AN APPENDIX TO THE LATE ANSWER, Printed by His majesty's COMMAND: OR, Some seasonable ANIMADVERSIONS upon the late Observator, and his seven antimonarchical ASSERTIONS. TOGETHER With a VINDICATION of the KING, And some OBSERVATIONS upon the TWO HOUSES.  
Printed Anno Dom. 1642.   

Seasonable ANIMADVERSIONS upon the late Observator, and his seven antimonarchical ASSERTIONS.  
IT is usual (I know) for Books to have Prefaces, and plays Prologues; but whosoever peruseth this, must expect nothing but concise reasons; forasmuch as Vnusq●isque suo sensu abundat, so let him reflect and censure of this at his pleasure.  
The Observator, pag. 1. saith, That power is originally inherent in the people, &c.  
To this the answer is, that power is in God primariò & per se, according to that of the Apostle; Rom. 13. and in the King or people, but only secundariò & derivatiuè: Power or Dominion is not a gift of Nature, that is to say, naturally inherent in us; for if it were, than might all men have equal power, for that by nature we are all equal; but power is a gift of God to Nature, and is gratia gratis data; and yet power is congruous in nature, as was the power of King, and office of Priesthood in Melchisedec: for surely he had them both given, or appointed to him by God, being by interpretation King of righteousness, and King of Peace, Heb. 2.7. And therefore it is not likely that he usurped to himself the regal title of King, no more than he did of being Priest; and yet it was very probable that it was also agreeable in Reason and Nature, and although not tyrannical, yet peaceable Kingly reign, and sacred Priesthood did fitly belong to him: 
Seth and his generation began first to call upon the name of the Lord, that is to say, to give to God some set form of worship, as Priests did, &c.  for he is by most Divines thought to have been Sem, the eldest son of Noah; and by the law of Nature, of Moses, and of most Nations, the eldest is to inherit; so that what was the right of Adam, Seth, and Noah, might belong unto him by birthright, although it may be God confirmed it unto him extraordinarily. But to return, power and dominion is derived from God, and congruous in Nature: but the power is in the people only, when they are absolutely free to choose to themselves what form of government they please, as were the Jews before they subjected themselves to Kings, being formerly freed from the bondage of Egypt by the finger of God. The Romans when they erected their Senate and Consuls, having rebelliously (for it was no better) shaken off the yoke of Kings. The Venetians, when they first instituted their commonwealth. But in Monarchies, where the people have been brought into subjection, either by the sword, as in Turkey, Persia, and the like; or by innate, and prescribing, and prevalent authority, as in Florence; or by both, as in France and Castille; in these Dominions power is not inherent in the people, but in the Prince. And although some hereditary monarchs are more limited than others, as is the King of France more than the great Turk, and the King of England more than the King of France: yet is their power derived immediately from God, and inherent in themselves, not in the people: for those limitations are (in conquered Nations) but mere donatives of grace, proceeding from the Prince or his Successors to the people, touching certain immunities and privileges; so that the Prince his power is the efficient cause of them, and such immunities or privileges are but as material effects. Now as it is most improper to say, that the effect should cause his own cause, so is it to say, that a privileged people should cause the Prince's power, or that Power should remain originally in such a privileged people.  
Some Nations elect their Kings, or Princes, and restrain them far more by conditional inaugurations, then hereditary monarchs are, or aught to be restrained or limited: Yet have not such nation's power in themselves totally, but only partially; that is, they have power to conditionate with their Kings or Princes, how far forth they will be subject, and by what Rules they will be governed; but they have not power to conditionate with their Kings or Princes, that they will only be subject at their own pleasures, and as themselves shall think good; that is to say, if they please at any time to assume more liberty unto themselves, and to alter and disannul former Constitutions of Government, that they may do it without the consent of their Kings or Princes. This they cannot do without treason to their crowns or Diadems: For although the persons of such Princes be elective, yet is their power permanent, jure constituto Coronae; which though they claim not as from progenitors, yet are they invested therewith as from Predecessors. And therefore being enthroned, they enjoy their dignities by prescription; that is to say, what belonged to their Predecessors; belongeth in the same manner to them, being once invested; nor can such Nations revolt from their elected Princes, without being reputed Rebels.  
Now of this nature are the Kings of Poland, Hungary, and some other (to speak nothing of the Duke of Venice, for he is merely titulary, and a cipher) and such Kings first and principally claim their authority from God the author of all power, who enspheareth them in the orb of dignity above others.  
And secondly, they acknowledge it from the general consent of the Nation, which made choice of them, and over which they rule. And surely such was the right and title of Saul, the first King of Israel: for he was appointed by God, 1 Sam. 9.17. then anointed by Samuel, Chap. 10. v. 1. afterwards approved by the people, ibid. vers. 24. And finally, confirmed in his kingdom, Chap. 11. vers. 14. And in the same manner was David likewise established in his kingdom; so that their first and chief claim was immediately from God, and their second from the consent of the people. Nor is it of any consequence to allege, as the Observator seemeth to infer, pag. 1. that those Kings had an extraordinary Institution from God; and therefore they might more lawfully claim their right, as appointed and appropriated to them by God. For to such Allegation it will be answered, That there is no power but of God, Rom. 13. So that whether God institute Kings by extraordinary, or ordinary means, it maketh no matter. For although Saul and David were instituted extraordinarily by God's special appointment; yet most of the Kings of Judah and Israel reigned afterthem but by ordinary succession; had they not therefore the same power that Saul and David had? Surely the Scriptures tell us they had. The Priests and Prophets in the old Law had