THE WISDOM OF Public Piety DISCOURSED, IN A SERMON PREACHED Before the Right Honourable THE Lord MAYOR and aldermans Of the CITY of LONDON, At the GUILD-HALL Chappel, Septemb. xxviii. 1679.  
By EDMUND SERMON, Master of ARTS, and late of St. Mary HALL. in OXFORD.  
LONDON, Printed for Walter Kettilby, at the Bishop's Head in St. Paul's Churchyard, 1679.   

giving the assistance of Your favour to the Discourse which is here offered to You. It is a Discourse which came forth with as great disadvantages as can well be supposed; the composing of it being incommoded with the weakness of an obscure Author; and the delivery of it obstruded by such an indisposition, as for a space deprived him of the use of memory and speech. An accident which as it was unhappy in giving a disturbance to such an Auditory; so possibly it might have the good effect upon some minds, to make the impressions of some things upon them more deep and effectual. However, what it was Your patience first to stay for, it was Your goodness afterwards candidly to interpret. And I wish that the Discourse which could not be so well heard, were more worthy of Your sight and perusal. But such as it is, I humbly Dedicate to Your favourable acceptance, as an imperfect description of that Moderation and Prudence; which, as it hath made Your Government of a Great City so useful and advantageous to it, in a tumultuous and distracted Time; so may it ever continue to be as successful to promote the benefit of Public Peace and Order: which is the Prayer of  
RIGHT HONOURABLE, Your most humbly devoted in all Observance, EDMUND SERMON.   

A SERMON ON JAM. III. XIII. Who is a wise man, and endued with knowledge amongst you? let him show out of a good conversation his works with meekness of wisdom.  
THe reasonable Soul being the excellency of Man's nature, and wisdom and knowledge the perfection of that; no wonder that all who have any respect for themselves, and that value the honour of their Creation, should ardently affect those accomplishments of the mind, or at least the opinion and repute of them.  
It was not without good reason, that our Saviour declared the highest punishment to be due to him who should say to another, Thou fool [Mat. 5.22.] that he particularly said concerning such a reproacher of his neighbour, that he was in danger of Hell-fire. Because the imputing of folly to a man, being in effect to degrade him from his manhood, and to rank him with a lower sort of creatures that are void of reason, as it is a reflection upon God's workmanship, so it hath ever been by the universal resentment of mankind, taken for one of the most unsufferable affronts and provocations that can be given.  
So that nothing is more apt to dissolve all the ties, and destroy all the endearments of common friendship, to stir up the malignity of choler and indignation, and consequently to produce all the mischiefs ensuing thereupon. Nothing doth sooner exasperate men to variance, and engage them in the most irreconcilable quarrels and bloody combats.  
For the most mean and degenerate spirit is even to impatience sensible of the infamy of ignorance and indiscretion. And generally to tax men with lack of wit, is more unpardonable than to brand them with want of honesty. 'Tis safer to impeach their morality than their understanding; and to disparage their judgement is a more intolerable offence, than with the severest reflections to expose their conscience. And the reason is, because to those who have any conscience, the depriving them of reason is the same thing as the denying them religion; nay, 'tis the same thing as to make them beasts, which are uncapable of the impressions of Divinity. And as for those who have no conscience, those very men think it their interest to preserve a reputation of policy and cunning, albeit they seldom use it, but to carry them through such actions as are unconscionable.  
But though the World hath so much fondness and concern for the title of wisdom, and esteems it to be so very glorious and reverend; yet the unhappiness of it is, that the most of men run away with the empty name of wisdom, not knowing what particular thing is intended by it. Some general and confused conceit they have of something that is very excellent and noble; but being ignorant of the specialty wherein it consists, they commonly run counter to their own aims, and flee from wisdom whilst they aspire towards it. And seeing truth is but one, and the opposite mistakes are infinite; 'tis no wonder that men should invent as many ways to be wise, as they have of showing themselves vain and imprudent; no wonder that in this case their errors should be manifold, when rightly to pursue wisdom argues some possession of it, and nothing but discretion can truly inform us what itself is.  
