The true and lively Portraiture of the Honourable and learned Knight Sr Walter Ralegh.    

THE PRINCE, OR MAXIMS OF STATE.  
Written By Sir WALTER Raleigh, and presented to Prince HENRY.  
Sapere & Silere.  
London, Printed, MDCXLII.   

THE CONTENTS.  

OF Government.  
Of Policy.  
Of Monarchy.  
Of Aristocraty, or Senatory State.  
Of Free State, or popular State.  
Of Tyranny.  
Of oligarchy, or the Government of a few.  
Of a commonwealth.  
Of causes of States, and commonwealths in general.  
Of founding a State.  
Of causes preserving a State or commonwealth.  
Of Mysteries or sophisms.  
Of Axioms or rules of preserving a State.  
Rules for preserving of a kingdom. 

Hereditary.  
Conquered.    
Kingdom's hereditary are preserved at home by the ordering of a Prince.  
Kingdom's new gotten, or purchased by force, are preserved by 10. Rules.  
Rules politic of Tyrants.  
Sophisms of a barbarous and professed tyranny.  
Sophisms of the sophistical, or subtle tyrant to hold up his State.  
Of preservation of an Aristocraty.  
Of preservation of an oligarchy, by 

Sophisms.  
Rules.    
Of conversion of States in general.  
Causes of conversions of States are of two sorts: general and Particular.  
Particular causes of Conversion of State, are of two sorts.  
Of sedition.  
Causes of sedition are of two sorts.  
Of alteration without violence.  
A Method, how to make use of the book before, in the reading of story.  
Old age is not ever unfit for public Government.  
Example of the like practice in Charles the fift.  
Of observation for the Affirmative and the Negative.  
Of defence for David in marrying Abishag.   

Political Nobility.  
Of Adoniah aspiring to the kingdom.   

Observations.  
Of ways of such as aspire to the kingdom, and marks to discern them.    

OF GOVERNMENT.  
GOvernment is of two sorts. 1. Private of himself. Sobriety. Of his Family; called economy.  
2. public of the commonwealth; called Policy. A man must first govern himself, ere he be fit to govern a Family: And his Family, ere he be fit to bear the government in the commonwealth.  

Of Policy.  
POlicy is an Art of Government of a commonwealth, and some part of it according to that State, or forme of Government wherein it is settled for the public good.  
State, is the frame or set order of a commonwealth, or of the governors that rule the same, specially of the chief and sovereign governor that commands the rest.  
The State or sovereignty consisteth in 5. points.  
1. Making or annulling of laws. 2. Creating and disposing of Magistrates. 3. Power over life and death. 4. Making of war, or Peace. 5. Highest or last appeal. Where these 5. be, either in one or in more, there is the State.  
These 5. points of State rest either in; 1. One Monarchy or kingdom. 2. Some few chief of men for virtue and wisdom, called an Aristocraty. 3. Many, called a Free State or a Popular State. These three sorts of Government have respect to the Common good, and therefore are just and lawful States.  
These 3. degenerate into 3. other governments. 

1. Monarchy.  
2. Aristocraty.  
3. Popular Estate.   Into 

1. Tyranny.  
2. Oligarchy, or Government of a few, rich or able.  
3. commonwealth or Government of all the common & baser sort, and therefore called a Common wealth, by an usurped Nickname.    
These all respect there own, and not the public good, and therefore are called Bastard governments.   

1. Monarchy.  
A Monarchy, or kingdom, is the government of a State by one head, or chief, tending to the Common benefit of all.  
Monarchies or kingdoms are of 3. sorts touching the right or possession of them; viz.  

1. Hereditary, by descent, as the English, French, &c.  
2. Elective, by suffrage of the other Orders, or some of them, as the Polonian.  
3. mixed, or of both kinds; viz, by descent yet not tied to the next of blood, as the ancient Jewish State.   
Monarchies are of 2. sorts touching their power or authority: viz.  
1. Intier. Where the whole power of ordering all State matters, both in peace and war, doth by law and custom appertain to the Prince, as in the English kingdom, where the Prince hath power to make laws, League and war, to create Magistrates; To pardon life: Of appeal, &c. Though to give a contentment to the other degrees, they have a suffrage in making laws; yet ever subject to the Prince's pleasure, nor negative will.  
2. Limited, or restrained that hath no full power in all the points or matters of State, as the Military King that hath not the sovereignty in time of peace, as the making of laws &c. But in war only as the Polonian Kings.   

2. Aristocraty or Senatory State.  
AN Aristocraty is the Government of a commonwealth by some competent number of the better sort, preferred for wisdom and other virtues for the public good.  
Aristocraties are of 3. sorts, viz, where the Senators are chosen, for 1. virtue, Riches, and the Common good, as the Venetian.  
2. virtue and the public good without respect of wealth, as sometimes the Roman when some of the senators, were fetched from the plough, and some from the schools.  
3. virtue and Wealth, more respecting their private, than the public good which inclineth towards an Oligarchy, or the Government of the Richer or Nobler sort, as in Rome towards the end.   

3. Free State or Popular State.  
THe Popular State is the Government of a State by the choicer sort of people, tending to the public good of all sorts; viz. with due respect of the better, nobler, and richer sort.  
In every just State, some part of the Government is, or aught to be imparted to the people; As in a kingdom, a voice or suffrage in making laws; and sometimes also, in levying of arms (if the charge be great, and the Prince forced to borrow help of his Subjects) the matter rightly may be propounded to a Parliament, that the tax may seem to have proceeded from themselves. So consultations, and some proceedings in judicial matters may in part be referred to them. The reason, least seeing themselves to be in no number, nor of reckoning, they mislike the state or kind of Government: And where the Multitude is discontented, there must needs be many Enemies to the present state. For which cause, Tyrants (which allow the people, no manner of dealing in State matters) are forced to bereave them of their wits and weapons, and all other means, whereby they may resist, or amend themselves, as in Rusheland, Turkey, &c.   

4. Tyranny.  
A Tyranny is the swarving, or distorting of a Monarchy, or the Government of one tending not to the public good, but the private benefit of himself, and his followers. As in the ruff and Turkish Government, where the State and Wealth of other orders are employed only to the uphoulding of the greatness of the King, or Emperor. This is the worst of all the Bastard States, because it is the perverting of the best Regiment, to wit, of a Monarchy, which resembleth the sovereign Government of God himself.   

5. Obligarchy, or the Government of a few.  
AN Oligarchy is the swarving, or the corruption of an Aristocraty; or the Government of some few that are of the Wealthier or Nobler sort, without any respect of the public good. The chief end of these governors is their own greatness and enriching. And therefore there manner is to prepare fit means to uphold their Estates. This State is not wholly so bad, as is the tyranny, and yet worse than the commonwealth, because it respecteth the good of a few.   

6. Commonwealth.  
A commonwealth is the swarving or depravation of a Free or Popular State, or the Government of the whole Multitude of the base and poorer sort, without respect of the other orders.  
These two States, to wit; The Oligarchy and commonwealth, are very adverse the one to the other, and have many bickerings and dissensions between them. For that the Richer or Nober sort suppose a right of superiority to appertain unto them in every respect, because they are superior, but in some respects only, to wit, in riches, birth, parentage, &c. On the other side, the Common people suppose, there ought to be an equality in all other things, and some State matters; because they are equal with the rich or noble, touching their Liberty, whereas indeed neither the one nor the other are simply equal or superior as touching Government and fitness thereunto, because they are such, to wit, because they are Rich, Noble, Free, &c. But because they are wise, virtuous valiant &c. and so have fit parts to govern a State.  
These several States are sometimes mixed and interwrought one with the other, yet ever so, as that the one hath the preheminent predomination over the other, as in the humours and complexions of the body. So in the Roman State, the people had their Plaebiscita, and gave the suffrage in the election of Magistrates: Yet the Senate (as the State stood) for the most part swayed the State, and bare the chief rule. So in the Venetian State, the Duke seemeth to represent a Monarch, and, the Senate to be his council: Yet the Duke hath no power in State matters, but is like a head set on by art that beareth no brain. And so that State is Senatoricall or, aristocratical.   