an extraordinary vocation, especially the Prophets: the Priests or Ministers of the gospel have but an ordinary vocation, are they therefore defective in power to those of the old Law? or have they not their vocation from God, because they have not extraordinary calling? Surely no. For how could Sacraments be administered, and the word preached? So is it with Monarchs: For though they have but ordinary succession; yet is their power immediately from God. Our sovereign is a free (though in some things a limited) Monarch, and derived therefore his power immediately (not mediately, as do other inferior Ministers of justice) from God. And as touching limitations and privileges, they are nothing else (as is aforesaid) but acts of grace conferred on this Nation by His majesty's predecessors in several ages, and at several times, and some of them lately by His Majesty himself, as the continuation of this present Parliament, the abolishing of the star-chamber, and High Commission censures, and the like. But these privileges, and others granted to the subjects, disinvest the King of no primary, or Birth-right-royalty, but only oblige him in honour to observe them as covenants. A Lord purchaseth a manor for himself and his heirs for ever; his son and successors grant certain Franchises to the tenants, and oblige their heirs for ever to perform them: so the tenants live-in a more free state and condition, than they did in the first purchasers days; and paying their rents, and performing their services, they are not altogether subject to be turned out at the pleasure (or rather displeasure) of the Lord; but doth this Franchisement or freedom of theirs, cause the Lord to derive his right or title from his tenants? Law and experience tells us no. And this is our sovereign's case; The conqueror by his sword, or by deed of gift, or rather indeed by both, came in as a purchaser of the kingdom of England, for himself, and his heirs for ever, and by the Law of conquest had power to have made greater alteration in the State than he did, and to have induced what form of government he had thought good, even as the King of Spain hath done in Navarre, and the West Indies; yet he did not, but only imposed some hard things, as the having of laws in the French tongue, which the people generally understood not, Cover-fue-bell, and the like: his successors afterwards did immune, and ease the people from such grievances, so that they lived, and live at more liberty, and enjoy more securely their liberties and properties. But do therefore such immunities granted to the people, cause the King to derive his power and right from the people? The laws and customs of all Nations and kingdoms that live under Monarchs, tell us no. The ancient and present Monarchies of the world being sufficient witnesses thereof, besides the Dictamen of Scripture, and reason already inserted.  
The Observator, pag. 2. saith, that it is an error in some Princes, to strive more to be great over their people, then in their people. It may be some Princes have committed such an error; but withal let the Observator take notice, that it is convenient for a free Prince to be both; that is to say, to have them wealthy, and yet obedient Subjects: for if he be only great in his people, and not over them, he may resemble the now Roman, or German Emperor, or the ancient Kings of France, the one whereof is daily in danger to be disinvested by commotion, & combinations of his Princes; the other were heretofore almost continually molested by factions of their peers and people: And sure the French themselves have greatly occasioned the heavy burden of divers tributes and impositions which they undergo: for they ever and anon rising in arms against their King, gave him occasion to enslave them the more by his reconquering of them, or reducing them into his obedience, so that had they subsisted in due allegiance, 'tis likely their King had been as equally great over as in them; which equality, or parity in government, is (no doubt) the most happy and blessed counion that any Prince and people can enjoy.  
The Observator telleth us in the same page, that the King, though he be singulis major, yet he is universis minor. But why so? The Head natural is not only singulis, but also universis membris majus dignitate, (though it may, 'tis not so in universis, as shall be by and by declared) For the Head hath in itself all Senses, other Members receive from it, but Feeling only, and Motion; the head governeth and directeth the whole Body, and is therefore in dignity more Noble than all the Members of the Body considered together: and yet though it be more noble and excellent than them all; (for as much as Motion and Feeling dimane from the brain, which is in the head, to them all) notwithstanding in universis, in all things, or faculties, the head is not more excellent than all the members; for the Heart is the seat of Life (according to most Philosophers) being primum vivens, & ultimum moriens, and from it proceedeth natural heat; the stomach likewise administereth sustenance, and aliment; the Feet go, and the Hands work, and without them the head cannot subsist, yet are they all subordinate to the Head: and even so is it, or ought it to be in the body politic, unless we must believe the Observator, who in his 19 Page saith, That the Head political receives more subsistence from the Body than it gives, &c. But by his leave, if privileges and Immunities are (as they are) matters of Grace, proceeding from free Monarchs (for of such the Treatise is) to the people, do not such Heads give as much subsistence to the body politic, as they receive from it? The Observator telleth us, Pag, 6. That Edward the first was the first (whether he were, or not, it is not material) that repaired the Breaches which the Conquest had made upon this Nation; if so, did not he, by such his reparation, give as much subsistence to the commonwealth, as he received from the commonwealth, or Body politic? And do not his Successors give likewise as much as they receive, when they confer the like acts of Grace? Surely, he that considereth rightly Magna Charta, and all other privileges and Immunities, which now extend to the freeborn people of this kingdom, will find them first to have proceeded from the Grace and Grant of our Kings: and therefore it is improper to say, That the Head politic doth not give as much subsistence to the Body politic, as it receives from it.  
The Observator saith likewise in his second Page, That id quod efficit tale, est magis tale; meaning thereby, that the people conferring, as the efficient cause, Power on the King, have jointly more Power in themselves.  
