THE POSITION OF JOHN PRESTON, Doctor in DIVINITY, SOMETIMES MR OF EMANUEL college IN CAMBRIDGE, And Preacher at Lincolns-Inn; Concerning the irresistibleness of CONVERTING GRACE. LONDON, Printed by J. G. for Nath: Webb, and Will: Grantham at the sign of the Bear in S. Paul's churchyard near the little North door. 1654. An exact Catalogue of all the works of Dr. John Preston, sometime Master of Emanuel Col. in CAMBRIDGE. 1st. Vol. in 4o. I. THe New Covenant, in 14. Sermons, on Gen. 17. 1, 2. unto which is added four Sermons on Eccles. 1. 2. 11, 12. II. The Saints daily Exercise; Or, A Treatise of Prayer, on 1 Thes. 5. 17. III. Five Sermons preached before K. James. 1. The Pillar and Ground of Truth, on 1 Tim. 3. 15. 2. The New Life. 1 John 5. 12. 3. A Sensible Demonstration of the Deity, on Isa. 64. 4. 4. Exact walking, on Eph. 5. 15. 5. Samuel's Support of sorrowful Sinners, on 1 Sam. 12. 20. 21. 22. IV. The breastplate of Faith and Love, eighteen Serm. on three several Texts, viz. Rev. 1. 17. 1 Thes. 1. 3. Gal. 5. 6. 2. Vol. in 4o. V. Four godly and learned Treatises. 1. A Remedy against covetousness, on Col. 3. 5. 2. An Elegant description of spiritual Death and Life, on John 5. 25. 3. The Doctrine of self-denial, on Luke 9 23. 4. Of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, on 1 John 5. 14. VI. Sins Overthrow, a Treatise of Mortification, on Col. 3. 5. A liveless Life; or, man's spiritual Death in sin, on Eph. 2. 1, 2, 3. with a Sermon on Gen. 22. 45. 3d. Vol. in 4o. VII. The saint's Qualification; or, a Treatise 1. Of Humiliation, ten Sermons, the first nine on Rom. 1. 18. the tenth preached before the Commons House of Parliament, on Numb. 25. 10, 11. 2. Of Sanctification, nine Serm. on 2 Corin. 5. 17. 3. The Cup of Blessing, in three Serm. on 1 Cor. 10. 16. VIII. The Doctrine of the Saints infirmities, 2 Chrch. 30. 18, 19, 20. Ix.. Remaines, in three Treatises. 1. Judas' Repentance, on Mat. 27. 3, 4. 5. 2. The Saints Spiritual Strength, on Eph. 3. 16. 3. Paul's Conversion, on Acts 9 6. X The fullness of Christ for us, a Serm, before K. James, on John 1. 16. 4th. Vol. in 4o. XI. Life eternal, a Treatise of the knowledge of the Divine Essence and Attributes, in eighteen Sermons, the four first on Heb. 11. 6. the fifth on Isaiah 46. 9 the other thirteen on Exod. 3. 13, 14, 15. XII. 1. The Golden sceptre, on 2 Chron. 7. 14. 2. The church's Marriage, on Ephes. 5. 32. 3. The church's Carriage, on Ephes. 5. 22, 23, 24. XIII. Of the Divine Love of Christ, five Sermons on 1 Cor. 16. 22. XIV. The Christians freedom, on Rom. 6. 14. The Deformed form of a formal Profession, on 2 Tim. 3. 5. The Saints Submission in 12o. Prayers in 24o. The Position of Dr. Preston, Master of Emanuel college in Cambridge, Concerning the irresistibleness of Converting Grace. IT is often professed by Arminius, that he attributes as much unto Grace as ever any other, that there is nothing said by others concerning the efficacy of Grace, which is not also affirmed by himself; yea, that he acknowledges whatsoever that be thought or imagined for the opening and setting forth of the power of Grace, and that therefore he is misreported by those that render him injurious to the grace of God, and one that attributes too much to freewill. You will find in Augustine, that Pelagius professes as much concerning himself. And yet in the mean time, This is true, that, if Arminius his opinion stand good, all this Efficacy of Grace, which he so much magnifies and amplifies in words, depends on the will of man, in regard that by virtue of its native liberty, it may receive or reject this grace, use it or not use it, render it effectual or vain. Neither can it be otherwise, unless we abolish the liberty of the Will, and destroy those properties, which are inseparable from the Nature of it. Lest that any should suspect that I fasten upon him an opinion, which is not his, let his words be read, which may be found in a Treatise entitled Decl. sent. Arm. pag. 181. and they are these, Grace (saith Arm.) is so described in Scripture, as that it may be resisted, received in vain, that man may hinder his assent unto it, deny to cooperate with it, and therefore an irresistible power, and working, is not to be attributed unto Grace. Now, if Arminius in these words do not pull down what he seemed to build in the former, let others judge. I know the Arminians cavil about the word Irresistible, used by Calvin, and other of our Divines, and cry out, That by this opinion of ours, men are turned into stocks, acting not at all in the work of Conversion, but, as stones, are acted and moved by another; yea, that men do not believe, but God in man repents and believes. But you shall easily see how falsely these things are charged upon us, and how truly we say that Arminius derogates more from the grace of God, than the Jesuits; If you will give me leave faithfully to set down their opinions, and briefly to compare them together: For in these four things shall my Discourse consist. First, I will repeat the Opinion of our Adversaries. 2. I will explain our own Opinion. 3. I will add Reasons for the confirmation of our Opinion. 