Imprimatur.  
April 16. 1687. Ex aedibus Lamb-hithanis. Jo. Battely.   

A Future World, In which MANKIND shall Survive their Mortal Durations, Demonstrated by RATIONAL EVIDENCE, From NATURAL and MORAL ARGUMENTS Against the Atheist's Pretensions.  
By WILLIAM SMYTH, D. D.  Vera Beatitudo, quam Deus dabit, non tantum Authoritate Divina, sed adhibita Ratione, qualem propter infideles possumus adhibere, clarescat. St. Aust. de Civ. Dei, lib. 19 cap. 10. 
LONDON, Printed by T. M. for R. Clavel at the Peacock in St. Paul's Churchyard, 1688.   

To the Right Honourable WILLIAM Earl and Viscount Yarmouth, Treasurer of His Majesty's Household, AND Lord Lieutenant of Wiltshire.  
My LORD,  
ALtho' I do humbly Acknowledge, That it is too Great a Happiness for me, to have both the Honour and Advantage of sheltering myself in this Adventure under Your Lordship's Protection, yet I hope I may presume upon another Favour from Your Lordship, by this Address: And that is, That Your Lordship would please to Interpret and Accept it, as an Instance of my Grateful Acknowledgement of many Signal Kindnesses formerly received from some of Your Lordship's Noble Ancestors.  
And tho', My Lord, there may be an Exception made, That I should Dedicate a Book that relates to a Future World, to a Person of Honour, in the Youthful Flourish of his Age, and in the very Point of his Ascendency to Temporal Greatness; yet I am so far Assured of Your Lordship's Ingenuity and Goodness, that You will neither refuse to be advertised, nor be aggrieved to think, That when You have passed over the several Stages of Your Mortality, You must become an Inhabitant in the Future World, whose Real Existence I have endeavoured to ascertain to the Reason of a Man, as the Truth of it is more especially secured, by the Faith of a Christian.  
And, My Lord, I doubt not, but that this Discourse will be the rather acceptable to Your Lordship, now You are so Honourably engaged in His Majesty's Service, as that it may possibly add to the Numbers of His Majesty's Dutiful Subjects: And that, because there are no sorts of Men more ready to Degenerate into Republican Principles and Practices, than those, who when they are told of their Duties to their Prince, upon Religious Obligations, can Mock at the Concerns of another World.  
And now, My Lord, as to Your Own Person; If Your Lordship shall, upon Your Perusal of this Treatise, meet with any thing which may Contribute to Your Lordship's Happy Interest in that Following World; as such a Success will amply Recompense me for the Pains I have taken upon that Famous Subject, so it will answer the affectionate Desires and Prayers of,  
My Lord, Your Lordship's Obliged and most Obedient Servant, WILL. SMYTH. March 28 th'. 1688.   

A Prefatory Account TO THE READER.  
AND he is to be Advertised, That the cogent Reason which overruled my Thoughts, to engage at this time in a Discourse upon this Subject, is, because I am convinced, that there hath not been the same Industrious Care taken, to Control the Atheist's Pretensions, against the Belief of A Future World's Existence, as in many other Cases of lesser moment and danger, it hath been expressed.  
For tho' Men may Answer in Excuse for that Omission, because a professed Unbelief of that State, is in its self so odiously abhorrent, as that few Men have adventured the reproach of making any Open Discoveries of their Unbelieving Sentiments: Yet such as are guilty of that Omission, have not well considered, what an Inclination there is in Men, grossly Irreligious, to listen to any suggestions, which may (tho' covertly) licentiate their continuance in their most Impious and Immoral Practices; Nor have they considered, that there hath not been such men wanting, as were ready in their loose and complying Societies, (tho' sometimes but slyly and sportfully) to insinuate such Atheistical Thoughts into their Associates Heads, (of the prodigious Effects of which we can't be unsensible:) I say, these things considered, (of which I shall presently give a further account) I know not what can be said in real Excuse for that Omission.  
And further, to evince the Truth of this Charge, let the numbers of Books, which relate to the different Opinions about Religion, be computed, in which Fellow-Christians have expressed their Zealous Labours one against another; and then let a Man examine how few Treatises there be extant, which have been engaged in the Defence of another World's Existence, in such a manner, as might convince Atheistical and Doubtful Minds, and I am confident, such an Enquirer into that Disparity, will find, that not One Book of a Thousand, hath born any singular Attention to that Work; and yet perhaps none more Needful to have been undertaken; as I shall presently make it appear.  
I confess, I have a good while had these Papers finished by me, but I have been hitherto discouraged from publishing them, because I perceived the late Controversies have so swallowed up the Minds, and devoured the time of Reading Men, that the Books upon any other Subjects could obtain no attentive Regard at all; Nor would those men permit themselves to inquire after any Discourses, but such as bore some alliance to those present Controversies.  
But now, at this juncture of time, supposing Men to be throughly wearied with those Toss of Dispute; and with being continually Spectators of such endless Oppositions; and even nauseated with those numerous Pamphlets, sent abroad almost every Week, with the heaps of which, their very Houses are encumbered, as well as their Heads: I say, I imagined, for those Reasons, that such men would now be in a disposition, if it were but to alleviate their fastidious Minds with some Variety, to attend to some other Discourses, which might abett no Party on either hand. And the present Subject, I am sure, may challenge an Exemption from any such biased Concernment.  
And then more particularly, this Discourse may the rather claim a greator Attention from every Party, because it is in the Defence of a Subject which is the Prime Fundamental (next to the acknowledgement of a GOD) upon which all Religions, howsoever variated by different Persuasions, must necessarily be superstructed; and without a firm Belief of which, what would signify such elaborate Multiplications of the present Controversial Differences? Which, perhaps, by some men's manner of management, may, in time, give no small occasion for the Usefulness of such a Discourse as this: Especially if there should be the same Event from the Intestine and Civil Wars of the Pen, as from those of the Sword; according to my Lord Verulam's Observation about the Introduction and Increase of Atheism.  
And now I wish I had no more to say to my Honest-minded Reader for his satisfaction. But some Captious men have provided other Work for me. For I hear (upon the very notice of my design) that there are many Exceptions intended, whereby to overrule the Necessity, and to disparage the Lawfulness of my whole Undertaking. And therefore I must entreat my well-intending Reader's Patience, while I endeavour to solve the Import of those Exceptions before I begin. And they are especially these Four.  
First, Some (as I hear) are prepared to say, that this Author must needs himself suppose, and would have others to think, that there be many People at this time, who are very extraordinarily Defective in their Belief of this Fundamental Article; or he would never have taken upon himself to engage in this particular Subject, with so much earnestness; nor have been so solicitous in solving every Little Allegation and Exception, as if a studied Sceptic stood always at his Elbow, to suggest them to him.  
My Solution of this Exception is, That I must needs Confess, I do really think, that there are more Considerable Numbers in the Nation, (occasioned principally by the Former Ages unhappy Rebellion) than men are ordinarily aware of, who do at this time (tho' for fear or subtlety they don't always discover their Thoughts) either wholly disown the Being of any Future at all, or else that do admit the Belief of it, but (dimidiata side) with a sceptical and doubtful Faith, and under some disordered Apprehensions; such as may Licence them in their Irreligious Ways of Living, without any control from a Sense of what's to come in Future. And if those men's Practices may be allowed for a Demonstration of such defects in their Faith, what Arguments of that kind can be supposed to be wanting in their Actions, to assure such an Evidence?  
For tho' it's true (as some are apt to allege) that a bare supine inconsideration in some Men, and some Prejudices and odd Nations of Religion in others; and perhaps some Unhappy Educations, and disadvantageous Exemplifications in many more, may so far prevail, as that many men may be tempted to a Carelessness of Conversation; that is, perhaps to be engaged in some fashionable Vices, and common Follies; or to be regardless of some Religious Offices: But when we shall see men so professedly Wicked, as to make no Conscience at all of the grossest Immoralities; and so profane, as to make a Mock of all the salutary Expedients which a Gracious GOD hath provided in His Church for their Eternal Good and Happiness; What can induce a Man to think otherwise, but that such men's minds must be debauched, either with a Latent Unbelief of Another World; or with such an imperfect Sense of it, as by which their Thoughts might not be affected with any Judgement or Punishment to come, for whatsoever they do?  
And why may I not think my Conjecture to be reasonably enough deduced, when (if the Targums sense of the case may be accepted) such an Observation may be verified from the Beginning of the World, in the Famous Case of Cain and Abel? Here lay the ground of their vastly-different States and Events. The one believed a Future State, and made use of his Faith to perform an acceptable Sacrifice to GOD, in order to a Future Reward: The other Brother denied the Being of such a state. For whereas it's said, (Gen. 4. 8.) That Cain talked with his Brother Abel; (as the Targum expounds it) the Discourse was about a Future World; and Cain told Abel, 
Respondit Cain & dixit Abeli, non est judicium, nec judex, nec saeculum aliud, etc. Respondit Abel, est judicium & judex, etc. Et propter harum rerum caulam, contendebant super facies agri, & surrexit Cain contra fratrem suum, & fixit lapidem in front ejus, & interfecit eum. Targ. Jonathan. B. Vriell. Bibl. Polrg.  that there was neither Judgement nor Judge, Reward nor World to come, etc. But Abel told him, that all those were to be believed as true. Upon this Difference Abel suffered Martyrdom in defence of his Faith; and Cain, by his Unbelief, became a Murderer, and Famously miserable.  
Now, as no man can think it impossible, but that there may be some men in this Age, who may be as irreligious and malicious, as revengeful and profane as Cain was; then why may it not, without breach of Charity, be presumed that there may be such also amongst us, as have entertained in their minds the same Atheistick Principles which Cain indulged? And tho' this my Conjecture may seem to some men surprising and too severe, yet I can't imagine how any observing man can behold the little conscience that is made but of that one Horrid and crying sin of Perjury only, by which the Power and Justice of God are so often dared to his Face; and the import of the Sacred Bible, upon which they swear, as often scorned, and (as it were) defied, but he must incline his mind to my unhappy Conjecture.  
But if some men, (out of civility to Mankind, the Nation and their Neighbours) should refuse to admit such a manner of answer to this Exception and be resolved to think, that there be no men so defective in their Faith of another World, how irreligious soever they may be in their Lives; yet I can assure myself, that this my Discourse may be useful, not only to them, but even to the most Religious sort of Believers; Who may be highly pleased and gratified, when they shall understand that that Fundamental upon which they had adventured all their hopes of being in Future Blessed, should not stand upon the only point of Believing, for which they might suffer, from some Atheistick Persons, the reproach of an easy Credulity, (a Credat Judaeus Apella) but that they can now be able to defend themselves in that point, against such Atheists, even upon the Evidence of their own Principles.  
2. The next Exception is entertained by them, who will say, that my way of Arguing for another World's Existence by Rational Demonstration, is wholly to the disparagement of the Evangelic Revelation; and that it calls in question its sufficiency to do its own Work, as having brought Immortality to light, and given the most convincing Evidence for the Belief of another World. And that therefore there is now no more need to fly to Philosophical Argumentation, than there is to the Miracle of one rising from the Dead for further Conviction. For say my Exceptioners, 
Luke 16. 29.  they have Moses and the Prophets, to whom the Unbelievers being sent, the Officers of Religion are discharged of any further Care for such men's recovery from their Infidelity. But then also they will be ready to object and say, that such a Proceedure, by Rational Demonstration, will turn all Religion into Scepticism, and bring Christianity back again to Philosophy.  
First, In my answer to this most material Exception, I shall consider of what importance that alleged Text of Scripture is, to make good that Charge against me in this Case. And then I say, that that Text is only to be understood, that the Divine Revelation may be sufficient for the Belief of another World's Existence, without any new instances of Attestation; such an one, as one rising from the Dead, to confirm the Credibility of that, which was sufficiently testified before. But it doth not thence follow, tho' there should be no more need of Testimonial Proof, That men should be denied (when the occasion especially requires it) the Benefit and Use of Rational Demonstration, to evince the Truth of A Future World's Existence. Which when it's done, it will be so far from being a Disparagement to the admitting the Truth of it by Divine Attestation, That it will add much to the Credit of the Testimonial Authority, which exacted the Obedience of such a Faith.  
And therefore, since it hath pleased God Almighty to allow Men the Advantage of both ways to evince the Truth of this Fundamental Principle of all Religion, surely it was not his design, that they should disparage or amaze one another, but that they should be Auxiliaries, and subservient one to another.  
Secondly, I answer, That it was a method which the Church frequently undertook to convince the Heathen World; especially when Miracles became unfrequent. Therefore Clemens Alexandrinus owns both those Advantages from God: First, that of Revelation, 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Strom. lib. 1. Mihi pag. 282.  as principally to be attended to; and then also of Philosophical Demonstration to be made use of, in the behalf of the Gentile World.  
And the Primitive Apologists transcribed me such a Copy of what I have here attempted, (tho' they managed it by measures agreeable to their then Opponents) that either my Exceptioners must question the proceedures of those Ancient Defenders of Christian Faith, or they must think themselves unjustifiable in condemning me. Especially when they may consider, that it is very probable, that I may have a sort of men to deal withal, who may maintain as stubborn an Opposition to the Scriptural Revelation, and all other the Churches Testimonial Proofs of a Future State's Existence, as those ancient Heathens may be presumed ever to have entertained. And by the Sense of the Increase of such an Obstinate Modern Atheism was Curterius Governed, when he gave his Reasons for the Edition and Interpretation of the Famous Philosopher Hierocles. 
— Libellus, qui philosophicis rationibus, ab illis id extorqueret, (nisi hominis naturam exuerint) quod divini Verbi Authoritas persuadere non potuit. Praef.  As when he saith, That it was not without a Divine Providence that such a Book should come to public View, which by Philosophical Reasonings should extort those Truths from them, (unless they would unman themselves) which the Divine Revelation could not prevail with them to admit.  
Thirdly, I answer, in Justification of those Ancients. Practice, and my own Undertaking, That there is no Attempt or Method so proper, and in its self so reasonable, to bring such Atheistical Minds to embrace the Christian Religion, as that which I have endeavoured by this present Discourse. For if once such men's Understandings can be convinced by any means, to entertain an assured Acknowledgement of A Future World's Existence; and then shall be sensible of those events, which are reasonably consequent to such an Acknowledgement, it will of course engage them (if they have any minds at all) in the study of finding out the best way, how they might most securely provide for their own Safety in such a Following World.  
And when, for that purpose, they shall have considered of, and surveyed the several Modes of Religion in the World, they cannot but find Christianity more accommodable to the serious Conceptions of an Intellectual Mind, than any Institution that was ever tendered to the Thoughts of Man, especially when he shall understand that it is a Principle that hath in all Ages endured the Test and Trial of the acutest Literature; and hath hitherto born down all Oppositions with the greatest Success. That hath been ennobled with the highest instances of Generous Resolution, even to Death itself, in the declared defence of it. A Religion that hath made the most absolute Provision for the Welfare of all Societies: That is, that it keeps up Sovereign Power with the Intirest Loyalty, and the Rights of Men with the exactest Justice, and provides for the Needs of Mankind with the Tenderest Mercy. And that where its Institutions are truly observed, it makes men civil and obliging; placable and condescending; and will engage them to do nothing, but what is seemly and prudent, faithful and honourable.  
But then, when upon these considerate Thoughts, our Convert, by such a Rational Conviction, shall be once brought to the Door of Christ's Kingdom, (the main intention of my Design) he is not to expect, nor will the Christian Institution admit it, that the Heavenly Contrivance and mysterious Doctrines of it, should depend upon, or necessarily be accounted for, by the same Rational and Demonstrative Way of Proof, which at first induced him to entertain the Thoughts of Embracing the Profession of that most Holy Religion. He will then find Reasons to think, That to Believe will be made his Duty; and that he must Walk by Faith, and not by Sight, as St. Paul declares positively. And that then also he must not give leave to his Captious mind; to be always enquiring for Demonstrating Reasons for every thing that is tendered to his Belief. It's true, That Rational Evidence did first bring him to Christianity; but it must be his Faith, that will make him a true Professor of it: And the Conformity of his Life and Actions to that Holy Faith, will at lust bring him to the Happiness of that Future World; of the Existence of which, he was so convinced.  
And thus, I hope, I am sufficiently acquitted of that suspicious Objection, as if, when I endeavoured by Rational Evidence to bring an Atheist to the Belief of such a World to come, that I designed to turn all Religion into Scepticism, and the Christian Faith to Philosophy. This solves the Second Exception.  
3. The Third Exception is made by them, who will be ready to say, That since I have undertaken, against the Modern Atheists, to Demonstrate a Future World by Rational Evidence, how comes it to pass, that I have not also endeavoured to Offer at the same Way of arguing, to evince the Being of One Supreme GOD? And Is there not (say they) the same Necessity for the one, as for the other, against the Atheist's Pretensions?  
To this Exception my answer is, That in the management of this my Demonstrative Way of arguing for A Future World's Existence, I have not been precariously Presumptive of any one other Principle, either Philosophical or Divine, but only of that One, viz. the pre-supposed believed Existence of a Supreme and Infinite GOD, as the Creator, and consequently the Sovereign Governor of that His Created World. And I presumed, that such a Concession no man, that consults his Reason, would ever deny me, because no man can disbelieve His Divine Existence without a Violence offered to his Reasoning Understanding. In which, if that Notion be not naturally implanted, (as many Learned men believe) yet it will so uncontrollably Command any Considering Minds assent, as that no Nation, how barbarous soever, nor any man so rude, but he must submit to the acknowledgement of a Deity; 
Tusc. Quaest. Lib. 1.  as Cicero positively discourseth.  
But if my Exceptioner shall, in prejudice to me, still proceed to lay that Omission, as a stumbling-Block, in my way, I desire that he would but seriously consider, Whether the Opinion of the World's Eternity, or its coming into that Figure, in which it now exists, by the casual Confluence of little Atoms (the only two Refuges to support the Denial of such a First creative Cause) can be managed in any man's Thoughts so accommodably and naturally, as may the acknowledged Being of an Eternal GOD, to be the Original Creator of such a World; whose Greatness must proclaim His Power; whose Orderly Figure His Infinite Reason; and whose regular and constant Continuance in that Order, when so many Being's are naturally subjected to such numerous intercurrent Motions and Contingencies, must evince His Providential Wisdom and Government? This the Third Solution.  
The Last Exception, with which I am most likely to be attacked, is offered by them, that will say that my Discourse is upon a Subject which hath been already handled by a great many considerable Authors; and that I shall but still add to the so much complained of redundancy of Books, with which the World is already too much encumbered.  
My Answer to this Exception is; That as I had never enquired after, nor ever read any Treatise that Concerned the Defence of another World's Existence, before I had exactly finished my own Arguments; so since, though▪ I have made as strict an enquiry as I could, to find out such Discourses, I could not meet with any but such, as generally managed this important Case, either but as in some digressive Passages, or as occasionally inter woven in Discourses otherwise designed. And where any Treatises may have given any likelihood of being purposely published for the purpose in hand, yet their Arguments were too concise and summary, to solve a nice and Sceptical Doubt, much less to overrule an Obstinate Opposition.  
For though the Substance of the Truth might be couched in such short Mediums of Proof, yet I conceive, that they were too like the contracting a considerable Controversial Cases, into an Article of Aquinas; which must be presumed to be by far otherwise better managed, when the controverted point shall be agitated by industrious Opposition. And which then may occasion whole Volumes to discharge the Debate, when a few Lines, at another time, would have served the turn. I say, the Arguments were too Compendious and Epitomised, and therefore 〈◊〉 many cases, for want of fuller explanations, they would seem to be built upon Principles and Premises too precariously presumed. And then, for that Reason also, they could not possibly provide against those numerous Exceptions, which Scrupulous and Steptick Minds would be apt to interpose; and of which there must have been more particular and exact Solutions, or such men would never have admitted the Conclusion.  
To avoid all those Inconveniencies, I have endeavoured in the whole Progress of my Arguings to understand beforehand, what could possibly be suggested in such Cases; wheresoever I could either hear, read; or think of them. And if thereby I may seem to have made too Copious Enlargements, either in the Explanations of the Premises, or solving the Exceptions, I must crave such Readers Patience and Ingenuity to think, that I have done it for their sakes, who (I thought) did specially need them, or that would exact them from me. And thus my Fourth Exception is solved.  
But, I confess, I might have most justly subjoined one more, and perhaps the Greatest, and with which I am sure to be sufficiently assaulted; and that is, the Unsufficiency of my Performance. But of that I need not be advertised, I have Reasons enough in my own mind to humble me; and no Man can speak meaner of it than I think.  
I know it were silly in me to say, I was too inadvertently surprised into an Allowance of the Publication of this Treatise, or that when it was once in a Learned Friends hand, I did not only give him leave, but desired him, that a flame might make it never to be thought on more; yet this I am sure, I may inoffensively say, that I shall be so much the less concerned at whatsoever kind of Reception, the nice Age shall please to allow it, as that I have but a short step to make, before I shall enter into that other World, where (to be sure) I shall not be affected with the little Notices of a For or Against. But if I were so Unfortunate, as to be concerned, yet I could not but consider, that there is but a Die cast for my Lot: And that a Book's Entertainment in the World, is even as Hazardous as a Juries Verdict; where Dissatisfaction, Prejudice; or Ignorance, may cast the issue on the wrong side. It may be my case, tho' this whole Preface was designed to prevent such a Consequence, and to provide a necessary defence of the Subject's Usefulness, and my own Credit, against such Exceptions as are managed against both. And I hope this will justly plead my Excuse for the length of such an Introduction.   

A short Account of the Heads of the Five ARGUMENTS, with the numbers of those Pages where they all begin.  

THE First Argument is founded upon the Promiscuous usage of Good and Evil in this World, and begins Page 2.  
The Second from the Rational Faculties, not given for this World only; and begins Pag. 85.  
The Third upon the Encouragements to Virtue from another World only; and begins Pag. 187.  
The Fourth from the Miseries of Mankind in this World; and begins Pag. 281.  
The Fifth from men's Innate Desires of Happiness, not satisfied in this Life; and begins Pag. 367.    

INDEX.  

A.  
APpeals to God's Tribunal 20  
Adam's Sin 331  
Age described 301   

B.  
Belief of a Deity 213   

C.  
Conscience of Evils 16  
Contemplation 143  
Chiefest Good 406  
Covetousness 115   

D.  
Dead-men's Future State concealed, and why? 50  
Death described 301 309  
Discontents 92 297  
Drunkenness 119   

E.  
Exemplification 259   

F.  
Fools by sensual living 109  
Fools Charactered 115  
Friendship 295   

G.  
Government 137  
Its End 221  
Gospel's easiness examined 267   

H.  
Heathens opinion of the other World 3●  
Hobbs his Necessitation examined 204  
Happiness naturally desired 373  
Differences about it 406  
Happiness, by Memorials left behind, examined 409  
Honour 247 395   

I.  
Jews Temporal Promises 237  
Justice at one time or other 7  
Justice not done in this World 26  
Justice respited to another World, why? 52   

L.  
Learning 125   

M.  
Miseries of Mankind represented 288  
From God; why? 323  
Murderers of Mens-selves examined 337  
Miseries beneficial 353  
Surplusage of them examined 357   

P.  
Predestinarian Principles 201  
Philosophical Rules to prevent Self-murder, examined 345  
Parent's Case to their Children 337  
Pleasures 396 403   

R.  
Rational Faculties not given for this Life only 87  
Rewards may be proposed 207   

S.  
Spiritual things satisfy 152  
In men's power 160   

T.  
Temporal things not satisfy 92  
Not in men's power 99  
Time how to be spent 181   

V.  
Virtue described 195  
Virtue her own Reward examined 229  
Virtues difficult; how? 243  
Reasons for it, why? 269   

W.  
Wisdom by Religion 167  
Wise and good man's Character 171  
Wealth examined 398  
Useful 417    

These following ERRATA, being most material, the Reader is desired to Correct with his Pen, and pardon the rest, as I hope, of less moment.  
PAge 4. l. 12. for That is, r. And. P. 6. l. 4. for God r. His. P. 18. l. 22. r. Menelaus. P. 42. l. 6. add Poets. P. 48. l. 12. r. Sensibly. P. 50. l. 16. add Scholastic. P. 51. l. 2. r. a Rheiorick 〈◊〉 P. 59 l. 3. r. disposed. P. 63. l. 12. r. thus. P. 65. l. penult. deal. that. P. 99 l. 1. add is. Ibid. l. 20. r. Constitutives. P. 102. l. 10. deal are. P. 141. l. 18. add if. P. 144. l. 5. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. P. 184. leave out all from Notion, l. 19 to maketh, l. 21. P. 189. l. 16. add a. P. 262. l. 28. r. Ingenuous. P. 275. l. 3. r. to signify their. P. 278. l. 25. deal sense and. P. 378. l. r. deal, and. P. 381. l. 7. for as r. at. P. 382. l. 19 r. a Being. P. 383. l. 14. for [▪] put [▪] P. 386. l. antepen add It's certain. P. 390. l. 4. for stout r. afflicted. P. 401. l. 28. for Honour r. Fame. P. 403. l. 27. r. Excesses. P. 404. l. 19 for disease r. disgrace. P. 413. l. 5. deal Happiness and. Ibid. Blot out from satisfaction l. 5. to concerning l. 8. inclusively. Ibid. l. 8. deal Kind of Happiness. P. 426. l. 12. r. were they.   

First Argument.  
The Sum of the FIRST ARGUMENT.  
THE First Argument designed to demonstrate the necessary Existence of a Future State, is founded upon an obviously acknowledged Observation, That there is not Universal Justice, Judgement and Equity done to Mankind in this present World, according to the different Qualifications of their Lives and Actions. But that Good Men, and their Righteous Causes, are very frequently oppressed and defeated; and that Evil Men, and their Unjust Undertake and Practices, as commonly prosper and succeed.  
All which cannot but reflect upon the essential Goodness and Wisdom of Almighty GOD; because those unequal Proceedings and Events could not be acted, and brought to pass, without His Divine Permission; and also, because it was always in His Power to have prevented them when he pleased.  
Now if nothing else can solve that Reflection upon those Divine Attributes, but only the belief and acknowledgement of a Future World, to which God's impartial and complete Administrations of Justice, Judgement, and Equity, should be respited and adjourned: That is, if it shall appear, that that Adjournment of it to that State, can only secure the Universe in its naturally stated Order; and than that no other season of its Administration, can so sufficiently acquit GOD's gracious care of, and love to Mankind, according to the Nature he gave them: Then it must needs follow, That he hath ordained and constituted such a Future World, and State.  
Now, that this Argument may more fully attain its designed End, and that I may take away all possible Exceptions against the Premises, or what relates to them, I shall divide the general Concern of it, into Three Chapters or Heads of. Discourse, in order to the clearer Inference of the Conclusion at last.  
In the first Chapter, I shall offer to proof, That what is just and equitable, will by a Good and Just GOD be impartially administered to all sorts of Mankind, according to the different Qualifications of their Lives and Actions, at one time or another; that is, either here or here after.  
In the Second Chapter, it will be made evident, That Almighty GOD doth not execute such an universal administration of Justice to Mankind in this present Life; and then I shall take into consideration, what an Influence that Omission had upon the Minds of the Heathen World.  
In the Third Chapter, it will appear, That GOD's respiting and adjourning the completely impartial Administration of His Divine Justice to a Future World, can only solve the apprehensions we have, That GOD intended to preserve the present Universe in the same Order that his Power and Wisdom had at first Created it, especially as to his Divine Care of Mankind, whether as socially, or individually considered.  
And if all these Three Premises shall, upon sufficient Proof, be found to be certainly true; there will be no Cause at all to question the Conclusion for the undoubted Existence of another World.  
A FUTURE WORLD'S EXISTENCE Demonstrated by Rational Evidence.  

CHAP. I.  
THE First Chapter is designed to represent and prove, That GOD Almighty will, without doubt, administer an impartial distribution of Rewards and Punishments to the Good and Evil, according to the different Qualifications of their Lives and Actions at one time or another. And the truth of this necessary presupposition, is founded upon these Five Grounds or Reasons, which make up so many Sections.  

Section I.  
THe first Reason that I shall offer for the necessary belief of such an impartial distribution of Justice are one time or another, is alleged from the believed Existence of a God, with a particular respect to his Natural and Essential Goodness, which by a necessary consequence from his being acknowledged the World's Original Maker, must be believed to be as infinitely Operative, as any other of those Divine Perfections, which the Creation of the World must necessarily suggest to belong to such an infinite First Cause, and Independent Being.  
And for the reasonableness of this deduction, I appeal to the Philosopher Simplicius, who upon the account of considering God as the Cause of Causes, 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Pag. (mihi) 210.  & Beginning of all Begining, presently as a necessary concomitant with such a conception of him, concludes him to be Goodness of Goodnesses, that is, Good to all Perfection.  
Now whatsoever Being, is in any degree, or sense, a real Goodness in itself, must be supposed to afford a reason of that denomination, from a Good that is done according to its capacity, where there be Objects that need it, or Causes that require it.  
And if the Goodness of God be such, (which no man can suspect without Blaspheming the Divine Nature, and contradicting his own Reason) the mind of man cannot possibly suggest a doubt, but that it should express itself in the Case in hand. That is, that a God of infinite Goodness and Equity, when it is always in his Power, as to understand, so to do all that is good and right, should at some time or other, vindicate and justify the innocent Causes of Good Men; that is, should recompense and reward their undeserved Sufferings; especially when for their adherences to virtue, they have been harassed and perplexed by the malicious usages of unjust and unreasonable men. I say, if the verification of his infinite Goodness be not to be thus expressed, What Cases are there, by which the reason of man can be otherwise satisfied, that that glorious Attribute hath a title to the same perfection, which the rest are presumed to have? or how otherwise, in any kind of practical Notion, can any reasonable Being understand, for what end or purpose he is commanded or obliged to be good at all? or how can a created moral Agent be so accounted either by God or Man upon such an omission? To refuse to do Right & Good, when it is always in his capacity to do it, would make but an untoward Character of such a Person, by an indifferent Judge of what Goodness is. And therefore to suppose God (with Epicurus) to be so wholly unconcerned in the Government of the World, and especially at what happens amiss to good men in it, so as to take no care at all of their vindications, when they are unjustly used and oppressed, would be reason enough, not only to reproach God's infinite Goodness, but, upon a very reasonable consequence, to tempt men to question his whole Existence. This is the first Reason.   

Section II.  
THE Second Reason is alleged from the Nature of Man, as God was pleased to make him a free and voluntary Agent, designed to be left to the conduct, and in the hand of his own Counsel; that is, because God gave him by his nature, in distinction from all other visible Creatures (who act necessarily by a sovereign Impulse, from which they cannot depart) a Power in himself to think, deliberate, and act Good or Evil at his own choice, and as he should judge fit to determine his own Mind and Actions. And the reason of this deduction is, because either the same Wise God, that formed him into such an arbitrary Nature, must have certainly provided and constituted for him some superior Judge and common Arbiter, by the dread of whose sovereign Authority and Justice, he might engage his mind and conscience to do what's just and good, and to whom he might be accountable for his actions whether good or evil; or it must be presumed that God made him possibly to be, the most (I may say the only) lawless, unsociable, and ungovernable part of the whole Creation. That is, that he should live (as it is manifestly seen men do, where such a Judge is neither regarded nor sufficiently considered) both to be his own folly and ruin, and the world's trouble and misfortune.  
Hence Athenagoras ingeniously observes, That as it's necessary to man's nature, that having an appetite he should have meat to preserve his life; 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. de Resur. P. 60.  and that as he is a mortal, he should have posterity to preserve his species; so as he is a rational Creature, that he should have a common Judge of all his actions, and from whom he might expect a reward, and dread a punishment.  
Now if such an Universal Judge, and Arbiter must for that reason be thus necessarily supposed, then it's certain that there can none be believed to be so universally qualified for it, as the same God that Originally gave man his being; and who by the Title of Creator was invested with a natural Sovereignty over all his Creatures which he made; and especially over Man, to whom he had given such a figure of mind and being, as naturally to need his Governing Dominion, more than any other Creature besides, if not only.  
For none can be such a competent Judge, but a Being that is Omniscient, and so is capable of understanding all Causes, Minds, and Actions; that is of an infinite goodness, and so can love, approve, and bless all that is done well, justly, and worthily: And lastly, of an infinite power so as to be able to execute all his own judiciary purposes and determinations, how and when he pleases.  
No Being, that wants any of these qualifications, can possibly be a Competent Judge of Men and their Actions, so that Universal right and equity may be completely and impartially done to the whole world of such Rational and Voluntary Agents. And because God Almighty can only be qualified for such a Judge, what can make a Suspicion, that he should not execute that just, necessary, and sovereign Office, at one time or another?  
As for what concerns the committing his Judiciary Authority to sovereign human Powers, it will be accounted for in the third Argument (chap. 2. sect. 3.) that is, how far thereby the Divine Care of administering universal Justice to the world, is attained and discharged.   

Section III.  
THe Third Reason that secures a Belief, that God will at one time or other, undertake the vindication of all righteous persons and causes, and bring them all to a true balance of impartial Right, is from a plea, & a just appeal, (and that upon most Rational Consequences) which all that are unjustly oppressed, may make to the holy and sovereign God, in their own behalf.  
First, By alleging, that the promiscuous world of Mankind, in which good men are unavoidably subjected and exposed (for reasons which a Future World can only solve) to the hazard of such miscarriages, and disadvantages, was naturally so disposed by God's own Original pleasure and ordination, as possibly to admit and produce such unequitable effects. And therefore the evil usages of virtuous and good men in such a world, must needs, in that respect, be the consequences of such causes and occasions, which God might have prevented if he had pleased, but which themselves could not control, when they would.  
Secondly, And more particularly, good men that are so oppressed, may further allege, that those very faculties and capacities, by which, unjust men, as men, are naturally empowered to choose and act their evil designs against the innocenter part of Mankind, were not only the Issues of Gods own Workmanship, when he was first pleased to Create Man; but they must be still kept up in their natural Use and Operations, by his Wife and Ordinative Permission.  
And from hence it is, 
Jud. 3. 12.  that the Scriptures (to whom an Atheist will permit an Appeal, 
2 Sam. 16. 10.  to illustrate such a natural truth) do all along attribute to God, 
2 Cron. 21. 16.  and interest him in (with expressions, 
Psal. 44. 9, etc.  which bear a very near alliance to Causality) the worst Actions, 
Lam. 2. 1, etc.  which wicked men have most voluntarily, 
Amos 3. 6.  and of their own evil minds, contrived and acted against Himself, his Church, and choicest Servants.  
Now the sum of these thoughts is, That if there be any such thing as a righteous Cause, or if any case may be reputed a causeless oppression; if there were ever any such men as were good and virtuous, 
Gen. 18. 26.  and that in Abraham's sense might be adjudged in God's esteem righteous persons: or if there were ever any such, 
Luke 1. 6.  besides Zacharias and Elizabeth, that walked in all the Commandments of God blameless, that is, acceptably so: And yet if nevertheless such good and righteous Persons have been oftentimes unjustly oppressed, and sometimes have passed away their whole mortal lives, racked, and worryed by the undeserved malice of evil men. And then lastly, if it be considered, how much God himself was concerned (so far as I have represented the Case), who can resist a belief, or what good man can silence his complaint and expectation, but that Almighty God, who is so much more or less interested, will at one time or other, order a through justification of his innocency, and redress his wrongs by some gracious method, and in the most proper season, which his own great wisdom and impartial equity, shall think fit to choose in this Life or another? This is the third Reason.   

Section IU.  
THis fourth Reason that supports a belief, that God will undertake, at one time or other such an Administration of his Divine Justice, is alleged from that natural conscience, and innate disposition; to fear the doing of (at least) notorious Acts of Immorality, which do universally and naturally (though in different degrees) attend the minds of men. And which must either signify, that there is a vindicative hand above, which will at one time or other return their wicked Actions upon themselves in some proportionable punishment; or else it must be presumed, that God gave them naturally and unavoidably such a Conscience only for their Delusion, and implanted in them that natural fear, to be only of something, that may possibly (if there should be no other world) never come to pass. Which is a consequence, that no good mind can entertain, that hath any regard at all for the Honour of his Maker's infinite justice and goodness.  
Now, though some men have laboured all they can to usurp upon that natural temper of their minds (whether by the influence of great examples of wickedness, or by the surprising temptations of some mighty present advantage; or upon the flattering hopes of the greatest secrecy) and may have, for a time, subdued the Authority of their Natural fear and conscience: and given themselves leave to be engaged in some vile and villainous practices: Yet when they had once acquired their ends by them, and digested the success (how great soever) of their unjust attempts, they have been afterwards inwardly arrested and attended, with an unaccountable dread of something (they knew not perhaps distinctly what) that might befall them for what they had done: Or at least they have been pursued with such an uneasiness and disorder of mind, that they could afford themselves no true rest or contentment, and but a very small satisfaction, in their own rightful, much less, in their unjustly acquired enjoyments.  
Now of this sad and dismal aftergame of a debauched natural conscience, there be so many instances in divine and humane story, that it's become as luxuriant a common place, as any whatsoever; and have afforded Stories for common talk, and (sometimes) divertisement, as much or more than any Subject that can be named.  
So that, if I should now undertake to spread my present discourse, with an Enumeration, but of some of them, (considering the Sceptical Humour of those men, whose Theistical Principles I design to control) I should but alarm their incredulity into a fit of derisive sport. And therefore I shall only offer one or two intimations of what may be said for it by such men, whose observations they have no reason to undervalue or suspect.  
What do they think of the representation of the Case by Euripides, in personating the humour of an avenging conscience in Orestes, 
Men. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Orestes. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc.  who being asked by Menelaus, what disease it was, that destroyed him, could answer, That it was his own mind or conscience, for the great evils that he had done? Or what did Juvenal mean, when he averred it of those Roman Emperors (that were most famously the greatest Tyrants) that in their unjust successes they had not escaped all their enemies; 
— Nec tamen hostes Evasisse putes, quos diu conscia facti Mens habet attonitos & surdo verbere caedit. Lib. 5. Sat. 13.  for they had every one of them one in their own guilty minds, that was always their attendant scourge, and that would perpetually wound them with the severest strokes of inward guilt? Or why did the Philosopher Simplicius say, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. cap. 38.  That such men shall punish themselves with the most acute torments, of their own minds, which shall be more vexatious to them, than the sharpest tortures of any bodily disease; and shall less admit of comfort or remedy? I say, what suspicion can our unbelieving Opponents create to themselves, That those men, who were Heathens themselves, should not deal fairly with the world in declaring their own Sentiments of this Case.  
And then the Sum is, whence can that natural fear of crimes (where there be temptations for present profit, honour or pleasure) before they are committed, and such unsufferable reflections, uneasiness, and sometimes torments of mind, after they are perpetrated, proceed, but from an undeleble, implanted Principle in man's Nature, to revere the vindictive Power, and severe justice of a God above, to be executed upon them at one time or another; especially when 'tis considered, that sometimes those wicked men could neither have them upon any other account, that can be imagined; nor could they lay them down, or escape them, when they most resolvedly endeavoured to release their minds from those most afflictive impressions. This is the Fourth Reason.   

Section V.  
THis Section offers a Reason, or rather a pregnant presumption, which some Men perhaps may think fit to make use off: And tho' it be not singly of its self sufficient to convince; yet in conjunction with the former Reasons it may serve to persuade, That God Almighty doth so take notice of the Oppressed, that he will at one time or other, and by what methods he pleases, vindicate the Causes of good men, and justify their innocency.  
And that is from a consideration of those men's practice, who for their causeless Sufferings, and undeserved Oppressions, having been deprived of all manner of redress from the Powers and Judicatories of men, have solemnly appealed to an impartial Tribunal above; and in the deep pressures of their Souls, have implored some signal indications, that God designed their Justifications in another World. Of these I shall give some few instances instead of the many, that might be offered.  
The first I shall give, is from what several Authors have reported, of one Lord John Thursin among the Vestogothi, who with greater Severity than Equity, commanded a certain man to be Beheaded, who before the separation of his Head from his Body, said to that Lord, I cite thee this hour to appear before the Tribunal of Almighty God, to answer to him, why thou hast condemned me to Death being innocent. And immediately that Great Lord, after the man was Beheaded, fell from his horse and died.  
Baptista Folgoso relates it of a Genua Captain, who condemned a Catalonian Commander to be hanged; who Pleading for mercy, and finding none, thus said to the Genua Captain; Since thou wilt needs execute upon me this most unjust sentence, having never in my life offended thee, or thy Nation, I appeal unto God the just avenger of injured innocence; and I desire that this instant day, thy Soul may appear with mine before Him, to yield an account for the wrong thou hast done me: And not many hours after, the Genua Captain died.  
Camerarius mentions it of a Master of the Teutonic Order, who, upon a falsely pretended Crime, had caused an innocent Person to be condemned to die; who being lead to his Punishment, cited the Master thirteen days after to the Tribunal of Christ; and the thirteenth day being come, the Master being hail and well, with his own mouth confessed to several persons, that he must now appear before Christ's Tribunal, and that day died.  
Both Exnerus and Lipsius tell us of Ferdinand the Fourth King of Spain, that when Peter and John, the two Brethren of Carvaialius were suspected for the murder of Benavidius, and upon an unsufficient proof being Convicted, the King sentenced them to be thrown down headlong from the top of an high Tower. They crying out that they were to die innocently, and the King's ears being shut against their just defence, they summoned the King within thirty days to appear and answer to the high God for what he had done; and the very thirtieth day after the King was found dead in his Bed.  
Lipsius gives us a story, from Lambertus Schafnaburgensis, whom he calls a famous Writer, and worthy of belief, of Burchardus Bishop of Halberstad, who entering into an unjust controversy with the Abbot of Helverden about Tithes in Saxony, which he had taken away from his Monastery; & the Abbot finding no relief from any Judicatory on Earth desired Frederick Count Palatine to tell the Bishop, That he appealed to Almighty God for Judgement, and that both of them should prepare themselves to try the Cause before the Divine Tribunal. In a little while the Abbot died, and presently after the Bishop; who falling from his horse, was heard to say, that he was just then snatched away to God's Tribunal there to be Judged.  
To these I could have added many more of this kind, such as the famous stories of the Templar at Bordeaux, of Radulphus Duke of Austria, and the like; but then I must have exceeded the proportion of this Paragraph. Therefore I shall now only take notice of a passage that looks that way in the Holy Scriptures. And that is of Moses in the Case of Corah and his complices. It was very like an appeal to the Justice of God, when for his Justification he said; 
Num. 16. 28, 29, 30, 31, 32.  If these men die the common death of all men; or if they be visited after the visitation of all men; Then hath not God sent me. God answered his Appeal, For the Earth opened and swallowed them up quick, etc.  
Now as to the other former Instances, they may be supposed to have been acted from sudden Efforts of deeply oppressed Passions, and not from any known Rules to licentiate them in those practices, and so the Appealants could not have promised themselves any assurance of those extraordinary events upon their provocations. And therefore it hath been and ought always to be questioned, whether it may be allowable or lawful ordinarily to imitate the practice of such appeals. And for this I shall not engage in the Controversy: My design was only to take notice of such as happened, to be made use of to our present purpose, as any man shall think fit; reputing them extraordinary Cases, and unusual instances of the Divine Justice; and as Lipsius calls them, 
* Exemppla mira, & supra fidem videantur, sed fides Authoribus scripta. Mon. & Exem. Cap. 11.  Wonderful Examples, and which might seem to exceed belief, but that they are related by Faithful Authors, and Memorials. This the Fifth.  
Now these Five Sections being ended, in which I have endeavoured to prove, that God Almighty will at one time or other, administer impartial Justice and Judgement to all Mankind, I should presently make a nearer approach towards the Conclusion for a Future World's Existence upon the account of this Argument, were I not obliged to consider, whether Almighty God doth not execute such administrations of his Justice to the Good and Evil in, and with respect to, this present life. And as to that enquiry, the Second Chapter is concerned.    

CHAP. II.  
IN this Chapter I am concerned to offer to Examination, Whether or no Almighty GOD doth not execute, or permit the Executions on Justice and Judgement to Mankind, according to the different Qualifications of their Lives and Actions, in this present Life. And this Enquiry will occasion three distinct Sections designed for several debates. In every one of which, something will be improved for the better illustrating the Reasson of the Argument.  
In the first Section will be managed the Matter of Fact, and therein it will be evidenced, That the administrations of Justice and Judgement to the Good and Evil, is not impartially executed in this World.  
In the second, will be offered to Observation, what an influence the sense of that Omission had, upon the Minds of the Heathen World.  
In the third, an occasion will be taken to offer Reasons, Why the imperfect Apprehensions, that are generally had of the state of the Dead, and of the manner of GOD's Management of his Justice in the other World, do not at all invalidate the belief of its real Existence, nor of the certainty of GOD's making an impartial Completion of his universal Justice and Judgement to the Good and Evil, in that state.  

