To my Honoured Friend Mr. M. T. one of the Committee chosen by the Common Council of London, for the Insuring of Houses from Fire. SIR, YOurs I received, together with the Enclosed Papers about the Undertaking of some private Persons for the Insuring your Houses in the City from Fire; and according to your Request, shall give you my Sentiments concerning this matter; which though others that know to what a Master of Reason I writ, may call it Presumption, yet your Commands have made it Duty and Obedience. I could not but wonder that when you and the other Magistrates of the City were consulting about this Affair, what pretence a few Foreigners and private Men could have to chop in, and set on foot the same Design which you were managing, not only without, but also directly against your consent. For though they pretend that they were the first Inventors of it, and therefore please themselves with a fond Conceit that the wisdom of the Parliament will allow them the sole enjoyment thereof for a considerable time, if not for full Fourteen years; yet it is sufficiently known that this Affair was propounded in your Common Council as early as Febr. 1670. long before ever it entered into their thoughts, and ever since from time to time continued under Consideration how it might be most effectually put in Practice. So that 'tis plain, these Gentlemen have lighted their Taper at your Fire, and that in more Senses than one they are building on other men's grounds. But if they had been the first Inventors of this Design, yet I doubt not but I shall make it evident, that it is far more for the Public Good that the City should be entrusted with the management of it, than these or any other private men; Because, (1.) the City can settle a better Security; (2.) 'tis more reasonable the City should enjoy the Profits arising from it; (3.) it would be of ill consequence to entrust these private Persons and Foreigners with the management of it; and (4.) it would be no prejudice to the City or Citizens to have it in their own hands. First, The City can settle a better Security or Fund for ensuring Houses than these Persons have or can. 'Tis sufficiently known that the City of London is already possessed of Ground-rents to a great value, of a clear Title, and free from all manner of Encumbrances, and can when they will augment the same, in manner and measure, far beyond what these or any other private men can reach to. And whereas they propose Lands and Ground-rents to the value of but Thirty thousand pounds, the City hath resolved that Lands and Ground-rents, to the value of One hundred thousand pounds at least, shall be forthwith settled; and likewise the Praemium, as an additional Fund, shall be soon after settled to ensure Houses subscribed for, upon trusties of some of the Principal Citizens, chosen by the Insured from among themselves, which trusties shall be obliged by their Hand and Seal, each of them to the Insured, for the payment of their Losses and satisfaction of Damages, in case the same be not immediately performed by the Chamber, where will always be a considerable Bank. The division therefore of Securities into Real, Personal, and the Seal of a Corporation by the Author of the Enquiry, etc. was very impertinent; for there was no intention to practise the strength of the City Seal at all, but only in settling the Ground-rents on the trusties, as to which the Enquirer himself will not Question its validity. But the Insured are to have their Security from the trusties, for their Damages if their Houses should be burnt; for the Recovery of which, there is no need (as the Enquirer pretends) of commenceing a tedious Suit with the City, but they may immediately have Relief in Equity upon the Fund, as in all other Trusts whatsoever. The clearness of which Fund, I hope the Enquirer will not have the impudence to call in question. And sure there's none but will believe it to be a better Security than any that can be given, either by a person whose Chamber-door daily suffers an Assault and Battery, from a whole posse of Bricklayers, Carpenters, Masons, etc. and who, if one may judge by the several Actions of Debt that every Term are brought against him, is in a fair way to Retire for Refuge into one of his own Chambers, which he hath built in the Temple; or by one, who though he may be thought to be shot up into some considerable height from a low and ordinary Condition (as Rushes do from Mud) yet is every day liable to be called to an Account for Maladministration of a Public Office: and if he should be found to be in Arrears to his Majesty, even those Lands or Ground-rents which he offers as a Security, would be seized in the behalf of his Majesty. I know indeed the Enquirer pretends the Security would be better, as settled in private Persons, than in the hands of the City. His Arguments I shall consider, and answer, as First, He pretends the Design will be better managed by the private Persons, because men's Credit, Care, and Industry will be more concerned to preserve Private Interest than Public, and so Fires will be better prevented and extinguished. But to this I answer, sad Experience shows us that Estates and Public Revenues which have been committed to the care of a few private Persons, have been miserably perverted; but where have any been more carefully and faithfully applied, than those that have been entrusted with the Chamber of London? 