A REMONSTRANCE Of the UN-LAWFULNESSE Of the war, undertaken by the pretended PARLIAMENT of ENGLAND, against their sovereign; And of the injustice Of the Alteration of the Ancient Gouvernment and fundamental Laws of the kingdom.  
 royal coat of arms 
HONI. SOIT. QVI. MAL. Y. PENSE.  
dieu ET MON DROIT   
AT PARIS 1652.   

TO HIS MOST EXCELLENT majesty CHARLES The II. By the Grace of God King of England, Scotland, &c. Defendor of the faith.  
Most Gracious, and dread-full sovereign.  
THe pretended Parliament of England having their Agents lately in the Low Countries, treating with the United Provinces about conditions of an offensive and defensive war, my resolution was to have set out this Remonstrance in the Dutch tongue for the satisfaction of those Provinces; but the treaty ended almost as soon as I began to actuate my resolution: whereupon I altered my purpose, and have now set it out in English for the satisfaction of your own Subjects, hoping the truth being here clearly illustrated, may have some effect upon their Consciences, which can not but have great sway over them in ordering and directing their Actions. Experience teacheth that most men act less boldly and resolutely,( especially where their lives must be engaged) when they act against their Conscience, then when they are persuaded of the lawfulness and justice of their cause. There hath been more blood spilled by civill war in your Majesties dominions within the space of ten yeares, since those pernicious principles touching the supremacy of the People and lawfulness of resistance have been instilled into mens mindes by some who fetched their doctrine from Hell to furnish the world with tragedies, then formerly in an Hundred. I conceive the nearest and readiest way to reform such un-christian practices, is to reform the Conscience, although I deny not but more sharp and violent remedies must also be applied: for some have lost all sense of Conscience, whom your Majesty, I hope, assisted by the almighty providence of God, shall reform by the sword. This is that which Religion calls for at your hands, now oppressed by such a multitude, and confused swarm of Sectaries, that I should think it impossible for so many men of several Religions to live together in unity, did not the likeness of their Nature and Manners reconcile their affections, as much as their differences in Religion can alienate and estrainge them. And this is that which all your faithful Subjects pray for, who desire nothing more then to see your Majesty seated in your royal Throne, and able to protect them from the insolences of the Rebells, who make their will their law, disposing as freely of mens lives and fortunes, as if they had created them and given them their being.  
It is a rule in optics, when a dark body is greater then a light to which it is directly opposed, it casteth a shadow in infinitum: Such a shadow( if the continent were capable of an infinite shadow) will the dark body of the Rebells cast upon the kingdom of England, whilst it is interposed between your Majesty and your loyal Subjects, depriving them both of your favourable Aspect, and of your Light and Influence, without which they can look for nothing but a continuation of their present miseries: for should the Rebells prevail and prosper in their designs, what else can be expected, but that which is wrested from others by Force and Violence, should be maintained by Tyranny and Injustice? But whilst they wade in blood to places of preferment and command, the Lord shal overthrow them in the midst of their course, as he overthrew the egyptians in the read sea; I usurp not the name of a Prophet, but I speak as one believing God to be a faithful observer of his promises: He will not always be deaf to the prayers and complaints of those that are oppressed, but sand them deliverance in his due time, and supply your Majesty with all things necessary both to vindicate your own Rights, and free your People from their oppression.   

THE CONTENTS.  
An INTRODUCTION. The beginning, raise and progress of the Rebellion raised by the pretended Parliament. The Principles whereby they endeavour to justify their proceedings. The Questions that shall be discussed.  
THE FIRST question. Whether the people and their deputies in Parliament be supreme and above the King, or coordinate with him by the laws of the land.  

CHAP. I. The State of the Question explained.  
CHAP. II. The Kings supremacy in general shewed by the Statutes of the Land.  
CHAP. III. The Kings supremacy in particular shewed by the Statutes of the Land.  
CHAP. IV. The Kings supremacy in general shewed by the Common Law. That the English Monarchy is susceptible of no alteration. That fundamental laws ought not be changed.  
CHAP. V. The Kings supremacy in particular shewed by the Common Law.  
CHAP. VI. The Kings supremacy both in general and particular shewed by Reasons depending upon the laws and customs of the Land.  
CHAP. VII. Divers objections made by the pretended Houses, answered: The Kings supremacy shewed to be in his Person not in his courts.  
CHAP. VIII. Divers general objections made by the author of the treatise of Monarchy touching the limitation and mixture of the English Monarchy, and coordination of the two Houses, answered. The nature of absolute, limited and mixed Government explained.  
CHAP. IX. Divers general objections taken from the testimony of his Majesty, Bracton and Fortescue, together with the Presidents of Edward the second, and Richard the second, answered.  
CHAP. X. Objections made against the Kings supremacy in particular, by Mr. Bridge, the reverend Divines, and Others, answered.    

AN INTRODUCTION.  
The beginning, raise, and progress of the rebellion raised by the pretended Parliament. The Principles whereby they endeavour to justify their proceedings. The Questions that shall be discussed.  
I look upon the government of England if the laws might be restored to their ancient dignity and authority as inferior to none in the world Parliaments whilst the King and people have acted in their several spheres, and not invaded the rights and privileges of on another, have always been the surest means under God to unite their affections together, and to prevente those dangers which by their mutual discord must of necessity have ruined both. Some are so rash as to affirm that all transactions, negotiations, and accords between Kings and subjects ought to be interdicted, not onely depriving subjects of the light and favours which they should receive from their Prince, but Princes also of many commodities which they may receive by capitulating with their subjects in Parliaments, where the whole kingdom being present, either in person, or by representation, may give the King, and receive from him again, such reciprocal testimonies of love, that he may be assured his people seek nothing more then the preservation of his life, honour, and royal dignity; and they, that their King endeavoureth no less to increase and maintain the liberty, riches, and prosperity of his people. And I am confident the last Parliament had been as great a blessing to the land as ever any was in former ages, had not the ambition, avarice, and malice of some interrupted the course of the laws. But for this factious assembly which hath a long time called themselves a Parliament, it is a disturber of the Kingdoms peace, an enemy and destroyer of the people; and if we look upon their actions in their beginning, in their raise, and in their progress, they may seem to have had always a formal opposition to justice and to have acted by some occult and specifical quality not common to other Christians. There was endeed at the first beginning of the Parliament, much murmuring and discontent amongst the people, partly caused by monopolies and the unusual taxation of shippmoney, and partly by the rigorous proceedings of the starchamber and High Commission, whereby divers were often oppressed: Here the enemies of the commonwealth, finding a spacious overture to enter into this rebellion, began to act their partes, and being too provident to loose such an advantage, laboured to exasperate the mindes of the people, and to stir up those evil humours which began already to appear. And although his Majesty offered all just satisfaction for what was past, and the best security themselves should in reason require that the like disorders might for ever after be prevented, yet these turbulent and factious spirits, being men of broken fortune, and hoping to heal themselves by the ruin of others, opposed all such motions, and would needs themselves become chirurgeons to the state; and as chirurgeons are wont to smooth and stroke the partes which they resolve shall bleed, so they began to smooth and stroke the people, promising them a new light in matters of religion, and that they would remove the grievances, and sweeten the evils which afflicted the commonwealth, although in stead of removing and sweetening them, they have almost made them incurable. By these persuasions mixed with many pretences of religion they procured the people to meet together in great multitudes, and in a tumultuous manner to assault divers of the Lords as they were going to the Parliament, and to drive them back again, not permitting them to speak in the house when their speech was most necessary for the service of the kingdom. Although it was easy for his Majesty to discover their intentions, yet the love he bare his people made him to dissemble it, and to give way to their proceedings, hoping they might in time be brought by his favours to mitigate and correct their furious practices; but finding at last that his patience served for nothing else but to fortify and encourage them in their malice, he thought himself obliged to take such ways as he judged most convenient to stoup the course of their proceedings, the continuation whereof was like to bring so many mischiefs to the commonwealth: and seeing it was like to be prejudicial to the safety of the people as well as to his own to stay longer in a place where there was neither security for his person, nor liberty for any other then those factious persons to vote according to the dictates of their own reason, he was forced to withdraw himself from the Parliament to avoid the pernicious effects of those mens counsels which were resolved the whole commonwealth should sink rather then themselves not obtain those places of command and profit which they aimed at. The King being gone it was not to be wondered if they which in his presence had the boldness to wove such pernicious designs against the state, should in his absence endeavour to corrupt the fidelity of his subjects and frame new practices to stir up the people to rebellion, for having the city of London wholly at their command they neither wanted means nor opportunity to draw the people to their faction, who by such artificial divices as they used were easy to be ensnared: They told them that by resisting the King they should not be rebells, but an army authorized by those which were depositaries of the Kings authority, that this resistance was an inspiration from heaven which promised the restauration of their ancient liberties that had been so often violated by the King: They made them believe that the authority of the King and the whole commonwealth would be brought into confusion if they did not vigorously oppose those disorders were growing upon them, and remove those evil counsellors from the King that did misled and seduce him; and withall they entred into a league and covenant with the people to preserve and defend the Kings Majesties person and authority together with the liberties of the kingdom, assuring them they had no thoughts or intentions to diminish his Majesties just power and greatness. They enticed some by these divices, and compelled others to fight against their consciences, thinking to strengthen themselves by a multitude, or at least to make their own ruin more famous by the ruin of so many others. But it pleased God they should prevail for a time; and now we see the effects contrary to those words and promises which were so solemnly made to the whole kingdom, and that by calling God a witness to the sincerity of their intentions: for they have not only diminished his Majesties just power and greatness, but most traitorously deprived him of his life, and that after he had condescended so far as to satisfy all their unreasonable demands, which fact of theirs althougt it hath been masked with many specious pretences, and coloured with the fairest shows of justice, yet was it the most execrable murder that ever was committed next that of our saviour Christ, and his ambitious judge hath gained this, that next PILAT BRADSHAW of all such judges shall by posterity be esteemed the chief. This murder of the King as it was most unjust, so was it also most unseasonable considering the present disposition of the kingdom, whose strength being already too much weakened and attenuated, ought not to have been further wasted and consumed by renewing the war which the death of the King did threaten. But such motions could work nothing upon those which had long before resolved to make all other considerations give place to profit and ambition; the people abused themselves whilst they thought this factious assembly would be more careful and tender of them then of the King: for they have not onely brought a new war upon them which might have been avoided, dashinge them all against one another, but have also themselves many ways barbarously afflicted and destroyed them: they have made the scaffold, the gibbet, the prison, and the grave, the common places of their rendezvous, and those which they have not devoured by their cruelty, they devour by their unsatiable avarice; whilst they declayme against Kings for oppressing the people by unjust taxations, they have themselves, as hath been computed by many, squeezed more in one year from the commonwealth then all the Kings of England have done since the conquest. The lawful magistrates are deprived of the liberty and honour of their functions; and such as are the greatest enemies to justice are set up in their places; some are bereft of their estates, others driven out of the kingdom and forced to seek a foreign air, where they may breath more freely then in their own: The whole Nobility, clergy, and Commonalty walk desolatly and mournefully up and down, being no more like the men they were, then the skins of sacrificed beasts are like their living bodies. And after all these indignities offered to the King and people, they indeavoure contrary to the laws to alter the government and to pull up the very foundation of the kingdom, calling their new frame and structure a Free Estate, and themselves the keepers of the freedom of England: Thus having guilt over this idol of their own fancy, they force all men to fall down and worship it; they whose virtue oblige them to refuse, are cast into a furnace hotter then that of Babylon. Seeing the body of the kingdom devoured thus to the very entrails, I could not without horror behold such a miserable carcase so rent and torn in every parte, nor could I satisfy mine own conscience if I should not endeavour according to my poor abilities to oppose the rage and fury of these men which are grown so fat with the blood and spoil of others: My intention therefore is reserving matters of fact for another place to speak here of matters of right, and to show the injustice of their cause, and discover the falsehood of all those Principles, whereby they endeavour to justify their proceedings, not doubting but I shall so far convince the understanding of all those that shall red this ensuing discource, that they shall not hereafter enter into any combination with the rebells or continue with them in case they be already engaged, except their hearts be hardened so far as they dare act in matters of such concernment contrary to their consciences.  
The Principles and grounds whereby they endeavour to justify this present war against the King are two; First they say that it is lawful for the people to resist their sovereign and supreme governours by force of arms in case they be Tyrants, and bent to subvert the laws and religion established, or by illegal proceedings invade the lives, estates, or liberties of their subjects. But there is some disagreement amongst them in the restriction and limitation of their Principle; for some give free scope and liberty to all private persons to resist and with their swords in their hands to defend their lives and estates against the unjust invasion of all Kings and governours whatsoever. Others do a little stint the people and limit the bounds of resistance, permitting none to have that power but subordinat magistrates, or the people collectively taken and their substitutes in Parliament. Yet these content themselves with the same particular instances brought by the others, alleging little besyds particular examples, as the example of David who as they say would have resisted Saul if occasion had been offered; The example of the Priestes, who, as they say assaulted Uzziah, and such like examples of particular men, which were neither the people collectively taken, nor their substitutes in Parliament, nor yet the greater part subordinat Magistrates. This is their first Principle, which yet some of them dislike, confessing it to be against the Lawe of God, and to tend directly to the ruin and subversion of government: these have thought upon an other way how to make good their rebellion, and proceed upon another Principle, namely that supreme jurisdiction belongs to the people; the King they say is mayor singulis but minor universis, greater and hath more authority then any one of his subjects taken by retail, but taken in the gross his subjects are greater and have more authority then he; and these agree altogether in this that they teach all authority to be originally in the people tanquam in primo subjecto creato as in its first subject immediately under God, and from them translated to Magistrates; Kings they say were promoted to that authority by the adoption of the people, which did voluntarily submit themselves and communicate their authority to those which they thought most capable to defend them, and to administer justice. Mr. Prynne affirmeth that even those Kings which were appointed immediately by God himself received their authority from the people, who might have refused them notwithstanding they were anointed by God and designed unto that office, their free choice being no ways restrained or limited by that designation. It is apparent saith he that the Iudges and Kings of the Israelites were not properly hereditary but oft elective by the people: 
The sovereign power of Parliaments and kingdoms page. 124.  and though God did sometimes immediately nominat the persons of those that should reign over them, as is apparent by Saul, David, jeroboam, jehu, others; yet the people did constantly confirm, make them Kings, and gave them their royal authority, none being made Kings by divine appointment, but such as they willingby accepted, approved, confirmed for their Kings; Gods previous designation being but a preparative to their voluntary free( not restrained or limited) election. Yet these are divided amongst themselves about the extent and latitude of the power that may be translated; for some of them say that the rights of soueraignitie belong to the people by the law of nature, and are so essential to them that they can not be separated or divided from them; they can not be taken away by conquest, they can not part with them by consent, but under what form of gouvernment soever they live, by what means soever established and set up, they have still reserved in them a supreme jurisdiction over all Magistrates, by which they are authorized to give a legal judgement upon all their actions, and to resume again their whole authority when they shall see occasion, making a circled in government, and granting a power in magistrates to judge and govern the people, and also in the people to judge and govern their Magistrates. So that by their opinion not only the people of England, but the people of all other kingdoms and commonwealths have authority over their magistrates to judge juridically whether their actions be just, and in case they find them not such, to deprive them of all authority, to punish them with death or otherwise as they shall think it expedient. Others on the contrary side say that the people may loose the rights of sovereignty by conquest, or parte with them by consent, so that they shall not reserve to themselves supreme jurisdiction over their magistrates to judge juridically whether their actions be legal or illegal; but the people of England, they say, have not de facto partend with their authority in such a full degree, but are supreme by the laws of the land, or at least coordinate with the King; for at the first coalition of the government by paction and agreement made with the King they reserved to themselves a parte in the rights of sovereignty which they still hold by law. This is their other Principle as destructive to government as the former, and the authors and maintainers of them both agree well enough in their end, that is to stir up the people to rebellion: onely, they of the first rank would persuade them they may lawfully do it by way of self preservation, and they of the second, by way of jurisdiction. I intend now by Gods assistance to examine these mischievous Principles, and to discover as well the falsity of them as the dangerous consequences that flow from them, which I hope to perform with such clearness, and evidence that the most hare-brainde sectaries amongst them shall be convinced if they will but red that which shall be alleged against them.  
Now that I may proceed in opening and clearing the truth with the better method, I will divide the matter I am to handle into two partes; In the first part I will speak of supremacy, and here I will show that the King alone is the only supreme head and governor of the kingdom of England, and that all the people and their deputies in Parliament, as well collectively taken, as severally, are his subjects and not coordinate with him: In the second part I will speak of resistance, and there I will show that the supreme magistrates and governours of any kingdom or commonwealth may not by their subjects be resisted by force of arms upon any pretence of tyranny or misdemeanour or upon any other cause or pretence whatsoever. I will begin with supremacy, because they endeavour now chiefly to purge themselves from the murders and injustice which they have committed by the authority of the people, whose supremacy they say is sufficient to warrant their proceedings. At the first they denied not the supremacy of the King, but as the keepers and guardians of it they raised an army against him by virtue of his own authority, but having seized upon his person and imprisoned him, it was then more conducible to their ends to avouch the supremacy of the people: but whosoever have the title, they exercise the power themselves, and as before they rebelled against the King, so now they murder and oppress the people by pretence of their own authority, which as their Deputies in Parliament they intend to manage as long as they can find means to defend and uphould their tyranny. Now although this pretended Parliament are no more deputies of the people of England, then the Banditi are deputies of the people of Italy, who if they had as great a power would soon have as great a right as they to govern under that pretence, yet for the present we will suppose them such and examine only their Principle by which they labour to support their cause, that is the supremacy of the people; and first I will show that the people and their deputies in Parliament are neither supreme nor coordinate with the King by the laws of the land, as some of them say; secondly, that they are not supreme by the laws of nature, as others; thirdly, that the people never had in them any authority or jurisdiction at all which they could give or resume again upon occasion, as they generally affirm; and these particulars I intend to handle in three questions.  
The first question shall be, whether the people and their deputies in Parliament be supreme and above the King or coordinate with him by the laws of the land.  
The second, whether the people and their deputies in Parliament be supreme by the laws of nature, and have always reserved a juridical power of judging their magistrates, whether their actions be just, and of resuming authority in case they be not.  
The third whether authority be originally in the people and translated by them to Kings and other supreme magistrates, or in the Kings and other supreme magistrates themselves immediately from God tanquam in primo subjecto creato, as in the first created subject.   

THE FIRST QUESTION.  
Whether the people and their deputies in Parliament be supreme and above the King or coordinat with him by the laws of the land.  

CHAP. I.  
The state of the Question explained.  
THE first Question that shall come into consideration is whether the people and their deputies in Parliament be supreme and above the King or coordinat with him by the laws of the land. The pretended Parliamentarians affirm the two houses to be coordinate with the King in the rights of sovereignty: for the Monarchy of England, they say, is a mixed Monarchy, and this mixture is in the power and rights of Majesty themselves, so that the King alone hath not full and plenary authority to perform all acts requisite to government, but there is in the Monarchy a concurrence of several answers belonging to several estates, which being mixed together make up one whole and entire power, and those several estates one supreme head of the commonwealth. And although some of them are so liberal as to allow the King a primity of share in this coordination: yet others say that the superiority belongs to the two houses, the King being greater then any one of the members of Parliament, but less then the two houses collectively taken, who in the legislative power, which is one of the principal rights of sovereignty, have a greater interest then He, in whose breasts alone remaineth the final determination of draw; for they deny the King to have a negative voice, as if his sitting in Parliament were a ceremony and mere formality, and not an act of Majesty and jurisdiction. This foundation, as I think, was first laid by the fuller Answerer, but the Treatiser, the reverend Divines, and divers others have added a superstructure to it of many fine and new inventions of their own, which are not needful to be here related, because they alter not the state of the Question; for they all affirm the two houses to be coordinate with the King in the rights of sovereignty, and the mixture of the English Monarchy to be in the power itself. I will set down their assertions in the fuller Answerers own words. Before we judge saith he, of what a Parliament can do in England, it will be needful to know what kind of government this of England is, we are therfore to know that England is not a simply subordinative and absolute, but a coordinative and mixed Monarchy; this mixture or coordination is in the very supremacy of power itself, otherwise the Monarchy were not mixed: all Monarchies have a mixture or composition of subordinate and under officers in them, but here the Monarchy or highest power itself is compounded of three coordinate estates, a King, and two houses of Parliament. And again a little after he saith, But you l' say, what? is not the Parliament subordinate to the King? Are they not all subjects? I answer, the Parliament can not be said properly to be a subject, because the King is a part, and so he should be subject to himself: no nor are the two houses without him subjects, every member seorsim, taken severally, is a subject, but all collectim in their house are not. In his answer to Doctor Ferns reply he addeth further. Although every one and all the members are subjects, the houses can not properly be said to be subject and coordinate too; they are the two membra dividentia, which must at no hand admit coincidence: nay tho' all the members as partes and put them together too are subjects, yet all the partes of a whole taken all together are not equal to the whole, the order, site, relation, unîon of the partes, whence the formality of the whole results, being still yet wanting. These are the fantasies of the pretended Parliamentarians, which are so gross and contrary to law, that the fuller Answerer seems to me to have been in a dream, when his head was first impregnated with such conceptions, as also to have done very improvidently in making the site, relation, order, and union of the members necessary to his coordination; for although I know not what site and relation the members may have had amongst themselves, yet I am sure there hath not been so much order and union amongst them as will lift them out of the condition of subjects, and make them coordinate with his Majesty.  
I say therefore in opposition to these fantasies, first, that the King alone is by the laws of the land the only supreme head and governor of England, and that the people and their deputies in Parliament taken both collectim and seorsim as well collectively as severally are his subjects and not coordinate with him: there is no mixture at all in the rights of sovereignty; for in respect of the power itself, the Monarchy is absolute, simplo, pure, independent, without profanation of outward mixture, the King alone without further influence from the two houses having full power and authority to do or cause to be done all acts of justice, so that what interest and authority soever the two houses have in making laws or in the exercise of any other act of power, they have it by derivation from him. The King alone makes laws by the assent of the two houses, and if the two houses are said at any time to make laws, it is by a deligate power and authority communicated to them from him, and not by any power and authority which they have radically in themselves.  
Secondly I say that the King alone is not onely invested with all the rights of sovereignty, but hath them also so inseparably annexed to his royal person by the laws of the land, that they can not be separated from him by any act of Parliament, by any civill constitution, or pragmatical sanction, by any law, or ordinance whatsoever; but in case the King himself should improvidently by act of Parliament agree to any thing tending to the diminution of his royal dignity, it is then in the power of the common law to control such a statute, and to make void all such acts as tend to the degradation, much more such as tend to the annihilation of Majesty. Having thus opened the state of the Question, I will now proceed to demonstrate the truth by statutes, by common law, and by reasons depending upon the laws and customs of the land.   