Section. I.  
FIrst, in this Section I am engaged to represent that universal Justice is not impartially done to all Mankind, according to the different qualifications of their Lives and Actions in this their present Existence. But if it be alleged, That the Notoreity of the Fact, and a more general consent in the Case, is sufficient to supersede the offering of any thing, that is Explanatory to confirm the Truth of it: My Answer is, That as I can't foresee what evasions my attendant Sceptics may suggest to elude the plainest Presumptives, so I am willing (as I shall do all along) to indulge such as are already Believers, with the clearest explanations of the Case; If not the more fully to assure them, yet the more lively to represent to them, the attested Truth of their own Observation. And for that end, I shall take leave to trouble the Common Reader with some authoritative Testimonies. And to avoid Redundancy, I shall produce but two only of every sort.  
First, I shall offer the Scriptural sense of the case, and that only as it's represented by two Prophets of God, who by their interrogatory manner of speaking, do more strongly confirm that Matter of Fact.  
As, Why does the way of the Wicked prosper? 
Jer. 12. 1.  wherefore are they happy, that deal Treacherously? (saith the One). And, Wherefore boldest Thou thy tongue (saith the Other) when the Wicked devoureth the man that is more Righteous than he? 
Hab. 1. 13.  To which I might easily have added innumerable more, if I could have thought it necessary, or any way reasonable in this case, as to our Modern Theists.  
Secondly, I shall subjoin the sense of two Fathers of the Christian Religion. The first is that of Athenagoras the anicent Apollogist. And he undertakes an Argument for the assured belief of a future Judgement, because (saith he) We have seen many Wicked Men that have studied all their lives to do all manner of unjust things, 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. De resur. Mor. p. (mihi) 61.  and yet never met with any Evils to afflict them here; when others of approved Virtue, have wasted away their Lives in Sorrows, Vexations, Reproaches, and all kinds of Calamities.  
The next is Salvian, who in his Book of Providence, seems to alarm the Reader's wonder, 
Si totum quod in hoc mundo; est curae & gubernaculo & indicio Dei; Curio melior multo sit Barbarorum conditio, quam nostra? Cur inter nos quoque sors bonorum durior, quam malorum? Cur probi jacent, improbi convalescunt? Cur iniquis potestatibus universa succumbunt? Lib. de Prov.  saying, If all things in the World do depend upon the care, and government of God, Why is the condition of the Barbarians, much better than ours that are Christians? Why do the Good meet a harder portion in this Life, than those that are Wicked?  
And if my sceptic Reader, to invalidate the credit of these Authorities, shall object; That such men might be conducted into those affirmations, only to serve the faith of the divine Revelation, for the Existence of another Life; I shall therefore (fully to take off that exception) add the like number of Heathen Philosophers, who as positively as either of them have attested the same thing.  
The first shall be the sense of Cicero, (though perhaps he may personate Cotta, or some other man in speaking it) who was so greatly concerned in this case, that discoursing of the Gods, he saith, That if they have taken upon themselves any care of the world at all, it would be well with the Good, and otherwise with the Evil: But (saith he) there appears no such thing. And then the Philosopher further ingageing in an enquiry after it, confirms his own observation, by several instances that relate to it for its verification. As when he saith, 
* Cur duos Scipiones Poenus oppressit? Cur Hannibal Marcellum interemit? etc. Nat. Dear.  Why did the Carthaginian oppress the two Scipio's? Why did Hannibal prevail upon Marcellus and kill him? And then proceeds with a Catalogue of other examples of the oppressed Virtuous, and of as many more of the prosperity and success of Men extremely wicked.  
The second that I shall allege, shall be Simplicius, who in discourse admits a concession, That the Wicked may flourish in this Life in power, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Cap. 38. 212.  riches and health, and may continue in a prosperous state, even to their death, and may leave their Posterity in the like Prosperity: and that the Good and Virtuous may in the mean time, be harassed in the world, without any remarkable instances of Relief or Compensation.  
These be the three kinds of Authorities, which I thought, if not absolutely necessary, yet very convenient, to be offered in this Case: For though the matter of fact be obvious enough, yet our Sceptics know, that upon its unquestionable concession, the weight of the whole Argument depends; and therefore we must not be precarious in the least instances of proof, upon which we Argue.  
But what saith the Heathen world to all this? or what influence had it upon their minds? that's now to be examined: Therefore,   

Section II.  
IN this second Section, I have obliged myself to represent, what a remarkable influence, the ordinary omission of that impartial administration of God's justice to the good and evil in this life, had upon the minds of the Heathen World itself. And the reason why I take occasion to do it in this place, is because I perceive, that they were especially controlled into whatsoever they affirmed or doubted, concerning the Existence of a future state, from an observation of the promiscuous usage of the Good and Evil in this Life.  
Now, that I may fully discharge this design (which will appear so considerable an improvement of the present Argument) at once, I shall produce, or point at something, from the most famous Heathen Philosophers, with a transient Aspect upon the general run of the Poets, as to the case in hand.  
First as to the Heathen Philosophers, I shall not here take any notice of the Sense of Plato, or his Followers; or of what they and some others have affirmed concerning Socrates in that case. But I shall only make use of some such Philosophers, (and of those the most considerable) as lived since our Saviour's time; it being presumed that they should maintain an opposition to the acknowledgement of a future World, in pure defiance to Christianity; and that because the professors of it had so positively declared that state, and the issues of it, as it's principally rational Fundamental of all their virtuous Practices, and resolute Sufferings.  
Now, it will appear, that as those Philosophers could not escape the Observation of God's ordinary omission of his impartial justice to the Good and Evil in this life, so as oft as that consideration came intentively into their minds, it so staggered them in their Atheistical Hypothesis concerning a future World, that sometimes they were necessitated to admit the thoughts of it, though (as Minutius Foelix observes, dimidiata fide) but with a halfway, or doubtful Faith.  
The first of that sort, of whom I shall take notice, shall be Seneca, who lived not many years after our Saviour's Resurrection, and was Tutor to Nero, and whose Authority goes a great way with our modern Theists. He indeed expressed himself very frequently with a positive denial of any future World at all. As when he said, To die, was not to be at all: And that there shall be as much after me, 
Mors est non esse. Hoc erit post me, quod ante fuit— nos quoque accendimur, & extinguimur. Epist. ad Luc.  as there was before me: Our birth (saith he) kindles us into life, and our death extinguisheth us into nothing.  
But notwithstanding, when he was to comfort Polybius, for the death of his Brother, a virtuous Person; and considering how impossible it was for him to offer any sufficient reasons to support his Patience, without suggesting something concerning a future World, he could then say to him, 
Ne ita invideris fratri tuo, quiescit tandem liber, tandem tutus, tandem est aeternus— Fruitur nun● aperto & libero coelo— Erras, non perdidit lucem frater tuus, sed securiorem sortitus est— Non reliquit ille nos, sed antecessit, etc. De Cons. ad Polyb. cap. 28.  Be not troubled for your Brother; He is safe, and that eternally: He enjoys a free and spacious Heaven; and is brought into a Glorious place by Him, who receives separated Souls into his bosom: He hath not left us, but is gone before us. And upon the same account, comforting Martia, greatly afflicted for the Death of her Son, he could then say, Why run you to his Sepulchre? he is translated to the lofty Regions, 
Non est, quod ad Sepulchrum ●ilij curras,— ad excelsa sublatus, inter felices currit animas, excipitque illum coetus sacra, Scipiones Catonesque— De cons. ad Martiam, cap. 25.  to move among the Souls of the happy, and is received into the sacred society of the Cato's, and Scipios, and such excellent Men as are set free by the benefit of their Dying. Thus, as Seneca was not consistent to himself, so he stands our Theists in no such stead as hath been pretended.  
The next shall be the most famous Plutarch, who lived in the time of Domitian and Nerva, but especially flourished in the days of Trajan. And, what I said of the former, I shall affirm the same of him; that is, That he frequently declares his goodwill, to baffle the Faith of a future Life; otherwise how could he have once said, that The the Dead should fall into the same condition, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Pag. (mihi) 109.  in which they were before they were born: And, that as before they came into the World, it was neither good nor ill with them, so shall it be with them, when they are gone out of it. And that it shall be the same state with us after our death, as it was before we were born. And in his tract of Superstition, he attributes the fear and apprehension of future Punishments to that cause; and he there tells us, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. De Super.  That Death is the Boundary of Life, but Superstition extends it further, and suggests fears, that when men have passed over all the Evils of this life, they may meet with more after death, which shall never have an end.  
All this the Philosopher imputes to vain and needless Superstition, as he doth in that tract very many ridiculous persuasions. But nevertheless, though he had so often expressed his willingness to disbelieve a future World, yet to show how impossible it was for him altogether to blot out of his mind the thoughts of it, and how improbable it was to him, that the Good and Just, after all their pursuits of Virtue, and the pious improvement of their Time and Being's, should find no other recompense, but Annihilation: I say, When he was to comfort Apollonius for the Death of his Son, (whom he had commended for his Modesty and Piety, towards the Gods, his Parents, and Friends, and for his Virtuous Life) he could then tell him, That If what the Ancient Poets and Philosophers had said of the Pious, be true, which (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) was very likely to be so; that is, That after their death they shall attain to Honour in a happy place; 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc.  That then he ought to hope well of his Son, that he now dwells with the Souls of the Pious, that he enjoys that happy state. And then he caresseth him with what Pindar spoke of the Dead, and with what Plato had discoursed of the Souls immortality.  
Now, what shall we think of the ingenuity and honesty of this Great man, (who could affirm of himself, That he had rather Plutarch were not Plutarch, than that Plutarch were not virtuous) in the managery of his Comfort to Apollonius, Did he believe another World's Existence, or no? If he did believe it, with what Integrity could he so often express himself to the contrary? If he did not believe it, Why did he deal so insincerely with Apollonius, as to put him upon such a delusive hope in his distress? Or, if it be said, that Apollonius perhaps might have been before affected with what Pindar and Plato had said, about a future World, but then Why did he not reprove him for his Folly, in busying his Head with such Romantic Dreams, and not rather direct him to that solid comfort, which a Stoick's Reason (as is pretended) might have afforded him? Or, Lastly, If to solve all this, it may be suggested, that whatsoever he had said, he indeed might doubt of that State's Existence, I have so far attained my End, as that I can interpret, That he doubted of that state, because he could not avoid the force of this and other Arguments, that so cogently demonstrated it to his mind, in despite of all his Resolution to maintain the contrary against the Christian Cause.  
To these I may add something very considerable from the Famous Emperor Marcus Antoninus, who always spoke very confusedly of what should become of men, when they die: As once he did concerning Alexander and his Muliteer, that they should be reduced (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to something, he could not tell what; that is, that they either should be received into the same Principles whence they came, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Lib. 6. Sect. 24.  or be dispersed into Atoms: Yet when he came afterward to consisider, that the gods had done all things else so orderly, and with such singular Love to Mankind, he wondered at their neglect of one thing; that is, that they should take no Care, that Men, who had held such correspondencies with them by pious Actions and Sacred Ministrations, should, when they die, be no more, and be wholly extinguished. I say, at this Block he stumbled, and would be offering some Reasons for it, but such as were hypothetical and uncertain; and therefore begins with a (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) How can it be? 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Lib. 12. Sect. 5. Gat. p. 117.  or, How comes it to pass that it should be so? etc. And it's enough for my purpose, that I have attained this from that excellent Philosopher.  
Thus I have represented how those Philosophers (by whose, if by any kind of Authority, our present Sceptics must pretend to Patronise their Atheism) who lived after Christianity was planted in the World, were necessitated to behave themselves in the case of a future state: Which had they positively maintained and published, coincidently with the Christian Faith, they foresaw, that they must have disbanded the greatest part of those their credulous Followers, who were then persuaded to oppose it. And that because those Philosophers understood, that all the Practics of the Christian Religion were so consonant to, and perfective of, right reason; so conducing to the Safety of all Societies, and that did oblige its Professors to be, upon that main reason, so virtuous and innocent, that it was necessary they should make them ridiculous in trusting to a future reward and happiness, (which they designed to laugh at, as fond and superstitious) whom they could not represent to the World, as scandalous and offensive in their morals and practices.  
And this their halting and shuffling in a matter of that importance, seems to me a greater Argument to confirm the credibility of another World's Existence on this account, than if I had cited a Thousand Authorities of such Philosophers, as positively believed and professed it; because thence it appears, that the reason of the thing was so prevailingly convincing, that it controlled their minds (as it were, whether they would or no) sometimes into a serious doubt, at other times into a seeming concession; though they were fain to retract it, as oft as the interest of their cause, and their opposition to Christianity exacted it from them.  
And now having dispatched the Philosophers, or these some famous ones instead of them all, I could have added many and great Authorities to our Purpose, from the Heathen Historians, though of a more ancient Date, such as one from the famous Deathbed Speech of Cyrus, to his Sons, in Xenophon; And of Veturia's Oration to her Son Martius, to be Merciful to the City of the Volsi, Recorded by Dionysius Halicarnesseus. But I omit the use that may be made of them, as unnecessary.  
And then as to the Heathen Poets, (by whose Works the Ancient Philosophy, natural Theology, and indeed most kind's of Learning were so considerably preserved) it's obvious enough, how positively they declared their thoughts of a future World's Existence, and what apprehensions they had of the Rewards and Punishments of another Life, upon the account of the unequal Distributions in this World, to the Good and Evil. And for that purpose they described the Rewards of the Virtuous, by an Elysium; That is, by certain pleasant Fields, fitted for all advantages of Pleasure and Happiness. And thus they did, as to the Punishment of the Wicked, by a great many instances of dreadful Representations: As by such frightful Officers, grim Judges, and by some particular Examples of several severe punishments, such as of Tantalus, Ixion, Sisyphus, and Titius. And this ingenious way of representing the state of the Dead, was so ancient, that Diodorus Siculus affirms, 
Lib. 2. c. 4.  That Orpheus received it from the old Egyptians. But the general Run of the Poets is so well known to abett our design, that it were an inexcusable redundancy, to offer at a citation of their innumerable Expressions to our purposes.  
And thus having made use of these few instances of the Heathen World's Opinions, concerning a future Life upon the account of this Argument; let no man think that I design to approve or answer for all the imperfect Notions, or doubtful Representations, which many of those Philosophers (such as Plato and his Followers especially) that asserted the Being of a Future state, had of the manner of the Soul's Existence in it: Much less do I intend to account for the Lusory and extravagant Fancies concerning the modelled circumstances of that State: But so long as it appears, That upon some natural convincing Reasons, and especially upon the Prospect of the promiscuous usage of the Good and Evil in this World, nothing could so solve the difficulties of such Observations, but that they were necessitated to admit the acknowledgement of a Future World, I have, as far as I designed in this case, attained my End.  
And now, if any Sceptical Theist should go about to perplex this way of Arguing, and shall allege, That the confused and unaccountable Apprehensions, which those Learned Heathens had of the manner, place, and other circumstances of men's Existence in that State, and how the Rewards and Punishments are there to be executed to the Good and Evil: And then to strengthen their Exception, should object to us, That the Christians themselves, who pretend the greatest assurance of the Future World's Existence, have expressed almost as imperfect an understanding of those mentioned Cases and Circumstances of that Future World; and sometimes have discoursed as wildly of the state of the Dead, as others had done; And then, that their Great Apostle St. Paul should affirm, That the knowledge of those future Events, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 1 Cor. 13. 12.  was but as by a Riddle, at the meaning of which men, were left to guests; or, like one that sees through the imperfect medium of a Lattess: I say, if by these Allegations such a Sceptic should encourage his Denial or Suspicion of the Reality of such a World's Existence; My answer to such an Exception shall be managed in the next Section by its self, in which I shall offer Reasons, why God was pleased, that there should be such an imperfect knowledge, or such a concealment of the manner, place, and other circumstances of the state of the Dead in another World. And this I do the rather take care to explain, because it's probable, that even a Believer may sometimes stumble at the difficulty of that Solution.   

Section III.  
IN this Section, I shall therefore endeavour to represent, That men's imperfect knowledge of the state of the Dead, that is, of the place, manner, and other the precise circumstances of that State, and especially of the way and method of God's disposure of Mankind to their respective Rewards and Punishments in the other World, are no reasonable Arguments to suspect the reality of them, and much less of the State itself, in which they are to be Administered.  
And this I shall do by way of an answer to a Cavillers exception, and it shall be thus laid. Saith he, I have no mind to be imposed upon by a pretence of such Encouragements, as are so presumptively and generally, and therefore, obscurely, proposed; nor be obliged to a Religion for an end, of the particular manner of whose enjoyment, I can have no explicit understanding, and of which no man can give any sufficient demonstration to my mind and reason. I can't thus answer the exprobration of my friends, nor solve my discretion to myself, for living such a strict and selfdenying Life. That is, that when I come to die, I can't convincingly tell myself, or them, whither I shall go, or what shall then become of me; so that if I can receive no better account of those Future Events, I am like to live as pleases myself at present, and to adhere to those thoughts, that have engaged my suspicion of any Real Existence of another World at all.  
In Answer to this exception thus laid, though some men, whose minds are firmly settled in the Faith of what is necessary to be believed concerning another World, would choose to leave such persons in their incredulity, as if there were nothing in Rational Evidence to control their unbelief, yet I hope I have something to offer in this hard case, that may reasonably persuade, if not absolutely convince them, out of the Error of their own suspicion. And I shall attempt it upon the account of these two Reasons. The First shall be with respect to the present State of humane understandings. The second upon a moral reasonableness of Gods permitting, that the manner and circumstances of that Future State, should be so darkly represented, and imperfectly understood.  
The First Reason that I shall offer, is, because we may presume, that men's understanding Faculties are not at present capable of admitting a direct apprehension, or representation of objects, that are by their sublimity of a different Kind and Nature. And the Reason is, because those Faculties, at present, are tied down to so many restraints, and limitations. As First, by their natural dependence upon the outward Senses, which must first intromit those and all other Notices, before the Mind can manage its Conceptions of things. And then Secondly, because the grossness of those Corporal Organs, by which men naturally Act their intellectual Powers, doth render the mind too dull and unfit, to entertain such unaccommodable, and disproportioned Objects, and notices of things, especially that are at such distances of Place, and Time.  
And therefore it's possible our Case, as to the present understanding of that State, and of the nature of those Divine and after-Dispensations in another World, if they were never so well discoursed to us by the best Reason, and the most advantageous Revelation, may be like to the man's that is born Blind in respect of Light, who can never be made to frame a right conception of it in his mind, by all the definitions and descriptions, that can be made of it to him. For if he be told, that it comes from a body, that is seemingly not above a foot and half Diameter, and yet notwithstanding, that it gives Luster, Heat, and Life to all the visible World; or suppose that a man should make use of any other glorious appellations of its Nature and Qualities, they would but amuse and confound the blind man's mind, and perhaps he would think, that the person came on purpose to abuse him. But then suppose that blind man's Eyes to be opened at an instant, he can then be presently satisfied with a right conception of it. Now it's as unreasonable to doubt of a Future State, because we can have nothing in our present Conceptions, that answers to it, as it's impertinent for a blind man to disbelieve the Existence of Light, because he can never be able by all the discourses that are made of it to him, to frame a right Notion of it in his mind.  
And further, if this objection were reasonable, and should succeed, our Sceptic, might as well on that ground, take confidence to question the very Existence of God himself; because he doth not offer his Nature to the Knowledge of his Creatures by any direct tender of it to the apprehension of their Senses, when by the common reason of mankind (upon the acknowledgement of His Infinite Being, which none that considers the Existence of the World, can possibly resist) he must always be believed to be as near us as the Objects which we see or touch. A notion of His absolute Perfections can admit no less.  
But these men should be discoursed a little further on that account, and asked, whether they do not believe, that there be innumerable things in Real Being, which they can't directly and sensible discern and apprehend, because perhaps they are too fine, or too abstruse, or in other respects disproportioned to their present Senses, and for that reason the natures of such Being's, could never come into any intelligible cognisance? or do they not think, that there be thousands of other Being's, that are in ken of sensible perception, and have come under Philosophical disquisition, and yet the most diligent enquirers into their Existencies, have been sensible how much they have fallen short of the perfect knowledge of the Natures of most of them? and are there not as many extraordinary Phoenomenas', or manifest appearances in nature, that are not under observed causations, and yet are believed to be true, though how they are, or should be so effected, they cannot, with all their skill and industry, find out? Of this nature I account, especially Witchcrafts, and Apparitions; of whose Existences we may be perfectly satisfied, by as plain and notorious matters of fact and testimonies, as by which any thing in the world was ever made any ways sufficiently credible. And now if because some instances of that kind have been acted by knavery, and more of them suggested by fear, whereby the real facts have been sometimes put out of credit and countenance; If I say, for those reasons my sceptic may take occasion to deride my taking notice of such things in this place, I shall admit his Scoff with so much the less dissatisfaction, as that with me, he must reflect upon the universal Wisdom of Mankind. And I challenge him to show me any learned Age or Nation in the world, to whose general Opinion I may not reasonably appeal in this Case; only always excepted, that in every Age there might be here and there, perhaps one or two (such an one as Diagoras was among the Athenians) who might in a dogmatizing humour be singularly promoting their private Opinions against the binding Authority of Common Judgement.  
Now as to the matter in hand, if the unequal distributions of Justice and Judgement, of Rewards and Punishments to the Good and Evil in this Life will enforce the reason of men to assent to the belief in general, that there must needs be another World to follow, wherein a Just and Holy God will allow all his Creatures (that are capable of it) Impartial Right & Judgement; why should any man quit his faith of that State, though his senses at present, cannot give, or his understanding admit any direct information of the Manner, Measures, Place, and the other Circumstances of its Existence, because they cannot; or because for good reasons they ought not? And if some men, to cure this Scruple, have been too busy and positive in their descriptions of the State of the Dead, I think such adventurous Conjectures have not at all added to the evidence for the credibility of a Future World; but, on the contrary, they have contributed a great advantage to them, that have a design to call in question, and to deride the whole Faith of that State. Such kind of additions to an Article, being like to the Mixtures of the Author's Wit and Invention in a Serious History, which may reasonably bring in question the credit of all its relations; or like the commendations of a virtuous Person to excess, which may make a suspicion of Flattery in the whole Encomium: An Article, like a man, may be so imposed upon by a dress, that the knowledge and belief of it may be lost in the disguise. This the First Answer.  
My Second Answer to our Captious Sceptics exception, is, That as it's certain that we have not faculties in this mortal State, that are figured and fitted for a direct and sensible perception of such distant and unaccommodated Objects; so the moral Reason why GOD Almighty might be pleased, that there should be such a concealment of them, may be because, that if that state, and all that is enjoyable in it, were in all points and circumstances made cognizable to us in such a manner as sensible representations can make any thing to be, tho' such a kind of knowledge of them, might possibly satisfy some men's curiosities, yet it would be a very considerable hindrance to men's living virtuous and religious Lives with reference to their future Interest. And the reason is, because they being placed here to act, as in a state of trial and probation, for that future Reward and Happiness, upon condition of living such kinds of Lives; if such a sensible notice, and exact conception of the measures, and manner of all the particular Instances of that Future Happiness, were allowed them in this Life, such a Discovery would probably overbalance their Souls equally poized Liberty (which can only consist with the notion of their being probationers) too much on the one hand or side. That is, it would incline it too much towards a necessity of acting its virtuous Purposes. To which necessity, every approach of the Mind (whencesoever it proceeds) would take away so much of the reason of all Good Actions being accountably rewardable. But of this more in my Third Argument.  
And now if it should be said against this, that indeed if men were put into any enjoyment of the happiness of that Future State, it might take off that freedom of acting, and incline the Will too much on the one side of the Scale of its natural Liberty, and preponderate the Mind too much towards that determined State, which it shall enjoy in the other World; but this (saith our Sceptic) is only a present particular knowledge of that Future Happiness, and 'tis no more, that I inquire after.  
To this I reply, That such a knowledge would be a kind of enjoyment in its self, especially, if it be considered (as reasonably it ought) that the intellectual part of man (by which he essentially is, and acts himself) will be most principally concerned in the fruition of that Future Bliss; when the Judgement and the Will shall be freely determined (that is, determine themselves) to the Embraces of that mighty Happiness. And therefore, tho' the Blessed shall for ever unconstrainedly choose to serve God, and to do all the Good they can in that state (& there may be occasions for it more than we can conceive) yet I think that those their virtuous Actions shall not then be made so Rewardable, as when they were acted in a state of Probation, upon an equal poise of choosing Good or Evil at their own Election; but will be rather a part of their Joy, Bliss, and Fruition. This the Second Answer.  
And now having thus solved this grand Objection, I hope there is nothing more to be alleged to put any further stop in our way, but that we may fairly proceed to show, how far the respiting and adjourning of universal Justice to a future World, will administer new Reasons for a stronger demonstration of a future states Existence on that Account. But that's the business of the next Chapters adventure. Therefore,    

CHAP. III.  
IN this Chapter, that the Argument may be found to be of sufficient validity to attain its End, I shall endeavour to demonstrate, That GOD's respiting and adjourning the Completion of his judicial administrations to a future World, is so naturally reasonable, that nothing else can solve the apprehensions we may have of GOD's Design, to preserve the present universe in that natural order in which by Creation it was at first fitted to subsist: Neither can any other expedient secure a belief, that GOD intended a regard to the Good and Happiness of Mankind, whether as socially, or individually considered.  
But here be several things, which must be distinctly and apart considered, in so many Sections by themselves.  
In the first Section, it must be examined how that part of the universe, which consists of necessary Agents can otherwise be preserved, in its natural Order.  
In the second, we shall examine the case, by that part of the universe, that acts in it as rational Agents; and first, as they are to enjoy their Wellbeing in social Communions.  
Thirdly and Fourthly, we shall offer to examination, how otherwise GOD's care of Mankind may be acquitted, as they are individually to be considered. And that particularly, as they may be distinguished into the two sorts of Evil and Good.  
In all which respects, there will appear cogent Reasons, Why Almighty GOD should adjourn the completion of his judicial administrations of Justice and Judgement to another World.  

Section I.  
IN this Section I am concerned to represent, That if Almighty GOD should not respite the completion of his judiciary purposes for the Good and Evil to another Life, but should in this world be universally and actually justifiing and abetting every righteous Person and Cause; and should also as universally be constantly correcting and confounding every Evil Man's unjust adventures, it would certainly discontinue the natural order of those Agents, that act by necessary impulse, as often as they should be made use of for those judicial executions. And that because they cannot subserve an extraordinary proceedure of the Divine Justice, unless they should be continually interrupted in the order of their natural Causations and Operations.  
And to make this Observation the more convincingly conspicuous, we may take measures by some few famous Cases, in which, GOD was sometimes pleased to exercise his absolute Dominion, and extraordinary Authority over those necessary Agents, for the present executions of his Justice. That is, suppose that all the Seas and Rivers of the Universe should be forced from their natural Courses (of which there be some instances) to fourd over all those good Persons in their flight from an Attachment, as oft as there were no other means for their escape, and that the Sun should as oft stand still, as it were necessary it should, to crown a good Cause with a complete Conquest; or suppose, that as often as any man were ready to perish with Thirst, every hard Rock or natural mound to Waters, should be forced open for a River to run in dry places, to supply their present want; or that the Clouds should suspend their kind showers to refresh the growth of Plants; or that the Sun's enlivening warmth should be turned into a Flame to burn up the surface of the Earth, so oft as the Inhabitants thereof should deserve those instances of the Divine Judgement upon them: I say, if these, and a thousand such like cases as these, should so often become necessary for the completion of GOD's Favour to the Virtuous and Innocent, and for the just execution of His Displeasure to wicked Men in this world, the necessary Agents, which were naturally disposed to serve the necessities & conveniencies of Mankind, would be found to act contradictions to their own Natures; and their orderly Causations would be so daily and hourly changed into miraculous Events, that the Universe itself would appear to be nothing else, but a scene of Prodigies, to amuse and affright Mankind.  
Now, though such wonderful executions of the Divine Justice, and especial Favour, may well enough consist with the world's present created order, when they are so unfrequently done, and upon some extraordinary occasions, yet if they were constantly and fully acted, for the completion of every single Persons reward or punishment (which must be supposed, if the Arguments in my first Chapter, that GOD will certainly do it at one time or other, be true) the necessary Being's, which should be subservient to those ends and executions, must be so often interrupted in their natural motions and causations, that nothing would follow, but the World's universal Disorder, if not its total Discomposure.  
But perhaps, things may go better among the Rational Agents. But that is next to be enquired into. Therefore,   

Section II.  
IN this Second Section, we are engaged to examine the next grand inconvenience and disorder to the universe, as God by his own Sovereign Wisdom stated it, with respect to that part of it, which are called Rational and Voluntary Agents, as they are naturally and necessarily to subsist together in Social Communions one with another for their common welfare. And then I say, that if God Almighty should in this life universally execute those administrations of Rewards and Punishments to the Good and Evil, it would destroy the ordinary good subsistence of all humane Societies. For if while the dispensations of God's providence are so promiscuously dispensed to the Good and Evil, whereby they do so constantly share in one another's blessings and misfortunes, Mankind do attain the good ends of their Social Subsistence with so much difficulty and hazard, as that in a thousand Cases it had been better, in that very respect, for innumerable single persons never to have known what a world had meant, what disorders, and cross accidents, what perpetual dissolutions of a Governments, and frustrations of the most material contracts, and agreed proceedings in Common Affairs, what calamitous interruptions in all manner of Societies, from an Empire to a Family, must necessarily succeed? in so much that the World of Rational Being's, would presently become the only confused rout of Creatures that ever God made; and the Existence of the meanest Animal were rather to be chosen, than to enjoy a Being amongst them: All which inconveniencies, nothing but a respiting the Completion of God's Justice to a Future World, can possibly prevent.  
And now I appeal to any Theistical mind to tell me, Whence can all this be? or how should the understanding of man, upon such a prospect of things, conjecture, that God should at first make a world of Rational Being's, naturally subject to so many oppressions, and unjust usages one from another, and that yet, when they happen (as they daily do in all places of the world) they should not possibly be universally redressed, without a greater inconvenience to, if not, with a certain ruin of all their present Societies, (in which it is naturally necessary they should subsist) but from a design of making an universal after-view of all the Actions of Men at a time, when all such mixed societies shall have their irrevocable periods, and that the good and evil shall be separated to their several distinct communions, and apartments by themselves?  
And by this observation will our Saviour's parabolical representations of the present State of Mankind, 
Mat. 13. 29, 49.  appear highly reasonable. That is, That the Wheat and Tares (by which is meant the Good and Evil) should grow together, till the Harvest, lest a present plucking up of the one should endanger the Success, if not the very being of the other; and that the good and bad Fish should both of them be promiscuously comprehended, not only in the same Sea of the World, but in the same net of the Church together. Now let the Hectorers down of the belief of another world assign me a conjecture for any other reasonable expedient how to solve this doubt, and I shall then renounce the use that may be made of this observation for the necessary Existence of another world.  
But to all this, if an exception should be interposed from the sense of them, that are true believers; who (saith our Caviller) will be apt say, that if God Almighty doth for the most part respite the the executions of Justice and Judgement to a Future World, the apprehension of such a suspension would take away a great deal of the reason and encouragement, why good men should so constantly pray (as 'tis done in public Litanies and private Devotions) for their own Justifications, and the common deliverances of the Church from its implacable Enemies. And therefore were it not better, and more reasonable for such good men to sit down in a patient acquiescence than to be so solicitous in their prayers for that which (as the Second Chapter hath assured us) doth so uncommonly, and uncertainly come to pass.  
My answer to this exception, is, that all prayers of that nature, as for all other temporal blessings, are supposed to be always made interpretatively, if not in direct words, upon some conditions, and terms of limitation. And of those conditions there be two especially to be considered.  
First, Good men, so often as they supplicate to be delivered and justified, or any other way blessed in this World, do always desire those Mercies at the Hand of God, upon a condition, that they may consist with the common Good and Safety of those public Societies, in whose communions they enjoy their present Subsistence. That is, they desire not, that their private Satisfactions and Vindications, should be purchased at the rate of common Ruin, or upon the terms of any destructive alterations of the communions in which they live. And that might be the reason, 
2 Sam. 24. 17.  why David desired that the Punishment of God might rather fall upon himself and Family, than upon the People in general.  
And as Good men would not enjoy their particular Exemptions from Oppressions, in exchange for a common Disturbance or Mischief; so, nor would they desire their Personal Justifications, as to their private Enemies, if they must be had upon terms, which must infer either their present, or their future Ruin: Lest a Thought of Revenge should tempt their innocent minds to a complacency in their Enemy's misfortunes.  
And therefore that Saying, (fiat justitia, ruat mundus) Let Justice be done, though the whole World should perish, cannot be true Divinity, unless the meaning of it be, Let the World perish, rather than any man should do what is unjust; but it is false to desire it should perish, rather than suffer what is most unjust.  
And that you have the first condition upon which a Good man's Prayers are supposed to be made, when he implores the present vindication of his Right and Cause.  
Secondly, I answer, That when Good men pray to God for the present deliverances and justifications of their Persons and Causes, they have always another condition in reserve; that is, That God would grant their Petitions for their deliverances, unless a continuance in their Sufferings should tend more to their present and future Good, otherwise they can interpret and believe, that it is a mercy of God to have their Prayers in such cases denied. And therefore, when they perceive that their Petitions are in such instances rejected, they are ready with all submission and contentment of mind, to think and say, that, Had they not some way or other needed their implacable Enemy's success, their Prayers had certainly prevented it: And that there was something defective in themselves, which God thought fit in that manner to correct, in order to their own final Good and Happiness, or such an event had never fallen out, so contrary to their Supplications.  
And thus by such wise and pious reserves they can reasonably satisfy themselves, when they meet a disappointment in their expectations of Temporal Blessings, after they had prayed for them, and were denied.  
These, and such as these, are the conditions upon which Good men pray for Temporal Deliverances, and their present Justifications. And, as such Prayers are sufficiently consistent with a Belief of God's respiting and adjourning the complete executions of his justice to another World, so it's encouragement enough (and sure it's all that need be given) that when those conditions will bear it, Good men may assure themselves, that God will not, nor did ever fail to answer their Petitions, and grant their requests. And this perfectly solves the Sense of our Saviour's indefinite Promise, with respect to Temporal Mercies, that Whatsoever you shall ask the Father in my name, 
John 14. 13.  he will give it you.  
And further, it's to be considered in that case, That when the reason of those Conditions hath intervened between God and his Petitioners, though they have been denied their Supplications in kind, yet, for their encouragement still to pray, they might and ought to believe, that God would grant them in some other equivalent matter and manner, for a compensation of all they asked, and were denied. Howsoever, in the mean time they can satisfy themselves, that they have been doing their Duties, and paying the daily Homage they owed to God, and may live comfortably under the expectation, that God will do them right in another World.  
And, let it now be also especially remarked, that what I have here said concerning the Conditions upon which Good men pray for their Temporal Deliverances and Vindications; and upon the reason of which they are so often denied their Petitions, may hold good also in the case of God's executing his Justice, as to the Rewards and Punishments of this Life: That is, That that God will so often act those measures of Providence, as the reasons of those two mentioned Conditions will admit it. That is, when it may be done; First, without bringing any common destruction to those communions, by which the World ordinarily subsists; and, Secondly, when such a present execution of his Justice shall on any account tend most to the concerned person's present or future Good and Interest.  
But in all other cases, where the reasons of these two Conditions are superseded, the executions of the Divine Love and Justice to the Good and Evil, are so often reserved and respited, for his impartial retributions in another World.  
Now, as this Observation may enable us to think, that there be no small number of Cases, that are so reserved and respited, so it will easily, and very naturally solve those men's doubts and inquiries, Why either all those Executions are not universally done in this Life; or why there should be any part of them certainly effected; that is, why there should be always so many, and sometimes such remarkable Examples and Instances of God's justifying the Persons and Causes of Good men, and of his baffling the unjust Interests and Dealings of the Evil in this World. Of which, as there will be always so many, as may be enough to control the pretensions of the Epicureans, and our present Atheists, That God takes no care of the World at all; so there may be also few enough to suppress & silence the murmurs of those men's too-forward minds and hasty desires, who, upon a bare possibility, and some rare Examples of God's executing his Justice visibly in this Life, have been apt to raise their expectations even to a criminal discontent and impatience of their own present recompenses and justifications. When they ought to have considered the reasons of the former conditions, (as also what other reasons God may give himself, which we (perhaps) can't understand) upon which they are so often omitted, and should rather have endeavoured to wait with patience, till the season approacheth, in which there shall be an impartial execution of Justice to the whole World of Good and Evil.  
And this finisheth the second Section or Reason, that may be given, why God is pleased so observedly to defer the Executions of his impartial Justice to the Good and Evil to a future World, with respect to Mankind in general, as they are ordinarily to subsist in Social Communions. But, besides this Social Concern of Mankind, there was somewhat offered, as to God's care of them in other respects. Therefore,   

Section III.  
IN these two remaining Sections I am concerned to represent the case more particularly, as Mankind may be divided into the two sorts of Evil and Good; and as God's just and gracious care of them both, as so distinctly and apart considered, may be sufficiently acquitted by reasonable and religious Thoughts.  
Now, this Third Section first offers the case of the Evil part of Mankind: That is, of such as have wilfully and temerariously permitted themselves to be betrayed into any state of Vice and Immorality. I say, if GOD Almighty should, in this Life, be presently confounding every such Evil person, as soon as he begins to persist in his unjust and immoral ways; it would prove such a disparagement of the Divine Care, Equity, and Goodness, as could hardly in any case be imagined or represented, upon several accounts.  
First, Because he could not then have allowed them such sufficient possibilities of Recovery, as were consistent with the Mercy of a Gracious GOD to Creatures, that were made so defectible by their own original Nature.  
That is, Who can't consider, that such men have generally fallen into that irreligious state, sometimes by the importunities of their own natural Passions and sensual Appetities within them, which they could not unmake, though it were in their power, with some difficulty, to have overruled them; and that sometimes they fell into that state of Sin, by the Temptations of the World's variously-enchanting Objects without them, which they could not remove, though it was in their own power, with the same difficulty, to have controlled and resisted them? I say, when these occasions of their falling into a state of Sin, are throughly considered, and then how much those occasions do refer to God, as Creator and Supreme Governor of all things, What mind can reasonably entertain a suspicion, but that an infinitely good God should allow them the most equitable possibilities of Recovery, which an adjournment of his Administration of Justice to a future World can only admit?  
And hence appears the reasonableness as well as the mercy of some Metaphorical Expressions in the Scripture, designed to represent this case. There we find, that the field was not presently thrown off to Briars and Thorns, (it were against Reason and common Custom so to do) till the respite for Rain and Dressing had given a further Experiment of its unfruitfulness. 
Heb. 6. 7, 8.  Nor was the Figtree sentenced to be presently cut down for the first or second, and at last, not for the third years barrenness, but it was still respited, 
Luk. 13. 6.  and husbanded, till the ordinary term was past, that, by a wise Husbandman's reasonable observation, it might be judged hopelessly unfruitful.  
And as by this respiting and adjourning the Divine Justice, every impenitent Sinner is made altogether inexcusable, 
Rom. 2. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  so is God's love and equity universally acquitted, as having most reasonably allowed him all advantages for his recovery, which the case and nature of the thing would bear. So that I doubt not, but that Almighty GOD may as justly say to every unfortunate impenitent person, as he did to his unfruitful Vineyard, 
Esay 5.  What could I have done more, that I have not done? That is, not limiting God's Power in himself, but supposing him to act according to the measures and nature of men, as reasonable Creatures. This is the first reason.  
Secondly, To evidence that it is reasonable that God should suspend his completely universal Justice to the evil part of Mankind, to a future World, is not only that he might allow them a fair and equitable possibility of recovery, as to their own interest, but because such a present execution of his Justice upon them, would be highly detrimental to the common Good of the World in its several Societies. That is, if Fire should come down from Heaven, to consume every Oppressor, as oft as zealous Innocence might possibly cry for it; or, that God should throw away every unjust person from his protection, and as oft cut him down in his vengeance, as the justifying of every Good man's Cause might be effected by it; What great advantages might the World's Societies be deprived of, by the loss of so many Evil men, to whom God had allowed, and accepted an after-attempt for their Repentance and Recovery?  
If there had not been such suspensions of God's Justice to such men, than had St. Matthew never been called a Saint; nor had he become so useful an instrument for the first establishment of the Christian Faith: Saint Paul had died a Persecutor of the Church and Doctrine of Christ, of which he afterward became such a successful promoter, and so stout a defender: And the Christian Religion had then been deprived of the Patronage of Constantine the Great, for the scandalous Sins of his Youth. And as I have instanced in these few, so if we had notice of those millions of Evil men, who on that account have been afterward useful to such like purposes, we might easily be convinced of the reasonableness of God's suspension of the administrations of his Justice, upon every man, as soon as he became wicked; and who, at several seasons of their mortal Lives, have so successfully made after-attempts for their recovery to Virtue, with so much advantage to the World.  
3. The third Reason to demonstrate, that it was God's design, that the suspension and adjourning of his universal judgement to a future World (besides for the equitable possibilities of their recovery to their own benefit, and for their afterusefulness in general) is, because it can only solve a considerable doubt in his ordinary visible providence as to many of those Evil men, even while at present they live in a state of Sin. And that is when we see that such men do not only live in a tolerable well-being in the World, but that they very frequently enjoy greater instances of a flourishing Prosperity, 
Psal. 73.  and (as David complains) that they sometimes come in no misfortune like other men. And then the reason is, that with respect to a Future World, they might have an encouragement, as well as a respite to repent. That is, as if God designed to tell them, that as he hath at present so much favour for them, as to allow them, by his general Providence, more than ordinary considerable Portions of Advantage in this World; so that they might from thence reasonably interpret, that God is not as yet made unplacable to their Persons, or would rejoice at their following unrelievable state of misery; but that on the contrary, his mercy and goodness are always most ready to admit them to his present Spiritual Blessings and future Happiness, whensoever they shall prepare themselves for their reception. And that, as▪ He hath already so much Love for them, as to permit His Sun at present to shine upon them, sometimes with a greater Benignity than upon others; and to let his Rain descend upon their Fields, sometimes with more refreshing showers than upon other men's; so that his mercy and pardon shall be as readily afforded them, whensoever they shall endeavour to qualify themselves for the Greater Blessings that relate to a future Life.  
But if in contradiction to all these manifestations of God's Favour and Patience, they shall still obstinately set their hearts to do evil, 
Eccl. 8. 7.  because sentence against an evil work is not speedily in this world executed; yet they have all the reason imaginable, (with the vain young man in the same wise Book) to consider, that after all their sensual enjoyments, they must all come to Judgement. And though (and because) they may escape the execution of God's Vengeance in this World, yet they cannot (if they will allow their minds a liberty of considering like men) but fear it in another.  
And as by acknowledging such a respite our sceptics may thus reasonably extricate that doubt in providence, so such as are believers may solve another query in the Christian Religion. That is, why our Saviour should so extraordinarily engage his Disciples universal Charity to such evil men, even sometimes when they are their own most deadly enemies. That is, that he should call such a Charity, 
Mat. 5. 48.  the nearest approach to Perfection, and an especial assimulation of the Godhead; 
Luke 6. 14, 15.  or that he should make no after-remark upon any other Article of his own Prayer, but upon that of Forgiving Trespasses; and should make it the most indispensable condition of all the pardon they themselves can expect from Him. And then that this Charity, upon special command, should oblige them to all manner of methods for their recovery, as by reproving and advising them by forgiving and praying for them, and by supporting their lives with all manner of necessaries, when they want them. Now the solution of all this is, that as these acts are to be accounted very considerable instances of a good man's duty, and that he shall be rewarded for it; so we may believe, that God the rather instituted them to be so, not only from his mere preceptive authority, but that they might be expedients of his own Divine Love and Care of that part of Mankind, that needs his Pardon upon their Repentance and Amendment; I say, what can possibly solve this query, but the belief of God's respiting and adjourning the administrations of Justice to a Future World, to express his reasonable kindness to the evil part of mankind in order to their recovery?  
Now, if against this whole reason it be objected, that God sometimes permits not wicked men to live out half their natural periods, but cuts them down in the midst of their time and sins; and that of this as the Scriptures have given some extraordinary instances, so common observation can in every Age and Place afford us daily Examples.  
My answer to this allegation is, first, That very many instances of that nature are of such Persons, as have been apparently the wilful causers of the Shortening their own lives, and of depriving themselves of that possibility of their own safety, which God, as to all reasonable Creatures, had allowed them. And then how is God concerned in such fatal miscarriages?  
But in cases where God may be so far chargeable as by permitting the concurrence of natural causes (of which perhaps they themselves were not any ways at all presumptuously and wilfully causal) to put a sudden period to such men's lives, it may be presumed that upon a foresight of what they would afterwards do, God might permit it in mercy to their own persons, that is, from their doing greater evils, whereby their accounts might be at last the more pitiable. And then in kindness to others, that their sudden surprises might be exemplary to other evil men, that survive, to take them off from too confident a presumption of enjoying life, thereby to make a further delay of their repentance (in which delay they might otherwise proceed, till their neglects of it might make their conditions irremediable) if some such examples were not sometimes set before their eyes. And in this manner some have endeavoured to solve the Eternal punishments of the damned in Hell; That is, that they may there be executed upon the Evil, like the judiciary punishments of Malefactors in a State, to be possibly exemplary to some new worlds of Probationers, which may as possibly succeed. In which respect, if such a solution may be allowable (which I refer to better judgements, and do but with submission mention it) why may not all such examples, as I have discoursed them, be accounted also as instances of God's mercy to numerous others, that shall at that present time or afterward exist, rather than to think, that God should be any otherwise pleased with such sudden and severe executions of his Justice upon such single Persons.  
And thus this Objection being answered, it doth upon the consideration of the former Reasons appear most accountable, that God should respite and adjourn his universal Justice and Judgement for the sake of the Evil Part of Mankind.  
But God's regard to that Part of Mankind, concludes not His care of the rest. Therefore,   

Section IU.  
IN this last Section I am concerned to demonstrate, That an adjournment of so great a part of GOD's universal Justice to another World, doth not only acquit, but highly advance his most gracious care of the good and virtuous part of Mankind. And this I shall do upon several Accounts.  
First, that the belief of such a Respite might keep their minds in a constant satisfaction, That GOD intended to make better provisions for their Recompenses, than can be had in this present world: In which, the best advantages that can possibly be attained, are hardly considerable enough to bear them up above the ordinary discouragements, which they may daily meet with for nothing else, but because they are good: And therefore it's there happiness to know, that when their duty calls for a submission to more afflictive portions of Trouble, an expectation of present recompenses would be almost a contradiction in the thing, and that because the bearing of the Cross doth in itself import a destitution of what might make them conveniently happy in this Life: And then, that such a consideration might put them upon a kind of benign necessity, to keep themselves entire and close to the desire and expectation of those adjourned Recompenses, that can only be such, as may make them truly Blessed; insomuch, that should the virtuous but too commonly and ordinarily meet their justifications in this Life, and too generally be crowned with present successes, as oft as they prayed for it, or expected it according to the justice of their Causes, they might suspect, that GOD designed to give them their Portions in this world only, and that, in some displeasure, he had turned them off, to be content with such an unfortunate exchange.  
Secondly, it's highly reasonable, that God should respite and defer the rewards and recompenses of Good and Virtuous Men to a future State; because it very often falls out, that it's their best interest, that they should not be so happy, as always to succeed in their justest Erterprises; nor be always gratified with present, though desired Advantages in their secular Undertake; and that because some tempers are not at all capable of bearing a successful interest, and the best and strongest Piety hath been staggered and endangered by it. What a prodigy of miscarriage, and of a lost virtue was David once in his great prosperity, and how did the following unsuccessful passages of his life, restore him to a virtuous temper, hardly to be paralleled? How much less than a man was he in the one, and how much more than an ordinary Saint in the other?  
And this is the reason, Why some Men of eminent Piety, being sensible of the danger of too great and too successful an affluence, have voluntarily chosen to abridge themselves of their own just enjoyments; and have been cheerfully thankful, when Providence hath offered them some cross overtures in their affairs, thereby to abate and lessen in them too great a complacency in their present fruitions.  
But upon this subject I shall enlarge myself afterwards.  
The third Reason, why God might please to order an adjournment of his recompensing Mercies to the Virtuous and Good to another World is, that he might the more equitably admit them in his mercy, to the completer degrees of them in that state. For, who can't consider, that all good men (of which none are more sensible than themselves) have their Failings, and some unavoidable Miscarriages, even when they are endeavouring to pursue their integrity as well, and as far, as they can? And that there be many of them, who, tho' they may now be as good, as their infirm mortal nature and circumstances will at present admit, had past some considerable Portion of their Lives, before they returned to Virtue, in an universal neglect of God, and Goodness. And therefore, in both respects, GOD in his Wisdom and Justice might please to leave them unjustifyed in many cases that concern this Life, that being at present chastised, and as it were, punished for their many follies, before they returned to Virtue and Goodness, and for their manifold Infirmities after they had been so recovered they might not be laid to their charge afterward, so as to occasion any abatements of their happiness in another World.  
In these three Reasons is contained, what I had to say concerning God's care of the Virtuous Part of Mankind, for the adjourning the complete administrations of his Divine Justice to another world. And so I have finished the design of my Third Chapter; and then all the premises are Ripe for the assumption.    