'Tis but too often seen, that a man by leaving his Children to the care of two or three private Guardians, hath in effect as fatally exposed them, as some did of old to ravenous and devouring Beasts, that have made a Prey of them; that have spent their Portions for them: or at best, when they have bestowed them in Marriage, have made a Match for them, and a Bargain for themselves. Those Hospitals, for the most part, that are in the hands of private Gentlemen, are but sadly looked after; for they are usually made Lodges for their Porters, Stables for their foundered Grooms, etc. So that the Hospitals themselves are become the objects of Charity, whereas those Orphans that are looked after by the City of London, have their Estates preserved and duly paid; and the Revenues of those Hospitals which the City inspects, are laid out for those Pious purposes for which they were given. Besides, the Revenues for the maintaining of London-Bridge are husbanded by the City with all the care and prudence imaginable; but if they were in the hands of these private Gentlemen, I am afraid the Decays of that Bridge would not be so much repaired as those of their own Estates. Further, Late Acts of Parliament have entrusted the Chamber of London with the Money for building of Churches, Disbanding the late Army, etc. And if the choice of trusties for any of these purposes were now to be made, who would prefer these private Persons before the City? I doubt not but the City would be as diligent, faithful, and industrious in this Affair of quenching Fires, as it must be acknowledged to be in all the forementioned Particulars. But Secondly, The Enquirer pretends that the payment of Losses, and satisfaction of Damages, will be easier and sooner dispatched by the Office of these private men, than by the City, because of the Attendance on the Court of Aldermen or Committees. But to this I answer; The City have erected an Office, where there shall be constant attendance, and ready dispatch given. And I dare say this Office, erected by the City, shall pay the Losses of those whose Houses are burnt down sooner than this Enquirer shall the wages of those that built his up. Thirdly, Saith the Enquirer, a private person must part with all to satisfy his Debts, but in any great loss the City will rather have Private Concerns suffer than the Public. To which I answer, There is more reason to fear that these private Persons, in such a Case, will insure themselves instead of their Creditors. They are more likely than the City to be reduced to such an Exigence, as to be forced to break or compound. A little leaky Scholar sure is more in danger of sinking in the wide Seas, than a large, beautiful and well-built Ship. Besides, the nature of the Security proposed by the City, destroys the foundation of this Argument; which last Consideration will serve as an Answer to the Fourth Argument also, That if the City refuse to pay the Loss, the Remedy is not so Easy against them as against Private Persons; for the Party aggrieved is not to sue the City, but may have Relief immediately in Equity, upon the Fund, as aforesaid. Thus it appears, that the City can settle a better Security or Fund for Insuring Houses, than these Private Persons have or can. The Second Reason why the City, and not these Private Persons should Insure Houses, is, because it is more reasonable the City should enjoy the Profits arising from their own Citizens, than these Foreigners or out-lying Deer. The Enquirer indeed objects, That the Profit of Insuring will not be so considerable as the City may imagine; but 'tis very well known, the Primary intention of the City (though we may easily judge what the Inquirers) in Insuring, is not to rake together a mighty mass of Money, but the Security of every particular Citizen's House, and of the whole City in general; and this being effectually provided for, the City is content, let the Profit of this Undertaking be as little as the Enquirer pretends, or less; but how little soever it be, I am sure 'tis too much for one that hath made it his business to run up a multitude of Houses, in the adjacent parts, as if he were resolved to drain the City of its Inhabitants and Trade. I think I may too truly say, He hath done almost as much prejudice to the City by building Houses, as the Papists by firing them. The Third Reason why I cannot grant these Private Persons should Insure, is, because it would be very much to the prejudice of London if they should: For, First, I am very well satisfied, that the City of London have under their present Consideration the making of certain Engines, etc. for the quenching of Fire; which, as they will be far more useful for the Public than any that hath yet been invented, so they will be by much too Chargeable for these Private Persons to provide themselves withal, and 'tis but reasonable the City should have the Profit of this Undertaking, that so they may receive no prejudice by the Charges thereof. Secondly, For the Quenching of considerable Fires, a numerous Assistance ordered by Authority is requisite, for otherwise the more Company the less Help. Now the City have the Magistracy, who by Law are empowered to command Constables, Officers, and Private Citizens, as they shall judge most useful. Thirdly, If the City become the Insurers, not only the Magistrate, but every Private Citizen will be more diligent and industrious for the Quenching of Fire; for every man will then consider, That the spreading of the Fire will not only be a loss to those particular Persons whose Houses are in danger, but the Revenues of the City in General would be impaired by it, which potent Argument would be lost, if Private men Insure. Fourthly, The City hath no reason to intrust a matter of this Consequence within their own Walls, in the hands of Foreigners, and perhaps Enemies to the City, though indeed Friends to themselves. Fifthly, The Chief Magistrates of the City are Sworn Surely and safely to keep the City, it is therefore an affront to them for any to take their work out of their hands, as if they were not sufficient to Secure the City, but