HAving with much delight, satisfaction, and content perused this Treatise, entitled, The Philosophical Touchstone, I allow it to be printed and published, and commend it to the learned and judicious Reader, as a work sound and solid, and eminently acute and accurate.  
john Downame.   

THE PHILOSOPHICAL TOUCHSTONE: OR OBSERVATIONS UPON Sir Kenelm digby's Discourses of the nature of BODIES, and of the reasonable SOUL.  
In which his erroneous Paradoxes are refuted, the Truth, and Aristotelian Philosophy vindicated, the immortality of man's Soul briefly, but sufficiently proved.  
And the weak Fortifications of a late Amsterdam Engineer, patronising The Souls mortality, briefly slighted.  
By ALEXANDER ROSS.  Pers. Sat. 5. Non equidem hoc studeo, bullatis ut mihi nugis Pagina turgescat, dare pondus idonea fumo. 
LONDON, Printed for james Young, and are to be sold by Charles Green, at the sign of the Gun in Ivy-lane. 1645.   

TO THE Right honourable, JOHN, Earl of RUTLAND, Lord Ross, etc.  
My Lord,  
WIth the same boldness that I have adventured to lap up in the folds of a few paper sheets the rich Jewels of Philosophical truths, with the same have I presumed to present them to your Lordship's view; not that you can receive from them any addition of honour, but that they, from your Name and Protection, may partake a farther degree of irradiation and lustre. Here you may see what odds there are between natural gems, and counterfeit stones; between solid wholesome meats, and a dish of Frogs or Mushrooms, though made savoury with French sauce, to which that ingenious rather then (in this Discourse) judicious Knight doth invite us: who, breathing now in a hotter climate, cannot digest the solid meats of Peripatetic verities, which hitherto have been the proper and wholesome food of our Universities; and therefore entertains us with a French dinner of his own dressing, or with an airy feast of Philosophical quelque choses: a banquet fit for Grasshoppers and Chameleons, who feed on dew and air, then for men, who rise from his Table as little satisfied, as when they sat down. We that have eat plentifully of the sound and wholesome viands which are dressed in Aristotle's kitchen, are loath now to be fed, as the Indian gods are, with the steem or smoke of meats; or, as those — Umbrae tenues, simulachraque luce carentum, those pale ghosts in Proserpine's Court, to champ Leeks and Mallows.  
My Lord, in this Dedication, I only aim at an expression of my gratefulness and observance, which I own to your goodness; and of those real sentiments I have of your favours and opinion, which yourself, and your truly noble and religious Countess have been pleased to conceive of me. I hearty pray for an accumulation of all happiness on you both, as likewise on the fruit of your bodies, especially the tender plant, and hopeful pledge of your mutual loves, my Lord Ross; which is the wish of  
Your Honours humble servant, ALEXANDER ROSS.   


The CONTENTS of the first part, containing 68 Sections.  

Word's express things as they are in their own nature. sect. 1.  
Divisibility the effect of extension; this is not the essence of quantity. sect. 2.  
Rarity the effect, not the cause of heat: rarified bodies not the hottest. sec. 3.  
The essence of local motion consisteth not in divisibility. sec. 4.  
Place is not a body, but the superficies of a body. sec. 5.  
Not density, but gravity is the cause of activity; and frigidity cause of both. sec. 6.  
Pressure and penetration not parts, but effects of frigidity: heat is more piercing. sec. 7.  
Though accidents be real entities, yet they exist not by themselves. sec. 8.  
Heat is not the substance of the fire. sec. 9  
Light no body, but a quality, proved by twelve reasons: Nor can it be fire. sec. 10.  
Of the qualities of light, and how it heats, and how it perisheth. sec. 11, 12.  
The dilatation and motion of the light, and how seen by us. sec. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20.  
The greatest bodies have not the greatest virtue. sec. 21.  
How natural bodies move themselves. sec. 22.  
How the Sun causeth motion. sec. 23.  
If the light bears up the atoms, and if it be a part of them. sec. 24.  
There is in nature positive gravity and levity, by which she works. sec. 25.  
Light descends thorough dense bodies. sec. 26.  
Atoms do not press. sec. 27.  
Egyptian earth, why heavy upon change of weather. How a vessel with snow and salt in it freezeth by the fire. The vanity of atoms. sec. 28.  
Water is not actually heavy in its own sphere. The sea moves naturally to the centre. Water can divide water. sec. 29  
Heavy bodies tend naturally to the centre. Gravity is not the cause of violent motion. The effect sometimes exceeds the cause. Inanimate things, without understanding, affect and dis-affect what's good or bad for them. sec. 30.  
The true cause of the motion of projection, and its properties. sec. 31.  
The heavens void of generation, corruption, alteration: they are natural bodies. sec. 32.  
Atoms are not the causes of heat, nor ofre-action. sec. 33.  
How elementary forms remain in mixed bodies. sec. 34.  
There are in nature four simple bodies. sec. 35.  
Wind is not the motion of atoms, but an exhalation. sec. 36.  
Natural, Mathematical, and Diabolical magic. sec. 37.  
The weapon-salve a mere imposture. sec. 38.  
The true causes of the temperament under the line. sec. 39  
The loadstone is not begot of atoms drawn from the North-Pole. sec. 40.  
Without qualities no operation in nature. sec. 41.  
Atoms pierce not the earth. Odours decay by time. Salt how it grows heavy. sec. 42.  
Natural agents at the same time work diversely. sec. 43.  
The heat of the marrow is not the cause of the hardness of the bones, but the heat of the bones themselves. sec. 44.  
God is not dishonoured, by calling him the Creator of the meanest things. sec. 45.  
The formative power of generation in the seed. sec. 46.  
Whether the heart or the liver first generated. sec. 47.  
Thin bodies, as well as thick, the objects of touch. Rarity and density what kind of entities. sec. 48.  
Objects work not materially, but intentionally on the sense. sec. 49.  
Sound is not motion, proved. How perceived by deaf men. It shakes not houses. sec. 50.  
Colours are not quantities nor substances, but qualities. s. 51.  
How living creatures can move themselves. Of nature and properties. Of life: And how the life of God differs from the life of the creature. sec. 52.  
Of sense and sensation. How the sense worketh and suffereth. sec. 53.  
Vision is not caused by material atoms. Seven things required in sensation. sec. 54.  
Words are not motion, nor are they the chief object of memory. sec. 55.  
The organ of the memory. How the intellect and memory differ. sec. 56.  
Purging consisteth not in liquefaction, but in attracting and expelling. sec. 57  
Pleasure is not the motion of a fume about the heart, but the apprehension of a convenient object. sec. 58.  
Pain and pleasure move not the heart. Of systole and diastole. sec. 59  
Pain is not compression, but the effect of it. All hard things breed not pain, nor soft things pleasure. The heart is more active than passive, because hot. Fear, sorrow, and stupidity how they differ. Passion is not the motion of the blood and spirits, but of the sensible appetite. Every passion is not motion. The division of passions. Why birds more musical than other creatures. sec. 60.  
There are sympathies and antipathies in nature, of which we can give no reason, which is the punishment of Adam's pride. sec. 61.  
Of impressions made in the embryo, and of the formative power. sec. 62.  
Substances could not be known, were it not for qualities. No action, passion, and motion without qualities. Alterations from them. sec. 63.  
All bodies are not merely passive. Rare and dense not the primary division of bodies. sec. 64.  
Aristotle not the author of atoms, but Democritus. sec. 65.  
The necessity of metaphysical knowledge. Privations and negations conceived as positive entities by Aristotelians, how. sec. 66.  
Qualities are not dispositions of parts. Beauty is neither composition nor proportion. Health is not temper. Agility is not proportion nor strength. Science is not ordered phantasms. sec. 67.  
Sir Kenelm modestly reproved for mocking at Aristotelians. sec. 68  
How, and why accidents are in their subjects. Accidents are entities. Aristotelians vindicated from tautologies. Nature aims at unity, why. Of similitudes, and the ground thereof. How man is like to God, not God to man. sec. 69.    

The CONTENTS of the second part, containing 28. Sections.  

ARistotelians make not heat and cold indivisible qualities. Not they, but the Masspriests turn bodies into spirits. sec. 1.  
Not the nature, but the similitude of the thing apprehended, is in the man apprehending; and therefore the understanding is not the same with the thing understood, proved by ten reasons. sec. 2.  
All relations are not notions, but real entities, proved by ten reasons. sec. 3.  
Existence is not the property of man, but of entity, or rather its formality; in God only it is one with essence. sec. 4.  
The soul is more than an active force. She sleepeth not in the grave, etc. sec. 5.  
Being hath no great affinity with the soul: it is neither the end, nor the Idea of the soul. sec. 6.  
Things are understood rather by way of similitude, then of respect or relation. sec. 7.  
Man's knowledge how finite and infinite. God only absolutely infinite. How he is known by us here and hereafter. How infinity can be known. sec. 8.  
Things lose not their being, by reason of quantity, but by the privation of the form. sec. 9  
Mathematicians consider not the natures of things, but bare accidents abstracted from sensible matter. sec. 10.  
All life consisteth not in motion. Life is not an action, but the act. How motions come from without, how not. sec. 11.  
How the soul is perfect. In her no privative, but negative imperfections. There are accidents in the soul. sec. 12.  
Place is not a body: it is neither form nor matter. Whatsoever hath existence hath ubiety, even Angels and souls. How souls are in their bodies. They are not nowhere, nor are they everywhere. sec. 13.  
How time is the measure of motion. Time and motion different things. When the heavenly motions shall cease, there will be time, how understood. Things below would move, though the heavens stood still. sec. 14.  
What things are in time chief and primarily. How spirits are not in time, and how in time. Tempus, aevum, eternity. God only exempted from time. Discrete time. sec. 15.  
The soul is no accident. She knoweth not all things. There is no exterior and interior soul. Phantasms are not bodies. All souls have not the same amplitude of knowledge. Life is not motion. Neither the soul nor the life becomes to be a spirit. sec. 16.  
Both Angels and souls stand in need of external and internal helps of knowledge. Memory remains in separated souls. How the species depend from the fantasy. Divers habits left in the soul separated. The souls in their understanding differ from the Angels. What things they know not. God is not understood by species. sec. 17.  
The fantasy worketh not upon the soul, but the active intellect upon the passive. How the fantasy helps the understanding. The fantasy works in sleep. How the soul worketh upon herself, by means of her divers faculties. sec. 18.  
In Angels and departed souls there are actions and perfective passions. The want of action argues death rather than life. Some actions cease after death, not all. All actions not corruptive. Sir Kenelm contradicts himself. sec. 19  
The soul the subject of memory, recordation, reminiscence, and of oblivion too. What habits are left actually and potentially in the soul. 'Tis a happiness to be forgetful of some things. sec. 20.  
Rhetorical flourishes useless, and hurtful in Philosophical disputes. sec. 21.  
Perfection of knowledge makes not the substance of the soul more perfect. The soul ceaseth not to be a soul, though she brings knowledge with her. False judgements and erroneous opinions are a part of the punishment of damned souls in hell. sec. 22.  
All effects do not immediately follow upon the working of the efficient. Opus and Operatio. The act of entity and of causality are to be distinguished. The effect, which is the property of the cause, followeth immediately. God an eternal entity, not an eternal cause. sec. 23.  
That the soul is not a material, but a spiritual substance, infused, not traduced, proved by twenty arguments. Of the operations, knowledge, and liberty of the soul in willing. Of her excellency above the senses and corporeal substances: this is proved by Scripture. In what sense the soul is called corporeal by some Fathers. She is no part of the divine essence, as some heretic's thought. sec. 24.  
The specifical perfection or excellency of souls is alike in all. There may be some difference in accidental perfections, in respect of the organs and fantasy. sec. 25.  
The nearer the Intelligences are to God, the more they know. The superior have a greater similitude with God than the inferior, and stand in need of fewer intelligible species.  
All behold God's essence, but not in the same measure. Neither is their knowledge equal, nor infinitely unequal. sec. 26.  
The soul is not made complete in or by the body, but rather incomplete, because she is then a part of the whole. sec. 27.  
Nature, reason, and knowledge are but blind guides to heaven, without Christ, proved by Scripture and reason. What we are by nature. How Christ may be called nature, reason, and knowledge. sec. 28.    

The CONTENTS of the Conclusion, containing 17. Sections.  

THe immortality of the soul proved by Scripture. sec. 1.  
The same proved by six reasons grounded on the Scripture. sec. 2.  
That the soul is immortal of her own nature, proved by four reasons: and how this phrase is to be understood. sec. 3.  
The soul's immortality proved by thirteen natural and moral reasons. The Gentiles, by nature's light, were not ignorant of this truth. Aristotle in this point cleared and vindicated. sec. 4.  
How Angels and men's souls subject to annihilation or dissolution. sec. 5.  
The first Objection against our doctrine answered, and is showed how the soul is immortal, both by grace and nature. sec. 6.  
The second Objection answered. Solomon compares not men's souls to beasts, but the death of men's bodies to that of beasts. sec. 7.  
The third Objection answered. Job denieth not the resurrection, but showeth it cannot be effected by the power of nature. sec. 8.  
The fourth Objection answered. Austin cleared. The way how the soul is infused, and original sin propagated. sec. 9  
The fifth Objection answered. How the soul in under standing depends from the senses. sec. 10.  
The sixth Objection answered how the soul suffers. sec. 11.  
The seventh Objection answered. How immaterial grace is corrupted. sec. 12.  
The eighth Objection answered. Desire of immortality in man only. sec. 13.  
The ninth Objection answered. The soul understands better being separated, then now she doth in the body. sec. 14.  
The many mischiefs that Christian Religion suffers by this opinion of the soul's corruptibility. sec. 15.  
The late printed Pamphlet at Amsterdam, which undertakes to prove the soul's mortality, briefly refuted, and slighted as a frivolous and irreligious rhapsody, having nothing in it but froth. Wherein he abuseth Scripture. He is refuted in four observations. The soul, after death, subsisteth naturally, not violently, nor miraculously. sec. 16.  
A devout and comfortable meditation upon the soul's immortality, fit for all afflicted Christians. sec. 17.     


