THE POLITICAL Will and Testament Of that Great MINISTER of STATE CARDINAL Duke de RICHELIEV; FROM WHENCE LEWIS XIV. the Present French KING has taken his Measures and Maxims of GOVERNMENT.  
In Two PARTS.  
Done out of French.  
LONDON, Printed, and are to be Sold by the Booksellers of London and Westminster, MDCXCV.   

ADVERTISEMENT TO THE READER.  
THE World would have reason to Wonder, that this Political Testament of Cardinal de Richelieu, could have been concealed so long, did not the Consequence of it, and the use to which it was designed, convince us that he never intended the publishing thereof. But whereas it is the Fate of Mysteries to have a certain Date, and that it is impossible not to confide things of this Nature to some Indiscreet Persons, there is no reason to wonder at their falling at last into Liberal hands, who are glad to Impart them to the World.  
It would be a Reflection on the Judgement of the Public, to Imagine that they could mistake this Work; for though Men can never be too Cautious to avoid being imposed upon; It is impossible to read this without discovering all the Characters of that great Man's mind. The Elevation and Beauty of his Genius, joined to the Nobleness of his Expressions, appears clearly in this; but moreover what variety of matter is not found in it? They are all handled with so much Solidity, that it is obvious that he knew them by a profound Meditation, seconded by a consummated Experience, and that none but himself was capable to Write them.  
If it be very delightful to read the Reflections and Political Precepts which the best Authors make on the principal Events they Relate, that satisfaction, is considerably lessened, when we consider that most of them only reason after the Fact, and in their Study's, and that they would be at a great loss themselves to overcome the difficulties of the least Negotiation, or of the least dangerous Intrigue.  
But this Political Testament is of a different Nature. It is a favourite and a first Minister of State, who has Governed upwards of 25 years one of the most considerable Kingdoms of Europe, who has Guided it; and as it were held it by the hand in the first years of its Rise: Who prescribes no Council, but what he has often practised himself; and Finally who by his Steadiness and Courage has overcome an infinite number of Obstacles, and Intrigues, which would have overwhelmed any other Man.  
Therefore there never was a Work of more use for those who are called to the administration of great Affairs, Kings, Princes, Favourites, Ministers, Councillors of State, Ecclesasticks, Nobles, Magistrates, Courtiers, and in fine, all sorts and degrees of Men, find instructions here, of an Inestimable Value.  
Not that this Work is in the Condition in which it would undoubtedly have been had he had leisure to revise it; but though some carelessness is discovered in it, and some Expressions less happy than others; nevertheless all the parts of it compose so fine Body, that those little faults can only be looked upon, like those Strokes in fine Pictures, which tho' careless, discover the skill of the Artist.  
It would be an Extraordinary Presumption to endeavour by Words to Enhance the excellence of a Work, which sustains itself so well, and is infinitely above the Elogys' that could be given to it. The reading of one Chapter of it will speak more in its behalf, than whatever we could say.  
The first Edition of this Book, and the two others which followed it close, have been taken from a Manuscript which seems to be of thirty years standing, and to have been written with great precipitation, by two different hands, without any blots, but with many faults: The most Essential have been mended in this fourth Impression, and we thought fit not to alter the rest, for fear of mistaking the sense of the Author. As there is no reason to believe, that the Copy we have made use of, is the only remaining one, we entreat those who have a better, and who shall observe any Capital faults, to Impart the same to us, in order to correct them in a fifth Edition.  
The very Contents seem to be written by the Cardinal de Richelieu himself; as he was a very methodical Man, it is very likely that he begun his Work by the said Contents, lest the Matters should anticipate upon each other.  
The World will certainly be surprised at the Title of the first Chapter, which speaks of the General Peace, of which he designed to mention the Year which he has left in blank; since there was no General Peace at that time. But we have been obliged to follow the Manuscript, and it is apparent that he designed it, and thereby to conclude the relation of the King his Master's great Actions.  
As for the time when this Work was written, it is very likely that he did it at several times. In the first Chapter he prosecutes the relation of the King's Actions until the Year, 1638. Yet in some other Places he seems to write in 1635. since he gives the King but 25 years' Reign. It may also be questioned whether what he writes of the Jesuits, is before, or after the Intrigues, which Father Causin, the King's Confessor, and Father Monod, Confessor to the Duchess of Savoy, set on foot, to remove him from the Court, which had like to have succeeded. If he writ the said Chapter after he had defeated the said Intrigue, no body can sufficiently admire his Moderation in speaking so soberly of them; and if he writ it before, it is impossible to praise him enough, to have left his Work in its first State, without expressing more marks of his resentment in the same.  
That which seems most surprising, is, that he does no wise mention the Birth of the present King in his Political Testament; from whence we may infer, that it was written before; that Event being too considerable, to pass it under silence.  
Moreover, we must consider, that he had given over Writing long before his Death; by reason of the mischance of his Arm, being obliged to dictate all his Dispatches; and whereas it is very likely, that he would not trust his Political Testament to any other hand, he was no longer in a condition to do it himself, and that may be the reason of the said Omission.  
All the Notes of the present Edition are in the Manuscript, but the Historical Observations on the first Chapter, were lately communicated to me, and are peculiar to the fourth Edition: if ever any Work deserved to be adorned with Remarks, it certainly is this. The Life and Memoirs of this Great Man, will furnish abundance; but that is not sufficient, it requires something more particular yet, to heighten the Intrigues of that Court, which have not been divulged, which would be of great Use for the better Understanding of the History. Several useful Remarks might also be made upon the then State of France, and that to which it is grown since: Wherein the Counsels and Maxims of that great Minister have been followed, and in what they have deviated from them, and several other Remarks not only curious, but important. If any body will be so kind as to impart all those things to Us, We will willingly communicate them to the Public.   

TO King LEWIS XIII.  
SIR,  
AS soon as Your Majesty was pleased to admit me into the Management of Your Affairs, I resolved to use my utmost Endeavours to facilitate Your great Designs, as useful to this State, as glorious to your Person.  
God having blessed my Intentions, insomuch that the Virtue and Happiness of Your Majesty have astonished the present, and will be admired in future Ages, I thought myself obliged to write the History of your glorious Successes, both to hinder many Circumstances, worthy to live for ever in the Memory of Man, from being buried in Oblivion, through the Ignorance of those who cannot know them like me; and to the end that the time past might serve as a Rule for the future. Therefore I forthwith applied myself to it, being persuaded that I could never begin that too soon, which was only to end with my Life.  
I did not only carefully collect the matter of such a Work, but moreover, I reduced part of it into Order, and put the Transactions of some Years in the Form I designed to publish them.  
I own, that tho' there is more Pleasure in furnishing the Matter of History, than in putting it into Form, yet I found a great deal of Satisfaction in relating what had been performed with great Labour.  
While I began to relish the Delights of that Performance, the Illnesses and continual Inconveniences which attend the weakness of my Constitution, joined to the Weight of Affairs, forced me to lay it aside, because it required too much time.  
Yet tho' I cannot possibly perform, upon this Subject, what I so passionately desired, for the Glory of your Person, and for the Welfare of your State, I think myself obliged in Conscience at least to leave your Majesty some Memoirs of those things I think most necessary for the Government of this Kingdom.  
Two Reasons oblige me to undertake this Work. The first is, The Fear and Desire I have of ending my Days before the Expiration of yours.  
The Second is, The Faithful Passion I have for your Majesty's Interest; which makes me not only desirous to see you attended with all sorts of Prosperities during my Life, but also makes me earnestly wish to see a Prospect of the Continuation of the same, when the Inevitable Tribute we are all obliged to pay Nature, shall hinder me from being a Witness of them.  
This Piece will appear under the Title of my Political Testament; because it is made to serve after my Death, for the Polity and Conduct of your Kingdom, if your Majesty thinks it worthy of it: Because it will contain my last Desires in relation thereunto; and that in leaving it to you; I bequeath to your Majesty the best Legacy I have to dispose of, whenever God will be pleased to call me out of this Life.  
It shall be conceived in the most concise and clearest Method I am capable of, as well to follow my own Genius, and my usual way of writing, as to comply with your Majesty's Humour, who ever loved, that Men should come to the Point in few Words, being as much pleased to hear the Substance of things, as apprehensive of the long Discourses most Men use to explain them.  
If my Spirit, which will appear in these Memoirs, can after my Death contribute any thing towards the Regulation of this great State, in the Management of which your Majesty has been pleased to give me a greater Share than I deserve, I will think myself infinitely happy.  
To that end, judging with Reason, that the Success God has hitherto been pleased to grant the Resolutions your Majesty has taken with your most Faithful Creatures, is a powerful Motive to invite you to follow the Advices I will give you for the future: I will begin this Work with an Abstract of the great Actions you have performed with so much Glory, which may justly be styled, The Solid Foundation of the future Felicity of your Kingdom.  
This Relation will be made with so much Sincerity, according to the Judgement of those who are faithful Witnesses of the History of your Time, that it will induce every body to believe, that the Counsels I give your Majesty, have no other Motives, but the Interest of your State, and the Advantage of your Person. I am, and will remain Eternally,  
SIR, Your Majesty's most Humble, most Faithful, most Obedient, most Passionate, and most obliged Subject and Servant, Armand Du Plessis.   

THE Political Testament Of the Famous CARDINAL Duke de RICHELIEU.  
PART I.  

CHAP. I. A Short Relation of the King's great Actions, until the Peace concluded in the Year—  
WHEN Your Majesty was first pleased to admit me into your Councils, and to repose a great Confidence in me for the Direction of your Affairs; I may affirm with Truth, that the Huguenots shared the State with you; that the Grandees behaved themselves as if they had not been your Subjects; and the most powerful Governors of Provinces, as if they had been Sovereigns in their Employments.  
I may say, that the ill Example of both was so prejudicial to this Kingdom, that the best regulated Communities were tainted with their Behaviour, and in some cases lessened your Majesty's lawful Authority, as much as in them lay, in order to extend their own beyond reason.  
I may say, that every Man measured his Merit by his Presumption; that instead of valuing the Favours they received from your Majesty by their Intrinsic Worth, they only valued them according as they were suitable to the Unruliness of their Fancy; and that the most daring were esteemed the wisest, and often proved the most happy.  
I may also say, that Foreign Alliances were despised; Private Interest preferred to Public Good; in a word, the Dignity of Royal Majesty was so much debased, and so different from what it ought to be, by the Defect of those who had then the principal Management of your Affairs, that it was almost impossible to distinguish it.  
The Proceeding of those to whom your Majesty had entrusted the Helm of your State could no longer be tolerated, without ruining all; and on the other hand, it could not be altered all at once, without violating the Laws of Prudence, which do not allow the passing from one Extreme to another, without a Medium.  
The ill Posture of your Affairs seemed to constrain your Majesty to take precipitated Resolutions, without Election of Time or of Means; and yet Choice was necessary in both, to improve the Alteration which Necessity exacted from your Prudence.  
The Wisest were of Opinion, that it was impossible, without a Shipwreck, to steer through the Rocks that appeared on all sides in times of such Uncertainty: The Court was full of Men, who accused those of Rashness, who should dare to attempt it; and all of them knowing that Princes are apt to impute the ill Success of things that have been well advised, to those that are about them; so few expected a good Event of the Alterations, it was said, I designed, that many concluded my Fall, even before your Majesty had raised me.  
Notwithstanding all these Difficulties which I represented to your Majesty, knowing what Kings can do, when they make a good use of their Power, I presumed to promise you without Temerity, in my Opinion, what is come to pass in your State; and that in a short time your Prudence, your Power, and the Blessing of God, would alter the Affairs of this Kingdom.  
I promised your Majesty that I would use my utmost Endeavours, and all the Authority you were pleased to give me, to ruin the Huguenot Party, to abate the Pride of the Grandees, to reduce all your Subjects to their Duty, and to raise your Name again in Foreign Nations, to the Degree it ought to be.  
Moreover, I represented to your Majesty, that in order to compass a happy end, it was absolutely necessary you should conside in me; and that notwithstanding for the time past all those who had served you had thought no way so proper to obtain and to preserve your Confidence, as to remove the Queen your Mother from it, I would take the contrary way, and that nothing should be wanting on my side to keep your Majesties in a strict Union, so necessary for your Reputation, and for the Welfare of the Kingdom.  
As the Success which has attended the good Intentions which God has been pleased to inspire me with, for the Settlement of this State, will justify to future Ages the steadiness wherewith I have constantly pursued that Design; so your Majesty will be a faithful Witness that I have used my best Endeavours, lest the Artifice of some Evil-minded Persons should be powerful enough to divide that, which, being united by Nature, ought also to be united by Grace. If after having, for many years, happily resisted their divers Efforts, their Malice has finally prevailed; it is a very great Comfort to me, that your Majesty has often been pleased to express, That while I was most intent on the Grandeur of the Queen your Mother, she laboured for my Ruin.  
But I refer this matter to another place, to keep to my present Subject, and not to break the Order I am to keep in this Work.  
The Huguenots, who have never slipped any occasion to increase their Party, having in 1624. surprised certain Ships which the Duke of Nevers was preparing against the Turk, afterwards raised a potent Navy against your Majesty.  
Notwithstanding the Care of the Sea had been so far neglected till then, that you had not one Ship, your Majesty behaved yourself with so much Address and Courage, that with those you could get among your Subjects, 20 from Holland, and 7 from England, you defeated the Army the Rochelois had put out to Sea. Which proved the more wonderful and happy, in that this advantageous Effect proceeded from a Succour which was only granted to serve you in appearance.  
You took the Isle of Ré by the same means which the Rochelois had unjustly made themselves Masters of long before: You routed 4 or 5000 Men they had put into it to defend it, and forced Soubise, who commanded them, to fly to Oleron; which your Friends not only drove him out of, but also forced him to fly the Kingdom.  
This happy Success reduced those Rebellious Souls to make a Peace so glorious for your Majesty, that the most difficult were pleased with it; and all agreed, that it was the most advantageous that had been made till then.  
The Kings your Predecessors having for the time passed rather received from, than given a Peace to their Subjects; though they were diverted by no Foreign Wars, they were Losers in all the Treaties they made with them; and tho' your Majesty had many other Occupations at that time, you then granted it to them, reserving Fort St. Lewis, as a Citadel at Rochel; and the Isles of Re and of Oleron, as two other Places which served as a good Circumvallation about it.  
At the same time your Majesty secured the Duke of Savoy from the Oppression of the Spaniards, who had attacked him openly; and notwithstanding they had one of the greatest Armies that had been seen of a long while in Italy, which was Commanded by the Duke of Feria, a great Man; you hindered them from taking Verua, of which your Arms, jointly with the Duke of Savoy's, sustained the Siege with so much Glory, that they were finally forced to raise the Siege shamefully.  
The Spaniards soon afterwards making themselves Masters of all the Passes of the Grisons, and having fortified the best Posts of all their Valleys, your Majesty, not being able by a bare Negotiation to free your ancient Allies from that Invasion, in which those unjust Usurpers had the more success, by reason that the Pope favoured them, upon the vain Hopes they gave him of procuring some Advantages for Religion, did that by force of Arms, which you had not been able to obtain by strength of Reason.  
Your Majesty had by that means for ever freed that Nation from the Tyranny of the House of Austria, had not Fargis your Ambassador in Spain, at the Solicitation of Cardinal de Berulle, made (as he has confessed it since) without your Knowledge, and contrary to your Majesty's strict Orders, a very disadvantageous Treaty, to which you adhered at last to oblige the Pope, who pretended to be concerned in that Affair.  
The late King your Father of Immortal Memory, designing to marry one of your Majesty's Sisters in England, the Spaniards thought themselves obliged to break that Project, by marrying one of their Infanta's there. The Treaty thereof being concluded, the Prince of Wales was so ill advised, as to expose himself to the Discretion of a Prince, who being Master of his Person, might impose whatever Law he thought fit upon him, and passed through France incognito, in order to go into Spain to marry her.  
As soon as the thing was known here, such Negotiations were set on foot, that notwithstanding the great Honours he received in that Court, where the King gave him the Right Hand all the while he tarried there, altho' he was not Crowned Head at that time, the Marriage was broken off, and soon after it that of France was treated of, concluded and accomplished, with Conditions three times more advantageous for Religion, than those which were designed to be proposed in the late King's time.  
Soon after that Powerful Cabals were formed at Court, into which the Duke of Orleans your Brother was engaged by those who had the Care of his Conduct, before his Age made him capable of it.  
Being constrained to say, with great Regret, that a Person of the greatest Consideration was insensibly drawn into it, with several others, who fomented and followed her Passions. I cannot omit the Merit you acquired before GOD, and before Men, in suppressing the Noise her imprudent Conduct would have made, had you not wisely winked at what you might have repressed, with as much safety as reason.  
The English blindly engaged in those Cabals: Many of the Grandees of the Kingdom entered very far into them: The Duke de Rohan and the Huguenot Party were to wage War within, while the English with a Potent Navy were to attack the Isles and Coasts of this State.  
The Plot seemed to be so well laid, that most Men were of Opinion, that it was impossible to resist the Force of the Conspirators. Nevertheless, the taking off Colonel Dornano, the Duke de Vendome and the Grand Prior; the Chastisement of Chalais, and the removal of some Princesses, broke that Cabal, insomuch that all the Designs projected in your Majesty's Court were dissipated, and had no effect.  
As it was not without a great deal of Goodness and Prudence together, your Majesty consented at Nantes to the Marriage of Monsieur your Brother; so the Sincerity of your true Servants in taking the boldness to represent to you beforehand the Inconveniences which might attend it, was a very great Proof of their Fidelity, and a certain Testimony they had no design to surprise you.  
All these Disturbances which seemed to weaken your Power, did not hinder you from putting a stop to the course of Duels, by the Chastisement of the Sieurs de Bouteville and des Chapelles. I own that my Mind was never more agitated than it was on that occasion, in which I had much ado to forbear yielding to the universal Compassion, which the Misfortune and Valour of those Young Gentlemen imprinted in the Hearts of all Men; to the Prayers of the greatest Persons of the Court; and to the Importunities of my nearest Relations.  
The Tears of their Wives moved me sensibly; but the Sluices of Blood of your Nobility, to which nothing could put a stop but the Effusion of theirs, encouraged me to resist my own Inclinations, and to persuade your Majesty to cause that to be put in Execution, for the good of the Kingdom, which was almost against the Sense of every body, and against my particular Sentiments.  
As it was not possible to stop the Course of, and to hinder the great Preparations the English had made for a War, your Majesty was obliged to oppose them by Force of Arms.  
Those ancient Enemies of the State landed in Re, and there besieged the Fort St. Martin, while it was God Almighty's Pleasure to afflict France, by the Illness wherewith he visited your Majesty at Ville-Roy.  
This dismal Accident, and the Ill Conduct which Le Coigneux and Puy Laurens endeavoured anew to inspire into Monsieur, did not hinder your good Subjects from opposing the Efforts of that Warlike Nation, by the Influence of your bare Name. And your Majesty no sooner recovered your Health, but you Relieved the Place they had Besieged, Defeated their Land-Army by a signal Combat, and forced their Naval Forces to quit your Coasts, and to make for their own Ports again.  
After which you Besieged Rochel, and took it after a Years Siege: And your Majesty behaved yourself with so much Prudence, that tho' you were sensible that the Spaniards neither desired the taking of the said Place in particular, nor the Prosperity of your Affairs in general; judging that the bare appearance of their Union would be of use in the opinion of the World; and that it would be no small matter to hinder them by a Treaty from joining with the English, who were your Declared Enemies at that time; you made one with them, which produced the only Effect your Majesty expected from it.  
The Spaniards, who only designed to deceive you, in order the better to cross your Majesty's Designs, and the taking of the said City, did animate the English as much as in them lay to relieve it. And the Cardinal de la Cueva promised them positively, to that end, that his Master would send your Majesty no Succours, until you had no further need of it, and that he would recall it before it could annoy them: Which was so Religiously performed, that Don Frederick Admiral of Spain, who Sailed from the Coronna with 14 Ships, after he was informed of the Defeat of the English in Ré, refused to tarry one day at Rochel, upon the Report that a new Fleet was coming to relieve the said City.  
This Assurance encouraged the English at two several times to attempt the Relieving of it, and afforded your Majesty the Glory of taking it with your own Forces, in sight of a Potent Naval Army, which, after two useless Engagements, had the Disgrace to see itself wholly frustrated of its end.  
Thus at one and the same time the Infidelity and Cunning of the Spaniards proved ineffectual, and the English were overreached.  
During this Siege the Spaniards attacked the Duke of Mantua in Italy: They took that time on purpose, thinking your Majesty would not be able to Succour him.  
Cardinal de Berule, and Marillac the Lord Keeper, advised your Majesty to abandon that poor Prince to the Injustice and insatiable Avidity of that Nation, which is an Enemy to the Repose of Christendom, lest they should trouble you; the rest of your Council proved of a different Opinion; both because Spain durst not have taken such a Resolution immediately after your having made a Treaty of Union with the English; and that tho' they should have followed so ill an Advice, they could not have been able to stop the Progress of your Designs.  
They represented to your Majesty, that it would be sufficient not to Declare for the Duke of Mantua while you were engaged in that great Siege; and that you could do no more, without committing a Baseness unworthy of a great Prince, who must never consent to it, whatever Advantages might accrue to him by it.  
I should commit a Crime, if I did not observe in this place, that your Majesty, according to the Sentiments of your Heart and your usual Practice, took the best and most honourable Party on that occasion; which was attended with so much Success, that soon after it Rochel was taken, and your Arms in a Condition to assist that Prince so unjustly Attacked.  
Although at that very time Monsieur your Brother, who was become a Widower a Year after his Marriage, had a mind to marry the Princess Mary; he was so ill advised, that instead of favouring the Duke of Mantua her Father, he crossed him more than his Enemies, by withdrawing from your Majesty, and retiring into Lorraine, at a time when it was his Interest to be strictly united with you, in order to make your Power the more considerable.  
This ill Conduct did not hinder your Majesty from continuing the Journey you had undertaken, for a Design so glorious; and God blessed you so visibly, that as soon as you came to the Alps, you forced all the Passages of it in the midst of Winter, beat the Duke of Savoy, assisted by the Spaniards; raised the Siege of Cazal, and constrained all your Enemies to agree with you.  
This glorious Action, which restored Peace in Italy, was no sooner achieved, but your Majesty, whose Mind and Heart never found any rest but in Labour, passed directly into Languedoc, where after having taken Privas and Alez by force, you reduced the rest of the Huguenot Party throughout your Kingdom to Obedience, and by your Clemency granted a Peace to those who had presumed to wage a War against you; not by granting them Advantages prejudicial to the State, as had been done till then; but by banishing him out of the Kingdom, who was the only Head of that miserable Party, and who had all along fomented it.  
That which is most considerable in so glorious an Action, is, that you ruin'd that Party absolutely, at a time when the King of Spain endeavoured to raise it again, and to settle it more than ever.  
He had newly made a Treaty with the Duke of Rohan, to form in this State a Body of Rebellious States to God and to your Majesty at once, in consideration of a Million of Livres which he was to pay him yearly, for which he made the Indies Tributaries to Hell. But their Projects proved ineffectual: And whilst he had the Mortification to hear, that the Person he had employed to be the Bearer of so glorious an Establishment, was executed upon a Scaffold by a Decree of the Parliament of Thoulouse, before whom he was Tried, your Majesty had the Satisfaction and Advantage to pardon those who could no longer defend themselves, to annihilate their Faction, and to use their Persons well, when they expected nothing but the Chastisement of the Crimes they had committed.  
I am sensible that Spain thinks to excuse so ill an Action, by the Succours you granted the Hollanders; but that Excuse is as ill as their Cause.  
Common Sense will convince every body, that there is much difference between the continuation of a Succours established upon a Lawful Subject, if Natural Defence is so, and a new Establishment manifestly contrary to Religion, and to the Lawful Authority Kings have received from Heaven over their Subjects.  
The late King your Father never entered into a Treaty with the Hollanders, until the King of Spain had formed a League in this Kingdom to usurp the Crown.  
This Truth is too evident to be questioned; and there is no Theology in the World, but will grant, without going against the Principles of Natural Reason, that as Necessity obliges those whose Life is attempted, to make use of all Helps to preserve it; so a Prince has the same Right to avoid the loss of his State.  
That which is free in the beginning, sometimes becomes necessary in the sequel: Therefore no body can find fault with the Union your Majesty maintains with those People, not only in consequence of the Treaties of the late King; but moreover, because Spain cannot be reputed otherwise than as an Enemy to this State, whilst they retain part of its ancient Demeans: It is evident that the Cause which has given a Rise to those Treaties not being removed, the continuation of the Effect is as lawful as necessary.  
The Spaniards are so far from any Pretence of being in the same case, that on the contrary, their Designs are so much the more unjust; that instead of repairing the Injuries they have done this Kingdom, they increase them daily.  
Moreover, the late King never joined with the Hollanders, until they were entered into a Body of State; and was constrained to it by an Oppression which he could not wholly avoid: He neither occasioned their Revolt, nor the Union of their Provinces.  
And Spain has not only often favoured the Revolted Huguenots against your Predecessors; they also endeavoured to unite them in a Body of State in yours: A holy Zeal has induced them to be the Authors of so good an Establishment; and that without any Necessity, and consequently without Reason; unless the Continuation of their ancient Usurpations, and the new ones they design, rectify their Actions so much, that what is forbidden to all the World besides, is lawful in them, upon the account of their good Intentions.  
Having treated this matter more at large in another Treatise, I will leave it to continue the Sequel of your Actions.  
The ill Faith of the Spaniards having induced them to attack the Duke of Mantua again, to the Prejudice of the Treaties they had made with your Majesty, you marched the second time into Italy, where, by the Blessing of God, after having gloriously crossed a River, the Passage whereof was defended by the Duke of Savoy with an Army of 14000 Foot and 4000 Horse, contrary to the Faith of the Treaty he had made with your Majesty the Year before: You took Pignerol in sight of the emperor's and King of Spain's Forces, and of the Person and all the Power of the Duke of Savoy; and that which renders that Action the more Glorious, in sight of the Marquis de Spinola, one of the greatest Captains of his Time.  
By that means you took Susa, and overcame at once the three most considerable Powers of Europe, the Plague, Famine, and the Impatiency of the French, of which there are not many Examples in History.  
After which you Conquered Savoy, driving an Army of 10000 Foot and 2000 Horse before you, which had a better Advantage to defend itself in that Mountainous Country, than 30000 to attack them.  
Soon after which the Combats of Veillane and of Coriane signalised your Arms in Piedmont: and the taking of Valence, Fortified by the Duke of Savoy, in order to oppose your Designs, made the World sensible, that nothing could resist the Just Arms of a King as Fortunate as Powerful.  
Cazal was relieved, not only against the Opinion of most Men, but even against the very Thoughts of the Duke de Montmorency, who had been employed to that end; and against the Opinion of Marillac, who was substituted in his Place, who both publicly declared, that it was an impossible Enterprise.  
The Relief of the said Place was the more glorious, in that a stronger Army than your Majesty's, retrenched at the Head of the Milaneze, which furnished them with all sorts of Conveniencies, and sheltered under the Walls of Cazal, which had been consigned in their Hands, was constrained to quit it, and five other Places at the same time, which the Spaniards held thereabouts in the extent of Mont-Ferrat.  
Those who know, that in the very height of that Design your Majesty was reduced to the utmost Extremity by a Fit of Sickness; and that tho' your Person was dangerously Ill, your Heart was yet in a worse Condition.  
If they consider, that the Queen your Mother, at the Instigation of some malicious Persons, formed a potent Party, which, weakening you, considerably strengthened your Enemies: If they also consider that they daily received Advice, that your Majesty's most faithful Servants, whom they both did hate and dread, would not much longer be in a Condition to do them any harm; they must needs acknowledge, that the Goodness of God has contriouted more towards your good Successes, than the Prudence and Force of Men.  
It was at that very time the Queen your Mother used her utmost Endeavours to change your Majesty's Council, and to establish one to her own mind.  
It was at that very time also the Evil Spirits which possessed Monsieurs Mind, were labouring in his Name, as much as in them lay, to ruin me.  
The Mother and the Son had made an Agreement, which was more contrary to the State, than hurtful to those whose Ruin they openly proseouted, since in the present state of Affairs it was impossible to alter without ruining them.  
The Son had promised not to marry the Princess Mary, which the Mother dreaded to that degree, that in order to prevent it, she had put him into the Castle of Vincenne in your Absence, where he tarried until that Agreement procured his Liberty; in exchange of which, the Mother had promised to put me out of your Majesty's favour, and to remove me from Court.  
In order to render these Promises the more inviolable, they were put in Writing; and the Duke de Bellegarde carried them long between his Shirt and his Skin, to show that they touched his Heart; and to make those that had made them sensible, that he would never lose them without his Life.  
There never was a stronger Faction in any State; it would be easier to name those who were not concerned in it, than those that were.  
And that which increased the wonder of your Conduct on that occasion, is, that being sollieitous myself to withdraw from your Majesty, to oblige the Queen, who desired it passionately; your Majesty being destitute of all other Counsel at that time, had no body to consult with, and to help you to resist the Authority of a Mother, the Artifices of all her Adherents, and my earnest Solicitations against myself.  
I say this, because the Marshal of Schomberg, who was faithful to you, was absent at that time; and that the Lord Keeper Marillac was one of those, who, seconding the Queen in her Designs, served her against herself.  
Your Prudence was such, that in removing the Lord Keeper of your own accord, you delivered yourself of a Man, who had so great an Opinion of himself, that he thought nothing well done, unless done by his Order; and who thought many ill ways lawful, to compass the Ends which were suggested to him, out of a Zeal which may be styled Indiscreet.  
In fine, your Proceeding had so much Wisdom in it, that you granted nothing to the Queen to the prejudice of your State; and yet refused her nothing that could be granted without wounding your Conscience, and without acting as much against her as against yourself.  
I might forbear speaking of the Peace which was concluded at Ratisbonne between your Majesty and the House of Austria, by reason that as it was agreed on by your Ambassador on Conditions, which the Emperor himself was sensible he had no Power to grant; for that reason it cannot be placed in the number of your Actions. But if the World considers, that tho' the Fault of your Ambassador could not be imputed to you; as it required a great deal of Goodness to suffer it, it required no less Address to repair it in some measure, and not to lose the Fruit of a Peace which was so necessary to this State, at a time in which your Majesty had so many Crosses.  
This Action will be looked upon as one of the greatest you ever did, and consequently such as cannot be omitted in this place.  
Reason and Conduct of State did require an Exemplary Punishment of him, who had exceeded your Orders in so nice a Point, and in so important an occasion: But your Goodness tied up the Hands of your Justice, by reason that tho' there was no Ambassador but himself, he had not acted alone in that Affair, but with an Associate of such a Quality, as made you rather consider the Motive of the Fault, than the Fault itself.  
They were both surprised to that degree with the extreme Illness you fell into at Lions, that they acted rather according to the Condition into which the Kingdom would have been by your Loss, than that in which it was, and according to the Orders they had received.  
Notwithstanding the ill Conditions of their Treaties, the Imperialists were soon after forced to restore Mantua; the Dread of your Arms obliged them to restore what they had usurped over the Venetians and Grisons; and after your Majesty had suffered the Duke of Savoy's Forces to enter into Pignerol, and into the Fort and Valley of peruse, according to the Treaty of Querasque: You agreed so well with him, that by virtue of a new Treaty those two Places did remain in your Majesty's Hands, to the general Satisfaction as well as Advantage of all Italy, which for the future will be less in dread of an unjust Oppression, since it sets a Door open to its Relief.  
At that very time the Discontents the Duke of Bavaria had received from the Emperor and from the Spaniards, and the Dread which all the other Electors both Catholics and Protestants were in of being divested of their Stairs, like many other Princes at their Solicitations, having induced them secretly to desire your Assistance, your Majesty treated so dexterously with them, and with so much Success, that they hindered, even in the Emperor's Presence, the Election of the King of the Romans, notwithstanding the Diet of Ratisbone had only been Convened to that end.  
After which, to pleasure the said Duke of Bavaria, and to satisfy the Electors, as well as to confirm them in their Resolution, of rendering the Catholic League not only Independent of the Empire, but of Spain also, which usurped the Direction of it; your Ambassadors kept so good a Correspondence with those Princes, that they facilitated the means to them of depriving Walstein of the Command of the Armies of the Empire, which proved very prejudicial to his Majesty's Affairs.  
Your Majesty's Credit proved as great towards the North, since the Baron de Charnau, without the Title of Ambassador, procured almost at the same time a Peace between the Kings of Poland and of Sweden; a Peace which had been attempted in vain by many other Potentates.  
The said Peace gave way to the Enterprise the King of Sweden made soon after, to prevent the Oppression of the Princes of the Empire, in Germany; which Design was no sooner known to your Majesty, but to prevent the Prejudice the Catholic Religion might receive by it, you made a Treaty with him, which obliged him not to interrupt the Exercise thereof in all the places of his Conquest.  
I am sensible that your Enemies, who endeavour to justify their own Actions, by crying down yours, have used their best Endeavours to render that Agreement odious; but their Design had no other Effect, than to discover their Malice.  
Your Majesty's Innocence is the more apparent, in that your Ambassador never entered into any Treaty with that Conqueror, until Sin Months after his entering into Germany; which evidently justifies, that the Conditions that were made with the said Prince were the Remedy of the Evil, of which they could not be esteemed the Cause.  
The Treaties that were made not only with that Great King, but also with many other Princes of Germany; are the more just, in that they were absolutely necessary for the safety of the Duke of Mantua unjustly attacked, and for that of all Italy, over which Spain had no less Right, than over the Dominion of that poor Prince, since they thought their Convenience a sufficient Right.  
The Danger this Kingdom had been reduced to by the Division the Spaniards had openly fomented in your Royal House, obliged your Majesty to seek out proper Expedients to resettle it.  
Monsieur having lest the Court of France for the third time, by divers Artifices, which the Spaniards certainly were the principal Authors of; and the Cardinal Infant having received the Queen your Mother in Flanders, as he did at that time; it is natural to conclude, that unless those good Neighbours had been employed at home, they would have proceeded farther, and would have employed themselves at your Majesty's Cost in this Kingdom.  
It was absolutely necessary to remove the Storm, and moreover to prepare to sustain the Effort of it, in case it could not be avoided.  
For that reason, after your Majesty was assured of a potent Diversion, you did like those, who, in order to prevent the Plague, which the Corruption of the Air threatens them with, carefully purge themselves; being persuaded that the best and safest way to secure themselves from external Injuries, is to cleanse the Inside.  
God's Providence proved so favourable to you on that occasion, that those who, animating the Queen and Monsieur against France, thought thereby to put them in a way to do it a great deal of Harm, only rendered them incapable of doing any; and your Conduct appeared so much the more wonderful on that occasion, that in recalling the one, and desiring the return of the other, your Goodness towards them was evident to all the World, while the Effects of your Justice fell upon those who had advised them to take such ill Measures.  
The Duke de Bellegarde was deprived of the Government of Burgundy, and consequently of the Keys of the Gates he had opened to Monsieur, to let him out of the Kingdom.  
The Duke d' Elboeuf was likewise turned out of that of Picardy, which your Majesty had lately given him.  
The Duke of Guise being conscious of his Faults, retiring into Italy, when you called him to Court, there to give an Account of his Actions; that Criminal Retreat made him lose the Government the late King your Father had honoured him with.  
Thus your Majesty was delivered of ungrateful faithless Governors, and Burgundy, Picardy and Provence, Provinces of great Consideration, remained in your Hands, free from those dangerous Spirits.  
You gave the first to the first Prince of your Blood, who was passionately desirous of it; and thereby you prudently interested him in the Affairs of the Time, and filled Monsieur with anxious Thoughts, who, with reason, dreaded nothing so much in the World, as the Establishment of a Person who came up so close to him.  
You bestowed the Second on the Duke of Cheureuse a Prince of Lorraine, to show, that Faults are personal; and that your Indignation extended only on those of that Family, who had made themselves guilty by their ill Conduct.  
You gratified the Marshal de Vitri with the Third, as well upon the account of his Loyalty, as because that being upheld by your Authority, he was naturally capable to oppose him who had lost it.  
In the mean time the Declarations you caused to be Registered in the Parliament, were highly approved of by every body; seeing that in condemning the Authors and Adherents of the Queen and of Monsieurs Flight, you excused those two Persons, who are as dear as nearly related to your Majesty, altho' the contrary had been done formerly on the same occasions.  
Your Majesty eluded with a great deal of Vigilancy divers Designs, and many Erterprises meditated and attempted in the Queen and Monsieurs Names; and you showed so much Patience on those unhappy Occurrences, that I may almost affirm, that you made nothing known of their Ill Conduct, but what you could not dissemble.  
Nevertheless, in order to stop the Course, and remove the Licence wherewith all things seemed lawful to be undertaken under their Shadow, you caused the Marshal de Marillac's Head to be cut off, with so much the more reason, that being condemned with Justice, the present Constitution of the State required a great Example.  
Those great and vexatious Affairs did not hinder you from repressing, with as much Authority as Reason, certain Erterprises of the Parliament of Paris, which had been tolerated in many other occasions; which is more remarkable, in that it was done during the Heat of the Discontents of the Queen and of Monsieur, and of all their Adherents, than for the thing itself.  
Afterwards Monsieur entered France with Sword in Hand, at the Instigation of the Spaniards, and of the Duke of Lorraine, with Forces, of which those good Neighbours had furnished the greatest part.  
One should have thought, that the News your Majesty received at that time of his being expected in Languedoc by the D. de Montmorency, who had a great Authority in that Province, which he was Governor of, should have put a stop to the Design which had led you in Lorraine to disengage that Duke out of the ill Party he had espoused; ●ut finishing what you had begun to so good an end, you caused Monsieur your Brother to be pursued so close by the Marshal de Schomberg, and you followed him so soon yourself, after having received three Places from the Duke of Lorraine as Pledges of his Faith, that all the Efforts of those who were Leagued against you proved ineffectual.  
The Victory which your Majesty's Forces, commanded by that Marshal, obtained at Castelnaudari, was as certain an Argument of the Blessing of God on your Majesty, as the Favours you afterwards granted to Monsieur, and to his Followers, when the ill state of his Affairs might have induced you to use them otherwise, was an evident Testimony of your Goodness.  
The Sincerity wherewith you observed all the Promises, which were made to them in your Name at Beziers; tho' you were sensible that Puy-Laurens's only Design was to avoid the Danger he was in, under the pretence of Repentance, which he could avoid no other way, was also as Authentic a Proof of your Majesty's great Courage, as of your inviolable Faith.  
The Chastisement of the Duke de Montmorency, who never could contain himself from making an Inlet to all manner of dangerous Rebellions at all times; and particularly, when an Heir apparent of the Crown made himself, by ill Counsel, Head of those who swerved from their Duty, showed all the World that your Steadiness equalled your Prudence.  
That Punishment also showed, that your Servants preferred Public Good before Private Interest; since on that occasion they resisted the Solicitations of several Persons, whom it behoved them to have a great deal of Consideration for, as well as the Threaten of Monsieur, which Puy-Laurens carried to that degree, as to declare, That in case Montmorency were put to Death, Monsieur would find a time to make them suffer the same Fate.  
The Patience wherewith you have born the new Conspiracies which Puy-Laurens formed in Flanders, in Monsieurs Name, who retired thither for the third time, is altogether like that which induces a Father to excuse the Behaviour which one of his Children is inspired with, after having laid aside his Obedience.  
That which has induced you to bear as long as the Good of the State and your own Conscience would permit you, the Malice and Levity which have often induced the Duke of Lorraine to Arm against you, is a Virtue which has but few Examples in History.  
The Goodness which has prevailed with you to be contented, for the Reparation of his second Faults, with the Deposition of some Places, capable to keep him within the Bounds of his Duty, had not his Folly equalled his Breach of Faith, will be found perhaps the more singular, in that there are few Princes who lose the opportunity of making themselves Masters of a Neighbouring State, when they have a lawful Subject and Power at once so to do.  
After so many Relapses committed by the Duke your Vassal, after he had snatched away from you, contrary to his Faith, against Divine and Humane Right, a Pledge almost as precious as your State; the Prudence wherewith you divested him, when his Malice and Inconstancy could receive no other Remedies but the utmost Extremities; is the more to be commended, because, that had you done it sooner, your Justice might have been called in question. Neither could you tarry longer, without showing yourself insensible, and without committing by Omission a Fault, equal unto that which a Prince should commit in divesting another without a Cause.  
What ought we not to say of the good Nature, which has inclined you to procure Monsieurs Return into France for the third time; when there seemed no longer to be any reason to trust his Faith, after the divers Relapses and extraordinary Infidelities of his Followers? Many thought with Reason, that he could never come back again, without exposing your most Faithful Servants; and yet they were the only Persons who did solicit your Majesty to draw him out of the Peril into which he had exposed himself.  
That Action will meet but few Examples in Antiquity, if we consider the Circumstances of it; and perhaps but little Imitation of it for the future.  
As no body could, without a great deal of Boldness, advise your Majesty to grant Monsieur, contrary to your own Sentiments, a notable Augmentation of Power, the Government of a Province, and a strong Place, in order to recall him out of Lorraine, the first time he went out of the Kingdom; so it required a great deal of Firmness to resist the Instances he made for a whole Year together, to have one given him upon the Frontier, where he designed to retire in quitting Flanders.  
It was no small Happiness that those two Counsels succeeded so well, that the Concession of the first place occasioned his first Return; and yet proved so innocent a Cause, that being useful on that occasion, they could not make an ill use of it since, when his Adherents endeavoured it.  
And that the Refusal of the Second was so far from hindering him to return to his Duty, and into his Native Country, the only place of his Safety; that on the contrary, it induced him to return back again with as good an Intention, as he and his have confessed since, it was bad, when under Pretence of the Safety of his Person, he desir'd a Retreat to disturb the growing Peace of France anew.  
The extraordinary Favours your Majesty granted to Puy-Laurens, to induce him to inspire a good Conduct to his Master, are so worthy of remembrance, that they must not be forgotten in this place.  
The Punishment he received, when you discovered that he continued to abuse your Favours, was too just and too necessary not to insert it afterwards.  
I am persuaded that Posterity will observe three things, which are very considerable on that Subject: An entire Resignation of all Interests, but such as related to the Public Good, in your Creatures; who having received him by your express Command into their Alliance, nevertheless advised you to secure him, because the Good of the State required it: A great Prudence in performing that Action in the Presence of Monsieur, who could not near hand disapprove a Council which he would have dreaded for himself at a distance; had not Experience made him sensible, that he was not aimed at. A great Boldness, in allowing him as much Liberty as he enjoyed before; grounded barely upon this, That as ill Counsels only had seduced him, the Effect would cease with the Cause; and that he would be no sooner destitute of them, but he would follow by his own Sentiments a Method quite different from that he had been put upon.  
This Action, and many others transacted during your Majesty's Reign, will, I am sure, make this pass for a certain Maxim, That it is necessary on certain occasions, in which the Welfare of the State is concerned, to assume a Male Virtue sometimes, to exceed the Bounds of Common Prudence; and that it is sometimes impossible to avoid certain Evils, unless something be given to Fortune, or rather, to Divine Providence, which seldom refuses its Assistance, when our exhausted Wisdom can no longer furnish us with any.  
Moreover, your Conduct will be acknowledged the more just, in that those who will read the History of your Life, will find, that your Majesty never punishes any body, without having first endeavoured by some extraordinary Favours to retain him within the Bounds of his Duty.  
The Marshal d' Ornano was made Marshal to that end.  
The Grand Prior was certain of the Command of the Sea, when he perverted his Brother's Mind; and both gave you Cause to deprive them of their Liberty.  
The Marshal de Bassompierre only subsisted by your Favours, when his way of speaking and of behaving himself at Court obliged you to confine him to the Bastille.  
The Lord Keeper Marillac was the more obliged to perform his Duty, because the height to which his good Fortune had elevated him, left him no room to desire any thing, tho' never so ambitious.  
The Marshal his Brother settled in Verdun, and elevated to an Office of the Crown, had all the reason imaginable to avoid the Fate he deserved by his Ingratitude, and by his evil Behaviour.  
The several Commands the Duke de Montmorency had had in your Armies, tho' he was as yet very young to deserve them, the Office of Marshal of France, the free Access your Majesty gave him to your Person, and the Familiarity he had with your Creatures, were Favours and Privileges sufficient to hinder him from flying to his Ruin.  
Chateauneuf had been so lately honoured with the Seals, when his ill Proceed were first discovered, that there is Reason to suspect, that at the beginning of his Magistracy he had the same Intentions, as when he ended it.  
Nevertheless, that first place of Justice to which your Majesty raised him, contrary to his Expectation, an Hundred Thousand Crowns he received from your Liberality in one Year, the Government of one of your Provinces, which are extraordinary Favours for a Man of his Profession, were not sufficient Considerations to hinder him from being the Promoter of his own Ruin.  
The several and great Favours Puy-Laurens received in a short time from your Majesty's Goodness are so extraordinary, that those who will know them, will perhaps be more surprised at them, than at his ill Proceeding, which is usual enough in Persons whom Fortune raises in an instant without Desert.  
The Indemnity of his Crimes, which your Majesty granted him at his return from Flanders, will not be thought inconsiderable by Posterity.  
The Immense Sums he received from your Liberality, the Government of Bourbonnois, the Quality of Duke and Peer, and my Alliance, were sufficient Engagements to keep any other Man within the Bounds of his Duty; but he was not capable of prescribing any to himself.  
When Count de Cramail was put into the Bastille, he had lately received, by his being recalled to Court, an Instance of the Remission of his first Faults. But that favourable Treatment did not hinder him from resuming his former Course, in acting against the present state of Affairs, and in endeavouring to make your Majesty alter your ancient Conduct, of which the Events justified the Happiness, and the Blessing of God the Justice.  
The Choice that was made of the Marshal de Vitry for Provence, obliged him to live very warily in so great an Employment, which his Courage and Fidelity had procured him. But his Greediness and haughty insolent Behaviour did not contribute little to deprive him of it, to place him in a Government of less Extent.  
If I must speak of those that were barely removed from Court, what Obligations had not the Duke de Bellegarde received from your Majesty, and from your Servants?  
The Goodness of the one, and the Address of the other, had freed him out of some Troubles into which his exceeding Vanity, and the Unruliness of his Passions had engaged him. He was a Duke by your Favour, and the more obliged to behave himself well with Monsieur, when he assisted him to get out of the Kingdom, because you had settled him in the first Places of his Household, which he stood in great need of.  
From being a poor ordinary Gentleman, Thoiras was seen to rise in an instant to the degree of a Marshal of France, so loaden with Favours, that he received not only the best Employments, and the greatest Governments of the Kingdom, but over and above upwards of Six Hundred Thousand Crowns in Gratifications.  
La Fargis had all the reason imaginable to behave herself well; since your Majesty, by placing her with the Queen your Consort, had put her above the Discourses that were made of her.  
The Duke's de Guise and d' Elboeuf have received, to the knowledge of all the World, incredible Favours from your Majesty.  
While the Princess of Conty was most zealous in forming of Cabals, she drew a great deal of Money out of your Exchequer for the Sale of Chateaurenault; but that was not sufficient to keep her within the Bounds of her Duty.  
The Duke de la Valette's Removal, tho' voluntary, and not forced, giving me an occasion to put him in this Classis; I cannot forbear observing, that a little before his soliciting Monsieur your Brother, and the Count of Soissons, to employ your Army, which they commanded at that time, against your Person, your Majesty had honoured him with the Quality of Duke and Peer: Neither can I forbear adding, that in order to engage him the more in your Service, you were pleased to allow his Alliance with those who were altogether inseparable from it; and that in consideration of my said Alliance, you had granted him the Survivorship of the Government of Guyenne, and added 30000 Livres to the Revenue of his Place of Colonel of the Infantry. To which I may add, that the Pardon your Majesty was pleased to grant him, out of an extraordinary Goodness for so foul and so shameful a Crime, averred by the Mouth of two Princes, whose Testimony was undeniable, could not hinder his Weakness and Jealousy against the Prince of Conde and the Archbishop of Bourdeaux, or his Design of crossing your Affairs, from doing a very shameful thing, in losing the occasion of taking Fontarabia, when the Enemies could no longer defend it.  
If it be an effect of singular Prudence to have withstood all the Forces of the Enemies of your State, with those of your Allies, by putting your Hand into your Purse, and not to your Arms. To have made an open War, when your Allies were no longer able to subsist alone, is another of Wisdom and Courage together, which justifies sufficiently, that managing the Repose of your Kingdom, you have done like those Oeconomists, who having been careful to lay up Money, know how to spend it prudently, to prevent a greater Loss.  
To have at one and the same time made divers Attacks in divers places, which was never done by the Romans or Ottomans, will undoubtedly be looked upon by many as a great piece of Imprudence and Rashness. And yet as it is a Proof of your Power, it is a greater yet of your Judgement; since it was necessary to cut out so much Work on all parts to your Enemies, that they might be invincible in none.  
The War of Germany was somewhat forced, since that part of Europe was the Stage on which it was begun long ago.  
Although that of Flanders had not the Success which might have been expected, yet it was impossible not to look upon it as advantageous in the Project.  
That of the Grisons was necessary to engage the Princes of Italy to take Arms, by removing their Dread of the Germans: and to encourage those that had taken them in Germany, by showing them, that Italy was not in a Condition to secure the Enemies they had in their Country.  
That of Italy was no less material; both because it was the ready way to engage the Duke of Savoy, and by reason that the Milaneze being as it were the Heart of the Territories that are possessed by the Spaniards; it was necessary to attack that Part.  
Moreover, considering that your Majesty had Allies on all parts, who were to join their Forces to yours; it must be concluded, that it was evident by that Union, that the Spaniards being attacked in divers places, should be forced to submit to the Effort of your Power.  
And yet during the course of that War, which lasted Five Years, no ill Accident ever befell you, but what seemed only to be permitted for your Glory.  
In 1635. the Army your Majesty sent into the Low Countries, as soon as they came there, won a famous Battle, before their being joined with that of the State's General: And if the Prince of Orange, commanding both, had no Success suitable to those great Forces, and to what was expected from a Captain of his Reputation, the fault of it cannot be imputed to you.  
Having submitted your Arms to the Command of that Prince, it was his part to pursue the Point of an Army he received Victorious. But the Slowness of a heavy Nation could not improve the Eagerness of yours, which requires Execution rather than Counsel; and which by dallying, loses the Advantage which their Fiery Nature gives them over others.  
That very Year the Forces of the Empire having passed the Rhine at Brisac, came so near your Frontiers, that tho' you could not free them from Fear, yet you freed them from the Losses your Enemies sustained.  
One of the finest Armies the Emperor had put on foot for a long while perished in Lorraine; and their Loss proved the more considerable, in that the bare Patience of those who commanded your Forces in those parts occasioned it.  
At the same time the Duke of Rohan, favoured by the principal Heads of the Grisons, who desired their Liberty, entered happily into their Country with open force, seized the most considerable Passes and Posts, and fortified them, notwithstanding the Opposition which the Neighbourhood of the Milaneze enabled the Spaniards to make conveniently.  
The Dukes of Savoy and of Crequi, who did command your Armies in Italy, took a Fort in the Milaneze, and built another upon the Po, which proved a dangerous Thorn to your Enemies.  
In 1636. the Cowardice of three Governors of your Frontier Towns having given the Spaniards a Footing into this Kingdom, and cheaply enabled them to acquire considerable Advantages: Without being discouraged, when all seemed to be lost, in Six Weeks time you raised so powerful an Army, that it might have been able totally to destroy your Enemies, had those to whom you entrusted the Command of it, employed it as they should have done. Their Failures obliged you to put yourself at the Head of it; and God assisted you to that degree, that that very Year, in the sight of those who had only taken those Places because you were distant from them, you retook the only one which was of Importance to your State.  
You overcame many Difficulties in that Expedition, which were created by your own Men; who being prejudiced by Ignorance or Malice, highly disapproved so great a Design.  
If you did not succeed in the Siege of Dole, the reason which obliges every one to run to that which is most pressing, was the only Cause of it. Your Majesty removed your Forces from thence with great Prudence, since it concerned you more to retake Corbie than to take Dole.  
At that time Galas entering this Kingdom with the main Forces of the Empire, to which the Duke of Lorraine joined himself with his. They were both driven out of Burgundy with the shame of Raising the Siege of St. John de , a weak Place, and the loss of part of their Cannon, and of so great a number of Men, that out of 30000 wherewith they entered this Kingdom, they did not march out Ten.  
The River Tosino was Witness that very Year of an Action no less fortunate in Italy, where your Forces gained a famous and bloody Combat. And you had Advantages in Valtelina, which were the more considerable, by reason that your Enemies, having often taken the Resolution to engage your Forces, in order to drive them out of it by Force, they never attempted to put their Design in Execution, but fight and being beaten, proved one and the same thing to them.  
In 1637. you took two Places from your Enemies in Flanders, and retook one of those which had been delivered up to them the Year before by the Cowardice of the Governors.  
A Third being besieged in the Country of Luxemburg, was taken soon after; and your Enemy suffered as much Damage by the entrance of your Armies in their Country, as they designed to make you suffer the same way.  
If the Panic Fear of him who commanded your Forces in Valtelina, and the Infidelity of some of those, for whose Liberty you had sent them thither, made you lose, through Cowardice and Treachery together, the Advantages you had acquired there by Force and Reason: That Year was happily Crowned by the retaking of the Isles of St. Margaret and of St. Honorat; and by the Relief of Lucare, besieged by the Spaniards.  
By the first of those two Actions, Two Thousand Five Hundred French landed at Noonday in an Island, kept by as many Spaniards and Italians; an Island fortified by Five Regular Forts, joined to one another by Lines of Communication, which enclosed it almost entirely by a good Parapet. Your Men fought at their Landing, and beat your Enemies which opposed them; and after having forced the major part of them to retire into their Ramparts, they forced them out of them in Six Weeks time, Foot after Foot, by as many Sieges as there were Forts; tho' one of them was composed of Five Bastions Royal, so well provided with Cannon, and with Men, and all other Necessaries, that it seemed a Rashness to attack it.  
By the Second, a potent Army, so well retrenched, that there was but one Head of a Thousand Fathom by which it could be attacked; a Head so well fortified, that at every Distance of Two Hundred Paces there were Forts and Redoubts, garnished with Cannon, and lined with Infantry, was attacked in the Night, and forced by an Army, which, tho' inferior in number, did nevertheless defeat it wholly, after several Combats.  
Those two Actions are so extraordinary, that one cannot say they are signal Effects of the Courage of Men, without adding, that they were seconded by the Providence and Hand of God, who visibly fights for us.  
In 1638. tho' the beginning of the Year proved unfortunate to you in Italy, at St. Omer, and at Fontarabia, by the ill Fate of Arms, and by the Imprudence, Cowardice, or Malice of some of those who commanded yours, the End Crowned the Work by the taking of Brisac, after a long Siege, two Battles, and divers Combats attempted to relieve it.  
Moreover, as soon as you had notice of the ill Event of the Siege of St. Omers, your Majesty repaired in Person to the Place, where there was reason to expect some dangerous Events: You put a stop to the course of the Misfortunes of your Arms, by taking and demolishing Renty, which greatly incommoded the Frontier.  
After which le Castelet, the only Place of yours then remaining in your Enemy's Hands, was taken by Force in sight of them, without their daring to oppose the Effects of your Arms.  
The Naval Engagement, in which 14 Galleys and 4 Ships of Dunkirk, all retired into the Bay of Gattary, under Five Land-Batteries, not daring to keep the Sea before 19 of yours, were all burnt or sunk, with the loss of Five or Six Thousand Men, of 500 Guns, and a considerable Store of Ammunitions of War for the Relief of Fontarabia, are great amends, not for the Losses you sustained at St. Omer and Fontarabia, which were not considerable, but for the Gains you miss in not taking the said Places.  
If to this Advantage we join that which you had before, when your Arms made your Enemies lose, in the Port of Passage, 14 great Ships, a great number of Guns, Colours, and all sorts of Ammunitions, it will be found, that if the Spaniards mark this Year as being favourable to them, they esteem themselves happy when their Misfortunes are less than their Fears.  
Finally, the Combat of the Galleys, perhaps the most famous that ever was fought at Sea, where 15 of yours attacked as many of Spain, and fought them with so much advantage, that your Enemies lost between Four and Five Thousand Men, and Six Galleys; among which the Admiral and two Patroness did not a little signalise that Action.  
This Combat, I say, shows, that the Prudence of your Conduct has not only been accompanied with good Fortune, but also, that the Boldness of your Commanders has been seconded.  
Several things are observable in this War.  
The first thing is, that your Majesty only engaged into it, because you could not avoid it; and that you only laid down your Arms when it was proper so to do.  
This Remark is the more glorious for your Majesty, in that you were often solicited by your Allies to take Arms, and still refused to do it; and that during the War your Enemies often proposed a particular Peace to you, which you would never hearken to, because you could not forsake the Interest of your Allies.  
Those who shall know, that your Majesty has been forsaken by several Princes, who were engaged with you, without abandoning any of them; and that notwithstanding some of those who did remain steady in your Party, failed you in many important things, they have still received Effects from your Majesty suitable to your Promises; those, I say, will acknowledge, that if your Majesty's good Fortune has appeared in the Success of your Affairs, your Virtue equals your good Fortune.  
I am sensible, that had you broken your Word, it would have lessened your Reputation considerably, and that the least loss of that kind in a great Prince is irreparable. But it is no small matter to have performed one's Duty in sundry occasions, in which Vengeance, and the Quiet which is naturally desired after a War, induce one to do the contrary.  
It required no less Prudence than Force, nor less Effort of Mind than of Arms, to persist almost alone in the same Design, which was to have been prosecuted by the Union of many.  
Nevertheless it is most true, that the Defection of several Princes 
* Saxony first abandoned the King of Sweden, Brandenburg, the Landgrave of Hesse, several Hans Towns. Wirtemberg, Parma, and Mantua.  of Germany; that the Duke of Parma's being obliged to abandon your Party through the necessity of his Affairs; that the Duke of Mantua's Death, and the Levity of his Dowager-Mother to the Young Duke, who was no sooner Mistress, but forgetting all her Obligations to France, she turned publicly against it; that the Decease of the Duke of Savoy, and the Imprudence of his Widow, who lost herself, because she would not receive the Assistance that was offered her; I say, it is most true, that all these Accidents never shook your Majesty's Resolution; and tho' they altered the state of your Affairs, they did not hinder you from persisting in your Designs.  
The Second Remark worthy of great Consideration on this Subject is, That your Majesty never would condescend to free yourself from the Perils of War, by exposing Christendom to that of the Ottoman Arms, which were often offered to you.  
Your Majesty was not ignorant, that you might have accepted such a Succours with Justice; and yet that Knowledge could not prevail with you to take a Resolution dangerous for Religion, but advantageous to obtain a Peace.  
The Example of some of your Predecessors, and of divers Princes of the House of Austria, who do particularly affect to appear as Religious before God, as they are in reality to their own Interests, proved too weak to induce you to do that, which History informs us has often been practised by others.  
The Third Circumstance, which has caused a great deal of Wonder in this War, is, the vast number of Armies, and of Sums, which were required to sustain the same.  
The greatest Princes on Earth having ever made a Difficulty of undertaking two Wars at once, Posterity will have much  to believe, that this Kingdom was capable to keep up separately, and at their own Charge, Three Land, and Two Naval Armies, besides those of their Allies, towards the Subsistence of which they contributed considerably.  
Yet it is most certain, that besides a potent Army of 20000 Foot, and between 6 and 7000 Horse, which you kept all along in Picardy, to attack your Enemies, you had another in the same Province, composed of 10000 Foot and 4000 Horse, to defend the Entrance of that Frontier.  
It is moreover true, that you kept one all along in Champagne of the same Number with this last.  
One in Burgundy of the same Strength.  
One no less powerful in Germany.  
Another as considerable in Italy, and another in Valtelina at certain times. And what is most to be admired, the major part of them were designed more to attack than to stand upon the Defensive.  
Although your Predecessors despised the Sea to that degree, that the late King your Father had not one Ship, your Majesty nevertheless during the whole Course of this War, kept 20 Galleys and 20 Ships in the Mediterranean, and about 60 well Manned in the Ocean. Which has not only prevented your Enemy's Designs upon your Coasts, but has done them as much Harm as they designed to do us.  
Moreover, you have yearly assisted the Hollanders with 1200000 Livres, and sometimes more; and the Duke of Savoy with upwards of a Million.  
The Crown of Sweden with the like Sum.  
The Landgrave of Hesse with 200000 Rixdollars; and divers other Princes with divers other Sums, according as occasions did require it.  
By reason of which excessive Charges, the Expenses of every one of the Five Years, during which France has supported that War, has amounted to upwards of 60 Millions; which is the more to be admired, in that it has been done without taking the Salary of Officers, without touching the Revenue of private Persons, and even without demanding any Alienation of the Fund of the Clergy, all extraordinary means, which your Predecessors have often been obliged to have recourse to, in less considerable Wars.  
Thus 60 Millions of Expense every one of those Five Years; an Hundred and Fifty Thousand Foot both in your Armies and Garrisons, and upwards of Thirty Thousand Horse, will be an Immortal Argument to Posterity of the Power of this Crown.  
If I add, that these different Occupations did not hinder you at the same time from fortifying your Frontiers to that degree, that whereas they were open on all parts before to your Enemies, they cannot look on them now without amazement, I shall touch a new Point no less considerable to Posterity, since that as this Kingdom is thereby secured for ever, it will receive as much Benefit by it for the future, as your Majesty has endured Labour and Pain in the Performance.  
Those whom History will acquaint with the Crosses your Majesty has met with in all your great Designs, through the Envy your Prosperities, and the Fear of your Power, have created in divers Foreign Princes, by the want of Faith of some of your Allies, by the Treachery of some of your Subjects, by a Brother ill counselled at some times, by a Mother always possessed by ill-disposed Minds, after her having deprived herself of your Majesty's Councils, and separated her Interests from those of your State; being sensible, that such Obstacles are no small heightenings to your Glory; being sensible also, that great Hearts having formed great Designs, cannot be withheld by the Difficulties they meet in the same: If they consider besides the natural Levity of this Nation, the Impatience of the Soldiers, little used to the inevitable Fatigues attending the course of Wars; and finally, the Weakness of the Instruments you were forced to make use of on those occasions, among which I take the first place, they will be forced to own, that nothing could supply the Defect of the Tools, but the Excellence of your Majesty, who was the Workman.  
Moreover, if they consider, that overcoming all those Obstacles, you have attained the Conclusion of a Peace, in which the Defect of some of your Allies, and the Affection you have had for them, have obliged you to relinquish part of what you had Conquered by your own Forces, they will needs be obliged to acknowledge, that your Goodness is equal to your Power, and that in your Conduct, Prudence, and the Blessing of God, have kept an even Pace.  
These, Sir, have been your Majesty's Actions hitherto, which I will esteem happily ended, if they be attended with a Repose, which may allow you to bless your Kingdom with all manner of Advantages.  
In order whereunto, it is necessary to consider the several Orders of your Kingdom, the State they compose, your Person, which is charged with the Conduct thereof, and the Means you must follow to perform it worthily; which requires nothing in general, but to have a good and faithful Council, to esteem their Advice, and to follow Reason in the Principles it prescribes for the Government of your Kingdom: 'Tis to that I will reduce the Remainder of this Work, treating those matters distinctly in divers Chapters, subdivided into divers Sections, in order to explain them the more methodically.  
REFORMATION OF THE Divers Orders OF THE STATE.  
ONE might make whole Volumes upon the Subject of the several Orders of this Kingdom; but the Scope of my Design not being the same with many others, who aim at nothing but to discourse well upon all the parts of a State, without considering whether the Public will receive any Benefit by their Discoursing, or not. I will only endeavour to represent to your Majesty in few Words, what is necessary to procure the Welfare of all your Subjects in their several Conditions.   

