FAITH VINDICATED FROM Possibility of Falsehood: OR, The Immovable Firmness and Certainty of the Motives to Christian Faith, Asserted, Against that Tenet, which, denying Infallibility of Authority, subverts Its Foundation, and renders It Uncertain.  Desistes adversus alios dicere; caeterùm ita pro Veritate loquêris, ut ea quae dicuntur argui refellique non possint. Dionys. Areopag. Epist. 6. 
LOUVAIN, A. D. MDCLXVII.   

Introduction.  
THough nothing be more natural than that all, who deny the Certainty of the Rule of Faith, should deny also the Certainty of Faith itself, since the Certainty of this later depends on the Certainty of the former; and, it is impossible the Conclusion should be held Certain, unless the Premises be held so too, yet, the conceit which the Generality of those who call themselves Faithful or Christian, have of their Faith, and, consequently, the nature of that kind of Assent, is such, that nothing can sound more horridly and blasphemously to their ears, than bluntly and without disguise to say, That all their Faith may possibly be a lie for any thing any man living absolutely knows. For, a certain goodness of Rational Nature, has fixed this apprehension in them, that, since the World is made for the Salvation of Mankind, it is unsuitable to the Wisdom and Goodness of Providence, which has furnished us with means of Certainty for our inferior concerns, that the Principles on which Eternity depends, should fall short of that Certainty, and, consequently, of strength and efficacy to move & carry us on to a steady pursuit of that greatest, and, in comparison, only Interest. Notwithstanding, so unresistible is the force of this evident truth, that, whoever has deserted the Catholic Church, and her Rule of Faith, Tradition, can have no absolute Certainty of Faith; that is, indeed no true Faith (for that truly is Faith which the Generality of those who use the Word mean by it) that the more intelligent amongst them, conscious of the manifest weakness of their Grounds, are necessitated, in their Controversies, when they should defend their Faith, in plain terms to disgrace and betray it; choosing rather candidly to confess it to be all a possible Falsehood, than to undertake that impossible performance to maintain that it is an Absolute Truth.  
I cannot resemble this Natural Conceit of the perfect Certainty of Faith, inbred as it were in the Generality of those who have had even a glimmering of Christianity, to any thing so well as to the apprehension, the former World had of a Godhead. For, as natural Instinct forced those, who had not light to know the True God, to affix the Notion of a Deity to some false one, as some eminent Hero, the Sun, Thunder, Fire; nay, there was nothing so ridiculous but they would make a God of it, rather than forgo the tenet of a Sovereign Power so deeply rooted in them by Nature; so, our modern Misbelievers, rather than they will relinquish their Opinion, that Faith and the means to know the way to Heaven is absolutely-Certain, springing naturally from the conceit they have that God has a Providence for the Salvation of Mankind, choose to misplace the notion of the Certain means to know God's will, or Rule of Faith, in the most unlikely things imaginable; as, in a ridiculous whimsy of Fancy little better than a Dream, nay sometimes in a dream itself, or in the motion of some hypocondriacal vapour, as do the fanatics; others, in other things seemingly wiser; as, in their opinions of some men they esteem Good and Learned; in merely their being educated thus by Parents who confess they have relinquished what themselves had been educated to; in Interpretations of words by Grammatical skill which were writ long ago, and in dogmatical points, where every word is capable of equivocalness; nay (which is indeed as mad as the most extatick of them all) to affirm that such words are so plain to every Reader that none can miss the right sense of them: All which, though plainly confuted by this Principle which Nature teaches the rudest, that, That can never be a way which many follow to their power and yet the greater part are misled, joined to their plain Experience that many followers of these ways exceedingly differ; yet, so prevalent is the force of the other Truth, that they will wink at this later to embrace that; insomuch that none of those (I except Seekers, by what name soever they are called, as not being pretenders to Faith) but, were they asked whether they be not as Certain of their Faith as that they live, would readily and heartily answer affirmatively; I mean those of every sort who follow merely the Guidance of uncorrupted nature in this affair.  
Notwithstanding, as in the Pa 'gan World There were found many Witty men, who, out of Unacquaintance with the True Godhead and the Unworthiness of the False Gods then in vogue, or out of a conceit of many misgovernments in the world, speculated themselves out of their natural notions and went about to deny absolutely there was any God at all; so it happens that, amongst those who have deserted the Catholic Church, there are found divers men of speculative and searching brains; who, out of Unacquaintance with, or at least their slightly penetrating the nature of the Catholic Rule of Faith, the Living Voice and Practice of the Church, or TRADITION, and, withal, seeing the Vanity and manifest Inability of their own pretended Rules to ascertain them absolutely their Faith is True, joined with the experienced Disagreement in Faith amongst divers Pretenders to it, would speculate themselves out of their Natural Christianity, and deny any Absolute Certainty at all of Faith, or the way to Salvation; contenting themselves with a Probability in the Grounds 'tis built on, miscalled by them Moral Certainty; confessedly consistent with a Possibility of Falsehood. Which kind of Grounds permits▪ that perhaps all may chance to be shown to morrow a mere Illusion and a bold Lie; and all the Christian World hitherto to have been possibly led by the nose by a False Impostùre; nay, to have held that Imposture Most Sacred, and preferred the adhering to it before all the Goods, Life or Nature could bestow.  
How near this wicked Tenet approaches to Atheism appears hence, that 'tis next to the Denial of a Godhead, to deny that in proper speech we know Him, or the Way to Him; Yet this is the very Position of those who put a Possibility of Falsehood in Faith; since none can truly be said to know that to be true; which he sees and acknowledges may not be true at the same time. This Seed of Infidelity sown when the Rule of Faith was renounced, first dared to appear publicly above Ground in the writings of Mr. Chillingworth and the L. Falkland; and, though, had it been proposed barefaced, in another occasion, it could have hoped for no welcome Reception even amongst the Generality of the Protestants themselves, who were made believe ever since their Breaking from the Church, their Faith had the Word of God for its Basis, which they honestly understood to have the same Certainty as if God himself had spoke it; yet, being dressed up by their plausible Rhetoric, and, advanced in a circumstance when they were confuting the Papists, the middle sort of Protestant Readers at unawares let it pass as meritorious to their party; and the wiser sort embraced it both as a real Truth, and also as making best for the Interest of their Cause when they would oppugn us; what disservice soever it did tot he Common Cause of Religionor Christianity. For, they were not at all solicitous (so strangely did faction transport them) so they could in their conceit overthrow the Infallibility of the Catholic Church, though they reduced all Faith into Incertainty, and all the Grounds on which 'tis built, into a tottering Contingency.  
It seemed to threaten a Mischief considerable enough to Christianity, that such a pernicious Tenet should be publicly owned in Controversy, to taint the wiser sort of Readers with Atheism, in which it hath been too successful; but, it grew intolerable when it durst take the boldness to appear in Sermons pronounced in very Honourable Assemblies, and afterwards published in Print; where, under the Title of [The Wisdom of being Religious] and a great many seeming shows, and, I heartily think, very real Intentions of impugning Atheism, by an ill-principled, and (in that circumstance) imprudent and unnecessary confession in equivalent Terms of the possible falsehood of Faith, nay even as to the chiefest and most Fundamental point, the Tenet of a Deity. Religion receives a deep wound, and Atheism an especial Advantage: as may perhaps more particularly be shown hereafter. I envy not that Sermon, and some other Productions of Mr. Tillotson their Author, their due commendations, though he be my Adversary; I acknowledge that in his clear Method, or disposition of his matter, and the cleanness of his style, which fit him for an Excellency in Preaching, he hath few Equals; and that, had he good Principles, he would deliver them as intelligibly as any man I know; only I could wish he had right Principles to Ground his discourse, without which he can never make a Controvertist, but must needs undermine the solid Foundation of Christianity, if he undertake to meddle with the Grounds of it, even while he goes about to defend it.  
What I am on this occasion chiefly to reflect on, is my own obligation; which is, the boldness of owning and publishing the Incertainty of Christian Faith, being come to the height, to assert its Absolute Firmness and Certainty in the best manner God shall enable me: and his Providence seems to require it of me at present; In regard 'tis expected I should reply to Mr. Tillotson 's pretended Answer to Sure Footing; whose first Principle in that Reply seems to be this, that, what he deems the Rule of Christian Faith, and, consequently, that Faith itself is possible to be False; for, by virtue of this Position, which he defends p. 118, and in divers other places implies and builds on, he more oppugns my discourse than by any other Thesis whatever. The contrary to which if I evince, than the Protestants own confession, that they have no Absolutely-Certain Ground or Rule of Faith, confutes them without more ado, and concludes them to have relinquished its only right, because its only truly certain Rule, TRADITION.  
Yet, were it not my chief design to establish the Absolute Truth of Christian Faith in itself, by all the Arguments I can imagine, and not merely to confute Protestant Controvertists, I needed not take the pains thus to multiply Demonstrations, or even allege so much as one. For, since, whatever they pretend seemingly to Antiquity or Authority of Fathers by their voluminous quotations, yet they will finally and heartily stand to nothing in contests about Faith, as Conclusive, but their own Interpretations of Scripture; Which being so weak a Ground that every day's Experience shows its Failings; an ordinary Probability is abundantly enough to overthrow their Discourses, whose very Principle is not only Improbable, but evidently a False one; Whence, the meanest Catholic writer cannot fail to have the advantage over their Best in a Prudential man's Esteem; because he cannot possibly miss of a Medium more probable than is their main Ground. I declare then that my Chief End in this Treatise is to settle Christian Faith, or to demonstrate that it must be truly or Absolutely Certain; and that my applying it now and then to my Opposers, is only a Secundary Intention, and merely Occasional.  
Ere I fall close to my Proofs, that Faith cannot possibly be False, to avoid Equivocation in the words, I declare that by the word [Faith] I am not solicitous whether be meant our Act of Faith or the Points of Faith, that is, the Object of that Act; but judge that distinction wholly Impertinent in this present discourse; and, the reason is, because I cannot affirm a Point True or False, but as it stands under Motives able to make me judge, assent or believe 'tis such or such; which Motives, if they be such as are able to convince that the Point cannot but be so, than my judgement or Assent tothose Points, thusconcluded, that is my Act of Faith cannot but be True; because it depends entirely on Grounds Impossible to be False, viz. those Motives; But, if those Motives are not of such a nature as is absolutely Conclusive the thing is, than both the Thing, Object, Point, or Proposition of Faith, as being only Knowable by virtue of them, may be otherwise, and also my Act of Faith or Belief of those Points may be a wrong or erroneous judgement; that is, both of them may be False. To ask then if Faith can possibly be False, is to ask whether the Motives laid by God's Providence for Mankind or his Church to embrace Christian Faith, must be such as of their own nature cannot fail to conclude those points True; and, to affirm that Faith is not possible to be False, is equivalently to assert that those Motives or the Rule of Faith, must be thus absolutely Conclusive, Firm, and Immovable.  
Hence is seen, that I concern not myself in this discourse with how perfectly or imperfectly divers persons penetrate those motives; or how they satisfy or dissatisfy some particular Persons; since, I only speak of the Nature of those Motives in themselves, and as laid in Second Causes by God's Providence to light Mankind in their way to Faith: to which the dimness of eyesight, neglect to look at all, or looking the wrong way, even in many particular men, is Extrinsecal and Contingent.  
Lastly, to avoid Mistake and Confusion, I declare, that there being two sorts of Questions, one concerning the Existence of a thing, called An est, viz. whether there be any Certainly-Conclusive Rule of Faith, or no; and the other about what is the Certain or truely-Conclusive Rule of Faith, called Quid est; I am not now discoursing about the later (that was the work of SURE FOOTING) but the former only. Indeed, in my first discourse there I endeavoured to evince this Truth from par. 1. to par 17. by divers Arguments; but, because Mr. T. waves the speaking to those Premises as they tend to infer my Conclusion, and only discourses a little (Mistakingly) against the Conclusions themselves, therefore, being resolved to write a Treatise to establish Christian Faith, I thought fit to apply it to his proceedure there; that so I may both more forcibly invite him to that necessary though neglected Duty, and, withal that by settling the Existence & Nature of Faith and its Rule first, I may clear the way methodically to discover what, and only what, can be the right Rule of Faith. And, possibly in my next Treatise if Mr. T. and Mr. St. think fit to continue on this discourse forwards by answering this, they may, by denying that in true speech the Points of Faith are Truths, or Faith is True, oblige me to begin yet higher, and make use of such Mediums as are more direct and immediately fit to confute Atheism.  
The understanding Reader will easily pardon the Speculativeness of this Treatise in great part of it: if he reflects that discourses built on Intrinsecal Mediums and managed in the way of Severe Reason, do naturally, nay must necessarily, bear up to the First Principles; yet, by the Harmony and Connexion of Truths with one another, there will be found also very many Proofs fairly Intelligible by the middle sort of Prudential men; especially in those Arguments which are drawn from Practice; and, if I flatter not myself, some Proofs, and those Convincing ones too, suitable to every Capacity. This comfort my Readers may expect to reap by this Procedure that it must forcibly shorten Disputes, and bring Controversies after a while to a period, unless our Adversaries be still obstinately bend to play the Drolls instead of soberly and pertinently disputing. For, hardly can Error hide her deformity, when she is exposed naked to the view of Rational nature in the noon-day-light of FIRST-PRINCIPLES.   
Faith Vindicated FROM Possibility of Falsehood.  

First Eviction.  
§ 1. I Lay for the Basis of my present Discourse these two Propositions.  
1. Christians are obliged to hold firmly, profess, and stand to it, even with 
Postulata.  the loss of their Lives, that Points of Faith are TRUTHS.  
2. None can be thus obliged to hold, profess, and maintain that to be TRUTH which they know not to be so.  
The later of these is as certain, as that God, the Imposer of this Obligation, is Good: For how unworthy his Infinite Goodness were it, to will that rational Nature or Mankind should act irrationally by holding firmly what it has no firm Grounds to hold; that is, what it knows not to be so? Or to sacrifice its very Being to testify the truth of those Points, concerning which, if it work according to right reason, the nature God has given it, and deviate not from that by a weak credulity, it can never be perfectly satisfied that they are indeed Truths; which it can never be, if, notwithstanding all it knows, they yet may possibly be Falsehoods. No man in true morality ought to say what he knows not, much less so asseverantly, as to seal it with his blood.  
As for the former Proposition, which I account most fundamental to the ensuing Discourse, I am to declare that by Holding, etc. a thing to be a Truth, I understand the holding that the thing absolutely, in reality, or indeed, is so as I judge. Whence to this Holding a Thing to be Truth, 'tis not enough that a man hold it is so to the best of his judgement; but 'tis required moreover, that he hold he is not deceived in making such a judgement; and this, because he holds his Thought conformable to the Thing. For, this settles Verity or Truth on its proper and firm Foundation, the thing; and not on the unstable motions of his Judgement, as does the other. My first and chief Postulatum thus understood, I esteem to be self-evident to all that converse with Christianity taken in its largest sense, as I declared in my Introduction; setting aside that sort of Speculaters; I mean those of our modern Adversaries, against whom I dispute at present; and of whom the Question is now agitated, whether they are indeed to be held right Christians or no. And I conceive that he who should deny it, must be bound to put the contradictory Position; and to affirm, that Christians are not bound firmly to hold, profess, and maintain with the loss of their lives the TRUTH of their Faith, but its Likelihood only.  
He that affirms this, if he would be held a Christian, is to be confuted by the contrary sentiment of the generality of Christians, from whom he dissents in so Fundamental a Point as is the rightly understanding the nature of Faith, which they profess, and which it so highly imports them to know; that is, indeed, in rightly understanding the meaning of the word Faith. If he be no Christian, yet hold the Godhead, 'tis to be demonstrated partly from the proper effects of Faith, and the nature of the great difficulties, both intellectual and moral, which 'tis ordained to master: partly out of the nature of God and his Attributes, obliging him to lay means proportioned to an intended end; or to establish every thing according to the Concern that depends on it, which Concern in our case is the highest imaginable, to wit, the Salvation of Mankind, the End of creating those very Entities on which the Certitude of Science is built. Or, lastly, if he be an Atheist, the Deity and its Attributes are first to be demonstrated: as also what is Man's summum bonum, and the immediate Disposition to it; and then the nature and Certitude of Faith, and consequently of its Rule are to be demonstrated.  
Supposing then my later Postulatum to be evident to all that know there is a wise and good Governor of the world, and who understand the common Principles of Morality; and my former Postulatum to be clear and undeniable matter of Fact to those who converse with Christianity; and therefore to have unavoidable force upon all that would be held Professors thereof, I shall be bold to proceed upon them.  
And, first, Logic, whose proper office 'tis to look into the nature and actions of our Soul as Rational; and as it were, to anatomize her Thoughts, takes up the discourse, and proceeds thus.  
§ 2. Truth's are found in Propositions; 
The Thesis demonstrated from the nature of Evidence.  a Proposition consists of two Notions called Subject, and Predicate, and a third, whose office 'tis to connect them; whence to know a thing to be Truth or true, is to see the Connexion between the two Notions spoken of, or to see that the third truly connects them. Now there are but two ways imaginable (abstracting from Experience) how this may be seen: Either by seeing immediately that those two Notions are the same with one another out of the very Notions themselves; or else by seeing that they are each of them the same with a Third; whence follows, that, unless that Third Notion can fail to be the same with itself, those two Notions which are the same with it, cannot possible fail to be the same with one another. The former is called Self-Evidence; this later, Evidence by deduction: Both are built immediately upon this grand Verity, that, The same is the same with itself; wherefore, unless it be seen: that the Truth of that most Self-Evident Axiom is engaged in their Patronage, they cannot be even known to be True; and, if it be seen that it is thus engaged, they must needs be known impossible to be false; since 'tis most manifestly impossible, that First Principles should be false, or that the same should not be the same with itself. Wherefore, either Points of Faith need not be known to be Truths, or else they must (by Reflecte●s at least) be known impossible to he false.  
§ 3. The same is evinced from the nature 
From the nature of the Subject in Faith-Propositions.  of the Subject in those Propositions which affirm the Truth of any point of Faith: For, if we look narrowly, we shall find that the Subject in those is, either formally, or in effect, a Proposition itself; as when we say, This Proposition [Christ is really in the Sacrament] is true; [That God is one and three] is true, etc. Where the Subjects are manifestly these; Christ is really in the Sacrament; God is one and three, or, a Trinity is. A Proposition then being a Speech apt to express Truth or Falsehood, nay necessarily determined to do the one, (excepting those which speak of a future Contingent) it follows, that who ever is bound in reason to affirm that the Proposition expressing the point of Faith is True, is bound likewise to affirm 'tis impossible to be false, if taken in the same sense he means it; that is, indeed, if taken for the same Proposition, since 'tis impossible Truth should be Falsehood. Either then Christ's followers are not obliged to affirm the Points they profess are true, which thwarts the Sentiments of the Christian part of mankind; or else, they must necessarily be obliged, withal, to affirm them impossible to be false.  
§ 4. The same is concluded from the 
From the nature of the Copula  nature of the Copula, [is] whose office being to connect or identify the notions of the Subject and Predicate, that is, to express that what is meant by those two notions is to be found in the same Thing, or that they have one common stock of Being, its proper signification is Being or Existence; not absolutely, as if it meant that either of the Terms exists in Things; but comparatively or conditionally as it were, that that Being which belongs to one of the Terms, is the same Being with that which belongs to the other; or that by the same Being whereby one of the Terms is, the other is also. Now then, this kind of Expression or Signification being such as has no latitude between it and its utmost Opposite or Contradictory, [is not] it being the most uncompounded notion that is, and not capable to be mingled with any alloy or participation of its Opposite, as it happens in Contraries: it follows that who holds the Truth of the Proposition, or, which is all one, the Identification of the two Terms expressed by the Copula [is] must hold it absolutely, and the Opposite to be impossible to be false; nothing being more impossible than that is and is not should both be true at once; or that the same thing should be the same and not the same in the same respect, that is, should be true, and not be true: And hence it is, that though distinctions use to fall upon the Equivocalness of the two Terms, yet no man that knows what Logic meant, ever distinguished the mere Copula, its simplest notion not admitting any possible division.  
§ 5. Our Argument from the Copula 
From the nature of the Predicate in most of those Propositions,  is particularly strengthened from the nature of the Predicate in the Propositions we speak of; I mean in such Speeches as affirm such and such Points of Faith to be True. For True means Existent, in Propositions which express only the An est of a thing, as most Points of Faith do; which speak abstractedly, and tell notwherein the nature of the Subject it speaks of consists, or the Quid est. So that most of the Propositions Christians are bound to profess, are fully expressed thus; A Trinity is Existent, a Christ God-and-man is Existent, etc. and the like may be said of those Points which belong to a Thing or Action past; as, Creation was, Christ's Crucifying was, etc. For, Existent is the Predicate in these too, only affixed to another difference of time; and 'tis equally impossible such Subjects should neither have been nor not have been, or have been and have not been at once, as it is that a thing should neither be nor not be at present, or both be and not be at present. Regarding then steadfastly the nature of our Predicate, [Existent;] we shall find that it expresses the utmost Actuality of a Thing; and, as taken in the posture it bears in those Propositions, that Actuality exercised; that is, the utmost Actuality in its most actual state; that is, as absolutely excluding all manner or least degree of Potentiality, and confequently all Possibility of being otherwise; which is radically destroyed when all Potentiality is taken away. This Discourse holding, which in right to Truth I shall not fear to affirm (unconcerned in the drollery of any Opposer) to be more than Mathematically demonstrative, (as shall be shown more particularly hereafter) it follows inevitably, that who so is bound to profess a Trinity, Incarnation, etc. is or was Existent, is also bound to profess that 'tis impossible they should be not-Existent; or which is all one, that 'tis impossible these points of Faith should be false.  
§ 6. The same appears out of the nature 
From the nature of Distinction, as applied to the Predicate.  of distinction or division applied to our Predicate Existent, as found in these Propositions: For, could that Predicate bear a pertinent distinction, expressing this and the other respect, or thus and thus, it might possibly be according to one of those respects, or thus considered, and not be according to another, that is, another way considered: But this evasion is here impossible; for, either those distinguishing Notions must be more Potential or antecedent to the Notion of Existent, and then they neither reach Existent, nor supervene to it as its Determinations or Actuations, which Differences ought to do; nor can any Notion be more Actual or Determinative in the line of Substance or Being, than Existent is; and, so, fit to distinguish it in that line; nor, lastly, can any determination in the line of Accidents serve the turn; for, these suppose Existence already put, and so the whole Truth of the Proposition entire and complete antecedently to them: 'Tis impossible therefore that what is thus affirmed to be True, should in any regard be affirmed possible to be false; the impossibility of distinguishing the Predicate pertinently, excluding here all possibility of divers respects. 
From the impossibility of distinguishing the subjects of Faith-propositions.   
§ 7. The same is demonstrated from the impossibility of distinguishing the Subjects of those Faith-Propositions; for those Subjects being Propositions themselves, (as was shown § 3.) and accepted for Truths, as is supposed, they are incapable of Distinction, as shall be particularly shown hereafter, (Evict. 3. § 5.) Besides those Subjects being Points of Faith, and, so, standing in the Abstract, that is, not descending to subsuming respects, even in that regard too they are freed from all pertinent distinguishableness.  
§ 8. The same is demonstrated from the nature of Truth, which consists in 
From the nature of Truth, consisting in an Indivisible.  an Indivisible: Whence there is nothing of Truth had, how great soever the conceived approaches towards it be, till all may-not-bees, or Potentiality to be otherwise, be utterly excluded by the Actuality of Is or Existence: which put or discovered, the Light of Truth breaks forth, and the dim twilights of may-not-bees vanish and disappear.  
§ 9 The same is demonstrated out of 
From the nature of Connexion  the nature of Connexion found in the aforesaid Propositions. For, 'tis evident their Truth consists in the connexion of those Notions which make the Subject and Predicate. Whoever therefore sees not the Connexion between those Notions in the Principle of Faith, sees not the truth of any of those Propositions; that is, those Propositions are not to such a man True. Wherefore, Connexion excluding formally Inconnexion, so that 'tis clearly impossible they should be found together in the selfsame Subjects, and the falsehood of such Propositions consisting in the Unconnectedness of their Terms, it follows that he who is obliged to profess those Faith-Propositions True, must see the Connexion between their Terms, and consequently that they cannot possibly be inconnected or false. Again, since all approaches or vicinity to Connexion, by how near degrees soever they are made, are not Connexion, it follows that all Connexion consists in an Indivisible, and can admit no Latitude for a Possibility to be otherwise, to be grounded on. Lastly, all Connexion being necessarily Immediate, or seen by virtue of Immediateness, and to see Immediate Connexion being the Producer of Certain Knowledge, or of Assurance the Thing cannot but be so; it follows, that to see the Truth of such Propositions, or, which is all one, the Immediate Connexion of their Terms, is to see they cannot but be so, or that they are absolutely void of all Possibility of Falsehood.  
§. 10. By this time we are brought 
From the nature of Opinion.  orderly to look into the nature of Opinion. Which word I take not here in a large sense for any kind of Assent, however produc't; but for an Assent or Adhesion to a Tenet without sufficient Grounds to evince the Thing is so as the Opiner judges; as it is taken in that Proverb, Turpe est opinari. Now, 'tis most evident, that there would be sufficient Grounds to convince, in case, the Term or Point were seen to be deduced by immediate steps, or a Train of immediate Connexion's to that very Conclusion. 'Tis manifest then, that 'tis therefore Opinion, and blame-worthy, because its Grounds, as they are laid in the understanding of the Assenter, want or fall short of this immediate Connexion; So that Opinion is a judgement upon remote or unimmediate Considerations. By which means it comes to pass, that the most necessary verity of that Grand Principle, [The same is the same with itself] upon which all Certainty both of first Principles and of Deduction is built, and whose perfect Self-Evidence and Interessedness in whatever belongs to right discourse, seem to make the very Light of Reason consist originally in It, is not engaged in the Opiners discourse; whence, wanting Immediateness, it becomes unconnected, incoherent, weak, and slack, or rather indeed null. No wonder then if all Opinion, how near soever it approaches seemingly to Immediate Connexion, and how strongly soever it be supported by an experienced seldomness of such Effects, or the conceived unaptness and fewness of Causes fit to produce them, yet it admits Possibility of being otherwise; in regard it fails in its very Root and Basis, by not relying on the main Principle and Foundation of all steadiness in humane Discourse, and which is of so necessary a Truth, that 'tis impossible to falter or give way, to uphold and exempt it from a liableness to disconnexion of those Notions which it pretended, and aught to Identify; that is, from a liableness to Error.  
§ 11. From this declaration of the nature of Opinion, it is rendered manifest out of what Fountainhead all Rational Assents flow; namely, from seeing the Immediate Connexion of one Term with another; or, which is all one, that this Principle [The same is the same with itself] stands engaged for their verity: Also, that the Light of Reason consists fundamentally in this; and formally in deriving the perfect Visibleness of this to make other Propositions also visible to the Eye of our Understanding. Likewise, that Assents not springing from this Light of Reason, must be, as such, Irrational; and arise necessarily from the Will, taken as not following the Light of Understanding, but as prompted and put forward by some passion, viz. some irrational desire or inclination the thing should be so, which pressed and precipitated the understanding into Assent before due motives forced it. As likewise, that since none can be bound constantly to profess what he cannot steadily see to be true, a Christian who is thus bound to profess his Faith True, must see that the First Principle now spoken of, which gives all Steadiness to our Intellectual Sight, is interessed in the patronage of the Proposition he assents to: Whence, true Faith, by reason of its immovable Grounds, can bear an asserting the absolute Impossibility of its being False; whereas, who ever affirms Faith may possibly be false, makes it built upon remote mediums, that is, such as are either not immediate; or (which is all one) not seen to be immediate to the two Terms of the Proposition assented to; and so, they become destitute of the Invincible strength of that first Principle which establishes all deduced Truths, and legitimates all Assents to them. Whence follows inevitably, that he turns all Faith into Opinion; makes Faith absurd, preternatural and irrational; importing that 'tis a thing which men must assent to or say interiorly 'tis so, and yet see no solid Grounds why it must be so; profess stoutly 'tis true, and that they are sure of it; and yet, if they will speak truly, profess with all, that it may be false, and that the whole world may be mistaken in it; and lastly, he leaves all Christ's Doctrine Indefensible, and utterly unmaintainable to have, absolutely speaking, either any solidity or steadiness in its Grounds, or one true word in itself.   

