the heroic Theseus was banished by the Athenians. Val. Max. l. 5. c. 3. Diod. Sic. rer. of't. l. 5. c. 5. Plut. in Thes. I do not deny, but as these Historiographers report, as likewise Heraclid de Pol. Ath. Theseus before that time had restored liberty to the Subject, and had put Power in the People's hand. It is also reported, that Agamemnon the King of Kings, was thrust from his Charge, because he would not suffer his eldest Daughter to be sacrificed to satisfy the fury of Diana, for the Roe which he killed feeding about her grove. Dict. Cret. l. 1. That of Theseus, and of Agamemnon were done about the time the Children of Israel did seek a king to reign over them. We might also here allege examples of other ancient kings, who were brought into subjection to the sentence of inferior judges. But we pass them as not beseeming the purpose in hand: for they are relative to after-ages, of latter years then what Aristotle speaketh of. Yet we find one example or two more than what we have alleged already, answering to this purpose. It is reported that Sardanapalus, because of his beastliness and sensuality, was dethroned by his Subjects. Arist. Pol. l. 5. c. 10. Metasth. an. Pers. lib. Just. l. 1. Diod. Sic. l. 3. c. 7. Miltiades was incarcerated by the Athenians, and died in prison. Val. Max. l. 5. c. 3. Aemil. Prob. in vit. Milt. Plut. in vit. Cim. Albeit he was not the Athenian king, yet was he their great General, and crowned king of Chersonesus. Herod. l. 6. Aem. Prob. in vit. Mil. It is needless to examplifie this any more; for afterward it shall be showed by multiplied examples, how that kings in all ages have been brought to the Stage, and punished by the People.  
Therefore Salmasius shall do well, not to imagine, that in old times all Kings were absolute, and the inferior Judge did not sit upon the Bench against any of them. And for myself, I do not deny, but in old, Kings were of a vast and absolute power, though I cannot be moved to think that either all of them were absolute, or any of them so absolute as Salmasius dreameth of. But more of this afterward. And, I do also think, that the Assyrian Monarchy, caeteris paribus, was in it-self rather more, then less absolute, then either the Median, or the Persian; though by some accidental occurrents, as afterward shall appear, it was not. Indeed it had the first start of them, and was in the time wherein Royal Power was more in request then either before or after. This makes Aeschylus to call the king of the Argives, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a governor that may not be judged. At this time the Inachides did reign: whose kingdom began about the reign of Baleus, the eight king of the Assyrians. Herod. lib. 1. Diod. Sic. rer. of't. lib. 6. cap. 14. compared with Beros. of't. lib. 5. ARAL VII. BAL. VIII. MAM XVI. SPAR. XVII, and Xenoph. de aequiv. PHOR. And as for Homer, I do not doubt but the man idolised Kings. But in the interim you will be pleased to give me leave to say, that it follows not: Homer calleth kings, Divine, and such who are educated and brought-up by Jupiter: Ergo Homer opinionateth, that they were absolute and subjected to none but to GOD. He telleth us, that Agamemnon, in a convention of the general Persons of the Army, was greatly upbraided. Iliad. 9 And yet he calleth him, a king begotten of Jupiter, and trained-up by him. And, it is very well known, that Agamemnon was not an absolute King over the Grecian Princes: for both Dict. Cret. lib. 1. and Dar. Phr. de exc. Tro. lib. report, that Agamemnon was put from his Office, and Palamedes chosen in his room. See also Arist. Pol. lib. 3. cap. 10. I stand not here to dispute at what time Homer lived, but leave it arbitrary to the Reader, either to follow Archil. lib. de temp. who saith, that he lived in his time, an. D. after the destruction of Troy. Or Herod. de vit. Hom. who saith, that he lived, CLXVIII after the Trojan battle. Yet one thing I may determine on, that Homer calleth those kings of the nations, who lived about the time wherein the People of Israel did seek a king to reign over them, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And whatever be Homer's meaning in these words, yet I am not of another opinion, but do think that he was much, if not all the way for absolute Monarchy. The temper of his times did lead him that far on. But though I subscribe to this, yet will it never therefrom follow, that all the Kings of the Nations at that time, when the People of Israel did seek a King to reign over them, were absolute & not subject to law. This we have made good already.  
Secondly: While as Samuel taught the Jews, of what temper kingly-government is, lest afterward they should pretend ignorance of the power and right of the king, he plainly declareth unto them, That he might do any thing, without fear of punishment, not subject to any but to GOD. Salmas. def. reg. cap. 5. Friend, this is rather said, then proved. But afterward, nolis, velis, we shall evidence, That Samuel thought no such thing.  
Thirdly: If Kings had been subjected to the Sanhedrin, and aught to have been arraigned before it, either to have been accused or condemned, then had there been no difference between the Judges and the Kings of the Jews. But the latter is false: Ergo. This is Salmasius his great gun. And for proof of the Major he saith, The Judges of the people of Israel did judge, led forth their Armies, made Laws, executed judgement, and did exercise all other suchlike functions which are exercised by Kings. Therefore unless the Kings of the Jews had been unliable to the Sanhedrin, there had been no difference between the Judges and the Kings of Israel. The Assumption he maketh it good thus: It had been altogether in vain (saith he) to have changed the government of the Judges into the government of Kings, if they had been both one. Thus the difference had only been in name, and not in reality, Def. Reg. cap. 5. But the man cap. 2. proveth the Assumption more largely and most pertinently. There (saith he) the Judges amongst the people of the Jews were subject to the Sanhedrin. And so he saith, the Judges amongst the Jews were like the Consuls among the Carthaginians and Romans. They were called in the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sophetim Whence the Paenans derive the word Suferes. Now, the Judges in the Senate of Carthage were called Sufetes. And Festus observeth, that Sufetes in the Punic language signifieth and denotateth a Consul. And out of Caelidus he citeth these words: Senatus censuit referentibus Sufetis. So the Roman Consuls referred to the Senate, and the Senate judged of their refer. Therefore seeing the Judges of Israel were but like Consuls who were subject to the Senate (as the case was amongst the Carthaginians and Romans,) they were not of a kingly power, but subject to the Sanhedrin, though they retained the government so long as they lived, whereas the Roman Consuls, and Carthaginian Sufetes, were only but yearly Magistrates. And this is further cleared from the Holy Ghost's contradistinguishing, Judg. 9 the government of Abimelech, (who took upon him a kingly government) from the government of the rest of the Judges. Yea, the Israelites, Judg. 8. offered to Gideon that same power over them, which his son Abimelech usurped. This was a kingly government that they offered to him. Which Gideon refused. And yet nevertheless he was a Judge. And consequently if both Judges and Kings amongst the people of Israel had one and the same power, not only the people of Israel had offered to Gideon, no new power, but what he had before, but also Gideon had refused to enjoy that power which actually he did enjoy.  
Ans. We hearty subscribe to the Minor, and do much cry-up Salmasius in the probation thereof. I wish the man were as solid and pertinent in all the rest, as in that. Yet I crave his leave to deny the Major. And I think, I have good reason to do so: for he only differenceth absolute Kings from Judges, imagining that none properly can be a King essenitally distinct from a judge, but he who is absolute and unlyable to the Law. He far mistaketh the point. It is one thing to be an absolute King, not subject to the Sanhedrin and Senat, and another thing to be a nonabsolute King and subject to Law. And yet both are properly and univocally King. The nonabsolute King is essentially differenced from the Sophet or Sufet, the Judge, because he is major singulis, but minor universis in synedrio. But the Judge is but of equal authority with the rest of his colleagues in the Senate, though because of his eminency and personal endowments, he may praeside and be as a leading man amongst the rest. Such was the case of the kings and Judges amongst the Jews, as afterward shall be showed. There are some accidental differences also between the Judges amongst the people of the Jews and their kings, as namely, 1. The Judges were in a most special, immediate, and extraordinary manner, designed and appointed by GOD himself, to govern his people. Kings were not so, if we look to them in an ordinary way, and for the most part. 2. The Judges of Israel had no hereditary power and government over them. Such had their kings. 3. The kings of Israel both in their ordination and afterward, were attended with prodigal, sumptuous and Royal Dignities, which were denied to their Judges. And whereas Salmasius essentially distinguisheth Melech a king, from Sophet a Judge, because the one is of an absolute power, and the other is not, he shall do well to advert, that he lose not more this way than he gaineth: for so he putteth the essential frame of the king in an absolute and uncircumscribed power. But in our first argument against this, we have showed the incongruity and absurdity thereof. Which afterward shall more appear from what is spoken, as followeth.  
Fourthly: There can be no example alleged in the Book of God, whereby is pointed-out the subjection of Kings to Law. We read not, that ever the Sanhedrin, or the people of the Jews did punish Kings for their faults. And yet many of their Kings were most guilty of many great and criminal faults, as namely David and Solomon. Def. Reg. cap. 5.  
Ans. This argument is like the first. Both of them speak much de facto, but nothing de jure. This is a very bad consequence: The people of Israel sought an absolute King to reign over them, and did setup such a King over them: Ergo the power of an absolute King is lawful, and Kings de jure are not subject to Law. Friend, you break-off too soon. Though I should grant you the Antecedent, yet before I can approve the validity of the consequence, you must prove the validity of their practice. You count your reckoning too soon, whileas you thus conclude: There is no practice in Scripture holding-out to us that the Jewish Sanhedrin did ever execute judgement, on any of their Kings, who transgressed the Law, and did violate it: Ergo Kings are not subject to Law. What if I should grant the Antecedent? You have notwithstanding to prove the lawfulness of their non-executing judgement on their kings who transgressed, before I can at any time subscribe to the consequence. Philosophs know (though many Humanists do not) that à facto ad jus non statim valet consequentia, Ay, they can tell you, that argumentum negativum nihil concludit. Well, as I deny your consequence, so I do not admit your Antecedent. I illustrate the vanity of it from examples in Scripture, both ordinary and extraordinary. Ordinary] Jehojadah in the face of the Assembly commanded to fall upon Athaliah, and kill her, 2 Kings 11. 2 Chron. 23. And though you shall deny this practice as concluding any thing against your purpose, yet I pray you, what can you say of that practice in kill Amasiah? We have showed elsewhere, that such a thing was done in a Public and legal way. Extraordinary] The Prophets rebuked the Kings of Israel and Judah for their faults and transgressions. And what is rebuke but a degree of punishment? And so Kings not having immunity from the lesser degree of punishment, why are they not also liable to the greater, according to their delinquency? Magis & minus non variant speciem. Yea, Jehu executing the purpose of the Lord on the house of Ahab, slew both the King of Israel and the King of Judah, 2 King. 9 and withal he caused cut-off all the sons of Ahab, 2 King. 10. O, but you will say, These practices of the Prophets and of Jehu were extraordinary. And then; It is a very bad Argument: The Apostles preached by the extraordinary instinct of the Spirit: Ergo Ministers, who have nothing but an ordinary spirit, should not preach. So, it doth not follow: The Prophets and Jehu acted against delinquent kings through an extraordinary call thereto: Ergo those, who have nothing but an ordinary call thereto, should not do so. It may be you will say, The People can have no ordinary call, to act against their kings. Be not mistaken. (1) Extraordinary things supply the room of ordinary things, whileas they are wanting. So Samuel killed Agag, because Saul, the ordinary Judge, was wanting in his duty. 1 Sam. 15. (2) At least it followeth, that the same thing, which is done extraordinarily, may also be done lawfully in an ordinary way. Otherwise many absurdities and blasphemies should follow. (3) Dato uno oppositorum datur & alterum. And consequently seeing there is an extraordinary call for punishing Kings, there is also an ordinary call for doing it. The reason of this is, because esse extraordinariae vocationis is so called, and is so in it-self, because it standeth in opposition to esse ordinariae vocationis, as we have showed at length, curs. Philosophico-theolog. disp. 4. Sect. 6. And therefore there can be no extraordinary call for punishing Delinquent Kings, unless there be also an ordinary call for doing so. (4) Punishing of delinquent Kings either in it-self is sinful and unlawful, or not. If sinful and unlawful, then neither ordinarily, nor extraordinarily may Kings lawfully be punished: for no sin can be committed by an extraordinary Divine providence. Otherwise God should extraordinarily sin. But we have showed already, that Kings may be punished by virtue of an extraordinary call. And consequently, it is not a sin in it-self, to punish delinquent Kings. If lawful and unsinfull, I see no reason why a thing which is in it-self lawful and honest, may not lawfully be done, by ordinary as well as by extraordinary midses: for either the exercise of ordinary midses is in itself lawful, or not. None, I am sure, will say, that the exercise of ordinary midses is unlawful, Otherwise every thing that is done ordinarily, is done sinfully. Which to say, is absurd. And if you say that the exercise of them in itself is lawful, than it is lawful in itself by virtue of an ordinary call, to punish delinquent Kings. But if there be any fault and escape in the way and manner of employing that call that no whit hindereth, but the call in itself is lawful and commendable: for such things are merely extrinsecall to the nature of the call it-self. And ab extrinseco, ad intrinsecum, non est sequela. (5) Jehu and the Prophets, had no other reasons for them in speaking and acting by virtue of an extraordinary call against delinquent Kings, but what those may have in proceeding against them, by virtue of an ordinary call. They not otherwise proceeded against them by virtue of their extraordinary call, but as it was for the good of the LORD's People, and for executing Justice on their delinquency, that others might learn not to offend. But sure we are, such grounds are competent to an ordinary call, for proceeding against delinquent Kings. And 'tis an undoubted maxim, Idem est jus, ubi eadem est ratio juris.  
Inst. That example concerning Athaliah (saith Salmasius) deserveth not an answer: for (saith he) she usurped the kingdom, and killed the whole Royal Family. And so there was less executed against her, than she deserved. And withal according to the Jewish Laws, it was not permitted to women to sway the Sceptre, and sit on the Throne: for it is not said Deut. 17. Thou shalt set a Queen over thee, but a King over thee, Def. Reg. cap. 4.  
Ans. That the example concerning Athaliah very much concludeth our purpose, we argue thus: E●ther Athaliah had the right and authority of a King, or not. If she had the right and authority of a King, ergo if the King be of an absolute power, and not subject to Law, than Athaliah was no more subject to Law then any other King: for as Salmasius, and all Royalists will have it, the King is of an absolute power, and not subject to Law. And consequently, Athaliah being invested with the right of a Kingly power and authority, she was no more subject to Law, than any other of the Kings of Judah. Therefore if you say that Athaliah was invested with the right and authority of a King, you must either commend the practice of Jehojadah and the people in killing her, or else you must change your opinion, and not imagine Kings to be absolute, and not subject to Law. If she had not the right and authority of a King, then either because she usurped the Kingdom, and intruded herself upon it, contrary to the consent of the People, or because she did cut-off the righteous heirs of the Kingdom, and set up herself in the Kingdom, or else because according to the Law women ought not to govern. Not the first, because according to the Doctrine of Royalists, conquest is a lawful title to the Crown. But Athaliah conquered the Crown of Judah to herself. What more I pray you, did she in intruding herself upon the Kingdom of Judah, then unjust Conquerors do, in thrusting themselves in upon the kingdoms which they subdue? As she intruded herself, without the free consent and election of the People, so do they. And yet Salmasius, with the rest of his Brethren, will have such Conquerors lawful heirs, and absolute kings over these kingdoms, which they subdue. Nor can you say the second, because conquerors, who subdue other men's kingdoms, cut-off all those who by pretended blood-right, claim a title to the Crown. And yet Royalists will have such lawful heirs, and absolute kings over these kingdoms, to which they have no title but the sword. Nor can you say the third, because all Royalists admit Royal birth, a just and absolute title to the Crown. But women no less than men may be and are of the Royal Offspring. And consequently, if the doctrine of Royalists be true, and unless Salmasius will contradict himself, women may as lawfully govern as men: Therefore it doth not follow, that because Athaliah was a woman, she had not right to govern the People of the Jews, and reign over them. I confess, by Royal birth she had no title to the Crown. But she conquered the Crown to herself, and did reign six years with the consent of the People. But sure I am, Salmasius and all the Royalists, as they hold the consent of the People, as a necessary ingredient to makeup the lawfulness of the title to the Crown, so they maintain conquest without all exception, to be a just and lawful title thereto But what need I thus to stand? do not I know that Salmasius and the whole nation of Royalists will have the formal and essential being of the King to consist in an absolute and illimited power? But any person, whether man or woman, usurper or non-usurper, is capable of such a power, and may be invested therewith. And consequently, though Atha●iah was but a woman, and an usurper, it doth not follow, that because she was such, therefore she was not of an absolute and arbitrary power. The greatest of Tyrants, and the worst of women, is capable of such a power. And the power is not changed, because of the change of the person, and of such and such qualifications in him. Such things are merely  to the nature of the power it-self. So then, if the King be formally a King, because he is of an illimited and arbitrary power; I see no reason why Athaliah did not reign as a King: for she was capable of such a power, wherein, according to the doctrine of Royalists, the essential frame of a King doth consist. And consequently, seeing she did reign in stead of the King of Judah, and exercised his authority, there is no reason why she was not absolute and unsubject to Law, as well as he. Therefore Salmasius must either leave-off his opinion, and not imagine that the Kings of Judah were absolute and not subject to Law, or else he must cry-down the laudable practice of Jehojadah, and of the People, in killing Athaliah. For shame he will not do this.  
Propos. 2. Except the Lacoedemonian kingdom, there was no kingdom in old, wherein absolute and uncircumscribed Monarchy was not erected, though in some more remiss, and in others more intense.  
For proof of this Salmasius showeth, what was the condition of Monarchy in the Assyrian, Egyptian, Jewish, Median, Persian, Grecian, and Roman kingdoms. Of the Jewish kingdom we have spoken already, and more of it afterward in a more convenient place. As for the Assyrian kingdom, together with the Median, he proveth, that kings in them were absolute and un-subject to Law, because such was the condition of the kings of Persia. This he maketh good from Ottanes the Persian, who defineth Monarchy to be that, to which every thing is lawful, unpunishably. Herod. lib. 3. Yea, Artabanus averreth, That no Law amongst the Persians was more commendable than that whereby they enacted, that the King should be honoured as the Image of God. Plut. in vit. Themist. And Claudian saith, That they gave a like obedience to cruel and tyrannous Kings. Therefore (saith Salmasius) seeing the Medians succeeded to the Assyrians, and the Persians to the Medians; it appeareth, that as the Kings of Persia, so the Kings of Assyria and Media, were absolute, and not subject to Law. And though the Egyptian Kings, before they were subdued by the Persians, were hemmed-in by the bonds of Law in every thing that they did, yet notwithstanding, we never read that at any time they brought any of their Kings upon the stage, and caused them to suffer for their Delinquency. They did bear the yoke of two cruel tyrants (Busiris and Cambyses) most patiently without reluctancy. Which Cambyses, because of his cruelty, the Jews called Nebuchodonozor. He desired in marriage his german sister: and so calling a Council, he demanded at his Counsellors, if there was any Law in Persia which did permit such a marriage. They desirous to gratify their King, told him, That they found a Law whereby the King of Persia was permitted to do any thing he pleased. Herod. lib. 3. As for the Grecian Empire, it is known (saith Salmasius) that Agamemnon had an absolute power over that Army, which be led on against the Trojans. And therefore he is called Rex Regum. And Aeschylus calleth the King of the Argives, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an uncensurable Governor. So Homer calleth the Grecian Kings, Kings made by Jupiter, reigning by, and holding their Crown of him. He calleth them, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, divine Kings, trained up by Jupiter Philip saith, that the King hath equal power with GOD. Diogenes, in lib. de Reg. writeth, that the King is just so in respect of the Commonwealth, as GOD is in respect of the Universe. And so, as GOD hath power over the whole world, in like manner the King hath power on earth. In like manner Ecphantas calleth it a thing proper to the King, to govern himself, and to be governed by none. Lastly, he stepeth-in to show, how that the Roman Kings of old were of a vast and arbitrary power. Romulus (saith Tacitus) governed the Romans as he pleased. Pomponius writeth, that Kings at the beginning of Rome had all poor. Dio saith, they are unsubject to any Law. Plutarch and Justinian, will have the Laws subjected to them. Which maketh Severus and Attoninus to say, Licet legibus soluti simus, attamen legibus vivimus, Instit. lib. 2. tit. 17. Plinius in his Panegyrics saith to Trojanus, that he subjecteth himself to the Laws. And yet, as Dio saith, he had power to do every thing by himself, to command both himself, and the Laws to do every thing that he would, and not do what he would not. And Sallust saith, that to do every thing unpunishably, that is to be a King. Def. Reg. cap. 5.  
Answ. I suppose, there is not plena enumeratio partium here. There were more Kingdoms then what Salmasius hath reckoned-up. Howsoever I shall do my endeavour to find him out. And that I may take away the strength of all that he objecteth, and leave not so much as the groundstone thereof, I lay down these following Conclusions.  
Conclus. 1. Because of extraordinary heroicisme and gallantry of old, some were of a simply vast and absolute power, and in nothing subject to Law.  
This we make good from the condition of some Kings, both before and after the Flood. Before the Flood, the point is clear. About the 500 year of Noah's age, which was in the 1556. year of the world, Policy began to have some footing: for then men began to follow after their own inventions & hearts desires; and so men than a-dayes being of huge strength, and undaunted courage, given to pleasure and renown, those amongst them, who by strength of hand could carry the pre-eminence and precedency over others, no less performed it then endeavoured it. And Noah was five hundred years old,— Gen. 5. There were Giants in the earth in those days, and also after that when the sons of God came-in unto the daughters of men, and they bear [children] unto them, the same became mighty men, who [were] of old men of renown, Gen. 6. Hence mark these two things. 1. That in the 500 year of Noah's age there were men of a gigantine strength, mighty men, given to hard and warlike exploits, minding their own honour and renown. 2. That such men lived at random, not subject to law, nor under the command of any. Their extraordinary valour and desire of renown led them on to rule, and not to be ruled. Therefore they took them wives of all which they chose, Gen. 6. Their awless and lawless living, maketh the Lord say, My Spirit shall not always strive with man,— Ibid. But the faithful Historian, Berosus, giveth us great clearness in this matter. He saith that before the Flood there was a City called Oenone, about L●banus, a receptacle of Giants, who did reign over the whole world, from the Occident to the Orient. These (saith he) confiding in the vast strength and stature of their body, having found Arms and Engines of war, oppressed all and governed according to their pleasure. Antiq lib. 1.  
After the Flood the first King we read of, is Nimrod; of whom it is said, And Cush begat Nimrod,— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And the beginning (or the head) of his Kingdom was Babel and Erech,— Gen. 10. This Nimrod the holy Ghost calleth, a mighy one in the earth, or the mighty hunter before the Lord, Gen. 10. i. e. a man matchless, none like him in the earth for strength and gallantry. Because of this he erected a kingdom, despising the commandment of Noah, Beros. of't. lib. 4. and disdaining to be in subjection, whether to God or man Joseph. of't. Jud. lib. 1. cap. 5 his aspiring thoughts drew him on to build a Tower, that thereby he might get himself a name to secure himself both before God and man. Gen. 11. Phil. Jud. bibl. of't. lib. And Josephus in even-down terms telleth us, that he incited his followers to pride, and to the contemning of God, telling them that their happiness did not depend from GOD, but from their own proper strength. Whereupon at last he tyrannised and governed at random. Ant. jud. lib. 1. cap. 5. To Nimrod succeeded Belus, to Belus Ninus, and to Ninus Semiramis in the Kingdom of Assyria. Every one of which acted more than another for enlarging their Empire. They subdued all, and ruled over all, libidine dominandi. Ber. ant. lib. 5. Mnes. lib. 97. hist. Archil. lib. de temp. Fab. Pict. de aur. sec. etc. lib. 1. Metast lib. de judic temp. & annal. Persic. Herod. lib. 1. & 3. Diod. Sic. rer. of't. lib. 3. cap. 1, 2, etc. And as amongst the Assyrians, we find these four grand and matchless Heroes, who governed at random without any subjection to Law, so we find amongst other Nations some also of that same stamp. Amongst the Egyptians, Osiris, who succeeded to his Father, Chemesenuus in the Kingdom of Egypt, commanding the whole earth, except these Nations and Kingdoms that were under the Authority of Zames King of Assyria. In the eight year of whose reign, Osiris returned into Egypt, with triumph over all the Nations, beside what were under the jurisdiction of the Assyrian Empire. And as Osiris did reign as an universal Monarch, so did his son Hercules, who succeeded Osiris in the Kingdom, under the reign of Baleus, the eleventh King over the Assyrians. Ber. ant. lib. 5. We read also of Simandius and Sesostris, two Egyptian Kings, who subdued the whole world Herod. lib 2. Diod. Sic. rer. of't. lib. 2. cap. 1. But it is very easy to prove from Berosus, that Simandius is Osiris, and Sesostris is Hercules. Amongst the Libyans, Dionysius was the great Heros. Herodot, and Diodore report, that he subdued the world, and conquered many Kingdoms by battle. And Berosus saith, that Dionysius gave to Osiris the Kingdom of Egypt. Albeit Herodot and Diodore, opinionate him to be a Grecian, yet I rather incline to the judgement of Berosus, who saith he was begotten of Rhea, by Hammon, and became Jupiter to the Libyans, even as his mother was the pretended Goddess of the Egyptians. Hesiodus, Marcianus, and other Grecian Writers, hold him as a God, and allege him to have been begotten of Semele, by Jupiter. Howsoever for valour and strength, he was a most extraordinary person, and swayed many Kingdoms by his Sceptre. Amongst the Grecians we find namely two extraordinary Heroes, Hercules and Alexander M. What great things were done by Hercules, and how he vanquished many Kings, and subdued many Kingdoms, is clear from many grave Writers, Hesiod. scut. Herc. Pindar. odd. 1. & 7 Sophoc. Trach. Diod. rer. of't. lib. 5. cap. 2. Of him Herodot, Theocritus, and others do write. The extraordinary valour and courage of Alexander, Justin, Plutarch, Q. Curtius, and other grave Writers do abundantly testify. I need not to stand here in a particular and exact way, to prove that these Kings had an absolute immunity from Law, without all restriction and reservation. But to satisfy the curious ear a little therein, we shortly make it good thus. 1. These Kings came not to their Crowns, whether by election, or succession. At least all that they commanded fell not to them, either of these ways. They held the right to their Crown by their sword. And so overruling all by force and strength of hand, they could be tied to no Law by any civil sanction, but as they pleased voluntarily to subject their necks to the yoke of Law. But as they delighted to overrule men, no question they have thought it their glory to be likewise above the Law it-self. I confess it is very gatherable both out of Berosus and Diodore, that Osiris, and Hercules the Egyptian, did live according to the Laws. Yet I do not think that it was by command, but according to their own free and voluntary resignation. That held true in them which the Roman Emperors speak of themselves, Licet legibus soluti simus, attamen legibus vivimus. Instit. lib. 2. tit. 17. Indeed there is great difference between a Kingly power had by succession, and election, and a Kingly power obtained by conquest and sword-right. In an elective and hereditary Crown, people have at least a Physical power, to bind the King to them by Oath and Covenant. But the case is far otherwise between a conquered people and the Conqueror. They have no power to tie him to them by Law. He may put them all to the edge of the sword, if he will. And it is in his own goodness whether to spare them, or square himself according to their Laws. Experience teacheth today what boundless power the Turk and the King of Spain have over those Kingdoms to which they have no title, but sword-right. Therefore it is no wonder though these grand and matchless Heroes had an arbitrary and boundless power over the Kingdoms, which they conquered by strength of hand. 2. The men themselves were esteemed and honoured as Gods. And so by proportion a Godlike power was given unto them. Nimrod was called the Babylonian Saturn, and Dionysius the Libyan Jupiter. The Assyrians hold Belus and Ninus as Gods. The Egyptians worshipped Osiris and Hercules as Gods. So did the Grecians honour Dionysius and Hercules as Gods. And Alexander thought no shame to be called the son of Jupiter, and honoured as a God. And as Ninus was holden as Jupiter, amongst the Assyrians, so Semiramis was holden by them as Juno, and worshipped as a Goddess. And what Godlike titles Semiramis caused put on and engrave upon the Pillar, she set upon Ninus, you may read it, Xenoph. de aequiv. You may read also some specious and stately titles on some of these Heroes, Herod. lib. Diod. rer. of't. lib. 2. cap. 1. All which serve to point-out the boundlessness of their power. And withal in terminis we have showed already, that Nimrod's power was most  and absolute. And so it followeth that Belus, Ninus and Semiramis, who succeeded him were rather more than less absolute than he: for as every one of them enlarged their power beyond another, so all of them extended their power beyond what Nimrod's power did reach to. And of Belus, Berosus saith in express terms,— Coepit libidine dominandi torqueri,— of Ninus,— Omnibus bellum intulit, nulli parcens,— quod esset in omnium desiderio, omn●●di● ad inten●●tum quaeritabat.— Hic omnium primus ex nostris regibu● Babylonicum regnum propagavit,— And of Semiramis,— haec ante●●ssit militia, tr●umphis, divi●iis, victoriis & imperio omnes mortales.— N●mo unquam huic foeminae comparandus est virorum, tanta in ejus vitadicuntur, & scribuntur tum ad vituperationem, tum maxime ad collandationem magnificam. Ant. lib. 5. It is both needless and infinite labour for me to sum up the absolute and arbitrary actings of these grand Heroes. I pass them over in silence, and do remit the Reader to spend his brain alittle, if he be curious, upon these Histories above cited. Where he shall find all made good that we speak of this purpose. 3. These Kings were not only extraordinary men, and Kings, but also they were extraordinary Heroes. They were even extraordinary amongst extraordinary men, being the chiefest of all the Heroes. And so, seeing other Kings and Heroes were of an absolute and arbitrary power, as afterward is showed, much more they. 4. It cannot be denied but Alexander M. was of  and boundless power. 1. Because he commanded Darius to write to him not only as to a King, but also as to his King. 2. He gloried to be called the son of Jupiter, and to be holden more than a man. 3. He despised Parmenio's counsel, and Darius his offer, disdaining that any should govern but he alone. Whereupon Menstree saith notably.  
No, I will reign, and I will reign alone,  
Disdaining to admit of more Commanders:  
For as the heaven can hold no Sun but one,  
The earth cannot contain two Alexanders.  
4. Whileas a seditious tumult was raised in his Army, upon his march toward the Occident, whereas no words would asswadge them, after a Speech had to his Army, he did leap as a Lion from the Bench, amongst the midst of them, and with his own hands, none daring to withstand him, took thirteen of his prime Incendiaries, and delivered them up to his Guard. All which demonstrate the absoluteness of Alexander's power. By undoubted consequence it followeth, that the rest of the foresaid Hereos were rather more than less absolute than he. 1. Because they were men, if not of g●●●er courage, at least of greater strength than he. They lived in the flower of time, when strength and courage were most in vigour. Indeed, in this they had the start far before Alexander. 2. Because Alexander himself esteemeth it honour and power enough to imitate the ways and carriages of Heroes who went before him. Ad Herculis imitationem me contuli, ad aemulandum Perseum me comparavi. Volo Liberi patris, mei progenitoris, generisque mei proauctoris vestigia persequi. Plut. de fortu. Alex.  
Conclus. 2. Without all controversy those who firstly erected Kingdoms, and planted Colonies, were of an absolute power, and altogether unsubject to Law.  
For clearing the point, we shortly glance at some of these. In the tenth year of Nimrod, Comerus Gallus erected a Kingdom in Italy, gathering a number of people together, over whom he ruled as King, Ber. ant. lib. 5. Hence Myrsilus saith, that the Tyrrhenians do affirm, themselves to have their arisal from Razenu●, Janus Vadymona's son. De Orig. It. & Tyr. lib. But Berosus cleareth it, how the Italians had their arisal from Janus his son, saying, that having left his daughter Grana Helerna, together with his son Cranus whose posterity, to differ from the Aboriginists he called them Razenues, after his son Cranus Razenuus. Long before this time Italy was inhabited by the posterity of Comerus Gallus, and his Colonies. Myrsilus also telleth us, that some do opinionate the Tyrrhenians to have their arisal from the Lydians, saying, that A●ys King of Maonia, begotten by Hercules upon the virgin Omphalis, daughter to Jardana Queen of the Maeonians, begot two twins, to wit, Lydus and Tyrrhenus. But when as one Kingdom could not contain them both, Atys commanding his son Tyrrhenus to go from him, he forthwith went toward the Septentrional part of Tiber, and there built Cities and Towns, calling them after his own name. But the Grecians mistake this very far. Indeed, Hercules the Egyptian came into Italy, and built Cities there, leaving his son Thuscus behind him to reign over them, Ber. ant. lib. 5. And as Myrsilus saith, the Thuscits only worshipped Jupiter and Juno. So Osiris and Isis were called the parents of Hercules the Egyptian. Ber. ant. lib. 5. Diod. rer. of't. lib. 1. cap. 2. That the Italians had their arisal from the posterity of Noah, see M. Burc. Cat. ex lib. orig. fragm. Fab. Pict. de an. saec. etc. lib. 1. Sempron. de divis. Ita. etc. In the twelfth year, of Nimrod, Jubal gathering a number of Colonies together, erected a Satrape in Celtiber, called Spain, and afterward planted other Colonies, called Sam●tes. In the fifteenth year of his reign, Oceanus and Chemesenuus, with their Colonies, erected a Kingdom in Egypt. In the eighteenth year, Gogus with his Colonies inhabited Arabia felix, Triton Libya, Japet Atlaa-Africk, Cur Aethiopia, and Getulis Getulia. In the twenty fifth. Thuyscon, with his Colonies, erected a Kingdom at Sarmaria, and Masa, with the sons of Ister, erected Colonies from the hill Adula unto Pontica Mesembria. In the thirty eighth, Saga with his Armenian Colonies possessed all the region of Caspia, from Armenia unto Bactria, and Janus translated the Janean Colonies unto Hyrcaria, as also the Janilians unto Mesopotamia. In the fourteeths, some Colonies of the sons of Gomer, erected a Kingdom in Bactria, and Ganges in India. In the third year of Belus, Tyras erected a Kingdom in Thracia, Arcadius in Arcadia, and Aematnia, or Macedonia. Yea, Phaethon, whom Porcius calleth the first of all the Grecians, erected a Kingdom in Italy, by emplacing Colonies therein, after he had abandon Attica. Ber. ant. lib. 5. Porc. Cat. ex lib. orig. fragm. Janus erected Colonies in Arabia felix, calling them ●anineans; and Camesennus in Italy, calling them Montan aboriginists, An. Nin. 4. Yea Janus coming out of afric unto Celtiber-Hispania, emplaced, two Colonies, calling them Noelans, and Noeglans. Berosus also reporteth, that Dardanus being gifted by Ato, with a part of the Land of Maeonia, with his Colonies there erected the kingdom of Dardani. An. Ascat. 41. About which time Tyrr●enus planted the Tyrrhenians to Italy. Where also the Griphonians, and the Colonies of Phaethon were planted, together with the Colonies of Auson. An. Aral. 8, 9, 10. and 49. And Armatr. an. 20. Cydnus, and Eridanus erected the Kingdom of Ister in Italy. Ber. ant. lib. 5.  
In shall not be amiss for us, here to use a distinction. Some of these forenamed Colonies were immediately planted after the flood, about the 150. year thereafter. Such are these, who were planted under the reign of Nimrod, Belus, and Ninus, or thereabout. Some of them were planted a long time after, whileas all the Countries round about, where they took up their residence, were aforehand planted. So the Tyrrhenians, Griphonians, Dardanians, Istenians, the Colonies of Rhaëton and Auson, were planted. Indeed, I may say, that the heads of the Colonies of both sorts, were absolute and of an arbitrary power. Yet I cannot imagine, but the absoluteness of the heads of the first sort of Colonies was more intense than that of the other. 1. Because the heads of the first sort were holden and worshipped as gods. Thus Cur is called the Saturn of Aethiopia, Chemesenuus the Saturn of Egypt. Xenoph. de ●quiv. And it is observable, that all the first founders of Kingdoms, are called Satur's, and those, who immediately succeed to them, are called Jupiter's. And consequently the first and primary erecters of Kingdoms being holden as gods, yea, as the chief gods, to us it is more than apparent, that such have been of a most intense and absolute power. They could not be honoured and esteemed as gods, unless a Godlike power had been ascribed unto them. But we judge, that the after-planted Colonies, who came in upon other men's share, sheltering under their wings, and receiving places of abode from them, had no proper gods of their own, but honoured those as their gods, from whom they received the places of their residence and abode. So the Thuscits worshipped Juno and Jupiter, i. e. Isis and Osiris, who are Egyptian gods. These they worship, because Hercules, Osiris' son, who is also called Jupiter, erected them, and gave them his son Thuscus to reign over them. Yea, the Tyrrhenians do not worship Tyrrhonus, though he was their first King, but Janus who was the first planter of Italy, by whose Colonies Janus had planted there, Tyrrhenus was graciously received. And it is observable, that the chief Kingdoms which were first inhabited, as Assyria, Italy, Egypt, and Ethiopia, did honour and worship their first Kings and Planters, as great gods. And so, we do not think, but the first and primary Founders of other Kingdoms, (as Mese and Getulis, who erected the Kingdom of the Masagets in India, as did Anamaeon the Kingdom of Maeonia. An. Nim. 45.) were likewise holden by their People and Colonies as prime gods, to whom they did owe Godlike worship and respect. Thence it is that Xenophon saith, Saturni dicuntur familiarum nobilium Regum, qui urbes condiderunt senissimi. De aequi●. And as the first and primary Founders of Kingdoms are holden as Satur's, & primary gods, so their firstborn are holden as Jupiter's and Juno's, & the chiefest of their grandchildren as Herculeses. And so, as Xenophon saith, the secondary gods are multiplied according to the multiplication and diversity of the primary gods. So then, seeing the primary Kingdoms, and first Colonies have their own proper gods, and the secondary Kingdoms, which were planted in aftertimes, the chief parts of the Continent being aforehand planted by primary Colonies, had no proper gods, but such as were common, both to them, and the primary Colonies, or the first inhabiants: It is evident to us, that the heads and leaders of the secondary and after-Colonies, had no such absolute power as the heads and leaders of the primary, Colonies. The power is proportioned according to the honour and respect people give to their Kings and Rulers. A primary honour, a primary power, a secondary honour a secondary power. And consequently, the Kings of the primary Colonies being attended with a primary respect, whereas the Kings of the after-Colonies got but honour in a secondary way; no question, the power of the one was more intense, than the power of the other. 2. Because the heads of the after-Colonies being in aftertimes, were neither men of such ancient descent and root, as the heads of the primary Colonies; nor do I think they were men of such courage and strength as they. Strength and courage was the more in vigour, how much more they approached the youth and beginnings of time. Time's youth declining, man's youth also faded. Aftertime, after-strength. And withal, after-Colonies coming in upon other men's lot, both the Law of courtesy and obligation (unless the primary Colonies by way of gratification, or else in simplicity, had past all claim of privilege over them; of which we read nothing, neither is it probable) did tie them to hold one way or other of the former and primary inhabitants. This maketh nothing against the absolute power of their own proper Kings, though they honoured the first Kings of the primary Colonies, as gods. They might very well have acknowledged their own proper Kings, as their absolute Lords, though ascribing a divine and more intense honour and respect to the first Kings of the primary Colonies. This maketh us think, that the Thuscites (albeit Thuscus was their proper King) held Hercules the Egyptian, (though Hercules to the Egyptians) as Jupiter. Idem quoque qui unis populis est Hercules alteris est Jupiter. They held of Hercules more than of Thuscus. Thuscus was their King, but they had their being and residence of Hercules. Whereupon we conclude, that the first of Kings were most absolute, of a more  and intense power then Kings of aftertimes and secondary Colonies. Yet we cannot deny but even such were absolute also, they being men of great valour and courage, and not only such, but even those from whose conduct and means the being of their people did in a most special manner depend. They did not only govern them, as a people, but they made them a people. But notwithstanding this, I cannot imagine that their power was so absolute, as that it admitted no restraint. And so in respect of them, I take Aristotle by the hand, who saith that in the days of the Heroes Kings were absolute, though some of them in some things were restricted. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Polit. lib. 3. cap. 11. I say some of them, because the first founders of Kingdoms and the grand Heroes were absolute, without all restriction. But afterwards we show, that Aristotle's meaning is concerning Heroes of the secondary rank, and such who in aftertimes erected Kingdoms and planted Colonies.  
Moreover, as there were colonies planted in old, by way of donation, shelter and gratification, (as were the Griphonians, the Tyrhenians, and the colonies of Phaethon and Auson) so colonies were planted by way of commission and subordination. So the Assyrian, Median, and Magogan, colonies were planted in Asia, together with the Moscits, who at one time erected their tabernacle both in Asia and Europe. An Nimr. 45. This they did by virtue of a Commission, which Assyrius, Me●us, Magogus, and Moscus, their four chief leaders had from Nimrod. I can not imagine that such had a  and arbitrary power over their colonies: for what power they had over them was by way of Commission, and in subordination to the Assyrian Monarchy. But we shall not stand much to grant that even such had an absolute power over their colonies, though not so vast & intense as that of Nimrod's. 1. Because though the Princes of these colonies were subordinate to Nimrod, yet it is very likely that their Colonies had no power over them: for as the being and residence of these colonies did in a most special manner depend from the conduct and means of their Princes and leaders, so then a day's people did much adore Princely Government, and they knew very little than what it was to call consistories and exercise the Laws, Xenophon telleth us, that Ninus was jupiter to the Assyrians. De aequiv. and so we conceive, that their Hercules hath been Assyrius, their first Prince and leader: for so by proportion Nimrod was their Coelum, Belus their Saturn, Ninus their jupiter, and consequently their Hercules behoved either to be Assyrius, or else Saturn's grandchild. Xenophon allegeth that the chiefest of Satur's grandchildren are the Herculese. But Belus had not a grandchild who succeeded to him in the Kingdom. And so we suppose that their Saturn's grandchild being wanting, they have conferred the honour of Hercules upon their own native Prince. And what the Assyrian colonies did in that purpose, is most probable the rest of the foresaid colonies did the like also. And so they conferring a Divine honour upon their Princes and first leaders, no question they have given them all obedience and absolute subjection. And Ashur (whom Berosus calleth Assyrius) is reckoned up Gen. 10. as a very mighty and active Prince. 2. Because Herod though a precary and substitute King, yet was he not subject to Law, & was declared unanswerable to any for the murder which he had committed against Aristobulus. joseph. of't. lib. 15. cap. 4. I confess this was by the means and vindication of him, of whom Herod in a precary and substitute way held the Kingdom. And why may we not think far rather, that the Princes of these Colonies, though but Nimrod's deputies, were of an absolute and arbitrary power, though you should say, that they had it not because of themselves, but because of Nimrod. Howsoever I stand not much here, but let the Reader choose either of the parts he wil And I only put him in mind of this, that the Colonies of Gelnus and Eridanus were Commissionary and subordinative: for they erected a Kingdom in Istria, by ordors and Commission from Ligur. An. Armat. 20.  
Furthermore observe, there were some Colonies planted by mere purchase. So Hercules the Egyptian planted the Thuscits, whom Berosus calleth Arnits, Libarnits and Musarnits. These he planted by his own power and conquest. So did Aeneas plant his Trojans in Italy, and Brutus his Trojans in England. Yea, jolaus upon his own proper purchase planted a Colony in Sardinia, calling it jolaa. Diod. lib. 5. cap. 2. And as for the Kings and heads of such Colonies, I see nothing against it but they have been of an absolute and arbitrary power: for as they planted their Colonies, without all obligation to the natives, so the being and residence of their people did more intimately depend from their conduct and means, than any of these sorts of colonies, we have spoken-of already, did depend from their Captains and leaders. And so, I think, caeteris paribus, there was more reason for the absoluteness of the leading men of such colonies, then for the absoluteness of the heads of any of the rest of the colonies spoken-of already. Here mere purchase carrieth the business, but there the business is carried-on by the free donation of others, and by lot, or land for the up-taking. Thus the colonies were the more obliged to the conduct and industry of their Leaders. Whereas in the plantation of Colonies according to this last sort, they are extremely engaged to the endeavour and conduct of their heads and overseers. This maketh me think the fondness of the people, in ascribing too much to their industry, hath made them devolve their whole power over upon their Kings, who by their conquest and purchase made them a people, and possessed them in land.  
Conclus. 3. Personal endowments, and extraordinary gifts have drawn-on people to devolve an absolute and full power, without all reservation, upon some men.  
We may make this good from the example of Noah. The Scripture acquainteth us with his completeness, how that there was none like him in his time, Gen. 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 Yea, Berosus talketh much to his praise and commendation, ant. lib. 1, 2, 3, 4. & 5. He holdeth him as a God, yea, as the first and chiefest of all Gods. So did the Italians, Myrs. de orig. Ital. M. Porc. Cat. ex lib. orig. frag. Fab. Pict. de aur. saec. etc. lib. 1. Sempr. de divis. It. etc. So do Archilochus, lib. de Temp. Xenophon, de aequiv. & Metasthenes, de judic. temp. & annal. Pers. lib. But for the clear up-taking of this matter, you shall observe with me, that in Noah's time, about the 131. or 150. year after the flood, the whole earth was divided. But before this time they were all of one mind, without all sedition and division. Then men conveniently lived without any Civil and Politic Government▪ for so they lived under Noah as under a common father, receiving the Law from his mouth, and withal every one of his posterity did know, how that nature had laid most strict and near bonds of relation upon each one to other. Whence peace and piety were preserved amongst them, Gen. 8.9. and 10. Ber. ant. lib. 3. Ios. of't. jud. lib. 2. cap. 4. and 5. Men than were given more to Piety then Policy. They were little, or rather nothing acquainted with the rules of complex Policy. They studied more to entertain simple ingenuity, and the ties of pure nature, then to rule one of them over another. Hence saith Archilochus that 250. years after the flood, there was a golden age, in which Nature itself lived within the bounds of Law, without all politic sanction, ever and while Ninus and Semiramus by force of Arms began to corrupt the way of Man's living. Lib. de temp. So saith Mues. Phoex. Damasc. 97. histor. and likewise Ovid. Metam. lib. 1. But Fabius Pictor nobly storieth to this purpose, saying, That in the golden age, there was no Kingly Government, because then the desire of governing had not entered any man's breast. De aur. saec. etc. lib. 1. In the interim observe, concerning the duration of this golden age there are different opinions. Some who allege Ninus to have been the first that usurped authority and government, do reckon it to have lasted 250. years. So Mnes. hist. lib. 97. Xenoph. de aequiv. Por. Cat. ex. lib. orig. frag. Pict. de aur. saec. lib. 1. These again who allege Nimrod to have been the first King, and erecter of government after the flood, allege it to have endured 131. years. Beros. of't. lib. 4. Whom both Manetho and Metasthenes do follow. But Archilochus halteth between these two opinions. Yet we incline to the judgement of Berosus, and the Caldean Writers. Therefore seeing immediately after the Flood, 131. years, Noah was honoured by all as a common father; no question all power was devolved over upon him. And that not only because of his paternal privilege which he had over them all, but also because of his personal endowments, wherein he exceeded all his posterity at that time. Therefore nobly saith Fabius Pictor, that because those who commanded them, were just men and devouted to Religion, they were called and esteemed as Gods: for then (saith he) they did not departed from the Law, whether the governor's or the governed. All then of their own accord, did hold that which is good, either without fear or constraint. Shamefastness governed the people, and Law the Princes. De aur. sec. lib. 1. But by the Princes he doth not understand Kings or politic Governors. As you may find it above written; he saith in terminis, that at that time there were none such. Therefore by Princes he understandeth the chief Fathers, and the heads of the chiefest Families; As Noah, his sons, and his sons sons. Whom indeed these Ethnic Writers, which before we have often already cited, call and hold as Gods. Philo-Judaus giveth us a very large and express Catalogue of these Princes and chief heads of Families at that time. Bibl. ant. lib. what can we say of Noah who was the father of all, but that he was also the chief and head of all? Whereupon we need not fear to conclude, but Noah then had a vast and absolute power. And this may be considered two ways in respect of the object of his power. 1. In respect of good. And so I do not think but he had a power without all limitation, to order and govern every thing in an orderly and beseeming way. Firstly, because he was the common father of all, and by nature it-self had the precedency over them. Secondly, the case than was extraordinary: for at that time he was the only man who best knew how to order and govern affairs. Men at that time were little or nothing acquainted with Laws and constitutions. Knowledge and Learning were but in their beginnings then. Therefore the ignorance of these times necessarily called them to take the word at Noah's mouth, who was extraordinarily endowed with grace and knowledge from above. None like him in his time. All the rest weak and ignorant in respect of him. Therefore seeing he had the precedency before all, not only in respect of nature, but also in respect of gifts and graces, and not only so, but likewise all stood in need at that time of information from him, no question all the reason in the world maketh for an absolute power in Noah, in respect of every good thing. Thence it is storied of him, that he went abroad from Country to Country planting Colonies, and ordering things wherein GOD's honour and the people's weal were concerned. 2. In respect of evil. Indeed I will not say that such a Saint of GOD as he, did take on him a power to rule at random, and according to his heart's lust. I conceive indeed, he took upon him an absolute power, to govern according to Law, but not against Law. Neither did he take on him such a power, because he delighted to govern, and to be above others. No verily. But because he was necessarily called to govern so. Both the precedency in respect of nature, and likewise in respect of gifts, as also the weakness and ignorance of the times, called him to overrule all according to Law, with a vast and full power. His government was extraordinary, and by necessity. And therefore we can conclude no ordinary government from it, (absolutely to govern according to Law) devolved-over upon the shoulders of one man, or of some few. Much less can there be concluded therefrom a power of governing contrary to Law, without all bounds of limitation. Albeit I make it no question, whether Noah took upon him an absolute power of governing, whether against, or according to Law; yet do I think it very probable that none at this time would have taken it upon them, to have judged him, accused him, or condemned him. 1. No question, drunkenness is punishable by Law: But we hear of none that did so much as rebuke him for it, but wicked Cham, who therefore derided him, and was therefore accursed. 2. He was the common father of all at that time. 3. Of all at that time he was the most reverend, wise, and eminent. 4. They knew little what it was to hold Assizes, and call Consistories. All which move us to apprehend, that none at that time would have dared to judge him, even albeit he should have desired them. David far inferior to him, wanting many privileges over his People which Noah had over his in the golden age, notwithstanding both his adultery and murder, was spared and overleaped by the Sanhedrin. So Solomon was not judged by it, notwithstanding his idolatry and multiplication of wives & horses; which were punishable, and inhibited by Law. And yet Solomon had no such privileges over his people, as Noah had over his posterity. And I do verily believe, that the emency of David and Solomon, and because they were extraordinary persons, moved the Sanhedrin to spare them. Yea, it is to be considered, that such eminent men do not fall through a preposterous and malignant humour, but through an extraordinary desertion of God, for noble and high ends best known to God himself. No question, this hath been taken to heart by the Sanhedrin. And this being conferred with the eminency and singularity of the men, hath carried the Sanhedrin by, from inflicting punishment upon them. I shall not stand to dispute, whether they did this de jure, or not. But sure I am, as they did it de facto, so they have been much moved thereto from pregnant considerations of the men's personal endowments. And for myself, though I think a David subject to Law, yet would I think it a great temptation to me, (though as Judge) to sentence such a man with death. The eminency of the man, and the way of his falling would put me to my second thoughts, albeit I should endeavour nothing therein but justice. Well, call it injustice in the Sanhedrin to have spared David and Solomon, yet would I not have you to wonder too much thereat. There is great difference between a David and an Ahab, a Solomon and a Jeroboam. Such are not all day's men. And therefore I must needs say, that as the Sanhedrin spared David and Solomon, from thoughts of the singularity and eminency of the men; far more would Noah's posterity, in the golden age, have spared Noah, though in many things delinquent: for as the man was most eminent and singular, and could not have fallen but by an extraordinary desertion, and for most good and noble ends, so he had a privilege from Nature above all in his time. Yea, in David, and Solomon's time, people were well seen in Laws and politic Constitutions. The Sanhedrin needed not to have spared David and Solomon through ignorance and want of skill. But it was far otherwise in the golden age in Noah's time. Then men were but Apprentices, and spelling the first side of the Catechism of Policy. Every thing was but in its beginnings, in its first rudiments. Let it be so, that de facto, and not the jure, in the golden age, Noah's posterity denied not to him an absolute and uncircumscribed power. I seek no more but that. And I may say, that though at that time de facto, Noah should have had immunity from the exercise of Law against him, though much delinquent, yet shall I not think that ever Noah claimed such a privilege to himself, as competent to him de jure, and according to the Law.  
