Error Nonplussed, OR, Dr. STILLINGFLEET Shown to be The Man of NO PRINCIPLES. WITH An ESSAY how Discourses concerning Catholic Grounds bear the Highest Evidence. Multum necesse est ut Propheticae & Apostolicae Interpretationis Linea secundum Ecclesiastici & Catholici Sensus Normam dirigatur. Vinc. Lir. cap. 2. Printed in the Year, 1673. PREFACE TO THE Learned of this Nation. IS it possible than that Error can admit Principles? Or (which is equivalent) that Truth cannot admit any, but must be quite destitute of such firm Supports? Or is it even possible that Falsehood dare so much as pretend to such Evident Grounds, and offer to make good her Pretence, and not sink in deepest Disgrace for laying Claim to a thing to which it must needs be Evident she has not the least Shadow of a Title? Certainly, whoever considers attentively that Principles are (properly speaking) First Truths, either Absolutely, or with Restriction to such a matter, and withal that these must be most perfectly Self-evident, and other Principles confining upon the former, must needs partake a very high degree of Conspicuousness by their near approach to those great Luminary Truths, will, upon the joining these two Considerations, easily conclude such a Pretence Unmaintainable, if things be rightly stated and proposed. Besides, since all True Judgements are built on the Things being such as we judged it to be, and what●s True is Impossible to be False, it must needs follow that (all Circumstances taken in) it was Impossible, and so, a Contradiction, the Thing, at what time we framed that right Judgement of it, should have been otherwise then it was. A Contradiction I say; for that which is in the Thing or Object an Impossibility, is a Contradiction in our Minds informed by that Object. Whence results this Great and Clear Truth, that Every Error necessarily involves a Contradiction, and every Truth a First Principle; and that, though not in Formality of Expression, yet in Reality of Sense they are both of them such. And is it possible that these Best Evidences now spoken of should be held Obscure or False; or that Contradictions (their Opposites) which Principle all Falsehoods, should gain the repute of Clearest Truths? Surely, there must needs be a strange perversion of Nature somewhere, when such Monsters in Rationality can obtain the Esteem of being Legitimate Production● of Reason: And, this must be either in the minds of the Persons to be informed, who are violently swayed by Passion or Interest to those of their own Party, so as not to consider at all What Evidence there is in what they say, but to accept themselves and cry up to others any piece of Empty Rhetoric, Plausible Talk, or pretty Irony for solid Conviction: or else in the Discoursers who are to inform those Readers; and the Chief Engine with which they work upon their want of Skill is to talk indeed of Principles, because 'tis the highest Credit that can be to be thought to have such Invincible Grounds: But they never look into the Nature of Principles and thence make out to their Readers what kind of Sayings those must be which can deserve that Excellent Name, lest they should disgrace themselves and shame their Cause; while the whole strength of their Discourse is built on this, that those Propositions they rely on are indeed Right Principles; and yet, when looked into, are no more like what they are pretended to be then so many old Wives Tales. It seems then to me both most Conducive to the Clearing of Truth, as also the most Candid and Equal way of proceeding to look first into the Nature of Principles, and by laying it open to determine thence what Propositions deserve that name, what not. For, if I rightly perform this, and it appear thence that Dr. St. has indeed produced such Grounds as have in them the true Nature of Principles and proceeded upon them, all his Discourse thus built, must necessarily be Convictive, and the Result of it a Certain Truth. But, in case he has not produced any such, his whole Discourse is convinced to be mere Trifling and Folly. A Principle then, taken as distinguish't from other Propositions or Sayings, involves two Perfections in its notion: Evidence and Influence upo● some other Truths that partake their Evidence from It. For, were it never so Evident in itself, yet, if it derived none of that Evidence to another, nor had Relation to any thing besides itself, it might be indeed in that case a Great Truth, but it would no more be a Principle, then that can be said to be a Beginning which has neither Middle nor End, nor any thing following it. Evidence is twofold, Self-Evidence and Evidence by way of Proof. The former belongs to First Principles as hath been at large proved in Reason against Raillery, Disc. 2. & 3d. Evidence by Proof, belongs to Subordinate Principles, which are Conclusions in respect of those above them, and yet themselves Influential to prove other things. And the Evidence of these must be resolvable finally into Self-evident ones, otherwise it would follow that all Proof must proceed higher and higher in Infinitum, and so nothing could ever be proved at all. Now other kinds of Evidence besides these two (speaking of Speculative Evidence) are unimaginable; since 'tis most manifest, that what is neither Self-Evident, nor made-Evident is not Evident at all. Hence is seen, that 'tis Impossible, the nature of Principles once rightly understood, Error (on whose side soever it be) should maintain its Pretence to Principles; Since 'tis Impossible that any thing should either be Self-Evident or Made-Evident which is not a Real Truth; as also Impossible that what's Evident any way (or, which is all one, a Truth) should patronise or abett Error. This way then of managing Controversies is perfectly Decisive; For which reason I have frequently pressed his Party to it in my Letter to my Answerer and other places, and have been seconded therein by the Learned and worthy Author of Protestancy without Principles; but none was ever found so hardy to attempt it, till this man of Mettle, hoping his tinkling expression and gingling wit would baffle even Truth itself, took the Confidence to talk of what he never understood. However he is to be thanked by us both and acknowledged a Generous Adversary, that, laying aside at present those frivolous Inconclusive ways of quoting Authorities which himself holds may deceive us in all they say, as also those Insignificant Devices of Pretty Jests and other Rhetorical Dexterities, he accepts our Challenge to such a manner of Fight, as must necessarily be Fatal to one side and Victorious to the other. Had he stated also the nature of Principles exactly, and shown his to be such, how formidable a Goliath had he appeared, and how terrible a man of his hands? whereas now, if it comes to be discovered that what he called a Sword, or a Canon, is indeed but a Bulrush, or Potgun (a Pygmy's proper weapons,) that is, if it be proved that those things he bragged of and relied on as Principles, are in Reality but so many Paradoxes or Impertinences, I hope we may s●●cease our Fears, and turn them into a more pleasant humour. Though the Prognostic be very obvious what he can do in this case, yet who knows but for once he may work an Impossibility, who (as will appear in the ensuing Treatise) has told us so many Contradictions. In the mean time, if he thinks fit to attempt any Reply, 'tis Evident from the former Discourse what he is to do, unless he will strangely Prevaricate from his Duty; viz. either to disallow my settling here the nature of Principles, and state them better, that is either to deny that they are to have any Evidence or Influence at all; or else, if he allows it, to make out that his pretended Principles have those Qualifications; which is best done by resolving them into First Principles and connecting them distinctly with their respective Consequences. And let him remember that, till he does this, he neither defends Himself against my present Answer, nor gives a home Reply to Protestancy without Principles (whatever gay things or things he says to particular passages in it) since himself acknowledges these Principles of his were intended an Answer to that Book▪ and out of the nature of both Treatises they appear to be the proper Return to it. I have no occasion, nor is it my intent here to write against the Church of England or any of her Legitimate Sons: rather I must declare that, in case they all hold as M. Thorndike (a Man of Eminent Learning & Esteem amongst them) declares himself to do (Just weights, p. 159.) that the Scripture interpreted by the perpetual Practice of God's Church is the Ground of Faith, which implies, that Practical Tradition is that which gives them Christ's Sense or Faith, and so is their Rule I must heartily applaud their joining with Catholics in the main Point of all, and which settled is apt to unite us in all the rest. What I impugn then here is a pestilent Tenet, destructive to all Episcopacy, and the very Essence of Church; making Church-Governors Useless in their main Duty of Teaching Faith to their Flock, and Lame in that of Government: For, if every private man is to rely on his own Interpretation, he ought neither believe nor Obey the Church when the contrary seems to his Fancy to be grounded in Scripture; and, if that man do but allege he judges in clear in Scripture, and consequently that the Church is corrupt and errs: I see not with what justice, according to these Principles, the Church can either excommunicate him or bind him to his Duty. I expect Dr. St. will object, that I deny divers of his Principles which some of ours have granted; for his Friend Dr. T. and he abound in such sleight Topics; To which, though I could answer, that unusquisque in sensu suo abundat in productions of Human Reason, yet I need only allege Dr. St's ambi-dextrous and ambiguous way of contriving his Principles to look so with different faces that even the same man may sometimes apprehend them to mean thus, sometimes otherwise. Besides, all his Confuters aim n●t at one End: Mr. E. W. intending only to show they conclude not the Point they pretend, and which is superscribed to them: Mr. N. O. to show their Destructiveness to Government; while I take for my task to discover their Oppositness to all Logic; True Learning, and Common Rationality, and that there is nothing at all in him of what was pretended, neither Principles, Consequences, Connexion, Conclusions, Reduction, Influence nor End: Nor must he think that every thing that is granted by any for dispute s●ke is allowed for good by the Respondent; 'tis frequent to express we grant things which we only pass as nothing to the main Point which is to be concluded; nor can Dr. St. pretend with any reason that others have yielded them to be Principles whereas I deny it: The Author of Reason and Religion, p. 650. has pithily declared his 〈◊〉 of them and their true merit, in 〈◊〉 words:— Whether the forementioned Principles be True, False, Controverted, or Obscure, no Verity peculiar to 〈…〉 be deduced from them,— which expresses their want of Clear Evidence, and so quite degrades them from the Dignity of Principles. If any think the Title prefixed to this Book forestals immodestly the Readers judgement; my Reply usust be, that I hope for Readers of more Prudence then to receive Prejudice from so easy an Occasion. A Counterfeit Modesty sprung from Sceptical Despair or Disregard of Truth will naturally dislike such Expressions; but those who heartily hold there is such a thing as Truth and entirely love It, will esteem the open avowing her complete victoriousness both Fitting and Necessary: and that she conquers at present, I have all the best Maxims of Rational Nature engaged for my Security. INDEX. ABsolute Certainty of Faith asserted. p. 21. 22. 50. 51. Attributes of God not engaged to preserve private Interpreters of Scripture from damnable Errors. p. 81. to 85. Not to be argued from alone. p. 32. 33. much less from Power alone. p. 33. 34. Certainty how abusively taken. p. 164. 165. 166. 168. 173. 174. 179. 180. True Certainty asserted and from its deepest Grounds explained. p. 167. 168. Moral Certainty in Faith discussed, p. 176. 177. 178. A Christian Life Spiritual. p. 8. 9 54. 55. 191. to 195. The Church turned with the heels upward by Dr. St. p. 96. 97. His six Conclusions examined. p. 211. the nature of Conclusions laid open. p. 222. Faith in Catholics Rational, p. 29. Infallibility requisite to Faith. p. 92. to 96. 104. 158. 159. 162. how found in the vulgar, how in others p. 133. to 157. Mankind how Infallible and in what. p. 186. to 189. Necessary to the being of a Church. p. 232. 233. 234. Principles agreed to by both sides examined p. 7. 8. etc. shown to be twofold p. 12. Principles not agreed to, examined. The 1st p. 20. the 2d p. 22. the 3d. p. 23. the 4th p. 24. the 5th p. 26. the 6th p. 30. the 7th p. 31. the 8th p. 35. the 9th p. 38. the 10th p. 53. the 11th p. 72. the 12th p. 73. the 13th p. 81. the 14th p. 85. the 15th p. 90. the 16th p. 96. the 17th p. 104. the 18th p. 106. the 19th p. 114. the 20th p. 128. the 21th 22th 23th p. 130. the 24th p. 159. the 25th p. 163. the 26th p. 171. the 27th p. 173. the 28th p. 179. the 29th p. 181. the 30th p. 185. Rule of Faith distinctly cleared. p 44. 45. 49. 54. 55. etc. unanimously held by Catholics. p. 45. 46. How held by the Council of Trent. p. 47. 48. Scripture not the Rule p. 60. to 69. p. 79. 80. How perfect, p. 86. 87. etc. 109. to 113. Sophistry in Dr. St. laid open p. 25. 26. 27. 28. 30. 31. 74. 75. 131. 132. 161. 164. 165. Ignorance in Divinity p. 191. 192. In Logic, p. 228. 236. 237. His Performances reduced to their proper Principles, Contradictions. p. 236. Tradition the Rule of Faith p. 45. 46. 141. 142. Union how to be hoped. p. 51. 52. Writing how capable to be the Rule of Faith. p. 36. 37. 38. Errata. PAge 2. line 4. receive. p. 11. l. 21. perfectly. p. 15. l, 2. disparate. p. 32. l. 1●. than we can p. 45. l. 12. Again. p. 67. l. 27. deal and this as far etc. to the end of the 4th line after. p. 81. l. 29. deal of. p. 84. l. 2. Endeavorers. l. 29. Endeavorers. p. 104. l. 4. deal we. p. 100L. l. 5. his. p. 124. l. 5. and. p. 131. l. 30. deal in the. p. ●. 2. l. 11. infallibly. l. 23. then. p. 834. l. 17. be False. l. 20. about. p. 159. l. 22. if. p. 100L. l. 14. as. l. 15. deal be. p. 167. l. 11. deal if. p: 173. l. 18. to a higher degree. p. 177. l. 23. which are. p. 181. l. 2. degree. p. 184. l. 24. ground. p. 185. l. 15. reason given. l. 18. keep men. p. 187. l. 14. is. p. 188. l. 14. dissatisfaction. l. 21. some. p. 192. l. 5. conformable. l. 16. it. l. 26. by her all. p. 193. l. 17. our. p. 198. l. 2. received. p. 199. l. 14. in wisemen in this point. p. 202. l. ult. The 5th and 6th. p. 214. l. 3. deal to. p. 216. l. 12. its. p 221. l. 18. Dr. St. p. 234. l. 18. applying it. p. 235. l. 23. produced one. p. 250. l. 9 not. THE FIRST EXAMEN CONCERNING Dr. Stillingfleet's Design in this Discourse, as expressed in his TITLE. 1. IN the first place, the Title superscribed to this Discourse, and signifying to us the Nature and Design of it, is to be well weighed; that so, we may make a right Conceit of what we are justly to expect from Dr. St. in this occasion: 'Tis this, [The Faith of Protestants reduced to Principles.] 2. Now Principles, as we have discoursed in the Preface, must either be Evident to both Parties, or at least, held and granted by both; else no discourse can proceed for want of Agreement in that on which all Rational Process is grounded. Also, they must be Proper for the End intended, or Influential upon the Conclusion which the Arguer aims to evince: otherwise, if the thing in question deceive not its Evidence and Truth from them, though those Propositions be never so evident in themselves, yet they cannot be to It, or in this Circumstance a Principle, whatever they may be in others. Wherefore, to make good this Title, Dr. St. is to produce nothing for a Principle, but what is either granted at first by both Parties, or else is of so open and undeniable an Evidence, as all the World must see and acknowledge it; such as are either first Principles, or those which immediately depend upon them, and are comprehended under them: or, if he builds on any Propositions as Principles, which are not thus evident but need Proof, he is at least to render them evident ere he builds upon them, And, lastly, he is to apply them close to that which he professes to conclude from them; otherwise, he can never show them to be Principles in this occasion, any more than one can be a Father who has no Offspring, or than any thing can be a Ground which has no Superstructures. 3. Next, we are to consider what Dr. St. means by the word [Faith] in this place. And, I hope, he will not think I injure him in supposing he has so good thoughts of the Faith of Protestants, as to hold 'tis more than a bare Opinion, whose Grounds may all be false: For if so, the Assent of Protestants as Faithful, may possibly be an Error, and all the Tenets they profess to be Truths, and hope to be saved by believing them, liable to be proved nothing, perhaps in reality but a company of Lies. If then (as in this supposition he must) he hol●s the 〈◊〉 of Protestants Impossible to be Fa●●e, he is 〈◊〉 to reduce it into 〈◊〉 Grounds and Principles as are likewise Impossible to be False; and, consequently, if it relies on Authority, he is to bring Infallible Authority for it; all that is Fallible (as Common sense teaches) admitting Possibility of Falsehood in whatever is grounded on it. Such Grounds then or Principles he is obliged to produce for the Faith of Protestants, in case he holds it may not perhaps be an Error for any thing he or his Church knows But, in case he judges this Assent or Belief of Protestants may be True Faith though the Grounds of it may be False, than he owes me an answer to Faith Vindicated, where the contrary is proved by multitudes of Arguments; not one of which has yet received one word of sober Reply from him or Dr. Tillotson; though, as appears by the Inferences at the end of that Book, it most highly concerns them both to speak to the several Reasons it contains. 4. In the third place we are to reflect what may be meant by the word [reduced] in the said Title. And, since all Truths not self-evident, nor known by immediate impression on sense, are at first derived or deduced from Principles; this word [reduced] having a signification directly contrary to the other, intimates to us, that Dr. St. makes account he has begun by putting the Faith of Protestants which is the Conclusion, and brought it back (for so the word [reduced] imports) to Principles; whereas 'tis Evident to every Scholar, he proceeds in a way quite contrary to what he here pretends. First, laying six Principles agreed on, than thirty others, which, since they go before his Conclusions we are to think he meant for Principles too, and thence drawing in the Close, six Inferences or Sequels; which is most manifestly to deduce from Principles, not to reduce to them. 5. But, however it be unblamable in one who owns himself a Scholar, especially pretending the rigorous and learned way of proceeding by Principles, not to understand the nature of the Way himself takes; yet let us kindly suppose that Dr. St. out of an unwariness only, made use by chance of an improper word; which being but a human lapse, is more easily pardonable; especially, since the Method he here undertakes, viz. to begin with Principles, is (if rightly managed and performed) the most honourable for a Scholar, and the most satisfactory that may be, and, so, deserving to make amends for many greater faults. Let him then by [reduced to Principles] mean deduced from Principles] yet since both reducing and deducing, imply the showing a Connexion between those Principles, and what's pretended to be drawn from them; and this either Immediate, as to every particular Conclusion, or Mediate: We are to expect Dr. St. should still show us this Connexion: which is best and most clearly done, by relating each of his six Conclusions to their respective Premises or Principles: that so, by this distinct proceeding and owning particularly whence each Deduction follows, we may be better enabled to discover the Goodness of his Consequences, and thence discern clearly the Truth of those Conclusions; which we are to suppose, his Intention in making those Discourses. 6. In the last place we are to weigh very well what is meant by that signal and particularising word [Protestant's:] for 'tis the Faith of these and these only, which he undertakes here to reduce to Principles. And I will have the kindness for him, as to suppose he so much zeals the Purity of the Protestant Church, as not to defile her with the mixture of Anabaptists, Independents, Quakers, and such like, much less the most abominable Socinians who deny the Trinity, and the Godhead of Christ. Therefore, these being secluded from the notion and name of Protestants, we are encouraged by this Title to expect such a Discourse as is not proper for Socinians, or any of those other Sects to allege for themselves; otherwise it might and ought with as much right be entitled The Faith of Socinians, Quakers, etc. (as the Faith of Protestants) reduced to Principles. The sum then of what we are by this Title to expect from Dr. St. is this; viz. to show us such Grounds for our Assent to Points as divinely revealed, as are Impossible to be Erroneous; and such as are not competent Allegations for Socinians, Arians, etc. but proper to Protestants only: Also, that these Grounds or Principles are such as are either self-evident or made evident. And this he is obliged necessarily to do, unless he will sustain either that Socinians, Fift-Monarchists, etc. are Protestants; or, that the Faith of Protestants is but Opinion; or, that there can be any Principles which are neither evident of themselves nor by means of others, that is, no ways evident, or not evident at all: Or, lastly, that he can show us any Conclusion reduced to Principles, or deduced from them, without showing us that it is connected with them. This then is what Dr. St's words bid us expect from him; let us see now how he answers this expectation. Second Examen. Six Principles agreed on by both sides examined, and their Import and Use weighed. 1. HE begins with laying down six Principles agreed on by both sides; and they are (as to the main) all of them very True and granted by us, if rightly understood: wherefore in case any ambiguous word do occur, I am to explain it, that so our perfect concurrence with him in admitting them may be rightly apprehended, and the discourse more unoffensively proceed, in case these Principles should come hereafter to be made use of. They are these. 1. That there is a God from whom Man and all other Creatures had their Being. 2. That the notion of God doth imply that he is a Being absolutely perfect, and therefore, justice, Goodness, Wisdom and Truth must be in him to the highest degree of perfection. These two first are rigorously and literally true, and worded very exactly. 3. That man receiving his Being from God, is thereby bound to obey his will, and consequently is liable to punishment in case of Disobedience. This Proposition is also most true; yet that it may more throughly be penetrated and rightly apprehended, it were not amiss to note, that though the word [obey] generally amongst us signifies doing some outward action willed by another, yet in this occasion 'tis to signify also, nay principally, the exercising Interior Acts of our soul, viz. of Faith, Hope and Charity; in which kind of Acts consists our Spiritual Life, as we are Christians. That then this Principle may be better understood, I discourse it thus; that, Because God, as far as concerns his own Inclination (or rather Nature) precisely, out of his overflowing Goodness will all Good, and amongst the rest, the Means to Eternal Happiness to his Creatures; and the Believing in Him, Hoping all good from Him, and Loving him are such Virtues or Perfections of the Soul as are apt and connatural means to raise and dispose it towards the attainment of Bliss or Fruition of the Deity, hence he wills that man should believe on him, hope in him, and love him; whence are apt to follow the outward observances of his Law, and if they follow not out of these motives they are not properly virtues or truly Perfective of the soul in order to its Last end, nor available in the least to the attainment of Bliss; nor Acts of Obedience to God's will, nor in true speech the keeping his Commandments. God therefore willing us Happiness to be attained through the proper means to it, it follows that those who disobey this Holy will of his, that is, those who do not cultivate their minds with the said Virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity, become liable by such their disobedience to eternal misery; as wanting through this neglect, the Proper Means which is to elevate them to the capacity of attaining Heaven. 4. That in order to Man's obeying the Will of God, it is necessary he know what it is; for which some manifestation of the Will of God is necessary, both that Man may know what he hath to do, and that God may justly punish him, if he do it not. 5. Whatever God reveals to Man is infallibly true, and being intended for the Rule of Man's obedience may be certainly known to be his Will. I approve very well of these two Principles. And to this end I make it my request to the Proposer of them, that the word [manifestation] and [certainly known] may be understood in their proper signification for that which is True, or Absolute Certainty; and not be taken abusively as Dr. T. still takes it for such a Certainty as is indeed Incertainty, as is shown at large in Reason against Raillery and Faith vindicated. Again, that we may know whether this be a Principle agreed to by both sides, as Dr. St. pretends, I shall first put down our Tenet, which is; that (at least) the Pastors of the Church, who are to teach the Faithful, convert Unbelievers, (amongst whom are many acute wits) as also to defend their Faith, and make out the Truth of it, may, nay must have Infallible Grounds, and so be Infallibly or Knowingly Certain of what God revealed to Man, that is, of their Faith. If then Dr. St. grants the wisest portion in God's Church to be thus Infallibly Certain of their Faith, we agree with him in this Proposition; but if he denies this kind of Certainty to them, and consequently (there being no middle between Infallible and Fallible) says they, and so, the whole Church is only Fallibly-Certain of what they believe; he both speaks nonsense, and lays for a Principle agreed on by both sides, that which is absolutely denied by us, and indeed the main point in Controversy between us. 6. God cannot act contrary to those Essential Attributes of justice, Wisdom, Goodness and Truth in any way which he makes choice of to make known his Will unto man by. This Principle is absolutely granted, having no Fault in it, but that it expresses not all the Truth it ought; for God not only cannot act contrary to those Essential Attributes, but he is obliged by his very Nature to act perfectly according to them, in making choice of such a Way or Rule to make known his Will unto man by, as shall be (all things considered) most proper for Mankind; that is, most suitable to the respective Capacities of those who are to be led by it, that so their Acts of Faith (as far as they spring from the Provision of motives laid by God) may be pefectly rational; and also most effectual to the end for which God intended that Rule and Faith which depends on it. These are the six Principles Dr. St. proposes as agreed to by both sides; which (in the main, and thus understood) are of so universal a Nature, and such sacred Truths, that if he draws any necessary consequences from them to the establishing the Faith of Protestants, or overthrowing that of Catholics (which latter seems chiefly intended) his Victory is likely to be very complete; If he does not, but rather makes no use at all of them in concluding from them what he pretends, and his Title imports, it must needs be understood that they were only produced to make a plausible show, and to prepare the Readers mind to Apprehend he must necessarily conquer all before him, having such sacred Principles engaged in his Patronage. One thing more I am to add on this occasion; which is, that no discourse at all can proceed, unless all the Principles be agreed to by both sides; for, if the Person against whom we argue deny our Principles, 'tis a folly to hope by means of them, to force him to admit of the Conclusion depending solely on those Principles for its Truth and Evidence. But we are to reflect, that an Adversary may two manner of ways grant us our Principles; either voluntarily and of his own accord; or else forcibly, that is, convinced by strength of Argument, if the Principles be subordinate ones, and so can admit Proof; or for fear of shame from Human Nature, if they either be First Principles, or that the Controversy by discourse be reduced to that most Evident Test. Since then Dr. St. makes account we yield him but these six voluntarily, we are to expect from him such manifest proofs for the other thirty, as may make us by the clearness of their Evidence, or under the penalty of having Mankind our Enemy for deserting Rational Nature, assent to their verity: otherwise, there is no hopes for him to conclude any thing at all, while we are at liberty to deny every thing he builds on. But alas! how far is it from such Talking Disputants, even to think of such performances; though the necessity of his duty, if he pretends to Principles, obliges him unavoidably to it. Third Examen. Sifting the first nine Principles that seem to concern the Nature of Divine Revelation in Common, and its several ways. AFter these six Principles agreed on, follow thirty other Paragraphs, or whatever else we may guests it fit to call them; and they are introduced by this Transition. These things being agreed on both sides, we are now to inquire into the particular ways which God hath made choice of for revealing his Will to mankind. I expected that since Dr. St. had promised us to reduce the Faith of Protestants to Principles, he would after he had put down the Principles voluntarily agreed to by both sides, have pursued the Method himself had made choice of, and have produced next, the Principles made use of by him in this particular matter which we are not voluntarily agreed on; and either have maintained them to be First Principles, and so, self-evident; or else subordinate ones, and deriving their Evidence from those First, and therefore have shown us their derivation from them, or Connection with them. This had been a Method becoming a man pretending to ground himself on Principles, especially in a discourse where this, and this only was pretended; for by this means it might, as reason requires, have been examined first, whether those Principles had subsisted or no in themselves; which, if they had, then only the Consequences had needed Examination; and so the Business of Truth had been quickly decided. 2. But, instead of this candid and clear and Methodical proceeding, thirty odd kind of Sentences, Sections, Paragraphs, or I know not what, come huddling in one after another, of such uncouth fashions, such desperate and disagreeing natures, so void of coherence with one another, that none knows well what to call them, not even Dr. St. himself, as appears by the Carriage of the matter. Some of them seem deductions from the Principles agreed on. Others seem to contain Entire discourses of themselves. The Illative particle [therefore] or its Equivalent, which necessarily Ushers in all Conclusions, is so rarely heard of here, that one would verily think they were all Premises or Principles; but this Conceit is again thwarted, because divers of them are merely Hypothetical Propositions, involving sometimes such a condition as never was put; others are bare voluntary Assertions and False into the bargain. Some few of them pretend modestly to own themselves deductions from some other Paragraphs, but yet only hint it afar off, as it were, not speak it out plainly, as if they feared some danger: Others pretend to draw a Consequence in their Close, not at all following from the part foregoing. Lastly, the whole mass of them hang together like a rope of ●and for want of declaring their Relation to others; and, though now and then they sergeant a semblance of some sleight coherence, yet their whole Frame is loose and ill-built for want of an orderly and visible dependence of one part on another. Now, this odd variety in their Complexions puts an attentive Considerer at some loss what to name them; no Apellation fitting the thirty but that which is common to such Quantities of matter or Multitudes of lines (whether it be sense or nonsense) such as are Paragraphs, Sections, and such like: since their motley nature will neither let us call them Deductions, nor Conclusions, nor Principles, nor Propositions, nor Discourses, nor Inferences, nor Postulatums, nor Axioms, nor Maxims, nor Proofs, nor any thing of any such nature; and yet all this while the superscription is, The Faith of Protestants reduced to principles. 3. It were not amiss for all that, to consider what Dr. St. himself calls them, and to hope thence for some better knowledge of their nature than we could attain to by our own Consideration. But he is at variance with himself about the point, no one common name being capable to fit them all, where the things to be named are of so many Parishes or Families. All he does (as appears by his Transition) to make them all taken together, amount to an Inquiry into the particular ways which God had made choice of for revealing his Will to mankind. I do not by any means like this Insignificant word [Inquiry] 'Tis so very safe, that 'tis absolutely Inconfutable. Had he said candidly and plainly, [Hear follow the Principles not agreed on voluntarily which therefore I will make Evident, that my Adversary's Reason may be forced to acknowledge their verity, and by that means my discourse proceed, and way be made towards some Conclusion] he had offered me some play, for than I might possibly have discovered the weakness or Inevidence of his Principles, or the slackness of his Consequences; but now all my Attempts are defeated by this one pretty word [Inquiry] for though I should hap to confute every line in all the thirty Paragraphs, yet still after all this, none can deny but he has enquired into the Point in hand, whether he have produced one word to evince it, or no: Thus Dr. T. (in his late Preface) got rid of the hardest and mainly concerning passage in Sure-footing, by virtue of two insignificant words, alleging that he had [sufficiently considered] it in his Rule of Faith, which words were perfectly verified, though (as appears in Reason against Raillery Disc. 8th) he readily granted all I contended for as to that point. Once more I desire our Learned Readers to reflect on the different manner in which I and my Adversaries bear ourselves towards one another. I candidly avow my Grounds to be Evident Principles, my Consequences to be necessary, my Arguments to be absolutely- Conclusive or demonstrative; and by so doing I offer them all the fair play imaginable; and, (trusting to the invincible force of Truth) expose myself freely for them to lay hold of my discourse where they see it their best Advantage. They on the other side make a show indeed of bringing their Faith to Principles, because the very pretence is honourable; but when it comes to performance are so far from owning the Principles they proceed on for such, that (except in those six agreed on, which, as shall be shown, are not one jot influential to the point they are aimed to evince) they not so much as name the word [Principle] nor vouch any Argument Conclusive, or any Consequence to be Necessary, much less candidly affirm such in particular to be thus qualified; but hide and obscure all these in one dough-baked slippery word [Inquiry] by which means none can tell where to take any sure hold of any part of their Discourse. 4. Notwithstanding that Dr. St. is thus shy to name these thirty Paragraphs, Principles, in regard they are so monstrously unlike those Clear and Evident Truths, which use, and aught to bear that sacred name; yet 'tis manifest by his carriage he meant them for such, and would have them thought such too; for they immediately follow after the six Principles voluntarily agreed on, as if they were the other sort of Principles, not voluntarily agreed to; and all of them antecede his six Conclusions or Sequels which he puts immediately to follow out of them. Again, the Running Title superscribed to them is, [The Faith of Protestants reduced to Principles:] All which manifests to us beyond Evasion that he makes use of and relies on them as Principles, though he be something bashful to call them so directly. Wherefore in compliance with his Intention, we will for once strain a word to the highest Catachresis that may be, and by a strange Antiphrasis, call Black, White, and all these Paragraphs, Principles. 5. Yet, though there be nothing of candid and clear and consonant to any maxims even of Natural Logic in this Discourse, yet I must allow that there is as much cunning and slight and Sophistry in it, as could well be stuffed into so narrow a room: Wherefore, that I may not be like him, I shall openly profess before hand what I undertake, viz. to show plainly that he hath not spoke one efficacious word to the purpose he intended; that is, he has not produced any one Principle, one Reason, one Argument, either settling in the least, the Faith of Protestants, nor unsettling that of Catholics. This will be seen by our Examination of each particular Principle in order, and the Answer to them. To which I now address. 1. An entire Obedience to the Will of God being agreed to be the condition of man's happiness, no other way of Revelation is in itself necessary to that end; than such whereby man may know what the Will of God is. Love of God above all things, and of our Neighbour for his sake being the Fulfilling of the Law, does by consequence include in itself eminently an Entire Obedience to the Will of God, and is agreed to be the Condition of man's Happiness. Yet this Love or Charity presupposing Hope, and both Hope and Love presupposing Faith as their Basis; both of these do by consequence come within the compass of Obeying the Will of God, and are in their several manners and according to their several nature's [Conditions of man's Happiness.] as I doubt not but all sober Protestants will grant. Again, Faith being part of our Obedience to the Will of God, and so, commanded by him, and it being against those Attributes of God agreed on by both sides, to command Man to act contrary to the right Nature himself had given him and established it Essential to him, that is, contrary to true Reason; Also, Faith being a Virtue, and so agreeable to right Nature, nay more, a supernatural Virtue, and so, perfecting and elevating Right Nature or True Reason, not debasing or destroying it; it follows, from these and many other Reasons alleged in Faith Vindicated, that this part of our Obedience called [Faith] must be rationabile obsequium, a Reasonable Obedience, and that our Assent called [Belief] taking it as imposed by God, is conformable to Maxims of Right Reason, and that it perfects, and not in the least perverts Human Nature. But it is directly opposite to Human Nature as given us by God, or to Right Reason, to assent and profess that Points of Faith are True (as the Nature of Christianity settled by our Saviour enjoins us) in case we are to rely solely on the Divine Authority for the formal Motive of this our believing or holding them such, and yet when we come to doubt concerning their Truth, cannot possibly arrive to see any Grounds absolutely Certain, that the Divine Authority is indeed engaged for the Truth of the said Points. Also, 'tis quite opposite to Human Nature to love Heaven above all things, in case there be not Grounds absolutely certain that God has told us there is such a thing as Heaven, or such a Blissful state attainable by us in the sight of Him: wherefore, when Dr. St. says no other way of Revelation is in itself necessary to this end, or to the Entire Obedience to God's Will, than such whereby man may know what the Will of God is; we are to mean by the word [know] that at least the governing part of God's Church, or Ecclesia docens, may be absolutly-certain that the Points of Faith, (the assenting to and professing which, and grounding upon them Hope and this all-over-powering Love of Heaven, the main part of our Obedience) are True or Impossible to be False. If then Dr. St. takes the word know in this signification, this Principle is granted: if in any other, or for a great Hope only that they are True (as I fear when it comes to the point, he intends no more) I must for the Reasons here given, and many more alleged in Faith Vindicated, and Reason against Raillery, deny that no other way of Revelation is necessary, and put him to prove it, which he neither has done, nor can do. 2. Man being framed a rational Creature capable of reflecting upon himself may antecedently to any External Revelation, certainly know the Being of God and his dependence upon him; and those things which are naturally pleasing unto him; else there could be no such thing as a Law of Nature, or any Principles of Natural Religion. I suppose he means by the word [God] the True God, and then 'tis not so evident that every Man in the state of corrupt Nature may arrive to know him, however some few may, and in the State of Right Nature, All. And in case he takes the words [certainly know] in their proper signification, than he may consider how ill his Friend Dr. Tillotson discourses, who professes not to have, even with the assistance of Christianity, that Certain Knowledge of the Being of God, which (as Dr. Still says) was attainable by the mere Light of Natural Reason. 3. All Supernatural and External Revelation must suppose the truth of Natural Religion; for, unless we be antecedently certain that there is a God, and that we are capable of knowing him, it is impossible to be certain that God hath revealed his will to us by any supernatural means. If he means here Priority of Nature; 'tis to be granted; for this Proposition [God has revealed] implies and presupposes as its basis [God is] Butler, if he understands it of priority of Time, as I conceive he does, than I both deny the Proposition, and the validity of the Reason given for it. For, 'tis Evident both by Reason and Experience, that manifest and Convictive Miracles (which are supernatural and external Revelations) done before the Heathens, who yet know not the true God, in Testimony of Christianty, at once or at the same time made it certain that he whom we adore is the True God, and also that God revealed his will by supernatural means: and so 'tis not Impossible (as Dr. St. here affirms) to be certain of such a Revelation, without knowing any time before hand that there is a God, nor must All Supernatural and External Revelation needs suppose the Truth of Natural Religion, that is, of the Knowledge of the True God, as he pretends; since such a Revelation may cause that Knowledge, and so antecede it, not be antecedent to it. 4▪ Nothing aught to be admitted for Divine Revelation which overthrows the Certainty of those Principles which must be antecedently supposed to all Divine Revelation. For that were to overthrow the means whereby we are to judge concerning the Truth of any Divine Revelation. This Discourse seems at the first show to carry so clear an evidence with it, that nothing appears so Irrational as to doubt or dispute it. And indeed 'tis no less, if the words in which it is couched be not equivocally taken, but still be meant in the same sense. To prevent then the growth of a witty piece of Sophistry which I foresee creeping in under the disguise of an ambiguous word, I am to provide against it with a distinction both pertinent and necessary to the present matter. These words [Divine Revelation] may either mean the way or Act of Revealing, or else they may mean the Thing divinely revealed, that is, the Point of Faith: which differ as showing and thing shown, or as an Action and its Effect. In the same manner as the word Tradition is sometimes taken for the Way of Delivery, sometimes for the Thing or Point delivered. When they are taken for the one, when for the other, partly the circumstances and the aim of the discourse determine, partly some annexed particle or variation of the word; so that, if they be taken for the Thing revealed or delivered, and be expressed singularly, 'tis called A Divine Revelation, or A Tradition; If plurally, Divine Revelations, or Traditions. Now it seems something doubtful in whether sense it be taken here, for §. 