4. I will answer the Objections, at least, one or two of the chief of them, whereby our opinion is opposed. As to the first, Some Jesuites affirm, That Sufficient grace, as to means is given to all, even to Reprobates; but effectual grace, which shall certainly and infallibly attain its end, is given only to the Elect. If we ask wherein they place the efficacy of this Grace; they answer, Not in a physical determination of the Will, but in a moral persuasion, and that not of any kind, but congruous (as they call it) that is a persuasion offered with such circumstances of Place, Person, and Time, as to which, God (who from everlasting knows all the inclinations of the Will) foresees the will shall certainly and infallibly yield unto. They distinguish therefore between Sufficient and effectual grace, that is, those whom God hath chosen unto life, by virtue of that absolute Decree he intends to offer unto them, not only sufficient persuasion, but at a fit time, when he knows that the person so called, will undoubtedly obey the call of God: but those whom he hath not chosen, to them also he offers persuasion sufficient, but not at a time so fit, and when he certainly foresees that they will not obey the divine calling. From whence we gather, that this is the opinion of the Jesuites. 1. That effectual vocation doth follow, and not precede the decree of election, and consequently, that the decree is absolute, not conditional. 2. That the same and equal grace is not granted to the converted and unconverted; but that which is given to the elect is always more effectual, although not in respect of it self, yet in respect of the suitableness, which it hath unto the will of the man to be converted. 3. That all to be converted, shall be certainly and infallibly converted, and that only by the power of Converting Grace; but others certainly also, and infallibly, shall not be converted, not only because they will not, but in regard of the defect of congruity in the grace offered. Which Grace, although as to the substance of it (as they say) is sufficient, so that by the help of it men might be converted (if they would) yet as to the circumstances it is not sufficient, because it is not offered at a suitable time. For thus Suarez: moral persuasion, though abundant, is not sufficient. A physical or real determination is too much, for it taketh away liberty, but the whole efficacy of grace consists in a Certainty, Congruity, or Conveniency. But the Arminians, although they seem to assert, that the beginning, progress, and perfection of every good work, is to be attributed unto Grace, so that no man (without preventing, accompanying, and following Grace) is able to think, will, or act any thing that is good: yet when they plead, that all this is done after a manner resistible, so as to leave it in the power of the Will, to use or not to use that grace unto conversion. It is apparent, that they do only in pretence, and not heartily and really attribute these things unto grace. This will easily appear by a distinct opening of the opinion of the Arminians. 1. First they grant, That the Understanding is irresistibly illuminated by Divine Grace. 2. That the Affections also are excited and renewed by the same Grace irresistibly. 3. That the Will is also so stirred up by assisting Grace, that it is now disintangled, whereas before it was encumbered; now freed, whereas it was before bound; now awakened, whereas before it was asleep. But that the Will is renewed, and by a real operation inclined unto good, by God; or that any quality, or habit of holiness is infused into the Will, by virtue of which it is inclined more to good works than to evil, the Arminians utterly deny. Because, that if any of this were granted, the natural liberty of the Will (as they suppose) were destroyed; unto which liberty they hold it essential that the Will be free to act, or not to act, when all things required unto its acting are in being. Let their very words be seen, The Confer▪ at Hague, pag. 298. Into the mind (say they) is infused a habit of knowledge, into the Affections holiness is infused, as Hope, or fear, &c. But such an infusion cannot be made into the Will, because of its nature, freedom to will good or evil. Hence (as they say) First there is a moral persuasion stirred up in the Understanding, but by the help of Preventing Grace: Secondly, To this persuasion the Will may assent, but by the help of Concomitant Grace: And thirdly, This assent may be produced into act, but by virtue of Subsequent Grace. But to all this they diligently annex this caution, although the Will can do none of these things without the help of Grace, yet it is in the power of the Will to resist this Grace, to put it by, to neglect it or cast it away, if it please. Neither can it be otherwise, if the natural properties of the Will be preserved. Thus is the state of the question explained by Joannes Arnoldus, against Bogerman, p. 263. allowing all those which God useth in working our conversion; yet conversion itself doth so far remain in our power, that we may not be converted. This opinion being asserted, the Arminians are constrained to defend these Positions more false than those of the Jesuits. 1. They defend a conditional Decree grounded on the prescience of Faith, for if the Will, supposing all the actions of God toward it, may convert or not, believe or not; it is necessary that God first foresee who will believe, and who not, before he can choose some to life, and appoint others to wrath. But the Jesuits hold the Decree to be absolute, and Faith to be an effect or fruit following thereupon. 