A FREE and IMPARTIAL CENSURE Of The PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY Being a Letter Written to his much Honoured Friend Mr N. B.  
By SAM. PARKER. A. M.  
OXFORD, Printed by W. Hall, for Richard Davis, Ann. Dom. 1666.   

To the Reverend Dr. BATHURST, The Worthy and Learned PRECEDENT Of TRINITY COLLEGE in OXFORD.  
I Shall not need (as the Custom is) to argue the decency and fitness of this address, nor to excuse its many nice and critical Solecisms, because your absolute and unalienable Right to all the Fruits of my Studies has made it due and necessary; (and the Obligations of Duty cancel all the Laws of Indecency) so that if to present you with so mean a trifle be unhandsome, yet not to have done it, would have been unjust. For my Studies (Sir) are too deeply indebted to your Encouraging Directions, to make any other repayment then by entirely resigning themselves up into your hands, and therefore I cannot alienate any thing that's theirs, from being Yours, without being guilty at once of the greatest Injustice and Ingratitude. So that though I do but Injure your Name by concerning its Authority in behalf of so worthless a Trifle, yet an Injury that's the result of Duty and Gratitude, may hope for not only your Pardon, but (such Sir is your Candour) your Acceptance too; since you cannot suspect the Reality of my Resentments, when I decline not so Criminal an Evidence thereof, and rather wilfully chose to commit any Faults and Indecencies than lose the least Opportunity to prove it.  
I will not be so troublesome as to remind you of the retail of your Obligations, yet there is one, whose peculiar matchlesness obliges me to as peculiar an acknowledgement. For to your prevailing advice (Sir) do I owe my first Rescue from the Chains and Fetters of an unhappy Education, than which 'twas impossible either for you to have conferred, or for me to have received a greater benefit, there being no Perfection to be Valued at so high a Rate as a true Freedom and Ingenuity of Mind: 'Tis this, that distinguishes Churches from Herds. And those men that have laid aside the free and impartial use of their Reasons, are just as fit for Religion as Sheep and Oxen, for they differ only in this, that the one are Brutes without Reason, and the other Brutes with it. How could the Scythian have sacrificed Rational Being's, had he not first sacrificed his Reason; or the Egyptian adored Irrational Creatures, had not himself been one? Onions could never have been Deities if Egyptians had been men; but when Reason was once banished the Temples, no wonder if folly and superstition commenced Religion; a stock might be a Deity when the Priest was no more. But (Sir) the excess of my joy and Zeal tempt me to be impertinent.  
Philosophy may perhaps think herself hardly dealt with, to have two of her famousest Sects called to the Bar by so mean a Clerk as myself, yet I think I have done them not a little Honour in citing them before so Eminent a judge, and one so much their Peer in all Sublime Learning and Generosity of Soul; that their great Masters Zeno and Plato might justly Resign the Chair, and yield their Porch and Academy inferior to the College that you Preside. Where the many good foundations, and grounds of Polite Literature, that you alone have laid, may well be thought the only Talismans' of its present flourishing and prosperous Condition. These Papers therefore which were form and hatched under your immediate Influences, being to take their flight abroad into the World, aught to be legitimated by no other than that Sun, which has always shined so favourably upon all my Endeavours. I cannot but acknowledge that (Sir) I have one selfish design in this Epistolary Address; namely, to bribe your affection that it may defend me from the Power of your judgement. 'Tis a very unusual request I confess, but yet 'tis mine at present, that you would be pleased to Protect me from yourself; For I here offer to your sight that Paper which (did I not know your Candour to be proportioned to your other Accomplishments) I could even wish might escape it. And thus (Sir) by prefixing your Name to this Pamphlet, I have not only Rescued it from your own judgement, and the Contempt of others, but have also in some measure gratified my own Pride, in that as many as shall chance by the sight thereof, to understand that there's such a thing as I in the world, may withal be informed of the Honour and Happiness I have in being  
Reverend Sir, Your most Faithful, most obliged, and most humble Servant, SAM: PARKER.   

A Free and Impartial ACCOUNT OF THE PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY.  
SIR,  
WE that are so inconsiderate, as to print Books, sell ourselves into the greatest Slavery in the world, being thereby exposed to the severe commands of those that know us, and severer lashes of those that know us not: so that you may perhaps sooner expect to find me in a Venetian Galley then in the Press again. Not as if I were either so little a Philosopher, as to regard other men's Censures, (for I have too little esteem for the Generality of Mankind, to be at all concerned how they esteem of me; and you know 'tis one of my greatest designs in this world, to be one of the most unconcerned men in it,) or so little your Friend, as to style your commands Burdens: yet, (to be plain with you upon the warrant of our Philosophic Friendship) had they not surprised me at a very seasonable time, I had sent you no other reply, then either of Excuse, or flat Denial: For, though I was then addressing myself to some Mathematical Studies, to the pursuance whereof I allotted the next portion of time, yet the main of my Studies for some weeks before had been employed in Platonic Authors, so that both my Brain and my Papers being well stuffed with Ideas, I was not displeased with the opportunity you have given me of Venting the one, and Methodizing the other.  
The Task than you enjoin me, is, To give an account of two Passages in my Tentamina Physico-Theologica; The one out of the last Chapter of the first Book, in which I exclaim against the Platonic Philosophy, as an ungrounded and Fanatic Fancy: The other out of the last Chapter of the second Book, where disputing against those that assert the necessity of the World's Eternal Existence, I was occasionally obliged, to glance upon the two grand Attributes of God's Dominion and Goodness; hence you enjoin me to make good my charge against Plato by giving you a larger, and more particular account of his Philosophy, and to send you a further Explication of the Nature and Extent of the forementioned Attributes, especially, as they have reference to the lately revived Hypothesis of the Preexistence of Souls, seeing I have there reckoned that up among other rash and unwarrantable opinions, which some men think to maintain from the Nature of God's goodness; together with a special account of the groundlesness of the Hypothesis itself.  
But if (Sir) I now pay one part of this Debt, I owe to your Commands, I may safely presume upon your Candour for a forbearance of the other half; because (as I have often told you) although the Recreation, I sometimes take to frame my Thoughts and Conceptions into words, almost equals the Ravishing delight I derive from their first Births and Discoveries, yet too long a continuance at this employment is to me (and I believe to most men else) the most tedious and wearisome piece of Drudgery in the world; so that if after this payment in part, you will but grant me a short respite to refresh myself with a little Variety, I do here engage to discharge the whole Debt, when ever you shall demand it. At present therefore deferring the latter half of my Task, I shall only send you as satisfactory an account of the Platonic Philosophy, as I am able; and that it may be as full and entire as its brevity will permit: I shall consider it in all its parts, according to the most usual, and perhaps most comprehensive division of Philosophy into Morality, Logic, Physic, and Natural Theology.  
FIrst then, as for their Morality, no Platonist can set an higher estimate upon it, than myself; For beside those useful and excellent Notices, which it teaches in common with the Ethics of other Sects, it may challenge a signal Pre-eminence upon several accounts; as  
1. In that the Rules and Directions it prescribes are Sober and Practicable; it does not flatter men with Romantic Degrees of Happiness, upon fond and fantastic Principles, but complies with the conditions of Humane life, and neither Promises nor Designs greater proportions of Felicity, than our present Capacities will allow of. The Platonists were not so Vain as to comfort themselves with high strained Paradoxes against the convictions of Sense and Experience: They do not teach us, when we are in the extremity of Pain and Anguish, to sing Quam suave, quam dulce hoc est, Quam hoc non curo? No, but they esteemed of every thing as they found and felt it, and therefore whatsoever they experienced agreeable to their Natures they put into the Accounts of Good, as on the contrary, whatsoever they found to be a Grievance, they needed no other inducement to convince them of its Evil. Whereas it was the humour of the Stoics, rather to strain for Parodoxes and Braveries than give practicable Rules of Life: And therefore it was well observed by some of the Ancients, that never any man could attain to that height of wisdom, which the Stoical Philosophy pretends to. Stoici eam Sapientiam (says Cicero) interpretantur, quam adhuc nemo mortalis est consecutus; And Seneca speaking of a true Stoic; Fortasse (says he) tanquam Phoenix semel anno quingentis simo nascitur; and then only mentions the single instance of Cato. But the last time I had the happiness to Discourse with you, you was sufficiently convinced how little the virtue of Cato, and the honesty of Regulus are to be valued. If you should demand of me an account of the Stoical Principles, they are such as these. That the Beggarly Stoic is the only Rich man, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because forsooth he is Master of all other men's wealth. That he alone is beautiful, free, and noble, that all other men are ugly sordid slaves. That he alone is Prince and Emperor of the Universe. That he can vie Perfection & Happiness with God Himself; nay Seneca blushes not to affirm, 
Epist. 53.  est aliquid quo sapiens antecedat Deum. That he alone is a true Poet, Orator, Painter, Shoemaker, Cobbler, Tailor, or that himself is good for everything, and no body else good for any thing. That to kill a Swallow is not a less villainy than Parricide. That 'tis as great a virtue to take a flea-biting patiently, at it is to preserve one's Country by the most Gallant and Heroic Actions. That there is as much prudence in lifting up your finger with discretion, as in managing the Roman Empire. That he always hath his will, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Wish what you will, and you shall obtain what you wish: Like old decrepit jolaus in Euripides, that by the force of a wish, retrived his youthful Vigour and Spritefulness, etc. After all which, you will think this a Paradox indeed, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that 'tis impossible for a Stoic to be mad. So Extravagant are their Principles, that Plutarch has made it the Title of one of his Books, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the Stoics talk more Extravagantly than the Poets. I could quote you many places out of Lucian to this purpose against the Stoics, but than it must only be to show you how well I am acquainted with his Writings, for he is every where so abusive and bitter in his Satyrs, against all sorts of Philosophers, that if his mouth be any slander, they must have been a pack of the Vilest Villains that ever breathed, and upon that score I shall wave his Testimony: To proceed therefore,  
Whereas it was a Fundamental Principle of the Stoics, to esteem all things out of the power of a man's own will, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nor good nor evil, and thence not to reckon Health, Cheerfulness, good Name, Wealth, Friends, Sickness, Grief, Disgrace, Poverty, Enemies, into the accounts of Good or Evil. The Platonists, on the contrary, made their measures of Good and Evil, from the observations of Sense and Experience; They therefore went not about to persuade themselves that any accident, which they felt to be evil, was ere the less so, by being placed beyond the reach and command of their own wills; but looking about into the Nature of things, they first found that Man was a complex and multifarious Being, integrated of Body and Soul, and so that his felicity could not be consummate, if one constituent half of him was miserable: and then, that the body was liable to a thousand foreign contingencies, which 'tis not in the power of the mind of avoid, but yet that Virtue and Consideration, which have the most immediate, and most diffused influence upon the repose and satisfaction of mankind; derive entirely from within a man's self, and depend not at all upon any external occurrencies; whence they concluded, that though the biggest portions of our felicity be at our own disposals, yet that it must be acknowledged that some of the smaller parcels thereof are left to Chance, and uncertain Emergencies. And these they did not hope (with the Stoics) to escape by a wilful senselesness and stupidity, like Posidonious, who when a very importunate fit of the Gout attempted to interrupt his Harangue before Pompey, cries out, Nihil agis dolour, quamvis sis molestus, nunquam consitebor te malum esse; the most pathetical Expression of the acuteness of his pain! But the course they took, was to purge their minds of froward popular humours, and to sweeten them with mild and benign Principles; to moderate and command their passions, to furnish themselves with prudence and experience, and then whatever happened, to govern themselves by the Laws of Wisdom and Moderation: Because, though all the Fountains of contentment are not within, nor do all our joys issue from our own Bowels, yet they receive their chief tinctures thence: and hereby almost all our happiness is prudently confined within the compass of our own minds; for all intellectual endowments (which are our greatest perfection, because they perfect and advance our highest faculties) depend upon ourselves, and when the mind is furnished with Virtue & Wisdom, it is able to extract something beneficial to its own Interests, from the most malicious accidents. For every thing having two ends as well as two handles; if a wise man miss the one, he will not fail to hit the other; as he in Plutarch, who throwing a stone at a dog, but hit his cursed Mother in Law, said, That he had not missed his Mark. A Wise man having his Palladium deposited within his own bosom, by whatsoever circumstances he is besieged, must needs be secure, if by good, they minister to the delights of Temperance, if by bad, they are improved to the interests of Patience and Contentedness; so that though a Wise man be obnoxious to the spitful injuries of Fortune, and may be assaulted by foreign calamities, yet his mind (his Fort-Royal) is impregnable, and in the midst of all disappointments, its serenity shines as indisturbedly as the Lights of Pharos in the midst of Storms and Tempests. Hereby you see that though many of the ingredients of our happiness grow not within ourselves, yet their composition being at our disposal, 'tis easy, either to add to their good qualities, or to allay their bad ones. But because herein consists the Fundamental difference between the morality of the Academics and Stoics, I will endeavour to assert and illustrate it a little more clearly, by discussing the main objecdtion of the Stoics; which is this,  
If (say they) our satisfaction should depend upon foreign advantages, and any part of our happiness should be beyond our power, than it being suspended on a thousand uncertainties, it would both render Philosophy useless, and the condition of mankind unavoidably calamitous and deplorable, in that no body can be master of his own satisfaction, but must be forced to intrust it with so blind and so uncertain a thing as Fortune, and so must needs be continually liable to infinite misfortunes, and incessantly harassed with fears of losing those things, which are not more necessary to his happiness, than they are uncertain and variable.  
Though this objection be pregnantly answered by every man's Experience of humane affairs, yet partly because 'tis the main Basis of Stoicism, and partly because it reflects unhandsomely on the dealings of Providence, supposing that mankind would be hardly dealt with, if all his Goods be not placed within the confines of his own power, I shall endeavour to silence it for ever, which I think may be done by these ensuing considerations.  
1. That our Earthly happiness is never mere and unmixed, but when 'tis purest, it's diluted with some dashes of misery.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Eurip.   
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Unallayed satisfactions are too Divine to be enjoyed any where, but where the Divinity itself Resides: For as to the happiness of this life, there is no one ultimate Object or summum Bonum, to the Acquisition whereof all other Goods do but contribute as Intermedial Instruments, but every thing that Ministers to our Contentment, is a Portion of our Sovereign Happiness, which is nothing else but a man's present repose and satisfaction. I can not therefore but commend that Principle of some of the Cyrenaicks, that neither expected, nor pursued any other happiness in this life, beside what was to be found in every single action and affair thereof. For all unanimously teach, that the tranquillity and satisfaction of the mind, is the Sovereign happiness of this life, and yet that is only an act of the mind exercised about its present objects, and not any distinct object thereof: But the Creatures are not replenished with that variety of perfections as to be able to gratify all our Appetites, much less with that infinite fullness as to be able to satisfy them: for alas! all Created Being's are but small fragments of perfection, which only serve to support our Souls, till we arrive at the fruition of that Object, whose Prerogative it is to be adequate and satisfactory to all our desires and expectations. The Stoics then forget themselves, when they think an impossibility of being certainly and entirely happy here, such an insupportable Misery; when all things in this world are by the unalterable Laws of Providence imperfect, variable, and subject to the Vicissitudes of Fortune. Now Wise men, that consider the Nature and Inconstancy of things, will not design to themselves more raised degrees of Blessedness, than the World can afford: but will be content to be as happy as their own Capacities, and the present Condition of things will permit and not fruitlessly aspire to heights of felicity, which they can never reach.  