1. he speaks of the Way of Revelation, which can only mean Revealing, and in the two following ones 'tis taken in the same sense as appears by the words [God hath revealed] found in the Third. But this matters not much, so it be here taken in the same sense throughout; which I fear 'tis not; For, the word [Revelation] is here made use of thrice; and, in the first and last place it seems plainly to mean the Points revealed; in the middle the Way or Act of Revealing; yet the two following Principles incline the doubtfulness of the Expression to mean the Points of Faith themselves; Though this be, to speak moderately, by far the more preposterous and absurd Tenet, as shall hereafter be shown. But I am to provide for both parts since I am to skirmish with such an ambidextrous Adversary; and therefore, applying this discourse to his Proposition, I distinguish thus, and grant that Nothing ought to be admitted for Divine Revelation (taking those words to signify the Act of Revealing) which overthrows the Certainty of those Principles which must be antecedently supposed to the Act of Revealing: Also I grant that nothing ought to be admitted for Divine Revelation (taking those words to signify Points of Faith revealed) which overthrows the Certainty of those Principles which must be antecedently supposed to those Points. This is candid and clear dealing, and far from that sophistical and equivocating ambiguity which (contrary to the Genius of Truth) he so constantly and so industriously affects. 5. There can be no other means imagined whereby we are to judge of the Truth of Divine Revelation, but a Faculty in us of discerning Truth and Falsehood in matters proposed to our Belief; which if we do not exercise in judging the Truth of Divine Revelation, we must be imposed upon by every thing which pretends to be so. Here are many acquaint things to be considered. For, if Dr. St. means that we cannot judge of Truth without a Faculty to judge of Truth, 'tis a 〈…〉 Principle, though very litt●● 〈◊〉 his purpose. But 'tis most 〈◊〉 paradoxical to say that no other means can be imagined to judge of Divine Revelation, but such a Faculty. For, if there can be no other means imagined but this Faculty, than This is all the means; and so those Knowledges which are to inform and direct this Faculty are no means at all: whence all motives to Faith, Rule of Faith, all Teaching, nay Scripture itself are to no purpose; For none of these are our Faculty of discerning Truth and Falsehood. Again, what is meant here by [Divine Revelation?] If it be meant of the formal Act of Revealing, then 'tis False that there can be no other means to judge of its Truth but a Faculty in us of discerning Truth and Falsehood in matters proposed to our Belief: For these Matters are Points of Faith, and 'tis a madness to think we must begin with examining their Truth ere we can know that God has truly or indeed revealed them; since the Knowledge that God has revealed or spoken is had ordinarily by natural means antecedent even to the Revelation itself, much more antecedent to those Points; viz. by the Rule of Faith, which shows the Divine Authority engaged for their Truth. But, if he means by Divine Revelation the things or Points divinely revealed, and (as appears by those words [matters proposed to our belief] he bends strongly that way) than the sense is evidently this, that we must judge the truth of the Points of Faith by exercising a Faculty of judging of the Truth of those Points: And since to judge is to exercise our Faculty of judging, it amounts plainly to this, that we must judge of the truth of Points of Faith by judging of the truth of points of Faith; which is an Identical Proposition and perfectly true, but not at all to his purpose. Yet it is too: for 'tis creditable now and then to speak clear Evidences, however in reality they prove Impertinencies. But if Dr. St. means nothing but that we must use our Faculty of discerning Truth and Falsehood, that is indeed our Reason even in Assenting to things above Reason, or to Mysteries of Faith, he says very right: For 'tis most Rational to believe that to be True which God, who is essential Verity, has said; and exceedingly Rational to believe God has said it, or (which is all one in our case) that Christ and his Apostles have taught it, upon an Authority Inerrable in that affair. And thus my Faith may be most Rational without exercising my Reason in scanning and debating the Truth or Falsehood of the matters proposed to my Belief, or examining the Points of Faith themselves. Nay more this Method of his is most preposterous and absurd; For, the Mysteries or Points of Faith being elevated above the pitch of our ordinary Natural Reason, and such, (for the most part) in which Gods Infinity most exerts (as we may say) It's utmost, but the Knowledge of the Rule of Faith which is to ascertain to us the Divine Revelation or that God has told us them, lying level to our Reason as informed by natural Knowledges; hence, to relinquish the method of examining the Truth of Divine Revelation by those Knowledges which lie within our own ken, and to begin with those which are most elevated above it (as it is to comprehend the extent of God's Infinite Power) is both against all Art and Common sense: Both which tell us we must begin with what's more easily knowable and thence proceed to what is less Knowable. Nor is there any danger of being imposed upon by everything that pretends to be Divine Revelation (as the Dr. scruples,) as long as we are Certain that God cannot lie, and that God has said this; for these put, the thing is most certainly True. 6. The pretence of Infallibility in any person or Society of men must be judged in the same way that the Truth of a Divine Revelation is; for that Infallibility being challenged by virtue of a supernatural Assistance, and for that end to assure men what the will of God is, the same means must be used for the trial of that, as for any other supernatural way of God's making known his Will to men. Here the words [A Divine Revelation] which he now first uses, give us to understand that Dr. St. means a Point of Faith and not Gods Revealing it or Divine Revelation; which words he used formerly. And this is farther confirmed by his saying that that Infallibility which is challenged by virtue of a supernatural Assistance must be judged in the same way that the Truth of a Divine Revelation is: For, such an Infallibility through supernatural Assistance of the Holy Ghost, consists in the Sanctity of the Church, which is a Point of Faith, and so the words [A Divine Revelation] which he joins and parallels to it, must mean a Point of Faith also. Whence is discerned what marvellous dexterity Dr. St. hath used to gain a notable Point against us, and how smoothly he hath slided from Gods revealing Faith to us, or the Act called Revelation, to the Points of Faith revealed: In hope by this confounding one with another to persuade his unattentive Reader; that, because 'tis the only right way of procedure to begin with the using our natural Reason so to judge whether God hath Revealed such a point or no; therefore 'tis fit to begin with the same Method in examining the Points of Faith themselves which pretend to be revealed, and thence conclude whether they be indeed divinely revealed or no: which how absurd it is hath lately been shown. But to come closer and apply this to his present Discourse. The Pretence of Infallibility by virtue of supernatural Assistance must indeed be judged in the same way that the truth of a Divine Revelation is; for both of them being Points of Faith must be judged by the same way all other points of Faith are; viz. by the Evidence there is that the Divine Authority cannot deceive, and that it stands engaged for those Points. 7. It being in the power of God to make choice of several ways of revealing 〈◊〉 Will to us, we ought not to dispute from the Attributes of God the necessity of one particular w●y to the Exclusion of all others, but we ought to inquire what way God himself hath chosen; and whatever he hath done, we are sure cannot be repugnant to Infinite justice, Wisdom, Goodness and Truth. I do not remember to have heard that any man living ever went about to dispute from the Attributes of God alone, the necessity of one particular way to the Exclusion of all others, nor does it appear how 'tis possible to do it without considering also the Nature of those several ways of Revealing: in doing which if we come to discover that only one is (as things stand) of itself sufficient for that End, and all others pretended to by those against whom we dispute depend on It for their Certainty, than they can safely argue from the Attributes of God, particularly his Wisdom that none but this could have been actually chosen by him. So that Dr. St. seems here to counterfeit an imaginary Adversary, having never a Real one. This will better appear if we attempt to frame a Discourse from God's Attributes alone. In endeavouring which it will appear that all we can argue from that single Head is this; that, What's disagreeable to God's infinite justice, Wisdom, Goodness, and Truth cannot be willed by him, and what's agreeable can. Now who sees not that this signifies nothing either to the Exclusion or Admission of any particular Way, unless we subsume thus, But this or that is most agreeable or disagreeable to the said Attributes; whence follows, therefore it is to be admitted, or rejected by him. Whence 'tis clearly seen that no Argument can be drawn from those Attributes alone without taking in the consideration of the nature of the Way itself, and its sufficiency or insufficiency, as Dr. St. himself confesses in common at the end of the 8th Principle, though he perpetually avoids to examine the particular nature of his Way, and its Fitness of mankind to build Faith upon its evidence. Yet let us see at least though it be so plain a point how weakly he proves that we are not to argue from those Attributes, It being (says he) in the power of God to make choice of several ways, etc. we ought not to dispute from the Attributes of God the necessity of one particular, etc. so that the Argument stands thus, Because 'tis within the extent of God's Power, therefore it crosses not but agrees with all those other Attributes; otherwise, if it did, we could with good reason argue from them against Gods having made choice of such a way. Now this reason of his is so palpably absurd that I admire the meanest Divine living could stumble upon it. For what man who holds God Omnipotent can doubt but that his Power can reach to reveal his Will to every single man by hourly Apparitions, the flying of Birds, nocturnal Dreams, or throwing of Dice upon a Fortune-book: yet no wise man will doubt but were we to inquire what is the way fit for God to reveal his Will to mankind by, we should reject these as misbecoming God's Wisdom, etc. and for the same reason all others but one, in case noneX but that one were of itself qualified to do that Effect as it ought, and so befitting God's Wisdom to make choice of it; and yet, notwithstanding all this, it might lie within the the compass of the Power of God to choose several others. It follows; but we ought to inquire what way God himself hath chosen; and whatever he hath done we are sure cannot be repugnant to Infinite justice, Wisdom, Goodness and Truth. All this is yielded to, unless he means this to be the only way of arguing from God's Attributes, as he would seem; which I must deny, and demand of him why 'tis not equally Argumentative to say, This way of Revealing or Rule of Faith, as both Experience and Reason shows, is evidently incompetent to give Faith that Certainty which its Nature and the many Effects to be produced by it, and Obligations incumbent on it, require it should have; therefore I am sure 'tis repugnant to God's Justice, Wisdom, Goodness and Truth, and so can never have been chosen by him. Or thus; God is infinitely Wise, Good, Just and True; therefore he hath not chosen a way so Incompetent to those Ends. In the same manner as out of the known Incapacity of a sieve to draw water, or to ferry one over the Sea to the Indies, we may conclude demonstratively that 'tis unbeseeming God's Infinite Wisdom, Goodness, Justice and Truth to assign that for a Means to attain that End: Or, if God in some extraordinary case intends such a Miracle, 'tis necessary all those who are to use those means be absolutely assured of this wonderful Assistance; otherwise if they compass not that End, but perish in the Sea, they may blame their own presumptuous rashness (which would needs tempt God) for their miscarriage and not God, who never bound himself by promise in frequent and ordinary transactions to bring about Effects miraculously by Imcompetent Causes. How weakly Dr. St. presumes rather than proves that God has chosen Scriptures Letter to be the Rule of Faith will be seen hereafter. 8. Whatever way is capable of certainly conveying the Will of God to us may be made choice of by him for the means of making known his Will in order to the happiness of Mankind. So that no Argument can be sufficient à priori, to prove that God cannot choose any particular way to reveal his mind by, but such which evidently proves the Insufficiency of that means for conveying the Will of God to us. First, Taking the words [certain conveying] to mean Absolute Certainty as I proved before in this, and in divers Treatises of mine to be requisite, I am next to distinguish the word [capable] which may either mean that the Way in common may possibly bear it, in case it shall please God to use his best Power to improve it, and make up its defects with all the Assistances it can need. Or it may mean that such a way or manner, as it stands now on foot in the world (for example the Scriptures Letter as 'tis now contrived) is of itself capable of conveying the will of God to us with absolute Certainty, without needing any other Thing to regulate us in the understanding it. Whatever is capable in the later sense I grant may be made choice of by God for the means of making known his will: For, this being supposed to have in itself actually all that is requisite for such an effect, is fitting to be made use of by God, whose Wisdom and Goodness it becomes (when he acts not miraculously) to use every thing as it is or according to its nature established by the same Wisdom. But I deny that what is capable in the former sense may always be thus made choice of by God; For, however such a way in common may be made capable to do that effect, if it should please God to exert his Power to support its natural defectiveness, as is exemplified before in Dreams, Apparitions, and those other odd methods there mentioned; yet 'tis unsuitable to God's Wisdom, Goodness or other Attributes to show himself so extraordinarily in things which reach the Generality of Mankind, and this for a perpetuity, and so ought to be allowed only his ordinary Concourse; especially if other means be already placed in the world able to perform this with a constant, orderly and connatural assistance. If then we can prove the Insufficiency of any Particular means (taking it alone as 'tis now found extant) belonging to such a way in Common, for example of the Scriptures Letter as it now is, to give Mankind Absolute Certainty of God's sense, or Faith; then, however the way of Writing in Common can possibly be supported by God's Infinite Power so as to be able to work the Effect of thus Certifying us of its sense, yet not being such of its own nature, taking it as it stands now thus contrived, 'tis not a fitting Instrument for God's ordinary Providence to make use of for such a general Effect as is the Certifying all sorts of people of their Faith. 9 There are several ways conceivable by us how God may make known his will to us; either by Immediate voice from Heaven, or inward Inspiration to every particular person; or inspiring some to speak personally to others; or assisting them with an Infallible Spirit in Writing such Books which shall contain the Will of God for the benefit of distant persons and future Ages. All this is granted and much more; for there are innumerable other ways conceivable how God may make known his Will to us, besides those here recounted, in case we regard only God's Power to do it, and set aside his Wisdom and other Attributes; namely those four ways mentioned by me above, and multitudes of other such. But, out of all these, God's Wisdom, which has pre-established the nature of all things, will make choice of That which is fittest to perform the Effect intended, that is, to certify absolutely the first delivered Faith to us who live now. And, left it should be too early understood which Way is best for that End, which would forestall and render void Dr. St's future discourses, he therefore very politicly quite leaves out any peculiar mention of our Rule of Faith, which one might have thought deserved a place amongst the rest. Leaves out I say, for those words [or inspiring some to speak personally to others] suit better with Prophetical Messengers than with the Tradition of God's Church. Wherefore, premising this Note, that it is agreed Christ and his Apostles taught and settled the whole Body of Faith at first, and therefore that there needs no more for us to know Gods Will now, but to find out what is the best means of conveying the same down to our days, I beg leave to supply Dr. St's. neglects, and to insert into the middle of this §. these words, [or else by the way of open Attestation of a world of Immediate Christian Fathers to a world of Children by living voice and constant practice of what they had learned by their daily sensations.] which had Dr. St. done, any considerate Reader, whom his much talking of God's Power and what God may do, had not diverted from reflecting that his Wisdom determins his Power in ordinary and General Effects to do what according to the established natures of things is the fittest means to compass such an end, would quickly have inclined to judge this the most connatural and fittest way, and therefore actually to have been made choice of by God; being assisted or supported by the basis of Human Nature according to its Sensations which are naturally framed to receive right Impressions, and according to his Rational Faculty, which determins him to speak Truth still in open and undisguisable matters of Fact; and, if that Body of men called the Church had any effectual means of Goodness in practice amongst them, super-assisted also by Grace not to v●ry from right Faith, and knowingly deliver a False for a True one. And thus ends the first Division of Dr. St's. Discourse promising to reduce the Faith of Protestants to Principles. In which I observe but a few things even hinted that can make for his purpose: and not so much as any one of them proved, but either slightly and slily insinuated, or dexterously brought in, not by Connexion of Terms, (far be any such piece of Confidence from so Learned and profound a Jeerer at Demonstration) but by the virtue of some pretty Equivocation. I remind the Reader of the chief of them by putting some of my opposite Propositions, each of which is made good in its respective place. 1. An Entire Obedience to the Will of God is principally performed by a heartily-assenting Faith, a Lively Hope, and an Ardent Charity, and not by outward actions otherwise than as they spring from these; therefore the way of Gods revealing his Will to us, or the Rule of Faith which grounds these, must be absolutely-certain or Impossible to be False. 2. The Nature of the Mysteries or Points of Faith are more removed from our knowledge than those Maxims which assure us that God revealed them; therefore 'tis not proper to begin with examining those Points but the Grounds for Gods revealing them. 3. This way of proceeding is perfectly secure; for, the Divine Authority being granted veracious, if there be Infallible Grounds that God has said them, those Points are Infallibly True: If not, they are not Points of ●aith; and so, not worth examining whether they be True or no. 4. God's Power alone gives us no Light what is or is not the Rule of Faith, but his Wisdom, Goodness, etc. joined with the Knowledge of the Fitness or unfitness of the Thing pretended to be so. 5. God's Wisdom makes choice of that way to reveal his Will to the Generality of Mankind, which, according to its nature as now established, is a capable or fit Instrument to such an Effect; and not by that way which is only capable to do it by an extraordinary working of his Power. These may serve for Antidotes to the opposite Positions, if he thinks fit to own them. For, though he is able to deliver himself as clearly as most men, if he pleases, yet he affects all over this discourse a strange perplexed Intricacy and Ambiguity▪ and he puts down his Principles in the same manner as a crafty Lawyer who had a mind to bring an Estate afterwards into dispute, pens Writings. Much shifting wit there is in them, but nothing of candid, clear and down right. And this Intricacy is made greater by his unconnected way of discoursing; no man living being able to discern in better half of his odd-natured Principles what influence they have, either Immediate or Mediate, upon any thing following. The rest of what is contained in these nine, are either Absurdities, already laid open; or else Impertinent Truths, as will be seen by their uselessness in the Process of this Discourse. A Discourse CONCERNING The Rule of Faith, Necessary to the better clearing the following Principles. THe several Ways of Revealing, (at least as many as Dr. St▪ thought fit,) being proposed, he goes about in the next place to establish one of them, viz. Writing, to have been intended by God to be the Rule of Faith, or, the fittest means to ascertain Faith to us who live now; and this he does in the first five Principles▪ Whence he proceeds to reject the Infallibility of any Church whatever either to attest or explain those Writings; and this he attempts to prove in the five ●ex●. On this occasion it were not amiss to declare before hand, what I mean by Rule of Faith, or rather to repeat something of that much I have writ formerly concerning that point in my Second Appendix to Sure-footing, and elsewhere; that so (all equivocation being taken away) it may more clearly be seen where the Point sticks on Dr. St's. side, as also that his understanding me to have different sentiments from some Catholic Divines in this matter may be removed; for, if I understand myself or them, there is no variance at all between us in the Thing, but only in the Word. It being agreed then amongst us all that what Christ and his Apostles taught is God's Word, or his Will, and the Means to Salvation; all that is to be done by us, as to matters of Faith, is to know with Absolute Certainty what was the first taught Doctrine, or Christ's sense; and whatever can thus assure us of that, is deservedly called the Rule of Faith. Now, the word Rule made use of to mean a Spiritual or Intellectual Direction, is Metaphorical, or translated from some Material thing, as most words that express Spiritual Notions are; and 'tis one of those kind of Metaphors which are transferred from one thing to another for some Proportion or Resemblance between them. For, as a Material Rule is such a thing, as, if one endeavour to go according to it, and decline not from it, preserves one from going crooked; so, this Intellectual Rule called the Rule of Faith, is of that Nature, that, if one go according to it, and swerve not from it, it preserves one from going wrong or from erring, in his knowledge of what is True (or First-delivered) Faith; and Faith being intended for persons of all sorts or Capacities, the Rule of Faith must be able to preserve even those of the meanest Capacity from Erring in Faith while they rely upon It. Agian, this being the Proper and Primary Effect of the Rule of Faith, and every Nature that is, having essentially in itself a Power to produce of its self, and without the Assistance of any other its Primary Effect (or rather being itself that Power) as man to discourse, Fire to burn, etc. it follows that, since to preserve all that rely on it in right Faith is the Proper effect of the Rule of Faith, what has not in itself the Power to do this, and this of its self, independently on any thing else but on God (who establishes the Natures of all things to be Certain Powers to produce their Proper Effect) is not in true speech a Rule of Faith: Since than not one Catholic in the World holds that Scriptures Letter of itself and independently on something else (viz th● Church's Tradition attesting the Truth of the same Letter, and Interpreting it) has in itself Power thus to certify persons of all capacities of Christian Faith, without possibility of Erring, nor any one but holds the Church's Authority is able alone to do this Effect, (since 'tis known and confessed it actually performed this in the beginning) there is not one Catholic that I know of who holds either that the Scripture is the Rule of Faith (taking the words in this sense) or that any thing but the Churches living voice and Practice, or Tradition is It; and, so taking the words properly, as I do, they all agree with me. On the other side, taking those words [the Rule of Faith] for any thing that contains Faith, or that may signify it with absolute Certainty to people of all sorts, not of itself, but merely by virtue of another, whose Power of Asserting the Truth of the Letter in those Passages (at least) that concern Christian Faith, and of unerringly Interpreting it lends it to be thus certainly significative of God's Will; taking, I say, [Rule of Faith] in this sense, as some of ours do, I grant with them that Scripture is a Rule of Faith. So that still I agree with them in the Thing; only I descent from them in the word, and judge that this Container of Christ's Doctrine, as now described, is but improperly called a Rule of Faith; as not having in itself the nature of such a Rule, that is, not, having a Power in itself, and of its self thus to ascertain Faith by absolutely engaging the Divine Authority. This Distinction now given I learned from the Council of Trent; which no where says that Scripture is a Rule of Faith, as it does expressly of Tradition (Sess. 5.) but only that it contains Faith, as also Tradition does; but whether it contains it in such a manner that all those who are to have Faith by relying on it, may by so doing, be absolutely secured from erring, which is requisite over and above to make it in true speech deserve the name of a Rule, the Council says nothing. I am sure it is far from saying that people of all sorts reading the Scriptures and attending solely to the Letter as interpreted and understood by their private selves, shall be sure never to err in right Faith; nay, it engages not for their security from erring so much as in any one point; which yet ought to be said, if Scripture in itself, and of itself have the power of regulating them in their Faith or be a Rule. Rather the Council by its Carriage says the direct contrary; for, though being about to define against Heretics it professes to follow in its definitions the written word, yet 'tis observable * See Sure Footing 2d Ed. p. 145, 146. that it no where builds on any place of Scripture, but it professes at the same time to build its Interpretation of that place on Tradition; which evidently argues that though Scripture in the Judgement of the Council contained the Point, yet that which indeed regulated the Council in its Definitions, was the Tradition of the Church, as it also expressly declares where ever it defines. And I dare say that there is not one Catholic in the world who thinks the Council knew not both what and how to define against Luther and Calvin at that time, without needing to seek its Faith anew in Texts of Scripture; which plainly concludes that the Council was not regulated by It, or looked upon it as her Rule, but only considered it as of a sacred Authority and available against Heretics professing to rely on Scripture, and accusing the Church for going contrary to the Word of God. Nay the Council defines that none should dare to interpret Scripture contrary to the sense which our H. Mother the Catholic Church hath held and does hold; which clearly takes it out of private hands, and makes the sense of the Church, ever held, the only Interpreter of Scripture, especially in matters of Faith, and extends to all Scripture; which unavoidably makes it no Rule of Faith. I am sure the Distinction now given shows my sentiment consistent, if not perfectly agreeing with that Common Opinion of our Divines, that Scripture is a Partial Rule; or that Scripture and Tradition integrate one complete Rule. For they clearly mean by those words that Faith is partly contained in Scripture, partly in the Tradition of the Church. So that what they had an eye to in so doing was not the Evidence requisite to a Rule, but only the degree of Extent of Scripture to the matter contained in it; whence 'tis evident they meant only that Scripture contained some part of Faith, which I perfectly allow to it, and perhaps more. This is my Judgement concerning the notion of the Rule of Faith and what is such a Rule; and these my Reasons for that Judgement: If any one thinks he can go to work more Logically and exactly in finding out the true nature and notion of a Rule, and show me I take it improperly, I shall heartily thank him, and acknowledge my mistake. But I never yet discerned any such Attempt, nor do I see any reason to fear any such performance. And I much doubt should any Catholic Divine out of a Charitable Intention of Union (which I shall ever commend and heartily approve) trusting to the Equivocalness of the word, say Scripture is the Rule or a Rule, I much doubt (I say) that, when the thing comes to be examined to the bottom, it will scarce tend to any solid good; for, however Words may bend, yet the true Grounds of Catholic Faith are Inflexible; and we must take heed lest, while we yield them the Word, they expect not (as they may justly, having such occasion) that we should grant the Thing properly signified by that Word; which if they do, we must either recede, or else forgo Catholic Grounds. But now the difference between me and Dr. St's party is in the very Thing itself, and this as wide as Contradiction can distance us. For * Rule of Faith. p. 118. Dr. T. (whom he still abetts) makes it possible that he has neither True Letter nor True sense of Scripture: that is makes his Rule of Faith, and consequently his Faith built solely on It, possible to be False. And all that go that Way fall unavoidably into that precipice, while they admit no Grounds but what are Fallible, as I have shown at large in Faith Vindicated and Reason against Raillery. Whereas I still bear up to the Impossibility that Christian Faith should be a lie, and consequently I maintain that the Rule of Faith which engages the Divine Authority on which its Truth solely depends, and without engaging which it might be all False, must be Impossible to be False, or Infallibly certain. And hence, taking my rise from the Nature of Faith, in which all Protestants and indeed all that have the name of Christians (except some few speculators) agree with me, viz. that, taking it as built on those Motives left by God for his Church to embrace Faith, that is, taking it as it ought to be taken, 'tis above Opinion and Impossible to be False; hence, I say, building on this mutual Agreement, I pursue a solid Union, which I declare myself most heartily to zeal; Hoping that this point once distinctly cleared against the Sophisms and blinding Crafts of some weak Heterodox Writers, it will quickly appear that 'tis every man's Concern, who is of Capacity, to look after such Grounds that the Divine Authority (on which the Truth of all Faith depends) is engaged for the Points he holds, as are absolutely Certain or Impossible to be False. And I make account, that, were this quest heartily pursued, it would quickly appear, both by others Confessing the possible Falsehood of theirs, as also by enforcing Reasons, nay by Dr. Tillitsons yielding to the sufficiency of this Rule, Rule of Faith p. 153. Reason against Raillery p. 190, 191, etc. even when he was to impugn it, that nothing but Tradition or the Testimony of the Church can be such a Ground. Perhaps also it might be shown that both more learned and more sober Protestant Authors have owned the admitting Tradition and a reliance on the Church's Authority for their Faith, and for the true sense of Scripture in order to the attaining true Faith, than those are who have maintained this private-spirited way so zealously advanced by Dr. St. of leaving it to be interpreted by every vulgar head; to the utter destruction of Church, and Church-Government. This is and shall be my way of endeavouring Union, which beginning at the bottom, and with our mutual Agreement in so main a point that it bears all along with it, viz. the Absolute Certainty of Faith, is hopeful to be solid and well built, and, so, Effectual; if it please God to inspire some Eminent and Good Men to pursue home a Principle which themselves have already heartily embraced. If not, I have this satisfaction that I have done a due right and honour to Christian Faith, and given it that advantage by asserting its perfect security from error, as, God's Grace assisting, is apt to make it work more efficaciously both interiorly and exteriorly in those who already possess it. Fourth Examen. Sifting the the ten following Principles concerning the Letter-Rule and Living Rule of Faith. THe right nature of the Rule of Faith being thus stated, 'tis high time to address to our Examen how Dr. St. from Principles settles us such a Rule beginning from his tenth. 10. If the Will of God cannot be sufficiently declared to men by Writing, it must either be because no Writing can be Intelligible enough for that end, or that it can never be known to be written by men Infallibly assisted. The former is repugnant to common sense, for words are equally capable of being understood, spoken or written; the later overthrows the possibility of the Scriptures being known to be the word of God. I have already said, and in divers books manifoldly proved, that no declaration of God's will, or (which is all one in our case) no Rule of Faith, is sufficient, considering the Nature and Ends of Faith, 〈◊〉 obligations arising from it, but 〈…〉 to be false, and built on Infallible Grounds. This premised, we are to inquire, whether Writing be the best Way for thus assuring it in all Ages to the end of the world. To come then closer to our Answer. We are first to reflect again what Dr. St. means by the Will of God, at lest what he ought to mean by it: For, these words at the first sight, seem to signify only some External Actions commanded by God to be performed or avoided; and it is the Dr's Interest they should be taken only in this sense; for such a will is more easy to be signified by Writing than some other things of a more abstruse, spiritual and dogmatical nature, which yet are of absolute Necessity to be believed by the Church, such as are the points of the Trinity, Incarnation and Godhead of Christ who died for us: since then Gods Will extends not only to aim at Mankind's Attainment of his Last End or True Happiness, but also to provide for the best means to it, or, to give us knowledge of those Motives which are apt to create in man a hearty Love of Heaven above all things (the best Condition of Man's Happiness or Immediate disposition to it) it follows that the holding all those Tenets which contain in themselves such Motives, do all come within the compass of the Will of God. To omit many others, I will instance in two Points, of main Concern and Influence towards Christian Life; namely the Godhead of Christ, and the Real Presence of Christ's Body in the Sacrament. Now, who sees not how wonderful an Ascendent both these, if verified, must needs have over Christian hearts? Can any Amulet of Love be so charming, or apt to elevate to the Love of God above all things, as to be ascertained that he who was really GOD, Infinite in all his Attributes, and Infinitely happy in himself, should, purely out of his overflowing Goodness toward miserable mankind, take his nature upon him, become his Brother, Friend, Physician, Master, nay suffer for his sake many hardships during his life, and at length buffeting, scourging, crowning with thorns, and a most cruel death on the Cross; and to keep the remembrance of these many Benefits warm in our hearts to give us after a wonderful manner his most precious Body and Blood in a Sacrament instituted for that end; by this means not only reviving the memory of the former incomparable love-motive, but also adding new Incitements to that best of virtues by our apprehending lively that he so dearly embreasts and embosoms himself with us by his uniting himself to us through his corporal presence, that so our souls may by means of the Love springing from this consideration, feed on, and be united to him Spiritually? On the other side, if these be not Truths, but that the Church may perhaps err in embracing them, who sees not that the Church itself is Idolatrous (at least, materially) in giving True Divine Honour which is Proper only to the Creator, to a Creature? Each of these two Points then is of that High concern as to Christian Life and Practice, that it must needs be of its own nature either a most wicked and damnable Heresy to deny or else to assert it: Wherefore 'tis the highest Impiety to imagine that God has left no Way to ascertain Mankind whether these two Points (omitting many others) be True or False; since 'tis unavoidable they are, if True, the greatest and most efficacious helps to Christian Devotion that can be; If False, the greatest Hindrances to the same; as corrupting the best Devotions of those Christians into Idolatrous worship. The Knowing then the truth of these and such like, being most certainly willed by God, we are to expect such a Rule of Faith as is declarative of these, and such as these, with Absolute Certainty. Let us now consider whether Writing be the best means for such an end; which if it be not, it may certainly be concluded from God's Wisdom, Goodness, etc. that it hath not been made choice of, or intended by God for it. But 'tis observable that Dr. St. perpetually waves any Discourse of this nature, and chooses rather to argue from God's Power; which though I have already shown how Incompetent and Absurd it is, let us examine at lest what works he makes of it. If (says he) the will of God cannot be sufficiently declared to men by writing, it must either be, etc. I must distinguish the words [cannot be declared by writing] as I did formerly; and affirm that they may either mean, that the Way of Writing, as taken in the whole latitude of its nature and standing under God's Infinite Power ordering it with all possible Advantage to the end intended, cannot sufficiently declare God's will, as to such Points: or, they may mean that God's Revelation of his Will by Writing, so qualified as it is now actually found in the Scripture, cannot sufficiently, or with absolute Certainty declare Gods Will as to the Points aforesaid to men of all capacities in all future Ages. Taking them in the former sense, I deny the Proposition, and say that Gods will as to such Points can be sufficiently declared by Writing. For, 'tis absolutely within the compass of God's Power to contrive a Book on that manner as might define exactly, or else explicate at large in what precise sense every word that expresses each point of Faith is to be taken, and to provide that it should never be taken in that book in more than that one sense; or, if in more, to notify to us in which places 'tis taken in a different meaning. He could also have laid it so, that a hundred or two of Originals of these Books might be preserved publicly in several distant Countries from the Beginning, which might by their perfect Agreement bear Testimony to one another; and, so assure us the Text was kept hitherto inviolate even to a tittle, and also remain a Standard to correct all the multitudes of Divers Readins which, as experience shows us, is apt otherwise to set the Copies at variance with one another. He could also have so ordered it that the Original Languages might have been as well understood by the Generality of the Church as their own is, & so have avoided the Uncertainty of Translations: Again, lest crafty Heretics should at any time for the future, by wittily alluding places, or playing upon words, or other Sophistries, pervert the sense; God's Power could have caused a Book to be written after the manner of a large Prophecy, foretelling that in such a time 〈◊〉 place, such and such a Heretic should arise, perverting such and such a Point, and forewarn men of his Sophisms and Errors. This and much more might have been effected by God's Power to establish Writing such an absolutely Certain and Intelligible Way: which why his Wisdom should not have done, in case Faith be an Assent which, while it relies on the Ground God has left for Mankind cannot be an error, (as it may be if none can be absolutely certain both of the Text and sense of Scriptures) I would gladly be informed: Especially since Dr. St. tells us here (Princ. 15.) there is no need of an Infallible society of men, either to attest or explain them, and all that is Fallible (as common sense tells us) falls short of elevating it above possibility of being an Error: whence follows that there being no means on foot in the world, Tradition of the Church failing, or being set aside, to secure us absolutely of this; it can only be had by the Extraordinary Operation of God's Power securing the Letter of such writings, and rendering those Write themselves perfectly Intelligible in the manners assigned, in case Writing be indeed the RULE OF FAITH. Writing then can be the Rule of Faith, or able thus to ascertain Faith to us if Gods Infinite Power undertakes the framing it such as I have expressed; but, because experience tells us 'tis not so ordered, let us leave this Platonic way of considering how thing, should be in that supposition, and following the Aristotelian, consider things as they are; and accordingly examine how G●ds Wisdom has thought fit to order such Writings actually; and thence gather whether (however 'tis agreed between us, they be most excellent for other uses and ends) they were ever intended by the same Wisdom for a Rule of Faith. To evince the contrary of which, (not to repeat those many Arguments I have brought elsewhere,) I fartner offer these Reasons. First, If the Writings of men divinely inspired were meant for a Rule of Faith, then either all such Writings, as such, are therefore to belong to that Rule, or some only; If all, then since some Writings granted to have been written by such persons are known to be lost, it may be doubted, nay it ought to be granted that the present Written Rule is defective in the nature of a Rule, unless it be well made out that those divinely-inspired Writings which were lost were of another Nature than these extant, and therefore that they had no part in being a Rule: The Proofs for which point ought to be very pregnant and convincing; otherwise it may be questioned whether any Books writ by men divinely inspired had in them the nature of a Rule, or were intended for that end by God. And this is particularly enforced, because, Dr. S● here (Princ. 