THE DEAF and DUMB MAN'S DISCOURSE. OR A Treatise concerning those that are Born DEAF and DUMB, containing a Discovery of their KNOWLEDGE or UNDERSTANDING; as also the Method they use, to manifest the sentiments of their Mind. Together with An Additional Tract of the REASON and SPEECH of Inanimate Creatures. By GEO. SIBSCOTA.  
LONDON, Printed by H. Bruges, for William Crook at the green Dragon without Temple-Bar. 1670.   

A DISCOURSE Concerning those that are born DEAF and DUMB, And of their KNOWLEDGE.  
1. SUch is the calamity of Mortals in this state of misery, that they are invaded on all sides not only when they are born, by a vast army of Diseases, but are also troubled with many distempers whilst the Womb is their Lodging; there we often meet with the precursory messengers of Death even in the very beginning of Life; and whilst the formative faculty is framing this machine of our immortal Souls, some deformity, some irregularity in the structure, or other preternatural disposition obstructing the exercise of the parts immediately intermixeth itself with our birth. Which enormity of the parts, or constitution repugnant to the Laws of Nature, prejudicing the operations, and contracted at our Birth, some have been so scrupulous as to think that it ought not to be called by the name of a Disease, but of a Defect, reserving the name of Disease for the defects of that which was once perfect.  
2. And as this kind of defect is found to be in many members of man's body; so it most frequently happens to the sense of Hearing: Which was Aristotle's Observation long ago, who therefore in the first of his Problems, Sect. 11. moves this very question; Why the Hearing, of all Senses should be most prejudiced from our Nativity? And submits it to Consideration, whether this may not be the reason or cause of it, because the Hearing and Voice seem to be derived from the same principle: For Speech (saith he) which is a kind of Voice, may easily be depraved, and not without great difficulty restored to its perfection; a sign whereof is, that we continue mute for some time after we are born (for in our Infancy we cannot speak at all) then at length we begin to stammer; since therefore Speech may be easily perverted, and that the principle of Hearing and Speaking is the same (for, saith he, 'tis the Voice that is the primordium of Hearing) it follows consequently, that, that Hearing, of all the Senses is soon corrupted, as it were per accidens, not per se. We may (saith he) lay this down as au Argument taken even from other Creatures, that the principle of Speech may be easily destroyed; for no other Creature can speak; but Man solely is endued with this faculty; yet he (as is prementioned) is a long while, before he begins to speak.  
3. We will propose to ourselves three things to be throughly weighed in reference to this consideration of Aristotle. First, the reason itself, by which he maintains, that the Sense of Hearing may be easily injured from the very Birth above all the rest of the Senses; because, the principle of Speaking or of articulate speech may be easily prejudiced, the principle of Hearing being the same; and therefore Hearing may be injured from the Birth not per se, but as it were per accidens. viz: by reason the common principle of Speech and Hearing may be hurt. Secondly, we will take into our Consideration, that which follows by consequence from that very reason; to wit, that the Hearing is never damnified from the Birth, unless Speaking, or the articulate enunciation of the Voice be so likewise: because there is a certain common principle belonging to the Speech, as well as Hearing, which being injured, it necessarily follows that both of them must be prejudiced. This consequence was so certain in the opinion of Aristotle, that in his fourth Book of the History of Animals, chap. 9 he ingeniously pronounceth, That they who are born Deaf, are also Dumb; and for that reason they may make use of a Voice, but not of Speech. Thirdly, we will subjoin and inquire into their Understanding that are born Deaf, as also the way and manner of their Knowledge. Fourthly and lastly, we will Contemplate a little upon the reason, and discourse of brute Animals.  

SECTION I. Why is Hearing, of all Senses soon prejudiced.  
4. AS to the first, Aristotle lays down a certain common principle of Hearing and Speech: But doth not sufficiently declare what, or what kind of thing that is: Indeed he affirms that Voice is the principle of Hearing, as well as of Speaking, and withal saith, that the Hearing and Speaking seem to proceed from one and the same Principle. And truly the Voice is the material principle of Speech, as far as the articulate speech is framed by the Voice; as if the same Voice were the principle by which the Hearing is stirred up to the act, or the Hearing had an actual being by means of the Voice, as Peter Apponensis explains the meaning of Aristotle.  
5. But this principle will not effect our Design, for this question will remain unsolved, why, where there is a Voice in Deaf men, yet there is no Hearing? and where those that are mute can frame a Voice? or brute Animals themselves, yet they cannot speak by virtue of that common Principle? And wherefore since Infants can hear, should they not also be able to speak by the assistance of that common Principle? For the particular cause, either of the obstruction of Hearing, or impediment or depravation of Speaking, is on either hand to be sought in the organs: the irregularity whereof, the vitiated conformation, or solution of the continuum, or the convenient influx of the animal spirits being impeded by any defect of the organ: obstructs the operation thereof. But we will see in our following Discourse, whether there may not probably be some other principle found out, that depends upon the mutual conjunction of the nerves.  
6. But the reason why Newborn Babes can hear, but not presently speak, or pronounce articulate words, is, because there is more required to the framing of speech, or speaking, than to the reception of a sound, or hearing. For, the Hearing is merely passive, and the Sound arriving at the organ of Hearing (which is the very auditory Nerve, expanded to the internal parts of the windings of the Auditorium; presuppossing a convenient disposition of the outward, as well as inward parts of the Ear) a Sound is immediately represented: but 'tis not the same when a Voice is uttered, the Speech is not immediately framed, or Discourse raised, nor doth it merely consist in passion.  
7. Brute Animals that have Lungs and the Aspera Arteria, are able to utter a Voice, otherwise than those other Creatures, that only make a Sound or noise; but yet they cannot therefore speak.  
The Dolphin, saith Aristotle, in the 4 th'. Book of the History of Animals c. 9 hath Lung and the Artery, and therefore can utter somewhat of a Voice, but yet hath not a free and voluble Tongue, nor Lips by which it might frame any articulate voice; therefore it only makes a noise and muttering.  
8. But those that have Lips and a greater liberty of the Tongue, so as to be able to frame some one articulate Word (as Sheep do the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Oxen and Cows 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc.) yet they cannot frame their Voice to several articulate words; for all Brutes want that aptitude of the organs, by which articulate words are made and form; though there are some brute Animals that do imitate the words and voice of Man: Of which hereafter.  
9 But Infants and Children, though they have that aptitude of organs naturally, by which an articulate Voice may be pronounced, yet the use of those organs is not then made so familiar to them, as truly to frame words: for there must be exercise, and from thence a habit contracted to speak easily and readily; just as when a man in time hath gained a habit, he sweetly plays upon a musical Instrument  
10. Besides, the organs of Infants are then but infirm, and by degrees arrive to perfection. when Nature, or the innate heat by little and little consumes the superfluous moisture. And so Aristotle in his last forequoted place is in the right, where he saith, that as Children cannot rule and govern their Limbs, so their first impotency and imperfection appears in the Tongue, and 'tis long before they are freed from it; which is the reason that for the most part they stammer, and speak with difficulty. And hence it is that Infants cannot properly be said to be mute, because there is no privation, but in a subject that is capable of the habit, yet they may properly be said to be born Dumb, whose organs are so disposed from their Nativity, as that they have an ineptitude to speech when grown in years.  
11. But this property of the organs, as the Tongue, Palate, Lips, Teeth and Throat, is only bestowed on Man to the end that he may get a habit of speaking any thing. Though herein also is great variety by reason of the Countries and Kingdoms, insomuch that all men have not a ready pronunciation of all Letters in use with other Nations: Thus the guttural Letters are appropriated to the Eastern people; and among them another, though no guttural letter called Dad (which is pronounced like ddsh) is so peculiar to the Arabians, that they can distinguish any foreign Nation from their own, by the pronunciation thereof; though they converse with them never so long, and the Arabians are meant by those that pronounce this Letter exactly, as when they say that Mahumed was the most Eloquent of all that pronounce the letter Dad, that is, of the Arabians. The same is every where obvious in the European Tongues: for, it is a matter of difficulty for the French to pronounce the Germane G, which is pronounced like the pointed Kef of the Persians or Turks; hence it is that they cannot without difficuty pronounce the Germane monosyllable Tangle: and so in the reft.  
12. As to the reason or cause why the Hearing of all the Senses is soon prejudiced from the Birth, that cannot by any means be referred to any common principle of Hearing and Speaking; because such a principle cannot be judged a sufficient principle of Hearing only, or it conferrs no otherways to the hearing then objective; in regard that at least it cannot possibly fall under the notion of the efficient cause, by which there is any perception of the Voice; therefore there must be some other reason or cause found out of the thing in question, if we hold it simply true, that the Hearing is soon injured from the Nativity.  