THE PHILOSOPHICAL TOUCHSTONE.  
NOble Sir KENELME, as I reverence your worth, so I admire your pains, who, being a Gentleman of such eminency, thinks it no disparagement, but an honour, to spend your time in good literature, which giveth true Nobility: your practice herein is exemplary, which I wish the Gentry of our Nation would imitate, who think they are born merely for themselves and their pleasures; whose time is spent either idly, wickedly, or impertinently, as Seneca complains, Eorum vitam mortemque juxta existimo: but your mind, being of a more noble extraction, semine ab aethereo, you know that you are not borne for yourself; and therefore, by your indefatigable pains, do both eternize your fame, and ennoble your Country: but because this life of ours cannot challenge the privilege of perfection, and truth here is accompanied with error, as the light with shades; therefore I find that this your Work, of the nature of Bodies, and of the Souls immortality, hath some passages in it heterodoxal, and not consonant to the principles of Divinity and Philosophy, which have drawn from me these sudden Observations (for I have here neither time, books, nor opportunity to enlarge myself) in which I promise both brevity and modesty, suffering no other language to pass from me, but such as may beseem both your worth, and my ingenuity; for my end is not to wound your reputation, but to vindicate the truth.  
The first mistake I meet with is [That words express 
Sect. 1. Pag. 2. cap. 1.  things only according to the pictures we make of them in our thoughts, and not as the things are in their proper natures.] But if our words express not the things which we conceive in our minds, as they are in their own natures, than our conceptions are erroneous, and our words improper or false: and if there be not an adequation of our conceptions with the things we conceive, there can be no metaphysical truth in us; which consisteth in the agreement of our thoughts with the things, as ethical truth doth in the consent of our words to our thoughts. Our conceptions are our internal words which represent real things, and our external words represent these conceptions, and, by consequence, they express things as they are in their natures: So Adam in Paradise gave names to the creatures according to their natures, and so have wise men ever since. The Latins call the sea mare, quasi amarum, from its saltness or bitterness, for it is so in its own nature.  
Secondly, [You define quantity to be nothing else but the 
Sect. 2. Pag. 9 cap. 2.  extension of a thing] and shortly after [that quantity is nothing else but divisibility.] Thus you confound extension and divisibility, which differ as much, as in man rationality differs from risibility, the one being the effect of the other; for therefore things are divisible, because they are extensive: take away extension, divisibility faileth; and therefore numbers are not properly divisible, because they have no extension, but only in resemblance. Secondly, extension is not the essence of quantity; for if it were, all that have quantity must have also extension: but Angels have discrete quantity, which we call number, and yet have no extension. Thirdly, there is a quidditative or entitive extension, by which one part is not another in bodies, though there were no quantitative extension at all: therefore not every extension is the essence of quantity. There is also the extension of site, which is no quantity.  
Whereas [you make heat a property of rare bodies, and 
Sect▪ 3. Pag. 28. cap. 4. Pag. 30.  that out of rarity ariseth heat, and that a body is made and constituted a body by quantity] you speak paradoxically; for the rarest body is not still the hottest: A burning coal is hotter than the flame, and scalding lead is hotter than scalding water. Secondly, rarity is not the cause of heat, but heat the cause of rarity; that which begets heat, is motion, and the influence and light of the Stars: motion then begets heat, heat begets rarity. 'Tis true, that rarefaction prepares the matter to receive heat, as heat prepares the matter to receive the form of the hot element; but what prepares, is not the cause. Thirdly, a body is not made and constituted by quantity, for this is posteriour to a body, being a substance, and follows the body as its accident; and therefore more ignoble. Every accident hath a subjective dependence from the substance; a body hath or may have entity without quantity, so cannot quantity without the body.  
The essence, or, as you call it [the substance of local motion, 
Sect. 4. Pag 34. cap. 5.  doth not consist in division;] because whatsoever division there is in this motion, it is either in respect of the thing moved, or in respect of the space in which it is moved: but both these are external to motion, and not belonging any ways to its essence; therefore in that divisibility which is in them, cannot consist the essence of local motion. Besides, divisibility is a property of quantity flowing from its essence, whereas local motion is quantitative but by accident; and not, but by way of reduction, in the predicament of quantity: therefore, except you be of Scotus his opinion, who will have mobile and motus all one, division cannot be the essence of local motion: And if you were a Scotist in this, yet you cannot prevail; for division, being the accident of the thing moved, it cannot be of its essence; for no accident can constitute the essence of a substance.  
You speak not like a Philosopher, when you speak 
Sect. 5. Pag. 34 cap 5.  [of uniting a body moved to that other body, which is called its place:] For place is defined to be the superficies of the ambient body, but the body quantitative is a different species from the superficies: the substantial body is in another predicament; therefore place cannot be a body: for if it were, it could not be equal to the thing contained; for every body that contains, is bigger than the body contained: as the dish is bigger than the water. The air than is not the place of our bodies, but the superficies or terminus of the air, which is the accident of that subject.  
[In regard dense bodies (you say) are dividers, the earth 
Sect. 6. Pag. 36. cap. 5.  in that respect must be the most active element, since it is the most dense.] The earth is active in dividing, not because it is most dense, but because most heavy; and, indeed, the cause both of density and gravity is frigidity; and therefore this is the active quality, not density. Again, elements are called active, in respect of the two active qualities, heat and cold; and, of these two, heat is the more active; and consequently, the element of fire is simply and absolutely most active.  
[The action of cold is composed of two parts, to wit, pressing, 
Sect. 7. Pag. 36. c. 5.  and penetration.] Pressure and penetration are not the parts, but the effects of frigefaction. Pressure but a remote effect, for it is immediately caused by gravity, and this by cold: And for penetration, it is rather the effect of heat then of cold; for hot liquors pierce sooner than cold: and it is rather by reason of the rarity of its substance, then of the coldness thereof, that it pierceth; for this cause air is more penetrating than water, and fire then air.  
[A real entity necessarily hath an existence of its own, and 
Sect. 8. Pag. 39 c. 6.  so becomes a substance.] By this you infer, that qualities must needs be substances, seeing they are real entities distinct from the bodies they accompany. But this consequence▪ is irrational; for accidents are real entities, because they are not bare notions and conceptions of the mind, but things existent, and distinct from their bodies; yet their entity is weak compared with that of substances, so that sometimes they are called nonentity by Philosophers: but if all real entities must needs be substances, then in vain is it to make above one predicament, or to divide entity into substance and accidents. Then qualities cannot be contrary one to another, as heat to cold, nor can they admit of magis and minus, but are subjects susceptible of contrariety without alteration of themselves, which are the properties of substance: but although accidents be real entities, yet they have no existence in or by themselves, but in or by their substances; for Accidentis esse est inesse; and therefore ens is called [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] as respecting principally substance; but accidents secundariò, as they inhere in their substance: which as they cannot subsist, so they cannot be defined without their substance. The Papists themselves will not yield, that accidents in the Eucharist can subsist without their proper subject, except by miracle, or Divine power: and Scotus is so far from yielding 
In 1. Phys. quaest. 7.  any subsistence to accidents without their substance, that he will rather believe, that the accidents in the bread, are turned by miracle into a substance: to which opinion it seems you incline. Thomas tells us, that whiteness 
1. ●▪ q. 90. Art. 2.  and other accidents have no entity, but as they are in their subjects: And Aristotle, that accidents are entis, 
7 Metaphys.  rather than entia. You must first prove that accidents have any entity without their subjects, and then, that to have real entity, and to subsist by itself; or, that essence and self- existence is all one: when this is proved, we will be of your opinion.  
[Heat is nothing else in the fire, but the very substance of 
Sect. 9 Pag. 41. c. 6.  it.] If heat be the substance of the fire, than it is either the matter, or the form of it; not the matter, for heat is active, the matter passive; not the form, for the form is the essence, and therefore incommunicable; but heat is communicated by the fire to the water: Heat is not in the element the principle of motion, but the form thereof is. One form is not contrary to another: but heat is contrary to cold. Heat admits degrees, so doth not the substantial form. Heat and cold cannot be contraries, 
Contraria sunt sub eodem genere.  seeing heat is a substance, say you, and cold a quality.  
[It cannot be imagined that light is any thing else but fire.] 
Sect. 10. Pag. 43. c. 6.  If it be so, then wherever fire is, there is light: but we read of a fire without light. 2. Then wherever light is, there is fire: but there is light in the Stars, in Cat's eyes, in Glow-worms, in Fish scales, yet no fire. 3. The nature of fire is to ascend only, the nature of the light is to descend also. 4. Water is opposite to fire; but to light, darkness. 5. Fire heats by degrees, and successively, light illuminates suddenly, and in an instant. 6. Fire contains itself in a narrow place, as the chimney, light dilates itself over all the room. 7. If light be fire, than it must be heat, for heat you say is fire; but if light be heat, than it will follow that light is tangible, and heat visible: but ask a blind man, if he can discern light by touching, and ask him that hath eyes, if by them he can see heat, which he must needs do, if heat and light be the same thing. 8. There is heat in a dark Oven that bakes your bread, when there is no light at all; and there is light in Saturn, but no heat at all. 9 When the fire warms the water, it makes a change in the water, by expelling a positive quality, but when the Sun illuminates the air, there is no change made in the air, because no positive quality is expelled; darkness being a mere privation. 10. The light of the Sun in the air and in the Sun, is the same light; but if it be fire in the air, much more must it be fire in the Sun: No wonder then if Icarus his waxed wings melted, flying so near the Sun. But the snowy mountains have the Sun's light more than the valleys, yet have they not thereby the more heat. Snow enlighteneth the air in the night, but warms it not. The air is not warmer at the full Moon, then at the change. 11. Iflight be fire, than it must be a body, but a body it cannot be; for then when light is in the air, two bodies must be at once in one place. ². It must be the subject of motion. ³. It must be compounded of matter and form. ⁴. It can never be annihilated, for the matter remains still; but what becomes of the candlelight in your chamber, when the candle is put out? doth the matter of it assume some new form? and is the corruption of light the generation of darkness? ⁵. If it were a body, it must enter into the composition of things, and so make up a part of the mixed body; but how absurd is the conceit of these things? 12. If light be fire, than it must be a substance; and so it can subsist by itself, and is incapable of degrees; not to speak of the instantaneall motion of light, of which corporeal substances are not capable, nor of the immobility of it in the air, when the air is moved with winds.  
[You see upon the paper which you held near the flame of a 
Sect. 11. Pag 43.  candle, being a little removed, some part of that which you saw in the candle.] The parts of the candle are, the wieke, the tallow, and the flame; Do you see any of these on the paper? Indeed, you see no part of the candle on the paper; but only by the light of the candle you see the paper; which will not prove light to be a body, no more than [the dilating of gold:] for though gold dilated, and fire dilated, are gold, and fire; yet this will not prove that light is fire dilated. As for your [blind Schoolmaster] you speak of, he might feel the heat of the fire in his brains, but not the light; for light is not the object of touching. [As for the breaking or reflecting of light] these will prove it no more to be a body, than the breaking or motion of a shadow, can prove a shadow to be a body: Nullum simile est idem. The motions of light and shadows, are but like the motions of bodies. [The uniting of light in a burning-glasse] proves it no more to be a body, than the uniting or reinforcing of cold by antiperistasis, proves cold to be a body: And if you'll say that light is fire, because it begets heat in a burning-glasse; you may as well say, that motion is fire, because that begets heat in two hard bodies rubbed together.  
[There is no doubt but light heats as well as enlighteneth.] 
Sect. 12. Pag. 46. c. 7.  All light, as is said, heats not, nor hath all heat light annexed with it. But if all light did heat, yet will it not from thence follow that light is fire; for motion heats as well as light, and the Sun warms us as well by the one, as by the other; and both are but means, and the Sun's instruments to procreate heat by in this inferior world. [As for the flame of the spirit of Wine, which you say will not burn,] I grant it; but yet it will warm, which the light doth not: Nay, I am assured, that no light at all warms, except the celestial, which it doth (as they speak) effectiuè, not formaliter: But the fire heats by its form, not by its light: Therefore you are mistaken in all your discourse, confounding the celestial light, with that of the fire or candle; and attributing heat to the light of the fire, which heat proceeds immediately from its form, not from its light. And though the Sun's light in a burning-glasse may inflame, yet no other light can do so; and so by calling light fire, you confound the accident with the substance, as when you call [The scent of odoriferous water, the water itself.]  
When we ask you, What becomes of the light when 
Sect. 13. Pag. 49. c. 7.  the Sun is gone, or is intercepted by a cloud, or the Moon's body? You ask again, [What becomes of the flame when it is extinguished?] I answer, the flame, being a substance begot of smoke, returns again unto smoke, for the smoke being elevated to that height of heat and dryness, presently becomes flame; which when its nutriment fails, or violently by the wind is separated from its grosser substance, encountering with the cold air, returns unto smoke again: But for the light in the room, there is no such generation and corruption; for when the flame is extinguished, and resolved into smoke, the light quite perisheth and vanisheth into nothing, as being a bare accident, and somewhat like to nothing. If it be a substance, and resolved into some other matter, tell us into what.  
[You prove the light to be nothing else but the flame dilated, 
Sect. 14. Pag. 7. c. 8.  by bringing similes of a basin of water dilated unto vapours by heat, and of perfumes dilated unto odoriferous smoke.] But these are no proofs at all: We sensibly perceive the vapours generated of the water, and the smoke of the perfume, and the diminution or total resolution of these named grosser bodies, into thinner aereal; But we see no such thing in the light, for there is no resolution at all of the flame into that diffused light, nor any diminution of the flame, by the increase of the light; or any total abolishing of the flame unto that imaginary substance of the light. When the water and perfume is quite consumed, the steam and smoke remain a great while after; but doth there remain any light of the flame in the room after the flame is wasted and gone? which must needs be, if the light be the flame dilated or resolved. It were strange Philosophy to say, that the light of the Sun is nothing else but the body of the Sun dilated: To how many inconveniences should that celestial body be subject? To how many generations and corruptions?  
[Light is not in every place of the room really, which is enlightened.] 
Sect. 15. Pag. 53. c. 8.  This is a pure contradiction; for, what is enlightened hath light in it. If there be not light in any part of the room which is enlightened, than some enlightened parts are dark: such mysterious Philosophy I understand not. As for these Atoms in the Sun, [Which you say hinder not our sight;] if they be but few, 'tis true: but I have seen often times so many of them, and so thick together near the ground, that they sensibly hinder the sight. And though there be many Atoms in the air, yet there is no penetration of dimensions, as there must needs be, if the light be a body. If there be a thousand lights in a Church, so many bodies there must be, besides that of the air, penetrating one another. What a strange body is the light, that can pass through the solid and dense substance of a glass, and not break it? 
Sect. 16. Pag. 56. c. 8.   
[As for the circumaction of a lighted torch in the dark, and the swift motion of the Sun,] though these may deceive our sight: this, by reason of its vast distance; that, because the fiery end of it, being the only object of the eye in the dark, sends the species of it unto the eye, and in the form of a fiery wheel; because the beams of our eye are dissipated and broken, by the swift motion of the lucid object: Yet these will not prove, that we are deceived in the instantaneall motion of the light from East to West, or of a candle in the room where we are; for if the eye be continually deceived in the motion of its proper object, being within a convenient distance, then is the eye given to us in vain, and so God is made imperfect in his work: And therefore our argument is good, when we say, that the light can be no natural body, seeing it illuminates the whole Hemisphere in an instant.  
You give a reason why the light by its motion doth 
Sect. 17. Pag. ●9. c. 8. Pag. 60.  not shatter the air, or other bodies in pieces: [Because in light there is only celerity, but no bigness or density:] This is a strange body, that hath no dimensions; you were better call it a spirit, than a body; for if it be a body, it must have matter and form: by the matter, it hath quantity, which is inseparable from it; by the form, that quantity hath its determination and limits: therefore if there be in the light celerity, there is motion; if motion, than the principles of motion, which are two, to wit, the active form, and the passive matter: and these cannot be without quantity, nor this without dimensions; and what dimensions can be wanting in so vast a body as the light is, reaching from heaven to earth? You cannot allow less than the three dimensions of longitude, latitude and profundity, and that (I think) is bigness: and if it incorporate itself with the air, there must needs be a condensation; two bodies, nay perhaps a thousand, in one Church (if there be so many candles) being united in one.  
[No light is seen by us, but what is reflected from an opacous 
Sect. 18. Pag. 61. cap. 8.  body to our eye.] I pray, from what opacous body is the light of the Sun, Moon and Stars reflected, when we look upon these luminaries? Do they not immediately, without any such help, strike our eyes when we look on them? And wherefore [hath the wind no power to shake the light, which strikes our eye in a strait line?] Is the wind more restrained by a strait then a crooked line? The wind shakes the air, and yet shakes not the light which is in it. Sure, it is not the strait line that keeps the light from shaking, but because it is an accident, and not a body, as the air is, and bodies only are the objects and subjects of motion.  
[Our arguments (you say) against light being a body, are 
Sect. 19 Pag. 62. cap. 8.  only negative.] All negative arguments are not to be rejected; there be negative demonstrations as well as affirmative: and you which hold light to be a body, how will you prove it to be no accident, but by negatives? and yet I have urged already divers affirmative arguments to prove that light is a quality, as well as negative, to prove it is no body. And whereas you conclude [that if fire be light, than light must needs be fire,] 
Pag. 63.  it will not follow; for fire may be light or lucid in the concrete, and yet not so in the abstract: and if it were so, yet light is not therefore fire; for sure, the light of snow, or fish, or glow-worms is not fire, nor indeed any light, as I have proved.  
[By how much the quicker the motion is, by so much the 
Sect 20. Pag. 65. cap. 9  agent is the perfecter.] The quickness of the motion argues not the perfection of the agent, except you will have the Moon, which moves swifter, a perfecter agent than the Sun, whose motion is much slower. Is Mercury a more perfect agent then his father jupiter? or is Tobias less perfect than his dog, because he is not so nimble footed?  
[The nature of a body is, that greater quantity of the same 
Sect. 21. Pag 65. cap. 9  thing hath greater virtue than a less quantity hath.] You confound the two sorts of quantities, to wit, virtutis and molis; the greatest virtue is not always in the greatest bulk: there was more spirit and courage in little David, then in great Goliath. A little horse hath oftentimes more metal than a bigger; and a few drops of chemical spirit have more virtue than an handful of herbs: little women, for the most part, are fruitfuller than the tallest. And there is more force in a little gunpowder within a musket, then in twenty times so much in an open place.  
[You can see no principle to persuade you, that any body can 
Sect 22. Pag. 70. cap. 9  move itself towards any place.] If your meaning be, that no body can move itself totally, that is, that the whole, and every part in the whole be both movers and moved, I assent to you; for one and the same thing cannot be in the same respect actually and potentially in being, but the mover is still in actu, the thing moved in potentia: nor can the same thing be more noble than itself, which it must be, if the body thus move itself, seeing the mover is more noble than the thing moved; but if your meaning be, that no body moves itself, that is, that in the same body one part doth not move the other, you are mistaken: for every body is compounded of form and matter; the form is the mover, the matter is moved: and so every body moves itself, as having within itself the principle of its motion, which is the form. So heavy bodies move themselves downward, light bodies upward; the one by gravity, or the form of gravity, the other by the form of levity: gravity and levity being qualities proceeding from the form of these inanimate bodies; and this power of moving themselves, these bodies had in their generation from their generator, who gave them being and form, and the consequences of form; dans formam, dat consequentia ad formam: therefore when a stone falls downward, that motion is not from an external mover; for then the motion should not be natural, but violent: now the motion is natural; for nature is the principle and cause of it, and nature is intrinsecall, and the form is the chief nature, which causeth this motion; therefore the generator cannot be the cause of this motion, as being gone and separated from it: nor is the removing of the impediment or the impeller the cause of this motion, for these are causes only by accident, which must be reduced to the self cause: Doubtless then all bodies move themselves. Now [if the quality be nothing else, (as you urge out of Thomas) but the modification of the thing whose quality it is,] than you must exclude all habits, natural faculties and passions, all colours, sounds, scents, and many other qualities, from being real entities; which is absurd.  
[The Sun is a perpetual and constant cause, working upon 
Sect. 23. Pag 76. cap. 10.  inferior bodies, by his being sometime present, sometime absent.] You spend much paper in showing that the Sun is the cause of the motion of inferior bodies, which we deny not; but we are not satisfied with this cause: for the Sun, as all other celestial bodies, is but an universal and remote cause of inferior bodies and their motions; but such a cause begets no scientifical knowledge: the cause, by which we must know scientifically, is particular and immediate, to wit, the forms of bodies by their properties, gravity and levity; these are the causes of motion, by which we know. The Sun is too remote a cause, and I doubt whether he be a cause at all why the fire burns, and of other such like effects. And though the Sun, being present, is the cause of sublunary effects, yet, being absent, he cannot be a cause properly, but accidentally, or causa deficiens, not efficiens.  
[The light carrieth up an atom with it,] and shortly after 
Sect. 24. Pag. 80. cap. 10.  you tell us [that light is a part of the atom.] Is not the air strong enough to bear atoms, except you add this new carrier or porter, light? What becomes of these atoms when the light is gone? Are they not too heavy a burden for the air to support, without its fellow-helper?  Hercule supposito sidera fulcit Atlas. 
This is much like their conceit, who feared that Atlas was not strong enough to bear up the heavens, if Hercules shoulder had not helped him; but how comes the light to be a part of its own burden? an atom then, I see, is no atom, but may be cut in parts and anatomised, and these parts are light: But is light an integral, or an essential part? Are there any atoms in candlelight? if there be, how shall we know? if there be not, then is the light no part of atoms: And if atoms be opake bodies, how can light be a part of such? is one opposite a part of another? I think, your atoms sustained by the light, are like the dreams in Virgil, supported by an elm; or like the shadows in the Elysian fields, flying about the green meadows:  

— tenues sine corpore vitae  
Cernuntur volitare cava sub imagine formae.   
You have been too much conversant in the school of Democritus, who held the world to be made of atoms. [And to say, that the first and most general operation of the 
Pag. 76.  Sun, is to raise and make atoms,] is to give the Sun a very poor, unworthy, and fruitless employment. Caligula and his soldiers were better employed, when they gathered shells and pebble-stones; and so was Dioclesian in catching of flies.  
[There is no such thing among bodies, as positive gravity 
Sect. 25. Pag. 81. cap. 10.  and levity, but that their course upwards or downwards happen to them by the order of nature.] It seems you understand here by nature, the universal nature, which is nothing else, but the dependency of all inferior causes orderly from the supreme cause. If this be your meaning, as it must needs be, you commit a contradiction; for you deny the secondary causes, which you suppose to depend from the supreme. If then I should ask you, why a stone descends, you will answer, Not because of any positive gravity in it, but because it so happens by the order of nature. But why hath nature ordered a stone to fall downward, & not to move upward, seeing there is no positive gravity in it? You answer me, [Because it meets with the air or water, bodies lighter & thinner than the stone.] Then you here acknowledge a comparative gravity in the stone; for, if the air be lighter than the stone, the stone must be heavier than the air, and so comparatively it is heavy: but every comparative includes a positive; for, if you be wiser than another, than you are wise: but indeed, universal nature works not without the particular, neither doth God or the heaven move the stone downward, but by the stones gravity; therefore gravity is the immediate cause of its motion, which if you deny, you may as well deny the fire to be hot; and if you say the fire burns only, because it happeneth so by the order of nature, you were as good say nothing.  
[Any body will descend, if it light among others more 
Sect. 26. Pag 81. c. 10.  rare than itself; and will ascend, if it light among bodies more dense than it.] What say you then to your light body of light, which you say is nothing else but fire dilated? surely, meeting with air, a body heavier and denser, it should never descend to us, who live here on the earth, but ascend rather; how comes it that so light a body should descend so many miles from its fountain, the Sun, to us, seeing the air is much more dense than it? Nay, it descends thorough a denser body, the water; for, divers find light in the bottom of the sea. Again, what say you to a thick plank of timber, which meeting with the water, a rarer body, notwithstanding descends not to the bottom, but swims above? This is contrary to your doctrine.  
You told us afore, that light hath no bigness or density, 
Sect. 27.  that the more dense the body is, the more active it is, that the light carries up atoms; [and (now you say) that these atoms, the subtlest divisions of light, do press 
Pag. 86. c. 11.  down a leaden bullet, and penetrates or runs thorough it, as light thorough a glass, water thorough a sponge, and sand thorough a sieve.] The light than carries up these atoms, which press down a leaden bullet, and yet the light hath not density. These are riddles which Oedipus cannot unfold: for, how a quality should be a body, how that body should want dimensions, how it should want density, and yet bear up that which presseth down with its weight a leaden bullet, how there should be so much weight in atoms, as to press down such a bullet, how these atoms should pierce so dense a body as lead, whereas light cannot do it; yea, run thorough lead, as water thorough a sponge, or sand thorough a sieve, are (I think) some of these second notions which Chimaera did eat. But how do the atoms press down the lead? do they remain in their expansion dispersed? then they cannot more press the lead, than the sea-water presseth him down that dives in it; elementum in suo loco non gravitat. Or do the atoms meet together in a body to help the lead downwards? if all the atoms in the light were in one body, how big would that body be?  
[The clod of earth, which in Egypt is shut up in a close 
Sect. 28. Pag. 87. c. 11.  room, and doth show the change of weather by the increase of its weight,] receiveth not this weight [from the atoms of salt-peter, piercing the walls, as you say;] but from the air itself, of which it is made up, as other mixed bodies are, which therefore sympathize with the air, and its change, as our own bodies do, though we were never so close shut up in a room. When the air is inclined to rain, bodies grow heavy, and in a close room we see the water in weather-glasses ascend and descend, as the air changeth abroad, although the water in the glass hath no commerce with the air abroad: and so we feel aches upon change of weather in our bodies, and heaviness of our heads after sunset, by reason of the heaviness or gloomy heat of the air, caused not by your atoms, but by vapours, mists, or fumes in the air, which we are continually sucking in by the lungs, by which the two principal parts of our bodies are affected, to wit, the head and the heart, and by them the rest of the body. And as for [spirits or atoms of snow and 
Pag. 87.  salt-peter, which (you say) pass thorough a glasse-vessell,] I know no such thing. 'Tis true, that the outside of a glass or pot, being made wet, will freeze to the board, though near the fire, if you put snow and salt-peter in the pot, because the cold snow, by antiperistasis, becometh much colder, in having the hot salt joined with it, and so shunning its enemy, the salt, fortifies itself, which causeth the wet bottom to freeze. So in great frosts the fire is most hot and scalding; wells and deep cellars in summer are most cold, without any penetration of atoms at all, which were heretofore bodies, and parts of light, now by you are called spirits. And as there is no concourse of atoms to press down the falling bullet in the air [neither is there of water, to press down the stone 
Pag. 88  falling in it, as you say] because both the air and the water meet only to fill up the place which the bullet and stone had, that there may be no vacuity; for lighter bodies press not downward the heavier, but support the lighter. But it troubles me to waste so much time and paper in refelling your Paradoxes of atoms, which are as void of solidity, as the atoms themselves. Hence we see how easy it is to deviate from the truth, and to lose ourselves in the winding labyrinths and intricate Meanders of error, when we fall off from these known and generally received principles, which have had the approbation of wise men for so many generations. Is it not a shorter way, and more consonant to reason, to say, that cork sinks not, and iron doth, because the one is porous and full of air, the other dense, and more earthy; because the one and the other are moved diversely, according to their divers forms, and the properties from them, to wit, gravity and levity; then to devise phantomes of atoms, which involve within them so many absurdities?  
[The elements do weigh in their own spheres; for, a ballone 
Sect. 29. Pag. 95 c. 11.  stuffed hard with air, is heavier than an empty one. Secondly, more water would not be heavier than less. Thirdly, if a hole were digged in the bottom of the sea, the water would not run into it.] I answer, a stuffed ballone is heavier, because the air, which is in it, is separated from its own sphere, in which it doth not weigh, according to our principles. Secondly, more water is not in its own sphere actually heavier than less; for a man in the bottom of the sea feels no more weight, then if he were but half a yard from the superficies: but potentially it is, gravida est, sed non gravitat. Thirdly, the sea would run down, and fill up the hole, because it moves naturally, as it is heavy, towards the centre; which weight appears not actually in its sphere, till it remove towards the centre. Nature in her actions is not to be seen in all places, and at all times. There is life in seeds, and fruit in trees, though not always actually seen: So there is gravity in water, though not always felt; as you seem afterward to confess, when you say [that water in a 
Pag. 97. cap. 11.  pale, because it is thereby hindered from spreading abroad, hath the effect of gravity predominating in it:] So one part of water in its own sphere doth not divide the other; Shall we then say, there is no power in water to divide water? Yes, there is; for water poured out of an 〈◊〉 into a basin, wherein is water, will divide the water in the basin.  
Your reason, to prove that there is no inclination in 
Sect. 30. Pag. 98. cap. 11.  heavy bodies to tend to the centre [because the centre is as often changed, as any dust lighteth unequally upon any one side of it,] is a weak one; for let the centre change never so often, every hour if you will, yet a centre there must be still; and to that centre, in what place of the earth soever it be, the heavy body hath its inclination. And no less weakness is it, to confound vis impressa, or a violent motion, with the natural motion of gravity, as you do; for gravity is neither the mediate nor immediate cause of a violent, but of a natural motion. [Neither 
Pag. 99  is it impossible for any cause (as you say) to produce an effect greater than itself;] for the flame may produce a greater heat in iron, then is in itself: May not a little man beget a tall man? Oftentimes the effect exceedeth the cause both in quantity and virtue: A blind man begets a son with eyes; the heat of an Egyptian oven hatcheth chickens; and the Sun's heat begets many sensitive creatures of putrefied matter. Neither must you infer [That 
Pag. 99  gravity is no natural quality of earthy bodies, because a bullet can ascend out of the bottom of the barrel of a gun, being sucked up by one's breath:] for this infers the bullet to be naturally heavy, in that it doth not naturally ascend, but is forced by the violent motion of traction; which traction were needless, if the bullet were not naturally heavy. Neither doth this motion show [That gravity is an intellective entity, as you say;] for though the natural properties of things have not understanding, yet they have that appetite given to them by the God of nature, to preserve their own unity, and the unity of the universe, and to shun their own destruction: and this is no determining of the quality by itself, which is the act of an intelligent creature, to wit, to determine itself; but it is a power given by the God of nature to every thing, to preserve itself, and to shun its own hurt. So the stomach, which hath no understanding, receives and concocts wholesome food: the meseraick veins suck the purest part thereof, prepare and fit it for the second concoction, and send away the excrementitious and superfluous parts to the guts; and the same stomach vomits out that which is hurtful to it; and all this is nature, not understanding. What understanding will you give to a loadstone, when it draws iron? or to those senseless creatures, which by their sympathies and antipathies affect or hate each other?  
Though your atoms be but little bodies, yet they 
Sect. 31.  are your great servants; for they help you still at a dead lift, and do you much service in all your actions: they are your light-bearers, they make all things move in their natural courses, upward and downward; they are also the causes of violent motions: as of projection; for [by their help the arrow flieth out of the bow (as you say) and 
Pag. 181. c. 12.  the ball from the racket:] So these atoms are your archers, slingers, gunner's, or cannoneers, and they help you at your sports in the Tennis-courts. Multitudo populorum sepidum, as Apuleius calls them, the Aunts, did not so much good service to Psyche, in that intricate labour of dividing all sorts of grains, enjoined her by Venus, as these atoms do you: By them the arrow flies out of the bow, the stone out of the sling, the bullet out of the gun or canon; and if it were not for them, we could not kill our enemies in the wars: for, the gunpowder could have no force to carry the heavy iron bullet so fare in the air, and to beat down stone walls of towns and castles, if these atoms did not put to their shoulders. What Hercules is able to resist such Pigmies? but we, who have been bred in the peripatetic schools, at the feet of Aristotle, find the main cause of projection to be the quality or force of the projicient impressed upon the body projected; as, the force of the gun-powder-fire impressed in the bullet, carries it thorough the air: Neither is it more impossible for this impressed force and adventitious quality, to carry a bullet violently, then for the intrinsecall qualities of gravity and levity, to carry bodies to their own places naturally. The generator impresseth a quality of gravity in the stone, to move naturally to its own place: the projicient impresseth the quality of projection in the same stone, to move violently from its place. If you ask why the stone returns at last to its own motion downward, and continues not flying in the air; the reason is, because the air makes resistance, which at length weakens the impressed force; so that this, growing weaker than the resistance, yields, and the stone falls down. Neither is it reasonable, that an extrinsecall quality should have that continuance, as a quality that is natural, which cannot receive any mutation, except there be a change in the first qualities, whose commixtion, gravity and levity naturally follows; but the force of the projicient makes no such change in the first qualities of the body projected. Neither doth the stone lose its gravity whilst it flies upward, but hath it only suspended, while the projicients impression lasts: when this is spent, down falls the stone again, showing the same gravity it had before. If any say, that this impulse is contrary to the inclination of the body impelled, I answer, 'Tis contrary to its inclination to local motion, but not to any inclination the stone might have to the active quality of levity, which is not in the stone; levity then expels gravity, but projection doth not. This impulse than is an accidental form, and, in respect of the impression, it is in the third species of Quality; but as this impression inclineth the stone to motion, it is a natural faculty in the second species of Quality; I say natural; not as being the natural form, or the property flowing from thence; but because it moves like the natural form, though not to the same place; and because the stone in which the impression is made, is a natural subject, and the projicient is a natural agent. You see then that this doctrine of impression is no shift, as you call it; but it is a shift to make Atoms carry a Canon bullet so fare in the air; for as the air itself is passive, having no other motion in projection, but what it receives from the projicient, even so be your Atoms (if any such were) which are dispersed by the wind and force of the bullet.  
[Wheresoever there is variety of bodies, there must be the 
Sect. 32. Pag. 27. c. 14.  four elements:] then belike in the Heavens there must be the four elements, for there are variety of bodies, one star differing from another in glory: But indeed, there be no elements, nor generation, nor corruption, nor alteration, but such as belong to light, and local motion; and therefore the heaven is but a natural body analogically, which proportion consisteth in this, that as sublunary bodies have a nature, which is the inward principle of motion, so hath the heaven, though in a far different way; and for this cause, we deny that the matter of the celestial bodies is univocal to that of elementary, for then there should be mutual action and passion between them. ² Then the celestial matter should have an appetite to being or not being. ³. It should have an appetite to divers forms. ⁴. It should be the subject of corruption, and of transmutation into 
In comment. de terrae motu circulari.  sublunary bodies; all which are absurd, as I have showed elsewhere.  
Why may we not as well say, that fire warms the 
Sect. 33.  water, or burns the board, by its quality of heat, as to multiply entities to no purpose, as you do, in your innumerable Atoms, which is your salve for all diseases? for, as if these had not done you service enough already, you must make them your Cooks to boil and roast your meat: You will have them to come out of the fire, and pierce the bottom of the kettle, and so up unto the water, and 
Cap. 15. c. 16.  being quickly weary there, ascend in smoke, and then descend in drops. But, if these Atoms be the smallest parts of the substance of the fire, I wonder how they scape drowning, when they are in the water, and that they are not served, as the Persian god was by the Egyptian Priest, and so Canopus prove to be the better god: Nay, you will not have any occult quality in the Loadstone to draw the iron, but these Atoms must do it; and your reason is, [because otherwise the whole body of 
Pag. 139.  the agent must work, which it cannot do but by local motion.] But what need is there to say, that the whole body must work, if the Atoms do not? It is not the whole body that works, or at least not totally; for the fire heats by its form, not by its matter; and so the Loadstone draws: but if we did yield that the whole body did work, must it therefore work by local motion? Cannot the fire warm you, being within a fit distance, except the fire come to you? The Loadstone shall keep its distance from the iron, and yet shall draw it without Atoms; but they are little beholding to you, in that after all their good service they have done you, you set them together by the ears, and makes all re-actions to be performed by them; you make an irreconcilable war between the fiery and watery Atoms; like Homer's Batrochomyamachia; or like that battle in Ovid's Chaos; where  