2. Though some smaller parcels of our happiness be beyond the command of our wills, yet the greater Portions thereof are not: for instance, all that in which the Stoics place their whose felicity; and that is pregnant enough of Tranquillity, to render our lives sedate and comfortable. What though some appendages of our happiness are out of our own reach, if the main body thereof be within it? Sure if Virtue be so Sovereign a good, as singly to complete our felicity, it will be sufficient to support our repose in the absence of smaller helps and assistances; Why then should they deem our estate so deplorable, when we can be secure of our most important interests, though some lesser concernments be left to the disposal of fortune  
3. 'Tis in our power to alleviate and qualify those evils, which 'tis not in our power to escape. What though I can not avoid Sickness, Poverty, and Disgrace, yet I may by prudent reflection avoid being grieved at them, and may improve them to the benefit of Virtue and Wisdom? The mould of a man's Fortune is in his own hands, though the materials are not. Although a firm and healthful habit of body be exceeding conducive to a cheerful Tenor of mind, yet may I be cheerful without it, though I might have been much more so with it. When I cannot suit events to my desires, I will suit my desires to them, I will compromise with those grievances which I cannot shun, and those blows of Fortune, I cannot ward off by Prudence, I will dead by meeting them with a hardy courage and resolution. I know I cannot bend the Laws of nature of my own will, there remains therefore no other remedy then that I sweeten and mollify their rigour, by a cheerful and generous compliance with them, and so according to that vulgar, but very wise saying, Make a Virtue of necessity: and so that metal that's most solid and generous, is most malleable too. But (to dispatch) methinks it becomes not a dull Apathist to object that we should be disquieted with perpetual fears, if any parcel of our happiness should not be locked up within our own breasts: sure he might resolve, when there remained no other remedy, to cast himself into an insensible Apathy. How ever every man that premeditates the nature and uncertainty of things, will neither be so stupid, as to be surprised with any disaster, nor so silly as to double it by a fruitless anxiety, but will make the best of his condition by prudence and discretion.  
2. A second thing for which I value the Platonists above all other Philosophers, is the innocent Gaiety and Pleasantness of their Humours. For Whether I look into their Principles, or into their lives, I can see nothing but what is calm and cheerful. For beside that their complexions were generally brisk and sprightly, the Genius of their Philosophy was free and facetious. It being one of its main principles, That as God had provided ineffable pleasures for good men in the next world, so he had made liberal provisions for their entertainment in this, and consequently that this life affords enough to please, though not to satisfy; whence they were willing to enjoy all its innocent pleasures and sensualities, though they thought them not of any great concernment to such as were furnished with capacities of rising above it, and aspiring to heavenly delights. And thus you may see, how at the same time a wise man may enjoy the world and despise it too. And from this manly and Philosophic indifferency of life, resulted a handsome and generous contempt of death, for they did not so much defy it, out of a dogged neglect of life, as slight it out of a sober and Philosophic uncertainty, whether it were better that they continued in their present happiness, or left it to enjoy more pure and generous delights. This was the main ground of Socrates' undaunted constancy in reference to death, because whether it were preferable before life, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, it was uncertain and ambiguous to all but God alone, as Plato concludes his incomparable Apology. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (says Euripides) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Who knows whether is life to live or die? To die, is to be born into another world, which every goodman may justly presume he shall find better than this. Though the main reason, why they were so willing to bid adieu to this present Stage of life, was an eager curiosity to be acquainted with the transactions and Phoenomena of the next. And methinks, had I no other Rule to guide myself by, then mere Philosophy, I could willingly play the Platonist in this particular: For though I am neither valiant nor miserable, and am as yet in my green and unexperienced years, and have tasted less of sensual delights, than (I believe) any one placed in the same capacities and circumstances with myself (for I have hitherto scarce employed any of my senses, but that of seeing) insomuch that though my Palate be not surfeited and cloyed with the same repeated relishes, nor my Eye quite weary of beholding the same repeated objects, yet I could be highly content (upon the account of a Philosophic curiosity) to leave this present Theatre, that I might enter upon the next, for the delight of being entertained with a new Scene of things. Socrates having been discoursing of the condition 
In Apolog.  of good men after death adds 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, were I but sure of the truth of these things, I would die a thousand deaths, for an experimental knowledge of them. Besides the whole life of man is transacted in the short space of 24 hours, in the rest of his age he does but tread the same Stage over and over, the same businesses always returning in the same compass of time. Now any wise or generous person, that shall but reflect upon the best spent day of his whole life, will scarce find the business of it so enticing, as to make him over greedy of more of it. But a man that has been running in this Round several years, should (methinks) be so sick and weary of doing the same things over and over, as to be willing to be at Rest, or at least to change his Employment; so that though life be no misery, yet because there may be a satiety of it, deaths a privilege. But for the Stoics (that I may continue the parallel with their only Rivals in mortality) they founded their satisfaction upon a scornful & friarly contempt of every thing, & are so injurious to their Creator, as to teach that he has provided nothing to entertain his Creatures with, but a few such childish empty trifles, as grave men (i. e. Stoics) should scorn to taste, much less to feed upon. But though the Platonists are not so impious as to think that God made the world vain, yet they are so wise and observing, as to perceive that it has made itself so; and therefore I meet with no Sect raised so much above the admired and gaudy trifles of the vulgar, as they, nor any more confidently putting the world's Pomp quite out of countenance by a handsome and free-spirited disdain, than they; nor any less concerned in news, and the little transactions of humane affairs; Nor any better entertaining themselves with the various and odd humours of mankind, making daily Comedies to themselves from the follies and little conceits of the inconsiderate many. Thus the spangled & glittering Squire, who came to Athens very brave and gallant, with a numerous train of Attendants, supposing himself fine enough to be adored by the Athenians, and to be reputed at least a Demi-God, was by the discreet and facetious Satyrs of the Platonic Philosophers laughed out of his vanity, and reduced to discretion and sobriety. And thus the Platonist in Lucian raises mirth to himself from the several Acts of the Play; now he laughs at the Rich man's displaying his Purple, with his troublesome crowd of poor-spirited Sycophants; anon pleasing himself with the disturbances and foolish madness of the Horse-race; & then with those pretty passages which happen at Funerals and making of Wills; next at the silly pleasures of great Feasts and curious Entertainments; and then at the little tumults & odd contingencies at the Baths, etc. But to conclude this head, the Platonists were generous souls, that being raised above the little concernments and under-Shreiveries of this life (as the Cardinals of Rome are pleased to style all secular employments) sat as unconcerned spectators, looking down from aloft, with pity and disdain, upon the odd Carriage of humane affairs. And happy is he 
— Celsâ qui mentis ab arce  
Despicit errantes, humanaque gaudia ridet.   
For no Prospect is so pleasant and delightful to the mind of man, as when he sees all the world below him, & beholds all others scrambling for aspiring to those things which himself contemns and tramples upon.  
3. The third good quality of the Platonists, was their valuing good-nature at so high a rate, which though it be a constitution no less virtuous and excellent, then 'tis charming and amiable, yet the estimate they set upon it was proportionable to its real value. Whence resulted that exceeding delight they took in the Society of ingenious and sweet-natured young Gentlemen, 
V. Platonis Convivium.  upon which score they professed themselves as great Votaries to the Celestial Venus, as common Mortals are to the Earthly one, for their Amours were not kindled by lust and petulency (they being professedly the most generous contemners of Women in the world) but were pure and cleanly enough to become Angels and separated souls, Plato's Love-Laws forbidding to court any other objects then abstracted and intellectual Beauties. And Plotinus makes it the first ascent to wisdom, 
Ennead. 1. l. 3  to be affected with the mere proportions of Harmony abstracted from the sensible sound, and to be enamoured with the features of beauty, without respect to the body, which they render beautiful. And yet hence some have taken occasion to slander Plato himself (together with his incomparable master Socrates) as guilty of that unnatural beastliness of the lustful Sodomites. Although Plato at the end of his Convivium has said as much to remove all suspicion from Socrates, as a matter of this nature is capable of. And himself in his first book of Laws detests and strictly prohibits this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dishonourable impurity as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a most unnatural impudence. But the forementioned calumny had never gained any credit with us, had it not been reported by some of the Ancient Fathers, & yet it is too notorious to dissemble that they were not only very careless in their relations concerning the Philosophers, being apparently guilty of innumerable 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but also in many Instances highly disingenuous, insomuch that I find no Prose-writer to agree so much with their reports as Lucian, whose main design it was to abuse every body that was grave and sober. Which may a little appear by giving you an account of the original and progress of the forementioned slander. The first Authors then of this and other resembling reports were the Comick-Poets, who were persons of a free, droling, and Satirical humour, and whose chief design in their Comedies, was to abuse men with roguish and unlucky Stories; whatever was their Argument, their Plot was always satire. They therefore who flourished about the time of the Peloponesian War, when the government of Athens was popular, were wont to traduce the great and rich men of the City: But when the Grandees were grown too big to be brought upon the Stage (by the alteration of the Government into an Aristocracy) they betook themselves to abuse former Poets, and in that Age, Homer was sufficiently lashed; but afterwards, when Philosophy began to flourish, the Philosophers (upon every small quarrel that happened between them and the Poets) were brought upon the Stage, and persecuted with all their Satyrs. And thus this foul charge of Sodomy, wherewith Socrates has been so loudly impeached, was nothing else but an abusive invention of Aristophanes, who having an implacable picque against him, endeavoured by all means to render him both odious and ridiculous: For Socrates being of a grave and severe humour did not a little dis-relish the vanity and looseness of the Stage, whereupon Aristophanes the Poet Laureate of that Age, was so nettled, that he immediately left the old Comical Argument of droling upon former Poets, and set himself to abuse the Philosophers, but especially Socrates, all whose actions he continually persecuted with sharp and unlucky Satyrs. And therefore whereas Socrates was wont to take home to himself, the most ingenious & sprightly Youths, he could meet with, to bestow upon them an Education proportionable to their parts, Aristophanes (with too much foulness for any Ingenuous Person) represents him as one that picked up the loveliest youths, to the foulest and most beastly purposes. And whereas Socrates taught, that God was to be sought after in Heaven, and not in their Images. Aristophanes' perstringes him as one that Worshipped the Clouds, and to this end he Wrote his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 only to abuse Socrates and his Gods. Neither did their Malice rest here, but proceeded to Death and Banishment; for the Poets had the greatest hand in the impeachment of Socrates; and Melitus, that was his most vehement Accuser, was one of Aristophanes' Players. And a while after (about the CXX. Olimpiad) one Sophocles, a Pragmatical Fellow of the Poetic Faction, procured a Decree for the Banishment of all the Philosophers from Athens, which took effect, till at length the Controversy being fairly debated before the Senate, the cause of the Philosophers seemed so apparently innocent to them, that they immediately caused the Decree to be canceled, ordered that the Philosophers should be speedily called home, and fined Sophocles five Talents. Now, though the Fathers could never meet with any such filthy Relations in sober and impartial Historians, yet because they apprehended (though very ineptly) that it made for the Interest of Christianity, that the best men among the Heathens should be but bad enough; rather than be destitute of competent Testimonies against Socrates, (the most eminent instance of Ethnic Virtue) they would cite them from such as were not only his Enemies, but Poets and Satirists too; i. e. from those who were not only obliged by their design to abuse all men, especially the wiser and more serious sort, but also were incensed with a peculiar spite and malice against him. Any one therefore that is acquainted with the Genius of the Grecian Comedy in general, and with this now mentioned Contest of the Philosophers and Comedians in particular, will be far from thinking their Satyrs a sufficient Testimony against any man's morality. And therefore some of our modern Critics are not very kind to the Philosophers, when they think a good part of the Philosophic History is to be collected out of the Ancient Comedians. Having consumed so many lines in Vindicating our Philosopher's chastity, I shall wave adding any farther Evidences of the goodness of their Natures; only give me leave to throw in this single item thereof, that in the Platonic History you may meet with more instances of true Philosophic & Heroic Friendship, then in all the world beside. They were indeed generally somewhat too fond of their Friends, & it was their expressing the offices of Friendship and Good-Nature (by way of Allusion) in amorous terms, that gave too much ground for the forementioned slander.  
And now (Sir) how much will this Excellent Quality recommend them to our esteem, when we consider at how high a rate our Blessed Saviour himself valued it? If we look into his Laws, what are they but so many injunctions to the several instances of good nature, Mildness, Patience, Mercifulness, Humility, Candour, Ingenuity? His new and peculiar Precept is, That we should love one another, and be kind not only to Friends, but Enemies. And therefore a peevish ill-natured Christian, is the greatest contradiction in the World. Peevishness being the greatest reproach and weakness of humane Nature, and most contrary to the temper of the Divine Mind: So that they, who, not long since, were wont to discourse, that the Saints or People of God (i. e. That sort of people who can be Devout and Godly, without being Virtuous) are indeed peevish here, but in Heaven this imperfection shall be removed, might as well have told us, that the Saints are Drunkards here, but in Heaven they shall be Temperate; the Saints are Cheats and Knaves here, but in Heaven they shall be Honest; the Saints are Adulterers here, but in Heaven they shall be chaste; for an habitual Peevishness is as inconsistent with the design of Christianity, as the sins of an habitual dishonesty, Drunkenness, and Adultery. And then if we look into our Saviour's life, the unparallelled civility and obligingness of his Deportment, seems to be almost as high an Evidence of the Truth and Divinity of his Doctrine, as his unparallelled Miracles were; For 'tis altogether unimaginable that so sweet-natured a Person should be such a base and profligate Impostor, as he must have been, if he had been one. And among all his Favourites, it was the Gentle and sweet-natured St. john that was his darling Disciple; whilst we often find him checking Peter's rude and unmannerly Zeal.  
But all this while, by good Nature, I do not barely design a sweet Complexion and temperament of Body, (though that is an happy advantage to Virtue) but such a Divine and Gracious temper of Mind as produces a sincere kindness and benevolence towards all men. 'Tis the fairest Character and Imitation of the Deity, that distributes his Bounty to all, and like his own Sun, shines upon the Just and Unjust. 'Tis a Catholic Charity that enfolds the whole world in the Arms of love and kindness. Only there are some persons of such pevish and self confined Spirits, that will not suffer themselves to be embraced by those, whose unbounded embraces equally comprehend all, and disdain to be but the partial objects of an impartial Love. These men confine the displays of their love and tenderness, within the narrow and contracted Circumference of a small party, and Excommunicate the residue of Mankind as unworthy their charity, and think it a great pollution to entertain any kind thoughts for any besides themselves, confining the Elect within the walls of Rome or Geneva: Now against such testy and irregular Spirits, the sweetest Natures have the greatest Antipathies, not from any malice or bitterness against their Persons, but from a true Zeal, for largeness and ingenuity of Spirit, and a real hatred against all those Pestilent qualities that tend to supplant or destroy it. Whence the Blessed jesus (who was the highest and most matchless Pattern of all the Instances of Good-Nature) was remarkably sharp and severe in his Invectives against the Pharisees; because these Illnatured Fellows despised and scorned all that were not of their Sect, endeavouring to confine all Goodness to their own Faction, and looking upon the rest of Mankind, as a rout of vile and worthless Reprobates. Now, though our Saviour could win and oblige Publicans and Harlots, (persons of the most debauched and losest lives) by his mild and sweet Deportment, yet when He had to do with these holy Pharisaical Zelots, his usual Language was, Ye Scribes and Pharisees, Hypocrites, ye are of your Father the Devil. There being nothing more hateful to God, than a high pretender to Religion, void of Charity and true Goodness.  
I have heard some men (of a bitter and envious Complexion, that have too much Gall to have the Innocence of Doves, and that through the bitterness of their own Spirits, cannot relish the sweetness of Good-Nature) inveigh against the advancing of Good-Nature, as if it were a more neat and secret design of undermining the Interests of Religion, and advancing those of Atheism. A Calumny as absurd as 'tis impious: For how can that undermine Religion, which is its prime intendment? Can any design be injured or defeated by its intrinsic and proper end? And what more evident, then that one of the main purposes of Christianity, is to sweeten and refine our Natures? What does our Lawgiver more vehemently and frequently urge, than Meekness, Mercifulness, Humility, and other resembling Instances of Good-Nature? What bids greater defiance to the genuine Spirit of Christianity, then rude, churlish, and ungentile Peevishness? What more lovely in the Blessed jesus then the sweetness and obligingness of his Conversation? What did he ever more inveigh against, than an uncivil and Pharisaical Zeal, howsoever otherwise sincere and cordial? so that if to urge upon men the practice of Good-natured Qualities be to supplant Christianity, than Christianity must supplant and contradict itself.  