28.) makes Scripture the Rule and Measure of what we are to believe; and if the Measure fall short, 'tis to be feared the thing measured or Faith will fall short likewise. But, if he says only some of those divinely-inspired Writings were sufficient, 'tis very necessary it should be made out how many are needful; that so it might be throughly understood what are the precise Grounds of Christian Faith: concerning which yet there is much difference in opinion amongst those who hold the Letter-Rule; which signifies that none of them know distinctly what themselves assign or hold to be that Rule. Or, if he says that only those which God's Providence has preserved are that Rule; then he must either say that God's Providence therefore preserved these because they contained holy Doctrine and were writ by men divinely-inspired, or were apt to benefit future mankind; and then, by the same Reason, those which perished should have been preserved too; or else, that God preserved these in particular because these which remain are, besides those qualifications, Proper and Sufficient to be the Rule of Faith. And then he begs the Question, and supposes his own Tenet true, even while he is proving it so. Nex●, supposing the Originals of these Books now extant to have been once the Rule of Faith▪ it was requisite the Church in the beginning should have looked upon them as such; and consequently have made account for the first 300 years (till when they were not collected or universally proposed) it had no Absolute Certainty or Entire Body of their Faith. But, of this we hear not that any had the least Jealousy, or that they looked after Books of Scripture as Things without which the Church was not either absolutely Certain of its Faith, or had not all its Faith. Again, had those Books been then the Rule of Faith as (considering that some of them were unacknowledged, one scattered here, another there accidentally) is senseless to imagine. Yet, how can we ●ow, or, future Ages hereafter have Absolute Certainty that some substantial word or other is not altered, omitted, or inserted in those places that concern the main Points of Faith (for example, the Godhead of Christ, or the Real Presence) in case there be no Infallible Authority to attest the Truth of it, which Dr. St. denies here Princ. 15. It is not evident he must say that none of these can be made out with Absolute Certainty, and consequently confess with * Rule of Faith. p. 118. Dr. T. that all this may be otherwise; unless he have recourse to God's Extraordinary Assistance to the multitudes of Transcribers and Translators, because of the Necessity the Letter should be thus preserved still unchanged, in regard otherwise none could say his Faith is True: which again begs the Question, and supposes it the Rule of Faith instead of proving it so. Farther, Let the Letter be supposed exactly like the Original, how will that Letter secure from all possible Error all that rely on it, as the Rule of Faith ought, or, to use Dr. St's words (Princ. 15.) reveal so plainly the whole will of God, that no sober Enquirer can miss of what is necessary for salvation? Now if they cannot miss of what's necessary for salvation, they must needs hit on it, and so are in a manner Infallible, as to that point, while they rely thereon. To put it to the Trial, let us consider what Disputes there are out of Scriptures Letter, between Socinians and their Opposers about a Trinity and the Godhead of Christ: and what between Catholics and their Adversaries about the Real Presence. How many Interpretations of [This is my Body.] How many Allusions of one place to another in both those Points to hammer out the Truth, and these agitated on both sides, by Bodies of eminent men, excellent Scholars, Acute Scripturists? Must every sober Enquirer, and every private ignorant person who sincerely endeavours needs hit on the right, and judge better of these Points than all those Learned men? Or, must we needs conclude that all those learned Enquirers found in each of those vast different parties are mad or Insincere? I wish he would prove this: 'Tis his best Interest, and would give his Argument some likelihood; which till then has none: for the Fact being so notorious, how earnestly they all endeavour to find out the Truth of these points by the Letter, none will judge but that if their Heads or Hearts be not strangely disordered by Folly or Insincerity, the Letter which should inform them, is strangely incompetent for that end. But 'tis remarkable how neatly Dr. St. skips aside from the Point. He undertakes not to give us any Assurance that his sober or sincere Enquirers shall by virtue of this his Rule of Faith, find out that any one point of his Faith is an Absolutely Certain Truth, but only that he shall not miss of what is necessary for salvation, that he shall not err, or at least, not be damned for it. So that, for any thing appears by his discourse, let him but read the Scripture, though he holds nothing but Error by so doing, yet he is still in the way to salvation by the very Reading and Running into Error. But this deserves a particular reflection hereafter. Lastly, the very nature and Genius of the Scripture, as it now is, shows that, however it be excellently Useful for perfecting the Lives of the Faithful in many regards, yet it was never intended for the Rule of Faith. For, (to omit innumerable other reasons frequently alleged by our Authors,) Its several parts were evidently writ on several emergent occasions, and have not the least semblance as if the whole had been purposely compiled to deliver an entire Body of Faith. Nor does it observe any method tending to clear each several Point. For, it neither begins with defineing or explaining every word made use of in signifying those Points, which is the best means to avoid Equivocation, the Ground of all mistake: nor does it pursue home the evidencing any one Point, by making us aware of the sinister senses in which each word expressing that Point might seem to be taken; nor does it put objections against each Tenet, and establish us in the right Apprehension of it by solving them, nor distinguish by laying common Rules to know when the words are to be taken properly, when Metaphorically, much less tell us particularly in which places each word is to be taken thus or thus: nor can it justify with absolute or Infallible Certainty either its Text or Copy to be substantially like the Original, nor (if we may trust Dr. St. here Princ. 15.) can any Authority on Earth supply that necessary duty for it: nor, (it being requisite to compare one place to another so to find out the sense) does it tell us which place is to be compared to another as its proper Explainer, nor of the two alluding places which is to stand firm and be taken as the Letter lies; which to bend its signification in correspondency to that other; without foreknowledge of which 'tis pure folly to think to avail ourselves by comparing Places. None of these things, I say, are found in the Scriptures Letter as it lies; which notwithstanding, and perhaps many other such like, it had been agreeable to God's Wisdom and Goodness to have given it, in case it had been intended by him for a Rule of Faith, or such a Direction by relying on which, people of all capacities might have so well-grounded an Assent to those Points, as is impossible to be an Error while they thus rely on it; which Assent in Christian Language we call [Faith] On the other side 'tis evident that of some Points it gives only accidental hints here and there without insisting upon them amply or explaining them fully; and that Book which was most designedly intended to assert Christ's Divinity, was yet so far from putting it out of all dispute or preserving it from being opposed and called in question, that never yet did Heresy prevail so much against God's Church as did the Arians, who denied that very Point of Faith. But what needs more to evince this Point than these two Arguments, one à priori, the other à posteriori. All words are either Proper or Improper and Metaphorical; of which Proper ones express that the Thing is indeed or in reality so: but Improper ones that 'tis not indeed or in reality so: whence it happens that in matters of so exact Truth as Points of Faith (especially when the Points are of main Concern) it imports a plain Heresy either to take a Proper word for an Improper, or, an improper one for a Proper: For example, those Texts expressing that God has hands, feet, reputes, grieves, is moved by our Prayers, etc. are, if taken properly wicked Heresies and destroy the Spiritual and unchangeable nature of the Godhead. Also, to take those words Christ is man, suffered, died, rose again, etc. improperly, are wicked Heresies too, and take away the main supports of our salvation: This being so, it follows that the absolutely-certain Knowledge when the words of Scripture are taken properly, when not, being determinative of what's true Faith, what Heresy, it must be had from the Rule of Faith itself, and so from the Letter of Scripture, if that be indeed the Rule. But this Knowledge is not had from the Scriptures Letter; for this must either be done by that Letters signifying in each place expressly or equivalently that the words are properly or Improperly there taken, which is Impossible to be shown, nor was ever pretended; or else by signifying the contrary Point in another place; and this, as far as the bare Letter carries, or abstracting from all Interpretation, can only signify that the Letter in one place seems to contradict itself in another place; and this, as far as the bare Letter carries, or abstracting from all Interpretation, can only signify that the Letter in one place seems to contradict itself in another place, which is far short of giving us an unerring security which side is Truth. Or, if it be said, the Letter alone gives us not this security without some Interpretation, than this Interpretation performs what the Letter (if it be a Rule) ought, but could not, and determines with Absolute Certainty when the words are taken properly, when not; that is gives us our Faith; and consequently that Light or Knowledge, whatever it was, which the Interpreter brought with him, and had it not from the Letter, gave us the right sense of Scripture; and, so, It, not the Scripture was the True Rule of Faith. From the Effect, or à posteriori I argue thus: We experience that Great Bodies of men of divers sects, with equal earnestness (as far as appears to us) go about to find their Faith in the Scriptures Letter, and equally profess to rely upon God's Assistance to that end; wherefore either we must be forced to judge that none of those several sects do sincerely desire to find True Faith in the Scriptures, and so by Dr. St's Principles no sort of men in the whole world has right Faith: which quite takes away all Christianity; or else we must think all of them truly desire to find right Faith in the Scripture, and rely on God's help to assist them, In which case, since the fault is not in them taken as applying themselves to their Rule, and relying on it, and yet 'tis manifest they differ (that is one side errs) in most Fundamental Points, as in the Trinity, Divinity of Christ, Real Presence of Christ's Body in the Sacrament, etc. it follows unavoidably that the Faul● is in those persons in holding it their Rule, for, in case they erred not in holding it to be a Rule, that is in case it were indeed apt to ascertain them absolutely if they applied it, and that they did actually apply it, it is impossible they should have ever erred. Scriptures Letter then is far from securing men of all sorts, while they rely on it, from Error; since whole Bodies of men, and, amongst those, multitudes of great Scholars and learned Scripturists err grievously and that in most Fundamental Points, even while they rely upon it: Which if it destroy not the nature of a Rule, I know not what does. This Discourse being forelaid, we shall be able to make shorter work with his Principles, to which we now address. Whereas then in his tenth Principle, he contend; that the will of God can be sufficiently declared to men by writing. I answer, That by Extraordinary Contrivances and Actings of God's Wisdom and Power it may; but that this will avail him little, since 'tis evident that de facto God has not thus exerted his Wisdom and Power in making Scriptures Letter fit for that End; whence we conclude that it was never meant for a Rule: and, whereas he says that words are equally capable of being understood, spoken or written; I deny it absolutely; for nature teaches us that the countenance and Carriage of the Speaker, the Accent of the voice, the giving a due and living Emphasis to the words, with the whole Complexion of Circumstances in which the Speaker is found, and which generally are not unknown to the person to whom he speaks; and, amongst these, principally, his applying himself pertinently to the present exigency, Thoughts and Expectation of the Hearer: All these, I say, and many others give Living voice an incomparable Advantage over Dead Characters in point of Intelligibleness and Expressiveness: And, though Dr. St. may contend that whatever advantage in signifying, That has over This, may possibly be put in writing and expressed by means of many large Explications writ by the person himself that was to deliver his mind, yet he can never show that those Multitudes of words in those very Explications have the same degree of Significativeness and Intelligibility as if they had been spoken viuâ voce by their Author; since they will still want all or most of the Advantages now spoken of, which manifestly determine the signification of words. To omit, that all this will little make for his purpose when he comes to apply it; since Scripture has no such large Explications writ upon it to supply that less clearness of expressing which the way of writing is necessarily subject to, if compared with that of speaking: much less if daily practice go along with living voice to declare men's minds, as is found in Tradition. As for what he adds, and builds on, that Scripture may be known to be the word of God: If he means it may be known to be such according to the Grounds he proceeds on, he ought either to have put it amongst Principles agreed on by both sides, or else have proved it; which he no where attempts, but afterwards (Princ. 15.) very solidly and learnedly disproves and confutes: while he denies the necessity of any Infallible society of men to attest or explain those Write; For, since in the bare Letter as it lies, there are found many passages which contradict one another, and, abstracting from all Interpretation and Attestation of the Letter, no part of it is to be held truer than other (for if it once lose the repute of being God's word, as in that case it must, 'tis all equally liable to be false) it follows that if there be neither any men Infallible in attesting nor in explaining those Writings, all the World may be deceived in performing both those duties; and, so, all Mankind may be deceived both in judging the Scriptures which we now have to be the same book which was writ at first, since there is no INFALLIBLE Attestation of it, and also may be deceived in judging there are not Contradictions in it, since there is no Infallible Explanation of it to secure it from many such Imputations, Evident in the bare Letter taking it as un explained or uninterpreted. Any man of reason would think that to leave Scripture in such a pickle, were but a slender provision to give it such a Certainty as will fit it to be a Rule of Faith, if he but reflects that that Rule must be the Basis of all our Knowledge that God ever revealed any thing at all; that is, of all Mankind's way to salvation. But suppose it thus granted that the will of God can be fufficienty declared to Men by writing, in the manner declared above, let's see what follows. 11. It is agreed among all Christians that although God in the first Ages of the World did reveal his mind to men immediately by a voice or secret inspirations, yet afterwards he did communicate his mind to some immediately inspired to write his Will in Books to be preserved for the benefit of future Ages, and particularly that these Books of the New Testament which we now receive were so written by the Apostles and Disciples of jesus Christ. This is granted: only it is not agreed among all that bear the name of Christians of what nature this benefit is which God intended men in future Ages by the Scriptures, whether of strengthening them in Faith, and stirring them up to good Life, or teaching them their Faith at first and assuring it to them nor how this benefit comes to be derived to the Generality, whether by Immediate reading and penetrating it themselves: or, through the Preaching and Instruction of some others deputed by God for that end, who have Faith in their hearts already by some other Means: But we are to expect Dr. St. will in the process of his discourse clear this point solidly and throughly, for 'tis the main hinge of all this Controveesie: He goes forward thus. 12. Such Writings have been received by the Christian Church of the first Ages, as Divine and Infallible, and being delivered down as such to us by an Universal consent of all Ages since, they ought to be owned by us as the Certain Rule of Faith; whereby we are to judge what the Will of God is in order to our salvation; unless it appear with an Evidence equal to that whereby we believe those Books to be the Word of God, that they were never intended for that end because of their obscurity or Imperfection. This whole Paragraph amounts to one Proposition, which is this, such Writings, (viz. penned by men divinely inspired for the benefit of future Ages) received at first, and delivered down ever since as Divine and Infallible, are to be held the Certain Rule of Faith, unless there be Evidence of their Defectiveness, equal to that of their being God's Word. Which is a bare Assertion, neither proved from any Principle agreed or not agreed on, and therefore perfectly Groundless, and unproved; and False into the bargain, though the main stress of his whole discourse relies on it. Now that 'tis False I prove, because its Contradictory is True. For, there may be writings penned by men Divinely inspired and delivered down to us as Divine and Infallible, and yet we need not be bound to hold them the Rule of Faith, though we have not equal Evidence of their defect as we have that they are the Word of God. Since to be writ by men divinely-inspired, to be Divine, Infallible, and the word of God, signifies no more but that they are perfectly Holy and True in themselves, and beneficial to mankind in some way or other; and this is the farthest these words will carry; but that they are of themselves of sufficient Clearness to give sincerely-endeavouring persons such Security of their Faith while they rely on them as cannot consist with Error (which is requisite to the Rule of Faith) these words signify not: They may be most Holy, they may be most True in themselves, they may be exceedingly Useful or Beneficial to mankind, and yet not be endowed with this Property, which yet the RULE OF FAITH must have. And whereas he says they are for these reasons to be owned for the Rule of Faith (that is we are for these reasons to judge and profess them such) unless it appear with an equal evidence, etc. that they are defective; sure he never understood what judging and Professing is built on, who can make such a Discourse: Our Assent or judgement is built on the Grounds or Reasons which conclude the thing to be as we judge, and not on our seeing nothing to the contrary: for, in case the reasons produced conclude not the thing to be so, the not appearing to be otherwise will avail nothing to conclude it so: All it can effect is to make us maintain our liberty of suspense and Indifferency that so we may be void of forestalment or prejudice and free to believe it when competent or conclusive Reasons shall appear to evince it. What then Dr. St. is to do, is to produce Conclusive Reasons to evince that the Letter of Scripture has such a perspicuity and other Perfections belonging to such a Rule as must ground that most Firm, Unalterable and (if rightly grounded) Inerrable Assent called CHRISTIAN FAITH, and this considering the Nature of Faith, the Effects which are to proceed from Faith, and Obligations issuing from it, and Incumbent on the Faithful, as such; But in stead of performing this necessary Duty of his, to argue as if, though the Reasons he brings conclude it not, yet it must needs be so because we have no Evidence 'tis not so, is, so pleasant and new invented a way of arguing, that he must find the World a new Logic, and Mankind itself a new nature ere he will arrive by means of such Discourse at any Conclusion. And, whereas he seems to build much on the word [Equal,] alleging that we must, for the reasons there given, hold the Scriptures the Rule of Faith unless it appear they are defective with an Evidence [Equal] to that whereby we believe those books to be the word of God: 'Tis absolutely denied, not only for the reason lately given in common, that, none can be bound in reason to hold or own any unprov'd Position; but particularly because of the peculiar nature of the thing we are discoursing of; For, the Rule of Faith being that which is to tell us God said such or such things, or engages the Divine Authority for their Verity, if we should happen to misuse Scriptures Letter, by letting loose people of all capacities to rely on it as their Rule of Faith, then, in case it should peradventure not have been intended by God for this end, but for some others, we expose ourselves and others to the desperate danger of running into Endless Errors by this misusage of Scripture, and of adhering to those Errors as firmly as if God himself had spoke them; that is, we hazard erring irrecoverably in matters which ate the proper means of salvation, and blaspheming God daily in making him the Patron of Lie. In this case then there is particular caution to be used, and so, if upon sincere and strict Examination it be but any thing dubious that Scripture was never intended by God for a Rule of Faith, we can never be obliged to hold or own it for such, especially not having any Certain Argument to conclude it such; much less must we be obliged to hold it to be such unless we have EQVAL Evidence of its Unfitness to that whereby we believe those Books to be the word of God, unless Dr. St. will say that nothing ought to restrain a man from hazarding the greatest mischiefs in the world but perfect Evidence, that no harm will come of it. So that still his main business, and without which he does nothing at all, remains yet to be done; which is, to bring solid convincing Proofs that God intended Scripture, or his Written Word for the Rule of Faith; that is, for such a Rule as people of all sorts relying on it should be Infallibly or absolutely-secured from Error by so doing. In making good which concerning Point he hath hitherto trifled exceedingly. Nay himself here is afraid to own the Goodness of his own Proof; otherwise he would never have thought it fit to annex those words, Unless it appear with an Evidence equal to that whereby we believe those books to be the word of God, that they were never intended for that End because of their obscurity or imperfection. For, the Evidence whereby it appears those Books are the word of God must be conclusive (else according to his Grounds, we can never conclude one word of Faith True) and so an Evidence equal to it must be Conclusive likewise: If then he had thought his reasons to prove Scripture the Rule of Faith were Good and Conclusive, Common sense would have forbid him to add these cautious words Unless it appears with an equal evidence, etc. for Common sense tells us no Conclusive reason can possibly be brought for the Negative, if Conclusive Reasons be once produced, or be producible for the Affirmative; It appears then by this behaviour of his on this occasion that he distrusts that either he has produced any Conclusive reason for that main Point of Scriptures being intended for the Rule of Faith, or that any can be produced. Lastly, That we may give perfect satisfaction to this Fundamental Principle of his, though perhaps there is not Evidence Scriptures Letter was never intended for the Rule of Faith equal to that whereby we believe those Books to be the Word of God, in regard we believe this upon the Authority of God's Church which is supported with the whole strength of Best Nature and Supernaturals, yet we have rigorous and Conclusive Evidence that it is not penned in the very best way imaginable to avoid all ambiguity of words and forestall mistakes, as being immediately inspired by God, whose works are perfect, if it had been intended by him to be our Rule of Faith, it ought to be. And I shall presume I have already brought Conclusive Evidences both à priori and also à posteriori in my answer to his 10th Principle to evince that it has not in it the nature of such a Rule, nor consequently was it intended by God to be such a Rule. How incomparably excellent soever it be for other Ends for which it was indeed and solely intended. But omitting all the rest at present, I remind him of one (which I cannot too often repeat) and enforce it upon him thus. He cannot deny but the Points of a Trinity, and Christ's Godhead are most Fundamental Points of Faith, he cannot deny but both Protestants and Socinians rely on the Letter of Scripture for the sole Rule of their Faith, and sincerely endeavour to know the meaning of them, which is all he requires on the Persons side: He cannot deny but that, notwithstanding this, one party holds There is no Trinity, and that Christ is not God, the other that there is a Trinity, and that Christ is God, and so one side errs most Fundamentally: He cannot deny but, Error being a Defect, there must be a fault somewhere to beget this Error, that is, either in the Persons judging of what the Rule of Faith tells them, or else in judging that to be a Rule which is not the Rule; for in case they err in neither of these, 'tis impossible they should err or misconceive at all in matters of Faith. He cannot deny in any reason, but the persons on both sides being such acute men and excellently well versed in the Letter of Scripture have both Capacity enough, and apply that Capacity to their power by as great a Diligence as any; nor can he in Charity deny but they sincerely endeavour to know the meaning of it in such points. Therefore he cannot deny but the persons attending to the Rule are faultless either in understanding Scripture in these points, if it be to private Understandings clearly intelligible, or Will to understand it if they could; and indeed 'tis Incredible they should not will or desire this, since they use such exact diligence in it, and solemnly profess to rely on the Letter alone, or that did they indeed slight the Letter or purposely decline relying on it, their bias should not manifestly appear in so long time, and they be branded for Evident Insincerity: He cannot deny then but the Persons are faultless as to their Capacity and Will to understand the Rule; therefore, unless he will renounce his Reason, he cannot deny but the Fault must be in the same Persons, judging that to be the Rule, which is not; and consequently that the Letter of Scripture is not alone and of itself clear and Intelligible enough to preserve private men, both capable and diligent and relying solely on It from possibility of Error, no not from actually Erring in most Fundamental Points of Faith, nor consequently has it in it the true nature of the Rule of Faith, and so, since God never intends any thing should do what its Nature reaches not to do, that is should do what it cannot do, 'tis manifest Scriptures Letter was never intended by God for that End, or to be such a Rule. 13. Although we cannot argue against any particular way of Revelation from the necessary Attributes of God, yet such away as writing being made choce of by him, we may justly say, that it is repugnant to the nature of the design, and the Wisdom and Goodness ●f God, to give infallible assurance to persons in writing his Will, for the benefit of Mankind, if those Writings may not be understood by all persons who sincerely endeavour to know the meaning of them in all such things as are necessary for their salvation. It is not yet proved, nor ever will, that God hath made choice of the Way of writing for a Rule of Faith, nor designed it for that end, nor that the benefit he meant Mankind by such Writings was to Ground their Faith on what appeared to their private Judgements to be the sense of the Letter; therefore 'tis no wonder if all persons should hap to misunderstand it even in such things as are necessary for their salvation, notwithstanding their sincere endeavour to know the meaning of them, since God has never promised that any who takes a way never intended by him for such an End, shall infallibly arrive at that End by such a Way; nor is the Wisdom and Godness of God at all concerned in preserving any from Error if they take such a Way, especially if we reflect upon these following Considerations. First, That God hath no where engaged his word to secure every single or private man from Error who shall sincerely endeavour to find his Faith in the Scripture, in case he rely on his own private Judgement & neglect to hear his Pastors: whence if such private persons rely on God's promised Assistance to such an End, they rely on what neither is, nor ever was, and so no wonder their hopes fail them, if those Hopes be groundless. Secondly, They cannot but know, if but meanly versed in the world; that whole Bodies of men, and amongst them divers of great learning, interpret Scripture several ways in very concerning points of Faith, and it must needs favour of a proud self-conceit in any person to think God regards his single self more than he does whole Bodies and Great Multitudes. Again, it cannot without a strange Unreasonableness & Uncharitableness be imagined or judged that not one person of those many who adhere to the opposite Tenet as clear to them in Scripture according to their best Judgement, does sincerely endeavour to know the meaning of these Sacred Books; and, if they do, then Common sense tells this private person that the whole Foundation on which his Hope is built, is unsound; and that more is requisite than the Letter of Scripture and a sincere endeavour to understand it; and that if these suffice to direct him right, they ought for the same reason be sufficient to direct another; and so he ought to doubt whether himself or those others proceeding on the same Grounds and having the same Means, be in the right, that is, he ought to doubt of his Faith no better grounded. Lastly, This private man belongs to some particular Church, and so has Pastors and Governors set over him to teach and instruct him, and those too (as we'll suppose) read and rely on the Scriptures; Also, he must judge this Church sincerely endeavours to know the meaning of Scriptures; for this being the requisite condition to find right Faith, without this his Church has no right Faith, and so is no Church: now for a private man who is subject to such a Church, and aught to be taught by the Pastors of that Church, not to submit to the Judgement of that Church and his Lawful Pastors, as to the Sense of Scriptures or his Faith, even though they be sincere endeavours as well as he, but to adhere to that for his Faith which appears to his private self to be in the Scriptures, though he contradict and defy all the Church he his a member of in so doing (which he ought to do, if he proceed on this Principle that Scriptures may be understood by all persons who sincerely endeavour to know the meaning of them in all things necessary for his salvatiou, for he ought not for any man's sake relinquish his Faith or its Rule.) I say, to behave himself thus, as in that supposition he ought, is such an intolerable, ma apert Presumption, so Senseless and Unnatural and Self-condemning a Rebellion, and such a Fanatic Spiritual Pride, as I much doubt will give a man but small title to hope for Especial Assistance from God's Wisdom and Goodness, At present I only remark the Faults of this Principle which are these. First, That it supposes God has made choice of, or designed the Scriptures to be this Rule of Faith for private persons. Next, that God's Wisdom and Goodness is Engaged that it be thus Intelligible to every sincere Eadeavourer! Neither of which is in the least proved or provable. Lastly, when he comes to the close; instead of making it so intelligible as that all sincere Endeavours might thereby be absolutely secured from erring as to the Truth of their Faith, (which is the Duty of the Rule of Faith) seeing very well these slight Grounds were not able to carry so far, he substitutes in their room these waty words [in all such things as shall be necessary for their salvation] so that though they err in all the main points of Christianity, yet for any thing we know, or these crafty common words inform us, they have still all that is needful to save them, that is though they go wrong all their lives they are still all the while in the way to Heaven. But, I suppose Dr. St. means that no more is necessary for any ones salvation than just as much as he can understand in Scripture. Which I wish he would once begin to set himself to prove & make out by some convincing argument: I am heartily weary of speaking still to his unprov'd and voluntary Assertions. 14. To suppose the Books so written to be imperfect, i. e. that any things necessary to be believed, or practised are not contained in them, is either to charge the first Author of them with fraud, and not delivering his whole mind, or the Writers with Insincerity in not setting it down, and the whole Christian Church of the first Ages with folly, in believing the Fullness and Perfection of the Scriptures in order to salvation. As far as I apprehend, the foregoing Principle was intended to show that Scripture was sufficirntly Intelligible to be the Rule of Faith, and this under examination is to prove it to be the measure of Faith as he calls it, Princ. 28. and all he contends here is that it CONTAINS all that is necessary TO BE BELIEVED and practised. And, that we may not multiply disputes, I grant those Holy Books contain all he pretends, some way or other either Implicitly or Explicitly; either in Expressed words, or by necessary consequence. But, that those Books contain, or signify (for they are the same) all that is to be believed and practised, so evidently that all persons who sincerely endeavour to know their meaning, and this for all future Ages, may thence alone (as his discourse aims to evince) that is, without the Church's interpretation, arrive to know what's necessary for their salvation, with such a Certainty as is requisite for the Nature and Ends of Faith, and the Obligations annexed to it, I absolutely deny, and if he means this by the word [Perfection] which he adds to [Fullness] I deny also that either the first Author can be charged with Fraud, since he promised no such thing; or the Writers with Insincerity, since they were not commanded, nor did intend thus to express it; nor, as far as appears, had any order from God to set down his whole mind, but only writ the several pieces of it occasionally: nor did the Christian Church in the first Ages, ever attribute to Scriptures such an Intelligibleness as that private persons should ground their Faith upon their Evidence without needing the Church's Interpretation, if we speak of all points necessary to Mankind's salvation, as he seems and aught to do. And here I desire to enter this declaration to all the world, that I attribute not the least Imperfection to the Holy Scriptures; Every thing has all the Perfection it ought to have, if it can do what it was intended to do, and in the manner it was Intended. Treatises of deep Philosophy are not Imperfect, if they be not as plain, as plainest Narrative Histories; no not if they be ita editi ut non sint editi, in case they were meant as a matter for the Author to explain and dilate upon to his Scholars; nor are the Laws Imperfect, though they often need Learned Judges to interpret them. Nor are we to expect that the Prophecy of Isaiah should be as plain as the Law of Moses. The Immediate End of writing each piece, as far as appears to us, was occasional, St. Paul's Epistles were evidently so; nor can I doubt but they were perfect in their kind, and apt to signify competently to those to whom he writ what he intended; so that, if they had any farther doubt, they might send to ask him, or do it viva voce; and yet we see that even in those days when the complexion of all the Circumstances was fresher and nearer than now, some unlearned persons erred damnably in mistaking and misconceiving them, that is, while they went about to frame their Faith out of them; 'Tis questionless also they relied upon them as God's Word, or dictated by the Holy Ghost, else they had not so built upon them, or adhered to them. They might sincerely endeavour too to know their meaning; yet, if the Writings were disproportioned to their pitch they might Err damnably for all that. What farther End God intended the H. Scriptures for, appears not by any Express either promise or declaration of our Saviour; but out of the knowledge that they were writ by persons divinely inspired and the Experience the Church had of their usefulness towards Instruction and Good Life, joined with the Common Knowledge we have that all Goods that come to the Church, happen through the ordering of God's Providence, hence we justly conclude (as Dr. St. well says) that they were intended and writ also for the Benefit of future Ages. And from their usefulness and the success of their Use, we may gather how God intended them for the Church. The Learned and stable sons of the Church read them with much fruit to excite their wills to Goodness. The Pastore of the Church make excellent use of them in exhorting, preaching, catchising, etc. and in many other uses of this sort they are excellently beneficial, which are so many that were it now seasonable for me to lay them open at large as I truly hold them, none would think I had little Reverence for Scriptures; but in deciding Controversies, or finally silencing Heretics, as the Rule of Faith ought to do, by the unavoidable evidence of the Text to private persons no use was ever made of them (alone) with any success as the Fathers also complain; Unless the the Church's Authority, going along, animated the dead Letter in dogmatical passages, and showed the sense of the places to have been perpetually held from the beginning, and so give It the Sense, Majesty Authority and Force of God's Word, elevating it thus above the repute of being some private Conceit or Production of Skill and Wit interpreting the Letter. Scripture then is perfect, or has all due to the nature God intended it; if, duly made use of as the Church's best Instrument, it be able to work those Effects spoken of, though it be not so Evident or self-authorized as to be the Rule of Faith. We give it absolute Pre-eminence in its kind, that is, above all other Writings that ever appeared in the world; but we prefer before it Tradition or God's Church, which is the Spouse of Christ, the Pillar and Ground of Truth, and consisting of the Living Temples of the H. Ghost, for whose sole Good, as its Final End, Scripture itself was intended and written. 