CHAP. II.  
The Kings supremacy in general shewed by the statutes of the land.  
I Could both from Saxon and divers other laws and antiquities show the Kings of England to have ruled more absolutely, and to have anciently exercised a larger jurisdiction, then hath of later yeares been exercised or challenged by their successors: but because many immunities and privileges have been granted to the subjects since their times; I will therfore confine myself to such statutes as have been made since the giving of the great charter. And to avoid tediousness I will omit many statutes wherein the King is by both houses collectively taken acknowledged to be supreme: for they frequently in the statutes style him Our gracious sovereign Lord the King. Our dreadful sovereign Lord the King. I will likewise omit many others wherein they aclowledge themselves to be his subjects, and that when they were in their site, relation, order, and union, in which posture the fuller Answerer fancies them to be coordinate: for such expressions run through divers statutes, Most humbly beseech your most excellent Majesty your faithful and obedient subjects the Lords spiritual and temporal, and the commons in this your present Parliament assembled. In their most humble wise shown unto your royal Majesty your loving subjects the lords spiritual and temporal, and the Commons of this present parliament assembled. I will only allege such statutes as have been made on purpose to declare to whom supremacy and all power and jurisdiction belong: for there hath been divers acts of Parliament made to that end upon several occasions wherein the Kings supremacy hath been acknowledged and confirmed unto him. In the four and twenty year of Henry the eight an act was made that no appeals should be used but within the realm: the reason alleged in the Statute is because the King alone is the only supreme head of the realm, and is furnished with plenary and entire power to do all acts of justice. Where by divers sundry old authentic Histories and Chronicles it is manifestly declared and expressed that this realm of England is an Empire, and hath so been accepted in the world, governed by one supreme head and King, having the dignity and royal estate of the imperial crown of the same: unto whom a body politic, compact of all sorts and degrees of people divided in terms and by names of spiritualty and temporalty been bound and own to bear next to God a natural and humble obedience, he being also institute and furnished by the goodness and sufferance of Almighty God with plenary, whole, and entire power, pre-eminence, authority, prerogative, and jurisdiction, to render and yield justice and final determination to all manner of folck resiants or subjects within this his realm. This clear testimony of the Kings supremacy, is thus eluded by the fuller Answerer. Wee see then saith he, what is meant by governed by one supreme head, such a one as is able to do all acts of needful justice, which the King in his natural capacity can not do( he can not make a law) it must therefore be understood in his full and entire politic capacity, which takes in law and Parliament; nor can it be said that by those words a body politic compact of all sorts and degrees the Parliament is properly meant, but the kingdom at large. The sum of his Answer is this, that in this Statute by the King not the King alone, but the King and the two houses of Parliament are to be understood, and so although he would have the Kings power to be less, yet to make him amends he will have his name to signify more then it did before. But this is nothing else but the evaporation of his own brain; for if in any place the word King could signify the King and the two houses of Parliament, yet in this it must of necessity signify the King alone: 
35. H. 8. cap. 1.  these words having the dignity and royal estate of the imperial crown of the same, can have reference to no other. besides in this Answer he contradicts his own Principles: for if the two houses be coordinate with the King, and have power radically in themselves, not derived from him, they can not be comprehended under his politic capacity. Whereas he saith the King can not make a law, and infer from thence that the King alone without taking in the two houses hath not entire and plenary jurisdiction, his inference is very infirm; for it doth not diminish Majesty, but redounds to the glory of it, 
Argum. l. 8. c. de legibus.  to give laws to the people by the counsel and assent of wisemen: It hath been, and is for the most part the practise in absolute Monarchies, to make laws that shall bind posterity by general consent and agreement, which yet doth not deprive the Monarch of his power, or derogate any way from the plenitud and entireness thereof. But I shall speak more of this when I come to answer their objections. Whereas he saith that by a body politic compact of all sorts and degrees, not the Parliament, but the kingdom at large is properly meant, I know not why he should add this, except it were to fill up more room, for no man will say that the two houses alone are properly to be meant, yet I say the two houses are comprehended under the kingdom at large, and are representative thereof in Parliament, and representatives can not be the head when the kingdom at large, whose representatives they are, is but the body. But here the fuller Answerer hath a little overshot himself; for if by the body politic the kingdom at large be understoode then is the King mayor universis greater then all the people collectively taken by his own confession.  
In the first year of queen Elizabeth another act was made, wherein she is declared supreme head of the realm in all causes as well ecclesiastical as temporal, and an oath enjoined to be taken by divers both ecclesiastical and Lay persons, wherein they were to aclowledge hir supremacy, and to promise faith and true allegiance: the oath was this, I A. B. do utterly testify and declare in my conscience, that the Queens Highnesse is the only supreme governor of this realm, and of all other hir Highnesse dominions and countries, as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes, as temporal, and that no foreign Prince, Person, prelate, State, or Potentate, hath or ought to have any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence, or authority ecclesiastical or spiritual within this realm, and therefore I do utterly renounce and forsake all foreign jurisdictions, powers, superiorities and authorities, and do promise that from henceforth I shall bear faith and true allegiance to the Queens Highnesse, hir heires, and lawful successors, and to my power shall assist and defend all jurisdictions, privileges, pre-eminences, and authorities, granted or belonging to the Queens Highnesse, hir heires, and successors, or united and annexed to the imperial crown of this realm; so help me God and the contents of this book. They answer, first, that this Statute was made to exclude a foreign power, and therefore all that can be collected out of it is that the queen was above all foreigners, but not above the two houses. It is no matter wherefore the Statute was made, the queen is there positively declared to be the onely supreme governor of the realm, the words of a Statute, whatsoever the end was, are the law, and are pleadable in their usual and grammatcall sense to all purposes. But was the oath framed onely to exclude a foreign power, are they sure of that? When God shall make inquisition for blood, and call the reverend Divines, the fuller Answerer, the Treatiser, and the rest of their Complices, to account for all the murders, oppression, and injustice, whereof they have been the authors and abettors by stirring up the people to rebellion, and teaching them lies, they will be found to have broken the oath of allegiance, now his Majesties rights have been invaded by the two houses, as well as if they had been invaded by a foreigner: For the Statute was made as well to declare who was the supreme governor of the realm, as to declare who was not; The Pope challenged no superiority over the queen in temporal matters, and yet in the oath the queen is acknowledged the supreme governor of the realm as well in temporal as in ecclesiastical causes: This had been very superfluous, and a kind of Excrescence in the oath if it had been composed and given onely to exclude the Pope; and I wonder the reverend Divines and the rest attributing so much to other Parliaments should attribute so little to that as to imagine them not able to frame a Statute in words and terms suitable to their ends and intentions; for surely their invention was much straitned if they could not declare the Popes authority to be void otherwise then by calling the queen the onely supreme governor of the realm, which was neither true nor a fit expression, if the two houses had been coordinate with hir: neither had they sufficiently excluded a foreign power by this Act, which, they say, was the onely end was aimed at: for the Pope claimed supreme jurisdiction over all in ecclesiastical causes, as well over the two houses as over the queen, yet in this Act provision is made for none but the queen; by the title of the Statute all ancient jurisdictions are restored to the crown, but there is no restauration of dignity or jurisdiction to the people or to their substitutes in Parliament, so that the Pope hath yet an interest in the kingdom, notwithstanding any thing enacted in this statute, if their assertion were true. Secondly they answer, that the queen is declared to be supreme in respect of particular persons, but not in respect of the people collectively taken, or their substitutes in Parliament. The queen is declared in the oath to be supreme governor of the realm, and the realm includs the people collectively taken, besides supremacy can not admit of that distinction, for they that have any above them or coordinate with them are not supreme, although they be greater then any one in particular. Thirdly they answer that the Queens supremacy was to be understood in curia non in camera in hir courts and not in hir private capacity. The queen by communicating hir authority to hir courts did not part with it herself; Mr. Lambart in his discourse upon the high courts of justice almost at the end of his book speaks punctually to this exception, Thus have I saith he run along our courts of all kindes, and have said( as I was able) severally of these lay and mixed courts of record, deriving them from the crown their original, and drawing by one and one( as it were so many roses) from the garland of the Prince; leaving nevertheless the garland itself undespoyled of that hir sovereign virtue in the administration of justice: or as Bracton saith well; Rex habet ordinariam jurisdictionem,& omnia jura in manu sua, quae nec ita deligari possunt quin ordinaria remaneant cum ipso Rege: And therefore whatsoever power is by him committed over unto other men, the same nevertheless remaineth still in himself in so much as he may take knowledge of all causes unless they be felony, treason, or such other, wherein because he is a party, he can not personally sit in judgement, but must perform it by his delegates. The Kings authority then is as well in his person in regard of his private, as in his courts in regard of his politic capacity, and according to the Acts of sovereignty and Majesty onely in his person; for a delegate power can not be supreme: not but that it is the same authority whereby he acts himself in person, and his judges in his courts, but because it is not all the same authority, but restrained in his Iudges by commission, writ, or law.  
In the first year of Edward the sixth an Act was made wherein the King is acknowledged to be the supreme head of the Church and realm, and that all power and authority was derived from him. whereas the Archbishops and Bishops and other spiritual persons in this realm do use to make and sand out their summons, 
1. E. 6. cap. 2.  citations and other process in their own names in such form and manner as was used in the time of the usurped power of the bishop of Rome, contrary to the form and order of the summons and process of the common law, used in this realm. Seeing that all authority of jurisdiction spiritual and temporal is derived and deducted from the Kings Majesty as supreme head of these Churches and realms of England and Irland, and so justly acknowledged by the clergy of the said realms, and that all courts ecclesiastical within the said two realms be kept by no other power or authority either foreign or within the realm but by the authority of his most excellent Majesty. Be it therefore further enacted, &c. Is it not evident from hence that the two houses of Parliament are subordinate to the King and that they have their power by derivation from him, who is the fountain of all authority? These words seeing that all authority of jurisdiction spiritual and temporal is derived and deducted from the Kings Majesty, as supreme head of these Churches and realms of England and Irland, do clearly intimate the two houses to have no authority radically in themselves, and to be no way coordinate with the Kings Majesty in the rights of sovereignty.  
For conclusion of this Chapter I will add one Act more made in the first year of King james, wherein the two houses of Parliament collectively taken made an humble recognition of their faith and obedience to him. We your most humble and loyal subjects the lords spiritual and temporal, and the Commons in this present Parliament assembled, do from the bottom of our heartes yield to the Divine Majesty all humble thankes and praises not onely for the said inestimable benefits and blessings above mentioned, but also that he hath further enriched your Highnesse with a most royal progeny of most rare and excellent gifts and forwardness, and in his goodness is like to increase the happy number of them, and in most humble and lowly manner do beseech your most excellent Majesty, that( as a memorial to all posterities amongst the records of your high court of Parliament for ever to endure of our loyalty obedience and hearty and humble affection) it may be published and declared in this high court of Parliament, and enacted by authority of the same, that we( being bound thereunto both by the laws of God and man) do recognise and aclowledge( and thereby express our unspeakable joys) that immediately upon the dissolution and decrease of Elizabeth late queen of England the imperial crown of the realm of England and of all the kingdoms, Dominions, and Rights belonging to the same, did by inherent birthright, and lawful and undoubted possession, descend and come to your most excellent Majesty, as being lineally, justly and lawfully next and sole heir of the blood royal of this realm, as is afore said, and that by the goodness of Almighty God, and lawful right of discent under one imperial crown, your Majesty is of the kingdoms of England, Scotland, France and Irland, the most potent and mighty King, and by Gods goodness more able to protect and govern us your loving subjects in all peace and plenty then any of your noble progenitors. And thereunto we most humbly and faithfully do submit and oblige ourselves, our heires, and posterities, for ever, until the last drop of our bloods be spent: And do beseech your Majesty to accept the same as the first fruits of this high court of Parliament, of our loyalty and faith to your Majesty and your royal progeny and posterity for ever. This is a far different strain from that which the present pretended Parliament have used to his Majesty, who although bound both by oath and duty to have been as respectful and obedient towards him, yet have they themselves after many insolences committed against his person most audaciously and unadvisedly taken away his life, and procured others by diffamatory libels to blast his credit, who according to the trust reposed in them, cease not to traduce him, and by malicious aspersions to stain his chiefest virtues, creeping like snails over the sweetest flowers, and leaving behind them their slime and filthiness.   

CHAP. III.  
The Kings supremacy in particular shewed by the Statutes of the Land.  
THe Kings supremacy in general being thus confirmed by several Acts of Parliament, I will now decende into particulars, and show his Majesty to be legally invested with all the particular rights of sovereignty. I will begin with the militia, which is a right so essential to Majesty, that it can not nor ought not to be separated from it: For Majesty consist not in a bare and empty title, but in the rights of sovereignty, which he can not be said to possess, who commandments the sworde to protect the sceptre. It was confessed by the two houses at the beginning of these dissensions, that the militia by right pertained to his Majesty, and therefore at the first they laboured to have it assigned to them by his own assent; but he opposing their unjust desires, as knowing both his own and the ruin of his posterity would be the necessary consequences of such a grant, they resolved, seing they could not gain it by surrender, to take it by assault, and assisted by men of like natures and incinations, they seized upon his Majesties forts and magazines, and have since exercised an arbitrary and tyrannicall power over the lives and estates of all that pleased them not, and none could ever please them, but such as are of the same humour and disposition with themselves. Afterwards the pretended house of Commons thought it fit to take upon them the tuition of the kingdom, and to exercise the power of the militia without the lords; who though excluded from the society of government, will not be excluded from the society of their crimes, but are yet many of them ready to contribute to the effusion of more blood, which by men of that faction hath of late been accounted a very cheap commodity, and upon all occasions spilled and powred out like water. I must confess I am amazed when I consider how confidently and desperately they have carried on their designs in a case so contrary to law and justice; for they could not have begun a war or contested with his Majesty about a matter more clear then that of the militia, which is a right so inherent in the crown, settled upon it by the fundamental laws of the land, and confirmed by so many several acts of Parliament, that although the pretended Parliamentarians have a great dexterity in coining distinctions to elude the laws, yet they will not easily coin such as shall serve their turn in this particular. In the seventh year of Edward the first a statute was made to enjoin all men to go to Parliaments, Treatises, and general Assemblies without force and arms, wherein the Kings power over the militia is acknowledged. The King to the justices of his bench sendeth greeting. Whereas of late before certain persons deputed to treat upon sundry debates had between us and certain great men of our realm, amongst other things it was accorded, that in our next Parliament after provision shall be made by us and the common assent of the Prelates, earls, and Barons, that in all Parliaments, Treaties, and other Assemblies, which should be made in the realm of England for ever, that every man shall come without all force and armor well and peaceably to the honour of us, and the peace of us and our realm. And now in our next Parliament at Westminster after the said Treatise, the Prelates, earls, Barons, and the Commonalty of our realm their assembled to take advice of this business, have said, that to us it belongeth, and our parte is through our royal signiory, straitly to defend force of armor, and all other force against our peace at all times when it shall please us, and to punish them which shall do contrary, according to our laws and usages of our realm, and hereunto they are bound to aid us as their sovereign Lord at all seasons when need shall be. We command ye that ye cause these things to be red afore you in the said bench, and there to be enrolled. Given at Westminster the thirtieth day of october. In another Statute made the eleventh year of Henry the seventh, it is declared that all the subjects of the realm but especially those that have by the King any dignities, gifts, offices, fees, or annuities; are bound to assist the King in his warres against all rebellions, insurrections, and powers raised against him. Where every subject by the duty of his allegiance is bound to serve and assist his Prince and sovereign Lord at all seasons when need shall require, 
11. H. 7. cap. 18.  and most specially such persons as have by him promotion or advancement, as grants and gifts of offices, fees, and annuities, which owe and verily be bound of reason to give their attendence upon his royal person to defend the same when he shall fortune to go in his person in warres for defence of the realm, or against his rebells and enemies for the subduing and repressing of them, and their malicious purpose: wherefore be it enacted and established by the King our sovereign Lord, by the advice of his Lords spiritual and temporal, and the Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by authority of the same, that if any person or persons being within this realm of England or Wales, having such offices, fees, or annuties by any of his rehearsed gifts and grants, do not give their attendance upon him, when he shall fortune to go in warres in his person, in their said persons, as their duty bindeth them: that then they and every of them making therof default( the Kings special licence not had, or else he hath such unfeigned sickness, letting, or disease, that he may not in his person come to do his personal attendance and service after the form afore said, and that duly proved) that then every such person or persons forfeit and lose their said offices, fees, and annuities, and to stand void at the Kings pleasure any act, ordinance, or statute to the contrary, after this time had or made in any wise notwithstanding. By the Parliament holden the fourth and fifth yeares of queen Mary an act was made, wherein it is acknowledged that the queen and hir progenitors had power and authority to appoint commissioners to muster and array the people and subjects, and to levy such a number as they should think fit to serve them in their warres, and a remedy provided against the abuses, that had formerly been committed by divers who absented themselves from such musters, and brought not their best furniture and array with them. 
4. 5. M. cap. 3.  Where heretofore commandement hath been given by the King and queens Majesties, and other the progenitors of the queens majesty, Kings of this realm, to divers and sundry persons, to muster their Majesties people and subjects of this their realm of England, and to levy a number of them for the service of their Majesties, and of this realm in their warres, such as were most able and likeliest to serve well in the same: which service hath been greatly hindered, as well for that a great number hath absented them from the said musters, which ought to have come to the same, as also for that many of the most able and likely men for that service hath been through frendshipe or reward, released, forborn, and discharged of the said service, and some other not being able or meet, taken, appointed, and chosen thereunto, and yet the same disability and unaptnesse notwithstanding, the same unable and unmeet persons upon sums of money, or other kind of rewards or exactions by them paid to some such as had the order of the said musters, have been also released and discharged of the said service, to the great improverishment of the subjects, and chiefly to the great peril and danger of this noble realm, in the hindrance of the true and necessary service thereof; for remedy whereof be it enacted by the King and queen our sovereign Lord and Lady, with the assent of the Lords spiritual and temporal and the Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that if any person or persons that shall be commanded at any time hereafter, generally, or specially, to muster afore any such as shall have authority or commandement for the same by or from the Kings and queens Majesties, or by the heires or successors of the queens Majesty, or by any Lieutenant Warden, or other person or persons authorized for the same, do willingly absent him or themselves from the same musters, having no true and reasonable excuse of sickness, or other lawful impediment: or at their appearance at such musters do not bring with them such their best furniture, or array, and armor, as he or they shall then have for his or their own person in a readiness, shall for every such default and offence have and suffer imprisonment by the space of ten dayes without bail or mainprize, by the commandement of such as shall have authority is is aforesaid to take the same musters, unless he or they so offending as is afore said, do agree to or with the said Commissioners, or two of them, to pay to the use of the King and queen our sovereign Lord and Lady, or of the heires and successors of the same our sovereign Lady, for every such offence, forty shillings for a fine: which said fine after agreement for the payment of the same as is afore said, shall be certified and estreated into the court of the exchequer at Westminster, by such as shall have power to take the said musters as is aforesaid, or by two of them under their seals or the seals of two of them within the space of two monthes next after such agreement, to pay the said fine had or made; and the same fine so estreated, to be levied in such form as fines assessed by the justices of assize or of gaole delivery in their circuits are used to be levied. I will omit the statutes made in the 11. 
cook lib. 7. 7. B.  H. 7. cap. 1. and the 2. E. 6. cap. 2. by which it appeareth that the subjects of England are bound to go with the King in his wars as well within the realm as without: I will also omit the act not printed made in the fifth year of Henry the fourth concerning the commission of array, as also divers other acts and statutes made to that effect and purpose, because so much hath been said about that subject already by his Majesty, in his anwer to the declaraiion of both houses of Parliament concerning the commission of array.  
Secondly the legislative power is an other right of sovereignty, whereby Kings and supreme Magistrates are enabled by just and necessary laws to provide for the peace and safety of their people, and this is wholely and entirely in the King, although he be limited in the exercise of his power so as he can not make laws without the assent of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament. And this is that which the pretended houses have stood so much upon: because the Kings of England desiring to rule their people by lenity, have out of princely clemency condescended so far as not to impose upon them( which they anciently did as I shall show hereafter) any new law, or alter and repeal the old, without their own consent, they from the premises would make the people believe that their authority is equal to the Kings, and that themselves as their deputies are coordinate with him: and not content with the share which they unjustly challenged at first, they afterwards laid claim to all, excluding the King as altogether useless in Parliaments, and denying him his negative voice, usurping and taking upon themselves the whole power of making laws, whereas they can have no other interest or authority but what they derive from him, that is a power of assenting or dissenting what shall be made a law, but for the power and authority of the law which obligeth the subjects to obedience, that the law hath from the King alone: the Statutes declare this in express terms, for their ordinary style is. 
5. K. 2. cap. 4.  The King doth will and command, and it is assented in the Parliament by the Prelates, Lords, and Commons. 
7. H. 4. cap. 15.  Our sovereign Lord the King by the assent of the lords spiritual and temporal and the Commons in this present Parliament, hath ordained. And that the meaning and true intention of these expressions is such as I have said will appear by the resolution of the Iudges, of which I shall speak hereafter: 
22. E. 3.  Now that the King hath a negative voice in making laws and that nothing can or ought to be esteemed an Act of Parliament without him, is evident by divers Statutes. In the first year of King James a Statute was made wherein the two houses petitioning the King, that the recognition of their duty and obedience, as also of his Majesties right unto the crown of England, might be published in high court of Parliament, to remain as a memorial to all posterity, conclude after these manner, which if your Majesty shall be pleased( as an argument of your gracious acceptation) to adorn with your Majesties royal assent, without which it can neither be complete and perfect, nor remain to all posterity according to our humble desire, as a memorial of your Princely and tender affection towards us, we shall add this also to the rest of your Majesties unspeakable and inestimable benefits. But in the fifteen year of Edward the third a Statute was made on special purpose to make void an Act where unto the King had promised to set to his seal, and seemed to assent,( which by some for that reason was esteemed a Statute) because he had not actually assented and set to his seal. Edward by the grace of God, &c. to the sheriff of Lincoln greeting, whereas at our Parliament summoned at Westminster in the 15. of Easter last past, certain articles expressly contrary to the laws and customs of our realm of England, and to our prerogatives, and rights royal were pretended to be granted by us by the manner of a Statute, we considering how that by the bonde of our oath we be tied to the observance and defence of such laws, customs, rights, and prerogatives, and providently willing to revoke such things to their own state which be so improvidently done, upon conference and treatise thereupon had with the earls, Barons, and other wise men of our said realm, and because we never consented to the making of the Statute, but as then it behoved us we dissimuled in the premises, by protestations of revocation of the said statute if indeed it should proceed, to eschew the dangers which by the denying of the same, we feared to come, forasmuch as the said Parliament otherwise had been without dispaching any thing in discord dissolved, and so our earnest business had likely been ruinated, which God prohibit. and the said pretensed statute we promised then to be sealed. It seemed to the said earls, Barons, and other wise men that sithence the statute did not of our free will proceed, the same be void and ought not to have the name nor strength of a statute; and therfore by there counsel and assent we have decreed the said statute to be void, and the same in as much as it procedeed of deed, we have agreed to be adnulled; willing nevertheless that the articles contained in the said pretensed statute, which by other of our statutes or of our progenitors Kings of England have been approved, shall according to the form of the said statute in every point, as convenient is, be observed: and the same we do onely to the conservation and reintegration of the rights of our crown, as we be bound, and not that we should in any wise grieve or oppress our subjects, whom we desire to rule by lenity and gentlnesse. And therefore we do command thee that all these things thou cause to be openly proclaimed in such places within thy bailiwick where thou shalt see expedient, witness myself at Westminster the first day of october the fifteenth year of our reign.  
Thirdly, allegiance or ligeance( I speak not of feudal but natural ligeance) is another right of sovereignty due only to supreme Rulers and Governours; A coordinate magistrate who hath but a parcel and share of authority, can not alone challenge all obedience from the people, for all that are coordinate and have their shares in the rights of sovereignty jointly taken together make up but on supreme head to whom only allegiance or ligeance is due, for as the ligatures or strings do knit together the joyntes of all the partes of the body, 
cook in Calvins case lib. 7.  so doth ligeance join together the sovereign and all the subjects, quasi uno ligamine. Now that allegiance or ligiance is due to the King and onely to the King will appear by several Acts of Parliament. In the first year of King james, the Lords and Commons declared, 
●. jac. cap. 2.  that both the ancient and famous realms of England and Scotland were united in allegiance and loyal subjection in his royal person, to his Majesty and his posterity for ever; In 34. H. 8. cap. 1 and 35. H. 8. cap. 3. &c. the King is called the liege Lord of his subjects: and in the Acts of Parliament of 13. R. 2. cap. 5. and 11. R. 2. cap. 1. 14. H. 8. cap. 2. &c. subjects are called the Kings liege people. By other Acts of Parliament divers oaths have been framed and given to the people, the contents and effects whereof were, that they should bear all faith and allegiance to the King and his heires: In the six and twenty year of Henry the eight an oath was taken by all the Kings subjects for the surety of the succession of the crown of England, the oath was this; Ye shall swear to bear faith, truth, 
26. H 8. cap 2.  and obedience all onely to the Kings Majesty and to the heires of his body of his most dear and entirely beloved lawful wife queen Anne begotten and to be begotten. and further to the heires of our said sovereign Lord according to the limitation in the statute made for surety of his succession in the crown of this realm mentioned and contained, and not to any other within this realm, nor foreign Authority, or Potentate, and in case any oath be made, or hath been made by you to any person, or persons, that then ye repute the same as vain, and adnihilate, and that to your cunning, wit, and utmost of your power, without guile, fraud or other undue mean, ye shall observe, keep, maintain, and defend, the said act of succession and all the whole effects and contents thereof, and all other acts and statutes made in confirmation, or for execution of the same, or for any thing therein contained. And this ye shall do against all manner of persons, of what estate, dignity, degree, or condition soever they be. And in no wise do or attempt, nor to your power suffer to be done or attempted, directly, or indirectly, any thing or things, privately or appertly to the let, hindrance, damage, or derogation thereof, or of any parte of the same, by any manner of means or for any manner of pretence; so help you God, and all saints, and the holy Evangelists. There are two things observable in this oath, first, that they swear inclusivè to bear all faith, truth and obedience, to the Kings Majesty and his heires, and onely to them; Secondly that they swear exclusivè to bear faith, truth, and obedience, to no other either within the realm or without, not to other persons, nor to other authority, by both which clauses of the oath it appears, that the King, and none but the King, can challenge faith and allegiance from the people. 
28. H. 8. cap. 7.  Afterwards in the eight and twenty year of King Henry the eight the like oath was enjoined to be taken by all his subjects touching his succession by Queen jane, for the former Act touching his succession by queen Anne was repealed, but the oath enjoined was otherwise the same; And in the five and thirty year of his reign an other oath was framed, wherein, besides the contents of the former touching allegiance due to the King and his heires, some other additions were inserted touching his supremacy in ecclesiastical causes: because the former oaths were not thought full enough to that effect and purpose; And these oaths were extraordinary and imposed by special appointment: But besyds these there is an other ordinary oath of Allegiance which was first instituted by King Arthur, 
l. 35.  and is mentioned amongst the laws of King Edward, and confirmed by the laws of William the conqueror; 
l 59.  this oath continueth still in force and should by the law be given in every Leete. The order and form of it appeareth in briton who wrotte in the reign of Edward the first, and compiled a book of the Statutes and laws which were then in use; the effect of it is this: 
cook lib. 7. in Calvins case.  You shall swear, that from this day forward you shall be true and faithful to our sovereign Lord the King and his heires, and truth and faith shall bear of life and member and terrene honour, and you shall neither know nor hear of any ill or damage intended unto him, that you shall not defend so help you almighty God. By this it is clear enough that allegiance is due to the King: the two houses on the other side are so far from having authority to exact allegiance from the people that they are bound themselves by law to take the oath of Allegiance before they be admitted to sit in the house; and having every one singly taken the said oath at his first admittance into the house, how they should collectively taken by sitting together be absolved, none but the pretended Parliamentarians themselves can understand, whose common practise hath been to play with oaths as children play with toys and trifles, seeming rather to make them their pastime, then to esteem them religious acts, or sacred obligations.  
Fourthly to pardon the transgression of the laws to remit treason, murder, felony, manslaughter; to appoint subordinate Iudges; to make leagues with foreign Princes and States, all these are rights of sovereignty; and all these are declared and determined by the Statutes of the land to belong to the Kings Majesty. First the power of pardoning the transgressions of the law and of remitting treason, murder, felony, manslaughter, and such like offences is declared and determined to be in the Kings Majesty by a Statute made in the twenty seventh year of Henry the eight. Where divers of the most ancient prerogatives and authorities of Iustice appertaining to the imperial crown of this realm have been severed and taken from the same by sundry gifts of the Kings most noble progenitors, 
27. H. 8. cap. 24.  Kings of this realm, to the great diminution and detriment of the royal estate of the same, and to the hindrance and great delay of justice, for reformation whereof be it enacted by authority of this present Parliament, that no person or persons of what estate or degree soever they be of, from the first day of july which shall be in the year of our Lord God 1536. shall have any power or authority to pardon, or remit any treasons, murders, manslaughters, or felonies, or any utlaries for any such offences aforesaid, committed, perpetrated, done, or divulged, or hereafter be committed, done or divulged by or against any person or persons in any parte of this realm, Wales, or the marches of the same; but that the Kings highnesse his heires and successors Kings of this realm shall have the whole and sole power and authority thereof united and kint to the imperial crown of this realm, as of good right and equity it appertaineth any grants, usages, prescription, act, or acts of Parliament, or any other thing to the contrary hereof notwithstanding. Secondly the power of appointing subordinate judges is declared and determined to be in the King by the same statute. And be it also enacted by authority aforesaid that no person or persons of what estate degree or condition soever they be, from the said first day of july shall have any power or authority to make any justices of Eire justices of assize, Iustices of peace or justices of goal delivery: but that all such officers and ministers shall be made by letters patents under the Kings great seal, in the name and by authority of the Kings highnesse and his heires Kings of these realm, in all shires, counties, counties Palatine, and other places of these realm, Wales, and the marches of the same, or in any other his dominions, at their pleasure and wills in such manner and form as justices of eire, justices of assize, justices of peace and justices of goal delivery be commonly made in every shire of these realm, any grants, usages, prescription, allowance, act or acts of Parliament, or any other thing or things, to the contrary thereof notwithstanding. Thirdly the power of making leagues with foreign Princes and States is declared to be in the King by a Statute mad in the fourteenth year of Edward the fourth which begin thus. 
14. E. 4. cap. 4.  whereas divers and great offences and attempts have now of late been done and committed against the amities and leagues made betwixt our said sovereign Lord the King and strainge Princes. By this beginning of the Statute it is manifest that the power of making leagues and contracting alliance with foreign estates is a right belonging onely to the crown. I could yet add divers other acts of Parliament to confirm this and all the other particulars above name, but I suppose these which are already alleged, are more then sufficient, there are also other rights of sovereignty which I could show by the statutes to be in the King, but because there is no contestation about them I will not fight with a shadow; those above mentioned are the chiefest and inseparable from Majesty.   