Now in this variety of humane imaginations, the wisdom of God interposeth its direction and umpirage; and to relieve the weakness of our minds, and to prevent the uncertainty and extravagance of our choice, gives us a distinct notion of the wisdom which is properly so called; that so we might not be lost in the maze of our own thoughts, but might clearly discern the way and method, by which we may successfully steer towards that great attainment.  
But seeing wisdom directs us to that which is our crown and ornament; and seeing the glory of the best capacity lies in that exercise of it, into which life and action reduceth it; and seeing withal that every honourable employment is managed by proper rules and laws; 'tis easy to be conceived that such instructions as reach to the truth of wisdom, must extend to the due conduct and government of our actions.  
And farther, in that the most perfect of our actions are those that are public, and that is most answerable to our capacity which we do in relation to our common league and society with the rest of mankind, it follows, that no precepts come up to the height of wisdom, but those that teach us rightly to compose and order our conversation in the World. And therefore according to these measures St. James resolves that important question, To whom the character of wisdom and knowledge truly belongs? as it is plainly expressed in the words of the Text, Who is a wise man, etc.  
Where we need not stand critically to dispute, whether the Apostle meant, that a good conversation tempered with meekness is a demonstration of wisdom and knowledge; or that wisdom and knowledge oblige and direct men to such a conversation; it being in effect the same, which sense of the two we take; because if a good conversation be a proof of wildom, then wisdom must oblige and direct us to it: and if wisdom doth oblige and direct us to such a conversation, nothing without that conversation can be a proof of wisdom.  
And therefore to proceed; Two things are to be considered in the words. 

1.) That a good conversation is a principal sign of a wise and understanding man.  
(2.) That meekness is an essential part of that good conversation which denominates a man truly wise and knowing.    
(1.) A good conversation is a principal sign of a wise and understanding man. This will appear evident whether we consult the Principles, 

(1.) Of that wisdom which is revealed; Or,  
(2.) Of that which is natural.    
(1.) If we consult the principles of that wisdom which is revealed. For this wisdom teacheth us, that as our life was not given us by our own power, so it is not to be spent to our own purposes.  
God hath made us sociable Creatures, and fitted us for conversing with those of our own frame; and therefore, not to have correspondence with those in whose nature we communicate, that is, not to perform those Offices for them which we are capable of doing, is to contradict the end of our Creation.  
The fairest pretence that can be made for men's withdrawing themselves from humane intercourse, and addicting themselves to solitude and retirement is this, that thereby they have freedom for those contemplations, from which company and business doth divert them.  
But what I pray are those Contemplations? If they are such nice and subtle things as exhaust men's age and strength, and at last leave their Judgements unresolved, and their Virtue unimproved; I know no man of whom they are required, but contrariwise they are forbidden to all. But as for such as are more necessary and useful to the government of a Man's life, there needs no such long time to be spent for satisfaction about them. And as they are made obvious by an ordinary diligence, so when they are sully comprehended by one, it is his duty to impart them to others.  
This, if any lover of privacy, and his own thoughts neglect as a thing not incumbent upon him; 'tis plain that he transgresseth the rules of that common justice, which if others should as little regard as himself, the world could not subsist. For, is not the Man who museth in his Cell, beholden to others for his temporal support? Do his lofty speculations and curious inquiries provide the Bread that he eats, or the  he puts on? If then he receive such benefit from the labours of other Men, common justice requires that according to his capacity he should make them some recompense. And no way is so convenient for making them a requital, as the allowing them the advantage of his Christian conversation with them.  
