AN INQUIRY Concerning VIRTUE, In Two Discourses; VIZ. I. Of VIRTUE, and the belief of a DEITY. II. Of the Obligations to VIRTUE.  
HONESTUM igitur id intelligimus, quod tale est, ut, detractâ omni utilitate, sine ullis praemiis fructibusve, per seipsum possit jure laudari. Quod quale sit, non tam definitione, quâ sum usus, intelligi potest (quamquam aliquantum potest) quam communi omnium judicio, & optimi cujusque studiis, atque factis: qui permulta ob eam unam causam faciunt, quia decet, quia rectum, quia honestum est; etsi nullum consecuturum emolumentum vident.—  Cic. de Fin. B. & M. Lib. 2. 
LONDON, Printed for A. Bell in Cornhill, E. Castle near Whitehal, and S. Buckley in Fleetstreet. M. DC. XC. IX.   

ERRATA.  
PAge 11. line 18. read, As when there are other Minds, besides one chief one; but. lin. 21. r. As when there are, besides one chief good Principle, several Principles. P. 22. l. 22. r. in himself. P. 35. l. 7. r. to their. P. 69. l. 11. r. are those. P. 79. l. 2. r. ill occurrence. P. 83. l. 2. r. IS, and. P. 104. l. 29. r. degrees. P. 105. l. 26. r. from hence. P. 146. l. 9 r. order, set. P. 154. l. 29. r. content. P. 163. l. 17. r. perpetual Satiety. P. 182. l. 13. r. and are. P. 185. l. 5. r. losing. P. 187. l. 20. r. highly reigning. P. 197. l. 1. r. the natural.   


BOOK the First. OF VIRTUE, AND THE Belief of a DEITY.  

SECT. I.  
RELIGION and VIRTUE, as they have near relation one to another, and are ever presumed to reside together; so they are very rarely considered apart, or distinguished from one another. However, since there have been instances of some, who having great Zeal in Religion, have yet wanted even the common affections of Humanity, and have been extremely vicious and corrupt; and since others, even amongst those who have scarcely owned a Deity, have been seen to practise the rules of Morality, and have seemed to act with good meaning and affection towards Mankind: it has given occasion to several to inquire HOW FAR VIRTUE ALONE COULD GO; AND HOW FAR RELIGION WAS EITHER NECESSARY TO SUPPORT IT, OR ABLE TO RAISE AND ADVANCE IT. And since by the example of others we have been engaged in an enquiry of this kind, and are now about to enter upon a Subject where there is need of a very particular Explanation of things, and of a more than ordinary clearness in terms; we may do well first of all to consider What it is that we call ATHEISM, and what VIRTUE: and afterwards we may examine the consistency of these two together.  
FIRST, then, AS TO ATHEISM. And here it cannot justly be wondered at, if the method of explaining this appears unusual and strange, since the Subject itself, and the Question here treated of, has, perhaps, so little entered into consideration, and is a matter of so nice and dangerous speculation. But to begin, therefore, according to the best of our Reason; the judgement of which is submitted to others.  
IN the Whole of things (or in the Universe) either every thing is according to a good order, and the most agreeable to a general interest that is possible: or every thing is not according to a good order; but there is that which might possibly have been better, more wisely contrived, and with more advantage to the general interest of Being's, or of the Whole.  
IF every thing that exists be according to a good order, and for the best, by being in the wisest and justest manner; then is there of necessity no such thing as REAL ILL in the Universe, nothing ILL with respect to the whole.  
WHATSOEVER, then, has such an Existence or Being as that it could not have been better, or better ordered, is perfectly Good. Whatsoever in the order of the world is called ILL, supposes a possibility in the nature of the thing to have been otherwise contrived or ordered by some wisdom or other: for if it could not have been better made, or any otherwise have been better, by any supposed order or regulation; it is perfect, and in no wise defective or ILL.  
WHATSOEVER is ILL therefore, must be caused or produced, either by design (that is to say, with Knowledge and Judgement) or through want of design, from chance.  
IF the order of all things be such, that nothing can be thought of, or imagined, more wise, perfect and just; than it is impossible but that there must be Wisdom, Understanding and Design in the whole; and that in the perfectest, and highest manner and degree.  
WHATSOEVER is from Design implies a Mind, Discernment, and Intelligence.  
IF there be any thing ILL in the Universe from design (and it must be, if at all, either from Design, or from Chance) then that which is the cause of, or which disposes all things, is no one good designing Principle. For either there is but one designing Principle or Mind, and that corrupt; or if there be one that is good, there is another in being which operates contrarily, and is ILL.  
IF there be any thing of ILL in the Universe from Chance, or which was not designed, but accidental; then a designing Principle or Mind, whether good or bad, cannot be the cause or guidance of all things. And if there be a designing Principle which is the cause of good, and is good, but cannot prevent the ill which happens from Chance, or from a contrary ill design; then is there no such thing as a supreme good Design or Mind but what is impotent and defective: For not to correct, or totally exclude that ill of Chance, or of a contrary ill design, must proceed either from impotency, or ill will.  
WHATSOEVER has intelligence, and is a Mind, having a superior power over us, or having any eminent place, direction, or control in nature, is that we call God, or Deity. For, though a People believe and worship that which they think neither perfectly good, nor perfectly powerful, nor yet eternal; it is a Deity or God still, though an imperfect one, which they worship: or whether they think fit to worship or no, still they believe a God of some sort.  
WHATSOEVER therefore is superior in any degree over the World, or that rules in nature with discernment and a Mind, is that which we call GOD. If there are several such superior Minds, they are so many Gods. But if that single superior, or those several superiors are not in their nature necessarily good, they rather take the name of DAEMON. For remove all good from either of those Being's, and we shall immediately pronounce it a Devil.  
TO believe therefore that every thing is governed, ordered, or regulated according to the best, by a designing Principle or Mind, such as is good and eternal, is to be a perfect THEIST.  
TO believe nothing of a designing Principle or Mind, nor any cause or measure or rule of things, but Chance; so that in nature neither the interest of the whole, nor of any particulars, can be said to be pursued, designed, or aimed at; is to be a perfect ATHEIST.  
TO believe no one supreme good designing Principle or Mind, but several, is to be a POLYTHEIST.  
TO believe this one single Mind, or these many Minds, are not absolutely and necessarily good in their nature, but are vicious and unjust, is to be a DAEMONIST. For, to believe any thing of Being's, or of a Being which does universally superintend, which governs all things by his Power and Will, but not with that obligation and necessary confinement to good, and to what is best, is to believe an infinite Devil, and not an infinite God.  
TO believe this supreme Mind, or these supreme Minds good, and not the cause of ILL (if real Ill be allowed) is to allow some other cause, which is either Design or not Design. If it be Design, and of consequence a malicious and ill Design (that is to say, if it proceed from the prevalency of an ill Mind or Minds) then is this in reality being a Daemonist in some degree. If it be from no design, but from chance; so that a Mind prevails but in some things, and Chance in others; then is this to be an Atheist in some degree, or in as far as Chance is thought prevalent and unsurmounted by the power and wisdom of any supreme Mind or Minds.  
THERE are few men who think always consistently, or according to one certain Hypothesis upon any subject so abstruse and intricate, as this concerning the Cause of all things, and the Oeconomy or Government of the Universe. For it is plain in the case of the most devout People, and by their own confession, that they have times when their Faith only supports them, and that they are ready to judge (that is to say, that their reason inclines them to judge) to the disadvantage of a Providence and a just Rule.  
THAT alone therefore is to be called a man's Opinion, which is of any other the most habitual to him, and occurs upon the most occasions. So that it is hard to pronounce of any one, that he is an Atheist; because, unless his whole thoughts do at all times carry him against all design, or government of a Mind, he is no perfect Atheist: for, to believe any thing of design, or government of a Mind, though limited, and not infinitely powerful, is to believe something of a God. And that this is a proper way of speaking, and a necessary one, appears from this; that otherwise if no one were to be styled a Theist in any degree, who permitted any thing to Chance; then likewise would no one be to be styled a Theist who permitted any thing to a contrary ill Principle, as those do, who believe a Devil or Daemon, opposite to God; or that there is any such thing in the Universe, as real Ill, which is neither from chance nor from God. But if any one believes more of Chance and Confusion than of Design; then is he more an Atheist than a Theist, from that which most reigns with him, and has the ascendent. As on the other side, if he believes more of the prevalency of an ill designing Principle than of a good one, he is then more a Daemonist than he is a Theist, and may be called a Daemonist from the side to which the balance most inclines.  
ALL these sorts both of Daemonism, Polytheism, Atheism, and Theism, may be mixed: as thus.  
1. THEISM with Daemonism: 2. Daemonism with Polytheism: 3. Theism with Atheism; 4. and so Daemonism with Atheism; 5. and so Polytheism with Atheism. 6. Theism (as it stands in opposition to Daemonism, and denotes a goodness in God) with Polytheism: 7. and that part of Theism and Daemonism, together with Polytheism; 8. or with Polytheism and Atheism.  
1. AS when the one chief Mind or sovereign Being is divided betwixt a good and ill Nature, by being the cause of ill as well as good.  
2. AS when there is not one, but several corrupt Minds that govern; which may be called Polydaemonism.  
3. AS when Chance is not excluded; but that God and Chance divide: for instance, JUPITER governed both the Gods and Men, but could not prevent the ill fate of his Son SARPEDON, nor the growth of the Titans, who sprung not from him, but from Chance, and fought against him to gain the Sovereignty.  
4. AS when an evil Daemon and Chance divide.  
5. AS when many Minds and Chance divide.  
6. AS when there are more Minds than one, but agreeing in good, and with one and the same will and reason.  
7. AS when there is 〈…〉 good Principle, and an ill Principle; or several such Principles or Minds, both good and bad.  
8. AS when the last is together with Chance.  
RELIGION excludes none of these except perfect Atheism. Undoubtedly perfect Daemonists there are in Religion; because we know whole Nations that worship a Devil or Fiend, to whom they sacrifice and pray, only to prevent the mischief he would do them. And we know that there are those of some Religions, who give no other Idea of their God, but of a Being arbitrary, violent, causing ill, and ordaining to misery; which is a Devil in the place of God.  
NOW as there are all these opinions concerning a God; and that there are some who have no opinion at all, either through Scepticism, and a doubt which to assent to, or by having never thought at all, so as to be influenced by any belief in Religion, or any opinion in Philosophy as to this matter; the consideration is, how any of these Opinions, or this of having no constant Opinion, or no Opinion at all, does consist, or is inconsistent with Virtue.   

SECT. II.  
BUT to examine now concerning VIRTUE. There is in every Creature a certain Interest or Good, which is as an End in that Creature; and to which End if any thing either of his Appetites, Passions or Affections be not conducing, but the contrary, this is ill to him: and in this manner he is ill with respect to himself; as he is said to be ill also with respect to others, when any such Appetites or Passions make him injurious to them. And if, by the natural constitution of any rational Creature, the same irregularities of Appetite which make him to be ill towards others, make him to be ill also as to himself; and that the same regularity of Affections which makes him to be good in one sense, makes him to be good also in the other; then is that Goodness by which he is thus useful to others (if this perhaps be what we call Virtue) a real good to himself.  
WHETHER this be so or not, is reserved to be considered afterwards. Our present design is, to examine separately the good of Virtue to Society.  
IF any one will maintain that a Creature well constituted as to himself, may yet be chose towards others; then, notwithstanding a Creature be thus good for himself, this is not enough to make it be said of him that he is a good Creature; unless he could be understood to be absolute and complete in himself, and without any real relation to any thing in the Universe besides. For if there be any where in nature a System of which this living Creature must be considered as a part; then, if the Creature be to carry the name of good, he must be such a part as makes to the good of that System or Whole. Now if there be any thing in the structure of a particular Animal more than what has relation to himself, or his own private System or Nature, and by which he has an absolute relation to some other thing, or other System or Nature without him; then is this Animal but a part of some other System: for instance, if an Animal have the parts of a Male, it is with a relation to the Female; and the parts both of the Male and Female have a relation to another thing besides the System of themselves. So that they are parts of another System: which System is that of a particular species of living Creatures that have some one common Nature, or are provided for by some one order or constitution of things subsisting together, and uniting to that end, of their support.  
IN the same manner, if a whole species of Animals be such as contribute to some other thing; and that their Existence has a necessary relation to something else, or to the existence of some other species of Animals; then is that whole species but a part of a System. For instance, to the existence of a Spider, the existence of such Animals as Flies is made to be necessary: so that the Fly has a relation to the Spider, as the Web of the Spider, and the Spider itself have relation to such Animals as Flies. And thus, in the structure of one of these Animals, there is absolutely as apparent and perfect a regard and relation to the other, as in the system of ourselves and in our own body there is a relation of parts one to another; as of the stomach to the limbs: or, as in the branches or leaves of a Tree, we see a relation to a root and trunk. In the same manner are Flies necessary to the existence of other Creatures, both Fowls and Fishes. And thus are other species or kinds subservient to one another; which is being Parts of a certain system, according to which the nature of Animals is disposed.  
SO that there is a System therefore of all Animals together; an animal System, and an animal Nature, or a Nature common to all Animals.  
IN the same manner if the whole system of Animals, together with that of Vegetables, and all other things in this world of ours; that is to say, if this whole system of the Earth has a relation to, or a dependence on any thing else whatsoever (as it has, for instance, with respect to the Sun, and Planets round that Sun) then is the Earth but a PART of some other system. And since there must be a SYSTEM OF ALL THINGS, a universal Nature, or Nature common to the whole; there is no particular being or system which must not be either good or ill in that general System of the Universe: For if it be insignificant and of no use, it is a fault or imperfection, and consequently ill in the general System. Therefore if any being be wholly and really ILL, it must be ill with respect to the universal System; and then the System of the Universe is ill or imperfect. But if the ill of one private System be the good of other Systems, and be still the good of the general System (as when one Creature lives by the destruction of another; one thing is generated from the corruption of another; or one planetary System or Vortex may swallow up another) then is the ill of that private System no ill in it sell; more than the pain of breeding teeth is ill in a System or Body, where without that occasion of pain, the body would suffer worse by being defective. So that we cannot say of any Being, that it is wholly and absolutely ill, unless we can positively show and ascertain it, that that which we call ILL is not GOOD in some other System, nor in THE WHOLE.  
BUT if any entire species of Animals be destructive to all the other Species, then is that to be called an ill Species, as being of ill in the animal Nature or System. And if in any species of Animals (as in Men, for example) one man is such as to be of a nature pernicious to the rest, then is he an ill Man.  
BUT we do not say a man is an ill man, because he has the Plague-spots upon him, or because he has convulsive fits which make him strike and wound those that come near him. Nor do we say a man is a good man, when his hands are tied, which hinders him from doing the harm that he has a mind to do, or (which is near the same) when he abstains from executing his ill purpose, through a fear of some impending punishment, or through an allurement of some private pleasure or advantage, which draws him from his ill intention.  
SO that in a sensible Creature, that which is not done through any affection (and consequently with no knowledge, consciousness or perception at all) makes neither good nor ill in the nature of that Creature, according to the sense we speak in, when we say a Creature is a good or an ill Creature. And whatever is done either of good or ill, otherwise than as through good or ill affections in that Creature, it is in the nature of that Creature neither good nor ill, according to the common understood sense of a good or ill Creature, a good or ill Man.  
A CREATURE in this sense is only good therefore when Good or Ill (that is to say, a Good or an Ill to his System, or to that which he has a relation to) is the immediate object of some Affection moving him: it being then only to be truly said that he has good Affections, good Inclinations or Passions, a good Nature, or a good Soul.  
FOR if a Creature that is moved by a passion of Hatred to his own kind, be by a violent fear of something hurtful to himself, moved so as to do that Good which he is not inclined to, by any affection to the Good itself; it is not good (that is to say, good as above) which is the object of the affection moving him: for that which moves him is no affection relating to any good of his Species, or of that which he is joined to, or is a part of: and therefore there is no Goodness there; that is, there is nothing which takes from, or abates any thing of the ill Nature or ill Disposition (which is the true illness of the Creature) although the effects of that ill nature or ill disposition be accidentally prevented, or that some Good come accidentally to be wrought by that Creature, without good Nature, good Disposition, or good Intention.  
IF there be any affection towards private Good, which is for the good of the Species in general that every individual should have, this cannot be other than a good Affection; 〈…〉 it be not for such affection as this, that a Creature is commonly called good.  
IF there be any affection towards private Good which is not really consistent with such private Good or Happiness; this, as being hurtful to the Creature, and being superfluous, and such as must detract from, anticipate, or prevent the other good affections, is vicious and ill.  
IF there be any affection towards private or self-good which is consistent altogether with real private Good or Happiness, but is inconsistent with that of the other kind, the public Good or good of the Species (which whether a thing possible to be supposed or no, will be afterwards considered) this must be ill and vicious in the common sense of Illness and Vice; for although profitable to the particular Creature, it is injurious to the Society or Whole. If the Affection, by being only in a moderate degree, be agreeable to the other general Good; but by being immoderate, is the contrary; then is the immoderate degree of this affection vicious, but not the moderate. And thus, if there be any thing which is the occasion of a more than ordinary self-concernment or regard to separat and private Good, or of an overgreat extension of the appetite 〈…〉 attention of the Mind towards what is merely of self-good, or reputed self-good; this, as being detracting from the affections towards other Good, and inconsistent with just and equal concern for the Species, or towards public Good, must necessarily be ill and vicious: and this is what is called selfishness.  
NOW, if there be any affection towards self-good, or towards pleasure, which is in itself contributing to the other good, that of the Species or System; then is that affection so far good, as that it is absolutely necessary in order to constitute a Creature good.  
FOR if the want of such an affection (as for instance, of that towards Self-preservation, or towards Generation) be of injury to the Species or System; then is it vicious in some degree to want those affections, or to have such as are contrary: as no body would doubt to pronounce, if they saw a man who minded not any precipices that lay in his way, or who had a disposition that rendered him averse to any commerce with Womankind, and of consequence unfit him through illness of Temper (and not merely through a defect of Constitution) for the propagation of his Species or Kind.  
SO that the affection to self-good or private good, may be a good affection or an ill affection. For if the affection towards self-good be too strong (as for instance, the love of Life, which by being overgreat, unfits a Creature for any generous Act, and hinders him in the doing his PART) then is it vicious; and if vicious, the Creature that is moved and acted by that, is viciously moved, and can never be otherwise than vicious in some degree, whilst moved by that vicious affection. Therefore, if through such an overgreat love of Life and Being, a Creature be accidentally induced or engaged to do a good thing, or several good things (as he might be upon the same terms induced to do ill) he is not any more a good or a virtuous Creature for this good he does, than a man is so much more a good man for pleading a just Cause which he is hired to, or for fight in a good Cause against a Tyrant whom he happens to have a private quarrel with, and whom he fears or hates on that account only.  
WHATSOEVER therefore is done that happens to be of good to the Species, or to the System as above, through this affection towards self-good, or separat private Good, does not imply any more Goodness in the Creature than as the affection is good. And if that affection in itself be not to be styled a good or virtuous Affection; whatsoever happens through it, is not Goodness nor Virtue, nor the Creature any more a virtuous or good Creature: but let him do whatsoever Good, if it be only that vicious affection of exorbitant selfishness, or an excessively extended Appetite towards Self-good, which moves him; and that there be wanting therefore to move him any good affection, such as aught of right to do it; the Creature is in itself still vicious, and will always be so in some degree, whilst the passion towards Self-good, though ever so moderate and reasonable, is in any degree his motive in the doing that which a natural affection to his kind should have moved him to; but, which natural Affection is wanting in him, or so weakly implanted as to be insufficient to move him without help from the other.  
NOR indeed can there be any goodness till it comes to be a part of the natural Temper of a Creature, such a one as is moved by affections, to be carried by some immediate affection, directly and not consequentially or by accident, to Good or against Ill: that is to say, till some Good or Ill (which is a Good or an Ill as above) come to be the object of his affection, either as towards it, or against it; and that such affection become part of his natural Temper: for in the instance of Fear beforemention'd, where through fear a Creature hating his own Kind, is kept from hurting them, or is even induced to do them good; in this case the fear of self-ill or private ill, or love of self-good or private good, is part of the natural Temper: but the fear or abhorrence of other Ill, or love of other Good (which is requisite in a good Creature) is no part of the natural Temper, but far the contrary. So, let the Creature act how it will, or whatever way it is casually moved by those affections which regard merely private or separate Good or Ill; it will not have any thing more of true goodness on that account, but will be still vicious and depraved, unless the natural Temper come about, and the nature of its Affections change.  
FOR instance, if a Creature naturally fierce and cruel, lose that fierceness, and is made tame, gentle and treatable; then is his natural Temper changed. Suppose now that the Creature has indeed a tame, gentle and mild Carriage, but that it proceeds only from the fear of his Keeper; which if set aside, his other Passion instantly breaks out; then is that mildness not his natural Temper: but his natural Temper is what it was, and the Creature still as ill a Creature in its own nature.  
SUPPOSE on the other side, that a Creature be naturally inclined towards the preservation of its young; but that the terror of the Hunters, or of an Enemy in some extraordinary case, cause it to abandon them: in this case the Temper of the Creature remains still what it was, and is not prejudiced or impaired, though hindered from operating by a strong Passion suspending it for the time. But if by any operation of outward things, or by any thing from within, that Passion or Affection towards the young comes to grow weaker, so that other Passions may more easily prevail over it; then is the natural Temper changed in some degree, and the Creature not so good a Creature.  
NOTHING therefore being properly either goodness or illness in a Creature, but what is from his natural Temper (or from those Passions or Affections which constitute natural Temper) as it respects that Good or Ill of his Kind or Species; a good Creature or a good Man in such a one as by his Affections or natural Temper, is carried primarily and immediately, and not secondarily and accidentally, to Good and against Ill; and an ill Man the contrary: who is wanting in right Affections of force enough to carry him towards Good, and bear him out against Ill, or who is carried by his natural Affections just contrariwise; to Ill, and against Good.  
IF the natural Temper be vicious, the man is vicious in the same degree: and so if the natural Temper be good, he is in the same degree good.  
IF a man be by his natural Temper just, equitable, kind; but that his natural Temper towards Ambition fights against his other Temper, but not so as to conquer it; in this case he is good still by natural Temper; the better natural Temper being that which is prevalent in him, and has the mastery.  
WHEN in the general, all the Affections or Passions are suited to the Good that we have spoke of (the good of the System to which man relates) then is the natural Temper, and consequently the man, chiefly good. If any such Passion or Affection be wanting, or any Passion or Affection be redundant and over and above, or too little and weak, or repugnant, or any way such as to be unconsonant to that good, and disserviceable and contrary to that end; then is it vicious.  
I NEED not instance in Rage, Revengefulness, and other such (where it is so obvious) to show how they are ill, and constitute an ill Creature: but even in Kindness and Love, though rightly placed, and towards a proper object (as when it is that sort of love of a Creature to its young) if it be immoderate and beyond a certain degree, it is vicious. On the other side, not to have it at all, or not to have it to a certain degree, is a Vice in the Temper: and not to have it at all towards this object, but to some other which is improper (as when a fantastical Woman is fonder of a Toy, or of some tame Animal, than of her Child) this is a double Vice. But where the good Passion is too intense and eager, as where love to the young, or pity is in that degree; it is both hurtful to the Creature, and disserviceable to that end it carries to: for so overfondness is destructive to the young, and excessive pity uncapable of giving succour. Thus the excess of motherly Love is a vicious fondness; over great pity, effeminacy and weakness; over great concern for self-preservation, meanness and cowardwise; too little, rashness; and none at all, or that which is contrary (viz. a Passion or Passions inclining to self-destruction) a very great depravity.  
