Sr. Walter Ralegh King MAXIMS OF STATE. Written by Sir WALTER RALEIGH. Whereunto is added His Instructions to his son; AND The Son's ADVICE to his Aged Father. LONDON, Printed by W. Bentley, and are to be sold by W. Shears, at the sign of the Bible, over against the North door of Paul's. 1650. THE CONTENTS. Page. OF Government. 1 Of policy. 2 Of monarchy. 3 Of aristocracy, or Senatory State. 5 Of Free State, or Popular State. 6 Of ●yranny. 7 Of oligarchy, or the Government of a few. ibid. Of a commonwealth. 8 Of causes of States, and commonwealths in general. 10 Of founding a State. ibid. Of Causes preserving a State or commonwealth. 15 Of Mysteries or Sophisms. ibid. Of Axioms or Rules of preserving a State. 19 Rules for preserving of a kingdom. Hereditary. 25 Rules for preserving of a kingdom. Conquered. 25 Kingdoms hereditary are preserved at home by the ordering of a Prince. ibid. Kingdoms new gotten, or purchased by force, are preserved by 10. Rules. 35 Rules politic of Tyrants. 41 Sophisms of a barbarous and professed tyranny. 42 Sophisms of the sophistical, or subtle Tyrant, to hold up his State. 46 Of preservation of an aristocracy. 52 Of preservation of an oligarchy, by Sophisms. ibid Of preservation of an oligarchy, by Rules. ibid Of Conversion of States in general. 59 Causes of conversions of States are of two sorts: General and Particular. ibid. Particular causes of Conversion of State, are of two sorts. 60 Of sedition. 61 Causes of sedition are of two sorts. ibid. Of alteration without violence. 64 A Method, how to make use of the Book before● in the reading of the story. 67 Old age is not ever unfit for public Government. ibid. Example of the like practice in Charles the Fifth. 68 Of observation for the Affirmative and the Negative. ibid. Of defence for David in marrying Abishag. 70 Political Nobility. Of Adoniah aspiring to the Kingdom. 71 Observations. Of ways of such as aspire to the Kingdom, and marks to discern them. 73 Political Prince. 75 THE TABLE Of the Chapters contained in Sir Walter Raleigh's INSTRUCTIONS to his SON. CHAP. Page. VIrtuous persons to be made choice of for friends. 1 I. Great care to be had in the choosing of a Wife. 4 II. Wisest men have been abused by flatterers. 10 ●V. Private Quarrels to be avoided. 11 ●. Three Rules to be observed for the preservation of a man's estate. 17 VI. What sort of servant● are most fit to be entertained. 20 VII. Brave rags wear soonest out of fashion. 2● VIII. Riches not to be sough● by evil means. ibid● ix.. What Inconvenience happen to such as deligh● in Wine. 2● X. Let God be thy protector and director in all the Actions. 2● MAXIMS OF STATE. OF GOVERNMENT. GOVERNMENT is of two sorts. 1. Private, of himself. sobriety. Of his Family; called O●●onomie. 2. public, of the commonwealth; called Poli●ie. A man must first Govern himself, ere he be fit to govern a Family: And his Family, ere he be fit to bear the Government in the commonwealth. Of policy. policy is an Art of Government of a commonwealth, and some part of it according to that State, or form of Government wherein it is settled for the public good. State, is the frame or set order of a commonwealth, or of the governors that rule the same, specially of the chief and Sovereign governor that commandeth the rest. The State or Sovereignty consisteth in 5. points. 1. Making or anulling of Laws. 2. Creating and disposing of Magistrates. 3. Power over life and death. 4. Making of War, or Peace. 5. Highest o● last appeal. Where these five are, either in one or in more, there is the State. These five points of State, rest either in, 1. One monarchy or Kingdom. 2. Some few chief men for virtue and wisdom, called an aristocracy. 3. Many, called a Fr●e-State, or Popular State. These three sorts of Government have respect to the common good, and therefore are just, and lawful States. These 3. degenerate into 3. other Governments. viz. 1. monarchy, 2. aristocracy, 3. Popular Est●t, into 1. tyranny. 2. oligarchy. 3. commonwealth o● Government of all the common and baser sort, and therefore called a commonwealth by an usurped nickname. These all respect their own, and not the public good, and therefore are ●ailed Bastard Governments. I. monarchy. A monarchy, or Kingdom, is the Government of a State by one Head, or chief, tending to the common benefit of all. monarchy, or Kingdoms, are of three sorts touching the right, or possession of them; viz. 1. hereditary, by de●cent, as the English, French, &c. 2. Elective, by suffrage of the other Orders, or some of them, as the Polonian. 3. mixed, or of both kinds; viz. by Descent, yet not tied to the next of blood, as the ancient Jewish State. Monarchies are of two sorts touching their power or authority; viz. 1. entire. Where the whole power of ordering all State matters, both in peace and war, doth by law and custom appertain to the Prince, as in the English Kingdom, where the Prince hath power to make Laws, League, and W●r; To create Magistrates; to pardon life: Of appeal, &c. Though to give a contentment to the other degrees, they have a suffrage in making Laws, yet ever subject to the Prince's pleasure, nor Negative will. 2. Limit●d or restrained, that hath no full power in all the points o● matters of State, as the Military King that hath not the Sovereignty in time of peace, as the making of Laws, &c. But in War only, as the Polonian Kings. II. aristocracy, or senatory State. AN aristocracy is the Government of a commonwealth by some competent number of the better sort, preferred for wisdom and other virtues for the public good. Aristocracies are of three sorts, viz. Where the senators are chosen, for 1. Virtue, Riches, and the Common good, as the Venetian. 2. Virtue and the public good without respect of wealth, as sometimes the Roman, when some of the senators were fetched from the plough, and some from the Schools. 3. Virtue and wealth, more respecting their private, than their public good, which inclineth towards an oligarchy, or the Government of the Richer or nobler sort, as in Rome towards the end. III. Free-State, or Popular Sta●e. THe Popular State is the Government of a State by the choicer sort of people, tending to the public good of all sorts; viz. with due respect of the better, nobler, and richer sort. In every just State, some part of the Government is, or aught to be imparted to the People; As in a Kingdom, a voice or suffrage in making laws; and sometimes also, in levying of Arms (if the charge be great, and the Prince forced to borrow help of his Subjects) the matter rightly may be propounded to a Parliament, that the tax may seem to have proceeded from themselves. So consultations, and some proceedings in Judicial matters, may in part be referred to them. The reason, least seeing themselves to be in no number, nor of reckoning, they mislike the state, or kind of Government: And where the multitude is discontented, there must needs be many enemies to the present State. For which cause, Tyrants, (which allow the people, no manner of dealing in State matters) are forced to bereave them of their wits and weapons, and all other means whereby they may resist, or amend themselves, as in A●shland, ●urk●y, &c. IV. Tyranny. A Tyranny is the swerving, or distort●g of a Monarc●ie, or the Governm●●● of one, tending not to the public good, but the private benefit of himself, and his followers. As in the ruff and Turkish Government, where the State and Wealth of other o●●ers, are employed only to the upholding of the greatness of the King or Emperor. This is the worst of all the Basta●d States, because it is the perverting of the best Regiment, to wit, of a monarchy, which resembleth the Sovereign Government of God himself. V. oligarchy, or the Government of a few. AN oligarchy is the swerving, or the corruption of an aristocracy; or the Gov●●nment of some few, that are of the Wealthier or Nobler sort, without a●y respect of the public good. The chief end of these Gover●●●●s, is, their own greatness and enriching. And therefore their manner is, to prepare fi● mean● to uphold their Esta●es. This St●te is not wholly so bad, as is the tyranny, and yet worse than the Commo●-wealth, because it respecteth the good of a few. VI. Commonwealth. A commonwealth is the swerving or depravation of a F●ee, or popular State, or the Government of the whole multitude of the base and poorer sort, without respect of the other Orders. These two States, to wit; The Olig●●chie, and commonwealth, are very adve●se the one to the other, and have many b●ckerings between them. For that the richer or nobler sort, suppose a right or superiority to appertain unto them in every respect, because they are superior, but in some re●pects only, to wit, in Riches, Birth, Parentage, &c. On the other side, the Common-people suppose, there ought to be an equality in all other things, and some State matters; because they are equal● with the Rich or Noble, touching their Lib●●tie, whereas indeed neither the one nor the other are simply equal or superior, as touching Government and fitness thereunto, because they are such, to wit, because they are Rich, Noble, Free, &c. But because they are Wise, Virtuous, Valiant, &c. and so have fit parts to Govern a State. These several States are sometimes mixed, and inter wrought one with the other, yet ever so, as that the one hath the preheminent predomination over the other, as in the humours and complexions of the body. So in the Rom●n State, the people had their Plehis●●ta, and gave the suffrage in the election of Magistrates: Yet the Senate (as the State stood) for the most part swayed the State, and bare the chief rule. So in the Ven●tian State, the Duke seemeth to represe●● a Mon●rch, and the S●nate to be his Counc●l: Yet the Duke hath no power in State matters, but is like a head set on by art, that heareth no brain. And so that State is S●natorical or Aristocratical. Causes of States & commonwealths in general. Causes of States or of commonwealths are of 3. sorts, viz. 1. Founding, or settling a State where to be considered. 