As for Noah's authority and power, after his posterity was divided into factions, before we can determine upon it, you shall mark with me, immediately after the golden age, that there were three divided and distinct parties. 1. The godly party. 2. The heroic party. 3. The politic party. The godly party was of the posterity of Shem. These followed Noah, and walked in his ways. The heroic, and politic party were of the posterity of Ham and Japhet. And as the heroic party followed Nimrod, so the politic party followed Ham, whom the Chaldeans call Chemesenuus. No question, Noah immediately after the golden age had a vast and absolute power over the godly, and those who walked in his ways. You may learn the reasons of this from what is above-written. And as for the heroic, and politic party, it would seem probable, that they contemned Noah, and slighted his Authority: for they walked contrary to his ways, Gen. 10.11. It is known, how that Ham (the head of the politic, yea and of the magical party) did mock Noah, Gen. 9 Beros. of't. lib. 3. Yea, Nimrod, the head of the heroic party, contrary to the mind and purpose of Noah, caused Babel to be built, Gen. 10.11. Ber. ant. lib. 4. But notwithstanding this we may say, that at the most it concludeth that such were disobedient to Noah, and walked contrary to his will. But it will not conclude that such denied to Noah immunity from the Law. V g. A prodigal and riotous son may work and act contrary to his father's will: But it doth not follow, ergo sach a child doth strike and punish his father. Nay, a debording child may act contrary to his father's will, and be so far from eclipsing his power over him, that he may in patience endure his correction over him. So we read that Ham did not repine against his father's reproving and cursing him, Gen. 10. Yea, Berosus storieth, that Noah did shut him out from his presence, and he did so accordingly, ant. lib. 3. And beside that he telleth us, that Noah, Nin. an. 19 gave him liberty to stay beside him three years in Italy. But finding, how he did corrupt the Colonies there, he commanded him to be gone, and he did so. And yet at this time he was the Saturn of Egypt, a mighty King, and of great power, both in Egypt and in Italy. Ant. lib. 5. I think there is very good reason for it, to say, that Noah in so far had an absolute power over them, as that none of them in a direct and positive way would have acted against his commandment, despising him as an enemy, and as one on whom they would and did execute their fury. The most we can call them, is disobedient, but not rebels to Noah. They acted against his will, but not in despite of his will. They took not liberty from him, to do his will, though they took liberty to do their own will also. We can not think that the light of Nature was so far extinguished in them, that they did not honour him as their father. A debording son, as Esau, can entertain Isaac with Venison, though he walk not in his ways. And I do not think, if they had not honoured him as their common father, unless they had been extraordinarily restrained, they had destroyed him and all his followers. Sure I am, they wanted not power to do so. The godly party was but an handful in respect of them. What then, I pray you, could be the ordinary mean of their restraint, but their natural respect and affection toward him? Nay, they honoured him so much, that they esteemed him their Coelum, their Sol, their Chaos, the semen mundi, yea, and the father, both of the greater, and lesser gods, Ber. ant. lib. 3.  
And what we have spoken of Noah, the like also may be said of Adam. Before the Flood there was also a golden age 1556 years. Wherein men lived as under one common father, each of them knowing the intimate relations one to another, until Monarchy was erected, till the close of the 500 year of Noah's age, as is showed already. Before which time Adam had died 626 years, and Seth 514 years. But so long as Adam lived, what superiority Noah had over his posterity in the golden age after the Flood, Adam had it rather in a more than less measure than he. Adam was not only their common father, but also he was their first and primary father.  
As we have evinced the truth of this point, from examples in Scripture, so we may evidence it from examples in humane Histories. V G. The Mitylenians gave to Pittacus an absolute power of governing because of his personal endowments. Diog. La. de vit. Phil. lib. 1. de Pit. Arist. Pol. lib. 3. cap. 10. The like power did the Athenians confer upon Solon, upon the same account, Diog. La. de Sol. Plut. in Sol. So it is alleged, that James 6. because of his pretended personal endowments, obtained an absolute power and a negative voice in Parliament. In the interim observe, That those who allow absolute Monarchy, because of personal endowments, do not imagine that Kings have an absolute power because they are Kings, but as they are such Kings, i. e. Kings not only in respect of station, but also in respect of qualification, exceeding all others. And so they conclude, that a King so qualified may very conveniently be entrusted with an absolute power: for they apprehend, that though such a man have power above Law, yet will he not act against Law. And likewise they imagine, that such a man being in all respects above all men, both in respect of station, and qualification, can no ways be inferior to any man. Thus Aristotle inclineth to absolute Monarchy of this moulding, Pol. lib. 3. cap. 11, & 12.  
Conclus. 4. Kings in old were of an absolute power, without the bounds of all restriction, by virtue of purchase and conquest.  
So were the grand Heroes, as is showed already. Hence was it, that Nabuchadnezzar, and the Kings of the Persians, had an absolute power over the People of the Jews.  
Conclus. 5. Kings in old, by mere usurpation and tyranny, had an absolute power, without any circumscription.  
So Pharaoh had an absolute power over the children of Israel, and the wicked Kings of Judah (at least of Israel) over their people. Thus Nabuchadnezzar had an absolute power, not only over the people of the Jews, but also over all his subjects. Of whom it is said,— Whom he would he slew, and whom he would he kept alive; and whom he would he setup, and whom he would he put-down, Dan. 5. After this manner Ahasuerus, and Artaxerxes, had an absolute power over the people of the Jews; though we deny not, but what either of them did act or intent against the Jews, was by the mediation of evil Counselors. So had Herod an absolute power. Matth. 2. Jos. Ant. lib. 15. Yet we deny not, but it was through other men's means more than his own, that he had a power to tyrannize and govern at random. The ten persecuting Kings, Dan. 7. Rev. 13. had an absolute power over the People of God. But more examples of Tyrants you may read, Judg. 1. and 9 2 Sam. 21. Mat. 27. Luke 23. & Act. 12. In the books of Apocrypha, as Tob. 1. Judas 2. & 3. 1 Macc. 10. 2 Mac. 4.14. etc. See also Beros. Ant. lib. 1. Diog. La. lib. 6. Plut. the Dionys. Brus. lib. 6. cap. 21. Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 10. What needeth us so to accumulate quotations and examples, when as it is evident, both from divine and profane writ, that there have been almost, tot Tyranni, quot Reges?  
Conclus. 6. Unless it had been for some of these causes above-written, there was never at any time any King so absolute, but one way or other, according to Law, his power was restricted.  
In establishing this Conclusion, we observe this order.  
Firstly, we prove the point from example. And in doing so you will do well to observe, that examples to this purpose are of a twofold kind. 1. There are some which point-out to us, That Kings in old were no less subject to Law, than any of the People. 2. Some of them show to us, That though the King's power for the most part hath been absolute, yet notwithstanding in some case or other it hath been hemmed-in by Law. Of the first kind we have examples both in the days of the Heroes, and in aftertimes. That in the days of the Heroes, some Kings were no less subjected to Law then the People, may be examplified both from the Commonwealth of the Jews, as also from the condition of some Kingdoms amongst the Gentiles. But we forbear till afterward, to speak any thing of the Jewish Commonwealth. And amongst the Heathen, you have to begin with the ancient and stately Kingdom of Egypt. It cannot be denied, but the Kings of Egypt in old were most precisely hedged-in by Law. Whatsoever they did, was according to Law. They walked, they washed, they lay with their wives, they did eat and drink, according to Law: They wrote Letters, and dispatched Messages according to Law. It was not permitted to them to treasure-up silver, to judge or punish any at random and according to their pleasure: but as private men they were subjected to the Laws, the yoke of which they did bear patiently, willingly submitting themselves thereto, and esteemed themselves happy to be subject to them. Diod. Sic. rer. of't. lib. 2. cap. 3. This Diodore, as he confesseth himself, hath from the writings of the Egyptian Priests, which he diligently searched, as he saith. Out of whose writings he giveth us three reasons, why the Kings of Egypt were for the most part good and kept themselves within bounds. 1. Because the sons of the chiefest Priests, who were the greatest and the most learned of all the rest, beyond the age of twenty years, were ordained to attend the King day and night: By whose on-looking and presence, the King was taught reservedness. 2. Because the Laws were most exactly and precisely exercised on the King's Person. 3. Because the Priests, as both before death, and after death, did celebrate the praises of the good Kings, honouring them with hyperbolic encomies, so they spoke both before, and after death, to the discommendation and disparagement of the bad and wicked Kings, depriving them of stately Exequys at their interring. Now the desire of the one, and the fear of the other, kept them back from extravagency and debording, and caused them cheerfully to take with the yoke. Ibid. And, which is more to be wondered at, Sesostris, one of the grand and primary Heroes, ordained Praetors, as Judges, to govern in the Land of Egypt. Diod. rer. of't. lib. 2. cap. 1. The care of every thing was cast over upon them. Yea, Berosus telleth us, That Sesostris, whom he calleth Hercules, delivered Italy from tyranny and slavery. Ant. lib. 5. This insinuateth, that this Noble Conqueror delighted much to live according to Law, when-as he could not endure tyranny to be exercised in a strange Kingdom, which he conquered. Far less I think, would he have suffered tyranny to be in his own Kingdom. The like also did his father Osiris (whom Diodore calleth Simandius) in Italy. Ber. ant. lib. 5. Him Berosus calleth Jupiter the just. I conceive he could not have been so called, unless he had been a man that walked strictly according to Law. And if these two glorious Heroes, and noble Conquerors did subject themselves to Law, how much more the rest of the Kings of Egypt in old, who were far inferior to them? Let it be so, these two lived according to the Law, ex voluntate, but not ex lege, yet will it conclude (if we compare arightly the highness of them with the lowness of the rest) that the rest ex lege were subject to Law. So saith Diod. Ant. lib. 2. cap. 3. Where he also saith out of the Egyptian Writers, That the Egyptians choosed-out the best men of their chiefest Cities, of whom they made-up a Judicatory, not inferior either to the Council of Athens, or the Senate of Lacedaemon, judging all impartially without respect of persons. Aristotle observeth, That it is a sign of a well governed Commonwealth, where neither tyranny, nor sedition is. Pol. 2. cap. 9 But we read not, but very seldom, that in old either of these was in Egypt. See Beros. of't. lib. Maneth. de Reg. Egypt. lib. Diod. Sic. rer. of't. lib. 2. cap. 1, 2. etc. Moreover, Aristotle prescribeth it as a rule, for preventing sedition, and keeping the Commonwealth in its integrity, to govern according to Law, and to abstain from tyranny. Pol. 5. cap. 8. & 10. The like do all Politicians, together with the consent of Machjavel, and Salmasius. But it is known, that the Kingdom of Egypt, as in old there was seldom sedition in it, so likewise it endured a long time inviolable. Which makes us conclude, that the Egyptian Kings kept themselves within bounds, refrained from tyranny, and walked according to the Law. But they could not ordinarily and for a long time have done so, unless they had been subordinate and subjected to their Counselors and Parliament. The proverb is, Who get Liberty, do take Liberty. And for the most part, it always holdeth good.  
We must not imagine that the Kings of Egypt in the days of the Heroes were singular in this matter. The Athenians under Theseus had a Kingly government, rather like a Commonwealth then Monarchy. Therefore saith Heraclid, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.— De Pol. Ath. i. e. Theseus having gathered the Athenians together, reconciled them, making them all of an equal and like authority. And Plutarch saith the like. But (saith he) he keeped back the popular government of Athens from confusion, differencing between persons and persons. De Thes. And so Theseus being subject to Law was at last banished by the People. Val. max. lib. 5. cap. 3. Diod. ant. lib. 5. cap. 5. Plut. in Thes. So insinuateth Heraclid in the place . Verily Theseus was both their King, and in valour and Heroicisme a second to Hercules the Grecian. Yea, Agamemnon whom Paterculus, and others do call Rex regum was subject to Law, albeit Salmasius def. reg. cap. 5. allegeth the contrary. (1.) Because it is reported that he was thrust from his charge, because he would not suffer his eldest daughter to be sacrificed, to satisfy the fury of Diana, for the Roe which he killed feeding about her grove. Dict. Cret. lib. 1. (2) Because he was put from his Office by common consent of the Officers of the Army, and Palamedes put in his room. Dict. Cret. lib. 1. and Dar. Phr. de exoi. Tro. (3) In a Convocation of the general Persons of the Army Agamemnon was greatly upbraided. Homer. Iliad. 9 (4) Because Aristotle likeneth the Laconic Government, to Agamemnon's power. And for this he citeth that of Homer, by us already alleged. And the Laconic Government, he callech it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, most according to Law. Pol. lib. 3. cap. 10. I confess with Salmasius, that Agamemnon had the potestas belli. But what then? ergo he had a power in battle, whether to destroy the Army or not, either to deliver it up to the Enemy, or not. It not ways followeth. I confess, he had an absolute Power in battle, to govern according to Law, but not both according to it, and against it. Questionless, the Army never gave him such a power as that over them, whereby in the time of command he might have disposed upon them as he pleased. They still kept a power in their own hands of deposing him, and acting against him according to his deserts. They deposed him, and acted against him, upon mere prejudices and groundless apprehensions: Ergo far more would they have acted against him, if in the time of battle he should have gone about to have sold them unto the Enemy. 'Tis ridiculous to say, that the General of an Army, hath power to sell the whole Army to the Enemy, and the Army may not resist him in so doing in the time of battle, though the Army may withstand him at any other time. Sure I am, they have more reason to withstand him at that time, then at any other: for as then they are most in hazard, so than they have most reason to stand by their own security and self-preservation. It is reported of Achilles, That he disdained to be commanded by Palamedes. And yet Palamedes was invested with that same power which Agamemnon had. Moreover, Minos was not only King, but also the Lawgiver of Crete. Heracl. de Pol. Cret. Nic. Damasc. de mor. gent. Cret. Val. max. lib. 1. cap. 3. Diod. Sic. rer. of't. lib. 3. cap. 5. lib. 5. cap. 5. & alib. Plut. de Thes. But, as afterward is also showed, the Cretian Monarchy was not absolute, but regulated. And though you say, that it was so in aftertimes, but not in the days of Minos, yet do we gain the point: for it cannot be denied but the Cretians did use these same Laws in aftertimes, which Minos first established amongst them. So saith Aristotle, Pol. 2. cap. 8. The like also saith Plato in the alleged Dialogue between Minos and Socrates. Socrates moving the question, Whether or not did the Cretians use the ancient Laws of Minos and Rhadamanthus; Minos answered, they did. Lib. 7. Min. vel. de Leg. And Plato extolleth Minos above the very Heavens. And for this he citeth Homer and Hesiodus. He is holden by Homer to have been such a strict justiciar, that he feigneth him to be the Judge of the departed souls. To which Lucian alludeth, Dial. Min. & Sost. Withal, he allegeth him to have gotten his Laws from Jupiter. And Hesiod in even-down terms calleth him, the best of all mortal Kings. Yea Plato saith, That what he commanded the People to do, he did it himself also. And, which is more, he allegeth, That the Lacedæmonians had their Laws from the Cretians. Therefore we may conclude, that in Minos' time the Cretian Monarchy was regulated: for what he commanded the People to do, that same he did himself likewise. And it was like to the Lacedaemonian Monarchy, which was not absolute, but precisely regulated according to Law. What? Can I think that such a strict Justiciar and eminent Lawgiver as Minos, would have assumed any arbitrary and lose power to himself, and denied it to others, executing on them the full rigour of the Law? That verily is against this practice of which Plato speaketh, who saith, That he commanded not to do one thing, and did another himself. The man is reckoned up amongst the chiefest Lawgivers, and, as Hesiod, Homer, and Plato would have it, he is the chiefest of them all. But afterward it shall be showed, that all such were against a vast and arbitrary power. And to close up this whole matter in a word, Aristotle saith, That in old, Kingly Government was amongst the Cretians, but afterward the Cretian Cosmi (like to the Lacedaemonian Ephori) did take it away. Pol. 2. cap. 8. This insinuateth, that in old amongst the Cretians these Cosmi were, whose power was all one with the Lacedaemonian Ephori, who indeed had power over their Kings. And we read not of any beside Minos, who did institute these Cosmi amongst the Cretians. He was the first Lawgiver amongst them, whose Laws they retained until after-ages, as is said already.  
As amongst the Egyptians and Grecians, we find Monarchy in the days of the Heroes, in like manner we find it to have been regulated also in other Kingdoms. The Ethiopian Kings were so much restricted to Law, that it can hardly be determined, whether they, or the Egyptian Kings were most subjected thereto. As Diodore telleth us, of the subjection of the one to Law, so doth he story of the subjection of the other thereto. In express terms he saith, That the Ethiopian King, according to statute and ordination, leadeth his life according to the Laws, doing every thing according to the Country-fashion, neither rewarding, nor punishing any, but according to the Law of his Ancestors. And, which is more to be wondered at, the Priests have such power over the King, that at their command and pleasure he suffereth death. And for this they allege it to have been an old custom amongst all their Kings from the beginning, to undergo death at the desire of the Priests. Rer. ant. lib. 4. cap. 1. I shall not stand here to dispute, whether or not, Monarchy amongst the Indians, in the days of the Heroes was regulated and subjected to Law. Albeit there be some probability for the non-absoluteness thereof, yet we think it good to leap it over, because the matter is not clear enough. And we shall begin with the Indian Kingdom, to show, that in aftertimes in it Kings were of a non-arbitrary and regulated power. It is reported, that the Indians established those Laws which they received from their ancient Philosophers, the Gymnosophists: Who taught, that all were free, and none were servants. This they established by Law. And so the Indians, like the Lacedæmonians, had their Ephori and overseers, chosen-out from amongst the common people; and beside them there were some few chosen, who in nobility and prudence exceeded all the rest, who were interested in governing and ordering all the great affairs, both of King and Kingdom. Diod. rer. of't. lib. 3. cap. 10. In like manner the Egyptians, as in the heroic times, so in aftertimes, they most precisely subjected their Kings to Law. Diod. ant. lib. 2. cap. 3. For as in old both the King and the Kingdom were governed and regulated by Praetors, so afterward out of their chiefest Cities, Heliopolis, Memphis, and Thebes, the best men were chosen to fit in Judgement, and to overrule all, not inferior to the Athenian Areopagites, nor to the Lacedaemonian Senators.  
Amongst the Grecians there were several Kingdoms wherein the Regal power was hemmed-in by the hedges of Law, in aftertimes after the days of the Heroes. Which maketh Aristotle say, that in aftertimes the power of Kings was weakened, and subjected to the People, partly by the peopl's detracting from their power, and partly by the King's own voluntary dimission. Polit. 3. cap. 10. We have examples of these not only amongst the Grecians, but also among other nations. The Athenians diminished the power of their Kings after the Codrids had become lecherous, soft and effeminate. At that time they changed their Kings into Princes, whom they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Heracl. de Pol. Ath. But it seemeth very probable that then they rather changed the name then the power of their Kings: for long before the race of Codrus was extirpated, Theseus had restored liberty to the Athenians, and (as is said already) had erected a Commonwealth amongst them. Which appeareth to have lasted during both the time of the Kings, and likewise of the Princes. And consequently seeing there was a Commonwealth in both their times, there could be no difference in their power. But that we may give an exact and punctual answer to this pre-occupation, you shall take notice of the different condition of the Athenian Commonwealth, and of the changes thereof. First, before Theseus' reign, we do not imagine otherwise, but that the Athenians were governed, not only by a Kingly government, Ber. ant. lib. 5. Maneth. de reg. Egypt lib. Heracl. de Pol. Ath. but also their Kings then were of a  and absolute power, according as the power of the Kings used to be in the days of the Heroes, Arist. Pol. 3. cap. 10. and 11. Secondly, under Theseus reign the power of the Kingly government was much impaired. Then the people were restored to liberty, and got power in their hand, as is said already. Therefore Euripides saith, that the Athenians under Theseus did not come under the yoke of one man, but the people as freemen governed like a King by course. In Thes. Yet we must not imagine that then there was a perfect and entire Commonwealth erected. No, verily: for Theseus remained notwithstanding as their Prince, and as one having greater authority than any Patriot and Commonwealth's-man. I will not say that Theseus retained a power in his hand, equal to the power of the People, and their Representative. That is expressly against what Euripides and others  do report. But this much I may say, that he retained as much power in his own hand, as made him superior and of greater authority than any one atleast, whether of the Council, or of the People. And that he was the first man in dignity and authority in the Commonwealth is clear. 1. Because as both Aristotle and Plutarch report, he remained notwithstanding the Prince of the Commonwealth. Therefore even unto this day he is reckoned-up in the Catalogue of the Athenian Kings. 2. Because he differenced between the Patricians (whom we call gentlemen) tilers of the ground, and Craftsmen, giving to them power according to their ranks and stations, investing some of them with greater, and some of them with lesser power: and consequently seeing he differenced one kind of persons from another in the Commonwealth, making some of them in authority Superior to others, much more hath he retained a power in his own hand, whereby he was differenced from any amongst all the rest. 3. Because the Codrids and those who succeeded him, were properly called Kings, and therein they are contra-distinguished from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Princes, and diametrally opposed to them. But I conceive that there was greater reason why Theseus was a King than they were. He was heroic, and not so were they. Yea, Heraclid in plain terms saith, that Kings were not abrogated from amongst the Athenians till the posterity of Codrus became effeminate and lecherous. At which time (saith he) they were taken-away, and Princes put in their room. Observe therefore, that from Theseus until the last of the Corids, the Athenian Monarchy was regulated. We establish the point thus. 1. Because Theseus himself (as is proved already) was regulated: Ergo far more Codrus and his posterity were regulated. Theseus was of an heroic temper, such as were not the Codrids. And so by nature he was more disposed for an absolute way of governing than they. He lived in an heroic time, wherein Monarchy was most in request. But their time was of another stamp wherein Monarchy was wearing-out of request. 2. Because, whileas the Grecians carried-on an Engagement against Troy, at that time the Athenian Monarchy remained regulated also. Justin saith, that Demophoon son to Theseus was Captain of the Athenian navy, which went out with Agamemnon against the Trojans. lib. 2. But we believe other more ancient Writers rather than him, who say, that the Captain of the Athenian navy than was Mnestheus, Theseus son. Dict. cret. de bell. Tro. lib. 1. Dar. Phr. de exc. Tro. lib. and Homer. Iliad. 2. Howsoever Plutarch gathereth from the way of Homer's speaking of the Navy, which came from Athens, under the conduct of Mnestheus, that Theseus government was regulated and much impaired: for (saith he) Homer doth call these ships, as belonging to the People. in Thes. Just so say Dictys Cretensis, & Dares Phrygius. And so Plutarch's way of reasoning holding good the Athenian Monarchy, whether under Mnestheus, as some say, or under Demophoon, as Justin saith, was not absolute but limited: for the ships which were rigged-out of Athens, against Troy were not called Mnestheus or Demophoon's ships, but ships belonging to the people of Athens. Well, I reverence this consequence, not for it-self (for Homer speaketh that same way of the out rigging of ships in other Grecian Kingdoms, where I do not think but there was absolute Monarchy, though in some things peradventure circumscribed) but for Plutarch's authority. And so in this matter resting upon it, I conclude, that seeing the Athenian Monarchy was kept within the bounds of Law, in the days of Mnestheus and Demophoon two brave Heroes, much more was it of a circumscribed power in the days of Codrus and his posterity, who were but of an ordinary and non-heroick temper. And as for Codrus himself, I do not think that such a man would have endeavoured the away-taking of those liberties wherewith Theseus privileged the Athenians, whereas in maintenance of their liberties he exposed himself to the undergoing of death it-self. Val. max. lib. 5. cap. 6. Just. lib. 2. Plut. in Codr. Ay, and which is more, whileas the Codrids became lecherous, soft, and effeminate, the Athenians did abrogate Kings from amongst them, and changed their Kings into Princes. Which beareth us this much in hand, that the Athenians did retain a power in themselves, whereby they might either keepin or shutout their Kings. And it is remarkable that it is not said they did abrogate their Kings, because of the tyranny of the Codrids. Heracl. de Pol. Ath. Which insinuateth that notwithstanding their personal escapes and out-breaking, they acted nothing for diminishing the people's Power.  
Thirdly, after the Codrids had become effeminate, and had abused their power, the people took-away Kings from amongst them, and in their room set up Princes. Now, the question may be moved whether or not had these Princes as great power as had Theseus and Codrus? For removing of this difficulty observe, that there were some who did govern only as Princes, and some did rule as Kings. Those who governed as Princes are of a threefold kind. 1. Some of them were appointed to govern for their whole life-time. Who were thirteen in number, each of them reigning after another. 2. Some of them were decennal Princes, seven in number who governed every one of them for the space of ten years. The last of the decennall Princes was Erixias, whose government left-off, an. mun. 3282 before the reign of Pisistratus about 128. years. 3. Some of them were annual and yearly Magistrates. Some would think it strange to say that these three kinds of Princes had that same power and authority which Theseus and Codrus, or any other of the Athenian Kings had. But if you take along with you this distinction, you shall find the matter clear. There is a twofold nonabsolute and circumscribed power. 1. Intensive and substantial. 2. Extensive and circumstantial. It cannot be denied but these Princes in all the three kinds had one and the same power, intensively and essentially, which Theseus and the Codrids had. The reason of this is because the power of the Athenian Kings in itself, and at the utmost was but a regulated power subjected to the Law of the people, as is proved already. Therefore saith Euripides, bringing-in Theseus speaking of the power of the Athenians, 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.—  In English. 
— Athens,  
A city free is not governed by one.  
As King by course the people reign alone.  Whence it is more than evident, that Theseus was no less subjected to Law then any of the people. Thence it is that Diodore reporteth, that the Athenians taking it in an evil part that Helen by lot had fallen to be wife to Theseus, he feared them, and therefore transported her into Amphidria. Rer. ant. lib. 5. cap. 5. And how they keeped both him and the Codrids in subjection to Law, is already proved at length. Which maketh us say, that formally and according to the essential frame of nonabsolute and limited power, they had no more power than any of these Princes abovesaid, who did govern only as Princes: for both of them were subjected to Law, and neither of them had a prerogative over it, and an exemption from it. We have showed already that the Athenian Kings had no such privilege: Ergo far less had the Athenian Princes any such privilege. 1. Because Princes as Princes are ever one way or other inferior to Kings. 2. Because the Athenians changed their Kings into Princes, because their Kings became lecherous, soft, and effeminate. And consequently unless they had changed their power as well as their name, they had wrought to no purpose for reforming the abuses and enormities of their Kings. 3. The annual and yearly Princes, (whereof nine did govern together, six of them being Thesmothites) were solemnly sworn to the people that they should govern according to Law. And he who was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, King, amongst these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Princes, had no more power but to provide for the sacrifices, and to order and govern the battle. Heracl. de Pol. Ath. This cometh just to that which Aristotle saith concerning the detracting of the power of Kings in after-ages. Then (saith he) the people detracted so much from their Kings, that they entrusted them with no more power but to govern the battle, and to oversee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the sacrifices. Polit. 3. cap. 10. This is reckoned-up by him as the lowest degree of Monarchy, which he calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, most according to Law, and of the Laconic kind. Pol. 3. cap. 10. and 11. But if you shall allege that the yearly Princes amongst the Athenians had not such power as the decennal Princes, and those Princes who keeped the government for their life-time, I shall not stand much to yield that: for I suppose that as in some accidental and circumstantial way in the matter of power the Athenian Kings were differenced from the Athenian Princes, so it is most probable that after such a manner, these three foresaid kinds of Athenian Princes were differenced eachone from another; and therefore it is alleged that a Commonwealth was not erected amongst the Athenians till annual Princes were set over them. Which maketh the Princes of the first and second kind, though not of the third, to be reckoned up as Kings. Yet they must give me leave to say, that though the Athenian Commonwealth was not fully and completely established till the upsetting of annual and yearly Princes; notwithstanding in some degree or other, there was ever a Commonwealth amongst them, from the days of Theseus until some of their annual Princes began to usurp and brought them under bondage: for not only, as is said already, their Princes of the third kind, but also their Kings and Princes of the first and second sort were subjected to Law, and the people had a ruling power over them. And so all of them had the like power according to the essential frame of a regulated and nonabsolute power, though the Kings had a more  authority, and might extend their power further according to Law then the Princes, and those of the first kind, than the Princes of the second, or at least of the third kind. Even-as Majors, v. g. have greater power than Alder-men, and Alder-men than Counselors. Howsoever we find that the Princes of the third kind are also called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as well as the rest. They are said to have had the power of the battle, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of the sacrifices. He who had this power is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, King. Thus we find that he had that same power which the Lacedaemonian Kings had. But it is afterward showed that such were proper, though not absolute Kings. Well, I regard not though you esteem not such as Kings properly so called. I lose nothing by this. If we argue from examples of former and ancient Commonwealths, then have we the Athenian and Lacedaemonian Republics as precedents of a popular government and Commonwealth. Friend, this is the mark we drive most at in the matter in hand.  
Those Princes who governed as Kings did usurp a greater power than what according to the fundamental government of the Kingdom, and the institution of Theseus did belong to them. So Cylon endeavoured, but his attempt was choked in the bud. Herod. lib. 5. Thucid. lib. 1. Herac. de Pol. Ath. Cic. de leg. Phutar. de Sol. But what he intended Pisistratus acted, as is storied by the same authors, together with Diogenes Laertius, Valerius maximus, and Diodore. And that usurpation continued until Thrasybilus and Rhinon's days. These did vindicate the liberty of the Athenians, against those tyrants who did keep them under bondage. Herac. de Pol. Ath. Val. max. lib. 4. cap. 1. lib. 5. cap. 6. Aemil. Prob. de Thras. And so their government turned merely popular, and became an even-down Commonwealth. Alex. ab Alex. lib. 4. cap. 23. And as for these Princes we deny not, nor can we say otherwise, but they had, not only as great, but also greater power than any of the Athenian Kings, whether Theseus or any King that succeeded him. And that they were of equal power atleast, is evident: for they did reign not as Princes, but as Kings. Her. de Polit. Ath. And Pisistratus (one of these usurping Kings) in his Epistle to Solon saith plainly that he walked according to Solon's Laws, differing in nothing from the people but in honour and dignity. But he addeth, that he took upon him that power which the Athenians conferred upon Codrus and his posterity. And in this he acknowledgeth that he failed, and had such a power, not by the Law of the Kingdom, but by a Law of his own making. Whence it is evident that Pisistratus by usurpation took upon him as great power as did Codrus, or any of his race. Yea, and that they had greater power, is also clear: for Justine storieth, That after Codrus, whileas the Administration of the Republic was given over into the hands of yearly Magistrates, the King's lust became the People's law. Thus he telleth us, that in the times of defection, and whileas corruption entered the State of Athens, Kings became absolute and were of an arbitrary power. Post Codrum,— administratio Reipublicae annus Magistratibus permissa est. Sed Civitati nullae Leges tunc erant, quia libido Regum pro legibus habebatur. And afterwards he speaketh, how they were reform by Solon, and how Pisistratus and others who succeeded him, did tyrannize over them. Lib. 2. Solon looked upon the Athenians, under Pisistratus reign (albeit he governed according to Solon's Laws) as under the yoke of bondage.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Diog. La. de vit. Phil. lib. 1. in Sol. And it is reported, that Cleon, and those who followed him, destroyed the Commonwealth. Great tyranny there indeed, and arbitrariness of power. Her. de Pol. Ath. Thus we see clearly, how that not only Kings in aftertimes were regulated and in all things subjected to Law, but also, as some of the Athenian Princes were inferior, so some of them were superior to the Athenian Kings.  
In Corinth, the Kingly Government was also regulated. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Herac. de Pol. Corinth. i e. Periander first changed the Commonwealth, taking to himself a guard,— and at last appointing to himself a Senate. Now you must not think, that this Senate had not power over Periander. 1. Because that Senate cannot properly be called a Senate, wherein the King hath a negative voice: It is but at the most a cipher, far from the nature of Senates that were in old amongst the Athenians, Carthaginians, etc. 2. Because Periander, in his Epistle to Solon, advised at him, what he should do in securing himself from those who went about to kill him. And Solon in his Epistle to him, advised him to lay-down his lording power. It is very easy to know what hath been the cause, why his own subjects endeavoured to cut him off: for it is reported of him, that he was the first King who went conveyed with a guard of Soldiers. Whereupon he suffered none to live in the City. This could not but irritate his subjects against him, and make them conspire against his life. See Herod. lib. 5. Diog. La. de vit. Phil. lib. 1. in Sol. & Periand. Herac. de Pol. Corin. Thra. sibulus counsel was just contrary to Solon's. He desired him, to spare none, whether friend or foe, but cut all off. Which he did indeed, as Herodot reporteth. But we must think, that he advised with Solon, after he had put in execution Thrasibulus counsel: for Solon, in his Epistle to him, telleth him, That the way to secure himself in his Kingdom, was, not to cut-off any, but to lay-down his lording power over them. This insinuateth, that he had followed Thrasibulus counsel, and had cut-off his subjects, before either Solon wrote to him, or he had advised with Solon. And Heraclid saith in even-down terms, That he was neither unjust, nor violent, hating all gross and scandalous vices, and commanding all those to be drowned in the sea, who were prostitute to such manner of wickedness. This could not be in the time of his tyranny, when he made havoc of his people, and of which Heraclid speaketh, before he entereth talking any thing of his justice and reservedness. Which is more than apparent to us, that he became a just and moderate man, leaving-off his tyranny and oppression, upon Solon's counsel and advice. And so we fear not to say, that he did put power in the people's hand, adding a Council to him, for keeping him within the bounds of Law. This we may learn from Heraclid, who having spoken of his moderation and justice, telleth us, That he did constitute 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Council or Senate. Verily, we cannot think but it was Periander's wisdom and choice, to follow Solon's counsel, in giving liberty to the people, and in privileging them with a power over him, to hedge-in his ways by the rules of Law. Aristotle saith, that his lording over the people made them lay their heads together against him. Pol. 5. cap. 10. And Solon counselled him, to leave-off his lording power, as the chief and only way of securing himself, and conciliating the favour of the people. Who can think that such a wise man as he (who is reckoned-up amongst the seven Sages) would have despised the counsel of such a wise man, another of the Sages also? Yea Chilo, in his Epistle to Periander, though in a satiric way, is little or nothing different from that which Solon counselled him to. And that Periander practised according to Solon's advice and counsel, is clear, by comparing it with what Heraclid speaketh concerning Periander. He had the wise men, his fellows in wisdom, in greater respect then to postpone any of their advices, as is evident from his Epistle which he written to them. Diog. La. de vit. Phil. lib. 1. in Per. 3. Because it was Periander's express judgement, that Popular Government was better than Monarchy, Dio. La. ibid. Now, this could not be, whileas Periander delighted to lord and tyrannize over his people. And so, 'tis more than probable, that as he changed his judgement, he likewise changed his practice. These two go always hand in hand together. Wherefore to me it is more than evident, that Periander gave his people power over him, and willingly subjected himself too Law.  
Regal Government amongst the Carthaginians, in aftertimes was regulated, and in all things subjected to Law. But you will do well to consider with me these things. 1. As Carthage was in its beginnings. 2. As it was in after-ages. In the first respect, it cannot be denied, but Regal Government in it was absolute. Firstly, Because Dido, the first founder of Carthage was worshipped by the Carthaginians as a Goddess. Secondly, Because Dido, by her own proper industry builded Carthage, and made the Carthaginians a People. Just. lib. 18. Thirdly, Because in the beginning Kingly Government was most in request. And therefore Kingdoms in the beginning were governed by Kings. So say Aristotle, Justin and Sallust. Then men were little acquainted with the rules of Policy. Which makes Aristotle say, that Kingly Government in the beginning was established, because it was then difficult and hard to find-out many men of wit and judgement, to govern the Commonwealth. Pol. lib. 3. cap. 11. & lib. 4. cap. 13. We shall therefore not judge it strange, that Kings in the beginning of any Kingdom were absolute and of an arbitrary power. People then had not policy, and knew not how to exercise Law aright, and to keep their Kings within the bounds thereof. But according to the second respect, we must think that there was a change in Court. Then the Carthaginian Kings became subjected to Law. It is therefore reported, that Machaeus (or, as Orosius saith, Mezeus) was banished by the Carthaginians. And finding, that (after he was by strength of hand released from his banishment) he endeavoured to lord over them, they accused him, and executed judgement on him, as on a malefactor and parricide, both as a Rebel against his Country, and as a murderer of his son. Just. lib. 18. Tell me not that Machaeus was not their King, but the general Captain of their Army. (1) Because his son Cartalo, was by the Carthaginians trimmed-up in a Kingly attire, instead of Machaeus his father; they clothed him in Purple, and put a Crown of Gold upon his head. This signifieth that Machaeus was of a Kingly Power, though not boundless and arbitrary. Just. ibid. (2) Because the Lacedaemonian Kings had no power, but of the battle. And yet they were properly Kings. But Machaeus had such a power as that. (3) Because it cannot be denied, but Machaeus had as great power as Hannibal. Mago succeeded to Machaeus, Asdrubal to Mago, and Hannibal to Asdrubal. Just. ibid. But it is known, that Hannibal was of a Kingly Power: for he was one of the two Carthaginian Kings, Aemyl. prob. in Han. 'Tis remarkable that Hannibal, for fear of the Carthaginian Senate, fled into Syria. Wherefore the Senate forfeited his estate, did cast down his house, and declared him a banished man. Prob. ib. Plut. in Han. Howsoever Aristotle in even-down terms telleth us, That the Carthaginian Kings were subjected to Law. For comparing the Carthaginian, and Lacedaemonian Commonwealths together, he saith, that the Carthaginian Kings, and Senat were just so as the Lacedaemonian Kings and Senators: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Pol. 2. cap. 9 And so he subjoineth, that the People both amongst the Carthaginians, and Lacedæmonians, did command both King and Senate, having a power of judging them, and of contradicting their Ordinance. That same also he saith of the Cretian Commonwealth. And cap 7. he says That Cosmi amongst the Cretians, had the same power which Ephori had amongst the Lacedæmonians. I confess in that chap. he saith, That in the beginning the Cretians were governed by Kings, who were at last taken away, and the power of the battle devolved upon the Cosmi. This maketh nothing against us: for so he insinuateth, that the Cretian Kings had but the power of the battle, seeing in putting-out their Kings he speaketh of no more power that was added to the Cosmi, but that they were entrusted with the managing of the war. And cap. 9 in plain terms he saith, (comparing the Cretian and Lacedaemonian Commonwealths together) That the Cretian Kings and Senate were of the same stamp and condition, of which were the Lacedaemonian Kings and Senators. And (saith he) in the Carthaginian, Lacedaemonian, and Cretian Commonwealths, the people had power both over King and Senate, to judge and withstand them.  
As for the Lacedaemonian Kings, it is beyond all controversy, that in after-ages they were subjected to Law, no less than the people. Therefore saith Xenophon, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. De Repub. Laced. lib. i e. Lycurgus did not suffer a lording and tyrannic power to be given to the King, nor did he put such power in the people's hand, as to beget jealousy and envy against the kingly power. And Aristotle saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. 3. cap. 10. i. e. The Kingly Power in the Laconic Commonwealth is most restricted to Law: for it hath not a  and arbitrary power. This maketh him say, Pol. 2. cap. 7, & 9 That the Kingly Power was subjected to the People, and the Ephori had the greatest power in the Commonwealth. Which cometh just to that which Heraclid saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. De Pol. Laced. i e. The Lacedaemonian Ephori had the greatest power in the Commonwealth. Xenophon likewise saith, That the King did swear monthly to the People, to govern according to Law. De Rep. Lac. lib. And Nicolaus Damascenus, That he did swear to govern according to Law, before he got the Crown. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. De Mor. Gent. Laced. And how great the power of the Ephori, the Representative of the People, was over all the rest of the Magistrates in the Commonwealth, you may learn it from Plat. de Leg. lib. 4. Isoc. Pan. & Plut. de Civil. Instit. Whereupon saith Xenophon, they had power of deposing, imprisoning and judging (even to the sentence of death) the rest of the Magistrates. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. De rep. Laced. lib. And because of the vastness of their power over the rest of the Magistrates, they did at their own hand imprison and condemn Agis their King, Plut. in Ag. In this they went against the Law of the Nation, because according to it, they had only power to judge and sentence their King, whileas the King of the other family did sit upon the Bench with them. Pausan. Lacon. But they without the concurrence of any, at their own hand did imprison and sentence Agis. The power of the Lacedaemonian King is taken-up in these notions. 1. At home he had charge of the sacrifices, Arist. Pol. 3. cap. 10. Herod. lib. 6. Xenoph. de rep. Lac. lib. of ordaining Magistrates and Priests, and of dismissing Messages, whether friendly or hostile. See Herod. & Xenoph. ibid. But Xenophon saith, That at home he had but the honour of a private man. 2. From home, and in the battle, he was first, and had the chief hand in managing the matters of the war: So say the forecited Authors.  
Inst. 1. The Lacedaemonian Monarchy (saith Salmasius) was peculiar. All other Monarchies beside were absolute and of an uncircumscribed power, though some were more intense, and some more remiss. And (saith he) the Lacedaemonian Kings were rather General Captains, than Kings. Therefore Aristotle defineth their power, to be a power of commanding the battle, from a perpetual title of birthright. Pol. 3. cap. 10.14. Yea, and though the Lacedaemonian Ephori did cut-off Agis, yet notwithstanding the people did abominate and detest that fact. Def. Reg. cap. 8. Wherefore the man doth esteem the annual Carthaginian Kings properly not to have been Kings. Otherwise (saith he) the Judges of Israel may also properly be called Kings: for they had that same power which the Carthaginian Kings had. The one were called Sophetim, and the other Sufetes. Both which come to one purpose. And yet (saith he) the Scripture calleth the Judges of Israel, Kings, Judg. 18. But this must be taken in an improper sense. And so he concludeth, that Probus doth call the Carthaginian Sufetes, Kings improperly. Def. Reg. cap. 7.  
Ans. We do much wonder at the man, who is not ashamed to say, that all Monarchies besides the Lacedaemonian were absolute and unsubjected to Law. We have evinced the contrary of that already, having showed from the examples of many Commonwealths, that Kings were no less subjected to Law then any of the people. And in this the manner of Royal Power amongst the Romans is not wanting. The power of the King was subjected to the Senate. Rex ad Senatum referebat. Pomp. Laet. de mag. Rom. i e. The King had his refers to the Senate. Penes hoc quidem senatores adeo semper totius Reipublicae summa innixa est, ut ne Reges quidem, consuls, aut Dictatores, aut alius quispiam magistratus inconsulto Senatu quippiam moliretur. Fenest. de mag. Rom. i e. The sum and head of the whole Commonwealth did ever so depend from these senators, that even Kings, Consuls, or Dictator's, or any other Magistrate did not enterprise any thing without consulting the Senat. Senatores,— voluti praesides, & Reipublicae custodes, tantae authoritatis fuere, ut si populus Regem, aut magistratum quempiam jussisset, id sic ratum foret, si Senatus author fieret. Alex. ab Al. lib. 4. cap. 11. i. e. The Senators,— as Precedents and keepers of the Republic were of so great authority that if the people had commanded the King, or any Magistrate, that accordingly should be ratified, if the Senate authorised it. See also Liv. lib. 1. Dionys. lib. 2. Digest. lib. 1 tit. 9 Luci. Ann. lib. 1. cap. 1. & Plut. in Romul. Ay, which is more, Dictatours (whereof Julius Caesar was one) who amongst the Romans were of greater power than Kings, were subjected to the Tribunes: for it is reported that M. Fabius' appealing from L. Papyrius dictator to the Tribunes, by their authority exempted his son Q Fabius from punishment. Alex. de Alex. lib. 1. Well, we shall not allege that the Tribunes, the Representative of the people, had greater authority positively in exercising acts of Law then the Dictatours: for not only Alexander ab Alex. lib. 1. Geni. di. cap. 3. lib. 4. cap. 23. lib. 5. cap. 2. but also Pomponius Laet. de magist. Rom. and Fenestella de mag. Rom. lib. alt. do plainly say, that in respect of positive authority the Dictatours were above the Tribunes, and there was no appellation from them. Yet all of them say, that in respect of negative authority, the Tribunes were above Dictatours, Consuls, and all the rest of the Roman Magistrates, because they had power of interdicting and discharging all the rest of the Magistrates, Dictatours, or any other from undertaking any thing as they judged fit and expedient, should neither be acted-for nor against. And so having this power de jure, as is condescended upon by Alexander himself, and all others, I admire why Alexander maketh any question concerning M. Fabius appellation from the dictator to the Tribunes: for so he did not appeal to them, as to judges of greater authority than the dictator, but as to propugnatours and defenders, having a power of inhibiting what was done, as they judged amiss by the rest of the Magistrates. Albeit they had not a main voice in judging (wherein the power of the dictator was above theirs) and in descerning, yet had they a main voice in defending, approving and disapproving.  
And whereas this man allegeth that Aristotle is of his judgement, he is close mistaken: For Aristotle doth not define the Laconic Monarchy, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the power of the battle, according to a perpetual title from blood-right, because he opinionateth that the Lacedaemonian Kings were not properly Kings, but because the greatest authority the Lacedaemonian Kings had, was in leading-forth the Army. There indeed they were primi above the Senate and Ephorie. Whereupon he also calleth the Laconic Monarchy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a power of leading forth the Army by its own power. He is so far from being of Salmasius opinion, that contrariwise he reckoneth up the Laconic Monarchy amongst the proper species and and kinds of royal power. Polit. 3. cap. 10. and 11. And whileas he speaketh of the Lacedaemonian Kings, he doth so call them, Pol. 2. cap. 7. and 9  
Inst. 2. Aristotle doth so (saith Salmasius) 1. Because the power of the battle was hereditary to the Lacedaemonian Kings. 2. Because the Lacedaemonian Kings in battle had a full free and Kingly power. Ay, (saith he) they had also a power in those things, which related to the ceremonies, wherewith Kings in old were solemnly entrusted. Def. Reg. cap. 8. Ans. The first reason is forthwith nought. 'Tis a bad consequence: The Lacedaemonian Kings were hereditary Commanders of the Army in chief: Ergo Aristotle because of that calleth them Kings. Quasi vero he had had no such reason for him to call them Kings, if they had only been entrusted with the power of the battle by election. Friend, you are alittle mistaken in this. 1. Because Aristotle divideth the power of the battle into hereditary and elective power. Pol. 3. cap. 10. Thus he contradistinguisheth the one from the other, as two different species properly and specifically differencing the power of the battle in general. 2. Because a Kingly power is not therefore Kingly, because it is hereditary. Yea, which is more, a Kingly power, caeteris requisitis, is properly and formally elective. And therefore Aristotle should have had more reason to have called them Kings, if their power had been by election, and not by succession. So the man himself judgeth whileas he saith, that the Carthaginian and Cretian kings were better ordained then the Laconic; Because (saith he) the Laconic kings are ordained by succession, and they by election. And he addeth a reason to this, because saith he, by election the best are choosed, whereas by blood-right the like cannot be had. Whereupon (saith he) the hereditary title of Kings amongst the Lacedæmonians hath brought great hurt and detriment unto the Commonwealth. Polit. 2. cap. 9 And as for his second reason, it plainly contradicteth himself: for so he confesseth, that in the battle they had a Kingly power. And he hath little reason to say, that Aristotle called them Kings because they had a power of over-seeing the sacrifices. So had the Athenian annual Princes, whom properly he will not admit to be called Kings. Howsoever it cannot be denied, but properly they were Kings, albeit they were subjected to Law. 1. Because it doth not follow that a King properly is not a King, because he is a regulated King. We have showed already, that GOD no otherwise mouldeth the King, but as he subjecteth him to Law. Assert. 2. And afterward we shall show how that the Kings of the Jews were regulated Kings. And yet who will deny but they were proper Kings? 2. The King is not properly King, unless he be a regulated King and subjected to Law, as both already and afterward is showed. And therefore the Lacedaemonian Kings were Kings properly, the rather because they were regulated. 3. Because Salmasius himself confesseth, that in the battle the Lacedaemonian Kings had a full and Kingly power. And yet then their power was not absolute and arbitrary. They had not then a full power to act against Law, but according to Law, as you may learn from Conclus. 6. in comparing their power with Agamemnon's power. Therefore either Salmasius will contradict himself, or else he must needs say, that Kings are properly Kings, though they be regulated. 4. Because all that writ of the Lacedaemonian Commonwealth, of whom we have cited many already, do call the Captains-general of their Armies, Kings. And 'tis remarkable that Lysander in an oration, which was found after his death, persuaded the Lacedæmonians to shake-off the Kingly government, and elect a captain-general for governing the battle. Plut. & Aemyl. prob. in Lys. This he speaketh of the Lacedaemonian Kings, as contradistinguished from Captains-general of Armies. O, but (saith Salmasius) Lysander only dehorted the people from setting over their Army's Captain-generalls' by succession, and persuaded them to take from them the name of Kings. Def. reg. cap. 8. See how the man bewrayeth himself: for Lysander was captain-general of the Lacedaemonian Army. And yet he was not their King. Therefore amongst the Lacedæmonians it was one thing to be King, and another thing to be Captain General of the Army. I confess their King had also the power of the Army. But he had not only other power beside, but also he had power of the battle in a more intense way then any deputed and substituted Captain amongst the people. Otherwise there had been no difference between Lysander and the King, who was but only Captain of the Army. Yea, which is more, Lysander doth not speak of shaking-off regium nomen, but regiam potestatem as is clear out of Probus. But sure I am, regia potestas is not nomen regis, but res regis.  