IN a Creature capable of forming general Notions of things, not only the sensible things that offer themselves to the sense, are the objects of the Affection; but the very actions themselves, and the affections of Pity, Charity, Kindness, Justice, and so their contraries, being brought into the Mind by reflection, become Objects; as even that very thing itself of a good and virtuous Life, or the PART of a good and virtuous Creature, having a thorough good Affection, or entire good Affections: so that, by means of this reflected sense, there arises another kind of Affection, which is towards the very Affections themselves that were first felt, and are now the subject of a new feeling, when either they cause a liking or aversion. And thus the several Motions, Inclinations, Passions, Dispositions, and consequent Carriage and Behaviour of Creatures in the various parts of Life, being in several scenes represented to the Mind, which readily discerns the good and the ill towards the Species or Public; it proves afterwards a new work for the Affection, either virtuously and sound to incline to, and affect what is just and right, and disaffect what is contrary; or, viciously and corruptly to affect what is ill, and disregard or hate what is worthy and good.  
AND in this case alone it is that we call any Creature virtuous, when it can have a notion of Good, and can make Goodness and Illness an object, or have the speculation or science of what is morally good and ill, of what is admirable or unblamable, right or wrong: for though we may call a Horse a vicious Horse; and so in the case of other Animals and things (as a vicious Medicine, a vicious Stomach) yet we never say of a good Horse, or even of an Idiot or Changeling, though ever so well natured and good, that he is virtuous.  
SO that if a Creature be generous, kind, constant, compassionate; yet if he cannot reflect on what he does, nor approve of what he does or sees others do, by observing what that thing is that is generous, just, or honest; and making that idea or conception of Goodness, or a good Action done through good Affection, to be an object of his Affection, he has not the name of being virtuous: for thus, and no otherwise, he is capable of having a sense, in any kind, of what is right or wrong; that is to say, of what is done through just, equal, and good Affection, or what is not so.  
IF any thing be done through an Affection which is not just, equal, and universally conducing to the good of the Species or System to which man belongs; this is certainly of the nature of wrong. If the Affection be equal, sound, and good, and the subject of the Affection such as may with advantage to Society be ever in the same manner prosecuted or affected; this cannot but be right. For, Wrong is not barely such action as is the cause of harm (for thus a Son striking to kill an enemy, but killing with that blow his Father, would do wrong, which is not so) but that which is done through insufficient or unequal Affection (as when a Son has no concern for the safety of a Father, or prefers the safety of an indifferent person to the safety of his Father) this is of the nature of Wrong.  
BY unequal Affection is meant Affection unproportionably or unequally applied, not towards the Object as it always actually exists or is (for then the running to save a Father in distress, but taking a wrong man for him, would be unequal Affection, and consequently wrong) but towards the Objects or Object, as it appears to be, as it is the Object of the Mind, and as represented by the Senses. For in this instance last mentioned, the Affection was, according to this meaning, rightly applied to the Object; so that the Affection was not unjust, but equal and right, though the Sight perhaps were ill; and that it were a purblind man who thus mistook a Stranger for his Father.  
NEITHER can any weakness or imperfection of this sort create wrong, as occasioning the unequal application, abuse or prostitution of the Affection, so long as the Object, in the manner that it is taken or apprehended, is neither absurd nor improper, but suitable to, and worthy of the Affection or degree of Affection applied to it: for if it be possible to suppose a rational Creature who has an entire and forcible Affection towards Right and Good, and who never fails in a just and right degree of Affection towards every Object presenting itself, but that his Memory or Parts fail him; and that the Objects are through the Senses, as through ill Glasses, falsely conveyed and represented to him, not as they are actually, but after a different manner; the person thus failing, since his failure is not in the Affection, but elsewhere, is only vicious where his defect is; that is to say, in his Senses (as in his Hearing, Seeing, etc.) or in his Memory: but it being not for ill Memory, or ill Organs of Sense that a man is called vicious, this is not Viciousness or Wrongfulness in one thus defective.  
BUT as the extravagance of Opinion and Belief is such, that in some Countries we have known that even Monkeys, Cats, Crocodiles, and such like Animals, have been held for Deities; should it appear to any one of the Religion and Faith of that Country, that to save such a Creature as a Cat, before a Parent, was Right; and that the Cat deserved the greater affection of the two; this would be wrong, notwithstanding the appearance of the thing, or any appearance or belief in the World.  
SO that whatsoever is the cause of the misconception or misapprehension of the worth or value of any Object, so as to raise an affection or degree of affection towards it, such as ought not to be; this must be the occasion of Wrong, as it is the occasion of an inequality or disproportion in the affection towards the Object represented or appearing. For thus he who affects or loves a man for the sake of something which is reputed honourable, but which is in reality vicious, is himself vicious and ill: as when an ambitious Man, by the fame of his high Attempts; a Robber or a Pirate by his boasted Erterprises, raises in any others an esteem and admiration of himself, and of that immoral and inhuman Character which deserves abhorrence. But on the other side, he who loves and esteems another, as believing him to have that Virtue which he has not, but only counterfeits, is not on this account wrongful, vicious, or corrupt.  
SO that a mistake in fact (where there is due advertency) being no cause of, nor any ways implying ill Affection, can be no cause of Wrong. But whatsoever is a mistake of Right (that is to say, of the worth of the Object represented) this being the cause of unequal or unproportioned Affection, is the cause of Wrong.  
BUT as there are many occasions where the matter of Right (that is to say, the worth of the Object represented) may even to the most discerning part of Mankind appear difficult and of doubtful decision (as when a man amongst several Relations or Friends about to perish, doubts whom he shall first succour) it is certain that the very lest mistake in this way, the least wrong preference, though in a matter the most intricate, is in strictness of speaking an Injustice or Wrong: yet however, as to that name or appellation of a worthy or good Man, or Man of Integrity, it is not the very lest error of this sort, or the slightest inequality or disproportion of the Affection, through a mistake of Judgement, which takes away that denomination, and makes a Man to be esteemed a vicious or ill Man, whilst the Aim and Intention is still good, and the Affection strong and of full force towards public Good, Justice and Equity. Tho on the other side, where this good Aim is ever so much; and where the Affection towards Right is ever so strong; yet if through Superstition or strange Custom and Vogue, or through any wildness or extravagancy of Opinion, there come to be very gross mistakes in the assignment or application of the Affection (as when human Sacrifices or Bestiality are practised as worthy and right) this cannot but be wrong and vicious; and must denominate a man ill: and the same when the Mistakes are less gross; but so complicated and frequent, that a Creature cannot well live in a natural state; nor with due affections, so as to perform his part even but tolerably well towards his Society or System.  
AND thus we find how far Virtue (which is Goodness or Soundness of Affection in a rational Creature) depends on a right knowledge of what is right and wrong, and on such a right use of Reason as may give ground to a right application and exercise of the Affections; that nothing horrid or unnatural, nothing unexemplary, nothing contrary to, or destructive of that natural Affection by which the Species or Society is upheld, may on any account or principle whatsoever, through any notion of Honour, or on any pretence of good to Mankind, or of obedience to supreme Powers, be at any time affected or prosecuted as a good and proper Object of inclinable Affection, Love, and Esteem. For such an Affection as this must be wholly vicious: and whatsoever is acted upon it, can be no other than Vice and Immorality. And thus if there be any thing which teaches men either Treachery, Ingratitude, or Cruelty, though under the colour and pretence of Religion, or of any present or future good to Mankind or Society; if there be any thing which teaches men (as amongst some Indians) that to torment Captives of War in sport, and to eat their flesh, is a thing very plausible; or that to eat the flesh of Enemies; or that to cut and slash themselves in a religious Fury before their God; or to commit all sort of Bestiality, is excellent or lovely in itself, or conducing to his particular Nation or Society, or to Society in general, or to the Interest or Honour of the Deities, and as such, praiseworthy and honourable; be it what it will that teaches this; be it Custom that gives applause, or Religion that gives a Sanction; this is not Virtue, nor ever will be of any kind, or in any sense; but is still horrid Depravity in these men, notwithstanding any Custom or Religion of their Country, which may be ill and vicious itself, but can never alter the eternal measures and true nature of Virtue.  
TO conclude therefore, upon this matter, from what has been said before. As to those Creatures who are only capable of being moved by sensible Objects; they can only be either GOOD or Vicious (for we cannot say they are VIRTUOUS or Vicious) as those sort of Affections stand. A Creature on the other hand, capable of framing in his mind those other rational Objects of moral Good, of Justice and Right, of what is generous, worthy, and becoming; although his other Affections towards the sensible Objects may, any of them, remain ill; yet if they do not prevail over him, because of his good Affections to the other sort (that is to say, to Goodness and Virtue, as they are Objects of his Reason) then is his natural Temper good in the main; and the Person esteem'd-virtuous by all people, according to that natural Temper which is the Test still, and by which every thing of Goodness or Virtue is measured.  
NOW, if by natural Temper any one is passionate, angry, fearful, amorous, or the like; but that he resists these Passions, and keeps to Virtue, notwithstanding all their impression and force, we say commonly in this case, that the Virtue is so much the greater: and we say well. Tho if that which keeps the Person virtuous, in opposition to these Dispositions, be no good Affection elsewhere in the Temper towards Goodness or Virtue; but that it be only some Affection towards private good or self-good (as hope of Reward, or dread of Punishment) then is this not so much as any Virtue at all, as has been shown before. But this still is evident, that if an angry Temper bears, or an amorous one refrains, so as that nothing of Severity, nor any Action immodest or irregular can be drawn or forced from such a one, thus strongly tempted; we applaud the Virtue of the Person, above what we should do, if he were free of this Temptation and these Propensities: tho, at the same time, there is no body will say that a propensity to Vice can be any way understood to be an addition to Virtue, or helping to complete a virtuous Character. But thus it is. If there be any part of the natural Temper in which ill Passions or Affections are stirred, and which is consequently vicious; but that in another part of the natural Temper the Affections are so vastly forcible towards Good; and that the sentiments of Right and Wrong, of a virtuous Life, and of Integrity, are so strongly fixed, as to master these other Attempts, of a contrary vicious Temper; then is this the greatest proof imaginable, how strong the principle of Virtue is in such a person, and how much a thorough good Affection toward Good and Right (which is the true principle of Virtue) is strongly fixed in and possessed of the natural Temper. Whereas if there be no such ill Passions stirring in the natural Temper, a person may be much more cheaply virtuous; and may live virtuously without▪ having so much of a virtuous principle as this other. But if this other, who has the principle of Virtue so highly and so strongly implanted, be without, or do lose these natural Impediments; he certainly loses nothing in Virtue, or is wanting in any manner to Virtue; but losing that other part which is vicious in his natural Temper, is more entire to Virtue, and has it in a clearer and higher degree.  
HOWEVER ill the natural Temper be with respect to the sensible Objects; as for instance, however passionate, furious, lustful or cruel any Creature naturally be; yet if there be any attractiveness or prevalency in those rational Objects of Justice, Generosity, Gratitude, or any other Image or Representation of Virtue, so as that it draws an Affection towards it; there is however some Virtue here. And on the other side, however vicious the Mind be; or whatever ill Rules or Principles it goes by; yet if there be any flexibleness in the Temper towards the sensible Objects of moral Good or Ill (as when there is any such thing as Mercy, Compassion, Bounty) still there is some good left in that Creature; and he is not wholly unnatural and depraved.  
THUS a Ruffian who refuses to discover his Associates out of a sense of Fidelity and Honour of any kind whatever; and who rather than betray them is contented to endure Torments in a Dungeon, and there expire, has something of the principle of Virtue, and may be called virtuous in some degree: and so in the same manner that Malefactor who rather than do the office of Executioner to his Relations, chose to be executed with them.  
IN short, therefore, it is hard to pronounce of any man, that he has no Virtue, or that he is entirely vicious; there being few even of the horridest Villains who have not something of Virtue, or some Goodness. Nothing being more just than what is a known saying, THAT IT IS AS HARD TO FIND A MAN WHOLLY ILL, AS WHOLLY GOOD: because wherever there is any good Affection left, there is some Goodness or some Virtue still remaining.  
AND, having considered thus as to Virtue, what it is, we may now consider how it stands with respect to the Opinions concerning a Deity, as abovementioned.   

SECT. III.  
THE nature of Virtue consisting (as has been explained) in just and equal Affection, which we may hereafter call a due sense of Right and Wrong, as comprehending in one the soundness both of Judgement and Affection; nothing can in a Creature capable of such a sense, exclude a principle of Virtue, or can obstruct or make it ineffectual, but what  
1. EITHER wholly, or in some degree, excludes or takes away the sense of Right and Wrong.  
2. OR causes a wrong and disturbed sense of what is right and wrong.  
3. OR, though there be a sense of Right and Wrong, is the means however of guiding the Affection to what is contrary. As when a man knowing any Action or. Behaviour to be morally ill and deformed, yet through some violent passion, as of Lust or Anger, or through love of some imagined good, he notwithstanding commits▪ the ill or unsociable Action.  
AND so, on the other side, nothing can be assistant to, or promote Virtue, but what either in some manner nourishes and supports that sense of Right and Wrong, or preserves it from being false and imaginary, or causes it, when sound and genuine, to be obeyed and submitted to, by subduing and subjecting the other Affections to it.  
UPON this account therefore, we are to consider, how it is that any of these Opinions about the subject of a Deity do affect in these cases, or cause any of these three things.  
I. AS to the first case, THE TAKING AWAY THE NOTION OR SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG. It will not be imagined, that by this is meant the taking away the notion or sense of what is good or ill for the Species, or in Society, since this is what no rational Creature can be unsensible of: but, it is then that we say it of a Creature, that he has lost the sense of Right and Wrong, when being able to discern the Good and Ill of his Species, he has at the same time no concern for either, nor any sense of excellency or baseness in what relates to one or the other. So that except merely with relation to private or separate Good, there is nothing which gains any estimation or any good affection towards it; nothing which is thought right, or worthy in itself of admiration, love or good affection; nor any thing on the other side which is accordingly disliked or hated, as morally ill, be it ever so horrid or deformed.  
THERE is in effect no rational Creature whatsoever, but knows that when he offends or does harm to any one, he cannot fail to create an expectation or fear of like ill, and consequently a resentment and animosity in any Creature looking on; and therefore must be conscious to himself of being liable and exposed in some manner to such a treatment from every one, as if he had in some degree offended all.  
THUS Offence and Injury is always known as punishable, and claiming punishment from every one; and Equal Behaviour, which is therefore called Merit, as rewardable and well deserving from every one. This is no more than what the wickedest creature imaginable has, and cannot but have a sense of. So that if we have any farther meaning in this, of a sense of Right and Wrong; if there be any sense of Right and Wrong which an absolute wicked creature has not, it can be only the hatred and dislike of what is accounted morally ill; HATRED of offence and injury, as such merely, and the love of, or approbation of what is accounted morally good; LOVE of equal Behaviour; equal and kind Affection as such merely, and not because of consequent Punishment or Reward, which implies only love of private Good, hatred of private Ill, and not of any thing farther, as in itself amiable or detestable. So that Sense of Right and Wrong, as here treated of, is nothing but the very Affection itself of kindness or dislike to such objects of moral good or ill, as above explained.  
IT is scarcely to be conceived, that any Creature should be at the very first so ill, and of so cursed a nature, as that if it be merely a sensible, not a rational Creature, it should as soon as it comes to be tried by objects, have no one passion of Goodness towards its kind, no foundation in its Temper of either pity, love, succorableness, or the like: or if the Creature be more than sensible, and be a rational Creature, that it should as soon as it comes to be tried by rational Objects, as of Justice, Generosity, and other Virtue, have no inclining Affection, no kind of liking towards these, or dislike towards what is on the contrary side cruel, horrid, base, villainous, or the like, but so as to be of absolute indifference towards any thing of this kind; this is in a manner impossible to suppose.  
SENSE of Right and Wrong therefore being as natural to us as Natural Affection itself, and being a first principle in our Constitution and Make; there is no speculative Opinion, Persuasion, or Belief, which is capable immediately, and of itself to exclude or destroy it: and it being itself an Affection of first rise and production in the affectionate part, the Soul or Temper; nothing but contrary Affection, by frequent check and control, can operate upon it so as to make it cease to be; since that which is of original and pure nature, nothing but contrary Habit or Custom (a second nature) is able to displace: for, where the Mind is the most earnestly bend, merely against any bodily gesture or mien, either natural or by Habit acquired, and would endeavour to break it, so as to remove it wholly out of the carriage; it is not by such an immediate and sudden disapprobation, or contrary bent of the Mind that this can be removed; neither can that Affection in the Soul, of hatred to Inhumanity, love of Mercy, or whatsoever else in a rational Creature implies a sense in some degree of Right and Wrong, be instantly, nor yet without much force and violence effaced or struck out of the natural Temper, even by the means of the most pernicious Opinion and Belief in the world. But this mischief being not to be effected directly through any Opinion, but in consequence and by effect of untoward and opposite Affection (which may often be owing to, and occasioned by Opinion) we may then speak of it more particularly when we speak of the ill operation of other Affections, set in opposition to that of a sense of Right and Wrong.  
II. AS to the second case. If there be A SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG, BUT THAT IT BE MORE OR LESS MISTAKEN AND CONFOUNDED, as in the case of those barbarous Nations, as above; it often happens that it is no Opinion at all about the subject of a Deity which influences in this place: for it is frequently nothing else but the custom of some Countries, and the force of Education against Nature, where such and such things are repeatedly viewed with Applause and Honour accompanying them. So that it is possible that a man forcing himself, may eat the flesh of his enemies, not only against his Stomach, but against his Nature (if I may so speak) and yet think it very right and honourable, as being of considerable service to his Community, and capable of advancing the name, and spreading the terror of his Nation.  
BUT to speak of the Opinions relating to a Deity, and what effect they have in this place, which is our business.  
AS to Atheism, it does not seem that it can directly have any effect at all here towards the setting up, or making of a false species or show of Right or Wrong. For though a man by ill practice, which may be occasioned by Atheism, may come to lose, in a manner, all sense of Right and Wrong (that is to say, all sense of good or ill, amiableness or deformity in any moral Action, as above) though Atheism, thus, may be the occasion of an almost thorough selfishness, as when a creature has scarcely any thing that attracts him but what is of a selfish kind, and what relates to a deliberate self-end, the satisfaction of some Lust, or the security of the animal State; yet it does not seem that Atheism should of itself be the cause of any such estimation, or valuing of any thing as noble of performance, generous, self-worthy and deserving, which was just the contrary: so as that it should be thought that the being able to eat man's Flesh, to commit Bestiality, or any such like Actions as have been mentioned, were after the same manner, good and excellent in themselves. But this is certain, that by means of ill Religion, or Superstition, many things the most horridly unnatural and inhuman, come to be received as most excellent, good and laudable in themselves: For, where the commiting Bestiality is taught as a religious Practice, there it is generally in high esteem, and thought to be in itself a thing excellent: For if any thing that is abominable and horrid be enjoined by Religion, as the supposed command of some Deity; if the thing be not taken for good and excellent, but for horrid and abominable, then must the Deity be taken for such, and be thought of as a Being odious and malignant; which every Religion forbids to believe. Therefore whatever teaches the love and admiration of a Deity, that has any character of Ill, teaches at the same time a love and admiration of that Ill, and causes that to be taken for good and amiable which is horrid and detestable.  
SO that if the Praise and Love of a Deity be that which is proper to every Religion, there is no Religion where God is not represented entirely good, and free of malignity, injustice and cruelty, but what must make that sort whatsoever it be, of malignity, injustice, or cruelty, to be applauded and taken for Good and Right; and must be the cause therefore of men's acting against natural Affection, and of their growing malignant, unjust, cruel, and the like.  
FOR instance; if JUPITER be he that is adored and reverenced; and that the History of JUPITER makes him to be lustful, and to satiate his Lust in the most loose and exorbitant manner; then is it impossible but his Worshipper believing this History and Character, must be taught a greater love of lustful Actions. If there be a Religion that teaches the adoration and love of a God, whose Character it is to be full of jealousy, captious, and of high resentment, subject to wrath and anger, furious, revengeful, and revenging injuries on others than those who did injury; and if there be added in the Character of this God, a fraudulent inclination, encouraging deceit and treachery, favourable to a few, and that for slight causes or no cause, and cruel to the rest; it is evident in the case of such a Religion as this, that it must of necessity raise even an approbation and respect towards the vices and imperfections of this kind, and breed accordingly that parallel disposition, that unsociable and jealous temper, partiality, selfishness, moroseness, bitterness and revengefulness, as well as treachery and inhumanity: for whatever is of this nature must in many cases appear noble to him who views these things in that Being to which he gives the highest Honour and Veneration.  
BUT, if it be supposed, that in the worship of such a God, there is nothing besides what proceeds merely from fear and awe, without the least esteem or love towards him, as to one supposed amiable or excellent; then is not any one indeed by this opinion, misled as to his notion of Right and Wrong, of what is amiable or detestable in Actions. For if in following the precepts of his God, or doing what is necessary towards the satisfying of such his Deity, he be compelled only by fear, and act against his inclination the thing which he dislikes as barbarous, unnatural, or any other way ill and odious; then has he a sense of what is ill, and of what Right and Wrong is, and is sensible of ill in the character of his God: however nice he be in pronouncing any thing concerning it, or in not daring so much as to think formally about it out of a superstitious fear or shyness. For whoever pretends to believe that there is a God, and that God is just and good, must mean that there is such a thing as Justice and Injustice, Right and Wrong, according to which he pronounces that God is just: for if the Will of God, or Law of God alone, be said to be that which makes Right and Wrong, then must this be a name only for what is or is not his Will: for thus if by his will one Person were to be punished for another's fault, this would be Just and Right; and so the same, if arbitrarily and without reason, some Being's were made to suffer nothing but Ill, and others only to enjoy Good; which to say is just, is to say nothing, or to speak without a meaning.  
AND thus it ever is, and must be an ill consequence in false and ill Religion, that where there is a real Reverence, Esteem and Worship of a supreme Being, represented not as absolutely just and perfect, it must occasion the loss of rectitude in the Creature so worshipping and adoring, and who is thus immorally Religious.  
TO this I need only add, that as the character of a vicious God (or rather Daemon or Idol of the Mind) does injury to the affections of Men, disturbs and impairs the sense of Right and Wrong; so on the other hand, it must highly contribute to the fixing of right Apprehensions, and a sound sense of Right and Wrong in men, to contemplate, respect, and adore a God who is ever, and on all accounts represented to them so as to be actually a true model and example of the most exact Justice, and highest Goodness and Worth; and who by a constant good Affection expressed towards the Whole, must of necessity engage us to act within our Compass, or in our Sphere or System, according to a like Principle and Affection: and having once the good of the Species or Mankind in view, and as our end or aim, it must be with difficulty that we can be misguided to a wrong sense of what is Right or Wrong. Nor can any thing more prevail on men, or more naturally form their Minds to a union with Virtue and Excellence, than an established opinion, such as this, concerning a supreme Deity. But of this afterwards.  