But men have unhappily of late Christened a sort of sulphureous and Fanatique fire, by the name of Zeal: And when once their minds are tainted and enraged by this hot devotional Zeal, 'tis as natural to them to be rude and base-natured, as 'tis to Dogs and Tigers. Zeal is a fire in the Soul, which unless qualified and slaked by meekness and a calm-nature, doth not only prey upon the mind, and devour its intellectual Powers, and inflame all the Passions, but its rage breaks forth, and sets whole States and Kingdoms into a combustion, and reduces the whole World to Ashes; the greatest Zealots always proving the greatest Incendiaries; so that what Homer says of the Syrian Star, is not more true of any thing then this fiery Zeal, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Iliad. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   
4. A fourth pre-eminence of the Platonists (that I may insist on no more) is their readiness & ability in the smaller Morals, by which I mean their skill in all the Arts of behaviour and conversation. For though I have sufficiently experienced a modest shamefacedness, and uncoothness in ceremonial addresses, to be the natural and unavoidable results of privacy, (as all Metals contract rust by lying) yet the Platonists, notwithstanding their contemplative retiredness, were not inferior to the most polished Courtiers, in the neatness and complaisance of their Deportment. Which I am apt to ascribe chiefly to the readiness and pregnancy of their Fancies; for though a sound and steady Judgement (which rarely goes in company with subtle and flashy imaginations) is the most useful and commanding ability in business, yet 'tis the quick and sprightly fancy that takes and commands most in converse. A strong ready wit, with a bold and plausible Tongue, shall win more respect and reputation, than all other more valuable and emproving accomplishments, if wanting these advantages. Besides, they did not spend all their time and diligence in Bookishness, which renders Scholars soft, silly, unexperienced things, but proposing to themselves ability and judgement in business, as one main end of Study; they rather used their Learning, than admired it, according to that Aphorism of my Lord Bacon, Crafty men contemn studies, simple men admire them, & wise men use them. But the main ground of their good-meen, was their being blest with all the advantages of nature & education. Were it not too tedious to run through the whole succession of the Academy from the first rise thereof to its utmost period, it would not be difficult to represent to you, how every member thereof superinduced to a pure complexion, and a gentile education the advantages of Travel and severe Study; and what more could be desired to complete them in all the Realities and Ornaments of Humane Nature? As Plato himself was of so well-tempered a complexion, that he chose an unhealthy place of residence, for a check and revulsion to his too high and luxuriant habit of Body, and yet lived to a great age unacquainted with sickness and diseases, and at last this Socratic Swan expired insensibly in a pleasant contemplation: Est etiam (says Cicero) quietae & purae atque eleganter actae aetatis placida ac lenis senectus, qualem accepimus Platonis, qui uno & octuagessimo aetatis anno scribens mortuus est. And then for his Parentage, though I do as little credit that he was begot either by Apollo or by a Spectre in his shape, as I do that he was born of a Virgin Mother (and yet both are reported by many Authors, and seem to be believed by more) yet 'tis past doubt that his extraction was from two of the most Ancient and most Noble Families in Athens, his Mother Perictione being of the race of Solon, and his Father Aristo of the Family of the Codri. And then for his Education he was no Athenian Cockney, but was Socrates' darling favourite, Traveled into all parts of the Learned World, resided a considerable time in the Court of Dionysius, where he was both admired and envied by the Courtiers for the unaffected Gracefulness of his addresses, and some say the reason why he received so bad usage from the Tyrant, was that he excelled him so far in all the Arts and charms of conversation, that he seemed to be almost as much respected and admired as himself. For he knew how to be facetious without being vain or trifling, & how to be serious without being sour or morose, his behaviour was always mild and courteous, his humour always cheerful and uniform, and his gravity at an equal distance from moroseness & vanity; to be brief, he was entirely adorned with all the accomplishments that can command either love or honour. And then for Plotinus, his deportment (as Porphyry relates in his life) was so gentile that his Audience was composed of a confluence of the Noblest and most Illustrious Personages in Rome; his integrity so eminent, that he was deputed overseer to most of their Wills, and Arbitrator in most of their Controversies, and yet managed all with that Candour, Prudence, and Sincerity, as that he neither lost one Friend, nor Purchased one Enemy in five and twenty years' Residence at Rome, For the rest of his life consult Porphyry and Eunapius. For the life of Porphyry, I refer you to Eunapius, but yet I cannot omit this single instance of the goodness of his humour, that after an obstinate conflict, and many reiterated controversial Rencounters with Amelius, as soon as he was convinced that Truth and Amelius stood together, he neither scrupled to make a Public Recantation then, nor to record it to Posterity, that himself was baffled (as he has done in the Life of Plotinus) than which we scarce know a greater instance of an Heroic Candour. For Proclus consult his Scholar Marinus the Neapolitan, and Philostratus the younger De vitis Sophistarum (I say the younger, because he was Nephew to him that wrote the History of Apollonius Tyanaeus, though they be usually confounded upon the Authority of that careless Rhapsodist Suidas, who has been the Author of infinite other resembling mistakes) lastly consult Eunapius for the lives of AEdesius, jamblicus, Sopater, (Constantine's unhappy favourite) Eustathius, and his eminent wife Sosipatra (of whom so many strange stories are reported,) Crispus one of Iulian's Courtiers, a man of eminent prudence and policy, Oribasius, julian's Physician, Maximus and Chrysanthius his great Favourites, the former whereof, was an eminent Courtier, during the time of Iulian's Reign, & afterwards (I fear too much) an instance of Christian Cruelty and Revenge; though the generous Chrysanthius could never be courted from his Philosophic retirements by all the Emperor's importunity: Proaeresius, who was so famous an Orator, that the City of Rome erected to him a public Statue of Brass with this inscription, Regina Rerum Roma, Regi Eloquentiae. Hephaestion, Himerius, Libanius, Nymphidianus, etc. and you will find them such a succession of Gentile, Virtuous, and Generous Persons, that the Ethnic world cannot show the like. To these I might add the novel restorers of Platonism; for as the Platonic succession expired not long after the reign of julian, having received its mortal wound from Constantine, who dissolved their Schools and dispersed their Professors; so about the fourteenth Centurie, it began to revive and to wrestle with Aristotle's Philosophy: for some of the Grecian Prelates, that then sat in the Council of Florence (called to reconcile the Greek and the Latin Churches) seeing all other Philosophy quite dashed out of Countenance in these Western Parts by the Aristotelian, they were not a little zealous to restore that of Plato, whence arose the disputes between Georgius Trapezuntius, and Georgius Scholarius on the behalf of Aristotle, and Bessarion Bishop of Nice, (made Cardinal for his eminent services in the Council) and Gemistus Pletho on the behalf of Plato. But Pletho getting into favour with Laurentius Cosmo the great Duke, inspired him with such a mighty zeal for the Platonic Philosophy, that he immediately devoted young Ficinus (Son to one of his chiefest Physicians) to its Restauration, and educated him accordingly; and invited that worthy Hero johannes Picus the Earl of Mirandula, Georgius Vespusius, Christophorus Landinus, Angelus Politianus, and others to Florence, where they erected an Academy. Which, with much more, you may meet with in the extant Epistles of the Earl of Mirandula, Marsilius Ficinus, and Angelus Politanus. But I proceed, though the Platonists could Artificially conform their Behaviour to the more refined and Gentile sort of Men, yet as for that savage Beast, the Popular Rout, they valued no more to please them, then to gratify Wolves or Tigers; for really (Sir) folly is so moulded into the Constitution of the common and mechanical sort of men, that that Philosopher must be well-nigh as absurd as they, who supposes them capable of wisdom, when they have scarce wit or judgement enough to think a thought, that is not inept and ridiculous. Their childish and froward humour is not unhandsomely displayed by Charon. All that they think is Vanity, all that they say is false and erroneous; that they reprove is good, that they approve is naught; that which they praise is infamous, that which they do and undertake is folly. So that 'tis not possible for any man, who aspires to wisdom, to condescend to any compliance with their base and absurd humours. And therefore these Sons of wisdom were regardless of them, as of Apes and Baboons.  
But now for the Stoics, their Conversation was insolent and supercilious, their looks affected and artificial, their Deportment was such a sour and morose behaviour, as the vulgar stile gravity. And I think josephus was not much mistaken, when he described the rude and ill-natured Pharisees by comparing them with the Stoics, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (says he, describing his own Sect) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. For as the supercilious Pharisees accounted their own Sect the only School of Sanctity, so the Stoics esteemed themselves the only Sons of wisdom, and all others Children, Fools, and Madmen. I might both evidence these things by several particular instances, and add several other Prerogatives of the Platonic Morality, but because I fear I have more need to beg your pardon for having been already so tedious, I shall only tell you, that you may find the fairest and exactest Idea and Picture thereof in the Life and Precepts of Socrates, the several lineaments of which lie scattered and diffused in Plato's Writings, but are pretty handsomely collected into one Table in a late French discourse of Mr. julien Davion, Entitled, Le Crayon du Christianisme en la Philosophie de Socrate.  
And now I proceed to the ne●●●art of my Task, their Logic, of which my censure is briefly this, That as Plato's manner of arguing is more succinct than the tedious way of Syllogising, so 'tis not less sure and evident; for what discourse can proceed with greater evidence and conviction, then after you have explained the Terms of the Question, and agreed with your Adversary about the matter debated of, to propose to him some Principles so clear and palpable, that they shall either presuppose or enforce his assent, and from thence to lead him by Induction through a series of propositions depending upon and orderly deduced from your first Proleptick Principles, till he is fairly brought or unawares betrayed into an unavoidable necessity of assenting to the Truth you assert? Which is the method that Plato pretends to. I must confess that arguing by Syllogisms is more suitable to Youths and Novices in Reason, but 'tis far more Elegant and Manly, to manage a few short Interrogatories with that dexterity and strength of Reason, as thereby to distress your Adversary so far, as to force him either to Seal to your Opinion, or to retract his own former concessions: For in the former Method, the Disputant moves on by slow Progressions, and takes a great compass about to approach and get up to his Enemy; but in the latter his motion is quick and nimble, and the engagement so direct and smart, that it cannot be closely pursued, but by Persons very expert and knowing in the Art and Laws of Reasoning.  
But some that make the best Laws, are not always their best observers. Thus though Plato's discourse about practical matters are exceeding handsome and pertinent, yet when he treats of speculative Notions, his rules of arguing could not be more strict, close, and exact, than his Argumentations were wide, 
In his Plato Exotericus.  lose, and incoherent: When Patricius confidently asserts Plato's demonstrations in his Parmenides to be so strong and undeniable, Ut nullae tales apud Mathematicum ullum reperiantur; I commend his confidence, but dare not contradict his assertion, because I think it unhandsome to contradict in a matter, which I dare not be very confident I understand. But when Cardinal Bessarion asserts, 
Adu. Calum. l. 1. c. 5.  Totum Platonis Timaeum ex syllogismis demonstrativis constare; I who have read over that discourse with as much caution and attention as I could, dare (by the Cardinal's leave) pronounce that there is not one demonstrative syllogism in the whole Book; nay that there is not one true and valid Argument, but that the whole discourse is weak and incoherent: And (to speak out plainly) that Person will much oblige me, that shall direct me to one material ratiocination about speculative Theories in all Plato's Writings, where I cannot show him some manifest flaw or other. For they either (1.) bottom upon uncertain and inevident Principles, as they generally do; but because there can be no certainty in the conclusion, without a certainty in the premises, and the certainty of intermediate propositions depends upon the first, if that be uncertain, the whole train of Inferences deduced from it, (though aptly connected to each other) must needs be so too. Or else (2.) they are circular, as in his Meno he bottoms the Souls Reminiscency of those Ideas, it conversed with in a former state, upon its presupposed Immortality; and yet in his Phaedo, he fairly argues for the Souls Immortality from its presupposed Reminiscency. And any one that peruses his Writings warily, will find them to abound with infinite such Circles. Or (3.) he wanders into matters remote and impertinent to the Subject and Argument of his Discourse, roving into disputes of a quite distant nature from the Question in debate; or beating about through wild, intricate and uncertain Ambages, or taking a wide and tedious compass to pursue and drive a trivial word into its proper signification. Though perhaps this charge will admit of an Apology. Because most of his disputes were managed against the Sophists of that age, who made it their whole business to maintain wrangles by tricks and shifts of words, and therefore whoever undertook to dispute against them, must of necessity be engaged in word quarrels. And hence it was that Plato does almost every where take such large compasses merely to vindicate the signification of a single word against their idle cavils, and though sometimes he may pursue his task presly and coherently, yet because of the small importance of the matter debated of, his discourse must needs be both very tedious and not very profitable. Or else (5.) there is some flaw and incoherence in some of the intermediate propositions, which must needs mar the chain of his whole Discourse: For the certain knowledge of Consequences is only conditional, and supposes the Truth of Premises, so that where any Proposition is false, there the coherence ceases, and all conclusions that follow it are absurd, because incoherent. But if I should give you a Catalogue of his Circular arguings, incoherences, contradictions, non-consequences, and all other violations of the Laws of Reasoning, I must send you a Volumn as vast as his. And besides it would not be less fruitless than tedious, and might seem to aim at no other design, but merely his disparagement. But yet that you may not suspect me of rashness in drawing up so big a charge against so eminent a person without being able to back it with a proportionable evidence, I suppose it will not be impertinent to give you a competent proof of it, if I can perform it without being tedious. Which may be done by proposing one instance and referring you to an Author, that will supply you with infinite more, if you think it worth the while to examine them. The Instance I shall give you, is the known and famous Argument for the Souls Immortality in his Phaedrus. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. The sense of which words is fully and more plainly contained in this Analysis, The Soul is always in motion; that which is always in motion, is self moving; that which is selfmoving, is never deserted of itself; that which never deserts itself, never ceases to move; that which never ceases to move, is the source and origine of all motion; that which is the source of all motion has no beginning; and that which has no beginning can have no ending. To omit that every Proposition is either false, or uncertain, or incoherent, as yourself will easily observe, judge whether we are not likely to have a mighty proof of the Souls immortality, when it must be resolved into its own self-subsistence.  
The Author I shall refer you to, is johannes Baptista Crispus his Quinarius Primus de Ethnicis Philosophis caute Legendis. 'Tis a Book of no small bulk, containing above 500 pages in folio, and yet the main business of it is to display the defectiveness of Plato's arguings: Where you may be supplied with infinite apparent & palpable instances thereof if you will be at the pains to read and consider them. We might possibly have had a better account in Theopompus his Book 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of which thus Athenaeus 11. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Plato's Dialogues are trifling and false, and that many others of them are stolen out of the Discourses of Aristippus, or Antisthenes, or Bryson of Heraclea.  