Salmasius shall have no need to deny that the Carthaginian annual Kings were Kings properly so called. But in the interim he shall give us leave to consider and take a light view of the nature of the word sufetes. Which is taken in a twofold sense. 1. Largely. And so the word may be derived from the root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sapha. Whence sufes is all one with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sophe, speculator inspector, episcopus, or ephorus. Thus sufetes may be referred to judges of any sort. And in this sense Alexander ab Alexandro referreth it to the Grecian aesymnetae, the Egyptian dioecetes, the Persian megistanes, the Oscian medix, etc. Geni. di. lib. 4. cap. 23. Him Julius Scaliger followeth, whileas he saith, Porro qui Hebraïce sciunt, & non ignorant Poenos, Tyrorum colonos esse, concedent mihi, Sufes idem esse, quod 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And so the man supplying Festus words, saith, Sufes dictus est Poenorum lingua summus magistratus, ut Oscorum medix, etc. 2. Strictly and by limitation. And so it is derived from the root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saphat. Whence sufes is all one with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sophet. Which in the Greek is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a judge. In this sense it is applied to the Carthaginian yearly Kings, and Roman Consuls. Alex. ab. Al. gen. di. lib. 3. cap. 3. The word sufes by Festus, and T. Livius is rendered consul. So it is by Sabellicus, Aen. 5. lib. 5. It cannot be denied but as sufetes is a Punic word, so in it's most strict and rigorous acceptation, it is only relative to the Carthaginian annual Kings. Yet I must needs say, that as it is taken strictly and by way of limitation, with very good reason in may be referred to the Roman consuls: for they had that same power which the Carthaginian Kings had, and both of them were yearly Magistrates. Having thus discussed the grammary of the word, you may observe, that in its first acceptation it is not only relative to those who in old were above Kings, but also to those who were inferior to them. And in the second acceptation it is relative to such, who amongst the Carthaginians were both re, and nomine Kings, and amongst the Romans, to such who were Kings, not nomine, but re. But if we take sufetes precisely for sophetim, (unless you take sophetim in a larger sense than it is taken in the book of the Judges) you must needs say, that it is only relative to such who were Kings neither re nor nomine: for afterward I shall make it appear, that the Judges of Israel were so far from being of a Kingly power, that contrariwise they were but of equal authority with any of the Sanhedrin. At least it is easy to prove that they were not of a Kingly power, or of such power as had the Roman consuls, and the Carthaginian sufetes, albeit we should say that they were the first of the Sanhedrin, having greater power than any of the rest: for the Athenian annual Princes had more power than any member of the Athenian council, and yet they were not properly Kings. We may say the like also concerning the decennal Princes, and those Princes who amongst the Athenians did govern for their life-time. I deny not but these may be, yea and were, called Kings, who were not so indeed, as the Judges of Israel, Judg. 18. And, we deny not, (as Salmasius will have it, Def. reg. cap. 8.) but many both of old and new also were and are not called Kings, who were and are of greater honour & authority than they. What then? This will never conclude, that the Carthaginian sufetes were not of a Kingly power. Though the word sufetes may be taken for sophetim, yet shall we never conclude therefrom, that the Carthaginian sufetes had no more Power than the Judges of Israel. At the most it concludeth, that they had not a kingly power in a full and intense measure. And therefore the word in its most native signification is all one with consuls, who had a kingly power, though not in the highest degree. And for myself, I can find no essential difference between the Carthaginian Sufetes, and the Lacedaemonian Kings. Whereupon I am made to conclude, That as the one, so the other also, were of a kingly power.  
This man looketh upon the offcutting of Kings, as a thing of another world, even as if such a thing had never been practised before since the world began. He telleth us of Agis, how that amongst all the Lacedaemonian Kings, none was cut-off but he. But in the interim he shall observe, that though in the examples which we shall allege to this purpose, there be some of them which speak nothing of the offcutting of Kings. Yet all of them do speak of the punishment of Kings, either one way or other. And know likewise, that in old, Kingdoms in punishing of capital faults, used divers ways of punishment. Amongst the Indians the delinquent, though guilty of the greatest crime, got no more for his punishment, but to be shaved at the King's command. This was thought amongst them a capital punishment. Nicol. Damasc. de Mor. Gent. Ind. Some Nations, who dwelled about Caucasus, on capital transgressors did execute banishment, as a capital punishment. They executed it instead of death. It is reported, That the Tratlians thought it punishment enough to inflict upon a murderer, if he did give a bushel, or measure, of Pulse to the friends of the defunct. The Druids and Cercets, for the greatest faults, did no more, but interdicted the delinquent from being accessary to the sacrifice. The like punishment was also executed upon sacrilegious persons in Elephantine Ethiopia. Alex. ab. Al. gen. di. lib. 3. cap. 5. Where if the Reader shall be pleased a little to trouble his eyes, he shall see how that some Nations in old, according to the Laws of the kingdom, in their punishments were most severe, though against the smallest faults, and some were not so, but were most remiss in their punishment, though against the greatest crimes. Therefore Salmasius shall not think, that those, who did not punish their Kings with death, were any more favourable to them, than those, who did bring them to the scaffold and cut-off their heads: for he may see, that amongst some Nations, even a small punishment was thought capital. We shall therefore think, that the Egyptians of old in with holding stately and glorious burials from their delinquent Kings, did esteem that as great, if not a greater punishment, then if they should have brought them forth, and caused cut-off their head. Diod. rer. of't. lib. 2. cap. 3. In Meros' they withdrew themselves from the society of their delinquent Kings, till through want of company they consumed away in languish. This they esteemed a greater punishment, (and indeed so it was) then if they should have brought him to the scaffold. Alex. ab. Alex. lib. 3. cap. 5. And how the Egyptians plagued Amasis their King, is storied already, Prop. 1. Ans. The Senate amongst the Cumaeans, which they called Phylactus, holding their Kings by the hand, still detained them till they either rewarded them, or punished them according to their deserts. Alex. ab. Alex. ib. The heroic Theseus was banished by the Athenians. Val. max. lib. 5. cap. 3. Diod. Sic. rer. of't. lib. 5. cap. 5. Plut. in Thes. Sardanapalus, because of his beastliness and sensuality, was dethroned by his subjects. Arist. Po. lit. lib. 5. cap. 10. Metasth. an. Pers. lib. Just. lib. 1. Diod. Sic. ant. lib. 3. cap. 7. And (as Herodotus, lib. 1. storieth) after Sardinapalus was put out of the way, both the Assyrians and Medes for a long time were governed without Kings, by Popular government. The Athenians did cut-off Cylon, together with his complices, who intruded himself upon the Kingdom, or at least endeavoured to do so. So did they cut-off Hipparchus, son to Pisistratus, and also endeavoured the offcutting of Thessalus, another of his sons, who succeeded to him in the Kingdom. They did also cut-off Cleon, together with 1500 with him, who had destroyed the Commonwealth. Herac. de Pol. Ath. They caused Miltiades to die in prison, although he was King of Chersonesus. Herod. lib. 6. Val. max. lib. 5. cap. 3. Aemil. Prob. in vit. Miltiad. Plut. in vit. Cim. And you will find Aristotle tell you in the general concerning Pisistratus and his posterity, who were Kings in Athens, how they were punished and shut from their Kingdom. Pol. 5. cap. 10. Leonidas, King of Lacedemonia was banished. So was Cleombrotus. And Agis was imprisoned, and cut-off in prison, though I must needs say, unjustly. Plut. in Ag. & Cle. But Aristotle shutteth-up all this in a word, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. Therefore the Lacedæmonians have destroyed many kingly powers. Pol. 5. cap. 10. The Syracusians, under the conduct of Dion, expelled Dionysius, and banished him. Arist. Pol. 5. cap. 10. Aemil. Prob. & Plut. in Dion. The Carthaginians once banished, and at last did cut-off Machaeus. Just. lib. 18. They also banished Hannibal, and forfeited his estate: And if he had not stolen away privily, they had cut him off. Plut. & Prob. in Han. Tarqvinius superbus, C. Caesar, and D. Nero, were cut-off by the Romans. Luc. An. lib. 1. cap. 7. lib. 4. cap. 2. Plut. in C. Caes. & Carol. M. Suet. in C. Caes. & Ner. Aurel. victor. in Ner. Epit. vit. Caes. in C. Caes. Ignat. Rom. prin. in lib. 1.  
Inst. 3. O but (saith Salmasius) Nero was cut-off, not de jure, but de facto. And (saith he) there was as great a difference between Charles and Nero, as was between the Roman Senators, and the English Butchers. Def. Reg. cap. 4. Ans. This poor man ●oweth not what he would be at. His over-word is, Did ever any, as the Rebels in England, cut-off their King? Was ever any Nation (saith he) so monstruous, so cruel, and so barbarous as the English Rebels, Cutpurses, and bloody Butchers, who dared to put hand in their dread Sovereign? Read this man's Book all over, and you will find this to be over-word: What? Did not the Senate of Rome cut-off Nero? And yet (saith he) never any before did cut-off their King, but the English Enthusiasts, and giddyheaded Traitors. The man needeth not to look upon the offcutting of Charles, as a thing singular: If he will not be wilfully deluded, he may learn from what foregoeth, many examples of punishing, and cutting-off delinquent Kings. The Question between us is not only, whether, or not Kings, de jure, may be cut-off; but also, whether, or not, de facto, Kings were punished and cut-off by the People? Concerning the fact, Salmasius cannot get it denied, albeit he strives to justle us out of it, by changing the state of the question, and starting aside from that, which for the present is most in hand. And I wonder much, that the man calleth in question the lawfulness of the fact of the Roman Senate, in causing Nero to be cut-off. And as for the jus and lawfulness of the Roman Senat's fact, in cutting-off Nero, I know not, if any beside Salmasius can deny it, but an incarnate Devil: he was a murderer, a parricide, a persecuter of the Saints, and a destroyer of the Commonwealth. And Royalists themselves have not a face to deny, that it is lawful to cut-off Tyrants. And whereas he saith, That there was a difference between Nero and Charles, and between the Senators of Rome, and the Representative of England. So say I too. Nero was an Ethnic, but Charles a Christian. But friend, nomine Christian, and re Antichristian. In this he was worse than Nero, more dangerous at least, though not so gross. Nero was a parricide, but not Charles. Yet let me tell you, as they differed in some things, they agreed in other things. As Nero was an enemy to Christ's reign, so was he. As Nero was a murderer, so was he. As Nero was a persecuter of the Saints, so was he. And as Nero was a destroyer of the Commonwealth, so was he. And as for the Representative of England, they differ from the Roman Senators in this, that they professed friendship to Christ, & the Roman Senators in Nero's time were not so. And who, but enemies to Christ, will say, That Ethnics had more power to execute judgement on a Tyrant, a persecuter of the Saints, and a destroyer of the Commonwealth, than such had in executing judgement on a man of that same stamp, rather worse than better?  
And to draw home to our own doors, we will give you some examples out of the English and Scotish Chronicles, how Kings were punished and brought upon the stage. Amongst the English Kings, we find these, Gorboniannus, Emeriannus, Vortiger, Edwine: All these were dethroned and put from their Kingdom. Edward 2. was imprisoned by the Barons, with the help of the young Queen and Prince. Edward 5. was dethroned, and obscurely buried in the Tower of London. Amongst the Scotish Kings we find not a few, who were either banished, imprisoned, or cut-off. Thereus by his Nobles was constrained to flee for fear of them. Durstius was killed in battle by his People. Gillus, his People and Nobles arising against him, diffiding his own, fled into Ireland, and at last was discomfited, taken, and killed. Evennus 3. was taken in battle by his Nobles, & condemned into perpetual bonds. Dardanus was taken in battle, and being beheaded, his head was hanged-up for a spectacle, and his body cast into a Sink. Lugthacus, once was censured by a Parliament, for slighting the counsel of the States, in appointing base men to Public Offices; and at last he was killed by the Noblemen and People. The like happened to Mogaldus. Conarus degraded and imprisoned (where he died) till he resigning the Kingdom, they substituted another. Athirco being pursued by his Nobles, killed himself. Donaldus 3. usurper, was killed by Crathilinthus, idonea manu collecta. Romachus was censured by the Parliament, and being beheaded by his Nobles, his head was put upon a pole. Constantinus 1. was punished by his States. Ferchardus 1. (Renuentem, arce expugnata,— in jus pertrahunt) in prison killed himself. Ferchardus 2. was also censured by the Parliament. Egenus 8. was put to death by the Parliament, all consenting thereto. Donaldus 5. being censured by the Parliament, was put in prison, where he killed himself. So Ethus being dethroned, in prison died of grief. Constantine 4. was killed in battle. Grimus, being taken in battle, his eyes were put out, and he died of wounds and grief. Macbethus being vanquished, fled into the Castle of Dunse, where he was killed. Donald 7. was made to flee by Duncanus (for whom the Nobles sent) in Aebudas. Duncanus was made to flee, and afterward put in prison, where he died. This was done by Edgar, sent for by the Noblemen to that purpose. Edward Balliol was expelled and shutout of his kingdom. James 3. was killed in the pursuit by his Nobles. Q. Marry was arraigned in Parliament, and by a great part condemned to death, by many to perpetual imprisonment. What will Salmasius say to these practices? Or rather, what will the Scots speak of them? O marvellous and unspeakable Providence! Never enough admired, never enough praised: Behold, and see in this matter the stately steps of Providence. It is known this day to the world, that no Nation is so malignant as Scotland, so much idolizeth a King, and doteth upon him as it doth: It is not ashamed, to postpone Christ's Interest to Caesar's. No Nation pleadeth so much for absolute power to the King, as it doth; It pleadeth for an absolute immunity to the King, from all punishment and restraint. And yet (albeit I have read most of the ancient and chief Chronicles of all the ancientest and chiefest Kingdoms of the world) I never read of any Kingdom that proceeded so much against, and so often did punish delinquent Kings, as the Scots in old have done. No question, our LORD in his wisdom hath done this, that the ancient Scots may stand up in judgement today, to condemn the practice of the latter Scots, who are not ashamed to idolise a King, a creature like themselves.  
Having most abundantly evidenced, how that Regal power in many foreign Kingdoms, in old, hath been subjected to Law, no less than any inferior power; we do now in the next room, drawing home toward our own doors, demonstrate, the King of Britain to be a regulated and nonabsolute King, according to the Laws and Customs of England and Scotland. As for England, we must needs take it under these notions: 1. As it was before Julius Caesar conquered it: for that time, it is thought very doubtsome and uncertain, and therefore I mind to pass it at this time, till afterwards in a more convenient place; in a word, not sparing to say, that Brutus, the first King of England, was an absolute King: for as he lived in the days of the Heroes, wherein Regal power was most in request, so by his own proper conduct and industry, he firstly founded and planted a Kingdom there. This cometh nigh that which Aristotle saith, alleging that in the days of the Heroes Kings had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Observe by the way, that though 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 draweth nigh to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, yet is there some difference between them. But how they differ, as also how Aristotle in this place is to be understood, you have at length expressed afterward. Now Aristotle for his saying assigneth many causes, amongst which these be, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, either by gathering people together, or by purchasing a Kingdom. Polit. 3. cap. 10. Now Brutus, as is reported, did both these. And consequently, we need not scruple to say, that he had a full and absolute power. We dare not say so much in behalf of his posterity, and those who immediately succeeded him. Heroîcisme than was upon the declining hand, and withal, the people were not so much engaged to them as to Brutus himself. And, after the Line of Brute was ended, it is reported, that Corbomannus K. 28. was deposed by the people, which could not have been, if he had had an absolute and arbitrary power. Emerianus K. 34. when he had tyrannously reigned seven years, was deposed. Chirennus, K. 41. through his drunkenness reigned but one year. Whereupon we may very probably conclude, that from Brutus unto Cassivelanus, who was subdued by Julius Caesar, the English Kings were not absolute. 2. As it was from Julius Caesar, unto William the Conqueror. As for this time, there may be something said for the absoluteness of the English Kings. If we speak of those Kings whom the Roman Emperors deputed, it is likely, they had an absolute power, by derivation from the Roman Emperors, as had Herod from Antonius, and the Roman Senat. Jos. of't. lib. 15. cap. 4. And whileas the Englishes were subdued by the Danes and Saxons, I think it no wonder, though then the Kings of England had an absolute power, and that which is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. We have showed already, that conquering Kings are all-commanding Kings. See. Concl. 1.4. And those who are acquainted with the English History, do know, that from Cassivelanus, unto William the Conqueror, the Kingdom of England was never free, either of intestine or of foreign wars. It was no time then for exercising Laws to the full against any, much less Kings. There were some of their Kings at that time, to whose conduct and valour the Englishes were much engaged, in maintaining their Liberties, and withstanding the force and fury of the common Enemy. No wonder, though such, by way of gratification, were invested with a full and large power. Others again were mere Conquerors, or else deputed by the Conqueror. And so we think, there was reason for it, why such were clothed with an absolute and plenary power: for then the Kingdom of England was not under Kings, but under Masters. And what can Masters do, but lord over their servants? All that while the Kingdom of England was an unsettled Kingdom, and could scarcely be called it's own. Which maketh me in reason conclude, that then there was little time left for exercising Policy, and putting Laws in execution. This Polydorus Virgilius telleth in a word, whileas he saith, that before Henry 1. there were few Conventions made by the Kings amongst the people, for ordering according to Law the business of the Kingdom. Angl. hist. lib. 11. Although in an absolute notion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, we may say, that from Brutus unto Cassivelanus, and from Cassivelanus unto William the Conqueror, Kingly Government in England was nonabsolute, and without full power, yet we cannot say so in a relative notion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as afterward shall appear.  
3. As the Kingdom of England was about the days of the Conqueror, whether a little before, or afterward, unto this time. We deny not but under the reign of the Conqueror himself, Regal Government in England, was of a most absolute and arbitrary power. In this we take Salmasius by the hand. He needed not Def. Reg. cap. 8. to have troubled himself to have cited any Authors for proof thereof: Very reason it-self teacheth the point: for he subdued England by strength of hand. But sure I am, a Conqueror may dispose upon a conquered Kingdom, according to his pleasure. It is an act of favour in him if he do not destroy all, much more as an absolute Lord to rule over all. In the interim I desire Salmasius to take a view of Polyd. Virg. Angl. hist. lib. 9 where he shall find the point evidenced to his heart's desire, beyond any Historian he citeth. Although in this we go-along with him (as we must needs do) yet notwithstanding we cannot say so much, whether concerning Edward who preceded, or those who succeeded him. Let it be so, that those who succeeded the Conqueror, had the same privileges which the Conqueror did arrogat to himself. Yet can it not be denied, but according to Edward the Confessor his Laws, or as they are called, the ancient Laws of the Kingdom, Kingly Government in England is regulated, and not absolute. We make the point good from these reasons. Firstly, because according to these Laws the King of England is not hereditary. And therefore we read not, that ever Edward did tie the Crown of England to Royal succession. I confess, it is alleged, that he promised the Crown after him to William the Conqueror, (who was of near kindred and great credit with him) if he had not children of his own. But this is not only improbable in it-self, but also it is so judged. And why shall we think otherways of it, seeing the Conqueror came not to the Crown of England, by blood-right, but by mere Conquest, having the whole Kingdom of England against him? And Polydore saith, Hinc colligere licet, vel Edovardum non servasse fidem Gulielmo, quam à principio de hereditate regni, non satis considerate dedisset,— vel nullum (quod verisimilius est) fecisse promissum. Angl. hist. lib. 8. This he gathereth from that which Edward spoke to Haraldus, whileas he prayed GOD, that either he would avert the coming of England into the conquerors hand, or else that he would keep him back from it so long as he lived. Therefore to me it is more than apparent, that the Confessor did not in his Testament assign the Conqueror to the Crown, albeit Salmasius allegeth the contrary, Def. Reg. cap. 8. What? Doth not Polydore tell us, that because Edgarus was of young and tender years, he was not admitted by the people to reign? And fearing lest the Conqueror should succeed to the Crown, they rejoiced greatly, that Harald took upon him to reign in Edward's room: Whereat (as may be learned from Polydore) Edward was not displeased himself, but very well satisfied that Harald should succeed to him. Whereupon we fear not to say, that not only the power of enki●ging was in the people's hands, but also, that the Confessor did not promise the Kingdom to the Conqueror after him, although the contrary be alleged. And is it likely, that the people would have so much declined and withstood the Conqueror, if Edward had assigned him to the Crown, as his heir? No verily; for they adored him as their Lawgiver. It is known, that Rufus was but third son to the Conqueror, and yet he was created King. Him the people preferred before Robert his eldest brother. What? Would they have done so, if blood-right, by the Law of the Kingdom, had been the title to the Crown? No verily: It is remarkable, that Rufus was ordained King, and it was not so much as objected, that Robert was elder than he, he being but the third son to the Conqueror, and Robert being the eldest Yea, Rufus dying without children, they appointed Henry, the conquerors fourth son, King; as yet passing-by Robert the eldest. And (which is more) though Henry 1. had left in his Testament, his daughter Mathildis, together with her sons, as heirs of the Kingdom, yet notwithstanding the people created Steven, Nephew to Henry 1. By the authority of Parliament it was ordained, that Steven so long as he lived, should enjoy the Kingdom of England, and that Henry 2. son to Mathildis, daughter to Henry 1. should succeed to Steven in the Kingdom of England, passing-by any that was begotten by Steven. Likeways the people created John King; although K. Richard (dying without heirs) had left Arthure, son to Gaufredus, who was elder than John, heir to the Crown. I might speak more for clearing this purpose, but I forbear, judging this sufficient. Whence it is more than evident, that the Crown of England, since the days of Edward the Confessor, by no Law of the Kingdom, is hereditary. I confess, since that time, now and then, the King's eldest son did succeed, and was holden as He●r of the Kingdom. But this was only by custom, through favour of the Race, in which, according to the manner of Nations, (which I must needs call an abuse) very ordinarily the firstborn, is preferred as the only lawful Heir of the Crown. Therefore seeing the Crown of England since that time hath not been (at least, precisely) hereditary; to me it seemeth very probable, that for that time it hath not been absolute and arbitrary: for so the original and fountain-power of enkinging is in the People's hands. And consequently in this respect, the People are simply above the King, as the cause is simply above its effect. Philosophers say, That causa est nobilior suo effectu. And so, seeing the King of England dependeth from the People; no question, they have simply a power over him, and not he an absolute power over them.  
Secondly, Because, according to these Laws, the liberty of the subject is vindicated, and the Prince is subjected to Law. Because in Henry 1. his time, a Parliament was holden. At which time Parliamentary Power by the Law of the Kingdom was declared the Supreme and highest Authority: for any thing of weight was referred to it. So that whatsoever was done, either by the command of the King, or of the People, it was holden null, unless it had been ratified by the Parliament. In it every one, whether King, or other Members thereof, have alike and equal power of speaking. And withal, nothing spoken in it is of validity and force, unless it be concluded on by the major part, together with the approbation of the King. Polyd. Ang. hist. lib. 11. It is observable, That by the authority of the Parliament it was ordained, That Steven so long as he lived, should remain King of England, and that Henry 2. afterward should succeed him. By whose mediation and authority, the debate between Henry and Steven touching the Crown, was decided. And, I pray you, how could these things have been, unless the Parliament had been above the King?  
Inst. 4. But (saith Salmasius) the power of convocating, and dissolving the Parliament, belongeth to the King of England. The power of the Parliament is extraordinary, and pro tunc. But the power of the King is ordinary and perpetual. And likewise, the King of England in Parliament, hath a negative voice. And therefore in many Acts of Parliament, he is called the King and Lord of the Parliament, and what is ordained, is enacted in his Name. And so (saith he) though the King of England doth act according to the Laws of the Kingdom, and concurrence of his Parliament, yet notwithstanding, he is an absolute King. Otherwise the Kings of the Jews had not been absolute, who had power to do nothing without the consent of the Sanhedrin. And Artaxerxes had not been absolute, who could not be reconciled to Vasthi, because the Law discharged it. Yea, if Kings were not absolute, because they act according to the Law, and the advice of their Parliament; then Cambyses had not been absolute; who conveened a Council, whileas be intended to marry his german sister, and demanded of them, if there was any such law for allowing such a marriage. Def. Reg. cap. 8. & 9  
Answ. Salmasius shall do well, to consider these few things. 1. What the power of the English Parliament is. Which is defined by Camdenus, to be made-up of three Estates, having the highest and most sovereign power in making Laws, confirming Laws, annulling Laws, interpreting Laws, and in doing every thing wherein the good of the Commonwealth is concerned. Brit. chorog. de Tribun. Ang. This is far from Salmasius mind, who (Def. Reg. cap. 9) opinionateth, that the Parliament hath not power over every thing in the Kingdom. But Polydore summeth-up the power of the Parliament under these notions. First, Every thing wherein the good of the Commonwealth is interested, is referred to it. Secondly, Whatsoever is done at the command, whether of King or People, is of none effect, unless it be authorized by the Parliament. Thirdly, It establisheth and taketh away Laws, as it judgeth fit. Fourthly, Every Member of it hath alike power and freedom in voicing. And what is decreed and enacted by Parliament, he calleth it, the proper and municipal Law of the Kingdom. Seeing then the Parliament is the most sovereign and supreme power in the Kingdom of England, according as it was in old; how can it be said, That the King of England hath power over it? If it be so, than you admit two Supreme powers, and a power above a Supreme power; which is contradicent. The Lacedaemonian Ephori were not otherwise above their Kings, but because they were invested with the highest and supreme power. All things were referred to the Parliament, even as the Roman Consuls, as Festus (out of Coelidus) saith, did refer every thing to the Senate. Now, because of this, the Senate had the highest power, and was above the Consuls. Ergo, seeing all matters of the Commonwealth in old, in the Kingdom of England, were referred to the Parliament, no question it had power above the King. The Roman Senate is therefore said, to have been of the supremest power, Fenest. de Magistrate. Rom. cap. 1. because neither Kings, nor Consuls, nor Dictator's, nor any other Magistrate, could do any thing without their advice and counsel. Ergo, seeing whatsoever the King of England, or any other of that Kingdom, did in old, was to no purpose, without the authority and approbation of Parliament, without all controversy the King of England was subjected to the Parliament. Salmasius concludeth the King to be above the Parliament, because he allegeth, the Parliament can do nothing without the King. Why may not I then conclude, the Parliament to be above the King, because re ipsa, and according to the Law of the Kingdom, the King can do nothing without the authority and consent of the Parliament? Where then, I pray you, is the King's negative voice? There is not a Member in Parliament, cui aequa loquendi potestas non competit. So saith Polyd. Angl. hist. lib. 11. What? Do you imagine, that ever the Parliament could by their authority have drawen-up the foresaid agreement, between Steven and Henry 2. unless they had had power above the King? What they did therein, was a direct acting both over Steven their present King, and Henry 2. their future King. But, will you tell me, whileas the States of England did seek of K. John, to be governed by the ancient Laws made by Edward the Confessor, whether or not were these Law's Acts of mere pleasure, giving the King a liberty to do as he would, either to tyrannize over the people, or not? You can not hold the affirmative, because what they demanded of the King, was to be restored to liberty, & to be freed of tyranny. Polyd. Vir. Angl. hist. lib. 15. And if you hold the negative part, then do the ancient Laws of England pull absoluteness out of the king's hands, and subject him to Law. Magna charta saith, The King can do nothing but by Laws, and no obedience is due to him but by Law. And the States of England were so far from permitting John to rule at random, and not according to the ancient Laws of the kingdom, that contrariwise they combined against him, entering in oath together, to pursue him still on, till he should govern according to Law, and establish the ancient Laws of the kingdom. Yea, albeit that Pope Innocent commanded them to lay-down arms, and though upon their denial thereof, they were declared enemies by the Pope, they notwithstanding followed on their purpose, and cryed-out, that they would be avenged by fire and sword, on such a wicked tyrant, who did so much slight the people. Ay, which is more, they sent into France, and from thence brought Ludovick the French king's son, and created him king, notwithstanding any thing either John or the Pope could do in the contrary. Thus they never rested, till in sorrow they brought John's head into the grave. Where I pray you is the absoluteness of the king of England, whenas the States would not suffer him to govern but according to Law, and in denying to do so, pursued him in arms, unkinging him, enkinging another in his room, and bringing himself in sorrow to the grave? This is far from the arbitrary and infinite power of kings, Salmasius speaketh of. And whereas he saith, the Parliament is but extraordinary and pro tunc, this is, either because Kings were long before Parliaments; or because the Parliament hath not power to intermeddle in every business of the Commonwealth, but is convened pro re nata, for ordering the weightiest Affairs of the kingdom. If you say the former, we do not deny it. We hearty confess, that of all Governments, Monarchy was first established. And Aristotle giveth the reason of it, because (saith he) in the beginning it was hard to find-out many men, fit and able to govern. And therefore necessity moved them to lay the government on one: for though in the beginning it was hard to finde-out many, yet was it easy to finde-out one endowed with qualities and gifts for governing. Polit. 3. cap. 11. lib. 4. cap. 13. But though this be granted, yet doth it not follow, but Senates, or Parliaments being established, they have (even according to the custom of the Nations) more power than kings, as is showed already. And therefore Aristotle saith in the places forecited, that by process of time, the number of Common-wealth's-men increasing, kings at last went close out of request, and were denuded of all power. And Pol. 3. cap. 10. he saith, that in aftertimes the power of kings was extremely lessened, partly because of their own voluntary demitting, and partly because of the people's detracting from their greatness. Nay, any king Aristotle alloweth, he alloweth no more power and greatness to him, but to be greater and more powerful than every one separatim, and many conjunctim, but to be of less power and greatness than the people. Pol. 3. cap. 11. But I pray you, what is the Parliament, but the Representative of the people? If you say the other, we deny it, as is showed already. And it seemeth very strange to me, that the Parliament hath not power in small matters, and yet hath power to manage and go about matters of highest concernment. If Salmasius will ask Philosophs, they can tell him, Qui potest majus, potest minus. He imagineth that he gaineth the point, because the King of England had power to conveen and dissolve the Parliament, as he judged fit. This is but a singing of the triumph before the victory: for the Roman Consuls had the same power over the Senat. Alex. ab Alex. gen. di. lib. 3. cap. 3. But who will say, that they had an absolute power over the Senate, though they had power of convocating and dissolving it? It is not unknown, that their power notwithstanding, was a nonabsolute and limited power. Alex. ab Al. ibid. Pompon. Laet. de mag. Rom. cap. 15. Fenest. de mag. Rom. cap. 7. So say Festus and Coelidus.  
2. What honour is given to the King. And if Salmasius will consider this aright, he will find that there is a vast disproportion between his honour and his power, and that there is more given to him in word then in deed. The King of Scotland cannot be called by Salmasius, or any other, an absolute Prince. This afterward shall most evidently appear. And yet in many Acts of Parliament he is called the Parliament's Sovereign Lord and King, and what is enacted in Parliament, ordinarily it is expressed under the King's name. Salmasius imagineth, that this maketh much for his purpose, whileas it is said, Dominus noster Rex, ad petitionem suorum praelatorum, comitum, & baronum congregatorum in Parlamento, constituit certos articulos. In praef. stat. voc. Art. sup. chart. temp. Ed. 1. i. e. Our Lord the King at the desire of his Prelates, Earls and Barons, assembled in Parliament, constituted certain Articles. In Parlamento supremi domini Regis, illius concilium convenit, & ita praeceptum est ab ipsomet. In stat. Escheat. fact. 29. an. Edu. 1. i e. In the Parliament of our Sovereign Lord the King, his Council convened, and so it was commanded by himself. The like we have in the Acts of the Scotish Parliaments. Eodem die Rex per modum statuti ordinavit. Jam. 1. Parl. 6. act. 83. i. e. The same day the King by way of Statute, ordained.— Rex, ex consensatotius Parlamenti, statuit & ordinavit. act. 84. i. e. The King with consent of the whole Parliament, did statute and ordain. But Parl. 5. act. 81. the King withal getteth a very lordly stile. Item the said day, our sovereign Lord the King, with consent of the whole Parliament, ordained. The Scotish parliamentary acts are full to this purpose. But can any therefore conclude, that the King of Scotland is an absolute Prince? No verily. King's get such honour, and every thing for the most part is enacted and emitted in their name, not because they have power and dignity above the Parliament, but because they are the highest and chiefest Members of Parliament. And let me tell you, people are so much deluded with the greatness of the King, that they cannot give him only that which is his due, but they ascribe that which is due both to him and Parliament, to him alone. People know better how to idolise Kings, then how to honour them. Yea, people are more ready to obey the King, than the Parliament: And therefore I think, Parliaments that will have Kings for effectuating their purposes, do wisely to emit Acts in the King's name, and set him awork to execute them. Therefore Salmasius shall not need to boast with this, that the King of England is called, the Parliament's Sovereign Lord; and the Parliament, the Council of the King. The like he will find more than once amongst the Prefaces and Acts of the Scotish Parliaments. Yet he, or any for him, can never prove, that the King of Scotland is an absolute King. He shall therefore do well, (lest he confound things which should be divided) to distinguish carefully between that which the king hath re tenus, and what is given to him but nomine tenus. And so he will find, that though the king of England hath as much nomine tenus, as if he were an absolute Prince, yet re tenus he is subjected to Law.  
And whereas he allegeth, kings may govern by advice and counsel of Parliament, and yet may be absolute, and have a negative voice, the like say I too. But he shall give me leave to say, that such have not such a vast power as he talketh-of, as afterward is showed. I confess, the examples of Ahasuerus and Cambyses are to the purpose, though the man fail a little concerning the jus of the kings of the Jews, as afterward is showed. Howsoever, though I grant this, yet shall he never prove, that the king of England, according to the Law of the kingdom, is an absolute Prince, and hath a negative voice in Parliament. He can never show me, that the king of England had the same power which the king of Persia had.  
Inst. After the Conqueror (saith Salmasius) in Rufus, Henry 1. Steven, Henry 2. and Richard 1. did remain purum putum Monarchicum, the power of even-down and unmixed Monarchy. And though (saith he) in the reign of King John, that power was lessened, yet was there nothing derogated from the King's supremacy and absoluteness, remaining unviolated, until the perjured English rebels at this day have altered and diminished the just greatness of the King of England. Def. reg. cap. 8.  
Ans. I admire that this man knoweth nothing, but to rail on them whom he knoweth not. Well, I cast him over into GOD'S hands, and fall to examine what he allegeth. Sure I am, notwithstanding all his railing, it cannot abide the touchstone. It is known to be a manifest lie which he allegeth, concerning the immediate successors of the Conqueror. It is reported in even-down terms, that these kings (of whom Salmasius expressly speaketh) esteemed Norman Laws established by the Conqueror, too rigorous and unjust. And therefore, before they got the Crown, they promised to the people to abrogate them, and in place of them, to establish the Laws of the Confessor. Yea, every-one of them promised more than another, and to keep themselves within the bounds of Law, to the very heart's desire of the people. This was not only promised by themselves, but also by others in their name. And unless they had so promised, they could never have gotten the Crown. They got it upon the expectation of the accomplishment of their promise, as the English Histories do abundantly story. And it cannot be denied but Henry 1. did give the Englishes a free Parliament, and made it the government of the kingdom. So that he is called the first king in England, in whose time the power of Parliament was established. And as for John, it is very well known, that because he did not stand to his oath and promise at his Coronation, for establishing the ancient Laws of the kingdom, but endeavoured to govern after the manner of the Conqueror, in an arbitrary and lose way, therefore the people rose-up in arms against him, and dethroning him, did setup another in his room. And whereas this man saith, that the ancient Laws of the kingdom did not derogate from the supremacy and absoluteness of the king, the contrary of that is already proved. It seemeth strange to me, that he is not ashamed to affirm, that what Laws were established by Edward the Confessor, and granted by King John, were preserved inviolable to this day, derogating nothing from the absoluteness of John's successors. Who knoweth not, that the liberties of Magna Charta, and de Foresta subject the King to Law? And because that Henry 3. did not stand to the maintenance thereof, after he had given his Oath at a Parliament at Oxford, to maintain them inviolable, therefore the People took up Arms against him, till after many debates between them, they caused him often to promise, that they should be inviolably observed, as well by him, as by all other. Thus they tied, not only him, but also his heirs, to govern according to the ancient Laws of the Kingdom. And because Edward 2. did act against these Laws, following the counsel of Peter Gaveston, and the two Spensers, therefore he was imprisoned and dethroned, after several conflicts between him and the People? 'Tis remarkable, that the People refused to crown him, till firstly he did put P. Gaveston from him. And likewise Edward 5. was deposed, after he had reigned two months and eleven days, and was obscurely buried in the Tower of London. Where then, I pray you, is the absoluteness of the King of England?  
Inst. 6. Under Edward 4. (saith Salmasius) it was enacted, That the King might erect a public Judgmet-seat, by his Letters patent, in any part of the kingdom he would. Under Henry 7. it was enacted and declared, That the King had a full power in all Causes, in administering Justice to every one. In the first year of Edward 6. a Statute was made, declaring, all authority, both Spiritual and Temporal, to be derived from the King. Def. Reg. cap. 9  
Answ. I must needs say, This hath more colour of probation, than any thing the man as yet hath objected. But notwithstanding this he will do well to observe this distinction. 1. What is given to the King by way of compliment and Court-expression. 2. What is giving to him in reality and by way of action. The truth is, in the first notion there is as much ascribed to the King of England, as if he had been indeed an absolute Prince. On him you have these Court-Epithets, The King of the Parliament, The sovereign Lord of the Parliament. Yea, and the Parliament is called, The Parliament of the King. He is called, The Original both of Spiritual and Temporal power; having full power over all causes and persons, and to erect Judicatories in any part of the kingdom, where he pleaseth. This is spoken. But what then? Examine the matter aright, and you will find it but spoken. What? cannot Court-Parasites, and flattering Councillors pass a fair compellation upon their Prince? 'Tis the least thing they can do, to bring themselves in credit with him. Read the Parliamentary Acts of Scotland, and you will find just as much spoken, if not more, of the King of Scotland. In Parl. 18. Jam. 6. Act. 1. & 2. James 6. is called, Sovereign Monarch, absolute Prince, Judge and Governor over all Estates, Persons, and Causes. And yet who dare say, but the King of Scotland, according to the Law of the kingdom, is a regulated and nonabsolute Prince? But according to the second notion, let us examine the strength of these Epithets. And so in the first place we fall a-discussing particularly these three Sanctions, of which Salmasius speaketh. The first saith, That the King by his Letters patent may erect Court-Judicatories in any part of the Kingdom, where he pleaseth. This will never conclude, that the King of England hath an absolute power. This Act only speaketh of his power of calling inferior Judicatories. What is that to the purpose? The King of England had power to call, and dissolve the Parliament, the highest Judicatory of the Land. Yea, Henry 1. did ordain and constitute the Parliament. Yet notwithstanding that, (as is showed already) the King of England cannot be called absolute. The King of Scotland hath power of giving-out Letters of Caption. Parl. Jam. 2. chap. 12. Courts of Regalities are justified by the King's Justice, chap. 26. And the Parliament petitioned the King to cause execute the Act anent the Establishment of Sessions, for executing Justice, chap. 65. The power of the College of Justice is ratified and approved by the King. Jam. 5. Parl. Edinb. Mar. 17. 1532. But who will therefore call the King of Scotland an absolute King? The second Sanction giveth the King full power over all persons, and all causes. But I pray you, doth this give the King power over the Parliament and Laws? No verily. It only giveth the King power over all persons and estates, separatim, but not conjunctim, as convened in parliament. Which cometh just to that which Aristotle saith, alleging, that the King hath power over all, seorsim, but not conjunctim. Polit. 3. cap. 11. And he is said, to have a full power, not because his power is absolute and boundless. Verily, it must not be taken in a simple and absolute notion, but in relative and comparative sense. It doth not imply the exemption and immunity of the King, from Civil and Politic subjection to Law: But at the most it pleadeth for exemption to him from foreign power, and subjection to foreign laws. This is evident by comparing this sanction under Henry 7. with stat. 18. Rich. 2. ch. 5. Where it is declared that the Crown of England is free without subjection to any other Crown, but is only subject immediately to GOD, in every thing which relateth to the managing of its Affairs. The like is spoken Henry 8. Par. 24. So we find the like fullness of power pleaded-for to the King of Scotland. ITEM It is thought expedient, that since our Sovereign Lord hath full jurisdiction, and free empire within his Realm, that his Highness may make Notares,— and in time to-come, that no Notare made nor to be made by the Emperor's authority have faith in Contracts Civil, unless he be— approved by the King's highness. Jam. 3. parl. ch. 38. This exemption is pleaded for to the King of Scots, from subjection to the Imperial Laws. But who, I pray you, for this will conclude the King of Scots to be an absolute Prince, having immunity and freedom from all Laws, whether muncipall and Country-Lawes, or forensick and foreign? And as for the third sanction, the words whereof be these, Omnem authoritatem spiritualem & temporalem derivari a Rege, you shall be pleased concerning it to observe this distinction. There be two terms in the act it-self, one concerning temporal, and another concerning spiritual power. We begin at temporal power. The King may be called the original of it two ways. 1. Formally, i. e. as if all temporal power were therefore authoritative and juridical, because of the Kingly power, it being only in it-self essentially authoritative and commanding. This we deny to be the sense of the sanction, in respect of temporal power. It is not only repugnant to Magnacharta, the ancient Laws of the Kingdom, the nature of Parliaments appointed and ordained in Henry 1. his time, to the oaths and promises of Rufus, Henry 1. & their successors to act and govern according to Law, but also to the ordinary practices of the Estates, who in maintenance of their Liberties and the ancient Laws of the Kingdom, did rise in arms against their Kings, and caused them nilled they, willed they, to subject their necks to the yokes of Law. Amongst other of their practices this is very remarkable, that albeit they had saluted Ludovick as their King, and put him in the room of John, yet notwithstanding in the end they declined him, and in his stead crowned Henry 3. John's son. This speaketh much of the State's power above the King. 2. Virtually. It cannot be denied but in this notion all temporal power dependeth from the King. And that two ways, effectively, and vindicatively. Effectively, because the King of England had not only power of convening & dissolving the Parliament, & of ordaining inferior Judicatories, but also by him the Parliament of England was firstly instituted and ordained. Vindicatively, because it was his part to patronise and execute the acts of Parliament, at least as the main and prime man of maintaining and defending them. The like power the Kings of Scotland had also as is clear from their Acts of Parliament. But as for the spiritual power of the King of England, I stand not much to confess that he had a formal and Ecclesiastic power in Church-matters, and that what power the Church (so called) had was derived from him. It cannot be denied, but before the conquest there were Ecclesiastical Laws made by many Kings of England, as Inas, Alfred, Edward the elder, Gythrum, Ethelstane, Edmund, Edgar, Aetheldred, Canutus and others. In the interim this Gentleman shall do well to observe, that the King of England had not always this power. It cannot be denied but Lanfrancus, Anselmus, and Berket going to complain on their Kings and Governors, firstly brought the Pope's judicial authority from Rome into England, both over King and people. Which supremacy of the Pope over the Church of England until in and about Henry 8. his days, who did shake-off the Pope's yoke, did continue. And so Edward 6. succeeding to him; to me it is more than probable that by the foresaid sanction made in his time, the ancient power of the Kings of England in Church-matters was taken out of the Pope's hands, and put upon the King. And it cannot be denied, but according to Edward the Confessour's Laws, the King of England had a primary formal and Ecclesiastic power in Church-matters. I stand not to grant that. But what though I should say, that according to this statute made in Edward 6. his time, the King of England had a primary and original power, and that formally, both in respect of spiritual and temporal jurisdiction; yet will it only conclude an absoluteness of the King according to Law, but not against it. It not ways denudeth the people of a fountain power, to defend themselves against the unjust decrees and actings of the King. The Roman dictator had an absolute power in judging, and yet it was lawful for the people to repeal his acts in their own just defence. Many times have the People of England defended themselves from their King and stood by their own liberties, notwithstanding the King's acting against them. What, I pray you, is it for me to say that the King of England by this act is called the original both of spiritual and temporal power, under a formal notion? Is he not called also the King and Sovereign Lord of the Parliament? Is not the Parliament called his Parliament? Is not every thing ordinarily acted and emitted under his name? Is it not ordinarily said, It is ordained by the King, with the consent, or it the desire of the three Estates? It is very seldom said, It is ordained by the King and Parliament. But, I pray you, what be these but Court-complements? They are words, and nothing but words. Go, confer them with the practice of the Parliament and you shall find the one just contrary to the other. No wonder forsooth, because the King getteth more honour than he hath power. Try this, and you will find it an ordinary practice. Ay, which is more, cannot a corrupt Parliament through the defection of the times give the King more than what is due to him, either by the Law of GOD, or by the law of the Nation? Know we not that Parl. 18. K. Jam. 6. through the backsliding of the times did advance him to greater privileges than the King of Scotland by the Law of the Kingdom had, or can be warranted by the Law of GOD? Indeed, I will not say so of Henry 8. for it is known that in his young years he did put the managing of the Kingdom into the hands of the Princes, as did others of his predecessors before him. And as for Edward 6. I must needs say, his times were better than any times of his predecessors. But it appeareth to me, that as both Henry and he have encroached very far upon the liberties of the Church (so called) so did they encroach too far upon the liberties of the State. But leaving Henry, of whose power I find not so much spoken as of Edward, I must tell you one thing concerning Edward, and it is this. Those who writ of him, and namely Fox, do cry him up beyond all the Kings of England, for piety, wisdom and learning. And Fox runneth so far out in his commendation, that he esteemeth him inferior to no King, though worthy to be preferred to many. Whereupon he feareth not to match him with Josiah, and put the qualifications of both in one balance. Which maketh me imagine that the foresaid act emitted in Parliament under Edward's reign, did pass in his behalf, because of his personal endowments. The like act upon that same ground, (though in respect of him it was merely pretended, without any reality in his person) did pass Parl. 18. upon K. jam. 6. Thus the case is extraordinary. We deny not but because of personal endowments Kings may be, and have been advanced to greatest power. What? will this conclude an ordinary precedent thereof, and a standing law therefore? No verily. There is no consequence from extraordinaries to ordinaries. The standing ancient laws both of England and Scotland are against absolute Princes. Of Scotland and of England we have spoken already at length. Verily the example of Edward 1. though there were no more; may serve to clear our purpose. He, to repair what was done amiss by his father Henry 3. (who was at variance with the people touching the liberties of Magna charta, and de foresta) did much gratify the people; restoring them to great liberty, and abrogating all laws which did make for the bondage and slavery of the people. Howsoever the matter be sive sic, sive non, these sanctions  by Salmasius, do conclude the Parliament to have power above the King. The reason is, because if we look precisely on these acts, what power the King hath is from them. They not only declare, but also they enact and ratify his power to be such such. And so the king's power is the creature of the Parliament, depending from it, as the effect from the cause. But sure I am, causa est nobilior suo effectu, And consequently, if the king hath an absolute power, by virtue of the Parliament, then must the Parliament's power be more absolute; for propter quod unumquodque est tale, illud ipsum est magis tale. And nemo dat quod non habet.  