13. But the genuine reason of the thing must be found in the winding and truly labyrinthean structure of the inward part of the Ear, which may be soon perverted or obstructed; into which the more tender Nerve hath a maeandrous passage, which also is soon affected with the smallest thing and from the filth of those humours which descend thither partly and primarily proceeding from the moisture of the Brain.  
14. Besides the drum of the Ear may itself be more gross from the Birth, than ordinary, or be overspread with the sinews of the Brain, or some other gross humour; or there may be some thick membrane that may cover the auditory maeanders; but they, to whom this happens, are only troubled with thickness of hearing, and do as it were receive the sound by the Mouth, the reason whereof shall be given in our following Discourse. And sometimes there may be some peculiar defect in the structure of the Ear, extending itself to the Jaws and palate of the Mouth, which is the reason that those that are Deaf use to speak through the nose, as Aristotle affirms in his second and fourth Problem s. 11.   

SECT. II. Whether those that are Born Deaf, are Dumb also?  
NOw we come to the examination of the second point, which seems to be the consequence of the former; and which is confirmed by Aristotle, in the 4. Book de Hist. Animal. c. 9 viz. That those that are born Deaf are also Dumb. And as this is deduced and laid down as a Proposition by Aristotle, by reason of the former Assertion, though against reason: so it is admitted by very many, and those Physicians too, as an universal truth, without any further search into the truth of the thing or disquisition of the difference. Hence they presupposing on all hands, as a thing beyond exception, That all those that are born Deaf are likewise Dumb. (as Sanctor. comm. in Art. Medic. and Galen Part 2. Question 41. are also of opinion) make an inquisition after the cause only of the thing supposed, or incontrovertibly true: But we will more narrowly discuss the Thesis before we pry into the cause, why it often falls out to be so.  
16. Indeed, if by those that are Mute we understand such whose organs have in themselves an ineptitude to the framing of an articulate Voice, it is an absolute mistake to maintain that all that are born Deaf, are Dumb also: for the ineptitude of organs to the framing of Speech doth not immediately follow the want of Hearing. For where deafness depends not so much upon the defect which is common to the Hearing and Speaking, (which we have allowed may sometimes happen) as upon the imperfection rather peculiar to the very adequate organ of Hearing (of which as there are many parts, so there may be many obstructions, that may destroy the Hearing) it doth not follow therefore that there is an immediate inability to speak.  
But why rather as the Hearing is sometimes destroyed after the birth, the speech remaining perfect, so also at the very birth, or immediately after, may not such a constitution of the Organs happen, whereby they may be adapted to the forming of speech, and yet be incapable of Hearing?  
17. Here we must consult with experience, which testifies that those that are born deaf, may learn to speak. For so Valles. Philoso. Sacr. cap. 3. reports, that one Peter Pontius a Monk of the Order of St. Benedict, and his Friend, taught those that were born deaf to speak, by no other way, than instructing them first to write, pointing at those things with his finger that were signified by those Characters, and then putting them forward to that motion of the Tongue, that did correspond to the Characters.  
18. But if by those that are dumb we understand, such as have Organs fit for the forming of words, but yet understand no language, nor ever learned such words as express the conceived sense of the mind; it is undeniably true, that many that are born Deaf, are also Dumb, who never were instructed in any Tongue, or signicative words by the forementioned artifice, or some such kind of means.  
19 Therefore as to the cause, why those that are born Deaf are also Dumb, (at least for the generality) Albertus Magnus in his 4. Book de Anim. Tract. 2. C. 2. saith, that those that are Deaf from their Nativity are also Dumb, because they could learn no Idiom by the sense of Hearing, And Sanctor in Art Medic. approves of this opinion. Galen part. the 2. Question 4. as also Bartholinus in the 3. book of his Anatomy c. 9 referring the cause of deafness to the Drum of the Ear, who saith that those who from their birth are thus affected, are also for the most part Dumb, because they can neither conceive in their mind, nor utter with their Tongue those words, which they never heard.  
20. But Laurentius contradicts this opinion in the 11th Book of his Anatomy and the 11th Question where he saith, I do not allow of that vulgar conceit, that the reason why those that are Deaf are mute, because they can learn no language, and because Hearing is the Sense of Learning; for than saith he, if that be the only cause, why Deaf Men are Dumb;  
First, Why do they breathe out their sighs and groans, which are natural passions with so much difficulty?  
Sccondly, whether or no, might not those that are Deaf frame words and speeches to express the sense and conceptions of the mind, if they could pronounce them, as well as those, who were the first Inventors of them.  
21. But in truth we may give this answer to Laurentius his first argument, that it is a fallacy, to say that Deaf Men groan and sigh with difficulty; because original deafness, hath no manner of communication with the parts subservient to respiration. But Laurentius his mistake seems to be grounded upon what Aristotle writes in his 4th Problem. Section 11. That deaf Men breathe not without violence; by which Aristotle doth not mean a violent or difficult respiration which belongs to the Lungs and Breast, but a vehement spiration or breathing through the Nostrils; whereupon he adds, that the Nostrils become more large by the passage of the Spirits, and that's the reason they cannot speak but through the Nose. And so also in the second Problem, (saith he) Those that are deaf want but little of being dumb and those that are dumb, speak through the Nose, for their Spirits are driven that way, because they cannot speak.  
22. Now where there is a kind of ineptitude to speech in deaf Men, occasioned by some defect appertaining to the Palate, as well as the Organ of Hearing, they breathe not without difficulty; and because their Spirits do bend their course more towards the Nostrils, by reason of the wideness of their passage, besides that, they breathe out a kind of voice with their mouths, as Aristtole speaks concerning Elephants in the 4. Book de Hist. Anim. c. 9 yet that sound, they make with their Nose, resembles the hoarseness of a Trumpet.  
23. To Laurentius his second argument it may be replied; although man by nature, though deaf, is armed with reason to make him fit for invention; yet as Plato teacheth, it is not the property of a vuigar Genius to impose names upon things, much less is it in the power of every person, to invent an elegant speech or peculiar Tongue, to make the conceptions of the mind intelligible.  
24. He that first gave creatures their names, to wit, Adam, was in his integrity, and in the supernatural state of innocency instructed with such wisdom, as transcends the capacity of prevaricated nature: The confusion of various Tongues was afterwards supernaturally sent by God at the building of the Tower of Babel; and then the variety of Idioms did gradually proceed from the commixture of Tongues, or had some other rise by the common use and consent of men.  
Yet those that are mute, can find out a way whereby to explain the sense of their mind to others, as well as if they had the faculty of speaking, which is analagous' to speech, as shall be manifested in its proper place.  
25. But possibly some persons believe that if deaf men had in them that aptitude of Organs whereby they might be capable of speaking, that they should use some native Language, or speech, which Nature their School-Mistress should instruct them: for since Sermocination is essential to man, as subordinate to reason, so it is not improbable, that where the Organs are so adapted, there must be granted external speech. To which we answer, that 'tis true the very faculty of sermocination, which is subservient to them in the declaring the sense of their mind, by those significations that are set forth by words, whatsoever they be, is essential to man; yet the names of things, and so consequently the Languages themselves, or the Idioms of speech are not to be learned by nature, but by instruction, exercise and custom.  
26. And really if any certain speech did depend upon nature, as every individual person of mankind hath one and the same nature: so all Nations whatsoever would use one and the same Tongue. But the contrary is known experimentally. Therefore their opinion is altogether vain and foolish, who, being ignorant of Philosophy, would needs oblige themselves and others to this persuasion, that if a Child were taught no Language in his Infancy, but left to his own conduct, he would speak Hebrew, that is, he would make use of this Language by the mere instinct of Nature, which is a conceit altogether inept and foolish.  
27. Vallesius in the forequoted place makes a good objection to this fantastical opinion; saying, If Speech were connatural to men, as many other things are; it would be so, though they learned any other Language, and consequently all men would understand two Tongues. For, if the Speech in which a man was first instructed doth not hinder his learning another; (since many men can speak two, three, or four Languages) much less can that which is natural, be impeded by that, which is acquisititious.  