1. Measure. 2. Parts, & their Qualities. 2. Preserving a State. 3. Changing, and altering a State. Founding a State. In founding a State are to be considered 2. things. 1. Proportion. 2. Parts. PRoportion, is a Just Measure or mediocrity of the State, whereby it is framed and kept in that Order, as that neither it exceed nor be defective in his kind, to wit, so that a Monarch b● not too Monarchical, nor strict, or absolute, as the ●usse Kings; nor Aristocratical, that is over-mated or eclipsed by the Nobility, as the Scottish Kingdom, but ever respective to the other degrees. That aristocraty be not to magnificent nor entire to itself, but communicate with the people some commodities of State or Government, as the V●netian, and sometimes the Roman allowed the people to elect certain Magistrates out of themselves, to have a Tribune, to make Plebiscita, &c. So a Free-State or commonwealth that it be not over popular, viz. That it depress not to much the richer, wiser, nor learneder sort; but admit them to offices with a Caution out of the rules and mysteries of that State. That they seek no alteration of the present State. The reason, because the moderate States in their several kinds (as all other things that observe the mean) are best framed for their continuance, because they give less cause of grudge, envy, and affecting the Wealth, Honour, and liberty which they see in others that govern the State; And so are less subject to stirs and commotions, and easiest kept in their present State wherein they are set. Parts. THe Parts of the State, or those Magistrates that bear place or sway in the public Government. Parts or Partakers of public Government, are 1. council or Senate, which consul●eth of all matters pertaining to War and Peace, Magistrates, &c. in admitting of whom there ought to be a more special care, that they may be men expert in matter of policy, because it is their Trade and Vocation, as men use to choose Pilots, and Masters of Ships, such as know the Art of Navigation, and not husbandmen, &c. And so the contrary. 2. Magistrates and Officers, which are to be executioners of that which is consulted, and found to be expedient for the commonwealth, wherein are to be observed, the kinds of Magistrates, that they be such as fit that kind of Government; The time of their continuance, and the manner of their election or appointing, by whom, out of whom, and in what manner they be chosen. 3. judges; To determine in Civil, and Criminal matters, where are to be observed, out of whom they are to be chosen; what kinds are necessary, and the manner o●Iudgement, and judicial proceeding. In Magistrates are to be observed. 1. Kinds of magistrates as, 1. Civil 1. superior, which are to be such & of that kind as agree with the State, as Consuls for a year, and not perpetual dictators in a senatory State. Praetors, & Censors, that oversee manners & orders of the people. For a Kingdom Lieutenant of Shires, Marshals, Masters of Horse, Admirals, &c. inferior, as conservatous of Peace, Constables, &c. Overseers of youth, that take care for their education for civil & warlike exercise. Clarks of the Market that provide for the quantity, and price of victual. aediles for Buildings, Streets, Bounds. questors, or Treasurers, to keep and dispense the public Treasury. A●●uaries, or recorders, which keep the public Records. gaolers, to keep prisons and Prisoners. surveyors of woods and fields, &c. 2. Ecclesiastical. 1. As Bishops or pastors, Elders, Wardens. 2. Time of Magistrates, whereof some are perpetual, some for a time, viz. for more years, a year, half a year, according to the necessity of the commonwealth, and not perpetual; or at least not Hereditary in a Kingdom. Yearly in an aristocracy, or half yearly in a Free-state. 3. Manner of choice, by whom and how to be chosen, where especially they are to be chosen by suffrage, and not by Lot. Causes preserving a State, or commonwealth. In preserving of States, 2. things required. 1. Mysteries, or Sophisms. 1. General to all States. 2. Particular, for every several State. 2. Rules, or Actions. 1. General, for all States. 2. Particular, for every State. Mysteries, or Sophisms. MYsteries, or Sophisms of State, are certain secret practices, either for the avoiding of danger, or averting such effects as tend to the preservation of the present State, as it is set or founded. State Mysteries are of two sorts. 1. General: That pertain to all States; as first, to provide by all means, that the same degree, or part of the commonwealth, do not exceed both in Quantity and Q●ality. In Quantity, as that the number of the Nobility, or of great persons, be not more, than the State or commonwealth can bear. In Quality, as that none grow in wealth, liberty, honours, &c. more than it is meet for that degree; For as in weights, the heavier weights bear down the Scale: So in commonwealths, that part or degree that excelleth the rest in Quality, and Quantity, overswayeth the rest after it, whereof follow alterations, and conversions of State. Secondly, to provide by all means, that the middle sort of people exceed both the extremes, (viz.) of Nobility and Ge●t●y, and the base rascal, and begarly sort. For this maketh the State constant and firm, when both the extremes are tied together by a middle sort, as it were with a band, as for any conspiracy of the rich and beggarly sort together, it is not to be feared. To these two points, the Particular rules or Sophisms of every commonwealth, are to be applied. 2. Particular: That serve ●or preservation of every commonwealth, in that form of State wherein it is settled as in a Kingdom. That the Nobility may be accustomed to bear the government of the Prince, especially such as have their dwelling in remote places from the Prince's eye, it is expedient to call them up at certain times to the Prince's Court, under pretence of doing them honour, or being desirous to see, and enjoy their prese●ce; and to have their children, especially their eldest, to be attendant upon the Prince, as of special favour towards them and theirs, that so they may be trained up in duty and obedience towards the Prince, and be as Hostages for the good behaviour, and faithful dealing of their Parents, especially, if they be of any suspected note. To that end serves the Pe●si●● practice, in having a Band, or Train of the S●trapa's children, and other Nobles to attend the Court; which was well imitated by our Train of H●n●●men, if they were of the Nobler sort. Again, sometimes to borrow small sums of his Subjects, and to pay them again, that he may after borrow greater sums and never pay: So in an Oligarchy, lest it decline to a Popular State, they deceive the people with this and the like Sophisms, (viz.) They compel their own sort, to wit, the rich men, by great penalties, to frequent their Assemblies for choosing of Magistrates, for provision of Armour, warlike Exercises, making an Execution of Laws, &c. By that means seeming to bear a hard hand over the richer, but to suffer the poorer, and meaner sor● to be absent, and to neglect those Assemblies und●r pretence, that they will not draw them from their business, and private earnings,: Yet withal to cite thither some few of them, (viz.) so many as are easily over matched by the ●icher sort, to make a show, that they would have the people or poorer sort, partakers likewise of those matters, yet terrifying those that come to their Assemblies, with the tediousness of consultations, greatness of Fines, if they should misdo, to the end, to make them unwilling to come again, or to have to do with those Consultations; by which means, the richer sort do still govern the State, with the people's liking, and good contentment. Axioms. Axioms or Rules of preserving the state are, 1. G●neral, that serve for all commonwealths. 2. Particular, that serve for every several State. General Rules. 1. THe first and principal Rule of policy to be observed in all States, is to profess, and practise, and maintain the true worship and Religion of Almighty God prescribed unto us in his word, which is the chief end of all government. The Axio●, That God be obeyed simply without exception, though he command that which seemeth unreasonable, and absurd to human policy; as in the Jews commonwealth, That all the men should repair yearly to one place to worship God four times, leaving none to defend their coast, though being beset with many Enemies. Not to sow the seventh year, but to suffer the ground to rest untilled without respect or fear of famine, &c. 2. To avoid the causes of Conversions, whereby States are overthrown, that are set down in the Title of conversions; For that commonwealths (as natural bodies) are preserved by avoiding that which hurteth the health and State thereof, a●d are so cured by contrary medicines. 