THE GREAT LAW OF NATURE, OR SELF-PRESERVATION, Examined, Asserted, and Vindicated from Mr. Hobbes his Abuses.  
In a small DISCOURSE; Part Moral, part Political, and part Religious.  
London: Printed for the Author, and are to be sold by Will. Crook at the Green-Dragon without Temple-Bar, 1673.   

TO THE READER.  
READER;  
THis small Treatise was writ two or three years ago, and since hath remained in the hands of some friends, till now at last I have adventured it to censure. It is chief the result of a few serious thoughts upon consideration of some of M. Hobbes his strange Tenants, which he would seem to ground upon that Great Law of Nature, Self-preservation; whereby, in the judgement of the world, he takes away all Foundations of Virtue and Goodness: yet is he well approved of by many, who would be thought like him, Great Wits, and to have Understandings and Capacities much transcending the Doctrine and Pedantry of Moralists and Divines.  
Knowing therefore with whom I have to do, I have argued chief out of Master Hobbes his own Principles, and thereby endeavoured to evince the grossness and folly of his Errors, in making all Justice, Honesty, Morality, Goodness and Virtue, the consequences only of a Civil Government; as if, where there were no Civil Magistrate, these things had no being; and where there is a Civil Magistrate, took their measures only from his Mouth: So that whatsoever he pleases to call Good, Just, Honest, Virtuous, must therefore only necessarily be so; and whatsoever he pronounces Evil, , Dishonest and Vicious, immediately, for the same reason, is become so to all his Subjects; And these Enormous Tenants he pretends to deduce and ground upon his Definition of the Right of Nature, and the Great Law of Self-preservation. This shameful abuse both of God, and Nature, and all that dare pretend to any thing of real goodness and virtue, I have endeavoured to detect and confute out of his own granted Principles: which whether I have effected, I must leave to thy judgement: And doubt not, but Truth and Reason will prevail at length with the Intelligent and Rational: And that they may so do with all, I have linked them also with Interest; being assured thereby, to leave none that love themselves unconcerned in the matter of the subsequent Discourse, and out of the reach of the arguments and reasons thereof, according to the best of my understanding.   

ERRATA.  
PAge 11. l. 19 for non, read man; page 86. l. 20, 21. blot out this whole sentence, viz. if others will interpose, let it be at their perils.   

THE Great Law of NATURE, OR SELF PRESERVATION, EXAMINED.  
THat the Notions or Laws of Right and Wrong, Just and Unjust, Good and Evil, are independent upon, and naturally and rationally antecedent to the Constitution of any Commonwealth, or Civil Government, and are binding or obligatory to all men, both in the state of Nature, and in all Political Government; proved out of Mr. Hobbes his own Principles of Self-Preservation, and equality amongst men.  
2. From the Nature of God; with a subsequent Discourse, showing the unreasonableness of that Tyrannical and Arbitrary Government, seeming to be vindicated, and held necessary by the same Author in his said Book: with another light reflection upon the Justice and Reasonableness, or rather the Injustice and Unreasonableness of their Demands, who in any Civil Government will challenge to themselves Liberty of Conscience, or a public free exercise of what Religion they best fancy; being all grounded upon the same Principles of Self-preservation.  
And because the greatest part of these  Errors seem to be deduced from Mr. Hobbes his definition of the Right of Nature, I will first begin with that.  
By the way requiring one thing only to be granted, viz. That Right Reason is to be the Law and Rule of all our actions. By Right Reason, I do not mean as Mr. Hobbes, De Cive, pag. 21. every man's private Reason; for who but himself did ever call this Right Reason? but I mean what is commonly hereby meant, an unerring Reason, or that which proceeds always upon true Principles, and thence deduces true Consequences and Conclusions.  

Mr. Hobbes his Definition of the Right of Nature Examined.  
THe Right of Nature, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own Nature, that is to say, of his own Life, and consequently of doing any thing which in his own judgement and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereto: In his Leviathan.  
Though we should freely assent to the first part of this definition or description of the Right of Nature, which we do not, yet may we be well allowed to deny the inference or consequence thence deduced: For though it should be granted, that the Right of Nature is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own Nature, yet is the inference guilty of a most notorious Error, viz. that it is therefore a liberty that each man hath of doing any thing which in his own judgement and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereto; for in his own judgement and reason, he may, and often doth conceive that the aptest means thereto, which re vera is not, but rather quite contrary to it, and the aptest and readiest means to bring him to destruction; of which infinite examples might be produced, and every man's daily experience confirms this for a most undeniable truth.  
And what rational man will pretend, that because he hath a right and liberty granted him by God or Nature, to preserve his own life, or another man's, will conclude, that hereby is intended to him a Grant of a Right and Liberty to destroy himself, or another?  
Now according to the definition itself, the Right of Nature is only a liberty that each man hath to use his power for his own preservation, not his own destruction; for this should be really to infringe the Law of Nature and Reason, to the breach of which no rational man will ever pretend to any Right, which commands Self-preservation: and this is meant, I suppose, of a real preservation, not a seeming or intentional only; therefore the means, in order to this end, aught to be really and truly, and not only seemingly and intentionally (in the party acting) conducing to the end; otherwise the Law of Nature will re vera, really and truly be broken, contrary to design and appearance: for seeing that this is the great Law of Nature and Reason, viz. Self-preservation; to act that which is really and truly contrary to this Law, must needs be a breach thereof, though the man so acting may be so far in an error, as not to think the action to be so destructive to the end he aims at as it is: And therefore I affirm, that though a man's own judgement and reason prompt him to do a thing as seeming to him the aptest means to secure this end of Self-preservation, which thing really and truly is not according to the rule of right reason the aptest and most probable means to attain this end aforesaid, this man is guilty of misusing that liberty given him, guilty of transgressing the rule of right reason, which obliges all men, at all times, in all places; and guilty of acting that which is absolutely contrary and prejudicial to his own preservation, the end and design of his actions: nor 〈…〉 excusable, because he did that which to himself seemed most conducing to the end; for as in Civil Government, ignorance of the Law is no good Plea to excuse and justify, though it may somewhat extenuate a Crime in some cases; so in statunaturae, error, ignorance or passion, cannot excuse and justify those actions which are really contrary to right reason, or that principle of Self-preservation. And seeing each man desires to justify his actions by right reason, and chief of all other things, desires, intends and endeavours Self-preservation; each man hereby implies, and doth acknowledge, that every act contrary to right reason, & this Principle of Self-preservation, is folly, which he condemns; though if you come to urge him with a particular case of his own, ignorance, partiality and pride, (because he would seem no less wise than he ought to be) may make him endeavour to justify his own actions with a gloss of reason, though really, and in themselves, irrational, and destructive to the end he aims at. Now because no man is absolute Master of right reason, it follows, that all men are guilty of transgressing the Laws thereof, amongst which Self-preservation is a Chief; and this frail condition of man is agreeable to the Lessons taught by the Divine Lawgivers, viz. That man is born in sin, and under an inavoidable necessity of sinning, as he is in the state of Nature; because he is not always able to regulate all his actions according to the exact Rules of right reason.  
It is be objected, That if we grant Self-preservation a constant Rule and Maxim of right reason, a man in statu naturae not knowing but every one he meets may have an intent to kill him, ought, according to the rule of this reason, to prevent the dauger if he can, by killing the other first, or reducing him into a condition not to be able to do him any prejudice, and this act shall be good and just, because rational, and so by consequence all other inferior acts of hostility; therefore no active and positive justice and injustice, good and evil, in statu naturae.  
To this I answer, That if such act or acts be really and truly most conducing to the end of Self-preservation, we will disputandi gratia suppose them good and just, or not evil or injust. And to try this, let us examine them according to the Principles of Equality and Self-preservation agreed to by the Hobbists: As first, That Nature hath made men equal in power; if therefore you go about to take away the Life of any man, there is as much reason and probability to suspect he may take away yours, as you his; and so if you attempt to take away from him any other thing that he hath right to: Therefore whensoever you attempt any such act, consider, that by reason of the equality that is betwixt you naturally, you do, as it were, upon even terms, throw Dice for your Life. But this is not all: suppose you conquer and kill, yet doth there rest as many such Battles to be fought by you, as your shall find men in the World, for the same reason which bids you suspect one, and fight him, bids you suspect all; so that you are to throw Dice (as it were) for your Life, not once, but a hundred, 〈◊〉 thousand times: And were it not rather Madness, than Reason, to suppose that you shall win every throw? And if you imagine yourself to have a little more craft in the Game you are to play then another, so as by cunning, skill, strength, confederacy, deceit, surprisal, etc. you may conceive more hopes of prevailing then another, you impugn the Principle of Equality already allowed; the same hopes, for the same reasons, and all the same advantages, being common to others, and yourself lying as obnoxious to them, as they to you; and you may expect to meet with as cunning Gamesters as yourself, and to be caught upon the same odds, surprisals and disadvantages. By this it appears, that even in the state of Nature, such attempts to take away the Life or the right of another man, are not according to right reason, and regulated by the wellweighed rules of Self-preservation: But to kill, se defendendo, all Laws adjudge just and allowable. To sum up in short what I have said, I affirm, That 

For a man to do that which is destructive to his own Life and happiness, is against the Right and Law of Nature and Reason:  
But for a man to do any thing, or every thing, which in his own judgement and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means for the preservation of his own Life, ofttimes is to do that which is destructive to his own Life and Happiness: Ergo  
For a man to do any thing, or every thing, which in his own judgement and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means for the preservation of his own Life, is ofttimes against the Right and Law of Nature and Reason, and no man can have any Right by Nature to act contrary to these Laws.    