'Tis true, Men may be allowed to live recluse for a season, in order to the preparing of themselves for a public Office, so John the Baptist was in the Defarts until the time of his showing unto Israel. [Luk. 1.80.] So the Schools of the Prophets were places sequestered from common familiarity and business, and dedicated to the study of useful knowledge, such as might put them into the best capacity to receive the gift of prophecy, and the admonitions of God.  
But then that gift in the Jewish Church was ordained for the benefit and edification of others, as well as it was afterwards in the Christian. So that notwithstanding the instance alleged, he that conceals himself within a Cloyfter, and devotes himself to a perpetuity of solitariness, doth manifestly oppose the designs of privacy; he makes that his end which was only his way, confounds his education with his employment, and takes up his rest in that secrecy and retirement which was intended to fit him for the discharge of some public trust.  
But if it be incumbent upon Men to be of public spirits, and to do their Generation service; and consequently to be of sociable tempers, and to converse with their Neighbours; 'tis as requisite that their conversation should be good. For it were better that we had no communication at all with Men, than that it should be such as corrupts good manners. And how much it is our wisdom by what hath been dictated to us in the Gospel, to walk honestly and without blame, is evident from hence, that the wrath of God is revealed from Heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness, [Rom. 1.18.] and that the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from Heaven with his mighty Angels, in flaming Fire, taking vengeance of them that know not God, and that obey not the Gospel, [2 Thess. 1.7, 8.] So that according to the Principles of Christianity, 'tis our greatest wisdom to be of an upright conversation; because the contrary is our damnation. And to show how deplorable a state of misery it is to which an evil conversation leaves us liable, our Saviour hath plainly told us, [Mat. 18.6.] that whoso shall offend, that is, scandalise, or by wicked practice make to offend one of those little ones that believe in him; it were better for him that a Millstone were hung about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depth of the Sea. All which he will find to be true, when he is cast into the Lake that burns with Fire and Brimstone.  
But a good conversation is not an argument of wisdom, as wisdom is only taken for a zealous care of our own welfare; but also as it implies strength of reason, and soundness of judgement to take right methods, that this welfare may be secured. For Religion doth not wholly consist in being affectionately concerned for that which is ultimately to be desired; but it requires soberness of mind, regularity of thought, and an understanding well informed, such as is of ability to apprehend, and propose what is really conducive to our great advantage.  
And what necessity there is of a Man's being very judicious, in order to his being capable of a good conversation, will appear upon more accounts than one. For if we consider the frailties to which we ourselves are subject; if we call to mind how many vain and enchanting fancies, how many strong and pre-engaged affections, how many subtle insinuations of our enemy, and how many surprising temptations of the World, do continually besiege us, to bring us into bondage to folly and vice, we cannot but acknowledge that there is need of very great prudence and foresight, of the most serious consideration, and of the most stayed and watchful mind, to escape the dangers wherewith we are encompassed. And he that by shunning all those snares can approve himself a Christian, doth certainly show himself to be a very great Man.  
Again, one great law of Christian conversation, is that we walk charitably, with respect and compassion towards our weak Brethren. So that no Man's conversation is unblameable but his, who doth nothing whereby he causeth his Neighbour to offend. This is plainly and fully determined by the Apostle, [1 Cor. 8.] where he states that great case of conscience, of eating things offered in sacrifice to Idols. For [v. 4.] he grants, that the thing in itself is not absolutely sinful: because he that knew that an Idol was nothing in the World, and that there was but one true God, might eat of those meats as the gift of that God, giving thanks to him, and not paying any worship and honour to the Idol: But then he tells us [v. 7.] that the taking of this liberty might be prejudicial to some weak persons, who having not so much judgement to distinguish as others, might by their example be encouraged to eat with conscience of the Idol, as the expression runs, that is, with some portion at least of that respect which the Heathens gave to their Idols in their Festivals.  
And the general rule that presides in this case holds no less in all the parts of a Christian's life: For in every action 'tis his duty to consult, not only the integrity of his own conscience, but also the safety of his Neighbours; and he is by the strictest law of religion bound upon pain of damnation, to abstain from any public act, which by a probability of consequence and natural tendency may induce his Neighbour to commit a sin.  