3. To take heed, that no Magistrate be created or continued contrary to the Laws and policy of that Stat●. As that in a S●nate, there be no● created a perpetual Dict●tor, as Caesar in Rome. In a Kingdom, that there be no Senate, or Convention of equal power with the Prince in State matters, as in Poland. 4. To create such Magistrates as love the State as it is settled, and take heed of the contrary practice, as to advance Popular persons in a Kingdom, or A●istocracie. And secondly, to advance such as have skill to discern what doth preserve, and what hurteth or altereth the present Stat●. 5. To that end to have certain officers to p●y abroad, and to observe such as do not live and behave themselves in sit sort, agreeable to the present State, but de●●e rather to be under some other form, or kind of government. 6. To take heed that Magistracies be not sold for money, nor bribe in their Offices, which is specially to be observed in that commonwealth which is governed by a few of the richer sort; For if the Magistrate gain nothing but his Common Fees, the common sort, and such as want honour, take in good part that they be not preferred, and are glad rather that themselves are suffered to intend private business. But if the Magistrate buy and sell matters, the common people are doubly grieved, both because they are debared of those preferments, and of that gain they see to grow by them, which is the cause that the Germ●in Oligarchi●s continue so firm; for both they suffer the poorer sort to grow into wealth, and the richer sort are by that means freed, and secured from being under the poor. 7. To take heed that the State, as it is settled and maintained, be not overstuct, nor exceed in his kind; (viz.) That a Kingdom be not too Monarchical, nor a Popular State too Popular: For which cause it is good, that the Magistrates sometimes yield of his right touching honour, and behave themselves familiarly with those that are equal unto them in other parts, though inferior for place and Office; And sometimes popula●ly with the common people, which is the cause that some commonwealths, though they be very simply, and unskilfully set, yet conti●●e ●●rm, because the Magistrates behave thems●lves wi●ely, and with due re●pect towards the r●st that are without honour; and therefore ●ome kind of Modera●● Popularity is to be used in every ●ommon-wealth. 8. To take heed of small beginnings, and to meet with them even at the first, as well touching the breaki●g and altering of laws, as of other rules which concern the continuance of every several State. For the disease and alteration of a commonwealth, doth not happen all at once, but grows by degrees, which every common wit cannot discern, but men expert in policy. 9 To provide, that that part be ever the grea●er in number and power, which favours the S●ate as now ●t sta●ds. This is to be observed as a ve●y Oracle in all Common-weal●hs. 10 To observe a mean in all the degrees, and to suffer no pa●t to exceed, or decay over much. As first for p●efe●ments, to provide that they be rather small and short, than great and long; and if a●y be grown to overmuch greatness, to withdraw or diminish some part of his honour. Where the Sophisms are to be practised (viz.) to do it by parts and degrees; to do it by occasion, or colour of law, and not all at once. And if that way serve not, to advance some other, of whose virtu● and faithfulness, we are fully assur●d, to as high a degree, or to a greater honour; and to be the friends and followe●s of him that excelleth, above that which is meet. As touching wealth, to provide, that those of the middle sort (as before was said) be more in number; and if any grow high, and overcharged with wealth, to use the So●●isms of a Po●ula● State, viz. to send him on Embassages, and foreign Negotiations, or employ him in some Office that hath g●●at charges, and little honour, &c. To which end, the Edil●ship served in some commonwealths. 11. To suppress the Factions, and quarrels of the Nobles, and to keep other that are y●● free from joyni●g with them in their partakings and Factions. 12 To increase or remit the common Taxes and Contributions, according to the wealth, or want of the People and Common-wealt●. If the people be increased in Wealth, the Taxes and Subsidies may be increased. If they be poor, and their Wealth diminish, specially by dearth, want of traffic, &c. to forbear Taxes and Impositions, or to take little. Otherwise grudge and discontentments must needs follow. The Sophisms that serve for Imposi●itions, are these, and other of like sort, to pretend business of great charge, as War, building of Ships, making of Havens, Castles, Fortifications, &c. for the Common defence; sometimes by Lotteries and like devices, wherein some part may be bestowed, the rest reserved for other expenses; but Princely dealings needs no pretences. 13 To Provide that the Discipline & Training of youth of the better sort be such as agreeth with that commonwealth: As that in a Kingdom, the sons of Noble men to be attendant at the Court, that they may be accustomed to obedience towards the Prince: In the Senatory State, that the sons of the senators be not idly, nor over daintily brought up, but well instructed and trained up in Le●rning, Tongues, and Martial Exercise; that they may be able to bear that place in the commonwealth, which their Father held, and contrariwise, in a Popular State, 14. To take heed, lest their Sophisms, or secret practices for the continuance and maintenance of that State, be not discovered; lest by that means they refuse and disappoint themselves, but wisely used, and with great secrecy. Particular Rules. Rules and Axioms, for preserving of a Kingdom. Hereditary. Conquered. Kingdoms Hereditary, are preserved at home by the ordering, 1. HImself, viz. By the tempering and moderation of the Prince's power and Prerogative. For the less and more temperate their power and State is, the more firm, and stable is their Kingdom and Governm●nt; because they seem to be further off from a Master-like, and Tyrannical Empire; and less unequal in condition to the next degree, to wit, the Nobility, and so less subject to grudge and envy. 2. Nobility; viz. By keeping that degree and due proportion, that neither they exceed in number more than the Realm, or State can bear, as the Scottish Kingdom, and sometime the English, when the Realm was overcharged with the number of Dukes, Earls, and other Nobles; whereby the Authori●y of the Prince was eclipsed, and the Realm troubled with their Factions and Ambitions. Nor that any one excel in Hono●r, Power, or wealth, as that he resemble another King within the Kingdom, as the house of Lancaster within this Realm, To that end, not to load any with too much Hono●r or preferment, because it is hard even for the best, and worthiest men, to bear their greatness, and high Fortune tempera●ely, as appeareth by infinite examples in all States. The Sophism for preventing, or reforming this inconvenience, are to be used with great caution and wisdom. If any great person be to be abated, not to deal with him by calumniation, or forg●d matter, & so to cut him off without desert, especially if he be gracious among the people, after the Machiavilian policy, which besides the injustice, is an occasion many times of greater danger towards the Prince. Nor to withdraw their Honour all at once, which maketh a desperate Discontentment in the party, and a commiseration in the peole, and so greater love, if he be gracious for his virtue, and public service. Nor to banish him into foreign Countries, where he may have opportunity of practising with Forr●ign States, whereof great danger may ensue, as in the example of Coriolanus, Henry the fourth, and such like. But to use these, and the like Sophisms, viz. To abate their greatness by degrees, as David joab's, Justinian Bellisarius, &c. To advance some other Men to as great, or greater Honour, to shadow, or over-mate the greatness of the other. To draw from him by degrees his friends, and followers by prefe●ments, rewa●ds, and other good and lawful means; especially, to be pr●vided that these great men be not employed in great or powerful affairs of the commonwealth, whereby they may have more opportunity to sway the State. 3. People, viz. So to order and behave himself, that he be loved, and reverenced of the People. For that the Prince need not greatly fear home-conspiracies, o● foreign Invasion, if he be firmly loved of his own people. The reason, for that the Rebel can neither hope for any forces for so great enterprise, nor any refuge, being discovered and put to flight, if the multitude affect their Prince: But the Common people being once offended, hath cause to fear every moving, both at home and abroad. This may be effected by the Prince, if he use means and art of getting the favour of the people, and avoid those things that breed hatred & contempt; viz. if he seem as a Tutor, or a Father to love the people, and to protect them, if he maintain the peace of his Kingdom; For that nothing is more popular, nor more pleasing to the people, than is peace. 