REFLECTIONS UPON THE CONDUCT OF THE King of Great Britain In the late WARS. Contained in a LETTER from a Subject of One of the Confederated Princes, to a Friend in HOLLAND.  
Done into English.  
SIR,  
SInce in renewing the Correspondence between us, which has so long a time been interrupted you are fallen upon the subject of the Affairs of Europe, and particularly touching the share that the King of Great Britain has had therein for some late years, which has given you occasion to take some freedom in making reflections upon the Conduct of that Prince; I do not doubt but you now reciprocally expect my Sentiments upon this Matter, which by consequence I will give you, with the same liberty, but also with all the impartiality, that an honest Man can have in judging of the actions of others, and much more of those of Great Princes. You may easily imagine, I know nothing of the Articles of that Treaty of Alliance you speak of, between the said King and Spain, and I must confess to you, that the Author of the Reflections upon that Treaty, seems to have found a fine matter for the exercising of his Pen. But as amongst all the sport of his Wit, the severest Remark he makes, seems to me to be in the Paragraph where he blames that King for not having endeavoured to put a stop to the course of the Victories of France when it lay in his Power; and for having contributed more than any Other to the Greatness of France: it does likewise concern us Allies, for the measures we are to take, to judge soberly. If this imputation can be justly charged upon that Prince, it is then very true, that to take the thing in general, 'tis difficult not to lay the blame at His Door, for not having taken the part of the Allies before the Peace, and that this seems to justify Our Resentments against Him. However, to give them so much the more ground, if they are just, let us consider what time in the course of Affairs could be assigned to Him for the entering into War; and to decide that question in general, it seems it ought to have been either when the Interest of His Nation, or His own Honour, or the Necessity of the Allies began to exact it. Now as for the Interest of His Nation, and principally of His Great City of London, methinks that King could not have chosen a better Policy, than after being got out of the War, wherein He had left His Neighbours engaged, to keep His People as long as He could in Peace, and in a state of enjoying alone the Commerce of Europe, and advantage which We know was envied them with anguish by you Hollanders, and which made you so impatient to engage England in a War as well as yourselves, even before the Honour of that King obliged Him to it, or He was pressed to it by the Necessity of the Allies. As for the Honour of His Majesty, what could He desire more glorious, than to see Himself the Sole Mediator, and when He pleased, the Arbitrator of the Affairs of Europe, to receive the Differences and Addresses of all other Pinces', and in short, to have it in His Power to re-establish a sure and Honourable Peace, when He thought convenient, either by His own sole Authority; or by joining His own Forces to it, when it should be necessary to employ them for that purpose: this Case of Necessity being the sole one, which could change the Considerations of the Honour of His Majesty, and the Interest of His Nation. 've now to examine at what time it began, when it was pressing, and how far we may impute to the Prince we speak of, the having failed in what all these Considerations together Counselled Him to do. We shall easily agree, that while Our Forces were sufficient, not only to defend us, but even to attempt upon France, it would not have been handsome for us to have proposed to that King to have engaged Himself contrary to the Interest of His Nation. Now it is manifest that during the three first Campaigns, at least after the Peace between His Majesty and Holland, We were in that posture, which may be easily made appear by looking back upon the events of those Campaigns. Certain it is that at and after the Battle of Seneffe, in the Year 1674: the Forces of France were worsted and continued in the weakest condition, the Prince of Conde was obliged to retire beyond the Sambre; and the Army of the Confederates was then in a posture of laying Siege to Oudenarde; and though the Prince of Conde made an effort to come suddenly to its relief, he would in all probability have been repulsed, if the Count de Souches, General of the Imperial Army, would have come up in time according to the Advice of the Prince of Orange, of which His Highness made great Complaints to the Emperor, and several of the Principal Officers of the Army refused to serve any longer under this Count, which obliged the Emperor to to take away his Commission. The Armies of the Allies were likewise much the stronger upon the Rhine that same Campagne; the Elector of Brandenbourg took his Winter Quarters in Alsatia, from