Second Eviction.  
§. 1. FRom this notseeing the Connexion of the two Terms in 
The Origin and Natures of Suspense and Assent.  the Conclusion by a Medium immediately connected to them both, but by distant Glances only, which have not the power to make one see Intellectually the Thing is, or Assent; joined with this that, notwithstanding, 'tis not seen those Terms are Opposite or Inconnectible; the Soul becomes hereupon, as it were, environed with a kind of Intellectual Darkness, and sees not which way to step forwards, without danger of harming hor Cognoscitive or Truth-affecting Nature by Error. Whence, she remains in a kind of Neutral Condition, which we call Suspense. But, 'tis to be well noted, that this Suspensive Condition of the Soul, not being a state of Actuality or Determination, (much less of utmost Actuality, as is the seeing, by virtue of that main Principle beforenamed, that a thing is) but of Indetermination, Potentiality, and Confusedness; its Nature admits consequently infinite degrees, according as the Appearances which incline her towards Assent or Dissent are greater or less. Moreover, as in the passing from Indetermination to Determination (for example) in a motion to a Terminus of Rest, there are divers approaches of that Motions Quantity so very near the Terminus or End, that their distance is undiscernible to a vulgar eye, and needs exact skill to distinguish them: So it happens here, that there must necessarily be found divers Inclinations or Approaches towards Assent, which have so small a degree of Suspense in them, that they are hard to be distinguished from absolute Assents, but by a learned Reflecter; and the way he takes to distinguish them must be to observe whether the Understanding, acting reflectingly, that is, looking into the Nature of its own Act, finds there that it absolutely yields itself over to judge the thing is existent or true, or whether it only judges it very probable or Truthlikely. For, any Assent to the greatest Likelihood of a thing is as far from being an Assent to the things Existence, as the Notion of Existent or True is from the Notion of very likely to be true. And if the Assent to the former be not actually an Assent to the later, yet tend towards it, as it does; then 'tis Potential in respect of it, and so includes some degree of Suspense; which defect only can in our present case, hinder the other from being actually it, according to our former Discourse. Assent, then, to the mere Likelihood of a thing, is, or at least implies, Suspense of its Existence  
§ 2. Another thing which inclines men to confound the Assent to the Likelihood of a thing, with the Assent to its Existence or Truth, is Habituation or Custom. For, men being used to proceed naturally to outward Action upon a very high Probability, without more ado or examination, they are hence apt to apprehend that a Conceit, which had so little and so undiscernible a proportion of Suspense in it, was a perfect Assent: and that, because the Soul quite yielded to the Motive as to Exterior Action, therefore it yielded likewise as to Interior Assent. Whereas, by reflecting on the Nature of this Act in the Soul, and by retriving its Grounds, we come to discover that, however the Soul runs promptly and rationally to Outward Action upon such a Motive, when she is concerned to act, even after deliberation; yet, not so to Interior Assent, if she acts rationally; but, upon reflection, finding in herself nothing to fix in her the Existence of the thing, or elevate it beyond the possibility of not-being or being False, she hangs back from assenting the thing is, and is constrained to say interiorly, or acknowledge in her own breast, she may possibly be mistaken, and the thing possibly be not-Existent, for aught she sees; which restrains her from truly assenting that the thing is.  
§ 3. An Instance will render our Discourse clearer. 'Tis proposed then (for example) to our Judging Power, whether America be or no? And we'll suppose (to avoid a disputed case) the Evidence of Authority has convinced the Understanding it once was, by the Impossibility the several Attesters should either be deceived in a plain Object of Eyesight, or have a common Motive able to make them conspire to belly their Eyes. But, the Question is, whether it be now or no. And, the uncouthness and unlikelihood that so vast a place should be destroyed, joined with the Customariness of acting upon a very great probability, makes him who is to act in order to it, (for example, send a ship thither) proceed to his intended outward action fearlessly, and esteem him mad who desists upon a conceit of so unlikely a failure. For, since all Action is in particulars, and Particulars are the very Sphere of Contingency, it follows, that we must not act at all, if we expected Demonstrations of the several Objects and Adjuncts of our outward Action: Whence he deserves justly to be accounted frantic who should desist from Action where there is so high a Probability; for this extravagant cautiousness were in effect to take away the Motives to any Exterior Action in the world, and consequently all such Action itself. But now, let two Speculaters or Scholars meet together, who consider not the Practicableness, but merely the Truth of things; and aim not to better their Purse by Merchandizing or outward Endeavours, but their Understandings by rightly-made Judgements or Assents, that is, by Knowledges: and we shall see their working on the Point turns upon other hinges. In the other, there was Necessity of acting, without which the world could not subsist: but, here's no necessity of Assenting, which we suppose only aimed at, at present; nor can there be any, unless that Principle or Cause of all Assent [The same is the same with itself] comes to exercise its overpowering Virtue upon the Soul. There, it was enough that prudential considerations discovered a betterness to act exteriorly, all things weighed; to which needed not a severity of Principles forcing the Truth of the thing: but here, those Principles, which are the Maxims of Metaphysics or Supreme Wisdom, are the only things to be consulted; and the prudential weighing of Particulars avails little or nothing towards the secure establishment of the Truth aimed at. There, some harm was likely to ensue, if they acted not exteriorly, and went not about their work: but, here, no harm at all could come by not acting interiorly; I mean, by not-Assenting, but Suspending till the beams of Truth, by the Fountain-light of that First Principle, cleared their Understandings: rather on the contrary, a great harm was certain to ensue upon assenting in that case, that is, an Injury to Reason, their true Nature; by concluding, without seeing a middle Term connecting the two Extremes, on which every act of right Reason is built. These Scholars then, or Pursuers of Truth, consult with Speculative, not Practical Principles, to guide their Assents by. They are certain that such an Effect (as is the destruction of America) cannot be without a Cause; and Experience tells them such Causes seldom or never happen: Yet, knowing that all material things have Contingency annexed to their Natures, and not discovering any evident Principle in Nature hindering the vast Oceans on either side America to overswell the Continent, and so destroy it; they are forced to confess interiorly America may, for any thing they know, possibly not be; whence they are forced to suspend, as to its Existence, and only Assent to its extreme Likelihood of existing.  
§ 4. The use I make of this discourse 
The Point evinced from the natures of Suspense and Assent  at present is this: that, though Likelihoods have a great latitude; yet Assent, (being the terminus of those Inclinations towards it, which gradually exceed one another) consists in an Indivisible, as does the notion of is, on which (either seen, or deemed to be seen) 'tis built, and to which it goes parallel. That, all Acts falling short of Assent to the Existence of a thing advance no farther than great Assents to its Likelihood, and fall under the head of suspensive Acts; as to that things Existence, as the Soul will discover upon reflection: and that, when we mistake one for the other, 'tis for not distinguishing well the great resemblance between assenting as to outward Action, and as to the speculative Truth; as also between assenting to the extreme Likelihood of a thing, and assenting to its Existence. That, whensoever we see the Possibility of a things being False or not-Existent (which in our case is all one) we cannot have an Assent to its Existence, but to the likelihood of it only, and suspend as to its Existence or actual being: and that, therefore, they who acknowledge that, notwithstanding all the Means used and all the Grounds it has, Faith may possibly be false to us, cannot be held to assent to the Existence or Truth of those points; but to suspend concerning their truth, and to assent only to their likelihood to be true, Which, whether it be a sufficient disposition to denominate such persons Christians, will easily and best be determined by the vulgar of Christianity, who possess the genuine and natural meaning of the word Faith, untainted with the frantic conceits sprung from such speculations as are taken out of Fancy; not, as they ought, from the nature of the Thing.  
§ 5. The same Argument may be 
From the nature of Holding.  made from the nature of firmly Holding, as was from Assent; and the selfsame discourse, mutatis mutandis: since 'tis most Evident, none can firmly hold a thing to be true, which he sees and acknowledges, that is, holds may be False; however he may hold it Very likely to be True.  
§ 6. The same is evinced from the 
From the nature of Knowing.  notion of knowing: which word I take here abstractedly, unconcerned what kind of knowledge it be; provided it be True and proper knowledge, and not abusively so called. For, since nothing can be known to be but what is, nor known to be such but what is such: again since Christians, if they have either Honesty or Wit in them, must, some way or other, know points of Faith to be true, whose truth they esteem themselves bound to profess and stand to even with the loss of their lives; it follows, those points must be what they are known to be, that is True; and consequently (unless knowledge can be Ignorance) impossible not to be or to be False.  
§ 7. What hath been said of Assent and Holding and Knowing may also be discoursed 
From the nature of Certainty, in many regards.  from the notion of Certainty: for this has the same nature with the former, as it is a determination of the Understanding; I mean, Intellectual determination is the common Genus to them all: and they differ only in this, that Knowledge and Certainty are proper Effects of Evidence, whether sprung from the thing or from the Attester, nor can they be where there is wanting the Intellectual Light issuing from that First Principle of all Evidence so oft spoken of; whereas H●lding or Assenting can proceed from the Blindness of Passion, or from Ignorance, as well as from the clear Sight of the Understanding. Now that the Nature of Certainty consists in an Intellectual Determination thus originized, and consequently, when put, excludes all possibility of being otherwise (which is the point I aim to evince) appears, partly from the Etymology, and most evidently from the Use of the Word. For, Certus signifies Determinate. As then, when the matter spoken of restrains that word to Volition, it signifies an Absolute Determination of Will or Resolution; as, certus ●undi: so, when we are speaking of the Ground of Intellectual Certainty, and say the thing is Certain, we intent to express full as much as when we say, the thing is; which speaks Ultimate Determination and Actuality in the Object, considered in itself: and, in like Manner, when the same word is intended to signify Formal Certainty in Us, or that Disposition of the Understanding whereby it is said to be Certain, it must necessarily signify (unless, contrary to the nature of Words its most formal Notion be less rigorous than those which are less formal) a Determinate state of the Understanding, or an Intellectual Determination. Whence, as a thing is then Certain or Determinate when it is; so the Understanding is then Determined according to its Nature, or Certain, when the Thing is seen to be as it is, which immediate Effect of the other is impossible, but by virtue of the first Principle of Evidence making that clear discovery; and, This engaged, all Intellectual Potentiality, or Possibility of not being seen to be, is totally and formally, that is, most absolutely excluded. The true and genuine Notion, then, of Certainty imports an absolute impossibility that that judgement which so fixes and determines the Understanding should be an Error, or False: Since nothing can be seen to be, but what really is.  
§ 8. Again, since Determination in any kind, is the Terminus of all Indetermination in the same kind, and so, beyond it: it follows, that Certainty or Intellectual Determination, is placed beyond all possible degrees of Indetermination of the mind, or Uncertainty. Certainty, therefore, is not attained till all possible degrees of Uncertainty, and, consequently, Possibility of Falsehood to us, or Error, be transcended and overcome. Faith, then, must be denied to be Certain, if it be put Possible to be False.  
§9. And, as my former Discourse has endeavoured to display the Nature of Certainty from its Genus and Difference, which compound its Definition; so the same will be still more satisfactorily evinced from observing the Language of Mankind, when they use the word Certain. For, that being most evidently the signification of a word which the intelligent Users of that word intent to express by it: if by divers sayings of theirs we can manifest that they meant to signify such a Conception by that Word, that will infallibly be the true meaning of it, and that Conception will have in it the true Nature of Certainty. Let us observe then attentively what is at the bottom of their hearts, when they use these and the like familiar Discourses, which naturally break from them. How frequent is it, when any one asks another, Is such a thing true? and the other replies, I verily think it is; he returns upon him with this pressing demand; I, but are you certain of it? may not you be mistaken? Which clearly intimates that that Disposition called Certainty, is beyond all Inclinations, Motions, or indeterminate Tendencies of the Understanding, making it verily think 'tis true, which speaks the next remove, as it were, from a certain Assent; and, consequently, that 'tis an absolute determination and fixure of the Soul that 'tis true: As also, that Certainty elevates the Soul beyond hazard of mistake. Again, many times, when one is smartly questioned, if he be Certain of a thing? not daring, upon better reflection, pretend to Certainty, he replies warily (in a moderate word which diminishes and falls short of the other) that he is Morally certain of it; which evidences that the Notion of Certainty is in point of fixing or determining the Understanding, beyond that counterfeit Certainty, called Moral Certainty: Wherefore, since all Moral Certainty (as they call it) how great soever, though it be penetrated perfectly according as 'tis in its own Nature, is seen to consist with a Possibility to be otherwise; True Certainty, which exceeds it, must needs include an Impossibility to be otherwise. Faith, then, is not, in true speech, Certain, unless it be Impossible to be False.  
§ 10. Again, let an Overweener, after his mistake becomes Visible, be challenged with it; we find that, in common speech, we use these or the like words, You said, or thought, You were Certain of it, but You see You are mistaken, Is it not Evident that the word Certain excludes a possibility of being otherwise? since his being Certain of it formerly is denied purely upon this score, because he was mistaken: which shows that the true notion of Certain is inconsistent with mistake; that is, that Certainty implies Unmistakableness or, which is all one, Inerrability hîc & nunc in the present affair. Whereas, had the notion of Certainty admitted a Possibility not to be as he judged, he had not been so mistaken in judging that Certain which by actually happening not to be was shown afterwards Possible not to be. To think to evade, by alleging that it was not meant his mistake consisted in judging that Certain or Impossible not to be, which was Possible not to be, but in judging that would be, which afterwards happed not to be, is merely Childishness and Folly amongst Men, who hold that things are carried on by the course of Cause and Effect; and that things therefore happen because a Cause puts them, or not happen because no Cause puts them. To judge, then, a thing would not be is the same, amongst Intelligent Men, as to judge there would be no Cause to make it be; and, if there would be none such, 'tis most evident it could not be, or was Impossible to be in this order of the world. Such answers are fit for men who are led more by Sounds than Sense; and who think a different word will gain them an Escape, though that word signifies the same thing as the former.  
11. The same will appear from the Absurdity, which palpably discovers itself in any Expression that modifies the true Notion of Certain with a Contingency: as if one should say, 'tis Certain per adventure, or 'tis fallibly Certain: The Nonsense of which shows that the true Notion of Certainty implies an Oppositness to all Contingency, or an Impossibility to be otherwise. You'll ask, what then must be said of the Phrase, [Moral Certainty] where Certainty seems to admit an allay of Contingency? I answer, 'tis evident even hence and from all my former Discourse, that the word Certainty is there used Catachrestically or abusively, for some great Likelihood, and its Epithet means such a degree of it as is found generally in humane exterior actions which depend on freewill, and are contingent as being Particulars; and speaks not proper Certainty, as 'tis meant to signify that perfect Intellectual Determination, whose Principles and Causes being high Truths, are unalterable. Whence, Moral Certainty, how high soever it be exalted and triumph in an empty name, is in reality Uncertainty; and the highest degree of Moral Certainty is the lowest degree of Uncertainty, truly so called; that is, of that which expresses an Intellectual Indetermination.  
§ 12. Thus much from the use of the word; which, when it falls naturally and unaffectedly from the tongue of the Speakers, is a proper Effect of the Notion or meaning in their Souls, that is, of the Signification of that word; whence 'tis an apt Medium to demonstrate that Notion, its proper Cause, à posteriori.  
§ 13. From this Discourse follows, first, that, since, speaking of the present, (and the same, in proportion, holds of other differences of time) 'tis the same to say, The thing is certain, as to say the thing is; and to say the thing is speaks Indivisibility; the Notion of Certainty too consists in an Indivisible. By which is not meant that one Certainty may not be greater than another, both from a greater Perfection in the Subject, and a greater certifying Power in the Object: but, that Certainty, in the way of being generated in the Soul, is either there all at once or not at all; in the same sort as there is no middle between is and is not, (or half-beings of them) which are the formal Expressers of Certainty. Whence, again, appears that what we abusively call Moral Certainty, is indeed none at all; because it reaches not that Indivisible or Determinative Point in which True Certainty consists.  
§ 14. Secondly, since true Certainty 
From the Impossibility that what may be false can have any Principles.  is caused in us by seeing the thing is; and this cannot be seen but by virtue of Principles; (especially that chief one, A thing is the same with itself) which Principles being Truths, cannot possibly be False: it follows both that what is Certain cannot possibly be False, and that what can possibly be False subsists upon no Principles. Whence, all Moral Certainty, as they call it, as also all high Probabilities, which confessedly may possibly be false, are convinced to subsist upon no Principles: and they, who acknowledge they have but Moral Certainty and high Probabilities for their Faith or Opinion, confess they have no Principles, which in true Language deserve that name, to ground them; but, at best, certain likely Topical Mediums that oft prove true, or hold for the most part: which may serve for a talking kind of Discourse, or Exterior Action; but are flat things and useless when Truth is to be concluded.  
§ 15. Thirdly, it follows that true 
From the Identity of Certainty with Infallibility.  Certainty of any thing is the selfsame with Infallibility or Inerrability, as to the same thing. For, Certainty is not had, till it be seen, that that First Principle, [A thing is the same with itself] is engaged for the identification of the two Notions which make up the Proposition we are Certain of; that is, for the Truth of that Proposition: Wherefore, since we can have Infallible Assurance of the Truth of that First Principle; as also of this, that nothing can be seen to be, unless it be; we can frame an Inerrable Judgement that, when we see that First Principle engaged for the Identity of those two Notions, 'tis engaged for it, and so they identified; that is, we must know Infallibly that that Proposition is true. This I say in case it be a True Certainty, and not an only deemed or mistaken one: yet even then there is a deemed Infallibility, and the person that mistakingly judges himself certain of a thing, judges withal that he cannot be mistaken, hic & nunc, in that particular, which manifests that the Notion of Certainty is the same with that of Infallibility, however it may be misapplyed. Again, since the natural use of words gives it not to be nonsense to say, [I am Infallibly Certain of such a thing] 'tis plain that the Notion of Infallibly is not disparate from the Notion of Certain, or incompetent to it: it must then be either Tautological, or else be a different yet appliable Notion, and so apt to difference or distinguish it; but it cannot be this later, for then the Notion of Certain aught in all Reason and Logic admit with equal sense the opposite difference [Fallibly] which we experience it does not; nothing being more absurd and foolish than to say, [I am fallibly certain of a thing] 'Tis clear then that infallibly is not fit to difference the Notion of Certain, or not a different Notion from it; but the same sense reiterated in another word for aggravations sake, as when we say, I saw it with mine own eyes; or such like; that is, if we consider it calmly, we shall find that that malignant word Infallibility which so bewonders our Opposers, amounts to no more but true Certainty, and has the selfsame Notion with it.  
§ 16. Fourthly, it appears that, seeing 
From the contrary opinion unavoidably subjecting Faith to Chance and Contingency.  what may be otherwise, how unlikely soever, needs but a lucky chance to be so; they who say Faith may possibly be False, instead of establishing it, subject it to Chance and Contingency; and confess it has no Grounds so to secure it but a greater Wit than has been formerly, may possibly show it to be False; that is, may subvert all the Grounds it now stands on. So that these men are convinced not to settle Faith upon any firm Grounds, or on the Nature of the thing: but to hang it on Humane Wit, that is, on the Wit of the present Christians maintaining its Plausibility; and, possibly, on the fortunate want of an acuter Wit than any now extant; who, when he shall arise, may perhaps outwit them, and show all their Faith to be a ridiculous foolery.  
§ 17. Lastly, speaking of Truths, 'tis 
From the Incompossibility of Truth with Falsehood.  perfect Nonsense to say they can possibly be False; since 'tis a direct contradiction Truth should be Falsehood; as is evident in Predications of past or future things, viz. in these, Christ has died, the Resurrection will be: the former of which, if once True, has been, and so cannot have not been, the Circumstance of Time being gone in which only it could not have been; and the later, if once put to be true, that is, to stand under certain or unimpedible Causes, is Impossible to be False, or not to succeed. So that 'tis the greatest madness and folly in the world to put either of these possible to be False. if they be once rightly judged Truths: and indeed I fear rather that they who judge the later possible not to be, subject them to impedible Causes; and so make them, or at least their Grounds as to our knowledge, Future Contingents, which have neither determinate Truth nor Falsehood. Speaking then of those Propositions or Points of Faith which predicate de praesenti, it will be found by the Considerer, that they are all in a matter which is unalterable, and above Contingency; and, in case this were not, their very Determination to the present frees them from being other than they are for the present: Every thing while it is being necessarily what it is. There is no shadow, therefore, of Ground, for a man, who affirms Points of Faith to be Truths, to affirm withal they may possibly be False. All I can imagine in their behalf, to excuse them from speaking palpable Contradictions, is this; that perhaps they may mean our Discourse, while in viâ to find out these Truths, was impedible, and so there was then a possibility they might not become seen to be True, that is, might be no Truths to us. But, the Question returns, Whether, in the end of our weighing their Motives, we discover them to be Truths or no? If not, why do we so asseverantly affirm they are? and why are we bound by Religion to profess them to be so? or, if we come to discover they are Truths, how are we so stupid as not to discover withal, that they cannot possibly be Falsehoods?  
§ 18. My last Argument from Logic 
From the nature of Disputation, and the Impossibility otherwise to evince the Truth of faith.  shall be this, that there is no way left to prove Faith, or persuade it to another that acts according to perfect Reason, in case it, that is, its Grounds as to our knowledge, can possibly be False. And, that this is so, is not so much evident from any particular Consideration in Logic, as from the whole Nature of Artificial Discourse, or Disputation. For, in case the Premises be but Morally Certain, (as they call it) or possible to be false, that is, if the two Terms be not seen to be connected, these Propositions may, nay aught to be denied by the Respondent; whose Office and Right it is to grant nothing but what is Evident, lest he ensnare himself; but to put the Arguer to prove them. What then must the Opponent or Arguer do? Must he bring a Syllogism consisting of Premises only morally Certain or possible to be false, to make the other good? What will it avail? since these Premises are also deniable for the same reason, and so in infinitum; that is, nothing at all can possibly be concluded finally, till Grounds impossible to be false be produced; which put, the Conclusion may be such also. Wherefore, unless Faith have Grounds impossible to be False, (and, consequently, able to show It such also) none can Rationem reddere Fidei, give a true Reason of their Faith; but such an one at best as, in due right of Dispute, is ●●deniable at pleasure: Whence Faith is rendered both unmaintainable or indefensible in itself, and unperswadable to others that guide themselves by perfect Reason. For, however all who discourse of Religion, when they would convert any to Faith, use not to pin their Motives to Syllogistical Form: Yet, since no Reason in the case of convincing the Understanding, is allowable, but what will bear the test of true Logic; and this assures us there's no concluding any thing at all, without relying finally on Premises or Grounds impossible to be False: it follows that, how finely and quaintly soever these men talk, unless they produce such Grounds, they can conclude nothing at all; and all their importunate Persuasions, which are not reducible to these Grounds, (nay, are made use of by Persons who declare against having any such Grounds for Faith) signify just as much as if they should say, I beseech you, Sir, be so good natured as to believe me; though to tell you true, I acknowledge sincerely neither can I bring, nor can there possibly be brought any Ground able to make good what I say, or any undeniable Premises to force my Conclusion.   