And where a Man is bound to walk so circumspectly, there is need of very good discretion to make all things regular. He that must consider all the weakness of others, and use caution that the ignorant may not be ensnared by his practice, must very well forecast in his mind what may be the circumstances and events of actions; and this argues no small dexterity of reason.  
Nay farther, Christianity doth not only oblige us to consult the condition of the simple, but of the froward too. We may not transact at any rate as we please, with those who are of crooked tempers. When they are unreasonable, we must be discreet; and when they are mad and outrageous, we must be calm and moderate. Just men must not slander, revile and threaten, or exercise revenge and cruelty, because the Sons of Belial do so. The man of God, of what condition soever, must be gentle and patiented. But when a Man is assaulted with insolent provocations, not to be discomposed and transported so as to act any thing unbeseeming the gravity of his judgement, or the dignity of his place, is certainly an argument of a most admirable prudence, and demonstrates the government and command of himself to be very singular.  
(2.) If we consult the principles of that wisdom which is natural, a good conversation will appear to be a principal sign of a wise and understanding Man. And that upon Two accounts.  
(1.) Because a good conversation doth most conduce to a Man's preservation.  
(2.) Because that administers the truest satissaction.  
(1.) Because it doth most conduce to a Man's preservation.  
And because I would not have my arguments to be precarious, or give occasion to any to say that they take the advantage of a popular prejudice and opinion; I shall beg your leave to discourse it a little, as if I supposed myself to have to do with those to whom Scripture and Gospel is no authority.  
To proceed then: 'Tis possible that many are not so well acquainted with the Fundamental maxims of truth and reason, and the course and government of the World, or have not so good a faculty to draw conclusions from those Principles, as by the strength of their own reasoning to find out a God to whom belongs Power and Judgement. But then 'tis as certain, that by all the sophistry and speculation imaginable, no Man is able to prove that there is no such Being, as governs and gives laws now, and will hereafter reward and punish Men according as their conversations have been good or evil. And therefore a state of virtue is in wisdom to be preferred before that of vice, upon the score of safety and preservation; because however things be, a good Man cannot be miserable hereafter, whereas a wicked man, though he be an Atheist, may for aught he knows be so eternally: and it is a dictate of wisdom in case of uncertainty to avoid danger, and provide against the worst that may be supposed to happen. The only objection that can be made against this, is, That uncertainty is not to be preferred before certainty; but to this religion sometimes obliges us, when Perfecution ariseth upon the account of it; for at such time the keeping of our conscience damnifies us in a present convenience, and for the sake of what we expect we lose that good which we have in sure possession.  
But as plausible as this objection may seem, it is easily silenced. For beside that it reacheth not all times, let us but consider the vast disproportion that there is between the short age of Man, and that Eternity which infinitely exceeds all time: that in a very short space, it will be all one whether a Man lived here in plenty, or perished for want of Bread; yea, if we consider him in respect only to this World, that it will be all one whether ever he had had any Being in it or no: let us but consider how small the goods are which the Atheist possesseth, in comparison of the evils which he may justly fear; and we must conclude that it is no wisdom to keep such inconsiderable certainties, when we run a hazard that is infinitely more considerable than they. Especially when those present certainties are so uncertain, as that we are liable to the final loss of them every moment; and the pretended uncertainties are so far certain, that the best reason of Man doth oblige him to expect them.  
(2.) A good conversation doth administer the truest satisfaction. For this only can make Men hope for a future blessedness. And what satisfaction is comparable to the steadfast looking to the recompense of the reward? This is a joy that the irreligious man wants: and to take him in the most favourable circumstances, it cannot but somewhat stun and afflict him in his delight to think, that after a little time he can enjoy it no more.  