CHAP. II. Of the Reformation of the Ecclesiastical Order.  

SECTION I. Which represents the ill State of the Church at the beginning of the King's Reign; the Present State thereof; and what is necessary to be done to put it in that in which it ought to be.  
WHEN I remember to have seen Gentlemen and other Lay Persons, in my Youth, who held not only the major part of Priories and Abbeys, but also of Cures and Bishopric in Commendam; and when I consider that in my first Years there was such a Licentiousness in Monasteries of both Sexes, that nothing but Scandals and ill Examples were met with in places where Edification was to be looked for, I own that it is no small Satisfaction to me, to see those Disorders absolutely banished under your Majesty's Reign; and that the said Tenors and the Disorders of Monasteries are scarcer than lawful Possessions and Orderly Communities were at that time.  
The best Method, in my Opinion, for your Majesty to continue and to increase that Blessing, is to take a particular Care to place Persons of Merit and of exemplary Lives, in Bishoprics; to besto● Abbeys and other simple Benefices of your Nomination on Persons of Probity; to deprive those who lead Licentious Lives in so holy a Station, a that is which unites men particularly to God; o● your Sight and Favours, and to make an exemplary punishment of the Scandalous.  
I might propose many other Expedients for the Reformation of the Clergy; but provided your Majesty will be pleased to observe these Four Conditions, and to use virtuous Men of that Profession favourably, you will discharge your Duty, and will render the ecclesiastics of your State either such as they ought to be, or at least so prudent, as to endeavour to become so.  
To that end it is my Duty to represent to your Majesty, that it is very necessary to take Care not to be mistaken in your Judgement of the Capacity of Bishops.  
A Man may be Learned, may be Capable, and yet not fit for that Function; which besides Science, requires Zeal, Courage, Vigilancy, Piety, Charity and Activity together.  
It is not sufficient to be an honest Man, to make a good Bishop; for he must be good for others as well as for himself.  
I have often had a Dread that Men of Quality would hardly contain themselves within the bounds of their Duty, and that they are less regular in their Lives than others: Many others being moved with that Fear, are of Opinion, that Doctors of a good Life, and low Birth, are fit for those Employments, than those who are of higher Extraction: But there are many things to be considered on that Subject.  
A Bishop ought to be Learned, full of Piety, Zeal, well Born; by reason that the Authority required in such Places is only to be found in Persons of Quality. But as it is difficult to meet all those Qualifications in one and the same Person, I will be bold to say, that good Manners, which must be considered above all things, being supposed, Quality and Authority, which are commonly Companions, are to be preferred before great Science; having often seen very Learned Men who made very ill Bishops, either for not being able to Govern, upon the account of their low Extraction, or for living too near, according to their Birth, which borders upon Avarice; whereas Nobility, which is attended by Virtue, commonly has a particular Desire of Honour and of Glory, which produces the same Effects as Zeal, occasioned by the pure Love of God; that they generally live with a Splendour and Liberality conformable to that Dignity; and better understand the manner of behaving themselves in, and conversing with the World.  
Above all things, a Bishop must be humble and Charitable, have Learning and Piety, a steady Courage, and a great Zeal for the Church, and for the Salvation of Souls.  
Those who aim at Bishoprics out of Ambition and Interest, are commonly those who make their Court best to obtain that by Importunity, which they cannot pretend to by Merit, and therefore such must not be chosen, but those whom God calls to that Vocation; which is easily known by their different way of living; these applying themselves to the Ecclesiastical Functions, that are practised in Seminaries. And it would be very proper for your Majesty to declare, That you will choose none but such as have spent a considerable time after their Studies, in applying themselves to the said Functions in Seminaries, which are places appointed in order thereunto; since it is not reasonable, that the most difficult and most important Profession in the World should be undertaken without having first studied it; since no Man is allowed to exert the meanest and the most vile, without a Prenticeship of many Years.  
After all, the best Rule in that Choice is, to have no general one; but to choose sometimes Learned Men, sometimes Men that have not so much Learnig, and are better Born; young Men on some occasions, old ones on others; according as Men of divers Conditions may be thought most fit to Govern.  
I have always had this Consideration; but yet whatever Care I have taken to make a good use of it, I own I have been sometimes mistaken, and indeed it is very difficult not to be mistaken in Judgements, which are the less easy, in that it is almost impossible to penetrate into the Hearts of Men, or to fix their Inconstancy.  
They change their Humour with their Condition; or rather, they discover what they dissembled till then, to obtain their ends.  
While such Men live in Misery, they make it their business to be thought much better than they are; and when they have obtained their ends, they no longer constrain themselves to conceal the ill Qualifications they have had all along.  
Nevertheless, in using the Precautions I propose in the said Choice, you will discharge your Conscience before God: And I maintain boldly, That your Majesty will have nothing to fear, provided, that obliging those who shall be chosen with the said Caution, to reside in their Dioceses, to establish Seminaries there for the Instruction of their ecclesiastics, to visit their Flock, as they are obliged to do by the Canons, you put them in a way to perform that Duty effectually.  
I say this, Sir, because it is absolutely impossible for them to do it at present, by reason of the daily Encroachments your Majesty's Officers make upon their Jurisdiction.  
Six things are likewise to be wished, that the Souls which are committed to their Care may receive all the Assistance they can expect from them.  
Three of them depend on your own Authority; one on Rome only; and the other two on Rome and your Authority together.  
The three first are, the Regulations of Appeals, that of Privileged Cases, and the Suppression of the Regalia, pretended by the holy Chapel of Paris, over the major part of the Bishoprics of this Kingdom, until those who are nominated for the same by your Majesty have taken the Oath of Allegiance.  
The fourth is, a Regulation of the Plurality of the Sentences required by the Canons, for the Punishment of a Crime committed by an Ecclesiastic; to the end, that the Guilty may not be able to avoid the Punishment they deserve, by the Delays of the Formalities that are practised.  
And the other two, which relate to the Authority of the Church and yours together, are the Exemptions of the Chapters, and the Right of Presenting to Cures, which belongs to divers Abbots and Seculars.  
We must distinctly examine these Cases one after another.   

SECT. II. Of Appeals, and the Means to regulate the same.  
I Do not design in this place to explain the Original of Appeals, as a thing, the Knowledge whereof is absolutely necessary; provided it be known how to apply a proper Remedy to the said Evil, it matters but little to know when it first began.  
I am sensible, that it is so difficult to discover the true Source of that Practice, that the Advocate General Servien used to say, That had he known the Author of so good a Regulation, he would have erected his Statue.  
Nevertheless, there is great Reason to believe, that the first Foundation of it arose from the Confidence which the ecclesiastics reposed in the King's Regal Authority, when being imposed upon by the Anti-popes', Clement the 7th, Benedict the 13th, and John the 23d, who fled to Avignon for a Refuge; they had Recourse to King Charles the 6th then Reigning, to be discharged of the first Fruits, Pensions and extraordinary Subsidies they often imposed upon them.  
The Complaints of the Clergy of France having induced that King to make an Ordinance, prohibiting the Execution of the Rescripts, Mandates and Bulls which the Popes might give for the future, to the Prejudice of the Franchises and Liberties the  Church enjoined.  
This Order gave way to the first Enterprises of the King's Officers over the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction.  
Nevertheless, it was no sooner made, but the fear they had of being prejudiced by it, instead of receiving the Advantage they desired, prevailed with the King to defer the Execution of the same for some Years. Afterwards, the continuation of the Vexations Benefices were afflicted with, made it to be put in execution for some Years; after which, it was finally suppressed by King Charles VII. at the beginning of his Reign, by reason of the divers Abuses that were committed in the practice thereof.  
The Experience of the Abuse of such an Order, obliged the Clergy for a while patiently to bear the ill Treatments they received from the Officers of the Court of Rome.  
But finally, the redoubling of the Exactions that were laid upon them, obliged them to assemble at Bourges, in 1438. to consult about the means to free themselves of the same. That Assembly, which was famous for the Number and Merit of the Prelates which composed it, carefully examined the many Grievances the Church was afflicted with; and concluded, That the best Remedy they could apply to them, was to receive the Decrees of the Council of Bale; which reducing most things to the Constitution of the Common and Canonical Right, disabled the Officers of the Court of Rome from attempting any thing against the Clergy.  
After which, they formed a Pragmatical Sanction of the Decrees of that Council, which they resolved to put in practice by the King's Leave, whom they Petitioned to be Protector of the same.  
The King adhering to the Supplications of his Clergy, enjoined his 
* The Judges Royal had already begun a little to affect the Cognisance of what only belongs to the Church, under pretence of the possession of Benefices, of which the Bull of Pope Martin, given in the Year 1439. attributed the Cognisance to them.  Judges Royal, to cause the said Pragmatical Sanction to be Religiously observed; and 'tis from thence the Grievances the Church labours under at this time in this Kingdom, by the interposition of the King's Officers; received a new Force, after the beginning they had had under the Reign of Charles VI And it is also from thence the Parliaments have taken an occasion to assume the Cognisance of the greatest part of what only belongs to the Tribunal of the Church of God.  
It was very easy for them to attribute to themselves, to the Exclusion of subaltern or inferior Judges, what had been at first only committed to them, and to extend their Power under that pretence beyond its lawful Bounds, since they had none but Inferiors to encounter with.  
In the Establishment of the first Order, made to remedy the Infractions of the Pragmatical Sanction, 
* That first Regulation never had the Name, End, or Effect of Appeals.  Appeals were not allowed of: They only chastised such as did obtain Rescripts, or Mandates, from the Court of Rome, against the Common Right, upon the bare Complaint that was made and averred of the same, and that without taking cognisance of the Merits of the Cause.  
After which, Time, which changes all things, being joined to Tower, which, like Fire, attracts all to itself, made them proceed from that Order, established for the Preservation of the Common Right, and the Franchises of the  Church, against the Attempts of Rome, to the Appeals; the abuse of which, utterly annihilates the Jurisdiction of the French Prelates, as well as of the Holy See.  
I am sensible, that the most subtle Adherents of the Parliaments, to authorise their Practice, may say, That the Prelates assembled at Bourges, having petitioned his Majesty to hinder the Holy See, by his Officers, from infringing the Pragmatital Sanction, have tacitly given him a Right to oppose the Contraventions that might be made to the same by themselves, which authorises them to take cognisance of the Sentences which are daily given in their Tribunal.  
But the Proverb may be alleged in this place, which is most true, That a Bargain is nothing but what it is made; and that it is as certain as evident, That the  Church assembled at Bourges, never thought on what these Gentlemen pretend; and moreover, that they had no reason to do it.  
They had recourse to the King, against the Erterprises of Rome, by reason that the Holy See having no Superior Tribunal on Earth, Temporal Princes alone, as Protectors of the Church, can put a stop to the course of the Exorbitances of the Officers of Rome, whereas the Attempts of the Bishops may be repressed by their Superiors, to whom one may and aught to appeal.  
Finally, he that gives his Friend Arms to defend him, can never be supposed to give them for his own Destruction. The Parliaments cannot pretend, that the Protection which the Prelates assembled at Bourges, desired of the King, giveth his Officers a Right to oppress their Jurisdiction.  
Nevertheless, as Evils are greater in their Progress, and in their Periods, than in their Beginning, the Design of the Parliaments, covered with divers Pretences for a time, began to appear without a Mask in the last Age 
* Ordinances of 1539. , under King Francis I. who was the first that ever made use of the Name 
† The Wor● has its Original from the Practice of Attorneys and Advocates; who according to the Order of applying themselves before the Parliament by way of Appeal, gave the same Name to the recourse ecclesiastics had there.  of Appeal in his Ordinances.  
Many knowing the Illegality of that Practice, which the Church complains of at present, will think perhaps, that since it may be abolished with Justice, it would be proper to do it: But I'm of Opinion, that such an Alteration would do more harm, than the Evil they would avoid; and that nothing but the Abuse of such an Order is prejudicial.  
Whatever Ground the said Practice may have, it is certain, that when it was first publicly established, it was only with a pretence to put a stop to the Encroachments the Ecclesiastical Judges might attempt upon the King's Royal Jurisdiction.  
In process of time, they have not only made use of it against the Transgressor's of the Ordinances of the Kingdom, which include many matters besides Jurisdiction, but they have also extended it to the Infractions of the Holy Canons, and of the Decrees of the Church, and of the Holy See; and finally, by excess of abuse to all sorts of Matters, in which the Laics pretend a Lezion of Polity, which they maintain only belongs to the King's Officers.  
One might reasonably desire to have the Effect of this Remedy reduced to its first Foundation, which had no extent beyond Attempts upon the Royal Jurisdiction, which is sufficiently regulated by the First Article of the Ordinance of 1539. But to remove all pretence of Lezion from the Officers of the Prince, and to hinder them from pretending with any appearance, that it is impossible for them to get the Ordinances observed, by reason of the Erterprises of the Church; I am of Opinion, that they may consent to the said Appeals, when the Judges shall pronounce directly against the Ordinances; which is the only Case in which Charles IX. and Henry III. by the 59th Article of the Ordinance of Blois required them to be admitted. Provided they be not extended under that pretence to the Transgression of the Canons and Decrees, because many Ordinances, particularly the 
* Regulation of Church Affairs.  Capitularies of Charlemain, often contain the same substance with those of the Church.  
I am sensible, that it will be difficult to make so exact an Indiction of the Ordinances to this end, but that sometimes there will be abuses in whatever Regulation may be made. But it is certain, that there is no difficulty in the Will of the King's Officers, who shall be employed to put his in execution: The Order which he will be pleased to give them, will serve them as a Rule without any trouble.  
The Pretence which the Parliaments use, that when Ecclesiastical Judges judge against the Canons and Decrees, of which Kings are the Executors and Protectors, they have the Power to correct the Abuse of their Sentences, is a Pretence so void of all appearance of Justice, that it is altogether insupportable.  
Should the whole Church judge against the Canons and Decrees, one might say, that the King, who is the Protector of the same, might and aught to maintain them in an extraordinary manner by his own Authority: But since, when a Judge gives a Sentenee against their Tenor, the said Sentence may be reversed, and he corrected by his Superior, the Officers of the Prince cannot, without invading the Priestly Office, and without a manifest Abuse, do that which only belongs to those that are particularly consecrated to GOD: And when they do so, before the last Sentence of the Church is given, their attempt is not only void of Justice, but even of all appearance of Justice.  
The Endeavours of the Parliaments also to translate all the Spiritual and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, to the Tribunal of Princes, under pretence of Temporal Justice, is no less void of Ground and of Appearance: And yet there is no Presidial or Judge Royal, but will ordain the time of Processions, the Hour of High Masses, and many other Ceremonies, under colour of public Convenience; thus the Accessary becomes the Principal: And whereas the Service of God should preceded all things, and be the Rule of Civil Actions, it will no longer be in force, than while the Temporal Officers of Princes will be pleased to allow it.  
I am very sensible, that sometimes the Maladministration of Justice of those who exert the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, and the Tediousness of the Formalities prescribed by the Canons, give a specious Pretence to the Encroachments of the King's Officers; but it cannot be with Reason, since one Inconvenience does not establish another, but obliges to correct both; which is what I design to show hereafter.  
I would willingly pass under silence the Pretention which the Parliaments have to render every thing abusive which is Judged against their Decrees, to which, by that means, they would give the force of Ordinances, if I were not obliged to show, that this Abuse is the less supportable, in that they endeavour by that Encroachment to equal their Authority to that of their Master and of their King.  
The Detriment the Church receives by such Encroachments, is the more insupportable, in that it hinders the Prelates absolutely from performing their Office. When a Bishop designs to punish an Ecclesiastic, he straight removes from under his Jurisdiction by an Appeal; if in making his Visitation he makes any Ordinance, the effect of it is immediately stopped, by reason, that tho' in matters of Discipline Appeals are only by way of Devolution, yet the Parliaments make them suspensive against all manner of Reason.  
In fine, we may affirm with Truth, that the Church is fettered; and that, if her Ministers are not blind, yet their Hands are tied; insomuch that tho' they know the Evil, it is not in their Power to redress it.  
That which comforts me in this Extremity, is, that what is impossible to the Church on this Subject, will be very easy to your Majesty, on whose bare Will the remedy such Disorders depends.  
The first thing that is to be done in order thereunto, is, to prohibit those Appeals for the future; unless in the Case of a visible attempt upon the Royal Jurisdiction, and of an evident Transgression of the Ordinances, which only relate to the Temporal Authority of Kings, and not to the Spiritual Authority of the Church.  
This Ordinance being supposed, if in order to have it regularly observed, your Majesty will be pleased to make a Regulation containing Six Heads. You will at once put a stop to the Encroachments of the Church, and of the Parliaments.  
The First Head of that Regulation must order all Appeals of this kind to be sealed with the Great Seal, for the Parliament of Paris; and that in all others, which the Distance of your Court obliges to make use of the Privy Seal, they may not be sealed before three ancient Advocates have affirmed under their Hands, that there is cause of Abuse, submitting to a Fine, in case it be found otherwise.  
The Second must declare, that all Appeals made in point of Discipline, shall be only by way of 
* The like Remedy was practised 15 Years after the Pragmatical Sanction, to stop the course of the Secular Judges Usurpations over the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction; it was ordained, That those who had a mind to get Letters out of the Chancery, to oppose the Rescripts and Letters of the Popes, should be obliged to quote evidently the means by which they did pretend to justify, that the Pragmatical Sanction was infringed.  Devolution, and not of Suspension.  
The Third must order the Abuse complained of to be specified both in the Appeal, and in the Sentence that shall be given upon the same; which is the more necessary, in that it often comes to pass, that tho' there is only an Error in point of Formality, or in some particular Head of the Sentence, which contains many, when the Parliament declares that there is an Error or Abuse, the Sentence is held void in all things; tho' it ought only to be so in one of its Circumstances, which commonly is not very material.  
The Fourth must oblige the Parliaments to enter the Causes of the said Appeals upon the Rolls before any others, and to call and judge them preferably to all others, without referring the same, to avoid the Delays; which are often desired by those, who only aiming to elude the Punishment of their Crimes, endeavour to tyre out their ordinary Judges, from whom they Appeal; and because it is not reasonable to deprive the Public of the Administration of Ecclesiastical Justice, by making those who are the principal Officers of it bore Solicitors before a Tribunal which is inferior to theirs.  
The Fifth must impose a Necessity on the Parliaments, to Fine and to Condemn those to pay the Costs, who shall appeal without a Legal Cause, without the Power of remitting the same, on any account, or upon any pretence whatever; and to send them back again before the same Judges, from whom they have appealed without a Cause; which is the more necessary, because that without this Remedy all Criminals would be at liberty to free themselves of the common Jurisdiction, by Appealing without a Cause  
The best Ordinances and the justest Regulations being often despised by those who ought to observe them most Religiously; and the Licentiousness of Sovereign Courts often proceeding to that degree, as to violate or reform your Orders, according to their pleasure; the best way to render your Will effectual, and to make yourself to be obeyed in a point of such Consequence, is to add a Sixth Head to the Five foregoing, which will be as effectual a Remedy to oblige your Officers to perform their Duty on that subject, as that of Appeals is excellent to hinder the Ecclesiastical Judges from being wanting in theirs in the Exercise of their Jurisdiction.  
This Remedy requires nothing but to grant the humble Petition of your Clergy, that your Majesty would be pleased to allow them to Appeal from you to yourself; by applying themselves to your Council, whenever your Parliaments shall be wanting in the Observation of your Orders and Regulations.  
This is the more reasonable, in that whereas, in order to suppress the Encroachments of the Church, by appealing to your Judges, Application is made to a Tribunal of an Order different and inferior by its Nature; and that in having recourse to your Council, to put a stop to those of your Parliaments, Application is made to an Order of the same kind. And undoubtedly, even those who envy the Franchises of the Church, can find no fault with it, since that instead of making it independent of Temporal Jurisdiction, it adds a Degree to its subjection.  
Finally, it will be the more advantageous to your Majesty in that, as it will keep the Power of the Church within its own Bounds; it will also restrain that of the Parliaments within the just Extent, which is prescribed to them by Reason and by your Laws.  
And if besides your Majesty's Commands to your Council, to exert the Power they have by your Authority to hinder the Encroachments of all your Subjects, and particularly those of your Officers, who administer your Justice in this Kingdom, you take Care to fill it, not with Men, whose Pretention and Importunity are the best Titles they can produce to obtain their Ends, but with Persons chosen for their Merit, from among all your Subjects; you will have the Satisfaction to see, that those who will not contain themselves within the bounds of their Duty by Reason, will be constrained to it by force of Justice; which will not be continued long, but you will find clearly, that what was forced in the beginning will become voluntary.   

SECT. III. Of Privileged Cases, and the means to Regulate the same.  
THose who Consecrate themselves to God, by devoting their Lives to his Church, are so absolutely exempted of the Temporal Jurisdiction of Princes, that they can only be tried by their Ecclesiastical Superiors.  
Divine Right, and the Law of Nations, establish the said Immunity clearly. The Law of Nations, in that it has been acknowledged by all Nations. Divine Right, by the Confession of all Authors who have treated of it, before the Modern Jurisprudence of the last Age.  
The Church has enjoyed it until the Maladministration of Ecclesiastical Justice has opened a way to the Ambition of the Officers of Temporal Princes to take Cognizance of the same.  
The Church also being sensible, that the Misfortunes of the Times hindered them from being able to redress by their own Power, many Disorders, which those who were under her Jurisdiction were fallen into, resolved in order to remove all Cause of Complaint, upon the account of the Impunity of the Crimes, which were committed under the Protection of her Authority, to give Secular Judges the Power to take Cognizance of thm in certain privileged Cases; 
† Fifty Years ago this distinction of Privileged Cases and of Common Trespasses was unknown to the Church: Common Trespasses are all the Faults, the Cognizance whereof belongs to the Ecclesiastical Tribunal.  because they could not do it otherwise, than by virtue of the Privilege that was particularly granted them to that effect.  
It must be noted, that there is a difference between the Cases that are styled Privileged in all States, and those that are particularly pretended such in France.  
The First may be reduced to Two, which are Voluntary Homicide with Premeditation, and manifest Apostasy, as to persuade Clerks to despise, and to forsake an Ecclesiastical Life, to quit the Habit of it, and to live with Scandal in the World, either in bearing Arms, or in doing any other Action directly contrary to their Profession.  
The number of the Second were inconsiderable at first. When the Pragmatical Sanction was established, there were but two; the bearing of Arms, and the Infraction of the King's Safeguard; but by degrees they have been extended farther.  
All Trespasses against the Pragmatical Sanction have been deemed Criminal Cases.  
That of the 
* Agreement made between King Francis the 1. and Pope Leo the 10. about Benefices.  Concordats has been put in the same Rank.  
The Verification of Cedules before the Judge Royal is also deemed of the same kind.  
Ravishments, Robberies upon the High Ways, False Witnesses, Coining, High Treason, and all enormous Crimes are deemed to be of the same nature by the Parliaments.  
In fine, if we believe them all the Faults of ecclesiastics, even common Injuries are privileged Cases, there are no longer common Trespasses.  
Such Crimes as are granted to be privileged Cases, in all States, are owned as such by the unanimous Opinion of the whole Church; and many of those that are deemed such in this Kingdom, are so by Abuse, and by the Encroachments of the Officers Royal.  
They have been the bolder in assuming the Cognizance of all the Deportments of Clerks, by reason that, according to the Order of the Canons, which requires three conformable Sentences for the Condemnation of their Faults, it is very difficult to punish even the most notable, and impossible to do it in a short time.  
Although this Pretence is plausible, and that it requires a Reformation of the Formalities observed in the administration of the Justice of the Church; nevertheless, the ancient Lawyers could not forbear blaming the said Encroachment publicly. And it is no Argument to urge, that those Crimes which render ecclesiastics unworthy of their Character, deprive them at the same time of their Immunities; since by such Arguments many Conclusions would be inferred as false as prejudicial, even to those who draw such Consequences.  
The only Consequence that can be inferred of the Delays and Irregularities observed in the Administration of the Justice of the Church, is, that it is necessary to remedy the same; and that as the ecclesiastics are obliged so to do, so Kings are obliged to maintain them in the Immunities which God has been pleased to confer on his Church.  
In order to discharge these Obligations, the Church is obliged to remedy, by the means we shall propose hereafter, the intolerable Delays of these Sentences, required by the ancient Canons; and in the next place, to become so exact in the punishment of the Crimes committed by those that are under her Jurisdiction, that as soon as a Scandal is discovered, the exemplary Punishment of the same may be known as soon as the Offence.  
And the King making a Declaration to express all the privileged Cases, which may be reduced to those which may be committed by such, and in all States, and in all Orders; and besides, in the bearing of Arms, the Infraction of the King's Safeguard, the Verification of Cedules, manifest Apostasy, as it is above explained, Robberies on the High Way, Coining, and all Crimes of Leze-Majesty, must absolutely forbid his Officers to take Cognizance of any other Cases, until the Accused be sent to them by the Judges of the Church; and that in case they infringe the said Order, their Punishment may be known almost as soon as their Trespass.  
Now since Justice requires an exact knowledge of a Fault before it can be punished; and that Kings cannot administer Justice themselves to all their Subjects: His Majesty will discharge his Obligation, in ordering his Privy Council to receive the Complaints of the Infractions made by his Officers of what Quality soever, to such a Regulation, and to punish their Encroachments severely: In which case the Church being satisfied with such an Order, will be the more careful to administer Justice, when they do receive it from their Prince.   

SECT. iv Which shows the Consequence of the Regalia pretended by the Holy Chapel of Paris over the Bishops of France, and opens a way to suppress the same.  
ALtho' the Canons of the Holy Chapel 
* By Letters Patent of 1453. Charles the 7th granted that favour to the Holy Chapel, instead of the Gift Charles the 5th had made to them of the remainder of all the Accounts delivered in the Chamber, which he desired to be employed for the Reparation both of the Palace and of the Holy Chapel.  of Paris maintain, that the Regalia was given them by St. Lewis their Founder: Yet it is most certain, that the first Grant we find of it is of Charles the 7th, which allows them for three years only the right of enjoying the Temporal Revenue of the vacant Bishoprics, over which the Regalia should be found to have a Right. The time of the said Grant being expired, he continued the same for three years longer, and for the four following; the whole on condition, that one half of the Money arising thereby should be employed for the maintenance of the Chanters who were to perform the Service; and the other, for the Reparation of the Glass Windows and Ornaments, and for the maintenance of the Choiristers, according as it should be ordained by the Chamber of Accounts of Paris.  
Charles the 7th being dead, his Son Lewis the 11th continued the same Favour to the Holy Chapel, during his Life, which was looked upon to be so extraordinary, that the Chamber of Accounts would only verify the Letters Patents thereof for Nine Years.  
After the Reign of Lewis the 11th, his Successors Charles the 8th, Francis the 1st, and Henry the 2d continued the same Favour during their Lives.  
Charles the 9th went farther, 
* By the Edict of Febr. 1569.  and granted to Perpetuity to the Holy Chapel, what his Predecessors had only granted them for a time.  
The Intention those Princes had is praiseworthy, since they gave a Right which did belong to them to a good end. But the Use those of the Holy Chapel have made of it can never be sufficiently blamed, since that instead of being satisfied with what was given them, they have endeavoured under that pretence, to make all the Bishoprics of France subject to the Regalia.  
The Parliament of Paris, which pretend to be the only Judges of the Regalia, have been blinded to that degree by Self-interest, as to make no Scruple to declare even all those Bishoprics, 
† The Bishop du Bellay.  which in our days have been united to the Crown, liable to that Servitude; and to order the Advocates in proper terms no longer to question, but that the extent of the Regalia was as large as that of the Kingdom.  
This Encroachment being too visible to produce any Effect, induced the Churches which were not liable to that Right no longer to acknowledge that Tribunal for Judges, and the Kings to refer all such Causes to their Council.  
The extent of that Right over all the Bishoprics of the Kingdom, is a Pretention so ill grounded, that in order to discover the Injustice thereof, it will be sufficient to read a Deed 
* The Deed gins with these words, Dominus Rex. , the Original of which is in the Chamber of Accounts, which the Precedent Le Maitre caused to be printed, which gave an Account of the Bishoprics that are subject to the Regalia, and of those that are free from it.  
Formerly the common Opinion was, that there was no Regalia beyond the River Loire 
† 
The Ordinance, Dum Episcopus alicujus Episcopatus, ubi Rex habet Regaliam.  
Philip the 4th in his Philippines of the Year 1302. uses these words, In aliquibus Ecclesis Regni.  
Philip the 6th in his Ordinance of the Year 1334. speaks thus, In the Bishoprics in which we have a Regalia.  
Lewis the 12th in his Ordinance of 1499. cited by the first Precedent Le Maitre, We have and do forbid all our Officers in the Archbishoprics, Bishoprics, Abbeys, and other Benefices, in which we have no Right of Regalia, or of Guard, to establish any there, on pain of being punished as guilty of Sacrilege.  
Pasquier in the 3d Book of Inquiries, chap. 13.  
The late King Henry the 4th, by his Edict of the Year 1606. Art. 17. We only design to enjoy the Rights of the Regalia, as our Predecessors and ourselves have done heretofore, without extending the same to the Prejudice of the Churches, that are exempted from it. And that good Prince believing that the Parliament of Paris would judge to the contrary, suspended all the Causes about the Regalia for a year by his Letters Patent of the 6th of Octob. 1609.  
The King now Reigning having inherited his Piety as well as his Kingdom, declares by the Ordinance of 1629. Art. 16. That he only designs to enjoy the Regalia as it has been done for the time past. And the Clergy having complained, that those Terms were not express enough, H.M. ordered his Commissioners to make this Answer, That the Ordinance being referred to that, of 1606. those Terms were sufficient to satisfy the World, that he did not desire to enjoy the Regalia in those places where it has not been enjoyed for the time past.  
The Ordinance, Dominus Rex, makes use of these Words, Consuevit capate Regaliam.  
Philip the 4th, in his Ordinance of 1302. says, Regalias, ques Nos & Praedecessores nostri consuevimus precipere.  
And the Philippine of the Year 1334. Our Predecessors Kings upon the Account of the Regalia, and the Nobility of the Crown of France have used and have been accustomed to be in Possession and Seisin. And since all the Kings in their Ordinances have only spoken of the Custom and of their Possessions.  , the Kings Lewis le Gross and Lewis the Young exempted the Archbishopric of Bourdeaux, and the Suffragans thereof, of the same. Raymond Count of Tholouse granted the same Favour to the Bishops of Provence and of Languedoc, which was afterwards confirmed to them by Philip le Bell; and St. Lewis yielded the Regalia of all Britain to the Dukes of the Country, by the Treaty he made with Peter Mauclerc; which shows, that he did not give it to the Holy Chapel when he founded it.  
Several other Bishoprics, as Lions, Autun, Auxerre, and divers others, are so undoubtedly free from that Subjection, that no body calls it into question.  
The Ordinances made at divers times show clearly, that the Kings of France never did pretend to have a Regalia over all the Bishoprics; and that Truth is so evident, that Pasquier the King's Advocate in the Chamber of Accounts, is forced to confess, that he who maintains that Doctrine, is rather a Court Flatterer than a French Lawyer. These are his very Words.  
The Ignorance, or rather the want of Spirit, and Interest of some Bishops, has contributed very much towards the Vexation the Prelates of this Kingdom suffer at this time, who, to free themselves of the Persecution they did receive in their own particular, have made no scruple to receive Acquittances from the Holy Chapel for Sums they never paid.  
The Opinion they had, that in disputing their Right before Judges who were their Parties, they would be condemned, has persuaded them that they might innocently commit such a Fault, the Consequence of which would be very dangerous, if your Majesty's Goodness did not repair the harm done by their Weakness.  
Common Right requiring the Disposition of the Fruits of a vacant Benefice, to be reserved for the future Successor; the contrary cannot be done without an Authentic Title to empower one so to do.  
Yet we find none of that kind to justify the Pretensions of Kings, to dispose of them according to their Pleasure; for want of which they are forced to have recourse to Custom.  
This Truth is so certain, that all the Ordinances made upon that Subject only maintain their ancient Possession.  
As it is very easy for Sovereign Princes, by divers Pretences, to attribute that to themselves which does not belong to them; and that thereby an unjust Usurpation in the beginning, may in process of time be deemed Lawful, by virtue of Possession: There may be a great deal of Reason to question, Whether Custom can have the force of an authentic Title in the case of Sovereigns.  
But not designing to dispute your Majesty's Rights, but only to persuade you to regulate them, insomuch that they may not endanger the Salvation of Souls; without endeavouring any farther to examine the Source and the Foundation of the Regalia's, which I suppose valid; I only design to examine what the Holy Chapel can pretend by virtue of those Concessions of your Predecessors, and to propose the Remedy of the Abuse which is committed in the enjoyment of such a Grant.  
It often happens, that a Bishop who is Rich in all the Qualifications required by the Canons, and which the Piety of Good Men can desire in him, but Poor by his Birth, remains two or three Years incapable of performing the Duty of his Office, both by the Payment of the Bulls, to which he is obliged by the Concordates, which often sweep away a whole Year's Revenue, and upon the account of this new Right, which takes away another. So that adding to these two Expenses the Charge he must be at to buy the Ornaments he stands in need of, and to furnish his House according to his Dignity; it will often be found, that three Years are passed, before he can receive any thing for his Maintenance: For which reason, many of them do not go to their Bishoprics, excusing themselves upon necessity; or laying aside House-keeping, deprive themselves of the Reputation they ought to have to feed their Flock, as well by Acts of Charity, as by Words.  
It also often comes to pass, that to avoid these Inconveniencies, they engage themselves so far, that some are prevailed with to practsie illegal means to acquit their Debts: And those who do not fall into that Extremity, live in perpetual Misery, and finally frustrate their Creditors of what they own them, for want of Power to pay them.  
The Remedy to that Evil, is as easy as necessary, since it only requires the annexing to the Holy Chapel, an Abbey of equal Revenue with that which they can receive by that Settlement.  
Some perhaps will say, That it will not be easy to clear this Point as it should be, by reason of the difficulty the said Society will make of disclosing that which they design to conceal: But if your Majesty order them to justify in two months' time, by the Acts of their Registers, what they did enjoy before the perpetual Concession made to them by Charles IX. and that on pain of forfeiting the said Right; this lawful Proceeding will soon discover what is necessary to be done, to recompense the Grant they have received from your Predecessors.  
I am sensible, that the said Chapter will pretend, that the Revenue they receive by the Regalia, ought to be considered, according to what they enjoy by it at present; but whereas it is certain, that they were no sooner sure of the perpetuity of that Grant, but they extended it on divers Bishoprics which are not liable to it, it is evident, that the Fine I propose is that on which you may justly take your Measures.  
If your Majesty will be pleased to do this, you will easily procure an incredible advantage to your Church, by which means the Souls will more easily receive the Food that is so inecessary for them, and which they ought to expect from their Pastors.  
If, in the next place, you continue the Resolution you have taken, and which you have practised for a considerable time, Not to grant any Pension on Bishoprics, which is absolutely necessary, you will admit nothing in your Power, to put Bishops out of danger of not being able to perform their Duty for Want.   

SECT. V Of the Necessity of Protracting the Delays that are used in the Course of Ecclesiastical Justice; from whence it happens, that three Crimes remain unpunished.  
EVery body knows, that the Orders which are merely Political in the Church, may and ought often to be changed, according to the Alteration of Times. In the Purity of the first Ages of Christianity, some Establishments of that kind were good, which at present would be very prejudicial.  
Time, which is the Father of all Corruption, having rendered the Manners of ecclesiastics different from what they were in the Fervour of their first Zeal; it is certain, that whereas during the course of several innocent Years, the Church, in which the Zeal of the Prelates made them as severe in the Punishment of Crimes, as they are slack and negligent in that Performance at present. It is certain, I say, that whereas in those Days the Delays of the Formalities, observed in the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, were of no ill Consequence, they are very prejudicial at present; and Reason does not permit the continuanco of the same.  
This Consideration makes it very necessary to abolish the ancient Order prescribed by the Canons, which requires three conformable Sentences for the Conviction of Clerks.  
The ill use that has been made, for a long while, of the said Order, Author of all Impiety, and consequently of the Disorders of the Church, obliges it to do itself Justice in that point, to remove all Pretence from Temporal Judges, to follow the Opinion of certain Theologians, who have made no scruple to say, That it were better the Order should be reversed by an Incompetent Judge, than to see Disorder reign.  
It is impossible to take away the Right of Jurisdiction of the Archbishoprics, of the Primates of the Holy See; but whereas it often comes to pass, that Six or Seven Sentences are given, before Three of them happen to be conformable to one another, the said Inconvenience may be removed, by ordering the Sentence of the Judge's Delegated by the Pope, upon the Appeal of the Primate, or Archbishop, to be definitive and absolute; and to the end this last Judgement may be obtained speedily, and that the Zeal of the Church may appear in the good Administration of their Justice, it will be fit his Majesty would be pleased to join with his Clergy, to obtain from the Holy See, that instead of having recourse to Rome, in all the particular Cases that are to be Tried, his Holiness would be pleased to Delegate, in all the Provinces of the Kingdom, Persons of Capacity and Probity, with a Power to Judge Sovereignly of all Appeals made in his Tribunal, without any new Rescripts.  
This Proposition cannot be odious at Rome, since the Concordate obliges the Pope to Delegate in partibus, for the Decision of the Causes that are depending there; this difference will only be found, That whereas at present there is a necessity of having recourse to Rome in every Cause, for the Delegation of those Judges, they will then be all ready Nominated for the Decision of all the Causes of the Kingdom; which facilitating the Punishment of the Crimes of the ecclesiastics, will remove all pretences of the Parliament's Encroaching, as they do, upon the Justice of the Church, and all Subjects of Complaints from the ecclesiastics against them.  
And thereby the Mouths of those that are open Enemies of the Church, or envious of her Immunities, will be shut; and her best Children who have been silent hitherto upon that Subject, will maintain her Cause, and speak boldly and freely to defend her Liberty, against those who would oppress it without Reason.  
I am sensible, that the Holy See will fear, lest those Delegates should become perpetual Dictator's in time; but the changing of them from time to time, which I think to be fit and necessary, will remove the fear of that Inconvenience; and continuing to sue out the Appeals at Rome in every Cause which may be suffered, the Rights of the Holy See will remain entire, without any diminution.  
It may be urged, That it will require no more time to obtain a new Delegation of Judges from Rome, for every Crime that shall be committed, than to sue out an Appeal to remove the Cause, before those that are already Delegated; but the thing is very different, since it is certain, that one of the principal Abuses which hinders the Punishment of the Crimes of the Clerks, consists in that the Appellant commonly obtains at Rome his Removal, before such a Judge as he thinks fit in France, by Collusion with the Benchers, who for Money serve their Clients as they please.   

SECT. VI Which represents the Prejudice the Church receives by the Four Exemptions several Churches enjoy, to the Prejudice of the Common Right; and proposes Means to remedy the same.  
EXemption, is a Dispensation, or Relaxation of the Obligation we lay under to Obey our Superiors: They are of different kinds; some are of Right, others of Fact.  
The Exemptions of Right, are those we enjoy by the Concession of a lawful Superior, who grants them upon mature Deliberation, and for certain Reasons.  
The Exemptions of Fact, are those we are in possession of without a Title, 
* Quòd enim, qua sine Privilegio potest acquiri. Consuetudine immemoriali, say the Canons.  but only by the use thereof Time out of Mind.  
The Exemptions of Right are approved of by all Casuists, as granted by a Lawful Authority.  
Those of Fact, though not lawful in themselves, are not always condemned by them; because those that have enjoyed a Privilege Time out of Mind, had formerly Bulls for the same, though they cannot produce them.  
There are Three different Exemptions of Places; The First is that of Mendicant Monasteries, which the Bishop does not visit, though he is received solemnly there, whenever he goes thither, may hold his Orders there, and perform all the Episcopal Functions, whenever he thinks fit.  
The Second is of many other Places, in which they are not received, and can perform no Episcopal Function, unless they make a Declaration, That it is without prejudice to the Rights and Privileges of the said Places. The Abbeys of Marmoutier, and of Vendosme, and many others, are of this kind.  
The Third is of certain Territories, in the extent of which, the Bishop exerts no Jurisdiction, not even over the Laity; over which, those who enjoy such Exemptions, have the sole Jurisdiction, and the Power commonly called, Lex Diocoesana: The Abbeys of S. Germane des Prez, or of the Fields, of Corbie, of S. Florent le Vieil, of Fescamp, and many others are of this kind within the whole extent of their Territories, the Monks themselves exert all the Episcopal Jurisdiction.  
They give Dispensations of Banes; they appoint Monitories; they publish Jubilees, assign the Stations after the Orders are come from Rome; the Visa's are expedited in their Names. Moreover, they pretend a Right to choose whatever Bishops they think fit to give Orders, without Leave from their Diocesan Bishop.  
Finally, they give Demissories to receive Orders from any Bishop.  
The Chapter of Chartres enjoys this Exemption; by virtue of which, the Bishop cannot make his Entry into the Church, without giving an Act, by which he promises to preserve the Privileges of the Church, nor make any Visitation, either of the Holy Sacrament, or of the Holy Oils.  
Those Persons are so far exempted from the Jurisdiction of the Bishops, that when a Canon becomes a Delinquent, the Chapter nominates the Judges that are to Try him; and if there be an Appeal of Judgement, they apply themselves to Rome, to have Judges in Partibus, because that Church ad Sanitam Romanam Ecclesiam, admisso nullo medio, pertinet.  
They publish Indulgences; they have a hundred and odd Parishes; they exert all the Diocesan Jurisdiction, and the Appeal of all their Sentences is carried to Rome: They ordain all General Processions.  
St. Martin of Tours enjoys the same Privileges.  
Four sorts of Persons are particularly exempted in the Church; the Archbishops of the Primates; the Bishops of the Archbishops; the Monks, and the Religious of the Bishops; and the Canons of the Bishops and Archbishops.  
Those Exemptions differ in many Circumstances; some only exempt Persons, and others also exempt the Place of their Abode, and that differently.  
Anciently the Archbishops were subject to the Primates 
* 'Tis but 60 Years ago, since the Archbishop of R●üen has been freed of the Yoke of the Primate of Lions, and has made himself Primate of Normandy. , to whom the Pope sent the Pallium to exert Power and Authority over the Metropolitans. But since those of France, excepting those of Tours, of Sens, and of Paris, have obtained, either by Bulls, or by Prescription, leave to have no Dependence on the Primates.  
Some Bishops 
† 
The Bishop du Puy is exempted from the Jurisdiction of the Archbishopric of Bourges, and so are many others in Italy; yet they are obliged to appear in the Provincial Councils that are held by the Archbishops.  
St. Gregory of Tours exempted an Hospital, a Church, and a Monastery from the Jurisdiction of the Bishops of Autun, at the Request of Queen Brunehalt, and of her Grandson King Thierry.  
Crotbert Archbishop of Tours exempted the Monastery of St. Martin from his Jurisdiction.   have also obtained the Exemption of their Subjection to their Archbishops from the Pope.  
The Monks are almost all exempted from the Common Jurisdiction, and their Right is grounded on the free Concession of their Bishops, or of the Popes; their most ancient Exemptions, are those that were granted them 7● or 800 years ago, by the Bishops and Archbishops; but all those they have obtained since, have been granted by the Popes, to one of these ends, either least the Presence and Court of the Bishops should disturb their Solitude, or to free them from the Rigour of some, by which they were, or pretended to be severely used.  
The last that have been exempted from the Jurisdiction of their Superiors, are the Canons. In their first Institution they were so strictly bound and united to their Bishops, that they could do nothing without their leave; and to endeavour to free themselves of their Obedience to them, would have been looked upon as the greatest Crime they commit in those days.  
Many have been of Opinion, that they have obtained all their Exemptions from the Antipope▪ or that they are evidently surreptitious, or barely grounded on the Possession of a Time out of Mind; but it is most certain, that some of them are more ancient than the Schisms, and more authorised than those which draw their Force and Virtue from the Anti-popes'.  
The most lawful have granted some; 
* A Letter of Alexander the 3d to the Chapter of Paris, shows, that the Popes have granted Exemptions.  either in Confirmation of the Concessions of the Bishops, or of the Agreements made with them; or of their own accord, under pretence to secure the Canons against the ill Usages they did receive from them.  
In order to penetrate into the bottom of this matter, and clearly to distinguish the good Exemptions from the bad, we must consider the Bulls by which they are Authorised differently.  
Those that were granted by the Popes before the Misfortune of the Schisms are different from those which were granted since the Extinction of the same.  
The first sort must be looked upon as good and valid; but yet such Bulls being an Exemption from the common Right, which is always odious, must be carefully examined, for fear of being mistaken in the Tenor of them; since it is certain, that many are produced as Bulls of Exemption, which are only Bulls of Protection, which were obtained anciently; and Bulls, which grant some particular Privileges, but not an Exemption from the usual Jurisdiction; or Bulls, which only authorise Chapters to erect a Jurisdiction inferior to that of the Bishops; like unto those of the Arch-Deacons, who in some Churches have a right to Exeommunicate, to Interdict, and to enjoin public Penances, tho' they are still subordinate to the Bishop's Jurisdiction.  
As for the second sort, as they are void in themselves, for want of a Lawful Authority in those who did grant them, particularly by the Constitution of Pope Martin the 5th, 
* The Exemptions of Sens, Paris, Bourges, Bourdeaux, Lymoges, Meaux, Auxerre, and the Country of Man's, have been obtained by the Anti-popes'.  which annihilates all Bulls obtained during the Schisms, no body can pretend, without Malice or Ignorance, to make use of them to the Prejudice of the Common Right.  
The third sort have been granted, either to serve for new Exemptions, or to confirm preceding one's.  
The first must be reputed void, either because they are directly opposite to the Decree mentioned by Martin the 5th; or because they have been surreptitiously obtained, as the Parliament of Paris and Tholouse have adjudged it, against the Chapters of Angers and Cahors.  
The second being only granted to confirm an ancient Right, which is never found to be lawfully established, must, in the Judgement of all Impartial Persons, be looked upon as of no Effect.  
It now remains to see whether the Exemptions 
* The Exemption of Auxerre, Noyo●s, Orleans, B●auyais, Chalous, Angers Poitiers and Lions are grounded on the Concessions of the Bishops, and the Agreement made among them.  grounded on the bare Concessions made by the Bishops, or on the Agreements and Arbitral Sentences interposed upon that Subject against them and their Chapters, are good and valid.  
If it be never lawful for Bishops to alienate their Temporal without an evident Advantage and Profit, much less can they renounce their Spiritual Authority, to the great prejudice of the Church, which thereby sees her Members divided from the Head, and the Rule whereby it subsists changed into a Confusion, which destroys it.  
The Nullity of Agreements, mutual Promises, or Arbitral Sentences is very visible by that Principle: No Man can compromise or transfer a thing, the Disposition whereof is not in his Power; and if there be any Authors who are of Opinion, that Spiritual things may be transferred, all in general except some, among which the Subjection of this nature is the first: And indeed those sort of Titles are so invalid in the Case in question, that tho' they were confirmed by the Popes, they would not be sufficient to deprive of their Right the Successors of the Bishops, who have parted with their Superiority in one of the three ways above specified.  
As Reason shows that none of these ways can be of force against common Right; it also shows, that Bulls barely confirming the said Concessions, Agreements, or Arbitral Sentences, give no Right to those who would make use of them, because they can have no more Force than the Foundation they suppose.  
One Point only remains liable to Examination, viz. Whether the Custom and ancient Possession which Chapters claim against the Authority of their Bishops, is a Title sufficiently valid to make the Church undergo the Prejudice it suffers by Exemptions.  

* Cyprianus. Frustra quidam qui ratione vincuntur consuetudinem nobis opponunt, quasi consuetudo major sit veritate, aut non fuerit in spiritualibut sequendum; si melius fuerit à spiritu sancto revelatum.  Custom is a very deceitful Rule; the ill ones, tho' ne-never so ancient, are universally condemned; and all those that are against common right, and destroy an Order established by Ecclesiastical Constitutions, must be reputed so, and can be no just ground of Prescription, much less in what relates to Ecclesiastical than to Civil Laws, since the Settlements of the Church are grounded on a more certain Principle; and the Difficulty proposed must be decided every where, by saying, That Custom may serve as a Title in those things which may be possessed by common Right, but never in those in which Possession violates it; in which Case it is absolutely void, unless it be accompanied with a Title so Authentic, that it may be liable to no manner of Suspicion: Whence it results, That Common Right submitting all Canons to their Bishops, there is no Custom sufficiently powerful to exempt them from that Subjection.  
It is impossible to imagine the many Evils Exemptions are the Source of. They overthrew the Order the Church has established consonant to Reason, which requires Inferiors to be subject to their Superiors. They ruin the Concord which ought to be between the Head and the Members; they authorise all sorts of Violences, and leave many Crimes unpunished, as well in the Person of the privileged; as in that of many Libertines, who take the Advantage of them to secure themselves.  
There are two ways to redress that Evil, either by annihilating the Exemptions absolutely, or by regulating them.  
I am very sensible that the first Expedient, as the most absolute, is the most difficult: But since it is not impossible, I will nevertheless propose it to your Majesty, who has ever delighted in doing that which your Predecessors durst not attempt.  
However, I do not think it proper in relation to the Exemptions which Monks and their Monasteries enjoy. As they are dispersed in divers Dioceses, the Uniformity of Mind, which ought to reign among them, requires, that instead of their being governed by divers Bishops, whose Minds are different, they should be under the Government of one Regular Chief; upon which Foundation I affirm boldly, That it is as necessary to allow them the Possession of the lawful Exemptions they enjoy, as it is just to know the Validity of them, by the Examination of their Bulls, which they extend sometimes farther than Reason requires.  
But I say moreover, that the other Exemptions may be abolished with so much Advantage for the Church, that that Universal Motive is sufficient to make one despise particular Interests on that occasion.  
When a thing is just, it is a sufficient Inducement for us to undertake it; and we are absolutely obliged to do it when it is altogether necessary.  
The Church having subsisted hitherto without the Alteration I propose, I do not suppose it has this last Quality; but I say, that it would be very useful, in that it would leave no subject of Excuse to the Bishops, in case they were wanting in their Duty.  
To make use of this first Expedient would only require a Revocation made by his Holiness of the Exemptions and Privileges in question, and a Power given to the Bishops to exert their Jurisdiction over their Chapters, and all other privileged Persons, except those above mentioned.  
Such a Bull, accompanied by a Declaration from your Majesty, verified in your Parliaments and in your Council, would break the Fetters which tie the Hands of the Prelates of your Kingdom, and would make them answerable for the Disorders of their Dioceses, which it is almost impossible for them to do at present.  
The obtaining of the Pope's Bull would prove the easier in my Opinion, in that it is consonant to the overtures of the Council of Trent, which declares particularly 
* Sess. 14. Cham of Ref. 1. Capitula & Cathedralium & aliarum majerum Ecclesiarum illorum Person●● Exemptionibus, Consuetudinibus, Sententiis, Jaramentis, Concordatis▪ fieri ●st possint, quo minùs à suis Episcopis, & aliis majoribus Prelatis per 〈…〉 vel illis quibussing videtur adjunctis, jux●● Canonicas sanctities; toti●s quoties opus fucrit visitari, corrigi, & emandari, etiam authovitat●, Apostolica possint & valeant. , That the Chapters and Canons cannot by virtue of any Exemption, Custom, Possession, Sentence, Oath and Concordat whatever, be excused of being visited, corrected, and chastised by their Bishops, or other Persons deputed by them: And tho' this Expedient ●ere not relished at Rome, where Novelties, tho' useful, are commonly odious, and where the least Opposition generally obstructs great Advantages; your Majesty causing the Decree of the Council to be observed on this Subject, will have no need of any new Expedition.  
I am sensible that this Remedy will be disliked by the Parliaments, with whom Use and Practice is far more prevailing, than whatever Reasons can beurged; but after having foreseen that good, and considered all the Obstacles which may be met in it, I declare boldy, that it would be much better to pass over all of them, than to stop at any opposition whatever: And your Majesty may undertake the said Alteration the better, and with more Reason, because that in restoring things upon the foot of common Right, you will restore them in their own Nature; and that it sometimes becomes Sovereigns to be bold on certain occasions, which are not only just, but of which the Importance cannot be questioned 
* Isidorus. Sape per Regnum Terrenum, Culeste Regnum profecit, ut qui infrà Ecclesiam positi contra Fidem & Disciplinam Ecclesia agunt, vigore Principium conterantur. .  
The Canons keep their Titles so concealed, that it is impossible to come to the knowledge of them, unless by the King's Authority: Moreover, they often suppose them, when they have none; which Peter de Blois and Peter le Venerable openly complain of.  
Tho' the Advantage of these two Expedients, which indeed are but one and the same, aught to prevail with the World to approve them; yet the Fear I am in, that the Difficulties which would be met with, to put them in Execution, would make them ineffectual, makes me pass to the second, which consists in the Nomination of Commissioners, Bishops, Canons and Monks, which being joined to Deputies of the Council and of the Parliaments, shall take an Account of all the Exemptions and Privileges of the Church; to the end, that being represented to your Majesty, those that will be found good and valid may be regulated; and those that have no lawful Foundation, retrenched and abolished: And the said Expedient is the more practicable, in that the Ordinances of Orleans 
* Ordinance of Orleant, Art. 11. All Canons and Chapters, whether Seculars or Regulars, and of Cathedral or Collegiate Churches, shall be equally subject to the Archbishop, or Diocesan Bishop, without being allowed to plend any Privilege or Exemption, in relation to the Visitation and Punishment of Crimes, all Opposition or Appeals whatever notwithstanding, without Prejudice to the same, of which we have transferred the Cognizance and retained the same to our Privy-Council. , made under Francis the 2d, have a particular Article for the Regulations of Exemptions.  
If, in the next place, the Pope would be pleased to empower in every Metropolis the Delegated Judges we have above proposed, to regulate by the Authority of the Holy See, what the Bishops will not be able to do of themselves, by reason of the Exemptions, which will remain in their Force and Vigour, and your Majesty to command your Council to take Cognizance of the Differences which will arise upon such a Subject, you will absolutely remedy all the Evils the said Privileges occasion.   