2. The Jesuits grant that more grace, as to the manner of dispensing it, is bestowed upon those who are converted, than upon those who are not. The Arminians contrariwise, that more grace (as to the manner) is often conferred upon the unconverted than the converted. 3. Hence also the Arminians do ordinarily cast the principle of Conversion in part, upon the will of man (whatsoever they profess in words to the contrary) whereas the Jesuits attribute it wholly to the good pleasure and will of God. 4. Hence also the Arminians hold, That converting and quickening Grace is not peculiar to converted and chosen Ones, but to be common also unto others. But the Jesuits confess, That congruous or suitable vocation (in which they place the efficacy of Grace) is peculiar unto the Elect. 5. The Jesuits judge, That all those, whom the Holy-Ghost intended to convert, are certainly and infallibly converted. The Arminians utterly deny it; whence they are commonly bold to say, That the Holy-Ghost may be resisted, even than when it works upon a man with intention of his conversion. These things being premised, I will now briefly lay down what our opinion is: But that our judgement may be throughly understood; we must know that the conversion of a man is perfected in these four degrees: 1. God infuseth into the whole soul, and so into the Will, a habit or quality of holiness, renewing it, and making it, of evil good, of unwilling willing; by which means, that which belongs to the nature of the Will, is preserved entire, but that which was corrupt is rectified. 2. From this quality so infused, presently there arise in the Will, certain imperfect inclinations, preventing the notice of reason, like unto those which the schoolmen call the very first Motions of the heart: For by these the will doth not completely, and effectually will that which is good, but is only initially, and incompleatly inclined to those good works which please God, from whence such acts may be called, not so much willings, as wishings and wouldings. 3. Those inclinations are presented as an object to the understanding, which weighs them, debates them, takes counsel about them; and at length, when it hath by its ultimate, and conclusive dictates, confirmed them, propounds them to the will as to be chosen. 4. After those initial inclinations, arising from infused Grace, have passed the censure of the understanding, and are allowed by the preceding judgement thereof; then at length doth the Will put forth a complete and effectual willingness, from which conversion immediately doth follow, or rather that very willing is the conversion of a man unto God. In these four things is the conversion of man accomplished: 1. Here first the reception of the habit of Grace infused is indeed irresistible, but neither free nor voluntary, for the Will is merely passive in the receiving, and therefore exercises not its freedom. 2. Secondly, The inclination arising or flowing from Grace is irresistible, for it proceeds from the Will, formed and endued with Grace, not in a moral, but physical way: that is, not in a way of persuasion, but real operation: But it is voluntary, for it is produced by the Will in an active way; yet it is not free, because one of the requisites to freedom, which is the foregoing judgement of the understanding, is yet wanting. 3. Thirdly, The judgement of the understanding, concerning this initial and imperfect Inclination, is irresistible, For the understanding being enlightened by Divine Grace, doth irresistibly and infallibly approve this Inclination, and it is so far free as the Understanding is capable of freedom. 4. Fourthly, When the Understanding hath put forth its last and conclusive dictate, than the Will (as I said) puts forth a complete and executive willing, which is actual Conversion unto God: And this Willing is both irresistible and free, and so Conversion itself is both free and irresistible. 1. It is irreresistible, because it necessarily follows the real Inclination of the Will preceding, and the last dictate of the Understanding approving and confirming it. It is also most properly free, for it hath those things which are required unto liberty, seeing the Will therein is not passive, but active. 2. It is not brought forth, but in the way of moral persuasion, that is, not without the preceding judgement of the understanding, weighing on each part what is best to be done; for every active and complete Willing, which hath had such a deliberation and determination of the Understanding, concerning an object offered, going before it, must be called truly and properly free. And for that definition of freedom whereby that is said to be free, which supposing all things requisite to action, may either act or not; t is a definition settled only in the brains of the Jesuits; and neither hath foundation among the Fathers, nor the ancient Philosophers, nor yet among the more ancient schoolmen, whom yet Suarez endeadeavours to wrest to the maintenance of his opinion. So have you our opinion; according to which, a man is converted irresistibly, and yet freely, which that you may yet more fully understand, these axioms follow from it, which are contrary to those of the Jesuites and Arminians. 