Third Eviction.  
§ 1. THus far Logic: Let's see next 
The main Thesis demonstrated from the want of Potentiality in the Subject.  what Nature and Metaphysics say to the Point, in which Quest yet we must not leave Logick's Assistance. And, first, these Sciences assure us, that as all Capacity of different Being's springs from First Matter, so all Capacity of contrary Determinations arises from what we call Potentiality or Indifferency in the Subject. Now the Subject in our present case is not so much our mere Faculty of Understanding, as the Points of Faith itself in our Soul, or the judging Power of our Soul considered precisely as affected with these Points; for, 'tis these, or our judging Power taken merely as conversant about These, that is, our Judgements, which our Opponents must affirm True, yet Possible to be False. Since therefore both the Points themselves and our Judgements consist formally in Affirmation and Negation, that is, in is and is not, which are indivisible, and constituted such by a Formality the most formal and actual that can be, (as hath been shown) they can have, as such, no Indifferency or Potentiality in them to the contrary, neither Natural nor Metaphysical; nor, consequently, Possibility of Falsehood.  
§ 2. The Position of our Adversaries 
From the, otherwise, necessity of putting a consistency of Truth with Falsehood.  is still rendered more absurd by this Consideration, that even in Nature where there is the greatest Potentiality that is, viz. First Matter, the Subject is not yet capable of opposite Qualities at once, but successively; at least in the same part: Whereas, their Position is not that Faith which is now True is possible to be False afterwards upon the Alteration of some Contingent Matter; but, that 'tis Possible now to be False, or possible to be now False, for any thing any man knows; that is, the understanding may have possibly Truth and Falsehood in it at once, and as to the same Part or Point.  
§ 3. But 'tis still far more irrational, 
From the, otherwise, necessity of putting Contradictories to be true.  in regard these seeming Contraries, (True) and (False,) applied to the Propositions we speak of, have in them the perfect nature of Contradictories; it being necessary that in those which speak de praesenti, one should be expressed by [is existent] the other by [is not existent] as 'tis in those which speak preteritly and futurely, that one should be expressed by (hath been) or (shall be,) the other by (hath not been) or (shall not be:) To think than they can at once be True and False, is to judge that Contradictories may be verified of the same, or that both sides of the Contradiction may be true.  
§ 4. Again, Truth being a Conformity 
From the, otherwise, necessity of putting it possible the mind should be at once conformable and disconformable to the thing.  of the mind to the Thing, and Falsehood a Disconformity; to say, a Proposition is True, and yet possible to be False, is to say, that the mind, considered as judgingly conversant about that Proposition, may be at once Conformable and Disconformable to the same thing. Too wild a Position to be introduced into a rational nature, by any thing but such a wilful and blind passion, as must first actually corrupt, and, in fine, tend to destroy the very nature itself.  
§ 5. And, to void this Thesis from all 
From the Impossibility of different Respects here so to avoid a Contradiction.  possible evasion, here can be no different Respects according to which these Affirmations and Negations may be made, so to avoid Contradiction; but all such Respects are excluded, both out of the nature of the Predicate in most of those Propositions, as hath been shown (Evict. 1. § 5.) as also out of the nature of the Points of Faith; which, standing in the abstract, descend nor to, nor meddle with subsuming Respects, but have their Notions completed in the common words which express them. And, lastly, because Truths and Falsehoods are not capable of Distinctions and Respects: For, however a Proposition taken into Consideration and scanning whether it be true or no, may admit Respects and Distinctions, and so be affirmed to be in this regard True, in that False; yet, what is once accepted to be True, cannot in any Respect afterwards be affirmed possible to be not True, or False. For example, this Proposition [An Ethiopian is white] is distinguished by Respects to several parts, and in regard to his Teeth 'tis true; to his skin, 'tis false: But after those Respects have distinguished the Ambiguity of it, and so, by dividing it into two Propositions, settled one to be True, the other to be False, there can be no further use of Respects or Distinctions, which are to antecede to Truth and Falsehood by clearing the doubtfulness of Propositions, and can have no place after the Truth is once acknowledged, or supervene to it. He than that once acknowledges Points of Faith to be Truths, can have no Assistance from recourse to this and the other Respect, to evade a Contradiction when he affirms they may be False.  
§ 6. Again, 'tis particularly opposite 
From the nature of the Soul.  to the nature of a Soul to have such an Act in her as to judge a thing True yet possible to be False at the same time. For, our Soul as to her Judging Power is essentially a Capacity of Truth; whence the First Principles which ground all Truths are so connatural to her, that she cannot but embrace them and judge them true. Nothing therefore being more opposite to Truth than a Contradiction, it follows that nothing is more impossible to be received or subjected in the Soul according to her Judging Power than a Contradiction; that is, no implicatory or contradictory Act can settle there. Now, to judge a Proposition or Point to be true, is to judge the thing to exist just as it affirms; and, to judge it Possible to be False, is to judge it Possible not to exist as it affirms; and this, not in order to different times but the same; that is, to judge a Proposition or Point true yet possible to be false, is the same, as to judge the thing actually is, and yet perhaps is not at the same time; and this, as appears by our former Discourse, not to be avoided in our case by difference or diversity of Respects. Wherefore, since such an Act is not possible to be in the Judging Power of the Soul, 'tis most manifest, that he who holds one side of the Contradiction, cannot possibly hold the other; that is, he who holds Faith may be False, cannot hold that 'tis True; and that, if it be held and professed to be True, it ought also to be held and professed Impossible to be false.  
§ 7. Moreover, the Soul, antecedently, 
From the necessity of putting the Soul at once determined and indetermin'd in order to the same Point.  to its being informed by the Object, was indifferent and undetermined to judge it True or False, that is, to be or not to be; but, when it came afterwards through consideration of the Thing or Object to judge it True, it became determined; and how, but by a Notion the most determinative of any other, viz. that of being or is: wherefore, since to put in her at the same time a Judgement of its possibility to be False, puts her to be indetermin'd, and this in order to the same, This Position puts the Soul to be at once determinate and indeterminate as to the same; which states are as vastly distant as actual Being and not-actual Being can remove them. Nay, this monstrous Thesis makes the Soul Indeterminate to either side, that is to Truth as well as to Falsehood, even after it had supposed her determined to Truth; For, to judge a Point possible to be False, puts the Judgement Potential or Indetermin'd as to the Falsehood of it; and False signifying not-true, possible to be False must signify possible to be not True, and so include Potentiality or Indetermination to Truth also: in regard, were it actually True, it could not be Possible to be not True, or not itself. The Soul must then be Indeterminate to either, that is, neither judge it true nor false, even after she was supposed to judge it true, in case she can then judge it possible to be false: and, consequently, this Position of Faith's possibility to be false, cannot, without highest contradiction, stand with a hearty conceit that Faith is True. To think to escape the force of this Argument by alleging the respect to different Motives, or, that the Understanding was not perfectly but partly determined, is in our case frivolous. For I ask, was it determined enough by any Intellectual or Rational Motives to judge the thing is? if not, what made it judge so when those Motives could not? Is it not evident it must be some weakness or some blind motive in the Will, not Light of Understanding? But, if it were determined enough to judge the thing is or is true, 'tis also enough for my Argument and Purpose.  
§ 8. Especially the force of this Argument 
From the Formal Natures of Truth and Falsehood.  will be better penetrated when it shall be well considered in what Truth and Falsehood formally consist; and that, taken rightly, they are certain Affections or Dispositions of our Understanding. For, that is not to be called True by me which is not True to me; not is any thing True to me, but when 'tis seen by me to be so in the Object; and to be thus seen by me, is the Object to inform and actuate my Understanding Power as 'tis Judicative; whence that Power, as 'tis thus actuated, gains a Conformity to the thing itself, in which consists the precise nature of Truth. However than Truth come from the Object which is the ground or cause of it, yet 'tis formally no where but in the Understanding or Judgement; as appears evidently from this, that Truth is found in Propositions: now Propositions are not in the thing formally, (though, when true, they are derived hence) but in the mind only, and significatively in words. Truth then is that whereby I am true or veracious when I say interiorly, the Thing is, or is thus and thus; wherefore the Truth of any Point is not had till this Actuation or Determination of my Power by the Object, which as its Formal Cause makes this Conformity to it, be put: And, this put, to think that at the same time or at once the mind can be unactuated, undetermined, potential or disconformable to it, is too gross a conceit to enter into the head of any man endued with the common Light of Reason. Whoever than affirm's Faith or those Propositions which express Faith possible to be false, he is convinced by the clearest Light of Reason (in case the desperation of maintaining the Truth of Faith, for want of grounds, drives him not to say any thing, but that he speaks candidly what he thinks) not to judge or say from his heart, His Faith is indeed True, having never experienced in his Soul, for want of Principles to put it there, that the Object or Ground of his Faith hath wrought in it that Conformity to the thing, in which Truth consists; and, consequently, that, when he professes Points of Faith to be Truths, he either by a fortunate piece of folly understands not what he says, or collogues and dissembles with God and the world for honour or some other Interest.  
§ 9 'Tis hence farther demonstrated that the Position we impugn destroys 
From the notion of Metaphysical Unity  the Notion of Metaphysical Unity, consisting in an Indivision or Indistinction of any Notion, Nature or Thing in itself, and a Division or Distinction of it from all other: For, according to this Tenet, Truth or the Conformity of our Understanding to the Object, put by our joint supposition that the Proposition of Faith is true, may possibly be Disconformity or Falsehood, and this Determinate State, Indeterminate; which makes the mind as having in it One Notion, that is indeed that One Notion, capable to admit into its bowels Another, not only disparate, but Opposite, that is, One possible to be not One, but Another.  
§ 10. The same is demonstrated concerning 
From the notion of Metaphysical Verity.  Metaphysical Verity. For this Position makes the selfsame mental Proposition or Disposition of the Understanding we call Truth, possible to be Falsehood; that is, Possible not to be the same with itself, which subverts all Metaphysical Verity; that is, the Foundation or ground of all Formal Verity or Truth in the World.  
§ 11. The same injury demonstratively 
From the notion of Metaphysical Bonity or Goodness.  accrues to Metaphysical Bonity or Goodness. For, it makes that Conformity of the mind to the thing which is Truth, and so the Good or Perfection of the Understanding, to be at once possible to be Falsehood, that is, possible to be not good but harmful and destructive to it.  
§ 12. I make no question but my Adversaries will think to elude the force of these three last Demonstrations, and perhaps of some others by alleging that they deny absolutely Truth can possibly be Falsehood, and that they mean only that though the Points of Faith appear now upon considerable Motives to be True, yet those Motives secure it not from being absolutely False; but not so that they can really be both. And I grant this would be a good Answer, in case they did not affirm Points of Faith to be really True, (upon which Supposition taken from the common Language and Sentiments of all that profess Christianity, even theirs too as Christians I proceed) but only professed they were Likely to be True; for than it would be so far from following that Truth could be Falsehood, or that the same Points could be both true and not true at once, that, in that case, it would follow they ought to affirm they were neither True nor False; since likely to be True and True indeed are no more the same, than a Statue which is like a man is the same with a man. But, if all Christians be bound to profess, and themselves actually do so, that their Faith is indeed True, then let us see how they will avoid the consequences of my former discourse, when they assert it withal Possible to be False. For it is that very individual judgement they make concerning a Point of Faith, or an Act of Faith, which they must affirm to be True or a Truth, that is conformable to the thing; and 'tis of the selfsame Judgement, though called by them a Truth, of which they affirm that 'tis possible to be False, or disconformable to the Object: And, this is not so meant as if it should become so afterwards, either by some Alteration of that Judgement into another, or of the thing to which it is Conformable; but that even that very selfsame Judgement, while they speak and hold it after their Fashion True, may even then possibly be False; from which 'tis evident, that for want of solid Grounds to settle Points of Faith in their Soul as Truths, they hold them indeed only Likelihoods, whose Nature 'tis to be Possible to be F●lse; and yet, forced by the natural sense and language of Christianity, which 'tis dishonourable to them too palpably to contradict, they become obliged to profess them Truths, whose firm Grounds make them Impossible to be False; though at the same time they affix to them the proper badge of Likelihoods, Possibility of Falsehood. Whence by confounding the purest and solidest nature of Truth's Gold, with other Notions of so base an alloy that it cannot admit any mixture with them, all Principles which are to support the true Natures or Being's of things, are by consequence attacked; and, could their Position stand, would quite be overthrown.   