CHAP. IV.  
The Kings supremacy in general shewed by the Common law.  
HAving shewed the Kings supremacy from the Statutes, I come now to the Common law, which is the ground and foundation of it; for Statutes are but declarations of the royal power, the power itself with the several modifications and qualifications of it is more ancient then any statute, and can not be limited or restrained by an act of Parliament in any thing that tends to the derogation or diminution of Majesty: for the English Monarchy by the Common law is an absolute Monarchy susceptible of no alteration in the rights and pre-eminences of Majesty.  
First I say the English Monarchy is an absolute Monarchy by the Common law admitting no mixture in the rights of sovereignty, the King alone being the onely supreme head and governor having none superior to him or coordinate with him either singly or collectively taken. this is expressly determined in Sir Edward cokes reports who hath been cried up by the pretended Parliamentarians for the oracle of the law, as being no ways guilty of too much affection to prerogative: the words of the report are these. If that act of the first year of the late queen, had never been made it was resolved by all the judges that the King or queen of England for the time being may make such an ecclesiastical commission as is before mentioned by the ancient prerogative and law of England. 
cook. lib. 5. in Caudreys case.  And therefore by the ancient laws of this realm this kingdom of England is an absolute empire and Monarchy consisting of one head which is the King and of a body politic compact and compounded of many and almost infinite several and yet well agreeing members; all which the law divideth into two general partes, that is to say the clergy, and the levy, both of them next and immediately under God subject and obedient to the head; also the Kingely head of these politic body is instituted and furnished with plenary and entire power, prerogative, and jurisdiction to render justice and right to every part and member of these body of what estate degree, or calling soever, in all causes ecclesiastical or temporal otherwise he should not be a head of the whole body. This is further proved by Sir Edward cook by divers presidents and, Acts of Parliament, who concludeth his report after this manner. 
Fol. 40. 6.  Thus hath it appeared as well by the ancient common laws of this realm, by the resolutions and judgements of the judges, and sages of the laws of England in all succession of ages, as by authority of many acts of Parliament ancient and of later times, that the kingdom of England is an absolute Monarchy, and that the King is the onely supreme governor as well-over ecclesiastical persons and in ecclesiastical causes as temporal within this realm; to the due observation of which laws both the King and the subject are sworn. Bracton saith as much in effect, although he calleth not the English Monarchy an absolute Monarchy in express terms. Sicut Dominus Papa in Spiritualibus supper omnibus habeat ordinariam jurisdictionem, ita habet Rex in Regno suo ordinariam in Temporalibus,& pares non habet neque superiores. As the Pope hath ordinary jurisdiction over all in spiritual causes, so hath the King in his kingdom in temporal, 
Lib. 5. cap. 15.  and he hath none coordinate with him, or superior to him. Bracton speaketh not here of particular men, but of the people collectively taken; he saith the King is over all, and he compareth his temporal jurisdiction with the spiritual jurisdiction of the Pope, which in his time was acknowledged in England to extend ad universos, as well as ad singulos, as it is now in all other places where it is acknowledged.  
In the second year of King james in hilary term letters being directed to the judges to have their resolution concerning the validity of a grant made by queen Elizabeth under the great seal, of the benefit of a penal Statute; in which grant power was given to the Lord Chancellor or keeper of the great seal, to make dispensations when and to whom he pleased, after great deliberation it was resolved, that when a Statute is made by act of Parliament for the public good, the King could not give the power of dispensation to any subject, or grant the forfeitures upon penal laws to any before the same be recovered and vested in his Majesty by due and lawful proceedings: and the reason their alleged is because the King as head of the commonwealth, and the fountain of justice and mercy, ought to have these rights of sovereignty annexed onely to his royal person. Car quant un statute est fait pro bono publico& le Roy( come le teste deal bien public& le fountain de justice& mercy) est par tout le realm trust ove ceo cest confidence& trust est cy inseparablement adjoin& annex al royal person deal Roy in cy haut point de sovereignty, 
cook lib. 7. Tit. penal. Statutes.  queen il ne poit transfer ceo al disposition on poiar d'ascune private person ou al ascune private use. For when a statute is made for the public good and the King( as head of the commonwealth and the fountain of justice and mercy) is by all the realm trusted with it, that confidence and trust is so inseparably annexed to the royal person of the King in so high a point of sovereignty that he can not transfer it to the disposition or power of a private person or to any private use. I shal not need to explain and amplify the matter by arguments and inferences drawn from these reports for the words are clear of themselves, and do expressly declare and resolve the Monarchy of England to be an absolute Monarchy, the King alone to be the only supreme head and governor of the whole body, that is of all the people, as well collectively as severally taken.  
And hence it is,( namely in regard of the Kings supremacy he being the onely head of the kingdom, having no equal or superior but God alone, whose Vicegerent he is upon earth) that the common law doth by way of fiction and similitude attribute unto him the Divine perfections. Finch lib. 2. deal lay. cap. 1. 
1. H. 7. 10.  Roy est le test deal bien public, immediate desouth Dieu, desuis touts persons& en touts causes: Et pure ce●entant queen il resemble le person deal Dieu,& port son image enter homes le lay attribute a lui en un similitudinarie manner, l'ombre deal excellencies queen sont en Dieu, cest ascavoir sovereignty, tout terre est tenu de luy: 
7. E. 4. 17. 21. H. 7. 2.  nul action gist vers luy car quis commmandra le Roy? 
cook 7. fol. 7. B. 43. El. cook 5. fol. 114. B.  POYAR, il poit commander ses subjects daler horse de realm en guerr: poet faire ascune foreign coin currant icy per ses Proclamations. majesty, 
4. E. 6. 31. 5. E. 4. 7.  ne poet prend ne departer ove ascune choose forsque per matter de record si non soit chattel ou tiel quia de minimis non curat lex. 
2. H. 4. 7. 1. H. 7. 19.  infiniteness en un manner, esteant present en touts ses courts, si come home poet dire en chescun lieu. PERPETVITY ayant perpetual succession, 
35. H. 6. 26.  & ne unque mor̄. PERFECTION, car nul laches, folly, infancy, 
10. El. 331.  ou corruption deal sank est judge en lui. VERITY, 
35. H. 6. 61. 4. El. 246.  ne serra unque estoppe. justice, ne poet esse disseisor, ne fairre ascun tort. The King is head of the commonwealth immediately under God, over all persons, and in all causes; and therefore because he represents the person of God, and bears his image, the law attributeth unto him in a similitudinary manner a show of Divine excellencies; namely sovereignty, all lands are holden of him, no action lieth against him for who shall command the King? POWER he may command his subjects to go out of the realm to war. he may make any foreign coin currant here by his Proclamations: majesty, he can neither take not parte with any thing without matter of record, except it be chattel or such like, because the law regard not such small matters. infiniteness after a Manner, being present in all his courts, and as it were in all places. perpetuity, having perpetual succession and being not subject to dy; PERFECTION, for no laches, folly, infancy, or corruption of blood can be judged in him; TRUTH, he can not be estopped. IUSTICE, he can not be a disseisor, or do any wrong. These divine excellences which the lawe supposeth to be in the King are not by law also supposed to be in the two houses, because they represent not the person of God, but the persons of the people, whose deputies and Lieutenants they are, and not the deputies and Lieutenants of God.  
There are also divers prerogatives and privileges by the common lawe belonging to the King, and divers acts which the King may do, or not do, by reason of his Supemacy: The King shall not in his writ give any man the style or Title of Dominus because it is unbeseeming his Majesty to use that term to any, he being himself omnium subditorum supremus Dominus, the supreme and sovereign Lord of all his subjects: and in this case although there be variance between the writ and obligation, or other specialty, 
8. E. 6. 23. B.  yet the writ shall not abate, which it shall in other cases, 
11. E 4 2 8. E. 4. 2.  as if they vary in the name, or surname, or if they vary in the sum.  
The King can hold land of no man, because he can have no superior, 
As. pl. 1. 18 Elizab. 498.  but on the other side all lands either immediately or mediately are holden of him as sovereign Lord: for although a man hath a perpetual right in his estate, yet he hath it in the nature of a fee; and whether it cometh to him by descent, or purchase, he oweth a rent or duty for it: and therefore when in pleading a man would signify himself to have the greatest right in his estate, 
Littleton fol 3.  he saith, queen il est ou fuit seize de ceo en son demesne come de fee, that he is or was seized thereof in his drawn as of fee; and if a man holds his estate immediately of the King, as of his crown or Person, this tenor is called a tenor in capite, because he holds it of the supreme head of the commonwealth.  
If a man holdeth land both of the King and other inferior lords whereby his heir becometh a ward, the King alone shall have the custody both of the heir and land, the reason which is rendered in lawe is because the King can have none coordinate with him, or superior to him. Glanvil. lib. 7. cap. 10. Si quis in Capite de Domino Rege tenere debet, tunc ejus custodia ad Dominum Regem plene pertinet: sieve alios Dominos habere debeat ipse haeres, sieve non, quia Dominus Rex nullum habere potest parem, multo minus superiorem. If any man holdeth land of our Lord the King in capite, then his wardshipe shall wholly belong to our Lord the King, whether he hath other lords or not, because the King can have no equal, much less a superior. Bracton. lib. 2. cap. 37. Si aliquis haeres terram aliquam tenuerit de Domino Rege in Capite, sieve alios Dominos habuerit, sieve non, Dominus Rex aliis praefertur in custodia haeredis,& sieve ipse haeres ab aliis prius fuerit feofatus, sieve posterius, cum Rex parem non habeat nec superiorem in regno suo; If an heir holdeth land of our Lord the King whether he hath other lords or not our Lord the King shall have the wardshipe of the heir, whether the heir were first or last infeofed by others, because the King hath no equal, or superior in his kingdom: The lawe is the same as well for whole Societies, Incorporations, and collective bodies, as for Particular men; if a man should make the two houses his heir leaving them lands holden of them by knights service, if the same persons held also of the King in capite by knights service, the King alone should have the wardshipe and custody of the heir and land, though first infeofed by the others; and if the reason in law of this prelation be, because the King hath neither equal nor superior, as is alleged by Bracton, and Glanvil, it followeth then, that the two houses collectively taken are neither superior nor yet coordinate with the King.  
By the common lawe there lieth no action or writ against the King, 
21. H. 7 2.  but in case he seizeth his subjects lands, or taketh away their goods, 
Stanford in his exposition of the Kings Prerogative cap 22.  having no title by order of law, petition is all the remedy the subject hath, and his petition is called a petition of right: The reason which is given in lawe for this is because the King is supreme and accountable to none but God. Bracton lib. 1. cap. 8. Non debet esse mayor eo,( I. e. Rege) in regno suo in exibitione juris, minimus autem esse debet vel quasi in judicio suscipiendo si petat; Si autem ab eo petatur( cum breve non currat contra ipsum) locus erit supplicationi quod factum suum corrigat& emendet, quod quidem si non secerit, satis sufficit ei ad poenam quod Dominum expectet ultorem. Nemo quidem de factis suis praesumat disputare, multo fortius contra factum suum venire. There ought not to be in his kingdom a greater then he ( that is, then the King) in the exhibition of lawe, but he ought to be the least, or as it were the least in receiving judgement if he desire it. But if it be desired of him( because no write lieth against him) there shall be place for petition that he would correct and amend his deed, which if he refuse to do, it is sufficient for his punishment that he may expect God a revenger, for no man must presume to dispute of his fact, much less oppose and resist it. And again lib. 4. cap. 10. Item inter caetera videndum est quis sit ille qui deijcit, Princeps s. ex potentia, vel aliquis pro eo, vel nomine suo, vel judex qui male judicaverit, vel privata persona. Si autem Princeps, vel Rex, vel alius qui superiorem non habuerit nisi Dominum, contra ipsum non habebitur remedium per assisam, immo tantum locus crit supplicationi, ut factum suum corrigat& emendet, quod si non fecerit, sufficiet ei pro poena quod Dominum expectet ultorem. It is also to be considered who it is that disseiseth, whether the King by his power, or some other in his name, or a judge who judgeth unjustly, or a private person. If it be the King, or any other, who hath no superior but God, there shall be no remedy had against him by assize, onely there shall be place for petition, that he would correct and amend his deed, which if he refuseth to do, it is sufficient for his punishment, that he may expect God a revenger. This is all the help which a subject hath against the King, because he is supreme, and bound to give an account of his actions to none but God, and this is the course which the two houses of Parliament are to take by law in case the King infringeth or is supposed to infringe the rights and liberties of the people, as will appear by divers petitions of right exhibited in former Parliaments.  
Secondly I say, the English monarchy by the common lawe is susceptible of no alteration in the rights and pre-eminences of Majesty; I mean by any Act of Parliament, or by any agreement of King and people: what a conqueror in a just war, or what the people may do in case the blood royal, which God prohibit, should be extinct, is not now disputable: but so long as there remains a King, or heir apparent to the crown, the rights and pre-eminences of Majesty can by no act, agreement, stipulation, or covenant made between King and people be severed and taken from the crown; should the King unwarily by act of Parliament consent to any thing prejudicial and derogatory to his royal prerogative, such acts are void by the common law, and the Iudges( being bound by oath to assent to nothing that may turn to the Kings hindrance or damage) are bound to declare them so, 
23. H. 6. cap. 8.  and have done it de facto upon several occasions. By a Statute made the twenty third year of Henry the sixth it is ordained that no man shall continue sheriff of a Shire above one year, and that all patents from the King of that office, for term of yeares, of life, in fee simplo, or in fee tail should be void any clause or word of non obstante in any wise put or to be put into such patents to be made notwithstanding; now this Statute so far as it striks at the Kings prerogative is by the Iudges of the land declared to be void, 
2. H. 7. cook lib. 7. fol. 14.  contrary to the express puruiew of that act, and all Kings since might with a clause of non obstante against the manifest sense and words of that Statute have granted that office for life in tail, or in fee. Finch. lib. 2. fol. 22. Roy poet licencer chooses prohibit per statute, 
11 H 7. ●1. B.  come a coiner argent queen est sait felony per un statute,& devant ceo fuit loyal a saire, car ceo est forsque malum prohibitum: mes malum in se, come a levier un nuisance en le haul chemine, Roy ne poet licence home a faire; mes apres queen est fait il poet ceo perdoner. Mes si lestatute did, queen son licence serra void, la le licence aver' un clause de non obstante, cest assavoir, di●● non obstante ascune statute al contrary, ou auterment nest bone: come le Statute 33. H. 6. cap. 18. est, queen grant deal Roy deste viscount deal ascun county pluis longement quam per un an serra void; nient obstant queen son patent aver un clause de non obstante: uncore ove un cause de non obstante, tiel patent, serra bone. The King may licence things prohibited by Statute, as to coin silver, which is made felony by Statute, but was lawful before, for that is evil onely because it is forbidden, but that which is evil in itself, as to levy a nusans in the high way, the King can not licence a man to do that, but he may pardon it after it be done. But if the Statute say, his licence shall be void, there the licence shall have a clause of non obstante, viz. it shall say any Statute to the contrary notwithstanding. or otherwise it is not good: As the Statute 23. H. 6. cap. 18. is, that the grant of the King to be sheriff of a Shire longer then a year, shall be void, notwithstanding his patent shall have a clause of non obstante, and yet with a clause of non obstante such a patent shall be good. So likewise the King hath a power to dispense with penal Statutes, and if such dispensations should be prohibited or made void by act of Parliament, yet with a clause of non obstante, 
cook lib. 7. 37.  they shall be good, although it should be provided in express terms that such dispensations notwithstanding the said clause should be of none effect. By divers Statutes it hath been enacted, 
2. E. 3. cap 2. 4 E. 3. cap. 13 14. E. 3. cap. 14.  that no charter of pardon of the death of a man nor of other felony should be granted; yet all these Statutes are by the common law made void, 
Stanford lib. 2. 101.  because they cut off parte of the Kings prerogative: for it is against reason, that the fountain of mercy should by an act of Parliament be dried up, although Kings ought to make use of their prerogative but sparing in that particular, when they meet with a fit object of mercy, and not in cases where the law of God command execution of justice, or in ordinary cases, whereby offenders may be encouraged. 
20. H. 7. 8.  So likewise to grant letters patents of Denization is esteemed by the common law inter jura Majestatis& insignia summae potestatis, 
cook in Calvins case.  and is so inseparably and individually annexed to the royal person of the King as it can not be divided from it. That which I have hitherto said of the rights and pre-eminences of Majesty, is to be understood of those rights and pre-eminences that are so essential to it, as they can not be separated without the diminution or destruction of Majesty. As the power of the militia, the power of making laws, the power of appointing Iudges, and such like acts of jurisdiction, as also the power of dispensing with penal Statutes, the power of pardoning the transgressions of the law, the power of prosecuting the law, and such like supreme acts of justice and mercy: some of which rights and pre-eminences can not be taken away without giving a wound, others not without bringing death, and dissolution to Majesty: yet there are other rights and pre-eminences that are called privileges, which are not so essential to Majesty, but that thy may by special grace of the King be separated. Bracton. lib. 2. cap. 24. Ea vero quae jurisdictionis sunt& pacis& ea quae sunt justitiae& paci annexa ad nullam pertinent nisi ad Coronam& dignitatem Regiam, nec à Corona seperari poterunt cum faciant ipsam Coronam. Ea vero quae dicuntur Privilegia, licet pertineant ad Coronam, tamen à Corona separari possunt& ad privatas personas transferri, said de gratia ipsius Regis speciali. Those things which belong to jurisdiction and peace, and those which are annexed to justice and peace pertain to none but the crown, neither can they be separated from it because they make the crown: But those which are called privileges, although they pertain to the crown, yet they may be separated from it and transferred to private persons, but not without the special favour of the King. It may seem strainge that the King and the Lords spiritual and temporal, and the house of Commons, which are virtually the whole kingdom, should not have power to make what laws they please, and to bind themselves and the whole kingdom by them in things not repugnant to the law of God; yet if we consider the ground of this restraint, we shall find it reasonable: for they which lay the first foundation of a commonwealth, have authority to make laws that can not be altered by posterity in matters that concern the rights both of King and people: for foundations can not be removed without the ruin and subversion of the whole building: As for example, the division of things which is made at the first foundation of a commonwealth( whether the people took the country they divide from the inhabitants by conquest in a just war, or whether they did first actually possess it themselves as being before empty and vacant) can not be altered by posterity, and a new division made without manifest injustice. The laws which they then make for the preservation of their right and propriety in the said division, can not be disannulled by succeeding Parliaments, nor can any particular man be deprived of his inheritance, which descend unto him by virtue of that division, or of any parte or parcel, or appurtenances thereof, by any contrary law which shall be made by them; I speak not what Parliaments may do by force, but what they may justly do; for they have not such an arbitrary power, but that they are always in a moral subjection to the rules of justice and natural equity. And in this case the kings condition ought not to be worse then the peoples, but his share and rights in the said division are as firmly and unchangeably to be preserved, as the share and rights of particular men: And both the King and people are obliged to this, not onely by the rules of justice, and natural equity, but by oath, and by the municipal laws of the land, to which they are both sworn. That the King is bound to this, appears by the laws of King Edward. 
l. 17.  Debet vero de jure Rex omnes terras,& honores, omnes dignitates,& jura,& libertates coronae regni hujus in integrum cum omni integritate& sine diminutione observare& defendere; dispersa& dilapidata& amissa regni jura in pristinum statum& debitum viribus omnibus revocare. The King ought by right to maintain and defend all the lands, honours, dignities, rights and liberties of the crown, entirely without diminution; and by all means to recall again those rights which are lost and separated from the crown. That the people are bound to this, appears likewise by the laws of King Edward, 
l. 35.  and of William the conqueror, who did a little enlarge the laws of King Edward in this parcular. 
l. 59.  Statuimus etiam& firmiter praecipimus ut omnes liberi homines totius regni nostri praedicti sint fratres conjurati ad Monarchiam& ad Regnum nostrum pro viribus suis& facultatibus contra inimicos pro posse suo defendendum,& viriliter servandum,& pacem& dignitatem coronae nostrae integram observandam,& ad judicium rectum& justitiam constanter omnibus modis pro posse suo sine dolo& sine dilatione faciendam. Hoc decretum sancitum est in civitate London, we will and commande that all free men of our kingdom be sworne brothers to defend and keep our Monarchy and kingdom according to their power against the enemies of the same, and to maintain the peace and dignity of our crown entire, and to exercise right judgement, and justice according to their power without deceit and delay. This decree was enacted in the city of London. By the civill law also the rights of sovereignty can not be separated from the Prince, and the reason alleged is, because they are essential to Majesty. Suprema jurisdictio et potestas regia, etsi Princeps velit, a se separari non possunt, sunt enim ipsa forma et substantialis essentia Majestatis, ergo manente ipso Rege ab eo abdicari non possunt. Cabedo practic. observe. par. 2. decis. 40. n. 8. jo. Andr. in addit. ad specul. Tit. de jurisdict. c. Cum Marthae. de celebrat. Missar. supreme jurisdiction and Kingly power can not be separated from the Prince although he would himself, for they are essential to to Majesty, and can not be abdicated whilst he remaineth King.   