The Conclusion.  
AND now having stood my ground against all the Suggestions, that could be offered to invalidate the Three Constituent Parts of the Argument: That is, having in my first Chapter demonstrated, that the Just and Holy God, at one time or other, will certainly act the part of an Impartial Judge of all the World, in Justifying the Just Causes of the Virtuous, and Punishing Evil men for their unjust undertake, and all their Immoral Actions, and Proceedings: In the Second Chapter, having sufficiently evinced by all manner of Authorities, and by every man's own common Observation, that that Work is not done in this life, to any such degree, as may acquit the Universal Justice of a good and just God to his Rational World: And lastly, having Demonstrated the Reasonableness of his respiting and adjourning the executions of his Rewards and Punishments to another State, and how it evidently tends most to the Order of the whole Creation, and particularly and especially for the good of Mankind in all Capacities; I say, having shown that all these Premises are certainly True, I cannot conjecture what exception can possibly be alleged against the just inference of the Conclusion, that is, That on this account there must needs be a Future State in real Existence.    

Second Argument.  
The Sum of the SECOND ARGUMENT.  
THE Second Argument that demonstrates the Existence of a Future State, is founded upon Man's being created with those Rational Powers or Faculties of his Soul, by which he hath a mind, essentially advanced above the State of all other visible Animals, and may be presumed to come up to a near Resemblance or Image of his Sovereign Creator, viz. his Understanding and his Will.  
By the one he is made capable, first, discursively to learn and know, and then judicially to determine, what is most fit to be undertaken and done for the attainment of such an End and Good, as may properly and sufficiently answer, and be accommodable to the quality and natural temper of his own Rational Mind. And by the other, viz. his Will, he is naturally capacitated with a power in its self, first, freely to choose such a Good so adjudged, as his principal Interest and Happiness; and then also as freely to embrace, and act all the Means and Methods proposed for the assured attainment of it.  
Now if it shall be made evident by plain and convincing Reasons, that those great faculties of his Soul, were not given him designedly for the sake only of his Mortal Duration, nor for the attainment of any End or Good, that relate only to, and are determinable, by the Period of his present Life; but that they were given him most specially and purposely for the end and Interest of a Future World, and for his making use in this Life, of all such means, as directly tend to the attainment of the Happiness of that State, than it naturally and necessarily follows, That GOD Almighty hath constituted the Existence of such a World and State.  
Now that this Argument thus generally stated, may the more unexceptionably attain its design, I shall endeavour to offer at whatsoever needs a more particular explanation in three distinct Chapters. The sums of whose Contents are these:  
In the first Chapter, I shall give Reasons to prove, That those Rational Powers of the Soul, were not given to Man for the sake only of his Mortal Life.  
In the second, I shall endeavour to solve some Objective Exceptions, by which it's pretended, that those Faculties may be improved for the attainment of several ends in this Life, which may appear to be sufficient Reasons, Why GOD Almighty should give them to Mankind, though they should never be concerned for any thing, that relates to a future World.  
In the third Chapter, I shall positively demonstrate, that those Rational Powers were principally, and upon the most special purpose given to Mankind, for the sake and concern of a Future Life.  
And if what I have thus proposed to be made Good in these three Chapters, shall be found to be demonstrably true, they must necessarily infer the Conclusion for the undoubted Existence of another World.  
A FUTURE WORLD'S EXISTENCE, Demonstrated by Rational Evidence.  

CHAP. I.  
IN which I am concerned to demonstrate, That those rational Faculties or Powers of the Soul, were not given to Mankind for the sake only of their mortal Durations: Nor for the attainment of any End or Good, that relates only to, or is determinable by the period of their present Lives.  
And this I shall evince by the Evidence of these three Reasons.  
First, Because there is no End or Good attainable in this World, whose enjoyment can afford the rational mind any real satisfaction, rest, or acquiescence.  
Secondly, Because those best Enjoyments, that are most likely in common opinion and estimation, to make the life of man more acceptable to himself, are not in the power of those faculties to obtain at pleasure.  
Thirdly, Because the more designedly and intently Men act for those Enjoyments, as their principal Interest and Concern, the less they can escape their being engaged in such Follies and Absurdities, as are inconsistent with their Characters of being Reasonable Creatures.  
And these will require the attendance of so many Sections to explain them.  

Section I.  
THE First Reason that I offer, why those Faculties, or the Rational Mind of Man, were not given him of GOD, for the attainment of any End or Good, that relate only to his present Mortal Life, is, because the best enjoyments of this world can't allow him any real or permanent satisfaction, or rational acquiescence: As it is supposed they should, if his Existence were to be wholly determined at the period of his mortal duration; or otherwise it must be believed, that God Almighty had given him a more unhappy Being, than He had done to any other Creature besides, in that respect.  
Now, as to any direct arguing for this Truth; that is, that the best Enjoyments of this world cannot afford the Rational Mind any such satisfaction or acquiescence, if the common Sense of Mankind can't supersede my Concern in that point, I must then refer my Reader to the Fifth Argument, that is principally engaged to make good that Observation. And I shall only in this Section proceed so far in that Case, as to give the Reasons, why the Mind of Man can admit no such Satisfaction from any, the best enjoyments on this side a future World, or from what relates to it in this Life.  
Now, the natural Reason of all that deficiency in those Temporary Enjoyments, to afford the Mind of Man any such real and permanent satisfaction, is not only from the Troubles, uncertain Events, and cross Accidents that generally attend them, (as universally men complain and suggest as the only reasons of their discontentment) but principally because by Divine Ordination all such Enjoyments do properly and naturally relate, not to the satisfactions of the superior and Rational, but of the inferior and animal part of man's Being. For, though the superior mind doth concern itself in the managery of those Enjoyments, for the better conveniencing men's mortal Lives, yet is that rather matter of Ministration and servile Employment, than of real and satisfactory fruition.  
It's true (to make good our Reason) that those enjoyments of this Life may sometimes be pleasing Entertainments for the Fancy and Imagination, and may gratify men's Senses, corporeal Appetites, and the other Dispositions and Inclinations which humane Nature holds in common with sensitive Being's; but it's very rare, and impermanent, and almost unnatural, if the Rational Soul shall permit itself to entertain any kind of satisfaction by the fruition of any of them.  
And this appears experimentally true, because the more intently any man allows his considering mind to balance the worth and importance of any such fruitions, let them relate to Pleasure, Knowledge, Honour, Profit, or Dominion, or to whatsoever else it is, that tempts to a value, and a present acceptation, especially as to any real satisfaction, resulting from them: And the more he strives to make his intellectual Self to come in as Partner with his animal dispositions, in the perception of them for such an End, he will always be so much the more sensible, how defective they are for the making up of any such sufficient Good, as may accommodate the nature, or natural temper, of his Rational Mind.  
And therefore hence it is, that the imaginative Faculty, Senses and lower Appetites, do never entertain those present Objects so easily and acceptably to themselves, as when men do either want, or resolvedly, wholly renounce, or but divert the use of their considering and reasoning Powers, from making too near an inspection into the Ends which they attain. And this may be verified by some observable instances.  
First on this account it is, that many great Persons do designedly deliver up their mind's part, that is, the Rational conduct of their affairs, and managery of their Fortunes, to the care and reason of some prime Officers; that themselves, if they be Religiously disposed, might improve their understandings to more proper and satisfactory purposes; or if they be sensually inclined, that they might caress themselves in their Pleasures, with a greater freedom, for the satisfaction of the sensual and animal part of their Being's.  
And then upon the same Reason it is, that men are so apt to applaud, and with such great delight to recount the happiness they did enjoy in the childish and youthful part of their time; that is, because they then enjoyed all the necessaries and conveniences of Living, by the benefit of other men's rational Care and Understandings; and that themselves did look no further, than the gratification of their Senses and Brutal Appetites.  
And this was the cause that induced Heraclitus (as Laertius reports it of him) when the Ephesians desired him to undertake the Government of their City, 
De Vit. Phillip Lib. 8.  that he betook himself to play among the Children; intimating thereby, that it, was much easier for him to be so engaged, than to have his mind taken up with the managery of their Public Affairs, from whence it was not like to receive any real satisfaction, or contentment to its self, though perhaps his imagination (if he would have permitted that, as an end of his undertaking) might have been gratified with the Plenty, Veneration, and splendid Title of a Governor.  
Now as this unsatifaction of the Superior and Rational part of Man, may thus arise from the natural propriety, that all outward Enjoyments bear to the Animal part of his Nature, so is that unsatisfaction much more increased, (which I make as an additional Reason) by the greatness of that Impropriety, which those Enjoyments of this present Life, do hold to the Rational Mind; for they are not only things indifferent to it, but such as are alien, divers, and unallyed to its natural temper; and are objects as foreign and improper to it, as those would be useless to one sense, that properly belong to another. And a man may as well imagine, that his Taste should be affected with a Dish of Colours, or a Glass of shining Light; or that his Ear should be delighted with some fragrant Perfume, as that the Rational Mind of Man, as such, should be really satisfied with the fullest Fruition of any thing that relates only and properly to the Animal Part of himself.  
And now if any man of an enquiring humour, should, upon this kind of arguing, ask for a Reason in Nature, why the same Person integrally considered, should be so vastly differently affected in himself; and how his Nature should require for his universal satisfaction, Objects, that bear such evident improprieties on several accounts, both among themselves, and to his own mind; My Answer would be, Because there is in every Man, two kinds of Selves, viz. the Rational and Animal; each of them requiring different, and sometimes almost contrary designs, business, and objects for their several natural ends and satisfactions. And for this distinction, the Scriptural Revelation doth not only give us a most plain Account, by the different notions of a spiritual and carnal Mind and State; the one referring to the government of a Man's mind and life by Religion and Reason, and the other, according to the humour of his lower and animal Inclinations: But the Heathen Philosophers themselves, admitted that distinction a great way towards the same purpose, even by their Rational Discourses and Apprehensions. But I shall instance only (though I might have alleged▪ Heirocles and others) in one of them, and he (perhaps) remarkably as great an Enemy to Christianity, as I could have well lighted upon; and that is, Phorphyry; who affirms, That the Souls exists in the Body, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc.  but for a foreign Employment, and as in a strange place: 
Sent. 239. (mihi)  And that it is adjoined to a substance, that is altogether divers from it.  
And all this said to confirm the Reason given, Why those Rational Faculties, that is, the Intellectual Mind could not be given for the sake, that is, for the ends and purposes of Man's mortal Life only, because all the present Enjoyments that are celebrated, as the only expedients of humane Happiness, do principally and properly relate to the satisfaction of that part of his nature, which bears an agreement with sensitive Being's.   

Section II.  
THe second Reason designed to demonstrate, That those Rational Faculties or Powers of the Soul were not given to Man for the sake, ends, and intendments of his Mortal Duration, only is, because it is evident, That all the most considerable constitutions of his present Wellbeing, and that are in common estimation most likely to become a satisfactory happiness to himself in this World; are not directly, nor at all certainly placed in his power to obtain them, when he most needs them; nor can he with any assurance recall them, when he hath been deprived of them.  
And then were it not a hard thing to make such a conception of a good God, that he should Place man in such a world for his whole Existence, in which there should be nothing assured to him as attainable by the principal Powers of his Being, which might render his life acquiescent and satisfactory to himself?  
I say, who knows not, that it is not in any man's power certainly to enjoy Peace, Health, Credit, Friends, Success, Plenty, or any thing else that may make his life capable of any real contentment to its self, when those faculties act their utmost for their attainment?  
Let men know and study for them by their intellectual capacities, as much as they can, and choose them as earnestly as their elective faculty can exert itself; yet the unfortunate men of the world, (which are always in one respect or other, by far the greatest part of Mankind) will tell you, that they might as well have been obliged to alter the general fixed course of nature in its Stated order, as to attain all those perquisites that must ordinarily concur, to make up such a kind of living, as by which they may think themselves to have escaped their being more miserable, than any other visible Creatures whatsoever.  
And therefore our wise Master, when he had advised his Disciples, not to be solicitously concerned about the necessaries and conveniencies of their Mortal lives, gave them this reason, Because they were no more at their dispose and command, 
Mat. 6. 27.  than was the heightening their Stature by another Cubit. That is, that they were by Divine ordination not certainly in their power at all. And though it may be said, that some men do sometimes (and their number is not great) successfully advance themselves in some prosperous attainments in their Mortal state; yet it may be presumed, that those present advantages have by far the most generally fallen out, where there have happened Cases so effectually circumstantiated, as if they were purposely set by providence for such successes: and which were interpretatively little otherwise, than as it may be said, that a man's hand can take up Gold, when it's laid before him; or embrace his prosperity, when it's provided for him, as an effect of some propitiously concurrent causes and accidents, which gave Solomon the Reason to say, That the Race was not to the Swift, nor the Battle to the Strong; neither Bread to men of Understanding, nor yet Favour to men of Skill, but Time and Chance happens to all. That is, that those happy events did not certainly come to pass according to those men's excellent qualifications, but that they proceeded from some overruling cause of that Time and Chance; of which expect some account at the period of this Section.  
And this solves the observation why it doth so often come to pass, that the best outward materials of a pretended happiness in this world, do become the Portions of men but indifferently qualified in the regions of their minds, and very frequently of such, as are hardly so much as are sensible of the value of their own plenteous circumstances: or else of such as are sensually disposed, and then they either abuse. Them by their pride and intemperance, or else disimprove them through their own indiscretions and carelessness to their own discontent, rather than the lots of such as have the largest share of intellectual endowments, or that are the greatest Friends to Worth and Virtue.  
And for that reason it hath been observed, even to a Proverb, that men of the finest and most ingenious parts have seldom acquitted themselves from the severe straits of Fortune, nor from very undecent dependencies: And that to have been said, to be as indigent as a Poet or a Philosopher, was thought as severe an exprobration of being poor, as could well be given.  
It's true (to invalidate my thus reasoning) that it is commonly affirmed, That an exact frugality will make a man Rich; That a close retirement will procure him Quietness of Life; and, That Temperance will secure his Health and long Life: And then (they'll say) that all these expedients for those considerable events towards a man's easier and happier Being in this life, are all of them in the power of the rational faculties to judge, choose, and undertake at pleasure.  
My answer to this Allegation is, That those expedients do so uncertainly and contingently attain their ends, that all cases considered, it will hardly allow a man's thoughts a probability, that they ever should succeed according to the undertakers Expectations. And to evince this, I shall admit those three cases to a more minute examination.  
As to the first of them, a strict and cunning Frugality: Let me demand of my Objecter, whether he thinks that the most anxious care can prevent unfaithfulness in all them, upon whom the industrious Frugals must be presumed more or loss to rely, on one occasion or other, for trust or employment; or can their nicest observation secure them from common Cheats, or secret frauds? or can a Box of writings or a Chest defend their Wealth from the harassings of War, and all other the common accidents of humane Life? And if so, what kind of certainty can such men presume upon to encourage them in this undertaking, for their own sufficient happiness in this World?  
Then as to the second, viz. Retirement in order to a quiet Life: Can it secure a man from all the effects of contempt, the certain attendant of a designed privacy? Can it prevent the inconveniencies of being friendless, as oft as his relation to the Public calls for the favour of men in power, to help him to what is right or kind? Or can it secure him from being seized upon as a prey by those who mark out the private, and the solitary, for the execution of their mischievous, and sometimes bloody purposes? And then, I say, with what a strange kind of improbability, must such an expedient attain its end to their satisfactions.  
As to the last expedient, Temperance, in order to the securing a man's health and long life: Is it yet determined, upon any general ground of reason or experience, what should be the certain measures of such a Temperance? Or did ever any skilful Person pretend to give any such infallible rules of it, as might be universally accommodable? Or if the methods of a temperate life could be stated by a common measure, would they secure a man's health and long life, from hereditary evil constitutions, or from common contagions, or from the sudden surprises of Epidemic diseases? Or lastly, from such distempers, as may be occasioned by diabolicals impressions, which may at any time, through the Divine permission, be as commonly acted, as instances have been given of such cases, by most credible and unsuspected relations, and as they stand upon Authentic records? For which the Learned Bodinus may be consulted; I say, all those Cases being duly considered, who can presume to think, that God hath placed any man's health or long life, with any assurance in his own power, by the best use he can make of his intellectual Faculties?  
And now, because I have thus undertaken, in favour of my Argument, to remark this last temporal Blessing, and Enjoyment, Health; which in most respects ought to be accounted the principal and necessary Attendant and Concomitant of all present humane Wellbeing; Let me a little further engage my Observation of the defect and insufficiency of Man's rational faculties for the attainment and preservation of it. And that not only because a man's own Understanding may be so easily defeated in finding out the expedients of its safety, but because the Reason and Skill of those Men, who have made it the study, business, and employment of their whole Lives to administer to it, do so much fall short of any certain attainment of that Happiness to Mankind. And for this observation, I shall only remark, what that admirable Patron of Learning S r. Francis Bacon discourseth concerning it, 
Corpus humanum maxime capax remedii, sed vicissim illud remedium maxime est obnoxium errori. Pag. 266. Ars ista (praesertim quo nunc habetur modo) inter praecipue conjecturales reponenda. Pag. 267. Nam Medici traditionum & experientiae fructum Magistratibus destruxerunt & sustulerunt. 282. Tamen si quis ea, quae praescribere & ministrare soleant Medici, acutius introspiciat, inveniat pleraque vacillationis & inconstantiae plena, & quae extempore excogitantur, & in mentem illis veniant absque certo aliquo, aut praeviso curationis tramite. p. 286. De Augment. Scient. lib. 4. cap. 2.  and that only in the Margin, and without interpretation, to avoid offence; for I have said all this upon no other design, but to improve the notion I have here undertaken upon my Reasoning for the certain Existence of a Future State.  
And now having thus concluded my second Reason, let me superadd one observation upon that account; that is, Suppose it should be enquired, that since Man hath naturally so little power over the circumstances of his own Wellbeing in this World, by what other cause or causes are men's present conditions conducted, or whether by none at all?  
My answer is, that the acknowledgement of a Future World; and GOD's design, that men's principal Happiness should be placed and expected in that State, doth most plainly and naturally answer that Enquiry; and that, without flying to stubborn Fate, or blind Fortune (as some, even great Philosophers have done) it doth perfectly solve the doubt. That is, that GOD was pleased to take upon himself the care of disposing every Man's portion of outward things in this Life; and in that manner as he saw might best suit with every man's particular temper, and circumstances, for the better attainment of his happiness in the other World. And then moreover, that men, upon a prospect of the uncertainty of their own endeavours for any assured successes in this life according to their own desires, might have, as a greater reason, so more leisure and opportunity, to attend the concerns of another to come: That is, as our Saviour reasons, that they might not be folicitous about what they should Eat, or Drink, or put On, but should leave all those events to the wise conduct and care of a Gracious God, and then entertain them with the same indifferency and unconcernment, that sensitive Being's do, who subsist by the ordination of the same All-disposing Hand of God. Always considered, that as those Animals comply with the Divine Providence, by a natural care of themselves, and in actions to which their nature obligeth them for their own preservation; so should men make use of their Rational powers for the careful improvement of all such means, which God allows them (as he thinks fit) for the better management of their own Well-beings in this world; but still with deference to their principal business and design, of attaining the happiness of a following life. This the Second Reason.   

Section III.  
THE third Reason intended with further explanation to represent, that man's Rational Faculties, and Intellectual Mind, were not likely to be given him, for the sake of his mortal life only, is because it's commonly observed, that the more designedly, and intently, men employ their minds and lives, for the attainment of such ends and satisfactions, as relate only to their present enjoyments; the less are they likely to escape their acting such follies and absurdities, as cannot consist with their characters of being Reasonable Creatures. And that the highest wisdom such men do commonly arrive at, will in their best successes, amount to little more than what the natural discretion Brute animals themselves express, in the mannagement of their well-beings.  
And therefore it were well for the happiness of most of that sort of men, who appear to live to no other purpose, but to serve the interests of their mortal durations only, that a few of thousands of them, could in the managment of their secular and sensual designs, arrive at the common and natural prudence of ordinary Brutes. So that when it is usually said, that if men live only for their own ends and sensual satisfactions in this world, that they degenerate into Beasts, they put a disparagement upon the Honour of those Creatures (whom Porphyry contends to make, 
De Abst. lib. 3.  as it were, co-brethrens with us in the Rational world) and that because they regularly act their natural powers and faculties for their own good, agreeably to the ends for which they were made; whereas when men renounce the concerns of another world, they act commonly in contradiction to their own principal natures, and do degenerate, not so much into Brutes, as that they turn Fools and Sots.  
And though it's a common custom to call men wise, who live at that rate, with any present success in their worldly designs; yet it must be presumed, that it is at best by way of comparison, that is, that they may be lesser Fools than others; or perhaps this may be done by a kind of mutual combination among such men themselves, to call one another Wise, where there is no manner of manly reason, why they should be so accounted; and perhaps all the reasons in the world, why they should be reputed otherwise, if their designs and ends, actings and discourses, were measured by the Standard of that, which is true and genuine Wisdom.  
And further, to enforce the Reason why on this account it may more manifestly appear, that Almighty God did not furnish Mankind with those Rational Powers on purpose for the sake only of their mortal Durations, (which must be so▪ if no World in future) is because it's obviously observed, that the greater Portions of intellectual abilities, whether complexional or acquired, that those men have, who live only to their own present sensual ends; and the more solicitously they apply their minds for the attainment of them, without any regard at all of what's to come in a future World, so much the more remarkable are their degeneracies to folly and absurdities.  
And therefore we may take notice, that such kinds of men, if they be but indifferently qualified in their Understandings, and of duller Capacities, do always act all their sensual Adventures, as with weaker desires, so with fewer imprudencies, and do even seem comparatively wise and discreet in their very follies. And I shall instance in some cases, their Covetousness (when it falls out to be the present humour) is less solicitous; Their Amours more indifferent; They drink more quietly, talk more temperately, and their Passions are more tolerable: And indeed, as in these, so in all other kinds of sensual and secular regards, they act like prudent men in comparison of those Persons, that are of more lively and brisk Capacities. For their covetous humour is managed with more cunning and overreaching Intrigues; Their Amours are violent and disturbing: Their Drink makes them as riotous as Bethlems; Their Passions rage and are intolerable; Their Talk is clamourous and provoking: And indeed in all their Sensualities, their Wit engageth them to act their several humours and inclinations, to their own greater folly and misfortune. So that in the event, many of them may be easily tempted to wish that they had been born natural Fools, Brutes, Trees, or any thing, rather than to have been made Intellectual Being's, so much to their own disadvantages.  
Now, how could such Rational Creatures be possibly engaged in such reproachful miscarriages of their Understandings, but that their Minds had lost their proper and natural Authority over their own Affections and Appetites, and consequently over their own Thoughts and Actions, for want of being principally concerned for Religion and Virtue, in order to the happy events of a future World? For their Rational Powers being left to have nothing to be employed about, but for the ends, and pretended satisfactions of this Life, it's no wonder that they should admit, if not administer to, such wild excesses of Folly and Indiscretions.  
So that if any unconcerned Person of an observing humour, would but take the pains (if it were but for his diversion) to make an impartial Survey of the Rational World, as at any time men generally do appear to act their several parts in it, and then would but recount, as far as he can make a Prospect, the various Follies and Imprudencies which the men wholly unconcerned for Religion and another World, do daily commit, and habitually persist in, he could not but judge, that too great a part of it would look like one entire Scene of Fools and Madmen. That is, should he but particularly take notice how sillily one man manageth his love of Money, another his fondness to a Woman: With what idle extravagancies a Third is treating the pride of his Heart; while another is tugging hard for a Feather-cap promotion: And shall then observe, how such a man's next Neighbour is, by his restless humour, storming every body out of their peace and order; while he spies another sort of cunning Men sit close together in a corner, drinking away their Health, Fortune, and Reason; with a thousand suchlike idle Adventures, to which their unconcernedness for Religion and another World, do daily expose them.  
And now, if any man should advise me, the more convincingly to make Good what I have thus so severely affirmed concerning so great a part of Mankind, who will be apt to rage to see themselves thus ridiculously exposed, I could think of no other expedient, that would more effectually acquit me, than to make use of a little Burlesque, which an honest Country Droll hath promised me, to dress up some of those intellectual Fops in their proper Garbs. For some great Authors have told me, That the best way of handling an artificial Fool, is to do it in his own kind: And to laugh him into Discretion would be the best expedient to recover him from his Folly.  
But then the Author's desire is, That it may stand in the midst of this Discourse, but in the nature of a Parenthesis; some telling him that it's too light for the gravity of the Argument; and others again, of another opinion, persuaded him by all means to let the Fools see how the representations of their Folly doth become them, when they have read their own ridiculous Characters. And let it go at all adventures.  
(The first ridiculous piece among the silly Crew, of whom my Neighbour brought me a description, was of one, whose debauched Imagination, for want of being concerned for his best Interest, had betrayed his Reason to think, that it would be principally for his happiness, if he could but grow famously Rich; and that with an especial design, to raise up a succeeding Family, big enough, to make a great Show in the World. And as the most likely Expedient for the carrying on his wise Project, he employs all his intellectuals, how he may best attain to the mighty Art of Thrift. And then to that as to his Deity, he devotes all the powers of his Soul; and sacrificeth to it, not only all that may be useful to others, but convenient or decent for himself. And for that end, (to instance in some cases) if necessity doth but at any time hector him into a mind to clothe his Carcase, his design (for that can only solve his discontent about the Charges of it) is to wardrup up the old Case, as part of his Stock, to be Inventoried by his Executor when he dies.  
If he eats, the only Hautgoust that relisheth his Meat, is either that it costs him nothing, or as it best agrees with his stomach in his Pocket; for there principally lays his hunger and thirst, and the palating he delights in.  
If he rides abroad, it's generally upon an Animal, whose bones he designs to tell in for money, in the next Sum he takes Bond for. And if at any time he seems kind or civil, it's only to them, of whom he designs to make a Prize upon a fore-seen Bargain.  
The Furniture of his House is nothing but a rubbaged heap of Pawns and Stresses: and his Storehouse is generally stocked with nothing else but the atoning Presents of his affrighted Creditors. But if a Vote for a Tax be rumoured, though the King's, or the Church's Safety lays at stake for want of Money, it sounds in his Ears like a Knell, or a Raven. His Religion is a Conventicle to choose, for there he can sit or lie along, pull his Hat over his Eyes and Count, and not be interrupted with sometimes standing up, and then kneeling down, and ever and anon, with saying, an Amen, or a Lord have mercy upon me▪ or with the like Invasions upon his Christian Liberty. But if the Preacher in that place must have Money, then farewell to that Religion; saith he, I can discharge my Christianity at a cheaper rate at home: that is, by reading some Chapters every Sabbath night: let them be out of Genesis or Matthew, Canticles or Corinthians, that's all one to me; so they be read.  
But to be sure, he hates all those Religions that put men to Charge for Ornaments, Utensils, Repairs of Edifices, and Moses and Aaron's: Nothing so abominable to him: And then a Sacrament with an Offering, and a Priest in a Dress, and who must have Tithes too; and if so, that are uncrampt by a Two penny-custom: All this, saith he, is downright Idolatry and Antichristian. And as for those days they call Holidays, they are mere loss of time, and turn to no common Profit: And they are Popery too.  
Now all this while, when there is any thing to be got by it, he is as poor as he can creep, and looks always of such a kind of Quality, that did not some men now and then mistake him for a Conjurer, one would swear, that he were downright some Vnder-Officer in the Commonwealth of Beggars. And indeed to save Charges, he could find in his heart to take a turu or two with them about the Country: but to be sure, it shall be no longer, than till they come to their General Rendezvous: He knows how to make better use of his Money, than to bear a Club among those merry and generous companions.  
But stay! While this Man of Gold is going on thus hastily in his wise Journey for getting Money, suddenly a Fever arrests him for an old Debt, ready to burn down his Souls dry Tenement; or a Dropsy opens a Flood to drown it. And then he sighs, and is troubled in Conscience, that he hath yet but enough to make some Body, but an ordinary Knight or Squire. And if he dies upon't, the last event of all his wise Endeavours is; 
Octo pedes Caesar habet.  that when the joy-sorrow of his Heir hath once Serjeanted up a Prisoner to an eight-foot Dungeon, with a Pompous Funeral; its odds but the World will smile, that he hath gotten all that Treasure for one, that's like to know little more, than how to talk idly and swear; go gay and drink; and to turn the New House in the Country, designed for the Seat of the Chimerical Family first into an Inn, or a Seraglio, and then perhaps into a sheet of Parchment, for the use of another Fop, that may act the Part of Father or Son.  
Assoon as my merry Neighbour had dressed up for me the former hopeful Adventurer, for a present Happiness, in his Fool's Coat, he presently changeth the Scene, and dresseth up another intellectual Brute, of a quite contrary humour, and he is as wise as Drink can make him. And the first Enterprise that his contriving Understanding puts him upon, whereby to get rid of the encumbrances of his Wit and Money, is to lead about a Hog (I mean himself) in a string from Town to Town, to make Sport for a Regiment of Boys and Tapsters, with his frantic adventures.  
But in a while, being tired with making so much work for Constables, Justices, and Glasiers, he resolves, upon important Reasons, to take a wiser method for his own greater happiness; and that is to set up for himself, and to be his own Innkeeper at home. And for that end he furnisheth his House with all manner of Utensils for the sooping Employment; he turns all his Apartments into drinking Rooms: Only he solemnly devotes his Cellar for a Chapel, where he and his devout drunken Assembly do constantly finish their last completorium, with their Hats off in great order, and sometimes upon their knees, if the Health be to Somebody; and in the morning they return thither again, and are as zealous as Thirst can make them, to pay their early Devotions at the Tap. And in this more solemn place, as in a Repertory, he sets up all his drinking Laws and Sanctions; and at the heads of the Vessels stands up chalked, the only Almanac, by which he understands how the Year passeth, always accounting from the famous Months of March and September.  
And by this time you may imagine, that the Head-house is become one entire Inn, or indeed one nasty Trough, common to all the Swine in the Country: Where all the Year long they are swallowing down the Sun, and drinking up the Night, till the Morning discovers how all the Rooms are spread over with so many sprawling Monsters, where one hath lost his Legs, another his Eyes, and All, their Wits; so that, if a Stranger should come in, and would have but patience to stop his Nose, he cannot but think, that he had in prospect some new-fashioned Hospital, or that he had in view those imperfect shapes which the Egyptian drunken Mud produceth, when it hath a while debauched itself with the Nile's lusty Liquor.  
And now having a few Years constantly attended to this wise way of living, (as if he had been shut up to be fatted in a Sty) at length his body swells to the likeness, and perhaps, to the bigness of one of his large Casks, which in a short time begins to leak at so many Orifices, designed by Art and Nature, to prevent the inundation of a Dropsy, that at last his Associates are necessitated, for fear of a common Contagion, to remove that unweildly Puddle of humours, and lodge it in a little dark Cellar under ground, where a brisk Club of little Good-Fellows of his own breeding, stave him, or (as they call it) dust him, and merrily drink him up to a drop, before they have done.)  
Thus ends the long (and to some perhaps unwelcome) Parenthesis; but they may pass it over if they please; and there is no hurt done.  
Now, to these two, I could have added many more such like Characters of other sorts of Fops, who are as constantly acting their silly Parts upon the World's Stage, but my designed method would not admit such an Enlargement in a single Paragraph; And, perhaps, these two are too many already in some men's opinions. But if I had not thought, that I might do some considerable Good by such an attempt, I had certainly chosen to have laid them aside. That is, That when such men should see, as it were in a Glass, their own ridiculous deformities, they might bethink themselves of putting on a wiser and more acceptable Garb of Living; and than that others, who were not yet engaged in those Follies, might endeavour to prevent their appearing in the World, such Monsters of Absurdity.  
And this was done, not that I thought that all men who are not concerned for Religion and another World, do always make use of their Rational powers to so very ridiculous purposes, as such a piece of sportful Characters do represent them; yet I am assured, that there be always too many in the world, that do really come up even to the highest degrees of such kinds of follies, and even among them that have no cause to complain of any defect, either in their Natural, or acquired Rational abilities.  
And then as for those that do not come up to such famous and clamorous pitches of absurdity, in the management of their Sensual engagements of life, I am so far satisfied, that there is no man, that resolv'dly quits his mind of all concerns for a Future World, but when he acts only for present ends and satisfactions, as the sole happiness, which he resolves to expect, but that his practices and their events, must more or less bear a resemblance to such described follies. And though perhaps some men's actions may admit mixtures of some discretion, comparatively of some other sensualists proceedings, yet generally such men cannot but move and act beneath the dignity of a Rational Being; and their actions will be found to be as great a condescension from their natural humanity, as if a Prince, who exempting himself from his Governing Affairs, shall spend his time in catching Flies, and tending an Aviary, or practising the Trade of an Artificer, with such like impertinent Adventures. And though some other ways of passing away the time, that are in fashion, may have gained a better reputation in common opinion, (setting aside what use may be made of them, for innocent divertisements) may yet in themselves be as silly and childish as the former; when right Reason, the great judge of human actions, shall arraign their importancies, and how far they come short of that Wisdom, to which the Grandeur of a rational Being should aspire. This the last of the three Reasons.  
And thus I have argued, how those Ratational Faculties and man's Intellectual Mind, could not be given him for the sake, ends, and intendments only of his present life. I should now attend to what may be said to prove, that they were principally, and on the most special purpose given him, for the sake and concern of another World. But my exceptioners have designed other work for me, and I must first attend to them, and fairly acquit myself of their suggestions to the contrary of what I have endeavoured to prove, before I can be engaged in that main business which concerns the chief strength of my Argument.    

CHAP. II.  
IN this Chapter we must endeavour to solve those Objective Exceptions, by which some men have alleged, that there be several cases; for the reasons of which, God Almighty might be pleased to give those Rational Faculties to Mankind, though they were never to be concerned in their use and operations for any thing, that relates to a Future World. And those Cases are Three, to be examined in so many Sections.  
1. The First respects the attainment of all manner of Learning.  
2. The Second is, that a man by those Faculties may be the better enabled to manage the Government of National Societies.  
3. The Third is, that those Rational Faculties may be improved for the admirable use of Contemplation, which some Philosophers have represented, to be a very considerable expedient of human happiness in this Life.  

Section I.  
IN this Section we must wait upon the learned Nation, who will be apt to suggest and say, That though those Noble Faculties, when they are wholly employed about the unsufficient Ends and Happiness, which worldly prosperity, pleasure, and a sensual way of living, can be pretended to afford, may be found so defective (as hath been represented) yet as they may be improved for the attainment of universal Learning, which hath been always accounted such a special accomplishment and satisfaction of the Mind, it may be one sufficient End, why Man might be furnished with those rational qualifications, though they were never to be concerned at all, for what relates to a Future World.  
My Answer to this seemingly great Exception is, that I shall evince that that which is reputed Learning in all its parts, can no more accommodate the natural temper of Man's rational mind, as to any real satisfaction, than the enjoyment of any other temporal Good; and that it is subject to the same defailancies for such an end, even in the highest acquisitions, that humane life can possibly admit.  
And all this I shall endeavour to represent upon the account, of two Reasons. First, from the way and manner of its attainment; Secondly, from the value and Importance of it, when it's so attained. But in the management of which Reasons, I must crave an ingenuous consideration from the Lovers and Students of that universal Learning for what end I do it; that is, thereby intending only to control the Theists Pretensions, who are apt to take all occasions to invalidate the necessary belief of another World's Existence: and not at all designing to disparage the Honour, or discourage the Diligence of them, that attend to the attainment of it.  
The first Reason, why such attainments of Learning could not be a sufficient end in its self for GOD's giving those rational Faculties to Mankind, whereby any man might allow himself the thoughts of enjoying such a sufficient Good, as might answer the temper, and satisfy the desires of his intellectual mind, without a principal regard had to his Concern in a Future World, is from the manner of his attainment of all Rational Learning.  
For than we say, how can the mind of man entertain any such real satisfaction to its self, when it's considered, That so great a part of his Mortal Duration must be spent and worn up in the very preparative and proemial Labours towards the acquisition of any one part of that which is reputed Learning, before he can be presumed to be so much a Master of it, as to have the pleasure or satisfaction of comprehending, what is Intellectual or Rational in it. For he must first be supposed to endure the unpleasant hardship of a kind of Captive, and must be several years tied to the drudgery of (as it were) dragging about a Mill, only for the acquiring the little skill, how to read and speak congruously and sensibly. He must then encumber his head with a company of hard terms, definitions, and distinctions in an instrumental Art, which are like to give his mind as much satisfaction, as toil can administer, before he can be able to work out the distinct notions of things, or be capable to think, or discourse intelligibly of them.  
And when after this he comes to a nearer approach towards any Art or Science, he must then spend some time in charging his memory with the proper Elements, and some introductive general Principles, (as Prolegomena) before he can engage in the true understanding of it. Now what contentment or satisfaction can all those previous Labours be to a Rational Mind, any more, than the tuning a set of Viols to a musical Ear, or the confused noise of Axes and Hammers, and the unmethodized prospect of a heap of Tools, and unfinished Materials, be to him that hath undertaken a Design for a stately Edifice? But then after our Students laborious Preface to his obtaining an entrance into the wide field of Learning; What true satisfaction can he possibly give his mind, when he cannot but have heard, that his whole Life (too little for the perfect attainment of any one considerable Science) must be always in a progressive motion towards the end, which he proposeth to himself; and for that Reason, he cannot but expect to live in a state of a continued Imperfection, and to be all his days in the capacity of a Disciple.  
The Sense of which, though it may sometimes be made use of, to drive further on in his Studies; yet a little time and experience will inform him, that it is no more, than a going forward towards something, from which he shall always find himself as far off, (if not much farther) as when he first set forth. And the reason is, because the more he knows, the more he shall still, to his great dissatisfaction, find cause to think, that there is yet much more to be learned and known. Every degree of his acquired knowledge, will be but a further discovery of his ignorance of other things, and advance his thirst of what else is yet to be understood.  
And sure it was from hence, that Antonius took occasion to represent his thoughts when he advised, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Lib. 2.  That a Man should drive out of his mind the Thirst of Books, lest he should go murmuring to his Grave; but rather be content, and give the gods thanks for the knowledge he hath a capacity ordinarily to attain.  
And now, when the expectant Student hath once considered, how he hath sped in the former part of his short Existence, he may then suggest to himself, what satisfaction he may hope for, after he hath passed the Meridian of his days: That is, whether, as he grows older, he doth not rather go backward than forward in the field of Learning; and upon a nearer approach towards the period of his life, whether he finds not apparently that he is upon the retrogressive and losing point. I don't speak of that declension of age, when it's possible for a man to forget his own Name; but I mean, whether all along (when he should be presumed to reap some Harvest of his proposed satisfaction to the comfort of his own mind) he perceives not a continued diminution in his stock of Learning; which perhaps he imputes to the straightness of his minds Repertory, that either the later notions do (as it were) run over into forgetfulness, or else being crowded together in so small a room, that they stifle and confound one another. So that, what by the imperfections of his approaching age, and the frequent interruptions by infirmities; What by attendancies to those affairs, which the necessaries and conveniencies of Living do exact from him; and what by adhering to those Studies, to which in his Youth he had accustomed his mind, perhaps he may live to see himself baffleable by every fresh Adventurer, so as to bear the shame of being outdone in common Talk by any such an one, as is better acquainted with the newer methods, and later notions of his own Sciences. And this accounts for the first Reason.  
The Second Reason, which I intimated before to represent, That the attainment of Learning (to such a degree as the Mind can admit in Man's short duration) could not be a sufficient end, why GOD Almighty should give those Rational Faculties to Mankind, for any real satisfaction of humane Life, is from an examination of what importance and value such an acquired Learning may be in its self, so as to answer the Mind's natural temper, and its innate desires of knowledge; And I think I may, in that respect, without offence, affirm, of all the Learning in the World, That were it not that it may be made serviceable to Religion, and practical Goodness, in order to the Interest of another World, it would hardly deserve its own Name, especially with such a Character, as the World allows it. And by reason of the defective attainment of every part of it; no man did ever think himself, in all points, so sufficiently learned, as to allow his mind any manner of complacency, or real satisfaction, but the ignorantlybold, and such an one, whom flattery and vulgar applause had seduced into such a blind opinion of himself.  
And therefore it hath been always reckoned among the wise and modest, to be a considerable advance of a judicious Understanding, for a man to think himself to know too little, or even nothing, 
Dieg.  (as it is reported of Socrates, that he should so affirm of himself) that is, 
Laer.  That he knows nothing comparative of that, 
Lib. 2.  which he cannot but be sensible is more and more yet to be understood.  
What Science is it, that was ever yet believed by the judicious to be brought to any tolerable perfection? That which hath been most likely of late to gain the best improvement towards it, is Experimental Philosophy, especially as to those attempts that have been made, for the finding out the natures of Being's. And though they have offered at those discoveries with considerable success, and perhaps to a greater degree than have yet been attempted and attained, yet nevertheless, I am apt to believe, that they have so far fallen short of any perfect attainment, that if Six Thousand men were appointed to find out the nature of every single Vegetable (as they account their number) and so many Thousands more, about the numerous species or kinds of Animals, Infects, and Minerals, they might be presumed to find so far work enough for their whole Lives, as that Basilius Valentinus, who writ of Antimony, did affirm, (as Mr. boil relates▪ 
— Nat. Hist. p. 13  it) that The shortness of Man's Life makes it impossible for one man to understand throughly, or to learn that Mineral only; in which, every day there was something behind, that was to be discovered afterward.  
And what I may affirm of the great distance of that kind of Learning from Perfection, the same also may be said of all the parts of Learning whatsoever. That is, (to instance in some particulars) if he that designs a Happiness to his mind, by furnishing it with the best Treasures, which the Historian Learning can afford, could be sensible and secure, that there were such a Body of History, in which there should be nothing related, that were neither Partial nor Romantic: Or, if he that aims at a great felicity, by the attainment of the best knowledge in the learned Languages, were sure, that if he were Master of any one of them, as far as Art and Study could advance him, that he should never have Thoughts of any defect in the acquisition or use of it: I say, if it might be so affirmed of these, and all other parts of humane Learning, there might be some pretence for the mind's attainment of some sufficient satisfaction in this life, without respect to another; but when it's known to be far otherwise, it lessens the wonder of Sextus Empericus his Confidence, 
Cap. 1.  when he went about to prove so industriously, that there is no Learning at all, but in uncertain opinion; and that in another place speaking of the Mathematical Science, 
Nam etsi forte fortunâ quisquam hoc verum assequatur, nescit tamen se esse acceptum, sed putet, & opinatur.  (of which one should think that the least doubt were to be made) he should assert, That he that hath attained to the knowledge of any Truth in it, yet that it was but by Good fortune; and that he can't certainly know whether he hath attained it or no, but only may opine and think so. Or, that Cornelius Agrippa should assert not only the difficulty, 
— Tam est scientiarum omnium cognitio difficilis, ne dicam, impossibilis, ut prius vita tota hominis deficiat quam vel unius disciplinae minima ratio perfecte investigari possit. Proleg. de Van. Scient.  but even the impossibility of attaining to the least Reason of any one Science perfectly in the whole Life of a Man.  
Or, Lastly, That Sextius Romanus, (of whom we have an account in Plutarch) who had parted with his honourable Fortunes, 
De prob. Virt. pag. mihi 77.  upon design to attend to the Philosophical Studies, 
Edit. Gr. & Lat.  should after a while fall into so great an unsatisfaction of mind for what he had done, as to be weary of his life, and to make an attempt to cast it away.  
And this dischargeth me of my Second Reason, given to evince, That the value of Learning is not such, as that either the mind of Man should have a sufficient satisfaction in its self, by the attainment of it, or that it were reason enough why GOD should give Mankind those rational faculties for that end, though they should never be concerned for a future World.  
And now I would not that any man should prejudge by these Reasons offered, that I intent to put any disparagement upon Learning, in that imperfect degree it is attainable, (as I cautioned the Reader in the beginning of this Section) or to give any discouragements to the Lovers of, or Endeavourers for it; For upon the supposal of the Existence of a Future World, and of that Religion, and the knowledge of it, that is necessarily requisite for the attainment of the happiness of that state, I do most heartily acknowledge, that all kinds of Learning, in the proportions to which they may be improved, are sufficiently and satisfactorily useful, and in themselves highly honourable. 
— Dio. Laert. Lib. 6. In vita Crat. The.  And I wish the Studious of them may meet better encouragements in the World, than by the measures of that man's unworthy Bounty, who gave Three Pounds to his Cook, a Dram to his Physician, a Talon to his Mistress, and Three-halfe-pences to the Philosopher. And this concludes my Answer to the first Exception.   