But suppose he saith that he hath no need of a holy comfort: that he can caress himself with the diversions of mirth, and fortify his mind by pleasures against all melancholy and sorrowful presages; yet it cannot be denied, but that the hope of real happiness hereafter is a greater satisfaction, than barely not to be dismayed with the terrors of Death and Judgement.  
Besides, seeing the Atheist cannot with all his art disprove the Articles of our Faith; he hath no way to secure himself from the sad jealousies and suspicions of future misery, but by debauching his mind, and hurrying himself beyond all consideration. And what wisdom I pray is in that complacency, which prohibits the best use of our reason, and wretchedly enjoins the understanding to withdraw.  
Nor is this carnal solace of the irreligious Man only unsound and irrational, but (as all such things are,) it is also unstable: it accompanieth a Man when he hath least need of it; but assoon as he is destitute of other helps, that forsakes him too. For upon consideration of the whole matter, we shall find that this is a solace only for them, whose estates are plentiful, and constitutions firm; whose minds are not crossed, nor their spirits decayed. It may attend Men whilst they are rich and healthful; but when they fall under poverty or pain, it vanisheth like a dream or shadow.  
'Tis true indeed, if a Man be only poor, Atheism can prescribe this remedy, to steal and filch his Neighbour's goods, that his own substance may be increased by it: which yet is but a desperate remedy, where there is either pubick law and justice in a Nation, or but the natural dictate of self-preservation, as there is in all private men: and in a contention which is here to be supposed, 'tis very great odds but the poorest will be overcome.  
And when this way of Men's making their condition better proves unsuccessful, irreligion hath nothing better to propose to them, than by a stroke at their life to put an end to it. And this is all the comfort it can administer to them in time of sickness, when they are neither able to hurt others nor help themselves; when their soul abhors all manner of meat; and they say of laughter it is mad; when the most pleasant recreations are distasteful to them. And is this a satisfaction equal to what the just Man hath, who in the critical minute of affliction and distress triumphs in the prospect of God's great salvation? How much better were it for a Man in anguish and torture to have hope in the everlasting God? This hope would turn his very evils into helps, and make Death itself to appear his greatest advantage. So great supports has righteousness in the worst estate, and the spirit of a just Man will sustain his infirmities. And so much may suffice to be spoken to the first thing considerable in the words, viz. That a good conversation is a principal sign of a wise and understanding Man; I now proceed to,  
(2.) The second thing, which is, that meekness is an essential part of that good conversation which denominates a Man truly wise and knowing.  
The truth of this will appear upon Three Grounds.  
(1.) Because meekness preserves the World from trouble and disquietness.  
(2.) It is an advantage to Men's conference and discourse.  
(3.) It makes them successful in their undertake.  
(1.) Meekness preserves the World from trouble and disquietness. It is upon these very terms commanded by our Saviour [Mat. 11.29.] Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me, for I am meek and lowly in heart; and ye shall find rest unto your souls.  
'Tis the nature of meekness to calm the mind, and preserve it from vexation. For it is contrary to wrath and fury; and therefore look how much trouble rage is to a Man's spirit, so much doth meekness help us to avoid.  
Nor doth it only prevent the trouble and torment of anger, but it is also inseparably united with other quieting Graces, such as humility and contentment, by which means all fretting passions are stilled. For he that is of so serious a temper as not to be incensed with provocations, can certainly avoid the follies of pride and discontent; he can rest satisfied in a low place, wherein his gracious God puts him, and cheerfully acquiesce in the disposals of his wise providence.  
And what a happiness is it for a Man to enjoy such peace and tranquillity of mind, and to be exempt from the disturbances and turmoils of passion and lust! This is to have a foretaste of Heaven, and in some degree to be in an Angelical state; whilst in the midst of those occurrences which cut unwise Men to the heart, we can be quiet and unconcerned, sing praises to God for all his works; and our Souls can with freedom return to their rest.  