CHAP. V.  
The Kings supremacy in particular shewed by the Common law.  
I Come now to the particular rights of sovereignty, which are all by the Common law wholly in the power of the King. First, 
19 E. 4. 6. cook 7. 25. B.  the militia is his by the Common law, and to him it onely pertaineth, to make war with foreign Princes and Estates; as also to maintain the peace, to suppress rebellions, and to see justice executed at home within his own kingdom: Fleta lib. 1. cap. 17. Habet Rex in manu sua omnia jura quae ad coronam et Laicalem pertinent potestatem, et materialem gladium qui pertinet ad Regni gubernaculum. The King hath all the rights in his hand which belong to the crown, and to temporal jurisdiction, and the power of the sword, which belong to the government of the kingdom. So likewise saith Bracton lib. 1. cap. 8. Sunt et alij potentes sub Rege qui dicuntur Barones, hoc est robur belly, sunt et alij qui dicuntur Vavasores, viri magnae dignitatis, vavasor enim nihil melius dici poterit quam vas sortium ad ad valetudinem. Sunt et sub Rege milites, s. ad militiam exercendam electi. There are other great men under the King, which are called Barons, and other which are called Vavasours, men of great dignity. There are also souldiers under the King chosen to exercise the militia. And in the beginning of his book he saith that it is necessary this power should be in the King. In Rege qui recte regit, necessaria sunt dvo haec, arma videlicet et Leges, quibus utrumque tempus bellorum et pacis recte posset gubernari: utrumque enim istorum alterius indiget auxilio, quo tam res militaris posset esse in tuto, quam ipsae Leges usu armorum et praesidio possint esse servatae. Si autem arma defecerint contra hostes, rebelles, et indomitos, sic erit regnum indefensum: Si autem Leges, sic exterminabitur justitia. In a King that governeth well, two things are necessary, arms and laws, by which he may be enabled to rule both in times of peace and war; and both these need the help of on another, whereby both arms and laws may be preserved. If arms be misrepresenting against enemies, and rebells, the kingdom shall be without defence; if laws be wanting, without justice. This is also evident from the tenors, whereby most of the chief men in the kingdom hold their estates: for all that hold in capite by knights service, are bound for their fee to assist the King in his warres whensoever they shall be summoned by him; whether it be to suppress rebellion, or to resist a foreign invasion. And this hath been the known law of the land ever since the the time of William the Conqueror, in the fourth year of whose reign this right was confirmed unto him by act of Parliament: The words of the Statute are these. Statuimus et firmiter praecipimus, ut omnes Comites, et Barones, et milites, et servientes, et universi liberi homines totius regni nostri praedicti habeant et teneant se semper been in armis, et in equis ut decet et oportet, et quod sint semper prompti et parati ad servitium suum integrum nobis explendum et peragendum, cum semper opus adfuerit, secundum quod nobis debent de feodis, et tenementis suis de jure facere, et sicut illis statuimus per commune consilium totius Regni nostri praedicti, et illis dedimus et concessimus in feodis jure hereditario. We will and command that all earls, Barons, Souldiers, villeins, and all free men of our whole kingdom, be always well provided with horse and arms, as it behoveth them, and that they be always in a readiness to serve us as often as need shall require according as they are bound by their lands and tenements, and as we have appointed them to do by the common council of our whole kingdom, and for that consideration have given and granted them lands in fee for ever.  
Secondly the legislative power belong to the King alone by the Common Law, the two houses have authority granted them by the King to assent or dissent, but the power that makes it a law the authority that animats it and makes it differ from a dead letter, is in the King, who is the life and soul of the law by whose authority alone the laws commande, and forbid, and vindicate, and punish offenders. So saith Bracton lib. 1. cap. 2. Hujusmodi vero Leges Anglicanae, et consuetudines, Regum authoritate jubent quandoque, quandoque vetant, et quandoque vindicant et puniunt transgressores. These laws and customs of England by the kings authority do sometimes command, sometimes forbid, and sometimes chastise and punish transgressors. This was also resolved by divers earls and Barons, and by all the justices in the time of Edward the third: For one Haedlow and his wife having a controversy with the King, and desiring to have it decided in Parliament, a reference being made to divers earls, and Barons, and to all the justices, to consider of the business, it was resolved that the two houses were not coordinate with the King in the Legislativer Power, but that the King alone made laws by the assent of the two houses, that he had none equal or coordinate with him in his realm, and that he could not be judged by the Parliament. 
22. E. 3. 6.  Fuit did queen le Roy fist less leis per assent des peers& de la commune, et non pas less peers, et le commune: Et queen il ne avera nul pere en sa terre demesne, et queen le Roy per eux ne doit estr̄ ajuge. It was resolved that the King make laws by the assent of the lords and Commons, and not the lords and Commons: and that he could have no peer in his own land, and that he could not be judged by them. The Common practise of the lawe confirm this as well as the resolution of the Iudges; for the breach of any Statute whether it be by treason, murder, felony, perjury, or by any other way, is an offence against the kings authority alone, and pleas made against such offences are called the pleas of the crown, because they are done encounter la corone et dignity le Roy, 
Stanford less pleas deal corone. lib. 1. cap. 1.  against the crown and dignity of the King. So that it is not the dignity and authority of the lords and Commons which is violated by contempt of the law, but the dignity and authority of the King. He may dispense also with such laws as forbid a thing which is not malum in se, and pardon the transgression of others, as Treason, felony, and the like; which in reason he ought no more to do, then to dispense with the laws of Germany, or pardon the transgressors thereof, if they were not made by his own authority. again the King calling the Iudges to him, hath a power to interpret the Statutes, and it is an uncontrollable maxim of Law, Ejusdem est leges interpretari cujus est condere: None can interpret the laws, but the same power that make them. I know the two houses have challenged this power, and voted it a high breach of privilege for any to question their authority herein: but we desire they would show us by what law they can work such miracles; for the King taking the Iudges to him, have always had that power by the laws of the land: their exposition upon the Statute of gloucester made in the sixth year of Edward the first is extant amongst the printed Statutes, and followeth immediately after the said Statute, in these words. After by the King and his Iustices, certain expositions were made upon some of the articles above mentioned, that is to wit, to the first article, for entries by disseisin, damages shall run from the time of the Statute published. In the same wise, in writs of entre upon disseisin and in all writs of Mortdauncester. cozenage, Aiel or Besaiel, of intrusion by ones own act by any manner of writ, damages shall run after the writ purchased against them that held by Statute, albeit their ancestors died seized thereof. Touching an Inquest to be made of such as be with in age, the Statute shall run without limitation of time. Touching alienation of lands holden by the lawe of England, the Statute shall run for such lands being aliened after the time of the Statute published. In like manner the Statute shall extend and run upon the lands of a wife aliened by hir husband( whereas no fine was levied thereof in court.) Touching lands being let in fee ferme, to pay therefore yearly the fourth parte of the very value thereof, the Statute shall run as well unto lands that were leased before the making of the Statute, as after, in case that the tenant have withhoulden above the space of two yeares after the Statute published, so much as he should have paid to his leassor yearly according to the form of the Covenant. And as to the punishment of wast in all cases( except it be of dowers and wards) it shall be understanded of wasts done sithence the Statute published. And of the forfeiture of triple in cases of wast of dowers, and wardships, it shall be understanded of wasts committed after the Statute published. And as concerning them which do alien their dowers, it is to be understanded after the publishing of the Statute. Given at gloucester the Sunday next after the feast of Saint Peter ad vincula, the sixth year of the reign of King Edward the first; Here we see to whom the interpretation of the law belongeth, the Iudges by themselves have a power to interpret it judicialiter, they could not otherwise proceed to judgement; but being, called by the King, with him, and under him, they have a power to interpret it authoritativè as hath been the practise, and is the known law of the land. But for the two houses( besides that they can do nothing jointly together, unless the King doth actually concur with them) their structure is such that they are altogether uncapable and unfit to interpret law: For the power that interpret law must be always existent, to act as new occasions shall arise, which require the exercise of that power, which the two houses are not. And yet were they always existent, both houses having a negative voice, upon any disagreement between them, the interpretation of the law must be retarded, and all controversies depending there upon undecided: and this disagreement might perhaps endure for ever, and so a final determination in such suits would be impossible, except they should determine their differences by force, which they have been often necessitated to do, since they have usurped the power of interpreting law, and ordering the affairs of the kingdom. Now these are inconveniences which ought not to be admitted in any commonwealth: for it derogats both from the honour and wisdom of a Nation to be so moulded and framed, that justice can not have a free passage in all contingencies. I will yet add for the further clearing of this point, that not onely the legislative power itself, but the very exercise of the power also, so far as it is essential to government is in the King alone; for he can by edicts and proclamations provide for all necessary occasions, and special emergencies, not provided for by fixed and certain news; which is one of the most excellent and eminent acts of the legislative power, and a sufficient remedy against all mischiefs, in case the two houses should refuse to concur with him in those things which concern the benefit of the kingdom. He may also grant immunities, liberties, and privileges, to any college, hewn, city, or incorporation, and authorize the said communities to make such local statutes as shall oblige every member thereof so far as they contradict not the general Statutes of the Land, which are all acts of the legislative power that he can exercise without the concurrence of the two houses. Now concerning the kings negative voice, it is the known law of the land that the King hath a power of dissenting, and that no act of Parliament can have any authority except either in person or under his seal he signifies his assent. 
12. H. 7. 10. 4. H. 7. 18. 7. H. 14. judge jenkins fol. 18.  This hath been often times resolved by the justices; and if no law or custom could be showed for it, yet it is unreasonable to think that the kings of England should by agreement with the people divest themselves of this authority, and leave the power of making laws wholely to their subjects, whereby they should have enabled them by law to pull the crown from off their heads, and set it where they please.  
Thirdly allegiance or ligeancy is due to the King, and none but the King by the common law, as Sir Edward cook prophesieth at large in Calvins case from the resolution of the judges. By that which hath been said appeareth, saith he, that this ligeance is due onely to the King so as therein the question is not now cvi said quomodo debetur. It is true that the King hath two capacities in him, one a natural body being descended of the blood royal of the realm, and this body is of the creation of almighty God, and is subject to death, infirmity, and such like; The other is a politic body or capacity, so called because it is framed by the policy of man( and in the 21. E. 4. 39. B. is called a mystical body) and in this capacity the King is esteemed to be immortal, invisible, not subject to death, infirmity, infancy, nonage, &c. Vide Pl. come. in le Case de signior Barclay 238. Et in the case deal duchy 213. vide 6. E. 3. 291.& 26. ass. pl. 54. Now seeing the King hath but one person and several capacities, and one politic capacity for the realm of England, and an other for the realm of Scotland, it is necessary to be considered to which capacity legiance is due, and it was resolved that it was due to the natural person of the King, which is ever accompanied with the politic capacity, and the politic capacity as it were appropriated to the natural capacity) and is not due to the politic capacity only, that is to the crown or kingdom distinct from his natural capacity. In the same case a little after it followeth. And where divers books and Acts of Parliament speak of the ligeance of England as the 31. E. 3. Tit. cozenage 5. 42. E. 3. 2. 13. E. 3. Tit. Bre. 677. 25. E. 3. Statut. 2. De natis ultra mere. All these and divers other speaking briefly in a vulgar manner( for loquendum ut vulgus) and not pleading( for sentiendum ut docti) are to be understood of the ligeance due by the people to the King. For no man will affirm that England itself taking it for the continent thereof, doth owe any ligiance or faith, or that any faith or ligeance should be due to it; but it manifestly appeareth, that the ligeance or faith of the subject is proprium quarto modo to the King, omni, soli,& semper.  
Fourtly, the power of making Iudges, and all such State officers, as exercise any jurisdiction, is in the King alone by the Common law, and can not, nor ought not to be separated from him: for it is not reasonable that deligate Iudges should be substituted by any but those whose deligates they are; nor can a King execute justice according to his oath( which next the Glory of God is the chief end of Government) by a naked title onely; His subjects may be vexed by the rapine and exactions of unjust Iudges, they may be wearied by delays, exhausted by insupportable fees, oppressed many several ways, and the King in the mean time must stand still and look on, being too weak to resist, if his hands be bound, and he disabled from punishing their delinquencies, and deputing others into their places. And therefore this power can not be disunited from the crown, but ought to be de jure, as it hath always been de facto, a part of the Kings prerogative. Bracton lib. 3. Tit. de actionibus, cap. 10. Et si ipse Dominus Rex ad singulas causas terminandas non sufficiat, ut levior sit illi labour in plures personas partito onere, eligere debet de regno suo viros sapientes& timentes Deum, in quibus sit veritas eloquiorum,& qui oderunt avaritiam( quae inducit cupiditatem)& ex illis constituere Iusticiarios, Vicecomites,& alios Ballivos,& Ministros suos, quibus referantur tam quaestiones supper dubijs, quam querimoniae supper injurijs. And if our Lord the King be not sufficient to determine all controversies himself, he ought to selecte wise men, fearing God, and hating covetousness, and out of them constitute Iustices, Sherifts, bailiffs, and other officers, to whom controversies and complaints may be referred. The practise of the law hath always been the same since Bractons time, and all Iudges and chief officers appointed by writ, patent, or commission from the King. Hence it is that all patents and commissions of Iudges, and other such officers, determineth by the common law at the Kings death. cook Tit. discontinuance de process, &c. part. 7. 30. Al common lay per demise le Roy le plea fuit discontinue,& le process queen fuit agard,& nient return devant le mort, le Roy fuit perde: Car per le breve deal predecessor rien poit easter execute in le temps deal novel Roy, si non queen il soit in especial cases; car le mort le Roy, non solemnt less justices de lū Bank& de launt,& Barons deal exchequer, mes less viconts auxi,& eschetors,& touts commissions de Oyer & Terminer, goal delivery,& justices de peace, sont determine per le mort le predecessor queen eux fist. By the Common law all pleas were discontinued by the death of the King, and process awarded and not returned before his death was lost: for by the writ of the predecessor nothing can be executed in the time of the new King, except it be in some special causes; for by the death of the King not onely the justices of both the benches, and the Barons of the exchequer, but Sheriffs also, and Escheatours, and all commissions of Oyer and Terminer, goal delivery, and Iustices of peace, are determined by the death of the predecessor that made them.  
Fiftly, the power of making leagues and contracting alliance, as also of making war, with foreign States is in the King alone. cook lib. 7. 25. Leagues between our sovereign and others are the onely means to make aliens friends,& foedera percutere to make leagues; onely and wholly pertaineth to the King: warres do make aliens enemies, and bellum indicere belongeth onely and wholly to the King, and not to the subject, as appeareth in 19. E. 4. fol. 6. 6. 
19. E. 4. 46. 22. E 4 Fitz. jurisdiction last placite. judge lenkins fol. 17.  It hath been resolved by the Iudges, that if all the people of England collectively taken should break the league made with a foreign Prince, without the Kings consent, the league holds, and is not broken. There are yet other rights of Majesty as the power of coinage, the power of granting letters patents of Denization, the power of dispensing with such laws, as are dispensible, and the power of pardoning the transgression of them, with divers others, all which belong to the King by the Common law; but because they are not called in question, I will pass them over and conclude this chapter with the testimony of Bracton. Dominus Rex ordinariam habet jurisdictionem, 
lib. 2. cap. 24  et dignitatem et potestatem, supper omnes qui in regno suo sunt, habet enim omnia jura in manu sua quae ad coronam et laicalem pertinent potestatem. Our Lord the King hath ordinary jurisdiction and dignity, and authority over all that are in the kingdom, for he hath all the rights in his hand which belong to the crown, and to the secular power.   

CHAP. VI.  
The Kings supremacy both in general and particular shewed by reasons depending upon the laws and customs of the Land.  
ALthough I esteem positive laws and customs more demonstrative then deductions and inferences, yet these have also their weight and importance; I will therefore in the last place add such reasons as shall sufficiently confirm the Kings supremacy, although the laws had positively declared, or the Iudges resolved nothing concerning it.  
First, that power which is so under control that it can be amnihilated at the will of an other, must needs be inferior to that power which do so overrule and master it; Now such is the condition of Parliaments, that the King by law can annihilate them at his pleasure; for they depend upon him quoad existentiam for their existence and continuance: If it should be granted that Parliaments are in actu signato by original constitution, yet the precise time of their existence, and continuance, hath always been at the Kings appointment, it being in his power to call them and dissolve them when he please. So that they must needs be subordinate to him and depend upon him for their operation, when they depend upon him for their existence. To this the reverend Divines, answer, that for the convention of Parliaments, the State have authority in some cases to meet together in Parliament without a legal warrant from the King, as if the King be a prisoner in the enemies hands, or distracted; and have done it de facto in the infancy and minority of some kings: and for the dissolution of Parliaments, they say that they have heard wise men affirm, that by lawe a Parliament can not be dissolved whilst there are any petitions of grievances, or such matters of importance depending and unfinished. What needed the reverend Divines to have cited these wise men? Could they not as easily have said themselves that Parliaments could not be dissolved by the kings command, as they said they might be called without it? Perhaps they thought that such notorious falsities would never pass currently amongst the people, if they were not confirmed by the authority of wise men as well as by their own: yet I believe the wise men they speak of were not so wise as Thales Milesius, but whatsoever they were, their magisterial dictates must not pass for law; for both that which these wise men affirm, and that which they affirm themselves, is manifestly opposite to draw and truth. There was never yet since the first foundation of the monarchy a Parliament called without a legal warrant from the King, nor can a Parliament be called without it; for the cases put by them are altogether impertinent, and can not be supposed: the King according to his politic capacity can not be a prisoner, or an infant, or distracted; but in case his condition be such as make him uncapable to guide and manage his charge in person, as in case of infancy, or distraction, the law hath made sufficient provision who shall exercise the regal power in such occurrencies; if he be a prisoner in the enemies hands he may substitute others, or if he be so closely kept as that can non be permitted, in such events also the law is not deficient: but in all these cases nothing can be acted by authority inherent in the people, but by the Kings authority, which can never be in prison, nor is it subject to infancy or distraction; and Parliaments called at such time, by those that have authority by law to exercise the royal power, are called by a legal warrant from the King; and without such a legal warrant they never were nor can be called: If there have been any general Conventions without it, as the reverend Divines( who should have done well to have quoted their authors, and their words) assure us, their acts were never esteemed laws, nor such Conventions, Parliaments. And that the King hath a power by law of dissolving Parliaments when he shall think it fit, hath been always without controversy: The two houses in the last Parliament, though thrifty managers of their privileges, never claimed an arbitrary power of sitting without the Kings assent: 
Modus tenendi Parliamentum 4. pars instit. fol 3. 4.  It is a known maxim of the lawe, Rex est Principium, Caput,& Finis Parliamenti. The King is the Beginning, the Head, and the end of Parliament.  
Secondly, he that last fashioned and reformed the English monarchy obtained the crown by conquest; he had it not by election as a gift and gratuity of the people, but made his passage by the Sword: and conquerors are not wont to allow of such coordinations, or admit so many sharers in the rights of sovereignty as it phantasied. Some answer that conquest is no good title; But I shall speak of this at large in the second question, where I shall show that conquest in a just war undertaken by those that have authority, is a lawful and just title. Others answer that the conquest was not full and entire, but a partial conquest, occasioning a composition and agreement, and so the government is specificated according to that final composition and agreement, which was made. I deny not a composition and agreement, but I say there was none such as is pretended: for the composition and agreement was made after a victory; and it is not probable that the conqueror having been at such expense of blood in gaining the crown and rights of sovereignty, should after his victory give them away again, and agree to such a mixture as is pleaded for. And although it may be justly exacted from them to prove that there was such a composition and agreement, as they speak of made between them; yet I will take the burden of proving upon myself, and show there was not: for all the composition and agreement which was made or reported to be made by any author, was a grant from the conqueror that the kingdom should enjoy the ancient laws and customs, whereby it had been formerly governed, which were called the laws of King Edward: this he performed, being moved by the petitions and instances of the people, in the fourth year of his reign, wherein he confirmed unto them the said laws and customs. Now amongst the laws of King Edward there is nothing to be found that can give the least colour or pretence for such a coordination as is conceited, but on the other side the kings supremacy is chiefly established by the ancient laws of the land, for the common law was the same it is now before the conquest; And is the base and pillar of royal power, as hath already been showed sufficiently: To which I could add many other things out of the laws of King Edward wherein the King is declared to be a Monarch and to be Gods vicegerent constituted and ordained to govern the kingdom( which include the people collectively taken) and his Church, and to protect and defend them( which is an act belonging onely to supreme authority, 
{αβγδ}. fol. 142.  and which can not be performed without it) from injuries and oppression. Rex autem quia Vicarius summi Regis est ad hoc est constitutus ut regnum terrenum,& supper omnia sanctam veneretur Ecclesiam ejus, et regat,& ab iujuriosis defendat, etc. Vniversa vero terra et tota et insulae omnes, usque Norwegiam, et usque Daciam, pertinent ad coronam regni ejus, et sunt de appendicijs et dignitatibus regis, et una est Monarchia, et unum est Regnum, et vocabatur quondam Regnum Britanniae, modo autem vocatur Regnum Anglorum. The King because he is the vicar of God is ordained that he may govern the Chureh and his Kingdom, and the people of God, and defend them from all injuries, &c. But the whole continent and all the islands as far as Norway and Denemarke, belong to his crown, and are the appurtenances and dignities of the King, and are one monarchy, and one kingdom, and it was anciently called the kingdom of britain, now the kingdom of England. By another law of King Edward all men within the realm are obliged to take an oath of allegiance, and to promise fidelity to the King, 
Besold. de jurib. Majestat. cap. 2. num. 36. Bornit. de Majest. c. 17.  which is a duty to be payed onely to supreme authority. 
L. 35.  Ita debent facere omnes Principes,& comites,& simul jurare coram Episcopis Regni in folcmote, & similiter omnes proceres regni,& milites,& liberi homines universi totius regni Britanniae facere debent in pleno folcmote fidelitatem Domino Regi ut praedictum est coram Episcopis Regni. So ought all the Princes to do, ( that is, to take the oath of allegiance) and earls, and swear together before the Bishops of the kingdom in a public assembly, in like manner all the great men of the kingdom, and Kinghtes, and all the free men, ought to do fealty to our Lord the King, in a full assembly before the Bishops of the kingdom. To conclude this point; by the laws of King Edward, the crown hath legibus solutam potestatem, 
johan. Corvin. Briviar. cap. 11. Bisol. cap. 2. de jur. Majest. Special. num. 41. Morl● in Empocio juris Tit. 1. quaest. 2. Petra cap. 25.  which is a prerogative compatible to none but supreme powers: by them the King may dispense with the Statutes, pardon the transgression of them, and loose whom he please from imprisonment wheresoever he goeth by his bare word alone. 
L. 19.  Habet etiam Rex alterius modi potestatem misericordiae supper captivos; ubicunque enim venerit in civitatem, vel burgum, vel castellum, vel villam, vel etiam in via, si captivus fuerit, potest eum solo verbo solvere à captione: Solutus tamen satisfaciat cvi forisfecit. Murdrator vero, vel traditor, vel hujusmodi criminosus, quamvis Rex iis condonaverit vitam& membra, secundum legem nullatenus in patria remanebunt. The King hath also an other kind of power of pardoning such as are in prison, for wheresoever he goeth into any city, burrow, castle, or village, or also in the high way, if any prisoner be there, he may by his word alone release him from imprisonment; yet he that is so released, must satisfy those to whom he hath made the forfeiture, but a murderer, traitor, or any such notorious delinquent, although the King hath given him his pardon of live and member, may not by law remain in his country. The laws then granted by William the conqueror did not deprive him of the rights of sovereignty, but did rather strengthen his title joining Law to Conquest; for lest he might discretely suffer his wings to be clipped, before he made the said grant he caused all the laws and customs that were in force in the time of King Edward to be written out, and then after good deliberation, finding nothing in them prejudicial to his crown and royal authority, he ratified and confirmed them. For whereas some of them say the fundamental laws are not written( that so they might cover their fraud and deceit, who protending fundamental laws are able to allege nothing out of them) this is contrary to all the Histories, and records of those times, which testify that William the conqueror commanded twelve of the wisest men to be chosen in every county, who did upon oath declare all the laws and customs which they knew, not adding or omitting any thing; Aldered Archbishop of york who had crowned him, and Hugo Bishop of London, as Chronicon Lichfeldense relateth, writ them out with their own hands. Yet he granted not these laws without some emendations, as appear by the laws of Henry the first, 
Leges H. 1. cap. 2.  Lagam Regis EDWARDI vobis reddo cum illis emendationibus quibus eam Pater meus emendavit, consilio Baronum svorum. I restore unto you the laws of King Edward with those emendations, which my father by the advice of his Barons added unto them. For although he let the old foundation stand, yet he enlarged it, and added divers new dignities and pre-eminences to the crown; not wholely relinquishing the rights he had gained by conquest, as some without ground or reason affirm, but joining the rights of law and conquest together: 
{αβγδ}. fol. 159.  And this was all done by consent and agreement of the people, and confirmed by act of Parliament.  
Thirdly the two houses of Parliament are but the kings counsel, according to their usual style both in our Statutes and law books; at first the two pretended houses gave themselves no other name, and in probability would have been longer content with it, upon condition, his Majesty would have observed their counsels as laws, and have acknowledged himself bound to obey them: for they were willing then he should have had the title of a King, so themselves might have had all the power and authority belonging to the crown. But the truth is there is a great distance between counsels and commands: councillors are but subordinate officers, and may not impose their counsels for laws upon those which they serve in that employment. To this it is answered, first, that the two houses are called the counsel of the realm as well as the kings counsel, and are trusted by the people as well as by the King. Although in some respects they be trusted by the people, yet as touching the office of councillors, they are trusted by the King; and when they are called the council of the realm, it is all one as it they were called the counsel of the King, for under divers phrases the same thing is signified, it being an usual custom in law in expressions of this kind to take the realm or kingdom for the King himself. cook lib. 7.12. And oftentimes in the reports of our book cases, and in acts of Parliament also the crown or kingdom is taken for the King himself, as in FITZ. NATVR. BRE. FOL. 5. tenor IN CAPITE is a tenor of the crown, and is tapistry in gross, that is of the person of the King, and so is the 30. H. 8. Dyer fol. 44. 45. a tenor in chief as of the crown, is merely a tenor of the person of the King, and therewith agreeth 28. H. 8. Tit. tenor Br. 65. The Statute of the 4. Hen. 5. cap. ultimo gave Priors aliens which were conventuall to the king and his heires, by which gift saith 34. H. 6. 34. the same were annexed to the crown. And in the said act of 25. E. 3. whereas it is said in the beginning, with in the ligeance of England, it is twice afterward said in the ligeance of the King, and yet all one ligeance due to the King. So in the 42. E. 3. fol. 2. where it is first said the ligeance of England it is afterward in the same case called, the ligeance of the King, wherein though they used several manner and phrases of speech, yet they intended one and the same ligeance. So in our usual commission of assize, of goal delivery, of oyer and terminer, of the peace, &c. power is given to execute justice secundum legem& consuetudinem regni nostri Angliae: and yet Little. lib. 2. in his chapter of usage, fol. 43. in disabling of a man that is attainted in a praemunire, saith, that the same is the Kings lawe; and so doth the register in the writ of ad jura Regia style the same. Secondly, it is answered, although the two houses be the kings counsel, yet they are not chosen by himself, the Lords are consiliarii nati born counsellors and the Commons are consiliarii dati counsellors given him by election of the people. Although the Lords be born counsellors, and the commons chosen by the people yet they can not sit in counsel, but at such times as the King is pleased to make use of them, and when he is pleased to summon them and command them to sit, the Lords can not refuse to come, or the people to sand their deputies: nor doth it alter their condition whether they be born his councillors, given him by the people, or chosen by himself; they which are born to places of dignity and jurisdiction, or they which are chosen to them by the people, cease not for all that to be subordinate to the King: and in this present case their birth and election can neither raise Them above the condition of counsellors, nor throw Him beneath the condition of a King; they are all his subjects and ministers, and are so far from having authority to challenge obedience to their counsels, that if their counsels be not such as they ought, they are themselves obnoxious to a censure of law. A King is obliged in time of Parliament to follow the advice and direction of the two houses, and out of Parliament of his privy counsel, when their advice and direction tendeth to the preservation of his person, and of his royal authority, and to the preservation of his people, and of their rights and privileges; not that counsellors have authority over Kings, but because the matter of their counsels do morally oblige their consciences: but if their advice and direction tend to the ruin of either, he may and ought to recede from their counsels; and such a King is not a tyrant, but such counsellors traitors by the law. This is mysteriously represented to the Lords when they are first preferred to that degree and dignity, by the usual solemnities then performed; for if in stead of giving counsel for the King, they give counsel against him, they are not onely by the Statutes of the Land declared to be traitors, but if the Statutes were silent, by a tacite condition of law annexed to their dignities, and veiled under certain ceremonies used at their first creation, they are to be condemned for such, and to forfeit their estates. cook in Nevils case lib. 7. fol. 34. Ceux queen sont countees ount office de grand trust& confidence,& sont create pure 2. purposes: 1. ad consulendum regi tempore pacis: 2. ad defendendum regem& patriam tempore belly. Et pure c̄ antiquity ad done eux 2. ensigns a resembler ceux deux duties: car primeremnt lour teste est adorn ove un cap de honor,& coronet,& lour corps ove un rob in resemblance de counsel: secundmnt ilz sont succinct ove un espee in resemblans q̄ ilz ser̄r Foiall et loyal a defender lour Prince et pays: Donques quant tiel person encount le duty et fine de son dignity, priest non solemnt counsel, mes arms auxi encount le Roy a luy destroyer et de c̄ est attaint per due course deal lay, per ceo il ad forfeit son dignity per un condition tacite annex al estate de dignity. They which are earls have an office of great trust and confidence and are created for two purposes first, to council the King in time of peace, secondly to defend the King and their country in time of of war; and for this cause Antiquity hath given them two ensigns to represent these two duties, for, first, their head is adorned with a cap of honour, and a coronet, and their body with a rob in resemblance of counsel; secondly they are gird with a sword in resemblance that they shall be faithful and loyal to defend their Prince and country, when such a person then against his duty and end of his dignity take not onely council but arms against the King to destroy him, and be attainted thereof by due course of law. He hath thereby forfeited his dignity by a tacite condition annexed unto it.  
Fourthly the Parliament is one of the kings courts as is apparent both by our Statutes and law books; 
1. jac. cap 1. Bracton lib. 2. cap. 16. ●leta lib 2. cap. 2.  the two houses therefore must derive all their authority from him: for the King is as a full sea of authority from whom all power and jurisdiction, by commissions, writs, letters patents, &c. as through so many channels, run into all his courts; if the two houses have authority radically in themselves by fundamental constitution, or if they derive their authority from any other then the King, the court is none of his. The Treatiser having made divers suppositions, which he telleth the reader are the laws of the land, or to use his own words the model and platform of the English Monarchy, out of the said suppositions frameth this answer. It is his Parliament because an assembly of his subjects, convocated by his writ, to be his council to assist him in making laws for him to govern by: yet not his as his other courts are altogether deriving their whole authority from the fullness which is in him. Whereas he calleth the Parliament an assembly of his subjects, whereas he saith they make laws for him to govern by, and that there is a fullness of power in him, he doth but compliment with his Majesty; his suppositions and principles agrees not with such expressions: And yet all that he saith is not sufficient to make the Parliament his Majesties court, except it deriveth all authority and jurisdiction from him; it is not enough that they are an assembly of his subjects; for in divers foreign Nations ecclesiastical persons are subjects to the princes they live under, yet ecclesiastical courts belong not to those Princes, but to the Sea of Rome; nor is it enough which he addeth, that they are summoned by his writ; for the judges of divers courts, but chiefly of courts Christian, have sent out citations and summons, in their own name, as the King doth by writ, and yet they are not the proprietaries of those courts; nor yet is it sufficient that they sit in Parliament to advance his interest, in giving him counsel, and assisting him to make laws to govern by; for they Consult and make laws for the interest of the whole kingdom as well as for the interest of his Majesty, and according to his own opinion they consult and make laws for themselves to govern by, so far as concerns their own jurisdiction, and the administration of that power which they have in the supposed coordination. It is not therfore because they are his subjects, or because they are summoned in his name by his writ, or yet because they are called to be his counsel, and to assist him to make laws to govern by, that makes it his court, but because it derives authority from him; It is authority that constituts a court, and enables it to proceed judicially, he which owns that, is owner and Master of the Court. Whereas he saith that the Parliament is not his as his other courts are, altogether deriving there whole authority from the fullness which is in him, he contradicts all that he said before; for if the two houses derive not their authority from his Majesty, but have it radically in themselves, how is there a fullness of power in him? if the jura Majestatis be divided amongst them, he hath not a fullness, but his share onely of power: or how do they assist him to make laws to govern by? they assist not him alone, but all the three estates are mutually assistant to one another in making laws to govern jointly, where their joint concurrence is necessary, or to govern in their several charges, where they may act severally. Or lastly how can they be called his subjects? subjection is due to the three estates acting together, or to either of them in their several places, and jurisdictions, as well as to him; for it is due to him in the administration of that power which belong to him alone, so is it likewise to them in things within the verge and compass of their authority. And as this last part of his answer is a contradiction to the former, so is it likewise to the laws of the land; for I have sheved as well by the Statutes as Common law, that all authority both ecclesiastical and civill is derived from the Kings Majesty; and that he hath full and plenary power to attain and reach to all the ends of Government: Mr. 
Archeion fol. 274.  Lambart himself although a great Advocate of the two houses, and one that have said more to enhance their authority, then himself if he were alive, or any one for him, are able to maintain; Yet, discoursing upon the high courts of justice, he acknowledge them all, and amongst the rest the high court of Parliament, to have their original from the King, to be all Roses belonging to the garland of the crown, and to derive all authority from him.  
Fiftly, Parliaments as they are now established, consisting of three estates, the King, the Lords, and the Commons, are but of late existence; and therefore such a composition and mixture of the said estates as is pretended can not be by original constitution. It is granted that Parliaments otherwise are of a long continuance, and may pled the prescription of many hundred yeares; for although the word Parliament hath been introduced( as is probable) since the Norman conquest, yet a convention of that nature was in use in the time of the Saxon Kings, who did seldom make laws without the council and assent of their wise men; and this assembly was called in the Saxon language geþeate a counsel and synoþ a synod, which last appellation is borrowed of the Greeks. It is granted also that the Commons were sometimes called to such consultations, but that was a thing not necessary, or frequent, but rare, arbitrary, and contingent. There were no certain persons designed by law, whose concurrence was required to constitute a Parliament, but the King used the advice of those onely which he pleased to call unto himself, which were always such as he thought most able to council and direct him, in the matters that were to be consulted of, and whose assent was likely to add most credit and estimation to the laws that were to be divulged. Sometimes he made laws without the assent of others; 
In vita Offae 2.  for Offa King of the Mercians as Matthew Paris relateth being at Rome ordained that every householder in all his dominions,( which were three and twenty Provinces, or Shires) that had above thirty penny-worth of goods in the field, should every year pay a Penny to the maintenance of the English school that then flourished at Rome, which in those times was a great taxation. His igitur auditis Rex, quid dign tantae benignitati compenset, secum studiose pertractat. Tandem Divina inspirante Gratia, consilium inivit salubre, et in die crastina scolam Anglorum qui tunc Romae floruit ingressus. Dedit ibi ex Regali munificentia ad sustentationem Gentis Regni sui illuc venientis, singulos argenteos, de familiis singulis, omnibus in posterum diebus, singulis annis. Quibus, videlicet sors tantum contulit, extra domos in pascius, ut triginta argenteorum pretium excederet. Hoc autem per totam suam ditionem teneri in perpetuum constituit, excepta tota terra Sancti Albani, suo Monasterio conferenda, prout postea collata privilegia protestantur. The King hearing this considered with himself how he might recompense so great a courtesy; at last by Divine Inspiration very Sound counsel was suggested unto him, and going the next day into the English school that then flourished at Rome, he gave to the sustentation of such as should come thither out of his own kingdom a penny to be payed yearly for ever out of every family by all whose goods in the field exceeded the value of thirty pence. And this he made a perpetual constitution through out all his dominions, excepting onely the lands, that were to be conferred upon the Monastery of Saint alban, as the privileges afterwards granted do witness. This law continued a long time in force, yet I find it not confirmed by act of Parliament either in his own, or in the reigns of his successors, I find onely in the laws of some Kings, 
L. 4.  as of King Edgar, and King Edward, a strict provision made for the payment thereof, 
L. 10.  because it was the kings alms, which reason doth imply that it was not given by the whole kingdom in Parliament, but by the King alone. But yet in those times laws were made commonly by the approbation and consent of the Nobles, Archbishops and Bishops, in a public synod or Parliament: Sometimes the Queen was present, sometimes the inferior clergy, and sometimes also the Commons, but that happened very seldom. I have seen divers Charters both in the Saxon and latin tongue, granted to Churches, and Monasteries, confirmed by act of Parliament, and attested by the Members of the same, yet amongst them all I have not seen so much as one, where unto the assent or name of any of the Commons is subscribed. I will here insert one, for example sake, granted to the monastery of Saint alban by Ecgfride son of Offa because it is but short, and extant in the last edition of Matthew Paris, were any one that please may see both that and divers others of like nature. 
Auctar. additament.& fol. 239. 240.  Ego Ecgfridus gratia Dei Rex Merciorum, anno Dominicae incarnationis septingentesimo nonagesimo sexto, Indictione quarta, primo vero anno Regni nostri: terram X. manentium nomino Thyrefeld cum terminis suis. Domino meo Jesu Christo & ejus pretioso Marteri Albano, liberaliter& aeternaliter cum consensu& testimonio optimatum meorum, in jus Monasteriale, pro anima mea& parentum meorum devotissime tribuo& libenter concedo. Sitque praedicta terra ab omni terrenae servitutis jugo, semper aliena; atque eadem libertate sit libera, qua caeterae terrae Monasterii beati Albani conscriptae atque concessae sunt à glorioso Offa genitore meo.  
Ego Ecgfridus Rex hanc meam donationem cum signo crucis confirmare curabo.  