Frigida pugnabant calidis, humentia siccis,  
Mollia cum duris, sine pondere habentia pondus.   
When you hold ice in your hand, you will not have the ice by its coldness to work on your hand, nor your hand by its heat to re-worke on the ice, but Atoms to work one against another. When you saw wood, be there any Atoms that come out of the teeth of the saw, which divide the wood? or Atoms out of the wood, which blunt the saw? But, seeing you will not have re-action to consist in qualities, I desire to know, whether in every re-action there is not an alteration: this you cannot deny, for when you put hot iron in cold water, you make an alteration from heat to cold, and from cold to heat; but alterations consist in qualities, as augmentation doth in quantity, and generation in substances; therefore re-action must consist in quality, not in your Atoms which are substances. Besides, substances are not contrary to each other, but in re-actions there be contrarieties, which argues quality, in which properly consists contrariety.  
I know not what to make of your Atoms, for sometime 
Sect. 34. Pag. 142. c. 16. Pag 143.  you call them substances, and [here you will have them to be qualities:] Again, you say [these Atoms are the pure parts of the elements▪] and by and by, that [they are accidental qualities:] It seems then, that accidents are parts of substances, by your Logic. Besides, you say [the elements remain pure in every compound,] and yet you 
Ibid.  will not have [their substantial forms to remain actually:] sure the elements remain not if their forms are gone; for it is by their forms that they are elements: and if they remain pure in the compound, than the compound is not a physical mixed body. And if your Atoms be qualities, than there is no mixture at all, for mixture is of substances, not of qualities; and the body mixed differs specifically from the elements of which it is mixed. We hold then, that the elementary forms remain in mixture, but refractè, remissè, castigatè, as they speak, and in some degree only, which degrees the substantial forms admit, but not as the qualities do; for these admit degrees, remaining the same they were before; so do not the forms, for as soon as there is any remission of degree in them, the species is changed, and so that which was the form of the element, becomes now the form of a mixed body, being of another species than the element. Take any degree of the substantial form from fire, and it's no more fire. 
Sect. 35. Pag. 143. c. 16.   
[It doth not appear to what purpose nature should place storehouses of simples, seeing mixed bodies can be dissolved into other mixed bodies.] Into what then shall these mixed bodies be dissolved? Into mixed still? Must there not be a dissolution into simple bodies at last, as well as there was a composition of them? Sure if there were not storehouses of these simples, the world could not be perfect▪ for in this is its perfection, that it consists of all sorts of bodies, to wit, as well simple, as mixed: and if there be four prime qualities, where shall they have their residence, but in the four prime simple bodies, which we call elements? hence the elements are eternal in the whole, though they be perishing in their parts, when they enter into composition.  
[The motion of Atoms we call a wind:] A wind is a 
Sect. 36. Pag. 152. c. 17.  substance, as afterward you confess, when you say, [winds are made up of bodies:] but motion is an accident, therefore wind cannot be a motion; I think your meaning is, that winds are Atoms moved, or moving; but than you should have told us whether these Atoms move themselves, or are they moved by some other: these Atoms are unruly bodies, which if they were not kerbed by Aeolus,  

— Maria ac terras, caelumque profundum,  
Quip ferent rapidi secum, verrantque per auras.   
Who would think there should be such strength in Atoms, to overturn trees and strong houses, to move the Seas from the bottom, to sink ships, and to move the earth itself? Was that a motion of Atoms which drove the Sea again into its own place, and dried the earth from Noah's Flood? Are those Aetesii, which blow continually under the Line, motions of Atoms? or those which blow constantly in Egypt forty days together, in the summer solstice? 'Tis strange there should be such strength in these bodies, which are so weak, that the light, as you said before, can support them; and that there should be such spite and courage in them, as to encounter in duels, and trouble the world with their quarrels,  Saepe & ventorum concurrere praelia vidi. 
Were these Satan's soldiers, when he by the winds overthrew the house where jobs children were? Your best way will be to leave your Atoms, and to acquiesce in the received opinion, that the wind is an exhalation raised by the Sun out of moisture; which exhalation, by reason of its lightness mounting upward, is repelled by the cold middle region of the air, and so moveth not directly downward, because 'tis light, but athwart and sidling. As for your Atoms, leave them for Aeolus to bind up in a bag, who were so unruly before the took them to task, that they turned the sea upon the land, and the land into the sea, dividing Italy from Sicily, and Spain from Africa.  
[Is it not a wrong to God and his instruments, to impute to 
Sect. 37. Pag. 164 ca 18.  the Devil the aides, which to some may seem supernatural?] True, for there is a natural magic, by which you may do strange things, and anticipate the time prefixed by nature, in producing of divers effects, by applying activa passivis: So you may produce a Rose in Winter, and raise Parsley out of the ground within a few hours after the seed is sown. There is also a Mathematical magic, by which strange things are done; as was that wooden Pigeon, which Architas caused to fly; and that brazen head, which Albertus Magnus made to speak. That worthy man Boëtius was very skilful in this way. Such things, and many more, may be done without witchcraft: but withal, there is a Diabolical magic in working strange things by the power of Satan, by a contract which Witches make with them, God permitting, in his secret judgement, the affectors of such evil things to be deluded and abused by the evil Angels. Saith S. Austin, 
De doct. Christ. l. 2. cap. 22, 23.  'Tis fit that he, who forsakes the fountain of living waters, dig to himself fountains that will hold no water: Therefore in all our actions we ought to aim at God's glory, at the salvation of our own and others souls, at the honour of the Church and State, in which we live, and to avoid scandal, to submit our thoughts and actions to God's Word, and not to practise such things as have no cause or reason in nature: as, to cure diseases by spells or words, characters and knots, which, being artificial, and quantities, cannot naturally operate.  
[The weapon-salve must be conserved in an equal temper, 
Sect. 38. Pag. 164 c. 18.  and the weapon, which made the wound, must be orderly dressed.] Paracelsus, the inventor of this salve, is ill reported of, to wit, to be a Magician: Baptista Porta, Goclenius, Dr. Floid, & some others have been too credulous to believe him; for, if it be not magical, it is suspicious, considering the author, the superstitious ceremonies in gathering of the moss from the dead skull, with the other simples used in it, besides the unreasonableness of their opinions, who think that a wound can be cured by such a way; whereas nihil agit in distans, natural agents work not but within a proportionable distance: as the fire will not heat, if the object be not within its reach: neither will the loadstone draw, except the iron be near: But the patrons of this salve will have it cure the wound, though many miles distant, and though there be an interposition of many dense bodies; as of houses and hills. What medium can carry this virtue so far, & thorough so many impediments, whereas the Sun cannot convey his beams to us, if the Moon, or a thick cloud be interposed? And what sympathy can we conceive to be between a sword, or a clout, and a wound? except you'll say, It is because the blood touched it; or, as you say, [Because the steem or spirits entered into the pores of the weapon.] These are piercing spirits indeed, that can pass thorough steel, and stay there so long after the blood is cold, whereas the blood, which in phlebotomy is received into a dish, loseth the spirits as soon as the blood is cold; though many ounces of blood be there, yet never a spirit left, nor any sympathy at all between the dish and the wound. Sure, by this reason, when the sword that wounds is kept in the same room with the wounded man, it must cure, whereas it cures so fare off. But no such cure is to be found; for I was yet never cured by the knife that cut my finger, though never so often dressed. If any reply, that some cures have been done by this salve; I answer, that I have heard so, and they that writ of it, most of them write but upon report: and suppose some cures had been done, yet I will not impute them to the salve, but to the washing and keeping of the wound clean, in which case nature will help itself. The imagination also is sometimes a help to cure; and sometime Satan may concur, for his own ends, videlicet, to confirm superstition and error. If any say, that there is a sympathy between the pole and the needle touched with the loadstone, which are farther distant than the sword and the wound; I grant it, because the influence of celestial bodies upon earthy, is not hindered by distance; but we cannot say so of the actions of sublunary bodies, whose matter is fare different from that of the heavens. In a word, the effects of this salve which you speak of, are much like the effects that are said to be caused by images of wax made by Witches. The like credit is to be given to those other reports you speak of, to wit, the curing of the kines swelled soles by a turf cut from under their sore feet, and hung upon an hedge; the drying of which is the mending of the sore feet: And the running over of the Cow's milk in boiling into the fire, will cause an inflammation in the Cow's udder; and that this is cured by casting salt into the fi●e upon the milk. I could tell you many such tales as those, which I have partly read, and partly heard; but  — credat judaus Apella. 
I will stick to that Philosophical principle, Ominis actio 〈◊〉 per 〈◊〉▪ but here is no contact; and I will as soon credit Apuleius his Metamorphosis into an Ass, by the anointing of his body, as the curing of a wound by an ointment, which is not at all applied to the body. If any will say, that such cures are done by the influence of the Stars, let him prove it; we may so salve all questions, and not trouble ourselves to search any further into the hidden causes of things: These influences are the sanctuary of ignorance, but Stars are universal agents, whose operations are fruitless, if they be not determined by the particular agents. Lastly, I like your supposition well: [If the steem of blood and spirits carry with it the balsamic qualities of the powder into the wound, it will better it.] In this I am of your opinion; for if Daedalus did fly in the air, wings doubtless would help him: but there is great odds between the scents which the Dear, or Hare, or Fox leave behind them, and this imaginary virtue of the weapon-salve; this being altogether hid, these other being manifest qualities, quickly apprehended by the sagacious hounds.  
[You say, that the heat of the torrid Zone draws air to 
Sect. 39 Pag. 176. c. 20.  it from the Poles, and rest of the world, otherwise, all would be turned into fire.] The air about the Poles, you confess, is very cold, and the air under the Line very hot. Now, that heat should draw cold to it, is to contradict a sensible maxim; for, what is more plain and sensible, than that one contrary drives out another, and like draws its like? The heat of the fire draws out the heat of a burned finger, or the heat of the stomach, whereas the cold air repels it. Hence it is, that we concoct better in Winter then in Summer. The heat of the upper and lower region of the air doth not draw to it the cold of the middle region; but the cold fortifies, and unites itself against its enemy. Secondly, the air under the Line, is carried about so fast by the motion of the primum mobile from East to West, that there is a continual trade-wind, and a strong tide to the West: So that the air there will not give leave, by reason of its swift motion, for any other air to come thither. Thirdly, the torrid Zone needs no refrigeration from the Poles; for there are great lakes, rivers and seas, besides constant gales of wind, which refresh the air, and make it no less temperate than Spain, if you will believe 
Hist. Ameris.  Acosta. Not to speak of the equality of the night there with the day, so that the Sun is not so long above their Horizon, as he is above ours in Summer. And if there were such extreme heat there, as is supposed, there would not be such multitudes of all sorts of herbs, fruits, and trees green all the year, as Lerius witnesseth in his 
In Brasil.  navigation.  
You have found out a pretty way for generation of 
Sect. 40.  the loadstone, [which (you say) is begot of atoms, drawn 
Cap. 21.  from the North Pole, by the heat of the torrid Zone, and so sent down into the bowels of the earth, where meeting with some condensate stuff, becomes this stone.] This is the sum of your large discourse: But first, we would know what these atoms are, whether parts of that cold air, or of the light. Secondly, how the heat of the torrid Zone can draw cold atoms such a great way, ninety degrees at least, whereas we have showed, that hot air expelleth the cold, but draweth it not. Thirdly, how it comes that loadstones are found in Macedonia, Spain, Bohemia, Germany, and other Northern places. Did the atoms in their Southern progress stay there, being weary of so long a journey, and plant colonies near home? Or were they sent back by the heat which brought them thence? Fourthly, how can such weak bodies pierce so deep into the earth? Fifthly, when these atoms cast their spawn into the matrix of our great Mother, whether she doth feed upon iron when she's breeding, seeing the stone, when it's come to maturity, loveth iron so well? Or did she not surfeit upon garlic, which is such an enemy to the loadstone? Sixthly, of what atoms is the stone Theamedes made, that so much hates the iron, which the loadstone loves; and the Adamant, that hinders its operation? Though I honour your worth and ingenuity, in aiming at such abstruse causes, yet both you and I, and all men must confess, that our science here is but ignorance: and we see the natures of things, as that blind man, who saw men walk like trees. Who can tell why Rhubarb purgeth choler; Agarick phlegm? How the Torpedo stupefieth the hand thorough the cane, and the Remora stays the ship? 
Virgil.   

