SOME OBSERVATIONS Concerning the REGULATING OF ELECTIONS FOR PARLIAMENT.   

SOME OBSERVATIONS Concerning the REGULATING OF ELECTIONS FOR PARLIAMENT, FOUND Among the EARL of Shaftsbury's Papers after his Death, and now recommended to the Consideration of this Present Parliament.  
With Allowance.  
LONDON: Printed, and are to be Sold by Randall Tailor near Stationers-Hall. 1689.   

SOME OBSERVATIONS Concerning the REGULATING OF ELECTIONS FOR PARLIAMENT, etc.  
THE Parliament of England is that Supreme and absolute Power, which gives Life and Motion to the English Government. It directs and actuates all its various procedures, as the Parent of our Peace, Defender of our Faith, and Foundation of our Properties; and as the Constitution of this great Spring, and Primum Mobile of Affairs, is in Strength and Beauty, so will also all Acts and Performances which are derived from it, bear a suitable proportion and similitude. For whether the Constituting Members of this Great Body be such, as may give it the denomination of Sanctum, Indoctum or Insanum, (by which Epithets some former Parliaments have been known and distinguished) such will also be, all the Acts and Statutes which are made by them, each naturally wearing the Character and Likeness of that, to which it owes its Being.  
This Great Council bears a date, coevous perhaps with the Originals of our Government, and was Constituted with sufficient prudence and caution, with relation to the Innocence and Ignorance of the Times and People then in being. It was then, that a Deed of three Inches square, was sufficient to convey away twenty good Manors and Lordships. But Subtlety and Cunning having now made some bolder advances into the World, we are forced to alter our Measures, and instead of Inches to take Ells. It seems therefore necessary, as in things of smaller concernment, so most especially in matters of so much greater moment, (as is the settling and fortifying our Parliament,) so to erect its Bulwarks and Rampires, that the most vigorous Attacks of Fraud and Corruption may make no Breaches or Inroads upon it. It is here, our care and diligence ought to be applied with the greatest exactness; for as our Laws and Government are Established, we can derive our Happiness or Misery from no other Source. It is from the Fruit of this Great Council that we must expect our Nutriment, and from its Branches our Protection; I hope therefore it may not seem over Officious, if with the skilful Gardener, I do open and expose the Roots of this great Tree of the Commonwealth, with an intent that every Branch and Fiber may with the greater ease and conveniency, be so trimmed and laid, that no Defects or Redundancies may continue; But that every individual of this Great Body, may happily conspire to produce that Peace and Tranquillity in the Nation, which may be expected from their Counsels, and a well constituted Government.  
It seems then reasonable to believe, That the Privilege of sending Representatives to Parliament, (though grounded upon a Natural and Fundamental Right in the People) was at first immediately derived from the King; for that, where Histories and Records begin to transmit memorials to succeeding Ages, we find him sending his Writs, directed to such Persons, Towns, or Vills, which he thought most considerable within the Kingdom, by virtue of which Writs, Elections were accordingly made, and Representatives returned to Parliament. That the King's Prerogative does still extend to grant this Franchise, to such other Towns or Villages as he shall think fit, I cannot affirm, because some 
(a) pryn's Register of Parliament Writs, 1. Part, f. 238. b.  Learned in the Law assure us it cannot legally be done, but by Act of Parliament. But others are again of a contrary opinion, as was adjudged in the Case of 
(b) Hob. Rep. f. 14.  Duncannon and 
(c) Journal of the Commons House.  Newark. It is certain, that Parliamentary matters were never settled otherwise than by Act of Parliament, as appears by several 
(d) 5. R. 2. c. 4. 1. H. 5. c. 1. 23. H. 6. c. 15.  Statutes in such Cases made, and we also find the privilege of sending Members to Parliament, given to several places by 
(e) 27. H. 8. c. 26. 34. H. 8. c. 13. 35. H. 8. c. 11.  Act of Parliament, which had been unnecessary, could the King alone have granted it by any other Method. It is moreover a thing of very dangerous Consequence, to have such a Power lodged in the King alone; for than he might thereby infranchise what number of Vills he pleases, and by the same power place the Election of their Representatives in a select Number, such as he should always have the power to direct and appoint; which would be in effect to choose his own Parliament, and thereby to Make or Repeal what Laws he pleases. Wherefore I conceive this Point ought now to be so settled, as for the future to obviate all such inconveniencies which might otherwise ensue.  