28. Nay rather; if one Tongue were natural to man, they could not be docible of all the rest; because that which is internal obstructs the external. Therefore as Nature made Man without Knowledge; that he might be capable of all Arts; it must necessarily follow, that she Created him without any Language, that he might learn them all. We also find that many men are more apt to learn other Languages, than the Hebrew; and that many Europaeans attain the true pronunciation of some Hebrew words with no small difficulty; which could not be, if the Hebrew were our natural Language; for all things do voluntarily tend to that which is natural to them.  
29. We conclude therefore, that they who are born absolutely Deaf, though their organs are fit for the prolation of words, which frequently happens, yet they are for the major part, Dumb; that is, they cannot pronounce significative words, because they could not learn any Idiom by the Ear: For it is very rarely known that they are taught to Speak by any such particular art as Peter Pontius made use of, which out of Vallesius we have before mentioned.  
30. But in the mean time we do no way contradict, but agree with Laurentius, when he ascribes it to another cause, why all those that are Deaf are generally Dumb, or at least speak with difficulty, taken from the mutual conjunction of the Nerves. For this we lay down, as another cause why Deaf men born, are Dumb, and so really dumb that they are altogether incapable of speaking articulate Words. For that communion of the Nerves consists not in this, that because the Nerve of the fifth Conjugation which is the auditory Nerve, and the Nerves of the sixth Conjugation, which are those belonging to the Speech (or rather of the seventh, for this is the Nerve of the Tongue) are mutually joined together within themselves, before they are dispersed into their proper parts, as Peter Apponensis in in his Explanation of the proposed Problem, is of opinion; or because that the same Nerves are originally invested with the same Tunicle, which in the judgement of others, is no less repugnant to itself; for the Nerves of either of the prementioned Conjugations are found by a sufficient and long interval originally distant; and it cannot be said, that they have any other common Tunicle, than what all other Nerves are covered with, viz. the Pia Mennix from which far-fetched communion of the Nerves we may also infer, that those that are Deaf, are Blind, and those that are Blind, Dumb.  
31. But that Conjugation of the Nerves is well demonstrated by Laurentius (which is also mentioned by Bauhinus in the third Book of his Anatomy c. 22. 60. and others,) that the Nerve of the fifth Conjugation (commonly called the auditory Nerve) hath several branches issuing from it, the larger whereof is expanded to the Ear and the membrane of that most exquisite sense, and carries all sorts of Sounds to the Brain, the lesser extends to the Tongue and Larynx, and is there embraced by the seventh Conjugation.  
32. And from this Communion of the vessels proceeds the sympathy between the Ear, the Tongue, and Larynx, and the very affection of those parts, are easily communicated one with the other. Hence it is, that the pulling of the Membrane of the Ear, causeth a dry Cough in the party; which Avicen takes notice of: and that is the reason, most deaf Men, at at least those, whose deafness ariseth from the ill-affection of the Nerves of the fifth pair, are Dumb, or else speak with great difficulty; that is, are not capable of framing true words, or of articulate pronunciation, by reason of the want of that convenient influx of the animal spirits; and for this cause also, it is that those that are thick of Hearing, have a kind of hoarse speech.  
33. In like manner, if there be any evil defect which usually consists in the inward structure of the Ear and the palate (which makes them speak through the Nose, as we have before mentioned out of Aristotle) there follows a deafness and withal an impediment of Speech, the organ of speech, being vitiated, but not simply, because a Language cannot then be learned by hearing. But contraily, if the only structure of the Ear be defective or only that branch of the fifth pair, which is carried to the Ear be preternaturally affected; the Hearing may be hindered, or Deafness may arise; but the impediment is but by Accident; because that when Words cannot be heard or received by the Ear, they cannot be learned.  
34. But if the Hearing be prejudiced by the defect of the Tympanum, or by any particular Membrane that is over it, that is a peculiar Accident; for in this case there happens to be a thickness of Hearing, which is nearest of kin to Deafness, rather than an absolute Deafness itself. And in such cases, those that are deafish use to hearken with their Mouth, or to suck in Words and Sounds with gaping, and so to pronounce without trouble those very words, by the help of those organs subservient to Speech, which they learned by Hearing; and such are by no means to be called Dumb persons.  
35. But the Sound flows to the inward part of the Ear, or the very organ of Hearing, by the help of the little Cartilagineous Pipe, which is conveyed from the second passage of the Ear to the Mouth and palate, being appointed to convey the Excrements of the Ear through the Mouth, like an Aquaeduct.  
By the benefit of this Conduit-pipe it is, that we can exactly apprehend our own Words, when both our Ears are stopped; so also, if we hold a Stick in our Mouth, and therewith touch any musical instrument, we hear the sound thereof more exactly; and if you are desirous to know, whether there be any person approaching near you in the Night time, place one end of the Staff on the ground, and hold the other with your Teeth, you hear then far better, though at a great distance.  
36. By the same Pipe, when we blow our Nose, or hold our Breath, by stopping of the Ears and shutting the Mouth, we are sensible that the air finds a passage into the Ear, by which the Membrane of the tympanum is struck with the outward sound, and sometimes prejudiced thereby, if it be very violent, and by this it is that Smoakers puffing up their Cheeks having taken in the fume of Tobacco, send it out at their Ears, so as that they seem to Breath at the Ears. Therefore the Opinion of Alcmaeon is not ridiculous who held that she-Goats did Breath through their Ears, as Aristotle hath it in his first Book de Hist. Animal. c. 11. And to Physicians this conveyance doth insinuate, that masticatory Medicines are not to be slighted in the inward pains of the Ears.   

SECT. III. Of their way of Understanding that are Born Deaf.  
37. BEfore we come to the third point of what is to be dicussed concerning the proposed Problem, we must Contemplate a little further on those that are Born Deaf, and see with what Knowledge they are endued, since men usually gain the major part of what they know, by Hearing.  
38. First, those persons that are Born Deaf, and have the Visive faculty entire, they may gain the Knowledge of all Visible things, as visible, and may frame those universal conceptions of them by the abstraction of the Mind, as well in this case, as where the Hearing is perfect: Nay farther, and these persons as well as all other men in general may proceed from things Visible by the light of the Understanding to the Knowledge of the Invisible mysteries of the Deity; so that they are left inexcusable, as well as any other persons whatsoever, if they do not glorify God, and return him thanks for Benefits received: Of these the Apostle speaks Rom. 1. v. 20, 21.  
39 Furthermore, if those that are Born Deaf, are also Blind, although they are deprived of the knowledge of many things, which come within the compass of the Senses, nor can arrive at the knowledge of God by the outward Book of Nature, as the other, yet they may obtain the knowledge both of God and themselves, by those notions that are grafted in their minds. And it is very probable, that those whose Intellects are less disturbed in Contemplation by the appearance of corporeal things; the implanted Seeds that are in them of the Knowledge of Divine and immaterial Being's, do easily break forth into action; as we ourselves are more apt for the search and Contemplation of Divine things, the less we are distracted by outward objects, and the fancies that result from them.  
40. Certainly it is not at all consentaneous to reason, that the rational Soul, or Mind is altogether unactive in such persons, and lies as it were lurking in the lethargy of a benumbed security, or that they do not according to their capacity incline their minds to the Knowledge of the Deity, by virtue of that innate light that is in them, as well as the Celestial Angels, and Devils; since the Soul is to be reckoned in the number of Intelligences (though perhaps placed in the lowest rank of Intelligences) and in reality is not so deeply plunged in matter or matterial functions, by reason of its defect of Sight and Hearing.  
41. But what is to be thought of those who are born Deaf, as to their Knowledge in things that concern the Mystery of our Salvation?  
These things as they are too sublime, either for Universal, Humane, or Angelical knowledge, cannot be found out, or understood by those notions implanted in the mind. And as Faith comes by Hearing, according to the Apostle, where this is wanting, it may possibly seem very agreeable to truth, that there can be no Faith, and therefore no saving knowledge; and the consequence is undeniable, since no man can be saved without Faith.  
42. Oh this is indeed a very hard saying, which shipwrecks the Soul! Truly since those that are born Deaf are no more guilty of neglecting the means of their Salvation, than Infants (concerning whom however the Sacred Pages advise us to be more charitable) what reason I wonder can there be, why we should think God less merciful to them, who are also born of faithful Parents, than to Infants! We will leave the disquisition of their Faith, or the manner thereof to Divines. Hath God therefore, who according to his Will hath elected some on't of all Mankind corrupted by the Fall, to be Vessels of mercy, and others Vessels of his wrath, strictly registered all those that are born deaf in the number of those that are Vessels of wrath? Yet God's Promise and Covenant belongs to these, as much as to the children of the faithful.  