15. These Writings being owned as containing in them the whole Will of God so plainly revealed, that no sober enquirer can miss of what is necessary for salvation; there can be no necessity supposed of any Infallible society of men either to attest or explain these Writings among Christians, any more than there was for some Ages before Christ of such a Body of men among the jews, to attest or explain to them the Write of Moses or the Prophets. He that owns this, must own it without reason for any thing appears yet; for Dr. St. has afforded us hitherto nothing to prove this point but a few words craftily laid together, which, when looked into, have not a jot of reason in them. And the like empty inside we find in this present Principle. For, if the whole will of God be plainly revealed in Scripture, then in case nothing else be requisite to understand Gods will but the disposition of soberly enquiring (as he puts no other) it must follow that no sober Enquirer can miss of knowing there the whole will of God; and since every Article of Faith is part of God's Will, it would follow hence that every sober Enquirer may understand all Faith in Scripture, which yet the Dr. is not disposed to say; as appears by his avoiding to put down what the tenor of his discourse required, namely, that the whole will of God is so plainly revealed in Scripture that no sober Enquirer can miss [of knowing his whole will there;] and instead of it substituting, that the whole will of God is so plainly revealed in Scripture, that, no sober Inquirer can miss of [what is necessary for salvation] which words may be true though they fall far short of knowing the whole will of God by that means. Next, it is very material, and it would be very requisite to know how a man must be qualified to be a sober Enquirer. In order to which, we may reflect that (as was said before) it ought in reason be judged God's will that we should know whether Christ be God, and whether his Body (and consequently Himself) be really in the Sacrament; lest we either want the best Incitements to Devotion if he be, and we judge he is not; or else commit material Idolatry by judging him to be so, when he is not so. Now I would have him clearly show (clearly, I say, for all depends upon it, according to his Grounds) in what either the Roman- Catholics or the Socinians fall short in point of being sober enquirers; for 'tis plain they must both fall short of being such if the whole will of God be clearly revealed in Scripture, since the former holds Christ is really in the Sacrament; the other, that he is not God, the contrary to both which I suppose Dr. St. holds to be the true sense of Scripture. Farther, if there can be no necessity of any Infallible society of men either to attest or explain those Writings, 'tis Evident there can be no need of a Fallible society of men for those Ends. For if Writings which are attested or explained by a Fallible Society of men be the Rule of Faith, or the Grounds God has left us to build our Faith on, and it be evident that a Fallible Attestation or Explication may possibly lead us into nothing but Error, it would follow that God himself may possibly have led all Christians hitherto and still leads them to the end of the world into actual Error; since a reliance on Fallible means of knowing the Letter and Sense cannot possibly raise any Assent beyond possibility of being Erroneous. There needs therefore by Dr. St's discourse neither Infallible nor Fallible Societies; and so according to his Principles, farewell all Church, both Catholic and Protestant, as far as concerns these two main Duties, on which all else depends. Again, though all this were true, and that the Scriptures were owned as containing in them the whole Will of God so plainly revealed that no sober Enquirer can miss of what's necessary to salvation, and that therefore there needed no Church to explain them. Yet 'tis a strange Consequence that therefore there can be no necessity of any Infallible society of men to ATTEST, them, or to witness that the Letter of Scripture is right. This is so far from following out of the former part of his Discourse that the contrary aught to follow; 〈…〉 prejudicing his own pretence, that 〈◊〉 conduces exceedingly to it; for, certain●y, his sober Enquirer would less be in doubt to miss of what is necessary to salvation in case the Letter, on which all depends be well attested, than if it be not, and most certainly an Infallible society of men can better attest that Letter than a Fallible one, and those Writings can with better show of reason be owned to contain in them the Will of God, if their Letter be attested beyond possibility of being wrong, than if left in a possibility of being such; for if the Letter be wrong, all is wrong in this case. It might seem wonderful then what it is that thus byasses Dr. St. against his own Interest; And I wish I had reason to think it were not a kind of Innate Antipathy against not only our Church but Church in Common, and a desire to attribute as little to it as he can possibly though he hazard some prejudice to his own Cause and even all Christian Faith into the bargain. His whole way of discourse here bends strongly towards the taking away all divine Institution of Pastors (for this would oblige the people to hear them) and levelling all into a Fanatic Anarchy. I would gladly interpret him otherwise; and imagine that perhaps he means that, since 'tis owned the Scriptures thus contain God's will, therefore there needs not be supposed any Infallible society of men either to attest or explain them; but I cannot conceive he should think Scriptures Letter must be owned to be right without some either Fallible or Infallible Authority to attest it to be such; or that, however he may sceptically dread no Authority can be Infallible, yet that he will deny but that it were good there were such an Authority to attest Scriptures Letter, nay needful too in case he heartily held that Christian Faith built (according to his Grounds) solely on that Letter may not possibly all be a lie; which common sense tells us, it may be, in case we may all be deceived in the Truth of the Letter. Lastly, That for some Ages before Christ there was no Necessity of such a Body of men among the jews to attest or explain to them the Write of Moses and the Prophets, is first not proved, and yet Dr. St. builds upon it as confidently as if it were evidently concluded, or else Self-evident. Next, what mean those words [for some Ages before Christ?] If the whole time of the Mosaical Law; then 'tis evidently false, since (Deut. 17. v. 10, 11▪ etc.) God commanded upon pain of death to do according as some persons he had appointed for that end should explain the Writings belonging to that Law; and if these men had not some way or other been secured from Error, God by commanding the subject Laity under so heavy a penalty to act as they adjudged, had both led them into actual Error, and punished them thus grievously in that case for adhering to Truth; which are too horrid blasphemies to be heard or imagined. But, if they mean only, for some time of that Law, or some Ages immediately before Christ when the Synagogue was most corrupt, this implies a Confession that such a Society was necessary in the Ages foregoing; and then Dr. St. is to show us why it was not equally necessary in the later as in the former, and not suppose it gratis. Nor was the Synagogue ever more corrupt than in our Saviour's days, and yet we see how severely he enjoins the Jews of that time to obey the Scribes and Pharisees because they sat in Moses his Chair; which it were blasphemy to say Christ could do, if he had not secured their Doctrine from being Erroneous, that is, preserved them Inerrable in that Affair. Add, that were all granted, yet there is far more necessity of explaining the Scriptures now, than at that time: For the Law was in a manner all of it, either matters of Fact to be done, or Moral Duties and so agreeable to nature; whence both of these were far more easily expressible in proper language, and consequently Intelligible, than the sublime, spiritual and mysterious Tenets of the Law of Grace; which are more hard to be expressed in per words; and being more removed from our knowledge, the natures of the Things are more hard to be penetrated, and so those words more difficult to be rightly comprehended and understood without an Interpreter, than were those other. 16. There can be no more intolerable usurpation upon the Faith of Christians than for any person or society of men to pretend to an Assistance as Infallible in what they propose as was in Christ or his Apostles without giving an equal degree of Evidence that they are so assisted as Christ and his Apostles did; viz. by miracles as great public and convincing as theirs were; by which I mean such as are wrought by those very persons who challenge this Infallibility, and with a design for the Conviction of those who do not believe it. Thus the Dr. makes sure work against the Infallibility of any Church; which overthrown, his single self nay any private man or woman that has but self-conceit and confidence enough to proceed openly upon these Principles of his, is upon even ground with the best nay all the Churches in the World at the main point of understanding and determining what's Faith, what not: Nay more, may defy all the Governors of all Churches in the World, if he or she be but conscious to themselves that they sincerely endeavour and soberly inquire for the true meaning of the divine writings; for these being their Rule of Faith, and being assu●ed by Dr. St. that they cannot miss, if they soberly inquire, of what is necessary for salvation, and being informed by common Reason that 'tis a point very necessary to the salvation of a Christian, or one who is to follow and adore Christ, to know whether he be God, and so may without fear of Idolatry have Divine Honour given him or no; these things being so, in case it should seem to the best judgement of such a man (and let him be, for example, one brought up in the Church of England and newly turned Socinian) that Christ is not God, he ought not to relinquish his Rule of Faith at any rate, nor what he judges the Scriptures sense of it (this being his Faith) but maintain it boldly against all his Pastors; talk, and quote Scripture as briskly as the best of them all; defy them to their faces, nay, die in defence of his interpretation of it, and be a special Martyr though he take his death upon it, that all his lawful Pastors and the whole Church of which he is a member, are most hainons Idolaters for giving the worship proper to God, to a man. In this case 'tis plain, the Church cannot pretend to oblige him to believe her interpretation of Scriptu●e; Alas! all such power is quite taken out of her hands by these new principles; not to act exteriorly as she does; for that were to oblige him to deny his Faith in his Actions and carriage, and this in so heinous a point as committing flat Idolatry, and which his Rule of Faith tells him is such. Nor to acquiesce so far as to hold his tongue and not contradict the Church; for 'tis both ingratitude to God who has so plainly revealed it to him in Scripture, not to stand up for his honour so wickedly violated by the Church; and withal most uncharitable to his neighbour not to communicate to him the light he has received by such plain Revelation from God's word, and to endeavour his reducement from so grievous an Idolatry, especially if this man be a Minister of the Church of England, whose Office and Duty 'tis to hold forth or preach what he judges God's word: Nay, though it were a Layman or a Lay-woman, all's a case; why may they not with as much reason make known so concerning a truth plainly revealed to them, as Aquila and Priscilla did of old. As for all power of the Church to restrain them that's quite thrown out of doors. Humane commands can have no force when the best duties to God and man are neglected by obeying; and the more the Church is obstinate and opposes this private man or woman, by so much greater is the necessity of his (or her) informing the Church right, and standing up for the Truth. Hereafter more of this: at present let us see how he destroys infallibility in the Church, which is his chief design, and indeed it makes very much for his purpose; for I so far concur with him, that if it be but fallible in attesting or explaining Scripture, 'tis little available to the grounding Christian Faith, so that if infallibility be but overthrown and these Principles settled in its stead, every private man is a Church; which (our corrupt nature loving liberty) will no doubt be very taking, and please the rabble exceedingly. He is so earnest at his work that he stumbles for haste. For, first, who did ever pretend to an infallibility equal to what was in Christ or his Apostles, as his words import? Christ was essentially infallible; the Apostles by Immediate Inspiration from God: The Church pretends indeed to be infallibly assisted, but that she pretends to have it either essentially as God has it, or by way of immediate inspiration, as the Apostles had it, is a thing I never yet learned. 'Tis enough to justify her constant claim of infallible assistance, that she have it mediately, or by means of the ordinary working of natural and supernatural causes, so she but have it. And to have it this way seems far more agreeable to reason than the other of immediate inspiration, as to have by way of immediate inspiration was far more fitting for the Apostles; For neither was it in their days accepted by a great portion of the world that Christ was God, or his Doctrine truth, that so they might receive it transmitted from the foregoing divinely assisted Church, that these and these doctrines were His, but they were the First that were to propagate this doctrine; and publish and make out the Truth of it: not could their own testimony avail to the end intended; for what could they testify? That Christ said thus, and did such and such miracles to testify the truth of his doctrine, or that the H. Ghost inspired them? The latter was latent, and the hearers had but their own words for it; the other was patent indeed, and so fully Convictive to those who knew and conversed with them, and were acquainted with the Circumstances, but to remote nations, whither two or three of them were to go and Preach, it signified little, and depended upon their bare words. Hence Miracles were at first (and shall till the end of the world in like cases be) absolutely necessary, to make such unheard of Tenets enter and sink into the hearts of great multitudes how circumstanced soever. But, when afterwards a World, or vast Body of men were by those Extraordinary Means settled unanimously in a firm belief that Christ was God, or at least that his doctrine was true, there could need no more but to know it was continued down all along the same, to make deserters of his Church (against whom we dispute at present) accept it; and it being visible, audible and practical, and so subject to sense; hence Attestation of the foregoing Age to the Age succeeding was the most Proper way to continue it down; and perfectly Certain, being now grown so Ample and Vast; and the Attesters being Intelligent Persons, and having the sense of Christ's Law written in their heart, could deliver and explain themselves pertinently to all arising difficulties, and clear all possible misunderstandings, which the dead Letter could not; and so this Living rule is perfectly Intelligible too. I omit here the Supernatural assistances, which those who comprehend what most effectual means of Sanctity there is in the Doctrine, Sacraments, and Discipline of the Church, and consequently (as appears by divers excellent effects of it) the Product also of those means, or Holiness in great multitudes of the Faithful, will see and acknowledge, do incomparably strengthen the Authority of the Church, in delivering down right Faith. Hence appears our D●s. unreasonableness intimated to us in this principle: That though Connatural and Ordinary means be now laid in the world to continue Christ's doctrine from ou● time forwards, and were laid in the first Age to continue it along hitherto: Though Common Reason and (as I remember) St. Austin have taught him that, into the place of Miracles succeeded the consent of Countries & Nations; though Mr. Baxter, whom perhaps he holds as Holy a Father, as great a Saint, and as eminent a Scholar as St. Austin himself, have told him in his More Reasons for the Christian Religion, etc. p. 32. That humane testimony may be so circumstanced as amounts to a natural infallible certainty, instancing in the existence of King james▪ and our Laws being made by King and Parliament (which how Dr. T. his Scholar will like I know not) and so the Church's infallibility in Faith to the end of the world might descend down to us by testimony to have been the doctrine of Christ and his Apostles, without needing New miracles done still to evince it: Nay, though himself in correspondency to both these Doctors, does in his Rational account p. 205. make Tradition of the same use to us now which our Eyes and Ears had been, if we had been actually present when Christ delivered his Doctrine and wrought his miracles, and so could as well certify us of the first taught doctrine, as if we had seen and heard it, and consequently of the Infallibility of the Church in case that were a point of Doctrine taught at first; yet now, one of his principles must be, that no Argument though never so strong and convictive, no Tradition how well qualified soever it be, nor any Plea in the world though never so legal and evident, shall acquit the Church from a most intolerable Usurpation if she challenge Infallibility, but down right Miracles, full as great (observe his ●igour) public and convincing as were those of Christ and his Apostles, and wrought by those very persons that challenge this infallibility, nay, and wrought with a design too for the conviction of those who do not believe it. How shrewdly sure this Rome●destroying Principle is laid! But if one should ask seriously whether a Convincing reason to prove this infallibility, I mean such a one as evidently concluded the point, might not do without a miracle, I know no rational man that ever would deny his assent upon such a condition; nor would Dr. St. perhaps in another occasion; but here, oh here 'tis another case! His hatred against the Church of Rome's Infallibility is so vigorous that he professes to defy Demonstration itself, that is, renounce Humane Nature rather than admit it; nothing but Miracle with all the nice cautions imaginable shall serve the turn. A notable resolution, and only parallel to his whom nothing would satisfy of the truth of Christianity, but the miraculous appearance of his Angel Guardian: but the Miracle not being granted him, he died an Atheist. In a word, if the Church ever usurpted the pretence of Infallibility, I hope she first invaded it at one time or other: Now, since as long ago as St. Paul's time she we was called by that good man Columna & Firmamentum veritatis, The Pillar and Ground of Truth; which words ill consist with a Fallible proposer of such truths as belong to her sphere o● points of Faith, he ought to show and make out when the Church lost that Title and pre-eminence; otherwise, since she is found claiming it now, and actually holding and possessing it upon the tenure of Tradition as promised her by Christ, we have very good reason to hold, she never usurped it at all, but inherited it by a continued line of Succession from the beginning of Christianity to this very day: Nor has it ever seemed Intolerable to any but to those whom nothing would content but new fangled Innovation, and altering the long-established doctrine of Christ, delivered down perpetually from his time. 17. Nothing can be more absurd then to pretend the necessity of such an infallible Commission and Assistance to assure us of the truth of these writings, and to interpret them, and at the same time to prove that Commission from those writings from which we are told nothing can be certainly deduced such an assurance not being supposed; or to pretend that infallibility in a Body of men is not at liable to doubts and disputes as in those books from whence only they derive their Infalliblity. The first part of this Principle is granted as to the Absurdity of the Position, abating the Degree of it; for, I take it to be equally or more absurd not to assent to the Infallibility of a great body of men (which is all that is pretended) whatever Reason or Tradition appear for it, without an evident Miracle. The second part is likewise granted, in case it suppose (as it seems to do) the knowledge of their Infallibility derived only from those very books which they recommend, and in passages which they are to explicate, ere they can be sure of such an infallibility. Otherwise, 'tis possible a book; obscure in multitudes of other passages may be clear in that one which relates them to the Church or that body which they are to hear and obey as to the proper interpreters of the Scriptures in Dogmatical and controverted passages which belong to Faith. But the Dr. should do well to show us any society of men or Church, that pretends to build her Infallibility only on the Scriptures interpreted by that very Infallibility. Otherwise it will not touch our Church who claims the Supernatural assistance of the Holy Ghost upon her Rule of Faith, Tradition: and, as for her being naturally supported from error in attesting former doctrines 'tis grounded by those who discourse of that point upon Humane nature as to its infallible Sensations and on its Rationality, which renders it incapable to do any thing without a motive, as they must do, should they transmit a not-delivered, that is, an evidently-new doctrine for an old or delivered one. 18. There can be no hazard to any person in mistaking the meaning of any particular place in those books, supposing he use the best means for understanding them comparable to that which every one runs who believes any person or society of men to be infallible who are not; for in this later he runs unavoidably into one great error, and by that may be led into a thousand; but in the former God hath promised either he shall not err, or he shall not be damned for it. This whole Paragraph is built on a false and unprov'd supposition, viz. that any Adversary of his believes any society of men to be Infallible which is not. Other faults there are in it, and that good store; as, granting in effect here what he lately denied, that a man using the best means for understanding Scripture may mistake the meaning of any particular place, though not with a hazard incomparable to that of the other: whereas, if Scripture be the Rule of Faith as he contended, 'tis impossible that a man relying and proceeding upon it, and using that means in the best manner he can possibly, should come to err in his Faith; for in this case the man having done all that can be done by him as to the understanding the Rule, the fault must needs be in his judging that to be a Rule which is none. But this main and fundamental error is couched in the last words; [in the former, God hath promised he shall not err, or shall not be damned for it, what mean [in the former case, etc.] This certainly and nothing but this, if we may trust his own words; in mistaking the meaning of any particular place in th●se books supposing he use the best means for understanding them: Now 'tis a strange thing to me, that God should promise that a man mistaking the meaning of these books should not err in so doing: But omitting this slip of Dr. St's. Reason or memory; I ask what means this disjunctive promise, either of not erring or not being damned for it? Why it means that Dr. St. knows not well himself what to say to the point, or whether he should stand to it or no, that a man using the best means for understanding Scripture, that is, according to him, the best means lest by God for him to arrive at Faith, should not err, and therefore he warily subjoined [or he shall not be damned for it] and then he thinks himself secure enough from confute; it being a hard thing to conclude of any particular well● meaning man when he is damned, when not; whereas it might perhaps be no such hard matter to prove whether what he held was true or not. I could ask him whence or how he comes to this assurance of God's disjunctive promise here so confidently asserted, on the truth of which the salvation of so many souls necessarily depends? Not by Tradition: For this would make him rely on a society of men, or a Church, which he hates with all his heart; not by Scripture, for this would make the same thing be the proof to itself: not by Reason, for we are to suppose he has done his best in that already, and yet (as is shown) has effected nothing. But I would demand of him seriously; did God ever promise that if one takes such a way as (for want of a due intelligibleness in proportion to his capacity) is not able to secure him from error, he shall not err, or that if he will needs be wiser than his Pastors and choose a Means for such an end which God never intended for that end, he shall yet be sure to arrive at that end by that means; or that, if by relying on it and erring, he shall happen to fall short of sufficient means, he shall notwithstanding miraculously be saved without sufficient means? These are the points he is to consider well, and speak to, and not thus confidently call every thing a Principle which he thinks fit to say on his own head, though never so extravagant. In a word, let him prove Scripture to have in it the nature of a Rule of Faith, or (which will fall into the same) to have been intended by God for that end, that is, to be of itself such to people of all capacities that soberly inquire, as secures them from erring in Faith while they rely on it, and this of itself without needing any society of Men, or Church to attest or explain it, and then I shall yield his discourse to run as currently as his own heart can wish: but in proving this, he hitherto hath and ever must fall short most miserably. He hath often, as I noted formerly, instead of saying his Rule of Faith should preserve those who endeavour to follow it from error or from missing of truth, substituted those words, cannot miss of what is necessary for their salvation, and such like: The examination of which words I have reserved till now; and, that I may do him all right imaginable, I will press his Argument (or rather indeed bare saying) in behalf of Scripture as far as my reason can carry it. None can deny but that the knowledge of a very few points are sufficient for well-meaning particular persons, as appears by the Iewe● that were saved, and many silly and weak Christians since; nor can it be denied but every one that reads Scripture or hears it read by one they dare trust, may understand some few good things, to which if they live up heartily (and if they do not 'tis their own fault) they shall be sure to be saved: And as for such points as a Trinity, Christ's Godhead, Real Presence, and such like, the knowledge of them (even in case they are truths) is not of necessity to salvation, since none doubts but tis, absolutely speaking, possible to be saved without knowledge of them since many have been actually saved who never heard of any such points. Having impartially said in short the best I could in Dr. Sts. behalf, and much more than he has said for himself; let us see now what ought to be replied in behalf of Truth. To make way to it, I premise these Maxims. 1. That according to the Ordinary course of God's Providence, men are saved by means. 2. That All points of Faith, are to some degree Means of salvation. 3. That according to the several Circumstances and Exigencies of particular persons, one needs more Means than another. 4. That, therefore, it must be said some have miscarried because they had no more of those means of salvation applied to them, who might yet have been saved had they had more. This being so, how great a presumption and madness it is to affirm that every man who reads the Scripture shall be sure to understand there so much as is sufficient means for His salvation; or motives to work up his soul to a disposition for Heaven, considering his Exigencies, without needing the knowledge of other Points which contain other Motives ten times more forcible perhaps to move and excite him to true interior goodness? Is it not manifest, that (considering men's several capacities, which 'tis a perfect Frenzy to think they must needs be perfectly adjusted to their spiritual necessities) one may as well say that every one who throws a Die upon a Fortune book shall most certainly light on his own Lot, as that every one who reads Scripture shall, let his exigencies be what they will, find motives sufficient for his salvation? If Dr. St. says that some one or two Points have proved sufficient for some few, therefore they might have served All if they would, and that God's goodness towards Christians obliges him to no more; I reply, First, That he speaks against nature, since 'tis evident some temptations require greater Motives to overcome them than others, and no man can assure us, that those who have fewest motives shall not have the strongest temptations. And if it were but rightly comprehended that 'tis Love of God which unites us to him, and so saves us, and that 'tis for want of this those miscarry, who do miscarry, it would be easily understood that many excellent and incomparable motives, as the Godhead of Christ and such like are lost to weak souls, and consequently Heaven, by their not understanding them; and not only so, but by the necessary connexion of truths with one another, while they misunderstand the Scripture, and so, by their holding opposite to such great truths oppose in their thoughts other points of Faith, those also lose their motive force, whence their souls become tainted with multitudes of erroneous Maxims and Practices. Secondly, this answer takes away the necessity of all other points of faith but of such a few of them only, which have happed by the very especial assistance of God's preventing and assisting grace to have accidentally (as it were) sufficed to have saved some few. If he says that, proceeding on this manner, none can hold an error; for they are to hold nothing but what they see to be evidently there, and in all other things which they see not they are to suspend. I would know what should hinder them from thinking they see that to be evidently there, which is not evidently there; since 'tis acknowledged the vulgar or Generality are but bad judges and distinguishers of a true Evidence from a Counterfeit one; besides, there are in the open Letter as it lies, many Heresies; and if they know these to be such, how can they be sure of any thing they read there to be True, since nothing is plainer in the letter than are those Heresies; unless it be said that natural or moral Maxims taught them these places are to be literally understood, and did not tell them so of the other; and then, they are beholding to those Maxims and not to Scripture for their faith, since in that case It has taught them no more than they knew before. Again, may not an acute wit make out to the generality of D. Sts. Faithful, that to know the meaning of Scripture right, they must compare one place with another; and then, by doing so dexterously, make them believe a thousand Errors to be pure Scripture, and God's Word, which are not. Much more might be said on this occasion; but I only make one reflection on this Principle, and so proceed. His intent in it is to show which Party runs greater hazard. The Adherers to Scripture used on his fashion, or those who hear the Church; and he would run us down by virtue of an unprov'd Supposition, that the Church is not Infallible. To offer him fair play, let us grant him all the advantages he pretends to in Scripture, and let him grant us all we pretend to secure us, in the Church, and then compare the two hazards together; nay more, let us condescend as much as himself can imagine, even so as to abate the Infallibility of the Church, and to grant that she is Fallible; and yet the very light of Nature will stand on the side of our Faithful against his. For, this teaching them that Superiors are to be obeyed, and their Teachers to be heard and believed in things not known to be against God's Command, and experience telling them that Scripture is oft times liable to dispute in passages that to both sides seem clear; both Humility, Prudence, Obedience, and the due care of their Salvation and all Virtues that can be concerned in this kind of action, incline them strongly rather to adhere to what Persons wiser than themselves, or their Pastors conceive to be the meaning of Scripture, than to what seems so to themselves, in opposition to the same Pastors and Multitudes of other Christians, who are evidently of greater knowledge, and, as far as they can be informed, of equal sincerity. 19 The Assistance which God hath promised to those who sincerely desire to know his will, may give them greater assurance of the Truth of what is contained in the Books of Scripture, than it is possible for the greatest Infallibility in any other Persons to do, supposing they have not such assurance of their Infallibility, God hath promised no Assistance that those should arrive at their end who take a way disproportioned to that end; otherwise God should oblige himself to work constant Miracles as oft as well-meaning people out of weakness should act imprudently. Next, if men desire sincerely to know Gods will and be humble (and if they be not 'tis doubtful their desire is not sincere as is aught) they will, as God's command, the Order of the World, and common Reason obliges them, be rather willing to trust their Pastors who are better qualified for such Knowledge, and whom God hath set over them to instruct them, what is the sense of Scriptures, than trust their own private shallow judgements. And, 'tis observable that Dr. St's. discourse all along concerning this point, is a plain begging the Question; For, if God have left a Church and commanded the Faithful to hear it, and conform to its Faith, and consequently to receive the sense of Scripture as to Points of Faith from it, than there is no necessity of Scripture's being intended to be plain to all Capacities of itself, nor of thinking men may sincerely desire to know God's will in Scriptures, and use due means to understand it, without making use of the Church's Judgement in that affair; upon which false supposition Dr. St. wholly builds his otherwise perfectly ruinous discourse; Wherefore, his supposition being denied, I must reply, that those who sincerely desire, to know God's wisl, have a certain virtue in them called Humility; and this teaches them not to overween in their own opinion, but to think that their Pastors appointed by God to teach them are generally wiser than those who are to be taught, and that those who are wiser know better than those who are less wise. A little of this plain, honest, rational Humility would quite spoil all Dr. St's discourse, and convince all his Principles to be a plausible piece of Sedition and licentious presumption, tending of its own nature utterly to destroy all Church and Church-Government; and, if applied to that Subject, Temporal too. I should be glad to know what means the word [such] in the last line; if he means Infallible, and that the Church pretending to Infallibility must have Infallible Assurance that she is Infallible, 'tis asserted by us; and his supposition that she is not, is absolutely denied: For the Church is Infallibly certain that Christ's promise to her shall not fail; and also Infallibly certain by constant Tradition and the belief of good Christians in all Ages that Christ has promised her this Security or Immunity from Error in Faith, none questioning it but those who have rebelled and revolted from her. In a word, this whole Principle is Faulty, being built on a False and unprov'd Supposition; and were the Supposition granted, and that the Church were Fallible, still it were false, that his Faithful would have greater Assurance of their Faith than ours, as hath been partly now shown, and more amply in my Reply to the foregoing Principle. Recapitulation. The Sum then of Dr. St's Performances in these ten Principles of his, which most Fundamentally concern his Faith, and the pretended Reduction of it to Principles, is briefly this; that he hath not brought so much as one single Argument proving either that Scripture's Letter is the Rule of Faith, nor that Tradition or the Infallible Testimony of God's Church is not it. And as for the particular Maxims or Sayings of his, on which he chiefly relies, they have been one by one disproven, and the opposite Truths established; As, 1. That Faith being such an Assent, as when built (as it ought to be) on the means left by God for mankind to rely ou, is impossible to be False, and so that Means or the Rule of Faith being necessarily such as while men rely upon, it is impossible they should err; These things, I say, being so (as I have largely proved in Faith Vindicated, and the Introductory Discourse to this present Examine) Dr. St. has not so much as made an offer or attempt, to show that Scripture is the Rule of Faith. 2. That since 'tis agreed God can contrive Writings sufficiently Intelligible for that End, or sufficiently clear to ascertain those who rely upon them of their Faith, and yet, on the other side, 'tis evident God has not the facto done this, or contrived such Methods and ways as our Reason tells us evidently, are proper means to keep those Writings called the Scriptures from being thus misunderstood by several Parties, even in Fundamental Points, as we experience they are it follows hence most manifestly that God never intended the way of writing for the Rule of Faith. 3. Since several Parties of excellent capacities in understanding words aright, and both owning Scripture for their Rule, and applying themselves with greatest diligence to know the true sense of it, do notwithstanding differ in those Fundamental Points of a Trinity and the Godhead of Christ; 'tis manifest that Scripture is not able so secure those who rely on it to their power of the Truth of their Faith, and so is not the Rule of Faith. 4. Again, since in passages that concern Faith the knowing whether the words be taken properly or improperly is that which determines what is Faith, what not; and this knowledge is not had from Scripture, it follows, that Scripture is not the Rule of Faith. 5. God has no where promised that he will still assist those who sincerely endeavour to compass an end, in case they take a way disproportioned to attain that end; and which way was (consequently) never intended by him for such an end: for this were to engage himself to do perpetual Miracles, when ever any one should act irrationally. Wherefore, unless it be first solidly proved that Scripture is the Rule of Faith, or apt of its own nature to give those who rely on it Inerrable security of the Truth of their Faith while they thus rely on it, and consequently that it was intended by God for such an end, none can justly lay claim to God's assistance, or tax his Justice or Veracity if they fall into Error; Much less, if they neglect those Duties which Nature makes evident to them, and common Christianity teaches, viz. to obey and hear their Governors, Pastors and Teachers ordained by God, and rely on their own private Wit, or God's Immediate Assistance to their single selves rather than to those Public Officers of the Church God had appointed to govern and direct them, for this intolerable spiritual Pride is so odious and pernicious that it most justly entitles them to delusion, Error, and Heresy. 6. Hence, since God has left some means for Faith, and 'tis Blasphemy to say that those who rely according to their utmost power on the means left and Intended by God to lead Men into Truth, can, while they do so, run into Error; which yet private understandings (as was seen) may, relying on the Written Word; it follows 〈◊〉 unavoidably that some other way is left (which is not Writing) to secure the Relyers on it from Error in Faith, or to be to them the Rule of Faith. 7. Scripture not being the Rule, and Christ's Doctrine being once settled and accepted in the Christian part of the World, by means of Miracles, there needed no more but to derive it down to future Ages; and, this Doctrine being Practical, and, so, objected to to our Senses, Testimony was sufficient to do it, so it were sufficiently qualified, that is, the best and on the best manner supported that any ordinary means can be; such was the Testimony of the Church (or Tradition) which, besides what is found in humane Testimony, has also the whole body & joint force of supernatural motives to preserve the Testifiers Attentive and Veracious. Thus the Church or the Christian Society of Men being established Infallible in delivering down Faith, needs not prove her Infallibility by Miracles; but 'tis sufficient the Faithful believe that Christ promised to protect her from Error (and consequently to believe the An est of her Infallibility, or that she is infallible) upon the same Rule they believe all their Faith and the Scriptures too, viz. upon Tradition; and that her controversial Divines who are to defend Faith, by way of Reason or Argument prove the Quid est of this Infallibility or make out in what it consists or in what second Causes this ordinary and constant Assistance is founded, and consequently prove its force by such Maxims as ground the Certainty of Humane Testimony, and (if the Reader comprehends them) by the strange efficacy of supernatural motives also conspiring to strengthen Nature as to that effect of rightly testifying the Doctrine received and believed to be Christ's. 8. There is no Necessity then of proving this Infallibility merely by Scripture interpreted by virtue of this Infallibility; Nor do the Faithful or the Church commit a Circle in believing that the Church is Infallible upon Tradition. For first, taking them as Faithful precisely they are merely Believers not Reasoners, or such as put one proposition artificially before or after another. Next, they believe only the supernatural Infallibility built on the Assistance of the Holy Ghost, that, is, on the Church's Sanctity; and this is proved by the Human Testimony of the Church to have been ever held since the beginning, and the force of the Human Testimony of the Church is proved by Maxims of mere Reason. Add that the Certainty of such a va●t Testimony is self-evident practically; in the same manner as 'tis self-evident that the Testimony of all England cannot deceive us in telling us there was such a man as King james: whence no Circle can possibly be committed, if it be believed for its own sake, or rather known by its own light though there would be if discoursing it rationally we should put the same Proposition to be before and after itself. 9 Since those who have the least capacity of penetrating Scripture, and consequently (according to Dr. St.) have the fewest Motives of good life applied to them may frequently live amongst greatest Temptations, that is, in circumstances of needing the most; 'Tis a blind Undertaking, and no securer nor wiser, than idle Fortune-telling, to bear men in hand that persons of all capacities who sincerely Endeavour shall understand Scripture in all such things as are necessary for their Salvation. 10. Since 'tis most evident that private judgements may err in understanding Scripture but not evident that Christ has not promised his Church Security from erring in Faith, they run the greater hazard by far who rely on their private sense of Scripture, than those do who rely on the Church; especially, since the Church denies not Scripture but professes to go according to it, and so in common reason is likely to comprehend its meaning far better than private men; but most especially since our Moderns when they first began to rely on their own Judgements of Scripture for their Faith, revolted from hearing the Church, and rebelled against Pastors and lawful Superiors, which both God's Law and the light of Nature taught them they were to follow and submit to. Thus our new Apostle of the private spirit of Gifts and new Light, hath endeavoured to pull down the Church and subvert the Foundation laid by Christ; and instead thereof to set up as many Churches as there are private and proud Fancies in the world. Each of which may by this devilish Doctrine defy the Church for Teaching him his Faith; or for governing him as as a Church, that is, governing him as one of the Faithful; for she can bind never a subject in conscience to any thing but what herself and each man judges to be True and Sound; wherefore, if any or each private person understands Scripture another way than she does, he is enfranchised by his Rule of Faith (which he ought not relinquish) from her Authority; she may in that case wish him well and pity him as every old wife may also do; and he in return may wish well to the Church end pity her; She may endeavour to admonish and instruct him better, so to pluck him out of his Error; and he in requital, that he may not be behindhand with the Church in Courtesy, may with equal nay better Title admonish the Church of her failing, and endeavour to pull her out of her Error, or (as the new phrase is) reform her; for, being conscious to himself that he reads the Scripture and sincerely endeavours to know the meaning of it, he has all the security of his Faith, (and consequently of the Churches being in an Error,) that may be; Nor can he being thus gifted, want Power to preach to her and others; For, certainly the World would be most perversely ordered, if they who are in Error, should have Licence and Power to propagate their Errors, and those who follow Truth should have no leave to propagate Truth. Thus the Church has lost all power, that is, has lost herself, being able neither to lead nor drive her equally-gifted Subjects: so that her exercising Jurisdiction over them would by this wicked Doctrine be a most Tyrannical persecution, and every such private man's refractory Disobedience (see the wonderful gifts of the private spirit!) would become a most Glorious Confession of Christian Faith; and every Rebel acting against the Church, (so he be but so selfconceited as to judge he knows more of God's mind in the Scripture than all the Church besides) would by this Doctrine (in case the Secular power should think fit to curb his Insolence) be a most blessed Martyr, such, no doubt, as John Fox'es were. The Fifth Examen. Sifting the Eleven remaining Principles, which seem Chiefly to concern the nature of Faith. WHoever hath perused the foregoing Examine, and reflected well upon what a sandy Foundation Dr. St. has built his Faith, will doubtless expect that he will assign it such a nature as is of no exceeding great strength; for fear lest his weak Grounds ' should not support his Superstructures nor his Proofs carry home to his Conclusions. Now the Conceit which the Generality of Christians have of Faith, importing its true Nature, is that 'tis such an Assent as is impossible to be an Error or False; Whence follows, that its Grounds are likewise such: And indeed, since all hold, That Faith is an immovable and Unalterable Assent which is to bide by us and we by it all our whole lives till we arrive at our future state, the Region of Light, where we shall see fancy ad faciem, who sees not that it must be held; and so (since there can be no Necessity to hold a thing to be what 'tis not) must be Impossible to be false? for, otherwise were we to hold it, that is, were itself possible to be False, it ought to be held Alterable, when ever more Light should appear discovering it to be an Error. To evince this Truth I have produced multitudes of Arguments in Faith vindicated, none of which has been thought fit to be replied to, though mine and Faith's opposers still craftily persist to insinuate the contrary Error; But I will at present make use only of one, which will, I conceive, best conclude the Point between us. For, Dr. St. makes Scripture the Rule of Faith, and so speaks of Faith as standing under what he conceives the firmest and clearest Ground, and which was left by God for Mankind to embrace Faith. I do the same when I assert the Church's Testimony or Tradition to be the Rule. So that neither of us speak of the particular odd ways by which some persons casually come to have Faith, nor of Faith as had by such means, but of the common roadway left by God for Mankind to attain to Faith, and of Faith as standing under such a Means or Rule. Upon this Agreement if we join issue, and proceed, it seems that nothing but evident Obstinacy against manifest Truth can hinder us from agreeing in our Conclusion. For since, if we may be deceived in believing even while we follow the direction of that Rule which God himself has appointed to light us to Faith, it would follow that there is no means imaginable likely to do that effect, as also that God himself had deceived us, which is both Blasphemous and Impossible, it must follow, That Faith built upon the Rule left by God (whether Scripture or Tradition) must be Impossible to be an Error, and consequently its Ground or Rule must be Impossible to be False or Erroneous. Wherefore Dr. St. is obliged as well as I am to hold heartily this double Conclusion, and, if he attempts to discourse of that point, to make it out, that the Rule he assigns is such as cannot leave us in Error and our Infinitely-perfect God in the blame. How far short he hath fallen hitherto of making out his pretended Rule of Faith (viz. Scripture as standing under the Judgement of every private person) to be Impossible to suffer men to err while adhering to that way, is already shown; How heartily now he asserts Faith itself, built on the Means or Rule left by God, to be Impossible to be Erroneous or False, comes next to be examined. 