Causes of States and commonwealths in general.  
Causes of States or of commonwealths are of 3. sorts, viz. 

1. Founding or settling a State where to be considered.  
2. Preserving a State.  
3. Changing and alltering a State.   

1. Measure.  
2. Parts and their Qualities.     

Founding a State.  

In founding a State are to be considered 2. things. 

1. Proportion.  
2. Parts.     
PRoportion is a Just Measure or Mediocrity of the State, whereby it is framed and kept in that order, as that neither it exceed nor be defective in his kind; to wit, so that a Monarch be not to monarchical, nor strict, or absolute, as the ruff Kings; nor aristocratical, that is over-mated; or eclipsed by the Nobility, as the Scottish kingdom; but ever respective to the other degrees. That an Aristocraty be not to magnificent nor intier to itself, but communicate with the people some commodities of State or Government as the Venetian, and sometimes the Roman allowed the people to elect certain Magistrates out of themselves, to have a Tribune, to make Plaebiscita &c. So a free State or commonwealth that it be not over popular, viz. That it depress not to much the richer, wiser, nor learneder sort; but admit them to offices with a Caution out of the rules and mysteries of that State. That they seek no alteration of the present State. The reason, because the moderate States in their several kinds (as all other things that observe the mean) are best framed for their continuance, because they give less cause of grudge, envy, and affecting the wealth, honour, and liberty which they see in others, that govern the State; And so are less subject to stirs, and commotions, and easiest kept in their present State wherein they are set.   

Parts.  
THe Parts of the State, or those Magistrates that bear place or sway in the public Government.  
Parts or Partakers of public Government, are 1. counsel or Senate, which consulteth of all matters pertaining to war and Peace, Magistrates, &c. in admitting of whom there ought to be a more special care that they be men expect in matter of Policy, because it is their trade and vocation, as men use to choose Pilots and Masters of ships such as know the Art of Navigation, and not Husbandmen &c. And so the contrary.  
2. Magistrates and Officers which are to be executioners of that which is consulted and found to be expedient for the commonwealth, wherein are to be observed the kinds of Magistrates, that they be such as fit that kind of Government; The time of their continuance, and the manner of their election or appointing, by whom, out of whom, and in what manner they be choosen.  
3. judges; To determine in civil and criminal matters, where are to be observed, out of whom they are to be chosen; what kinds are necessary, and the manner of Judgement and judicial proceeding.  
In Magistrates are to be observed, 1. Kinds of Magistrates, as 

1. Civil.  
2. Ecclesiastical.   


1. superior, which are to be such and of that kind as agree with the State; as Consuls for a year, and not perpetual dictators in a Senatory State. Preators and Censors that oversee manners and orders of the people.  
For a kingdom Lieutenants of Shires, Marshals, Masters of Horse, Admirals, &c.  
inferior, as conservators of Peace, Constables, &c.  
Overseers of Youth, that take care of their education for civil and warlike exercise.  
clerks of the Market that provide for the quantity and prize of victual.  
aediles for Buildings, Streets, Bounds.  
quaestors or Treasurours to keep and dispense the public treasury.  
Actuaries or Recorders, which keep the public records.  
Gaolers, to keep Prisons, and Prisoners.  
surveyors of Woods and Fields, &c.  
As Bishops, or pastors, Elders, Wardens.   
2. Time of Magistrates, whereof some are perpetual, some for a time, viz., for more years; a year, half a year, according to the necessity of the commonwealth, and not perpetual; or at least not hereditary in a kingdom. Yearly in an Aristocracy, or half yearly in a free State.  
3. Manner of choice, by whom and how to be chosen, where especially they are to be chosen by suffrage, and not by Lot.    

Causes preserving a State or commonwealth.  In preserving of States, two things required. 

1. Mysteries or sophisms. 

1. General to all States.  
2. Particular for every several State.    
2. Rules or Actioms. 

1. General for all States.  
2. Particular for every State.       

Mysteries or sophisms.  
MYsteries or sophisms of State, are certain secret practices, either for the avoiding of danger; or averting such effects as tend to the preservation of the present State, as it is set or founded.  
State Mysteries are of 2. sorts. 1. general: That pertain to all States; as first, to provide by all means, that the same degree or part of the commonwealth do not exceed both in quantity and quality. In quantity as that the number of the Nobility, or of great persons, be not more than the State or commonwealth can-bear. In quality, as that none grow in wealth, liberty, honours, &c. more than that is meet for that degree; For as in weights, the heavier weights bear down the scale; So in commonwealths, that part or degree that excelleth the rest in Quality and Quantity, overswayeth the rest after it, whereof follow alterations and conversions of State. Secondly, to provide by all means, that the middle sort of people exceed both the extremes (viz.) of Nobility and Gentry, and the Base, rascal and beggarly sort. For this maketh the State constant and firm, when both the extremes are tied together by a middle sort, as it were with a band, as for any conspiracy of the rich and beggarly sort together, it is not to be feared. To these two points, the Particular Rules or sophisms of every commonwealth are to be applied.  
2. Particular: That serve for preservation of every commonwealth in that form of State, wherein it is settled as in a kingdom. That the Nobility may be accustomed to bear the Government of the Prince, especially such as have their dwelling in remote places from the Prince's eye, it is expedient to call them up at certain times to the Prince's Court under pretence of doing them honour, or being desirous to see and enjoy their presence; and to have their children, especially their eldest, to be attendant upon the Prince, as of special favour towards them and theirs, that so they may be trained up in duty and obedience towards the Prince, and be as Hostages for the good behaviour and faithful dealing of their Parents, especially if they be of any suspected note. To that end, serves the Persian practice in having a band or train of the Satrapa's children; and other Nobles to attend the Court which was well imited by our train of Henchmen, if they were of the Nobler sort. Again, sometimes to borrow small sums of his Subjects, and to pay them again, that he may after borrow greater sums and never pay: So in an Oligarchy, lest it decline to a Popular State, they deceive the people with this and the like sophisms (viz.) They compel their own sort, to wit, the rich men by great penalties to frequent their assemblies for choosing of Magistrates, for provision of Armour, warlike Exercise, making an Execution of laws, &c. By that means seeming to bear a hard hand over the richer; but to suffer the poorer and meaner sort to be absent, and to neglect those assemblies under pretence, that they will not draw them from their business and private earnings: Yet withal to cite thither some few of them (viz.) so many as are easily over-matched by the richer sort, to make a show, that they would have the people, or poorer sort partakers likewise of those matters, yet terrifying those that come to their Assemblies with the tediousness of consultations, greatness of fines, if they should misdo. To the end to make them unwilling to come again, or to have to do with those consultations; by which means the Richer sort do still govern the State with the peoples liking and good contentment.   

Axioms.  

Axioms or Rules of preserving the State, are 

1. general, that serve for all commonwealths.  
2. Particular, that serve for every several State.      

