OBSERVATIONS upon some of his majesty's late Answers and Expresses.  
IN this contestation between regal and Paliamentary power, for methods sake it is requisite to consider f●●se of regal, then of Parliamentary Power, and in both to consider the efficient, and final causes, and the means by which they are supported. The King attributeth the original of his royalty to God, and the Law, making no mention of the grant, consent, or trust of man therein, but the truth is, God is no more the author of regal, then of aristocratical power, nor of supreme, then of subordinate command; nay, that dominion which is usurped, and not just, yet whilst it remains dominion, and till it be legally again devested, refers to God, as to its Author and donor, as much as that which is hereditary. And that Law which the King mentioneth, is not to be understood to be any special ordinance sent from heaven by the ministry of Angels or Prophets (as amongst the Jews it sometimes was) It can be nothing else amongst Christians but the Pactions and agreements of such and such politic corporations. Power is originally inherent in the people, and it is nothing else but that might and vigour which such or such a society of men contains in itself, and when by such or such a Law of common consent and agreement it is derived into such and such hands, God confirms that Law: and so man is the free and voluntary Author, the Law is the Instrument, and God is the establisher of both. And we see, not that Prince which is the most potent over his subjects, but that Prince which is most Potent in his subjects, is indeed most truly potent, for a King of one small City, if he be entrusted with a large Prerogative, may be said to be more Potent over his subjects, than a King of many great Regions, whose prerogative is more limited: and yet in true reality of power, that King is most great and glorious, which hath the most and strongest subjects, and not he which tramples upon the most contemptible vassels. This is therefore a great and fond error in some Princes to strive more to be great over their people, then in their people, and to eclipse themselves by impoverishing, rather than to magnify themselves by infranchising their Subjects. This we see in France at this day, for were the Peasants there more free, they would be more rich and magnanimous, and were they so, their King were more puissant; but now by affecting an adulterate power over his Subjects, the King there loses a true power in his Subjects, embracing a cloud instead of Juno, but thus we see that power is but secondary and derivative in Princes, the fountain and efficient cause is the people, and from hence the inference is just, the King, though he be singulis Major, yet he is universis minor, for if the people be the true efficient cause of power, it is a rule in nature quicquid efficit tale, est magis tale. And hence it appears that at the founding of authorities, when the consent of societies conveys rule into such and such hands, it may ordain what conditions, and prefix what bounds it pleases, and that no dissolution ought to be thereof, but by the same power by which it had its constitution.  
As for the final cause of regal authority, I do not find any thing in the King's papers denying, that the same people is the final, which is the efficient cause of it, and indeed it were strange if the people in subjecting itself to command, should aim at any thing but its own good in the first and last place. 'tis true according to Machavills politics, Princes ought to aim at greatness, not in, but over their Subjects, and for the achieving of the same, they ought to propose to themselves, no greater good than the spoiling and breaking the spirits of their Subjects, nor no greater mischief, then common freedom, neither ought they to promote and cherish any servants but such as are most fit for rapine and oppression, nor depress and prosecute any as enemies, but such as are gracious with the populacy for noble and gallant Acts.  
To be deliciae humani generis is grown fordid with Princes, to be public torments and carnificines, and to plot against those Subjects whom by nature they ought to protect, is held Caesar-like, and therefore bloody Borgia by mere cruelty & t●eachery hath gotten room in the calendar of witty, and of spirited Heroes. And our English Court of late years hath drunk too much of this State poison, for either we have seen favourites raised to poll the people, and razed again to pacify the people; or else (which is worse for King and people too) we have seen engines of mischief preserved against the people, and upheld against Law, merely that mischief might not want encouragement. But our King here, doth acknowledge it the great business of his coronation oath to protect us: And I hope under this word protect, he intends not only to shield us from all kind of evil, but to promote us also to all kind of political happiness according to his utmost devoir, and I hope he holds himself bound thereunto, not only by his oath, but also by his very Office, and by the end of his sovereign dignity. And though all single persons ought to look upon the late Bills passed by the King as matters of Grace with all thankfulness and humility, yet the King himself looking upon the whole State, aught to acknowledge that he cannot merit of it, and that whatsoever he hath granted, if it be for the prosperity of his people (but much more for their ease) it hath proceeded but from his mere duty. If Ship money, if the star Chamber, if the High Commission, if the Votes of Bishops and Popish Lords in the upper House, be inconsistent with the welfare of the kingdom, not only honour but justice itself challenges that they be abolished; the King ought not to account that a profit or strength to him, which is a loss and wasting to the people, nor ought he to think that perished to him which is gained to the people: The word grace sounds better in the people's mouths then in his, his dignity was erected to preserve the commonalty, the commonalty was not created for his service: and that which is the end is far more honourable and valuable in nature and policy, then that which is the means. This directs us then to the transcendent {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} of all politics, to the Paramount Law that shall give Law to all human laws whatsoever, and that is Salus Populi: The Law of Prerogative itself, it is subservient to this Law, and were it not conducing thereunto, it were not necessary nor expedient. Neither can the right of conquest be pleaded to acquit Princes of that which is due to the people as the Authors, or ends of all power, for mere force cannot alter the course of nature, or frustrate the tenor of Law, and if it could, there were more reason, why the people might justify force to regain due liberty, than the Prince might to subvert the same. And 'tis a shameful stupidity in any man to think that our Ancestors did not fight more nobly for their free customs and laws, of which the conqueror and his successors had in part disinherited them by violence and perjury, than they which put them to such conflicts, for it seems unnatural to me that any nation should be bound to contribute its own inherent puissance, merely to abet tyranny, and support slavery: and to make that which is more excellent, a prey to that which is of less worth. And questionless a native Prince, if mere Foree be right, may disfranchise his Subjects as well as a stranger, if he can frame a sufficient party, and yet we see this was the foolish sin of Rehoboam, who having deserted and rejected out of an intolerable insolence, the strength of ten tribes, ridiculously sought to reduce them again with the strength of two. I come now from the cause, which conveys Royalty, and that for which it is conveyed, to the nature of the conveyance. The word Trust is frequent in the King's Papers, and therefore I conceive the King does admit that his interest in the crown is not absolute, or by a mere donation of the people, but in part conditionate and fiduciary. And indeed all good Princes without any express contract betwixt them and their Subjects, have acknowledged that there did lie a great and high trust upon them; nay Heathen Princes that have been absolute, have acknowledged themselves servants to the public, and borne for that service, and professed that they would manage the public weal, as being well satisfied populi Rem esse, non suam. And we cannot imagine in the fury of war, (when laws have the least vigour) that any Generalissimo can be so uncircumscribed in power, but that if he should turn his Canons upon his own soldiers, they were ipso facto absolved of all obedience, and of all oaths and ties of allegiance whatsoever for that time, and bound by higher duty, to seek their own preservation by resistance and defence: wherefore if there be such tacit trusts and reservations in all public commands, though of the most absolute nature, that can be supposed, we cannot but admit, that in all well formed monarchies, where kingly Prerogative has any limits set, this must needs be one necessary condition, that the subject shall live both safe and free. The Charter of nature entitles all Subjects of all Countries whatsoever to safety by its supreme Law. But freedom indeed has divers degrees of latitude, and all Countries therein do not participate alike, but positive laws must every where assign those degrees.  
The great Charter of England is not straight in privileges to us, neither is the King's oath of small strength to that Charter, for that though it be more precise in the care of canonical privileges, and of Bishops and Clergymen (as having been penned by Popish Bishops) then of the Commonalty, yet it confirms all laws and rightful customs, amongst which we most highly esteem Parliamentary privileges; and as for the word Eligerit, whether it be future, or past, it skills not much; for if by this oaths Law. Justice and discretion be executed amongst us in all judgements (as well in, as out of Parliament) and if peace and godly agreement be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 amongst us all, and if the King defend and uphold all our laws and customs, we need not fear but the King is bound to consent to new laws if they be necessary, as well as defend old: for both being of the same necessity, the public trust must needs equally extend to both; and we conceive it one Parliamentary right and custom, that nothing necessary aught to be denied. And the word Eligerit, if it be in the perfect tense, yet shows that the people's election had been the ground of ancient laws and customs, and why the people's election in Parliament should not be now of as great moment as ever, I cannot discover.  
That which results then from hence, is, if our Kings receive all royalty from the people, and for the behoof of the people, and that by a special trust of safety and liberty expressly by the people limited, and by their own grants and oaths ratified, than our Kings cannot be said to have so unconditionate and high a propriety in all our lives, liberties and possessions, or in any thing else to the crown appertaining, as we have in their dignity, or in ourselves, and indeed if they had, they were not borne for the people, but merely for themselves, neither were it lawful or natural for them to expose their lives and fortunes for their Country, as they have been hitherto bound to do, according to that of our Saviour, Bonus Pastor ponit vitam pro ovibus. But now of Parliaments: Parliaments have the same efficient cause as monarchies, if not higher, for in the truth, the whole kingdom is not so properly the Author as the essence itself of Parliaments, and by the former rule 'tis magic tale, because we see ipsum quid quod efficit tale. And it is I think beyond all controversy, that God and the Law operate as the same causes, both in Kings and Parliaments, for God favours both, and the Law establishes both, and the act of men still concurres in the sustentation of both. And not to stay longer upon this, Parliaments have also the same final cause as Monarchies, if not greater, for indeed public safety and liberty could not be so effectually provided for by Monarchs till Parliaments were constituted, for the supplying of all defects in that Government.  
Two things especially are aimed at in Parliaments, not to be attained to by other means. First that the interest of the people might be satisfied; secondly that Kings might be the better counselled. In the summons of Edw. the first (Claus. 7. 111. 3. Dors.) we see the first end of Parliaments expressed: for he inserts in the writ that whatsoever affair is of public concernment, aught to receive public approbation, quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbari debet, or tructari. And in the same writ he saith, this is l●x ne tissima & provida circumspectione stabilita, there is not a word here, but it is observable, public approbation, consent, or treaty is necessary in all public expedients, and this is not a mere usage in England, but a Law, and this Law is not subject to any doubt or dispute, there is nothing more known, neither is this known Law extorted from Kings, by the violence and injustice of the people, it is duly and formally established, and that upon a great deal of reason, not without the providence and circumspection of all the states. Were there no further Antiquity, but the reign of Edward the first to recommend this to us, certainly so, there ought no reverence to be withheld from it, for this Prince was wise, fortunate, just, and valiant beyond all his Predecessors, if not successors also, and therefore it is the more glory to our freedoms, that as weak and peevish Princes had most opposed them, so that he first repaired the breaches which the conquest had made upon them. And yet it is very probable that this Law was far ancienter than his reign, and the words lex stabilita & notissima seems to intimate, that the conquest itself, had never wholly buried this in the public ruin and confusion of the State. It should seem at this time Llewcllins troubles in Wales were not quite suppressed, and the French King was upon a design to invade some pieces of ours in France, and therefore he sends out this summons ad tractandum ordinandum, & faciendum cum Prelatis Proceris & aliis incolis Regni, for the prevention of these dangers: These words tractandum, ordinandum, faciendum, do fully prove that the people in those days were summoned ad consensum, as well as ad concilium, and this Law, quod omnes tangit, &c. shows the reason and ground upon which that consent and approbation is founded. It is true we find in the reign of Edward the third, that the Commons did desire that they might forbear counselling in things de queux ils nount pas cognizance; the matters in debate were concerning some intestine commotions, the guarding of the Marches of Scotland and the Seas; and therein they renounce not their right of consent, they only excuse themselves in point of counsel, referring it rather to the King and his counsel. How this shall derogate from Parliaments either in point of consent or counsel I do not know, for at last they did give both, and the King would not be satisfied without them, and the passage evinces no more but this, that that King was very wise and Warlike, and had a very wise counsel of war, so that in those particulars the Commons thought them most fit to be consulted, as perhaps the more knowing men.  
