NON VLTRA: OR, A LETTER TO A Learned CARTESIAN▪ Settling the RULE of TRUTH, AND FIRST PRINCIPLES, Upon their DEEPEST GROUNDS.  
By I. S.  
LONDON, Printed for A. Roper, at the Black-Boy, over against St. Dunstan's Church, in Fleetstreet, MDCXCVIII.   

To the Much Honoured Sir EDWARD SOUTHCOT, Knight and Baronet.  
SIR,  
'TIS so Unusual a Compliment, to make a Person of your Quality a Judge in a Philosophical Controversy, that it will be Admired at by those who do not know you▪ and, I fear, scarce Accepted by yourself. Such Studies do so seldom colour with the Profession of a Gentleman, that He must be much raised above the Common, who can merit the Esteem of being fit for such an Umpirage. To be held, not only a Lover of Learning, but a Discerner too in that Highest Sort of Knowledge, is such a Starry Embellishment to a Noble Extraction, and sets such a Deep Stamp of Honour upon it, that it gives a Double Tincture of Excellency to such Illustrious Persons, and ranks them in the First File of Heroes. In the Time of Augustus, when the Roman Learning was in its Zenith, such Famous Worthies might have been easily met with; but they are so Rare nowadays, that they seem Uncouth, and look like Monsters: And such, indeed, they are, in Scaliger's Phrase; that is, Monsters of Perfection. Great Men do generally, now, so undervalue Learning, and 'tis so despicably-Little in their Eye, as if they took a View of it at the Wrong End of the Prospective. The Noble Sir Kenelm Digby, the Honourable Mr. boil, and some few others, have rescued the Universality of their Peers from this Imputation: But, now that they have left us, such Personages are so very thin-sown, that, for any thing we see, there are but Few left, besides yourself, who give us any Prospect of keeping alive a Succession of Men, endowed with that Renowned Character.  
Yet, Ignorance and Folly are such Ignoble Blemishes, that KNOWLEDGE, in Common, does still uphold itself, with the Generality of Mankind, in a Fair Esteem: But, this Thing, called [PHILOSOPHY,] looks like such a bugbear to most of our Modern Great Ones, that the very Name and Sound of it puts them in a Marvellous Fright; whence, 'tis no wonder Men do not love, or esteem Amiable, what they fear, and look upon as Hideous. Whereas, indeed, the Study of Philosophy is no more but the Improvement of our Reason, (by which we are Men,) in Reading, and (to a fair Degree) Understanding the Book of the World; or, in Knowing those Things, with which, whether we will or no, we must Converse, and be Concerned daily. Certainly, their Palate is much out of Taste, who cannot relish a Benefit so Natural to our Soul; but think it below the Station of a Gentleman, to regard it. I could wish such Men would please to reflect upon what kind of Objects their Thoughts and Affections are employed, while they neglect This. I believe it would shame their Choice, if they duly considered what Empty Toys they pursued, and preferred before this Solid and Substantial Good. PHILOSOPHY, truly such, and rightly understood, is far from being such a Frightful Thing as their Imagination paints it; being only Plain, Natural Reason, Polished, Bettered and Elevated by Art and Reflection: So that they who check at the Knowledge of Philosophy, aught, with much better Reason, find fault with the Teaching Persons of Quality to Sing, Dance or Play on the Lute: Unless they think it very Prudent, and Expedient, to give our Voice, Feet and Fingers the best Advantages we can, to perform their Actions artificially, and exactly; but, that 'tis a very Needless Folly to perfect the Knowing Power of our Soul; and wondrous Wise, to let it still dose on sluggishly, in its Homespun Native Rudeness, and lie wholly Uncultivated. Nay, such Gentlemen would be much offended their Houses should not be clean Swept, and Garnished; yet, they are not, in the least, concerned, that Cobwebs should hang in the Windows of their Intellect, and Dusty Ignorance dim and blear the Sight of the Noble Inhabitant.  
But, where is this Philosophy all this while? Or, Is there, indeed, any such Thing in Nature? Whatever Glorious Attributes some have given it, they all Agree in this, that it is the Knowledge of Truth: If so, then, as Truth can be but One, so it should follow, that ●either can there be more than One philosophy which is the True One and, that all others are but 〈◊〉 Pretended; and, consequently, in reality, Fabulous, and Erroneous. Where, then, shall we certainly find this One, or only-True Philosophy? Multitudes of Sects did, of old, set up to drive the Trade and Profession of Philosophising: But, they all Broke, and shut up Shop, having but a very few Chance-Customers; except that Great Man, (whom St. Hierome calls, Ingenii Humani Finis,) ARISTOTLE. He, I say, alone, has got Quiet Possession of the Schools, for a long time; and, ha● now strengthened his Title, by an Immemorial Prescription: Nor did any Pretender of Note put in his Claim against him, till, in our Days, the admirably-Ingenious CARTESIUS declared himself his Competitor. Till then, Aristotle being drawn into different Senses, by his Many-minded Commentators amongst the Modern Schoolmen, those Men who were of Sharp Wits, and hated jurare in verba— were in danger to turn Sceptics; and began to think that Truth was either flown to Heaven in Astraea's Coach; or, (as some Ancients thought,) was in puteo defossa; or else, if she were aboveground, that she was sequestered in some Terrestrial Paradise; so that none could get Knowledge of her Habitation, or come at her. In this juncture, to rescue the Flower of Mankind from falling into perfect Scepticism, and to encourage them still to hope for Truth in Philosophy, there arose, very opportunely, those Great Men, Thomas Albius, Sir Kenelm Digby, and Cartesius; who were, all of them, in a manner Contemporary: All of them promised Science, which kept up those Men's drooping Spirits from Despair of Truth. The former Two of these, in many of their main Principles, declared themselves Aristotelians; as also did those who followed their Philosophy: Whereas, Cartesius ravelled all the Schemes hitherto woven by others, moulded all the World in a New Frame; and set up for his Single Self, without any Copartner. By which you see, Sir, that your Task, which seemed at first so Vast, and Endless, is reduced, and confined to this One Enquiry; viz. to determine (in your own Thoughts at least, whether you think fit to pronounce Sentence, or no) which Party, viz. these Followers of Aristotle, or of Cartesius, are True Philosophers. On which side soever the Lot falls, it follows of course, that, since they contradict one another, the Other, let them Talk and Write as long as they will, are, in reality, None.  
Still you will complain, that even This is beyond the Extent of your Narrow Province, and exceeds the Purlew of your Reading, and Thinking too. But I dare assure you, Sir, that this present Debate is of that nature, that it requires no more to Decide it, than a Fair Stock of Clear and Penetrative Natural Reason; in which your Discerning Genius (besides what Acquisition may have added to it) is well known to be Abounding, and no way Deficient. To perform this, there needs no Sedulous and Tedious Turning over all the Books writ by both Parties, or Scanning the Force of their Arguments. Providence would be wanting to Mankind, were there no other Way than this left us, to know where Truth is to be found: Nor would Man's Life be long enough for such an Endless Task. I know not what Untoward Ways Men, who love much Talk, have framed to themselves, and introduced into the World: But, certainly, the GOD of Truth, who envies not to Mankind his Best Natural Perfection, Exact Knowledge, or True Science, has furnished us with a more Compendious, and more Sure Method, if we will but follow it: Which is, to examine which Party, what Book, what Discourse has Right PRINCIPLES; and, which not. If two Mathematicians follow their Principles, and yet differ in their Conclusions, we may be sure the Pretended Principles of one of them are no Principles at all: And the same, for the same reason, holds in all other Sciences. But, how shall we know who has True, or Right Principles? Most easily, by Examining the FIRST PRINCIPLES either Side pretends to. For, if the First Principles may be Fallacious, and, consequently, None; then the Second Principles, which depend on the First, can be none neither; and, so, they will be unavoidably convinced to have no Kind of Principles at all. Nor is it possible for any Man to be Ignorant, whether the First Principles, or First Truths, which are to be the RULE of knowing all other Truths, be truly such; because These must be Self-evident, most Firmly Grounded, Unmistakable, and necessarily Assented to, by All Mankind; as is demonstrated in the Following Treatise; and, indeed, is Evident by Common Reason. Again, If either Side would pass upon us Gratuitous, or Unprov'd Supposisitions, for Principles; or decline the Way of Connexion of our Simple Apprehensions, in which all Truth formally consists; and, without which, all Discourses must be necessarily Incoherent: Lastly, If the RULE of Knowing Truth which One Party assigns, be such, that even Learned Men may be Mistaken, and Deceived, while they think they follow it; in all these Cases, I say, 'tis Incontestably Evident, that that Party are no Philosophers: nor can know any thing at all, if Nature be not Kinder to them, than their own Unprincipled Doctrine.  
You see, Sir, by this time, that a Gentleman, endowed with a far less Perfection of Understanding than your self is Master of, may, by these Tests, determine, who are True Philosophers, who not: As also, how all Controversies in Philosophy may be easily Decided; how all Occasions of Wrangling about particular Tenets, may be avoided; and, lastly, how the Fiercest Opposers, if they really seek after Truth, may be Reconciled, and Satisfied.  
'Tis the Business of this following Paper, to let you into the Certain Knowledge, what Kind of Propositions are the First Principles, and the Rule of Knowing all Truth whatever. The First Step we take into our Inmost Thoughts, we meet with and discover these Primary Truths: whose Self-Evidence is the Earliest Light that dawns to our Soul, as soon as over her Power of Knowing awakens into Action. 'Tis a Subject, tho' most Necessary, and of the highest Influence, yet neglected by Writers hitherto. Two or three have, indeed, spoken of it; but, none I know of, has handled it professedly, and at large. Tho' it be Dry, and requires Chawing ere it becomes Nutritive; yet, I dare presume, it is Solid, and not at all Windy. Even, Seeds, when first planted, are Dry; which, yet, hinders them not from yielding a Large Increase afterwards: The First Principles are the Seeds of all Truths; which, by how much their Roots are laid Deeper, so much Higher they Rear and Extend their Branches. The Present I offer you, is Small; but the Little it contains, (as far as concerns this Subject,) is wrought entirely out of Natural and Reflected Reason, without being beholding at all to the Dishonourable Task of Transcribing; as some Pieces, I could name, are. I dare undertake, that the Reasons produced here, are so firmly Grounded, that they can fear no Opposition but Drollery, the last Effort of Nonplussed Reason. You will not expect Fine Language, in a Matter that cannot bear it. Self-Evidence is so brightly Luminous, that nothing can make it more Glossy: Nor is all the Eloquence in the World able to do these First Truths any Service at all: All Attempts to burnish or varnish them, do, instead of doing this, dawb and hide them; as Painting does a Perfect Beauty. The Sum is; The whole Controversy, now agitated, is this; Whether of these two Philosophies abovesaid is built on more Evident Principles; or, has a more Self-evident, and Unmistakable RULE of Knowing; And, your Steady, and Equally-poized judgement, is requested to hold the Scales. What the Trifle I here send you, wants in Worth, is, I am sure, abundantly supplied by the sincere Respects, which are, at the same time, presented you by,  
Much Honoured SIR, Your ever Devoted, and Very Humble Servant. I. S.   

Honoured SIR,  
1. I Give you many Thanks for your kind Visit. Had you known how welcome it was, I am confident you would have accepted my kind Invitation, and have gratified my Request that you would repeat it often. But your exceeding Modesty and Civility, did, it seems, fear that might be a Trouble, which, I do heartily assure you, was esteemed by me as a high Favour. Of which I thought I could give you no better Testimony, than by letting you see that I am not willing that small Scantling of your Conversation you then allowed me, should be lost. Wherefore, I thought it not amiss to give you a Rehearsal of it, as far as my Memory reaches at such a Distance; and withal, my Sentiments of the several Particulars then touched upon; what my First Thoughts of them were then, and my Second Thoughts since: Not debarring myself the Liberty of adding some farther Reflections that occurred to me, while I was writing this Paper; because the Treating of many Things confusedly, ere any one was concluded, made the Tenor of our Conference Uneven, and Shattered▪ For, in Discoursing of Principles, a Slow Pace is the Surest; and, when Wit is too Nimble, it hazards to lame Reason and judgement, to keep pace with it.  
2. I must confess, Dear Sir, That when I heard you discourse, you did it so ingeniously in the Cartesian Way of Wit, which consists in Explicating and Doubting, and seems to exclude Proving, that I did not see how the Great Cartesius himself could have defended his Doctrine better: For, he could not have Doubted more scrupulously than you did; nor, I think, have Explicated himself more ingeniously. You guarded his Doctrine so warily, that it was scarce possible to attack it. Tho', that I may not flatter you, I cannot say you did this by the Evidence of any Proposition you Advanced, but by your Ready Exceptions against any thing that Art or Nature could oppose; at least, taking them as managed by one no better skilled than I am. Your Cause seemed to me, as if it had been secured in some Castle; made Impregnable, not by means of the Ordinary Methods of Fortification, used in Lawful War; but, (which is against the Old Laws of Arms,) by a kind of Enchantment. Your Bulwarks, Entrenchments and Redoubts lay so cunningly hid in your Way of Ideas, that they were altogether Invisible; so that the most quicksighted Engineer living could not discern them, or take any sure Aim at them: Much less such a Dull Eye as mine; who, tho' I bend my Sight as strongly and steadily as I am able, yet I cannot, for my Heart, see what kind of Things those Spiritual Ideas are. And, which leaves me in a helpless Condition as to that Particular, such very Ingenious Cartesians as Mr. Le Grand, who, having poured so long upon them, should be best acquainted with them, and therefore best qualified to inform me what they are, gives me no Account of them; unless we can think there may be such Things as are made up of Contradictions, and altogether Chimerical. As you may see in the 2d Examen of my Ideae Cartesianae Expensae, §§. 26, 27, 28, 29, 30.  
3. Now, Sir, This looks like a kind of Rosycrucianism in Philosophy, to build all your Doctrine on Ideas, and yet keep the Secret among yourselves, and conceal from us what those same Ideas are. Indeed, our Doctrine, which makes our Notions, Conceptions, or Simple Apprehensions, to be the very Things objectively in our Understanding, seems very Abstruse to those who guide themselves by Fancy, and not by Connexion of Terms; in regard it depends on the Manner of Operating proper to Spiritual Natures; which is above our Common Speculation concerning Natural Subjects, and is only reachable by those who are well versed in Metaphysics: Yet, notwithstanding, I tell you plainly (Preliminary 2d.) what these Notions are: I explicate them fully, so that none can doubt what I mean by them: Nay, more; I bring there many (at least pretended) Demonstrations, to prove they must be such; none of which Mr. Le Grand (if he do, indeed, differ from me in that Point) has thought fit to solve. This being so, you would very much oblige me, if you would help me to the sight of any Cartesian Author, who has so clearly and candidly given us his Thoughts concerning your Ideas; who has fully explained their Nature, defined them, and attempted to demonstrate they must be such. Which if it be not done, all other Sorts of Philosophers in the World have reason to complain that they are very hardly dealt with. For your Method calls into Doubt, in a manner, all the Ways of Knowing held by Mankind, till Cartesius' Time: And you would have us renounce all our former Judgements, and accept nothing for Certain, but what appears to us by your Way of IDEAS; and yet you will not give us a Clear and Distinct Knowledge, what your Ideas are, nor demonstrate them to be such as you would have us believe them to be: Without which, perhaps there are no such Things as those Ideas of yours; nor, consequently, is your Way of Philosophy, building all our Science upon such Ideas, any Way at all. But, to return to our Conference.  