SECT. VII. Which represents the Inconveniences that arise from the Bishops not having an Absolute Power to dispose of the Benefices that are under them.  
IT now remains to speak of the Evil which proceeds from, that the Bishops do not dispose of the major part of their Cures of their Dioceses, to which the Ecclesiastical or Lay-Patrons have a Right of Presentation.  
The ecclesiastics began to enjoy the right of Patronage 
* The Year 441.  in the Council of Orange, where it was ordained, That the Bishops, who should build Churches in another Diocese, should have a Right to put such Priests there as they should think fit, provided their Capacity was approved of by the Diocesan Bishop.  

* Novel. 123. Ch. 18. the Year 541.  The same Right was also given by Justinian to the Laymen, who should be Founders of Chapels, which they obtained afterwards even in respect of Monasteries, which they should be Founders of.  

* St. Gregory 's Epistle to Secundinus, in the Year 598. justifies that Point.  The Ninth Council of Toledo moreover extended the Right of Laic Patronage to Parochial Churches, allowing the Founders to nominate Curates, lest the Negligence wherewith Bishops would serve their Foundations should discourage them from making any new ones.  
In the beginning this Right was of no longer continuance than the Founder's Life, Gregory and Pellagius extended it to their Children; and finally, under Charlemagne it passed to the Heirs, whoever they were, which has continued ever since.  
This Right, which is approved of by several Fathers of the Church, being confirmed by divers Councils, particularly that of Trent, must be looked upon as holy and inviolable, by reason of its Ancientness, for its Authority founded on the Canons of the Fathers and of the Councils, and for the Advantage which accrues to the Church by the same, in favour of which many Foundations are made, thereby to acquire the Power to nominate those that are to enjoy them.  
But when I consider, that Necessity has no Law, and that the Use of a Privilege, which was good during the fervour of the Founders, is at present so prejudicial by the Corruption of those who are Heirs of their Estate, but not of their Zeal and of their Virtue, nor even sometimes of their Religion, that it is impossible to continue it, without exposing many Souls to their Ruin: I dare affirm boldly, that a Disorder of that Consequence can no longer be connived at, without being answerable for the same before God.  
Many are of Opinion, That the best Remedy for this Evil, is wholly to abolish the Cause of it; but when I consider, that a Legacy of this nature cannot be possessed with Justice, without performing the Conditions on which it has been given; and that the Fathers of the Council of Trent, who were sensible of the Abuses of the same, durst not alter them, I am at a stand; and I do not think that a private Man can, without Temerity, propose such a Remedy: It will be better to have recourse to a milder way, in some measure proposed by the Council of Trent 
* Sess. 2. Ch. 18. of Reff. , though not directly.  
That way is, 
† Idem Sess. 24. of the same Chapter.  That the Synod should Elect Examiner's, by which all the Pretenders to Benefices, which have the Cure of Souls, shall be carefully examined, to the end that their Capacity and Probity being known, they may afterwards propose two or three of the most Capable, to the Patrons of the Cures which shall be vacant, for them to choose, and present to the Bishop the Person which shall be most agreeable to them.  
I am sensible that this Expedient takes off something of the Liberty Patrons enjoy in France at present; but since in restraining it, it nevertheless leaves it them, and hinders incapable Persons from being put into Cures, it ought to be received; and that the more willingly, in my Opinion, since that in redressing the Evil which arises from the Presentations to Cures, if the Order of the Council be observed, it will also redress those that are caused by the facility wherewith the Archbishops often receives the Priests, whom their Suffragans have refused; in that as the Council's Orders, that the Examiner's, proposed by it, to be the Judges of the Capacity of those that are to be named for Cures, shall be obliged to give an account of their Proceed to the Provincial Councils; so it will not allow the Archbishops to pass by their Judgement, without so just a Cause, that no body may disapprove it.   

SECT. VIII. Of the Reformation of Monasteries.  
AFter such just Regulations, as are above mentioned, it will suit with your Majesty's Piety to Authorise the Reformation of Monasteries as much as is possible.  
I am very sensible, that many Considerations may give cause to fear, that those which have been made in our Days, are not so austere in their Progress, as in their Beginning; but yet it is very necessary to mind, and to favour them; since Good does not change its Nature in not being lasting, but still remains good; and that he who does what he can with Prudence for a good End, performs his Duty, and answers what God expects from his Care.  
It is true, that I ever was of Opinion, and am so still, That it were better to establish moderate Reformations, in the Observation of which, both Bodies and Minds may subsist with some ease, than to undertake such austere ones, that the strongest Bodies will hardly be able to bear the Rigour of them. Temperate things are commonly constant and lasting; but it requires an extraordinary Grace to make that subsist, which seems to force Nature.  
It is also observable, That the Reformations of Religious Houses in this Kingdom, must be different from those of other States, which being free of Heresies, require rather a profound Humility, and an exemplary Simplicity in the Members thereof, than Doctrine, which is altogether necessary in this Kingdom, in which the Ignorance of the most Virtuous Monks in the World may prove as prejudicial to some Souls who stand in need of their Learning, as their Zeal and Virtue are useful to others, and to themselves.  
I must needs say by the buy on this Subject, That as to what relates particularly to the Reformation of the Monasteries of Women, to restore the Elections, and particularly the Triennial, instead of the King's Nomination, is not always an infallible Expedient.  
The Brigues and Factions which reign sometimes amidst the Weakness of that Sex, often rise to that degree, that they are not supportable; and I have seen your Majesty obliged twice to alter it, in places where you had settled it, to restore Things to their former state.  
As it behoves your Majesty's Piety to labour about the Regulation of ancient Monasteries, so it behoves your Prudence to put a stop to the progress of the overgreat number of new Monasteries which are daily established.  
In order whereunto, it is necessary to despise the Opinion of certain Persons, as Weak as Devout, and more Zealous than Prudent; who often fancy, that the Salvation of Souls, and the Safety of the State, depends on that which is prejudicial to both.  
As none but such as are wicked or blind, can be insensible or disown, that Religious Houses are not only very useful, but also necessary; so none but those who have an indiscreet Zeal can be ignorant, that the excess of them is inconvenient, and that it might come to such a point as would be ruinous.  
That which is done for the State being done for God, who is the Basis and Foundation of it; to Reform the Houses that are already established, and to put a stop to the excess of new Establishments, are two Works very agreeable to GOD, who loves Rule in all things.   

SECT. IX. Of the Obedience which is due to the POPE.  
THe Order which God requires in all things, gives me an occasion to represent to your Majesty, in this place, That as Princes are obliged to acknowledge the Authority of the Church, to submit to their Holy Decrees, and to pay an entire Obedience to the same, in what relates to the Spiritual Power which God hath placed in her hands for the Salvation of Mankind; and that as it is their Duty to maintain the Honour of the Popes, as Successors of St. Peter, and Vicars of Jesus Christ; so they ought not to yield to their Attempts, when they endeavour to extend their Power beyond its Bounds.  
As Kings are obliged to respect the Thiara of the Sovereign Pontifs, the same Obligation lies upon them to preserve the Power of their Crown.  
This Truth is acknowledged by all Theologians; but it is very difficult to distinguish the Extent and Subordination of these two Powers aright.  
In such a matter, Princes are neither to credit the Gentlemen of the Long Robe, who commonly measure the King's by the Form of his Crown, which being round, has no end; nor those who by the excess of an indiscreet Zeal, declare themselves openly in favour of Rome.  
Reason advises us to hear both the one and the other, in order afterwards to resolve the Difficulty by Persons of so much Learning, that they may not be liable to mistake through Ignorance; and so sincere, that neither the Interests of the State, not those of Rome, may prevail with them against Reason.  
I may declare with Truth, That I have ever found the Doctors of the University of Paris, and the most Learned Monks of all Orders, so reasonable on this Subject, that I have never observed the least Weakness in them, that could hinder them from defending the just Rights of this Kingdom; neither have I ever observed any excess of Affection in them for their Native Country, which could induce them, contrary to the true Sentiments of Religion, to diminish those of the Church to augment the others.  
In such Cases, the Opinion of our Fathers must be of great Weight; the most famous and most impartial Historians and Authors, who have written in all Ages, must be carefully consulted on those Occasions, in which nothing can be more, dangerous than Weakness or Ignorance.   

SECT. X. Which sets forth the Advantage of Learning; and shows how it ought to be Taught in this Kingdom.  
HAving represented, that Ignorance is sometimes prejudicial to the State; I am now to speak of the Necessity of Learning, one of the greatest Ornaments of States, this being the most proper place for it, since the Empire of it is justly due to the Church, by reason that all sorts of Truths have a natural Relation to the first, the Sacred Mysteries of which, Eternal Wisdom has been pleased to make the Ecclesiastical Order Depositories of.  
As the Knowledge of Letters is absolutely necessary in a Commonwealth, it is certain, that they ought not to be taught without distinction to every body.  
As a Body having Eyes in all its Parts, would be monstrous; a State would be the same, if all the Inhabitants thereof were Learned; we should find as little Obedience in it, as Pride and Presumption would be common.  
The Commerce of Letters would absolutely banish that of Trade, which enriches Nations; would ruin Husbandry, the true Mother of the People; and would soon destroy the Nursery of Soldiers, which increases more in the Rudeness of Ignorance, than in the Politeness of Sciences: Finally, it would fill France with Litigious Persons, more proper to ruin private Families, and to disturb public Peace, than to do the State any good.  
If Learning were profaned to all sorts of Minds, we should see more Persons capable to form Doubts, than to resolve them; and many would be fit to oppose Truths, than to defend them.  
'Tis this Consideration which induces Politicians to say, that a well regulated State requires more Masters of Mechanic Arts, than Masters of Liberal Arts to teach Letters.  
I have often heard Cardinal du Perron, for the same Reason, earnestly wish the Suppression of part of the Colleges of this Kingdom; he was desirous to have four or five famous ones established in Paris, and two in every Metropolitan City of the Provinces.  
He added to all the Considerations I have urged, that it was impossble to find a sufficient number of Learned Men in every Age to supply a great number of Colleges; whereas being contented with a moderate number, they might be filled with worthy Persons, who would preserve the Fire of the Temple in its Purity, and would transmit by an uninterrupted Succession the Sciences in their Perfection.  
I cannot forbear thinking, when I consider the great number of Men who profess the Teaching of Letters, and the multitude of Children that are instructed, that I see an infinite number of Sick People, who only aiming to drink pure and clear Water for their Cure, are pressed with such a disorderly Drought, that receiving without distinction all those that are presented to them, the major part drink such as are impure, and often out of poisoned Cups; which increases their Drought and their Distemper, instead of easing either.  
In fine, this great number of Colleges, indifferently established in all places, produceth two Evils; the one, by the mean Capacity of those that are obliged to Teach, there not being a sufficient number of eminent Persons to fill the Pulpits; the other, by the want of natural Disposition in those whose Fathers oblige them to study, by reason of the Conveniences of it, without examining their Capacity; which is the reason, that most of those that study have only a mean Tincture of Learning; some for want of more Capacity, others for not being well instructed.  
Tho' this Evil is of great consequence, the Remedy is easy, since it only requires to reduce all the Colleges of such places as are no Metropolitans to two or three Classis, sufficient to free the Youth from gross Ignorance, prejudicial even to those who design to follow Arms, or to spend their Lives in Trading.  
By that means, before Children are determined to any Condition, two or three Years will discover the Capacity of their Minds; after which, those that have a good Genius, being sent to great Cities, will succeed the better in their Learning, both upon that account, and by their being instructed by abler Masters.  
Having thus provided against this Evil, which is much greater than it seems to be, we must also provide against another into which France would infallibly fall, if all the Colleges that are established were in one Hand.  
The Universities pretend, that a great deal of wrong is done them, in not leaving them exclusively from all others the faculty of Teaching Youth.  
The Jesuits on the other hand would not be displeased, perhaps, of being the only Persons employed in that Function.  
Reason, which ought to decide all sorts of Differences, does not permit the frustrating of an ancient Possessor, of what he possesses with a just Title: And Public Interest cannot suffer a Society, not only recommendable by their Piety, but famous for their Learning, as the Jesuits are, to be deprived of a Function, which they are able to perform with great Advantage for the Public.  
If the Universities should teach alone, there would be cause to fear they would in time resume their former Pride, which might prove as prejudicial for the future as it has been heretofore.  
If on the other hand the Jesuits had no Companions in the instructing of Youth, besides that the like Inconvenience might be feared, there would be moreover a just subject to fear many others.  
A Society which is governed, more than any ever was, by the Laws of Prudence; and which, devoting itself to God, without depriving themselves of the knowledge of the things of this World, lives in so perfect a Correspondence, that the same Spirit seems to animate the whole Body: A Society, which by a blind Vow of Obedience is submitted to a perpetual Chief, cannot, according to the Laws of Sound Policy, be much Authorised in a State, in which a powerful Community must be formidable.  
If it be true, as it is most certain, that Men have a natural Inclination to advance those they have received their first Instructions from; and that Parents have always a particular Affection for those who have educated their Children. It is also true, that the absolute Education of Youth cannot be committed to the Jesuits, without being exposed to give them a Power, which would be the more obnoxius to States, in that all the Places and Honours which give the management thereof, would be filled by their Disciples; and that those who take an Ascendant early over the Mind sometimes retain it during their whole Life.  
If we add, that the Administration of the Sacrament of Penance gives that Society a second Authority over all sorts of Persons, which is of no less weight than the first: If we consider, that by those two ways they penetrate into the most secret Motions of Hearts and Families, it will be impossible not to conclude, that it is not fit to leave them the said Ministry alone, without Competitors.  
Those Reasons have been so powerful in all States, that we have no Example of any hitherto, who have been willing to yield the Empire of Letters, and the absolute Education of their Youth to that Society alone.  
If that Society, good and harmless in itself, created so much Jealousy in the Arch Duke Albert, one of the most pious Princes of the House of Austria, who only acted according to the Motions of the Council of Spain, that he thought fit to exclude them out of certain Universities, in which they were actually settled, and to oppose the new Settlements they designed in Flanders.  
If they have behaved themselves so, as to induce some Republics to remove them absolutely out of their Dominions, tho' with too much Rigour, it is the least that can be done in this Kingdom, to give them some Check, seeing not only that they are submitted to a Foreign and Perpetual Chief, but moreover, subject and, at the Devotion of Princes, who seem to desire nothing more, than to humble and ruin this Crown.  
As in point of Faith all the Catholic States of the World have but one Doctrine; in that which does not relate to it, there are many who differ, from whence the Source of their Fundamental Maxims is often derived; for which reason, standing in need of some Theologians, who may on certain occasions courageously defend the Opinions, which have been always received there, and preserved by an uninterrupted Transmission, they require some free from any Engagement with any suspected Powers, having no dependence to deprive them of Liberty in things, in which Faith allows it to all the World.  
History informs us, that the Order of St. Benedict was formerly so absolutely Master of the Schools, that no body was taught in any other places, and that it decayed so absolutely in point of Science and of Piety together in the Tenth Century of the Church, that it was called Unhappy upon that account. It also informs us, that the Dominioans have afterwards enjoyed the same Advantages which those good Fathers were first possessed of; and that Time has deprived them of it like the others, to the great prejudice of the Church, which happened to be infected at that time with many Heresies: It also informs us by the same means, that Letters are like passing Birds, which do not always remain in the same Country. And therefore Policy requires the preventing of the said Inconvenience, which being come to pass twice, is with Reason to be feared a third time; and which probably will not happen, if that Society has Companions in the Possession of Letters.  
All Parties are dangerous in point of Doctrine; and nothing can be more easy, than to form one under pretence of Piety, when a Society thinks itself obliged to it by the Interest of their Subsistance.  
The History of Pope Benedict the 11th, against whom the Cordeliers, nettled upon the account of the Perfection of Poverty, viz. of the Revenue of St. Francis, were animated to that degree, that they did not only declare open War against him by their Books, but moreover by the Emperor's Arms; by favour of which an Antipope arose, to the great prejudice of the Church, is too great an Example to require any thing more to be said upon that subject.  
The more Societies adhere to their Chief or Superior, the more they are to be feared, particularly by those to whom they are not favourable.  
Since than Prudence obliges not only to oppose whatever may be prejudicial to the State, but also to prevent whatever might contribute thereunto; since the Power of so doing often creates a Desire so to do.  
Since also the Weakness of Humane Nature requires a Counterpoise in all things, and that it is the Foundation of Justice; it is more reasonable, that the Universities and the Jesuits should Teach in Emulation of one another, to the end that the said Emulation may whet their Virtue, and that Sciences may the better flourish, and be certain in the State, in that being deposited into the Hands of Two Guardians, if the one should chance to lose this sacred Pledge, it may be found among the others.   

SECT. XI. Means to Regulate the Abuses which are committed by Graduates in the obtaining of Benefices.  
WHereas it would be prejudicial to a State, if Men of all Capacities should apply themselves to the Sudy of Letters, it is to be wished that Men of Sense may be encouraged in it. Your Majesty cannot do a more useful thing to that end, than to put a stop to the Abuses which are committed in the Distribution of Benefices, which ought to be reserved for those to whom they are due, as a Reward of their Labours.  
None but such as are Enemies to Learning and Virtue can question that Right. The Council of Basle 

Sess 31. The Council of Basle ordained, that one third Part of the Benefices should be conferred on Masters of Arts, Bachelors, Licenciates, and Doctors of Physic, Law, and Theology, which have studied a certain time in a Privileged University.  
By the Concordate, which was made since at the Council of Lateran, bertween Leo X. and Francis I. it was agreed, that Graduates should enjoy vacant Benesicet the 3d. part of the Year, viz. in the Months of Jannary. April, July, and October.  , and the Concordate which passed afterwards at the Council of Lateran, between Leo X. and Francis I. have settled it too clearly, for any one to have such a Thought: But yet, at the same time, Men must be void of Justice and Reason, not to be desirous to correct the Abuses of the same; which are so great by fraudulent Permutations, by supposed Resignations, by the Artifice of Patrons, and by the Authority of the Indultaries, who are more powerful than the Graduates, and by the Industry of those who are only indebted to their Purse for their Degrees; that the said Privilege is so far from being the Reward of Virtue at present, that it is only the Recompense of the Craft and Villainy of those, who being ignorant of Letters, are only learned in Litigiousness.  
The true Remedy to that Evil, is to prefer, conformably to the Holy Canons, Doctors and Bachelors in Divinity, to all those who have the same Degrees in other Faculties.  
That among Theologians equal in Degrees, those who have preached the Word of God, or Theology longest, be provided before the others.  
That Doctors and Bachelors at Law may have the same Advantage over such as are only Masters of Arts; and that among the last, those who have been longest Regent's, be preferred first.  
That none be allowed to take out his Letters for the Mastership of Arts, nor his Degrees in Civil or Canon Law, but in the Universities where he has studied.  
That none of the said Letters be granted to any, but such as have actually made an entire Course of Philosophy; nor any Degrees in Civil or Canon Law, but to such as have studied for the space of Three whole Years in Law-Schools, and have made their Exercises publicly, with the Intervals required.  
In case this Order be carefully observed, the Merit of Letters will certainly be rewarded; and Ignorance will no longer be protected by it, and receive what is only due to Learning.  
If, in the next place, your Majesty will be pleased to free those, who shall make themselves famous for Learning, from the Persecution of the Indultaries, it will encourage many to redouble their Labour, in order to receive the deserved Reward of the same.   

SECT. XII. Of the Right of 
* A Grant from the Pope to Confer Benefices.)  INDULT.  
THE Right of Indult being derived from a Bull of Pope Eugene 
† Bull of Pope Eugene, granted to King Charles 8th. , which is not to be found; if it should be examined with rigour, we would find that the Foundation of it is not solid; since, according to Reason, such things as cannot be proved, aught to be put in the same Classis with those that are not.  
I am sensible, that Paul III being willing to oblige the Precedents and Counsellors of the Parliament of Paris 
† The Bull was sent to King Francis I. in 1538. , who did oppose the Concordates, gave them a Power of Nomination to Regular and Secular Benefices. I am also sensible, that the Chancellor of France, as Precedent of the said Parliament, received the same Privilege by the same Bull: But if we consider that the said Bull is grounded on that of his Predecessor, which is not to be found; that Consideration will have no force, since Lawyers inform us clearly, That a Reference can have no force, unless the thing referred unto, is clear and evident 
* Non creditur referenti, nisi constet de relato. .  
The less the Foundation of that Privilege is certain, the more the Abuses which are committed in it, are insupportable.  
Notwithstanding the said Right is Personal; that is, Though it was only granted to the Person of the Officers, specified by the Bull of Pope Paul III it passes now to the Widow, and to the Heirs, as a Temporal Heritage: And tho' the said Favour was only granted them, in order lawfully to gratify either their Children, or some of their Relations or Friends, capable of the Benefices to which they should be Nominated; they often, contrary to Divine and Human Laws, constrain those who obtain Benefices by virtue of their Indults, to resign them to whomsoever they think fit; abusing the said Privilege to that degree, that often those who will not hold them in Commendam, can only avoid that Crime, by committing another, which makes them guilty of Simony before God.  
The Weakness of the Foundation of the said Grant, and the Number 
* Aug. Ipsa mutatio consuetudinis etiam qua adjuvant utilitata novitat perturbat.  of Abuses committed by virtue thereof, might lawfully induce your Majesty to abolish it; which would be the easier, in that it would be sufficient in order thereunto, to refuse the Indultaries their Letters of Nomination, without which, they can pretend to no Benefices: But Experience teaching us, That an accustomed Evil is often more supportable than a Good, the novelty of which is vexatious; it will be sufficient for your Majesty to make so good a Regulation, that those who are to enjoy the Benefit of the said Grants, may not be able to make an ill Use of the same, as they have done heretofore.  
If you hinder the same Officer from having his Nomination upon several Benefices: If you order those that shall be presented by him to be Nominated, not to be admitted before a good Examination, according to the Ordinances, without Favour.  
If you make an Order, that the Letters of their Nomination shall express positively, That the Benefices to which they are Nominated, shall be really for them: That it shall not be allowed for them to be constrained to resign them to any body; and that if it be discovered that if they lend their Names to any to possess the said Benefices in Gommendam, they shall not only be made incapable of ever possessing any Benefices for such a Crime, but moreover be liable to Punishment.  
If, in the next place, you are pleased to order the said Right, which is only Personal, from being transmitted to Heirs; the Observation of such a Regulation, will produce this effect, That your Officers not being deprived of the Favour your Predecessors have obtained for them, Learned Men will receive a great Advantage under your Reign, and will be delivered of the great Vexation they receive from them.  
You might also refuse to allow your Officers, after having Nominated a Man to an Indult, to substitute another in his room, in case he should die before it be filled.    

CHAP. III. Of the NOBIITY.  

SECT. I. Divers Means to Advantage the Nobility, and to make them Subsist Honourably.  
AFter having represented what I esteem absolutely necessary for the Re-establishment of the First Order of your Kingdom; I proceed to the Second; and say, That the Nobility must be Respected, as one of the principal Sinews of the State, capable to contribute much towards its Preservation and Settlement. They have been so much depressed of late Years, by the vast Number of Officers, which the Misfortune of the Age has elevated to their prejudice, that it is very necessary to protect them against the Attempts of such Men. The Wealth and Pride of the one, triumphs over the Necessity of the others, who are only rich in Courage, which induces them to employ their Lives freely for the State; of which your Officers reap the Advantage.  
As it is necessary to protect them against those who oppress them; so a particular Care must be taken to hinder them from using those that are under them, as they are used by the others.  
It is a common Fault in those that are born in that Order, to exert Violence against the People, to whom God seems rather to have given Arms to get their Livelihood, than to defend themselves.  
It is absolutely necessary to stop the course of such Disorders, by a continued Severity, to the end that the weakest of your Subjects, though unarmed, may be as safe under the protection of your Laws, as those who are armed.  
The Nobility having shown in this War, happily ended by a Peace, that they have Inherited the Virtue of their Ancestors, which induced Caesar to prefer them before all others; it will be fit to Discipline them, to the end that they may acquire a new, and preserve their former Reputation, and that the State may be usefully served.  
It is most certain, That the Nobility which does not serve you in the War, is not only useless, but a Burden to the State; which in that Case may be compared to the Body which supports an Arm which is troubled with the Palsy, as a Load which burdens it, instead of affording it any ease.  
As the Gentry deserves to be well used when they do well, it is necessary to be severe against them, when they are wanting in what their Birth exacts from them: And I make no scruple of saying, That those who degenerating from the Virtue of their Forefathers, do not serve the Crown with their Swords and Lives, with all the Constancy and Courage which the Laws of the State require, deserve to be deprived of the Advantages of their Birth, and to be reduced to bear part of the Burden of the People.  
As Honour aught to be dearer to them than Life, it were better to chastise them, by depriving them of the first, than of the last.  
To take away the Life of Men who expose it daily upon a mere Notion of Honour, is much less than to take away their Honour, and to save their Life; which in that Condition, is a perpetual Torment to them.  
As all means must be used to maintain the Nobility in the true Virtue of their Fathers; so none must be omitted to preserve them in the possession of the Estates they have left them, and to help them to acquire new ones.  
As it is impossible to find out a Remedy against all Evils; so it is very difficult to find out a general Expedient to the Ends I propose.  
The many Marriages which are contracted in every Family in this Kingdom, (whereas in other States, seldom any but the Eldest Marries) are one of the true Causes which ruin the best Families in a short time. But if that Custom impoverishes private Families, it enriches the State, the main force of which consists in the Multitude of Men; insomuch that instead of complaining of it, it must be encouraged; and instead of opposing it, means must be found out for the subsistence of those it brings into the World, according to the Purity of Heart they derive from their Birth.  
In order thereunto, it is necessary to distinguish the Nobility which is at Court, from those who live in the Country.  
That which is at Court will be considerably eased, by retrenching the State and insupportable Expenses which have been introduced there by degrees; since it is most certain, that such a Regulation will do them more good than all the Pensions they receive.  
As to those who live in the Country, though such an Order will not ease them so much, by reason of their Misery, which will not allow them to make superfluous Expenses, they will nevertheless find the Benefit of the said Remedy; so necessary for the whole State, that, without it, it can never avoid its ruin.  
If your Majesty be pleased to add to the Regulation of that Disorder, the Establishment of Fifty Troops of Gens d'Armes, and the like number of Chevaux Legers, to be paid in the Provinces, on the Conditions hereafter specified, it will be a great help for the Subsistence of the most indigent Nobility.  
If, in the next place, you suppress the Sale of the Governments of the Kingdom, and of all Military Employments, which the said Order pays sufficiently for, at the Rate of their Blood.  
If you observe the same Method in what relates to the Places of your Household: If whereas at present all manner of Men are admitted into the same, by the dishonourable Traffic of their Purse, you prohibit the receiving of any Person into them, but such as have the Happiness of being of a Noble Blood: If, moreover, the Entrance thereof be no longer allowed, even to those who have that Advantage, unless by your Majesty's choice of them, in consideration of their Merit, the said good Regulation will prove both Advantageous and Honourable to all the Nobility.  
Whereas at present Gentlemen can only purchase Places and Dignities at the Rate of their Ruin, their Fidelity will be the more certain for the future, by reason that the more they will be gratified, the less they will think themselves indebted, for the Honours they will receive, to their Purses, and to their Creditors, who never put them in mind of what they own them; but at the same time they are troubled for being raised that way.  
If, moreover, you will be pleased to extend your Favour so far, as to be careful to gratify their Children (who shall be found to have as much Learning and Piety as is required) with part of the Benefices that are in your Gift; that Order will be the more obliged to you, in that discharging them of part of the Burden which overwhelms them, you will put them in a way to keep up their Families, since the Support and Preservaition of the best, depends often on those who espousing an Ecclesiastical Life, commonly look on their Nephews as their own Children, and place their chief Delight in bringing up some of them to Learning and Virtue, in order to their being promoted to some of those they are in possession of, if they prove capable of them.  
I might mention many other things to ease the Nobility; but I suppress the Thoughts of it, upon Consideration, That as it would be very easy to write them, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to put them in practice.   

SECT. II. Which Treats of the Means to prevent Duels.  
SO many Edicts have been made hitherto to no purpose, to put a stop to Duels, that it is very difficult to find out a certain Way to stop the course of that Rage.  
The French despise their Lives so much, that Experience has taught us, that the most rigorous Proceed have not always proved the best to stop their Frenzy.  
They have often fancied, that it was very glorious to violate the Edicts; and to show by such an Extravagance, that they valued their Honour more than their Life: But the dread of losing the Conveniency, without which, they cannot live happy in this World, having a greater influence over them than the fear of Dying without the Grace of God, without which they will be unhappy in the next; the fear of losing their Places, their Estates, and their Liberty, has proved more prevailing than the fear of losing their Life.  
I have used my utmost Endeavour to find out some proper Remedy for the Cure of this dangerous Distemper. I have often consulted to know, whether as it is lawful for Kings to make two private Men Fight, to prevent a Battle, and thereby to decide the difference which has obliged them to take Arms, they might not also grant some Combats, to avoid the multitude of Duels that are daily Fought. I urged, That it was very likely that this proceeding might free France of this Frenzy, which is so prejudicial to it, since that in putting those in hopes of obtaining leave to Fight, who should have a just Reason to claim the Combat, every Man would freely submit to the Judges deputed to examine the Nature of the Offence; which probably might prevent the Misfortune of Duels, since most Quarrels would be determined by a good Accommodation.  
The better to favour this Thought, I added, That formerly many Duels had been allowed of in this Kingdom, which had also been practised in divers States.  
I thought it might be a means to abolish the Barbarity of the Custom, which wills, That every Man that is offended, should do himself Justice, and find his Satisfaction in his Enemy's Blood: But after having perused, over and over, what the most Authentic Authors say upon those Matters, and often mused on this important Subject, I have found by the Advice of the least scrupulous and most resolute Theologians of the Time, That Kings being Established to preserve their Subjects, and not to ruin them, they cannot expose their Life without some public Use, or particular Necessity: That they cannot permit private Combats, without exposing the Innocent to receive the Punishment of the Guilty, seeing that God not having obliged Himself always to render Reason victorious, the Fate of Arms is uncertain: And that notwithstanding such Permissions have been Authorised sometimes, at least in divers States, and even with the Approbation of some particular Churches, they have ever proved abusive; which appears evidently, since finally the Universal Church has prohibited and condemned them, under very great Penalties. I have discovered, that there was a great deal of difference between making two particular Persons fight, to prevent a Battle, and to put a period to a War, and making them fight to prevent a Duel.  
The First is lawful; because Nature teaches us, That Part ought to be exposed for the Whole; and that Reason requires, That Particular Persons ought to be hazarded for the General Good; by reason that besides that the said Expedient has been practised at all times, we find Examples of it in Holy Writ; and that the Effect of it is wholesome and certain, in that whatever Event a Duel allowed of in this Case may have, it saves the Lives of abundance of Men, who may serve the Public in other Occasions.  
But it is not so with the Second, which is unlawful in its Nature, since that instead of certainly saving the Generality, by the hazard of some private Persons, and thus to prevent a great loss by a small, it exposes private Men directly to their Ruin, upon the bare Imagination of a public Good, which has no certain Foundation: This Method is the less allowable, since that instead of preventing Duels, it is capable to increase the Licontiousness of them; because the Blindness of the Nobility is such, that many being of Opinion, That to demand a Combat thus, would be to seek out a way to avoid it, would think themselves obliged in Honour to find out a shorter way to right themselves, and to show their Courage.  
The late King attempted this Way, in 1609. with all the Circumstances that could make it useful: He deprived all those of Estates, Places, and Life, who should Fight without leave; but all in vain: And that obliged your Majesty, after having made the same Trial at the Beginning of your Reign, to have recourse by your Edict of March 1626. to another Remedy, which has proved more effectual, by reason that though the Penalties of it are more moderate, yet they are more smarting to those who value their Lives less than their Estates and Liberty.  
Now whereas the best Laws in the World are useless, unless they are inviolably observed; and that those who commit those kind of Faults, use so much Art to invalidate the Proofs of it, that it is almost always impossible to convince them.  
I presume to tell your Majesty, That it is not enough to punish averred Duels and Challenges, by the Rigour of your Edicts; but when there is a Notoriousness without Proof, it will be absolutely necessary to imprison the Delinquents at their own Charge, for more or less time, according to the divers Circumstances of their Faults: Otherwise, the common Negligence of your Attorneys-General to inform against them, the Indulgence of your Parliaments, and the Corruption of the Age, which is such, that every Man esteems it as Honourable to assist those who have Fought to disguise their Crime, as an honest Gentleman would think it shameful to conceal the Theft of a Robber, will make the Edicts and your Cares ineffectual.  
'Tis in such a Case, that nothing but the way of Fact can oblige Men to observe your Laws and Ordinances; 'tis on those Occasions your Authority must pass over Forms to maintain Rule and Discipline, without which a State cannot subsist; and it will enable your Officers to punish Crimes according to Forms, since it is more probable that the Cause and Proof of a Fault will be sooner found when the Guilty are seized, than when at liberty to use their utmost Endeavours to stifle the Discovery of the same.  
If, in the next place, your Majesty will be pleased to order Rencounters to pass for Duels, and to be punished as such, until those who have been guilty of them, surrender themselves Prisoners, and are absolved of the same by Law; you will do whatever is probable to stop the course of that Frenzy; and your Care to preserve the Lives of your Nobility, will make you Master of their Hearts, and will engage them to so strict an Allegiance, that they will pay with Usury, whatever your Majesty can expect from them, in all the Employments they are gratified with.    

CHAP. IU. Of the Third ORDER of the Kingdom.  
TO Treat of the Third Order of the Kingdom with Method, and to see clearly what is proper to be done to make it susist in the State in which it ought to be, I will divide it into Three Parts.  
The First shall contain the Body of the Officers of Justice.  
The Second, of those who have the Management of the Finances. And  
The Third, the People, which commonly bears the Burden of the State.  

SECT. I. Which relates in general to the Disorders of the Courts of Justice; and examines in particular, whether the Suppression of the Sale of Offices, and of Hereditary Offices, would be a proper Remedy for such Evils.  
IT is much easier to discover the Defects of the Courts of Justice, than to prescribe Remedies for the same: Every body is sensible, that those who are appointed to hold the Scale even in all things, have inclined it so much themselves on one side to their own Advantage, that there is no longer any Counterpoise.  
The Disorders of the Courts of Justice are come to that pass, that they can go no farther: I would enter into the Particulars of the said Disorders, and of the Remedies which may be applied to the same, if the Knowledge I have both of the Person of him who has the First Office of Justice at present, and of his Design to render it as pure, as the Corruption of the World will allow it, did not oblige me barely to propose certain general Remedies to your Majesty, to stop the progress of the principal Disorders.  
In the Opinion of the Generality of the World, the Chief consists in suppressing the Sale of Offices, in extinguishing the Inheritance of the same; and in giving them gratis to Persons of such known Capacity and Integrity, that even Envy itself may not be able to contest their Merit.  
But whereas it is a thing which cannot be done at this time; and that it will be difficult to practise this Expedient at any other, it would be useless at present to propose Means to that End.  
Whenever the said Design is undertaken, some will certainly be found, which cannot be foreseen at present; and those one might prescribe, would be no longer in season, when the thing might be attempted.  
In the mean time, though it is commonly dangerous to be singular in Advising, I cannot forbear saying boldly, That considering the present State of Affairs, and that which may be foreseen for the future, it is better, in my Opinion, to continue the said Sale and Inheritance of Offices, than absolutely to alter the Settlement thereof.  
So many Inconveniences are to be feared in such an Alteration, that as though the Elections for Benefices are more ancient, and more Canonical than the Nomination of Kings; nevertheless the great Abuses which have been committed in the same, and which it would be impossible to prevent, render the Nominations more supportable, as less subject to ill Consequences.  
So, notwithstanding the suppression of the Sale, and Inheritance of Offices, is consonant to Reason, and to all the Constitutions of Right; yet the inevitable Abuses which would be committed in the distribution of Offices, depending so much on the bare Will of Kings, and consequently on the Favour and Craft of those who should have most Power with them; would render the present proceeding in the same, more tolerable than that which has been used heretofore, by reason of the great Inconveniences which always attended it.  
All reasonable Men must needs see the difference between these two Parties, and hearty desire the suppression of the Sale and Inheritance of Offices, supposing that in this case Places would be distributed by the pure Consideration of Virtue.  
Neither can they be ignorant, that in such a Case, the Artifices of the Court would prevail before Reason, and Favour before Merit.  
Nothing contributed more to make the Duke of Guise so Powerful, in the League against his King and Country, as the great Number of Officers his Credit had introduced in the greatest Employments of the Kingdom. And I have been told by the Duke of Sully, That the said Consideration was the most powerful Motive which induced the late King to the Establishment of 
* Duty yearly paid by the Judges and other Officers, etc.  the Annual Duty: That that great Prince had not so much regard to the Revenue which accrued to him by it, as to the Means to secure himself for the future against such Inconveniences: And that notwithstanding Treasure had a great Influence over him, Reasons of State were more prevailing on that occasion.  
In the new Establishment of a Commonwealth, it were a Crime not to banish the Sale of Offices, because in such Cases, Reason obliges to establish the most perfect Laws Human Society can permit: But Prudence does not allow it in ancient Monarchies; the Imperfections of which are turned to use, and the Disorder of which (not without Advantage) composes part of the Orders of the State.  
In such Cases, Men must submit to Weakness, and prefer a moderate Regulation, to a more austere Settlement, which perhaps would be less proper, the Rigour of it being capable to shake the Fabric which one would strengthen.  
I am sensible that it is a common Saying, That he who buys Justice by the Lump, may sell it by Retail; but yet it is certain, that an Officer who lays out the best part of his Estate upon a Place, will be kept from doing ill in a great measure, for fear of losing all that he is worth; and that in such a case, the Price of Offices is not an ill Pledge of the Fidelity of the Officers.  
The Complaints which are made against the Sale of Offices, have been the same in all the Ages of the Monarchy; but though they have ever been looked upon as reasonable in themselves; yet the Disorders, upon which they are grounded, have been tolerated, supposing that we are not capable of the austere Perfection which is the scope of them.  
Those who are not ignorant of History, must needs know, that some Writers, not even sparing the King St. Lewis, have upbraided his Reign, because Places were not bestowed gratis in his Time: That they condemn others after him, because the Traffic of Offices was already so public, that the Money arising by the same was Farmed; and that they cast an Odium upon the Memory of the great King Francis, because he was the first, who upon the account of the necessity of the Age he lived in, made a Regulated Commerce of them, which has lasted ever since.  
I own that it is a Misfortune for that great Prince, to have been the first Author of that evil Establishment; but perhaps he would not be blamable, if the Reasons which constrained him to do it were known. The Knowledge he had that his Favours were sold by private Persons without his Leave, and the Importance of the Affairs which overwhelmed him, persuaded him that there was no better nor more ready way to get the Estates of his Subjects voluntarily, than to give them Honour for Money.  
The late King, assisted by a very good Council, in a profound Peace, and in a Reign free from Necessity, added the Establishment of the Annual Duty, to the Sale of Offices, introduced by that great Prince:  
It is not to be presumed that he did it unadvisedly, and without having foreseen, as much as Humane Prudence could permit, the Consequences of the same; and it is most certain, that those things which have been done by Princes, whose Conduct has been Judicious, cannot be changed without a Reason; unless Experience discovers the Prejudice of them, and that it is evident that one might do better.  
The Disorders which have been Established by Public Necessities, and strengthened by Reasons of State, cannot be reformed without Time: It must be done by degrees, without passing from one Extreme into another.  
An Architect, who by the Excellence of his Art corrects the Defects of an ancient Building, and who without pulling of it down, reduces it to some supportable symmetry, deserves more Praise, than he who ruins it absolutely, to erect a new Edifice perfect and accomplished.  
It would be very difficult to change the Order established for the disposition of Offices, without altering the Hearts of those that are in possession of them; in which case, there would be reason to fear, That whereas in Times past they have been serviceable to keep the People within the Bounds of their Duty, they would contribute more towards their Debauches for the future, than any others. Prudence obliges sometimes to weaken Remedies, to make them the more effectual; and those Orders which are most consonant to Reason, are not always the best, because they are not always proportioned to the Capacity of those that are to put them in practice.  
Whereas the suppression of the Sale and Inheritance of Offices, aught to make way for Virtue, it would only make way for Brigues and Factions, and would fill Places with Officers of low Extraction, often more loaden with Latin than Estates; which would produce many Inconveniencies. If Men could obtain Places without Money, Merchandise would be forsaken by many, who being dazzled with the Splendour of Offices, would sooner embrace Offices and their Ruin together, than addict themselves to Merchandise, which inriches Families.  
Moreover, it is very well known, that the Weakness of this Age is such, that Men yield more to Importunities, than they are guided by Reason; and that instead of being ruled by Justice, Favour oftentimes sways us.  
The Experience of what is past, should make us fear the future; both because; it has ever shown us, That the most powerful in Credit often gain their Cause, to the prejudice of Virtue; and that as the Prince and his Confidents can only know the Merit of Men, by the Judgement of others, they are often liable to take the Shadow for the Body.  
A low Birth seldom produces the Parts which are necessary in a Magistrate; and it is certain, that the Virtue of a Man that is wellborn, has something more noble in it, than that which is found in Men of meaner Extraction. The Minds of such Men are difficult to manage; and many of them have such a nice Authority, that it is not only troublesome, but also prejudicial.  
It is with the first, in respect to the second, as with Trees, which being planted in a good Ground, produce better Fruit, and finer, than those which are in an ill one: And therefore the Sale of Offices ought not to be condemned, because it excludes many Persons of low Extraction from Places and Offices; since, on the contrary, 'tis one of the Reasons which rather makes it tolerable.  
A good Estate is a great Ornament to Dignities; which are so much heightened by exterior Lustre, that one may boldly affirm, That of two Persons of equal Merit, he whose Circumstances are the most easy, is preferable to the other; since it is most certain, That a poor Magistrate must have a world of Virtue to withstand the Temptations of Interest. Experience also informs us, That the Rich are less liable to Extortion and Bribes, than the others; and that Poverty constrains an Officer to be very careful of the Revenue of the Bag.  
It may perhaps be urged, That though these Inconveniences may induce to suffer the Sale of Offices; yet it is most certain, that the Annual Duty ought to be suppressed, because it puts Offices out of Price, and hinders virtuous Men from obtaining them even for Money.  
The late King foreseeing that Evil, had inserted, in the Edict he made upon that Subject, Precautions capable to prevent it; excepting not only from the Annual Right the Offices of first Precedents, Attorneys, and Advocate's General, but moreover reserving to himself the disposal of the Offices that are comprised in the same, when they were vacant, paying in lieu thereof, to the Heirs of those who were in possession of them, the Price they should be valued at.  
Those Precautions were as equitable as necessary; and to say the truth, the Evils which the Annual Duty causes at present in the State, do not proceed so much from the Defect of its Nature, as from the Imprudence of those who have removed the Clauses which that great Prince had included in it. Had the Edict been kept in its first Purity, Offices had never come to the excess of Price they are at present. The Alterations that have been made in it, have made the use of it as prejudicial, as it would have been innocent, had it been left in the first from in which it was made; and therefore it is fit to correct the Abuses of it, than to reverse it.  
The Revocation of the Annual Duty, would oblige the old Officers to quit their Offices, when the Experience and Maturity of their Age would render them most capable to serve the Public. Yet it is necessary to have both old and young ones, by reason, that as the Prudence of the first may be of great use to direct the others, the Vigour of the younger sort is necessary to revive and animate the old ones.  
If I had a mind, by this Work, to acquire the Inclination of the People, rather than to deserve their , by making myself useful to the State, I would maintain, That it is necessary to suppress the Sale of Offices and the Annual Duty at once; all Men are so prepossessed that they are the two Sources of the Disorders of the Kingdom, that the Public Voice would decree Crowns for me, without examining whether I deserve them or no.  
But being sensible, that those who endeavour to gain Reputation, by the Overture of a Reformation, more conformable to the Rigour of the Laws, than proportioned to the Strength of the State, only seek their own Interest, and can never excuse a Vanity, which is not only blamable, but criminal also; and that in such a case, their Cares, though specious, are as prejudicial to the Public, as the Negligence and Malice of others.  
I will take special care not to commit such a Fault; the suppression of those two Edicts is attended with too many Inconveniences, to conclude it necessary to be done.  
If they did really contribute towards Negligence and Vice, as it is commonly supposed, I would give my Vote immediately for the revocation of them: But when I consider, that if any Persons are admitted into Offices, not being qualified for the same, it is only the fault of the Attorney's General, who are to inquire into their Lives and Conversation, and of the Courts; which being Judges of their Capacity and Virtue, aught to refuse them when they want the Qualifications required. I cannot forbear saying, That the Remedy of the Evil consists more in the observation of the Ordinances, than in the suppression of the Sale of Offices and Annual Duty, which are not the Causes thereof.  
Perhaps it may be urged, That if Places of Judicature were not sold, Justice might be administered gratis; but provided the Charges of it be regulated, they cannot be considered as a great Grievance.  
I am sensible, that examining the thing with rigour, that very Price which is due for the Administration of Justice, is paid for the loss of the Liberty of those who have voluntarily submitted themselves to the Observation of Laws; and therefore, that to oblige those who go to Law, to give Money, is obliging them to buy that a second time, which they have already dearly purchased by their Subjection. Nevertheless, the said Custom has prevailed so far, that though the Spice is sharp by its Nature, yet no body dares complain of that which is paid in the 
* The place where the Courts of Judicature are held,  Palace; and should any body propose to abolish the use of it, they would expose themselves to the Laughter of all the World.  
There are Abuses which must be tolerated, for fear of falling into Inconveniences of worse Consequence: Time and Occasion will open the Eyes of those who will succeed in other Ages, to perform that usefully, which we dare not undertake in this, without exposing the State imprudently to a great deal of danger.  
All the Reasons abovesaid, and many others being maturely considered, though the Sale and Inheritance of Offices are not Canonical; though it were to be wished that Merit were the only Price of Offices, and Virtue the only Title to transmit the succession of them to the Heirs of the Officers, instead of concluding for the alteration of those two Settlements, the present Constitution of the State obliges me to say three things determinately.  
The First is, That by the Reversion of the Act for the Sale of Offices, the Disorders which would proceed from the Brigues, and the Solicitations which would be made for the obtaining of Offices, would be greater than that which arises by the liberty of Selling, or Buying of them.  
The Second, That if the Inheritance of the same were only abolished, besides that the abatement it would daily occasion in the Price of the Offices which would become vacant, would render the Revenue, which occrues to the King by the Sale of the same, wholly insignificant; and that thereby a base Commerce would be introduced, which would enable many Men of little Merit, secretly to share the Favours, which Kings only design for their Officers, we would relapse into the Evil the late King endeavoured to free the State from, when by the Establishment of the 
* A yearly Revenue which the King receives from all Officers of Judicature, etc.  Paulette, he deprived the Grandees of the Kingdom of the means to make many Creatures at his Cost, to serve them on all Occasions, to the prejudice of the Public Good.  
The Third is, That since the Virtue of Men is not always strong enough to induce them to prefer Merit before Favour; it is better to leave the Sale of Offices and the Annual Duty, than to abolish those two Settlements, which are very difficult to alter all of a sudden, without endangering the State.  
But, I add, That it is absolutely necessary to moderate the Price of Offices; which is risen to that degree, that the excess of it is intolerable.  
If the Excellence of a Council consists in its being useful and easy to put into practice, this aught to be received, since the Benefit of it is evident, and the Practice easy; since the execution of it only requires to restore the Edict of the Annual Duty to the first terms of its Settlement.  
In so doing, Offices being reduced to a reasonable Price, which will not exceed one half of that, to which the Extravagance of the Age has brought it at present; and the King having the liberty to pay it to the Heirs, to dispose of the said Places according to his Pleasure, the State would be so far from receiving any prejudice by it, that, on the contrary, I dare repeat, that a considerable Advantage would accrue by it.  
Moreover, things may be reduced to that point, without affording the least cause of Complaint to the Parties concerned; since it is easy to make them amends for the Prejudice they have done themselves by divers means I do not specify at present, by reason that if they were discovered, they would lose their Force, before they could be put in practice.   

SECT. II. Which proposes the general Means which may be used to put a stop to the Disorders of the Courts of Justice.  
AFter what is abovesaid, I have nothing to add before I conclude this Chapter, but what I have represented to your Majesty, upon the Subject of the First Order of your Kingdom.  
If you encourage those Officers of Justice, who are Men of an unspotted Reputation; if you discourage those, who being destitute of all Merit, have nothing but Money to obtain the Magistracy; if you deprive all those of your Favour, and cause them to be punished who do not perform their Duty, and do sell Justice to the prejudice of your Subjects, you will absolutely do whatever can be usefully done for the Reformation of that Body, which, as well as that of the Ecclesiastical Order, depends more on those who have the Administration of them, than on Laws and Regulations; which remain useless, unless those who are employed to see them observed, are willing to perform it.  
Although the Laws were defective, if the Officers are Men of Honour, their Integrity will be capable to supply that Defect and let them be never so good, they prove ineffectual, when the Magistrates neglect the putting them in execution; much more when they are so wicked as to pervert the use of them, according to their Passions: Since it is difficult to be a Judge, and young at the same time, I cannot forbear observing, after what I have said, That it is a thing of no small Consequence, in order to reform the Courts of Justice, to put the Ordinances in execution, in what relates to the Age of Officers.  
In my Opinion, it is impossible to be too exact in it, nor consequently too severe towards the Attorney's General who shall be wanting in their Duty, in taking care that the Parties concerned may not be able to surprise the Judges on that Subject, nor to elude the good Intentions of the Prince, by Suppositions or Concealments.  
Thereby the Evil of Youth, which is considerable, will be avoided, as well as that of Ignorance, which is the Source of many others.  
Officers not being able to precipitate themselves, as they do at present, in their Reception, will study more; since otherwise they would remain idle, which seldom happens to those who have studied until they have obtained the End they propose.  
I must not omit saying on this Subject, That it would be fit absolutely to retrench the Practice of certain Doctors, who, prompting the Young ones like Parrots, often teach them to say things they do not understand, and only make them Learned in cheating the Public, and themselves also.  
Such Men may be compared to Fencing-Masters, who are only good to instruct Men to their own ruin, and to hinder them from Learning the true Exercises of Soldiers, which are only learned in Armies, with a great deal of time and fatigue.  
The banishment of such, would be of great use; which in the Practice would be found as difficult, as it is easy in the Proposition. Therefore I rather choose to condemn the Fathers in this place, who suffer their Children to be instructed thus, and to advise them no longer to commit any such Faults against their own Blood, than to entreat your Majesty to prescribe new Laws upon that Subject; which would be no sooner made, but a thousand ways would be found out to elude the Effect of the same, and to avoid the putting of them in practice.  
The Experience which Twenty Years of continual Occupation I have had, in the Administration of Public Affairs, has given me, obliges me to observe, That though it were to be wished, that the Sedentary Courts, which are absolutely established to administer Justice to every one, and to prevent and regulate all the Disorders of the Kingdom, should acquit themselves so well of their Duty, that there might be no necessity to have recourse to extraordinary Commissions to maintain them in the same. It is nevertheless so difficult to hope for that, which is to be wished on that Subject, that I dare be bold to say, That in order to maintain this great State in the Policy and Discipline, without which it can never flourish, nothing can be of greater use, than to send from time to time in the Provinces Chambers of Justice, composed of Counsellors of State, and Masters of Requests, well selected, to avoid the Thorns of Parliaments, which foment Difficulties upon every thing; to the end that the said Court receiving the Complaints which may be made against all sorts of Persons, without any exception of Quality, may remedy the same immediately.  
I am sensible, that the Sovereign Courts will be loath to suffer any such Establishments to be made: But as they must needs know, that a Sovereign is not obliged to suffer their Negligence, and that Reason obliges him to remedy those Defects; I am not afraid of saying, That it is safer on that occasion to acquire their Esteem in performing one's Duty, than to preserve their , in being wanting in what is due to Public Good. But whereas it is impossible to send such Commissions at one and the same time in all the Provinces, and that it will suffice, for one of that Nature, composed of the same Officers, or different, to make the Circuit of France in six Years time; I am of Opinion, that it will be necessary to send often Counsellors of State into the Provinces, or Masters of Requests well selected, not only to perform the Function of Intendants of Justice in Capital Cities, which may serve more toward their Vanity, than be of any use to the Public; but to go into all the Parts of Provinces, to inquire into the Behaviour of the Officers of Justice, and of the Finances; to see whether the Impositions are raised according to the Ordinances; whether the Collectors commit no Injustices in vexing of the People; to discover how they perform their Offices; to know how the Nobility behaves itself; and to put a stop to all Disorders, especially to the Violences of those who, being Powerful and Rich, oppress the Weak, and the King's poor Subjects.   

SECT. III. Which represents the necessity of hindering the Officers of Justice, from encroaching upon the King's Authority.  
AFter having represented what ought to be practised, and may be done with ease, to render the Officers of Justice such as they ought to be, in relation to private Persons, I cannot, without a Crime, abstain from proposing what is necessary to hinder so Potent a Body, as that which they compose, from being prejudicial in the whole to the State.  
One would think there were a great deal to be said upon that Subject; and yet I will say as much as is necessary in three Words, if I set forth that it only requires to restrain the Officers of Justice from meddling with any thing but the administering of the same to the King's Subjects; which is the only End of their Establishment.  
The Wisest of your Predecessors have made it their Business, and have found the Benefit of it; your Majesty has followed their Example as long as I have had the Honour to serve you: And indeed it is a thing of such moment, that unless a strict hand be kept over those Powerful Societies, it would be impossible afterwards to keep them within the Bounds of their Duty.  
It would be impossible to hinder the ruin of Royal Authority, in following the Sentiments of those, who being as Ignorant in the Practice of the Government of States, as they presume to be Learned in the Theory of their Administration, are neither capable to Judge solidly of their Conduct, nor proper to make Decrees upon the Course of Public Affairs, which exceed their Capacity.  
As nothing must be suffered from those great Companies, to wound Sovereign Authority, it is Prudence to tolerate some of their Defects of another kind.  
It is necessary to wink at the Imperfections of a Body, which having several Heads, cannot have the same Mind; and which being influenced by as many different Motions, as it is composed of different Subjects, cannot sometimes be inclined to discover, or to suffer its own Good.  
Every body must needs blame their Proceeding, when they act contrary to Justice and Equity; but in condemning it with Reason, it is difficult to find a Remedy for it; by reason that in great Companies the number of the Wicked always exceeds the Good; and that though they were all Wise, yet it would not follow, that the best Sentiments would be found in the Majority; Judgements being so various, even in those who only designing Good, do neither differ in their Intentions, nor in their Ends.  
It is a thing so common in such Bodies, to pry into, and to find fault with the Government of States, that no body can wonder at it.  
All Subordinate Authority looks upon that which is Superior to it with an envious Eye; and not daring to dispute the Power of it, they take the liberty to exclaim against the Conduct thereof.  
The mildest Government is in some measure odious, even to the most reasonable: And upon that Consideration, one of the Ancients said, with a great deal of Reason, That among Men who are Equals by Nature, there are few who do not repine at the difference which Fortune puts between them; and who being obliged to submit, do not blame those who have a Command over them; to show, that though they are inferior to them in Power, they exceed them in Merit.   