43. The Holy Ghost in truth is the chiefest cause of Faith, who begets it in our hearts by the preaching of the Word, and consequently by Hearing. This is the ordinary way of God which he commands us to follow; he that neglects this, is excluded from Faith by his own fault. Yet God is not wholly tied up to this one way of operation. He hath extraordinary ways which we are ignorant of, and he will not reveal to us. Yet God made use of peculiar means to bring St. Paul to the christian Faith, and made him of a Persecutor of the Church, become an Apostle, Acts. the 9 He proceeded after another manner to the conversion (at least in part) of the Eunuch of Candace the Aethiopian Queen. Acts the 9 viz. By the reading of the Word of God.  
44. And shall we judge that no persons can be saved, that live where there is no public preaching of God's Word, and so by consequence where the mind gains no spiritual knowledge by Hearing? May we not affirm, that by diligent reading, and co-operation of the Holy Ghost, Faith may be engendered in the Souls of the Godly? Now therefore if this means be without Hearing, why may not God manifest other ways, that so at least his operation may not be confined to the hearing solely?  
45. But let us examine whether there are not other means appointed by God, by which those that are originally deaf, may attain the knowledge of divine Mysteries sufficient for salvation.  
There is no necessity, why speech, which is usually acquired by Hearing, should precede writing; but speech useth to be in the first place by reason of its facility, for those that have all their senses perfect, are more apt to speak, than write— But where there is a defect of Hearing, they may begin with writing, and so by writing come to speaking, as is manifrst by the forecited example out of Vallesius. Now external speech is a kind Messenger or rather representation of the internal, or of the intellect itself.  
They therefore that are born Deaf may by writing inform their minds with the knowledge of those things, which must be obtained by hearing in others, whose senses are all perfect; and so they may make use of writing in leiu of speaking, which is otherways attained by Learning; and they as Vallesius speaks in his third chapter de Phil. Sacr. Do gain the knowledge of Divine things by the sight, which others do by hearing, which I myself (saith he) can testify, in those Scholars which my friend Peter Pontius undertook, who first taught them that were born Deaf to write, or to express the conceptions of their mind by writing, and then to speak.  
46. The same reason there is for those that are born Deaf, if Dumb also; they may by writing understand things, although no external writing is subsequent to speech; for the speech in Man conduceth not to the gaining of knowledge to themselves; but only to communicate the Conceptions of their own mind to others. This is clear by an example taken out of Pel. Platerus who in the first book of his Observations pag. 118. reports, that a certain person who was born Deaf and Dumb, could with Chalk draw out his mind in a Table-book, which he carried continually about him, and understand what others writ therein.  
47. But as writing, or the reading thereof, may serve in stead of speech, by which the Conceptions of the mind are laid open to the sight, as well as they are by speech to the Ear; so there may be other signs made imitating the outward speech, and Succedaneous to hearing; as those are which Mutes themselves always make use one in lieu of speech, and by which they conceive the Sentiments of other men's minds. For experience teacheth us, and there are also many obvious examples among us, that those that are originally Dumb, and Deaf do by certain gestures, and various motions of the body as readily and clearly declare their mind, to those with whom they have been often conversant, as if they could speak, and likewise by such gestures of other Persons, they do absolutely understand the intentions of their mind also.  
48. The Emperor of the Turk maintains many such Mutes in his Court; who do express the Conceptions of their minds one to another, and as it were interchange mutual discourse, by gesticulations, and variety of external significations, no otherways than we that have the faculty of signifying our own thoughts, and conceiving those of other Persons by outward Speech. Nay the Turkish Emperor himself, and his Courtiers, take great delight with this kind of Speech shadowed out by gestures, and use to employ themselves very much in the exercise hereof, to make them perfect in it.  
49. Cornelius Haga Ambassador to the Emperor of the Turks sent thither by the States of the United Provinces did once invite all those Mutes to a Banquet (as I observed from the relation given me by the most Noble and Worthy Dr. Brinkins Senator of Hardervick) where though there was not a syllable heard yet they did exchange several discourses, as is usual at other Treats, which the Ambassador understood by an Interpreter on both sides by whose assistance he himself did discourse with the Mutes upon all subjects.  
50. But those very significations of things, which Mutes make use of, proceed not from nature, but from their own institution no more, than our speech; Therefore they attain unto them by Study and exercise.  
Although however most of them do shadow out some outward manner, of the things which they aim at. As when they close one hand, and move it up towards the Nostrils, thereby they signify a Flower. Now the significations of those Mutes (which is as it were their Speech) are not like the Languages which vary among several Nations, nor are so absolutely different.  
51. And as the Mutes do by their gestures exactly and distinctly understand one another, and those Persons also that use such a kind of analogous' Speech among them; so they conceive many things by the gestures, motion of the Lips, and such like things in those that really do speak, and sometimes understand a great part of their conceptions by such outward things. So saith Platerus in the place abovementioned: that his Father told him, that that Deaf and Dumb man (whom we discoursed of a little before) when he very devoutly heard Oecolampadius Preaching, did apprehend many things from the motion of his Lips, and gestures; and so from others.  
52. And there is now at this very time in the City of Gronning, such a one who being born Deaf and Dumb, constantly frequents public Sermons, and doth as it were contemplate upon the Words of the Preacher with his eyes fixed upon him, so that he seems to receive them in at his Mouth as others do by the Ear. This person when he earnestly desires to receive the Holy Sacrament, I do not at all question, but that he hath that knowledge of those Divine things, that concern his Salvation, insomuch that he cannot be debarred from it without some scruple of Conscience. Although I am of opinion that he ought to be examined as to this his knowledge and Confession, which may be done, by means of his Wife, or Servant, his Interpreters, whom he always hath with him, and who discourse with him very nimbly by signs, of any thing whatsoever.  
53. We will subjoin one example out of Phil. Camerarius, which is in Horae Subcisivae 1 Gent. 37- We have now among us (saith he) a young Youth and a Maid born of the same Parents, and indeed of a Noble and honest Family, who have an extraordinary acuteness of Wit: and though Nature brought them forth Deaf and Dumb, yet they can both of them Read distinctly, Write an excellent hand, and keep Merchants Accounts. And as he dextrously perceives by a Nod what you would have him to do, and ifhe wants a Pen, will express himself by gestures; and is very cunning at all Games that are usually played among us upon the Dice, which cannot be managed without great subtlety; so she very much exceeds all Maids at her Needle and curious Weaving. But among other their admirable qualifications, which Nature hath bestowed upon them; this is wonderful, that they seem to understand what any one speaks by the motion of the Lips; Wherefore they are often at Church, hearing the Word Preached. So that it will be no absurdity to say, that 'tis probable they take the Words in at their Eyes, they are so intent, which others use to do by the Ear. For they can at pleasure without any suggestion, or other help write the Lords Prayer, and other pious Orisons. And can remember the Gospels appointed to be read on holidays as well as others, and readily Write them. And if the Holy Name of jesus be mentioned in the Church, he, above all the rest, will in a posture of Reverence uncover his head, and bow the knee. Thus Nature like an indulgent Mother was solicitous and studious to recompense their defects, that she might free herself from the injurious accusation of a cruel Stepmother.   

The Fourth SECTION, Being A DISCOURSE Concerning the REASON, AND SPEECH OF BEASTS.  
54. THese things, concerning those that are born Deaf and Dumb being thus determined, we will proceed to a further Illustration of the rest which occur in the Problem proposed, and the Explication thereof; And the third point which Aristotle hath offered, to our meditation concerns the Speech of Beasts, where he lays down this, as an Assertion.  
That the faculty of Speech (which presupposeth reason) is only bestowed upon Man, and that no other Creature can Speak: Which we will take into our Consideration.  
55. To speak truly, the inward Speech is no more, than the nuncius or a certain image of internal reason, which goes to the Idea of the reason expressed; whence the Grecians, and that not without reason, call rationem and sermonem, Reason and Speech by the same name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 absolutely, i. e. Speech which the Philosophers distinguish into 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 into internal and external, and the one must necessarily accompany the other, unless there be an imperfection, or defect in the organs. Therefore this is a necessary Consequence, That where there is no Reason, there can be no external Speech; and so on the contrary.  
56. And 'tis from this strict copulation of Reason and Speech, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 rational is expressed in the Arabic Version, by the word Natthack, which signifies Speaking, Gen. 2. v. 7. as its opposite 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, irrational, Chares, which signifies Mute, is so named in 2 Pet. 2. v. 2. to which the Dutch phrase answers, e'en stom Be'st, (and our English exactly, a Dumb Beast) i. e. an irrational Creature.  