It hath been showed already, that free Monarchs, such as our King is, derive not their power from the people, but immediately from God: But suppose our King did secundarily acknowledge his power from this Nation's general consent; as it may be, the King of Poland doth acknowledge his power in part from the aristocracy of that kingdom; and as Saul and David did in part from the Jews approbation and consent: notwithstanding, it follows not from hence, that the people are the sole efficient cause of the King's power, but only the secondary and partial. Now, when it is said, that id quod efficit tale, est magis tale, it is to be understood of entire and total causes; but in this case, the people being at the most but the partial cause of the King's power, the axiom or Rule faileth: as for example, the moon being of herself a body dark, receives her light (at leastwise her chiefest) from the sun, as from an entire cause; the sun is therefore truly said to be more light, being the total subordinate cause of light; in this case therefore it is truly said, id quod efficit tale, est magis tale: but the sun, mediante homine, producit hominem; & mediante Leone, Leonem; & mediante Plantâ Plantam; for that the sun affordeth to all sensible and vegetable creatures an influx of vigour and natural heat: yet for as much as the sun is, in the production of these creatures, but a partial, and not an integral cause, it were absurd to say, that the sun were more a man, than is a man; or more a lion, than is a lion; or more a Plant, than is a Plant: and so is it to say, that because a King may acknowledge his power in part received from the people's general consent, that therefore the people have more power than himself.  
The Observator telleth us, Page 3. That the King's dignity was erected to preserve the communality, the communality was not created for his service.  
This is somewhat too harsh, especially if we consider our King to be, in all Causes, as well ecclesiastical as civil, next and immediately under Christ, supreme Head and governor: such words would have been better accommodated to a Duke of Venice, then to a King of England. The Jews, I believe, when they asked a King at God's hands, were somewhat inclining to the Observators opinion; for they desired a King for their own ends, chiefly to judge them, and to fight their battles; not well considering, that if they had a King, he must and aught to have a Kingly Dominion over them: Wherefore God caused the Prophet Samuel to instruct them concerning the Praeeminence of a King; and, that if they would have a King, a King would be such, and such a man, as is evidently characterised in the first of Samuel, chap. 8. where amongst other things, vers. 17. the Prophet saith, He will take the Tenth of your sheep, and ye shall be his servants: Where, by the word will, he showeth the Authority which Kings would have; and by the word shall, he showeth the obedience that Subjects should have: nor did the Prophet speak of some, or to some few only; but of all, and to all the people, (at leastwise to all the chiefest of them) saying, ye shall be his servants.  
I desire therefore that the Observator, and all his other adherents, would take more special notice of this Text of the Prophet, and that of Saint Paul's confirmation of this Text, Let every soul be subject to the higher Powers: For, though Christian monarchs ought not, by the Rules of Christianity, to Tyrannize, or make our sons their Slaves, or our Daughters their Concubines, and the like; as did many of the Kings of the Gentiles, and some of the Jews; yet ought they not to be thought so contemptible, as that the communality was no way created for their service.  
The Observator saith in the same Page, That the right of Conquest cannot be pleaded to acquit Princes of that which is due to the people, as the authors and ends of all Power; for mere Force cannot alter the course of Nature, and frustrate Law; and if it could, there were more reason why the people might justify Force to regain due liberty, than the Prince might to subvert the same.  
By the Observators leave, for his first Clause it is answered already, That in Monarchies the people are not the authors or ends of Power. For the second Clause, That mere Force cannot alter the course of Nature, or frustrate the tenor of Law; that is to say, That mere Force cannot captivate and debase a people by nature free, and living under a law of common consent. I suppose the words, cannot alter, should have been, cannot, de jure, alter; or ought not to alter, &c. For that force can alter, and de facto hath altered the freedom and laws of People and Nations, is known to most men; Histories and Chronicles testifying to the world the several alterations and forms of Government which conquerors have induced; but whether they ought so to have done, is a question. Yet should the Observator and his adherents take advice, that though in Nature there is a parity of mankind, and therefore Dominion may not seem to be intended by Nature, yet God the author of Nature, foreseeing the fall of Man, and the depravation in Nature, which did ensue thereof intended power and dominion, and that some should be masters, and others servants; some command, and others obey; some should become slaves to Tyrants, others subjects to free monarchs; others members of popular Estates: and these things God hath ordained by his divine wisdom according to his will, and disposes and altars them at his pleasure: But as for the pot, it ought not to say to the Potter, Why hast thou made me thus? It is enough for it to know, that there is no power but of God, and so to be appliable to the use it was made for; if for honour, to honour; if for servility, to servility; being subject for conscience sake: Rom. 13.5.  