The major needs no proof; the minor is proved by all men, as often as by their own folly they bring mischief and destruction upon themselves, which when it is too late they commonly see, confess and condemn. Now though there be a necessity of acting according to each man's private reason, right or wrong, and consequently of acting not seldom contrary to the principles of right reason and self-preservation, yet is every such act a failing or sin, and all men in some degrees guilty thereof: amongst whom they are most excusable, who endeavour most to find out the true rules of right reason, and according to these rules to regulate their own private actings; they most culpable, who not attending to that more Noble principle, suffer themselves to be led by the brutish part of nonsense and passion only.  
To give more light to what hath been said, and to examine more exactly the nature of right and wrong, good and evil, according to the granted principles of equality and self-preservation, let us consider the first of these according to Mr. Hobbes his Assumption, Part 1. Cap. 3. of his Leviathan, in these words, viz. Nature hath made all men equal in the Faculties of the body and mind, as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned up together, the difference betwixt man and man is not so considerable, as that one can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he. See Chartes in the beginning, De Methodo, to this purpose, as to the faculties of the mind, which only makes the man.  
Seeing therefore that all men are by Nature equal in power, and that measuring the power of each man, we shall measure his right and title to what he lays claim to (as he is in the state of Nature) which is adequate and proportionate to his power (according to Mr. Hobbes his Principles) the power of all men being equal by Nature, their right and title to all things they lay claim to must be also equal, and if their right and title be equal, then ought their share and parts to be equal in the said things; Nature in giving them equal power, declaring that they have equal right, and aught to have equal portions thereof: Therefore though we agree with Mr. Hobbes, that every man in the stat of Nature hath right to every thing; yet do we not agree, that this right extends to the whole thing if there be Competitors, but to a just and equal portion of it.  
And from this Fundamental Thesis of Equality in Power amongst men in the state of Nature, before the Constitution of any Commonwealth, the rules men are to live by, in this state of Nature, may rationally be deduced: As for example, in those rules which are that part of the Moral Virtues which respect our Neighbours.  
I. Seeing men are equal by Nature, one man ought not to take to himself a greater liberty in his actions, which respect or concern another man, than he is willing another man should in his actions which respect or concern him; for this would be an impugning the natural equality betwixt them, in abridging the power of his Fellow, and enlarging his own; and consequently the other, according to the rule of reason may, and therefore it ought to be expected he will by force maintain and defend his own just rights. Hence the Rule of Justice and Equity, Do not to others, what you would not they should do to you: From which it is evident; 

1. That no man ought to take that liberty over the person of another, as to affront, abuse, imprison, hurt or kill him, because he is not willing another should take the same liberty over him; and this branch of Justice concerns the person, and personal injuries.  
2. One man ought not to endeavour to abridge another of that right he hath to all things equally with himself, because he is not willing he himself should be abridged in the same by another: And this is the second branch of Justice, which concerns the right and enjoyment of things appertaining to the person of each man.    
II. Seeing men are equal by Nature, in the state of Nature, one man ought not to expect any greater service, as due to himself from another, than he thinks due from himself to another; for that were to abridge another man's liberty, in making him more a servant than his Fellow, contrary to the equality betwixt them, and therefore, according to reason, he ought to expect that the other will maintain and defend his just rights by force. Therefore seeing it is evident others are not obliged to do more for you, than you are obliged to do for others, do unto others as you would they should do unto you; Hence it follows, that we ought to think ourselves obliged to do all good Offices for others upon every just occasion, because we desire and think the same due to ourselves from others; and this is called Charity; and these two Virtues of Justice and Charity, are the grounds, and the foundation, and the very ligaments of all Humane Society; and all Covenants, or Pacts, express or implicit, whereby Commonwealths are constituted, or one man obliges himself to another, are binding as acts of natural Justice, which one man ought to observe towards another, according to the rules of reason, grounded upon Equality and Self-preservation; it being contrary to the rules of Justice for a man to infringe his faith and promise given to another, whereas he himself would not another should do so to him: And upon these two Laws of Justice and Charity, all other Moral Virtues, which respect our Neighbours, are grounded; and actions are esteemed virtuous or vicious, good or evil, as they are conformable or repugnant to these two Laws: As for example, to enumerate some particulars; Gratitude is a point of Justice in returning kindnesses received; for as you would expect that others should pay obligations of Gratitude to you upon occasion, so ought you to do to others: So sincerity in all your deal and transactions with others is a point of Justice, because you desire others should deal sincerely with you: So to keep promise or Covenant; so of Mercy, where you have had just provocations, and suffered injuries, Charity bids you pardon, because you desire to be pardoned: All other Virtues, respecting our Neighbours, are easily reducible to the same Heads. Contrary to these Laws, and injurious to our Neighbours, are Pride; to arrogate to himself more than is due, and to put too high a value upon himself, and too low upon another, this is injustice: So of all kind of wrong, as Theft, Murder, Reproaches, Affronts, Backbiting, Slandering, Lying, Malice, Envy, Hatred, Cheating, Dissembling, etc. no man being willing to suffer these things from another, therefore in Natural Justice he ought not to do them to another.  
Now there is another sort of Virtue and Vice which hath no respect to our Neighbours, or not so much to them as to ourselves; and the measure of these, with their reasons and grounds, may be deduced only from the Law of Self-preservation: Such is Temperance in all things that concern ourselves, as in eating, drinking, recreation, study, exercise either of the mind or body, etc. which actions are so far allowable, as they are consistent with Self-preservation, that is, the health of our bodies and minds; and if we exceed in them so far as to prejudice our health, we destroy ourselves, and sin against Nature, or the Law of Self-preservation.  
And as we have demonstrated that Justice, Charity and Temperance, with all their subordinate Species, do naturally result from the consideration of these two Maxims of Equality and Self-preservation, without any reference or dependency upon a Civil Power of Commonwealth; so also doth it appear of the notions of good and evil, which in a Moral sense are nothing else but Virtue and Vice; so that so long as men are men, viz. rational beings, and are acted and governed by reason, they must all necessarily agree in these Notions of good and evil; every virtuous action being denominated good, every vicious action evil. And hereby it appears, that these are not things merely arbitrary, or dependant upon the mouth of the Prince, or the Constitution of a Civil Government; it being impossible that any Civil Power should make those actions, which in themselves are good, that is, conducing to the general happiness of mankind, as Justice, Charity and Temperance, to be evil; or those things which are evil, as Injustice, Uncharitableness. Intemperance, to be good, because always destructive to that happiness; Therefore these are not things dependant upon the Constitution of a Commonwealth, or the mouth of the Civil Magistrate; but the Constitutions of all Civil Governments and Commonwealths are depending upon them, and if not framed according to them, must needs be ruinous and pernicious to as many as live under such Governments, or the greatest part of them; for without Natural Justice, Charity and Temperance, it is in vain to think any Civil Government can subsist, the design of all Civil Government being the execution of these Laws, in order to Self-preservation; there being no need of any Civil Magistrate, if these Laws could be made to be observed without their help; nor doth any benefit accrue to any people from their Magistrate and Government, where these Laws and Rules are not observed; and to exempt the Prince from the observation of them, is to exempt the people, who are to obey him, and to reduce all things into a Chaos; for these being the Laws of Reason and Self-preservation, the nonobservance of them is to act contrary to both, and the consequence destruction.  
And that these Laws, even in statu● Naturae, do oblige in foro conscientiae, viz. to a desire that they should take effect, Mr. Hobbes accords: If then the● oblige to a desire, wheresoever the en● Self-preservation, and the actual exerting of that desire may consist together they certainly oblige to actual performance; for whosoever is obliged to a desire that he might do a thing, is certainly obliged to do it, where he may do it with safety, especially where with benefit and advantage to himself and others.  
Now that the actual performance of these Laws of Nature are always consistent with Self-preservation, is evident from what I have before shown, viz. that they oblige only to do that, which according to the rules of right reason, is most conducing to that end, the actual performance whereof must needs be always requisite; and therefore to say they oblige only in foro interno, or to a desire, is as much as to say a man is obliged always to desire Self-preservation, but must not use the means to secure it.  
And as for that Objection, That the practice of Justice and Charity, in a state of Nature, is not the means to preserve ourselves, because it would expose good men as a prey to the danger, lusts and passions of evil men, who would observe no such Laws in their dealing towards us:  
To this I answer, That it is neither against the Law of Nature, nor Reason, or every man to stand upon his guard, ●o be as cautious as he can, and as jealous as he pleases, or sees cause, of those with whom the hath to deal, unless he 〈◊〉 well acquainted with their disposition and temper: and it is very lawful for him to put himself in a condition to de●●nd and preserve his own right, but in ●o doing, he must not prejudice another's; for that were to provoke and pull ●ose dangers upon himself, against which he desires to secure himself; for ●he Rule of Justice, Do not to others what ●●u would not others should do to you, ●lls every man in the state of Nature, as hath been shown) that he is not to inure another: And the same Rule tells ●s, that whosoever doth to us an injury, ●●at person thereby declares, that he is willing to be looked upon as an Enemy, and must in reason and Justice expect a like return of hostility: for he who doth injuries, aught in Justice and Equity to expect the same, and cannot complain of injustice, if the party injured take from him the power of doing him any further injuries, even by taking away his life, if in reason it appear he cannot otherwise secure his own: But where more gentle proceed are likely to take place, there the rigorous are always to be avoided, because more dangerous to ourselves, and destructive to others: So that though by the rigour of Justice you may requite one injury with another, yet according to the Rule of Charity, you are to suffer injuries, and do good for evil, and forgive your Enemies, because you desire when you offend others in the like manner to be favourably dealt with, and forgiven yourself: besides, it is more safe to spare an Enemy, then prosecute him with the utmost rigours, lest either he himself should in a desperate condition make as desperate a resistance, or some others seeing your cruelty towards him, should serve you the same sauce, as with reason is to be expected. You see therefore these Laws of Nature, Justice and Charity, do not bind up our hands, and expose us to the abuses and injuries of others, but gives us liberty to use the means, according to right reason, most likely to secure us: But if we will foolishly conceit, we cannot be safe unless we subdue all we see, and make them our Vassals; or will upon every slight injury, or weak surmise of an intended injury, do a real one, this is not according to the rule of right reason, most conducing to our preservation, but will certainly and suddenly, at some time or other, be our destruction: Much less ●an it be just and reasonable, where there ●s no cause of fear nor danger from a man, to abuse, rob, spoil, wound, hurt or kill him.  