Nay, the Holy Scripture calls irrational; dumb Creatures, or Creatures without Speech, 2 Pet. 2. v. 16. where the Ass of the Prophet Balaam is said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, subjugale mutum humana voce locutum; which our English Translation renders, The dumb Ass speaking with Man's Voice.  
57 But here our Galen suggests a difficulty, who, whilst he seems to deny Brutus' external Speech, yet he affirms, that they have Reason, from whence external speech indisputably proceeds; so that if any Brutes have fit organs for the uttering of articulate words, it seems that they must not be denied external speech, reason or ratiocination being supposed; For thus Galen expresseth himself in the beginning of his Book entitled Exhort. ad Art. lib. Stud. It is not yet certain, whether Beasts, which are called Brutes, are altogether void of Reason. For though peradventure they have not that Reason in common, with us, which is understood by the Voice, and called denunciative; yet certainly, they all of them have that which is taken according to the Soul, which they call Reason, capable of Affections in common, as well as we, though some more, some less.  
58. But here we must make a halt for a while, to the end that we may more exactly determine what is to be thought of the Reason of brute Beasts commonly so called, and also of their Speech. Indeed the most profound Philosophers, PorphIndeed the most profoundyrius, Plutarch, and Galen (saith Bodin in Theatr. Nat. lib. p. 476.) have proved by almost an infinite number of Arguments, that Nature hath bestowed Reason upon Beasts. And Huartus in Scrutin. Ingen. ca 6. There is no doubt (saith he) but that brute Animals have a Memory and fantasy, and a certain Power besides, which is correspondent to the Intellect, as an Ape resembles a Man.  
59 How many things do we meet with, concerning the Ingenuity and Reason of Brutus' (of which Plutarch hath writ a peculiar Treatise, as also many things are mentioned in Gryllo) as well by Tradition from Authors, as those which are obviously known to us, which certainly seem to argue some kind of Reason, or somewhat analogous to Human Reason.  
Prodigious things are related of the Elephant by Pliny, Aelian, Plutarch and others, which Lipsius hath Collected out of several Authors in his first Century ch. 50. Where among many other observable things this following Story, which is almost beyond belief, yet faithfully quoted out of Acosta, and Garcias ab Horto Hist. Arom. lib. 1. c. 14. relates it also.  
There was an Elephant in the City of Cochin, who wanting his food at the precise accustomed hour, complained, and brayed. His Master excused it by showing him that the Brazen Vessel, which usually contained his food was leaky and run out, and that the occasion of this delay was, because, that it could no longer hold his Drench or Wash: And therefore commands him, if he would eat, to carry it to the Braziers to be mended. He obeys, takes it upon his Trunk and brings it to the Brazier. Who either through negligence, or to make sport with the Beast, did not mend it well, and stop up the Chinks. The Elephant brings it back again, his Master spying the fault, grew angry, and exclaimed both against him and the Elephant; and in fine, bids him carry the Vessel back again. He doth so, and with a querulous tone throws it at the Brazier. He being a pleasant fellow, endeavours to put a Cheat upon him the second time, and makes, as if he did stop the holes, but did not: Yet he missed his aim; for the Elephant was so cunning, as to carry the Cauldron to the River, and there puts it into the Water and fills it, to try whether it would hold, but he found that it did run out. He being hereupon highly incensed, runs back to the Brazier, and bellowed out with a thundering voice, so that the Neighbours came about them, and among the rest the King's Viceroy. The Brazier pacifies the Beast with fair words (and here saith Lipsius, I know not whether I dare proceed any further) and at last he takes the Vessel into his hands and mends it well and strongly. But the Elephant being mistrustful, carries it again to the River and fills it with Water; when he saw that it would hold, he turns himself to the standers by and shows it, calling them as witnesses to the matter of fact; and so went home.  
61. Garcias adds further, who traveled into those parts, that there are some yet living, who affirm they saw it done. And he testifies, that Elephants do not only understand the Language of their own, but also those of foreign Countries, if taught them. And a little after; In sum, there is nothing wanting in this Creature to make him appear rational, but only Speech: although this also (as the same Garcias witnesseth) is by some attributed to it. Of which hereafter.  
62. And lest that any one should make a doubt of what is reported concerning Elephants; hear jac. Bontius an Author of very great credit; who was some few years passed in the East-Indies, and chief Physician to the Belgian Society, and himself an Eyewitness thereof; who, in his Notes upon the forementioned place in Garcias, declares expressly, That whatsoever is said of the Elephant's docility, is true: The same things in some measure are related by Pliny, Scaliger, Canerarius, Lipsius and others, concerning the tractablnesse and ingenuity of Dogs and Horses, and also of their fidelity to their Masters, which almost exceed all belief; and yet are every where made manifest by daily experience.  
63. There was in Holland not many years ago, a comely Horse carried about by a fellow to be seen, being by custom brought to that which Scaliger mentions of another in his 209 Exercitation, who did very strange things, at his master's command, or single Nod, among other things being commanded to show him the greatest wencher, or drunkard, etc. in the Company, he was not much out of the way, being without doubt, directed by some private sign from his Master.  
64. Scaliger in his 236 Exercitation, reports, That he saw a Dancing Parrot, who did with the gesture of his head, and by hanging down and fluttering of his wings imitate a Savoyard (that was a Songster) dancing; which he assures us a Crane did also very pleasantly.  
jonstonius in Thaumat. Natur. reports of another Parrot, that she would say over the Apostles Creed before the Cardinal, and answer questions. Also of another that belonged to Henry the Eighth King of England, who being fallen into the River cried out for help, and promised twenty pounds to those that would save her, but being taken up, he bid them give the man a Groat.  
65. I myself at present, have a little Dog at home, who not long ago seeing the Cat licking a large Ladle that was hung up by the Chimney; he first leapt at her, and endeavoured to drive her away by barking; but she fell still to her work not minding him, by accident he finds me out a great way off from that place, runs to me, and ever and anon fawns upon me with his forefeet, and then runs towards the Cat, as it were to show me his meaning, that I might see her, and drive her away; so that the Whelp took notice of this unworthy act of the Cat, though not used to do it, and would out of envy have her driven away. I had formerly another small Cur at Hardervick, who would very hardly be kept at home when I went abroad, insomuch that if he had slept in the Kitchen at any time longer than ordinary, being uncertain, whether I were gone out in the interim, or no; starting up of a sudden, he would run into the Parlour, and look about for my Cloak, which as soon as he spied, he returned into the Kitchen satisfied, gathering as it were from hence, that I was in my Study, and so as yet within.  
66. We may daily observe, the gestures of Apes, and their imitation of men's actions without any fraud or deceit, though not accustomed to it formerly. Oornithographer affirm that Cranes observe a kind of discidline in their flight, and keep a Watch or stand Sentinel. Every day's experience openly proclaims the admirable ingenuity and policy of Bees and Ants. The Spinning of Spiders, and the way they have to ensnare Flies, or trap them sometimes unawares. I omit a thousand other observations of brute Beasts, that are daily obvious to our senses, which do seem to declare that there is some Idea of Reason, or some kind of ratiocination in them.  
67. I will only annex one thing which Fort. Licet. lib. 2. the Monst. c. 68 relates out of the Portugal Annals of Castanenda; to wit, That a certain Woman for some Crime was by Sea transported to a Desert Island, when she was set a shore there, a horrid company of Apes (which that place abounded with) came and stood round about her; and that there was one among them bigger, than the rest, to whom all gave place; who taking the Woman very gently by the hand led her into a vast Cave, and that he and the rest, did set before her store of Apples, Nuts, and variety of Roots, and with a complimental Nod invited her to Eat; at length she was Ravished by the Beast; who continued the act a long time, insomuch that she had two Children by him; and that she lived in this miserable condition for some years; till (God commiserating her case) a Portugal Vessel was driven thither, and the Soldiers coming a shore for Water, which they had out of a Fountain next adjoining to that Cave, and by great chance the Ape being absent, the woman ran to the men, having seen none of that Sex a long time, and falling suppliantly at their feet, beseeched them to free her from that wicked and miserable servitude; they pitying her condition, did condescend to her entreaties, and she came aboard of them. But behold, saith he, the Ape unexpectedly coming after her, and with strange gestures and noises calling back his Consort, and yet no Consort: When he saw them hoist up the Sails, he runs back with great speed, and brings one of the Children and shows it to the Mother, threatening to throw it into the Sea, unless she would return; and did so immediately; then he runs back to the Cave, and returning to the Seashore with the same speed shows the other, threatens, and then drowns it; and at last he himself swims after her, and was drowned.  