AS to this second case therefore; RELIGION (according to the kind it may be of) is capable of doing great good or great harm, and ATHEISM not any positive good or harm. For, however it may be indirectly an occasion of men's losing a good and sufficient sense of Right and Wrong; yet it will not, as Atheism merely, be the occasion of setting up false Right and Wrong, which only fantastical reasoning, ill custom, or ill Religion can do.  
III. AS to the last case, THE OPPOSITION OF OTHER AFFECTIONS TO THOSE VIRTUOUS ONES, WHICH CREATE A REAL SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG; it is to be considered that a Creature having this sort of sense or good Affection in any considerable degree, must necessarily act according to it; if this Affection be not opposed either by some interesting Affection towards a contrary imagined Self-good and private Advantage, or by some strong and forcible passion, as of Lust or Anger, which may not only overbear the sense of Right and Wrong, but even the sense of private Advantage too, and overrule even the most settled opinion of what is conducing to self-good.  
NOTHING therefore can overcome or suppress this sense we speak of, or injure the integrity of such a Creature, but what EITHER raises or affords growth to those strong and obstinate Passions; OR otherwise causes an imagination of some interest or self-advantage in opposition to this affection of Virtue; so as to cause this good disposition to be resisted and gone against deliberately, and in cool judgement. Whatsoever is of this kind, besides that it turns a Creature towards Vice in spite of this other good dispositions it must in time also even wear out that good disposition itself, and so leave the Creature in a manner totally resigned to Vice.  
NOW, in this former part of our Inquiry, our business is not to examine (as we afterwards shall) all the several ways by which this corruption is introduced or increased: but we are to consider how the opinions concerning a Deity do influence one way or another in this place, or cause this corruption whereby we act in contradiction of good and right Affection, and which is followed by the loss of that right Affection, or sense of Right and Wrong.  
AND this being after this manner complicated, we shall treat it more openly and at large.  
THAT it is possible for a Creature capable of using reflection, to have a liking or dislike of moral Actions, and consequently a sense of Right and Wrong, before such time as he may have any notion or sense of GOD at all; this is what will hardly be questioned: it being a thing not expected, or any way possible, that a Creature such as Man, arising from his Childhood slowly and gradually, to several degrees of Reason and Reflection, should at the very first be taken up with those speculations or more refined sort of Reflections, about the subject of God's Existence.  
BUT to make this more plain; let us suppose a Creature wanting Reason, or unable to reflect at all, who notwithstanding has many good Qualities and Affections; as considering only that one of Pity or Compassionatness: it is certain that if you give to this Creature a reflecting faculty, it will at the same instant approve of Charity and Pity, be taken with any show or representation of Pity, and think Pity amiable and good, and Cruelty the contrary: and so the same in case of any other Passion or Affection. And this is to be capable of Virtue, and to have a sense of Right and Wrong.  
BEFORE therefore that a Creature may be supposed to have any Notion or Opinion one way or other, concerning the subject of a God, he may be supposed to have a sense of Right and Wrong, and to have Virtue and Vice in different degrees; as we know by experience of those who have lived in such places, or in such a manner as never to have entered into any thoughts or opinion at all in that matter; who yet are very different amongst themselves, as to their Honesty, Good nature and Virtue.  
BUT whether we suppose in a Creature but the least part of this good disposition or virtuous Principle; let us consider what it is (as to any of these Opinions concerning a Deity) that can, or is likely to raise any Affection in opposition; or on the other side, may be able to prevent and hinder any such opposite Affection, subdue it, or make it less.  
NOW, as to the belief of a Deity, and how men are influenced to yield obedience, and act in conformity to such a supreme Being; it must be either in the way of his POWER, as expecting advantage or harm from him, or in the way of his EXCELLENCY and adorable Perfections, as thinking it the perfection of Nature, and highest Glory and Honour to follow and imitate him, or to be approved by him.  
IF (as in the first case) there be a belief or conception of a Deity, who is feared as one that will punish such or such a Behaviour; and if upon this account, through the fear of such a certain Punishment, the Creature be restrained from doing that particular ill, which he is not otherwise in any manner averse from; this is not, nor ever can be, as has been proved, any Virtue or Goodness, any more than as it may be said perhaps, that there is meekness and gentleness in a Tiger chained up, or innocence and sobriety in a Monkey under the discipline of the Whip. For however orderly and well those Animals, or Man himself upon like terms, may be brought to act, while the Mind or Reason is not gained, nor the Inclinations carried that way; but that Aw alone is that which prevails and forces obedience; the obedience is but servile, and all that is done through it merely servile; and the greater degree of such a submission or compliance is but the greater servility towards whatsoever subject it chance to be. For, whether such a Creature have a good Master, or an ill one, he is not less servile in his own nature: and though the Master or Superior so feared be ever so perfect, and of so excellent a Nature, yet the greater and more prostitute submission that is caused in this case, and through this Principle or Motive only, is but the lower and more abject servitude, and implies the greater wretchedness and meanness in the Creature, as having those passions of Self-love, or towards Self-good so much more strong and excessive, that is to say, more faultily and viciously; as has been explained. So that this belief of a God dispensing Rewards and Punishments according to such and such Actions, is not of itself directly the cause of Virtue; though it may be perhaps of a virtuous-like Behaviour. But if it be the character of a Religion, to enjoin not only the good Action, but the Affection, such as Charity and Love; and that in reality it be the effect of such a Religion, to make men endeavour all they can to create in themselves such free dispositions to Goodness: then is a Person by this means made to have Virtue in any particular, when he begins to act through such sincere and sound Affection. And thus the fear of Punishment and hope of Reward may be understood to be the occasion of Virtue, when it gives rise to another Principle than itself, and is at length the occasion of doing good out of some other Affection than either that towards Reward, or that of apprehension and dread of Punishment; there being no such thing possible as either actual Love, Charity, or Goodness, till such time.  
IF (as in the second case) there be a belief or conception of a Deity, who is admired and adored, as being understood to have the most high and glorious Qualities; such as of infinite Power and Wisdom, which make him conspicuous and cause him of necessity to be reverenced and held in Veneration; and if in the manner that this sovereign and mighty Being is apprehended, or as he is related and described, there appear in him a high and eminent regard to what is good and excellent, a concern for the good of all, or an affection of Kindness and Love towards the Whole; such an example as this (of the good of which we have already spoken) must certainly help to raise and increase the affection towards Virtue, and help to submit and subdue all other Affections to that. And if joined to this, there be an opinion or apprehension of the superintendency and all-seeingness of such a supreme Being; as one who is a witness and spectator of human Actions, and conscious of whatsoever is felt or acted in the Universe; so that in the perfectest recess or deepest Solitude there is not wanting one closely joined to us, whose Presence singly is of more moment than that of the most August Assembly on Earth, or of all Mankind overlooking, before whom as the shame of guilty Actions must be the greatest shame, so the Honour of well-doing, even under the unjust censure of a whole World, must be the greatest Honour and Applause; in this case, it is to the commonest view apparent how far conducing a perfect Theism must be to Virtue, and how much want there is in Atheism.  
THEREFORE, if there be a Being conceived, all-intelligent, and allseeing, of infinite Power, Wisdom and Goodness; the belief of such a Being (which is barely the Theistical Belief and no more) must of necessity, thus, be highly effectual to the creating or furthering of good Affections, and to the removing of contrary ones; by rendering every thing that is of Virtue more lovely, splendid, and attractive, and every thing that is of Vice more ignominious and deformed.  
WHAT the fear of future Punishments, and hopes of certain future Rewards, may farther do towards the promotion of Virtue; and of what Benefit this accession of Belief may be to Virtue, we shall further consider as we proceed.  
BUT this in the mean while is certain, that neither can this fear or hope be of the kind of those Affections which we call good Affections, as being the springs and sources of all Actions truly good. Nor yet can it, as has been proved, so much as admit of a thorough good Affection, where it stands as essential to any moral performance, or where it has to do, as but in part a motive to that which some other Affection ought alone to have been a motive full and sufficient: so that it is therefore not only not the Cause, but is exclusive in some degree, of any virtuous Action, and must withal, as it increases, strengthen the vicious Principle, that of excessive selfishness, or habitual earnest attention of the Mind, and application of the Passions towards self-good; which Principle as it is improved and made stronger every day, by the strong exercise of the Passions in this Subject of more extended Self-interest, must spread itself through the whole Life; and by causing a greater attention to self-good in every thing else, must of necessity take off from, and diminish the Affections towards other Good, that is to say, public and extensive Good, or good of the System, as above; in short, must destroy more and more true Generosity and Virtue, and introduce meanness and narrowness of Soul.  
THUS if true Piety be esteemed a Love of God for his own excellency, it will follow, that as this solicitous regard to private Good expected from him, is greater or lesser; so it will prove either more or less a diminution to the Love of God for his own excellence, and consequently prove a diminution of Piety: because whilst God is beloved only as the cause of private Good to any one, he is beloved but as any other instrument or means of Pleasure by any vicious Creature: and when there is more of this sort of Passion or Affection towards private good, there is less room, as has been shown, for the other towards more general Good, or towards any deserving object worthy of Love and Admiration for its own sake; such as is God.  
IN the same manner, if the love and desire of Life, or prolongation of Being, be remarkably strong in any Creature; the stronger it is, the less he is able to have true submission or resignation to Providence, or the Rule and Order of God, and consequently the less is his Piety. And if his Resignation depends wholly on that expectation of infinite Reward, the meaning of his Resignation, whatever the appearance be, is only this, That he resigns all other things upon a condition of THAT which he himself confesses to be much beyond an Equivalent, viz. eternal Living, and in a State of highest Pleasure and Enjoyment.  
BUT, notwithstanding this, it is certain that although the Principle of Virtue cannot in its own nature but suffer diminution by whatsoever is of that other Kind; as by eagerness of Reward (which by itself, and in the room of better Affection is mercenariness) and dread of Punishment (which is in the same sense servility:) and although as any such ardent pursuit of Pleasure, or overgreat attention of the Mind to self-concernment increases, the principle of Generosity, Magnanimity and Virtue, must suffer and decrease; yet it is certain that this Principle of fear of future Punishment and hope of future Reward may indirectly, and in particular circumstances, be the occasion of great good and advantage to Virtue; and what this may be, we shall to the full endeavour to show.  
IT has been already considered how, that notwithstanding any implanted sense of Right and Wrong, or any good affection towards Society, yet by violent Passion, as by Rage or Lust, this other good Affection may be frequently controlled and overcome. Where therefore there is nothing in the Mind capable to make such Passions as these the objects of its aversion, and to cause them earnestly to be opposed and struggled against; in this case, if there be any thing in Religion which creates a belief that Passions of this kind as well as their consequent Actions, are the object of a Deitys animadversion, it is certain that such a Belief must be allowed beneficial to Virtue, as it will be allowed to tend to the calming of the Mind, and to the disposing or fitting the Person to a better recollection and observance of that other good and virtuous Principle, which by being unobstructed must the more increase.  
THIS also may be said as to the support which this Belief of a future Reward and Punishment may prove to Virtue; that as it is capable of raising men to Virtue who were at first in a manner strangers to it; so where men are already in a virtuous Course, it may prove that which alone can save them from falling off from the Virtue they possess, into a licentious and vicious practice.  
TO prove how this may be, we may consider the thing thus. A Person who has much of goodness and natural rectitude in his Temper, being sensible of Poverty, Crosses and Adversity; and being perhaps of a Nature too sensible towards some certain Pleasures, as of Fame or Reputation, Ease, Indolency or Repose; it is certain that the meeting with any of these first, or the being disappointed in any of these latter, must give a sourness and distaste to the Temper, and make it averse to that which is the occasion of such ill. Now if the Person be so affected as to think his Honesty or strict Integrity to be at any time the occasion of this ill; it is likely he may be made dissatisfied with his good Disposition and Principles. And if his own thoughts, or the corrupt insinuations of other men still present this to his Mind, that his Honesty is the occasion of this ill to him, and that if freed from this restraint of Virtue and Honesty, he might be much happier; 'tis very obvious that his love and relish towards Virtue and Honesty, must every day diminish, as the Temper grows uneasy and quarrels with it. But if he opposes to this the consideration, that Honesty carries with it, if not a present, at least a future recompense, so as to make up that loss to private or self-good which he repines at; then may this injury to his good Temper and honest Principle be prevented, and his Love or Affection towards Honesty and Virtue remain the same.  
IN the same manner where there is not a love, but a sort of aversion towards what is Good and Virtuous, as towards Lenity and Forgivingness, and that there is a love of its contrary, Revenge; it is possible and very natural, that by the consideration that Lenity is, by its rewards, made the cause of a greater self-good; that very Affection of Lenity and Mildness may be industriously nourished, and the contrary depressed; so that the good Affection may come at last to be seated in the Temper, and the good and proper Object to be beloved, as by a Creature well affected, when no Punishment or reward is thought of.  
THUS we see that in a State or Public, a virtuous and good Administration, and an equal and just distribution of Rewards and Punishments is of service, not only to restrain vicious men, and to make them act usefully to the public; but, by making Virtue to be apparently the interest of every one, it removes all prejudices against it, creates a fair reception for it, and leads men into that path which afterwards they cannot easily quit. For, thus a People made virtuous by the long course of a wise and just Administration, when ever this happens to be interrupted by some sudden Tyranny or Usurpation, they will on this account rather be raised to exert a stronger Virtue. And even, where by long and continued arts of a prevailing Tyranny, they are at last totally oppressed, the seeds of that Virtue will still remain, and for some Ages afterwards show themselves not wholly extinct. But this withal we must here observe, that it is Example which chiefly works these Effects; for a virtuous Administration is seldom but accompanied with Virtue in the Magistrate. Nor is it so much the reward itself, or the punishment which does this, as the natural estimation of Virtue, and shame of Villainy which is excited and moved by these expressions of the hatred of Mankind towards injustice, and their approbation of Goodness and Virtue. For even in the suffering of the greatest Villains themselves, we see generally that the infamy of their Act, the odiousness of their Crime, and their shame towards Mankind, contribute more to their misery than all besides; and that it is not so much Death itself which creates their horror, as that kind of Death they undergo.  
IT is the same in private Families: and here though the Slaves and mercenary Servants, restrained and made orderly by punishment, and by the severity of their Master, are not on that account made Good or Honest; yet the same master of the Family using proper Rewards and Punishments towards his Children, teaches them Goodness, and by this help instructs them in a Virtue which afterwards they practise upon other grounds, and without thoughts of reward.  
IF by the thoughts of future Reward, or what regards another State, be understood the love and desire of virtuous Enjoyment, or of the very practice and exercise of Virtue in another Life; the expectation or hope of this, must not only be a great encouragement to Virtue; but it appears plainly, that the very following of Virtue in hope to obtain that supreme Happiness which consists in the perfection of it, is of itself a degree of Virtue, a proof of the sincere Love we have for it, as for its own sake; and cannot be called a motive of self-interest or selfishness: for if the love of Virtue be any thing distinct from that which we mean by common and narrow self-interest, than the love and desire of Life (when loved and desired for the sake of Virtue alone) must also be distinct. But if the desire of continued or prolonged Life, be only through the violence of that aversion which is towards Death; if it be through the love and desire of something else in Life, than virtuous Affection and Practice, and through the unwillingness of parting with something else than what is purely of this kind; then is this no longer any Virtue, or sign of Virtue.  
WHOEVER therefore (from what has been said before) is after any manner, or in any way at all persuaded or induced to think that Honesty and Virtue have their Rewards; such a one is capable of being led to a Virtue which he already is not arrived at; though yet his doing any thing on the consideration or foresight merely of such Reward separate from Virtue and of another nature, is no Virtue; nor even that thing of setting about to make himself virtuous on that score, can be any Virtue. For though he may intend to be virtuous, he is not become so, for having only intended, or for only intending to be so, because of the rewards of Virtue: but as soon as he is come to have one single good Affection, any Affection towards what is good and worthy, sociable, human, or any way morally good, as liking and affecting this for its own sake, and as good and amiable in itself; then is he in some degree Good and Virtuous, and not till then.  
UPON the whole therefore, one who has not any Reason or Belief to hinder him from thinking that Virtue is the cause of Misery, and is of self-ill, such a one must be subject to lose much of his Virtue and good Disposition. And one who has a contrary Reason and Belief, which makes him think Virtue to be his Good, or a cause of good to him, has an inducement to Virtue, and an assistance in it which the other has not.  
WHOEVER thinks always consistently, or according to one fixed or settled Judgement, that Virtue causes Happiness, and Vice Misery; or whoever there is, who, as they say commonly, feels by himself, that he can never be happy, if he quits his Integrity and Innocency; either of these Persons carry with them that requisite security, and that assistance to Virtue abovementioned. Or if there are such who have not such thoughts, nor can believe that Virtue is their interest in Life, except they are otherwise rewarded; yet if they believe a God dispensing Rewards and Punishments in this present, or in a future State, to Virtue and Vice, they carry also this security and assistance to Virtue along with them; whilst their Belief continues thus, and is not in the least either wavering or doubtful. For it must be observed here, that whensoever the dependence upon this is exceeding great, it very much takes off from any other dependence or encouragement; for, where high Rewards are enforced, and the imagination strongly turned towards them, the other natural Motives to Goodness are apt to lose much of their force, whilst the Mind is thus transported and taken up in the contemplation and pursuit of a highly elevated Self-interest, and in a concernment of such infinite importance to ourselves in particular, that on this account, all other Affections towards Friends, Relations, or Mankind (mere worldly objects) are slightly looked upon; the interest of our Soul being so far superior. And we know this by experience, that the Persons who are the most highly Devout, are, from the contemplation of the high enjoyments of another State, accustomed to undervalue all other earthly advantages of Goodness; and in the same religious Zeal are often carried to decry all other natural benefits of Virtue: so as to declare, that except only for the sake of that supreme Reward, they would divest themselves of all Goodness at once, and should think it their greatest advantage to be vicious. So that there may be nothing more fatal to Virtue, than the weak and uncertain belief of a future Reward and Punishment; for, having laid the stress wholly here, if this come to fail, or loosely to waver, it must prove a betraying of Virtue, and must prove, if not the ruin, at least of mighty prejudice to men's Morals.  
BUT to return to our Argument; the belief of a God therefore may supply that defect in the Thought or Opinion concerning the want of Happiness in Virtue, which Atheism has no remedy for. Although it be not otherwise employed, but that without an absolute and clear assent to that Hypothesis of full and complete Theism; the other Opinion, or the other Thoughts as to the Happiness of a man with good Affections, and the Misery of a man with contrary ones, may possibly be established in the Mind; and so Virtue be esteemed good, or the means of Good; and Vice always the contrary. Tho yet the natural tendency of Atheism be very different; since besides the unaptness and disproportion of such a belief as that of Atheism, to the apprehension or imagination of any thing in such just order, and according to so admirable a disposition as that would be, were Virtue always the Good, and Vice the Ill of every Creature: it must be besides confessed too, that there is a great deal wanting in this Belief towards the promotion of that particular good Affection of love to Virtue; which Love however when at its height, and when forcibly felt, is the chiefest thing that can make the happiness of Virtue to be well credited: for it is almost impossible constantly and firmly to retain this opinion of the great Happiness arising from Virtue itself, without conceiving high thoughts and estimation of the Pleasure and Delight resulting from the very love of Virtue; from the contemplation of what is worthy in itself, as well as from the mere conveniences of a virtuous Life: which sort of Pleasure and Delight is likely to gain but little opinion or credit where it is not highly experienced. The chief ground and support, therefore, of this Opinion, of the constant Happiness of Virtue, must be from the powerful feeling of this Affection, and the knowledge of its Power and Strength. But this is certain, that there must be but little encouragement or support of any such Affection as this, or of liking and affecting any thing as in itself good and beautiful, where there is neither goodness nor beauty allowed in the WHOLE itself; nor any perfect or wise direction for the good of any thing, nor any good Affection of a supreme Mind or Will towards the good of all in general, nor any consciousness in such an all-knowing and perfect Mind, of the Virtue and good Affection of particulars. This must tend rather to the cutting off of all love, veneration or esteem of any thing decent, just or orderly in the Universe, to the weaning of the Affections from any thing amiable or self-worthy, and to the suppressing even of that very Habit and Custom of contemplating with satisfaction and delight the beauties that are in Nature, and whatever in the order of things is according to a harmony and proportion the most resulting to sense. For how little disposed must such a Person be, either to love or admire any thing as orderly and comely in the Universe, who thinks that the Universe itself is nothing but disorder? how unapt to reverence or respect any particular or subordinat Beauty (such as is part of the structure) when the WHOLE itself is thought to want perfection, and to be only a vast and infinite deformity?  
AND when we consider further concerning such an opinion of the WHOLE as this is, and the thoughts of living in such a distracted Universe, from which so many ills may be suspected, and in which there is nothing good, nothing lovely to be contemplated, or that can raise any affection towards it other than that of Hatred and Aversion; it will seem hardly possible for us to think otherwise of such an Opinion as this, than that it must by degrees embitter the Temper, and not only make the love of Virtue to be less felt, but help to impair and ruin natural Affection and Kindness. So that as there is nothing so exalting to Virtue, or so heightening to the pleasure derived from it, as a pure and perfect Theism; so on the other side a perfect Atheism is that which must tend exceedingly to destroy all ground of delight in Virtue, and even that very Principle itself of all Virtue, viz. natural and good Affection.  
BUT now on the other side; neither is it implied that every one whosoever that believes a God, believes to this effect, and with this advantage to Virtue; or that whoever believes both a God, and Rewards and Punishments dispensed either in this present, or in some future State, believes to this effect. For if he believes that these Rewards and Punishments are tied to, or follow something else than good or ill Affections (as they do, who believe Rewards for simple actions or performances irrational, and without account; or who believe such Rewards and Punishments as are tied to things casual and accidental, as the being born in such a place, or of such Parents) then may the Affections grow ill and vicious without hindrance, or rather with help, as has been shown; because of the supposed want of Rectitude in the adored sovereign Being.  
WHOEVER therefore has a firm belief of a God whom he does not merely call Good, but of whom in reality he believes nothing but what is good, and is really suitable to the exactest character of Justice; such a Person believing Rewards and Punishments in another Life, must believe them Rewards and Punishments of Virtue and Vice merely, and not of any other Qualities or Accidents, which make them either Rewards for ill, or for nothing; and therefore not properly Rewards, but capricious distributions of Happiness or unhappiness to Creatures. And such a Person as this has the advantage spoken of, and can grow to be, or can keep himself virtuous where an Atheist cannot; in case there be a failure, as abovementioned, in the thoughts or opinion as to the happiness of Virtue in itself, and that it come to be believed the contrary way, that Virtue is an enemy to Happiness, with respect to this Life merely: which that it is so in the main, is an opinion that only an Atheist or imperfect Theist can have. For whatever be decided as to that of any Life after the present one, and of Rewards and Punishments to come, he who is a perfect Theist, and who believes an eternal universal Mind, reigning sovereignly and through all things, and with the highest perfection of Goodness, as well as Wisdom and Power, cannot but believe that Virtue is made the good or advantage of every Creature capable of having Virtue. For what could be more an unjust Ordinance and Rule, or be imagined more a defective Universe and ill constitution of things, than if Virtue were naturally made the ill, and Vice the good of every Creature?  