Fourth Eviction.  
§ 1. THe very first Principle of all Truth cannot escape the pernicious 
From the contrary Thesis' being destructive to the Fi●st Principle in all Metaphysics.  Attempts of this Erroneous Tenet. 'Tis this Quicquid est, dum est, impossibile est non esse, or, The same thing cannot both be and not be at once. For in Faith-Propositions, especially those in which Existent is the Predicate, [as the Trinity is, etc.] 'tis the same to say the Proposition is True, as to say the Subject is Existent; and the same to say it may be False, as to say 'tis Possible to be not Existent, or that it may not be; and our Adversaries relate not this to a several circumstance of time in which they may be conceived to agree to the Subject successively, for their sense is that this Proposition [a Trinity is, etc.] may (for any thing they know) even now possibly be False while they pronounce it true. Since then to affirm a thing Existent, and yet Possible to be not Existent at the same time, is to say directly, that it may be and may not be at once, 'tis most manifest that either they must not say a Trinity is Existent, or else 'tis not possible not to be Existent at the same time; that is, if indeed that Point of Faith be True, they must withal affirm it Impossible to be False; as also that they who affirm both, profess to hold direct Contradictories. So that while these men go about to violate the Sanctuary of Faith, whose solid Nature is so built that 'tis intrinsically repugnant to Falsity, they by consequence subvert the Groundwork and Bottom-Principles of all Truth. So wisely did that best Master of Mankind settle his Doctrine, that we cannot call into question that which makes us christian's, without renouncing all that makes us Men.  
§ 2. I foresee my Adversaries will still 
From the Impossibility of a sufficient Motive to judge a thing True, with a Motive to judge it possible to be False.  object that I mistake them and impose upon them to relate their Discourse to the real Being of the thing as it stands in the thing itself, whereas they intent it only to mean the thing as standing under Notion, or considered according to divers Motives they either have or may have to persuade or dissuade them as to the Verity of it; and in plain terms that they mean only this; that Faith is not so conveniently proposed to them but that the grounds of it for any thing appears evidently are possible to be False. I answer, that I also speak of the thing as standing under Notion, else how could I put it in Propositions, and discourse from the nature and contradictoriness of those Propositions as I do all along? But yet, lest my Notions should be airy and empty, I am careful to take them from the nature of the thing, and to rate the Truth of my Propositions from the Conformity they have to the Object as in itself; and the force of my Motives from the relation they have to First Principles; and then I am sure to discourse and speak solidly. The same I expect from them: Whence I ask them, whether they assent to this Proposition, [A Trinity is Existent] that is, judge it really and indeed True, or not? If not, I argue not against them at present, but leave them to be confuted by the natural Sentiments, and punshed by the abhorrence of all that profess themselves Christians, even their own party; of whom I have so good an Opinion that they will heartily abominate that man who shall make any difficulty to profess and maintain that there is indeed a Trinity, or that his Faith is True. But, in case they do assent indeed to this Proposition, [A Trinity is] or judge it True, than I contend farther that they must be forced likewise to affirm it to be so in the thing in itself as they predicate; that is, there is found in the same Thing or Being what corresponds to the Notion of Trinity and the Notion of Existent; which put, and that they thus judge it to pass in the Thing, I affirm that, out of the formal Opposition between Existent and not-Existent, and their Incompossibility in the same subject, which they cannot but know, it follows necessarily that they must judge it Impossible it should be not-Existent, or that that Proposition should be false at the same time they judge it true and the thing existent; nor ever afterwards, unless the thing whence it's Truth is taken be Alterable. I will endeavour to explain myself a little clearer if I can. As real existence so ultimately determines and actuates the Thing in which it is, that it excludes, while there, all possibility of real nonexistence: so Intellectual or Judged Existence expressed by the word [is] so ultimately determines and actuates the Soul as to its Judging Power, that it excludes, whiles there, all Possibility of judged nonexistence; in such sort, that (the Soul being by Nature framed a Capacity of Truth) 'tis no less Impossible it can judge a thing may be and may not be at once, than 'tis that a thing should at once be and not be in reality. Again, I affirm that, 'tis equally impossible the Motive, which (in case she acts rationally) convinces the Soul the Thing is, should consist with a Possibility of it's not Being, as 'tis that the Soul can at once judge it to be and not to be, or that the thing can both be and not be really; since this Motive was the Cause of the other judgement, and an Effect of the Thing's Being so in reality; and depends on the same Incompossibility of Being and not-Being, or on the simplicity of the Notion is; and, lastly, on a Maxim as evident as what is most; namely, that the same is the same with itself. Whence I make account whoever has sufficient Grounds to affirm a Point of Faith is, or is true, that is, is more than Likely to be True, has withal true Grounds to affirm it Impossible to be False; and that, who confesses it Possible to be False, disclaims any true Grounds of judging or professing it is, or is True; and so judges it in his heart to be but a high Probability or a good Likelihood at most, which is enough for plausible Talkers, but falls far short of making a man a true Christian.  
§ 3. And, hence, we may with horror and pity reflect upon the perniciousness of Heresy, in corrupting the Understanding, that eye whose defect fills (as our Saviour discourses it) the whole Body with darkness; by subverting fundamentally all those Principles in which the Common Light of all Knowledge consists; and perverting (as much as the Goodness of Nature established by our Creator will suffer it) that very Faculty which makes us Men in what is most Intrinsecal and Essential to it, the knowledge of the first Principles, that is, despoiling it quite of all Intellectual Perfection due to its nature: But to return to our Arguments.  
§ 4. Can any discourse be taken higher than from first Principles? Yes, in some sort there can; that is, from the First Cause or Being, or, à Patre Luminum, the Father of lights, from whom all created Natures, whence those Principles are borrowed, and the very nature of our Understanding itself, where they are found, derive their Origin. This First Being Metaphysics demonstrate to be Self Existent, that is, Infinite and Unlimited in Existence, and consequently in all perfections; amongst which, since to be a Self-determination to act according to right Reason is one, God has or rather is that too. It being then according to right Reason to do what is seen clearly to be best, all things considered; God, seeing what is absolutely Best, must therefore be Self-determined to do still what is Best. This put, looking into the notions of Good and Best, we find them to be both relative, and that what is good to none is is not good at all: Applying which to God's Perfection every way Infinite and no way farther perfectible, 'tis seen manifestly that when he is said to operate exteriorly in this world what is Best, it cannot mean what is Good or Best to Himself, or any thing which is His own Good, or Perfection, but, what is good or best to his Creatures. And hence we settle this most comfortable, most evident and most enlightening Conclusion, that God does what's best for his Creatures. And, it being evidently Best for them to be guided or governed according to the true natures which he has given them, it follows also that God governs his Creatures connaturally, or suitably to their right natures.  
§ 5 Hence it follows that, if we can once demonstrate that to Act thus or thus is most Connatural to such a Species or Nature, we can demonstrate from the Highest, First, Best and most Immutable Cause, that, however Contingency finds place in divers particulars, yet that kind, as 'tis subjected to God's guidance, is governed most agreeably to its true and right nature, which his Creative Wisdom and Goodness had at first given it.  
§ 6 Particularly, 'tis consequent that it cannot be God should command or expect from his Creatures what is opposite to the true Nature he had given them. For, since their being what they are, or their Metaphysical Verity is fixed by the Ideas in his own divine Understanding, from which in their Creation they unerringly flowed, hence, as to put them at first was to act conformably to himself or his own Wisdom, so, to violate them, is to work Disconformably and unlike to himself; which it cannot be thought God should do through Inclination or Choice, and as little be made to do it through force.  
§ 7. Again, since we can no otherwise discourse of God but by such Notions as we gather here from Creatures; which, however improper, yet all grant to be truly pronounced of him if they signify Perfection; Hence, if we can demonstratively evince that such an Action is truly agreeable to Wisdom, Goodness, Mercy, etc. and such others disagreeable, we can know Demonstratively that those are worthy to proceed from him, These Impossible to have so infinitely perfect an Author.  
§ 8. What use may be made of this 
From the nature of the First Cause, or the Deity.  Principle of Supreme Wisdom [God does what is best for his Creatures] will be seen hereafter. The use we make of it at present, is to add a new degree of establishment to our former Discourses by applying it to them. I argue then thus: Since 'tis agreeable to rational Nature, or rather since 'tis the very Nature itself, not to hold any thing but upon the tenure of Immediate Connexion, or seeing that the first Principle of all rational discourse, [The same is the same with itself] is engaged for the Truth both of the Premises and Consequence; since Assents not thus abetted are but Opinions, and, as such, deprave Humane Nature; since nothing but true Certainty can fix the Understanding in a steadness of Judgement; since 'tis connatural to Rational Nature to proceed upon Principles, which is not to be had where there is Possibility of Falsehood; since this Possibility renders Faith unmaintainable; and so, contrary to rational nature, makes Christians hold and profess what they cannot make good; since the putting Points of Faith to be Truths, yet possible to be False, puts the Soul in violent and Incompossible States, as of Indetermination and Determination, Conformity and Disconformity to the Object; nay subjects her to the judging Contradictions True, which is most repugnant to her Nature; since it subverts all the Principles of our Understanding, both Logically and Metaphysically considered, that is radically and fundamentally destroys all possible Rationality; since it destroys the Nature of Faith itself, and by consequence the stability of all the Natures in the world; since, I say, these things are so, as hath been particularly proved in my precedent Discourses, it follows that 'tis the greatest Impossibility that God, who does the best for his Creatures, can govern or manage his Darling-Creature, Mankind, on this preternatural fashion: But, 'tis Certain that the way to arrive at Faith is particularly laid by God's Providence, and so is an especial part of his Government of Mankind; 'tis known also and acknowledged that he has commanded us to profess the Truth of our Faith in due occasions; Therefore, 'tis Impossible the Means, Grounds or Rule of Faith, and, consequently, Faith itself, should be capable to be False; Seeing this last Position, joined to the other immediately foregoing, induces all the Absurdities mentioned in my former Discourse, and pins them upon the Deity as on their first Cause. So horrible and Diabolical a Tenet is this of the Possible Falsehood of Faith, that it calumniates Heaven itself; nor can any thing but an Invincible Ignorance in the Maintainers of it, excuse them from highest Blasphemy, & from making the unenvious Fountain of all Goodness like our own narrow and crooked Selves.   

Fifth Eviction.  
§ 1. LEt us hear next what the Science of Divinity both Speculative and Moral will award concerning the Point in Question.  
§ 2. The Wisdom of the Eternal Father 
From the nature of the proper Agent in instructing Mankind.  having been pleased to take our Nature upon him, and, amongst his other Offices he performed towards Mankind, that of a Master being manifestly one; we cannot doubt but that he both would and could, that is, did accomplish what belonged to that Office. Again, true Divinity assigning one main, if not the chiefest, Reason why the Second Person was made Man, to be this, that, it being requisite God should come and converse with us visibly, to cause in us Knowledge of his heavenly Doctrine, or be our Master, and Knowledge or Wisdom being appropriated to the Second Person, it was therefore most fit that Person should be Incarnate; it follows that the Office of a Master in our Saviour Christ springs peculiarly out of the nature of his Divine Personality, and not of his Humanity precisely, as does his Suffering and Dying for us, etc. Wherefore the Proper Agent of Instructing and Teaching Mankind being, as such, Infinitely Perfect, 'tis evidently consequent Christ performed the Office of a Master, or wrought the effects proper to a Teacher as such, with all imaginable Perfection.  
§ 3. It being then the proper Office or Effect of a Master or Teacher to make his Scholars know his Doctrine is True, we cannot think but that this Divine or Infinitely-perfect Master made them absolutely or perfectly know the Truth of his Doctrine.  
§ 4. And, because the end of this Teaching was not terminated in those few himself conversed with, nor in the Christians of the First Age, but was principally intended for the Body of Mankind, which was future in respect of them; it follows that this Enlightening and Instructing now spoken of, was to be equally extended to the following World of Christians: they being all Sectators or Followers of his Doctrine; that is, his Scholars, and He their Master. Unless then he had taken order that succeeding Ages also should have perfect Assurance or know his Doctrine was absolutely True, he would have set up a School and laid no means to preserve the far greater part, and in a manner the whole Body of his Scholars (or Christians) from Ignorance and Error.  
§ 5. All Christians then both the Primitive and their Successors had and will have means to Know absolutely Christian Doctrine is True. This means we call the Rule of Faith: Both the Rule of Faith then must be known to be veracious, and Faith which is built on it to be absolutely True, and by consequence to be absolutely Impossible to be False.  
§ 6. Besides Man being an Intellectual 
From the nature of the Persons instructed.  Creature, 'tis evident the true Perfection of his Nature consists in Knowing; and this, whether we consider him as a Speculater, or as an Actor. For if the thing may Possibly be False for any thing he knows, than he is most evidently Ignorant whether it be False or no; that is, whether it be True or no; which speaks Imperfection in his Nature as 'tis a Capacity of Knowledge; And, if he be to Act about it, 'tis evidently a less Perfection and worse for mankind to go to work unassuredly than assuredly; Faith then being God's Ordinance, and God doing what is best for Mankind, it follows Faith is perfectly secure to him; that is, he must know it to be such; and, consequently, 'tis not subject to the Contingency of being False.  
§ 7. But, leaving Man, the Subject of 
From Faith's being a Virtue.  Faith, and reflecting upon Faith itself in us, the first thing that offers itself to our Consideration is, that its Habit is a Virtue, and consequently Rational. Also that its Act is an Assent upon Authority; since then 'tis demonstrated formerly that there can be in reason no Assent without Certain Grounds, and that what is Certain is Impossible to be False, it follows that the Grounds of Faith, and, consequently Faith itself is not possible to be False.  
§ 8. Next, Faith is an Intellectual 
From Faith's being an Intellectu. all Virtue.  Virtue, that is, apt to perfect man's understanding as such; that is, 'tis to him a Knowledge, and so informs his mind with Truths. The Nature of Faith than forces that Points of Faith must be Truths, and, so, as is manifoldly demonstrated, Faith itself is not possible to be False.  
§ 9 Again, this Intellectual Virtue 
From Faith's being a Supernatural Virtue.  called Faith is also a Supernatural one; and, therefore, as such, proceeds from an Agent infinitely more perfect than any can be found in Nature; therefore the immediate effect aimed at by Faith, that is, the informing the Understanding, would be performed with infinite advantage as far as concerns that Supernatural Agent's or God's part; and, if it be not so tightly performed, it must spring from some Incapacity in the Subject. There being then in this Effect of informing the Understanding two Considerations, viz. Evidence, which is had either by Experience of our Senses, (of which Spiritual Natures, the chief Objects of Faith are incapable) or by intrinsecal Mediums, that is Demonstration of those Spiritual things; of which, taking the Generality of mankind, the Subject of Faith, very few are capable; And that other of Certainty, attainable both by those Intrinsecal and also extrinsical Mediums, or Authority; which Authority, by means of the Practicableness of its Nature, all are to a great degree able to understand; it follows that, here being no violence or unsuitableness to Humane Nature considered in its Generality, the supernatural Agent or Cause of Faith will effect here a greater Certainty than mere natural Impressions could produce; that is, (all extrinsical Arguments being finally resolved into Intrinsecal ones) the Best and Chief Nature in the world will be made use of, and most strongly supported to make up the greatest Authority that is possible, and so to establish this Certainty of Faith and its Principles beyond that of any Humane Sciences. But divers pieces of Humane Science, nay the least particle of true Science is acknowledged impossible to be False; Faith therefore à fortiori must be such also.  
§ 10. This Supernaturality of Faith, (by 
From the firmness Supernatural Faith ought to h●v●●bove Natural.  which word we mean Divine Faith) convinces that it ought to exceed all other Faiths according to the Notion of Faith in common; that is, it ought to partake whatever Perfection truly belongs to Faith or Belief, as such, in an especial manner; and far above what is found in Humane Faiths; in a word, it ought to have as much in it as can elevate it under the Notion of Faith, without wronging that Notion or Nature: Faith then in common, as distinguished from Science and Opinion, being an Assent upon Authority, and Firmness being evidently a Perfection in an Assent, Divine Faith ought to have a far greater degree of firmness in it than any Humane Faith whatsoever; Wherefore, since Humane Faith can rise to that Degree of Stability, that Mankind would think him mad, that is, a Renouncer of evident Reason, who can think seriously it can be an Error or possible to be False, (for example, the Belief of this present Age concerning the Existence of France or K. james) Divine Faith being Supernatural, aught to be more firmly grounded; and consequently more highly Impossible to be False.  
§ 11. Again, we find that the more 
Another Proof from the same head.  we are ascertain ' that a Convictive Authority is engaged for the Truth of any thing, the more strongly that Authority is applied to our Understanding; and consequently, more forcibly works its effects there, or subducs it to Assent; whence this Certitude is so far from being against the nature of Belief, that 'tis most manifest it strengthens and perfects it under that Notion. Divine Faith then being Supernatural, has a peculiar right to have such an Application of the Divine Authority to the understanding, as may be truly Certain or Impossible to be False; since by such an Application 'tis most evident that not less but more Belief is given to the said Authority, and the understanding becomes more humbled and subjected to it; that is, by such an Application, how scientifically evident soever it be, the Act of Faith is never the nearer being an Act of Science, but is perfecter under the very Notion of an Act of Faith; being still a steadier, heartier, and firmer Assent for the Authority's sake, which is thus strongly and closely applied, and a greater Reliance on it.  
§ 12. Moreover, Faith being to work through Charity, and to guide our actions 
From the requisiteness▪ that Christian Action should proceed from the Actors in the perfectest manner.  as we are Christians; and rational actions being so much more perfect by how much more knowingly they proceed from the Agent; unless Faith were truly Certain, that is, Impossible to be false, Christian action would fall short of the Perfection found in most ordinary Humane Actions of an inferior and (in comparison) trifling concern; and a Christian would go to work with less assuredness and steadiness than a Carpenter and Cobbler; and this, not out of the Impediments of Original Sin, (which is Contingent and extrinsical to Faith or Religion) but merely out of a defect of Certainty in the Intrinsecals of Faith itself and its Grounds; which beyond all evasion, affixes the Imperfection upon Christianity itself.  
§ 13. I may add, that Arts and Sciences, 
That otherwise Christian Religion would be more defective in point of Principles than any other Art or Science.  even the most slight and inconsiderable ones, and which are most liable to Contingency in their Effects or the Actions springing from them, have yet all of them Certainty in their Principles. Religion then being the Art of carrying or guiding Souls to Bliss, and the Points of Faith its Principles, in virtue of which 'tis to perform this Effect; and the Ground of Faith the main and supreme Principle, whose Firmness is to establish the rest, and, so, render them efficacious: unless Faith itself and its Grounds were truly Certain, the Principles of all Religion would be exceedingly more defective and inefficacious than those of any petty Mechanical Trade, and indeed no Principles.   