Now upon a due comparing of these passages with some of the King's late Papers let the world judge whether Parliaments have not been of late much lessened and injured. The King in one of his late Answers, alleges that his Writs may teach the Lords and Commons the extent of their Commission and trust, which is to be Counsellors, not commanders, and that not in all things, but in quibusdam arduiis, and the case of Wentworth is cited, who was by Queen Elizabeth committed (sitting the Parliament) for proposing that they might advise the Queen in some things, which she thought beyond their cognizance, although Wentworth was then of the House of Commons.  
And in other places the King denies the assembly of the Lords and Commons when he withdraws himself, to be rightly named a Parliament, or to have any power of any Court, and consequently to be any thing, but a mere convention of so many private men.  
Many things are here asserted utterly destructive to the honour, right, & being of Parliaments. For first, because the Law had trusted the King with a Prerogative to discontinue Parliaments: therefore if he did discontinue Parliaments to the danger or prejudice of the kingdom, this was no breach of that trust, because in formality of Law the people might not assemble in Parliament but by the King's writ, therefore in right and equity they were concluded also, so that if the King would not grant his Writ, when it was expedient, he did not prove unfaithful, or do any wrong to the people; for where no remedy is, there is no right. This doctrine was mischievous to us when the King had a Prerogative to diffuse Parliaments, and if it be not now exploded and protested against, may yet be mischievous in the future dissolution of Parliaments, for that power still remains in the King's trust; and if to go against the intent of trnst be no wrong, because perhaps it is remediless, our triennial Parliaments may prove but of little service to us; Secondly when Parliaments are assembled they have no Commission to counsel but in such points as the King pleases to propose, if they make any transition in other matters, they are liable to imprisonment at the King's pleasure, witness Wentworth's Case. A mere example (though of Queen Elizabeth) is no Law, for some of her actions were retracted, and yet without question Queen Elizabeth might do that which a Prince less beloved could never have done: There is a way by goodness and clemency for Princes to make themselves almost unlimitable, and this way Queen Elizabeth went, and without doubt had her goodness and Grace been feigned, she might have usurped an uncontrollable arbitrary lawless Empire over us. The sun sooner makes the travailour desert his cloak, than the wind; And the gracious acts of soft Princes (such as Tiberius did at first personate) if they be perfectly dissembled may more easily invade the subject's liberty than the furious proceedings of such as Caligula was, but we must not be presidented in apparent violations of Law by Queen Elizabeth; for as general reverence gave her power to do more than ordinary, so her perfect undissembled goodness, upon which her reverence was firmly planted, made the same more than ordinary fact in her, less dangerous than it would have been in another Prince. In this point then leaving the mere fact of Queen Elizabeth; we will retire back to the ancient Law and reason of Edward the first, and we thereby shall maintain that in all cases wheresoever the generality is touched, the generality must be consulted.  
Thirdly, if the Lords and Commons be admitted to some Cognizance of all things wherein they are concerned, yet they must merely counsel, they must not command, and the King Reasons thus, that it is impossible the same trust should be irrevocably committed to us, and our heirs for ever, and yet a power above that trust (for so the Parliament pretends) be committed to others, and the Parliament being a body and dissolvable at pleasure, it is strange if they should be guardians and controllers in the manage of that trust which is granted to the King for ever. It is true, two supremes cannot be in the same sense and respect, but nothing is more known or assented to then this, that the King is singulis major, and yet universis minor, this we see in all conditional Princes, such as the Prince of Orange, &c.  
And though all Monarchies are not subject to the same condition, yet there scarce is any Monarchy but is subject to some conditions, and I think to the most absolute Empire in the world this condition is most natural and necessary, That the safety of the people is to be valued above any right of his, as much as the end is to be preferred before the means; it is not just nor possible for any nation so to enslave itself, and to resign its own interest to the will of one Lord, as that that Lord may destroy it without injury, and yet to have no right to preserve itself: For since all natural power is in those which obey, they which contract to obey to their own ruin, or having so contracted, they which esteem such a contract before their own preservation are felonious to themselves, and rebellious to nature.  
The people then having entrusted their protection into the King's hands irrevocably, yet have not left that trust without all manner of limits, some things they have reserved to themselves out of Parliament, and some thing in Parliament, and this reservation is not at all inconsistent with the Prince's trust, though he desire to violate the same; but on the contrary, it is very aiding and strengthening to that trust, so far as the Prince seeks to perform it, for the people's good; but it is objected, that a temporary power ought not to be greater than that which is lasting and unalterable, if this were so, the Romans had done unpolitikely, in creating Dictators, when any great extremity assailed them, and yet we know it was very prosperous to them, sometimes to change the form of government; neither always living under circumscribed Consuls, nor yet under uncircumscribed Dictators: but it in further objected, that if we allow the Lords and Commons to be more than councillors, we make them Commanders and Controllers, and this is not suitable to royalty. We say here, that to consent is more than to counsel, and yet not always so much as to command and control; for in inferior Courts, the Judges are so councillors for the King, as that the King may not countermand their judgements, and yet it were an harsh thing to say, that they are therefore Guardians and Controllers of the King: and in Parliament, where the Lords and Commons represent the whole kingdom, (to whom so great a majesty is due) and sit in a far higher capacity than inferior Judges do, being vested with a right both to counsel and consent, the case is far stronger; and as we ought not to conceive, that they will either counsel or consent to any thing, but what is publicly advantageous; so by such council and consent, we cannot imagine the King limited or lessened: for if it was by so known a Law, and so wisely established in Edward the first's days', the right of the people, to be summoned at tractandum, ordinandum, faciendum, approbandum, in all things appertaining to the people, and this as then was not prejudicial to the King, why should the Kings Writ now abbreviate or annull the same, if the King himself be disable for many high matters, till consent in Parliament add vigour to him, it cannot be supposed that he comes thither merely to hear council, or that when he is more than counselled, that it is any derogation, but rather a supply of virtue to him. A fourth thing alleged to the derogation of Parliaments is, That whatsoever the right of Parliaments is to assemble or treat in all cases of a public nature, yet without the King's concurrence and consent, they are liveless conventions without all virtue and power, the very name of Parliament is not due to them. This allegation at one blow confounds all Parliaments, and subjects us to as unbounded a regiment of the King's mere will, as any Nation under Heaven ever suffered under. For by the same reason, that Parliaments are thus vertulesse and void Courts, upon the King's desertion of them, other Courts must needs be the like, & than what remains, but that all our laws, rights, & liberties, be either nowhere at all determinable, or else only in the King's breast? We contend not merely about the name Parliament, for the same thing was before that name, and therefore the intent is, that the great Assembly of the Lords and Commons do not represent and appear in the right of the whole kingdom, or else that there is no honour, nor power, nor judicature, residing in that great and majestical Body, than which, scarce any thing can be more unnatural. But these divisions between the King and Parliament, and betwixt the Parliament and kingdom, seeming more uncouth, 'tis attempted to divide further between part and part in Parliament, so making the major part not fully concluding, and in the major part, between a faction misleading, and a party mislead. Such excellent Masters of division has Machiavils rule (divide & impera) made since the 3 of November 1640. 'Tis a wonderful thing, that the King's Papers being frayted scarce with any thing else but such doctrines of division, tending all to the subversion of our ancient fundamental constitutions which support all our ancient liberties, and to the erection of arbitrary rule, should find such applause in the world: but we say further, that there is manifest difference between deserting and being deserted: if the wife leave her husband's bed, and become an adulteress, 'tis good reason that she lose her dowry, and the reputation of a wife, but if the husband will causelessly reject her, 'tis great injustice that she should suffer any detriment thereby, or be dismissed of any privilege whatsoever. So if the King have parted from His Parliament, merely because they sought His oppression, and he had no other means to withstand their tyranny, let this proclaim them a void Assembly: but if ill counsel have withdrawn him, for this wicked end merely, that they might defeat this Parliament, and derogate from the fundamental rights of all Parliaments (as His Papers seem to express) under colour of charging some few factious persons in this Parliament, (God forbid) that this should disable them from saving themselves and the whole state, or from seeking justice against their enemies. So much of the Subjects right in Parliament.  
Now of that right which the Parliament may do the King by council, if the King could be more wisely or faithfully advised by any other Court, or if His single judgement were to be preferred before all advice whatsoever, 'twere not only vain, but extremely inconvenient, that the whole kingdom should be troubled to make Elections, and that the parties elected should attend the public business; but little need to be said, I think every man's heart tells him, that in public Consultations, the many eyes of so many choice Gentlemen out of all parts, see more than fewer, and the great interest the Parliament has in common justice and tranquillity, and the few private ends they can have to deprave them, must needs render their counsel more faithful, impartial, and religious, than any other. That dislike which the Court has ever conceived against Parliaments, without all dispute is a most pregnant proof of the integrity, and salubrity of that public advice, and is no disparagement thereof; for we have ever found enmity and antipathy betwixt the Court and the country, but never any till now betwixt the Representatives, and the Body, of the kingdom represented. And were we not now, those dregs of human race upon whom the unhappy ends of the world are fallen, Calumny and envy herself would never have attempted, to obtrude upon us such impossible charges of Treason and Rebellion against our most sacred council, from the mouths of Popish, prelatical, and Military Courtiers.  