X Ego Cynedrid Regina consensi.  
X Ego Vnwona Episcopus.  
X Ego Weohthunus Episcopus.  
X Ego Beona abbess.  
X Ego Elfhun Episcopus.  
X Ego Brorda Dux.  
X Ego Wigbertus Dux.  
X Ego Wicga Dux.  
X Ego Cutbertus Dux.  
X Ego Ethelheardus Archiepiscopus cons.  
X Ego Eobing Dux.  
X Ego Forthred abbess.  
X Ego Sighere filius Siger.  
X Ego Esne Dux.  
X Ego Cydda Dux.  
X Ego Winbertus Dux.  
X Ego Heardbertus Dux.  
X Ego Brorda Dux.   
Conscriptus est autem hic liber, in loco qui dicitur Chelchyd, in Synodo publico.  
I Ecgfride by the grace of God King of the Mercians in the year of our Lord seven hundred ninety six, in the fourth Indiction, and first year of our reign, do give and grant, for my own soul, and the souls of my ancestors with the assent and testimony of my Nobles, ten hides of land called Tyrefeld with the bounds thereof, unto the monastery of Saint alban: and I exempt the said lands from all services, and make them free with the same freedom which was granted to the rest of the lands of the same Monastery by Offa our father of glorious memory,  
This Charter was written at Chelchyd in a public Synod.  
By this Charter it is evident, that Parliaments were holden in those times without the Commons; for whereas it is specified by the King, that the above said lands were given cum consensu& testimonio Optimatum, his meaning is, that his grant was confirmed by the assent and testimony of Parliament; and yet the word Optimates can not be extended to the Commons, neither was his grant confirmed by their testimony. In the prefaces likewise of divers Saxon laws set out by Mr. Lambart the persons are expressed by whose counsel and assent the said laws were enacted; yet, except onely in the preface of King Inas laws, there is no mention at all made of the Commons, but several Kings made most of those laws by the advice and consent of their Bishops, and wise men, which were no other then their privy Counsel, Mr. Lambart in his Archeion affirmeth them to be the Nobility, 
Pag. 15●.  and commons; and to support his opinion he allegeth a passage out of the preface of the laws of King Elfred which is neither material, nor faithfully cited; for there is no such passage to be found in that preface: But to make his error apparent I shall need no other testimonies, then two presidents mentioned by himself, 
Pag. 247.  the first is of a Parliament holden by Edwin King of Northumberland, the second of a Parliament holden by Segebert King of the East Saxons, whereunto they called their friends and their wise men; 
Beda Hist. Eccles. lib. 2. cap. 13.  for Edwine being instigated by Paulinus to embrace the Christian religion, answered {that} he ƿolde mid his freondum& mid his þitum sƿraece& geþeate habban, that he would speak with his friends and with his wise men in Parliament, which he did accordingly, and by their assent, himself his whole Nobility, and a great part of the commons, were baptized, in like manner Sigebert held a Parliament whereunto he called his friends and his wise men upon the like occasion, 
Beda Eccles. Hist. lib. 3. cap. 22.  Ða haef ðe geþeate mid his pitum& freondum& mid heora trymenysse& fultum& geþafunge cristes geleafan onfeng. Then he held a parliament with his wise men and friends, and by their advice, aid, and consent, received the Christian faith. From this I gather that their wise men could not be their Nobility and commons, as Mr. Lambart supposeth, for all their friends must needs be contained under one of those degrees, and in case his supposition were true, should not have been distinguished from their wise men, which in all good construction they must, for the words do evidently imply, that besides their wise men, they called such other of their friends, as they thought, by reason of their prudence, or power and prevalency with the people, were most like to assist them, and further their designs. But whosoever their wise men were, although they were frequently called, yet they were not all of them called always to make laws, for in the time of Ethelstane divers laws were made by the counsel and assent of the clergy alone, which we find amongst his other laws. Ic Aeþelstane Cyning Eallum minum gerefum binnon mine rice gecyþe mid geþeate þulfhel-mes mines Aercebiseoþes& calra mina oþra biseopa& gods ðeoþa for mina sinna forgyfnesse {that} ic þille, &c. I Ethelstane King signify to all my governours within my kingdom, that by the advice of Wulfhelmus my archbishop, and all my other Bishops, and servants of God, for the forgiveness of my sins, I have ordained, &c. The laws that go before these were made by the assent of the archbishop Wulfhelmus and other Bishops onely, and they which follow after at a more general convention at Gratlie where the Archbishop Wulfhelmus and many Noble men, and wise men were present. And although laws were frequently made and Parliaments holden, in the reigns of the Saxon kings, yet the people had been so seldom called to such conventions in the time of Henry the first, 
polydore. Virgil. lib. 11. Hist.  that Polydore Virgil saith that institution may seem to have sprung from him. At illud appositè habeo dicere, Reges ante haec tempora non consuevisse populi conventum consultandi causa( nisi perraro) facere, adeo ut ab Henrico id institutum jure manasse dici posset. But this I can speak appositely, that Kings before these times were not accustomend( except very seldom) to call the people to their consultations, so that this institution may be said to have had its first beginning from King Henry. This is certain the house of Commons hath been accustomend now a long time to give their consent in making laws, but how long is not certain; their opinion is most likely which think this custom began to take place about the time of Edward the first. For there are probable reasons which confirm, that laws were made without the concurrence of the Commons long after the time of the above said Henry the first, who, although he did call them more frequently then any of his predecessors had done, yet did not bind himself to make laws always by their assent. But because it would require an entire treatise to speak sufficiently of this subject, and because it can no way prejudice the cause in hand if we grant Parliaments as they are now moulded to be by fundamental agreement, seeing ihe King by the laws of the land, and the said fundamental agreement, is invested, as hath been shewed, with all the rights of sovereignty, I will lay by many advantages, and omit many reasons and passages which I could allege touching this matter.  
sixthly, if the Nobility and people be then, and onely then, coordinate with the King, when they are in their site, relation, order, and union, in Parliament, as the fuller Answerer affirmeth; in time of Parliament the kingdom should be a Head without a Body: For if the King be part of the Head, and the whole Nobility part of the Head, and all the People part of the Head too, where is the Body? And on the other side in the vacancy of Parliaments, the kingdom should be a Body without a Head: For if the Nobility and people he onely then coordinate when they are in their site, relation, order, and union in Parliament, after a Parliament be broken up, where is the Head? For as the preservation of the whole consist in the order and union of its partes, so the dissolution of it followeth their separation and divorce. If this opinion then were true, the commonwealth should be a strainge deformed monster; for in time of Parliament, when all the Body were a Head, it should be monstrous by too much perfection; and out of Parliament, when two partes of the Head were fallen into the Body, it should be monstrous by too little: In both cases is should want that beauty and comeliness which consists in the harmony and proportion of several partes.  
Lastly, if we descend into particulars, we shall find Parliaments to be so moulded, that their frame and composition rendereth the two houses an unmeet subject for supremacy; for the Militia, the power of making war or peace with foreign princes, and most of the other rights of sovereignty, require a subject perpetually existent; many occasional accidents may arise that may call for present and sudden use of the supreme power, for which there can be no provision made by bodies not existent.  
I could add much more, both from the statutes, Common law, and reason, as well concerning the Kings supremacy in general, as concerning the particular rights of sovereignty: But I presume that which hath been said is more then sufficient, not onely to satisfy all that are indifferent and neutral, but to convince those that are most interested, who shall not easily find shifts and distinctions plausible enough to illude such clear testimonies of law. But God onely is able to change their heartes, and to make such impressions there as can cause them to repent and turn from their evil ways; I shall pray continually he would do it, as well in regard of the peace and happiness of the kingdom, as of their own salvation, which I can not otherwise hope they should obtain; For whatsoever deceivs them, and bears up their spirits for a time, repentance at last,( if God give them grace) will prove their best fortune.   

CHAP. VII.  
Divers objections made by the pretended houses answered: The Kings supremacy shewed to be in his person, not in his courts.  
THe Kings supremacy being made apparent I shall now proceed to answer their objections, which yet are of that nature that they deserve more to be contemned then answered: for in stead of law they allege Bedas axioms, their own fancies, and such other impertinencies, as one would think should Sooner move a man to laughter, then to be of their opinion. But because they shall not complain that their objections are concealed, and because in answering them I shall further confirm the Kings supremacy, I will bring them all in order, not suppressing or omitting any thing that hath but the face of an objection, how slight and impertinent soever. I will begin with that which is alleged by the two pretended houses themselves, whose most remarkable objections are these which follow, being the sum and substance of that which they say in all their declarations touching matter of right, in this particular. The Kings supremacy is meant in Curia non in Camera in his courts not in his private capacity, and to speak properly, onely in his high court of Parliament, wherein he is absolutely supreme head and governor, from which their is no appeal. And if the Parliament may take an account what is done by his Majesty in his inferior courts, much more what is done by him without authority in any court. And it is preached to the people in the kings declarations, that by the supremacy is meant a power inherent in the Kings person, without, above, against all his courts the Parliament not excepted, whereby the excellent laws are turned into an arbitrary government. Argus eyes will scarce be able to discover a word of law or truth in all this, every sentence seemeth rather to be a sarcasm then to contain matter of serious importance, wherein they deal with his Majesty, as the Iewes did with our saviour Christ, who having stripped him of his apparel, and used all the spiteful and opprobrions terms they could device against him, added at last a mock to their other in civilities bowing unto him, and saying, hail KING OF THE IEWES. The two pretended houses having likewise seized upon all his Majesties revenues, and rights of the crown, and offered him all the indignities they could invent, do yet style him their King, and supreme head and governor, but in such a manner, as they may seem, like the Iewes, rather to do it by way of derision then in earnest.  
The Kings supremacy, they say, is meant in Curia non in Camera, in his courts not in his private capacity. As they fancy the people to have conveyed all authority to the King, so they fancy the King to have poured it out again into his courts, as if he had no power, authority, or jurisdiction, adherent in his person, but had committed all to his delegate Iudges, or rather( which they say is to speak properly) unto themselves: whereas he hath by law a royal and superimenent jurisdiction above all his courts, 
Manwoo● of forest laws part. 1.  and may call causes out of them before himself, or hear appeals, and reform their abuses when occasion require. Lambart. Archeion fol. 95. I shall not need to repeat that which I have before this time opened, touching the beginning of the Kingly power and authority, for the delivery of justice to all the sorts, and in all the suits of his subjects, but I will confirm by prooses drawn out of our country laws, and lawyers that the selfsame general jurisdiction is appropriated to all the kings of this realm of England. Master Henry Bracton that lived in the time of King Henry the third hath in the ninth and tenth chapter of his book these words following: Rex(& non alius) debet judicare, si solus ad id sufficere posset, cum ad hoc per veritatem Sacramenti teneatur astrictus, exercere igitur debet Rex potestatem juris, sicut Dei Vicarius& minister in terra. Sin Dominus Rex ad singulas causas determinandas non sufficiat, ut levior sit illi labour in plures personas partito onere, eligere debet viros sapientes,& timentes Deum,& ex illis constituere justiciarios. The words do prove two things serviceable to this purpose: first, that the King ought onely to be the judge of his people, if he alone were able to perform that office, as well because he is within his own kingdom the vice-Roy of God( the supreme judge of the world) as also for that he is thereunto bound by oath, taken at the Coronation. The second that albeit he do( for the multitude of causes) substitute others underneath him, yet is he not thereby discharged himself; for it is done ut levior sit illi labour that his labour be the lighter, not that he should sit unoccupied; and least you should doubt that so much is not comprised in that oath of his, one question therein amongst others is this: Facies fieri in omnibus judiciis tuis aequam,& rectam justitiam,& discretionem in misericordia,& veritate secundum vires tuas: To which he answereth, faciam: wherein the words judiciis tuis,& vires tuas, do more properly denote his own doing, then the doing of his subaltern justices; albeit their judgement be after a certain manner, the judgement of the King himself also, from whence their authority is derived. Much like the words of Bracton speaketh King Edward the first in the beginning of his book of laws commonly called briton: where after he had showed that he is the Vicar of God, and that he hath distributed his charge into sundry portions, because he alone is not sufficient to hear and determine all complaints of his people; then he addeth these words: Nous volons queen nostre jurisdiction soit sur touts jurisdictions en nostre realm: issent queen in touts manners de felonies, trespass, contracts,& en touts manners de autres actions personals, ou real, ayons poer a render& faire render less jugements tiels come ills afferont, sans auter process, par la ou nous sçavons la droit verity come judges. We will, saith the King, that our own jurisdiction be above all the jurisdiction of our realm: so as in all manner of felonies, trespasses, contracts, and in all other actions personalls, or realls, we have power to yield( or cause to yield) such judgements as do appertain( without other process) wheresoever we know the right truth, as judges. neither may this be taken to be meant of the Kings bench, where there is onely an imaginary presence of his person; but it must necessary be understoode of a jurisdiction remaining and left in the Kings royal body and breast distinct from that of his Bench, marshalsea, Common pleas, exchequer, and the other ordinary courts: because he doth immediately after, in the same place severally set forth by themselves, as well the authority of the kings Bench, as of the rest of those his ordinary courts of justice. And that this was no new made law, or first brought in by the Normane conquest, I must put you in mind of that which I touched before, out of the Saxon laws of King Edgar, where you did red it thus: Nemo in light Regem appellato, nisi quando domi jus consequi non poterit, sin juris summi onere domi prematur, ad regem ut is id oneris allevet, provocato: Let no man in svit appeal to the King unless he may not get right at home; but if that right be too heavy for him, go to the King to have it eased. By which it may evidently appear, that even so many yeares ago there might appellation be made to the Kings Person, whensoever the cause should enforce it. Hitherto Mr. Lambart; who doth afterwards further prove this supreme and supereminent jurisdiction of the King by divers presidents and acts of Parliament. And although the Commons in some other Parliaments have seemed to impugn this Prerogative, yet here, as he saith, 
Fol. 125.  the Kings always most gravely and considerately repelled that sort of attempt. The Kings supremacy then is inherent in his Person not in his courts, as the two pretended houses affirm; for his politic capacity can not be separated from his natural, but what power soever he maketh over unto his courts, the same and greater remaineth in himself; His authority is not separated from him by such a concession privitivè but Cumulativè onely as Civilians distinguish in Concessions of like nature made by the Emperour; who give these reasons for the ground of their law, not much different from those alleged by Lambart out of Bracton and others. Credendum non est Imperatorem ita fontes suos derivasse forâs ut nihil penes se remanserit; said in quavis concessione semper authoritas& persona ejus excepta censetur: quis enim tam stolidus ut alii benefaciendo seipsum consumere velit, cum etiam Principis sit,& ad officium ejus proprie pertineat jus dicere Knichen. d. superiorit. territ. cap. 1. num. 5.18. Wurms. exercit. 3. num. 15. Rosental. d. feud. cap. 5. conclus. 13. Pruckman. d. Regal. cap. 1. num. 17. Leipold. d. Concurrent. jurisdict. quaest. 1. It is not to be imagined that the Emperour should so empty his fountains as to leave nothing in himself; but it is to be conceived that in every concession his own Person and authority is excepted, for who is such a fool to consume himself by doing good to others, it is also the essential property, and office of a Prince, to do justice.  
The pretended houses proceed; And to speak properly onely his high court of Parliament wherein he is absolutely supreme head and governor from which there is no appeal. They speak not more properly as they say, but much more improperly then they did before; it is the same authority that is in all his courts and in his Person too, though not all the same authority; for it is limited and restrained in his courts by commission, writ, or law; and according as those limitations and restrictions are more or less, so may courts be said to have a greater or less jurisdiction, but not the King to be more or less supreme: nor is their expression improper onely, but also full of falsehood and deceit; for whereas they say there can be no appleale from the high court of Parliament, they desire the people should so construe their words, as to think the two houses could jointly by reason of the Kings virtual presence take cognizance of a plea, and give judgement upon it, from which their could be no appeal; which had they spoken out their falsehood had been transparent. for onely the Lords house is a court of judicature, and from thence appeals may be made to the King who may and have reformed the undue proceedings of that court; for anno 18. Edward. 1. 
Lambarts Archeion fol. 133.  Bogo de clear being discarged of an accusation put against him in Parliament for some imperfections of form that were discovered in the complaint, the King commanded him nevertheless to appear before himself ad faciendum& recipiendum quod per Regem& ejus consilium fuerit faciendum and so proceeded to a reexamination of the whole cause. neither is the former part of their words truer then the latter; the Kings supremacy they say to speak properly is onely in his high court of Parliament. This in their sense is false; the supremacy of the King is no more in his high court of Parliament by reason of his virtual presence or politic capacity, then in his other courts, when he is personally there his supremacy then together with his Person is in the Court, not otherwise. For I have shewed already in divers places that the rights of sovereignty are not onely individually inherent in his Person, but so inseparably also annexed unto it that they can not be communicated to others by any grant or concession made by himself in private, or by an act of Parliament. 
Lib. 7. in Calvinet case.  I shall now add, that their conceit is called in Cokes reports a damnable and damned opinion, and hath been at large confuted, and condemned, by all the judges, as is there related; it was first invented by the Spencers, who to cover their treason, said that homage and the oath of ligeance was more by reason of the Kings crown, that is by reason of his politic capacity then by reason of the Person of the King: from which opinion they inferred these detestable consequences. 1. If the King do not demean himself by reason his revenges are bound by oath to remove him. 2. Seeing the King could not be reformed by svit of law, that ought to be done per aspertee. 3. that his Lieges are bound to govern in aid of him, all which were condemned by two Parliaments, one in the reign of Edward the second called exilium Hugonis le spencer. And the other anno 1. E. 3. cap. 1. And indeed their conceit is so irrational, that it might easily be prognosticated they would never make good Statsmen which could find no better evasion to illude the laws. For when the King is not personally present is his courts, he can be there by reason of his politic capacity no other ways but by virtual emanation; there can be in them no more authority then is delegated and committed to his judges: Now it is a common conception as evident as the first principles, that a delegate power can not be supreme. A King may alienate and resign up supreme authority, but he can not delegate it; In how general terms soever, say Civilians, authority be granted by the Concessour to the concessary supreme authority can not be comprised under those terms. Quocunque modo Regalium concessio fiat, nihilominus superius illud& Majestaticum imperium, ea largitione nunquam censeatur comprehensum, said potius mayor semper, quam est concessa, reservata& retenta putetur potestas. cap, Dudum.§. hoc igitur de praebend. in 6. l. inquisitio. Et ibi De●c. de solut. Periginus de jure fisci, lib. 1. Tit. ult. num. 33. Kniken. de jure territorii cap. 1. num. 315. Which way soever Regalities are granted, it may not be supposed that supreme authority is comprehended under such a grant, but rather that a greater power then is granted is reserved to the Prince.  
They add further, And if the Parliament may take an account what is done by his Majesty in his inferior courts, much more what is done by him without authority in any court. This if is well put in; they say not categorically they may take an account what is done by his Majesty in his inferior courts, yet they would have the people think them to have such a power; and therefore they lay it down as a supposition which they seem to take for granted, although they know it to be false: for they may take an account what is done in his courts by subordinate Officers and Ministers, but not what is done by his Majesty, who as King can no more do begging then God can be the author of sin; His authority is from God, and if injustice be committed in his courts his Kingly authority is not the cause thereof, but the corruption of his judges who abuse it; and his Majesty may take an account of them either privately, or in his Parliament, but is not himself accountable for their abuses. For although the judgement of his courts may and is termed in law the judgement of the King, yet that is to be understood of the act itself, which can not be effected without his influence and concurrence; not of the obliquity and deviation from justice which is in it. Nor is he yet accountable to any but God for his personal actions; by the laws of the land he can not be obnoxious to any guilt; 
1. H. 7. 4.  had he committed treason or any other crime before he was King, by taking the crown upon him all attainder of his Person is purged ipso facto. And therfore if the assumption were granted yet the consequence must not; had they power to call him to account for the corruption of his courts, it followeth not that they might also convent him for his personal errors: for the jurisdiction of a court is not to be argued and proved by inferences, but by commission, Statute, or prescription; and I am sure they can not prove such a jurisdiction as they challenge by any of those pleas. Enough hath been said already to prove them to be his inferior delegate, and subordinate ministers, that derive their authority from him, and in case of grievance are to sue unto him by petition, which is all the help the law giveth in such exigencies; for they are so far from having any jurisdiction over him in matters of misdeamenour, that they can not take knowledge of those cases wherein Majesty without disparagement may submit itself to a legal trial as in controversies of right, or of title to land, &c. except he be pleased to have the business decided in that court. In Haedlows case before mentioned, it is resolved by all the justices, that controversies which concern the King can not be determined in Parliament; 
22. E. 3. 6.  and it is there added above what hath been cited, that Kings may not be judged by others then themselves and their justices, unques Roys ne serra adjuge si non per eux mesmes& lour justic. And this is true, at it is resolved by Scrope in the Bishop of Winchesters case, not onely in respect of others, but in respect of the Members of Parliament themselves: for although they are to be tried by their own respective houses in things which concern the Parliament, if the fact touch not the King; yet if it touch the King, and the case be prosecuted by him, they can not then take cognizance of it, except he thinks it expedient, who hath power if he please to try it in any of his other courts, howsoever the two pretended houses have exclaimed against it for a great breach of privilege. Fitz. Tit. coron. P. 3. E. 3. P. 161. Ceux queux sount judges in Parliament sount judges de lour Pieres, mes le Roy naver pier in sa terre demesne, per queen il ne doit per cux easter judge ne ailours faire son suite vers cestui qui luy trespassa quam la ou luy pleist. They which are judged in Parliament, are judged of their Peers, ( that is the Lords by the house of Lords, and the Commons by the house of Commons) but the King can have no Peer in his own land, and therefore he ought not to be judged by them, nor to make his process against him that offends, but where he please himself.  
Last of all they charge the King for attributing too much power and authority to himself. And it is preached to the people in the Kings declarations that by the supremacy is meant a power inherent in the Kings Person without, above, against all his courts, the Parliament not excepted, whereby the excellent laws are turned into an arbitrary Government. It is no wonder if the pretended houses were more inclined to hear what their own seditious divines preached in Saint Margerets, then what the King preached in his declarations; they which sustain such a cause, can no more endure to hear, then to speak the truth: yet I believe it had been better for them if they had entertained his Majesties Person and Declarations with more respect and duty. Although for the present they seem to have ruined him and his people too, and to have advanced their own interest by the ruin of them both; Yet they which have mounted to places of dignity and profit upon the dead bodies of the King and people, may find in the end, that Rebellion and Murder sit not so high, but that vengeance and divine Iustice sit above them. As for the charge which they bring against his Majesty, it is partly false; his Majesty never used such expressions as they pin upon him: where doth he say that he hath a personal power above and against the Parliament? let any man produce the words out of which he can force such a sense. He is himself in Person head of the Parliament, and to say that he hath a personal Power above and against himself were to speak as improperly, as the pretended houses use to speak in their own declarations, which his Majesty is not guilty of. their charge is also partly vain and frivolous; for whereas they accuse him for saying his supremacy was inherent in his Person, they might as well accuse him for saying he was King: supremacy is an essential attribute of Majesty, and can not be separated without the corruption of its subject; to say the Kings supremacy is in his courts and not in his person, is not onely to contradict the laws, but the Common principles of reason. This hath been demonstrated in divers places, yet because occasion is offered again, I will here add the resolution of all the Iudges made in the first year of Henry the seventh concerning this matter; for a Parliament being then called, and both the King himself, and divers of the Members, being attainded of high treason, it was resolved by the Iudges that the attainder of the Members ought to be adnulled before they could sit in the house: but touching the King it was resolved, that his attainder was adnulled upon his admittance to the crown, because the King is personable, that is, because his Kingly authority was inherent in his Person, by reason whereof he was discharged of all guilt against the laws. Et donques fuit move un question queen serra did pure le Roy mesme pure ceo queen il fuit attaint, 
1. H. 7. 4.  & puis communication ew enter eux, touts accordront, queen le Roy fuit Personable, & discharge de ascune atteind' eo facto q̄il priest sur luy le reign& ēe Roy. And then a question was moved what shall be said of the King himself for he was also attainted, and after commmunication had amongst them, all agreed that the King was Personable, and discharged from all attainder in the very act that he took the kingdom upon him and became King. It is likewise shewed that the King hath not onely an absolute jurisdiction in cases extraordinary, which can have remedy no where else; but ordinary also, above all his courts wherein he is but virtually present; yet for further illustration of the truth, I will here call to remembrance two places of Bracton alleged before for other purposes, yet serving also to confirm the Kings ordinary jurisdiction. The first is Sicut Dominus Papa in spiritualibus supper omnibus habeat ordinariam jurisdictionem, ita habet Rex in Regno suo ordinariam in temporalibus,& pares non habet, neque superiores. 
Lib. 5. cap. 15.  The second is, Dominus Rex ordinariam habet jurisdictionem, 
Lib. 2. cap. 24.  & dignitatem,& potestatem, supper omnes qui in Regno suo sunt; habet enim omnia jura in manu sua, quae ad coronam& laicalem pertinent potestatem. That in Fleta is also to be understoode of the Kings ordinary jurisdiction. 
Lib. 1. cap. 17.  Potentia Rex omnes in Regno suo praecellere debet, quia parem habere non debet, nec multo fortius superiorem in justitia exhibenda. The King ought to have a supereminent power above all the rest in his kingdom, because he ought to have no equal, much less a superior in exhibiting justice.   