1. We do not say, that freewill, or the faculty of the Will, as to spiritual things, is half alive and half dead, as the Arminians would have it, Confer. Hag. p. 300. or that it is like the power of moving in one who is bound in fetters; or as the faculty of seeing in one who is shut up in a dark place, as the Papists say: But we hold, That the faculty of the Will, as it respects a truly spiritual good, is wholly extinct, as the power of life in a dead man of motion in a slain man, of sight in him whose eyes are put out. 2. They also defend, That the Will is only stirred up by moral or assisting Grace, knocking at the door of it, and admonishing it, not that it is changed by habitual Grace, healing and renewing it: For these are their words, There is no reason why moral Grace, that is morally persuading, may not make a natural man spiritual. But we suppose, that the will is quickened and renewed by the infusion of habitual Grace, that is of a new quality imprinted on the Will, which is as an inward principle enlivening and changing the Will, from whence all good inclinations and operations do proceed. 3. They hold, That the Will is otherwise concerned in Conversion, than in an active way, We maintain, that the Will in the first act of Conversion is partly passive, and partly active, that is, first Passive, then Active, and so it worketh together with God, not partly by a natural ability, and partly by a supernatural strength, received from grace, passing by, but by virtue of a power wholly supernatural, which is conferred by infused and quickening grace, according to that of Augustine, To will, is of ourselves, but to will well, both partly and wholly, is of grace. 4. The Arminians think, That the quickening grace of the Spirit, and whatsoever else on God's part is required to the conversion of a man, is communicated as well to the Reprobate, as to the Elect, and that with intention of their salvation, otherwise God should deal deceitfully and hypocritically with them when he offers the Word unto them. Let their own words be read, Coll. Hag. p. 308. But we hold, That the quickening grace of God, which is fit for the healing and renewing of the Will, is peculiar to the Elect, and is imparted to them by virtue of the divine Decree, to the end they might be saved: But 'tis denied to others, and that our God hath not determined to save them 5. They say, That the Will stirred up by quickening grace, may act or not act, turn to God or not; but otherwise it were not free: for they hold liberty to stand in this, That granting all things required, or all the actings of God, the Will may act or not, whence is that of Corvinus against Tilenus, pag. 337. Grace doth not so furnish the Will with strength, but that it always remains in the power of the Will to use it or not use it. We, on the contrary, say, That the will cannot resist or withstand the real motion proceeding from Grace, nor the divine persuasion offered to it by an enlightened understanding, but doth necessarily follow the guidance of God, according to that of S. Augustine, freewill cannot resist God in the work of salvation. 6. They say, That the Will excited by Grace doth properly work together with God, is a coordinate joint-cause, a partial Concomitant-cause, and hath such an influence into the effect, that if it be withheld, the effect in no wise can follow. We, on the contrary, say, That the Will, indeed, doth cooperate, but as a cause every way subordinate and wholly subject to the dominion of God as the principal agent, insomuch that it cannot properly be called a coworker; but rather it acts as it is acted, move as it is moved, and being first turned into God, it turns itself unto God. 7. They deferred, That God cannot convert us in an irresistible way, unless we be turned into stocks and blocks, and so being driven with a continual motion, we act nothing, but God all in us. On the other side, we say, that stocks and stones have no power to act, being acted; but that men are free Agents, and therefore have a power by virtue of which they act, being acted by God, and therefore may be said truly to act, and turn themselves; for the will being changed from evil unto good, and of unwilling made willing, hath in itself an inward principle of willing well; from whence the dominion of its own act, whereby it turns unto God, may properly be given unto it; for although the grace of God is the principle by which, yet the will of man is the principle which worketh all. In like manner, although God be the first and total efficient cause of conversion, yet the Will is the next efficient cause, and total also in the kind of second causes; therefore, as the effects are wont to be attributed unto second and created causes, although they act by virtue of the first cause, so conversion is most properly to be attributed unto the Will, although it act wholly in the strength of God and converting Grace. 8. Lastly, They deny, That the unresistibleness of divine Grace, and the liberty of man's Will, can stand together. But we say, That Conversion is irresistible, and yet free. But we distinguish concerning the irresistibleness of Grace. 1. There is one kind of irresistibleness, whereby regenerating Grace infused from God, is received by the Will; and this irresistibleness of reception, we confess, cannot stand with liberty 2. There is another kind, whereby the inclination putting on to spiritual good doth flow from, after a physical or real manner, from the Will fashioned by Grace: and this motion (we say) comes from the Will irresistibly and voluntarily, but not freely. 