4. Foreseeing I should not be able to give Satisfaction to your Acute Wit, without beginning from the very Bottom-Ground of all Truth, (to do which my own Genius also inclined me,) I alleged, That it was manifest we could neither speak True nor False, without Affirming, or Denying, (which we use to call Formal Truth;) and therefore, that Truth was no where to be found, but in such Speeches as were Affirmative, or Negative: Which kind of Speeches Logicians call Propositions. Also, That all Truth, if Affirmatively expressed, consists in the Connexion of the two main Parts of a Proposition; which Logicians call, its Terms, or Extremes; and that, for the same reason, if those Terms were Unconnected, the Proposition was False. I flattered myself, you would become Convinced thus far; the Ground I built on being Unavoidable, my Deductions thence Immediate, and the Consequence Clear and Undeniable. But you were too hard for me in your Doubting Way: For, you gave some small Stop to my Proceeding, by your Dislike of the Word [Proposition] as savouring of the Way of the Schools. This a little surprised me: For, I conceived, that since Words were only intended to signify our Meanings, there could be no Reason why the Word should dislike any, so it was declared what was meant by it; which, the Common Usage of it by Philosophers, for so many Centuries, had, I thought, sufficiently manifested, and warranted. This gave me Occasion to explain myself; and to declare, that I meant no more by the Word [Proposition,] but A Speech that Affirms, or Denies. I added, That therefore, such Speeches, if Affirmative, (and the same, mutatis mutandis, is to be said of Negative ones,) must consist of something that is Affirmed, something of which, is Affirmed, and some Word which Affirms or expresses the Affirmation. Which three Parts of a Proposition, Logicians agree to call Predicate, Subject, and Copula. These plainest. First Rudiments I was forced to begin with; not out of any Apprehension you did not know them; but, out of my Desire you would admit the Words, after such an Explanation of them; fearing, otherwise, I should want Language to discourse with you, in a Subject of this nature.  
5. What followed immediately, I do not certainly remember; but I think it was, That you excepted against that whole Artificial Way of Discoursing; and made account there was a more Compendious Method, or Shorter Cut to Science: Which, I conceive, was, by Contemplating your Ideas; by which you hoped to arrive at Truth, by the Clear and Distinct Appearance of it to your Mind. To defend our Method, I alleged, That it was the Way of Nature, tho' perfected by Art; as all our other Natural Faculties and Operations are. That all Art, if it be Solid, and not Fantastic, is nothing but a Deeper Inspection into Plain, Honest Nature, made by the Reflection of our Mind. That such Mental Speeches and Propositions, and each Part of them, (as was shown lately,) were in the Understandings of all Mankind, when they do conceive, or intent to speak any Truth, or Falshood. That all the Discourses about a Syllogism, made by True Logic, (which is nothing but Exact Reflection upon what passes in every Man's Mind, naturally,) is nothing but the Dissecting an Evident or Conclusive Discourse, made by our Natural Faculty of Reasoning, into all its Parts; the Placing those Parts best, in order to Clearness; and the Showing those Nerves and Wires, (the First Principles of our Understanding,) which are, as it were, th● Main Springs of our Reason, an● give Strength and Vigour to such a Discourse. And the same may be said of a Proposition, both as to its P●●●s, and the Connexion or Identity of its two Terms, (the Subject, and Predicate,) in which consists its Truth: A●● which, I hope, I have shown very particularly, in the Second and Third Books of my METHOD to SCIENCE. Moreover, Because I saw, your Prejudice against our Way was taken from the Insignificant jargon of some of our Schoolmen, I take leave to add, that, let others talk as superficially of those Matters as they please, and disparage the true Way of Art, by mis-managing it, and making it look Fantastic; yet I am not conscious to myself, that I have any thing in my Method, but what is entirely built on the Nature of the Thing in hand; I mean, Notions, Propositions, and Rational Discourses, found in the Minds of all Mankind: Which Way of Building on the Nature of the Subject of which we are speaking, is the only Ground that can give Solidity to any Discourse: At least, I am sure, that, if I have any Argument there, which has any other Foundation, I shall renounce it, as swerving from my Method, and my Intention: And I do candidly here declare, that I am obliged, either to bring a more Solid Proof for that Point, or I ought not to expect it should be well received by any Man of Learning. Which being so, I have that good Opinion of your Equity, that you will not therefore discard a Way which is thus willing to approve itself to be Solid, and to subsist by Arguments built on the Firm Ground of the Nature of the Thing, because some slight Understanders of it have used it triflingly. Nor would you think it reasonable, that the Cartesian Hypothesis should be quite rejected, upon no other Reason, but because you think some late Writers have not done it the Right they ought.  
6. In order to your Clear and Distinct Perception, which you therefore judged to be the Rule or Test of all Truth, because we cannot but Assent to that, as True, which we Clearly and Distinctly see to be so, I make these Preliminary Remarks. 1. That this is the main Hinge of all the Cartesian Hypothesis, which persuades them to place the Ground of Truth within their own Minds, and its Productions; and not in the Things themselves. 2. That this is the most Ingenious and Plausible Conception, which the Great Wit of Cartesius ever advanced; and therefore it most deserves Clearing: Which is, indeed, one main Reason why I strained Courtesy a little, in publishing this Paper. 3. That the Plausibility of it lies chiefly in this, That every Man must grant the Truth of that Proposition, as it lies: For, Who can deny, but that what I see to be True, is True? This being full as Evident, as that I cannot see what is not. This, then, is a plain Truth, and might deserve the Name of a Subordinate Rule; were it Certain, or proved first, that we could not possibly be Mistaken in thinking we have a Clear and Distinct Perception of a Thing, when we have it not. Mr. Le Grand confesses, this may happen when the Will is biased, or Men are Unskilful; (and how frequent is that?) And we shall give many Instances afterwards, how we are deceived in many other Occasions. 4. That this Clear and Distinct Perception, the Cartesians so much speak of, and value themselves upon, tho' the Expression be New, is no more in reality, but Perfect Evidence of an Object: For, the seeing any Object Clearly, is the seeing it Evidently; nor can we see It evidently, if that Object, or It, be Confounded with others, and not seen to be Distinct from them. Wherefore, this Phrase, of Clear and Distinct Perception is a mere Amuzement; and, being New, makes the Readers apt to conceit that it is a lately-found-out Discovery of some unheard of Thing, or some New Method, of which all former Philosophers were hitherto ignorant; whereas, 'tis the selfsame with Perfect Evidence of some Particular Object; which all the Learned Part of Mankind have ever used, before Cartesius was born; nay, have allowed, and held also, That no Man could refrain from Assenting that the Thing, or Mental Proposition, is True, when with Perfect Evidence It is seen to be so. Wherefore, this last Point will not, I hope, break Squares between the Cartesians and me; for, thus far we agree in our Meanings; however, I except against the Novelty of the Expression, which would seem to intimate something Extraordinary in the Method you pretend to have first found out, and introduced; and which, by your Carriage, you seem to appropriate to yourselves, as singularly yours. 5. These Things being so, it follows, that the First Rule of our Knowledge of all Truths whatever must be Common to all Knowing Natures in the World: It must also be the most Evident that can be, or Self-evident; so that none can disagree, dissent, or be Deceived in it, but must See and Assent to it, in despite of any Weakness of the Understanding, or any Bias or Obliquity of the Will; as we shall see hereafter our Rule is, and must be. And the Reason is, because this Rule being that, by means of which, a Creature made for Knowledge is capable of knowing any thing; it follows, that, if it lay in any Man's power to be Ignorant of this Rule, or to descent from it, or be deceived in it, it would be in his power, not merely to pervert, but utterly to destroy and unmake the Nature given him by God; and, of Cognoscitive or Capable of Knowledge, make it Cognoscitive or Incapable of Knowing any thing; which, the Natures of Things being fixed by God's Wisdom, to be what they are, 'tis as impossible for any Man to do, as it is for him to put off his own Individuality, and not be the same Person he is.  
7. These Notes premised, I come closer to examine your Rule of Truth. You say, If you Clearly and Distinctly see that a Thing is True, you do thence certainly know it to be so. I allow the Conditional Proposition; for, 'tis Impossible to see that which is not to be seen; or ●o know that to be True, which is not-True. The only Question, then, is, Whether this be a Rule of Truth; Mr. Le Grand very rationally granting, p. 92. there goes more to constitute a Rule of Truth, than to be True? In order to the Clearing of which, I ask: Was it True before you saw Clearly and Distinctly it was True? Or, Did it become True by your seeing it (as you phrase it) Clearly and Distinctly to be True? If it were True before you thus saw it to be True; then, 'tis unavoidable, there was Another Rule, or Reason, for that Truth which anteceded your Seeing it to be such; and therefore, your Clear and Distinct Perception could not be the Rule of Knowing that Truth, being Subsequent to it. And, if you say, it became True by your Seeing it Clearly and Distinctly, than it was not True before; and then, you saw that to be True, which was not True; that is, you saw it to be otherwise, than, in Effect and Reality, it was. And, consequently, that pretended Sight or Perception is so far from being A Rule of Truth, that it is a palpable Error and Mistake; and therefore, all the Judgements issuing from it must be False. Which, instead of Constituting it A Rule of Truth, would make it, indeed, A Rule of Falshood.  
8. To make this yet plainer, please to reflect, that this Clear and Distinct Perception is such an Act of your Understanding; and that all Acts have their being such, from the Object of those Acts. For, the Faculty or Power of Understanding was, of itself, Indifferent and Indetermined to All and Every Particular Act: And, since nothing that is Indetermin'd, nor any Act in Common, can Be; it follows, that the Being, and being such, of each Act, depends formally on the Object, and is such in particular, as that Object, which informs the Power, is. Wherefore, when you see a Thing to be True, that which you saw thus Clearly and Distinctly True, must have been thus True before you saw it to be so. Whence, we ask, What was that which made the Object you perceiu'd-to-be-true, to be True? Or, What was the Rule of Truth to that Object that was True, ere you saw it to be such? Must not the Object be such, ere you can know it to be such? Or Clearly and Distinctly Perceptible to be such, before you can Clearly and Distinctly Perceive it to be such? If not, than you must say, you can know what is not to be known, or Clearly and Distinctly perceive what is not Clearly and Distinctly to be perceived: Which is a perfect Contradiction.  
9 For Instance; Since Truth is no where to be found, but in such Speeches as Affirm, or Deny, that is, in Propositions; let us put some Proposition which you thus Clearly and Distinctly perceive to be True, and therefore (as was lately demonstrated) must have been True before you saw it to be so. Does it not clearly follow, that, Either that Truth must have been made Evident by Another, and that again by Another, and so in infinitum; (by which means, nothing at all could ever be seen to be True;) or else there must have been some First kind of Truths, whose Noonday Evidence imparts Evidence to others, and is itself Visible, or (if you please) Clearly and Distinctly Perceptible to all Mankind; and forces them, at first sight, to Assent to its Verity? Now, if some such First kind of Truths can be found, which, by their Absolute Self-Evidence, do, as Objects of our Understanding Power, necessarily determine the Understandings of all Mankind, to Assent; and do withal influence All our other Truths, and our Knowledge of them; then (our Act of Perception being clearly Excluded from being the Rule of Truth) these First Truths have all the Requisites that can be imagined for a Ratio cognoscendi Veritatem, or a Rule of Truth; since they self-evidently manifest to us their own Truth; and by it, give us Light to know all others. Let us pursue then the Quest of these First Truths. Our Discourse, because it concerns and antecedes all other Knowledges, and all particular Truths, must necessarily be fetched from the Deepest Grounds, and therefore▪ must needs be very Speculative. But, I know I speak to him whose Piercing Wit will easily comprehend it. Only, I beseech you, so far to bend your Bias, which you must needs have contracted by your Long and Steady Meditating on your Way of Ideas, till you reduce any Obliquity that may have prepossessed your good Judgement, to a Rectitude, or Indifferency; and then I cannot doubt, but I may do you some Service, even, perhaps, against your Will: For, Evidence, if Clear, and well penetrated, does ofttimes force Assent, whether the Will repugns, or no.  
10. The Ideas, or Essences, of each Piece of the World's Fabric were in the Mind of the Divine Architect, ere they were made. Again; Since he did not make them by the Hand of some Bungling Journeyman, who might, perhaps, deviate from his Pattern, or Model; but immediately, by his own Infinite Wisdom and Power; it cannot be doubted, but that each Part of the Creation was framed exactly according to the Archetypes of those Unchangeable Ideas; and therefore, was perfectly Established in its respective Essence, or Nature, as those Original Ideas were; that is, they were fixed to be what they are, by an Inerrable Hand; in which consists that which we call their Metaphysical Verity. Wherefore, since all Truth, Originally, Primarily and most Fundamentally consists in this Metaphysical Verity of Things, it being the Immediate Effect of the Divine Wisdom; it follows, that the First Formal Truths that can be in our Minds, (which, consequently, are the Rules, or Principles, to all others,) must be those which speak, express, or Affirm this Metaphysical Verity, or, that the Things are what they are. Which kind of Self-evident Propositions, can therefore, be no other than those we call Identical. This is most Evident, and Incontestable: For, since this Metaphysical Verity, which (next to the Divine Maker of all Things, from whom it immediately proceeded) is the Ground and Cause of all Truth, does consist in this, That Things are Fixed in their Essences, or are what they are; 'tis Impossible to speak this Truth, or make it a Formal Truth, by affirming, or Denying, (that is, by putting it into a Proposition;) but by Affirming, that they are what they are; which is most evidently an Identical Proposition.  
11. Hitherto, then, it is undiscernible, how it can, with any Show of Reason, be denied, that the Self-Evidence that so visibly shines in Identical Propositions, bids fair towards their being the First Rule of Knowing all Truths; or, which is the same, the First Principle to all other Knowledges. For, 1. There cannot be any so great Clearness, or Evidence, as is Self-Evidence; nor so Close Connexion of the Terms in any Proposition, or Speech, that expresses Truth, as is Perfect Identity, or Self-Connexion; consisting in this, That the Thing, or Mode of Thing spoken of, is what it is, or, is its self. 2. 'Tis Impossible any thing else can be so Solid, or so Firmly Established; being immediately built on the Unchangeable Metaphysical Verity itself; or rather, being It, spoken, and expressed: Which Verity (as was shown) is imprinted in the Essences of every Created Thing, by the Immediate Hand of Essential Truth. Whence it is so nearly allied to that Infinite Truth itself, that it is removed but one Degree from it. 3. By reason of this Connatural and Immediate Descent from that Brightest and most Glorious Luminary of all Knowledge, the Father of Lights, who is Candor Aeternae Lucis, and Infinitely Intelligible; it forces the Assent of all Mankind to its Verity. Insomuch, that no Disease can so pervert a Rational Being, which has the least Use of Reason, as to deny it, or doubt of it; nor suspend their Judgement concerning it: Nor can the highest Passion of the most Profligate Wretch living, hurry his Understanding into the Admittance of such a Folly. No Scepticalness can call the Truth and Certainty of it into Question. No Whimsical Speculation can inveigle any Man into a Conceit, that it can be False. No Opposition can make head against it; since, whatever can be alleged to overthrow it, must needs appear to be less Evident than It; and, therefore, Unable to shock it. No subtle Distinction can impair its Truth; or pretend it is True in One Respect, but not in Another; since it is Impossible to distinguish the Copula [is;] the Notion of Existence being so perfectly Simple, and most Formal, or Indivisible, that it can admit of no Distinction into Divers Formalities; according to One of which, it may be True; according to Another, False. Nor can it prejudice any such Proposition, to Distinguish its Subject, or Predicate; since whatever Distinction can fall here upon the Subject, must fall upon the Predicate too; both of them being the selfsame Notion. By which means, the Identicalness and Self-evidence of the Proposition will be still the same after the Distinction is given, as it was before. So that 'tis Impossible to imagine, that any thing can be proposed, which can, in any Regard, or in any Degree, vye with Identical Propositions; either in being so Solidly Grounded, or so perfectly Clear, Undeniable, Unmistakable, and placed above the reach of any possible Attack. Nor did Cartesius himself, amongst all the Evident Things he called into Doubt, in the least Question the Evidence and Truth of such Propositions, formally expressed: Nor could he have done it, without utterly Destroying, at the same time, the Certainty of all he could have said; nay, even of his own First Principle too; as will be seen hereafter. From all which Considerations, (any One of which might suffice,) I may Safely and Evidently conclude, that, in point of Evidence of its Truth, and Stability of its Grounds, nothing can be any way comparable to the Light which strikes the Eye of our Understanding, by its steady Rays emitted from these Self-evident, or Identical Propositions: Which goes very far to the Entitling These, and These only, to be the Rule of Knowing all Truths, or the First Principles to all Science, in whatever particular Subject; not excepting even Metaphysics itself.  