CHAP. VIII.  
Divers general objections made by the Author of the treatise of Monarchy touching the limitation and mixture of the English Monarchy, and coordination of the two Houses, answered. The nature of absolute, limited, and mixed government, explained.  
THe Author of the treatise of Monarchy, the fuller Answerer, and other pretended Parliamentarians, have invented a new form of Government to delude the people, which they tell them is the Government established in England; namely a mixed Monarchy, consisting of three estates, independent for their authority upon on another, all of them being coordinate, and having several shares in the rights of sovereignty, by the fundamental laws of the land. A strange kind of monarchy, not so much as heard of until these times, much less established in England: for a Monarchy is the Government of one alone, as the etymology of the word importeth; now to say the Government of three Estates, is the Government of One alone, doth not sound half handsomely. Other authors have spoken of mixed Government, and mixed commonwealths, but of mixed Monarchy in that sense which they do, none but themselves have treated. For according to the verdict of other authors, when monarchy, aristocraty, 
Besol. Synops. polit. doct. lib. 1. cap. 9.  and democraty, are melted and allayed together, that which resulteth can take its name from none of the simplo species or kinds of Government, although the chief authority, or primity of share belong to ony one of the estates: it is a solecism to call him a Monarch who hath not all the rights of sovereignty, and who hath them not alone; 
Besol. lib. 2. cap. 4.  where more then one do sway the affairs of State, and have amongst them a common empire, the form of Government is Polyarchicall. Yet if they will needs have a mixed Government to be denominated from that kind that hath predominancy, they might with better reason have called their new frame a mixed democraty; this denomination( besides that it is not so improper as the other, democraty, implying the government of the people, but not of the people onely, as monarchy doth of the Monarch alone) is more agreeable to the quality and nature of their platform; for the Kings authority being so inconsiderable as they make it, the people in this mixture must needs be the predominant element. The Author of the treatise of monarchy who seemeth to give most to the King, although in terms he grants him a primity of share in the supreme power, yet in substance he would have it placed in the two houses, attributing unto them such authority, as they may thereby make him deprivable at their pleasure. Now although the said Treatiser seemeth to be a Poet rather then a Lawyer, having many new fictions, but scarcely a word of law in all his treatise, yet because I can not conveniently reduce his objections to any of the other questions that are hereafter to be discussed, I will answer them in this place: But before I come to examine them, that all things may be clear, and better understoode, I will, for perspicuity sake, speak a word or two of the division and several Kindes of Absolute, Limited, and Mixed Government.  
I will begin with Absolute Government of which there be three kindes; the first is Absolute both in respect of power and also in respect of the use and exercise of it. In this kind of Government the supreme governours have perfect, Absolute, full, and entire power; and in the exercise of it are subject to no limitation made by any human law, paction, or agreement, but are limited ab externo by the laws of God and nature onely, being otherwise left to the free determination of their own wills. This is also called Arbitrary Government, not because such Governours as have the free use of their power may do what they please; for their power is bounded by the laws of God and nature, and may not transgress and go beyond its limits: but because it is not bounded by any human positive law made to restrain and regulate it. The ends of Government may be attained several ways in many particulars without breach of the laws of God and nature; now when a governor is not directed to his end in any of those particulars by human constitution and appointment, but hath an open and free passage to act which way he please, his Government is Absolute and Arbitrary. Amongst all the several kindes of Government this onely is jure Divino, as being more ancient then any human law that could be made to direct it, by virtue and authority whereof, human laws were at first enacted; all other sorts were introduced by the policy of men, yet lawful, human Constitutions serving to conduct power to its end; making as it were a furrow, for it to pass in, and to contain it, which otherwise is apt to overflow its bounds, and to degenerate into tyranny. The second is Absolute in respect of the power alone; In this kind of Government the supreme Governours have as perfect, Absolute, full, and entire power as the former, their authority have the same latitud, and all the same dimensions; but they are limited ab externo in the use and exercise of it, either by original and fundamental constitution, or else by laws made afterwards by special grace and condescension: so that although their power be perfect, Absolute, full, and entire, in all respects, and able to produce all the effects of Government, yet they can not put it forth, and act by it according to their own free election, or according to the full activity of it, but must act according to those limitations made and granted by law. The third is Absolute in respect of the exercise onely; In this kind of Government the supreme authority is committed for a certain time, but not translated, to one or more, who by virtue of the said commission may exercise the power in an arbitrary manner during the time assigned them. Such were the Dictators of the roman Commonwealth, who ruled as arbitrarily all the time of their Dictatorshipe, as the most Absolute Monarchs in the world, yet the supreme authority remained in the Senate: And such are they who exercise royal power in the minority of Princes whose Government is Absolute and Arbitrary.  
There are also three kindes of Limited Government answereable to absolute; the first is Limited both in respect of Power, and also in respect of the use and exercise of it; In this kind of Government there are always more Governours then one, which are all Limited in the very essence and being of their power, having none of them perfect, absolute, full and entire authority, but onely their several shares and proportion: neither can they act in an arbitrary manner according to the full extent of that power which they have, but have a certain rule set them by law. The second is Limited in respect of the power alone; In this kind of Government as in the former there are always more Governours then one which have all their Limited shares, yet may all act arbitrarily either jointly together, or every one within the pale and limits of his own authority. The third is Limited in respect of the exercise onely; In this kind of Government, the Governours are absolute in regard of power, but circumscribed and Limited in the Acts of it.  
As of absolute and limited so there are likewise three kinds of Mixed Government suitable to the other; the first is Mixed both in respect of power and also in respect of the use and exercise of it. In this kind of Government there is a mixture of several powers which compound and make up one perfect, absolute, full, and entire power; and also of several persons, and estates, to whom the said powers do radically and fundamentally pertain, which do jointly concur in the administration and exercise of them. The Second is Mixed in respect of the power alone; In this kind of Government several persons and estates are mixed together in the possession of power, but one alone do exercise all the acts of sovereignty, In this manner was the Roman Commonwealth governed by Sylla; and by Dictators in the time of exigence and necessity. The third is Mixed in respect of the exercise onely; In this kind of Government several persons and estates are Mixed in the exercise of power, but one of the estates alone hath the dominion, and propriety of it.  
Now touching the Government of England, I have showed already that it is monarchical, that the monarchy is Absolute, in respect of the power; that the King alone hath perfect, Absolute, full, and entire jurisdiction, able if put in action, to effectuate, and bring to pass, all the ends of Government: and that all other persons, of all estates and degrees whatsoever, both Nobles, and Commons, move in their several circuits, and spheres of activity, by virtual emanation from him, and not by force of any power, authority, or jurisdiction inherent in themselves. And indeed all Monarchies are Absolute in this respect; that is, in respect of the power, for when the limitation is in the essence and being of power, monarchy is destroyed, not limited.  
But yet the English monarchy is Limited in respect of the use and exercise of power, the King being obliged to govern according to the laws of the land, which although they do not diminish Majesty in essentialibus, yet they do diversely qualify, and modificate it. It is also Mixed in the same respect, the King being obliged in some cases not to use his power without the assent and concurrence of the two other estates. The pretended Parliamentarians, on the other side, deny the English monarchy to be Absolute in any respect; and affirm it to be Limited, and Mixed, as well in respect of the power itself, as in respect of the use and exercise thereof, the two houses of Parliament being coordinate with the King, not onely in the administration of power, but in the possession of it. Yet they are not able to allege one syllable of law to make good these strainge novelties, but strive by indirect inferences to deceive the people. Howsoever I will bring their objections, such as they are, and answer them in order: and first I will bring their objections whereby they endeavour to prove their pretended limitation, and then those whereby they endeavour to prove their pretended mixture.  
I conceive and am in my judgement persuaded, Saith the Treatiser, 
touching limitation.  that the sovereignty of our Kings is radically and fundamentally limited, and not onely in the use and exercise of it: and am persuaded so on these grounds, and reasons. First, because the Kings Majesty himself, 
declare. from Newmarket Mart. 9. 1641.  who best knows by his counsel the nature of his own power, says, that the law is the measure of his power: Which is as full a concession of the thing as words can express. If it be the measure of it, then his power is limited by it; for the measure is the limits and bounds of the thing limited. And in his answer to both the houses concerning the Militia Speaking of the men name to him, says, If more power shall be thought fit to be granted to them then by law is in the crown itself, his Majesty houldes it reasonable, that the same be by some law first vested in him, with power to transfer it to those persons. In which passage it is granted, that the powers of the crown are by law, and that the King hath no more then are vested in him by law.  
Secondly because it is in the very constitution of it mixed as I shall afterwards make it appear, then it is radically limited, for as I shewed before every mixed monarchy is limited, though not on the contrary: For the necessary connexion of the other power to it, is one of the greatest limitations, a subordination of causes, doth not ever prove the supreme cause of limited virtue, a coordination doth always.  
Thirdly, I prove it from the ancient ordinary and received denominations; For the Kings Majesty is called our liege, that is, legal sovereign; and we his liege, that is, legal subjects. What do these names argue but that his sovereignty and our subjection is legal, that is restrained by law?  
Fourthly had we no other proof, yet that of prescription were sufficient: in all ages beyond record, the laws and customs of the kingdom, have been the rule of Government; liberties have been stood upon, and grants thereof, with limitations of royal power, made and acknowledged by Magna Charta, and other public and solemn acts; and no obedience acknowledged to be due but that which is according to law, nor claimed but under some pretext and title of law.  
Fiftly the very being of our Common and Statute laws, and our kings acknowledging themselves bound to govern by them doth prove and prescribe them limited: For those laws are not of their sole composure, nor were they established by their sole authority, but the concurrence of the other two estates: so that to be confined to that which is not merely their own, is to he in a limited condition.  
Before I come to answer his objections out of his own mouth will I condemn him; for if his heart and his tongue go together, if he be persuaded, as he saith in his first objection, that the King by his counsel knew the nature of his own power best, why hath he acted contrary to his Majesties declarations? why hath he, against his conscience, affirmed it to be worshipful for the two houses to take up arms against him? he knows his Majesty was never of that opinion. Now to his objections I say that the second, and fift, proceed upon his own principles, namely, that the monarchy of England is mixed in the power itself, and that the Legislative power is not in the King alone, but jointly in the three estates: If these principles were true his objections were material; but I have showed the contrary, and shall yet show it further hereafter. In his other three objections he doth not so much as touch the question propounded; he layeth down this conclusion to be proved, That the Kings sovereignty is radically and fundamentally Limited, and not onely in the use and exercise of it, but endeavoureth to prove no more then that it is limited in general, without specifying whether radically and in the essence and being of it, or in the exercise onely. A legal moderation and limitation of royal power, as far as I know, is denied by none, although the Treatiser be pleased to lay a false imputation upon some Divines, because they hold it not limited in the same manner which he hath represented it: The Kings sovereignty to be radically and fundamentally limited, and not onely in the use and exercise of it, is, in the sense by him explained, to be so limited, that his Majesty shall not onely be restrained in the use and exercise of supreme power, but shall also be stinted in his share of it, and have no more then a single parte, two other partes of the said power belonging to the other estates. Now that he may deceive the people, he maketh a show as if he had gained his purpose by proving the Kings power to be limited in general, whereas he knoweth well enough that there is a great difference between being limited, and being so limited by law. The Kings power to be measured and limited by law, includs no more then that his power is of such a size and bigness as the law hath ordained; if the law giveth him perfect, absolute, full, and entire power, and limits him onely in the exercise of it, this is a restraint and limitation according to law, yet not in the essence and being of power. And indeed this is the true and onely limitation of monarchy, whereby the Monarchs power is limited ab externo by human laws and constitutions, and not by the free and arbitrary resolutions of his own will, and yet monarchy preserved entire. But when the rights of sovereignty are divided and placed in several Estates which limit one another, such a limitation is inconsistent with monarchy. But the Treatiser objecteth further against this answer, that where the limitation of power is onely in the exercise of it and not in the power itself, all acts of Government are resolved at last into the arbitrary will of the Monarch: for although he be limited in the exercise of power by law, or promise, yet if he will conrrary to law and promise sinfully put it forth, his power is authoritative and may not be resisted: this is the full scope and sum of that which he replieth to Doctor Fern with no small ostentation. A legal restraint, saith he, you seem to aclowledge; 
Pag. 11.  but such an one as resolve into the arbitrary will of the Monarch, as I have made it appear in my former treatise, which you will never be able to wipe of by this or any other reply. If this reply were strictly examined it would appear far unworthy such boasts and brags as are brought to set it out; but I shall onely in brief show the insufficiency of it, and so let it pass. First therefore I say that we do by this assertion no more resolve monarchy, then he resolves his mixed Commonwealth, into an arbitrary Government. For although in a mixed Government every one of the estates hath but a limited share, yet taken together they have perfect, absolute, full, and entire power, which if they will contrary to law or promise sinnefully put forth, it is as authoritative and unresistible as if it were in one man. He will grant, I suppose, the power of Government to be equal in all commonwealths, and that there can be no essential but onely an accidental difference between them; for all commonwealths have a sufficiency of power to attain to all the ends of Government, and to make provision for all occurrencies, which can not be otherwise limited then in the exercise: This he confesseth in an other place; for disputing about the limitation of power in the essence and being therof, and having made an objection against it, in answering the objection he saith, such a limitation can not be where power is supreme, 
Pag. 23.  but for limitation to a rule and defined way of working, I can not see how it withstands the end of Government, which, if I do rightly understand his meaning, is the same in other terms that he confutes in Doctor Fern, and doth expressly conclude that the power of Government taken in sua latitudine can not be limited in the essence and being of it, but in the use and exercise onely; for, to be limited to a rule ad defined way of working is to be limited in the exercise, but not in the essence of power. If then all acts of Government are resolved into the arbitrary will of the Governours where the limitation of power is onely in the exercise of it, doth he not himself resolve his mixed commonwealth into an arbitrary Government? But secondly I say, that to limit power in the exercise of it, is so far from resolving all cases into the arbitrary will of the governor, that it is the onely way and means to restrain arbitrarinesse: the limitation of power in the essence and being of it alone, is not sufficient to restrain it; for when a power is limited in its essence and being, and terminated onely within its own intrinsic bounds, such a limitation is opposed to an Infinite, but not to an Arbitrary activity. When the three Estates have all their limited shares, yet they may all act arbitrarily according to the extent of that power which they have, not onely when they act jointly together, but in the administration of their several charges, if their power be not regulated by law in the exercise of it; it is not the limitation of power therefore in the essence and being of it, but in the exercise, which denominats and constituts a limited Government. Power which is limited in the essence and being of it onely, although it can not act arbitrarily in so great a latitud as when it is entire and absolute, yet it may act arbitrarily within its own bounds if it be determined onely by the will of him that acteth by it, and not by a certain rule of law. besides the former objections the Treatiser in his reply to Doctor Fern hath added others which proceed upon one of their own principles, namely that all authority and power is originally in the people, from whence he infereth that they may translate as much and as little as they please to their Governours, and so limit their power in its being and essence. But because they speak not de facto but de possibili, and because I shall handle these things ex proposito in the third question, I will refer them to their due place.  
I come now to the objections whereby they endeavour to prove the English Monarchy to be a mixed Monarchy. 
touching mixture.  I conceive it, saith the Treatiser, a clear and undoubted truth, that the Authority of the land is of a compounded and mixed nature in the very roote and constitution thereof, 
Answer to the 19. propositions.  and my judgement is established on these grounds. First, it is acknowledged to be a monarchy mixed with Aristocracy in the house of peers, and democracy in the house of Commons. Now( as before was made appear in the first part) it is no mixture which is not in the roote and supremacy of power: For though it hath a subordination of inferior officers, and though the powers inferior be seated in a mixed subject, yet that makes it not a mixed Government; for it is compatible to the simplest in the world to have subordinate mixtures.  
His Majesty acknowledgeth monarchy to be so mixed with aristocraty and democraty in the exercise of some part of his power, that the conveniences of all those forms of Government, without the inconveniences of any of them, are obtained by such a mixture; But he denieth the mixture to be in the power itself, for the convenience which he saith it hath from monarchy, is, that it is Governed by one Head: Where by one Head, he meaneth not, one by mixture, but one single Person, one pure and unmixed subject, that hath all power and authority alone. The Treatiser, I conceive, hath purposely omitted his words, that his sense might not appear; but I shall city them in the next chapter, and show the true intention and meaning of them. Now whereas his Majesty hath acknowledged a mixture, to infer from thence that he granted the mixture to be in the power itself, because the other kind is not a true, but an improper kind of mixture, is a strainge and unusual way of argumentation. If his Majesty was in an error, and apprehended that to be a true mixture, which is not, all that can be concluded thereupon, is, that he misunderstoode the true nature of mixture, not that he granted the mixture to be such as they contend for; when it is evident that a man deny a thing in terminis, there is neither candour nor ingenuity in those, which will by consequences argue him to affirm it: Some accuse the roman catholics of idolatry, because they affirm such things, as in their conceit seem by way of consequence to allow it; but no man was ever so void of ingenuity as to dispute the question whether idolatry be worshipful, and then city them for authors that maintain it to be worshipful: In like manner some accuse Calvine of antinomianism, because he affirm such things, as in their conceit seem by way of consequence to justify the practise and religion of the Turcks; but no man was ever so unreasonable as to dispute the question whether the Turckish religion be the true religion, and then city him for an author that maintained it to be true; because it is evident that if those questions were propounded in terminis, the roman catholics would deny Idolatry to be worshipful; and Calvine, if he were alive, the Turckish religion to be the true religion, what consequences soever other men draw from their words. Yet the Treatiser dealeth in this manner with his Majesty; for although it be evident, that his Majesty denied, in terminis, the mixture of the English monarchy to be in the power itself, yet he argues him by consequences to affirm it: this to the Antecedent. But secondly the consequent is also false; the mistake is in himself not in his Majesty: why is it no mixture, which is not in the roote and supremacy of power? he answereth, Though it hath a subordination of inferior officers, and though the powers inferior be seated in a mixed subject, yet that makes it not a mixed Government; for it is compatible to the simplest in the world to have subordinate mixtures, what if no government in the world be so perfectly simplo as to exclude all subordinate mixtures? it doth not follow from thence, that it is no mixture which is not in the roote and supremacy of power, but the contrary; for a subordinate mixture is a mixture. I shall also deny the very ground and foundation of his argument; such subordinate mixtures, as are in the English monarchy, are not compatible to the simplest Government in the world, for where the Government is arbitrary and absolute both in respect of power, and in respect also of the use and exercise of it, supreme Governours can put forth all the acts of power and jurisdiction alone; they can make laws, raise taxes, and exercise their whole power, according to the full activity of it, without the concurrence of the other estates: and although they do often make use of their direction and assistance, yet this mixture in the exercise of power proceeds not from the constitution of Government, but from their own voluntary election, choosing this as the most conducible means to obtain the ends of Government. For although they may act according to the full activity of their power, yet they can not act in person at all times and in all places, nor is one mans wisdom sufficient to meet with all the Events and accidents of Government, by reason whereof they are driven to seek a remedy against such inconveniences as would arise from these and the like causes; and if, when they find no better, they substitute others and give them authority to act with them in the exercise of power, this voluntary mixture can not have such an effect as to denominate a Government mixed, because it depend upon the the immediate will of the supreme governor, who may rule and actuate all his intentions and purposes without them, where and when he please: and whether he acts with them, or without them, the frame of Government is still the same; for it is the constitution of a Government that specificate it, and causeth it to be denominated mixed, or simplo. And therefore whereas the Treatiser saith though the powers inferior be seated in a mixed subject, yet that makes it not a mixed Government, this is false when the answers inferior are seated in a mixed subject by the constitution of the Government, and not by the immediate will of the supreme governor. There is a great difference then between such subordinate mixtures, and the subordinate mixture that is in the English monarchy, those are mutable, uncertain, depending upon the will of the supreme governor, this immutable, certain, depending upon the constitution of the Government: for whether it was effected by original contract with the people at the first foundation of the Monarchy, or whether it was established afterward by the voluntary grant and concession of some of our Kings, or whether it was introduced by custom, the Government is now so constituted, that the King can not make laws, raise subsidies, or exercise some other acts of his power, without the assent of the two other estates. So that the very constitution of the Government is mixed in some respect, namely in respect of the exercise of some acts of power, which happeneth not in Commonwealths where the Government is arbitrary. besides that which is here alleged, the Treatiser bringeth other objections in his reply to Doctor Fern, against mixture in the use and exercise of power. Aristocracy and Democracy, saith he, are powers, 
Pag. 38.  not Persons, as well as Monarchy: therefore a composition of these three must be all of powers, and endeed this Chimera of a mixture in the exercise of power is plain non sense, for a mixture in the acts or exercise supposeth a mixture in the principles of action, that is in the very powers: A mixed act proceeding from a simplo power, is such stuff that I never heard before. First he saith that Aristocracy and democracy are powers not persons, as well as Monarchy; and this he taks for granted, which is both an apparent falsity, and a solecism; for monarchy, aristocraty, and democraty, are neither answers, nor persons, but forms of Government equally relating to both, the words, according to their etymologies, noting persons as well as answers; and when these are mixed together it is the mixture of persons, not of answers, that denominate a mixed form of Government, as I shall show immediately. Secondly he saith that a mixture in the exercise of power is plain non sense for a mixture in the acts or exercise supposeth a mixture in the principles of action, a mixed act proceeding from a simplo power is such stuff that I never heard. Here in stead of law he bringeth an axiom, either of his own coining, or taken out of some author that receiveth De causa& causato, to confirm his mixture; such axioms are no authentical proofs were they generally true, which for the most part they are not, but admit of divers limitations: it is a very difficult matter to prove what kind of Government is established in any commonwealth, by Bedas axioms, or the axioms of any other author; it had been more seasonable whilst he was mixing the rights of majesty, if, in making his assertion good, he had mixed a little Law with his Philosophy and logic. But as his axiom is not authentical, so without divers restrictions, it is not true; A mixed act may proceed from a simplo cause, the sun doth by the same power heat, resolve, and harden, at the same time; for the virtue of natural Agents is diversely modificated of the subject wherein it is received, and acteth variously according to the several dispositions thereof. And yet if his axiom were authentical, or true, it is not pertinent; for what have we to do with mixed acts? the question is, whether the mixture of several estates in the exercise of some acts of power be not a true mixture, sufficient to denominate a mixed Government; how doth it follow now that it is no true mixture because a mixed act can not proceed from a simplo power? If that were true, yet a mixed form of Government may proceed from the mixture of several persons and estates: the division of Government into simplo and mixed, is made in respect of the persons, and estates, not of the power, which remains the same under all forms and changes of Government, and can not properly & per se, but improperly & per accidence be said to be mixed; for it is mixed onely ad mixtionem subjecti, when it is seated in a mixed subject, being otherwise the same that it is in a simplo: and when a simplo form of Government is changed into a mixed, or a mixed into a simplo, the power suffereth not the least alteration, but is denominated simplo or mixed, according as it is seated in a simplo or mixed subject. This is the Common assertion of all authors, who do generally teach the diversity of Commonwealths to arise from the diversity of Persons, their simplicity and mixture, from the simplicity and mixture of Persons, and estates; not from the diversity, or from the simplicity and mixture of powers. Quoad imperium haud discriminamus species rerum publicarum: Siquidem in qualibet Rep. deprehendere est summam legibusque solutam potestatem; verum quoad eos penes quos imperium est, differentia reipublicae formarum fieri debet, eoque nomine aut Monarchicus aut Polyarchicus status est, Polyarchicus status aut simplex, aut vero mixtus existit. Besold. Tit. de Reg. legit. Frederic. Tileman. Disp. Digest. 2. thes. 8. We distinguish not the forms of Commonwealths by power, for there is a supreme power above the laws in every Commonwealth; but the difference ariseth from the persons in whom the power is seated: and in that respect the state of a Commonwealth is either monarchical, or Polyarchicall; the Polyarchicall state is either simplo or mixed. Now where the several forms of Government are totally mixed, that is, where the mixture of the thres Estates is both in the power and in the exercise of it, there the simplo forms of Government are corrupted, and that which results out of their mixture and corruption is an other form distinct from them all, which by authors is generally called a mixed Commonwealth: this kind of Government is always Polyarchicall, such a mixture being incompatible to monarchy. But where they are but partially mixed that is, where the mixture of the three Estates is in the exercise of power alone, there the simplo forms of Government are not destroyed by such a mixture, but suffer onely an accidental change. This is a light mixture in comparison of the other, but as great as is consistent with any of the simplo forms of Government; and as true a mixture as the former, which although it doth not totally corrupt, yet it doth manifestly alloy the simplicity of a Government: for where several estates have interest by the constitution of a Government in the exercise of power, the Government is not so simplo, as where one of the estates alone have all the interest.  
Secondly that power where the legislative power is in all three, is in the very roote and essence of it compounded and mixed of those three; for that is the height of power, to which the other partes are subsequent and subservient: so that where this resideth in a mixed subject, that is in three distinct concurrent estates, the consent and concourse of all most free, and none depending on the will of the other, that Monarchy is in the most proper sense and in the very model of it of a mixed constitution: but such is the state of this monarchy, as appears in the former question, and is selfe-apparent.  
This objection is soon answered by that which hath been said in the fifth chapter; but because it is their principal objection, I will more at large show the invalidity of it: first therefore I answer to the antecedent, that the concurrence of one or both the other Estates with the Monarch in the making and promulgation of laws is no good colour or pretence, much less a sufficient ground for such a coordination and mixture as is pressed by them: Although their assents be free, and not depending upon the will of the Monarch, they are not thereby coordinate with him in the rights of sovereignty, It is the common assertion of 
Pannormit. cap. gravem de sententia excommun.  Canonists, 
Bertol. in L. omnes populi ff. de justitia& jure q. 2. princip. quoestiune. 5. num. 20.  Civilians, and 
Suarez lib. 1. de legibus lib. 1. cap. 8. num. 9.  schoolmen, nor is it to my knowledge contradicted by any, that the Legislative power is delegable, 
Besold de jurib. Majest. cap. 2.  that such a concurrence is no argument of supremacy, or of such a mixture as they would infer out of it: 
Arnisae doct. polit. lib. 1 cap. 8.  Some call it therefore apparence mixtura because it seemeth to destroy a simplo form of government, and to make a mixture in the power itself, but doth not; though otherwise they aclowledge it to be such a mixture as doth remit the simplicity thereof. Grotius affirmeth to this purpose, Istam legislationem, quae alii quam summae potestati competit, 
De imperio summarum potestatem circa sacra, cap. 8. num. 11.  nihil imminuere de jure summae potestatis; quod in Scholis dicunt, cumulativè datam censeri, non privativè. He speaketh this of laws made by general conventions whose concurrence, he saith, doth not in the least manner diminish the rights of Majesty. Such a mixture of the three estates hath been in other Monarchies which all men aclowledge to have been absolute in respect of power; In the Persian monarchy, how absolute soever, the other Estates had interest with the Monarch in the legislative power, as appeareth by that passage of Daniel, wherein the Princes, Governours, and others officers of Darius sought to betray him by a law. 
Dan. cap. 6. ver. 7.8.9.  Then these Presidents and Princes assembled together to the King, and said thus unto him, King Darius live for ever, all the Presidents of the kingdom, the Governours, and the Princes, the counsellors, and the captaines, have consulted together to Establish a royal Statute, and to make a firm decree, that whosoever shall ask a petition of any God or man for thirty days save of thee, O King, he shall be cast into the den of lions. Now, O King, Establish the decree and sign the writing that it be not changed, according to the law of the Medes and and Persians which altereth not, wherefore King Darius signed the writing and the decree. These Princes, Governours, and Officers of Darius, had the same authority in making laws that the Lords and Commons have in England; yet were not coordinate with the King: They had votum Consultivum and Decisivum; these words, have consulted to establish a royal Statute, include both an act of counsel, and an act of authority and jurisdiction. Grotius saith they signed the decree as well as the King, and that they had this authority by the constitution of the Government: 
In Dan. cap. 6.  And the sequel of the history doth imply as much; for had the act been his alone, had he set out this decree by way of Edict or Proclamation, he might have altered it himself, as Ahasuerus did the decree he set out touching the destruction of the Iewes: 
easter 3.12.13.& 8.10.13.  but being made by the assent of others who had a concurrent authority with him by law, he could not alter it. I shall not need to instance in the roman Empire, or in other kingdoms, for it is generally known that such a mixture was in that, and hath been, and is, in most other Monarchies. And not onely whole representative bodies, but divers particular free cities have the same privilege; yet have not supreme authority. In our own kingdom the Common counsel of every Incorporation have authority to make ordinances and constitutions within their own liberties, for the good order and Government of their body. The inhabitants of every Parish have authority to make Bylawes and Ordinances amongst themselves for their own profit, where they have custom for it; and for the public good, where they have no custom. cook part. 5. in the chamberlain of Londons case; tit. Cases de Bilawes& ordinances. Inhabitants dun ville, sauns auscun custom poyent faire ordinances ou Bylawes pure reparation deal Eglise, ou dun haut voy, ou dascun tiel choose, queen est pure le bien public generalment,& in tiel case le greinder part lier̄ touts sauns ascun custom. Vide 44. E. 3. 19. Mes si soit pure lour private profit dem̄, comme pure le bien ordering de lour Common de pasture ou semblables; la Sauns custom ills ne poient faire Bylawes. The Inhabitants of a parish without any custom may make Ordinances and Bylawes for the reparation of a Church or of the high way, or any other thing that is for the pubique good in general, and in such a case the greater part shall bind the less. But if it be for their own profit, as for the ordering of their Common, or the like, there without custom they can not make Bylawes. Why doth not the Treatiser and the pretended Parliamentarians conclude from hence that every man is coordinate with the King in the rights of sovereignty? for this is done by the legislative power, and this authority they have by the constitution of the Government.  
But secondly I answer to the consequent, that the Legislative power is not radically in the three Estates, but in the King alone; for although their assent be free and dependeth not upon his will, yet their authority is derived from him: he should have proved his consequent, which he saith appeareth in the former question, where indeed he doth confidently affirm the whole latitud of the Nomotheticall power to be jointly in the three estates, yet offereth not to prove it. But there is scarcely any man in the kingdom, so much a Strainger to to the laws, but knows that the King alone hath power to dispense with the Statutes, and to abate their rigour where a mischief would otherwise ensue; that he alone hath power by edicts and proclamations to order all affairs for which there is no order taken by certain and perpetual laws, that he with his judges hath power to declare the meaning of the law, and to give an authentic interpretation to statutes of ambiguous and doubtful sense. The King can exercise these and all other partes of the Nomotheticall power which are of absolute necessity to government without the assent of the two houses, whose concurrence is onely necessary in making laws which shall bind posterity, and may not be repealed without the consent of the people, as well as of the King. And when such laws are made it is the Kings authority that givs life unto them, they having otherwise no power to oblige the conscience then as they are his commands. This hath been sufficiently confirmed already, yet I will here further illustrate the truth by the testimonies of 
Lib. 3. cap. 9.  Bracton and the author of 
Lib. 1. cap. 17.  Fleta, who applying that passage of the civill Law, Quod Principi placet legis habet potestatem, to the King of England, say, that clause ought not to be understood of every thing that is rashly presumed to be his will, but of that which is justly determined upon good advice and deliberation by the council of his Magistrates, Rege Authoritatem praestante, the King giving it authority, and confirming it for a law: and from hence by an argument ab indecoro they show that the King ought not to do unjustly, Cum ipse sit Author juris non debet ind Injuriarum nasci occasio, unde jura nascuntur, when he himself is the author of the law, injustice ought not to spring from the same fountain from whence the law doth spring. The legislative authority is in the King therefore as in its spring and fountain, and in the other Estates by derivation; they have right and interest in the use and exercise of some partes of the power, and may assent or dissent what shall be made a law, but the power itself is radically in him. Now the legislative power is either architectonical or preceptive: the architectonical power is that which layeth the materials of a law, and it consisteth in two things. First, in determining what is just, convenient, or necessary, to be enacted; they to whom this power is committed, have no jurisdiction granted them, but onely an office and employment to deliberate and consult. Secondly, in declaring and promulgating that to be actually made a law and enacted, which upon consultation is thought to be just, Convenient, or necessary; they to whom this power is committed, have a jurisdiction granted them to define authoritatively what shall be a law. The preceptive power is that which impresseth a character upon the law that maketh it sacred and inviolable, and which giveth it force to oblige the conscience. It is evident that both partes of the architectonical power is committed to the two houses, they have votum consultivum& decisivum both authority to consult what is just, convenient, or necessary; and also to decree what shall be made a law: but this authority is derived from the King. It is not much material to the present question if it be granted also that they have a Preceptive power; yet the law giveth them not so much. The Treatiser in his reply to Doctor Fern seemeth to be unsatisfied with this answer and doth there dispute against it after this manner, my second argument saith he for radical mixture, 
Pag. 39.  is from the Legislative power being in all three: He answers; that phrase is satisfied and explained by that concurrence and consent in the exercise of supreme power. It seems that invention of his must serve all turns, is a legislative power satisfied by a bare powerless consent? I demand: is that consent causal and authoritative? or merely consiliarie and unauthoritative? And whereas I prove that they have an enacting authority by that received and set clause in the beginning of acts; Be it enacted by the Kings most excellent Majesty, and the authority of the lords and Commons assembled in Parliament. He tell us a vote and power of assenting is a great authority, I inquire not how great it is: I ask whether that be all; whether that clause, which as expressly as words can, asscribs an enacting authority to them, be satisfied by such a power of assenting. Here are many words heaped together, yet not so much as one that toucheth the present controversy: the question is not, whether the two houses have authority, nor yet wether they have an enacting authority; it is evident they could not sit as judges in the court without authority, nor enact without an enacting authority: but the question is, first, whether their enacting authority spoken of in the foresaid clause be onely a power of assenting that such or such a law shall be established, or a power that Commandeth and giveth life and vigour to the laws: Secondly, whether this power be radically in themselves or derived from the King. 
7. H. 7. 14.& 11. H. 7. 25.  To the first I say that it is onely a power of assenting that such or such a law shall be established; for it hath been resolved by the judges that this clause which he allegeth, Be it enacted by the Kings most excellent Majesty, and the authority of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament, is no more in substance and effect then that which was used anciently, The King, 
Lambarts Archeion fol. 271.  with the assent of the Lords and Commons, establisheth, the words assenteth and enacteth being equivalent in this case. And to the second I say that their authority is derived from the King, not radically in themselves; For although this Treatiser knows nor, or will not seem to know how to put a difference between having an enacting authority, and having the Legislative authority radically in themselves: yet the judges did, and the Statutes do: For they may enact by a delegate authority, that is by having the use and exercise of the Legislative power committed to them so far as is necessary to that act, although it be not radically in them as their own. But now the Treatiser Speaketh not a word to either of these points, but sheweth onely that they have an enacting authority, which is a point not controverted. For their power of assenting and laying the materials of a law, is an enacting power, although their activity be not equal to the Kings; Subordinate Agents that are but Instruments of an other, and work by a derived power, when they concur with the principal and supreme Agent have their causality in producing the effect. And therefore whereas he demandeth whether their consent be causal and authoritative, or merely consiliary and unauthoritative? I answer that it is as causal and authoritative as if the legislative power were radically in themselves, for he that worketh with an other mans tools is as much the cause of the work as if the tools he useth were his own; whether the authority by which they enact be the Kings, or radically in themselves, the effect will be the same. Now I confess it is not expressed in the clause that their authority is derived from the King, nor is it expressed to be supreme, but onely authority is attributed to them in general terms, as it is also to the Justices, and other delegate and subordinate Ministers in divers Statutes, neither is it necessary or convenient that wheresoever the word authority is name, it should be defined whether supreme or derived authority be meant in that place, for it is expressly declared in divers Statutes that all authority is derived from the King, and it is not needful it should be declared in all.  
It may be further objected that these words, Be it enacted by the Kings most excellent Majesty, and the authority of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament do imply distinct authorities, the authority of the King and the authority of the lords and Commons; for the addition of these words, And the authority of the Lords, and Commons, is improper, if laws be enacted by the Kings authority alone. To this I answer; first, that there is nothing more frequent when the King acteth jointly with his subordinate Ministers, then to ascribe a concurrent authority to those that act with him, although their authority be derived from his Majesty: for although his authority can not be separated from him privativè as hath been said, yet cumulativè it may, that is, it may be inherent in his own Person, and yet be in others too, as the light of the sun is inherent in its own body, and yet multiplied and diffused through the world; Now when it is separated from him after that manner, it is commonly called their authority to whom it is committed, because they are the seat and subject of it. That light which the stars derive from the sun is usually called the light of the stars, and the stars are said by the means thereof to concur with the sun, and to have a causality and operation upon inferior bodies; it is no impropriety to say, The light of the sun and the light of the stars enlighteneth all the world, although the light of the stars be derived from the sun. The judges have authority by the constitution of the Government to interpret a statute jointly with the King, as well as the two houses have authority jointly with him to make it, so that the King can no more without their assent and concurrence give an authentical interpretation to a law, then he can make it without the assent and concurrence of the other; the exposition of a law must be made by the concurrent authority of them both, the authority of the King, and the the authority of the judges; yet no man hath hitherto affirmed the judges to be supreme, or to have any other authority then what they derive from the King by Commissions, writs, letters patents, Statute, or prescription. But secondly, what if it be granted that the Lords and Commons have authority of their own distinct from the Kings authority? To speak my own opinion freely I think they have a distinct authority. I mean not supreme authority, but an authority derived from the King, yet distinct from his. He that hath but a delegate power, if it be committed to him for term of years, term of life or perpetuity, he doth by such a grant acquire an estate in the said power, and an authority distinct from his that gave it him. As in an Estate of lands wherein a man hath a perpetual right in fee simplo, or in fee tail, his right is distinguished from the Kings right of whom he holds it, the King having the demean of the Land, and the other the demean of the Fee: so it is in an estate of power and authority; if the King granteth an estate of power, authority, and jurisdiction, in fee simplo, or in fee tail, for term of years, term of life, or perpetuity, their rights in the said authority are distinct, the King hath the demean of the Power, the other the demean of the use, the King hath Dominium directum the other Dominium utile. When one man hath power and authority to use an other mans power and authority, their authorities are apparently distinct. And this is the present case; the Legislative power is wholly and entirely the Kings, yet the lords and Commons have a perpetual right in the use and exercise of some part thereof, so that the King can not actually make a law, except they will also use the authority committed to them, it being in their power to assent or not assent, to use or not to use, the said authority. There is an authority then in the Lords and Commons distinct from the Kings authority which must necessary be put forth in the making of laws, yet not supreme, but subordinate to the King, derived from him, and depending upon him. For their authority is not subsistent of itself, but dependeth upon the Kings authority, as the light in the air dependeth upon the light in the sun, as a shadow dependeth upon the substance, or an accessary upon the principal. But this is more then can be forced out of the foresaid clause, and I think more then is intended in it.  
Thirdly, that Monarchy in which three estates are constituted to the end that the power of the one should moderate and restrain from excess the power of the other, is mixed in the roote and essence of it, but such is this as is confessed in the answer to the said propositions.  
The Antecedent and consequent must both be denied; The erection of courts, wherein the judges have authority to proceed according to law, notwithstanding the personal and arbitrary Commands of the King, hath always been esteemed a strong and effectual means to restrain and moderate the excesses of monarchy: Yet the judges can not be inferred from hence to be coordinate with the King in the rights of sovereignty, or to have a mixed power with him in the Government of the kingdom. But the consequent hath neither appearance nor shadow of truth; Parliaments were ordained, that the other estates might consult with the King about the weighty affairs of the kingdom as often as he thought it needful, and agree to such laws as should be found profitable and expedient: not that they should quarrel and contest with him. It is true the two houses do for the most part in time of Parliament gain an opportunity to have grievances redressed, because they may otherwise deny the King the assistance he desire, but they have no authority radically in themselves to do it; nor were they constituted for that end. If it should be granted that Parliaments are by original constitution and agreement, and that the People have always given what laws they pleased to the conqueror as often as the crown hath been obtained by conquest; yet in probability they could have no such end as this Treatiser imagineth, or to abuse the people, seemeth to imagine: had they purposed the three estates, should moderate the excesses of one another in Parliaments, they would never have granted the King authority to dissolve them at his pleasure, whereby he might easily avoid and frustrate their intention. besides Parliaments are so tempered as it is impossible to attain to that end by such a mixture; one of the estates, or any two of them, having no authority to make an act of Parliament without the third, which way can they moderate the excesses of one another by such acts further then the exorbitant estate shall be willing to be moderated? Nor doth his Majesty, as he imputeth to him, any where confess that three estates are constituted in this monarchy to the end that the power of one should moderate and restrain from excess the power of the other, I am sure his majesty saith not this in terminis, he should therefore have cited his words, that the Reader might have judged of their sense.  
These are the objections, brought by the author of the Treatise of monarchy which are partly taken out of the fuller Answerer, and partly invented by himself. In answering them to avoid needless, Controversies I have granted that a mixed form of government is possible, although I be not ignorant that a mixed Government is but the invention of later times, and reputed impossible by authors of chiefest note. I have admitted also that the King, the Nobility, and Commons, are the three Estates of Parliament, although I know this contrary to the intention of the Statutes, wherein the three Estates of Parliament are declared to be the clergy, the Nobility, and the Commons. I have insisted the longer upon these objections because the author of the foresaid treatise is esteemed by some the chief Advocate of that side. I intend not to derogate from the author, who I presume would have written more substantially had the case been capable of defence; Yet if a man may guess at his humour by that treatise, he seemeth to be much more inclined to assert new principles, then to show reasons how they should be maintained. That he might illude the laws wherein the Government of England is declared monarchical, he layeth down divers positions to this effect, that where a transcendent interest, 
Part. 1. cap. 4  or primity of share, is in one man, it is sufficient to constitute a monarchy, although the other Estates have their shares also in the rights of sovereignty, and supreme authority; but he doth not so much as ofter to prove this either by law, or reason, although it be contrary to the Common received principles of other authors, who teach that such a trascendent interest or primity of share can not make a Monarch. 
Besold. Synops. Polit. doct. lib. 1. cap. 6. num. 4.  For such a pre-eminence is in some persons in the most popular States, as in the dukedoms of Venice and Genua where the Dukes have a transcendent interest, and primity of share, above the rest, and are Rectores& executores summique magistratus, having the gubernative, and executive power in their hands, and excelling all other in dignity and authority: 
Clapmar. Dearcan. Rerump. Tit. de simulacris Imperii cap. 3.  Such pre-eminences therefore are reckoned amongst the Simulacra Imperii Regii being but images and shadows of Kingly Government where full and entire power is wanting. again that he might illude the laws wherein the King is declared to be supreme, he Saith that a transcendent interest, or utmost Chiefty, 
Vindication of the Treatise of monarchy fol. 39.  is sufficient to make good that title; yet he endeavoureth not to confirm this by one instance or example of law, although it be contrary to the received signification of the word when it hath reference to power and jurisdiction: for in law when a governor or ruler is called supreme, the word supreme is always opposed to subordinate, and not to less: amongst Lawyers he shall often find power and jurisdiction divided into supreme and subordinate, but never into supreme, and less, if that which is less be also supreme, and independent. Nor is this principle consonant to that which he saith in other places; for if the Legislative power, which he saith in one of his objections is the height of power all the other partes being subsequent and subservient thereunto, be jointly in the three Estates, how is the Apex and culmen potestatis in the King alone? how can he be denominated supreme in his own sense by having the subsequent and subservient partes of power? But yet if his new principles were granted to be true, he can not by such shifts in any plausible manner evade the Statutes, wherein the King is declared to have entire, whole, and plenary power, and to be so supreme that all authority is derived from him, and wherein it is declared that all obedience is due to him, and to him onely: will a transcendent interest make good all this? is a Primity of Share entire, whole and plenary power? can all authority be derived from him that hath but an utmost chiefly? is all obedience due to one of the Estates, where the mixture is in the power itself, and supreme authority radically in the other? Surely if the other Estates have power, allegiance and obedience is due unto it; they had as good challenge no power, as challenge no obedience.   