whence Monsieur de Turenne was obliged to retire and go to Paris; and though by an admirable Diligence and Conduct, he returned the same Winter, and constrained the Forces of the Elector to repass the Rhine, which he likewise passed himself in order to the Campagne of 1675. This however having been his last and fatal Year, General Montecuculi repulsed and pursused his Army, diminished by above half, to the other side of the said River, and laid Siege to Sauerne: and though when the Prince of Conde (who was sent to save the Ruins of that Army, and give reparation to the Affairs of France) approached him, he raised the Siege, yet indeed it was only to triumph over that Prince, and to drive him before him as far as he pleased, after which when it seemed he might have made some good use of his advantage, he attempted nothing farther before their going into Winter-Quarters. On the other side the total rout of the Marshal de Crequi by the Forces of the Dukes of Lunenburg, and the recovery thereupon of the City of Treves out of the hands of the French, had reduced their Affairs into that condition, that His Most Christian Majesty found not a more present remedy, than to have recourse to His Arricreban, which was likewise beaten by the Duke of Lorraine, the Elector of Brandenbourg having besides so gloriously freed his Country from the Swedes and the Duke of Lunenburg and Bishop of Munster having stripped them of all they possessed in the Duchy of Bremen, except the City of Staden; Denmark having likewise taken part in the War, whereby the Sweeds remained altogether unable to defend themselves, and much less to assist France, the Forces of the Allies began to be formidable to it, and found themselves capable in the Campaign of 1676, to attempt at the same time the two Sieges of Maestricht and Philipsbourg. But as the most of 'em saw themselves in a fair way of making Conquests, Jealousy began to rise up among them, each Party fearing that his Neighbour would have too good a share therein, the Disputes for the Dividend having delayed the taking of Staden, and the succours which were to have come to the Prince of Orange, of the Troops which blocked up that Place, were the causes that this Prince was obliged to raise the Siege of Maestricht, during which the French had time to take Air from the Spaniards. Hitherto we all thought ourselves uppermost in our Affairs, which I might easily demonstrate by things that passed openly in the Congress of Nimeguen, which it was clearly to be seen by all the World, that the Most Christian King aimed at nothing but securing His Honour by a Peace that might have given us satisfaction. But after the misfortune of Maestricht, the Hollanders began to fear with more apprehension what afterwards happened, namely, That the remissness and different interests of the Germane Princes, the weakness of Spain, and the diligence of the French, the Spanish Low Countries would be swallowed up in spite of all the Forces of the Confederates. Yet as by the taking of Philipsbourg the Power of the Emperor was augmented, by that of Staden the Princes of Lunenburg and of Munster had their Hands free, that they promised a good and sincere Correspondence; and as there were great hopes conceived from the Zeal and good Conduct of the Duke of Lorraine, who commanded the Imperial Army, the Power of the Allies seemed still vigorous and formidable. But as the Most Christian King, by his usual diligence, began the Campaign of 1677. with the Sieges of St. Omer and of Cambray at the same time, before any Army of the Allies could or would appear, except that of the States, and the Prince of Orange being nettled with the reproaches of the Spaniards, that he did but eat up their good Land of Waes', while he saw two of their Towns besieged, out of a generosity which filled them with admiration, hazarded both his Army and Person for the relief of St. Omers, but without any other success than what might be expected from an Army inferior in Forces to that it attacked, which was likewise powerfully succoured by that of the Kings insomuch as the above mentioned Places and the Town of Valenciennes were thereupon taken by the French, and afterwards the Prince of Orange was obliged to quit the Enterprise of Charleroy, by a laudable and necessary prudence not to hazard once again all the Forces the States had left for their defence. On the other side it was evident that it was impossible for the Duke of Lorraine, and would be always so for the Imperialists to make any great Invasion into France, or to execute any considerable Enterprise elsewhere, while the French should content themselves with acting upon the defensive with a sufficient Army. I must confess it was in that juncture our Affairs began to stand in need of some powerful intercession of the Prince whose Conduct we are considering, and it is from what passed since in England, that we are principally to judge of his intentions.  