Now though it be certain, that if men would live according to the Laws of Nature, I do not mean that Nature which is common to man with Bruits, but that which specifically constitutes man's Nature, and distinguishes him from other inferior Creatures, viz. Right Reason, (for every one hath but so much of Man in him as he hath of Reason) they might live happily and securely, as in the Golden Age celebrated in the Fictions of the Poets of Old: yet because men are acted very much by the inferior principles of appetite and passion, common also to the Beasts, which are always strong and vigorous in them, and because no man is absolute Master of Right Reason, nor are all men in equal degree Masters thereof; hence it is, that generally they are swayed by passion, blinded by ignorance, biased by self-love, pride and conceit, or interest; which imperfections each man easily perceives, and takes notice of in others, but seldom can, or will see, or acknowledge in himself: So that though every man in the state of Nature should agree for quietness and security's sake, that each should have an equal share or proportion in all things, and equal services done as required of him, yet when these agreements come to be put in execution, they would not agree in their accounts and calculations of the individual and just measure to be assigned to each in particular; whence Contentions, Strife and War arise. To avoid those mischiefs, and that each may enjoy what in Justice and Equity belongs to him without strife or danger, Reason advises them, as the only remedy, that they should choose one or more to administer Justice, and to sit as sole Arbitrator of all Causes, and that they should unanimously agree to submit themselves to his or their judgement and determination in all their concerns, who is by mutual Covenant to see Justice impartially executed. But because such Judge or Judges so constituted cannot execute their charge without a Power able to force obedience in the disobedient and refractory; it is also necessary that all agree to give to such Judge or Judges, such Power as is necessary to bring Offenders to just punishment, and defend the Commonwealth from violence; and this Power is thus transferred to the Supreme Authority chosen, viz. by Promise, Covenant or Oath, express or implicit, to assist him or them with the hazard or life and estate, to the utmost of each man's power, in all things necessary for the executing Justice, and defence of the Commonwealth; of which necessity the Supreme Power to be Judge, and not the Suject: And this Supreme Power is not only to be Judge of what is just betwixt one of his Subjects and another, but also of what is just betwixt himself, and any of them, or all of them together; yet are not all his actions therefore just, nor any of them just, any further than they are conformable and consentaneous to the Law of Nature or Reason, whereby he is obliged to assume to himself no greater liberty of Command over his Subjects Persons and Estates, then is necessary for the accomplishing those ends for which he is constituted their Prince, viz. execution of Justice, and defence of the Commonwealth; and if he assume any greater, he is absolutely unjust, unless that liberty be granted to him by the general consent of the people: for though the people transfer to their Sovereign so much of their power and right as is necessary to execute Justice, yet this Authorising him to be Judge, and obliging themselves to adhere to his Decrees, doth not make those Decrees of his to be all just; for than were it impossible, in this sense, for any Judge or Arbitrator to do an act of injustice; which is contrary to what hath been already proved: and therefore we conclude, that when any Prince or Power in Authority Sovereign, acts contrary to the Laws of Nature, viz. Justice, etc. he doth wickedly and unreasonably, in regard such actions tend to the destruction both of himself and people, though for any such acts done, he is not: accountable to any Earthly Power; for if you give his Subject's Authority to call him to account for his actions, you must suppose the Commonwealth dissolved in so doing, the Minister of Justice being disabled to execute his duty, because under check and restraint, and in the power of others. And thus far we have argued only upon those principles which Mr. Hobbes makes use of, and which are before the constitution of a Commonwealth, both natura, and tempore, viz. equality amongst men, and self-preservation. And this I have done, and shall do, not because it is my own opinion that there are no other grounds or foundations of good and evil, but this Principle of Self-preservation and Equality; but to show out of these Principles granted by Mr. Hobbes, that those Eternal Laws of Justice, Charity, Temperance, Reward, Virtue, etc. which he by the same Principles seems to destroy, or make the Daughters only of Civil Government, are the Mothers and the Foundation of it, and grounded in the very nature of man, so as to oblige him to act according to them, though there were no Civil Magistrate in the world, or though the Magistrate positively command the contrary.  
Now Reason will dictate to us another Principle, from whence, and the same Rules of Equality and Self-preservation already laid down, the same things may be deduced and confirmed more strongly and effectually, viz. that Justice and Injustice, Right and Wrong, Good and Evil, are not consequents only of a Civil Government, so as to leave no place for any Evasions to any man that will acknowledge that he ought to govern himself by the rules of reason: and this principle is, That there is a God; which may be proved, and is evident: 1. From the order of causes in the world, it being to every man's indifferent judgement, that hath any, apparent and clear, that there must be a first cause. 2. From the order and method of the Universe itself, and the admirable frame of it, and the Creatures therein; which shows that they were not the effects of Chance, but of some wise and skilful Architect. 3. From the general consent of all men in all Nations, and of the wisest men, and greatest Masters of Reason, that have been in the world: and that which the most part of all, and the most part of the wisest agree to, at least is most probably true. If therefore Reason tell us we ought to believe that there is a God, the first Cause, Creator, and Architect of the Universe; the same Reason will also tell us, that whatsoever perfection we perceive in ourselves, or in the Universe besides, we must conclude to be in the Creator and Giver in a far higher degree then in ourselves, or the Creatures; for nothing can give to another what it hath not in itself: Let us therefore consider what things we esteem the greatest perfections and excellencies. Now above all others, we set the highest value upon Power; therefore in the first place we call God Omnipotent, and attribute to him all Power; and because Power without goodness may be idle or hurtful, as we find by experience, in the second place we denominate him Good; which we see verified, in that he hath made use of his Power in creating us, and giving us whatsoever we have, that we can call good: and also because Power without Knowledge or Wisdom, may err in its Operations; therefore, in the third place, we denominate God Wise, or Omniscient; and in these three Attributes, or Perfections, are contained all others; for he that hath Power, and is thereby able to do all things, and Wisdom, and thereby knows what is best to be done, and how best to do it, being also Good, we are not to doubt, but that we are to expect from him all things that are the results of Power, Wisdom, and Goodness co-operating. Hence therefore you may conclude, that he is Eternal, True and Just; the Opposites of which, viz. Finite, False and Unjust, are all contrary to the Attributes of Omnipotent, Good and Omniscient. It being thus demonstrated, that every man, according to the Rule of Right Reason, must acknowledge that there is a God; and that this being supposed, we must necessarily believe, that he is owner of all Perfections; and that those Attributes , viz. Omnipotency, Omnisciency, and Goodness, etc. are the greatest perfections, and therefore his; and we being all by the right of Creation and Dominion his Subjects, we ought, according to the rule of reason, to believe that he will do Justice to every one according to his Nature, and the Office of a Sovereign; and therefore we ought to be careful to live according to the Laws of Justice already by reason determined, which command us, not to do to others what we would that others should not do to us, and to do to others as we would that others should do to us: For though we should, in acting contrary, foolishly hope to escape the ill consequences that we ought reasonably to expect we shall hereby draw upon ourselves from the hands of men; yet seeing there is no hope left to escape an Omnipotent and Omniscient Judge, the Rule of Self-love, or Self-preservation will command us, not to do those things, which if not most certainly, yet certainly most probably will bring evil and destruction upon us, from the hands either of God or men: And this is argument sufficient to determine the judgement and actions of all men that resign themselves to the Government of Reason; and to those only I speak.  
Now if any take notice that I have given a notion of God according to the notions that men have of perfection, whereas I should have given a notion of perfection according to the true notion and Attributes of God; it being fit to say, Whatsoever is in God is a perfection absolute and universal, then to say, Whatsoever is amongst men a perfection, is a shadow or Character of God: I answer, seeing we can frame no other notion of God any otherwise, then by attributing to him whatsoever we esteem, according to reason, most excellent and perfect; Hereby it appears, that it is the good pleasure of God that we should really believe him to be such as we have spoken him to be, it being most reasonable, we should think it his pleasure we should judge of all things, and therefore of him, according to those faculties he hath given us to judge by: which we have done. And seeing it is the will of God we should really believe him to be such as our faculties declare to us, we ought also to believe, that he really in his own Nature and Essence is such, because the same faculties reasonably judge, that he is no deceiver, for that is an Attribute inconsistent with the former perfectious that constitute his Nature.  
And thus I have demonstrated, that every man ought to believe there is a God, that this God is good, and therefore just, seeing Justice (as we have shown before) is good, and a good absolutely necessary, and most conducible to the good estate of the Universe; and therefore the presumption of him that does evil, and yet hopes to escape the hands of men, though it does, for the most part, bring him at one time or other to destruction, even by the hands of men, and is therefore unreasonable; yet the consideration of a God being also in the way, such presumption must be the greatest madness, and absolutely contrary to the Rules of Self-preservation, the Principles whereupon we have proceeded.  