After this brief account of Plato's Logic, I come now to his Natural Philosophy, in which I shall endeavour all possible brevity, because this part, as well as the former, doth not so directly concern my present design, the intendment of my charge being chiefly against his Natural Theology. But that my Discourse may be entire in all its parts, and regular in its method, I shall to my account of his Logic cast in this of his physiology. Which will be sufficiently displayed and disparaged too, by telling you that in its main strokes it accords with the Aristotelean Philosophy; a parallel between them was asserted and demonstrated by Ammonius, Porphyry, Hierocles, 
V. Phot. eclog. CCLI.  and others of the sacred succession among the Ancients, and among Modern Writers has been attempted by Foxius, Carpentarius, Marronius, Buratellus and others. The Retail of instances you may see in them, but he that tells you in gross that they agree in one Principle, by which alone they solve all the appearances and productions of Nature, tells you all. For as Aristotle resolves all Phaenomena into his Forms, (which he starts from the Bosom of matter) so Plato solves all by the Soul of the Universe and Ideas, (which in Greek are all one with Forms.) For the Mechanical Hypotheses having been probably advanced to a considerable Grandeur by Leucippus and Democritus (of whom Plato makes not any mention in all his Writings) and other Ancient Vertuosis, these two great and ambitious Wits, Plato and Aristotle, designing a Philosophical Empire to themselves scorned to be so meanly employed, as only to improve other men's principles, and therefore endeavoured to amuse the world with new ones, which they knew others could as little confute, as themselves could prove, by reason of their obscurity and remoteness from sense. How little Aristotle intended his Forms should be understood is already infinitely notorious, and how little mind Plato had that it should be ever known what kind of Thing his Universal Soul is, is as notoriously apparent from his descriptions of it, which are nothing else but some odd fantastic Schemes of numerical figures and proportions, as you may see in both the Timaeus'; where 'tis highly pleasant to read how seriously he prescribes the Method of its Composition out of numerical Ingredients. Take (saith he) all the numbers which make up Musical proportions, as Diapasons, Diapente's, Diatesserons, and an infinite number more, but be especially careful not to omit the double 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that which arises by even proportions, as 1, 2, 4, 8, etc. and that whose proportions run into odd numbers, as 1, 3, 9, 27, etc. Mix and pound them together with all possible exactness, and if you find any void spaces between the even and odd numbers, fill them with the smallest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (which are some very fine and minute fragments) and when you have wrought all exceeding exactly into the shape of the Letter I, divide it in the middle long ways into two equal parts, cross them in the form of the Letter X, and be sure to fasten them very strongly at the Commissure, and then bow all four joints, till at length you make them so pliable, as to bring them into a Spherical figure, and then 'tis brought to a right Animary Temper and Harmony. If this description (to what ever purpose 'tis designed) be not prodigiously silly and ridiculous, pray tell me what is. And yet this senseless insignificant Jargon is made the sole and intimate Principle of all Natural Events. All Motions, Generations, Corruptions, Alterations, Sympathies, Antipathies, the properties of Bodies, the figure of the Heavens, the system of the Stars, the motions of the Planets, Eclipses, Comets, Meteors, The roundness of the Earth, the Flux and Reflux of the Sea, the Original of Rivers and Fountains, the Generation of Winds, Thunder, Lightning, Clouds, Rain, Hail, Snow, Ice, Dew, Petrification, the wonders of the Magnet, the Generation and Transmutation of Metals, the Powers and Specific Virtues of Plants, the Variety of Animals, their Origine, their Shapes, their Nutrition, their Faculties, The Qualities of the Elements, Heat, Cold, Gravity, Levity, Fluidity, Firmness, Rarity, Density, Perspicuity, Opacity, Hebetude, Subtlety, Smoothness, Asperity, Hardness, Softness, Stubbornness, Flexibility, Light, Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Smells, and all other Phaenomena of Nature are only so many Tricks of this Magical kind of Soul. If I could have satisfied myself it had been to any purpose, I should have given you an account of his enormous absurdities in all the forementioned particulars, as they are discoursed of in his Timaeus, which contains the whole Body of his Natural Philosophy. But I shall beg your leave to dismiss this Theme, partly because none have more professedly disclaimed the Platonic physiology, than they that stickle most for his other Whimsies, partly because the Aristotelian Philosophy having been of late so shamefully baffled, this which agrees so much with it in its main Principles, and more in its Genius, must of necessity perish together with it, and so will as little need as deserve any particular confutation; partly because their physiology is well nigh purely Theological; The Platonists always Treating of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. as Proclus observes; so that in ventilating and sifting their Theology, I must also of necessity discuss their Natural Philosophy, which is every where so intimately mingled with it; but chiefly because I am lately grown such a despairing Sceptic in all Physiological Theories, that I cannot concern myself in the Truth or Falsehood of any Hypotheses. For though I prefer the Mechanical Hypotheses before any other, yet me thinks their contexture is too slight and brittle to have any stress laid upon them; and I can resemble them to nothing better than your Glass drops, from which, if the least portion be broken, the whole Compages immediately dissolves and shatters into Dust and Atoms; for their parts, which rather lie then hang together, being supported only by the thin film of a brittle Conjecture (not annealed by experience and observation) if that fail any where, the whole Systeme of the Hypothesis unavoidably shatters: And how easy a thing it is to spoil the prettiest conjecture, is obvious to the most vulgar observer. The chief reason therefore, why I prefer the Mechanical and Experimental Philosophy before the Aristotelean, is not so much because of its so much greater certainty, but because it puts inquisitive men into a method to attain it, whereas the other serves only to obstruct their industry by amusing them with empty and insignificant Notions. And therefore we may rationally expect a greater Improvement of Natural Philosophy from the Royal Society, (if they pursue their design) than it has had in all former ages; for they having discarded all particular Hypotheses, and wholly addicted themselves to exact Experiments and Observations, they may not only furnish the World with a complete History of Nature, (which is the most useful part of physiology) but also lay firm and solid foundations to erect Hypotheses upon, (though perhaps that must be the work of future Ages:) at least we shall see whether it be possible to frame any certain Hypotheses or no, which is the thing I most doubt of, because, though the Experiments be exact and certain, yet their Application to any Hypotheses is doubtful and uncertain; so that though the Hypothesis may have a firm Basis to bottom upon, yet it can be fastened and cemented to it no other way, but by conjecture and uncertain (though probable) applications, and therefore I doubt not but we must at last rest satisfied with true and exact Histories of Nature for use and practice; and with the handsomest and most probable Hypotheses for delight and Ornament.  
And now I pass over to the main design of these Papers, which is to give an account of the Platonic Theology: The Civil Part whereof, viz. That which concerns their Public Worship, I shall omit, For all the Religious Observations of their Country being trifling, obscene, or inhuman, their temporizing Conformity to them, stands upon Record as one of their greatest Blemishes: Though it must be confessed that the Platonists were of all men the greatest Refiners and Improvers of Helenisme; instead of rude and barbarous Usages, introducing civil and more modest Ceremonies. And yet the latter Platonists, or second School of Plato, degenerated into the basest and foulest Superstition, being the greatest Patrons of Theurgical Rites and Magical Arts, or rather juggling Tricks, (for whatever they were, they could be no better) especially those of them that did most Pythagorise, As Apollonius Tyanaeus, that grand stickler for Ehtnicism; jamblicus, one of their Famousest Devoto's; julianus the Syrian, Surnamed Theurgus, from his Eminent knowledge and agility in Magical Tricks, were great Zealots for the Pythagorean Philosophy. But if you look into Eunapius, you will see, that not only these, but the Emperor julian, Porphyry, Maximus, Libanius, Amelius, Sopater, AEdesius, Chrysanthius, and others were Zealous Asserters of this Magical kind of Juggling, chiefly (as 'tis supposed) to confront the Christian Religion, and the Miracles on which it stood. But I forbear to prosecute this Theme, my intention being not to discourse of their public and political actions, but only of their private sentiments.  
Their Theology then consisted of two parts; Practical, or that which concerns Theological Virtues; and Speculative, or that which concerns speculations about Theological matters. Which two parts integrate a Body of Divinity not unlike to that of King Ptolemy's man in Lucian, who was one half perfectly black, and the other exceeding white; so that part of their Theology, which relates to practice, is eminently clear and perspicuous, whilst that which is employed in Theory and Contemplation is monstrously dark and obscure. This latter I shall endeavour to evince more largely in the sequel of my discourse; but for a brief evidence of the first, take this short Catalogue of their Sentiments concerning Religion, which are such as these.  
It's main design is to perfect and dignify humane Nature, 'tis consonant to our Natural Reasons, complies with our Natural Necessities, relieves our Natural Wants. It consists in living up to our Faculties, and acting as becomes Rational Being's; In clearing the Soul from prejudices and prepossessions, and pursuing Truth with an honest and impartial Simplicity: In following the Conduct of Reason, and being confident in its Guidance, seeing the Condition of him that does so is as secure, as 'tis certain that Infinite Goodness cannot be angry with him, that has endeavoured with all faithfulness and diligence to know and do his Duty. It resides in the Mind and Spirit, not in Customs and bare Ceremonies. It is Free and Ingenuous, not Slavish and Troublesome, because it flows from a true Love of God and Goodness. It is truly Noble and Generous, and requires of us to act suitable to the Dignity of rational Being's, to keep up the Splendour and Grandeur of our Natures, and to scorn any Action that's unhandsome, or unworthy our Station and Quality: It commands us only to live like Men, and forbids us nothing but what makes us Brutes or Devils. It teaches us to imitate and resemble the Divine Perfections, to be Godlike in Wisdom, and Justice, and Goodness, in Meekness, and Pity, and Clemency, in Kindness and Patience, in forgiving Injuries, and Pardoning Enemies, in doing hurt to no Man, and doing good to every Man. It interdicts us not any Innocent Delights, but only restrains the Extravagancies of our Passions and Appetites. It is the most conducive Instrument in the world to the pleasures of both Mind and Body; Infelicities (though Providence were banished the World) being the Spontaneous Issues of Vile Practices; and Sin the Natural Womb of Punishment; it therefore permits (unless in some special contingencies) all Corporeal Pleasures, as far as they are healthful and pleasant, and debars us of no delights, but those that are destructive of the Tranquillity of our Minds, or Indolency of our Bodies. It produces a sweet and gracious temper of Mind, that causes an universal benevolence and kindness to Mankind. It makes us Affable, Humble, Courteous, Charitable, Moderate, Prudent, Unpassionate. It consists of Love, Candor, Ingenuity, Clemency, Patience, Mildness, and all other Instances of Good-Nature. It detests nothing more than a Peevish, Froward, Morose, Uncivil, Passionate, Furious, Talkative, Fanatic Zeal. It begets a true Liberty and Freedom of Spirit. It Exempts us from all effeminate Fears and Scruples, and begets the greatest Serenity and Cheerfulness of Mind. It instructs us to dread no Evil from God, but to look upon Him as an infinitely Gracious and Benign Being, that designs nothing more than the happiness and perfection of his Creatures; that Transacts with Mankind by gentle and paternal Measures, and that is so far from tying upon us Niceties and Scruples, that he pities our Infirmities, and bids us to concern ourselves only about plain and palpable Duties. It is the most sprightly and vivacious thing in the world, driving away all sad and gloomy Melancholy, begetting in us a firm and rational Confidence, and the ineffable joys of a good Conscience. It advances the Soul to its Just Power and Dominion, and enables it to govern all Corporeal Appetites, and therefore enjoins us above all things to shun Intemperance, not only for its own Intrinsique Baseness, but for its mischievous Effects; because it naturally so debauches and dulls our Reasons, as to disable them for all good and virtuous Actions. For Religion is pure, cleanly and spiritual; but an intemperate sensuality is nasty, sottish, and makes the mind of man cheap and foolish, and unapt for any thing that is Manly, Generous, and Rational, and so is the greatest Impediment to all the ends and Exercises of Religion, which directly tends to the enobling of our Natures, the fortifying of our Reasons, the subduing of all our lower and sottish Appetites, the advancing of our manly and intellectual Abilities, in any thing that renders us less like Beasts, and more like men. But as for Intemperance, that does by a natural necessity besot and weaken the vigour of our Reasons, and so directly thwart all the ends of Religion, for it either stupifies or enrages our Spirits, either stuffing our Bodies with dull, watery, and flatulent humours, or putting their Ferments into irregular and extravagant motions. I have often known a rude, wild, dissolute, choleric, ungovernable Spirit enter into persons (otherwise of a well-inclined Complexion) by no other way then a wide and devouring Throat. To conclude, our work in this World is to see that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 maintain its own Authority against all the assaults of rude and barbarous Passions; that it tame and civilize that wild and savage Beast, to which Providence has tied it, that by a complete Victory over all ignoble and unhandsome motions of the brutish Faculties, it may be in a manner restored to the condition of a pure and intellectual Being; and so be capacitated to relish the joys proper to God and Spiritual Natures, for we are not capable of that degree of Felicity which they enjoy, till our Souls are rendered so by proportionate degrees of Purity and Holiness; for the happiness of Heaven is pure and intellectual, and therefore our minds are purged here from all feculencies of matter, that they may be fitted and qualified to relish its Enjoyments; so that when the vigorous Energy of the Soul has melted down all the drossy parts of sluggish and unwieldy matter, and is become 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Godlike, and purely spiritual, than it shall mount up into the Regions of Bliss and Happiness, and shall be admitted into an intimate converse and union with the Divine Nature, and shall live in the Ravishing Contemplations and Embrace of uncreated Beauty, and bathe its dilated Faculties in the full streams of Infinite Goodness, and Sun itself in the Invigorating Beams of Light and Love, and spend a whole Eternity in the blissful Acts of Love, and Joy, and Peace, and every thing that can procure or increase its happiness. By all which, you easily discern that Religion is no Arbitrary Exaction, but Wise and Rational, and of natural necessity to perfect and refine our Natures, to raise and purify our Minds, to prepare and fit us for a higher and more Divine Condition, the Soul being not capable or fit without it to enjoy the pleasures of God and Heaven.  
And now I descend to their Speculative or Metaphysical Theology, which the Platonists style Divine; The Peripatetics Primitive Philosophy; and include in it that which they call Sapience or Metaphysics; so that I shall not confine myself to matters merely Theological, but shall take in all the general Principles of Science; especially because I do not intend a pursuit of all particular Disputes, (for that would be an endless undertaking) but only some such General Exceptions, as though they may have a more direct aspect on Metaphysical Speculations, yet may concern their Philosophy in gross, and cast an oblique look upon all its other parts, This premised, I proceed  
1. The first thing therefore, against which I except, is their way of resolving knowledge into its first and fundamental Principles; in that by rejecting the Testimony and Judgement of sense in matters of Philosophy, they do but involve and perplex the Principles thereof, under the pretext of a more abstracted and intellectual discovery of things: For hereby the minds of men are taken off from the native Evidence of plain and palpable Truths, and are fain to ground all their knowledge upon nice and subtle Speculations, whereby, at least, clear and unquestionable Truths are resolved into Principles infinitely more uncertain and disputable than themselves. And that the Platonic way of resolving knowledge is justly chargeable herewith, needs no other proof then barely to represent it. They then suppose that the Truth of all Being's consists in a conformity to their Archetypal Ideas, whereby they mean some General Patterns, by which all the Individuals of each species are framed, so that to investigate the Nature of things, we must endeavour to know the Resemblance they have to their Originals; and that therefore to reflect upon these, and to consider their agreement with sensible things, is the only way to attain a certain knowledge of the Natures of the things themselves. And therefore Plato concludes the Omniscience of the first Mind, from the supposition that it is furnished with the Ideas of all things. And that Mankind might be in a capacity of knowing the Natures of things, he asserts that God has hanged a multitude of these little Pictures of himself and all his Creatures in every man's understanding, that by attending to them, he might direct himself in his Conceptions and Notions of the things themselves; and that herein alone consists the Nature of true Science; 
In Timao.  and therefore the only difference he assigns between Science and Opinion, is, that the one attends to these unchangeable Ideas, but the other to the uncertain and variable Reports of sense. And in another place, 
In Epist. ad Dionis Amicos.  discoursing more particularly of this Notion; to the Science of a thing he requires a threefold knowledge, viz. of its Name, of its Definition, and of its Picture, which last he asserts to be the chief cause of knowledge, and instances in a Circle, to the true Science whereof, 'tis necessary that we know by what name to express it, and then its Definition, that 'tis a figure, whose parts are every where equally distant from the Centre; and lastly, that it be represented to us by some visible figure; which, says he, gives us a far more solid knowledge of the nature of a Circle then the other two; and is that which advances our knowledge from Opinion to Science: Now (continues he) the same use that these delineations have in Mathematical Theories, Ideas have in Physical Speculations, as therefore we best understand what a Circle is by looking upon its Delineated Figure, so the surest knowledge, we can have of the Natures of things, is gotten by contemplating their Ideal Pictures or Images engraven on our understandings.  
But first, methinks this fetching of Principles and Proleptick Notions out of the mind of Man, is the same thing, as to anatomise the eye to search for the first Principles and Postulata of Optics: For as 'tis the Nature and Office of the Eye to contemplate and observe those objects with which 'tis presented, and thence to frame Optical Rules and Maxims, so 'tis of the mind to speculate and consider those things, which are any way conveyed to its notice, and thence to make general Rules and Observations, which after an exact scrutiny and comparison of every individual, are justly admitted for Proleptick and fundamental Verities: so that general Axioms are only the results and abridgements of a multitude of single Experiments; thus from the plain experience and observation of all mankind was framed that unquestionable Maxim, That the whole is greater than its parts, because they saw and found it was so in all individual Bodies in the world, and the Reason why all men assent to it at the first proposal, is because they cannot look abroad, but they are presented with innumerable instances thereof, every visible thing in the world being a whole compounded of parts sensibly smaller than itself. Now to what purpose should Providence imprint such obvious and apparent Notices as this upon the minds of Men, when as but to open our eyes, is enough to discover their undoubted Truth and Evidence? A man that has animadversive Faculties, has as little need to be minded of such obvious and apparent Certainties, as a man that has his Eyes in his head, has to be taught that there is a Sun in the Heavens. But suppose that we were born with these congenite Anticipations, and that they take Root in our very Faculties, yet how can I be certain of their Truth and Veracity? For 'tis not impossible but the seeds of Error might have been the natural Results of my Faculties, as Weeds are the first and natural Issues of the best Soils, how then shall we be sure that these spontaneous Notions are not false and spurious? Now the only way to be fully satisfied of their Truth and Sincerity, is to examine them by a wary and discreet Experience, the Test whereof will remove all ground to doubt for the future of their Integrity. And if so, to what purpose do Connate Principles serve; for before I have made Trial, I cannot use them, because I have no Reason to trust them, till I can be certain of their Veracity; which I cannot be, but by Experience, which yet makes them useless; because Experimental knowledge is of all others the safest and most unquestionable, and therefore must needs render all lesser evidence vain and unnecessary. At lest when our knowledge proceeds in an Empirical way 'tis solid and palpable, and made so undoubtedly certain from the plain and most undoubted Testimony of Sense and Experience, as undeniably to convince Scepticism of a pitiful and ridiculous Obstinacy. But when we begin our knowledge from Notions within ourselves, besides that 'tis a difficult and nice dispute to prove that the mind of man is furnished with any such innate Prolepses, and that we are destitute of any sure 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to discern Natural Anticipations from Preconceptions of Custom and Education (unless we bring them to the Touchstone of Experience) 'tis doubtless that Generalites are not capable of so palpable and convictive an Evidence, as single and particular Observations. 