3. There is an irresistibleness, whereby the Will assents unto this physical motion proceeding from Grace, as also to the persuasion of the Understanding, approving of it, and that necessarily or certainly: And this kind of irresistibleness, we say, may very well stand with Liberty, because it comprehends in itself those two things in which Liberty stands. 1. That the Will in putting forth this last act of willing, is active, and not passive. 2. Because the moral persuasion, or judgement of the Understanding, thinking that the conversion propounded, that is, either the taking or refusing the object offered, is in the power of man, hath gone before. For we hold, That whatsoever is done in the act of Conversion, either by a mere Reception, or by a physical (or powerful) Determination, is not free. But that every willing is only so far free as it is produced in an active way, and flows from a reasonable persuasion; and that upon this ground, that reason lies indifferent to things opposite, that is, Reason only is the root and foundation of all Liberty; from whence it follows, that every act of the Will, into which Reason hath its influence, is most free. You see now what our opinion is, which we have been the longer in opening, because the explication of it is its chief confirmation, and the confutation of the contrary. Besides, it is a very difficult thing to express what the Arminians hold in this dispute, because they cover and wrap up their opinion in so doubtful and specious words. There yet remain the Arguments, by which our opinion is so to be confirmed, which I shall be brief in: Two things are to be proved: 1. That qualities or habits may be infused into the Will, which they deny, because they suppose, that such an infusion doth utterly destroy and take away the nature and liberty of the Will. 2. That this habitual and quickening Grace, being thus infused, we are converted by God in a certain way, and by us irresistible. Arg. I That there is such an infusion of Grace renewing and healing the Will, inclining and determining it to one of the two opposites in the act of Conversion, appears by this, That all Divines hold, that there is in the Will an habitual aversion from God, and an habitual turning to sensible and carnal things: But this habitual corruption of nature cannot be healed by the sole help of Grace, merely exciting: For, as corporal, so spiritual diseases are not cured, but by contraries; and therefore habitual corruption cannot be changed but by an habitual quality, imprinted on the Will. Prosp. therefore saith right, The inward sense is not opened to do spiritual things, until the foundation of Faith, and fervour of Love is planted in the Heart. 2. Unless it be granted, That such an habitual Grace is infused into the Will, by which it is inclined to good after a physical manner; there will be found no formal principle in man, from whence good acts may be produced: for as in corporal things no man fees, unless he first have eyes; nor hears, unless he hath ears: so in spiritual things, no man sees unless God hath first given him eyes to see; nor hears, unless he hath given him ears to hear. By the same reason no man can turn himself to God, unless he have a new Heart; that is, a new Will to turn and love God: For what means that Scripture, An evil Tree bringeth forth evil Fruit, a good Tree bringeth forth good Fruit? But that we should thereby understand, that the Will must first be made good, before it can perform any spiritual work, which must necessarily be done, not by exciting or persuading Grace, but by Grace healing and regenerating. 3. Let it be supposed, that the Will deformed by habitual corruption, could, by the mere help of exciting Grace, be raised to the putting forth of spiritual acts: Yet would this be contrary to that sweetness of Divine Providence, which is acknowledged by all Divines. For God should not sweetly put forward the Will so disposed, but in a forced way hurry it on to its work, which its own inclination is yet averse from. It is therefore more meet, to place in the Will a certain habitual Propension unto spiritual good, which it may perform, not by virtue of exciting grace, but from the infusion of habitual grace. 4. It is confessed by all, that the Will unrenewed hath no principle in it truly spiritual; and yet they will not deny, that this act of turning unto God, is truly spiritual and supernatural, but how the Will, only excited by motioning Grace, and not changed by Grace regenerating, should be placed in the rank of supernatural agents, I understand not. 5. I will ask what is that which makes a man truly holy and Godly, not simply acts good and godly; for (as the Philosopher says) Acts do not denominate the subject to be such: it must therefore be some habit, by virtue of which a man is called godly and holy: But that habit is not placed in the irrational part of the soul, for that is not properly capable of virtue or Vice, but only by Participation: to wit, so far as the rational part of the soul redounds upon it. But if it must be placed in the rational part, it must not be in the understanding; for no man is good or evil, only because he understandeth good and evil things (as Aquinas very well observes) but therefore is one called a good or evil man, because he wills those things which are good and evil. It remaineth therefore, that the habit of holiness cannot be placed anywhere but in the will, as being the subject most properly capable, both of habitual holiness, as also of habitual corruption and rebellion, which is contrary thereunto. 