Section II.  
IN this Section, we must attend those men's Exception, who will allege, That those rational powers of the Soul, are necessarily useful for the conduct of governments, & that without which, there would not be capacities sufficient for the contrivance of expedient Laws and Orders; and for other the manageries of public Affairs, to preserve National Societies in Peace and welfare: and that then there is another end, why GOD Almighty should furnish Mankind with those intellectual qualifications of mind, though they should never be concerned for another World. To this, my first Answer is, that if our Exceptioners have any eye towards that humane Learning, which we have lately discoursed upon, as if that, as such, were sufficient to influence men's minds for the better management of Governments, they offer their exception with too great a hazard of being disbelieved. For the contrary hath frequently, and famously been experimented to be true. And therefore Clemens Alexandrinus informs us, 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Strom. lib. 1.  That such Men, by their sophizing & Oratory, have served frequently to amuse, and steal away the minds of the People, and sometimes have occasioned a Cadmean War, and its unfortunate Events. And for that Reason, the Philosophers and Poets have been ofttimes banished from States, 
— Neque illis solum temporibus nimis rudibus, necdum Graeca doctrina expolitis Philosophi ex Urbe Roma pulsi, verum etiam, Domitiano imperante, Senatus-consulto evecti, atque Urbe & Italia interdicti sunt. Qua tempestate Epictetus quoque Philosophus, propter id Senatus-consultum, Româ decessit. Lib. 15. Cap. 11.  as Dangerous to their Peace. And thus the Romans did, (as Aulus Gellius tells us) not only when they were Rude and Impolite, but even in the learned Age of Domitian, when Epictetus himself was not excepted.  
But secondly, I answer, that if our Exceptioners mean only, that those rational Faculties do sometimes furnish Men with a greater natural sagacity; and which being improved by experience and observation, may better qualify them, to contrive and act, what is most convenient for the Piece and well-Governing of Nations, it must be allowed as true. But then I say, that if those qualifications be not accompanied with a concern for a Future World, and with some sense of the necessity of being Good and Virtuous, as an universally acknowledged condition of obtaining the Blessing of it; and that thereby such men may have some kind of Conscience of what's Right and Good, to oblige them so to act and govern; there would be no society in the World, with which it were worth the holding any Communion. All such natural and acquired Capacitations for public Good in such men, would presently (as it's too generally observed) be made use of for the more successful prosecution of private Interests and designs. Prince's could no longer enjoy their Thrones in peace, nor the People their Social Rights in safety, than that there wanted men, that had ambition, covetousness, and power enough, to interrupt and invade them both: Nor would the Communion itself in the issue subsist, but by a state of War, with all its attendant calamities and savageries, and the miserable consequences of the longest and most successful Sword. Which would highly defame the Creator's Wisdom and Goodness, that His most excellent creatures, beneath the Heavens, should have no better means allowed them to preserve themselves in their Social Communions, but by being always in apparent danger to be harassed with the bloody attempts of cunning and ambitious men, who would be perpetually contending for Sovereignty and Power. To prevent which confusions, when Princes have to deal with a mutinous and seditious People, they are sometimes necessitated to secure themselves, and the common peace, by armed force.  
And therefore the great Masters of Policy have adjudged Religion, with regard to future rewards and punishments, so necessary for the safety of Governments, that they have in the first place (as Matcheavil observes) endeavoured to establish the profession of it among the People. 
In id enim prae caeteris incumbere debent, ut verum Religionis cultum recte instituant & venerantur. Disp. lib. 1. cap. 12.   
Which Profession of Religion (saith Plutarch) is so necessary, that the Belief of the gods was the first and greatest thing to be considered of in the constitution of Laws. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Adver. Colorem. p. 1125.  Thus Lycurgus provided for his Lacedæmonians, Numa for the Romans, the ancient jon for the Athenians, and Deucalion for the Grecians. It's possible (saith he) that a City may somewhere be found without Walls, or Learning, or Wealth, but no man ever saw a City without Temples and Prayers.  
Particularly for this reason, Livy observes, That Numa Pompilius was necessitated to go an extraordinary way to work; that is, to feign that he had communion with Aegeria, and that by her command and direction, he was obliged to constitute a Priesthood, 
Dec. 1.  and appoint such Orders and Holy Rites, 
Lib. 1.  as might advance a greater Solemnity and higher veneration of the gods.  
And Matheavil offers to consideration, that when the World began to despise the Oracles of Jupiter Ammon and Apollo at Delphos, than men began to be impious, and to be fit for all manner of public disturbances. 
Impii ex ea re facti sunt, & ad omnia turbamina prompti. Disp. lib. 1. cap. 15.  And then he concludes, That Princes ought (if they intent to be obeyed, and to have their Kingdoms quiet) to hold their Subjects, as much as possible, inclined and devoted to Religion.  
And it should be hence suggested, that it is a disparagement to Religion, when it's alleged to be so far concerned in politic designs; and that it gives too just an occasion to lewd and atheistical persons, to reproach and decry it, as only a contrivance of ingenious men to keep the world in order. My answer would be, that if it were true, it would give such a reproach to the Divine Wisdom and Goodness as nothing but a spite to the belief of a Deity, could possibly suggest it. For it must suppose, that either God could or would not (when all Being's were in his hand to dispose of as he thought fit) otherwise provide for the world's social subsistence and welfare, but by giving men a capacity and a necessity to invent a lie to do it, and to put a cheat upon mankind, to attain that End.  
But suppose that some men, who were no ways at all affected with the sense (and perhaps the belief) of Religion, should be the Authors of that advice to Princes, to keep the People in more peaceable Order; would it thence follow, that Religion itself had no real foundation in itself, for that and greater Ends▪ Is it not known, that some particular Persons, and even whole parties of men, have artificially contrived a Religious guise in Hypocrisy, thereby the better to pursue their private, or their popular designs and ends? and can any Argument be reasonably thence deduced, to bring the Truth of the Religion they abuse into question? But that rather the contrary must be true, for a deguise must be of something that is somewhere in real Being, or there would be no kind of pretence for acceptance upon dissimulation. If there were no such thing as a Real Friendship in the world, what entertainment would a false, and a barely-pretended kindness obtain?  
Now the Sum of this Section is to demonstrate, That no acts of the Intellectual Powers can make competent expedients to preserve the World in any tolerable order, unless as founded upon the belief of another world, as it's only practical encouragement (of which expect an account in my Third Argument, Chap. 3. Sect. 1.) whereby the Reasons or Consciences of men may be obliged to live innocently, and quietly, both to their Governors, and one towards another. And thus I have dispatched my Second Exception.   

Section III.  
IN this Section I must consider the last exception against my asserting, that the Rational powers could not be given to man for any end, or good attainable in this his present Life, and consequently not for the sake only of his mortal duration. And the Exception is thus suggested, that is, that those Rational Faculties may be made use of, for the Excellent Office of Contemplation, which in itself is so great a satisfaction to the mind, as that it may make him truly happy, though they were never improved for the concern of a Future World.  
Now the reason why I do the rather oblige myself to take notice of this Exception, is, because so great a man as Aristotle hath in his Ethics so solicitously contended to make Contemplation (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) a self-sufficient happiness of human life in this world.  
But to show the vanity of that pretention, abstract from the use, that may be made of it, with respect to that state of mind and life, which do necessarily conduce to the self-sufficient good of a Future World, I offer these several things to consideration.  
First let it be enquired into, what such an operation of mind can, in itself, naturally do; and then I say, that accordingly as men are disposed to either Good or Evil, so by their Contemplative Faculty, they may act wisely or foolishly, happily or unhappily for themselves, as they shall think fit to make use of it for either. For by that power of the mind, they can contemplate of God, his Word, and Works, of Religion and Virtue, and of the happy Events of both, or of any innocent thing, that may reasonably consist with their welfare in this or a following World. And all this may be done to the comfort and contentment of men's lives.  
And then on the other side, by the same Faculty, they may contemplate or think on Things or Objects that do really tend to their own misfortune and disquit. That is, they may thereby be projecting designs, and amassing heaps of mischief together against themselves. They may accumulatively augment their own sorrows in a fit of sadness; and at another time advance an Eutopian Joy, as idle and insignificant as a fond Dream. They can thereby serve their fruitless Love, Anger, Fear, and the rest of their affections and passions, with imaginations, that are accountable to no manner of Use or Reason: And all this may be done, and a thousand times worse, to the discomfort and uneasiness of their own minds and lives, so that the faculty itself is naturally upon a pure indifferency, to act both for the Good or Evil of him, that admits his mind to make use of it for either. Now if it shall appear, (as I shall endeavour it) that no other Objects, upon which it may be employed, but such as bear a consistency with what relates to a Future World, as it's only proper encouragement, why it should so think or contemplate, can possibly make any account for the real happiness of humane life, then what's become of the pretence of its selfsufficiency, without the concerns of such a State to come?  
And if it be said, that that thinking or contemplative power, may be exercised upon Objects of this present life, thereby the better to convenience a man's worldly affairs, as that, by the use of it, he may act them the more deliberately and prudently; it's granted to be true But then (if he designs any substantial happiness to himself, or satisfaction to his thoughts) those Contemplative or Thinking operations, must be acted from a mind that is generally influenced by the hopes or fears of the events and issues of a Future World, or it will meet the same unsatisfactions in the obtaining such advantages, to which its subject by the real enjoyment of them. Of which an account hath been already given, in the first Chapter of this Argument.  
And moreover, it may be also further considered, that without such a regard to what's to come in that Future State, as the same contemplative or thinking Faculty, when placed upon such present Objects, may the better enable him for such advantageous successes in his worldly business; so also it may capacitate him the more subtly to pursue his ends by undue methods; it may help and enable him to cheat and deceive, with more artificial dexterities, as well as manage with greater prudence. And how few are there in the World, whom any other principle can restrain, from such unwarrantable proceedures in their affairs, when so virtuous a person as Socrates should affirm of himself, That if he could believe there were no other world, he should not be afraid to do any thing that were unjust? But the case is more fully managed in the third Argument.  
Secondly I answer, that as for Aristotle's way of Arguing for his notion of a present (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as he calls it) self-sufficient Felicity, by the use and benefit of a Rational Contemplation. If I could possibly think that his Arguments were not purely romantic, and as sounded upon a supposal of something, which is altogether unaccountable upon any other Reasons, but such, as must be deduced from the believed acknowledgement of a Future World, I should choose to give an attendance to every one of them. Upon what other principle could any man allow those fits of contemplation, the appellations with which Aristotle adorns his notion, of that pretended felicity? As when he calls it, The most perfect Blessedness— the best of all humane Actions and Operations— and that the man that exerciseth it, 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉— Lib. 10. Cap. 7.  is the most absolutely blessed; with such like Divine expressions, which can be accommodable to no other kind of happiness, but what is presumed to be enjoyable in another world; or otherwise they can no where be found, but in the regions where speculative impossibilities exist.  
It's true, I solemnly grant, that if our Contemplator be religiously disposed, and is hopefully sensible, that his Life and Actions are pleasing and acceptable to the Mighty GOD, and so bear a tendency to his happiness in another World; I say, I then grant and believe, that such a man's contemplation, when he is meditating upon the regularity of his own actions, the excellencies of GOD's Love and Favour, and is recounting the measures of that Joy and Peace, Love and Society, which he shall meet withal in the other World, may attain to such a degree of his minds satisfaction, as may very nearly accord with the Philosophers high appellations of such a thinking Operation.  
But then, on the other hand, if the contemplative power be acted by a Person that is viciously and immorally disposed, there is no peradventure, but he employs it to his own greater infelicity. That is, he will be apt either to devour his own contentment with invidious or revengeful Thoughts, or be creating his disquiet with anxious Cares, or needless Fears, or with the like destructive Operations of his Mind: Or, if we suppose it to be acted by one that is of an inoffensive and virtuous Humour (upon which supposition I conceive the Philosopher did principally found his Discourse of the contemplative Happiness) yet if that man shall resolv'dly entertain no thoughts at all of, or be in no manner concerned for, the events of a Future World, it must be presumed, that he will be most apt always to think at best, worldly, if not altogether vainly and impertinently, and in the manner of men, that are always talking idly, and to no purpose. Whereas, that Religion which relates to a Future World, will oblige him to make Conscience of his inward Thoughts, as well as of his overt Actions; and for some Reasons, and in many respects, it will be found his Duty to give his greater attendance to avoid those Evils of his thinking Mind.  
And now, how otherwise can our Exceptioner imagine, that the contemplative Faculty, that GOD gave Mankind, should be restrained from such absurdities, or that his Thinking Mind, that is always busily at work upon one Object or another, should be able to confine itself to such only, as tend to Virtue, and his own satisfactory Good and Happiness, when his own unruly Passions and impetuous Appetites within him, and the loose and vain World without him, will be perpetually soliciting him to be thinking of those other objects, that may really make him unhappy, except it be from the grand encouragement of securing his future and principal Interest in another World? And for a fuller demonstration of this Truth, my Reader may respite his Thoughts till he is engaged in the Third Argument intended for that purpose. This the last Exception.  
And thus I have accounted with my Sceptic for all his three Exceptions, and I think we have lost no ground in the defence of my assertion, That the rational faculties, and intellectual mind of Man, were not given him of GOD, for the sake, ends, and intendments of his Mortal Duration only; but upon a more especial purpose, and principally for the sake of another World. And that is the business of the next Chapter to prove.    

CHAP. III.  
IN this Chapter I shall endeavour to evince positively, That those Rational Faculties were principally, and upon the most especial purpose, given to Mankind, for the sake, ends, and intendments of another World. And that, when they are exercised in their natural Operations, about the attainment of the happiness of that state, (it will appear) they will be then engaged in their own most proper and natural business and employments.  
Now, the most reasonable method to be undertaken, to demonstrate a Truth of this nature, will be to show, That the Reasons offered in the First Chapter, why those Faculties were not given to Mankind for the sake of this Life only, (which must have been true, if there were no other to succeed) are perfectly solved, when they are employed about the concerns of a Future World.  
And, because those Reasons were three especially, I shall therefore confront them in the same number and method, in so many Sections for that purpose.  

Section I.  
IN this Section, I shall remind the Reader of the first Defailance of those Rational Faculties, upon which I founded my First Reason, to prove that they were not given to Man for the sake only of his mortal Life; and that was, because the enjoyments of it could not afford the mind any settled or sufficient satisfaction, though a man were most prosperously possessed of them, much less provide for him any solid contentment, through the various Turns and Exigencies of humane life. And then I also showed, That though such Enjoyments might for a time naturally gratify the inferior part of a Man's self, yet that by the impropriety and unalliance they bear to the Rational and Supreme part of his Being, (which is most properly himself) they could never affect the Mind with any real or accommodable acquiescence, or natural satisfaction.  
Now, to confront that defailance, it will evidently appear, That when those Rational Faculties are made use of, to judge and choose the Interest of another World, as Man's chiefest Good; and then be actually engaged for that virtuous and religious way of living, that naturally tends to the obtaining the happiness of that state, they will be found experimentally to enjoy as much ease and satisfaction to themselves, as the mind of Man is capable of in this life; and as Objects, whose completion stands at such a distance, can possibly affect it. And those faculties will then as naturally acquiesce in their operations, when they are so employed and engaged, as do necessary Agents, when they attain those ends, to which, by natural instinct, they were obliged: Or, as when the outward Senses are exercised in their operations, about their proper Objects.  
But my attending Sceptic will here except, and say, That all these are but precarious Presumptives only; and therefore they can carry no certain Evidence for demonstration or conviction. To this Exception I shall answer, First, That the last Argument will give a fuller and more natural account of this Case, (being its most peculiar business) to which I must refer my Reader, to prevent my saying the same things over again.  
But then, Secondly, I answer, That I shall in this place only offer one single Expedient, and it's as considerable to our purpose, as such a case can possibly bear to evince a Truth of this nature; because the mind can only be convicted in its self, as to what it understands or thinks, and can't convince another, but upon the credit of its own discovery. And the Expedient is this, viz. A Solemn Appeal to the Faith, Conscience, and Experience of any of those men, who have been generally observed to live habitually in a course and state of Virtue and Piety; and that have solemnly professed themselves, by word and deed, to espouse the happiness of another World, as their principal and governing Interest; I say, to such a kind of person (be it whom my Exceptioner will, that can think and speak understandingly) I solemnly appeal, to declare upon his conscience, what Sense he hath had of his choice of such an Interest, and of all those Actions, and of that way of Living, which (upon the common agreement of all unprejudiced Minds) do naturally conduce to the happiness of a Future World: That is, whether he did ever repent himself, when his mind was free to judge, of the choice of that Future Interest; or that ever he continued in any dislike, or serious dissatisfactions of mind, about any virtuous designs or practices, which he had laboured to promote and act? Or, whether he was not generally pleased with himself, while he led his life strictly in that manner, and only then apt to be troubled, if at any time he had been surprised into a neglect of his Duty, or inadvertently overcome by the strength of any Temptations, to omit or do any thing that might abate his hope of his future Safety? Or, whether at any time, if he were afflicted with Sickness, or any other oppressive circumstances, his mind did not then retire into its self, and find there Reasons resulting from its religious temper, to support his pressures with more content and patient satisfaction? I say, if such a good man's sense and judgement may be believed to be true, it's easy to understand what those objects are, and what manner of Enjoyments those must needs be, with which the Rational mind should be thus satisfactorily affected and pleased.  
But my Sceptic hath yet more to except, and tells me, That all this may be nothing else but either the effect of an Enthusiastic Imagination, or otherwise vitiated Fancy, whereby the man's Reason may be so disordered, as that himself (how honest soever) should not be a competent Judge even of his own Sentiments. To this my answer is, That I grant, that there is such a possibility of a man's being himself deceived in his own thoughts; but if that were accounted at all times sufficient to control every affirmative Truth that depends upon a man's Solemn discovery of his own mind, there would want one of the most considerable Expedients, by which the World is to be kept in Peace, and regular Communion. And besides, it would be considered, that such a disordered Reason as our Exceptioner mentions, must be presumed to carry its own symptoms with it, and so be easily discovered for the invalidation of the credibility of what he affirms. But we offer our Exceptioner to stand to the sense and judgement of such an one, whose well-weighed understanding in the management of all other his Actions, can overrule all manner of suspicion of such an uncertain imagination. But then again, replies our Caviller, Such a man's Integrity may be called in question, and Who knows how far Hypocrisy may be baited with Temptations of Honour, Friendship, or other Worldly Ends, to put on all manner of taking-disguises of Religion, and amongst the rest this in debate? My answer to this is much the same with the former, that is, That such a false mind hath its certain Symptoms, as well as a disordered Reason, by which the dissimulation may be detected, and the affirmation may be judged invalid. And therefore, if we grant, That when we thus appeal to the Faith and Conscience of a Good man, concerning the inward Satisfaction of his Soul in his Religious Course, that we may possibly meet an Enthusiastic, or an Hypocrite, affirming the same thing; yet our arguing in this case runs no hazard at all, the largeness of our Appeal supersedes all danger of being disbelieved; for unless all that live piously in the World, be enthusiastics or Hypocrites, that is, Fools or Knaves; we can't miscarry in this point of Proof. And though some such Good men, sometimes in a Fit of deep Melancholy, occasioned generally by the ill-disposition of their Bodies; or by some unhappy Principles imbibed in their Education; or else by too nice and sensible an apprehension of their own infirmities, (which for want of a clear Judgement, they can't at present solve) may for a time deprive themselves of the comfort of their own happy state: Yet, to be sure, the ground of their discomfort never arose from any unkind apprehensions of their being virtuous and religious, or for their choice of another World's Interest, as their principal happiness; but rather they were troubled from a Fear they were not good enough, or that their hopes of their future happiness were not so sufficiently assured to their thoughts, as they desired. And in the saddest posture of mind, we shall ever find such Good men, (we may be assured) that they will never lose their serious approbation of Virtue and Piety, and that they will be always ready to declare, That a religious Conversation is incomparably preferable to the living, in a state of Sin, though attended with all the prosperous advantages of humane Life; and if put to competition and choice, would, without any further doubt, embrace such a Conversation at all adventures.  
And, Lastly, We are so secure of the Truth of all Good men's satisfactions of Mind, while they continue in their virtuous engagements and practices, in order to their happiness in another World, that we dare thus far appeal to most Evil men, even in their worst sensual habits, when they have at any time admitted their own minds to serious Thoughts, (which the worst sort of such men cannot always escape) to declare, Whether they did not then think, that it were much happier for them to have lived otherwise, and in an habitual course of Virtue; and then also most heartily wish, that their Children, for whom they have the most endeared regard, might so live?  
Now, Whence can all this be, but that such religious engagements and hopes are in themselves naturally accommodable to the intellectual powers of the Soul? And that, if at any time they be reduced and overruled to embrace the Objects that are proper only to the inferior and sensual Part of Man, it will become so unnatural to the superior mind, that there will be a kind of violence done to it; and like Animals out of their own Elements, and like Inanimates out of their proper places, it can never have any rest or true satisfaction, till its Operations be entertained and made use of, for the Concerns of Virtue and a Future World. This the First.   

Section II.  
IN this Section, I shall endeavour to confront the second defailance of the Rational Faculties, upon which I founded a reason to evince, that they were not given, for the Sake, Ends, and Intendments of Man's mortal life only, and that was, because all the proper Materials, and necessary Constitutives of man's Wellbeing in this world, and which are universally celebrated as such, were not by Divine ordination certainly, if at all really, placed in men's power, by the use of those faculties, to obtain them when they did most diligently seek after them, or specially need them. But to solve this defect to our present purpose, and thereby to demonstrate, that the interest and intendments of another world, were the principal End why God Almighty gave those Rational qualifications to man's Nature, it will appear, that the choice of the other world's happiness, and the actual performance of all such Virtuous and Religious methods, as naturally conduce to the assured acquisition of it, are all placed in men's capacities by the use of those intellectual powers, as sufficiently to understand and judge, so also as designedly to choose and put in practice at their own free election.  
It was before suggested, that every man could not at his choice, and upon his best endeavour be certainly Rich and Healthful, live Prosperously and Peaceably, when he pleased: But no man in his Wits can question, if he allows himself the free use of his Reason's Authority (which the interest and encouragement of another world's happiness can at all times admit him to, as will be made evident in the next Argument) he may live Virtuously and Religiously if he will resolve upon it, and diligently attend it? What can hinder his Pious intentions, or prevent his Virtuous resolutions, or frustrate their consequent Happy events, but his own wilful refusal, so to live and act? he can always, in the midst of all discouragements, act Justly and Honestly, live Soberly and Peaceably, and do any thing else, that may dispose him for the happiness of another life, if he will improve the use of his choice by such Counsels, as his understanding mind can suggest to him. Of that possibility he is secure. But he cannot always act successfully in his nearest concerns for his mortal Wellbeing, of those advantages he hath naturally no assurance. What man can be certain of enjoying one hours Health more, or of Bread for another day's subsistence, or of his very Life for three moments to come? A thousand unthought of Accidents may discontinue his possession of those, and all other his present enjoyments; and it were an unexcusable Folly in him, if he did not allow his mind a liberty so to think. But all his Enemies, whether Devils or Men, cannot, by all the power they have, disseise him of his Virtuous purposes, and an innocent and religious Mind, unless he will wilfully choose to consent to his own mischief, and designedly become his own deadly Foe and Traitor; if he turns not first his own Devil, the powers of Hell can never hurt him.  
It's true, the great man may discharge him of his employment to his undoing, and he may throw him upon his potent Malice and Revenge to his Ruin, but it is not in his power to deprive him of his Patience, or his Charity; of his Justice or Sobriety, or of any other virtuous or religious Qualifications, or Intendments whatsoever: Of those, GOD hath made him naturally His own Sovereign and Master, and in danger of no other Being, to ravish or extort them from him.  
Upon the supposition of this Truth, it is, That all wise and good Men do account it not only unkind, but very barbarous, to reflect upon, or upbraid the Unfortunate, as to this world; that is, they don't reproach Men that are unhealthful, or contemptible, poor or deformed, because they can't tell, whether such unhappy men could ever have avoided those hard and oppressive circumstances of their lives; but every one is ready to blame and accuse those that are impious and immoral, because they are sure, that such men must act their own miscarriages and misfortunes, in contradiction to the use they might have made of their own understandings; and in opposition to that possibility of living otherwise which God Almighty had as certainly allowed them, as that ever he had given them any Rational Minds at all, or Natural Capacities to improve it.  
And if that possibility were not permitted them, it would be not only a disparagement to the Divine Goodness, but it would so evacuate all manner of real obligation to be good or virtuous, as that there could not be in moral consideration, any such thing as Virtue or Vice at all; much less any true reason of Reward or Punishment, from any Authoritative Judge or Arbiter whatsoever. And therefore as an Evil man, if he could not have voluntarily avoided his being Vicious, ought not in justice to be reputed a criminal, so neither can any one that is Virtuous, if he might not have been otherwise if he would, have any more just title to that denomination, than if one should go about to applaud the innocency of a Stone or Flower.  
Now, if our Exceptioner should allege, That that distinction between things in and out of our Power and Choice, depends only upon a Scheme of a Theology formally digested, the more speciously to impose upon men's credulity, as in others, so in this particular Case.  
My answer is, that I shall prove the contrary, by offering to him the sense of the Heathen Philosophers themselves, who could not escape the reasonableness and apparent necessity of allowing such a distinction.  
First, Epictetus lays it down as a Principle in the first Chapter of his Enchiridion; 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. cap. 1.  That some things were not in our power, as Money, Glory, Dominion, etc. and some things were in our power, as Desire and Aversation, and indeed all our own Works or Actions. By which, he especially means such as are morally either Good or Evil, as Simplicius explains his Meaning; and thence he oftentimes asserts, 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Pag. (mihi) 88  That that liberty of Choice of the one and the other to be such, as no Power whatsoever, can either force it on the one hand, or restrain it on the other.  
Antonius affirms the same, and positively declares, That in every place and time, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Lib. 7.  and present case, it is put in all men's power to deal one with another, according to what is Right and Just.  
But Cicero most elegantly explains this case, and discourseth the difference between things that are not at our Command, 
Salvos, incolumes, opulentoes, etc. Justos, temperatos, sapientes, etc. Lib. 3. de Nat. Deo.  Such as are to be Rich, Healthful, Safe, etc. And things that are in our power, as to be Just, Temperate, Wise, etc.  
He that can't command (saith Aristotle) the fixed Order of the Earth, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Eth. lib. 10. cap. 8.  and Motion of the Sea, to serve his present Interest, yet hath it in his power to do good and worthy things.  
And now having secured this Point by the common consent of these famous Philosophers, my Reader will easily be convinced of the truth of that distinction, upon which I have endeavoured to found the main stress of my Second Reason, why those Rational Faculties were principally, and on the most special purpose given to Mankind, for the sake, and intendments of a Future World. And that was, because whatsoever is supposed to conduce to the happiness of that State, is only absolutely in the power of those faculties to act and attain at pleasure. Always considered, that herein we only differ from the sense of those Philosophers, that the proposal of that Future Happiness, is necessarily required in the mind to encourage and actuate it for the performance of such Religious and Virtuous undertake. The truth of which the next Argument is designed to evince.  
But my Reader is in haste to attend to my third Reason; Therefore,   

Section III.  
IN which I am obliged to take notice of the third Defailance of the Intellectual and Rational Faculties (mentioned in the Third Section of the First Chapter) when they are employed and engaged in their use and operations for the concerns only of Man's mortal duration. And that was because it's observed, when a man's Mind and Life are wholly taken up for the ends, purposes, and enjoyments of that state, without any regard at all to what relates to the events of a Future World, such a person will hardly escape his doing many, if not most things, that upon the account of Rational Judgement, must at best be but vain and trifling, if not (as it most generally falls out) directly foolish and absurd; and always beneath the wisdom and dignity of that Reason, with which GOD hath naturally endowed humane Souls.  
And upon this pregnant Observation, we endeavoured to found a Reason to prove, That those Faculties of the Rational Mind were not likely to be given to Mankind for the sake, ends, and intendments of their mortal Durations only; which must be so, if no World in Future.  
Now, on the contrary, to prove, That those Faculties were given principally, and upon the most special end, for the intendments and business that relate to that Future State, it will manifestly appear, That when Men do engage those Faculties in their use and operations upon such designs and purposes, and do in all things govern themselves by those measures, all their actions will be all that while the effects of genuine Wisdom, and such as will become the Prudence and Dignity of a Reasonable Creature. So that, by the regularity of such a Conduct, they shall never habitually continue to think, speak, or do any thing that is absurd or foolish, or of which they shall ever have cause to repent, to their own shame and sorrow. And therefore it is conclusively true, That to be Wise and Good; to live Religiously and Intelligibly; to act by the Influence of a Future State's Belief, and by the Conduct of right Reason; do all, as to practice, import the same purpose, and do all require the same measures and ways of living.  
And here, by the way, we may observe a wonderful Contrivance of Mercy in our Good and Wise GOD, that He should please so far to consult, not only the possibility, but even the easiness of Man's attaining his Chiefest Good and Felicity, as that the Conditionals and Methods of its attainment should be so accommodable to the Powers and Principles of his Nature, that the discretion and prudence of his very mortal life should generally depend upon his designs and endeavours to be made Happy in another World.  
But if an Exception should be here offered against this Observation, by alleging, That there may perhaps be as many men, who acknowledge the Existence of a future State, and that sometimes do pretend to the hopes of being Blessed in that Life, that do as many absurd and foolish things as other men. My Answer is,  
First, That probably some such actions may but seem so, in the invidious or mistaken opinion of Worldly and Sensual Men. But then,  
Secondly, If many actions of such Believers should happen to be really foolish, yet they must be then presumed to miscarry only in their Wisdom, when they kept not to the plain Paths of Virtue, and opposed the natural Influence, which the Faith and Hopes of another World might have made upon their Minds and Lives. Had they been steady in their Actings for that end, they had never ceased to be Wise, as well as Good. So that men's deviation from the Rules of Religion, doth not only make them Sinners in Gild, but makes them Fools in Practice and real Notion.  
But, because this general and presumptive way of Arguing may be thought unsufficient for Conviction; therefore, as before, my merry Neighbour dressed up for me a parcel of silly Worldlings, and sensualists, that were adventuring for a present pretended Happiness, in their proper Sportful Garbs, such as for their Follies they deserved to wear: So, now let my serious Thoughts attempt a description of that man's Wisdom, who hath improved his intellectual powers, to think and live the intent and interest of another World. Let me delineate, in short, his beauty and comeliness in every Limb, and draw up an abbreviate Plate and Scheme of his whole Life's wisdom and felicity, in every Relation he bears to Society, and in every quality and condition of Life, by which he is acting his particular part, with respect to his own Personal Happiness in the Scene of his Mortality.  
First, I shall begin with him in the instances of all his Social Capacities, and that because his Prudence and Felicity is therein the more remarkably expressed and enjoyed.  
And the first shall be of that, which concerns the greatest of his Social Interests. And then I demand of Mankind to judge, whether the man must not be accounted Wise and Happy, who never was justly exposed to the hazard of being brought upon the Stage for any Seditious Words, or Mutinous Practices? That never could be charged for running a Nation into Blood and Confusion, by endeavouring to disarm his Prince of that Sword, by which he should be able to protect his People, from acting that violence upon one another, to the loss of their universal peace and safety. And that did never go about to starve the Government, and as it were, to tie up its Hands, and make it uncapable to preserve itself, till a foreign Enemy should usurp upon the Nation's Peace and Honour. Nor that ever could be accused of a fordid Neutrality at any time, when his Prince's just Cause was in dispute. This is that wisdom, in which his Religion and a conscience of his Duty to GOD must instruct him, against all Temptations of discontent and frowardness, to act the contrary.  
Or, (which is next in concern for Social Wisdom) Is not he a wise and happy man, that hath chosen to bear a part in a neighbourhood of universal Peace; where, if every one were conducted by a Religious Fear of GOD, there can be no such offence given or taken as may at any time interrupt it? Where Justice acts every ones right, and Mercy provides for every ones need: Where all are obliging one another with mutual Civilities and Kindness; and with a common and reciprocal defence and guard of every Neighbour's Peace and Proprieties.  
Or, (which is the last case of Social Prudence and Felicity) Is not he truly Wise, who acts his part in a Family of an Angelic Communion; That is, where nothing inhabits, but quiet, cheerfulness, and contentment: where every one in the House is constantly acting the Offices and Duties of his proper Place and Relation: where there be no brawls, jealousies, or spiteful intermeddlings; but the whole House is full of sweet joy, and mutual endearments of Respect and Love?  
Now, if we inquire what it is, upon the account of which, we may adjudge every Member of those Societies to be so Wise and Happy as I have represented them, the whole reason of it is obvious; for it is no more, but that every one that bears a part in such Communions, would be Good, and make Religion his main concern, and the Happiness of a Future World his principal aim and interest, and the business, without more ado, is done. It is nothing but men's deviations from those intendments and practices, that can expose any Societies to those Follies, which must necessarily disorder the happy composure of all Communions.  
But to come to an Examination of that Wisdom, which in a more Personal respect concerns Mankind. And then I demand again, whether is not that man truly Wise and Happy, who admits Temperance to the government of all his meals in the day, and that at night lays himself down to sleep upon a chaste Pillow: and that regulates all other his natural actions by a rational judgement?  
And, Is not he the same, that can keep up the credit of an unsuspected fidelity, and never offended God or virtuous Ears, with loud Oaths and Imprecations, upon a vain, yet generally an unsuccessful pretence, the better to secure it? And then, Whose peaceful and placable Soul can, upon the greatest provocations, so alloy his Passions, as not to encumber his mind with any troublesome Intrigues of Revenge; and, if possible, to prevent the chargeable attendances, with which the Laws vexatious periods do too much afflict the contentious World?  
And, Must not Mankind judge him Wise and Happy, that doth not perplex his mind with such anxious cares and fears, as may create in him an habitual discontent, about the measures of his present quality and manner of subsistence? That is, That can really and satisfactorily judge his Allotted Habitation, (of what figure soever it is) as acceptable to himself, as the Great man's splendid Palace; And be so fully content with the little Income he enjoys, as never to wish with a sigh to be Master of another man's more plentiful Fortune: And withal, who makes the most substantial assurance for the continuance and improvement of his own; and for a Provision for his Children when he's gone; of whose welfare he contentedly judgeth himself as certain, as that GOD Almighty hath passed His Promise for it? And there be them that have challenged the World to give any famous instances of the non-performance of His Word.  
But, suppose our Good man to be placed by Providence in the Lowest order, and that he must labour for his daily Subsistence; Is not he as wise and Happy as his quality can admit, whose peaceful Soul and pious Contentment can make his sweet Sleep in the night compensate for his weariness in the day; and that can take a greater pleasure in the hautgoust of his dearlyearned Bread, than those sensualists can do, when they are daily puffing over their nauseating Varieties? Whose cheerful dependence upon God, to provide for his Children, supersedes all manner of anxious solicitude; knowing that for their concern, he shall not be affected with those encumbrances of mind to which the Rich are subject, when they are torturing their heads with fears of having their Honours at present, and their Fortunes afterwards, shipwrecked, to promote their Children in the World. To be short, This is the man that's so wise, that his Innocency gives him Cheerfulness; his meekness begets him Love, and his Fidelity, Trust; whose Industry gains him Employment, and his Honesty such a Friendship, as may support him till he hath ended his Labours, and exchanged them for a perpetual Rest. Now that Poor man, that cherisheth a constant hope of another World's Happiness, and lives according to the expectation of it, cannot but be such an one as I have described him; and then, Who lives, that is Wiser and Happier than he?  
And, Doth not that man deserve the reputation of being Wise, who lives so inossensively, as stoutly to defy all manner of instances of shame or covert; to whom a Whisperer, or the invidious serutinies of the malicious, can give no concern; That is not solicitous, if the doors of his whole Soul stood always unlocked, or that all the moral actions of his Life lay common to every Eye; and whose innocency renders a false rumour, or a causeless accusation, so far from being a vexation to him, that he only heartily pities the follies of men's malice, and by a ready forgiveness, permits not his passions to forment and arrest his sleep, or at any time to disorder the steady temper of his mind?  
Further, Is not he a Wise and Happy man, who, when the World is alarmed with the evil Tidings of National Disturbances abroad, or that lives amidst the Broils of a divided state at home, can unconcernedly discharge his mind of all afflictive Fears, by an entire resignation of his Thoughts to God, to bring about what events he thinks fit; and than that always cheerfully interprets, that all things shall be well with him in the end, whatsoever God shall please should come to pass?  
Lastly, Is not he highly wise for himself, who hath provided beforehand a Store of Contentment to support his patience, when Sickness, or any kind of Misfortune shall invade his Health, or impair his Plenty? And that hath laid up such a stock of Reasons and Arguments, in his mind, as may be always ready to relieve his unpleasant Thoughts, when he shall begin to feel his Clay-Tabernacle reel with age; and when his Life is grown encumbered with the sense of all its decaying circumstances? And then, that can fearlessly make the gradual approaches of his last and necessary period, to be thought only so many steps of advance towards his everlasting Rest, and the blissful state of a following world. And finally, when he is come to the last point of his mortality, that hath no conflicts of doubt about A Future World's Existence; that hath upon his Soul no such guilt, as may ruffle his Thoughts with the amazing fears of the Divine Vengeance; nor doth any Horror seize his steady Hope? And in the last gasping moments, when the World's Factors for present Pleasures and Prosperity, are with a disordered reason uttering the broken Expressions of their last and heavy Farewell; then shall our Wise man be admiring his mighty Creator's Love and Goodness, with such a joy and satisfaction, as shall, if not wholly remove, yet so allay all the natural Terrors of Dying, that he shall go out of the world as cheerfully as a Traveller, when he hath reached his home; and shall leave all his mortal affairs and enjoyments behind him, with the same unconcernedness that a Pilgrim removes from his last night's Lodging.  
Thus I have drawn a resemblance to the Life, of that man's Wisdom, whose Mind and Life are governed by the great Interest of another World, and by the Rules of such a Conversation as naturally conduce to the attainment of it. And though it can't be presumed, that he should escape all humane inadvertencies, and casual mistakes in the management of his habitual Virtue and Piety, (to which the best of men are subjected, and) which may somewhat abate the perfection of an absolute Beauty, yet those errors being no parts, but only spots in the Feature, the comeliness of the representation may nevertheless not be the less acceptable, and perhaps the more graceful, because it's the most natural and genuine figure of a Good man on this side of a Future World.  
But all this while, I have almost forgot to confront what I offered in the Third Section of the First Chapter, where arguing, That the Rational Faculties were not likely to be given to Mankind in their use and operations for the designs, business, and ends of Man's mortal Life only, because it was generally observed, That where there was no concern at all for another World, and that men acted according to the influence of such an unconcernment, the greater proportion that such men had of either complexional or acquired intellectual Capacities, their degeneracies to Folly would most commonly appear to be so much the greater and fouler, and their actions and practices so much the more remarkably absurd and foolish.  
And now, to improve our present Arguing for a future World, and to show, That those Rational Faculties were principally, and on purpose, given on that account, we can affirm, That it is notoriously observed, that as Good men's minds are advanced with more knowing qualifications and ingenious understandings, so they do generally act their virtuous and religious Intendments, with a Wisdom incomparably above the common measures of such as are qualified but with ordinary endowments, though those Persons should be in no degree inferior to the most ingenious, in the uprightness of their minds and lives. For such men's knowing judicious managery of their Virtues, will not only create a bare acceptableness of, but they must give a conspicuous Lustre to their lives and practices: by which they will so adorn all the exercises of their Goodness, that they cannot escape their being specially marked out for Love and Honour.  
And therefore, such men do not only live the End, but the Honour of their Nature, and by their wise and unblameable conversations, they take off those prejudices and exceptions that are daily offered against Religion itself, to which the indiscretions of men of ordinary capacities may have oftentimes exposed it. But, among all the signal Excellencies that attend and adorn an ingenious Piety, there is nothing more remarkable, than the wise use and disposure of Time; which like the Rational Faculties themselves, was principally given to Mankind, for the employment of what concerns a Future World: And it's for want of that proper business, that it so often becomes uneasy and burdensome to such men, as are in no order of mind to make use of it for that especial purpose; and that sometimes to such a degree of uneasiness, that their very Lives themselves grow tiresome to their own Thoughts. So that were it not for that reason, that Time was allowed Man principally for the sake of another World to solve the doubt, it would make one stand amazed to think, that Creatures endowed with a Rational Understanding, should ever condescend to employ it about actions that are sometimes so troublesome and uneasy, and at other times so childish and silly, that they bear no more towards manly ends, than the dancing of a bubble, or the pursuit of a Fly. Hence it is, that men unconcerned for a Future World do sometimes swine away their Time in drink and debaucheries; while others are trifling off their precious hours in Courtships and Gallanting, in nicer dress, and other sensual pleasures: And to be sure they all must sleep away the sweet mornings, lest that serious season should attack their minds with the sense of their midnight fooleries. These, and such as these, are the pitiful shifts which men unconcerned for a Future Life are fain to busy their time away with something that is nothing to the purpose.  
Now, on the other hand, How happily will men, whose minds are advanced in higher degrees of thinking and judging understandingly, when they are really Virtuous and Good! I say, How happily will those men be able to engage themselves in such a wise managery of their time, as may secure them not only from finding it a burden to their own Thoughts, but from being tempted to throw it away upon such unaccountable misadventures. To prevent which inconveniencies, they can ingeniously methodise their time into various Apartments, and successively distinct Periods, the better to alleviate the slow Progress of their hours. That is, they can set out these days and hours for Devotion; Those for the Offices of doing Good, or for secular employments; and then some for keeping up friendship and civil conversation; others again for innocent recreations and divertisement. All which wise divisions of Time, will shut out all occasions of its disimprovement to weak and silly purposes; and which being once made easy by an habituated regular observation, they shall as delightfully reciprocate those several Duties in their proper season, as they do their Meals or times of Rest.  
And then all this while, how pleasant and satisfactory will the use of time thus wisely, because religiously managed, be to their own Minds and Consciences? And with what a ravishing contentment will they recount such spent hours, when old Age shall allow them little else to do, but to think of what is past? But then chiefly, How will such Thoughts alleviate the horror of their dying Scene, when they shall go out of the World with Minds full of Hopes of the long-expected Returns of a well-spent Time and Life?  
And now having dispatched the design and import of this Last Section, Who is it that can call in question the judgement of the Sacred Revelation, when it so often declares the distinction of the Good and Evil, by the severe discrimination of Wise and Fool; or, that Repentance should there be described by a Turning to the Wisdom of the Just; 
Luke 3.  and that St. James should call so many Virtues of humane Conversation, even to innocent Civilities (as the Text imports) The wisdom from above? 
Jam. 3. 17.  And Lastly, Why should any man ever dispute the conclusive Sentence of the wise Ecclesiastes, when he determines, That to fear God and to keep His Commandments, is not only the principal Expedient of all humane Happiness, but that it is that, by which alone Man may live up to, and attain the end of his own nature, as he is a reasonable and arbitrary Creature? For, so saith the Text, This is (not the whole Duty, 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Eccl. Septuag.  as it's sometimes interpreted, but) This is Man: Or as Aristotle, (discoursing of Virtue in his own notion) whether he thence learned it, 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. In Eth.  or only in his Reason complied with it, maketh use of almost the same words: This is especially Man. These Premises being thus clearly stated, let us await the Conclusion.    

The Conclusion.  
THat is, if it be sufficiently proved, that the Rational Faculties of Man's mind, by which he is essentially himself, were not given by Almighty GOD to Mankind, for the Sake, Ends, and Intendments only of their Mortal Lives; as it appears in the First Chapter:  
And if those pretensions for a sufficient use of those Faculties in several concerns relating to a man's Mortal Life be as sufficiently overruled and answered, as it is in the Second Chapter:  
And then if it be positively proved, as in the Third Chapter, that those Faculties were given to Mankind, principally, and on the most Special purpose for the Sake, Ends, and Intendments of something that is Future; what can be suggested to Doubt, but that God hath most certainly constituted the existence of a Future State?    

Third Argument.  
The Sum of the THIRD ARGUMENT.  
THE Third Argument to demonstrate the real Existence of a Future State is founded upon a Consideration, That if Man's Being should extend no further than the Boundary of his Mortal Life, and that there were no other World, whose Rewards and Punishments might affect his present Hope and Fear; than it must necessarily follow, That he can have no sufficient encouragements; that is, no sufficient Reasons (they being both the same in this case to Rational and free Agent) to oblige himself to live a Virtuous Life. Which consequence being true, it cannot but reflect upon the Wisdom, Justice, and Goodness of GOD, who by His sovereign Will and Pleasure, gave him that limited Duration; and then obliged naturally to enjoy his Being in such social Communions, whose universal Welfare should necessarily depend upon men's living Virtuously one with another: and yet in which social World, it was not possible for him to meet any sufficient Encouragements or Reasons to oblige him so to live. And if nothing else can solve the Vindication of those Divine Attributes, but only the acknowledged Existence of a Future State, whose Rewards and Punishments, being proposed to the mind of Man, may be sufficient encouragements or reasons, why be should live such a Virtuous Life: then it's certain, that GOD Almighty hath ordained and constituted such a Future World.  
Now there being many parts of this Argument, which will require some considerable explanations, I shall therefore endeavour them in Three several Chapters.  
In the First Chapter, it will be requisite to set free the terms and sense of the Argument in general, as it's in the whole stated and proposed, from some opinions that would evacuate the force and import of it, for the end it is intended.  
In the Second Chapter, I shall endeavour to solve some objective exceptions against the inference of the conclusion by it, as so stated.  
In the Third Chapter, Reasons will be given, Why no other motives or encouragements whatsoever, can sufficiently oblige Men to be Virtuous and Good, but such as are deduced from the acknowledgement of a Future World's Existence.  
A FUTURE WORLD'S EXISTENCE, Demonstrated by Rational Evidence.  

CHAP. I.  
IN which I design something, that may be preparative for the Arguments clearer proceedure, and that is to secure the true Sense of it, in the manner and order it is Stated and Proposed. And this I shall do, by detecting and representing some erroneous Opinions, which must reflect upon the right understanding of it in general.  
Now those erroneous Opinions are these three; By the first, we mean some false glosses that are put upon the notion of Virtue, or living Virtuously. By the second, we understand such as have been offered by some men, to make God to be altogether unconcerned, how men live and act, morally or immorally in this World. And the third sort of such Opinions are those, by which some men have been persuaded, that it is unlawful to propose Rewards, as encouragements to live Virtuously; or Punishments, to deter men from living Viciously.  
These be the three Opinions, that must needs perplex the Stating of the Argument in general, and therefore must first be controlled, before we can admit it to a free and clear proceedure. And that shall be endeavoued in these three following Sections.  

Section I.  
IN which we shall first endeavour to free the Argument from some mistaken notions of Virtue, or living Virtuously. For if we have not a right understanding of that, before we begin, it's in vain to argue for what encouragements will be sufficient, to engage men so to live. And then by living Virtuously, I here especially, though not only, understand Virtue in a social respect, that is, as to men's endeavouring to live and act one with, and towards another, by the strict rules of Universal Justice, as in a larger sense it comprehends Universal Goodness, in all their several Parts and Branches.  
First, by men's living up to the rules of Universal Justice (as it's strictly to be considered), I mean the allowance of what's right and due to every man. First as to that, which is called Distributive Justice, which is the just performance of all relative and reciprocal Offices and Duties between all Superiors, (whether Natural or Politic) and their respective Subjects and Subordinates'. And then as to that, which we call Commutative Justice; I understand it to be men's doing what's Right and Just, in all manner of mutual Transactions, Contracts, and intercurrent Affairs whatsoever.  
And then by Universal Goodness (as Justice in a larger sense comprehends it) I understand not the acts only of doing all men Right, but of men's doing Good one to another (according to their respective capacities morally considered) as there is need of one another's mutual help; whether it be for one another's Honour, Peace, Liberty, or in any other Circumstances of their Wellbeing. And this habit of Goodness, Sir Francis Bacon calls The greatest of all Virtues, 
Essay. 13.  and Dignities of the mind; being the Character of the Deity; and without which (saith he) a man is a Busy, Mischievous, and Wretched thing.  
Now the man that lives according to the Rules of Justice in all these acceptations, is the man that ought most properly and especially to be denominated Virtuous. Not but that we suppose a necessary concurrence of all the other personal Virtues, as they are branched out particularly in Theological, and Philosophical Schemes. But than it is to be affirmed of most, if not of all of them, that they do one way or other especially refer to Justice or Goodness, as I have here described them; and as that their contrary Vices do generally receive their essential notion of being Evil, because in one respect or other they make a breach upon the Rules of doing Right or Good.  
Hence it is, that it's no wonder, that the Moralists have always expressed that regard to the notion and practice of Justice, (as it's in all respects to be considered) that whether it be, because it is so nocessary for the happy being of all Humane Societies; or whether for its attendance upon the menage and events of most other Virtuous actions, they have ennobled it with the most comprehensive, and general name of Virtue. Thus Aristotle calls it, not only the best of Virtues, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Eth. Lib. 4. Cap. 1.  but observes, that it came to a Proverb, That all Virtues did exist in Justice; or as Hierocles expresseth it, that it comprehends all Virtues, as its Parts or Members: 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Hier. in Carm. Pythag.  And not only the Philosophical Moralism, but even the Christian Religion itself, as it refers to all those Duties, which it enjoins to be performed to God and Man, is commonly expressed by the name of Righteousness or Justice; 
He that doth Justice (or Righteousness) is Just (or Righteous,) 1 John 3. 7.  and the true Professors of it, Righteous or Just; as it is promiscuously rendered in our Translations, from the same word in the Original, which the Philosophers made use of.  
Now, the reason why, in the first place, I offer this term of Virtue, or living virtuously, thus to consideration, is, because there hath been too commonly a very false notion of Religion, or living Religiously: Some men placing it only in some Rites and Offices, proper to such or such a Religion; upon the performance of which, they have tempted one another to think themselves, if not wholly exempted, yet in some measure fairly dispensed from living virtuously, as I have represented the Notion of Virtue. And this hath been observed, not only when Religions have been artificially instituted by Wise men in several Heathen Nations, (of which some account will be given in the following Arguments) but even then, when Religions have been tendered to the World, by the clearest Evidence of Divine Revelation.  
Thus did the Jews most grossly prevaricate with God, 
Es. 1. 13. 14, 17, etc.  by their intolerable omissions of living virtuously, that is, by the Rules of Universal Justice and Goodness, 
Jer. 7. 4, 8, 9, etc.  as His holy Prophets so often complain. And for this did our Saviour, in his time, so severely reprove those strict Religionists, 
Mat. 23. 24.  the Scribes and Pharisees.  
And it's observed, That the Wise men of almost every Age of the Church, have engaged themselves in making such complaints of the Times they lived. in. And I wish heartily, that I had not too just a cause (which gave me the chief occasion of this Section) to complain of a Religion of a later date, in which Justice and Goodness have been so wonderfully laid aside, as if they bore no part at all of the Profession of it. And the better to solve that intolerable contradiction to the very design of Christianity, they have taught themselves a most scandalous distinction between Grace and Virtue; between Godliness and Justice; between Saintship and all Moral Honesty, in their notion, and (as we have seen) practice of Religion, to the great disparagement and dishonour of whatsoever bears that Sacred Name. This the First.   