The Parliament had been a long time making him Addresses to recall his Troops out of the service of France; and though His Majesty suffering at the same time Six Regiments of His Subjects in Holland, and being to keep his Neutrality as Mediator, did at first only forbidden by His Proclamations any new Troops from passing into France, He recalled them at length, and they returned very much diminished in number, and misused as is well known. But as this was but the least remedy to our evils, and the Parliament had more warmly taken the Alarm, in the beginning of the Campaign 1677, Those Gentlemen were of Opinion that it was time to make some Paces towards a War, and prayed the King in their Addresses to fortify himself with Alliances against France. Hereupon to our misfortune, which will be found theirs likewise at the end of the account, Jealousies began to break out between the King and His Parliament. His Majesty demanded of them a Sum of 600000 l. Sterling, as necessary for the putting him in a posture of speaking and acting as became him. Those Gentlemen gave him only credit for 200000 Pounds with general promises of assisting him after he had made His Alliances. His Majesty imagined that the course they took was an encroachment upon his Prerogatives, and upon that Prorogued from time to time their Assembly, until the beginning of the Year 1678. In the mean while, after the end of the aforementioned Campaign of 1677, He called his Nephew the Prince of Orange into England, for the Personally concerting Affairs with him, and gave him in Marriage the Lady Mary, against the will, as was believed, of the Duke of York, that Princess' Father, which methinks is a sufficient testimony that this King withdrew himself entirely from France, and it has not been doubted but that the French so understood it. His Majesty made likewise thereupon an Alliance with your Republic, and at the assembling of the Parliament, communicated to them these things, with promises if they would arm him sufficiently to enter into a War, he would never be at rest until he had reestablished a Peace in Christendom, which any one Prince should not be capable of disturbing. Those Gentlemen thereupon presented him an Address, wherein giving him still only general promises of assistance, they desired him to make new Alliances, engage all his Allies not to make any Peace, but upon the foot of the Treaty of the Pyrenees, nor to have any Commerce with France, nor to suffer the Ships of any Nation to enter or go out of the Ports of that Kingdom. This Proposition which was very remarkable gave different motions to those it concerned. Most of the Allies took Courage seeing the assurance and resolution with which those Gentlemen spoke. It gave astonishment to you in Holland, where you were not desirous to embark in a long War, and were content with a Peace of less safety, and your profound Dreamers in Policy did already imagine that the English might carry their Arms as far as formerly into France. But it was very displeasing to the King as may be seen by the answer he made thereto, which was found very rational, and wherein after his Arguments, he presses them again to hasten their assistance of Money as the time required. But there still passed a Month or more before they completed the Resolution for Money to raise Forces. By that time the French had made themselves Masters of Ghent, and were in a condition of proceeding much further, before the Succours that were preparing in England could hinder them. The Hollanders seeing none of their Allies ready, some refusing to March, their own Forces being for the greatest part in the Spanish Towns, from whence they could not withdraw them, the rest being uncapable to defend them, were in a great consternation. The Most Christian King did not fail to take advantage of this juncture, and having made them Propositions of a General Peace, which he caused to be Printed, they easily disposed themselves to accept them, and to persuade their Allies to do the like. They sent for that purpose to the Duke of Villa Hermosa who opposed it a long time, but the Parliament in England seeing by the disposition of the Hollanders, that it would be almost impossible to prevent the Peace, and not being willing to leave the King armed, turned all their thoughts from War, and took the resolution to speak no more of Money, until they had obtained their demands in affairs of Religion, that Duke did likewise then accept of the Peace, seeing there was no timely succour to be expected from England.  
This, Sir, I take to be the true Draught of things, from whence we are to judge if the King of England is the only cause of the Greatness of France. We may certainly say, the Jealousies that arose betwixt him and his Parliaments are the true occasion of them. It was to be wished both for Him and Us, that either one Party or other had yielded sooner. I am not well enough acquainted with the Maxims of their Country to decide positively which ought to have done it. The King not only thought his Prerogatives were usurped upon, but seemed to have just apprehensions of engaging in a War, which it would be in the Power of his People to put an end to by shutting their Purses. If they had furnished him with the Sum of 600000 Pounds when he demanded it, he might either have engaged himself in a War, or been in a posture of making Peace as he thought convenient; but those Gentlemen apprehended to put Arms into the Hands of His Majesty for fear that he should make use of 'em to render himself absolute. However since they found it necessary to do it afterwards, had it not been better they had done it in time? To speak the Truth, methinks that Great Body though composed of so many Wise Heads, did not sufficiently foresee what might happen, or, those Gentlemen did secretly aim at Peace, while they openly declared for War, and they hoped the heat and resolution which they showed for the latter, would produce the former without striking a blow, and such an one too as they desired. We must however say that they shown a great deal of Wisdom in not continuing inflexibly bend to the last, to hazard rather the Ruin of Europe, than to confide an Army in the King. The consideration they had for the Public Good has likewise appeared in that they made no difficulty of paying that Army, though the King kept it on foot much longer than they ordered, for the obliging the French to restore the Towns of the Spanish Netherlands, before the restitution of the Swedes. The King likewise on his side, had manifestly made appear the little ground there was to suspect him of a design to render Himself Absolute; since having that Army so long at his Disposal, he made not the least use of it to that purpose. Methinks then that His Subjects may be in repose on that side, and would to God for our Interests, that the future Parliaments may be in the same disposition as was that we speak of, of yielding rather to His Majesty, than suffer France to draw the fatal advantages from their Dissension, which in all likelihood it will endeavour to do.  
I am, etc.   

London, Printed for H. R. 1682.