6. If the Will be indifferent in itself, and equally inclined unto either part; whence is that facility and promptitude in working? for as by evil actions the Will contracts a stain whereby it is habitually disposed unto evil; so by good actions the soul is touched with a better tincture, whereby it is habitually inclined unto good, and that setting aside the operation of moving and exciting Grace. 7. All Divines of better note acknowledge, That charity, or the love of God, is not a mere act, but a permanent habit; but that habit hath no place in the understanding, because it is an affection; nor in the sensitive appetite, which cannot be raised to spiritual love. It remaineth therefore, that it be peculiar to the Will, and so the Will to be most properly capable of habits, and of habitual Grace. 8. Lastly, How absurd is it to grant the whole man to be dead in sin, so that it can no way reach unto any good truly spiritual: and yet to defend, that the Will, which is the very leader of the soul, the driver of all faculties, the Lady and Queen of human acts, and that principle, which impaireth spiritual good or evil, unto all actions which men perform. How absurd (I say) is it, to hold that this faculty was neither spiritual before the Fall, nor carnal after the Fall, but to be utterly void, both of the corruption brought in by the first fault, and of spiritual gifts infused in the regeneration of man. It were easy to overwhelm this Opinion with more absurdities; but these shall suffice. By all these things it is apparent enough, that a new quality or habit of grace is infused into, or impressed upon the Will, which is earnestly denied by the Arminians, as hath been before proved by their own words. But who so yet doubts whether this be their Opinion, let him read the Hague Conference, pag. 298. of Bertius Translation; where they do industriously and purposely defend, that in spiritual death, spiritual gifts are not separated from the will of man, neither were implanted in it before that death in the state of Innocency, because if by these kind of gifts the will were inclined unto either part, the liberty of it were taken away, which (they say) consists in this, That it can equally bend itself to either part, when all requisites unto action are afforded. It remains now briefly to be proved, that God, whether immediately or mediately, both by infused grace and moral persuasion, turneth sinners unto himself after an irresistible manner. But this caution is to be premised, that by the word Irresistibly we do not understand any force offered to the Will, which is repugnant to its nature, but only an insuperable efficacy of Divine Grace, which inclines the Will sweetly and agreeably to its own nature, but so certainly and necessarily (we understand that Necessity, which even now we called Certainty) that it cannot be put off by the Will. 1. The truth of this Opinion is manifest from hence, That everywhere in Scripture the conversion and regeneration of a sinner is attributed to God alone, and to his good will and pleasure; but every, even the least cooperation is taken away from man himself. Rom. 9 It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy. He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth: which could not be truly said, if a man at his own freedom and pleasure, allowing all the actions of God requisite to conversion, might receive the quickening grace of God in vain, and make it void (as Arminius speaks.) And let it be observed from these words, That this man's repenting, and that man's hardening, is not only attributed to God alone, but the will and endeavours of man, is utterly excluded from having any part in this business. It is not (saith the Apostle) of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, &c. As the wheel doth not run well, that it may be round; but because it is first round: so a man doth not therefore will or run that God might have mercy on him, and regenerate him by the quickening grace of the spirit: but because God first hath mercy, therefore he willeth and runneth in the way of righteousness. 2. The second reason is taken from the infallible connexion of the Effect, with the Cause; that is, of Conversion, with converting and quickening Grace: For if this quickening Grace always attain its effect, neither is offered to any, but those in whom it is effectual, to the healing and regenerating of their soul: we must necessarily attribute unto it a certain, prevalent and irresistible working. But it appears by many places of Scripture, that this grace doth always attain its end in those to whom it is communicated. John 6. 37. Whatsoever my Father giveth me cometh unto me. Jer. 31. 23. Turn thou me and I shall be turned. From whence it is gathered, That into whomsoever grace, fit for the conversion of a man, is infused, that man is certainly and infallibly converted; otherwise a man could not thus address to God. turn me; that is, do what thou art wont to do by the help of thy Spirit, and the infusion of thy Grace, and I shall be converted, for perhaps the will, in whose power it is to receive or reject grace, may make it void. The same is evident from John 6. 