4. If he show himself oftentimes graciously, yet with State and Majesty to his people, and receive complaints of his suppliants, and such like. 5. If he sit himself sometimes in open Courts, and place of Iustic●, that he may seem to have a care of justice among his people. If he bestow many benefits and graces upon that City, which he maketh the seat of his Empire, and so make it sure and faithful unto him, which is fit to be in the middle of his Kingdom, as the hear● in the middle of the body, or the Sun in the middle of Heaven, both to divide himself more easily into all the parts of his Dominions; and lest the furthest parts● at one end move, whilst the Prince is in the other. I● he go in progress many times to see his Provinces, especially, those that are remote. 6. If he gratify his Courtiers and Att●n●ants in that ●ort, and by such means, as that he may seem not to pleasure them with the hurt and injury of his people, as with Monopolies, and such like. 7. If he commit the handling of such things as procure envy, or seem grievous to his Ministers, but reserve those things which are grateful, and well pleasing to himself, as the French Kings, who for th●t purpose, as may seem, have erected their Court at Paris, which acquitteh the Prince from grudge and ●nvy, both with the Nobles and the P●ople. 8. If he borrows sometimes sums of money of his people, though he have no need, and pay the same justly without defalca●ion of any part by his Exchequer, or other Officer. 9 If he avoid all such things as may breed ●atred, or contempt of his person, which may be done, if he show himself not too light, inconstant, hard, cruel, ●sfeminate, fearful, and dastardly, &c. But contrariwise, Religious, Grave, just Valiant, &c. Whereby appeareth the false doctrine of the Machiavilian policy, with far the betmeans to keep the people in obedience, than love, and reverence of the people towards the Prince. 10 If the Prince be well furnished with Warlike provision, which is to be rumoured, and made known abroad: if it be known, that he is reverenced, and obeyed by his peoples at home. 11. If he provide so much as lieth in him, that his neighbour Kingdoms grow not over much in power and Dominion; which if it happen, he is to join speedily with other Princes, which are in like danger to abate that greatness, and to strengthen himself and the rest against it. An oversight of the Christian Princes towards the King of Spain. 12. If he get him Intelligencers by Reward, or other means, to detect or hinder the designs of that Prince, with whom he hath differences, if any thing be intended against his State. Or at least have some of his own lodging abroad, about that Prince's Court, under colour of Embassage, or some other p●etence; which must be men of skill and Dexterity to serve for that turn. 13. To observe the Laws of his country, and not to encounter them with his Pr●rogative, nor to use it at all where there is a Law, for that it maketh a secret and just grudge in the people's hearts, especially if it tender to take from them ●●●ir commodities, and to bestow them upon other of his COURTIERS and Ministers. 14. To provide especially, That that part, which favoureth the State as it standeth, be more potent, than the other which favoureth it not, or desireth a change. 15. To make special choice of good and sound men to bear the place of Magistrates, especially, of such as assist the Prince in his Counsels, and Policies, and not to lean over much to his own advice, contrary to the rule of Machiavil, who teacheth, That a Prince can have no good counsel, except it be in himself; his reason, because if he use the counsel of some one, he is in danger to be overwrought, and supplanted by him; & if he counsel with more, than he shall be distracted with the differences in opinions. As if a Prince of great, or mean wisdom, could not take the judgement of all his Counsellorurs in any point of policy, or of so many as the himself thinketh good, and to take it either by word, or in writing; and himself then in private peruse them all, and so after good and mature deliberation, make choice of the best, without any distraction or binding himself to the direction of one. For the Proverb is true, that two eyes see more than one; and therefore the advices, and Consultations of a Senatory State, is compared by some to a Feast, or dinner, where many contribute towards the shot, by which means they have more variety of dishes, and so better fare; and yet every man may make choice of that dish, that serveth him best ●or his health and appeti●e. 16. The Prince himself is to sit sometimes in place of public justice, and to give an experiment of his wisdom and equity, whereby great reverence and estimation is gotten, as in the example of Solomon, which may seem the reason, why our Kings of England had their King's Bench in place of public Justice, after the manner of the ancient Kings that ●ate in the Gate; where for better performing of this Princely duty, some special causes may be selected, which may throughly be deba●ed and considered upon by the Prince in private, with the help and advise of his learned council, and so be decided publicly, as before is said, by the Prince himself; At least, the Prince is to ●ake accomp● of every Minister of public Justice, that it may be known, that he hath a care of Justice, and doing right to his people, which makes the justicers also to ●e more ●●reful in performing of their duties. 17. To be moderate in his Taxes, and impositions; and when need doth require to use the Subjects purse, ●o do it by Parliaments, and with their consents, making the cause apparent unto them, and showing his unwillingness in charging them. Finally, so to use it, that it may seem rather an offer from his Subjects, than an exaction by him. 18. To stop small beginnings; unto ●his end to compound the dissensions ●hat arise amongst the Nobles, with caution, that such as are free be not drawn into parts, whereby many times the Prince is endangered, and the whole commonwealth set in a combustion; as in the example of the Barons Wars, and the late Wars of France, which grew from a quarrel betwixt the Guisian Faction, and the other Nobility. 19 To stir up the people, if they grow secure, and negl●gent of A●mour, and other provision for the commonwealth, by some rumour or fear of danger at home, to make more ready when occasion requireth. But this seldom to be used, lest it be supposed a false Alarm, when there is need indeed. 20. To have special care, that his children, especially, the heir apparent, have such bringing up as is meet for a King, viz. in learning, specially of matters pertaining to State, and in Martial exercise, contrary to the practice of many Princes, who suffer their children to be brought up in pleasure, and to spend their time in hunting, &c. which by reason of their defects, afterwards is a cause of misgovernment and alteration of State. II. Kingdoms new gotten, or purchased by force, are preserved by these means. 1. FIrst, if they have been Subjects before to his ancestors, or have the same tongue, manners, or fashions, as have his own country, it is an eas●● matter to retain such Countries within their obedience, in case the Prince's blood of the said country be wholly extinct. For men of the same quality, tongue, and condi●ion, do easily shoal, and combine thems●lves together, so much the rather, if the people of that country have served before, and were not accustomed to their own Lib●r●y, wherein specially is to be observed, that the laws and customs o● that purchased country be not altered nor innovated, or at least it be done by little and little. So the ●urgundians and Acquitains were annexed to France. The reason, because partly they have been accustomed to serve, and partly, for that th●y will not ●asily agree about any other to be their Prince, if the blood royal be once extinguished. As for the invasion of a foreign country, whereunto the Prince hath no right, or whereof the right heir is living,; It is not the part of a just Civil Prince, much less a Prince Christian to enforce such a country; and therefore, the Machiavilian practices in this case, to make sure work by extinguishing wholly the blood Royal, is lewd and imper●inent: The like is to be said of murdering the Natives, or the greatest part of them, to the end he may hold the rest in sure possession. A thing not only against Christian Religion, but it is inhuman injustice, cruel, and barbarous. 2. The safest way is, (supposing a right) that some good part of the Natives be transplanted into some other place, and our Colonies, consisting of so many as shall be thought meet, be planted there in some part of the Province, Castles, Forts, and Havens, seized upon and more provided in fit places, as the manner was of the Babylonian Monarch, which Transplanted 10. Jews: And of the Romans in France, Tribes of the Germany, Br●tany, and other places. The reason: 1. For that otherwise Forces of Horse and Foot, are to be maintained within the Province, which cannot be done without great charge. 