Of a strange nature therefore are those words, viz. There were more reason why the people might justify force, to regain due liberty, than the Prince might to subvert the same. If this Doctrine had been good, our Saviour would surely have counselled the Jews (when they asked him whether it were lawful to give tribute to Caesar) to have kept their money in their purses, or to have made up a stock of it, and by force to have sought to regain their due liberty from Caesar, and not have bid them Give unto Caesar what is Caesar's. If it be alleged, that in case Christ had counselled the Jews so, they would have played the Jews indeed, and have accused him of high Treason: What then? Would Christ have concealed, or did he at any time conceal the truth for fear of the Jews accusations? When he was conjured to express whether or no he were the son of God, (a thing more hateful to the Jews ears, than the denying of tribute could have been to the ears of the Romans) Christ answered, Thou hast said it; which is as much as Yes. But suppose the Jews would have accused him of high Treason, in case he had denied tribute to Caesar, and that God would not have such a vile imputation as Treason laid on the Redeemer of the World: Yet had regaining of due liberty by force been lawful, Christ might have said, ye may give tribute to Caesar, in the potential Mood, (in which words no exceptions could have been taken) and not have said, Give tribute to Caesar, or Give unto Caesar what is Caesar's, in the Imperative Mood. Or otherwise, when they asked him, Whether it were lawful to pay tribute to Caesar, he might only have answered them, Yes; but foreseeing in his divine wisdom, that some indirect constructions might be made of such a single word as Yes, 'tis lawful to pay it, ye may pay it if ye please, 'tis not against the law of God, if ye do pay it, &c. therefore Christ bid them show him a piece of money, and bid them Give it unto Caesar, informing the covetous minds of that perverse people, that they ought and were obliged to part with their money and substance to Caesar, if demanded as a tribute. But to let Arguments of Divinity pass, and to induce a few State reasons: If the people may justify force to regain due liberty, what Monarchy, what Aristocracy, what Popular estate can remain secure? The French subjects being in general oppressed with taxes, may revolt from their King, if this Tenet be good; and so may the Spanish: The Polish Peasants may rebel against the King and their Lords, for that they hold them in villinage: and the Townsmen and boors in Holland, and the Pisani in Venice against the States, for their imposing on them terrible excizes. This Tenet, or Position, may quadrate, it may be, with the Irish Rebels, (for they pretend by force to regain due liberty) but never with loyal subjects. And surely this Tenet, or Position aforesaid, is dangerous to all the Monarchies and States of the world, yea, even to Parliaments themselves, if rightly considered; and opposite also to the law of God and Nations.  
The Observator telleth us, Page 13. That where the people by public authority will seek an inconvenience to themselves, and the King is not so much interested as themselves, it is more inconvenience to deny it, then grant it. This is a strange assertion, and against all rule of monarchical Government. Suppose (for a supposition is no fallacy) that a Christian people should generally (which God forbid) desire to revolt from Christianity to mahometanism; should their King grant it? they seem to be more interessed than the King, because it concerns their salvation or damnation; is it injustice therefore to deny it? Surely no; but most just and acceptable to God to hinder them from it. Suppose this Nation should in general (which God of his goodness prohibit) desire to turn Anabaptists and Brownists, whereof there are too many already; is the King bound, or ought he to condescend to their desires? Surely no: but as God's vicegerent, to oppose such exorbitant inclinations of the people. But if the Assertion of the Observator be good, Pilate seems to be excusable, whom the Observator condemneth in the page before: for the Jews sought by authority of the Priests and Elders to crucify Christ, (an inconvenience enough to themselves) and instanced a law, and that by that law he ought to die, Joh. 19.7. and the Jews were more interested in Christ, (he being their countryman, and subject to their laws, as they conceived)▪ than was Pilate; so that according to this Assertion of the Observator, It was more inconvenience and injustice for Pilate to have denied to the Jews Christ to have been crucified, then to have granted it. Judica Deus.  
The Observator saith, Page 17. The name of a King is great, I confess, and worthy of great honour; but is not the name of a People greater?  
The Observator must give me leave to tell him, that in Monarchies, where there were or are Kings, the name of a people neither was, nor is greater than the name of a King: Senatus populúsque Romanus, ceased to be, and gave place to the name of Caesar. The Ottoman name at this day, dignifies that great Empire subject to that family; and so doth the name of Sophy the Persian. The name of the House of Austria decorates their dominions; and so doth that of Bourbon, France: And I see no reason but why the name of Stewart should do as much in England. If it be asked, But what availeth the names of these great monarchs, without their kingdoms or Dominions? The answer is, That Dominions are to monarchs, as it were, material subjects; themselves (from whom their names result) as forms. Now as the form is more worthy than its Matter, so is a free Monarch more worthy than his Empire, in respect of dignity political.  
And indeed the word Monarch infers as much; for Monarchy is derived from Monarch, not Monarch from Monarchy. But it may be some will instance from hence, that if it be so, the good of a Monarch seems to be preferred before the good of all his Subjects in general, so that a whole kingdom or Empire should be utterly pillaged, wasted, and consumed, rather than his Treasures be destroyed. Not so: for though Empires and kingdoms are but as material subjects, and monarchs as forms political; yet even as in nature, forms cannot subsist without matter, (from whose power all forms, except the rational soul, are educed;) so in policy, Monarchs cannot subsist without their people, from whose subjection and obedience their power is educed immediately from God, as are forms from matter by nature: the good of both therefore must be consistent together, so that not salus populi alone, as the Observator would have it, but salus Regis & populi, is the true end of monarchical government.  
Thus have I briefly answered the Observators chief arguments, from whence all his other assertions and conclusions are drawn, desiring him and all others, rather to study how to produce reasons for obedience (where it is due) to Monarchs, then to derogate from monarchical government: to endeavour how to incline, and not to disaffect (by nice positions) the distracted minds of the people towards the King: to propound prudent Arguments which might move the King to accommodate with his Parliament; and not by lessening his authority, to divert him from it. Finally, to seek how to unite the King and commonwealth, and not to disunite them by impertinent and invalid conclusions. God of his goodness grant counion (as much as in this world may be) between our sovereign and His people, that He may know truly how to rule, and they to obey.   