Advancement of Learning. l. 1. c. 5.  And therefore my Lord Bacon has well noted it as none of the least obstructions to the advancement of knowledge, that Men have sought for Truth in their own little Worlds, and that withdrawing themselves from the Contemplation of Nature, and the Observations of Experience, they have tumbled up and down in their own Speculations and Conceits; And so have by continual meditation and agitation of Wit urged, and as it were, invocated their own Spirits to Divine, and give Oracles unto them, whereby they have been deservedly and pleasingly deluded.  
But secondly, however the case may be as to other Innate Notions, the Existence of Plato's Ideas is altogether precarious and uncertain, and therefore absolutely unfit to be made the foundation of all Science, for by them they unanimously understand real Pictures and Images of things, painted and carved upon the Mind, rather than Habits, Thoughts, or Conceptions, and therefore Plato defines them to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which further appears from the grounds from whence they labour to deduce them; for it is evident, say they, that the Eternal Mind exerted Intellectual Actions from all Eternity, but because there can be no Intellection without an Intelligible Object, it must follow, that there must be Exemplars and Ideal objects in the Divine Mind, to terminate the actions thereof. But to suppose that the understanding cannot act, unless it be employed about an object really existing, is not only precarious, but for any thing appears to the contrary, contrary to every man's Experience, seeing we are all able to create Chimaeras at pleasure. But though this Postulatum were granted as to created Intellects, yet to tie and limit the Contemplations of the Divine Mind to a pre-existent object, is (beside many other absurdities) not less rash and unwarrantable then to confine the operations of Omnipotence to the Laws of Matter and Motion: seeing then there's no tolerable Evidence to be produced of the Truth and Reality of these Mental Images, what can more betray the cause of Science to the Exceptions of Sceptics, then to resolve its utmost Truth and Evidence into such uncertain and imaginary Principles?  
2. A second Fault, for which they are justly unblamable, is their serious endeavouring to know and define the Notions of abstracted Essences; for these pure and Seraphic Intellectualists forsooth despise all sensible knowledge, as too gross and material for their nice and curious Faculties, and disdain to pursue any knowledge, but what is pure and Intellectual, that is such as is suitable to their refined, and as it were, separated Understandings; and therefore they chiefly employ their Thoughts about abstracted and purely Metaphysical Being's; and thence they take upon them exactly to describe the mere Essences of all sorts of Being's, whether Material, or Immaterial; whether they belong to the intellectual, or to the sensible World: In order whereto, they resolve all Being's into their simple and unmixed Ingredients, and then attempt to assign their precise notions and differences from each other. Thus they Analyse all Physical Bodies into ten Principles or Primitive Ingredients; for first, they supposing that all things, by how much the less perfect they are, are so much the more compounded, and then placing Bodies in the lowest rank of Being's, they infer that something of all Superior Essences must concur to their Constitution, so that all Bodies must participate of the nine Superior Orders of Being's, 
See Patricius' Panarchia, especially the eleventh Book.  viz. Form, Quality, Nature, Soul, Mind, Life, Essence, Unity, One, from the mixture of which, after the four several ways of Composition, i. e. of Profundity, Latitude, Longitude, and Solidity results Corporeiety, And some are so strangely subtle and abstractive, as to make a real and substantial difference between Matter and Body. Again, to pass by their several kinds of immaterial Motion and Harmony, they make five sorts of Numbers, Divine, whose Property is Uniformity; Substantial, whose Property is Immobility; Animarie, whose Property is a Power of Selfmoving; Natural, whose Property is a Capacity to be moved; Mathematical, which is the common sort, and the grossest of all, because (say they) it may be deciphred by External figures. But if they are able to frame a Conception of any Number, besides that which is Mathematical, they have more faculties than I, who am born but a Man, and live by the use of my Reason, and five Senses.  
And yet they confidently enough assay to give the world minute descriptions of these, and such other nice and subtle Essences. It will be unnecessary to examine their particular performances, if I can evidently Convict the Attempt itself of Folly and Madness, as I presume to you I easily can, Because I know you are already sufficiently convinced how fruitless and insignificant these definitions of Metaphysical and abstracted Essences are, for they are in truth nothing else but notifying that thing by more words of a narrower signification, which at other times is signified by a single one of a larger Import, as if in Arithmetical Accounts, we should denote one greater sum by many little ones. But the expressing of a thing by divers words, does not more unfold its Nature, then when 'tis signed by one; because the use of Words is not to explain the Natures of Things, but only to stand as marks and signs in their stead, as Arithmetical figures are only notes of Numbers; and therefore Names are as unable to explain abstracted Natures, as figures are to solve Arithmetical Problems. I am not ignorant that it has been an ancient and creditable Opinion of the Platonists, that Names have in them a natural resemblance and suitableness to things, and are peculiarly expressive of the several natures and properties of those things they are used to represent. But words being merely several Modifications of sound made by the Organs of Speech, can have no likeness to any thing but sounds; and where a word signifies any peculiar sound, it may have a natural resemblance to it, by giving it a sound like that which it represents, as Tintinnabulum and Clangor, which words strike the Organs of hearing somewhat after the same manner, as those things do, of which they are expressive. But to imagine that any words should carry in them a resemblance to any things besides Noises, is an absurd and groundless conceit; which will evidently appear by imposing upon words contrary significations, and applying them to express things quite contrary to what they now signify. For Example, take the Names, by which Fire is expressed in all Languages, and apply them to water; and so on the contrary, call Water by the names of Fire, and you will easily perceive they have no more natural Correspondency to the one then to the other, and that the Names of fire have as much agreement with the Nature and Properties of water, as they have with the thing they now signify, and that they would as well express it, if men would agree to change their Imposition.  
And therefore I conclude that the office of Definitions is not to explain the Natures of things, but to fix and circumscribe the signification of Words; for they being Notes of things, unless their significations be settled, their meaning must needs be Equivocal and uncertain; that is, unless it be determined of what things such particular Names are signs, no man shall be able to signify his Thoughts to another, because he will use uncertain signs. And therefore to define Matter, Form, Substance, Accident is not to unfold the Intrinsic nature of those things, of which the names of Matter, Form, Substance, Accident are marks and signs, but only to define what things I intent to express and signify by these Names. And unless I have some Idea and knowledge of that thing which I call Form or Accident, Antecedently to my denoting of it by these Names, they will be altogether insignificant, because I know not what thing 'tis which they signify, and the Names themselves give me no more knowledge of those things, than Gas and Blas or any other words of no defined signification. All which I hope sufficiently evinces the vanity of Metaphysical definitions in order to the discovering the hidden Essences of things. But yet further, we are so far from attaining any certain and real knowledge of Incorporeal Being's (of an acquaintance with which, these Visionists so much boast) that we are not able to know any thing of Corporeal Substances as abstract from their Accidents. there's nothing can more perplex my Faculties, than the simple Idea of naked matter. And certainly, it was never intended that mere Essences should be the Objects of our Faculties. And therefore the truly wise and discerning Philosophers do not endeavour after the dry and sapless knowledge of abstracted Natures, but only search after the Properties, Qualities, Virtues and Operations of Natural Being's; the knowledge whereof may be acquired by Observations and Experiments; but there are no certain means or rational Methods (that I could ever yet meet with) to investigate the mysterious Ideas of bare and abstracted Essences. Besides, all Being's are either Objects of sense, or not; now to go about to discover the nature of the former by metaphysical definitions, would be ridiculous, seeing they are far better understood by our senses. If any one should ask me, what a Bedstaff or a Joint-stool is, the only way to acquaint him what they are, is not to amuse him with fine artificial definitions, but to show him the things themselves: And besides to abstract sensible things from materiality, is to abstract them from themselves, because their very Essences are Material. And then of them that take upon them to describe the Natures of Being's that are not obnoxious to sense, I demand by what ways and methods they came to that knowledge. For 'tis not enough to prove that this or that is the Idea of any thing, because some fanciful men are able to make pretty Hypotheses concerning it, but if any man have attained any certain knowledge thereof, he is able to give a rational account of the way and method, by which he proceeded in his Enquiry. But this these bold definers neither have, nor can do; but if you will be so civil as to take their words, they will requite your Civility by acquainting you with more strange and stupendious Mysteries. And here (before I conclude this head) I cannot but proclaim a Quarrel against the Metaphysics of the School-Doctors, who pretend too by their definitions to unfold the most hidden and abstracted Essences of Things, But their performance is a pregnant Argument of the vanity of their undertaking. For their Vast Volumes are filled with well nigh nothing, but empty and insignificant words, frivolous and confused distinctions, useless and imaginary notions, precarious and uncertain suppositions, senseless and unintelligible Discourses, and with a deal of such fantastic and uncouth stuff, as makes Fools stare, and Wise men laugh: But the Intrinsic Essence of any one Being is no more explained and unsecreted after all their Labour, than it was afore. This, Sir, you may understand as a recantation of my Error, or rather bemoaning my unhappiness, in that I have (contrary to what you once advised me) lost so much time and industry in these absurd and senseless Authors. And though this be only to accuse, yet 'tis as easy a task to make good my charge to the utmost, as 'tis to make it, but that, because it cannot be done unless by an induction of particular instances, would require a larger Discourse than can be allowed to a Digression in this Letter.  
3. My Third Impeachment, is their affecting a mysterious obscurity and abstruseness, thereby to render their notions more solemn and venerable. Of this I might produce you infinite Instances: But for a full conviction, let me only engage you to spend one hour either in Plato's Parmenides (which though Proclus thinks an entire & exact System of Platonic Divinity, 
In Plat. Theol. lib. 1. cap. 7, 8, 9, 10, etc.  yet himself wastes several Chapters in an Enquiry after the scope and design of that Dialogue) or any of those of his Theological Commentators, whom they will allow to have understood him, (for Patricius will not allow that his first Glossers to the number of above 75 were able to reach his meaning) 
In his Plato Exotericus.  but chiefly Proclus his 6 Books upon Plato's Theology, or for brevity sake his Theological Institutions annexed to them. Of the Obscurity and Ambiguity of Plato's sentiments concerning the Deity, I have treated you know where, & therefore thither I refer you, only let me note, 
Adv Calum. l. 2. c. 3. the passage is somewhat too tedious to transcribe.  that when Cardinal Bessarion professes to give us a brief & summary account of Plato's notion of God in his Parmenides, he amasses together (as their manner is) a Cento of flat contradictions, & gives a Description much like that Peripatetic Riddle of matter, Aelia Laelia Crispis, nec Mas, nec Foemina, nec Androgyna, nec casta, nec meretrix, nec pudica, sed omnia, and then applauds both himself and Plato for their Orthodox sentiments about the Deity. Just such another senseless jargon is that supposititious piece of Dyonysius the Areopagite, de Divinis Nominibus. Again is it not a wild kind of speculative fanaticisme to explain the unaccountable Ideas of immaterial Being's, by numbers and figures, of which I have already given you a sufficient Instance? But if I should transcribe their pretty dreams and conceits of the superessential Unity, of the Divine Orders and Oeconomys, of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of the Paternum Profundum, jynges, Teletarchae, Fontani Patres, of the Field of Truth, the Super-celestial Regions & Invisible Heavens, together with the descriptions of their several Inhabitants, & of all other Intellectual Hypostases, I am confident it would tempt your gravity (though you were Stoically morose) much beyond the essay of a smile, unless perhaps your perusal of jacob Behem may have prevented their novelty.  
But the Grecian Theology (as Proclus contends being founded by Orpheus, 
Plat. Theol. l. 1. c. 5.  advanced by Pythagoras, and completed by Plato; as Orpheus represented his mysteries by Tales and Fables, Pythagoras by Numbers and Symbols, so Plato and his Followers have (in imitation of them) communicated their Notions by Emblems, 
See Proclus in Platon. Theol. lib. 1. c. 4.  Fables, Symbols, Parables, heaps of Metaphors, Allegories, and all sorts of Mystical Representations (as is vulgarly known.) All which upon the account of their Obscurity and Ambiguity are apparently the unfittest signs in the world to express the Train of any man's thoughts to another: For beside that they carry in them no Intelligible Affinity to the Notices, which they were designed to intimate, the Powers of Imagination are so great, and the Instances in which one thing may resemble another are so many, that there is scarce any thing in nature, in which the Fancy cannot find or make a Variety of such Symbolising Resemblances; so that Emblems, Fables, Symbols, Allegories, though they are pretty Poetic Fancies, are infinitely unfit to express Philosophical Notions and discoveries of the Natures of things: and besides, seeing they have left us no key to these dark Ciphers, there can be no sure and constant way to unriddle what conceptions are locked up under them; so that it does not only require a great deal of pains to frame conjectures of their mea●ing, but the surest we can pitch upon are withal so uncertain and ambiguous, that they unavoidably leave us fluctuating in mere uncertainties. And what wife man will take so much pains for such a knowledge that can at highest amount but to a doubtful guess? The truth of it is, they have by these Exorbitances been highly injurious to the advancement of true and solid Philosophy; for it needs little less pains to discover their meaning, then perhaps it would to have examined the thing itself, and yet when that is done, we are as far from our end as before. The end of Philosophy is to search into and discover the Nature of things, but I believe you understand not how the Nature of any thing is at all discovered, by making it the Theme of Allegorical and dark discourses.  
But I must not too much aggravate this Accusation upon the Platonists in particular, seeing it has been the Catholic Crime of all the Learned World. The Monk of Viterbo in his Counterfeit Berosus derives this Art of wraping up and unfolding Mysteries at the same time from Noah, but perhaps another man would have fetch't its Invention from the Oracular Devils, who taking upon them to foretell, what they could not foreknow, were forced to use such shifts to hide their Ignorance. 
Ambage nexa delphico mos est Deo  
Arcana tegere.  And from hence they who affected a Title of Wisdom imitated their Oracles, and because they undertook to explain those secrets, which were above the reach of their Inquisition, that they might not discover their ignorance instead of their knowledge, they wrapped up their Mysteries in dark and enigmatical Representations, as being too Sacred and Venerable (as they pretended) to be prostituted to vulgar and unhallowed Minds. 
Stromat. l. 5.  Clemens Alexandrinus roundly charges almost every Sect of the Philosophers herewith. 