2. For that the whole Province is ●roubled and grieved with removing and supplying the Army with victuals, carriages, &c. 3. For that Colonies are more sure and faith●ul, than the rest. As for the Natives that are removed from their former years, they have no means to hurt, and the rest of the Natives being free from the inconvenience, and fearing that themselves may be so served if they attempt any thing rashly, are content to be quiet. The Turks practice in Asia, where the chief grounds and dwellings are possessed by the soldiers, whom they call, Timariotae. That the Prince have his seat and his residence, in his new purchase, especially, for a time, till things be well settled; especially, if the Province be great and large, as the Turks in Greece: The reason; 1. Because the presence of the Prince availeth much to keep things in order, and get the good will of his new Subjects. 2. They conceive that they have refuge by the Prince's presence, if they be oppressed by the Lieutenants, and inferior governors: Where it will be convenient for the winning the people's hearts, that some example be made of punishing of such as have committed any violence or oppression. 3. Because being present, he seeth and heareth what is thought and attempted; and so may quickly give remedy to it, which being absent, he cannot do, or not do in time. 4. If the Prince himself cannot be present to reside, then, to take heed that the charge of Governing, or new purchases be committed to such as be sure men, and of other meet quality, that depend wholly upon the Prince's favour, and not to Natives, or other of their own Subjects, that are gracious ●or their Nobil●●y, or Virtue; especially, if the Province be great, and somewhat far distant, which may soon seduce the unsettled affections of those new subjects. As for such governors, as depend wholly upon the Prince's favour, being not born, but created Noble, they will not so easily suffer themselves to be won from their duty, and in case they would revolt, yet they are not able to make any great strength, for that the people obey them but as instruments and ministers, to keep them in Subjection, and not for any ill will. 4. To have the children of the ch●e● Noble men, and of greatest Authority, Hostages with them in safe keeping, the more the better: For that no bound is stronger, than that of nature, to contain the Parents and allies in obedience, and they the rest. 5. To alter the laws but by degrees one after another, and to make other that are more behooveful for the establishing of the present Govern●ment. 6. To keep the people quiet and peaceable, and well affected so much as may be, that they may seem by being conquered, to have gotten a protector, rather than a Tyrant; For the Common-People, if they enjoy peace, and ●e not distracted nor drawn from their business, nor exacted upon beyond measure, are easily con●ained under obedience; Yet notwithstanding, they are to be dis●used from the practice of Arms, and other Exercises which increase courage, and ●e weakened of Armour, that they have neither spi●it, ●or will to rebel. 7. If the●e be any ●action in the country, to take to him the defence of the better and stronger part, and to combine with it, ●as Caesar in Fra●●e. 8. To look well to the Borders, and confining Provinces, and if any rule there of great, or equal power to him●elf, to join league with some other Borderers, though of less strength, to hinder the attempts (if any should be) by such neighbour Prince. For it happeneth often, tha● a country in●e●ted by one neighbour P●ince, ●calleth in another, of as great, o● greater power, to assist, and rescue it from the other that invadeth it; So the Romans were called into Greece, by the AEtolians; the Saxons, by the Britains, the Danes, by the Saxons. 9 To leave their Ti●les and dignities to the Natives, but the command and Authority, wholly to his own. 10. Not to put much trust, nor to practise to often the Sophisms of Policy, especially those that appertain to a Tyrannical State, which are soon de●ected by men of Judgement, and so bring discredit to the Prince, and his Policy among the wiser, and better sort of his subjects, whereof must needs follow very ill effects. The Sophisms of Tyrants, are rather to be known, than practised, (which are for the supporting of their Tyrannical States,) by wise and good Princes, and are these, and such like as follow. Rules politic of Tyrants. Rvles' practised by Tyrants are of 2. sorts. viz. 1. Barbarous, and Pro●essed, which is proper to those that have got head, and have power sufficient of themselves, without others help, as in the Tu●kish, and ruff Government. 2. So●histical, and Dissembl●d; As in some States that are repu●ed for good and lawful Monarchies, but inclining to Tyrannies, proper to those which are not yet ●●tled, nor have power sufficient of themselves; but must use the power and help of others, and so are forced to be politic Soph●st●●s. I. Sophisms of a Barbarous and professed Tyranny. TO expel and banish ou● of his country all ho●est means, whereby his people may a●tain to learning, wisdom, valour, and other virtues, that they might be fit for that estate, and ●ervile condition. For that these two, learning, and martial exercise, effect two things most dangerous to a Tyranny: viz. Wisdom, and Valour. For that men of spirit and understanding, can hardly endure a Servile State. To this end, to forbid learning of li●eral Arts, and Martial exercise; As in the Rus●e Government, so Julian the Apo●tata dealt with the Christians. Contrariwise, to use his people to base occup●tions, and Mechanical Arts, to keep them from idleness, and to put away from them all high thoughts, and manly conceits, and to give them a liberty of drinking drunk, and of other base and lewd conditions that they may be sotted, and so made unfit for great enterprises. So the Egyptian Kings dealt with the Heb●ews; So the ruff Emperor with his ruff people: And Charles the fifth with the Neth●rlanders, when he purposed to enclose their privileges, and to bring them under his absolute Government. 2. To make sure to him, and his State, his Military men by reward, liberty, and other means, especially, his Guard, or Praetorian ●and; That being partakers of the spoil and benefit, they make like that State, and continue firm to it; as the Turk, his janissaries; the ruff, his Boyarens, &c. 3. To unarm his people of weapons, money, and all means, whereby they may resist his power; And to that end, to have his set and ordinary exactions, viz. Once in two, three, or four years, and sometimes yearly, as the Turk and Russe; who is wont to say, That his people must be used as his flock of sheep, viz. Their fle●c● taken from them, lest it overlade them, and grow too heavy; That t●ey are like to his beard, that the more it was shaven, the thicker it would grow. And if there be any of extraordinary wealth, to borrow of them in the mean while, till the Tax come about, or upon some devised matter, to confiscate their goods, as the common practice is of the ruff and Tu●k. 4. To be still in Wars, to the end, his people may need a Captain; and that his Forces may be kept in practice, as the ruff doth yearly against the Tartar, Pol●nian, and Sweden, &c. 5. To cut off such as excel the rest in wealth, favour, or nobil●ty; or be of a pregnant, or a spiring wit, & so are fearful to a Tyrant, and to suffer none to hold Office, or any honour, but only of him; as the Turk, his Bas●●●s; and the ruff, his ●u●zzes. 6. To forbid Guild●, Brotherhoods, Feastings, and other Assemblies among the people, that they have no means or opportunity to conspire, or confer together of public matters, or to maintain love amongst themselves, which is very dangerous to a Tyrant, the Russes practice. 7. To have their Beagles, or listeners in every corner, and parts of the Realm; especially, in places that are more suspect, to learn what every man saith, or thinketh, that they may prevent all attempts, & take away such as mislike their State. 8. To make Schism, and Division among his Subjects, viz. To set one Noble man, against another, and one Rich man against another, that through Faction & disagreement among themselves, they may be weakened, and attempt nothing against him, and by this means entertaining whisperings, and complaints, he may know the secrets of both parts, and have matter against them both, when need requireth. So the ruff made the Faction of the Ze●●ky, and the Oppress●nie. 9 To have strangers for his Guard, and to entertain Parasites, and other base and servile fellows, not too wise, and yet subtle, that will be ready for reward to do and execute what he commandeth, though never so wicked and unjust. For that good men cannot flatter, and wise men cannot serve a Tyrant. All these practices, and such like, may be contracted into one or two, viz. To bereave his subjects of will and power to do him hurt, or to alter the present State. The use is Caution, not Imitation. II. Sophisms of the Sophistical, or subtle Tyrant, to hold up his State. 1. TO make show of a good King, by observing a temper and mediocrity in his Government, and whole course of life; To which end, it is necessary, That this subtle Tyrant, be a cunning politician, or a Machiavilian at the least, and that he be taken so to be, for that it maketh him more to be feared and regarded, and is thought thereby, not unworthy for to Govern others. 