Has nè possimus naturae accedere parts,  
Frigidus en obstat circum praecordia sanguis.   
[The loadstone (you say) works by bodies: Ergo, not by 
Sect. 41. Pag. 18. 5. c. 21.  quabities.] I deny the consequence; for, bodies do not work upon bodies, but by their qualities: take these away, and there will be no action in nature; for actions have their original from qualities, and their properties too: therefore actions are susceptible of contrarieties, of intention and remission, because the qualities, from which they have their being, are capable of these: And, as among substances, only the form; so among accidents, only the quality is operative, because it is the accidental form of the subject in which it is. 'Tis true, accidents work not by their own power, but in and by the power of their substances: The hen by her heat, which is a quality, prepares the matter of the egg for introduction of the form of a chick; for the same agent that disposeth the matter, introduceth the form: The fire warms by its heat. What's the reason that you can cut down a tree with an axe, which a child cannot do with a wooden dagger? 'tis because you have the qualities of strength and skill, which the child wants; and the axe hath the qualities of strength and sharpness, which are wanting in the wooden dagger. Your reasons, by which you prove your assertion, are weak, viz. [Because a greater loadstone hath more effect than a lesser.] A greater fire heats more than a lesser; is therefore heat no quality? Or must the same degree of heat be in a little fire that is in a greater? The quality increaseth and decreaseth, according to the quantity of the subject. Secondly, [A loadstone giveth less force to a long iron then to a short one.] So the fire warmeth more at a near, then at a remoter distance: Natural agents work not in distans. Will you deny your faculty of seeing to be a quality, because you can see better near at hand, then at too remote a distance? Thirdly, [The longer an iron is in touching, the greater virtue it getteth.] Fourthly, [An iron or loadstone may lose their virtue, either by long lying, or by fire.] Will these reasons prove the virtue of the loadstone to be a body? then virtue, I see, is a body with you, and in the predicament of Substance. These your reasons prove the loadstone to work by a quality, because it hath degrees of more and less virtue, and because it may be lost. Is cold no quality, because it may be lost in the water? Or is the blackness of a man's hair no quality, because it may be lost? Or doth the fire consume nothing but bodies? Is whiteness an accident, or a body? a quality it is, doubtless: Cast your paper in the fire; and what becomes of its whiteness? Qui colour albus erat, nunc est contrarius albo. Your arguments are so weak, that they refute themselves, and so they will save me a labour.  
[Atoms, which pierce iron, may penetrate any other body.] 
Sect. 42. Pag. 186.  I know the fire can pierce iron, and yet not pierce the dense body of the earth; which your atoms must do, if they will beget a loadstone. And if the fire could pierce the earth, yet this will not prove, that your magnetical atoms can do the like, except you give them the same 
Pag. 186.  virtue. And [though light pass thorough thick glasses,] as you say, yet there is some hindrance; for the thicker the glass is, the less light you shall have: Try if light can pass thorough a thick unpolished horn, as it doth thorough the thin horn of a lantern. If the thickness of a body makes no opposition to the light, than you may see the Sun as well thorough a thick cloud, or thorough the body of the Moon, as thorough the thin air. If then there be opposition, though never so little, of the glass to the light, there must needs be some tardity. As for odoriferous bodies, which, you say, [continue many years spending of themselves, and yet keep their odour in vigour,] is a miracle; for, how can the odour be kept in vigour in those bodies that still spend themselves? If odour be a quality, it must decay, as the body spends in which it is: If odour be a body, it cannot continue in its vigour, and be still spending of itself; this is a contradiction: Besides, ' its repugnant to sense; for, as the flower decays, so doth the smell: And though there be a power in roots of vegetables, to change the advenient juice into their nature, yet there is not the like power in loadstones, or salt, as you will have it, except you will make these also vegetables, and so they must not be called stones and minerals, but plants rather. Salt doth not change the air into its substance, by lying in it, as you say, and would prove by the weight of it increased; for, if it change the air into its substance, it feeds on it, and so some parts of its matter must be still wasting, and there must be still a repairing of the decayed matter by nutrition, and this must be done by natural heat, and a vegetative soul; and what is this but to make salt a plant? As for the weight of it, which you say increaseth, I doubt of it: but if it were so as you say, yet that weight is not increased, by turning the air into its substance, but rather by the loss and evaporation of the air, by its long lying: So paper-books grow much heavier, by beating the air out of the paper. But whereas you say, [That the nature of the Loadstone proceeds from the Sun's operation 
Pag. 200. c. 22.  on the torrid Zone, which operation is contrary to the Loadstone, as being of a fiery nature, and therefore the torrid lands are not so magnetical as the polar,] is a riddle; for how can the nature of the Loadstone be contrary to that which begets it? and how can the Sun beget magnetic virtue by that heat, which by reason of its fiery nature hinders or destroys it? 
Sect. 43. Pag 215. c. 23.   
You say, ['Tis as impossible for diversity of work in the seed to proceed at one time, and in the same occasions, from one agent, as it is for multiplicity to proceed immediately from unity.] I will not now tell with what arguments Physicians prove, that the seed is the epitome of the whole body, and extracted from every part thereof, and containeth potentially all the parts of the body, which the plastic or formative power of the seed educeth unto act, by degrees: but this I must tell you, that natural agents can, at the same time, produce diversity of works; for, doth not the Sun, at the same time, produce multitudes of divers effects, according to the multitudes of bodies it works upon? doth not the fire, at the same time, rarify, condense, soften, harden? doth not the same liver at the same time by its heat, produce blood, choler, melancholy, and phlegm? even so may the same formative power of the seed, at the same time, fabricate and distinguish all the parts of the body.  
[The marrow being very hot drieth the bones, and yet with 
Sect. 44. Pag. 226. c. 24.  its moisture humecteth.] How the same natural agent can, at the same time, on the same object, work contrary effects, I know not: Can the fire at the same time both harden and soften the wax? 2. The brain comparatively is colder than any other of the soft parts of the body, and consequently the marrow which groweth from thence. 3. If heat be the cause of the bones dryness, than the heart which is the hottest part of the body, should have the hardest bone about it. 4. What the bones are in sensitive creatures, that the stones are in vegetables: but the hottest fruits have not the hardest stones; for the stone of a cold Peach is harder than the kernels or stones of the hot Grapes. 5. If marrow were the cause of dryness, or hardness, it would follow, that where there is most marrow, there should be the hardest and driest bones; but Philosophers tell us, that those creatures whose bones are most solid and dry, have lest marrow. 6. That dryness then and hardness of the bones proceeds not from the heat of the marrow, which is held to be less hot than the brain, but from the innate heat of the bones themselves, wasting the aerial and oily substance thereof; which heat is not fiery, but temperate, as the natural heat should be; yet it causeth this hardness and dryness, because the matter on which it works is gross and terrestrial, and because of the heats continual working on the bones.  
You will not have us [too irreverently engage the Almighty's 
Sect. 45. Pag. 227. c. 25.  immediate handiwork in every particular effect of nature.] We offer no irreverence to the Almighty, if we call him the Creator even of the meanest creatures, being no less admirable in Creatione vermiculorum, quàm Angelorum, in the creation of worms, then of Angels, says S. Austin: and therefore Basil thinks it no irreverence 
Homil. 7. in Gen.  to say, That God in the beginning did not only create Fishes in the sea, but Frogs also in the pools, nay Gnats, and vermin. Whose immediate handiwork were the Lice that were procreated of the Egyptian dust, at the stretching out of Aaron's and Moses his Rod? Did not the Sorcerers acknowledge, that the finger of God was there? If it be no disparagement to the Almighty, that the excrementitious hairs of our head, are the objects of his providence; neither can it be any dishonour to him, if we say, the meanest creatures are the effects of his omnipotence.  
[The work of generation (you say) is not effected by the 
Sect. 46. Pag. 231. c. 25.  formative power, except we mean by it, the chain of all the causes, that concur to produce this effect.] When we speak of the proximate or immediate cause of things, we exclude not the remote causes; for, Causa causae est causa causati: He that says that Isaac was begot of Abraham's seed, denies not that Abraham's seed is begot of his blood; and he that says a man is a reasonable creature, says also, that he is a sensitive, vegetative, corporeal substance: but what ever the remote causes be, the formative faculty in the spirits of the seed, effects the work of generation; which spirits are derived from all parts of the body, otherwise how could they frame all the distinct parts and members in the seed? but the gross or material part of the seed, is only from the vessels.  
[You hold the heart to be first generated.] This is probable, 
Sect. 47. Pag. 225. c. 24.  but it may be doubted; because whatsoever liveth must be nourished: but nourishment is from the blood, and blood from the liver; therefore Galens opinion was, that the liver is first generated; which he also proveth by the umbelicall vein: But indeed, Hypocrates his opinion is most likely to be true, that all the parts are form at the same time by the spirits in the seed. However it be, this is certain, that fearfully and wonderfully are we made.  
[The touch converseth with none, but with the most material 
Sect. 48. Pag. 244. c. 27.  and massy bodies.] What think you of the air, the wind, the flame? are these masfie bodies? and yet they are the objects of our touch; the instrument of which is not only in the hands and fingers, but diffused also through all the skin: and if the flame touch your skin, you shall as soon feel it, though it be no massy body, as you shall a stone. But whereas you call [heat and cold, wet and dryness, affections of quantity,] you confound entities, and the predicaments, as you use to do. If by affections you mean properties, than heat and cold are not the properties of quantities, but of elementary bodies, which are substances: If by affections you mean effects, much less can these be the affections of quantity, for quantity is not operative: Neither are rarity and density (out of the degrees of which you will have cold and heat, etc. to arise) quantities, but qualities; for rarity is nothing else but the tenuity of parts, and that is a quality: but if you take rarity for the distance of parts among themselves, as a sponge is called rare or thin, so it is in the predicament of Site; but quantity you cannot make it by Logic.  
Your argument by which you prove the object to 
Sect. 49▪  work materially upon the sense, is, [because it works so 
Pag. 245. c. 27.  upon inanimate things, as the heat or cold works alike upon a stone, and upon a man's body:] but indeed these work not alike; for the fire that heats the stone, heats also my body, and in that respect it works upon both materially, that is, it produceth the same form (specifically, not numerically) of heat in the matter of the stone, and of my body: yet besides this operation, it produceth another, which we call spiritual or intentional, upon my sense, which it doth not upon the stone, to wit, the Image, Idea, or representation of that heat which my sense apprehends, or receives, and, by means of the sensitive soul in me, judgeth of it; which a stone, being inanimate, cannot do: The heat than worketh on the stone only materially by heating, it worketh on my body not only materially by heating; but spiritually also, by impressing the species of the heat in my sense of feeling, by which the soul in the sense is stirred up to judge of it, and to make use of it, so far as it may be convenient for the body, otherwise to avoid it; therefore we need not labour much to prove these intentional species to be in nature, which you deny: for, though their entity be weaker than of material forms, because their being is not in the subject; that is, the intentional heat by which my sense is affected, is in the sense as in a subject; yet in its being and conservation it depends not on the sense, but on the agent, the fire that produced it; whereas the material form of heat is received into the body, and depends only in fieri from the agent, but in its esse and conservation from the matter in which it is received. Neither is it hard for us to prove, that your material actions are not able to perform these effects, that our intentional can; for if the heat did work materially on your body, it must produce another heat, for a material accident cannot pass from one subject to another, which it must do, if the same numerical heat of the fire did pass out of the fire into your body▪ & so you having another heat in your body then was in the fire, cannot feel nor judge of that heat which was in the fire. Again, if the hardness of the iron did work materially on your hand when you touch it, your hand must be also hard. Besides, when you see a horse, is the same horse in your eye, that is without? Or hath he the same material being in the eye, that he hath without? This must needs be true, if he work materially on your eye. Moreover, if the object work materially on the sense, the nearer it is to the sense, the better it is perceived: but the contrary is true; for, sensibile positum supra sensorium impedit sensum. Again, no material action is in an instant, being it is a motion, and hath resistance from a contrary quality; but the act of sense is in an instant. Lastly, you must attribute action to quantities, if the object work materially; for when you see a triangle, that must produce another triangle in your eye, which is absurd; & may be avoided by saying, the species or image of the triangle is in the eye.  
[That thing which we call sound, is purely motion.] If 
Sect. 50. Pag. 249. c. 28.  sound be motion, which is the mobile? for every motion is in a subject, and no other subject can be given but a body. The air is the medium that conveyeth the sound to us, but the subject thereof it is not; for the air being a light body, its motion is to ascend, but sounds are carried to us by all sorts of motions imaginable: The sound of the bell at the same instant ascends, descends, spreads itself abroad through all the parts of the circumstant air. Besides, no motion is performed in an instant; but the sound in an instant fi●s thousands of ears, if they be near. Again, rest is opposite to motion, but it is not opposite to sounds: By the motion of the air sound is carried to us, but sound is not therefore motion; and so you do often times in this Chapter distinguish sounds from the motion of the air. And whereas you say, [Great sounds do shake houses:] It is not the 
Pag. 251.  sound, but the wind of the Ordnance or Gunpowder that moveth the air violently, by which houses or towers may be shaken; and the same air which is moved by the wind, and shakes the house, carries the sound to our ear; which sound can no more be perceived by the eye (as you aver in this Chapter, thereby confounding both the actions of the senses, and their objects) than colours can be perceived by the ear. He that sees sounds, let him hear colours too. 'Tis true, a blind man will discern light from darkness, when a candle or the Sun beam is brought and let in to a room, not that he perceives the light by his ears, but because▪ though the crystalline humour of his eyes be out, yet, the visive spirits in the optic nerves not being lost, can easily discern light their proper object, though they cannot see visible objects by it, the crystalline humour which should receive the visible species being gone. [As for a 
Pag. 257.  deaf man's perceiving of music by a stick held in his teeth, whose other end lieth on a Viol:] I deny that he hears any sound at all, if he be deaf: he may perceive a motion or trembling of the air, by means of his stick, but a sound he cannot perceive, as wanting the organ of perception: And though I should yield that he perceives the sound, yet that will not evince sound to be a motion: for there be many motions without any sound; as the motions of the heavens. The shooting of stars, and the light, which you will have a body, move through the air without any sound: So the clouds move; and you may move your hand, or any part of the body, without sound. Besides, there is a sympathetic & an antipathetical power in sounds, to affect or dis-affect the hearer, which is not in motion. Again, after the sound of the Ordnance is past, the motion of the air continueth a while. Lastly, lay any soft cloth or silk upon a bell whilst it's sounding, the sound will be dulled or stayed, but not the motion: therefore, doubtless, sounds and motions are different entities; these being in divers predicaments, and sounds only in the predicament of Quality.  
You conclude [That colour is nothing else but the power 
Sect. 51. Pag. 262.  which a body hath of reflecting light into the eye.] Then immediately you say, [Light is nothing else but the superficies of it,] and shortly after, [Colours are not qualities, but tractable bodies.] With the same breath you contradict yourself; for you deny colour to be a quality, and yet you will have it a power in the body, to reflect light. Are not natural powers or faculties, qualities? Is not the power that water hath to cool, a quality? but in this you are also mistaken; for colour is not such a quality as you make it, to wit, in the second species, where only those powers are, which can naturally produce their own acts: As, in the eye there is a power to see, a power, I say, which it can produce into act, when occasion serves; for the eye doth not always actually see: but colour is no such power; for it cannot produce its own act primarily, as the former power did, but in the second place: For first, it must affect the subject in which the colour is, and secondly, work upon the eye; and so colour is in the third species of Quality. Now, if colour be a quality, how can it be a superficies, which is a quantity? The essence of colours is not in extension, though they may be extended according to the extension of the subject in which they are. Extension is the essence only of quantity. If colour than be not a quantity, but quality, how can it be a tactable body? Colours cannot subsist of themselves: they admit degrees; therefore cannot be substances.  
You are angry [with vulgar Philosophers, who force you 
Sect. 52. Pag. 275. c. 22.  to believe contradictions, in that they say, life consisteth in this, that the same thing hath power to work upon itself.] Aristotle then and his learned Peripatetics are with you but vulgar Philosophers, who teach us, that those which move themselves by an internal principle, have life in them; and so, because quicksilver seems to move itself, and fountains or springs of water seem also to move themselves, hence the Latins call the one argentum vivum, the other, aquas vivas. And because these created entities, which we call living, actuate themselves, either by perfecting themselves, or by representing something within themselves by their knowledge, or by inclining themselves to the things which they know by their appetite: hence it is, that we attribute life unto God, in that he actuates himself, at least negatively, so that he is not actuated by any other; and in that he understands and wills himself, and all things in himself. But here is the difference between the life of the Creator, and of the creature, that our life is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as Aristotle says, the abode or mansion of the vegetive soul in the body, or natural heat: Or, as Scaliger, another of these vulgar Philosophers, tells us, unio animae cum corpore, the union of the soul with the body. And our life hath a dependence from a higher cause, and our vital actions depend from a causality, as Understanding and Will from the essence of the soul; but the life that is in God, and his vital actions, are the same identically with his essence, having no dependence, or inhesion, or connexion at all. Tell us then where the contradiction lieth, when we say, that the living creature can move itself? Doth the Scripture teach contradictions, when it tells us, that Saul killed himself, that judas hanged himself, that we should accuse ourselves, condemn ourselves, convert ourselves, and many such like? Neither do we say, that life consists in this, that a thing can work upon itself, as you would have it; for we make not the essence of life to consist in this, we only make this a property of life, for the living creature to move itself. Neither do we say, that life is action, but that life is the principle of action: therefore we act, because we live; actiones sunt suppositorum. Though the form work upon the matter, yet the suppositum or compound is the subject of action or motion: The form worketh originally, or as principium Quo; the suppositum worketh subjectively, denominatively, or as principium Quod. The form is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the suppositum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so life is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the act, not the action; but the efficient cause of five actions; to wit, of understanding, sense, motion, nutrition, and generation: For, if life were an action, it should be the cause of these actions; but actionis non datur actio. Lastly, life is in the soul originally, in the body by participation, and in the compound subjectively.  
You challenge also Philosophers [that they hold sensation 
Sect. 53. Pag. 275 ca 32.  to be a working of the active part of the same sense upon its passive part, and yet will admit no parts in it, but will have the same indivisible power work upon itself.] Philosophers distinguish between the organ, the faculty, and action of the sense. The organ is a substance, the faculty a quality, which is properly called sense, of which ariseth the action, which is properly sensation. The form is the cause of sense, God is the supreme cause of the form, and consequently of sense too: for, dans formam, dat consequentia ad formam; and sense is the cause of sensation. And so they hold, that there is in the sense an action and a passion, but in a different respect; for the passion is in respect of the object, the species of which is received by the sense; but reception is passion: yet in the sense there is an action too, but that's in respect of the soul, working by the sense, its instrument, which it animates, and by it judgeth of those objects which are convenient or inconvenient, not only for the body, but for the soul too: For the two noblest of the senses were made principally for the soul, that by them she might gain knowledge; and in the second place for the body. Now, out of all that's said, tell us where this indivisible power works upon itself; or who holds any such thing. The power of the soul in actuating the sense, the power of the sense in receiving the species, is not the same power, no more than the power of the soul in moving the hand, and the power of the hand in receiving a blow; the one being an active, the other a passive power; the one being from the soul, the other from the disposition of the matter, whose property is to suffer, as the forms is to act: Therefore we hold not active and passive parts in the sense, but that the whole sense is passive, in respect of the object; & the whole sense is active, in respect of the soul working in it: So the whole water is passive, in regard of the fire which hears it; and it's wholly active, in respect of the hand which is warmed by it. Lastly, I hope you will not deny, but some indivisible powers there are, which work upon themselves, else, how can Angels and souls of men love and know themselves?  
The atoms are your sanctuary, to which you fly upon 
Sect. 54. Pag. 277. c. 32.  all occasions: [For you will now have these material parts of bodies work upon the outward organs of the senses, and passing thorough them, mingle themselves with the spirits, and so to the brain. These little parts must needs get in at the 
Pag. 278.  doors of our bodies, and mingle themselves with the spirits in the nerves, and of necessity must make some motion in the brain.] Doubtless, if this be true, there must needs be an incredible motion in the brain; for, if the atoms of two armies fight should rush into your brain by the eye, they will make a greater motion than Minerva did in jupiters' brain: you would call for a Vulcan to cleave your head, and let out those armed men, who would cause a greater struggling in your head, than the twins did in Rebecca's womb: For I do not think these little Myrmydons would lie so quiet in your brain, as the Grecians did in the Trojan horse. But if the material atoms of the object pierce the organ; as for example, of a horse; then tell us how many atoms must meet to make up a little horse: and how can that horse, being bridled and saddled, pierce your eye without huring of it, especially, if you should see mounted on his back such a gallant as S. George, armed with a long sharp lance; or Bellerophon upon Pegasus? And if a thousand eyes should look at one time upon that object, will it not be much lessened, by losing so many atoms and parts as enter into so many eyes? Or can the object multiply itself by diminution, as the five loaves did in the Gospel? Or suppose, you should see as many horses at a time, as were in Xerxes his army, would there be stable-room enough in your brain to contain them all? Or, if you should see a thousand horses one after another, doth the coming in of the later drive out the former? Which way do they come out? the same they went in? or some other way? or do they stable all together there? or do they die in the brain? Will not they perish the brain, and poison your optic spirits, with which, you say, they are mingled? Or suppose you should see in a lookingglass a horse, doth the atoms of that horse pierce first the glass to get in, and then break thorough the glass again, to get into your eye? Sure, if this be your new Philosophy, you are like to have but few sectaries of these deambulatory wise men, whom you call vulgar Philosophers. Is it not easier, and more consonant to reason, that the image or representation of the object be received into the sense, which reception we call sensation; then to say, that the very material parts, which you call atoms, should pierce the organ? for then the same object must be both one, and many; and so, if all the inhabitants of either hemisphere should look at once upon the Moon, there must be as many Moons, as there are beholders. Again, we distinguish that which you confound, to wit, first, the organ, which is called sensorium: secondly, the sensitive faculty, which resides in the spirits: thirdly, the act of sensation, which is caused by the object: fourthly, the object itself, which causeth sensation, but not the sense or faculty itself: fifthly, the species, which is the image of the object: sixthly, the medium, which is air, water, etc. seventhly, the sensitive soul, actuating the organ, and in it judging and perceiving the object, which diffuses and sends its species, or spiritual & intentional qualities, both into the medium & the sensorium: & this is no more impossible, then for the wax to receive the impression or figure of the seal, without any of its matter.  
[What are words, but motion? and words are the chiefest 
Sect. 55. Pag. 283. c. 32.  object of our remembrance.] Words are not motion, but by the motion of the tongue words are uttered. I believe you move your tongue many times when you speak not: but if words were motion, you must still speak when you move your tongue. Words are articulate sounds, but we have already showed, that sounds are not motions, but caused by motion, or the collision of solid bodies. And if words be the chief object of our memory, we have spent our time ill; for the end why we learn words and languages, is to come by them to the knowledge of things: And if we remember words only, than our knowledge is verbal only. Do you remember nothing in Divinity but words? or are these the chiefest object of your memory? If this assertion be true, Christians are of all men most miserable, who spend their time, strength, and means, to attain the knowledge of those things, which when they remember, prove but words. I have read of a verbal, and of a real memory: some are apt to remember words than things; others remember things better than words.  
[The medium which these bodies move in (that is, the memory) 
Sect. 56. Pag. 286. c. 33.  is a liquid vaporous substance, in which they swim at liberty.] These atoms in this Chapter you call sometimes bodies, and sometimes similitudes and species, confounding qualities and substances, as you are wont. But if you take memory here for the organ, or hinder-part of the brain, that is not the medium, but the receptacle of the species: the medium are the spirits, which convey the species from the fantasy to the memory; which two senses are near neighbours in the brain: much less can these bodies (as you call them) in the memory, be the memory itself, which is a faculty of the intellective soul in man, of the sensitive in beasts: And indeed, the intellect and intellective memory is one and the same power of the soul, only differing in this, that as it keeps the species, it is called memory; as it makes use of them in understanding, it is called intellect: And what need we multiply faculties to no purpose? for, as the same faculty which apprehends, judgeth also; so the same faculty which understandeth, remembers too. And as these bodies or medium cannot be the memory, much less can they be reminiscence or recordation, which is the motion of the impressed images in the memory; which reminiscence is only in man, because it requires discourse, of which beasts are not capable.  
You tell us of two effects of purging: [the one, to 
Sect 57 Pag. 292. c. 34.  make the humour more liquid; the other, to make the stomach or belly suck or vent it.] But indeed, the effect of purging is not the liquefaction of the humour, which is liquid enough of itself, saving the melancholy humour, which is somewhat thicker than the rest, by reason 'tis more earthy; but the pituita and choler are liquid enough of themselves: therefore 'tis not the work of the purge to liquefie the humour, but, by reason of its innate similitude it hath with the humour, to draw it, as the loadstone doth iron: which similitude consisteth in their essential forms, and in the properties flowing thence. And, as the loadstone draweth iron, & is not drawn by it; so doth the medicament, being the more active, draw the humour, but is not drawn by the humour. Neither do I think, that the stomach or belly sucks the humour, which is so offensive to it; for, simile trahit simile: but the expulsive faculty of these parts, wherein the humour lay, being partly oppressed by the humour, & partly irritated by the medicament, sends it away to the stomach or belly; & these also, being quickly wearied with such troublesome guests, send away the humour by vomit, or by the stool.  
[There riseth a motion of a certain fume about the heart, 
Sect. 58. Pag. 294.  which motion is called pleasure.] Apuleius makes pleasure to be the child of Cupid and Psyche: you say, that it is the motion of a fume about the heart; of which Psyche cannot be the mother, nor Cupid the father. There are oftentimes fumes about the heart, which beget more pain than pleasure; and there are pleasures, where are no fumes at all. What fumes are there in beautiful objects of the eye, with which it is delighted? Music affords pleasure to the ear, but no fume at all: and so the other senses have their pleasures in their objects without fumes; for pleasure is nothing else, but the apprehension of a convenient object, or its species rather, which object is the efficient cause of pleasure. The form or esience of pleasure consisteth in the fruition of that convenient object, either by judging of it, if present; or by remembering it, if absent. If from this pleasure there proceed an elation of the mind, by diffusing of the spirits, this we call joy. Again, if pleasure consist in fruition, it is rather a rest then a motion. Besides, if pleasure be the motion of a fume, what think you of the soul? Sure, there are no fumes, and yet there is pleasure in the soul. And Angels have their pleasures too without fumes; for, I believe the fumes in Popish Churches do as much please the Angels, as they affright Devils. Did Paradise, the garden of pleasure, called therefore Eden, beget many fumes about Adam's heart? Or, are there greatest pleasures, where there be most of these cordial fumes? I think, that where is most heat, there are most fumes; but so a lion should have more pleasure than a man: for, the lion's heart is hotter; and so our hearts are hotter in burning fevers, then in health. Moreover, when at the first sounding of music we take pleasure, that pleasure quite vanisheth, if we grow weary of the music; do the fumes than vanish also? Lastly, if beatitude consists in pleasure, as many think, than it is within ourselves, having these fumes; and so we need not go fare to be blessed. But why should the fumes about the heart be pleasures, rather than the fumes about the brain, seeing in the brain is the fantasy and apprehension, as also the original of the senses? Now, pleasure consists in feeling and apprehension, so that pleasure increaseth as the sense and apprehension do. I believe, Tobacco-suckers and Winebibbers will hardly admit of your Philosophy, who define their pleasure by the motion of fumes in the brain, rather than about the heart.  
[All that moveth the heart is either pain or pleasure.] 
Sect. 59 Pag. 298.  Physicians tell us, that the heart is moved by the vital spirits; the Aristotelians by the heat, which is the soul's instrument: the heat moves it upward, the hearts own weight moves it downward, and this is that they call systole and diastole; not a compounded motion, but two several motions, proceeding from divers principles; for, no natural motion can be compounded, nor can two contrary motions make up one, nor is motion made of motions: and not only are these two motions opposite in the heart, but also different in respect of time. Secondly, pain and pleasure are passions of the appetite; for every motion in the sensitive appetite is passion, caused by external objects, being apprehended as good or evil: but passions are not agents. Thirdly, what pain or pleasure moves the child's heart in the mother's belly, or our hearts when we sleep, or a heart after it's taken out of the body? We see it moves, so long as any heat or spirits remain in it: but you will hardly believe, that pain or pleasure moves it. Fourthly, if pain and pleasure move not the senses, but the species of such objects (which are convenient or inconvenient for us) cause this motion, and of this ariseth pain or pleasure; how can these move the heart, which never moved the sense?  
[The effect, which we call pain, is nothing else but a compression.] 
Sect. 60. Pag. 298.  Pain is not a compression, but the effect of compression, and not of this neither; for some pleasing compressions there are, but of compression, as it is offensive or hurtful to our nature: Neither [are they generally 
Pag. 298.  hard things which breed pain in us, and those which breed pleasure oily and soft,] as you say; for there are divers soft and oily things, which, being touched, would not cause any pleasure in us. A Toad is soft, gold is hard; but as the touching of this breeds no pain, so the touch of that begets no pleasure. [Neither is the heart 
Pag 299.  extremely passive, by reason of its tenderness and heat,] but rather active; for heat is an active quality, and where is most heat, there is most activity: therefore is the fire the most active of the elements, and the heart the most active of all our members, because of heat. And how the heart is exceeding tender, I know not; the flesh of it is not so tender as of other parts. [Fear in its height contracteth 
Pag. 301.  the spirits, and thence 'tis called Stupor.] Sorrow contracteth also the spirits; what difference then do you put between sorrow and stupidity? You should have said, a sudden contracting; for stupor suddenly contracts those spirits, which sorrow doth leisurely, and by degrees. Secondly, you should have distinguished stupidity; for there is one that comes of fear, another of admiration. Thirdly, fear and stupidity are not the same thing; for in fear there is an inordinate motion of the spirits, in stupidity there is an immobility of the same spirits. [Passion is nothing else but a motion of the blood and 
Pag. 306. c. 35.  spirits about the heart.] There is a continual motion of the spirits and blood about the heart, even when we sleep; is there then also a continual passion? I think, in sleep men are seldom troubled with passions. Secondly, if passion be continually in us, than passions and patible qualities are ill distinguished by Logicians, which make the one transient, the other permanent. Thirdly, passion is the motion of the sensitive appetite, which is moved by the object, and from it receives its specification, as from its form; how then can it be solely the motion of the spirits and blood? I grant, that in every passion there is some alteration of the natural motion of the heart; that is, the systole and diastole is more or less: but this alteration is caused by the passion, which is, as I say, the motion of the sensitive appetite, not of the blood and spirits, but secondarily and accidentally. Fourthly, every passion in us is either morally good or evil: but the motion of the spirits and blood about the heart is merely natural; and therefore cannot be good or bad morally. Fifthly, every passion is not a motion; for joy, which is one of the six passions of the concupiscible appetite, is a rest or acquiescence in the fruition of that good, which we desired, but now possess. The other five indeed consist in motion, to wit, love and hatred, desire and flight, and sorrow; and so do the other five which are in the irascible appetite, to wit, hope and despair, fear and audacity, and anger: but these are the motions of the sensitive appetite, not of the spirits and blood, as is said. [Birds are more musical than other creatures, because they are 
Pag. 318. c. 36.  of a hotter complexion.] If this were true, than Ostriches, Eagles, and Hawks, should be more musical than Larks and Nightingales; for, they are fare hotter: And birds are hotter in the dog-days, then in the spring; and yet in the dog-days they are mute, and vocal in the spring: neither do they sing as you say, [because they require more air to cool them,] for their singing, being a strong motion, (as some birds by too much and too eagerly singing, have killed themselves) should rather heat then cool them: it is not therefore heat, but emulation which is stirred up in them by some sharp and sympathising sound; or else the delight and pleasure which they take in the weather or air, in which they are most conversant, and by it the spirits are cheered.  
The agreement and disagreement of the creatures [you 
Sect. 61. Pag. 332. ca 38.  will not have to be caused by instincts, antipathies, and sympathies, but by downright material qualities.] This is petere principium; for, if I ask you, What it is that makes these material qualities affect or disaffect one another, you must be forced to fly to secret instincts, and occult principles. Are they material and manifest qualities, that in the Torpedo stupefy the fisher's hand, and in the Loadstone draw the iron, whereas other stones and fishes have the same manifest qualities, that the Loadstone and Torpedo have? Why do not other stones and fishes produce the same effects? If by these material qualities you understand your Atoms, you must be forced to fly to occult qualities; for what cause can you give of the emanation of these Atoms from the Loadstone to the iron, more than to any other thing, but the sympathy it or they have with the iron? Would you have me tell you the causes of sympathies and antipathies? I will tell you, when you can tell me the cause of the contrarieties that are between manifest qualities. Tell me why heat is contrary to cold. 'Tis modesty and ingenuity to confess our ignorance in those secrets which God hath purposely concealed from us, to teach us humility, for the pride of our first Parents, in affecting the forbidden fruit of knowledge; and that we should account all knowledge here but ignorance, in respect of the excellent knowledge of Christ, in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. This we know, there are divers contrary, and also sympathising principles in nature, which are the causes not only of occult, but likewise of manifest qualities: but to demand the reason of these, is to search into those secrets of God, the knowledge of which is reserved for us in a happier life, than this we now enjoy. And to fly upon every occasion to Democritus his Atoms, is a poor asylum. Why cannot qualities produce the same effects which your Atoms do? Do not you see how the sound of Music, or the words of an eloquent Orator, which are but qualities, work forcibly upon the affections?  
You say, [the impression which the mother's imagination 
Sect 62. Pag. 330. c. 38.  makes upon the child, is by means of the spirits conveyed from the head unto the seed.] If you will assign us the prime cause, you must ascend higher, to wit, to the soul itself, which is both the mover, the form, and final cause of the body: which soul sendeth not only the spirits from the head of the parent, but from all parts of the body, as it doth the seed; for therefore the seed contains potentially all the parts of the body that shall be, because it is derived from all parts of the parents body actually in being: and as the soul conveys the spirits unto the seed, so doth it likewise the formative power, by which the impression is made; not in the seed, which is not capable of such impressions, whilst it is seed, but afterwards in the Embryo; which formative power doth not all its work at one time, but successively; first, transforming the seed, then distinguishing and articulating the parts and members, and then making the impression on the child, being now capable to receive it.  
In the conclusion of your first Treatise, [You call qualities 
Sect. 63. Pag 342. Conclus.  unknown entities, and you will have us prove, if in nature there be such.] If qualities be unknown, then tell me what it is we know; for substances we know not, but as they are clothed with their accidents or qualities. Take away heat, colour, light, levity, and other qualities from the fire in your kitchen, and how shall you know there is fire there? and what will your Cook say, if you bid him dress your supper with fire, wanting these qualities? We have no knowledge but by the senses, to which, neither the form, nor the matter of things are obvious, but by their qualities, therefore if substances be known to us by their qualities, much more known must the qualities be; according to the old rule, Propter quod unumquodque est tale, etc. 2. To bid us prove qualities, is to bid us prove that fire is hot, and water cold; or to prove that you are a learned Gentleman, a good Philosopher, a wise Statesman: and I pray you, are not learning, wisdom, goodness, qualities? from whence proceed all alterations in the world? do they not from qualities? the substance is still the same. When water which before was cold, is now hot, hath lost neither its matter, nor form, it is the same water still, only altered in its quality. Are not you sometimes angry, sometimes pleased, sometimes fearful, sometimes bold, sometimes sick, sometimes healthy? you are not still glad, but sometimes sad; what is it in you that is thus altered? not your body, nor your soul, which are still the same subjects of all these passions: the alterations than are in the passions, or qualities themselves. I believe these entities are not unknown to you as you are a man: Homo es, humani à te nihil alienum puto. Lastly, if qualities must be proved, than I must prove that there is motion, action, and passion in the world; but you'll say these need no proof: so say I, and consequently, neither need we prove, that there are qualities; for if there were not heat in the fire, there could be no calefaction in the water. The perfection of substances consisteth in their operations, but take away qualities, you take away all operation, and by consequence, the perfection of substance; nay, you must deny all generation and corruption in nature, if you deny qualities, for by their service the matter is prepared to receive the form, or lose it; and they are inseparable handmaids, waiting on the forms as their mistresses, and ready to perform their commands.  
[The body is a mere passive thing.] What think you of 
Sect 64. Pag. 342. Conclus.  the celestial bodies? are they merely passive? if they be, what is it that works upon this inferior globe? Are the Sun and Moon mere passive bodies, by which all things here have light, life, motion, and vegetation? But perhaps you mean not celestial bodies: Then come lower; Are not the animal and vital spirits bodies? and yet they are active, not merely passive: and if they were not active, they could not unite the soul with the body, as they do; but, unire est agere: nay, what say you to your little Pages, the Atoms? they are bodies you confess, and yet not merely passive; for in this Treatise of yours, they have done you Knights-service. Neither am I of your opinion when you say, [that rare and dense is the 
Pag. 342.  primary and adequat division of bodies.] For there is in bodies a division more prime then of dense and rare; to wit, of hot and cold; for rarity is but the effect of heat, and density of cold; now the effect is not the prime but posterior to its cause.  
Though we have not sworn to defend Aristotle in all 
Sect. 65. Conclus.  his Dictates, yet, till we know better, we will adhere to his: If you can inform us of principles more consonant to truth, we will follow you, and leave him; for neither Plato, nor Aristotle, but Truth is it we fight for. But indeed, we do not find your Philosophy answerable to your pains, or our expectations. I will not dispraise your endeavours, nor will I promise to follow them. I honour your worth, I admire your pains, but I dislike your tenets. Your good parts deserve my love, but your principles convince not my judgement: therefore afford me the same liberty in dissenting from you, which you assume to yourself in deviating from Aristotle, whom notwithstanding you think you have exactly followed in your opinion of Atoms. But if my judgement fail me not, in this you are mistaken: for, though he denies not minima naturalia, or atoms in bodies, which are parts of the whole; yet he never affirmed, that all actions, passions, motions, mutations are performed by them: much less was he of your opinion, that light, heat, cold, and other qualities were atoms or corporieties, but through all his works, when he hath occasion to speak of them, he makes them distinct entities, and placeth them in distinct predicaments: Therefore father not these your Atoms upon Aristotle, but set the right saddle on the right horse; and let Democritus enjoy his own conceits, to whom by right these atoms belong, and not to Aristotle.  
Though Metaphysical principles be of a higher strain 
Sect. 66. Pag. 344. conclus.  then Physical, yet we must not [set them apart, and make no use of them in the compositions, resolutions, and motions of things,] as you would have us; for, both the subject of Physic is subordinate to Metaphysic, and the principles of that demonstrable by the principles of this. How can you know exactly a natural body, and its affections and principles, if you know not what is entity, essence, existence, act, possibility, & c? The thing defined, cannot be known but by the definition, nor this without the genus and difference. If you know not what is animal, you know not what is man. How shall we know without Metaphysic what your active atoms are? whether they be bodies or spirits, corruptible or incorruptible, substances or accidents, perfect or imperfect, & c? By the touchstone of Metaphysic we must try the goodness of your new coined opinions: but you wrong the learned 
Pag. 344.  Aristotelians, when you say [that they imagine positive entities to the negatives of things, as to the names of points, lines, instants:] for they never called names and negatives positive entities; nor are the names of points, lines, instants, negatives with them: and though they did imagine such to be positive entities, yet they do not hold them to be so indeed; for, you may imagine or conceive darkness or blindness under the notion of positive entities, though you know them to be privations. And indeed, we cannot imagine privations and negations without some reflection on their habits and affirmations; because entities are only the objects of the intellect. You shall do well to name the Aristotelians, who are guilty of this your accusation.  
You would make Aristotle a weak Logician [if he 
Sect. 67. Pag. 345▪  should mean by qualities nothing else but a disposition of parts,] as you say. But he is of another mind; for qualities are with him in one predicament, the disposition of parts in another, to wit, in the Category of Site: therefore your definitions are lame, for want of Logic and Metaphysic; for you define [beauty, a composition of parts and colours in due proportion,] whereas beauty is a quality, composition an action, and proportion in the predicament of relation. So when you define [health a due temper of the humours,] health is not the temper of humours, but is the effect of this temper: For, as sickness is an affection hurting and hindering our natural, vital, and animal actions; so health is an affection, preserving and maintaining these actions in safety: but affections are qualities. Neither is [agility a due proportion of spirits, and strength of sinews,] as you define it; for, proportion is a relation, but agility a quality. Besides, there is in Elephants a due proportion of spirits, and more strength of sinews then in a Mouse or Weasle, and yet no ways that agility. And as bad is your definition of Science, which, you say [is nothing else but ordered phantasms,] whereas I have ordered phantasms of contingencies, corruptible and individual things, and yet of these there is no science. Though I have ordered phantasms of the effect, yet, for want of the knowledge of the cause, I have not the science of it; for, scire est per causas cognoscere. And, if you take phantasms for the objects of knowledge, as they are in the fantasy, sure science cannot be phantasms, no more than the eye can be the colour which it sees: Knowledge or Science, and the thing known, are relatives; but these are opposites: therefore not the same. Lastly, science is a habit, phantasms are patible qualities, if you speak of the objects in the fantasy; but these are different species of quality.  
You conclude your first part pleasantly, making your 
Sect 68 Pag. 345. Conclus.  self merry in these sad times, but with your own shadow and conceits, playing with these, as a Cat doth with her own tail: You make the Aristotelians speak absurdities of your own invention, and of which they never dreamt, and then you laugh at them, comparing them to a boy, that, by adding Bus, turned all English words into Latin. Thus, Turnus-like in the Poet, you fight not against Aenaeas, but his Image, or rather your own imaginations; and you play upon these sampson's, who can easily pull down, with the strength of their arguments, this temple of your large discourse, which you have been so many years in building. If you were not a Gentleman, whom, for your good parts, I honour, I could say, that the boy was not so much to blame for Bus, as you are for being too busy in jeering at such eminent men, and at those Maxims which have been so unanimously received by all Universities, and for so many hundred years constantly maintained; but your worth and my modesty enjoin me silence, and restrain my pen from recrimination.  
But let us see what it is that you so play upon them 
Sect. 69.  for, [Because when you ask how a wall is white, they answer, There is an entity, whose essence is whiteness, in the wall: If you ask again how whiteness sticks to the wall, they reply, By means of the entity called union. If again you ask, how one white is like another, they answer, 'Tis done by another entity, whose nature is likeness.] Thus you make them very simple and ridiculous, and indeed, no wiser than the boy with his Bus, or rather Bussards than Philosophers. These men (whom you mock) say, that [praedicare sequitur esse,] the wall is called white, because it is white; and it is white in concreto, because the Painter would have it so, by introducing whiteness the abstract into it. But I will tell you, why whiteness is in the wall, & other accidents in their subjects; because they cannot subsist without them; and they cannot subsist without them, because their essence is to inhere. If you ask a reason of this their essence, I must leave you, and send you to the Author of nature. If you dislike the term of entity to be given to whiteness, and union, and likeness; then they must be nonentity: for the one or the other they must needs be, seeing there is no medium between entity and nonentity. But Philosophers are not so childish as you make them, when you will have them say, that whiteness sticks to the wall by means of union; this is to tautologise, not to satisfy: they say not then, that union unites whiteness to the wall, but that accidents are united to their subjects, as heat to the fire, because without them the substance, whose ultimate perfection consists in operation, cannot work; nor the accidents, whose essence is inherence, without their subjects cannot subsist. So we say, that in mixture the substances are united, not by means of union, but of humidity, which is the glue and cement in natural compositions, as dryness dissolves the union. Again, one whiteness is not like another, because of likeness: that's childish; but because nature aims at unity, and in similitude there is a kind of unity. The reason why she aims at unity is, because there is most entity, where is most unity; multiplicity inclines to nonentity, from which nature flies as fare as she can: and because she aims at perfection, which consisteth in unity; therefore she aims at unity. And because where there is division, there are parts; now parts being of the whole (which is the same either generically or specifically with the parts) they resemble the whole, and each other in some sort: Or, if you ask me the reason why two eggs are like each other, I answer, Because they have the same quality. So then the identity of the quality is the cause or ground of similitude; and so saith Aristotle, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, they are like that have the same 
5. Metaph. cap. 15.  quality; yet not qualities only, but other entities also are the ground of similitude: The thing generated, and the generator have the same similitude, because they have the same essential form. All things that are united in a specifical form, have a specifical similitude; and they have a generical similitude, that have the same genus, and so equivocal effects are like their causes. So there is the similitude of actions, passions, quantities, relations, site, etc. And as the form, whether essential or accidental, is the ground of that similitude, which is called of participation; so entity itself is the ground of that which is called the similitude of proportion. Thus man is like unto God, because he is an entity as God is, but by participation; therefore like to him only by analogy and proportion. And because the entities of God and of man are not of the same order; therefore God is not like man, no more than you are like your picture, though perhaps your picture may be like you. Lastly, [you will not admit qualities, except we can show you out of Aristotle a medium between natural and logical entities.] Then belike you suppose, that we make qualities neither natural nor logical entities, but some middle between both: but if you were versed in Philosophy, you will find, that Aristotelians make qualities natural or real entities; and therefore place them directly in the predicament, which is the receptacle of real entities only. You would take it ill, if any should tell you, that the habits of wisdom, learning, etc. the natural faculties of seeing, hearing, etc. which are in you, as likewise your passions and patible qualities, with your form and figure, were not natural and real entities. But this shall suffice briefly to have pointed at some of your deviations, which I have done hastily, not having time to make a full survey of your Treatise. Let us now pass to your second Discourse, and see whether your insight in the nature of the Soul, be as good as that which you have made show of in your Treatise of the nature of Bodies.   

