A short DISCOURSE Concerning the INVASION OF FRANCE, BY THE German Army Upon the RHINE.  
THE success of our Army upon the Upper Rhine, is of Infinite Concernment to the Confederates. For if it make a good Impression, it may at once turn the Fortune of the War. But here lies the Difficulty, that the French, having that whole River from switzerland down to Philipsburg, will be at their old play: that is, while We are acting on this side the River, they will slip over into Germany, and make havoc there. which will break all our Measures.  
There are two Remedies for this Evil.  
THE FIRST REMEDY is; To attack some place, not on this side the Rhine, but upon the Rhine. That so the Besiegers may cover Germany the while: being near at hand to march after the Enemy, in case of an Incursion. If there be Necessity, or if there be a fair Opportunity to destroy them, we may quit the Siege, and march after them with our whole Army. Otherwise we may leave some Foot to continue the Siege; and March with the rest, and with all the Horse and Dragoons.  
The Places which the French have upon this River( to begin with the lowermost) are these; Philipsburg, Fort-Louis, Strasburg, Brisach, and Huningen. As for Friburg, which is their only Place beyond the Rhine, it will be hard to take, and will not signify much when it is taken. For it is but a dozen English Miles( as I take it) from Brisach: So that Brisach would Command almost as far without it, as now it doth with it.  
Of these Places upon the River, Strasburg I doubt is too great and too strong to be attacked: and Brisach and Huningen seem too much out of the way. But Fort-Louis and Philipsburg stand fair for us: and Philipsburg the fairer of the two. To the Siege whereof all Necessaries( and particularly Boats for Bridges) may be carried by Water: that is, down the Neckar from heidelberg to Manheim, and from thence up the Rhine to Philipsburg. And by taking this Place we should clear a good Country on the German side of the Rhine; and on the French side command far and wide, and open a way into Alsatia. In short, Philipsburg plainly lies the first in course; and if it could be had with a Wish, we should Wish for it in the first place. But if the gaining it will be exceeding difficult, and Fort Louis may be had much easier; we must then pass by Philipsburg, and fall upon Fort Louis. which indeed consists of three Forts; one on each side the River, and the main one in the midst within an iceland. The Boats for Bridges may be taken up below Philipsburg; and being carried two or three miles over land, may be put again into the River above. which thing while 'tis doing our Army may be Bombarding the Town. Or these Boats, as all other Necessaries, may be carried directly by Land from heidelberg: the distance from thence to Fort Louis being not above twenty of our Miles. It must be granted, that our having Fort Louis will not clear or cover any part of Germany: But it will terribly annoy the French Quarters; and plainly dismember Alsatia, which is now entirely Theirs. Also this Place lies very commodiously to carry on the War further; that is, to carry it into lorraine, and so into France.  
But if both Philipsburg and Fort Louis, which are exceeding strong, be likewise so furnished and provided, as not to be taken but by hard and long Sieges; we must pass them both by, we must not meddle with them. We must not imitate the late Duke of lorraine; whose hard Fate or great Fault it was, always to attack those Places that were best provided. which made all his Archievments so extremely difficult to him. Never any man did so little, with so many and so great Advantages in Force.  
We see therefore that the first Remedy( I mean that already proposed) will in this case fail us. For we cannot reasonably attack some Place upon the Rhine, if there be no Place upon it proper to attack. We must therefore of necessity employ ourselves on this side the River: that is, on the West or French side. And then the second Remedy may stand us in some stead, which I am now to propose. THE SECOND REMEDY against the Evil before mentioned, that is, against the Incursions of the French, is this; That we should have two Armies, one to Observe and Confront the Enemy, and the other to carry on Sieges. But it is of great Concernment, that this Observing Army should be rightly Posted. For except it be so, it will signify nothing. If it be Posted on this side the Rhine: the French will make their Courses into Germany at their pleasure: if on the other side, they will easily disturb our Sieges. It follows therefore that this Army must be Posted upon the Rhine: with a Bridge over it, thereby to Command both sides. By which means ▪ they will Cover the Country on the one side, and the Sieges on the other.  
A Bridge therefore upon the Rhine, well fortified, is the Ground work and Foundation of this whole Affair. But where and in what part of the River must this Bridge be? Had this Question been asked last year, or the year before, I must have answered that Manheim should be the Place: where also the Germans passed the Rhine those two Years. This Town stood( for it is now demolished and ruined) upon a Tongue of Land, at the Con●●uence of the Rhine and Neckar: being one of the best situations in Germany. And tho in those former years, the Germans were not strong enough to undertake great Sieges, yet they might easily have fortified Ma●heim: which had been a mighty advantage to them. For whereas before they had the Rhine up to Mentz, they would then have had it up to Manheim: which is near forty Miles higher. And the Place would plentifully have been supplied, from Mentz up the Rhine. and down the Neckar from heidelberg. Also the Contributions out of the French Quarters would have maintained a great Garrison: which the greater it had been, the farther it had Commanded. The French Garrisons of Philipsburg and Landau, being the while ●●rewdly kerbed by this rampant Garrison at Manheim. The neglecting therefore of this Place was then a very great Oversight: tho I impu●e it, not to want of judgement, but to more Slothfulness.  