And seeing we have proceeded thus far upon these Principles of Self-preservation, and the Equality amongst men by Nature, as to deduce from thence the Laws men are to live by, and the Nature of Good and Evil, as to the Conceptions which man must necessarily, in respect of himself, frame thereof; and thereby made it appear, that Mr. Hobbes abuses and perverts his own Principles, in order to another small Disecurse; we will declare more at large, not what Mr. Hobbes understands, but what in reason ought to be understood and meant by the word Self-preservation, lest any should conceive I intent no more thereby, then barely the preserving of life, or a bene esse in this life, which would injure the notion I think we ought to have of it, by a great mistake; for whatsoever Mr. Hobbes his Opinion is concerning Self-preservation, when he makes it the great Law of Nature, it is manifest to any indifferent judgement, that hereby aught to be intended, not only the preservation of life, or a bene esse in this life, but a general desire that necessarily and naturally is in every rational creature, whereby they wish to themselves happiness and satisfaction; which may properly be called Philautia, or self-love, or is grounded thereupon, and is infinite as desire, running parallel with Eternity itself: for every man doth not only naturally desire to preserve his life, or to live happily in this world, but to be for ever and eternally happy, freed from grievous objects, and conjoined to pleasing and desirable; and this I think undeniable: and hence it appears, that this Philautia is the Centre upon which every man's actions move, and finally are determined and directed; it being impossible for any one endued with a rational soul, rationally and intelligently to desire to be miserable, or not to desire to he happy. This therefore being acknowledged for the great and necessary Law of Nature, it must of necessity be granted, as a consequence plainly deducible from hence, that that is always to be accounted best and most Eligible by each man, that conduces most to that particular man's real happiness; and that most of all to be accounted of by the Universal suffrage and consent of all men jointly, that is most conducing to the benefit, happiness and satisfaction of all men: and it is easily visible upon the observation of the whole frame of the Universe, and the nature of man in particular, that if we submit to the judgement and dictates of right reason, each man's private happiness will be found linked together with, knit and united to the happiness and felicity of the rest of his Fellows, as to this life; the greatest pleasures whereof are found to consist in Society, and the benefits we have by the mutual commerce, company and enjoyment of one another: And this is the reason that people desire to unite themselves in Commonwealths, and under Civil or Politic Governments; and a more powerful and effective reason, I think, then that of fear, which Mr. Hobbes seems only to insist upon, though I acknowledge them both to be strong motives. Now seeing that a Civil Government, for the reasons before alleged in our former drscourse, and this last mentioned, is necessary, as much conducing to the better and more comfortable estate of mankind in this life, the Dispute will arise, what kind of Government is to be desired, whether Monarchy, Aristocracy, or Democracy, the common Species talked of. I say, that Government is most to be desired, which is most conducing to the end for which it is desired, which, as hath been said, is the safety and more pleasant comfortable living of all the men in the world, and this, I think, no man can plausibly cavil at: Consider then which of these disserent Species of Government, last mentioned, do most conduce to this proposed end, viz. the general safety and comfortable living of all mankind, and not only of this or that particular person, or some sort of men; and I am much mistaken if any man will deliberately, proposing this end of Government, adjudge Mr. Hobbes his Monarchical Tyranny to be such; that is, for all men to submit their Lives, Estates, and all their Concerns, only to the will and pleasure of one Man, and he to be Sole Proprietor and lawful disposer of them all, without doing wrong or prejudice to any; nay, as it seems by his Principles, without possibility of doing any injustice, injury or evil: Such an absolute power in any one man's hand, is too great and unsafe, unless we could suppose him always the best of men, or little less than some Divinity. But suppose he be, or become Fool or Madman, or get some distemper in his brain, either by sickness, or any other accident, how shall such a one manage the Sword of Justice with an equal hand? his will and desire may be the same with Caligula's, that all the people of his Jurisdiction had but one Head, that he might cut them all off at one blow, or the like fumes of madness, melancholy or extravagancy: And certainly no man having the use of reason, whilst he sees and knows himself, and all his concerns in this life, subject to the will, humour, and extravagancy of such a one, can think he lives happily or comfortably, though he yet see the threatening dark storm fall besides himself. If it be urged, that if we do make a King, it is not possible to make him with a limited power, because if there be any other power in being that can check and control him, that power is saperiour to him, and therefore he but a subject to this: I answer, That he may have a power limited by the Rules of Natural Justice and Fquity, which oblige all men, Kings and others, not to do wrong; and limited also by positive and National Laws, or express Covenants, to which he may be obliged by Oath, Promise or Covenant; and such a limitation I only mean, which is a sufficient Obligation and restraint to a good and just, or any reasonable and wise Prince.  
In an Aristocratical Government, though there be not so much danger that all the Rulers may agree together to destroy or abuse their Subjects, yet doth self-ends and interest carry them very often upon projects and private designs, and beget Factions, dangerous and of fatal consequence to the Public.  
A Democratical Government is most difficult to be continued, some, not withstanding all caution and care of prevention, growing more eminent and powerful than the rest; and spurred by ambition, attempting the subversion or disturbance of the Government, and often, at last, grow too powerful for the Commonwealth, and change the face of the Democratical into a Monarchical Government, as in the Roman Commonwealth did Caesar, etc.  
To avoid the inconveniencies of each several Species, it is evident, that the well compounded Government, as that of England, is the best, under which it is most manifest that the people live the most happily, I mean all sorts and degrees, the Commons as well as the Lords, of any Nation in the world; where though there be one Monarch, and the Government resembling that applauded by Mr. Hobbes, yet doth he not pretend to that absolute arbitrary and unlimited power Mr. Hobbes would give his Prince; the Laws and Legislative Power being not solely posited in him, without the concurrence and consent of the People by their Representatives, though the Execution of them only be in the King, with other Royalties and Prerogatives, whereby he is sufficiently enabled to do Justice amongst his Subjects, and defend them against the strongest of his and their Enemies. And though if you respect absolute Power abstract from Justice, it is in the Kings to pervert these Laws established, at least as to the execution of them; yet with Justice he cannot do it, nor without imminent danger to himself and his people: for though Subjects ought not to take upon them to oppose and resist their Prince's actions, whether just or injust, as hath beer said, otherwise then by Petition, or refusing to be the Ministers of these injust Commands; and such Doctrine they ought to be well instructed in, with the reasons thereof; yet is it very difficult to impose this belief upon men, for each man naturally thinks himself concerned, as a Subject, to a higher Prince than any upon earth, viz. the God and Creator of all things, to maintain and uphold the Eternal Laws of that King of Kings; so that where a Prince, the greatest in the world▪ doth an act of apparent wrong and injustice, or which is so construed and apprehended, all parties so understanding and apprehending it, do thereby conceive the Majesty of that greatest King offended; and consequently, considering also the case to be of a general concernment, and may be their own, they desire and wish to see such irregularities (as they conceive them) reform, and thereupon often engage in the quarrel unadvisedly and precipitately, as being both Gods, and their own private, and that of all the world besides, wherein to die a Martyr must meeds be Meritorious; not considering, that the thing which they conceive to be unjust, may not withstanding be most just and reasonable, and the error not in their Prince, but in their own private Opinion and Judgement; and not considering, that if the Prince did pervert Justice, etc. yet those particular acts wherein he did so, would not be of so bad a consequence to the Commonwealth, as the remedy they did attempt, viz. a Civil War: which if so, then are they themselves guilty of a greater injustice, in bringing greater calamities upon a Nation, to avoid the lesser; and what greater calamity can be then such a War?  
Now the Constitution of the Commonwealth of England is such, that besides the old Laws, approved by many Ages of experience, no new Laws bind the people, which are not, or have not been ratified by their own consent: The King therefore that is to Rule according to those Laws, wi●● certainly be more cautious in observing that they be put in execution, then ● he were left at liberty, and unconfined● and his own Imperial Commands or E●dicts were only and singly to be accounted Law; the diversity betwixt such a Government as this of ours, and such a Tyrannical Government a● Mr. Hobbes speaks of, being this: i● ours, the people can say, We have agreed and submitted to such and such Laws and no other, and by these we desire to be ruled, and if you govern or handl● us otherwise, you do us apparent wrong, and let God and your own Conscience judge betwixt us and you● whether you observe, as you are obliged by the mutual Covenants and Engagements betwixt us and you: But in these absolute Monarchical Tyrannies, there is no such mutual compacts or agreements betwixt the Sovereign and the People, no positive Laws but the Prince's Command or Edict; and the people agreeing, or having agreed to be subject to such a kind of Government, have no other will then that ●f their Prince; it being the same a● if hey had said, We submit our wills to our will, and ourselves to be wholly overned according to your discretion; do ● us what to you seems good, we and all we have are yours, and you may dirose of us and ours as you think fit and invenient; your only Edicts and Command's shall be the absolute Laws to which we willingly submit ourselves, and which shall be by us inviolable.  