SECT. iv Of the Officers of the Finances.  
THe Officers of the Finances and the 
* Those who Farm the King's Revenue.  Partisans, are a separate Classis, prejudicial to the State, but nevertheless necessary.  
Thesesort of Officers are an unavoidable Evil; but they must be reduced to supportable Terms.  
Their Excesses, and the Disorders which have been introduced among them, are come to that height, that it is impossible to suffer them any longer. They cannot raise their Fortunes higher, without ruining the State; and without undoing themselves, by giving the Prince a just Pretence of seizing their Estates, upon the bare knowledge of the excessive Riches they have heaped up in a short time, upon the difference which will be verified between what they had when they were first employed, and what they are found to be in possession of.  
I am sensible, that such a Proceeding may be liable to great Mistakes, and that it may serve as a Pretence for very unjust Violences: Neither do I mention this, by the buy, to advise the putting it in practice, which would occasion great Abuses; but I maintain, that no body could justly complain of it, if it were managed with so much caution, that in punishing those who do enrich themselves of a sudden, by the sole Industry of their Fingers, no prejudice were done under that Pretence, to the Estates of those who are grown Rich and Powerful, either by their Patrimony, one of the most lawful means to rise; or by the Gratifications received from the Favour of their Master, which exempts them from Crime; or by the Rewards which have been given to their Services; which is also one of the most lawful, since that in being useful to private Persons, it is also advantageous to the State; which will be the better served, when those who serve it usefully are well rewarded.  
It is absolutely necessary to remedy the Encroachments of the Financiers, otherwise they will finally occasion the ruin of the Kingdom; which is so much impaired by their Robberies, that unless a stop be put to the same, it will be quite undone in a short time.  
The Gold and Silver they abound in, affords them the Alliance of the best Families in the Kingdom; which are so much Bastardised by that means, that their Issue proves as different from the Generosity of their Ancestors, as they often differ in the Resemblance of their Faces. I may affirm, as having been an Eye-witness of it, in many occasions, that their Negligence, or Malice, has been very prejudicial to Public Affairs.  
After a serious Consideration, on all the Remedies of the Evils they occasion, I dare say, that the best is to reduce them to as small a Number as is possible; and to employ, by way of Commission on important Occasions, Men of Probity and Capacity, instead of Persons whose Places being for Life, or Hereditary, think it a sufficient Title to Rob, without the least fear of Punishment.  
It will be very easy, in time of Peace, to suppress many Officers of this kind, and thereby to free the State of those who, without doing it any Service, suck up all its Substance in a very short time.  
I am sensible that it may be urged, That they are commonly used like Leeches, who with a Grain of Salt, are often made to disgorge all the Blood they have sucked up, and, like Sponges, which are easily squeezed dry again, though never so full before. But, in my Opinion, it is an ill Expedient; and I look upon the Agreements and Compositions which are sometimes made with the Officers, as a Remedy which is worse than the Disease; since, proproperly speaking, it gives them a Title to Rob anew, in hopes of a fresh Pardon; and that if any thing be got out of their Purse that way, they do not only recover the Principal they have given, but also the Interest at a much higher rate than is allowed of by the Law. Wherefore I conclude, That besides certain necessary Officers, as a Treasurer of the Exchequer, a Receiver General, Two or Three Treasurers of France in every Generality, and such others as are absolutely necessary, it will be no small piece of Service to the State, if in satisfying those who have, bona fide, given their Money in hopes to advance themselves by such Employments, according to the course of the times, all the rest are suppressed. Without this Remedy, whatever Regulation may be made, it will be impossible to preserve the King's Money, since all Punishments, tho' never so great, are not capable to hinder many Officers of that kind from converting part of the Money, which will pass through their hands, to their own use.   

SECT. V Of the PEOPLE.  
ALl Politicians agree, That when the People are too easy, it is impossible to keep them within the Bounds of their Duty. Their Reason is, That being more Ignorant than the other Orders of the State, which are much more cultivated, or better instructed, unless they are kept under by some Necessity, they will hardly keep within the Bounds prescribed to them by Reason, and by the Laws.  
Neither does Reason allow their being exempted from all Charges, since that in losing thereby the Badge of their Subjection, they would also lose the Remembrance of their Condition; and that if they were discharged of Tribute, they would also think themselves discharged of Obedience.  
They must be compared to Mules, which being used to Burdens, are spoiled more by Rest than by Labour; but as the Labour must be moderate, and that the Burdens of those Animals must be proportioned to their Strength; so unless the Subsidies which are imposed on the People are moderate, even when they are useful to the Public, they are unjust.  
I am sensible, that when Kings undertake Public Works, 'tis said with truth, That what the People gets by it, returns to them again by the Payment of the Taille: But than one may also maintain, That what Kings get out of the People, returns to them again; and that they only advance itto get it again by the Enjoyment of Rest, and of their Estates, which cannot be secured, unless they contribute towards the Maintenance of the State.  
I know moreover, that many Princes have ruined their States, and their Subjects, by not keeping sufficient Force on foot for their Preservation, for fear of over-burthening them; and that some Subjects have been exposed to the Servitude of their Enemies, by desiring too much Liberty under their Natural Sovereign. But there is a certain Point which cannot be exceeded without Injustice, common Sense teaching every Man, that there must be a proportion between the Burden and the Strength of those who bear it.  
That Proportion must be so Religiously observed, that as a Prince cannot be esteemed Good, if he exacts more from his Subjects than is necessary, those are not always the best, who never raise but what is absolutely necessary.  
Moreover, as when a Man is wounded, the Heart, which grows faint by the loss of the Blood which flows from it, does not draw that of the lower Parts to its assistance, until the greatest part of that which lies in the uppermost is exhausted; so in the urgent Necessities of States, Sovereigns must, as much as in them lies, make use of the abundance of the Rich, before they bleed the Poor extraordinarily.  
'Tis the best Counsel your Majesty can take; which you may easily put into practice, since for the future you may draw the principal Subsistence of your State, out of your General Farms, in which the Rich are more concerned than the Poor, by reason that as they spend less, they do not contribute so much to the Product thereof.    

CHAP. V. Which considers the State in itself.  

SECT. I. Which represents how necessary it is, that the several Parts of the State should remain every one within the extent of their Bounds.  
AFter having spoken separately of the divers Orders the State is composed of, I have but little to say in the main; but that as the Whole only subsists by the Union of its Parts in their Order and natural Situation; so this great Kingdom can never flourish, unless your Majesty takes care to keep the Bodies which compose it, in their Order; the Church having the First Rank, the Nobility the Second, and the Officers, which are at the head of the People, the Third.  
I speak this boldly, because it is as necessary as just, to put a stop to the Encroachments of some Officers, who being puffed up with Pride, either upon the account of the great Estates they are possessed of, or by the Authority they derive from their Places, are so presumptuous as to challenge the First Rank, whereas they can only pretend to the Third. Which is so contrary to Reason, and to the Good of your Service, that it is absolutely necessary to put a stop to the Progress of such Enterprises; since otherwise France would no longer be what it has been, and what it ought to be, but a monstrous Body, which as such, could never subsist or be lasting.  
As it is most certain, that the Elements which are capable of weight, have none when they are in their Place; so it is certain, that none of the Orders of your State will prove burdensome to the other, while each do remain in the Place which their Birth has assigned them.  
And as neither Fire, Air, nor Water, can sustain a Terrestrial Body, because it is heavy out of its place; so it is certain, that neither the Church, nor the Nobility, can support the Burden of the Officers, when they endeavour to move out of their Sphere.  
As I am very sensible that your Majesty knows how to keep all Orders within their Bounds, without enlarging any farther upon this Subject, I will proceed to two Questions, which I incent in this Chapter, because they have an equal Relation to the Threedifferent Orders of the State.   

SECT. II. Which examines, Whether it is better to make the Governments Triennial in this Kingdom, than to leave them Perpetual, according to the Use which has been practised hitherto?  
EVery body will fancy at first, that it will be better to make them Triennial; but after having compared the Advantages which may thereby accrue, to the Inconveniences that are to be feared; perhaps it will be thought, as I have already observed it, that though the Nomination to Benefices is not so Canonical as the Elections, the Use of it is nevertheless more advantageous at this time, for several Reasons; as also that notwithstanding the suppression of the Sale of Offices is to be desired for several Reasons, yet the not tolerating the Use of it would occasion many Inconveniences expressed in their proper places.  
So it is impossible to render the Governments of Provinces and of Towns Triennial, without being exposed to far greater Inconveniences, than those which may be feared by the perpetual Settlement of Governors.  
I am sensible, that some may urge, That a Man having a Government only for Three Years, will, in all probability, endeavour to quit it with Reputation, and to behave himself with so much Prudence, that his Administration may be preferred before his Predecessor's; whereas having it for Life, the certainty of it gives him more Licence.  
But it is much more likely, that he who knows he is not long to continue in his Office, will endeavour to draw as much Profit out of it, as he might expect during his Life, if he were to enjoy it to his Death. Moreover, considering the Inconstancy of our Nation, there might be some reason to fear the employing of some, who foreseeing the End of an agreeable Administration, might resolve to perpetuate it, by receiving those as Masters, whom they ought to look upon as Enemies.  
If the Practice of Spain be urged, which often changes Governors, after having answered, that Example shows us, that nothing can be more dangerous than that Government; I will add, That as there are Fruits, the Use of which is excellent in one Country, and a Poison in another; so there are Settlements, the Practice whereof is good in one State, but yet would prove pernicious in another.  
Some may say, to prevent the Objections which may be made against the Practice of the Order of Spain in this Kingdom, That those who will lay down an Office, after the expiration of the term of their Administration, will have no reason to be dissatisfied, since they will be employed in others which will prove better; but such great difficulties will be met with in the Practice of such an Order, that it will be impossible to overcome them.  
A Man may be fit to Govern in Piccardy, by reason of his being born there, who will not be fit to be employed in Britain, where he has no Acquaintance, and where the Place which will be given him, will hardly be able to maintain him.  
The Governments of France are, for the most part of so little Profit, that unless they are given to Persons who are more desirous of them upon the account of Honour, and for the Convenience of their Neighbourhood, than out of any other Consideration; there are few who are able to bear the Expense of them: Besides, there are not Men enough in the Provinces, for the Alterations which must needs be made, if Employments are made Triennial.  
Those Mutations are not only practicable, but absolutely necessary in the great Employments of Spain; as those of the Viceroys of Naples, of Sicily, of Sardinia, the Government of Mi●an, and other Employments of the like Consequence: And all of them are so profitable to those that possess them, that in quitting the Abundance of the one, they enter into the Wealth of the other.  
Places which are distant from the abode of Princes, require a Change of Governors in Places of the Consequence of those I have mentioned, by reason that a longer Residence than that of Three Years, might enable them to form Projects to settle themselves there for ever; seeing particularly that the Ambition of Men is so prevailing, that they are easily inclined to change the Condition of Subject into that of Master.  
But the case is different in France, where the Governments are not so distant from the abode of the Kings, as to fear such Inconveniences; nor the said Employments so great, as to give the Possessors a sufficient Authority to make themselves Masters of the same.  
Therefore provided your Majesty, and your Successors, keep the Power of Changing the Governments as you shall think fit, upon real Cause given so to do, which you may always do with Justice, provided they are given gratis, and not sold; I dare be bold to say, That it is better in that point to follow the ancient Custom of France, than to imitate that of Spain; which is nevertheless so politic and so reasonable, considering the extent of its Dominion, that though it cannot be usefully practised in this Kingdom; yet it will be proper, in my Opinion, to make use of it in those Places, of which France will preserve the Possession in Lorraine and in Italy.   

SECT. III. Which condemns Survivorships.  
THe Survivorships in question in this Place, are granted either against the Will of the Possessors of Places, or by their Consent.  
All Men are sensible, that it is very unjust to nominate the Successors of a Man, while he is alive, against his Will; since it exposes his Life to the Artifices of the Person that is to profit by his Death, and that the Dread which may justly seize his Mind, is a kind of Death to him.  
That Practice which was formerly very much in vogue in this Kingdom, is at present banished from thence. It is so dangerous, that the Councils, and the best Constitutions of Temporal Princes, do condemn it, as well as Reason.  
Neither can the Consent of the Possessors any ways justify that Proceeding, since that whatever Confidence they may repose in those who are appointed to succeed them, they are often mistaken: Though it is impossible to satisfy every body in a State by Grants, yet it is necessary at least to afford hopes to those to whom nothing better can be given: Which can never be done, if Places, Offices, and Benefices are given to Children, who in the height of their Merit, and of their Age, would perhaps hardly dare to expect those Honours and Dignities which are granted them in the Cradle.  
Such Favours, in which the State is greatly concerned, hardly oblige any body. A Man does not think that that is given him, which his Father, or another Relation is in possession of, he looks upon the Survivorship of it as a Right of Inheritance, rather than as an effect of the Prince's Goodness.  
Notwithstanding that the Good of the State requires, that in the Promotion of Offices, Merit should be preferred to all other things; in what relates to Survivorship, a greater regard is had to the Service of him who demands a Successor, than to the persons that is to succeedhim can do. The Favour of the one on such occasions, often serves in lieu of Merit in the others, who have nothing but their Importunity to recommend them.  
Therefore I conclude, that the less Favours of that kind are granted, is certainly the best; and that it would be better yet never to grant any; seeing that whatever particular Considerations can be alleged, the Consequence of them is dangerous in States, where Examples have often more Force than Reason.  
If any one observes that I condemn a thing in this Article, the practice whereof I have suffered even in respect to my own Relations 
* When the Command of the Sea was given to the Cardinal, Trade was almost totally ruined, and the King had not one Ship. , I am sure that he will remain very well satisfied, if he considers, that while a Disorder is in vogue, without any possibility of a Remedy, Reason requires that Order should be extracted out of it: Which was my Intention in preserving Places, which had been established by my Cares, to Persons whom I could more strictly oblige to follow my Intentions and my Steps. If it had been possible, during the Troubles of a Reign agitated by divers Storms, to settle the Regulation I propose, I would have been a very Religious Observer of it.    

CHAP. VI Which represents to the King, what Men think he ought to consider, in relation to his Person.  
GOD being the Principle of all Things, the Sovereign Master of Kings, and He who makes them Reign prosperously; if your Majesty's Devotion were not known by all the World, I would begin this Chapter, which relates to your Person, in representing to you, That unless you follow the Will of your Creator, and submit to his Laws, you must not expect to have yours observed, and to find your Subjects obedient to your Orders.  
But it would be superfluous to exhort your Majesty to Devotion; you are so naturally inclined to it, and so much confirmed in it, by the Habit of your Virtue, that there is no reason to fear that you will ever deviate from it.  
Therefore instead of representing to you what Advantages Religious Princes have above others, I will content myself with saying, That the Devotion which is necessary in Kings, must be free from Scruples: I say it, Sir, because the Niceness of your Majesty's Conscience often makes you dread to offend GOD, in doing things, which certainly you cannot abstain from without Sin.  
I am sensible, that the Faults of Princes, which are of this nature, are much less dangerous for the State, than those which incline to Presumption, and to the Contempt of those things they ought to reverence. But since they bear the name of Faults, it is necessary to correct them, particularly if it be true, as it is most certain, that many Inconveniences may arise from thence, very prejudicial to the State.  
In consideration of which, I make it my humble Petition to your Majesty, That you would be pleased more and more to fortify yourself against Scruples; calling to mind, that you can never be guilty before GOD, if you follow (on Occasions which will prevent themselves of difficult Discussion, in what relates to your Conscience) the Advice of your Council, confirmed by that of some good Theologians, unsuspected, in the case in question.  
This first Foundation being laid, as nothing can be more material towards the Welfare of your Affairs, than the Preservation of your Majesty's Health, I cannot forbear resuming so important a Subject.  
The careful and diligent Observations I have made on all that relates to you, makes me say boldly, That nothing is required to so important an End, but your own Will, which nevertheless is the greatest Enemy you have to encounter with on this Subject; since it is often very difficult to prevail with Princes to will that, which is not only very useful, but absolutely necessary for them.  
Your Majesty's Mind has so absolute a Sway over your Body, that the least of your Passions seize your Heart, and disturb the whole Frame of your Person; many Experiences have convinced me of this Truth, with so much Certainty, that I have never seen you sick by any other Principle.  
GOD has been pleased to give your Majesty Force enough courageously to bear those things, in which you are most concerned, in Affairs of the greatest Consequence; but as a Counterpoise to this great Quality, He has permitted your being so sensible, to those things which concern you, in Subjects of far less Consequence, that even things which one should think at first could not displease you, trouble you to that degree, that it is impossible to ease you on such occasions, according to one's Desire: Time, which makes those Fumes that surprise the Sense to evaporate, has hitherto been the sole Remedy to such Distempers in your Majesty, who has no sooner been seized by them, but the Consequence has proved a corporal Indisposition.  
In that, you are like those, who despising the Points of Swords, through the greatness of their Courage, cannot, nevertheless, by a certain natural Antipathy, bear the pricking of a Launcet.  
If it were impossible for all Men to prevent, by Reason, the Surprises they receive by their Passions; yet I would not think it so in your Majesty, who has many excellent Qualities which others have not.  
And therefore I am of Opinion, That the first Heat of your eager Youth being past, the Phlegm of a riper Age will assist you, to secure yourself by Reason, against an Enemy, which is the more dangerous, in that it is internal and domestic; and which has done you so much harm, particularly twice or thrice, that it had like to have cost you your Life.  
As it is a thing very important for your Health, it is no less considerable for your Reputation and Glory, which cannot suffer that any thing, which is nothing in Reason, should have an Influence over your Sentiments, which ought to be regulated by it in all things.  
Neither can I forbear, on this Subject, to reiterate a Petition I have often made to your Majesty, conjuring you to apply your Mind to great things important to your State, and to despise little ones, which are unworthy of your Cares and Thoughts.  
It will be advantageous and glorious to you, of ten to meditate on the most considerable Designs which the course of Affairs will put in agitation; whereas you will be so far from deriving the least Advantage, by applying your Mind too much on those which are not of that nature, that, on the contrary, you will receive great prejudice by it; not only in that such Occupations will divert you from others of more Consequence, but also by reason that as small Thorns are more capable of pricking than great ones, which are easily perceived, it would be impossible for you to avoid many Vexations, of no use to the Affairs of the State, and very prejudicial to your Health.  
The great Disquiets wherewith I have seen your Mind agitated on divers occasions, oblige me to represent to you, in this place, as I have done on sever I other occasions, That as certain Cares are necessary for the Welfare of Human Affairs, there are some which can produce no other Effects, than to alter the Good Disposition of Him who applies himself too eagerly to them; and such a Surprise to those who serve, that the Trouble of their Mind renders them the less capable to perform what is expected from them.  
The Experience which a Reign and Government of Twenty five Years affords your Majesty, does not permit you to be ignorant, that in great Affairs, the Effects never answer the Orders that have been given exactly. It also informs you, that you should rather pity those to whom you commit the execution of your Will, when their Labour does not succeed, than to impute to them the ill Events which they are not guilty of.  
GOD alone can render his Resolutions infallible; and yet his Goodness is such, that, letting Men act according to their Weakness, he suffers the difference there is between their Events, and his Dispositions; which teaches Kings to suffer that patiently by Reason, which their Creator only endures out of his Goodness.  
Your, Majesty being naturally of a tender Constitution, not very healthy, of a restless impatient Humour, particularly when you are in an Army, of which you take the Conduct upon yourself, I should think myself guilty of a Crime, if I did not make it my humble Request to you, to avoid War for the future as much as it is possible; which I do upon this Foundation, That the Levity and Inconstancy of the French, can only be vanquished by the Presence of their Master, and that your Majesty cannot, without exposing yourself to Ruin, fix upon so lasting a Design, nor consequently expect a good Success from it.  
You have sufficiently shown your Valour, and the Power of your Arms, to think on nothing for the future, but to enjoy that Peace and Tranquillity which you have acquired to the Kingdom by your Labour, keeping yourself in a posture to defend it against all those, who, contrary to Public Faith, would offend you anew.  
As it is very usual to many Men to have no action, unless they are animated by some Passion, in which they may be compared to Incense, which never smells sweet but when it is put into Fire, I cannot forbear telling your Majesty, that this Constitution, which is dangerous in all sorts of Men, is particularly so in Kings, who ought to be guided by Reason above all others.  
And indeed whenever Passion inclines to Good, it is by chance, seeing that by its Nature it makes us swerve so much from it, that it blinds those in whom it reigns; and that though a blind Man may chance to hit upon the right Way, yet it is a wonder if he does not lose himself; and he must needs stumble often, unless he has an extraordinary Fortune.  
So many Misfortunes have befallen Princes and their States, when they have followed their own Sentiments to the prejudice of Reason; and that instead of consulting Public Interest, they have been guided by their Passions, that it is impossible not to entreat your Majesty to reflect often upon it, in order to confirm yourself more and more in what you have all along practised to the contrary.  
I also humbly crave you would be pleased often to call to mind what I have represented several times to you, That no Prince can be in a worse Condition, than he who not being always able to do those things himself which he is obliged to do, is loath to permit others to do them for him; and that to be capable to suffer himself to be served, is not one of the least Qualities a great King can have; seeing that otherwise occasions are often sooner fled, than Men can dispose themselves to take hold of them, whereby favourable Conjunctures for the advancement of the State are lost, for Subjects of no consideration.  
The late King your Father being reduced to a great Necessity, paid his Servants with good Words; and made them do things by Caresses, which his Necessity did not allow him to incline them to any other way.  
Your Majesty not being of that Constitution, has a natural dryness, which you take from the Queen your Mother, as herself has often told you in my presence, which hinders you from imitating the late King on this Subject. I cannot forbear representing to you, that it is your Interest to do good to those who serve you; and that at least it is reasonable to take particular care not to say any thing to disoblige them.  
As I shall have an occasion in the sequel to treat of the Liberality which is necessary in Princes, I will say no more of it in this place; but I will enlarge upon the Evils which attend those who speak too freely of their Subjects.  
The Wounds which are received by Swords, are easily cured; but it is not so by those of the Tongue, particularly by the Tongues of Kings, the Authority of which makes them incurable, unless the Cure comes from themselves.  
The higher a Stone is thrown from, the more impression it makes where it lights; many would freely expose themselves to be run through by the Swords of their Master's Enemies, who cannot bear a Scratch from his hand.  
As a Fly is not Meat for an Eagle; as the Lion despises those Animals which are not of his Force; as a Man attacking a Child would be blamed by all the World; so I presume to say, That great Kings ought never to wound private Persons with Words, because they bear no proportion to their Grandeur.  
History is full of the ill Events which have been occasioned by the liberty great Men have formerly allowed their Tongues, to the prejudice of Persons they deemed to be of no Consideration.  
GOD has been pleased to favour your Majesty so much, that you are not naturally inclined to do harm; and therefore it is reasonable you should regulate your Words so much, that they may not do the least prejudice.  
I am certain, that you will not willingly fall into that Inconvenience: But as it is difficult for you to stop your first Motions, and your sudden Agitations of Mind, which do sometimes transport you, I should not be your Servant, unless I acquainted you, that your Reputation and Interest requires your taking a particular care to suppress them, seeing that though such liberty of Speech should not wound your Conscience, yet it would very much prejudice your Affairs.  
As to speak well of one's Enemies, is an Heroic Virtue. A Prince cannot speak licentiously of those who would venture a thousand Lives for his Service, without committing a notable Fault against the Laws of Christians, as well as against sound Policy.  
A King whose Hands are undefiled, whose Heart is pure, and whose Tongue is innocent, has not a common Virtue; and those who possess those two first Qualities eminently, as your Majesty does, may easily acquire the third.  
As it suits with the Grandeur of Kings to be reserved in their Words, that nothing may come out of their Mouths capable to offend private Persons; so in Prudence it behoves them not only to take care never to say any thing to the disadvantage of the Principal Communities of their State, but moreover, to speak in such a manner of them, that they may have reason to believe they have an Affection for them: The most important Affairs of the State oblige them so often to cross them, for Public Good, that Prudence requires they should be satisfied in things which are not of that nature.  
It is not sufficient for great Princes, never to open their Mouths to speak ill of any body; but Reason requires they should shut their Ears against Slanders and false Reports, and that they should turn out, and banish the Authors of them, as dangerous Plagues, which infect the Courts and Hearts of Princes, and the Minds of all those who come near them. If those who have a free access to the Ears of Kings, without deserving it, are dangerous, those who possess their Hearts out of pure Favour, are much more so; seeing that in order to preserve such a Treasure, they must needs make use of Art and Malice, to supply the want of Virtue which is not in them.  
I cannot forbear adding upon this Subject, That I have always dreaded for your Majesty the Power of such Men, more than the Power of the greatest Kings of the World; and that it behoves you more to beware of the Artifice of a Menial Servant, than of all the Factions the Grandees could form in your State, though they should all tend to the same End.  
When I was first introduced into the Management of Affairs, those who had had the Honour to serve you before, were prepossessed that your Majesty believed whatever was reported to their prejudice; and upon that Foundation, their principal Care was ever to keep some of their Confidents about you, to secure themselves against the Evil they were afraid of.  
Though the Experience I have of your Majesty's steadiness in relation to me, obliges me to acknowledge, either that their Opinion was ill grounded, or that the Reflections which Time has allowed you to make upon me, have removed that Easiness of Youth; yet I must needs conjure you to settle yourself so firmly in the Conduct you have been pleased to use towards me, that no body may have reason to dread a contrary Fate.  
In the next place, I must also tell you, That as Prince's Ears must be shut against Calumnies, so they must be open to hearken to the Truths which are useful to the State; and that as the Tongue must have no motion to say any thing to the prejudice of any body's Reputation; so it must be free and bold to speak, when Public Inteaest is concerned.  
I mention these two Points, because I have often observed, that it was no small trouble to your Majesty to have the Patience to hearken even to that which was most important to you; and that when the Welfare of your Affairs obliged you to express your Will, not only to Persons of great Quality, but also to those of mean Condition, you had much ado to resolve to do it, when you suspected that it would be disagreeable to them.  
I confess, that the said Dread is a sign of Goodness; but to be no Flatterer, I must also tell you that it is a sign of Weakness, which though tolerable in a private Man, cannot be so in a great King, considering what Inconveniences it may be attended with.  
I lay no stress upon that such a Proceeding would lay all the Odium and Hatred of Resolutions upon your Majesty's Council, because that is inconsiderable, if it could prove beneficial to the Affairs of the State; but that which is worth considering, is, that there are often occasions, in which whatsoever Authority a Minister can have, it cannot be sufficient to produce certain Effects, which require the Voice of a Sovereign, and an absolute Power.  
Moreover, if the Grandees were once persuaded, that an unseasonable Shame would hinder a King from performing the Office of a King, in Commanding absolutely, they would always pretend to obtain by Importunity, the contrary of what has been ordered by Reason; and finally, their Audaciousness might proceed so far, that finding their Prince apprehensive of acting like a Master, they would grow weary of acting as Subjects.  
Prince's must have a Masculine Virtue, and do every thing by Reason, without being guided by Inclination, which often leads them into dangerous Precipices, if those which blind them, and induce them to do whatever they please, are capable to produce Mischief, when they follow them with too much Inadvertency, the natural Aversion they receive sometimes without a Cause, may cause greater yet, unless they are tempered by Reason as they ought to be.  
In some occasions your Majesty has stood in need of your Prudence to check the Tendency of those two Passions; but more in the last than in the first, since it is easier to do Mischief, following the Dictates of Aversion, which requires nothing but a Command in a King, than to do good according to one's Inclination; which cannot be done, without depriving one's self of one's own, which many Persons can hardly resolve to do.  
Those two Motions are contrary to the Genius of Kings, principally if reflecting little upon them, they oftener follow their Instinct than their Reason.  
They often induce them to engage in the Divisions, which are frequent in Courts, among private Persons, which has occasioned great Inconveniences in my time. Their Dignity obliges them to reserve themselves for Reason, which is the only Party they ought to espouse on all occasions; they cannot do otherwise, without divesting themselves of the Quality of Judges and of Sovereigns, to take that of Parties, and submitting, in some measure, to the Condition of private Men.  
They thereby expose their State to many Cabals and Factions, which are formed afterwards. Those who are to defend themselves against the Power of a King, are too sensible that they can never do it by Force, to attempt it otherwise than by Intrigues, Artifices, and Cabals, which often occasion great trouble in States.  
The Sincerity which is necessary in a Man who makes a Testament, does not permit my Pen to end this Section, without making a Confession as true as it is advantageous for your Majesty's Glory, since it will testify to all the World, That the Law of GOD has always been a Bound capable to stop the Violence of any Inclination or Aversion, which could have surprised your Mind; which being liable to the least Defect of Human Nature, has always Thanks be to GOD, been free of the most notable Imperfections of Princes.   

CHAP. VII. Which represents the present State of the King's Household; and sets forth what seems to be necessary, in order to put it into that in which it ought to be.  
THe Order of Arts, and of all good Discipline, requires that a Man should begin his Work by that Part which is most easy.  
Upon this Foundation, the first thing an Architect does, who undertakes a great Building, is to make a Model of it; in which the Proportions must be so well observed, that it may serve him as a Measure and Foot for his great Design: And when he cannot compass the said Project, he lays aside his Enterprise; common Sense making the dullest sensible, that he who cannot perform the least, is altogether incapable of the most.  
In that Consideration, as the meanest Capacities are sensible, That as the Structure of Man is an Abstract of that of the Great Word, so private Families are the true Models of States, and of Republics; and every body being persuaded, that he who either cannot, or will not regulate his Family, is not capable to Order a State Reason did require, that in order to compass the Reformation of this Kingdom, I should begin by that of your Majesty's Household.  
Nevertheless, I confess, that I never durst under take it, by reason that your Majesty having ever had an Aversion for the Orders you reckoned to be of small consequence, when any private persons were concerned in them, no body could propose such a Design, without openly shocking your Inclination, and the Interest of many Men, who being continually about you in great Familiarity, might have prejudiced you against those Orders which were most necessary for your State, to put a stop to those of your Household, the Irregularity of which were useful to them.  
But as a Testament sets forth many Intentions, which the Testator durst not divulge during his Life, this will petition your Majesty towards the Reformation of your Household, which has beem omitted, both by reason that though it did seem more easy than that of the State, yet it was in effect much more difficult; and also because Prudence obliges to suffer in some measure small Losses, to gain considerably in others.  
As it is obvious to all the World, that no King ever carried the Dignity of his State to a higher degree than your Majesty; so no body can deny, that none ever suffered the Lustre of his Household to be more trampled upon.  
The Strangers who have travelled in Fr●●●e in my time, have often wondered to see a State so exalted, and a Household so debased.  
And indeed it is insensibly decayed to that degree, that some are in possession of the first Places of it, who under the Reigns of your Predecessore, durst not have presumed to aspire to the least: All things have been in confusion there, from the Kitchen to the Cabinet.  
Whereas in the King your Father's time, the Princes, the Officers of the Crown, and all the Grandees of the Kingdom, did commonly eat at your Tables; in your time they seem only established for Servants, common Chevaux Legers, and Gens d'Arms. Moreover, they have been so ill served, that some of them have been so nice as to despise them, instead of being fond of them.  
Strangers have often found fault, even with your own, being served by common nasty Scullions, whereas those of other Kings are only served by Gentlemen.  
I am sensible that this Custom has not been introduced in your time; but it is never the more tolerable for being ancient, since it is absolutely derogating from the Dignity and Grandeur of so great a Prince.  
I am also sensible, that the said Practice has been suffered hitherto, under pretence of the Safety of Kings, saying, That it is impossible for Officers to answer for what they have done, unless they carry, or see it carried themselves to your Majesty.  
But this Reason seems inconsiderable to me, since there is no reason to believe, that a Scullion will be more faithful to his Master, than a Gentleman, who in divers other occasions might betray him, if he were so minded.  
Fourscore young Gentlemen, whom your Majesty maintains Pages of your Chamber, or of your Stables, would be much better employed in that Service, than in barely serving your First Gentlemen, or Queries who Command them; and without doubt as they would do it with more Dignity, they would not perform it with less Fidelity.  
The Neatness, which is becoming in all places, is consequently more required yet in the Palaces of Kings: The Magnificence of Furniture is the more necessary there, by reason that Foreigners only judge of the Grandeur of Princes by what appears externally; and yet though your Majesty is vastly stored with the same, both fine and rich, which are destroyed in the Places where they should be preserved: Your Majesty often uses such in your Chamber, that those to whose share they fall when you lay them aside, do not think fit to use them after you  
The Entrance into your Cabinet has been allowed to all Men, not only to the Prejudice of your Dignity, but also in Contempt of the Safety of your Person.  
Ambassadors have been crowded more by Footmen, by Pages, and other inferior Officers, than by the Grandees of your State, in their Audiences; and nevertheless, your Dignity, and the ancient Custom of this Kingdom, require on such Occasions your being attended by the Princes, Dukes, and Peers, the Officers of the Crown, and other Grandees of your State.  
I am sensible, that most Kingdoms have different Customs: That in Spain, the Greatest see their King oftener than in England: There are such good Orders there upon that Subject, that though all the Doors are open, none are seen in the Chambers or Cabinets, but such as have a free entrance there, by their Dignities and Employments.  
I know moreover, that it is a Privilege of those who bear your Crown, to be crowded by their Subjects; but it should be with this distinction, that usually it ought to be by your Nobility, and on the occasion of receiving Foreigners by qualified Persons, of which there is a sufficient Number in your State, to make them observe the Grandeur and Singularity of it, by that Prerogative.  
In a Word, Disorder reigns so universally in all your Majesty's Household, that there is no particular place free from it.  
Though all great Princes are careful to have an Equipage of great Horses, suitable to their Grandeur, your Majesty never had one in your great Stable, which you could use on occasion; though you are at a greater Charge about it, than ever any of your Predecessors were.  
I might easily specify many other Defects, no less remarkable than this; but I will not enter into the Particulars of so great a Disorder, both because it would be a very difficult Task, without descending too low for the Dignity of this Work; and that it is sufficient to know a Distemper without publishing it, to prescribe Remedies for the same. I will perform my Duty, in proposing to your Majesty the true means to afford as much Lustre to your Household, as there is Meanness and Disorder in it at present.  
The first thing which is necessary to that end, is, That your Majesty should be strongly bend to the said Reformation; since it is certain, that in Affairs of this nature, the Will of Kings is like the Will of GOD, in relation to the most difficult things, in which to will and to do, is one and the same thing.  
The second is, That you would be pleased, for the future, to employ none but Persons of Quality in the First Places of your Household, having all the Qualifications which are required to discharge their Trust worthily.  
Let an Officer be never so great, he will apply himself to the least Dependencies of his Office, if he be capable of it; because he will judge them to be of Consequence, as indeed they are.  
Unless the Stewards, for instance, take a particular Care, to cause those Places to be cleansed, Morning and Evening, where People eat, as soon as the Tables are removed, they will be wanting in one of the most material Points of their Charge.  
I may say the same of all the Principal Officers, and particularly of the First Gentlemen of your Chamber, who must be careful to keep all your Majesty's Apartment so neat and so clean, that it will not be too much to sweep and perfume them three or four times a day, by reason of the vast Concourse of People which cannot be avoided there, though it be never so well regulated.  
Provided every Man be qualified for his Office, every thing will be done according to your Majesty's Desire; and the Regulation of all the rest, depends on this point: For whatever Rule be established, it will prove useless, unless there are Men capable to see it performed; and if they are, they will have Wit enough to cause that to be done, which Reason will show them to be necessary for the Dignity of their Place, and for the Service of their Master.  
The third consists in That your Majesty should employ none but Gentlemen in all the Places of your Household, unless in the Lowest; which contributing much towards your Dignity, will create the more Affection into your Nobility, in that they will have more means to advance themselves near your Person.  
By this means, your Majesty may make the four Troops of your Gens d'Arms of the Body, the Four best Troops of Gens d'Arms in your Kingdom; it being most certain, that there are many Gentlemen who would be overjoyed to have a means to live in that Quality, provided those Places be given them gratis, which are now sold at who gives most.  
In that case, many will be glad to have that Employment, who would by no means accept of it at present, because it is usurped by Persons who do not deserve it.  
And all Gentlemen will willingly accept of it, upon the account of the access it will give them at Court, where a Chance and some Acquaintance may advance their Fortune in an instant.  
Your Majesty will also receive another Benefit by the said Establishment, in that as it will lessen the Number of the 
* Yeomen, or all those who are not of the Order of the Nebility or Gentry.  Roturiers, who are freed of the Tailles by the Places they enjoy in your Household, it will increase the Number of those who are to help the People to bear the Burden they are overwhelmed with at present.  
The fourth is, That your Majesty should give all the Places of your Household gratis, without allowing them to be sold upon any Consideration whatever.  
It may be urged, perhaps, That it is not reasonable, that those who have bought Places very dear, should not be allowed to sell them again; but as it is impossible to make any Settlements of great use for the Public, without their being attended with some Inconveniencies for private Persons, the said Inconvenience is not considerable, seeing that as they did not buy their Places with an assurance of leave to sell them again, like those Officers who pay an Annual Duty to the King, they may be deprived of the Hopes they had framed to themselves, without any Injustice.  
And though some private Persons may find themselves grieved by such an Alteration, all the Nobility and the Greatest will find a notable Advantage by it, in that whereas they were formerly obliged to sell a considerable part of their Estates to get Places, which has often ruined the best Families of the Kingdom, there will be no means left to expect them, but Merit; which will hinder them from ruining their Estate, and will oblige them to acquire Virtue, which is despised in this Age, because the Price of all things only consists in Money.  
Moreover, there will be so many means to satisfy those who upon the account of any particular Consideration will deserve to be exempted from the general Rule, That the Public will receive the Benefit of the Advantage your Majesty will be pleased to procure them, and yet such private Persons as might have cause to complain with Justice, will receive no prejudice by it.  
As it is impossible to question the Usefulness of these Propositions, the Facility to put them in Execution is evident, since, as abovesaid, it only requires a firm and constant Resolution in your Majesty, to reap the Benefit of the same, and to restore your Household to its former Greatness.   

CHAP. VIII. Of the PRINCE's Council.  

SECT. I. Which shows that the best Prince stands in need of a good Council.  
IT is no small question among Politicians, to know, Whether a Prince who Governs a State by his own Head, is more desirable than he who not confiding so much in his own Abilities, relies much on his Council, and does nothing without their Advice?  
Whole Volumes might be compiled of the Reasons which might be alleged for and against it: But referring this Question to the particular Fact which obliges me to introduce it in this place; after having preferred the Prince who acts more by his Council, than by his own Opinion, to him who prefers his own Head to all those of his Counsellors; I cannot forbear saying. That as the worse Government is that, which has no other Spring than the Head of a Prince, who being incapable, is so presumptuous as to slight all Counsel; the best of all is that of which the main Spring is in the Sense of the Sovereign, who, though capable to Act by Himself, has so much Modesty and Judgement, that he does nothing without Advice, upon this principle, That one Eye does not see for well as many.  
Besides that Reason discovers the Solidity of this Decision, Truth obliges me to say, That Experience has convinced me so much of it, that I cannot forbear affirming it, without doing myself a Violence.  
A Capable Prince is a great Treasure in a State; a Skilful Council, and such as it ought to be, is no less considerable: But the Concert of Both together, is of an inestimable Value, since thereon depends the Felicity of States.  
It is certain, that the most happy States are those, in which Princes and Counsellors are the Wisest.  
It is also certain, That there are few Princes capable to Govern States alone; and, moreover, though there were many, they ought not to do it.  
The Almighty Power of GOD, his infinite Wisdom, and his Providence, do not hinder Him from making use, in things which he might do by his bare Will, of the Ministry of Second Causes; and consequently Kings, whose Perfections are limited, instead of being infinite, would commit a notable Fault, in not following his Example.  
But whereas it is not in their power, as in Gods', to supply the Defects of those they employ, they must be very careful to choose them as perfect and as accomplished as possible can be.  
Many Qualifications are required to make a perfect Counsellor; nevertheless they may be reduced to Four, viz. Capacity, Fidelity, Courage, and Application, which includes many others.   

SECT. II. Which represents what Capacity is required in a good Counsellor.  
THe Capacity of Counsellors does not require a pedantic Knowledge: None can be more dangerous in a State, than those who will Govern Kingdoms by the Maxims they find in Books: They often ruin them thereby, because the Time past has no relation to the present, and that the Constitution of Times, Places, and Persons, is different.  
It only requires Goodness, Steadiness of Mind, Solidity of Judgement, true Source of Prudence, a reasonable Tincture of Letters, a general Knowledge of History, and of the present Constitution of all the States of the World, and particularly of that in which they are.  
Whereupon two things ought particularly to be considered:  
The First, That the greatest Wits are more dangerous than useful in the Management of Affairs; unless they have a great deal more Lead than Quicksilver, they are no ways fit for the State.  
Some are fertile in Inventions, and abounding in Thoughts; but so variable in their Designs, that those of the Morning and of the Evening, are never alike; and have so little connexity and choice in their Resolutions, that they altar the good, as well as the ill ones, and never remain constant in any.  
I may say with truth, as knowing it by Experience, that the Levity of such Men is no less dangerous, in the Administration of Public Affairs, than the Malice of many others.  
Much is to be dreaded from Minds whose Vivacity is accompanied with little Judgement; and tho' those who excel in the Judicious part should not have a great reach, yet they might be useful to States.  
The Second Remark to be made on this Subject is, That nothing can be more dangerous in a State, than to give a great Authority to certain Men, who have not Sense enough to Govern themselves, and yet think they have too much to stand in need of any bodies.  
They are neither capable to take a good Counsel from their own Head, nor to follow the Advice of those who are capable to direct them; and thus they commit gross Faults.  
Presumption is one of the greatest Vices a Man can be guilty of, in public Employments; and if Humility is not required in those who are designed for the Conduct of States, yet Modesty is absolutely necessary; since it is most certain, that those who have the greatest Parts, are sometimes the least capable to admit Society and Counsel; Qualifications without which, even those to whom Nature has given most Knowledge, are not fit for Government.  
Without Modesty, Men of great Parts are so wedded to their own Opinions, that they condemn all others, though better; and the Pride of their natural Constitution being joined to their Authority, renders them altogether insupportable.  
The wisest Man in the World ought to hearken to the Advice of those whom he thinks less capable than himself.  
As in Prudence a Minister of State ought to speak but little, so it behoves him to hearken much. A Man may profit by all sorts of Advices; the Good are useful in themselves, and the Ill ones confirm the Good.  
In a word, The Capacity of a Minister of State, requires Modesty; and if with that Quality he has a good Genius, and Solidity of Judgement, he will have whatever is necessary.   

SECT. III. Which represents the Integrity that is required in a good Counsellor.  
IT is a different thing to be an honest Man in what relates to GOD, and in relation to Men.  
He who takes a particular care to observe the Law of his Creator, performs his Duty in the first; but to do it in the second, be must observe that which is prescribed by the Honour of Men.  
Those different Integrities are necessary in a Counsellor of State; but it is uncertain yet, whether he who possesses all the Qualifications which are required in order thereunto, as to those of the World, also commonly has those which make him an honest Man before GOD. A Man might be very careful to regulate his Conscience according to the Will of his Creator, who being deprived of some of the Conditions of that Integrity, will be less fit to be employed in the Ministry of public Affairs, than he who having them all, may be subject to some particular Defects, in relation to the first.  
However, as the Disorder of Conscience is the true Source of all the Imperfections of Man; I declare boldly, That the Two Integrities I am speaking of, are equally necessary for the Perfection of a Counsellor of State, and that he cannot have the second, if he be destitute of the first.  
In a word, A State's man must be Faithful to GOD, to the State, to all Men, and to himself; which he will be, if, besides the Qualities abovementioned, he has an Affection for the Public, and has no private Ends in his Counsels.  
The Integrity of a public Minister, does not suppose a fearful scrupulous Conscience; on the contrary, nothing can be more dangerous in the Government of a State; since that as the want of Conscience may occasion many Injustices and Cruelties, Scruples may introduce many Emotions and Indulgences, very prejudicial to the Public: For it is most certain, that those who tremble in the most certain things, out of fear to ruin themselves, often ruin States, when they might save themselves with them.  
As the Integrity of a Counsellor of State can never agree with a certain Rigour, which is accompanied with Injustice, it is not contrary to the Severity which must be used of necessity in many occasions; on the contrary, it advises and prescribes it sometimes, and often obliges to be Pitiless.  
It does not hinder a Man from minding his own Business, in serving the State; but it only forbids him to think on it, to the prujudice of public Interest, which ought to be dearer to him than his own Life.  
That Integrity does not allow a certain Goodness, in those who are employed in public Affairs, to hinder them from boldly refusing those who have unjust Pretensions; on the contrary, it requires, that in granting that which is reasonable, they should be steady in denying what is not so.  
I cannot proceed on this Subject, without saying what Ferdinand Great Duke of Florence, who lived in our time, was used to say on the said Subject, That he would prefer a corrupted▪ Man, before one whose Facility was extraordinary; because, added he, a corrupted Person cannot always be wrought upon by his Interest, which does not always come in play; where is he who is of an easy Temper, is easily swayed by all those who press him; which happens the oftener, by reason that it is known, that he is not capable to resist those who press him.  
The said Integrity requires that all those who are employed in the Governments of a State, should walk an even pace; and that as they act to the same End, they should hold the same Language; otherwise, if any one be found, who, though he behaves himself well in effect, speaks less resolutely than the rest to decline Envy; besides, that he will be wanting in the Integrity required in a Minister of State, he will load those with Hatred whose freeness of Speech is consonant to the Steadiness of their Actions.  
There are Men, whose Virtue consists more in Bewailing Disorders, than in applying a Remedy to the same, by the establishment of a good Discipline.  
Those are not the Men we seek for; their Virtue is only in appearance; and as it has no Action which can be of use, it differs but little from Vice, which has none but what may be hurtful.  
The Integrity of a Counsellor of State must be active; it disdains Complaints, and fixes on solid Effects, which may be useful to the Public.  
There are others, who having nothing but the good of the State in their Mouth, have so extravagant an Ambition in their Heart, that no End can stop their Desires, and nothing can satisfy or content them.  
Others proceeding farther, not contented with never being so, convert, under specious Pretences, Public Interests to their own; and instead of guiding Particular Interest by that which is Public, they do the contrary, with as much Injustice as Boldness.  
Such Men are not only destitute of the Integrity which is necessary in the Employment of Public Affairs but they are moreover true Plagues to a State; they are the wild Boars of the Scripture, in the Vineyard, in a full Vintage, who do not only fill their Bellies with it, but spoil and destroy all the rest.  
Those who are of a wilful Temper, and follow their Passions more than Reason, and who, instead of choosing Men barely upon the account of their Capacity, in those things in which they are to be employed, choose them only because they are sensible that they have an Affection for them, and that they are linked to their Interest, cannot neither be reckoned Men of the Integrity which is required in the Administration of States.  
If a Man be Revengeful, to put him in Authority, is to put a Sword in the hand of a Fury: if he follows his Appetite, and not Reason in his Elections, it is exposing the State to be served by Men of Favour, rather than of Merit; which will occasion many Inconveniences.  
A Man of true Integrity must never 〈…〉 own Injuries, unless when he rights those 〈…〉 State: Moreover, he must not be endued to public Vengeance, upon the account of his particular Interest; 〈◊〉 when he does it, as those who ha●● a scrupulous Integrity, often inju●● themselves by a good Principle, it may be said with truth, that he does good by an ill one.  
As the Integrity of a Counsellor of State requires his being proof against all forts of Interests and of Passions, it also requires his being so against Calumnies; and that all the Crosses he may meet with, may never discourage him from doing well.  
He must know, that the Labour Men undergo for the Public, is seldom acknowledged by private Persons; and that no other Reward is to be expected for it on Earth, than that of Fame, which is the true Reward of great Souls.  
He must also know, That the great Men who are employed in the Government of States, are like those who are condemned to suffer; with this difference only, That those receive the Reward of their Faults, and the others of their Merit.  
Moreover, he must know, That none but great Souls are capable to serve Kings faithfully, and to support the Calumnies which the Wicked and Ignorant impute to Men of Honour, without disquiet, and without slackening in the Service they are obliged to do them.  
He must likewise know, That the Condition of those who are called to the Administration of public Affairs, is much to be pitied; by reason that 〈◊〉 do well, the Malice of the World lessens 〈…〉 of it, pretending that one might do better, though it were absolutely impossible.  
Finally, he must know, That those who are employed in the Ministry of the State, are obliged to imitate the Stars, which notwithstanding the Barking of Dogs, lighten them, and follow their Course; which ought to oblige him so far to contemn such Injuries, that his Integrity may not be shaken by it in the least, nor he hindered from prosecuting those Ends steadily, which he has proposed to himself for the Advantage of the State.   

SECT. iv Which represents what Courage and Force is required in a Counsellor of State.  
THe Courage which is necessary in thsi case, does not require so much Boldness in a Man, as to despise all sorts of Perils; nothing can be more likely to ruin States: And a Counsellor of State ought to be so far from behaving himself so, that, on the contrapy, it behoves him to be very wary on all occasions, and to undertake nothing without great Consideration, and in proper Time.  
Neither does the Courage required in a perfect Counsellor of State, oblige him to think on nothing but Great Things, which happens often to the most elevated Souls, when they have more Courage than Judgement; on the contrary, it is absolutely necessary, that he should stoop to the meanest, though they may seem below him at first; because great Disorders often arise from small Beginnings; and that the most considerable Establishments, have sometimes Principles which seem to be of no Consideration.  
But the Courage in question requires a Man to be free from Weakness and Fear, which render those who are tainted with those two Defects, not only incapable of taking good Resolutions for the Public Good, but also from putting those in execution which they have taken.  
It requires a certain Fire, which makes Men desire and prosecute great things with as much Eagerness, as the Judgement embraces them with Wisdom.  
It requires moreover a certain Steadiness, which makes Men undergo Adversities bravely, and hinders them from appearing, and from being altered in the greatest Alterations of Fortune.  
It ought to give the Minister of State an honest Emulation of Glory; without which, the most ●apable and the most worthy seldom signalise themselves by an advantageous Action to the Public.  
It must give him the force to resist, without being daunted, Envy, Hatred, Calumny, and all the Crosses which are commonly met with in the Administration of Public Affairs.  
Finally, It must justify the Saying of Aristotle in his Person, who affirms, That whereas those that are Weak make use of Cunning and of Craft, those who are strong despise both equally, by the just Confidence they have in themselves.  
To this end, we must observe, That to be Valiant, and to have Courage, is not the same thing.  
Valour supposes a Disposition to expose one's self willingly on all occasions to the Perils which present themselves, which Courage does not require, but only a sufficient Resolution to despise Peril, when we are engaged in it, and to support Adversity patiently when we are involved therein.  
We may even proceed farther, and say, That besides the Disposition above specified, Valour requires another, which is Corporal, and which enables Men to show their Valour by their Arm.  
I am sensible, That those who have spoken of the principal Virtues of Man heretofore, did no● understand those Distinctions; but if you consider them maturely, you will find the first absolutely necessary, and the second not superfluous; because most Men only judge of a Man's Valour, by the Performances of his Arm, which show his Worth.  
Whatever sense you take Valour in, it is not necessary in a Counsellor of State; there is no need of his having a Disposition to expose himself to Perils, nor even a corporeal Aptness to show his Worth by the virtue of his Arm; it is sufficient for him to have so much Courage, that an ill-grounded Fear, and the Crosses he may chance to meet with, may not be able to divert him from his good and generous Design; and as the Mind governs, and not the Hand, it is sufficient that his Heart should sustain his Head, though it cannot influence his Arm.   

SECT. V Which represents what Application is required in Counsellors of State.  
APplication does not require that a Man should Labour incessantly in Public Affairs; on the contrary, nothing is more capable to make him useless, than such a proceeding: The nature of State-Affairs requires respite, by reason that the weight of it is greater, and more burdensome than all others; and that the Forces of the Mind and Body of Men being limited, a continual Labour would exhaust them in a short space of time.  
It allows all manner of honest Divertisements, which do not divert those who take them, from those things to which they ought to be particularly applied.  
But it requires, that he who is engaged in Public Affairs, should make them his particular Care, and should fix his Mind, his Thought and Affection on them; it requires that the greatest of his Pleasures should be the good success of his Affairs.  
It requires that he should often surround the World, to foresee what may happen, and to find means to prevent the Evils which are to be feared, and to execute those Enterprises which Reason and Public Interest advise.  
As it obliges not to lose one moment in certain Affairs, which may be ruined by the least delay; it also requires, that we should not precipitate ourselves in others, in which time is necessary to take such Resolutions as one may have no reason to repent of.  
One of the greatest Grievances of this Kingdom is, that most Men apply themselves more to those things to which they cannot apply themselves without a Fault, than to those they cannot omit without a Crime.  
A Soldier speaks of what his Captain ought to do; the Captain, of the Defects he imagines in his Colonel; the Colonel finds fault with his General; the General disapproves and blames the Conduct of the Court; and none of them move in their own Sphere, or think of performing those things which their Station particularly obliges them to.  
There are Persons of so little Action, and of such weak Constitutions, that they never apply themselves to any thing of their own accord, but barely receive occasions, which influence these more than they do them.  
Such Men are fit to live in a Cloister, than to be employed in the Administration of States, which require Application and Activity together; so that when they are in them, they do as much harm by their languishing Conduct, as another may do good by an active Application.  
We must not expect great Effects from such Minds; no body is obliged to them for the Good they do; neither can they be blamed much for the harm they do, since properly speaking, Chance acts more in them than themselves.  
Nothing can be more contrary to the Application which is necessary in Public Affairs, than the Inclination which those who have the Administration of them have for Women.  
I am sensible, that there are Minds so absolutely Superior and Masters of themselves, that though they are diverted from what they own to GOD by some unruly Affection, yet it does not divert them from what they own to the State. There are some, who not giving those an Influence over their Will, who sway their Pleasures, only apply themselves wholly to their Business.  
But there are but few of this nature; and it must be granted, That as a Woman lost the World, nothing is so capable to ruin States as that Sex; when influencing those who Govern them, they often make them move as they please and consequently ill. The best of Woman's Thoughts being commonly ill, in those who are governed by their Passions, which generally usurp the Empire of Reason in their Mind, whereas Reason is the only and true Motive which must animate and influence those who are employed in public Affairs.  
Whatever Force a Counsellor of State may have, it is impossible for him to apply himself as he should do to his Trust, unless he be free from all such Engagements. He may chance to perform his Duty with them; but being free of them, he will do much better.  
Whatever Station he is in, in order to do well, he must divide his Time so, as to have Hours to work alone about the Expeditions which are required by his Place, and others to give Audience to every body; Reason obliges him to treat every one courteously, and with as much Civillty as his Staition, and the distinct Quality of Men who have Business with him requires.  
This Article will give Posterity a Testimony of my Integrity, since it prescribes what I have not been able to perform in every point.  
I have always lived civilly with those who had Business to treat with me, the Nature of Affairs, which obliges to refuse many Persons, does neither allow ill Looks, nor ill Words, when we cannot satisfy them by Effects: But the illness of my Health has not allowed me to give access to every body, as I could have wished; which has often troubled me to that degree, that that Consideration has sometimes made me desirous to retire.  
Nevertheless, I may affirm with truth, That I have husbanded the Weakness of my Forces so well, that if I have not been able to answer the Desires of every body, they have never been able to hinder me from performing my Duty in relation to the State.  
Finally, Application, Courage, Integrity, and Capacity, form the Perfection of a Counsellor of State; and the Concurrence of all those Qualities must meet in his Person.  
A Man may be very honest, who having no Talon for Affairs of State, would be altogether useless in them; and would keep Places he were not able to discharge.  
Another might be capable, and have the Integrity which is required, who not having Courage enough to sustain the divers Casualties which it is impossible to avoid in the Government of States, would be prejudicial instead of being useful.  
Another might mean well, be capable, and have Courage together, whose Laziness would prove destructive to the Public, he not applying himself to the Functions of his Office.  
Another may have a good Conscience, be capable, have Courage and Application to his Employment, who being more sensible to the Object which touches him, than to what Concerns the Interest of the Public, though he serves often usefully, is nevertheless much to be feared.  
Capacity and Probity produce such a perfect Agreement between the Understanding and the Will, that as the Understanding knows how to choose the best Objects, and the properest means to acquire the Possession of them; the Will also knows how to embrace them with so much eagerness, that it omits nothing within its power to compass the Ends proposed by the Understanding.  
Integrity and Courage produce an honest Boldness, to tell Kings what is useful for them, though it be not altogether pleasing to them.  
I say, an honest Boldness; because unless it be well regulated, and always respectful, instead of being reckoned among the Perfections of a Counsellor of State, it would be one of his Vices.  
King's must be spoken to with silken Words. As a faithful Counsellor is obliged to mind them in private of their Faults with Caution, he can never represent them to them in public, without committing a great Fault.  
To speak that aloud which ought to be whispered, is a Reproach which may become criminal in the Mouth of him who utters it, if he Publishes the Imperfections of his Prince, to advantage himself by it; being more desirous, out of a vain Ostentation, to show that he disapproves them, than that he has a sincere Desire to correct them.  
Courage and Speculation produce so much Steadiness in the Designs chosen by the Understanding, and embraced by the Will, that they are prosecuted with Constancy, without being liable to the Changes which the Levity of the French often produces.  
I have not spoken of the Force and Health of Body necessary in a Minister of State, by reason that though it is a great advantage, when it meets with all the Qualifications of Mind above mentioned, it is not, nevertheless, so necessary, but that Counsellors may perform their Functions without it.  
There are many Employments in the State, in which they are absolutely necessary, because the Body is to act as well as the Mind, in repairing to divers Places, which often must be done with speed; but he who holds the Helm of the State, and whose sole Care is the Direction of Affairs, stands in no need of that Qualification.  
As the Motion of Heaven only stands in need of the Intelligence which moves it; so the Force of the Mind alone is sufficient to conduct a State; and that of the Arms and Legs is not necessary to move all the World.  
As he who Governs a Ship has no other Action than that of the Eye to see the Compass; after which, he order the Turning of the Helm, according as he thinks fit; so in the Conduct of a State, nothing is required but the Operation of the Mind, which sees and orders at once what it thinks fit to be done.  
If it be true, that the Sun which heats all things is not hot in itself; it is evident, that in order to make the World act corporeally, the Action of the Body is not required.  
I own nevertheless, that I have often wished myself rid of the Government of the State, upon the account of my want of Health; the Line of which has been so short, that it has almost been impossible for me not to exceed the measure of it often.  
Finally, After having served your Majesty many Years in the most difficult Affairs that can be met with in a State, I may confirm by Experience, what Reason teaches all the World, That it is the Head, and not the Arm, which conducts States.   