THUS therefore there is an advantage to Virtue necessarily supposed in perfect Theism, which is not in the Atheistical Belief: on the contrary it is, though not wholly impossible, yet very rare and difficult, that through all the ill Chances to which a virtuous man may be exposed, the certain remembrance and belief that Virtue is the best or only means of Happiness, or the consciousness of his not being able to recede from it, without falling into greater Misery, and a more deplorable State, should be able to keep itself a firm principle in his Mind, if he be one who has no opinion at all of any wisdom or order in the Government of the Universe; no example above himself of any Goodness or good Affection, and whose natural reflections on this Subject cannot well be other than melancholy and disgustful. Now, if there be wanting in a Mind that which can more kindly dispose the Temper, and is able to raise the Affection to a greater admiration and love of Virtue; then is there much wanting of what should make the happiness of Virtue credited; since nothing is more assistant to this Belief than the full experience of those better and kinder Affections, and of that satisfaction enjoyed in the love of Virtue itself.  
AND now in the last place, there is yet greater advantage to Virtue, in that opinion of perfect and complete Theism, which we will endeavour to explain; though the matter itself be of that kind which is nicely Philosophical, and may be thought, perhaps, to be so overmuch. There is no Creature, according to what has been proved above, but must be ill in some degree, by having any Affection towards, or against any thing in a stronger degree than such as is suitable to his own private good, and that of the System he is joined to: for, in this case the Affection is an ill Affection. Now if a rational Creature has that degree of aversion which is requisite against any particular ill (as suppose that Ill of being overcome, banished, or ruined in Fortune) this is regular and well. But if after the ill happened, his passion of aversion proves such, that he still rages at the accident, and is in continual abhorrence towards his fortune or lot; then will this be acknowledged vicious in itself, and further prejudicial to Temper, and to all Virtue: as on the other side, the patient endurance of the Calamity, and the support of the Mind under it, must be acknowledged virtuous and preservative of Virtue. Now although that which Atoms and Chance produce (supposing no other Principle besides) need not give occasion to that excess of abhorrency, violent Rage and Anger, which is what a tolerably rational man may allay by considering, that what is done is neither meant nor designed, but is from Atoms and Chance only; yet if there be nothing at the bottom, nor any Rule or Reason besides Chance and Atoms, there can be no satisfaction at all in thinking upon what they alone produce: for if the thing seems ill, and be ill felt, it cannot be admitted in that Hypothesis, (or in the Atheistical one whatever it be) that this Ill is a real good elsewhere, and with respect to the whole of things, as being according to the wisest and best design that is conceivable. Now that which is thought ill, and altogether unaccountable and without reason, cannot but raise some degree of Aversion towards it. But in another Hypothesis (that of perfect Theism) the affirmative of this, that whatever happens is good, must necessarily (as has been proved) be the Belief. Therefore in the course of things in this world, whatsoever Ill occurring would seem to force from a rational Creature a censure and dislike, or whatsoever may happen to be his private Lot; he may not only acquiesce in it, and have patience, which is but an abatement of the natural anger and dissatisfaction, but he may make the Lot or Part assigned to him, an object of his good Affection in some sort, as having a good and kind Affection in general towards all that is produced in the Universe, as coming from the most perfect Wisdom, and being perfectly Good: which Affection, since it must in a much greater degree cause a good support of whatever is endured for Virtue, or in any state of sufferance; and since it must cause a greater acquiescence and complacency with respect to ill accidents, ill men and injuries (and consequently a greater equality, meekness and benignity in the Temper); so it must of necessity be a good Affection, and the Creature that has it, so much the more a virtuous and good Creature: for whatsoever is the occasion or means of more affectionately joining or uniting a rational Creature to his PART in Society, and causes him to prosecute the public good or good of the System he is joined to, beyond what he would otherwise do, is undoubtedly the occasion or cause of greater Virtue in him. Now if the subject of such an Affection be not just or deserving, if no such Hypothesis is to be admitted as that of perfect Theism (so that there is real Ill continually produced in the course of things in the Universe, and no good intelligent and powerful Principle able to exclude such ILL) yet notwithstanding this, the Affection towards this false subject (if it be to be supposed false) must be so far good, as that the having of it will be the occasion of greater strengthening and forwarding of Virtue, as has been shown. But if the subject be just; that is to say, if every thing which the Universe produces be according to all reason the wisest and best of what could be imagined, and be therefore the most worthy of admiration, applause, and all good Affection of rational Creatures, as coming from a most perfect, wise and good Principle; then does such an Affection become due and requisite in every rational Creature, so as that it must be vicious to want it. On which it may be grounded, that the relation which Virtue has to Piety is such, as that the FIRST is not complete but in the LATTER: and that where this latter is wanting, there cannot be the same benignity, perseverance, the same good composure of the Affections, nor so good a Mind.  
TO conclude then: Having considered how any Opinion about the Existence of a God can have influence on the Manners of men, and cause either Virtue or Vice; if the reasons we have offered be found to be of any weight, it will appear in resolution of the question which has been treated of: That one who has not the Opinion or Belief of an intelligent Principle or God, may, though very difficultly, and at a great hazard, be capable of Virtue, so as to have an Honesty, a Faith, a Justice perhaps of great note and worth; may have many generous and good Passions, and possibly that of love to Virtue for its own sake, as well as for being believed advantageous: but that in the other Belief, there are not only greater securities and advantages to Virtue, but there is besides a degree of Virtue which the Opinion contrary to it cannot admit. So that the chiefest security, the perfection and the highest degree of Virtue, must be owing to the belief of a God.    

BOOK the Second. OF THE OBLIGATIONS TO VIRTUE.  

SECT. I.  
WE have already considered WHAT VIRTUE IS, who may be allowed in any degree virtuous. It remains now to show, WHAT OBLIGATION THERE IS TO VIRTUE, and how any one may have reason to embrace Virtue, and shun Vice.  
WE have seen that to be virtuous and good, is for a rational Creature in the use of good Understanding and Judgement, to have all his natural Affections▪ or better Passions, his dispositions of Mind and Temper suitable and agreeing with the good of his Kind, or of that System (as explained before) where he is included, and of which he is a PART. So that to have all these Affections right and entire, by which we are kindly and naturally joined to our PART in Society; this is named Rectitude, Integrity: and to want any of these, or to have their contraries, such as alienate from hence, is Depravity, Corruption, Nature vitiated.  
THAT in the Passions and Affections of particular Creatures there is a relation to the interest of a Species or common Nature (as that there is an Affection towards the propagation of the kind, towards the nurture of the young, towards mutual Support and Succour) this is not deniable, neither will it be denied; therefore, that such an Affection as this of a Creature towards the good of that common Nature, is as proper an Affection, and as natural to him, as to any member of a Body to work in its own way, as to a Stomach to digest, as to other Entrails to perform their other offices, or as to any other Part in an animal Body to be so affected, and to operate so as is appointed to it in its System.  
IT is certain also, that a Creature having such Affections as these towards the common Nature, or System of the Kind, at the same time that he has those other Affections toward the private Nature or Self-system, (as in the case of self-preservation, self-support and maintenance) it must happen that in following the first of these Affections, the Creature must often contradict and go against these latter; as in the instance so often before used, where the love to the young makes every other Affection towards private good give way, and causes a total neglect of self-interest or concernment▪  
IT may seem therefore in this place, that there is a perfect opposition between these two; as if the pursuing or being carried towards the common Interest or Good, by such Affections as are suited to that common Interest, were a hindrance to the attainment of private Good, as being a hindrance and check to those Passions which aim thither. And it being found that hazards and hardships make but ill for the animal State, in the private System; these other Affections towards another Good (that of the Kind, or public System) being such as do often expose to hardships and hazards, by overruling their opposites, the self-preservative passions, and by necessitating the Creature thus to self-denial, and, as it were, self-desertion; it may be concluded, perhaps, from hence, that it is best for the Animal to be without any such Affections at all. So that that Love which joins us to others of the same Kind; that reconciling Affection towards a Species or fellowship of Creatures with whom we are bred, and live; that social Kindness, or whatever else, be it what Affection soever that goes against that other Principle, takes the place of the self-interesting Passions, and draws us as it were out of ourselves, so as to make us disregardful of our own convenience and safety; whatever is of this kind should be abolished; love to the young, tenderness and pity abolished; in short, all natural Affections should thus be extinguished and rooted out, as dangerous, tormenting and destructive.  
ACCORDING to this it would seem to follow, that in the constitution of that Order or System of a Kind or Species, the PART is ill affected, and in an ill state as to itself, which is naturally and well affected towards the WHOLE: and the only natural and good state of the private nature or single PART, as to itself, is to be in an unnatural and ill state towards the common Nature or WHOLE. A strange Constitution indeed! in which it must be confessed that there is much disorder and untowardness; but which in Nature is no where observed besides: that in a System, as in a Tree or animal Body, any Part or Member should be in a good and prosperous state as to itself, which was under a contrary Affection, and in an unnatural operation as to its Whole.  
THAT this is otherwise, I shall endeavour to demonstrate, so as to make it appear, that what seems thus to be an ill Order and Constitution in the Universe, (and which, if true, would necessarily make natural rectitude the Ill, and depravity the Good of every Creature) is in reality according to a wise and excellent Order in the Universe; insomuch that for every particular in its System, to work to the good of that System or Public, and to its own good, is all one, and not to be divided. By which means natural Rectitude or Virtue must be the advantage, and Vice the injury and disadvantage of every Creature.  
IT has been shown before, that no Animal can, as an Animal, be said to act in any manner but through Affections or Passions, such as are proper to an Animal: for in convulsive fits▪ where a Creature strikes either himself or others, it is a simple Mechanism, an Engine, or piece of Clockwork that acts, and not the Animal.  
WHATSOEVER therefore is done or acted by any Animal as such, is done and can be done only through some Affection or Passion, as of Fear, Love or Hatred, moving him.  
AND as it is impossible that the weakest Affections should overcome the strongest (as that a lesser love should overcome a greater love, a lesser fear a greater fear) so it is impossible but that where the Affections or Passions are strongest, or where they make the strongest side, either by their number or force, thither the Animal must incline, and by that be governed and led to action.  
THE Affections or Passions which must influence and govern the Animal are either,  
1. THE natural ones towards the Kind, or which carry to the good of something beyond the private System.  
2. OR the self-ones, which carry to the good of the private System, as towards self-preservation, self-nourishment or support, self-defence, or repelling of Injury.  
3. OR such as are neither of these, and neither tend to any good of the public or private System. And it is through these several Affections or Motions that a Creature must be Good or Ill, Virtuous or Vicious. But, before we come to speak of these separately, it may be convenient to premise some few things in general, in order to clear some matters which may create a doubt and disturbance.  
WHEN in a rational Creature, any thing is done with real and full intention towards public Good, and with that just and excellent natural Affection which leads towards the good of Society; if there be any failure in the Judgement, which notwithstanding guides and directs amiss; how far this may be vicious, has been before mentioned, so as not to need any thing farther in this place, nor is this worth insisting on: it having little to do with the essential part of Vice, and that which is with most reason complained of in the world, as creating those disorders we see. For where there is in a rational Creature an inclination and strong affection towards Virtue, superior to all other Affections, prevalent over all Obstructions, and freed from the ill influence of any unnatural Passions, such as those raised from Superstition, and horrid Custom before spoken of; there is little fear of failure through wrong choice or preference in moral actions, or through want of a right knowledge of Duty when rightly and sincerely sought: but if notwithstanding such a search, it be however missed in any small degree, the misfortune or self-injury is, as the Vice itself, very slight and of little moment.  
THE natural Affections separately considered, as either Pity or Compassion, love to the young, and such like, however excellent they are, they may notwithstanding be in a too great, and therefore vicious degree: as when Pity is so overcoming as to destroy its own end, and prevent the succour and relief required; or as when love to the young is such a fondness as disables from rightly taking care of the young, or such as destroys the Parent, and consequently the young too. And though it seems harsh to call that vicious which is but an extreme of some natural and kind Affection; yet the thing being rightly considered, it is apparent, that wherever any single Affection of that kind is over great, it must be worst for the rest, and take off from their operation: for a Creature possessed with such an immoderate and excessive Passion, must of necessity allow too much to that Passion, and too little to others of the same note or character, and equally natural and excellent as to their end; so as that this must be the occasion of partiality and injustice, whilst only one duty or natural PART is earnestly followed, and other duties neglected, which should accompany, or perhaps take place and be preferred.  
NOW as natural Affection of this sort may be too high, so may the Affection towards the private System, or SELF, be too weak. For if a Creature were self-negligent▪ insensible to danger, or wanted such a degree of Passion in any kind, as was necessary to preserve, sustain, or defend itself, this would be a vice or imperfection in the natural temper, with respect to the private System, and the design of Nature in the animal Constitution; in the same manner as it would be a vice or imperfection in that single part an Eye not to shut of its own accord and unknowingly to us, by a natural caution and timidity; which, were it, wanting, however we might design the preservation of our Eye, we should not preserve it by any observation or steady intention of our own ever so good towards the preserving it. And thus though the Passions of this kind do not immediately regard, nor have for their object the good of the Kind, but a self-good; and although no Creature be (according to the common way of speaking) called good and virtuous for having any of these: yet since it is impossible that the public Good, or Good of the System, can be preserved without these; or that it should be well with the Particulars, if these were wanting, which are for the good of the PARTS, and of the Whole together; it follows that a Creature wanting any of these, and being wanting to itself and to the Whole, is in reality wanting in some degree to Goodness and natural Rectitude; and may thus be said to be defective or vicious, though this be not what is commonly called so.  
'TIS thus that we say of a Creature that he is too good; when he either has his affection of any sort towards the Kind so violent, as to carry him even beyond his Part; or that it happens that he is really carried beyond his Part, not by a too highly kindled passion of that sort, but through want of some self-passion to restrain him in some bounds.  
IT may be objected here, That this of having the natural Affections too strong, (where the self ones are overmuch so) or of having the self ones thus defective or weak (where the natural ones are weak) may often prove upon occasion the only reason of a Creature's acting honestly and well. For, thus possibly, a Creature insensible to some self-interesting passion (as suppose he were altogether indifferent to life) may even with the smallest degree of some one natural Affection, do what the highest Affection of that kind should or can perform: and thus a Creature excessively timorous may by as exceeding a degree of some one natural Affection, do that which requires the perfectest Courage to perform.  
TO this I answer; That when we say of any Passion that it is too strong, or that it is too weak, we must speak with respect to a certain Constitution or Oeconomy of a particular Creature, or Species of Creatures. For if a Passion carrying to any right end, be only so much the more serviceable and effectual, for being strong; if the violence of it be no way the cause of any disturbance or distraction within, or of any disproportionableness between itself and other Affections; then consequently the Passion, however strong and forcible, cannot be blamed as vicious. But if to have all the Passions in equal proportion with it, be what the constitution of the Creature cannot bear or support; so that one or more Passions are perhaps raised to this height, but that the others are not, nor can be in the same proportion; then is it to be said of those more than ordinary forcible Passions, that they are excessive: for, notwithstanding that they may be such as the Creature can well bear, that they agree with his frame and constitution, and that they are no ways an obstruction to their own end; yet these Passions being in unequal proportion to the others, and causing an ill balance in the Affection, must be the occasion of inequality in the Conduct, and must incline to a wrong moral practice.  
BUT to explain a little further this of the Oeconomy of the Passions, by what we may observe in other Species or Kind's. As to those Creatures that have no manner of power or means given them by nature for their defence against Violence, nor any thing by which they can make themselves terrible to such as injure or offend them; it is necessary that they should have very great and extraordinary Fear, but little or no Animosity or Passion, such as should cause them to make resistance, or should delay their flight, which is their only sasety, and to which the passion of Fear is useful and of help. It is thus that Timorousness, and an habitual and strong passion of Fear may be according to the Oeconomy of a particular Creature, both with respect to himself and his Species: and that on the other side, Courage may be vicious. Even in one and the same Species this is by Nature differently ordered, with respect to different Sexes, Ages, Growths. At a time when the whole Herd flies, the Bull alone makes head against the Lion, or whatever other invading Beast, and shows himself conscious of his part; for so nature has made him to be: and should he lose this generous Passion and Animosity, he would be degenerate. Even the Female of this Kind is, we see, armed by nature in some degree to resist Violence, so as not to fly a common danger. As for a Hind, a Do, or any other inoffending and defenceless Creature; it is no way unnatural or vicious in such a one to desert the young and fly for safety: for to do otherwise would be contrary to the Oeconomy of the Creature and Species. But for those Creatures that are able to make resistance, and are by nature armed (as those Savages of the Wood) with that which can mortally offend; it is natural in one of these to be roused with fury, and to oppose itself to death against its Enemy or Invader; by which known passion in the Creature its Species is secured: since such a one can hardly on this account be assaulted, or injured with impunity, and that a Creature, such as this, sells his own and offspring's Life at so dear a rate. To do less therefore than this, is in such a one unnatural and degenerate, and is a betraying of his Species. And of all other Creatures Man is in this sense the most terrible: since if he thinks it just and exemplary, he may in his own, or in his Countries cause, revenge an injury on any one living; and by throwing away his own life (if resolute to that degree) is almost certain Master of another's, though ever so strongly guarded: of which several examples given, have served to deter those in power, and restrain them from using the utmost outrages, and urging men to extremity.  
BUT to come to what was said: No Passion therefore, which carries to a right end, and which is such as a Creature in his constitution can bear, without the desorder or sufferance of his Body or Mind, and which is no other than proportionable with respect to other Passions, such as are suited likewise to the Oeconomy of the Creature, and of the Species in which he is included; no Passion such as this can be too strong or too forcible a Passion. But whatever Passion (though of the sort of those we call the natural Affections, or Affections towards the kind) is overstrong in proportion to any other Affection, this is immoderate Passion, and in too high a degree. And in answer therefore to the Objection made: though it be true that this of having a self-passion too weak, or a natural affection too strong, may occasion Virtue in one place, and cause one virtuous action; yet, with respect to the whole of Life, it is what must create confusion and disorder, and must occasion too (as has been shown before) partiality and injustice.  
BUT, to express this all at once, under an easy and very familiar Comparison. It is the same with the Passions in an animal Constitution, as with the Cords or Strings of a musical Instrument. If these, though in ever so just proportion one to another, are strained however beyond a certain degree, it is more than the Instrument will bear; and by this the Instrument is abused, and its effect lost: On the other side, if while some of the Cords are duly strained, others are not wound up to their due proportion; then is the Instrument still in disorder, and its part ill performed. The several Species of Creatures are as different sorts of Instruments: And even in the same Species of Creatures (as in the same sort of Instrument) one is not entirely like the other; nor will the same Cords fit each: the same degree of strength which winds up the Cords of one, and fits them to a Harmony and Consort, may in another burst both the Cords and Instrument itself. Thus men who have the liveliest and exquisitest sense, and who are in the highest degree affected with Pleasure or Pain, have need of the strongest ground and foundation of other Passion, as that of natural Affection, sensibleness to Friendship, Love, Pity, and the like, in order to keep a right Balance within, and to preserve them in their duty, and the performance of their part; whilst others, who are more flegmatic, heavier, and of a lower Key, need not, nor are made for the feeling those other Passions in altogether so high a degree.  
IT would be agreeable enough to inquire thus into the different tunings (if one may speak so) the different structures and proportions of different men, with respect to their passions, and the various mixtures, temperatures and allays, which make that which we call Temper, according to which the goodness and worth of any Creature is esteemed. But here we should have too large a Field: Tho however we may, in passing by, observe, that whilst we see in all other Creatures around us so great a proportionableness, constancy and regularity in all their passions and affections; so great a harmony, and such an adherence to Nature; no failure in the care of the Offspring, or of the Society (if living in Society); no prostitution of themselves, nor no excess in any kind; whilst we see those Creatures who live as it were in Cities (as Bees and Ants) never to go out of that constant Train and Harmony, nor contradict those Affections which carry them on to operate to the public Good, the Good of their WHOLE; and that even those Beasts that live the farthest out of Society of that sort, maintain however a conduct one towards another, such as is exactly well fitted for the good of their own Species; Man in the mean time, vicious and unconsonant man, lives out of all rule and proportion, contradicts his Principles, breaks the Order and Oeconomy of all his Passions, and lives at odds with his whole Species, and with Nature: so that it is next to a Prodigy to see a Man in the world who lives NATURALLY, and as A MAN.  
THUS having cleared this Part, and having explained what is meant by having any passion in too high or too low a degree; and how that to have any natural Affection too high, or any self Affection too low, is (though not so called) a Vice and moral Imperfection, and is prejudicial both to the private and public System; we come now to that which is the chiefest and most considerable part of Vice, that which alone is called Vice and Illness.  
THE several senses in which a Creature may be said to be ill or vicious, are, first, when the Affections are all orderly and right; but that through want of judgement, any error is committed in the choice of moral Objects. Of this there is no need to speak more than we have done. All other Vice or Illness besides, must be through the immediate disorder of the Affections themselves; as when the natural Affections are too strong, or the self Affections too weak: Tho nothing of this hitherto be what we ordinarily call Illness or Vice. That which remains of any way or sense, in which a Creature may be ill, or can possibly act ill, is either through the want of natural and good Affections, and the having no such thing at all to move him, or that is sufficient to move him; or, through contrary Passions or Affections moving him to what is wrong, and overcoming those others, whensoever there are any of those to make opposition.  
THAT is to say, either by having the natural Affections weak or deficient: or by having the self Passions too strong: or by having such as are neither natural Affections, nor self ones; and of which the smallest and moderatest degree is not tending to the support or welfare of either the Species or private System.  
OTHER WISE than thus it is impossible any Creature can be ill or vicious. And if it may be proved that it is the interest of the Creature to have his Passions or Affections never thus, but chose; it will then be proved, that it is the interest of a Creature to be, and keep in that state in which he cannot but be good or virtuous: so that Virtue, then, can never be but his Good, and the contrary his iii.  
OUR business therefore will be to prove,  
1. THAT to have those excellent Affections (the kind and natural ones, such as have been mentioned) is to have the chief enjoyment of Life; and that to want them, is, and must be, besides the loss of that Good, the occasion of farther and greater Ill  
2. THAT to have the self Passions excessive or beyond such a degree in which they cannot but of necessity yield, as is fitting, to the natural ones, whenever they meet or are opposed to each other, is also injurious to the Creature, and is of self-ill.  
3. AND that to have the other sort of Passions, those which are neither natural Affections towards the kind, nor self ones, of which the least degree is essential or requisite in the Constitution or Oeconomy of the Creature, is prejudicial to the Creature.   

SECT. II.  