Section II.  
THis Section will represent another very dangerous prejudice, as to the manner of our stating the Argument. And it's to be done by making and answering an Enquiry, whether or no Almighty GOD will be at all concerned, as to Rewards and Punishments, how men live and act, whether morally or immorally in this World. For if he be pleased to be so indifferent and unconcerned, the Argument is void; and that because a Proposal of any such things, as Rewards or Punishments, to encourage and deter, would then be the most impertinent Concern of Mind that it is ordinarily capable of.  
Now, though it may be thought, that there should be but a very few, or none, that acknowledge a Deity, so desperately inconsiderate of His Divine Honour, as to own and publish such a contradiction to His Essential Holiness, and to that sovereign and wise Authority, which he must be presumed to have and exercise naturally over that Rational World, which he created and made at his own choice: For it were the same thing, as to believe, That he intended to licentiate men in all those horrid practices and confusions, which should ever be acted and fall out to the World's end; yet it's certain, that there have been, and are opinions entertained, which must imply such an indifferency and unconcernment in God, howsoever men live and act. And I doubt not, but that they have been made use of by many, thereby to encourage their continuance in their most immoral practices and vicious ways of Living.  
Now, the opinions which have brought forth that wretched effect in men's minds, are three, to be especially considered and rebuked.  
The first which I shall take notice of, is that which doth directly and professedly make God to be owned as Author and Cause of Sin: And then, How can He be concerned at all at that sinful action, of which He himself should be really causal? Of which horrid and blasphemous opinion, 
Lib. 5. c. 20. cap. 34.  Eusebius accounts one Florinus to be the first Promoter; though Vincentius Lerinensis makes one more ancient, and averrs Simon Magus as its first Patron. And the Fathers did charge that Heresy afterward upon Cerdon, Martion, and others, as concurrent with their several Heterodoxies.  
But the most remarkable Restores in this later Age, of that abominable Principle, were the late Libertines, (as the Historians and Divines of those Times called them) in Germany, that thereby they might go on with their intolerable Profanations and desperate Immoralities, for their thorough-work (as they called it) of a more perfect Reformation, with greater Liberty and Encouragement. By whose Example, and upon their Principles, we have too great a reason to suspect, that out late rebellious Reformers, transcribed too resembling a Copy, both in their minds and practices; and for whose sakes I have taken occasion to offer at this representation.  
The Second Opinion that must consequentially infer an indifferency and unconcernment in God, how Men act and live, as to the Rewards and Punishments of another Life; is that of an eternal and irrespective decree of some men to Salvation, with the inevitable preterition of all the rest of Mankind.  
And that because that Doctrine must in consequence suppose, not that Man, but that GOD Himself should be the efficient Cause and principal Agent in all the Good and Evil Actions that are done in the World; and then, How could the one be reasonably rewardable, and the other punishable? And first, as to the Good and Virtuous Actions of them, that are so absolutely elected to Salvation, they cannot be supposed to be properly their own, but God's; because they are wrought in them (as they commonly affirm) by such an impulse of His Grace, as which they have not a Liberty in themselves to resist or defeat.  
And then, as to the sinful actions of them that are under that fatal preterition, How can they be morally their own, but God's, (as Causa deficiens in necessariis est efficiens) because they become unavoidable for want of that Grace, by which it was only possible for those unhappy men to have escaped and prevented them? And though our Opinionists dare impudently pretend, That those men have all of them a sufficient Grace given them, yet nevertheless they most senselessly mean, That it is sufficient in itself only, but not as unto them, so as possibly to effect upon their best endeavour, any advantage to themselves.  
And now, How can God be reasonably concerned to Reward the actions of the one, or to Punish those of the other; when neither of those actions were properly and voluntarily their own; that is, when neither of those sorts of men were ever allowed to act by a Mind that had any truly-balanced Liberty of choice in its self? And therefore, in such a case, the proposal of Rewards and Punishments (upon which the Reason of the Argument is founded) to encourage the Good or deter the Evil, were as impertinent, as if a man were counselled to act an Adventure for an Estate, when he is confirmed in his opinion, that either he hath had a fore-decree for an undefeizible Title to it, or else of which he were assured to be deprived by an insuperable Bar, long before put in against him; I say, If he were sure, that one of those two unalterable causes were upon him, though he did not know which it was, What manner of encouragement is it, that should reasonably induce him to do any thing for the securing or obtaining such an Estate? And where lays the difference of that Case from this in debate, I can make no conjecture.  
The Third Opinion that necessarily implies, That God should be indifferent and unconcerned how men live and act, as to Rewards and Punishments, is from Mr. Hobbs his Necessitation of all humane actions, from a Chain of Causes linked together at one another's end, to the very immediate Last that necessarily determined the Understanding so to judge, and the Will so to choose. The unaccountable Sense of which, his shiftless distinction can never solve, as when he averrs, 
Leviathan.  That though a Man can Do what he will, yet that he cannot Will what he will: For if the binding up the last and immediate Causes of the Action (that is the judgement and will of Man) to a necessity of judging and choice, (if it be not Nonsense to call it a judgement or a choice at all) can give any rational Man leave to think, that that Action can be an effect of true Liberty; then may the natural motion of an Inanimate, and the operations of a sensitive Being, which do spontaneously (yet nevertheless) necessarily, (as necessity stands in opposition to rational Liberty) follow that impulse, which the Creator had put upon their several Natures, be properly called an act of a free and voluntary Agent. Now whosoever hath entertained such an opinion of the necessitation of all humane actions, must suppose, that the first Link of that Chain of Causes, that moves or knocks the next to it, and so every next successively his next, till the last Cause drives the Will into a necessity of Choice; I say that first Link of Causation must be sovereignly held in the hand of God, as he is the first cause of all Motion, as well as of all Being. And then it must also be supposed, that none of those intermedial or secondary Causes, can break from the natural order of that train of Causations (without an extraordinary intervention of the First Causes, Will and Power) till the Action, be it good or evil, be chosen and effected. So that if there be any cause of the Action that is truly voluntary, and by which it may be really denominated morally Good or Evil, it must be the first only: for all the other Causes are under a natural or fatal necessity of acting what they do, and the Judgement and Will of Man, which should make the moral distinction, are under an impossibility of judging or choosing otherwise, (as Mr. Hobbs asserts) and therefore, there being no other Will at liberty, by which, such an Action is to be freely chosen, if there be any morality in the Action, it must have it from the first Cause, or no where: and than what a piece of Blasphemy are we fallen upon? For it makes God not only a cause, but the only cause of all evil and immoral Actions, as such: which a bare spontaneity in the Will of Man, can no more solve, than it can make a necessary Agent, when it's any way instrumental to a mischievous Event, really a Criminal: so that I may be angry with the Stone that hits me, and like a Dog in rage, by't it, as well as with the person that threw it, if in both of them there were as much necessity of the Action, as is consistent with a natural spontaneity. And then how can GOD be concerned in such Actions, as to Rewards and Punishments, any more, than that they should be capable of Praise or Blame, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Strom. lib. 1. p. 311.  as Clemens Alexandrinus argues against such a necessity of acting in moral Agents.  
These be the three Opinions, that support the second Prejudice, or mistaken Notion of GOD's being unconcerned, how Men live and act, whether morally or immorally, as to Rewards and Punishments. But the very explaining of them, with a consideration had of their intolerable consequences, makes them sufficiently their own abhorrence, and confutation.  
There is one erroneous Notion more, that concerns a lesser sort of People; and now my hand is in, it shall not pass unrebuked.   

Section III.  
THis Section is designed to overrule the last prejudice, which would also make void the sense of the Argument, as it is stated. And that must be done by making another enquiry, Whether or no Almighty GOD (if it be granted, That He will be pleased to concern Himself; as to Rewards and Punishments, how Men live and act) intended, that men should think themselves obliged to live virtuously, upon the account only of His own Sovereign Authority, and absolute Command, and that they should charge themselves with no other motive or reason, but only that? Or whether GOD designed not also, in that case, as in all others, to deal with Mankind, as rational and voluntary Agents; that is, that they might propound to their own Minds, some considerable Interest or Happiness, upon the encouragement of which, they should oblige themselves so to live and act? And then on the other hand, whether they might not also, as reasonably propound to their own Thoughts, a Consideration of the many Inconveniences at present, and their certain Ruin in the event, to dissuade and deter themselves, from living immorally and viciously? Now the Reason, Why I offer this case to enquiry, before I further engage in the pursuit of my Argument, is, because it's known, that there be some Men, (even enough to make a party) who being resolved not to be otherwise persuaded, but that a proposal of Rewards to encourage Men to be Religious, and to do good, is a most dangerous approach to Popery; (the ordinary expedient, used by such men to affright Minds, where Reasons are wanting) and that it can import nothing less, than the Romish Merit, and I know not what.  
And then on the other side, (say they) for men to suggest to themselves, the dread of Future Punishments, (though for that reason they are proposed as objects of the Christian Faith) is nothing else but slavish Fear, (by which they falsely represent that religious Act of mind) and that to avoid sinning on that account, can no way be acceptable, but rather distasteful to Almighty GOD.  
But these mens prejudices in this point, have yet further ends and little notions to serve. For (say they) such a proposal of Rewards and Punishments, do tempt men to give too much to the Creature; it hinders the Advancement of free Grace, and takes men off from bottoming themselves upon Christ, (as they phrase it) and from rolling themselves by Faith, inconditionately upon his Merits; with many more such like humouring Notions.  
Now such unhappy impostors as these, have vulgar minds admitted, to the vast prejudice of Virtue, and an active Religion; and all this because they would fain go to Heaven, without any encumbering moralities, such as are the Virtues and Graces of strict Justice, Restitution and Satisfaction upon the Breach of it; entire Loyalty to their Princes, and Obedience to their Superiors of every kind; Charity to their Enemies, and doing Good to all Men as much as in them lay, and the like; And that instead of them, they may go to Christ (they think) for Salvation, by a shorter 〈◊〉, as by the force of an imaginary Faith, or a delusive Reliance, and the like; which will not put them upon so much trouble and charge. And now if such prejudiced men would but consider, how much such triflings with God and their own Souls, are inconsistent with all solid Reason, and how foreign such Notions are to the express purpose and end of the Gospel, in which all along its Professors are obliged to observe all its strict rules of obedience by the special command of God, 
John 15. 10. Rom. 2. 6, 7. Mat. 10. 42. Rev. 22. 14.  upon the hope and encouragement of his present Love and Blessing, and of his future Rewards and Recompenses; secured to them by so many gracious and infallible Promises, they should need no other confutation but their own shame, for dealing so irrationally with so plain a revelation of the express will of God, to the contrary.  
And now having finished the preconsideration of these three Prejudices or Mistakes, that might have been pretended by our apponents to call in question the right stating of the Argument in the terms it is proposed, it may now be thought that I might bring the Argument to its final issue, upon a positive Proof, that no reasons or encouragements can be sufficient, to oblige men to undertake such Virtuous lives, but what relate to the concerns of another World. But this hasty proceedure must be justifiable in the opinion of such only, who have not considered how many subterfuges are to be detected, and how many exceptions and objections are to be controlled and answered, before I can make so near an approach towards the conclusion. And therefore that's the proper work of the next Chapter.    

CHAP. II.  
IN which I shall endeavour according to the method proposed, to solve some exceptions, which may be made use of to confront the Argument in general as so stated, and to render it unsufficient to infer the conclusion. Now the design of those Exceptioners, is to pretend, that there are several expedients and encouragements, which may be sufficient to engage men to be Virtuous and Good, and to deter them from living Immorally and Viciously, though there were no belief or apprehension of the concerns of a Future State at all.  
But I shall reduce them all to Five Heads, which I shall handle apart in so many distinct Sections; and I shall begin with those that are more easily solved.  

Section I.  
THis Section offers the first Exception, and that is made by those who will say, that there is no Nation, how barbarous soever, but that by their native Light, and the use of their natural Faculties, may attain to the sense and acknowledgement of a Deity, 
Nulla Gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam sit immanis, cujus mentem non imbuerit deorum opinio. Multi de diis prava sentiunt (id enim more vitioso effici solet) omnes tamen esse vim & naturam divinam arbitrantur. Tus. Qu. l. 1.  (as Tully observes;) and then, that such a sense and acknowledgement, may be sufficient to over-awe such Men from acting immorally, and against the Rules of Common Justice, without any apprehension of a Future Life to restrain them.  
To this exception it's answered, that I grant it to be certain, That such a kind of People may in that manner attain to a notion of a Deity: but then it's very probable (where there be no additional institutions further to instruct them) that they will entertain that notion of his Being, with an apprehension chiefly of His singular kindness and goodness to them: and that because a great part of that demonstration, which they can make for His Existence, must arise from an opinion of His being their first Maker, and constant Benefactor. And if they shall so represent the Deity to their Minds, they may as easily suggest to themselves, that he could not but indefinitely design them to be happy, when at first he made them; or that otherwise, he would never have given them the enjoyment (or rather the misfortune) of a Being at all.  
And then they at present seeing no other way, how any Happiness may be atained; but by a present power and plenty, and an easy Way of living, would soon satisfy themselves, That that Deity hath given them an allowance, to make use of all their natural Skill and present Power to attempt any thing, whatsoever it be, whereby they may promote for themselves the attainment of such a desirable way of living.  
And further, those natural Theists, knowing perhaps at present nothing to the contrary, but that that Deity hath put them originally into the same condition with all other Animals in general, What Arguments can they offer themselves to the contrary, but that they may as lawfully choose to imitate the same freedom, which by a natural instinct, is allowed to such Animals, who do generally preserve and please themselves, by preying upon the Labours and Lives of one another? Is it not evident, (say they) That the most Famous of those sensible Creatures in their several Elements, viz. the Lion, Eagle, and Leviathan, do make use of that their natural Power and Liberty to the utmost, sometimes not sparing the lives of Men, to maintain their sensual Greatness, Ease, and Pleasure? And do not the very Plants themselves, (say they) especially such as naturally aspire to Grandeur, subtract their Juices for growth and nourishment, from the lesser Vegetables of the Neighbourhood, though it be to the making them grow Feeble, Fruitless, and Die?  
And then, when that suggestion is over, cannot those men, thus naturally convinced of a Deity, tell themselves, That they may have the same freedom in their private capacities, which the most famous Conquerors do assume to themselves in order to their public Achievements? And then, say they, (if they have had notice of it) How did Alexander the Great rob and destroy whole Nations to gratify his own ambition of Greater Power, and larger Dominions? And who is it that blames him for his Usurpations, or that doth not rather applaud him, and entertain his Name and Memory with Renown, for his Success and Valour? And they will also allege, (if it hath come to their knowledge) That the World admires and applauds the ancient Romans for their famous Acquisitions; Though it's known, say they, that they advanced themselves to that greatness from first to last, by disordering the Peace, preying upon the Plenties, 
Si qua soret tellus, quae sulvum mitteret Aurum; Hostis erat. Petr. Arb.  and destroying the defence of their neighbour Nations. And from this it is, why Seneca observes, That Poverty was the Foundation and Cause of their Famous Empir●▪ 
— Paupertatem fundamentum & causam imperii sui.  That is, (we suppose him to mean) their real or pretended want of Power, and Plenty, was thought a sufficient Reason to justify them in all their Invasions and Usurpations. 
Epist. Lib. 13. Ex. 88   
Now, (say these natural acknowledgers of a Deity) sure such Conquerors as these did believe God, or gods, as well as We, (for some of them (we hear) consulted their Oracles) and that those gods allowed them in what they did, or they durst not otherwise have adventured upon such methods, to advance their own Greatness and Power; and then, What should restrain us from the like Liberty in our several Capacities, to pursue our own private and particular Interests of Profits and Pleasure, by whatsoever actions we shall invade our weaker Neighbours Lives and Proprieties?  
And so, thus far we see, That the bare acknowledgement of a Deity, without some other consideration had to dissuade them from all immoral acts, to serve their own present desires and designs, for a prosperous Being in the World, cannot reasonably be thought a sufficient Ground and Reason.   

Section II.  
IN this Section we account, That that acknowledged Deity may, by further reasoning, be represented to men's Minds, not only as indefinitely good and kind (as before) but also as just, that is, impartially so: and that, as his Goodness may be apprehended in conjunction with his universal Equity.  
And then (say they) such a notion of a Deity may influence men into a belief. That he designed, that every man should be happy, as well as any; and so that no man that hath any veneration for him, as so represented, should presume to pursue his own private Interest and Wellbeing otherwise than is consistent with common Justice and Equity, and with the safety of other men's Lives and Proprieties.  
And in this Exception it may be further suggested, That when there is at present but such an imperfect notion of a Deity, it's possible, that in a short time there may arise men of clearer thoughts and apprehensions, 
Lib. 1. De Vit. Philos.  who may set up for Philosophers, (as Diogenes makes mention of the Gymnosophists, Druids and Magis, in the several barbarous Nations) and may be able to form Digests, and stated Rules of Justice and Goodness, and may then suggest into People's minds, That the same Just Deity would certainly be favourable to, and reward them that shall observe those Rules; and will be displeased with, and severely punish the Transgressor's of them. And upon this possible Supposal our Exceptioners will allege, That there may be then a sufficient Expedient offered to oblige men to be Virtuous and Good, and to overrule them from immoral practices, without a necessary consideration to be had of what relates to another World.  
In answering this Exception, I shall contract my Reply to this latter period of it, where there only doth appear whatsoever is cogent in it. And then, I say, That whereas it's suggested, that those Philosophers might influence such men's minds into a Belief, that God will be favourable to Good men, and punish Offenders; if they mean (as they must, except they own a future State) that the executions of that Deity's favour and displeasure are only to be acted in this World, then is the pretended Expedient an unsufficient Subterfuge.  
For if that Deity should not constantly keep up his favourable Providence to the Virtuous, so as always to answer their reasonable hopes and expectations: or if he should not as constantly rebuke and punish the Offenders, so as to secure their constant Fear of Him; Men would not be affected with the uncertain hopes of the one, nor dread of the other, so as to decline any advantageous, though the most unjust Adventure, for their present ease, profit, or pleasure.  
And that God Almighty doth not administer the exact Executions of His Favour to the Virtuous, and of His Displeasure to the Vicious in this Life, common experience doth sufficiently evince: And it hath been the business of the First Argument, to demonstrate the Truth of it.  
But now, suppose, that it were certain to all, as it falls out sometimes to some, that that Deity would infallibly do that work in this world, according to the merits and demerits of the one and the other; yet would the Criminals easily avert those fears, by considering, that either the Divine Justice would strike them with an immediate death, and (as it is the sense of a Theist) throw them into a present annihilation; and then they would judge for themselves, that such a a state of being nothing (if I may be allowed so to call it) is a thousand times more preferable, than to live miserably or uneasily, if those cases came at any time in competition; or if their punishments were to be executed by the measures of some tedious calamity (the severest case that can be suggested) yet than they would also consider, that at hardest it would but make it eligible for them, to put a present period to their own miserable and vexatious Lives, and in one instant be reduced to the same quiet nothing; which they knew a few years or days might perhaps determine for them in some very sad and more afflictive Method.  
And surely Socrates might upon these considerations aver to Simia and Cebes, That if he did not think that he was going into another World, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Plat. Phed.  the fear of dying should not have restrained him from doing any thing that were unjust.  
And thus we see the defect of this Second exception, though stated to the highest advantage. But these are but light skirmishes, before we engage in a war with others, that are pretended to be more formidable Adversaries. Therefore,   

Section III.  
THis Third Section tenders us the exception of them that will allege. That God Almighty hath delegated the executions of his Providence, in this Case, to humane Powers and Authorities, to make Laws & Edicts which may keep the World in order, and that the accountableness of men's lives and actions to their Cognizance and Umpire, for the rewarding the Virtuous, and punishing the Immoral, thereby to oblige all men to act well and virtuously, is all that the Great Creator designed or intended for the Administration of his justice on either hand in that Case, so that there is no need of a consideration to be had of what concerns another world, to work that effect.  
To this exception I answer, That it could not be the purpose of our Gracious God, in his ordering the world's Government in the manner and method it's constituted, that Mankind might universally (for it must be so, if there be any Sense in the Allegation) offer themselves sufficient reasons and encouragements (as to rewards and punishments) to oblige themselves to be Good and Virtuous, or restrain them from being immoral on that account, without a consideration of a future State, upon these two especial Grounds and Reasons.  
First, Because, where there be the best Laws and Constitutions that ever were made and established, it must suppose all Supreme Powers and Governors to have a sufficient Prospect of the merits and demerits of every individual Person and Action, as they are to be balanced by the measures of all their various circumstances: And then to be always intent, curious, and constant in the performance of their rewarding and punishing Offices, for the Interests of every such single Cause and Person, as well as in Matters of general and public import: And again, in this Case, it must be further supposed, That all the substituted Administrators of their Prince's Laws and good Intentions, (the Work being impossible to be always done in their own Persons) must also be as knowing and faithful in their due subadministrations: I say, If it were possible to be presumed, that all Governments and their Subordinates', were designed of God to be always thus qualified and disposed, there might be a tolerable Plea and Pretence to believe, that he intended no better, or no other reasons to oblige men to be Good and Virtuous, and to restrain them from being Evil: But if common, and sometimes woeful Experience, can prove the contrary; and if the Maxims of Government, which the grand Politician Machiavil have offered the World, 
Collected by a Learned Italian, and Translated into English by J. B.  be justifiably represented, the doubt and uncertainty is too great for a Good man to depend upon such administrations for his reward, and the former Supposals too unlikely to be True, so as to restrain an Evil man, that is either bold or cunning, from his unjustest intendments and undertake.  
Secondly, The next reason to evince, That it could not be God's Purpose, that all men's accountableness to Governors, should be their sufficient Reason to live virtuous Lives, or to deter them from living otherwise, is, because their Laws, how well and wisely soever constituted and administered, are experimentally found to be always so avoidable, by some men's Greatness, by other men's Cunning, and by most men's favourable Constructions, that it too often comes to pass, that virtuous persons have been so far from obtaining a Reward for doing well, that they have hardly acquitted themselves by the benefit of the Laws, for their own ordinary Rights and Safety. And that on the other hand; unjust men have been so far from being so sufficiently terrified, as to restrain them from doing Evil, that they have oftentimes been rather encouraged to adventure upon the worst of actions, by an Observation, that it is but a small number, whom the Law rebukes and punisheth, in comparison of the multitudes of Delinquents that daily escape.  
It's more than probable (they'll say) that there is never a man beheaded for Treason, or arraigned for lesser Crimes, but that there be hundreds in the Province, who have deserved as much or more, yet of whose actions the Laws ordinary proceedure hath taken no hold at all. And if from the great Estates that have been raised by frauds and oppression, (where the Laws have silently passed them by) the men that advanced them and their Heirs, were enforced to refund to the satisfaction of the injured, many great men must descend into a apparel equipage with their honest Neighbours of a meaner quality. And if every delinquent should come into the Congregation in a White Sheet, that have deserved it as much as they that do, the Congregation in some places would perhaps come to too near a resemblance of a Collegiate Assemblies Complexion.  
These be the Two Reasons, by which is evidenced the deficiency of all humane Governments and Laws for the ends pretended.  
But now comes my Sceptic, and he offers a reasonable Enquiry to know, that if this be not, what then is the end, which Governments do obtain, so as to answer Gods Wise Intendment in their Constitutions?  
My Answer to his Enquiry is, That it is without all doubt, that God Almighty obliged all Authorities, upon their Duty to him, and in his place, faithfully to endeavour the justification and protection of the Good and Virtuous, and for the punishment of evil doers (as St. Paul discourseth); 
Rom. 13. 4.  but because all those persons, that are so entrusted to act that good to Mankind in their several Authoritative Capacities, are free Agents, Created with Faculties indifferently disposed to Good and Evil, and are themselves (as all other men are) set in a probationary State for another World, & so are at choice, whether or no they will prepare themselves for a future Reward or Punishment, by their performing or omitting their respective governing Offices; therefore, as it could not but be a contingency, whether they would be so just and careful, so it could not but be a conditional intendment in God, when he first designed their constitution.  
But more closely to solve the doubt, I conceive that the absolute end, which God designed that his deputed Authorities must certainly attain, and without which attainment they must of course cease to be, what they are, is, That the Nations and Communities under their respective charges, might be kept in social or national subsistences, whatsoever the miscarriages of their Governments otherwise should be in all other respects. That is, when Princes are careful so to keep up their Authorities, that the People may not by their Seditions bring themselves at pleasure into an Anarchical and tumultuary State; which ought to be accounted the most fatal misfortune to Mankind, and of all evil, humane contingencies in this world, the greatest.  
So that the wisdom and Goodness of God in constituting and upholding Governments, is not then only to be owned and acknowledged, when every single virtuous person, and just cause, is perfectly rewarded and vindicated; nor when every unjust man is as fully Rebuked and Punished (a work not to be expected to be completely done, while defectible Mortals are engaged in that management of it) but God's mercy is then to be acknowledged, when the People's safety is so far provided for, that evil and licentious men (though they may sometimes disturb, yet) cannot at will overturn the Established Governments under which they live, and are protected. And therefore it is on all hands adjudged, that the worst Tyrannies, and the most oppressive Governments, are incomparably to be preferred to no Government at all; that is, when all men are left at liberty to act how and what they please: and so become (as certainly they will) their own greatest Tyrants and Oppressors; and without any control from any other expedient, but that which God himself hath appointed for their safety and deliverance: and that is, Sovereign Authority, and their submission to it.  
And if these solutions can't satisfy our Cavillers enquiry, when he offers any other, that shall appear more sufficient to an unprejudiced understanding to solve this observation, in which the Creator's honour it's so much concerned, I shall then renounce the use I make of them, as evidential for another world's Existence. And this solves the Third Exception.   

Section IU.  
THis Fourth Section is designed to take off another exception of more difficult import, and which many have thought an immovable block in my way. And that is, that it is encouragement and reason enough for men to live good and virtuous lives, without the necessary consideratien of what concerns another world, because virtue is her own sufficient reward in this life.  
With this famous subterfuge I have often been assaulted by some considerable persons, and such as were no enemies to the belief of another world upon other accounts, and therefore I must bespeak the Readers patience, if my stricter examination of the case, in order to a thorough detection of the fallacy, shall a little longer than ordinary, detain him in this Paragraph; and my Answer and Solution will be managed by several steps.  
1. First I take notice, That that Opinion (or Saying rather) That Virtue is her own Reward, was originally put into reputation, as by the Stoics principally, so also by some other Philosophers, on purpose to uphold the Belief of the possibility of Man's attainment of a sufficient Happiness in this present Life, to avoid the necessary Belief of placing it in another World. For those Wise men having tumbled about their Thoughts where to fix that sufficient Good and Happiness, and finding that those, who had placed it upon any present Enjoyments for a prosperous and sensual way of living, could not possibly stand their ground, against those pregnant Reasons, that every man's Experience could dictate to the contrary: So those Wise men were at last necessitated to pitch upon this Expedient of making Virtue her own Reward, as being subject to the least Exception. Though in the sense and manner, how it should effect that Reward, the Philosophers were no more likely to agree, than those men, who designed to place men's Chiefest Happiness in any other thing, whose enjoyment was determinable in this present World. Of which the Reader will find a full account in the last Argument, Chap. 2. And this Philosophical Principle hath since been kept up by the Predestinarian Divines, as better consistent with their notion of irrespective Election, of which I have given some account in the First Chapter, Sect. 2. And from that kind of Divinity, I verily believe, that notion hath been inconsiderately and unwarily entertained even to this day, by Divines and others, of a better Mind and soberer Judgement.  
2. Secondly, I answer, That as that Opinion or Saying had those unhappy Interests to serve in its First Rise and Process, so, upon a more strict Examination, it cannot in itself be True. And, first, as to the nature and proper notion of a Reward; which cannot but be of something that is kindly as well as equitably bestowed, by any Person concerned to give or allow it to another: For no man can be properly said to reward himself; he cannot in any tolerable Sense be the Giver, Receiver, and Judge of the Equity of the same thing; which must be True in a strict Propriety of Speaking, if Virtue may be said to be properly her (that is, the virtuous man's) own Reward.  
Then, Secondly, If it be alleged, That Reward in that Saying aught to be taken in a Metaphorical Sense; but neither then can the notion hold good in that acceptation, to the purpose, for which that Saying was to be made use of. For to be metaphorically accepted, is as much as to say, That Virtue is her own Reward, because it becomes something that is like, or resembles a Reward: but than it must be such a something, that must be supposed (if they will allow the Mind to be the proper Seat of a Rational Being's happiness) to depend upon the virtuous man's opinion and imagination; that is, That he is sufficiently rewarded and happy, if he can think himself so, and so long as his Mind is in temper to imagine himself to be so. But then, if a man would consider how insecure any such virtuous person must needs be of keeping his mind in that good humour, upon several accounts, he would soon find cause to blush at the pretence of believing Virtue to be her own Reward, upon his Thinking act of its selfsufficiency. For Who knows not, but that sometimes his Minds kind temper (without any reason to be given for it) may alter by his imaginative Faculties natural disposition to change and variation: sometimes according to the present temper of the Body, (as in hypocondriac Persons especially) sometimes by the Minds inability at all times, to subdue the clamours of its unruly Affections, and lower Appetites; and very often by a virtuous man's observation of his own many defects and imperfections in his best intendments and performances? I say, when these various cases happen, What's then become of that Reward, or that which is Tropically like it? Can it give the Mind a Beatitude, without its own allowance or consent? Or, Can the Mind have satisfaction, and be unsatisfied at the same time? In short, Can that be a man's sufficient Happiness, of whose enjoyment he cannot be one hour secure?  
Thirdly, That the weakness of the pretence of making Virtue her own sufficient Reward, without any other expectation, may yet be further discovered: It's observed, that the greatest Contenders for that saying, do sufficiently demonstrate its defect, by supposing a concurrence of almost all parts of humane prosperity, as necessary to support that, which they call Virtue's Reward.  
And to make this good, I shall here only offer the Opinion of Aristotle, (who, as industriously as possible, had endeavoured to have Man's self-sufficient Beatitude placed in Virtues being her own Reward) and he tells us, that there be unfortunate cases that concern Honour, Children, Beauty, and the like; which by no means can allow the virtuous Man to be a happy Person. And then (saith he in the same place) how can he be happy that's deformed, 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Lib. Eth. cap. 8.  ignorant, or that lives unsocially, and without Posterity, etc.  
Now, if such a concession, and supposal of the necessary confluence of so many conveniences of living well and easily in the world, do not show the unsufficiency of such a pretended self-Reward, we must disclaim every consequence that's most rationally inferred. Hence it is, That the Ingenious 
* 
None facile invenies multis de millibus unum,  
Virtutem pretium qui putet esse sui.  
Ipse decor recti, facti si pramia desunt  
Non movet, & gratis poenitet esse probrum. Ovid.   Poet had so slender an Opinion of Virtues being her own Reward, that he even derides the Humour of that presence, and tells us, that it would but teach Men to repent, that ever they had been Virtuous at all, if they got no more by it.  
Fourthly, and lastly, I answer and grant, (to save our Pretenders Credit) That it is with that saying of Virtues being her own Reward, as it is with many other general Axioms, and common Proverbial Speeches, that are grounded upon some certain Truth, which yet in other respects, may admit several Restrictions and Exceptions, and with which, those very Axioms may be so overbalanced, that there may be sometimes as good ones taken from some of their very limitations.  
And there may be some Axioms so equally balanced between true and false, that it were indifferent, if they were given either negatively or affirmatively. Upon this consideration, I do allow some Truth in the common saying, That Virtue is her own Reward, that is, the mind may sometimes by living virtuously receive some general satisfaction to its self, and that some Virtues may sometimes convenience a Man's credit, health, peace, and the like: but then on the other side, when it's considered, that there is no such absolute certainty in attaining those conveniences, as to make up an entire and self-sufficient Happiness, without any reference at all to the grand Rewards of another Life: I say, when all those Restrictions are put into the balance, I dare as positively affirm, that Virtue is not her own Reward, as to say it is. Nay, I must say its impossible it should be so affirmed, if any man (as the Philosophers did) shall go about to confront the Beatitude of another World, by giving it Appellatives, that can only be proper to the blessedness of the Beatific Vision, or an enjoyment of the nearest Communion with GOD Himself. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Eth. lib. cap. 9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Cap. 7. vid. cap. 9  For so Aristotle calls it the greatest, the most excellent, the best and divine Good: Elsewhere, he calls it the highest, most perfect, and self-sufficient Good.  
And now, after all this that may be offered in disproof of that Saying, as it bears a design to exclude (though but in notion) any other kind of Happiness to stand in competition with it, I cannot but wonder, that any man of the Christian Name, should go about a defence of it; or that any Divini should dare to affirm (as it hath been usually done) in public, That if there were neither Heaven nor Hell, it were encouragement enough to live a religious and virtuous Life, because Virtue was her own Reward. What could be said more to the disparagement of the Sacred Institution of the Gospel, whose main design is to tender the Rewards of another World, as the most reasonable and prevailing Inducement, to engage men to live good and virtuous Lives? Of which surely St. Paul was sufficiently sensible, when he avowed, That had they Hope only in this Life, they were of all men most miserable. 
1. Cor. 15. 19  He had forgot, that Virtue was her own self-sufficient Reward, and that by which they might all have been perfectly Happy, notwithstanding their want of any such Hope.  
And thus my Argument hath escaped the Danger of this Fourth Exception.   

Section V.  
THE Fifth and Last Exception against our● Proceedure upon this Argument, with which our Sceptic designs to war against us, with a Weapon fetched from our own Tents, is, That GOD Almighty made no other Proposal to the Jews, to encourage them to live virtuously and religiously, but of Temporal Blessings only; And, What (saith he) GOD himself thought might then be sufficient for his own dear People, surely should not at any time be called in question as insufficient.  
First, I answer, That it's true, that God Almighty, in the Mosaical Dispensation, gave the Jews no other plain and direct Promises, but of Temporal Rewards, as they are in those cited Chapters more especially enumerated: 
Levit. 26.  But then he gave them notice of some express general Promises, 
Deut. 28.  as that which he had made to Abraham, to be his God, and his great Reward, 
Gen. 17.  in which the Blessings of a future World could be thought to be no more wholly excepted, than in that affirmation, when the Psalmist so confidently averred in general, 
Psal. 58. 11.  That Verily there is a reward for the Righteous, doubtless there is a God that judgeth the earth: or, that he should say of himself in particular, 
Psal. 27. 15.  I should utterly have fainted, but that I believe verily to see the goodness of God in the Land of the Living.  
Now; in respect of the obscurer way of God's allowing the Jews the notices of another World's Rewards, (as for other reasons) St. Paul calls the Law, A shadow of good things to come; 
Heb. 10.  that is, though the clear revelation of a future state was respitted to the Evangelical Dispensation, yet the Jews might, in that darker manner, have as much certainty of its Existence, as a shadow can evince, That the Sun is in Being, though its own body of Light were then not directly looked upon; or, as when in a gloomy day the Sun is mantled with a Cloud, yet it may be apprehended as certainly, That the Sun is in the Horizon, and that it is Day, as if there were never an Interposure in the Firmament: The Lineaments of a Face, though drawn with a Coal, can assure one, that it represents such a Person, though it wants the attractive beauty, which the finishing strokes may afterward add to the Picture.  
And had there not been such a known Certainty, though in such shady representations, of another World's Rewards and Blessings, to the Ages preceding the Messiah, 
Heb. 11.  How could St. Paul aver of the ancient Saints of God, of whom he makes such a large Catalogue, That what they did and suffered for GOD and Virtue, was upon the encouragement of hoping for a better Country than Canaan? or, that he should say of Moses himself, That when he renounced the Egyptian Glories, and the present Pleasures of Sin, he was encouraged to it, by having his Eye upon the Recompense of Reward?  
So that the manner of God's giving them the Understanding of a future World, was but accommodated to all other the parts of their whole Dispensation. Particularly to instance in the Case of their solemn Expiations, by the Blood of those Animals, which were appointed for that Service: Now, as it was impossible for the Jews to believe so grossly, 
Heb. 10. 4.  as if the Blood of Bulls and Goats (as the Apostle argues) should take away Sins: but that there was something more to come, of which that Blood was Typical; so the same Thoughts we must have of them, as to a future state: It was not possible that such Persons could think, that all the Blessings which God designed to His obedient and faithful Servants, should look no further than the Advantages of Temporal Blessings, (of which its questionable, whether God constantly continued to them so vastly a greater share than he did to other Nations) which they could not but see, to be generally and promiscuously disposed both to the Good and Evil.  
Secondly, I answer, That though God gave them no express Revelation for the Existence of the other World, yet they had the common Benefit which God allowed to Mankind in general; That is, to be able to demonstrate the Existence of that state to themselves and others, by Rational Evidence; by which they, as well as the Heathen World, might be encouraged to live virtuous Lives, according to the common measures of Natural Religion, of which the substantial part of the Jews Dispensation did especially consist.  
And GOD might be pleased, in His sovereign Wisdom, to admit the Jews to no express revealed way of understanding the certain Existence of that future state, but by such an Expedient, of which the Heathen World might be capable, as well as themselves: That is, that the Gentiles might be the more reasonably invited to it, and the more readily entertain the Jewish Religion, when they saw, that the principal Fundamental of it did stand upon so firm a bottom as Rational Demonstration. And the reason of that might be, because the Jewish Dispensation had no such considerable Attestations to confirm its credibility, as the Gospels had; nor were all the Precepts of it in themselves so universally consonant to right Reason, nor so perfective of natural Religion, as the Gospels was; so that to adventure the knowledge of a future state upon a bare Proposal of Revelation only, might then have put those Gentiles Minds into a Suspicion, That that part of the Revelation had had no better Foundation in Reason, than many other parts of the same Revealed Religion had. Now, it was otherwise with the Evangelic Dispensation, because all the principal practic parts of its Profession were so Rational, and so agreeable to natural Religion, that had not the Article of a future World, and all that relates to it, been offered to Faith, and not left to Demonstration, (as the Jews in a great part might have it) the whole Christian Religion would have seemed to a Heathen Mind, and perhaps so to some others, rather to be of Philosophical than of Divine Institution.  
Thirdly, I answer, That it is very probable, that such a Rational way of demonstrating another World, might be also somewhat encouraged by Tradition from the Patriarchal state of the Church, from which the Jews had many things in great veneration, and constant practice.  
But howsoever, that knowledge of the other World reached their Minds, it's certain, that the belief of it was a Doctrine so catholic among the Jews, that the Sadducees (whose Sect began about the time of Alexander the Great, that is, about three Centuries before Christ came) were accounted amongst them as Heretics, for denying the Existence of Spirits, the Resurrection of the Dead, and of another World. Afterward, in the early Age of Justin Martyr, Trypho the Jew, in his Dialognizing, acknowledgeth, That pious Souls, after their departures from the Bodies, 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dial. cum Tryph. pag. 223.  shall exist in a better place; and, that the unjust and the wicked shall be in a worse state, expecting the time of their Judgement. And the Author of Europae Speculum, accounting the present state of the Jews, 
Europe. Spec. Pag. 223.  informs us, That the Belief of the end of the World, and of the final Judgement; of the restoring of men's Bodies, and of their everlasting Happiness in the height of the Heavens, is Good in general. And by these Answers, our Sceptic, I hope, will place no confidence in this Last Exception.    

CHAP. III.  
WHerein (as the proceedure of the Argument doth necessarily require it) I shall endeavour to represent positively, That there can be no other sufficient Motives or Encouragements; or (which is the same) no other sufficient Reasons morally to oblige a man, that is, (as he acts rationally) really to enable him to live a virtuous Life, or to restrain himself from being vicious and immoral, but such as bear a relation to a Future World. And to make this appear convictively true, I shall reduce all I have to say about it, to one general Head, which, with what relates to it, must necessarily occasion two distinct Sections. In the First, I shall offer Reasons for it from the mighty Difficulties, with which a man must engage, when he is about the work of living a Virtuous Life. In the Second, I must Answer two Exceptions against what those Reason's import, concerning the difficulties of being Virtuous and Good; and I shall also give Reasons, why GOD was pleased that the possibility of being so, should be so encumbered.  