This is the nature of Mr. Hobbes his Monarchical Tyranny: Now let any national man judge, whether the Prince, whose power, as to the just measure of ●●, and how far it ought lawfully to be extended, is known and determined, and cannot without notorious injustice and breach of Covenant be enlarged, will not be more cantious in using the ●● me according to moderation and discretion, and containing himself within the Sphere and extent of Justice and equity, than he who may, according ●o the Laws of the Kingdom and Government, and without seeming wrong ●r injustice to his people, by reason of their consent to his Arbitrary Government, do what seems most agreeable with his own fancies, however extravagant and destructive to his people● in the first case, the sense of the apparent injustice opens his eyes to the danger of such actions, and restrains his irregular designs; in the latter, no fault is committed the people by the Laws of the Land can justly complain of, or the Prince by any Law but Divine, or natural Equity and Conscience, know to be a fault; and therefore, I confess, no such pretence of Insurrection or disobedience to the people, nor sense of injury to them done in the Prince: But it is most certainly true, that with all bad Princes, the fear of bringing mischief upon themselves from their wronged, and thereby provoked, and at last enraged people, is a great safety, and the best Shield of the people to protect and secure them from violence and injustice. And when the Prince is by express Laws, by Oath and Covenant with his people, positively bound to the observation of their established known Laws, which without the general consent of the people are unalterable: Surely matters being thus reduced to a certainty, as to ●he method and Laws of Government and Justice, the people will, even in the Princes own judgement, much sooner apprehend and disgust irregular and ●njust proceed, having a constant Standard to measure them by, then when all is referred only to the Princes will and pleasure; where quoth libet linnet, quod licet aequum est; and the Prince, though he vie with all the Records of History for all forts of Tyranny and Oppression, yet must be thought to do ●o evil, or at least not wrong to his poor Subjects; and this apprehension, and doubt of the bad consequences which will probably ensue upon such Tyrannical actions, is a great check to Tyranny. And though the Doctrine be admitted most certainly true, that for no reason whatsoever any Subject aught to take up Arms or wage War against his Prince, no not to preserve his own life, (which yet Mr. Hobbes allows of) yet will this give no security at all to the Tyrannical Governor; for but sew men in the world busy their brains to search out and apprehend the true reasons of things, as they ought, or are capable of so doing; and fewer will be content to sit still and suffer wrongfully (as they conceive) where there is good hopes of defending and vindicating themselves from wrong, let the wrongdoer be what he will. The number of those that will be dissatisfied with the just and lawful proceed of a just Prince, doth often overpower their Fellows, who are good and loyal-hearted Subjects, as woeful experience doth often teach: how much more ought it to be expected, that when the Prince doth, contrary to Justice, and the established Laws, abuse and Tyrannize over his Subjects, the number of the prudent Loyal, and lovers of peace, should be much inferior to the number of Malcontents and Mutineers? And hence the danger arises that so often overtakes the Tyranny even of lawful Princes and Governors, and the fear that the Prince must necessarily stand in of falling by the number of his irritated and provoked Subjects, who conceive themselves wronged by him, will always put some restraint upon his extravagancy and Tyranny, let him be never so wicked, if he have but such an indifferent measure of prudence or consideration, as to respect his own safety and estate; so that the people's sense of wrong, doth often conduce much to the securing them from much oppression under wicked Princes, as it doth often also bring great iniseries and asslictions upon them under both good and bad Princes. To restrain which natural propensity that all men have of revenging themselves, even upon their Princes and Governors, though with the hazard of a whole Nation, where it lies in their power, for an injury done, or conceived to be done to them or theirs, though by their Prince; it is very reasonable and necessary that the Laws should be so severe as they are against Rebels and disturbers of the Peace; and yet for all this, all to little to curb the exuberancy of this disease: for though good effects may sometimes be the result of unlawful and irregular actings, yet such actings ought not therefore to be allowed or approved, because such effects are but accidental, and not naturally incident to them; besides, w● must not do evil that good may insue● but it seems a secret of God's Providential contrivance, as in many other like cases, so in this, that the sins of the Prince, as Tyranny, etc. should be punished by the sins of his people, as Rebellion, etc. and so vice versa, the Rebellious humour of the people to be punished by the heavy hand of the● Prince, or some other Usmping Tyrant: Therefore, I say, where the Law are made and established, and thing reduced to as great a certainty as is possible, as to what is just or unjust, lawful and unlawful, both in respect ●● Subject and Prince, and one Subject and another; though the interpretation ●● these Laws, and the execution of them be left solely to the Prince; yet is there much more hopes the people may enjoy some benefit of these Laws, then where there are no Laws so established, but all is left to the will and discretion o● the Prince to make new, or revoke old or do what he list: for a Prince tha● will pervert these Laws, after they are so established, and he sworn to the observation of them, What would the same Prince do if there were no such Laws at all to stand in the way of his will and desire? certainly be much more Irregular, Tyrannical, and Exorbitant. Suppose the Kings of England had been all actually Kings of France, or of the Turkish Empire, to Rule there according to the Custom of those Countries, do you think those Countries of France, and the Nations under the Dominion of the Turk, should have been used by the same Kings with no less respect and regard to the people's satisfaction, and no less Liberties, Immunities and Privileges allowed them, then to the English. Subjects? Or suppose the French King, or the Turk, were to govern according to the Laws and Constitutions of England, amongst a people enured to such a Government, do you think that the people should presently undergo as much servitude under them, as the people they now Rule? No certainly; the different Constitutions of Government, though under the same men, would alter the condition of the people that lived under those men and Governments, and the Princes be thereby and by the humour of the people, deterred from abusing them contrary to their Laws, with the same licentiousness they would their other Subjects Hence it is clearly evinced, that good Laws established, as in England, are th● immediate cause, under God, of th● happiness, freedom, wealth and privileges, the people living under them as in England, enjoy above those other people and Nations of the world. And though, in other Countries, the Prince may have a more absolute Dominion and Arbitrary power, of doing or undoing whatsoever to him seems good, yet to a good Prince this is no ma●ne● of felicity, his satisfaction and contentment consisting chief in making his people under him live happily, and with the greatest assurance of the greatest immunities and privileges they may be capable o● as Subjects; and therefore desires not to impose any thing upon them, but what is in order to this proposed end: For why is the Prince said to represent God, but because he ●s to be as God to his people? whose greatest Attribute wherein we enjoy him ●eing goodness, the advantage the Prince hath above all others, is, as God, ●o do good to so many people his Subjects, and under the influence of his pow●r. And certainly to any soul that is livine aure particula, that carries in it ●he Image of its Creator, the greatest ●●●licity in the world is to do good to 〈◊〉, and oblige all by benefits and courtesies, or at least to deserve well at the ●ands of every the meanest subject or ●erson: for this is that which God hath done of all his Creatures; and ●hose creatures which desire to resemble their Creator, must do so by one another; and that man, I think, ought always to ●ook upon it as a special favour of God, ●nd a great blessing, in whose hands God hath been pleased to put the means and opportunities to delight himself in this pleasing Godlike exercise of distributing happiness, and contentment, and ●ll the benefits of peace, plenty, riches, honours, immunities, rewards, and other good things, to his inferior Subjects or Vassals; and that man who finds no satisfaction in thus acting the part of God towards his fellow-creatures, or rather whose greatest and chiefest satisfaction and pleasure is not herein found to consist (for omnium suavissime delitiae sunt obligandi delitiae) hath no part of God, nor no resemblance of him: And let him pretend to what other virtues, excellencies or perfections he will, they all lose their lustre without this one Noble qualification, which is their end; and he thus destitute of this ennobling perfection of the Soul, which is the light thereof, he resembles no more the light which is God, but darkness his contrary.  
But it may be objected against what I have said, that the people under those absolute Monarches by Mr. Hobbes described, being their Slaves and Vassals, and all they have theirs in Law and Justice, freely to dispose of according to their high Prerogatives, the Prince will be more careful, in this case, of preserving his own, than he would otherwise be if the people challenged, and had absolute propriety in their estates, goods and possessions, and a free disposal of themselves, and all they had, without being liable, or obliged by any Laws or Commands, but those by themselves expressly made or consented to; for the Prince being as Master of the Family, will be more careful of the Family, and all that appertains to it, looking upon all as his own proper goods, then if he were but a Guardian and Overseer for another's benefit.  