THERE are few, who when they think of such a Creature as is void of all natural Affection, all social Inclination, Friendliness, Complacency or Love, but think of it as in a condition miserable enough as to itself, without regard to the ill terms upon which such a Creature must live with those that are his fellow Creatures: 'Tis generally thought, I believe, that such a Creature as this feels but a little part of the satisfaction of Life, and relishes but little those few Enjoyments which are left with him, those of eating, drinking, and the like; when those others of sociableness, kindness and love, are substracted. It is well known, that to such a Creature as this, it is not only incident, to be morose, rancorous and malignant; but that of necessity a Mind or Temper thus destitute of all mildness and benignity, of all kind and indulgent inclination, sense or feeling, must turn to that which is contrary, must be agitated and wrought by Passions of a different kind, and be a continual seat and lodgement of those bitter, hateful and perverse ones, made from a constant ill humour, frowardness, and disquiet, in an uncalm, unaffable, and unloving Temper; and that the consciousness of such a Mind or Nature, thus dissociable, obnoxious, and averse to all humanity, hating and hated of Mankind, must overcloud the Mind with dark suspicion and continual jealousy, alarm it with fears and horror, and raise in it a continual disturbance and disease, in the most appearing fair and secure state of Fortune, and in the highest outward Prosperity.  
THIS, as to the perfect immoral or inhuman state, is generally noticed: and where there is this absolute degeneracy, and a total deprivation of all humanity, love, or natural affection, there are few who do not see and acknowledge the misery of such a State, when at worst as hear supposed. The misfortune is, that this escapes us, and is not perceived in less degrees: as if to be fully and perfectly horrid, unsociable and inhuman, were indeed the greatest misfortune and misery that could be; but that to be it in a little degree should be no misery nor harm at all: which is as reasonable as it would be, to allow that it is the greatest ill of a Body to be in the utmost manner distorted, maimed, and in an absolute disuse or perversion of all its Organs; but that to lose the use of one Limb, or to be impaired in some one single Member, is no inconvenience or ill at all.  
THE parts and proportions of the Mind, their relation to, and dependency on one another, the connexion and frame of those Passions which constitute the Soul or Temper; in short, the whole Order or Symmetry of this inward Part being no less real and exact than that of the Body, yet by not being obvious to sense as that other is, it comes not into consideration. So that though the greatest misery and ill is allowed to be from the Mind or Temper, which it is owned may suffer by abuse and injury, as the Body does; yet it is not known by what means this former suffers, how it receives abuse or injury, or at what rate and in what degrees it comes to be impaired; it is not known nor though of, what it is that should maim or offend any particular part; or how it should happen to a Temper or Mind, that▪ being wounded or hurt in any one particular part, the whole should be the worse for it. On the contrary, we think that a man may violate his Faith, commit any wickedness unfamiliar to him before, engage in any Vice or Villainy by which a breach is made on good Affection, to the furtherance and promotion of what is chose malignant, horrid and enormous, and all this without the least prejudice to himself, or any misery following from the ill action merely. 'Tis thus that it is often said, such a one has done ill; but what is he the worse for it? And yet we say of any nature savage, cursed, and throughly inveterate, that such a one is a plague and torment to himself. And we allow that by certain Passions, and merely by Temper alone, a man may be fully miserable, let his circumstances, as to other respects, be what they will.  
NOW did it appear that this fabric of the Mind were such, that it was impossible to remove from thence, or out of the natural Temper, any one good or orderly Affection, or introduce any ill or disorderly one, without danger of ruin and fatal destruction, without drawing on in some degree that horrid and detestable state, and making in part that havoc and confusion, which at its height, or but in some particular occasion, is observed and justly confessed to be so miserable; were this made appear from the oeconomy of the Mind, or of those Passions which constitute the natural Temper or Soul, it would then be confessed, that since no ill, immoral, impious, or unjust action could be committed, without a violence committed here, without either a new inroad and breach on the Temper and Passions, or a farther advancing of that execution already begun; whoever did ill, or acted in prejudice of his Virtue, Integrity, good Nature, or Worth, acted in the same manner towards himself, but with less mercy, than he who with his own hands should wound or any way destroy or ruin his own Body.  
I. BUT to begin now in the first place with this proof, THAT TO HAVE THE NATURAL AFFECTIONS (such as are founded in Love, Complacency, Goodwill, and in a sympathy with the Kind or Species) IS TO HAVE THE CHIEF ENJOYMENT OF LIFE; and THAT TO WANT THE SAME AFFECTIONS IS TO BE ON THE OTHER HAND AS MISERABLE. We may consider, first, what those are which we call Pleasures or Satisfactions, from whence Happiness is reckoned and esteemed. They are satisfactions or pleasures (according to the common distinction) either of the Body, or of the Mind.  
THAT the pleasures of the Mind are greater than those of the Body, is allowed by most people, and may be proved by this; that whensoever the Mind having a high opinion or feeling of some excellence (be it in what subject it will, either where worth or excellence is, or is not) has received the strongest impression, and is wrought up to the highest pitch or degree of Passion towards the Subject; at such time it sets itself above all bodily pain, contemns Torture and Racks: for thus we see Indians, Barbarians, Malefactors, and the very horridst and most execrable Villains in the world, oftimes, for the sake of a particular Gang or Society, or out of some cherished notion or principle of Honour, of Revenge, of Gratitude, or something of that kind with which they are taken, embrace any manner of Hardship, and defy Torments and Death. Whereas on the other hand, a man being placed in all circumstances of outward enjoyments, surrounded with every thing that can allure or charm the Sense, and being then actually in the very moment of such an indulgence; yet no sooner is there any thing amiss within, no sooner has he conceived any internal ail or disorder, any thing inwardly vexatious or distempered, but instantly his enjoyment ceases, the pleasure of sense is at an end; and every thing that is a means of that sort becomes ineffectual, and is plainly rejected as uneasy, and giving distaste when offered.  
THE pleasures of the Mind being allowed, therefore, superior to those of the Body, it follows, that whatever can create to any intelligent Being a constant flowing, a series or train of mental Enjoyments, is more considerable to his Happiness, than that which can create to him the same constant course or train of sensual ones of the Body.  
THE mental Enjoyments in a great measure are actually the very natural Affections themselves, in their immediate operation.  
OR, they proceed from, and are caused by natural and good Affections.  
HOW much the natural Affections themselves are really Pleasures and Enjoyments, cannot but be owned by any one who knows the condition and feeling of the Mind under a lively and forcible affection of Kindness, Love, Gratitude, Bounty, Succour, or whatever else is of a generous, sociable, or friendly kind; and who is sensible of what pleasure the Mind perceives when it is employed in acts of that nature, and is touched and moved in that sort. The difference we find between a Solitude and Company; between a common Company, and the Company or merely the sight of those we love; the reference of almost all our Pleasures to Society, and the dependence which they have either on Society itself immediately, or on the imagination and supposal of it, as present; all these are sufficient proofs, or rather experiences and inward convictions of the truth of this. That the Pleasures of this sort are thus forcibly felt, and are even superior to those of any bodily kind, may be known too from effects; not only from this (though this withal may be remarked) that the very outward features, the marks and signs which attend this sort of Joy, are expressive of a more intense, clear, and undisturbed Pleasure, than those which attend the satisfaction of Thirst, Hunger, Lust, and the like; but it may be known with certainty from the prevalence and ascendency of this sort of joy over any other; from the silencing and appeasing of every other motion of Pleasure where this presents itself; and from the preference which is apparently given by every Nature almost, at some time or other, to this feeling or affection, which has the power of drawing from every other (as in the case of love to the young, and a thousand other instances) or of so engrossing the whole Temper, as to render it, in the midst of all other Pleasures, sensible in a manner only to this alone, which remains as master of, and superior to the rest. There is not any one who, by the least progress in Science or Learning, has come to know barely the principles of Mathematics, but has found that in the exercise of his Mind, or the discoveries he there makes, though merely of speculative Truths, he receives a pleasure and delight superior to that of Sense. But this again, how great soever the Pleasure may be, must of necessity be infinitely surpassed by virtuous Motion or Exercise, where, together with the strongest delightful affection of the Soul, there is an approbation given by the Mind to what is acted in consequence of that Motion or Affection; and where there is the fairest matter of Speculation, the goodliest view and contemplation on Earth, which is that of a beautiful, proportionable, and becoming Action, self applicable, and of which the memory and consciousness is of any other thing the most solidly and lastingly pleasing. In the passion of Love (we mean of that sort which is between the Sexes) in which there is a mixture of the strongest sensual Affection together with natural Affection, or affection of Kindness (such as is in that case towards the object beloved) it so far appears that the sense or feeling of the former, and the Pleasure enjoyed in it, is outdone in this latter, that it is commonly known how that often, through that affection of Kindness, and for the sake of the Person beloved, when in any danger, or any ways exposed, the greatest things in the world have been done, and are so every day; the greatest Hardships submitted to, and even Death itself voluntarily embraced, without any desired or expected compensation; not here in this World surely, for Death puts an end to all; nor hardly, I suppose, hereafter, for there are few who have ever thought yet of providing a Heaven or future Recompense for the suffering Virtue of Lovers. But what is more yet, as to the excellence of these natural Affections, and their agreeableness to our natures; not only the natural Affections of this kind, when Joy, Sprightliness and gaiety are mixed with them, have real enjoyment and happiness above Sensuality, or the gratification merely of Sense; but even that natural Affection which is clouded and under the worst appearance, the very Sorrow and Grief (if one may say so) which belongs to natural Affection, to a generous, humane and kind Concern; though it may be thought contrary to Pleasure, is yet for contentment and satisfaction far above those other pleasures of indulged Sense. And where a series or continued succession of these Motions or Affections can be carried on, even through fears, apprehensions, alarms, doubts (the object Virtue being still kept in sight, and its Beauty appearing still in the midst of the surrounding Calamities) there is inseparably joined to this a contentment and satisfaction of the highest sort; insomuch that when by mere illusion, as in a Tragedy, the Passions of this mournful kind are artfully excited in us, we prefer the Enjoyment and Pleasure to any other entertainment of equal duration, and find by ourselves that the moving our Passions in this sort, the engaging them in the behalf of Merit and Worth, and the exerting of that Goodness that is in us, though there be nothing more remote from sensual or bodily Pleasure, is yet of exquisite sensation, and to such as are refined enough to feel it, more moving, and of greater enjoyment than any thing of the other kind abstracted entirely from this. And after this manner it may appear how much the mental Enjoyments are actually the very natural Affections themselves.  
HOW much they proceed from, and are caused by natural Affection, we have now to consider.  
THAT the affection of Love, Kindness, and Bounty, is itself of the highest degree of mental Pleasure, has been shown. The EFFECTS of Love or kind Affection in a way of mental Pleasure are, a delight in, and enjoyment of the Good of others; a receiving it, as it were, by reflection, so as to participate in the Joy, Pleasure, or Prosperity of whom we love or kindly affect; And a pleasing consciousness of love or approbation from others, or of our meriting it from others.  
THERE is nothing plainer than that both these Satisfactions and Delights, viz. Joy in, and participation of the Good of others; and pleasing consciousness or sense of merited Love from others, can possibly be nothing else but the EFFECTS of Love in us; and that they increase and decrease, as their CAUSE diminishes or grows. So that where no Love or natural Affection is, or where it is but weak or unsound, there the consequent Pleasures cannot be at all, or at least must be but weak and unsound. Now the Pleasures of sharing Good with others; of receiving it in fellowship and company; of gathering it from the pleased and happy States of those around us, from accounts and relations of such Happinesses, Joys, Deliverances; from the very Countenances and pleased Looks even of Creatures foreign to our Nature and Kind, whose signs of Joy and Contentment we can discern or understand; the Pleasures or Delights of this sort are so infinitely spreading and diffusive through our whole lives, that there is hardly such a thing as Pleasure or Contentment, of which this is not a part, and which, if this were taken away, would not totally sink and be corrupted, or at least lose its chiefest vigour, that which made its refinement, and without which it would be dross. And thus in the same manner, as to the other Pleasure, that of Sensibleness to the love of others, and consciousness of merited Esteem and Love; which in as far as it is a pleasure, must be wholly the EFFECT of Love, and cannot be felt where natural Affection is not felt. How familiar and natural it is to us, continually to be drawing some sort of satisfaction from hence! How frequent and habitual it is with us, and how great a part of our enjoyment of Life, to be in joy and delight, as either well satisfied in the consciousness of merited Esteem and Kindness from others; or as flattered by the imagination of it! What Wretch is there, what open violator of the Laws of Society, destroyer or ravager so great, who has not a Companion, or some particular Set, either of his own Kindred, or of such as he calls Friends, with whom he shares his Good, in whose Welfare he delights, and whose Joy he makes his Joy? Who are there amongst these that are not flattered by the kindness of some that are near them, and sensibly moved by the Affection which they apprehend is boar to them, even by such as are no way capable of assisting them, or serving their Interest? It is to this that almost all their actions have reference; and without this there are few even of these ununiform and inconsistent livers, who would not find themselves in an unsupportable solitude and desertion, and think Life itself a torment to them. It is this that goes through our whole lives, and mixes itself even with most of our Vices. Of this, Vanity, Ambition, Luxury, have a share, and many other disorders of our Life partake. So that were Pleasure to be computed in the way that other things commonly are, it might be said, that out of these two Branches would arise more than nine tenths of all that is enjoyed in Life. Now there is not, nor can be any thing of this kind which does not immediately depend on the having natural and kind Affection. And as natural Affection is narrow, broken, or imperfect, so must be the Content and Joy arising hence.  
FOR, first, PARTIAL AFFECTION, or natural Affection in part, and only to some particulars, is an inconsistency and contradiction: And as it has no foundation or establishment in reason, so it must be easily removable and subject to alteration without reason. Now the variableness of such sort of Passion, which depends solely on capriciousness and humour, and must undergo the changeable successions of alternate Hatred and Love, Aversion and Inclination towards the same Object, must not only in the end diminish natural Affection, and together with it the pleasures enjoyed from reflected Good, or Good of Participation, as above; but must create continual disturbance within, unquietness, disgust, and give an allay to whatsoever is actually enjoyed in the way of natural and social Affection. Whereas on the other hand ENTIRE AFFECTION (which is throughout, and equal towards the Society, or Whole, wheresoever any relation lies) as it is answerable to itself, duly proportioned, rational, and accountable; so it is irrefragable, solid, and lasting. And as in the other, every deficiency elsewhere, and every exorbitancy in the Affection, does in some manner resist and disturb the present and immediate feeling of social and friendly Affection; so in this, every other good Affection, and the consciousness of integrity and soundness, casts a good reflection, and an addition of contentment on every particular Affection felt, and makes it of more inward pleasant feeling in the Soul, and more satisfactory and rejoicing in the Mind. Thus he who is least selfish, and can, according as there is merit, love another with most sincerity and strongest Affection, does not only enjoy most by division or sharing of Good, and by communicating and imparting of it; but through the consciousness of the Justice, Beauty and Excellence of that Love, of its proportionableness to all his other Affections, and of the sutableness of those Affections to Nature, and to the whole, he enjoys a satisfaction vastly above what is received from that limited, entangled, and much corrupted pleasure of imperfect, partial, and unintire Affection.  
AND in the last place, as PARTIAL AFFECTION is fitted but to a small enjoyment of those Pleasures of communicative and reflected Good abovementioned; so neither is it capable of extracting any thing considerable from that other principal Branch of human Happiness and Delight, The being sensible to the love and esteem of others, and the being conscious of that which merits it. For in the same manner as the Affection itself is narrowly limited, infirm and changeable; so accordingly is the merit arising hence very imperfect, and of little account. And, as the Merit is but low and inferior, whilst only towards some mean and inconsiderable part of Mankind, and not towards Society and the Whole; so, accordingly, the consequent pleasure of the mind must below and defective. And as it is not possible that any who esteem not, nor love according to Virtue, should in the number of their so beloved and esteemed Friends find either those in whom they can so constantly and throughly rejoice, and have satisfaction in meriting from, or whose reciprocal love, esteem, or merited approbation, they can equally and constantly prise and enjoy; so, they of necessity must fall short in this other part of mental Enjoyment. Nor can the Pleasures gathered from self-flattery in that unsound esteem and love of those who are neither rightly nor constantly esteemed or loved, be any other than unsound, disorderly and disturbed. Whereas on the other hand, ENTIRE AFFECTION has all the opposite advantages; it has Applause and Love from the best; and, in disinterested cases, from the very worst of men: and of this we may say, that it has a consciousness of merited love and approbation from all Society, from all intelligent Creatures, and from that which is the highest and supreme of all Intelligences. And the satisfaction which attends this Entire Affection, is full and noble in proportion to its ultimate and final Object, which carries all in itself, and contains all Perfection, according to that sense of Theism above established. This is the result of Virtue: and to have this ENTIRE AFFECTION, or INTEGRITY, is to live according to Nature, and the Dictates and Rules of supreme Wisdom; this is Morality, Justice, Piety, and natural Religion.  
THUS therefore it is evident that by reason of the EFFECTS of natural Affection in reflected good from the joy and good of others, and in that of sensibleness to kindness and love from others, the chiefest of mental Pleasures (which are the chiefest of all Pleasures) are derived from, and owing to natural Affection.  
AND to show by farther instance yet, how much the mental Pleasures proceed from, and are caused by natural Affection; let any one consider, that all those Pleasures which a man can have in any other besides a merely sensual way, all those Pleasures received from Converse, Familiarity, Society, in private Contemplation, Thought and Retirement, in Mirth and Entertainment, or whatsoever they be of that Species and Kind of mental Pleasures; they are wholly in a manner founded in the having as well disposed and easy Temper or Spirit, free of harshness, distaste, sourness, turbulence; and in having a Mind or Reason in good order, reconcilable to itself, such as creates itself no unpleasant views, nor is of ill reflection. Now such a MIND and such a TEMPER as this, which must fit and qualify for the enjoying of the Pleasures mentioned, is, and must be owing to the natural and good Affections.  
AS to what relates to TEMPER (which we will consider first) and how a Temper of that happy sort comes to be really owing to natural Affection; it may be considered thus.  
THERE is no state of Health or Prosperity so great, where Inclination and Will are always answered, Fancy and Humour pleased; where there are not hourly almost some stops, impediments or crosses to the Intention, Appetite or Liking; some Accidents or other from without to check the licentious course of the Desire; or something from within, from the disposition of the Body, the Humours, or what else is common in the ordinary course of a Constitution, which must occasion distaste and vexation, and cause a habit of that kind, where there is nothing to oppose it, so as to stop the progress of it, and hinder its gaining upon a Temper. Now the only thing that can be opposed to this, is some natural and kind Affection: for if the Mind by reflection resolves to suppress this ill at any time when risen in the Temper, and that it thinks fit to do it in good earnest on any account, it can no otherwise effectually and really do it but by introducing into the Soul, or passionate Part, some affection of Love, some motion of Kindness, Affectionatness or Candour, to allay and convert that motion of Impatience and Discontent. For, if it be not done this way, the Countenance may indeed be counterfeited, but the Heart not changed: and if it be done only by the power of immediate Fear or Apprehension, or by the power of any other Affection than such as is by nature opposite and contrary; the ill Passion is suspended only during the time which that fear lasts, but is not subdued or in the least debilitated against the next occasion, nor hindered therefore as to its progress or gaining over the Temper. So that where an affable, benign, and kind disposition reigns not; where there is not a mildness and serenity spread through the whole Temper, so as to render it of easy acceptation, and fair construction, compliant, easily conceding, charitable and good; there can be but little of an easy and free Spirit long remaining, and consequently but few and slender Enjoyments of a mental kind: for in a Temper where the slightest thing diseases and provokes, where displeasure and offence are always ready to arise, and nothing kind and reconciling to allay and turn those Motions; but where bitterness and choler in a manner swim at the top and over all, and where something of a froward and malignant kind is ever stirring and active; in such a Temper as this there can be but little reception for any of those mental Pleasures, which in this case can be but very rarely experienced, must be very faint, and of small continuance.  
BUT, to press this further yet: It is most certain that by what proportion the natural and good Affections are lost or wanting in any Creature, by that proportion the ill and unnatural ones must prevail. It is the nature of every Passion by use and exercise to grow stronger and more confirmed. There are in every Life, even in the most prosperous (as has been said already) continual sources of displeasure and uneasiness, either from inward bodily constitution, variety of disposition, or the unconformity of things without to fancy, humour and will: and if those who are in the highest circumstances of Fortune seem to come off the easiest, it is to be considered that the most humoured and indulged State is what receives the most disturbance from every disappointment or smallest all. Now since besides what is of the kind of natural Affection, there is nothing of any kind else which can hinder the course and growing habit of impatience, discontent and vexation; much less can any thing else besides natural and kind Affection, resist the more violent motions of Anger, Rage, Revengefulness; and, where provocations, offences and enmities arise, (as there are subjects infinite) be able to correct the virulence and malignity of those Passions once kindled, and to expel that which is infective in them, and poisonous to the Temper: so that the forward, prone and sudden passions of Resentment, Pique, Vexation and Frowardness, which are sure to be moved on a thousand occasions, and which arise in a manner of themselves, without any apparent subject, having no check or control; but, being left masters and possessors of the Soul (when there is nothing there either of human or good Affection to resist or make a stand) and growing thus by use and exercise into greater strength and prevalence, they cannot but cause a settled inveteracy and rancour, and make this the ground and bottom of the whole Temper. But, of the misery of this we shall speak when we come to consider of the unnatural State. In the mean time it seems to have been proved, that all those mental pleasures of Converse, Mirth, Familiarity, and the rest, depend upon a Mind and Temper properly disposed; and that the TEMPER which produces these is and must be owing to the natural and good Affections.  
NOW as to the other part, a MIND or Reason thus disposed and in good order, reconcilable to itself, and of good reflection; and upon what account this is, and must be owing to natural Affection, we may consider it after this manner. Whatever Creature has Intelligence and Reason in the manner that we have it, and who from several degrees of reflection has risen to that Capacity which we call Sense and Understanding; such a Creature as this, in the very use of his contemplative or reasoning Faculty, is forced to receive reflections back into his Mind of that which passes in itself, of the actions of his Will, and of his foregoing Behaviour in the common course of his natural Temper towards his fellow Creatures, as well as in all occasions besides. And though we say of some giddy and heedless people, that they live without reflection, it is not that they are exempt from this sort of feeling, or have not this consciousness with them as others have (for their Memory is as good, and the necessary occasions are as many of remembering and calling to mind what they did or felt before) but they are said to have no reflection, because they do not designedly, or with any service or help to themselves in their Conduct, call to mind any number of circumstances to draw Inference from thence to what is present or future. Now to such a reasoning or reflecting Creature as this, who is forced of necessity to endure the review of his own Mind and Actions, and to have representations of himself and his own Affairs constantly before him, obvious to him, and passing in his Mind; to such a Creature as this there are TWO things which must be horridly offensive and agrieving; to have the reflection in his Mind of any past Action or Behaviour which he likes not should be imputed to him, which he knows odious, and feels to be of ill merit: or, to have the reflection in his Mind of any thing foolishly done (either as supinely and negligently, or as rashly and extravagantly) in the prejudice of his own Interest and Good. CONSCIENCE is one or other, or both of these. For the fear of future Evils or of eternal Ill inflicted at the will of some superior and supernatural Power, is to have awe and terror of the Deity, but does not imply Conscience, any more than the fear of those evils which are apprehended from Spirits, Enchantments, and such like, does imply Conscience: for to fear the Devil and to fear God would (as to Conscience) be then all one; and to fear God in any other manner than as in consequence of some justly unblamable and imputable act, is to fear a devilish Nature, or Devil in the stead of God: so that Conscience may even be where sense of future divine Punishment is not. Nor does the terror of Hell, or a thousand other terrors of the Deity imply Conscience except in this case, viz. where there is ill reflection in the Mind of what is wrong, odious, morally deformed, and ill deserving; or of what was committed contrary to wisdom, and unaccountably: and wheresoever this is (whether joined or not joined with any positive fear of future divine Punishment to be inflicted) there Conscience is, there Conscience accuses. And thus there is besides a religious Conscience that which we may call moral or natural Conscience: although that also may be called religious Conscience which regards the odiousness of any act with respect to the all▪ seeingness of the Deity; who being so highly thought of as to all Excellence and Greatness, it cannot otherwise be, but that in the conceived presence of such a Being, the shame of Villainy or Vice must with great forcibleness be felt, even independently of that apprehension or sense of any future Punishment of positive infliction.  