12. Notwithstanding all that has been so fully evinced hitherto, I have, as yet, done but half my Business; or rather, the better half is still left behind. For, a First Rule, or First Principle, requires Another Quality, peculiar to itself, to complete its Notion, besides its being thus Solidly Grounded, and thus Supremely Evident; which is, That All other Truths, or Knowledges, must be Ruled, or Principled by It: It must have an Universal Influence over all other Knowledges, and impart its Light to them. The former Qualities will, I believe, be granted to Identical Propositions, by every Attentive Considerer, who knows what belongs to Logic, or Reason reflecting on itself; and is, withal, but meanly versed in Metaphysics. This later Qualification will be denied by many, perhaps by most; nay, will be fancied, and abetted by very Few. For, every one's Genius does not lead him to speculate so deep; and there are scarce any who have proposed this highest and nicest Point, much less handled it at large; tho' divers have given the Grounds whence it must follow. The Reason of this General Dislike of Identical Propositions, is, because they have such a Dry Mien, and Contemptible Aspect; so unlikely to give us the least kind of Instruction, or Light, to know any thing but their own Insignificant Selves, that nothing seems more Ridiculous, than for any Man, who is to teach others, even to propose such Insipid Sayings as a Means, much less as a Rule, to gain the Knowledge of any Truth whatever; nor is it Discernible how we can come to know any thing, or work out▪ any new Knowledges, by making use of such Blunt Tools.  
I think I have said the worst against them, that the keenest Adversary can allege. It remains, then, to show how I can clear them of this Disgraceful Character; or make out that they have such a General Influence over all other Truths, as is pretended.  
13. I demand, then, of my Opposers, whether it be not Fundamentally necessary in all Discourses about whatever Truth, to attend still, and keep an Eye directed to the Nature of the Thing or Subject about which we are Discoursing, and to take special Care we do not deviate from it? I do not think any Scholar living, attending to his Natural Thoughts, or Common Sense, will deny this. For, if any Discourse makes the Thing be otherwise than it is, it must necessarily be False; and expose the Author of it to speak manifest Contradictions. Now, I do no more but this, while I make Self-evident or Identical Propositions to be the First Rules, or First Principles of all other Knowledges: All I do, is, to keep a heedful Eye to the Nature of the Thing, and its Metaphysical Verity. Only, because it is manifest to every Reflecter, that all our Discourses are made up of Propositions; nor can a Rule or Principle be expressed, but by such Forms of Speech; nor is the Comparative, or (as I may say) the Compositive Nature of our Soul satisfied, till it has brought the Object it would Discourse about, into some Formal Truth, (her only Perfection in this State,) which is expressed by a Proposition: Hence, we become forced to put the Nature of the Thing, or its Metaphysical Verity, into such a Frame of Speaking; so to fit it for Discourse: which 'tis Impossible to do, but that Speech, or Proposition, whether we will or no, must be an Identical one.  
14. As for their seeming so Ridiculous, and Dry, this happens because of their most perfect Simplicity, having as little Composition in them as is possible; or rather, none at all, but what is in the Form of Expression; I doubt not but your Acute Judgement is well aware, that the first Stamina, in what kind soever, are, and must be, the most Simple; and, therefore, such, that, should Nature stop her Course there, and proceed no farther, they would be the most Insipid, and Useless Things in Nature. And yet, from such Simple Beginnings, or (to use Virgil's Expression) tenues orsus, all the most Perfect Productions in Whole Nature have their Rise: Nor could any Work of hers ever arrive at Maturity, or attain to that Admirable Frame it afterwards grows up to, unless it had had at first such a Simple and Shapeless Origin. The same happens in the First Stamina of all our Succeeding Knowledges: They are so Simple, and have such an Odd, Bald and Unfledged Appearance, that we know not what to make of them, when we regard them only in themselves; or, what Use they are of in the Acquisition of Science; yet, without such Simple Beginnings, forelaid in our Knowing Power, no Distinct Knowledge at all could be had of any other Thing; as will most Clearly appear shortly.  
15. We may observe, that, generally, we are not so Sensible of Goods, as of Harms; because the Former, through the Generous Bounty of GOD's Good Providence, are of so many kinds, surrounding us on all sides, that they are Common, and Quotidian; whereas, the Later are Seldom, and (as it were) Casual: Whence, These are Remarkable, and apt to strike our Apprehensions smartly, and f●rce us to take notice of them; which Those, being Ordinary, and Customary, do not. To breed then a due Reflection, what Good those First Truth's now spoken of, laid up in our Minds, do us, we will consider what Universal Mischiefs their proper Opposites, [Contradictions,] would do to all our Knowledge; and what a Malignant Influence they would have, not only to pervert all our Actual Knowledge, but to destroy our very Power of knowing any thing. Let us suppose then, that those two Propositions, [What is, is not;] and [A Thing is not what it is,] which are the proper Contradictories to those Chief Identicals, [What is, is;] and, [A Thing is what it is;] to be, both of them, True: Would it be possible, in that Case, to speak a Word of Truth; or, to Discourse at all; but, instead of speaking consequently, to talk a hotchpotch of Incoherent Nonsense? For, we cannot Affirm any thing to be True, but by means of the Copula [is,] in whose Connecting or Identifying Sense, all Truth most Formally consists: Wherefore, if that Word, or the Notion it signifies, were Chimerical, and might be the same with [is not,] then, since there can be no Middle between them, all we affirm might be False. And, since the Subject we speak of, must either be some Thing, or some Mode of Thing; all that we speak of that Thing would go to wrack, and be False, in case the Subject of our Discourse, or Speech, were not Distinguished from all other Things or Modes; that is, if it were not itself only, but Another, all the while. Since then, the Contradictories to these two Identicals now spoken of, have such an Universal Influence, that they constantly set up Error, and destroy Truth; 'tis manifest, that Identical Propositions (their Contradictory Opposites) do, for the same reason, of their own nature, tend to abet Truth ' and destroy Error; and therefore they are deservedly entitled to be the Rule of Truth; the Influence they have over all Truth's being full as Universal, as Contradictions, their Opposites, have, to induce Error.  
16. But nothing can more victoriously confute, or more unanswerably convince an Adversary, than to show that he must be forced, for his own Interest, to admit the Truth of that Tenet which he opposes. Ask, then, a Cartesian, how he knows any Particular Truths; or (which is the same) how he knows that such Predicates, or Attributes, do belong to such a Subject? He will answer, Because he finds those Predicates in the Idea he has of such a Thing, or such a Nature. Very good, replies the other: But, how shall we know that the Idea you have of that Thing is not Chimerical, and involves in it many other Things, as well as That? Which, if it does, your Discourse, applying it to That Thing only, must needs be Incoherent, and False. Your only Answer, in this Case, can be This, That each Idea you have is Distinct from all other Ideas, and has its Metaphysical Verity and Unity peculiar to itself, or (which is the same) is its self only; which is an Identical Proposition, and speaks, or expresses the Metaphysical Verity of each Idea you have. Now, say I, hence appears evidently, that this Truth, viz. [Every Idea is itself only, or no other;] which is an Identical Proposition, is the very First Truth you can have; and, that on it depends, Fundamentally, your whole Doctrine by way of Ideas: For, if this be False, 'tis most Evident that your Ideas can give you no Distinct Knowledge of any Thing, or Mode of Thing; that is, they could enable you to know Nothing at all.  
17. You will say, perhaps, it is not Needful to put, lay or propose so expressly those Identicals, they being so very Clear, of themselves, to all Mankind. I reply, 1. That this comes over to me, as to what relates to their Clearness, and Self-Evidence, and abets my Position. 2. That, certainly, That is most needful, on which, as was now shown, all depends. You must, then, have those Identicals in your Mind, at least Understood, and Presupposed, tho' you express them not. 3. You must be forced to express them if you come to discourse rigorously, and reduce your Thesis to the First, and Self-evident Truths; without doing which, (especially, if you hap to encounter with a Sceptic,) nothing can be finally Decided, or Concluded. 4. The Point is, That 'tis most Needful to express them, nay, Unavoidable, when the Question, [Which is the First Truth that can be, which gives Light to all others,] is in Agitation; as is our Case at present: You must be forced to confess, that the Truth of these Identicals is Antecedent to all the following Knowledges you can have by your Ideas; that, thence, you can know Nothing, unless this be Presupposed, and Foreknown; and that, therefore, it influences all your Future and Dependent Knowledges, after its Fashion; and gives and secures to them all the Strength, Distinction and Evidence they have. Whence is clearly inferred, that the Self-evident Light which appears in such First Truths, aught to be made, by the Cartesians themselves, the Rule of Knowing whatever other Truths they can pretend to know by their Ideas; that is, the very First Rule of all others; that is, the Only one: For, none can be, in Proper Speech, a Rule, unless it be the First; all others being regulated by that which is the First: So that It, and only It, is the Rule; all the rest, Ruled. And, certainly, it will appear Evident to all Mankind, that what is most Self-evident, as all Identicals are, were there nothing else, should be the Rule of Knowing all other Truths which are not so Evident as They. Be pleased, Sir, to reflect upon that Proposition, by which you notify, or express to us your Rule of Knowing, viz. [That which I clearly and distinctly see to be True, is True.] Consider, how many Words are in this Proposition; and that each Word has its Proper, or Peculiar Idea, each of which Ideas must be Distinct from all other Ideas, that is, each of them must be the same with its self only, (which make so many Identical Propositions;) or else, none of those Ideas can be possibly able to do you any Service. So that, 'tis manifest, your Rule of Knowing depends on the Self-evident Light supposed to be in ours. Whence 'tis Concluded, that yours is not the First Ratio Cognoscendi, the First Rule, or First Truth; but, Ruled by ours, Grounded on ours, and Subsequent, in the Order of Knowing, to ours.  
18. I do not expect, that such high Speculations will please every Body: But, I hope, it will plead my Pardon, that I could not avoid it. In so Nice a Point, as is the Settling the First Rule of all Knowledge; or, what is the very First, Self-evident, and most Firmly-Grounded Truth; no Speculation, resolving all Dependent Truths into that which is Absolutely-Independent, (as the Rule of all Truth must be) can be too Accurate, or laid too Deep. 'Tis not, then, any Humour of mine, or a kind of Trial of Skill, which moved me to this very Abstracted, and Metaphysical Way of Discoursing▪ but, it was the very Nature of the present Subject, that forced me upon it.  
19 Nor was it any Care of overreaching your Acuteness, nor the Desire of Opposing the Rule of Knowing Truth introduced by the Great Cartesius, which put me upon this Unusual piece of Doctrine. I had, above twenty Years ago, upon some Hints given me by that Second Aristotle, the profoundly-Learned Albius, applied my Speculative Thoughts to dig very deep into this Subject, to find out the immovable Centre of all Truth; and I had begun to write a very Speculative Treatise, showing how to reduce every Truth into an Identical Proposition; and every Error, to a Contradiction; which, I saw, lay hid at the Bottom of every Truth, and Falsehood. This, I say, was an Old Design of mine, before I thought of Opposing any, or of being Opposed by any. I foresaw also, while I was writing my Method, that (it being more easy to be Witty, than to be Solid) Identical Propositions would be looked upon by very Ingenious Men, who were not thorough-speculators, as Sapless, Useless, and Insignificant. Wherefore, I did there take some Occasions, which lay in the Track of my Thoughts, while I was settling the Grounds to True Science, to clear those First Truths from such Unworthy Misapprehensions. To this End, I demonstrated there, B. 3. Lesle. 1. §. 3. That all the Force of Consequence, in which consists our Rationality, can only be built upon such Propositions. I show, B. 2. L. 2. in what their Self-evidence consists: What is the First of them, and their several Sorts and Degrees. I set myself to Demonstrate, by many Arguments, from §. 11. to the End of that Lesson, that all First Principles must be Identical Propositions; and (§. 19) that plain Reason teaches us it must be so: Which evinced, it follows, that whoever denies these to be Useful, must, with the same Breath, affirm, that all First Principles are Useless, and good for nothing; which is a strange Position. Nay, since there is an Order in Truths, and therefore all Second Principles have their Force from the First, it follows, that we can have no Use of Second Principles, if the First be Useless; and so, we must talk ramblingly, and at random, all our Lives, without any Principles at all. I manifest the same, (L. 3.) by Instances, fetched from the Mathematics, and other Sciences; and show what Use is to be made of them; which is not to make them either of the Premises in a Syllogism; but to avail ourselves of them in a higher nature. I show (B. 2. L. 2. §. 18.) that even plain, Uncultivated Nature makes the Vulgar recur to them, as their First Principles, when they would express that which is decisive of the Dispute, and Undeniable. I prove, that all Middle Terms which are Proper, are built upon the same Ground with them. I endeavour (B. 3. L. 3. §§. 16, 17, 18.) to evince clearly, that All Truths have, at the bottom, Identical Propositions, and are Reducible to them; and I attempt to show, (Lesle. 4.) the Way how to reduce Inferior Truths to those Highest ones. All which, if I have fully proved, especially, that All First Principles are Identical Propositions, which bears all along with it, and is concluded there by divers Demonstrations, on which I dare venture my whole Cause, that they are impossible to be solved; then, I may safely presume, I have evinced, that the Intelligibility and Light of Identical Propositions is most Self-evident; the Ground on which they are built, most Solid; and the Usefulness or Influence of them upon all other Truths, most Universal: And, therefore, that they are every way qualified to be the First and Only Rule of Knowing all Truth's whatever.  
20. To comprehend better the Evidence of this Discourse, let us imagine a Man devested of the Knowledge of Identical Propositions; and then let us consider whether he could know any thing at all, or what he is good for. To instance in one of them; Let us suppose him Ignorant that A Thing is what it is; or a Cartesian, that Each Idea is itself, and no other; and Common Sense will tell every one, that such a Man could know nothing, nor make any Judgement or Discourse concerning any Thing, or Idea either; since that Thing, or Idea, he would Judge, or Discourse of, is, perhaps, all the while, for aught he knows, Another. Whoever would see farther the Use of Identical Propositions brought to Practice, may please to observe how they are serviceable in many places of my three Treatises here mentioned: Not by proposing them first, and then Deducing and Arguing from them, as some may mistake; but by Reducing the Truth of my Discourses up to those Standards of all Truth; and by showing these to be engaged in the Patronage and Support of my Thesis; by which means, they smartly clinch the Force and Evidence of my Arguments, by bearing up to them, and relying on them.  