Sixth Eviction.  
§ 1. THe foregoing Considerations are more enforced by this, that 
From Faith's being the Knowledge of our last End, and of the way to it.  Faith is the Light which discovers to us our Last End and the Way to it; that is, which is to guide us in that to which all our other Concerns are subservient, and all our Actions directed. Unless therefore this Knowledge or Light of Faith be steady and firm, all our whole Life, as Christians, would be feeble, tottering and uneven: as wanting Certainty of the First Practical Principles which are to ground our Christian Behaviour; nay, Certainty of the End we should aim at, without which the whole Course of our Life must needs be staggering and inconstant, and itself but a blind groping in the dark.  
§ 2. Moreover, since all Mankind, 
From the Certainty the Heathens had of the Principles of their imperfect Morality.  even the Heathens themselves, had perfect Evidence and Certainty of the Practical Principles of Natural Morality, which grounded their Moral (seeming) Virtues, as is confessed; which Virtues yet, for want of the Light of Faith teaching them to know their true last End, and so perform the Acts of those Virtues for its sake, or order them to Heaven, fell short of elevating them towards it and bringing them thither: It follows that, had there not been provision made that Points of Faith, the Principles of Christian Morality, should be as Certain as were the other, things would have been perversely ordered; that is, greater care would have been taken to create those imperfect Dispositions of the Soul, which alone were not able to secure one man from the State of Eternal Misery, than for those Sublime Perfections, called Christian Virtues, which are the direct steps for man to arrive at Eternal Bliss, and the Immediate means to attain the End he was created for, the Sight of God.  
§ 3. Especially, since this Last End 
From man's last End being only attainable by Intellectual means.  and Chief Good of Mankind is not attainable by External Actions or Local Motions; but Intellectually, or by Interior Acts of the Soul; by which he is promoted forwards even to the very assecution of it; that is, by force of Knowledge or Truth exciting him to act, and guiding him in those actions: 'Tis manifest, the Points of Faith must be Truths, and so, as has been manifoldly proved above, Impissible to be false.  
§ 4. Again, Virtues spring connaturally 
From Virtue's being the connatural Effect of Truth, and Vice of Falsehood.  from Truths, and Vice from Falsehoods: If Faith then be Possibly False, the Practices springing thence are Possibly no Virtues but Vices; and, so, they, and consequently, Faith, whence they proceed, possibly would not dispose, but indispose us towards our last End; which destroys perfectly the Notion of Faith and Virtues too. Faith, therefore, would be no Faith, were it possible to be False.  
§ 5. You'll object, a Reason merely Probable or Morally-Certain is sufficient to make Us act for a Temporal Good; much more, then, for an Eternal and Infinite one; since the greater Goodness is in the Object, the less is the hazard; and consequently the more the Reasonableness to act for it. I answer, though, if all other things corresponded, the Objection would be Valid, and the reason given for it, speaking abstractedly, be really Conclusive: Yet, in our present case, there are so many things which make it Unparallel that no Shadow of Consequence can be made from the one to the other. First, for the reason lately given; Viz. because our Last End being in itself Spiritual and most Perfect, is not attainable but by Means of Best Spiritual Perfections or Virtues; and the more knowingly these proceed from Us the better they are; according to that saying, None is cordially and solidly good, who knows not why he ought to be good: whence they cannot be Best in their kind, nor, consequently, Means fit to attain that End, Unless they proceed at least, from True Knowledge; which cannot be had by a mere Probability, how high soever it be. Whereas, Material and Temporary Goods depend not on a constant course of Causes or Dispositions towards them knowable by us: but very frequently, if not equally on a Chanceable or Contingent cast of Things; whence we use to say, Fools have the best Fortune. Hence, the intending and directing part in such Actions depends on the Knowledge of some particulars; but the Attainment is carried on by Material Means: nay, very frequently, there is no knowledge at all requisite in any respect. For Example, He that, by the death of a hundred Relations in a Plague-time should alone survive and so inherit their Estates, would be really rich, whither any interior Act of his mind in the least contributed to it or not; that is, though he never desired, aimed at, or even thought of it. But, if a Man in time of persecution and Martyrdom should say within himself, I cannot believe there is a God or a Next World; Yet I'll venture to die rather than deny them; in hopes that, if perhaps there be such a thing or state, he will give me a far greater reward: such a Man I dare affirm to be no nearer gaining Heaven by this Act no better principled, than if he had never had any such Act at all; in regard he wanted that First necessary disposition which St. Paul and Connaturality require; Accedentem ad Deum oportet credere quia Deus est. Heb. 11. v. 6.  
6. Again, Faith is intended for a 
From the otherwise Inability of Faith, to resist & overcome Temptations.  Spiritual Armour to rebeat all the assaults and temptations of our three Ghostly Enemies, Original Corruption in us, the Vanity of the World about us, and the Cruelty of the Devil and Wicked men over us. Hence the Advice of the Apostle, cui resistite fortes in Fide; hence his recommending to us above all things to take Scutum Fidei; hence the Contempt of all Worldly Honours, Pleasures, and Riches in God's choice Saints, and their suffering Persecution gladly for Conscience sake; hence, lastly, their embracing and even courting Torments and Death itself with such Alacrity and Constancy. But, alas, how unactive had their Charity and Zeal been: how dull their desire to forego all present Goods, even life too among the rest; if this wicked Doctrine had been in their hearts, that perhaps all was a lie, which they professed, suffered, and died for! And, how coldly and timorously would they have looked Death in the face, having perfect Certainty on one side that they were about to lose all the known Goods they possessed, for others unknown and uncertain? Well may a Natural sincerity preserve divers persons who are out of the Church morally honest and innocent: but we must not hope for any eminent Sanctity or Heroic Act of Virtue from any Professors of such a Faith, if they follow their Teachers, maintaining there are no stronger Motives for the Truth of Christianity, to comfort and establish the Souls of the Faithful. And 'tis to be feared that, though their highly-conceited Probability or Moral Certainty (as they call it) be enough to Exclude Actual Doubt, while Men are in a state of Security and all things go well with them; Yet it will scarce be able to preserve them from doubting Actually, when they are upon the point of foregoing all the Goods they at present enjoy, and are so highly concerned to be Certain of the Existence of those Future ones they hope for in lieu of them.  
§ 7. Moreover, we are perfectly Certain 
From the, otherwise,  by manifest Experience, of the Existence of Temporal Goods, viz. Honours, 
Uncertainty of the Existence of Spiritual Goods, or the Attainableness of them in the next life.  Pleasures, Riches, etc. or, that such things are in the world; whereas, unless Faith be truly Certain, that is, Impossible to be false, the Generality of Mankind cannot be perfectly assured even of the Existence of Heaven, or those Future Goods for which they are to relinquish all present ones. Wherefore, the Existence of the thing being the first and main Basis of all Humane Action, and the Ground of all the other Motives: 'tis clear there's a manifest difference between acting for Heaven and for Temporal Goods, even in this respect, whatever Parallel may be pretended in some other Considerations. Besides, all acting even for Temporal Goods were unjustifyable, unless those Goods be held Attainable; and de facto we are perfectly certain that Honours, Pleasures, Riches, etc. not only exist, but are of such a nature also as they may be attained to, due means used; since we experience multitudes of men have and do daily arrive at them. But, even, though Heaven be held to be, yet it cannot be held to be attainable, unless the Proposals of Faith be Certain; since neither have those who are to come to Faith seen nor experienced any man get Heaven, nor discoursed with any whom they know to have come thence and seen it. So that I fear, were the Objection, concerning the Sufficiency of Probable Motives to make us act for Inferior or Humane Goods, distinctly cleared, it would be found not to mean that Probability of those Humane Good's Existence or Attainableness suffices; for example, that there are Riches in common, or that they may be gotten one way or other, both which are presupposed to the Action as certainly known: but it seems to mean only this, that men ought to proceed to Action though there be but Moral Certainty or great Likelihood that those Goods are actually to be attained in this or that circumstance of Time or Place, or by such or such means, as, by sending Ships to the Indies, inventing Water-works, Husbandry, Soldiery, and the like: which assertion held within its bounds will break no squares; seeing even in the actual attainment of Heaven by me or by this particular way or means, when those means depend on material Circumstances, there is found the same room for failure and contingency, notwithstanding the Certainty of heavens Existence and Attainableness in common, secured to us perfectly by Faith. For, though Virtue practised is an Infallible Way to bring Souls to Bliss; yet no man has Certainty that any extrinsical State he puts himself into, or material means he uses, will make him truly virtuous, or finally get him the end he aims at: but must content himself with Likelihoods, or the seeming-betterness of his putting himself in that State or Circumstance, or his using this or that means; in the same manner as it happens when he acts for Temporary Goods; and, for the success, leave it humbly in the hands of Divine Providence, or miserentis Dei, acknowledging with David, that in manibus tuis Domine sortes meae, and working out his Salvation with fear and trembling.  
§ 8. Besides, to act Externally is in 
From the, otherwise, preternaturality in producing a due love of Heaven  the power of the Will; but, to act Internally, at least as is requisite for each Effect, is not so. For, however the Will may set the Understanding to consider the Motive; yet it must be the Truth of the Object's Goodness, or the clearness of the Proposal of it, which only can oblige connaturally the Understanding to conceit it as it ought, and consequently the Will to love it accordingly: in which conceiting and heartily loving not only the Intending and Commanding part of the Action is placed in our case, as it happens in our acting for material Goods; but also the Executive and Assecutive Parts of it. Not the same sleightness of Motive; therefore, or Moral Certainty, will here serve the turn; but true Certainty or Impossibility of Falsehood is required: this being the best and properest to beget a hearty, lively, steady, and all-over-powering Affection for Heaven; and such as may (as it ought) make Christians practically repute all other things as Dung in comparison of That.  
§ 9 But, the main consideration 
From the Incredibleness of the Mysteries nor superable by any Motive possible to be False.  which forces the Certainty of Faith and the Motives which are to beget it, (that is, of the Rule of Faith) above those which ground our Action of pursuing Temporary Goods, is the unconceivable Mysteriousness of the Points of Faith: Truths exalted above the ordinary Course of Nature as far as Heaven is above the Earth: Many of them looking so odd and uncouth to our course Humane Reason unrefined by Faith, that, as they seemed of old to the Greeks Foolishness, so still they are acknowledgedly most unsuitable to the grossness of Fancy, by which the Generality of the world, especially those who are yet unelevated by Christian Principles, are led; and confessedly above Reason; insomuch as it costs the best Wits of Christianity no small pains to maintain them not to be Contradictory or Impossible to be True. Putting, then, the Motives of Faith, and consequently Faith itself, Possible to be False; the only seeming Certainty (I might say, the confessed want of Certainty) of the Motives to believe would be so counterballanced by the Incredibleness and seeming Contradictoriness of the Thing or Object, or rather indeed overbalanced in the Conceit of all those who are yet to embrace Faith; that there would be no overplus of weight left to incline them to hold those Points True rather than False: much less to make them absolutely hold they are Certain Truths. And, he that should assert the contrary, I wonder how he would go about to prove it, or by what Standard he would measure whether is the greater of the two counterposed Unlikelihoods, viz. that the possibly false Motive of Faith should hap to be actually such, or that the seeming-Impossibility in the Objects should chance to be a real one. For, 'tis not enough to say here that we are in reason to expect the Divine Nature should be exceedingly exalted above its Creatures, and incomprehensible; and therefore we are not to measure his Perfections by the ordinary Rules found in Creatures, but think it reasonable he should infinitely exceed them: For, however this has weight in Points of Faith which concern the Divine Nature and its Perfections as in itself, yet here it will not serve the turn, in regard Faith teaches us many other Points seemingly repugnant to the Divine Nature itself, and most strangely debasing and vilifying it; as, that God, infinitely happy in himself, should be exposed to injurious Bufferings, Scourge, and an ignominious Death, for a Creatures sake that, in comparison of him, is a mere Nothing; and that Omniscience and Omnipotence could not invent and practise some easier and more honourable way to work the End they intended; and, lastly, that it should beseem Infinite Goodness that a Person superlatively innocent should be so severely punished, to do an undue favour to those who were enormously wicked, This consideration, then, necessitates plainly the Impossibility of Faith's being false; for else 'twould be irrational to believe it. And lastly, it shows the case of Christian Interior Acts utterly unparallel to that of Acting Exteriorly for sensible and material Goods; which one may apprehend to be attainable; and also comprehend the Way to attain them, without puzz'ling his Understanding with any unconceivable mysteriousness in the business to check his Assent.  
ere I leave this Point, I must desire the Reader to reflect well on the condition those persons are in who are yet to embrace Faith. They have no Light but their pure Natural Reason, and to this are proposed for Objects to the one side the Motives to Faith, or the Authority (in our case) that God has spoke it; on the other the strangeness of the Mysteries. Let then those persons understandings no better elevated, go about to scan the profound Mysteries of Faith, 'tis clear, and I think confessed by all, they must needs seem to them Impossible to be True; which therefore nothing but a Motive of its own nature seemingly Impossible to be false, can conquer so as to make them conceit them really True. But this Motive or this Rule of Faith is confessed by our Adversaries Possible to be false; nor (it being a fit and proportioned Object for Humane Reason) is there any thing to make it seem better than it is, or Impossible to be false; 'tis then against all reason to believe, were Faith and its Grounds Possible to be false; the Motives of Dissent being in that case evidently greater than are the Motives of Assent.  
§ 10. Again, since 'tis incomparably 
From the otherwise greater plausibility of Objections against Faith.  more easy to throw down than to build, or less difficult for the Understanding to comprehend an Objection, than 'tis to lay orderly in the Soul a severely-connected frame of Discourse forcing the Truth of a Point; particularly, when those Points are utterly unsuitable to Fancy, and even exalted above Reason; and so lie open to very plausible and easily penetrable Objections, on which disadvantage or disproportion to weak Judgements, (that is, indeed, a high excellency on the Object's side) Atheists ground their drollery against the Mysteries of our Faith: It follows, that were not the chief motives to Faith, or Rule of Faith practically self-evident, and, so, Impossible to be False; there would be, considering the rudeness and unelevatedness of the Generality of those who are to come to Christian Faith, and the unsuitableness of the Mysteries to their fancyled Understandings, greater Temptations and more plausible, (that is, to them stronger) motives laid to make them descent to those Mysteries, than to make them assent. The motives to Faith, then, must be Practically self-evident, and, so, Faith itself must be Impossible to be False.   

Seventh Eviction.  
§ 1. PErhaps the Language and Practice of Christianity, expressing most manifestly their sentiments, may give to some a more natural and penetrable satisfaction, that 'tis Impossible Faith should be false; than all the Speculative and Scientifical Proofs hitherto deduced.  
§ 2. For their Language, then, I only 
From Faith's being a Knowledge of God, & of his Will  hint to the memory of my prudential Readers, (for, to transcribe them were endless) all those Expressions so frequent in Scriptures, Fathers, Councils, and the mouths of the Faithful to these very days, viz. That Faith is the Knowledge of God, his Will, and of revealed Truths. Nor will I straighten the signification of the word Knowledge, to mean Scientifical Knowledge, ('tis neither my Tenet nor Interest;) but will leave it at large for any that are concerned, to explicate how this Knowledge is bred: provided they leave the true Nature of Knowledge, and do not abusively call that Knowledge, which in reality is (when looked into) no Knowledge. Hence I argue; Since 'tis impossible any one should know what is not to be known; and what is not, is not to be known; it follows, that the Object of Faith is, and so, (here being no contingency in the Matter) Impossible not to be; and consequently Faith, or the Belief of it, impossible to be False.  
§ 3. Nor am I afraid of those canting Distinctions without sense, that 'tis Morally a Knowledge, or that they know it to be True, morally speaking. For, if it be expended what is meant by these words [Morally a Knowledge;] it will quickly appear, that, as True Knowledge can only be an Effect of the Thing's Being: so this Counterfeit Knowledge, called Moral, falling short of the other, can only be the Product of the Thing's Likelihood to be, and so can only have for its Object the Thing's Likelihood: which, whether it be enough to specify and terminate an Act of Christian Faith, I appeal to the constant Expressions of all who are generally called and reputed Christians; and challenge my Adversaries to produce one Expression of theirs, which sounds thus dwindlingly and feebly, as if it meant only some high likelihood, or their apprehension of it as no more but such. Observe but the Life and Energy of their words in such occasions: as that of job: Scio quod Redemptor meus vivit; and that of S. Paul: Scio cui credidi, & certus sum etc. and we shall find their Understandings so perfectly possessed of the Object's Existence, & not deeming only its Likelihood; that they seem rather to want words to express their Absolute Certainty of it. Oftentimes indeed they deny Faith to be Evidence or Science, and affirm it to be Obscure: but what's this to the purpose? while all Reliance on Authority is obscure; and Certain Knowledge can be had by means of Authority, as appears in divers Instances of Humane Faith.  
§ 4. Particularly, waving the former, we will reflect on some places more expressly assertive of our Position; as, that of the Prince of the Apostles, Acts 2. 36. Certissimè sciat ergo omnis Domus Israel, etc. Where, about to bring them to Faith, he expressed it to be A most certain Knowledge, and this Attainable by the whole House of Israel, which must mean the Generality at least.  
least 5. I add, (omitting many others) two of his Fellow-Apostle Paul. The first, Col. 1. 23. Si tamen permanetis in Fide fundati, & stabiles et immobiles à spe Evangelii: Now, how any one can be founded or grounded in Faith, if Faith be Possible to be False, that is (Eviction. 2. § 14.) have no Foundation, Principles or Grounds itself; how any one can be Stable and immovable in a Persuasion, which very Persuasion and its Grounds may not only be moved but overthrown & subverted (as must inevitably follow, if it be possible to be False.) I expect to be informed by Mr. Tilletson and Mr. Stillingfleet. Do these words sound only an Exclusion of Actual Doubt, or Suspicion of it at present, which Protestant Writers make sufficient to an Act of Faith? or rather does it not mean that which of its own nature is such as can admit no Possible Cause of Doubt at any time for the future? Let them dispense a while with pursuing their affected Gaynesses in the Outsides of words, and take the pains to look into their Meanings; and then, if they can make out that Groundedness, Stability and Immobility can consist with Possibility of falsehood, I shall promise them my utmost endeavour to hold Contradictions with them; for, in that case, those would be the only Truths.  
§ 6. The second shall be that most emphatical one of the same Apostle. Licèt nos aut Angelus de coelo annuntiaverit vobis praeter id quod accepistis, Anathema sit. Though we or an Angel from heaven should preach to you otherwise than you have received, let him be Accursed. Which were a very rude and unreasonable carriage (especially for us Christians now adays) were Faith Possible to be False, and so, short of the credit due to so Incomparable Authorities: For since 'tis known that many things which have seemed, (that I may use Mr. 't's words) morally impossible to be False, have proved to be actually and indeed False, and 'tis granted that 'tis always possible to be so: but it was never heard that an Apostle of jesus Christ, or an Angel from heaven could, or at least did at any time preach False: 'tis most manifest that nothing which was Possible to be false, can with any reason sustain itself against the force of their Authority; and that Faith, which ought to do so, must be Impossible to be False.  
§ 7. From the Language and Sense of the Saints and Christians of former 
From Faith's being placed beyond contingency.  times, let us come nearer home, and see how unsuitable 'tis to the Notions and Expressions of present Christianity, to say, Faith is possible to be False. Now, the Possibility of Faith's Falsehood, is built on the Contingency of the Motives which are to ground it: for, were there no Contingency in them, but that their Causes were so laid, that 'twere impossible they should not be Conclusive, they could not possibly fail of being able to conclude; and so Faith would of its own nature be Impossible to be False. Considering, then, the Nature of Contingency, whether Speculatively in itself, or Practically in Instances wherein 'tis found, we may observe that it implies a certain kind of Proportion between the frequency of Effects on the one side, and the Seldomness on the other: which we usually express by Ten to one, a Thousand to one etc. If then Faith be Possible to be False, its Nature will bear, nay oblige us to express the probable degree of its Likelihood in such kind of Language; and that we assert it to be likely in such a proportion, but not-likely in a higher: for example, it would be perhaps wise and agreeable to the Nature of the Thing, as thus proposed, to say, v. g. 'Tis a hundred to one there is a Trinity, a Heaven or a Hell; but 'tis not a Thousand to one that there are any such things. Or, if any contend I have assigned too-small an over-proportion to Faith's Likelihood; yet at least he must grant that, in a greater, it would inevitably follow, that such language ought, in True speaking, be used, when we are to express the degree of Faith's Firmness. Wherefore, it being experientially manifest, that nothing sounds more ugly to a Christian ear, than to say, that 'tis so many to one Faith is True, but not so many more: 'tis evident that the Nature of Faith is placed beyond all Proportions of its failing to its standing, and all degrees of Contingency; that is, 'tis Impossible to be False.  
§ 6. Moreover, to say, 'Tis a thousand 
From the manner in which Christians express themselves when they profess their Faith  to one Faith is True, or there is a Trinity, is not to say, 'Tis True, or There is a Trinity; Christians, therefore, aught in due candour, then when they are to profess their Faith, express only how much over-proportion, in a Moral Estimation, its Likelihood bears to its Unlikelihood; and not to stand telling a Lie, when they are to make Profession of their Faith; saying, 'Tis True, when 'tis only to such a degree Likely to be True; that is, Lying, when they should be doing a chief duty of Religion. And, which is worst of all, as being not only most unwise and imprudent, but most diabolically wicked and impudent, to stand stiff in the Profession of that lie, though they hazard the loss of their Estates, and even Lives too, by the bargain. Yet, this imputation of such a most foolish and most damnably-dishonest Obstinacy is Unavoidably to be affixed upon Christians, if they thus profess their Faith True, in case it be Possible to be false; that is, in case it be only a thousand to one (for example) that 'tis True. If it be said, they saw not perhaps this possibility of Falsehood, and so acted virtuously in that Absolute Profession of its Truth, because of their good meaning; the Answer is ready: First, that Mr. Tillotson, Mr. Stillingfleet, and such who maintain, and, so, if they write what they think, see Faith Possible to be False, are bound not to profess Faith to be True, and to forewarn others not to make such a Lying Profession: Next, that if God have commanded us to make such a Profession, as all Christians grant he has; then, not only their Meaning, but the Act itself is good and laudable. Which, joined to these men's Principles, and their Natural Consequences laid open in our former Discourse, signifies that Dishonesty is Honesty, and a most foolish and wicked Obstinacy a high Virtue, as being commanded by God: Nay, that God is the Author of Sin, commanding them to tell a lie in Professing their Faith True. Positions most abominable, as well as contradictory; but 'tis most fit the Nature of all Goodness should go to wrack, when the Nature of Truth is once violated.  
§ 7. Again, if Contingency have place in Faith's Basis, there must be some stint of 
From this, that otherwise it were lawful to lay a wager Christian Faith is a Ly.  this Contingency, according to the moral estimation of things: be it then, for Example, a thousand to one, or what other proportion you please, for it altars not the present case: If then it be but a thousand to one Faith is True, then 'tis One to a thousand 'tis not-true, that is, it will bear a Wager that Faith is a lie; and a Christian, according to these Principles may, without injury to his Faith or its Grounds, and with a great deal of Honesty, lay a wager that his Faith is actually False. Nay, if he get any one to cope with him at excessive odds; he is bound in Reason and Prudence to undertake him, and lay a wager all Christian Faith is a Ly. Which sounding highest Impiety in the ears of all reputed Christians, of what Sect soever, that govern themselves by the Natural conceit they have of Faith; 'tis plain that the Nature of Faith is placed beyond all Contingency of failing, that is, all Possibility of Falsehood. If it be objected, such a Wager could never be tried, and so, it could never in Prudence come to be laid: I reply, my Discourse is unconcerned how able or unable man's Understanding is to decide it, and only contends that the Nature of the thing, that is, of Faith no better settled, would bear or justify it; which is unavoidably consequent.  
§ 8. Particularly, 'tis strange that 
From the Carriage of the Martyrs, if supposed Honest & Prudent.  none of the Christian Martyrs, who from time to time have died for their Faith, should when their life lay at stake, endeavour to mitigate the fury of their Persecutors with such like language. I beseech you, (Great Nero; or Dioclesian!) understand us Christians right: we deny not absolutely the possibility of your opposite Tenets being true, nor assert our own Faith so far as to say it may not possibly be False. What we profess is only this, that it seems to us so highly probable, or Morally-Certain, that we have no Actual Doubt of it at present; though we cannot absolutely say but we may come to discover it to be false hereafter, and your opposite Tenets true, and so renounce Christianity and join with you: Indeed we dare venture a thousand to one (or perhaps something more) that our Faith is true; yet for all that we shall not stick to lay one to a thousand 'tis false. These had been moderate and mollifying Expressions, and questionless might have saved the lives of very many: which why they should not have used, they being (according to our Adversaries Principles) true, and honest to profess them, and highly prudent to do it, their lives being concerned; nay, Conscientious too, (for there is none but holds it highly sinful to conceal any Truth which may save another man's life) no other reason can be given but this, that the Possibility of Faith's falsehood had never entered into their hearts; but they held God's promises of a better life full as Certain, as was their present possession of this, or present determination of losing it for Christ's Name. All their Expressions sounded the Certainty of the Truth they professed, and their most comfortable Hopes grounded upon that Certainty. Nor did any of the circumstant Faithful ever judge them too lavish of their blood, for standing so stiff upon their avowing the rigorous Truth of their Faith, and the Falsehood of its Contradictory; but always esteemed their Action no less Wise and Honest, than it was Undaunted. What kind of Profession of his Faith a Protestant, thus principled, would make, in case of imminent Martyrdom, I know not; but I should esteem myself the foolishest Knave living to tell aly to hang myself, by professing my Faith true, which I could never heartily judge it to be, whilst I held it Possible to be False; and so, at best, only Likely to be True.  
§ 9 Note here, that I have conceded very much in yielding a thousand to one of the Likelihood of Christian Faith in the Protestant Grounds without Traditions Certainty, which they deny: rather, taking in the Incredibleness of the Mysteries, it would be (in that Hypothesis) above five to one, speaking modestly, that all Faith is False. For, since 'tis Evident the Certainty of Books cannot be had at all without the Certainty of Tradition; and Protestants deny the Certainty of Tradition, and bring multitudes of exceptions against it (as may be seen in Mr. Tillotson's Answer, or rather Abuse of Sure Footing) there is some degree of Incredibleness in the right Conveyance of Christ's Doctrine hitherto: to which difficulty add the Incredibleness of the mysteries themselves, exceedingly enhancing the other; 'tis manifest there would be a high disadvantage on Faith's side. Nay, granting a pretty high Probability (which is perhaps as much, as they care for) yet, the notonely Improbability, but seeming-Impossibility of the Mysteries of Faith, if taken, not as standing under Authority, but as Objects of our Humane Reason (as in this counterballancing case they ought to be) would quite overpoise the Probable motive, and incline the Soul strongly towards Dissent, unless Interest, Custom, or some other Affection come in to the Assistance of the weaker Motive, Printing it in a bigger Letter, and diminishing the difficulty in the Object by not letting it be considered or penetrated, that is, by hindering the working of Right Reason. Now, in this case, if this Discourse holds, a Protestant may with a safe Conscience lay odds, and wager two to one at least, his Faith is all a Falsehood: A strange Impiety, but yet the natural Consequence of that impious Tenet [Faith is possible to be False] as this is the genuine Sequel of denying the right Rule of Faith.  
§ 10. The same is deduced from the very notion of a Martyr and the proper signification of that word, which is to be a witness; and this, as appears by his Circumstances, of all witnesses the most Solemn and serious, and the perfectest under that Notion that can be imagined; as engaging not only his word, but his Life and dearest Blood for what he testifies. Now all witnessing or Attestation being most evidently of what the Witnesser knows to be True, and nothing sounding more unnaturally, or being more disagreeable to the nature of that kind of Action than to have a Likelihood for its object, or to witness what he knows not, (as will appear by the constant practice of it in all other occasions) it follows that a Martyr or Witness of the Truth of Christ's Faith, must know it to be True, that is, he must know it to be more than likely to be True; and, consequently, (nothing being more Impossible than that one can know what is not) Impossible not to be True, or to be False.  
§ 11. No less unnaturally would it 
From the Blasphemousnes of the Equivalencies to this Proposition Faith is Possible to be False.  sound should we gather together, and make use of all the Equivalent Speeches to this Proposition, [Faith is Possible to be False] such as are, There is no Certain way to Heaven. No man knows there is a Heaven, a Hell, a jesus Christ, a Trinity, etc. No man sees any reason securing Faith from being a lie. The Ground of all our Hope is unstable and may be overthrown. Absolutely speaking it may be there is no such thing as that which Christians are to profess, and aught to die for. It may be Points of Faith are so many lies, and false as so many oldwives Tales. The Light of Faith may be Spiritual Darkness and Error. What we hold to come from God, the Author of all Truth, may perhaps come from the Devil, the Author of all Lies. All our Supernatural Truths may be Diabolical Falsehoods. Faith has no Principles. The Points of Faith are not Truths, but Likelihoods only. These and innumerable such others, are all Equivalent Periphrases to this Proposition [Faith is Possible to be False] as in this Treatise has been manifested; but, how horrid and blasphemous, needs no proof but thebare rehearsing of them.  
§. 12. From the Language and Practice 
From the Practice of Learnedest Christians in captivating their understandings to Faith.  of the Generality of the Faithful professing Faith, we come next to the Practice of the Wits of Christianity; not proceeding as Speculaters and Scholars (a most trifling impertinent Topick when we are speaking of Faith, yet most frequently used by our Adversaries, especially Mr. Stillingfleet, and Mr. Pool, who are obstinately bend to practise that wilful mistake) but as Christians or Faithful: and this, not only acting or speaking in Abstraction from Humane Knowledge, but as in direct Opposition to it, and (as it were) in defiance and despite of it. Now, with these intelligent Persons 'tis very solemn, after, by penetrating the Grounds of Faith, they have come to embrace Faith itself, immediately to discard & renounce all Tenets opposite to the said Faith, how Certain soever they held them formerly: Nay, to stand with a mind prepared to disassent to anypiece of Humane Learning, how Scientifical soever it looked, which they saw evidently to thwart any of those Believed Truths. Making account it was their duty captivare Intellectum in obsequium Fidei, to captivate their Understandings to the Obedience of Faith, or, to yield them totally up, by an absolute and perfect Assent to the Truth of those Mysteries; and not to heed or credit any objections or Proposals of Humane Reason to the contrary, when once the stable and immovable Grounds or Motives of Divine Belief, that is, the Rule of Faith, had subdued their Judgements to that invincible Assent; but to rest well assured that all reasons were fallacious, and all Positions False which went against those Sacred and Established Truths. This was ever their unanimous and constant Profession; particularly the Fathers are full of Expressions of that kind: An Evident Argument that, as Christians, they ever held Faith and its Grounds Impossible to be False; for, otherwise, they had been obliged, by Honesty and their love of Truth, not to have so readily rejected their formerly-conceited Truths, nor to have stopped their ears so obstinately to new Reasons against Faith; but, as long as Faith was possible to be False, they ought in due candour to have still weighed the Opposite Thesis and the Objections perpetually alleged, against the strength of Faith and its Rule, and considered which was more likely to be true; and not have still concluded so partially on Faith's side, and obstinately resolved to hear nothing against it; bearing themselves as if all must needs be True which Faith's Rule teacheth us, that is, indeed, as if Faith could not possibly be false.  
§. 13. Whence follows, that all who 
From the Duty incumbent on the maintainers of the impugned Tenet to remain Seekers all their lives.  hold Faith is possible to be false aught, in Conscience and their natural duty or love to Truth, remain Seekers all their Lives: For, however they may hope at present that what they adhere to is true, yet, since they hold 'tis possible to be false for any thing they know, they ought, the affair and its concern being so weighty, to be still examining its Grounds, and casting about to see whether this Possibility of Falsehood, which they already see, be not indeed Actually such, though as yet they see it not; or at least, whether some other Profession may not, after long consideration, appear less possible to be False, and another still less than that; that so they may go as near Truth as they can: weighing discreetly and impartially what Deism, Paganism, Turcism, and such others, wisely represented without their Poetical Fancies, and Fooleries, can say for themselves. Or, lastly, if they come to such a Scepticism in Religion (which I doubt is the true case) as to judge such a quest lost labour; because, when all's done, the sullen Dame [Truth] will never the sooner discover her face, nothing being to be found but what will still appear Possible to be False: the Practical Conclusion naturally following hence will be this, to fix there where it lights most advantageous to their temporal Interest; in the same manner as men addict themselves to this or that Trade; cry it up and maintain it stoutly to be Truth, because 'tis Creditable to the Profession, though they judge all the while it may be a falsehood; and, because they see their Faith can have no Certain or Firm Grounds, undertake to make it good that Faith itself needs have none, by the best assistances plausible Rhetoric, seemingly-probable reasons, weak or misused Testimonies and voluntary Cavils and Mistakes can lend them. And, in a word, since they are not in circumstances to settle any thing, to laugh heartily at those who go about it, and to endeavour very politicly to pull down every thing; which any Intelligent Reader will manifestly see by this establishing Treatise, compared to their performances, to have been the Effects of my Adversaries labours.  
§ 14. The Unnaturalness of this Tenet 
From the inefficaciousness it brings to Christian Preaching and Exhortation.  will perhaps be brought nearer home, and so be better penetrated even by our Opposers themselves, if we reflect how wickedly it would sound from the mouth of Preachers; if, after a Sermon, exhorting and pressing the Faithful to the Love of Heaven, or particularly, to stand steadfast in their Faith, they should in the close, to prevent in their Auditors the misunderstanding some overstraining Expressions, add an ingenuous caution, That they should not, for all that, adhere to Faith as if it could not be False, nor work for Heaven as if there were any absolute Certainty of the being of any such a Thing. Is it not manifest, this (in our case) honest-dealing Profession would enervate the force of all the Motives they had proposed and pressed? And, if so, is it not as evident, that all the efficacy of Christian Preaching springs naturally from the Impossibility that Faith should be False? For, 'tis not only the Unseasonableness of this Profession, but the Impiousness of it, which would so scandalise the Hearers; and either avert them from the Preacher, or make them cold in Virtue. 'Tis clear, then, that all the forceable Application of Christian Motives to the hearts of the Generality of the Faithful, is grounded on the Impossibility of Faith's Falsehood: and that, therefore, he who holds the opposite Tenet, and would be honest, should either leave off Preaching, for which this Tenet makes him unfit; or else use much caution while he preaches, lest, by implying the perfect Certainty of Faith, while he practices Assentation to That, he becomes Injurious to Truth, and consequently to It too, if it be True.  
§. 15. But, to conclude; it has been 
From the Churches constant Practice of Obliging to Belief.  no less the Practice of the Governors of the Church, or Ecclesia docens, to oblige the Faithful to believe what they recommended to them as the Doctrine of Christ and his Apostles, (Nay Mr. whitby, in his late Treatise [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] page 53, 54. asserts the same of the Church of England, as to their Creed or Fundamentals) Which, had Faith been held by the Governors and the Governed Possible to be False, had signified just thus much, as if the Governors should say, You shall believe it, though we know it may be false; or, You shall believe us telling you the Apostles taught it, though both we and the Authority we trusted for it may be deceived, for any thing we know: And as if the persons governed should answer, We will believe you, though we know you may be in the wrong, and the Point itself false; which is in effect the same as if they should profess they are resolved to believe them, let it prove what it will, right or wrong, True or False. So strange a Tyranny in the Imposers or Commanders, and Slavery in the Believers or Obeyers, as is impossible in either to consist with Humane Nature, had not both of them (the Obeyers at least) been verily persuaded those Commanders had such Motives to propose as should have been able to oblige Assent; without which all Command of an Interior Act of the Soul is Nonsense and Folly. Oh, but (will a witty Atheist say) Humane Policy might have made the Governors conceal the Cheat, by which means the ignorant governed were frighted into a belief of any thing! Very likely, indeed, that amongst so many millions, and of those, many Saints by our Adversaries own Confession, all should persist and be true Conspirators in so unnatural a Confederacy: or that, in so free an admission of all sorts of prudent people to any kind of knowledge, as is practised in Christendom, insomuch that there are found many thousands of the Governed equal in Parts and Learning to divers of the chief Governors, and superior to very many of them, all should so comely permit themselves and the world to be abused in a Point no less important than their very Manhood. 'Tis then above Policy and Force, and only atchievable by the Natural strength of the Motives, to oblige such Multitudes, and so qualified, to Christian Faith: and these Motives must have been Impossible to be False; none else being able to subdue the Understandings of such a great portion of Mankind to hold their Proposals true, or justify all the Church-governors in all Ages from a most unjust and most unnatural Tyranny.   