SECT. VI Which represents the Number of Counsellors of State that is requisite, and that one among them ought to have the Superior Authority.  
AFter having examined and discovered the Qualifications that are necessary in those who are to be employed in the Ministry of State, I must also observe, That as the Plurality of Physicians sometimes causes the Death of the Patient, instead of contributing towards his Cure; so the State will receive more prejudice than advantage, if the Counsellors are in great Number: I add, That no benefit can be derived by them, if their Number exceeds Four; and moreover, That one of them must have the Superior Authority, to be as it were the Primum Mobile, which moves all the other Heavens, without being moved by any thing but its Intelligence.  
I am loath to set down this Proposition, because it will look as if I designed to maintain my own Cause; but considering that it would be easy for me to prove it by several Authorities of Scripture, of the Fathers, and of Politicians; and that the Confidence your Majesty has always honoured me with, while you have been pleased to give me a share in the Administration of Public Affairs, wants no other Principle for the defence of it, but that which was necessary for its Establishment; I mean, your Will; whick will be looked upon by Posterity as a just Reason of the Authority I have had all along in your Councils; I find that I may speak upon this Subject without being suspected; and that it is my Duty to do it, to prove that by Reason, which the Honour I have always received from your Goodness will authorize by Example.  
The natural Envy which is commonly met with among equal Powers, is too well known to every body to want a long Discourse, to show the Truth of this Proposition.  
Divers Experiences have made me so knowing in this matter, that I should think myself answerable before GOD, if this present Testament did not declare in proper terms, That nothing can be more dangerous in a State, than divers equal Authorities in the Administration of Affairs.  
What the one undertakes, is crossed by the other; and if the worthiest Men is not the most capable, though his Propositions should prove the best, they would always be eluded by the most powerful in Sense.  
Each will have their Sectators, which will form divers Parties in the State, and will divide the Forces of it, instead of uniting them together.  
As the Distempers and Death of Men only proceed from the Discord of the Elements they are composed of; so it is certain, that the Contrariety and the want of Union, which constantly reigns among equal Powers, will ever disturb the Peace of the States they have the Management of, and will produce divers Accidents, which finally may ruin them.  
If it be true, That Monarchical Government is more consonant to GOD's than any other; If all Politicians, both Sacred and Profane, teach us, that that Form surpasses all those that were ever put in practice; we may boldly affirm, That if the Sovereign cannot, or will not have a continual eye himself upon his Map, and upon his Compass, Reason requires that he should give the peculiar Charge thereof to one above all the rest.  
As divers Pilots never put their Hands at once to the Helm; so there must be but one at the Helm of the State.  
He may receive the Advice of others; moreover, he ought sometimes to desire it; but he is to examine the Goodness of it, and to turn his Hand to the Right or Left, as he thinks it best, to avoid the Storm, and to steer his Course.  
The main point consists in making a good Choice on that occasion, and never to be deceived in it.  
Nothing can be more easy than to find a Primum Mobile to move all, without being moved by any Superior Authority but that of his Master; but nothing is more difficult than to find one to move well, without being able to be moved by any Consideration which might disorder its Motion.  
All Men will think themselves, by their own Sense, capable of that Function; but as no Man can be a Judge in his own Cause, the Judgement of a thing of this importance, must be referred to those who have no interest to blind them.  
Such a Man will not be capable of being wrought upon by the Practices and Presents of the Enemies of the State, who may be moved by their Artifices.  
Another may be capable of being wrought upon by Interests; which though not criminal, might nevertheless prove very prejudicial to the State.  
There are many, who would rather die than act against their Conscience, who nevertheless would not be useful to the Public, because they are too apt to yield to the Importunities, and to the Tenderness they have for those they love.  
Some may be incapable of being moved by any Interest whatever, who may be moved by Fear, by Astonishment, and by a panic Terror.  
I am sensible, that the Capacity, Integrity, Courage, and, in a word, all the Qualities which we have attributed to Counsellors of State, may remedy such Inconveniences; but, to speak the truth, as the Minister we are speaking of must be above all the rest, so he must have all those Qualities in an eminent degree, and consequently he must be carefully examined before he is chosen.  
The Prince must have a personal Knowledge of the Person he entrusts with so great an Employment, and though the said Person must be elected by himself, yet the Choice he makes of him, must if possible, be accompanied with Public Approbation; for if he has the liking of every body, he will be the more capable to do good.  
As those who are the best skilled in Astronomical Supputations, can never be deceived of one Minute, but the Judgements they make afterwards must be liable to all manner of Falsities; so it is certain, that if the Qualifications of the Person who is to govern others, are only good in appearance, his Conduct will prove very bad; and that if they are but mean, his Government will not prove excellent.  
It is is easy to represent the Qualifications that first Ministers ought to have; but it is difficult to meet them all in one Subject.  
Nevertheless, it is certain, that the Happiness, or Unhappiness of States, depends on that Election; which lays a strict Obligation on Sovereigns, either to take that Care themselves, which the Weight of their Crown Charges them with, or to make so good a choice of him on whom they will disburden themselves of it, that their Opinion may be approved by Heaven and Earth.   

SECT. VII. Which represents what the King's Behaviour is to be towards his Counsellors; and shows, that in order to be well served, the best Expedient he can take is to use them well.  
YOur Majesty having thus chosen your Counsellors, it is your Business to put them in such a state, that they may be able to labour towards the Grandeur and Felicity of your Kingdom.  
Four things are particularly necessary to that end.  
The First, that your Majesty must confide in them, and that they should know it, which is absolutely necessary, because that otherwise the best Counsellors might be suspected by Princes; and that the Ministers not being certain that their Sincerity is known, would restrain themselves in many occasions, in which their silence might prove very prejudicial.  
'Tis a common Saying, That a Physician who is liked by his Patient, and is beloved by him, will be able to do him more good than another: And 'tis also certain, that there is none who could apply himself boldly to the Cure of his Patient, if he were persuaded that he was diffident of him.  
The Second is, To command them to speak freely to him, and to assure them that they may do it without Peril.  
That Condition is absolutely necessary, not only for some weak and timorous Minds, who want to be encouraged, but also for those who not being naturally timorous, employ their Zeal the more usefully for the Advantage of the Public, in being certain that their Boldness cannot be prejudicial to them.  
The Soldier who fires behind a Breast-work, is more confident than he who knows that in shooting he may be shot; and indeed, few Men would expose themselves to Ruin to serve the Public.  
It is true, that an honest Man must never consider his own Interest, when the Public is concerned; and that the highest Point of Fidelity that can be desired in a Servant, is, to speak that ingenuously which he knows to be for his Master's Interest, without the least fear of incurring the Hatred of those who have most interests with him, nor even of displeasing him: But there are but few who have so much Zeal as to run such a Risque.  
The Third, To be liberal towards them, and to give them reason to think, that their Services will not be unrewarded.  
Which is the more necessary, because there are but few Men who love Virtue naked; and that the only way to hinder a Servant from thinking too much on his own Interest, is to practise the Advice of that Emperor, who recommends to his Son, to have a great care of the Affairs of those who are very mindful of his.  
No honest Man ever endeavours to enrich himself at the cost of the Public, in serving it; but as it would be a Crime to have such a Thought, nothing can be more shameful in a Prince, than to see those who are grown old in his Service, loaden with Years, with Merit, and with Poverty together.  
The Fourth is, To authorize and maintain them so openly, that they may be certain, that they need neither fear the Artifices, nor the Power of those who would ruin them.  
The Interest of the Prince obliges him to behave himself thus, since no Man can serve the Public effectually, without incurring the Hatred and Envy of every body; and that few would be found so virtuous as to do well, if they thought it would prove prejudicial to them.  
There is no Town in the World, though never so strong in itself, but will be taken in process of time, unless a particular Care be taken to defend her Outworks.  
It is the Case of the Greatest Kings, who can never preserve their Authority entire, unless they take a singular care to maintain it in the least of their Officers, near or distant from their Persons, which are Outworks that are attacked first; the taking of which, emboldens Men to make Efforts against those within, though they seem to be impregnable, as sacred and fixed to the very Person of Kings.  
Few Men will be so presumptuous as to attack those by open force, whom the Prince will make choice of to serve him; because all are sensible that their Power cannot cope with their Sovereign, who is too much concerned to protect his Servants, to neglect it to his prejudice; but there are always some who endeavour to ruin them by Artifices and indirect Means, difficult to be discovered.  
Men behave themselves commonly with so much Cunning in those occasions, that when the least prospect is observed in such Designs, they must be looked upon as certain; not to harm those who are supposed guilty before they are convicted, but to prevent them with Prudence.  
The Artifice of Men makes them disguise themselves a hundred different ways to compass their Ends: Some speak openly, under pretence that their Silence would be criminal; but there are few of that kind: Others feign to be Friends to those they design to ruin: Others employ a Third Person to speak, and reserve themselves to second the ill Offices they have begun. Finally, there are so many ways to do harm in that kind, that a Prince can never be too much upon his Guard, to secure himself against surprises, in a thing of that importance.  
Whenever any body speaks to him in private against the Government of the State, under any pretence whatever, he may assure himself that it is to ruin and to undo him.  
We may compare those who behave themselves so, to those who have Fevers, which are the more malignant, in that the external Fire seems little, when they are almost parched up within.  
Such Distempers must be prevented in time, without staying for a perfect Knowledge of them, because it often happens that we can only have it by the Event, and the Effect of the ill Design which is projected.  
Those who make such Enterprises, are too sensible of the Danger to which they expose themselves to begin them, without a Resolution to go through with them. On such occasions, Men begin slowly and fairly; but afterwards, the nature of such Affairs obliges them to double their pace, and to run for fear of being surprised by the way.  
In that, they imitate the Stone which is fling from the top of a Mountain; its first motion is slow, and the more it descends, the more weight it receives, and redoubles the swiftness of its fall: And as it requires more force to stop it in the midst of its fall, than in the beginning; so it is very difficult to stop a Conspiracy, which not being stifled in its Birth, has already made a great Progress.  
The more considerable a Place is, the more the Enemy endeavours to seduce the Governor of it; the more a Woman is beautiful, the more Men endeavour to engage her Affections: So likewise the more a Minister is useful to his Master, powerful in his Mind and Favour, the more Men envy him, and are desirous of his Place, and endeavour to supplant him to come in his room.  
Among faithful Governors, those are most esteemed, who do not only resist the Propositions which are made to them against their Duty, but also refuse to hear them, and who immediately stop the mouths of those who will tempt them by such means.  
Among chaste Women, those who have no Ears to hearken to the ill Discourses which Men would make to them to seduce their Purity, are, by the Judgement of the Wisest, preferred to those who open them, even when they shut their Hearts.  
So among Masters who have Servants, whose Fidelity has been tried on so many occasions, that they cannot question it with Reason, those are the Wisest who stop the Mouths of those would speak ill of them.  
Whatever Virtue there may be in resisting Temptation; Princes and Husbands are esteemed too Indulgent, when they allow their Governors and their Wives, to give Ear to those things which they would not have them adhere to, and to which they cannot consent without a Crime; and Masters must condemn themselves, when they give Ear to what Men would tell them against those, whose Fidelity is unreproachable. The Primitive Reason of this decision consists in that, as to expose one's self boldly to danger in a just and useful occasion, is an Act of Valour; so to do the same without Cause or Reason, is an Act of Temerity; and it is in that Sense, it has been said with great Reason, that whoever gives Ear to Calumnies deserves to be deceived.  
Perhaps some will say, that there is a great deal of difference, between the Duty of the Governor, of the Woman, and of the Prince, in the case which is represented: That it is true, that the Governor and the Woman, do a great deal better not to hearken, because they can in no wise consent to what is to be proposed to them; but that the case is different in relation to the Prince, who must keep his Ears open, since he may be told Truths of that consequence, that he will be obliged to provide against them.  
To that I answer in the first place, That in speaking only of such Servants whose Fidelity is unreproachable, and whose Conduct has been tried on many occasions of that importance, that it is impossible to meet with greater; the disserence will be so inconsiderable in the Comparison aforesaid, that in Reason it must be looked upon as none; the Rule of Moral Things, obliges to look upon those things as nothing, which are of slight consequence.  
I add in the second place, That the some inconvenience might attend the closing of one's Ears against what any body would say against a Servant of approved Fidelity; It is so inconsiderable in respect to those which are inevitable, in opening them to the prejudice of Persons thus qualified, that I may say absolutely, that the Governor, the Woman, and the Prince must equally shut them in the occasions abovementioned.  
There is no ground to presume, that he who has been faithful all his Life, would become unfaithful in a moment, without Cause or Reason, principally when the Interest of his Fortune is joined to his Master's.  
An Evil which can happen but seldom, must be presumed not to happen at all; particularly, when to avoid it, we must expose ourselves to others which are inevitable, and of greater Consequence, which is the Case in question: It being certain, that it is almost impossible for a Prince to preserve his most faithful and most assured Servants, if under pretence of not shutting his Ears against Truth, he opens them to the Malice of Men; besides, that it is certain that he will lose more, in losing one thus Qualified; than if for want of giving Ear, he should tolerate in any one, Faults which cannot be of great consequence, if he finds him faithful in the most important Occasions.  
If he who gives a free entrance to the Murderers who kill a Man, is guilty of his Death; he who receives all sorts of Suspicions, and of Calumnies, against the Fidelity of one of his Servants, without examining the Case to the bottom, is answerable before GOD for such a proceeding.  
The best of Actions are deemed ill by two sorts of Men; by the Malicious, who impute every thing to Ill by the excess of their Malice, and by those who are naturally suspicious, who explain every thing ill by their Weakness.  
There is no Man on Earth, though never so virtuous, that can pass for innocent in a Master's Mind, who not examining things himself, giveth e'er to Calumny.  
As there are but two ways to resist Vice, either by Flight, or by Combat; so there are also but two to resist the Impressions which are made by Calumnies, the one consists in rejecting them absolutely, without harkening to them; the other in being so careful in the Examination of what is told, that the Truth or Falsehood thereof may be averred.  
To avoid all Inconveniences, to secure one's self against the Artifices and Snares that are laid by the Wicked, to ruin honest Men, and not to be deprived of the means to discover the ill Behaviour of those who serve ill; the Prince must look upon all those things as Calumnies which are only whispered to him; and upon that account, refuse to hear them: And if any Man will maintain what he has to say in the presence of those he accuses, than he may give ear to them thus, on condition of a good Recompense, if he says any thing material to the Public which proves to be true; and of a great Punishment, if his Accusation prove false, or not considerable and important, though it should prove true.  
I have always begged of your Majesty to follow this Method in relation to myself, in order to give those who would censure my Actions an opportunity to do it, and me means to defend myself.  
I may say with truth, That your Majesty never had the least Disgust against my Conduct, but when you have not practised this Council, which is the more to be received, in that it is altogether innocent.    
The End of the First Part.   

THE Political Testament Of the Famous CARDINAL Duke de RICHELIEV.  
The Second PART.  
THE Rules I have set down in the first Part of this Book, being well established; it is the Duty of Counsellors to use their best Endeavours like Men of Honour according to certain general Principles on which the good Administration of States depends.  
It would be easy to propose many, which would seem very useful; but as the Excellency of Sciences consists in a small number of Principles by reason that they are the sooner and better understood, I will reduce those I look upon to be most advantageous for the Government of this Kingdom to Nine, which in my opinion are absolutely necessary.  
Tho some of them may have divers Branches, they will not increase their Number, as those of Trees do not multiply the Stems.  

CHAP. I. The first Foundation of the Happiness of a State is the Establishment of the Reign of God.  
THE Reign of God is the Principle of the Government of States; and indeed it is a thing so absolutely necessary, that without that Foundation it is impossible for any Prince to rule well, or for any State to be happy.  
It would be easy to write whole Volumes upon so important a Subject, for which Scripture, the Fathers and all sorts of Histories furnish us an infinite number of Examples, of pretences and exhortations which all tend to the same end: But all Men are so sensible by their own Reason, that their Original does not proceed from themselves, but that a God is their Creator, and consequently their Director, that they all feel that Nature has imprinted that Truth in their hearts with undefaceable Characters.  
So many Princes have undone themselves, and their States, by laying the foundation of their Conduct upon a Judgement contrary to their own knowledge; and so many have been loaden with Blessings in submitting their Authority to that from whom it was derived, for having only sought their Grandeur, in that of their Creator; and for having taken more Care of his Reign than of their own, that I will enlarge no further on a Truth too evident, to stand in need of any Proof.  
I will only say this, that as it is impossible that the Reign of a Prince, who suffers disorder and vice to reign in his State, should be happy; so God will not easily permit his to be unhappy, who takes a particular care to establish his Empire within the Extent of his Dominion.  
Nothing can be of greater use to such an Establishment than the Regularity of Prince's Lives, which is a Law that speaks and persuades with more efficacy than all those they could enact to induce People to follow the good they would procure.  
If it be true, that whatever Crime a Sovereign may fall into, he sins more by the ill Example he gives than by the nature of his fault: It is no less certain that whatever Laws he may make, if he practices what he prescribes, his Example is no less useful towards the Observation of his Will than all the Penalties of his Ordinances, though never so grave.  
The purity of a chaste Prince will banish more impurity out of his Kingdom than all the Ordinances he could publish to that end.  
The Prudence and Discretion of those who avoid Swearing will sooner put a stop to the Oaths and Blasphemies, which are too common in States, than all the Rigours they can exert against those who addict themselves to such Execrations.  
Not but it is absolutely necessary at the same time to chastise Scandals, Swearing and Blasphemies with the utmost Severity; It is a thing in which Princes can never be too exact; for let the Life of a Prince or of a Magistrate be never so godly and regular, they will never be reputed to have performed their Duty, unless while they invite People to it by their Example, they also force them to it by the Rigour of their Laws.  
All the Sovereigns of the World are obliged by that Principle to promote the Conversion of those, who living under their Reign, stray out of the Road to Heaven. But as Man is reasonable by his Nature, Princes perform their Duty, in practising all reasonable means to attain so good an end; and Prudence does not allow them to attempt any so hazardous, as to run the risk of pulling out the good Wheat in endeavouring to remove Dissension, which it would be difficult to purge a State of by any means but those of mildness, without exposing it to a tottering condition capable to ruin it, or at least to cause a notable prejudice to it.  
As Princes are obliged to establish the true Worship of God, they must be very careful to banish the false Appearances of it, so prejudicial to States, that one may truly affirm, that Hypocrisy has often served as a Veil to cover the deformity of the most pernicious attempts.  
Many Persons, whose Weakness is equal to their Malice, sometimes use that kind of Varnish, which is the more common in Women in that their Sex is more inclined to Devotion, and that the little force it is attended with makes them the more capable of such disguises, which suppose less Solidity than Cunning.   

CHAP. II. Reason must be the Rule and Conduct of a State.  
NAtural Knowledge convinces us, that Man being created reasonable, Reason ought to be the Guide of all his Actions, since otherwise he would act against his Nature, and consequently against him who is the Author of it.  
It also teaches us that the greater a Man is, and the more he is elevated, the more he ought to respect that Privilege, and to avoid abusing that reason which constitutes his Being; because the advantages he has over other Men, oblige him to preserve, whatever relates to the Nature, and to the End, which he whom he derives his Elevation from proposed to himself.  
It follows clearly from those two Principles, that if Man is Sovereignly reasonable, it is his Duty to give Reason an absolute Empire; which does not only require his doing nothing without her, but obliges him moreover to use his best endeavours to oblige those who are under his Authority to reverence and follow it religiously.  
This Consequence is the Source of another, which teaches us, that as we ought never to will any thing, but what is just and reasonable, so we must never will any thing, without putting it in execution, and without exacting an entire Obedience to our commands; since otherwise Reason would not reign sovereignly.  
The Practice of that Rule is the easier in that Love is the most powerful Motive to oblige Men to obey, and that it is impossible for Subjects not to love a Prince, when they are sensible that Reason is the Guide of all his Actions.  
Authority constrains to obey, but reason persuades to it, and it is much safer to guide Men by Ways which insensibly engage their Will than by such, which for the most part only prevail by force.  
If it be true, that Reason ought to be the Light to guide Princes in their own Conduct, and in the management of their States, it is also true, that as nothing in Nature is more inconsistent with it than passion, which blinds Men to that degree, that it often makes them mistake the Shadow for the Body; a Prince must above all things avoid to act by such a Principle, which would render him the more odious, in that it is directly opposite to that which distinguishes Men from Animals.  
Men often repent at leisure what Passion has induced them to do in haste, and we never run that risk when we act by reasonable Considerations.  
We must be positive on what we resolve by such Motives, since it is the only way to be obeyed, and that as humility is the first Foundation of Christian Perfection, Obedience is the most solid ground of subjection, and so necessary towards the welfare of States, that they can never flourish while it is defective.  
Many things are of this Nature, that there is no difference between the Will and the Performance, by reason of the facility we meet in the execution; but we must will them to the purpose, that is, with so much firmness as never to desist from them, severely chastising those who shall refuse to obey, after having commanded them to put them in execution.  
Those that appear most difficult and almost impossible are only so upon the account of the difference, wherewith we seem to will and to command them; and it is most certain that Subjects will always be religious in obeying, while Princes are steady and persevering in their Commands; from whence it follows that it is most certain, that their Indifference and Weakness is the Cause of it.  
In a word as to will a thing positively, and to do what one has a mind to, is one and the s●me thing in a lawful Prince; so to will weakly, and not to will, are things so different from 'em, that they tend to the same End.  
The Government of a Kingdom requires a manly Virtue and an unmoveable steadiness, contrary to the Irresolution, which exposes those who are governed by it, to the Enterprises of the it Enemies.  
Men must behave themselves in all things with Vigour, principally seeing that though Success should not answer our expectation, at least we will have this advantage, that having omitted nothing in order to make it succeed, we will avoid the shame, when we cannot avoid the misfortune of an ill Event.  
Tho Men should absolutely miscarry in performing their Duty, the Disgrace would be happy; and on the contrary what ever Success a Man could have, in deviating from that which he is obliged to out of Honour and Conscience, he ought to be esteemed unhappy, since he can gain nothing thereby to equal the disadvantages he receives by the means wherewith it has been procured.  
Heretofore, most of the great designs of France have miscarried, because the first difficulty that opposed the putting of them in execution, put a stop to the Proceed of those who in reason ought nevertheless to have prosecuted them; and if it has proved otherwise during your Majesty's Reign, it is to be imputed to your Perseverance.  
When a Time proves improper for the execution of a good design, we must expect another, and when we have once set our hands at work, if the difficulties we meet with oblige us to any suspension reason instructs us to resume our first designs, as soon as time and occasion prove more favourable.  
In a word, nothing ought to divert us from a good Enterprise, unless some Accident happen, which renders it altogether impossible, and we must omit nothing to further the Execution of those we undertake with Reason.  
That obliges me to mention Secrecy and good Discipline in this Place, which are so essential towards the good Success of Affairs that nothing can be more.  
Besides that Experience justifies it, the reason of it is evident, seeing that whatever surprises, commonly astonishes somuch that it often deprives Men of the means to oppose it, and that the prosecuting the Execution of a design slowly, and the divulging of it, is just like the Speaking of a thing not to do it.  
This is the reason, that Women who are naturally lazy and have not the gift of Secrecy, are so unfit for Government, and if we consider moreover, that they are very subject to their Passions, and consequently little capable of Reason and of Justice, that Principle will exclude them from all public Administrations.  
Not but some might be found so free of those defects that they might be admitted to it.  
There are but few Rules without Exceptions; This very Age has produced some which can never be sufficiently commended; but yet commonly their natural Weakness renders them Incapable of masculine Virtue, so necessary for Administration, that it is almost Impossible for their Government to be free either of Lowness or of Diminution, which the Weakness of their Sex is the Cause of: or of Injustice, or Cruelty, which the unruliness of their Passions is the True Source of.   

CHAP. III. Which shows that Public Interest should be the only End of those who govern States, or at least that it ought to be perferr'd to particular Advantages.  
PUblic Interest ought to be the only Aim of the Prince, and of his Councelors, or at least both aught to have so singular a respect for it, as to prefer it to all particular advantages.  
It is Impossible to conceive the good a Prince, and those he Employs in his Affairs are Capable of doing in following this Principle Religiously, neither can any one Imagine the Miseries a State is liable to; when Private Interest is preferred to Public good: And that the last is regulated by the first.  
True Philosophy, the Christian Law, and Policy give such lively demonstrations of this Truth, that the Councillors of a Prince can never sufficiently make him sensible of the necessity of this Principle, nor the Prince be too severe in the Chastisement of such members of his Council, as are so wretched as not to put it in Practice.  
I must needs observe on this Subject, that the prosperity which has constantly accompanied Spain, for some Ages last passed; is wholly to be imputed to the Care of their Council, to prefer the Interest of the State to all others, and that most of the Misfortunes which have befallen France, have been occasioned by the application which many of those, who have been employed in the Administration, have had to their private Interest to the prejudice of the Public.  
The first have all along followed Public Interest which by the force of its Nature, has inclined them to do that which was most advantageous to the State.  
The others suiting all things to their Private Interest or Capricio, have often diverted it from its own end, to apply it to that which was most agreeable or most advantageous to them.  
Neither Death nor the Alteration of Ministers have ever occasioned any Mutation in the Council of Spain. But it has been otherwise in this Kingdom, in which Affairs have not only been altered by the removal of Councillors, but they have taken such variety of Forms under the same Persons, by the variety of their Councils, that such a Proceeding had undoubtedly ruined this Monarchy, did not God out of his infinite Goodness extract out of the Imperfections of this Nation, the Remedy of the Evils it creates. Tho the diversity of our Interests and our Natural Inconstancy incline us often to dangerous Prejudices, the same Levity does not permit us to remain firm and constant even in those things which are for our good, and turns our mind with so much swiftness that our Enemies not being capable to take just measures upon such frequent Varieties, have not time enough to improve our faults to their advantage.  
The Proceeding of your Council being altered of late, your Affairs have also taken a new face to the great advantage of your Kingdom; and if your Successors take care to follow the Example of your Majesty's Reign, our Neighbours will not have the advantages they have had for the time past: But this Kingdom sharing Wisdom with them, will undoubtedly share their good Fortune, since that notwithstanding Men may be wise without being happy, the best means we can use not to be unhappy is to tread the Path which Prudence and Reason direct us to, and not to follow the Irregularities to which the Minds of Men are subject, and particularly the French.  
If those to whom your Majesty will confide the Care of your Affairs, have the capacity and probity above mentioned, you will have no further care in what relates to this Principle, which of itself will not prove difficult, since the particular Interest of a Prince's reputation and those of the Public have the same End.  
Princes easily consent to the general Regulations of their States, by reason that in making them, they follow the dictates of Reason and of Justice, which Men easily embrace when they meet no Obstacles to lead them out of the right way. But when occasion offers itself to practise the good Settlements they have made, they do not always show the same steadiness, because that is the time when divers Interests, Piety, Compassion, Favour and Importunities solicit them and oppose their good Intentions, and that they have not always force enough to vanquish themselves, and to despise particular Considerations which ought to be of no weight in respect to those of the Public.  
It is on those occasions it behoves them to muster up all their Force against their Weakness, considering that those whom God appoints to preserve others, must have none but such as may serve to discover what is advantageous for the Public, and proper for their Preservation.   

CHAP. IU. How much Foresight is necessary for the Goverument of a State.  
NOthing can be more necessary for the Government of a State than Foresight, since thereby we may easily prevent many things, which cannot be redressed without great difficulties when they are come to pass.  
Thus a Physician who has the skill to prevent Distempers, is more esteemed than he who only labours to cure them. Therefore it is the Duty of Ministers of State to represent to their Master, that it is more necessary to consider the future than the present; and that Distempers are like the Enemies of a State against whom Prudence obliges us to march rather than tarry till they are come to drive them out again.  
Those who do not follow this Method will fall into great Confusions, which it will be very difficult to remedy afterwards.  
Yet it is a common thing among weak Men to drive off time, and to choose the preserving of their Ease for a Month rather than to deprive themselves of it for a while, to avoid the trouble of many Years which they do not consider, because they only see what is present, and do not anticipate time by a wise Providence.  
Those who never consider to morrow live happily for themselves, but others live unhappily under them.  
Those who foresee at a distance, never do any thing rashly, since they consider betimes, and Men seldom miscarry when they consider before hand.  
There are some occasions on which we are not allowed to deliberate long, because the nature of Affairs does not permit it. But when they are not of that kind, the safest way is to slumber over them and to recompense by the prudence of the Execution, the delay we use the better to digest it.  
There was a time in which no Orders were given in this Kingdom by way of prevention, and even after the evil was come to pass, none but Palliating Remedies were applied to it, because it was impossible to proceed absolutely against it, without wounding the Interest of many particular persons, which was then preferred to public good. For which reason they only endeavoured to ease the wound, instead of curing it, which has caused a great deal of harm in this Kingdom.  
Of late years, thanks be to God, this way of proceeding has been altered with so much success, that besides Reasons inviting us to continue the same, the great benefit we have received by it, obliges us strictly so to do.  
We must sleep like the Lion, without closing our Eyes, which must be continually kept open, to foresee the least inconveniencies which may happen; and to remember that as Phtysick does not move the Pulse, tho' it is mortal: So it often happens in States, that those evils which are imperceptible in their Original, and which we are least sensible of, are the most dangerous, and those which finally prove of most consequence.  
The extraordinary care which is required not to be surprised on such occasions, is the reason that as all those States have always been esteemed very happy which were Governed by Wise Men; so it has been thought, that among those who did Govern them, the most unwise were the most happy.  
The more capable a Man is, the more he is sensible of the weight of the Government that lies upon him.  
Public Administration takes up all the thoughts of the most Judicious, insomuch, that the perpetual Meditations they are obliged to make to foresee and prevent the Evils that may happen, deprives them of all manner of Rest, and Contentment, excepting that which they receive in seeing many sleep quietly relying on their Watch, and live happy by their misery.  
As it is very necessary to consider before hand, as much as is possible, what success may attend the designs we undertake in order not to be mistaken in our reckoning. The Wisdom and Sight of Men having bounds beyond which they can see nothing, God only being able to see the ultimate end of things; it often suffices to know that the Projects we form are Just and Possible, to undertake them with Reason.  
God concurs to all the Actions of Men by a general Co-operation which seconds their designs, and it is their part to use their freedom in all things, according to the Prudence Divine Wisdom has endued them with.  
But when Men are engaged in great undertake which concern the Conduct of Mankind after having discharged the obligation they are under to open their Eyes doubly, the better to take their measures; after having made use of all the considerations Human Minds are capable of, it is their Duty to rely upon the goodness of the Spirit of God, which sometimes inspiring those thoughts into Men which are set down in his Eternal Decrees, leads them, as it were, by the Hand to their proper ends.   

CHAP. V Punishment and Reward are two Points absolutely necessary for the Conduct of States.  
IT is a common but a very true saying, which has ever been in the Mouths and Minds of Men, that Punishments and Rewards are the two most considerable points for the Conduct of a Kingdom.  
It is most certain, that tho' no other Principle be used in the Government of States, but that of being inflexible in Chastising those who act against them, and Religious in rewarding those who procure them any notable advantage. They cannot be Governed amiss, since all Men may be kept within the bounds of their Duty, either by Fear or Hope.  
I place Punishment before Reward, because that if there were a necessity to be deprived of one of them, one might better dispense with the last than the first.  
As good is to be embraced for its own sake, there is no Reward due to those who perform it, taking it in the strictest Sense. But as there is no crime which does not violate that, to which Men are obliged, there are none but what require the Punishment which is due to disobedience, and that obligation is so strict, that in many occasions a fault cannot be left unpunished, without committing a new one.  
I speak of faults which affect the State, and are committed with premeditation, and not of many others, which happen by chance and by misfortune, for which Princes may and aught to use Indulgence.  
Tho' to Pardon in such cases is a laudable thing; not to Punish a considerable Fault, the impunity of which opens a door to Licentiousness, is a criminal omision.  
Theologians allow it as well as Politicians, and all agree that on certain occasions in which the Prince would be to blame not to Pardon those who are entrusted with the Government of the Public, they would also be inexcusable, if instead of a severe Punishment, they should use Lenity.  
Experience teaching those who have had a long practice of the World, that Men easily lose the remembrance of Favours, and that when they are loaden with them, the desire of increasing them often makes them Ambitious and Ingrateful together, shows us also that Punishment is a more certain way to keep Men within the bounds of their Duty; since they are not so soon forgotten, by reason that they make a stronger impression on the senses of most Men than Reason, which has but little power over many.  
To be severe towards Private Men who make it their Pride to despise the Laws and Ordinances of a State, is to be kind to the Public. And the greatest crime one can be guilty of against the Interest of the Public, is to be indulgent towards those who violate them.  
Among many Combinations, Factions and Seditions that have been made in my time in this Kingdom, I have never observed that Impunity ever inclined any one naturally to correct his evil Inclination. But on the contrary that they returned to their old Vomit, and often with more success the second than the first time.  
The Indulgency hitherto practised in this Kingdom has often reduced it to very great and very deplorable Exremities.  
Faults not being Punished, every Man has made a Trade of his Place, and without regarding what he was obliged to do to discharge his Trust worthily, he only considered what he could do to get the more by it.  
If the Ancients have been of opinion, that it was dangerous to live under a Prince, who will remit nothing of the Rigour of Right, they have also observed that it was more dangerous to live in a State in which Impunity opens a door to all sorts of Licentiousness.  
Some Princes or Magistrates will be afraid of being faulty by too much Rigour, who would be accountable to God, and must needs be blamed by all Wise Men, unless they exerted that, which is prescribed by the Laws.  
I have often represented it to your, Majesty and it is my humble Petition still that you would be pleased to remember it carefully, by reason that as there are Princes who want to be persuaded from Severity, to avoid Cruelty, to which they are naturally inclined, your Majesty wants to be diverted from a false Clemency, more dangerous than Cruelty itself, since Impunity obliges to use a great deal in the end, which can only be prevented by Punishment.  
The Rod which is the Emblem of Justice must never be useless; I own at the same time that it ought not be so much accompanied with Rigour, as to be destitute of Goodness; but that last qualification does not consist in the Indulgency which authorises disorders, which though never so inconsiderable, are often so prejudicial to the State, that they may prove its ruin.  
If any are so ill advised in this Kingdom as to condemn the severity which is necessary in States, because it has not been practised hitherto, let them only open their Eyes, and they will find that Impunity has been too common in it hitherto, and the only cause, that Order and Rule have not been observed, and that the Continuation of Disorders obliges to have recourse to the utmost Extremities, to put a stop to them.  
The only Source of all the Parties that have been formed heretofore against Kings, has been their over much Indulgence. Finally, those who are acquainted with our History, cannot be ignorant of this Truth, of which I produce a Testimony which is the less to be suspected, in this case because it is taken from the Mouth of our Enemies, which almost in all other occasions would make it suspicious.  
Cardinal Sapata a Man of good Sense, meeting Baraut and Bautru in the King his Master's Antichamber, a quarter of an hour after their having received the News of the Duke de Montmorency's Execution, put this question to them; Which was the chief cause of that Duke's death? Hautru answered immediately according to his flery temper, in Spanish; Sus falsa●. No, replied the Cardinal: Pero la Clemensia de lors, Royes antepassadoes: which was as much as to say, that the Punishment of the said Duke was more to be imputed to the faults the King's Predecessors had committed, than to his own.  
In Crimes of State, it is absolutely necessary to banish Pity, and to despise the Complaints of persons concerned, and the discourse of an ignorant Multitude, who sometimes blame what is most useful to them, and often absolutely necessary.  
Christian's ought to bury the remembrance of private Injuries; but Magistrates are obliged not to forget those which concern the Public; add indeed to leave them unpunished, is rather to begin them anew, than to pardon and remit them.  
There are many whose ignorance is so stupid as to imagine that a new Prohibition is a sufficient remedy to any Evil, but they are so much in the wrong, that I may affirm with Truth, that new Laws are not so much a remedy for the disorders of States, as Testimonies of their Illness, and certain proofs of the weakness of the Government; by reason that had th' ancient Laws been put in execution; there would be no necessity to revive them, nor to make others to prevent new disorders, which would not sooner have appeared, but it would have been easy to punish the evil committed.  
Ordinances and Laws are altogether useless unless they are put in execution, which is so absolutely necessary, that notwithstanding in the course of Common Affairs, Justice requires an authentic proof, it is not so with those which concern the State; in such cases, that which appears by pressing conjectures must sometimes be held as a sufficient conviction, seeing that the Factions and Conspiracies that are formed against public safety, are commonly carried on with so much Art and Secrecy, that we have seldom any evident proof of them, but by the event, which is past remedy.  
In those cases it is sometimes necessary to begin by Execution, whereas in all others, proving the Fact evidently either by Witnesses or undeniable Authorities ought to precede every thing.  
Those Maxims seem to be dangerous, and indeed they are not altogether void of peril, but they will most certainly be found good, if not making use of the last, and extreme remedies, in faults which will only be verified by conjectures, the course of them is barely prevented by innocent means, as the Banishment or Imprisonment of suspected persons.  
The good Conscience, and the penetrate of a judicious Mind, who being learned in the course of Affairs, is able to know the future almost with as much certainty as the present, as well as a meaner capacity, by the very sight of things, will secure that Practice from ill consequences; and at the worst, the abuse that can be committed in it being only dangerous for private Persons, whose life will not be in danger this way, it ought not to be rejected, since their Interest is not to be compared to that of the Public.  
Yet it requires a great deal of Prudence not to make it an Inlet to Tyranny, which will be avoided undoubtedly, if, as I have said, in doubtful cases, none but Innocent remedies are practised.  
Punishment is so necessary in what relates to Public Interest, that we are not so much as allowed to commit faults of Indulgence in this kind, recompensing a present evil, for a past good; that is to leave a crime unpunished, because the person that has committed it, has done good service on other occasions.  
Nevertheless this has hitherto been often practised in this Kingdom, in which not only light faults have been forgotten, in consideration of important services; but the greatest Crimes abolished, by services of no moment, which is altogether insupportable.  
Good and Evil are so different in their Nature, that they can never be put in Parallel one with another; they are Enemies, among which there is no Quarter to be given, nor Exchange to be made; if the one is worthy of Reward, the other deserves Punishment, and both aught to be used according to their Merit.  
Although Conscience would allow the leaving of a signal Action unrewarded, and a notable Crime without Punishment, Reasons of State could not allow it.  
Punishment and Rewards relate to the future more than to the time past; a Prince must be severe of necessity, to prevent the mischiefs that might be committed, in hopes of a Pardon, if he were known to be too Indulgent; and very kind to those that are of use to the Public, to encourage them to continue their Endeavours, and every body to imitate them and follow their example.  
There would be a great deal of pleasure in pardoning Crimes, if the Impunity of the same had no ill consequence; and the necessities of the State would sometimes lawfully excuse a Prince from Rewarding a Service, if in depriving him, who has done it, of his Reward, he did not at the same time deprive himself of the hopes of receiving others for the future.  
Noble Souls taking as much pleasure in good, as they are loath to do harm, I quit the discourse of Punishments and Executions, to conclude this Chapter agreeably, by Favours and Rewards; whereupon I must needs observe, that there is this difference between the Favours which are bestowed as a Reward of Service, and those that have no other foundation than the inclination of Kings, that these aught to be greatly moderated, whereas the others ought to have no other bounds than those of the Services they have done the Public.  
The Good of States does so absolutely require that their Princes should be Liberal, that when at any time it is come into my mind, that there are Men, who out of a natural propensity are not inclined to do good; I have always concluded, that this natural defect, blamable in all Men, is a far greater imperfection in Sovereigns, who being in a more peculiar manner the Image of their Creator, who by his Nature does good to all the World, cannot fail of imitating him in that point, without being answerable for the same before him.  
The Reason of it is, That it is his pleasure they should follow his example, and bestow their Favours handsomely; for those who oblige without that condition, are like the Misers, who serve good Meat in their Treats, but so ill dressed, that those who are invited to them, e'er them without any pleasure, and without thinking themselves beholden to those that have been at the charge of it.  
I would enlarge more upon this Subject, if I had not done it already in one of the preceding Chapters, representing the necessity of Princes being kind to those of their Council, who serve them faithfully.   

CHAP. VI A Continual Negotiation contributes much towards the good Success of Affairs.  
State's receive such advantages by continual Negotiations, when they are managed with Prudence, that it is almost incredible to any but those who have had the Experience of it.  
I own that I had been employed five or six years in the management of Affairs before I discovered this Truth: But I am so certain of it at present, that I dare affirm boldly, that to Nagotiate continually, openly, or secretly, in all Places, although no present benefit be received by it, and but little Prospect for the Future, is a thing absolutely Necessary for the good of States.  
I may say with Truth, that in my Time, I have seen the Affairs of France and of Christendom quite altered, by having put that Principle into Practice, by the King's Authority, which till then had been absolutely neglected in this Kingdom.  
Among the Seeds of them some produce Fruit sooner than others; some are no sooner in the Ground but they sprout while others are a long while without producing the same Effect.  
He who Negotiates finally finds out a proper moment to compass his Ends; and though he should not find it, at least, it is certain, that he can lose nothing, and that by the means of his Negotiation, he is informed with what passes in the World, which is a thing of no small Consequence for the good of States.  
Negotiations are Innocent remedies, which never do any harm; it is necessary to Act every where, far and near, and particularly at Rome.  
Among the good Councils, which Anthony Perez gave the late King, he advised him to make himself powerful in that Court, and not without reason, since the Ambassadors of all the Princes in Christendom, who repair there, judge that those who have most Credit and Authority in that Court, are in reality those who have most Power in themselves, and most Fortune; and indeed their Judgement is not ill grounded, since it is certain, that though Popes ought to respect Reason above all other Men, yet there is no Place in the World in which Power is more considered than in their Court, which is so evidently true, that the Respect which is paid to Ambassadors there, increases or diminishes daily according to the good or ill State of their Master's affairs, from whence it often comes to pass that those Ministers receive two different Faces in one day, if a Courier who comes at night brings different News from those that came in the Morning.  
It is with States as it is with Human Bodies, the fresh Colour which appears in our Faces, makes the Physician conclude that all is well within, and as that good Complexion proceeds from the good Disposition of the Noble and Internal Parts, so it is certain that the best way a Prince can put in Practice, to be in favour at Rome, is to settle his Affairs well at home, and that it is almost impossible to have a great reputation in that City, which has been long the Head, and is the Centre of the World, without having the same throughout the Universe, to the great advantage of public Interest.  
Natural Reason teaches us, that we ought to have a great regard for our Neighbours, by reason that as their Neighbourhood gives them an opportunity to annoy, it also puts them in a condition to serve as the Outworks of a Place, which hinder the Immediate Approach of the Walls.  
Persons of mean capacity limit their thoughts within the extent of the States in which they are born, but those to whom God has been pleased to give more knowledge, learning from Physicians, that in the greatest Distempers Revolutions are made with most Violence in the most distant Parts, they use their best Endeavours to fortify themselves at a distance.  
It is necessary to act in all Places (which is to be observed) according to the humour and by suitable means to the capacity of those with whom we negotiate.  
Different Nations have different Ways, some speedily conclude what they design to do, and others are very slow.  
Republics are of the last kind, they proceed slowly, and commonly they do not at first grant what is desired of them, but one must be satisfied with little in order to obtain more.  
As great Bodies do not move so easily as small ones, those kind of States being composed of several heads, they are much slower in their Resolutions and in their Executions than others.  
And for that reason, Prudence obliges those who negotiate with them to give them time, and to press them no more than their natural Constitution permits.  
It is observable, that as strong and solid Reasons are excellent for Men of vast Genius, weak ones are better for Men of meaner Capacitys, because they are more suitable to their reach.  
Men conceive Affairs according to their capacity, the greatest seem easy and small to Men of good Understanding and great Courage, and those who want these qualifications commonly find every thing difficult.  
Such Men are incapable of apprehending the Weight of what is proposed to them, and sometimes slight what is most considerable, and also often set a great stress on things which deserve no consideration.  
It is necessary to act with every Man according to his Capacity: On some Occasions to Act and to speak, courageously, when we have right on our side, is so far from making a Breach, that on the contrary, it is rather the way to prevent and to slifle it in its Birth.  
In others, instead of resenting unseasonably, certain imprudent Expressions spoken by those we treat with, we must suffer them with Prudence and Address together, and have only. Ears for those things which may conduce to our Ends.  
There are Men who are so presumptuous, as to think they ought to show their Bravery on all occasions, hoping thereby to obtain what they cannot get by reason, and what they cannot constrain People to do by force.  
They think they have done harm by threatening it; but besides, that this proceeding is contrary to reason, it never succeeds with Persons of Honor.  
As Fools are not fit to negotiate, there are Minds so very nice and refined, that they are as unfit for it as they, by reason that subtilizing upon every thing they are like those who break the Points of Needles in whetting them.  
The most proper Men are those who keep a Medium between those two extremes, and the most subtle making use of their Wit, to avoid being deceived, must take care at the same time not to use it to deceive those they treat with.  
Men are always diffident of those that act craftily, and give an ill Impression of the frankness and fidelity they ought to behave themselves with; That never advances their Affairs.  
The same Words have often two Senses, the one depends on the Sincerity and Ingenuity of Men, the other on Art and Subtlety by which it is very easy to turn the true Signification of a Word to voluntary Explications.  
Great Negotiations must not have one Moment's Intermission, it is necessary to pursue what we undertake with a perpetual chain of designs, never ceasing to act, unless with Reason, and not by a Relaxation of Mind, Indifference, wavering thoughts and contrary resolution.  
Neither must Men be disgusted by an ill Event, since it often comes to pass, that what is undertaken with most Reason, succeeds with least happiness.  
It is difficult to combat often, and always to be Conqueror, and it is a Sign of an extraordinary Blessing when Success is favourable in great Undertake, and only contrary in those that are of little Moment.  
It is enough that Negotiations are so harmless, that one may receive considerable advantage by them, and never any harm.  
If any body urges, that some of them prove prejudicial sometimes, I give him leave to reject my Judgement, if he does not find, in case he will open his Eyes, that instead of having any reason to impute the ill success he has observed in the Remedy I propose, they are only to be imputed to those who did not know how to make a good use of it.  
Tho it should produce no other advantage than to gain Time on certain occasions, which happens commonly, the practice of it would be very commendable and useful in States, since a moment often serves to avoid a Storm.  
Notwithstanding the Alliances, which are often contracted by Marriages between Crowns, do not always produce the Effect that might be desired, yet they must not be neglected; and they often prove the most Important matters of Negotiations.  
They always produce this advantage, that they retain States for some Time in some considerations of Respect one towards another; and to have a Value for them, it is sufficient that they prove sometimes advantageous.  
As the way to get good Fruit is to Graft; the Princes of France, who derive their Birth from Parents of Equal and high Quality, must in Reason be more elevated, and without doubt, their Blood remains the more Illustrious, in being less mixed with other.  
Moreover Alliances serve sometimes to extinguish Leagues and Engagements among Princes, and though they do not always produce that good Effect, the advantages the house of Austria derives by them, shows that they are not to be neglected.  
In matters of State, all things must be improved, and what may be useful, must never be despised.  
Leagues are of that kind, the Benefit of them is often very uncertain, and yet they must be respected: However I would not advise a great Prince, to engage himself voluntarily, upon the account of a League in a design of difficult Execution, unless he finds himself powerful enough to make it succeed although his Colleagues should fail him.  
Two Reasons oblige me to advance this Proposition.  
The first draws its Original and Force from the Weakness of Unions, which are never very certain among divers Sovereign Heads.  
The second consists in that Petty Princes are often as careful and diligent, to Engage great Kings into great Enterprises, as they are slow in seconding them, notwithstanding they are strictly obliged so to do, and that there are some, who save their own stake, at the cost of those they have engaged against their Will.  
Although it is a common Saying, that whoever has Force, has commonly Reason, it is true never theless, that two unequal Powers being joined by a Troary, the greatest is in danger of being forsaken by the other; the reason of it is Evident. Reputation is a thing of so much Importance to a great Prince, that no advantage can be proposed to him, to recompense the loss he would suffer by it, in case he should forfeit the Engagements of his Word and Faith: And such Terms may be offered to him, whose Power is Inconsiderable, though his Quality is Sovereign; that according to all Probability he will prefer his advantage to his Honour, which will make him fail in his Obligation towards him who, foreseeing his Infidelity, cannot resolve to prevent it; by reason that to be abandoned by his Allies, is not of somuch Consequence to him, as the prejudice he would receive in violating his Faith.  
King's must take a great deal of Care what Treaties they make; but when they are made they must keep them Religiously.  
I am sensible that many Politicians teach the Contrary; but without considering in this Place what the Christian Faith affords us against those Maxims; I maintain, that since the loss of Honour is greater than the loss of Lise, a great Prince should sooner venture his Life, and even the Interest of his State, than to break his Word, which he can never violate without loseing his Reputation, and consequently the greatest Force of Sovereigns.  
The importance of this Place makes me observe, that it is absolutely necessary to be exact in the Choice of Ambassadors, and other Negotiators; and that a Prince can never be ●●o severe in punishing those who exceed their Commissions; since by those Faults, they expose the Reputation of Princes, and the Well far of the Commonwealth at once.  
The easiness, or corruption of some Persons, is sometimes so great, and the desire of others, who are neither so weak nor so wicked, to do something is often so extraordinary, that if they are not kept within the bounds which are prescribed them, out of fear of absolute Ruin, there will always be a greater Number of those who will be drawn in to make ill Treatys, than to make none at all.  
I have had so much Experience of this Truth, that it forces me to end this Chapter, saying, That whoever shall not be Rigorous in those Occasions, will be wanting in what is necessary to the subsistence of States.   

CHAP. VII. One of the greatest Advantages, that can be procured to a State, is to give every one an Employment suitable to his Genius and Capacity.  
SUCH Misfortunes befall States through the Incapacity of those that are Employed in the principal Places and most important Commissions, that the Prince, and those who have a share in the Administration of Affairs, can never be too careful to employ none but such as are fit for the Places they are designed for.  
The most clear sighted being sometimes blind, and there being but few Men, who are willing to impose Bounds to themselves, according to the Rules of Reason; Those who are in credit about Princes always think themselves worthy of all sorts of Employments, and upon that false Foundation, they use their utmost Endeavours to obtain them.  
Nevertheless it is certain, that a Man who is capable to serve the Public in certain Functions, may be capable to ruin it in another.  
I have seen such strange Inconveniences proceeding from the ill choice that have been made in my time, that I cannot forbear exclaiming upon that Subject to avoid the like for the future.  
If Physicians will not suffer Experiments to be made on Persons of any consideration, it is easy to conceive how dangerous it must be to put unexperienced Persons in Places of the greatest Trust, since thereby you give way to Learners to make Essays on occasions, in which Masters and Master pieces are so necessary.  
Nothing can be more capable to ruin a State than such a Proceeding, the true source of all sorts of disorder.  
An Ambassador ill chosen to make a Treaty may cause a notable prejudice out of Ignorance.  
A General of an Army incapable of such an Employment is capable of hazarding all his Master's Fortune, and the happiness of the State unseasonably.  
I dare say on the contrary, That if all those who are employed in Public Trusts were worthy of them, State's would not only be exempted from many accidents, which often trouble their quiet, but they would enjoy unexpressible Felicities.  
I am sensible that it is very difficult to meet Subjects, which have all the Qualifications required for the Places they are designed for; but at least they must have the Chief, and when none that are accomplished can be found, it is no small satisfaction to choose the best that can be found in a barren Age.  
If the mask most Men put on, and if the Artifices they usually practise to disguise themselves, and to conceal their Defects, deceive us, insomuch that being once settled in great Places, they appear as malicious as they were esteemed full of Virtue when they were chosen; the said mistake must be rectified immediately, and though Indulgence may induce to Tolerate some small Incapacity, it must never excuse malice which is so to prejudicial to States, to be Tolerated in consideration of Private Interest.  
It is on this Occasion our Duty obliges us to represent freely to Princes, to what degree they are answerable before God, when they give Places of great Trust out of pure favour, which can never be possessed by mean Capacitys, without prejudice to the State.  
It is on the said Occasion, we are obliged to show, that though we do not absolutely Condemn particular Affections, which have no other foundation but that natural Inclination, which Men have rather for one Person than for another; we cannot excuse Princes who suffer themselves to be prevailed upon so far, as to give those, they Love thus, Places, in the administration of which they show themselves as prejudicial to the State, as useful to themselves.  
Those who have the happiness to Enjoy the favour of Princes, by the force of their Inclination, must not be deprived of receiving Advantages from them, though they have not all the Qualifications required to make them worthy of the same, and the Public can not complain of it with Reason, unless they are Immoderate.  
But it is a sinister Omen for a Prince, when he, who is the most Considerable for his Interest, is not the most considered by his Favour, and States are never in a worse Condition, than when the Inclinations the Prince has for some particular Persons, prevail before the services of those that are more useful to the Public.  
In such a Case, neither the Esteem of the Sovereign, nor the Affection one has for him, nor the hope of reward do any longer excite Virtue. Men remain on the contrary in an Indifference of Good and Evil, and Envy, and jealousy, or Spite, Induce all Men to neglect their Duty, because that in performing it, they have no prospect of reward.  
A Prince, who desires to be beloved by his Subjects, must fill up all the Places of Trust, and the first Dignitys of his State, with Persons so much esteemed by every one, that the Cause of his Choice may be found in their merit.  
Such Men must be carefully sought after throughout the State, and not received by importunities, or chosen in the Crowd of those who press most about Kings, and about their Favourites.  
If Favour has no hand in Elections, and Merit be the Sole foundation of them, besides that the State will be well served, Princes will avoid a great deal of Ingratitude, which is often met with in certain Men who are the less grateful for the favours they receive, in that they least deserve them: It being most certain, that the same Qualifications, which render Men worthy of favours, are the same which make them Capable and desirous to acknowledge them.  
Many have good sentiments in the moment you Oblige them, but the Constitution of their Nature sways them soon after, and they easily forget what they own others, because they only love themselves; and as Fire converts all things into its own substance, they only consider Public Interests, to convert them to their one advantage, and equally despise those who do them Good, and the States in which they receive it.  
Favour may innocently be allowed in some things; but a Kingdom is in a sad Case, when the Throne of that false Goddess is raised above Reason.  
Merit should always turn the Scale, and when Justice is on our side, favour cannot prevail without Injustice.  
Favourites are the more dangerous, in that those who are raised by Fortune seldom consult Reason; and whereas it seldom favours their designs, it proves commonly Ineffectual to stop the Course of those they form to the prejudice of the State.  
In my opinion nothing is more likely to Ruin the most flourishing Kingdom in the World, than the Appetite of such Men, or the inordinate Passions of a Woman, when a Prince is possessed by them.  
I am the bolder in advancing this Proposition, because there are no Remedies against those Evils, but such as depend altogether on Chance and Time; which often suffering the Sick to die, without any assistance, must be looked upon as the worst Physician in the World.  
As the greatest Light in Nature cannot make the blind perceive one glimpse of their way, so there is no Ray capable to unseal the Eyes of a Prince, when they are sealed by Favour and Passion.  
Those whose Eyes are blinded, can never make good Choices unless by Chance, and therefore since the welfare of the State requires them ever to be made with Reason, it also requires that Princes should not be possessed by Persons who deprive them of the Light, they stand in need of to see the Objects, which are put before their Eyes.  
When the Hearts of Princes are engaged by such means, it is almost Useless to do well; because the Craft of those who are in possession of their Affections, tarnish the lustre of the purest Actions, and make the most signal Services pass for Offences.  
Many Princes have undone themselves, by preferring their particular Affection to Public Interest.  
Such misfortunes have befallen some, by the unruly Passions they have had for Women.  
Some are fallen into the like Inconveniences, by such a simple blind Passion they have had for their Favourites, that in order to raise their Fortune, they have ruined their own.  
There have been others, who having no natural Inclination for any thing, have nevertheless been swayed with so much Violence in favour of some particular Persons, that they have occasioned their Ruin.  
Men perhaps will wonder at this Proposition, which is nevertheless as True, as it is easy to be conceived; and if Men consider, that such Motions are distempers to the Minds that are influenced by them, and that as the Cause of Fevers is the Corruption of Humours; one may also say, That those sorts of Violent Affections, are rather Grounded on the defect of the Person in which we find them, than on the Merit of those who receive the Eflect, and Advantage of them.  
Such Evils commonly carry their Remedy along with them, in that being Violent they are not lasting; but when they continue they often occasion Death, as well as the Fevers of that Kind; or a want of health, which is seldom repaired afterwards.  
The wisest Princes have avoided those divers kinds of Evils, in making Reason the guide of all their Affections.  
Many have cured themselves of them, after having found to their Cost, that unless they did it, their Ruin was Inevitable.  
To return precisely to the Point of the Question proposed in this Chapter, the scope of which is to show how Important it is to discern those who are the fittest for Employments; I will conclude it, saying, That since Interest is that which makes Men guilty of Male-adminnistration in the Places that are committed to them: ecclesiastics are often to be preferred to many others, in what relates to Places of great Trust: Not that they are less subject to their own Interest, but because they have a great deal less self Interest than other Men, since that having neither Wives, nor Children, they are free from the Bonds which engage Men most.   