21. It was a well-aimed Reach of Speculation in Mr. Locke, [Essay concerning Humane Understanding, B. 2. Ch. 32. §. 2.] where he says, that the Metaphysical Verity of Things contains in them a Tacit Proposition: Which I would understand, not to be meant of that Verity, as it is in the Thing itself; but as it is in our Understanding, where only Propositions are, or can be. For, since this Metaphysical Verity is not a Natural Notion, imprinted directly by our Senses, it can only be known by Reflection. The Mind, then, careful to be well assured of the Subject of which it is to Judge, or Discourse, (without which Preassurance, it could do neither,) reviews it heedfully, and steadily; and then says of it, within itself; ['Tis this, and no other.] Which is an Identical Proposition, in Substance; tho', for a Reason we shall give shortly, we put it afterwards into an Expression more formally Identical. Why the Soul does this, springs hence; because, being naturally made to see Truth; and no Truth (in the First and Proper Signification of that Word) being possible to be had, without Affirming, or Denying; hence 'tis Natural, and Necessary, that, when it comes to review the Object, in order to see its Truth or Falsehood, it should put it into the Frame of an Identical Proposition; only which kind of Speeches are capable to Affirm, or Deny. And this is that I mean, when I use to say, (as I do frequently,) that the Nature of the Soul is Comparative, or Relative: For, when a Proposition is moulded in the Mind, the Predicate of it is Compared or Related to the Subject, in order to see their Agreement, or Disagreement; without which, nothing can be known to be, in proper Speech, True, or False: In which Position, Mr. Lock perfectly agrees with me. Now, setting aside extrinsical Denominations, which are not at all found in the Thing, but merely tacked to it by our Consideration; this Comparing is, either of the Mode, to the Thing; and, seeing, in general, how it affects it, as is seen in the two last Predicables of Porphyrius; which, because Modes are not Distinct Things, and yet differ vastly from the Formal Notion of the Thing itself, of which they are Modes, can only be Connected with it Materially; or, as Belonging to the Thing, as their Subject: Or else, the Mind compares the Thing to what's Formal, or Essential to it. And this, either in the Whole, as is found in our Identical Propositions; for which reason, I am forced to make a Sixth Predicable, in which the Whole is predicated, entirely and formally, of the Whole: Or else, in Part; when some Part of the Essence or Nature of the Whole Thing is Predicated, or Compared to it diversely; as is seen in Porphyrius' Three First Predicables, called Genus, Species, and Difference; which do, all of them, in part, belong to the Essence. These Notes borrowed from Logic, and premised, 'tis here farther to be Noted, that all those Comparisons, or Relations the Soul makes in whatever Proposition, is done by that Relation, called Identity; as is manifest from the Copula [Est.] Wherefore, to review what we said lately; the Predicates belonging to the two last Predicables of Porphyrius, are Referred only according to Material Identity; or, only as found to belong to the same Thing, and not as Essential to it. The three former are related, or Compared, as Identified Formally to the Thing; yet, still so, as but several Parts of its Essence. The 6th is, when the Whole Thing is Compared, Related to, or Identified with the Whole Thing; and this Entirely, or according to all that is in the Thing. And, this Way of Comparing or Relating the Whole Thing to its Self, is that Relation of Identity, which is the most Essential, most Formal, and most Expressly such, of all other; and, is only found in those Propositions we call First Principles. Which Propositions being, for the Reasons given, most Fully and Properly such, we do therefore, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, call Identical.  
22. Whence may be seen, that the Virtue of Identical Propositions threads, or runs thorough all those Propositions that are Essential; and, collaterally, those also whose Predicates are immediately and necessarily Connected with the Essence. For, since the Parts are found in the Whole, and all Identification in part, is a Part of the Identification of the Whole Thing with its self; it follows, that Propositions, or Truths, in which the Predicate is but Part of the Whole, are, in Reality, but Parts of our Identicals. Nor is this all; but the Force of every Consequence too is Grounded on them, in which consists all our Rationality; as was shown above. Whence Mr. Lock, in his Essay, B. 4. Ch. 2. §. 7. shows, very Judiciously, that every Step we take in true Demonstrations, is made by Intuitive, or Self-evident Knowledges.  
23. Whence, 'tis Evident, that even your Rule will force you, tho' contrary to your Intention, to come over to us; and, will oblige you to guide yourselves by Connexion of Terms, (which is our Way,) however you strive to avoid it. You say, that when you Clearly and Distinctly see a Proposition to be True, it must be so: And we say, you can never see a Proposition to be True, but when you see its two Extremes, (or, the Subject and Predicate,) Connected. You will allege, you see it in your Idea: But, (as is shown above,) there are three Parts in a Proposition, which have, each of them, a Distinct Idea; in regard, the selfsame Idea which is of the Subject, cannot be the Idea of the Predicate; for, this would throw you upon Identical Propositions, which is our Rule: And, the Idea of the Copula is, most evidently, quite Different from the other Two; being, precisely, That which Affirms, or Denies; which neither of the other does. This being so, I beseech you to reflect, that Truth (which is the Thing in question) cannot consist in these Ideas, singly considered; for, taken thus, they are, all of them, Simple Apprehensions▪ which can neither be True, nor False. It remains, then, that you must confess, Truth can be only in those Ideas, put together, or Connected; nor, can they be Connected, but by that which only is apt to Connect or Identify them; viz. by the Copula [Est;] for, these three Parts cannot be framed into one Speech, by any other manner, but by putting the Word [Est] between them. Wherefore, 'tis Evident, that you cannot pretend to see clearly and distinctly, that any Proposition is True, (which is your Rule to know Truth,) but by seeing its said Terms Connected, or Identified. I see not how you can, even in your Way of Ideas, deny this Clear Discourse: And, if you grant it, we are thus far Friends. Only, we add, that, to make such Connexion's the RULE to all others, you must allow them to be Self-connexions', or Identical; which is our Position. So that, which way soever you wriggle, to avoid our Rule, the Light of Common Reason, or Natural Logic, will force you into it, whether you will or no.  
24. As for the Dryness of Identical Propositions, which goes not down with some Men of Fancy, I have this to add; that That which is objected to them, as Scandalous, and Opprobrious, is, in reality, a Great Commendation to them. For, this Conceit of their Dryness springs from their seeming too Obvious. Whereas, were not the very First Principles, and the Rule of Knowing all Truths, thus most Plain, Easie and Obvious, but needed the least Reflection, or Consideration, they would be utterly unfit to be what they ought to be; First Principles, and Self-evident. Nothing pleases the Palate of such Gentlemen, which is not New, or such as they knew not before. Not Reflecting, in the mean time, that nothing is New, but Conclusions lately Deduced; and that all First Principles must be as Old as Nature, or Mankind itself: Nor could they be the Rule of Truth, which must oblige all Mankind to see their Evidence, and Assent to their Verity, were they otherwise.  
25. How pretty a Delusive Faculty is this Fancy of ours! and, how apt, if we be not aware, to decoy us, every Step, into Error, by Customary Appearances; which, by striking often upon it, would fool our Reason! Our own Thoughts, and those of others, do, in all our Conversations, use to come to us, clad in Words: Whence it happens, that 'tis very hard, liquidly and clearly to strip the Sense from those Words; and to consider It, and nothing but It. If a Man says, [Every Thing is Distinct from all other Things,] none is apt to smile at him, or impute it as Ridiculous, or Foolish: But, if he says, [A Thing is its self,] Witty Men can scarce contain their jest at such an Idle Proposition: And yet they are, most evidently, the selfsame in Sense; for, that which is Distinct from all others, must either be its Self, or Nothing; and, the taking away all Distinction, does, almost in Terms, at least, most formally, and necessarily, put Identity. Let us take another Instance: If one says, [A Whole is more than a Part,] it appears to such Men, wondrous Wise; and, none blames him, in the least, that says it, or lays it for a Principle. But, if he says, and puts for a Principle, [What's more than a Part, is more than a Part,] it is good Luck if they do not think he deserves Midas' Ears. Yet, both of these Propositions are the selfsame, and both of them equally, and most perfectly Identical in Sense; and only differ in the Manner of Expression. Which I thus show: A Whole consists of its Parts; and, since every Thing is that of which it consists, A Whole is its Parts. But, the Word [Parts,] being Plural, signifies more than One Part; Wherefore, [A Whole is more than a Part,] is the same as to say, [What's more than a Part, is more than a Part;] which is as perfectly Identical, as can be imagined. Nay, more; If we regard it well, we shall find, that the former Proposition had not been known, Speculatively, to be Self-evident, nor could have been made out to be such, but because it is the same with this later, whose Terms are most formally Identical; to which, the other is easily reduced.  
26. It will be asked, why we could not let the Sense alone in its former Dress, (which became it much better than this other,) since it was Self-evident enough before? I answer; Because the Self-evidence better appears, when it is also brought to Terms most perfectly Identical; as any one may discern, who compares the two Propositions now mentioned: And, hence also the Sceptical Dissenter, or Denier, is most forcibly, and unavoidably thrown upon a Direct and Open Contraction; for, to Deny those Identicals, which are such, not only in the Sense, but in the manner of Expression too, is, to avow a Contradiction proposed barefaced, and in the plainest Terms; which could not have appeared so clearly from the Terms of the former Proposition. Lastly, A Brabbling Pyrrhonian might have drawn the Words, [whole,] and [Part,] into some sinister Construction; and have wrangled and quibbled about them, by putting upon them divers Senses; which he is quite debarred of, when the Terms are thus Identical: For, when the Words of both the Terms are the very selfsame, whatever Sense he gives the Words of the Subject, must be allowed to the Words of the Predicate too; so that he will be put quite past his Shifts, and the Proposition will still remain equally Identical as it was before, maugre all his Cavils, and Evasions.  
27. By this time I have, as I conceive, good reason to presume enough has been alleged by us, to prove that our Rule of Truth is, in every Regard, qualified for such an Employ. We will therefore, if you please, now turn the Tables, and examine what your Rule can pretend to; or, what it it has in it, which can entitle it to be such a Rule; or, in any respect, counterbalance what has been produced for ours. To do which, we will consider it, both as to the Act of your Clear and Distinct Perception, the Immediate Object of that Act; and, at the same time, as to the Stability which each of these may be conceived to have from its Ground. We will begin with the Object, that determines your Faculty of Understanding to this or that Particular Act. If I rightly conceive the Cartesian Doctrine, the Immediate Objects of your Clear and Distinct Perception, are your Ideas, in which appears this Truth which, you say, you Clearly and Distinctly see. Now, these Ideas of yours are, confessedly, Effects produced by a Second Cause, the Mind itself; and not the Immediate Work of the First Cause, on which (as has been sh●wn) our Rule is built: Which gives ours an Infinite Advantage, above yours, as to the Stability of its Ground: Ours having, for its Solid Foundation, the Ideas in the Divine Understanding; whence are unquestionably Derived, and by which are Established, the Essences of Things, on which ours is Immediately Grounded: Whereas, your Ideas are held by yourselves, to be the Creatures, or Productions of your own Mind; which (were it granted it could produce any such Ideas) is a Defective Agent of its own Nature; and, therefore, its Productions so Uncertain, that it seems a most strange piece of Doctrine, to build all the Certain Truth and Knowledge Mankind can possibly have on such an Unsteady Foundation. How many Thousands, even of a fair Pitch of Understanding, have mistaken Lively Fancies, for Evident Knowledge? Must, therefore, all Truth be built on a Mistakable Principle? Nay, more; such Men, judging thus, by Mistake, the Thing was Evident, taking them as possessed with such a Mistake, cannot but Assent to it, as True, tho' it be never so False: Must we therefore consecrate this Erroneous Ground of theirs, into a Rule of Truth? Oh, but it belongs to God's Goodness, to take care, that, since we cannot but Assent upon such a Clear and Distinct Appearance, we should not be forced upon Error. Why so? If you will needs leave the Things his Wisdom has made, take your own Way, and over-conceit the Infallibility of your own Faculty, in judging you Clearly and Distinctly know a Thing, when you do but fancy it; is God's Providence answerable to support every overweening Rashness of ours? Doubtless, his Goodness is never wanting to such a considerable Species, as is Mankind, in N 〈…〉 to their Knowledge, for which th●●● Nature was made: But, if there 〈◊〉 Another Way, more Solidly Ground●● and Evident than yours; nay, aga●●●● which (as has been proved) ther● can lie no Exception, and Men will not take it; his Providence is acquitted, and, 'tis just to let them delude themselves. At least, it will be said, that this Clear and Distinct Perception is a Rule of Truth to us, tho' not to Truth, considered in itself. But, if what we assent to upon that Imaginary Ground, may still be false, for any thing that Ground can assure us, how can it be a Rule of Truth to any? To return to our Ideas; The main Point is, that it is so far from Evident that there can be any such Ideas Elicited, or Produced, by our Minds, that there are many pretended Demonstrations against it; as may be seen in Ideae Cartesianae Expensae, Exam. 2. from § 31. to §. 49. Nay, there are very many others in my Second Preliminary, proving there can need none; the Thing itself being objectively in our Understanding. To none of which Demonstrations, I do expect any Full and Solid Answer; but only, perhaps, some slight Touches. I add, that the Ideists themselves cannot agree amongst themselves, what kind of Things these Spiritual Ideas should be. Mr. Locke makes them to be Similitudes; Which Mr. Le Grand denies; and, is so at variance with himself, that he puts them to be many several sorts of Things, and those Inconsistent with one another; and so makes them to be Chimaeras. This Inconsonancy of those Writers with one another, and with their own selves, makes it very Dubious that there are any such Things as these Ideas, at all; at least, 'tis Evident, that they who ground all their Doctrine upon them, do not know what they are; and, therefore, they build all their Hypothesis on they know not what. And, if this be so, than the Immediate Object of their Clear and Distinct Perception is, perhaps, a Nonentity; or, at least, such an Entity, as no Man living (nor themselves neither) knows what to make of it.  
28. Again; This Object, which you Clearly and Distinctly see to be True, must be some Mental Proposition; for, nothing can be Formally True, but some Speech that Affirms, or Denies. Now, say we, 'tis most incontestable, that the First Proposition we can make of a Thing, is, to affirm its Metaphysical Verity; or, to say, 'Tis this, (or its self,) and no other: For, the Subject being the Basis of all our Thoughts, we must fix it certainly, Clearly and Distinctly, ere we can, with Certainty, say any thing else of it. This Proposition, then, say we, is such, that our Understanding no sooner opens its Eye, to take a View of it, but it must assent to it, because of the Self-evident Identification of its Terms; whose Self-Evidence we do therefore make our Rule. It remains then, that you show us some Truth, or Proposition, which is before this, (which we think to be the First,) and which both makes itself thus Visible; and also, by its Self-evident Light, giveth Clearness and Intelligibility to all other Truths; and, lastly, which is so Firmly Grounded, that it may be a Solid First Principle, and not an Airy and Fantastic Conceit. You must then, (we say,) produce, and show us some other Proposition than that you have brought hitherto, which tells us your Clear and Distinct Perception is your Rule; for, this, you see, is already, by many Unanswerable Arguments, thrown out of doors, and shown Unfit to be a Rule. And, till you do this, you ought not to be offended, if we tell you friendly, and plainly, that you have no Rule of Truth at all.  