Another thing, which also requires the care of this Great Council, is to limit and restrain the exorbitancies of a Quo Warranto so, that the Electing Burroughs may have their privileges and immunities secured, from the Judgement of a Corrupt Judge, who derives his Being, and holds his Judicial Breath only ad voluntatem Domini. If this Grievance be not obviated by some good Law, a King may as well destroy all the old Burroughs, as erect new ones, to the inevitable overthrow of our Laws and Government.  
In the next place I conceive it may become the Prudence of this Parliament (from which we may expect the Foundations of our Happiness will be so laid, as to become impregnable against all the future Assaults of an invading Tyranny) to look into the Constitutions, and Customs of such Burroughs which have right to Elect, and which in several particulars, seems to require a touch of the Supreme Authority to set them Right. The first inconvenience they labour under, is the variety of their respective Titles; some claiming to Elect by Prescription, others by Grant; some again by a select Number, others by the Populacy; some by the Magistrate and Burgesses, others by the Magistrate, Burgesses and Freemen, others again by the Magistrate, Burgesses, Freemen, and Commonalty, and some also in respect of their ancient Burrow Houses only; the rest of the Town, which is the much more considerable part, being excluded. The Grievance which grows from this difference of Title in several Burroughs, is often ambiguity and uncertainty of Title in the same Burrow; for sometimes the select Number contends with the Community, one Burrough House with another, etc. And from hence it is, that we have usually so many Petitioners in each Parliament, the Magistrate not knowing which of right aught to be Returned. Nor can a Committee of Elections ever settle their respective Titles, by a final determinative Judgement; for we find it often giving an Opinion upon one and the same Title, and in the same Burrow, differently, as favour and power can make the stronger interest. All this may be remedied by an Act, which should give one and the same new Title to all the Electing Burroughs in England and Wales, by which alone, they should all for the future, claim to send Members to Parliament; thereby settling the Electing power in such persons, (whether they be a select Number, or the whole Populace,) as in prudence should be thought most convenient.  
The design of choosing the Members of Parliament by the People, was, that no Laws should be made, no moneys raised, nor any Course pursued, by those who sit at the Helm, but with the Steerage and Direction of the People, by their Representatives. Now by all the Laws and Rules of Representation, no Town, City, or Body of People, can be represented without a Vote in the Choice of their Representative. That the Parliament as now Constituted, is no equal Representative of the People, is notorious; in that several Burroughs, so inconsiderable, that they contain not above three or four Houses, send each of them two Representatives to Parliament, whilst others (which contain an hundred times their Number of Houses, People, Trade and Wealth) have no Representative at all in the management of Public Affairs. So also the County of Cornwall sends no less than forty three Members to Parliament, whilst the City, and whole County of Chester sends but four, and the twelve Counties of Wales but twenty four amongst them all.  
From this inequality of Representation it follows, that Acts are often made which redound to the prejudice of the whole Body of the People, merely to advance the Gain and Advantage of some particular places; as was that which Prohibited the Importation of Irish Cattle, being carried principally by the supernumerary Votes of some Counties, which have more Electing Burroughs, than upon a just and equal Devidend, do fall to their share; and these being generally of a dry and barren Soil are thereby chiefly adapted to the breeding of Cattle; which benefit would have been diminished by an inlet of Beasts from Ireland. This inconvenience may be easily removed by depriving Towns of less note of this Franchise, and bestowing it upon others of greater Consideration in the same, or in other Counties, which most want it, as do those of Cambridge, Bedford, Hartford, Huntingdon, etc.  
Where the Electing Right is committed to a select Number, I think it were desirable, that the Electors should be chose annually, and not be Tenants for Life in their Electorate; this would in a great degree prevent preengagements, and corruption, which often happens where a power by long continuance in one person, is apt to stagnate and putrify.  
The great number of Electors in Popular Burroughs, and in choosing Knights of the Shire, requires to be regulated and limited, and the power of Election to be fixed in the Optimacy only. My Reasons for this are, that amongst the Electing Crowd, the Majority is generally of a mean and abject Fortune in the World, and thereby subject not only to disorders and quarrels, but to be misguided also by their ignorance, and total want of that discerning faculty, which Electors in such weighty concerns aught to have: they are moreover under the temptation of being Corrupted and Seduced by the inveiglements of a little Money, or a Pot of Ale: whilst those whose Circumstances are more enlarged, have their thoughts so likewise, being thereby raised beyond such low allurements, and rendered more careful how, and into whose Hands they dispose of this great Trust, the breach whereof might at once Rob and deprive them of that their substance, which has been the acquisition perhaps of some Ages. It was for these and several other Reasons mentioned in the Preamble, that by the Statute of the 8. of H. 6. c. 7. it was enacted that no Knight of the Shire should be chose by any, who had not a Freehold of the clear yearly value of 40 s. per annum, which was then as much in value as 40 l. per annum is now, or has been, since the finding out of the American Treasure, and the enlargement of our Trade. And I think it but reasonable that as the value of Money falls, so the Wealth of the Electors should rise, and that Electing Votes in the County should again be limited to such only, who now have Lands and Tenements to that value, which 40 s. per annum bore in those times when this Act was made. If this particular were thus regulated, the numbers at the County Elections would be reduced, probably to a fourth part of what they now are, and thereby the unreasonable expense in entertaining so great a Crowd, and the great dangers which may accrue from such an ungovernable Multitude, would be in a great degree avoided and prevented.  