To this I answer, That it were happy for many men, Masters of Families, both in respect of themselves and their Families, if they had not power to waste their substance, ruin their estates, and be a continual affliction and vexation to all those that are necessarily dependant upon them, in some sense their poor Subjects and Vassals: And how many examples have we of this nature? Is it not the most common and ordinary thing in the world, to see the Son scatter what the Father hath scraped together; and by his folly and extravagancy, totally destroy all the Monuments of his Father's frugality, wisdom and industry? And how many families every day fall to ruin; and from a plentiful estate, are reduced to beggary, or a very low and mean condition, by the misgovernment of the Pater-familia's? How few Ancient Families, of many thousands, have continued their Hereditary Estates and Grandeur from the first Foundation of this Kingdom, or but from the last settlement of it under the Norman? And how many times have the best of them been shaken, and reduced to a low and very weak estate, only by the exorbitancy of their own heads? If Kings then were as Masters of Families, and governed after the same manner, as freely and arbitrarily disposing of all the Profits and Revenues of the Nation, and the labours of the people; what man is so blind, as not to see that Kingdoms would be things of no firmer foundation, nor longer continuance, at least under one and the same form of Government, and Race of Princes, than Families are, or the Estates appertaining to these Families continue under, and in the hands of the same Lineal Masters, whereof one in a hundred doth not continue its felicity a hundred years together; but is without any other default or cause then that of the Governor, or Pater Familia's thereof, reduced to the greatest extremities, and in some respect annihilated? Where is then this care that each man hath of his own Proprieties? And certainly Kings being but men as others are, and challenging from nature no more nor greater abilities either of mind or body, if they might without opposition, and with as much facility, dispose of their Kingdoms and people, as a Master of a Family of his Estate, many of them being guilty of the same extravagancies other men are, would make both their own Grandeur, and their people's Fortunes, subject to the same incertainties, periods and vicissitudes, that ordinary Families are; with this diversity, that a Master of a Family having not so absolute a power, is not able to do so much mischief. If it be further objected, that many of those Tyrannical Kingdoms, as that of the ancient and present Persian Monarchy, the Turkish, Indian, and others, are or have been of long continuance: I answer, That even these, however they seem to be absolutely Tyrannical, yet de facto they are not so: For in the first place, each of these Countries hath its Religion established and certain, besides Customs, which arbitrarily to alter, is not in the power of any the greatest Princes amongst them. Secondly, though the Princes may, according to the Custumes of some of those Countries, by their high Prerogative, and without infringing any positive Laws, take away the estate or life of any the greatest Subject without any legal proceeding, or good cause shown, or real guilt (contrary to the Laws here with us) and so often do; yet is it not in their power to change the Souls of men, and make them approve and like well of such injustice and wrong. Hence it is, that further than their absolute power maintained by the strength of a Military force will uphold them to exercise these Tyrannical actions, they neither can nor dare do them; but the awe of the Soldiery, whose interest such Princes have commonly linked with their own arbitrary Dominion, and whose advantage usually arises out of the oppression o● the people; and the custom whereby the people have been enured to such subjection, makes many such oppressions and tyrannies to pass with less opposition or disturbance: But than is not this Prince so arbitrary in his Government as is supposed; for he can do nothing but what shall be liked and approved of by his Army or Soldiery, with whom he must always carry fair, oblige, gratify, and please them; and even they, further than their own interest doth bias and incline them, will never be drawn to countenance and maintain open injustice, injury and oppression; and the Prince is himself in the power of these, by whose power he tyrannises over his people; and that it is so, is often experienced, they casting him off upon any displeasure conceived, and setting up who they please. But by reason it hath been usual with the Subjects of such Princes to be thus tyrannised over, being well acquainted with the irregular proceed of their Prince, and the power of his Armies, and having no established Laws but his will, nor no pretence of any Law to defend them, or interpose against such wrongs, but only extrema necessitas, or Lex Nature; they are content to bear much, and much more than will those people, who being enured to another manner of Government, and having positive established Laws, do no less. impatiently endure the breach or infringement of those their Country's Laws and privileges, though but lightly touching their estates, persons or conveniencies, than the others do the greatest extremities of tyranny and oppression. Hence it is, that in such Tyrannical Governments the Prince having enured the people to suffer a far greater measure of wrong, hardship and slavery, then in some other places they have been acquainted withal, may with more safety, and less danger of provoking them, continue the same, than another Prince commanding a freer people, and better acquainted with more liberty, and good usage, may reduce them to suffer from him a far lighter measure of injustice: which if a good Prince, he will never desire to do nor attempt; if a bad, I see not why any man should desire, that he should find an easy and uninterrupted path to help to go more cheerfully, and with greater facility, to the execution of his bad designs, in oppressing and grinding his people, and making their lives unpleasant and uncomfortable. Yet if any man could convince me, that the people were made only for the Prince, and not the Princes for the people, I could perhaps be more easily induced to think, that every thing that made the way more plain and open for the more absolute Dominion of the Prince; and the most absolute slavery of the Subject, were to be made a part of our Creed: But this is a Doctrine no well-advised man methinks should ever desire to set on foot, nor no wise or good Prince would ever make any use of, his people's greatest assurance of a happy estate under his Government being his own greatest glory and content: And though he himself may be good, and therefore need no restrictive Laws to limit him his actions; yet he knows not what his Successors may prove, or how fit or unfit to be trusted with so great and arbitrary a power; and therefore is well contented to give the people all the security he can, which may be consistent with his and their safety, for enjoying themselves and their estates, in the best manner that Subjects can be capable of, without desiring that all should be arbitrary, and depend only upon the will and fancy of him that shall sit in the Roval Seat; which is that which Mr. Hobbes will needs make Essential to it: For, saith he, in his Book de Cive, The rules of good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishanest, are Civil Laws; and therefore what the Lawgiver commands is to be taken for good, what he forbids for evil. And again, Before Empires there was no such thing as just or unjust; therefore lawful Kings make those things which they command just, by commanding of them; and what they forbidden, by forbidding of them, they make them injust; and a Subject, cannot sin in obeying his Prince. If this should be all taken for Gospel by all the world, as Mr. Hobbes would have it, there needs no more than the Succession of a bad Prince or two in each several Nation, to destroy the Generation of Mankind from off the earth. What brave sport would some of those Roman Emperors, as Nero, Caligula, etc. have made, if all their Subjects would have been so exactly obedient to their Commands? Yet in some cases Mr. Hobbes will allow the Subject to deny obedience to his Prince; For, saith he soon after, We must not obey the Prince, if he command us to dishonour God, or not to worship him; for to dishonour him, or not to worship him, can be by none understood for any manner of worship: Nor had any one, before the Constitution of a Civil Government, the Right to deny honour due to God, and therefore could not transfer such Right upon the Civil Power. Well then, Mr. Hobbes grants the Lawgiver is not always to be obeyed: When is it then lawful to disobey? saith Mr. Hobbes, When he commands us directly to dishonour God, or not to worship him. And why may we not dishonour God, or not worship him? Sure, I think, for no other cause, but because it is directly contrary to the light of Reason: Therefore by consequence, whensoever the Lawgiver commands us any thing directly concrary to the light of Reason, we are no obliged to obey, according to Mr. Hobbes his Concession; and such are all Commands contrary to the Laws of Nature, viz. Justice, Charity, Temperance, etc. as hath been shown. But Mr. Hobbes will say, such Commands must be directly contrary to the Light of Reason, and not by consequence only. I will not trouble myself with the meaning of this distinction, but affirm, that whatsoever is by a clear consequence contrary, is directly contrary to reason; and even, according to Mr. Hobbes, the Subject, in this case, is necessarily to be Judge himself, whether the thing be directly contrary to reason or not which is commanded. And whereas Mr. Hobbes saith, That no man before the Constitution of a Civil Government had the right to deny honour due to God, and therefore could not transfer such right upon the Civil Magistrate, and therefore may deny obedience: I have likewise already proved, that before the Constitution of a Civil Government, these Laws of Nature, Justice, Charity and Temperance, were obligatory, and no man had any right to break them, or dispense with them; and therefore neither, in these cases, could transfer any such right upon the Civil Magistrate. But sure Mr. Hobbes had forgot his definition of the Law of Nature, when he said, We must not obey the Prince, if he command us to dishonour God: For a Prince may command such a thing on penalty of life, and then the very Law of Nature gives us a right to save our lives, which is with him Suprema Lex.  
Having thus spoke to the concerns of men, in respect of this life, let us look a little, or rather a great way further; that is, to his concerns after this life is ended, to all Eternity; and by the same principle, whereby actions relating to our present estate are guided and directed, by the same is that also, viz. Philautia, self-love or self-preservation, taken in a more liberal sense; for God himself hath made that the great business of every intelligent rational being (as hath been before intimated) and by his infinite and gracious wisdom and goodness, hath made those actions which most conduce to that end of self-preservation, to be the same with what his own Eternal, and also late Laws have appointed and directed to be done: So that insisting in that path, and closely pursuing that end, we shall infallibly please our great Creator, and do those things which are consonant and agreeable to his will, and his very Nature and Essence (as we ought to believe) for seeing he is good infinitely, and wise infinitely, out of his infinite goodness and wisdom he hath conjoined our interest with our duty; for certainly we could never have thought that goodness in God, according to the notion we necessarily frame to ourselves of goodness, which should have made our interest inconsistent with his will, and where in endeavouring our own felicity we should have crossed, his Laws: Therefore (as hath been said) we ought to believe, that God out of his wisdom and goodness hath closely conjoined and united our interest, happiness and felicity, to all Eternity, with his own glory, his good will and pleasure, his own Eternal Laws of goodness and wisdom; which than we shall be sure most closely to pursue and follow, when we most closely pursue our own interest, our own real happiness and felicity: and this being granted, confirms and establishes those  Laws of Justice, Charity and Temperance, etc. without which it is impossible for men to live securely or comfortably in this life; without which there can be no Civil Society; and without which the Generation of Mankind must of necessity, in short time, be destroyed, and perish from off the earth: Therefore it ought to be concluded by all, that Justice, Charity and Temperance, etc. are things in themselves absolutely good, because absolutely requisite and necessary both to our well being, and the very being of all future Generations, and so strictly to be observed, even according to the Law of Nature: and whatsoever Religion or Opinion crosses or impugns these Laws, confutes itself.  
This being proved before, let's consider what Religion ought to be established in a Common wealth: for though Justice, Charity and Temperance, and some other Virtues, be granted to make a necessary part of it; yet may other matters be admitted, no less necessary, in some respects, so as they be not inconsistent with these: and herein are men at a great loss, and a mighty stir is made in the world, and not without reason, for seeing Religion is that which respects our eternal happiness and well being, no wise man but will think himself therein more concerned, then in all the comforts and conveniencies of this short life; so as he will rather choose to lose all those benefits and advantages, together with life itself, then lose himself eternally.  