29. Thus much for the Immediate Object of your Clear and Distinct Perception. As for the Act it self, I beseech you, Sir, consider on what a Sandy Foundation you would build all Truth. What signifies yours, or mine, or any Man's judgement, that he Clearly and Distinctly sees a Truth; or, that he must Assent, or may not Assent to it? What signify these, I say, to the Truth of the Thing? Must Truth be built on Men's judgements, or their Manner of Conceiving? What's True, is Infallibly such; and this, by virtue of its Grounds. Is our judgement, or Manner of Conceiving, such a Certain Ground, or Infallible? How many Instances is the World full of, to prove those Perceptions of ours, tho' judged by us most Evident, to be Fallacious? A Passionate Man, highly Injured, and bend upon Revenge, judges it most Evident that he ought to take his Private Satisfaction: And, you can do no more, but verily judge you have this Clear and Distinct Perception, that such or such a Proposition is True. I am to presume, that those Cartesians who stigmatised me with the Ignominious Note of being Impious against God, etc. judged they did Clearly see, I was thus wicked; for, otherwise, they left their own beloved Rule, to blacken me; which is too high a Malice for any Man to charge them with: And yet, no Man living, as far as myself, or my Friends, can discern, did think so, but themselves; for, 'tis hard to conceive, that, if others had thought so, none of them should have that Zeal for God's Honour, as to object it, or reprehend me for it: Nor am I to doubt but they thought they clearly and distinctly saw, that when I said, Annihilation was Impossible, I did, by that Doctrine, set upon God himself: And, yet, tho' the Learned Albius maintained the same, in his Metaphysics, 50 Years before, no Friend ever admonished him, that by saying so, he had fallen into a Wicked Error: Nor any of his Opposers, who were very Learned Men, tho' they gathered many Propositions out of his Books, which seemed to sound ill, did ever object This; whereas, had they judged it Impious, they would not have spared him, but have laid load upon him for it. But, it seemed, they all wanted this Gift of Clear and Distinct Perception, which is peculiar to the Cartesians. To come to other Instances; How frequently are People mistaken, in thinking they have a Clear and Distinct Perception, or Perfect Evidence! Prejudice, Faction and Education work this ill Effect, and make Men absolutely judge they see most Evidently, they are in the right. People far gone in the Spleen, or a deep Melancholy, do Assent, and Judge, perhaps, more Firmly than you do, that they see Clearly twenty Ridiculous Fooleries to be True. Highflown Enthusiasts judge the same. Pious Women, and Prudent in other Things, if much given to Introversion, judge, they see clearly and distinctly (nay, far more lively than we do) many strange Things in their Imaginary Visions and Revelations; insomuch, that they would pawn their very Souls for their Truth; which, yet, are oft known, by their Effects, to be mere Illusions of Fancy. From all which Errors and Inconveniences, our Rule is Free: For, who can, out of Humour, Precipitancy, Fancy, Disease, or any other Casualty whatever, be deceived, in Judging, that Identical Propositions are True? This, then, unanswerably concludes ours to be the genuine Rule of Truth; in regard, this must be such as all Men must be forced to Assent to, unanimously Agree in it, nor can ever hap to be Deceived in it by any Chance whatever: Since, otherwise, the whole Nature of those Men would be Depraved, and good for nothing, as having no Rule by which to know any Truth whatever. Nay, it must be such as may be produced openly, by the Asserters of any Truth; that, by alleging It, they may be able to convince others, that what they maintain is a Real Truth, and not some Fantastic Conceit of their own; without which, their Clear and Distinct Perception is Invisible, and so can satisfy no Man; nor clear themselves from being Selfconceited; but, to argue like fanatics, who pretend they discern Things by an Inward Light, which none can see but themselves, nor they themselves make it visible to others. Of which, more hereafter.  
30. I beg of you, once more, (the Point being of great Importance,) that this Question, concerning your Rule, may be rightly stated, and understood. None doubts, but that, if we clearly know a Thing to be True, it is True; otherwise, it would follow, that we may know what is not; or, (which is the same,) may know that which is not to be known. The only Question, then, is, Whether we may not be Mistaken in judging we know it, when, indeed, we do not know it, but only fancy it: Which is a Thing so Common amongst all Mankind, that not very many escape this Fault of Overweening. Wherefore, ere you can pretend that this Rule of yours is Useful, and a Certain Means to know Truth, you should first prescribe us some Self-evident Rule, how we may know assuredly, that our judgement that we do Clearly and Distinctly know a Thing, is not a Mistake: For, otherwise, we are often apt to think we do most certainly know a Thing, when we have only a Lively Apprehension, or Fancy of it. Besides which, this Rule must have Force upon all Mankind, that we may easily make it out to others, that we do indeed and really know, and not merely presume we know, when, perhaps, we do not: Otherwise, it will neither give others, nor ourselves, any Certainty that what we imagine we know, is True. This is the true Difficulty; and against this, I do not discern any effectual Provision made by you; nor how you can make any, without having recourse to the Self-evident Connexion of the Terms in an Identical Proposition. This Self-evident Connexion we can produce openly, to every Man's Eye; whereas, you cannot produce your pretended Clear and Distinct Perception to any Man: And, it being, when thus produced by us, impossible not to be seen and acknowledged by any Man, who has any Use of his Intellectual Faculty, 'tis able to give perfect Satisfaction to ourselves, and to others also, that we neither are, nor can be Mistaken in our Judgement, that we do really and indeed Know it; and, not only Deem it. You see, Sir, where the Difficulty pinches. That can never be a Certain Rule to me, or to any Man, which I can never be sure I make use of: Now, 'tis evident by what is said here, I cannot be assured I do clearly and distinctly know, unless my Judgement that I do so be secured from Mistake: For, if I be mistaken in that Judgement, and do not clearly and distinctly know, your Rule affects not me at all; nor am I a jot the better for it, or nearer the Knowing any Truth by it: But, which is yet worse; 'tis Evident from this Discourse, that there needs another Rule of Knowing, Antecedent to yours, to guide my judgement that I do clearly and distinctly know, and do not mistake, or rashly presume I know; as we experience, the Generality of Mankind does. Which evidently concludes, that the Proposition by which you express your pretended Rule of Knowing, may, indeed, be a Truth, (in case you do really know,) but can never be a Rule of Truth to you, me, or any Man: For, this must be First known, or Self-known, to all Mankind; or otherwise, it needs another Antecedent Rule, to make it Useful; and, so it is Ruled, and no Rule. Here it is, then, that the Point sticks; and, here 'tis like to stick, for any thing I can imagine, in behalf of the Cartesians.  
31. I am apt to apprehend, that your Acute Wit will object, that some few of those Instances I alleged formerly, of Men who verily judged they clearly and distinctly knew such and such Things to be True, and yet were mistaken in thus Judging, do fall short of Concluding; I mean, those that concerned People in Diseases; which you may, with some reason, think, are known to be plain Deviations from Nature, by an easy Criterion; viz. by the Standard of Mankind, who have the right Use of their Reason. Which I shall not contest with you; nor had I brought such as these, but that I see your Writers bring the same against the Certainty of our Senses; as, that Icterical People see all Things Yellow, and such like; which are solved by the same Criterion. But, what are these to many others which I there alleged; and could press farther, were it suitable to the Brevity I had intended. To force that Objection home, what shall we think of Speculative Men, and Great Philosophers; nay, of many Great Mathematicians, who thought they had most certainly Squared the Circle? They are held to be Men in their perfect Wits; nay, they are held to be Candid too; and, moreover, Learned; and, which is more, both Sides offer Demonstrations for their Tenet; and have, ofttimes, great Multitudes that follow them, and embrace their Doctrine. Can it be denied, but that such very Learned, Acute and Ingenious Men do verily Judge that they clearly and distinctly see their Doctrine to be True? And yet, we are certain that, since they contradict one another, one Side must needs be in an Error in that Judgement. We will bring it yet nearer home, and lay it even at our own Doors.  
32. I do not doubt, but yourself (for, I cannot suspect your Candour) does verily judge that you clearly and distinctly perceive, or (which is the same) have Perfect Evidence, that your Way of Ideas is the True Way to Science: And I, on the other side, am as fully persuaded, as that I live, that I do clearly and distinctly see, it is so far from being the Way to Science, that it is perfectly Groundless, and leads to Innumerable Errors. That you are thus persuaded, seems very Evident to you; for which, I am very willing to take your Word. And, that I am thus fully persuaded I do Clearly and Distinctly see the Contrary, besides my faithful Asseveration, I believe Indifferent Men will think I have given sufficient Testimony, by bringing so many pretended Demonstrations against your Way; and hazarding my Credit, by vouching them to be Conclusive; which, therefore, are so many Sure Gauges for my Sincerity, when I declare this to be my Sentiment. Add, that these Demonstrations are not like Flashes of Wit, coined by my own Brain; for, then, perhaps, I might, for some by-end of Applause, or some such Foolery, have falsely pretended they were my true Thoughts: But, they are all built upon the Nature of the Thing, or Subject in hand; which being Established to be what it is, 'tis beyond the Wit or Power of Man, to make, mar, alter, or deface it; and, should I go about to disguise or misrepresent it, 'tis easy for any Adversary to show, I speak Contradictions, and expose me to open Shame for my Confident Ignorance: For, what is against the Nature of the Thing, makes that Thing to be what it is not; which is a plain Contradiction. This, then, being so manifest, that I may convince you by your own Method, Why ought not you, by your Way of Doubting of every thing that has any Show or Possibility of Falsehood, or any Uncertainty, to lay aside, and renounce your Rule of Truth, as Uncertain and Fallacious; since we do both of us follow it to our power; and, yet, since we contradict one another so Diametrically, one of us is, notwithstanding, in a vast Error! Here is Matter of Fact, then, against the Usefulness of your Rule; and that too, as Certain, and Evident, as that one (or both of us) is not the worst sort of Hypocrites; that is, belies himself, and his own Thoughts: Whereas, I believe, no Man that knows either of us, had ever such a bad Opinion of us. I could press this Topick much farther; but I had rather leave it to your Sincere and Deliberate Consideration.  
33. The Rule by which we are to know Truth, ought therefore, (as was said,) in such a manner oblige all Mankind to Assent, that it should be apt, of itself, to compose all Differences in Opinion, by Applying, and Bearing up to it: Whereas, yours can compose none at all; but, chose, engages Learned Men in an Endless Wrangle. We both grant, That if we see a Thing clearly to be True, it is True; since Common Sense tells every Man, that none can see what is not to be seen: Nor is there any such Mystery, or Mastership, in advancing this obvious Position; or, for magnifying Cartesius so highly, for inventing it; since, I think, no Man living ever denied it. The Question is, Which of us has this True Evidence, which you call Clear and Distinct Perception? You will say, you have it, and I want it: I shall reply, that I have it, and you want it. You will blame some Defect in my Understanding, or some untoward Bias or Propension of my Will, both which, according to Mr. Le Grand, (p. 93.) can make one deceived in thinking that he evidently perceives: And I, on the other side, think I may, with equal Justice, blame yours: And, so, we may come to lay the Fault, either on the Weakness of one another's Understanding, or the Depravedness of his Will; which naturally leads Men to pelt one another with Rash judgements, and hard Words: But, since we can, neither of us, see one another's Thoughts, or discover to others, how Clear they are, which is your Way; both sides will still remain as far from Conviction, and the Point from Decision, as at first, for any thing your Rule helps either of us. And, if we set aside Propositions and Discourses, and the showing that their Terms are Undeniably Connected, and therefore, Themselves certainly True; (which is not yo●● Way;) how, I beseech you, shall Men ever come to a Final Conclusion by dint of Reason, without being put to it to avail themselves by Ill Words, and Passion; which (I fear, by proceeding upon your Rule; for, you pretend not to have produced any Connexion of Terms) has been such a Stickler, of late, to uphold the Cartesian Cause?  
34. This seemed to me so Odd a Procedure, that I begged the Favour of you, to acquaint me, how, or by what Means, you would make others know you had, indeed, this Clear and Distinct Perception; or, how you could prove you had it, but by making use of Propositions and Discourses; the Force of which consists only in Affirming, Denying, or Inferring; that is, in the Connexion, or Inconnexion of the Terms. As I remember, your Answer was, by Explicating to them clearly the Point, and desiring them to Meditate upon it: Which Way you seemed to magnify very much. I could have alleged, that you could not have proposed, or used, even this Way, without making use of Propositions, and Discourses: But, letting you proceed, I barred Explications, if they were brought (as it here seemed) to evacuate any Need of Proof: For, Explicating, as contradistinguished to Proving, amounts to no more but a kind of Rhetorical Persuasive, made up of Similitudes, Parallels, Allusions, and such little sorts of light, Witty Fancies, which may serve, and are made use of, in a manner, equally, to abet Error, as well as Truth. Indeed, if the Terms of the Question be Dubious, Explications are needful, and very requisite; lest, otherwise, we levelly our Argument at a wrong Thesis: But, if the Point in question be rightly understood by both Parties, it must either be Proved, if it be not Self-evident and needs no Proof; or, it must remain for ever Uncertain, and Undecided. I should be glad to know whether, or no, you would go about to convince such a Man by Grounds and Principles? If you say, you would, and that you think you can do this: than you wrong your Cause exceedingly, by waving the Mention of such Strong Supports as Principles and Grounds; and Recurring to, and Relying on such Unsteady, Feeble Reeds as Explications. If you say, you cannot evince your Thesis by Principles; then all your Explications, tho' never so Witty, are, confessedly, Unprincipled, and Groundless. If you pretend, your Explications do involve Proofs in them; 'tis clearly for the Interest of your Cause, to make use of the Argumentative part of such Discourses, and leave out the Explicative: For, 'tis certain, that the Argument, if a good one, subsists upon some Solid Principle; whereas, an Explication may be without any at all. It will therefore, to any considering Man, be a strong Prejudice against the Cartesians, and make Men apt to think they have no Grounds or Principles at all, that they do not much pretend to them, much less build their Discourses on them, or reduce them to them; but seem to abdicate them, while they place their chief Support in Explications. In a Word; Let the Position be first Proved to be True, or all Explications are Frivolous: For, to what purpose is it to stand Explicating a Falsehood? The nature of all Explications, is, to give us the Sense of the Thesis proposed; but, let it be first Proved, and Seen that it bears good Sense; for, 'tis a very sleeuless Task, to stand Explicating Nonsense.  
35. On this Occasion, it were not amiss to note here a certain manner of Writing, very frequent amongst some Modern Philosophers; which is apt to lead the Generality of Learners into very great Errors. We do, all of us, naturally affect Knowledge; and therefore, we love to read Authors that are Clear, or write clearly; as being very Knowable, or Intelligible. But, now, Clearness is of Two sorts: The one makes Clear the Thoughts of the Writer; The Other makes Clear the Truth of the Point he writes of. The One expresses clearly his own Meaning, when he says thus: The Other manifests clearly, that he says True when he says thus. The Former is performed by means of Rhetoric, and Witty Expressions: The Other can only be done by Solid Principles, and by True Logic. But, it too often happens, that those Readers who have not a Strong Bent to see Truth, and, with a steady Aim, pursue it, and It only, are so well apayed with the Clear Expression of an Author, in delivering his own Mind; which cannot but be very Pretty, and Taking, being, generally, neatly clad; that they are, at unawares, Decoyed to think the Thing itself is Clear, when 'tis only the Sentiment of the Author which is rendered so Evident; especially, if there be also some slight Show of Coherence; which seldom wants, if the Writer be a Man of Parts. And, yet, perhaps, all this while, were that Discourse stripped of its Superficial Gaiety, and sounded to the bottom, nothing will be found to support its Truth; but it will appear Plain Bald Nonsense en cuerpo. On the other side, it lights so, that Discourses that are Solid, and built all along on Evident Principles, (only which can clear the Truth of the Point,) do want the other sort of Clearness, which consists in Explicating, to recommend them to the Liking of the Reader. And this happens for Two Reasons: One, because Principles do consist of Few Words, or Notions; and those too, such as are General, or Universal ones; which do not admit such varying the Phrase, or Smooth Explications, to make them more Knowable; their Clearness consisting only in the greater Simplicity of those General Terms, and their Close Connexion. The Second Reason is, that those Writers who endeavour to look deep into the Foundation and Principles on which Truth is Grounded, and are not satisfied with Skimming over Questions superficially, do not care to avail themselves by Explications, and the Way of Smooth Expressions; but quite disregard them, and judge them only Lukewarm Words in their present Circumstances; because they neither conduce to the Attainment of Science, nor to Settle and Clear the Truth of the Thesis; which such Men see can only be done by the Strict and Evident Connexion of their Notions. To apply this Discourse; I entreat you, Sir, to consider whether the Former Sort of Clearness be not that which the Cartesians affect; the Second, that which we take, and pursue. I shall hope, that whoever peruses my METHOD to SCIENCE, with an Attentive and Indifferent Eye, will easily observe, that I first put my Thesis, and then endeavour to establish it by rigorous Proofs, drawn from the Nature of the Thing or Subject treated of in those respective Places: And that the Cartesians do not use to take any such Method, but place their Hopes of recommending their Tenets to the Reader's Approbation, in their Explications. Which makes it so difficult for a Logician to find where their Arguments lie hid, or where they press; of which, with just Reason, I so often complain.  