45. Whosoever hath heard and learned of the Father cometh unto me; that is, whosoever hath so heard and been taught of God, that he hath also received and drunk in the quickening Grace of the Spirit, he hath certainly come unto me. Whence it appears, That Grace fit for the conversion of a man is never frustrated, but it attains its effect after an insuperable manner, so that it can never be put off by the will of man: Which is further confirmed from the nature of Grace, and that powerful manner, whereby God infuseth it into the heart of man: For if Grace be the effect of infinite power (as it is) and that man be regenerated by the same power wherewith Christ was raised from the dead; then God in the implanting of it in the will of man, puts forth that almighty power, which no created faculty is able to withstand or resist. 3. This Argument may also be added, The grace of God is so the efficient cause of Conversion, that it admits no joined and coordinate cause, although it hath a subordinate cause; to wit, the will of man adjoined to it: But if the Will, when it is excited by assisting grace (as they call it) can resist it, than it may also assist it; if it may withstand it, than it may also join endeavour with it, to produce the same effect; if it can make it void, it may also make it effectual, and so may be a cause coordinate with the grace of God, in bringing forth the first act of its conversion. But that God doth convert or regenerate men by his own and only work, excluding all coordinate causes, is so clear, that it need not be proved; for it is frequently found in Scripture, The Lord converteth, the Lord gives repentance; that God circumciseth, and takes away the stony heart, and gives a heart of flesh. Lastly, That God doth regenerate, and by his own power raise from the death of sin. I let pass the force of the similitude, as no man can contribute any thing to his own generation or resurrection; so neither to his spiritual regeneration or resurrection. God (I say) doth all these things; but they could not be attributed to him alone, if he had any cause so cooperating with him, as that if it refused, no such effect could follow. I add, that of the schoolmen is most true, That God is the cause of the whole Being; that is, although God be not the efficient cause of sin (which is not a being, but rather a defect of what should be in a faculty or act) but rather a▪ deficient will▪ but of every good work (of which kind our first conversision is a chief one) if it be most full of Being, or if it be a whole Being, as it is, of such a whole work; I say, it is necessary that God should be the cause; for God alone is the cause of the whole Being wheresoever it is found: Yea, all Divines acknowledge, that so far as sin itself is a Being, God is the cause of it: Wherefore, although the Will be the secondary and subordinate efficient cause of conversion; from whence it is that the Scriptures do exhort us to turn ourselves, and circumcise our hearts, and so forth. Yet, as a coordinate cause, it no way can resist the quickening grace of God, and receive it in vain (as Arminius speaks.) I add, although God would admit of a Partner in this work, yet the will, which is wholly depraved and dead in sin, can no more cooperate with exciting and moving grace, than a carcase prepared and disposed by rubbing can revive itself, and put forth vital acts. But, that I may conclude this reason, Let it be supposed, that the Will may work together with the grace of God, or not according to its liberty: yet, if this opinion stand, how much more than is meet will be arrogated unto man, and derogated from the glory of God? Man may well boast that his will contributed so much to regeneration, that if he had▪ not willed, it had never been produced. For as he, who being admonished by another, gives an alms, doth attribute the work more to himself, than to him that persuaded him, or stirred him up to it; so he, whose will being only moved or admonished by assisting grace, turns itself unto God; doth more, or, at least, equally ascribes his conversion to himself than to Divine Grace, which had never produced that effect, unless he himself had consented unto it, and made its persuasions effectual, whereas it was in his power to have rendered them frustrate. The fourth reason is taken from hence, That the Decree of Election (by which God determined with himself to save some persons selected from the common mass) is absolute, and therefore doth necessarily and in●●●libly attain its effect, That the Decree of Election is absolute, so that the Lord looked upon nothing foreseen in the persons chosen, but absolutely decreed to work in them all conditions required to salvation, is so clearel● manifest from many places of Scripture, that it scarce needs any proof; for if we choose not God, but he us, Ioh. 15. if we are chosen that we might be holy, not holy that we might be chosen: If he chose Jacob rather than Esau, when both were of like and equal condition. Rom. 9 If effectual vocation and justifying faith are the fruits and effects of predestination, not the foregoing conditions. Rom. 8. Lastly, If God's mere good pleasure be the only reason of the Decree [He hath mercy on whom he will, and hardeneth whom he will.] It necessarily follows, that God hath absolutely decreed to save some: and to that purpose to bestow upon them Grace, Faith, and holiness. Granting these things, it appears, that God converts all