The King says; 'Tis imp●obable and impossible that His Cabinet counsellors, or his Bishops or soldiers, who must have so great a share in the misery, should take such pains in the procuring thereof, and spend so much time, and run so many hazards to make themselves slaves, and to ruin the freedom of this Nation: how strange is this? we have had almost 40 years' experience, that the Court way of preferment has been by doing public ill Offices, and we can nominate what Dukes, what Earls, what Lords, what Knights, have been made great and rich by base disservices to the State: and except Master Hollis his rich Widow, I never heard that promotion came to any man by serving in Parliament: but I have heard of trouble and imprisonment, but now see the traverse of fortune; The Court is now turned honest, my Lord of Straffords death has wrought a sudden conversion amongst them, and there is no other fear now, but that a few Hypocrites in Parliament will beguile the major part there, and so usurp over King, kingdom, and Parliament for ever, sure this is next to a prodigy, if it be not one: but let us consider the Lords and Commons as mere Counsellors without any power or right of Counselling or consenting, yet we shall see if they be not less knowing and faithful than other men, they ought not to be deserted, unless we will allow that the King may cause whither he will admit of any counsel at all or no, in the disposing of our lives, lands, and liberties. But the King says, that he is not bound to renounce his own understanding, or to contradict his own conscience for any Counsellors sake whatsoever. 'Tis granted in things visible and certain, that judge which is a sole judge and has competent power to see his own judgement executed, ought not to determine against the light of nature, or evidence of fact.  
The sin of Pilate was, that when he might have saved our Saviour from an unjust death, yet upon accusations contradictory in themselves, contrary to strange Revelations from Heaven, he would suffer Innocence to fall, and pass sentence of death, merely to satisfy a bloodthirsty multitude. But otherwise it was in my Lord of Straffords case, for there the King was not sole Judge, nay, he was uncapable of sitting as judge at all, and the delinquent was legally condemned, and such heinous matters had been proved against him, that his greatest friends were ashamed to justify them, and all impartial men of three whole kingdoms conceived them mortal; and therefore the King might therein, with a clear conscience have signed a warrant for his death, though he had dissented from the judgement. So if one judge on the same bench, dissent from three, or one juror at the bar from a eleven, they may submit to the major number, though perhaps less skilful than themselves without imputation of guilt: and if it be thus in matters of Law, a fortiori, 'tis so in matters of State, where the very satisfying of a multitude sometimes in things not otherwise expedient, may prove not only expedient, but necessary for the settling of peace, and ceasing of strife. For example: It was the request of the whole kingdom in the Parliament to the King, to intrust the Militiae, and the Magazine of Hull, &c. into such hands as were in the people's good esteem. Conscience and understanding could plead nothing against this, and if it could have been averred (as it could not, for the contrary was true) that this would have bred disturbance, and have been the occasion of greater danger, yet Where the people by public authority will seek any inconvenience to themselves, and the King is not so much interested in it as themselves, 'tis more inconvenience and injustice to deny then grant it: what blame is it then in Princes when they will pretend reluctance of conscience and reason in things behooveful for the people? and will use their fiduciarie power in denying just things, as if they might lawfully do whatsoever they have power to do, when the contrary is the truth, and they have no power to do but what is lawful and fit to be done. So much for the ends of Parliamentary power. I come now to the true nature of it, public consent: we see consent as well as counsel is requisite and due in Parliament and that being the proper foundation of all power (for omnis Potestas fundata est in voluntate) we cannot imagine that public consent should be anywhere more vigorous or more orderly than it is in Parliament. Man being depraved by the fall of Adam grew so untame and uncivil a creature, that the Law of God written in his breast was not sufficient to restrain him from mischief, or to make him sociable, and therefore without some magistracy to provide new orders, and to judge of old, and to execute according to justice, no society could be upheld, without society men could not live, and without laws men could not be sociable, and without authority somewhere invested, to judge according to Law, and execute according to judgement, Law was a vain and void thing, it was soon therefore provided that laws agreeable to the dictates of reason should be ratified by common consent, and that the execution and interpretation of those laws should be entrusted to some magistrate, for the preventing of common injuries betwixt Subject and Subject, but when it after appeared that man was yet subject to unnatural destruction, by the Tyranny of entrusted magistrates, a mischief almost as fatal as to be without all magistracy, how to provide a wholesome remedy therefore, was not so easy to be prevented. 'Twas not difficult to invent laws, for the limiting of supreme governors, but to invent how those laws should be executed or by whom interpreted, was almost impossible, nam quis custodiat ipsos custodes; To place a superior above a supreme, was held unnatural, yet what a liveless fond thing would Law be, without any judge to determine it, or power to enforce it; and how could human consociation be preserved, without some such Law? besides, if it be agreed upon, that limits should be prefixed to Princes, and judges appointed to decree according to those limits, yet an other great inconvenience will presently affront us; for we cannot restrain Princes too far, but we shall disable them from some good, as well as inhibit them from some evil, and to be disabled from doing good in some things, may be as mischievous, as to be enabled for all evils at mere discretion. Long it was ere the world could extricate itself out of all these extremities, or find out an orderly means whereby to avoid the danger of unbounded prerogative on this hand, and to excessive liberty on the other: and scarce has long experience yet fully satisfied the minds of all men in it. In the infancy of the world, when man was not so actificiall and obdurate in cruelty and oppression as now, and when policy was more rude, most Nations did choose rather to submit themselves to the mere discretion of their Lords, then to rely upon any limits: and to be ruled by Arbitrary edicts, then written Statutes. But since, Tyranny being grown more exquisite, and policy more perfect, (especially in countries where Learning and Religion flourish) few Nations will endure that thraldom which uses to accompany unbounded & unconditionate royalty, yet long it was ere the bounds and conditions of supreme Lords were so wisely determined or quietly conserved as now they are, for at first when Ephori, Tribuni, Curatores &c. were erected to poise against the scale of sovereignty, much blood was shed about them, and, states were put into new broils by them, and in some places the remedy proved worse than the disease. In all great distresses the body of the people was ever constrained to rise, and by the force of a Major party to put an end to all intestine strifes, and make a redress of all public grievances, but many times calamities grew to a strange height, before so cumbersome a body could be raised; and when it was raised, the motions of it were so distracted and irregular, that after much spoil and effution of blood, sometimes only one Tyranny was exchanged for another: till some way was invented to regulate the motions of the people's moliminous body, I think arbitrary rule was most safe for the world, but now since most Countries have found out an Art and peaceable Order for public Assemblies, whereby the people may assume its own power to do itself right without disturbance to itself, or injury to Princes, he is very unjust that will oppose this Art and order. That Princes may not be now beyond all limits and laws, nor yet left to be tried upon those limits and laws by any private parties, the whole community in its underived Majesty shall convene to do justice, and that this convention may not be without intelligence, certaine-times and places and forms shall be appointed for its regliment, and that the vastness of its own bulk may not breed confusion, by virtue of election and representation: a few shall act for many, the wise shall consent for the simple, the virtue of all shall redound to some, and the prudence of some shall redound to all. And sure, as this admirably composed Court which is now called a Parliament, is more regularly and orderly formed, than when it was called the mickle Synod, or Witenagenot, or when this real body of the people did throng together at it, so it is not yet perhaps without some defects, which by art and policy might receive further amendment, some divisions have been sprung of late between both Houses, and some between the King and both Houses, by reason of the uncertainty of jurisdiction; and some Lawyers doubt how far the Parliament is able to create new forms and precedents; and has a jurisdiction over itself. All these doubts would be solemnly solved. But in the first place, the true privileges of Parliaments, not only belonging to the being and efficacy of it, but to the honour also & compliment of it, would be clearly declared: for the very naming of privileges of Parliament, as if they were chimaeras to the ignoranter sort, & utterly unknown to the learned, hath been entertained with scorn since the beginning of this Parliament. The virtue of representation hath been denied to the Commons, and a severance has been made betwixt the parties chosen and the parties choosing, and so that great privileges of all privileges, that unmovable Basis of all honour and power, whereby the House of Commons claims the entire rite of all the Gentry and Commonalty of England, has been attempted to be shaken and disturbed, most of our late distempers and obstructions in Parliament have proceeded from this: that the people upon causeless defamation and unproved accusations have been so prone to withdraw themselves from their representations, and yet there can be nothing under Heaven, next to renouncing God, which can be more perfidious and more pernicious in the people than this.  
Having now premised these things, I come to the main difficulties lying at this time in dispute before us, it is left unquestioned that the legislative power of this kingdom is partly in the King, and partly in the kingdom, and that in ordinary cases, when it concerns not the saving of the people from some great danger or inconvenience, neither the King can make a general binding Law or Ordinance without the Parliament, or the Parliament without the King, and this is by a known maxim, Non recurrendum est ad extraordinaria &c.  
It ought to be also as unquestioned, that where this ordinary course cannot be taken for the preventing of public mischiefs, any extraordinary course that is for that purpose the most effectual, may justly be taken and executed by the most transcendent overruling Primum Mobile of all human laws, if the King will not join with the people, the people may without disloyalty save themselves, and if the people should be so unnatural as to oppose their own preservation, the King might use all possible means for their safety, yet this seems to be denied by the King, for he sets forth Proclamations and citys Statutes in them to prove, that the power of levying arms and forces is solely in him, and he presses them indefinitely, not leaving to the Subject any right at all of rising in arms, though for their own necessary defence, except he joins his consent and Authority: In the same manner also, he so assumes to himself a share in the legislative power, as without his concurrence the Lords and Commons have no right at all to make any temporary orders for putting the kingdom into a posture of defence, in what public distress soever: And therefore in Sir John Hothaems case, he doth not only charge him of Treason, for observing the Parliaments instructions and Commissions in a pretended danger, but he pronounceth the mere act Treason, let the circumstances be what they will. Let the world judge whether this be not contrary to the clearest beams of human reason, and the strongest inclinations of nature, for every private man may defend himself by force, if assaulted, though by the force of a Magistrate or his own father, and though he be not without all confidence by flight &c. yet here whole nations being exposed to enmity and hazard, being utterly uncapable of flight, must yield their throats and submit to Assassinates, if their King will not allow, them defence.  