68 As to the Speech of Brute Animals; 'tis confirmed by daily experience, that some of them may by custom imitate in some measure an articulate Voice, or Humane Speech. This is a very familiar observation in the Parrot, Pie, and Sterling. Plutarch, Pliny, Ovid, and others, testify the same thing of the Nightingale. I myself (saith the Author) have observed (at Mersa in my native Country Anno 1646. at the House of the most Noble and Strenuous Gentleman Wilhelmus Reinerus a Clou, who was a Peer and Governor of that City and County) in that kind of Finches, which they call a Goldfinch, and Aristotle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that could imitate Man's Speech articulately and distinctly enough: This little Bird was so accustomed by heartng people speak frequently, that as often as she did prepare to sing, she would utter these words distinctly, Sing Manneken, sing man, but in a lower tone, as if she were hoarse; and after she had often repeated them, than she would proceed with a most sweet harmony.  
We have given you an account of the Parrot that could rehearse the Apostolic Creed; and of the other, that falling into the River desired help and promised a reward, in the foregoing part of our Discourse.  
69. We will not here take any notice of the Serpent's discourse with Eve, immediately after the Creation, Gen. 3. nor of the Speaking of Baladm's Ass, Numb. 22. and 2 Pet. 2. v. 16. because we are satisfied that the one, was done by Diabolical, and the other, by Divine operation; we will only briefly insist upon those things which the Naturalists, as Pliny, Aelian, Plutarch, and others, report concerning the Speech of Elephants, and of their writing too. Among which possibly we might reckon the ingeminated Words that were heard to be spoken by the Statu of juno Moneta, and Fortuna, as Valerius Maximus reports, but that the more inward recesses of Nature are first exactly to be discussed by us, that we may the more clearly discern the illusions of Satan from the Works of Nature.  
70. Concerning the peculiar Speech of Elephants, Oppian delivereth himself, as followeth;  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
'Tis famed, that Elephants with their own kind  
Talk, and in proper terms express their mind.  
Acosta affirms (who lived a long time in East-India, and did diligently examine the nature and towardness of Elephants, and received it from those who made daily observations of their nature) That in the Kingdom of Malabar, 'tis a general received opinion, that these Creatures do Talk one with another.  
71. Nay, it is believed that they can learn Humane speech, and express their inward conceptions by familiar Words. There was (saith the same Acosta) an Elephant in the City of Cochin, who did, at his daily work in the Haven about marine affairs; who though tired, was however urged by the Praefect of that City, to draw a light Vessel, (or Pinnace) into the Sea, which he had already begun to do, but the Beast refused it, and he pressed him with many fair words; and at last (not prevailing) he entreated him to do it for the King of Portugal's sake. At which (O incredible!) the Elephant being moved (saith Acosta) repeated these two Words Hoô Hoö; which signifies in the Tongue of the People of Malabar, I will, I will; and drew the Ship into the Sea without any further delay.  
72. Garcias ab Horto in the place above mentioned, saith, That there are some People in Cochin, who affirm they saw a public Register (called an Attestation) which did mention, That there was an Elephant there that could Speak, and did ask his Governor for food, but he answered, that the Cauldron in which he boiled Rice for him was full of holes, etc. which story is related before by Lipsius out of Acosta,  
73. But let us speak something of the Writing of Elephants, which is a representation of the external speech; Pliny out of Mucianus, reports, that one of these Creatures learned the Greek Letters, and Writ in that Language, Ipse ego haec scripsi & spolia Celtica dicavi.  
And Philostratus, They write (saith he) and Dance, nay, to the Pipe also. But Aelian saith, I myself have seen an Elephant Writing the Roman Letters in a Table-book with his Trunk, and that withal, they were writ very even, not crooked; Nay, whilst he was Writing, his Eyes were earnestly fixed upon the Table-book, that you might plainly say, they were intent and accustomed to Writing.  
74. Although the major part of Brutes have no articulate Voice, and so do not make use of Speech properly so called: Yet we see on all sides, that they express their inward conceptions one with another, and with Men also, by the Gestures, Sounds, and Noises which they make with their Bodies, and such other kind of means; even as Dumb Men use gesticulations and various motions, in lieu of Speech, whereby they discourse very significantly among themselves, as well as with other persons.  
75. Hither is to be referred that of Philostratus in the Life of Apollonius, in his 4. Book ch. 1. concerning the Sparrow, who, as a messenger, by the raising of his chirping tone, did signify to the rest, that he had found out some place, where there was good store of scattered Corn, and so did communicate the food he had discovered to the rest of the Sparrows, who hearing that Voice of his, they all making a sudden noise, immediately flew after him.  
The like example was related to me by the most Noble and renowned Brinkins, p. m. Burgomaster of Hardervick when living, concerning a Goose, who when she had found in any of the Fields a Stock of Corn, took her flight immediately to the rest of her Consorts, and making a noise among them, the whole Flock followed her, she flying foremost, and showing the rest where their food was. We may daily observe in Dogs greater remarks whereby they signify their inward sense to others.  
76. And since it is so, what must we think of the Reason of Brutes, and their Sermocination whatsoever it be? What is there wanting to make them rational Creatures, or make them accounted to be of Humane society? Are we not bound to acknowledge that there is in Brutus' a kind of analogical Reason or estimative faculty that resembles Reason, from whence their Ingenuity is derived, and by virtue whereof, they seem to be in some respects prudent.  
77. And truly since we see that Brute Animals do sometimes Rave, and Dote (for Apes when Drunk, have a kind of delirium; Dogs are troubled with the Hydrophobia or Madness, which happens (as is reported) to Horses, Oxen, Asses, and Camels) it must needs also follow, that they have Wit, and the use of Reason in some measure; for natural Potency and Impotency are to be referred to the same subject: Hence we find, that as that analogical Reason is in some, more exquisite and vigorous, so some Brutes differ from others in Ingenuity. Prudence, Docility and Stupidity. Of which Subject I have variously Discoursed in Theatr. Natur. Univers. part. 2. Disputat. 5. s. 29. and the following Sections.  
78. Yet this Reason of Brutes is absolutely different from Humane Reason in its very essence, for the former is a kind of sensitive or material faculty of the Soul, to which, that which is vulgarly called Cogitative in man, or the estimative faculty itself, illustrated with Reason, from the presiding, and hypostatical union of the rational Soul with the sensitive, Body, doth in some measure agree: and yet this very Cogitative faculty in Man, though it be material, it is far more noble and excellent, than the Reason in any species of Brutes can be; and doth by many degrees surpass the Reason of Elephants; then this Reason is apprehended to transcend the Reason of Gallus Africanus, insomuch that there is herein a kind of irradiation, or a represented Image in Man, flowing from the Immortal Soul, which also by its Native and Essential Reason is capacitated to imitate the Celestial Intelligencies; which bright light of Reason in Man communicates itself to the estimative faculty, by reason of the intimate connexion of the Rational Soul with the Sensitive Body, by which the whole Suppositum becomes Rational.  
79. And therefore 'tis not without reason that Aristotle saith in the First Book of his Ethics to Nicomachus, the last Chapter; That Man hath a twofold Reason; the one, he hath principally in himself, viz. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the very Mind or rational Soul: the other, that he is obedient to Parents, and that he hath Reason by participation, to wit, that which he calls in Man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or that part that is without the Humane Soul, as the Sensitive faculty; this first Reason of Man is the very Intellect itself, so called by Aristotle, which he saith, 3. De Anim. cap. 5. t. 20. is separable, immortal, and impassable; the latter, the passive Intellect, which he doth not affirm to be immortal and eternal, because it perisheth with the universal sensitive faculty, when the rational Soul is separated from the Body.  
80. The former sort of Reason in Man, which is proper to the rational Soul or Mind, and is its native faculty, as the Mind of Man is an immaterial substance, not at all enveloped in matter, so that makes use of no corporeal organ in the exercise of its functions; but soaring above all the Senses, contemplates upon Divine, Immortal, and Eternal Being's; and understands those things which no Sense of the Body can conceive; and still desires that which the sensitive faculty wholly abhors. So that Calvin in the first Book of his Institutes c. 5. S. 5. reprehends those (and that not undeservedly) who being addicted to preposterous subtleties would fain wrest that saying (which teacheth that the Faculties of the Soul are organical) to a contrary sense (viz. from the sensitive faculty, to the very rational Soul) as well (saith he) to destroy the immortality of the Soul, as to rob God of his proper right: for (saith he) because the faculties of the Soul are organical: by this pretext they so link it to the Body, that it cannot subsist without it.  