ANIMADVERSIONS upon those Notes which the late OBSERVATOR hath published upon the seven Doctrines, and Positions, which the KING by way of Recapitulation (he saith) lays open so offensive.  

POSITION I.  
THat the Parliament hath an absolute, indisputable power of declaring Law: so that all the right of the King and People depends upon their pleasure.   

To this the Observator saith;  
It hath been answered, That this Power must rest in them, or in the King, or in some inferior Court; or else all suits will be endless, and it cannot rest more safely then in Parliament.   

ANIMADVERSION I.  
THe Observator hath contracted His majesty's words, but hath kept the sense in more general terms, and seems (though but faintly) to justify the Position, by approving (I know not whose answer) that this Power can rest nowhere m●re safely then in Parliament. He means the Parliament without the King; if he had allowed the King his place in Parliament, I know no understanding man but will easily subscribe, That the King in Parliament, or the Parliament with him, have an absolute, undisputable power, both to make, and declare Law; and to end all suits of what kind soever, determinable by human Law within the kingdom. And here is the most safe resting of this power (and here it hath ever rested) & not in the King alone (who claims not that Power, but is willing to govern His Subjects according to the known laws) and much less in any inferior Court. But that such an absolute undisputable Power of declaring Law, as hath lately been assumed, by the Major part of the present sitting Parliament, should be resting in them, is neither necessary for the ending of suits, nor can be safe either for King or Subject. If they may declare that for a Law, a fundamental Law, which never yet was exacted, or had any being; and deny the plain undoubted laws that have been Enacted, or frustrate them by some unheard of interpretation, (as if such interpretation had been some mental (or rather parliamental) reservation, laid up within the Parliament walls, to be produced upon emergent occasions, by their successors) they will have so full an Arbitrary power, that the right and safety of King and People must wholly depend upon their Votes. Which power can never be safe, either for King, or People, nor can they produce one precedent that may warrant such a Power. But they are not bound, or limited by such precedents, That's the second Position.   

POSITION II.  
THat Parliaments are bound to no precedents.   

Observator.  
Statutes are not binding to them, why then should Parliaments? Yet there is no obligation stronger than the honour & justice of a Parliament.   