See if this be not contrary to the original, end, and trust of all power and law, and whether it do not open a gap to as vast and arbitrary a prerogative as the Grand signior has, and whither this be not the main ground of all those bitter invectives almost which are iterated and enforced with so much eloquence in all the Kings late papers. See if we are not left as a pretty to the same bloody hands as have done such diabolical exploits in Ireland, or to any others which can persuade the King that the Parliament is not well affected to him, if we may not take up arms for our own safety, or if it be possible for us to take up arms, without some Votes or ordinances to regulate the Militia, or to make our defence manly, and not bestial and void of all counsel, the name of a King is great I confess, and worthy of great honour, but is not the name of people greater? let not mere terms deceive us, let us weigh names and things together, admit that God sheds here some rays of Majesty upon his vicegerents on earth, yet except we think he doth this out of particular love to Princes themselves, and not to communties of men, we must not hence invert the course of nature, and make nations subordinate in end to Princes. My Lord of Strafford, says that the Law of Prerogative is like that of the first table, but the Law of Common safety and utility like that of the second, and hence concludes, that precedence is to be given to that which is more sacred, (that is) regal Prerogative. Upon this ground all Parasites build when they seek to hoodwink Princes for their own advantages, and when they assay to draw that esteem to themselves, which they withdraw from the people: and this doctrine is common, because 'tis so acceptable: for as nothing is more pleasant to Princes then to be so deified, so nothing is more gainful to Courtiers then so to please. But to look into terms a little more narrower, and dispel umbrages; Princes are called Gods, Fathers, Husbands, Lords, Heads, &c. and this implies them to be of more worth and more unsubordinate in end, than their Subjects are, who by the same relation must stand as Creatures, Children, Wives, Servants, Members, &c. I answer, these terms do illustrate some excellency in Princes by way of similitude, but must not in all things be applied, and they are most truly applied to Subjects, taken divisim, but not conjunctim: Kings are God's to particular men, secundum quid, and are sanctified with some of God's royalty; but it is not for themselves, it is for an extrinsical end, and that is the prosperity of God's people, and that end is more sacred than the means, as to themselves they are most unlike God; for God cannot be obliged by any thing extrinsical, no created thing whatsoever can be of sufficient value or excellency to impose any duty or tye upon God, as Subjects upon Princes: therefore granting Prerogative to be but mediate, and the weal public to be final, we must rank the laws of liberty in the first Table, and Prerogative in the second, as Nature doth require; and not after a kind of blasphemy ascribe that unsubordination to Princes, which is only due to God; so the King is a Father to his People, taken singly, but not universally; for the father is more worthy than the son in nature, and the son is wholly a debtor to the father, and can by no merit transcend his duty, nor challenge any thing as due from his father; for the father doth all his offices meritoriously, freely, and unexactedly. Yet this holds not in the relation betwixt King & Subject, for its more due in policy, and more strictly to be challenged, that the King should make happy the People, than the People make glorious the King. This same reason is also in relation of Husband, Lord, &c. for the wife is inferior in nature, and was created for the assistance of man, and servants are hired for their Lord's mere attendance; but it is otherwise in the State betwixt man and man, for that civil difference which is for civil ends, and those ends are, that wrong and violence may be repressed by one for the good of all not that servility and drudgery may be imposed upon all, for the pomp of one. So the head naturally doth not more depend upon the body, than that does upon the head, both head and members must live and die together; but it is otherwise with the Head political, for that receives more subsistence from the body than it gives, and being subservient to that, it has no being when that is dissolved, and that may be preserved after its dissolution.  
And hence it appears, that the very order of Princes binds them not to be insolent, but lowly; and not to aim at their own good but secondarily, contrary to the Florentines wretched politics. And it follows, that such Princes, as contrary to the end of government, effect evil in stead of good, insulting in common servility, rather than promoting common security, and placing their chiefest pomp in the sufferance of their Subjects, commit such sins as God will never countenance; nay, such as the unnatural father, the tyrannous husband, the merciless master is not capable of committing; nay, we must conceive that Treason in Subjects against their Prince, so far only as it concerns the Prince, is not so horrid in nature, as oppression in the Prince exercised violently upon Subjects. God commands Princes to study his Law day and night, and not to amass great treasures, or to increase their Cavaliers, or to lift up their hearts above their brethren, nor to wast their own demeanes, lest necessity should tempt them to rapine. But on the contrary, Machiavel's Instructions puff up Princes, That they may treat Subjects not as brethren, but as beasts, as the basest beasts of drudgery, teaching them by subtlety, and by the strength of their Militia, to uphold their own will, and to make mere sponges of the public coffers: And sure if that cursed heretic in policy could have invented any thing more repugnant to God's commands, and nature's intention, he had been held a deeper Statesman than he is; but I conceive it is now sufficiently cleared, that all rule is but fiduciarie, and that this and that Prince is more or less absolute, as he is more or less trusted, and that all trusts differ not in nature or intent, but in degree only and extent: and therefore since it is unnatural for any Nation to give away its own propriety in itself absolutely, and to subject itself to a condition of servility below men, because this is contrary to the supreme of all laws, we must not think that it can stand with the intent of any trust, that necessary defence should be barred, and natural preservation denied to any people; no man will deny, but that the People may use means of defence, where Princes are more conditionate, and have a sovereignty more limited, and yet these being only less trusted than absolute Monarchs, and no trust being without an intent of preservation, it is no more intended that the People shall be remedilessly oppressed in a Monarchy, than in a republic. But tracing this no further, I will now rest upon this, that whatsoever the King has alleged against raising of arms, and publishing of Orders indefinitely, is of no force to make Sir John Hotham, or those by whose authority he acted, traitors, unless it fall out that there was no ground nor necessity of such defence. So much of danger certain.  
I will now suppose the danger of the Commonwealth uncertain, the King says; the Parliament denies; the King commands, the Parliament forbids: The King says the Parliament is seduced by a traitorous faction; the Parliament says the King is seduced by a Malignant Party: the King says the Parliament tramples upon his crown; the Parliament says the King intends war upon them: to whether now is the Subject bound to adhere? I will not insist much upon general presumptions, though they are of moment in this case: for without all question 'tis more likely, that Princes may err and have sinister ends, than such general conventions of the Nobility, Gentry, and Commonalty so instituted, and regulated as ours are in England. The King does highly admire the ancient, equal, happy, well poised and never enough commended constitution of this Government, which hath made this kingdom, so many years both famous and happy, to a great degree of envy, and amongst the rest, our Courts of Parliament: and therein more especially, that power which is legally placed in both Houses, more than sufficient (as he says) to prevent and restrain the power of Tyranny; But how can this be? if the King may at His pleasure take away the being of Parliament merely by dissent, if they can do nothing but what pleases Him, or some Clandestine counsellors, and if upon any attempt to do any thing else, they shall be called Traitors, and without further arraignment, or legal proceeding, be deserted by the kingdom whose representations they are, what is there remaining to Parliaments? are they not more servile than other inferior Courts; nay, are they not in a worse condition than the meanest Subject out of Parliament? and how shall they restrain tyranny, when they have no subsistence at all themselves; nay, nor no benefit of Justice, but arbitrary. Surely if these principles hold, they will be made the very Engines and Scaffolds whereby to erect a government more tyrannical than ever was known in any other kingdom, we have long groaned for them, but we are likely now to groan under them: but you will say, the King hath a power of dissent, he may use it at his pleasure, if he have none, than he is a mere cipher, and the Parliament may tyrannize at pleasure: either the one or the other must be predominant, or else by a mutual opposition all must perist; and why not the King predominant rather than the Parliament? We had a maxim, and it was grounded upon Nature, and never till this Parliament withstood, that a community can have no private ends to mislead it, and make it injurious to itself, and no age will furnish us with one story of any Parliament freely elected, and held, that ever did injure a whole kingdom, or exercise any tyranny, nor is there any possibility how it should. The King may safely leave his highest rights to Parliaments, for none knows better, or affects more the sweetness of this so well-balanced a Monarchy than they do, and it hath been often in their power under great provocations to load that rule with greater fetters & clogs, but they would not. Let us mark but the nature, the right, the power, the wisdom, the justice, of Parliaments, and we shall find no cause to suspect them, of such unmatchable treasons and conspiracies as are this day, and never was before charged upon them; for our Chronicles makes it apparent, that there is scarce any other Nation wherein Monarchy has been more abused by rash inconsiderate Princes, then in this, nor none at all wherein it hath been more inviolably adored, and loyally preserved from all diminution, I wish it were not some incitement to those execrable Instruments, which steal the King's heart from us, that they think the Religion of Protestants too tame, and the Nation of the English too insensible of injuries; but I hope God will the more tenderly resent these things. The composition of Parliaments, I say, takes away all jealousies, for it is so equally, and geometrically proportionable, and all the States do so orderly contribute their due parts therein, that no one can be of any extreme predominance, the multitude loves Monarchy better than Aristocracy, and the Nobility and Gentry, prefer it as much beyond Democracy, and we see the multitude hath only a representative influence, so that they are not likely to sway, and yet some influence they have, and that enough to preserve themselves from being overswayed. We also in England have not a Nobility and Gentry so independent and potent as in France, Germany, Denmark, &c. Nor as they were here immediately after the Conquest, by reason of their great feoffs, whereby to give laws either to the crown, or the people; but they stand at such fair and comely distances between the King and people, and also between themselves, that they serve for an excellent screen and bank (as the King's words are) to assist both King and people against the encroachments of each other. And as the middle Region of the air treats loving offices betwixt heaven and earth, restraining the fumes and exhalations of Sea and Land, that they ascend not too high, and at the same instant, allaying that restless Planets scorching flames, which else might prove insufferable to the lower Elements: So doth both Houses of Parliament, as peaceably and sweetly arbitrate betwixt the Prince and his poorest Vassals, and declining. Tyranny on the one side, and Ochlocracy on the other, preserving entire to the King the honour of His Scopter, and to the people the patrimony of freedom. Let us not then seek to corrupt this purity of composition, or conceive that both Gentry; and Nobility can combine against the King, when they have no power but derivative, the one more depending upon the King, and the other upon the people, but both most excellently to affect the good of the whole, and to prevent the exorbitance of any one part. Next, the right of all the Lords and Commons in this State is so great, that no change of government can be advantage to them in that temporary capacity, except they could each one obtain an hereditary crown, which is a thing utterly impossible. Next, their power is merely derivative, so that except we will conceive that both King and people will be consenting to the usurpation, nothing can be done; and if we conceive that they may by fraud gain their consent, nothing can withstand them. Lastly, their wisdom hath been ever held unquestionable, and their justice inviolable, no Prince that ever cast himself thereupon was defrauded, no Prince that ever declined the same, proved prosperous. In sum, Parliamentary government being used as physic, not diet by the intermission of due spaces of time, has in it all that is excelleut in all forms of Government whatsoever. If the King be an affector of true liberty, he has in Parliament a power as extensive as ever the Roman Dictators was, for the preventing of all public distresses. If the King be apt to intrude upon the common liberties, the people have hereby many democratical advantages to preserve themselves. If war be, here is the Unitive virtue of Monarchy to encounter it, here is the admirable council of Aristocracy to manage it. If Peace be, here is the industry and courage of democracy to improve it. Let us now see how Kings usually, govern without Parliaments especially such as are ruled by council averse from Parliaments. I need not speak of France, and other Countries, where together with these general Assemblies, all liberty is fall'n to the ground; I need not travel further than our stories, nay, I need not pass beyond our own Times, my discourse will be endless if I do.  