20. No man's Faith can therefore be Infallible merely because the Proponent is said to be Infallible: because the nature of Assent doth not depend upon the objective Infallibility of any thing without us; but is agreeable to the Evidence we have of it in our mind●s; for Assent is not built on the nature of things, but their Evidence to us. This Principle begins with a Fallacy of non causa pro causa: For what man in his Wits ever said or held, that Faith must therefore be Infallible, merely because the Proponent is said to be Infallible; must a mere saying, that is, a saying neither self-evident nor proved, be held a competent Ground to build the Existence of any thing upon? But let us suppose that Dr. St. by the words [is said to be] meant [is] or [proved to be] as is indeed our true Tenet, let's see how he confutes us. Our Tenet is, that in case the Proposer of Faith be Infallible, all that rely on It for that particular are by so doing Infallible likewise. He argues against us from the nature of Assent which he says depends not on the Objective Infallibility of any thing without us, but is agreeable to the evidence we have of it in our minds. If he means by the words [depends not] such a dependence as is Immediate, I grant it; For our Assent being an effect wrought in our Soul, and a Result of some foregoing knowledges, notions or natures of things within us, which produce that Assent if it be a Conclusion; or compound it if a First Principle; 'tis impossible any thing without us, and staying there, without evidencing itself to our minds, or breeding some Interior discovery of itself there, should beget any Assent at all concerning it. But, if he means by those words that our Assent depends not mediately, or depends not at all on the Object without us, as his large Expression seems to signify, then 'tis absolutely denied; For the Evidence of the Thing in us, is an Effect of the nature of the Thing without us; nor could evidence of the Thing in us cause Assent without such dependence on the Object or Thing without us, for, unless by means of the Object and dependence on it, this Evidence itself could not be. The last words, [For Assent is not built on the nature of things but their evidence to us] is but a Tautology or short rehearsal of the reason lately given, and so needs no new Answer. Yet, however D. St. for want of Logic expresses himself ill & confusedly, there is notwithstanding a kind of knot in in his discourse, and I shall lend my best Assistance to lose it; but, first it will be necessary to put down his three next Principles, since they all seem to club into one Dilemma against Infallibility 〈◊〉 Proponent. 21. It is therefore necessary in order to an 〈◊〉 Assent, that every particular person be infallibly assisted in judging of the matters proposed to him to be believed; so that the Ground on which a necessity of some external Infallible Proponent is asserted, must rather make every particular person Infallible, if no Divin Faith can be without an Infallible Assent; and so renders any other Infallibility useless. 22. If no particular person be Infallible in the Assent he gives to matters proposed by others to him, than no man can be Infallibly sure that the Church is Infallible: and so the Church's Infallibility can signify nothing to our Infallible Assurance without an equal Infallibility in ourselves in the belief of it. 23. The Infallibility of every particular person being not asserted by those who plead for the Infallibility of a Church, and the one rendering the other useless (for, if every person be Infallible, what need any representative Church to be so!) and the Infallibility of a Church being of no effect if every person be not Infallible in the belief of it, we are farther to inquire what certainty men may have in matters of Faith, supposing no external Proponent to be Infallible. Ere I begin my Discourse I am to note Dr. St's. shuffling way of contriving his Sentences here, or of penning his Principles as he calls them. His 21st contends 'tis necessary to Infallible Assent that every particular person be infallibly assisted in judging of the matters proposed to him to be believed. And the 22d in consonancy to it, mentions the Infallibility of particular persons in the Assent they give to matters proposed by others to them, which clearly signify that Faith cannot be Infallible unless we have Infallibility or Infallible Knowledge of the Points of Faith; for what can [matters proposed to us to be believed] signify else? On the other side in the 21st Princ. he seems only to aim at proving, there must be Infallibility in us that the Proponent is Infallible. Also Princ. 22. he concludes, that to our Infallible Assurance there is required equal Infallibility in ourselves in the belief of the Church's Infallibility. And lastly, Princ. 23. he concludes, the Infallibility of the Church of no effect if every person be not Infallible in the belief of it. Which expressions are of quite different sense from the former; and require not Infallibility in the in the matters proposed to believed, as did the other, but only in knowing the Proponent to be Infallible. Now, because I have no mind to cavil but am heartily glad when he gives me occasion to handle any good point, I will not take him as his former words sounded, it being perfect Nonsense to require evidence of the Points. Proposed ere we can be certain of the Authority that Proposes them (for what need can there be either of any Proposer, or of knowing him Infallible, if we be Infallible certain antecedently of the Points themselves,) but I shall willingly pass by those expressions as effects either of a strange Unwariness, or of a crafty Preparing for future Evasion, and discourse of the Later Thesis; For in truth it hints at a very excellent difficulty, though he proposes it but ill and pursues it worse. I will therefore clear his discourse from his contradictory expressions, and put it home and close as well as I can, and so as I hope himself will not say I at all wrong it. He seems them to argue thus. Objective Infallibility in another (viz. the Proponent) avails nothing to make my Faith or Assent Infallible, unless I be also Infallibly certain that the Proponent is Infallible, wherefore (in case Infallibility be requisite to Faith] every one of the Faithful must be also Infallible. But this renders both these Infallibilities useless and Insignificant; for the Infallibility of the Church is of no effect, if every person be not Infallible, and if every person be Infallible what need any Church Representative or Council be so: Therefore, this Doctrine of an Infallible Proponent is frivolous and Inconsistent. To make way towards the clearing this considerable difficulty, I premise these few Notes. 1. That a man may be Infallible, or out of the power of being deceived in some particular thing two manner of ways: Either, from his penetrating the reasons which conclude the thing to be as he judges, that is, from his knowledge that the Thing is so, which we may fitly term Formally Infallible. Or else by adhering, not through Knowledge, but accidentally as it were, to some thing which is a real Truth, though he penetrate not the Grounds why it is True; or by adhering to the Judgement of another person in some thing or Tenet whose Judgement is indeed well grounded and Certain as to that Thing, though he see not 'tis so. And such a man may fitly be said to be materially Infallible. Both of them are absolutely secured from Error or Infallible Fundamentally by the Thing's being such as they judge it to be, that is, (in our case) by relying on a Proponent which is Infallible; and they differ only in the ways by which they come to rely upon that Proponent; the one being led to it by perfect Sight that the thing must be so, or that the Proponent must be Infallible; the other perhaps blindly, at best not out of clear discernment embracing that Judgement, yet, as long as he adheres to the Judgement of another man who cannot be deceived or in an Error as to that thing, himself is actually secured from possibility of erring; and so, Infallible or Incapable to be in an Error likewise. To this difficulty I had regard in my Faith vindicated when I distinguished between Faith's being True in us, and True to us. For the blindest Assenter that is, though he stumble upon a Truth, yet if he really hold it, his Judgement is truly and really conformable to the Thing or Object, and consequently True or Impossible to False, and so himself undeceivable or uncapable to be in an Error in holding thus: yet, if we go about to relate that Truth which is in him, to evident reasons or Grounds in his mind, connaturally breeding that Conformity of his Judgement to the Thing, there is no such thing perhaps to be found; whence, 'tis not True to him, or evident to him 'tis True, since he sees not or knows not that 'tis True; yet still, as I said before, he is Infallible or Impossible to be in an Error while he adheres to it as True, because that Judgement of his is in reality comformable to the thing. 2. 'Tis requisite and necessary that the Assent of Faith in every particular Beleeyer be at least materially Infallible, provided it be built (as it ought) upon the means laid by God for Mankind to embrace Faith, that is, upon the Right Rule of Faith. For (omitting many other mischiefs and Inonveniencies) otherwise, as was lately proved, it would follow that God, who is essential Truth, did lead Mankind into Error, in case relying sincerely on what God ordered them to rely on, their Judgement, by so doing, did become Erroneous. 3. 'Tis requisite and necessary that the Assent of Faith in divers particular Believers be formally Infallible, or that those persons be Infallibly certain by Evident Reason, that the Authority or Rule of Faith they rely on cannot herein deceive them. Else Great Wits and acute Reflecters whose piercing understandings require Convictive Grounds for their Faith, would remain for ever unsatisfied; nor could the wisest Christians sincerely and heartily Assent to, nor with Honesty profess the truth of their Faith, nor could any prove it True to establish Rational doubters in it, or convert men of exact knowledge to it, or convince Heretics calling the Truth of it in question. Nor could Governors and Leading Persons with any Conscience or Credit propose and Preach the Truth of Faith to the Generality: Also it's Truth being otherwise unmaintainable, the best vigour of Faith and its efficacy to work through Charity, must needs be exceedingly enfeebled & deadened. 'Tis necessary then that the Grounds of Faith be both Conclusive of its Truth, and also penetrable by those whose Proper work it is to make deep Inspection into them; whence they will become formally or knowingly-Infallible that the Authority they rely on for Faith's Conveyance cannot possibly deceive them. 4. Besides these men who are to be Formally Infallible in the Grounds of Faith, and so able to discourse of those Grounds, and make out their Absolute Certainty by way of Skill or Art, there ought to be moreover another sort of men in the Church Formally-Infallible in discerning the True and distinct notion of each Point of Faith and this is the proper work of the Governors of the Church. For these, by reason of their State of Life, which is to meditate on God's Law day and night, their perpetual Converse with the Affair of Faith, by Preaching, Teaching, Catechising, Exhorting; their Concern to overlook their Flock lest any Innovatour should infect them with Novelties; their Constant Addiction to observe exactly their Rule, Tradition, the Standard by which they govern themselves in distinguishing the true Faithful from revolting Apostats. or Heretics; their Duty to be well versed in the Doctrine of Fathers, and Acts of former Councils, and according to these soberly and gravely (not quirkingly and with witty tricks) to understand and interpret Holy Scripture: These Eminent Personages, and Chief Magistrates and Master's of the Faithful being t●us furnished with all requisite endowments to give them a most distinct and exact knowledge of the doctrine descended to them by Tradition, and of the sense of the Church, in case any Heretic revolts openly from the formerly delivered Faith, these Men, I say, are by the Majesty and sway of their mo●t venerable and most ample Authority to quash and subdue his petty party newly sprung up; and either reduce him to his duty by wholesome advice and discipline, or, if he persists in his Obstinacy to cut him off solemnly from the Church by Excommunication, that so the sounder Faithful may look upon him (according to our Saviour's command) as on a Heathen or a Publicans, it being thus made evident, that he stands against all his Superiors, and rebels against the most sacred Authority upon Earth. Or, in case that Heretic cloak his poisonous doctrine in ambiguous expressions, or goes about to pervert the words used formerly by the Church, by drawing them to a sinister sense never intended by Her; They, being perfectly acquainted with the language and sense of the Church, are to invent and assign proper words to express the Church's sense, and such as are pertinent and effectual for the present juncture and exigency to defeat the crafty Attempts of those quibbling Underminers of Faith: or else, they are to clear the true sense of the former words used by the Church by declaring in what meaning the Church takes and ever took them; And sometimes too, beating the Heretic at his own weapon, Scripture's Letter, by avowing this to be the sense in which the Church ever took such and such places. Hence, they are said to define Faith, that is, to express in distinct words it's precise Limits and bounds, that so no leaven of Error may possibly intermingle itself; and, to seal and recommend their Acts by stamping on them the most Grave, most Venerable, and most Sacred Authority in the whole Christian world. Now, that this Authority of the Church Representative is Infallible in knowing the Points of Faith, and that on the best manner is proved hence, because, if such a Learned Body, consisting of the most Eminent and Knowing Personages in the world, can be deceived while they rely on the Means left by God to preserve mankind from error in understanding the Points of Faith, 'tis evident no man in the world can be ●●cur'd thereby from Error, and so the Means would be no Means to arrive at Truth, but rather a Means to lead men into Error, since they erred relying solely on that, which, it being supposed to have been intended by God for a Contrary end, is absolutely Impossible. 5. Though the Substance or Essence of Faith consists in believing what is True upon the Divine Authority certainly engaged for those Truths, which is the Formal Motive of Believing, and therefore 'tis enough for trne Faith that the ●Generality of the Church or the Vulgar be materially Infallible in their Faith; yet it adds evidently a great perfection to Faith that they be Formally Infallible, and that the Faithful see with Infallible Certainty that the Divine Authority is actually engaged when they believe. First, because Faith is an Intellectual Virtue, and so to proceed knowingly upon its Grounds, makes it more Agreeable to the Understanding and Perfective of it. 2. Because the more evident 'tis, that the Divine Authority is engaged, the more heartily those who reverence it, are disposed to submit their judgements by believing: whence Faith in such Persons is more lively, firm and immovable, also more Efficacious and (if other Considerations be equal) more apt to work through Charity, than it is in others. Moreover, such Faithful are incomparably more able to satisfy and convert others; being able (as is supposed) to make ●ut evidently the Grounds of their Faith; Wherefore, every thing being then in its perfectest state when 'tis able to produce its like, or another of it's own kind, 'tis a sign that Faith in such men is Ripe, Manly, and Perfect; since 'tis able to propagate it s●lf to others, or (as S. Paul phrases it) gignere in Evangelio. Whence, those who are to convert souls and propagate Faith, are obliged to labour all that may be to accomplish themselves in this particular, lest they fall short of this Perfection which seems properly and peculiarly due to their state. For 'tis not so opprobrious to the Laity to be unable to perform this, but 'tis highly so to them, because they are lame without it. 6. Notwithstanding this, 'tis God's Will that all the Faithful should be formally Infallible in their Faith, or know Infallibly the Grounds of Faith cannot be False, as far as they are capable. For, this being (as was lately shown) a Perfection in Faith, and God, who is Essential Goodness, not being Envious, but desirous his Creatures should have all the Good they are capable to receive, especially such goods as tend to the bettering their souls and promoting them towards Heaven, it follows that he wills them this Perfection in Faith, as far as it can stand with the Universal Order of the World, or the particular natures of Things, that is, as far as they are capable to receive it. 7. He hath therefore ordained such a Means by which to know his Will as far as concerns our Belief, or what he would have us believe, that is, he has constituted such a Rule of Faith, that its Certainty may be most easily penetrable by all degrees and sorts of the Faithful. Whence follows most evidently that Tradition and not Scripture is that Rule. For, of all ways of Knowing and Ascertaining imaginable, nothing is more easy to be comprehended or to satisfy people of all sorts than is that of Witnessing Authority; as we experience in their perfect belief of K. james or K. H. 8ths existence, and such like. The Grounds of which Truths, not needing to be learned at School, but being either inbred or by an ordinary converse with the world instilled into them, nothing is easier than for the wiser sort of them to fall into the account of it of themselves, occasion being given; as also to awaken, as it were, those dormant Knowledges in the Vulgar, and make them reflect and see (not with a clear and distinct sight as do the wiser portion of the Church, but) with a gr●sse and confused, yet solid Knowledge, and suitable to their pitch, that a Rule of such a nature is Certain; and so, those who professedly own and proceed upon it are in the truth; they who reject it, in an Error; Whereas yet they are utterly Incapable by any Maxims in their rude Understandings either to know that the Letter of the Scripture, on the rightness of which all depends was preserved from Error, among so many Translatious and Transcriptions; or that the Sense is necessarily such as they conceive it to be, amidst such multitudes of Commentators and Sects wrangling about the meaning of that Letter; nor yet are they competent Judges of the skill of all those several Sects and sorts of men whom they see and hear differ about the sense of it. Tradition then of the Church being thus proved the Rule of Faith, 'tis both farther shown how Unreasonable, Unnatural and Unsafe Dr. St's private-spirited Rule of Faith is, and also (even hence) demonstrated against him here that Tradition of the Church is Infallible; since being by this moans proved to be the Rule appointed by God to light Mankind to their Faith, 'tis impossible that those who rely and proceed upon it, should be led into Error, and also Impossible that Faith itself thus grounded should be False. But I needed not have gone thus far to confute D. St's four Principles now under hand. The four first Notes had abundantly given them their Answer; and 'tis time we now begin to apply them to that purpose. Whereas then he grounds them all on our Tenet, That No Divine Faith can be without an Infallible Assent, he may please to know that we only mean by those words there materially Infallible, or so as cannot possibly be an Error: and in this sense we own the Position, and so must he too unless he will speak open blasphemy; For, Divine Faith being a believing upon the Divine Authority, and (as we both suppose) upon some Means laid by God himself by which he proposes to us what we are to believe, by telling us he has said it, in case an Assent thus Grounded could possibly be an Errou●, it would follow necessarily that God himself would be the Cause of that Error. The Substance then of Faith could be preserved, and the Chief End of Faith (our Salvation) on some fashion attained, were there no more than this, that is, though never a man in the whole world did know or could come to know that the Rule of Faith were Infallible; provided none in the Church did speculate, and so, looking into the Grounds of his Faith, and finding them (as far as he could see) Inconclusive, did begin to suspect the Truth of it; nor any out of the Church did oppose Faith; For the Faithful would in that case be in actual possession of those Excellent Truths called Points of Faith, firmly assented to by their Understandings, which were apt to produce tho●e Good Dispositions of their Wills, called Virtues; in the same sort (though not in the same degree) as they do now; and, by means of them, they might arrive at Heaven. Thus the Dr. may see that all he builds on is a pure mistake; and that all the Faithful may be thus Infallible in their Assent, and thus Infallible in judging the Proposer does not, nay cannot deceive us; nay Infallible in judging thus of the matters proposed to us to believe, and yet not one man be Infallibly sure by way of Evident Knowledge that the Church is Infallible; because all this proceeds not in the least (in this supposition) from the reach of any man's Intellective Faculty, but purely from the Goodness and Conclusivenesse of the Grounds laid by God, and his good Providence which led those men to embrace them, though they neither penetrate nor went about to discourse them, but simply to believe them; on the same manner as our ruder unreflecting vulgar are led now. But, in this case, were all the World no wiser, the wisest in the Church would be no wiser than the weakest and rudest vulgar now mentioned; wherefore, both for that reason, and many others ' assigned in my 3d and 4th Note, it was absolutely requisite to the Church, and so becoming God's Providence to order that it should be otherwise; and that the Conclusiveness of those Infallible Grounds on which God has founded our Faith should be penetrable by those who set themselves to such speculations, or fall into doubts concerning them, according as the exigencies of the Church shall be found to need such helps. If this will not serve Dr. St. (I am sure it will serve to defeat all his Arguments) I shall farther tell him that the Generality or main Body in the Church is formally Infallible in judging the Church to be such in delivering down the First-taught Faith, as I have proved in my 6th and 7th note and elsewhere. Besides my reasons given there and in other places, I must desire him and the rest of my Readers that in conceiving how this may be, they would take their measures from the Absolute Certainty such people are capable of in Parallel matters, and not from their Ability to explain or defend this absolute Certainty, or their Constancy in adhering to it if combated by plausible reasons; for he is a very mean Reflecter upon Nature, who observes not that the Vulgar have Absolute Natural evidence of many Truths, which yet they can neither give reason for, declare, defend, nor, perhaps (through levity incident to such weak souls) do very firmly adhere to; and no wonder, since so great a man as Sextus Empiricus speculated himself out of the Conceit of the Certainty of his Senses; of which yet none doubts but Nature, till he began to pervert it by wrong speculations, had given him as Infallible Certainty as to any other, Also, they are to reflect how Infallibility) or, which is all one, Certainty) may be in a thousand different degrees according to the greater or lesser Capacity of the subject; which they will best comprehend by reflecting with how different a Clearness many things appear to us now we are at Age, and how dimly when we were young, which yet we were absolutely Certain of at that time. Nor yet does one of those Infallibilities spoken of render the other useless; for they may either be about different Objects, as if the Church Officers were formally Infallible in knowing what particular Points came down from Christ's time, and penetrating the distinct Limits of each point; and those other Particular persons be only Infallible in judging the Church to be so; as it happens in many Controvertists, who are well instructed in the Grounds of their Faith, yet not so well versed in the nature of particular points, but believe them only by Implicit Faith; or else one of their knowledges may be more Clear and distinct than the others, and so serve to perfect and advance it, in the same manner as Art does Nature. Lest of all can it follow that the Infallibility of the Church Representative is needless; for This is not intended to teach the Faithful their Faith at first, nor do I remember ever to have seen a General Council cited in a Catechism; but this is performed by the Church Diffusive by her Practice and Language, and by her Pastors in their Catechisms, and Instructions; But it's use is to secure and preserve Faith already taught and known, from receiving any taint by the Equivocating Heretic, and to recommend it more Authoritatively to the Faithful, when cleared. And, whoever reads my 4th Note will see so many particularities in the Members which compound a Representative Church above others who are purely Parts of Ecclesia Credens, that he cannot in any Reason judge them useless, though those others be in an Inferior degree Certain of their Faith too, For all this while the word [Infallible] which seems to have so loud a sound, and is made such a monstrous piece of business by the Deniers of it, is in plain Terms no more but just barely Certain, as I have proved Faith Vind. p. 37. 38. and Reason against Rail. p. 113. To come closer up then to my Adversary; His 20th Principle which speaks of Assent in common is wholly built upon a False supposition, that it can only be Grounded upon Evidence; For however indeed in perfect Reflecters that are unbyast, Evidence of the Object or of the Credibleness of the Authority, is always requisite to breed Assent, yet Experience teaches us that Assent, in weak and unreflecting persons, is frequently built on a great Probability, sometimes a very little one, and sometimes men Assent upon little or no reason at all, their Passion or Interest byassing their wills, and by it their Understandings, and this many times even against such reason as would be Evident to another. Again, material Infallibility, which is enough to that Assent we speak of, precisely and solely considered, depends solely, at least Principally, on the Object, contrary to what is there asserted. And, whereas he says Princ. 29. that the Infallibility of every Particular person is not asserted by those who plead for the Infallibility of a Church, he sees by this discourse it both is and must be Asserted, and that we maintain that every particular person must be materially Infallible or incapable of erring while he relies on the Grounds laid and recommended by God; that is, while he believes the Church, which yet is far from rendering the Formal Infallibility of the Church useless; unless he will say, that because it suffices for the pitch of weak people, (whose duty 'tis not to maintain and make out the Truth of their Faith) that they be simply in the right, or void of Error, and that they see after a gross manner that the thing is so, though they cannot defend it; therefore there is no need that those whose duty 'tis to do so, should be able to penetrate the Grounds of Faith, and, so, explicate, prove and maintain it to be True. Nor will it follow, that though the Generality were after a rude and gross manner formally Infallible in their belief that the Church is Infallible, and therefore that the Points she proposes are all likewise Infallibly-true, it will not follow, I say hence, that a greater and clearer and more penetrative degree of Formal Infallibility is useless in Church-governors; for, as appears by my 4th Note, there are many other things to be done by them of absolute necessity for the Church, which far exceed the pitch and posture of those dull Knowers of the lowest Class, (which is the next degree above Ignorance) and are unauthorised to meddle in such affairs. Unless he will say, that Art is needless because there is Nature, or that there needs no judges to decide such Cases in which the Law seems plain. And thus much for the clearing this concerning Point. In the rest of his Principles I shall be briefer. But I must not pass over his Transition to them, which is this [We are further to inquire what Certainty men may have in matters of Faith, supposing no External Proponent to be Infallible.] And he need not go far to satisfy his Enquiry: For, it being most evident by the Disputes between the Protestants and Socinians that Scripture needs some External Proposer of its true meaning in such kind of Points, as also some External Proposer or Attester that this is the true Text of it (on which all is built.) Also it being evident that Dr. St. (Princ. 15.) denies any Infallible Proposers of either of these, and that here again he pursues close the same doctrine; Lastly, this Proposer being such, that, however we can have Certainty without It that the Divine Authority is to be believed, yet we must depend on It for the Knowledge when and where 'tis engaged, that is, we must depend on It for the Certainty of our Faith; It follows, that in case this Proponent be not Infallible, it can never be made out with Infallible Certainty that the Divine Authority stands engaged for the Truth of any one Point of Faith, and consequently that the Certainty men have in matters of Faith is not an Infallilible one. And if it be not an Infallible Certainty which Faith has (as he no where challenges, but very laboriously disproves it) he need not go far to inquire or learn what Certainty it must have; for Common Sense tells him and every man who has the least spark of Natural Logic, that, if Faith must have Certainty (as he grants) and have not Infallible Certainty, it must either have Fallible Certainty or none at all; there being no Middle between them; and so, we must make account, that because it overstrains D. St's weak Grounds to assert Faith to be Infallibly Certain, therefore his next Attempt must be to overstrain Common Sense, and to the inestimable Honour of Christian Religion, maintain that all Christian Faith is Fallibly-Certain. But he must do it smoothly and warily; and, however he named the word [Infallible] loud enough and oft enough when he was confuting it, yet he must take heed how he names the word [Fallible] Certainty when he is asserting it, lest it breed laughter or dislike; though it be evident out of the very Terms that he who confutes Infallible Certainty must maintain Fallible Certainty, sf he maintains any. But now he begins his defence of Faith's Fallible Certainty, and 'tis fit we should listen: Monstrous things use to challenge and even force Attention from the most unconcerned. 24. There are different degrees of Certainty to be attained according to the different degrees of Evidence, and measure of Divine Assistance; but every Christian by the use of his reason and Common Helps of Grace may attain to so great a degree of Certainty from the Convincing Arguments of the Christian Religion and Authority of the Scriptures; that, on the same Ground on which men doubt of the Truth of them, they may as well doubt of the Truth of those things which they judge to be most Evident to Sense & Reason. I wish D. S. had explained himself here what he means by [different degrees of Evidence] whether some Glances or likely Appearances of Truth called greater or lesser Probabilities; or such Intellectual Sights at the least of them discovers the th●ng, th●● evidenced, to ●e be indeed so, or True. I suspect much he means the former, because th●se are the most proper Grounds for Fallible Certainty which he is now going to establish whereas the Latter sort of Evidences would hazard to carry too far and to beget Infallible Certainty, which would quite spoil his most excellent design of settling the Fallible Certainty of Faith▪ for those Evidences which show the thing to be True, show it at the same time to be Impossible to be False; whence 'tis a thousand to one that such Evidences as these would utterly destroy his beloved Fallible Certainty, and endanger to introduce again by necessary and enforcing consequence that Popish Doctrine of Infallibility which he had newly discarded When he adds that every Christian may by the means here assigned attain to so great a degree of Certainty etc. I had thought he had meant Certainty of the Points of his Faith; but my hopes were much defeated, when, coming to the Point, he flies off to his Christians not doubting the Truth of the convincing Arguments of Christian Religion and of the Authority of the Scriptures; For this is far wide of our purpose and his Promise, which was to reduce the Faith of Protestants to Principles; whereas these words signify no more but not to doubt of Christianity being the True Religion, or Scriptures being God's word; but reaches not to what are those points of Christianity or determinate sense of Scripture in particular, which constitutes Protestantism, and only concerns our debate. Now 'tis evident that the roman-catholics profess not to doubt of the convincing Grounds of Christianity, nor yet of Scripture, but to hold that Christianity is the only-true Religion, and that the Scriptures are Holy and God's word: and yet we differ so much from Protestants that he thinks us Idolaters. What we are then in reason to expect from Dr. St. is, that he would bring us Grounds for the Certainty of his Faith as to determinate Points; viz. Christ's Godhead, a Trinity, Reality or not-Reality of Christ's Body in the Eucharist and such like; and those so certain as that we may as well doubt of what we judge to be most evident to sense and Reason, as doubt of them, as he here pretends; and not put us off with Common words in stead of particular Satisfaction concerning his Faith and the Certainty thereof. I would ask him then how it comes to pass that the Socinian whom he will not deny to have both use of his reason and common helps of Grace, and both the convincing Arguments of the Christian Religion and Authority of Scriptures to make use of, how, I say, he comes so to fall short of Evidence and consequently Certainty springing from that evidence concerning Christ's Godhead (which is a Fundamental Point of Christian Faith,) that he doubts it, nay utterly denies it, whereas yet the Protestant having the same means to work with, judges he has evidence and Certainty grounded on that evidence that Christ is God; yet all this while they descent not at all in things most evident to Sense or Reason? I much fear our Drs. big words concerning his degrees of Evidence and the Certainty of his Faith built on those degrees will, when examined, amount to a very obscure evidence and a Problematical kind of Assuredness; much like those comfortable lights which both parties have when they lay even wagers at cockfighting & such games; giving good hopes to both sides, but good Security to neither. But, so it ought to be, if the Grounds of Faith be not Infallibly but only Fallibly-Certain. which is all he is bend to prove. 25. No man who firmly Assents to any thing as True, can at the same time entertain any suspicion of the falsehood of it; for that were to make him certain and uncertain of the same thing: It is therefore absurd to say that these who are Certain of what they believe, may at the same time not know but it may be False; which is an apparent Contradiction, and overthrows any Faculty in us of judging of Truth and Falsehood. This Principle and the next were, I conceive, intended to preserve the Dr's and his Friends Credit against the Inference at the end of Faith vindicated and divers other Passages, showing them either to be far from good Christians in holding that all Christian Faith may possibly be an Error and Lying Imposture, or else very bad Discoursers of their own Thoughts whilst they equivalently expressed themselves in divers places to be possibly in an Error in all they believe, nay more all Christians in the whole world to be in the same condition. This, if justified, cannot but reflect on them, being so concerning a Lapse, and I have at Dr. St's brisk instigation charged it home in Reason against Raillery; though I still expressed myself to incline to the more Civil and more Charitable side; and rather lay the blame on their Understandings then on their Wills and Intentions. Which Book had Dr. St. seen when he writ this, he would have discerned the triflingness of these weak excuses. But let's see what he says. His Fir●t part is built on a most gross and senseless Error, which is, that he who firmly assents to a thing as True is Certain of it, as appears by those words, [for this were to make him Certain and Uncertain of the same thing.] I wonder exceedingly where the Dr. ●earn't this notion of Certainty? Not from Mankind I am sure, at least not from those who had the use of their Reason. For all these already know it to be Evident that a man may firmly assent to a thing as True, and yet that thing be False; must that man therefore be Certain of that Falsehood, and that it is, though in reality it be not? We experience, that opposite parties firmly assent to contrary Tenets as True; for example, the Socinians firmly assent, that Christ is not God, We and the Protestants that Christ is God; Catholics assent firmly that they are not Idolaters when they make use of Holy Images in Divine Worship: D. St. firmly assents they are; at least he would persuade his 〈◊〉 by his Books he does so: Are all these opposite sides Certain of their several Tenets because each side firmly assents to them as True. It were an excellent world for Heretics if this notion of Certainty would take: For these being obstinate in their Errors no men more firmly assent to Falsehoods than they; and questionless the Generality of them judged what they held, True too: nay, they must all do so, if they once be put firmly assenting, as in our case: for to assent to a thing is to judge it to be indeed True; By which means all Heretics in the world are Certain of their Errors; and, if they be Certain of them Common Sense tells them they ought to hold what they are Certain of. Again, ●light Probabilities make many weak people firmly assent, so does Passion and Interest▪ yet they are all by this new doctrine Certain of what they hold, and so all's well. 