ANIMADVERSIONS upon Sir Kenelm digby's Treatise, of the nature of the SOUL.  
IN your Preface you traduce Philosophers 
Sect. 1. Pag. 352.  [for turning all bodies into spirits, because they make heat and cold to be of itself indivisible, a thing by itself.] This is a great mistake; for neither do they make heat and cold in themselves indivisible, but divisible rather, to wit, into degrees: nor do they make them things by themselves, but they say, that they have no being, except in and by their subjects; so neither do they make them indivisible, in respect of parts, but they hold qualities partible, according to the parts of the body in which they are. And if they did, yet it will not follow, that therefore they turn bodies into spirits; for spirits are not free from divisions: nor are qualities bodies, as we have already showed; nor can bodies be turned into spirits, except you mean such spirits as fly up and down your nerves and arteries. And indeed, not Philosophers, but the Masspriests are guilty of your accusation; for they, as it were, by magical words, ●●rne the bread into a spirit, and they make the accidents of the bread to have essence and existence by themselves, without their subjects.  
[The nature of a thing apprehended, is truly in the man 
Sect. 2. Pag. 356. c. 1.  who doth apprehend it, and not the similitude; because where there is a likeness, there is a dissimilitude, which is not in the thing apprehended; and therefore no likeness, but the very thing itself.] Then first, the thing containing and receiving, must be the same with the thing contained and received, which is impossible: Then secondly, there will be no difference between the direct act of the intellect, in apprehending things without itself by the species or similitudes of these things; and that act which is called reflex, when the intellect understands itself, without any species: though in this the apprehendent, and thing apprehended be the same; yet it cannot be so in the outward objects. Neither indeed is the intellect every way the same as it apprehends, and as it's apprehended: it apprehends as the intellect, it's apprehended as an intelligible object. Then thirdly, one and the same object may be multiplied in an instant to two or three thousand, if there should be so many to look upon an object at the same time. Fourthly, Tell us how an horned beast, passing thorough a man's eye, should not hurt it; or a stone thorough a lookingglass, and not break it: but there must be a breaking of the one, and a hurting of the other, if the very substance of the thing apprehended is truly and really in the eye or fantasy, or mind of the man apprehending, or in the glass. Is the very substance of the seal, or only the impression and species of it in the wax? Fifthly, The intellect is not the same with the thing apprehended essentially and formally; but only subjecti●● as they say;) for the intellect is the subject of the received species, which of an abstract becomes a concrete, and which before the reception of the species was intellectus, but not informatus, till they come. Now, if the thing received by the intellect be a substance, than it cannot be one with the intellect, being they are both actual entities; Ex duobus in actu non fit unum per se. Sixtly, If the intellect be every thing really which it understands, then by understanding or apprehending a horse, it becomes a horse, and so man must needs be a horse, saith Scaliger. Seventhly, If the intellect be essentially 
Exerc. 307. 6.  the same thing which it apprehends, than the thing apprehended cannot be present or absent without the destroying of the intellect; but we say accidents may, and therefore the species are but accidents, because by their coming and going the intellect is not destroyed. Eightly, There is nothing in the intellect which was not before in the sense; but if the substance of the fire be received into the crystalline humour of your eye, before the visory spirits can apprehend, or convey that fire to the fantasy, & thence to the intellect; either the fire will burn up the crystalline humour, or the moisture of the humour extinguish the fire, and so the intellect be deprived of its object. Ninthly, Give me the reason why a man seethe that which sometimes he perceiveth not: Our Peripatetics give the reason thus; because, though the crystalline humour suffers in receiving the species, yet the visory spirits act not by apprehending them, because the fantasy employs them about some other object: but this could not be, if the substance of a man or horse be received into the eye; for it were impossible that such a substance could be received into the eye, and not perceived by the spirits in the eye. Lastly, There is a dissimilitude between the thing apprehended and the power apprehending, though you deny it: for, if there be no dissimilitude between the fire that is in your chimney, and that in your eye, than there must be the same coals, heat, smoke, and quantity, in your eye, that is in the chimney: if it were so, your brains could not avoid conflagration, nor your eyes a total extinction.  
[A respect is not where to be found in its formal subsistence, 
Sect. 3. Cap. 1. p. 359. & 360.  but in the apprehension of man: the likeness that one white hath to another, is only in man, who, by comparing them, giveth nature and being to respect.] Then it seems there is no true and real respect or relation between a father and his son, a master and his servant, a King and his people, but a mere notion in our apprehension; so that if men did not apprehend such notions, there should be no relation at all between these: So you are no longer a father, nor can your son be your son, but whilst you are thinking of it; and if you think not of it, nor dream of it in your sleep, your son hath lost his filiation, and consequently his tie of obedience and respect, which he oweth to you. 2. Our Philosophers were unwise men, to place relations in a predicament, which is the series of real entities, if respects be mere notions; and so they ought not to be handled in Metaphysics, if they be not real entities. 3. What think you of that respect or relation which is between the Creator and the creature? or those relations which are in the persons of the blessed Trinity? are they only notions, and such as have no subsistence, but in man's apprehension? 4. In relation there is opposition, but opposites differ really. 5. A respect or relation may be really lost from its subject, and therefore 'tis a real entity; for when you die, the relation ceaseth which you now have to your son, or he to you. 6. If all respects be notions, what distinction do you make between those which are called relata realia, and relata rationis? 7. Relations are so far from being mere notions, that in them there is a twofold reality: The one, as they are accidental forms, inherent in their subjects; the other, as they import a respect to another, which is called its terminus. Lastly, they are said to be like, which have the same quality; to wit, of whiteness, or such like; but if whiteness be a real entity, the likeness, which is the identity of it, cannot be a notion: for Metaphysic tells us, that identity is real: And what will you say of that similitude which Adam had with God, or which a regenerated man hath, consisting in righteousness and true holiness? Is this image of God in man, which by us was lost, and now by grace is repaired, a bare notion? then will our happiness, and joy, and hopes, and religion, consist rather in conceit then in reality:  Dii meliora piis, erroremque hostibus illum. 
Sect. 4. Cap. 1. p. 360.  
[BEING or a thing (the formal notion of both which is merely being) is the proper affection of man.] This anigma would trouble Oedipus, or Sphynx himself; for in your margin, by this word being, you understand existence: But is this the proper affection of man? what becomes of other creatures? have they no existence? If they have, than it is not proper to man quarto modo. If they have not, than they are but entities in possibility; for existence is the actuating and restraining of the essence (which in itself is indeterminate, and in possibility) to actuality, which we call existence; therefore existence is not the proper affection of man, but of entity as it is in act, or rather the formality of actual entity. Besides, if existence be the proper affection of man, what shall we say of Angels, and other spirits; nay, of God himself? Is there no existence in them? Again, existence is not an affection or property; for it is no accident, but the very essence of the thing actuated, which before was in possibility; and therefore by Philosophers 'tis called actus primus, to distinguish it from properties and operations, which are called second acts; for a thing is first actuated by its existence, and then by its properties and operations. But what you mean by [the formal notion of both 
Pag. 361.  which, and of their merely being,] I know not. Sibylla's leaves are not more obscure, to which you may add, [your stock of being, and the grafts inoculated into it,] for 
Pag. 361.  with such mists of metaphors you involve your Philosophy, against the rules and custom of Philosophers; and so you leave your Readers, as Sibylla left hers, unsatisfied; thus,  Inconsulti abeunt, sedemque odere Sibyllae▪ 
I wish Mr. White had helped you here, whose aid hath not been wanting to you at a dead lift hitherto. I should trifle away too much time and paper, if I should insist or name all your fancies, of the tribes as you call them of predicaments, whose office you will have [to comprehend all the particular notions that man hath: and how you will have [all entities to be respective] and all notions to be grafted on the stock of being, etc.] Abundance of such stuff, with which your book is fraughted, I pass over, as being not worth the expense of time; and indeed, they refute themselves. As likewise that you make [essence and existence the same] whereas they are one and the same in God only, but not in the creatures, in whom the essence and existence differ: for, whilst a thing is in its causes, it hath an essence; but no existence, till it be produced by its causes, and as it were quit of them.  
[All the knowledge we have of our soul, is no more but that 
Pag 368. c. 2.  it is an active force in us.] I hope you know more of the soul than this, to wit, that it is an immortal, immaterial substance, infused by God into the body, created of nothing, consisting of the intellect and will, capable of beatitude. You know also, I hope, that the soul had no being till it was infused into the body, and that it is not in a place as bodies are, by way of circumscription, and that it is all in all, and all in every part of the body, and that after death it immediately goeth to hell or heaven, not lingering about the grave, or sleeping in the dust till the resurrection. But it seems you have not very great knowledge of the soul, when you say [that a thing apprehended by the soul, becomes a part, or affection of the soul;] for neither hath the soul any parts, nor can that be an affection of the soul which comes from without.  
In your 5. Chapter you make [1. Being to have a very 
Sect. 6. Pag. 395. c. 5.  near affinity with the soul. 2. To be the end of the soul. 3. To be the soul's pattern and Idea.] For the first, there is small affinity between the soul which is a substance, and Being which is neither substance nor accident, but a transcendent. Being or existence is the general affection of entity, so is not the soul: the body hath existence before the soul is infused, and when the soul is gone, it hath existence still: the body hath no more existence from the soul, than the soul from the body. 2. If being be the end of the soul, than it moved God to create it, for the end moveth, at least metaphorically; but sure nothing moved God, except his own goodness and glory: and how can that existence which God gave to the soul in the creation, be the end of its creation? Is creation the end of creation? and the giving of being the end why being is given? what can be more absurd? And whereas being is internal and essential to the soul, how can it be the end, which is an external cause? 3. Being is not the pattern or Idea of the soul; for Being is intrinsecall to the soul, so is not the pattern or Idea, but extrinsecall: As, the Idea or pattern of a building is in the mind of the builder, but not in the house which is built: and if being is the end of the soul, how can it be the Idea? for the end excites the action of the agent, but the Idea determinates that action; and these are very different.  
[You will not have the understanding to be the objects it 
Sect. 7. Pag. 404. c. 6.  understands by way of similitude, but by way of respects.] Understanding is by way of similitude, not of respect; for your son, who hath a near respect or relation to you, doth not the more for that understand this your Book; I believe he understands books written by strangers, to whom he hath no respect, better than these your intricate mysteries. There are relations and respects between inanimate or senseless creatures, and yet no understanding: it is not therefore the respect, but the reception of the species into the intellect, and its assimilation or similitude with the intellect, that makes understanding. Besides, there are some respects grounded upon similitudes, than I hope there are some things understood by way of similitudes: I may truly say, all things, for nothing is understood, but what is in the understanding; and nothing can be there, but by way of similitude; every thing is intelligible actually, if its similitude be in the intellect actually.  
[The amplitude of the soul, in respect of knowledge, is absolutely 
Sect. 8. Pag. 405. c. 6.  infinite, that is, she is capable of knowing at the same time objects without end or measure.] Where is absoluteness, there is no respect; how then can the soul be infinite absolutely in respect of knowledge? Is there an absolute respect, or a respective absoluteness of infinity in the soul? I thought God only had been absolutely infinite; and what odds will you make between God's knowledge and man's, if the soul at the same time is capable of knowing objects without end or measure? God's knowledge cannot exceed this; for what can be known beyond infiniteness and immensity? And if the soul knows at the same time things infinite and immense, than the soul must be also infinite and immense: For the Understanding, and the thing understood is the same; but infiniteness and immensity are Gods proper attributes. For my part, I confess that all I know of infiniteness is, that I know it not. For this cause Aristotle proves, that the principles of natural bodies cannot 
Lib. 1. phys. text. 35.  be infinite, because they are known; for they could not be known, if they were infinite: And therefore Philosophers could not attain to the knowledge of God, because of his infiniteness, but only by degrees reached to the knowledge of some of his attributes: as first, that he was an entity, than a mover; then they came to know his power, after that his wisdom, and then his goodness. And sure, all the knowledge we have of God in this life, is but the light of the Owls eyes to the Sun. Our Peripatetics are more modest, who say not, that the soul at the same time is capable of knowing objects without end or measure, as you do; but they say, that the faculty of understanding must be proportionated to the object. Now, the object of the intellect is finite; for nature acknowledgeth no infinitum actu. Infiniteness by succession there is, and so she may know infinite things, that is, one thing after another in infinitum; for she knoweth not so much, but she may know more: yet she knoweth not infinite things actually or habitually, because actually at the same time she knoweth that only which hath one species; but infiniteness hath not one species. Hence it is, that she knoweth in infiniteness one part after another; and so, we know not God in this life, because there is no proportion between his actual infiniteness, and our finite understandings. Nay, in heaven we shall not know him by way of comprehension, though we shall then know his essence. And because we cannot actually at the same time understand many things, therefore the intelligible species enter into the understanding successively. And if at any time we understand many things together, it is, not as they are many or divers, but as they are united in one common notion or nature. So the Angels themselves understand not many things at once, but as they are united in one species, whether we speak of those species which are innate, or of those which they see in the glass (as they call it) of the Trinity. And this truth of the Peripatetics you seem afterward to yield unto, when you say, that if knowledge be taken properly, we 
Pag. 410. c. 7.  do not know eternity, however by super natural helps we may come to know it.  
[All things which within our knowledge lose their being, 
Sect. 9 Ibid.  do so by reason of their quantities.] Quantities are not active; therefore nothing can lose its being, by reason of them. When a man dieth, he loseth his being, as man; and yet the fame quantity remains that was before in the body. If you speak of the formal being of things, they are lost, not by reason of the quantity, but by reason of the introduction of another form, which expels that form that was; as, the form of the chick expels the form of an egg, and then followeth a change of the quantity: but if you speak of material being, that is not lost at all, the matter being eternal; and so quantity, which followeth the matter, remaineth too, but indeterminate, till the form come, which restrains and confines the exorbitancy both of the matter, and of its quantity. 
Sect. 10. Pag 419. c. 9   
You say [that those Philosophers, who search into nature, are called Mathematicians.] They are so by you, but by whom else are they so called? They use to be termed Physici, natural Philosophers; but for Mathematicians, they consider not nature at all, neither the matter, nor the form of things, but bare accidents; not as the natural Philosopher, (who handles them as affections of natural bodies) but as they are abstracted from all sensible matter: So the Geometrician considereth continued quantities, the Arithmetician discrete quantities or numbers, Astronomers motions and measures of celestial bodies, Optics light and shadows, Musicians sounds.  
[All life consisteth in motion, and all motion of bodies 
Sect. 11. Pag. 420. c. 9  cometh from some other thing without them. The soul can move, without receiving her motion from abroad.] First, all life consisteth not in motion: for, there is life in spirits, without motion; so there is in bodies too: In Dormice and other sleeping creatures in Winter, in trees at the same season, in women that are troubled with histerica passio, they have life, and yet no motion at all. Secondly, life consisteth not in motion; for it is not the action, but the act of the soul; not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Life consists in union; but this is rather rest then motion. Life is not in the category of action. From life proceed divers actions: as understanding, sensation, motion, nutrition, generation; but actionis non est actio. It's true, that life is manifested by motion; but it consisteth not in motion: for the foul, being separated from the body, liveth, but moveth not. Thirdly, all motions of bodies come not from without; for the form is the cause of motion, but the form is not an external cause. Though your hand, in flinging up a stone, be an external mover, yet when the stone falls downward, it is moved internally, by its own form. What external mover is that which moveth the heart, even when it is separated from the rest of the body? Fourthly, the soul moveth not, but by receiving her motion from abroad: for, as all things have their forms from the first cause; so from the same cause they have their motion, which follows the form, dans formam, dat consequentia: therefore the Apostle tells us, it is in God we live, and move, and have our being.  
You are troubled with fancies, when you tell us [of 
Sect. 12. Pag. 423. c. 10.  a perfect, and imperfect soul; that, you call a knowledge, an art, a rule, etc. and this, you call a participation of an Idea. So in our thoughts, you make some part of them corporeal, and some spiritual. In the soul you will have no accidents, but all to be soul that is in her.] We say, that every body is perfect in its own kind; so that there is no imperfect body in the world: but how one soul is more imperfect than another, you must tell us, if you will have us be your disciples. The essence of every thing is indivisible; but the soul is the essence of the living creature, and the essence of the thing is the perfection of it. A negative imperfection there is in the creature, compared to the Creator: so in men's souls, compared to Angels; because they have not these perfections: nor are they capable of them in that estate they are now in, except their species be altered; and yet the souls are perfect in their own kind: for, perfectum est, cui nihil deest. Thus a Diamond is a perfect stone, though it hath not the perfections of man. But a privative imperfection is not in any soul, because there is nothing wanting that aught to be in the soul (I speak here of natural faculties, not of supernatural grace) if there be some failing or defect in the organs, by which the soul worketh, that imperfection to no more to be imputed to the soul, then want of skill to an expert Musician, because his Lute is out of tune. Secondly, when you call [the soul a knowledge, an art, a rule,] you make the soul an accident, or a collection of accidents; and so, you are more injurious to the soul than Hypocrates and Galen, who believed it to be nothing else but a celestial heat. Thirdly, what you mean by [an imperfect soul, which (you say) is the participation of an Idea,] I know not. Fourthly, neither can I tell [how some part of our thoughts are corporeal, and some spiritual,] seeing they are actions, and accidents of the soul. Fifthly, if there be no accidents in the soul, then there be no habits, nor actions, nor intelligible species in her; for these are mere accidents, but such are in every soul, or else you must deny, that there is either knowledge or wisdom, goodness or evil in the soul. 'Tis true, there are not material accidents in her, because she is free from materiality; yet, in that she is not a pure act, as God is, there is in her a potentiality, whence arise these spiritual and immaterial accidents which be in her.  
[To be in a place, is nothing else but to be in a circumstant 
Sect. 13. Pag. 424. c. 10.  body. It is absurd to say [it is] therefore [it is somewhere.] it is an eminent property of a separated soul to be no where, and yet she is every where.] Place is not a body; for than two bodies must be in one place, which nature abhors. Neither is place any part of a body: not the matter, because the matter doth not contain as the place doth, but is contained; nor is it the form, for the body may be separated from the place containing, without any hurt to the body contained: so cannot a body be separated from its form, without its destruction. And if place were either matter or form, there would be no motion to a place; for, body's move to their place, because they are not in it; they move to enjoy that they want: but bodies having and enjoying already their matter and form, cannot move to have or enjoy them; therefore place is not a body, but the superficies of an ambient body, or rather the concavity of that superficies. Secondly, it is no absurdity from the existence of a thing, to prove the ubiety of it; for whatsoever is, must necessarily be somewhere, except God, whose centre is everywhere, his circumference nowhere. And though spirits are not in a place, by way of circumscription, as bodies are, whose extremities fill the vacuity of the containing superficies; yet they are in their ubi, by way of definition or designation; that is, whilst they are here, they are not there: whilst the Angel Gabriel is with the Virgin in her chamber, he is not the same time in heaven; and whilst our souls are here present in their bodies, they are absent from the Lord, saith the Apostle. And though Angels and our souls are in bodies, as in their ubi, yet they are not there as in a place; for neither is there any dilatation nor condensation of the bodies upon their entering in, no more than there is of the air in your chamber upon the shining of the Sun beams in it: Or, if they be in a place, they are not there by any quantitative, but by a virtual contact. Thirdly, you make it [the eminent property of a soul to be nowhere, and yet everywhere.] But if the soul be nowhere, it is nothing; and if everywhere, it is God, whose property it is indeed to be everywhere, by his essence, power, and providence: but how the soul can be everywhere, and yet nowhere, is one of your riddles. I think you have read that passage in Seneca, Nusquam est, qui ubique est. But, indeed, neither are the souls nowhere, nor are they everywhere; not nowhere, for ubietie is so necessary to created entities, that (like Hippoer ate's twins) they live and die together: Tolle spatia corporibus, & nusquam erunt, & qui a nusquam erant, omnino non erant. What S. Austin speaks there of bodies, must be also understood 
Epist. 57  of spirits; for, no reason can be given why spirits should have more privilege to exist without their Ubi, than bodies have to exist without their place▪ And how can we imagine, that a spirit can work or produce any effect, except the cause and the effect, the work and the worker have a local coexistence? Therefore Plato 
In Timae● part. 3.  said well, that what is not contained within the compass of heaven and earth, cannot be at all. And so saith Aristotle, that which is nowhere, is not. If Sphinx be 
4. Phys. t. 1.  nowhere, there is no such creature. And to say, that souls are everywhere, is to oppose both Divinity and Philosophy: for the one teacheth us, that ubiquity is God's property; the other, that Intelligences, which are of a more eminent essence or nature then our souls, are not in every part of their orb, but in that only which moveth most swiftly. As their essence is finite, so is their existence, and so is their Ubi. As they cannot work everywhere, so they cannot be everywhere. The souls departed then are in their Ubi, which excludes ubiquity.  
You say [you have explicated how time is the motion of 
Sect. 14. Pag. 424. c. 10.  the heavens.] You had need explicate this well; for how the measure can be the same thing with that which it measureth, I know not. Now, time is the measure of motion, but not of celestial motion: for time, being the affection of that motion, must needs be after it; but a measure is naturally before the thing measured; and the cause is the measure rather of the effect, than the effect can be of the cause, saith Scaliger: Therefore, as the 
Exerc. 352. 2.  first body is the measure of other bodies, so is the first motion the measure of other motions. And nature by motion measureth time, because by motion she begets time; but we make time to measure motion, when we say, so many degrees of the equinoctial have moved in such a time. Again, time cannot be motion, because time is the same everywhere, but motion is not the same: one time is not swifter or slower than another, but one motion is swifter or slower than another motion. Besides, it is a received opinion among Divines, that the motion of heaven shall cease after the resurrection, being the motion of the Sun, Moon and Stars is a part of that vanity, to which the creature is subject; and of this motion there shall be then no use, either for distinction of times and seasons, or for generation, corruption, and alteration of sublunary bodies: but though this motion shall cease, yet time shall not cease, except it be that which is caused by their motion, to wit, hours, days, years, etc. But that time, which consisteth in the succession of duration or motion of any other thing, whether it be of our bodies, or of our thoughts, that time, I say, shall not cease. To be brief, time is not the motion of heaven, because that motion is only in heaven, as in its subject; but time is everywhere, and in every thing▪ neither is that time, which is caused by the motion of the first movable, the same that inferior motions are, because they are separable; for the heaven might move and cause time, though there were no inferior motion below: and there may be motions here below, though the heavens stood still. The wheel of a clock would go, though the heavens moved not: And josuah did fight, though the Sun stood still.  
[Though a separated soul consists with time, yet she is not 
Sect. 15. Pag. 425. c. 10.  in time.] If you understand by being in time, to be measured by time, and to be overcome by it, I yield; for so, whatsoever hath a perpetual being, is freed from the laws of time, saith Aristotle, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
4 Physic.  And so motion only is in time, to wit, per se, & primò, because it is motion only that primarily, and by itself is measured by time; for time is the number and measure of motion per prius & posterius: And therefore motion, having of itself and primarily, priority and posteriority, it is only primarily and of itself in time, and other things but in respect of motion. As for spirits, because they have no dependence on time, nor on the motion of the first sphere, neither in respect of their being, nor of their conservation, they cannot be said to be in time: for, to be in time, includes three things: first, to be measured: secondly, to be comprehended: thirdly, to be mastered and consumed by time; and so only corruptible bodies are in time, and yet these are not in time, but in respect of their motions and mutations: For the being or essence even of corruptible things consists in indivisibility, and have not in them priority and posteriority, nor succession, which are necessarily required for time. But though spirits are not in time after the manner of corruptible bodies, yet they are in time, in respect of their local motions, thoughts, volitions and operations, which require a succession, priority and posteriority, and cannot be in an instant: But this the Schoole-Doctors will not have to be called physical time, which consisteth in a continuated motion; but tempus discretum, being composed of divers minutes, or little stays or delays succeeding one another. And though their operations be indivisible in themselves, yet they, by succeeding one another, make up that discrete time, which is divisible: So unities and instances indivisible in themselves, make up numbers and time which are divisible: So than this duration of spirits, though it be indivisible and permanent, according to their proper being, yet it is variable, according to their operations proceeding from them. And though in respect of indivisibility and permanency, they will have this their duration to be called, not tempus, but aevum; yet they acknowledge them to be in discrete time, in regard of their successive operations; and they admit, that their aevum is virtually divisible, having its succession, as it is co-existent with our time: And therefore the duration of Angels and separated souls is greater this year, than it was an hundred, or a thousand years ago, because they have been co-existent to a longer time. Besides, nothing but God can be said to be exempted from time, because his essence, existence, and duration or permanency, is all one: but in the creatures these are distinguished; for duration is extrinsecall, and accidental to the essence of the creature, even of spirits; and therefore they are not the same with their duration, but something else: they are in aevo, as we are in tempore, although aevum be not a fit term to express the duration of Angels and souls, being it signifieth the same that eternity, only proper to God; for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and this is eternity: and God only is eternal, knowing neither beginning nor exding, antiquity nor novelty: for the one supposeth an end, the other a beginning, as Tertullian showeth: Deus, si vetus est, 
In Martion. 1. cap. 8.  non erit; si novus, non fuit: novitas initium testatur, vetustas finem comminatur.  
Not long ago you said, [The soul was nothing else but 
Sect 16. Pag. 426, 427, 428▪ cap. 10.  an active force,] now you call it [an indivisible substance, an actual knowledge of all things, a skill, a rule by what itself is, that she is all that she knoweth; her nature is order. That there are some imperfect souls, and an interior soul; that the amplitude of knowledge is common to all humane souls separated; that phantasms are little bodies, which go with the body; that life is a general motion, preceding that moment in which she becomes an absolute spirit.] And then you confess, [you have engulfed yourself into a sea of contradiction.] You have indeed, and I know not how to help you out, but by telling you, that if the soul be a substance, it cannot be a rule, a knowledge, a skill, an order; for these are accidents. Secondly, if the soul be all she knoweth, than she needs no other knowledge but of herself; for in knowing herself, she knows all things. Thirdly, if there be some imperfect souls, than God is not a perfect Creator; for he immediately creates the soul, and infuseth it. Fourthly, and if there be an interior soul, tell us which is the exterior, or how many souls a man may have. Fifthly, and if phantasms be bodies, how can they have their residence in the soul or understanding? Spirits may dwell in bodies, but that bodies should reside in spirits, I have not heard till now. Sixthly, neither do you tell us a reason why these your little bodies should forsake the soul upon her departure, and go with the body. Is not the understanding of a separated soul, as capable to lodge and entertain such guests, as before? Or, are these little bodies made of dust, that to dust they must return? Seventhly, have all separated souls the same amplitude of knowledge? then the soul of judas in hell hath as much knowledge, as Abraham's soul in heaven; but I see no reason for it. Eighthly, if life be a motion, it is an imperfect thing, consisting not in esse, but in fieri; and so the life of man, both here and hereafter, cannot be perfect, no not in heaven. And in a separated soul, tell me which is the mover, the motion and the mobile. Ninthly, tell us what this She is, that becomes an absolute spirit: Is it the soul? or is it life? If the soul, than she was, before she was a spirit: If life, than motion may become a spirit. I see, it is not without cause you complain of engulfing yourself into the sea of contradiction. Help yourself out again, if you can.  
But you plunge yourself over head and ears, when 
Sect. 17. Pag. 430. c. 10.  you tell us, [That separated souls do enjoy their knowledge, without the help of external objects, phantasms, instruments, or any other helps, having all things requisite in themselves.] This is to deify souls, and to elevate them above the pitch of created entities. For the Angels themselves have not such an eminent knowledge, in that they stand in need of helps; both external, to wit, that supreme light, and clear lookingglass of the Trinity, in which they see all things; as also of the innate species or idea, both of universalities and of singularities, without which they can have no knowledge: therefore à fortiori, if Angels stand in need of such helps, much more must departed souls. Secondly, memory remains in departed souls, but memory or recordation is by help of the species laid up in the mind, to the understanding of which, when the mind applies itself, this is called recordation. Thirdly, though the intelligible species depend from the senses and fantasy in their fieri, or being, yet they have no dependence from them in their conservation. For the sensible species in sleep serve the fantasy, though the common sense, and all the outward, are bound up, and as it were dead. Fourthly, in Angels and departed souls there are divers habits both of love and knowledge, and virtue, yea, of tongues also in respect of entity, though there be no use nor exercise (but after a spiritual way) of speaking: now habits are the causes of action, and in vain should they be left in the soul, if she by them did not work, and actually understand: neither can the effect, to wit, actual understanding, subsist without its cause, which is the habit; for this is such an effect as depends in its conservation from the cause. Fiftly, understanding, and the manner of understanding accompany the nature of the soul, but the nature of the soul is the same here and hereafter, therefore the manner of understanding must be the same, to wit, by the species. Sixtly, Whereas the souls departed do specifically differ from the Angels, they must have a different manner of understanding, to wit, by discourse: but this way needs help, not of the phantasm or senses, (being all commerce with the body is taken away) but of the species. Hence than it is apparent, that departed souls stand in need of helps, and of objects of their understanding, and that they have not all things requisite in themselves: which objects are external in respect of their essence, though the species be inherent or adherent to the souls: much more external are these objects which they see in God, although God himself is not intelligible by any species, by reason of his immensity; neither doth the soul understand itself by any species, nor doth she know (except by revelation) what is done or doing here on earth; which she must needs know, if she had all things requisite for knowledge in herself; but indeed, Abraham is ignorant of us, and Israel knows us not. Nesciunt mortui quid hic agatur, 
De cura pro mortuis.  nisi dum hic agitur, saith S. Austin.  
[Our looking upon the phantasms in our brain, is not our 
Sect. 18. Pag. 430. c. 10.  soul's action upon them, but it is our letting them beat at our common sense, that is, our letting them work upon our soul.] The fantasy being a corporeal sense, cannot work upon the soul which is a spirit: it is not then the fantasy that works upon the soul, but the agent intellect refines, purifies, and makes more spiritual those phantasms, or species which are represented by the fantasy, and so impresseth them in the passive intellect; and this is called understanding. The agent intellect is the force or quality of the soul mediating between the fantasy and passive intellect, framing the intelligible species, which the passive intellect receiveth, and so by the one power the soul acteth, and by the other suffereth; but not at all by the fantasy, whose hand cannot reach so high as to knock at the gates of the soul. It must then be a spiritual power that must work upon a spirit: the passive intellect is rasa tabula, like clean paper, having no innate species, or images of objects in itself, but what it receiveth from the active intellect; so that the fantasy helps the understanding only dispositiuè, not efficienter, being rather the material then efficient cause of understanding, furnishing those species which the active intellect refineth, and impresseth in the passive. If you should ask, whether our understanding is an action, or a passion, I answer, that it consists in both, for not only doth it receive the intelligible species, but also operats upon them. And this is that action of the soul which you deny: and what do you talk of [letting our phantasms beat at our common sense?] The phantasms will beat whether you will or no. If you will not believe me, believe your own dreams in sleep: I suppose your phantasms than beat, when you could be content they would spare their labour, and be quieter. But so long as the spirits do make their intercourse between the fantasy and the common sense, there will be an agitation and beating of the phantasms. But it seems, you take the soul and common sense for the same thing, when you say, [that to let the phantasms beat upon the common sense, is to let them work upon the soul.] They may beat upon the one, and not work upon the other; for the soul suffers not but by itself, and her suffering is perfective, not destructive, as that of the matter is. But she doth not work upon, or deduce herself out of possibility into act, considered as the same thing, but in respect of her divers faculties, whereof the one is the efficient, the other the patiented, and resembles the matter: and if it were not so, we should never actually understand; for what should excite the passive intellect to receive the species being purified and cleared from materiality, and those accidents which neither conduce to the essence, nor to the intellection, if there were not an active power, altogether impatible, immaterial, immortal, using neither corporeal organs, nor being mixed with corporeal senses, which we call the active intellect, and which irradiats & illuminats intelligible things, making them actually intelligible, which before were potentially only, as the light makes these colours actually aspectable, which in the dark were invisible? 
Sect. 19 Pag. 432. c. 10.   
[In the state of a soul exempted from the body there is neither action nor passion: which being so, the soul cannot die; for all corruption comes from the action of another thing.] This is but a weak argument to prove the soul's immortality; for actions and passions do neither hinder nor further it. In departed souls there remain loco-motive actions, for they move from the body to their ubi, where they remain till the resurrection, and then they shall move again to their bodies; so the actions of understanding and will remain in them. Shall any then conclude that the souls are mortal, because they are the subjects of action, and of passion? but their passion, as I said is perfective. The same actions are in Angels both in moving and removing. Were the Angels that carried Lazarus his soul into Abraham's bosom mortal? or that Angel that carried Habakkuk, because of this action? Are there not also in Angels the actions of intellect and will? Nay, action and passion do rather prove immortality, and the cessation of these, corruption: For, whilst the body is the souls patiented, it lives; but when it ceaseth from suffering, and the soul from acting in it and by it, follows immediately its corruption. What think you of the first matter which is the first subject of passion, and yet it is eternal à parte post? And if you take away all action and passion from departed souls, you must abridge them of the joys they have in the fruition of God's presence, and of their duty in praising him; so you rob God of his honour, and them of their happiness. Again, we have showed that habits remain in departed souls, but to what end, if there be no action? for, Habitus est propter actionem; and indeed, actions are more excellent than habits. Again, if there be neither action nor passion in the departed souls, they are in the state of death, rather than life; for life consisteth in action, though itself be no action; and the soul is an act, therefore cannot be without action: but death is a cessation and rest from all action. If you had said, that some actions cease in the soul after her departure, as generation, nutrition, and such as are the actions of the whole compound, you had said somewhat; but to exempt her from all action, is to make her a dead body, not a living soul: and though corruption, as you say, [is the effect of action,] or indeed, rather of passion, yet it will not follow, that all action is the cause of corruption; for there are actions of creation, generation, conservation, etc. Lastly, you contradict yourself, for here you deny actions in separated souls, but in the next Chapter, cap. 11. p. 439. you say, [that the body hinders the soul's operations, and that her actions will be far greater and more efficacious, when she shall be free from the burden of her body.]  
[To put forgetfulness in a pure spirit, so palpable an effect 
Sect. 20. Pag. 433. c. 11.  of corporiety, and so great a corruption, is an unsufferable error.] I do not think oblivion to be an effect of corporietie; for, as the soul is the subject of memory, which is one of her faculties: of recordation, which is the work of the intellect, viewing over the species: of reminiscence, which is a disquisition or unfolding of the same species, if they be clouded or confused; so likewise is the same soul the subject of oblivion, as the same eye is of sight and blindness, the same air of light and darkness, there being the same subject of habit and privation. Now, there are habits in the soul departed as I have said, some actually there, as the habit of knowledge; some potentially, as in their root and original, such are the sensitive habits: where the habit is actually, there is the privation potentially; but where the habit is potentially, there the privation is actually, as the habits of seeing, hearing, etc. in the separated soul, make it clear. And what we have said of the habits, we may say of memory, which is a power and faculty in the soul, by which she retains the species: why then may there not be in her a deletion, loss, or abolition of such species, the memory whereof will make her rather miserable then happy? therefore the blessed souls in heaven remember not the vanities nor infirmities of their former life: if they did, they could not be truly happy and joyful; and so the oblivion of such things, is not in them [a corruption,] as you say, but a perfection rather. Therefore Albertus Magnus before his death prayed, that he might obtain the oblivion of all former vain knowledge, which might hinder his happiness in the knowledge of Christ. 
Sect. 21.   
Your Rhetorical descriptions (which are both useless in, and destructive of Philosophy) make the soul sometimes equal with God, sometimes no better than a corruptible body; for to a separated soul you give those attributes proper to God, [as, freedom of essence, and subsisting in itself, a comprehension of place and time, that is of 
Pag. 439, 440, 441. c. 11.  all permanent and successive quantity, and the concurrence of infinite knowledge to every action of hers.] So you give to the soul independency, ubiquity, infinity, which three are Gods due. If you lay the fault of this upon your Rhetorical expressions, I must answer you, that Rhetoric in such a subject may be well spared: use your Rhetoric when you will work upon the affections, but not when you will inform the understanding; for in this regard you do but cloud, not clear the intellect. Rhetoric is like fire and water, a good servant, but a bad master; therefore ought not to be used, but with great discretion, especially in abstruse questions: For this cause, Logic was invented, to curb and restrain the exorbitancy of Rhetoric. If you will dispute like a Philosopher, you must lay aside Rhetoric, and use Philosophical terms; otherwise you'll do as the fish Sepia, to wit, you'll so thicken the waters of your discourse, with that liquor that cometh out of your mouth, that you will make yourself invisible, and delude the Reader, which is the fashion of those, who dare not confide in the strength of their arguments; whereas naked truth cares not for such dress, nor seeks she after such corners. And indeed, you are too much in extremes; for you do not more extol a separated, than you do abase an incorporated soul, as you call it, in saying, [that her being in a body, is her being one thing with the body she is said to be in:] for if she be one thing with the body, she hath the same essence and essential properties of a body, which I believe you will not subscribe to. 
Sect▪ 22. Pag. 441. c 1▪ 1.   
[Should a soul by the course of nature obtain her first being without a body, and be perfect in knowledge, she must be a complete substance, not a soul, whose nature is to acquire perfection by the service of the senses.] 1. You suppose what is not to be supposed; for no soul can obtain her first being by the course of nature. 2. If she did, yet it were not repugnant to her nature to be perfect in knowledge. 3. Perfection in knowledge will not make her a complete substance. 4. Though the soul naturally acquires perfection by the service of the senses, yet that hinders not her bringing in of knowledge with her. Adam's soul had perfect knowledge, as it was fit, being all the works of God were created in their perfection, and Adam was to be the Doctor and instructor of his posterity, and because he was created both in the state and place of happiness, which could not subsist without knowledge; yet Adam's soul ceased not therefore to be a soul, or the form of his material body, nor did her knowledge make her a complete substance; for in her substance she was no more complete than our souls are in our nativity. Neither did that knowledge which Adam brought with him, hinder his soul from acquiring, by the service of his senses, a fuller measure of understanding; for he neither had the knowledge of future contingencies, nor of the secrets of men's hearts, nor of every particular individuum of every species, nor of every stone or sand in the world, which belonged nothing to his perfection and happiness. If you'll say, that Adam's soul obtained not her first being by the course of nature, I grant it, nor was it possible she should: but by what course soever you imagine the soul to have her being, she may bring perfect knowledge with her, and yet not cease to be a soul. But when you say, [That no false judgements can remain in a 
Pag. 442.  miserable soul after her departure,] you make the damned souls in hell in fare better condition than we are here upon earth, who are subject to false judgements, and erroneous opinions, even the best of us: but I am not of your mind; for, doubtless, false judgements are a part of that punishment which the wicked souls suffer in hell. But if there be no falsehood or error of judgement in them, they must be in this point as happy as Adam was in Paradise.  
[If nothing be wanting but the effect, and yet the effect 
Sect. 23.  doth not immediately follow, it must needs be, that it cannot follow at all.] This inference will not follow at all; for we see many effects do not immediately follow upon the working of the efficient, and yet follow at last. The fire melts not the metal presently, nor the Carpenter builds the house, nor the Sun produces corn, grass, and fruits immediately, nor doth the Physician presently cure diseases; and yet all these are efficient causes, and actually work: the effects follow at leisure, and at last, though not immediately. You should do well to distinguish between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the working or operation, and the work itself. When the efficient is not only in its act of entity, but of causality too, there follows immediately operation, but not opus; the working, not the work; the effect in fieri, not in esse. Again, you must discriminate between voluntary and natural agents; the one operate freely, the other of necessity. The soul is doubtless a voluntary, not a natural agent; so that the effect may follow, though not immediately. And if in natural causes the effect follows still immediately, it is where the effect is an essential property of the subject flowing immediately from the form: as, heat from the fire, which notwithstanding produceth not heat immediately in water, or other subjects. Lastly, if your argument be good, they are not to blame, who held the eternity of the world: for, they reasoned as you do, that the cause being eternal, the effect must immediately or eternally follow, or else not follow at all: But they should have known, that God was no natural, but a voluntary agent; and though from eternity he did actually exist, yet he did not from eternity actually create: The act of entity in him was eternal, but not the act of causality.  
In the conclusion of your discourse you make nature 
Sect 24.  play the Smith; for you say, [If the dull percussion, which, by nature's institution, hammereth out a spiritual soul from gross flesh and blood, can achieve so wondrous an effect by such blunt instruments as are used in the contriving of a man; fifty or an hundred year's time, must forge out in such a soul an excellency above the form of an abortive embryo.] You may with your Rhetoric as soon persuade me, that Minerva was hammered out of jupiters' brain, by the percussion of Vulcan's hatchet, as that the spiritual soul can by nature's institution, or any dull percussion of hers be hammered out from gross flesh and blood. It is not nature, but the God of nature that is the efficient cause of the soul: It's not nature's dull percussion, but God's active inspiration that is the instrument: It is not flesh and blood, out of which it is educed, but into which the immaterial soul is introduced. The soul is not framed either in, or of the body, by the work of nature; but is inspired by the breath of the Almighty, who in the beginning breathed into Adam the breath of life, and so became a living soul. Nature cannot hammer out such a piece as the soul is, though she had the help of Vulcan's Cyclopes,  
Brontesque, Steropesque, & nudus membra Pyracmon: She is of too pure a quintessence, and of too sublimated an alloy, to be extracted out of such gross materials as flesh and blood are. After the body is articulated, the new created soul is infused, accompanied with her perfections, which she receives not from, but communicates to the body; and so that rude mass of flesh in the matrix becomes a man: And the same soul which makes him a man, makes him lord over all the works of God's hands; by this he subdues the wild beasts, commands the earth, masters the ocean, measures the heaven, searcheth into the nature of herbs, trees, metals, minerals, stones, etc. foretelleth celestial changes, inventeth arts and sciences, and becomes the lively character and express image of the Almighty. Can nature then hammer such a divine essence out of gross flesh and blood? It is questioned whether God himself can do it, without implying a contradiction, which is so repugnant to him. Nature indeed extracts the gross souls of the beasts out of their gross bodies, which, as they came of them, so they die with them; but the reasonable soul, being 1. the act of the body, and principle of all vital operations: 2. being she is a spirit, not capable of physical matter and quantity; for she is all in all, and all in every part of the body: 3. being she is not only the first act of the organical body, but also the very agent or efficient of the body's organisation; therefore she cannot be material, nor hammered out of the matter. 4. If she were corporeal, either in her being, or in her extraction, the world could not be perfect or complete: for, as it is made up of creatures, some merely spiritual, some merely corporeal; so, for the compliment and perfection of it, there should be some creatures partly spiritual; partly corporeal; and these are only men. 5. The effect cannot exceed the cause in perfection and eminency, but the soul fare exceeds the body. 6. Man had not been fit to rule over the corporeal creatures, if he had not a spiritual soul, which only is capable of reason and dominion; and not the bodily substance. 7. One species cannot beget another; but the soul is a species of spirits, far different from bodily species. 8. There can be no connexion between the superior and inferior creatures, but by certain media, by which nature passeth from one extreme to another: therefore it was fit, that the spiritual and corporeal creatures, which are the extremes, should be united in that creature which is partly spiritual, partly corporeal; and this is only man. 9 If the soul be not merely spiritual, she cannot enjoy the vision of, nor friendship and familiarity with God, who is a spirit; nor can she be capable of any spiritual gifts. The Spirit of God cannot dwell but in a spirit; nor can that which is merely corporeal be like unto God, or see him as he is. 10. If the souls be material, they must be mortal; for we have no other reason to induce us to believe the souls of beasts to be mortal, but because they are material, and educed out of the possibility of the matter. 11. As Christ proved the truth of his body, by feeding upon bodily substances, so we prove the spirituality of the soul by her food and delights, which are not corporeal, but spiritual things; for knowledge, wisdom, truth, virtue, honesty, which are incorporeal things, are the souls chief delights, next to God, in whom only she rests, and with whom only she is satisfied. Fecisti 
August.  nos Domine à te, & inquietum est cor nostrum, nisi requiescat in te. 12. If the soul be of the parents seed, or conveyed with it, the seed must needs be man, and so a reasonable creature, and consequently capable, as being man, of eternal joy or pain. 13. The operations of the soul are spiritual, such as be the actions of understanding and will. The principal then of these operations, which is the soul, cannot be corporeal; for no operation can in dignity of entity exceed the substance whence it ariseth, or the power and faculty of the soul by which she worketh, and which differs from the soul as the property doth from the subject; for as the potentia or faculty receiveth its specification from the act, so the act hath all its dignity from the faculty: now, if the faculty be spiritual, the soul which is its subject cannot be corporeal, for no indivisible quality can be inherent in a divisible subject. And as the faculty receives its specification from the act, so doth the act from the object, and therefore the act by which we understand spirits, must be spiritual: And, though in the act of conception we may fancy spirits to be like bodies, yet in the act of judgement, we know them to be immaterial substances, and of a far other nature or essence than bodies; and this act is elevated above the senses, and abstracts the spiritual object from all sensible conditions. 14. The soul knows all bodies celestial, terrestrial, simple, mixed, etc. which she doth by receiving these intelligible objects: but she could not receive them being corporeal, if she were not free from corporiety herself; for Intus existens prohibet contrarium: and she doth not receive them as the senses do, to wit, superficially only, but she pierceth into their inmost natures, searcheth out their causes, properties, and effects, and yet higher she riseth above the senses, by substracting bodies from individuation, and all sensible accidents, which the senses cannot do; and so she considereth them in their universalities, which is a kind of spirituality: but this she could not do, if she were not spiritual herself. 15. As the dissolution or corruption of the body dissolveth not the soul, neither doth the constitution or generation of the body give being to the soul; for if she hath her being from the body, she must decay with the body. 16. Liberty of will proves also the immateriality of the soul; for all materiat agents work either by necessity, as the insensitive; or are led by instinct, as the animat, except man, who is master of his own actions, and can promote or stay, suspend, and incline them which way he likes best: and in this he comes near to the Angelical nature, for, only Men and Angels have this prerogative of freewill; inferior creatures want it, because of their materiality, which determinats them to one kind of operation, and so to a necessary working that way; as, for the fire to heat, for a stone to fall downward. But such is the independency, and spirituality of man's soul, that no creature, neither Heavens, Stars, nor Angels, have any power to command or force man's will: whereas all material entities are subject to mutation, by the influence and working of the superior agents, to wit, the Angels, and the Heavens. 17. If the intellect or the soul were corporeal, she should be hurt and weakened by a vehement object, as the senses are; to wit, the eye with too much light, the ear with too violent sounds: but no intelligible object, be it never so strong and powerful, hurts the intellect at all, but perfects it rather. 18. If the soul were corporeal, it would grow weak and feeble, and by degrees decay, as the body doth by old age; but we see the contrary, for the soul, even when the body is weakest, is most active, and by old age rather perfected then weakened. 19 If the soul were corporeal, entity in its latitude could not be the adequat object of the intellect; for the material and organical faculties are determinated by the matter to some particular objects: only man's understanding, as likewise that of the Angels, have entity as entity for their object; that is, both uncreated and created, spiritual and corporeal, substantial and accidental entities: which could not be, if the intellect were not spiritual. 20. That this hath been the doctrine of the Church, of Fathers, of Counsels, of Philosophers and Poets, is manifest to them, who are conversant in their writings: even Aristotle himself was of this opinion, though a few passages in him have caused some to doubt. And the Scriptures, lastly, are plain in this case, which we will not forbear to allege, though we deal with a Philosopher: Solomon tells us, that the 
Eccles. 12.  Spirit returns to God that gave it. Christ commends 
Luke 23.  〈◊〉 spirit into the hands of his Father. S. Paul says, that 〈◊〉 holy Spirit bears witness with our spirits: in which 
Rom. 8.  places, the word spirit is used, as it is opposite to a corporeal substance. Apollinaris of Alexandria indeed held the souls to be corporeal, and Tertullian too, but in that sense that he held God himself to be corporeal, to wit, a true & real substance, and not imaginary or fictitious. And when we read in Athanasius, Basil, Damascen, and some others, that the soul is a bodily substance, we must know that they speak of her, not as she is in herself, but as she is compared to God, to wit, that both souls and Angels are infinitely distant from that purity and excellency which is in the Divine Essence, in comparison of which, they are corporeal and gross substances. And the more willingly they used to call the soul corporeal, because they would beat down their heresy, which held the soul to be a part of the Divine Essence; such as were Carpocrates, Cerdon, the Gnostics, Manichees, and Priscillianists; than which heresy none can be more pernicious, for it makes God changeable and divisible, and the soul altogether immutable, all-sufficient, eternal, omnipotent: these than are two dangerous rocks we must avoid, to wit, deifying of the soul with the Gnostics, and incorporating her with the Stoics. He that holdeth the soul to be Particula divinae aurae, is a Manichees; and he that believes the soul to be a body, is a Sadducee: the one is injurious to God, the other to the soul; the one is the scholar of Carpocrates, the other of Cleanthes or Chrysippus, but neither of Christ.  
[You will have a soul of fifty or a hundred years standing, 
Sect. 25. Conclus.  to be more excellent than the soul of an Embryon.] All souls are of equal excellency and perfection, as well the soul of an Embryon, as of Aristotle; if you speak of the essential or specifical excellency, which is equally communicated to all the singulars or individua of the same species: for there is but one specifical difference by which man, and every particular man is distinguished from the beasts, so that one man is not more reasonable than another. It is true, that the genus may be more perfect in one species then in another, so man is a more excellent creature than a beast, because the difference of rationality, which is in man, is more excellent than the irrationality of beasts: but Peter is not a more excellent man than Paul, because the specifical difference is not more in Peter then in Paul; in respect of some accidental differences, there may be some inequality, but these concern nothing the nature or essence of man: even so, one soul may have more knowledge, or other accidental perfections than another, in respect of fit organs, and a better disposed fantasy; otherwise the same essential excellency is equal in all, and the soul of a fool is not less excellent than that of Solomon, nor of an Embryon, then of him who hath lived a hundred years, except in accidental perfections, as I have said: for had the Embryos soul the same perfection of organs, and fantasy that the soul of Aristotle had, she would exercise the same organical acts that he did; the same, I say, that immediately flow from, and depend upon the soul.  
[Among the Intelligences, the lowest knows as much as 
Sect. 26. Pag. 453. Conclus.  the highest, and yet the knowledge of the highest is infinitely more perfect and admirable than the knowledge of his inferiors.] The nearer any Intelligence is to God, the more perfectly doth he know his will, and the more acquainted he is with his counsels; the nearer he is to that Divine Light, the more illumination he must needs have: but the superior Intelligences are nearer to God than the inferior, and therefore better acquainted with his counsels. There is a greater measure of knowledge and other perfections in the superior, then in the inferior Intelligences, seeing the inferior work by the power of the superior; and God, who is the God of order, not of confusion, will have a dependency of these inferior spirits from their Superiors. Secondly, where there is a greater similitude with God, and a more lively representation of divine excellencies, there must be the greater knowledge; but this similitude is greatest in the superior Intelligences. Thirdly, where are fewest intelligible species, and more universal, there is a more excellent way of knowledge; but such are the species of the superior Intelligences, whereas the inferior must make use of multitudes of species, which is an imperfection in knowledge. Fourthly, the inferior Intelligences do not understand so exactly the nature of the superior, as the superior do themselves, therefore their knowledge cannot be so great, as that of the higher Intelligences. Fiftly, can the lowest Intelligence as well understand the nature of that orb, which the supreme Intelligence moveth, as he himself that by his understanding moveth it? I deny not but all the Intelligences immediately behold the Divine Essence, yet not all in the same measure and perfection: we look upon the same Sun that Eagles do, but much more weakly than they; therefore doubtless the inferior Intelligences must in knowledge yield to the superior, who know things both sooner, and more exactly: sothat what is revealed immediately by God to the superior, is communicated by them to the inferior Intelligences. But whereas you make [the knowledge of these spirits equal, and yet the knowledge of the highest infinitely more perfect and admirable,] is to me an admirable riddle; for, can there be in equality an infinite inequality? this is one of your contradictions, and none of the least: If their knowledge be equal, it must be infinitely perfect in both, or else it is not equal: besides, you must grant, there may be two infinits; which cannot be, because there must be something in the one which is not in the other, or else they cannot be discriminated; but there can be no infinitude where there is a defect.  
I like not your phrase [of a complete soul, completed in 
Sect. 27. Pag 453. Conclus.  its body;] for the soul receives no completion or perfection in or from the body, but she brought it with her. You should rather say, that she is incomplete in the body, because she becomes a part of the compositum, and every part is incomplete. She was complete before she informed the body, and she will be complete after she hath forsaken the body: Complete, I say, in her entity, whether it be of essence or existence; and complete in her knowledge too: for we know but in part here, and in aenigmate. The souls of beasts have their completion from those bodies whence they have their original, without which bodies they have no subsistence; but man's soul gives subsistence to the compositum, whereof the body is a part: so that the soul receives no more completion in or by the body, than an exquisite Musician hath in or by his Lute. The soul, being separated, ceaseth to inform the body; but doth not therefore cease to be complete, no more than a Lutenist ceaseth to be a Musician, when he lays aside his Lute.  
You will have us [to supply what is wanting, before we 
Sect. 28. Pag. 456. Conclus.  are called to our dreadful account: which is soon done, if we be what our nature dictateth us to be; if we follow but reason and knowledge, our wants are supplied, our accounts are made up.] We shall make but a sorry account, if we follow such guides as our own nature, reason, and knowledge: These are blind guides, which will lead us into the ditch. The Scripture tells us, that the natural man comprehendeth not the things of God's Spirit, neither can he: That our 
1 Cor. 2. 14.  natural wisdom is enmity against God; for it cannot be 
Rom. 8. 7.  subject to the Law of God. Of ourselves we cannot 
2 Cor. 3. 5.  think a good thought, as of ourselves. Our foolish 
Rom. 1. 21.  hearts are darkened. Our understanding is darkened. We 
Ephes. 4. 18.  were sometimes darkness. The light shined in darkness, 
Ephes. 5. 8.  but the darkness comprehended it not. There is none 
John 1. 5.  
Rom. 3. 11.  that understandeth, none that seeketh after God. We are 
Act. 7. 52.  stiffnecked and of uncircumcised hearts, and have always resisted the holy Ghost. Evil trees cannot bring 
Mat. 7. 15.  forth good fruit. Our hearts are perverse and deceitful 
Jer. 17. 9  above all things. The imaginations of the thoughts of 
Gen. 6. 5.  man's heart are only evil continually. We are by nature 
Ephes. 2. 1.  dead in our sins and trespasses. What guides were reason, nature and knowledge to the jews, when Christ would have gathered them, as the hen gathers her chickens 
Mat. 23. 37.  under her wings, and they would not? What fruit can wild olives, or withered vine-branches bring out, if 
Rom. 11.  the one be not inserted into the true and natural olive; the other into the true Vine? Do men gather grapes of 
John 15. Mat. 7. Act. 16.  thistles, or figs of thorns? If God had not opened the heart of Lydia, her own reason and nature had never opened it. God must give us a heart to understand, and 
Deut. 29.  eyes to see, and ears to hear. He must take away our stony hearts, and give us hearts of flesh, that we may walk 
Ezek. 11. 19  in his statutes, and keep his judgements. He must give us his Law, and write it in our hearts. And indeed, he must 
Jer. 30. 33.  give us ipsum velle, even Will itself; for, as by nature our understandings are darkened, so our wills are perverted, our affections, inclinations, thoughts and desires are all depraved. If nature and reason had been good guides, man, who was made upright, had not found out to himself so many inventions, as Solomon complains. Cain's posterity had not fallen from the true Church; nor had the posterity of Noah, by Cham and japhet, nay, by Sem too, fallen into idolatry. Why did God communicate his will by tradition before, and by writ after the Law; nay, oftentimes by miraculous and extraordinary ways, if man's reason and natural knowledge had been good guides? And how can these be but deceitful guides in supernatural things, which fail us even in the causes of things merely natural? Therefore that saying, Naturam ducem sequi optimum, is not true in supernatural things, nor altogether sure, as I said, in natural. The ship of man's soul will split against the rocks of error, if she have no better helm to steer by, than the helm of reason. Reason is not the Star that will bring us to Bethlehem, nor the cloud and firie-pillar that will conduct us to Canaan. We must deny ourselves, if we follow Christ. And what is that, but to abandon nature, and natural reason in the things that concern Christ? Peter had reason and nature, when he bid Christ, speaking of his death, have a care of himself; but how Christ took him up for it, you know. There was as much nature, reason and knowledge in the great Rabbis, as in the poor ignorant Fishermen, yet these followed Christ, and forsook all; so did not the others. The young Lawyer had too much nature and reason, which hindered him from, not furthered him to Christ. And truly, the Gentile Philosophers acknowledged, that reason was oftentimes clouded and enslaved to fear, anger, love, and other passions; even so in us all, what was strait, is become crooked; and what was alive, is dead: We are dead, saith the Apostle, in sin; what reason can be expected from a dead man? I know this is but a similitude, yet it sufficiently proves, that until Christ hath spiritually quickened us, our reason and nature will little avail us. Our hearts are by nature barren, as the mountains of Gilboa; fruitless, as the figtree in the Gospel; untame, as the wild colt, or the wild ass, that scorns the voice of the hunter: and all this is natural to us. If Lycurgus his dog had not had more than nature, when he forsook the flesh-pot, to run after the Hare, he would have stayed at home with his fellow, which had nothing but nature. And even the Schoolmen acknowledge, that nature is wounded in us; to wit, our understanding with ignorance, our wills with wickedness, our irascible faculty with weakness, our concupiscible with lust. You had done well then not to have named these guides, which, like ignis fatuus, will bring us out of the way. You should have named him, who is the only 
John 14.  way, the truth, and the life, without whom we can do nothing, as he saith himself; and without whom there 
John 6.  is no coming to the Father. 'Tis he who first opened heaven to all believers; who is the door, by whom we enter: and the key of David too, who openeth, and no man shuts; shutteth, and no man openeth. The bright morningstar, the Sun of righteousness, the ladder of jacob, upon the steps or degrees of whose merits and graces, we may climb up to heaven. The true brazen Serpent, by looking on whom we are cured of our spiritual wounds. If then by nature you had meant God, who is Natura naturans: If by reason, you had meant Christ, who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the reason or word of the Father, whose service 
John 1.  is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a reasonable service: If by knowledge you had meant that which is in Christ, by which he justifieth 
Rom. 12.  many, & in respect of which he is called the Wisdom of the Father; for in him are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge: Or, had you meant that which we have of Christ by illumination, and in respect of which, the Apostle accounted all things lost, desiring to know nothing but Christ crucified: If, I say, you had meant such guides, I had approved of your judgement, and I had been your fellow-traveller; for, indeed, by these only [our wants are supplied, and our accounts made up:] And in this respect naturam sequi, est Deo obsequi.   