CHAP. IX.  
Divers general objections taken from the testimony of his Majesty, Bracton, and Fortescue, together with the presidents of Edward the second, and Richard the second, answered.  
besides the former objections they urge the testimony of his Majesty, of Bracton, and Fortescue; to which I anwer in general, that the decision of this controversy depends upon law, and not upon the bare words and authority of any. The words of Lawyers are to be regarded no further then they are approved by law; for they are but men, and may be incited by passion or private interest to speak or writ what they ought not. I have therefore purposely myself omitted all proofs of that nature, and although I could produce a catalogue of Lawyers longer then a genealogy to confirm the Kings right, yet I have cited none but such as prove what they say by the laws, except onely those that are cited by themselves, which I had also omitted, but that I desire to make it evident how far those authors are from favouring their seditious opinions. And if his Majesty out of a desire to avoid the effusion of blood used such gracious expressions as were most likely to prevail with the people, and consolidate their mindes, they ought not in equity to prejudice the rights of the crown, although he had abdicated therein some parte of his authority, and granted things destructive to his own prerogative. I have given this general answer not because his Majesty, Bracton, or Fortescue have affirmed any thing in favour of their right, but to show the insufficiency of this objection in case they had; but the truth is they have notoriously perverted the meaning of his Majesty, as also the meaning of Bracton and Fortescue. And although I can not Imagine any man so senseless as to believe his Majesty ever subscribed to their judgement; or any that have perused the works of Bracton and Fortescue so void of understanding as to think they were ever abettors of such fantasies: yet that they may not exclaim for want of an answer I will more particularly examine what they say.  
Out of his Majesties answer to the nineteen propositions they allege this passage. There being three kinds of Government amongst men, absolute Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, and all these having their particular conveniences and inconveniences, the experience and wisdom of your ancestors, hath so moulded this out of a mixture of these, as to give to this kingdom( as far as human prudence can provide) the conveniences of all three, without the in conveniences of any one, as long as the balance hangs even between the three estates, and they run jointly on in their proper channel( begetting verdure and fertility, in the moddowes on both sides and the overflowing of either, on either side raise no deluge or inundation); the ill of absolute monarchy is Tyranny; the ill of aristocracy is faction and division; the ills of democracy are tumults, violence, and licentiousness. The good of monarchy is the uniting a nation under one head, to resist invasion from abroad, and insurrection at home; the good of Aristocracy is the conjunction of council in the ablest persons of a state for the public benefit; the good of democracy is liberty and the courage and industry which liberty begets— the Lords being trusted with a judicatory power, are an excellent screen and bank between the prince and people— by just judgements to preserve the law, since— therefore the power legally placed in both houses is more then sufficient to prevent and restrain the power of tyranny— since to the power of punishing, which is already in your hands according to law. Thus far, and in this manner, his Majesty is cited by the fuller Answerer, who that he might the better wrest his Majesties Speeches to his own purpose, hath made many transitions from one place to another, mutilating the sense, and leaving out that which should have made his Majesties meaning apparent. 
Answer to Doctor Fern pag. 3.  And from these words he maketh divers deductions; his first deduction is, that his Majesty granteth the Government of England to be mixed in the power itself, this he infereth because his Majesty acknowledgeth a mixture, and it is no true mixture he saith, which is not in the very supremacy of power itself; but this is answered in the former chapter: I shall here onely desire the reader to take notice that his Majesties true and real intention is such as I have their expounded; for these words, The good of monarchy is the uniting a Nation under one Head, are a perfect Comentarie upon the former, and do clearly manifest that his Majesty asserted not the Head and seat of supreme power to be a mixed subject, but granted a Mixture in the administration of power alone. His second deduction is that the King granteth the power of interpreting, 
Reply to Doctor Fern pag. 34.  and giving final judgement of the sense of law, to be in the two houses, this he concludeth to be his Majesties meaning when he saith, The Lords being trusted with a judicatory power, are an excellent screen and bank between the King and People by just judgements to preserve the law. But this they may do without having a power of interpretation and giving final judgement of the sense of law; It is sufficient that they have a power to interpret law judically in such cases as are cogniscible in the court, when they are brought before them, although they have no power to interpret it authoritatively, and to rule all cases as they please. This is a great Savegard to the people, and as convenient and fit a remedy against oppression as human prudence can provide, for a certain and infallible remedy against all mischiefs they can not have: if the two houses had a power to declare what they would to be law, what screen should the people have against their oppression? what banks to hinder the irruption of their tyranny? whereas now they have a remedy by law against the evil instruments of the King, and may repair their losses by a legal trial, what remedy could they have against the misimplyed agents of the houses? Such a power placed in them, would not make them a Screen or bank between the Prince and people, but a rock and precipice, dangerous and fatal to them both; and would be as contrary to the true interest of the kingdom, as the inference is to his Majesties true intention. But the best of all is that he infereth from the words above said both the houses to have a power of declaring law, for whereas his Majesty in the premises speaks onely of the house of Lords, by a trike of more then Presbyterian legerdemain he hath juggled the house of Commons into his inference. His third deduction is that his Majesty granteth the two houses a power of forcible resistance in case they should judge his actions tyrannicall and unjust; this he collecteth out of these words since— therefore the power legally placed in both houses is more then sufficient to prevent and restrain the power of tyranny. This he says can not be made good unless the houses have a power of resistance; for tyranny can not be otherwise restrained. But it is evident that his Majesty speaks not in this place of a forcible, but of a legal way of restraint; Id posset quisquam quod jure posset, Every man is said to have a power to do that which he can do by law, although he may be hindered in the execution of it. His Majesty grants them not an absolute power of restraining tyranny, but let that be taken in which goeth immediately before, and his words will bear no other sense but that they have a power of restraining it, so far as human prudence can by worshipful and just ways provide: as for forcible resistance his Majesty knew it to be against the law of God, and that to invest the pretended houses with such a power, was not the way to pull down, but to set up tyranny. neither is forcible resistance a more certain means of restraining tyranny then other legal ways less corrosive, if the houses had a power of resistance, they are not sure always to prevail, a tyrant and his evil instruments may be able sometimes to oppose them, and to hinder the execution of their power: it is not convenient therefore they should have such a power, it is better to tolerate a mischief then to use a remedy which is worse then the disease, and uncertain too. But they have by law a double power as effectual as forcible resistance, they may inflict exemplary punishment upon evil instruments, whereby others may be afraid to take upon them such employments, and they may refuse to give the King subsidies and other necessary assistance, if he refuseth to moderate his excesses; If a tyrant and his evil instruments be strong and in no necessity, were it worshipful to resist and to levy war against them, the success would be doubtful, the damage certain: and if the best happen they should but cure the commonwealth of an Ague by giving if the Plauge; but if he be necessitated either by insurrections, or otherwise, to crave the assistance of his subjects, they shall then have liberty to execute their power upon his evil instruments, or to make use of any other means the law hath put into their hands. Where tyranny reigns such opportunities will in a short time assuredly be offered; the best Princes can not always suppress rebellions by the help of their loyal subjects, how much less can tyrants be able to do it without them. Such exigencies being considered, I say the power legally placed in the houses is more then sufficient to restrain tyranny, without a power of resistance.  
Secondly they allege the testimony of Bracton. Rex habet superiorem Deum. S. item legem per quam factus est Rex, 
L●b. 2. cap. 16.  item curiam suam videlicet Comites, Barones, that is, The King hath God, the law, and his Court of earls and Barons superior to him.  
Themselves will not admit the house of Lords alone to be superior to the King, and yet these words can have reference to no other; for the house of Commons consists not of earls and Barons, neither are they a court of judicature. It is otherwise also evident that Bractons scope and meaning can not be such as they would fasten on him, who, when he speaketh of this subject, doth every where resolve the contrary, whereof the places above cited are sufficient instances. The words therefore can not relate to a legal superiority over the person of the King, but to a moral superiority over his conscience, and they imply onely that the King in governing the people hath God, the law, and the house of earls and Barons morally above him, by whose admonitions and judgements, so far as they are legal, he ought in conscience to be swayed. I well set down the whole and entire Period, with that which immediately before hath reference to it, and let the Reader Judge of the sense. Nec factum Regis nec chartam potest quis judicare, ita quod factum Domini Regis irritetur. said dicere poterit quis, quod Rex justitiam fecerit,& been,& si hoc eadem ratione quod male,& ita imponere ei quod injuriam emendet, ne incidat Rex& justic. in judicium viventis Dei propter injuriam Rex autem habet superiorem Deum. S. item legem per quam factus est Rex, item Curiam suam, videlicet Comites, Barones, quia Comites dicuntur quasi Socii Regis,& qui habet socium habet Magistrum,& ideo si Rex fuerit sine froeno. 1. sine lege, debent ei froenum ponere. If these words be well considered it will be clear that nothing but a moral superiority can here be understood; first, he saith that no man hath authority to judge of the Kings fact, or of his Charter, Nec factum Regis nec Chartam potest quis judicare. This can not stand with a legal superiority; if the earls and Barons can not judge of the Kings fact, or of his charter, they can not have a legal superiority over him. Secondly, he saith some notwithstanding, in case justice be not duly administered, may advertise him thereof, and admonish him to reform his errors, said dicere poterit quis quod Rex justiciam fecerit,& been,& si hoc, eadem ratione quod male,& ita imponere ei quod injuriam emendet. thirdly he sheweth that the earls and Barons in Parliament have this authority, who, if they see him break out into violent and illegal Courses, ought to put a bridle of the law upon him, Rex autem hvbet superiorem Deum. S. item legem per quam factus est Rex, item Curiam suam videlicet Comites& Barones, &c. But the whole tenor and effect of the words import that they ought to put upon him a bridle of law by faire and gentill means, as by admonitions, advertisements, council, or any such other way as the law prescribs, and not like judges by force and compulsion. Fourthly, he saith the King hath God his superior, and the law, and the earls and Barons in his court: he maketh no distinction of superiority, but calleth them all superior after the same manner, now it is evident that God doth not exercise a legal superiority over Kings, and that the law being inanimate can not; both of them have onely a moral influence upon their consciences, and therefore those words must be interpnted onely of a moral superiority. It is true after his death God shall dispose of him as his judge, but Bracton in these place speaketh of giving present judgement upon his fact and upon his patents, according to human laws, which how illegal soever can not be judged by any: yet he saith God, the law, and the earls and Barons in his court are Morally above him, by whose counsels and admonitions he ought to amend his excesses. Fiftly he giveth this reason why they are his superiors because they are his Companions, and he that hath a Companion hath a master, this is true of a moral Master but not of a legal; all Companions can not Legally be one anothers Masters, but Morally they may. The whole coherence of the words, but especially this reason doth make it clear that they are meant of a moral superiority, so that if the whole period be taken in, this passage of Bracton maketh not for them, but against them.  
Thirdly they allege the testimony of Fortescue, who speaking of the King of England, saith, Principatu ne dum Regali said& Politico suo populo dominatur. That is, He governeth his people not onely by Kingly, but also by politic power.  
Fortescue implieth in these words that the King ought not to make his will, but the laws the rule of his power; not that others are coordinate with him in the rights of sovereignty. For Imperium is either Despoticum or Politicum; Despoticall or Kingly power is an arbitrary and unlimited power, not restrained by human laws and constitutions; politic power is a limited power, restrained and moderated by human and politic laws. Now Fortescue saith that the Kings power is not merely Despoticall and regal, but politic and tempered by law; and his intention is to show the difference between the common laws of England, and the civill law; by the civill laws the Emperour after the power was translated to him from the Commonwealth by that law which in the Digest is called lex regia, until the custom of making laws by the assent of the people took place again, might Command what he pleased, Quod Principi placet legis habet potestatem, is a part of that law; but the King of England, he saith, can not altogether govern his people by such a power, but is obliged to rule them according to the tenor of the politic laws and constitutions of the kingdom. But how doth this concern the case in hand?  
Fourthly they allege Presidents; Parliaments saith Mr. Prinne, have exercised a supreme power over the crown of England itself, to transfer it from the right heir, and settled it upon whom themselves thought meet to elect for their King. He citeth two Kings which were deposed, Edward the second, and Richard the second, and then concludeth that those Parliaments which have exercised such jurisdiction over them must certainly be above them, and the highest sovereign power.  
The deposition of those Kings hath been resolved treason by all the Iudges of England; 
cook institut part. 2. Tit. treason.  and yet if it had been legal, the Presidents are impertinent, for those acts were confirmed by the Kings themselves, and could never have been esteemed acts of Parliament without their own assent.   