81. The latter Reason of Man, which is communicated to the sensitive or estimative faculty by participation, as it is not corporeal, nor intermixed with the Body (as Aristotle shows the Anim. l. 3. c. 4. text 6.) because that it is a kind of communicated image, and represented as it were in the Mirror of the Mind; so neither doth it use any organ in its operations (according to Arist. in the forecited place) although 'tis busied about outward appearances, as the object of its operations, and can understand nothing without them (as Aristotle teacheth c. 8. text 39 And in truth that which he hath in the last quoted place, belongs to this passive Intellect, or rather to Man, as he is of a sensitive nature, adorned with an active Intellect; that an Intelligent person must Contemplate upon outward Phaenomena, according to that common saying, Nihil est in Intellectu, quod non fuerat prius in sensu. Nothing can be in the Intellect, that hath not been first received by the Senses.  
82. For this sensitive faculty in Man, though illustrated with Reason, understands nothing of itself, but is like a blank Paper, or Book, that is susceptible of any inscription, 3. lib. de Anim. 4. text 14. for it is capable of all things that are cognoscible, by virtue of that light which darted from the rational Soul, whereby it is illustrated, and extends itself to all material, immaterial, individual, abstracted, Mortal and Eternal objects.  
For as it is sensitive, it perceives v. g. the Water, Fire, Flesh, Magnitude and the like; and forms an imagination of them (which is also common to Brutes, as well as Men) but since Flesh is one thing, and the Essence of Flesh another; Magnitude, is one thing, and the Essence of Magnitude, another; and so of the rest; it doth by another part of itself, or by itself in another capacity (viz. not as it is sensitive, but cogitative, or as it partakes of Reason, and is enlightened by the rational Soul) distinguish the Essence, from the things themselves, which fall under our Senses.  
83. But the former Reason of Man, or the genuine faculty of the rational Soul, as it is altogether immaterial, so it challengeth a Knowledge proper and natural to itself, not any way proceeding from Matter, or the Senses of the Body (For there is not always one and the same, but a different reason of the supernatural Knowledge of Divine Mysteries, or of those things which exceed our Human Capacity, and want the support of Faith) whilst in the interim it renders that very Knowledge which is drawn from the Senses and inferior Reason far more illustrious, and more clearly discerns the truth itself.  
84. For this genuine faculty of the rational Soul, hath within itself the connate principles and seeds of all manner of Knowledge (which do not involve Divine Mysteries) or else is furnished with such an Understanding, that it can extract the truth of things out of their Womb by discourse and ratiocination. So also the knowledge of God is engraven in the minds of men, yet not so, as if every man did acknowledge a Deity, or that the existence of God is as it were written in their minds so soon as Born (of which opinion Anselm and Hieronymus were, according to Suarez Disputation 19 S. 2. §. 3.) but that by Nature there are such principles of a Deity implanted in our minds, and such an intellectual light connate with them, that we may by the strength of our own Genius, without any assistance from the Senses attain the knowledge of the Power and Divinity of the Supreme Deity. Just as we do truly assert, that Geometrical truths are connate in us, though we do not originally understand the Elements of Euclid.  
85. And as the dull and rude Vulgar, who use not to abstract the Mind from the Body (and therefore have no other knowledge but what is exerted by the Senses, and the dictates of inferior or cogitative Reason) understand and conceive the invisible things of God from the Creation of the World by Works, so that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which may be known of God (as our Version hath it) in the first to the Romans may be understood by the very Plebeians; so Philosophers and such as are conversant with more sublime Speculations, or have learned to free their minds from this terrene incarceration, attain unto the knowledge of the Deity by the inward qualifications of their minds, without being obliged to the testimony of Sense.  
And really those very seeds that are naturally planted in the minds of men, do sometimes so powerfully exert themselves into action, that they bind the very Consciences of the most obstinate, and such as deny the very dictates of Senses. And herein we may affirm with Calvin, in the first Book of his Institutes, c. 3. §. 1. That beyond all Controversy there is by a natural instinct, a kind of sense of the Divinity in the mind of Man, for God both endued all persons with the Intelligence of his Deity, that no man should shelter himself under the pretext of Ignorance, who by a constant recollection of his memory, furnisheth him with fresh instillations.  
87. But as to the Reason of Brute Animals; being it depends upon the sensitive Soul, it is absolutely material, and drowned in the Body, it is altogether inseparable from it, and perisheth with the Individuum, and therefore is conversant with nothing but what is Corporeal and Mortal. The same faculty is in all the species of Brutes employed about some certain and determinate object, to which all of them are hurried by a natural propensity; and not as it is in Man, indifferent to any thing. So Nature instructs Swallows to build their Nests of Clay; Beasts to get Coverts or Dens; Dogs hunt the Hare; and Cats watch for Mice; which neither the Reason of a Cow, nor an Ass prompts them to; nor can they by Art be brought to it.  
88 And although probably some species of these Brute Animals are more freely exercised, about various objects by raciocination, than others, as we find in Elephants, Apes, Monkeys, the Cynocephali, and Dogs themselves, and the like; yet they are apprehensive of the objects themselves no otherwise, than under the notion of singulars: For they perceive the Water, Fire, Flesh, Magnitude and the like; and then frame some phantasms of these very things; and these they, either compound or divide, and so judge or esteem of the species so received: but Flesh being one thing, and the Essence thereof, another; Magnitude, one thing, and the Essence thereof, another, etc. as Aristotle speaks, they cannot discern the Essence of things from the things themselves, nor can they abstract individuals from universals. So that their universal Reason consists in particular and material things; and therefore they are incapable of Learning, which is comprehended under certain Maxims and Rules.  
89. Besides if it could possibly be maintained, that some Brute Animals have a kind of Sense of Divinity (it is reported that that Idolatrous Religion consisting in the Worship of the Sun, Moon, and Stars, did proceed from Elephants) or that some faint image or shadow of Piety may be distilled into them, yet by that they cannot conceive any thing of God, unless it be by corporeal reason, and so have no Conception of God, nor can they ever be able to dispute concerning God by the deduction of Causes, or by the successive end, nor by conclusions drawn from the principles imprinted in their minds; but only by the singular commodity or use, or the more splendid appearance of the particular individual body, viz. of the Sun or Moon, and so they cannot apprehend the invisible things of God, but can only frame a conception or imagination of the corporeal Idea of those things which proximately move the Senses.  
90. Undoubtedly that which is purely Incorporeal and Divine, or which is the true Essence of Divinity, which is only Religiously to be Worshipped, cannot fall under the apprehension of a faculty merely corporeal. But if there do appear in Elephants, as well the shadow of many Virtues, as a certain kind of imaginary Idea of Religion (as Lipsius hath heaped together many Examples out of divers Authors to that purpose) what wonder is it, that the Celestial Bodies strike the Senses with greatest admiration and yet are not tightly apprehended by the Senses, that that representation of Religion whatsoever it be, should be directly apprehended? And so they be believed by Plutarch and Aelian, to Worship the Rising Sun; and by Pliny and Aelian, the New Moon.  
91. Finally, the Wisdom of Brutes consists only in that part wherein they also suffer a delirium; but Man's Wisdom also consists in the mind or active Intellect, in which they never dote, and herein they evidently differ from Beasts, who have not this faculty. So that that passage of Hypocrates, Aphor. 6. Sect. 2. belongs only to the passive Intellect, so far as it resides in the sensitive faculty; where he saith, That those who are troubled in any part of the Body, and are hardly sensible of the pain, their mind (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or as Galen interprets it in his Commentary 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) is disstempered, for they are deceived by a defect of the inward Senses, which Brutes have in common with Men, and stand always in need of their Ministry, whilst tied to the fetters of the Body.  
92. Therefore Men are truly said to be distinguished from Beasts by Reason; because Brute Animals have not any footsteps of that Reason that is natural to the rational Soul, or the active Intellect; but they only have some kind of shadow of that Reason which is communicated to the sensitive faculty, or of the passive Intellect; so that they are said to have Reason Analogically.  
93. Now as to the Speech which is apprehended to be in some Brutes, that have organs fit for the emission of an articulate Voice; what kind of Reason that may be, and how it differs from Humane Speech, is the thing to be discussed: And as the speech of Parrots, Crows, and other Birds, woe are taught by Art, is nothing else, but a certain articulate Voice without any mental understanding, to which they are trained up by Custom, not knowing for the most part what is signified by this or that word. So that Parrot that rehearsed the Apostles Creed; did not at all understand the thing signified by those words. And therefore this sort of speech, is not at all a representation of the intrinsic reason, and so consequently no true speech.  