CHAP. VIII. Of the Evil which Flatterers, Detractors, and Intriguers commonly occasion in States, and how necessary it is to remove them from Kings, and to banish them from their Courts.  
THere is no Plague so capable to ruin a State, as Flatterers, Detractors and certain Men, who apply themselves wholly to form Cabals and Intrigues in their Courts.  
They are so industrious to spread their Venom, by divers imperceptible ways, that it is difficult to scape it, without abundance of care.  
As they are neither of a Quality, nor Merit, to have a share in the Management of Affairs, nor good enough to be concerned for the Public Good, their only aim is to disturb both; and expecting great advantages from Confusion, they omit no means to overthrow, by their Flatteries, by their Crafts, and by their Detractions the Order and Rule which deprives them absolutely of all hopes of Fortune, since it is impossible to build any in a well disciplined State, unless it be upon Merit, which they are wholly destitute of.  
Besides that as it is a common thing for those who have no share in Affairs, to endeavour to ruin them, those sort of Men are capable of doing all manner of Evils; and therefore it behoves Princes to take all the precautions imaginable against the malice, which disguises itself in so many different dresses, that it is often difficult to ward it.  
There are some, who notwithstanding they have neither Courage nor Wit, have nevertheless so much of both as to feign as much steadiness, as a profound and severe Wisdom, and to set off themselves, in finding fault with every body's Actions, even when they are most to be commended, and that it is Impossible to do better, in respect of the thing in question.  
Nothing is so easy as to find apparent Reasons, to Condemn what cannot be better done, and what has been undertaken upon such Solid Foundations, that one could not have done otherwise without committing a notable fault.  
Others having neither Mouths nor Spurs, dislike by their Gestures, by shaking of their Heads, and by aserious Grimace, what they dare not Condemn with Words, and cannot be blamed with Reason.  
Not to flatter in what Relates to such Men, It is not enough for the Prince to refuse them his Ear, he must also banish them from the Cabinet, and Court together; because that as their facility is sometimes so great, that to speak to them and to persuade them, is the same thing; even when they cannot be persuaded, there still remains some Impression, which has its Effect another Time, when the same Artifice is renewed: And indeed the Little Application they have to Affairs, induces them often to Judge the Cause, rather by the number of Witnesses, than by the Weight of the accusations.  
I could hardly relate all the Evils, those Evil Councelors have been the Authors of, during your majesty's Reign. But I have so lively a Resentment of it for the Interest of the State, that it forces me to say, That there can be no room for mercy for such Men, in order to prevent the mischiefs that have been done in my Time.  
Tho a Prince be never so Firm and Constant, he cannot without great Imprudence, and without exposing himself to Ruin, keep ill Men about him, who may surprise him unexpectedly, as during a Contagion a Malignant Vapour seizes in an Instant the Heart and Brains of the strongest Men, when they think themselves soundest.  
Those Public Plagues must be removed, never to return, unless they have cast all their Venom, which happens so seldom, that the care we ought to have of repose, obliges more to the Continuation of their Removal, than Charity can Invite to recall them.  
I boldly advance this proposition, because I have never seen any of those Lovers of Factions bred in the Intrigues of the Court, lose their Ill habit, and change their Nature, unless for want of Power, which, properly speaking, does not Change them, since the will of doing Ill remains in them, when the Power has left them.  
I am sensible that some of those Men, may be sincerely converted, but experience teaching me, that for one who persists in his repentance, twenty return to their old Vomit; I decide boldly, That it is better to use Rigour against one Person who deserves favour, than to expose a State to some prejudice by being too Indulgent, either towards those who keep their malice in their Heart, only acknowledging their fault in Letters, or towards those whose levity may give a reason to dread a relapse, worse than their former Evil.  
'Tis no wonder that Angels should never do any Evil, since they are confirmed in Grace; but that those who are obstinate in that kind of Malice should do any good, when they may do harm, is a kind of Miracle, which must be wrought by the immediate Powerful hand of God, and it is certain that a Man of great Probity, will find much more difficulty to subsist in an Age corrupted by such Men, than one whose Virtue they will not stand in dread of this Reputation not being so Entire.  
Some are of Opinion, that it suits with the goodness of Kings to Tolerate things which seem to be of small Consequence in the beginning; but I say, That they can never be too careful to discover and to extinguish the least Intrigues of their Cabinets and of their Courts, in their Birth.  
Great Conflagrations being occasioned by small sparks; who ever puts out one, does not know what mischief he has prevented: but to discover it, if he leaves any one unextinguished, though the same Causes do not always produce the same Effect, he will perhaps find himself reduced to such an Extremity, that it will no longer be in his Power to remedy the same. Whether it be true or no that a little Poison stops a great Vessel, the Course of which it cannot advance of one Moment, it is easy to conceive by what Naturalists relate to us of that Poison, that it is absolutely necessary to purge a State of that which may put a stop to the Course of Affairs, though it can never advance it.  
On such occasions it is not sufficient to remove great Men upon the account of their Power, the same must be done to the meanest, upon the account of their Malice: All are equally dangerous, and if there is any difference, mean Persons, as those that are most concealed, are more to be feared than the others.  
As the bad Air, I have already mentioned, locked up into a Trunk often Infects a House with the Plague, which afterwards spreads throughout the Town, so the Intrigues of Cabinets often fill the Courts of Princes with partialities, which finally disturb the body of the State.  
As I may affirm with Truth, that I have never seen any Troubles in this Kingdom, but what did proceed form thence, I answer once more, that it is more Important than it seems to be, to extinguish not only the first sparks of such Divisions, when they appear, but also to prevent them, by the removal of those who make it their whole business to kindle them.  
The Peace of the State is too Considerable, to neglect that Remedy, without being answerable for it to God.  
I have often seen the Court in the midst of Peace, so full of Factions, for want of practising this good Counsel, that they were very like like to overthrow the State.  
That knowledge, and that which History has given your Majesties of the like Perils, to which many, and particularly the last of your Predecessors, have often been exposed upon the same account, having obliged you to seek out a Remedy, I have seen France so peaceable at home, while she had Wars abroad, that considering the Repose it enjoyed, no body could have thought it was obliged to oppose the greatest Powers.  
Perhaps some may urge that the Factions and Troubles I have mentioned, have been occasioned more by the invention of Women, than by the Malice of Flatterers.  
But that Instance is so far from being against what I have urged, that on the contrary it confirms it powerfully, seeing that in speaking of Flatterers, and the like, I do not design to exclude Women, who are often more dangerous than Men, and to whose sex a World of Charms are annexed, more powerful to Disturb and to embroil Affairs, Courts and States, than the most subtle and industrious Malice of any others whatever.  
It is true, that while the Queens Catherine and Mary de Medicis, had a share in the Government and that many Women being Influenced by them, meddled with the Affairs of the State, many of them very powerful in Sense and Charms, have done a world of Mischief, their Places having acquired them the best Qualified Persons of the Kingdom, and the most Unhappy; they have drawn this advantage by it, that being served by them according to their Passions, they have often prejudiced those who were not in their Favour, because they were useful to the State.  
I might Enlarge upon this Subject, but divers respects stop my Pen, which not being Capable of Flattery, when it condemns openly, cannot forbear observing, That the Favourites I have mentioned in the preceding Chapter, often supply the place of those, whose Malice I have examined in this.  
After those Truths, I have no more to say, but that it is Impossible to secure States against the Evils those sort of Persons may occasion, but by removing them from the Court; which is the more necessary, in that it is Impossible to keep a Snake in ones bosom, without exposing one's self to be stung by it.   

CHAP. IX. Which Treats of the Power of the Prince; and is divided into Eight Sections.  

SECTION. I. The Prince must be Powerful, to be Respected by his Subjects and by strangers.  
POWER being one of the most necessary Ingredients towards the Grandor of Kings, and the prosperity of their Governments; those who have the chief Management of Affairs, are particularly obliged not to omit any thing, which may contribute to Authorize their Master so far as to make all the World Respect him.  
As goodness is the object of Love, Power is the cause of Dread: and it is most certain, that among all the Princes who are capable to Stir a State, Fear grounded upon Esteem and Reverence, has so much Force, that it engages every one to perform his Duty.  
If this Principle is of great Efficacy in respect to the internal Part of States, it is to the full as prevailing abroad: Subjects and Strangers looking with the same Eyes upon a formidable Power, both the one and the other abstain from offending a Prince, whom they are sensible is in a condition to hurt them, if he were so inclined.  
I have observed by the by, that the ground of the Power I am speaking of, must be Esteem and Respect; I add, that it is now a thing so necessary, that when it is grounded upon any other Principle, it is very dangerous; in that case instead of creating a reasonable Fear, it inclines Men to hate Princes, who are never in a worse condition than when it turns to public aversion.  
The Power which induces Men to respect and fear Princes with Love, is of many different kinds; It is a Tree which has five divers Branches, which all draw their nutriment and substance from one and the same Root.  
The Prince must be powerful by his Reputation.  
By a reasonable Army always kept on Foot.  
And by a notable Sum of Money in his Coffers, to supply unexpected exigencies, which often come to pass when they are least expected.  
Finally, by the Possession of his Subjects hearts, as we may easily see.   

SECTION II. The Prince must be powerful by his Reputation; and what is necessary to that End.  
REputation is the more necessary in Princes, in that those we have a good opinion of, do more by their bare words than those who are not esteemed, with Armies.  
They are obliged to value it beyond Life; and they ought sooner to venture their Fortune and Grandeur, than to suffer the least Breach to be made in the same, since it is most certain that the least diminution a Prince receives, though never so slight, is the step which is of most dangerous consequence for his ruin.  
In consideration of which I declare freely, that Princes ought never to esteem any Profit advantageous, when it reflects in the least upon their honour: and they are either blind, or insensible to their true Interests, if they receive any of this nature.  
And indeed History teaches us, that in all Times and in all States, Princes of great reputation are always happier than those, who being inferior to them in that Point, have surpassed them in Force and Riches, and in all other Power.  
As they cannot be too jealous of it, their Counsellors can never be too careful, to cry up the good Qualities they possess.  
Those who will form their Conduct upon the Rules and Principles contained in this present Testament, will undoubtedly acquire a Name which will be of no small weight in the mind of their Subjects and of their Neighbours, particularly if being Religious towards God, they observe the same Rule towards themselves.  
That is, in being true to their word, and faithful to their Promises; conditions which are so absolutely necessary for the reputation of a Prince, that as he who is destitute of them can never be esteemed by any body, so it is impossible for him who does possess them not to be reverenced and credited by all the World.  
I could instance many Examples of this Truth; but as I do not design this Work for a Common Place, easy to be performed by all sorts of Men, who will extract good Books; I will only instance such as are so certain and so clear, that all sensible Persons will find the Proof of them in their own Reason.   

SECTION. III. The Prince must be Powerful by the force of his Frontiers.  
NONE but such as are deprived of common sense, can be unsensible how necessary it is for great States to have their Frontiers well Fortified.  
It is a thing the more necessary in this Kingdom, in that, that though the Levity of our Nation should make it incapable of making great Conquests; their Valour would render them Invincible, in their defence; having considerable Places, so well fortified, and so well provided with all things, that they may be able to show their Courage, without being exposed to suffer great hardships, which are the only Enemies they have to overcome.  
A Frontier well fortified is capable either to discourage Enemies from the designs they might have against a State, or at least to stop the Course of the same, and their Impetuosity, if they dare venture to do it by open force.  
The subtle motions of our Nation stand in need of being secured against the Terror they might receive in an unexpected attack, if they did not know that the entrance into the Kingdom has such strong Ramparts, that no foreign Impetuosity can be capable to take them by Storm, and that it is impossible to overcome them, without a considerable Time.  
The new method of some of the Enemies of this State being more to starve the Places they besiege than to take them by force of Arms, and to ruin the Country they invade by a great number of horse, than to advance by degrees into it with a considerable body of Foot, as was done anciently; it is clear, that Frontier Places are not only useful to resist such Efforts, but also to secure States, in the Bowels of which it is impossible for Enemies to make any great Progress if they leave Places behind them to cut off the communication of their Countries and their Convoys together.  
These considerations oblige me to represent, that it is not sufficient to fortify Places, and to put such Provisions and Ammunitions into 〈◊〉, as may serve to resist brisk attacks, but also to ●●●●ish them with all things necessary for a year at least, which is a sufficient time to relieve them conveniently.  
I am ●●nsible that it is almost impossible for great Kings, to provide many Citadels thus; but it is not to with great Towns in whichis the Society of Men produces a great store of many things, which a particular Governor cannot make a sufficient provision of, and it is easy to oblige the Inhabitants to provide Provisions for a Year, which will always suffice for six Months and more, if they turn out useless Mouths, as reason requires.  
I am so far from pretending that this Order should exempt Princes from having public Magazines, that on the contrary I am of opinion that they can never have too many, and that after having provided them, they must establish such good Orders to preserve, them that the Governors, to whom the disposition of the same belongs, may not have the Liberty to dissipate them in vain, either out of negligence, or a desire to convert them to their own Uses.  
I do not particularly specify the Number of Cannons 
To omit nothing, I will observe in this Place, that it is better to have Magazines of Salt Petre, of Brimstone and of Coals than of Powder ready made, by reason that it spoils in time by keeping, and that an Accident of Fire is the more to be feared. , of Powder and of Bullets, and of all other Warlike Ammunitions, which are to be put in every place, because it is to be different according to their different Largeness. But I will say that Provisions for the Mouth are not more necessary than those of War, and that it would be to no purpose for a Town to be well stored with Victuals, if they wanted what is absolutely necessary, both to defend themselves and to annoy their Enemies, seeing particularly that Experience showeth us that those whoshoot most, commonly kill most▪ when a Place i●●●sieg'd, one might better spare Bread than Powder.  
The Ancients having observed very well, that the real Strength of Towns consists in the number of Men, I cannot forbear adding, that all Fortifications are useless, unless the Governor and the Officers, who command in a place, have a Courage equal to the Strength of the Walls and Ramparts, and unless the Number of Men is proportioned to the Largeness of the place, and the quantity of the Posts that are to be defended.  
Experience has showed us in divers occasions, that the least Holds are impregnable by the steadiness of the courage of those who defend them, and that the best Citadels make no great resistance, when those that are in them have not a Courage suitable to their Force.  
Therefore Princes can never be too careful in choosing those to whom they intrust Frontiers, since the Welfare and repose of the State depends chief on their Fidelity and Vigilancy, their Courage and Experience, and that often the lack of one of these Qualifications costs millions to States, if it does not prove the absolute cause of their Ruin.   

SECTION. iv Of the Power a State ought to have by its Land-Forces. This Section has several Subdivisions, upon the account of the abundance of matter it contains, which will be specified in the Margin.  
THE most potent State in the World cannot boast of enjoying a certain Peace, unless it be in a condition to secure itself at all times, against an unexpected Invasion, or Surprise.  
In order thereunto it is necessary that so great a Kingdom as this is, should always keep a sufficient Army on Foot to prevent the designs which hatred and envy might form against its Prosperity and Grandeur, when 'tis looked upon to be in a secure Repose, or at least to stifle them in their Birth.  
Who has Force, has commonly Reason on his side; and he that is Weak, is commonly thought in the wrong in the Judgement of most Men.  
As a Soldier who does not always wear his Sword is liable to many inconveniences; that Kingdom which does not always stand on its Guard, and keep itself in a condtion to prevent a sudden surprise, is in great danger.  
Public Interest obliges those who have the management of States to Govern them so, as not only to secure them against all the Evil which may be avoided, but also from all apprehensions of it.  

* The Power of Princes is the only means that can produce that Effect and therefore it only remains to know what Forces ought to be kept on Foot in this Kingdom.  As Reason requires a Geometrical Proportion, between that which sustains, and that which is sustained, it is certain that there must be considerable Forces, to sustain so great a Body as this Kingdom.  
Those that are necessary to so great an End, may and aught to be of a different Nature, that is, that among the Men designed for the preservation of this State, some must be listed to be ready on all occasins, and others actually in Arms, in order always to be in readiness to make a good defence.  

* The Number of Men which ought to be kept on foot in this Kingdom.  In order to provide for the Frontier Towns, and to keep a Body on foot to oppose all unexpected Designs, it is necessary to keep at least four thousand Horse, and forty thousand Foot actually in Arms at all times, and it is easy without burdening the State, to keep ten thousand Gentlemen, and fifty thousand Foot listed, ready to be raised on all Emergencies.  
It may perhaps be urged that the Defence of the State does not require such great Preparations, but whereas the said Establishment is so far from being a Burden to France, that on the contrary the Nobility and the People will receive a Benefit by it; I say, that it is necessary to make War, when ever the Good of the State will require it.  

* War is sometimes receslary.  In the opinion of the most judicious, War is sometimes an unavoidable Evil; and on other occasions, it is absolutely necessary and advantageous.  
States stand in need of it at certain times, to purge their ill humours, to recover what belongs to them, to revenge an Injury, the Impunity of which draws on another, to free Allies from Oppression, to put a stop to the Progress of a Conqueror's Pride, to prevent the Evil one is threatened with, when there is no other way to avoid them, or, in fine, to prevent many other Accidents.  
I maintain, and it is an undoubted Truth, that no War can be happy unless it be just, and that not being so, though the Event should prove favourable according to the World, yet an account must be given for it at the Tribunal of God.  
Therefore the first thing to be done, when a Prince is forced to take Arms, is to examine the Equity of the Cause for which they are taken, which must be done by Doctors of Capacity and Probity.  
This Foundation supposed, the means to carry it on vigorously must be considered, and to time it well, is not one of the least Material.  
There is this difference betwixt him who pursues revenge with Anger, and he who does it with Reason, that the first does mischief, at the venture of receiving the same, choosing rather to suffer himself than to lose an opportunity to prejudice his Enemy; and the last dissembles his resentment, until he finds an occasion to punish him who has wronged him, without sharing his Sufferings.  
The first acts like a Beast, according to the Impulse of Nature; and the last behaves himself like a Man, suffering himself to be guided by reason.  
In order to succeed in War, it is not sufficient to choose a fit opportunity, to have a strong Army, abundance of Money, of Provisions, and warlike Ammunitions, the main point is to have Men fit for the Service they are designed for, to know how to make them observe a good Discipline, to make them live regularly, and to manage one's Money, Provisions and Ammunitions prudently.  
It is easy to set down these general Principles, but the practice of them is difficult, and yet in case it be neglected, the Success of a War cannot be happy, unless by chance or miracle, which wise Men must never trust to.  
There is no Nation in the World so unfit for War as ours; their Levity and Impatience in the least hardships, are two Principles which are but too well known.  
Tho Caesar says, that the French understand two things, the Military Art, and that of Speaking, I own that hitherto, I have not been able to apprehend upon what ground he attributes the first of these Qualifications to them, since Patience in Labour and Sufferings, a Qualification absolutely necessary in War, is but seldom found among them.  
Were this Qualification joined to their Valour, the Universe would be too little to bond their Conquests, but as the great heart God has given them, makes them fit to overcome whatever opposes them by force, their Levity and Laziness make them incapable of overcoming the least Obstacles, which the delays of a subtle Enemy opposes to their Eagerness.  
This is the reason why they are not fit for Conquests which require time, nor to preserve those they might make in an instant of Time.  
They are not only inconstant, impatient, and little inur'd to Faituges, but moreover they are accused of never being pleased with their present condition, and to have no great Affection for their Country: and the said Accusation is so well grounded, that no body can deny, that there are more among them who are wanting in those Duties which their Birth exacts from them, than among all the other Nations of the World.  
There are few who wage-War against France, without having French Men in their Army, and when they are Armed for their Country, they are so indifferent in what relates to its Interest, that they do not use the least Endeavours to overcome their Natural Defects to its advantage.  
They run an hundred Leagues to seek a Battle, and yet would not expect the occasion of one a week, the Enemy tires them out, even before they have begun to work.  
They are not afraid of Peril, but they will expose themselves to it without any Pains; the least delays are insupportable to them, they have no Phlegm to tarry one moment for their happiness, and they are tired even with the continuation of their Prosperities.  
At the beginning of their Enterprise, their eagerness is not common, and indeed they are more than Men that moment, but they cool by degrees, so that they become equal to those who have but a common Virtue, and in process of Time, they are disgusted and grow effeminate, insomuch that they are less than Men.  
They still retain Courage enough to fight; provided they are put to't immediately, but they do not keep so much of it as to tarry for an occasion; though their Hon the Reputation of their Country and the Service of their Master requires it.  
They can neither improve a Victory, nor resist the Fortune of a Victorious Enemy; Prosperity blinds them beyond other Men, and yet they have neither Courage, nor Judgement in Adversity, and in Labour.  
In fine, They are subject to so many faults, that it is not without reason, some judicious Persons wonder how this Monarchy has been able to subsist from its Birth, since that as it has always found faithful Children for its Defence, it has never been attacked but its Enemies have found Sectators in its Bosom, who, like Vipers, have used their utmost Endeavours to gnaw the Bowels of their Mother.  
I am sensible at the same time that the French have good Qualifications to counterpoise those Imperfections; They are Valiant, full of Courage and Humanity; their Heart is void of Cruelty, and so free from rancour, that they are easily reconciled.  
But though these Qualifications are the Ornaments of Civil Society, and Essential to Christianity; yet it is certain, that being destitute of Phlegm, of Patience, and of Discipline, they are exquisite Victuals served without Sauce to relish them.  
I am not ignorant that the Providence of God, which is admirable in all things, is particularly so, in having counterpoised the ill Qualities of every Nation, by other advantages which make amends for their defects.  
If the French Nation is inconstant and impatient, their Valour and Impetuosity often makes them do that at the first Onset, which others are a long time about.  
If their uneasiness hinders them from remaining long in Armies willingly; God's Providence has made it so abounding in Men, that there are always abundance of them, who being moved by the same Principle of Levity, are ready to supply the room of those who are desirous to come home again, and these are ready to go back, before those who have succeeded them, are weary.  
If their want of affection for their Country inclines them some times to take Arms against their King, the Inconstancy and sudden Motions, to which they are subject, not permitting any body to rely upon them, they do themselves more harm than they are capable of doing to their Country.  
'Tis most certain, that the Spaniards surpass us in Constancy and Steadiness, in Zeal, and in Fidelity for their King and Country; but in exchange, that Kingdom is so barren and so desert in some Places, and so little abounding in Men, that were it not for their Constancy, it would often be abandoned by itself.  
Moreover, if among the French, some particular Persons engage against their Master, the Spaniards some time's mutiny and revolt in bodies in their Arms.  
If the Emperor has the advantage to govern a Nation, which is the Nursery of Soldiers, he has the disadvantage, that they easily change their Party and Religion together, besides that they are very much addicted to Drunkenness, and far more unruly than ours in the Field.  
In a Word all Nations have there defects, and the most prudent are those who endeavour to acquire by Art, what Nature has denied them.  
It is more easy to add Phlegm, Patience, and Discipline, to the Courage, Valour, and Courtesy of the French, than to inspire that Fire in Flegmatic Nations, which they have not naturally.  
The French are Capable of every thing, provided their Commanders are Capable to teach them what they are to do.  
Their Courage, which inclines them to seek out War all the World over, Justifys this Proposition: Since they live like Spaniards in their Arms, like swedes in their Country, like Crawats when they are listed among them, and like Hollanders in their States.  
They observe their several Disciplines; which shows, that if they keep their Natural Imperfections in their Country, it is because they are tolerated, and that their Officers do not know how to Correct them.  
If they live in this Kingdom without Discipline, it is not so much their fault, as the fault of their Leaders, who commonly content themselves with making fine Ordinances, and do not take so much care as they should do to cause them to be observed.  
Nothing can be more easy than to prescribe Rules to live well, and nothing more difficult then to put them in practice; however it is not impossible.  
Endeavours must be used to show the Justice of them by reason, and then no mercy must be shown to those who Violate them.  
If one, two, or three Examples of Punishment do not put a stop to Disobedience, the continuance of it will do't; and I dare assure your Majesty, that if you find Chiefs worthy to command, you will never want Subjects fit to obey. It is most certain, that the general Opinion of the World, That the French are incapable of Rule and Discipline, has no other Foundation than the Incapacity of their Commanders, who do not know how to choose necessary means for the Ends they propose.  
The Siege of Rochel, in which during thirteen Months an Army of 25000 Men received Orders, and obeyed like Monks bearing Arms, and the Expedition of Pignerol, where they did the same, plainly demonstrate what I have said.  
But the General must be a Man of Resolution, and no respecter of Persons, and known to be so; for it is certain that unless he has so much steadiness as to remain inflexible in the Rigour of the Rule he has prescribed, no Man will think himself obliged to observe it; or at least many will venture to break it, in hopes of a Pardon.  
But when a General persists as much in punishing as the Delinquents in their Faults; his steadiness will stop the course of our excessive Levity; and without such a Remedy it is in vain to expect to keep so hot and so impetuous a Nation as ours is, within the Bounds of Reason. The Punishments of Marillac and of Montmorency, have reduced all the Grandees of the Kingdom to their Duty in an instant of time; and I dare affirm, that the same being practised against Ten Officers, and Fifty Soldiers, will maintain the Arms in Discipline, and in a condition to perform whatever will be desired of them.  
Punishing those thus, who shall be wanting in the Performance of their Duty, few Men will be punished, since few will venture to expose themselves to ruin, finding it inevitable, and by the Death of a small Number, the Lives of many will be preserved, and Order observed in all things.  
The Defects of this Nation never appeared more than under your Majesty's Reign, which being signalised by great Prosperity and Power by your Conduct, will also be signalised in the opinion of the most judicious, for many Infidelities you have suffered, and by a World of Attempts against your Service.  
After having made divers Inquiries into the Reasons of both, I am not afraid of saying, That they proceed from the Weakness of your Majesty's Minority, during which Men have so insensibly accustomed themselves to all sorts of Licentiousness, that they thought they might continue the same under your Reign with the same Impunity as heretofore.  
The first is, that as there are more Colleges of Religious Orders, more Officers of Justice, and of the Finances than for the time past, there are not near so many Soldiers, for which reason the desertion of those who retire from the Armies is more apparent, because there are not so many found as formerly, to supply the room of those who forsake their Duty.  
The second, that Soldiers advanced their Fortune more, formerly than in these Times, in which the Officers of the Finances, and the 
* Those that farm the Public Revenue.  Partisans reap all the Fat, to the great disgust of those who are constrained to expose their Lives almost to no purpose.  
The third, that Generals are less careful in our days of military Discipline, and less levere in chastising those who swerve from it than our Forefathers were.  
The fourth, that the long discontinuation the French have had of Foreign Wars, in which they had powerful Enemies to encounter, had almost made them forget the Trade, and disused them from the Fatigues they are little capable of, though they must go through many, when they have brisk and potent Enemies to deal with.  
I add to these considerations, that your Majesty's health has not always permitted you to be in the Army, and that the Injustice of the French is so great, that they are never satisfied in a Place, where they venture their Life, unless they see their King, whose presence they fancy does in some measure secure it.  
None but the Enemies of this State can make War successfully by their Lieutenants; the Phlegm of their Nation gives them that advantage; but the French are the most unfit for it of any other Nation, because the eagerness of their Courage and the desire of fight gives them an Impatience, which can never be vanquished, but by the presence of their King.  
If at any time any great Enterprise has met with Success under Lieutenants, it will either be found that those who have had that good Fortune, were Men of very great Authority, by the Trust reposed in them by their Master, and by their particular Merit, or that those Wars were not so lasting, as to oblige them in overcoming the Enemies also to vanquish the humour of the French.  
It is no small Trouble to me to be obliged in this Place to discover the defects your Majesty has often observed in your Nobility; yet they are so public, that it is impossible to conceal them.  
The Affection I have for that Order, obliges me to examine them, to find out Examples and to endeavour to remedy the same.  
The esteem they were in heretofore will hardly permit one to believe, that they have committed faults on some occasions in your Reign; but I will discover the reason of them to those who have beheld their Effects.  
All Men easily apprehend, that there is a great deal of difference between the Spirits, which naturally ascend on high, and the grosser Parts of their Bodies which remain below.  
The excellency of the Nobility which love War, are those Spirits which ascend on high, esteemed by all the World; and those who only follow it, because the Laws of this Kingdom constrain them so to do, are if not the Lees, at least the Wine which drops out of the Cask, which is hardly fit for Servants.  
There are no Communities in which there are not more ill Subjects than good ones; and whereas a little Tare is capable to spoil several heaps of Wheat it is no wonder if, when the Nobility is assembled, the greater number corrupts the less, though better; and as the best Wine mixed with the Lees is nought, so the Service of the best Nobility is not only useless but prejudicial, when joined with the Lees which altars it.  

* Arriere Ban.  This Discourse engaging me to speak of the Ban, and Arriere Ban, I cannot forbear saying that it is an Assembly of Gentry, which having no Head with any Authority, governs itself without Rule, and lives without Discipline.—  
An Assembly the subsistence of which has so little certainty, that the fickleness, cowardice, malice or disgust of three or four Persons, is capable to diffipate it in a moment.  
An Assembly which ruins the Places through which it passes far more than the regular Forces, which ruining your Majesty's Country pay part of what they spend, whereas those pay nothing at all.  
They never perform any Guard in an Army, which produces a double Ill, Laziness and the Disgust it creates in others.  
Unless they fight at their first Arrival, as they are quick in coming, they are speedy in going back, and threaten it every moment; in retiring they do not only debauch many by their ill Example, but the most ingenious among them, invent whatever Craft can suggest to cover their Infamy, and to persuade that they do not retire without reason; so that they both weaken and astonish Armies at one and the same time.  
Your Majesty being much better acquainted with these Truths, of which you have seen the practice, than I am, without insisting on the defects of an Order, the Perfections of which I have represented, my Conscience obliges me to declare freely, that Princes must never have any recourse to such a Succour, which is much more prejudicial than useful to the State.  
But that this Kingdom may not be deprived of the Service of the Nobility, which has always been the Principal Sinew of it, and is obliged to serve it in time of War, upon the accounts of the Fiefs which have been granted them on that condition, and of the advantages they enjoy over the People in time of Peace: It will be necessary to tax all the Fiess in every Bailywick, according to their Revenue, to form regular Troops with the said Money, into which such as had rather serve in Person, than to pay the Contribution of the Fiefs shall be admitted, provided they engage to perform the Conditions of their Obligation.  
Prudence requires that Men should be employed according to their capacity, and that the defects of Nature should be supplied by Art; and for that reason it is necessary to make this use of the Body of the Nobility, in order to derive some advantage by them.  
Next to this Observation, proceeding on, I am obliged to observe, that it is almost impossible to undertake great Wars with Success with the French alone.  

* Strangers necessary.  Foreigners are absolutely necessary to maintain the Body of Armies, and if the French Horse are good to fight, there is no being without Foreigners to perform the Guards, and to support the Fatigues of an Army.  
Our Nation, though hot and eager in Combats, is neither vigilant to guard itself, nor proper to form Designs or Erterprises, which require toil and labour.  
One half of the French Arms were formerly Composed of Foreigners, and we have experienced how advantageous it is to use them, to supply the defect of our Nation, besides that the good qualifications of those by whom we may be assisted may in some measure correct our Imperfections.  
But whereas if we want well disciplined Soldiers, steady and constant in their Duty, we are yet in greater want of Commanders, qualified as they ought to be; it will be needless to remedy one of these Evils, unless we also correct the other.  
There are but few of them in the World, and less in France than in any other part, who do not suffer themselves to be blinded by Prosperity, and do not lose their Courage and Judgement in Adversity.  
Nevertheless it is necessary there should be Men employed in the administration of the State, and in the Command of Arms free from these defects, otherwise we should be in danger of never improving the favourable occasions, which God may offer us, and of being considerable losers by the first frowns of Fortune.  
Tho the Head guides the rest of the Body, and Judgement is the most Essential Part of him who Commands, Nevertheless I prefer a great deal of Courage and Indifferent Parts in a General, before a great deal of Wit, and an indifferent Heart.  
Many perhaps will wonder at this proposition, because it is contrary to the opinion of many, but the reason of it is Evident.  
Those who have a great deal of Coruage are never astonished in danger, and make use of all the Wit and Judgement God has endued them with on such occasions; whereas those who have but little Courage being easily astonished, are so much dismayed in the least danger, that let them have never so much Wit, it is absolutely useless to them, fear not allowing them to Use it.  
I make but little difference between giving the management of the Finances to a Thief, and the Command of an Army to a Man of mean Courage.  
As Avarice, and the desire the first has of getting an Estate, hinders him from improving the occasions to increase his Master's Fund, so the second, having a desire to preserve his Life, and to avoid many Perils, which are only such in his Imagination, commonly loses and avoids many advantageous occasions to employ his Arms; and thus if the first is capable of committing faults out of a desire to fill his Purse, the last is liable to do the same, in order to secure his Life.  
Among Men of Courage, some are naturally Valiant, and others are only so by reason; The first are fit to be Shoulders than Captains, by reason that their Valour is commonly accompanied with Brutality; but the last are good to make Commanders: Nevertheless it is always to be wished that their reasonable Valour may not be void of Natural Courage, because otherwise it were to be feared, that the consideration of many incoveniences which may happen, and yet do not happen, might hinder him who proceeds with too much caution from undertaking that which might succeed in others with less Wit and more boldness.  
Want of Judgement contributes considerably towards the Valour of some Men, who perform Actions which are the more hazardous, in that they are not sensible of the Peril to which they expose themselves.  
Judgement is of no small use to others to feign a great boldness on some occasions, which though dangerous in appearance, are neither so in Effect, nor in the opinions of those, whom God has endued with more knowledge than others.  
As a General's Valour must not be destitute of Judgement: So though he be Prudent and Judicious to the highest degree he must have sincerity to hinder him from making Artifices pass for Actions of Courage. Men disguise themselves so many different ways, that it is almost Impossible to distinguish the Effects which proceed from the head from those which proceed from the Heart.  
There are Men so naturally Valiant, that they continue so to their dying day.  
Others, which not being so, make an Effort in their Youth to appear such, to gain some Reputation, in favour of which they may pass their Life without Infamy.  
These last have no sooner obtained their Ends, but the Effects of their Valour disappear, because they have what they desire, and that Artifice is the Source of their Courage, and not their natural Inclination.  
Great Care must be taken not to choose a Chief of that Nature, remembering that Craft is as dangerous in those who Command, as Judgement and Courage is necessary.  
Those two qualities ought almost to keep an even pace, but they must be accompanied with many others.  
Great enterprises not being children's Play, they require a ripe Age in those who perform them; but as the maturity of Judgement which advances with years is useful to form a design, the Fire of Youth is no less necesseary to put it in execution, and it is most certain that Fortune often Smiles on Youth, and Frowns on Age.  
Therefore it is fit to observe, that there is a great deal of difference between a Novice, a young Man, and an old one. It is difficult to be good and bad at once.  
To be Excellent, it is necessary to be young in years, but not in Service and Experience. For though Old Men are commonly the Wisest, they are not the best to undertake, because they are often destitute of the fire of youth, which is requisite in such occasions.  
In conclusion, Courage, Wit, and good Fortune are three qualifications so Essential in a General, that though there are but few who possess them altogether, it is difficult to expect without hazard great events from those who are destitute of either of them.  
But if a Prince be so happy as to find any, in whom these qualifications are met, it will be easy to remedy the defects of those who shall be committed to their Conduct.  
One of those which does most harm, as I have observed, is the Inconstancy of our Nation, which rendering it almost incapable of remaining long in the same State, an Army is no sooner Raised, but one half of it dwindles away.  

* A Remedy to make Arms Subsist.  I have thought sometimes that the best Expedient that could be taken to make Soldiers Subsist, and to maintain them in Discipline, would be to restore the Establishment of Legionarys, formerly practised in this Kingdom, adding some particular Orders to it, altogether necessary to make it safe; but Reason and Experience have altered my mind.  
Reason, in that it shows clearly that what is committed to the care of many, is the less certain, in that every one lays the blame upon his Companion, and that the Elections which are made by the advice of Communities, are rarely made by the bare motive of Reason, because that though there are many Persons of Wisdom, and Probity among them, the number of Fools, and of Knaves is always the greatest.  
Experience, in that it Teaches every body, that no money is laid out worse than that of Communities.  

* This Truth is so well Justified by the male administration of the Sums raised for the Reparation of Cities and Churches.  Besides that I may say with Truth, that when ever the urgent necessities of the State have constrained your Majesty to employ Forces sent by Princes, led and paid by their own Officers, which I have seen Twice during this last War; they have always cost double, and have committed as much and more disorder than the others, and have done less service than those which were raised at the same Time, and conducted by particular Persons at your Charge.  
Those considerations have convinced me that instead of Charging the Provinces with the Raising and maintaining of Soldiers; Sovereigns ought to take the Care of it, and that they may make them subsist with order if they will use proper means to that end, according to the following order.  
All Soldiers must be Listed, their Names, place of Birth, and of abode, Entered, that in case they should run away from their Colours, they may be the sooner found again.  
The Register of every Place must be charged with the number of those that shall be raised within his Precinct, and the Judges obliged to use their endeavours for the apprehending and punishing, according to the Ordinances, all those who shall come back from the Arms without leave; on pain of the said Judges being turned out of their Offices, upon proof of their having received Information of the return of your Soldiers without having prosecuted them for the same.  
For the Listing of Soldiers, every one must be obliged to serve three Years without demanding to be dismissed, unless in the Case of an Evident Illness, on condition that the said Term being expired it shall not be lawful to refuse it them, when demanded.  
This condition is very necessary, by reason that when the French think themselves constrained, and kept against their Will, they commonly think of nothing but running away, though they were to lose a thousand Lives, if they had so many, whereas when they are at Liberty to retire, it is likely they will freely remain in the Armies, Nature commonly inclining Men to have a less desire for what they are allowed to do, than to do that which is forbidden them.  
Whatever Soldier shall obtain his dismission, shall be obliged to enter the same into the Register of the Jurisdiction in which he was raised.  
The Chiefs and Officers of a Regiment shall not be allowed on any pretence whatever, to receive Soldiers of another, on pain of being degraded of Arms, nay more, of their Gentility, if they are Gentlemen.  
And the Soldiers who shall abandon their Captains without leave, shall be sent to the Galleys without Mercy, at whatever time they are taken, neither shall any change of Place, or of condition exempt them from the same.  
No Furlow or Dismission shall be allowed of, unless signed by the Colonel, or Commander in Chie● in his Absence, and sealed with the Seal of the Regiment.  
Every Regiment shall have a Provost, a Commissary, a controller, and a Pay Master, who shall all be obliged to follow the Regiment; on pain not only of being cashiered, but also of Exemplary Punishment.  
In case any disorders happen, and the Provost does not Punish the offenders according to the Laws of Arms he shall be punished himself, as soon as the said Complaint is brought to your Majesty, or to the Generals.  
In case the Regiment is not Complete, and the controller or Commissary do not give Notice thereof, they shall be answerable for it themselves, and be severely punished.  
If the Men are unpaid by the Pay-Master's fault, either by his imbezeling the King's Money, by bare put offs or delays, or other failures, he shall be liable to pay the quadruple, and to be exemplarily punished.  
The said Officers shall only be employed by way of Commission, Experience having shown that nothing spoils the King's Officers more, particularly in Military Affairs, than to give them Places for Life, which properly speaking, is nothing but a Title to steal with Impunity.  
Those who command the Forces, shall be obliged to put them in Battalia whenever it shall be required by the Commissaries.  
To the end that those who shall have such Commissions, may perform them faithfully; the Commissary shall have 200 Livers a month, the controller 150 Livers, the Provost 100 Livers, his Clerk 50 Livers, and every one of his Men 30 Livers.  
And whereas it would be to no purpose to regulate the Soldiers and inferior Officers, without prescribing the Order which must be observed by the principal Officers. The Colonels, Captains, Sergeants Major, Lieutenants and Ensigns, shall not be allowed to quit their Posts, without leave from their Generals, and Commanders of the Forces, or from your Majesty: and in case any shall infringe the said Regulation, they shall be Cashiered, Degraded of their Gentility and Arms, if they are Gentlemen, or barely Cashiered if they are not, without any prejudice to greater punishments. It will be fit for Your Majesty to impose this Law upon Yourself, never to grant them any such leave in time of War, without a Lawful Cause: but when they are in Garrison, Your Majesty may be so kind as to grant furlows to a third part of the Officers for four months, to the end, that in a years time they may have it all in their turn.  
If with this good Rule, which cannot be thought too Austere, even by those who may suffer by it, particular care be taken of the Soldiers: If Bread be given them all the year round, six Musters and a Suit of : If the Military Missions be continued which were practised in 1639. to prevent their falling sick: If when they are ill, Hospitals be provided to follow the Army in all places, as it was done in the said year, and a livelihood secured for those who shall be maimed in the King's Service, in the Commandery of St. Lewis designed to that end; I dare answer, that the Infantry of this Kingdom will be well Disciplined for the future.  

* Cavalry.  It will be the same with the Horse, if raising them with the same Order, (which I do not repeat, to avoid a tedious Narration) every Trooper be obliged to keep two Horses for Service and a Sumpter: If they are made to observe the Ordinances rigorously, which oblige them never to be without Arms: and if in time of Peace they are put in Garrison in close places, to prevent the disorders which it is impossible to secure the People against, when Soldiers are Quartered in the open Country.  
They have behaved themselves so ill in these last Wars; that in case they should remain in the same condition, they would be no longer fit for any Service.  
The true cause of their decay is the vast number that has been raised in these latter times, to oppose the Cavalry of Foreigners who make all sorts of Men Troopers indifferently.  
For which reason it has been impossible to raise them among the Gentrey of Courage and Activity as formerly, and the Officers have been obliged to take not only old Soldiers, but also raw young Men of all conditions, whose Courage or Strength had never been Tried.  
If in imitating Strangers who receive all sorts of Men in their Cavalry, ours had learned also to support Fatigues as well as theirs, tho' they had lost part of their ancient Valour, which made them recommendable, we should have some reason to comfort ourselves; but the Inconstancy and love of ease which reigns almost among all conditions in our Nation, having quite altered them; they have lost the best qualification they had without acquiring that which they had not.  
Tho' Physicians esteem the cure of a Distemper in a very fair way, when the cause of it is known; I own that notwithstanding the source and reason of the Evil in question be known, the cure is nevertheless very difficult.  
If none but Gentlemen are admitted into the Cavalry, it will be impossible to raise a sufficient number of them, to oppose that of the Enemies; and if all sorts of Men be received among them, it is impossible they should be such as History represents the French Horse.  
The only expedient that can be taken, in my Opinion, in this Extremity, is to exhort the Captains to get as many Gentlemen in their Troops as can be got, to make an Order that none of them shall be admitted to Muster, unless one half of them are Gentlemen.  
To oblige all those of that Birth being 20 years of Age, to bear Arms, declaring them incapable of any Employments or Dignities, unless they have actually served three years in Your Majesty's Forces.  
To forbid all Officers of Horse to List any Soldiers in their Troops, not being Gentlemen, unless they be above 25 years of Age, and have born Arms in the Foot at least three years.  
Finally, to cause the ancient Military Orders to be put rigorously in execution, which ordaint all Troopers who shall abandon their Commander in a Combat, to be disarmed upon the bare knowledge of the said fault.  
If this Regulation is Religiously observed, I do not doubt, but the French Horse will regain its former Reputation, and Your Majesty's Infantry and Cavalary being well Disciplined, you will be able to boast your being strong in Arms, at any time whatever, and in a condition to give your Subjects in time of Peace as much safety as terror to your Enemies.  
It now remains to know whether this State will be able to bear the expense of so great a Body of Men, as that which I have drawn a Project of. Which will be examined hereafter.  
In the mean time tho' there is reason to hope that by means of so useful a Regulation, and so easy to be observed, as that which I propose, the Armies will subsist for the future, according to our wishes; or at least that they will behave themselves a great deal better than heretofore; I will nevertheless make six Remarks which will be the more necessary in a great War, in that Prudence requires many expedients in important Affairs, that Men may never fall short of their Measures.  

* Remarks to make Armies subsist, and to make War advantageously.  The first is, that in order to have 50000 effectual Men, it is necessary to raise a hundred, reckoning upon a Regiment of 20 Companies which ought to consist of a hundred Men, only as a thousand.  
The second, that it is necessary to refresh Armies often by new Levies, without which though they are strong upon the Rollo, they will be weak in Effect.  
The third, that such Refreshments ought rather to be made by frequent Recruits of old Regiments, which must be preserved tho' absolutely decayed, than by raising of new ones, which nevertheless must be done on certain pressing occasions, because Soldiers love to List themselves under new Officers.  
The fourth, That when Forces are ruined, it is better to pay them on the foot on which they are, than to disband them, because it is impossible to do it without losing excellent Officers and good Soldiers.  
I am sensible, that the remaining Soldiers may be put into other Regiments. But it is not practicable, the kindness Soldiers have for their Captains, giving them a pretence to retire, or at least of covering their inconstancy in so doing.  
I am also sensible that in reforming Regiments, one might imitate the Spaniards who do not only initiate the Soldiers into old Regiments, but the Officers also.  
But tho' it be easy to resolve upon such an Order, no severity will be sufficient to put it in execution; the ambitious, inconsiderate humour of our Nation, not permitting them to suffer themselves to be commanded, after having commanded, whatever advantage they might receive by such an Obedience.  
The Fifth, that it is absolutely Impossible in Wars which require extraordinary Efforts, to pay the musters of the Forces that are raised regularly, as it may be done in an Enterprise which does not exceed the Power of a State: But in such a case these two Expedients may serve to remedy such a defect,  
The first consists in making so good a Provision that the Soldiers may never want Bread.  
The Second, to oblige the Commanders, who being satisfied, have too much Interest to preserve the Men under their Command, not to use their utmost Endeavours in order thereunto; whereas when they are misused their Complaints and Negligence give way to the Licentiousness of their Soldiers, and give them a desire to run away, though otherwise they would not think on't of their own accord.  
However I must not forget to observe, that to do well, it is necessary to make three Musters, during the Campaign, besides five Months of Winter Quarters which the Forces must have regularly.  
And whereas nothing is more material towards the subsistence of Arms, and the success of all the designs that can be undertaken, than to take such measures that Provision may never fail them.  
I add for the sixth remark, that the said care is one of the chief that is to be taken, and that Oeconomy and Policy are the chief qualifications of Generals.  
Arms hardly fight once in a year: But they must live daily, and subsist with order; which cannot be done without an extraordinary Oeconomy, and Policy.  
History affords us the Example of more Arms that have perished for want of Bread, and Policy, than by the effort of the Enemy's Arms; and I am a faithful Witness, that all the Erterprises which have been made in my days, have only miscarried upon that account.  
Those who have no Experience, commonly think they have done all when they have raised Arms, and provided for their Pay; but let them be paid never so well, unless they are in a Place where they may live conveniently, their Money is of no use to them, and cannot hinder them from perishing.  
Therefore I must needs say, that it is dangerous to rely upon the Faith of a Purveyor who obliges himself to provide all the bread of an Army.  
The Life of such Men is too poor a security for the mischief their negligence may occasion, to rely upon their Faith.  
The Care of the Provisions ought to be committed to Persons of Quality, of known Vigilancy Fidelity and Capacity; since the Welfare of Arms and often of States depends upon it.  
No men can be too great to be employed in such Places.  

* A Wagon with four Horses must carry Seven or eight Septiers of Wheat in all Countries, amounting to 1500. pound weight. Every Septier weighing 240 in Bread it ought to carry 1000 Rations which must weigh 500 pounds, in Biscuit it will carry 2000 Rations, thus 15 good Wagons will carry Bread for a fortnight for a tthousand Men, and Biscuit for three Weeks, and consequently 225. Wagons will carry bread for 25. days and Biscuit for 30 for an Army of 15000 Men.  In order not to be mistaken in our reckoning, in putting an Army on Foot, the Provisions must be settled so, that every Regiment of a thousand Men may have 15. Wagons to carry Bread for a Fortnight which is partly as much as is required for a considerable Enterprise: Moreover it is necessary to have a hundred or two, over and above the common Calculation, otherwise one might fall short.  
Special care must also be taken to carry Mills and Ovens, for though Commonly the use of them is not good, yet it is necessary to have some, to make use of them in certain Places in which it would otherwise be impossible to subsist, and in which it may happen that a stay of four days may give the Enemy's a great advantage, over an Army which wants Provision.  
As the least things ought to be considered in great designs, the General of an Army must take a particular care of every thing belonging to his Train.  
He must know that a Cart is not so cumbersome as a Wagon which turns with more ease in narrow Passes; but on the other hand that they are sooner overthrown, and that the overturning of one is capable to stop a Train a long while. Therefore it behoves him to consider the Places he is to march through, to make use of the one or of the other, according as he will think it most proper.  
He must also know that there are two ways of carrying the Bread, either in Carriages which are very heavy and cumbersome, or in Carts plaited on the sides and covered with cere  which are more Convenient.  
After these six Remarks, I have only two Counsels to give to those who Command our Arms.  
The first is, always to be the first in the Field, because it is difficult for an Army, though never so considerable to make any progress, when they find another ready to oppose them, and often very easy for those that come first into the Field to secure a good success.  
The Second is to attack, when it may be done without rashness, rather than to stand upon the defensive; by reason that, besides that he who has the boldness to attack gives some Impression of fear to him he attacks, the Imparient and Inconstant Temper of the French, is as unfit for the defensive part, as their fire and first eagerness qualifys them to perform their duty in the first.  
Experience makes me speak thus, and I am persuaded that those who are perfect Commanders will say the same.   

SECTION. V Of Naval Power.  
THE Power of Arms does not only require that the King should be strong a shore, but also potent at Sea.  
When Anthony Perez was received in France by the late King your Father, and that in order to soften his misery he had secured him a good Pension: That stranger being desirous to express his Gratitude to that great King, and to show him that though he was unfortunate he was not ungrateful, gave him three Counsels in three Words which are of no small Consideration, Roma, Consejo, Pielago.  
The advice of this old Spaniard consummated in Affairs, is not so much to be looked upon for the Authority of him that gave it, as for its own weight.  
We have already mentioned the Care Princes ought to take to have a good Council, and to be authorised at Rome, it now remains to show how it behoves the King to be Potent at Sea.  
The Sea is, of all Heritage's that in which Sovereigns pretend to have the greatest share, and yet it is that on which the Rights of every body are least agreed upon.  
The Empire of that Element was never well secured to any. It has been subject to divers Revolutions according to the inconstancy of its nature, so subject to the Wind that it submits to him who Courts it most, and whose Power is so unbounded that he is in a condition to possess it with violence against all those who might dispute it with him.  
In a word, the old Titles of that Dominion are Force and not Reason, a Prince must be Powerful to pretend to that Heritage.  
To proceed with Order and Method in this point, we must consider the Ocean and the Mediterranean separately, and make a distinction between the Ships which are of use in both those Seas, and of the Galleys, the use of which is only good in that which Nature seems to have reserved expressly betwixt the Lands to expose it to less Storms, and to give it more shelter.  
A great State must never be in a condition to receive an injury without being able to revenge it.  
And therefore England being situated as it is, unless France is powerful in Ships, the English may attempt whatever they please to our prejudice, without the least fear of a return.  
They might hinder our Fishing, disturb our Trade, and in blocking up the mouth of our great Rivers, exact what Toll they please from our Merchants.  
They might Land without danger in our Islands, and even on our Coasts.  
Finally, The Situation of the Native Country of that haughty Nation, not permitting them to fear the greatest Land-Forces, the ancient Envy they have against this Kingdom, would apparently encourage them to dare every thing, should our weakness not allow us to attempt some thing to their prejudice.  
Their Insolence in the late King your Father's time towards the Duke of Scily, obliges us to put ourselves in a posture never to suffer the like again.  
That Duke being chosen by Henry the Great for an extraordinary Embassy into England, Embarking at Calais in a French Ship with the French Flag on the Main Top Mast, was no sooner in the Channel, but meeting a Yacht which came to receive him, the Commander of it Commanded the French Ship to strike.  
The Duke thinking his Quality would secure him from such an affront, refused it boldly; but his refusal being answered with three Cannon shot with Bullets, which piercing his Ship, pierced the Heart of the French; Force constrained him to do, what Reason ought to have secured him from, and whatever Complaints he could make, he could get no other reason from the English Captain, than that as his Duty obliged him to honour his Quality of Ambassador, it obliged him also to compel others to pay that respect to his Master's Flag, which was due to the Sovereign of the Sea.  
If King James' words proved more civil, yet they produced no other effect than to oblige the Duke to seek for satisfaction in his own Prudence, feigning himself cured, when his pain was most smarting, and his wound incurable.  
The King your Father was obliged to dissemble on that occasion; but with this Resolution another time to maintain the Right of his Crown by the Force, which time would give him means to acquire at Sea.  
I represent this Great Prince to my mind projecting in that occurrence, what your Majesty must now put in Execution.  
Reason obliges to take an Expedient, which without engaging any of the Crowns, may contribute towards the preservation of the good understanding which is desirable among the Princes of Christendom.  
Among many that might be proposed, the following are in my opinion the most practicable.  
It might be agreed upon, that French Ships meeting English Ships upon the Coast of England, should Salute first, and strike the Flag; and that when English Ships should meet French Ships upon the French Coast, they should pay them the same Honours, on condition that when the English and French Fleets should meet beyond the Coasts of both Kingdoms, they should both steer their Course without any Ceremony, only sending out their respective Long-Boats to hail each other, coming no nearer than within Cannon shot.  
It might also be agreed upon, that without having any respect to the Coasts of France or England, the greater number of Men of War should be Saluted by the smaller, either in striking (the Flag or otherwise.  
Whatever Expedient is found out on that subject, provided it be equal on all parts, it will be just if your Majesty is strong at Sea, that which is real sonable, will be thought so by the English who are so much blinded on that subject, that they know no Equity but Force.  
The advantages the Spaniards, who are proud of being our Enemies at present, derive from the Indies, oblige them to be strong on the Ocean.  
The reason of a sound Policy does not allow us to be weak there; but it obliges us to be in a condition to oppose the designs they might have against us, and to cross their erterprises.  
If your Majesty be potent at Sea, the just apprehension Spain will lay under of your attacking their Forces, the only Source of their Subsistance: of your making a Descent on their Coasts, which have upwards of six hundred Leagues Circumference: your surprising some of their places, which are all weak, and in great number: that just apprehension, I say, will oblige them to be so powerful at Sea, and to keep such strong Garrisons, that the major part of the Revenue of the Indies will be consumed in Charges, to preserve the whole, and if the remainder suffices to preserve their States, at last it will produce this advantage, that they will no longer he able to trouble their Neighbours, as they have done hitherto.  