The Conclusion, wherein is asserted the Souls Immortality, and Objections answered.  
THus, Sir Kenelm, I have briefly run over your voluminous Discourses of the nature of Bodies, and of the Souls immortality; in which, though you have showed much wit and good language, yet your arguments and descriptions of the Soul are not of that evidence and validity (which I have showed) as to convince our understanding, and to vindicate our belief in assenting to all your dictates in this your laborious Work: therefore give me leave, without prejudice to your pains, to point briefly at such reasons and arguments, as I conceive will be more evincing and pressing, and more prevalent, both with Christians and Pagans, than those which you have imparted to us.  
1. We will first then begin with divine Testimony, which is of greater authority than all humane capacity. God tells Moses, Exod. 3. that he is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and jacob; by which words our Saviour proves the soul's immortality, in affirming, that God is not the God of the dead, but of the living, Matth. 22. and consequently, that these were not dead, but alive in their souls. Solomon tells us, Eccles. 12. that the spirit returns to God that gave it. The Scripture tells us, that Samuel's soul was alive after her separation, 2 Sam. 28. which place, though it be controverted, whether it was truly Samuel's soul or not; yet that apparition which was believed by the jews, shows, that they doubted not of the soul's immortality. Christ tells us of Lazarus his soul, that was carried by Angels into Abraham's bosom, and the rich Gluttons into hell, Luke 16. He tells us also of that rich man's soul, which, after his barns were full, was to be taken from him, Luke 12. But if she perished with the body, how could she be taken away? He assures the good thief, that his soul should be with him that night in Paradise, Luke 23. And he will not have us fear them that can destroy the body, but cannot kill the soul, Matth. 10. by which he intimates, that the soul is not liable to death, as the body is.  
2. We prove it by arguments grounded on the Scripture: as first, The soul of Christ was immortal, when it was separated: therefore our souls are so. The consequence is evident, because Christ was like to us in all things, except sin: The antecedent no Christian will deny, except he will deny the hypostatical union of the Divinity and the Humanity, which was not, nor could not be dissolved by death; for the Divinity was not separated from Christ's body in death, much less from his soul, to which it was immediately united. 'Tis true, Christ's body died, because the soul was separated, by which the Divinity gave life to the body, to wit, effectively, not formally; but God, being united immediately and principally to the soul, she could not die. And though God hath not so united our souls to himself, as he did Christ's, yet he is so nearly united to our spiritual souls, being a spirit himself, that they cannot die, except he should forsake them, which he will not do; for he will not leave our souls, nor forsake them, nor suffer them to see corruption. Secondly, man was made to the image of God, Gen. 1. which image consisteth partly in hyperphysical graces, as righteousness, and true holiness; and partly in five physical gifts: 1. understanding, 2. will, 3. dominion, 4. liberty, 5. immortality. Thirdly, man's soul was not educed out of the earth and water, as the souls of other creatures were, but immediately inspired by God, Genes. 1. by which it is plain, that the soul of man is of a fare more excellent condition and nature, than the souls of beasts are; and that she hath immediate dependence from God, not from the body: therefore not mortal. Fourthly, if the soul die with the body, there can be no resurrection; and so 
1 Cor. 15.  our hope and faith are in vain. Now, there can be no resurrection of the body, if the soul, its form, be not pre-existent: For how can the soul be reunited to the body, or inform it again, if it be extinguished with the body? Fifthly▪ the Kingdom of Christ, the joys and 
Luke 1. Matth. 25.  happiness of the Saints, and the torments of the wicked are eternal: therefore the souls of men, which are the subjects of Christ's Kingdom, and the inheritors of joy or pain, cannot be mortal; for what subjects shall this eternal King have, or to what end are the rewards and punishments eternal, if the souls, which are the chief subjects, and chief interessed in these rewards and pains, perish and die? Sixthly, Moses shows, that the Sun, Moon, and Stars of heaven were made for the service of man, Deuteron. 4. which argueth, that man is of a more excellent nature than they. Now, this could not be, if he were not spiritual and immortal in his soul; for in his body he is inferior to them, in regard they are incorruptible, and unchangeable substances.  
3. We prove that the soul is not only immortal by Divine power, but also of her own nature. First, she is made to the image of God, but this image, as I have showed, consisteth not only in supernatural graces, but also in natural powers and faculties of the soul. Secondly, the soul is a spirit of her own nature, therefore of her own nature immortal; for spirits are free from the prime qualities, which are the causes of corruption. Thirdly, the soul is a simple uncompounded substance, therefore cannot be corruptible; for, how can that be dissolved which was never compounded? And though Tertullian held the materiality, yet he acknowledgeth 
De resur. c. 34.  the soul's immortality to be natural to her, Salva erit anima natura sua per immortalitatem. Fourthly, if the soul were not in herself immortal, how should the Heathen Philosophers who knew not God, nor the Scriptures, dispute so accurately as they do in defence of her incorruptibility? But when I say that the soul is immortal by nature, my meaning is not that she is the efficient cause of her own immortality, or that she is not mortal and dissoluble by external power, for so God is only immortal, as the Apostle showeth, and as the sixth 
Tim. 6. Sess. 11.  Synod hath defined, and some Fathers have proved; so that the Angels in this respect are not immortal: but my meaning is, that the soul is not a subject capable as bodies are, neither hath she in herself any passive power or possibility of dissolution.  
4. The soul's immortality is proved by natural and moral reasons, thus: 1. If the soul perish, it must be either by annihilation, or dissolution: not by the first naturally, for nothing of its own nature can be annihilated: God indeed by his omnipotency may annihilate what he made of nothing, but there is no entity of itself capable of nonentity, nor any action tending to it naturally: Neither by the second, for nothing is dissolved but what had parts, (dissolution being nothing else but the solution of one part from another) but what is not compounded hath no parts, and such is the soul, as I have showed: For she is independent, as she is a substance, from any subject: as she is a spirit, from any created substance; therefore dieth not when the body dieth: for neither is she compounded of essential parts, which we call matter and form; nor of integral, which we call members or limbs: And hence it appears, that though the souls of beasts may be free from such compositions, yet they are not from dependence on the body, of which they came, and with which they decay. 2. The soul is a quintessence, and of a more excellent nature than the four elements are; and therefore as she is not of their nature and substance, she cannot be capable of their affections and properties: but the main quality and property of elements is to be the subjects of generation and corruption. 3. Such as the operation of a thing is, such is the subject whence the operation proceeds, for operations are emanations of the substance, and flow from thence: but the chief operation of the soul, which is understanding, is spiritual; therefore the soul cannot be corporeal: for, if the soul were compounded of the elements, these operations of the soul must be in the elements; for whatsoever is in the compound, was before in its principles, these being their acts, whose principles they are: but understanding and will were never in the elements, nor are they capable of such operations: and so the soul is immortal as she is incorporeal. 4. If the soul may be annihilated naturally, then naturally she was produced of nothing; but such a production is repugnant to the Peripatetic tenants, and so, by consequence, must such an annihilation be. 5. Whatsoever is corruptible, is corrupted or destroyed by a contrary agent, for without contrariety there can be neither generation nor corruption: But in man's soul there are no contrarieties, for she can receive contrarieties without contrariety, because she receives not contrary forms as they are in their natural, but as they are in their intentional being: Hence it is that the heavens, though they be compounded, are not corruptible, because they are not subject to contrarieties. 6. The Gentiles, by the glimmering light of Nature, knew there were some supreme entities, by which the world was guided, the wicked punished, and the innocent rewarded; which the Poet acknowledgeth:  