Inst. 7. Bractonus (saith Salmasius) doth aver, that the King hath power over all that is in his kingdom. And that those things which concern peace and power, do only belong to the Royal dignity. Every one (saith he) is under the King, and he is inferior to none but to GOD, as reason requireth. In power he ought to be above all his subjects: for he ought to have none like him, nor above him in the Kingdom. De Angl. Monar. lib 4. cap. 24. sect. 1. lib. 1. cap. 8 sect. 8. & lib. 2. de Reg. In Rich. 2. stat. 18. cap. 5. it is said, Corona Angliae libera fuit omni tempore, & non habet terrenam subjectionem, sed immediate subdita est DEO in omnibus rebus, & nulli alteri. Act. 24 Parl. Henr. 8. Regnum Angliae est Imperium, & ita ab orbe fuit acceptum. Act. Parl. 24, Hen. 8. Quod hoc tuae gratiae regnum nullum superiorem sub DEO, sed solum tuam gratiam agnoscat. Fuit, & est liberum a subjectione quarumcunque legum humanarum— Cap. 9  
Ans. We stand not to gloss Bracton's words. He lived in Henry 3. his days. And finding the King and States at variance about superiority, as a Court-parasit, he wrote in behalf of the King, as Royalists do nowadays. He did just so as they do now. Bracton had that same occasion of writing in behalf of the King, which Salmasius hath today. As the late King was at variance with the people of England, for claiming absolute power over them; so the controversy stood just so in Bracton's time between Henry 3. and the people. But I pray you was it not as free to Bracton to flatter Henry, as for Salmasius to flatter Charles? Leaving this man to himself, I hasten to examine the strength of these Acts which Salmasius citeth. And in a word, they do not plead so much for the absoluteness of the king, as of the kingdom. They do not speak de Rege Angliae, of the king of England, but de corona, or Regno Angliae, of the Crown or kingdom of England. Howsoever, none of them doth speak for immunity and exemption to the king of England, from municipal, but from foreign Laws: And therefore they declare the Crown of England to be a free Crown, and subject to no other Crown; and the kingdom of England to be a free kingdom, subject to the Laws of no other kingdom. I confess, they declare the king to be above the kingdom, and inferior to none but to GOD. Which is true indeed, taking the kingdom in esse divisivo, but not in esse conjunctivo. Indeed, the King is above all in the kingdom sigillatim, one by one And in this respect he is inferior to none but to GOD, though taking the kingdom in a collective body, he be inferior thereto.  
Inst. 8. In the first year of James his reign in England, the Parliament acknowledgeth him to have an undoubted title to the Crown by blood-right. And therefore they did swear allegiance both to him and his posterity. Whereupon Camdenus saith, that the King of England hath supreme power and mere empire. De Brit. lib. And Edvardus Cokius saith, That according to the ancient Laws of the Kingdom, the Kingdom of England is an absolute Kingdom: Wherein both the Clergymen and Laics are subjected immediately under GOD, to their own King and head. Cap. 9  
Ans. As for that concerning James, we make no reckoning of it: He was declared the righteous and undoubted heir of the kingdom, through the defection and back-sliding of the times. What other Kings of England hinted at before, that he did execute. Because he became King of Great Britain, and entered the kingdom of England upon blood-relation; therefore flattering, Malignant and Antichristian Counselors did declare his title to the kingdom of England to be of undoubted hereditary right. I pray you, friend, were there not Malignants then, as well as now? I may say, there were moe then, then now, at least they had greater authority than what Malignants have now a-dayes. And tell me, do not Malignants at this day make use of the King's pretended greatness and hereditary right to the Crown of Britain, for cloaking their knavery, and effectuating their malignant purposes? Do not you imagine, but Papists and Malignants in England had that same reason for them, to make use of K. Jame's power? What I pray you is the over-word of Papists and Malignants in Britain today? The King (say they) is the undoubted heir of the kingdom, and absolute in power: Who then should rise against him? This is even the most they have to cloak their knavery, and to cast a lustre upon their Antichristian and malignant endeavours. Do you imagine that the devil was sleeping in K. James time? No verily. And there hath nothing been done these twelve or thirteen years bygone, whether against State or Church, but what was moulded then. The very platform of all was cast in his days, By the Scotish Parliament his power was declared absolute: And by the English Parliament, his right to the Crown of England was declared undoubted and hereditary. They stood not to swear obedience to him and his posterity into all ages. And how far on he drew the power of Episcopacy, and how much he acted for intruding the Mass Book upon the Kingdom of Scotland, is more than known. Many wits, and many Pens, in his days were employed for carrying-on and effectuating malignant & antichristian designments. S al. is a child to object from the practice of the English Parliament in K. James time. He may as well object for evincing his purpose, from the practice of the Parliament holden at Oxford, by Charles. And if he doth either of them he doth nothing but beggeth the question. He telleth us that the Parliament of England K. James an. 1. declared and enacted his right to the Kingdom of England to be undoubted & hereditary. Well I can tell him that William the Conqueror, the Normane-Lawgiver, doth deny to the King of England any such title or claim to the Crown. Diadema regale (saith he) quòd nullus antecessorum meorum gessit, adeptus sum, quod divina solummodo gratia, non sus contulit haeriditarium,— Neminem Anglici regni constituo haeredem, sed aeterno conditori, cujus sum, & in cujus manu sunt omnia, illud commendo; non enim tantum decus haeriditario jure possedi, sed, diro inflictu, & multa effusione sanguinis humani, perjuro Regi Haraldo abstuli, & interfectis, vel fugatis fautoribus ejus dominatui meo subegi. Camd. Brit. chorogr. descr. which he citeth out of hist. de monast. Steph. Cadom. in Norm. i e. I have acquired the Royal Crown, which none of my ancestors did bear, which the grace of GOD alone, and not hereditary right bestowed upon me,— I constitute no heir of the English Kingdom, but I recommend it to the eternal Creator, whose I am, and in whose hands are all things: for I did not enjoy such a honour by hereditary right, but by dire conflicts, and great effusion of man's blood I took it from the perjured King Harald, and subjected it to my dominion, having killed or put to flight his favourers. Thus Salmasius may see that he buildeth hereditary right to the Kingdom of England upon a sandy foundation, in pleading for the undoubtednes thereof from what right the Conqueror had over it. Let it be so, the Conqueror himself had right to it by the sword, yet in his foregoing latter-wil he shaketh all his successors lose of any right to it by succession, and casteth the disposition thereof wholly over upon GOD and the people. Whence was it, that (as is said already) the people did create Rufus king in his room and passed-by Robert his eldest son. 'Tis remarkable, that not where it can be read that the Conqueror did tie the Crown of England to his posterity. Salmasius cap. 8. maketh a fashion of proving it out of Malmsburiensis, Hundingtoniensis, and other English historians: who say nothing but that the Conqueror subdued England, and caused the people swear allegiance and fidelity to himself. No other thing can be read in them. And nowhere can Salmasius find it, that ever he did tie the people of England by oath, both to himself and his posterity. Neither dar Salmasius conclude any thing from these Historians, directly. He concludeth that but by the way, because of the Conquerour's full and absolute subjecting of England to himself, as indeed these Historians do report. Yet friend, this is but a stolen dint. You lose more than you gain by it.  
As for Camden he cannot be of Salmasius judgement, unless he contradict himself. From him we have said already, that the power of the Parliament is above the King. Therefore while as he saith, that the King of England hath supremam potestatem, & merum imperium, it cannot be understood of the kingdom taken in a collective body. And it is true indeed, taking the people sigillatim, one by one, the King of England is above them all, and inferior to none, but to GOD. And in this sense he speaketh well, nec praeter Deum superiorem agnoscit. In this sense the latter part of Cokius words is to purpose. Because of this superiority the 24. Parl. Henr. 8. passeth a fair compliment upon him, saying, that the kingdom of England doth acknowledge none superior to it under GOD but his majesty, and that it is governed by no Laws, but what were made within it-self by the tolerance of him, and his progenitors.— Per tolerantiam tuae gratiae & tuorum progenitorum,— There Salmasi, it had been more for thy purpose, if they had said, Per authoritatem tu●e gratiae, & tuorum progenitorum. This soundeth no ordinative and effective, but permissive and approbative power in the King. Well, let this pass, the former part of Cokius words doth not speak of the absoluteness of the King, but of the kingdom of England. Juxa igitur leges hujus regni antiquas, (saith he) hoc Angliae regnum absolutum est imperium,— De jur. Reg. eccles▪ He saith not Angliae Rex absolutus est imperiator. There is a difference indeed between the King's power, and the kingdom's power. So much of England.  
We come now in the next room to demonstrate the King of Scotland, according to the Law of the Nation, to be a regulated and nonabsolute Prince. This is so clear, that we need not to speak any thing of it. And it is so abundantly proved by our godly & dear Countryman, Lex Rex, quaest. 43. that no man in it can go beyond him. Therefore we shall only glance at it by comparing in some few particulars the Lacedaemonian kingdom with the Scotish, in subjecting their Kings to Law. 1. As the Lacedaemonian King did every thing according to Law; (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polit. 3. cap. 10.) so the King of Scotland hath power to do no other ways. In the Parliament an. 1560. the Nobility saith frequently to Q. Regent, Regum Scotorum limitatum esse imperium, nec vuquam ad unius libidinem, sed ad legum prescriptum, & nobilitatis consensum, regi solitum. So it is declared Parl. at Sterl. 1567. and 1578. concerning Q. Mary. This was practised by Mogaldus, who did all by the Parliament, as the ancient custom was. Whence the kings of Scotland had no power to do any thing without the advice and counsel of the Estates. They had no power to establish or abrogate laws, according to their pleasure. This my dear Countryman proveth at length in the place . In the interim take-alongst with you that decree made in Finnanus, Rex 10 his time, viz▪ That the king should enjoin nothing of concernment but by the authority of Parliament, and that they should not administer the Republic by private and domestic council, nor the businesses of the king and public, should be managed without advice of the fathers, and that kings by themselves, without the ordors of the fathers, shires and governor's, should not make or break war, peace or leagues. 2. As the Lacedaemonian king did bind himself by oath to govern according to the Laws of the kingdom, Xenoph. de Repub. Laced. &. N. Damasc. de mor. gent. Laced. so the king of Scots by Oath and Covenant is tied to do the like. The platform of the king's coronation-oath is set-down, K. James 6. Parl. 1. Whereby he is obliged, to maintain the true Kirk of GOD, and Religion now presently professed in purity, and to rule the people according to the laws, and constitutions received in the Realm, causing justice and equity to be ministered without partiality. This did both James 6. and Charles swear. And that this is no new custom amongst the kings of Scotland, you will find it more than abundantly proved by our learned Countryman in the place above-quoted. 3. The Lacedaemonian kings were subjected to the stroke of justice. Which maketh Pausanias so to write of them, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. i e. Concerning the Lacedaemonian King judgement was so ordered: Twenty eight in number who were called Senators, were appointed to judge. And with them did sit the Ephorick magistracy, together with the King of the other family. So the king of Scots was censured by the Parliament, made up of three Estates. His neck was brought under their yoke, as my learned Countryman maketh good in the place forequoted. And so, as the Lacedæmonians did cut-off, and turn-out many kings, (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Pol. 5. cap. 10.) so the Scots in old did the like, as is made good already. See Lex Rex, loc. cit. I have read much of the non-absolutenesse of the Athenian, Cretian, Lacedaemonian kings, etc. But I may justly say, that no kingdom in the world (as I can learn from history) hath exercised Law more, or so much on their kings, as the Scots have done. There is indeed a strange change in Court amongst the Scots, if we compare the latter times with the former. For myself, I observe GOD's special providence in it, who will have the practices of the ancient Scots much to condemn and plead against the endeavours and practices of the latter Scots to day. Yea, the ancient Scots even in this do go beyond the Lacedæmonians, viz. the Lacedaemonian king was hereditary. But till Kenneth 3. the Scotish king was elective, though for favour of the Fergusian race, those who came of Fergus were created kings. See Lex Rex, ibid.  
It remaineth now that we make good the conclusion it-self, from the examples of kings in the second notion, i. e. of those kings whose power was one way or other limited, though for the most part absolute. In this we will observe Aristotle's method. He brancheth-forth Monarchy into four species. The first he calleth Laconic; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Polit. 3. cap. 10. which cap. 11. he reckoneth-up, as the fourth branch of Royal Government. Of this we have spoken already at very great length. The second kind he calleth herill and despotic. Such kind of Monarchy (saith he) was in Asia. And albeit he saith, that under such kind of Royal power, the people lived as slaves and servants, yet withal he telleth us, that the government was carried-on and administered according to the Laws of the kingdom. We stand here alitle, to illustrate this by example. v. g. The Median King had an absolute power over the Medes. Any thing the Kings of the Medes decreed and enacted, was unalterable. Because of the vastness of their power, the wicked Precedents obtained a Decree from Darius, That none should make prayer to any, save to the King, for forty days. Dan. 6. And yet notwithstanding, Darius had not power to recall his Decree after it was made, albeit he laboured till the going-down of the Sun to revoke it. Ibid. The King of Persia was an absolute Prince, Esth. 1. Dan. 6. Herod. lib. 3. And yet notwithstanding Ahasuerus, not only in divorcing Vasthi, did call a Council of wisemen, experienced in the Laws, but also he submitted himself to their determination, Esth. 1. And albeit he desired through the abundance of love he did bear to Vasthi, to be recnociled to her, yet could he not recall the Divorcement, because the Law made against it, Joseph, Antiq. Jud. lib. 11. cap. 6. I deny not but the Persian Kings had an arbitrary power in making Laws. Yet being made, they had not power at their own pleasure to recall them. Their Laws were irrevocable, Esth. 1. Dan. 6. And consequently, though their power was absolute in making Laws, yet was it limited in abrogating them. They had power to make them, though not to break them. 'Tis observable, that Cambyses, a most wicked and tyrannous King, desiring in marriage his german-sister, called a Council to consult thereabout. Albeit he had an arbitrary power, to do what he listed, yet went he not about that matter, brevi manu, but sought and followed the advice of his Counselors therein. And at this day there be many Kingdoms, wherein Monarchy and Regal Government is of this same stamp and tenor, as namely amongst the Turks. The third is elective and aesymnetick. This kind of Monarchy also Aristotle calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. This he illustrateth by the example of the Mityleneans, who elected Pittacus to reign over them. Truly, for myself I do imagine, that they did give Pittacus an uncircumscribed power, because of his personal endowments, to govern as he pleased. Therefore they did not restrict him to govern according to the Law of the Kingdom, but voluntarily submitted themselves to Laws of his making. They did not tie him by Law to them, and in this his power was illimited and without bounds. Yet in so far as they conferred absolute power upon him, but as because of his personal endowments, he would undoubtedly govern according to Law; in so far his power was limited and circumscribed. See Gyraldus, de vit. Pittac. And Diog. Laer. de vit. Phil. lib. 1. in Pittac. The like power did the Athenians also offer to Solon, as is abovesaid. The fourth he referreth to Monarchy, as it was in the days of the Heroes. This kind of Monarchy he calleth also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Pol. 3. cap. 10. and cap. 11. he calleth it a Regal power restricted in some things, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And what these things be, he hinteth at, cap. 10. saying, that they had not power over the sacrifices, which concerned the Priesthood, and that some of them were either tied by oath to the people, or by lifting-up the sceptre, to govern according to Law. Thus it is manifest, that all the four kinds of Monarchy Aristotle speaketh-of, which were set up in old, one way or other are limited and subjected to Law. But concerning the fourth kind, which was in the days of the Heroes, we must stand alitle here. Hence the question ariseth, whether or not doth Aristotle refer this fourth species of Monarchy to the Heroes without exception? We shall not stand much upon what may be Aristotle's mind in this matter. It appeareth to us, that he is in this indefinite. I confess, his words with a distinction may bear a good sense. Yet I must needs say, that neither in this, nor in the third species, the man is clear: for, I take him to be summing up all the ordinary species of Royal power. But either he erreth, or else he confoundeth in the third and fourth species, both ordinary and extraordinary kinds of Royal power, together, taking them both under the same power and notion. And in this he erreth also. But that we may clear our purpose, the Reader shall mark this way of differencing the species of Monarchy one from another. Generally it is divided into ordinary and extraordinary Monarchy. In an ordinary acceptation it is pambasilick, and non-pambasilick. In this sense Aristotle is to be understood, as we couceive. And so the pambasilick Monarchy, (i. e. which hath a power over all things) relateth to the fifth species of Royal power, which Aristotle, Polit. 3. cap. 11. superaddeth to the four foresaid species thereof. And the non-pambasilick (i. e. which hath not a power over all things) is relative to these four species above-written. Each of them (according as both Aristotle, and example teach) is either one way or other, limited and kept within bounds. And afterward we shall also show it from reason itself. But observe by the way, that the third species of Monarchy in this sense, cannot be illustrated by the example of Pittacus. What power was laid upon Pittacus, as is showed already, was done in an extraordinary way. Now Aristotle in this species, cannot confound that which is ordinary and extraordinary together, and illustrate them both by one and the same example. As for the fourth species taken in this sense, I do verily imagine, that his words deserve a distinction. Whereupon the question may be moved, whether or not doth Aristotle by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (which he maketh the fifth species of Royal Government) understand an all-commanding power, according to Law, or both according to, and against Law? It cannot be imagined, as afterward shall appear, that Aristotle understandeth an all-commanding power above Law. Therefore is it, that Polit. 3. cap. 10. he interlaceth the fifth species of Monarchy with the fourth. Without any clear and formal distinction, as he doth cap. 11. he passeth from the one to the other, in a continuat way, linking the one with the other. And so taking up the fourth and the fifth species, under a continuat notion, we easily resolve Aristotle's meaning by this distinction. In the former part of the fourth species, he averreth, That Monarchy in the days of the Heroes, was in some things restricted, wanting this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-commanding power. And in the latter part of it, he saith, that in ancient times kings had that which is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Verily, the man in this is very cryptick and unclear: He speaketh of the days of the Heroes indefinitely. So doth he of ancient times, But opposing ancient times to the days of the Heroes, they can be relative to no times, but to the golden age; which was immediately after the Deluge about 131 years. All this time, as is showed already, there was not so much as any politic government at all. And to this Age immediately succeeded the time of Heroicisme. Nimrod, and many other heroic Blades immediately after that Age, did breakforth, who erected kingdoms, and did many valiant acts. And if we speak of the ancient times before the Flood, we find also (as is showed already) that contradistinguishing ancient times from the time of Heroicisme, there was no kingly power setup, till men of renown and heroic spirits did erect it about the 1556 year of the world. And all the while before, which was the Golden Age before the Flood, there was no kind of Politic government at all, as is showed already. So then, whether before or after the Flood, the times of the Heroes did immediately succeed to the ancient times. And as in the ancient times there was no Monarchy or Regal power, so it was firstly erected and setup by the Heroes. Therefore you may see that is very hard to purge Aristotle's meaning in this from error. Yet for respect I bear to the man, I will put upon his words the best sense they can bear. And so I suppose, that he referreth both the parts of the fourth species to the days of the Heroes. Now, it cannot be denied, but even amongst Heroes of the secondary kind, there was difference of power, some being of a more intense, and some of a more remiss power. No question, those of them who in respect of time were prior to others, were also in dignity and power, prior to them. I cannot think, but how much more Regal power was in request, so much more the power of it was extended. Therefore was it, as is showed already, that some kings were altogether illimited and uncircumscribed in power. But in the fore-times of Heroicism Monarchy was more in request then in the aftertimes thereof. And consequently those ordinary Heroes, who had the first start of time, before others of that same kind, were of a more vast and intense power than they. As they were superior to them in time, so likeways in power. In this sense Aristotle's words hold good, if he refer the former part of the fourth species to the after-most times and ultimat centre of Heroicisme, and the latter part to the prior, though not to the first times thereof. You cannot say, that the former part is relative to ordinary, and the latter part to extraordinary Heroes. It is already proved by us, Conel. 1. That extraordinary Heroes had more than 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an all-commanding power. They had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an arbitrary power, to do what they listed. These two Caligula, speaking of himself to Antonia, pertinently distinguisheth.— Remember (saith he) that I may do all things, and that I have power to do to all men, what I please, Sueton. in Calig. cap. 29. Thus he putteth a difference between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an all-commanding power, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an all-willing power. And beside this, even ordinary Heroes, namely the founders of primary Colonies, had an absolute power without all restriction, Con. 2. Where also is showed, that Heroes in aftertimes, as founders of after-Colonies, had an absolute power though not so intense and uncircumscribed as founders of primary Colonies. Such indeed had power to do all things, though not to undo all things. And so, according to the rules of proportion, as the after-Heroes were of less power than the former, so the last of them had lesser power than any of them. Aristotle saith, That at last the power of Kings became exceedingly lessened. This was after the flower of heroicism was quite faded. This could not be at the first, but hath come on by degrees. After 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which the erectors of primary Colonies had, in-stepped 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: Which Aristotle saith, was in ancient times. i e. in the times of the after-Heroes, in and about the days of the founders of the secondary Colonies. And then toward the close, or in and about the middle time of Heroicism, the Kingly power in some things became restricted, as Aristotle saith: And so he subjoineth, that at last it became exceedingly lessened. Now you see, that in reason no better construction can be put upon this fourth species of Monarchy, assigned by Aristotle. And for reverence of the man's memory, I suppose, that the third species of Royal power, is taken by him, both in an ordinary, and extraordinary acceptation. And he only illustrateth it, as it is taken in an extraordinary sense, because that way it is more material than the other way. He passeth the illustration thereof, as it is taken in an ordinary notion, because so it is not only less material, but also that way it is more clear than the other way. Or I may say, that Aristotle confoundeth these two notions together, because comparitively aesymnetick Monarchy taken in an extraordinary notion, may be called ordinary. The reason of this is, because men at least may be, because of personal endowments, more frequently called to govern in an absolute and ordinary way, then for extraordinary Heroicism, and such like. Howsoever, this I know, that Aristotle reckoned-up not other kinds of Monarchy, but such as have power to, and do govern according to Law. But these, who are advanced to an illimited power, because of personal endowments, are not precisely called thereto to govern, whether according to, or against Law. That doth militate against the ground and motive of their call. They are no otherwise called to govern according to their pleasure, but as people expect, their will shall bring forth the choicest Laws. Whence precisely and formally, their power both according to the subject and object thereof, is restricted and kept within the bounds of Law. But we cannot say so of absolute Monarchy, acquired and conferred by extraordinary heroicism and such like. And consequently we may very justly say, that Aristotle referreth absolute Monarchy, obtained because of personal endowments, to the third species of Regal government, and doth not refer absolute Monarchy because of extraordinary heroicism and such like, to any species or kind of Monarchy he speaketh of. The reason we say, is this, because any kind of Monarchy he speaketh of, doth not exceed the bounds of Law. But illimited Royal power conferred, because of extraordinary qualifications, precisely and formally doth not exceed the bounds of Law. Whereas being conferred upon grounds of extraordinary heroicism, purchase, and such like, precisely and formally the power thereof out-reacheth all Laws. Thus we judge Aristotle's mind to be cleared concerning all the specics and sorts of Monarchy summed-up by him.  
I confess, Salmasius imagineth that Aristotle, by Pambasilick, or all-governing Monarchy, doth mean arbitrary Monarchy, having power to govern at random, either according to, or against Law. But the Gentleman in this is a little mistaken: for otherwise in the moulding of the King he had not required such conditions and limitations as he doth. Which be these. 1. That he should descend of such a race, which in virtue and goodness should exceed all others, Pol. 3. cap. 12. Whence is it, that both there, and Polit. 1. cap, 3. he saith, that the best, according to nature, over-ruleth that which is worse, and less good. 2. That the King himself should exceed the rest in virtue and goodness. Yea, but for a King to govern according to his own hearts lust, even against Law and Reason, there is no necessity of virtue and goodness, seeing illegality and injustice flow from a vicious and corrupt principle. Therefore Aristotle in opposing Monarchy, or Government laid upon one, to Government carried-on and managed according to Law, doth not insinuate an arbitrary power in the King, having immunity and freedom from Law; but in so doing he only opposeth the power of Government laid upon one, to its power being laid upon many, implying, that as in this respect the Governor is subject to the rest, and cannot act any thing of Law without their consent and assistance; so in the other respect the Governor in carrying on things according to Law, hath immunity from subjection to any other beside, and in doing things legally may perform them without the interposition of any other man's authority. Whence we see that Aristotle alloweth an absolute power in the king to act according to Law, but not to act either according to Law or against it. And therefore in so far he taketh these by the hand, who deny Monarchy to be according to nature, in as far as they contend, that to be against Nature, which is against Law. Which maketh him conclude, Tyranny to be against Nature, it being against Law and Reason. And consequently he doth not allow arbitrary power in the king, to do either good or bad according to his pleasure. He only pleadeth for power to the King, which is according to Nature, Justice and Utility. He will have him a man excelling others in virtue, and governing according to Law. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,— Polit. 3. cap. 12. Moreover, it is contrary to the nature of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which Aristotle expresseth, cap. 11. to render it an arbitrary power. There is a very great difference between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Howsoover he expoundeth it himself, cap. 10. and defineth it to be a power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to govern the City, and all the Public matters, whether at home or abroad. Thus the man speaketh of a governing power. But arbitrary power is a misgoverning-power. He speaketh of a power ordering and doing all things. But arbitrary power is a power of misordering and undoing all things. It doth not follow, that because kings of old had power over all things: Ergo they had power to dispose on them according to their pleasure Quasi vero there were not an all-commanding power, according to Law. This consequence doth not immediately follow from the Antecedent. It is a fallacy ab homonymia: for there is a twofold all-commanding power, one according to, and another above Law. 'Tis therefore a poor shift, to conclude an arbitrary power from an all-commanding power. The original 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth bear an arbitrary power, only by way of analogy. And it is known, that the Roman Dictator had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an all-commanding power, though not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an all-willing power. Well, let it be so, that Aristotle saith, That kings in ancient times had an arbitrary power, a power above Law. But I pray you, what kings then doth he understand? Either they are the Founders of the primary Colonies, or the after-Heroes and-Founders of the secondary Colonies. If of the first kind, ergo you gain just nothing. We have granted that already, Concl. 2. Their power was extraordinary. If of the second kind, we might also therein take you by the hand. Howsoever with some distinction or other you have our mind cleared in this, ibid. Therefore howsoever you understand the latter part of the fourth Species, I lose nothing. If you say that Aristotle only meaneth in it an all-commanding power according to Law, then do I gain my purpose. And if you suppose his meaning to be otherwise, you learn from what foregoeth, that I lose nothing. Thus the case is extraordinary. And I deny not but Royal power that way hath been arbitrary. Yet you cannot deny, but the first, second, third and fourth (or the former part thereof) Species of Monarchy, do not speak a word of Royal power above Law.  
Although Aristotle's words may bear this construction, yet do we judge it were corresponding to his sense and meaning, to put this sense upon them. In the former part of the fourth Species he contradistinguisheth the times of the Heroes from the ancient times, which he expresseth in the latter part thereof. But the one being opposed to the other, if we speak rigorously and properly, by the ancient times can be nothing understood but the golden age: which after the flood (Ethnic Writers know no time before the flood) lasted, as some say, 250 years, and as others say with better warrant, 131 years. All which time, if we speak properly and rigorously, there was no kingly government at all: for, as is showed already Concl. 3. there was no government then but natural and oeconomick— In qua nullo ferente legem, natura ipsa vivebatur,— Mnes. Phoen. Damasc. lib. 97. hist. Archil. de temp. Notwithstanding this, I do imagine, that Aristotle opinionateth, there were Kings in the golden age. Fuerat enim antiqua Civitatum (saith he) guhernatio, rationabiliter, paucorum & regia. Polit. 4. cap. 13. So say Sallust, conjur. Catel. and Trogus, or Justin, hist. lib. 1. Indeed these two do diametrally oppose the ancient times to the days of the Heroes: for they contradistinguish them from the times wherein the Assyrian monarchy took its beginnings. Which was the very first birth of herocisme. And yet they say, before this time Imperium penes Reges erat. What is meant by these Reges, Fabius Pictor explaineth. Principes (saith he) quia justi erant & religionibus dediti, jure habiti Dii & dicti. De aur. sec. etc. lib. 1. And yet in the preceding words he saith, Ea aetate nulla erat monarchia, quia mortalium pectoribus nondum haeserat ulla regnandi cupiditas. Therefore by these Reges, and Principes can be nothing else understood, but the fathers and heads of the chief families, as Shem, Japhet, etc. over all whom Noah did rule as a common father. And it cannot be denied, but such had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an all-commanding power; yea, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an all-willing and arbitrary power, Concl. 3. which maketh Trogus say, Principio rerum,— arbitria Principum pro legibus erant. Lib 1. This was because those Fathers and Princes did not only stand in order to the People, as natural fathers to natural children, each of them being by the intimate bonds of Nature tied to other, (which maketh Aristotle compare the fifth Species to oeconomick and paternal government) but also because they did far go beyond their people in the matter of qualification. Yet we must not imagine that this arbitrary power which they had was so, precisely and formally. If we speak rigorously, arbitrary power conferred because of intimate and natural relations, and personal endowments, is rather limited then illimited: for as the grounds thereof tie the people to all due obedience and subjection, so they tie the Prince to every due and lawful way of governing, and that in a most intense and extraordinary way. Therefore speaking precisely Aristotle's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, all-commanding power, doth not include 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an all-willing and arbitrary power. But let it be so, that Aristotle speaketh of an arbitrary power given to Princes and heads of chief families, yet can it be no other ways understood, but as it is already explained by us, Concl. 3. Which speaketh nothing, but of an arbitrary power, in an extraordinary case. But ab extraordinariis ad ordinaria, non est sequela.  
As Aristotle is very unclear in the latter part, so is he likewise intricate in the former part of the fourth species. In it he saith that the Kings in the in the days of the Heroes were in some things limited and did govern 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according to the Law. This indeed deserveth a distinction. No question extraordinary Heroes and the founders of primary Colonies had a vast and arbitrary power, concl. 1. and 2. What power other Heroes had, I stand not much on it, to determine. Yet I may very conveniently use those distinctions which are expressed, concls. 2. But for further clearing this point, we shall stand here alittle to illustrate by Example all these ways Aristotle setteth down in the former part of the fourth species, whereby heroic Kings came to their Crowns. In summing them up we shall observe a more exact and resolutory method than Aristotle doth. (1.) By gathering people together and planting Colonies. Which is considered four ways. Firstly, by way of lot and division. Thus the primary Colonies were planted. And no question the founders of such had power to govern at random, concls. 2. Secondly by way of donation. Thirdly, by way of subordination. Fourthly, by way of purchase and acquisition. Though we cannot be of Aristotle's mind in respect of the founders of the first sort of Colonies, yet in respect of the second and third, we may take him by the hand. And notwithstanding this, we may very probably conclude either of the parts, whether by granting or by denying, the arbitrariness of the founders of these Colonies. Howsoever concerning all the four sorts you have our judgement expressed, concls. 2. (2.) By way of battle. Firstly, by way of regaining. So did Dionysius, Hercules, Ber. lib. 5. and Orestes, Dict. de bell. Tro. lib, 6. Secondly, by way of conquest. So did the extraordinary Heroes, as is showed already, concls. 1. Ordinary Heroes who subdued Kingdoms be these. Amongst the Assyrians, Arius, Baleus, etc. Beros. of't. lib. 5. Amongst the Grecians the Heraclids who subdued Mycenae, and Alemeon who subdued the Kingdom of Thebes. Diod. lib. 5. cap. 4. and 6. (3.) Because of the benevolence and bountifulness of ancestors. So Crana and Cranus were dignified with the swaying of the Sceptre, amongst the Razenues, because of the singular benevolence and courtesy of Janus their father toward the Italians. For the same reason also Thuscus, son to Hercules the Egyptian, was graciously admitted by the Arnites, Libarnites, Musarnites, to reign over them. Beros. of't. lib. 5. (4) By cunning and art. This may be taken two ways. Firstly, as it implieth a conferring of the Kingly power, because of engine and invention. Thus the Thebans advanced Oedipus to reign over them, Sophocl. in Oed. tire. Diod. lib. 5. cap. 6. Secondly, as it implieth a cunning and subtle way of obtaining the Kingdom. So Camesenuus obtained the Kingdom of Bactria, Ber. lib. 5. and Neoptolemus acquired the Kingdom of Thessaly, which belonged to his father Achilles, Dict. Cret. de bell. Tro. lib. 6. (5) By acquisition. This is taken three ways. Firstly, by way of emption. Thus Agamemnon obtained the military power over all the Grecian Princes in the Trojan expedition, by letting-out amongst the Soldiers a huge mass of money, Dict. Cret. lib. 1. Secondly, by way of compensation. So Antenor was created King of Dardany, in compensation of his pains in betraying Troy to the Grecians. Dict. Cret. de bell. Tro. lib. 5. Dar. Phr. de exc. Tro. lib. Thirdly, by way of mere purchase and simple acquisition. Thus did Aeneas acquire Melena, with its Continent. Dict. Cret. loc. cit. Sallust. conjur. Catel. So did jolaus purchase a Kingdom to himself in Sardinia, Diod. lib. 5. cap. 2. These things being thus illustrated by example, I do nextly desire the Reader carefully to distinguish between extraordinary and ordinary Heroes, and between those of them who were in the precedent times and those who were in the subsequent times of Heroicism. For myself I cannot say, but extraordinary Heroes at least, and the founders of primary Colonies, were invested with a vast and arbitrary power. But as for the ordinary Heroes, and the after-founders of Colonies, I am contented with Aristotle, to say, That their power was hemmed-in by the hedges of Law. We find several examples amongst the after-heroes to this purpose. Priamus was not only withstood by his own subjects, who did steal Helena, but also what he did therein either firstly or last, was according to the advice and counsel of the Senators. Dict, Cret. de bell. Tro. lib. 1. & 5. Dar. Phr. de excid. Tro. lib. And though Dares Phrygius reporteth, that Priamus determined and voiced otherwise then they who followed Antenor and Aeneas (who appear to us to have been the major part of the Senate: for we gather from both these Historians, that not only the greatest part of the Senate, but also the whole body of the People were for the concluding and drawing up peace with the Grecians. I confess Dares Phrygius in plain terms saith that Priamus voiced against peace, and truce taking-up with the Grecians, and what he voiced was established and holden as a thing concluded-on by all. Indeed, he carried it contrary to all who opposed him, as Dares will have it. Yet Dictys storieth the just contrary, and saith, that Priamus, followed the advice and determination of the Senat. And indeed Q. Calaber, lib. 12. and Tryphi●dor, de Il. exc. insinuate no less: for they observe Dictys way, which he hath in storying the Grecian stratagem which ensued upon terms of peace concluded-on between the Trojans and Grecians. Howsoever, albeit I think myself rather obliged to incline to Dares relation, yet lose I nothing thereby, if I do so. I am not of that opinion to think, that Priamus was so hemmed-in by Law, as the Lacedaemonian Kings. Let it be so, he had a negative voice in Senate, as Dares insinuateth; yet sure I am, none will say, that the Senate was a cipher, having no authority at all. You will learn from these forecited historians the contrary of that. And in so far as Priamus did act according to the advice & counsel of the Senate, in as far he did act according to Law. Thus he did not simply act according to pleasure, and in an arbitrary way. No verily. In this his power was somewhat limited. And this is all that both Aristotle and we do crave. And so we must not think but Alcinous was some way or other regulated by his Princes and Rulers, as you may read, Hom. odies. 8. And how much Agamemnon was subjected to Law, is showed already. Of him is made good, that which Aristotle speaketh, of the tying of the King to the People, by the elevation of the Sceptre as by Oath and Covenant. Hom. Il. 2. Alex. ab Alex. lib. 5. cap. 10. We need not think it strange to say, that in the days of the Heroes Kings were somewhat subjected to Law: for not only Agamemnon, but also Theseus, were no less subjected to Law, as is showed already, than the Lacedaemonian kings? 'Tis observable, that Orestes, son to Agamemnon, and King of Mycenae, was judged and absolved by the Council of Areopagus. Him Mnestheus, son to Theseus, and King of Athens, could not get set free, till firstly he was examined by the Areopagites whom Dictys calleth most strict Justiciaries, de bell. Tro. lib. 6. Mark, that the Mycenan King was judged by the Athenian Judicatory. Then tell me, seeing a King of another Kingdom in the days of the Heroes was subjected to the Law and Judicatory of Athens, shall we not think that Kings in those days, in some things at least, were restricted and subjected to Law? Verily this is an argument from the greater to the lesser. But hear what Alexander ab Alexandro saith, Tantique Areopagus fuit, ut Heroas & semideos illuc in judicium advocatos dicerent, & Pisistratus in eo judicium subire non dubitarit. lib. 3. cap. 5. i. e. And Areopagus was of such power, that they cited into judgement the Heroes and Semidei, and Pisistratus doubted not to undergo judgement there. And I would have Royalists to observe, that in this matter I give them more of their will then Aristotle doth: for according to this last sense and exposition, his words insinuate, That all Kings in the days of the Heroes in some things were rest icted. Yet we say, that many of them had a vast and arbitrary power. Yea, in the latter part of the fourth species he saith, That Kings in ancient time had but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an all-governing power. But we go further-on with the Malignant, and say, That they had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an all-willing power. Yet precisely and properly, their power was but Pambasilick, an all-governing, and not arbitrary and illimited.  
We shall stand here a while, to speak of the Kingdom of England: for it is not only the chief subject of our discourse, in order to which we drive all that we speak, but also it falleth-in here by a string-line. Already we have spoken of it at length, from the days of the Conqueror, or a little before, until now. It therefore remaineth, we speak of it, as it was from its beginning unto the reign of the Normans. And so we consider it under these notions. 1. As it was in its first beginning and original And though I will not say, that Britain was inhabited so soon as other Kingdoms, which lie in, and about the middle and chief part of the Earth. No question, such parts were firstly inhabited, as both history and reason doth teach. Yet I may very conveniently say, that the chiefest Kingdoms, and those which lie next Armenia, being planted, after people were extremely multiplied on the earth, they did seek out to inhabit the uttermost Isles of the world. There was a physical necessity for this. People daily multiplying could not dwell all in one part, but of necessity they behoved to departed one from another, for residence sakc Yea, there was a moral reason for it also. No question, desire of great lands and possessions, so soon as people were greatly multiplied on the earth after the flood, could not but set them awork to seek-out the remotest parts. This is confirmed by what the holy Ghost saith: The sons of Japhet, Gomer,— by these were the Isles of the Gentiles divided in their lands, every one after his tongue, after their families, in their nations. Gen. 10. I pray you tell me, while as the holy Ghost speaketh there indefinitely of the Isles of the Nations, if he doth exclude the Isle of Britain? What more reason is there to exclude it then any other? And for myself I think, there is more reason to include it then any of the rest. Firstly, because it is the chiefest Isle in the world. And therefore in itself the more delectable, and the more to be sought after. Secondly, because Gomer, whom Berosus calleth Comerus Gallus, did come into Italy, and erected Colonies there, Ant. lib. 5. Now tell me, is it not most probable that Gomer did translate Colonies from Italy into France, and from thence into Britain, every-one of them lying contiguously one with another? We find as much in his name as pointeth-out this. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gomer signifieth to end. And is not Britain (as it were) the last centre and extreme part of EUROPE? Berosus giveth him a surname, calling him GALLUS. Now the Frenches are called Galli. And Gallus cometh from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, milk. But the Frenches are called white or fair in respect of other nations which lie nearer the Sun. But Britain was called Albion, which signifieth whiteness. And thus very appositely it partaketh of the signification of Gomer's surname. And why shall we not think, whether France or Britain one way or other, have their denomination from the names of their first founders, as well as other nations and kingdoms have their names from the founders, who firstly erected them? V G. Israelites from Israel, Assyria from Ashur, Media from Medus, etc. Camden largely disputeth for the plantation of Britain by Gomer. But the man is somewhat intricate, and confused in it, alleging that the original of the Britain's is as it were derived from the Frenches. I will not deny, but Gomer hath sent Colonies, firstly to France, it lying next to Italy, where Gomer himself took up his residence. Yet I may say, that he did send Colonies nextly into Britain, which is adjacent to France. Verily, he might have simul, and semel, translated Colonies into both: for as France is next adjacent to Italy, so Britain is next adjacent to France. I cannot imagine, that Britain lying so near Italy, that ever Gomer would have left it unplanted, till by the multiplication of Colonies in France, people out of France had been translated into Britain to plant it. Howsoever I stand not on this, but sure I am, both Frenches and Britain's have their original from Comerus Gallus, as Camden very notably and at length proveth, Brit. Chorog. descr. Albeit Caesar, de bell, Gal, & Diodore, rer. of't. lib. 6. imagine, that the Britain's be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Aboriginists. Thirdly, because Theophilus Antiochenus saith, Come in priscis temporibus,— homines,— post linguarum divisionem aucti & multiplicati paulatim sunt,— nec prius desierant terram ubique occupare, quam etiam ad Britannias, in arctois climatibus accesserint. i e. When in ancient times— men,— after the division of tongues, increased and multiplied by little and little,— neither did they leave-off to possess and takeup the earth , until they did also come into Britain, situated under the Pole Arctic. In this notion I take, Britain to have been under Gomer as its King and Saturn. And so I conceive, he had an arbitrary power over them, Concl. 2. But what Government they had amongst them after Gomer's death, cannot be determined. Yet in all probability they had no Kingly Government amongst them till Brutus' days. And in respect of this time, Dio Nic. ex Xiphil. epit. de Brit. saith very pertinently, Apud hos populus magna ex parte principatum tenet. And Camden noteth, That as the Frenches, so the Britain's in old were not governed by one, but by many. So say Caesar, bell. Gal. lib. 1 & 5. and Pomponius Mela, de sit. Orb. lib. 3. cap. 2 & 6. But I take all these to speak of the Government amongst the Frenches and Britain's as it was immediately before the conquest of Julius Caesar, or at least as it was from the first beginning of these Kingdoms until his days. Howsoever you will do well to observe with me, that in old, France was divided into three parts, according as Caesar and Mela do story. But Berosus divideth it into two parts; the one he calleth Gallia, and the other Celtaes. But for reconciling these divisions, you shall know, that Berosus speaketh of a more large division than they do. He contradistinguisheth these three Kingdoms one from another, viz. Italy, Celtae, and Gallia. The inhabitants of Italy he calleth Comari, from their King Comerus. The inhabitants of Celtae he calleth Disceltes, or Celtes, whose first King (saith he) was Samotes. The inhabitants of Gallia he calleth Galli: for (saith he) Comer's nephews did so call them from his surname, Gallus. This insinuateth, that Comer's nephews sent-out with Colonies from him, did firstly plant and inhabit Gallia. Which maketh us conclude, that Gallia includeth both France and Britain. No question, the inhabitants of both in old have been called Galli, from Gallus, the surname of Comerus, seeing both of them were alike planted by him and his posterity. We need not think it strange, to say, that both of them do pass under the same epithet and notion: for the Frenches are called Cimbri, as Valerius maximus, Cicero, and Appianus say; and Gomeri, as Josephus, and Zonaras teach. So the Britain's are called Kimbri, changing C, into K. and Cumeri, changing Go, into Cu. They are so both called from Gomer, or Comer, the name of Gallus. And consequently, seeing they both have one common epithet from his forename, why may they not also pass under one notion, and be called Galli▪ from Gallus his surname? I will not much contend, whether the Frenches or Britain's had Kings after the days of Comerus and his nephews, or not. And if they had any, sure I am they were governed by more than one. No question, the Land in both was divided into divers Satrapees. So we find the Kingdom of Italy in old, to have been so divided. Yet we do not think, but amongst those Satrapees there hath been one greater than any of the rest. As no question, in Italy, the Comars were more powerful than any of the rest of the Colonies and inhabitants of the Kingdom, as you may learn from Beros. of't. lib. 5. So amongst the Frenches, the chiefest Kingdom was the Satrapee of the Celtes. Thence it is that Berosus, ant. lib. 5. doth reckon-up in a catalogue the Kings of the Celtes, as he doth the Assyrian Kings; and Manetho beginning where Berosus left, summeth-up one by one the Kings of the Celtes, as he doth reckon-up the Egyptian Kings. Thus there is no repugnancy between the divisions of Berosus, and of Caesar and Mela: for he speaketh of a general and large division, and they keep themselves within more restricted and narrow bounds. They only speak of the division of France, separating it into three parts, Belgia Aquitania, and Celtae. And if we believe them, in old, ever unto the days of C. C●esar, these were three distinct Satrapees, governed by different Magistrates and distinct Laws. The chief people in Aquitania were called Ausci, in Belgia, Treveri, and in Celtae, Hedui. Mel. de sit. Orb. cap. 2. And the chief Magistracy amongst the Hedui, was called Vergobretus. With which in Caesar's days Divitiacus and Liscus were invested. Which was a yearly Magistracy, having power both of life and death, as Caesar saith, the bell. Gal. lib. 1. What the Vergobret did amongst the Hedui, was done, convocatis eorum principibus. Those who were clothed with it as they were annual and but for a time, so they did nothing absolutely and by themselves, but according to the counsel and advice of the Princes. This is far from the arbitrary power that Salmasius speaketh-of. Yet we will not say, that the power of the Celtic Kings was always so hemmed-in by Law. I do not think but their primary founders, not only amongst the Celtes, but also amongst the Aquitans and Belgists, had a vast and arbitrary power. Yea and their after Kings, so long as the flower of Heroicism lasted; had such power as Aristotle speaketh-of (and which by us is already expressed) in the fourth species, or in the former part of the fourth species of Monarchy, Polit. 3▪ cap. 10, & 11. And so, the flower of Heroicism fading, and Kingly Government wearing out of request, no question, there hath been no more power left to their Kings, than what Caesar speaketh-of in the place . Which cometh just to that which Aristotle saith, concerning the detracting from, and dimitting of the power of Kings in aftertimes, Polit. 3. cap. 10. Although we may very justly say, That the Kingdom of France was divided into distinct Satrapees, ever until the days of C. Caesar, yet we dare not adventure, positively to say so much of Britain, if we take it by restriction for the Kingdom of England. And, that this may be cleared, We,  
2. Must diligently observe the cause and reason, why England and Scotland are called Britain. Thus we come to consider England in a second notion, as it was in the days of Brutus, until in and about the days of C. Caesar. By the way I must needs confess, that this is a hard business on which I now enter, more difficult to be found-out, than any thing we have spoken to this purpose. The original of France and Britain, is very easily learned from Beros. of't. lib. 5. M. Porc. Cat. Orig. lib. Solinus, and others. But now Britain was secondly inhabited, is much controverted amongst the Writers. Some imagine, that it was secondly planted by Brutus, son to Ascanius. Of this opinion is Galfredus. But this cannot be: for we read of no such man, whether in Maneth. de Reg. Egypt. Sempr. de div. Ital. Solin. cap. 1. Marl. lib. 1. cap. 2. or in any other Writer beside, who speak of Aeneas and his posterity. Others again imagine, this Brutus to have been a Roman Consul. Of this opinion is Gildas. But for this he can produce no Author. But others think, that he was either Brito Centaurus, of whom Hyginus speaketh, or else Bretan, whose daughter (as Parthenius Nicaeus saith) was Celtice, on whom Hercules begot Celtus, the father of the Celtes. From him Hesychius draweth the denomination of Britain. For myself I subscribe to this, albeit I suppose this Brito Centaurus to be all one with Bretan. Howsoever, if we may give credit to these Writers, Britain was secondly inhabited by one named Brutus, or Bretan, or Brito, according to the Greek. And why may we not, I pray you, as it were a posteriori conclude Britain to have been secondly planted and governed by one called Brutus, or Brito? Kingdoms ordinarily use to derive their denominations from such. To this very pertinently agreeth that of Sibylla a most ancient Writer, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifieth Britain's. And I think, the derivation of it very pertinent to deduce it from Brutus, as Media from Medus, and Gallia from Gallus; And it is observable that she addeth, — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉— The point being thus established, I make no reckoning whether this Brutus be called a Trojan, or a Grecian. And if he was a Trojan▪ then I may justly say, if it be true which Ammian. lib, 15. saith, That while as the Trojans came into France, they did also come into Britain. And that such came into France, is confirmed by Manetho, who saith, that Francus, about the 9 year of the Egyptian dynasty, was created and ordained the Celtic King. Him he calleth one of Hector's sons. De Reg. Egypt. Now, this could not have been, unless (as Ammianus reporteth) many fugitive Trojans had come along into France. And so in all probability, as the dispersed Trojans took-up their residence, and erected a Kingdom in France, they have done the like also in Britain, the one lying contiguous with the other. But for further clearing the point, we must not lightly overleap that which Parthenius saith. The man imagineth, that Celtus son to Hercules, begotten on Celtice, daughter to Bretan, was the begetter and founder of the Celtes. Here is need of a distinction. Surely, Samotes, as is said already, firstly erected the Kingdom of the Celtes. And Hercules the Egyptian (as Berosus saith) coming thorough the Celtes into Italy, begot on Galtea (whom Nicaeus calleth Celtice) with the consent and permission of her parents, Galatis, or, as Nicaeus saith, Celtus, who was created King over the Celtes. And from him they were called Galli. Which, as is imagined, the Latins use for Galatae. Howsoever here from it appeareth, that the Celtes had not their being but their name from Hercules' son. And so reconciling Parthenius with Berosus, we may call Hercules' son, Galatis-Celtes. Whence from his name they were called Galatae, or, as the Romans say, Galli, and from his surname Celtae. Indeed B●rosus doth not express the name of Galtea, or Celtice her father, unless we take Celte, who did reign over the Celtes, at that time when Hercules came along them. Which maketh us opinion at that Galtea, or Celtice, was daughter to Celte: for, as Berosus saith, with the consent and permission of her parents, Galatis was born of her, King to the Celtes. And who I pray you, had power to put such a disposition and right upon Galatis, but the King and Queen of the Celtes. I warrant you, such a thing standing upon consent and renunciation, without being obtained by strength of Arms, the consent and permission given to Hercules' son to reign over the Celtes, was not sought from any inferior, but from him whose interest it was to reign as King. I trow, it stood not upon the consent and permission of any subject, that Hercules son should be born King to the Celtes. And consequently, Celte at this time being King over the Celtes, was Galtea's father, by whom it was given, that Galatis (Hercules' son) should be born his successor and King after him. Therefore, following Berosus, I conclude, that the Celtes were so called from Celte, grandfather to Galatis, and Galli, or Galatae from Galatis, nephew to Celte, and son to Hercules. Yet Nicaeus positively and expressly calleth Celtice, or Galtea her father, Bretan, From whom Hesychius, as is said already, deduceth the original of the Britain's. And this being true, it followeth, that Britain's Brutus is more ancient than they ordinarily talk-of. Although I do fully imagine, that Britain hath its denomination from this Bretan; yet I will never think, but Britain was inhabited ere ever this Bretan was. The Celtes are so called from Celte, and Galli, or Galatae, from Galatis. And yet they were a people long before their days. Verily, I think it most likely, that Britain hath its denomination from Bretan, and was secondly enpeopled by him: for resigning the Kingdom of the Celtes, to Hercules' son his nephew, it is more than apparent, that being a King all his life-time before, for his own honour and advantage, he hath gathered a number of people together out of his own Kingdom, and translated them into Britain, and there erected a Kingdom. This was more honourable and advantageable to him, then to live a private life in subjection to his nephew. What? can it be imagined but desire of wealth and honour both to himself and his posterity, would have drawn him on to such an undertaking? No question, he being a powerful King, and father-in-law to the great Monarch Hercules, on whose son he had conferred a singular courtesy, in renouncing the kingdom to him, did want nothing that conduced, not only for undertaking but also for effectuating such a purpose. Wanting his own kingdom, Britain, a glorious kingdom lying next to France, either at that time scarcely en peopled, or at least filled with men of rude breeding, it cannot come in my mind to think otherwise, but this Bretan became Brutus to Britain. And this I take to be him, about whom they controvert so much. Which agreeth with that which is storied, saying, That the Britan's were a people of lesser Britain, which is in the Celtic region, who in old did inhabit the Isle of Britain. Whether you shall imagine, this Bretan, and Brito, to be all one, or that the Trojans came into Britain, while as they came along into France, I remit it to the Reader to judge, as a thing arbitrary and indifferent. And herein I do not contemn the authority of Waldhave, who calleth Britain Brutus' Lands. Thus concerning the original of Britain, firstly, and lastly, I have offered my judgement freely, which being arightly considered, doth much serve to reconcile all different opinions in this matter. Well, whether you say that Bretan came into this Isle with Bretanes, or Brutus, with Trojans, (I shall not stand to controvert, if he be Brito of whom Hyginus speaketh) while as Francus son to Hector came along into France, and did reign there, what power they had is already showed, but namely concl. 2.  