General Rules.  
1. THe first and principal Rule of Policy to be observed in all States is to profess, and practice, and maintain the true worship and religion of Almighty God, prescribed unto us in his word, which is the chief end of all Government. The Axiom, that God be obeyed simply without exception, though he command that which seemeth unreasonable, and absurd to human Policy, as in the Jews commonwealth, That all the men should repair yearly to one place to worship God four times, leaving none to defend their coast; though being beset with many Enemies. Not to sow the seventh year, but to suffer the ground to rest untilled without respect or fear of famine, &c.  
2. To avoid the causes of conversions, whereby States are overthrown that are set down in the title of conversions; For that commonwealths (as natural bodies) are preserved by avoiding that which hurteth the health and State thereof, and are so cured by contrary Medicines.  
3. To take heed, that no Magistrate be created or continued contrary to the laws and Policy of that State. As that in a Senate, there be not created a perpetual Dictator, as Caesar in Rome. In a kingdom, that there be no Senate or convention of equal power with the Prince, in State matters; as in Poland.  
4. To create such Magistrates as love the State as it is settled, and take heed of the contrary practice, as to advance Popular persons in a kingdom, or Aristocraty. And secondly, to advance such as have skill to discern what doth preserve, and what hurteth or altereth the present State.  
5. To that end to have certain Officers to pry abroad, and to observe such as do not live and behave themselves in fit sort, agreeable to the present State; but desire rather to be under some other form or kind of Government.  
6. To take heed that Magistracies be not sold for money, nor bribe in their Offices, which is specially to be observed in that commonwealth which is governed by a few of the Richer sort: For if the Magistrate gain nothing but his Common Fees, the Common sort and such as want honour take in good part, that they be not preferred, and are glad rather that themselves are suffered to intend private business. But if the Magistrate buy and sell matters, the Common people are doubly grieved, both because they are debarred of those preferments and of that gain which they see to grow by them, which is the cause that the German oligarchies continue so firm, for both they suffer the poorer sort to grow into wealth, and the Richer sort are by that means freed, and secured from being under the poor.  
7. To take heed that the State as it is settled and maintained be not over strict, nor exceed in his kind; (viz.) That a kingdom be not too monarchical; Nor a Popular State be too Popular: For which cause it is good, that the Magistrates sometimes yield of his right touching honour, and behave themselves familiarly with those that are equal unto them in other parts, though inferior for place and office; And sometimes popularly with the Common people, which is the cause that some commonwealths, though they be very simply and unskilfully set; yet continue firm, because the Magistrates behave themselves wisely, and with due respect towards the rest that are without honour; And therefore, some kind of Moderate popularity, is to be used in every commonwealth.  
8. To take heed of small beginnings, and to meet with them even at the first, as well touching the breaking and altering of laws, as of other Rules which concern the continuance of every several State. For the disease and alteration of a commonwealth doth not happen all at once but grows by degrees, which every Common wit cannot discern, but men expert in Policy.  
9 To provide, that that part be ever the greater in number and power which favours the State, as now it stands. This is to be observed as a very Oracle in all commonwealths.  
10. To observe a mean in all the degrees, and to suffer no part to exceed; or decay overmuch. As first for preferments, to provide that they be rather small and short, then great and long; And if any be grown to overmuch greatness, to withdraw or diminish some part of his honour. Where the sophisms are to be practised (viz.) to do it by parts and degrees; to do it by occasion or colour of Law, and not all at once. And if that way serve not, to advance some other, of whose virtue and faithfulness, we are fully assured, to as high a degree, or to greater honour: and to be the friends and followers of him that excelleth, above that which is meet. As touching wealth, to provide, that those of the middle sort (as before was said) be more in number; and if any grow high, and overcharged with wealth, to use the sophisms of a Popular State; (viz.) to send him on Embassages, and foreign Negotiations, or employ him in some office that hath great charges and little honour, &c. To which end the Edeliship served in some commonwealths.  
11. To suppress the factions and quarrels of the Nobles, and to keep other that are yet free from joining with them in their partakings and factions.  
12. To increase or remit the Common taxes and contributions, according to the wealth, or want of the people and commonwealth. If the people be increased in wealth, the taxes and subsidies may be increased. If they be poor, and their wealth diminish, specially by dearth, want of traffic, &c. to forbear taxes and impositions, or to take little. Otherwise grudge and discontentments must needs follow. The sophisms that serve for impositions are these, and other of like sort, to pretend business of great charge, as war, building of Ships, making of Havens, Castles, Fortifications, &c. for the Common defence; sometimes by Lotteries and like devices, wherein some part may be bestowed, the rest reserved for other expenses; but Princely dealing needs no pretences.  
13. To provide that the Discipline and training of Youth of the better sort be such as agreeth with that commonwealth: As that in a kingdom, the sons of noblemen to be attendant at the Court, that they may be accustomed to obedience towards the Prince: In the Senatory State, that the sons of the senators be not idly, nor over daintily brought up, but well instructed and trained up in learning tongues and martial exercise; that they may be able to bear that place in the commonwealth, which their Father held, and contrary wise in a Popular State.  
14. To take heed, lest their sophisms, or secret practices for the continuance and maintenance of that State be not discovered, lest by that means they refuse and disappoint themselves, but wisely used and with great secreflie.   

Particular Rules.  

Rules and axioms for preserving of a kingdom; 

Hereditary.  
Conquered.      