Divers Principal Objections Answered.  
TO mistake every passage voluntarily is so in fashion, and so continually pursued, as the best method to answer Discourses which proceed by the way of Principles, that, perhaps, it were not imprudent to forestall such Blinds, and prevent such misrepresenters from raising their light and airy dust, by acting ourselves, if we can, the part of an Opponent after a solider manner than we are to expect from those prevaricating Discoursers: besides, nothing more clears a Point than to manifest that such Objections which aim at the Root of it, quite lose their force while levelled against it. I recommended this foregoing Discourse, when I had finished it, to the perusal of divers of the most judicious and impartial Friends I could pick out; courting their severest candour to acquaint me with its defects. Their most pertinent and most fundamental Exceptions, I present the Reader with; which I have strengthened as well as I could, and added divers of mine own; protesting, that, did I know myself, or knew where to learn of others, more forcible and efficacious ones, I should not have declined the proposing them; nor have feared to oppose the Invincibleness of the Truth I here defend against the strongest Assaults of the most Ingenious, most rational, and most acute Discoursers.  

Objection I.  
The word Truth is both in the Postulata, and all over this Treatise taken in too Metaphysical a Rigour: in which sense it may, perhaps, be denied that Faith is True, or that the Generality of Christians do so esteem it.  
Answer. I take that word in the plain natural, and proper sense, in which all mankind takes it, for what in reality and indeed is so; which I affirm to be sufficient for my purpose, or to ground all those Arguments which I bring thence to evince the Impossibility of Faith's Falsehood. But, I fear the Objecter confounds the First operation of our understanding with the Second, that is, our simple Apprehension or Meaning of the word Truth or True with the Propositions or Judgements made concerning it. For, not only weak people judge many things True which stand under no Certain Grounds; but even solid men, when the Concern of the Point is sleight, and no circumstance awakes them into a heedfulness, and, as it were, engages their Honesty to speak rigorous Truth; oftentimes carelessly and unconcernedly admit Things for Truths which are far short of having Grounds elevating them to an Impossibility of Falsehood; and, indeed, are far from being judged Truths even by themselves while they seem to admit them for such; nay more, though they sometimes use them as Truths, when the weight is not much whether they be so or no; as when in a Rhetorical Discourse, (or even in a solid one for Illustration sake) we make use of the Story of the Phoenix, or such like; or when in ordinary conversation we relate many passages abetted by no certain Authority, but taken upon the account of rumour, perhaps invented by witty humour; the Truth of which it were in those circumstances Imprudent and Impertinent to discountenance, but to let them go with a kind of Transeat, or a valeant quantum valere possunt; Yet, in both cases, what the solid man out of unconcernedness passes, and what the vulgar man out of weakness judges as a Truth, both the one passes the other judges to be in reality and indeed so: whence both of them have the genuine simple Apprehension or meaning of the word [Truth] and the same all other men have, however the one misapplies it, the other permits it to be misapplyed in Propositions.  
Nor will any distinction of Truths morally speaking, probably Truths, etc. serve the turn; for Truth (as was said) speaks the Conformity of the Judging Power to the Thing; that is, a Real disposition of the mind: which therefore either is or is not, in the same manner as the Wall is either white or not white; not admitting for its difference probably or not-probably, any more than Being does: But, as it is impossible but the Wall if it be not white, must necessarily be not-white, or have some other disposition in it which is not-whiteness; so 'tis impossible but the mind, if not Conformable to the Thing or True, must be Un-conformable or not-True; (meaning not-True negatively, not privatively so as to signify False) and, consequently in stead of that Conformity, it must have some other Disposition in it; whatever that Disposition be.   

Objection II.  
In some places of this foregoing Treatise Objective Truth is confounded with that disposition of the understanding or Conformity of it to the Thing called Formal Truth or, Truth in us.  
Answer. The clearing this requires the making an exacter discovery into the nature of Truth. To do which we will begin our explication with noting that our understanding hath two Operations (omitting the third, Discourse as not pertinent to our present purpose) viz. Simple Apprehension and judgement. The result or Effect of the first is called a Notion; Concerning which Philosophers discourse thus: that, when I apprehend what is meant by the word Man, or have that Notion in me, Man's nature is both in the Thing, and in my Conception; for 'tis impossiole (my Conception being an imminent Act) I should conceive what is not in my Conception, or that my Act of conceiving should be intrinsically determined to be this, but by what is intrinsecal or in it. What is meant then by the word [Man] has two states: one in the thing as existent out of me; the other in the thing as existent in me: as the selfsame figure is in the Seal and the Wax. Yet, neither of these different States enters into the Notion I have of Man, but merely what is common to the Thing, under either State, which is what answers to the definition; for, both Man, taken as in himself, is a rational Creature; and also what I conceive, or mean by the word [Man] is rational Creature; though the words [rational Creature] express neither the being in my Mind nor out of it, but abstract from either. By this means my Mind concieving Man gains an Unity of form with the Thing out of it, or a Conformity to it: which Disposition wants nothing to be called Truth, but that 'tis incapable of grounding Affirmation or Negation; the bare meaning of the word [Man] neither implying [is] nor [is not] Whence Truth and Falsehood are usual said to be incompetent to the first Operation of our Understanding,  
We will make way to the Second Operation of our Understanding by another Instance of the first. Imagine then there is proposed to my Eye a Round Pillar; which it affects, and by it my Brain, and, so, my Understanding; it cannot fail to beget there a simple Apprehension, and consequently a Notion of what is directly imprinted; which is, that Thing with as many of its qualifications as were apt to be conveyed in by means of that sense, confusedly blended together; as also (by my Experience that it affects or is affecting me) of its Existence. Moreover, as Occasion, or indeed Nature guides me, I may have distinct or abstracted notions of Pillar, Roundness and Existence, nay more of Pillar and Roundness as exercising or actually having the same existence; or, which is all one, of what is meant by this Proposition, [the Pillar is round] that is, of what corresponds to those three distinct notions, put now in a frame of a Proposition, and, so immediately apt to express Truth or Falsehood; and yet not proceed to behave myself affirmingly or denyingly, or judge any thing concerning them, but merely to conceive what is meant by those words.  
Way being thus orderly made towards the Second Operation of the Understanding by disposing the separate notions in a fitting posture by the First; nature seems to require It should supervene; and, so, the Understanding sets itself to judge whether those Extreme or distant notions, exhibited by the First in the posture of Connexion, be indeed connected or no; the standard or measure of which is to be taken from the Thing. Now in self-evident Propositions and First Principles the Understanding guides itself by that imbred or nature-taught Principium Intellectûs; [The same is the same with its self] In deduced Propositions; by the same Principle fundamentally, or originally, and immediately by this, [Those notions which are the same with a Third, are the same with one another,] Butler, in our present Instance, Experience alone suffices to inform the understanding, supposing the obvious knowledge of what Pillar and Roundness are, and that a Pillar is a Thing, whereas Roundness without Pillar is none, but only an Affection or determination of a Thing; both known by plain Nature, whatever some Schoolmen speculate. For, these put, mere Experience teaches us that that thing which is called Pillar, is the same thing which is called Round, or, which is all one, that in this Proposition, [The Pillar is round] the two extreme notions are indeed, (that is, with a Conformity to the Thing) identified, or that that Proposition is True.  
But to return home to our purpose: 'Tis clear that Pillar and Roundness Existing by the same existence or in the same Thing, are found in the thing after its manner, and in my Judgement (or Soul as apt to judge) after it's, that is judgingly: But Truth hath nothing to do with either of these manners of Being (as was discoursed formerly in the parallel case of Notions) but purely and adequately consists in the Unity or Community of Form which my Judgement has with the Thing; by having which in her, the Soul gains a Conformity to it. In this Common Form considered as in the Thing, consists its Metaphysical Verity, or it's Being what it is; and this Verity, considered as apt to stamp or imprint itself on my judging Power, is called Objective Truth; as received in me, and fashioning or conforming my said Power to the Thing as in itself, and so making my Judgement True; 'tis called Formal Truth.  
This declared, I deny that I any where confound Objective Truth with Formal, or what's in the Thing, with what's in me as in me; for, that were to identify those two most vastly and most evidently different States: A Supineness too gross for any attentive Discourser to fall into I conceive then what the Objecter would allege is, that I confound those Truths spoken of with Truth to us, or quoad nos, as the Schools speak. For, though what's Truth to us must needs be Truth in itself, and in us, in regard we cannot know that to be which is not; yet what's Truth in itself, or Truth in us, is not therefore Truth to us, in regard one may upon probable, nay improbable, or even False Grounds, light upon a right judgement; in which case his mind as judging, is conformable to the thing or True: yet, still, that thing is not true to him, in regard he hath no reason able to conclude it such, or to make him see it to be true. Truth then to us, is the same with our Sight of it; that is, with Certainty or Determination of our Understanding by force of Intellectual Motives; and, this indeed I often seem to confound with Truth in the two former Acceptions; but I therefore seem to do it because I am loath to transcribe and apply so often my Postulata, and suppose my Judicious Reader bears them in mind. Which if he pleases to understand as subjoined to those Discourses, it will follow that what is so in the thing itself, or perhaps in us, if it be so severely obligatory to be thus constantly professed and held so, and consequently (by my later Postulatum) necessary to be known to be so, all my mistaken proofs will be brought to conclude it True to us, that is, Certain.  
You will say, why is it not enough for God to provide that our Acts of Faith be indeed True in us, since, so, they would perfect our Understandings by conforming them to the thing; and guide us right; but they must also be True to us, or be known to be True. I answer, for two Reasons. One, because God's Government of Mankind would by this means be preternatural, obliging him to hold, profess, and die for professing the Truth of those Points which he knows not to be such. The other Reason is, because every Act of Faith as exercised would perpetually involve an Error, in case the Motives to those Assents were not conclusive of the Truth of those Points: For, however one may light by haphazard, or through weakness on a Truth from an Inclusive Motive, yet, since 'tis impossible a rational Creature should assent but upon some Motive, good or bad; hence, every Assent practically implies ['Tis true for this reason] Wherefore, if the Reason grounding such Assents be unapt to conclude the Truth of the thing, that Judgement necessarily involves a Falsehood or Error; however it be, otherwise, conformable to the thing abstractedly considered. Truth's then being bastard, illegitimate and monstrous, both the Intellectualness and Supernaturalness of that Virtue called Faith, make it scorn to own such defective Pr●ductions.   

Objection III.  
The Meanings of Words are indeed to be taken from the Vulgar, but the Truth of Propositions is to be taken only from the Judgements of Learned Men: though then that be indeed the meaning of the word [Faith] which the Generality of Christians mean by it, yet the Truth of this Proposition [Faith is possible to be False] must be judged of by the Sentiments of the most Learned Divines; the Generality (at least the Best) of which, and Catholics amongst the rest, grant the Grounds of Faith as to our Knowledge, and consequently Faith itself, to be Possible to be False.  
Answer. That Maxim is to be understood of those Propositions which require some Speculation to infer them; in which case also even the Unlearned are not bound to Assent upon the Authority of Learned men, taken precisely as men of Skill, because generally 'tis Practically-self-evident to them, that such Speculative men differ oft times in their Sentiments, and they are unfurnished of due means to discern which is in the right: yet, if they are to act in such affairs, they are bound in Prudence to proceed upon the Judgements of that part which is generally reputed most and ablest; and then their proceedure is laudable, because they do the best secundum ultimum potentiae, or that lies in the power. Whence Learned men who have ability to judge of the Reasons those Speculaters give, behave themselves imprudently and blameably if they even proceed to outward action, merely upon their Judgements without examining the Reasons they allege, in case they have leisure and opportunity to do so. But now the Maxim holds not all for those Propositions in which 'tis either self-evident, or evident to common and uncultivated Reason that the Predicate is to be connected with the Subject: as 'tis, for example, in this, [Man is a rational Creature] or this, which is palpably consequent from the former, [Man is capable of gaining Knowledge] for in such as these the natural Sentiments of the Vulgar are full as Certain as those of Speculaters; perhaps Certainer. And with the same Evidence the Predicate [Possible to be False] must necessarily be seen to be connected with [Faith] by all those who esteem themselves obliged by God's Command to profess and die for the Truth of those Points they believe. Besides, they hold that Faith makes them know God and his Will, that their Assent of Faith is to be immovable, or adhered to all their lives; that is, such as cannot be overthrown or shown False by any Reasons brought against it; both which equivalently imply Impossibility of Falsehood.  
Again, 'tis denied that Catholic Divines, even as Speculaters, hold Faith Possible to be False; since they all, to a man, (whatever they hold besides) hold the Catholic Church Infallible; and that we ought to receive our Faith from her Living Voice and Practice: Now the Tenet of Infallibility in the Proposer necessarily draws after it the Tenet of Impossibility of Falsehood in what is proposed, that is, in Faith, But, because it may be said this is their Sentiment as Catholics, not as Schoolmen, let the Angel of the Schools speak for the Schools themselves; his Expressions are common, and so reach all. Scientia (saith he, Sum. Theol. 2â 2e q. 1â a. 50 ad 4m.) cum opinione simul esse non potest simpliciter de eodem; quia de ratione scientiae est, quòd id quod scitur ex ●stimetur Impossibile esse aliter se habere; de ratione autem opinionis est quod id quod est opinatum existimetur possibile aliter se habere: sed id quod fide ten●tur, propter fidei certitudinem, existimatur etiam Impossibile aliter se habere. And again in the same Question, ao. 4o. ad 2ᵒ. Ea quae subsunt Fidei dupliciter considerari possunt: uno modo in speciali, & sic non possunt esse simul visa & credita; alio modo in generali, scilicet sub communi ratione credibilis; et sic sunt VISA ab eo qui credit; non enim crederet nisi VIDERET ea esse credenda, vel propter EVIDENTIAM▪ signorum, vel propter aliquid hujusmodi. It were easy for me to avail myself by these Testimonies to confirm the main of my Doctrine; but, what method will permit me, and leads me to at present, is only this, to show that this Great Father of the Church, and Doctor of all Schools, declares the common Sentiment, drawn out of the conceit of Faith's Certainty, to be this, that 'tis Impossible that Points of Faith should be otherwise, or false; and that we must, ere we believe, have Evidence of the Grounds of our Belief, which amounts to the same. All then that can be objected from some of our Divines is this, that they explicate their Tenet so, as by consequence Faith is left possible to be false; but, what is this to the purpose; since 'tis one thing to hold a Tenet, and another thing to make it out. In the former they all agree, in the later (as is the Genius of Humane Understandings where our heavenly Teacher has not settled them) they disagree with one another, sometimes with themselves. Nor, can it bear any Objection, nor breed scandal, that the Ground of Faith should be more particularly and distinctly explicated now than formerly; for, since Controversy is a Skill, why should it be admired, nay, why should it not be expected that it should receive Improvement, that is, better explain its proper object the Rule of Faith, than formerly▪ since we experience a progress in all other Arts and Sciences which are frequent in use, as this has been of late days:   