'Tis now come to light what kind of Certainty D. St. intended to pr●scribe for Faith after he had rejected Infallibility; namely, such a Certainty as one might have whether the Thing be True or no, merely by virtue of firmly assenting to it as True. And in this sense I think I may say he is Certain of his Faith, and I hope he will be so civil as to requite me with maintaining that I am certain of my Faith too, for we ●oth firmly assent to them as Truths, and so we are both very good friends, and by the same method so are Turks and Jews atoned to Christians. Nothing is so proper to reconcile Contradictions, as a Chimaera, viz. a Fallible certainty, or such a certainty as is none: Identical Propositions are mere toys to them; or, as Dr. T. says, good for nothing; But Fallible certainty, or Certainties that are no Certainties, can work wonders, and even do more than miracle. Ridiculous Folly! not to see that when any one says [I am certain of such a thing] all mankind understands him to mean he has such Grounds as infer that thing is as he says, and not only that he has a Firm Assent to it as True, without intending that he has any Grounds to enforce the Truth of it. This is what I often reflected upon in Dr. T. (Reason against Raillery,) that his discourse still aimed to take the business of Certainty out of the hands of the Object, and put it constantly upon the Subject, and to make account he was sure the thing was so, because he verily judged it, or did not doubt it to be so; And Dr. St. is here carrying on the same wise plot to which he begun to make way in his 20th Princip. where he told us that Assent is not built on the nature of things but their Evidence to us ' Indeed, if he speak of an Assent which it matters not whether it be True or False, or, rather which is or may be False 'tis merely built on our own Fancies and Conceits (which I suppose he must mean there by the word Evidence) But if the Assent we speak of, and to which himself applies it, be that of Faith, which must necessarily be True; both It and the Evidence which immediately breeds it must forcibly either be built on the nature of things, or else on nothing, and so both the pretended Evidence is a False Light, and the Assent itself False and Chimerical. On the other side, in case if the Evidence and consequently the Assent be built on the Nature of things, which are Footsteps of Gods Infinite Wisdom in which he has imprinted all Created Truths, and established them under penalty of the highest Folly and Contradiction to be inerrably what they are; it follows, that; in case the Evidence had from those things be indeed a true Evidence or a right Knowledge of their natures, our understanding Power will be the same within as they are without, and so Inerrable in its Assent and Its Certainty built on those natures; so that as their Metaphysical verity immediately depending on God, is fixed by that Essentially Unchangeable Being in a participated (but yet absolute) unchangeableness in being what they are; so Formal Verity or Truth in us being an Immediate effect of those Natures thus established, working upon our Understanding transfuses into It, that is, into our Knowledge, and consequently our Assent an● Certainty such a proper effect of themselves as suits with the Subject in which 'tis received, viz. an Intellectual Unchangeableness or an Unchangeableness built on Knowledge of those Natures, that is an Infallibleness. No wonder then both our Drs. in their weak discourses fly off so from depending for their Assents or Faith on the Objects or Natures of things, and recur still to the Subject, for by this means Common Sense is driven out of the world, and Nonsense and Contradiction grow in great request. And, first, Infallibility or true Certainty is radically destroyed, which otherwise (according to the discourse now made) must forcibly be admitted: then Fallible Certainty comes into great Credit, or such a Certainty as is firmly assenting to a thing as True whether ●t be true or no; that is, such Certainties as are no Certainties but Wilful Adhesions; such a Faith as is no Faith but Fancy; such a Religion as is no Religion but Folly or Interest; and such Truths as are no Truths but possible Falsehoods: In a word, the Object set aside and the dependence of our Assents upon things without us, as the Dr. would have it, the subjects are at Liberty to hold and say what best likes the spirit within them, or their voluntary Fancy; in which consists the glorious Liberty of D. St's Blessed Reformation. I grant him then ●hat no man who firmly assents to any thing as true, can at the same time entertain any suspicion of its Falsehood. But I deny that this plea will either acquit him or Dr. T. from the imputation of making Christian Faith possible to be False which was objected; for why may not this man who firmly assents to a thing as true, now, or to day, both suspect and see it to be False to morrow, unless he can show that that Assent of his depends on the Object or is built on the unchangeably-fixt natures of Things, which Dr. St. denies in express terms, Princ. 20. or what can establish him in his Assent of Faith, if that do not? Is it not evident he may change if he may see true Reason may be brought against it? What would do him credit in this case is to offer to make it out that, (Assent requiring Evidence, and, so, Firm Assent Clear Evidence,) he has this Clear Evidence from the Object to ground this Firm Assent, for than we may be sure his Assent will be Unalterable and solidly-grounded, or Impossible to be False, as becomes Faith; not desultory, Inconstant and weakly-built, as is the nature of Opinion. But this my two Adversaries must not do: For how can they pretend to an Unalterable Assent, if Assent be not built on the nature of Things only which are Unchangeable? or how to Clear Evidence, if they may, notwithstanding that Evidence be still deceived: as they must say all the Church may in the Grounds of their Faith if Infallibility be denied: Or lastly, how will their Evidence be Clear, if the nature of M●ral Things will not bear so clear an Evidence or afford us so much light of themselves as by it to conclude absolutely the Thing is so; as when it comes to the point I foresee both these profound Admirers of Moral Certainty will heartily maintain, and Dr. T. in his Preface to his Sermons p. 29. in express terms blames me for expecting in the Grounds of Faith. And whereas he says, 'tis absurd to say that th●se who are Certain of what they believe, may at the same time not know but it may be False. I grant it absurd; nay more, I affirm that in case they be truly Certain, that is, in case their Certainty be taken from the Thing or Object, than not only they may not kn●w at the same time, but it may be False, but not at any time ever afterwards, unless the thing itself hap to be in that regard Alterable. For true Certainty is built on the thing's being as it is, and nothing can ever be truly known to be otherwise than it is: But, if he takes Certainty in a wrong sense for a Firm Assent to a Thing as True, however that Assent be grounded; then, though upon supposition he firmly Assents, he cannot at the very same time be shaken in that Assent or not firmly Assent, yet he is far in that case from any Knowledge or Intellectual Certainty one way or other: because he regards not the Thing or Object, whence only true Knowledge can be had, whatever he deems or imagines concerning the truth of that which he firmly assents to. La●tly, these Excuses are quite besides the purposex: I never accused their thoughts; They are beyond the reach of my sight; but their Discourse and Writings I can see, and discover that they make Faith possible to o● False, as I have shown at large in Reason against Raillery: I meddle not then with what they assent to, or whether or no they can or do hold the contrary; what I objected was that their words in their books imported the possible Falsehood of Faith: for which they yet owe satisfaction to all Christians for the common Injury done to Faith, and as yet they have given none at all. 26. Whatever necessarily proves a thing to be true, does at the same time pr●ve it Imp●ssible to be False; because 'tis Impossible the same thing should be True and False at the same time: Therefore they who assent firmly to the Doctrine of the Gospel as true, do thereby declare their belief of the Impossibility of the Falsehood of it. The first part I easily grant, and the reason for it to be most valid. And, for the same reason, I expect he will in counterchange grant me this Proposition, that whatever words say, prove or imply a thing possible to be False, do at the same time say, prove, or imply that 'tis not necessarily true. And then Dr. T. must consider how he will avoid the force of it, who makes Scripture the sole Rule of Faith, or the only means for Mankind to be assured of their Faith, and yet (Rule of Faith, p. 118.) professes that both the Letter and Sense of it are possible to be otherwise than the Protestants take them to be; which, in case they take their sense of Scripture or Faith to be True, must mean, possible to be otherwise than True, that is, possible to be False. Whether his own contrary Positions hang together or no, is not my Concern. As for his Inference, I deny that assenting (being an Interior Act) is declaring one's belief. But I suppose he meant it thus. Therefore they who [declare they] assent firmly to the doctrine of the Gospel as True, do thereby declare their belief of the Impossibility of the Falsehood of it; and thus, this is readily also granted; only in requital I expect he should (for I am sure he must) grant me this counter-proposition, that therefore they who declare their belief of the possibility of Falsehood in Faith and its Grounds, or of the Letter and Sense of the Gospel, do thereby declare they do not assent firmly to the doctrine of the Gospel as true. Which done, let Dr. St. and his Friend look to the Consequences of it. It lies still very heavy upon their Credit as Writers, and ever must till they retract it. No sincere Protestant who loves his Faith more than their Writings, will ever be brought to endure it, if he once set himself seriously to consider it. 27. The Nature of Certainty doth receive several Names, either according to the nature of the proof or the degrees of the Assent. Thus Moral Certainty may be so called, either as it is opposed to Mathematical Evidence, but implying a firm Assent upon the highest Evidence that Moral things can receive; Or, as it is opposed to higher degrees of Certainty in the same kind. So Moral Certainty implies only greater Probabilities of one side than the other; In the former sense we assert the Certainty of Christian Faith to be moral, but not only in the latter. This Principle is pernicious to Human Nature as well as to Faith, and destructive to all Principles in the world that are true ones and not like itself. First, it designs to give us the several Names which the nature of Certainty doth receive, but it does indeed acquaint us with some species or kinds of Certainty, unless he will say that the moral Certainty he assigns to Faith is of the same kind with Probability, which I perceive he is loath to own. Next, to what purpose is it to discourse of one or more sorts of Certainty or to distinguish its Notion, unless we fir●t knew the Common notion of Certainty itself. The word Moral which is one of its Differences, and chiefly intended to be explained here is hard enough of itself alone; but when to this shall be added a new difficulty of not knowing what [Certainty] which is the Genus means, we are like to make a wise business of it. Now, all the Knowledge we have hitherto gained of Certainty in a discourse purposely intended to make us understand the Certainty of Faith, is this, that 'tis a firm Assent to a thing as true, and that there may be a Fallible Certainty, both manifestly employed in his discourse: where, all that we can gather of the Nature of Certainty by the former, is that perhaps 'tis a fixing or resting in some Tenet without any ground; and by the later that 'tis a Chimaera or Nonsense. Thirdly, he distinguishes Certainty according to the nature of the Proof, or the degree of the Assent; but I vehemently deny it as the most absurd Position imaginable, that there can be any kind of Certainty taken from the degrees ●f the Assent in contradistinction to the nature of the Proof, for this would make as if the Subjects or person's assenting more or less did constitute some Certainties without any kind of nature of Proof, that is without any regard had to the Object. After this he acquaints us with one kind of [Mor●l Certainty] Watch, he says is opposed to Mathematical Evidence. Now I neither discern how Moral and Mathematical come to be opposite to one another, more than Moral or Physical, and Metaphysical or Theological; less do I see how Certainty an● Evidence have such an Opposition and Antipathy; I thought they might have been both on the same side: but I conceive that the goodness of Natural Reason made him at unawares join Certainty to Moral, and Evidence to Mathematical; thereby confessing that this Moral Certainty, (as he apprehends it) is indeed the Issue of no kind of Evidence at all but of mere Obscurity, or at best of some conjectural glance of Likelihood. But he describes or gives us some distinct Knowledge of this Moral Certainty, telling us that it implies a firm Assent upon the highest Evidence that Moral things can receive, and this he assigns to Christian Faith. Where, first I would know whether this Moral Certainty here mentioned, be an Infallible Certainty, or a Fallible one; and I presume he will answer 'tis a Fallible one, for Infallible and Moral Certainty are opposite; which is a fair beginning towards the ascertaning Faith. Next, I would desire him to speak out candidly and tell me whether this Moral Certainty put Faith absolutely out of possibility of being False; or whether, notwithstanding this Certainty, it may with Truth be said, that still absolutely speaking all Christian Faith may be an Error or Mistake of the world. I presume he will not say 'tis absolutely Impossible it should be all a Mistake because 'tis so protected by this Moral Certainty; for he makes this a less degree of Certainty than Mathematical Certainty is, and Dr. T. has told us there can be no degrees in Absolute Impossibilities; besides, I see not how a Fallible Certainty can establish any Tenet Impossible to be False, for an Infallible Certainty, which is incomparably above that, can do no more. And yet, for all that, 'tis dangerous to his Credit, (for 'tis indeed blasphemous) to say that all Christian Faith may possibly be a lying Imposture for any thing any man living knows; or that all the Christians in the world, though relying and proceeding to their power on the Means God has appointed to establish them in True Faith, may notwithstanding be possibly in an Error. I suppose than he will recur to his late excuse and tell us, that no man who firmly assents to any thing as true can at the same time entertain any suspicion of its Falsehood. But this is nothing to our purpose. 'Tis not his judgement but his Doctrine which stands impeached; not his Thoughts, but his Words, and Discourses; let him clear those to the world, and I am to remit secret things to God and his own Conscience. I leave then him and his Fr●end to shuff●le about for better Evasions, which I am sure can never be candid and Scholarlike, but some learned quirks and Jeers, and address myself to a farther examination of this worthy Principle. 3ly, than I would ask, whether the Firmness of this Assent which he says here Moral Certainty implies, be taken from the Object, or from the Subject? I suppose he will say here from the Object, because he says 'tis upon the highest Evidence Moral things can receive; but I perceive him disposed even while he says so to blame the Things for receiving no more. I doubt he should rather blame himself for receiving no more from those Moral Objects, who are both as able and as ready to afford him perfect Evidence as perhaps any other things in Nature, did he dispose himself to receive it. For, are not Moral things as firmly established in their respective determinate natures as Natural and Mathematical things, from which Establishment all our Science is taken? Is not a will as Certainly a will, and Liberty as necessarily Liberty as a Triangle is a Triangle? Again, are not Voluntary, Liberty, Virtue, Vice and such like, very Intelligible words, and consequently the Natures of Moral things Knowable as well as others in other Sciences. I wonder then why the Evidences of Moral things cannot be as high as that of Mathematical things, since the natures of both are equally Firm, both natures can be known, and so engaged in our discourses of them and from them, and all science or Evidence springs from engaging the Natures of things. The Sum than is, Dr. St. hath given Faith excellent good words, in telling us its Moral Certainty implys a firm Assent upon the highest Evidence Moral things can receive: but, looking to the bottom of his meaning, he intends it only a Fallible Certainty or such as may still permit it to be False; and so the right descant upon his fine words is in true construction this. He allows Faith such a Certainty as is Uncertain; such a Firmness as may both bow and break; such an Evidence in its Grounds as is Obscure, and consequently makes it such an Assent as is Irrational: All which and much more must needs follow from this rejecting Infallible Certainty in the Gronnds of Faith. If he thinks I wrong him, let us put it to the test; Let him take the best of those Evidences or Proofs which ground his Moral Certainty, and put it with the help of a little Logic into a Syllogism or two, and then tell me whether it does necessarily conclude the Truth of Faith or no. If it concludes, why does he not say Faith is absolutely Certain, but mince it with Moral? If it concludes not, how can all the world avoid but his pretended Evidence is Obscure; his pretended Certainty built on that Evidence, Uncertain; the Firmness of that Assent, Infirm; and the Assent itself to a Conclusion thus unproved, and no ways Evident (in a man capable to comprehend what ought in due of Right Reason cause Assent) privatively Irrational, or Faulty. 28. A Christian being thus Certain, to the highest degree of a firm Assent, that the Scriptures are the Word of God, his Faith is thereby resolved into the Scriptures as into the Rule and Measure of what he is to believe; as it is into that veracity of God as the Ground of his believing what is therein contained. A Christian who is no better Certain then thus; that is by Grounds allowing only such a Certainty as is not absolutely or truly Conclusive of the Truth of Faith (as Dr. St. intends no more by his Moral Certainty) is not Certain at all: As appears farther by the next words, Certain [to the highest degree of a firm Assent.] the meaning of which must be that this highest degree of a firm Assent either is the same with the Certainty he intends his Faith according to his former doctrine, and constitutes or explicates it; or else that at least it helps to make up this Certainty, that is perfect it within its notion, and make it more a Certainty or a better Certainty; which makes the Conclusiveness or Evidence had from the Object needless to create a Certainty, and signifies thus much in plain Terms [Think or imagine what you will, so you imagine it strongly, and hold it stiffly, you are as Certain of it as may be.] Had he said, A Christian is or may be thus Certain by such a Proof had from the Object as was truly Conclusive of the Thing, how genuine, Coherent & Clear had his Expression been, which now is forced; Incongruous and Obscure? how Agreeable to Reason and the nature of Certainty as all Mankind understands it; which now is most Irrational and Unsuitable to the same Nature? How Honourable and Creditable had it been to his Cause, and to himself too as a Writer? But men that have not Truth on their side, and consequently are quite destitnte of found Principles and true Grounds, must not dare to speak Sense. Himself told us (Princ. 20.) that the nature of Assent is agreeable to the Evidence we have of it in our Minds, let him remember then that the highest degree of a firm Assent requires in reason the highest gree of Clear Evidence to beget it, which yet he lately denied to be had from Moral things, and attributed it peculiarly to the Mathematics. So that all is Incoherent, all is Common and big words, hollow and so of a loud and high Sound, but without any determinate Sense. Again, how does it follow, that because a Christian is thus Certain that the Scriptures are the Word of God, that therefore his Faith is thereby resolved into the Scriptures as into the Rule and Measure of what he is to believe? There is not the least show of consequence for this, unless he had first proved that God had intended to speak so clear in the Scripture as every private Understanding should not sail of being secured from mistake while it relied upon It; as also that God had spoken to us no other way but by the written Word, which he has no where proved, nor can ever prove. And, if the former of these (as experience tells us 'tis) be wanting, 'tis not a Rule to those Persons; if the latter, 'tis not necessarily the Measure of what they are to believe. 29. No Christian can be obliged under any pretence of Infallibility to believe any thing as a matter of Faith, but what was revealed by God himself in that Book wherein he believes his Will to be contained, and consequently is bound to reject whatsoever is offered to be imposed upon his Faith which has no foundation in Scripture, or is contrary thereto; which Rejection is no making Negative Articles of Faith, but only applying the general Grounds of Faith to particular Instances, as because I believe nothing necessary to Salvation, but what is contained in Scripture, therefore no such particular things which neither are there nor can be deduced thence. If Christians were bound to hold that God had revealed his whole Will in that Book, and this so clearly that all or most Christians could not miss of understanding it right so as thereby to be absolutely Certain of their Faith, than indeed the first half of his Principle here runs very currently and smoothly: but these rubs lying still in the way which Dr. St. has not in the least remould, they being also satisfied by the General Conceit of Christianity, and by the Nature and Genius of Christian Faith, that it cannot possibly be an Error or Lie, and, consequently, mu●t have such Grounds as cannot possibly permit all the world to be in an Error while they rely on them, that is, Grounds which are Infallibly secure, and, on the other side, observing both by experience and Reason that Scripture is not such a Ground as that private Understandings applying to it, are thereby perserv'd from possibility of erring (as Dr. St. also confesses in his next Principle) hence they are invited strongly to conceive that God has left some Persons on earth easily to be found who may supply what is wanting of Clearness to Scriptures Letter in the highest Points of Faith; and that God will some way or other perserve them from erring, and that while thus protected by God's signal Providence (whether this be performed Naturally, Supernaturally, or both ways) they cannot Err in that Affair, or in acquainting us with right Faith. So that, unless Dr. St. make out solidly that Scripture has in it the true nature of the Rule of Faith, of itself and without needing any Church, he must expect in reason that the very nature of Faith will necessarily incline all sincere persons, who have due care of their souls and of finding out true Faith, to believe the Infallibility of the Church. And, whereas he says that their rejection of such Points which have no Foundation in Scripture or are contrary thereto is no making New Articles of Faith, but only applying the General Grounds of Faith to particular Instances, he discourses therein very consonantly to his own Grounds were they worth any thing; Yet, I have one thing to propose to his Consideration, which is, that to justify his Reformers he must produce Grounds full as good or rather better for the Rejection of those Points as for his Faith; or to speak more distinctly, he must have as perfect (or rather perfecter) Certainty for these two Propositions [Nothing it to be believed which has no Foundation in Scripture] and [This or that rejected Point has no Foundation in Scripture] as he has for any point of Christian Faith For, since upon the Evidence they had of these two Propositions they disobeyed and rebelled against their then lawful Superiors and Church Pastors, and broke Church-Union, which was evidently forbidden by God's Law, and so the preserving Union & obeying them, is a point of Faith, and which themselves confess is such and binds them as such in case the reasons for their imposing New points be not valid, that is, if these two Propositions on whose Evidence they relied when they alleged they were wrongfully imposed, and thence rejected them, be not True; it follows that they must at least have equal Evidence (nay more, for bare Equality would only Balance them in a doubtful suspense berween either side) that those Propositions on which they grounds their Rejection of those Articles, and disobedience to their Pastors and Superiors, are True, as they have for their Faith. And, if the Grounds of this Rejection ought to be more Certain than the Grounds of their Faith, there is either some thing wrong in the pretended Grounds of their Faith, or else their Negative Articles ought to be allowed the honour of being Points of Faith too, since their greater Certainty gives them fair and equal Title to it, if not Absolute Pre-eminence. 30. There can be no better way to prevent men's mistakes in the sense of Scripture (which men being Fallible are subject to) than the considering the consequence of mistaking in a matter wherein their salvation is concerned: and there can be no sufficient reason why that may not serve in matters of Faith, which God himself hath made use of as the means to keep them from Sin in their lives: Unless any imagine that Errors in Opinion are far more dangerous to men's souls then a vicious life is, and therefore God is bound to take more care to prevent the one than the other. The Dr. being conscious to himself that he had, notwithstanding all his promises to reduce Faith to Principles, and to prove its Certainty, left it still Uncertain, thought it his best Expedient to close his blind Principles with a speeding one, which (to the shame of all Principles) should maintain that it need not be Certain; though he couches this sense warily as it behoves him. He seems to ground his Sceptical Discourse on this, that Men are Fallible, and so subject to mistake the sense of the Scriptures. I wish he would speak out once in his life and tell us plainly whether all Mankind be Fallible in every thing or only in some things, and in some Circumstances? Again, whether he means that men are naturally Fallible, or supernaturally, that is by means of God's Infinite Power, if it should set it ●elf to deceive them. If the later, 'tis not, nor aught to be our Question; for no man who has any Reverence for God or his Attributes, will ever think that he will do Miracles still to lead Mankind into Error, but rather judge it becomes his Goodness to provide, in case the Good of the world or the Church should require that some extraordinary thing be done, that Mankind should have notice of it by some Certain way to prevent his Erring, as it happens in the case of the Eucharist. Taking him then to mean that man is naturally Fallible, we inquire further; Is all Mankind (however one sense or another accidentally may be insincere in one or another particular) yet is all Mankind naturally Fallible in their daily Sensations, or which is all one, are the Senses of all Mankind so framed as to convey wrong Impressions into his Knowing Power? If not, they cannot err naturally: nor do I think Dr. St. will say our Senses thus and in this are Fallible; If he does, I know not what to say of him; which is, that he is a perfect Pyrrhonian and unworthy of Mankind's Conversation or Discourse with him; for, to what end should men discourse with him, if, all his Senses being Fallible, himself knows not whether they discourse or no? I ask still further, Are men naturally Fallible in some things not had immediately from sense, for example, in knowing that the world was on foot a year before we were born? or in First Principles, as Aequale est aequale sibi, An Equal equal to itself? Or in a Conclusion immediately depending on such Principles, as that therefore three lines drawn from the Centre to the Circumference are equal, and such like? I think he will not say it. We see then Men are capable of Infallibility or Certainty of their own nature: wherefore they can aim at it and desire it, especially in Faith, which is of so high a Concern to their Souls and the basis of all their Spiritual Building, therefore, both for that Reason and very many others recounted and enforced by me in Faith Vindicated and elsewhere, they ought to have this Certainty (especially since the Truth of Faith is neither Provable, Maintainable nor professible without it) in case such a Certainty be not in itself Impossible, and that 'tis not so, I have said something both in my Reason against Raillery, p. 64. to 67. and p. 112. to p. 116. as also in this present Treatise in my Answer to the 27. Principle. But, setting this aside, we will proceed and demand still farther; Are men deceivable in knowing what one another means in ordinary Conversation or domestic affairs? Can the Ma●●er and the Man the Mistress and her Maid understand one another? Or, in case some ambiguous Expression intermingle itself, cannot the Speaker upon the other's signifying his dissatisfaction, absolutely clear his doubt, and make himself be throughly understood? Experience tells us they can, and that they may as easily be mistaken in their Sensations as in such kind of Expressions. We see then Men are Infallible in many things, and even in understanding words aright in same cases. If then they be Fallible in understanding Scriptures, and this in the main and Fundamental Points of Christianity, as was shown above, 'tis evident this Fallibility is not to be refunded totally into the Subject or Man (since he is capable of Infallible Certainty in other things) but into the want of Clearness in the Letter of Scripture (as to such Points) in proportion to private Understandings, and consequently that it was never intended by God for their Rule of Faith; since, though both sides rely on this, yet one (even while doing thus) is still in an Error; and such an Error as is a Heresy. Since than what we hold is, that men are Infallible in affairs belonging to Faith, and this while they rely on the Grounds left by God for them to embrace Faith, I would ask him in a word, whether he holds all men may be deceived in that very affair even while they do this to the best of their power? If he says they can, 'tis unavoidable all the Christian world may possibly be now in an Error, and all Christian Faith be a mere lie: As also, 'tis evident, that in that case God would have left no ordinary means to secure his Church or any man in it from Error; & lastly, that God leads men into Error, s●nce they acting to the best of their Power (as is supposed) their Error cannot be refunded into them but into the defectiveness of those Means, that is their want of Perspicuity or sufficient Plainness to their addicted and faithfully-endeavouring Understandings, even as to those main Points. Thus much to show how craftily Dr. St. to avoid reflection on the Unfitness of the Rule he assigns, puts it only upon men's being Fallible, and how unreasonably he behaves himself in so doing: Let us now see how he provides against this Fallibility lest otherwise all Mankind should err in their Faith. He tells us that there can be no better way to prevent men's mistakes in the sense of Scripture, which men being Fallible are subject to, than the considering the consequence of mistaking in a matter wherein their Salvation is concerned. Well, put this Consideration in men, are any of them by virtue thereof yet Infallible, or secured from erring in understanding Scripture? If not, all mankind may yet according to his Grounds be in an Error in matters belonging to Faith, and so all Christian Faith may still possibly be False, notwithstanding all the Provision put by him to secure them and It. But if this render them absolutely secure from Erring, than we may hope God's Church too may have the grace given her by God as well as a private man, to consider the consequence of mistaking also, I am sure it as much concerns her, and so the Church (or, as he calls it a Society of men) may also be Infallible in understanding and explaining Scripture; and, by this means, we are come about again to an Infallible Proponent, which we have so zealously laboured to avoid. In a word, after he has put all Means left by God to be Certain of our Faith, and all the diligence and care possible to be used by man to lay hold on those means, let him either acknowledge that any particular man in the world, and so a fortiori God's Church or any S●ciety of men exactly following & relying on those Means to arrive at right Faith, is by so doing Infallible in that thing or in interpreting Scripture, and by consequence that Christian Faith is Infallibly Certain, or else confess that, notwithstanding all means used, all Christian Faith is still either not Certain at all, or else Fallibly Certain, which is a piece of most profound Nonsense; and, were it sense, signifies plain all may be False. The later half of this Principle, is still more admirable Nonsense than the former, and shows how meanly he is versed in solid Divinity; he conterposes there the Certainty in matters of Faith, to that which God has made use of as the means to keep men from Sin in their lives; as if Faith were not intended by God to make men Virtuous and the Certainty of Faith the most effectual part of those means. But because I see Dr. St. though he have a very good wit, yet by reason of his sole Application to verbal Divinity, which never reaches the Ground or Bottom of any thing it talks of, is very Ignorant of what is meant by Christian Life and its opposite Vice, or Sin, I will take a little pains to inform him better. He may please then to know that it suiting best with God's Wisdom to govern the world by way of Causes and Effects, he carries on the course of his Ordinary Providence even in Supernaturals by means of Dispositions The whole design then of his Goodness is to plant those dispositions in our Soul by means of Religion as may make us most comfortable to himself, that so Ascensiones in cord nostro disponendo, asceendamus de virtute in virtutem donec videatur Deus Deorum in Zion. That is, by Ordering those rising Steps in our heart we may ascend from Virtue to Virtue till the God of Gods be seen in Zion. Hence the life of a Christian, as such, is spiritual, and the Proper way for him to worship God is in spirit, that is by Spiritual Acts or Habits to perfect his Soul, or that part in us which is Spiritual, and dispose is for Heaven; But Error is also spiritual, and yet is far from perfecting our Soul, therefore Truth must go along with it, and so we are to worship God in spirit and Truth; Hence, the first of virtues, in priority of Nature is true Knowledge of God, and of the motives or means to attain him, and the only way for the Generality to arrive at these is by believing his Divine Authority upon some way of Revelation which gives his Church and by her and all others Absolute Certainty 'tis engaged; by which means we are perfectly secure that what we proceed upon is God's sense, or Truth, which is the Basis of all our Spiritual building. Out of these Knowledges are apt to spring Adoration, Reverence, Hope, and Love of him above all things, in Christian Language called Charity, the Queen of all Virtues, (major autem horuni Charitas, says St. Paul) and out of this Love of God above all things, Love of our Neighbour as ourselves; in the heartiness of which, or the having that Rational disposition in our hearts to do as we would be done to, consists the keeping all the Commandments of the Second Table; which is also our good; for, so, more undisturbed by Passion, or vexation from the Exterior World whose order we violate in transgressing against these, we are more free to practise those other virtues which are to elevate us towards Heaven and fit us according to the measure of out pitch appointed by God, for the Attainment of Bliss. Hence is seen what is meant by sin or vice; For, this, being formally a defect, is only a want of the opposite good Disposition or Virtue. The chief Vice then is Hatred of God, or a very slighting and perfectly deliberate disregard & Posthabition of his Incomparable self, our Final Bliss, to a Creature; next, Despair, Irreverence, Infidelity, totally, as in Heathenism, or in some particular, as Tur●ism, judaism, Heresy: In the last place comes the want of that due Love of our Neighbour for God's sake as leaves our Will disposed (as far as that motive carries us) to do him any injury for our own temporal Convenience; in which consists the violation of the Commandments of the Second Table. Insomuch as, though a man commits not one of those Acts there forbidden, out of the motive of Worldly Honour, Civility, Fear or any other such like, yet if he wants that rightly-grounded Interior Love of his Neighbour and builds not his Avoidance of harming him on that motive, that is, if he be disposed to commit them all for any thing that motive would hinder him, however in the sight of man or Exteriorly he keeps those Commandments, yet is he guilty of them all Interiorly or in the sight of God. To apply this then to our present purpose. 'Tis seen hence that Faith is the Basis of all virtuous Life, and consequently the want of it the ruin of all virtue and the ready way to all Vice and sin: For, external Acting or Avoiding are nothing to Christian virtue, unless they spring from a Christian motive: and 'tis only Faith which gives us those Motives; and the stability, well-groundedness or Truth of Faith, which renders those Motives effectual. Wherefore, unless the Faithful be materially Infallible while they believe God has revealed such and fuch things, that is, unless God did indeed reveal them, and so their Faith be really True; all God's worship and Good life is ill-built, ruinous and falls to the Ground: And unless some of them, or those who are capable to understand it to be True, be formally Infallible, it would work less effectually in all those who should re●lect that they saw not but it might be False, or be made so reflect by others who were enemies to Faith; nor could the Truth of Christian Faith be defended, or made out, or be Justifiably recommended to others as True, nor with Wisdom and Honesty be professed True, by those who judge themselves capable to look through its Grounds and yet see nothing Conclusive of Truth in them. Wherefore this Fallible Certainty of his destroys all Efficacy, all Defence and even Essence of Faith, and consequently radically subverts and overthrows all Christian Virtue, and all true Goodness. Which, I attest the Author and Finisher of our Faith, is the true reason why I with so much zeal and Earnestness oppose him and his Friend, for advancing Uncertainty, and consequently Scepticism in Faith, however they and their angry passionate party are pleased to apprehend me. I perceive Dr. St. will hope to evade by saying that Christian virtue may be upheld by the Certainty we have of some Points of Faith, though others be Uncertain: which Points, to make his Uncertainty of Faith go down the better, he calls here Opinions. But, if he means by Opinions the Tenets of a Trinity, Christ's Godhead and Presence in the B. Sacrament (all most highly concerning Christian Life one way or other) in which we discern great parties differing who all admit the Scripture and use the best means to interpret it as far as we can perceive; nay, and consider the consequence of mistaking too, which he makes the very best means of all: If, I say, these and such as these be the Opinions he speaks of, and counterposes them to means to keep men▪ from sin in their lives; and that the Rule of Faith he assigns leaves whole Bodies of Reliers on it in actual Error in such Fundamental Points of Faith and of most high concernment to good life, as has been shown, even while they proceed upon it; 'tis evident 'tis not the Rule God intended his Church and mankind to build their Faith on, and so none can presume of security of mistake by relying purely upon it; but all of Concern not known before by some other means, that is all which it alone holds forth, may be also liable to be a mistake likewise; unless some other Authority more ascertainable to us than it abets its Letter in such passages as are plain because they are either merely Moral or Narrative; or explain its sense in others which are more spiritual and supernatural and so more peculiar and Fundamental to Christianity. Recapitulation. To meet with the absurd Positions expressed or else employed in the Doctrine delivered here by Dr. St. in these last Eleven Principles of his, I take leave to remind the Reader of these few opposite Truths established in my former Discourse. 1. That Assent called Faith, taken as built on the Motives left by God to light Mankind to the Knowledge of his Will, (that is taken as it ought to be taken, and as 'tis found in the Generality) is for that Reason Absolutely (that is, more than morally) Certain, or Impossible to be False. 2. Though the Nature of Assent depend immediately on the Evidence we have of it in our minds when 'tis Rational; yet in case it be True, as the Assent of Faith ought to be, it must necessarily be built and depend fundamentally on the nature of the Thing; since without dependence on It, this Evidence itself cannot possibly be had. 3. A man may be materially Infallible, or out of possibility of being actually deceived in judging the divine Authority is engaged, by adhering to another's judgement who is Infallible, or in the right in thus judging, though he penetrate not the reason why that other man comes to be Infallible. Also he who is thus Infallible, being in possession of those Truths (relieved upon the Divine Authority as the Formal motive of believing them) which Truths as Principles beget those good Affections in him in which consist our Christian Life: such a man, I say, has consequently enough (speaking abstractedly) for the Essence of Saving Faith, though he be not Formally or knowingly Infallible by penetrating the Conclusiveness of the Grounds of Faith. 4. To be thus materially Infallible, or thus in the right in judging the Divine Authority is engaged, is requisite and necessary for the Essence of Faith; otherwise the believing upon the Divin Authority when 'tis not engaged, and so perhaps the believing and holding firmly to abominable Errors and Heretical Tenets might be an Act of Faith; to assert which, is both absurd and most impious. 5. 'Tis requisite to the Perfection of Faith to be formally or Knowingly Infallible that the Divine Authority is engaged. For, since it hazards Heresy and Error to judge that the Divine Authority is engaged for any point when 'tis not, it ought to breed suspense and caution in Reflecters till they see it engaged: & consequently the better they see this the more hearty they are apt to assent to the point upon the Divine Authority: So that the Absolute Certainty of the Grounds which conclude the Divine Authority engaged, betters and strengthens the Act of Faith. 6. However it be enough for the Faith of those whose downright rudeness lets them not reflect at all, to be only Materially Infallible that God's Authority is engaged, yet 'tis besides of Absolute necessity to Reflecters who raise doubts, especially for those who are very acute, to discern some reason which cannot deceive them, or to be formally or knowingly Infallible that 'tis indeed actually engaged for those points. Otherwise it would follow that provision enough had been made by God to satisfy or cause saving Faith in Fools, and none at all to breed Faith wise men; which, without satisfaction in this in point is in possible to be expected in such through-sighted Reflecters. The same Formal Infallibility is necessary for the wisest sort of men in the Church, both to de●end Faith and establish its Grounds in a Scholarlike way, as also for their Profession of the Truth of Faith, and other Obligations incumbent on them as Faithful, and lastly, for the Effects which are to be bred in them by Faith's Certainty. 7. Though then the Rule of Faith needs not to be actually penetrated by all the Faithful while they proceed unreflectingly, yet it ought to be so qualified that it may satisfy all who are apt to reflect and so to doubt of their Faith; that is, it's Ruling power ought to be penetrable or evidenceable to them if they come to doubt: and also so connatural and suitable to the unelevated and unreflecting thoughts of men of all sorts, that it be the most apt that maybe to establish the Faithful in the mean time and preserve them from doubting of their Faith. Both these are found in Tradition, or Testifying Authority, and not in Scripture's Letter. That therefore, and not This is the Rule of Faith. 8. Infallible Certainty of Faith being rejected, the Moral Certain●y he substitutes must either be a Fallible Certainty or none; this later is Impious, the former is nonsense; Wherefore all Dr. St's Discourse of Faith, while he rejects Infallibility, must forcibly have the one or the other of these Qualifications. 