The wisest of our Kings following their own private advice, or being conducted by their own wills, have mistaken their best subjects, for their greatest enemies, and their greatest enemies for their best subjects, and upon such mistakes our justest Kings, have often done things very dangerous. And without upbraiding I may say, that this King by the fraud of such as have incensed him against Parliaments, and his most loyal people, hath so far been possessed with a confidence in the zeal of traitors, that he hath scarce ever yet enjoyed that grandeur and splendour which his Ancestors did enjoy. He hath met in the field with two contrary Armies of his own subjects, and yet that Army which he went to destroy, and advanced their colours against him, was more loyal than that which himself commanded, and yet both were more loyal than those fatal whisperers which engaged them so one against the other, if the whole kingdom of Scotland had been more harkened to, rather than some few malignants of the Popish, and prelatical faction, the King had sooner found out the fidelity of that whole kingdom, and the infidelity of that wicked faction. But as things than stood, the King was as much incensed against them, as he is against us now, and he that did then persuade him that the Scots were no Rebels, seemed as great an enemy as he doth now that shall defend the innocency of Sir John Hotham; there was no difference at all betwixt that ease of the Scots, and this of ours, the King attributed then as much to his own conscience and understanding, as he doth now, and he attributed as little then to the public Votes of that kingdom, as he doth now to this, only in this, our condition is the more unhappy, because that so fresh and memorable experiment doth not at all profit us, but still by a strange kind of relapse, the King seems now the more firmly to rely upon his own private reason, and counsel, the more cause he hath to confide in public advertisements, and the more he professes to do contrary: the main question now is, whether the Court, or the Parliament gives the King the better council; the King says, he cannot without renouncing his own conscience and reason, prefer the Parliaments council before the Courts; and that which the King here calls Conscience and reason, can be nothing else but mere private opinion; for if the council of the Parliament were directly opposite to common understanding, and good conscience, and the council of the Court were evidently consonant thereunto, there needed no such contestation: For example, the Parliament conceives that such and such ill offices have been done to frame parties; and unite forces against the Parliament & the State, and therefore they desire that such towns, and Forts, and the public Militia may be entrusted to the custody and command of such Noblemen and Gentlemen as they confide in; the King's secret court-council suggests against this, that this request encloseth at reasonable intention in it, and that the aim is to wrest all power out of the King's hand, that he may be forced to depose himself; the effect of this is no more but to let the King know, that they are more wise and faithful than the Parliament, and that he may do royally to harken to them in condemning the Lords and Commons of most inexpiable, unnatural, impossible Treason, for they must needs love him better than the Parliament, but he cannot harken to the Lords and Commons without offering violence to his own reason and conscience; here we see the misery of all, if Princes may not be led by their own opinions, though infused by obscure whisperers, when they scandal the loyalty of whole kingdoms without cause, rather than by the sacred and awful counsels of whole Nations, they are denied liberty of conscience, and ravished out of their own understandings. And yet if Princes may be admitted to prefer such weak opinions before Parliamentary motives and petitions, in those things which concern the Lives, Estates, and Liberties of thousands, what vain things are Parliaments, what unlimitable things are Princes, what miserable things are subjects? I will enlarge myself no longer upon this endless theme: Let us look upon the Venetians, and such other free Nations, why are they so extremely jealous over their Princes, is it for fear lest they should attain to an absolute power? It is merely for fear of this bondage, that their Princes will dote upon their own wills, and despise public counsels and Laws, in respect of their own private opinions; were not this the sting of Monarchy, of all forms it were the most exquisite, and to all Nations it would be the most desirable: Happy are those Monarchs which qualify this sting, and happy are those people which are governed by such Monarchs.  
I come now to the particularities of our own present case, for it may be said, that though public advise be commonly better than private, yet in this case it may be otherwise; some men have advised the King, that the Parliament hath traitorous designs both against his Person & Crown, and not to be prevented but by absenting himself, denying his influence and concurrence, frustrasting and protesting against their proceedings is invalid and seditious, and laying heavy charges of Rebellion upon them, to this advise the King hearkens, so the Parliament requests, and advises the contrary, and now in the midst of all our calamities, of gasping Ireland, and bleeding England, the Parliament seeing that either they must make use of their legislative power and make ordinance to secure some Forts and settle the Militia of the kingdom in sure hands, and to prevent the seducers of the King, or else two kingdoms should probably be lost, they do accordingly. The King proclaims to the contrary notwithstanding. The question then as I conceive is this only, whether or no the King hath any just cause to suspect the Parliament of Treason (and can make appear to the world as some of his Papers mention) wherein they have attempted or plotted any thing against his person and crown, which was the only motive why he sought to absent himself from London, and to possess himself of Hull, and to frame such an impeachment against some of both Houses, if this can be affirmed and proved, the Parliament shall be held guilty in all their Votes, Ordinances and Commissions concerning Sir John Hotham and the Militia, &c. Although it be the first time that any free Parliament was ever so criminous, but if this cannot be proved, it must be granted that according to the Votes of Parliaments, the King's departure did by frustrating Parliamentary proceedings, in a time of such calamity and distress greatly endanger two kingdoms, and whosoever advised the King to that departure, and to the charging of Treason, since laid upon the Parliament (and all such as have obeyed them, in seeking to prevent public mischiefs) are as pernicious enemies to this State, as ever received their being from it. The business of Hull is most instanced in, let that be first surveyed, Sir John Hotham is to be looked upon but as the Actor, the Parliament as the Author in holding Hull, and therefore it is much wondered at, that the King seems more violent against the Actor than the Author, but since through the Actor the Author must needs be pierced, if the Act be found Treason, let us consider of circumstances, the same act may be treasonable or not, if such and such circumstances vary, for example, to possess a town and shut the gates against a King is Treason, if there be not something in the act or in the intention, or in the authority of him that shuts the gates to qualify and correct the nature of Treason in that act.  
The first thing then to be looked on is, that the King was merely denied entrance for that time, his general right was not denied, and no defying language was given, no act of violence was used, though the King for divers hours together did stand within Musket shot, and did use terms of defiance, and this makes the act merely defensive, or rather passive. And therefore how this should administer to the King any ground to levy guards at York, many men wonder, or that it should seem the same thing to the King, as if he had been pursued to the gates of York. Did the King without any fear treat Sir John Hotham as a traitor in the face of his Artillery, and after to enter Hull with twenty Horse only unarmed, and continue such a harsh Parley, so many hours, and yet when he was in York, in a County of so great assurance, could nothing but so many bands of Horse and Foot secure him from the same Sir John Hotham? The next thing considerable is the Parliaments intention: if the Parliament have here upon turned any of the townsmen out of their estates, or claimed any interest in it to themselves, or have disseized the King, utterly denying his right for the future, or have made any other use of their possession, but merely to prevent civil war, and to disfurnish the King's seducers of arms and Ammunition: let the State be branded with Treason, but if none of these things be by any credit, though their enemies should be judges, the most essential property of Treason must needs here be absent in this act.  
The next thing considerable is the Parliaments authority, if the Parliament be not virtually the whole kingdom itself, if it be not the supreme judicature, as well in matters of State as matters of Law, if it be not the great council of the kingdom, as well as of the King, to whom it belongeth by the consent of all nations to provide in all extraordinary cases, Ne quid detrimenti capiat Respub: let the brand of Treason stick upon it, nay if the Parliament would have used this forcible means unless petitioning would not have prevailed, or if their grounds of jealousy were merely vain, or if the jealousy of a whole kingdom can be counted vain, or if they claim any such right of judging of danger, and preventing them without the King's consent as ordinary and perpetual, and without any relation to public danger, let the reward of Treason be their guerdon.  
But if their authority be so sacred, their intention so loyal, their act free from offensive violence, and if the King might have prevented the same repulse by sending a messenger before hand, or by coming without such considerable Forces in so unexpected a manner, let not treason be here misplaced. Had Faux fall'n by a private man's Sword in the very instant, when he would have given fire to his train, that act had not been punishable; and the Scots in England took Newcastle but by private authority, yet there were other qualifications in that act sufficient to purge it of Treason, and he is not comprehensive of the value of a whole State, nor of the vigour of our national union which does not so interpret it; how much more unjust than is it that the whole State of England shall be condemned of Treason for doing such an act as this, when its own safety, wherein none can have so much interest as itself, was so highly touched? Let not all resistance to Princes be under one notion confounded, let the principles and ingredients of it be justly examined, and sometimes it will be held as pious and loyal to Princes themselves, as at other times it is destructive and impious. Let us by the same test try the actions, intentions, and authority of the Papists now in Ireland: and compare them with this business at Hull, and we shall see a diametrical contrariety between them. Their actions are all blood, rapine, and torture, all ages, all sexes, all conditions of men have tasted of their infernal cruelty. Their intentions are to extirpate that Religion which hath endeavoured so long to bring them from Idolatry and atheism, and to massacre that nation which hath endeavoured so gently to reduce them from poverty and bestial barbarism. Their chief leaders in this horrid tragedy, are Jesuits and mere Bandettoes, and the Authority of King, Parliament, and Magistracy is the principal thing which they strike at, and seek to overwhelm in this deplorable deluge of blood, such a direct contrariety then being betwixt the true rebels in Ireland, and the misnamed rebels here in England, the same men which condemn the one, if they would be true to themselves, they ought to commend the other, for we have had experience often in England, and other nations have had the like, that Kings have marched forth amongst their enemies to encounter with their friends, so easily are they to be flattered into error, and out of error to seek the ruin of those which aim at nothing but perdition. And yet questionless when Richard the second was environed with the Forces of Spencer, and his confederates, vowing to sacrifice their blood in his quarrel, and in defiance of the adverse traitorous peers, he which would have told him, that those Swords drawn for him, were in truth drawn against him and his best friends, and those Swords on the other side drawn against him, or rather against his seducers were indeed drawn for him, should have found but poor acceptance, for without doubt the King would have thought such a suggestion an abuse to his senses, to his reason, to his conscience, and an impudent imposture, worthy of nothing but scorn and indignation. And if it had been further pressed that the voice and council of the peers was the voice and council of the major and better part of the kingdom, whereas Spencer's party was but of inconsiderable fortunes, and his council was but private, and might tend to private ends, it is likely the King at the last resort; would have referred all to his own will and discretion; but I have now done with the business of Hull, and therein I think with all objections against the loyalty of the Parliament, for the same reason will extend to all their Votes and actions concerning the Militia, &c. and in sum all ends in this; if Kings be so inclinable to follow private advice rather than public, and to prefer that which closes with their natural impotent ambition, before that which crosses the same, are without all limits, than they may destroy their best subjects at pleasure, and all Charters and laws of public safety and freedom are void, and God hath not left human nature any means of sufficient preservation. But on the contrary, if there be any benefit in laws to limit Princes when they are seduced by Privadoes, and will not harken to the Great council of the Land, doubtless there must be some Court to judge of that seducement, and some authority to enforce that judgement, and that Court and authority must be the Parliament, or some higher tribunal, there can be no more certain Crisis of seducement, then of preferring private advice before public. But the King declines this point, and saith, that he doth not undervalue the whole Parliament, or lay charge of Treason upon all, he doth confess that divers have dissented, and divers been absent, &c. he deserts only, and accuses the faction and conspiracy of some few in Parliament. We are now at last fallen upon an issue fit to put an end to all other invectives, let us stick close to it. The King promises very shortly a full and satisfactory narration of those few persons in Parliament: whose design is, and always was to alter the whole frame of government both in Church and State, and to subject both King and people to their own lawless Arbitrary power and government; a little of this logic is better than a great deal of rhetoric, as the case now stands. If the King will please now to publish the particular crimes of such, as he hath formerly impeached of Treason, and the particular names of such as now he sets forth in those Characters, and will therein refer himself to the strength of his proofs, and evidence of his matter, it is impossible that any jealousy can cloud his integrity, or check his power any longer; Then it will appear to all, that he hath not left us, out of any disaffection to Parliaments, or out of any good opinion of Papists, Delinquents, and other Incendiaries, but that he was necessitated to depart from us, that he might be the better able to preserve to us our Religion, laws and liberties, and that none of his solemn oaths of cordial love to us hath wanted integrity and faith. This will satisfy all lovers of Justice, that he gives not light credit to weak whisperers or malicious informers (whose aim may be to bring this Parliament to some ignoble trial, or to confound it without any trial at all by general aspersions and mere calumnious surmises) this will proclaim his cander and sincerity, and set a brighter luster upon his Justice, than any oratory whatsoever. By the performance of this promise he shall not do only right to himself, but also to the whole kingdom, for the distracted multitude, being at last by this means undeceived, shall not only prostrate themselves, and all their power presently at his feet, but for ever after remain the more assured of his good, whether to public liberties and Parliamentary privileges. Howsoever nothing but the awful promise of a King could make us think so dishonourably of Parliaments, or suspend our judgements so long of them; for an Aristocracy in Parliament cannot be erected without means, and what this means shall be, is yet to us altogether inscrutible, for the power of Parliaments is but derivative and depending upon public consent, and how public consent should be gained for the erection of a new unlawful odious tyranny amongst us, is not discernible, the whole kingdom is not to be mastered against consent, by the train Band, nor the train Bands by the Lords or deputy lieutenants, nor they by the major part in Parliament, nor the major part in Parliament by I know not what septemvirat, there is some mystery in this which seems yet above, if not contrary to nature, but since the King hath promised to open it, we will suspend our opinion and expect it as the final issue of all our disputes.  