ANIMADVERSION II.  
IF Statutes be not binding to them, there is no reason that precedents should be. And he saith true, Statutes are not binding to them, that is, de facto, they are not (for they in some things go directly against them) but de jure, they are; that 〈◊〉 they ought to be binding to them, till they be repealed by the same power they were made, that is, by Bill orderly passed both Houses, and ratified by His majesty's royal assent. And unless they can show better reason than their bare Assertion, precedents (as they are the best warrant, so) they are, and aught to be the limits and bounds of their proceedings. He might have said as truly, That oaths are not binding to them: and therefore neither Statutes, nor precedents, But the Observator tells us (Pag. 44.) That the oaths of supremacy and Allegiance are not endangered, by making the kingdom, & not the King, the proper subject of power. And he yields reason for it. For (saith he) he that ascribes more to the whole universality, then to the King, yet ascribes to the King a true supremacy of Power and Honour above all particulars. I wonder what he means by a true supremacy of Power and Honour above all particulars: Surely he means nothing but priority of place, and height of Title; for he is allowed little power over some particulars, namely, over the Members of either House, and whom else they please to exempt (as they did sergeant Major Skippon for his Power and Commands.) But this distinction helps them The Members of either House are sharers in that supremacy which is in the Universality and above his; and by the power of that supremacy they can exempt whom they please from the power of this, inferior (pardon the phrase, and the absurdities cannot be expressed without a solecism) supremacy. Very good: but in good sober sadness, doth the Observator think this distinction was thought on by the Framers and enjoiners of that Oath, or that the Members of the House, at their entering the House, did take their Oath to the King, as to the Supreme over all, with exception of themselves, or reservation of an higher Supremacy to themselves, when they should be entered? It is hardly credible: Nor do all (that desire to tender all due honour to the Parliament) believe that they are so the Universality, or the kingdom, as the Observator presumes. They are trusted by the Universality and kingdom, and we pray, that they may discharge that trust, not knowing, but that a multitude of men subject (every one of them) to error, may fail in their judgement, and being not exempted from the common condition of the sinful Sons of Adam, may possibly, not rightly discharge the trust committed to them, as well as the King, who is blasted with foul failings and errors, in judgement. Me thinks, men that so much detest Popery, should not borrow the grounds of their reasoning from them: and I shall as soon believe the council of Trent, telling us that they are the universal Church, and therefore cannot possibly err, as that the Parliament is the universal, unerring, and unpervertibly just body of the kingdom. And surely, the Spirit of declaring must needs reside in a strangely large measure in them, who have power thus to declare, not only Law, but oaths too: a greater, than which the Pope's flatterers never gave him: and hardly ever any Pope assumed so great: Quo te constringam mutantem Protea nodo? How shall these men be bound to do right, who so easily untie the knots of these sacred books of Law and oaths? why, yes: There is a bond that will do it; The obligation of the Justice, and honour of a Parliament. But can any man be sure, that they whom neither Law, custom, & precedents of their Ancestors, nor oaths can bind, will be always held in by the obligation of Justice and Honour? Is it not possible that they may (in time) find a power in themselves of declaring that obligation void, as well as they have done the other? The same obligation of Justice and Honour, is as strong upon Kings, (and hath ever been held more powerful and obstrictive in them, then in any State managed by a Community;) and yet they dare not trust His Majesty, though so obliged. The observator than must pardon me, if I desire, they may rather be held in, (and hold themselves so to be) by the old obligations of Law, precedents, and oaths, rather than that the King's liege people should be put wholly to confide to that single obligation of the Justice and Honour of a Parliament.   

POSITION III.  
THat they are Parliaments, and may judge of public necessity without the King, and dispose of any thing.   

Observator.  
They may not desert the King, but being deserted by the King, when the kingdom is in distress, they may judge of that distress, and relieve it; and are to be accounted by virtue of representation, as the whole body of the State.   