the Elect after a manner, by them irresistible on this manner, Because if they could resist that Grace, which is fit to convert them, being also given to this end, that they might be converted; then this absolute and peremptory Decree of God might be disappointed by the creature, which must not be imagined: Neither is there ground that they should now object, that by the same reason those whom God hath rejected, do sin irresistibly. For we deny that there is the same reason of both: for although Faith be the effect of predestination, yet infidelity is not the proper effect of Reprobation. Whereas Faith requires a cause of itself efficient, which hath a true and proper influence into its effect. But there is no efficient cause required to unbelief: but deficient (because it follows upon the mere defect and absence of that cause by which Faith should be wrought.) As to the illumination of the air; there is required the Sun or some other efficient cause, having influence into that effect; but the absence of the sun is enough to cause darkness. In like manner, although the sins of Reprobates do infallibly follow from the determinate counsel of God, who hath decreed their event; yet Conversion and Faith do follow the absolute Decree of God after a much different manner; sins do follow infallibly indeed, but only by a necessity of consequence; that is, God not at all causing or effecting, but only permitting: but Faith and good Works follow by a necessity of the consequent, as of which God must most properly be called the Author, according to all Divines: For no man ever said that men did believe, were segenerate, and turned to God; did good works (God only permitting, but causing and working. But if this be granted to us (as needs it must) that Faith and Conversion do follow the absolute decree of God by a necessity of the consequent; that is, a necessity causing and coworking: I see not how it can be denied, that it is wrought in us after an irresistble manner. For when any Agent so worketh upon the patient, that it necessarily overcomes it, it is properly said to work irresistibly. In like manner God, if he so convert a sinner, that he is necessarily Converted, by a necessity of the consequent than he converts it irresistibly, that is after such a manner, as the patient must needs yield; from whence I wonder, that those who deny election, to depend on foreseen faith, do yet defend that conversion is wrought after a resistible manner, and so as it may be frustrated. Let this be the fist and last reason. If conversion be wrought after that resistible manner, as is described by them who follow Arminius, then Divine election cannot be certain according to their principles, because it dependeth on the mutable will of man, which as it is described by Arminius, I dare say, could not be foreseen by God himself; for let it be supposed (which they lay) as the foundation of that prevision that God doth perfectly foresee all the ways whereby the will may be turned aside, or inclined unto good: Let it also be supposed that God foreknows all objects, or circumstances, which may any way be offered or proposed to the will. Lastly, let it also be supposed, that God doth perfectly know how every object or circumstance is fit to move the will, and drive it this way, or that way, by persuasion. Yet if this be the condition of the will, that allowing any objects, yea further, allowing any fitness in these objects or circumstances, to incline the will this way, or that way; it may yet, by virtue of its intrinsical liberty act, or not act, I see not how God can foresee what the will certainly and infallibly will do, that is, whether it will turn to God or not. Not that God, by reason of any impotency is not able to search out what the will shall endeavour, but because the thing itself is not knowable. For there cannot be greater certainty in the knowledge than in the object, from whence I thus reason. If it be certain that the will shall assent unto grace offered, than it is falsely said, that the Will supposing all the actions of God that are requisite, may turn itself, or not? On the other side, if it be uncertain, whether the will shall resist this grace, or not, than that foreknowledge which God hath of it, cannot be certain, for that which is to be known is the measure of knowledge, and therefore it is a contradiction to say, that the knowledge is true, and yet there is more certainty in the knowledge than in the thing known. As it implies a contradiction to say, that the thing measured is greater or less than the measure, and yet to be equal to it; I add, although it be true, that God knows all the ways, according to which, the will may be well or ill inclined. Yet if the will be altogether undetermined, admitting nothing to determine it, neither within itself, nor without it, whether created, or uncreated, as they defend, implies a contradiction, that any certain way, whereby it should fall out that the will should be ordered or disordered, can be determined by God himself. Out of all these things it is gathered, that if converting grace move the will after a manner, that may be resisted by it, God cannot infallibly foreknow, who shall believe, and who not; and consequently, all election should be utterly taken away. Therefore it remains, That converting grace is both imparted by God, and received by us, after a manner Irresistible. FINIS.