Objection IU.  
A great part of the First Eviction, in case it proceed concerning Truth in us, as it ought, supposes the vulgar Skilful in Logic, and to frame their Thoughts and Assents in the same manner as Artificial Discoursers do.  
Answer. It supposes no Skill or Art in the vulgar or Generality of Christians, but only declares artificially what naturally passes in rational Souls when they Assent upon Evidence. And this it ought to do; For the Art of Logic frames not its Rules or Observations at random, but takes them from the Thing or its Object (as all other Skills do) that is, from what is found in rational Souls as rational, or apt to discourse: by observing the motions of which when it behaves itself rationally, the Logicians set down Rules how to demean our Thoughts steadily and constantly according to right Reason: So that the manner of working in Artificial discoursers in this only differs from that of Natural ones, that the one acts directly the other reflectingly. For example, a vulgar Soul when it assents interiorly a thing is, or affirms, has truly in it what a Logician calls a Proposition; and that Proposition has truly in it what corresponds to the notions of Subject, Copula, and Predicate; though he reflects not on it, as does a Logician. In the same manner when he gathers the Knowledge of some new Thing, he has truly in that discourse of his what corresponds to Major, Minor and Conclusion, nay he has practically in him what necessitates the Consequence or that Maxim [The same is the same with itself] of whose Truth, it being a Principle of our Understanding, he cannot possibly be ignorant. Though all this while he reflects not how or by virtue of what he acquires this Knowledge.  
And hence Light is afforded us to understand in common how the vulgar come to have Practical Self-Evidence of divers Truths: For, the Maxims which even scientifical men have of the Objects of several Sciences, being taken from the Things or the Objects of those Sciences; and (those Maxims being Common or General ones) from the obvious or common Knowledge of those things, which the vulgar who convers with them cannot choose but have; Again, nature imbuing them with the Knowledge of that Principle on which the force of all Consequences is Grounded, as also with the knowledge of all those we call Principia Intellectûs, or Principles of our Understanding, hence their rational nature is led directly by a natural course to see evidently and assent to divers Conclusions, without any Reflection or Speculation; which rude but unerring draught of Knowledge is called by me in Sure Footing and elsewhere Practical Self-evidence, because 'tis a natural Result of Practice or ordinary converse with those things; An Instance would at once clear this, and, if rightly chosen, be serviceable to the Readers of Sure Footing. An unlearned person that cannot read a word believes fully there was such a man as K. james; and that we may not mistake the Question, we will put him to be one that has a handsome degree of conversation in the world. We find him assent to the Affirmative heartily; But the point is how he is led into that Assent, and whether rationally? To ask him a reason why, is bootless; for this puts him to behave himself like a Reflecter on his own Thoughts, which he is not: whence we shall find him, upon such a question, at a puzzle to give the particular reason; though, as taught by Experience, he will stand stiffly to it in common that he has a reason for it, and a good one too. To help him out then, the way is to suggest the true reason to him, for than he will easily acknowledge it, finding it experimentally in himself; which done, deny the Goodness of it, and you shall find, he will, as taught by nature stand to it, and deliver himself in some rude saying or other in behalf of it. For example, tell him he believes there was a K. james because those who pretended to live then have told us so; but what if they were mistaken? His answer would in likelihood be to this purpose; what a God's name were they blind in those days, that they could not see who was King then? Which expresses naturally his conceit of their Inerrableness in such a point, in case they had eyes, which nature taught him men generally have. Insist farther; Perhaps they were not mistaken, but had a mind to cozen all England that came after them. Nature will lead him to this or some such kind of Reply; To what purpose should they all make fools of every body? Which words, though rudely expressed, yet couch in themselves the full reason given in Sure Footing, as far as 'tis built on Nature. For, first, it implies that man's nature with which he hath a fair acquaintance in common is to do a thing for a purpose, end or reason. Next, his Interrogatory way is in his rude style, equivalent to a Negative, and so it signifies there could be no reason for it; and, lastly, his standing to his former Tenet implies virtually a Conclusion from the reason given, that the thing could not be done; which involves necessarily a knowledge of that First Principle on which all force of consequence is grounded; and also of that Principle, no Effect can be without a due Cause; both perfectly supposed and held by him, though not expressed in his rude Enthymeme.  
From this discourse is collected what this Practical Self-evidence is; and, that 'tis distinguished from Experience in this, that Experience is only found of what uses to make the Minor in this virtual discourse, but Practical Self-evidence is of Conclusions deduced (as it were) from a common maxim naturally known, as the Major; and a Minor (for the most part) experientially, or else Practically known; which, joined with the Self-evident Principle in which the force of Consequence consists, make up that virtual discourse. Again, it differs from Science, in that a man of Science reflectingly sees a Medium identifying the two Extremes, and is aware of the virtue of those Causes which beget Evidence; whereas the other is rather Passive from Natural Impressions than Active by any Self-industry in these Knowledges, and rather feels the force of those Causes in his own Adhesion, than sees it. Secondly, 'Tis collected that this Practical Self-evidence is notwithstanding, True Knowledge; though, perhaps, it be the sleightest kind of it; in which 'tis differenced from Opinion built on probabilities. For, seeing such Assenters have both by Experience or by Common Conversation true Knowledge of the natures of divers things in common, which make the Minor, as also by Nature of all the Principles of our Understanding, which countervail the major, and force the Consequence; it comes to pass that this Practical Self-evidence is entirely and adequately grounded on true Knowledges both as to Premises and Consequence; and cossequently 'tis itself a True Knowledge likewise. Which consideration will help to explain my later Postulatum, and show by what means 'tis possible all Christians may know their Faith to be True, or the same the Apostles taught, by the Church's Testimony, because they know the Inerrableness and Veracity of vast and grave multitudes in open matters of Fact which are practiceable daily. And lastly, 'tis collected that what is Practically Self-evident to the Unlearned, is Demonstrable to the Learned: in regard These are capable of seeing by what virtue the causes of this Self-evidence bred that Knowledge, which the other's incultivated Reason would give no account of.   

Objection V.  
That first Principle [Every thing while it is, is necessarily what it is] seems to be often times misapplyed, particularly Evict. 2. § 11. & 13. to Truth at present; whence the Arguer would conclude that 'tis Impossible that a thing should be also at present False. Which is true, if it be meant of Objective Truth; but than it seems to miss the Question. But, the consequence holds not, in case the Discourse be of Formal Truth; that is, of Truth in us, or of Truth to us, that is, of Certainty; for none pretends that his Judgement can at the same time be Conformable and Disconformable to the thing, which speaks those inrintsecall Dispositions, called Truth and Falsehood in us; or that himself can be Cetrain or Uncertain of it at once, which expresses Truth and Falsehood to us; this being put those Motives which only he had at present in his Understanding, able to prove the Point true and false both or at once: whereas, what is pretended by the Objecter is only this, that, though upon present Motives he now judges it True and Certain, yet, afterwards, upon other Motives he may come to see it False.  
Answer. I mean in those places Truth to us, or Certainty: But, the Objection proceeds as if there were but one man in the world, or as if True, False, Certain and Uncertain could be relative to one person only. First, then, my Position is that, whoever puts a thing True to himself, yet possible to be False to another, puts no less a capacity of the thing's being at once thus True and False though in several Subjects, than as if it were in one Subject only. Next, he supposes each of those different Judgers to have possibly just Grounds for so judging, since he puts in one Motives sufficient to evince the Truth of the thing, in the other, possible ones to conclude its Falsehood. For our Question is not, to what degree weak Souls can miscarry in assenting, but what degree of strength is found in the Motives to Faith; which, the Objecter, as a Christian, that is, as a Holder that Points of Faith are Truths, must affirm to be sufficient to conclude it True; and yet, as himself contends, leaves it still Possible to be False; that is, provable by other Grounds to be so; for, else, the word False, cannot mean False to us, or in the Subject, as is pretended; that is, he must make it possible to be justly or in right reason, held by one True, by the other False. Now 'tis the Impossibility of such opposite Grounds I constantly maintain; or that the Grounds of Faith are Impossible to be False. Thirdly, hence I go farther and urge, that, if those different Motives can oblige justly one man to hold Faith True, the other to hold it False, then, putting them in the same man, it ought to oblige him to hold both sides of the Contradiction: and this enforces my proofs of this nature in my Third Eviction. I know it will be readily answe'rd, that this will not follow; because, the Motives being disparate, the more probable one would, when in the same subject, overpower the other, and so hinder the opposite Assent. But I desire it may be considered that Intellectual Motives or Reasons have their power to bind the Understanding to Assent, not from their relation to other extrinsecall Proofs corresponding or discorresponding with them, but from the Truth of the Premises on which they intrinsically depend, and the Goodness of the Consequence; and, finally, by virtue of their being built on first or self-evident Principles. If then the Motives one man has at present be sufficient of their own nature to oblige him, acting according to right reason, to judge Faith True; who ever has humane Reason ought to assent upon them: and, if Faith be still possible to be False, that is, False to us; that is, be possible to be shown False, or possible that others may have just ground to hold it so, put those Grounds also in the same man, and, since they must be convictive of humane understanding, they ought to have their formal Effect where they are; that is, convince it of Faith's Falsehood too; which however absurd, yet 'tis the genuine and necessary sequel of this Source of Absurdities, viz. That Faith and its Rule may possibly be False. How the force of this Discourse is avoidable but by alleging that no man acting according to right reason has just grounds to hold his Faith True to us, or can ever have just Grounds to hold it False to us, (which is to deny the Possibility of Faith's Falsehood to us, the Opposers own position) I profess myself utterly unable to discern. Now, he that holds these Positions is a perfect Sceptic or a Pyrrhonian as to matters of Religion; since he puts an absolute desperateness of knowing the Truth on either side, in that matter or subject.   

Objection VI.  
When 'tis said that Faith and its Rule may be False, the Arguer misunderstands it to mean that we assert it may actually and indeed be shown so, whereas 'tis only meant by those words, that 'tis Possible to be False for any thing we know; or, for any thing the Grounds of Faith as to our knowledge, evince or force to the contrary.  
Answer. I know not what Possibility to any thing means, if it be not a relation to its being actually and indeed: nor a Possibility of being False to us, but a Possibility of being actually and indeed such; that is, of being actually shown so to us. And all this must be forcibly admitted by him who puts no proper or necessary Causes in the Thing, nor consequently Conclusive Motives in men's Understandings why this Faith now professed should necessarily be the same Christ and his Apostles taught. 'Tis indeed a different thing to say, it may be so, and to say, I do not know but it may be so. But, he who maintains that Faith may possibly be False, if he be honest, knows what he maintains to be True; otherwise, certainly he were very wicked who would thus disgrace or diminish Faith, if he did not know his Position to be a Truth; whence follows that such a man must not only say, I know not but it may be False; but he must, if he will speak out what he thinks, be obliged to say, I know it may be False; however he be loath to declare Categorically and sincerely his Tenet in so odious a Point, or hazard his credit with the Generality of Christians, whose Sentiment he contradicts so expressly.   

Objection VII.  
'Tis enough that Faith be as Certain as that the Sun will rise to morrow, that America will not be drowned, as that there was a Henry the Eighth, etc. which are only Morally Certain, and enough for humane action, since they exclude Actual Doubt, or leave no suspicion of doubt behind them; which as Mr. Stilling fleet tells us, App. p. 76. is the highest actual Certainty which the mind of any reasonable man can desire. In the same manner as it is Certainty enough for me to use my house that I am morally certain it will not fall on my head, though I have no Absolute Security but it may. And this kind of Certainty seems more suitable to Mankind, being more easily penetrable by the Generality than the other rigorous and over-straining Certainty; which seems more fit and proper for the higher sort of Speculaters, than for a world of men, which comprehends capacities of all degrees and sorts, and the greatest part of them, perhaps, of little Learning.  
Answer. The Objecter must prove that all those Instances are only-Morally-Certain or Possible to be False, ere he allege them for such: That of Henry the Eighth, which does indeed oblige the understanding to belief, I affirm to be Practically Self evident and demonstrable, and so Impossible to be False. As for the rest, they are utterly unfit to parallel Faith's Certitude, being all of material things, whose very Essence is to be mutable; whereas Points of Faith, being Truths, and in matters not subject to Contingency, are essentially incapable of being otherwise than they are, that is, still Truths: So that far easier is it that all material nature should undergo all the Changes imaginable, than that any such Truth can not be itself, or the Principles on which 'tis built in us desist to be True or Conclusive. In particular, I would ask● whether it be enough for Faith to be as Certain to us Christians, as it was to those immediately before the Flood, that the whole world should not be drowned, which exceeds the case of America's possible destruction; or, as it was to those after the Flood, that the Sun should never stand still or go back; or, lastly, as it is that a house, of whose Firmness none had actual doubt, should fall? If so, than the Standing of the Sun in Ioshuah's time, and its Retrogradation in Ezekiah's, show the unparallelness of these Instances. You'll say these were both miraculous. But, this altars not the case; first, because it was never heard, nor can it be held by any sober man, that even Miracle can make such Truths, Falsehoods; or those Motives, which are of their own nature able to conclude the Truth of any such Points, Inconclusive or Invalid. Next, because, if the Motives to Faith, and so Faith itself are Possible to be false for any thing we know, 'tis Impossible to give a satisfactory Answer to a Deist, demanding how, in case they should prove indeed False, we can be assured God's Goodness to Mankind will not step in even miraculously to discover the vanity of so universal an Illusion, and the Abuse of Falsehoods so absurdly imposing upon the world, as to obtain the highest repute of Sacred and Divine Truths.  
Concerning the last Instance of the Moral Certainty of a houses standing, which hath been objected to me by learned Protestants, as sufficient to make me act as steadily and heartily as if I had a Demonstration that it would not possibly fall, besides the General Answer that Points of Faith are Truths, which renders the case unparallel; I reply, that the two houses, the one in Holborn, the other in King's Street, which of late years, & a third in Cock Lane, which of late days fell, when none had the least actual doubt or suspicion of doubt of it, else surely they would never have stayed in them, inform us sufficiently to what a changeable, tottering and ruinous condition Christian Faith would be reduced by these Principles and Parallels: No fewer than three Houses fell in the compass of a short time, and none had the least suspicion of doubt beforehand of such an Event; therefore, may an Atheist say, Down falls Christian Faith too, whose Foundation was (by this Doctrine) but Parallel for strength to the other; or, if it fall not in so long time, it has only something better luck, not better grounds than had the three Houses.  
As for the objected Unsuitableness of such a Certainty as I require, 'tis replied, that nothing is more natural for the Generality of Mankind, than to be led by Authority; nothing more penetrable by those of all sorts than the Infallibleness and Veracity of exceedingly vast and grave Authorities relating matter of Fact, as we experience in their belief that there was a Q. Elizabeth and such like; to comprehend and assent immovably to which costs them not the least over straining, as the Obiecter imagines. Which being so, I make account that God both in his power and wisdom could, & in his Goodness would render the Authority of his Church, the Ground and Pillar of Truth, as evident to all her Children, both as to its Inerrableness and Veracity as the other; nay incomparably more, it being in every regard so requisite.   