* Laert. in his Life.  Only Epicurus took the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Perspicuity for his Motto, whereas the rest generally disclaimed it. The story is common, that Hipparchus was banished Pythagoras his School, and a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 set in his place, as of a Person lost, and all because he went about to unriddle the Pythagorick Arcana: 
Cic. de finibus. l. 2.  neither is Heraclitus his Surname 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because of the obscurity of his Writings less famous, Clarus ob obscuram linguam magis inter inanes, as Lucretius quibbles upon him, & Laertius relates of him in his life, That he Wrote a Book so monstrously obscure, that at length it became a Controversy, whether it treated of a Commonwealth, or of Nature. And no less common is Aristotle's Epistle to Alexander, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Plut. in Alex.  wherein he professes that though he had made his Books public, yet he had not published them, and therefore he divides his Writings into exoterics, that were Intelligible to Vulgar Readers, and Eisotericks, that were Intelligible to none but Sons of Art; whence Atticus in Eusebius compares him to the Cuttlefish, because he like that sort of Fish, hides himself with his own Ink. And how well the School-Doctors (his great Admirers) have imitated him, I need not tell you, only I have more than once with pleasure observed it of Aegidius, that where he cannot make his Master Aquinas speak good sense, (though the Nonsense be palpable) he attributes a Mysteriousness to his extraordinary and more than humane subtlety. Shall I add the proud Race of Spagyrists, who (like Aeneas) go clothed in clouds, and what they discover by their fire, darken by their smoke? I might add many modern Writers, but I forbear, only methinks all the World seem to have gone to School to that Pedagogue in Quintilian, Qui discipulos obscurare quae dicerent, juberet, graeco verbo utens 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Institut, l. 8 c. 2.  All Writers are ambitious to have Commentators, and certainly 'tis not a little estimation that obscurity gains from the Vulgar, whence that commendation in Quintilian, Tanto melior, ne ego quidem Intellexi; and that conclusion in Lucretius, 
Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur amantque,  
Inversis quae sub verbis Latitantia cernunt.  But all that they understand, they despise, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, says Synesius in his Encomium of Calvisi●●. Now since I have ventured to play the Aristarchus in reference to so many eminent Vertuosis, methinks I may dare to add the same Censure of our late English Rosie-Crusians, but yet of all men I am most sorely afraid of angering these, because they seem to be of a very quarrelsome Humour, and to have a huge ambition to be esteemed the Polemical Scripturients of the Age; whereas I have been scared from Engaging with a Rosie-Crucian, ever since I first saw the Controversial Rencountres of Eugenius Philalethes; and besides, (to confess my fears to you) I know not but the Romantic Heroes of this Order may have retrieved the lost Invention of Enchanted Arms, especially that lovely Fairy Knight descended (as the Romance of his Life relates it, 'tis a prettier Tale then that of Amadis de Gaul) of the Cesar Heydons of Rome, and the venerable Author of the Heydonian Philosophy, as himself modestly styles his own ignorant, uncouth, and ridiculous Scribble.  
But 'tis more fitting that these Pedantic Cheats were chastised by the Public Rods, in that they directly Poison men's minds, and dispose them to the wildest and most Enthusiastic Fanaticisme; for there is so much Affinity between Rosi-Crucianisme and Enthusiasm, that whoever entertains the one, he may upon the same Reason embrace the other; And what Pestilential Influences the Genius of Enthusiasm or opinionative Zeal has upon the Public Peace, is so evident from Experience, that it needs not be proved from Reason. To conclude, I am confident, that from the beginning of time to this day, there has not been so great a Conjunction of Ignorance with Confidence, as in these Fellows, which certainly of all other Aspects is the most contrary and malignant to true knowledge.  
4. My next Accusation is, that instead of pure and genuine Reason, they abound so much with gaudy and extravagant Fancies. I that am too simple or too serious to be cajoled with the frenzies of a bold and ungoverned Imagination cannot be persuaded to think the Quaintest plays and sport of wit to be any true and real knowledge. I can easily allow their Discourses the Title of Philosophical Romances, (a sort of more ingenious impertinencies) and 'tis with this estimate I would have them read: But when they pretend to be Nature's Secretaries, & to understand all her Intrigues, or to be Heavens Privadoes, talking of the Transactions there, like men lately dropped thence encircled with Glories, and clothed with the Garments of Moses & Elias, and yet put us off with nothing but rampant Metaphors, and Pompous Allegories, and other splendid but empty Schemes of speech, I must crave leave to account them (to say no worse) Poet's & Romancers true Philosophy is too sober to descend to these wildnesses of Imagination, and too Rational to be cheated by them. She scorns, when she is in chase of Truth, to quarry upon trifling gaudy Phantasms: Her Game is things not words. I shall not presume to censure Plato's Style for its being too Pompous & Poetic, though this has been done already by Aristotle, Dionysius Halicarnasseus, Vossius, and other Professors of the Critical Art. Only I remember I had not long conversed with Platonic Authors, when I took occasion to set it down as a note to myself, that though a huge luscious stile may relish sweet to childish and liquorish Fancies, yet it rather loathes and nauceats a discreet understanding, then informs and nourishes it. That Platonisme is almost nothing but an Allegory, is too notorious to want a proof, Plato's two famous Dialogues, viz. his Symposium and his Phaedrus, ranked by Ficinus among his Metaphysical and Theological Treatises, treat of nothing but Love and Beauty, and of them too in Poetic Schemes and Fables. 'Tis pretty to read their Metaphysical Discourses of Truth, which are nothing else but Love-stories. The soul being enamoured with the transcendent Beauty and Loveliness of Truth is inflamed with impatient desires of enjoying her embraces, and therefore Woos and Courts her with indefatigable Patience, for she must be supposed (as all other Beauties are) excessively coy and difficult, but by diligence and importunity the understanding wins and enjoys her; And then they express their embraces in the same language, they would speak of the private transactions between Man and Wife. Thus (you see) they have the main Property of Romaneers to talk much of Love. And indeed Plato himself seems to have been the first Author of Amorous Romances, for towards the beginning of his Convivium he chides the Poets, that lived before him, for their Omissions in reference to Love, and that when they had made Panegyrics of all the other Gods. None of them had ever attempted an Elegy upon This.  
Now to Discourse of the Natures of Things in Metaphors and Allegories is nothing else but to sport and trifle with empty words, because these Schems do not express the Natures of Things, but only their Similitudes and Resemblances, for Metaphors are only words, which properly signifying one thing, are applied to signify another by reason of some Resemblance between them. When therefore any thing is expressed by a Metaphor or Allegory, the thing itself is not expressed, but only some similitude observed or made by Fancy. So that Metaphors being only the sport of Fancy comparing things with things, and not marks or signs of Things. All those Theories in Philosophy which are expressed only in metaphorical Terms, are not real Truths, but the mere Products of Imagination, dressed up (like children's babies) in a few spangled empty words, such as the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 empty Phraseologies that have not Notion & Thing enough to fill them out. Thus their wanton & luxuriant fancies climbing up into the Bed of Reason, do not only defile it by unchaste and illegitimate Embraces, but instead of real conceptions and notices of Things, impregnate the mind with nothing but Airy and Subventaneous Phantasms.  
But 'tis still more fantastic and absurd to talk metaphorically concerning those things, of whose Ideas we are utterly ignorant, & of which we are not able to discourse in Proper Terms, for such Discourse must needs be Nonsense, and the matter of it must needs be nothing; because they treat of they know not what. For Metaphors not signifying things, and things being always signified by proper Terms, what can be more evident than that mere Metaphors without proper Terms are employed about nothing at all, or only an Imaginary something. And they that talk thus, do but first imagine a Subject, and then imagine in it some Resemblances to something else, that is in effect, they make a bauble, and then play with it. Of this Nature, (to give you one Instance) are the greatest part of their discourses concerning the Soul, in discoursing of which, they draw Metaphors from all the Senses, Members, and Functions of the Body, from all the General Hypotheses of Nature; from all the Phaenomena of the Heavens and the Earth, from all the several Properties and Operations of the several species of Creatures, and apply them to the Nature, Faculties, and operations of the Soul; But because they are altogether ignorant of the nature and substance of the Soul, and are not able to express the greatest part of these things by proper terms; all these Metaphors must pass for idle and insignificant Nonsense, because they signify we know not what, and describe we know not how; so that methinks the Platonic Philosophy is just such another thing as the Epicureans fancy the world to be, a Mass of pretty words handsomely and luckily packed together; I must confess that before I had examined it, by reason of its huge Tumid words, I looked upon it at a distance, as the loftiest and sublimest knowledge in the world, but when I came to survey it more closely, I soon found that it was nothing else but words, so that I may more handsomely compare it to a Landscape, in which at a distance appear huge Rocks, and vast Mountains, that seem to vie height with, and outreach the Clouds, and yet by a nearer approach these vast bulky Appearances are found to be nothing but a few Artificial Shadows.  
5. Another miscarriage is, that they employ much of their Contemplations in things altogether uncertain and unsearchable. They delight excessively to wander into remote and invisible Notions, and to talk confidently (as Travellers into foreign Regions are wont to do) of doubtful and unaccountable Problems, and any thing which is as far distant from Humane discovery, as concernment. Which scopeless desire of searching into things exempt from humane Inquisition, is that which renders Curiosity Criminal; For Curiosity itself is a gallant and heroical Quality, and the natural Product of a Generous Complexion, but when it aspires after the knowledge of things placed above its Reach, it degenerates into a vain and fruitless Ambition, or rather an unnatural lust of the mind after strange and extravagant Notions. Though the Truth of it is, The minds (or rather fancies) of men have such a natural liquorishness after the knowledge of things strange and remote, that they swallow nothing with so grateful a Gusto, as stories of things rare and unusual; neither care they how uncertain and fantastic they be, so they be but odd and prodigious; and hence it comes to pass, that men are generally more tickled and enchanted with Legends and Romances, then with useful and remarkable Memories. Which (they say) is the Reason why the Ancients made so much use of Fables and Apologues to instruct the People, because they carried in them something monstrous, and exceeding the limits of Probability. The senseless multitude, that could not relish the wise Discourses of Socrates, would be much taken and surprised with a pretty and extravagant Tale of a Lion, an Ape, or a Fox, etc. But not to aggravate this Childishness of these dull and muddy Souls. 'Tis an unpardonable Luxury and Wantonness for Wise and considering Philosophers, to spend their time and study to disclose distant and inscrutable Mysteries, and frontlesly to dictate to the world in such Theories, as are infinitely remote from humane knowledge and discovery, and which 'tis as impossible to know, as it would be if they had never been. And that the Platonists are of all men most chargeable with this folly, these few ensuing instances may demonstrate. As when they confidently take upon them to give the world exact and minute descriptions of Incorporeal Being's; To give an account of the Nature and Oeconomy of the Godhead, and how the several Ranks of Ideas are suspended upon the three 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Uniform Hypostases, to pry into the most hidden Recesses of the Divine Mind, and distinctly to delineate how the Ideas of all Created Perfections are there displayed. To discourse about the Substance, Nature, Properties, Offices, Actions, Orders, and Polities of Angels: To assert that the Heavenly Host is divided into three Hierarchies, and that each Hierarchy is subdivided into three Orders, and every Order into as many Legions, as there are contained Individuals in every Legion, i. e. 6666; and that this Ternary of Hierarchies, and Norary of Orders do Circulate about the threefold Essence of God, (as the Planets about the Sun) with infinite other the like Dreams about their peculiar Natures, Offices, Distances, and Employments: 
See Proclus in Plat. Theolog. l. 4. c. 19  And withal to pretend to demonstrative Evidence in these things. Again, when they confidently assert the First Mind to be the only Author of Souls; and that humane Souls were tempered in the same Vessel, where the Soul of the Universe had been wrought; and that they were made out of some remaining fragments of that mixture out of which the Gods of the second and third Classis had been framed; That the First Mind had deputed the Genii or junior Deities Guardians of his Offspring; and that it is they, that Mary them to their Respective Vehicles. When they define whether the Apostate Genii be purely immaterial; and whether they be vitally united with matter; and whether they were made peccable only by union with their Vehicles; whether any of the Aerial Spirits be Atheists or no, whether any of them be of a sportive, droling humour, and delight to effect Antic Prodigies in the Air, to abuse and affright silly Mortals; How they change Intelligence, and discourse together. When they delineate the cosmography of the Archetypal World, replenished with the Immaterial Ideas of all material Being's; and describe the Systeme of the Invisible Heavens. When they frame particular Hypotheses, not only of the nature of the Soul, but of the manner of its living, before its lapse into this life, and after its return home again. Lastly, when they Graphically describe the manner of the world's last and final Conflagration: I might add too their Hypotheses about the manner of the world's Production; for unless they had been Spectators, it was not possible for them to know in what way and method the Universe was Erected; that depending wholly on the free Election of the Divine Will: Though some Learned Men have thought it a mighty Confirmation of the Truth of the Mosaic Writings, if they could but evince a consonancy of any of the, Philosphers Hypotheses with the Mosaic Account of the Origine of the Universe; as if their naked surmises could give any Testimony to Truth: For either they received the Account they give, from a credible Tradition, and if so, then Moses was the first Author thereof, for none else could give any certain Account of the Process, Providence was pleased to use in the Production of things, but certainly 'tis no Argument of the Truth of the Mosaic Account, because the jews told it to the Egyptians, and they to the Grecians, for this can add no Authority or Evidence to it: Or else they were of their own framing, and consequently were altogether groundless and unwarrantable Conjectures; for it was surely impossible any man's Reason should tell him the particular Circumstances of the world's Creation; as that its material Principle was a Tohu and a Bohu, that it was agitated by the Divine Spirit, that several Portions were formed at several times, that all was finished in six days space, rather than five or seven, and the like: this design therefore of discovering a Consonancy between the Hypotheses of any of the Philosophers concerning the Origine of the Universe, and the Mosaic Account thereof, is absolutely scopeless and unprofitable. But this is a digression that has thrust its self in here before I was aware of it. To resume therefore my former Theme, is it not the highest and most disingenuous madness for men to give such confident and definitive sentences in matters so remote and unaccountable? All the forementioned particulars (to which it were easy to add a thousand more) are apparently beyond the reach of humane Cognisance, and such things as cannot be known but by Revelation, there being no other means to attain to any knowledge of things of their vast distance and remoteness. And if we will but reflect upon our own Thoughts, we must confess that we cannot perceive the Ideas of Being's that are not placed within the Horizon of Sense, and those that pretend to a discovery of them, had better pretend to Oracles, Prophecies, Illapses, and Divinations, then to the sober and steady Maxims of Philosophy. And therefore 'tis not unusual with the Platonists to pretend to a kind of Enthusiasm. They style themselves 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the inspired Priests of Truth; and their Philosophy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as if it had been poured into them in a Divine and Ecstatical Fury, and Proclus says it a thousand times of Plato and his Commentators, that they did 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as if they had written with a kind of Bacchical Enthusiasm; And they every where talk so like Prophets and Oracles, as if they were inspired at least by a Bath-Col: And 'tis hugely pleasant to read their own Exorbitant Parades of the Exalted, Divine, and Extatick sublimity of Platonic Contemplation; they boast so often of sequestering themselves from all Corporeal Commerce, and soaring up into the Ethereal Regions, that a man would expect News from the third Heaven every day. If they were in good earnest, we might expect strange discoveries indeed, but alas, these Sons of Imagination are as little troubled with Real Ecstasies, as other men, only they are pleased to express the Frenzies of their fiery and subtle Fancies by these Allusions. So that let them talk never so Seraphically of retiring from the trivial and common Entertainments of sense, they do but sit down in the Theatre of Fancy, and entertain themselves with the Idola Specus, or Images of their own Complexion, and though they take them for great Realities, (as other Sleepers do their Dreams) yet when they awake out of their fanciful Visions, and return to a strength and consistency of Reason, they then discern them to have been only evanid Appearances represented (as all Dreams are) upon the Scene of Imagination.  
Now 'tis a great mistake of some men to think it necessary that we should be able to confute such vain and ungrounded Positions; and that for this Reason, because they are out of the Sphere of humane knowledge; for though they may sometimes perchance, like the Cartesian Vortices, justle with some certain Truth's belonging to our Sphere by reason of their Vicinity, yet that happens by chance, and is not necessary: But being in their own Natures out of our View, 'tis not to be expected we should give any account of them, because that would be to assert what we cannot know, which is to commit the very fault we are now chastising; 'tis therefore sufficient to show the absurdity of an assertion, if I can evince it to be unevident, though I can not to be untrue, for it is not less unbecoming a Wise man to assent to an uncertainty than to an untruth: because 'tis not the real certainty of a Truth, that is a sufficient motive of our assent, but its evidence to us; for all Truths are in themselves equally certain (though not equally necessary and durable) but 'tis from the variety of evidence that the difference of our knowledge proceeds; and howsoever assertions may be in themselves real and certain Truths, yet unless they are evident as well as certain, they will be to us vain and fictitious Phantasms. And therefore I cannot but commend this one Paradox of the Stoics, That a Wise man is always free from Opinion, Ignorance, and Error: From Opinion, because he will not assent to uncertainties: from Ignorance, because what he knows not, he knows that he knows it not, and so has as much knowledge of the thing, as he is capable of: from Error, because he that will neither assent to what is uncertain, and knows what is to be known, and what not, can scarce be liable to mistakes. And it was none of the least Instances of Epicurus' Wisdom and Modesty, that he made it one of his chiefest Physiological Canons, that he had nothing to do with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 matters merely Possible, and merely Contingent; and therefore he was always wont to state and conclude all Questions about the Phaenomena of the Heavens, and all other remote and unevident Inquiries, with nothing else but It may be so.  