Kingdom's Hereditary are preserved at home by the ordering.  
1. himself; (viz.) By the tempering and moderation of the Prince's power, and prerogative. For the less and more temperate, their power and state is; the more firm, and stable is their kingdom and Government, because they seem to be further off from a Master-like and tyrannical Empire; and less unequal in condition to the next degree; to wit, the Nobility, and so less subject to grudge and envy.  
2. Nobility; (viz.) By keeping that degree and due proportion, that neither they exceed not in number more than the realm or State can bear, as the Scottish kingdom, and sometime the English, when the realm was overcharged with the numbers of Dukes, Earls, and other Nobles; whereby the Authority of the Prince was eclipsed, and the realm troubled with their factions and ambitions. Nor that any one excel in honour, power or wealth, as that he resemble another King within the kingdom; as the House of Lancaster within this realm. To that end not to load any with too much honour or preferment, because it is hard even for the best and worthiest Men to bear their greatness and high fortune temperately, as appeareth by infinite examples in all States. The sophisms for preventing or reforming this inconvenience, are to be used with great caution and wisdom. If any great person be to be abated, not to deal with him by calumniation, or forged matter, and so to cut him off without desert, especially if he be gracious among the people after the Machivilian policy, which besides the Injustice, is an occasion many times of greater danger towards the Prince. Nor to withdraw their honour all at once, which maketh a desperate discontentment in the party, and a commiseration in the people, and so greater love, if he be gracious for his virtue and public service. Nor to banish him into foreign Countries, where he may have opportunity of practising with foreign States, whereof great danger may ensue, as in the Examples of Coriolanus, Henry the fourth, and such like. But to use these, and the like sophisms: (viz.) To abate their greatness by degrees, as David, joab's, Justinian, Bellisarius, &c. To advance some other Men to as great or greater honour, to shadow or over-mate the greatness of the other. To draw from him by degrees his friends and followers, by preferrements, rewards, and other good and lawful means; especially, to be provided that these great men be not employed in great or powerful affairs of the commonwealth, whereby they may have more opportunity, to sway the State.  
3. People: (viz.) so to order and behave himself, that he be loved and reverenced of the people. For that the Prince need not greatly fear home-conspiracies, or foreign invasion, if he be firmly loved of his own people. The reason, for that the rebel can neither hope for any forces for so great enterprise; nor any refuge being discovered and put to flight, if the multitude affect their Prince: But the Common people being once offended hath cause to fear every moving, both at home and abroad. This may be effected by the Prince, if he use means and art of getting the favour of the people, and avoid those things that breed hatred and contempt: (viz.) if he seem as a Tutor, or a Father to love the people and to protect them, if he maintain the Peace of his kingdom; For that nothing is more Popular, nor more pleasing to the people than is peace.  
4. If he show himself oftentimes graciously, yet with State, and Majesty to his people, and receive complaints of his suppliants, and such like.  
5. If he sit himself sometimes in open Courts and place of Justice, that he may seem to have a care of Justice among his people. If he bestow many benefits and graces upon that City which he maketh the seat of his Empire, and so make it sure and faithful unto him, which is fit to be in the middle of his kingdom, as the heart in the middle of the body, or the sun in the middle of Heaven, both to divide himself more easily into all the parts of his Dominions; and lest the furthest parts at one end move, whilst the Prince is in the other. If he go in progress many times to see his Provinces, especially those that are remote.  
6. If he gratify his Courtiers and Attendants in that sort, and by such means as that he may seem not to pleasure them with the hurt and injury of his people, as with Monopolies, and such like.  
7. If he commit the handling of such things as procure envy, or seem grievous to his Ministers, but reserve those things which are grateful and well pleasing to himself, as the French Kings, who for that purpose, as may seem, have erected their Court at Paris, which acquitteth the Prince from grudge and envy, both with the Nobles and the people.  
8. If he borrows sometimes sums of money of his people, though he have no need, and pay the same justly without defalcation of any part by his Exchequer or other Officers.  
9 If he avoid all such things as may breed hatred or contempt of his person, which may be done, if he show himself not too light, inconstant, hard, cruel, effeminate, fearful, and dastardly, &c. But contrariwise, Religious grave, just, valiant, &c. Whereby appeareth the false Doctrine of the Machivilian Policy; with fear, the better means, to keep the people in obedience, than love, and reverence of the people towards the Prince.  
9 If the Prince be well furnished with Warlike Provision, which is to be rumoured and made known abroad: If it be known, that he is revereneed and obeyed by his people at home.  
10. If he provide so much as lieth in him, that his Neighbour kingdoms grow not overmuch in power and Dominion; which if it happen, he is to join speedily with other Princes, which are in like danger to abare that greatness, and to strengthen himself and the rest against it. An overfight of the Christian Princes towards the King of Spain.  
11. If he get him Intelligencers by Reward, or other means, to detect or hinder the designs of that Prince, with whom he hath differences, if any thing be intended against his State. Or at least have some of his own lodging abroad about that Prince's Court, under colour of Embassage, or some other pretence; which must be Men of skill and Dexterity to serve for that turn.  
12. To observe the laws of his country and not to encounter them with his Prerogative, nor to use it at all where there is a Law, for that it maketh a secret and just grudge in the people's hearts, especially if it tender to take from them their commodities, and to bestow them upon other of his Courtiers and Ministers.  
13. To provide especially that that part which favoureth the State as it standeth, be more potent, than the other that favoureth it not, or desireth a change.  
14. To make specially choice of good and sound men to bear the place of Magistrates, especial of such as assist the Prince in his counsels, and Policies, and not to lean overmuch to his own advice, contrary to the rule of Machiavel, who teacheth that a Prince can have no good council except it be in himself; his reason, because if he use the council of some one; he is in danger to be overwrought and supplanted by him: And if he council with more, than he shall be distracted with the differences in opinion. As if a Prince of great, or mean wisdom could not take the judgement of all his counsellors in any point of Policy, or of so many as himself thinketh good, and to take it either by word or in writing; and himself then in private peruse them all, and so after good and mature deliberation make choice of the best, without any distraction or binding himself to the direction of one. For the proverb is true, that two eyes see more than one; and therefore, the advices and consultations of a Senatory State is compared by some to a feast, or dinner, where many contribute towards the Shot, by which means they have more variety of dishes, and so better fare: And yet every man may make choice of that dish that serveth him best for his health and appetite.  
15. The Prince himself is to sit sometimes in place of public justice, and to give an experiment of his wisdom and equity, whereby great reverence and estimation is gotten, as in the example of Solomen; which may seem the reason, why our Kings of England had their King's bench in place of public justice, after the manner of the ancient Kings that sat in the Gate; where for better performing of this Princely duty, some special causes may be selected, which may throughly be debated and considered upon by the Prince in private, with the help and advise of his learned counsel, and so be decided publicly, as before is said, by the Prince himself; At least the Prince is to take account of every Minister of public justice, that it may be known, that he hath a care of justice, and doing right to his people, which makes the justicers also to be more careful in performing of their duties.  
16. To be moderate in his taxes, and impositions; and when need doth require to use the Subjects purse, to do it by Parliaments, and with their consents, making the cause apparent unto them, and showing his unwillingness in charging them. Finally, av to use it, that it may seem rather an offer from his Subjects, than an exaction by him.  
17. To stop small beginnings, unto this end to compound the dissentious that arise amongst the Nobles, with Caution that such as are free, be not drawn into parts, whereby many times the Prince is endangered, and the whole commonwealth set in a combustion; as in the example of the Barons wars, and the late wars of France, which grew from a quarrel betwixt the Guisian faction and the other Nobility.  
18. To stir up the people, if they grow secure and negligent of armour and other provision for the commonwealth, by some rumour or fear of danger at-home, to make them more ready when occasion requireth. But this seldom to be used lest it be supposed a false alarm, when there is need indeed.  
19 To have special care, that his children, especially the heir apparent, have such bringing up as is meet for a King (viz.) in learning, specially of matters pertaining to State, and in martial exercise, contrary to the practice of many Princes, who suffer their children to be brought up in pleasure, and to spend their time in hunting &c. which by reason of their defects afterwards is a cause of misgovernment and alteration of State.   