As the Persons Electing aught to be Men of Substance, so in a proportioned degree ought also the Members Elected. It is not safe to make over the Estates of the People in Trust, to Men who have none of their own, left their Domestic Indigencies, in Conjunction with a Foreign Temptation, should warp them to a contrary Interest, which in former Parliaments we have sometimes felt to our sorrow. Wealth and Substance will also give a Lustre and Reputation to our great Council, and a security to the People; for their Estates are then pawned, as so many Pledges for their good behaviour, becoming thereby equal sharers themselves in the benefit or disadvantage which shall result from their own Acts and Councils.  
Thus a good Estate may be a good security to engage Faith and Honesty; but he who sits at the Helm of Government, ought not only to be a Graduate in Fortune, but in Prudence and Experience also. To me it seems extremely irregular, to see the unfledged Youth make his first advances into the World, in the quality of a Burgess for Parliament, chosen upon no other account but because it was his Fortune, by his Father's early death, to become the Landlord of a Neighbouring Burrow, or is perhaps its best Customer, deriving from thence the necessaries of a numerous Family. Forty years (whereof twenty five are generally spent in Childhood and vanity) seem to be few enough to entitle any one to the Grandeur and Gravity of an English Senator, and why so many, who seem by their greenness to be as yet but a Novelty to the World, should be admitted a place in this Great Council, whilst those of greater Age, Wisdom, and Experience must be excluded, I do not understand.  
By the 1. H. 5. ch. 1. It is Enacted that every Knight of the Shire should be chosen out of such who are Resident in the County, and every Citizen and Burgess, from amongst the Citizens and Burgesses of the Cities and Burroughs Electing. How far this Act ought to be observed, will be worth consideration; for a confinement in this Case, seems to be an abridgement of a free Choice, and it often happens, that Men of the greatest Knowledge and Experience in the Affairs of the Kingdom, have their Abode principally in the Metropolis, especially such of the long Robe, who by their Profession are obliged to it. But the Non observance of this Act on the other side, has been often the occasion that Courtiers have bolted into Country Burroughs, and by the strength of their Purse, and liberal Baits, have so seduced these poor Rural Animals, as to obtain an Election from them, though to the ruin and overthrow of their own Laws and Liberties. The choosing of such Men to serve in Parliament, might probably be obviated, by an Act, Prohibiting the Expense of any Money by Treats or otherwise, in order to be Elected, it being only to these indirect Methods, that such persons usually owe their success.  
But when all is done, it will be found difficult (though with the greatest Art) to bring an old irregular Structure into a convenient Uniformity, otherwise than by razing it to the Ground, and erecting a new Pile by some better contrived design. For although all the defects and irregularities in the Election of Members for Parliament beforementioned, should be removed and altered, yet there still remains something in the very Constitution of this part of our Government, which is not so agreeable to a curious thought. A True and Perfect Model to build by, is what I dare not pretend to give, yet that which follows may afford some hints and Assistance to a better Fancy and Judgement.  
In respect then, that every individual Person in the Nation, has a Natural Right to Vote in this Great Council; but this being impracticable, they are forced to do it by proxy (that is) by devolving this Right upon certain Common Representatives indifferently chosen, for certain Select Numbers and Communities of Men, in which the whole Body of the People is, or aught to be comprehended; And whereas, every Pater-Familias, or Housekeeper, is a Natural Prince, and is invested with an Absolute Power over his Family, and has by necessary Consequence, the Votes of all his Family, Man, Woman, and Child included in his; Let then the Sheriff's Precepts be directed to every Parish within his County, which the next Sunday following the Receipt thereof, may be publicly Read after the Forenoon Sermon in Church; Thereby giving notice to all the House keepers in the Parish, to meet at a convenient place, and certain hour the day following, in order to choose an Elector for the County. Let also the Churchwardens of each Parish prepare a List of eight or ten of the most eminent Persons for Wealth, Gravity, and Wisdom in their Parish; this List to be brought the next day to the place of Election, to this purpose, that every Housekeeper do, by a dot with a Pen, adjoined to the person's name whom he inclines to Elect, declare his Choice; and that by the plurality of dots, the Elector be returned by the Churchwardens to the Sheriff. This done in each Parish, let the Sheriff prepare a List in the same manner, of the names of all the Gentry in the County, who are each worth in Lands and moveables at least 10000 l. all Debts paid, and not under forty years of Age; which being in readiness, let all the Representatives of Parishes, chosen as aforesaid, repair to the County Town the very next day after the Parish Election is over, and there proceed to Elect out of the Sheriffs List, seven, nine, or eleven Members to serve in Parliament, or so many as upon a just Dividend, shall be thought expedient to complete the Number of Members, which are to Act in this great Council.  