Besides in such cases any man may assert whatever a warm or giddy Brain may suggest, and we shall have equal inducements to embrace contrary Hypotheses; thus as Mahomet has somewhere in his Alcoran, described the Systeme of the invisible Heavens, the Orders of Angels, & the several Folds, in which their several Choruses reside, as well as Plato, so I have as great Reason to induce me to credit the Mahometan Hypothesis as the Platonic. And then (to dispatch) we are not concerned in such cases to show the vanity of the Assertion (for that we suppose impossible) but that of the Assertor, whom we blame for acting so much against all the Rules of Reason, in affirming that, which 'tis evidently impossible for him to know; whereby he both troubles the world with debates equally unnecessary and endless, and obstructs the Advancement of True Knowledge, by diverting those that are in quest after it, into dark, dubious, and endless Traverses: And certainly among the many things that have been hindrances to the discovery of Truth, none seem to have been of a more unhappy and diffused Influence, than that men have been generally digging for it, where its veins lie too deep, and out of the fathom of humane Industry.  
Now if this one Caution against dogmatizing in matters remote and unevident were well imbibed, it would not only prove an effectual Antidote against many thousand pestilent controversies, that infest the world, but also a deadly Bane to the Platonic Philosophy; for if in reading the Platonists, you shall as you proceed, but ask them for a rational evidence of their magisterial dictates (especially in those things which they boast of as their sublimest speculations) and resolve that you will not make them matters of opinion, till they shall have given you some rational inducements so to do, I will engage you shall never be one of their Disciples, though you should study them to the revolution of their Great Year.  
Before I take my leave of this Consideration, I cannot but note that this Impudent humour of talking confidently of things uncertain and widely remote from humane Cognizance was the peculiar crime of the first and earliest Heretics in the Christian Church. Thus the main of the Heretical Opinions of the Gnostics, and the several sub-dividing Factions of them, Valentinians, Saturnilians, Basilidians and other primitive Heretics were only some extravagant Hypotheses concerning the Divinity, and its Essential Emanations, and their several Syzigiae, and Pleromata, out of which they framed a peculiar Oeconomie of the Godhead, compounding the Divine Nature out of a multitude of Orders and Individuals (you may fancy it such a kind of Monster, as the Picture of Mr Hobbs' Leviathan.) And this they did by blending some Fancies out of Plato, and Fables out of Hesiods Theogonia with the Gospel of Saint john, as the Fathers unanimously conclude. And as 'tis reported of Simon Magus, that he endeavoured to compound a Religious Worship out of the Rites of Paganism, and the Sacraments of Christianity; so 'tis manifest that the Gnostics would have integrated one System of Divinity by mingling the Orphean, Pythagorean, and Platonic Theology with the Doctrines of the Gospel. Of this sort of men and their Doctrines all the more learned Commentators understand the frequent cautions of the Apostles against Heresies and Heretics, and peculiarly that eminent passage, Colos. 2. 8. where the Apostle warns them against Philosophy and vain deceit, after the Tradition of men, after the Rudiments of the world, i. e. a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a false knowledge that pretends to know the highest mysteries upon the naked Assertions of some confident men. And of these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the several emanations of the Godhead do they understand those fabulous 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Saint Paul mentions 1 Tim. 1. 4. so that the Heretics, the Apostles speak of, were only giddy and opinionative men, that took upon them to introduce the Opinions of the Philosophers into the Christian Faith: For which reason it was that Tertullian styled the Philosopher's Hereticorum Patriarchus, because from them were borrowed the greatest part of Heretical Opinions. Thus the Learned 
* Dissert. de vita & scriptis Porphyr. c. 1.  Holstenius has made a Parallel between the Pythagorean and Manichean Principles. And johannes Baptista Crispus in his discussing of Plato's Opinions, has at the end of every Chapter shown what Heresies sprung from each Opinion. In this Notion of Heresy the School-Doctors will prove as Arch-heretics as any of the Ancients, for they have in the same manner corrupted the simplicity and purity of Christian Religion, by blending the Placits of Aristotle with the Articles of Faith, as Manes and Valentinus did by mingling with the Christian Faith, the Philosophy of Plato and Pythagoras. And then they have filled their vast Volumes with subtle and nice Hypotheses made out of this mixture, out of which are of necessity generated an infinite number of idle and unprofitable Altercations, or as (as my Lord Bacon prettily styles them) Vermiculate Questions, because they are generated from the putrefaction of true and solid knowledge, like worms from putrified substances: though perhaps they may ere long deserve that Epithet upon another score. I might have added to them the late grand Dogmatical Master of Orthodoxy, whose rude Dogmatising has occasioned as many Controversies in the Christian Church, as ever Manes or Valentinus did. The result of all this is to direct to the true Apostolical Notion of Heresy, which is not so much an Opinion that is apparently false, as one that is groundless and unwarrantable, and so naturally tends to the creating unnecessary disputes, and making Factions and Divisions, as Plotinus speaks of the Gnostics, 
Ennead 2. lib. 9  that they were Inventors of new and vain Opinions, to no other end then the erecting of a peculiar Sect. And though most of the Primitive Heresies were false and impious, as well as rash and ungrounded, yet that which gave them their denomination, was their vanity and tendency to create mischievous and destructive Schisms. The way then to prevent Controversies, and to avoid Schisms, is not to define, but silence groundless and dividing Opinions. The Church should in such cases imitate Socrates' Daemon, that never gave any positive Answer, but as oft as it was consulted answered either No, or Nothing; because they are usually started about matters uncertain, and consequently undeterminable. So that when both Parties determine contrary to each other, and upon that separate, they are both equally Schismatics, because they both divide upon insufficient and unwarrantable grounds. For instance (to pass by that early and unhappy Quartodecimarian Schism.) In that grand Schism of the Greek Church from the Roman, though the latter was notoriously Schismatical, yet the former was not altogether guiltless: for although they had Reasons sufficient to warrant a secession from the Romanists; as the Pope's usurpation in challenging a Power to impose on them new Articles of Faith, and putting of this Tyranny into practice, by requiring of all that would be Members of the Roman Communion, to receive his addition of the Filioque into their Creeds: Now (I say) had they divided only for the maintaining their own Liberty against the Papal Encroachments, and for not admitting the addition of Filioque as an Article of Faith, their separation had been just and noble. But when they stood as obstinately on the other side, as the Romanists did, and would not admit of an Union, but upon Condition, that it might be received as an Article of Faith, that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Father only, they cannot be cleared of a Schismatical division. Now if instead of being dogmatical in both these contrary Extremes, both Parties had agreed to silence the Controversy and decide it neither way, as Truth would not have been less secured, so Peace would have been much better preserved. I conclude therefore in the words of a late Learned and Judicious Divine. If the Church had stopped and damned up the Originals and Springs of Controversies, rather than by the determining for the one part, to give them as it were a Pipe and Conduit to convey them to Posterity, I persuade myself the Church had not suffered that inundation of Opinions, with which at this day it is overrun.  

The supposed Agreement between MOSES and PLATO DISPROVED.  
I Have (Sir) presented you with these Reflections rather than any other, not so much because I apprehend them more considerable (though perhaps they are so) as because they first occurred to my Thoughts: For it had been no difficult work to have added Infinite more; but these Considerations being already too prolix, and the small portion of Time allotted for this Task almost expired, I shall wave those that remain, and only vindicate the Accusations I have already made, by examining & controlling an Apology, that endeavours to wash them off.  
For it is replied on Plato's behalf, that he cannot well be charged with Rashness and Futility, but the Accusation must reach Moses also, and the rest of the Sacred Prophets; because from them Plato borrowed his choicest and sublimest Theories, which if in any thing vain and trifling, the first Authors ought in reason to bear the greatest Blame, & so at length my charging Plato with Futility, if it be valid, will fall foul upon Moses himself. Which farther completely excuses his Rashness, seeing he delivered his Theological Theories, not from his own Fancy, but derived them from so good and sure an Authority, as Moses and the Prophets. And that he did so is the unanimous consent of all the learned world: Fathers, School-Doctors, and Modern Writers agree not more unanimously in any one Principle then this: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is now become as vulgar and trivial as a Proverb. The particular account they give hereof, is this, That Plato derived many of these Mysteries from Pythagoras, who in his Travels into Egypt and the East had either immediately received them from the Jews themselves, or from the Egyptian Priests, and the Chaldean Wise men, who came to know them by Converse with, and Tradition from the Jews. And that Plato himself travelling into Egypt in quest after knowledge, received his choicest and most important notices concerning Divine and Supernatural things from the Jews, who about that time in great flocks resorted thither, or from the Egyptian Priests, who either derived them from the Mosaic writings, or received them from the Jews by an Oral Tradition. For (say they) God delivered to Moses in Mount Sinai a twofold Law, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Written Law, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Vocal Law, which is the Mystical and Enigmatical meaning of the Former, but by reason of its extraordinary sacredness was not exposed to the rude People, but only whispered and conveyed in the slender Pipe of Auricular Tradition from age to age among the great Sanhedrim and the Prophets down to the time of Esdras, by whom (and the great Synagogue, of which many of the latter Prophets were members) it was committed to writing, least by reason of their frequent dispersions and captivities it should by some ill fortune perish: which carried its stream out of the private Channel, in which it run before, and soon spread it abroad among Foreign Nations, especially in Egypt and Chaldea, where great numbers of Jews resided. For an eminent▪ Instance of all which, they allege the Doctrine of the Sacred Trinity, which (say they) being one of the Rarest and Choicest Mysteries of this Vocal Cabala, was greedily embraced by the Egyptians, from whom Plato and his Followers received that clear and full knowledge thereof, which appears so much every where in their Writings.  
To all which I answer in these ensuing Considerations.  
1. That it is so far from being matter of commendation that it is rather a disparagement to have been conversant in, and borrowed from the old Eastern and Egyptian Learning. That the Ancient Sages of Egypt and the East were acquainted with the first Rudiments of Mathematical Sciences is evident from the most authentic Records of Ancient Times, & from that skill, which the Grecians gained among them. But it is as evident that all their Theological Learning was lamentably frivolous, obscure, fabulous, uncouth, magical and superstitious. The Scythian Tarabostesci, the Persian Magis, the Indian brahmin's and Gymnosophists, the Egyptian Priests, the Bards and Druids of Gaul and Britain, and other Ancient Sects have (I confess) made a great noise in the world, yet they that endeavour to celebrate them most, tell us so many Superstitious and Pedantic stories, as sufficiently evince them to have been no very extraordinary Persons. Any one that considers those few Opinions and Ratiocinations of theirs that are still extant, will easily conclude them to have been men of no great Reason or Judgement. Some have endeavoured to maintain the Credit of this Ancient Learning by retreiving and collecting its scattered Fragments, and others by counterfeiting supposititious Authors, such as Zoroaster and Hermes Trismegistus, but whoever will be at the pains to peruse Zoroaster's Oracles, the Books of Trismegist, the Writings of Psellus, and the Earl of Mirandula's Riddles, with which he challenged all the Learned world, will need no other proof of the Vanity of all pretences to the more abstruse and mystical Learning of the Ancients. I do not question but that great and honourable Personage I last mentioned, was a Person of stupendious Parts and Learning, yet I am sure that those Notions, wherewith he made the greatest Noise in the world, were but grand and pompous Futilities.  
The Old Egyptian Learning was so Famous, that the Spirit of God, 
Act. 7. 22. 1 King. 4. 29, 30.  sets forth the Eminency of Moses' knowledge by his skill in it, & the matchlesness of Solomon's Wisdom by its exceeding it; And therefore I conclude that it was conversant about more generous and more useful Notices then afterwards; such as Geometry, Astronomy, Policy, Physic, and other resembling Arts, which either were perfective of their Rational Faculties, or did minister to the uses and necessities of Nature: as is generally reported by all Ancient Historians. But had the Pristine Learning of Egypt been the same it was in latter Ages, it had been as great a disparagement to Moses, as 'tis now justly reputed a commendation, that he was accomplished in all the Egyptian learning, and had amounted only to this, that he was a vain, trifling, superstitious Fellow. And what the Egyptian Priest objected to the Greeks, that they were always Children, might be more truly applied to themselves, if it be the property of children to value trifles. What childish fooleries their Hieroglyphics were, Learned Men now prove from the lost labour and fruitless industry of Kirchers Oedipus Aegyptiacus. CertaSinly, if they had designed to abuse and debauch this humour, they could scarce have contrived more fond and extravagant Emblems; and indeed their courseness and unlikeness to the things they should resemble, sufficiently discover them to have been but the rude Essays of a barbarous and undisciplined Fancy. The truth of it is, the Egyptians seem to have had only knowledge enough, to know that their neighbours had none at all, and cunning enough to vaunt an Inspection into strange and abstruse Mysteries, knowing that others by reason of their Ignorance could not control them, and by reason of their credulity would be very apt to credit them, and thence they continually abused the credulous Grecians with Tales and Fables. And surely the Egyptian Priest took not a little secret pleasure, 
In Platonis Timaeo.  when he perceived Old Solon to entertain his Romantic and Legendary account of Ancient Times with so much greediness and satisfaction; unless perhaps himself had been imposed upon by earlier Romancers, for I fancy the Egyptian Priests to have been such another generation of men, as our Monks were in the darkest times of Popery, who believed as well as recorded those Legends, which earlier Impostors had Coined. So that if the ancient Sages of Greece had purchased no more knowledge by their Travels into Egypt, than those few remainders of Egyptian learning still upon Record (excepting a few Mathematical Theories) they had spent their time and pains to as little purpose, as the famous Traveller of Odcomb, who footed most parts of the known world to no other purpose, then to describe his Hosts Beard or Signpost. I might here also give an account of the mean abilities of Orpheus and Pythagoras, but I delight not to speak too hardly of any Vertuoso's Ashes, and therefore I forbear: For it is not my design, by representing these Primitive sages as fools and dunces to rob them of that esteem and veneration, with which they have been deservedly honoured in all succeeding Ages, for though it be granted that their knowledge was much inferior to that of latter Ages, (for Learning being then in its Infancy, must needs be Childish, but is since grown more solid and manly) yet it is but reasonable they should be allowed bigger Proportions of Honour and Renown, not only because they were very wise Men, considering the rudeness and ignorance of the times, in which they lived, but because they were the first founders and discoverers of that knowledge, which after Ages have but improved, and the world surely is much more beholding to those that first invent useful Arts and Sciences, than to those that only improve them; it is therefore just, they should be allowed greater Glory, though they had much less knowledge than their followers. Besides, Theological speculations met with the latest and slowest improvements, and therefore those that might have considerable skill in other Theories, might be (as indeed they were) barbarously ignorant in these.  
2. I perceive not any such clear Agreement between the Platonic Philosophy and the Sacred Scriptures, as may give us any tolerable ground of suspecting the one to have been derived from the other: For most of the Notions, in which Plato speaks most consonantly to the Scriptures, are so obvious and so universally acknowledged, that it is easy to discern how he came by them, without any acquaintance with the holy Writings: such as are the Being of God, the Immortality of the Soul, the Essential differences of Good and Evil, some general Rules of Natural and Essential Goodness. Thus his Exceptions against the Grecian Idolatry and Superstition must by all means be transcribed from the Mosaic Writings, and when in the Eighth Book of his Laws, 
V. Collium de animab. Pagan. l. 5. c. 17. 25. Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. Euseb. prepar. Evang. l. 11, 12.  he enjoins Solemn Festivals in honour of the Gods, he must needs have it from the fourth Commandment of the Decalogue, and when in the Tenth Book, he declaims against Irreverence in Divine Worship, he must by all means borrow it from the second Precept, and when in his Eleventh Book he treats of honour due from Children to their Parents, he must doubtlessly have read the fifth Commandment, and the like in other Instances. Whereas the natural reasonableness of these Principles is in itself so apparently clear & evident, that they could scarce escape the observation of any rational and inquisitive man; and therefore Plato's lighting upon them is no more an Argument, that he was conversant in the Mosaic Writings, then is his saying that the Sun is the brightest Star in the Firmament. And then as for their more hidden and abstruse mysteries, where they seem to agree most, their difference is greater than their agreement; and it would not be difficult to show how these Notions, which have the fairest Consonancy to Scripture, are derived from Hypotheses that have none at all, as I shall anon evince in the Article of the Trinity. And shall in the Interim show the infirmity and vanity of this conceit, by showing the weakness of that Authority, upon which it is grounded.  