2. Kingdom's new gotten, or purchased by force, are preserved by these means.  
1. FIrst, if they have been Subjects before to his ancestors, or have the same tongue, manners, or fashions as have his own country, it is an easy matter to retain such Countries within their obedience, in case the Prince's blood of the said country be wholly extinct. For men of the same quality, tongue, and condition, do easily shoal and combine themselves together, so much the rather if the people of that country have served before and were not accustomed to their own liberty, wherein specially is to be observed, that the laws and customs of that purchased country be not altered nor innovated, or at least it be done by little and little. So the Burgundians and Acquitaines' were annexed to France. The reason, because partly they have been accustomed to serve; and partly, for that they will not easily agree about any other to be their Prince, if the blood royal be once extinguished. As for the invasion of a foreign country, whereunto the Prince hath no right, or whereof the right heir is living; It is not the part of a just civil Prince, much less a Prince Christian to enforce such a country; and therefore, the Machivilian practices in this case to make sure work by extinguishing wholly the blood royal is lewd, and impertinent: The like is to be said, of murdering the natives, or the greatest part of them, to the end he may hold the rest in sure possession. A thing not only against Christian Religion: but inhuman justice, cruel, and barbarous.  
2. The safest way is, (supposing a right) that some good part of the Natives be transplanted into some other place, and our Colonies consisting of so many as shall be thought meet be planted there in some part of the Province, Castles, Forts, and Havens, seized upon, and more provided in fit places, as the manner was of the Babylonian Monarch which transplanted 10. tribes of the Jews: And of the Romans in France, Germany, Britain, and other places. The reason: 1. For that otherwise forces of horse and foot, are to be maintained within the Province which cannot be done without great charge. 2. For that the whole Province is troubled and grieved, with removing and supplying the Army with victuals, carriages, &c. 3. For that colonies are more sure and faithful than the rest. As for the Natives that are removed from their former seats, they have no means to hurt, and the rest of the Natives being free from the inconvenience, and fearing that themselves may be so served, if they attempt any thing rashly, are content to be quiet. The Turks practice in Asia, where the chief grounds and dwellings are possessed by the soldiers, whom they call Timariotae. That the Prince have his seat and his residence in his new purchase, especially for a time, till things be well settled; especially if the Province be great and large, as the Turk in Greece. The reasons: 1. Because the presence of the Prince availeth much to keep things in order, and get the good will of his new Subjects. 2. They conceive that they have refuge by the Prince's presence, if they be oppressed by the Lieutenants and inferior governors: Where it will be convenient for the winning the people's hearts, that some examples be made of punishing of such as have committed any violence or oppression. 3. Because being present he seeth and heareth what is thought and attempted; and so may quickly give remedy to it, which being absent, he cannot do, or not do in time.  
3. If the Prince himself cannot be present to reside, then, to take heed that the charge of Governing, on new purchases be committed to such as be sure men, and of other meet quality, that depend wholly upon the Prince's favour; And not to Natives, or other of their own Subjects, that are gracious there for their Nobility, or virtue; especially if the Province be great, and somewhat far distant, which may soon seduce the unsettled affections of those new Subjects. As for such governors as depend wholly upon the Prince's favour being not borne, but created Noble, they will not so easily suffer themselves to be won from their duty; and in case they would revolt, yet they are not able to make any great strength, for that the people obey them but as Instruments and Ministers to keep them in subjection, and not for any good will.  
4. To have the children of the chief Noble men, and of greatest authority, Hostages with them in safe keeping; the more the better: For that no Bound is stronger, then that of Nature to contain the Parents and Allies in obedience, and they the rest.  
5. To alter the laws, but by degrees one after another, and to make other that are more behooveful for the establishing of the present Government.  
6. To keep the people quiet and peaceable and well affected so much as may be, that they may seem, by being conquered, to have gotten a protector, rather than a Tyrant; For the Common-people if they enjoy peace, and be not distracted, nor drawn from their business, nor exacted upon beyond measure are easily contained under obedience; Yet notwithstanding, they are to be disused from the practice of arms, and other Exercises which increase conrage, and be weakened of Armour, that they have neither Spirit nor will to rebel.  
7. If there be any faction in the country, to take to him the defence of the better, and stronger part, and to combine with it, as Caesar in France.  
8. To look well to the Borders and confining Provinces, and if any rule there of great, or equal power to himself, to join league with some other Borderers, though of less strength to hinder the attempts (if any should be) by such Neighbour Prince. For it happeneth often, that a country insested by one Neighbour Prince calleth in another of as great or greater power to assist, and rescue it from the other that invadeth it; So the Romans were called into Greece by the AEtolians; The Saxons by the Britain's, the Danes by the Saxons.  
9 To leave their Titles and Dignities to the Natives, but the command and authority wholly to his own.  
10. Not to put much trust, nor to practise to often the sophisms of Policy, especially those that appertain to a tyrannical State, which are soon detected by men of Judgement, and so bring discredit to the Prince, and his Policy among the wiser and better sort of his Subjects, whereof must needs follow very evil effects.  
The sophisms of Tyrants, are rather to be known, then practised, (which are for the supporting of their tyrannical States,) by wise and good Princes, and are these, and such like as follow.   

Rules politic of Tyrants.  
Rvles' practised by Tyrants are of 2. sorts: viz. 1. Barbarous and Professed, which is proper to those that have got head, and have power sufficient of themselves without others helps, as in the Turkish and Russe Government.  
2. Sophistical and Dissembled; As in some States, that are reputed for good and lawful Monarchies, but inclining to Tyrannies, proper to those which are not yet settled nor have power sufficient of themselves; but must use the power and help of others, and so are forced to be politic Sophisters.   

1. Sophisms of a Barbarous and Professed Tyranny.  
1. TO expel and banish out of his country all honest means, whereby his people may attain to learning, wisdom, valour, and other virtues, that they might be fit for that estate and servile condition. For that in these two, learning, and martial exercise, effect two things most dangerous to a Tyranny: (viz.) Wisdom and Valour. For that men of Spirit and understanding can hardly endure a servile State. To this end to forbid learning of liberal Arts, and martial exercise; As in the ruff government, so Julian the Apostata dealt with the Christians. Contrariwise, to use his people to base occupations, and mechanical Arts, to keep them from idleness, and to put away from them all high thoughts, and manly conceits, and to give them a liberty of drinking drunk, and of other base and lewd conditions that they may be sotted, and so made unfit for great erterprises. So the Egyptian Kings dealt with the Hebrews; So the ruff Emperor with his ruff people: And Charles the fifth with the Netherlanders, when he purposed to enclose their privileges, and to bring them under his absolute Government.  
2. To make sure to him and his State, his Military men by reward, liberty, and other means, especially his Guard, or Praetorian band; That being Partakers of the spoil and benefit, they make like that State, and continue firm to it; as the Turk his janissaries, the ruff his Boyarent, &c.  
3. To unarm his people of weapons, money, and all means, whereby they may resist his power; And to end, to have his set & ordinary exactions, viz. once in two, three, or four years; and sometimes yearly, as the Turk, and ruff; who is wont to say, that his people must be used as his flock of sheep: viz. Their fleece taken from them, lest it overlade them, and grow too heavy; that they are like to his Beard, that the more it was shaven, the thicker it would grow. And if there be any of Extraordinary-wealth to borrow of them in the mean while, till the tax come about, or upon some devised matter to confiscate their goods, as the Common practice is of the ruff and Turk.  
4. To be still in wars, to the end, his people may need a captain; and that his forces may be kept in practice, as the ruff doth yearly against the Tartar, Polonian, and Sweden, &c.  
5. To cut off such as excel the rest in wealth, favour, or nobility, or be of a pregnant, or spiring wit, and so are fearful to a Tyrant, and to suffer none to hold office, or any honour, but only of him; as the Turk his bashas, and the ruff his Ruezzes.  
6. To forbid Guilds, Brotherhoods, Feastings, and other Assemblies among the people, that they have no means or opportunity to conspire or confer together of public matters, or to maintain love amongst themselves, which is very dangerous to a Tyrant, the Russes practice.  
7. To have their Beagles, or listeners in every corner, and parts of the realm, especially in places that are more suspect, to learn what every man saith, or thinketh, that they may prevent all attempts, and take away such as mislike their State.  
8. To make schism and Division among his Subjects, (viz.) To set one Noble man against another, and one Rich man against another, that through faction and disagreement among themselves, they may be weakened, and attempt nothing against him; and by this means entertaining whisperings and complaints, he may know the secrets of both parts, and have matter against them both, when need requireth. So the ruff made the faction of the Zemsky and the Oppress●ie.  
9 To have Strangers for his Guard, and to entertain Parasites, and other base and servile fellows, not too wise, but yet subtle, that will be ready for reward to do and execute what he commandeth, though never so wicked and unjust. For that good men cannot flatter, and wise men cannot serve a Tyrant.  
All these practices and such like, may be contracted into one or two, (viz.) To bereave his Subjects of will and power to do him hurt, or to alter the present State. The use is Caution, not Imitation.   