Section I.  
IN this First Section, I shall pursue that order; that is, It shall endeavour to demonstrate, That no other Encouragements or Reasons (for in the case of rational Agents, they are both the same) can morally be sufficient to determine a Man's resolution and practice to live a Good and Virtuous Life, but such as relate to a Future World. And the Representation of it, will be founded upon the consideration of the very many, and otherwise, uncontrollable oppositions, difficulties, and discouragements, with which GOD thought fit, in His Divine Wisdom, That the possibility of Man's being Virtuous and Religious, should be so encumbered, That no less Reasons or Encouragements should be thought sufficient to balance his mind resolutely to grapple with them, but such as concern another World. And all this I shall endeavour to illustrate, by giving the Reader a full prospect of those Encumbrances, under these Five Heads.  
But before I can well begin to explain those several cases, I must first endeavour to obviate one great Exception; and it's offered by them, that will be ready to say, That there be some natural dispositions to Virtue in many, if not in most Men, more or less, that may even of course, make the way of Virtue more easy and less encumbered, without any necessary consideration had to the encouraging and obliging Concerns of anotehr World. Now our Exceptioner means, some men's natural Modesty, and good-Nature; other men's placable, peaceable, honourable and generous Inclinations; and then, that such natural Tempers may in themselves facilitate a Virtuous Life.  
My Answer to this Exception, will be managed upon several Considerations.  
First, as to such Virtuous Actions, as derive from those men's natural good Tempers, as they come up to some degree of necessity in acting them, and may resemble the Virtues of some Brute Animals, that act by instinct, so they may ofttimes, be rather materially, than truly, formally Virtuous. And therefore, Divines aught to advertise such kinds of Persons, not to be over-confident of their being really Virtuous (especially upon a Religious Account) from Actions, that perhaps, may be no more than the natural Effects of their complexional dispositions to some particular Virtues.  
Secondly, I suggest, That Men of those naturally good Qualifications, though in the beginning of their converse in the World, may readily act such Virtues, as relate to their complexions, yet when they come afterward to meet strong Temptations to the contrary, may find the same difficulties and discouragements to preserve their naturally good Temper, as others of a different humour. What prodigies of a lost Modesty, of a baffled good Nature, and of a debauched Honour, have some men appeared to be, that had the natural advantage of those Excellent Qualifications?  
Thirdly, I offer to consideration, That such Men, as are naturally endowed with any of those complexional dispositions to Virtue, may yet be observed, to have in their Tempers, some other Humours and Inclinations, which may create as great a difficulty to preserve their virtuous Conversations entire, as those Men meet withal, who have the task of contending with the want of such naturally good dispositions.  
Fourthly▪ and Last, As to that more famous natural qualification of an honourable temper, upon which principle In grant, that many excellently Virtuous things have been, and are acted in the World; but then I say, how easily is the Notion of true Honour lost, and what mistaken measures and disguises of it are too generally entertained in the world; so that, though such persons may show a greatness of mind in some cases, yet if they have no Religious Principles in them to give them a better conduct of their actions, how will their natural and complexional honour extravagate into such wild excesses, as are altogether unaccountable to any sense of Reason, or Virtue? how will some such men maintain their hardy resolutions, and natural stoutness in a Duel, perhaps only for an offensive word, that would not so honourably express it in all those acts of strict justice and goodness, as I have represented the notion of virtue, and living Virtuously, in the First Chapter of this Argument, Sect. the First?  
And now having acquitted myself of this exception, I shall presume upon the force of my Arguing, That the difficulties and encumbrances of being truly virtuous are such, that no encouragements can be sufficient to oppose and control them, but such as may be proposed from the concern of a Future World.  
First, let a man attentively consider in his mind, the true Figure of his whole compounded self; that is, how he is in general made up of two greatly divers, and in many respects, very incongruous parts and principles, viz. a Body and a Soul; each of which supposed to be naturally qualified with so many different capacities of acting, and which require such varieties of objects, about which, to exercise their operations. And then how those operations do bear a tendency to so many disagreeing ends and purposes, that a man's whole Nature seems to be a miscellany of Being's, or a complication of many natures in One.  
And then let him further consider, that most of those Parts and Powers of his thus compounded self, such as be his Imaginative faculty, the affections and passions of his Soul, and the various appetites of the Corporeal and Sensual part of his Being, are not only disposed to exert their several operations in a great disparity to, and with one another, but most commonly in direct contrariety to his reasoning mind.  
Now here lays the mighty difficulty of being Good and Virtuous, because it's a very hard thing to bring all those several parts of humane Nature, which are so variously multiplied both in Soul and Body, and are so inconsistent one with another, to the Rule, Conduct, and Dominion of right Reason; insomuch, that for the gaining that power, no man can acquit his endeavour, without a kind of Tyranny upon a very great part of himself: Of which Porphyry (though a Heathen) could not but be so sensible, that speaking of the purgation (which you may also frequently have notice of, in other Philosophers) of a man's sensual Appetites in order to Virtue, discourseth, that it can't be done without the Souls divorce from the Body, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Sent.  and its sensual motions: Or (as St. Paul expresseth it) without taking upon him the office (as it were) of an executioner, 
Galat. 5. 24.  and that in the hardest instance of its employment without a Crucifixion of himself in his affections and lusts.  
Now, if a man had been all Soul, and that Soul all Understanding, it would have been thought no hard matter to be Virtuous and Good, and that because his understanding power would not have allowed any thing to be undertaken and acted, that is contrary to its self: But when it's considered, that there be besides that faculty in humane nature, so many principles of action both in Soul and Body, that hold such a strong opposition to his reasoning Power, and will be constantly soliciting for satisfaction, against the interest of virtue, that man must be very credulous or unconcerned, that can think any encouragement (even for one that would desire to be virtuous) to be sufficient to engage him to enter the lists of that war with himself, and to uphold his mind against such powerful contradictions to his good intendment, except it be by a proposal to himself of some attainable happiness, whose interest may appear to him far greater and more considerable, than any of those satisfactions, which the inferior parts of his Nature exact and call for. And if it were not so, this absurdity must follow, That his Reason must be supposed to be left to act without a reason; that is, without a sufficient encouragement from some end or other, whose value and preference might overrule and control all other interests whatsoever, that are in themselves found to be less esteemable. Now I desire that any man would suggest to me, what happiness there is attainable in his Mortal life, which he may propose to himself to be so considerable, as may engage his superior mind to oppose the satisfactions of his imagination and passions of his Soul, and the sensual appetites of his bodily Self, in order to Virtue. And if he can't find any thing in this world, that may affect his mind with such a value (as I have in other Arguments convinced, that there is nothing) then either he must fly to something that is beyond this present mortal State, or else it must be presumed that God Almighty hath afforded him no sufficient encouragement to be good and virtuous at all. The sum is, That God hath designedly (as I shall represent in the next Section) made man in such a figure, and gave him such a kind of nature, that nothing can sufficiently encourage him to be Religious, Good, and Virtuous, but only the concern of another World.  
2. Secondly, as a man's intendments for virtue may be thus perplexed with a mutinous company of his inferior Passions, and sensual Appetites within him, so let him consider, what a kind of world it is, in which he is by Divine Ordination, socially to enjoy his Being; and then, how much therein all virtuous intentions will be constantly encumbered with so many differently flattering objects, that are not only foreign, but sometimes contrary to the exercises of Virtue, without him. Which kind of objects wheresoever he lives, with whomsoever he converseth, or in whatsoever quality of life he is employed; will always attend his senses and imagination, and be soliciting his affections and sensual appetites for entertainment. And if ever those bewitching enchantments for a present seeming satisfaction, do but gain a preference in his fancy (which will be a hard matter for him to escape) and after that shall but once come to interest his Affections, it's beyond a peradventure, but that the Supreme Part of his Soul, though it should then stand on the side or part of Virtue, would soon be wearied in the contest; and grow weak and imprevalent, if it hath not greater encouragements to enable it to undergo the conflict with those competitors, than such as he can possibly suggest to himself, from any the best concerns of this present life.  
And then, when by the treachery of his Debauched fancy and affections, the Rational part of his Soul shall stoop to admit an imposure upon its self, so as to approve and consent to what the Inferior parts of himself have so suggested; it's more than probable, but that all manner of virtues will immediately, not only become nauseous to him in his opinion, but will be represented to his mind under some reproachful characters of disparagement. That is, perhaps his mind will be overruled, to think Temperance too unpleasant and unsociable, Fortitude too dangerous, Prudence too formal, Gratitude and Ingenuity the silly effects of an easy Nature, Justice and Honesty too nice and unthrifty; and all other kinds of Virtues too unaccommodable for his present Interest, Pride, or Pleasure.  
And if the Rational Judgement be once thus disordered and prejudiced, what can restore him to the true estimation and love of what is Good and Virtuous, in order to a Manly resistance of all those powerful Temptations, that will be daily gazing upon him, to persuade him to the contrary? Surely there is nothing else can come in balance with those potent Enemies to Virtue, so as to overrule his mind to resist them, but a lively and a prevailing concern, for what relates to a Future World. It must be such an apprehension or none, That. can enable him to make an impartial Judgement of the necessity of being Good, or that can advance a sufficient rational Power in him to conquer his abused Imaginations and Affections; which will otherwise, in despite of all other Arguments that can be given him to the contrary, every day more and more endanger his mind, to be immovably affixed to the present World's delusive, and vainly admired Shows, and Fooleries.  
3. Thirdly, The difficulty of designing and living a Virtuous Life, is yet further increased, when it's considered, That so great a part of Humane Life is past and gone, before a Man is grown old enough to be himself; that is, before his superior mind will think itself at leisure, or indeed, be ordinarily capable at all, to encounter with his natural Affections, and unruly Appetites within him; or with the delusions of the World's deceitful Objects without him. I say, it's a great while, before a right, and well-informed Reason, that should undertake Virtue's Work, will be tolerably able to exercise its Authority over his Affections and Actions, or of passing a right Judgement upon his own principal Good and Interest. And especially if it be true, (which St. Austin averrs, as the Judgement of the most learned Men of that Age) that the natural Boundary of Youth is, 
Circa triginta quippe annos, definierunt etiam hujus saeculi doctissimi homines, juventutem. De Civ. lib. 22. cap. 15  when a man comes to the age of about Thirty Years.  
And then, if all that while he allows himself such a loose conduct of his Actions, (as is ordinarily observed in that time of Life) in what is he likely to pass away this ungovernable part of his Existence, but in trifling and folly, and in the ordinarily observed misadventures and miscarriages of Youth, 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, De lib. educan.  (as Plutarch fully represents them) without any sufficient Control from his yet immature, and unperfect Mind?  
And when he is thus tumbling down his youthful Precipice, if the Wisdom of Virtue stops him not, before the Meridian of his time be passed, he is in great danger of encountering with another potent Enemy to Goodness. And that is, with the Dominion and insulting Authority of a long-contracted habit of doing Evil, or, at best, of living idly and impertinently; which habit, if it be not timely rescinded, will strengthen itself every day more and more, like a shrunk Nerve, till it grows inflexibly stubborn against all remedy and relief, and obstinately set against all that Age and Experience may offer in Advice for his undertaking wiser measures of Living. So that it is not ordinarily so frequent, that men do get into a state of Virtue, either when they are very young, or very old: not when they are very young, for the reasons already alleged; Nor yet when very old, if they have continued their evil habits through the maturer part of their Lives; the proper season, when men should recover themselves from their former habituated follies, and be rationally fixed in the love and practice of Virtue.  
It's taken notice of, That Moses took that nick of time for his recovery: 
Acts 7. 23.  For (as the Texts infer that observation) he was full Forty Years old when he seemed to have begun that Mighty Work. 
Heb. 11.  He then unloosened himself from the Glories of the Egyptian Court, and renounced the transient Pleasures of it, and engaged himself into a course of Virtue; though he were sure then to act it in a state of great afflictions, with the then-suffering People of God. And for the performance of which (as the reason of the thing required it) he placed his encouragement upon the Concerns of a future World: 
Heb. 11.  For (saith the Text) he had an Eye upon the recompense of Reward. He durst stay no longer, lest a farther adherence to his Vanity had captived him beyond the relief of his reason; nor durst he adventure to trust his Soul with any less encouragement, to engage himself in that necessary Work, lest he had miscarried in that most important Enterprise for want of it.  
It's true, I confess, that there be always some good young men in the World; but then it's observed, that their virtue hath been (I speak not of all) but commonly contingent, or complexional; that is, either as growing upon the advantage of a good Education and Discipline, or as upon the Stock of their own naturally-sweet and tractable Dispositions. But than it hath also too often been observed, That afterward those pregnant and promising Hopes of a virtuous Life, have become abortive, when those young men have been left to act purely upon the strength of their own Minds and Reason. Like some Plants, which we take notice of to thrive well, while they feed only upon the nutriment which the body of the Seed afforded them, but when they come to grow upon the strength of the Ground only, after all their first vernant shows, have withered away, through the weakness of a defective soil: So many young men have been commendably virtuous upon the advantage of their own good Nature and Education, who afterward have failed, when they came to live abroad in the World's wide Field.  
Now, upon this whole consideration which I have made, concerning the time of Youth, What can be supposed to be offered to a young man, while he lives subject to be overruled by his passions and natural appetites? Or, What Arguments can be presumed to be strong enough to bring his Mind to any sufficient attendance to the Counsels of Virtue, amidst the prospect of so many enticing Objects, to divert him from it, but an alarm from the most serious consideration of the Concerns of another World? Therefore, when Solomon advertized the vain young man, 
Eccl. 12. ver. 1.  to Remember his Creator in the days of his Youth, and had told him, 
ver. 13.  That nothing but Fearing God and keeping his Commandments, could make him Happy, he obligeth his attendance to that Sovereign Counsel, (as knowing that nothing else could be sufficient) upon the Concerns of another World; because (saith he) God shall bring every work into Judgement, with every secret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil.  
4. Fourthly, Let us, after all these mentioned difficulties of being engaged in a course of Virtue, further consider, That he that designs to live virtuously, ought also to suppose, that it is not only possible, but very probable, that he must live counter to the Examples (in one kind or another) of the greater part of Mankind: And sometimes not only to the Examples of them, with whom he chooseth to converse, but ofttimes even of them upon whom he must necessarily depend: and (which adds much to the difficulty) very often to the Examples of such, whose Age, Station, Learning, and Experience had given some credit to lose and vicious practices.  
Now, if a man shall but seriously inform himself of the universally acknowledged prevalency of evil Examples, and how, (if they be too general) like a raging Torrent, they are apt to bear all that's Virtuous down before them; and then shall consider, how that prevalency ariseth not so much from any taking Argument that there is in vicious and debauched Examples in themselves, as from that inclination that is naturally implanted in all men, to be governed by Example, rather than by any other method of Conduct; the difficulty of being virtuous must, on that account, be still very much increased. It's known by common observation, That Orations, Sermons, dexterous Reasonings, and a diligent attendance to Books, (though they may very much influence, yet) are experimentally found to be far less prevailing with the natural temper of most men, than is a constant Prospect of actual Precedents and Examples, whithersoever they tend either to Good or Evil.  
And therefore, our Saviour, in his famous Sermon upon the Mount, after he had prefaced it with Eight qualifications of Mind, as necessarily required in them that intended to engage in the Observation of his following Precepts, begins the Sermon with that which he judged most considerably conducing to a Good Life, and that was, to make the Good actions of his Hearers exemplary to one another. (Mat. 5.) And as it was our Saviour's prime care to promote the Benefit of a good Exemplification: So it hath been ever since believed of such as were to be afterward the Substitutes of his Priesthood, that they have the more remarkably prevailed in their Ministerial Offices, 
Potior enim, est bene vivendi quam bene loquendi facultas.  when their good Examples have given Life to their other endeavours: And, the building up of God's Church, hath then most successfully gone on, when they have wrought with both Hands, that is, both by Life and Doctrine.  
Now, this whole Discourse, concerning the nature and importance of Exemplification, amounts to this, That if there be such a natural Prevalency in all Examples to control the Minds and Lives of men: And if there be so observably, always in the World, so many such Examples, as will be encouraging Vice, Immorality, and the Universal Neglects of Religion; What an addition is it to the difficulty of men's Undertaking to live good and virtuous Lives? What Power can stem such a strong Tide? or, What encouragements can the Mind assume to its self, from any thing that this World can tender, to restrain a man from following a common Mode (perhaps at that time most fashionable) of ill-living, for which he hath daily so many Precedents before his Eyes? Surely nothing can enable him to bear up against so powerful an opposition to Virtue, unless he advanceth his Soul to be concerned in what relates to another World.  
5. Fifthly, and Lastly, They that design to live virtuously, that is, strictly so, besides the mentioned inconveniencies of bad Examples, must also expect to be entertained (more or less) with as many discouragements, as the vicious and immoral can possibly contrive. For there is a malignant disposition in the Minds of most men that are habitually evil, which will commonly engage them either in an open Enmity, or in a secret Spite, against the Persons of the Virtuous: And in whatsoever other instances their Malice shall fail them, yet they will be sure to put the Actions of the Virtuous, let them be never so upright and innocent, upon the rack of all possible misconstructions for their discouragement.  
If such Good men shall live quietly and inoffensively in the World, it must be accounted from a pusillanimity and meanness of Spirit. If in any instances they be observably grateful or ingenious, it's nothing else, but an effect of a weak and untutored Judgement. If they can't comply with some men's Riotism and Debaucheries, 'tis Penury and straitness of Soul. If they be cheerful, they are vain; if reserved, 'tis Sullenness. If they be generally civil and obliging in their Behaviour, it must be Flattery, Neutrality in public Concerns, or base Compliance upon design: And then, if they keep distance, 'tis Pride and an unsociable Singularity. If the Good man shall go about to oblige such men by Kindnesses, they will hate him the more, because he was in capacity to do them: And if upon apparent affronts and abuses he be ready to offer terms of reconciliation, they will never forgive him the Injury (as they will account it) of his taking any notice at all of their Unworthiness: If the common business of the World brings the Good man into Company, he hears no body commended but the Thriving, and the Cunning, and no man applauded as Wise and Happy, but the Rich and the Successful; they are to be always the best men (as they call it) of the Neighbourhood, howsoever unfurnished in the Region of their Minds, or how irregular and unworthy soever in the course of their Lives. And while he is among them, if he offers to talk to purpose, no man listens to him: If he adviseth well, none attends his Counsel: If his indignation against such Trifles of Mankind, makes him speak a stout Word, that relates to Virtue, or another World, there's presently an alarm given either for an universal Sport, or a Quarrel. But if at any time a stronger temptation, and a snare laid, shall betray his virtuous Soul to comply too far with the humour of the loose Society, it shall never be forgotten to his reproach; and how soon and well soever he shall retract his Surprise, yet it shall be thought sufficient to justify all the affronts and unkind usages that the immoral and vicious shall for ever after design and offer upon him: And it's well if his Posterity escape.  
And then, a further disencouragement is, if he that designs to be Virtuous, be of Honourable Extraction, it shall be suggested to him, That his strictly managed Life, will lessen him in his Honour, if not degrade his Quality: If he otherwise stands in good and plentiful Circumstances, he must expect (in as many respects as they can) to be made a prey to the Vicious, who shall take the same pleasure to do it, and to boast of it, and shall be as little blamed for it, as he that robs an innocent Churchman of his due, or that plunders one, that refuseth to be Disloyal in a time of Rebellion. As for that Man's share in ordinary civilities, such as keep up Societies in mutual Friendships, he shall be sure to have the least proportion of them; and his strict and virtuous Life, shall set a mark upon his door, and teach the common Visitours to pass it by, like a House infected with the Plague: And at last, they shall grow so weary of his Neighbourhood, that they will always be wishingly enquiring (with the Evil Man in the Psalm, Psal. 41. 5.) When shall he die, and his Name perish? These, and such as these, are the discouragements, which he that intends to lead a Virtuous Life, may reasonably propound to himself to encounter with, from the evil part of the World; not that I think, that every Virtuous Man, and at all times alike, shall be assaulted with every one of them, in the manner and order that I have now represented them; yet nevertheless, we may be confident, That all Virtuous Persons (if strictly so) do meet with some of them, and some, with most of them: And they that meet with fewest, considering their other mentioned Encumbrances from within, and without them, will find work enough to bear up against them, that they may keep their minds and lives close to their Virtuous Resolutions. And than who can imagine, That they should entertain their minds with the hope of any such Encouragements, as may elsewhere balance their Reason, to overrule so many Discouragements, but of those only, which they may suggest to themselves, from the favour of a Good GOD, as it relates especially to the hopeful concerns of another World? This the last difficulty: but Why did GOD permit all this? That's the business of the next Section to solve.   

Section II.  
HAving thus laid down the Five Instances of the several difficulties, with which Men, that would live Virtuously, must expect to be encumbered, I might now come up close to the conclusion, did I not foresee a Rancounter from my constantly attending Caviller: and he hath two things to object against the Representations which I have made of those Difficulties. 1. First, saith he, How can all this consist with your own Principles, and the Notion, that is ordinarily made of the Christian Religion; of which it is affirmed, That its Commandments are not Grievous: 
1 John 5. 3.  or that Our Saviour should say, That His Yoke was easy, 
Mat. 11. 30.  and His Burden light?  
First, I Answer, that though Our Saviour declared His Yoke to be easy, etc. yet is it a Yoke, and a Burden still; and so those Metaphorical Expressions, must suppose and import something in their proper meaning, that is severe and difficult. And though His Commandments are not grievous, yet are they nevertheless Commandments still; that is, restraints, limitations, and boundaries of something, that Men are apt to account their natural Freedom.  
Secondly, I Answer, That that easiness and non-grievousness may be spoken but as comparatively of something that is harder, and more oppressive. And that is, either as to the bondages of the Mosaical Institution, or as to the Slavery and Drudgery of living under the intolerable Dominion and Tyranny of sinful Habits; which notion of easiness in those Two comparative Respects, doth not at all supersede what I have represented concerning the difficulties of living a Virtuous and Religious Life.  
3. Thirdly. The Evangelical Virtues may be represented as easy, as they are in a more general account accommodable to right Reason, and as they are in themselves more approvable to a man's natural understanding: and therefore can't be thought grievous to the supreme part of himself, (which is especially himself, and denominates him a Man) abstractly considered, how troublesome and difficult soever the practice of them may be in a complex and compounded Notion of himself; that is, as he is made up of so many inferior passions, inclinations, and sensual appetites, as I have represented the case, in the former Section.  
4. Fourthly, I Answer, that His Yoke, Burden, and Commandments may be found the more easy, and less grievous with respect to those excellent dispositions of Mind, with which every true Disciple of CHRIST that undertakes a Profession of his Religion, must necessarily be supposed to be qualified; that is, with meekness and lowliness of heart, such a submissive and humble temper of Mind, as he there adviseth to, in the same period of Discourse, as learned by his own Example, will make his Yoke so much the easier, and the practical Observance of his Commandments so much the less grievous to him, that designs to live a Virtuous and Religious Life.  
5. Lastly I reply, that those fair accounts of the easiness of the Christian Virtues, may be founded upon the belief of a future world, and with respect to the great rewards of that Blessed State; for the attainment of which, nothing ought respectively to be accounted hard, that is possible, as the bitterest Doses is cheerfully taken upon an assured prospect of Health, and as the Merchant's hard adventure is made light of, upon a fore-assurance of the import of his rich floating Cargo. And this solves the first Exception.  
But than Secondly, our Sceptic Dares arraign the Equity and Goodness of GOD to Mankind; and saith, That if Almighty GOD had ever seriously intended that Men should live Good and Virtuous Lives, upon which, His Divine Favour, and all their own Happiness, should chiefly and necessarily depend, (as it's pretended) he would never have been so unkind, as to put them upon such a way of Living, whose terms should be so hard and hazardous, and that cannot be performed without so many amazing difficulties, and discouragements; but would rather have obliged them so to live, upon conditions which might have had the same ease and security, by which other Animals attain their proper ends; from which they are in no natural danger to depart, by any wilful miscarriages of their own.  
My Answer to this bold Charge upon those glorious Attributes of God, in which he chiefly delighteth, shall be by offering sufficient reasons to justify God, why he was pleased to allow Mankind the possibility of being Good and Virtuous, upon such severely difficult, and discouraging terms, and conditions. And the Reasons are these Five.  
First, Had not man some such difficulties and discouragements to contend with in his attempts to be Virtuous; the very name or notion of Virtue must have been insignificant to all the purposes of its Reason, and Recommendation. If there were no enemy to conflict with, nor any danger to be encountered, there could be no reasonable account given either of courage, or conquest; And if it were naturally easy, and commonly obvious, to be Learned and Knowing, what honour were it to be accounted a Philosopher? So if the world had no enchanting Objects, no sensual Pleasures, no admired Splendour and Greatness in it, what Virtue were it to oppose temptations to Pride and Vanity, Revenge and Arrogancy, or to be constantly engaged in mutual condescensions, and in an universal practice of living peaceably and doing good? And if some parts of man's nature had no contrary propensions, and aversations; it would be no more to be Virtuous, than to Eat or Sleep; no more for a Man to be Temperate, than for a Lamb; his chastity would be no more commendable, than that of a Flower, and his peaceable and innocent Conversation, would be just so much accountable, as that of a Tree or Stone.  
So that if the matter be closely considered, it must not only acquit God's Justice, that he hath permitted (of which men are too apt to complain) some discouraging difficulties of being Virtuous, but it would highly advance his Goodness, as that thereby he had a gracious contrivance, how to make man possibly capable of being Good and Virtuous at all. And therefore when some men shall go about, upon that account, to make their vicious lives, and their resolutions not to amend, the more excusable to themselves and others; and when others that mean better, shall be always murmuring and complaining at every encumbrance they meet with in the way of Virtue, both the one and the other sort of men, aught to be informed, that all that while they are most ungratefully arraigning and undervaluing one of the choicest instances of God's Infinitely Wise Love to, and Care of Mankind.  
2. But than Secondly, another Reason, why God Almighty was pleased to permit those Encumbrances and Difficulties to be so great (as they are to be measured by those five mentioned Instances) was upon a further design of his Love and Goodness to Mankind, in order to promote a greater advance of their happiness in another World: That is, that the will of man might by those discouragements be the more duly and equally balanced in his choice of being Virtuous, so as to be capable of those vast Rewards and Blessings, which God designed for, and promised to him. And the Reason, is because upon God's proposal of those extraordinary returns of Reward and Blessing in another World; the very sense and expectation of them would otherwise have overbalanced the freedom of his choice of being Virtuous, too much on the one hand, towards a determination of his will, and a necessity of choosing, had not the greatness of those difficulties and discouragements so counterbalanced his mind and poised his will, for a more equal freedom in his election of Virtue: so that, had GOD Almighty been pleased, that the way of Virtue and Religion, should have been more easy; that is, less encumbered with those difficulties & discouragements, it ought to be reasonably presumed, That God would have communicated to the mind of Man, lower Apprehensions of that Future Happiness; and so the freedom of His Will, would have been balanced for a lesser stress of choice, and consequently with lesser hazard. But than it must be also as reasonably presumed, That the Happiness attainable as such a Reward in the end, would have been proportioned to such an easy, and less hazardous Choice. Waters are observed to rise to no higher pitch, than according to the advance they have from the original Spring.  
Therefore, I say it was a mighty instance of GOD's Wisdom, that he permitted those difficulties and encumbrances to be so great and numerous, that thereby he might make the hoped for Happiness, proportionable for Mans equally balanced Choice of so much Virtue, as was necessary for such an attainment. But then His Goodness is infinitely to be admired, that all this should be done on design, to advance him to so much the higher and nobler degrees of Happiness in another World.  
Thirdly. It's very reasonable to believe, That GOD was pleased to permit those difficulties and discouragements, and to allow the possibility of being Virtuous, upon those hard Terms, that he himself might act his Divine Favour to the virtuous part of Mankind, as near as possible, to the measures of Justice and Equity, as well as of Grace and Goodness. That is, that thereby he might make the free Donations of such extraordinary rewarding Blessings to the Virtuous, the more accountable and (as it were) the more justifiable to His own infinite Reason and Wisdom; which St. Paul 
2 Thes. 5. 6.  calls the Righteous Judgement of GOD; that so all His Divine Attributes, might be the better balanced in making His Creature, Man, completely happy. And who knows not, That it is ordinary for many wise and good Men (more especially Commanders in Armies) to offer such Employments to their Friends and Favourites, (whom they design to advance in Repute and Preferment) as have the greater trouble and hazard in them, for no other end, but to justify to their own minds, Discretion, in being nobly kind to such adventurers; and in which they may have more satisfaction to their generous minds, than for any manner of advantage, that they may receive to themselves, by such their Friends and Favourites hazardous Engagements? And then, Why may not we as reasonably have the same Thoughts of a Wise and Merciful GOD, as to the case in hand? This the Third Reason.  
Fourthly. GOD was so far pleased to permit, (I could say to order) that every Person might encounter with such oppositions, difficulties and discouragements; not only that His own mighty Favours to them, might appear the more reasonable to Himself; but that also (to the greater Glory and Justification of His Justice and Goodness) they might approveably appear so to all His created rational Being's, When he shall come to be admired in all them that believe in that Day; 
1 Thes. 1. 10.  as St. Paul expresseth it.  
And first, as to those Being's that had already struggled through those difficulties, and conquered those encumbrances, and are arrived at their Reward in another World, How much will it advance the Glory of an infinite Benefactor, when they shall recount (as it's reasonably imagined they will) what every one of their Fellow Saints had done and suffered for Virtue; and what hard Adventures they had made in the time of their Probation in the former World, to keep up their Virtuous and Religious Integrities? I say, How can it but advance the Glory of GOD, that all the glorified Saints and Angels can be able to say, That such a man is not in the blessed Place, altogether by a partial kindness with particular respects of his Person only, and so to have nothing to applaud, but such a mere and irrespective Love; but that in the free donation of his Happiness they can observe that all other the Divine Attributes did concentre with His Love; and so they may have Reason, as to magnify his Wisdom, Justice, and Equity, for the extraordinary measures he took to bring him to that blessed State in such a manner, so also His transcendent Love, in bestowing that blessing at all so graciously upon him? And then on the other side, those unhappy beings, who by their Cowardice had refused to conflict with those difficulties and discouragementr of living Virtuous Lives, and had thereby cheated themselves out of all those future Blessings, upon the temptations of a few vanishing Pleasures, and a little transient sensual Satisfaction, I say, why may it not be thought a wise ordination in God to permit those encumbrances in being Virtuous, that when those unhappy Souls shall observe, that God had bestowed those mighty Blessings upon those that adher'd to their Virtuous Living, so encumbered, they might for ever justify his equity, that it was not for nothing, or for what was very inconsiderable, or for what was not in their own power to have done, as well as in theirs, that he was pleased in his free love to bestow those mighty blessings upon the Virtuous in that happy apartment; so that in both respects, both to the Good and Evil, God's design was to have his Justice magnified as well as his Mercy. Therefore St. Paul 
1 Thes. 1. 6.  calls both those events, a Just and Righteous thing, or Act with God, etc.  
5. Fifthly and Lastly, God was pleased that man might not go through with a Virtuous state, without those difficulties and encumbrances, that the Virtuous might not only enjoy the hopes and expectations of those future Blessings at present with a more advanced inward pleasure and value (as having paid so dear for them) but that they might afterward enjoy them in the other world, with so much the greater satisfaction to their own happy minds; And that because they may be sensible of something done by themselves (though it be very inconsiderable in respect of the transcendent superredundancy of their reward) why they should be conferred upon them by a Just and Merciful God. For as a happiness that comes in any degree towards a notion and nature of a Reward, (being therefore the more accommodable to the mind of a Rational Creature) cannot but be preferable to any kind of happiness, that is merely and inconditionately gratuitous; so must the sense of the happiness, to him that hath hardly adventured for it, be so much the more welcome and valuable in his own sense and esteem.  
Now all this was so ordered by a Wise and Good GGD, that the Virtuous might be the more rationally happy, and so the more agreeably to their own nature in the other world. This the last Reason. And thus this third and last Chapter being ended, it's time to attend the conclusion.    

THE CONCLUSION.  
NOw upon the truth of all those Premises, which I have in the three Chapters and their Sections made so plainly and unexceptionably acknowledgable, and which cannot but challenge an assent from every unbiass'd mind; That is, having in my first Chapter rightly stated the terms of the Argument, against all such mistaken senses of them, as must have at first view invalidated the very Reason of it in general: And having in my second Chapter accounted with all those exceptionists that would fain have found out something, by which God might have otherwise provided, to engage men to live Virtuously, without a consideration had to what concerns another World: And lastly having in my third Chapter given sufficient Reasons to show that it is impossible there should be any competent encouragements, that is, any sufficient reasons, why a man should undertake, and go through with a Virtuous Life, but by the supposal of what concerns a future State; I hope I may now without any violence to, or imposure upon any man's credulity, conclude that God Almighty hath certainly constituted the real Existence of another World.    

Fourth Argument.  
The Sum of the FOURTH ARGUMENT.  
THE Fourth Argument to evince the Certainty of a Future State's Existence, is sounded upon Mankind's being born naturally subject to so many, and those so greatly afflictive Troubles and Calamities, as that they exceed, both in number and quality, all the Miseries of the whole created World besides. So that, if their whole Duration should be limited to the term only of their present mortal Lives, as a nonexistence were rather to be chosen, than to enjoy a Being upon such hard terms, so it cannot but reflect upon the Infinite Wisdom, Justice, and Goodness of GOD, who by His own sole Sovereign Will and Pleasure, should choose to make a Creature to be naturally so Unhappy.  
And if the Honour of those Glorious Attributes of GOD, and Man's hard Opinion of his own Being, can no other way be possibly solved, but by the supposal of a Future State's Existence, in which Mankind might be made capable of a Redress and Compensation, for the Evils to which their Nature hath subjected them: And if it shall also further appear, That for the better obtaining such a Redress and Compensation in that State, all those Evils, to which they are naturally so subjected, may be found to be designedly Subservient and Instrumental; than it cannot but demonstrably follow, That GOD Almighty hath certainly ordained and constituted such a State to come.  
Now, that this Argument, thus generally laid, may the more manifestly appear to be sufficiently concluding, I shall divide the management of its Explanation into these Three Parts or Chapters.  
In the First, I shall endeavour to demonstrate, That Mankind▪ are naturally born subject to more and greater Calamities and Miseries, than the whole visible created World besides. And in effecting this, I must be necessitated to spread my Discourse into a larger Explanation than, perhaps, every Reader may judge so needful in his first Thoughts.  
In the Second Chapter, I design to represent such intolerable Consequences, as must, in Reason, be inferred upon that Observation, that is, such as cannot possibly consist with the Honour or Notion of the Divine Attributes, nor with Man's tolerably-well Enjoyment of his Being, whether as socially or individually considered.  
In the Third Chapter its intended to demonstrate, That the supposal of a Future World's Existence, can only solve all those intolerable Consequences; and will also manifestly evince, That all those Evils, to which Man is naturally born subject, were designedly ordered, and permitted by the Divine Wisdom and Goodness, to be instrumentally subservient to the better attainment of that Future World's Happiness. And from those Premises, so explained and demonstrated, I shall (I hope) justifiably infer the Conclusion, for the necessary Existence of that Future State.  
A FUTURE WORLD'S EXISTENCE, Demonstrated by Rational Evidence.  

CHAP. I.  
IN this Chapter I shall endeavour to represent, That Mankind are naturally born subject to more and greater Miseries and Calamities, than the whole visible created World besides; and that by their Nature, with respect only to their mortal Lives, they are the most Unfortunate of Being's. And I shall manage the Proof of this part of the Argument, in Three Sections.  
1. In the First Section, I design (as particularly as I can) to give an account of the common Evils, to which Men are born naturally subject, to the last period of their mortal Lives.  
2. In the Second, I shall represent the Opinions of the Great and Learned Men of the World, in that Case, as authoritative Attestations of the Truth of it.  
3. In the Third, I shall offer humane Evils to a comparison 〈◊〉 all those, to which all the other parts of the whole visible World besides are subjected; and therein I shall more fully discuss the Case of Brute Animals, in which our Theists assume no small confidence for their Cause.  

Section I.  
IN this First Section I am obliged to give an Account of the common Evils of Mankind, to which they are naturally subjected. But, in doing this, I shall not pretend minutely to enumerate every one of them; for that were to undertake an Office, as difficult as precisely to number the Stars or Sands. But the better to explain the Truth of the allegation, I shall only take Leave to represent some general Heads, or sorts of those common Evils, which I will presume to place, as in so many several Rooms of an Imaginary House, into which I may invite the Readers observation, that he may thereby be, (as it were) an Eye-witness of what I shall offer to his Belief.  
1. And in the first Apartment of that House of Calamity, let me tender to his view, those Nations and Places, where all the wretched Sufferers by the Three great and astonishing Plagues and Scourges of Mankind, the Sword, Famine, and Pestilence (when they happen in the World) do, at the then present time, live and bear their several shares in the sad effects and consequences of such calamitous Causes.  
And here our Observer cannot but take notice of so many, and such amazing spectacles of humane misery, that the very Prospect itself (though himself were perfectly secure from every one of them) will hardly give him leave to think, That if he were now to choose a Being, (though otherwise accommodated with the fairest conveniencies) upon condition to be a constant Beholder of such Objects of Misery, he would not be very fond to accept it upon those terms. But certainly, those men themselves, that are at any present time sensible of those terrible occasions of humane Calamity, cannot but think it their great misfortune to Be at all; if there were no assurance of a Better state to succeed, by the hopes of which, they might relieve the present sense of their own confused conditions; and, which might atone their oppressive Wishes, that they had never Been at all.  
And though these great Distresses happen but seldom in the World, and but at some periods of Time, yet every man is born naturally subject to them all; and knows nothing to the contrary, but that he may bear his Portion in every one of them, before any Cause or Accident shall be so kind to him, as to determine his miserable mortal Being, to prevent them.  
2. Through this extraordinarily lamentable Apartment, let me lead our Observer into a Room called, The Lazar; that is, a place where ordinarily all the Sick, the Languishing, and the greatly Tormented, lay along on Beds and Couches, groaning and complaining under the heavy Pressures of their present numerous Distempers:  
Of which there be so many several kinds, that the Learned Physicians account Four Hundred, as the proper subjects of their Art; besides the innumerable accidents upon men's Limbs, and Senses from without, which are the proper business of the Surgeon's Skill and Employment.  
And of the Diseases, in which the Physicians are concerned, besides those that are promiscuously incident to Mankind in general, some are Hereditary, and descend from Parents, without any fault at all of the Diseased. Others there be, that are proper to their Countries, and are called Endemial, such as be the Bronchocele to them that live about the Alps, the Kings-evil to the Spaniards, Consumption to the Portuguez, and Scurvy to the Northern Nations: to all which Diseases, the afflicted might have contributed neither Cause nor Occasion. Then others there be, which are called Epidemical Diseases, with which, sometimes the greatest part of a Nation is at once unexpectedly surprised from the concurrence of some malignant, and sometimes, unaccountable Causes.  
And now, if a Catalogue were made by those Persons, whose Calling and Employment it is, to attend the Infirmities of that part of Mankind, which at all times some where or other lay under their Hands and Cures, of all the several calamitous Circumstances, which such afflicted Persons, and their Families endure, it would easily satisfy any considering mind, how much a nonexistence were to be preferred to such men's present Being's; if they could not believe, That GOD has allowed the Afflicted, an assurance of a better State to come.  
3. From a view of these woeful Objects, to whose Calamities, men's Bodies have exposed them, I lead our Observer into a Third Room, where all that are disordered in Mind, make up a Great and miserable Society. And there the Sick and the Diseased are more numerous, and their disorders by far more afflictive and uneasy, 
— Morbi perniciores sunt, pluresque, quam Corporis, etc. Tusc. Quest. lib. 3.  than those of the Body, as the Philosopher observes. Now the Diseases of the Mind (as he there accounts them) are Madness of all sorts; Envy, 
Diog. Laer. lib. 7. de Vita Zenon.  Anguish, Sorrow, anxious Cares and Fears; to which Zeno, in his enumeration of them, adds Jealousy, and Confusion, or Perplexity of Thoughts, Emulation, and Terrors, Shame, and an unwieldy Tiresomeness, or Lassitude of Mind.  
With any one of which, whosoever hath his Head affected and encumbered, will be hardly able to allow himself any considerable satifactions in the sense of his own Being, though he were otherwise accommodated, with all other the kindest circumstances of living: and for this, take great Plutarch's Words, thus expressing the Case. Fill thy Coffers with Gold and Silver, and fit thyself with all the circumstances of Pleasure; fill thy House with Attendants, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. etc. Lib. de Vitiis & Virtute.  and the City with Debtors, except thou canst conquer the Affections of thy Mind; except thou canst set thyself free from all its Vexatious Fears and Cares; all thy Enjoyments can no more cure thy Discontented Mind, than if thou gavest Wine to abate a Fever, or Honey to allay a Redundancy of Choler. All humane bodily Infirmities may, in comparison of the Mind's Distresses, be tolerable; that is, a Man's Reason may in some measure support him under them, 
Prov. 18. 4.  but, a Wounded Spirit who can bear? Saith Solomon.  
4. Having dispatched my Observer from this dismal place, I shall presently show him in the next apartment, an infinite number of such, as are made unhappy and unfortunate by the Evils, which Men are every day studying to bring reciprocally one upon another: and for that Reason it is, that when Seneca was asked, 
Quid homini inamicissimus? Homo.  What was the greatest Enemy to Mankind? he should Answer and say, That it was Man. And surely his meaning was, Because in Man, might be found whatsoever in all other Creatures might be Offensive to the Wellbeing of Mankind. The Savageries of the best armed, and most enraged Animals, the Noxious Antipathies, and Poisonous qualities of Plants and Minerals, and the most destructive Infects, are not more pernicious to Mankind, than are the ill humours of men, one towards another. And herein their Barbarisms exceed those of the most mischievous Animals, 

— Parcit Cognatis maculis fera. Quando Leoni  
Fortior cripuit vitam Leo? quo nemore unquam  
Expiravit Aper majoris dentibus Apri?  
judica Tigris agit validâ cum Tigride pacem  
Perpetuam. Savis inter se convenit ursis.   because that those creatures do commonly suspend their Cruelties to those of the same kind; but it is otherwise in men, the objects of whose base actions and intentions, are chiefly those of the same species with themselves.  
So that if we would but count the open Oppressions, secret Frauds, and all the arts of Falsehood and Subtlety which are every day made use of, to invade and violate men's Rights, and Fortunes; And if we could take a sufficient notice, of what private insinuations, and spiteful invectives, are daily invented and acted, to undermine and blast one another's honours and reputations; and if we should then reckon the intolerable practices of revenge, as they are every where prosecuted by the powerful interest of great men, by the vexatious methods of the Law, and by the common Malice of the world: and if to the complaints of those, were added the mournings of oppressed Widows, Parents tears, brethren's unnatural feuds, children's hardships, and all other the oppressions and unkindnesses which many men endure, at the hands sometimes even of such, who by all the obligations of Duty and Gratitude, should be just and kind; I say, if all these Calamities which men suffer one from another, were considered and accounted; there would be cases of Misery enough to afflict and tyre out all the Compassionate Ears and Hearts, that are at leisure to hear and resent them, and (if there were no other World to relieve them) to lament, that so many distressed Persons had ever been at all.  
But if that which is called Friendship, may be presumed to abate this severe representation; and if it be objected, that some Philosophers have thought that mutual endearment, a sufficient compensation for all the mischiefs and evils, which they can otherwise receive from the rest of Mankind: I may answer with one of the wisest of them, 
Dio. Laer. lib. 5. De vita Arist.  (as Phavorinus relates it of Aristotle) when he said, O my Friends, there is no Friend at all: That is (I suppose he means) if all those that are engaged in that excellent Society, had not in the beginning of it any private ends and designs of their own to promote by it; and if all those, which after a begun Friendship, could by no temptations become unconstant, or unfaithful; and if all those that undertake that profession, would steadily follow Seneca's Rules, That is, To be willing to be reciprocally equalled & counselled, 
En quid amicum paro? ut habeam pro quo mori possim, et habeam quem in exilium sequar, cujus me morti opponam, ut impediam. Epist. lib. 1. Epist. 9  and to interpose a relief for one another's misery, even by Banishment, and Death itself; I say, if all such were only to be accounted Friends, though I won't presume to affirm with the Philosopher, that there is no Friend at all; yet I think I may say, there are very few such to be found in the world, or at least not so many, that in any tolerable degree, can compensate for the innumerable mischiefs and misfortunes, that Good men, and even most men, endure, by the malice and falsehood of the rest of mankind. To whom the kind miscarriages of the truest Friends, are ofttimes no small addition of trouble; That is, when their indiscreet, though sincere affections, do prove as vexatious as the hatred of an Enemy; as Seneca observes. And the truth is, it's hardly possible, 
Saepe nihil interesse inter amicorum munera, & inimicorum tela. Quicquid accidere optant, in id horum intempestiva indulgentia impellit & instruit. Lib. de Ben. 2.  that the excellent union of Souls, and the entire management of true Friendship, can be supposed or expected to be any where else found but among those, who are qualified with that Honest and Religious Temper of mind, to which the hopes and fears of a Future World, have raised their Souls, above all such temptations, as might induce them to act unfriendly or unworthily.  
5. But if this Room be not a sufficient Prospect, to convince my Observer of the Truth of my Supposition, I will carry him into another Place, almost as large as the World itself, where he shall hear a mixed company of all sorts of men, continually repining and complaining of the particular Evils, that inseparably accompany every different condition, and quality of Life.  
What shall I say of the Cares and uneasy Affairs of the Rich and Great, to support an empty show in the world? What of the straits and Improvisions, the Contempts and Bondages of the Poor and Low, and how almost the whole species of mankind are made Drudges, and driven about like Machines', to serve the Pride, Pleasures, and Profits of a few? And if it were possible to find out a man, that had no kind of visible Misfortune upon him at present, yet are there reasons to be given, 
Ita enim foelicitas, se, nisi temperatur, premit. Sen. Epist.  that his very prosperity (as the Philosopher Observes) may in time oppress him, and become nauseous, burdensome, and afflictive to his thoughts.  
In this place it is, that the Married and the Unmarried are framing arguments to act their own Repentance in the state they are in at present; and when their conditions are changed, they are condemning themselves for believing their own Arguments and Reasons why they desired it. Here the Public and the Private, the Inhabitants of the City and Country, are arraigning their present States, by the various Opinions of those, who had studied to inquire and determine, whether of the two ways of living were encumbered with lesser or greater inconveniencies; and while each of them are complaining of their own present State; they wish, and perhaps attempt a change with the contrary; which when they have once done, they commonly encounter a new Tide of greater Dissatisfactions.  
Hence it is, that men of several Callings and Employments, are expressing their Discontents, 
Quî fit, O Maecenas, ut nemo quam sibisortem, Seu ratio dederit, seu for'rs objecerit, illâ Contentus vivat? jaudet diversa sequentes. O fortunati Mercatores, gravis annis Miles ait, multo jam fractus membra labour: Contra Mercator, etc. Hor. Sat. lib. 1.  and torturing their Heads with the Opinion and Sense of their own proper incommodities, and invidiously admiring the conveniencies that others enjoy, by the contrary ways of living; as the ingenious Satirist represents the Case.  
So that by this natural misfortune it comes to pass, that Men are always tempting themselves to make War upon their own Contentments; and (if the Religious Concerns of a Future World do not determine them) to oppose the little satisfactions they might possibly otherwise enjoy, in the state they are in at present, by harassing their thoughts with the unavoidable Evils, with which every one of them is naturally born subject to be encumbered. But that which mightily adds to this kind of Unhappiness, is, That the more fine, modest, and ingenuous the minds of Men are, they will always be the more afflictively sensible of their lesser Misfortunes, and the more vexatiously tyrannical to themselves in greater. A sweet Soul is turned away from his Benefactor with a rebuking Look, and frets upon the unkindness, while the Bold and the Immodest, can withstand a thousand Denials, and remembers no affronts to his discouragement.  
This is the last room of the Afflicted, in our imaginary House of Humane Calamity.  
Now, if these several apartments were brought into one prospect, and that I could show my Observer at once all those, that are at any time afflicted in their several Rooms, the World of Mankind would look more like one common Hospital of the Miserable, than a Society of Being's, which are presumed to be Superior in order, and the Divine Care to all other the visible parts of the Creation besides.  
But then, if it be objected, That there be many who have had the good hap to pass away a considerable part of their Lives with tolerable ease and satisfaction: That is, Suppose some young men, who in the strength and vigour of their time, are at present gratifying their sensual Appetites in the several Pleasures of their Youth: Or, suppose some others of further Progress in their space of living, who are now applauding themselves in their Skill and Success, for the attaining a more than ordinarily considerable Portion of Knowledge, Wealth, or Honour. I say, Suppose that any of, or all these, should reclaim against the Truth of what I have said, yet I must tell them, they are all to consider (though nothing else should ever happen to interrupt their Eutopian Happiness) that if they should live towards that boundary of time, which GOD and Nature hath appointed for the common duration of humane Life, they all must assuredly expect (and that expectation alone will be no small abatement of the Pleasure they pretend to take in any Enjoyment whatsoever, if they look no further than their present state) that a considerable portion of their days must be worn away at last, with the labour and sorrow, pains and weariness, contempt and uselessness, decays of Sense, and loss of Strength, and with other the many Calamities, naturally incident to old Age. Of which Stoboeus hath collected such a Description from Wise and Great men, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Ser. 113.  that nothing could be offered to the Thoughts, so full of Horror and dreadful Representation. For, if their Proprieties be then too narrow, they must bear the shame of being a Burden to the World; and if their Enjoyments be very plentiful, unkind Posterity will be apt to make promising Inspections into their years; and will be ready to think, and perhaps to say, (if Religion grounded upon the Hopes and Fears of a Future World prevents it not) that their continuance is an unhappy Obstruction to the completion of their Successor's long wished for Fortunes. Who can without a passion behold how much a stranger a poor old Father and Mother are sometimes made to their own Estates and Circumstances? And, What imperious Proprietors will their Children be apt to make themselves, in their decaying Parents Houses and Fortunes?  
Therefore so sensible have some whole Nations been of the wretchedness and calamities of old Age, that in mercy they would forestall Natures tedious acquitment of old men from their universal unhappiness, by a speedier way of exemption. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Lib. 4. de Abst. S. 21.  Of which Practice, Porphyry hath afforded us a large Account and Catalogue. The Massagetes and Derbicians (saith he) did slay and eat up those old men whom they loved best. The Tebarins threw them down a Precipice; The Caspians and Bactrians committed them to wild Beasts, for an hasty deliverance out of their miseries: The Scythians burned them upon the Funeral Piles of their deceased Friends: 
Lib. 4. cap. 15.  And the same usage had old men (as Diodorus Siculus reports) among the Troglodytes.  
Now, these Offices were very hard, and (in the Sense of men that own another World) very unwarrantable, yet the men that contrived and used them, thought, That what old men endured by such Expedients of release, was very short, and comparatively more eligible and tolerable, than to have them continued in the weariness and pains, scorns and sorrows, and other calamities, to which they knew a long old Age would have exposed their Friends. And that if they had lived it out, to its last natural period, 
Stultus est, qui non exiguà temporis mercede, magnae rei aleam redemit. Paucos longissima Senectus ad mortem sine injuriâ pertulit. Ex. lib. 8. cap. 59  (as Seneca tells us) they must have done it so much to their own damage, and greater inconvenience. But by this sad Scene, in which men act their old Age, the natural Tragedy of Man's declining time is not yet fully concluded: Nor doth it determine all his mortal Infelicity. And therefore, that which makes the Case yet much harder, is, that all those mentioned miseries may conclude with a terrible conflict at last, before the uneasy Mind can ordinarily be loosened from its vexatious Imprisonment, or a man's decaying Life be discharged of his Ages intolerable Burden.  
They are still to die: And if that last Epilogue alone were truly considered and represented, in all its ordinarily natural circumstances, the enjoyment of such a trifling Being as is a mortal Life, would, on that very account, be thought an unequal compensation, for this last Evil of it only. But, if men could be made throughly sensible of what some dying Persons endure, there would be but a few, (if it were offered to trial, and to their choice) that would be easily persuaded to accept of a mortal Existence, with that one severe condition; if there should be no state in Future, whose possible Happiness might balance the reason of their choice, to Be at all.  
For, Who can be otherwise assured, but that in his bitter Agony of Dying, he may not only endure as exquisite Tortures, as may even exceed the Inventions of the most barbarous Tyrants, but (which is worse to a generous mind) that he may die in such circumstances, as to be made a spectacle of Contempt, by the undecent effects of a confused and disordered Reason: And that so, in both respects, he may go out of the World, like a Malefactor and a Fool, both at once. And surely, upon the thoughts of this last respect it was, that that Excellent Author of the Religio Medici (a man not to be thought on by them that truly know him, without Love and Honour) could affirm, That he was not so much afraid of Death as ashamed thereof. 
Part 1. Sect. 39  It is (saith he) the very disgrace and ignominy of our Natures, that a moment can so disfigure us, that our nearest Friends, our Wife and Children, stand afraid, and start at us.  
Now, upon the whole matter, If a poor mortal shall consider, that after all the forementioned miseries of humane Life, this last completion of its Calamity (of whose approach he knows not, but that every next day may bring him the sad Tidings) may succeed, What possible reasonable satisfaction (if ever he seriously thinks of it) can he be presumed to allow himself in his amplest Plenties and Pleasures, 
Quae enim potest in vita esse jucunditas, quum dies & noctes cogitandum sit, jam jamque esse moriendum? Cic. Tusc. quest. Lib. 1.  if there should be no Future State, whose Belief and Hopes might at present relieve his oppressed Thoughts, and whose after enjoyment might for ever compensate him for all the sorrowful circumstances of his former Life and Death? But I am not singular in this account of Humane Misery. Therefore,   