The first time then, that I met with it, was in Modern Authors, who vouched the Authority of the Primitive Fathers for it, betaking myself therefore to them, I found some of them to aver it indeed with no small earnestness, especially Clemens Alexandrinus, Eusebius, Theodoret, but upon no better grounds, than the naked assertions of two or three jews (especially Cleobulus and josephus) and that, when contending about the Glories and Prerogatives of their own Nation, in which Controversy men of all Nations are apparently partial for their own, but none so grossly as the Jews; who would have their Nation the only Fountain of all knowledge and wisdom (as if all other men had been mere Mushrooms, and had not reason enough to reflect upon and observe the natures and properties of Things) and therefore Aristobulus (the first Founder and Foundation of this Conceit) does with the same Confidence maintain that the Peripatetic Philosophy was stolen out of Moses and the Prophets, 
Apud Clem Alexand. Strom. 5.  as that the Fancies of Plato and Pythagoras were taken thence. There are perhaps one or two obsolete Grecian Testimonies produced on the behalf of this Opinion, but I shall not be at the pains critically to examine their weight and authority, because I have as great a suspicion of all those obsolete records concerning the jewish Nation cited by some Ancient Authors, as I have of their Sibillan Prophecies and other confessed Impostures, in that most of them discover their own Forgery: As those so famous and still credited Testimonies of Apollo's Oracle on behalf of the Jews, of which there is ● gre●t multitude in Eusebius his Praeparatio Evangelica, among the rest this is one of the famousest 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
lib. 9 c. 10.   The Chaldeans and Hebrews alone are Professors of true Wisdom, who worship the Eternal God in a pure and holy manner. 'Tis strange Eusebius should think the world so credulous (& yet so credulous it has been) as to believe that this Distich ever dropped from Apollo's Oracle, for whether that were inspired by the Priests, or by the Devil, I am confident they were neither of them so honest or so simple, as thus openly to commend the jewish Religion and condemn their own.  
But now as for those Writers, who were best able to give the truest account of the Commerce between the Jews and the Grecians (if there had been any) they are universally silent in it: The Ancient Records of Greece are scarce more silent in any thing, than the jewish Nation. Though they relate frequent Voyages of their wise men into Foreign Countries, yet no mention at all of their jewish Traffic; they acknowledge their Geometry to have been imported from Egypt, their Astronomy from Chaldea, their Arithmetic from Phenicia, their Theology from Persia, but no account of their Cargo from judaea. And Lactantius justly and seriously chides with the Ancient Philosophers, because they neglected to trade with the Jews for wisdom, as well as other Nations. 
De verâ Sap. cap. 2.  Equidem mi●ari soleo (says he) quod cum Pythagoras & postea Plato amore indagandae veritatis ad Aegyptios, & Magos, & Persas usque Penetrassent, ut earum Gentium ritus & sacra Cognoscerent (suspicabantur enim sapientiam in Religione versari) ad judaeos tamen non accesserint, penes quos tum solos fuit, & quo facilius ire potuissent. There are indeed some conjectures to make it probable that the Grecians might confound judea with Phoenicia, which if true, 'tis a good Argument that they had very little knowledge of it; for 'tis not likely that any, who conversed with the jewish Nation should confound them with the Phaenicians, when there was so vast not only difference but contrariety between them as to their Civil State, Laws, Customs, and Religion. Nay the Jewish Religion, Customs, & Laws being of so peculiar a constitution from those of all other Nations, it can scarce be supposed but that those who so carefully observed the Laws and Customs of Foreign Nations, as the Grecian Philosophers did, should have taken a more signal and particular Notice of the jewish Constitutions if they had been acquainted with them. Besides all which, let me add that we find as great a consonancy of the opinions of the Wise men of other Nations with the Hebrew Writings, where there appear no footsteps of commerce between them, as of the Grecians. For instance, though Numa Pompilius is generally acknowledged the first Pythagorean (being more ancient than Pythagoras) yet there is not the least appearance of any commerce between him and the Jews. And therefore when Mr Selden thinks that if those 7 Books of Wisdom found in the Field of Petilius An, 
De jure Nat. & Gent. l. 1. c. 2.  ab U. C. DLXX. and attributed to Numa by an Inscription upon the Chest in which they were, were really his, that he was probably not unacquainted with the Discipline of the Hebrews, only because Cassius Hemina and C. Piso in Pliny report that the matter contained in them was very consonant to the Pythagorick Philosophy; the best foundation of the conjecture is the (deserved) greatness of his own name and authority, for you cannot but perceive that in itself 'tis very fond & frivolous, and if such a licentious latitude may be allowed in historical guesses, Quidlibet ex Quolibet will soon be as warantable a maxim in History, as 'tis in the Epicurean Philosophy. It were easy to have given you a larger account hereof, but I write a Letter not a Treatise.  
3. As to the pretence of a Vocal Cabala, I can scarce without amazement consider with what confidence and eagerness some learned men of late have cried up an invention so novel and fanciful; for I know nothing more precarious and destitute of tolerable pretences than these Cabalistical Traditions, being only a late & silly Invention of the jewish Rabbins: for they are altogether unknown to and unmentioned by the ancient both Jews and Christians. 
Oedip. tom. 2. class. 4. prefat.  And yet Kircher (who never gives out at credulity) would have every one that does not believe the Divine Original of the Cabala to be convicted of Heresy as an Enemy to the Divine Providence. But for my part, I cannot understand how any Rational man can be at all concerned for so vain and frivolous an Invention of the Modern (i. e. trifling) Rabbins. But he that could find all the Learning of the world in an Egyptian Hieroglyphic may find all the Articles of his Faith in a Rabbinical Fable. 'Tis certain that the Cabala was invented since the dispersion of the jewish Nation, (there being not the least footsteps of it before) but in what Century or Period is uncertain and must remain so, for from the Destruction of jerusalem there commenced as to the jewish History a Tempus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (a Period always fit for Fables;) there being no Records or Monuments of their Condition and Affairs, (unless some few fabulous Relations in the Talmud.) But whatever became of them, 'tis certain that being given up to a vain and trifling spirit, they employed themselves, in foolish & absurd Inventions, of which making Mystical and Allegorical Interpretations of Scripture is none of the least: especially when they prefer them so much before the true and literal meaning: for they compare the Scripture itself to a Candle, but the Mystical sense to a jewel, for the discovery whereof of the Candle is lighted; and the Misnical Doctors (that is, they that study only the literal sense) are compared to Apothecaries, who only prepare those Medicaments, which the Physician prescribes, but the Cabbalistical Doctors to Physicians, who understand their Natures, Uses, and secret Properties. And therefore they leave the literal and superficial sense of Scripture, to the rude and ignorant People, whilst they that are Learned dive into the mysteries and depths of the Law, and by the help of Fancy fetch strange and wonderful secrets from Words, Letters, Points, from their several Shapes, Combinations, Transpositions, Abbreviatures, Arithmetical Indications, and the like. And then with a frontless Impudence, assert that they came Originally from Adam, Abraham, and Moses. You may see enough of this Cabbalistical Trash in a thousand Authors, but most Copiously in Reuchlin de Arte Cabbalistica, and in that grand Thesaurus of Learned Trifles, Kirchers Oedip. tom. 2. Class. 4. The first that produced them into the Christian World was the Earl of Mirandula, in whose time the very word Cabbala was so unknown, that (as Hottinger relates out of Garzon) it was taken for a Witch, Vetula venesicits dedit●. And the Earl himself relates in his Apology, that one of his greatest Antagonists being asked what this Cabbala was, replied that he was a certain notorious Heretic, that had opposed himself against jesus Christ, and that from him his Accomplices and Followers were named Cabbalistae. The Earl, when he had at a high price purchased some small fragments of it from the jews, thought himself Master of the most ancient and valuable Monument in the World: The mistake was pardonable in him, but unpardonable in those who since have had opportunity to examine its first rise and antiquity, and cannot discern the least Traces of it beyond the Talmudical Rabbins: Besides this, I might overthrow the Cabbala from rational Arguments taken from the thing itself, as that it would reflect upon the Wisdom of God, that he should convey down such material and important Truths (as are supposed to be contained in the Cabbala) by so uncertain and questionable a way, as Oral Tradition. That it renders the Word of God ridiculous and useless, and makes its meaning altogether doubtful and ambiguous, and exposes it to the giddy and fanciful Conjectures of every warm Brain: but the groundlesness of the thing itself, makes all other confutation needless. Some (not unlearned men) have urged the Consistency of the Cabbala with itself, and the suitableness of the Allegory to the Text as no contemptible Argument of its Truth and Solidity. But alas, (beside that most of their Analogies between the Mystery and the Text are sufficiently forced and uncouth) there's nothing more easy then for Fancy to find some Consonancy between the most distant things, especially in such various and unlimited things as Allegories are. If you should require it, I think I could with an ordinary plausibility draw up a body of the Epicurean Philosophy out of the Writings of jacob Behem, and yet perhaps it would puzzle you to think of any Hypotheses of a more distant Genius than they. Such an Africa is Fancy, that it can couple things of the most distant and contrary Natures. And therefore I shall never think the prettiest Parallels, Analogies, and Similitudes, to be any tolerable Arguments.  
4. Having thus evidenced the unwarrantable Rashness of deriving Platonic Notions from jewish Traditions, I come in the next place to give (1.) A brief Account of the Rise of that seeming agreeableness between the Platonic and the Christian Trinity. (2.) To show by what Principles and steps the Platonists happened upon their Triad.  
For the first it seems to have its Original from those counterfeit and supposititious Authors, which pretended to the greatest Antiquity, but yet were really composed by the Gnostics out of the Ethnic and Christian Theology, and ascribed to names of the greatest Antiquity and Veneration, such as Hermes Trismegistus, Zoroasters Oracles, the Sybillan Prophecies, now it were strange if in these Authors there did not appear some kind of Resemblance and Vicinity between the Platonic Philosophy and the Holy Scriptures, seeing they had by all Artificial ways blended them together; as by coupling their different terms to express the same thing, for whereas the Scripture styles the first Person of the Trinity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and Plato the first of his Trinity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, they joined them together, and call him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and as the Second Person is in Scripture termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and in Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in these he is generally styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: Now they that knew nothing of the Imposture, meeting with such an Artificial agreement between Platonic Notions and Christian Doctrines, might easily imagine that it was natural. The first Author of this mistake seems to have been Ammonius of Alexandria (Father to that Golden Chain of Philosophers of the Sacred succession) who being both a Christian and a Platonist, & lighting upon these Spurious Books, in which the Platonic Notions and Christian Articles were blended and reconciled together, might thence be easily induced to fancy a true and real Consonancy 
Pa●arch. lib. 9  between them, And therefore Patricius avers that he was the first that understood aright the notion of Plato's Threefold Principle, and that he came by this knowledge by perusing the Books of Trismegistus. And hence those Platonists that followed him might speak of the Trinity more consonantly to the Scriptures, than perhaps they intended, though not long after these Impostures were discovered by Porphyry, as himself relates in the Life of Plotinus.  
For the second, the Platonic Triad is widely different from the Christian, for they intent by it so many Orders and Ranks of Intellectual Being's, and frequently added a fourth, which was the Humane Soul, and set it at no greater distance from the Third, by which they meant the Soul of this Universe, then that was removed from the Second, by which they meant the First mind or soul of the Immaterial world. And their Progress to the knowledge of these Being's proceeded in this Method.  
1. They suppose all things to ascend by Scales to Unity, as Plato endeavours to prove in his Parmenides, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Unity is the Origine of all Number, or all mixed and compounded Being's must be at last resolved into some one simple and unmixed Principle, otherwise the resolution would be endless, so that all blended and Heterogeneous Perfections both material and immaterial must of necessity exist somewhere simple and unmixed. And then all Immaterial Perfections being found blended together in the Humane Soul, they concluded that as many degrees of Perfection as they could discover there, that there were so many Ranks of superior and more homogeneal Being's in the Intellectual world. The Soul therefore (as they apprehended) consisting of four parts, must have the fourth Rank in the order of Intellectual Being's, and by consequence there must be three superior Orders more simple and uncompounded, which must by several steps as far exceed each other, as the lowest order surmounts the Soul, to the highest whereof must of necessity agree pure and mere simplicity.  
2. That which is the supreme Being, and consequently the first Author of all other Being's, must of necessity be the highest perfection, and contain in itself all the Excellency and Accomplishments of all its Productions, & yet by virtue of the former maxim it can be but one simple and uncompounded perfection, and therefore to find out its Nature, they consider with themselves what one Simple Perfection is so absolute and transcendent as to comprehend all others; and at length conclude that Goodness is the most consummate and most entirely complete Perfection conceivable, and therefore that the most simple and unmixed Goodness must be the First Being. Which as 'tis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. pure goodness, so it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. mere Unity or rather simplicity, and has the same Relation to the other Being's, as Unity has to Number. Now they do not attribute the Creation and Government of the world to this Being we have already discovered, but to the second Being, for, say they, it could not flow from the First, unless the Ideas of all Things had resided in him, but then he could not have been absolutely simple, having such a multiplicity of Ideas within him. But Ideas lodging in the Intellect, the Second Being which was nothing but Intellect was not only capable of receiving them, but had in him as it were an Ocean of them, which flowing from him filled all Possibilities of Being with actual Existencies. Upon this account they styled there 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it was not the immediate Fountain of Things, but only the Cause of that which was. And therefore I am apt to think that upon what Rationalities soever they pretend to introduce their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that their first inducement to it was, that they might rise higher than Anaxagoras and those other Philosophers, that asserted an Eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be the First Being and First Cause of all things.  
3. Intellect or Understanding being the Noblest Perfection next to Goodness, the second thing must be simply and absolutely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and being the Supreme Entity, it must also be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but because 'tis compounded of Intellect and Entity 'tis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 only by Participation. And hence was started that nice Controversy, whether is superior Ens or Unum? The Earl of Mirandula's Book the Uno & Ente is only a Dispute against the Platonists, to prove Unity not superior to Entity, because they assert their Original and Uncreated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be the Principle of all Being's, whilst itself is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and therefore they will not permit you to term it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but have invented that higher one of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Nature that is placed above Essentiality. But seeing (by the way) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies nothing but the Essence or Existence of the Thing, to which it is applied, 'tis a gross Contradiction to deny it▪ of any thing, that really exists, because if it exists, it must surely be itself, and if so, it may by consequence with as great Propriety of speech be denominated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as any thing else. But whatever that Term imports, the signification of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is of necessity most uncertain and ambiguous, for no body understands how much 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 advanceth the signification of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and because it may signify any thing it does in effect signify nothing, for an indeterminate signification is all one with an insignificant one. And yet in this Particle consists a great part of the mysterious sublimity of the supposititious and counterfeit Areopagite. But 'tis not my business to confute but to represent their Notions, seeing therefore they will Place the Supreme Cause of all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; the Second Being in order which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, must be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 becasuse it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
4. Their third Principle, which proceeds from the second as that from the first, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by which they understand nothing but the Soul of the Universe, and therefore usually style it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as being the Architect of the World; and hence as they assert the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or self originated Goodness to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Causally Intellect; and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or First mind to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Causally Soul, so they make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because 'tis the Cause of Matter and the Universe. I have already given you Plato's wild description of this Hypostasis; and therefore (especially because I begin to tyre and falter) I shall not trouble you with any farther account thereof, having sufficiently showed the difference of the vulgar Doctrine of the Trinity from the Platonic Triad, and withal from what Principles and by what Reasonings the Platonists happened to own and assert their Threefold Principle.  
It were easy (Sir) to add Infinite Considerations more, but if these wherewith I have already presented you be material, I have said enough; if not, too much. Being therefore already tired, I will not put myself to the trouble of caressing you with a fine and courtly Conclusion, but shall Bluntly and without any Ceremony sum up the main scope and signification of this tedious Letter into this one Serious and Eternal Truth, that I am,  
Sir Your most Faithful most Humble, and most Affectionate Servant, S. PARKER.    

PAg. 16. l. 15. for Mortality read Morality. p. 18. l. 7. for scrambling for aspiring read scrambling for And aspiring. p. 33. l. 3. for Politanus read Politianus. p. 93. l. ult. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
FINIS.