94. But if sometimes it so fall out that they seem appositely to appropriate the Names of things to the things themselves, or retain the signification of them, that is the work of the Memory, by which they do accommodate those things which they by their docility have gained to particular things, as they have been accustomed to them, and according to their often repeated appellations: But their speech extends no farther to other things, than Custom hath directed them. And as that Parrot which fell into the River called for help, and promised a Reward, it must necessarily be, that she had by practice learned those words being oftentimes before in the like danger.  
95. And since it is undeniable that not only Elephants, but some other Creatures, as Dogs and Horses (though these are not altogether so capable) do in some manner conceive the Speech of Man, to which they are accustomed, or understand what is meant by such and such words, as they are taught (and as they by the motion or gesture of their Masters, know what they would have) though some more exactly, than others. Is it a greater wonder for these Brutes, if they have organs fit for Speech, to be able by outward expressions (as they have learned by Custom) to signify the single conceptions of their estimative faculty to others, which they frame within themselves according to the common speech they are accustomed to, than that they should by the usual gestures of the Body, and other various ways (which is also the Speech of Mutes) be able to adumbrate their inward conceptions to others? Or what wonder is it for a Parrot, Pie, Crow, or Starling, to express what they inwardly conceive or desire by an articulate Voice, or such as they have learned by custom?  
96. And those Creatures that have been used to Speech can count numbers; and yet they have no formal conception of those numbers; because that cannot be done but by abstracting, and so consequently by the immaterial faculty. For in the numbering of any thing proposed, or the collecting a definite multitude out of unities, it is requisitely necessary that the mind have an Idea of some number be known, and that it appear, how the third differs from the fourth, and the fourth from the tenth, and so on; to the end, that the number may be rightly appropriated to any multitude proposed, according as the thing requires. But this does not at all come within the reach of the material faculty, with which Brutes are only endued.  
97. Since therefore number is not properly formed but by the Intellect, which Aristotle himself confesseth, 4. Phys. t. 131. it must necessarily follow, that the names of Number are only repeated by the Memory in Brutes that name it, but the Essence of Number, or difference, of the fourth, and fifth, or twentieth, is not in them.  
98. As to the Writing of Inanimate Creatures, since that Elephants use the Proboscis, as a Hand, and almost as readily as we do (for they will take the smallest piece of Money off from the ground, and ordinarily manage a Sword like a Fencer, handle a Gun, levelly it and discharge, as we ourselves, that have been eye-witnesses, can testify) it need not seem an impossibility for them to Write some Letters, whose figures they have been taught, either singly, or jointly, and so reduced them into words, and perhaps by Writing to express their conception of any particular thing according to custom, as other Brutes use to notify their conceptions by gestures, or other ways suitable to their nature.  
99 But it is sufficiently apparent by what hath been said, how infinitely the Speech of Inanimate Creatures, and the adumbration thereof by Writing, doth differ from Human Speech; whereas Man doth not appropriate this, or that word, to this, or that particular thing by custom only; but can use his Tongue volubly, and can exercise it in the expressing of any thing whatsoever, upon all emergent occasions, in a far different manner from that of Brutes: And as Man's Reason itself, or the internal Speech, doth not only aim at particular and material, but universal, abstracted, and immaterial things, which Brutes by their Reason cannot do, so the external Speech, which is the nuncius of the internal, is assisted thereby, which indeed the Speech of Brutes cannot aspire unto.  
100 So that there is, as vast a distance between the Reason of Inanimate Creatures and Humane Reason, and their Speech, or the signification of things which is designed by Speech, and the Speech of Man, as there is between the Material and Immaterial Faculty. And therefore we may truly conclude, that no Creature is endued with the faculty of real Speech, or true Reason, but Man only; but the Speech of Brutes may be said faintly to resemble the true Speech of Man, as also their Reason, Human Reason, by some kind of Analogy.   
FINIS.   

Books Printed for William Crook, at the green Dragon without Temple-Bar.  
Praxis Curiae Admiralitatis Angliae, Authore Fransc. Cherk. Printed 1667. price bound 1 s.  
The Complete Measurer, or an exact new way of Mensuration, by which may be measured both Superficies and Solids in whole Numbers and Fractions, in a more plain and easy way, than ever yet extant, whereby you may find out the Contents of all superficies and solids in whole numbers and fractions by the help of Multiplication, without Division, by Tho. Hammond. in 8o price bound 1 s..  
A Voyage into the Levant, being a brief Journey lately performed from England by the way of Venice into Dalmatia, Sclavonia, Bosna, Hungary, Macedonia, Thessaly, Thrace, Rhodes and Egypt, unto Gran Cairo, with particular observations concerning the modern Condition of the Turks, and other People under that Empire, by Sr. Henry Blunt Knight; in 12 ᵒ Printed 1669. price bound 1 s.  
A Tract concerning schism and Schismatics, wherein is briefly discovered the original Causes of all Schism, written by the late Learned and Judicious Divine john Hales of Eton; in 4 to. 6 d.  
Hugonis Grotii Baptizatorium; Puerorum Institutio alternis interrogationibus & responsionibus: Caiazzo adjicitur Graeca ejusdem Metaphrasis à Christo: Wase Regalis Colleg. Cant. ana cum observatiunculis in Graecam Metaphrasin ad Calcem appensis: Quibus accessit praxis in Graecam Metaphrasin per B. Beale cum Graecis Testimoniis ex sacra pagina & Indice locupletissimo, in 8o Printed 1668. price bound 2 s.  
The Court of Curiosity, wherein by the Algebra and Lott the most intricate questions are resolved, and Nocturnal Dreams and Visions explained, according to the doctrine of the Ancients; to which is also added a Treatise of Physiognomy: published in French by Mark de Vulson Kt. of the Order of S. Michael, and Gentleman in ordinary to the French King, (since translated into Spanish, Italian, and Dutch, and now) into English, by I. G. Gent. of the Inner Temple; in 8o Printed 1670. price bound 2 s.  
A description of Candia in its ancient and modern state, with an account of the Siege thereof begun by the Ottoman Emperor in the year 1666. continued 1667, 1668. and surrendered the latter end of 1669. in 8o printed 1670. price bound 1 s.  
The Complete Vinyeard, or an excellent way for planting of Vines according to the Germane and French manner and long practised in England, wherein is set forth the ways and all the circumstances necessary for planting of a Vineyard, with the election of the soil, the situation thereof, the best way for planting the young plants, the best time and manner of pruning, the turning & translation of the ground etc. with other observations, also the fashion of Wine-presses, the manner of bruising and pressing Grapes, and how to advance our English Vines enlarged above half by the Author W. Hugh's; 8o printed 1670. price 1 s. 6 d.  
Epigrams of all sorts made at divers times, and several occasions by R. F. 8o printed 1670. price bound 1 s.  
Sylva Sylvarum, or a natural History in ten Centuries, whereunto is newly added the History Natural and Experimental of Life and Death, or the prolongation of Life, published after the Author's death by W. Rawley D. D. one of His Majest. Chapl. whereunto is added Articles of Inquiry touching Minerals, and the new Melantis, as also the Life of the Author, never added to this Book before, written by the Right honourable Francis Lord Verulam, Viscount St. Alban, the ninth and last Edition, with an Alphabetical Table of the principal things contained in the ten Centuries. fol. printed 1670. pr. 8 s.  
The Triumph of God's revenge against the crying and execrable sin of Murder, etc. in 30 several histories, delivered by I. Reynolds, 5 Edition with pictures, fol. printed 1670. price 10 s.  
The Jesuits Morals collected by a Doctor of the College of Sorbonn in Paris, who hath faithfully extracted them out of the Jesuits own Books which are printed by the permission & approbation of the Superiors of their Society translated out of French in folio printed 1670. price bound 10 s.  
A Sermon Preached at the funeral of a sober Religious Man found drowned in a Pit not long ago, enlarged by the Author upon his review, in 8o printed 1670. price bound 1 s.  
The Deaf and Dumb man's Discourse, or a Treatise concerning those that are born deaf and dumb, containing a discovery of their Knowledge or Understanding, as also the Method they use, to manifest the sentiments of of their minds together with an additional tract of the Reason and Speech of inanimate Creatures, by G. Sibscota; 8o printed 1670. price bound 1 s.