2. Sophisms of the sophistical, or subtle Tyrant to hold up his State.  
1. TO make a show of a good King by observing a temper and mediocrity in his Government, and whole course of life; to which end it is necessary, that this subtle Tyrant be a cunning politician, or a Machivilian at the least, and that he be taken so to be, for that it maketh him more to be feared and regarded, and is thought thereby not not unworthy for to govern others.  
2. To make show not of severity, but of gravity, by seeming reverent, and not terrible in his speech, and gesture, habit, and other demeanour.  
3. To pretend care of the commonwealth; and to that end to seem loath to exact Tributes and other charges; and yet to make necessity of it, where none is, To that end to procure such war as can bring no danger towards his State, and that might easily be compounded, or some other chargeable business; and to continue it on, that he may continue his exaction and contribution so long as he list. And thereof to employ some part in his public service, the rest to hoard up in his Treasury, which is sometimes practised even by lawful Princes; as Edward the fourth in his wars against. France, when having levied a great sum of money throughout his realm, especially of the Londoners, he went over Seas, and returned without any thing doing.  
4. Sometimes to give an account by open speech and public writing of the expense of such taxes and impositions as he hath received of his Subjects, that he may so seem to be a good Husband, and frugal, and not a Robber of the commonwealth.  
5. To that end, to bestow some cost upon public Buildings; or some other work for the common good, especially upon the Ports, Forts, and chief Cities of his realm, that so he may seem a benefactor, and to have a delight in the adorning of his country, or doing some good for it.  
6. To forbid Feastings and other meetings, which increase love, and give opportunity to confer together of public matters, under pretence of sparing cost for better uses. To that end, the curfew bell was first ordained by William the conqueror to give men warning to repair home at a certain hour.  
7. To take heed, that no one grow to be over great, but rather many-equal great, that they may envy and contend one with another; and if he resolve to weaken any of this sort, to do it warily and by degrees, If quite to wrack him and to have his life, yet to give him a lawful trial after the manner of his country; And if he proceed so far with any of great power and estimation as to do him contumely or disgrace, not to suffer him to escape, because contumely and disgrace are things contrary unto Honour, which great Spirits do most desire, and so are moved rather to a revenge for their disgrace, then to any thankfulness, or acknowledging the Prince's favour for their pardon or dismission; True in atheists, but not in true Christian Nobility.  
8. To unarm his people, and store up their weapons under pretence of keeping them safe, and having them ready when service requireth, and then to arm with them, such and so many as he shall think meet, and to commit them to such as are sure men.  
9 To make schism or division under hand among his Nobility, and betwixt the Nobility and the People, and to set one Rich man against another, that they combine not together, and that himself by hearing the griefs and complaints may know the secrets of both parts, and so have matter against them both, when it listeth him to call them to an account.  
10. To offer no man any contumely or wrong, specially about womens' matters, by attempting the chastity of their Wives or Daughters, which hath been the ruin of many Tyrants, and conversion of their States. As of Tarqvinius, by Brutus, Appius, by Virginius, Pisistratus, by Harmodius, Alexander Medici's Duke of Florence, Aloisus of Placentia, Rodericus King of Spain, &c.  
11. To that end to be moderate in his pleasures, or to use them closely that he be not seen; For that men sober or watchful, or such as seem so, are not lightly Subject to contempt, or conspiracies of their own.  
12. To reward such as achieve some great or commendable enterprise, or do any special action for the commonwealth in that manner as it may seem, they could not be better regarded, in case they lived in a free State.  
13. All Rewards and things grateful to come from himself but all punishments, exactions, and things; ungrateful to come from his Officers and public Ministers; And when he hath effected what he would by them, if he see his people discontented withal, to make them a Sacrifice to pacify his Subjects.  
14. To pretend great cure of Religion and of serving of God, (which hath been the manner of the wickedest Tyrants) for that people do less fear any hurt from those, whom they think virtuous and religious, nor attempt lightely to do them hurt, for that they think that God protects them.  
15. To have a strong and sure Guard of foreign soldiers, and to bind them by good turns, that they having at least, profit, may depend upon him, and the present State; As Caligula, the German Guard, where the Nobility are many and mighty. The like is practifed by lawfuls Kings, as by the French King.  
16. To procure that other great persons be in the same fault, or case with them, that for that cause, they be forced to descend the Tyrant, for their own safety.  
17. To take part, and to join himself with the stronger part; if the Common people, and mean degree be the stronger to join with them; if the Rich and Noble, to join with them. For so that part with his own strength will be ever able to over match the other.  
18. So to frame his manners and whole behaviour, as that he may seem, if not perfectly good, yet tolerably evil, or somewhat good, somewhat bad.  
These Rules of hypocritical Tyrants are to be known, that they may be avoided and meet withal, and no drawn into imitation.   

Preservation of an Aristocraty.  
RVles to preserve a Senatory State, are partly taken from the Common Axioms, and partly from those that preserve a kingdom.  

Preservation of an oligarchy; by 

Sophisms.  
Rules.     
1. IN Consultations and Assemblies about public affairs so to order the matter, that all may have liberty to frequent their Common Assemblies and counsels: But to impose a fine upon the richer sort if they omit that duty. On the other side to pardon the people, if they absent themselves, and to bear with them under pretence, that they may the better intend their occupations, and not be hindered in their trades and earnings.  
2. In election of Magistrates and Officers: To suffer the poorer sort to vow and abjure the bearing of office under colour of sparing them; or to enjoin some great charge as incident to the office, which the poor cannot bear. But to impose some great fine upon those that be rich, if they refuse to bear office, being elect unto it.  
3. In judicial matters: In like manner to order that the people may be absent from public Trials, under pretence of following their, business. But the richer to be present, and to compel them by fines to frequent the Court.  
4. In Warlike Exercise and arms, that the poor be not forced to have Armour, Horse, &c. under pretence of sparing their cost, nor to be drawn from their trades by Martial Exercises; but to compel the richer sort to keep their proportion of Armour, Horse, &c. By excessive fines, and to exercise themselves in Warlike matters, &c.  
5. To have special care of instructing their Children in liberal Arts, Policy, and Warlike Exercise, and to observe good order and discipline. For as Popular States are preserved by the frequency and liberty of the people, so this Government of the richer is preserved by discipline and good order of governors.  
6. To provide good store of Warlike furniture, especially of Horse, and Horsemen; and of Armed men, viz. Pike, &c. which are proper to the Gentry; as shot and light furniture are for a popular Company.  
6. To put in practise some points of a Popular State, viz. To lade no one man with too much preferment; to make yearly or half years' Magistrates, &c. For that the people are pleased with such things, and they are better secured by this means from the rule of one. And if any grow to too much greatness, to abate him by the Sophisms fit for this state.  
7. To commit the Offices and Magistracies, to those that are best able to bear the greatest charges for public matters, which both tendeth to the conservation of this State, and pleaseth the people, for that they reap some relief and benefit by it.  
8. To the same end to contract marriages among themselves, the rich with the rich, &c.  
9 In some things which concern not the points and matters of State as electing Magistrates making laws, &c. to give an equality, or sometimes a preferment to the Common-people, and not to do, as in some oligarchies they were wont, viz. To swear against the people, to suppress and bridle them; but rather contrary, to minister an oath at their admission, that they shall do no wrong to any of the people; and if any of the richer offer wrong to any of the Commons, to show some example of servere punishment.  
For other Axioms that preserve this State, they are to be borrowed, from those other Rules that tend to the preserving of a Popular and tyrannical State; for the strict kind of oligarchy is kin to a Tyranny.  