CHAP. X.  
Objections made against the Kings supremacy in Particular, by Mr. Bridge, the reverend Divines, and Others, answered.  
THey have yet other objections whereby they endeavour to prove that the Particular rights of sovereignty are divided from the King and placed in the two houses. And first touching the Militia, Mr. Bridge and the reverend Divines, have found a device how the two houses may make use of that, and levy war against the King by his own authority. They say as judges they may sand out Messengers or Sergeants at arms for his evil counsellors, and in case they refuse to appear before them, fetch them in as delinquents by force of arms; this is the sum of their objection, but I will set it down in their own terms. Suppose, saith Mr. Bridge, a man be complained of to the Parliament for some notorious crime, it is granted by all that the Parliament hath a power to sand a Sergeant at arms for him, and if he refuse to come that Sergeant at arms hath a power to call more and if the Delinquent shall raise twenty or thirty or an hundred men to rescue him, then the Parliament hath power to sand down more Messengers by force to bring up the Delinquent, and if they may raise an hundred, why may they not upon the like occasion raise a thousand and so ten thousand? And again in his answer to Doctor Ferns reply. If the Parliament may sand one Sergeant at arms, then 20. then an hundred then a housand. This I confess is a very acute invention, for there can be by law but thirty Sergeants at arms at the same time within the realm; 
13. R. 2. cap. 6.  now if Mr. Bridge can show the two houses a way how out of thirty Sergeants at arms they may raise an army of a thousand, or ten thousand, his invention will be worthy to be applauded. The reverend Divines have in substance the same objection saving onely they are not so punctual for point of law as to have their army consist of Sergeants at arms; and they allege a case in law to justify that way of proceeding. Supposing, say they, the power of calling and dissolving Parliaments wholly in the King ordinarily; yet there may be such power in them so long as they do sit to command arms to be raised for the suppressing of any delinquents, maintaining themselves with arms even under the colour of the kings authority, which I those make good. If there be any such kind of power in the very judges in their courts at Westminster, for the whole kingdom, and in their several circuits for the shires they sit in, although themselves are made judges at the kings will merely, and put out ordinarily at his pleasure, and they can neither keep assizes at any time, nor keep any term any where, but when and so long as the King pleases to give commission: If( I say) there be such a power in the judges and even in one of them then much more in the whole Parliament, which is unquestionably and undoubtedly the highest judicature in the kingdom, and hath most power during their sitting, now that such a kind of power is in the Iudges I appeal to experience in the case following. A private man hath a suite with the King about land or house and the like, the king hath possession and some officer or tenant of his holds it for the king, the judges having heard the cause give sentence for the subject, ad judge him to have the possession delivered him by the kings tenant or officer; he refuses and arms himself to keep possession still upon these, after due summons and process of law a writ of rebellion shall go out against the officer of the kings even though he should pretend to keep possession still by a command and warrant from the King and the sheriff shall be commanded to raise arms even the whole posse Comitatus if need be to expel this officer of the kings and bring him to condign punishment for resisting the Kings authority in his laws. Here now is raysinge of arms by the Kings legal authority, against the Kings title, and the Kings officer notwithstanding any pretended authority from the kings personal command, and that officer hath a writ of rebellion sent against him, and shall be punished by law, for offering to resist the law upon any pretence( ask the overpowers whether in sense this be not the law, and ordinarily prastised, save that the king do not commande the contrary, but whether that would hinder law or not?) the Parliament may then in case of necessity raise arms against the Kings personal command for the general safety and keeping possession( which is more necessary then the hope of regaining) of the houses, lands, goods, liberties, lives, religion and all, and this by the Kings legal authority, and the resisters of this are the Rebells in the laws account, and not the instruments so employed legally, though with arms by the Parliament.  
For matter of fact, it was themselves that withheld Delinquents from a legal trial, the King detained none; but when divers members of the Parliament were assaulted in the streets, driven from the house, defamed by libels, and justice not permitted to take place, it was the office of the King to protect them in their rights and liberties, and to force the due execution of the laws: and if he refused to yield up those to their injustice which assisted him, this was not to keep Delinquents from their trial, but to protect his loyal subjects according to law; this for matter of fact. But for matter of right, suppose the King had taken up arms unjustly, the law doth not permit his courts to oppose him, or to call any in question that are assistant to him: when the King taketh up arms they which attend upon his person, 
11. H. 7. cap. 1.  or are employed in other places about the same service, may not be molested or troubled by process of law, or suffer any loss and damage in their estates for it, either by act of Parliament, or otherwise. As for their objection it is so full of erroneous passages and mistakes that I must let most of them go untouched; first, they assume the two houses to be the whole Parliament; Secondly, they assume them to be a court of judicature; thirdly they assume the judges to have a power of suppressing any delinquents, and maintaining themselves by arms: The two former assumptions are absolutely false, and the latter true onely in some cases, so far as they have order of law; and no man deny such a power to be in the two houses they may force delinquents to appear before them in such cases, and in such a manner as the law hath provided; for what is so done is done by the Kings authority, whose commands in law are to be obeied before his personal commands. But they must proceed no further, nor after any other manner then the King commands in law; neither they, nor the judges, can make what ordinances they please to raise arms, or employ their own instruments to bring in delinquents, but must proceed according to order of law, and commit the whole carriage of the business to such of the King officers as are appointed for that purpose, which are chiefly the high Sheriffs of counties, who are also confined by law, and may not exceed their commission. For both in the case put by the reverend Divines, and also in all cases whatsoever, if Delinquents grow so strong that they be able to resist the posse Commitatus, and can not be suppressed but by a war, and by the Militia of the Kingdom, the sheriff ought then to certify the court thereof, and the prosecution of the matter must be left to the King, to whom onely it is reserved to preserve the peace of the kingdom in such cases.  
Secondly they urge the oath taken by the King at his coronation against his Negative voice, whereby they say he is bound to give his assent to all bills offered him by the lords and Commons. The pretended houses in one of their Declarations have set down a form in latin which they say was anciently used, and ought now to be taken, concedis justas leges& consuetudines esse tenendas,& promittis pro te eas esse protegendas,& ad honorem Dei coroborandas, quas vulgus elegerit, secundum vires tuas Respondebit, Concedo,& promitto  
The word Elegerit they say may and ought to be taken in the future tense, and doth oblige the King to agree to all acts that shall be thought convenient by the Commons.  
If their gloss upon the said oath were authentical, yet an other form hath been long in use, whereof there are divers Presidents upon Record, wherein the King is sworn to uphould and maintain the laws and customs onely that are actually then in use when he taketh the said oath, not such as shall be offered him by the houses. The oath taken by his Majesty was this.  
bishop. Sir will you grant to hold and keep the laws and rightful customs, which the commonalty of this your Kingdoms have, and will you defend and uphould them, to the honour of God so much as in you lieth  
KING. I grant and promise so to do.  
If it were the custom anciently to take such an oath as they allege, that custom is now abrogated and other forms are upon record, which have been taken successively by many Kings together, and ought now to take place. Let not the Commons if they love their own interest pled to have all ancient customs revived. But secondly I say, that there was never such a custom; In the time of Henry the third the Kings oath contained onely these three things. 
B●acton ●. b. 3. cap. 9.  1. Se esse praecepturum,& pro viribus opem impensurum ut Ecclesiae Dei& omni populo Christiano vera pax, omni suo tempore observetur, 2. ut rapacitates& omnes iniquitates, omnibus gradibus interdicat, 3. ut in omnibus judiciis aequitatem praecipiat& misericordiam. Common practise doth also disprove such a custom; Kings have always refused what bills they would, yet breach of oath was never objected against them until these times. Now if the houses could show( which I believe they can not) that divers Kings have taken the foresaid oath, or any other bearing such a sense as they impose upon it, that is not sufficient to prove a custom seeing the practise was formerly, and is at the present otherwise. Thirdly if it be granted them that the said form ought now to be used, yet it will not admit of such an interpretation as they have given it; the worde laws in the oath can not be understood of those laws which shall afterwards be offered the King by the two houses in Parliament, for that clause, quas vulgus elegerit, can not be applied to the house of Lords. Fourthly let it be yet further granted that the above said form ought to be taken, and that the sense of it is such as they interpret, yet they bind him not to assent to all laws, but onely to those that are just, and so far he is bound in conscience to assent without an oath, and to that end he is assisted in Parliament by his justices, and council at law, who ought to in form him, where he wanteth information, what are the rights of the crown, what the liberties of the people, that so he might be the better able to determine what is fit to be passed, and what is fit to be denied.  
Thirdly some infer that the King hath not a power of dissenting, from the usual answer which he giveth when he refuseth to pass a bill, Le Roy s' adviserâ, wherein they say he doth not peremptorily deny his assent, but onely craveth time to deliberate upon it.  
To what purpose should he crave time to deliberate about that which can not be avoided, there is no consultation to be used de necessariis. Yet he may answer otherwise if he please, 
judge Ienkins fol. 32.  Roy ne veult, or 
Hollinsh. vol. 1 fol. 180  il ne plaist, are usual forms as well as that.  
Fourthly they allege Presidents, The Militia, and the chief officers of the kingdom, they say, have been disposed of in Parliament.  
If I should give a Particular anwer to all their Presidents I should weary the Reader with such impertinencies; sometimes they allege a seditious speech of some of the Members for an act of Parliament; sometimes they say such or such a thing was done by act of Parliament, and city an author in the margin, whereas no such thing is to be found in the said author; Sometimes they urge a President where in the houses denied to give the King such subsidies and assistance, as he required to his warres, because the said warres were undertaken without their assent, and conclude from thence that the power of making war and treating with foreign states belong to the two houses, when the reason of their denial was the miscarriages of the war, and the misimployment of former subsidies, not that they challenged the power of making war or treating with foreign states to pertain unto them. But supposing all that they say true, and all their Presidents pertinent, I shall make these two general answers; first, I say, that if the King, as in conscience he was bound, did at the request of the houses discharge divers corrupt officers, and substitute others into their places, or if upon just reasons and motives in the vacancy of an office he disposed of it by the assent and approbation of the two houses, or ordered his war by their advice and direction, this doth not argue them to have a right in the election of the said officers, or that the carriage and conduct of the war depended upon their assent: if the King at any time hath given way to their desires it was a voluntary and free act of grace, not an obligation of law. Secondly, I say, that if such a right as is pretended were placed in them by act of Parliament, such acts by the common law of the land were void, for the rights of the crown are settled upon it by the fundamental laws, as hath been shewed, and can not be separated by act of Parliament. These are all the objections which could without violence be referred to this place; The rest which depend not upon law shall be answered in the other questions, if any thing be omitted that seemeth to justify their cause, let any man undertake to answer me, and give me notice of it, and I doubt not but I shall be able, through the assistance of God, to make a full and satisfactory reply unto him. And this I shall desire of my Adversary, that when he maketh use of any authority he would city the words at large, as I myself have done in all material points, and not make references onely in the margin, that the Reader may judge of the scope and intention thereof, and be able to discern which of us dealeth faithfully, and which of us engaged by faction strive to illude the laws, and wrest them from their genuine and native sense.  
And th use by the Grace and Mercy of God I have in part discharged my conscience, being bound by all the bonds both of divine and human laws to oppose and withstand, as far I am able, the false doctrine, and principles, which Wolves in sheeps clothing endeavour daily to infuse into mens minds. I shall easily avoid, I presume, the usual calumny incident to those which writ upon this subject, as namely, that under the pretext of promoting the Apostles doctrine of obedience, they intend by flattering Princes, to promote their own private interest. I would to God the condition of his Majesty and the kingdom were such as they might have some colour to lay that imputation upon me. But I am not ignorant that I might Sooner have advanced my own interest by adoring the pretended Parliament, who dispose of all mens estates and fortunes at their pleasure, pretending as much right to all his Majesties kingdoms, 
Luke 4.6.  and to all the power and glory thereof; as the devil did to all the kingdoms in the world. For that, say the Members, is delivered unto us, and to whomesoever we will, we give it, And I know they use to distribute their favours liberally to those that will fall down and worship them. But how poor soever my condition is, I have no inclination to buy my interest at so dear a rate; I had rather perish in the performance of my duty then be confederate to their sacrilege, and other Impieties, or not render my country that service which I owe it, for whose liberty I would willingly Sacrifice not onely my own interest, but my life. I should be no good English man if I did not desire a better subject to discourse upon then the miseries of the kingdom, and if by being silent and turning away mine eyes, I could help to quench the flamme that audacious and factious Spirits have Kindled in it, I should have abstained from writing at this time: But the danger and miserable condition of the Commonwealth calls for action to all those, which had not rather see all things managed according to the appetite of those Incendiaries and Firebrands of sedition, then hazard themselves and their own interest for the rights and liberties of the kingdom. I could wish that all whom it concerns would seriously consider, that the fat and riches of the land was the patrimony and Inheritance of their ancestors, and may be of their Posterity, if their own fears and negligence givs it not to their enemies. I could wish also that the pretended Parliamentarians would seriously consider their own condition, whom I esteem of all men most miserable: To speak my desires, I wish unfeignedly the Salvation of them all; but to speak my thoughts, I conceive more hopes of the honest Heathen, then of any man that shall dy a rebel, or not make Restitution of all that he hath gained by oppression and injustice.   
FINIS.  
Soli Deo Gloria.