36. Thus much concerning your Method of Proving by Explicating; or rather, of substituting Explications in the place of Proofs. As for the other part of your Method, which is, your putting Learners to Meditate long and seriously, upon what you have proposed to them, I liked that as ill as I did that of Explicating: And, my Reason is, because, unless Men take Principles along with them, to guide their Thoughts right, and keep an Attentive Eye to them, while they thus Meditate; 'tis to be feared, their long Meditating will, by its frequent Dints, so imprint and fix what you have told them, in their Brain; and, at length, make it sink so deep into their Minds, that, whether it be Right or Wrong, it will stick there, as daily Experience shows us; Custom, a Second Nature, having a very powerful Ascendent over the Understanding, to imbue us with False Impressions, by the oftreiterated Thinking upon any Point that is Disputable; especially, Ingenious Explications (as was shown lately) too often serving for Reasons, to those who are not well versed in True Logic.  
37. But, the main Objection I make, is, That this Method of yours quite overthrows the Rule of Truth, which you intended to establish by it. For, this Rule being that, upon which all all our Knowledge of Truth depends, must be so very Clear of itself, above any thing we can add to its Highest Evidence, that it cannot possibly need any Explication, nor Meditation neither. Nor, consequently, can any stronger Argument be brought, to Demonstrate that this Rule of yours is not the Right one, than 'tis to confess or pretend that it stands in need of, or, even, can admit Assistance, or Light, either from the one, or the other. For, if it can need any Explication, it follows, that it must be something Obscure: And, if it can need Poring and Meditating upon it, ere it be admitted, or can be known, then 'tis far from being most Self-evident: Both which utterly destroy the Nature of such a Rule. For, since we must know all other Truths by It, its Evidence must be the First Thing to be known; and therefore, the Knowledge of its Truth must antecede the Knowledge of all other Truths whatsoever, and be Clearer than They. Which being so manifest, I wonder what Thoughts or Considerations our Explicating or Meditating can suggest, that can do this First Rule of Truth any Service, or give it any Advantage; since, all others being more Obscure than It, they may, indeed, (could they affect it,) impart to it their own greater Obscurity, and make it less Clear and Intelligible than it was; but, can never make it Clearer, as having no greater, but far less Clearness themselves. Lastly, As this pretended Necessity of Explicating, and Meditating, quite degrades yours from being the genuine, First, and, consequently, the Right Rule of Knowing Truth; so it abets ours, and gives it a Clear Title to be such a Rule, since the Self-evidence of those First Truths, expressed by Identical Propositions, (which is our Rule,) is such, as is both Impossible to be Explicated, and Impossible to need Meditating, to clear it to us; but, at the first Instant we open the Eye of our Mind, it discovers itself fully to all Mankind, to be most True; and, withal, begets, forces and fixes us in a Full and Firm Assent to its Verity.  
38. Perhaps it will be alleged, notwithstanding what I have said above, That this Clear and Distinct Perception is not pretended to be a Rule of Truth in itself, so that it establishes Truth Fundamentally; but of Truth to us, or, (as the Schools phrase it,) quoad nos; that is, a Rule whereby we may know what's Truth, what not: And, it seems, that it cannot be denied to be such a Rule, in regard 'tis Evident that we must Assent, or hold a Thing True, when we see clearly and distinctly it is so; nor ought we to Assent, or hold it to be True, unless we do clearly and distinctly see it to be so. I answer, That this Pretence is already forestalled, in divers places of my former Discourse; where it was shown, by many Instances, that, even in the Opinions Learned Men held, this Guiding our Thoughts and Judgements by what appears to us a Clear and Distinct Perception, is Uncertain, and Fallacious. Whence, in the Thesis constituting this to be your Rule, there is tacitly involved a False Supposition; v●z. That that Perception, on which we solely rely, is Unmistakable by us: For, if we may mistake it to be really a Perception thus qualified, when it is not, than our Assent may be Erroneous; and, how can an Erroneous Judgement, in any Sense, be True to us, or make us know a Thing to be True? If I am to draw a strait Line, and the Rule by which I guide myself be sometimes Strait, and sometimes Crooked, how is it a RULE to me, in that Action, or Draught? 2. In constituting this Perception to be your Rule, you begin at the wrong End: For, seeing this Perception is an Act, and that the Object specifies every Act, and makes it such as it is; the Object, or Thing, must be True in itself; and, by being in itself True, it thence makes our Judgement (when we rightly conceive it) to be True also. This Distinction, then, in our present Case, is altogether Frivolous; and the alleging it, Preposterous. 3. To Perceive, is an Act of the Understanding, and the same as To Know; and, to Perceive Clearly and Distinctly, is the same as to know perfectly. Whence follows, that to say, [I know that to be True, which I clearly and distinctly Perceive to be so,] is the very selfsame Sense, as to say, [What I know to be True, I know to be True;] or, [I know what I know:] Which is a good Confident Saying; and, moreover, True too. But, nothing can be more ridiculous, than to make Knowing the Rule of Knowing, or a Rule to make a Thing True to us. To say, [A Thing is, because it is;] or, [I know it, because I Know it;] is more like a Woman's Reason, when she is Fixed, and Wilful; than a Rational Man's, or a Philosopher's.  
39 The Ingenious Mr. Le Grand seems to go more charily to work, by putting his Rule of Truth, (Dissert. pag. 86) in these Terms, [Illud omne Verum est quod clarè & distinctè percipitur.] He does not say, [quod percipitur esse Verum;] but barely, [quod percipitur.] Which Words do not tell us, whether he speaks of our Perception by the First Operation of our Understanding, simply Apprehending a Thing; or of the Second, which is expressed by a Proposition. But, this still falls into the same: For, if he means the Former, then, since Simple Apprehensions have neither Truth nor Falsity in them, being no more but, barely, what's meant, or signified, by the Words; it cannot follow, that what I clearly and distinctly thus perceive, is therefore True: For, I simply apprehend, and this clearly and distinctly too, the Meaning of these Words, [A Triangle has four Corners;] yet 'tis far from being True, being a plain Contradiction. He must mean then, that I am to perceive the Sense or Meaning of those Words to be Connected, which is done by putting them into a Proposition; and then his Rule must run thus, [Whatever Simple Apprehensions I see clearly and distinctly to be Connected in a Proposition, that Proposition is True:] Which is that very Rule which we advance, and the Cartesians would avoid. Only, we say, That to make this a Rule, we must see the Parts of it Self-connected, or Self-evident; for, all other Connexion's are made, by the Terms being Connected by means of a Third; which is the same as to be Deduced, or Proved. But, these Connexion's being, all of them, Conclusions, they cannot pretend to be Rules, or Principles, since they must depend on such Rules, as show those Conclusions must follow. Again, If he means, (as he must, if he means any thing,) that his Rule is, That we must see those Simple Apprehensions, which we call the Terms, Connected in a Proposition; then we must see, or clearly perceive, that that Proposition is True: And then, his Principle must run thus; [Whatever Proposition I clearly and distinctly perceive to be True, is known by me to be True:] Wherefore, since to perceive thus, is, to know; and that, as appears by Cartesius' Words, there cited, he speaks of what's Verum mihi, as the Effect of his Principle; that is, of what I know to be True; join these two together, and this Principle, or Rule, does manifestly amount to this; [That which I know to be True, I know to be True;] which is a most prodigious Rule of Knowledge; and yet, this is most evidently the Sense of it, in case to Perceive means, to know; and Verum mihi means that which I know to be True: which, I think, is Undeniable by any Man of Common Sense. And, I wonder how the Great Wit of Cartesius could imagine that any thing could be True to Him, unless he first saw it to be True in itself, which it has from its Grounds; unless he makes account, that a Thing may be True to him, which, in itself, is False: Which makes those two Truths fall out, and contradict one another, which I ever took to be very good Friends. This makes me wish that the Ingenious Mr. Le Grand, who tells us here, p. 92. that there goes more to a Rule, than to a Truth, had told us, in what a Truth, and in what the Nature of a Rule consists; which we plainly deliver, by affirming that a Truth consists in the Connexion of the main Parts (or Terms) of any Thesis; and a Rule in the Self-Connexion of them, by Formal Identity; whence, such Rules become Self-evident to all Mankind, and able to impart their Light to all other Truth's whatever. But, this shows the Genius of the Cartesian Writers: They take what's uppermost, and descant very prettily and gently upon it; which, being Obvious, and Facile, does mightily please the Fancy of the Readers: But, they go not to the Bottom of any Question. They rake the Surface of the most Difficult Points; but they never dig deep into it, to find out the Ground and Foundation on which Truth is built. And, I hope, the Reasons I have alleged, both here, and elsewhere, will satisfy my Readers, that it is not the ridiculous Motive of Pique, or Humour, which makes me give this Character of their Way of Writing; but, merely, the Duty I owe to Truth, which obliges me to do it.  
Thus, worthy Sir, I have used the best Reason I was Master of, in examining exactly, and understanding rightly, your Rule of Truth; and I have endeavoured to stop all the Startingholes, by which the Cartesians may think to evade the Force of my Arguments. Which done, I presume I may take my leave of this Point, and apply my Discourse to what followed next at our Interview.  
40. My Design, at the beginning of our Conference, was to convince you, that Truth consisted in the Connexion of the Terms, in those Speeches we called Propositions; which evinced, I made account I could easily prove, that the very First Truths, which were to give Light to all others, or be the Rule of Truth, were such Propositions as were Self-connected, and therefore Self-evident. How your over-acute way of Doubting defeated my Intentions, and stopped my Progress, is seen above. Sorry to have been put out of that Direct Road, which I saw was the only Right one, and without settling which, all our Discourse would be Unconnected Talk to no purpose, I was casting about how to get into it again. But a Learned and Judicious Friend of ours, who was present, suggested, that [Cogito ergo sum] was pretended by you to be a First Principle; and, he pressed earnestly it might be thoroughly examined, that we might see whether it had in it the nature of a First Principle, or no. I was something troubled to relinquish the Method I had prefixed to myself; without which, I saw, the Nature of a First Principle could not be settled, nor shown: However, I yielded to his Request. I allowed then, that [Cogito ergo sum] was a True and Evident Consequence, as are a thousand such others, viz. Dabito ergo sum; Scribo, ambulo, dormio; nay, Somnio ergo sum, etc.) which is what, with Unattentive Considerers, give it all its Credit, and makes them look upon us, as Unreasonable Men, who, as they apprehend, do question this Consequence, or call it into Doubt. But they are quite mistaken; there is no Body that doubts it is an Evident Consequence; but, there is a very wide Difference between a Consequence and a Principle; or rather, if it be a Consequence, tho' never so good, it can never be a First Principle, because, the Premises, which induced that Consequence, were before it; and that Truth, on which all force of Consequence is grounded,, (as was noted above,) is before either of them. What we affirm then is, that it is not a First Principle, nor could be so to Cartesius, when he proposed, and made use of it as such: And I addressed myself, to show it had not in it, the nature of such a Principle, nor could, with Reason, be pretended such by Cartesius himself.  
41. To prove this, I alleged, that it is an Inseparable Property, or rather, Essential to First Principles, that they must manifest themselves, to be such by their own most perfect Self-Evidence; whereas Cartesius was forced to use very many prolix Antecedent Discourses, to prove all else to be Dubitable; and, because they were so, he went on, Enquiring farther, till he could find something that could not be Doubted; which, he conceived, was [Cogito ergo sum,] from which he came to Conclude, that this was the First Principle. Whence I alleged, that therefore, those Antecedent Discourses of his, which proved all else to be Doubtful, were the Reasons or Arguments whence he drew his Conclusion, that this was the First Principle. Now, I think this as Plain Reason as plain can be, that No Man can evince a thing to be the First in any kind whatever, but, because, there is nothing before it in that kind. And, from this consideration, I prove my Allegation clearly; because, had not those many and large Antecedent Discourses, to prove all else to be Doubtful, been True; his Conclusion, viz. that [This is the First Principle,] could not have followed, or been True neither. For, in case the Senses had not been thus Fallacious as still to deceive us, perhaps, Science might have been had from the Things without us affecting those Senses; nor had there been any need to recur to the Operations of our own Mind, to seek for the Ground of all Truth there, because, we might have had it from the Things in Nature. This being so, how many Propositions did he use all along, to prove that our Senses might all deceive us; that we know not certainly whether we sleep or wake; that Mathematical Demonstrations might be all Erroneous, etc. All which Antecedent Propositions, by the plain Rules of Logic, aught to be more Evident, and more Certain, than the Conclusion he gathered, or inferred thence, viz. that Therefore This, and only This, being Indubitable, and Certainly Known, is the First Principle. Add, that this being Plain Sense, his own Discourse overthrows the Establishment of his First Principle. For, since he had not this First Principle of his till he had found it, nor did he find it, till he found all else to be Doubtful; it will be asked How, and in virtue of What First Principle he became, while he was in quest of it, more Certain, that all other things were Doubtful, than he was of the Conclusion he inferred thence, viz. that [Cogito, ergo sum] being impossible to be Doubted of, was his First Principle. Wherefore, if he guided himself by no Indubitable, or First Principle all along, in those Antecedent Discourses, which were in reality his Premises; that Conclusion of his, cannot in any Logic follow, nor be Certainly True, nor aught to be Embraced; especially, by such a Philosopher as he was, who professes Doubting of ever thing, till he came at his First Principle, that can be in the least Dubitable.  
42. In Reply to this Discourse of mine, which is grounded on the Supposition, that Cartesius guided himself by Reason, in settling his First Principle; and on the plainest Rules of Logic that the Premises must be Clearer than the Conclusion; the former of which, I suppose you will grant, the latter is obvious to Common Sense; you brought an Ingenious Explication, by way of Similitude, or Parallel; which, I see, are to supply the place of Arguments, and Answers too, in the Cartesian way. It was this. Suppose I see a Man making great Holes in the Ground, or throwing aside Rubbish; and that I ask him what he is doing? He tells me, he has an Intention to Build, and to lay Foundations for that End, and is making Way for it. Now this Action of his looks like an idle business, if we consider it alone; but, if we regard his farther Intention of Building, it is a Wise and Necessary Preparative. And yet this Antecedent Action, of preparing to lay a Foundation, does not give strength to the Building, which is an Action quite different from it; but the Building depends on the Foundation itself, and on nothing else. And, therefore, it follows, by way of Parallel, that the Antecedent Discourses of Cartesius, need not be Connected with that First Principle, as Premises, to infer it must be such; since they served only to remove the Rubbish, or the Pretended Knowledge of Things by means of the Senses, which encumbered the Mind with Prepossessions; and, so to make way to lay that First Foundation of Science. I think I have done your Parallel all the Right you can expect: Wherefore, I come now to examine what Force it bears, and what Strength such a way of Discoursing has in it; which, I the rather do, that I may inform those Readers, who take such kind of Similitudes for Reasons, how easily, and how frequently they are deluded, by such Unsteady, Inconclusive, and Illogical Methods.  