Nor doth meekness only grant peace to a Man's own breast, but it also keeps the peace of the World. For the wrath of Man sets on fire the whole course of Nature. Anger hath in it the true property of fire, which is to produce itself in the subject upon which it works: and so the forcing of it stirs up strife. And where is then the wisdom of allowing it? It wracks the mind wherein it abides, and destroys its pleasure; for he that is angry is certainly displeased; and he that is displeased, must want his complacency. Nor is this all, but it also gives continual occasion of its own continuance. For it puts others into a heat like our own; thereby depriving us of the consolation of their kindness and assistance. It makes us either contemptible or odious to them; and so the great comfort of Man's life, friendly society, is utterly lost.  
(2.) Meekness is an advantage to Men's conference and discourse.  
He that would discourse like a wise Man must first judge so; and he that would judge rightly, and be constant in it, must be of a sedate spirit. For if his mind be disturbed, he can neither learn, teach, nor use knowledge. He cannot learn. Now Solomon gives this account of a wise Man, [Prov. 1.5.] That a wise man will hear, and will increase knowledge; and a man of understanding shall attain unto wise counsels: It's a sign of the greatest ignorance, for a Man to presume that he hath wisdom enough; and it argues a taste of knowledge, when a Man useth diligence to obtain it: insomuch that were not our understandings naturally furnished with the first principles and common notions of wisdom, we could not possibly study to advance and improve it.  
But is any Man a lover of wisdom? would he learn and find out what he hath not yet known? he must be very considerate, and seriously compare things together. And if so, it follows that he must be calm and dispassionate. Because the perturbations of the mind, darken, distract and confound the understanding: and the thoughts of wrathful men are too hasty and urgent, and thereupon too immethodical to be discreet. And if it be a matter of divine wisdom, wherein spiritual illumination is required; the wrathful and unquiet spirit hath no reason to expect that; the promise of it being made particularly to the meek, [Psal. 25.9.] The meek will he guide in judgement, and the meek will he teach his way.  
Nor can a wrathful person inform another, For his passion puts him out of his conceptions: it transports him beyond his right sense, and so diverts him from his proper method. Besides he that would instruct, must not only comply with the capacity, but in some measure also with the temper of his Disciples: as knowing how much a readiness or aversion in the will doth dispose the understanding to give or deny assent. But passion, if it meet with the more soft and tender dispositions, terrifies and scares them out of their own thoughts; so that they have not the use of their own faculties. And if it hath to deal with the more stout and undaunted, the discouragement that it gives them doth but make them desperate and harden them by degrees to an inflexible obstinacy of resolution.  
For the heat of passion taking away the steady use of reason from the instructor, and by a natural efficacy propagating itself in the learner, there is but little understanding to be found betwixt them; and then the appearance of wrath makes a Man so detestable and hateful, that when there is but a little reason left, it may well be thought it will be to no purpose.  
And what farther shows the folly of passion; it renders men uncapable of using in any way the knowledge which they have learned. For it disturbs their reason, and makes their thoughts to be desultory and incoherent. It puts them beside the true use of their memory; for when there is not serious deliberation to guide it, its recollections must needs be very casual and uncertain. In this case men are led as brutes, by the disorderly motions of fancy and appetite. And what licentious and irregular imaginations may intrude, when the guard of consideration is resigned to those powers, the wand'ring discourse of Lunatics may sufficiently inform us. So that meekness is a necessary qualification to preserve us from extravagance, and is therefore an essential part of that conversation which denominates a Man truly wise and knowing.  
(3.) Meekness makes men successful in their undertake. For 'tis easy to miscarry in any attempt, wherein true discretion is not our guide: but when fury is in place, discretion is absent.  
It must be granted, that wherever anger is, there is some cause or other in debate. But the wrathful man doth much thwart his own intention, in doing disservice to that interest for which he contends.  
For like a furious Warrior he falls on rashly, whilst his adversary keeps his ground, and watches an opportunity to attack him in that part which is weakest, and give him a blow where he can least bear it.  