But now, since the German Army will be much greater then it hath been in former Years, it seems more advisable that they throw over their Bridge between Philipsburg and Strasburg: and the nearer Strasburg, the better. For they will there be in the middle of their work; and will be more ready, to cover both the Sieges and the Country. Let not this Enterprise be thought either impossible or extremely difficult. For we may well remember; that the Duke of Bavaria, having his Boats with him upon Land-Carriages, quickly passed the Save in the face of the Turkish Army. And I think that River is as bog at Belgrade, as the Rhine is at Strasburg.  
When we have here laid our Bridge, and covered it at each End with good entrenchments, we shall be in a dreadful posture to push on the War. And we may keep most of the Horse, with some Foot, to confront the French Army: while a great part of the Foot, with some Horse, go to work with their Garrisons, and may have their Wills at them. I hope they will not engage upon any difficult Siege: and since all Places cannot be provided alike, I hope they will fall upon those that are worst provided.  
If the French Army Post themselves towards Strasburg( as 'tis most likely they will); Our Besiegers may then attack Fort Louis, if the thing be found feasible. But they must be sure not to spend too much time about it, which is now very precious. In case we attack and gain this Place, our new made Bridge will become unnecessary: in regard Fort Louis will secure the Passage of the River, and our Observing Army may be there Posted. So that we may take the Bridge in sunder, and slight the entrenchments. But in case we do not take Fort Louis, we must with care continue the Bridge, and make the entrenchments substantial and complete.  
If it may conveniently be done, we should be at some Cost and Labour in Bombarding Strasburg. I am loth to advice the ruin of so famous a City. But they have brought it upon themselves, by their base submission to the French. Were this City soundly bombarded and destroyed, 'tis verily thought the French would quit it. They would not be willing to spare so many Men, in a time when they are like so much to want them, to keep a heap of Rubbish. Their Garrison there is twelve or fifteen thousand Men. and there is the governor of the City, the governor of the Ci●adel, the governor of the Fort of Kiel, and the Governours of three or four other Forts. All which Forts would look very simply, if the City in the midst of them were destroyed. Wherefore as the French King said some years since, that he must have Strasburg; so We may say now, that we must destroy it.  
But as it hath been said before, we must not spend too much time in these Matters. For the principal work of our Besieging Army is to March directly for lorraine. And if the French March after them, our Observing Army will closely follow the French. Upon the very Edge of lorraine towards Alsatia, we shall find Phalsburg; and Sarburg a little further. about ten miles from each other, and Phalsburg about thirty miles from the Rhine. They are ordinary French Garrisons, and such as I desire we should deal with. For as Tully wishes that the Readers of some of his Books, should not be learned, nor yet downright unlearned: So I wish that the Places we attack, may be neither very strong nor very weak. If they are very strong, they are hard to be gotten; and if they are very weak, they are easily lost. The middling sort, as long as we are Masters of the Field, are as good as the best. But if there should be none of this middling sort, we should be better employed in fortifying weak Places, then in taking those that are very strong, and well furnished. The Places of all others most for our turn, are strong Places weakly manned, or otherwise ill provided. Such Places we shall meet with if we March into the Country: for they cannot then fully provide for all their strong Places.  
As matters stand, it is our Business to rush into the Country, and s●atter the War. Which would put the French upon such a guard, as would quiter drink up their Field Army. I confess this would take up a great many Men on our side likewise. But Germany would supply us plentifully with them, if we could but find means to maintain them. Also we may rely upon it, that the Country would come in; if they saw a Man amongst them, that went about his business like a Workman. Prince Lewis of Baden, if he be the Commander, knows well how to manage this Game. He is a General that dares March into the Enemies Country Such another Run as he had about Nissa, when he had not half the Numbers he will have now, would( at this Juncture) break the French Tyranny to pieces.  
If we did nothing else but secure a passage over the Rhine, and take some Place in lorraine, it would be a good progress: and it would make the French extremely uneasy. But this is but a step to further Advantages. Two more such steps would bring us to the Moselle, and another step would carry us into France. Tho Alsace and lorraine may also now be accounted France, being in a settled Subjection to the French.  
To conclude; If we have a Bridge upon the Rhine near Strasburg, we cannot well miscarry: but if we have it not, I doubt we shall be as basely baffled, as hitherto we have been. Or perhaps we may have one of the Duke of Lorrains fortunate Campagnes: that is, With a mighty Army which might have subdued whole Countries, we may take one strong Town; after a long, chargeable, laborious, and bloody Siege, Our having a Bridge near Strasburg will not hinder, but that we may have another at Manheim. which Place may be fortifying before the Armies can take the Field. But we must advance to further Conquests from the Bridge near Strasburg. For if we should do it from Manheim, 'tis doubt Germany would be too much exposed.  
I have pleased myself with the Thoughts of these Matters; and now I communicate them, to please Others.  
If the glorious Prince of Baden Command upon the Rhine, he will do much better, then either I or any man else can advice him.  
There are two Things which raise Peoples Expectations, and upon which( at this time) they chiefly ground their Hopes: and those are, the Descent from England, and this Invasion from Germany.  
FINIS.   

London, Printed by BENJ. mot, and Published by Randal tailor, near Stationers-hall, 1693.