43 First then, 'tis so certainly known, that Similitudes do not use quadrare per omnia, or, (as they say,) run on four Feet, that it is grown Proverbial; which lays a great prejudice upon that Way in common. 2. Similitudes drawn from Material Things, to Immaterial, are particularly liable to this Defect. They may, indeed, oft times, serve to illustrate some Truth, as fit Metaphors to suit with our Fancy; but then they presuppose the Truth, which they are to illustrate, to be known some other Way. Whence, unless this be done first, all they can do is to explicate we know not what, which destroys the nature of an Explication; for, Explications are not intended to put the Truth of the Point, but suppose it. 3. All the Actions of our Soul are, or aught to be Rational; and have a Dependence on one another, by the way of Reason gathering Subsequent Truths from those which preceded. Now, I think, 'tis impossible to be contested by any Man who has read Cartesius' Meditations, but that his Discourses which anteceded his finding out this First Principle of his, are reducible to this Enthymem; [For these and these Reasons, there can no Certainty be had, as to Speculative Knowledges, by any Information had from Outward Objects affecting the Senses; therefore, it ought to be sought for in some Interior Act of our Mind, which is most Comprehensive and Peculiar to it,] which he conceive was Cogitation; and thence he laid this First Principle: [Cogito ergo sum] Which being so, it follows necessarily, that the Laying this for his First Principle, depended on the Goodness of the Reasons he had, why our Senses were not to be trusted, nor could give us our First Notions; whence, by reflecting on their Metaphysical Verity, we might have those Self-evident, and First Truths, of ours. This, I say, was evidently the Tenor of his Discourse; because, did not those Reasons of his, against the Sufficiency of our Senses to give us this Information, conclude; but that, notwithstanding all those Reasons could prove, the Senses might still imprint on our Mind those First Notions, his Consequent would not have followed: Nor, could he have had any Ground for recurring to the Interior Act of Cogitation, for his First Principle, in regard it had been given to his Hand by means of the Senses, as was now declared. 4. It being then evident, that the Substance of those antecedent Discourses was summed up in the Enthymem now mentioned, 'tis manifest, that this Explication of yours falters in the main Particular, in which it ought to suit, and resemble. For, in case those Impressions on our Mind could have been made by means of the Senses, as aforesaid; then those Impressions, or Notions, being the Immediate Foundation, on which is built all our Knowledge, could not be called, or resembled to Rubbish; nor compared to a Hole, to lay the Foundation; for, the Holes were already made in those Inlets, our Senses; which were Pervious to the Effluviums affecting the Seat of Knowledge; and thence, the Soul. So that your Similitude is, in effect, the Begging the whole Question; and can have no Force at all, but by our Granting it; which, I see plainly, we shall never have Reason to do. Rather, unless this Petitio Principii (which is tacitly involved in this Parallel) be yielded by us, or proved by you, it makes against yourselves. For, by Denying all such certain Information from the Senses, you will be found, not to remove the Rubbish, in order to lay the Foundation; but, to stop up the Way to the laying any; and, to dam up all the Holes, by which the Materials could come into our Minds, where only such a Foundation could have been laid. At least, you see, your Explication amounts to nothing; and, that your Similitude is lame in all its Legs, and has not one Sure Foot to stand on. Which will, I hope, sufficiently inform others, that this Way of Explicating, so mightily affected by Cartesius, and his Followers, is utterly Insignificant. I shall hope too, that this Paper will light into the hands of some Readers, who are so Intelligent, as to discern, that this Explicative Way is taken up, to avoid the Way of Rigorous Proof; which is so Unfriendly to a Doctrine that wants Principles.  
44. Whence I should give this Advice to all Aristotelians, that whenever the Cartesians would obtrude upon them their Ingenious Explications, they would demand of them smartly, by what Grounds they know, or will prove to others, that what they explicate, is True; without doing which in the first place, no Explication ought to be admitted. It may serve for a kind of Currying Favour with weaker Understandings; but it can never improve any Intelligent Man in Solid Knowledge, nor make him one Jot the Wiser.  
45. After this, we came to argue that other Objection of mine, That First Principles, of all others, must be most Clearly and Distinctly Known; because they ought to be, of all others, most Knowable; there being no others before them, by means of which they might come to be better Known. Now, Cartesius himself expressly confesses, that, when he had found this First Principle, he did not yet sufficiently understand what [Ego,] the Subject in that Principle, meant: Whence I inferred, that therefore, [Cogito ergo sum,] could not be to him a First Principle. This is enforced, because the Subject is the Principal, and most Substantial Part in every Proposition: And, since, in ordinary Things, when we do not well know what we talk of, plain S●nse tells us, 'tis a Folly to talk at all; much more is it Disallowable in Philosophical Matters, where Exact Truth is aimed at; and most of all in First Principles, which must be most Self-evident. You seemed to think an Obscure Knowledge of the Subject was sufficient. But, how an Obscure Knowledge can be either Clear, or Distinct; much less, superlatively such: Or, how a Proposition, whose Principal Part is neither Clear, nor Distinct, should, notwithstanding, itself, (as here it must,) be most Clear and Distinct, is, I believe, past any Man's Comprehension.  
46. However, I let your smooth Explication slide, without pressing my Discourse too forcibly: For, it had been something Rude, at so Civil a Visit in my own Chamber, to push Things forward too rigorously; or, to seem to affect the Victory of a Confutation. But our Friend urged me to bring some one Argument, that might decisively conclude the Point. It came into my Mind, (waving what I had objected elsewhere,) to allege against it, that A First Principle must be some One Determinate Proposition; whereas it was Evident that this Principle of yours had in it Two, and those very Different ones. For, [Cogito] is a Speech that Affirms, which Logicians call a Proposition; and involves in it all the Three Parts that complete such a Speech, being clearly the same as [Ego sum Cogitans;] as [Sum,] for the same Reason, implies, [Ego sum Existens;] which is evidently a Proposition too, and Distinct from the other. Your Answer was, That, notwithstanding the manner of Expression, they made, or amounted to but One Proposition; and signified no more but [Ego sum re Cogitans.] But I replied, That this was the First Proposition; and hence I a●k, What becomes of the Later, [Ego sum Existens,] since the Predicate [Existens,] is a quite different Notion from the Predicate [Res Cogitans.] Add, that to prove himself Existent, was the sole Scope Cartesius aimed at in laying this Principle; as appears by his Words immediately following; viz. [Nondum tamen satis intelligo quisnam sim Ego ille qui jam necessario sum.] He does not pretend to have evinced that he was Res Cogitans, but only necessarily Existent. To enforce this the more, I alleged, that the Illative Particle [Ergo] did show plainly, that there were Two Propositions; of which, the One was an Antecedent; the Other, a Consequent. But you would not allow that [Ergo,] in that place, had an Illative Signification; nor, as far as I could discern, any at all; for, I am sure, if it has any, it can have no Other. I remember, you bestirred your Wit as dexterously as any Man could in such a Cause, to bring off Cartesius; but 'tis beyond the Power of Wit, or Art, to do it, unless the most pregnant and significant Words which Rational Creatures can use, must, for his sake, lose their Signification. Which is such an Injury to the rest of Mankind, who would be at a strange Loss to discourse or understand one another, were this admitted, that it will never be allowed by other Philosophers, who are Disinteressed, and have not that Passionate Concern for Cartesius, as some others seem to have. I remember, Mr. Le Grand tells us, he has spoke to some Exceptions made against this Principle formerly, and, perhaps, this may be one of them. But, as I could not light on that Book of his, so I clearly see, this Particular is so manifest, that 'tis impossible for any Man, in such a Case as this, to answer to the purpose.  
47. And thus ended our Discourse; In which, if you had any Disadvantage, it proceeded hence, that you would needs undertake to defend Cartesius' Logic: Whereas, nothing is more Evident, than that, in the far greatest part of his Meditations, (not to speak of some other pieces of his,) he regarded no Rules of Logic at all; but merely followed the Current of his own Ingenious Thoughts, in gliding smoothly and gently, from one Thing, to another, as his First Design led him, and in putting his Conceptions Clearly; I mean, according to the First sort of Clearness, mentioned above, §. 35. The Sum is this; Without Propositions, we cannot speak; and, without Illative Particles, we cannot make use of our Rationality; both which, notwithstanding, you do not seem very willingly and heartily to admit. Had I been of your Party, I should have advised you to have flatly denied all Syllogisms, Inferences, Antecedents, Consequents; and, in a Word, all Logic, and all kind of Connexion, and then it had been impossible for any Man to Attack you, or bring any Argument against you; I add, nor you any for yourselves.  
48. The Generality of Mankind (I wish I might not say, of Philosophers too) being much governed by Fancy, I am to expect, such a High Speculation as is the foregoing Discourse, will scarce find a Civil Entertainment amongst such Gentlemen. However, I hope it will not displease them, if, on this Occasion, I ask them some few pertinent Questions; leaving the Resolving them to themselves. 1. Whether there be not such Propositions; as those I call Identical? 2. Whether Mathematicians, and some others, who treat of Philosophy in a Mathematical Method, have not proposed such before me, and made use of them? 3. Whether such Propositions are not the most-firmly-Grounded, and the First of all others? 4. Whether they are not Self-evident, and force the Assent of all Mankind? 5. Whether we can be Deceived in judging them Self-evident; as we may, and often are, in Judging that we Clearly and Distinctly know a thing to be True? 6. Whether they have not an Universal Influence, in their Way, over all Truths, especially all Deduced Truths; since 'tis Demonstrable, that all the Force of Consequence is Grounded on them? 7. Whether, all these Qualifications being shown to be found in the Self-evident Knowableness of Identical Propositions, this Clearest Light, or Intelligibility, which so necessarily appears in them, ought not, with just Right, entitle Them to be held the RULE by which to know all other Truths? Lastly, Whether this Self-evident Connexion of the Terms of a Proposition, found in them, which is Producible openly, be not a Clear Means to show to others, that we do not mistake when we judge them Self evident, and True; since all Mankind that sees them Produced, must think the same of them we do? And, whether, on the other side, it can possibly be shown to others, that ourselves do Clearly and Distinctly know a Thing to be True, without producing finally some Proposition that is Unmistakable and Self-evident to Every Man? When they have duly weighed each of these Particulars, and the Proofs brought for them, I appeal from their Fancy, to their Reason, whether I have not done a Just and Necessary Duty to Philosophy, in endeavouring to settle the Rule of Truth upon so Solid and Evident a Basis; and, whether I could have been less Speculative in such a High Subject, as requires a Deep Inspection into the very Centre of all Truth whatever, even to the Resolving it Finally and Connaturally, into Essential Truth itself? If these Considerations do not acquit me upon either Account, I cannot but think myself Unjustly Condemned; and, I hope, the whole Court of Philosophers, who are Impartial, and Sincere, will judge the same.  
49. To clear me from Singularity in this Uncommon Method of Philosophising, I could farther allege, that Mr. Locke, in his Essay, B. 4. ch. 1. §. 4. gives us this Doctrine; that The First Act of the Mind, is, to perceive its own Ideas; and, that One of them is not Another; that is, that each of them is its self only; which is an Identical Proposition.— That this is so Absolutely Necessary, that, without it, there could be no Knowledge, no Reasoning,— no Distinct Thoughts at all. Which sufficiently expresses it to be the First Truth, or RULE of TRUTH, which influences all other Truths; since, without it, nothing at all could be known.— That a Man infallibly knows that the Ideas of White, and Round, are the very Ideas they are.— That this is the First Agreement, or Disagreement, (that is, the First Truth,) the Mind perceives in its Ideas.— That Men of Art have, for ready Application in all Cases, reduced this into those General Rules, [What is, is,] etc. In all which, (as he does in divers other main Speculative Points,) he so perfectly agrees with me, that, tho' I did not proceed on my own Grounds, I need no more but these of his, to draw such Immediate Consequences thence, as would establish and abet my Thesis. Indeed, it did not lie in the Way of that very Learned Man's Speculation, to reflect on the Universal Influence Identical Propositions have over all Truths, and all Knowledges, whatever; and therefore, his Dislike of them afterwards, (chap. 8.) can be thought to relate only to their apprehended Uselessness: Tho', even there, (§. 2.) he acknowledges an Excellent Use of them too; where he says, that [What is, is,] may serve sometimes, (he might have said, Always when it needed,) to show a Man the Absurdity he is Guilty of, when, by Circumlocution, or Ambiguous Terms, he would, in particular Instances, deny the same Thing of itself; because no body will so openly bid Defiance to Common Sense, as to affirm Visible and Direct Contradictions, in plain Words. To which Reflection of his, if this Learned Gentleman pleases to add, That whoever discourses False on any Subject, does, at the same time, make that Subject not to be what it is, or (if the Question be of some Mode) as it is; his Penetrative Judgement cannot but discern, that Identical Propositions are Equally Useful in all Questions, all Disputes, nay, all Discourses whatsoever, if the Way of Reducing Inferior Truths to Them, were but well improved, and cultivated.  
50. I much value your good Opinion; and, I perceived, I was in danger of losing it, by a hint you gave me, with a Dis-relishing Air, that I called Cartesius a Fanatic; which you thought very harsh. In Answer, I deny the Charge. 'Tis one Thing to say, that, when Cartesius was laying his Method to Science, by denying his Senses, and divesting himself of all his former Knowledges, which (as my Author expresses it) was no less than to Unman himself, he fell, for some few Days, into a Spice of Enthusiasm; nay, was brimful of it; and fancied he had Visions and Revelations; so that he seemed Crack-brained, or to have drunk a Cup too much; which are the very Words a Cartesian, who wrote his Life, has given us, (p. 34, 35, 36.) And, 'tis another Thing to say, he was habitually a Fanatic, or Enthusiast, all his Life, and in every Action he did, or Book he writ; the Former of which can neither be denied with Truth, nor the Later objected with any Degree of Modesty: Nor does it suit with the high Character I have given of him, in the Preface to my Method, and the Encomiums I have, upon Occasion, bestowed on divers of his Books. I beseech you, Sir, be so Just, as to stare my Case right. I was writing a METHOD to SCIENCE, and two other Methods, (if, indeed, they do not fall into the same,) which looked very Extravagant, did lie cross my Way; which, unless I removed, my whole Design had been spoiled, and of no Effect. I mean, that of Malbranche, which makes all Humane Science come by Divine Revelation: And, that of Cartesius, that we must deny all our Knowledge of Natural Truths, had by our Senses. The settling this Later Method, had, confessedly, lost Cartesius his Wits, for some time; and therefore, I had good reason to fear, that the following the same Method might do a greater Mischief to others, who had not such Strong Brains as that Great Man had; of which too, there do not want Instances. The former Method, advanced by Malbranche, I saw evidently, brought a kind of Fanaticism into Philosophy. For, I believe, no Man doubts, but that the Genius of fanatics is, to overleap all Humane Means, and to pretend that their Light of Knowledge comes to them immediately from GOD. My Fault, then, only consisted in this, that I was such a Friend to Truth, and to Mankind, as to endeavour (to my Power) to avert such Mischiefs from young Students, by forewarning them of what had prejudiced others, and therefore might highly prejudice them; and, to confute those Ways to Science, that so directly thwarted mine, which, my best Judgement told me, was the True one. Now, this being a Task so Unavoidable to one in my Circumstances; and the Confuting such strange Methods being, with good Reason, judged by me to be so Beneficial to others, it cannot, without Rashness, be thought, I did this out of a Desire of Opposing other Learned Men; but, purely out of Duty to my Reader, and a just Regard to myself. Yet, for pursuing this Laudable and (in my Case) Necessary Intention, I am persecuted with the highest Malice, by two overzealous Cartesians; who, to uphold these Awkward and Pernicious Methods, make no Scruple to break in upon the most Sacred Methods of Christianity; tho' I have done no more but cite the Words of their own Authors. Besides, every Candid Reader will, hence, easily discern, that it is not out of Pique against their Persons; but, purely, out of my Dislike of their Unprincipled and Dangerous Methods, that I have opposed them at all. Nor have I any Personal Reflections upon their Morality: Nor do I charge them with Impiety, but of Folly; which every Antagonist in Philosophical Debates is forced to object to his Adversary.  