But meekness gives a Man the advantage of a clear reason, and hath an art whereby it vanquisheth both Parties and Neuters. It overcomes those that are Parties in a quarrel, in that it tires them out. For though anger be troublesome to a Man's self, and though it be heightened by disagreement and opposition, yet such is the madness of it, that it desires opposition and conflict, and nothing wearies out angry spirits more, than to see their indignation and fury slighted; and so when they have sufficiently spent their virulency and rancour, wanting new fuel of provocation from others to maintain their flame, they quietly desist; and when they find that notwithstanding all impressions their adversary remains unshaken, they do like those assailants, who quit the siege when they find the Fort to be impregnable.  
And hence it may easily be conceived how much meekness may recommend a cause to bystanders; who being disinteressed have no such strong prejudice to be subdued. For the effects of rage are abominable in the common sense of humanity. Raillery, reviling, smiting, and the like, make a Person scandalous; and when he himself is accounted so bad, his cause and quarrel will not be esteemed much better.  
What say the indifferent Men of such a Hotspur? this is an abusive, a scurrilous, and injurious fellow; he knows not what religion, and conscience, nor common civility is. We have reason to fear this Man's principles: For if we be not what he requires, he will deal with us in as bad a manner. We have reason to suspect this Man's cause; for if it were good, these outrages might be spared, as being both unsuitable and unuseful to it: If there be an evil in the circumstance of his quarrel, why may not there be in the substance of it? and if he make use of indirect ways, why may he not as well aim at an unjust end? Thus doth fury make the credit of a Man's cause sink in the estimation of indifferent Men.  
Besides, what is more considerable for the making Men's ways unprosperous, seeing whatever the wrathful contend for, they must unavoidably be enemies to God and his Grace; it pleaseth him to curb their fury, and to put his hook into their nostrils, to defeat their purposes and blast their endeavours. For as the wrath of Man works not the righteousness of God, so neither will God suffer it to accomplish the will of Man. No: the rage of man must not govern the world; and God forbidden that it ever should; that ever that rage should prevail, which makes men not only as unreasonable as brutes; but oftentimes as merciless and savage too. Excellently to this purpose speaks David, [Psal. 76.7, 8, 9, 10.] Thou, even thou art to be feared, and who may stand in thy sight when once thou art angry? Thou didst cause judgement to be heard from Heaven; the Earth feared and was still, when God arose to judgement to save all the meek of the earth. Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee: the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain.  
But will some ask, may we not then be angry? and may we not express our indignation against dishonest things in some severity? Yea doubtless, not to be capable of anger is to be stupid. And that upon some accounts we may be severe with men, appears by the precedents of Magistracy in the Law, and the rules concerning it in the Gospel; as also by the example of David cursing the Church's enemies, of Christ sharply rebuking the Scribes and Pharisees, and of Paul in his conflict with Elymas the Sorcerer. But then we must well weigh the occasion, that our anger may be adjusted to it, and not exceed the bounds of moderation.  
And now having spoken thus much for the enforcing of a good conversation, and of meekness, so essential a part of it; I shall conclude my Discourse with a little Direction.  
(1.) In order to a good conversation in general, that besides imploring the help of the divine grace, you would be watchful and circumspect, that you do not unadvisedly fall into snares. 'Tis wisdom to foresee and prevent the occasions of sinning. And if by chance a temptation overtake you, do not trifle and dally with it. Be ferious in reasoning with yourselves against it; and remember what you have been taught, and what you believe. Consider the matter well, and when you have perceived it to be sinful, say with yourselves, Do I not believe that for such things God will bring me into judgement, and that for such things the wrath of God cometh upon the children of disobedience? Why then should I to gratify the incitement of a lust, do this wickedness and sin against God, and so pierce myself through with everlasting sorrows?  