2. To make show not of severity, but of gravity, by seeming reverent, and not terrible in his speech, and gesture, and habit, and other demeanour. 3. To pretend care of the commonwealth; And to that end, to seem loath to exact Tributes, and other Charges; and yet to make necessity of it, where none is: To that end, to procure such War as can bring no danger toward his State, and that might easily be compounded, or some other chargeable business; and to continue it on, that he may continue his exaction and contribution so long as he list. And thereof to employ some in his public Service, the rest to hoard up in his Treasury, which is sometimes practised even by lawful Princes, as Edward the fourth in his Wars against France, when having levied a great sum of Money throughout his ●ealm, especially of the Londoners, he went over Seas, and returned without any thing doing. 4. Sometimes to give an account by open speech, and public writing, of the expense of such Taxes and Impositions, as he hath rec●ived of his ●ubjects, that he may so seem to be a good Husband, and frugal, and not a robber of the commonwealth. 5. To that end, to bestow● some cost upon public buildings, or some other work for the Common good, especially upon the Ports, Forts, and chief Cities of his Realm, that so he may seem a benenefactor, and have a delight in the adorning of his country, or doing some good for it. 6. To forbid feastings, and other meetings, which increase love, and give opportunity to confer together of public matters, under pretence of sparing cost for better uses, To that end, the curfew Bell was first ordained by William the● conqueror, to give men warning to repair home at a certain hour. 7. To take heed that no one grow to be overgreat, but rather, many equally great, that they may envy, and contend one with another; and if he resolve to weaken any of this sort, to do it warily, and by degrees; If quite to wreck him, and to have his life, yet to give him a lawful trial, after the manner of his country; And if he proceed so far with any of great power and estimation, as to do him contumely, or disgrace, not to suffer him to escape, because contumely and disgrace, are things contrary unto Honour, which great spirits do most desire, and so are moved rather to a revenge for their disgrace, than to any thankfulness, or acknowledging the Prince's favour for their pardon or dismistion; True in Atheists, but not in true Christian nobility. 8. To unarm his people, and store up their weapons, under pretence of keeping them safe, and having them ready when service requireth, and then to arm with them, such and so many as he shall think meet, and to commit them to such as are sure men. 9 To make schism or division under hand among his Nobility, and betwixt the Nobility and the people, and to set one Rich man against another, that they combine no● together, and that himself by hearing the grief and complaints, may know the secrets of both parts, and so have matter against them both, when it listeth him to call them to an account. 10. To offer no man any contumely or wrong, specially, about womens' matters, by attempting the chastity of their Wives or Daughters, which hath been he ruin of many Tyrants, and conversion of their States. As of ●arquinius, by Brutus, Appius, by Virginius, Pisistratus, by Harmodius, Alexander Medici's, Duke of Florence, Aloisus of Placentia, Rodericus, King of Spain, &c. 11. To that end, to be moderate in his pleasures, or to use them closely, that he be not seen; For that men sober, or watchful, or such as seem so, are not lightly subject to contempt, or conspiracies of their own. 12. To reward such as achieve some great or commendable enterprise; or do any special action ●or the commonwealth, in that manner as it may seem, they could not be better regarded, in case they lived in a Free-state. 13. All rewards and things grateful, to come from himself, but all punishments, exactions, and things ungrateful, to come from his Officers, & public Ministers; And when he hath effected what he would by them, if he see his people discontented withal, to make them a Sacrifice to pacify his Subjects. 14. To pretend great care of Religion, and of serving God, (which hath been the manner of the wickedest Tyrants) for that people do less fear any hurt from those, whom they think Virtuous and Religious, nor attempt likely to do them hurt, for that they think that God protects them. 15. To have a strong & sure Guard of foreign soldiers, and to bind them by good turns, that they having at least profit, may depend upon him, and the present State; As C●ligula, the German Guard, where the Nobility are many and mighty. The like is practised by lawful Kings, as by the French King. 16. To procure that other great persons be in the same fault, or case with them, that for that cause they be forced to defend the TYRANT, for their own safety 17. To take part, and to join himself with the stronger part; if the Common people, and mean degree be the stronger, to join with them; if the Rich and Noble, to join with them. For so that part with his own strength, will be ever able to overmatch the other. 18. So to frame his manners & whole behaviour, as that he may seem, if not perfectly good, yet tolerably evil, or somewhat good, somewhat bad. These Rules of Hypocritical Tyrants, are to be known, that they may be avoided, and met withal, and not drawn into imimitation. Preservation of an aristocracy. RUles to preserve a Senatory State, are partly taken from the common Axioms, and partly from those that preserve a Kingdom. Preservation of an oligarchy, by Sophisms. Rules. 1. IN Consultations and Assemblies, about public affairs, to order the matter, that all may have liberty to frequent their Common Assemblies, and counsels,; But to impose a Fine upon the richer sort, if they omit that duty. On the other side, to pardon the people, if they absent themselves, and to bear with them under pretence, that they may the better intend their Occupations,, and not be hindered in their Trades, and earnings. 2. In Election of Magistrates, and Officers: To suffer the poorer sort to vow, and abjure the bearing of Office, under colour of sparing them, or to enjoin some great charge, as incident to the Office, which the poor cannot bear. But to impose some great Fine upon those, that be Rich, if they refuse to bear Office, being Elect unto it. 3. In judicial matters: In like manner to order, that the people may be absent from public Trials, under pretence of following their business. But the Richer to be present, and to compel them by Fines, to frequent the Court. 4. In Warlike exercise and Arms: That the poor be not forced to have Armour, Horse, &c. under pretence of sparing their cost, nor to be drawn from their Trades by Martial Exercises; but to compel the Richer sort to keep their proportion of armour, Horse, &c. by excessive Fines, and to exercise themselves in warlike matters, &c. 5. To have special care of instructing their Children in liberal Arts, policy, and Warlike exercise, and to observe good order and discipline. For as Popular States are preserved by the frequency, and Liberty of the People, so this Government of the Richer, is preserved by discipline, and good o●der of governors. 6. To provide good store of warlike furniture, especially of Horse, and horsemen, and of Armed men, viz. Pike, &c. which are proper to the gentry, as shot, and light furniture, are for a Popular company. 7. To put in practise some points of a Popular state; viz. To lade no one man with too much preferment; To make yearly, or half years' Magistrates, &c. For that the People are pleased with such things, and they are better secured by this means from the Rule of one. And if any grow to too much greatness, to abate him by the Sophisms fit for this State. 8. To commit the Offices and Magistracies, to those that are best able to bear the greatest charges for public matters, which both tendeth to the conservation of this State, and pleaseth the people, for that they reap some relief, and benefit by it. 9 To the same end, To contract marriages among themselves, the rich with the rich, &c. 10. In some things which concern not the Points, and matters of State, as Electing Magistrates, making Laws, &c. to giv● an equality, or sometimes a preferment to the Common People, and not to do, as in some Oligarchies they were wont; viz. To swear against the People, to suppress and bridle them; but rather contrary; To minister an Oath at their admission, That they shall do no wrong to any of the People; and if any of the richer offer wrong to any of the Commons, to show some example of severe punishment. For other Axioms that preserve this State, they are to be borrowed from those other rules that tend to the preserving of a Popular, and Tyrannical State; for the strict kind of oligarchy, is kin to a Tyranny. Preservation of a popular State; Sophisms. Rules or Axioms. 1. IN public Assemblies and Consultations about matters of State, creating of Magistrates, public Justice, and Exercise of arms, to practise the contrary to the former kind of Government, to wit, an Oligarc●ie. For in Popular States, the Commons and meaner sort are to be drawn to those Assemblies, Magistrates, Offices, warlike Exercises, &c. by mulcts and rewards, and the richer sort are to be spared, and not to be forced by fine, or otherwise, to frequent these Exercises. 