Si genus humanum, & mortalia temnitis arma;  
At sperate deos memores fandi atque nefandi.   
But they saw, that for the most part, wicked men enjoyed most outward happiness here, and good men were most wronged and oppressed; therefore they believed the soul's immortality, that wicked men might receive their due punishment, and good men their reward, or else they must confess that their gods were unjust. And as this reason did strongly move them, so it must us also, to believe the soul's immortality: for it is a righteous thing with God, to render vengeance to the wicked, and 
1 Thes. 1.  to you that are afflicted peace with us, saith the Apostle. 7. It is an undeniable Maxim, that God and Nature made nothing in vain; but if there should be in man's soul such a desire, and so earnest an affection to immortality, and yet not enjoy it, that desire which God hath given to her had been in vain. 8. From what proceeds the horror of conscience in wicked men, their trembling at the report, and serious thoughts of future judgement? on the other side, the unspeakable joys of good men, their cheerfulness, comforts, and alacrity, even in their pains and afflictions, if they did not believe the soul's immortality, and that after this life all tears should be wiped from their eyes? 9 God made man for some end, and that was to enjoy eternal beatitude, which consisteth in the enjoyment of himself: but if the soul be mortal, man cannot attain to his end, and so God made him to no end. 10. In ecstasies and raptures, though the body be without sense and motion, and seems as it were dead; yet the soul is not, but remains unperished, or unextinguished: which doth argue her immortality. 11. If the soul were mortal as the body is, she would grow aged, feeble, and would decay, as the body doth; but we see the quite contrary, for than she is most active and vigorous, when the body is most weak and decrepit. 12. If the soul be corruptible, she may be separated from her existence and being: now this cannot be done, but by the work of an external and contrary agent, which is more powerful than the soul; but no contrary agent abolisheth one form, but by introducing another; nor taketh away one existence, but by giving another: for no action tends to a negative, but to some thing that is positive. 13. The Gentiles, by the light of nature, believed the immortality of the soul; hence sprung the doctrine of transanimation among the Pythagoreans, of the Elysian fields, and places of torment among the Poets,  