Section II.  
IN this Second Section, lest any man should suggest, that I have been too partial in the Representation of Man's Unhappiness, in favour of my Argument, I shall call in the aid of some Authoritative Testimonies, (and those that shall give no suspicion of serving our cause by incompetency of Judgement) which do as fully attest the Truth of asserting the Miseries and Calamities of humane Life, as any of those former Instances may be presumed to demonstrate it. And I am sure, that there is no subject of Discourse can be abetted with a more solemn account from the Great and Wise men of the World. But I shall limit myself, and offer a few Testimonies of some of them, enough only to avoid the censure and suspicion of improving a Foundation for an Argument, beyond the common Opinion of other and Wiser men.  
Stobaeus accounts the Words of Aristotle thus, describing Man: What is Man (saith he) but an exemplary Instance of Infirmity, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, &c▪  the Spoil of Time, the Sport of Fortune, the Copy of Inconstancy, and a Balance tossed up and down between Envy and Misery? And he gives elsewhere the Sense of Herodotus, 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ser. 103.  whom he reports to have affirmed, That Man was nothing else, but one entire piece of Misery and Calamity. Or, 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Cons. ad Apoll.  as Plutarch renders it, (quoting Cantor for the Expression) It's not a Life, but a Punishment, and to be born is the greatest misfortune. Arrianus framing a Question, what Man is, makes him a part of the Universe, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arr. Ep. Lib. 2.  but the Disease of it, with the Evils of which he is a while to conflict, and within a short time to die.  
But, to omit the Thousands others that might be produced, I shall conclude with Seneca, who when he had given some instances of humane Infelicity, at last resolves them all into this Interrogation; 
Quid opus est partes deslere? Urgebunt nova incommoda priusquam veteribus satisfeceris. Lib. Cons. ad Martian.  To what purpose should I complain of it by Parts? The whole Life of Man itself is one Scene of Sorrow, in which Troubles follow one upon another in constant Succession. And he elsewhere calls Man's whole Life, 
Omnis vita supplicium est. Ad Polyb. Cons.  A mere Punishment upon another occasion.  
And therefore, the Ancients were so severely sensible of the Miseries of man's mortal Life, that, in favour of their deliverance from them, they constantly celebrated Death, (though in its natural account, the most formidable instance of amazement and terror) with Encomiums of the kindest Representations, only because it gave a period to all the rest of humane miseries. Arrianus, how careful soever to defend his Stoicism by the Rules of Patience, flies at last to the common Remedy; 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ar. Ep. lib. 4.  and for that end calls, Death the Haven and Refuge of all Misery. And Tully cries out, O ye immortal Gods! how sweet is that Journey, 
Proh dii immortales Quam obtabiliter iter illu ineundum, quam jucundur esse debet, quo confecto, nulla reliqua cura, nulla so licitudo futura sit? Tusc. qu. Lib. 1▪  (speaking of Dying) which being ended, all cares and troubles shall be determined and finished? And in another place, calls Death a safe Port after the restless Voyage, and storms of Mortality; and represents it as the Refuge of a sorrowful Life. For that end it's reported, That anciently, at a place in Spain, there was a Temple dedicated to Death, as to a common and certain Deliverer of all Mortals miseries.  
But perfectly to silence all suspicion of my partiality, I appeal to the Sacred Revelation itself, (which we must suppose to be especially concerned for the Creator's honour) and that sets forth man's present mortal state, under as severe representations, as any Authority that can be alleged. Man that is born of a Woman (saith Job) hath but a short time to live, 
Job 14. 1.  and is full of misery. To which his birth hath made his portion as naturally necessary, 
Job 5. 7.  as the sparks fly upward. Solomon calls the whole natural Circle of Man's duration, 
Eccl. 6. 12.  the days of his vanity, which he spendeth as a shadow. And he accounts all his Enjoyments (which might be presumed to balance all the inconveniences of his Life) no more considerable, than the most superlative Vanity, 
Eccl. 1. ●.  and no easier than that which must be the vexation of his spirit, may be presumed to be esteemed. No wonder then, 
Eccl. 4. 2.  that He praised the Dead, which were already dead, more than the Living, which are yet alive.  
But now let me ask my former Observer, whether or no, I have imposed upon his credulity, when I first asserted, That Man's natural subjection to such severe Portions of Misery and Calamity, made him (as I first suggested) the most, if not properly the only unhappy and unfortunate Being of the whole Creation. But this must be further examined. Therefore,   

Section III.  
IN this Section I shall more strictly account, how Mankind in this respect, are comparatively by their very nature, more unfortunate in their Being's, than all other the parts of the whole Visible Creation besides. And I shall there attack the Grand Exception, which the Theists make use of, concerning Brute Animals.  
First, Let our Observer in his most serious Thoughts round the whole created Universe, (the case of Brute Animals I shall account for by its self) from the mighty Bodies above, to the smallest insect, that creeps under his feet: Let him strictly examine all their Natures, with the same curiosity, as if they had all the ingenious Societies in the World, to make it their whole business, to attend the notices of their several orders, figures, and manners of Existence. And I am sure, the issue will be, that a mighty occasion would be given to advance men's minds to a greater admiration of their Creator's Power and Wisdom; an abundance of Nature's Phaenomena would be solved▪ but as to instances of misery and calamity among those Being's, they would not be so much as once named, or thought on. A Theme, which no Man ever attempted, or would adventure at, unless he designed to teach men to disparage the Honour of that Great CREATOR, whose perfection of Goodness and Essential Happiness, could not admit a thought of making any Creature naturally, that is purposely, and necessarily unhappy.  
First, if our Observer designs a consideration of all inanimate Being's, his thoughts are presently discharged of all suspicion of their unhappiness.  
The Heavens or Earth, or which of them it is, that is daily moved about, is not wearied with its Rapid Revolution. The bright and burning Luminaries above, are not scorched with their own Flames: The Stars of lesser Magnitude, are not emulous of, nor oppressed by those of the superior Orders: The Plants are not unfortunate by the Wounds they receive, when they are dismembered or cut down; nor are the Rocks disturbed, when they are torn open for Materials to serve the Health or Fortunes of Men; nor are the several natural Causes, that act their Powers to serve the Universe, tired or encumbered with their busy and constant Operations.  
As for what concerns Brute Animals, I must assault the strongest Hold, on which our Theists principally rely, to secure their opposition to their belief of a Future State, upon the account of this Argument; and they will object and say, What necessity is there of a supposal of the real Existence of a Future State to recompense Men, after their calamitous Lives and Deaths, more than the Brute Animals, who also are naturally made subject to as many afflictive Evils, pungent Torments, and ill Usages in their kinds; and at last, must pass out of the World, with the same (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) Disorder, Convulsions, and Conflicts, as Men do?  
To all which it's answered, First, that it is not true when it's affirmed, that Brute Animals miseries (if in any propriety of speech they might be so reputed, in comparison of those, which men endure) are as numerous, as those of Mankind. For upon an ordinary computation it must be acknowledged, that they are incomparably fewer in any one kind of them, and almost none at all in most; and for those Evils, with which those few seem to be encumbered, the Great Creator hath taught most of them, by a natural instinct, without the trouble and hazard of foreign aid, or counsel, (which men must employ for their relief and health; and which oftentimes, upon mistake, or worse, proves their greater misfortunes) to find out their own Cures, and remedies; or by a sagacious foresight to avoid and escape their approaching dangers. All which Arts in Brute Animals (saith Proclus) are from without, 
Et aliunde curantur, ea videlicet conditione, qua movet ipso motor: Orbata scilicet ea facultate, qua aliquid seipsum ducere valeat atque servare. Proclus de anima & daemone. Ficinus interpr.  and from an impulse, which they have received from the Original of all Motion. Hence it is, that they toil not for Manufactures to cover them, nor do they use Engines fetched from the bottoms of Mountains for their Armature, to defend them. Their parturitions are easy, their declension to their natural period's but a very little varied from the vigour of their perfect Age. And when men are racked and worn up with Cares and Labours to live in a tolerable plenty, their Tables are spread, and their Little-Ones provided for, by Nature's munificence. All which advantages put the ancient Poet Philemon, into such a fit of admiration of their Felicity, that he passionately cries out, O thrice Happy, and thrice Blessed Brute Animals, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. per Hert.  that are free from such Calamities, as Men endure.  
As for such as die for man's use, that is no more than a kind hastening them to their quiet Annihilations; a benefit, which many poor oppressed Slaves, and many others, that live in calamitous conditions, and even some in their prosperous circumstances, would judge an acceptable Relief, if Nature would allow it them.  
But Secondly, I answer, that Brute Animals, in whatsoever they endure, and howsoever their Senses, and sensitive Imaginations may be affected, are yet wholly freed from all the oppressions of a reflecting mind; which properly imports the special reason of all real Misery. From which, if Rational Agents in their Calamities, were as much exempted, they would not in most cases so much consider (in comparison of what they suffer by the Minds concurrence) the common Evils, to which their Natures have otherwise exposed them.  
Hence it is, that Brute Animals have no discursive antecedent fears of dangers, before they come; nor can they be intellectually sensible of their own infelicities when they are upon them, nor do they sorrowfully account them, when they are passed. As for those mournful Postures, Sighs, and Out-cries, by which they express their oppressive sensations, they are not the chosen effects of any inward trouble, or conflict of mind, (as ordinarily in men) but such as necessarily result from those different figures and alterations of parts, into which they are naturally and necessarily cast, when any offensive impressions are then upon their Bodies. And so they seem to import no more, than those Groans and Sighs, which are observed in men, when they are in no perturbation of mind at all, but are purely natural acts, consequent to some (sometimes unobserved) straitness or oppression in the inward parts of their Bodies; Or as when those acts are expressed by men in a fast sleep, and their Minds are not in a capacity to consider them. And it's like, that Brutes suffer no more by such impressions upon their Senses, either in Diseases or hard Usages, than a Soldier feels smart by his wounds, in the heat and fury of the Battle, when his mind is not at leisure to reflect; Or their dying conflicts, and convulsions (as when it's said, As Dyeth the one, 
Eccle. 3. 19  so Dyeth the other) may be no more afflictive to them, than that man's are, who goeth out of the world in a Lethargic, or Apoplectic Fit.  
I know that Porphyry did strongly contend, to have Brute Animals reckoned as fellow brethren in the Rational World, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. De Abst. lib. 3.  and to be capable of Reason, though in an inferior degree to Man, and so might have the same recompense at▪ God's hand by his equitable providence, one way or other, or at one time or other, as well as the afflicted part of Mankind.  
And for the proof of which, he allegeth the Subtlety and Wiliness of some, and the Virtues of others, such as Fortitude, Temperance, Gratitude, and the like. And then he offers to observation, their skill in the foresight of dangers, and of approaching different seasons. He instanceth in their teachableness of tricks, and imitation of many humane actions, for Sport and Divertisement.  
To all which it's Answered, first, That those mentioned Actions, that hold such an assimulation to those of Rational Agents, are only such as proceed from a natural necessary Principle, which their Wise CREATOR implanted in their several kinds in different manners, to supply the want of an intellectual Faculty. Therefore Nemesius, first a Philosopher, and then a Bishop, in his Book of the Nature of Man, observes, That in Brute Animals, there is an Understanding that is Natural, 
Cap. 2. § 7.  but not Rational; and then gives a Reason for it: 
Cap. 2. § 7. num. 3.  Because (saith he) every Creature of one kind, doth the same thing in one and the same manner; every Hare useth the same subtlety, every Fox the same wiliness; and every Ape is alike, an imitator of Humane Actions: But (saith he) it is not in all cases so with Man; for his Actions of Reason, are infinitely various, and of different sorts; in several individuals; and are variated by choice and freedom of Mind in the same Person.  
Then Secondly, as to those Actions of Brute Animals, which are called Virtuous, it only proves, That they have natural Qualifications, that make resemblances of Humane Virtues, but they are by instinct and necessary, and not of choice, nor upon any apprehension of doing Right or Good; nor from the proposal of any end, as is necessary in any action, that may be called morally Virtuous, such as must be supposed to be in Rational Being's.  
And lastly, as for their Dexterities and Tricks, it's certain, that they are learned, and done, not by any inventive or discursive faculty, but by a greater natural quickness and sagacity of their Senses, which fits them for imitation, and mechanical direction, how to act such things; which at present become as unaccountable, and may occasion as much present wonder in Spectators, as the nimble feats of Jugglers, because they escape the Beholder's observation: And so much as Jugglers are truly reputed Conjurers, so much may those Brute Animals, for that reason, be as justly esteemed Rational Creatures.  
Now upon the whole account of what I have said in the case of Brute Animals, it is so different from that of Mankind, that it can no way be imagined, How it should be unjustifyable in the Sovereign Creator, if they should meet no future Recompense for such comparatively very inconsiderable Endurances.  
And, if it were granted with Porphyry and others, That they were endued, in some degree, with a Rational Capacity, yet for as much as they want all manner of sense of a Deity, and are altogether uncapable of morally, either pleasing or offending Him; forasmuch as they have no Faculties, by which in their Afflictions they can either dread His Justice, implore His Mercy, or make any Complaints to Him; how can it be supposed, That they can have any Capacities, by which they should either be expectant, or acceptive of any Rewards or Compensations from Him in a Future World?  
But then as to Man, how is it possible, That he being made a Creature furnished with Faculties, by which he can make Conceptions of a GOD, that can own Him for his Creator, and can love and serve Him, and fear to offend Him; by which he can complain for a Relief, and hope for a Redress: I say, How is it possible, That such a Creature as this, after all the indurances of a Calamitous Life, should at last be so forgotten and forsaken, as to have his Being shut up in an empty Nothing? What a Gratification and Pleasure would the thought of this be to every rational Enemy of Mankind? And how would the Adversaries of Goodness and Good Men rejoice, if they were assured, that when Virtuous Persons, whom at present they scorn, hate, and oppress, were once gone out of the World, they should not only be in no better condition than themselves, but in no other, than what their Dogs and Horses pass into when they die?  
This mighty Objection, in which the willing Adversaries of a Future State placed such a Confidence, being thus solved, I hope I have fairly acquitted myself of the first part of my designed Method, to promote this present Argument; that is, I have endeavoured to represent, that Man, by the Divine Order and Permission, was created and born subjected and exposed to bear such severe Portions of Misery and Calamity, that if there be no other use and end of them, but only that they should be endured, as his subjection to them is sovereignly imposed, and no provision reserved in future, whereby he might enjoy a succeeding settled State of Rest, Freedom, and Compensation after them, then must Man, (as it was at first suggested, and since proved) be the only unfortunate Being of the whole Creation. And that the Existence of any other Created Being whatsoever (be it of a Stone, or Plant, Worm, or Fly) were rather to be chosen, if he had a liberty allowed him of making his Election. But concerning that, there are severer Thoughts still to follow. Therefore,    

CHAP. II.  
IN this Chapter it's designed to represent the several horrid and intolerable Consequences, which every rational and considering Mind must necessarily infer upon the apprehension of Man's being born naturally subject to those many, and greatly Afflictive Evils, without a consideration had of a Future World. And they will occasion three several Sections.  
1. The First demonstrates, That such a natural subjection to those Evils, cannot possibly consist with the Honour of GOD's Wisdom, Justice, and Goodness, who sovereignly gave Mankind a nature so unhappily subjected.  
2. The Second Section shows the Inference of many other desperate Consequences, by which Mankind's Subsistence in this World must necessarily be universally disordered; especially by that consequence of the Reasonableness of men's putting a present period to their own Afflicted Lives.  
3. In the Third Section, I shall endeavour to solve several Grand Objections, against the reasonableness of this last consequence.  

Section I.  
IN which I shall endeavour to demonstrate that Mankind's universal Subjection to those foremention'd troubles, miseries, and calamities, (without a consideration had of a Future Life) cannot but infer, to a reasoning mind, very unkind Reflections upon those Attributes of God, without which, it's impossible to form conceptions of His infinitely happy Being; that is, when an understanding mind shall consider, that such a disordered Effect should be produced by a cause of such an infinite Wisdom, which in all other His Works is so manifestly renowned; and that the perfection of Goodness and Equity, should choose to give a Being to any Creature, by which it may be sensible, That it is made so much the more unhappy, by the very Enjoyment of it; and that whereby it may reasonably judge itself much better, never to have been at all; 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Simplic. cap. 38.  as the Wise Philosopher Simplicius offers his Opinion.  
But Plutarch represents the Case, not as his private Opinion, but as true by universal suffrage; and as a notion made trite by common Discourse; 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Plutarch. Cons. Polyb.  that is, that (upon the consideration of humane Miseries) it were better for a Man never to have been, or that he should immediately die: so that, the mind of Man, will be apt to suggest, That if any one in any humane, sovereign Authority, should follow such a Pattern or Precedent; that is, if any Prince or Parent, without any other respect had to either, should out of mere Dominion and Arbitrary Power, make a Subject or Child to be unavoidably unhappy, when it was in their capacities to have prevented that misfortune; I make no question, That neither Almighty GOD, nor any created rational Being, would approve of such an use of their Power or Authority: and if it should be alleged, That the Sovereignty of GOD over His Creatures is more absolute than a Prince's or Parent's over his Subjects or Children: I must Answer, That His Divine Goodness must also be believed to have the same infinite dimensions with His Dominion; and that it is dishonourable to the Divine Nature to imagine, That there should be any act of the one, which should not be completely consistent with the other. Upon the assurance of which, it is, that the Son of Syrach could say, We will fall into the Hands of the LORD, 
Eccl. 2. 18.  and not into the Hands of Men: for as His Majesty is, so is His Mercy.  
But, against the Inference of this dreadful Consequence, I must encounter Three grand Objections, pretended for the vindication of the Divine Attributes in this case.  
First, It will be objected, That though GOD Almighty gave Man such a Being, by which, in some respects, he may live a more afflictive Life than other visible Creatures; yet nevertheless, it's to be considered, That GOD hath, in compensation, allowed him a far larger share of many happy Advantages in this World, by which he may be sensible of enjoying more Knowledge, Honour, Power, and Pleasure, than any other Creature besides can be possessed of.  
To this Objection, my Answer is, That whatsoever that Portion be, if there be no apprehension of a future Bliss, to make such Enjoyments acceptable in their esteem and use, it's known, (as my next and last Argument will sufficiently explain the Case) that whatsoever they be, they must be such as, in their nature, are neither universal, satisfactory, nor certain; nor in any man's power, at choice, to obtain them, when they most passionately desire them, or most extremely need them. And when they are possessed, they are such, as will be perpetually encumbering the Minds of Men, with so many fears, and unexpected turns and interruptions, and with so many attendant Evils, that any one of them considered, and felt, (as the nature of Man's mind is) may more afflictively assault its notice, to the Sense of its own Infelicity, than all other the integral parts of Prosperity can afford it contentment or satisfaction. So that, if it falls out, (and it's rare if it doth not) that the most prosperous man in all other respects, should be invaded either in Body or Mind, with any of those greater Evils, to which his nature hath subjected him, all other his Enjoyments (how many and great soever) would appear not only inconsiderable, but ofttimes nauseous to his Thoughts. First, A Fit of any violent Torment upon his Body, shall render his stately Palace, his plenteous Fortune, and his honourable Character, so unconcerning, as that a Noble man of this Nation (as I have been informed) should in a continued Fit of the Gout, wish an exchange of his condition in all those his famous circumstances, with an healthful Porter, rather than enjoy all other the parts of his Prosperity with that one attendant Evil.  
And then, Secondly, It's the same with any such Person, how prosperous soever in all other respects, that happens but to have his Mind affected with any disordered imagination, (how causeless, perhaps, or unreasonable soever) as that a great Lady of this Nation also, (as it was related to me by one that knew her) who at the same time that she was discoursed by her Favourite, to be the happiest Woman in the World, in respect of her Youth and Beauty, Noble Extraction and Fortune; and standing at a Window in view of a poor Oyster-woman, then passing by, should be so unsensible of the great advantages of living happily, which she enjoyed, as to say, That she could be content to exchange her own present condition with that Poor womans, at all adventures whatsoever. No wonder then, that the Wise Antoninus should so passionately express himself in our Case, as to say; 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Anton. lib. 5.  What is there here that should tempt the desire of being any longer detained in this Life? A company of poor outward things, so transient, so apt to change? Shall such obscure senses, that are so easily deceived? shall a little soul, that knows not itself? shall a vain and empty Name and Glory? What shouldst thou desire, but a present Annihilation or Transition? And this (I think) sufficiently solves my first Objection.  
2. The Second Objection that is pretended to obviate the reflection upon those Attributes of God, with respect to the abovesaid humane Infelicities, is thus laid: That is, That GOD may be so far justified in Mankind's subjection to them, as that those Evils are supposed to be inflicted upon men as punishments for their offences, and as effects of their own guilt. That is, That they have deserved them at God's Hand.  
My Answer to this seemingly great Objection is, That that kind of Solution of the consequence, does rather improve the Reflection upon the Divine Attributes, and must even blaspheme the Goodness of GOD itself, upon several accounts. First, Because it must suppose, that GOD designed to punish a Man, even in his Birth; it being an Infelicity in itself to be so born. Secondly, Because the real miseries that may attend his Infancy, Childhood, and the innocenter part of his Youth, must be reputed Punishments for Offences uncommitted, and but only in possibility. And then, Thirdly, When such Calamities have befallen men of fuller Age, they could not be really accounted Punishments, that is merely and properly so, because they come to pass generally in a promiscuous order and manner, and in most instances, without any visible distinction between the Good and Evil: And that Virtuous persons (who, though they be not absolutely perfect, yet perhaps not wilfully wicked) are alike concerned in those natural Evils, and in the ordinary contingences of Calamity, 
Non omnes honos esse beatos, quum in omnes bonos, ea quae ille in malis numerat cadere possunt. Cic. Tusc. quest. lib. 5.  as well as the obnoxious and great Offenders. Are not Good men (saith Cicero) surprised. in common Miseries as well as the Evil? Are they not as afflictively sick, poor, and old? And, do they not pass along in their mortal Durations, with the same severe circumstances of natural Troubles, and sad Accidents, as other men? And in many cases are they not observed to meet even harder usages than those that be enormously vicious? And if so, then (I say) Cannot Mankind in general be said to be subject to them, and afflicted by them, under the mere notion of Punishments? For though Providence may, and doth order them ofttimes for the Punishment of Evil men, yet it is to be accounted not by a natural, but by an occasional Ordination: That is, they are Primarily the miseries of Mankind, according to their nature, and then but Secondarily, and by occasion, the Punishments of Evil men, when they happen to them. As the same Evils and Misfortunes may in like manner be occasionally and ordinatively the acts of God's Paternal care and love, and for the greater Advantage of Good men, when they happen to them, as those Evils may be the discipline and chastisement of his Wise Love to, and care of, them.  
But then the Reason of all this must be founded upon the supposed Existence of a Future World. Otherwise it would be a great irregularity in Providence, if innocent Infants and Children, and that men of perfect age, who endeavour all they can to be Good and Virtuous, should nevertheless be made miserable, & be afflicted in the same manner, and to the same degree that wicked and vicious men are punished for their gross offences. Which must be True in consequence, if (I say) the consideration of a Future World doth not solve the doubt.  
But I shall respite the giving a sufficient Evidence for that Solution, to the Third Chapter. This the Second Objection.  
Object. 3. The Third Objection which our Theist doth choose to lay in our way, is borrowed from some of the Christian Name, (and it must be accordingly answered) 1. Who have been apt to affirm, That though it can't be said, that Man's subjection to those miseries and natural calamities, were imposed upon Mankind universally for their own offences, yet God may be justified in permitting, if not in inflicting them (without any consideration had to a Future State) for the imputed sin of another; that is, because that every man is born guilty of Adam's transgressions, and by that guilt alone, every man may be justifyably born subject to the unhappiness of all those mentioned Evils.  
To all this objection; First I say, That our Church indeed in her confession, 
Art 9  doth profess, That Original Sin is the fault and corruption of every Man, that is Naturally engendered of the Offspring of Adam, etc. And that therefore in every Person born into the World, it deserveth God's Wrath and Damnation. In which last words of the Article, as it's severest consequence, my Objecters may interpret, that man's natural subjection to those mentioned Evils is comprehended and understood; though the Article takes not any particular notice of that consequence of Adam's Sin.  
But the Tridentine Article indeed doth suppose it in express words: 
Si quis Adae praevaricationem sibi soli, & non ejus propagini— mortem & poenas corporis tantum,— etc. Caranza p. 910.  And the Bohemian Confession doth enumerate those very natural calamities, as particularly as I have done; as being comprehended in that menace, The day thou Eatest thereof thou shalt surely Diego 
Gen. 3. 5.   
But in full Answer to the Objection, I say that the Article is so far from being improvable to take off the reasonableness of that intolerable consequence, which so much reflects upon the Divine Attributes, upon the account of Man's natural subjection to all those Evils; that, were it not for the consideration and supposal of a Future State, it will appear, that the Sense of it cannot possibly be consistent or accountable. For whatsoever imputation of guilt is presumed by it to be derived from Adam's Sin to his Posterity, certainly God never designed thereby to be so unmerciful, as naturally to punish any man so severely for it, who should not afterward deserve it by his own offences, as that it may be believed, that God did but take occasion by the imputation to put Mankind under a new, 
Rom. 5, 16, 17, 18.  and a more gracious Covenant, for higher and nobler Interests, and upon easier, and more feisible Terms; for the better performance of which, man's natural and contingent Evils were to become designedly instrumental, and highly serviceable; otherwise it would argue such an act of Revenge, as can hardly be paralleled by the worst imaginary case; and that in an instance, that God hath most solemnly disclaimed, as when he so expressly reproved the use of that reflecting Proverb; 
Ezek. 18. 1.  The Fathers have eaten sour Grapes, and the children's Teeth are set on edge. Thereupon he renounced all manner of partiality in the execution of his Divine Judgement, and positively approved the equality of his own ways, upon a Fundamental of Eternal Equity; that is, 
v. 20.  That the Son shall not bear the Iniquity of the Father.  
As for that instance which hath been made use of to justify God in the present Miseries, and even in the Eternal condemnation of the greater part of Mankind, for Adam's Sin, because the Sons of Traitors may be punished for their Father's Offences, it holds no resemblance at all to this Case; for that's done, not that the Government doth not know, that there is an hard thing done to an innocent and unfortunate Heir, but out of pure politic necessity, to discourage others from attempting the like Treasonable designs to their own, their Posterities, and the Governments Ruin. Now this case is altogether different from the other; for here is only the punishment of one or a few, to prevent the undoing a numerous Many, and for a Public Safety: But there must be supposed such an imputation of one man's fault, as must put the whole world into a state of Misery without any consideration had to their own offences. A belief of such a proceedure cannot possibly consist with the very Notion of a Supreme Deity, without Reasons that might be given for such a Fact, from the consideration of man's designation to the happiness of a Future World; as for the better attainment of which, all humane miseries may be made subservient, as shall presently appear.  
And thus notwithstanding the objection, though the truth of the Article be assented to; yet it cannot take off the intolerable consequence upon the Divine Attributes, without a respect had to the Existence of another World. This the last Objection.  
But there be other severe consequences of another Nature, which must be also considered, but they are the business of the next, or Second Section.   

Section II.  
IN this Section I shall add several other very severe consequences, besides those that concern GOD Almighty, which are of themselves really destructive to humane Nature, both as Socially, and Personally considered: And which may as reasonably be inferred from men's being Naturally subject to those Evils; if we should not be able to balance such unhappy thoughts by the assured belief of a Future State, which is to be the enquiry of the Third Chapter.  
The first Consequence of that nature, is, That Parents would then be unaccountably cruel, who should permit a propagation of Being's, which they knew by undoubted Arguments of Discourse, and the Suffrage of universal Experience, must be born to an Inheritance (at least) of continual Toil and Trouble, if not of intolerable Misery and Calamity. Upon which observation, Clemens of Alexandria hath delivered us the Sense of an ancient Poet, 

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.— Strom. lib. 3.   who was persuaded, That Parents ought not to bring Children into the World, when they saw to what Evils they must be born: And makes mention of some, that thought, that the Pythagoreans, for that end, abstained from all the natural means of propagation.  
Secondly, On that account it would be true, That in cases of violent Torments or languishing Diseases, an Assassinate might more properly be sent for, as a fitter Instrument of Relief, than a Physician; a great part of whose Skill and Care would, in such Cases, be but a Tyranny to the Afflicted, except it were employed to hasten them to their Rest, and to facilitate their periods for their quiet Annihilation.  
The last Consequence (as that which I principally design to take notice of) is, That in a Thousand Cases it would then follow, That it would be every man's Duty to himself, 
Magna vis est in iis malis, quibus iste naturae vincitur sensus, quo mors omnimodis, omnibus viribus conatibusque vitatur: Et si non potuerit aliunde contingere ab ipso homine sibimet inferatur. Aug. de Civ. lib. 19 cap. 4.  to study for the readiest Euthanasie, (as the Romans in some cases did) to expedite their departures from their miserable Sations, that they might attain a lasting Repose in a nothing, rather than endure the misery of some Years torments, want, or disgrace.  
Therefore Seneca speaking like a Stoic, did boldly affirm, 
At si inutile ministeriis est corpus, quidni oporteat educere animunm laborantem?— Et cum majus periculum sit male vivendi, quam cito moriendi, stultus est qui non exiguo temporis mercede magnae rei aleam non redemit. Lib. Ep. 8. Ep. 60.  That if a man's Life became uneasy to him, He were a Fool if he did not drive out that troublesome Inhabitant within him, that made him sensible of his present unhappiness; or that he should refuse to purchase so great an Advantage to himself, upon so small an Adventure.  
On this account, What can be sufficiently said to condemn Mithridates, that he made his own Sword his Reprieve, from being dishonourably tied to Pompey's triumphant Chariot? Or to reproach Cato's courage, when he chose to allow himself a present Death, rather than to live in the disgrace of being a Trophy to Caesar's Victories? With many more Examples of that sort of men, whose Stoicism having afforded them an Allowance, it was but reasonable for them to make use of that Liberty, to set themselves free, when they were oppressed with the heavy Sense of being Unhappy.  
And what Kindness these men did themselves, for aught I yet see, (if there be no Future State, nor Laws to govern men's actions in order to it) my Friend, when he sees me in sorrow or torment, might as innocently do it for me, as to kill a Fly, and with far greater reason; and to whom I might appeal for my release, as it was told David, That Saul should do the Amalekite, Stand upon me and slay me, 
2 Sam. 19  because my Life is yet whole in me.  
This is the last of that sort of ill consequences, and it's the most famously considerable of them all. And therefore, against it, I must be attacked with several Objections, which will take up the next Section.   

Section III.  
IN this Third Section, I shall undertake the Answer of Three Objections, against the just Inference of this last horrid Consequence; that is, of men's taking a Liberty to put an end to their own Lives, as oft as they find themselves oppressed with those Calamities, to which their natures have subjected them.  
1. The First Objection is, That Men may be restrained from such destructive Attempts upon their own Lives, by a natural fear of, and a customary abhorrency from Dying; though they had no Faith at all of another World.  
2. The Second is founded upon an Observation, That persons who professedly renounce the Belief of another World, do not ordinarily, and but very rarely, make use of that Expedient, to free themselves from their own afflictive states.  
3. The Third Objection is, That the Heathen Philosophers have allowed the World a notice of some Wise Rules, by which it's presumed, that men may contentedly bear their natural and contingent Evils, without doing that violence to their own Lives, and also without any necessary consideration had of a future World.  
Object. 1. The First Objection is, That a desire of Living and self-preservation, is as connatural to Men, as their very Being's, and that it is in some Sense true, what Satan said, 
Job 2. 4.  Skin for skin, and all that a man hath, will he give for his Life. And therefore such an innate and (especially being made a) customary desire of Life, will be sufficient to hold men's hands from offering that confusion to the Societies of Mankind, upon every man's taking a Liberty to die, as oft as he is oppressed with any cross or calamity. And, so that there needs not any acknowledgement of a Future State, to prevent that grand inconvenience to the World.  
To this I Answer, That though it be granted, that there is such a natural desire of Self-preservation, and that it be moreover allowed, that that desire is ordinarily advanced by a customary fear of Dying; yet if it be reasonable in itself, because it is far easier to pass out of the World with a gentle stroke, but of one minute's duration, than to endure a long languishing Disease, or a tormenting Pain, or a permanent Oppression of Mind, (there being no fear of a following account, for the irregularity of the Fact) it's all I pretend to in this consideration. For what is purely reasonable in its self, may in time conquer a natural, sensual, and imaginary fear, and the power of custom; and subdue the common clamours of men's disapprobation of the Fact, and at last, by common usage, give Laws to the World, and a Reputation to the Design: As it hath done among the Indian Women, who cheerfully, in the briskest vigour of their Age, throw themselves into their dead Husband's Funeral flames, to prevent a following accustomed dishonour to themselves: And as it is among the Japanesses, who customarily rip up their own Entrails, rather than adventure the disgrace of being respitted, till the Executioner shall do his Office. Thus is the first Objection solved.  
Object. 2. The next Objection is, That if because, where there's no concern for a Future State, it will follow, that such an Expedient to set a miserable Person free from his present want, torment, or disgrace, would be a reasonable attempt (as I have discoursed): If this were True (saith my Objector) How comes it to pass, that that irreligious sort of men; who do professedly mock at the belief of another World, should not very often, if not always, act that kind piece of Friendship to themselves, when they happen to be greatly Unfortunate?  
To which I Answer, that I confess there is such a sort of men in the World, that do make a scorn of all Religion, and a Future Life; and that would be thought sufficiently able to defend the Case, when once they have picked up two or three notable exceptions against the Holy Bible, and can cross some Catholic Principles of Christianity, with a few hints of the Malmsburian Divinity; or when they can get no better Arguments to persuade their lewd Crew to comply with them in the same contempt of God, and of all that is Sacred and Good; they can think it at present a sufficient confutation of all that can be said in their own defence, if they do but swear down the man in Black, with a thousand Oaths and Curses, and with Unmanliness enough, can but droll upon him with some idle stories, purposely set on foot, to make themselves merry, with the defamation of the whole Sacred Order.  
But in the mean time these men give us no sufficient Reason to think, that they are sincere, and truly in earnest at the bottom in all this: For if they did but really believe, that there were no other World, as they swear and pretend, it were Impossible that they should be so dull and silly as to choose to be unhappy any one hour more; but that, when they are oppressed with want of money, with a baffled Amour, or loss of health, or when they are rotten, and creep about the town with half a Nose, or with other the like symptoms of their own debaucheries, they should determine their miseries at one blow; and prudently commit themselves to rest in a quiet annihilation; which they knew they might effect with so much ease and speed. If some of them would but briskly go about that work, they might gain a belief from us, that they meant what they said; otherwise they must excuse us, if we think, that they either are a pack of abominable cowards; (of which their blustering humour is a very probable indication) or else that they have some unlucky doubts of the Existence of another World creeping about their minds, that hinders the Rope, or some good old Well, from doing them a kinder Office, than the best friends they have in the world can otherwise do for them; if it were true, as they pretend, that there is no Future World, account, or punishment. But then the wonder is, that if that doubt, can, on the one hand, restrain them from an act so much to their present ease and deliverance; and yet that the same doubt, should not on the other hand, reclaim them from doing the most unreasonable thing in the World, that is, from living such infamous and prodigiously wicked Lives so much to their own danger of being eternally undone, if (as they doubt) there should happen to be such a thing indeed, as a following and dreadful Account in another World.  
But that I may throughly solve these men's Credit, I had rather tell the Objecter, That I am persuaded, that after all this, most of them do really believe the being of a God, and of another World; and they do in their best thoughts approve a Virtuous and Sober Life, only they are resolved to keep up their Atheistical and Hectouring humour, to show their bravery in being Wicked: That is, they speak and act such extremities of profaneness, that they may be admired for a more than ordinary Greatness of Mind, and so may insult over those little Sinners, that choose to creep to Hell, for a company of Low and Sneaking Transgressions.  
And then, they having passed away a considerable part of their time in that wretched manner of Living, upon this and the like fashionable motives; they are at last arrested with the fatal symptoms of a decaying and a dying State; and then they begin to whine for their own Follies, and admonish their surviving Friends, of taking wiser measures, and of making better provisions for themselves in another World. This solves my Second Objection.  
3d. The Third and last Objection, which I must encounter, is offered by them that will say, that Philosophy alone can suggest a sufficient relief to a mind under the severest pressures of natural or contingent Evils, as without such men's undertaking their deliverance, by putting a present period to their own uneasy lives, so without any consideration of a Future World as sufficient to prevent it.  
To this its first Answered, That upon the carefullest survey of Cicero's Arguments; (who I believe hath said as much, and as wisely, as can well be suggested in that Case) I find nothing that he offers that so much as pretends to any exemption from those natural Miseries, much less that tenders any thing in compensation for them; only he hath given some certain Rules, which (as it's presumed) may direct men how better to submit to, and the more patiently to bear up against, their present misfortunes; that is, to be more wisely miserable: But nevertheless, the afflicted man endures them still; that is, notwithstanding all those Rules, he is still an unhappy man.  
Secondly, I Answer, that all those directive Rules they give are a relief and cure by far narrower than the largeness of the distemper; that is, they are too Philosophical for the hundredth part of the afflict capacities, to learn or understand them: And they generally purport just so much help to the miserable, as if all men that want Money, were sent to the Philosopher's Stone, to cure the disease of their Purses.  
Thirdly, My Answer to that pretence is, That I observe our Philosopher makes the succesfulness of those his Rules, 
— Sic contra, illi sunt beati, quos nulli Metus terrènt, nullae Libidines incitant, etc. Tusc. Quest. lib. 5.  to depend upon such severe qualifications of Mind and Life, and upon so many strict acts of self-denial, (such as throwing off all natural Fear, and the force of all sensual Appetites, and the like) that the afflicted Persons may be ordered to go about almost to unman themselves, as well as pretend an Obedience to all his numerous and difficult prescriptions; which nothing but the Encouragements of a Future World can possibly enable them to undertake; as my Third Argument hath evinced.  
Fourthly, I Answer, That those Philosophers did so far believe their own notional Schemes of Patience to be unpracticable (and as a full confutation of all other their pretensions for the relief of the unfortunate) that at last they were driven to fly to the Rock of Fatal Necessity, 
Quid ergo expiationes, procurationes▪ que, quo pertinent si immutabilia sunt Fata? Permit mihi illam rigidam sectam tueri eorum, qui accipiunt ista, & nihil allud esse Fatum, quam aegre mentis solatium. Lib. 2. Nativ. Quest.  to give any tolerable quiet to men's uneasy Minds. This Seneca pleads as the last refuge, and the only remaining comfort for a Sick Mind; and without which, all other attempts for its relief, were altogether unsufficient.  
Now, if ever any manner of carriage could intimate a defective cause, This certainly must do it, as to our present concern; if there be no other, or no better shifts, to avert the cogency of our thus arguing for a Future World, on the account of men's natural subjection to such miseries and calamities of humane Life, the Controversy is at an end.  
What! Is there no other way to solve the Reflection upon the Divine Attributes, and to keep a Man from offering Violence to his own miserable Life, but by engaging him to think, that he must of necessity be Unhappy, and that an immovable Fate hath chained him down to it? What can be added more to complete his misery? The least hopes of Deliverance hath some Relief; but where there is none at all to be admitted, an Invitation to Patience is an additional oppression, and looks more like a revengeful Exprobration, than a rational Support.  
But, Fifthly and Lastly, To show how those men are necessitated to trifle in finding out a Relief for the Afflicted's Patience, (where the Concerns of another World are designedly to be laid aside) it may be observed, That the great Philosophers were so diffident of their own stated Rules, especially of their beloved Principle of Fate, that they themselves have despoiled the Credit of them, and proclaimed them all to be insufficient, by allowing a speedier Remedy for all humane Miseries; and, that is, by acquitting themselves of their Misfortunes and Being's all at once. Concerning this, I have already given some instances, and could have added many more great Examples of that desperate Expedient; which those Philosopher's mention with so much approbation, that Seneca taking occasion to speak of Cato and Scipio; of the later, 
Multum fuit Carthaginem vincere, sed amplius mortem. Ep. lib. 3. Ep. 34.  he hath this expression; that It was a great thing that it could be said of him, that he conquered Carthage; but much greater, that he had overcome himself; that is, ended his Life with his own Sword.  
And then, Do not the reason of the sad mentioned intolerable consequence recur? Doth not what I have here said sufficiently show, that what I before affirmed was true; that is, that it must necessarily follow, that if there be no Future State considered, it's reasonable for a man to put an end to his own Life and Misery together? Or, Why should such men (in whom this last Objection had its Concern) so often choose to make use of that Expedient, and in a Thousand Cases think it more reasonable to put an end to their wearied Lives, than to endure their present Miseries? This solves my Last Objection.  
And thus all my Opponents are disappointed of their Design to baffle the reasonableness of all my intolerable consequences: Which must hold immutably true, till the acknowledged Existence of a future State shall release them of their horror, and allow them a sufficient Solution; which is the business of the Third and Last Chapter of this Argument. Therefore,    

CHAP. III.  
THis Third Chapter is designed to demonstrate, That the Acknowledgement and Supposal of a Future State can only naturally and without all Exception, solve all those mentioned intolerable Consequences, to the immortal Honour of the Great CREATOR, who was pleased to create Mankind in such circumstances: And to the full satisfaction of every Good man, that considers himself to be so created. And this I shall endeavour to do, in two distinct Sections.  