AS for a rational Creature therefore, such as Man, who whilst he continues to be Rational and to have a Mind, must of necessity through the course of his Life be conscious of, and have before him still, the results of that Mind, the determinations and actions of his Will, and the effects of his natural Temper and Affections in his foregoing Life: if there be any action which, having proceeded hence, is odious of imputation, and of ill reflection, it must be discomposing and afflicting to him, as being acted against natural Conscience. There is no sensible Creature who maliciously and intentionally does ill, who is not sensible likewise that he deserves ill: and in this sense every Creature has Conscience. For, with all Mankind, and all intelligent Creatures this must ever hold, that WHAT they know they deserve from every one, THAT they necessarily must fear and expect from every one: and thus suspicions and ill apprehensions must grow, and terrors arise both of Men and of the Deity. But besides this, and over and above the very Return and Punishment which is feared, there must, in almost every rational Creature, be yet farther Conscience, from sense of deformity in what is thus ill-deserving and unnatural, and from the consequent regret and hatefulness of incurring what is odious, and moves aversion. There scarcely is, or can be any Creature whom consciousness of Villainy as such merely does not at all offend; nor any thing opprobrious or heinously imputable, move or affect: or if there be such a one, it follows then, that with such a Creature as this all things that are of a moral kind, or relate to either the good or ill of the Species, must be equal and indifferent in the Affection (for if it were not so, but that any thing of that kind were odious, it must be most of all odious of imputation or self▪ application.) If this be so, than neither can there be any natural Affection: if not that, than neither any pleasure of Society, or mental Enjoyment, as above; but instead of that, all manner of horrid, unnatural and ill Affection; of the misery of which we are to speak distinctly under our last head. So that not to be sensible to the odiousness or mere deformity of Crime and Injustice (which is to have no sense of the goodness or illness of any act, nor any natural Affection at all) and to be so far without Conscience, is to be most of all miserable in Life: but where Conscience or sense of this sort remains, there it follows, that whatever carriage, action or deed, is contrary to the sense of goodness and deservingness, and is therefore odious of imputation, unbecoming, and of ill consciousness, this must of necessity, by means of Reflection, be continually grievous and offensive. A man who in the height of Anger and Fury happens to kill another, does, as we often see, relent immediately at the very sight of what he has done, and only by beholding the miserable state of a dying Creature, in that spectacle of Death which he himself has caused: for this he suffers Agony; the subject of this continually occurs to him in his mind; and of this he must have ill memory and consciousness. If on the other side, he does not relent nor suffer any concern at all, then, either he is such a one as has no sense of Deformity, of Crime and Injustice, no natural Affection, and consequently no Happiness or Peace within: or if he have sense of moral Goodness or Illness, but that in this or any particular, he affects THAT as noble, gallant or worthy, which is the contrary; it must follow, that as there is no proportion, aptness or fitness but in Virtue alone to Esteem, Approbation, or good Consciousness; he must either through the inconsistency, contradictoriness and absurdity of such an unlasting and unaccountable Esteem and Approbation, and through the ill influence it must have in time upon his Temper, come to lose at last even this remaining imperfect Conscience; or, if he still retains it in any degree, it must follow that through the same unsutableness of Approbation or Esteem to any thing of a contrary nature to Virtue, there must be great confusion and disagreement in Life, and continual disturbance and dissatisfaction in the service of such a Principle. For it is impossible that a Murderer, or one of the Banditi, a Pirate, or any confederate Cheat or Ruffian, or in short, any one who is false to the society of Mankind in general, and contradicts natural Affection, should have any Principle that holds throughout, any fixed Standard or Measure upon which he can regulate his Approbation or Esteem, any Reason or Rule for his approbation of any one action moral; if any thing morally good or ill, amiable or detestable has place with him: so that the more he engages in the love or admiration of any thing as morally worthy, which is morally ill and detestable; the more self-contradiction he must meet with, the more dissatisfaction and self-disapprobation in the main, through the perpetual variableness and instability of that Rule by which he approves and disapproves, and through the irreconcilableness of his Mind and Reason to itself. And there being nothing more certain than this, that no natural Affection can be contradicted, nor no ill one advanced (as by false applause it is) without a prejudice in some degree to all the other natural Affections; it must follow that natural Deformity growing greater by the encouragement of unnatural Affection in any particular, if at the same time there remains a sense of moral Good or Ill; there must be of necessity more work created for ill Conscience, more subject of ill consciousness; and the matter or ground of self-disapprobation or self-dissatisfaction in Life, must be more increased, as irregular and ill Affection increases.  
IN short, there is no transgression, loss or violation of natural Affection in any degree, without ill Conscience of the first sort, viz. of ill merit or ill deservingness, such as loses us that supreme happiness of Rest, and security of Mind in a freedom from ill Apprehensions and Suspicions; and such as must draw on, necessarily, that contrary habit of Mind which causes us to live in terrors of Mankind, and of all credited, or but suspected superior Powers: from which fears we are by innocence and good consciousness so much delivered, and by that means placed in such security and ease. If there be no farther Conscience than this, if there be no Conscience at all from sense of deformity in moral Ill, and consequently no natural Affection; then is the Mind farthest of all from being at ease, by being (as it must necessarily be, when natural Affection is lost) in the horridest state of Savageness, Immanity and unnatural Passion. If there be indeed farther Conscience, as from a sense of moral Deformity and Excellence, than there being certainly no durable or consistent self-approbation from any thing besides what is of Virtue; there is ground of constant self-accusation or dislike from whatsoever is contrary to, or is a defect in natural Affection: as on the other side, there is ground of thorough self-approbation, joy and contentment, wheresoever there is integrity of Life, and adherence to natural and sound Affection.  
THIS also is to be considered, that when any one by an immorality or injustice offends his Conscience, and goes against natural Affection, or sense of Right and Wrong; he cannot possibly see a reason in himself, why he should not be carried further into all manner of Villainy, or why he should not esteem himself as a person liable and open to all Crime and Wickedness, even that which is as yet unknown to him. And this is a reproach which a Mind must of necessity make to itself upon the least offence of Conscience, and where any thing is committed in contradiction to a sense of Right and Wrong, that is, of an amiableness or deformity in moral Actions.  
AS for that other part of Conscience, viz. the ill remembrance or ill reflection of what is unreasonably done, and in prejudice of Interest or Happiness: This must follow still and have effect, wheresoever any action has given occasion to sense of Deformity contracted by Crime and Injustice: or where there is not the ground of any such sense; yet there must follow still an ill Conscience from sense of ill Merit with respect to Men, and to the Deity. Or though there be a possibility (which is hard to suppose) of excluding for ever all thoughts or suspicions of any superior Powers, yet it is impossible but that an almost total defect in natural Affection, which no dissimulation can long conceal, must occasion a sensible loss to us in the confidence and trust of men, and consequently in Interest and Happiness. And the sense of this great disadvantage is what can never fail to occur to us, when we see (as we must be forced to do with envy) the better and more grateful terms of Friendship, Trust, Love and Esteem, on which those who have not renounced their good and natural Affection, live with the rest of Mankind. Where natural Affection therefore is not; yet by Immorality, happening through want of such Affection, there must be disturbance from Conscience of this sort, viz. from sense of what is committed unwisely, and contrary to Interest and Safety: and this too, notwithstanding any security in which men may live against the apprehensions of a superior and animadverting Power.  
FROM all this we may conclude, that a MIND and Reason, well at ease, orderly, reconcilable with itself, and of good retrospect or reflection (on which, and on a TEMPER such as we have spoken of, all those mental Pleasures before enumerated do in a great degree depend, and are founded) is owing to natural and good Affection.  
SO that if the chiefest Happiness be from the mental Pleasures, and from the constantest succession or series of such in Life; and that the chiefest mental Pleasures are such as we have treated of, and are founded in natural Affection; it follows, that To have the natural Affections, is to have the chiefest enjoyment, possession, and happiness of Life.  
NOW as to the pleasures of the Body, and the satisfactions belonging to Sense; it is evident, that they cannot possibly have their effect, or be of any valuable or delightful enjoyment, but by the means of natural and social Affection.  
IF from the highest voluptuousness in eating or in drinking, the circumstances of a Table and Companions were withdrawn; so that all possible means of enjoying these delights in fellowship, all occasion for social feeling or Affection were denied; there would be hardly any Pleasure remaining that were worth acceptance, even in the opinion of the most debauched themselves: and if there are any of those Sensualists who can be sensual by themselves, who can be contented to take these satisfactions when perfectly alone, and can indulge themselves in the same manner, and eat and drink with the same relish then as at another season; there is no body who thinks the Pleasure of these persons to be very refined, or that they are so much as capable of enjoying it, so as to be reckoned upon as men of Pleasure. The very notion of a Debauch (which is a sally into all that can be imagined of Pleasure and Voluptuousness) carries with it an apprehension of reference to Society, or to a Gang, or something of Fellowship: it may be called a Surfeit or Excess of eating and drinking, but hardly a Debauch of that kind, when the excess was taken separately, out of Society or reach of People: and one that uses himself in this way, is often called a Sot, but never a Debauchee. The Courtesans, and even the commonest of Women, who live by prostitution, know very well how necessary it is, that every one whom they entertain with their Beauty, should believe that there are satisfactions reciprocal, and that Pleasures are as well given as received: and were the imagination of this to be wholly taken away, there are hardly any of the grosser sort of Mankind who would not think the remaining Pleasure to be gross and sordid, and of very imperfect enjoyment. Who is there that can well, or long enjoy any thing when alone, and abstracted perfectly even in his very Mind and Thought, from any thing of Society? Who is there that on those terms is not soon cloyed by any sensual Indulgence, and that is not uneasy with his Pleasure, however exquisite it be, of Sensation, till such time as he has found a way to impart it, and make it truly pleasant to him, by communicating his Joy, and sharing it at least with some one single person? Let men imagine what they please; let them suppose or believe themselves ever so selfish; or desire ever so much to follow the dictates of such a Principle, and to bring Nature under restraint; Nature will break out, and in agonies, disquiets, and a distempered state, demonstrate evidently the ill consequence of such violence, the absurdity of such a device, and the punishment which belongs to such a monstrous and horrid endeavour.  
THUS, therefore, not only the pleasures of the Mind depend on natural Affection; but even the pleasures too of the Body do in so far depend, that where natural Affection is not, they not only lose their force, but are in a manner converted into disturbance, uneasiness and disgust: so as that the matter which should feed joy, contentment and delight, feeds rather discontent and sourness, and breeds a nauseating, wearisome and restless disposition, by reason of the absolute incapacity in any thing sensual to please, or give any lasting or thorough contentment, where it is not mixed with any thing of affable, kind, or social Affection.  
AND thus both with respect to Mental enjoyment, and to the enjoyments of Sense also; TO HAVE THE NATURAL AFFECTIONS, IS TO HAVE THE CHIEFEST SATISFACTION AND HAPPINESS OF LIFE.  
NOW on the other side, THAT TO WANT THE SAME NATURAL AFFECTIONS IS TO BE CHIEFLY MISERABLE, appears first from the loss it implies both of the mental and bodily Pleasures; and also from its carrying with it the horridest of pains, those of the Mind: of which sort if (by what shall further be proved) those derived from unnatural and horrid Affections appear to be the very worst; it will follow that since (according to what has been proved already) unnatural and horrid Affection is and must ever be consequent to the loss of natural and good; that therefore to want natural and good Affection, is certainly to incar the greatest of Torments and Diseases.  
BUT, before we conclude as to this of natural Affection, we may add something in general, of the BALANCE of the Affection (of which we gave some hint before) and by this endeavour to demonstrate how that for want of a due proportion or balance in natural Affection, a Creature is at a loss and uneasy, disturbed, and ill affected in his other Passions.  
THERE is no body who has considered ever so little the nature of the sensible part, the Soul or Mind, but knows that in the same manner as without action, motion and employment, the Body languishes and is oppressed, its Nourishment grows the matter and food of Disease, the Spirits unconsum'd help to consume the Body, and Nature as it were preys upon itself; so also that sensible and living part, the Soul or Mind, wanting its proper and natural exercise, is burdened, and diseased; and its Thoughts and Passions being unnaturally witheld from their due Objects, turn against itself, and create the highest impatience. For the Mind or Soul, which more than the Body requires agitation and exercise, cannot be but in a state of Feeling or Passion, of some kind, and under some certain Affection or other: if not under such Affection as may fitly employ it in proportionable and fit subject; yet however under such as will make it a burden, disease and torment to itself.  
IN BRUTES, and such as have not the use of Reason or Reflection (at least not after the manner which Mankind has) it is so ordered in Nature, that between their daily search after Food, their application and intention towards the business of their own immediate support, or towards the affairs of their Kind, almost their whole time is taken up, and they fail not to find full employment for their Passion, according to that degree of agitation and vigour to which they are fitted, and which their Nature requires. If it happens that any one of these be taken out of a natural and laborious state, to be placed in the midst of Ease, and of a Plenty furnishing abundantly to all his Appetites and Wants; it proves, that as his Circumstances are luxuriant, his Temper and Passions grow so too; and that coming to have these accommodations at a cheaper rate, with respect to Labour and Employment, than was intended him by Nature, he is made to pay dearer for it in another sense, by losing the good disposition of his Temper and Passions, and the orderliness of his Kind or Species.  
IT happens with Mankind, that some by necessity are tied to Labour, whilst others are provided for in an abundance of all things at the expense of the Labours of the rest. Now, if amongst those of this easy sort, there be not something of fit and proper Employment raised in the room of what is wanting by such a vacancy from common Labour and Toil; if there be not an application to some sort of work, such as has a good and honest end in Society, as Letters, Sciences, Arts, Husbandry, public or private Oeconomy, or the like; but that there be a settled Idleness, Supiness, and a relaxed and dissolute State; it must needs produce (as is always seen) a total disorder of the Passions, and must break out in the strangest irregularities imaginable. It is not thus with those who are taken up in honest and due Employment, and have been well inur'd to it, as amongst the industrious sort of common People; where it is rare to meet with any instances of those irregularities of Affection that are known in Courts and where Idleness reigns. Neither may it be improper here, to remark what many have done in advantage of Employment and Application; that where a Person necessitated from his youth to a Life of the most laborious sort, has on a sudden changed his circumstances and become rich, he has found in himself the uneasiness and ill operation of that Ease and Rest he so much wished for, and having no other proper employment to turn himself to, he has again betaken himself to that Life out of choice, to which before be was only driven and necessitated.  
THERE is no need of going about by farther Instances, and Argument, to prove, that as motion and exercise is of absolute necessity to the good state and welfare of the BODY; so it is to that of THE MIND AND AFFECTIONATE PART.  
NOW Nature having (as we see evidently in Creatures) made it so great a part of the natural employment and exercise of the Mind and Passion, to be applied and bend towards the Species: and having suited and framed the rest of the Passions, the whole Constitution and Oeconomy of the Creature to this; it cannot but follow of consequence, that where this social Bent and Affection is wanting, the Mind and passionate Part must suffer much by the want of it; being sure to create to themselves unusual and unnatural exercise, where they are cut off from such as is natural and good. And thus in the room of social and natural Affection, new and unnatural ones must be raised, and all Order and Oeconomy be thus destroyed.  
IT is to have a very imperfect idea of the Order of Nature in the formation and structure of Animals, to think that so great a Principle, so fundamental a Part as that of natural Affection in the Soul, should be possibly lost or impaired without mighty disorder, calamity and injury to the Creature. In the structure of the Body, where all is so aptly adjusted, there is not any of all those which are called the noble or principal Parts, that can be wounded or hurt without the immediate disorder and sufferance of the whole Body. Nor is this otherwise in the structure of the Passions and Affections, which are with equal art and exactness suited and framed to one another, to every different Creature and different Sex; since we see the Whole so nicely built, that the barely extending of one Passion but a little too far, or the continuance of it too long, is able to overturn all, and bring irrecoverable ruin and misery, by Distraction. How is it possible, therefore, that in a System such as this, a principle of Life and Motion so great as that of natural Affection, so interwove with all the other Faculties, and suited to the other Motions within, should possibly be injured or lost, without the sufferance and ruin of the inward Part, and a total intanglement, torture, and perplexity of inward Disposition? We see in the example of Castration, how a small bodily alteration has an effect upon the Passions, so as to take away those Appetites and Affections that are the proper ones of the Sex, and how great a disorder this breeds; how Man himself no less than other creatures, is rendered by it unsound, imperfect, deformed, and miserably disposed in his Passions and Affections as well as in outward figure; how impotent of mind, and how weak, untoward and wretched in his whole state. It is the same thing when without any change in the bodily Organs, and only by the force of unnatural Education, Practice, or Use, any natural Passions are removed which are of the Oeconomy and Order of the Creature. A man effeminatly bred and used, though not an Eunuch, nor by any Metamorphosis changed into Woman, yet becomes a kind of Woman in part, and is the same disfigured creature as to his Passions and inward Composure, as that other sort of monster and creature of neither Sex. Who is there that can think of any creature that becomes degenerate, and loses any principal Feeling or Passion which is of the character of his Species (as of a Lion that should lose his Courage, a Bee his Industry, a Turtle his tender, and as it were conjugal Affection) without having the idea of an untoward imperfect Being, and of a Creature that for his own sake had better not be? Can any one think either of a Male that passes into any of the Passions or Affections proper only to the Female; or of a Female that loses the proper and peculiar softness belonging to the Sex, and becomes Masculine, without being offended, and without judging very readily, that as there is a different order of Life, a different oeconomy, different capacities of Pleasure, and enjoyments of Life; so there is a different order set, and oeconomy of Passions assigned in the same manner to the one, different from the other? For, where the Faculties, the Habitudes or Affections belonging to the Male, are joined to other Affections which are proper only to the Female; this being disagreeable, preposterous, and of disturbance to the smooth and regular course of the Passions, must be of necessity a torment and disease.  
NOW if for any Animal, even of the brutish kind, to lose any one of those Affections proper to his Species and to the character of his Kind, or of his Sex only, be of so great an injury to him; what must it be for Man to lose that sense and feeling which is proper to him as a man; which is his proper Character, his Make and Genius? What must it be for Man (whose dependence on, and relation to Society is yet greater than in any of those other Creatures) to lose any thing of that natural Affection by which he is carried on to the good of his Species and Society, and of which passion he has naturally so much more than other creatures, that he, of any other, can least bear Solitude or an intermission of social Enjoyment which he is still seeking after, and if long deprived of, is hardly able to endure his Being? Nor is any thing more apparent than that there is naturally in every one such a degree of social Affection as necessitates and drives him to seek the Familiarity and Friendship of others, amongst whom he may let loose a Passion which wants to be employed, and which when it is suppressed, creates a sadness, dejection and melancholy in the Mind, as great as is on the contrary that healing and enlivening Joy it brings when acting at its liberty and with full scope; as at that time we may see particularly when the Heart is opened, and the secrets of the Breast unfolded to a Bosom-friend. This we see confirmed in persons of the most elevated Stations, in Princes, Monarches, and those who seem by their condition to be above ordinary human Commerce, and to affect a strangeness and distance with Mankind. For although the wiser and better sort are perhaps out of a jealousy rejected by them, as not fitted for their intimacy or secret converse; yet there are those substituted in the room, who though they may have the least merit of any, and are perhaps the most vile and contemptible of men; yet serve however to that end of Friendship, and are so much the subjects of a Kindness and social Affection in these great ones, that for these we can see them often in pain and in concern; in these they easily confide; to these they can with pleasure be open, free, kind, succorable and bountiful, as rejoicing and taking delight in it, having no intention or aim beyond it, and their interest (in respect of Policy) often standing contrary to it. In Persons of but an ordinary good Disposition, no better than what is common to the generality of Mankind, it is discernible how much they are pressed with this necessity of entertaining Friendship and familiar Commerce, and how much these social Affections want (if I may say so) their daily exercise and discharge. How heavy does Life grow when without it? And how plain is it, that after a long absence, and a sort of abstinence in this way, after a banishment from the company of near Friends, and a disuse of Society but for a small time, the Mind is in distress, the Temper discomposed; and that no sooner is the man restored to the means of his former Enjoyment, but he takes new Pleasure, receives additional Delight, and enjoys more than before the freedom, intimacy, and all those circumstances of friendly Commerce, and of an inward Society from which he was separated?  
AND thus it may appear how much natural Affection is predominant in us; how it is inwardly joined to us, and implanted in our Natures; how interwove with our other Passions, and how essential to the regular motion and course of all our Affections, on which our happiness and self-enjoyment so immediately depends.  
THUS much as to the System and Constitution of the inward part, and as to that natural BALANCE of the Affections; which may not be thought (we hope) so odd or unjustifiable a way of speaking, after what has been said.  
AS to both those Ills which follow the ill balance and defect of natural Affection, viz. the enlargement and extension of the selfish Passions; and the growth of the unnatural and horrid ones; how and in what degree these Consequences are miserable, we come to speak in what follows upon each of those heads, which make the second and third part of this Examination.  
AND thus it appears, that As TO HAVE THE NATURAL AND GOOD AFFECTIONS IS OF THE CHIEFEST ENJOYMENT OF LIFE; So TO WANT THEM IS OF THE HIGHEST DISORDER AND MISERY.  
II. WE are now to prove, THAT BY HAVING THE SELF-PASSIONS TOO INTENSE OR STRONG, A CREATURE IS MISERABLE.  
WE have already considered in some measure of the Passions and Affections of this kind, as they are good and useful for the Creature, with respect to his private Interest and self-Oeconomy. Now these, if they are moderate and in a natural degree, are no ways inconsistent with the effects or right operation of natural Affection; which will prevail still where it ought, and in every fit occasion take place of any of those other Affections whilst thus moderate, and make them to be no obstructions: For thus in a Creature who has a natural affection towards its young, the Affections towards private good or safety, though abiding still in the Creature, are yet no hindrance to his operation towards public Good, or good of his Kind, even where Sufferings and Violences are to be undergon, and Life itself comes in question: And this is according to a right Balance and Proportion. But if the Passions of this kind toward private Good, or the Regards to private Good are excessive and beyond a certain degree; then is this Operation hindered, and the effects of natural Affection towards public Good prevented: and thus is the Balance broken, and Oeconomy destroyed. Therefore if it be supposed conducing to the Interest of any Creature, to have these self-Passions thus violently strong, and the Balance to be after this manner; than it must be according to his Interest resolutely to go against those natural Affections. But if (as we think it will appear) it can never be for the interest of a Creature to have his self-Passions thus strong or violent, so as to make this ill Balance; than it must be always at his own disadvantage, and not according to his interest, to go contrary to natural Affection, through that which we call self-Love.  