Hac iter Elysium nobis, at laeva malorum 
Aeneid. 6.   
Exercet poenas, & ad impia tartara mittit.   
Hence Tully concludes, that the ancient Romans believed the soul's immortality, because they were so careful of their dead bodies, and funeral ceremonies; Tam religiosa 
De Amici●.  jura majores nostri mortuis non tribuissent, si nihil ad eos pertinere arbitrarentur, etc. So Homer acknowledgeth 
Iliad. 23.  the soul of Patroclus to live, appearing after his death to Achilles: The word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by him, and imago by the Prince of Poets, is much used for separated souls, as— Inhumati venit imago,— Nota major imago,— Sub 
Aeneid. 1. 2. 4.  terras ibit imago, etc. The barbarous Indians assent to the soul's immortality, as Acosta, Lerius, Martyr, and others do witness: and Aristotle, who in some places seems 
De Anima. l. 1. t. 13. l. 3. t. 5. l. 2. de gen. Animal. c. 3.  to doubt, yet in other places plainly asserts this doctrine so universally believed, that the souls can subsist by themselves, because they have distinct affections and operations from the body, and the understanding or intellect enters from without into the body; it is void of passibility, and is some divine thing; and that the actions of the mind are not one with those of the body; and so in the ninth and tenth Chapters of his Ethics, we may see how he affirms the immortality of the soul, by her desire of beatitude. And whereas some think that he held the soul mortal, because he saith, she depends on the fantasy in her operation; they are mistaken, for he speaks of the soul as she is united to the body, and so she depends on the Fantasy; but yet only objectively, instrumentally, and occasionally, as the Philosophers speak, and not efficiently or formally; for it is true, that the Intellect receives its species from the fantasy, and therefore in the body depends antecedently from the fantasy: otherwise the Intellect is merely inorganical, and no ways depending on the fantasy, as a proper mover, and of itself, but only the passive Intellect thus depends on the active, and the act of understanding is altogether independent: And so when he says, that the passive Intellect is corruptible, he means nothing else but the fantasy or cogitative faculty, which, because it is in some sort capable of reason, he calls the Intellect, as he calls the passive Intellect sometimes by the name of fantasy, because it is moved by the superior Intellect. And so when he says, that remembrance and love perish in the soul, he means that their dependence, the one from the fantasy, the other from the appetite, perisheth, because these are corporeal faculties, and perish with the body; but otherwise recordation and love, in respect of their entity, remain in the soul as in their subject. So likewise when he saith, that the Intellect is in the possibility of the matter, he means that it is in the possibility of the matter in respect of introduction, not of eduction; as the matter is capable to receive it, when by a superior power it is thither induced. The soul than is in the possibility of the matter by way of reception, but not by way of extraction. So likewise, when he says, that the dead are not happy, he means the happiness of this life, which consisteth in operations flowing from the compositum, of which the soul is not capable. And lastly, when he says, that all have ending which had beginning, he means of those things which had beginning by generation; and so it is true: but the soul's original is by creation.  
Out of all than that we have said, it is apparent to any man, who is not a wilful Saducee or Arabian, that the soul is every way incorruptible, both in respect of grace, and in respect of nature; both in respect of external and internal agents, both in respect of annihilation and dissolution. There is only an obediential power of dissolution in the soul, as there is in Angels, and in the heavenly bodies, by the infinite power of the Almighty; and that rather by the negative act of his influx, than any positive act of resolving that into nothing, which he made of nothing: so that the soul hath no parts, principles, or causes in herself of corruption, nor of annihilation. Such reasons and arguments I take to be more evincing, than these farfetched notions of Sir Kenelm's, which he hath clothed with too many words; whereas Philosophical arguments sort not well with Rhetorical flourishes, and Tullian pigments.  
Now let us see what hath of old been, or can of late be objected against this known and generally acknowledged truth, by the impugners thereof. 
Sect 6. Object. 1.   
First they say, that the soul is immortal by grace, not by nature: To which I answer, that she is immortal by both; by grace, in that the soul hath her dependence from God, the first and sole independent entity, of whom, and by whom she is what she is, and so by that entity, as I said, she may be deprived of that being, which of his bounty she obtained: for, though she be free from subject and termination, yet she is not free from the causality of the first agent. She is also immortal by nature, in that there is nothing either in her own, or in the universal created nature, that can destroy or dissolve her. Our bodies are destroyed either by external agents, or by internal; the natural heat wasting our radical moisture, as a candle that is either wasted by the wind, or by its own heat: but in the soul, which is a spirit, there is no such thing.  
Secondly, they allege Solomon's words for them, Eccles. 
Sect. 7. Object. 2.  3. 19 where he saith, There is one end of man and beasts; as man dieth, so do they. Answ. Here is no comparison between man's soul, and that of beasts; but between the death of the one, and of the other: so that both are liable to death and corruption, and to outward violence, and inward distempers, which procure death in both: and both are so liable to the law and dominion of death, that from thence there is no redemption or returning by the course of nature: So that it's no more possible for man to avoid death, or its dominion, of himself, than it is for a beast. Secondly, Solomon speaks not this in his own person, but in the person of the Atheist, who will not forgo his earthly pleasures, because he believes not any heavenly, or any life after this.  
Thirdly, they would make job plead for them, when 
Sect. 8. Object. 3.  he says, there is more hope of a tree cut down, then there is of man, job 14. Answ. job speaks not there in his own person, but in the person of a wicked man. Secondly, though he did speak this as from himself, yet this will not avail our modern Saducees; for, by the course of nature, man cannot revive again, though the tree may sprout again after it is cut: which the Poet intimates, when he says,  

Pomifer autumnus fruges effuderit, & mox 
Horat. lib. 4. odd. 7.  Bruma recurret iners:  
Damna tamen celeres reparant coelestia Lunae. Nos ubi decidimus  
Quò pius Aenaeas, quò Tullus dives, & Ancus, Pulvis & umbra sumus.   
Thirdly, man shall not return again to live that life, or to perform those functions which he did in this world, when he lived here: but hence it will not follow, that man shall not be raised by that power which gave him being at the first: or, that he shall enjoy no life, because he shall not enjoy this life.  
Fourthly, they would feign draw in Austin to their 
Sect. 9 Object. 4.  side, because sometimes he doubts of the manner of the soul's production, whether it is by creation or traduction. Answ. 'Tis true, that sometimes he doubted of the manner how the soul entered into the body, because he doubted of the manner how original sin is propagated: but will this prove, that therefore he doubted of the soul's immortality, which he strongly maintains throughout all his Works? And so he doth also the soul's creation and infusion, although in a few places he speaks doubtfully of traduction, so fare as it hath relation to original fin; which notwithstanding is propagated, though the soul be pure which is infused, by reason of the union betwixt the soul and the body: for original sin is in the parent, as in the efficient; in the seed, as in the instrument; in the soul, as in the subject; but in the flesh by way of punishment▪ or rather indeed the whole man is the subject of original sin, which, with the soul, is conveyed from the parent to the child by, and in the seed; but only dispositiuè, not effectiuè; by disposing and preparing the embryo to receive the soul, and not by way of efficiency, producing the soul: and so, upon the infusion of a pure soul into the prepared and disposed embryo, the whole man is made up, who becomes the subject of original sin, by reason of the union of the soul and corrupted flesh; and in that he is the issue of such a parent, the branch of such a stock, which hath derived corruption in and by the seed, and fitted or disposed the body to receive a soul, though pure in itself, yet upon the union impure and corrupted, and even in itself actually void of original righteousness, and inclinable or potentially subject to guilt or sin. As a leprous father begets a leprous son, which leprosy is not in the seed actually, but potentially and dispositiuè; so the privation of righteousness is in the seed actually, but concupiscence, or inclination to sin, dispositiuè.  
Fifthly, they tell us, that man's soul cannot conceive 
Sect. 10. Object. 5.  any thing, yea not a spirit, but under the notion of a body; therefore she is corporeal, and consequently mortal. Answ. Though she were corporeal, yet is she not therefore mortal; for, the Sun, Moon and Stars are bodies, and yet incorruptible. Secondly, though the soul, being in the body, understands by the outward senses and fantasy, yet the act of understanding is inorganical, and that not only when she is separated, but while she is in the body: though then in the body she stands in need of the fantasy, without the body she shall not need it. Thirdly, the soul not only understands bodies under material notions, but searcheth deeper than any corporeal faculty can do, even into the natures, forms, and abstruse principles of bodies; so that here she understands the quiddities and essences of things, which a bodily power cannot do.  
Sixthly, they say, that the soul can suffer, to wit, by 
Sect. 11. Object. 6.  grief, pain, etc. therefore she is corruptible. Answ. As the soul is a spirit, so her sufferings are spiritual: all suffering supposeth not corruptibility, except it be caused by the prime elementary qualities, of which the soul is not capable. Secondly, there are some sufferings so far from being destructive, that they are rather conservative and perfective; such are the motions of the heavens. Thirdly, the soul suffers not, but by herself in grief: for by her own agency she makes herself a patiented; by her thoughts and knowledge of grief and sorrows she grieves and sorrows, and so becomes a sufferer.  
Seventhly, they tell us, that immateriality is no argument 
Sect. 12. Object. 7.  of the soul's immortality; for spiritual graces, which are infused into us, are immaterial, yet corruptible. Answ. These graces are accidents; we speak of the soul, which is a substance. Secondly, these graces are not corrupted by us physically, but metaphorically, or morally only.  
Eighthly, the desire of immortality, say they, is the 
Sect. 13. Object. 8.  affection of the whole man, not of the soul alone, and yet man is mortal: therefore they will not have us infer the soul's immortality, from her desire thereof. Answ. Though this desire be subjectively in the whole man, yet it is originally in the soul. Secondly, it is a good argument to prove, that something is immortal in man, though not all, because he so earnestly desires immortality. Thirdly, this desire is in man only, and not in beasts; which shows, that he, not they, hath an immortal soul. Fourthly, though the beasts strive to preserve their natural being, yet man only aims at a supernatural being, as having a more divine knowledge and appetite than other creatures are capable of. Fifthly, how much man desires immortality, is plain by the many pyramids, obelisks, triumphant arches, mausolets, brass, and marble statues, prodigious palaces, books, and other monuments; for which who would care, if he thought his soul should perish with the beasts?  
Ninthly, man's understanding perisheth after death; 
Sect. 14. Object. 9  therefore the soul cannot be immortal. Answ. Though the act of understanding did cease, yet the power remains, and consequently the soul, the subject of that power. for actually we understand not many things here, by reason of some defect in the organs; yet the soul ceaseth not therefore to be, nor the faculty of understanding to be none. Secondly, the soul doth actually understand, and more excellently, being separated, than she did in the body; because not only doth she retain the species which she carried out with her, but also she receiveth an addition of new species, by divine illumination. Thirdly, though she understands now by the fantasy, yet hereafter, by reason of new illumination, she shall need neither fantasy, external object, nor any corporeal organ. Fourthly, the knowledge which the soul shall have after death, shall be natural to the soul, though it proceed from God; for he is the author both of natural and supernatural light.  
These are the chief weapons, by which the Souls 
Sect. 15.  Antagonists strive to wound and kill her; which are of no more validity to hurt her, than that dart, which old feeble King Priamus fling at Pyrrhus, was able to hurt him:  

— telum imbelle sine ictu  
Conjecit, summo quod protinus aere pependit.   
These arguments make a sound, but have no strength: These Arabian Pigmies will never be able with such engines to overthrow the soul's immortality, which is the strong Fort and Citadel of every good Christian in his afflictions. Let there be but way given to this doctrine of the Saducees, we must bid farewell to laws and civility, nay, to Religion and Christianity. We must bid adieu to virtuous actions▪ and to all spiritual comforts. Christ died, the Apostles laboured, the Martyrs suffered, but all in vain, if the soul be mortal. Our faith, our hope, our preaching and reading, our restraint from pleasures, our sorrowing for sins, our taking up of our cross, and following of Christ, is all in vain, if the soul be mortal: And, in a word, we Christians are of all men the most miserable, if the soul be mortal. Why did Abel offer sacrifice, Abraham forsake his country, joseph forbear his mistress, Moses refuse the pleasures of Pharaoh's Court? And why have so many thousands endured mockings, scourge, bonds, prisonment, stoning, hewing asunder, murdering by the sword? Why would they wander up and down in sheep's skins and in goat's skins, being destitute, afflicted, tormented, if the soul be mortal? What needs Cain fear to kill his brother, joseph to lie with his mistress, Saul to persecute the Church, and Felix to tremble at the mention of a future judgement, if the soul be mortal? Admit but such Lucretian doctrine, you may shake hands with heaven and hell.  

Esse aliquos Maneis, & subterranea regna, 
juven. Sat. 2.   
Et contum, & Stygio ranas in gurgite nigras,  
Atque unâ transire vadum tot millia cymbâ,  
Nec pueri credunt, nisi qui nondum are lavantur.   
Here I had ended, but that I have now lighted on a 
Sect. 16. Man's mortality.  Pamphlet by chance, the Scribbler of which was ashamed to put to his name, his cause is so bad. He undertakes to prove the soul's mortality, but so weakly, that I should lose too much time, and spend too much paper to answer him according to his folly: For there is nothing in it but the froth of a luxurious wit, wantonly abusing Scripture, and obtruding a cloud in stead of juno, shadows of reason in stead of solid arguments: As first, when he will prove the death of the soul out of Scripture, he brings those places that speak of the metaphorical or spiritual death of the soul, which is the defiling of her by sin, and her separation from God; and so he confounds the life of nature, of grace, and of glory, as he doth death spiritual and corporal. Secondly, he abuseth the synecdochical speeches in Scripture, when he will have those phrases which are spoken of man, to be understood of the soul and body dis-junctively: And so, when the Scripture speaks of man's dissolution and death, he will have the soul die as well as the body; but by this means he must affirm, that the soul eats, drinks, plays, sings, weeps, because these things are spoken of men. What? were the souls of the Egyptians drowned in the red sea, and the souls of the Chaldeans burned in the fiery furnace, or the soul of the disobedient Prophet torn by the Lion, because these men died such deaths? Many things are spoken of the whole man, but not wholly: the total compositum is the subject of such predications, but not totally. Christ died, was buried, was borne, was crucified; and yet his Divinity suffered none of these things. He is a bad Divine, that knows not, that by the communication of properties, that is spoken of the person of Christ, which is proper only to either of his natures; and so that is spoken of man, which is proper only to either of his essential parts. Thirdly, he confounds the act and the habit, concluding that the habit is lost, because the act ceafeth; as that there is no habit or faculty of reason in a mad man, because the act of reasoning is hindered: As if you should say, that a Musician hath lost his skill in Music, when he ceaseth to play. Fourthly, some old objections he hath inserted, which we have already sufficiently answered; and the rest of the passages in his Pamphlet are so frivolous, that they are not worth the answering, or reading: for, Magno conatu, magnas nugas dicit. And so, he that shall diligently read this former Discourse of ours, and shall make use of these four Observations which now I have set down, will find that this irreligious rhapsody of his, is but froth, a vapour, or one of his dreams, Par levibus ventis, volucrique simillima somno: 
Virgil.  and which I think will little prevail with any rational man, much less with him who is truly sanctified with grace. For he that was led merely by reason, confessed, that the fatal hour of death was the last hour to the body only, not to the soul. Decretoria illa hora, non est animo suprema sed corpori. 
Seneca.  For, even reason will teach us, that the soul, which in herself is immortal, (I exclude not here the general, but the special or miraculous concourse of the Almighty,) may naturally subsist by herself after separation; for if her subsistence from the body were violent, than her return to the body should be natural; as, if the holding of a stone in the air be violent, the falling down of that stone, upon the removing of the impediment, must needs be natural: But her returning to the body, is an not miraculous, and of supernatural power; for though the soul, as she is the form of the body, hath a natural propensity, or innate appetite to a reinforming of, or reunion with the body, yet is she not again conjoined with the body, but by a special and supernatural work of God in the resurrection. Neither again must we think that the soul subsists after separation, by any special or supernatural power, for than we shall make the soul so subsisting, of no better metal than the iron so swimming on the water, both being sustained not by their own, but by a special and miraculous power; and by this means the soul of a dog may as well subsist after death, as the soul of a man: but he that thinks so, that the soul hath no other being after this life, may be in name a Christian professor, but is indeed a Cynic Philosopher, or Epicuri de grege porcus, fitter to dwell in the Isle of dogs, then among men. Therefore, as it was natural for the child's soul to subsist in the mother's womb, and it is as natural for the same soul to subsist without it; so is the subsistence of the same soul in and without the body essential and natural to her, and not violent or supernatural.  
But, to leave these men, whose souls are fit 
Sect. 17.  to dwell with Nebuchadnezars in a beasts body, then in their own; I will conclude this Discourse with an acknowledgement and confession of that solace, and true comfort which I take in these dismal and calamitous times in which we live, from the consideration of my soul's immortality; that, however she be now tossed upon the proud and lofty billows of the turbulent sea of afflictions in this life, with Noah's Ark, yet a higher mountain than those of Ararat is prepared for her to rest upon; and however this weary Dove flutter upon these boisterous waters, that she can find no rest for the soles of her feet, yet she sees a window in that celestial Ark which is above, ready open to receive her. Christ hath not in vain gone to prepare a place for us; he hath prepared it, that we may enjoy it: and to what end should he shed his blood for our souls, and redeem them at so dear a rate, if they be mortal, and can not enjoy that which they long after, as earnestly as the Hart brayeth after the rivers of water? Doth God mock us, when by his Prophet he tells us of fullness of joy in his presence, and at his right hand pleasures for evermore? Is God our Father, and Heaven our Inheritance, and must we be put off from the enjoyment of either? We are here miserable Pilgrims and strangers, if, after our tedious journey, we have no other home to rest in but a cold and stinking grave, and no other companions but worms: better is the condition of beasts, then of Christians. Surely the place of our future rest should not be called the Land of the living, if our souls there must die. And why should the Angels be so careful of us here, if they must be debarred of our company hereafter? In vain are our souls fed here with the Bread that came down from Heaven, if they must not enjoy that same bread again in heaven. Our condition will be far worse than that of the Prodigals, if we shall be fed with husks here, and not have access, when we return by death, to eat bread in our Father's house, where is such exuberant plenty. Can Christ, the Bridegroom of our souls, suffer himself to be perpetually separated from his Bride, whom he hath bought with so high a price as his own blood? Our life is a warfare, what encouragement have we to fight the good fight, if we enjoy not the Crown of righteousness? Hath Christ no other reward for his soldiers but a crown of thorns? then indeed we fight, as one that beateth the air; and we were better, with Caligula's soldiers, spend our time in gathering of shells and pebble-stones, then fight under the standard of such a General. But indeed we need not fear, for he that permitted the soul of the penitent thief into Paradise, and by the ministry of his Angels conveyed the soul of Lazarus into Abraham's bosom; and when himself gave up the Ghost, recommended his soul into the hands of his Father, will not leave our souls in hell, nor will he suffer his holy ones to see corruption. Though the shell of our bodies be broken, the precious kernel of our souls shall not be lost: these earthen pots may crack, but the jewels in them shall be preserved: There lieth a hid Mannah within (not our golden, but) our earthen pots, which is not capable of worms and corruption. Let that proud insulting Conqueror, who rides upon the pale horse, bruise the satchels of our bodies (as the Tyrant did that of Anacharsis) unto dust, yet over our souls, which are ourselves, he hath no power. Be not dismayed; though our mistress, Nature, strip us of the garment of our body, as Potiphars wife did joseph, yet of our▪ soul's she cannot rob us: she gave us the garment, it is her own, she may challenge it; but the soul was no gift of hers, she hath no title to it, she cannot claim it. Diseases, infirmities, and injuries, like so many Sodomites, may beset these houses of our bodies; but they cannot injure our souls, which are the Angels lodged within us. The celestial fire of our souls shall never be extinguished, though the temples of our bodies in which they burn shall be destroyed. That fire which consumed the Temple of Peace at Rome, did no hurt to the Palladium that was in it; neither shall the conflagration of our bodies in a Calenture or Burning-fever, prejudice or hurt our souls. The Vestal Virgins were not more careful to rescue the Palladium from the flame, than the good Angels, our ministering spirits, shall be to convey our souls out of these flames, unto a place of refreshing. Therefore my soul shall not be dismayed, though she be carried in this weak and leaking ship of an infirm body, on the waves of the Red sea of persecution; for even from hence she smells by faith the sweet odours of her heavenly Arabia, though as yet with her bodily eyes she cannot see it. The hot fiery furnace of affliction shall no more consume and annoy her, than the flame did consume the fiery bush, or the fiery furnace of Babylon did the three Children. The Presteres live in the fire, and are not burned; fresh waters spring out of the salt Sea, and yet are not thereby infected; nor are the fishes salt which live in salt water: neither shall our Soul either suffer by sickness in the body, or die with the body; but after she hath fought the good fight, like a Conqueror or Emperor, she shall be carried out of this campus Martius upon the shoulders, not of Senators, but of Angels. And as an Eagle flew out of the funeral pile when it was set on fire, leaving the body of the Emperor to be consumed; so shall our souls fly up unto their Maker, leaving their bodies to be wasted by time and corruption. For, as it is impossible for the body to die till the soul forsake it, which is the life of it; so much more impossible is it for the soul to die, until God, who is her life, forsake her: and that will never be, till God himself cease to be; for he hath promised never to forsake us, his love like himself is unchangeable. A mother may forget the fruit of her womb, fathers and mothers may, and will forsake us, but the Lord will never forget or forsake us; but when friends, and all leave us, he will then receive us: therefore let our souls magnify the LORD, and let our spirits rejoice in God our SAVIOUR.   
FINIS.