The main body of the difference being thus stated, I come now to the observations of some other several objections against this Parliament, and exceptions taken against arbitrary power in all Parliaments, and I shall observe no order, but consider them as I find them, either dispersed or recollected in the Kings late Expresses.  
The Parliament being complained against for undutiful usage to the King above all former Parliaments, hath said, that if they should make the highest precedents of other Parliaments their pattern, there would be no cause to complain of want of modesty and duty.  
The King, because some Parliaments formerly have deposed Kings, applies these words to those precedents, but it may justly be denied that free Parliaments did ever truly consent to the dethroaning of any King of England, for that Act whereby Richard the second was deposed, was rather the Act of Hen. the fourth, and his victorious Army, then of the whole kingdom.  
The Parliament is taxed of reproaching this King's government, to render him odious to his subjects, whereas indeed all the miscarriages and grievous oppressions of former times are solely imputed to the ill Ministers and councillors of the King, And all the misfortunes of these times since November, 1640. are imputed to the blame of the Parliament: the King's words to the Parliament are, That the condition of his Subjects when it was at worst under his government was by many degrees more pleasant and happy than this to which the Parliaments furious pretences of reformation hath brought them to. In this case the Parliament being accused of so heinous crimes, did unjustly betray themselves, if they should not lay the blame upon the King's evil councillors, the only enemies and interrupters of Parliaments. Nevertheless the King takes this as a way of the Parliament to let them into their frank expressions of him and his actions, and takes all things spoken against his ministers, as spoken against himself, how miserable here is the condition of the Parliament, either they must sink under unjust charges, or be censured for the reproachers of their king, nay they are undutiful, if they tell not the King himself, that he ought not to onerate himself with the blame of his councillors.  
The Parliament, because it could not obtain no equal Justice from the Court-Caveleers, who are conceived to be the first moovers of those stirs and tumults which happened at Westminster, did reserve the hearing of some of the contrary side itself, upon this it is objected, that the Parliament incited those seditious; and protected the actors in it, whereas they desire Justice yet, and that both sides may be brought fairly to an equal hearing, and before such hearing they desire that no parties may be condemned.  
And whereas the Parliament, upon those rude commotions, are condemned as unheard, and of that which is unproved, and never can be proved, That they leavyed war upon the King, and drove him away, yet they desire that that mere imputation may not draw any further opposition to their proceedings, and the necessities of the State; for if the King could not stay at London with safety, yet being now at York in safety, he may concur with the advice of his Parliament; the distance of the place needs not cause any distance of affection, since the King conceives He hath so few enemies, and assures himself of so many friends in Parliament.  
The Parliament says, That none of its Members may be apprehended in case of suspicion, where no information or witnesses appear, to make good the Prosecution, without acquainting the Parliament, if leave may be conveniently obtained. In opposition to this a case is put, Of a Parliament-man that rides from York to London, and takes a purse by the way, the Parliament doth not privilege Robberies so done; for though no such thing be likely ever to be done, yet if it be, in that case the evidence of the fact in that instant, allows not only the apprehending, but the casual killing of such a Robber: Who sees not many differences betwixt such a case, and that of the five Members of the lower House, where neither Witnesses, not Informers, nor Relaters, nor any particularity of crime could be produced? and yet by the same act the whole House might have been surprised: And all the world knows, That the impeached Members still suffer by that Charge, and yet can obtain no right against any Informers, though it be now converted to their disadvantage.  
The Parliament does not deny the King a true-real Interest in any thing held by him, either in jure Coronae, or in jurae Personae, yet merely because it affirms, That in the same thing the State hath an Interest Paramont in cases of public extremity; by virtue of which it may justly seize, and use the same for its own necessary preservation. Hereupon, the King replies, That this utterly abolishes His Interest in all things, so that by this device, He is made uncapable, either of suffering wrong, or receiving right: a strange violented wrested conclusion; and yet the King's Interest in Hull, and in the lives of his subjects, is not such an Interest as in other moveables, neither is the King's Interest taken away from him; the same things are still reserved for him, in better hands than he would have put them. The Parliament maintains its own council to be of honour and power above all other, and when it is unjustly rejected, by a King seduced, and abused by private flatterers, to the danger of the commonwealth, it assumes a right to judge of that danger, and to prevent it: the King says, That this gives them an arbitrary unlimitable power to unsettle the security of all men's estates, and that they are seduceable, and may abuse this power, nay they have abused it; and he citys the Anabaptists in Germany, and the 30 Tyrants at Athens. That there is an Arbitrary power in every State somewhere 'tis true, 'tis necessary, and no inconvenience follows upon it; every man has an absolute power over himself; but because no man can hate himself, this power is not dangerous, nor need to be restrained: So every State has an Arbitrary power over itself, and there is no danger in it for the same reason. If the State entrusts this to one man, or few, there may be danger in it; but the Parliament is neither one nor few, it is indeed the State itself; it is no good consequence, though the King makes so much use of it, That the Parliament doth abuse power, because it may: The King would think it hard that we should conclude so against him, and yet the King challenges a greater power than Parliaments: and indeed if the Parliament may not save the kingdom without the King, the King may destroy the Kingdom in despite of the Parliament; and whether then challenges that which is most Arbitrary, and of most danger? but the King says, This Parliament has abused their power. (I wish Kings had never abused theirs more) And the Parliament answers, That this is but his nude avirment, and in controversies that ought not to condemn private men, much less ought Parliaments to fall under it. And as for Mr Hooker, he does not say, That the Anabaptists in Germany did deceive Parliaments with their hypocrisy, and therefore infer that Parliaments ought no further to be trusted: the stirs of the Anabaptists in Germany conclude no more against Parliaments, than the impostures of Mahomet in Arabia do. And as for the 30 Tyrants of Athens, we know they were not so chosen by the people, as our Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses are, nor created or called by any King's Writ, as our Peers are; nor did they so merely depend upon their own good abearing, and the good liking both of King and State, as our Lords and Commons now do; neither had they so many equals and rivals as both our Houses contain: we know their power was not founded upon the consent of the Citizens, but the strength of their soldiers; neither were their soldiers such as our Train Bands, but mere mercenaries of desperate, or perhaps no Fortunes, whose Revenue was rapine, whose Trade was murder: I fear they were more like our Cavaliers at York, than the Militia at London: Were our new Militia any other our old train Bands, or our new lieutenants, and Deputies, any other than the same Lords and Gentlemen, with very little variation, which before were very well reputed of, both by King and Commons, and not yet by either excepted against, or did the whole fate of the kingdom depend merely upon the new Militia, this new device of an aristocracy might seem the more plausible; but as things now stand, this new aristocratical fabric cannot seem to any impartial man, but as empty a shadow, and airy a dream as ever man's fancy abused itself withal.  
The Parliament says, That the King's power is fiduciary, and not to be used against the Kingdom, but for it only: The King hereupon demands, May any thing be taken from a man, because he is trusted with it? Or may the person himself take away the thing he trusts when be will, and how he will? Our case of Hull is not so general, The things there remaining in the King's trust for the use of the Kingdom were Arms, and by consequence of more danger, than other kind of Chattels. And if I intrust my cloak to another's custody, I may not take it away again by force; But if it be my sword, and there is strong presumption, that it may be drawn upon me, I may use any means to secure it.  
The Parliament claims a right of declaring, and interpreting Law. The King makes this question thereupon? Is the Law itself subject to your Votes, that whatsoever you say, or do, shall be lawful, because you declare it so? Am I supreme, and yet you above me? Must my power be governed by your discretion? This is the Pope's Arrogance, That all must submit their understanding, and Scripture itself, to His declaring power: and a case is put of the Irish Rebels, making themselves a major part in Parliament, and so voting against the true Religion, &c. In perspicuous, uncontroverted things, the Law is it own interpreter, and there no Judge is requisite, and the Parliament cannot be taxed to have declared Law by the rule of their Actions; They have squared their Actions according to Law, They may be censured, but they cannot be convinced of any injustice. 'tis true, In mere matters of State, the Parliament is not bound to strict precedents at all times, but in matters of right, and justic● they have not deviated, either to the right hand, or to the left: Howsoeve●, In matters of Law and State both, where ambiguity is, some determin●●ion must be supreme, and therein, either the K●ngs power and t●ust must be guided by the discre●ion of the Parliament; or else the Parliament, and all other Courts must be overruled by the King's mere discretion; and there can be nothing said against the Arbitrary supremacy of Parliaments, &c. But far more upon better grounds, may be said against the Arbitrary supremacy of the King. As for the Pope's Arrogance, who undertakes to interpret Scripture where it wants no interpreter, And in matters of mere opinion to usurp over al● men's consciences; As if he had an infallibility in his sole breast. He is not an instance so fitly to be alleged against Parliaments, as Princes, For slavish very probable, That if the Church had not submitted itself to so 〈◊〉 a condition under one Man, but had been governed by some general Junto of Divines fairly elected, it had never swerved into such soul idolatry, and superstition, as it has done.  