It being sufficiently proved, that Britain was secondly enpeopled by Bretan, and very probably concluded to have been enpeopled the third time by fugitive and dispersed Trojans, under the conduct of Brito, of whom, (as we may probably say, though the contrary may be also holden) Hyginus speaketh: It now remaineth to consider what power those Kings had who succeeded Bretan and Brito. The tract of time which interveened between these two Kings, may be easily learned: for it is gatherable from Berosus, that Bretan erected his kingdom under the reign of Baleus, R. Assyr. XI. in, or about the fourteenth, or sixteenth year of his reign, ann mund. 2225, or 2227. and Brito did setup his kingdom in Britain (as may be gathered from Manetbo) in, or about the first, or second year of Teutheus' reign, King of Assyria XXIX, in, and about the year of the world 2791, or 2792. Concerning the power of these two Kings, we have spoken. And we come nextly to speak of the power of those Kings who succeeded them, until the days of C. Caesar. Out of no ancient Writer we can learn in particular what those Kings were. But in the general we learn these two things. 1. That in old, Britain was governed by Kings. 2. That afterward (though before Caesar's time) it was divided into Satrapees, and governed by many Princes. We take it upon us, to illustrate and prove both these. The first is evident from Tacitus, who saith. Olim Regibus parebant. To which he immediately subjoineth, Nunc per principes factionibus & studiis trabuntur. Thus he distinguisheth between the condition of Britain, as it was in old; and as it was in and about his time. In old (saith he) it was governed by Kings, but now being divided into factions it is governed by Princes. And therefore in another place he saith, a ragibus, usque ad pri●cipes. But Salmas. by principes understandeth the Roman Caesars Def. Reg. cap. 8. He saith so that he may elude the Government of England by many. He would have it to pass (if he could get it) that it was never governed but by Kings, It is no wonder that he be blinded in other things, seeing he shutteth his eyes at so clear a light as this. It cannot be denied, but Tacitus speaks of the government of England as it was in old, and as it was in and about his time. 1. Because it is very unlike that ever he would have called the Roman Caesars, Princes. 'Tis an epithet of less honour and power then Kings. And so I imagine, that he would rather have called the Kings of England Princes then them. Sure I am, the Roman Caesars were more powerful & did reign in a more kingly way then the English Kings. 2. Because he contradistinguisheth in positive terms the Government of England, as it was in old, from what it was of late, saying, That in old, Britain obeyed Kings, but now (saith he) it is governed by many, and divided into factions. And Salmasius himself cannot get this denied. Of which Princes Caesar speaks himself: Principesque undique convenire, & see, civitatesque suas Caesari commendare coeperunt, De bell. Gal. lib. 4. Thus the kingdom was delivered-up into Caesar's hands, not by one man, the King, but by many, the Princes. And lib. 5. he saith, Summa imperii bellique administrandi, communi consilio permissa est Cassivelauno. On which words, Camden noteth, That Britain then was not governed by one, but by many, taking that same course by common consent, in choosing Cassivelaunus General and chief leader to them, as the Frenches did in choosing Divitiacus to repel Caesar, Brit. chorogr. de prim. incol. But what needeth us to stand here? We shall make it more appear in proving the second particular. The first is also confirmed by the testimony of Mela, Fert [Britannia] (saith he) populos regesque populorum,— De sit. Orb. lib. 3 cap. 6. And what power those Kings had, I mind not to say precisely that it was so restricted as the power of the Lacedaemonian Kings. Neither will I say, that it was so narrow as the power of the English Kings, after the Conqueror. Yet I may justly say, That it was not boundless and arbitrary, as Salmasius dreameth-of. So saith Dio Niceus, ex Xiph. epit. Apud hos populus magna ex parte principatum tenet. i e. Amongst them (viz. the Britain's) the People in a great part do govern. This telleth, that in old, even in the time of Kings, in Britain, there was Popular Government. King's then in Britain were not sole Lords, but the People did govern also. Hence it is that Cordilla, jussu populi, was set to reign over the Britain's. So Gintolinus, Populi jussu, Rex dicitur, Polyd. Ang. hist. lib. 1. Because of the People's swaying power of old in Britain, Kingly Government somewhat before the days of C. Caesar, was altogether abrogated, as in part is showed already. But Salmasius shall not think that of old England was singular in this. There were in old other parts in Britain, where the kingly power was limited and hemmed-in by Law. Concerning the Aebuaan Isles, Solinus thus speaketh, Rex unus est universis.— Rex nihil suum habet, omnia universorum, ad aequitatem certis legibus stringitur. Ac ne avaritia divertat a vero, discit paupertate justitiam, utpote cui nihil sit rei familiaris, cap. 25. i. e. all of them have one King.— The King hath nothing proper, all things belong to the people, he is compelled to equity, by certain Laws. And lest avarice should withdraw him from the truth, he is taught justice by poverty, (to wit) as one that hath nothing belonging to himself.  
The second particular is manifest from Strabo, who saith, Complures apud eos sunt dominationes, lib. 4. In the original dominationes is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifieth Princes or Rulers. Thus they were governed toward his time, by many, and not by one. And Salmasius from this is made so to say, albeit he endeavoureth to elude what Tacitus saith, hist. lib. 1. The words are already cited and vindicated. But Diodore is most clear to this purpose, speaking of Britain. Reges, principes que, ibi sunt plures, pacem inuícem servantes, Rer. ant. lib 6. cap. 8. But sure I am, Salmasius will not say, that such had an absolute power over the people. Their Kings had not such power: Ergo far less they. Yea, the Heduan Vergobret, who did reign over moe than any of them, had not an absolute and arbitrary power. Which maketh me think, far less had they any such power. And 'tis observable, what they did, was communi concilio, Caesar de bell. Gal. lib. 5. So much touching the State of England in the second notion, i. e. as it was from the days of Bretan, Brito, or Brutus.  
3. We come now to speak of England, as it was under the Romans, Saxons, and Danes. As it was under the Roman yoke (speaking precisely) England had no Kings but the Roman Emperors. And what power they had, is spoken already, concerning the Roman Dictator's. And as for the power of the Danish, and Saxonick Kings, in England, no question, they had greater power than any of the Kings of England in old, or since the days of the Conqueror, if we except K. James. But to say, that their power was boundless and arbitrary, is more than I dare affirm. I will not deny, but the first, whether of the Danish, or the Saxonick Kings, had that same power, which the Conqueror had over England. As he subdued England, so did they. And it is the Conquerors privilege, to rule at random: Such do ordinarily conquer against Law. And I pray you, why do they not also rule without Law? But that all who succeeded these, had the like power also, I cannot be moved to affirm. It cannot be denied, but even under their reign there were Parliaments and Counsels. And I trow, they were not cyphers. I might enlarge this, but I judge it needless: for I care not which of the parts be affirmed. Under these Kings, England was not its own, but a subdued, and unsettled Nation. Which maketh me say, that it was no wonder, albeit then there was no time for it to exercise the Laws against its Kings. Thus at length I have offered my judgement freely concerning the power of the Kings of England, both of old and of late. And that we may shut up this whole purpose in a word, for cutting-off all that Salmasius can object, you shall be pleased carefully to distinguish between extraordinary, and ordinary Monarchy. As for an extraordinary Regal power, which was conferred on Kings, whether for extraordinary heroicism, personal endowments, or such like, we shall not stand to say, that such had not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an all-commanding power, but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an all-willing and arbitrary power. See Concl. 1, 2, 3, & 4. Yet we cannot say so much of ordinary Monarchy, if we look to the precise and ordinary way of the power of Kings. This by example is at length shown already. And so we come,  
Secondly, to prove it by reason. Can any in reason imagine, that people, unless it be for some extraordinary cause or other, will subject their necks to the pleasure and arbitrement of any? Nay, it is a combing against the hair, for people to resign their liberty into the hands of any man, giving him a full power to dispose upon them at random. It is very observable, That once Kings in Asia had not only an all-commanding, but also an all-willing power. So Nimrod, Belus, Ninus, and Semiramis, as is showed already, Concl. 1. And yet at last this pambasilick and arbitrary power, turned over into a despotic power, governing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according to Law. Polit. 3. cap. 10. Under these four Kings the condition of Regal power was very extraordinary. And so it was no wonder, though they did reign in an extraordinary way, having more will than other Kings. But the kingdom becoming settled, the power of their successors was hemmed-in. Their wings were a little clipped. And may we not judge so of all other Nations? Verily, I think it holdeth a majori: for the Assyrian Kings were universal Monarches, and no kingdom could ever match with the Assyrian empire. Which makes me imagine, that as the Kings of the Assyrian empire in an ordinary and settled case were reduced to Law, far more in that respect hath the case of other kings been such. And withal observe, there was a time, when Regal Government was much in request. It was much cried-up in the days of Heroicism. And that rather in the flower and beginnings, then in the fade and aftertimes thereof. And so it was no wonder though at that time kings were invested with a vast power. But by process of time, Monarchy became less esteemed. The power of it became much lessened, partly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the kings themselves dimitting, and partly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the people detracting from their greatness. So saith Aristotle, Polit. 3. cap. 10. So then we must not imagine that though kings sometimes had a vast and arbitrary power, they always had such a power, and their wings were never clipped. Nay, the disposition of every age is not for Royal power it-self, much less for the arbitrariness thereof. Let me never dream, that the ordinary way of people is to bring their necks under such a yoke. What is more consonant to nature then liberty? and what is more dissonant to it then tyranny? Can any deny, but arbitrary power in actu primo, is tyranny? It is still in a capacity either of tyrannising, or non-tyrannizing. It hath still a disposition for acting, either according to, or against Law. Can people then have an ordinary temper for taking with such a yoke? No verily, that is against the hair with them. 'Tis repugnant to their innate liberty, and the natural desire thereof. Yea, 'tis repugnant to the natural antipathy which all bear in hand against tyranny.  
This being done, we hasten now to give a direct and particular answer to that which Salmasius allegeth for proof of the second Proposition. We confess, that some Kings of Assyria had an absolute and arbitrary power. But we deny that such power was competent to all the Assyrian Kings, as is proved already. It will never follow, that because the first Kings of Assyria, who were extraordinary Heroes, in whose time the condition of the Kingdom was unsettled, had an arbitrary power; therefore all the Assyrian Kings had the same power also, while as the Kingdom became established. The one way the case is extraordinary, and the other way it is ordinary. But there is no consequence from extraordinaries to ordinaries. And Salmasius concludeth very unjustly, the Assyrian Kings to have been absolute, because the Persian Kings were so. I confess, the Persian Kings had a power to do any thing they pleased: but this was by the means of the great Persian Monarches, Cyrus and Darius. We read in Daniel, 6. ch. that in their days, the Persian Laws were unalterable. And so we conceive, that Law which gave the King of Persia a power to do every thing according to his pleasure, was made under their reign: Otherwise, they could not have decreed unalterably; Neither could Darius have decreed, that none for foully days should pray to any but to him, unless he had had an absolute & godlike power conferred upon him by the Law of the Kingdom. Of this Law Herodot speaketh, lib. 3. in the history of Cambyses marriage with his german sister. And it is known, that Cambyses did shortly after succeed to Cyrus. And it is already said by us more than once, that conquering Kings may, and did reign at random. And so it was no wonder, though the Persian Kings had an absolute power. 1. Because it was established amongst the first and fundamental Laws of the Kingdom. It was enacted by the power and means of the first Founders of the Persian Monarchy, who subdued the Assyrians, and brought them under. But you can never show me a Law amongst the Assyrians, establishing the arbitrary power of their Kings. 2. I do not deny, but arbitrary power may be retained in succession (being once acquired by some of the predecessors) for some short time. So arbitrary power acquired by Nimrod, continued till in, and about the reign of Zames. And if you say that it lasted longer, sure I am, it did not exceed the days of Heroicism. After which time Monarchy in Asia, became despotic and heril. Neither can you show me (as is proved already) that in the days of the Heroes, regal power was arbitrary, unless it had been in some extraordinary case. Well, I stand not to grant, that arbitrary power once acquired, may endure some few hundred years. But I cannot be brought to say, that such a power can be retained into many ages. This you may learn from what foregoeth. Now the Assyrian Monarchy continued about 1547, whereas the Persian Monarchy lasted but 230 years. And though Ottanes defineth Monarchy to be, that to which every thing is lawful unpunishably; yet he doth so by way of taxing the greatness thereof. And positively he taxeth the greatness of the Persian Kings, objecting to the people the licentious arbitrariness of Cambyses and Magus. Thus he endeavoureth to dissuade the People from establishing Monarchy, telling them, that it was neither good nor pleasant. And he giveth this reason for it: because (saith he) it hath a privilege to do every thing unpunishably, Herod. lib. 3. So then he defineth Monarchy after that manner, not because he esteemeth it to be its due privilege but because he holdeth it, as that which is competent to it against the pleasure and profit of the people. Therefore is it, that he useth it as a dissuading motive, for provoking the people no longer to setup Monarchy amongst them. We stand not here to gloss Artabanus mind, who commendeth that Law amongst the Persians whereby was enacted, That the King should be honoured as the Image of GOD. He was a great Courtier with the King of Persia. And it is the least thing Courtiers can do, to flatter. Although we do verily think, that Artabanus did allow vast and arbitrary power in the Persian King, yet that can be hardly drawn from his words. In Scripture, Kings are called Gods, and we are commanded to honour them as GOD's Vicegerents; yet doth it not follow, that according to Scripture-stile they are absolute, and have an arbitrary power. And we admit that of Claudian, who saith, that the Persians gave alike obedience to cruel and tyrannous Kings. Therefore was it, that by the very Law of the kingdom, arbitrary power was conferred upon their Kings, and continued so long as the Persian Monarchy endured. And though the Persian King had an absolute power in making, yet not in breaking Laws, as is said already. It is already showed by us, That in some things the power of the Persian King was restricted.  
Salmasius needeth not to tell us, that the Egyptians did not bring their Kings to the Stage. This is blocked-up already from his fingers. And though they did bear much with Cambyses, it was no wonder: for he subdued them. And what can a subdued people do, but suffer? And 'tis known that Cambyses himself was a vile tyrant. Therefore the story of Judeth calleth him Nabuchodonosor. So saith Josephus also. And Ottanes addeth to that, Herod, lib. 3. And what can Tyrants do but tyrannize? Such are very ready to usurp an arbitrary power, concls. 5. As for Busiris, I cannot think that ever the Egyptians had any such King, though Isocrates saith so, I confess, I read of such a man in Diodore, Rer. ant. lib. 2. cap. 1. But I can read little or nothing of him, either in Berosus or in Manetho. 'Tis true, Berosus, Ant. lib. 5. saith, That Busiris was King of Phoenicia. So saith Diodore, Ant. lib. 1. cap. 2. And Herodot reporteth, That Sennacherib invading Egypt, the Egyptians went about to help him against their own King Sethon, because he abused them, and did not his duty to them, Lib. 2. Thus we see that the Egyptians did hardly bear with tyrannous kings. This at length is showed already. And what power Agamemnon had over the Grecian Army, as also what power the Grecian Kings had, how they were absolute, and how not, is showed abundantly already. It is no matter that Philip saith, That the king hath equal power with God. So did Caligula arrogat an arbitrary and Godlike power to himself. Suet. in Cal. cap. 29. 'Tis the least thing that tyrannous kings can do, to plead for more interest, then either GOD, or Nature hath conferred on them. And Ecphantas calleth the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, not because he should be governed by none, but because he is above every one seorsim. In which notion he is above all, and subject to none. Yet this doth not conclude, but he is subject to the people, or their Representative. But knowing, that there are many Court-parasites, I regard not though you reckon-up Ecphantas amongst them. Yea, it is already showed by us, That the Roman Kings were regulated. And albeit we should grant, that Romulus was an absolute Prince, yet would Salmasius gain just nothing: for by his conduct and industry he made the Romans a People. And we have said already, that such kings, from whose conduct the people's welfare doth intimatly depend, have been absolute. But the case of such is extraordinary. And as for that which Pomponius saith, it needeth a distinction. It cannot be denied, but Romulus had a pambasilick power before the Senate was erected by him. But after it was established, we deny that he had any such power, as is showed already. This distinction you almost find in terminis, Digest. lib. 1. tit. 2. l 2. where Pomponius words are cited. This way also Tacitus is to be understood. We confess, the Roman Emperors have immunity from Law, and that according to the very Law of the kingdom. Princeps legibus solutus est, Dig. lib. 1. tit. 3. l. 31. And upon this ground say Severus and Antoninus, Licet legibus soluti simus, attamen legibus vivimus▪ Instit. lib. 2. tit. 17. And it cannot be denied, but Dio approveth that same Law. So do all king-flatterers. Yet Dion, lib. 51. saith, That this Law was enacted firstly in favour of Octavius. And no wonder: for he subdued and overcame all that stood by the liberties and privileges of the people. But the Conqueror may rule at random, as is often said already. So Darius, and Cyrus, having subdued the Assyrians, obtained the like privilege, not only to themselves, but also to their successors. In such a case we deny not, but kings have had an absolute and arbitrary power. But though Augustus obtained this privilege, yet sure I am, the Dictatours had it not, as is showed already.  
I confess, Diotogenes doth compare the King with GOD in some respects, i. e. As GOD is first by Nature and in Himself, and hath power over all the creatures; so the King by way of imitation and resemblance is first, and hath power on earth. But I read not a word in him of his comparing the King with GOD in the matter of absoluteness. And sure I am he could not make a comparison in order to GOD under the notion of arbitrary power: for GOD's essence knoweth not what it is to act against Law, and to tyrannize. Yet I do verily think that the man is of Salmasius judgement: for he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. The King hath an unsubjected power. And we do not deny, but Justinian, Novel. constit. 105. saith, That the King is above Law. He calleth himself also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Nou. constit. 1. tit. 1. Yet sure I am, Plutarch doth not say so, though Salmasius doth father it falsely upon his name. And truly for myself, I think it a great wonder, that Plutarch being a great Courtier with Trajan the Emperor, did not swear what Justinian spoke, 'Tis the least things Kings can do to say, They are absolute, and Courtiers to seal it with an Oath. A flattering Tacitus can say, Principi summum rerum arbitrium Dii dederunt. And Virgil before him deluding Augustus with flattery, blusheth not to say, Divisum imperium cum Jove Caesar habet. But this may be admired, That Plutarch, a most eminent Courtier, in plain terms saith, Lex omnium regina, Com. in Princ. But more of this afterward. And though Emperor Justinian claimed an arbitrary power, yet neither Theopompus, nor Lycurgus do so. But you shall hear more of this afterward. Well, I think it just nothing for Salmasius to tell me, that Kings and Courtiers do plead for an arbitrary power to the King. They both hold that as their interest, and what the one saith the other sweareth. But he must think it very material, and take it to his second thoughts, that both Kings and Courtiers do decline and abominate arbitrary and illimited power. Friend there is not self-interest here. But the other way you cannot say so much. And what is it that interest will not make a man do, who regardeth nothing but self-ends? As the one way partiality, so the other way impartiality taketh room. And as for Sallust, truly Salmasius wrongeth him very much. It is not his opinion, Impune quae libet facere, id est Regem esse. But Memmius thereby endeavoureth to dissuade the Romans to keep themselves by all means possible from the yoke of King Jugurtha, hereby insinuating the dangerousness and inconveniency of Monarchy, just so as O●tanes did to the Persians. But neither of them did allow this, but taxed it as an unjust and hurtful power in Kings. I must needs say Salmasius quoteth Memmius and Ottanes their words, as the Devil quoted in tempting Christ, Matth. 4. David's words, Psa. 91. v. 11. That which directly made against the Devil's temptation, he held-out, and only expressed that which he thought made for his purpose. So doth Salmasius straight-forth in quoting the words of Ottanes and Memmius. The thing that maketh against him, he suppresseth, and that which in show maketh for him, he expresseth.   

SUBSECT. 2.  
The rest of the Arguments, for enforcing the second Assertion, propounded and followed-forth.  
HAving at length discussed all that Salmasius doth, or can reply against our second Argument, we make ready now to propound the rest of our Arguments, whereby the King's arbitrary power is dismissed. And what further may be objected against our second. Argument (as indeed Royalists do) we shall take it off by the way in prosecuting the rest of our Arguments. And so by the way we shall meet with these Royalists, who with Salmasius, do directly military against our second Argument. Now,  
Thirdly, we make good our purpose from the power that the Kings of Israel and Judah had. And for clearing this, you shall be pleased to take notice of these Conclusions.  
Conclus. 1. The wicked Kings of the Jews had an arbitrary power, both over Religion and the People of GOD.  
For proof of this, see 1 Sam. 13.14, 15.22.23, etc. 2 Sam. 21. 1 King. 12.14.15.16.20.22. 2 King. 3.8.10.13.14.15.16.17.21.24. 2 Chr. 10.11.12.18.21.22.24.25.26.27.28.33.36.  
Conclus. 2. The tyrannous and usurping Kings of the Jews, in all probability had an arbitrary power over the Republic.  
There is reason for this: for such did reign against Law. And why did they not also rule against Law? And what can tyrannous Kings do, but reduce the people to slavery? Now it is known that the Kings of Israel for the most part, were of this temper. Many of them were cruel tyrants and vile usurpers. Therefore is it said, Rex neque judicat, neque judicatur, non dicit testimonium, nec in ipsum dicitur, In cod. Sanh. 11. This Maimonides expoundeth concerning the kings of Israel, in Gemar tract. de synedr. cap. 11. And this I take to be very true concerning the usurping and tyrannous kings of Israel, They did not judge, because tyrannous and usurping kings delight in cruelty. They seek nothing but their own case, and if they act any thing according to Law it is only for the fashion, as the tyrant Cambyses did, in seeking his german sister in marriage. What? Such hold will for Law. They know nothing but, 
Hoc volo, sic jubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas.  Juv. Satyr. 6. Such Kings do not judge according to the Law of the Kingdom. Neither is there power according to the Law of the Kingdom laid upon such. What they do is done by themselves unanswerable to any. They act will-way, and not Law-way. They were not judged, because they did take power to themselves above all Law. It cannot be denied but Salmastus concludeth well from 1 Sam. 8. and 2 Sam. 8. that the King of Israel judged. Def. Reg. cap. 2. But he will do well to advert, that though this be true Rex judicat, concerning the King of Israel, according to God's institution the Law of the Nation, and the practice of some of their Kings, yet this is as true Rex non judicat, concerning the ordinary practice of their Kings. And it is very observable, that Jannaeus, whom they called Alexander, all the while he did reign over the people of the Jews, acted nothing according to Law, but tyrannised over them, Jos. of't. Jud. lib. 13. cap. 21.22. But in Gem. tract. de Syned.) cap. 11. it is said, that because of Jannaeus, it was enacted, that the king should neither judge, nor be judged. And if it be true that it was enacted then, then do I not think that it was upon that fabalous ground, (which doth not so much as relish to Salmasius) of which the Rabbinick writers speak, but because of the tyranny and cruelty of the man, who did not govern law-way, but will-way. And as Alexander, so the tyrant Herod had an arbitrary power, though we suppose it did depend much from the concession of Antonius, Jos. Ant. lib. 15. cap. 4.  
Conclus. 3. The good Kings of the Jews because of personal endowments, had exemption and immunity from Law.  
This is manifest in the examples of David and Solomon. There were two things chief in David which were against the Law. 1. Multiplication of wives. Whereof David had very many, 1 Chr. 3. and 14.2. Murder upon the back of adultery, 2 Sam. 11. And Solomon did many things contrary to the Law 1. He multiplied gold and silver. 2. Horses and Charets, 1 Kin. 10. 2 Chron. 9 3. Wives. And 4 he fell into adultery, 1. Kin. 11. And yet we read not that either David or Solomon were judged therefore by the Sanhedrin. And what (I pray you) could be the reason of this? Not because the king de jure hath immunity from Law. Nor because they overawed the Sanhedrin by force of arms. We read nothing of that. And you shall not make me believe, that the Sanhedrin durst not attempt the executing of justice upon them. 1. You thereby put a great note of reproach upon David and Solomon. You do no less than insinuate a disposition in them for rebellion, if you allege that the Sanhedrin, which de jure (as both already and afterward doth appear) had power over them, durst not for fear of their resistance, execute judgement on them. That had been a disposition to resist the higher powers. which the Holy Ghost condemneth, Rom. 13. And I will not think that such men had the Spirit of rebellion to repine against the execution of justice. 2. We find that the Sanhedrin did execute justice on Amaziah. And the people did so against Athaliah, 2 Kin. 11.2 Chr. 23. Which maketh me think that it was not for want of power, that David and Solomon were spared. Other Kings of Judah were punished for their faults. The Sanhedrin and people had power to execute justice on them. And why not also on David and Solomon? They were all Kings alike. And it is very remarkable that after Solomon's death, ten tribes declined the house of David, because of Solomon's heavy exactions and tributes he laid upon the people, 1 Kin. 12. 2 Chr. 10. I believe they were as powerful to revolt from Solomon as from Rehoboam. And seeing the people took so heavily with Solomon's yoke, that therefore they did revolt from his son, it maketh me think that the Sanhedrin did not spare him, for fear of his power. Verily both they and the people have born patiently with his slips and heavy impositions, because of his rare and singular qualifications. Otherwise I can see nothing for it, why the people did not make a mutiny against, and revolt from Solomon as against, and from Rehoboam. 3. Because, as both already and afterward doth appear, the Sanhedrin, both according to GOD's institution, and the Law of the nation, had authority and jurisdiction above the king. But sure I am, it had been a very useless power if they durst not have exercised it. It had been all one to have wanted that authority, with wanting power to have put it in execution as occasion served. And this had been a having, and a non-having power. Which is ridiculous and repugnant. Neither can you allege that they were spared, because then judicatories were altogether turned corrupt, and knew not what it was to exercise justice: for that doth directly militate against the eminent Reformation both of Church and State, that was under the reign of both these Kings. Therefore seeing David and Solomon were spared, not because they were absolute, nor because the people durst not execute judgement on them, nor because the people and judicatories under their reign were altogether dissolute, not knowing the way of exercising justice; to me it is more than manifest that their delinquency was past-by, because of their personal endowments. The shining virtues and eminent graces that did appear in them, no question have kept back the Sanhedrin from putting hand on them. O! what a temptation would it be to me, to voice for a David's offcutting? O! how much would my soul be grieved, to sentence against a Solomon? And shall not I think but those of the Sanhedrin were much taken up with the qualifications of these men, as well as I could be with the virtues of suchlike? I cannot think that I am singular in this.  
In the interim observe, that my meaning is not that they had such a vast power as Salmasius dreameth of. I do not think that ever the Sanhedrin would have spared them, unless they could not have done otherways, if they had turned positive and even-down tyrants and destroyers of the Commonwealth. But only my meaning is, that because of their eminent qualifications, they had immunity from Law in some notes of delinquency. Neither do I speak, that they had this privilege, de jure, but de facto. Thus you see that this is no argument for Royalists, who object, the Sanhedrin's sparing of David and Solomon, as a ground of the King's arbitrary power: And in this none is more ready than Salmasius, Def. Reg. cap. 5. But they shall do well shortly to observe these things. 1. They were spared, because of their personal endowments. They were extraordinary men: Therefore they were extraordinarily privileged: They got an inch to the yard, and piece beyond common. Now ab extraordinariis, ad ordinaria, non est sequela. 2. It cannot be denied, but they got a dispensation for some points of delinquency. But Royalists have to prove, that they positively tyrannised over the Commonwealth, and destroyed it, and notwithstanding had exemption and immunity from law. This I am sure they can never make good. 3. This speaketh something of the exemption of Kings from Law, de facto. But Royalists, when they have said this, have as yet to prove, that this factum is de jure.  
Inst. O but, (say they) de jure, David (and if he, than also Solomon, and all other kings beside) had immunity from Law: for he saith, Against thee, thee only have I sinned, Psal. 51. And they take this to be the meaning of the place; as if David had been subject to none but to God. And for this namely they cite Ambrose, in Apolog. Dau. cap. 10. l. 2. Epist. 7. See Deus & Rex, and Salmasius, def, reg. cap. 3. But this is the main prop that all Royalists have for setting-up the arbitrary and lawless power of the King.  
Ans. I shall not stand here to repeat the judgement of Interpreters. Our learned and dear Countryman, Lex Rex, quaest. 26. of this speaketh abundantly. But in few words I expound the words thus. They are to be taken 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, insinuating, that David had mainly sinned against the LORD, and that David was more grieved for his sins, in so far as they offended GOD, then in so far as they offended man. No question, they are to be considered in an hyperbolic sense. They must not be taken in an exclusive, but in an inclusive notion. Just so as are these words, I [am] the LORD, and [there is] none else, Isa. 45. & Deut. 4. Now, this cannot be taken literally and simply as it is propounded. Otherwise it should follow, that there were no creature beside the Creator, and no other thing beside the LORD. And yet it is known, that there are Angels, men, and many other creatures. Therefore their sense is merely figurative and hyperbolic, pointing-out the eminency of GOD's essence. Even so David thereby aggravateth his grief for his offence done against the LORD. He only repeateth his sin done against GOD. But he speaketh nothing expressly of it, as it was done against Bathshebah and Uriah. No reason can be given for this, but because it more grieved him; that he had offended God then man. And so, as a man only taken-up with thoughts of guiltiness and miscarriage in order to God, he only harpeth upon that string: As a man overcharged with sorrow for sin done against God, can take no time to think upon his offence to man. So David carrieth himself just so here. And yet it cannot be denied but he sinned both against Bathshebah and Uriah. Otherwise, in so far as he committed adultery with the one, and murder against the other, in so far he did not sin. And consequently, he was excusable both before God and man. Where there is no sin, there is no Law. Our godly and dear Countryman would fain put a fair construction upon Ambrose, saying, that his meaning is, There was none above David, de facto, ibid. But the simple truth is, Ambrose is altogether of Salmasius opinion. Rex utique erat, (saith he) nullis ipse legibus tenebatur, etc. Any man that speaketh so plain language to this purpose as he doth, 'tis but lost travel, to gloss it. But if we compare Ambrose's practice with his judgement, we will find the one contrary to the other. It is reported of him, That he did excommunicate Emperor Theodosius, and would not suffer him to enter the Church (so called) till firstly he did satisfy for his slaughter committed amongst the Thessalonians, Theodor. lib. 5. cap. 17. Sozom. lib. 7. cap. 24. Hondorf. & Lonic. theatr. hist. exempl. 5. praec. We admire how Ambrose could do so much against the Emperor in action, seeing to his practice he is contrary in profession.  
I cannot overleap an interpretation which Salmasius citeth out of one whom he calleth Anonymus. He allegeth that David saith so, because God only could pardon him. But, saith Salmasius, this cannot be: for the remission of sins, obtained by the blood of Christ, under the new Testament, unto life eternal, had no place under the old Testament. O! (saith he) what ignorance and wickedness go hand in hand in these knaves? Def. Reg. cap. 3. This gloss, which Salmasius so much hisseth-at is the very words of Lyra. And it is cited by our dear Countryman Lex Rex, quaest 26. Well then, let that Anonymus be what he will (whom I take not to be the author of Lex Rex) Salmasius hath no reason for that interpretation to call him ignorant, unless he call Lyra ignorant also. And I must needs say, Hell, and the Devil never invented worse, than what now Salmasius speaketh. I wonder if he dare deny, but Christ was also mediator under the old Testament, aswell as under the new. Dare he say, That under the old Testament remission of sins unto life eternal was not centred upon Christ, and acquired by him? Hath this man a face to deny, Christ to be the Redeemer of Believers under the Law? By whose mediation I pray you did they pass from death to life, if not by the righteousness of Christ who is the only Advocate before the Father for the sins of all the Elect? I confess, those who were under the Law believed in Christ, who was to be incarnated, and who was about to shed his blood on the Cross for the Redemption of Believers. But doth this takeaway Christ's blood shed under the new Testament, as the ground and centre of Salvation and remission of sins to Believers under the old Testament? Howsoever, sure I am, this Gentleman cannot deny, but under the old Testament God only could pardon sin. Now this Author, whom he calleth an ignorant and pestilent knave, saith no more but this. And I shall let any indifferent Reader judge between Salmasius and him, whether or not Salmasius hath reason to fail so much against him, because he saith, That under the old Testament GOD only could pardon David's sin. Oh! that this poor wretch is not ashamed to speak so blasphemously. This truth is old enough, and can speak for itself. And sure I am, there is no honest heart who will allow Salmasius in this.  
Royalists need not to brag much, because David was unpunishable by man, for his murder and adultery. Arguing from this, the state of the Question between us and them is changed. And thus the Question is moved, Whether or not a man according to God's own heart, one worth ten thousand, and as in qualification, so in station, above every one of the People, should be cut-off and punished by the State, for committing adultery with a private woman, and committing murder against a private man? And what if I should hold the negative of the Question, (as indeed I make it a great case, and do spare to determine upon either of the parts at this time; yet would Royalists gain just nothing? The Question between them and us is this: Whether or not the King is unpunishable by man though turned a positive tyrant, and forthwith a destroyer of the Commonwealth? Friends, show me the like practice in David, and the Sanhedrin's sparing him notwithstanding, and I shall yield to you. Ye are so far from being able to do so, that weighing David's murder in a square balance, you will find it lighter than is supposed: for neither he, nor his, had formally, but virtually a hand in the murder of Uriah. This is far from a destroying of the People. 'Tis not like Nero's wish, that all Rome had but one Neck, that he might cut it off. Now, Royalists must object from the Sanhedrin's sparing a Nero. Otherwise they beat the air, and change the state of the Question.  
Conclus. 4. The Kings of the Jews, de jure, had no arbitrary and uncircumscribed power.  
This we make good, firstly from divine institution and God's moulding of the King, Deut. 17. from which is already proved, Subsect. 1. Assert. 2. That the power of the Jewish king is hedged-in by Law. And Josephus on the place saith, That he should do nothing without the consent and advice of the Priest and Sanhedrin, Antiq. Jud. lib. 14. cap. 8. 'Tis but vanity in Sa●nasius to elude Josephus speech, saying, That his meaning is only concerning the Kings of the Jews after the captivity, Def. Reg. cap. 2. Is he not blind, that seethe not this man's deceit? Sure I am, that which is spoken of the King, Deut. 17. was spoken long before the Kings of the Jews after the captivity, yea, long before there was any King in Israel. 'Tis the very positive rule and pattern of all Kings. And Josephus in the place above cited, as it were commenting on Moses words, giveth the meaning of them. Nay, but you shall further observe the fallacy of this Gentleman. He studieth to put his own construction, as most beseemeth his honour, upon Josephus words. And yet notwithstanding, he refelleth Josephus, and cannot rest satisfied with his own construction. Yea, which is more, he fleeth, cap. 9 to what Josephus saith, as to a main truth, in respect of all the Kings of Israel, both before, and after the Captivity. Then tell me what manner of man can he be, who cap. 2. declineth from, and cap. 9 inclineth to Josephus. In the one place he plainly denieth, That the Kings of the Jews, whether before, or after the Captivity, were tied to do nothing, without the consent of the high-Priest, and Sanhedrin. And yet in the other place he affirmeth the contrary. But he loseth all his labour, whether to deny what Josephus saith, or to gloss it according to his own humour: for, as afterward is showed, Josephus was no friend to Monarchy. And, which is more, what Josephus saith, is the common judgement of Jewish Writers Rex,— obediat curiae senatus majoris. i e. The King,— let him be obedient to the authority of the higher Sanhedrin, Deut. 17. Senatus major interficiendi gladio jus habeat. i e. Let the higher Sanhedrin have the right and power of killing by the sword, Exod. 21. Nemo seize opponat decretis sanctioris Senatus. i e. Let none withstand and resist the Statutes of the greater Sandedrin, Deut. 17. R. Mos. Egypt. praec. off. 176. and 225. praec. neg. 316. It cannot be denied, but the Jewish King was regulated, seeing not only he was obliged to give obedience to the higher Sanhedrin, but also every one without exception was tied not to contraveen the Acts and Sentence thereof. He had not so much as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, much less 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. The power of the sword was not in his hand, but in the Sanhedrin's. Thus his power was restricted, as was the authority of the Lacedaemonian king, and the power of other Kings, as is spoken-of already at length. Yea, Maimonides saith, Qui ex familia Davidis, sunt judicant, & judicantur. And so in expounding that, Rex neque judicat, neque judicatur, cod. San. cap. 11. he saith, That it is true in respect of the Kings of Israel, but not in respect of the Kings of Judah. And in what sense it is true concerning the Kings of Israel, is already explicated by us. The Gemarick Writers from these words, Oh, house of David,— execute judgement in the morning; and deliver him that is spoiled out of the hand of the oppressor, Jerem. 21. move this Question, Nisi in jus vocari possent, quomodo judicarent? i. e. How could the house of David judge, unless they were judged? This they prove, because in Scripture we are commanded to search and try our ways, i. e. as they say, Corrige te ipsum, deinde alios corrige. Salmasius rageth at this, and he denieth what they infer. I shall not take it upon me to make good their consequences. Let Salmasius impugn them as much as he will. My purpose is only to show, That they are not of his opinion. They are contented not only to say, That the king of the Jews, atleast of Judah, (as Salmasius himself out of Sichardus & R. Lakises hath) was subjected to Law, but also they dispute for that, and endeavour to enforce it by Arguments.  
Secondly, from their acting with the concurrence of their Princes. And David consulted with the Captains of thousands, and hundreds, [and] with every leader. And David said unto all the Congregation of Israel, If it [seem] good unto you,— let us send abroad unto our brethren,— that they may gather themselves unto us, 1 Chron. 13. There is much in this, If it seem good unto you. This insinuateth, that as David would not act without the advice and counsel of his people, so his acting depended from their determination. For the King had taken counsel, and his Priests, and all the Congregation in Jerusalem, to keep the Pass-over in the second month. He doth it not of his own head without advice. And the thing pleased the King, and all the Congregation. It is a thing done by common consent. So they established a decree,— Mark, it is not said, So the King established a decree. But the Authority both of King and Princes is interposed. The decree floweth from the joynt-authority of both. Therefore it is added, So the posts went with Letters from the King, and the Princes, 2 Chron. 30. They go not forth as commissioned only from the King, but also from the Princes. And it is most remarkable, that which Zedekiah said unto the Princes.— The King [is] not he [that] can do any thing against you. Jerem. 38. Ergo, if the King could do nothing against the will of the Princes, he had not an arbitrary power to dispose upon matters as he pleased.  
Inst. The King delivered Jeremiah into the hands of the Princes (saith Salmasius) not because he was inferior to them, but by way of courtesy and gratification, and perhaps for fear of sedition. Def. reg. cap. 4. Ans. I confess Josephus ant. lib. 10. cap. 10. doth insinuate as much. But by your leave I must needs say, that Zedekiah might have delivered Jeremiah into the hands of the Princes, whether through gratification or through jealousy, and yet he needed not to say that he could do nothing against them. And sure I am, if he had had an arbitrary power over them, he would never have said so. 1. Because it had been a known and manifest lie. Which he would have been ashamed to have spoken in the presence of the Princes. 2. He should have done altogether against gallantry and wisdom. Against gallantry, because if he should have denied his power by way of gratification, then should he have been simple. And if through jealousy, than he had been base and cowardly. Against wisdom, because the high way of fomenting sedition, is to dash upon suspicion thereof. The seditious party is encouraged, upon the fainting and relenting of the other. Well, I do not dispute upon what grounds Zedekiah delivered Jeremiah into the hands of the Princes. Whether it be the one way or the other, it is not material. Yet you must give me leave to add, that you can assign no reason whether from gratification, or from jealousy, why he should have said that he could do nothing against the will of the Princes, if he had had an arbitrary and boundless power. Nay but the words are so clear, that they need no commentary.  
Thirdly, from the council of the old men given to Rehoboam, who said to him, If thou wilt be a servant unto this people this day, and wilt serve them, and speak good words to them, than they will be thy servants for ever, 1 Kin. 12. 2 Chr. 10. They persuade the king to keep himself within bounds, and not to rule at random. They would have the King to carry himself as a servant toward the people. This is far from an arbitrary and lording power. It came to this, that either Rehoboam behoved to govern according to Law, and dimit of the power which his father had, although it was not boundless and arbitrary, in the full vastness of arbitrary power, or else the people would leave him and revolt from him. Thus it was not in Rehoboam's option to lessen or not to lessen the yoke of his father which he held upon the people's neck. No verily; Neither did the old men counsel him to dimit any thing of his father's power, as merely depending from his own arbitrament, but in relation to the people's desire. And that not only because of necessity, but also because of conveniency. Verily, the old men had been far in the wrong to Rehoboam to have counselled him to dimit any thing of his power, if he might have retained it justly. No necessity lawfully could have moved the old men to persuade Rehoboam to dimit his power, if he had had such a power of GOD, and if the desire of the people had been unhonest and unjust. No evil should be done, that good may come of it; Rom. 3. Verily the young men's counsel had been more just and reasonable, than the counsel of the old men, if Rehoboam lawfully might have kept the people under his father's yoke, and if the people's desire had been unlawful. But it is known (as Salmasius himself confesseth) that Solomon unjustly keeped the people under heavy pressures, 1 Kin. 11. and the counsel of the old men was just and reasonable yea and the desire of the people was honest and equitable, 1 Kin. 12. 2 Chr. 10. Ios. of't. Jud. lib 8. cap. 3. Now tell me, whether or not the Kings of the Jews de jure had an arbitrary and lording power over the people? If they had such a power de jure, than did the people contra jus, in desiring Rehoboam to dimit his father's power, which of the most can be called nothing but absolute and uncircumscribed, and the old men did also contra jus; in desiring Rehoboam to satisfy the people's desire. Salmasius himself will not say so. But he acknowledgeth that the peopl's desire was just, and the old men's counsel seasonable. Yet I remit it to any indifferent reader to judge, whether or not the people could have desired Rehoboam to lessen the yoke of his father, and the old men could have counselled him to serve the people, and satisfy their desire without the note of highest treason, if he had been their absolute lord? And if you deny that de jure they had any such power, then do I gain the point.  
Inst. Salmasius hath no more to say against this, But (1) they did not accuse, condemn, and bring Rehoboam to death, as the English rebels dealt with K. Charles. (2.) There is none who will not condemn Jeroboam, as an apostate and rebel, and impute rebellion to all his successors, Def. reg. cap. 4. Ans. This is a mere shifting of the question. What is it to the purpose that the people of Israel did not accuse, condemn, and cut-off Rehoboam? Will it therefore follow, that he had an arbitrary and lording power, or that they went not about to eclipse his power, and to keep it within bounds? The contrary of that is showed already. And I think, Salmasius will say, that they had not reason to cut-off Rehoboam. He did no more but threatened them with heavy pressures and grievous impositions, and that through the suggestion of wicked and evil counsel. We read not that he had tyrannised over them, and had put any thing in action, which he threatened them with. And yet they say, What portion [have] we in David? neither have we inheritance in the son of Jesse. Every man to your tents O Israel, and now, David, see to thine own house, 1 Kin. 12. 2 Chr. 10. My friend, were they any thing behind with Rehoboam in this? And I am sure, they did as much against Rehoboam in revolting from him, and in setting another King over them, upon his threatening them with tyranny, as if they should have cut him off, if at any time he had actually exercised tyranny upon them. Consideratis considerandis, the case is just one. They declined him upon his profession of tyranny. And I pray, imagine you but they would have dealt far more roughly with him, if he had put it in action? Did they not stone Adoram to death, who was sent out by the King to them? And was not the King constrained to flee to Jerusalem, for fear of his life, after they had revolted from him? Yea, were they not always in a posture to have withstood the King, if he had come against them in arms? 1 King. 12. & 13. 2 Chron. 10. & 11. I cannot stand here to dispute, whether or not they did lawfully revolt from him. But sure I am, I may very justly determine upon either of these two 1. That Jeroboam was a vile idolater, and was not worthy to be a King. 2. That the people justly desired Rehoboam, to dimit of the power which his father had, and that the old men did arightly counsel Rehoboam to do so. Neither of these doth Salmasius deny. And so I gain the point, as is already proved.  
Fourthly, from the People of the Jews processing their Kings. So did they against Athaliah, 2 King. 11. 2 Chron. 23. and Amaziah, 2 King. 14. 2 Chron. 25. See subsect. 2. prop. 1. And as they processed their Kings, so did they resist them, as afterward is showed. But I pray you, could they have done such things lawfully if their Kings had had an arbitrary power over them? And that they did such things according to Law and Reason is proved by us.  
Fifthly: If Ahab had had an absolute power, I see no reason how he could have been refused of Naboth's Vineyard, 1 King. 21 Sure I am, if he had had a prerogative above Law, and a power to dispose according to his pleasure, either upon the goods or the person of the subject, he might have taken Naboth's Vineyard at his own hand, without so much as demanding it with Naboth's leave. And yet the text saith, That Naboth having refused to give it him, he went home much dismayed, and refused to eat bread, because Naboth had denied it to him. And, which is more, he could not get it till a false process was led against Naboth, by the craft of Jezebel. But is it imaginable that ever such things would have been done, if Ahab's power had been arbitrary and uncircumscribed? No verily. No question, if his power had been boundless, by virtue of a Royal Act he might have taken Naboth's Vineyard, either without grieving himself, or without leading a false process against Naboth. And therefore Mr. Withers, al. Tom Plain-man saith notably: 
— Why, I pray,  
Did Ahab grieve, that Naboth said him nay?  
Why made he not this answer thereunto,  
(If what the Prophet said, some Kings would do,  
Were justly to be done) Thy Vineyard's mine,  
And at my pleasure, Naboth, all that's thine,  
Assume I may? Why like a Turkey-chick,  
Did he so foolishly grow sullen sick,  
And get possession by a wicked fact,  
Of what might have been his by Royal Act?  
If such Divinity as this, were true,  
The Queen should not have needed to pursue  
Poor Naboth, as she did, or so contrive  
His death, since by the King's Prerogative,  
She might have got his Vineyard; nor would God  
Have scourged that murder with so keen a rod,  
On Ahab, had he asked but his due:  
For he did neither plot, nor yet pursue,  
The murder, nor (for aught that we can tell)  
Had knowledge of the deed of Jezebel,  
Till God revealed it by the Prophet to him.  
Nor is it said, that Naboth wrong did do him,  
Or disrespect, in that he did not yield,  
To sell, or give, or to exchange his field.  Brit. Remembr. Cant. 8.  
Now hereby is made to appear, That the Kings of the Jews were not absolute, whether according to the Law of God, or the Law of the Kingdom. And why then do Royalists plead so much for the King's arbitrary power, seeing the Jewish Kings, de jure, had it not? Which maketh me think, other Kings far less should have it: for the ordination of the Jewish Kings did depend from God in a most special way, and God therein was most intimatly concerned. We must not think, that the Kings of Judah, after the captivity, de jure, had any privilege above Law, more than those who preceded them. According to the Law of God they had no such privilege, as is showed already. And that according to the Law of the Nation they had it not, is also evident. (1.) Because after the captivity the state of the Government was changed. And they had not so much as Kingly Government, much less absolute Monarchy, till Aristobulus firstly usurped the Crown Jos. of't. Jud. lib. 13. cap. 19 (2.) Because the people did withstand the tyrant Alexander. And while as he was dying, he was necessitate to exhort his wife, who succeeded to him, to dimit of his power, and to promise to govern according to the advice and counsel of the Senators, and Pharisees, Ant. Jud. lib. 13. cap. 22, & 23. Which she did accordingly, cap. 24. And at her death she desired the Sanhedrin to dispose upon the Kingdom as they pleased, even while her son Aristobulus was in arms, for bringing the Kingdom to himself. Yea, the Sanhedrin not only accused Antipater, but also arraigned Herod before them, who for fear of them was constrained to flee, Ant. Jud. lib. 14. cap. 17. And what arbitrary power Herod had, was by Antonius' concession, whom Herod blinded and deluded with gifts, Ant. Jud. lib. 15. cap. 4. I confess, while as Herod was cited before the Sanhedrin, he was not King, but Governor of Galilee. But what then? I hope Salmasius will not deny, (which indeed he confesses) that his father Antipater did reign as King. And yet the Elders of the People did accuse him before Hyrcanus. But neither Hyrcanus, who indeed was King of the Jews, nor Antipater, who was Procurator, and managed the matters of the Kingdom because of his weakness, were able to absolve Herod, notwithstanding Caesar the Precedent of Syria, wrote some Letters to Hyrcanus, threatening him, if he did not absolve him. The Sanhedrin wenton so precisely against Herod, that they went about to condemn him to death. So that Hyrcanus was necessitate, in satisfying Caesar's desire, to cause Herod flee quietly away. Now, I would fain know of Salmasius, if either Hyrcanus or Antipater had had an absolute and arbitrary power, might they not have absolved Herod at their pleasure, the Sanhedrin nilling, or willing, and not basely for fear of the Sanhedrin have dismissed Herod secretly? Therefore Salmasius must give me leave to say, (though he imagineth the contrary) that Sichardus very pertinently urgeth this example, to prove, that the power of the Sanhedrin was above the King. And Salmasius himself denieth not, Def. Reg. cap 2. & 5. but the strain and current of Rabbinick Writers doth run this way.  