51. But, am I the only Man, of our Moderns here in England, who have thought it the Interest of Philosophy, and of Truth, to oppose Malbranche and Cartesius? Mr. john Keyll, of Oxford; a Person of Great Wit, and Greater Hopes, being (as I am informed) scarce arrived yet at the Summer of his Age, has lately put forth An Examination of Dr. Burnet's Theory of the Earth; where, after he had, in his Introduction, discovered the Fopperies of divers of the Ancient Philosophers; and of three of our Moderns, Spinoza, Dr. More, and Mr. Hobbs, not much less Ridiculous than the former; he lays open that superlatively absurd Opinion of Malbranche, which I noted above. He gives us a Summary, and Parallel Consequences, of his Doctrine in that particular; which is, That We see not the Things themselves, but only their Ideas, which the Soul sees in GOD:— And, that there is no possibility of seeing any Bodies, except in that Being, (GOD;) which contains them after an Intelligible manner.— Bodies, therefore, and their Properties, are (only) seen in GOD; so that (says he) a Man who reads this Book, does not really see the Book itself, but the Idea of it, which is in GOD. Which he deservedly characters, to be Unintelligible jargon, and a Solid piece of Nonsense. He exposes that equally-senseless Opinion, That Bodies, of their own Nature, are neither heard, seen, smelled, nor tasted; and, that when, for Example, we Taste any thing, the Body Tasted cannot produce any Savour in us; but GOD Almighty takes that Occasion, to stir up that Sensation in us, to which the Body does not really concur. So that Mankind has, it seems, quite lost its Animality; at least, that we are not Naturally Sensitive Creatures, but only Supernaturally; or, by GOD's Immediate Power making us such, every time we are to use our Senses. He proceeds: According to him, it is impossible for any Man to move his own Arm; but, when he is Willing to move it, GOD takes it, and moves it up and down, as the Man Wills. If a Rebellious Son, or Subject, murder his Father, or his Prince, by stabbing him, the Man himself does not thrust the Poniard into his Father's or Prince's Breast, But GOD Almighty does it, without any other Concurrence of the Man, but his Will. It seems, our Laws are very Unjust; which do not Hang Men for merely Intending, or Willing; but for Ouvert- Acts; in which the Man himself has no hand at all; they being, all of them, entirely of GOD's doing. Whence we see, that, with the Cartesians, such Doctrine as this has no Impiety in it at all against GOD: It comes from Them, and so 'tis all Sacred. He proceeds, and affirms that no Second Causes act: So that no Body, tho' moved with never so great a Velocity against another, can be able to drive that other before it, or move it in the least; but GOD takes that Occasion, to put it into Motion. At this rate, one need not fear his Head-piece, tho' a Bomb were falling upon it, with all the Force that Powder can give it; for, it would not so much as break his Skull, or sing his Hair, of GOD did not take that Occasion to do it.— The most Natural Agents, with him, are not so much as Instruments, but only Occasions of what is produced by them: So that a Man might freely pass through the Fire, or jump down a Precipice, without any Harm, if GOD Almighty did not take that Occasion to burn him, or dash out his Brains.  
52. Coming to Cartesius, whom he calls the Great Master and Deliverer of the Philosophers, from the Tyranny of Aristotle;— and the First World-Maker of our Century, he lays the Blame at his door, of all this presumptuous Pride of his Followers, and their Fantastic Philosophy; and animadverts severely upon divers of his odd Placita: As, that there is always the same Quantity of Motion in the World. So that, if all the Men and Animals in the World were Moving, which most part of them can do when they please; yet, still there would be no more Motion in the World, than there is in the Nighttime, when they are at Rest; and, what Motion they had when they were Moving, must be communicated to the Aether, when they are at Rest. And, whereas Cartesius ' s Skill in Geometry gave those Contrivances of his Witty Fancy all their Credit, this Author assures us, p. 15. that, from the beginning to the end of his Principles, there is not one Demonstration drawn from Geometry; or, indeed, any Demonstration at all, except every Thing illustrated by a Figure be a Demonstration; for, then, indeed, there may be enough of such Demonstrations produced in his Philosophical Works. Now, in case this be so, then, it seems, Explications by Figures do serve Cartesius, and his Followers, for Demonstrations in Geometry, as well as Explications by Words serve them for Demonstrations, or Proofs, in other Sciences.— He adds, that, His great Fault was, that he made no Use at all of Geometry in Philosophy.— Nay, that His whole System was but one continual Blunder, upon account of his Negligence in that Point.— That Galileo and Kepler have by the Help of Geometry, discovered Physical Truths, more worth than all Cartesius' Volumes of Philosophy. He confutes his Vortices, by Mr. Newton's Principles; who shows it impossible, upon many Accounts; that the Earth, and other Planets, should move in a Vortex. With which most Consummate Geometrician, I believe, none of the Cartesians will be willing, or able, to grapple, or contend. And, were Cartesius now alive, perhaps he would have as much admired Him, as Himself, in his Life-time, was admired by others.— He subjoins, that, His Notion of a Vortex being ruined, the whole Cartesian System must of necessity fall to the Ground: And, that World, whose Origination he pretended to have deduced from Mechanical Principles, must be a wild Chimaera of his own Imagination. Cartesius' Discourse about the Motion of the Moon, is so notoriously False, that there is no Almanac-maker, but can demonstrate the contrary. Farther, That the Cartesians pretend to give a true Account of all the Phaenomena in Nature; whilst they understand so very little, that they have not given us an Explication of any one Thing:— And, that Cartesius has blundered so much in the easiest, and most abstract Things in Nature, that of the Seven Rules he has given of the Laws of Motion, there is but One of them True. Cartesius' Fancy of Making a World by Mechanical Principles,— has given the Ignorant Atheists (for, so are, says he, most of that Persuasion) some plausible Pretences for their Incredulity, without any Real Ground. Where the the Parenthesis lays such a Blemish on the greater Part of the Followers of Cartesius, and on his Doctrine, as occasioning it, that, as I have charitably endeavoured, in divers places, to wipe off that Aspersion, and have taken their part; so, I am sorry to see now, that 'tis beyond my Power to do it. I must own, that there have been many Virtuous Persons, Cartesians; but I am not so well versed in their Catalogue, as to to know, whether they, or the Athèists of that Persuasion, do make the Major Part. These are his present Objections against Des Cartes; and, by what I have read of this Learned Author, I know no Man more likely to make good what he has charged upon him, than He is.  
53. You see, Sir, how much it behoves the Cartesians to look to their Hits, if they have any; and, to arm themselves against such brisk Attacks, tending to the Overthrow of all their Hypothesis by way of Geometry; which I have attempted to do by way of Logical, Physical, and Metaphysical Principles. For, if this Opposition to Cartesius, by Geometrical Arguments, should come to be a Confutation; then, since Mr. Le Grand tells us, his Physics is but a Part of the Mathematics, his Credit, as a Philosopher, will sink utterly; as I am informed, the Esteem of his Doctrine does, by large degrees, in both the Universities; or rather, it is quite vanished out of one of them already.  
54. For my part, let them come off with the Geometricians as well as they can, I will not give them much Trouble; but, do sincerely declare, that if they can bring any one Evident Principle, either in Logic, Physics or Metaphysics, which they will vouch to have the Nature of a Principle in it; and prove that it abets any Point of their Doctrine, as 'tis distinguished from ours, I will cross the Cudgels for the next Comer, and promise, never to oppose them more. Fairer Offer was never made; nor any Method ever proposed, that shows a greater Sincerity of the Proposer in pursuing Truth, nor that can be more Decisive of a Philosophical Contest; in which, half a Sheet of Paper will do the Business, as well as whole Volumes. You see, Sir, I allow my Adversaries a large Field; out of which they may please to pick and cull what they like best, or judge they can best prove. If they know of any thing that grows there, which will bear the Test, and can approve itself by Principles, to be an Evident Truth, they have Free Liberty, and a fair Occasion to do Right to themselves, and oblige the World; and, withal, they will do Me an Especial Favour, (for which I shall not be Ungrateful,) in making me, by their Confutation, see a Truth I never knew before. This very Compendious Method, I say, will shorten Disputes, avoid all show of Wrangling, which is grateful to no Man; and, finally conclude the whole Cause. Or, if this does not please them; and, that it agrees not with their Genius to stand bringing Evident Proofs; then, let them but merely name, or put down Categorically, any one Principle of theirs, which they judge to be the Strongest, and most Evident, of any they have; and, which they will vouch to be Influential upon the Cartesian Doctrine; and I will undertake to Demonstrate, that either it is no Principle, or, that it has no Force to prove any Point of their Doctrine, nor has any Influence upon it at all. In case this Rational Proposal (which, if both Parties do candidly seek Truth, ought rather to be called an Overture of Peace, than a Challenge) be as friendly Accepted as it is meant, it must needs draw upon us both the Eyes of all Learned Men who are Lovers of Truth, and are Weary of Long Disputes; especially, if they be concerned to know whether the so much famed Philosophy of Cartesius be Solidly Principled, or only Extravagantly Witty: And, their Expectation will be strangely raised, to see what will be the Issue of a Controversy thus closely managed; our Philosophical Combat being, by this means, brought to the Last Trial, and a Final Decision by Principles, which are the Arma Decretoria or Truth. For, if it shall hap to appear that Cartesius' Doctrine has not so much as any One Principle, which is truly such, their Cause will be quite lost, past hopes of Recovery: But, if it subsists by Principles, than I must make them Satisfaction, by acknowledging publicly, that I have foolishly overweened▪ and take the Shame to myself, for my Rash Presumption. We may confine ourselves (as I said) to half a Sheet of Paper: All shall be transacted by pure Dint of Reason; and, he that uses the least Uncivil Word to his Adversary, and falls into Passion, shall be held to have lost his Cause, and to be reduced to a Nonplus. Every Man, acquainted with Humane Affairs, knows that, in some Cases, [Responsum non dictum,] may be a sufficient Plea to justify one who is to vindicate his Christian Credit, unjustly attacked, without any Provocation given to his Opposer. It happens too, often times, that a Man cannot clear himself fully of those Blemishes with which he is aspersed, but by laying them at the Door of the Injurious Affronter; whose Faults, if they be Great ones, cannot be so much as named, but the Words which express them must needs sound harshly. Retorted Language, in such a Case, is only the Rebound of the Aggressor's Violent Strokes, upon Himself; and are not thrown at him, but only Reverberated from an Object incapable to receive their Impression. But, especially, such a Replier is excusable, when he observes such a Temper and Measure, that he imputes no Impiety or Irreligion to his Adversary; but rather, charitably excuses him from any such high Crimes, even tho' he had causelessly, and uncharitably, imputed the same to himself; which (as I hope every Man will observe) is the distinguishing Character between Mr. Le Grand's Aggressive, and my Defensive. Notwithstanding, however such a Carriage against an Assaulter may, in Prudence, seem sometimes unavoidable; yet, certainly, it is, in itself, neither Edifying to good Christians, Instructive to the Learned, nor Profitable to the Readers. Therefore, to avoid it for the future, and to clear Truth, which ought to be our only Care, I have thought fit to make this Fairest and Civilest Overture. If it be accepted, neither Party, in case they do seek Truth, can be justly displeased. But if it be refused, and that my Opposers resolve to pursue their former Rude Method, I shall hope that all Wise and Good Men will hold me Excused, (I dare say, yourself will,) if I decline the Ungrateful Task of Reciprocating the Saw of Contention; but let them still wrangle on contentedly to themselves, and apply my Thoughts to better Things.  
55. It remains, Worthy Sir, that I beg your Pardon for Publishing this Paper, without acquainting you first with my Design. But, since you are not named in it, it need not concern you in the least, unless you please yourself. Besides, I have discoursed with other Cartesians, of your Profession, upon the same Subject; and, added, for their sakes, some Passages, which, otherwise, had not needed: So that it cannot particularise you, in the least. And, since this Paper has no other Tendency, but to clear Truth, I have reason to presume, that your Candour would not have been displeased at it. I entreat you to do me that Justice in your Thoughts, as not to interpret this Address, by way of Letter, to be a kind of Challenge, or Provocation. I am too well acquainted with the Study and Practise, in which you are so Laudably and Successfully. employed, to think it can allow you any Leisure for an Avocation so Impertinent to your Proper and Precise Business. I hope my [Ideae Cartesianae Expensae] may give you Satisfaction in divers other Points. But, I must bespeak your Pardon, while you peruse it, for the many Errata. It happened, that the Compositor understood no Latin; and (besides other Faults,) in two or three places, he happed to put in what I had blotted out in amending my Copy; and, my Circumstances were such, that I could not always be in Town, to correct the Press. I am,  
Honoured SIR, Your Sincere Friend, and Humble Servant, J. S.   
FINIS.  

Some Books Printed for, and Sold by Abel Roper, at the Black-Boy, over against St. Dunstan's Church in Fleetstreet.  
SOlid Philosophy Asserted, against the Fancies of the Ideists: Or, The Method to Science farther Illustrated. With Reflections on Mr. Locke's Essay concerning Humane Understanding. By I. S.  
The History of Poland, in several Letters to Persons of Quality; in Two Volumes: Comprehending an Account of the Form of Government in that Kingdom; King's Power, Court and Revenues, the Senate, Senators, and all other Officers; Of the Religion, Diet, and Little Diets, with other Assemblies and Courts; Of the Inter-regnum and Election, and Coronation of the King and Queen, with all the Ceremonies; Of the present Condition of the Gentry and Commonalty, as likewise, of the Genius, Characters, Languages, Customs and Manners, Military Affairs, Trades and Riches of the Poles: Together with an Account of the City of Dantzic's Origin, Progress, and Present State of the Teutonick Order, and the Succession of all its Great Masters: Of the present State of Learning, Natural Knowledge, Practice of Physic, and Diseases, in Poland: And, Lastly, A Succinct Description of the Duchy of Curland, and the Livonian Order; with a Series of the several Dukes, and Provincial Masters. With a Table for both Volumes; and a Sculpture of the Diet, in their Session. By Bernard Connor, M. D. etc. Composed and Published by Mr. Savage.  
Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion, in reference to Civil Society. Written by Samuel Pussendorff, Counsellor of State to the late King of Sweden. Translated from the Original.  
Marriage-Ceremonies: Or, The Ceremonies used in Marriage in all Parts of the World. Very diverting, especially to Ladies. By Signior Gaya. Translated from the Italian. The Second Edition: With an Addition of Remarks on Marriage; by Mr. Brown.  
A Defence of Dramatic Poetry: Being a Review of Mr. Collier's View of the Stage. In Two Parts.  
A Voyage to the East-Indies: Giving an Account of the Isles of Madagascar and Mascareigne, of Suratte, the Coast of Malabar, of Goa, Cameron, Ormus, and the Coast of Brasil; with the Religion, Customs, Trade, etc. of the Inhabitants. As also, A Treatise of the Distempers peculiar to the Eastern Countries. To which is annexed, An Abstract of Mr. de Rennefort's History of the East-Indies: With his Propositions of the Improvement of the East-India Company.  
The New Atlas: or, Travels and Voyages in Europe, Asia, Africa and America; through the most Renowned Parts of the World, viz. From England to the Dardanelles, thence to Constantinople, Egypt, Palestine, or The Holy Land, Syria, Mesopotamia, Choldea, Persia, East-India, China, Tartary, Moscovy and Poland; the Germane Empire, Flanders and Holland; to Spain, and the West-Indies: With a brief Account of Ethiopia; and the Pilgrimages to Mecha and Medina in Arabia, containing what is Rare, and worthy of Remarks, in those vast Countries; relating to Building, Antiquities; Religion, Manners, Customs, Princes Courts, Affairs Military and Civil, or whatever else is worthy of Note. Performed by an English Gentleman, in 9 Years Travels, more Exact than ever.