As for the case of Ireland, I conceive, 'tis improperly urged; For England and Ireland are one and the same Dominion, There is as true and intimate an Union betwixt them, as betwixt England and Wales; And though by reason of remote situation, they do not meet in one, and the same Parliament; yet their Parliaments, as to some purposes, are not to be held several Parliaments. And therefore, if the papists in Ireland were stronger, and had more Votes in Parliament than the Protestants, yet they would want authority to overrule any thing voted, and established before in England. For the reason, why the minor part in all suffrages subscribes to the major is, That blood may not be shed. For in probability, The major part will prevail, and else strife, and bloodshed would be endless: Wherefore the major part in Ireland, by the same reason ought to sit down and acquiesce, because Ireland is not a several monarchy from England; nor is that a major part of Ireland, and England too; for if it were, it would give Law to us, as we now give Law there; and their Statutes would be of as much virtue here, as ours are there.  
The Parliament In case of extreme danger, challenges an Authority of settling the Militia in sure hands, and removing doubtful persons; if the King will not be entreated to do it of himself? The Kings says, This is to put His entrusted power out of Himself into others, and so to divest and disable Himself for the protection of His people. This is a strange mistake. The Parliament desires no removal of that power which was in the King, But that which was in such or such a Substitute? And how do this divest and disable the King? And if the King says, That He has a better opinion of such a Substitute, then of an other, Though the Parliament conceive otherwise, than what does He but prefer His own private opinion before the most Honourable of all counsels, before the voice of the whole Kingdom? What higher Law then have we remaining then the Kings will? And as for his account to God, will it be easy▪ for him to plead, That he used such an instrument of His own mere discretion against public advice if things prove unhappy, then that He followed the most noble council, and such whose lives, fortunes, and interests, were most deeply concerned in it? And as for those absurd unreasonable, incredible suppositions of the injustice, and treasons of Parliaments, as if they were less careful of the public good, then single Rulers, Though it be spoken in derision, wise men perhaps may be not so apt to laugh in applause, as in contempt of it. For how has the Parliament removed the rub of all Law out of its way, because it assumes to itself to be higher than any other Court, and to be in declaring Law, as far beyond the King's single countermands in Parliament, as other inferior Courts are out of Parliaments? Or how, has it erected a new upstart Authority to affront the King, and maintain an aristocratical usurpations, when the main body of the Militia is still the same as it was, and such as the King professes no suspicion of, and no alteration is of the heads thereof, except only in some few popishly inclined, or not publicly so honoured, and confided in as they ought? And when the same Allegiance is performed, The same Supremacy of power confessed to be now in the King over the Militia, as has ever been? N●y, What ground can there be for this imaginary usurpation, when the King professes, He fixes not that traitorous design upon both, or either House of Parliament, being most confident of the Loyalty, Good Affectio●s▪ and Integrity of that great Body? Is the main body of the Kingdom loyal? Is the main body of the Parliament loyal? Is the King true to Himself? And is all His great party of Clergymen, Courtiers, soldiers, &c. constant? And yet is there a machination in hand, to introduce aristocratical usurpation odious to all men; which neither Kingdom, Parliament, King, nor all the royalists can oppose? What a strange unlathomable machination, and work of darkness is this? But this is said to be done by cunning, force, absence, or accident. If it be by cunning, Then we must suppose that the King's party in Parliament has lost all their Law, policy, and subtlety, And that all the Parliament, except some few are luld-a-sleep by Mercury's minstrelsy; or that some diabolical charm has closed up all their various eyes. If it be by force, Then we must suppose that our aristocratical heads carry about them great store of that serpent's teeth which yielded heretofore so sudden and plentiful a harvest of armed men, being but cast into the furrows of the earth, Though their armies have been hitherto invisible, yet we must suppose, That they are in a readiness to rise upon the first Alarum beaten. If it be by absence, than we must suppose, That this aristocratical machination is easily yet to be prevented, for 'tis not a hard matter to draw a full appearance together, and that we see has been done lately by the order of the House itself. Nay, we see 'tis not the House, but the opposite part that desires to scatter, and divide, and draw away, and as much as in them lies to hinder a full assembly: And therefore, This is not the way. If it be by accident, Then we must be contented to expect, and have a little patience; Fortune is not always constant to one certain posture, nor do the celestial bodies confine themselves to one unaltered motion.  
The Parliament requests of the King, That all great Officers of State, by whom public affairs shall be transacted, may be chosen by approbation, or nomination of the great council. The King takes this as a thing maliciously plotted against him, as a proposition made in mockery of him, as a request which He cannot yield to, without showing Himself unworthy of that trust, which Law reposes in Him, and of His descent from so many great and famous Ancestors: He conceives, He cannot perform the Oath of protecting His people if He abandon this power, and assume others into it. He conceives it such a flower of the Crown, as is worth all the rest of the Garland, not to be parted with all upon any extremity of conquest or imprisonment; nor for any low sordid considerations of wealth, and gain whatsoever. He conceives, That if He should pass this, He should retain nothing but the Ceremonious ensigns of Royalty, or the mere sight of a Crown and sceptre; (nay the Stock being dead▪ the Twigs would not long flourish;) but as to true, and real power, He should remain, but the outside, the picture, the sign of a King. Could this be, If all Parliaments were not taken as deadly enemies to Royalty? the substance of the request seems to be no more but this, That it would please the King to be advised by Parliaments, rather than His own mere understanding, or any inferior councillors in those things which concern the liberties, and lives of the whole people. And how could this request seem equal to a demanding of the Crown, to a dethroning of the King, and to a leaving of the Kingdom destitute of protection, if Parliaments were not supposed mortal enemies to Princes, and Princes not supposed, but openly declared enemies to Parliaments; if the King choose such a man Treasurer or Keeper out of his own good liking only, or upon recommendation of such a Courtier, here he is devested of no power; but if it be upon the recommendation of the whole kingdom in Parliament, who in all probability can judge better, and are more concerned, this is an emptying himself of Majesty, and divesting himself of Power. Ordinary reason cannot suggest otherwise hereupon, but either Parliaments affect not Kings, nor their own good, nor would make good elections, or else Kings affect not Parliaments, nor the Kingdoms good, and therefore they oppose such elections, merely because they are good: but let us observe the King's reasons against Parliamentary elections; For first, He conceives them prejudicial for the people: Secondly, Dishonourable to himself.  
Man is by nature of restless ambition; as the meanest vassal thinks himself worthy of some greatness, so the most absolute Monarch aspires to something above his greatness. Power being over obtained by haughty minds, quickly discovers that it was not first aimed at merely to effect Noble actions, but in part to insult over others; and ambitious men thirst after that power which may do harm, as well as good; nay, though they are not resolved to do harm, yet they would be masters of it,— Qui nolunt occidere quenquam— Posse volunt. And yet let this power be added, the mind still remains unfilled, still some further terrestrial omnipotence, a sharing with God, and surmounting above mortal condition is affected. Our Law has a wholesome maxim, That the King may only do that which is just; but Courtiers invert the sense of it, and tell him, That all is just which he may do, or which he is not restrained from doing by Law. Such and such things Princes ought not to do, though no Law limited them from doing thereof; but now those things which by nature they abhor to do, yet they abhor as much to be limited from. That disposition which makes us averse from cruelty and injury▪ we account a noble and virtuous disposition; but that Law which shall restrain us from the same is stomached at, and resisted, as a harsh bit to put into our mouths, or bonds upon our arms. Antoninus Pius is greatly renowned for communicating all weighty affairs, and following public advice a▪ dapprobation in all great expedients of high concernment; and he was not more honourable than prosperous therein. Had he been a mere servant to the State, he coul● not have condescended further; and yet if he had done necessarily, what he did voluntarily, the same thing had been in the same manner effectual; for 'tis not the mere putting or not putting of ●aw, that does after the nature of good or evil. Power then to do such an evil, or not to do such a good, is in truth no real power, nor desired out of any nobleness, but rather windy arrogance; and as it is useless to men truly noble, so to men that love evil for evil ends 'tis very dangerous. What will Nero more despise, then to condescend as Antoninus did? yet 'twere more necessary that Nero were limited than Antoninus; for excessive power added to Nero's cruelty, serves but as oil poured upon flame. When Princes are as potent as vicious, we know what Ministers swarm about them; and the end is, That as vast power corrupts and inclines them to i●l counsels so they perish at last by councillor's worst of all. 'tis pretended that Princes cannot be limited from evil, but they may be disabled from doing good thereby, which is not always true; and yet if it were, the people had better want some right, then have too much wrong done them: for what is more plain than this, That the Venetians live more happily under their conditionate Duke, than the Turks do under their most absolute Emperors. Nevertheless, if we consider the noble trophies of Rome which it gained under Consuls, and conditiona●e Commanders, we may suppose that no defect at all could be in that popular and mixed government. And our neighbours in the Netherlands are a good instance; for they being to cope with the most Puissant and free Prince of Christendom, being but the torn relic of a small Nation, yet for their defence, would not put themselves under a Dictatorian power, but they prepared themselves for that so terrible encounter, under the Conduct of a general much limited. Neither have those straightened Commissi●ns yielded any thing but victories to the States, and solid honour to the Princes of Orange; and what more, the mightiest Monarchs of our age have achieved or enjoyed, besides the filling of a fantastical humour with imaginary grandeur. I speak not this in favour of any alteration in England, I am as zealously addicted to Monarchy, as any man can, without dotage: but I know there are several degrees of Prerogatives royal, some whereof have greater power of protection, and less of oppression; and such I desire to be most studious of: In some things I know 'tis dangerous to circumscribe Princes, but in others there may be great danger in leaving them to their pleasure, and scarce any hope at all of benefit; and amongst other things, the choice of public Officers, if the State have (at least) some share therein with the King, what considerable inconvenience can happen thereby to the State or King, is not in me to foresee: but if it have no share, experience sufficient teacheth us what great disasters may happen. And so for the disusing and dissolving of Parliaments; if the Parliament divide some part of that power with the King, I see great good, but no harm at all that can ensue, either to weaken the Crown, or disturb the subject thereby. But it will be said in the next place, If this disables not the King from protecting the Subject, yet it diminishes his own Right, and leaves him but the shadow of Royalty. This is grounded upon a great mistake; for some men think it a glorious thing to be able to kill, as well as to save, and to have a kind of a creator's power over Subjects: but the truth is, such power procures much danger to ill Princes, and little good to any; for it begets not so much love as fear in the subject, though it be not abused; and the fear of the subject does not give so perfect a Dominion as love. Were Hannibal, Scipio▪ &c. the less honoured or beloved because they were not independent? surely no, they were the less feared, and for the same cause the more honoured and beloved. Or were Alexander, Pyrrbus▪ &c. the more honoured or beloved, because they were independent? I believe the contrary, and that they had lived more gloriously, and died less violently, if a more moderate power had rendered them less insolent in their own thoughts, and less feared in other men's. Was Caesar the private man less successful in his wars, or less dear in all his soldier's eyes, or less powerful in his countrymen's affections, than Caesar the perpetual Dictator? No, if the imperial Throne of the World added any thing to Caesar, 'twas not excellence, nor true glory, 'twas but the external compliments of pomp and ostentation, and that might perhaps blow up his mind with vanity, and fill the people with 〈◊〉, it could not make Caesar a nobler, gallanter, greater Caesar 〈◊〉 he was. I expect no less then to be laughed at at ●ourt, and to be h●ld the author of a strange paradox, by those men which stick not to say, That our King is now no more King of Scotland, than he is King of France, because his mere pleasure there, is not so predominant in all cases of good and evil whatsoever: but I regard not those fond things which cannot see in human nature what is depraved in it, and what not, and what proceeds from vain, and what from true glory; and wherein the natural perfection of power and honour, differs from the painted rays of spurious Majesty and Magnificence. To me the Policy of Scotland seems more exquisite in point of prerogative, than any other in Europe, except ours: And if the splendour, and puissance of a Prince consist in commanding religious, wise, magnanimous, warlike subjects, I think the King of Scotland is more to be admired then the King of France; and that he is so, to the mere ingenuity of Government, I ascribe it. But some will allow, That to follow the pattern of Antoninus freely, and voluntarily, as he did, is not dishonourable in a Prince; but to be under any Obligation or Law to do so, is ignoble. And this is as much as to say, That Law, though good, yet quate●●s Law is burdenous to man's nature; and though it be so but to corrupted nature, in as much as it retains from nothing, but that which nature in its purity would itself restrain from; yet corrupted nature itself is to be soothed and observed. I have done with this point: 'twas spoken in honour of Hen. 7. That he governed his subjects by his Laws, his Laws, by his Lawyers, and (it might have been added) his subjects, Laws and Lawyers by advice of Parliament, by the regulation of that Court which gave life and birth to all Laws. In this Policy is comprised the whole act of sovereignty; for where the people are subject to the Law of the Land and not to the will of the Prince, and where the Law is left to the interpretation of sworn upright Judges, and not violated by power; and where Parliaments superintend all, and in all extraordinary cases, especially betwixt the King and Kingdom, do the faithful Offices of Umpirage, all things remain in such a harmony, as I shall recommend to all good Princes.  