Inst. Nay but (saith he) in the Jewish Talmud it is spoken otherwise. And therefore it is said, Rex neque judicat, neque judicatur, non dicit testimonium, nec in ipsum dicitur, in Cod. San. cap. 11. Def. Reg. cap. 2. Answ. Verily this Gentleman needeth not brag much of this: for the Jewish Writers pull this out of his hands by a distinction. Some of them understand it concerning the Kings of Israel, and some of them refer it to the Samaritan Kings. But they deny it to have place in the Kings of Judah, and those who came of David. I admire much, that he should cite the authority of Jewish writ for him. He doth not deny, but the Jewish Writers are no friends to Kingly Government. And they positively say, (which he denieth not himself) that the King of the Jews was subjected to Law. And, which is more, they particularily condescend upon three cases, wherein the King was judged and punished by the Sanhedrin, viz. Idolatry, Murder, and Adultery. Let Salmasius impugn their say and consequences as much as he will, (no question, they speak many things from the purpose) I regard not. All that I seek of them, is, to show, that they are far from his opinion, though he leaneth much to humane authority. Yea that which in their say seemeth most for him, he himself is not fully satisfied therewith. He is constrained to put a fair face upon that, Rex neque judicat, saying, That it only hath place in the Kings of the Jews after the Captivity. But if his construction stand, than we shall expound the words thus, Rex neque judicat, i. e. The King of the Jews after the Captivity, did not judge, neque judicatur, i. e. The King of the Jews, whether before, or after the Captivity, was not judged. And so you must after the same manner expound the words which are added to these. And for myself I take this exposition of his to be mere nonsense. And sure I am, there is no Humanist, who according to the rules of true Rhetoric, can admit such an exposition. I see he will have Rex, taken in an ambiguous sense. But I know not if ever he read, that one and the same word in a continuate Oration, is taken under divers senses. Such cryptick expressions become not Humanists, but Sophists, & Amphibologick Prophets. Well, we have given the sense of these words already, in this same Section, Concl. 2. And we mind no more to stand here, but only put Salmasius in mind of this, That the Kings of the Jews, whether according to the Law of God, or the Law of man, had no prerogative royal above Law: Ergo far less any other Kings are so privileged.  
Fourthly: Absolute power, in actu primo, is a tyrannic power: Ergo it is not a lawful power and a power from God. The Antecedent cannot be denied, because absolute and arbitrary power putteth the King, or any invested therewith, in a disposition for, and capacity of acting either according, or contrary to Law, of tyrannising, and non-tyrannizing over the People. Now this aptitude of arbitrary power is the very actus primus thereof. The consequence is also undeniable: for God cannot be the author of any evil and tyrannous power. Power, in so far as it is tyrannous, in as far it is sinful and unlawful, either in less or more. The Scripture of God crieth-down tyranny, and so doth the very Law of Nature. But who will say, That God hath hand in any thing that is evil and unjust; unless he will not be ashamed to say, That God is the author of sin? And if it be so, that absolute and arbitrary power is not of God, I admire how Malignants are not ashamed to plead so much for it.  
The point being thus established from Scripture, and reason grounded thereupon, the next thing we have to do in this business, is to show, that it is not only my judgement, but even that also which the very light of Nature taught Ethnics to embrace. Herodot approveth Pindarus, because he called Law the King and Lord of every thing, lib. 3. And lib. 7. he saith, that amongst the Lacedæmonians Law was King. In like manner Plutarch approveth Pindarus for that same, comment. in Princ. Plato doth much cry-up Lycurgus, because he prevented tyranny, in choosing some to govern with him in the Kingdom, and made Law King. So that (saith he) Law became the King of men, and not men the Kings of Law, In epist. ad famil. Dion. And in the politics he saith, We should not call the civil and kingly power absolute. Aristotle reproveth arbitrary power in the Lacedaemonian Ephorie, and in plain terms saith, that it had done better to judge according to Law, then according to it's own will, Polit. 2. cap. 7. And Polit. 4. cap 4. he saith in even-down terms, that Law ought to rule all. Which maketh him say, that where Law doth not lord, there is not a Republic. Yea cap. 5. he calleth absolute optimacy, tyranny, calling it all one with the tyranny of kingly government. Pol. 5. cap. 10. he differenceth the tyrant from the King in this, viz. that the object of the King is honestum, and of the tyrant, quod placet. Thus he maketh Salmasius his cui quod libet licet, the propriety of a Tyrant, not of a King. And therefore shutting-up the whole matter in a word, he calleth all powers above Law mere tyrannies. But you shall not need to imagine that Aristotle in this contradicteth himself, while as Pol. 3. cap. 11. & 12. he alloweth pambasilick monarchy. 1. Because, as is above said, there is great difference between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And already we have showed that Aristotle doth not absolutely, but comparatively oppose government laid upon one governing ex voluntate, to government managed and carried-on secundum legem. 2. It is far from Aristotle's mind to dispute simply and absolutely for such a power. But his main purpose is to dispute against these who deny pambasilick and all-governing monarcny to be according to Nature. And it cannot be denied, but both mixed and unmixed monarchy are natural, albeit arbitrary and unlimited regal power be against the very Law of Nature itself. It is no wonder though Aristotle speak something for Royal power. Had he not Alexander to deal-with, who could endure none to govern but himself? Church-Prophets or rather prating parasites, such as are the lying spirits, and King-flatterers now a-dayes, were they as great Courtiers as Aristotle was, I trow they should not be ashamed, in plain language and positive terms to prefer the King to CHRIST. The Ethnics called Jupiter primus. But they could find in their heart to change that, and say, Caesar primus. Tell not me that Aristotle is for absolute and uncircumscribed monarchy. Compare place with place, and you will find the contrary. Yea, Polit. 3. cap. 12. he layeth down this as a ground, That Monarchy transgressing the right model, is against Nature itself. But sure I am, a power to tyrannize and act against Law, is against the right model: for both in actu primo, and actu secundo it is a tyrannic power. Howsoever Aristotle in that same place explaineth what the right model is, as is showed by us already. And it is far from taking-in arbitrary power. And, which is more, Aristotle is so far from allowing arbitrary Monarchy, that, as afterward is showed, no Government taketh so much room in his heart as Democracy. And what need we stand here, do not all Lawgivers disclaim arbitrary and uncircumscribed power? viz. Zaleucus, Charondas, Onomacritus, Thales, Lycurgus, Philolaus Plato, Dracon, Pittacus, and Androdamas, of whom Aristotle speaketh, Pol. 2. cap. 10. These could not have precisely prescribed Laws for hedging-in the ways of people, unless they had been positive and even-down enemies to absolute and arbitrary power. Howsoever it is without controversy, That the chiefest Lawgivers we read of amongst the Ethnics, could not away with arbitrary and uncircumscribed Government. Solon was altogether against it, Arist. ibid. Diog. Laer. de vit. Phil. lib. 1. in Sol. Val. Max. lib. 5. cap. 3. lib. 7. cap. 2. & lib. 8. cap. 7. Trog. lib. 2. See also Isocr. Areop. Panath. De permut. Pittacus was so much against it, that having reigned awhile over the Mityleneans, at last he resigned the Kingdom, Diog. La. de vit. Phil. lib. 1. in Pittac. See also Simonid. carm. Val. Max. lib. 4. cap. 1. lib. 6. cap. 5. Who will deny Lycurgus to have despised arbitrary power? So Xenoph. de Repub. Laced. and many others do report, as Herodot, Plato, Aristotle, etc. Neither can it be denied, that Plato was an enemy thereto, as is showed already. He could not endure the tyrant Dionysius, as Laertius, Plutarch, and others do report. And that Minos did abhor arbitrary power, is showed already, Concl. 6. Because he was a most noble Lawgiver, therefore he is feigned by Homer, Odyss. 11. to be Justiciar over the souls departed: In a word, that of Pindarus, Lex omnium est Regina, mortalium, atque immortalium, passeth current amongst the chief Lawgivers, and Philosophers. To which Plato▪ the great Philosopher and Lawgiver, in terminis doth subscribe, lib. 24. de Rhetor. What? shall we overleap the most noble Lacedaemonian King, Theopompus, indeed not unlike the signification of his name? No verily. While as it was said by his friends to him, having superadded the Ephorick power, That he should leave less power to his successors then he had of his predecessors; he forthwith answered, saying, Nay, but I leave them a far greater power, Arist. Pol. 5. cap. 11. See also Valer. max. lib. 4. cap. 1. & Plut. de doctr. princ. lib. Of the heroic Theseus we have spoken enough already to this purpose. And; which is to be admired, the very King-flattering Isocrates doth story much of his disclaiming arbitrary power. And this he reporteth not to his discredit, but to his praise, Helen. laud. & Panath. What needeeth us thus to multiply the actings and judgements of men against arbitrary Monarchy? Have we not already at large shown it to be repugnant to the ordinary course and strain of all Commonwealths? We will stand no longer here, but hasten toward another Question.    

SECT. II.  
Whether or not is Royal Government the choicest of Governments?  
AS in the former Question we have offered our judgement very freely, so shall we do the like here. And that we may do so to some purpose and distinctly, we offer our judgement to you in these Assertions.  
Assert. 1. Royal power, ectypically, is the choicest of Governments.  
This is to be taken two ways. 1. In order to the Creator. It cannot be denied, but Monarchy ectypically and by way of assimilation cometh nearest to the Government of God, and doth liveliest represent it: for the Divine Essence is simply one, admitting no diversity. Now, a thing is no otherwise good and pure, but as it is squared according to the perfect pattern of the Divine Essence. And consequently Monarchy having a more intimat assimilation to the Divine Essence then any other Government, ectypically and by way of assimilation, it cannot but be the chiefest of Governments. This breaketh the neck of all that is objected from the resemblance that is between Regal Government, and the Government of God, to prove Monarchy to be the choicest of Governments. So do some object expressly, Isoc. Nic. Aquin. de Pr. reg. lib. 1. cap. 2. Clicht. de reg. off. cap. 1. & 3. Bellar. de Rom. pont. lib. 1. cap. 4. Salmas. def. reg. cap. 5. and some, insinuatively, Cypr. de Idol. van. tract. 4.  
2. In order to the Creature. We find, that both amongst inanimate, and animate creatures, a natural kind of Monarchy is observed. Is there not in the complex body of the Universe one above all the rest? We see the Heaven is above all the four Elements. And in the Heaven all the stars in height, virtue, and excellency, are inferior to the Sun. Therefore Dionysius calleth the Sun, imaginem Coeli, terraeque regem, Lib. de Divin. nom. Amongst living (though brutish) creatures, have not Bees their own King, and flocks of Sheep their own leader? Apol. Nil. Hierog. lib. 1. Virgil, Geor 4. Plin. nat. hist. lib. 11. Cypr. tract. 4. Ambros. hexam. lib. 4. Veg. disp. in't. ter. sol. etc. Cranes have also a King, Apol. hierog. lib. 2. Plin. nat. hist. lib. 10. Hieron. in Epist. ad Rust. Ambr. hex. lib. 5. Hence the back of that Argument is also broken, which Salmas. def. reg. cap. 5. and others do draw from the natural kind of Monarchy that is amongst inanimate and brutish creatures, to prove Regal Government of all Governments to be the choicest.  
Assert. 2; Monarchy, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is the choicest of Governments.  
This cannot be denied: for of all Governments Monarchy is the most ancient. Before the flood we read of no Government Political, but of Royal power, Gen. 5. & 6. Ber. ant. lib. 1. And after the flood it was that also which had first footing, Gen. 10. Beros, ant. lib. 4. Archil. lib. de temp. Xenoph. de aequiv. Porc. Cat. ex lib. orig. fragm. Pict. de aur. sec. lib. 1. Metast. de Pers. annal. Isc●r. Panath. Jos. of't. Jud. lib. 2. cap. 4. & 5. Philo. Jud. ant. Bibl. lib. To this also Aristotle, Trogus, and Sallust, do subscribe, with the whole current of Writers. Royalists do meanly object, Monarchy simply to be the choicest of Governments, because it is the ancientest of Governments. So argueth Salmasius, def. reg. cap. 5. We confess, in respect of antiquity it is the best. 'Tis a bad consequence, Monarchy is best 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in respect of antiquity and priority of time: Ergo it is best 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, simply and absolutely. This is a caption indeed, a secundum quid, ad simpliciter.  
Assert. 3. Monarchy, demotically, in respect of the temper and disposition of the people, is the best Government.  
In clearing this, you shall observe with me, these three times. 1. The golden time. 2. The heroic time. 3. The non-heroick and aftertime. As for the golden time, it cannot be denied, but people than had only a disposition for natural and oeconomick government. See subsect. 2. concls. 3. But the heroic time did extremely incline to Monarchick Government. Before the flood Giants and men of renown did enlarge their power, and brought all in subjection to them. After the flood, about 131 years, Nimrod began to erect a Kingdom for himself. And afterward the heads of Colonies went forth, and established Kingdoms. At that time heroic spirits one way or other came to Crowns. Of this is spoken already by us at large: We shall not now need to repeat any thing we spoke, whether concerning the extraordinary, or ordinary Heroes. That time had such a disposition for Regal Government, that it carried the People of Israel to seek a King, whether God would or not, 1 Sam. 8. We find very reason for it, why then the disposition of people did most intensively carry them toward that kind of Government. 1. Because men than were ignorant: They were then more prodigal than politic. There could be found at that time few, or no Commonwealth's-men. And to this very pertinently agreeth that which Aristotle speaketh Polit. 3, cap, 11, & Pol. 4 cap, 13, saying, That Kingly Government was in the beginning, because then men were ignorant, and few Commonwealth's-men could be found. I confess, his meaning is mainly concerning the golden age: And in respect of it he also speaketh true. No question, than every thing was but in its beginning: Men than were but acquainted with the rudiments of learning and policy, and scarcely that. Any Government they had then was not Politic, but Natural and oeconomick: At least, it did not much differ therefrom. And it must needs be said, That then people were not acquainted with the Rules of Policy in the Heroic age. It cannot be denied, but in the Heroic time men had greater insight and experience then in the Golden time. In the heroic age Policy began to have footing. And no question at the end thereof men were better acquainted therewith, then at the beginning thereof. Their experience and insight than could not but be the greater. Yet we must needs say, that comparing the age of Heroicism with aftertimes, men in it were but meanly acquainted with the Rules of Policy. As far as the herock time therein exceeded the golden time, so far therein did aftertimes exceed the heroic time. And we find, that always the latter times do abound more in Learning and Policy, than the preceding and former. 2. Because in those day's men were of a gigantine strength and vast courage. Then they were much given to warlike exploits, to the building of Cities, and to the enlarging of their own dominions. What I pray you then could be more suitable to the disposition of men then Kingly Government? Prodigality was then more stood-by than Policy. Then men were always set awork on haughty and heroic designments. Therefore they could not be governed and ordered, but by such who were far above their reach. What? did not then the haughtiness of Israel cry for a King? 1 Sam. 8. They tell Samuel, they will have a King as other Nations. And this is as much as if they had said, We cannot endure to be inferior to other Nations. And therefore we will have a King. What was it I pray you, that made Nimrod to take Royal Power to himself, but because he was a mighty hunter, Gen. 10. one of an haughty and arrogant disposition? Pride of heart, and arrogancy of spirit would not admit Caesar to be Pompey's equal, and Pompey Caesar's superior. Liv. dec. 14. Luc. An. lib. 4. cap. 2. Plat. de Pomp. The very instinct of Nature doth abundantly teach, Kingly Government most to beseem the disposition and temper of the proud and haughty. Cranes, and Bees, which Nature hath taught to erect amongst them Kingly Government, in haughtiness and proudn●sse amongst all beasts are matchless, Apol. in hierogl. lib. 1. & 2. Virg. Geor 4. Plin. nat. hist. lib. 11. Juv. Sat. 13. Ambr. hex. lib. 5. Is it any wonder then though in the heroic age men did much dote upon Kingly Government. Then men were extreme haughty and arrogant, and could not be governed by equals. They were much given to high and lofty undertake. And what could expede them therein more than Kings? In aftertimes, I deny not but Monarchy did go much out of request, if we compare the non-heroick with the heroic time. This maketh Aristotle say, Polit. 3. cap. 10. That in aftertimes the kingly power was extremely lessened, partly by the King's dimitting thereof, and partly by the People's detracting therefrom. This is already illustrated by us▪ by manifold examples. No wonder that this was: for as the heroic age in Policy did exceed the golden age, so therein aftertimes did exceed the heroic times, yea much more. Thence was it men then so abounded in Learning and Policy, that in many Commonwealths they could endure no Kings at all. At last the number of Commonwealth's-men greatly increased, till they did not leave so much as the name of a King, much less the power. So it was amongst the Cretians, Athenians, Cyrenians, Romans, and other Republics. Yet observe this distinction, there is a threefold kind of people. 1. Haughty and malignant. 2. Ignorant and servile. 3. Witty and politic. The first sort can endure no Government but kingly. And that not only, because they would be great Courtiers themselves, and promoted to dignity, but also because they cannot endure to be governed by their equals. The second sort Stoically are incapable of the sense of slavery, and apprehend some deified lustre in the King. They are silly, base, common spirits. And because of their silliness, they are contented to live in slavery. And as they are base▪ so they are ignorant. And because of their ignorance, they apprehend all their slavishness abundantly to be made-up, with a glimpse of the King's countenance: for in their delusion, they look upon it as some deified species apprehending him to be much more than a man. And the third sort upon no terms can away with kingly Government. And that, because they delight in freedom, and the enriching of the Commonwealth. We see, that the most witty and politic Kingdoms we read of, did either extremely lessen the power of their Kings, or else did shake-off their yoke altogether, and that both in former and aftertimes. So the Egyptian, Ethiopian, Indian, Athenian, Lacedaemonian, Cretian, Cyrentan, Carthaginian, and Roman Kingdoms. And to day know we not, that the most witty and politic Kingdoms of the world, which delight in the liberty of the Subject and wealth of the Republic, cannot away with kingly Government? So Venice, Florence, Holland, and England. What I pray you can be the reason, that England cannot away with kingly Government, and Scotland so much thirsteth after it? Speaking naturally, there can be no reason given, but because England is a witty and politic Nation, and Scotland is not. What? doth not Aristotle, Polit. 3. cap. 11. & Pol. 4 cap. 13. impute it to the ignorance and unpolitickness of people, that in old, they did setup Kings to reign over them? And in the same places he saith, That Policy abounding, and Commonwealth's-men increasing, Kings were suffered no longer to govern. But although this be true, That people in aftertimes do not so much prize Monarchy, as in former times; and though even to day some kingdoms be less disposed for it then other kingdoms, having shaken it off altogether: yet notwithstanding, I am constrained to say, That in respect of the general and common disposition of the people, nothing doth relish so much to them as kingly government. No wonder forsooth: for there are more who are malignant and haughty, desiring to set their feet upon the necks of others, then are politic and witty. And besides this the general and common sort of people are merely ignorant and insensible of slavery. There are far more indeed of the first and second sort, than the third.  
Assert. 4. Kingly Government, consecutively, in respect of its fruits and consequences may be, hic & nunc, the best of all Governments.  
This we make good. Firstly, from example. It cannot be denied, but the good Kings, who in old did reign over the Jews, did setup most glorious and eminent Reformations amongst the people. They most nobly reform both Church and State. 2 Sam. 6, and 7. 1 King. 8 1 Chron. 13.15.16.17.22. & 28. Psa. 101. So much of David. Of Solomon▪ 1 Kin. 1.2.5.6 7. & 8. 1 Chr. 5.6.7.24.28. & 29. 2 Chr. 2.3▪ 4. & 8. Of Asa, 1 Kin. 15. 2 Chr. 14. & 15. Of Jehoshaphat, 2. Chron. 17. & 19 Of Hezekiah, 2 King. 18. 2 Chr. 29.30. & 31. There is much also spoken of Josiah, in acting for Reformation, 2 King. 23. 2 Chron. 34 & 35. See also Joseph. Ant. lib. 7.8. & 9 concerning the actings of these Kings. They were so instrumental in setting-up the Work of God amongst the people, that therein they did far exceed the Judges. Hence is it, we do not read, the people of the Jews at any time so cheerfully so fully, so speedily, and with such a plenary consent, to have gone about duty, as under the reign of these Kings. Under the conduct of the best Judges we read of great grudge, altercations and slips amongst the people, notwithstanding the non-consent of the Rulers thereto, Exod. 32. Numb. 11.12.13.14.16.20. & 25. Josh. 7. Jud. 2. But we read not of any such slips amongst the people under these reforming Kings.  
Secondly: Monarchy is attended with many noble proprieties, wherein it exceedeth any other kind of Government. By virtue of which, now and then, here and there, it produceth more noble and eminent effects than any other Government. In reckoning-up these proprieties we observe Bellarmin's method. 1. Order. 2. Intense Authority. Whereby it preventeth division, and speedily attaineth its purpose. In this sense the Poet saith well, 
— componitur Orbis  
Regis ad exemplum.—  From the second propriety, Darius disputing for Monarchy against Ottanes, concludeth it to be the choicest of Governments, Herod. lib. 3. It made Ulysses to say, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,— Hom. Il. 2.   
In English. 
That many rule it is not a good thing,  
One Prince let be, [and let there be] one King.  And therefore he sharply rebuked the dividing and murmuring Grecians, saying, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Hom. ibid.  
In English. 
We shall not, Grecians, in this place  
All reign indeed in any case.  From this Isocrates concludeth, Monarchy of all Governments simply to be the best, ad Nic. So do Seneca, lib. 2. cap. 20. Athanasius. Orat. adv. Idol. Hieronymus, par. 3. tract. 9 epist. 39 and Plutarch, in Num. & Sol. But they are far mistaken: for this only concludeth, Monarchy secundum quid to be the choicest of Governments. Yea Plato, in Polit. Aristotle, Eth. 8. cap. 10. Justine, in Or. exhort. Cyprian, tract. de idol. van. in this respect call Monarchy the chiefest of Governments. Yet not simply and absolutely, as do Isocrates, Darius, and others, 3. Power and strength. For in so far as Monarchick Government is less obnoxious to division, and more attended with union than any of the rest, in as far it secureth and strengtheneth the Commonwealth more than any of them. The strength of the Kingdom dependeth from union, consent, and harmony. The contrary of this is the ruin of it, Mat. 12. Whence, after Kingly Government had perished amongst the Romans, many intestine divisions did ensue, as D. Halicarnassius, Val. maximus, T. Livius, Fenestella, Plutarch, L. Annaeus, etc. do report. 4. Stability and diuturnity. Now, it is attended with this propriety for these reasons. Firstly, because it is most authoritative and farthest from the subjects reach. Secondly, because it is less liable to division and confusion, than any of the rest of Governments. Because of these things it is more free, than any other Government, whether from foreign, or intestine jars. Hence is it, that amongst all Governments, it hath endured longest, as is agreed on by all Historians. I confess, Isocrates, Panath. saith, That Democracy amongst the Athenians lasted 1000 years. But that cometh not up by many hundred years with the duration of the Assyrian, Egyptian, and other Kingdoms.  
But in the interim we humbly desire Bellarmine, not to imagine the Scythian kingdom to be of such antiquity and stability, that it is not only more ancient than any other kingdom, but also as yet was never conquered by any foreign power: for though Justine doth allege no less (whose testimony Bellarmine citeth, Lib. 1. de Rom. pont. cap. 2.) yet notwithstanding the contrary is evident from Berosus, ant. lib. 5.  
5. Facility of governing. This propriety floweth not only from the intensnes of its authority, but also from its faculty of preventing division & confusion: for as by the one its purposes are speedily acquired and cheerfully gone about, so by the other distraction and diversity of opinions is removed. By virtue of all these proprieties Kingly Government hic, & nunc, of all Governments proveth the sweetest. But these Gentlemen, and Court-parasits, who because of these proprieties conclude, it simply and absolutely to be the choicest of Governments, must give me leave to say, they are a little mistaken: for at the most they conclude it to be secundum quid and in some respect, the chiefest Government. But a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non est consequens.  
Assert. 5. Regulated and mixed Monarchy, per se and in itself, is of all Governments the sweetest:  
Firstly: Because per se and as it is in itself, it moderateth and removeth the evils of all Governments: for as it is monarchick, it preventeth division and confusion, the evils of Aristocracy, and Democracy. And as it is regulated and mixed, it obstructeth the foul emanations of tyranny. Who can deny, that to be the chiefest Government, per se and as it is in itself; which per se and as it is in itself moderateth the evils of all Governments, and serveth to remove them? Such is the case of regulated and mixed Monarchy.  
Secondly: Because per se and as it is in itself, it doth partake of the good of all Governments: for so it is the medium of all Governments, composed and made-up of all their natures. And consequently it including within it all the degrees of political goodness as it is in itself; in such a notion, cannot but be far more excellent than any kind of Government: for any other Government in itself doth only include one simple kind and degree bonitatis politicae. And in this sense these say well, who affirm, Regulated and mixed Monarchy to be of all Governments the choicest. But they will do well to advert, that though it be so in its essentials and pure naturals, yet it is far otherwise in its accidentals and way of administration.  
Assert. 6. Monarchy, consecutively, in respect of the fruits and effects, it may, and doth produce; simply and absolutely, of all Governments is most dangerous, and least to be desired.  
We establish it thus. Firstly, we make it good from Scripture-example. It cannot be denied, but as there were moe evil Kings then good Kings amongst the Jews, so there was more evil done by the one, then good by the other. 1 Sam. 13.14.15.22.23, etc. 2 Sam. 21. 1 King. 12.13.14.15.16.20. & 22. 2 King. 3.8.10.13.14.15.16.17.21. & 24. 2 Chron. 10.11.12.18.21.22.24.25.26.27.28.33. & 36. What? doth not this holdout to us, that there is greater danger and hazard to be expected and looked for at the hands of Kings then good? So it fared with the people of the Jews at the hands of their Kings. Amongst them all there were but six good; all the rest wicked. Of whom it is said, That they walked in the ways of Jeroboam, who made Israel to sin. And it is not for nought, that such a causal epithet is most often registered in Scripture, and annexed to the wicked Kings of the Jews, 1 King. 15.16. & 22. 2 King. 3.10.13.14. & 15. Now let the indifferent Reader judge, whether or not that causal epithet be so often ascribed and given to them in vain. There is a great emphasis in that, who made Israel to sin. If we plumb the bottom of it arightly, we shall find, it coucheth as much as that Kingly Government is most dangerous, and produceth badest effects. And it is the more evident, by comparing the state of the Jewish Commonwealth under Kings, with the state of it as it were under Judges. Peter Martyr from several pregnant reasons proveth, That the condition of the Jews was far better under the Judges, then under the Kings, Com. in Judic. cap. 1. His Reasons we digest thus. 1. The Judges did always deliver them from misery and bondage, Judg. 2.3.4.5.6.7.11.12.13.14.15.16. & 20. Whereupon it is said, Nevertheless the Lord raised up Judges, who delivered them out of the hand of those that spoilt them. Judge 2. But the King did not always so. 1 Sam. 28. & 29. 1 Kin. 24. 2 Kin. 6.7.12.13.16. & 17. 2 Chr. 12.18.21. & 28. They oftentimes destroyed them, 1 Sam. 22. 2 Sam. 21. 1 Kin. 18. & 22. 2 Kin. 16. & 21. 2 Chr. 24. They compelled them to slavery, to sodomy, and idolatry. 2. The people of the Jews were not led into captivity under the Judges, as they were under the Kings. 2 Kin. 18. & 25. 2 Chr. 36. Yea, under Judges, as is clear from the places above quoted touching them, the people were never brought into any misery and affliction because of them. They were not only ordained by God to deliver, and did deliver the Jews out of all their calamities; but also they laboured to keep them back from sinning, which was the cause of all their sorrows, Judg. 2. But the wicked Kings who did reign over them, not only did not dissuade them from committing iniquity, but also did draw them on unto the perpetrating of manifold and most grievous abominations: whence it was, many sad and sore judgements were infflicted upon them. 3. There were very few good Kings. But we read not of any evil Judges, save Abimelech and Samuel's sons. And it is very observable, that because Abimelech perverted judgement, and usurping the authority, did reign as King, God judicially plagued him, Judg. 9 Yea, for the bribery of Samuel's sons he rent the Kingdom from them And it was not won though the most part of the Judges were good, and few of them wicked. (1) Because (as Peter Martyr saith) in electing them they had no regard to their riches, but to their virtue and godliness, Exod. 18. and Deut. 1. (2) Because (as the same author saith) they were not declared by the voices of men, but by the ordinance and inspiration of God. Posterity, or succession was here of no force, Judg. 2. And 'tis remarkable, these two conditions being slighted, the Judges were corrupt and dissolute. But they being observed, they were ever found holy and much for the good of the people. Then tell me, is it any wonder though the Jews were in a far better condition under Judges, then under Kings? The Judges for the most part were holy. They always dehorted the people from profanity, always delivered them from slavery, & at no time brought evil upon them. But the Kings for the most part were wicked, & the contrary effects were produced by them. This, as a speaking commentary, intimateth to us, That the condition of the people is most desperate and hazardous under Kings.  
We cannot passe-by the condition of the Jews after the captivity, as it was under Captains or Judges, and as as it was under Kings. All the while they lived under Captains, their condition was most happy and blessed. Albeit at that time, now and then they were crossed with the bondage of strangers, yet were they free from intestine jars. Their Captains did not rise against them, and bring them under slavery, as did their Kings. Their zeal and forwardness in acting for the weal both of Church and Commonwealth, are fully registered in the books of Ezra and Nehemiah, Macc. 1. and 2 Jos. of't. Jud. lib. 12. and 13. And how much the Jews under the reign of Kings, after the captivity, suffered, is storied at length by Josephus, ant. Jud. lib. 13.14. & 15. In a word, the case of the Jews under Kings being most desperate, far unlike the sweetness of their condition under Judges, it speaketh to us, That Kingly Government of all Governments is the most hazardous. What better fruits, I pray you, needeth any kingdom to expect at the hands of Kings, than the people of the Jews were served with at their hands? Verily, I suppose, we may expect rather worse then better fruits, than the people of the Jews were made to taste of under the reign of Kings.  
Secondly. from the Lord's unwillingness to setup Kingly Government amongst the people of the Jews in remonstrating to them the extreme hazard and tyranny they should lie under, if they subjected their necks thereto. This is seen, 1 Sam. 8. And for making good our purpose therefrom we move the question, Whether or not doth Samuel in it describe the office, or rather the tyranny of the King? Royalists do proudly aver, That in it is understood the Office and Law of the King. And none herein is more forward than Salmasius, Def. Reg cap. 2. & 5. But that we may dispatch the business between us, we shall firstly try the sense of v. 11. what may be imported in the original text. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And he said, This shall be the manner of that King who shall reign over you. But Salmasius starteth very much at this translation. And for manner, he placeth law, or right. So the man will have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to signify. Yea, but he is far mistaken. Firstly, because in many places of Scripture we find the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 taken for manner, consuetude, or custom, Gen. 40. Exod. 21. Numb. 29. Josh. 6. ● Sam. 2. 1 Sam. 27. 1 King. 18. But a place or two we express for further clearing this purpose. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And they are doing into this very day, after their former manners 2 Kin. 17.— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And their customs keep not— Ezek. 20. Secondly, b●cause it is the ordinary and common translation. So the Chaldee Paraphrast translateth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Now 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is one and the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And it is to be rendered manner. Josephus, ant. Jud. lib. 6. cap. 40. is close of our judgement. And Cl. Alexandrinus in plain terms saith. That the Lord doth not promise them a King, but threatneth them with a Tyrant. And Salmasius, though he leaneth to humane authority, yet he standeth not to say, That Clement, and all, who expound the words contrary to his mind, do err. Def. Reg. cap. 5. I suppose, the man is for nothing, but what is for him. Ex ungue Leonem. But we have many more Interpreters and Writers of our judgement. Beda, lib. 2. in expos. Sam. Glos. interl. Hug. Card. Lyr. Cajet. Serar Corn. a lap. & Mend. in loc. Tust. Abul. in 1 Reg. cap. 3. quest. 17. Rebuf. tract de incong. Calv. in loc. P. Mart. in loc. Jun. Trem. Riu. Diod. Pisc. & Brent. in loc. So saith Buchanan. de jur. reg. ap. Scot  
I confess the Septuagints render 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And this Salmasius runneth-to, as to a strong tower, withal further alleging that sometime they translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Def. Reg. cap. 2. But he buildeth upon a sandy foundation. We make not reckoning, how the Septuagints elsewhere translate it. They do also in some places render it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. The word in it-self hath divers significations. But to our purpose, we contend that here it signifieth nothing, but manner or custom. And though 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, from which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hath its arisal, properly signifieth jus, justitia, and fas, yet improperly it is called ritus, mos, and consuetudo. It is said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Hom. Odies. And likewise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. de mun. According to this latter sense we understand the meaning of the Seventy.  
Thirdly, we clear it evidently from the text it-self. And that according to these reasons. 1. Because the LORD commanded Samuel to describe to them the State and condition of the King, to use it as a motive for dissuading them from following-out such a desire.— Howbeit yet protest solemnly unto them, and show them the manner of the King that shall reign over them, i. e. before thou shalt set a King over them, thou shalt protest solemnly against it. And in so doing, thou shalt draw arguments and motives of dissuading them from their purpose, from the very condition and nature of the King that shall reign over them. And R. Judas speaking on the place, saith, that what the LORD commanded Samuel to speak did serve to strike a terror in the hearts of the people. Salmasius vainly shifteth this, as subtly he expoundeth that of R. Jose, Quicquid dicitur in capite de Rege, eum Regum jus habere, to relate to 1 Sam. 8. and not to Deut. 17 Def reg. cap. 2. Howsoever see what Josephus saith. Now I command thee to make them a King, whom I shall design. But before thou shalt do so, forewarn them of the great evils that shall ensue thereupon, and protest that in so doing they cast themselves lose of a good estate into a worse. Ant. Jud. lib. 6 cap. 4. To this same purpose Brent speaketh more plainly and largely, Hom. 26. in 1 Sam. cap. 8. Now tell me if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 were to be understood concerning the office and right of the King, how could Samuel have objected it as a dissuading argument, to alienate the people's mind from seeking after Kingly government? Either he here speaketh of lawful, or unlawful power. If of lawful power, either he describeth to the people the good or the bad of it. If the good, ergo he did not protest against the power, but whereas he should have dissuaded the the people from seeking after it, he tacitly persuadeth them thereto: for how much more the excellency and goodness of a thing is pointed-out, so much more it is desired-after. And to say that Samuel did not dissuade them therefrom, but persuaded them thereto, is to avouch that either he did argue against himself, and militate against his own purpose, or else that he acted contrary to his Commission from GOD. The LORD commanded him solemnly to protest, and dissuade them from their purpose. He would have him to layout before their eyes the dangerousness of Kingly power, to strike terror in their hearts that they might forbear longer to desire it. If you come to my hand and say, that the Prophet in this place only speaketh of unlawful power, or of the bad of a lawful power I obtain my desire. I seek no more than that you say, he speaketh here of the abuse, and not the use of Kingly power. And I trow, the abuse of Kingly power is not the right, but the wrong of it.  
2. Because the Prophet in describing the manner of the King, setteth down acts of tyranny, not of lawful authority. We take up the description it-self under a general and particular notion. The general.— Ye shall be his servants. He shall beslave you, and make you serve him according to his pleasure. Which made Josephus say, And that I may speak it in a word, ye together with all yours, shall serve the King, no otherways then his own domestic servants. Ant. Jud. lib. 6. cap. 4. See plain language in Brent. to this purpose, hom. 27. in 1 Sam. 8. The particular notion hath several parts in it. Firstly, in order to the King's tyrannising over the sons of the people. He will take your sons, etc. As if he had said, your King shall make you sonless. He shall beslave them to his service, employing some in one office, and some in another. And in all these employments, whether base or not, neither ye, nor your sons, shall be holden as freemen, but all the fruits of your labours shall turn-over into the King's private advantage. Whereupon Josephus himself bringeth-in Samuel speaking, that he would declare to them, who should be their king, but adding, that he would first show them what things they would suffer under a king, and with how great disadvantages they would live under him. Therefore ye shall firstly know, that he will take from you your children, and he shall make some of them drivers of Chariots, etc. So that there shall be nothing which he shall not constrain them to do, after the manner of bought slaves. Ant. Jud. lib. 6. cap. 4. In this Josephus much agreeth with these words in the original text 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Which in their proper & rigorous signification are rendered, he will quite takeaway your sons. But we judge it not to be an Act of Regal power, but of mere tyranny, to denude the parent altogether of his child, and the King to dispose of him at his pleasure. For this Brent gallantly speaketh, loc. cit. Secondly, In order to the King's away-taking of the daughters of the people.— He will take your daughters to be confectionaries, and to be cooks, and to be bakers. As if he had said, He shall not only make you sonless, but daughterlesse also. And as he will make slaves of the one, so likewise of the other. Now 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is also in the original of this text. And it proporteth a ravenous and cruel away-taking. But hear Josephus Kings will make confectionaries of your daughters for their own use, kitchen-women, dressers of cloth, and they shall compel them to do any other service, which damsels for fear of strokes do perform. Loc. cit. Nay, but Brent, loc. cit. is more full and plain. Thirdly, in order to the King's away-taking of their possessions. And he will take your fields, etc. It may be you think, that your sons, and your daughters will be well taken-off your hands, and though he should wrong them, he will not wrong yourselves. Peradventure you imagine, his tyranny will take a stand there. Nay, but I'll tell you, if he takeaway your sons and daughters, he will also takeaway your substance. And well know I, if you get any courtesy at his hand, ye'll have little reason to boast of it. He will take the tenth from you. Sure I am, he will have so little respect to you, to your children that serve him, and to your pains, in gathering riches together, that what ye gain through the sweat of your brows, he will let it out to any base fellow in his Court, and ye dare not say it is evil done. If this be not an act of tyranny (saith Piscator) then had not God punished Ahab, for takingaway Naboth's vineyard. Ahab according to Law should have possessed it. Scholar in 1 Sam. 8. See Josephus, & Brent, loc. cit. Fourthly, In order to his away-taking of the people's servants.— And he will take your man-servants, and your maidservants, and your goodliest youngmen, and put them to his work. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is also in the original of this text. His tyranny shall not end at your sons and daughters, and at your possessions, but he shall violently rob you of your servants. And if he take not all of them be sure, he will take the chiefest of them. See plain Brent. ibid. Fifthly, In relation to his away-taking of their sheep. He will take away the tenth of your sheep. He will not leave you so much as a sheep's tail. At least he will take the tenth of them.  
3. The consequent and event both of the general, and particular part of the description, is the effect of tyranny, not of lawful authority.— Ye shall cry-out in that day, because of your King whom ye shall have chosen you— We are sure, that the people would never cry-out, for exercising the just and lawful Acts of Regal Authority. Thereby justice is promoted, and vice is punished. Which is a blessing, and not a bondage for people, to make them cry-out in bitterness of spirit. Thus it is abundantly made good, that Samuel here doth not describe the power, but the tyranny of the King. Now in-starteth another question, Whether or not, doth the Prophet in this place, dissuade the Jews from seeking a King, as a King? To which we answer affirmatively, and prove it thus: If the Prophet doth not dissuade the people from seeking a King, under the notion of a King, then either because he only taxeth carnal confidence in them, or arogancy and pride, or precipitation only, or else because they sought a King after the manner of the Nations. But none of these Reasons, whether conjunctly, or severally, are the adaequat object of the Prophet's dissuasion.  
Firstly, Because it is said, That Samuel was displeased, because they sought a King. The text is not, But the thing displeased Samuel, when they said, We will have confidence in a King, etc. But it is, The thing displeased Samuel, when they said, Give us a King. 'Tis wrong Logic to take 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 King, in esse accidentali. At least, 'tis very far fetched Philosophy, to take it under some  and adjunctive notion or other. See Josephus loc. cit. & Brent. hom. 27. in 1 Sam. 8. Secondly, Because God expressly commandeth Samuel, solemnly to protest against the election of a King. But if the Prophet should only have taxed them for incredulity, arrogancy, etc. then should the Lord only have given Samuel orders, to dissuade them from these evils, in laying-out before them the wickedness thereof. But the Prophet only layeth-out before them the danger of Monarchy, & expressly dissuadeth them therefrom. Who can imagine, if his main & only purpose had been for dissuading them from these evils, and not from setting-up Royal Government amongst them, but he would rather have turned his face against these evils, in spreading-out the dangers thereof before their face, then in pointing-out to them the evil of Monarchy? Verily, were it so, he had harped upon the wrong string: Thirdly, The people's answer is in reference to Samuel's reasoning. Nay but (say they) we will have a king over us. This had been a very uncategorick answer, yea plain nonsense; if Samuel had been only taxing them for carnal confidence, arrogancy, etc. and dehorting them therefrom. Fourthly, Because we have showed already, That Samuel, according to God's Commandment, draweth motives from acts of tyranny that the King would exercise, to dissuade the people from seeking after him. Would he say, Ye think your King will fight your battles, and save you from foreign invasion. Well, let it be so. But I'll tell you the King himself will tyrannize over you. Get him when you will, I warrant ye shall not be free of intestine trouble. Nothing is so evil as that. It is worse than foreign war. Therefore ye will do well to keep yourselves free of him, so long as ye want him. Fifthly, While as the Lord tacitly rebuketh them of carnal confidence, in these words, They have rejected Me, that I should not reign over them, he likewise in them insinuateth a reproof in order to their shaking-off the Government which he had instituted amongst them. It was God's Ordinance, yea the chiefest of its own kind. But whosoever shaketh-off though the least of God's Ordinances, doth shake-off God Himself. Rom. 13. I mean in a preposterous and carnal way, delighting in change, and going from the better to the worse. So did the people of the Jews at this time. Therefore God reproving them, as rejecters of Democracy, by way of consequence he checketh them as suitors of Monarchy: for he could no ways have rebuked them for rejecting the one, if he had not altogether allowed them in seeking after the other. Sixthly, They are reprehended and taxed expressly for seeking after a King.— I will call unto the LORD,— that ye may perceive and see, that your wickedness is great which ye have done in the sight of the LORD, in ask you a King.— And all the people said unto Samuel, Pray for thy servants, unto the LORD thy God, that we die not: for we have added to all our sins this evil, to ask us a king.— Ye have done all this wickedness,— 1 Sam. 12. Let the indifferent Reader judge now, whether or not the Spirit of GOD in these words doth manifestly reprehend them as they had sought after a king. The royalist would do well not to imagine, that these things do exclude the Prophet's dissuading the people's seeking a king, as a king. They rather include then exclude the king in this notion. And so Royalists in propounding these reasons, proceed a Divisione. They take inadaequatum, for adaequatum, the part for the whole.  
But for the more satisfactory resolution of the fourth particular, we demand, whether or not the Prophet doth tax the Jews, in seeking a King after the manner of the Nations, as they sought a King, or as they sought a tyrannous King? If the former, we gain the point. But the other is builded upon a mis-supposition. 1. Because it is altogether repugnant to Nature, earnestly to thirst after tyranny, oppression and misery. The like was never heard amongst any people, though never so rude and barbarous, far less amongst the people of the Jews, to whom were given the Statutes and Ordinances, and who in seeking a King, covered their knavery with fair pretences. 2. They seek a King, as they suppose, to be free of tyranny, and injustice done by Samuel's sons who judged them for the time. That did set them awork to seek a King. 3. Having gathered themselves together, in seeking a King from Samuel, they add this to their discourse, Thou art old. Would they say, not only thy sons oppress us and pervert righteous judgement, but even thou thyself art unfit to judge us. Old age hat rendered thee unable dexterously to go about matters of judgement. Therefore let us have a King who will supply thy wants. One who will judge us justly as thou didst in the time of thy youth. Let us have a King to judge us uprightly, as thou didst, and not unjustly as do thy sons. Now, let any rational man judge it such people who sought a King under such fair pretences, for promoving virtue, and removing vice, would ever have sought a King to tyrannize over them. See Josephus, ant. Jud. lib. 6. cap. 4. and Brent. hom. 25. in 1 Sam. 8. 'Tis remarkable, Salmasius will not let it be heard, that they sought a tyrannous king, Def. reg. cap. 2. And it can not be said, that all the kings of of the nations at that time were tyrants. This is showed already, and somewhat illustrated by Salmasius, loc. cit. In the interim, I humbly desire Salmasius that he speak without reflection, and more modestly than he doth. He insinuateth, that what Samuel did in dissuading the people, from seeking a king, that he did it through by-respect and self-interest. But we have showed, that what he spoke against their course, was from GOD's express and positive command. He did not dissuade them from it, for his own good, but their good. He shown them they would be in a far worse condition under kings then under Judges. It was not for the advantage of his sons, but for the advantage of the people, that he condescended to grant their desire. So is manifested already. This man is so malicious, that he spareth not to traduce GOD also. He allegeth, what God did, in keeping-back the people from following out their desire, was to gratify Samuel. Poor man, doth he imagine that ever God would have connived with Samuel, and put words in his mouth, to dissuade the people from following-out their desire, if it had been for his glory, and their welfare? Verily, this argueth, that God did prefer the gratification of Samuel to his own honour, and that which conduced most thereto, and the welfare of his people. This Gentleman needeth not boast that Moses, Deut. 17. foretold the upsetting of kingly government amongst the Jews. This he did not, because he allowed it, and preferred it to the government which he firstly instituted amongst them. The LORD commanded Samuel to hearken to the people's voice and condescend to their desire. Yet it doth not follow that God allowed it. He commanded Samuel positively to protest against it, and dissuade them therefrom, by displaying the evils thereof. So Moses through the Spirit of prediction, infallibly overseeing the Jews in their stiff-neckednes, and pride of heart, would undoubtedly seek-after, and setup kingly government amongst them, thereupon taketh occasion to prescribe a true platform of constituting and moulding kings. And to this day it serveth as a moral rule, according to which the structure of kingly government should be squared. Thus the Holy Ghost bringeth forth a most good effect from the foresight of their evil and sinister purpose. We can stay no longer here, but only put the Reader in mind of this, that it is not for nought God denied his applause and consent in setting-up Kings amongst the Jews. That is a strange word, They have setup Kings, but not by me; they have made Princes, and I knew [it] not. Hos. 8. I confess, this mainly relateth to the Kings of the ten Tribes. Yet you must give me leave to say, That it is spoken also in order to all the Kings of the Jews. Would the author of the exercitation conc. usurp. pow. ch. 1. compare this place with 1 Sam. 8. he would find, that God as much disowned the one King as the other. I suppose, this is not a word of applause, but disassent, in making Saul King, I gave thee a King in mine anger, and took [him] away in my wrath. Hos. 13. Sure I am▪ this is spoken against the King, both of Israel and Judah. It cannot be denied, but the direct and main strain of this Prophet is against the ten Tribes, and the Kings thereof. Yet he hinteth both at Judah, and Israel, and their Kings, as occasion serveth. In things common to both, he speaketh of both. So he doth in the text immediately foregoing. Sure I am both Israel and Judah had hand in seeking Saul to reign over them. Not only Israel, but Judah said, Give me a King and Princes. And why shall we not think, that the former text speaketh likewise of the Kings of Judah and those who did reign over both? The Lord's dislike and dis-owning of Kings, is as much in the one text as in the other. And sure I am Jereboam was as notably called both by God, and the ten Tribes to reign over them, 1 Kin. 11. & 12. 2 Chron. 10. as Saul was to reign over Judah, and Israel. Howsoever, I deny not Kingly Government to be from God. I confess, God effectively called Saul to reign over the Jews. So did he David, Solomon, and others, whom he called to reign in a most special way. Yea, he gave an hereditary assignation to David's posterity to the Crown upon conditions. But what then? This only saith, that Kingly Government is good, and in some cases much approved of God. Yet it never concludeth, that it is the best of Governments, most approved of God, and that the people of the Jews did not sin in setting-up it, and shaking-off another. It is laid before your eyes, that of all Governments it is the most dangerous. And seeing the Lord did extremely decline the setting-up of Kingly Government amongst the Jews, how much more to day amongst us? Beside all moral reasons, there was a special typical reason for Monarchy amongst the Jews. Under the Law, not only Christ's Prophetical, and Priestly Office, Acts 3. Heb. 8.9. & 10. but also his Kingly-hood behoved to be typified, both in substance and circumstance, Gen. 49. 2 Sam. 7. 1 Kin. 8. 2 Chr. 6. Psa. 2. Luke 1. Acts 2. Heb. 1. But I hope, none under the Gospel can show me such pressing grounds, why Kingly Government to day should be erected. None verily. Well, let them therefore advert, That people under the Gospel have more than reason for them, to shake-off and decline Monarchy. They have not so much reason for it, as the Jews had. And yet the Lord much disowned it amongst them, and much disassented from them in setting it up. What I pray you is the language of this, but that of all Governments it is most dangerous? And that it is so, is more than manifest from Samuel's way of charactering it.  