Now certainly, that Religion which hath the best foundation in Reason and Authority to ground it self upon ●●●ght by any reasonable man to be chosen; and that the Christian Religion is such, hath sufficiently been proved by the Learned Pens and Arguments of many great and wise men; and that it is not only consistent with, but strictly enjoins the observation of those great Laws of Justice, Charity and Temperance, etc. we all know and acknowledge: And that the holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, are the Books wherein this Religion of ours is fully comprehended and taught, or at least that all that is in them comprehended is true and authentic, is generally agreed to by most that profess Christianity; only the several Comments upon the Text, the various Expositions of men, who differ in their Opinions and Judgements, is the great occasion of that confusion that is amongst us, and the great differences about Religions; all pretending to ground their Tenants upon equal Authorities of Scripture: for where it is agreed on all hands, that the concerns of the life which is to come, are to be preferred before this present, as being of infinite greater and larger consequence, because relating to our eternal good or bad estate; Hence it is most clear and evident, that according to the Laws and Rules of Self-love, or Self-preservation, every man is obliged to do those things that may assure, or secure unto him his future everlasting happiness; and for no consideration, regard, or respect of any temporary or transitory pain, penalty, pleasure or profit, to lose or hazard the loss of himself, as to his future estate: And although, according to the same Laws, he ought only to pursue those steps that lead directly towards this end of a future eternal happiness, without treading awry, or erring to the right hand or the left; yet because no man is infallible, but each one subject to many failings and errors, in point of judgement as well as otherwise, all that can be done, is only for every man to do that which in his own judgement and reason he shall conceive the aptest means to this end, praying God's assistance, and to him referring the event: and the dictates and determinations of this judgement and reason of his, is that which he calls his Conscience; which though certainly in many things erroneous and mistaken, yet seeing that to him it appears otherwise, he must needs think himself obliged to observe and pursue the resolutions thereof; and therefore looking still upon the End, Eternal happiness, unto which his Conscience, as he conceives, directs him the true way, though perhaps in truth very erroneously and deceitfully; he is no less zealous in prosecuting these fallacious paths, pointed out to him by his ill-discerning Conscience, then if they were real'y the true ways. Nor is he to be blamed for doing that which he conceives the aptest means to the justly desired end he aims at, but for misconceiving that to be an apt means, which is not: Therefore the best remedy to avoid the great mischiefs that happen upon such misapprehensions, and conscientious errors, is for each man to lay aside that high conceit he hath of himself, and to put off his pride and prejudice, and retain but a moderate esteem of his own judgement, as easily misled and abused; and to consider with himself, that seeing there are so many different Opinions concerning one and the same thing, both in point of Religion, and other matters; and that all those who differ in Opinion from himself, and from one another, are men, and therefore, upon that account, equal to himself; and though some inferior, yet other perhaps suppriour to him in reason and knowledge. Hereupon he ought humbly with himself to conceive, that it is no less probable he himself may be mistaken, and his Conscience misled and abused, than some one of his Fellows: For methinks it is high arrogance and presumption, for any the wisest man upon earth, to suppose all his own Opinions infallible truths: And though clara, and distincta perceptio, according to Des Chartes, be a great and strong testimony for the truth of the thing conceived; yet men will deceive themselves with a firm belief that they have that clear and distinct perception of the truth of a thing, when to other men's judgements, and even in truth and reality, they are in a manifest and apparent error, and are afterwards themselves convinced of it; and a firm belief that a thing is so as the party doth conceive it, though not grounded upon sound reason, nor upon the evidence of a clear and distinct perception, but only upon fancy, enthusiasms, misconceit, ignorance or prejudice, is no less strong to overrule and determine the affection, and, even the mind and judgement itself, than the evidence and demonstration of the most infallible truths, grounded upon the clearest perception the mind of man is capable of: So that a man's firm belief, and unshaken confidence of the truth of a thing, though in the highest degree imaginable, is no sound argument to prove that he is not in an error. Let therefore every one consider his Neighbour as no less desirous of that happiness he is in pursuit of then himself, and to have a Soul, with Reason, Judgement and Conscience, equal with himself. No man will scruple to say, this Neighbour of his is mistaken in his judgement, and abused with false Doctrines and Principles of Religion: and in reason, why may not you who are so censorious of another, be as worthy of censure yourself? especially if you have no better Warrant for your Opinions, than the charitable belief you have ever had of your own, or your own Sects abilities to judge of the truth; which in reality are no more nor greater, perhaps inferior to that of your Neighbours, whom you condemn: So that if you will set aside this overbalance of self-conceit, which only gives you the advantage, in your own Opinion, to any other indifferent Judge, there is perhaps as much, or a greater probability, you are in an error, than your Neighbour; or else that both are mistaken. Let every man therefore suspend his zeal, and look to the grounds of his Conscience, without prejudice, pride, and self-conceit; examine them over and over again, especially let him try them by the Touchstone of these three Cardinal Virtues, of Justice, Charity, Temperance, and what others right reason dictates, and if after all this it will speak no other Language but what it did before, I say, than he ought at least in conscience to proceed in his own ways, though he afterwards may find, perhaps too late, his Conscience but a vain Opinion, and ill-grounded surmise: for his Conscience being the same with his judgement, it is evident, that this often failing and abusing him in many easy and familiar matters, subject even to the trial of his outward senses, or in points of his Calling, wherein with reason he may pretend to the greatest skill; it must be great presumption in him to be so peremptory, and lay so great weight and stress upon it in things of a higher nature, and of a more speculative and curious knowledge, unless he have cultivated his mind with those Sciences and Studies that may enable him the better to discern betwixt truth and error; which is the greatest and most difficult; though the most Noble and Excellent Art in the world; yet in its highest perfection and improvement, far from making any man infallible: and though every man's Conscience, that is, his own private judgement and opinion, aught and must necessarily be his Guide; yet sound judgement will advise, that in some things we should prefer another man's judgement before our own, especially in matters wherein we have reason to believe he hath great skill and knowledge, and better than we ourselves; as in matters of his Calling, whereunto we may be strangers, and never versed or instructed in the things appertaining to it: and therefore a Learned Divine, or the greatest Scholar, will rather rely upon, and admit of his Tailor's judgement, for cutting out a suit of , and his Shoemakers for making him a good pair of Shoes, then presume upon his own; and herein he ceaseth not still to follow the dictamen of his own private judgement, which he thinks fit, in these cases, with good reason, to submit and accommodate to that of others: Why should not therefore every Mechanic, with the same humility, submit to the Opinion of the Learned, in points of Learning; and to their Exposition of the Scripture, in Scripture-Interpretation; whose business, study and calling is conversant about, and doth make him a Professor of such knowledge? and if to the Opinion of one, much more to the Opinion of all the most Learned and Judicious of a whole Nation, being confirmed and owned by Public Authority.  
But still if Conscience cannot be persuaded to this, you will say, Conscience must not be wounded and forced, we must not drive, but lead her gently: For if my Conscience tell me this is a sin, it is no excuse before the Judge of Hearts, in committing this which I really conceive to be a sin, to say it is allowed of by the Commonwealth, a Convocation of Divines, or by the Parson of the Parish, but it appearing to me a sin, and I supposing it to be such, in giving way to it condemn myself, and am left inexcusable: therefore Conscience must not be violated; and every man will think himself obliged to act still according to the dictates and suggestions of his own Conscience, let all the Laws of the World, Humane or Divine, say what they will: for that hath only the power and influence to work upon a man's Conscience, which he himself conceives to be Law.  
Hence it is manifest, that every man in the world that hath any regard to Religion, or a future estate, will desire Liberty of Conscience; that is, that he may do any thing that in his own private judgement and Opinion he conceives the aptest means to attain a future Eternal happiness; and as far as such a future happiness is to be preferred above temporary transitory things, so far will he think himself obliged by that Principle of Self-love, to prefer the free exercise of his Religion, the means to this happiness, before life itself, or all the concerns of life. But in the mean time, each man I think will grant, that in reason he ought to consider others as equal with himself; and that according to the Eternal Laws of Justice and Charity, as he desires a Liberty of Conscience for himself, he ought to allow the same Liberty of Conscience to all other men, who for the same reasons, and upon as good grounds as he, viz. upon the account of their Eternal Estate, think themselves, and are as much as he also, obliged to follow the suggestions of their own consciences or judgements, in order to attain that great proposed end of Felicity. This being granted, the consequence thereof must of necessity be a dissolution of all Civil Government, where the consciences of men, as in these present times, do put them upon such different ways and means of accomplishing this proposed end, as are absolutely inconsistent, and cannot be allowed, without interfering and crossing one another, both in principles and practice.  
But however, if you will have Liberty of Conscience granted to any, then certainly the Supreme Authority of the Nation must not be deprived of this Liberty which every private man doth contend for, and thinks of right to belong to himself: This certainly were great injustice and wrong; yet this being once allowed, there is no more liberty left for any Subject, other than what is consistent with that of the Public. But you will say, the public Authority ought to take such a course, as every man may have his liberty, at least so far as is consistent with the Civil Government. I grant it; but then must the public Authority be Judge in this case, viz. what Liberty may be or is consistent with the Civil Government, and not every private person. Moreover, seeing the Supreme Magistrate is to have Liberty of Conscience, which I think cannot with reason be denied, so far as is consistent with the Laws of the Land, and the Religion by them established. Let us suppose, as we well may and aught, that he thinks himself obliged in Duty and Conscience, in point of Justice and Charity, to take no less care for the future, then present good estate of his people: Hence it will necessarily follow, that he ought to use all lawful means to suppress all Religions, Sects and Opinions, which he conceives to be Heretical and Erroneous, and contrary to the National established way of Worship; and what in him lies, to propagate that which he himself conceives to be the true; and unto the observance and defence whereof, he is not only by his private Conscience, but public Engagement obliged: For he who sees another man in his Opinion blind, and going directly upon a Pit, or Precipice, where he shall be sure to pitch upon his own death, is very much too blame if he do not hinder him from running thus foolishly to destruction, though the other party exclaim against him, because he will not suffer him to go forward upon a certain death: How much more than shall he fail, in point of Charity and Duty, who seeing men run upon their own Eternal death, by slipping into Errors and Heresies, shall not endeavour to relieve and recall them, or at least hinder them from drawing the rest of mankind after them, into the same Gulfs of misery and perdition, by suppressing and hindering the growth and propagation of these Errors; more especially where bearing the Sovereign Power, that Office lays a duty and obligation upon him, by his particular relation to his Subjects, to be careful of all their concerns?  