Before the Electors proceed to choose for the County, it might probably be convenient to Administer an Oath to this purpose, That their Vote is no way pre-engaged, and that they will choose, without Favour or Affection, such Members as in their Conscience they do believe most fit to serve in Parliament. And that to the Members Elected, upon their admission to the House, this Oath, together with the others in use, be Administered, viz. That they are worth 10000 l. all their Debts paid, and that directly, or indirectly they did not expend any Money, or Gratuity whatsoever, in order to their Election, and that they neither have, nor will receive any Gratuity whatsoever, upon the account of their Vote in Parliament, but that they will in all Matters that shall come before them, act uprightly according to their Conscience and Understanding, without any private Design, Favour, or Affection to any.  
That, to prevent the inconveniences of Fear and Favour in Electing, the Method be such, that none may know on whom the Electors Votes were conferred; and it may be thus performed. Suppose a Room with two opposite Doors, and a Table in the middle, on which the List shall be spread. All the Electors being at one Door, let them go in one by one, each Writing down his dots, and going out of the Room at the other Door before another comes in; or if this may prove tedious, it is only placing more Tables in the Room with every one a List on it, and so many may then be admitted in at once, as there are Lists, which will make greater dispatch, and yet no discovery, in that every List is upon a separate Table. To prevent also all fraud and indirect practice, it will be convenient that the Officers concerned in the Elections, both in Parishes, and in the County, be upon their Oaths. It is also fit that a limited allowance be made for the expense of the day, which is to be in Parishes, at the Parish Charge, and in the County Town, at the Charge of the County.  
If any Controversy arise about Elections, either in the Parishes or Counties, (which in this Method can scarcely be supposed) it may be decided by the Votes of the remaining Persons upon the List, who pretend to no Election. If several Persons happen to have an equal number of Votes, it shall be determined by Lott. If any Person from any part of England, shall send his Name to any particular County, to be inserted in their List, as a Person qualified to serve in Parliament; it may be done; but none to stand Candidate, in more than one List at a time, lest he should be chosen in both Counties, and to occasion the trouble of a new Election. That the same List of Candidates shall continue till the dissolution of the Parliament, if it fits not above three Years; and upon the intermedial death or removal of any of the Members for the County, than he who had the next Majority of Votes upon the List, to succeed in his place, without further trouble or charge of Election.  
By this Method the Parliament will be a perfect Representative of the whole Body of the People, and also of every numerical Person in the Kingdom. Here can be no partial (and consequently prejudicial) Acts made by separate Interests and Factions: None will sit in this Great Council but Men of Gravity, Wisdom, Integrity and Substance; No pensionary Members; no unfair Elections; no foul Returns; no Petitioners kept in Attendance till a Dissolution; no Quo Warrantoes to destroy the natural fundamental Rights of the People; no room for Corruption, Bribery and Debauchery, either in the Electors or the Members elected; no Patrimonies wasted in the Extravagancies of an Election; No Bankrupts shrouding themselves under the shelter of a Parliamentary Privilege; No unruly Rabbles, Tumults, Factions and Disorders in Election, amongst the Commonalty; No Heats and Animosities amongst the Gentry, often caused by their violent Competitions: But all will be managed with that evenness, Justice and Temper, that nothing can more effectually conduce to the securing of our Liberties and Properties, the Grandieur of our Government, and the Honour of our Nation, than such an Establishment.  
FINIS.   

An Advertisement.  
THere is lately Published by Randal Taylor the Proceedings of the present Parliament, justified by the Opinion of the most Judicious and Learned Hugo Grotious, with Considerations thereupon; Written for the satisfaction of some of the Reverend Clergy, and others, who seem to labour under some Scruples concerning the Original Right of Kings, their Abdication of Empire, and the People's inseparable Right of Resistance, Deposing, and of Disposing, and Settling of the Succession to the Crown.