ANIMADVERSION III.  
HIs majesty sets down this Position in more words, but these are much to the same purpose; and upon these the inference which His majesty makes, follows undeniably, That then the life and liberty of the subject, and all good laws made for the security of them, may be disposed of, and repealed by the major part of both Houses at any time present, and by any ways and means procured so to be; and His majesty shall have no power to protect them. They see nothing that see not the misery which may follow upon such a vast transcendency of arbitrary power, if it were invested in the Parliament, which (I dare boldly say) was never claimed by any Parliament, though in conjunction with (the head of it) the King. Every (the meanest) Subject hath such a right and propriety in his goods, that without Law they cannot be taken from him, though to be employed for the public good. And though the safety of the people be the highest Law, and that do (many times) give a power above other Laws, and against them, to the supreme Magistracy in a State, to dispose of private men's estates, yet the unchangeable rule of Justice must have place, even in that highest Law, and that requires a compensation to be made to those, whose estates or goods are so disposed of; and never gives power to uphold the public good with private injury. Nor can it be imagined, that a State upheld by such helps, should not be able to make a just compensation to those, by whom it was upheld. But let us hear our observator: They may not (saith he) desert the King. Gramercy for that; I am glad to hear they have yet any obligation upon them to tie them to the King. Yet I know not well what he means by deserting the King: if he mean it in that sense, which he doth the Kings deserting of them, which (out of question) is his not assenting to whatsoever they shall think fit; Then in reason they should not, by their disallowing all his Proposals, have driven him to dissent from theirs, and so to have deserted them. Well: But being deserted by the King, when the kingdom is in distress, they may judge of that distress, and relieve it. All their power then is upon supposition of the Kings deserting them: So that if it appear▪ that His majesty hath not deserted them (as many good men believe He hath not, in the redress of any real grievance,) than they have no such power. And however, they claim this power only when the kingdom is in distress; But how if the kingdom be not in distress, or (at least) that distress be only or principally caused by their claiming of that power, which cannot consist with the Honour and royal Estate of His majesty, which all men (by their late Protestation) are bound to defend? If it be so, we may easily discern how far they may stretch this power, which they claim only in order to distress; and that they may make as much use of it, as the Pope doth of his power in temporals; In ordine ad spiritualia. He claims no more, (though some have said he hath right to more;) and the Parliament will need no more, to do as much as he takes upon him to do with Christian Princes and States. But they must have a right to their power in this case of distress; Whence have they that? why, they have it as the whole body of the State, and that they are, and must be so accounted, by virtue of representation. Very good. But let us consider his words a little more. There is no understanding man, but must and will acknowledge (Unless he wilfully derogate from them,) that the Parliament represents the body of the State, for those ends for which they convene, as an ambassador doth the Prince that sends him, in the manage of that business for which he is sent: But this is not an absolute representation to all intents and purposes. Besides, whom do they represent? The body (saith he) of the State. Be it so: but it is only the Body without the Head. And if they were not by representation only, but really, the whole body of the People (if it were possible they should convene together) they are all but an assembly of Subjects, of men to be governed, not to rule; to be commanded, not to command their Head and sovereign: and then there can be no virtue of representation that can advance them to the power, which the observator ascribes to them, when such power was never in the whole Body, which is represented. No? never such power in the whole body? I know the observators stomach will rise here. Did not the people's consent at first make Kings, and convey power into their hands? Truly Sir, not solely: but grant it, what then? Marry, 
Pag. 2.  he saith, than it is a principle in nature. Quicquid efficit tale, est magis tale; In English, If the People make a King, they are more King themselves; or if they give power, they have more power: and may resume and exercise that power when they please. Excellent learning, and well applied; I believe he learned this piece from Suarez the Jesuit. But the observator may know, that that rule admits many limitations; and surely, it holds only in causis totalibus, which the People are not in the constitution of Kings. But suppose their consent did at first give power to Kings; when their consent is given for them and their successors, to a King and His heirs, can the succeeding people cut off the entail, and retract the consent their ancestors have given? By what right? with what justice? I know not: but the people may contract for them and their successors in the conveyance of sovereign power, (if ever they had it in their hands to give) as any man may in the conveyance of his lands or goods: and that such conveyance may be as binding to successors in the one, as in the other; and then I am sure they cannot have power at all times, and in all succeeding ages, to resume what they have so given. Our King's right (so far as it is derived from the people) is of this kind. And if he had no other grounds for his claim of sovereignty, (as it is most certain that he hath) such a consent once granted, were sufficient to bind the people, that it cannot ever be lawful for them, by a major part of them, (Coming in with a Nolumus hunc regnare super nos) to deprive him of that right. But surely, they would never make so absolute a grant of their power to Princes, as to divest themselves of it. Good Sir, show me that proviso in their grant. But it seems to you unnatural they should: 
Pag. 3.  I do not wonder it should seem so to you, who make it agreeable to the clearest beams of human reason, and the strongest inclinations of nature; 
Pag. 16  (and by consequence, as you would persuade the World, justifiable:) For every private man to defend himself by force, if assaulted, though by the force of a Magistrate, or his own Father; and though he be not without all confidence by flight, &c. I wish whilst you have such recourse to nature, you would not forget Christianity, which teaches subjection and obedience, and gives no liberty (either to private men, or the major part of the communality) of resistance; but saith, They that resist, 
Rom. 13  shall receive to themselves damnation. And if the Observatur be a Gentleman, he should tender how he hath recourse to nature in point of right, lest he give occasion to some Wat. Tyler's chaplain, to preach again upon that Text: 

When Adam dolve, and Eve span,  
Who was then a Gentleman.   He may find a goodly Sermon upon that Text, set down by John Stow, in Richard the second, and such Doctrine delivered upon it; the use of which would shake his title to his inheritance, and the name of Gentleman.   

POSITION IV.  
THat no Member of the Parliament ought to be troubled for Treason, &c. without leave.   

Observator.  
This is intended of suspicions only, and when leave may seasonably be had; and when competent accusers appear not in the impeachment.   

ANIMADVERSION IV.  
HIs majesty hath said so much of this, and so little of it hath been answered, (or indeed is answerable,) that I shall not need to say much: only I observe the modesty of this observator, that he doth not absolutely say they are not to be troubled for those crimes, but not upon suspicion only; &c. I know not what he may call suspicions, but I believe the best evidences may easily be held for bare suspicions, if they may not have liberty to speak out; and that they cannot have, unless the accused be first in safe custody, and brought to trial, where they may legally be produced. And, I believe, few wise men will think it reasonable, that the grounds of suspicion of Treason should necessarily be opened before trial.   