The Parliament conceives that the King cannot apprehend any just fear from Sir John Hotham, or interpret the mere shutting of Hull gates, and the sending away of Arms and Ammunition in obedience to both Houses, to be any preparation for war and Invasion against him at York, and therefore they resolve to raise Forces against those Forces which the King raises to secure himself from Sir John Hotham. The King hereupon charges the Parliament of levying war against Him, under pretence of His levying war against them. This is matter of fact and the World must judge whether the King's preparations in the North be only suitable to the danger of Sir John Hotham or no; and whether the Parliament be in danger of the King's strength there or no: Or whether is more probable at this time, that the King is incensed against the Parliament, or the Parliament against the King: or that the King is more intentive to assail the Parliament, or the Parliament the King. 'Tis true, the King abjures any intention of making war against his Parliament; but what he intends against the malignant party in or out of Parliament, is not expressed: and the King abjures invasive war against them; but whether he think not himself first invaded already, is not expressed; and the specifying of a faction in Parliament of some few malignants, secures none; for none can plead force, and none ought to plead folly in Treasons of this nature, and the major part of the Houses can neither plead absence or dissent; and those which can, must not be their own purgators. Besides, the act of Sir John Hotham is disputable; the King adjudges it Treason, the Parliament adjudge it no Treason; and the King has not declared whether he will refer this to the trial of the sword only, or to some other trial; and if so, To what kind of trial the judgement of a Parliament shall be submitted: If we call another Parliament to judge of this, so we may appeal in infinitum; and why another should be clearer than this, we cannot imagine: If we could constitute a higher Court for this appeal, so we might do in infinitum also; but we know no higher can be imagined: and if we appeal to a lower, that were to invert the course of nature: and to confound all Parliaments for ever; if we call all the Kingdom to judge of this, we do the same thing as to proclaim civil war, and to blow the Trumpet of general confusion: And if we allow the King to be the sole, supreme competent Judge in this case, we resign all into his hands, we give lives, liberties, Laws, Parliaments, all to be held at mere discretion? For there is in the interpretation of Law upon the last appeal, the same supremacy of power requisite, as is in making it; And therefore grant the King supreme interpreter, and 'tis all one, as if we granted him to be supreme maker of Law; and grant him this, and we grant him to be above all limits, all conditions, all human bonds whatsoever. In this Intricacy therefore, where the King and Parliament disagree, and judgement must be supreme, either in the one or other, we must retire to ordinary justice, And there we see, if the King consent not with the ordinary Judge, the Law thinks it fit, that the King subscribe, rather than the Judge.  
And if this satisfy not, We must retire to the principles of Nature, and there search, whether the King or Kingdom be to be looked upon as the efficient, and final cause, and as the proper Subject of all power. Neither is the oath of supremacy endangered hereby; for he that ascribes more to the whole universality, then to King; yet ascribes to the King a true supremacy of power, and honour above all particulars: Nor is our allegiance temerated, For when the Judge on the Bench delivers Law contrary to the King's command; This is not the same thing, as to proceed against the King's person, upon any judgement given against him. The King as to His own person, is not to be forcibly repelled in any ill doing● nor is He accountable for ill done, Law has only a directive, but no coactive force upon his person; but in all irregular acts where no personal force is, Kings may be disobeyed, their unjust commands may be neglected, not only by communities, but also by single men sometimes. Those men therefore that maintain, That all Kings are in all things and commands (as well where personal resistance accompanies, as not) to be obeyed, as being like Gods, unlimitable, and as well in evil, as in good unquestionable, are sordid flatterers. And those which allow no limits but directive only, And those no other but divine and natural; And so make all Princes as vast in power as the Turk, (for He is subject to the directive force of God, and nature's Laws;) and so allow subjects a dry right without all remedy, are almost as stupid as the former. And those lastly, That allow human Laws to obleage Kings more than directively, in all cases where personal violence is absence, and yet allow no Judges of those Laws, but the King Himself, run into absurdities as gross as the former.  
I come now to those seven doctrines, and positions, which the King by way of recapitulation lays open as so offensive— And they run thus:  
1. THat the Parliament has an absolute indisputable power of declaring Law, So that all the right of the King and people, depends upon their pleasure. It has been answered, That this power must rest in them, or in the King, or in some inferior Court, or else all suits must be endless, and it can nowhere rest more safely then in Parliament.  
2. That Parliaments are bound to no precedents. Statutes are not binding to them, Why then should precedents? Yet there is no obligation stronger than the Justice and honour of a Parliament.  
3. That they are Parliaments, and may judge of public necessity without the King, and dispose of anything. They may not desert the King, but being deserted by the King, when the Kingdom is in distress, They may judge of that distress, and relieve it, and are to be accounted by the virtue of representation, as the whole body of the State.  
4. That no Member of Parliament ought to be troubled for treason, &c. without leave. This is intended of suspicions only, And when leave may be seasonably had, and when competent accusers appear not in the impeachment.  
5. That the sovereign power resides in both Houses of Parliament, the King having no negative voice. This power is not claimed as ordinary; nor to any purpose, But to save the Kingdom from ruin, and in case where the King is so seduced, as that He prefers dangerous men, and prosecutes His loyal Subjects.  
6. That levying forces against the personal commands of the King, (though accompanied with his presence) is not levying war against the King: But war against His authority, though not person, is war against the King? If this were not so, The Parliament seeing a seduced King, ruining Himself, and the Kingdom could not save both, but must stand and look on.  
7. That according to some Parliaments, they may depose the King? 'tis denied, That any King was deposed by a free Parliament fairly elected.  
To stand in comparison with these, I shall recite some such positions as the King's papers offer to us; And they follow thus.  
1. THat regal power is so derived from God and the Law, as that it has no dependence upon the trust, and consent of man; and the King is accountable therefore to God and His other Kingdoms, not to this; And it is above the determination of Parliaments, and by consequence boundless.  
2. That the King is supreme indefinitely, viz. As well universis, as singulis.  
3. That the King has such a propriety in His Subjects, Towns, Forts, &c. As is above the propriety of the State, and not to be seized by the Parliament, though for the public safety.  
4. That so far as the King is trusted, He is not accountable how He performs, So that in all cases the Subject is remediless.  
5. That the being of Parliaments is merely of grace, So that the King might justly have discontinued them, and being summoned, they are limited by the writ, and that ad consilium Only, and that but in quibusdam arduis, And if they pass the limits of the Writ, they may be imprisoned. That if the King desert them, they are a void assembly, and no honour due to them, nor power to save the Kingdom, That Parliamentary privileges are nowhere to be read of, And so their representation of this whole Kingdom is no privilege, nor adds no Majesty, nor authority to them. That the major part in Parliament is not considerable, when so many are absent, or dissent. That the major part is no major part, Because the fraud, and force of some few overrules them. That Parliaments may do dishonourable things, nay treasonable: Nay, That this hath been so blinded by some few malignants, That they have abetted treason in Sir John Hotham, Trampled upon all Law, and the King's prerogative, And sought to enslave the whole Kingdom under the Tyranny of some few, And sought the betraying of Church, and State, And to the same erected an upstart Authority in the new Militia, and levied war upon the King, under pretence that He levies war upon them. That Parliaments cannot declare Law, but in such and such particular cases legally brought before them. That Parliaments are questionable, and tryable elsewhere.  
These things, we all see, tend not only to the desolation of this Parliament, but to the confusion of all other, And to the advancing of the King to a higher power over Parliaments, than ever He had before over inferior Courts. Parliaments have hitherto been Sanctuaries to the people, and banks against Arbitrary tyranny; But now the mere breath of the King, blasts them in an instant; and how shall they hereafter secure us, when they cannot now secure themselves? Or how can we expect justice, when the mere imputation of treason, without hearing, trial, or judgement, shall sweep away a whole Parliament; nay all Parliaments for ever? And yet this is not yet the depth of our misery, For that private council which the King now adheres to, and prefers before Parliaments, will still enforce upon our understandings, That all these doctrines, and positions tend to the perfection of Parliaments; And all the King's forces in the North, to the protection of Law and liberty. I find my Reason already captivated, I cannot further—  
FINIS.