IF there were any of these self-Passions, which for the good and happiness of the Creature might be set in opposition to natural Affection, and deserved a degree of strength able to overbalance it; THE DESIRE AND LOVE OF LIFE would be the most likely. But it may be found perhaps that there is no Passion which (by having so much allowed to it) is the occasion of more Disorder and Misery.  
THERE is nothing more certain, or that is more universally consented to and confessed by every one, than this; That Life may sometimes be even a misfortune and misery; and that nothing can be more desirable than to lay it down and withdraw from under the heavy burden. To cause, or any way enforce the continuance of Life in Creatures reduced to a certain extremity, is esteemed the greatest Cruelty: and even there where any religious Faith forbids, as a thing heinous and sinful, that any one should be his own reliever; still, if by any fortunate accident Death offers of itself, it is embraced as highly welcome, and as a Blessing. And on this account the nearest Friends and Relations often rejoice at the release of one entirely beloved. even though he himself may have been of so weak a mind as to have declined Death, and endeavoured earnestly the prolongment of his own uneligible and wretched State.  
SINCE Life therefore may frequently prove a Misfortune and Misery, and that even naturally it becomes so by being only prolonged till it reaches the infirmities of old Age; and since there is nothing more commonly known than the instances of Life overvalued, where, out of an eager desire of Life, men purchase it at an overrate, and at such a cost as hardly any Life can be thought worth; it follows evidently, that that Passion or Affection of love of Life, and abhorrence or dread of Death, if it be over great and exceedingly prevalent, and over balancing in the Temper of any Creature, must be the means of carrying him directly against his own interest and good, and must make him in occasions, such as are of the last importance, to become the greatest enemy to himself that can be, and necessitate him to act as such.  
BUT in the next place: though it were always the interest and good of a Creature, by all courses and means whatsoever, at any price or at any rate, to preserve Life; yet according to this, it is not for the interest of a Creature to have this Passion over great: for thus it will be ineffectual, and not conducing to its end. Various instances need not be given: for what is there better known, than that at all times an excessive fear betrays to danger, instead of saving from it; and that it is impossible for any one to do the least thing serviceably or well for his own preservation, or in his own defence, when strongly pressed with such a Passion: insomuch, that on all extraordinary Emergences, Courage is that which chiefly saves, whilst Cowardice robs us of the means of safety, and not only deprives us of our defensive Faculties, and hinders us from acting as we should do to that end of our defence; but even runs us into the mouth of Ruin, and makes us meet that evil which we scarce needed to have shunned?  
AND now though in neither of these senses it could be called an Ill, to have the Affection of this sort thus strong and prevalent; yet the Affection itself, when in this degree predominant in any one, must be the cause of Misery, if it be misery to have a thorough Cowardice, and to feel those horrors that are proper to the character of one who lives under a constant dread of Death. For, in a rational and reflecting Creature (to whom the thoughts and imagination of Death are continually in some manner or another presented) an inherent Passion of this sort must be the occasion of the greatest Agonies and Torments, such as must enter at all times into the pleasantest parts of Life, so as to corrupt and poison all Enjoyment and Consent. And thus by reason of this Passion alone, such a Life as this, if inwardly and closely viewed, would be found to be one of the most miserable, though attended with all other Circumstances that should in all appearance make it happy. But when we add to this the meannesses and base condescensions occasioned by such a fear of Death, and which necessarily follow from such an eager desire of retaining Life; when we consider how we are debased and shamed by it, when driven to actions which we cannot view but with dislike; when the Life we thus cherish, is by this means grown to be of so unpleasing reflection, sullied, deformed, and forced by degrees into still greater crookedness and perplexity; in this case I think there is no body ever so little ingenuous but feels that Life sits heavily upon us, and is worn uneasily: whilst all that is kind and social, the chief pleasure and good of Life, is for the sake of Life abandoned and given up, and things submitted to, for which nothing in Life besides can make amends.  
IN short, Is there any thing more miserable than the condition of a thorough timorous Nature, where the terror of dying is always a close and pressing Passion? And what Fortune, what outward State ever so secure, can deliver from this? To what is not such a one necessitated and driven, who lives under a more than ordinary fear of this sort? What torturing and endless work is still growing upon his hands, who out of an earnestness to retain Life at any rate, renders it so much the more exposed, as he is forced more and more into those indirect courses upon which such a Passion runs him? On the other 〈…〉, is there any one who will not esteem the life of a Person more easy towards this subject, to be a Life capable infinitely of greater Happiness and Enjoyment? Is not the very consciousness and feeling itself of such an Ease and Indifference as this, an infinite satisfaction in a world of occasions? And is not the effect of it an augmenting and heightening to our pleasures, and to the enjoyments we take in Life; as the contrary Passion is by its effect destructive to the pleasures of Life, and an allay and bitterness amidst all that is enjoyed of that sort?  
AND thus therefore, upon the whole, it seems evident, That to have that Affection of DESIRE AND LOVE OF LIFE, or ABHORRENCE OF DEATH, too intense and beyond a certain degree, is against the interest, good and safety of a Creature, and is opposite to the Happiness he enjoys in Life.  
IN the same manner as this passion of Fear (under a certain degree) is necessary to self-preservation, and to the avoiding of what is destructive; so is there another Passion as preservative to us, and as useful to our safety, by assisting us not to fly, but to repel Injury, and resist Violence when offered. It is by this that a Creature offering an injury, is deterred from it, as knowing by the very signs which accompany this Passion whilst it is rising and gathering strength, that the Injury will not go with impunity. And it is this Passion which, when violence is actually used, assists us more effectually to struggle against it, and adds a force to us, both in supporting it, and in returning it on the Inflicter. For thus, as Rage and Despair increase, a Creature grows still more and more terrible; and being urged to the greatest extremity, finds a degree of strength and boldness unknown till then, and which had not risen but through the height of Provocation. As to this Passion therefore of ANGER (for I know no other word for it) though its immediate aim be indeed the Ill or Punishment only of another, and not the good of self; yet it is plainly one of those Passions (of which we are now discoursing) that tend to the advantage and interest of the self-System, the Animal himself: since a certain degree of that Passion (whether that degree be properly called Anger or no, it matters not) is most certainly requisite in the Creature for his performance even of the better sort of moral Actions, whether tending to the good of Society, or to his own preservation and defence. For, who can resolutely enough divide from, or resist ill and detestable men; or who can fight either singly against a private enemy, or for the public against a public one, without feeling in some measure, and being armed as it were with a certain degree of this Passion? But, on the other side, there is hardly any need that we should explain how mischievous and destructive Anger is, if it be what we commonly mean by that word; if it be such as denominates an angry Temper, and be either hasty, rash, and violent in the instant of provocation only; or if it be of that kind which imprints itself deeply, and for a long season, and causes Revenge, and a vindicative Bent and Resolution. What can be a sorer or deeper wound, a closer grief, or more sensible misery, than to be agitated by this fierce Passion, and carry this sting within? And what wonder is it that so much is done out of Revenge, and in the fury of Anger, when the relief and satisfaction found in that indulgence is really the asswaging of the most torturous Grief and pressing sensation of Misery; which being removed, or for a while alleviated or abated, by the accomplishment of the Desire in the ill of another, leaves behind it (as a rack newly quitted) the perception of the greatest Comfort, and an overflowing of soft and pleasing Sensation? From hence are those untoward delights of perverseness, and of an habitual froward, envenomed and malignant Disposition acting at its liberty: for this is a perpetual asswaging of Anger perpetually kindled, and always renewing; which is the same as to be perpetually stung, and still curing of the Sore. Thus a thorough home Revenge being raised once to a high pitch, rests not till it attains its end; and that attained, is easy and reposes: making the succeeding Ease and Relief to be by so much more enjoyed as the preceding Anguish and incumbent Pain was of long duration, and of bitterest impatience. And certainly if amongst Lovers, and in the language of Gallantry, the success of ardent Love is called the asswaging of a Pain; this must be by far yet, more justly termed so. And surely, however pleasing that other pain may be said to be, this can be no pleasing one, nor can be any other than sound and thorough wretchedness, a grating and disgustful feeling, without the least mixture of any thing soft or flattering.  
TO speak any further of this Passion of Anger; to show the ill effects of it as to ourselves, our Minds and Bodies, our Condition, and Circumstances of Life with those around us; or to show on the other side, the good effects as well as happy feeling of a mild condescending Temper, easy of contentment, such as not easily takes offence, and easily forgives; to show how much this is suitable to Interest, to Health and Contentment, to easy and pleasant Living; and how much the contrary is embroiling, dangerous, exposing, and of perpetual disturbance, inconvenience and misfortune, would be I imagine needless. What has been said, may be enough to make this be understood, That to be subject to such affection of Anger of any kind, as we have been mentioning, is to suffer under a worse sort of Disease, and to be subject to no small Misery.  
WE are now to speak concerning other self-Passions that are of the Oeconomy of the Creature, as love or appetite to Nourishment; love of, and concern for those Conveniences by which we are well provided for and maintained; love and desire of Reputation, Authority, and Power of some kind, which advance our Welfare, good Establishment and Condition of living. Now these affections of Desire or Appetite towards what is self-advantageous, and of self-good, if they are moderate and in certain bounds, are such as are not blamable, by being any ways injurious to social Life, or a hindrance to Virtue: but being in an extreme degree, they become Luxury, Avarice, Ambition, and are known vicious and ill with respect to Society. How it is that they are ill also with respect to the private Person, and are his loss and injury as well as the Society's, we may thus consider. As first in that of LUXURY.  
WERE it true (as has been proved the contrary) that the most considerable Pleasures were such as came in by the sense; and were it true also that these Pleasures of the sense lay in such certain outward things capable and sure to yield always a due and certain portion of Pleasure according to their degree and quality; it would then follow, that the certain way to procure Happiness would be barely to procure largely of these Subjects to which Happiness and Pleasure were thus annexed; and by using or consuming the most of these, make sure of most enjoyment. But in what sense soever it be that this is called to live, and to live fast, as if this were to make the most of Life; it will hardly be found that the inward Faculties (such as are the cause that any thing of pleasure is conceived) are able to keep pace with these outward supplies. And if the natural disposition and aptness from within be not concurring, it will be in vain that these Subjects are thus heaped on, and multiplied with eager intention and desire. Now if those inward dispositions (such as of a Stomach towards nourishment) be disordered, overturned, and ruined by excess, then is there no longer the same enjoyment to be received from any thing; but all is in a manner ruined, and the capacity of real Pleasure lost, whilst that which remains is rather a sore and a disease: as may be observed in those who have gained a constant nauseating, though with a cravingness of stomach; or who have contracted a continual, eager, and insatiable thirst. But how much better does Nature, that has so well and easily provided for our Pleasure, dictate also and prescribe to us for the enjoyment of it? and who by quitting Nature e'er made advancement or improved in Pleasure? Was it ever known of any one, long used and accustomed to an active Life, and to Exercise begetting Health, and a kindly vigorous Appetite, that having then experienced the gratefulness of Food, even of the plainest kind; it ever came into his thought, upon a following change of Life and Diet, to compare or bring in competition the Pleasures received from all those delicacies of Luxury, and of a continual solicited and forced Appetite, with those former remembered satisfactions of a homely and common Diet, prepared by cheerful and wholesome Labour, and preceded by due Abstinence, and a suitable kind and natural Appetite? On the other side, Has any thing been more known, than the instances of People bred to a Life and Diet just the contrary, used never to wait, but to prevent Appetite, and accustomed to contend with an almost perpetual Society; who when by accident or choice they came to fall into that other more natural course of Life, or but for a while (as on a journey, or a day of hunting) came to experience once the satisfaction had from the plainest Food, have afterwards with freedom owned, that it was then that they received the greatest contentment and delight of that sort, and such as was infinitely above what arose from all those studied Pleasures of variety and excess? It is plain, that by pressing on and urging Nature thus, and by forcing continually the Appetite and Sense, the keeness and edge of those natural Sensations are by degrees lost: and though by vice and habit the same things may be sought after with equal violence as before; though the impatience of being without them may be greater and greater; yet the joy in having them is lessened and brought almost to nothing. The accompanying Palls and Nauseauting which continually intervene, are of the worst and most hateful sensation that can be; and hardly is there at last any thing tasted wholly free from something of this ill relish and untoward feeling: So that instead of a constant and flowing delight to be reckoned upon as belonging to this State; the State itself is a perpetual Sickness or Infirmity, a corruption of Pleasure, and cannot so much as admit of any thorough kind, natural, and agreeable sensation, even of the very sort of those it so earnestly seeks and aspires to with such eagerness.  
AS to the Consequences of such a pernicious greediness, and excessive desire towards Indulgence of this sort; how fatal to the Body, and to the health and vigour of the manly Frame; how ruinous by Diseases, such as are the most tormenting, and of the acutest pain and longest duration; all this needs scarce to be repeated: Nor how on the other side, the reverse of this, a temperate Life, and Desires moderated, afford every thing so happily contrary, by making Life so much more lasting, vigorous, and so infinitely more delightful, and of more pleasing inward sensation and lively feeling, proper always to that full healthiness of a temperate State; as a contrary Torpor and heavy wearydness is proper to a debauched State, and is spread still through the Senses of one used to continual excess.  
AS to the Consequences with respect to the Mind, the difference here between Temperance and Intemperance; which of the two is the most thriving state for the Mind, and which injurious and destructive, is superfluous to mention. Nor needs it be told, that as there is a vigour and alacrity gained to the Mind by temperance, so in the very practice of what is thus beneficial both to the Body and Mind, and advantageous so many other ways besides, there is a peculiar Joy and Satisfaction.  
THE Consequences as to Interest are plain enough. The misery of such a state of impotence and unforbearance, whilst it subjects us to the lowest and meanest carriage and dependence, as well as to all profusion, to all irregularity and extravagance of Conduct; the Injuries too, which even knowingly they do themselves, who out of an impotence of this sort, and an impossibility of restraint, forbear not what even they themselves declare they know to be destructive to them; all this, and more of this nature is obvious enough. And from less than what has been said, it would be easy to conclude, That to have this violent love, this luxurious and high desire towards the sort of pleasure mentioned, is to be highly inconvenienced and prejudiced as to Interest, happiness of Life, and enjoyment of real Pleasure.  
NOW as to those other excesses of the self-Passions, such as mentioned, as of regard towards the outward conveniences of Life (which in an extreme degree is Covetousness or Avarice) and that of inclination and good liking towards what is of Reputation and Authority (of which the extreme is Ambition and Vanity) how far the first of these A COVETING OR AVARICIOUS TEMPER is miserable, needs not that one should go about to explain. Who is there that knows not how little a Portion that is, which is agreed by all to be sufficient for a man's single use and convenience? And how much may even this be reduced still, and brought into a narrower compass, if all superfluity being cut off, Temperance and a natural Life were followed with near that application and earnestness that Sumptuousness and Luxury is practised by some, and studied as an Art or Science? Now where Temperance is found thus advantageous, and the Practice as well as the Consequences of it so pleasing and happy, there is little need to mention any thing of the miseries attending those covetous and eager desires after things that have no bounds or rule, as being out of Nature, beyond which there can be no limits or moderation set to Desire. For where shall we once stop when we are over this, when we are no longer contained within the bounds of Nature? How shall we any way fix or ascertain a thing wholly unnatural and unreasonable? Or what method or regulation shall we set to Excess or exorbitant Fancy, in adding Expense to Expense, or Possession to Possession? Hence that natural restlessness of coveting and eager Minds, in whatever state or degree of Fortune they are placed; there being no thorough or real satisfaction, but a kind of natural insatiableness belonging to this condition, whence it comes that Enjoyment is hindered: since it is impossible that there should be any real enjoyment but of what is in consequence of natural and just Appetite. Nor do we readily call that an Enjoyment of Wealth or of Honour, when through Covetousness or Ambition, the Desire is still forwards, and rests not as satisfied with its gains. But of this vice of Covetousness, and the misery of it (especially of that sort which is mere Avarice) there is enough said in the world; and in our common way of speaking, a covetous and a miserable Temper has often but one and the same meaning.  
NEITHER is there less known or said as to the ills of that other aspiring Temper, and the self-torments of a swollen PRIDE and AMBITION; which would be indeed but little felt in the World, if those Passions were as much fought against and controlled within, as they are condemned abroad, and owned by every body to be unfortunat and tormenting. But when one considers the ease, happiness, and the thousand advantages and securities which attend a satisfied Temper, a free and easy Spirit, such as can be accommodated on easy terms, is fitted to Society and Fellowship, and can suit itself with any reasonable circumstances; it will not be necessary any further to suggest the excellence and good of Moderation, and the mischief and self-injury of immoderate Desires, and of a Mind that covets eagerly Fame, Honour, Superiority, or Power.  
THIS too is obvious in this place, that as the Desires of this kind are raised and become impatient, so the aversions and fears of the contrary side grow in proportion strong and violent, and the Temper more subject to apprehensions from all events, and more uncapable of bearing the least repulse or ordinary loss or disappointment. And thus all quiet, rest and security as to what is future, and all peace, contentedness and ease as to what is present, is forfeited by having Desires of this kind, and by having Appetites thus swelling and immoderate.  
THERE is a Temper which is ofttimes considered as in opposition to these eager and aspiring Aims of which we have been speaking; not that it excludes the Passions either of Covetousness or Ambition, but that it is the hindrance of their Effects; and that by soothing of the Mind, and softening it into an EXCESSIVE LOVE OF REST AND INDOLENCE, it makes the attempts of those Passions to be impracticable, and renders the difficulties of their painful and laborious course towards Wealth and Honours to be insuperable. Now though an inclination towards Ease, a love of moderate repose and rest from Action, be as natural and useful to us as that inclination we have towards Sleep; and that to want such an inclination would be in the same manner an Ill, as if we had not at proper times a strong and pressing inclination to sleep; yet notwithstanding this, an excessive love of Rest, and a contracted hatred and aversion towards Action or Employment, must be greatly injurious, and be a disease in the Mind equal to that of a Lethargy in the Body, and no less destructive of it by keeping it in a perpetual dulness and in-action, than the other, by keeping it in a perpetual slumber. How much this of Action or Exercise is necessary for the Body, let it be judged by the difference we find in the Constitutions that are accustomed, and those that are wholly strangers to it; and by the different Health and Complexion which Labour and due Exercise create, in comparison with that habit of Body which we see consequent to an indulged state of Indolence and Rest. It is pleasing to observe what eager and impatient appetite towards Exercise Nature has given to Youth of all kinds, in that desire of Play, which is no other than the instigation or incitement of Nature to such an extraordinary motion of the Body as is at that time chiefly requisite. Afterwards, when grown up, and no longer in their Parents but their own care; when the subjects of labour increase, and self-defence, self-maintenance, search of Food, and Venery, the consequent charge of the young, and other Affairs begin to give them Employment in abundance; then is Ease and Quiet more enjoyed, and love of Rest increased, as Toil and Business increase, and the vigour and eagerness of Youth abates. But where through a corruption of Nature, Sloth and Laziness is engendered: where it is contracted as a Habit that slackens and enervates the Mind, and infeebles, and as it were dissolves the Body; it is not only ruinous of the body's Health, and destructive in the end, or by its consequences; but the immediate feeling of it, and the sensation itself becomes no other than a lingering, drooping Pain and heavy Oppression: it being impossible this way ever to feel (as those who live naturally) either the sprightly joy of vigorous and manly Exercise, or the succeeding Refreshment, and the Pleasures of a natural and wholesome Rest after due Labour and Employment. So that in the room of the Pleasures of a double kind that are thus parted with, there is nothing gained but a dull and heavy feeling more weighty and tiresome than any Labour whatsoever; a sort of languishing Disease prejudicial to all other enjoyments of a vigorous and healthy Sense, and injurious both to the Body and to the Mind: in which latter it is the occasion of worse disturbance, and of a more immediate spreading Corruption; for however the Body may hold out, it is impossible that the Mind in which the Distemper is seated, can escape without an immediate Affliction and Disorder. The Habit begets a tediousness and anxiety which infects the whole Temper, and is the occasion of converting this unnatural Rest into an unhappy sort of activity, such as that of vexatiousness, ill humour, and a preying active Spleen. And in the same manner as in the Body, where no Labour or natural Exercise being used, the Spirits that want their due employment prey upon the Body, and find work for themselves in a destructive way; so in a Mind unexercised, and which languishes and faints for want of due action, the Passions which should have an equal and apt Employment, and be taken up in a settled Application to some sit work and business in Life, being thus cut off from their course of action, find work themselves, and turning inwards, raise disquiet in the Mind, and an eagerness and irritation in the Temper, which becomes loosened towards Passion, is rendered more impotent, more incapable of Moderation, and like prepared fuel, is made apt to take fire by the least spark. Thus therefore by reason of the injuries that this Habit brings both to the Body and to the Mind, and to the Pleasure and real Ease of both; it is plain, That to have this overgreat inclination towards Rest, this slothful, soft or effeminate Temper, averse to Labour and Employment, is to have an unavoidable mischief and attendent plague.  
AS to Interest, how far it is here concerned, how wretched that state is, which by this habit a man is placed in towards all the circumstances and affairs of Life, when at any time he is called to action; how subjected he must be to all inconveniences wanting to himself, and deprived of the assistance of others; whilst being unfit for all offices and duties of Society, he yet of any other person most needs the help of Society, as being least able to assist or support himself; all this is obvious, and need not to be explained.  
THERE remains still one Passion more to speak of, which yet we can scarcely call a self-passion, since the sole end of it is the good and advantage of the Kind. But whereas all other social or natural Affections are joined only with a mental Pleasure, and sounded in a Kindness and Love only; this has more added to it, and is joined with a pleasure of Sense, and a necessity in some degree of indulging the Appetite which is towards it, for the ease and welfare of the Creature. And though the necessity be not absolute here, as in the cases of eating, drinking, rest and sleep; yet to abstain wholly from the use of VENERY (which is that we are speaking of) can hardly be without the sufferance of the Body in some degree: nor can the prejudice to the Constitution be absolutely avoided, without the assistance of Art, and a method and rule of Living, as is observable even in the Female Sex; where notwithstanding the toil and sufferance of breeding and bearing the young, the natural consequences are rather worse to the Constitution from being totally witheld, and never serving to that use and design of Nature, though through so much Labour and Fatigue. Such concern, therefore, and care has Nature shown for the support and maintenance of the several Species, that by an Indigence and a kind of Necessity which we are thus cast in, it is made an immediate Self-interest to us, with respect to our bodily state, to work towards the propagation of our Kind. The Passion therefore which carries us to this service and good to our Species, is made as it were a Self-passion, and is accompanied not only with an affection of kindness and love towards the Female, but with a desire of self-ease, and towards what is of use to the private animal Nature, and a satisfaction and indulgence of Sense.  
NOW whether or no it be the interest and good of the Animal to have this indigence and need beyond a natural and ordinary degree, and to have this Appetite towards Venery more eager, impatient, and more extended than of course it usually is in Nature, where no additional incitement or provocation is used; this is what we may consider.  