POSITION V  
THat the sovereign power resides in both Houses of Parliament, The King having no negative voice.   

Observator.  
This power is not claimed as ordinary, nor to any purpose, but to save the kingdom from ruin; and in case, where the King is so seduced, as that he prefers dangerous men, and persecutes his loyal Subjects.   

ANIMADVERSION V.  
HIs majesty infers upon this Position, That himself must be subject to their Commands. This sounds but harshly in the ears of loyal Subjects. That any posture wherein they can be put, can raise Subjects to a capacity of sovereignty, and reduce their sovereign to become their Subject. But he comforts us here, and tells us, this power is not claimed as ordinary, nor to any purpose, &c. This is but poor comfort: it is not, but it may be in good time, if they please. He doth not say, they shall not hereafter, and cannot claim it as ordinary, and to other purposes then that he names. So that there may be other causes that may make them claim this power, as well as this. But indeed they need no other, if it be in their power to declare that to be the case of the King and kingdom when they please: But they will never do it, but where there is a just cause for it, and the truth leads them to it. Truly, I believe honourably of the Justice and wisdom of Parliaments; but I do believe that they are not either infallible, or that they cannot possibly do amiss. And the Observator must bring better arguments; (and I fear he cannot bring so good) to make me believe otherwise, than ever yet were brought for the infallibility of a general council. But I have said enough for the present of the residence of sovereign power in the Parliament, and the ground of their claim to it, by the virtue of representation in my third Animadversion. I shall here only give the Reader a brief gloss upon the language here used by the observator to save the kingdom from ruin, (that is from Monarchy or being governed by the King.) The King is seduced, that is, he is persuaded (by his own understanding, and other evil counsellors,) not to part with his sovereignty, nor to become a Subject to his Subjects. He prefers dangerous men, (that is, such as would have him still to be their King.) persecutes his loyal Subjects, that is, such as would rule him, and the people at their pleasure.   

POSITION VI.  
THat the Levying of Forces against the personal commands of the King, (though accompanied with his presence) is not levying of war against the King: but war against his authority, not Person, is war against the King.   

Observator.  
If this were not so, the Parliament seeing a seduced King, ruining himself, and the kingdom, could not save both, but stand and look on.   

ANIMADVERSION VI.  
I Thought this Position so strangely paradoxal, and so apparently contrary to reason, and common sense, that no man would have appeared in the defence of it. Yet this Observator never blushes, nor blinkes at it, but affirms it stoutly. But for all that, I shall believe very slowly, That the King's Person can at any time be without the King, or without his Authority: Or that they may destroy the King's Person to preserve the King. My faith is not strong enough to believe these sublime points, and mysteries of State: I shall subscribe thus far, That war against the King's Authority (though in the absence of his Person) is war against the King: But that the King and his Person should be' intwo places, will never (I fear) down with me. But however I'll see his reason: What's that? Why else the Parliament seeing a seduced King, ruining himself and his kingdom, could not save both, but must stand and look on. Surely this reason is full of weight, and ready to burst, it is so big with probability. I suppose the Reader understands his language here by my former gloss: But if we should take the words as they sound, the reason would seem as strange, as that which it is brought to confirm. The King ruining himself, and his kingdom, a mad King, or an idiot (He means) and then 'twere fit the Parliament appointed him a guardian. Ruining himself and his kingdom. Is it possible, that the King should ruin himself and his kingdom. What? The King alone? Is he alone able to do it without the people? It is hardly credible: If he have the people on his side, and a prevailing major party, I think the observator (standing to his own Principles) will not deny that he hath sovereign power with him, and that it is unnatural to think the Community should destroy itself. But the Community (he will say) is to be looked at in Parliament. Well, But good Sir, may not the people withdraw the power of representation, which they granted to the Parliament; was their grant so absolute, and so irrevocable, that they dispossess themselves wholly of taking or exercising that power, in their own proper persons? Remember your principles about the conveying of sovereign power into the hands of Kings; and if you can show no better Cards for their power of representation, than the people's revocable consent, (and I would fain know why it should be more revocable from Kings than men) you will find their tenure in it very tickle.   

POSITION VII.  
THat according to some Parliaments they may depose Kings.   

Observator.  
'Tis denied that any King was deposed by a free Parliament, fairly elected.   

ANIMADVERSION VII.  
I Like this note better than all the rest, and am wholly of his mind: That never any free Parliament, fairly elected, deposed any King: and I hope (whatsoever his principles seem to insinuate) they do not believe they have power to do it, pray that they may never attempt, (at least, not be able) to depose the King, or destroy Monarchy.  
FINIS.