Very reason itself teacheth the point. Firstly, because the bad consequence of Monarchy is tyranny. 1 Sam. 8. I deny not, but it may, and doth flow also from other Governments: yet not ordinarily and properly. Properly and ordinarily, such have for their bad consequences, division, and confusion. But it must needs be granted, that tyranny in it-self is worse than either of these. And that, both formally and virtually. Formally, because tyranny, as tyranny, is positive and even-down oppression. But division, as division, and confusion, as confusion, cannot be so called. Otherwise the division and confusion of integral parts, should formally be tyranny and oppression. Virtually, because tyranny in its proper and rigorous acceptation presupposeth a mere and absolute passiveness in the parts oppressed and enthralled. But the case is far otherwise in respect of division and confusion. As they only beget oppression and thraldom per accidens, so they presuppose mutual resistance on both sides. They do not imply an absolute and simple passiveness on either of the sides. Both parties fall at variance, and both stand to their own defence, the one against the other. And so the one acting against the other, neither of them doth simply suffer. But absolute thraldom is worse than that which is nonabsolute. For acts of tyranny read Exod. 1. & 5. Judg. 1. & 9 2 Sam. 21. 1 King. 13.18.19, etc. 2 King. 21. Esth. 3. Jer. 38. & 39 Dan. 2. & 3. Mat. 2.14. & 27. Mark 6. Luke 23. Acts 12. Apocryphal books, Tob. 1. Jud. 2. & 3. 1 Macc. 1.5.6.10. & 13. 2 Macc. 4.6.7. & 14. To this day there be many notable expressions and narrations, which point-out to us that tyranny is of all evils the most dangerous and violent. Herod. lib. 3. Thucyd. lib. 2. Polyb. lib. 2. Tac. in vit. Agric. Born. de lib. Get. lib. Antisthenes being asked, why he preferred hangmen to tyrants, he answered, By the hangman the unjust, and by the tyrant, the just are cut-off. Stob. serm. 47. It was demanded at Diogenes, after what manner the tyrant Dionysius did use his friends? he answered, He killeth the rich, and neglecteth the poor. Diog. La. lib. 6. And Bias being posed. What amongst living creatures was most pernicious? he answered, A Tyrant. Plut. We cannot passe-by a most excellent story of the tyrant Dionysius. All the Syracusians, excepting the old woman, Himera, did pray for his death. Which being imparted to the tyrant, he asked her, why she prayed for long life to him? She answered, When I was young, a grievous tyrant reigning over us, I prayed, that he might be taken away. To whom one worse succeeded. I prayed for his death also. To whom thou Dionysius, worse than either of them succeeded. And now I pray for the lengthening of thy days, lest one worse than thyself should come in thy room. Brus. lib. 6. cap. 21. That must be of a strange stamp, which can make very Ethnics to pray against it. Mark, to pray for the continuing of it, to prevent another of its own kind worse than itself. Fr. Pat. Senensis saith, Tyranny devoureth after death, lib. 10. cap. 3. All which bear us in hand, that of all things tyranny is most dangerous and cruel. And it being the ordinary and proper bad consequence of Monarchy, who can deny Monarchy to be of a I Governments the most dangerous?  
Secondly, Kingly Government, as is said already, is most authoritative and of more commanding faculty then any other. And consequently, as a good King by his example, may, and doth draw the people into obedience and due performance, so an evil King may, and doth by his example ensnare the people. So Claudian, Regis ad exemplum totus componitur orbis. What? doth not the holy Ghost say, Riches beget friends, Prov. 14. and 19 And many do entreat the favour of the Prince, Prov. 19 and 29. 'Tis storied, that the Soldiers of Ant. Epimanes, a most lecherous King, did imitate his profane and bad example, Val. max. lib. 9 cap. 1. Many of the Syracusians did follow the evil example of the tyrant Dionysius. Plut. Whence is concluded, Plerique magis actiones aliorum, quamlibet pravas, imitantur, quam infortunia eorum cavent, Dion. lib. 53. If the King be altogether wicked, as ordinarily he is. (Moore Tyrants than Kings. Few of them in any age friends to Christ. Most part of them destroyers of the Commonwealth.) Oh! in how great danger under such doth Religion stand, and are the Liberties of the subject exposed to? Tell not me of a regulated King. 'Tis but a playing fast and lose. Aristotle, Pol. 5. cap. 8. saith, The least thing of the Law is not to be changed. This he saith, because it maketh way for the abrogating of the whole Law. He falleth upon that principle, Principiis obsta, sero medicina paratur. Setup to day regulated Monarchy, and to morrow it shall be absolute. If the King once get-in his little finger, he shall soon thrust-in his whole body. Small beginnings can produce great effects? 'Tis good to kill them in the birth. Make Caesar perpetual Dictator, Augustus shall become absolute Emperor. One degree bringeth on another. The least of Kings hath greater favour and power with the people, than the greatest of Counsels. All will be called his. The word subditi is current then. But aequales is detestable. If Alexander's neck be crooked, all his Courtiers must hang their heads to that side. I know not what the most of people for the Prince's favour, be what he will, regulated or absolute, will not do. Tell me, if he be not for GOD, and the good of the people, do not both Religion and the Commonwealth stand in greatest hazard? This doleful experience teacheth in all ages. Of our judgement are Jos. of't. lib. 4. cap. 8. lib. 6. c. 4., Mat. Agr. de insip. Reg. Th. Mor. Anonym. monit. lib. 2. Brent hom. 25. in 1 Sam. 8. Pet. Mart, come. in Jud. cap. 1. Virg. Malvez. disc. 39 See also Buchanan de Jur. Reg. ap. Scot   

SECT. III.  
Whether or not is a Commonwealth the best of Governments?  
WE know, Rollists hold the Quaerie absurd. But with their leave, I freely offer my judgement in the following Assertion.  
Assert. Without all controversy, Democracy arightly instituted, simply and absolutely, is of all Governments the sweetest, and contributeth most to the good of the people.  
In establishing this, we observe this order. Firstly, from the first and primary institution of the Jewish Commonwealth. It cannot be denied, but it was popular and democratic, and that for these reasons. 1. Because the Judges and Rulers of Israel were not choosed and set-apart upon the account of any national and carnal privilege. The Holy Ghost giveth them no preeminence above their brethren, for old descent, worldly honour and riches. Men to govern in it were not choosed for their riches, nobility, and blood-respects No verily. They had only place to govern because of virtue and godliness. Moreover thou shalt provide— able men, such as fear God, men of truth, hating covetousness, and place [such] over them [to be] ruler's,— and let them judge the people at all seasons,— And Moses choosed able men,— and made them heads over the people, rulers. — And they judged the people at all seasons, Exod. 18. Mark, there is not a word here of choosing the rich and honourable, or of any carnal or blood-tie. The Judges that are choosed, are men qualified, virtuous and godly, able to discharge their trust. And this was not only required in inferior Judges, but even in the higher Judges also, members of the Sandrin. The Seventy were wise men, and understanding, and known amongst the tribes, Deut. 1. They were not choosed at random, or at all adventures. No verily: They were selected out from amongst the Judges, spoken of Ex. 18. And the LORD said unto Moses, Gather unto me seventy men of the elders of Israel, whom thou knowest to be the elders of the people, and officers over them,— Num. 11. Now it is showed, that such men were virtuous and godly, able for places of trust And yet the LORD rested not satisfied therewith, but being about to entrust them with higher matters, he doubleth the spirit upon them. And I will come-down, and talk with thee there, and I will take of the spirit which is upon thee, and will put [it] upon them, and they shall bear the burden of the people with thee, that thou bear [it] not thy-self alone.— And the LORD came down in a cloud, and spoke unto him, and took of the spirit that was upon him, and gave it unto the seventy elders. Num. ib. Neither can it be denied, but those who were called Judges 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by way of excellency, were most eminently qualified far beyond any other. GOD had a most special hand in calling them to the charge, Judg. 2. So Moses, Joshuah, etc. Tell me, I pray you, have not we more than reason to say, That the first and primary Government amongst the people of the Jews was popular? I deny not, but qualification may be looked-to and have place both in Monarchy and Optimacy. But observe, both of these Governments in their best institution, do look to riches and honour as a necessary condition. As for Monarchy there is no question. And Aristotle distinguisheth between the government of few, and Optimacy. Both which ordinarily pass under the notion of Aristocracy. And Oligarchy (saith he) only looketh to riches and honour, Pol. 4. cap. 5. as Optimacy doth both to riches and virtue, cap. 7. Thus whether in Monarchy, or Aristocracy in their most reformed condition, not only qualification is looked-to, but also natural privileges are required as necessary conditions. But we hear not a word of any natural privilege in choosing and setting-apart the Judges and Rulers of the Jewish first Commonwealth. There is not a word spoken of their riches and honour, but of their abilities for the discharge of their trust. The Holy Ghost saith not, The wise men, rich and honourable, together with the heirs of the Rulers, were appointed to govern. There is not a word of any such natural respect. And do you imagine that the Holy Ghost at any time would have past-by in silence, these natural privileges, if they had been required as necessary conditions in the Judges and Rulers of the Jews? Well, is it so that according to the Holy Ghost's way, only the virtuous and godly should govern, and none other did bear rule in the first institution of the Jewish Commonwealth, why shall we imagine, but the people did bear rule amongst them? I hope you will not say, that virtue and godliness is not to be found amongst the people, but amongst the great ones. The contrary is rather true, 'Tis hard for a rich man to enter Heaven, Mat. 19 Job 32, 9 1 Cor. 1, 26 27, 28, 29. 'Tis observable at this time there was but small difference amongst the people of the Jews in the matter of riches. The most they had was the gold and silver they had gotten from the Egyptians, Ex. 3.11, and 12. And every man and woman amonost them goat jewels of silver and gold from the Egyptians. Nay, but it was not a time of their wealth, while as they traveled in the wilderness. Their condition then was very unsettled. What they had then, was from hand to mouth. Any provision they had, was from GOD'S extraordinary furnishing. And they were all that way alike served. And after they had entered the Land, and gotten possession of it, we read, the Land was equally divided amongst them, according to their Tribes and Families. They lived then as a peculiar people, claiming nearer relation one to another, than any people did. In after-ages and corrupt times, they could all tell you, they all were the children and seed of Abraham. The nearest bonds of Nature tied every one of them to supply another's wants. And as for Titles of honour amongst them, we read of none, till they goat Kings. Such vile and prodigali titles as to day are used, then were unknown. Yet obeserve, there was a twofold, and only a twofold sort of Titles amongst them. 1. A Title of Office. And thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Elders, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Officers, Ex. 18. Deut. 1. Josh. 24 Both which were called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Judges, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rulers. And as by their virtue they came to be Judges and Rulers, so by that same they attained to these Titles of Office. Which are most approved and commendable, as they are most ordinary and usual. 2. A title of mere nature. Thus in the time of Judges and Captains they were called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hea●s, Josh. 24. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 chief of the Fathers, Ezr. 4.8. and 10. These Titles and Privileges they had from the precedency of Nature, as the firstborn hath from the younger. The very Law of Nature it-self admitteth precedency, both in respect of office, and of natural generation and priority. Otherwise every thing should be turned topsie turvie, and all should run into confusion. But you shall not find thorough all the Book of GOD any other sort of titles used. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 King is also a title of office. You shall not show me, where the Rulers of the people of Israel are called Dukes, Marquesses, Earls, Viscount's, etc. Such titles, I tkink came from hell, and I wish they may thither return Now, tell me, whether or not, I have good reason to say, that the Jewish Commonwealth under Judges was popular and democratic? No precedency amongst them was known then, but what either office or nature did bear them to. They knew not precedency because of honour and riches, what it meaned. Any precedency amongst them, was either from natural generation, or from qualification. And none amongst them was advanced to any place of trust, because of any natural privilege and carnal respect, but because of virtue and godliness. And this was to be found amongst the people. We believe, qualification hangeth not at the girdles of great men. And such were not amongst the people of the Jews, in the time of the Judges. And though the Seventy were chosen out from amongst the Judges and Officers of the people, yet doth it not follow, but they were popular: for the Rulers were chosen from amongst the people. And so the Seventy being of the Rulers, it necessarily followeth, that they were chosen from among the people. It will never conclude, that they were not popular Governors, but that afterward they were advanced to an higher degree of office, than they were formerly. The Sanhedrin was entrusted with the management of the most public and greatest matters.  
2. It is said, Thou shalt provide out of all the people able men,— And Moses chose able men out of all Israel,— Ex. 18. There is a noble emphasis in all, or in all Israel. Mark the vastness and latitude thereof. It is not said, Judges were chosen from amongst the rich and honourable of Israel. That indeed had insinuated the restriction of places of office and trust to the rich and honourable. Blood-respect and natural ties had been necessary conditions in the choosing of Judges, if that had been said. But the word all, a note of universality, doth exempt none therefrom. It declareth, all and every one of the people, without exception, who were virtuous and godly, and fit for the discharge of public trust, secluding all natural ties and privileges, to be capable of official power. Indeed, you need not take all, in a restricted sense: for at this time they had none enclosing rich men, worldly worms, and vaingloriously honourable. They knew nothing but the priority of Nature, and the precedency of Virtue. And if you call not this Popular Government, I know not what you call Popular. Howsoever, let me have this, and I crave no better.  
Because it is alleged, Moses, Joshua, and the other Judges, did reign as Kings, we shall shortly demonstrate to you what power they had. Therefore shortly observe these Conclusions.  
Conclus. 1. Moses, before the counsel of Jethro, had a Kingly Power.  
This is more than manifest. Ever till then Moses governed all, and none but he. Exod. 18. This he did, not because he delighted to lord over the people, and that none should rule but he. 'Tis known, that he rested not contented with what Rulers he had appointed at the desire and counsel of Jethro. He entreated the Lord to appoint other Rulers, to bear burden with him. Num. 11. Deut. 1. Neither will I say, that Moses, out of mere simplicity and ignorance, before Jethroes counsel, did forbear to set any Rulers over the people beside himself. The very light of Nature taught him, that help was good, and that he alone was not able to discharge all the businesses of the people. But I conceive, he did it upon other grounds. He knew that the people of Israel were the Lord's peculiar people, whom he had brought out of Egypt extraordinarily, and over whom he had set him in an extraordinary way. Yea, he waited for judgement to the people, at the very mouth of the Lord. What Laws and Ordinances he delivered to the people, and what judgement he executed amongst them, were done according to extraordinary and immediate revelation from the Lord. Which maketh me think, that Moses in all matters of importance taking the word from God's mouth, and depending from his immediate revelation wholly waited upon God's Oracle, where, and when, one way or other, should be revealed to him, how, and what Judges should be appointed to rule with him. And so he perceiving Jethroes counsel to be wholesome and from the Lord, and that God had employed him as an instrument of accomplishing his expectation, therefore he thought good not to despise it, but speedily to embrace it. So we see, he wholly casteth the election of the Seventy over upon God, and therein only taketh the word at his mouth. Num. 11. Deut. 1. Albeit Moses all this while did reign as King, yet doth it make nothing for Kingly Government. 1. Because he was the Lord's extraordinary Lieutenant. He was extraordinarily and immediately designed by God to the charge. And to speak properly and precisely, in a politic notion, not Moses, but God himself was their King. What Moses did was by an immediate dependency from the Lord. He took the word at God's mouth. He enquired of God judgement, and was for the people to God-ward. Ex. 18. He was as God's mouth to the people. God employed him to deliver his Laws and Ordinances to the people, because they were afraid the Lord should speak to them. They could not without fear behold his glory and terror. Exod. 20. And Moses finding that his charge immediately and extraordinarily depended from the Lord, therefore he waited upon God, till he manifested one way or other, where, when, and how other Governors should be designed to rule with him over the people. And thus all the while he did govern alone, not he, but God properly and in a politic notion was their King: for he did nothing to the people, but by a special, extraordinary, and immediate dependency from the Lord. 2. Till in and about the time of Jethroes counsel, there was no fit time to create Rulers over the people. All the while before they were in a chased & most unsettled condition. In which time Moses did reign through mere necessity and exigency of the times. He did rule alone, because the case of the times so required. Thus Moses was King, per accidens, and not per se. 3. Although Moses had had an absolute and arbitrary power over the people of Israel, yet would it plead no whit for Kingly Government. By manifold and most eminent obligations they were tied to him. For their sake he refused to be called the son of Pharaoh's daughter, preferring affliction with them, to all the pleasures and pomp of Pharaoh's Court. He conducted them thorough the Red Sea, he was as the mouth of God to them, and by his favour with the Lord, he furnished them with all necessaries in the wilderness. And it is known that the man was most eminently endowed, matchless in his time. Thus what Kingly power Moses had, was not only accidental but extraordinary. Therefore it can be no ground to Royalists to build upon.  
Conclus. 2. After the institution of the seventy elders, and the accomplishment of Jethro 's counsel, neither Moses, nor any other of the Judges had a Kingly power.  
Firstly, The people desired Gideon to reign over them, and offered to devolve the Kingdom over into the hands of his posterity. And Gideon refused to do so, and embraced not their offer, Judg. 8. And he addeth this as the reason of his denial, The LORD shall rule over you. As it he had said, Neither I, nor any of my posterity can take upon us to reign over you as your Kings. Ye are the LORD'S peculiar people. Of whom the LORD hath a most special care. Any that rule over you, must be deputed by God in an extraordinary way. They must take the word at his mouth, ruling over you by an immediate dependency from him. Now, tell me, whether or not was Gideon King at this time? If he was King, ergo he refused to embrace the power which he had. And that is ridiculous. If he was not King, I obtain the point. Again, either they offered to Gideon a Kingly power, or not. If a Kingly power, ergo either Gideon was not King, or else by way of gratification, they offered him the power which he had already. And that had been in them greater impertinency than courtesy. Yea, they had dealt altogether ridiculously. And sure I am, Gideon had never answered them so, as he did, if he had had such power. He had positively denied to enjoy that which really he did enjoy. And that they did offer him a Kingly power is manifest. (1) Because the word in the Original text 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifieth to lord and govern in a Kingly way, Gen. 4.37. Dan. 11. Mic. 5. and in many other places. It hath affinity with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And the Grecians changing מ in , say 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Which signifieth, to reign in a kingly way. (2) It could be no other than kingly power, because Gideon wanted no power but that. He judged them, led-forth their Armies, and commanded in chief. And consequently either he was not King, or else the people offered no other power to him, than what formerly he had. And I cannot imagine, that ever they would have been so impertinent, to gratify his labours with the offer of just nothing. If they had done so, they had forthwith befooled themselves. And if Gideon had not kingly power, neither had any other of the Judges. He had that same power, and no less, which they had. They were all Judges alike.  
Secondly, Abimelech had different power from the Judges. What power he had, was kingly. This is evident, 1. From the question he putteth-up unto his mother's brethren, whereby he pleadeth to reign over the people of Israel. He useth there the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which the people used in offering to Gideon and his posterity, power to reign over them. And (as is said already) it implieth a kingly-ruling power. 2. From Jotham's parable, wherein the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used. And this under a parabolic notion he alludeth to Abimelech. And it cannot be denied, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is seldom or never used under any other signification then King. Precisely and ordinarily it is only attributed to one of a kingly power. You will find it so in innumerable places of Scripture. 3. From Jotham's application of the parable to Abimelech. In it is used 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Whence is derived 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And both of them ordinarily are only applied to persons of kingly authority. See Judg. 9 This is according as it is written in Chron Alex. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. this is Abimelech, who made himself King in the Kingdom, or, who tyrannously made himself King. I pray you, why doth the Holy Ghost call the Judges 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Judges, and Abimelech 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 King, if he had not been of a Kingly and different power from them? I confess Judg. 17, 18, 19, and 21. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is spoken concerning the Judge. Yet not properly, but metaphorically. It is spoken so, moeroris gratia, to express the dolefulness of the want of Authority, or of persons in Authority. And I must needs say, that authoritativenes, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is competent, whether to the Kingly person, or to the Kingly power. Therefore the Holy Ghost in these places expresseth his purpose by the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And this he doth not apply to one particular Judge, as to Abimelech, but to the whole incorporation of Judges. Then hear. Either Abimelech had different power from the Judges, or not. If different, ergo the Judges were not Kings, and had not Kingly power. The greatest power Abimelech had, was Kingly. And therein he was differenced from the Judges. You cannot say, that his power was not different from theirs, as is showed already. And consequently, his power at the most being kingly, and notwithstanding different from the authority of the Judges, it necessarily followeth, that the Judges had not kingly power.  
Thirdly, If the Judges had had kingly power, than there had been no change in the Government, after Saul was ordained King. Thus there had been change, nomine, but not re. And so the people in vain had sought a King, and Samuel in vain had denied them a King. Thus they sought nothing, and he denied nothing, but what they had before. Bellarmine, de Rom. pont. lib. 1. cap. 2. though to no purpose, laboureth to elude this, distinguishing between Rex, & Prorex. Indeed, we cannot but much commend him because he saith, That God in the time of the Judges was the proper and peculiar King of the Jews. This is showed already. And so implieth Gideon's answer, Judg. 8. And this cutteth the back of what Bellarmine saith: for so they being but Viceroys, and God the only King, then had they not properly kingly power. This is what I crave. Yet in the interim I demand, whether or not they could extend their power, as the Kings? And that they could not, is manifest. Because they had no more power than any of the Seventy and higher Sanhedrin. The Seventy were chosen to bear equal burden with Moses and the Judge, in all the weightiest and most public matters. Num. 11. Now, either conjunctively, or disjunctively, they had equal power with Moses, and the Judge. If but conjunctively, these two absurdities will follow. Firstly, that the Judge was not subject to the Sanhedrin: for the equal is not subject to the equal. And if not subject to the Sanhedrin, I see no reason why he was not also unpunishable and absolute. And so the Judge had greater power than the King. Which I am sure, none will admit. Secondly, before the institution of the Sanhedrin, all the greater and hard matters were referred to Moses, Ex. 18. And in this Moses power was greater than the power of those Judges, which he appointed at the advice and counsel of Jethro. But Moses finding, that he alone was not able to manage all the weightiest matters, therefore in greatest earnestness he besought the Lord, to add some to him, who might help him therein, and exonerate him of his burden. Mark a little: Either Moses as yet remained the only Judge of greatest matters, or else every one of the higher Sanhedrin had equal power with him. The reason is, because Moses power was according to the object of it. The greater matters, the greater power, Ex. 18. So proportion of Nature requireth. If you say, that notwitstanding the institution of the Sanhedrin, and its intermeddling with great and weighty businesses, the greatest of matters were reserved for Moses and the Judge's managing. I understand not that. That is against Moses desire. The thing which he prayeth for, is, That the Lord would ordain some to bear burden with him in discharging the weightiest matters. We find no such distinction in his desire, as that some might be appointed to oversee some weighty matters, and himself notwithstanding to reserve in his own hand the managing of the greatest affairs. Friend, this had been but a little easing of Moses burden under which he did grievously groan. Yea, in this case there had been great by-respect and self-interest in Moses desire. No less forsooth, than he should be eased of his burden, and notwithstanding reserve a lording power over his brethren. There is no little carnality in this desire, and as great absurdity to bind it upon Moses. Yea, were this true, he had been in power above the Seventy: for so his power did reach further than theirs, and might do what they could not. Tell not me, that his desire was to be eased of his burden, and notwithstanding to remain chief man in the Commonwealth. There is great carnality and self-interest there also. Moses desire is positive, without distinction. And if he, or any of the Judges was major singulis, I see no reason why they were not as essentially Kings as Saul, David, etc. The Kings had no more power. None of them according to Law, was major universis. So is demonstrated already. And so in the ordination of Kings there was no essential and substantial change in the Commonwealth. The people sought a King from Samuel. Was it not a foolish desire to seek what they had already? Samuel denied a King to them. Was it not foolishness in him to deny them that which already they had, and debate so much against it? Verily, there was nothing between them, if this be true, but pugna de lana caprina. And verily, Bellarmine wrongeth the people of the Jews very much, in alleging, they sought a despotic, heril, and hereditary King There is no such thing in their desire, as is showed already. They sought no more but a King. According to the Law he was regulated. And it is known, that they did not give the kingdom to Saul's posterity. Well, let it be so, the Judge had greater power than any one member of the Sanhedrin; yet doth it follow, that he only had such power as the annual Magistrate, v. g. in the Athenian Commonwealth. He had greater power than any one of the Council. And yet he had not a kingly power. Here from we draw this Argument:  
That Government is simply and absolutely best, and most for the advantage both of Church and Commonwealth, which the Lord not only did firstly institute amongst the people of the Jews, but also was unwilling to change it, and setup another Government in place thereof:  
But the Lord not only did firstly institute Democracy amongst the people of the Jews, but also was unwilling to change it, and setup another Government in place thereof:  
Ergo Democracy, simply and absolutely, is the best Government, and most for the advantage both of Church and Commonwealth.  
The Proposition, I suppose, cannot be denied: for whatsoever is most for the good of Church and Commonwealth, is most also for the glory and honour of God. And shall not I imagine, that the Lord most endeavoureth that which is most for his honour? As there is nothing which is so precious in the eyes of God as his own honour, so he endeavoureth most to erect, preserve, and maintain that which most contributeth thereto. None will say, that the Lord slighteth his own honour, and postponeth it to any created interest. The Assumption is made good from what foregoeth, not only in this, but also in the preceding Subsection.  
Secondly from the judgement of the gravest and wisest Philosophs. So Solon, of whom it is storied, 1. That he not only refused himself to reign over the Athenians, as King, but also he much endeavoured that Pisistratus should not attain thereto. This he did for preserving the liberties of the Athenians, and popular government amongst them inviolable. 2. He wrote several verses against the Athenians, because they had set Pisistratus over them, sharply rebuking them that they had gone from the better to the worse. 3. Because the Athenians had setup Monarchy amongst them, therefore he left Athens, and went into Egypt. 4. Not desiring to live under Kingly government, he left Egypt, Cyprus, and Lydia, and came into Cilicia, where he built a City, and called the name of it Solos. And it is very observable, that Croesus' having desired him to come and live beside him, he thanked him for his benevolent courtesy: But withal he added, that if he desired not to live in a free Commonwealth (which he had setup in Cilicia) he would choose rather to live with him, then in Athens. 5. Being desired by Pisistratus to return to Athens, he told him, he would not, lest he should appear an approver of his deed, in taking upon him to reign as King. 6. He wrote an Epistle to Epimenides, wherein he exceedingly regrateth the foolishness of the Athenians, in translating Democracy into Monarchy. 7. He wrote to Periander King of Corinth, desiring him to lay-down his Kingly power. 8. It is reported, that he did institute popular government amongst the Athenians. But the simple truth is, it was long before instituted by Theseus. And by process of time, the Commonwealth and the Laws thereof being corrupted, Solon reform both. And as Solon, so likewaies all the rest of the Sages, did prefer Democracy to any other government. Thales wrote to Solon in exile, desiring him to come and dwell beside him at Miletum. And if he did abominate the Milesian Monarchy, there was nowhere he could be free of the trouble of Kings. And therefore he thought it best he should live with him, and his own friends. Putting him in mind, how that Bias, one of the Wisemen, had desired him to come to Priene. And if he did so, he told him, they (meaning himself & the rest of the Sages) would flock about him. I suppose their sympathising in affection with Solon, doth also insinuat their sympathising with him in the matter of judgement. 'Tis storied, that the Wiseman Chilo was the first who instituted the Lacedaemonian ephori, the representative of the people. This is controverted. Sosicrates saith, Chilo did firstly institute the Ephorick Magistracy. To this inclineth Laertius de vit. Phil. lib. 1, in Chil. Herodot, Xenophon, and Satyrus say, it was instituted by Lycurgus; Aristotle and Val. Maximus, by Theopompus. Howsoever, I may determine on either of these two. 1. That Chilo was one of that Magistracy himself. Which made his brother envy him. 2. That not only Lycurgus and Theopompus, but also Chilo acted much for the maintenance and preservation of that Magistracy. And in an epistle to Periander, he spareth not to say, that nothing is secure to a King, nor is he happy though he should die in his bed without blood. Pittacus, one of the Sages, after he had reigned about ten years over the Mityleneans, willingly resigned the Kingdom. Tell me, if that man desired not people's liberty, who, though able to do so, would not so much as keep them under an easy yoke: for he did govern them according to most wholesome laws and constitutions. And in his answer to Croesus, he avoucheth that Law is the greatest commander. Compare this speech with his practice, and you will find he was a great friend to Democracy and people's liberty. Cleobulus greatly sympathized with Solon in his exile. And in his Epistle to him, he desireth him to come and dwell beside him in Lind; which he calleth a free City, not subjected to Kings and Princes. And there (saith he) you shall be free of all fear at Pisistratus hands. Periander, one of the Wisemen also, though at the first both a King and Tyrant, yet at last he appointed a Council to govern at Corinth. Which I must needs think, was popular, because in even-down terms he saith, that popular government is better than Royal. And how much he was taken with high and noble thoughts of the Sages and Wisemen, doth more than appear from his Epistle directed to them. Epimenides in his epistle to Solon saith, that the Athenians before Pisistratus reign, being free, and governed by most notable laws, would not still lie under slavery and bondage. Observe, he calleth Kingly government, servitude and bondage. And in the interim he intreateth him to come and dwell beside him in Crete, where there was no King to trouble him. Anaximenes, in his Epistle to Pythagoras, commendeth him much for departing from Samos into Croton, for avoiding the yoke of Monarchy. And withal he regrateth his own condition, for being not only subjected to the Milesian Kings, but also threatened by the Median King with bondage, albeit the jonians did contend for the liberty of all. This made him dolefully cry out, Oh, how can I, Anaximenes' search out Heaven's secrets, being exposed to the hazard of death and bondage? And it cannot be denied but Pythagoras was all the way for Democracy. 1. Because Anaximenes' writing to Pythagoras, speaketh of liberty: But sure I am, Aristocracy doth as much, if not more, takeaway liberty as Monarchy. What? it is the government of many Kings. And the tyranny of many is worse than the tyranny of one. 2. Because he went into Crete and Lacedemonia. And being fully instructed in their Laws, he returned from thence into Croton, where he setup a Council consisting of a thousand members. This could not but be popular, if he followed the platform of the Cretian and Lacedaemonian Commonwealths. His government is called Aristocracy, not as it is different from Democracy, but because it was managed by the best. It is evident from Anaximenes' epistle to him, that in the matter of government they were both of one judgement. Socrates is only for popular government. He runneth so far on this way, that he determineth upon these things. 1. All within the Kingdom have capacity of governing. 2. All things are common. 3. All the people are either ground-tillers or soldiers. I shall not stand here to repeat Aristotle's examination and censure on these things. But shortly you shall have our judgement of them. The first cannot be denied, caeteris paribus: for we suppose, all who are fit to govern, as occasion serveth, should be admitted thereto. And passing all carnal and natural privileges, there is none of the people, who per se and from nature, hath any more power to govern then another. Only qualification for conveniency of, and vocation to governing▪ do make the difference amongst men. The second I cannot away with. The community of wives and children, I understand not. It hath no ground either in the Law of GOD, or of Nature. But as for communication of riches, I shall elsewhere offer my judgement. We hearty subscribe to the third: for by ground-tillers he understandeth men of every trade and vocation, contra-distinct from these who serve in the wars. Thus I take the man, not to be for idleness and Nobility. And he holdeth idle men, and Noblemen (so called) as unprofitable, yea as non-members in the Commonwealth. So do I too. He is for none such. So am I From these three things Socrates concludeth, That the Governors of the Commonwealth are that same way in respect of the people and these whom they govern, even as other threads are in respect of silk. He would have the Magistrate shining and glorious in virtue far beyond the people. Plato is fully of Socrates' judgement. De Rep. Arist. Pol. 2. cap. 4. 'Tis reported of him, That the Arcadians, and Thebans, having desired him to institute and setup Government amongst them, he did it not, because they would not admit equality, as he learned. And it is known, that by Aristocracy he doth not understand that, which is contradistinguished from Democracy. No verily. But he opposeth it, not only to the confused multitude, but also to the Government of these, who are set-apart to govern, because of some natural privileges. Thus by Aristocracy he understandeth the Government of the best. And it is the very quintesscence and complete form of Popular Government. 'Tis the square and midway of removing the tyranny of Monarchy, and Oligarchy, and the confusion of the popular multitude. This kind of Government he desired Dion, to promote and setup amongst the Syracusians. 'Tis observable, while as Dion was setting forward against Dionysius, for restoring the Syracusians to liberty, and the upsetting of Popular Government amongst them, he was incited thereto, and encouraged, not only by Eudamus, and the Governors of the Republic, but also by Philosophers. All of these unanimously assisted him. Aristotle also in this is not wanting. He concludeth Popular Government to be the best, because it inclineth to mediocrity. It striketh a midst betwixt all Governments. Polit. 4. cap. 11.  
Thirdly, Of the chiefest Historians and Orators. Berosus imputeth it as a great fault to Nimrod, because he erected Kingly Government, contrary to what Janus (i e. Noah) gave commandment and precept for. Ant. lib. 4. I confess, what Government was before that time, was not purely politic. Yet it drew very near the borders of Democracy: for than they knew not what it was to be governed by one, or by some few, because of riches, honour, and such like. No verily they admitted no precedency, but purely natural and moral. Purely natural, because (speaking rigorously) they lived then as under fatherly and oeconomical Government. Purely moral, because those did govern who were eminent in godliness and virtue. It is called the golden age, because then men were free of deceit, each one living in a brotherly & conscionable way with another. They knew not what Law-quircks and Politic quiddities meant then. All lived as under one common father, governed according to the Laws of pure Nature and Justice. Subsect. 2. Concl. 3. Thus than none were holden-back to govern, to whom Nature and Virtue had given the precedency. And this I find only to be the difference between Popular Government, and what Government was then. The one was natural, and the other is political. Persons than did govern, not only because of virtue and godliness, but also because of natural priority. No wonder, because than they lived under Governors, as under natural fathers. Government then was rather oeconomical, then political. But Popular Government, though it giveth place to Physical and natural precedency, yet not in the matter of Government. It admitteth natural precedency in natural things. But in policy only virtue and godliness have the first place. Yet there is no repugnancy, but per accidens in politic things both may consubsist. Natural precedency in itself is not repugnantly capable of that which giveth political preferment. Herodot seemeth to commend Ottanes, who against Darius pleaded for the upsetting of Popular Government among the Persians. He saith, that Ottanes took the middle way. Lib. 3. But in medio stat virtus. No wonder though he inclineth to Ottanes judgement, rather than to the opinion of Darius, who pleaded for Monarchy. The man, as is said already, approveth Pindarus, in saying, Law is King. But amongst the Persians, Monarchy was ever above Law. Josephus calleth the Government firstly instituted amongst the Jews, the best of Governments, Ant. Jud. lib. 4. cap. 8. lib. 6. cap. 4. Howsoever he taketh-up the platform of that Government is not material. But I may determinately say, it was democratic and popular. This we take to be the judgement of Sallust. He opposeth liberty to Regal Government, a free City to Monarchy. Yea, he inveigheth against the Grecians, as base, free of virtue and painfulness, because (saith he) libertatem per inertiam amiserint. And he speaketh of Noblemen, as unprofitable members, in quibus sicut in statue nihil est additamenti. Yea, he calleth them socordes, ignavi, adding, per superbiam cuncta gentibus moderantur. Moreover, he layeth down this as a maxim, Libertas juxta bonis & malis, strenuis & ignavis, optabilis est. Liberty is to be desired by all, good and bad, stout and cowardly. In fragm. Cicero was fully of Pompey's way. He greatly commended his cause, and did much exhort others thereto. This you may see in many of his Epistles, lib. 2. ep. 18. lib. 4. ep. 44. lib. 5. ep. 62.64. & 74. See Plutarch in Cicer. Now Pompey was clearly for the defence and preservation of the Roman Commonwealth, at it was established before Caesar's usurpation. It is beyond all controversy, at that time it was in part popular. Then the Romans were governed by Tribunes of the people, who had power to defend against any Magistrate, whether Dictator, Consul, or any other of the people. Sure I am, none will say, but Demosthenes was all the way for Democracy, Orat. cont. Theocr. He pleaded still for the Liberties of the Athenian Commonwealth in many Orations, whereby he exhorted the Athenians to withstand Philip, for preserving amongst them Popular Government inviolable. Plutarch reporteth, he incited all Greece, both against Philip, and Alexander. In Demost.  
Fourthly, Of notable Kings and warriors. Minos (who by Homer, Hesiod, Plato, and others, is called the chiefest of Kings, amongst the Cretians) created Cosmi, Popular Governors. So Theseus, whom Isocrates crieth up above Hercules, did institute Popular Government amongst the Athenians. Theompompus, Lycurgus, and Agesilaus most noble Kings, and most notable patrons of Popular Government. And shall we not think, but Miltiades, Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, Hannibal, and many other notable warriors, who did live under the yoke of Popular Government, esteemed it the choicest of Governments? They acted much, both gallantly and cheerfully, for the preservation thereof. Men's practice is a more evident testimony of their judgement, than their profession. 'Tis known, that Lysander, an eminent warrior, in an oration to the Lacedæmonians, persuaded them to shake-off Kingly Government altogether. Plut. & Prob. in Lys. Had that been, I suppose, the Ephorick Magistracy should have governed all. Though Dion, a matchless warrior, was against the popular multitude, which inevitably begetteth confusion; yet was he for Plato's Aristocracy, which is reform Democracy.  
Fifthly, From the example of the chiefest and most reformed Commonwealths, whereof some were purely popular, and some mixed. v. g. Athenian, Cyrenian, Cumaean, Pyrean, Horean, Syracusian, Tarentinian, Theban; Roman. etc. Diodore, out of Herodot, reporteth, That the Assyrian Kingdom being overturned by the Medes, for a long time after the Cities were governed without Kings, by Popular Government.  
The point being thus established, both by divine and human authority, it nextly falleth into our way to make it good from Reason it-self. And for this we shall shortly give you the abridgement of the Arguments of some ancient Philosophers, which Aristotle allegeth, Polit. 3. cap. 11. and 12. As they do plead for Popular Government, so they do directly militat against Monarchy. The first is taken from the parity and equality of the Members of the Republic, the second from the necessity of Magistracy, the third from the equity and infallibility of Law, the fourth from the inconveniency of setting man above Law, the fifth and sixth from example. Sparing to repeat their arguments at length, we content ourselves with an argument of our own framing. And it is this,  
That Government is simply best, which restoreth us nearest, beyond all Governments, to our condition and liberties in the state of perfection and pure naturals:  
But Democracy restoreth us nearest, beyond all Governments, to our condition and liberties in the state of perfection and pure naturals:  
Ergo Democracy, simply, is the best Government.  
The Proposition is undeniable, because the state of perfection and integrity is simply the best. It is without either spot or wrinkle. And consequently, the nearer we draw to that condition, our case is so much more excellent and good. And so, whatsoever Government restoreth us nearest thereto, without all controversy is simply best. In making good the Assumption, we lay-down these two Conclusions.  
Conclus. 1. No man by nature in a formal and antecedent way is born subject to Government.  
Firstly: If Nature tied man formally and in an antecedent way to Politick-subjection, we demand, Whether or not in such respect it layeth bonds of subjection upon all men? If it doth, than Kings no less than subjects, are tied by Nature to jurisdiction. 1. Because that which agreeth to a thing formally and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is also competent to it universally and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 2. If Kings were not also subjected to Authority by nature, it would inevitably follow, all men, and not all men, were subjected to it. Which is implicatory. If not; than it followeth, That some men, by nature formally are born subject to Authority, and some not: Both which are repugnant: for if Nature, as Nature subjecteth man to Authority, it giveth exemption to none, more than to another. Otherwise you shall either admit a simple contradiction, or else you shall deny all men to be natural. Therefore of necessity the royalist must either admit, all men according to Nature, to be born free, or else, both King, and People, by Nature to be born subject to Government. He must either admit the one, or deny the other also. Which he proudly affirmeth. See what Philosophy this is: Man by nature is formally born subject to Government. So will the Royalists have it. This will be the Conclusion: Ergo man by nature is not formally born subject to Government. A plain contradiction indeed. The reason is: If nature subject man, formally, to Government, than it subjecteth all men thereto. And if all men, I demand, Whether or not doth nature subject one to another? If it doth, ergo either committitur circulus, or else one by nature is not subjected to another. Otherwise all according to nature are not subjected thereto, as is showed to be. If not, ergo none by Nature are borne subjects: for so by Nature there is none, to whom they are subjected. Non entis nulla sunt accidentia. Therefore it inevitably followeth, either all to be born free, or else all to be born subjected to Government, and not to be born subjected thereto.  
Secondly: If Nature laid formal bonds of subjection upon Man to Politic Authority, we judge it very strange, how there have been, and may be many families and societies of men void and free of such subjection. We can scarcely think, that the interveening of any accidental cause could obstruct the current of such a formal stream of Nature from issuing and streaming forth its formal effect. We can hardly digest it, how Nature formally bending its strength to produce Politic subjection, doth not also erect Government amongst Beasts, and subject one of them to another. See we not by experience, how natural predominants do always produce effects suitable to their temper? Why may we not then with as good reason allege, that Nature producing Government and subjection to Policy, would have also through its natural source drawn all natural creatures, to the erecting of Government and Policy amongst them? How cometh it to pass, I pray you, there is not King-Lion, King-Eagle, King-Elephant? &c:  
Thirdly: If Nature formally tied some men to subjection, and formally derived power of governing and reigning to others; then the constitution of Judges and Governors, would be a formal and natural act, Physically and formally flowing from Nature's principles, not contingently, but necessarily. Which taketh away the freedom of God, Deut. 17.1. Sam. 12. Ps. 75. and Dan. 4. in setting-up Governors and Rulers according to his pleasure, excluding all formal and physical necessity from Nature. And not only so, but also it followeth, that both Rulers, and ruled, are eternal and unchangeable. Which is repugnant both to Experience and Reason.  
The Gymnosophists and Indian Philosophs did enact it by Law▪ That all by Nature were freeborn, and none were servants, but to be of equal authority and alike dignity. Diod. Ant. lib. 3. cap. 10. Dionysius Halicarnassius saith, In all men the desire of liberty is innate, Lib. 5. & 6. Julius Caesar averreth, All men study to liberty, Lib. 2. & 3. the bell. Gal. And Gregory affirmeth, All men by Nature to be free, whom Nations have subjected to bondage. 12. quaest. 2. The Law speaketh much for us in this, and in positive terms saith, what we affirm, L. manumiss. F. de just. & jur. Lib. 1. digest. tit. 1. lib. 1. Inst. tit. 5. Ulpian, & Justian, distinguish between the Law of Nature, and the Law of Nations. The one is particular, only relating to man; the other is general, relative both to man and beast. Ulp. lib. 1. sect. ult. Just. dig. lib. 1. tit. 1. Inst. lib. 1. tit. 2. But I pray you, Wherein can the Law of Nature be common, both to man and beast, if you affirm Nature to have laid straight bonds of subjection upon one to another? We find by experience, that Lions are not subject to King-Lion, Boars to King-Boar, Eagles to King-Eagle. And so you annul this community of the Law of Nature to Man and Beast, if you understand subjective authority formally to flow from Nature. They do as yet more clearly difference these Laws, calling the one slavery, and the other liberty. Ulp. lib. man. D. Just. dig. lib. 1. Hence Ulpian. Inst. lib. 1. and Justinian, Dig. lib. 1. say, That all by Nature being freeborn, Manumission to Nature is unknown. It is the consequent of servitude according to the Law of Nations. See also Just. Inst. lib. 1. tit. 5. Whence is it, out of Florentine, he defineth liberty from Nature, and servitude from the custom of Nations. Dig. lib. 1. tit. 5. Where liberty is expressly opposed to Government and Authority. The one is called humane constitution, and the other, Nature's birth.  
But the Lawyer Prate would make us believe, by the Law of Nations Ulpian and Justinian do understand, a humane, universal Law and Sanction, and by servitude, praedure and tyrannous form of Government. And so (saith he) the Law of Nations must not always be opposed to the Law of Nature, as Livius saith. Neither must we think (saith he) that all Civil Constitution is contrary to Nature, but such as draweth the subjected into slavery. The Lawyer Baldwin seemeth to take him by the hand, while as he calleth the Law of Nations, the particular Law of Nature. But the man, come. in. Justit. Inst. lib. 1. & 2. seemeth neither to be much for it, nor much against it. Nay but Mr. Prate wresteth Ulpian and Justinian, their meaning: for if the Law of Nature were taken by them for any humane Law, then should humane Law be common both to man and beast. Do not they say, the Law of Nature is common to both? Therefore you shall either conclude, beasts to be men, and affected with humane faculties, or else you shall restrict your universal within the bounds of a particular.  
But if you shall say, That by the Law of Nations they understand an Universal Statute, and general Sanction, as it is contradistinct from the Civil Law, you also gain just nothing for your pains. 1. Because in such a notion, the Law of Nations is not the proper and immediate opposite of the Law of Nature. So it is properly and immediately opposed to the Civil Law, as Justinian out of Caius abundantly cleareth: for as he opposeth Digest. lib. 1. tit. 1. loc. 1. the Law of Nature to the Law of Nations, so loc. 9 and Inst. lib. 1. tit. 2. loc. 2. he contradistinguisheth the Law of Nations from the Civil Law. In the one he taketh the Law of Nations, as being the immediate opposite of the Law of Nature, and in the other, as being the proper opposite of the Civil Law. 2. Because both Ulpian, and Justinian, in the forequoted places, do call the Law of Nations, a thing common amongst men. But by your leave, if we take a narrow view of the Law of Nations, we shall find it rather particular, then general; it being taken as immediately opposed to the Civil Law: for so it is taken in a strict and rigorous acceptation. And such Law hath greatest footing, when Monarchy and the governing power is universal.  
And whereas Mr. Prate allegeth, That by servitude, is understood slavery and tyranny, he is far in the wrong to Ulpian and Justinian. They mean no such thing. 1. Because Justinian calleth Liberty, a natural faculty, inclining to that which any man pleaseth to do, unless it be obstructed either by strength, or Law. In which we mark two things that make much for us. Firstly, Liberty is referred to the natural faculty of the Will. So Aristotle defineth it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. lib. 6. Polit. Now no Government can be called the natural faculty of the Will, or any power of the Mind. Secondly, Liberty is opposed, not only to force and violence, but also to Law and Ordinance. These two things do absolutely distinguish the reason of Liberty from Government, in so far as it is taken for natural liberty. Now, Justinian to the definition of Liberty subjoineth the definition of Servitude. But, by your favour, why may not I with far better reason say, That Justinian taketh Servitude for Government, than you can allege him to take it for slavery and tyrannous authority? for as he defineth Liberty, it is uncompetent both to lawful, and unlawful authority. If Government be natural, the Liberty of which Justinian speaketh, is no ways competent to it. He speaketh not of natural, but of moral liberty. 2. Because Ulpian and Justinian call Servitude, constitutio juris gentium. But my friend, what Ethnic, much less Christian, would have called tyranny, constitutio juris, and not rather constitutio non-juris? Show me another place where they take jus gentium abusively in a catachrestick signification. 3. Albeit we should yield this to Mr. Prate, yet should he no whit encroach upon the main purpose in hand: for it is abundantly cleared, that they understand all men by nature to be born free. Jure enim naturali (saith Justinian) omnes homines ab initio liberi nascebantur. Just. lib. 1. tit. 2. loc. 2. Thence was it in the golden age, both before and after the Flood, they knew nothing but fatherly government, and filial subjection. Jerome also in this sideth with us. He calleth Liberty, a faculty of living according to pleasure. But as government restraineth the Will, so Nature giveth it liberty, sweetly concurring and conniving with it. Furthermore, he showeth, how that Liberty is natural, both from the subject and object of it. De Reg. inst. & disc. lib. 5.  
Conclus. 2. Nature per accidens and in a secondary way, intendeth government.  
The reason of this is clearer than the light: for in the state of corruption, Nature lieth between two straits. Either it must be altogether be slave●●o the predominant tyranny of its corruption, or else patiently submit it-self to Government's yoke. Thereby it mindeth to redintegrat that which by Corruption it loosed. It knoweth that it would be overcharged by the super-dominion of lording lusts, if it did not come under the reverence of government. It chooseth rather to take its hazard of subjection to a friend, then become captive to a foe, and always remain his prisoner. Thus it no otherwise mindeth government, but as in the case of fallen man it cannot be secure, nor preserved from the rage of lust without it. Therefore Writers do very pertinently call it natural. Arist. Pol. 1. cap. 2. Ulp. Inst. lib. 1. Just. Dig. lib. 1. tit. 1. loc. 1. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 Inst. lib. 1. tit. 2. loc. 1. and 2. And the Lawyer Vasquez in plain terms saith that same which we do, Illustr. quaest lib. 1. cap. 41. The Law saith, De jure gentium secundarius est omnis principatus. I. fin. ad med. C. de long. temp. praest. I.  
This being done, you may abundantly learn herefrom, what man's condition is in the state of perfection 〈◊〉 integrity. 'Tis a condition altogether unliable to any Politic subjection. It rendereth all free unsubjected to government. Yet we must not think, that it giveth man immunity and exemption from the Moral Law. That were a giving him power above his duty. Thus he should be rendered an outlaw. But in the state of integrity, man was most strictly engaged to all the duties of the Moral Law. He was obliged to perform them under pain of highest censure. He was answerable then to no humane Judicatory but only to the Judge of judges. His case was such, that he needed no governor's to hedge-in his ways. He needed nothing for that but his own nature. It's integrity and perfection was the best governor and government. But since the fall, Man is become exceeding labill, and standeth in need of many things which he did not before. Since the fall he is obliged no less than before it, to observe GOD's Law. And though before the fall he was free and subject to none but to GOD, yet now he cometh under Tutory. Before the fall he needed no Tutors, having wit enough then to govern himself. But since the fall, he is become infirm and ignorant, and standeth now in need of Tutors to help his infirmities. And the best Tutor he can have, is government. Now, tell me, which of the governments is best? No question, that which advanceth him nearest his first and primary condition. Nature no otherwise intendeth government, but as it contributeth in some measure or other, to make up what it hath loosed in the state of corruption. And as it hath loosed integrity, so likeways liberty. It had both these in the state of perfection. Well, will any deny, but of all goverments, Democracy is most for liberty? Monarchy and Aristocracy draw people's liberty within a narrow compass. In the one, the whole liberty of the people is devolved upon one, and in the other upon some few. Thus the liberty which Man had in the state of perfection, is extremely eclipsed. It denieth his native liberty to him, though in a larger measure he be capable of it. But Democracy giveth people their full liberty which they had in the state of perfection, in so much as they are capable of it. It withholdeth nothing of it from them, which in conveniency and without violation of the Law it can give unto them. It cannot conveniently give them the whole liberty which they had in their primary condition. Otherwise they should be without government. And so they should become outlaws, lose and dissolute. Thus they should come under the dominion of sin. Which is not liberty, but slavery. To prevent the incurable and extreme contagion of which, Nature hath provided Government as a remedy. And that government which advanceth Nature in the state of fallen man, in as much as it is capable of, to the liberty, which it had in the state of innocency and before the fall, no question must be the chiefest remedy against such contagion. Thus Nature in the state of Corruption, is advanced so near as is possible to its state it was in in the case of perfection. But Democracy amongst all Governments, is that which advanceth Nature nearest to the liberty which it had in the state of perfection. It giveth liberty not only to one, and some few, but also to all. It withholdeth liberty from none, in so far as it can consubsist with obedience to the Law; to which Man was subjected in the very state of innocency. It not otherwise withholdeth liberty, but as it preventeth Corruption's slavery. Ergo, of all Governments it is simply best. No wonder: for it advanceth Man nearest the condition he was in in the state of perfection.   