(2.) In order to meekness in particular, besides praying for the gift of the spirit of love and gentleness,  
(1.) Use those Considerations that may be Remedies against wrath and displeasure.  
Consider the weakness of laying the blame of your passion upon the occasion of it. Can that force you to be passionate without your consent and allowance? No, yourselves must be accessary to your own indignation.  
Consider besides, what weakness and inexperience of things it argues to be discomposed at things without us. Is not the course of the World such? and is there any better to be expected? shall our fury reduce things to a better state? When we have raged and tormented ourselves never so much, our anger may indeed help to make things worse, but is the most unlikely means to put them into a better posture.  
Consider again, that if there were no thwart and provocations, there would be no need of such a virtue as meekness; nor would there be any such virtue at all. For if nothing crossed us, but all things went according to our mind, there would be no occasion nor trial of meekness, for it would be impossible that we should be otherwise than pleased. But because things will fall out oppositely to our desires and expectations, therefore meekness is enjoined as a means to relieve us.  
We may do well to consider withal, that if things happen so ill as to disquiet us, whether it is not wisdom to make the best that we can of them; and so whether it be not our wisdom, instead of struggling with a provocation, to suppress and stifle our resentments of it.  
And seeing anger is most frequently stirred up by the provocations that are given by Men; and seeing we are not angry with Men, but when we judge that they deal unduly with us; As it becomes us to see that this judgement be true, and that we do not unjustly apprehend a wrong, when there is none done to us; so upon condition that we are injured, it were worthy of our consideration, how much it degrades a Person who hath the honour to be just, to stoop so low to the brutish, as to be wounded with a resentment of their villainy; and how much it is beneath the mind of such a man to be disordered by the rudeness of disorderly men. The very being concerned at their insolence doth but make it too plausible, whilst it shows them to be such as deserve consideration. Ye suffer fools gladly (saith the Apostle) seeing ye yourselves are wise, [2 Cor. 11.19.] And saith the wise man, [Prov. 26.4.] Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest thou also be like unto him: that is, take notice of him no farther than is necessary to prevent the evil that may follow from the toleration of his pride and vanity. It being a reproach to a wise man to submit his wisdom to the pleasure and controlment of a fool, who rageth and is confident: whose brutish passions first deprive him of sober sense, and then give him courage and boldness to expose his want of it. So true is that saying of Solomon, [Prov. 14.29.] He that is flow to wrath is of great understanding: but he that it hasty of spirit exalteth folly.  
(2.) Avoid those worldly affections and desires, which are the primitive and fundamental incentives to anger, as Covetousness and Ambition. For these make Men competitors for the same things, and so stir up anger and emulation amongst them. One is displeased, because another carries away his profit; and another, because his Neighbour steps in between him and honour. And especially pride produceth the greatest animosities and heart-burnings amongst Men. Thus when a Man is puffed up with the wisdom of speculation, he is angry that others are not of his judgement; though they perhaps have more reason to be displeased with him, because he is not of theirs.  
And generally where Men have great thoughts of themselves, they expect great regard and observance from others; and this earnestness and confidence of expectation makes them wrathful when they are disappointed. And how far their rage and discontent may go, and in what inhumanity it may end, as we do not know, so we need not to inquire; it being sufficient that we know thus much, that the effects of it are very sad and dismal.  
Now the God of Patience and Consolation grant us to be  one towards another, according to Christ Jesus, to whom with the Father and the Holy Spirit, be ascribed Dominion, Blessing and Praise, both now and for ever.  
FINIS.   

EDWARD'S MAYOR.  
Cur. Special. tent. die Lunae in Festo Sancti Michaelis Archangeli 1679. Annoque Regni Regis CAROLI Secundi Angl. etc. xxxi.  
THis COURT doth desire Mr. Sermon to Print his Sermon preached Yesterday at the Guild-Hall Chappel, before the Lord Mayor and Aldermen of this CITY.  
WAGSTAFFE.