Foreigners must be called in to do itâ–ª Sixthly, Suppose the Lord Mayor and other Magistrates, should think fit for the Common Safety to blow up a House which happens to be Insured by Private men, and these Private Undertakers minding their private Advantage should be of another mind: on this Competition may ensue Quarrelling, Blows, and Bloodshed, and the two Parties concerned be more zealous in opposing one another, than the Fire. The Fourth and last Reason, why I would have the City and not these Private Persons Insure, is, because it can be no prejudice either to the Citizens in particular, or the City in general to do it. Not to the Citizens, in particular, for as to what the Author of the Letter concerning Insuring, etc. objects about the Magistrates being liable to be biased in the exercise of their Power in blowing up Houses. I shall only say, He reflects upon the Prudence and Justice of the Magistrates of this City; besides, the Magistrates are empowered to blow-up Houses when they see occasion, whether the City Insure, or no; and though the City doth Insure, yet the Magistrates will have no private Advantage themselves by it: so that there is no reason to think they will be biased in one case more than in another. And whereas the Author of the Letter Insinuates, as if the City might hereafter put some unreasonable Tax upon Insuring Houses, I shall only say, the City hath already set bounds to itself in that case, by giving the particulars of the prizes both of Brick and Timber-Houses, either for a shorter or longer time, or for Ever (a thing which these Private Undertakers are not capable of doing) whereby they have tied up themselves from a possibility of enhancing their Prizes, if they had a mind to it: And that the City should be supposed to make a prey of itself by screwing up the Prizes, is to me as ridiculously as it is insolently objected. Thus the Citizens in Particular will not be prejudiced if the City Insure, neither will the City in General receive any damage by it. I know the Enquirer indeed pretends a great difficulty in raising and settling the Fund. But the City have already in their hands all the first Fund of Ground-Rents and Lands to the value of One hundred Thousand Pounds, and can as easily make them over to the trusties, as any Private Person can make over his Estate. And all the Difficulties mentioned by the Enquirer, as to the great number of Houses, that must be Insured to raise Twenty Thousand Pounds for a further purchase of Ground-Rents, the uncertainty of finding out a Purchase, or the Owners setting too high a Price upon them, will lie as heavy upon these Private Gentlemen as upon the City; and whatever good opinion they may have of themselves, I cannot but believe that the City is far more able to conquer a Difficulty than they. But further, the Enquirer objects, 'Twill be a matter, if not of difficulty, yet of ill Consequence, for the City to Insure, which he endeavours to prove by Three Arguments. First, This will lessen the Security of the Chamber for the payment of the Orphan's Portions, and the same settlement of a Fund may be justly expected, and cannot be justly denied them. But, (1) All besides this Enquirer know, that the Orphan's Portions are entrusted in the Chamber of London barely upon its own Credit (which it hath never forfeited) and that neither the Ground-Rents nor any other of the City Lands, are, or ever were engaged for their Security; neither, if the Chamber should fail, (which I hope our Enquirer will not be so Insolent so much as to suppose it will) are they liable to make any Satisfaction. And, (2) 'Tis as well known the Chamber of London never desired the Orphan's Money, the keeping thereof being a constant Charge and Trouble, but no Advantage to them; and therefore if the Relations of the Orphans will but give good Security, the Chamber never covets to have the Orphan's Money paid in to them, neither could they, if so minded, oblige the Relations thereto. Secondly, The Enquirer objects, If the City ever should have occaston of borrowing Money, those that lend it will expect as good Security as is offered by the City in this Case of Insuring, and not be content with the Security of the Seal only, especially when 'tis publicly known, that a great part of this City Lands are engaged for this use. But I Answer, (1) Whatever occasion the City had of borrowing Money as yet, these Ground-Rents were never engaged for it, so that when these Ground-Rents are engaged upon this design; the City can still give as good Security as ever yet it had need to give, (2) The raising and settling this Fund will rather strengthen than lessen the Security of the City, because 'tis agreed on by all hands, that this matter will be profitable more or less to the Undertaker, or else it may reasonably be concluded these Private Persons would never have engaged in it. But in the Third and Last place, The Enquirer objects, That if the City should Insure, it would be an Imitation of their Pattern. This I cannot but smile at, because 'tis so notorious as I intimated in the beginning of this Letter, they have borrowed this Design from the City, though they have the face to deny it, and ascribe it to themselves. But when I consider the condition of the Enquirer, the Principal of these Private Insurancers, I do not think it strange, that he who refuses to pay what he is indebted to others, should refuse to acknowledge what he owes to you. But whatever he or his Associates may do in this matter, I shall never follow their Example, but on all occasions freely and thankfully own and confess those many Obligations which Your Goodness hath so often laid upon him, who is, Honoured Sir, Your most humble faithful Servant, L.R. LONDON, Printed in the Year, 1682.