2. To make show of honouring and reverencing the richer men, and not to swear against them, as the manner hath been in some Popular States; but rather to prefer them in all other matters, that concern not the State and public Government. 3. To elect Magistrates from among the Common● by Lot, or ballading, and not to choose any for their wealth's sake. 4. To take heed, that no man bear office twice, except it be Military, where the pay, and salary, &c. is to be reserved in their own hands, to be disposed of by a common-council, &c. And to see that no man be too highly preferred. 5. That no Magistracy be perpetual, but as short as may be, to wit, for a a year, half year, &c. 6. To compel Magistrates when their time expireth, to give an account of their behaviour and government, and that publicly before the Commons. 7. To have public Salaries and allowance for their Magistrates, Judges, &c. And yearly dividents for the common people, and such as have most need among them. 8. To make Judges of all matters out of all sorts, so they have some aptness to perform that duty. 9 To provide that public Judgements and Trials be not frequent; and to that end to inflict great Fines and other punishments upon Pettifoggers and Dilators, as the law of requital, &c. Because for the most part the richer and nobler, and not the Commons are indicted and accused in this commonwealth, which causeth the rich to conspire against the State; whereby many times the popular State is turned into an oligarchy, or some other Government. Hereto tendeth that Art of Civil Law, made against Accusers and calumniators: Ad S●natus-consultum Turpilianum, l. 1. de Calumniatoribus. 10. In such free States as are popular, and have no revenue, to provide that public Assemblies be not after: because they want salary for Pleaders and orators; And if they be rich; yet to be wary, that all the revenue be not divided amongst the Commons. For, that this distribution of the Common revenue among the multitude, is like a purse or barrel without a bottom. But to provide, that a sufficient part of the revenue be stored up for the public affairs. 11. If the number of the poor increase too much in this kind of State, to send some abroad out of the Cities into the next country places, and to provide above all, that none do live idly, but be set to their trades. To this end, to provide that the richer men place in their Farms and copyholds, such decayed Citizens. 12. To be well advised what is good for this State, and not to suppose that to be fit for a popular State, that seemeth most popular; but that which is ●est for the continuance thereof: And to that end, not to lay into the Exchequer, or common-treasury, such goods as are confiscate, but to store them up as holy and consecrate things, which except it be practised, confiscations, and fines of the Common people would be frequent, and so this State would decay by weakening the people. Conversion of States in general. COnversion of a State, is the declining of the commonwealth, either to some other form of Government, or to his full and last period appointed by God. Causes of conversions of States are of two sorts: General and Particular. GEneral, (viz.) 1. Want of Religion: viz. of the true knowledge and worship of God, prescribed in his word; and notable sins that proceed from thence in Prince and people, as in the examples of Saul, Uzziah, the Jewish State; the four Monarchies●●nd all other. 2. Want of wisdom and good council to keep the State, the Prince, Nobles, and people in good temper, and due proportion, according to thei● several orders and decrees. 3. Want of Justice, either in administration (as ill laws, or ill Magistrates) or in the execution, as rewards not given where they should be, or there ●estowed where they should not be, or punishments not inflicted where they should be. 4. Want of power and sufficiency to maintain and defend itself; viz. Of provision, as Armour, Money, Captains, soldiers, &c. Execution, when the means or provision is not used, or ill used. 2. Particular: To be noted and collected out of the contraries of those rules, that are prescribed for the preservation of the commonwealths. Particular causes of Conversion of States, are of two sorts. 1. foreign: By the over-greatness of invasion of some foreign Kingdom, or other State of meaner power, having a part within our own, which are to ●e prevented by the providence of the chief, and rules of policy for the preserving of every State. This ●alleth out very seldom for the great diff●cul●y to overthrow a foreign State. 2. domestic: Sedition or open violence by the stronger part. Alteration without violence. Sedition. SEdition is a power of inferiors opposing itself with force of Arms against the superior power, Quasi ditio secedens. Causes of Sedition are of two sorts. 1. General. Liberty Richer WHen they, that are of equal quality in a commonwealth, or do take themselves so to be, are not regarded equally in all, or in any of these three. Or, when they are so unequal in quality, or take themselves so to be, are regarded but equally, or with less respect than those that be of less de●ect in these three things, or in any of them. Honour 1. IN the Chief: Covetousness or oppression, by the Magistrate or higher Power, (viz.) when the Magistrates, especially the Chief, increaseth his substance and revenue beyond measure, either with the public or (private calamity, whereby the governors grow to quarrel among themselves as in oligarchies) or the other degrees conspire together, and make quarrel against the Chief, as in Kingdoms: The examples of Wat Tyler, Jack Straw, &c. 2. In the Chief: Injury, when great Spirits, and of great power, are greatly wronged and dishonoured, or take themselves so to be, as Coriolanus, Cyrus minor, Earl of Warwick. In which cases the best way is to decide the wrong. 3. Preferment, or want of preferment; wherein some have overmuch, and so wax proud and aspire higher: or have more or less, than they deserve as they suppose; & so in envy and disda●, seek Innovation by open faction, so Caesar, &c. 4. Some great nec●ssity or calamity; So Xerxes after the ●oil of his great Army. And Sena●harib after the loss of 185. in one night. 2. Particular. 1. envy, when the chief exceed the mediocri●y before mentioned, and so provoketh the Nobility, and other degrees, to conspire against him; as Brutus Cassius, &c. against Caesar. 2. Fear, viz. Of danger, when one or more dispatch the Prince, by secret practice or force, to prevent his own danger, as Artab●nus did Xerxes. 3. Lust or lechery, as Tarqvinius Superbus, by Brutus; Pisistratindae, by Armodius; Appius by Virginius. 4. Contempt; For vile quality & base behaviour, as Sardanapalus by Arbaces; Dionysius the younger by Dion. 5. Contumely; When some great disgrace is done to some of great Spirit, who standeth upon his honour and reputation, as Caligula by Chaereas. 6. Hope of Advancement, or some great profit, as Mituridates, Anobarsanes. Chief. Other d●gr●es. Other degrees. Alteration without violence. CAuses of alteration without violence are; 1. Excess of the State; when by degrees the State groweth from that temper and mediocrity wherein it was, or should have been settled, and exceedeth in power, riches, and absoluteness in his kind, by the ambition and covetousness of the Chiefs immoderate taxes, and impositions, &c. applying all to his own benefi●, without respect of other degrees, and so in the end changeth itself into another State or form of Government, as a Kingdom into a Tyranny, an Oligarch●● into an Aristocraci●. 2. Excess, of some one or more in the commonwealth; viz. When some one or more in a commonwealth grow to an excellency or excess above the rest, either in honour, wealth, or virtu●; and so by permission and popular favour, are advanced to the Sovereignty: By which means, popular States grow into Oliga●chies; and Oligarchi●s and Aristocracies into Monarchi●s. For which cause the Athenians and some other free States, made their Laws of Ostrocismos, to banish any for a time that should excel, though it were in virtue, to prevent the alteration of their State; which because it is an unjust Law, 'tis better to take heed at the beginning to prevent the means, that none should grow to that height and excellency, than to use so sharp and unjust a remedy. FINIS. A METHOD, how to make use of the Book before, in the reading of the Story. DAVID being seventy years of age, was of wisdom, memory, &c. sufficient to govern his Kingdom; 1. Reg. Cap. 1. Old age is not ever unfit for public Government. Dauid being of great years, and so having a cold, dry, and impotent bodi●, married with Abishag, a fair maid of the best complexion through the whole Realm, to revive his body and prolong his life, 1. Reg. Chap. 1. verse. 3. Example of the like practice in Charles the fifth. Dauid being old and impotent of bo●t●, by the advice of h●s Nobles and P●isitians, marri●d a young maid call●d Abishag, to warm and pres●rve his old bodi●. Observation. WH●ther David did well in m●●rying a maid? and whether it be lawful for an old decayed and impotent man, to marry a young woman; or on the other side, for an old, worn, and decrepit woman, to marry a young and lusty man? For the affirmative. ARG. The end of marriage is society and mutual comfort; b●● th●r● may be Soci●tie and mutual comfort in a marriage betwixt an old, and young party; Ergo, 'tis Lawful. Answ. society and comfort is a cause & effect of marriage; but none of the principal ends of marriage: which are: 1. Pr●creation of children, and so the continuance o● mankind. 