SECT. iv  
Whether or not is it lawful to resist the Royal Person, and decline the Royal Authority?  
IT will be greater ease for us, to remove this difficulty, than those which formerly, by the Lords abundant help, we have fully discussed. You learn our mind in this matter from that which followeth.  
Assert. 1. It is not lawful to resist the King, as King, nor the Kingly Power, as the Kingly power.  
There is very good reason for this: for the King, as King, is ordained by God, and Kingly Government in itself is God's Ordinance. Therefore formally, positively, and directly, we cannot resist the King, nor the Kingly power; unless we be found fighters against God. This is at length made good by us, sect. 1. ass. 1.  
Assert. 2. It is lawful and commendable, to resist the tyranny of the King, and the abuse of his power.  
This we make good from several examples in Scripture. 1. From the example of Saul's Army, which in resisting him, rescued Jonathan from his fury. 1 Sam. 14. Royalists, such as Mr. Symons, and Ferne, do opinionate, this was done by no violence, but by prayers and tears. But this is false. There is not a word of prayers and tears in the text. The people without, and contrary to the King's consent enter in oath for rescuing Jonathan. Yea, which is more, contrary to the King's oath, they laid their heads together, and did bind themselves by oath to rescue him. The King's oath is, God do so, and more also: for thou shalt surely die, Jonathan. The People's oath is contrary to that,— As the Lord liveth, there shall not one hair of his head fall to the ground:— They go not behind his back, but they tell it him in his face.— the people said unto Saul, Shall Jonathan die—? Thus they withstand him to his face. The very highest degree of resistance. 2. David resisted and withstood Saul's fury, 1 Sam. 22.23 etc. 1 Chr. 12. Nay but Arnisaeus saith, David's fact in resisting Saul, and defending himself by arms against him, was extraordinary. He was anointed, and designed by God, as successor to Saul. But the man is far mistaken: for if it be lawful in an extraordinary case to resist Kings, no question in itself it is lawful to resist them. And so, it being in itself a thing lawful, it may be put in action, both in an extraordinary and ordinary case. See subsect. 2. prop. 1. And though David was designed King by the Lord, yet was he not formally called thereto by the People, in the time of Saul's reign. Will any deny, but Saul, so long as he lived, was King over Israel, and that David was his subject? Otherwise David was very far out of it, in calling him, The Lords Anointed, his Master, Lord, and King. We say no more, but refer you to Lex Rex, quaest. 32. Salmasius finding-out another starting-hole, saith, David with arms only defended himself against Saul 's tyranny, but not to cut him off, as the English Rebels, and bloody butchers did, in cutting-off Charles 1. Def. Reg. cap. 4. This is all we say concerning David. And there was very good reason for it, why David did not cut him off, though he was several times at his mercy. Firstly, because he could not do it legally. Though he had power legally to resist him, yet had he not power legally to cut him off. The very Law of Nature teacheth self-defence, though by the smallest means. But the offcutting of the Delinquent only belongeth to the Magistrate and Judge, unless it be in an extraordinary case. Nature hath always Law enough for self-defence, but not so for punishing Delinquents. The one is natural, the other political. Secondly, no question, David, by extraordinary impulsion was carried-by the offcutting of Saul. While as Abishai went about to kill him, David forbade him. And told him he should be cut-off and perish another way, 1 Sam. 26. Where you shall find David dehorting Abishai from laying hands on Saul, from these two grounds. Firstly, from the non-legality of the fact. He is the Lords Anointed. Thus he holdeth Saul as his superior. And therefore he had not power to cut him off. 'Tis usurpation in the inferior, to rise against the superior. Secondly, from the assurance of Saul's perishing another way.— As the Lord liveth, the Lord shall smite him, or his day shall come to die, or he shall descend into battle and perish. Would David say, It is needless either for me, or for thee, Abishai, to lay hands on Saul: Assure thyself he shall be cut-off another way. But I believe this man cannot say, the Representative of the English Commonwealth had such reasons for them, For keeping them back from cutting-off Charles Stuart.  
3. Elishah commanded to shut the door upon Jehoram's teeth. He calleth him, the son of a murderer.— See ye, how the son of a murderer hath sent to takeaway mine head. Look when the messenger cometh, shut the door, and hold him fast at the door.— 2 Kin. 6. Thus he giveth orders to the Elders, those who did sit in the Sanhedrin, being with him in the house, violently to keep it out against Jehoram, and his messenger. The word in the original, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proporteth a most violent way of resisting. It signifieth a holding fast at the door with pressing. So the Seventy, Chaldee paraphrast, Avenarius, and others do render it. 'Tis a vain thing in Royalists, to imagine, Elishah, and the Elders with him, did not resist the King, but his messenger. 1. The text maketh clear against this.— [Is] not the sound of his master's feet behind him? Thus Elishah commandeth the door to be shut upon the messenger, because the King was backing him, and coming-in immediately after the cutthroat. This intimateth to us, the shutting of the door, and the out-keeping of the house, was mainly against Jehoram himself. His immediate approaching upon the back of the messenger, is the ground of shutting the door, and keeping-out the house. They allege also this to be an extraordinary act. Quasi vero self-defence were not a thing most natural and ordinary. Away with this elusion. 2. Because what the King's emissary doth in the King's name, is done by him, as in the King's person and authority. And so virtualiter at least it is all one to resist the King's emissary, and to resist the King himself. Salmasius would lose the knot another way. And (saith he) the impure Puritans can conclude nothing from this, for cutting-off the head of Charles 1. The Prophet did not take it on him, to cut-off Jehoram. That was done by Jehu▪ whom God extraordinarily stirred-up thereto. Def. Reg. cap. 4. Who ever saw such a man as this? He only raileth, and shifteth the Question. The Question between us now, is not concerning the offcutting, but the simple act of resisting Kings. And though Elishah did not cut-off Jehoram, yet he cannot deny, but he withstood him, and defended himself against his violence. This is all for the present we crave. Neither can he deny, but Elishah gave orders to one of the children of the Prophets, to anoint Jehu King. Whereupon he went forth, and did cut-off Jehoram, executing the purpose of God on the house of Ahab. From which example is showed already, to be lawful to cut-off delinquent Kings. It is the Magistrat's part, and not the Prophet's, unless it be by extraordinary impulsion, to cut-off the delinquent. And so, as from the example of Elishah, it is lawful to resist, so from the example of Jehu (whom Elishah caused to be anointed, for cutting-off the house of Ahab) it is lawful to cut-off delinquent Kings.  
4. Libnah made defection from Jehoram, and revolted from him, 2 Kin. 8. 2 Chr. 21. Salmasius studieth to elude this, yet he saith nothing against it, but what others of his own tribe said before him. And (saith he) Libnah's revolt, in respect of God, the Judge of all the earth, was a just punishment of Jehoram 's sins. But in respect of the revolters, it is not where justified in all the text. Def. Reg. cap. 4. But with his leave, the text insinuateth the contrary. This you may learn from comparing the revolt of Libnah, with the revolt of the Edomites. So the Edomites revolted from under the hand of Judah unto this day.— There is nothing added to that. The same time also did Libnah revolt from under his hand.— This is added as a reason, because he had forsaken the Lord God of his fathers. Thus is abundantly holden-out unto us, that Edom and Libnab revolted from Jehoram in a different way. No question, in respect of God, the cause and ground of the revolt of both, is one. God caused both to revolt, to punish the sins and transgressions of Jehoram. But in respect of the Revolters there are different causes. The Edomites revolted, because they disdained to live under the yoke of the King of Judah. The text saith, they chose a King of their own. And from that, which is added as a ground of Libnah's revolt, it is more than apparent to us, it revolted from a principle of Religion. And these who comment upon the text say, Libnah revolted, because Jehoram pressed the people of the Land to Idolatry. I suppose upon good reason Libnah's revolt is far more justifiable, than the defection of the ten Tribes from Rehoboam. The one revolted upon a natural, and the other upon a spiritual account. And yet, as is showed already, the ten Tribes revolted allowably.  
5. Uzziah was withstood by Azariah, accompanied with fourscore valiant Priests of the Lord. And in this, contrary to the doctrine of Royalists, we shall make good these three things. 1. That they resisted him violently. 2. allowably, 3. that they dethroned him. The first is evident from the text. Firstly, because it is said, they withstood him.— They withstood Uzziah the Ki●●— 2 Chron. 26. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 They are words of violent resistance, signifying to stand against. And for this cause the fourscore Priests are called men of valour 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sons of strength. So the Seventy, and Arius Montanus translate them. It maketh us imagine, they were purposely selected from amongst the rest of the Priests, because of their valour and strength, to withstand Uzziah in sacrificing. Secondly, because they did thrust Uzziah violently out of the Temple— Azariah, the chief Priest, and all the Priests,— thrust him out from thence, Ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifieth to thrust out with violence. They hurried him out of the Temple, as the word importeth. The second is also manifest, because the Lord attended the undertaking of the Priests with miraculous and extraordinary succesfulnesse. They no sooner laid hands on the King, but beyond all expectation, the Lord did put hand in him also. He did back them notably. They no sooner did resist the King, but assoon the Lord from Heaven did strike him with Leprosy. And is it imaginable but the Lord one way or other had plagued them also, if they had failed in their duty to the King? I can see no reason, why he should have spared them in failing in their duty, more than he did not spare Uzziah in failing in his duty. And, which is more the Priests do not groundlessly withstand him. They argue from the King's duty, and from their duty. They tell him in plain terms, It did not become the King, to sacrifice, Num. 18. but the Priests, Ex. 30. Upon these grounds they setto, to withstand him, and keep him back from burning incense. Which insinuat, that their act of resisting him was in no part of his duty, and that which was proper to his kingly charge, but only in maintaining their own liberties, and what according to God's Law, was due to them. Would they say, We will withstand thee, O King, and have reason to do so; because, as thou dost that which is not incumbent to thee, so thou encroachest upon the peculiar liberties of our charge. The third is beyond controversy, though Royalists start much at it. (1.) Because he was cut-off from the house of the Lord. This was because of his Leprosy: for according to the Law, the Leper was cut-off from the Congregation. Thus the Priests spare not to execute the Law upon the King, though Royalists esteem him, to have exemption and immunity therefrom. And Uzziah, the King, was a leper unto the day of his death, and dwelled in a several house, being a leper: for he was cut-off from the house of the Lord, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signify, a solitary house, far from resort and society. Thus Uzziah was separated, so long as he lived, from the society of men. Which is the Law concerning the Leper, Levit. 13. (2.) Because his son was enkinged so soon as Uzziah was separated from the Congregation.— And Jotham his son [was] over the King's house, judging the people of the Land. Ibid. and 2 King. 15. Tell me, is it likely, or can it stand with reason, they would have enkinged the son, the father as yet remaining King? And I pray you, had it not been great madness in them, to retain the kingly power in Uzziah's hand, after he was cut-off from the house of the Lord, because of his leprosy? Firstly, because he was as an excommunicate man. And those who had not interest in the Church, had not interest in the State, the Jewish Church being national. What David doth in reforming the State, is in relation and subordination to the good of the Church. Psa. 101. Secondly, the man being thus cut-off, was as unfit to govern, as either stock or stone. I believe, God appointed not idiots and unfit men to reign. We shall speak nothing here of these examples, whereby is holden-out, not only the lawfulness of resisting, but also of offcutting of Kings, this not being the proper place thereof. We do only here speak of the simple act of Resistance.  
We add to these examples a few reasons. Firstly: These who have power to resist the tyranny of the King, and will not, offering both their bodies & goods to his fury, may very justly be called negative murderers and robbers of themselves. Thus they expose them needlessly to the King's merciless cruelty. Not unlike the man, who being able to preserve both his life, and his goods from the robbers committeth all unto their merciless hands. Who will not say, and that justly, but such an one is a selfmurderer, and self-robber?  
Secondly: It is against very Nature it-self, men having power in their hands, to defend themselves against the unjust violence and rage of the King, and yet to be wanting therein. Either Nature hath conferred upon them such power in vain, or not. You cannot say in vain; unless you reflect upon the Author of Nature, who worketh every thing to good purpose. And Nature, as it is in it-self, is good and perfect. So it is repugnant for it, considered as it is in it-self, to work unsquarely and produce bad effects. 'Tis against the proportion that is between the cause and the effect. Which maketh Aristotle say, God, and Nature ado nothing in vain. De Coel. lib. 1. cap. 5.  
Thirdly: It is a negative betraying of God and his interest. 'Tis a denying to act for God, contrary to the King's will. Sure I am, Christ cannot away with negatives. He putteth them up in the score of enemies, Mat. 12. 'Tis against the practice of the Apostles, not to act for God, against the will of the Ruler. They determine to act for him, whether man will or not: Man without exception. They make no reservation of the King. They resolve, to do God's will, though contrary to man's. Acts 4. and 5. And I believe the King be but a man.  
Inst. It is altogether against that, which Paul saith, Rom. 13. (say Royalists) to resist the King. This is much urged by Salmasius. He concludeth, the Apostles of Christ altogether to have been against the doctrine of Resistance. This he gathereth, not only from the place above cited, but also from Tit. 3. & 1 Pet. 2. Def. Reg. cap. 3.  
Answ. About the place, Rom. 13. Royalists amongst themselves do not agree. Some are so impudent, that they blush not to say, by higher powers are only understood Kings. But the contrary of this is true. 1. Because the kingly power is not the higher power, as if there were no power above it. It is not absolute, but limited, as is already demonstrated 2. The King is not above all the people. One of the best Kings we read of, is but worth some thousands of the people. David, a matchless King, at the most is called worth ten thousand, 2 Sam. 18. So then, though the kingly power, secundum quid, may be called the higher power, yet simpliciter it is not. The power of the people simply and absolutely is the higher power. The author of the Exercitation Conc. usurp. pow. by higher power understandeth no other than lawful and unusurped Magistracy. And this man bringeth some Arguments, but to no purpose to prove this, ch. 5 Which we takeup shortly into these two particulars. 1. Usurped powers are not powers ordained of God. The powers the Apostle speaketh of, have their ordination from God. 2. The powers the Apostle speaketh of may not be resisted under the pain of damnation, and are appointed for the good of people. Usurped powers are not so. This man mistaketh the matter very far. He will do well, carefully to distinguish between the usurped power as it is usurped, and as it is a power. In the first notion it is not of God, but of the Devil. But sure I am, in the second notion, it is of God. As it is a power, it is a real being. But who will deny, that every thing effectively dependeth from God, and is ordained by him? A thing as it is in itself, is good. And so it cannot but be ordained by God, & approved of him. Thus it carrieth along with it God's Image and species. And sure I am, God never hated his own Image in any of his creatures. This is more deep, than half-wit can draw. It is handled by us at length, curs. Philosophico-theol. disp. 8. sect. 29. I wonder if this Gentleman will deny, but Nebuchad. nezzar's power which he had over the Nations was usurped. The best title he had to them, was his sword. And yet the Lord owneth him in his undertake, commissionateth him to undertake, and setteth-up his throne, Jer. 43. What? had he any right over the Jews, but the lawless right of usurpation? Yet Jeremiah many times exhorted them to subject their necks to him, upon loss to themselves, and disobedience to God. And Ezekiel, ch. 17. threatneth them with destruction, because of their denying obedience to him. And I pray you, what better right had Cyrus to the Kingdoms of the Nations, then Nabuchadnezzar? And yet the Lord calleth him, his shepherd and his anointed. He promiseth to concur with him and help him in subduing the Nations. Isa. 44. and 45. Thus it is most evident, that not only usurped powers, as powers, are ordained of God, but also all lawful obedience is due to them. Sure I am, whileas the Apostle wrote this to the Romans, they did live under the greatest of Tyrants. Did not Nero reign then? And yet the Apostle commandeth, to give obedience to such, and calleth their power, an ordinance of God. This man imagineth, that C. Caesar, and all his successors, even unto Nero, had lawful and sufficient calls to govern. I shall not examine this by history, sensibly perceiving the man's weakness, in not adverting to the usurpation of Julius, and Augustus. I pass this, and shortly tell him, such vile Ethnics, as they, had never right to govern, as may be learned from what foregoeth. But to make shorter work, he shall do well to observe, all usurped powers to be, either Kingly, Aristocratick, or Popular. I demand, Whether or not usurped powers taken under such notions, be Ordinances of God? This he cannot deny. Will he say, that the Kingly, or any other lawful power, in abstracto, is not of divine institution? 'Tis bad reasoning, the Kingly power in it-self to be unlawful, because it is in an usurper's hands. Usurpation is accidental, whether to the thing, as King, or to the Kingly power as it is in itself. Tell me, I pray you, what Philosoph will admit a consequence a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 per accidens, ad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 per se? Will any conclude a thing to be evil in it-self, because it is abused? No verily. It is foolishness to say, the skin is not good, because it is itchy. I go forward. And for the other particular, I would have this Gentleman observing with me. 1. Paul prescribeth the duty of the inferior towards the superior. This he presseth by several arguments. 2. He prescribeth the duty of the Magistrate and superior towards the inferior. I confess, more expressly and largely he speaketh of the first, then of the second▪ for as he presseth the duty of the inferior toward the superior, tacitly and by the way he interlaceth the duty of the superior toward the inferior. Now, albeit the Apostle presseth obedience upon the inferior both toward good and bad, tyrannous and non-tyrannous powers and Rulers, yet hath he very great reason for him, to exhort all Rulers and powers, to exercise and administer justice. Albeit it be the duty of the inferior, to give obedience to the usurped and tyrannous power, yet it becomerh the Magistrate not to usurp nor tyrannize. And so the one being incumbent to the inferior, and the other to the superior, the Apostle presseth upon both of them their duty. No question, both of them may, and do fail in their duty; yet it doth become the Apostle to press their duty upon both. And in this that the Apostle saith, the Magistrate is God's minister, appointed by him for the good of the people, in exercising judgement and righteousness: it doth not follow that he only speaketh of lawful and unusurped powers. No verily. But he tacitly herein disclaimeth such powers, and prescribeth what should be the nature and power of Magistrates de jure, and not what it is de facto. And as it is the superiour's jus, to rule in righteousness, so it is the jus of the inferior to give all lawful and due obedience, whether to the usurped, or non-usurped power. So is proved already. The reason that maketh this man so far misconstrue the Apostle's meaning, is to cut-off allegiance from the usurped power, and, as he saith; from the Commonwealth of England, which he is not ashamed to call an usurped power. But he beateth the air. To make short work of this, we demand, Whether or not the people of the Jews did lawfully giveup allegiance to the King of Babylon? If they did lawfully, ergo it is lawful to giveup allegiance to usurped power. Sure I am, Nebuchadnezzar's power over the Jews was mere usurpation. And therefore the Lord threatneth to punish the King of Assyria and destroy his Kingdom, Is. 10. If unlawfully, ergo it was lawful for them, to break the oath of allegiance given to him. But this they could not: for the Prophets threatened them with wrath for the violation thereof. But because this matter is not only most clear in itself, but also we have little or nothing to do with it, therefore we content ourselves with this slender view we have taken of it. We leave this, and come to Salmasius, who is of an higher strain than he. Indeed he pleadeth for subjection and allegiance to the worst of powers. But to take away all that he objecteth, observe these few things concerning the clear meaning and exposition of the place, Rom. 13.  
1. Carefully distinguish between the superior, and inferior. 2. between the power it-self, and the abuse thereof. For the first we say, It is unlawful and not permitted, whether by the Law of God, or the Law of Nature, to the inferior to resist the superior. And as it is not lawful for the inferior to resist the superior, neither is it lawful to resist the superior power, as it is in itself. We find both these in the text. Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers.— The higher or superior, presupposeth lower and inferior. The one is correlat of the other. Thus it is evident, the subjection and nonresistance spoken-of by Paul, Rom. 13. is between the inferior and superior. And withal remark, the Apostle presseth subjection to the power, and nonresistance thereof. He doth not command obedience to the abuse and tyranny of it. We do therefore say, the place maketh nothing against us, but much for us. Though it be not lawful for inferiors to resist superiors. (That cannot be done, unless the inferior intrude himself upon the right of the superior, and usurp that, which he hath not). Yet is it very commendable, for the superior, to resist the inferior. Therefore it is undoubtedly lawful for the people, or their Representative, to resist the King. And that because their power is above his. His power is not absolute admitting no bounds. And consequently, the text speaketh against the resistance made by the King against the people. The people's power is the higher, yea the supreme power. And so subjection and obedience is so much more to be performed thereto. The Apostle commandeth subjection, and nonresistance to any higher power, though but higher secundum quid. His words are indefinite and without exception. Ergo much more to the highest, and the higher power simpliciter. And thus the Apostle to good purpose, exhorteth Christians up and down the Roman Empire, and namely in, and about the City of Rome, to subject their necks to the yoke of the Roman Magistrates. They were indeed inferior to them both in power and dignity. They could not have withstood them, being but an handful, unless they had become self-murderers and usurpers of power, which both God and Nature had denied them. And though it be unlawful to resist the power, as it is in itself, yet it is lawful, as is said already, to withstand the abuse and tyranny thereof. It doth not follow, that Paul commandeth subjection and nonresistance to the tyranny of the power, because he commandeth subjection and nonresistance to the power itself. This is a fallacy ab accident. The abuse of the power is altogether  to the power it-self. And ab extrinseco ad intrinsecum the consequence is vain. Thus these of Tit. 3. and 1 Pet. 2. are to be expounded after the same manner. Verily, if we might not use distinctions here, or in respect of what the Apostles speak concerning Kings; then were it altogether unlawful for us to pray against Kings, because the Apostle commandeth us, 1 Tim. 2. to pray for them. I wonder if these words can be taken without all limitation and restriction. No verily. Otherwise it were unlawful for us, to pray against Popish, Mabumetan, and Paganish Kings. Such side with the Beast, and whom the Lord appointeth to destruction, Rev. 12.17.19. & 20. In many places of Scripture, we read of prayers poured-out against such. Therefore the Apostle's words deserve a distinction, and must be taken in a restricted sense. And if 1 Tim. 2. why not also Rom. 13. the Apostle's words deserve a distinction? And so it is no otherwise lawful for us to pray for them, but as it is lawful to obey them, and subject our necks to their yoke. There is a time when we are necessarily tied to obey them. This is in the time of non-ability to resist. And if it be lawful then to obey them, it is lawful then to pray for them. When the People of God are brought to such a condition, that they are not able to resist wicked Kings, nor shake-off their yoke, there is nothing left them then but prayers and tears. And what is the end of their prayers for them? It is most for their own good and advantage. That we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty. The People of God in the time of weakness and want of power, can do no more but roll their Kings over upon God, and entreat him to do with, and in their Kings, what they cannot perform. But whereas the People of God have power to resist Kings, and shake-off their yoke, no question, as it is lawful to act, so likewise to pray against their proceed. And that ever with a reservation of God's secret decree, for disposing upon their persons according to his pleasure. And whereas he saith, Def. Reg. cap. 6. that, if the power of the People be the higher power, under any kind of Government, it followeth, there is no distinction and difference of Governments. He is not a little mistaken. It is great want of Philosophy that maketh him say so. The power of the people is the groundwork of the power of all Governments. The original and fountain-power is still reserved in the people. And so the kinds of Government, though they be different formally, yet not materially. Democracy is dilatated Aristocracy, and Aristocracy dilatated Monarchy, Aristocracy contracted Democracy, and Monarchy contracted Aristocracy. Thus the three differ not essentially, but accidentally. Even as the hand v. g. is one, whether folded or unifolded.  
Assert. 3. Kingly Government may very lawfully be declined, that one better may be setup in its room.  
This is made good from what is above written.   

SECT. V  
Whether or not doth the Covenant tie us, to preserve Monarchy inviolably.  
IN removing this difficulty, there be two things in the Covenant which we must carefully look to. (1.) Christ's Interest. And this is, 1. 2. 4. 5. 6. Art. (2.) The Interest of King, and Kingdom, Art. 3. In order to these things we give you these Assertions.  
Assert. 1. We are tied by League and Covenant, to maintain and espouse Christ's interest absolutely, notwithstanding any thing may ensue thereupon.  
We shall not need to stand here. It is a matter without all controversy, and denied by none, who profess Christ. This way there must be no rescinding of our Oath though to our own hurt, Psa. 15. He that swareth to [his own] hurt, and changeth not, (still espousing Christ's quarrel) shall abide in the Lord's tabernacle, and shall dwell in his holy hill.  
Assert. 2. By no Oath or Covenant can we be absolutely tied, to espouse the King's interest, and preserve Monarchy inviolably.  
There is very good reason for this. To standby and maintain Kingly power, either it is a duty simply necessary, or not. Simply necessary it cannot be. 1. Because any Civil Government in it-self is lawful. And consequently, as they are in themselves, we may lawfully giveup our allegiance to any of them. But if Monarchy were simply necessary, at no time could we lawfully by Oath bind ourselves, to maintain any other Government: for so we are absolutely and in all respects obliged, to maintain Monarchy and submit our necks thereto. 2. The preservation and maintenance of Monarchy is not necessary to salvation. Who will say, that none can be saved who act against it, and do not maintain it? What? is every Government sinful but it? and do all sin who oppose it? No verily. The contrary is showed already. And if the preservation of, and standing by Monarchy, be not in it-self simply necessary, it is great rashness and unlawfulness, to enter in Oath and Covenant, absolutely to maintain it, notwithstanding all hazards may ensue thereupon. 'Tis to make our duty necessary, where it is not so in it-self. Thus we bind the conscience, where God bindeth not. Whereupon I demand, whether or not are we any otherwise obliged to setto to our duty, but in answerableness thereto and as it is in itself? Sure I am, none will say, but the Oath should be suitable and proportionable to the duty. And if by our Oath we swear either to add to, or diminish from our duty, then are we either supererogatory, or wanting therein. And thus we walk not the right way, but incline either to the right, or the left hand. Whereupon we make our duty will-worship, either freeing the conscience where God freeth not, or binding where God bindeth not. So then, the maintenance and preservation of Monarchy being in it-self a duty not simply necessary, it must needs be granted, that we cannot swear absolutely to maintain it, unless we make our duty will-worship and supererogatory. And that God never required at our hands. Upon this we conclude this argument:  
That duty, which in it-self is not absolutely necessary, we cannot lawfully swear absolutely to setto to it:  
But the maintenance and preservation of Monarchy, is a duty in it-self not absolutely necessary:  
Ergo we cannot lawfully swear absolutely to set to to it.  
The Proposition is manifest, from the proportionableness that should be between the Oath, and the Duty sworn to. The Assumption is no less evident from the proportionableness that ought to be between the duty, and the object of the duty. And if that be not kept entire, then verily there is an inclining either to the right, or to the left hand. And so, we either diminish from, or supererogat to our duty.  
Moreover, it is to swear to an impossibility, to enter in Oath and Covenant, to stand absolutely by Kingly Government. 'Tis a matter very ordinary and possible, that all power be blocked-up from thee, till thou canst not so much as endeavour to maintain it, much less actually stand in defence and preservation thereof. I confess, the People of God, even in the matter of Religion may be brought to this. But deceive not thyself. The People of God cannot swear absolutely, by force and might, not only to endeavour, but also to act for Religion. That is also a vain Oath, and a swearing to impossibilities. How many times have the People of God been brought so low, that their power hath been wholly eclipsed. They can absolutely swear no more, but to employ all power God shall put in their hands, in the defence and preservation of Religion, and never alter nor change their faith, notwithstanding they run the hazard of perishing, goods, lives and fortunes. Tell me, wilt thou say, thou art obliged to swear so in standing by Monarchy? Dost thou imagine, thou art necessarily tied, to stand by Monarchy, as by Religion? Thou canst not change thy faith, nor decline it if it be true, whether before or after thou hast sworn to maintain it, unless thou run the hazard both of sin and condemnation. Thou canst not embrace the contrary faith and Religion without sin. Which draweth-on, as its inevitable consequent, if persevered therein, the wrath and eternal displeasure of the Almighty. But, I pray thee, thinkest thou it damnable to subject thy neck to the yoke of any other Government beside Monarchy? Are not other Governments lawful as well as it? Are not they consubsistent with Religion, and the matter of salvation, no less than it? How darest thou absolutely tie thyself by Oath and Covenant, to stand by one only kind of Government, when-as thou mayest lawfully submit thy neck, and giveup thy allegiance to any kind thereof? Thus thou not only overchargest thy conscience, but also exposest thyself needlessly to hazard. And so much the rather of this, because of all Governments, Monarchy is most dangerous, and least to be wished. Art thou not of all fools the greatest, to swear absolutely to maintain that Government which is least good, though thou mayest obtain that, which of all Governments is the sweetest? The Author of Exerc. con. usurp. pow. cap. 3. mistaketh the matter very far, whileas he saith, We are equally and that same way obliged by League and Covenant, to maintain the King's Person and Authority, as by it we are tied to maintain Religion. The contrary of this is already cleared.—  
Lastly, I deny not, but not only Monarchy in it-self is consistent with Religion, but also secundum quid it is the best of all Governments. Yet if we speak simpliciter, and of the ordinary fruits and Consequences of Kingly Government, the King's interest always cometh in competition with Christ's interest. So is proved invincibly (as we suppose) already. Now wilt thou swear absolutely to maintain that, which absolutely and ordinarily standeth in opposition to Christ and his interest? Thus thou swearest to maintain that, which serveth to over-turn both Church and Commonwealth. And hereby thou preferrest man's interest to God's interest: for so thou exposest both Church and Commonwealth to ordinary and inevitable danger and hazard, in maintaining Kingly Government inviolable. The foresaid Author in the place , endeavoureth to justle us out of this. He taketh much upon trust, but he proveth nothing. He would have us to take it upon his word, that Monarchy is most consubsistent with Religion and the good of the People. We cannot take him in this as an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. We have already upon this concluded more by force of argument, than he either may, or doth speak by word. What? is it any wonder, though he saith so? He is not ashamed to aver against Heaven and experience it-self, That Religion was consubsistent with the preservation and defence of the last King's Person. Let God judge this. O my soul, come not thou into his secret; Unto the Assembly of such, mine honour be not thou united.  

COROLLARY.  
HAving, through the Lord's more than ordinary assistance, discussed these five Questions above-written, it now remaineth to try, what strength is in them, to conclude the Commonwealth of England to be a lawful Government, and not usurped power. And we make it good thus: If the Commonwealth of England be an unlawful & usurped power, then either because the power of the King of England, not only according to the Law of the Kingdom, but also of God, is absolute. And so, without usurpation he can neither be judged, nor his Kingdom taken from him by any, but by God. Or because Monarchy is of all Governments the choicest. And so cannot be altered, nor exchanged with any other Government, unless we go from the better to the worse. And it is rash madness, or sinful rashness, to exchange the best with the worst. Or because Popular Government is least to be desired. Or because it is unlawful, to resist the Royal Person, and decline the Royal Authority. Or lastly, because we are tied, not only by the Oath of Allegiance, but also by solemn League and Covenant, to maintain and preserve Monarchy inviolably. But none of all these you can allege, to bind usurpation upon the Commonwealth of England, as is showed already. Ergo it is a lawful, and not usurped power.    
FINIS.   

Errors to be corrected, thus.  
REad Page 6. line 8. Beros. P. 9 l. ult. carrying-on. P. 10 l. 20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 P. 12. l. 10. tanes. P. 20. l. 35 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. P. 30 l. 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. P. 35. l. 4. Satrapie P. 60. l 24. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. P 64. l. 33. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. P. 65. l. ult hos. P. 67. l. 25. naught. P. 74. l. 17. Gorbomannus. l. ult. censured. P. 75. l. 2. excommunicated and to be punished. l. 3. Eugenius l 10, for Duncanus, read Again usurping he. P. 76. l. 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. P. 79. l. 20. after Steven, r. King. P 85. l: ult. after Inst. r. 5. P. 95. l. 17. Imperator. P. 96. l 24 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. P. 123. l. 30. exclusive. P. 125. l. 32. sect. 1. P 129. l. 32. subsect. 1. P. 132. l. 20. subsection. P. 134 l. 21. before Concl. 6. r. subsect. 1. P. 136. l 21. subsect. 1. P. 144. l. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l. 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. P. 148. l: 22. hath. P. 163. l. 40. & P. 171. l. 35. subsect. 1. P. 174, l. 19 hurled. P. 175. l. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 P. 175. l. 37. do.   

APPENDIX.  
In which the seven Angels sounding, are compared with the seven Angels plaguing, in overturning all Powers and Potentates.  
READER,  
I Have thought it expedient to annex to the foregoing Treatise concerning the Commonwealth of England, a small addition concerning the sounding and plaguing by seven Angels. And that because they do relate to the overthrowing of all Kings and Kingly Powers whatsoever. Whence my purpose in the foregoing Treatise is abundantly enforced and established. That I may the more conveniently give thee my thoughts in order to these Angels, I would have thee in the first place with me to remark, that the Angels sounding are all one with the Angels plaguing. And that not only because they are alike in number, but also one and the same effects are produced by them, though some things are enlarged in speaking of them the one way, which are abbreviated the other. I do therefore conceive these Angels are not distinguished but only in order to different relations and employments. And thus one and the same Angels both proclaim, and execute the wrath of God upon all the enemies of Christ's Interest, and his People. And as for their proclaiming by sounding with trumpets, see Joel 3. v. 9, 10, 11, 12. Of their executing the vials of God's wrath on the enemy and the avenger, see v. 13, 14, etc. of that same chapter. I shall a little glance at that which the holy Ghost intendeth, Rev. 16. And to this end I divide the chapter in these three parts.  
The first is a preface, v. 1. The second is a narration, from v. 2. to v. 18. The third is a peroration, from v. 18. to the close of the Chapter. The first I pass in naming of it. In the second there be these two things considerable (1) a party plaguing, to wit, Angels, the Ministers and executors of God's wrath. And they be in number Seven. Secondly, a party plagued, in number Seven also. The first of which is the Earth, v. 2. Which in Scripture in general is taken two ways, (1) Relatively, i. e. as it is joined with some other words to make up the sense of it. I have nothing to do with it as it is thus taken. (2) Absolutely. Thus it is taken three ways. (1) for one of the four Elements, Gen. 1.1. (2) As it is contradistinguished from Zion, standing in opposition thereto, Isa. 60.2. compared with ver. 1. and chap. 58. v. 14. And thus it can be no other but Babylon, or a People walking in a Babylonish state: for upon a Scripture account, Babylon directly, immediately, and diametrally opposeth Zion, as from many and sundry places is evident. (3) For the assistants of the Church, Rev. 12.16. In this Rev. 16.2. the Earth cannot be understood to be one of the four Elements. Sense and Reason will teach us so much that this noisome and grievous sore, Rev. 16.2. expounded to be hail and fire mingled with blood, Rev. 8.7. cannot properly be called the punishment or plague of the Earth, one of the four Elements. It is then to be taken mystically, for the assistants of the Church; not only because they will rather be preserved then plagued, in contributing their help to the Saints, (the Kenite escapeth when Amalek perisheth, because of his kindness to Israel in his coming up from Egypt) but also they have rather upon them the mark of the Woman then of the Beast. Now the Earth spoken of in the foresaid place, is expounded to be men who worship the image of the Beast, having his mark upon them, who cannot be the opposers, but the worshippers thereof; and therefore must needs be such as be in and of Babylon, which must fall; the vials of the wrath of God being poured forth upon her, Isa. 21.9. Rev. 11. v. 13. chap. 14.8. chap. 18 v. 3.  
The second party plagued is the Sea; which is taken in general two ways. (1) comparatively, Isa. 57.20. (2) absolutely. And that these five or six ways. (1) For the navigable and salted water, Exod. 14.2. (2) For the brazen and molten sea, in which the Priest did wash, 2 Chron. 4.6. (3) For traffic, Jer. 51.36. (4) For the powers of the Nations, Isa. 60.5. Jer. 51.42. (5) For the glassie-Sea in the new Jerusalem. Rev. 4.6. No man will understand the Sea spoken of, Rev. 16.3. as relating either to the Sea under the Law, or to that which is navigable: for as the one was long before the out-powring of the second vial, so the other (to speak properly) is uncapable of being plagued. Moreover, it is very unheard-of, that the navigable Sea should be turned into blood, the third part of the living creatures in it should die, etc. as be competent to the Sea, spoken of Rev. 16.3. compared with chap. 8.8.9. Neither can it be understood comparatively, because here it is taken absolutely. And none will say that it is the Glassy Sea in the new Jerusalem. On such the vials of God's wrath will never be poured. It therefore remaineth to say, that God in powring-out the vial upon the Sea, destroyeth the Forces of the Nations, and blocketh-up all their trading and traffic, which he doth by casting a mountain burning with fire into the Sea, Rev. 8.8. that is, by stretching-out his hand upon the destroying mountain Babylon, rolling her down from the rocks and making her a  mountain. Jer. 51.2, 5. The fall of Babylon is upon the powers of the Nations, and her fall making them to fall: for the powers and forces of the Nations be one of the pillars of the Babylonish-state, the Armies of the Earth siding with the Beast and False-Prophet, Rev. 19.10. against the Ancient of days and his Armies, v. 11, 12. So that the fall of Babylon can not otherwise be accomplished and brought to pass, but as it bringeth along with it the ruin and the overthrow of the Forces of the Nations, Hag. 2.22. compared with Rev. 19.20, 21. Thus the fall of Babylon shall be upon the Forces of the Nations, in so far as their overthrow is begotten as its ruin is intended and accomplished.  
The third party plagued is the Waters, and fountains of waters, Rev. 16.4. I do find waters these several ways taken in the Scriptures. (1) for one of the four Elements, Gen. 1.6. (2) for a calm and spiritual state, Psa. 23.2. (3) for crosses and afflictions, Psa. 69.1, 2. (4) for the vengeance and judgement of God, Psa 73.10. (5) for the graces and Spirit of God, Isa. 55.1. compared with Job. 4.14. and 7.38, 39 (6) for the Nations, as also their Head and Glory, Isa. 8.7. Rev. 17.15. Moreover, fountains of waters are taken diversely in the Scriptures, (1) for the heads & springs of the elementary and physical waters, Gen. 7.11. (2) for goods and possessions, Pro. 5.16. (3) for the springs of spiritual graces, Isa. 41.18. Rev. 7.17. Beside, I do find the word as it is taken in the singular number more variously understood then as it is taken in the plural, viz. for the spring of physical waters, Gen. 16.7. a woman's fountain, Levit. 20.18. possession and habitation, Deut. 33.28. God himself, Jer. 2.13. the Law of the wise, Pro. 13.14. the fear of the Lord, Prov. 14.27. the Church of Christ, Cant. 4.12.15. spoken of the eye of man, Jer. 9.1. In this place by waters must needs be understood the Nations; and by the fountains of waters, the glory of the same. Sure I am, no man in reason will say, That the plaguing of the elementary waters, of spiritual graces, spiritual quietness, afflictions and judgement, or any such like thing is intended in the out-pouring of the third vial. No verily, but the ruin and desolation of the Nations, together with the head and glory thereof. And that because the Nations and great ones of the Earth be two main pillars by which Babylon is underpropped: for as the Whore doth sit upon the Nations, Rev. 17.1.15. so the great men of the Earth bewail her desolation, Rev. 18.9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19.23. yea, and side with her as she engageth against the Saints of the Most High, Rev. 19.19. A great Star from Heaven burning as a Lamp shall fall upon the waters and their fountains, Rev. 8.10. by which the waters shall be enbittered as with wormwood, v. 11. so that many of them shall die, being turned into blood and made bitter, Rev. 8.11. compared with chap. 17.4. Which waters, and fountains thereof, be the very destroyers and persecutors of the Saints, Rev. 16.6. expounded to be Babylon, and such as side with her, Rev. 18.24. Behold how the Lord in overthrowing Babylon maketh its King and Lucifer (Isa. 14.4. compared with v. 12.) to fall from his throne and dignity. Whose fall seizeth upon the Nations, and the great ones of the Earth, by which they are enbittered and enraged, making die, and made to die. And that because the ruin of Babylon is attended and accomplished with the fall of the Nations, Rev. 16.19. and overthrow of Kings, Rev. 19.20, 21. the Lord of hosts staining the pride of all glory, and bringing into contempt all the honourable of the Earth, Isa. 23.9. Whereupon the heathen shall rage's, and the people imagine a vain thing, the Kings of the Earth shall set themselves, and the Rulers take counsel together, against the Lord and against his anointed, Psa. 2.1, 2. So that as they shall be enbittered, making many die, many men dying of the waters, because of their bitterness; so they themselves shall be destroyed, the waters and fountains thereof turning into blood. And thus the three main props of Babylon shall be quite overturned, viz. the forces of the Nations, their heads, and the Nations themselves, the Lord overturning, overturning, overturning, Babylon, that it be no more, until he come whose right it is, the Lord giving unto his Son the Diadem and the Crown, Ezek. 21.26, 27. anointing him King on his holy Hill, Zion, laying the Government on his shoulders in the day of his Personal Appearance. And thus there is an overturn for every pillar of Babylon.  
The fourth party plagued is the Sun, Rev. 16.8. which in Scripture is taken these several ways, (1) for the physical and visible Sun, Gen. 15.12. (2) God himself, Psa. 84.11. (3) Christ, Cant. 1.6. Mal. 4.2. (4) by way of comparison, it is taken for the Church, Cant. 6.10. (5) the chief, though transformed, light, or the Lucifer of an Antichristian and Babylonish state, Isa. 13.10. compared with chap. 14.12. Jer. 15.9. Ezek. 32.7. Joel 2.10. & 31. chap. 3.15. Amos 8.9. Mic. 3.6. Matth. 24.29. Mark 13.24. Acts 2.20. Rev. 6.12. (6) a main and chief light of the Church of God, Isa. 30.26. No man in reason will say, that in the out-powring of the fourth vial, is understood the plaguing of God, of Christ, (which to aver is blasphemy) or any such like thing; but the darkening the Lucifer of Babylon, or the main pretended light of the antichristian state with spiritual darkness. So that all the transformed and pretended lights of the Babylonish state shall be in a great part thereof smitten with darkness, Rev. 8.12. having their understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God, through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart, Ephes. 4.18. God sending them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie, 2 Thess. 2.11.  
The fifth party plagued is the Seat of the Beast, Rev. 16.10. i e. his power and authority which shall be smitten with great darkness, his kingdom being full thereof, Rev. 16.10. compared with chap. 13.2. A smoke rising out of the pit, as the smoke of a great furnace, by which the Sun and Air are darkened at the sounding of the fifth Angel, whileas a star falleth from Heaven on the Earth, Rev. 9.1, 2. whence Babylon is overthrown by violence and darkness, the day of the Lord upon it being a day of wastness and desolation, a day of darkness and gloominess, a day of clouds and thick darkness, Zeph. 1.15. Shall not the day of the Lord be darkness, and not light, even very dark and no brightness in it? Amos 5.20. And thus with a whirlwind of violence, and a cloud of darkness the Lord cometh up from the North, Ezek. 1.4. to lay Babylon with all her glory in the dust: for as by violence the powers of Babylon are overthrown, so by darkness they are hardened in heart, contemning the truth, blaspheming God, and not repenting of their deeds, Rev. 16.9, 10, 11. So that the greater violence is executed against them, the more obstinate in wickedness they become, blaspheming God, his People, and Interest, Rev. 16.21. Pharaoh-like, the more plagued the more hardened. As appeareth in some measure at this very hour among the enemies of Zion's Interest. The more to day the Egyptians are plagued, the more blasphemously do they reproach and are hardened in heart.  
The sixth party plagued is the River Euphrates, Rev. 16.12. Concerning which there be these things considerable. (1) The up-drying of it. Which cannot be understood mystically, seeing in no place of Scripture the word Euphrates is taken in a mystical sense. It is read twenty times only in the Scriptures, and no where is it taken mystically, but literally, as is more than evident to any that shall inquire after it. We must needs therefore say, that the River Euphrates shall be dried up, the Lord with his mighty wind shaking his hand over it, smiting it in the seven streams, and making men to go over it dryshod, Isa. 11.15. (2) The end for which it is dried-up. Which is to prepare a way for those Kings that come up from the East or the rising of the Sun, Rev. 16.12. And thus there shall be an high way for the remnant of his people, which shall be left from Assyria, like as it was to Israel in the day that he came up from the Land of Egypt, Isa. 11.16. Whence the Lord setting his hand again the second time to recover the remnant of his people Israel from Assyria, and from Egypt, Isa. 11.11. shall miraculously deliver them as he did whileas he set his hand the first time in bringing them up from Egypt by the conduct of Moses: for as at the first time he dried-up the Red-sea before them, so at the second time of their recovery he will utterly destroy the tongue of the Egyptian-sea, and dry up the River Euphrates before them, smiting it in its seven streams, that they may go over it dryshod. Now upon what account the people of the Jews are called the Kings of the East, you may read for this, The Saint's Kingdom, sect. 7. (3) The engagement the people of the Jews come to, as they come up from the East. Then do the unclean spirits like Frogs, draw forth the Kings of the Earth with their Armies to a day of engagement against the Kings of the East. The Paganish, Mabumetan and Antichristian spirits, Frog-like indeed, shall engage all the Heathenish and Mahometan powers against the four Angels, which are bound in the great River Euphrates, prepared for a day, a month, and a year, for to slay the third part of men, the number of the Army of the Horsemen being two hundred thousand thousand, Rev. 9.14, 15, 16. And thus at this day of engagement. Babylon, the powers of the Nations, with all their Potentates and glory, shall be overthrown: for in that time when the Lord shall bring again the captivity of Judah and Jerusalem, (gathering all Nations, bringing them into the valley of Jehoshaphat, to plead with them there, causing his Mighty-Ones, the Kings of the East, the hundred thousand thousand to come down upon them, putting in his sickle, the harvest being now ripe, Joel, 3.1, 2, 12, 13.) The Winepress shall be trodden without the City, till blood come out, even to the Horse-bridles, by the space of a thousand and six hundred furlongs, Rev. 14.20. Thus Gog and Magog, the Beast, the false-Prophet, the Kings of the Earth, and their Armies shall be destroyed in engaging against him who sitteth on the white horse, attended with the Armies in Heaven, Ezek. 39 8, 9 etc. Rev. 19.11, 12 etc. (4) the time of this up-drying and engagement. Which is secret and unknown. It is a time and season which the Father hath put in his own power, Acts 1.7. 'Tis not for us to know the time when the Kingdom shall be restored again to Israel. It cometh as a thief in the night, Rev. 16.15. and therefore both secretly and suddenly. Let us therefore watch, and keep our garments, lest we walk naked, and they see our shame.  
The seventh party plagued is the Air, Rev. 16.17. Which in Scripture is taken three ways, (1) for one of the four Elements, Gen. 1.26. (2) as it signifieth that which is done in vain and to no purpose, 1 Cor. 9.26. chap. 14.9. (3) for the power of Satan, Eph. 2.2. whose power is airy indeed, because of its subtlety and vanity. And thus as the Lord poureth-out the vial of his wrath upon the power of the Beast, so doth he likewise upon the power of the Dragon; for as in the day of vengeance, in the reign of the Ancient of days, whileas Christ reigneth in power, the seat and power of the Beast is overthrown by the up-coming of the Kings of the East; so in the time of Christ's Personal presence and reign Satan is chained and bound a thousand years, that he may deceive the Nations no more till the thousand years be finished, Rev. 20.2, 3. And this is whileas a great voice cometh-out of Heaven from the Throne, saying, it is done, Rev. 16.17. the Mystery of God being finished, and time being no longer, in the days of the voice of the seventh Angel, Rev. 10.6, 7. at whose sounding there be great voices in Heaven saying, The Kingdoms of this world are become the Kingdoms of our Lord, and of his Christ, and be shall reign for ever and ever, Rev. 11.15.  
In the third and last part of the Chapter (of which I shall speak but a little) the holy Ghost recapitulateth and summeth-up in few words all that he hath spoken at length in the second part of the Chapter, in order to the fall and ruin of Babylon, from vers. 18. to the close. In vers. 18. is spoken as to the shaking of Babylon, by wars, and rumours of wars, Nation rising against Nation, and Kingdom against Kingdom, there being tumults and earthquakes in divers places. In vers. 19 is spoken of the dividing of Babylon (after its shaking) into three parts: Of the fall of the Nations, and of Babylon's utter overthrow and desolation, as it is designed, in laying the Nations desolate. In vers. 20. is foretold the overthrow of the Forces, Power and Glory of the Nations, in bringing into contempt all the Honourable of the Earth. In vers. 21. is spoken, as to the grievousness of the plagues by which Babylon shall be shaken divided, and overturned, the Nations, their Forces, and their mighty Ones shall be destroyed, together with men's blaspheming God, his Truth, and his People, thereupon the more plagued, being the more hardened, as at this time in some measure doth appear.  
FINIS.