* Compat of Gattary.  Had your Majesty been as weak as your Predecessors, you could not have reduced to Ashes, in the midst of the Waters, all the Forces Spain could assemble in 1638. on the Ocean.  
That proud haughty Nation, could not have been constrained to suffer the checking of their Pride, not only within sight of Italy, but also before the Eyes of all Christendom, which seeing the Isles of St. Marguerits and of St. Honorat snatched out of their hands by open force, whereas they had only got them by surprise, has beheld at once and with the same Eye, the shame of that insolent Nation, and the Glory and Reputation of yours.  
You could not finaly have fought that famous Combat of the Galleys, on the Seas of Genoa, which striking your Enemies with Terror, increased the Love and Esteem of your Allies, and imprinted so much Reverence in the indifferent, that the weight of respect engaged them absolutely on your side.  
Your Majesty having Allies so distant from this Kingdom, that it is impossible to have any Communication with them but by Sea, if they found France destitute of necessary means to succour them on certain occasions, it would be easy for those who are Enemies of the happiness of both sides, to sow the same Division in the minds, which is between the States; whereas your Naval Forces being considerable, tho' divided as to place, they will remain strictly united in Heart and Affection to this State:  
Nature seems to have offered the Empire of the Sea to France, by the advantageous Situation of her two Coasts, equally provided with excellent Havens, on the Ocean, and on the Mediterranean.  
Britanny alone contains the finest in the Ocean; and Provence, which has but 160 Miles extent, has many larger and safer than Spain and Italy together.  
The separation of the States, which form the Body of the Spanish Monarchy, renders the preservation of them so difficult, that Spain has no other way to keep them in some Union, than by keeping a great number of Ships on the Ocean, and of Galleys in the Mediterranean, which by their continual going backwards and forwards, may in some measure preserve the Union between the Members and the Head, transporting to and fro whatever is necessary for their subsistence; as Orders for whatever is to be undertaken, Officers to Command, Soldiers to Execute, Money, which is not only the Sinew of War, but also the Fat of Peace; from whence it follows, that obstructing the Liberty of such passages, those States which cannot subsist of themselves, can never be able to avoid confusion, weakness, and all the desolations wherewith God threatens a divided Kingdom.  
And whereas the Western Coast of this Kingdom, separates Spain from all the Territories possessed by their King in Italy, so the Providence of God, which will keep an even Balonce, seems to have been pleased to separate the Territories of Spain, by the Situation of France, to weaken them by their Division.  
If your Majesty constantly keeps forty good Men of War well Rigged and Equipped, ready to put out to Sea on all occasions, that number will be sufficient to secure you against all Injuries, and to make you feared on all the Seas, by those who have hitherto despised your Forces there.  
As Men of War are necessary to that end in the Ocean, Galleys which are light Ships, and can make great Courses with their Oars in Calms, which are more usual in the Mediterranean than elsewhere, are as useful in the Levant.  
With thirty Galleys your Majesty will not only balance the Power of Spain, which by the assistance of their Allies can put fifty in a Body, but you will overcome them by the reason of Union, which reodubles the Power of the Forces it unites.  
As your Galleys may remain in a Body, either at Marseilles or Toulon, they will always be in a condition to oppose the conjunction of those of Spain, which are so much separated by the Situation of this Kingdom, that they cannot assemble without passing in sight of the Ports, and Roads of Provence, and even sometimes without Anchoring there, by reason of the Storms which surprise them half way the Channel, which those light Ships are not able to bear without great hazard, in a troublesome passage in which they are very frequent.  
The Gulf of Leon is the most dangerous passage in all the Seas of the Levant; the inconstancy and contrariety of the Winds, which commonly reign there, render the passage of it very difficult, whatever way it is undertaken.  
All stormy weather is very dangerous there, and unless our Coasts are favourable to those who pass by them, they seldom have a safe passage.  
The true reason of the hazard of this passage, proceeds from the contrariety of Winds, occasioned by divers Aspects of the Coasts.  
The more a Coast is Mountainous and elevated, the more it raises Winds, when the heat of the ground is opposed by the coldness and moisture of the water, or of the Snow it is covered with.  
This is the reason that the Coasts of Provence which are of this nature, being ever moistened during the Winter with Rain or Snow, are never free from Wind, which blowing from the Shore, are always contrary to those who have a mind to land there.  
And tho' those Winds are contrary to the approach of Vessels, yet they are not strong enough to carry them back to the places from whence they come, because they commonly meet with other shore Winds which drive them back again; in so much that the contrariety of Winds from our Coasts, and from those of Spain, force the Ships into the Gulf, where generally by Tempestuous Wether their ruin proves inevitable.  
All Ships and Galleys going from Spain into Italy, always set Sail from the Cape of Quires, and from the Gulf of Roses, and commonly tarry for a Werstern and Northwest Wind, safely to reach the Coast of Genoa, or Morgues which is their first landing place; but tho' they put out with a fair Wind, it changes as soon as they come to the Gulf.  
If the Wind turns to the S. W. or S. S. W. they must of necessity make for the Coast of Provence, and if it turns to the South East and by East, it is impossible for the Galleys and Ships which are near our Coasts, either to reach Italy, or to turn back to Spain, and in hard weather it is a Miracle if they are not lost on the Banks of our Coasts.  
On the other hand, the Ships which go from Italy into Spain, set sail commonly from Morgues, which is the last Port of Italy.  
In order to have a good Passage, they tarry for a North West and Northerly Wind, but they are never half way the Gulf, before the Wether changes, and without their being in Peril; because a South Fast or a Southern Storm renders their loss inevitable, unless our Ports are open to receive them.  
Therefore France being strong in Galleys and in Galleons, they can have no certain Passage, since they can never undertake to make the middle of the Channel in the Winter time, without running the hazard of being lost, either on our Coasts, or in Barbary, if the Wind turns wholly to the North.  
And even when the North East and by Nore drives them towards Majorca and Minorca, and the North West and by Nore drives them into Corsica and Sardinia, the violence of the Storms often breaks and destroys them before they can reach the shelter of the Isles that are favourable to them.  
And if to avoid that Peril they resolve to tarry for a fair Wind to sail along our Shores, it will not happen once in thirty times, that they will pass safely, without striking by some ill Wether, within our sight.  
And tho' they should meet with such favourable Winds, as to escape all the dangers of the Sea, the least advice we have of their Passage, will enable us to cross it, the more easily, in that we may always put out to Sea, and put in again without Peril, whenever the Wether threatens us, by reason of the Neighbourhood of our Ports, which they dare not come near.  
Thirty Galleys will afford your Majesty this advantage, and if to such a Body you add 10 Galleons, true Citadels of the Sea, formidable to Galleys, when they have a favourable Wind, because their Body bears no proportion to the weakness of those light Ships, and that they are not afraid of them even in the greatest Calms, by reason that being provided with as good Guns as their 
* The Guns placed in the Galleries of the Galleys.  Coursiers, they are capable to do them a great deal of harm if they come too near them.  
Tho the King of Spain should increase his Forces of one half in that Sea, which he cannot do without a great Expense, he would not be in a condition to repair the harm we could do him, by reason of the Union of our Forces and the Division of his.  
Such a Body may attempt any thing, it may attack the Spanish Armies in their Ports, when they are assembling there, experience having convinced us in the retaking the Isles of St. Marguerit and St. Honorat, that floating Fortresses, prevail over the most secure of the Sea, when Men know how to use them boldly.  
By this means your Majesty will preserve the Liberty of the Princes of Italy, who have been hitherto as it were, Slaves to the King of Spain.  
You will encourage those who have endeavoured to cast off the Yoke of that Tyranny, which they only bear because they cannot free themselves from it, and foment the Faction of those who are Frenchmen in their Hearts.  
The late King your Father, having ordered Monsieur d' Alincourt to make reproaches to the Great Duke Ferdinand, for having made a new engagement with Spain, notwithstanding the Alliance he had contracted with him, by the Marriage of the Queen your Mother: The Great Duke after having given a patiented hearing to what he said to him upon that subject, made an answer which signified much in few words, and which must be considered by your Majesty and by your Successors; Had the King had forty Galleys at Marselles, I would not have done what I have done.  
The Passage Pignerol gives your Majesty into Italy, being well preserved, if you open another by Sea, time and the steadiness which will be observed in your Councils, the inconstancy of which is feared upon the account of the Levity of our Nation, will alter the Hearts of many Italians, or rather will encourage them to show what they have been all along.  
Italy is looked upon as the Heart of the World, and indeed it is the noblest part of the Empire of the Spaniards, it is the place where they dread most be be attacked and troubled, and that in which it is most easy to obtain great advantages over them, provided we go about it as we should do.  
And consequently, tho' one had not design to do them any harm, nevertheless it is necessary to be in a condition to give them a Counter: stab so near the Heart whenever they shall attempt any thing against France, that their Arms may no longer have strength enough to attempt any malicious designs against us.  
That Force will not only keep Spain in Awe, but it will oblige the Grand Signior and his Subjects who only measure the Power of distant Kings, by that which they have at Sea, to be more careful than they have been hitherto, to keep the Treaties they made with them.  
Algiers, Tanis, and all the Coast of Barbary, will respect and fear your Power, whereas, they have despised it hitherto with an incredible infidelity.  
In that case the Barbarians will either live willingly in Peace with your Majest's Subjects, or if they are not so wise as to do it, they will be compelled to do that by Force, which they have refused to do by Reason.  
Whereas at present tho' we think we have no War with them, we receive all the Evils of it, and we neither enjoy Peace, nor the advantage we ought to reap by it; We will find Calm and Safety in War, which is very advantageous with Men whose natural Infidility is so great, that there is no way to avoid it but by Force.  
It now remains to examine the Expense, which will be necessary for the maintenance of the number of Ships above projected, which though never so great will be inconsiderable in comparison of the advantages we will receive by it; And yet it may be done with two Millions and five hundred thousand Livers, according as it will appear by the Settlement which will be inserted at the end of this Work.   

SECTION. VI Which Treats of Trade, as a dependency of the Power of the Sea, and specifies those which aremost Convenient.  
IT is a Common but a very true saying, that as States often are Enlarged by War, so they are commonly enriched in time of Peace by Trade.  
The Wealth of the Hollanders, which properly speaking are only a handful of Men reduced into a Corner of the Earth, in which there is nothing but Waters and Meadows, is an Example and Proof of the usefulness of Trade, which admits of no contestation.  
Tho that Country produces nothing but Butter and Cheese, yet they furnish all the Nations of Europe with the greatest part of what is necessary to them.  
Navigation has made them so famous, and so powerful throughout the whole World: That after having made themselves Masters of the Trade of the East Indies, to the prejudice of the Portugueze who had been long settled there; they have cut out a great deal of Work for the Spaniards in the West Indies, where they enjoy the Major part of Brasil.  
As in England the greatest part of those whose Circumstances are the least easy maintain themselves by common Fisheries the most Considerable drive a greater Trade in all the Parts of the World, by the Manufactures of their Cloth, and by the Sale of Lead, Tynn, and Sea Cole, which are productions of their Country. The Kingdom of China, the Entrance into which is allowed to no body, is the only Country in which that Nation has no Place settled for their Trade.  
The City of Genoa which only abounds in Rocks makes so good a Use of its Trade, that I may safely affirm that it is the Richest City in Italy, if the succours of Spain. 
* The Manuscript is defective in this place. —  
France only abounding too much within itself, has hitherto neglected Trade, though they are as conveniently seated for it as their Neighbours, and might free themselves of the assistance they receive from them on that account at their own Cost.  
The Fisheries of the Ocean are the easiest, and most useful Commerce, which can be made in this Kingdom. It is the more necessary, in that there is no State in the World so well Peopled as France.  
That the Number of those who are out of the Road to Heaven, is very inconsiderable compared to the Catholics, who living under the Laws of the Roman Church, abstain the third part of the year from the use of Meat.  
And that none of the dispensations practised in Spain are used there, to eat Meat at all times under a specious pretence.  
Trade will be the easier for us, in that we have a great number of Sea Men, who heitherto have been obliged to seek out employment among our Enemies, having none at home, and we have made no other use of them hitherto but to get salt Fish and Herrings. But having wherewith to employ our Mariners, instead of being Constrained to strengthen our Enemies, by weakening ourselves, we will be able to carry into Spain and other Countries, that which they have hitherto brought to us, by the assistance of our Men who serve them.  
France is so fertile in Corn, so abounding in Wine, Flax and Hemp to make Cloth and Riggings so necessary for Navigation, that Spain, England, and all other Neighbouring States, must have recourse thither.  
And provided we know how to improve the advantages which Nature has given us, we will get money of those who have occasion for our Goods, without troubling ourselves much with their Commoditys which are of little use to us.  
Spanish, English and Dutch , are only superfluous; we may make them as good as theirs, getting Wool from Spain as they do. Moreover we may have them more conveniently, upon the account of our Corn, and Linen , if we will exchange them to make a double gain.  

* The Draps de Sceau, are made at Rouen, and the Draps de Meunier at Remorantin, and Elbaeuf.  Our Kings having made a shift with Draps de Berry, we may very well make a shift now with Draps de Sceau, and de Meunier or Miller's Cloth, which are now made in France, without having recourse to those that are made abroad, the use of which will be abolished by this means, as well as the Serges of Chalons and of Chartres have abolished those of Milan.  
And indeed the Draps de Sceau are insomuch request in the Levant, that next to those of Venice made with Spanish Wool, the Turks prefer them to all others; and the Cities of Marselles, and of Lions. have heitherto driven a very great Trade in them  
France is Industrious enough, Not to stand in need of the best Manufactures of our Neighbours such fine Plushes are made at Tours, that they are sent into Spain, Italy and other foreign Countries, the Plain Tafetas which are made there also, are so much in Vogue throughout France, that there is no need to look for any elsewhere. Red, Purple and Spotted Velvers, are made finer there now than at Genoa: It is also the only place in which Silk Serges are made. Mohair is made as good there as in England; the sinest  of Gold are made finer there, and Cheaper than in Italy.  
So that we may easily forbear that Trade, which only serves to foment our Laziness, and to feed our Pride, to stick solidly to that which may increase our Wealth, and employ our Mariners, insomuch that our Neighbours may not improve our labours at their cost.  
Over and above those above specified which are the best in the Ocean, many others may be made.  
The Skinner's Trade of Canada is the more necessary, because there is no need of carrying Money there, and that they take such Commodities in Exchange, as scizzer Cases, Knives, small Pen-knives, Needles, Pins, Bills, Hatchets, Watches, Hatbands, Points, and other sorts of Mercery Wares.  
That of the Coast of Guiny in Africa, in which the Portgueze have long possessed a place called castle de Mine, which the Hollanders of the West-India-Company have taken from them within these 2 or 3 years is of the same nature, in that the only Goods exported there, are Pedlars Wares, Canvas and course Linen , in exchange of which the Negroes give Golden Powder.  
The Merchants of Roans have formerly driven a Trade of Linen and woollen  in the Kingdom of Fez and of Morrocco, by means of which they got a great deal of Gold.  
Were the King's Subjects strong in Shipping, they might engross all the Trade of the North, which the Dutch have got, by reason that the North standing absolutely in need of Wine, Vinegar, and Brandywine, of Chestnuts, of Pruens, and of Nuts; all Commodities in which the Kingdom abounds, and which cannot be consumed in it, it is easy to make a considerable Trade of them, and the better in that returns may be made of Wood, of Copper, of Pitch and Tar; things not only useful for ourselves, but necessary for our Neighbours, who can not get them from them without our Goods, unless they will lose the freight of their Ships in going thither.  
I do not enter into the particulars of the Trade which may be driven in the East-Indies, and in Persia, by reason that the humour of the French being so hasty, that they will see the effects of their desires as soon as they have conceived them: Long Voyages are not suitable with their temper.  
However as abundance of Silks and Carpets are brought from Persia, many Curiosities from China, and all manner of Spices from divers places in those parts of the World, which are of great use to us, that Trade is not to be neglected.  
To make a good Settlement, it would be necessary to send two or three Ships into the East, Commanded by Persons of Quality, Prudence, and Wisdom, with Patents and necessay Powers, to Treat with those Princes, and to Make Allyances with the People on all sides, as the Portugueze, English, and Dutch have done.  
This design would succeed the better, by reason that those who have taken a footing in those Nations, are very much hated by them at present, either because they have deceived them, or because they have subdued them by Force.  
As to the West, there is no great Trade to be expected there, Drake, Thomas Cavendish, Sperberg, L'Hermite, le More, and the late Count Maurice, who sent twelve Ships thither of 500 Tuns, on purpose to Trade there, either by way of Friendship, or by Force, not having been able to make any settlements there; there is but little to be hoped for on that side, unless a Military Force be sent thither to take possession of the places Spain possesses there at present.  
The little Isles of St. Christopher, and others seated at the Head of the Indies may yield some Tobacco, some Skins, and other things of small consequence.  
THERE NOW REMAINS TO KNOW WHAT MAY BE DONE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.  
Trade of the Mediterranean.  
Memorial of the different Trades driven in the Levant.  
Napoli de Romania.  The French carry some Goods there and Money, and bring back Silks, Goat's Leather, Wool, Wax, and Chief, part of which is distributed and sold in Italy. 
Satalia.  The French only carry Money there, and bring back Cotton, Wax, and all manner of Goat Skins. 
Smyrna.  The French carry more Goods there than Money, abundance of Merchandise going off there, for Chio, the Archipelago and Constantinople. The Goods carried there, are Paper, Caps, Draps de Paris, and of Languedoc, Brasil Wood, Cutchaneal, Spices, Satins made at Lions; and sometimes they bring back Persian Silks, and Rubarbs, which the Persians bring thither, Cottons spun into Thread, Wax, Mastic, and course Carpets. 
Scala Nova.  Sometimes our Ships take in Wheat and Legumes there. 
Constantinople.  The French carry abundance of Goods there, which are the same that are carried to Smyrna, excepting Gold, Silver, and Silk Stuff, and very seldom Money; they bring back Leather and Wool, there being nothing else; and often not finding Commodities for the Goods that have been sold there, they are obliged to send the said Money to Smyrna to be employed there, or else it is remitted by Bills of Exchange to Aleppo, there are always abundance of Goods to be bought there to carry into Christendom. 
Isle of Cyprus.  In which there are divers Ports; Money is carried thither, some  and Caps; and in return we take Cotton spun into Thread, Silks made in the said Isles, and some Drugs. 
Alexandria and the Port of Aleppo.  
Abundance of Merchandise and Money are carried thither from France. Those Goods are the same which are carried to Smyrna. And vast quantities of Silks and Drugs are taken in there, all sorts of Cottons, Oak Apples, Goat Skins, which they style of the Levant, Red, Yellow, and Blue, Callicos, and sometimes Indian Goods, which are brought there from Persia. Before the English, and Dutch went into the Indies, all Persian Silks, Drugs, and other Goods were brought to Aleppo, from whence they were brought to Marseilles, and from thence they were afterwards sold throughout France, England, Holland and Germany. And now the said English and Hollanders, have taken away the said Trade from us, and do not only furnish all France with Persian Goods, but also with those they buy on the Grand Seignior's Territories, which they carry through Persia to Goa, where they lad.  
The Goods that are brought from the Levant, are disposed of in Sicily, Naples, Genoa, Leghorn, Majorca, and throughout Spain, Flanders, and Germany.  
Seyda, the Port of Tripoli, Barut, and St. John d'Acre.  The French carry some Commodities thither, and for the most part Money; they bring back from thence Silks, spun Cottons, Ashes to make Soap, Drugs which come from Damascus, sometimes they take in Rice, and when they have a good Crop of Wheat, they suffer our Ships to take lading of it. 
Alexandria, the Port of Egypt and Grand Cairo.  
The French carry several French Commodities thither, as Cloth, Paper, Brasil, Cochaneal; but more Money than Goods; they take in their Natron, Drugs of divers sorts, and most of the Goods which sell in Italy or in Spain.  
Formerly all sorts of Spices were brought to Alexandria through the Red Sea, which were carried to Marseilles; but now the English and Hollanders go into the Indies, we must buy them of them.  
Tunis.  Wine is transported thither from Marseilles, Hony, Tartar, Cloth, Paper, and other Goods, and seldom any Money, and Leather and Wax is taken in there. 
Algiers and the adjacent Ports.  The same Commodities are often carried thither from Marseiles which are carried to Tunis, and Leather and Wax, are also brought from thence. 
I own I have been long deceived in the Trade the Proveneals drive in the Levant.  
I was of opinion with many others, that the said Trade was prejudicial to the State, thinking according to the common notion of the World, that it exhausted the Money of the Kingdom, in exchange of Goods no wise useful, and only fit to indulge the Luxuriousness of our Nation.  
But having made an exact enquiry into the Nature of that Trade, condemned by the public voice, I have altered my opinion upon such solid grounds, that whoever will know them, will certainly think I have done it with Reason.  
It is certain that we stand in absolute need of most of the Commodities of the Levant, as Silks, Cottons, Wax, Goat Skins, Rhubarb, and several other Drugs which are necessary to us.  
It is also certain that if we do not fetch them, Strangers will bring them to us, and get the profit, we might get ourselves.  
It is likewise certain that we do not carry near so much. Money into the Levant, as French Commodities: our Hemp, our Linen Cloth, our Timber to build Ships are in greater request there than Money.  
Those who understand the Trade of the Levant, know that the Money which is carried thither, is not of the growth of France, but Spain, from whence we draw it by the Traffic of those very Commodities we bring from the Levant; which is very observable.  
They are moreover sensible that the more the City of Marseilles Trades into the Levant, the richer it is in Money.  
That the Silks and spun Cotton which are the principal Commodities which come from the Levant, are wrought in France, and from thence transported into Foreign Countries, with a profit of Cent. per Cent upon the buying of the said Manufacture. That the said Trade maintains a vast number of Workman, and that it preserves us.  
That it employs abundance of Seamen, useful in time of Peace, and necessary in War.  
Finally, That the Customs of the said Trade amount to a great deal of Money.  
And therefore it is evident that the said Trade is not only advantageous, but absolutely necessary.  
Whatever advantages may accrue by the Trade of the two Seas, the French will never apply themselves to it with delight, unless the means appear as easy to them, as the end is useful.  
One of the best expediments to encourage them for their own good, is that your Majesty would be pleased yearly to fallen them some of your Ships at an easy rate, on condition that they shall employ them for Trade, and not sell them out of the Kingdom.  
This Medium applying a Remedy to their impatience, which does not permit them to tarry for the building of a Ship, to make use of it, will be the more agreeable to them, in that it will enable them to reap almost as soon as they have sown.  
Beside the profit that will thereby accrue to private persons, the State will receive a considerable advantage by such an Order; by reason that the Merchants will be very considerable in six years' time by the number of their Ships, and in a condition to assist the Kingdom in case of need, as it is practised in England, where the King makes use of his Subjects Ships, in time of War, without which he would not be so powerful at Sea, as he is.  
Moreover the number of Ships your Majesty designs to keep, will not be lessened by it, since the Public Docks you have been pleased to re-establish, will furnish you yearly as many as you please.  
There is no State in Europe fit to build Ships than this Kingdom, abounding in Hemp, Linen Cloth, Iron, Rigging, and in Workmen whom our Neighbours commonly debauch from us, because they are not employed at home.  
The Rivers Loire and Garrone have such convenient places for Docks, that Nature seems to have designed them for that use.  
The cheapness of Victuals for the Workmen and the conveniencies of divers Rivers which disburden themselves into them, and bring all manner of necessaries, justify the said Proposition.  
If next to this Expedient, your Majesty will think fit to grant Merchandising some Prerogatives to give a Rank to Merchants, whereas your Subjects are obliged to obtain it by divers Offices, which are only good to maintain their idleness, and to please their Wives, you will restore Trade to that degree, that every one, and all in general will be advantaged by it.  
In fine, if besides those two Favours, you will be pleased, to take a particular care to clear these two Seas from Pirates, which may easily be done; France will soon add to its Natural Plenty, what Trade affords to the most barren Countries.  
Six Guard Ships of two hundred Tuns, and six Pinnaces well Armed, will be sufficient to secure the Ocean, provided the said Ships keep constantly at Sea.  
And in order to secure the Sea of the Levant, it will also be sufficient to put out to Sea yearly towards the month of April, a Squadron of ten Galleys, steering their Course towards the Isles of Corsica and Sardinia, cruising all along the Coast of Barbary, unto the straits, steering the same Course back again, not to come home again until the Wether compels them to it, at which time six Ships well Equipped shall put out to Sea in their room, to perform their Caravan in the Winter time.   

SECTION VII. Which shows that Gold and Silver are one of the principal and most necessary supporters of the State; declares the means to make this Kingdom Powerful in that kind: shows the revenue of the same at present, and how it may be improved for the Future, in discharging the People of three parts in four of the Burden which overwhelms them at this Time.  
IT is an old saying, that the Finances are the sinews of a State; and it certainly is the point of Archimedes which being firmly settled, Inables to move all the World.  
A necessitous Prince can never undertake a Glorious Action, and necessity engendering Contempt. He can never be reduced to that condition without being exposed to the Efforts of his Enemy's and of those who are Envious of his Grandeur.  
Gold and Silver, are the Tyrants of the World, and tho' their Empire is unjust in itself, it is sometimes so reasonable, that we must suffer the Dominion of it; and sometimes it is so extravagant that it is impossible not to detest the yoke of it, as altogether Insupportable.  
There must be, as I have already observed it, a proportion between what the Prince draws from his Subjects, and what they can give him, not only without ruining themselves, but without a notable Inconvenience.  
As it is reasonable not to exceed the Power of those that give, neither can less be exacted than what the necessity of the State Requires.  
None but Pedants, and the real enemies of the State, can say, that a Prince ought not to exact any thing from his Subjects, and that his sole Treasure ought to lay in the Hearts of those who are submitted under his Dominion.  
But at the same time, none but Flatterers, and the true Plagues of the State, and of the Court, can Insinuate to Princes, that they may exact what they please, and that in that Case their Will is the Rule of their Power.  
Nothing can be more easy than to find plausible Reasons, to raise Money even when there is no necessity for it; neither is any thing less difficult than to produce apearent arguments, to Condemn the same though never so necessary.  
Men must lay aside all Passions, to be able to Judge, and to decide, what is reasonable on such occasions, and there is no small difficulty to find the dertain point of a just Proportion.  
The Expenses which are absolutely necessary for the subsistence of the State, being fixed, the less a Prince can raise among the People is the best.  
In order not to be forced to raise great sums, it is necessary to spend little, and the best way to make moderate expenses, is to banish all Profusion, and to Condemn whatever may tend to that end.  
France would be too Rich, and the People too abounding, if it did not suffer the dissipation of the public Revenue, which other States spend with rule.  
They lose more, in my opinion, than some Kingdoms who pretend some Equality with us, Commonly spend.  
A Venetian Ambassador told me, one day, wittily upon this Subject, speaking of the Wealth of France, that in order to make us perfectly happy, he only wished we knew as well how to spend that well, which we dissipate without reason, as the Republic knew how to lay out every Quatrain, without waste, and without overmuch husbandry.  
If it were possible to regulate the appetite of the French, I would think that the best way to manage the King's purse, were to have recourse to that expedient; but as it is impossible to prescribe bounds to the greediness of our Nation, the only way to contain them is to use them as Physicians do famished Pationts, whom they constrain to use abstinence, by keeping all manner of Victuals from them.  
To that end it is necessary to reform the Finances, by the suppression of the chief means, by which Men get money unlawfully out of the King's Coffers.  
Among them all, none are so dangerous as that of the 
* Persons employed to pay private services.  Comptans, the abuse of which is grown to that height, that not to remedy it, and to ruin the State is one and the same thing.  
Tho it is useful to use them on some occasions, and that it seems necessary in others, nevertheless the great inconveniences, and the abuses which arise by it do so far surpass their usefulness, that it is absolutely necessary to abolish them.  
Whole Millions will be saved by this means, and a thousand concealed profusions will be redressed, which it is impossible to discover as long as the secret ways of spending the public Treasure will be in use.  
I am sensible that some will urge that there are some foreign expenses, which by their Nature must be kept secret, and which the State may receive considerable advantages by, which it will be deprived of whenever those in favour of whom they may be made, will think they can get no more Money out of them.  
But so many robberies are committed under that Pretence, that I am of opinion upon mature deliberation, that it is better to lose some advantages which may accrue by it, than to be thereby exposed to all the abuses which may be daily committed to the ruin of the State.  
However not to Obstruct the means of making some secret Expenses to the advantage of the State, a million of Gold may be allowed for the said private expenses, on condition that the laying of it out shall be signed by the King himself, and that those who shall have a share in it, shall give acquittances for the same.  
If any one urges that these Comptans are necessary for the remitments which are in use, I say that it is one of the reasons, for which it is fit to remove them.  
Since Men have lived in former ages without the aforesaid Comptans, the same may be done again, and if in laying aside the use of them, the use of Farming were also abrogated, instead of doing any harm, it will do a great deal of good.  
Some perhaps may wonder, why, since I know the use of the 
* Persons employed to pay private services.  Comptans to be of ill consequence, I did not retrench it in my time.  
The great Henry was sensible of the evil established in his Predecessor's time, and could not remove it.  
The Troubles, and Intestine broils, the foreign Wars, and consequently the great Expenses, and the extraordinary Farms the King has been obliged to make and to let out to raise Money, have not permitted the thinking on the Execution of so good an advice.  
The ruining the Huguenot Party, abating the Pride of the Grandees, maintaining a great War against Powerful Enemy's, in order to secure the future Tranquillity of the State by a good Peace, are all means which have been used to reach the ends proposed, since that is the way to remove the Causes of the Toleration of those abuses.  
The Subject of the Comptains, having given me an occasion to speak of the letting out of extraordinary Farms, I cannot forbear saying that the great augmentations of the revenue, which may be made that way are so far from being advantageous to the State, that on the Contrary they are very prejudicial, and Inpoverish it, instead of Enriching it.  
Perhaps this proposition may be looked upon at first as a Paradox; but it is impossible to examine it carefully, without discovering the Justice and Truth thereof.  
The King's Revenue can only be increased by the augmentation of the Impositions which are laid on all sorts of Commoditys, and therefore it is evident that increasing the revenue that way, Expenses are increased at the same time, since those things must be bought dearer, which were bought cheaper before.  
If Mear grows dearer, if the Price of Stufs, and of other things rises, the Soldiers will not be able to maintain themselves, and consequently it will be necessary to augment their Pay, and the salary of all Workmen will be greater than it was before, which will make the increase of the Expense answerable to the augmentation of the Revenue and though it will be a great grievance to the People, the Prince will be but very little the better for it.  
Poor Gentlemen whose Estates consist in Land will not improve their Revenue by such Impositions; the Fruits of the Earth, will hardly rise in Price, at least for their advantage, and if the Times make them dear the less of them will be sold, so that at the Year's end, the poor Gentry will find no augmentation in their Revenue, though a very considerable one in their Expenses, by reason that the new subsidies will raise the Price of all those things which are necessary for the maintenance of their Families, which they will make shift to maintain at home, tho' poorly, but they will be no longer able to send their Children into the Armies, to serve their King and Country, according to the obligation of their Birth.  
If it be true, as it is most certain, that the sale of those Commodities which your Subjects deal in, diminishes according to the increase of Impositions, it may happen that such augmentations will lessen your Majesty's Duties instead of increasing them.  
If we consider such as are employed in the Kingdom, it is certain that when Goods are at a reasonable price, People buy, and really spend more, than when the price of them is excessive, for than they retrench even those which are most necessary.  
If on the other hand we consider those Commodities which are carried out of the Kingdom, it is plain that Foreigners who have hitherto been encouraged to buy them because they were cheap, will provide their stores elsewhere, if they can better themselves, which will leave France abounding in the Fruits of the Earth, but unprovided of Money: whereas the Impositions being moderate, the great quantity of Fruits which will be Exported by Foreigners, will recompense the loss some may fancy by the moderation of Subsidies.  
Moreover the increase of Impositions is capable to reduce a considerable number of the King's Subjects to idleness, since it is certain that the major part of the poor People and Workmen employed in Manufactures, will rather be idle and do nothing, than consume their whole life in an ungrateful useless labour, if the unreasonableness of the Subsidies hindering the sale of the Fruits of the Earth, and of their Labour, hinders them at the same time from receiving what they have earned by the sweat of their Body.  
To resume the thread of my Discourse, after having condemned the abuse of the 
* Persons employed to pay Private Services.  Comtans, and demonstrated that the augmentation of Subsidies, is sometimes not only uselss, but often prejudicial; I say that there ought to be a Geometrical proportion between the Subsidies and the necessities of the State, that is, that no Impositions ought to be made but such as are absolutely necessary for the subsistence of the Kingdom, in its Grandeur and Glory.  
Those last words signify much, since they show not only that it is lawful to raise that upon the People which is requisite to preserve the Kingdom whatever condition it may be in, but also to raise that which may be necessary to maintain it with Lustre and Reputation.  
Nevertheless care must be taken not to extend those last conditions so far, as to think that the Prince's bare Will should be, under that pretence, the Rule of those Impositions, Reason must be the only Rule in those cases; and if the Prince exceeds those bounds, exacting more from his Subjects than he ought to do, tho' even in that case they own him Obedience, he will be answerable for it before God, who will call him to a strict account for the same.  
Moreover Reason and Policy, can never allow the increasing of the People's burden, to receive no benefit by it: those that do it, draw public Maledictions upon their Heads, which are attended with very ill consequences, since it is certain that the Prince who exacts more than he should do from his Subjects, only exhausts their Love and Fidelity, which are far more necessary towards the Subsistance of the State, and the Preservation of his Person, than the Gold and Silver he may hoard in his Coffers.  
I am very sensible that in a great State it is always necessary to have a Fund to supply unexpected occasions; but that Fund must be proportioned to the Riches of the State, and to the quantity of the Coined Gold and Silver which is in the Kingdom; and unless it be regulated by that, the Riches of the Prince, would prove his Poverty, since his Subjects would no longer have any Fund themselves, either to keep up Trading, or to pay the lawful Duties they own their Sovereign.  
As a Prince ought to be careful to lay up Money to supply the necessities of the State, and Religious in preserving it, when there is no necessity to lay it out, he must be liberal in employing it when Public good requires it, and in doing it in due time; for delays in such cases are often dangerous to the State, and time thus lost, is never to be retrieved.  
We have examples of Princes who to preserve their Money, have lost both it and their States together, and it is most certain that those who lay out their Money with regret, commonly spend more than others, because they do it too late: It requires a great deal of Judgement to know the most important hours and moments, and some may be capable to lay up, who not knowing how to lay out, may occasion unutterable misfortunes.  
But whereas general Maxims are always useless, unless a proper application be made of them; there now remains to see,  
What the revenue of this Kingdom may amount to.  
What the Expense of it may be.  
What Fund is necessary to be kept in the Coffers; and to what degree the People may be eased.  
The Revenue of this Kingdom may be considered in two respects.  
Either as it may be in time of Peace, without altering the advance of Money which is drawn at present out of the general Receipts and Farms, making no other augmentation save that which may be made in reducing the old Rents which will be preserved, to six per Cent, as well as the Salary of certain Officers, who will rather suffer the Diminution of the same, than the Suppression of their Places with reimbursements.  
Or, as it may be, in making certain alterations, thought so reasonable, and so useful, by those in whose Hands I have seen the Management of the Finances, that in their opinion no other opposition is to be feared but that of Novelty.  

* 
Rents created upon the City, at 8 per Cont.  
Salt, one Million 231411 Livers.  
Aids 851000 Livers.  
General Receipts 474184 Livers.  
All these Rents have been constituted from the year 1551 until 1558.  
No Rents have been created in the Reign of Henry the 4th nor even in that of Henry the 3d. There are 23 Generalities; in every Office 24 Officers, which are in all 552. every one of which having 1000 Crowns Salary, the third part thereof amounts to 552000 Livers.   By the first Settlement, the Exchequer m●y expect to receive 35 Millions of Livers yearly, according to the following acount.  
By the Taille, 17 Millions 350000 Livers.  
By all the Gabelles, 5 Millions 250000 Livers.  
By the Aids, one Million 400000 Livers.  
By the Reduction of Rents to 6 per Cent, one Million.  
By the Reduction of the Treasurers of France to two thirds of their Salary, which they will willingly consent to, provided they are freed from the new Taxes they are daily plagued with, 552000 Livers.  
Des Parties Casuelles, which is the Income the King receives by the Sale of Offices, and the Annual Duty paid him out of the same, two Millions.  
By the Farm of Bourdeaux, 800000 Livers.  
By 3 Livers per Muid of Wine for the entrance into Paris, 700000 Livers.  
By the ancient 30 Pence and the new addition of ten more for entrance upon every Muid of Wine brought into Paris, 503000 Livers.  
By the Farm of 45 Pence instead of the Tolls, 503000 Livers.  
By the 9 Livers 18 Pence per Tun of Picrady, 154000 Livers.  
By the Farm of Brovage, 250000 Livers.  
By the Exportation of Goods from Languedoc, Spices and Drugs from Marseilles, and two per Cent from Arles, 380000 Livers.  
By the third additional Tax of Lions, 60000 Livers.  
By the five great Farms, two Millions 400000 Livers.  
By the new Impositions of Normandy, 240000 Livers.  
By those of the River Loire 225000 Livers.  
By the Farm of Iron, 80000 Livers.  
By the Sales of common Woods, 550000 Livers.  
By the Demeans, 550000 Livers.  
By the second Settlement, discharging the People absolutely of the 17 Millions of Livers, which the King receives at present by the Tails, the Receipt may amount to 50 Millions, as the following account will clearly justify.  
By an Imposition to be put upon Salt, or upon the Fens, in all the Provinces of the Kingdom, the King may receive all Charges being paid 20 Millions.  
By a Penny per Liver upon all the Merchandise and Commodities of the Kingdom, 12 Millions.  
By the Aids, one Million 400000 Livers.  
By the Reduction of the price of the Rents constituted on the 
* Like Guild-Hall.  Hostel de Ville, six Millions.  
By the Reduction of the Treasurers of France 550 thousand Livers.  
By the Income the King receives by the Sale of Offices and the Annual Duty paid him for the same, two Millions.  
By the Farm of Bourdeaux, 1800000 Livers.  
By the three Livers per Muid of Wine entrance into Paris, by a new Imposition, 700000 Livers.  
By the ancient 30 Pence, and the new addition of ten more for the entrance of every Muid of Wine into Paris, 580000 Livers.  
By the Farm of 45 Pence instead of the Tolls and Grants, 530000 Livers.  
By the 9 Livers 18 Pence per Tun of Piccardy, 174000 Livers.  
By the Farm of Brovage, 254000 Livers.  
By the Exportation of Goods from Languedoc, Spices and Drugs from Marseilles, two per Cent from Mies, 380000 Livers.  
By the additional Tax of Lions, 60000 Livers.  
By the five great Farms, two Millions 400000 Livers.  
By the new Impositions of Normandy, 250000 Livers.  
By those of the River Loire, 225000 Livers.  
By the Farm of Iron, 80000 Livers.  
By the Sale of common Woods, 550000 Livers.  
By the Demeans, 550000 Livers.  
Sum Total, 50 Millions 483000 Livers.  
I am very certain that this Settlement being well understood, will be found just and reasonable by all those who have any Experience and Capacity in the direction of States.  
Among the several superintendants of the Finances in my time, I have known some of the most learned in what relates to the Treasury, who equalled the bare Imposition upon Salt, or upon the Fens, to the King of Spain's Indieses, and who preserved that secret as the true foundation of the ease of the People, of the Reformation, and of the Wealth of the State.  
And indeed let Men be never so dull, they must needs be sensible that it is impossible to express the discharge, and satisfaction the People would receive, if they were allowed to use Salt as they do Wheat, every one buying no more than he thought fit, and could employ.  
It is certain that the suppression which would be made of the great number of Officers, which are established for the Imposition of the Salt, and the deliverance of the Disputes and Law-Suits they often commence to discharge their Trust, and sometimes out of Malice, to constrain the People to take the Salt that is imposed upon them, would be a wonderful ease to them.  
It is moreover certain, that one might easily recompense the Provinces, which hitherto have enjoyed the Exemption of Salt, by such a discharge of Tailles, that if for the future they were obliged to buy it dearer than they have done heretofore, the Diminution of the Taille would be equivalent to the augmentation of the price of the Salt, to which they would be liable, tho' they should buy it freely.  
It is also certain, that tho' it may be said, that the Diminutions of the Tailles only relate to the People, and that the augmentation of the price of Salt, which has hitherto been sold in the Provinces without any Imposition, would concern the Clergy, the Nobility, and those who are free. All of them would receive the benefit of the Diminution of the Tailles, bp reason that the Revenue of the Tailles being taken off, the Revenue of Estates would increase according as the Farmers who rend them were discharged of the Impositions which are laid on the Estates, they Farm.  
Finally, It is certain, that notwithstanding the difficulties of such an Establishment, might prove great, yet they might be overcome.  
If after having considered this Establishment of the Salt, we examine that of the Penny per Liver, it will be found the more just, in that it is established in many Countries, and that it has already been resolved upon twice, by the Body of the State, under the Great King Francis, and in the Assembly of the Notables at Roans, under the Great Henry of Eternal Memory.  
Nevertheless whereas Suspicions are so natural in the People, and in communities, that they commonly place their principal safety in their dissidence, which ever induces them to fear that what is most useful for them, will prove disadvantageous, and that great alterations are for the most part liable to dangerous Revolutions. Instead of advising such an establishment, I presume to advise the contrary, and the more boldly, because such Novelties must never be attempted, unless they are ablolutely necessary.  
Now France is so far from being under such circumstances, that on the contrary I am of opinion that it will be much easier to ease the People, and to enrich the State, without having recourse to such expedients, than in putting them in practice: seeing that tho' there is no difficulty in it but what may be overcome; yet undoubtedly much greater would be met with, in having recourse to such alterations.  
In order to verify this proposition, it will be sufficient to examine the Expenses one may make a shift with in time of Peace, and to see what improvement may be made with the Money the times will allow to lay up.  
The Safety and Grandeur of the Kingdom will allow no diminition of the expenses of War, above mentioned, which will amount near unto twelve Millions.  
The Charge of the usual Garrisons, which amounts yearly to three Millions, might be suppressed, both because the major part of the Forces which will then be maintained by the State will be quartered in the said Garrisons, and by reason that the best part of the said three Millions are only taken out of the King's Purse, to enrich the governor's, who commonly keep but ten Men, when they should have a hundred.  
But whereas it is difficult, not to have some Privileged places of such consequence, that it would be impossible to refuse the Governors of the same, some particular Garrisons, to enable them the better to answer for them, as being of their own choice; In my opinion it will be proper to retrench two thirds of the said Expense, to reduce it to one Million.  
The Expense of the Western and Eastern Sea, cannot be less than of two Millions 500000 Livers, as it appears by the particular Settlements of the same.  
That of the Artillery will amount to 600000 Livers.  
That of the King's, the Queen's, and Monsieurs Households, to three Millions 500000 Livers.  
The Pensions paid to the swissers, which cannot be retrenched in honour, amounts to 400000 Livers.  
The Buildings will cost 300000 Livers.  
AMbassadors 250000 Livers.  
The Fortifications 600000 Livers.  
All the Pensions might absolutely be retrenched, which cost the King four Millions; but as it is impossible to pass from one extreme to another without a medium, and that the Court of France is not used to resist importunities, tho' never so unjust; I am of opinion that it will be sufficient to retrench one half of them. Which is the more necessary, in that it is advantageous for the Public, that the Idleness of Courtiers may meet with no roward, and that they may be all annexed to the Perils of the War, and thus Pensions and Salaries will only amount to two Millions for the future.  
The King's Gentlemen in Ordinary, 50000 Livers.  
Warrants for the payment of certain sums 400000 Livers.  
Casual Accounts, and the King's Progresses, two Millions.  
Arrears of Duties, 150000 Livers.  
The King's Privy Purse, 300000 Livers.  
All these Expenses amount only to 25 Millions, which being deducted out of 35 to which the Receipt amounts; there will remain ten, which for the first year shall be employed towards the diminution of the Tailles.  
The true way to enrich the State, is to ease the People, and to discharge both of their Burdens: In lessening the Charges of the State, the Tailles may be diminished, and no otherwise; and therefore it is the chief end which ought to be proposed in the Regulation of this Kingdom.  

* 
Of 44 Millions to which all the different sorts of Leveys, which are raised upon the People by virtue of the brief of the Taille amount; thereare 26 Millions employed towards the payment of the Charges settled upon the Taille, which consist in Rents, or in Salaries and Taxation of Offices, or in Rights which have been engaged to them.  
Tho' the Farm of the Aids produces yearly 4 Millions, there is but 400000 Livers returned out of it into the Exchequet. The Rents Salaries, Taxationis, and Rights engaged upon the said Aids, consume all the rest, which is upwards of three Millions and a half.  
Notwithstanding all the Gabelles produce near 19 Millions, there is only five Millions 500000 and odd Livers of the same returned into the Exchequer, because the remaindor which amounts to near 13 Millions is employed towards the payment of the Rents created upon the said Gabelles, or towards the Salaries, Taxations and Duties of the Officers of the Magazines of Salt, or towards the Salaries of the Parliament of Paris, Chamber of Accounts, Court of Aids, Grand Council or the King's Secretaries.  
Although all the other Farms of the State produce twelve Millions, the King receives but ten of them, because upwards of two Millions must be deducted out of the same which are settled for the payment of some Rents. Salary of Officers, Taxations and alienated Duties.   In order to take true measures in an Affair of that consequence, it is necessary to know that tho' all the Levies which are made in this Kingdom amount to near 80 Millions; upwards of 45 of the same are employed in Charges, which may be so well husbanded, that whereas we may say at present, that the said Charges prove the King's Ruin: I dare affirm that the King will be eased and enriched by the means thereof.  
Many without doubt will be of opinion, that it would be fit to ease the State of all that burden, but as it is impossible to make agreat Body subsist without divers Expenses absolutely necessary for its maintenance. As the weight of all these Charges together cannot be born by the State, so the entire suppression of the same cannot be desired with reason.  
Three means may be proposed for the diminution of the said Charges.  
The first is grounded on the over long enjoyment which private persons have had of the King's Money, upon the Fund they have disbursed to acquire the Rents, Offices, and Rights they enjoy.  
I am sensible that it would be easy to dispossess some of the said persons of the Rents and Duties they receive, by making a true supputation of the Sums they have received, in which besides the Interest allowed by the Laws, it would be easy to find the reimbursement of the price at first laid down by them for the same.  
But tho' the Justice of the said expedient were allowed of, Reason would not permit the making use of it, since that in so doing, it would be impossible for the future to find out Money to supply the necessities of the State, Whatever securities were offered.  
Therefore it is necessary to observe that a thing may not be unjust, and yet contrary to Reason, and sound Policy, and to take care never to have recourse to any expedient, which without violating Reason, would nevertheless violate public Faith.  
If any urges that the public must be preferred to private Interest, allowing his proposition, I desire him to consider that in the discussion of this point, those different kinds of Interests are not in the least concerned, but that those of the public, are counterpoised by others of the same nature, and that as the future has a far greater Latitude than the present, which passes in an instant, those Interests which relate to the time to come, must be respected before those of the present, contrary to the custom of sensual Men, who prefer what is at the least distance from them, because the sight of their Reason has no greater extent than that of their Senses.  
If we consider public Faith in this point, as I think it absolutely necessary, the State will be far more eased by it than it would be, tho' part of its Charges should be suppressed without making any new Lives, in that it will remain Master of the Purses of its Members on all occasions, and yet will considerably increase its revenue.  
The second means to diminish the Charges of the Kingdom consists in the reinbursement of the Money which was actually paid by private persons; but the verification of it would prove difficult, since that in order to facilitate the Sale of what the necessity of the State has obliged to alienate that has often been given at four years purchase which appears to be engaged at six.  
This medium though justin itself, is not practicable without giving a pretence to many complaints, tho' ill grounded.  
The third means for the Diminution of the Charges of the State, consists in reimbursing those that are not necessary, at the same price at which they are sold among private persons: Reimbursing the Owners of the Offices of the Rents and of the Duties which will be thought necessary to be suppressed in this manner, they will receive no prejudice, and the King will not make use of the common advantage he has with private persons, who have the liberty to free themselves of the said Debts, when they are able to pay them at the rate they are commonly sold at.  
This medium which is the only one that can be used, may produce its effect divers ways, either in many years' time, by the bare management of the enjoyment of the said Charges, or in one only, by an immense sum of Money which must be had ready by the supply of an extraordinary Fund.  
The natural Impatience of our Nation, not allowing us to hope, that we will be able to persevere 15 or 20 years in the same resolution: The first way which requires so much time, is nowise receivable.  
The great Fund which is necessary to reimburse all at once such immense Charges as those of the State, would make this second proposition as ridiculous as impossible, and so the third only remains practicable.  
In order to make use of it, with so much Justice, that no body may have cause to complain, it is necessary to consider the charges which it will be necessary to suppress in three different manners, according to the divers rates at which they are sold.  

* 
The Major part of the Rents constituted upon the Taille since 1612 are still in the hands of the Grand-farmers', of their Heirs, or of those to whom they have made them over, and they have purchased them at so low a Rate, that they daily expect the retrenchment of them, which would be a far greater grievance to them than the Reimbursement of the same, at the common Price.  
The new Rents established upon the Aids, are only sold at seven years' Purchase, and they amount to two Millions.  
The new Rents upon the Gabelles are sold at seven years and a half Purchase, and they amount to five millions 260 thousand Livers.   The first Rents constituted upon the Taille which are commonly sold at five years' purchase, ought only to be considered and reimbursed at that rate, according to which their Enjoyment of the same makes the Reimbursement of them in seven years and a half.  
The other Rents constituted upon the Taille since the late King's Death, which are paid either in the Elections, or in the General Receipts, must be reimbursed at the rate of six years' purchase, which they are sold at, the Enjoyment of which will only reimburse them in eight years and a half.  
The Offices of Elections with salaries, Taxations of Offices and other Rights which they enjoy must be reimbursed at the rate of eight years' Purchase, which is the common Price of such Places.  
Reason requires the taking of the same method for the Reimbursement of the charges constituted upon the Aids, upon all the Gabelles, upon the five great Farms, upon the Foreign Farm of Languedoc and of Provence, upon the Customs of Lions, upon the Convoy of Bourdeaux, the Custom of Bayone, the Farm of Brovage, and such Reimbursements can only be made by the bare Enjoyment in eleven years' time.  
I am sensible that Rents of that kind are daily sold for less than eight years' Purchase; but I propose the Reimbursement of them at this Rate, for the satisfaction of the parties concerned, being sensible that if in an affair of that importance, there must be a loss, it is better it should fall upon the King than upon them.  
The Rate of all the Reimbursements which can be made, being justly established; it is necessary to consider that there are some Charges so necessary in this Kingdom, or engaged at so high a Rate, that I do not place them among those of which the Reimbusement is to be thought on, by the way I am proposing.  
Those are the salaries of the Parliaments and other sovereign Courts, of the Presidials and royal Courts, of the King's Secretaries, of the Treasurers of France and receivers General.  
Not that I think that no suppression ought to be made in those kind of Offices; that's far from my thoughts: But to proceed with order towards the diminution of the Charges of the Kingdom, Reason requires that one should begin by the Reimbursement of those which are sold at lower rates, and which are inconvenient to the Public.  
For that reason, I prefer the suppression of the Rents established upon the Tailles, and that of many Places of assessors, to all others.  
That of those sorts of Rents, by reason of the lowness of their Price, and that of the assessors, because those offices are the true source of the People's Misery, both upon the account of their Number which is so Excessive, that it amounts to upwards of four Millions in Exemptions, as also of their maladministrations which are so Common, that there is hardly any one Assessor who does not discharge his own Parish; that many draw considerably out of those they have nothing to do with, and that some of them are such abandoned wretches, that they are not afraid of loading themselves with crimes, by adding Impossitions on the People, which they convert to their own use.  
That very consideration is the only one which hinders me at present from speaking of the suppressions of many Offices of judicature, the Multitude of which is useless their Price being as extraordinary as their salaries are Inconsiderable, it would be an ill piece of husbandry to meddle with them, upon the account of the present necessity. When it will be thought fit to lessen the Number of them, the best way in order thereunto will be to make so good a Regulation of the 
* The Annual Duty the said Officers pay to the King.  Paullette, that the said Offices being reduced to a moderate Price, the King may be able when they become vacant, to Reimburse them to the owners, and suppress them at once,  
Neither do I as yet include in the number of the suppressions, the Colleges of the King's Secretaries, the Offices of the Treasurers of France, and the Receivers General, not upon the account of the smallness of their Profit, which is pretty considerable; but upon the account of the sums they have paid for the same which are not small.  
Neither do I put in the old Rents which have been created in the time of your Majesty's Predecessors which are paid in the Office of the City of Paris, both by reason that the actual sums disbursed by the Purchacers, are greater than that of all the rest, and because it is fit that the interest of Subjects should in some manner be mixed with those of their Sovereigns, as also because they are devolved to several Religious Houses, Hospitals, and Communitys, towards the maintenance of which they are necessary; and that having been often divided in Families, they seem to be settled there in such a manner that it would be difficult to remove them without disturbing their settlements.  
Nevertheless in order not to omit any husbandry that may be made with reason, to the advantage of the State, I must observe two things in this place.  
The first is that the Office of the Treasurers of France remaining, a third part of their Salaries may be retrenched, since they will think themselves very favourably used in the general Reformation of the Kingdom, if in securing them against all new Taxes their Salary is redued to two thirds of what they have enjoyed hitherto, and had by their first Creation.  
The second is that in not suppressing the Rents established upon the Town House, in the late King's time, which are all Created at the rate of eight per Cont, which will be the more reasonable in that as no private Persons do allow above six, the owners of the said Rents settled upon the Town-House, will by your Majesty's favour get two per Cent more, in the enjoyment of those of this Nature.  
And as they will find an advantage by this, the King will do the same by reason that the Rents charged upon the State, will be more coveted than those of private Persons, supposing they be paid exactly without any deduction, as in reason they ought to be.  
In order to pay the said Rents as well as the Salary of divers Officers either absolutely necessary or at lest which cannot be suppressed in these Times, I am of opinion that it will be fit to suppress thirty Millions out of the forty five this Kingdom is at present charged with, leaving the rest to acquit the remaining charges.  

* The Rents of which the Courant price is seven years' purchase, will amount justly to six Millions 812 thousand Livers, Viz. six Millions which have been settled out of the eight alienated Millions upon the Tailles in the month of February 1634. 415 thousand Livers settled by Le Sr. Gaillard and his Partners in the month of January 1634. And 112 thousand Livers settled by an Edict of the month of March of the said year, by the Creditors of Moyssel and pay.  Out of the thirty Millions which are to be suppressed, there are near seven, the Reimburstment of which being only to be made at the rate of five years' Purchase, the suppression of the same will be performed in seven years and a half's time● by the bare Enjoyment of the same.  
As many will be found, out of the remaining twenty four, which being to be reimbursed at the rate of six years' Purchase, which is the Currant price of them, will be suppressed in eight years and a half's time, by the bare enjoyment.  
But whereas, as abovesaid, long Wound designs are not the safest in this Kingdom, and that upon that account it is necessary to reduce all the suppressions which are fit to be made to a number of years not exceeding the compass of our Patience; in order to accomplish the Reimbursments which will be undertaken at the same time in which the Rents which are sold at five years' purchase will be suppressed by the very income of the same, an extraordinary Fund must be raised to the Value of a sixth part of the currant price of the Rents, which amounts exactly to seven Millions once paid, for the suppression of as much revenue.  
To accomplish the suppression of the thirty Millions proposed, there still remains 16 to be reimbursed, which must be done at the rate of eight years' purchase, because it is the common price of them.  
And whereas the reimbursement of those sixteen Millions, cannot be performed under twelve years' time by the bare enjoyment of the same, and that it is necessary to shorten that time, to reduce the said suppression to the term of seven years, as well as that of the fourteen preceding Millions, out of eight parts three must be supplied by extraordinary Funds, amounting to 48 Millions.  
Tho' the greatness of the said sum may surprise at first; those who are acquainted with the facility of Affairs of that nature in this Kingdom, will not question the feasibleness of the same, considering that it is only to be paid in seven years' time.  
And Peace will be no sooner settled, but the practice of 
* Farming part of the Revenue.  Parties, which is usual at this time to find out Money, being abolished, those who are bred in those sort of Affairs, not being able to alter their former way of living all of a sudden, will willingly convert all their Industry, to destroy what they have raised, by the same means they did use to establish it at first; That is, to extinguish and suppress by virtue of the Bargains they will make to that effect, the Rents, Rights and Offices, the creation of which they have promoted by virtue of other Bargains.  
Thus the Kingdom may be eased in seven years' time, of thirty Millions of common Charges which it bears at present.  
The People being actually discharged of the 22 Millions of Taille, which is one half of what they bear at present; The Revenue of the Kingdom will be found to amount to 57 Millions, as the following Settlement will justify.  

RECEIPT  
Of the Tailles, 22 Millions.  
Of the Aids, 4 Millions.  
Of all the Gabelles, 19 Millions.  
Of all the other Farms 12 Millions.  
Total, 57 Millions.   
Out of which deducting 17 Millions, which will be yearly put into the Exchequer, the said sum must be looked upon to be so considerable, that there is no State in Christendom which lays up half so much, all the Charges of it being deducted before.  
If next to these suppressions, which will make many persons liable to the Tailles, without their having any reason to complain of it, all Offices are suppressed which are officiated by enrolment or by bare Commissions; if the number of Notaries be regulated, not only such as are Royal, but those of common Jurisdictions, it will ease the People considerably, both in that they will thereby be delivered of so many leeches, and that as there are upwards of 100000 Officers of this kind to be turned out, those who will sinned themselves deprived of their usual employments, will be constrained to follow the Wars, to engage into Trade, or to turn Labourers.  
If in the next place all Exemptions are reduced to the Nobility, and to the Officers in ordinary of the King's Household, it is most certain that the Cities, and Communities which are exempted, the Sovereign Courts, the Offices of the Treasurers of France, the Elections, the Salt Magazines, the Offices of Waters and of Forests, of the Demain, and of the Tithes, the Intendants and Receivers of Parishes, which compose a Body of upwards of 100000 exempted persons, will discharge the People of more than one half of their Tailles; it being also certain that the Richest, which are liable to the greatest Taxes, are those who get exemptions by dint of Money.  
I am sensible that it will be urged, that it is easy to make such Projects, like unto those of Plato's Commonwealth, which tho' fine in his Ideas, is a real Chimaera.  
But I dare affirm, that this design is not only so reasonable, but so easy to execute, that if God pleases to grant your Majesty a speedy Peace, and to preserve you for this Kingdom with your Servants, of which I esteem myself one of the meanest, instead of leaving this Advice by Testament, I hope to accomplish it myself.   