9 A firm Assent to a thing as True renders no man Certain of what he thus assents to; for so Heretics might be truly Certain of all the pestilent Errors they hold, so they but firmly assent they are True. 10. Faith being the Basis of all Christian Virtues, on which all our spiritual Edifice is built, and from whence we derive all the Certainty we have of all that concerns it, aught by consequence be better grounded and firmer than any or all its superstructures. Also, 'tis ill Divinity to counterpose matters of Faith to the Means to keep men from sin in their lives, since Matters of Faith or Christ's doctrine is the very best of those Means; or to pretend that Errors in Opinion (I suppose he means in Faith, that being the point) are not more dangerous to men's. Souls than a vicious life; for this supposes Faith no part of a Christian Life, nor Infidelily, Heresy; judaism or Turcism to be vices: which, by consequence, degrades Christian Faith from being a virtue, contrary to the Sentiment of all Christianity since the beginning of the Church. I shall hope from any impartial and Intelligent Reader who is a Christian, that he will acknowledge these Posi●ions of mine bear a clear Evidence either in the● s●lves, or in their Proofs; and consequently, that the opposite ones advanced either Explicitly or Implicitly by Dr. St. are both Obscure and (which is worse) Untrue. The Total Account of Dr. St's Principles. THus have I spoken distinctly and fully to Dr. St's. Principles. It were not amiss to sum up their merits in brief, and give a short character of them; that so it may be seen how infinitely short they fall of deserving so Honourable a Name. But, first, we are to speak a word or two to the Principles agreed on by both sides: of which the First and Third are great Truths, and the word, God and Obedience due to God, now & then barely named; but no kind of Conclusions, are drawn from those two particular Propositions influential to the End intended, viz. to reduce the Faith of the Protestants to Principles; whence, though they are most Certain Truths, yet, as standing here, they are no Principles. The 2d and 4th which concern God's Attributes, are not at all used neither. For he cannot use them alone to evince Scripture's Letter is the Rule, unless he first prove that Scripture's Letter is the fittest for that End, and that therefore it become Gods' Attributes to choose it; which he no where does: and whereas he would argue thus, Princ. 7. God hath chosen it for a Rule, therefore 'tis agreeable to his Attributes; 'tis both Frivolous, because all is already concluded between us if he proves God has chosen Scripture for that end, for then 'tis granted by all it must be agreeable to his Attributes; and also Preposterous, for he makes that the Conclusion which should be, in case he argued from God's Attributes, the Principle: For his Argument ought, in that case, to run thus; Gods Wisdom and Goodness has chosen that for a Rule which is wisest and best to be chosen; but Scriptures Letter is such; therefore he has chosen it for a Rule. The 4th and 5th are either never made use of by him as Principles, or else they make directly against himself; For Fallible Certainty, only which, having discarded that which is Infallible, he sustains, can never make any one know what is God's will. This is an ill beginning, and a very slender Success hitherto; let us see next whether he has better luck with his own Principles. The first, taking the words literally and Properly as they ought to be taken in Principles, is against himself: for he confesses there that such a way of Revelation is in itself neccessary to our Entire Obedience to God's will, as may make us know what the will of God is; but common sense tells us that Fallible Certainty (which only, having rejected Infallible Certainty he can maintain) is far from making us Know: This Principle therefore is either against himself, or, if he means to go less by the word Know than what is apt absolutely and truly to ascertain, 'tis nothing to his purpose; for so, it can only settle Opinion and not Faith. The second is Useless, Impertinent, and in part False. The Third is False and Impertinent to boot, The Fourth is Ambiguous, and, taken in that sense, when distinguished, which he seems to aim at, 'tis absolutely False. The 5th is Absurd, Preposterous and against all Art, in putting us to argue from what's less known to what's more known; and withal totally False. The 6th is Sophistically Ambiguous and in great part False. The 7th builds on a groundless pretence, and contains a notorious 〈…〉. The 8th is to no purpose; or sin●● (as appears in the Process of his discourse) he means by the words [Certainly] and [Know] only Fallible Certainty which is none at all, he cannot possibly advance by such a discourse towards the settling us a Certain Rule of Faith. Besides he either supposes Scripture, as it now stands, Sufficient, which is to beg the Question; or else, he confounds God's Ordinary Power working with the Causes now on foot in the world, which only concerned the present point, with his Extraordinary, or what he can possibly effect by his Divine Omnipitence: The 9th only Enumerates the several ways how God may be conceived to make known his will, and, in doing so either minces or else quite leaves out the Tradition of God's Church: as if it were unconceivable God should speak to men by their Lawful Pastors in the Church; whereas yet himself must confess that in the beginning of the Church Faith either was signified and certified by that or no way. The 10th goes upon a False Supposition and includes two Fallaces, called by Logicians non causa pro causa, or assigning a wrong Cause, and omitting the True one; Also, 'tis in part False, in saying words are equally oapable of being understood spoken or written: and lastly, it confounds again God's Ordinary Power with his Extraordinary. The 11th makes account there is no benefit of Divine Writings but in being the Rule of Faith, which is against Common sense and daily Experience. The 12th comes home to the point; but 'tis perfectly Groundless, Unprov'd, False, and as full of Absurdities of several sorts as it can well ●old. The 13th begins with a False Position, proceeds with a False and unprov'd Supposition, and endeavours to induce a most Extravagant Conclusion only from Premises granted kindly by himself to himself without the least Proof. The 14tb contains three False and unprov'd Suppositions: viz. that God promised his Church to deliver his whole will in Writings; or that the Writers of Scripture had any order from God to write his whole will explicitly; or, that the primitive Church believed it to have such a perfection as to signify (without needing the Church) all saving Truth to every sincere Reader with such a Certainty as is requisite to Faith. The 15th begins again with a False and unprov'd Supposition, and draws thence a consequence not contained in the Proof, and, in part, against the interest of his own Tenet; and, Lastly, brings in confirmation of it an Instance which makes against himself. The 16th putts upon Catholics a Tenet they never held, and is wholly False, Irrational and Absurd: assuming gratis this position, that nothing but Miracle ought to serve, whether there be other Means laid or no; Or, that no Proof but Miracle can possibly be sufficient to satisfy men's Reasons in a thing Subject to Reason. For, the Natural Assistance of the Church is such of itself, and the Suppernatural, supposing the knowledge of Sanctity in the Church, is as plain Reason as that the greatest motives to Goodness, and Interior Goodness caused by those motives, will make those good men who have it act as good men ought and are apt to do. The 17th proceeds wholly upon a False Imputation laid on our Church, and on his confounding most absurdly the notion of the Church with that of the Schools; or rather taking a few speculative Divines, and those the weakest, to be the Church. The 18th is again built on an unprov'd Supposition (of which kind of Grounds he is still very free) and on a falsely pretended promise from God so to secure any private-spirited Contemner of the Church that he shall be in the way to Salvation whether he Err● or no; though (as common sense and the Order of the world gives it) he forfeit both his Reason and his Virtue by not hearing his Lawful and Learned Pastors rather than his selfconceited Ignorant self. The 19th has the same Faults with the former, and is wholly False, even though his own Supposition, mentioned in the close, were freely granted him, which 'tis not. The four Principles following are made up of these Errors. 1. That we hold that no man can have a True and saving Faith unless he sees and knows that the Proponent is Infallible. 2. That the nature of Assent (when rational) depends not on the Object. 3. That one cannot have an Infallible Assent in Faith without Infallible Assistance to judge of the Points of Faith themselves. 4. That there is no middle between no particular person, and every particular person being formally Infallible; whereas my Tenet is that some must be so, most may be so, and all need not be so. 5. That because all must be materially Infallible, or in the true Faith, but know not how they are so; therefore 'tis useless that any should know how to make out those Grounds, to settle, explain, and defend Faith and its Certainty. These with his self-contradiction are the jarring Elements which compound these four terrible Principles, with which he hopes to undermine and blow up the Church's Infallibility, and the absolute Certainty of all Christian Faith. The 24th gives good words in common of Certainty and Evidence, but he means by the former Fallible Certainty, by the Later only some Probability or Improbability, so it but appears so to the Subject. And is a total prevarication, from Settling the Truth of Faith to not doubting the Truth of the Scripture; of which there is no question. The 25th holds forth a most wicked and gross Absurdity, destructive of all Certainty, Evidence, Faith, Christianity, and even Manhood, viz. that to Assent firmly to any thing as True, is to be Certain of it: And intimates two others, viz. that a man who is now Certain of a thing, may at another time know that thing to be False, though not at the same time; as also, that such a Certainty is competent for Belief or Faith. The 26. speaks Evident Truth in the beginning of it, but is nothing available to his cause, but rather against him. The Inference thence is False, being defectively expressed; and when rectified, is also a clear Truth, but highly prejudices himself. The 27. is utterly 〈◊〉 of common Sense, Certainty, Faith and Christianity. The 28. Principle is a weak and inconsistent Discourse. The 29. supposes Scriptures Intelligible enough in all Points of Faith without the Church, and to contain expressly God's whole will, o● every Article of Faith, or at least with such a Ground of it there as that 'tis deducible thence by private understandings with a Certainty competent for Faith; none of which he has at all proved, nor ever will. The 30th and last confesses all men liable to Error in Faith, though relying on the Means left by God to secure them from it; which evidently makes that means to be none: and assigns a way for their best security, which all Erring Sects in the world (as far as we can discern) take, and yet still err. And, lastly, for an Upshot, he makes account, like a Solid Divine, that our Christian Life is not at all Interior, but only Exterior; and, consequently, that Faith is no part of a Christian's Life, nor the means to the other parts of it, nor Infidelity and Heresy a Sin or Vice; and then all's safe, and his Principles stand firm: for then 'tis evident that every private man may reject the Church at pleasure, and be sure to understand as much in Scripture as is necessary to Salvation; for, if these be no sins, and so do not damn a man either immediately or mediately, there is nothing that will. But indeed, in Dr. St's kind of Reformation, they are rather to be accounted Cardinal and Fundamental Virtues. Such Senseless Principles ought to produce no better Fruit; for this suits their Practice and his Principles: Rebel against God's Church, break the most Sacred Order of the World, and do but talk stoutly and with a bold grace and a pretty way of Expression of Scripture and God's Word, and then all is Holy and Good. Reflecting then back on the nature of Principles, and considering that to deserve that name they must necessarily have in them two Qualifications, viz. Evidence in themselves, and Influence upon some other Propositions which are to derive their Evidence from them; and it being manifest, both out of this short Review, and much more out of the full Replies to each of them, that not one of those which D. St. here calls Principles, but is either Vnevident and False; or, if True, Impertinent and void of any the least Influence upon the Point he aimed to prove by them: They are clearly convinced to have nothing in them like Principles, or entitling them to the honour of that name; and that he might with far more reason have called them, Conceits, Paradoxes, Quodlibets, or Crotchets. And I know no better way for him to vindicate them, but to entreat his Fellow-Hater of Infallibility Dr. T. who has a special gift at* See his Preface to his Sermons, p. last. putting Principles into Categorical and Hypothetical Syllogisms, to undertake these; that so the world may see the rare consequences that arise from them; to which, lest he should fail his Friend, we now address. The Sixth Examen of Dr. St's Six Conclusions. ANY man, who had either heard of Logic or reflected a little upon Nature, would verily have thought that such obscure Principles should necessarily have produced more obscure Conclusions, since the Evidence of the Later, being derived only from the former and participated from them, must needs be found in a lesser degree of Perfection in these, than is the Evidence of those former from whence 'tis borrowed and caused. But herein consists Dr. St's Masterpiece; that though his Principles be never so dark, his Conclusions are yet as light as Noonday. But I m●st not forestall the Reader's mirth. What I am to do is to declare in short what kind of things Conclusions ought to be; in doing which I will say no more than all men of Art in the world, and all who understand common reason will yield to be evident. A Conclusion, then, 1. Is a Proposition which follows out of Premises which are its Principles. 2. The Knowledge of its Verity depends on our knowing that the Premises (its Prinples) are True. 3. Therefore, the verity of these Premises must be more known to him whom we intent to convince of the Truth of the Conclusion, than is the Truth of the Conclusion it self; otherwise 'tis in vain to endeavour to convince him of this by the other. 4. The Consequence or Following of the Conclusion out of the Premises, or the Con●uxion between them, must be made known; for if by virtue of this Coherence it follow not thence, it may be perhaps a great Truth, but 'tis not at all a Conclusion. 5. To do this, 'tis requisite that each particular Conclusion should either be put immediately after it●s particular Premises, or else be related to them; otherwise, how shall any one be able to judge whether they cohere or no, if he know not what things are to cohere. Lastly, the Conclusion must be such as that in the granting it the victory of the Opponent consists; and so it must come home and close to the very point in difference between the two disputing parties. These short Notes duly reflected on, we advance to a nearer view of his pretended Conclusions. They are introduced with these three dry words [It follows that]. And here is our first defeat: The Consequences are Six, the Principles Thirty; and yet no light is thought fit to be given us, which Conclusion follows out of which Principles; but we are left to grope in the dark, and guests at a thing, which (as shall be seen hereafter) no Sphynx or O●dipus can ever make any probable nor even possible conjecture of. I wonder to what end he with such exact care noted all both Principles and Consequences in due Order with numbering Figures: was it only to give us a sleeveless notice that there were just Thirty Principles and just Six Conclusions? I see no such great Mystery or Remarkableness in that observation as should deserve such a Caution or Care. He should then either have omitted these, or else, to show them useful, have afforded us a few Figures more, relating each Conclusion to to it's respective Premises or Principles. But the reason of this Carriage is manifest: For, had he done this, we might have examined what coherence each Conclusion had with its Premises, and whether it followed from them by necessary consequence or no: Also, whether the Premises were more Evident than itself was: and all those other Properties of a Conclusion lately noted; without which 'tis the height of Nonsense to call any saying a Conclusion. Had these considerations come to the Test, his Consequences had come off as ill or worse than his Principles. Let themselves tell us whether I wrong them or no. It follows that 1. There is no necessity at all or use of an Infallible Society of men, to assure men of the Truth of those things which they may be Certain of without, and cannot have any greater assurance, supposing such Infallibility to be in them. This Proposition is so far from being a Conclusion from any Principles, much less from his, that 'tis self-known to all men of common sense, and amounts indeed to a first Principle. For, an Infallible Society of men, so circumstanced as he describes, is most evidently needless, and to no purpose; and so this Conclusion amounts in plain Terms to this Identical Proposition, only paraphrased a little, What's needless is needless, Or, 'tis to no purpose to put that which is of no purpose when put, or of no purpose to be put: Which are known by the Light of Nature, and so cannot admit Proof. Is not this a rare man, who first lays such obscure Principles as need Proof, and so ought to be called Conclusions; and then pretends to infer such Conclusions as cannot possibly need proving, being self-evident, and so ought rather to be called First Principles? What I desire at present is that he would please to acquaint us out of which of his ●o Principles it follows, that what needs not, needs not. If out of none, this is no Conclusion, though it be a most Evident Truth. 2. The Infallibility of that Society of men who call themselves the Catholic Church must be examined by the same Faculties in man, the same Rules of trial, the same motives, by which the Infallibility of any divine Revelation is. This is of the same nature with the foregoing. For, the former part, which says that this Infallibility must be examined by the same Faculties in man, is as plain as 'tis that nothing can be examined without a Faculty or Power to examine; or, that nothing can examine but what can examine, which is Evident beyond all possibility of Proof: Or, was ever any man in this world so silly as to imagine that, whereas we must use our Reasoning Faculty in judging the Infallibility of any Divine Revelation, yet perhaps we are to make use not of the same Faculty, but of our Loco-motive, expulsive or Retentive Faculty, in examining the Infallibility of the Church? As for the rest of it; if he means, by Rules of Trial and Motives, the maxims and Reasons we have for holding the Truth of any thing (as he can mean no other) then 'tis manifest that, taking Divine Revelation for a point of Faith revealed, 'tis Infallibility is to be examined by the same means other Points of Faith are, and so 'tis to be concluded Infallibly True, as other points of Faith also are, because the Divine Authority is shown to be engaged for the Truth of it. Again, taking those words to signify the Act or way of Revealing, which goes before Faith, and so is the Object of mere natural Reason, 'tis evident its Infallibility is to be examined by the same Maxims as the Infallibility of other Human Authorities also are, or rather, thus taken, the Infallibility of the Church testifying delivered Faith, and the Infallibility of the Divine Revelation are one and the same thing. So that, Distinguishing his words to clear his sense, his Conclusion plainly amounts to this, that [Points of Faith are to be examined in the same manner as Points of Faith are to be examined;] or else [That Things of such a nature Subject to Human Reason, are to be examined in the same manner as things of that nature Subject to Human Reason are to be examined.] Or rather, which will fit both of them, that [Things of any nature are to be examined as things of that nature are to be examined.] which is so evident to all men of common sense that it cannot need Proof, and can scarce admit any; I am sure is never proved by him: That is, 'tis no Conclusion drawn from any of his Principles, but putting in stead of [the same Rules of trial and Motives] these words [the same way] which includes them both equivalently, 'tis only a Repetition of his 5th and 6th Principle, and continues the same affected ambiguity in the word Revelation as he used formerly; nay and is the same nonsense too, in case he takes Revelation in either place for a point of Faith revealed, and the Infallibility of the Church for that only which is built on Natural Assistance, that is, for it's Human Testimony: for so 'tis most manifest the same motives neither are nor can be common to both. For Points of Faith are received upon Authority as their proper Motive, and are Relative to That; and the Human Authority of the Church depends on Maxims of mere natural Reason, and not at all on Authority: which evidence they depend upon different motives, and so must be examined by motives which are not the same. This pretended Conclusion then is no new Proposition from his Premises, as a Conclusion ought to be, but the self same with them; and is either self-evident, or else a mere piece of Folly and Nonsense, that is (the Terms of it being cleared) both False and unprov'd, and so again no Conclusion, which must be made evident or Proved. 3. The less convincing the Miracles, the more doubtful the marks, the more obscure the sense of either what is called the Catholic Church, or declared by it; the less reason hath any Christian to believe upon the account of any who call themselves by the name of the Catholic Church. No man in his wits could any more doubt of this then of what's most Evident by the Light of Nature; for, Convincingness of Miracles, Evidence of the Marks, and Sense of the Church, being evidently Means or Reasons to believe, this Conclusion, putting less of 〈◊〉 these Reasons, amounts in plain Terms to this Indentical Proposition [Where there is less reason to believe, there is less reason to believe] which is Dr. St. can show possible to follow out of any of his Principles as Premises, as he here pretends, he will do more than Miracle. For he hath not there proved in the least that our Miracles are less convincing, our Marks doubtful, our sense obscure; nor so much as mentioned those points, much less gone about to confute our pretence of their Convincingnesse and Evidence: and, without doing this, to pretend this is a Conclusion, and that it follows from his Principles, whereas it is incomparably more evident than the best of those he makes use of, is to abuse the common regard due to his Readers, and to declare he makes account they never knew what belonged to ordinary Natural Logic, or the Common Light of Reason. 4. The more absurd any Opinions are and repugnant to the first Principles of Sense and Reason which any Church obtrudes upon the Faith of men, the greater reason men shill have to reject the pretence of Infallibility in that Church as a grand Imposture. This is just such another as the former▪ For it being self-evident that Absurdities and Contradictions are not to be held; and self-evident likewise that that which recommends such things to our belief 〈◊〉 to be rejected; this pretended Conclusion amounts to this plain Truth that [What has more reason to be rejected, has greater (or more) reason to be rejected:] which is an Identical Proposition, so plain that it cannot need or admit Proof; and, if it did, or could, there is not the least semblance of any thing offered in his Principles to prove it by, nor any sentence or clause in them concerning that matter, which has the tenth part of the ●lear Evidence that shines in this Proposition which he pretends follows from them, as a Conclusion. 5. To disown what is so taught by such a Church, is not to question the veracity of God, but so firmly to adhere to that, in what he hath revealed in Scriptures, that men dare not out of love to their souls reject what is so taught. The first part of this, is of the same nature with the former: For the words [such a Church] and [so taught] meaning absurdly and repugnantly to First Principles, the Truth of it is full as self-evident to all Christians who hold God the Author of Truth, as 'tis that [The Author of Truth is not the Author of Lie.] The rest of it, which would seem to put the opposite to the foregoing part, and tells us that to disown what is so taught by such a Church is firmly to adhere to what's revealed in Scripture, etc. is absolutely False; for to disown what is so taught by such a Church, amounts to no more but to hold to the First Principles of Sense and Reason in points conrrary to those Principles, obtruded by that Church; which a man may do and yet be an Atheist, for any thing Dr. St. has brought to make him adhere to Scripture: for I much doubt that a professed Fallible Certainty, for such wonderful & extraordinary Points as he will be bound to believe if he becomes a Christian, will scarce be able to give him full satisfaction of their Truth, if he guide himself by the First Principles of Reason, as Dr. St. pretends he should. Nor is it in Dr. St's love of his Soul, as he like a Saint pretends here, but Humour and Interest, to adhere so firmly to his private Interpretation of Scripture for his Rule of Faith; which he cannot but see has not in it the nature of such a Rule, nor consequently was ever intended by God for such an end: since, renouncing Infallibility in men, he must confess that all possible means being used to find out Truth by Interpretations of Scripture no better grounded, it still leaves all the Reliers on it in a possibility of being mistaken (as himself also confesses Princ. 30.) that is, Insecure that their Faith is True, or only Fallibly Certain of their Faith. Before I proceed to his sixth and last Conclusion, it were not amiss to examine these according to the No●es put down formerly containing some Qualifications necessarily belonging to all Conclusions; and to show by their want of all those how utterly unlike these five last are to what they pretended to be. And first, not one of them follows out of his Principles as from their Premises, as I showed in each of them. 2. Their Verity is known and evident to all Mankind independently on those Principles of his. 3. Their Verity is more known than is that of those Principles. For, speaking of the main import and weight of them (abstracting from some particular words and phrasing his notions) they are all in a manner self-evident and Unexceptionable; whereas his thirty Principles are liable to multitudes of exceptions, as hath been shown in the proper Answers to each. 4ly and 5ly The Consequence, Connexion or Following of these pretended Conclusions out of their Premises is not so much as attempted to be shown, nor any one of them related to any Principle or Principles; but all the Figures which distinguish both the one and the others stand for Cypher● and are useless. Lastly, were all these Conclusions, granted him, yet still he is never the nearer having proved or compassed what he intended. For, suppose we granted that there can be no necessity of an Infallible Society of men to do that which can be done as well without them? What if the supernatural Infallibility of the Church must be examined by the fame Faculty and the same ways Points of Faith are, or it's Natural Infallibility the same way it's Natural or Human Authority is examined? What if we have less Reason to believe it, if its Miracles be less convincing, its Marks more doubtful, and its sense more Obscure; and greater reason to reject it, the more absurd its opinions are, and repugnant to the first Principles of Sense and Reason? What if to disown such Doctrines be not to question God's Veracity? What, I say, if all these were granted by us (as they would have been very readily at the first, though he had never skirmished and flourished and kept this pother with laying so formally six Principles agreed on by both sides, and then thirty other of his own?) yet, he is not one jot the nearer the reducing the Faith of Protestants to Principles which was promised us at the beginning, and so we ought to expect the performance of it when he had deduced his Conclusions, which use to infer the Intent proposed to himself by the disputant, and to come home to the very point the Arguer would be at. Indeed, if he could show us solidly that Infallibility in a Church were useless; that, examined by such ways and means as it ought, it would be overthrown and could not stand the trial; that its Miracles were Unconvincing, its Marks Doubtful, it's Sense declared by it Obscure, or that its Opinions were indeed Absurd and Repugnant to the First Principles of Sense and Reason: very great matters had indeed in that case been done against our Church and Faith, yet still nothing at all to the establishment of his own. A Catholic might in that case have indeed lost his own Faith, and be to seek for another, but never find any merely by means of these destructive Positions alone; unless Dr. St. can settle him some other Ground built on better Principles and such as are competent to settle Faith on, which Fallible Certainty (were it sense) will never reach. So that were all his Conclusions hitherto freely granted, he is still as far from having attained what he proposed to himself and promised others, as at the beginning, Nor can▪ it be imagined why he makes us this mock-shew of Consequences, but only, that as at the beginning he put down most undeniable and most sacred Principles agreed on both sides, so to make his Readers apprehend beforehand he must needs conquer who had such sure Cards to play (though by his shyness to make use of them and apply them home it appeared he had no Title to them.) so now he puts five undeniable Propositions for Conclusions to make weak nnattentive Readers imagine he had actually conquered, for nothing sounds a more complete Victory, that to in●ferr evident Conclusions; But the ill luck is, not one of them is a Conclusion, not has that kind of Evidence in it which is peculiar to such Propositions, viz. Evidence-had by means of Proof, but they are all evident of themselves or self-evident, and so a good plot is unluckily spoiled, I have yet one thing more to say to them, that they have all of them evidently the Nature of Premises in them, and would do extraordinary service to his Cause taken in that capacity (as far, I mean, as he aims to overthrow the Catholic Church) if the badness of it would let him pursue them and stand by them and apply them. To show which I will put them down in a clear method, that it may be seen where the point sticks. The First Conclusion than has in it the Nature of a Major Proposition; and put in a Discourse, stands thus. That Infallibility without which men may be Certain of Faith, and cannot have greater Assurance of Faith were it put, is not necessary to be put. But suoh is the Infallibility of the Church of Rome. Therefore the Infallibility of the Church of Rome is not to be put. The second stands thus, (if it can at all concern the purpose.) That Infallibility which is to be examined by the same Faculties, Rules of Trial and Motives by which the Infallibility of any Divine Revelation is, cannot bear the test, but must be overthrown. But the Infallibility of the Roman Catholic Church is to be thus examined. Therefore it cannot stand the test, but must be overthrown. The Third stands thus. That Church whose Miracles are less convincing, marks more doubtful, sense more obscure, has less reason to be believed. But such is the Church of Rome. Therefore she has less reason to be believed. The Fourth thus. The Infallibility of that Church whose Opinions are absurd and repugnant to the First Principles of sense and reason has great reason to be rejected as a Grand Imposture. But the Infallibility of the Church of Rome is the Infallibility of such a Church whose Opinions are absurd and repugnant to the First Principles of Sense and Reason. Therefore it's Infallibility ought to be rejected as a Grand Imposture. The Fifth thus. They who disown Doctrines thus absurd and repugnant to the First Principles of Sense and Reason do own and not question therein the veracity of God. But we (in disowning the Roman Church) disown such doctrines; Therefore, We in so doing own, or do not question the Veracity of God. By which discourses 'tis evidently seen that the natural posture and place for these five Propositions, in an attempt to overthrow the Roman Churches Infallibility, and to excuse the Protestants for not obeying her, as is here intended, (for they are nothing at all to the reducing the Faith of Protestants to Principles, which they were pretendedly brought for) is to make them the Major Propositions, where the Chief Principles to all Conclusions use and aught to be placed. 'Tis evident also that these Premises or Principles stand firm in their own undeniable Verity; and the only Thing for him to do is to make good all the Minor Propositions; which done, all the Conclusions must necessarily follow, and so his work is done; as indeed it always aught to be when the Conclusion is inferred. Whereas, making these Major Propositions the Conclusions, 'tis manife● he is to begin again and argue from them, when he had concluded, and so was at an end o● his discourse. So that 'tis most palpably Evident, that Dr. St. most absurdly, unskilfully and prepo●cerously made those his Principles which were obscure and ungranted and had hundreds of Exceptions against them, and so needed proof, that is, made those his Principles which ought to have been his Con●lusions; and put those for his Conclusions which were in a manner self-evident and must be granted by all Mankind, and which naturally ought to be the Majors in any discourse on this Subject; that is, he mistook Principles for Conclusions and Conclusions for Principles; which perhaps was the reason he made use of those words [reduced to Principles] in stead of deduced from Principles; intimating thereby, that his Conclusions were all of them indeed Principles. Did ever Logic and Common Sense go thus to wrack? His 6th▪ Conclusion remains yet to be spoke to, and 'tis this. 6. Though nothing were to be believed as the Will of God, but what is by the Catholic Church declareed to be so, yet this doth not at all concern the Church of Rome, which neither is the Catholic Church, nor any sound part, or member of it. This is far from being self-evident as were the former, but of itself as obscure as may be, and in that regard is capable of being a Conclusion, had there been any Premises to infer it. It comes home also to the point as far as his Intent was to impugn Catholics; for were that which it contains concluded, it would import no less than the utter overthrow of the Roman Cause. But, where are the Premises or Principles which are to infer it? Must every bold and unproved saying, and which begs the whole Question, be called a Conclusion whether it have any Principles or no to prove it by? If then it have none, why does he put it for a Conclusion, and so pretend he has concluded it? If any, why does he not show us them, and relate to them? Is there any thing more important then to be acquainted with those perilous all-overturning Principles on which a Conclusion so desperately destructive to Rome is grounded? Or, may we not justly suspect that not giving us notice with which of his Insignificant thirty Principles this Romantical sixth Conclusion had any Commerce, he was conscious to himself it followed from none of them; and yet notwithstanding having a mighty mind to be thought to have concluded it, he therefore very politicly called his own saying a Conclusion. I know he has pretended elsewhere Idolatrous worship (forsooth) has corrupted her and made her unsound, and twenty other Flaws he finds in her; But than he ought to have made this Proposition be related to those Discourses, and not pretend they follow out of his thirty Principles where not a word to that purpose is found. Moreover, these Churches now in Communion with Rome were once true Churches; how came they then, or when, to be now so rotten and unsound: Let the time be assigned when by altering their Faith and worship they became corrupt: Let the persons, place, manners of beginning, proceeding and other circumstances be particularised, that so a matter of Fact of this manifest and concerning nature may be made credible: Above all, how it happened that matters of this notorious and important nature should remain unrecorded, and still believed that no such change was, and this upon the score of a testifying Authority, so great, that it must be confessed even by our enemies, that it was never heard since the Foundation of the world, that so many vast Nations should swallow so prodigious an Error so tamely in a most manifest and most concerning matter of Fact, and which, if it be indeed an Error, none can be absolutely secure of the Existence of any former Kings or Actions done before our times, much less of the Authority or Text of any Book in the world. But, I suppose, if these things be pressed, the best answer will be some Text of Scripture, as that the Enemy sowed Tares while men slept; which, interpreted by Dr. St's private spirit, shall sanctify to us this prodigious piece of nonsense, that the Roman-Catholick Church altered her Faith and Christian practice, and yet none observed it or took notice of it; that is, that those many Millions of her Subjects begun (as they must at one time or other if she indeed altered her Faith) to believe and practise otherwise then they did, yet none of them knew they did so: All slept, and were wrapped up (God wot) in the dark night of Ignorance, till owl-eyed Luther even at that midnight of Infidelity most blessedly espied the Light of the Gospel dawning, and showed it to Dr. St's Predecessors. Now, whoever reflects how considerable a Part of Christianity those Churches in Communion with Rome make, and how many abominable Corruptions or Sicknesses there are in her, if those of Dr. St's Private-spirited Church may be trusted, will with good reason conclude that the Church has as many diseases in her as an old horse, and very few limbs of her free; so that it will appear she for whose sake whole nature was made is the greatest Monster for wretchedness, and that her condition is more miserable than any other thing in nature: and consequently, that God's Providence has a slenderer care of his Church then of the most trifling toy in the world; which ill suits with the great wonders and extraordinary things he has done for her; as being made man, dying for her, and such like. It were good too to know how long a member of the Church may remain unsound ere it be time to cut it off; also, whether it can be cut off, or who are likely to cut it off: without which the Church's case must needs be most desperate, to be almost from top to to● as full of diseases as she can well hold, and no means extant to give her help. But alas, 'tis so evident that there are none in the world but herself and some few Sects that have manifestly gone out from her, and it sounds so unnaturally, to say the Tree can be cut off from its branches, that whatever such Talkers may say in common, yet come once to put it in execution the Absurdity of the Practice of it bewrays the Falsehood of Tenet. But to come closer to this voluntary saying of his; Either the Church of Rome relies for the Certainty of her Faith, on, the right Rule of Faith appointed by God, or she does not: If not, she has no Faith at all, but only Opinion (however she may hap to be in the right in many Points she holds) for her Assent will want the Certainty requisite to Faith, as not being built on the stable Grounds God had laid to give it that Certainty; and, if the Church of Rome have no Faith 'tis impossible she should be a Church, or any part of a Church, sound or unsound, as wanting what's most Essential, True Faith; and so Dr. St. has provided rarely well for the Mission of his own Church; for, if ours were no Church, she had no Church-Authority; and if she had none herself, 'tis evident she could give none: whence will follow that the Reformed Churches derived nothing which was Constitutive of a Church from any foregoing one, but were wholly erected anew; and then I would know what Authority, under that of jesus Christ who constituted the Church at first, had power to constitute it anew. But if Dr. St. says, that the Church of Rome relied on the Means left by God to ascert●● Faith, then 'tis manifest that doing so she could not err in Faith, and so is as sound as may be, whatever our Talking Disputant says. Since than there is no middle between [relying on the Means left by God to ascertain Faith] and [not relying on it] and so that Body in Communion with the Roman Church must necessarily do one of them; and if she does rely on it she must needs have all true Faith, and so be very healthful or sound; if she does not, she m●st needs have no True Faith at all, and so not only lose her Health but her Essence too, which by consequence unchurches the Reformers also, it were good Dr. St. would consider the point over again, and not talk thus any thing at random without proof. As for his saying (for saying things craftily, and prettily is his only Talon) that the Church of Rome, by which I presume he means, as we do, those Churches in Communion with the Roman, is not the Catholic Church, this will be best decided by settling the Certain Rule of Faith, and then, by applying of it, to consider whether any body out of her Communion have not deserted that Rule; which if they have, they will be proved thence to have no Faith, nor consequently to have in them the Essence of a Church; and so if this defect appear in them all, they can be in true speech no parts of the Church; in which case it must necessarily follow that those in Communion with the Roman are the Catholic Church. Let us begin with Grounds and pursue them by close discoursing and things will easily be decided: but this Talking Voluntaries, this countersfeiti●g and pretending to Principles and Conclusions when there is in reality neither the one nor the other, is good for nothing but empty show. These excellent performances having emboldend this man of Confidence to conceit he has done wonders, he sounds the Triumph of his own Victory in these words. This may suffice to show the validity of the Principles on which the Faith of Protestants stands, and the weakness of those of the Church of Rome. These words give us occasion to reflect back on his Promise and his Performances: His Promise was to reduce the Faith of Protestants to Principles; What he has performed is this. He has not yet laid one Proposition which is to him a Principle; (that is, which he makes use of to conclude what he designs) but what is both Obscure and False; He has settled no Faith at all but brought all into Opinion, by discarding Infallible, and maintaining only Fallible Certainty. And had he indeed settled any Faith, yet he has not produced own word to settle the Faith of Protestants in particular, but all will equally fit a Socinian or a Quaker; and his way of managing his Rule will much better suit with a Quaker or any Fanatic than with a Protestant. Also, in stead of reducing to Principles, he at first begins to deduce from Principles, and in the process of his discourse he puts Conclusions for Principles, and Principles for Conclusions; and so reduces and deduces, that is draws backwards and forwards, blows and sups both at once. In a word, the Total sum of his Heroic Achievements amounts to this. He has laid thirty Principles, which wanting either evidence or else necessary Influence upon what he pretends to prove, are no Principles: He hath so reduced to those Principles that he makes six Conclusions follow, that is, he deduces from them; and, so, he has so reduced to principles, that he has not reduced to them. He has put that for a Rule, which wanting power to direct aright those who are ro rely on it, is evidently no Rule; He has attributed such a Certainty to his Faith, as is a Fallible one, that is no Certainty but a Chimaera: and consequently he has so Principled Faith as makes it no Faith, but Opinion only. He has made six Propositions so follow out the thirty, which for want of necessary coherence with them do not follow; Lastly, he has made those to be Conclusions which for want of Premises, and by reason of their greater Evidence than is found in his Principles, and for many other regards, are not Conclusions but rather Principles. All which is shown in their proper places. So that, his perplexing Intricacy in contriving and posturing his words oddly, being once unravelled, their affected ambiguity cleared, and his Insignificances and Incoherences laid open, the Common Light of nature will inform any Attentive and Intelligent Reader that Dr. St. has not reduced the Faith of Protestants to Principles, but that his whole discourse attempting it is reduced to Contradictions. Yet in confidence of his vast performances he ventures upon this grand Conclusion that shall strike all dead. From all which it follows that it can be nothing but wilful Ignorance, weakness of judgement, strength of prejudice, or some sinful passion, which makes any one forsake the Communion of the Church of England, to embrace that of the Church of Rome. But with how much greater reason may I conclude, that (in case the Church of England owns his way of discoursing her●, and holds not that the Tradition, Practice and Sense of God's Church is to give us that assurance of the meaning of Scripture as to build Faith on it, but that 'tis to be left to every private man's Fancy to be his own judge in that affair) nothing but either an Invincibly-weak Ignorance, or the wicked Sin of Spiritual Pride; making private men scorn to submit their Judgements to persons wiser than themselves, or to be taught by their lawful Pastors whom God has appointed for that end, can make any man remain in the Communion of the Church of England, and not unite himself to the Communion of the Church of Rome. Especially, since they all hold that Faith cannot possibly be False, & so must hold that the means to Faith cannot possibly lead the reliers on it into error, and yet (if but meanly versed in the world) they must needs experience that those who do rely on their own sense of Scripture differ in most Fundamental points of Christianity, and so, oneside necessarily err in so doing. FINIS. TRANSITION TO THE Following Discourse. HAving thus totally defeated Dr. St's. Attempt to reduce his Faith to Principles, and shown that in stead of performing this, all the most substantial parts of his Discourse are reduced to so many Contradictious, it may perhaps be expected I should assert the Truth of my own by showing that 'tis built on such Firm and Evident Grounds. But I presume I have already performed this in my Sure-footing and its Corollaries, as also in Faith Vindicated and its Inferences; and, if it shall appear needful or be required of me by Learned Men, it may perhaps hereafter be brought into a closer and more rigorous Form. Yet, that it may be seen how easily our Discourses concerning the Certainty and Ground of Faith are resolvable into Evident Principles, I shall annex for an Instance a small Peace of mine; whi●h, though it was never pretended to be a severe Process by way of Principles, but only meant for a connected Discourse, yet I doubt not but I shall show that each main joint of it where it speaks assertively, has a Firm and Evident Principle at the Bottom, giving it Stability and Evidence, and through virtue of these Qualifications, rendering it Solidly and Absolutely Convictive● THE METHOD▪ To Arrive at SATISFACTION IN RELIGION. 