Preservation of a Popular State; 

Sophisms.  
Rules or Axioms.     
1. IN public Assemblies and consultations, about matters of State, creating of Magistrates, public Justice, and Exercise of arms, to practise the contrary to the former kind of Government, to wit, an oligarchy. For in Popular States, the Commons and meaner sort are to be drawn to those Assemblies, Magistracies, Offices, Warlike Exercises, &c. By mulcts and rewards, and the richer sort are to be spared, and not to be forced, by fine, or otherwise, to frequent these Exercises.  
2. To make show honouring and reverencing the richer men, and not to swear against them, as the manner hath been in some Popular States; but rather to prefer them in all other matters, that concern not the State and public Government.  
3. To elect Magistrates from among the Commons, by Lot, or ballading, and not to choose any for their wealth's sake.  
4. To take heed, that no man bear office twice, except it be Military, where the pay, and salery, &c. is to be reserved in their own hands, to be disposed of by a Common council, &c. And to see that do man be to highly preferred.  
5. That no Magistracy be perpetual, but as short, as may be, to wit, for a year, half year, &c.  
6. To compel Magistrates, when their time expireth to give an account of their behaviour and Government, and that publicly before the Commons.  
7. To have public salaries and allowance for their Magistrates, Judges, &c. And yearly dividence for the Common-people, and such as have most need among them.  
8. To make judges of all matters, out of all sorts, so they have some aptness to perform that duty.  
9 To provide that public judgements and Trials, be not frequent; and to that end to inflict great fines and other punishments upon Pettifoggers and dilators, as the law of requital; &c. Because for the most part the richer and nobler, and not the Commons are indicted and accused in this commonwealth, which causeth the rich to conspire against the State; whereby, many times, the Popular State is turned into an oligarchy, or some other Government. Hereto tendeth that Art of civil law, made against Accusers and calumniators: Ad Senatos Consultum Turpilianum, lib. 1. di Calumniatoribus.  
10. In such free States as are Popular, and have no revenue, to provide that public Assemblies be not after: because they want salery for Pleaders and orators; And if they be rich; yet to be wary. that all the revenue be not divided amongst the Commons. For, that this distribution of the Common revenue among the Multitude is like a purse or barrel without a bottom. But to provide, that a sufficient part of the revenue be stored up for the public affairs.  
11. If the number of the poor increase too much in this kind of State, to send some abroad out of the Cities into the next Country places, and to provide, above all, that none do live idly, but be set to their trades. To this end, to provide that the richer men place in their farms and copyholds, such decayed Citizens.  
12. To be well advised what is good for this State, and not to suppose that to be fit for a Popular State, that seemeth most popular; but that which is best for the continuance thereof. And to that end, not to lay into the Exchequer, or Common Treasury, such goods as are confiscate, but to store them up as holy and consecrate things, which except it be practised, confiscations, and fines of the Common people would be frequent, and so this State would decay by weakening the people.   

Conversion of States in general.  
COnversion of a State, is the declining of the commonwealth, either to some other form of Government, or to his full and last period appointed by God.   

Causes of Conversions of States, are of two sorts: general and Particular.  
general, (viz.) 1. Want of Religion: viz. of the true knowledge, and worship of God, prescribed in his word; and notable sins that proceed from thence in Prince and people, as in the examples of Saul, Uzziah, the Jewish State; the four Monarchies, and all other.  
2. Want of wisdom, and good council, to keep the State, the Prince, Nobles and People in good temper, and due proportion, according to their several orders and degrees.  
3. Want of justice, either in administration (as ill laws, or ill Magistrates) or in the execution, as rewards not given where they should be, or there bestowed where they should not be, or punishments not inflicted where they should be.  
4. Want of power and sufficiency to maintain and defend itself; viz Of provision, as Armour, Money, captains, soldiers, &c. Execution when the means or provision is not used, or ill used.  
2. Particular: To be noted and collected out of the contraries of those rules that are prescribed for the preservation of the commonwealths.   

Particular causes of Conversion of State, are of two sorts.  
1. foreign: By the overgreatness of invasion of some foreign kingdom, or other State of mean power, having a part within our own, which are to be prevented by the providence of the chief, and rules of policy for the preserving of every State. This falleth out very seldom for the great difficulty to overthrow a foreign State.  

2. domestic: 

Sedition or open violence by the stronger part.  
Alteration without violence.      

Sedition.  
SEdition is a power of inferiors opposing itself with, force of arms against the superior power, Quasi ditio secedens.   

Causes of Sedition are of two sorts.  
1. General. Liberty.  Riches. When they, that are of equal quality in a commonwealth, or do take themselves so to be, are not regarded equally in all, or in any of these 3. Or when they are so unequal in quality, or take themselves so to be, are regarded but equally, or with less respect, than those that be of less defect in these 3. things, or in any of them. Honour.   
1. IN the chief: covetousness or oppression, by the Magistrate or higher Power, (viz.) when the Magistrates, especially the chief increaseth his substance and revenue beyond measure, either with the public or (private calamity, whereby the governors grow to quarrel among themselves as in oligarchies) or the other degrees conspire together, and make quarrel against the chief, as in kingdoms: The examples of Wat Tyler, Jarke Straw, &c.  
2. In the chief: Injury, when great Spirits, and of great power are greatly wronged and dishonoured, or take themselves so to be, as Coriolanus, Cyrus minor, Earl of Warwick. In which cases the best way is to decide the wrong.  
3. Preferment, or want of preferment; wherein some have overmuch, and so wax proud and aspire higher: or have more or less, they deserve as they suppose; and so in envy, and disdain seek Innovation by open faction, so Caesar; &c.  
4. Some great necessity or calamity; So Xerxes after the foil of his great Army. And Senacheris after the loss of 185. in one night. 2. Particular. 1. ENvy, when the chief exceed the mediocrity before mentioned, and so provoketh the Nobility, and other degrees, to conspire against him; as Brutus Cassius, &c. against Caesar. 2. fear, viz. Of danger, when one or more dispatch the Prince, by secret practice or force to prevent his own danger, as Artabanus did Xerxes. 3. Lust or Lechery, as Tarqvinius Superbus, by Brutus; Pisistratinde, by Armodius, Appius by Virginius. Chief. 4. Contempt; For vile quality and base behaviour, as Sardanapalus, by Arbaces; Dionisius the younger by Dion. Other degrees. 5. Contumely; When some great disgrace is done to some of great Spirit who standeth upon his honour and reputation, as Caligula, by Chaereas. Other degrees. 6. Hope of Advancement, or some great profit, as Mithidrates, Anobarsanes.   

Alteration without violence.  
CAuses of alteration without violence are; 1. excess of the State; when by degrees, the State groweth from that temper and mediocrity, wherein it was, or should have be settled, and exceedeth in power, riches and absolutnes in his kind, by the ambition & covetousness of the chiefs, immoderate taxes, and impositions, &c. applying all to his own benefit without respect of other degrees, and so in the end changeth itself into another State or form of Government, as a kingdom into a Tyranny, an oligarchy into an Aristocraty.  
2. excess, of some one or more in the commonwealth; viz. When some one, or more, in a commonwealth grow to an excellency or excess above the rest, either in honour, wealth, or virtue; and so by permission and popular favour, are advanced to the sovereignty: By which means, Popular States grow into oligarchies; and oligarchies, and Aristocraties into Monarchies. For which cause, the Athenians and some other free States made their laws of Ostrocismos to banish any for a time that should excel, though it were in virtue, to prevent the alteration of their State; which because it is an unjust law, 'tis better to take heed at the beginning to prevent the means, that none should grow to that height and excellency, then to use so sharp and unjust a remedy.  
FINIS.    

A METHOD, how to make use of the book before, in the reading of Story.  
DAVID being seventy years of age, was of wisdom, memory, &c. sufficient to govern his kingdom; 1. Reg. Chap. 1.  

Old age is not ever unfit for public Government.  
Dauid being of great years, and so having a cold, dry, and impotent body, married with Abishag a fair maid of the best complexion through his whole realm, to revive his body and prolong his life, 1. Reg. Chap. 1. Verse 3.   

Example of the like practice in Charles the fifth.  
Dauid being old and impotent of body by the advise of his Nobles and physicians, married a young maid called Abishag, to warm and preserve, his old body.   

Observation.  
Whether David did well in marrying a maid; and whether it be lawful for an old decayed and impotent man to marry a young woman; or on the other side, for an old-worn, and decrepit woman to marry a young and lusty man.   