HAVING said already so much concerning natural and unnatural Appetite above, there needs less to be said in this place. If it be allowed that to all other Pleasures there is a measure of Appetite belonging, which cannot be exceeded but with prejudice to the Creature, even in his very capacity of enjoying Pleasure: and if to have either a ravenous Appetite, such as is a Disease, and has a peculiar name; or to have that other sort of exorbitant Appetite (no less properly called a Disease) which we see in the Luxurious, be both of them unfortunate, and of prejudice even to the very right enjoyment of the Pleasures derived from those Senses, it will hardly be thought that there is no limit, bound, or certain measure of this other Appetite towards Venery: as if this were independent of Nature, and might extend to Infinite, and still be the occasion of greater and greater Pleasure; which is too great an absurdity to go about to confute. There are other sorts of ardent Sensations and eager Incitements of Flesh, which we accidentally sometimes experience in ourselves, and which are acceptable perhaps whilst in a certain degree; but which as they increase, grow intolerable. Even Laughter provoked by Titillation, grows an excessive pain, though it retains still in a great degree the same features of delight and pleasure. And although in the case of that particular kind of Itch which belongs to a Distemper that has its name from that effect, there are some found so sensually inclined, that they esteem the continual allaying of that Ardour, however eager and fierce, to be acceptable and delightful, yet it would hardly be reputed so amongst the more refined sort, even of those who make sensual Pleasure a study. Now if there be a certain height, a certain pitch or degree of the other Ardour, which by being further advanced, is so much less consistent with the pleasure of that Sensation, and is rather a sort of rage and sury (like that which is raised by certain poisonous Medicaments and Incentives to Lust;) and since there is a necessity of stopping somewhere, and fixing some Boundary, where can that possibly be done but where regard is had to Nature, beyond which there is no measure or rule of things? Now Nature may be known from that which we see of the natural state of Creatures, and of Man, when unprejudiced by unnatural provocation and youthful incitements of a vicious Education. Where it happens that we see any one bred to a natural Life, enured to honest industry and sobriety, and unaccustomed to any thing immoderate or intemperate; it appears always that such a one as this, when at full age, has his desires and inclinations of this sort at command, and no ways inflamed, till by force upon himself, and by giving into debauch and excess, he strains and widens his Appetite to a new and unnatural degree. But if such excesses are never used, the Desires contain themselves in their just limits. But when we reflect upon what is customary to almost all the Youth of human kind, especially of those who are above the labouring sort, and at what early years they are familiarized to the licentiousness of this Passion; when we consider to what Obscenities the ears of our Youth are accustomed; how their Inclinations are vitiated, and every day fed; and what practices are used to urge and precipitate Nature; we need not find it strange that men are so corrupted, and their Appetites so exasperated and inflamed to such a degree beyond all natural temperature. All other Creatures in the world are for their orderliness in this, a reproach to Man; since they, of what kind soever they are, have regular and proportioned Appetites, and have the use of Venery according to fit and proper Seasons and Subjects; whilst Man alone knows neither season, nor bound, nor fitness of Subject, but breaks into all horridness of unnatural and monstrous Lusts, regarding neither Sex nor Species (though of this latter the Instances are less common:) and all this through that inflammation of the Desire and Appetite, which, being swelled beyond a natural size, cannot be answered by plain and natural means. So that neither ought it to be thought strange, if what has been said in relation to that of Meats and Drinks, be said to hold good, and be the same in this: and that although such an abandoned indulgence as this is sure to bring a greater indigence and need on the Body, and fix a greater lust and cravingness in the mind; yet this is so far from resembling natural Appetite (which by being greater, is the occasion still of greater Pleasure) that the more these excessive Desires are thus increased, and the unnatural Appetite fomented, the less is there of a real pleasant Sensation, and the more mixture there is of Alloy. For thus, as we have shown already, a Sensation which seems to hold all of Pleasure, often by a small and almost imperceptible extension runs into Pain, and grows insufferable. So nearly bordering and related are these two things, even so as to be almost confounded with one another, which yet are really so distinct, and in appearance so very contrary. But on the other side therefore, by due abstinence, and more moderate use, the Pleasure spoken of is much clearer, and more enjoyed. So that were both these Sensations to be compared, that of a virtuous Course which belonged to one who lived a natural and regular Life, and that of a vicious Course which belonged to one who was relaxed and dissolute; there is no question but it would be pronounced in favour of the former, without regard to Consequences, and with respect only to the very pleasure of Sense perceived from hence: For it would be found, that a Man thus superior to his Appetites of this kind, had yet no less a share of satisfaction from them in that more sparing use, nor less pleasurable enjoyment in the whole, than he who lived in a manner only in the service of these Appetites, and who indulging the most that could be to this Sense, and seeking a perpetual support in it, had nothing else to do but to force and solicit Nature to the highest degree, and struggle against a perpetual Satiety, and against the heavy and dull intervals of a surfeited Sense, and of a Mind and Body unnaturally held, and as it were benumbed, and drooping in this imprisonment and restraint from other natural Action. As for the other Sex; although there be less of this satiated feeling experienced perhaps in them, yet they having once abandoned themselves, are capable of the same inconstancy and desire of change, as being wearied of the present. But it is enough to say of this Sex, that having once forsaken modesty, and given scope to their Desire and Appetite, beyond a duly restrained temperate and honest way, they grow insatiable and monstrous, and fall into a state which even they themselves, till grown into it, detest and think horrid.  
AS to the Consequences of this Vice with respect to the Body (the health and constitution of which is so much impaired, and so often wholly destroyed by it) there is no need to mention any thing.  
THE Injuries it does to the Mind, though less noticed, are yet in proportion much greater than those which the Body suffers. The prejudice to the Parts and Intellect, the wretched waist of time, the effeminacy, sloth, supiness engendered; the disorder, looseness, and impotence of a thousand Passions, through such a relaxation and enervating of the Mind; all these are the effects of this Vice, and are apparent when but reflected on.  
NOR is it less apparent how much is suffered as to Interest, and to what multiplied Inconveniences he is subject, who is under the power of such a Passion as this. What irregularity of Life, and disturbance of Affairs; what Animosity, War, and Contention must he undergo, who is thus addicted, and who has this temper to such excess, as to be a Rage possessing him, and ruling his Conduct? What trust or dependence is there on one of such a Character and Fame? And how must such a Person stand with respect to Friends, Relations, the public and general Society of Mankind, in an ordinary way of living and conversing? On the other side; how fair and recommending is the contrary character and habit of Virtue and Continence? How advantageous to all Oeconomy, and management of private and public Affairs, in all the duties and offices of Friendship, and of a civil Life? How promotive of Society, and conducing to all ease, prosperity, commodious and happy living?  
THUS have we considered of those which we may call self-Passions; and what the effect is of having them beyond a moderate degree; which when they once exceed, when once grown imperious and high, are the occasion that a Creature is mean and low, are the ground of that which we call selfishness, so much detested in Creatures. Tho yet it be the misfortune of some men, in their way of reasoning upon these Subjects, not to reckon upon such Selfishness as a real ill, or a misfortune, except only so far as it happens to be known and marked, as a just object of people's aversion, and of the contemt and hatred of mankind; not as if in itself it did imply any misery or disease: whereas there can be nothing so miserable in itself, and so wretched in its Consequence, as to be thus impotent in temper, thus mastered by passion, and to serve such a slavery to things of such mean and wretched dependence, and from the contemt of which the greatest satisfaction and self-enjoyment arises, and all generosity and magnanimity depends. It is by such a slavery as this that we lose at last all true Esteem both with ourselves and others; that we lose all Character, Authority and Respect; that we disagree and are at perpetual variance with ourselves as we alternatly serve and submit to these opposite Affections, so inconsistent with one another, and so utterly irreconcilable: and it is by this that we lose even the faculties of our Minds, which can never be so enlarged, and in such a way of improvement towards Knowledge, as in conjunction with Temperance, where there is a constant attention and obedience to Reason practised and established; and where, in the same manner as the Body by good use is fitted to its proper exercise, so the Mind is rendered apt and disposed by right Discipline and Rule to its proper Exercises and Employment.  
BUT besides what we have mentioned of the private Ill and self-Injury of every such self-Passion in particular; all these irregular and vicious Affections have this necessary effect in general, that they are ruinous also of the natural Affections, and by making them give place, by long suppressing and controling them, must at length sink and destroy them. As indeed who is there that knows not, and is not ready to own, that a Creature who is in a way of growing every day more selfish, and of having those Passions still in a higher degree, is in a certain and unfailing way of growing more and more unnatural, unkind, unaffectionate, and more out of all friendly and social Feeling? Who knows not that by the increase of selfishness, and of that subtlety and feignedness of carriage which it brings along with it, the candour and ingenuity of our Natures, the ease and freedom of our Minds must be forfeited; all trust and confidence in others, familiarity, inwardness, and heartinesses with others must be in a manner lost; and suspicions, jealousies, hatred and enmity succeed, and be in the room? Besides, a Creature used to Reflection, who by an ill use of Reason confirms himself in selfishness, and who in a settled manner is come to think it to be his good not to allay or correct, but to indulge and satisfy such Appetites as these, must by certain consequence industriously strive to silence and check his natural and good Affections, those that would carry him to the good of his Kind, and of Society, against the interest which he conceives he has elsewhere and in a contrary way. And this must work to the subversion of all good Affection in him, and to the forming of a profligate, inhuman and savage Nature. Now if these Passions, besides what other ill they are the occasion of, are withal the occasion and means of destroying and loosening the natural Affections; then, by what has been proved before, they must be the certain means of losing us the chief and best enjoyment of Life, and consequently too (as has been proved) of making us to incur those horrid and unnatural Passions, and that savageness of Temper which makes the greatest of Miseries and the most wretched State, as we are going in this next place to make appear.  
SO that we have seen thus, how that by a wrong balance in the Affections of this sort, and BY HAVING THESE SELF-AFFECTIONS TOO INTENSE OR STRONG, A CREATURE IS MISERABLE.  
III. THE Passions that are now left to speak of, are those that carry neither to a public nor a private good, and are founded neither in any advantage to the Species nor to the Self-system: for were there no such Passions as these, what then could be the meaning of THAT UNNATURAL AND BARBAROUS DELIGHT IN BEHOLDING TORMENTS, and in viewing those spectacles of Horror with that satisfaction and joy which is sometimes known, and which has been the reigning Passion of many Tyrants, and barbarous Nations? To see the sufferance of an Enemy with cruel delight, may be from the height of Anger, Revenge, Fear, and other extended Self-passions: but to delight in the torture and pain of other Creatures indifferently, of Slaves, of such as are unknown; to feed upon Death and dying Agonies; this has nothing in it accountable in the way we have been speaking, but is wholly unnatural, as being of a kind of which not the least degree can be said to aim at, or tend to the good or interest of the particular Creature, and much less of the Species, or of Society.  
THERE is another Affection nearly related to this, which is a gay and frolicsom Delight in what is injurious to others; a sort of WANTON MISCHIEVOUSNESS and Pleasure in what is destructive; a Passion which instead of being restrained, is usually encouraged in Children: so that it is no wonder if the effects of it are very unfortunatly felt in the World. For I think it will be hard for any one to give a reason why the same Temper that was wont to delight in disorder and ravage when in a Nursery, should not afterwards find delight in other disturbances and imbroils, and be the author of as much mischief in private Families, amongst Friends, and in the Public. But of this Passion there is no foundation in Nature according to that sense above explained.  
MALICE or ILL-WILL, such as is grounded on no self-consideration, and where there is no subject of Anger or Jealousy, nor nothing to provoke or cause such a desire of doing ill to another; this also is of that kind of Passion.  
ENVY too, when it is such as arises from the Prosperity or Happiness of another Creature no ways interfering with ours, is also of this kind of Passion.  
THERE is also amongst these, a sort of HATRED OF MANKIND AND SOCIETY; a Passion which has been known perfectly reigning in some men, and has had a peculiar 
* Misanthropia.  name given it.  
WE may add likewise to the number of these, all those Passions which are raised from SUPERSTITION (as mentioned before) and from the custom and usage of barbarous Countries; all which are too horrid and odious in themselves to need any proof of their being miserable.  
THERE might be other Passions named, as that of BESTIALITY, and of another sort of perversion of the venereal Appetite within our own Species; which are both of them in the same manner unnatural: of the misfortune of which depravity of Appetite we need not speak, after what has been already said on that subject.  
SUCH as these are the only Passions we can strictly call unnatural, though there are others which are indeed so much beyond the common bend of any Self-passion, that though they may have their foundation thence, and be derived from several of those combined; yet they so exceed all ordinary Appetite of that kind, and are so directly opposite to all natural Affection, that they are called and may be reckoned unnatural and monstrous: for instance, such an ENORMOUS PRIDE or AMBITION, as that which would willingly leave nothing eminent, nothing free, nothing prosperous in the World besides; such an ANGER as would sacrifice every thing to itself; such a REVENGE as is never to be extinguished, nor ever satisfied but with the greatest Cruelties; such an INVETERACY and RANCOUR as seeks, as it were, occasion to exert itself, and lays hold of the least subject, so as often to make the weight of that malevolent Passion fall even upon those who are mere objects of Pity and Compassion. These are in that other sense unnatural: and of these therefore we may speak in conjunction with those others, since they are such as join with those to make up that horrid and monstrous State above described.  
IT may be said here, that these Passions, unnatural as they are, carry still a sort of pleasure with them; and that however barbarous a Pleasure it be, yet still it is a pleasure and satisfaction which is found in that of Pride, of Tyranny, of Revenge, of Malice, or of Cruelty exerted. Now if it be possible in nature, that any one can feel a barbarous or malicious Joy of this sort but as in consequence of the perfectest of Tortures (that of a rancorous and malignant Disposition) then may this perhaps be called Pleasure and Enjoyment, like those pleasures of the Body which depend still upon some preceding uneasiness. But if to love, and to be kind, to have natural Affection, Complacency, goodwill, be in its own nature Happiness; and be as it were original Joy and Delight, as depending on no preceding pain or uneasiness perceptible, and as operating to Pleasure and Joy only; and that on the other side, Hatred, Animosity and Bitterness, be always original Misery and Anguish, always operating to Ill, and never producing any satisfaction, but as that Torture and Inflammation is as it were cooled and respited by something that looks like success in the fulfilling of the horrid desire and monstrous Appetite attending this Affection; then is the barbarous Delight improperly called Satisfaction or Pleasure; or if it must be called so, it is of the same nature in the Mind, as that pleasure in the Body which (as we had occasion to say before) is owing to Racks, Wheels, and other engines of Torture, or to the acutest Diseases which admit of sudden intervals. However strong therefore these Pleasures may be said to be, they do but the more imply the misery of that State which produces them. For as the cruelest bodily pains do by intervals of Assuagement, produce the highest of that sort of bodily Pleasure thence raised; so the fiercest and most raging torments of this sort in a Mind, are those which by certain moments of Relief, afford the greatest of those seeming mental Enjoyments. If those who know but little of this untoward disposition, and who are most easy in their Temper, find themselves however but too sensible of what happens to them in a way of Disgrace or Injury; if even these better Tempers are acquainted with the heavy disturbances which small occasions are apt to give; if they know the weighty pressure of an ill Humour (though such as comes but seldom) and the ill moments that are passed when the Temper is thus unquiet, fretted, or ever so little galled or diseased; if this be in reality so great a sore, and so great a part of thorough Misery; after what rate then must they be miserable who hardly know any better hours in Life, and who for the most part are agitated by a more active Spleen, a closer, bitterer Malignancy and passion of Hatred? How lively must be the sense of every thwarting and controling Accident? How great must be the shocks of Disappointment, the stings of Affront, the gripes and gnawings of a working Antipathy and strong Hatred, at either the real or fancied presence of the Objects that give offence? Nor can it therefore be wondered at, if to such Persons as these who are thus oppressed, thus agitated and wrought, it seems a high and exquisite Delight to appease and allay for the while these furious and rough Motions, by an indulgence of their passion in Mischief and Revenge.  
BUT now are we come to that which is easiest of proof, that which indeed scarce needs an Explanation; for who is there but knows that to hate, to be envious, to be enraged, to carry Bitterness and Malice, is to suffer? This it is which we properly call Displeasure; and to conceive Hatred or Displeasure, is all one as to conceive Pain, Anxiety, Misery. Whosoever has ill meaning, and an inclination or appetite to do hurt, it is through hatred thus conceived, and through brooding passions of this rancorous kind. Now whoever hates, whoever is angry, or feels rancour, is wounded, distressed, aggrieved; this cannot be otherwise in its own nature. So that whoever has ill will, and is carried to the injury, harm or sufferance of others, suffers within himself, and carries a wound within: and where the Passions of this horrid kind are deeply infixed, there the Heart is ulcerated, the Wound kept open and not cured; and the horridest of Tortures are thus made perpetual.  
NOW as to one who has in this manner lost all what we call Nature, and who has these horrid Affections; how such a one as this must stand towards the Society of Mankind, and how he feels himself in it, as conscious of his Affections towards others, and of what the Affections of others must be towards him, this is easily conceived. What enjoyment, or what rest is there for him who is not conscious of the merited Affection or Love of any human Soul; but on the contrary is conscious of merited Hatred, not only from every fellow-Creature, but from every thing in the universal Nature? What ground of horror and despair? what foundation of fear and continual apprehension from Mankind, and from superior Powers, when ever any such are credited, or but suspected? How thorough and deep must that Melancholy be, where there is nothing softening or pleasing from the side of Friendship to allay or divert it when once risen; no flattering view or prospect of that cheerful and reviving sort, not so much as from the fancy or imagination of kindness or affection from any part; but where every thing around is ghastly and horrid, every thing in appearance hostile, and, as it were, bend against a private and single being, who is divided from, and at war with the rest of Nature, in a disagreement and irreconciliation with every thing, and with the Order and Government of the Universe? 'Tis thus at last that a Mind becomes a Wilderness where all is laid waste, every thing fair and goodly removed, and nothing extant but what is dismal and horrid. Now if any thing that but looks like desert, or that feels like banishment or expulsion from human Commerce, be so heavy to bear; what must it be to be thus estranged from Mankind, and to be after this manner in a Desert, and in the horridest of Solitudes, even when in the midst of Society; and to live with Mankind as with a foreign Species, and as with those Creatures that are most remote from Man, and such as he has the most cause to fear? Were we to form a Hell in our Imaginations, we could by nothing so well represent it, as by those Terrors, Despondences, and Horrors which attend this dark state of a Mind revolted from Nature, in no concord or unity with any thing, but every way desperate; viewing its own deformity and disagreement; and as conscious of universal ill merit, so conscious of universally merited hatred, and punishment accordingly due, and ever to be expected from every hand.  
AND thus therefore it appears that the greatest of Miseries is that State which is consequent to the loss of natural Affection; and THAT TO HAVE THOSE HORRID, MONSTROUS, AND UNNATURAL AFFECTIONS, IS TO BE MISERABLE IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE.   

CONCLUSION.  
THUS have we endeavoured to prove what was proposed in the beginning. And since in the common understood sense of Vice and Illness, no one can be vicious or ill, but either,  
1. BY the deficiency or weakness of natural Affections;  
2. OR by the violence of selfish ones;  
3. OR by having those unnatural ones that carry to no end either in the private or public System:  
IT must follow that if each of these are pernicious and destructive to the Creature, insomuch that his completest state of Misery is made from hence; TO BE ILL OR VICIOUS, IS, AND MUST BE EVER, TO BE MISERABLE AND UNHAPPY.  
AND since every vicious Action must more or less in proportion help towards this Mischief and Self-ill, it must follow, THAT EVERY VICIOUS ACTION MUST BE OF SELF-ILL, AND NEVER BUT BE TO THE INJURY AND SUFFERANCE OF THE CREATURE.  
FOR, whatsoever is committed or done, that either goes immediately to the impairing of the unnatural Affections; or to the promoting of the unnatural ones; or to the widening and extending of the self-Passions, by an encouragement of those Lusts which overturn all order of Life, and are as much enemies to the ease and pleasure of the Body, as to that of the Mind; this must ever be esteemed injurious, and against the greatest Interest which a Creature can possibly have. For how can there be an indulgence of those irregular Appetites, without a greater inflammation of them? And how can such an Inflammation work, but to the disorder of the Soul, and to the corrupting of sound and natural Enjoyment, even in a way of Sense, as well as to the corruption of the Affections, the dissolution of the Temper, and the distortion, rack and misery of the Mind? Which way therefore can it be said, that any one thorough self-Interest can act either viciously or unsociably; since to do any thing through an imagination of self-Interest or Pleasure, that is contrary to natural or social Affection, or out of the just limits of natural Appetite and self-Inclination, is and must be of self-Injury, to that degree as has been shown?  
THUS have we computed, in the best manner we were able, the Good and Interest of Mankind, by enumerating and casting up all those Particulars from whence, as by way of Addition or Subtraction, that Sum or general Account of Man's Interest or Happiness in Life, is either swelled or diminished: so that the method here taken may perhaps for this reason be called a sort of Moral Arithmetic, and be said to have an evidence as great as may be found in Numbers, and equal to Mathematical Demonstration. For it seems to us, that there has not been any degree of certainty wanting in what has been said concerning the preferableness of the mental Pleasures to sensual; and even of the sensual ones accompanied with good Affection, and under a temperate and right use, to those sensual ones that are no ways restrained, and are supported by nothing social or affectionate. Nor is that (as we conceive) less just and real, which has been said of the united Structure and Fabric of the Mind, and of those Passions which constitute the Temper or Soul, and on which its happiness or misery so immediately depends. It has been shown, that in this Constitution the impairing of any one part must go to the disorder and ruin of other parts, and of the whole, through the necessary connexion and balance of the Affections; that those very Passions through which men are vicious, are of themselves a Torment and Disease; and that whatsoever is done that is knowingly ill, must be of ill consciousness, and must in proportion, as the Act is ill, impair and corrupt social Affection and Enjoyment, and destroy both the capacity of kind Affection, and the consciousness of meriting any such: so that neither can we in a manner participate thus in Joy or Happiness with others, or receive satisfaction from the expressed kindness and love of others; on which however the greatest of all our Pleasures are founded. If this be so, and that the state which is consequent to this defection, and which immediately succeeds to the loss or ruin of natural Affection and Integrity, be a state of all others the most horrid, oppressive, and miserable; than it will appear, that to yield or consent to any thing ill or immoral, is a breach of Interest, and leads to the greatest Ills: And that on the other side, Every thing that is an improvement of Virtue, and that is establishing to right Affection and Integrity, is an advancement of Interest, and leads to the greatest and most solid happiness and enjoyment of Life.  
THUS the Wisdom of what rules, and is FIRST and CHIEF in Nature, has made it to be according to the private Interest and Good of every Creature, to work towards the general Good; which if that Creature ceases to promote, and to be useful to, he in so far ceases to be kind and useful to himself, and is his own Enemy, as being no longer good to himself than whilst he is such as to be good also to Society, and to that whole of which he is a part. So that VIRTUE, which of all Excellences and Beauties is the chiefest and most amiable; that which is the Prop and Ornament of human Affairs, which upholds Societies, maintains Union, Friendship and Correspondence amongst men; that by which Countries, as well as private Families, flourish and are happy; and for want of which every thing comely, conspicuous, great, and worthy amongst Mankind, must perish and go to ruin; that single Quality, thus glorious in its effects, and of this good to all Society, and to Mankind in general, is, after this manner, equally a Happiness and a Blessing to each Creature in particular possessing it, and is that by which alone Man can be happy, and without which he can never but be miserable.  
AND THUS VIRTUE IS THE GOOD, AND VICE THE ILL OF EVERY ONE.    
THE END.   

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