1. SInce all Superstructures mn●t needs be weak whose foundation is not surely laid; He who desires to be satisfied in Religion, aught to begin with searching out, and establishing the Ground on which Religion is built; that is, the First Principle into which the several Points of Faith are resolved, and on which their Certainty, as to us, depends. 2. To do this, 'tis to be considered, that a Church is a Congregation of Faithful, and Faithful are those who have true Faith; Wherefore, till it be known which is the true Faith, it cannot be known which is the true Church. Again, A Council is a Representative, A Father, an Eminent Member of the Church, and a Witness of her Doctrine; Wherefore, till it be known which is the true Church, it cannot be known which is a Council, or who a Father. Lastly, Since we cannot know which is Scripture, but by the Testimony of those who recommend it; And of Heretics we can have no security that they have not corrupted it in favour of their false Tenets; neither can we be secure which is Scripture, till we be satisfied who are the truly Faithful, on whose Testimony we may safely rely in this affair. 3. Wherefore, he who sincerely aims at Satisfaction in Religion ought first of all to find out and establish some assured Means or Rule by which he may be secured which is true Faith; For till this be done, He cannot be secure either of Scripture, Church, Council, or Father, but having once done this, is in a ready way to Judge certainly of all; Whereas if he begin with any of the other, or indeed argue from them at all, till the Rule of Faith be first settled, he takes a wrong Method, and breaks the Laws of discourse, by beginning with what is less cortain, and indeed to him as yet uncertain; and in effect, puts the Conclusion before the Premises; unless he argue, Ad Hominem, or against the personal Tenets of his Adversary, which is a good way to Confute, but not to Satisfy. 4. And, because the Rule of Faith must be known before Faith can be known, and Faith before Scripture, Church, Councils and Fathers; it appears, that to the finding out this Rule no assistance of Books will be requisite, for every one who needs Faith, is not capable to read and understand Books: There is left then only Reason to use in this Inquiry; And, since People of all Capacities are to be saved, much sharpness and depth of wit will not be requisite, but plain Natural Reason rightly directed will suffice. 5. This being so, the Method of seeking satisfaction in Religion, is become strangely both more short and easy. For, here will need no tedious turning over Libraries, nor learning Languages, nor endless comparing voluminous Quotations, nor so much as the skill to read English, all being reduced to the considering one single Point (but such an one as bears all along with it) and this too comprehensible, (as will appear) to a mean understanding. Again, the large debating particular Points in a controversial way is by this means avoided. For, when the Right Rule of Faith is certainly known, then as certainly as there is any faith in the world, all that is received on that Rule is certain, and of faith. Not but that 'tis of excellent use too, to cherish and strengthen the faith, especially of Young Believers, by showing each particular Point agreeable to right Reason and Christian Principles, and recorded expressly in, or deduced by consequence from the Divinely-inspired Books. 6. Lastly, This Method is particularly suitable to the Nature of sincere Inquirers; who, if they want the liberty of their own Native Indifferency, and be awed by any Authority whatever before that Authority be made out, cannot but remain unsatisfied, and inwardly feel they proceed not according to Nature and the conduct of unbyast Reason; Whereas, when the Authority is once made evident, Reason will clearly inform them that it becomes their Nature to assent to it. 7. But how will it appear that 'tis so easily determinable by common Reason, which is the right Rule of Faith? Very evidently. But first we must observe, the Assent called Faith, depends upon two Propositions, [What God hath said is true] and [God hath said this] out of which two necessarily follows the Conclusion, that this or that in particular is true. Of these two we are concerned only in the later: For to examine Why God is to be believed when he has said any thing, which they call the formal Motive of faith, is not a Task for those who own Christianity. But all we have to do is to find out What God hath said, or (which in our case is all one) What Christ has taught; and that, whatever it be which acqnaints us with this, we call THE RULE OF FAITH; as that, which Regulates our belief concerning Christ's Doctrine, or the Principles of Religion. Now I affirm i● may be obvious Reason be discovered which this Rule is; and that by looking into the Nature of it, or considering what kind of thing it ought to be; which is no more than attentively to reflect what is meant by those two ordinary words, RULE & FAITH. 8. And both of them acquaint us that the Rule of Faith must be the means to assure us infallibly what Christ taught. For, in case a Rule, though we apply it to our power, and swerve not from it, leave us still deceivable in those points in which it should regulate us; we need another Rule to secure us that we be not actually deceived, and so this other and not the former is our Rule. Next, Faith (speaking of Christian Faith) differs ●rom Opinion in this, that Opinion may be false; but Faith cannot: Wherefore the Rule of faith, both as 'tis a Rule, and as it grounds Faith, doubly involves Infallibility in its Notion. 9 Let us apply this to Scripture and Tradition, (for setting aside the Light of the private Spirit grounding Phanaticism, there are no more which claim to be Rules of faith) & see to which of them this Notion fits; that is, whic hath trnly the Nature of the Rule of faith. And this is performed by examining which of them is of its own Nature, if applied and held to, able to assure us infallibly, that Christ taugbt thus and thus. 10. And for the Letter of Scripture, not to insist that, if it be denied, as many, if not all the parts of the New Testament have been by some or other; or mention that those who receive the Books, do often and always may doubt of almost any particular Text alleged, whether some fault through Malice, Negligence, or Weakness be not crept into it; in which Cases the Letter cannot evidence it self, but needs another Rule to establish it▪ I say, not to insist upon these things, which yet are undeniable, We see by experience Multitudes of Sects differing from one another, and some in most fundamental Points, as the Trinity and Godhead of Christ; yet all agreeing in the outward Letter. And it is not only Uncharitable, but even Impossible to imagine that none among so v●st Multitudes do intend to follow the Letter to their power, while they all pro●ess to reverence it as much as any, read it frequently, study it diligently, quote it constantly, and zealously defend the sense which they conceive of it, so far that many are even ready to die for it: Wherefore it cannot be suspected but they follow it to their power; and yet 'tis so far from infallibly teaching them the Doctrine of Christ, that, all this notwithstanding, they contradict one another, and that in most fundamental points. The bare Letter then is not the Rule of Faith, as not being of its own Nature able to assure us infallibly, though we follow it to our power, what Christ has taught▪ I would not be mistaken to have less Veneration than I ought for the Divine Books, whose Excellence and usefulness as it is beyond man to express, so peradventure among men there are not many who conceit this deeper than myself; and I am sure not one amongst those who take the confidence to charge us with such irreverent thoughts: But we are now about another Question. They are the Word of God, and their true Sense is Faith; We are enquiring out the Rule of Faith; whose office 'tis not to satisfy us that we ought to believe what God has said, which none doubts of, but What it is which God has said. And I affirm, That the Letter alone is not a sufficient means to assure us infallibly of this; and the experience of so many erring Thousands, is a lamentable but convincing proof of it. 11. On the other side, there needs but common sense to discern, That TRADITION is able, if followed to one's power, to bring infallibly down to after Ages, what Christ and his Apostles taught at first. For; since it means no more but delivery of Faith by daily Teaching and Practice of Immediate Forefathers to their respective Children; and it is not possible that men should be ignorant of that to which they were educated, of that which they daily saw; and heard and did; let this Rule be followed to one's power, that is, let Children resolve still to believe and practise themselves what they are taught by, and practised with their Fathers; and this from Age to Age; and it is impossible but all succeeding Children which follow this Rule, must needs from the Apostles time to the end of the World, be of the same Faith which was taught at first: For, while they do thus, there is no change; and if there be no change, 'tis the same. Tradition then, thus understood, has in▪ it the Nature of the Rule, of Faith, as being able, if held to, to bring down infallibly what Christ and his Apostles taught. 12. We have found the Rule of Faith, there remains to find which body of men in the World have ever, and still do follow this Rule. For, those, and only those, can be infallibly assured of what Christ taught, that is, can only have true Faith▪ Whereas all the rest, since they have but Fallible grounds, or a Rule for their Faith which may deceive them, cannot have right Faith, but Opinion only; which may be false, whereas Faith cannot. 13. And first, 'tis a strong presumption that those many particular Churches in communion with the Roman, which for that reason are called roman-catholics, do hold their Doctrine by this infallible Tenure; since they alone own Tradition to be an Infallible Rule, whereas the Deserters of that Church write whole Books to disgrace and vilify it: And, since no man in his wits will go about to weaken a Tenure by which he holds his Estate, 'tis a manifest sign that the Deserters of that Church hold not their Faith by the Tenure of Tradition, but rather acknowledge by their carriage that Tradition stands against them; and that 'tis their Interest to renounce it, lest it should overthrow their Cause: Wherefore, since Tradition [§. 11.] is the only means to derive Christ's Doctrine infallibly down to after Ages, they, by renouncing it, renounce the only means of conveying the Docttine of Faith certainly to us, and are convinced to have no Faith, but only Opinion. And not only so, but even to oppose and go point-blank against it, since they oppose the only-sure Method by which it can with certainty come down to us. 14 Besides, since Tradition (which I always understand as formerly explicated to be the Teaching the Faith of immediate Forefathers by words and practice) hath been proved the only infallible Rule of Faith, those who in the days of K. Henry VIII. and since have deserted it, aught to have had infallible certainty that we receded from it formerly: for, if we did not, but still cleaved to it, it could not choose but preserve the true Faith to us; and if they be not sure we did not, they know not but we have the true faith; and manifestly condemn themselves in deserting a Faith, which for aught they know was the true one: But, Infallible Certainty that we had deserted this Rule, they can have none, since they neither hold the Father's Infallible, nor their own Interpretation of Scripture; and therefore unavoidably shipwaack themselves upon that desperate Rock. Which is aggravated by this Consideration, that they built not their Reformation upon a zealous care of righting Tradition, which we had formerly violated, nor so much as Testimonial Evidence (as shall be shown presently) that we had deserted It; but all their pretence was that we had deserted Scripture: and, because they assign no other certain means to know the sense of the Holy Books but the Words, and those are shown to be no certain means [§. 10.] 'tis plain the Reformers regarded not at all the right Rule of Faith, but built their Reformation upon a weak Foundation, and incompetent to sustain such a building. Whence, neither had the first Reformers, nor have their Followers, Faith at all, but only Opinion. 15. On the contrary, since 'tis known and agreed to by all the World, at what time all Deserters of our Church, of what name soever, broke from us; as also who were the Authors and Abettors, and who the Impugners of such New Doctrines; besides, in what places they first begun, and were thence propagated to others: but no such thing is known of us even by our Adversaries, whom it concerns to be most diligent Searchers after it; seeing they are in a hundred minds about the Time when, and the Persons who introduced these pretended New Doctrines of ours, which they say vary from Scripture; as may be seen by their own words in several Books, and amongst others, one called, The Progeny of Protestants, and this for every point in which they pretend we have innovated: 'tis plain that when we charge them with deserttng the known Doctrine of the former Church, and the Rule of Faith, we speak open▪ and acknowledged evidence; when they accuse us of the same, their charge is obscure and unknown even to the very Accusers; nay, plainly proved false by the necessity of the things being notorious, if it happened, and the constant disagreement of those who allege it, when or how it happened. 16. I say Notorious; for, since Points of Faith which ground all Christian practice, are the most concerning Truths in the World, it cannot be but the denial of such Truths must needs raise great commotions before the opposite Truths could be nniversally spread; and the change of Christian Practice and Manners which depend on those Truths, must be wonderfully manifest and known to every body; wherefore; had we been guilty of such a change, and introduced New Tenets, and propagated them over the Christian world as is pretended, it must needs be manifestly and universally known that we did so; neither is it possible the change should be so Insensible and invisible, that our very Adversaries cannot find it out; especially this alone making their Victory over us so certain and perfect. For, seeing we own TRADITION as an Infallible Rule, We are irrecoverably overthrown, if they make out that we ever deserted It: and, surely, nothing should be more easy than to make out That, than which, if True, nothing can possibly be more Notorious. 17. Moreover, since it cannot be, that Multitudes of men should profess to hold points both infinitely concerning and strangely difficult to believe, and yet own no ground upon which they hold them: if we ever, as 'tis said we have, deserted Tradition, we must, till the time we took it up again, have proceeded upon some other Ground or Rule of Faith: And, because none ever charged ●s with proceeding upon the Letter of Scripture or Phanaticism, and besides th●se there is no other but Tradition, 'tis plain we never deserted, but always stuck to Tradition. 18. Besides, 'tis impossible that that Body of Men which claim for their Rule of Faith, an uninterrupted Tradition from the Apostles days, should not have held to that Rule of Faith from the beginning: For, otherwise they must have taken it up at some tim● 〈◊〉 other, and by doing so, profess to the 〈◊〉, that Nothing is to be held of Faith, but what descended by an uninterrnpted delivery from the beginning; and yet at the same time acknowledge that all they then held was not so descended, but received by another Rule, this of Tradition or uninterrupted Delivery being then newly taken up; which is so palpable a Contradiction, that, as Humane Nature could not fall into it: so, if it could, the very pretence would have overthrown itself, and needed no other confutation. 19 Add to this, that none of tbose many Sects who from time to time have deserted our Church's Faith and Discipline, and so become her Adversaries, ever yet pretended to assign the time when we took up this Rule of Tradition; and yet a change in that on which we profess to build all the rest, must needs be of all changes the most visible, and most apt to justify the carriage of those Revolters. Wherefore, 'tis demonstrably evident on all sides, that, as this present Body of men, called the Roman-Catholick Church, does now hold to Tradition, so their Predecessors uninterruptedly from the Apostles days did the same; that is, did hold to it ever. And, since 'tis shown before [§. 11.] that this Rule, if held to, will certainly convey down the true Faith unchanged to all after Ages, 'tis likewise demonstrable, that they have the true Faith, and are the truly Faithful, or true Church. 20. And hence by the way, is clearly seen what is meant by UNIVERSAL TRADITION, and where 'tis to be looked for and found; which puzzles many men otherwise very judicious and sincere; who profess a readiness, nay, a duty to follow Universal Tradition, but they are at a loss, how we may certainly know which is je. For, since 'tis evident that to complete the notion of the Universality of Mankind, (for example) it were absurd to think we must take in brutes too, which are of an opposite nature to Mankind, but 'tis sufficient to include all in whom the nature of Mankind is found; so, to make np the notion of Universal Tradition, it were equally absurd to think we ought to take in those in whom the nature of Tradition is not found, but its Opposite, that is, Deserters of Tradition or their Followers; but 'tis sufficient to include those in whom Tradition is found as in its Subject, that is, Adherers to Traedition, or Traditionary Christians. All, therefore, that have at any time deserted the Teoching and Practice of the immediately foregoing Church, how numerous and of what name soever they behave no show of Title to be parts of Universal Tradition,; and only they who themselves do, and whose Ancestors did ever adhere to it, how few soever they seem, are the only persons who can with any sense pretend to be those, of whom, as Parts, Universal Tradition consists. Whence also that Rule of Vincentius Lirinensis, directing us to hold that which is believed in all places, all times, and by all, which is so misapprehended by our Modern Dissenters, is clearly understood; viz. by taking it with Restriction to all those who hold to Tradition. For, otherwise, should we not restrain it to those only who have adhered to the Rule of Faith, but enlarge it to the utmost extent of the words, so as to comprehend also those who have deserted that Rule, nothing could possibly be held of Faith whlch any Heretic had ever denied: and so, in stead of being a Rule to distinguish or know what we are to believe, it would by thus confounding right Faith with all the Heresies in the world render it utterly Impossible ever to know what's Faith, what not, or discern Christ's true Doctrine from Diabolical Errors. But to return whence we digressed. 21. It follows from the former discourse, that those men who stick to Tradition, can, by applying that their Rule, certainly know who have true Faith, and which body of men is the true Church; likewise, that a Representative of that Body is a true Council, and that an Eminent Member of it delivering down to the next Age the Doctrine believed in his, whether by expressly avouching it the Chnrches' sense, or confuting Heretics, is a true Father. Lastly, they can have Infallible Certainty both of the Letter and Sense of Scripture, as far as concerns Faith: For, if any fault which shocks their Faith, whether of Translator or Transcriber, creep into any passage, or, if the Text be indeed right, but yet ambiguous, they can rectify the Letter according to the Law of God written in their hearts, and assign it a sense agreeable to the Faith which they find there; between which and that of the Holy Writers, they are sure there can be no disagreement, as being both inspired by the same unerring Light. 22. chose, those that follow not this Rule, and so are out of this Church, of what denomination soever, First; can have no true Faith themselves: 'Tis possible indeed and usual that some, and not seldom, many of the Points to which they assent, are True, and the same the truly Faithful assent to, yet their Assent to them is not Faith; for Faith (speaking of Christian Faith) is an Assent, which cannot possibly be false; and not only the Points assented to, but the Assent itself must have that distance from Falsehood, (as is proved at large in Faith vindicated) else 'tis not Faith, but degenerates into a lower Act, and is called Opinion: Now the strength of an Assent rationally made, depends upon the strength of its Grounds; & all Grounds of that Assent called Faith, (I mean such Grounds as tell us what Christ taught) besides Tradition, are proved (§. 10.) weak and none: Without It, therefore, there can be no true faith. Next, for want of that only Infallble Ground they cannot have Certainty which is true Faith, who truly Faithful, which the true Church, which a true Council, who a true Father, nor lastly, which is either the Letter or Sense of Scripture in Dogmatical passages that concern Faith. And, since they have no Certainty of these things, they have no right, nor ought in a Discourse about Faith be admitted to quote any of them; but are Themselves, and the whole Cause concluded in this single Inquiry. Who have a Competent, that is, an impossible to be false, or Infallible Rule to arrive at Faith. 23. The solid Satisfaction, therefore of those who inquire after true Faith, is only to be gained by examining who has, or who has not such a Rule. This METHOD is short and easy, and yet alone goes to the Bottom. All others, till this be had, are superficial, tedious, and, for want of Grounds, Insignificant. The Former Discourse Reduced to Principles. TO show the precedent Discourse built on most Firm and most Evident Principles, and such as I have described in my Preface, I request the Reader to look back with attentive Consideration upon its several parts, and he will discern that §. 1. The First Paragraph is only a Descant upon this Proposition [The Ground is to be laid before the superstructures] or (which comes to the same) that [He who builds must build upon something;] or, to put it in more Immediate Terms [What's First is to be begun with] that is [What's First is to be First] which is resolved finally into this Proposition supremely Identical [A thing is to be what it is.] §. 2. The Second relies on that famous Maxim of Logicians, that [The Definition is more known than the Thing defined] which is self-evident speculatively: For the words once understood, it comes to this that [what clears another thing must be clearer itself;] that [What explains, must explain] The latter part of it implies, that in plain things depending on Authority [Honest men are to be trusted before Knaves] which is self-evident practically. §. 3. The third is but an Inference from the two foregoing ones, and manifestly depends on the same self-evident Principles. §. 4. The Fourth is a farther Deduction; and (since to satisfy rationally is to make men know one way or other) plainly amounts to this [What's to be known by all must be possible to be known by all] which is as self-evident as 'tis that [That cannot (or is impossible to) be done, which is Impossible to be ●tne. §. 5. The Fifth is only a short Descant upon the foregoing parts of this Discourse, and so is reduced into the same Grounds with them. §. 6. The Sixth is as evident as 'tis that [Men are not to Assent upon Authority (or believe) if there be no Reason for it] or that [Rational Agents are to act rationally.] §. 7. The Seventh states the Question concerning the Right Rule of Faith, and shows the way to look after it by virtue of this plain Truth, [The Meaning of the word signifying any natune is the nature signified by that word:] or, which is the very same [What's meant by any word is meant by that word. §. 8. The former part of the 8th is resumed into this clearest Truth [What leaves us in need of a Rule is not a Rule] or [A Rule is able to regulate] which is perfectly equivalent to this [A Rule is a Rule.] The Second Part averrs, that Faith (taking it for an Assent upon the Motives laid by God which cannot lead into Error) is not (its opposite) Opinion; which is equivalent to this [Faith is Faith.] §. 9 The Ninth only directs our Application of the two preceding Paragraphs to the same purpose. §. 10. The former part of the Tenth is full as Evident as 'tis that [Those who are not Scholars (as the Generality of the Faithful are not) cannot be satisfy; d rationally in those things which require Scholarship] which, since to be satisfied rationally signifies to know, imports thus much that [Those who cannot know, cannot know.] And the second part is as clear as 'tis, that [That is not the Way which multitudes take & yet go wrong] which, since a Way is that which is to carry one right, is as palpably self-evident as 'tis that [A Way is a Way.] §. 11. The Eleventh which contains the main and in a manner the only point, has two parts: One, that Mankind cannot be Ignorant of what they see, and hear, and do. For, since both Reason and Experience tells us, that Senses in Men are Conveyers of Outward Impressions to the Knowing Power, should Impressions upon those parts not be conveyed thither, they would, in that case, not be Sensitive or Animals, and so no Men: And, did they not perceive when such Impressions are conveyed as they ought, they would be destitute of a Power receiving Knowledge by Senses, and so again, no Men. So that this first part is as evident as 'tis that [Mankind is Mankind.] And the Second part of this § directly engages this Identical Proposition [The same is the same with its self.] that is, both of them are self-evident, or immediately implying what is so. §. 12. The Twelfth has nothing new but what is built on this Manifest Truth [None can be assured without Means to assure] which, since [Means] speaks that by virtue of which as a necessary requisite an End s to be compassed, that is, without which it cannot be compassed, amounts to this self-evident Truth; [That cannot be done which cannot be done.] §. 13. The Thirteenth has for its Basis this undeniable Verity; 'Tis presumable that they who constantly maintain a Tenet do hold the same Tenet and judge it available to their Cause, or for their purpose, and that They who write against it and vilify it do not hold it in their hearts, nor judge it to be available to their Cause. Both which are perfectly the same with this Proposition which Practice makes self-evident. [Men not Frantic or in some high Passion will not act directly against their own Interest or to their own overthrow;] or too this which is self-evident speculatively [Rational Agents left to their nature will act as they are, that is, rationally. The rest of this § is shown to be self-evident in our Discussion of the 11th. §. 14. The Fourteenth supposing the Evidence of the 11th, 13th, and 10th is reduced to this clear Truth [They act irrationally and unjustifiably who relinquish a Rule Infallibly-Certain upon Uncertain Grounds] or that ['Tis better to proceed upon Certainty than Uncertainty] which Nature teaches all Mankind. §. 15. The Fifteenth contains these two Truths for its supporters, both of them self-evident practically. [That charge is Irrational which is grounded on a Thing unknown to the Accusers, and that Rational which is grounded on matter of Fact notorious to the whole Christian world.] §. 16. The Sixteenth subsists by virtue of this Evident Truth [An Universal Change in matters both manifest to sense and most concerning must needs be Notorious.] which engages that Principle [Man is Sensitive or an Animal.] Whence, this being a direct part of the Definition of Man, 'tis consequently Self-evident. §. 17. The Seventeenth is reduced to this plain Proposition [Men of Reason cannot hold and own themselves and propose to others Points most difficult to believe, upon pretence that they came from Christ, and yet yield nor own any reason why they held they came from Christ] or thus, [Men either have or else yield no Reason where there is most need of both:] which comes to this that [A pressing Necessity (which is the most violent of Causes, & which in our case strains Humane Nature & if it act nor, frustrates it of its end) has no Effect at all] which destroys all Causality, and consequently all Science in the World. §. 18. The Eighteenth is as plain as it is that Mankind (amongst which were in all Ages persons of great Wit & Goodness) in matters of highest moment and which require the best and surest Ground can continue to hold such things, and yet confess the Ground on which they hold it naught and Insufficient; or upon second Thoughts going about to settle a better, palpably and directly contradict their own pretence; which is to say [Where there is most need of reason men do not use it at all] And, since Effects are not done without Causes, (which in our case are Motives) and the greatest Necessity is the most powerful of Motives or Causes, if that move them not to act rationally nothing will do it; and so it implies by consequence the contradictory to this Identical Proposition [Rational Agents are capable to act rationally.] §. 19 The Nineteenth has the same Basis with the 16th and 17th. §. 20. The 20th is merely this Identical Proposition dilated [All in any kind are the Universality (or All) in that kind. §. 21, The Twenty First and Second are Grounded on those Evident Truth's [Those who have Means to arrive at an End can arrive at that End; and those who have not means cannot.] And, since [Means] speaks that which makes an End compassable, they amount to this [That wh●●●c●● be done can be done, and that which cannot, cannot.] §. 22. The last Paragraph, supposing the foregoing ones True, is of the same strain; and full as evident as it is, that [None can arrive at an End without what's Necessary to arrive at that End] or that [That cannot be done which is Impossible to be done.] Postscript. Having thus attempted to reduce the main Parts of my Discourse concerning the Ground of my Faith to First Principles. it is required of Dr. St. that in maintaining his, he would not decline the same Test: This if he thinks it safe to undertake, it will quickly and evidently appear on whose side Truth stands. And this is mainfestly his Task who pretends to Principles. For he must either vouch those he produces to be First Principles, or reducible to the First, else he must confess them to be none at all. I have little hopes he will think it fit to expose his Discourses to this Noon-day-Evidence; nor indeed will the Genius of Error endure such a Trial as the going about to connect it with First and Self-evident Truths: for what Communication can that Darkness have with this Clearest Light? and I conceive it was Clearness of Style, that is, a Grammatical or Rhetorical Clearness, and not a Logical or Rational one, (which consists in resolving his Discourse into First Principles,) that Dr. Tillotson boastingly attributed to him in his Sermon-Preface; for himself (as is evident by his whole way of writing) never dreamt of any other. 'Tis more to Dr. St's purpose (which is to keep things from being understood) to avoid by all means this discovering Method and all arguing from the nature of the Thing (whence he foresees no small danger of too great Evidence is likely to spring) and to lead his Reader into a Wilderness of Words (whole Libraries of Authors) where, by his way of managing Citations, which is by Criticising, upon ambiguous words and phrases, they may dance in the Maze till they be weary. I hear he is about this stratagem; and that he aims, out of some high Expressions of the Father's concerning the Excellency and Selfsufficiency of the Scriptures to prove the Vselesness of the Church to ascertain Faith. But, alas! how he will be defeated? Not one Testimony of any Authority will be found which comes home to his purpose, or proves that private men need not the Church's Interpretation ere they can securely build their Faith on it? To save him therefore the labour of collecting and Printing multitudes of these to no purpose; and his Readers from the fruitless toil of troubling themselves with Impertinences, I produce him one out of Vincentius Lirinensis worth thousands; for it speaks with as high Reverence of Scripture, and of its Fullness, Perfection, and Selfsufficiency as any, perhaps more; and so he cannot not with any reason except against it; and being intended purposely to speak to this Point must needs be the most apposite decider of the Question that can be; not to add the Acceptation and Esteem that Excellent Treatise of his ever had from the Church, which argues its perfect Conformity to the Church's Sense in settling and stating the Right Rule of Faith. I transcribe then from this Ancient and Learned Father his whole Second Chapter (in his Treatise Entitled Against the profane Innovations of Heresy) which is this. Hic for sit an requirat aliquis, etc. Here perhaps some may ask, since the Canon of the Scriptures is perfect, and enough nay more th●● enough suffices to itself for all things, what need is there that the Authority of the Church's Sense should be joined to it? Because all men do not take the Holy Scripture, by reason of its depth, in one and the same meaning, but divers men interpret its sayings diversely, so that as many Opinions in a manner as there are men seem possible to be drawn thence. For Novatian expounds it one way, Photinus another, Sabellius another, and Donatus another; Arius, Eunomius, Macedonius, take it in one sense; Apollinaris, Priscillianus in another sense: Jovinian, Pelagius, Coelestius understand it thus; and lastly, Nestorius otherwise. And therefore it is very necessary by reason of so great windings of so various Error that the Line of the Prophetical and Apostolical Interpretation may be directed according to the Rule of the Ecclesiastical and Catholic Sense. From which place we may Note, 1. That though he allows the Canon of Scripture perfect and sufficient for all things, yet by showing it Interpretable divers ways, and this by Great and Learned men, and so that they fall into multitudes of Errors by those Inerpretations, and thence requiring the Authority of the Church's Sense as necessary to understand it right so as to build Faith on it, he plainly shows, that Scripture alone is not sufficient for this End, since it needs another to achieve it. And hence it is not said simply [it suffices for all things] but [Sufficit sibi ad●omnia, It is sufficient to itself for all things] which can only mean that it has all the Perfection due to it's own nature (as I showed above, p. 87, 88, 89.) or is sufficient for the ends God intended it for, reckoned up by S. Paul to Timothy, amongst which no such thing is found as, sufficiency of Clearness to every sober Enquirer, so as to build his Faith on his private Interpretation of it, without the direction of the Church's Sense; only which will come to Dr. St's purpose. Since than I allow Scripture all Sufficiency and Perfection but this of being sufficiently clear to private Understandings so as to build their Faith on their own Interpretations of it, I allow it all this Learned Father or the Ancient Church ever did. 2. 'Tis observable that he puts not the fault in the Persons, but gives for the reason of their misunderstanding it, the depth or deep sense of the Scriptures: which argues that though some few out of wickedness wilfully mistake, yet the General reason of the miscarriage is the disproportion of the Scripture to private Understandings in Dogmatical Points of Christianity, as I constantly maintain. 3. He calls the Interpretation of it [a Line;] which is Flexible and Dirigible; and the sense of the Catholic Church the Rule; which lies firm, as apt to direct another; and so with me he makes the sense of the Catholic Church the only Rule of Faith. 4. This Sense of: he Church is intimated to be Antecedent to all Interpretation of Scripture, and therefore the Church must have had this Sense or Knowledge of Faith by Tradition; there being no other way becoming Gods Ordinary Providence but these two. 5. These things being so, 'tis most Evident that when in the former Chapter he mentions the Authority of the Divine Law (meaning the Scripture) and the Tradition of the Catholic Church, he meant them jointly, as appears expressly by the very next words beginning this present Chapter; nor did he speak there of the means of bringing men to Faith, as the Rule of Faith ought to do, but of keeping them in Faith or preserving them from sliding into Heresy; and since he attributes in this Chapter, Convictiveness of what's Faith only to the Church's Sense; 'tis manifest all that remains to be attributed to Scripture is Agreeableness of its Letter (if a good Pastor expound it) to the present Faith of the Church; to see which, exceedingly comforts Faith in the hearts of the already-Faithful, who must need's have a high Reverence for the Holy Scriptures Authority. The whole strain then of my Discourses here against Dr. St. concerning the Rule of Faith is perfectly consonant to this Learned Father of the Church and to all Antiquity. Only our frequent and close Contests with our acute Modern Dissenters have obliged us to a more Scholarlike way of distinguishing our Notions exactly which the Ancients did not, and (Faith being contained in two things, the Scriptures and the Breast of the Church) of determining which of them is the Proper Ascertainer of Faith to all the Faithful and those which are to be converted; and so in true and exact Speech the Rule of Faith; and both this Father and Evident Reason give it to be the Church. What then Dr. St. is to do in this Point; if he makes any such Attempt, is to allege Convincing Testimonies that the Ancient Fathers held Scripture so plain to every Sober Enquirer as to give him such Certainty that he may safely build his Faith on his own Interpretation thereof, without needing the Churches; when he produces such Testimonies as come home to this or an Equivalent sense he will work wonders; and, unless he does this, he does just nothing. But I foresee two unlucky difficulties; one, that he will not find one Testimony of any Authority which excludes the Church from this Office, as himself directly does; next, that could he produce thousands, he would spoil them all at the next word, and render them Inconclusive, that is, Insignificant, with telling us very soberly they are all Fallible as to that effect; and consequently were perhaps in an Error in all they say. FINIS.