And hereby it appears, that whosoever will set up for Liberty of Conscience for himself, seeing he can in Justice and equity do no less than allow that liberty to others, as well as desire it for himself, and consequently to the Sovereign Magistrate; this man immediately, and ipso facto, hereby deprives himself of all liberty, more than what the Law of the Land will allow him: for the Conscience of the Magistrate enjoining him to be as careful of the Souls of his Subjects, and their future estates, as of their bodies, and their temporal welfare, he can do no less, according to Conscience, then use the means and power that is in his hands, according to the Laws of the Land, to suppress all Religions but the true one; that is, that which he himself, as Supreme Head, hath judged so to be, by obliging himself to defend and conserve the same according to the Laws of the Land. And if you will exclaim against him for doing so, it is without any reason: For having allowed the Proposition, that every man ought to have Liberty of Conscience, and by his Conscience to regulate his actions; you ought not to accuse him who assumes this liberty of acting according to his Conscience, though it impugns yours: for to say, he acts not according to his Conscience, or that his Conscience is erroneous or wicked, and therefore not to be a rule to others, is to take upon you, in the first case, to know that which only God can know, the heart of man; or in the second, to presume to make your own Conscience the Standard of Truth, to measure another's by: So that the liberty you contend for, is only a liberty to set up, and idolise your own judgement and fancy, above all the world besides. And hereby it is evident, that Liberty of Conscience, other than what is allowed by the National or Civil Power or Authority, is not a thing to be desired; or if taken, will certainly dissolve and bring to ruin all Civil Government; and that man who cannot with a safe conscience submit to the Government in being, whether in a Kingdom, or any other Species of Government, I think his wisest way were to go to some such place or Country, where he may freely enjoy his own way of worship; and if no such can be found, then let him again consider, what kind of Religion he hath gotten, that drives him from the society of mankind: But for every man to think himself highly wronged, because he may not be suffered to set up a Religion according to his own fancy or conscience, is to offer the greatest wrong to all his Fellows, who may with as much Justice lay claim to the same privilege; and then will it be impossible for any Civil Government to take place or continue, where every man may be allowed the liberty to do what seems good in his own eyes, without respect to the established Laws: for who knows, or rather, who knows not, to what extravagancies men's consciences, or hypocritical wicked men, under pretence of Conscience (which is the same) are often carried? and therefore Liberty in this kind is necessarily to be restrained within certain bounds and limits, of which the Supreme Authority ought only to be Judge.  
Object. And now having through all these several discourses adhered so closely to the Law of Self-preservation, or Self-love, perhaps some will hence take occasion to say, this selfish Principle is base, and unworthy a Christian, nay even a generous Heathen; our duty to God, and respect to the universal good of all mankind, being things to be preferred before all self-ends.  
Answ. They who have well considered what I have said before, will save me the trouble of answering this Objection, and be able to do it themselves. and to the rest I say again, for I have said as much before, Our duty to God, and respect to the general good of mankind, are things inseparable from our interest; there being nothing so absolutely necessary to our well-being, as to do our duties to our Creator, and to do good to our Fellow-creatures, which is commanded by the Law of Nature, and by the example of God himself; whereby, in imitation of him, in all things to be imitated, and into a shadow of whose perfections we are to endeavour to form and model ourselves, as far as our natures are capable of it, we are obliged and enjoined to do good to all; which indeed is not only our duties upon the aforesaid accounts, but is also one of the most pleasing and delightful things to all good dispositions, and well-tempered spirits, that can be conceived or imagined, and they little better than Devils that are of a contrary sense and judgement. But if you will urge me further, and say, Suppose those duties we own to God and our Neighbours were really disunited from our interest, what were then to be done? I say, the very supposition is wicked, and injurious both to God and man; for it is as much as if we should suppose God could cease to be, or be otherwise then good, an Attribute and Perfection inseparable from his Nature: For certainly it could never be judged goodness in God, but its contrary, to make our duties to himself, and our Neighbours, inconsistent with our interest, I speak not here of petty worldly ends and advantages, which some baseminded men account their only interest; but that I account our interest which is eternally so, and upon which our future estate and happiness to all Eternity doth depend; and whatsoever is a means conducing to that end, and that only, I account our interest; and if others will interpose it, it is to be at their perils.  
If after all this it be objected still, that if we permit every private man to be Judge of good and evil, just and unjust, right and wrong, and that every man doth and must of necessity govern himself, and direct his actions according to his own private judgement and conscience, in order to his well-being; it must necessarily follow, that many men's private Opinions (as Experience teaches us every day) will make them refractory and disobedient to the Prince, and may be a cause of Rebellion, Sedition and War.  
I answer, It hath been ever so since the World began, and ever will be so till all men's private judgements jump in one: Nor is there any remedy for this mischief, as I conceive, but what I have already mentioned, viz. to persuade men to lay aside pride, prejudice and self-conceit, and be well advised before they oppose their private Opinions to the public, and the common remedy, which is, that he who hath so great, and probably overweening Opinion of his own private judgement and conscience, as to oppose them against the Public Authority, he doth it at his own peril, and is obnoxious to the Law; which if he think it more for his true interest and happiness to oppose, then submit to, he doth but observe the Rule of Self-love, or Self-preservation in so doing; and he cannot do otherwise (unless he could alter his Opinion of the means in order to that end) the greatest seeming good being always most prevailing with the judgement to determine it: For it is impossible for any man to renounce or resign the power of determining himself what is good and evil, and absolutely to be therein governed by another man's judgement, if he act rationally; the understanding not being otherwise to be determined, but by an apparent good; and where several apparent goods offer themselves, the understanding must necessarily be swayed by that which appears to be the greatest: and it is impossible for any man to make whatsoever another man pleases to call so, to seem to his reason and judgement an apparent good, or the greatest apparent good; even as much as it is impossible for any man to believe black to be white, or white black, pain pleasure, or pleasure pain, or that two is a greater number than three, only because another man bids him believe them to be so: And therefore that we should all believe the Commands of the Civil Magistrate to be the only Rule of good and evil, is not only unreasonable and destructive to Humane Society (as hath been showed) but also impossible, unless a man could believe what he listed: yet still so long as we all agree that such disobedience in the Subject to the Civil Magistrate, is punishable according to the Laws ordained, though private conscience put men upon such acts of disobedience, the Government may remain firm enough, whilst every private man satisfies the Law, either by active or passive obedience, obeying, or suffering for his disobedience: and if the Laws against such Dissenters as cannot be allowed or tolerated with safety in a Civil Government be strictly executed, men will be well advised of the grounds upon which they refuse obedience to Authority, before they thrust their fingers into the fire.   
FINIS.   

Books (since the fire in London, 1666.) printed for, and are to be sold by William Crook at the Green-Dragon without Temple-Bar, 1673.  

THe Triumphs of God's Revenge against the Crying of the Sin of Marther: With his Miraculous Discoveries, and severe punishments thereof, in 30 several Tragical Histories, committed in divers Countries beyond the Seas, with Pictures resembling all the passages: Written by J. Reynolds, Fol. Printed 1670. price 10 s.  
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A Description of Candia in its Ancient and Modern State; with an account of the Siege begun by the Ottoman Emperor, 1666. Continued 1667, 1668, and surrendered 1669. With all the remarkable passages, and the Articles of Surrender. Printed 1669 in Octavo, price 1 s.  
The Court of Curiosity: Wherein by the Algebra and Lot the most intricate Questions are resolved, and Dreams and Visions explained and interpreted: so which is added A Treatise of Physiognomy; published in French; and for the excellency of it, translated into Dutch, Spanish, Italian, etc. and now out of French into English. The second Edition, cleared from many mistakes of the former Impression, both in the Fortune-Book and Dreams: With an Alphabetical Table added; so that now the Dreams, or Answers to Questions, may with ease be sound out, in 12. Printed 1672. price 2 s.  
The Flower-Garden: Briefly showing how most Flowers are to be ordered; the time of flowering, taking them up, and planting them again; and how they are increased by Layers of S●ts, Slips, Cuttings, Seeds, etc. with other observations relating to a Flower-Garden. Whereunto is added the Gardiner's dialing, viz. How to make an exact Horizontal Dial on a Grass-plat, the knot of a Garden, or elsewhere; by W. Hughes, in 12. Printed 1672. price 1 s.  
The Memoires of the Life and rare unheard-of Adventures of Henrietta Sylvia M●liere; being the Remarks of the strange and Heroic actions of a great Lady in France now living. Written by herself in French, and translated into English, in 12. Printed 1672. price 2 s.  
The American Physician; or, A Treatise of the Roots, Plants, Trees, Shrubs, Fruits, Herbs, etc. growing in the English Plantations in America: Describing the place, time, names, kinds, temperature, virtues and uses of them, either for Diet or Physic: with the Governor of Jamaica's Letter, etc. Whereunto is added all the ways of making Chocoletta, and its virtues; by W. H. in 12. Printed 1672. price 1 s.  
Lux Mathematica: Wherein the 20 years' Controversy in the Mathematics, betwixt Dr. Wal●is and Mr. Hobbes, is debated, and dedicated to the Royal Society; by R.R. in Quarto. Printed 1672. price 5 s.   

Poetry and Plays.  
Epigrams, of all sorts, made at divers times on several occasions, in Octavo. Printed 1670. price 1 s.  
Poems written by the Right Reverend Dr. Richard Corbet, late Lord Bishop of Norwich. The third Edition corrected and enlarged. Printed 1672 in 12. price 1 s.  
Vittoria Corombona, or the White Devil: A Tragedy, as it is often acted at the Theatre Royal, by their Majesty's Servants, in Quarto. Printed 1672. price 1 s.  
The Old Troop, or Monsieur Raggou; A Comedy, as it was acted at the Theatre Royal. Written by John Lacie, in Quarto. Printed 1672. price 1 s.  
The Travels of Ulysses, as they were by himself related, in Homer's ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth Books of his Odysseys to the King of Phaeacia.