Objection VI.  
If the Motives to Faith must be Impossible to be False to us, they would necessarily conclude the Truth of Faith; wherefore they would, of themselves, oblige the Understanding to assent, and so there would need no precedent pious affection of the Will; which yet both Councils, Fathers, and Catholic Divines with one consent require. Nay, more, were not such a pious affection put, Acts of Faith would not be Free.  
Answer. If Experience teaches us that even assent to Humane Sciences, though Evident from Intrinsecal reasons, Comprehensible by our Understanding, and purely Speculative, is not to be acquired without an affection to see Truth; as is evident from the carriage of mere Sceptics, who having entertained a conceit of its hopelesness, come thence to want Love or Affection for it, and so never come to see it, how Conclusive soever the reasons be. Much more by far must some good affection be pre-requisit to assent to Divine and Supernatural Truths, which are Obscure in themselves, as depending upon Authority; Incomprehensible to our natural reason; and Practical, that is obligingly-Efficacious to break out into Christian Action or Love of Heaven above all sublunary things, as True Faith must be. The First obstacle of the three mentioned has this difficulty, that the beams of Truth, which come directly from the things themselves are generally apt to strike our Understanding more naturally, penetrate it more deeply, and to stick in it more immovably, than those which are reflected to us from the Knowledge of another, such as are Points of Faith; besides the new difficulty of seeing the Veracity of the Attester, which, how evident soever it be, yet it puts the Understanding to double pains; whereas, Evidence had from the Thing is but a single labour, and so less confounding and distracting the thought.  
The Second Obstacle, Incomprehensibleness is apt to stupify the Understanding and retard Assent; nay even to deter it from considering them as Truths; The Atheistical temper of the world (which could not subsist were Metaphysics duly advanced) sufficiently informs us how difficult it is for men to apply and fix their thoughts upon those considerabilities in things and those natures which are abstracted from matter; the reason whereof is, because it being natural that our Fancy be in act while our Understanding is so, and there being not Proper Phantasms, (the only agreeable ones to material men, who are not strong enough to guide their Judgements purely by Principles and Connexion's of Terms) which suit to such abstracted Conceptions, but Metaphorical ones only, which the Understanding must in rigour deny to be right ones, even while by necessity 'tis forced to make use of them; Hence the life of a Christian, as such, being to serve God in Spirit and Truth, and, so, the Objects and Principles of his new Life for the most part and principally Spiritual ones, it comes to pass that for this very regard alone, there will need a great love of Truth and Spiritual Goods to make the Understanding appliable to them, or even admit a consideration of them. I was told by a worthy Friend of mine that discoursing with an acute man, but a great hater of Metaphysics, and mentioning a Spirit, he in a disgust broke out into these words [Let us talk of what we know.] By which expression 'tis manifest that he mistook the Question An est, for Quid est; But what makes for my purpose is, that the unknowableness of the Essence or nature of a Spirit to us in this State, obstructed even his desire to consider whether there were any such thing or no; & consequently that there needs a contrary desire or affection to know Spiritual things, to make us willing even to entertain a thought of their being, much more to conceit it. But incomparably more needful is such an Affection, when to the Spirituality of those points there shall be added an Incomprehensibleness, nay, if only those points be considered, an Incredibleness; when no Parallel can be found in Nature, nor scarce any similitude weakly to shadow out the thing and its possibility; nay, when some of those points directly thwart the course of natural Causes, whence all our other Knowledges have their Stability. Then, I say, if ever there is requisite an Affection for the Nobleness and Excellency of those high Spiritual Objects, to make us willing to hearken to any Authority proposing them, how evident soever the Motives be for the Credibleness of that Authority.  
The third Obstacle follows, taken from the End for which Faith is essentially ordained, that is, from what it essentially is, viz. a mover of the Will to Virtue and Goodness, or a Practical Principle. Now, nothing is more evident than this Truth, that by-affections and contrary inclinations are apt to hinder the understanding from assenting, or even attending candidly and calmly to these Reasons, (how clear soever they be) which make against any beloved Interest; whence, there needs a contrary affection to these other, to remove the mists those passions had raised, and purge the Eye of the Mind, that so it may become capable of discerning what it could not before, though in itself most visible. How much more, (not only requisite but even) necessary must some pious affection be to permit the mind freely to embrace the doctrine of Christian Faith, containing Principles which enjoin a disregard and posthabition of all that is sweet to Flesh and Blood, nay even of Livelihood and Life itself.  
'Tis most manifest than that a Ploughs Affection pre-requisit to Faith, derogates nothing from its Certainty, but is perfectly consistent with the Evidence of those Motives which are to generate it; and that the Governors and Officers of the Church, though proposing the most convincing reasons in the world for the Authority conveying down Faith to us, can prevail nothing, unless the Great Governor of the world and Giver of every good gift, by his peculiar Power, plant antecedently in their hearts this good disposition, and prepare terram bonam, that their endeavours may take effect, and the Sowers Seed take root; no more than Paul, though miraculous, could convert all that saw his Miracles or heard his Preaching, but only such whose hearts God opened as he did Lydia's. It appears also by the same discourse how the Acts of Faith are free, that is, as depending on this pious disposition of the Will, which sets the Understanding on work to consider the Motives, and so produce them. The whole Humane Action is free, because the Will order it; though she do not produce it all, or though freedom be not formally in the Body: so the Act of Faith is free, because it is ordered by the Will which is free; though no freedom be found in the Understanding, which is incapable of such a qualification, but pure necessity of assenting when the Motives are seen to be Conclusive.  
No need then is there upon any account of a pious disposition of the Will to piece out the defect of the Reasons why we believe, and to oblige the Understanding to assent beyond the Motive; that is, assent, to a degree, beyond what it had reason to do. An Impossibility in Humane Nature rightly and connaturally governed, and (I much fear) no small disgrace to Christian Faith; considering the obstinate bent of the Church's Adversaries to confound the Speculative Thoughts of Divines, explaining Faith and its Grounds less carefully, with their Sentiments issuing naturally from them as Christians, nay with the Doctrine of the Catholic Church itself. What can revincingly be replied to an Atheist, objecting on this occasion that Christians make the Evidence of Faith's grounds stand need to be pecced out by Obscurity; our Knowledge of them by Ignorance, and the Rationality of them by Will without Reason, that is, Wilfulness. Wherefore I earnestly obtest and beseech, even per viscera Christi, all who shall read this Treatise, and yet have Speculatively held and maintained this Opinion I here impugn, (for practically, and as Christians, they hold the contrary Conclusion) seriously to weigh the Point once more, and not to obstruct the Resolving Christian Faith into immovable Principles, or absolutely Certain Grounds, by an Opinion only sprung from the conceited difficulty in making out those Grounds to be Impossible to be False; which yet themselves to a man profess and hold, as they are Christians. I humbly beg leave to propose to them these few Considerations: First, 'Tis Certain Faith is no less Faith, or an Assent upon Authority, though that Authority be demonstrated to be Infallible: but on the contrary, that 'tis both firmer and more rational even for that very regard. Secondly, 'Tis Certain that the Generality of Christians hold their Faith to be True, or Impossible to be False, (that is, 'tis True to us) and withal perfectly Rational, and consequently that its Grounds or Principles are so able to ascertain it that they place it beyond Possibility of Falsehood. Thirdly, 'Tis no less evident that, an inclination or motion of the Will, being of such a nature that it can have neither Truth nor Falsehood in it, can be no Rational Principle or Ground of our Assents or Acts of Faith; that is, apt to ascertain them, or indeed apt to establish the Truth of any Tenet. Fourthly, That 'tis most evident from my foregoing Discourse, that an antecedent pious disposition of the Will is still requisite to Faith, notwithstanding the perfect Conclusiveness of the Grounds on which 'tis built; and, that all Acts of Faith depend on this quoad exercitium at least, (as the Schools speak) which in the Judgement of many Divines is sufficient. Fifthly, That 'tis the common Opinion of the solidest Divines, that Faith consists with Evidence in the Attester. Sixthly, That Faith or a firm and immovable Assent upon Authority, is not thoroughly rational, and by consequence partly faulty, if the Motives be not alone able to convince an Understanding rightly disposed, without the Will's Assistance; for, what can be said for that degree of Assent which is beyond the Motive or Reason? Is it not evident from the very Terms that 'tis Irrational or without any Reason? But, the worst is, that, whereas all good Christians hold their Faith Impossible to be False, or judge their Acts of Faith immovable Assents, these Authors as Speculaters put all the Reasons for Faith to leave it still Possible to be False, and make this pious Affection the only thing which elevates it to Impossibility of Falsehood, which is vastly higher in point of Certainty; as if a rational Creature, not deviating totally from its nature, but acting according to right Reason, ought therefore to hold a Point Impossible to be False, because itself has an Affection, or (as we say) a great mind it should be so. Seventhly, This Assertion renders the Impossibility of Faith's Falsehood, not only unmaintainable, (as hath been now shown) but also unperswadable to others; for, how shall I be able to give account to others that my Affection which works this Persuasion in me is rational, and not apt to misled me, when as the very Position obliges me to profess the contrary, and to grant that this Affection bushes forward my Understanding to assent beyond the reason it has, that is, as to this degree in my Assent, (which is no small one since it raises it from judging Faith possible to be false, to judge it Impossible to be such) without reason? Or, will not this Speculative Tenet seem to force this Inference, that the Grounds of Faith, as to its most intrinsical consideration, viz. the Impossibility of its Falsehood, is made by this Doctrine full as dark a hole as 'tis to allege the private Spirit? Nor can the Reverence due to the Divine Authority suffice for such an Effect; both, because 'tis Impossible God should will that Mankind for his sake should act irrationally; as also, because there is no poison in the world so pestilent as an Error abetted by the most Sacred Patronage of God's Authority, as the Histories of the fanatics in all ages, and our homebred experience testifies. Whence, that very Reverence to the Divine Authority obliges us to be so sure 'tis engaged for a Truth ere we admit it for such, that we may securely though with an humble truth say with Richardus de Sancto Victore, Domine, si error est quod credimus, à te decepti sumus; so that there is indeed no greater injury and abuse to the Divine Name imaginable, than to hazard the making it patronise Falsehoods: against this deceit our Saviour hath forearmed us, by his forewarning us with a Nolite credere, when any one pretends, Lo here is Christ, or there is Christ.  
Lastly, 'tis visible to any indifferent understanding, that those Divines who defend this influence of the pious Affection upon the settling of Faith's Certainty, though in other Points very rational and acute, yet when they come to this, they are at an utter loss, and can make nothing cohere. Philippus de Sancta Trinitate contradicts himself twice or thrice in one leaf while he attempts to defend it. But, I instance in one for all, that is, Father Vincentius Baronius, a Doctor of Tholouse, and of the Holy Order of S. Dominick; a Person of as much Eminency, Gravity and Learning as any of late days. This Great Writer in his Manuductio ad Moralem Theologiam, p. 130, 131. falls upon Caramuel in these words, Distinguit Caramuel duplicem honestatis Certitudinem seu veritatem; formalem unam vocat, alteram objectivam; istam negat cuilibet opinioni probabili, ill am concedit, etc.— Sed hoc nobis ignorantiae prodiglum est aut temeritatis, dari veritatem aut falsitatem, certitudinemque cui nulla Objectiva correspondeat; Hoc ne deo quidem concessum est, ut Scientiam habeat rei non scibilis, i. e. veritatem formalem rei quae objectiuâ careat. Yet the same Author, p. 271 is forced, by the defence of this ill grounded Tenet which he had espoused, into the same paralogysm which he had so gravely, severely and learnedly reprehended in another. Where putting the Objection very home, he asks, Si praevium illud ad Fidem judicium sit intra probabilitatis fines, quâ ratione poterit mens assurgere in assensum illo seu opinione firmiorem? ergo fidei Certitudo nutlat si ab illo judicio, quod prudenter probabile dixi, pendeat, nec aliunde repetatur: This done acknowledging that tota Controversia & fidei summa is contained (as indeed it is) in this argument, he addresses himself to answer it. First slightly by an example, that this precedent Judgement is to Faith as Accidental Alteration to the Substantial Form, and so being only a disposition to it may be less noble or Certain than Faith is itself; whereas, if our Assent of faith ought to be thoroughly rational, this previous Judgement being that on which this Assent is built, as to us or as to our knowledge, must at least be Firm and Immovable itself, since the Assent of Faith built on it ought to be such, and consequently beyond Probability; whence the example is most unsuitable; signifying that as Nature disposes matter by imperfect degrees towards a perfect and ultimate Effect, so infirm Principles may rationally beget a firm Assent. After this, he alleges that the Certainty of Faith is to be fetch't from God the Author of it, who infuses Light and gives most efficacious strength to believe. But the question is whether God ordinarily and abstracting from Miracle infuses Light into rational Creatures, but by means of motives or reasons; and whether it requires such strength, or rather be not an unwise Credulousness, that is a great weakness, to believe beyond what we have reason to do, and so unworthy God the giver of every good and perfect gift. Lastly, he affirms that the Certainty of Faith is to be fetch't from the pious Affection of the will, qui mentem rebus credendis indubitato & immoto assensu alligat quasi nodo indissolubili; Which, as it were by an indissoluble Knot, ties the mind to the things to be believed with an undoubted and unmoved Assent. But, the question is how this knot is indissoluble, in case the probable reason prove false, unless the Soul be wilfully blind; or why a resolvedness in the will can rationally establish a true Intellectual Certainty. What I chiefly conclude from these answers of his is, that he perpetually waves Certainty had from the Object, and so unavoidably is forced to put a formal Certainty in as, to which no Objective Certainty corresponds; which his excellent wit in another circumstance saw to be prodigiously faulty, and a Certainty (that is a perfection) not competent even to God himself. So Impossible 'tis that Errors prejudicing the Rule of Faith should not either by Opposition to First Principles be discovered to be Falsehoods, or, by self-contradictions in their maintainers, confess it themselves.   

Objection VII.  
'Tis manifest that divers weak people assent upon very Inconclusive, nay silly, or less than probable Motives; whom yet no sober man will deny have saving Faith; the true nature of Faith than requires not necessarily motives Impossible to be False, or that Faith be True to us, but may be without any such qualification.  
Answer. When we say Faith is Impossible to be False, we take the word [Faith] in its proper and primary signification; now, that being the proper signification of a word that is most usual, and that most usual which is found in the Generality of the users of it, the proper signification (that is the true nature) of Faith is that which is found in the generality of Christians; which being evidently an Assent to be adhered to all one's life, to be died in, and died for, and the Object, or Form of that Assent being Truths; and, so, itself True; 'tis most manifestly, in each of those regards, employed that it must be Impossible to be False to us, or to the Generality of Christians; that is, it must have Grounds able to show it, nay actually showing it so to them, whatever Contingency may happen in a few particulars for want of applying to them the right Rule of Faith. Besides, Faith must be a Knowledge of Divine things, a virtuous Act, and, so, rational; and a most efficacious Cause of working for Heaven: Also, its Grounds must be apt to establish the most Speculative Faithful, to convert or confound the most acute Wits denying or opposing it, etc. all which and much more is proved in the First discourse of Sure Footing by arguments as yet not attempted to be invalidated by any; however something hath been offered against those Conclusions: Which Attributes it cannot possibly justify, nor yet perform those Offices, without being True to us, or having Grounds Impossible to be False. The word [Faith] then, applied to those weak persons now spoken of, signifies not the same as when 'tis found in the Generality of Assenters; but, merely, a simple credulity of any thing told them by a person that looks seriously when he speaks it, and is conceited by the Believer to be wiser, or to have heard more than himself. Which kind of Assent, if it be seconded by favourable circumstances laid by God's Providence, especially by such means as are found in the Discipline of the Church, so as it begets a love of Heaven above all things, may suffice to save those weak and well meaning Catholics. But, how incompetent an Assent no better grounded were for the establishment or propagation of Christianity; that is, how insufficient for the Body of the Faithful or the Church; how unfit for the Ends, and unable to produce the Effects true Faith (or the Faith found in the Generality of the Faithful) ought to do, needs no declaration to manifest it; since no person of ordinary capacity can without difficulty refrain from smiling at the ridiculous levity of such kind of Assenters.   

INFERENCES From the foregoing Discourses concluding all Controversy.  
1. IT rests, then, evinced and demonstratively concluded, with as great Firmness, as First Principles made use of for Premises, and Immediate Consequences from those Principles can establish it, that, that most firm or Unchangeable Assent called Christian Faith, laying an obligation on its Professors to assert it with the greatest Seriousness, Constancy and Pledges imaginable, to be TRUE, and its Object, Points of Faith, to be TRUTHS, is not▪ possible to be False to us, that is, to be an Erroneous judgement, or a Mistake of our Understanding,  
2. 'Tis with the same Certainty concluded, that the Ground of Faith as to our Knowledge, and, so, the Rule of Faith, must be likewise Impossible to be False. For, since nothing can or ought in true Reason be stronger than the Ground it stands on, if This be not Impossible to be False, it can be no Rule of Faith; because it would weaken Faith itself, which is built on it, into a Possibility of Falsehood, inconsistent with its nature.  
3. It follows with the same Clearness, that, if the Rule of Faith, or the Immediate Means to convey the Knowledge of Christ's Doctrine to us, be any Living Authority, that Authority must be Infallible, as to that Effect. For, if Fallible, Faith which is built on it would still be Possible to be False. As, Likewise, that, if it be any Book, both the Letter of that Book must be known to be Impossible to have been corrupted, as to what concerns Faith built on it; and withal, the Sense known to be Impossible to be mistaken. For, in case either of these (all the Causes being put to preserve them such as we have said) be truly judged or found to be Possible, Faith, which is to depend on them, will still be left possible to be False.  
4. It follows immediately, that those pretended Faithful, who have not Grounds of Faith thus qualified, have no true Faith; that is, no Act of Belief, but what, notwithstanding all that they know, or can know of it, may possibly be False: nor, consequently, are they to be accounted truly Faithful, as not having true Faith (that is, in our case, an Assent built either on Infallible Living Authority, or on unmistakeable Letter and Sense of a Book, § 3.) but Opinion only.  
5. It follows with like Evidence, that, a Controvertist being one who is to assert Faith, not by looking into the Mysteries of Faith and explaining them, (this being the Office of a School-Divine) but into the Motives to it or Rule of Faith, if he goes not about to bring Proofs which he judges and is ready to maintain, nay, which are of their own nature apt to show Faith and its Rule Impossible to be False, he does not the duty he owes to Faith, nor behaves himself like a Controvertist; but he betrays Faith by his Ineffectual and Probable managery of it, making it seem a sleight Opinion or lightly grounded Credulity. Especially, if he professes that all Proofs which can be produced in this matter, are Possible to be False: For, then, 'tis a plain and open Confession all his Endeavours are to no purpose; because he is to show Faith, the Subject of his Discourse, to be what in reality it is; that is, Impossible to be false. Nay, since Faith must be thus Certain, he manifestly destroys Faith, when he should defend and establish it, by professing all its Proofs or Grounds possible to be false.  
6. It follows immediately, that unless some other Medium can be found, or way taken, in that Skill or Science called Controversy, which is able to show Faith Impossible to be false, than what is laid down in Sure-footing, which partly by our Adversaries confession of the Inability of theirs to reach Infallible Certainty, partly out of the nature of the Thing (as is seen Sure-footing, Corol. 16 and 40.) is evidently impossible; nor was it ever yet attempted by any other Means, except by looking into the nature of Tradition: It follows, I say, that as it is Certain that Faith and its Grounds are Impossible to be false, that is, false to us, or may be shown thus Impossible to be False: So 'tis by consequence Certain, likewise, that the main Doctrine there delivered will stand, whatever particular miscarriages may have happened in the managing it; which are to be judged of by the strength of my Reasons there given, and the force of my Adversaries Objections.  
7. 'Tis necessarily consequent from the foregoing Paragraphs, that, if I have discoursed right in this small Treatise of mine, and have proved that Faith, and, consequently its Grounds, must be Impossible to be False; then Mr. Tillotson's Confession p. 118. (to which M. Stillingfleet's Doctrine is consonant) that [It is Possible to be otherwise (that is, to be False) that any Book is so ancient as it pretends to be, or that it was written by him whose name it bears, or that this is the sense of such and such passages in it] is a clear Conviction that neither is the Book-Rule he maintains the True Rule of Faith, (§ 3.) nor have he and his Friends True Faith, (§ 4.) and, consequently, there being no other Rule owned (taking away Private Spirit) but Tradition, that Tradition is the onely-true-Rule of Faith, (§ 6.) and, so, the main of Sure-Footing stands yet firm; and, lastly, 'tis evinced, that his own Book which opposes it, opposes the onety-true, (because the onely-impossible-to-be-False) Ground of Faith: that is, he is convinced in that Supposition, to go about to undermine all Christian Faith: Whence the Title of his Probable-natured Book is manifested to be an improper 
* Rule of Faith.  Nickname, and the Book itself to merit no Reply.  
8. This last point is hence farther confirmed because Mr T. (and Mr. St.) can claim no admittance into a dispute whether this or the other be the True Rule of Faith, till they approve themselves to be Christians and show they hold there is such a thing as Faith, or that it can bear the having any Rule at all; since an Assent to a point seen and acknowledged Possible to to be False, can never rise to be more than an Opinion; nor can the Motive of assenting to what may possibly be False, in true speech be called The Rule of Faith; both, because there is in that case no Faith, (Infer. 1.) and, so, it cannot be a Rule to what is not; as also, because what we see Possible to be False, cannot with any propriety be called a Rule to the Understanding directing it to Truth, in regard, for any thing it sees, 'tis a crooked path and a False Light leading it into Error. What therefore they are to do, in the circumstances they have brought themselves into, is, to show that they destroy not the Truth of Faith, that is, the Nature of Faith itself, and the Nature of the Way to that Truth or the Rule of Faith, by putting them both possible to be False. I saw they did; and therefore was obliged to begin my discourse higher, and to Settle the Existence of Faith by removing the possibility of its Falsehood; that, so, it might be shown able to bear the having a Rule; which, while it was in the tottering and uncertain condition to which Mr. T. and Mr. St. had reduced it, that is, in a Possibility of being all a lie, and indeed is an Actuality of being as to us not-Truth, but at most a great Likelihood, it was utterly incapable of. Since therefore in the right method of discoursing An est ought to antecede Quid ests they have lost their right to be discoursed with about the Quid est of the Rule of Faith, or what is that Rule, till they can justify themselves not to have destroyed the very An est or Existence of Rule and Faith both, with which Mr. T. is now challenged from his own words, and Mr. St. from his abetting him and espousing his Patronage. Both Nature, therefore, and Art excuse me from replying to Mr T. and Mr. St. where the just Laws of severe and rigorous Reason exactly observed; and, so, 'tis only a voluntary Courtesy not an obligatory duty to afford them or any other Writers thus Principled any Answer at all, or to admit them to a dispute about this Point, What is the Rule of Faith.  
Lastly, hence is inferred that a Conclusive Method or short way of ending all Controversies between the Catho like Church and all her relinquishers, is settled by this Doctrine. For, if right Faith must be Impossible to be False to us, or to the Generality of Christians, that is, if the Motives to embrace Christianity, must be thus firm; then 'tis Evident that that Party whose Writers renounce the having any such Motives, in case those writers speak the sense of that Party, is not rightly Christian or truly Faithful, 
* Infer. 4  but a distinct Sect from the body of right Christians: or, it being most unjust that the discourses of private Speculaters should be pinned upon the whole party, if they write things deniable by that party; in case any such Party should think fit to disclaim such Writers as private discoursers and their Tenet of Christian Faith's not being Absolutely Certain, which they are at liberty to do, and set some other writers to maintain the opposite Thesis, it will quickly be seen whether they are able to bring Infallible Grounds of Faith, I mean any Authority conveying Christ's Faith down to us infallibly (which they must bring 
* Infer. 2.  if they will prove Faith Impossible to be False) distinct from what the Catholic Church holds to, and which themselves renounced when they forsook her Communion. But that there are, any such Grounds as these, that is Grounds Inerrably bringing down the Knowledge of Christ's Faith to us, that is a, Rule of Faith Impossible to be False to us, I could never yet discern by the carriage, writings or Discourse of any Party that dissented from the Catholic Church, to be their Tenet: If, then, it be a most Certain Truth, that Faith must be Impossible to be false, as, I hope, I have abundantly concluded; 'tis, also, most Certain, that those who deny they have such a Faith, do, by that very denial, confess they have no True Faith, nor are truly Faithful, nor of the True Catholic Church.    

Postscript.  
THus, Reader, thou seest I still endeavour candidly to put Controversy home as far as my discourse can carry it; and that I have resumed here all the scattered ends of voluminous disputes into one point. By which means the sincere Protestant, and all others out of the Church, may see at a short view what they are to do. If they look into their own breasts, as they are Professors of Christianity, they will find it writ there in Capitals, That CHRISTIAN FAITH CANNOT BE AN ILLUSION ' OR FALSEHOOD; Also, that Faith is to be held by them True, and that they ought to suffer all Persecutions and Death itself for the professing it to be such: This found, and duly reflected on, the next thing to be done is, that they press their Learned men, by whom they are led, to show them by such Grounds as their separation from the Catholic Church permits them to hold, that is, by their Grounds, that Christian Faith is Impossible to be False; If they can; (as hitherto they have told us they cannot) than their Adherents may in reason hope well of their own condition till they see those attempts evidently shown invalid. But, if they profess still they cannot; and that Faith needs no such Certainty; then, not only the natural dictamen of Christianity in their own breasts ought to make them distrust the Principles of their Party, found to be so destructive to Christian Faith, but also I shall hope there are some Proofs in this foregoing Treatise which they will judge require an Answer.  
I expect my Answerer will sow together many thin Rhetorical fig-leaves to cover the Deformity of that abominable Thesis, that Faith may be False; which to propose undisguised were too openly shameful: But, I hope thou wilt be able to discern their sense through their Rhetoric, and heedfully to mark with a steadfast Eye, that, in how acquaint and elegant phrases soever they cloak their Tenet, yet the genuine, downright and natural sense of the position they go about to defend, will still be this, [The mysteries of Christian Faith may all be so many Lies, for any thing any man living absolutely knows, and the whole Body of Christian Doctrine a Bundle of Falsehoods.  
I expect also many plausible Instances and pretended Parallels of the sufficiency of inferior degrees of Certitude for such and such particular ends. But, what thou art to consider, is, whether those Ends be Parallel or equal to that highest End and Concern of Christian Faith.  
These things I expect; but I expect not that so much as one Principle, that will be found to deserve that name, will ever be thought prudent to be produced to justify a Tenet every way so Irrational, and unprincipled; or rather destroying the Certainty, and consequently the Essence and Nature, of the Best Body of Principles that either Nature, or the Author of Nature and Grace himself ever instilled into Mankind.  
Lastly, I beseech thee to obtain for me if thou canst, that, if any think fit to reply to this Treatise, they would be persuaded to set aside all WITTY PREVARICATION and ELEGANT DROLLERY, (the two chief, and in a manner only, Sticklers in the pretended Answer to Sure-Footing) and, beginning with First Principles, to draw thence Immediate Consequences, as I have constantly endeavoured in this Discourse. By their attempting or neglecting to do this, and only by that Test, it will be seen whether my Evictions stand or fall; whereas from flashy wit so little is gained, that even what's solid suffers disgrace by such a managery. And, I here very penitently beg pardon of my Readers that I have sometimes heretofore spent my precious time and less-fruitful labour which might have been better employed, in pursuing that way of Folly. For such my more deliberate Thoughts now discover it, however the reputed profoundness, but, indeed, real shallowness of my Adversaries, made it at that season seem most convenient.  
FINIS.   

Corrections of the Press.  
PAge 6. line 5. built upon. p. 14. l. 13. the Ten et. p. 25. l. 10. Acts. as p. 33. l 5. not be, is. p. 43. l. 9 is deniable p. 89. l 25. Objects on: p. 112. l. ult. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 121. l. 2. 'tis neither Affirmation nor. l. 9 usually. p. 126. l. 26. Such Truths. p. 128. l. 9 their power. l. 18. at all. p. 130. l. 25. of the Schools. p. 134. l. 26. find. p. 139. l. 18. being to. l. 21. both at. p. 149. Objection VIII. p. 161. l. 13. parologysm. l: 21: nut at. p. 164 l. 1. Objection IX. l. 5. to have. p. 171. l. 22. onely-true.