2. The av●iding of Fornication. As for comfort and society they may be betwixt man and man, woman and woman, where no marriage is, and therefore no proper ends of marri●ge. The Negative. ARG. 1. That conjunction which hath no respect to the right and proper ends, for which marriage was ●rdained by God, is no lawful marriage. But the conjunction betwixt an old im●otent, and young party hath no respect t● th●●●ght end, for which marriage was ordain●d by God. There●ore it is no lawful marriage. 2. No contract, wherein the part●e cont●acting, bindeth himself to an impossible condition, or to do that which he cannot do, is good or lawful. But the contract o● marriage by an impoten● person, wit● a young party, bindeth him to an impossible condition to do that which he cannot d●, viz. to perfo●m the duties of Marriage; Therefore it is unlawful. For the same cause, the civil Law determineth a nullity in these m●r●iages, except the woman know before the infi●mitie of the man, in which case she ca● have no wrong, being a thing done with her own knowledge and cons●nt, because Volenti non fit injuria:— In legem Julian. de adulteriis leg. Si uxor, &c. It provideth further, ●or the more certainty of the infirmiti●, That three years be expired before the dissolution of the marriage, because that men that have been infirm at the first, by reason of sickness, or some other accident, afterwards proved to be sufficient: De repudiis leg. in causis. Defence for David, in marrying Abishag. IT was rather a Medicine, than a marriage, without any evil, or disordered aff●ction. 2. It was by the persuasion of his Nobles, and Phisiti●ns. 3. It was for the public good, to prolong the life of a worthy Prince. 4. It was with the knowledge and consent of the young maid, who was made acquainted with the King's infirmity, and to what end she was married unto him; who if she did it for the common good, and for duties sake, having withal the gift of continency, she is to be commended; if for ambition, or some vain respect, it is ●er own, and not David's fault. Political nobility. Adoniah aspiring to the Kingdom. FIrst, took the advantage of David's affection and kindness towards him, and made him secure of any ill dealing. Secondly, of his age and infirmities, disabling his Father as unfit for Government. Thirdly, blazed his title, and Right to the Crown. Fourthly, got him Chariots, Horsemen, and Footmen, and a guard to make show of State. Fifthly, being a comely, and goodly Person, made a popular show of himself, and his qualities. Sixtly, joined to himself in Faction, Joab, the General of the army, who was in displeasure for murdering of Abner, and Amaza, and feared that David would supply Benajah in his place, and so was discontented. And Abiather the high Priest, that was likewise discontented with David, for the preferment of Zadoch. Seventhly, had meetings with them, and other his confederates, under pretence of a vow, and offering at the Fountain of Raguel, in the co●●ines of Judea. Eightly, made a show of Religion by Sacrificing, &c. Ninthly, made himself familiar with the Nobles and people, and entertai●●d them with feasting. Tenthly, drew into his part the chief Officers of the Court, and Servants to the King, by rewards, familiarity, &c. Eleventhly, disgraced and abased the competitor, and such as he knew would take part with him, and concealeth his ambition, and purpose from them. Twelftly, had Jonathan a favourite of the Court, and near about the King to give him intelligence, if any thing were discovered, and moved at the Court, whilst himself was in hand about his practice. OBSERVATIONS. Ways of such as aspire to the Kingdom, & marks to discern them. FIrst, they wind into the Prince's favour by service, officiousness, flattery, &c. to plant him in a good opinion of their loyalty and faithfulness, thereby to make him secure of their practices. 2. They take advantage of the Prince's infirmities, age, impotency, negligence, sex, &c. And work upon that by disabling the Prince, and secret detracting of his State, and Government. 3. They blaze their Title, and claim to the Crown, (if they have any) with their friends and favourites. 4. They provide them in secret of extraordinary forces, and furniture for the Wars, make much of good soldiers, and have a pretence (if it be espied) of some other end, as for the King's honour, or service, and to be in readiness against foreign enemies, &c. 5. They make open show of their best qualities, and comeliness of their persons (which though it be vain as a dumb show, it is very effectual to win the liking of the popular sort, which according to the rul● of the election of Kings, in the Bees commonwealth; think that Porma est digna imperare) activity, nobility, ancestry, &c. 6. To have their blazers abroad, to set out their virtues, and to prepare their friends in every Province. 7. To draw into their part, and make sure unto the●, of the chief peers, and men of best quality, such as are mightiest and most gracious with the soldiers, and the military men, and most subtle and politic, especially such as be ambitious and discontent with the State. 8. To have meetings for con●e●rence under some pretence of some ordinari● matter in some convenient place, not too near, nor too far off, but where friends may best resort and assemble unto them without suspicion. 9 To take up a show, and pretence of Religion, more than before, and beyond the practice of their former life. 10. They use popular courtesy (which in a great person is very effectual) feasting, liberaliti●, gaming, &c. 11. To be over liberal, and win to them by gifts, familiarity, &c. the chief Officers of the Court, and governors of Shires. 12 To have some near about the Prince, to keep them in credit, and remove suspicion, if any rise. 13. To disgrace such as they know to be sure and faithful to the Prince, and present State, or to the competitor, and to bring them into contempt by slander, detraction, and all means they can, and to ●onc●al the designs from them, lest they be discovered before they be too ripe. 14. To have some spy ●●ar about the Prince, to advertise them if any i●ckling of suspicion arise, whilst themselves are practising. Note the practices of Absolom: ● Sam. chap. 16. And of Cy●us minor in Xenophon; {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}. cap. 1. Political Prince. David being a most worthy and excellent Prince for wisdom, valour, religion, and justice, and so highly deserving of the commonwealth, yet grown into age, grew withal into contempt, & had many, both of his Nobles, & common people, that fell from him; first with Absolom, then with Adoniah, who affected the Kingdom, and rebelled against him: For remedy whereof, he stirred up himself to public actions, which might show his vigour and sufficiency to manage the affairs of his Kingdom. 1. AFter the victory against Absolom, he forced himself to ●orbear mourning, and showed himself to his discontented Army, when all were like to fall from him, for his unreasonable sorrow and lamentation for his son. 2. After the victory, he caused a g●n●ral convention to be ass●mbled o● the whole nation, to bring him home with honour to Jerusalem, which was a renewing, and re-establishing of him. 2 Sam. 19 12. 3. He gave an experiment of his power and authority, by deposing a person of great authority and estimation, to wit, Joab, General Captain of the army, and advancing Amasa to his place. 4. He sent kind Messengers to Jerusalem, and to other chief and head towns, and special men of Judea, his contributes, putting them of their alliance with him, with these words, That they were of his own flesh and blood, with protestation of his special love and affection towards them, to provide them with the like kindness and affection towards him. 5. He assembled a Parliament of his whole realm, and took occasion upon the designing of his successor, to commend unto them the succession of his house, and the continuance and maintenance o● Gods tru● worship and religion then established, and gave a grave and public ch●rge to his successor, now designed, touc●ing the manner of his gov●rnment, and maintaining of religion. 1. Chron. 12. 13. 6. He showed his bounty and magnificence in cong●sting matter for the building of the Temple, as gold, silver, brass, &c. And caus●d it to be published and made known to the Parliament and whole Nation, 1. Chron. 22. 13. 7 He revived the Church Government, and set it in a right order, assigning to ●v●ry Church, Officers, his place and function. 8. He suppressed the faction of Ado●niah, and ordained Solomon his successor, 1 Reg. 1. 22. By these means, h● retained his majesty and authority i● his old age, as appeareth by the eff●ct; ●o● that being bedrid, he suppressed the fa●ction of Adoniah, (which was grow●● mighty, and was set on foot) with h●● bare commandment, and si●nification 〈◊〉 his pleasure, and so he died in peace. FINIS.