For the Affirmative.  
ARG. The end of marriage is Society and mutual comfort; but there may be Society and mutual comfort in a marriage betwixt an old, and young party. Ergo 'tis lawful.  
Answ. Society and comfort is an use and effect of marriage; but none of the principal end is of marriage, which are: 

1. Procreation of Children, and so, the continuance of mankind.  
2. The Avoiding of fornication.    
As for comfort and society, they may be betwixt man and man, women and women where no marriage is, And therefore no proper ends of marriage.   

The Negative.  
ARG. 1. That conjunction which hath no respect to the right and proper ends, for which marriage was ordained by God, is no lawful marriage. But the conjunction betwixt an old impotent, and young party hath no respect to the right end, for which marriage, was ordained by God. Therefore it is no lawful marriage.  
2. No contract, wherein the party contracting, bindeth himself to an impossible condition, or to do that which he cannot do, is good, or lawful. But the contract of marriage by an impotent person with a young party bindeth him to an impossible condition to do, that which he cannot do (viz.) to perform the duties of marriage; Therefore it is unlawful.  
For the same cause, the civil law determineth a nullity in these marriages, except the woman know before the infirmity of the man, in which case she can have no wrong, being a thing done with her own knowledge and consent, because Volenti ne fit injuria:— In legem Julian. de adulteriis leg. Si uxor &c.  
It provideth further for the more certainty of the infirmity, that three years be expired before the dissolution of the marriage, because that men, that have been infirm at the first, by reason of sickness, or some other accident, afterwards proved to be sufficient: De repudiis leg. in causis.   

Defence for David in marrying Abishag.  
1. IT was rather a Medicine than a marriage, without any evil or disordered affection.  
2. It was by the persuasion of his Nobles and physicians.  
3. It was for the public good to prolong the life of a worthy Prince.  
4. It was with the knowledge and consent of the young Maid, who was made acquainted with the King's infirmity, and to what end she was married unto him; who if she did it for the Common good, and for duties sake, having withal the gift of continency, she is to be commended; if for ambition, or some vain respect, it is her own, and not David's fault.   

Political Nobility.  
Adoniah aspiring to the kingdom.  
FIrst, took the advantage of David's affection and kindness towards him, and made him secure of any ill dealing.  
Secondly, of his age and infirmities, disabling his father as unfit for Government.  
Thirdly, blazed his title, and right to the crown.  
Fourthly, got him Chariots, Horsemen, and footmen, and a guard to make show of State.  
Fiftly, being a comely and goodly person, made a Popular show of himself, and his qualities.  
Sixtly, joined to himself in faction Joab, the general of the army, who was in displeasure for murdering of Abner and Amasa, and feared that David would supply Benajah into his place, and so was discontented. And Abiather the high Priest, that was likewise discontented with David, for the preferment of Zadoch.  
Seventhly, had meetings with them, and other his confederates, under a pretence of a vow and offering at the fountain of raguel, in the confines of Judaea.  
Eightly, made a show of Religion by Sacrificing; &c.  
Ninthly, made himself familiar with the Nobles and people, and entertained them with feasting.  
Tenthly, drew into his part the chief officers of the Court, and Servants to the King, by Rewards, Familiarity, &c.  
Elevently, disgraced and abased the competitor, and such as he knew, would take part with him, and concealeth his ambition, and purpose from them.  
Twelftly, had Jonathan a favourite of the Court, and near about the King to give him intelligence, if any thing were discovered, and moved at the Court, whilst himself was in hand about his practice.   

Observations.  
Ways of such as aspire to the kingdom, and marks to discern them.  
FIrst, they wind into the Prince's favour, by service, officiousness, flattery, &c. to plant him in a good opinion of their loyalty and faithfulness, thereby to make him secure of their practices.  
2. They take advantage of the Prince's infirmities, age, impotency, negligence, sex, &c. And work upon that by disabling the Prince, and secret detracting of his person and Government.  
3. They blaze their Title, and claim to the crown, (if they have any) with their friends, and favourers.  
4. They provide them in secret of extraordinary forces and furniture for the wars, make much of good soldiers, and have a pretence (if it be espied) of some other end, as for the King's honour, or service, and to be in readiness against foreign enemies, &c.  
5. They make open show of their best qualities and comeliness of their person (which though it be vain as a dumb show, it is very effectual to win the liking of the popular sort, which according to the rule of the election of Kings, in the Bees commonwealth; think that Forma est digna imperare) Activity, Nobility, Ancestry; &c.  
6. To have their blazers abroad to set out their virtues, and to prepare their friends in every Province.  
7. To draw into their part, and make sure unto them, of the chief peers, & men of best quality, such as are mightiest, and most gracious with the soldiers, and the Military men, and most subtle and politic, especially such as be ambitious, and discontent with the State.  
8. To have meetings for conference under some pretence of some ordinary matter in some convenient place, not too near, nor too far of, but where friends may best resort and assemble unto them without suspicion.  
9 To take up a show and pretence of Religion more than before, and beyond the practice of their former life.  
10. They use popular courtesy (which in a great person is very effectual) feasting, liberality, gaming, &c.  
11. To be over liberal, and win to them by gifts, familiarity, &c. the chief Officers of the Court, and governors of Shires.  
12. To have some near about the Prince, to keep them in credit, and remove suspicion, if any rise.  
13. To disgrace such as they know to be sure and faithful to the Prince, and present State, or to the competitor, and to bring them into contempt by slander, detraction, and all means they can, and to conceal the designs from them, lest they be discovered before they be ripe.  
14. To have some spy near about the Prince, to advertise them if any inkling of suspicion arise whilst themselves are practising.  
Note the practices of Absalon: 2. Sam. Chap. 16. and of Cyrus minor, in Xenophon: {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} cap. 1.   

Political Prince.  
David being a most worthy and excellent Prince for wisdom, valour, religion, and justice, and so highly deserving of the commonwealth, yet grown into age, grew withal into contempt, and had many, both of his Nobles and Common-people, that fell from him; first with Absalon, then with Adoniah, who affected the kingdom and rebelled against him: For remedy whereof, he stirred up himself to public actions which might show his vigour and sufficiency to manage the affairs of his kingdom.  
1. AFter the victory against Absalon, he forced himself to forbear mourning, and showed himself to his discontented Army, when all were like to fall from him, for his unreasonable sorrow and lamentation for his son.  
2. After the victory, he caused a general convention to be assembled of the whole nation, to bring him home with honour to Jerusalem, which was a renewing and re-establishing of him; 2. Sam. 19 12.  
3. He gave an experiment of his power and authority, by deposing a person of great authority and estimation, to wit, Joab, general captain of the Army, and advancing Amasa to his place.  
4. He sent kind Messengers to Jerusalem, and to other chief and head towns, and special men of Iuda, his contributes, putting them of their alliance with him, with these words, that they were of his own flesh and blood, with protestation of his special love and affection towards them, to provoke them with like kindness and affection towards him.  
5. He assembled a Parliament of his whole realm, and took occasion upon the designing of his successor, to commend unto them the succession of his House, and the continuance and maintenance of God's true worship and religion, then established, and gave a grave and public charge to his successor, now designed, touching the manner of his government, and maintaining of Religion, 1. Chron. 12. 13.  
6. He showed his bounty and magnificence in congesting matter for the building of the Temple, as gold, silver, brass, &c. And caused it to be published and made known to the Parliament and whole Nation, 1. Chron. 22. 13.  
7. He revived the Church Government, and set it in a right order, assigning to every Church Officers his place and function.  
8. He suppressed the faction of Adoniah, and ordained Solomon his successor; 1. Reg. 1. 22. By these means. he retained his Majesty and authority in his old age, as appeareth by th'effect; for that being bedrid, he suppressed the faction of Adoniah, (which was grown mighty, and was set on foot) with his bare commandment, and signification of his pleasure, and so he died in peace.  
FINIS.