SECTION. VIII. Which shows in few words, that the utmost point of the Power of Princes must consist in the Possession of their Subjects Hearts.  
THe Finances being managed as above written, the People will be absolutely eased, and the King will be Powerful by the Possession of his Subjects Hearts, who considering his care of their Estates, will be inclined to love him out of Interest.  

* Philip de Valois.  Formerly the Kings thought themselves so happy in the Possession of their Subjects Hearts, that some were of opinion that it was better by this means to be King of the French than of France.  
And indeed this Nation had formerly such a Passion for their Princes, that some Authors praise 
* Ammian Marcellin Lib. 16 and 17.  them, for being always ready to spill their Blood, and to spend their Estates for the Service and Glory of the State.  

* 
That Policy was grounded upon the saying of a great Prince, who tho' deprived of the Light which consists in Faith, nevertheless was so clear sighted by Reason, that he thought he could never want Money in his necessities, since he was beloved by his People, who had enough for him.  
Cyrus and Xenophon, Book the 5th of his Institution.   Under the Kings of the first, second, and third Race, until Philip le Bell, the Treasure of Hearts was the only public Wealth that was preserved in this Kingdom.  
I am sensible that former times have no relation nor proportion to the present; that what was good in one Age, is often not permitted in another.  
But tho' it is certain that the Treasure of Hearts cannot suffice at present, it is also very certain that the Treasure of Gold and Silver is almost useless without the first: both are necessary, and whoever shall want either of them, will be necessitous in Wealth.    

CHAP. X. Which concludes this Work, in showing that whatever is contained in it will prove ineffectual, unless the Princes and their Ministers are so mindful of the Government of the State, as to omit nothing which their Trust obliges them to, and not to abuse their Power.  
IN order to conclude this Work happily, I am now to represent to your Majesty that Kings being obliged to do many things more as Sovereigns, than as private Men, they can never swerve so little from their Duty, without committing more faults of omission, than a private person can do of commission.  
It is the same with those upon whom Sovereigns discharge themselves of part of the burden of their Empire, since that Honour makes them liable to the same obligations which lie on Sovereigns.  
Both of them being considered as private persons, are liable to the same faults as other Men; but if we regard the Conduct of the public which they are entrusted with, they will be found liable to many more, since in that sense they cannot omit without sin, any thing they are obliged to by their Ministry.  
In that consideration, a Man may be good and virtuous, as a private person, and yet an ill Magistrate, and an ill Sovereign, by his want of care to discharge the obligation of his Trust.  
In a word, unless Princes use their utmost endeavours to regulate the divers orders of their State.  
If they are negligent in their choice of a good Council; if they despise their wholesome Advice.  
Unless they take a particular care to become such, that their Example may prove a speaking voice.  
If they are negligent in establishing the reign of God, that of Reason, and that of Justice together.  
If they fail to protect Innocence, to recompense signal Services to the Public, and to punish disobedience and the Crimes which trouble the order of the Discipline and Safety of States.  
Unless they apply themselves to foresee and to prevent the evils that may happen, and to divert by careful Negotiations, the Storms, which Clouds easily drive before them, from a greater distance than is thought.  
If Favour hinders them from making a good choice of those they honour with great Employments, and with the principal Offices of the Kingdom.  
Unless they are very careful to settle the State in the Power it ought to have.  
If on all occasions they do not prefer Public Interest to Private Advantages, tho' otherwise never so good livers, they will be found more guilty than those who actually transgress the Commands and Laws of God; it being certain, that to omit what we are obliged to do, and to commit what we ought not to do, is the same thing.  
I must moreover represent to your Majesty, that if Princes, and those who are employed under them in the first Dignities of the Kingdom, have great advantages over private Men, they enjoy that benefit upon hard conditions, since they are not only liable by omission to the faults I have already observed, but also that there are many others of commission, which are peculiar to them.  
If they make use of their Power to commit any injustice or violence, which they cannot do as private persons, they are guilty of a sin of Prince or Magistrate by commission, which their sole Authority is the source of, and for which the King of Kings will call them to a very strict account on the day of Judgement.  
Those two different kind of faults peculiar to Princes and to Magistrates, must needs make them sensible that they are of a far greater weight than those of private persons, by reason that as universal Causes, they influence their disorders to all those who being submitted to them, receive the impression of their movements.  
Many would be saved as private persons, who damn themselves as public persons.  
One of the greatest of our Neighbouring Kings, being sensible of this Truth at his Death, cried out that he did not stand in so much dread of the sins of Philip, as he was apprehensive of the King's.  
His thought was truly Pious, but it would have been much better for himself and for his Subjects to have had it before his Eyes in the height of his Grandeur, and of his Administration, than when in discovering the importance of it, he could no longer make that use of it which was necessary for his Conduct, tho' he might for his Salvation.  
I humbly crave your Majesty would be pleased to reflect this very moment on that which that great Prince perhaps only thought on a few hours before his death; and to invite you to it by Example, as much as by Reason, I promise you that I will spend no day of my life without endeavouring to introduce that into my Mind, which ought to be there at the hour of my Death, in what relates to those Public Affairs which you are pleased to intrust me with.   
THE END.   

Historical Observations. ON THE Political Testament, OF Cardinal de Richelieu.  
Book 1. Chap 1. Page 4●. of the First, and Page. 50 of the Second and Third Editions, published at Amsterdam by Henry Desbordes in the Year 1688.  
Upon These Words:  
THE Removal of the Duke de la Valette tho' Voluntary and not forced, giving me an occasion to put him in this Classis; I cannot omit saying, That not long before he did solicit Monsieur your Brother and the Count de Soissons to turn your Forces, of which they had the Command at that time, against your Person: Your Majesty had honoured him with the Title of Duke and Peer; to which I must also add that in order to Engage him the more in your service, you had thought fit to Unite him to those who were altogether inseparable from it; and that in Consideration of my Alliance, you had granted him the Survivorship of the Government of Guyenne, and were pleased to add 20000 Livers Income to his place of Colonel of the Infantry. I may say moreover, that the Pardon your Majesty did grant him for a Crime so base, and so shameful, averred by the mouth of two Princes whose Testimony was undeniable on that occasion, did not hinder his Weakness and jealousy against the Prince of Conde and the Arch Bishop of Bourdeaux, or his design to cross the prosperity of your Affairs, from making him lose a great deal of honour, in losing the occasion of taking Fontarabie, when the Enemy's could no longer defend it.  
Observation.  
THE Wisest Ministers have much ado to defend themselves against Pride. In this place the Cardinal speaks to the King his Benefactor and Master. The Duke de la Valette he speaks of, had the honour in his first Marriage to Wed 
* Daughter to Henry the 4 by the Duchess de Vernevil.  Gabrielle de Bourbon, the King's Sister, who upon that account always called him Brother, either in Speaking or writing to him. The Cardinal nevertheless thinks he does much for him, and that he will Engage him to be eternaly Faithful, though he had never been so before, by giving him Madamoiselle de Pont Chateau his Cousin.  
But the Actions of great Men must not be examined with Rigour. Neither would we reflect upon this thing, were it not to redress some essential Circumstances of the History which we know ab Origine.  
In order thereunto we must go back a Little, since it is Impossible to give a true account of the Duke de la Valette's Voluntary Removal, of his Innocence, or of his Gild, without explaining the then state of his Family, either in relation to the King, or to the Minister. This relation which perhaps will prove some what long, and will seem sometimes to deviate from the subject, will nevertheless always return to it, and if I am not mistaken will have some curious and remarkable passages.  
John Lewis de la Valette, whom we commonly call the old Duke d' Espernon, who was the first of that Name, Father to the Duke de la Valette, I am to speak of, was naturally very haughty and Imperious: a great and dazzling Fortune made in a short space of time, had not lessened his Courage. The unbounded ●avour of Henry the 3. had heaped Honours, Dignitys, Governments, and great places upon him. The said Prince sometimes boasted that he would make him so great that it would not be in his Power to destroy him.  
It is very well known that in giving him the Government of the three Bishoprics, Mets, Toul, and Verdun, he offered him the absolute Sovereignty of the same, which he had the Wisdom or Cunning to refuse.  
His Marriage with the Heiress of Foix, and of Candale had acquired him all the Lands of that ancient Family, and the most illustrious Alliances. Under the two following Reigns, among many contradictions, he had still kept his Rank, and defended his Fortune, being considered and feared rather than loved by all those who did govern, by the power he had to plague them within the Kingdom. It was perhaps for that Reason Henry the 4th. seemed dissatisfied with his behaviour at first, but being reconciled to him afterwards, in the year 1610. in the great War he was meditating, when Death prevented him, he designed him the honour of the Command of his Vanguard, until he had joined the Prince of Orange, and then sent him back to Mary de Medicis, to be her Minister. However reflecting on his former Favour and Elevavation, he could neither forget what he was, nor what he had been, nor agree with any Favourite, or Minister; less with Richelieu than with another, because he had a greater esteem for him than for any other, and did look upon him as the fittest Man to humble all those who had raised themselves.  
The Cardinal on his side though a far better Politician, finding himself at the helm of Affairs, could brook no resistance, tho' never so Inconsiderable, without being wounded to the very heart by it; nor suffer any grandeur unless subservient to his own. And indeed though we should allow him to be above all Weakness, or private Interest, which Humanity is never free from, his general Plan, and the honour of his Ministry, could hardly suit with the Power and Authority of a Man, who under Henry the 4th. had sustained an open War to maintain himself in the Government of Provence; who lately, in the Duke de Luines time, setting out of his Fortress of Metz in cold blood, with his usual Equipage of 20 Mules, and near two hundred Horse for his Guard, Gentlemen and other Persons of his Retinue, crossed the whole Kingdom quietly, to res cue the Queen Mother who was confined at Blois, to give her a refuge in his Governments, and to make himself Mediator between that Princess and the King her Son.  
The old Duke had three Children, Henry Duke of Candale, Bernard Duke de la Valette, the Person in question here, and Lewis Archbishop of Toulouse, as Men often were in those Times, in Commendam, without being engaged in sacred Orders, and since Cardinal de la Valette. Henry bore the names of Foix and of Candale, according to the Father's obligation, who had promised in Marrying the Heiress of that Family, to leave all her Estate, Name and Arms to the Eldest Son of that Marriage: This Gentleman having a lively Wit, a free and agreeable Humour, was likewise out of favour with the Minister, by reason that not being used better than another, he sometimes let fall some free Ingenious and sharp Expressions which some retained with pleasure, and never failed of being revealed; but in that he did not soothe the Inclination of his Father, with whom he was no better pleased than with the Minister himself: he could not forgive him, notwithstanding his having added to his share abundance of Lands over and above those of Candale to the Value of 50000 Crowns a year, besides the place of First Gentleman of the Chamber, the Governments of Saintonge, Aunis, Angoumois and Limosin, for having given his younger Brother the Government of Mets and of the three Bishoprics, in great Esteem at that time; but above all, the place of Colonel General of the French Infantry, which was looked upon as a Military Royalty, because it gave the Possessor of it a right to nominate to all inferior Places, without so much as excepting that of Colonel of the Guards; and that Vexation particularly with some other domestic troubles, made him acquire abundance of Glory, in seeking War, and the Command of Arms in foreign Countries. Bernard Duke de la Valette the second Son, designed all along to bear the Father's Name, was indeed the first object of his Affection, and of his Tenderness, which he answered with a great deal of Gratitude & Duty, keeping measures with the Minister, but without lowness, and in such a manner that the Duke his Father could receive no prejudice by it. Lewis the last of the Brothers, either as being a better Courtier, or as a Cardinal, or out of Inclination or Esteem, had contracted a Friendship with Cardinal de Richelieu. But the Father not approving his behaviour, often said; It is no longer the Cardinal de la Valette, it is the Cardinal Valet. The only reward he had for his Assiduity and for his Cares, was sometimes to command Arms, which he had earnestly desired contrary to the sentiments of the old Duke his Father, who had all along Endeavoured in vain to dissuade him from it. Perhaps it is a thing sufficiently remarkable (to observe it by the by) that Cardinal de Richelieu has not mentioned him once in all this Book, notwithstanding he did him the greatest and most signal Service that ever he received from any other. For it is very well known, that in the Famous day of the 
* Cullys.  Duppes, when the Queen Mother having prevalled with the King to dismiss him, thought on nothing in her Palace of Luxemburg but how to dispose of the greatest Places of the State; the Cardinal being ready to be gone, seeing nothing but solitude and disgrace about him, the only Cardinal de la Valette stood up to Encourage him, and offering to accompany him to Versailles, made him resolve once more to see the King and to speak to him, as he did, which on a sudden produced that great alteration of Affairs; the Cardinal being allowed to continue the Functions of his Ministry, The Lord keeper Marillac, who was come to succeed him, Imprisoned, and all the rest which is known without my repeating it. Which shows how necessary the advice of a firm and faithful Friend is sometimes even to the greatest Souls, in that uncertain and floating Condition, to which great Passions reduce us. But let us return to our principal and real Subject.  
Those general dispositions did not promise a great union between the old Duke, and the Cardinal Minister. Add now to this a vast number of things which did divide them absolutely, some of great Consequence, others which would seem to be Inconsiderable, if we did not know what effect they generally produce in men's minds. In 1624. Richelieu already made Cardinal, was made first Minister against the King's Inclination, by the earnest desires and importunities of the Queen Mother. The Duke who was absent from the Court at that Time, and who thought himself very much in favour with that Princess, as he had deserved it by his services, was both surprised and vexed thereat, because she had not given him the least hint of it. However he complied so far with decency and custom, as to make Compliments by a Letter to the new Minister, but less capable to oblige than to displease him. For he kept with him, as with all other Cardinals, to the end of his Life, the singular method he had taken, to write to them without leaving the whole Line, and to conclude by, Votre bien humble Serviteur. The Cardinal being nettled made no answer at all; but on the first occasion, which offered itself soon after, to send the King's orders to him, he writ to him without hardly leaving any blank space in the Line, and by your most Affectionate Servant, which the Duke was very much offended at. Those who knew how things passed in those Days, looked upon that beginning either as the Source, or Omen of all that happened since. Soon after this, the Duke, than Governor of Guienne, by his haughtiness, embroiled himself with the Parliament of Bourdeaux, under the first precedent de Gourgues, a Man of great sense and Vigour, who easily persuaded the angry Cardinal, to take their part. The same Affairs returned often, and others of worse consequence with Henry de Sourdis Archbishop of Bourdeaux, one of the Cardinal's Creatures, whose part he ever took as he was obliged to do.  
In 1627. Fortune presented them with a fine Phantasm and great hopes, as a notable Subject of discord. It was the wreck of two Large Portugueze Carricks returning from Goa: Their lading of Gold, Silver, Diamonds Ambergres, and other precious Commoditys, being valued at 15 Millions of Livers; the one was lost on the Coast of Medoc. The Right of the Wreck did belong to the Duke, as it was adjudged since, by Authentic Titles of the ancient Lords of Candale, who had maintained that Right in Law even against their Kings. The Cardinal did pretend to the same Right; as well as Chofet superintendent general of the Navy, and Commerce of France, which in effect was the Office of Admiral disguised for him under that new Title. The old Duke formerly Admiral himself, remembered then with great regret, that he had given that great and fine Place, with the Government of Provence to John de la Valette his elder Brother, to make him share his Fortune, who died soon after it.  
The Sea almost alone profited of those immense Riches, of which the Duke after often having proved his Right did not get above ten or twelve thousand Crowns. But the Process which he had maintained with Vigour before the King's Commissioners, chosen by the Cardinal himself, left new Impressions of Spite, and Animosity in the mind of that Minister. In 1629 the time of the Cardinal's Triumph, as I may say, when after the taking of Rochel, the expedition of Italy the Pas of Susa's being forced, the succours of Cazal, the Conquest of the Huguenot Cities of Languedoc, he thought he had wholly suppressed that Party by the reduction of Montauban; there was need of a new Negotiation, and of the Council of the most faithful of the old Duke's Servants, to oblige him to come to Bourdeaux to pay a visit to the Minister. But they all repent the giving of that advice. The said interview spoiled all, instead of contributing towards an accommodation: Not but the Cardinal, without descending from his Rank, which he was incapable of doing, paid the Duke a great deal of Respect, and caresses, even so far as to protest to him that he would stand him instead of a fourth Son; but the Duke still preserved that Air of Grandeur with him which he could not lay aside; and only received the Archbishop of Bourdeaux, whom the Minister presented to him after an apparent reconciliation, with a haughty Air, and not without some Coldness. In 1630 notwithstanding the Cardinal de la Valette his Son, had had so great a share, as I have said, in the day of the 
* Cullys.  Duppes, and that in his particular he had received some considerable disgust the preceding day from the Queen Mother, he went to Versailles to see the King upon this great alteration, and could never be persuaded by his Friends to step into the next Room, where all the Court repaired in a through to pay new homages to the restored Minister; he contented himvelf with seeing him two or three days after it, as if nothing extraordinary had happened to him. In 1631 the Cardinal seemed to have a mind to reconcile himself to that Family; for he prevailed for the Duke de la Valette, who was only a Duke by Brief, to be received into the Parliament in that Quality the same day with him, which the Court looked upon as a great Caress. But the following year 1632 gave him a new and very considerable cause of displeasure from the old Duke. He caused him to be sounded by the superintendent de Bullion, to try whether he would yield his Government of Mets and of the three Bishoprics to him in exchange, upon very advantageous Conditions; to which the Duke expressed a great repugnancy. Those whose Conjectures always go too far, or who reckon upon the easiness of Human minds to pass from desire to desire, and from one ambition to another, fancied that the Cardinal had a mind to make a great and lasting Settlement in that Country, to secure himself against all Revolutions for the future; to obtain next to that Government, the Bishopric of Met● and the great Abbeys of the said City, or adjacent Parts: In the next place, to get that from the King's favour, which the Duke had refused from Henry the 3 d's. To add to the three Bishoprics, first in the King's Name, and next in his own, Dun, Stenai, Jamets', and some other Places of Lorraine, Sedan which might be got out of the House of Bovillon, Chateaurenaud, Charleville, and mount Olympus; and finally to compose a little Kingdom of Austrasia capable to maintain itself against all the Neighbouring Powers, under a Sovereign of his capacity. If this was his design, which I would neither affirm ne'er reject, that Instance would discover as much as any thing the Character of his mind more used to give than to receive a Law. For it is certain that though he passionately desired the success of Bullion's negotiation, he broke it first, because the Duke, without explaining himself clearly, and without accepting, or refusing, talked of adding to the proposed exchange a Marshal's Staff for the Duke of Candale his Son, a Man who indeed deserved that honour, being famous throughout Europe, for his foreign expeditions, but to whom the Cardinal was unwilling to give such a reward for the jests he had made on him.  
Shall I say moreover, what others have written and published before me, which perhaps will seem frivolous. The said Negotiation was set on foot in 1632 in the journey of Toulouse, which ended by the Execution of the Duke de Montmorrency. They pretend that on their return two things which in appearance seemed to be inconsiderable, nevertheless sensibly moved the mind of that Minister. The first, as it is reported, is that he thought himself neglected by the old Duke who was too busy in receiving the Queen Ann of Austria in his House of Cadillac upon the road to Bourdeaux. The Queen was coming back that way to see Rochel, and the Cardinal to see Brovage, where he had never been since he had made great expenses there: The Coaches which the Duke had ordered to receive him at his coming out of the Boat, were taken up by the numerous Train of the Queen, and could not come back soon enough to prevent the Cardinal's arrival, who was not expected so soon. The Duke after having conducted the Queen to her apartment, brought them back to him himself, with a thousand excuses that his orders had not been well executed; but he could never persuade him to use them, and the Cardinal chose rather to walk the remainder of the way a foot, notwithstanding he was fatigued, and incommoded with a distemper, which had like to have killed him some days after. They add in the second place, that it proved a great deal worse, yet at Bourdeaux, where his distemper which was nothing but a suppression of Urine, obliged him to tarry after the Queen. The Duke out of respect to that Princess, and to keep no mark of Command in her presence had ordered his Guards to put of their Coats and Muskets: he ordered them to take them again, as soon as ever she was gone, and went to visit the Cardinal with his usual pomp of Governor, and a large attendence of Gentlemen belonging to him, or of the Province, who did always accompany him. It is thought that the Archbishop of Bourdeaux, and some others, who were the Duke's Enemy's, and were with the Cardinal at that time, persuaded him that it was not only done to brave him, but perhaps to quarrel him, in case of need, and to attempt upon his Person, so that he excused himself from seeing him, as being too Ill; and almost thought he had scaped a Peril, when he found himself in a Condition to leave Bourdeaux; The Duke having accompanied him at his departure with the same train, as it were to honour him. That which is certain, is, that the Duke was informed some time after it by the Cardinal de la Valette his Son, that some had endeavoured at least to give the Minister those impressions. That he took it very Ill from the Archbishop of Bourdeaux, and made War against him more than ever. Their quarrels proceeded so far, that the Duke having employed ways of fact, as it were to maintain his Authority of Governor in the Metropolitan City, induced the Archbishop to excommunicate him. The Clergy of France being inspired by the Cardinal, who put himself at their head, declared for the abused Prelate, and demanded reparation for the Injury. It was in that great Storm the Cardinal de la Valette his Son, and some of his Friends proposed, as a last remedy of reunion, the Marriage of Mademoiselle de Pontchateau with the Duke de la Valette: for Gabrielle de Bourbon, one of the most lovely Princesses of her time, beautiful and wise, very witty, and so mild, that she was never known to be angry, died six or seven years before, a fortnight after her being delivered of a Son, who died Duke of Candale in the year 1658. As soon as the Conditions of this new Marriage were resolved upon and accepted, all the Affairs with the Archbishop of Bourdeaux and the Clergy of France ended much sooner than they would have done. But if ever the old Duke showed his haughtiness it was on this occasion; he gave his Son his consent by word of mouth, but he refused to give it in writing, and to sign the Contract, saying sometimes that it was sufficient, that he had signed one; and sometimes with more frankness, that it would not be handsome for him to sign it without giving some thing, nor to give any thing to redeem himself, and to get out of a troublesome Affair. Neither must we forget among the Subjects of alienation and aversion we are speaking of, that the old Duke, who thought he had formerly obliged the Bishop of Lucon. complained that he had found no manner of Acknowledgement in Cardinal de Richelieu; and that in the latter times, he could not digest his Proceed against the Queen Mother; a Princess for whom the Duke had ever had a veneration full of Tenderness, and for whom he thought himself obliged to expose all. The Reader will perhaps conclude, that this relation was absolutely necessary to make Posterity believe the Secret I am going to reveal, not upon vain Conjectures, but upon certain Knowledge.  
What is it a great Genius does not think possible? or himself capable of? The Cardinal being sensible by Experience, that the old Duke would never be perfectly reconciled to him, formed a very extraordinary design to ruin him, in engaging nevertheless the Duke de la Valette his Son in his Interests in whom he had never found any Sentiments but such as were reasonable. After that Marriage he showed a great deal of Affection for a time to that young Lord, who was looked upon as his Son-in-Law, gave him a prospect of the greatest elevation and grandeur for the future, until judging the Fire sufficiently kindled, after having exhorted him to confide in his promises, which had never deceived any Body, and to look upon him as a true Father, he proceeded to declare to him that in order thereunto, it was necessary, he should have no other Father but him: In a word, that he should not be astonished, at his being resolved no longer to spare the Duke d'Espernon, and to destroy, those were his very Words, a Man whom he had never been able to tame. The Duke de la Valette, being as much surprised, as can be imagined, endeavoured in vain to dissemble his thoughts; part of them appeared in his Eyes, and upon his Face. The Obligations of Blood, Those he had to the best Father in the World towards him, who had preferred him in so many respects before his Elder Brother, a Man of great Merit, crowded all in a moment in his mind. He fancied he already saw that old Man, who was then fourscore years of Age or more, whose Fortune had been respected till then by his greatest Enemies, leading the remainder of his Life in obscurity and solitude, languishing in some place of Exile; To see himself, as a worthy recompense of his base compliance, shamefully invested with those Honours, which he was only to tarry for a few years, to possess them without reproach. Who knows, whether he did not add, that the most honest Engagements are commonly the safest; and that all Duty laid aside, no true Prudence could ever advise him to abandon the Fortune of his own Family, which was so well settled, to run after vain hopes, and to abandon himself to the new, and perhaps false Tenderness of that adoptive Father? Nevertheless doing himself a great Violence, he thanked the Cardinal for his kindness, as Men always behave themselves towards those who govern: He expressed his being obliged to him for the confidence he reposed in him: He assured him of a perfect gratitude on his side. As to his Father, without accusing or defending him, he added, that it was impossible to alter his mind for the little time he had to live: That his Behaviour was rough and daring, but that he had a great deal of Honour, that his Heart was upright and sincere, incapable of deceit and treachery: That taking his word once, one might rely upon it for ever; in a word that if the Cardinal would do him the honour to rely upon him, he would answer for the old Duke's fidelity as for his own. The Minister did very well apprehend what was not said to him, and was secretly concerned to have said too much himself. The Conversation ended in general Compliments on both sides, in which neither of them were deceived. From that time forward a serious behaviour and cold Civility succeeded the Carresses and advances of the Cardinal towards the Duke de la Valette. And in relation to the old Duke, all the disgusts and mortifications that can be given to a proud Heart, who will not oblige his Enemy so far as to complain. He met perpetual Contradictions in his Province of Guienne, in which it was known that he was very Jealous of his Authority. Those who were known to be his Enemies, or suspected by him, were applauded and favoured in all things; Fables were heard against him: The Exchequer was wholly shut up for several years together for his Salaries and Pensions, under pretence of public necessity, and of the Finances being exhausted: Excuses that are ever ready for those that are not beloved. And when ever foreign War threatened or attacked his Government, no succours besides Words was sent to him, as if they had been glad to expose him, to the prejudice of the State. In fine, neither he, nor his Son, could doubt but the first opportunity to ruin them, would earnestly be embraced: But the times were not proper for it. (1635.) France had declared War against Spain. (1636.) The Enemy's were entering into Guienne, Burgundy, and Picardy. (1637.) The People being oppressed by new Edicts to make the Arms subsist, and being as yet but little used to Obedience after the Civil Wars, did rise in divers Places, particularly in the old Duke's Government, sometimes by seditions at Bourdeaux, sometimes by whole Arms which ke●● the Field by the name of Crocans. He commonly stifled those Commotions with his own Forces, and by his sole Authority, being accused nevertheless to the Minister, but without any ground, of exciting them secretly himself, to make himself necessary. The Cardinal had not the injustice to believe it, but he reckoned among the Crosses of his Life, and of his Grandeur, to be obliged for a time, not only to keep measures with, but also to praise and to thank those, to whom he neither did, nor designed any good, but on the contrary, their Ruin. His Fortune was looked upon to be very much shaken, when the Enemy seemed to settle in the Kingdom, within sight of the Capital City, and of the Throne itself, by the taking of Catelet, of La Capelle and of Corbie. The success of that War which he alone had counceled, and which he was proud of being the Author of, was either his safety or his Ruin: having moreover so many Envious Persons, Enemy's, and secret Intrigues to oppose, he left no means unattempted to retake the Places of Picardy, with powerful Arms Commanded by the Duke of Orleans the King's brother, and by the Count de Soissons, a Prince of the Blood. The Duke de la Valette in an occasion which was looked upon, as a great Peril of the State, desired leave to serve as a Volunteer in the Army of Picardy, which could not be denied him. But before his departure from Paris, he made, rather by his Misfortune than fault, being as it were, forced to it, a new, and very deep wound in the Minister's mind. The Baron du Bec, Governer of La Capelle was the Duke's Friend: whether he had surrendered it too soon out of Weakness, or for want of all manner of Ammunitions as he pretended, which I have not dicovered, the Cardinal thought it necassary to make an Example of him, either to keep the Governors of the Frontier Towns in Awe by that severity, or to clear himself before the King and the Public, for the loss of that Place, which through Picardy, had given the Enemy an entrance into the Kingdom: For those who are at the helm of Affairs, are never in the wrong, and the weaknest is Commonly the most guilty. He would have that affair examined in a Solemn Coucil, the King being present, in which all the Officers of the Crown were to assist. The Duke excused himself three times from coming to it, to avoid the danger he foresaw. But Chavigny was sent to him the fourth, to acquaint him that he must either break of with the Cardinal, or not presist in his refusal. Therefore he went to the Council, but more faithful to Friendship, or to Reason, than to his own Interest, he spoke for the Accused contrary to the intention of the Minister, who not being commonly Master of himself in the first heat of his Anger, as soon as the Council broke up, calling him a side, used hard and reflecting Language towards him, which a good heart can never bear, nor forget. His answer was not only firm and bold, but full of a heat, which made the Cardinal sensible of his own, which he endeavoured to alleviate, concluding with obliging words. In this condition the Duke de la Valette went for the Army, where it is true, that the Count de Soissons, and the Duke of Orleans caused him to be sounded in secret, to engage him to a revolt, and to afford them a retreat in Guienne: But it is equally true, that he refused both, barely assuring the Princes on one hand of his Respect, and moreover of secrecy; and on the other, that the old Duke, without whom he could do nothing, would never hearken to any such thing, what ever Cause he had to complain of the Cardinal, as well as himself. It has never been known from the Dukes own Mouth who made him that proposition, he kept his word but too scrupulously, and never spoke of it, even when he might have done it without danger. What the Cardinal says here, that this crime is averred by the Mouth of two Princes whose Testimony is undeniable on that occasion, is easily cleared. One of them who out lived that Minister, has often owned, that he had been surprised, and persuaded that the Duke de la Valette had accused him, so that being irritated by his pretended Infidelity as well as by his Refusal, he was glad to excuse himself by laying the whole fault at his door. The sequel of things naturally represented, in my opinion does not allow the questioning of this Truth. The said Negotiation, whether rejected, or received, certainly was not prosecuted, and was not known in a certain time after it. But when Corbie was retaken and Picardy peaceable, and the Cardinal's authority better settled than ever, even those who thought him undone before, were earnest to serve him, and to inbrace his Interest. At that time one of the Duke of Orleans false Servants, to whom that secret was confided, made haste to reveal it to him. The two Princes who had notice given them thereof, removed forthwith from the Court, for fear of being secured. The Duke de la Valette who was gone for Guienne some days before, quietly prosecuted his journey. They sent Bourdeilles and Montresor, after him, to excite him, and the old Duke his Father, upon the account of their common danger, which both, they said, would endeavour in vain to defend themselves of, considering the opinion the Cardinal had of that business, and his desire to ruin them. They both shut their Ears, and the old Duke after Compliments full of respect for the Princes, gave them wise Counsels to regain the King's favour: The Duke of Orteans harkened to them, and made his Peace. The Count de Soilsons neglected them to his Misfortune, for he never returned to Court, and died afterwards, as it is known in Arms against his Prince and Country. The Cardinal having as good intelligence, as ever any Minister had, was not ignorant of the old Duke's wise behaviour on that Subject, which he never boasted of himself: There still is a Letter extant which that Minister ordered the Chevalter Seguier, his constant friend, to write to him, in which praising his prudence, which he assures him the King is very well pleased with, he Endeavours to make him discover more of the matter, which the old Duke had the address to excuse himself from. And so far from accusing him of any thing at that time, nor La Valette his Son, new orders were sent to both to drive the Spaniards out of Guienne: For they had settled themselves in the Port of Secoa, where they had two Forts, and five or six thousand Men well Retrenched. Those orders to express the more Confidence, gave the old Duke a power to raise such Forces as he should think fit, and to make what ever Impositions he thought necessary on the Province, to deliver it from the Enemy; which he looked upon as a snare that was laid for him, being warned by Ancient and new Examples, and even by that of Marshal de Marillac. Moreover he was persuaded that without Oppressing the People, whom he loved naturally, and whom it was his Interest to keep Measures with, he would be able to perform what he was ordered. And indeed the Duke de la Vallette having put himself at the Head of a small number of Men he raised in haste, besieged, or blocked up, as it were, those Spaniards retrenched, and much stronger than himself, but in want of all things, Notwithstanding the Sea was open to them: He took advantageous Posts; he made continual Courses on all sides, to hinder them from receiving any Subsistance out of the Country, and reduced them without fight, to such extremities, that they abandoned both Retrenchments and Forts, and made no use of the Sea, but for their retreat. The Court which seldom applauds those who are not in favour, was very glad of it, however without seeming over much satisfied; they could have wished the Spaniards had been cut to pieces, their Camp forced and pillaged, their Forts taken by assault; and in a word that no Bridge of Gold had been made to the Enemy. It was on that occasion the Cardinal bethought himself to attack Spain by Fontarabie. The Arch Bishop of Bourdeaux, or some other had inspired him with that thought, several years before: But the Duke D' Espernon and La Valette his Son, who were sent to View the Place at that time, always found very great difficulties in it. The Son was sent for, and repaired to Court, without knowing it was upon that Subject: After a much better reception, than he expected from the Minister he desired him to give him an account of what had passed at Corbie about the proposition of the two Princes; but he had either so much Credit, or so much Address as to prevent his being pressed to the utmost, and they were or seemed to be satisfied with him, without his ever saying any thing farther to the King, or Cardinal, but that a Man spoke to him near a Mile; that he had broken all his Measures by a speedy refusal: That he had not thought it necessary, in an Affair in which he saw no appearance of any success, to turn Informer without proofs against two Princes of the Blood, whom he thought he had sufficiently persuaded to remain faithful by his Reasons, and by his Example. After this Eclaireissement, the Siege of Frontarabie was proposed to him. Nevertheless I will never believe what others have written Bona fide, that it was with a real design to engage him, and the old Duke his Father, in an Enterprise in which they must needs perish. That is driving suspicion too far; and the Cardinal was not capable of such a false Policy against the Interest of France, and his own; but it is very probable that the said Minister who ever since the Siege of Rochel, and the expedition of Italy, thought every thing easy for him, made use of that occasion to send a Prince of the Blood in Guienne, with considerable Forces both by Sea and Land, which he might Employ, after that Victory, as he thought fit against the Duke D' Espernon himself, and against all his Family. it is most certain that the Command of the Army was only offered to the Duke de la Valette upon two Conditions; the one that the Prince of Conde should be Generalissimo over him; the other that the Naval Army should be Commanded by the Archbishop of Bourdeaux, who was, or seemed to be reconciled to the old Duke, for some years passed. The old Duke had refused more than once to Command Royal Arms under a Prince of the Blood; not said he, but he had a very great and most profound respect for that Rank, but he was too old, added he, to learn towards the end of his Days, to receive orders from any but the King his Master. It was easy for the Duke de la Valette to foresee the ill consequences of a subaltern and divided Command; but the Cardinal his Brother, and another Person less Faithful, who owed his Elevation to their Family, but yet was secretly a Creature of the Minister, persuaded him, with great difficulty, that it was not fit always to oppose the Inclinations of a Man who had an absolute power, as if they had designed to break with him at a time when he seemed to have a mind to be reconciled to all the Family; That what the Court had much ado to bear from the old Duke, would neither be excused, nor pardoned in his Son, in the same manner; Moreover that whereas he would Act more in the Army than any other, the Presence of a Prince would nowise lessen his Glory, if the Siege had a good success; but would totally discharge him, if the event should not prove favourable. These reasons induced him to engage himself to the Minister, before he had time to consult the old Duke his Father, who nowise approved them, but thought he ought not to find fault with what he had agreed to. If any body has written the Contrary, either they were not acquainted with the whole secret, or thought they might dissemble part of it. The resolution the Duke took himself, showed sufficiently that he was not pleased. It was to ask leave to go to his house of Plassae in Zaintonge to take Milk, as he sometimes used to do; but at that time, it was with a resolution never to return to his Government, until the Siege of Fontarabie were ended. However he tarried till the Prince was come to Bourdeaux, to pay his Respects to him; and taking his leave of him, after having represented the difficulties of the Enterprise to him, which ought only to have excited him the more, by the glory of overcoming the same, he offered if it were necessary, to come back, upon his first Orders, at the head of a thousand Gentlemen, to serve as a Volunteer under him. The sequel has sufficiently testified the prudence of that Resolution; for that has been known since, which he was ignorant of at that time: Which is, that the Prince had brought secret Orders from the King, to Command him to do that which he did of his own accord. The Siege was begun with great hopes. The Duke de la Vallette was praised for that he was the first who with Sword in hand at the head of his Forces, crossed the River of Bidassoa, which divides the two Kingdoms, through the Water up to the Waste; he forced the Retrenchments the Enemy had made there to defend the Entrance into the Country. It is also known that his attack was very much advanced, and in a fair way to take the Place, when an Order in writing from the Prince of Conde obliged him to yield that Post to the Archbishop of Bourdeaux; which indeed he had much ado to digest: and from that time forward, finding an open, and always ready, contradiction to what ever was proposed by him; and being weary with giving good advices which were not followed, he reduced himself only to command in his new Quarter which he thought himself obliged to answer for; it is also most certainly true, that even before that Incident, there was no perfect intelligence between our Generals; and that the strongest Arms commonly prove Ineffectual, when discord reigns among them. The Archbishop of Bourdeaux was far more mindful of the old differences he had had with the Duke and all his Family, than of a forced reconciliation. The Prince of Conde dreaded nothing more, than that all the honour of the success should be imputed to La Vallette. From the very beginning, he had not answered, either in relation to the Father, or to the Son, the Affection they both expected to find in him, and which they had had proofs of on other occasions, he perhaps being instructed in this by the Court, and being desirous to oblige the Minister. But after all, as far as ever I could hear, the true, or principal Reason of the raising of that Siege with so little honour, reflected upon the Cardinal himself more than upon any other in his Quality of Admiral, without laying any stress upon his having joined Commanders, whom he knew could never agree. The Naval Army which should have appeared at the same time with the Land Forces, was not ready; and whether the Prince had orders to begin the Siege before hand, or that the said precipitation proceeded from his own impatience, and the fear of losing the fair season; for it was in the Month of July, the Spaniards who were Masters of the Sea took their time to secure the Town twice, within sight of him, and to put a Governor into it, who contributed considerably towards its Vigorous defence. The Spanish Army appeared to relieve it by Land. The Duke de la Vallette's advice, tho' often reiterated, to march against, and to Fight them, was not harkened unto; and the event justified on that occasion, as in so many others, that commonly to be attacked, is to be half Vanquished. All things passed among ours with great surprise, Tumult and Disorder, without any of the Quarters being informed what passed in the other. The Prince of Conde's was forced and taken. The French never made so little resistance; which gave way to the Vain reports of the People, which they are still possessed with in those parts to this very day, as if the Prince had consented to it himself, being bribed with Spanish Doubloons, which were sent to him they say, in great quantity, in large Bottles, in the guise of Wine, for the Provision of his Table. The Duke de la Vallette had only notice of the Rout, and Combat, by runaway, and soon after it by the Prince himself, who retiring to Bayonne, left him to perform what could be done in that misfortune. The Duke approved what it would have been useless to Condemn, and moreover he exhorted the Prince to secure his Person. But as soon as his back was turned he could not forbear smiling; and that proved since, the main head of the accusation against him. After which giving his Orders with great Tranquillity and unconcernedness, he not only put all his Men in Battalia, but rallying the remainder of the others, and opposing the pursuit of the Enemy's, he saved the Major part of the French Army, and such Guns and Equipages, as were not taken yet. The Victorious Soldiers in Fontarabie boasted that they had plundered the Prince's Camp and that they had spared La Vallette who was their Friend: Another great Crime which was to be placed with the Bottles of Doubloons, and which nevertheless was afterwards laid to his Charge. It is impossible to express the Minister's anger against the Duke de la Vallette, whether it were that he only harkened to the interested relations of the Prince of Conde and the Archbishop, or that such an occasion kindled anew, all his Resentment against the Duke d' Espernon's Family, or that he dreaded lest the King and the Public, should impute that misfortune to his Conduct, in case the Prince or the Archbishop, or the delay of our Naval Army should seem to be the chief cause of it. He declared publicly that he would rather perform the Office of Attorney General against his Kinsman, than to leave his fault unpunished. The Duchess de la Vallette had the Generosity on this occasion, as in many others, not to waver one moment between her Uncle Regnant, and her Husband out of favour, but the Cardinal, when she spoke to him upon that account, fell into such a passion, that those who were not to be acquainted with the secret, and who were ordered to withdraw on purpose, overheard it. The Duchess d' Eguillon, who was the Duke's faithful Friend, after having used all her Credit, Art and Address with her Uncle, could obtain nothing but bitter Complaints, and open menaces, after which she expressed sufficiently that it would not be safe for the Duke to come, tho' on the one side he was passionately desirous to justify himself in Person; and on the other, he had been sent for, to give an account of his Conduct. It is very probable that the Minister designed not to spare him: At lest what he said, and declared publicly, was not a great inducement to Invite him to Court. A Little Council was held, hereupon at Paris by the Duke's Order, of Persons he thought wholly devoted to his Interest, in which was called, among a few others, one of the most Zealous and most grateful Creatures of his Family. It was Philip de Cospean, than Bishop of Nantes, formerly Bishop of Air, and since Bishop of Lisieux, for whom the old Duke during his favour, out of respect to his Merit, being delighted with his Sermons, had not only obtained the Bishopric of Air, without his knowledge, but caused the Bulls of the same to be expedited at his own Charge, and so sent them to him. This Gentleman who was a Man of Sense, and Wit, after having heard many arguments upon the circumstances of the Affair of Fontarabie; upon the facility the Duke would have to destroy such frivolous accusations, and not only to justify his Innocence, but also his Services: All this, said he is good, and I believe it; but who has told us, that they will not speak of the Man and the Mill. This proved sufficient to persuade the little Assembly; and that indeed was a thing to be dreaded in the hands of an incensed Minister. For though the Duke had cleared himself before him and before the King about it; and that instead of being punished, he was soon after honoured, with a considerable Command, it was no abolition in forms; and the Laws of the State oblige all Subjects, and particularly all the Officers of the Crown, to reveal what ever they know against the King's Service, without examining whether they have opposed it in secret, whether they could not prevent it, whether they thought the advice would be useless, finally without distinguishing Prince, Friend, Master or Benefactor. woe to those whose Fate, and that diversity of Duties put to such a terrible Trial. However the Duke, contrary to his own inclination followed the advice of his Friends, and retired into England. His process was made. The Cardinal would needs have the information against him brought in before the King. The Precedent de Bellieure, since first Precedent, and some others had the Courage to say they saw no proofs. The greater Number followed the false and pernicious Maxim that one may always Condemn an absent Person, because his Life is in no danger, and that it is the bare reward of his Contumacy. As if it were ever allowable to betray Truth and justice because they make no defence. The old Duke, d' Espernon who till then had been an object of envy, began to become an object of Pity. (1639) In six months' time of the year 1639 he lost the Duke de Candale his eldest. Son, he saw the second Condemned to Death, on whom he had fixed his heart and all his hopes, besides the Death of the Cardinal de la Valette his third Son, to whom it was thought Cardinal de Richelieu, as a recompense for his Services had promised not to disturb the repose of his Father's old age. Orders followed immediately to Confine him first to his House of Plassac, next to Loches where he ended his days some years after. His constancy was such in that great Age, that after having performed in his last sickness what ever could be desired of him for his Conscience, without Pride, or Weakness, for he ever had Religion and Faith, he let fall never a Word in relation to the Cardinal, but what was at once Christian like and Noble. He ordered the Duke de la Vallette's two Children to be recommended to the King, they having the honour to be related to him; they were the Children of his first Marriage, for he had none by the second: And some suggesting to him that he would do well to do them the same office with the Minister, whose power was so well known, he only answered mildly, I am his Servant, without being able to resolve to request any thing of him. He died on the 13 of January 1642, being 88 years of Age, repeating often, even in the middle of his Prayers, and in the very Arms of Death, the Name of his Son de la Valette, whom he looked upon as his Martyr. The Cardinal de Richelieu did not outlive him long: He died on the 4th. of December of the same Year, being only 58 years of Age, leaving to Courtiers one of those fine, but too subtle, Examples of what Fortune, Grandeur and Favour is, never certain, never contented, and which is worse, little present; and long passed. The King who grieved, in secret for having allowed him so much Power, and who had reason to dread all things from him, if he had lived much longer, did not think himself so much deprived of a faithful Minister, as delivered of a proud, insupportable, Master. It than proved a kind of Merit at Court not to have been too much his Friend. But all things were soon altered there a second time by the King's own Death, on the 14th. of May 1643. The Duke de la Valette called Duke d' Espernon since his Father's Death, came back from England, and surrendered himself in the Prison of the Palace of Paris, and was absolved by the unanimous Voice of the Parliament, with a general Applause of the Grandees, and of the People. No Man of any Note, that I know of, ever laid the ill Success at Fontarabie to his charge but the Cardinal; and as to the pretended Intelligence or Conspiracy with the two Princes, far from upbraiding himself with it, he placed it among his best Actions, since that tho ill used and oppressed by the Cardinal, to the highest degree he had been able to resist the Temptation to right himself, and the Duke his Father, by a Civil War, the greatest and most dangerous of all those of that time, if both had harkened to it.  
As the Cardinal de Berulle died with the repute of sanctity, and that all those who have known him have testified the same, except Cardinal Richelieu; it is a very material point to inform the Public with the Motives that could induce the said Cardinal de Richelieu to insert these Words in the Tenth Page of his Political Testament. Your Majesty would thereby have freed the Nation of the Grisons for ever from the Tyranny of the House of Austria, had not Fargis your Ambassador in Spain at the Solicitation of Cardinal de Berulle, made (as he has confessed it since) without the knowledge and contrary to your Majesty's express Orders, a very disadvantageous Treaty, to which you adhered at last to please the Pope, who pretended to be somewhat concerned in that Affair; and in the 14 Page, the Cardinal de Berulle, and the Lord Keeper Marrillac advised your Majesty to abandon that poor Prince, (he speaks of the Duke of Mantua) to the injustice and Insatiable avidity of that Nation, which is an Enemy to the Repose of Christendom (he means the Spaniards) to hinder them from disturbing it; the rest of your Council proved of a different opinion, both because Spain durst not have form such a Resolution, immediately after the making of a Treaty of Union among the English; and because if they should have followed so ill an aducie, they could not have been able to stop the progress of your Arms.  
A Little insight into the principal Affairs transacted in the reign of Lewis the XIII. is sufficient to know that the Cardinals de Berulle and de Richelieu, were both engaged in the Interest of the Queen Mother Mary de Medicis; and that they lived in perfect Intelligence until the year 1622, when the War of the Pon de Cee broke out. All the Queen Mother's Creatures did expect that Cardinal de Richelieu to whom that Princess had given Order & Power to conclude an accommodation with the King her Son's Ministers, would mind their advantages as much as his own, and would not expose them to the Vengeance of their Enemy's, whom they had only irritated to remain Faithful to the Queen Mother: Nevertheless Cardinal de Richelieu only thought of obtaining a Place for himself in the Sacred College, and neglected all the rest. For which reason Cardinal de Berulle, the Marshal and Lord Keeper Marillac, Monsieur and Madam du Fargis and several others fell out with him. In the Second Place, the first considerable affair which occurred in the Council of France in 1624. immediately after the Cardinal's being introduced there, upon the Marriage of Madam Henrietta of France youngest Sister to the King with the Prince of Wales. The Cardinal de Richelieu pretended to attribute all the honour of it to himself, and negotiated with so much address that he obtained from the Earls of Holland and Carlisle, Ambassadors from England more advantageous Conditions for the Catholic Religion, than those which the King of Great Britain had granted to the Spaniards when he desired their Infanta for the said Prince of Wales. But the main difficulty was to prevail with the Court of Rome to approve the Condition's Cardinal the Richelieu had made with the English Ambassadors. The Court pitched upon Cardinal de Berulle in order thereunto. He went to Rome, and there began, continued, and concluded the famous Negotiation, which is found among the Manuscripts of Lomenie in the King's Library. He obtained what ever he desired of the Pope, and that was sufficient to excite Cardinal de Richelieu's jealousy.  
As to the Treaty which du Fargis made at Moncon in 1626. with the Spaniard's in relation to Valtelina, we must consider that the said du Fargis had been six years before Ambassador in Spain, and that he was sent thither by the Court of France before Cardinal de Richelieu entered into the Ministry, which was in 1624. The instructions which du Fargis had received in taking leave of the Court, from M. de Puisieux Secretary of State, Son to the Chancellor de Sillery, obliged him to treat with the Spaniards on the same Conditions as he did since at Moncon, because the Council of State was resolved at that time not to break with Spain. But Cardinal de Richelieu caused that resolution to be altered, and the collection of the Pieces for the Justification of that Cardinal which were given to the Public by M. du Chatelet maintains in several Places that the said Cardinal sent M. du Fargis orders directly contrary to those he had received in France. But M. du Fargis persisted constantly in denying that ever he received them, and the thing remains undecided to this day. Therefore it is not true that he himself confessed that he had concluded the Treaty of Moncon at the solicitation of Cardinal de Berulle, without the King's knowledge, and contrary to his Majesty's Express Orders. For among so many Authors, who have attacked and defended the Reputation of Cardinal de Richelieu, none ever bethought himself hitherto to write this point of History; and there is no reason to believe the said Cardinal upon his bare Word, since he was so public an Enemy to the Cardinal de Berulle that his Panegyrists lose no occasion to blame him, and to push it as far as ever it can go.  
Finally it is yet less true that the Cardinal de Berulle and the Lord Keeper Marillac advised the King to abandon the Duke of Mantua to the injustice and insatiable Avidity of the Spaniards; but that which is certain in relation thereunto, as the two Authors who are most devoted to Cardinal de Richelieu, who are those that have written his Life, and the History of his Ministry, do acknowledge, is; that at the Death of Vincent Duke of Mantua, and when the Duke de Nevers succeeded him, it was put in agitation in the Council of France, not whether the Duke of Nevers should be absolutely seconded; but whether they should second him so far as to run the hazard on his account to break the Peace of Veruins which King Henry the Great had concluded with Spain, and it was carried by the plurality of Voices, that the King should not run the hazard of that risk: Cardinal de Berulle who was then one of the Principal Councillors of State, was of that opinion, he persisted in it until Cardinal de Richelieu, caused the said Affair to be examined anew in the Council, and made them resolve to maintain the Duke de Nevers against the Emperor and against the King of Spain. There was but six months' space between those two deliberations, and they were both taken in the year 1627. If the Cardinal de Berulle during the Interval of the said six Months pretended that it was not fit to exasperate the Spaniards, In that he only conformed to the determination of the Council of State of France. But I maintain that after the second deliberation which was to protect the Duke of Mantua towards and against all, the Cardinal de Berulle never let fall any word to blame the War which France engaged into upon the account of the Duke de Nevers with the Emperor, and the King of Spain, and no Man can produce any Printed paper, or Manuscript which says any such thing.  
THE END.   

THE Contents.  

Chap. I. A Short Relation of the King's great Actions, until the Peace concluded in the Year— pag. 1.  
Chap. II. Of the Reformation of the Ecclesiastical Order. pag. 48.  
Sect. I. Which represents the ill State of the Church at the beginning of the King's Reign; the Present State thereof; and what is necessary to be done to put it in that in which it ought to be. ib.  
Sect. II. Of Appeals, and the Means to regulate the same. pag. 53.  
Sect. III. Of Privileged Cases, and the means to Regulate the same. pag. 64.  
Sect. IU. Which shows the Consequence of the Regalia pretended by the Holy Chapel of Paris over the Bishops of France, and opens a way to suppress the same pag. 68  
Sect. V Of the Necessity of Protracting the Delays that are used in the Course of Ecclesiastical Justice; from whence it happens, that three Crimes remain unpunished. pag. 75.  
Sect. VI. Which represents the Prejudice the Church receives by the Four Exemptions several Churches enjoy, to the Prejudice of the Common Right; and proposes Means to remedy the same. pag. 78.  
Sect. VII. Which represents the Inconveniences that arise from the Bishops not having an Absolute Power to dispose of the Benefices that are under them. pag. 90.  
Sect. VIII. Of the Reformation of Monasteries. pag. 93.  
Sect. IX. Of the Obedience which is due to the POPE. pag. 95.  
Sect. X. Which sets forth the Advantage of Learning; and shows how it ought to be Taught in this Kingdom. pag. 97.  
Sect. XI. Means to Regulate the Abuses which are committed by Graduates in the obtaining of Benefices. pag. 104.  
Sect. XII. Of the Right of INDULT. pag. 106.  
Chap. III. Of the NOBILITY. pag. 109.  
Sect. I. Divers Means to Advantage the Nobility, and to make them Subsist Honourably. ib.  
Sect. II. Which Treats of the Means to prevent Duels. pag. 114.  
Chap. IU. Of the Third ORDER of the Kingdom. pag. 119.  
Sect. I. Which relates in general to the Disorders of the Courts of Justice; and examines in particular, whether the Suppression of the Sale of Offices, and of Hereditary Offices, would be a proper Remedy for such Evils. ib.  
Sect. II. Which proposes the general Means which may be used to put a stop to the disorders of the Courts of Justice. pag. 131.  
Sect. III. Which represents the necessity of hindering the Officers of Justice, from encroaching upon the King's Authority. pag. 135.  
Sect. IU. Of the Officers of the Finances. pag. 137.  
Sect. V Of the PEOPLE. pag. 140.  
Chap. V. Which considers the State in itself. pag. 142.  
Sect. I. Which represents how necessary it is, that the several Parts of the State should remain every one within the extent of their Bounds. ib.  
Sect. II. Which examines, Whether it is better to make the Governments Triennial in this Kingdom, than to leave them Perpetual, according to the Use which has been practised hitherto? pag. 143.  
Sect. III. Which condemns Survivorships. pag. 146.  
Chap. VI Which represents to the King, what Men think he ought to consider, in relation to his Person. pag. 149.  
Chap. VII. Which represents the present State of the King's Household; and sets forth what seems to be necessary, in order to put it into that in which it ought to be. pag. 162.  
Chap. VIII. Of the PRINCE's Council. pag. 171.  
Sect. I. Which shen's that the best Prince stands in need of a good Council. ib.  
Sect. II. Which represents what Capacity is required in a good Counsellor. pag. 173.  
Sect. III. Which represents the Integrity that is required in a good Counsellor. pag. 175.  
Sect. IU. Which represents what Courage and Foree is required in a Counsellor of State. pag. 181.  
Sect. V. Which represents what Application is required in Counsellors of State. pag. 184.  
Sect. VI. Which represents the Number of Counsellors of State that is requisite, and that one among them ought to have the Superior Authority. pag. 191.  
Sect. VII. Which represents what the King's Behaviour is to be towards his Counsellors, and shows, that in order to be well served, the boast Expedient he can take is to use them well. pag. 195.   

The second PART.  
Chap. I. THe first Foundation of the Happiness of a State is the Establishment of the Reign of God. pag. 2.  
Chap. II. Reason must be the Rule and Conduct of a State. pag. 5.  
Chap. III. Which shows that Public Interest should be the only End of those who govern States, or at least that it ought to be preferred to particular Advantages. pag. 9  
Chap. IU. How much Foresight is necessary for the Government of a State. pag. 12.  
Chap. V Punishment and Reward are two Points absolutely necessary for the Conduct of States. pag. 16.  
Chap. VI A Continual Negotiation contributes much towards the good success of Affairs. pag. 24.  
Chap. VII. One of the greatest Advantages, that can be procured to a State, is to give every one an Employment suitable to his Genius and Capacity. pag. 32.  
Chap. VIII. Of the Evil which Flatterers, Detractors, and Intriguers commonly occasion in States, and how necessary it is to remove them from Kings, and to banish them from their Courts. pag. 38.  
Chap. IX. Which Treats of the Power of the Prince; and is divided in to Eight Sections. pag. 45.  
Sect. I. The Prince must be Powerful, to be Respected by his Subjects and by strangers. pag. 45.  
Sect. II. The Prince must be powerful by his Reputation; and what a necessary to that End. pag. 46.  
Sect. III. The Prince must be Powerful by the force of his Frontiers. pag. 48.  
Sect. IU. Of the Power a State ought to have by its Land-Forces. This Section has several Subdivisions upon the account of the abundance of matter it contains which will be specified in the Margin. pag. 51.  
Sect. V Of Natural Power, pag. 80.  
Sect. VI. Which Treats of Trade; as a dependency of the Power of the Sea, and specifies those which are most Convenient. pag. 92.  
Sect. VII. Which shows that Gold and Silver are one of the Principal and most necessary supporters of the State; declares the means to make this Kingdom Powerful in that kind: shows the revenue of the same at present, and how it may be improved for the Future, in discharging the People of three parts in four of the Burden which overwhelms them at this Time. pag. 140.  
Sect. VIII. Which shows in few words, that the utmost point of the Power of Princes must consist in the Possession of their Subjects Hearts. pag. 132.  
Chap. X. Which concludes this Work, in showing that whatever is contained in it will prove ineffectual, unless the Princes and their Ministers are so mindful of the Government of the State, as to omit nothing which their Trust obliges them to, and not to abuse their Power pag. 133.   
THE END.