Section I.  
IN this First Section, I shall represent, That the Belief of a Future state, will most evidently solve all those consequences, that reflect upon the Honour of the Divine Attributes: And that whatsoever hath been suggested to disparage GOD's Goodness and Equity on the former account, will now be found to be falsely concluding, and that ought to be renounced as unreasonable and impious; when the Gracious Intention and Wise Designs, why GOD made Man naturally subject to all those temporary Infelicities, be but once throughly examined, and seriously considered. For than it will appear, That GOD made Man subject to such severe circumstances of a present mortal Unhappiness, for no less end, than to serve His own most Gracious Purposes of making him perfectly and eternally Happy in another World.  
Had not GOD made him a Rational Creature, he had not been capable of understanding his Duty, and of the proposal of an End to oblige him to it; and had also wanted a faculty of being receptive of any Blessing upon the performance of it: Had not Man been made a voluntary Agent, he had been unconcerned in all moral actions, and so uncapable of Rewards and Punishments: And had he not been born subject to those natural Evils, he had wanted the best reasons of a Probationary state; that is, he had wanted occasions for the choice and exercise of most of those Graces and Virtuous Actions, that were requisite to make him Good, and to keep him close to his Hope, and to his dependence upon GOD.  
And, if the worst Evils he encounters be improved to those excellent ends, (which all men that love and fear God, must believe they should) they will soon be experimentally found to be instances of God's favourable Ordination and Providence, and to be not only tolerable, but highly reasonable and approvable in their kind and nature. And not only so, but the afflicted man may in time find Reasons (which he can never want, if he studies for them) so to attemper his mind, that he may be as thankful for them, as for any other of God's Gracious Contrivements, to further his Good and Happiness. And on that account, he may as reasonably be able to rejoice for a fit of trouble, as for a hit of Preferment; for a Portion of Contempt, as for the refreshment of a Meal; for the Wicked man's oppressive Malice, as for the kind effects of an affectionate Friendship; and for a day of severe persecution in an innocent case, more than for a successful Conquest over his most imperious and implacable Enemies.  
Are they poor? (saith Salvian, speaking of Good men) they are pleased, and can approve their present fortune: 
Pauperes sunt? paupertati delectant: Lugent? lugere gestiunt: In honori sunt? honorem respuunt. Sal. de gub. des:  Are they made contemptible? They can despise Honour: Are they sorrowful? They can rejoice in their Mourning: Are they infirm and sick? They can find reasons to make their Infirmities acceptable instances of Providence.  
How many pious men are there in the World, (and it is not God's fault, that all are not so) who living to, and hoping for the Happiness of a Future state, would not have chosen an uninterrupted Health, nor put an end to a valetudinary state, nor have been perfectly freed from the unkindnesses of the malicious, nor willingly have renounced their Portion in other humane Evils, when Experience hath once ascertained them, how much they have all sensibly proved advantageous Instruments, and Occasions of their more entire love of, and adherence to GOD and Virtue; and of their keeping a stricter watch upon their own minds and actions?  
And then further, How many such men have there been, that would not have wished of their decaying Time, nor willingly have refused the inconveniences of old Age, when they have considered how much thereby they have overgrown all Temptations to youthful Follies; and found time to recollect the happy issues of their own Experience; and (what is more) are improving the Advantages of their natural timely Warning for their following Change? And, that every day, as they more and more decline, they are more and more strengthened in their satisfaction and contentment upon the present repasts, and lively hope and apprehensions of their near approaching transmigration to a Happier State.  
Thus, 
Vita humana, quae tot & tantis hujus saeculi malis esse cogitur misera, spe futuri saeculi, sit beata sicut & salva. Aug. de Civ. Dei lib. 19 cap. 4.  Though the Life of Man, as it's encumbered and oppressed with the so many Evils of his Mortality, may justly be accounted miserable, yet upon the expectation of the Happiness of a Future State, it ought to be esteemed happy and safe; as St. Austin discourseth.  
But then, let it be further observed, and that very considerably to our purpose, That God is so far justified in making and permitting Man's subjection to such Evils and Infelicities, (as I have represented them) in the Sense of them that have firmly believed, and that then, upon that Belief (which is unanswerably unreasonable, if they do not) are providing for the Blessed Interest of such a Future World; as that some of them have not thought their ordinarily incident and natural Evils great and many enough, to secure their Virtue and Innocency, but in imitation of God's own natural order and method for their Good, have voluntarily contrived more to themselves, when their Piety and Prudence have thought it needful.  
And this may be justifiably verified, from the innumerous Primitive Examples of Mortification; when the Saints of God have chosen severe Fast, and a constant hard Diet; afflictive Labours, and wearisome Employments; tedious Devotions, and the incredible Renunciations of (the so much admired) Temporal Greatness, Splendour, and Pleasures of the World; that they might with lesser hazard attain the great end of a Future Bliss.  
And, Lastly, For a further justification of the Divine Wisdom and Goodness in the case of humane afflictions, the consideration of a Future World will solve one great doubt and difficulty. And that is, If any man should demand a Reason, Why GOD is pleased that some men shall meet a greater Portion of present Misery than others, (as at all times, by many instances, it may be pregnantly observed and verified) and that one person's Life should be very calamitous, while another's is but tolerably uneasy: That some men should but taste of the Waters of Affliction, while others are plunged so deep in them, 
Psal. 69. 2.  that the Floods run over them: That is, That some should meet but with Troubles, while others are necessitated to encounter with Extremities. And then, if such extraordinarily afflicted People should sorrowfully bewail their surplusage of Discipline, comparatively to most other Examples of Misery; and should be tempted to call in question the impartiality of God's Goodness and Equity, to, and over them, the Belief of the real Existence of a future state, solves all this great difficulty also, (which nothing else can possibly effect, to the CREATOUR's honour, and Man's satisfaction) and makes such an unequal distribution of present Troubles and Afflictions, as reasonable and justifiable as any other the wise effects of God's Love, and His Gracious Providence, for their eternal Good, on these Two Grounds.  
First, Such extraordinarily afflicted Persons may, and aught to tell their own minds, that such unusual degrees and measures of calamity, may be more specially necessary for them in their particular capacities, than for other men; and that GOD saw they needed the severer methods of His Discipline, and correcting Love, more than others. Had I had but a tolerable Plenty, (saith one under the most oppressive Poverty) I had been much worse than any man that enjoys the largest proportions of Wealth. Had I been Possessor of the least degree of that man's Honour, (saith another, labouring under the burden of the greatest disgrace and contempt) I should never have managed it with the same Modesty and unconcernedness that he hath done. A Rebuke was sufficient to make another Good, but a pressure is hardly enough for me: An ordinary Discipline keeps this Man in order, but GOD thought fit to hedge up my way with Thorns, 
Hos. 2.  to restrain something in my ungovernable Temper. A little Dose secures another man's Health, but a whole course of Physic is hardly enough for me.  
Thus doth the devout Soul easily reconcile the different disproportions of the afflictive Evils of humane Life; and interprets of the several of them, that they are Arguments of God's greater love, and more especial care over his Soul; and renders his own Hope thereby the more reasonably applicable to the comfort of his own Mind.  
But then, Secondly, He may also as reasonably inform his Mind, that where there is such a redundancy of Troubles, the man that is afflicted with them, may, and aught also to his mighty comfort, believe, that as God's ways are always designedly Good and Equal, so that He might send them upon a design, and on purpose to allow him a greater degree of Happiness in a better state, and a recompense proportionable to his greater afflictions in another World. And for which he may as assuredly hope, as that he that hath improved his Talon in acting greater measures of Good, than others may on that account, believe himself to be answerably then rewarded. For as no one drop of cold Water in a cup of Charity, shall not be unrewarded in the one case, so shall not one Tear that is shed in sorrow for greater afflictions, 
Psal. 56. 8.  be unrecompensed in the other.  
And if all men were sensible, how valuable any advance of happiness were in a State of Glory, they could not but think, that whereinsoever they have hindered themselves, from doing all the good they can possibly do, they have acted very imprudently for their own interest; so if the men that meet more than ordinary afflictions in this world, did but consider the abundancy of their recompense in another; they would be so far from murmuring at their greater misfortunes, that they would (as our Saviour in one instant case represented it) on the contrary, 
Mat. 5. 12, 13.  rejoice and be exceeding glad, for their greater reward in Heaven.  
Now, as to the whole that I have said in this Case, as it will easily appear upon the belief of a Future State, that is was GOD's Gracious Design to make the enjoyment of a happiness in it, the Great End of Man's Creation; so also, that those mentioned Evils, to which his nature hath subjected him, may be improved into many instrumental advantages, to prepare and adapt him for it.  
And therefore, Mankind ought to be so far from making any unkind reflections upon the Justice and Equity of GOD, for their natural subjections to all those Evils and present Infelicities, that they must justify, and applaud his Wisdom and Goodness, that he ordered them for such excellent Ends and Purposes.  
And now, I shall once more call for the Observer of the formentioned Rooms of the calamitous of all sorts, but it is upon a new Errand; that is, not that he should stand still as a witnessing spectator only of their Miseries, but that upon the Reasons which I have given, he may pass another judgement upon the place; That is, that now he may not think those Rooms to be nothing else, but so many Apartments of Misery; but to be either so many Divine Laboratories, in which God designed to refine the Souls of men, and to prepare them for the purer Regions of a Future Bliss; or he may judge them to be so many Sacred Oratories, in which all the oppressed may (according to GOD's Ordinative love to them) be more strongly obliged to be daily adoring Him, and performing their constant Offices to implore His Blessing upon their several afflicted States: or lastly, he may look upon them as so many Military Theatres, in which, the Afflicted may with religious courage, be contending for the lofty Prize, that God hath set in their prospect, by Faith and Hope.  
And thus, I hope, I have so fully solved the First intolerable Consequence, that they, that shall hereafter complain of God for their subjection to their present Evils, must arraign his Love for doing them good, and reproach his Care in carrying on a design for the better securing their Future Happiness. And thus ends the solution of what might reflect upon the Creators' Honour.   

Section II.  
THis Second Section contains the solution of the other mentioned Intolerable Consequences, which the Afflicted may suggest to their own minds, from the Miseries and Calamities, to which their Nature hath subjected and exposed them, upon the belief of the Real Existence of a Future State, and of an established Happiness there enjoyable; I say all such other consequences will be easily, & naturally answered & controlled, upon the same Reason, that the Great CREATORS Glorious Attributes have been already vindicated.  
First, what was alleged concerning Parents cruelty, in propagating Being's to be subject to the possibility and danger of so much wretchedness and calamity, is presently solved, by a belief of such a Future State: For Parents can then on that Ground, most reasonably propound to their own thoughts and hopes, that they shall bring forth so many Candidates for an everlasting happiness, and so many Rightful Heirs of a most Glorious Inheritance; & that as so securely settled upon every one of them, that no Power, Malice, or Contrivance whatsoever, can disseise them of it, unless they shall wilfully resign up their own Right, and Title to it.  
So that if they should certainly foreknow, that those their Children shall infallibly meet the hardest circumstances of humane life; yet considering, that Parents have so much reason to believe, that the most afflictive Evils of Mortality, are possibly improveable for the better securing a Happy State in another World; it will be sufficient to remove the discouragement, which the mentioned consequence suggested to them. For upon a supposed tender of election, a good Parent would in no sense have his Children Great and Prosperous, if it stood in competition with his choice of having them Good and Virtuous, though they were assured, that their Children were to be encumbered with the greatest misfortunes, to which their natures have subjected them.  
Then Secondly, As to what hath been discoursed to justify men's putting a present period to their own uneasy lives, when they are heavily oppressed, with any of those severest Evils of their Mortality, though that practice would be reasonable enough, if there were no Future World (as I have shown Reasons, Authorities, and Examples of it); yet that State being once acknowledged and believed, and the men that do believe it, actually engage in the practice of those Virtuous Actions, that necessarily conduce to the happiness of it, they would then, not only hold their hands from such destructive attempts, but rather might find sufficient Reasons to own the continuance of their lives, as a Blessing in any condition.  
They would then be patiently and wisely accounting with themselves, That Almighty GOD may be mercifully pleased to continue them still in their uneasy Lives, because (perhaps) some part of the necessary work of their great salvation, is yet unfinished; that is, that possibly they may have some portions of their lost time to redeem some Remains of their Passions still to subdue; some further Additions to be made to their Heavenly Stock; some Defects in their daily Offices to be amended; or some further Degrees of Love and Zeal for GOD, and Goodness to attain to, before they die: Or they may be satisfying themselves, by telling their own minds, That GOD in Mercy to the World, may let them still live to be further Instrumental to some Common Good. Perhaps some distressed Families and Persons would want their support, or the careless Congregations, their devout Amens; or (perhaps) the Church cannot yet spare any part of Her Defence, and that if they were gone, there might be wanting some of the number that uphold a sinful State.  
In a word, as such Men can never want Reasons to judge honourably of GOD for their continuance in their mortal, though afflicted Lives, so they would not forgive themselves a thought of the least inconvenient usage of themselves, that might shorten their uneasy Abode in their present Circumstances, whatsoever they are. And this is the last instance of solution of the mentioned intolerable Consequences.  
Thus we see with what unconstraint, and unexceptionable coincidency; and how without any pretence of force or opposition, they are all solved and reconciled. And now what can we imagine should offer the least Doubt or suspicion, but that the solution of these intolerable Consequences, should as naturally, and as it were of course, infer the Truth of the designed Conclusion; especially, when we see all things do cohere with the same fitness and agreeableness to it, as a dislocated Bone falls into the same place, whence it was distorted, to the Patient's present Ease; or, as the scattered Materials of a Structure, when they are once fitted for a regular Frame, are presently put together, and accommodated to those Places and Positions, for which they were at first wrought and designed? So easily, and so naturally, do all those consequences admit their solutions, from the acknowledged belief of a Future State. But let us attend the Conclusion.    

THE CONCLUSION.  
AND now the sum is, That if no Man can deny the first Foundation of the Argument to be true in the First Chapter; that is, That Man is created and born naturally subject to such severe Portions of Misery, and Calamity, that he is by his Nature, made the most unfortunate Being of the whole visible Creation, if his Existence should be limited to the duration only of his Mortal Life. And then secondly, as in the Second Chapter, if from thence all the intolerable Consequences, which reflect so much upon the Honour of GOD's Equity and Goodness, and against the comfortable Thoughts of a Man's own Being be truly inferred. And lastly, as in the Third Chapter, if it be true, That nothing else can possibly solve those Consequences, but the Belief and Acknowledgement of the Real Existence of a Future World: then it's infallibly certain, That GOD hath designed, and constituted such a State.    

Fifth Argument.  
The Sum of the Fifth and Last ARGUMENT.  
THE Fifth Argument to demonstrate the necessary Existence of a Future State, is founded upon an Observation, That Mankind are naturally born qualified with the most earnest Desires, and the most constantly importuning Appetites of being happy: and yet, that there is nothing offered or allowed them as attainable or enjoyable in this present World, by which those natural Desires and Appetites can possibly be determined or satisfied; so that, if the duration of their whole Being's should be limited only to their present Mortal Lives, it cannot but reflect upon the Honour of the Creatour's Wisdom, Justice, and Goodness; Who, by His own Sovereign Will and Pleasure, gave Man a Nature qualified with such Desires and Appetites, and yet placed him in a World, in which there is nothing to be had, that can give any sufficient satisfaction to his own mind; the proper Seat, in which all true Happiness must necessarily be presumed to reside. And because the supposal of the Real Existence of a Future World, in which GOD may have provided such Enjoyments, as may naturally and sufficiently satisfy those restless Desires and Appetites of being Happy, can be the only possible solution of that Reflection upon those glorious Attributes of GOD, it necessarily follows, That GOD Almighty hath constituted such a Future World.  
But that this Argument thus generally laid, may the more clearly and convincingly infer the designed Conclusion, I shall order the full Explanation of all the parts of it in these Three Chapters.  
1. In the First Chapter, I shall represent, That GOD hath certainly created all men with those strong Desires, and predominant Appetites of their own Happiness; and that it is not in their own Power, when they please to lay them aside, or sufficiently to control them for their own ease: and then, that it cannot be doubted, but that GOD Almighty in His equitable Kindness, and essential Goodness, hath one where or other, made Provision for their Rest, and Satisfaction.  
In the Second Chapter, I shall evidently evince, That there is nothing allowed to Mankind, as attainable in their present mortal Lives, but what is unsufficient to make them truly Happy; or to give any constant, or indeed, any tolerable Acquiescence to their own restlessly desiring Minds.  
In the Third Chapter, I shall thoroughly demonstrate, That the supposal of the real Existence of a Future World, and of a sufficient Happiness there attainable, will naturally solve all those evil Consequences, that may be suggested against GOD's Attributes, for giving Man a Nature so qualified; and will also fully answer all manner of Exceptions and Complaints, that are ordinarily made against his Temporal Enjoyments by reason of their natural transiency, uncertainty and unsufficiency to make him completely Happy, during the time of his Mortal Existence.  
A FUTURE WORLD'S EXISTENCE, Demonstrated by Rational Evidence.  

CHAP. I.  
THE First Chapter is designed to represent the Truth of two things, both which must be presumed as Grounds, upon which I may build up the Argument so far in preparation towards the Conclusion. The two things are,  
First, That every man is certainly born with a Mind endued with those strong Desires and importunate Appetites of being Happy; such as are not in their own power to lay aside or control at their own pleasure.  
Secondly, That it cannot be doubted, but that a Wise and Good GOD hath one where or other provided for their rest and satisfaction; or he would never have naturally given them such qualifications. But these will take up two Sections.  

Section I.  
IN this First Section is designed the first Truth; And in order to a full Explanation of the case, it is requisite, that we first take notice, that God hath ordered all other Being's, both sensible and insensible, to be carried on by a necessary and natural impulse, to the attainment of all those their proper ends, to which, by his own sole Will and sovereign Authority, they were at first by their nature unchangeably determined and affixed. But it was other wise in GOD's design, when He created Man: For His Divine purpose, as to him, was, That he should be created with such free and self-determining Faculties, as by which he might be first enabled to understand and judge, and then be left at his own freedom to choose and act for his own end, that is, his own Happiness; for nothing can be proposed as a proper and natural end to a Rational Creature, but some adjudged and chosen attainable Happiness, that may satisfy the importunity of his Appetitive Mind, and be accommodable to the measures of his Rational Nature; as Aristotle discourseth the Case in the first Book of his Ethics.  
Now, that Man might be sure to endeavour the attainment of that his proper end, by the use of those his natural Faculties of judging and choosing it for himself; GOD gave him also as necessary an inclination, and as forcible an appetite to spur him on, to look after his own Happiness, as any other Creature had, to attain its natural end, and by as uncontrollable an instinct.  
And therefore it is certain, That as there is no qualification in his Nature more closely adherent to his very Being, 
Omnium certe sententia est, qui ratione quoquo modo uti possent, beatos esse omnes homines velle. Aug. de Civ. Dei lib. 10. cap. 1.  nor more unexceptionably universal to his whole Species, so is there no part of humane nature more predominant and authoritative. For it always gives Laws to all the Faculties and Affections of his Soul, and commandingly governs and controls all the designs, actions, and undertake of his whole Life.  
So that the CREATOR's powerful Will is not more sovereignly expressed in the natural qualifications and inclinations of any kind of inferior Being's to attain their natural Ends, than in this of Man's unsuperable Principle to will, desire, and act, for his own suitable Happiness.  
The Stone tends not downwards, nor the Sparks mount upwards, more necessarily and naturally.  
Or, to make use of the words of a late Author, who saith, That It is a disposition of mind, that is so prevailingly fixed against all attempts of losing it, 
Virtutibus valedicere, vitia derelinquere, opes profundere, honores contemnere, valetudinem pessundare, & vitam ipsam prodigere possumus; sed soelicitatis appetitus naturae adeo adhaeret, ut eam nisi & naturam excutimus, excutere nequeamus. Stern. Apho. de Foeli. p. 11.  or departing from it, that a Man may bid a farewell to all Virtue, he may cast away all his Plenty, and his Honour, he may undervalue and endanger his Health, and at last throw away his Life; but the desire of being Happy, does so firmly adhere to his very Being, that unless he can shake off Nature itself, he can no way unloosen himself from it. 
Animus hominis cupere nunquam desinit. Tusc. Quaest.  His Mind can never cease to desire, saith Cicero.  
An early Intimation of this natural and necessary Impulse, is observed even in his very Childhood; for no sooner doth the Eye of his Mind begin to open, but the first thing it looks after, is to show its little inclinations for the choice of something, in which he may be pleased.  
And as by the addition of a few years, his Reason gradually improves, and begins to have a little Skill to understand Discourse, and to mind any plain reasonable Inferences, so it presently teacheth him to knit little obvious Occurrences into Designs and Projections, and will be laying small Trains how to attain to something of a satisfaction, that is at present, agreeable to the measures of his yet imperfect Judgement and Capacity.  
And then afterward, when he hath attained to a completer maturity of his reasoning Faculties, this impetuous natural disposition restlessly drives him on to the choice of some Undertaking or other, by which he promiseth to himself an attainment of some kind of Happiness, as the end and scope of his intendment. And as Men are variously inclined, and differently (perhaps though but occasionally) biased in their Opinion of this or that way of living, so doth this restless Principle (by which men are universally acted) always attend, and haunt their several Minds, to hurry them on to the search after, and the choice of something, whatsoever it is, upon which they have fixed their opinion of being Happy by it.  
And hence it is, That when that natural Impulse scourgeth one man into the pale Study, to pass away his time (and sometimes his Health and Fortune) in a solitary converse with Papers, for the attainment of Learning, as his proposed Happiness; and when another is called out by the same natural Principle, to sacrifice his Peace and Quiet upon the Military Theatre, or to wind himself into the Intrigues of public business, upon a design of being Happy by some Applause or Honour; a Third makes use of all his Skill and Friends, to shroud himself in the most private retirement, and to live in a total Seclusion from all public affairs, as he judgeth it to be the best Expedient, how he may live an Easy and Happy life. And as in these, so in all other instances of like nature, men are always tumbling up and down in this busy World, and do behave themselves like Messengers sent out for some lost or undiscovered Treasure, who though they go a Hundred ways to find it, yet they all went out upon the same Errand, and were carried on by the same Impulse and Design of projecting and prosecuting something, in which they all might expect and presume a satisfaction to themselves. And all this is done by the force of their natural implanted desires, and impatient appetites of being Happy, which GOD gave them, and which they could not at choice resist.  
And this explains our meaning of the First Truth, of which we are in quest.   

Section II.  
THis Second Section informs us, That as by these few intimations, Man's natural overruling Appetite of being Happy, must needs be acknowledged; so, by a direct consequence, it must as necessarily be believed, that GOD hath not denied him somewhere or other, 
Neque enim omnes homines naturali instinctu immortales & beati esse vellemus, nisi esse possumus. Aug. 4. Cont. Julian.  some sufficient means, and a tender of some suitable Objects, which his rational and discursive Understanding may judge fit to be chosen, and in the enjoyment of which, he may be able to find out something that may be commensurate to his natural Desires, and which may answer his present endeavours for it, to his own Mind and Reason.  
All which must as infallibly be granted to be True, as that it cannot be believed, that the Alwise and Good GOD should create Man to be such an intolerable Encumbrance and Infelicity to himself; as to be always by Nature restlessly disposed to desire, seek, and attempt that, which was never put into his power and capacity to attain. For that were to give him a desire, and to dispose him for an endeavour of something, that were impossible: Which would be so irrational in its self, and so reproachful to the Divine Nature, as that it cannot be supposed, that such a disposition should be intentionably implanted in him by a Good GOD, unless any man can be so prosane in his Mind, as to think that GOD intended to make Man certainly Unhappy, at the same time when He first designed to give him a Being: Or, that He should please Himself in such an act of Sovereignty and Power, which should be so greatly inconsistent with His Love and Equity.  
And then afterward (which is worst of all) that the holy God should be presumed to behold a poor wretch, that was made by his own free choice and pleasure, and that always lays at the Foot of his own Dominion and Authority, to baffle himself like a Fool, and to toil like a Slave, for that which (without any fault of his own) he can never find out, or arrive as; or that after all his fruitless labours, and lost endeavours for some unsufficient Prize, he must at last be so unhappy, as to applaud the Being of a Stone, that lodgeth quietly in the Bosom of a Mountain; or be tempted to envy so many Plants and Animals, that infallibly enjoy the end of their nature, without any observable miscarriage in their actions, and certainly without any discursive and habitual sense of their own disappointment or dissatisfactions.  
These are such conceptions of a Good and Holy GOD, that they can never enter into the Heart of any man, but his, that resolves to maintain a dispute against his Sovereign Goodness, and indeed against his Real Existence; or that loves to sport himself, in managing Satyrs against the perfectest visible piece of work, which his Infinite Power and Wisdom ever brought forth into Being.  
And nothing but the supposal of a Future State can silence these unbecoming conceptions of the Divine Nature, as it will fully be made evident in the latter part of this Argument.  
Now the design of this First Chapter is to evince, that infallibly there is implanted in man by a natural and insuperable instinct, such a desire and appetite of being Happy. And then, that in consequence Almighty GOD hath either provided some where or other a Happiness that may answer and determine those desires, and satisfy those appetites of his nature, or else it must be presumed, that he Created him with the same infelicity, as to his mind, as if as to his Body he had qualifyed him with a natural thirst and hunger, and then had allowed him nothing, or what should be unsufficient to satiate such importunate Appetites. A Creation of being in such circumstances, would look more like an act of absolute Tyranny, than the effect of a Gracious Power and Authority.  
But hath not God provided a sufficient means by the happy enjoyment of a man's own being in this world (as other Creatures have) for the satisfaction of his natural desires and appetites, so that we shall not need to have recourse to the Existence of another World, where (we suppose) such desires may be answered and determined? But that Enquiry is the business of the next Chapter. Therefore,    

CHAP. II.  
IN this Chapter I shall evidently evince, That there is nothing allowed to Mankind as attainable in their present Mortal Lives, that is sufficient to give any tolerable acquiescence to those desires, and appetites, which GOD had Sovereignly and Naturally implanted in their minds: And that without a consideration had to the possible enjoyment of the happiness of another Life. All that they can be possessed of in this world, will be so far from determining their desires, that they will be found to be little better than frustration, and disappointment; and being relied upon (as in reason they should, if nothing else can be expected or found) as their present happiness, will become little more than a burden, and an oppression to their own lives. And the Truth of this will be managed in three Sections.  

Section I.  
IN this First Section, I shall State the Measures of what can possibly be reputed man's special happiness in this Life. And for that end let it be first considered, That all that, which God hath set in man's present view, and that most immediately stands at the door of his senses (the common in-lets of objects to his affections, and the imaginative part of his mind) for his desire and entertainment; and that is agreed upon and celebrated in the world by an universal consent and suffrage, as man's principal happiness in this life (where there is no concern for a Future State in Faith or Practice) must be at least that which may be commonly thought, and esteemed a present sufficient Wellbeing, or an enjoyment of it in some such degree and proportion as may acceptably accommodate the natural temper of a man's innate desires.  
Now if we strictly examine the nature of all that, which can be presumed to make up such a present Wellbeing, it will be found to consist in the enjoyment of so much Knowledge, Health & Plenty, as may procure a man so much Reputation, Friendship, Power, Peace, & other such like accommodations as may afford him, in his opinion, an easy and satisfactory way of Living. For nothing else can otherwise be suggested, which in any Sense may be called a present attainable Happiness, if the concern of another State be laid aside.  
As for the pretence of a sufficient Happiness in this World, by virtue's being her own Reward, the folly and insufficiency of it hath been examined in the Fourth Section of the Second Chapter of the Third Argument. And then, as to the Pretensions of Learning and Contemplation (as some Philosophers have contended for them) they also have been sufficiently accounted for in my Second Argument, Chap. 2. Sect. 1. & 3.  
Now, as to our described present Enjoyment of a wellbeing, allowing some circumstantial alterations in the opinion of it, according to the different humours and inclinations of men's Minds, though the whole World admire, proclaim, and desire it, as their chiefest Happiness in this mortal Life, yet it is certain, that in its best circumstances, and most desirable successes, it could never be designed of GOD (for whatsoever other ends he might please to allow it, of which an account shall be presently endeavoured) to be a Man's natural and sufficient Felicity, upon the warranty of these Three Reasons to the contrary.  
1. The First is, That if GOD Almighty had intended it as Man's sufficient Happiness, He would either have sovereignly given it to every Man, necessarily to enjoy it, or he would have put it in every man's power to attain to such a well accommodated State, and way of living at his own choice, and upon his own endeavours for it. Which sovereign Donation, or possibility of attainment, must be necessarily supposed, in whatsoever it is, that is propounded to such an intellectual Agent as Man is, for the satisfaction of his Rational Desires, and the Natural Appetites of his Mind; or those qualifications will appear to be given him, not only infinitely to his own disadvantage, but to be his perpetual Calamity and Encumbrance.  
A Desire, and not to enjoy, is upon any account a very uneasy State of Mind, but such a Desire, without any possibility of Enjoyment, is an intolerable Oppression.  
Now, that every man cannot attain to the enjoyment of the several mentioned Branches and Constitutives of a present well-being, by his own contrivance, and at his own choice. And then, Can any understanding Mind be so inconsiderately credulous, as once to imagine, that any such thing can be a man's proper, natural, and sufficient Happiness, which, when he most especially needs it, he cannot have it, and when he solemnly chooseth it, and most earnestly endeavours for it, he cannot assuredly obtain it? But this Case hath been largely accounted for already. Are. 2. Chap. 1. Sect. 2.  
2. But then, Secondly, Upon a supposal that some few men, by some extraordinary concurrent favourable hits of Providence, should be so successful in the World, as to be made rare Examples of such a Happy way of Living, with all its mentioned adjuncts and circumstances (which not one of Ten Thousand ever enjoyed) yet it is certain, that even then, that successful State, (in whatsoever degree it is allowed them) could never be designed of GOD as their sufficient Happiness (which must be supposed, if no future World) because it could never be found to give their Minds any constant and settled satisfaction, when they were so possessed of it, but that the more, and the longer those men enjoyed it, though no interruption had ever intervened (which were a monstrous Vanity of Mind to have presumed) the more they could not but discover its insufficiency to terminate their Desires. And to what degree soever they had raised their expectations of it, before they attained it, yet they always experimentally sound the Enjoyment of it to have come so far beneath a tolerable satisfaction, that it hath often proved little better than a baffle and real disappointment of Mind. And further, it's observed, that in the pursuit of such a present Felicity, the accession of every new Acquist does always but inflame men's Appetites, and heighten their expectations of some more, newer, and other Attainments: So that, in that respect, such men's Thoughts must necessarily be supposed to be always wand'ring up and down, and unweariedly fluctuating in an infinite Circle, and endless Maze, and Reciprocation of Desires and Unsatisfactions, Expectations and Disappointments.  
And, the main Reason of all this (as Seneca well observes) is, Because there is not any thing in the World that is enough; 
Cupiditati nihil satis. Si desiderabit aureis fulgentem vasis supellectilem, & antiquis nominibus artificum, etc. nunquam explebis inexplebilem animum, non magis quam ullus sufficit humor ad sanandum eum, cujus desiderium non ex inopia, sed aestu ardentium viscerum oritur. De Cons. ad Alb.  and that the highest Enjoyments are too straight and disproportioned. For though, perhaps, they are not so for men's present ordinary use, yet they will always be found to be so, for the satisfaction of the natural desires of their Minds.  
And this is the very Reason, Why many Persons that enjoy the fullest Plenty, and in appearance to others, all they could wish for, yet may be unaccountably uneasy in their own Minds, and oftentimes very unbecomingly froward in their demeanour to others, and even to them, whose fidelity, kindness and diligence they have cause to applaud and love: I say, all this is, because their Desires were originally and naturally fitted for a bigger, and indeed, for another kind of Happiness, than what this World could afford them.  
And upon this account it is, that Sir Francis Bacon takes notice, 
Cogita, quamdiu eadem feceris, mori velle, non tantum fortis, aut miser, sed etiam fastidiosus. Ess. 2.  (which he borrowed from Seneca) that The Fastidious, that is, such as are tired with any considerable continuance in their Enjoyments, are as willing to die, and leave them, as the stout, and the miserable that wants them; and that because (saith he) they have created a weariness of doing the same thing so often over and over. It's certain therefore, by a most necessary and reasonable consequence, that men's Appetites are to be satiated with some thing that is not here to be found, and therefore that must be future, and in reversion, or no where at all; which would be a Reproach to the CREATOUR's Honour, in giving him such a nature, and yet depriving him of a suitable satisfaction. But this hath been more fully managed, Ar. 2. Chap. 1. Sect. 1.  
The Third and Last Reason, to show the insufficiency of all the Enjoyments with which a Man can possibly be possessed of as his present Happiness in his mortal State, must fall so much short of answering his natural importunate Desires of being Happy, is, because they will always be (and he cannot but know it, if he considers) a possession of what's most unconstant and uncertain: Words that have from thence received their native Sense and Meaning, and which are never so properly expressed, as when they are used as Epithets and Adjuncts of every Temporal Enjoyment; and therefore, for which, nothing that's called a Rational Judgement, can have any kind of true satisfaction in them.  
There is nothing here (saith Seneca) that is not vanishing and deceitful, 
Nihil non lubricum & fallax, & omni tempestate mobilius. Jactantur omnia, & in contrarium transeunt, & in tanta volutatione rerum, ut nil cuiquam nisimors certum. Epist. de Con. Am.  or not unconstant as Seasons; all things are tossed up and down in their interchanges, and pass into their contraries; and that in such unsteady revolutions, as that a Man can call nothing Certain, but his Death: Or, as he expresseth it in another place; 
In tanta inconstantia turbaque rerum, nihil nisi quod praeteriit, certum est. Idem.  The unconstancy of things is such, as that there is nothing Certain, but what is past.  
Who is it that is certain of the contrary, but that Flames to morrow may throw him out of his stately House or Palace, into a despicable Tent or Cottage; or, that a Tempest may prevent the safe arrival of his importing Treasure; or, that War, Rapine, and a sudden change of Seasons, may defeat his Expectations in his fruitful Fields; that a malignant Distemper may empty his House of his numerous Posterity, and a Thousand Accidents may invade him in all the circumstances of his well-being? And then also, he cannot but know, that in despite of all his most powerful defence, he lays every day, one way or other, at the mercy of the malicious, and the spiteful.  
What privilege can I claim against the devouring Tyranny of the Covetous, 
Anne ipse privilegium impetravi ab invidia & avaritia, inexorabilibus tyrannis? Quod alicui, omnibus contingens est, quod omnibus, mihi. De Art Volun. lib. 3. 223.  and the Envious (saith Neirembergius)? What may happen to any, may happen to all; what to all, to me.  
And, if that man may think himself Happy, or can be cheerful, that knows a Sergeant, or an armed Party stands at his Door, upon design to arrest him; or when he understands, that his House stands amidst an infected Neighbourhood, ready every moment to seize upon him; then may a man be reasonably pleased, and happy, that considers, That all his Enjoyments are possessed with a perpetual danger of Change and Uncertainty. I say, Where things are thus insecure, What considering Mind can suggest a Reason of being Happy by any the greatest Enjoyments? And surely, where right Reason can give no Judgement: for it, that Mind cannot be truly satisfied in it.  
There is nothing in Nature truly Blessed, but what is exempt from fear. 
Non enim beatum est, nisi quod intrepidum. Inter suspecta malè vivitur.  No man lives but miserably, where all things are suspected, saith Seneca. And so are all things else, but the present Favour of GOD, and the Hopes of being Blessed in a better World, to him that lives a Virtuous and Religious Life.  
These are the Three general Reasons, which I have offered against the possibility of man's being truly happy by any thing that bears the name of an outward Wellbeing, in its best Circumstances; and therefore not likely to be designed of GOD for Man's choice, as sufficient to answer, and determine the created natural Desires of his Mind after his own Happiness. But the Sensual hath something to say against all this, which must be considered.   

Section II.  
THerefore, this Second Section tells us, That the earnest Pretenders to a present possible Prosperity, and the mighty Admirers of it, will, notwithstanding all this, think and say, That they are not to be turned off from their own sense of being happy with such a dry Philosophical Lecture as this; and that instead of being convinced by these Reasons, they will with Indignation and Scorn enough, mock at the Divine that preacheth them, or the Philosopher that disputes for them; or at the Sober and the Meek, the Just and the Charitable, that do exemplarily make use of them, to the practical Exprobration of their Follies.  
But then I am particularly obliged to take notice, That there be three sorts of such Men, (of which a great part of Mankind do appear at all times to consist) who are always more obstinately and uncontrollably bend against these, and all other Arguments, how reasonable soever, that can be offered in this case: And with these Men I am willing to treat apart, and by themselves in a closer Method.  
And the First of those Three, are the mighty Men of Wealth, who in Contempt of the former Reasons (which they can no more answer, than be wise) are resolved to think of no other Happiness, but to be perpetually listing numbers to their Regiment of Creditors, and catalogueing more Inhabitants to their increasing Territories, that they may be proclaimed Rich, and admired as Prodigies for their famous Acquisitions. For it's generally observed, That Covetousness and Pride, are complicated in the same Person, and do show themselves in all their Actions, where they may be compatible. And therefore, these men will defy the Man, that dares presume to charge their Reason with an obligation of being just or merciful, ingenuous or humble upon the reasonable Arguments of making a safe Provision, and an undefeizable Estate for themselves, in another, and a better World.  
The next silly Unattendant to the former Reasons, is the Man of Bustle and Ambition, and he wonders that any man should dare, with such Arguments as these, to affront his humour in the present sense of his own sufficient Happiness. And when he is accounting in a long List, the Names, Wealth, and Virtue of his Ancestors; and is relating some instances of his own Valour, & successful Achievements (though it were (perhaps) but in a Duel for a vain Woman, or in Revenge for an idle Word) that Man, that shall refuse to aggrandise his Bravery, and to admire his Happiness upon such pretensions, or inform him of any other sober instances of Honour, and true Fortitude, must be content for a while, to bear the Character of an ignoble and despicable Spirit.  
The Third of that obstinate sort of Men, is the sorry Voluptuary, who, with Contempt enough of the pretences of both the other, blesseth himself in the opinion of his own Happiness, and thinks that there needs no other to be offered to him for his present satisfaction, than to be rocked asleep in some sensual Pleasures; and would fain imagine that he enjoys his Being to Purpose and Happiness enough, while he is gratifying his Sensual Apperites; and then laughs at all those, that shall bring Reasons to advise him to the contrary, as a Pack of pitiful empty Fellows, that don't understand the Town, (as they call it) and that don't know what's Good Breeding; Eating, and Drinking, Gallantry, and Love.  
These are the three sorts of men that almost divide the vain World between them, and that are especially presumed not to be at leisure, to attend to the examination of such general Reasons, as are alleged for the unsufficiency of all present enjoyments, or of what may be offered for the happiness of another World: And therefore, are obstinately set to resist all possible counsels, that may be given to engage them in the serious thoughts of it.  
And now, that there may be nothing omitted, to oblige such men to take a full account of their own follies, I cannot but judge it very reasonable, that besides those three general imperfections, to which all temporal enjoyments are in common certainly subjected, and as so qualified, are rendered uncapable to afford any true happiness to such a rational Creature, as can discourse its measures; I say, I cannot but judge it both Necessary and Charitable, that I may make the conviction more complete and available; that besides those three Arguments that may inform their reasons in general, I may particularly arrest these men's several humours, and mistaken sentiments of their own happiness, with a proper remonstrance against every one of those pretended principal constitutives of humane prosperity; proving that every one of them have their proper and particular insufficiences, (besides those former general defailancies) to make a Man truly happy. And I shall give every one of them a fair Trial apart.  
1. And then, as to the first admired Instance of humane happiness, Wealth, let the forementioned men of Money seriously count and consider with themselves, what it is in its self and proper nature; and in the Issue of their thoughts they must find, that it is no more, but a servant to their natural necessities, and at best, but an expedient to attain the better conveniences and decencies of their short and mortal lives: And then, what there is more than will well serve those ordinary ends, (which an indifferent plenty may attain to with less trouble, and fewer dangers and fears) must in reason be accounted a redundant surplusage, either to become a prey for them, to whose trust and management it is committed, or to be thrown over board, to be catched up by them, that perhaps neither loved his person, nor deserved the advantage.  
And indeed, What signifies a vast and overgrown fortune, but noise and trouble, when the Fruitless Splendour of it shall be considerately discounted? For if the Owner of it be Good, Virtuous, and Religiously qualified, the burden of his Duties to GOD and Man is but so much the more increased, and the acquitment of a good Conscience so much the more nice and difficult; and his temptations to Folly will be infinitely multiplied. If it be said, that his plenty and greatness in the World's eye, may upon several accounts adapt him the better to assist in the conduct of public Government, it's truly affirmed: But then where lies the Happiness of it? 
Magna servitus est magna fortuna. Sen. ad Polyb. Cons.  It is no more than to ease others of that common burden, and for the benefit of those, who know not how to be satisfied with their own good: It is but to keep tame an unruly multitude; and when others may sleep quietly in their retired privacies, to be awake to watch over Lions and Tigers from devouring one another. For all which, he must expect little else, but ingratitude; and perhaps he may be paid for all his Cares and Pains, with nothing else but Spite and Hatred, the usual Vulgar Returns, for the most careful and vigilant Authorities.  
But if that Great Man been't good; that is, first, if his humour be to put his surplusage to a Trade of further Increase, how much is he better than some common Officer, or public Receiver of a great Revenue; by which, in time, he may gain the repute of being the common Cashkeeper of the Country, and so may possibly be on all hands addressed to, to find Money, to defray the Expenses of Fools and Sots with Sums, which (perhaps) his eyes may never see more, but in a little Scroll; or which his next Generation may abuse to maintain the Charges of some vain and silly way of living? Or if the mighty Man be sensually disposed; that is, if he expends his redundant surplusage in debaucheries, how much will his house differ from a common Inn and Hostage, unless it be, that it's so much a greater one? And if he hath a parcel of loose People of both Sexes in it, his abused Plenties may perhaps procure his House a more famous, but a worse Name.  
Moved with the sense of these Vanities and Inconveniences thus discovered, the Romans called Riches (Impedimenta) real Encumbrances, like the Cumbersome Baggage to a moving Army. 
Omnia ista bona, quae nos speciosa sed fallaci voluptate delectant, pecunia, dignitas, potentia aliaque complura, ad quae generis humani coeca cupiditas obstupescit, cum labore possidentur, cum invidia conspiciuntur, eosque ipsos, quos ornant, premunt; plus minantur, quam prosunt. Sen Lib. ad Polyb. Cons.  And, for which Reason, many great Philosophers have rejected the Enjoyment of that, which is called Wealth, and renounced the name of Rich: And many Great Potentates have unladed themselves of their worldly Greatness and Splendour, to enjoy the ease and freedom of a poor Monastic. 
Dio. Laer. in vita Crat.  And last of all, How can that be called an Expedient of a Man's proper Happiness, 
Theb. in vita Zenocr. Chaled.  (such as GOD should design to answer, and satisfy his natural Desires of being happy) that cannot, in the truest sense, make the possessor really either the more Virtuous, or the Wiser; 
Tusc. Quaest. lib. 11.  as the Philosopher argues? And thus we have examined the first material a Mortal's present reputed Felicity.  
2. Secondly, As to the Man of Honour, What signifies that which he calls Greatness or Splendour, or an ambitiously designed popular reputation in the World, when the nature of it is closely examined? For, it will be found to depend chiefly upon incompetent Judges of worth; and it seldom falls out to be the Portion of them that truly deserve it. Insomuch, that many Wise and Virtuous Persons have been so far from being ambitiously struggling for such an Honour, that they have shunned and avoided it, as much as they could: And have been more really ashamed of a popular Courtship and Applause, than other vain men have been concerned to be disappointed of them.  
But then, when it hath happened, that the vulgar Vogue hath not been mistaken, (which is very seldom) yet that acquired Honour must lay at the Feet of unconstant Mortals, and upon the hazard of every trivial Miscarriage, and misconstruction of Actions; for which solicitous Envy (its certain Attendant) will never want a contrivement, and an opportunity.  
Besides, we see, that Worldly Honour very seldom follows either Virtue, or any other worthy qualification of Mind, but that it purely depends upon Wealth, by what indirect Acts and Arts soever attained, and how unworthily soever used and managed.  
For he that hath Money, shall certainly be flattered as, Valiant, 

Omnis enim res,  
Virtus, fama, Deus, divina humanaque pulchris  
Divitiis parent; quas qui construxerit ille  
Clarus erit, fortis, justus, sapiens, etiam rex,  
Et quicquid volet.  
Hor. Lib. 2. Ser. Sat. 3●   Just, Wise, a Prince, and whatsoever he pleaseth to be (saith the Poet.) And without it, no man must expect to have a greater proportion of Honour, than a Virtuous Virgin without a Dowry; a Learned Priesthood without the Church's Patrimony; a Valiant Soldier in Age and Rags; or a Man nobly Born without a Fortune. And this is the sorry Nature of the Second reputed Constitutive of a Man's present Prosperity.  
3. Then as to the Man of Pleasure, if the nature of it be balanced by a considerate mind, it will be found at best, but immediately to affect the brutish part of Man; that is, his inferior Appetites. And about which, his superior Faculties shall be concerned in nothing more, than in discovering its Folly and Vanity, or controlling its Successes.  
And if you measure the duration of sensual Pleasure, it's gone as soon as known; and its fruition, is its end and extinction. And if it hath any repeated Periods, the most desirable instances of it, will in time nauseate, like meat to a full Stomach, and become as tiresome as Labour, and as unapprovable, as what is old, worn, and out of fashion. And which is more, there are no Pleasures, which Religion and Virtue, and the sense of another World can't account for, but are generally purchased at the choice of so much unworthiness, as to make others miserable, or at least, uneasy by them.  
Therefore, the great Philosopher, though he would fain have found out a sufficient attainable Happiness in man's mortal Life, yet found Cause of all men, to call the Voluptuaries the Burden of the World; 

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Arist. Eth. Lib. 1. Cap. 5.   and the Disease of Mankind. And Epictetus adviseth all Wise Men to abstain from them, if they design any after Joy, or satisfaction to their own Lives. 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ench. Cap 56.  This is the Third and Last integral part of Man's supposed present Prosperity.  
And thus I have strictly examined the several Natures, and particular Qualities of the three pretended Constitutives of all humane Prosperity in their proper kinds, and seriously weighed the Concomitant Defects, and Imperfections of every one of them in particular, where the Concerns of a Future State are laid aside. And now, What Understanding can be so ridiculously credulous, as once to believe, That any true Happiness can result from the Concurrence of such defective Causes; or that is built up of such incompetent materials, that the possessor should applaud the Enjoyment of it, as his summary and sufficient Felicity? And then, let a● considering man further seriously consult the Reason of his Soul, whether it be possible for him to have such unworthy Thoughts of a most Good GOD, as that he should create a Being with Faculties capable to judge and balance the terms and nature of all the Happiness, with which he must enjoy his whole Existence, and for the obtaining of which, he is by a natural instinct to be encumbered with the perpetual toil and solicitations of his own Desires and Appetites; and then should afford him the Enjoyment of no other, or no better Happiness, than what is offered to him in this World, as I have truly described the nature of it.  
But further, to evince how improbable it is, that the Happiness, which can only answer those desires and appetites which GOD implanted in all men's natures, should be lodged in any present enjoyment of humane Life, I shall remark how ridiculously the wisest men have behaved themselves in their Adventures to find out a way how to fix it in this World. But that's the business of the next Section.   

Section III.  
THis last Section discovers the disordered and disagreeing apprehensions of all those Philosophers and Wise men, who endeavoured to promote a possibility for the attainment of a real Happiness in this present State. And, it's observed, that even the Learned'st sort of them, like men at a loss where to fix and determine such a chiefest Good, and sufficient Happiness, ventured at every thing to which their humour, inclinations, and their resolved compliance with a Sect, guided their Sentiments and Apprehensions: Dealing in their Opinions of Man's summary and chiefest Happiness, as the old Egyptians did with the Supreme Deity, which, because they found it not among the Objects of a present sensible perception, they placed it in every contemptible part of the Creation, and unmanly adored it where they fixed it.  
But then our Opinionists distant and innumerous disagreements among themselves, was a certain sign, that they had all lost their Mark and Standard; and were become like men, who finding no certain Path to direct their Progress, (as it is the universal fate of all Error) wandered about, whithersoever their private Fancies, or some instant Accident determined their choice and motion: But still they found themselves out of the way, and the farther they went on, to look for such a present Happiness, the more their bewildered Minds discovered to them the misfortune of their Mistakes.  
Therefore, of the many that ever pretended to have succeeded in their Inquiries after the True Happiness of Man, few agreed in any one thing, in which it should consist. St. Austin reckons up from Marcus Varro Two Hundred Eighty eight several Opinions of Man's Chiefest Good. 
Aug. de Civit. Dei, lib. 19 cap. 1.  And Tully accounts a great many, and those (as he averrs) according to the Sense of the most remarkably Learned Adventurers, to find it out.  
The Epicureans placed it in Pleasure, the Stoics in the habits of Virtue, the Peripatetics in the Acts and Exercises of it: Some of them placed it in Knowledge and Contemplation, and others in Power and Dominion, 
Eth. lib. 10.  and many in Friendship, as Aristotle largely discourseth the Sentiments of them. Therefore the same Cicero acknowledgeth, That there was never any question, 
De nulla quaestione majorem esse inter summos viros dissentionem, quam de ea, quaenam res sit summum honum. Lib. 5. de finibus.  about which the most considerable sort of men had so many different Senses, as about that, in which Man's chiefest Good and Happiness should be placed. And Stobaeus quotes the words of the Ancient Philemon, complaining, That the Philosophers had laboured away their time, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ser. 53.  how they might find out the Chiefest Good, but all in vain. And while some placed it in one thing, and some in another, some in Wisdom, and some in Virtue, they did rather perplex the Notion, than find out what it was. Thus a Heathen could represent the Case a great while ago.  
But, among the different fond Opinions which the layers aside of a Future State, whether in Faith or Practice, have vainly suggested to their Thoughts, as their most satisfactory Felicity; I must not forget more strictly to examine those many men's pretensions, who have projected for a Sense of being Happy, by endeavouring to transmit something of themselves to Futurity, though it were but to keep alive their Names and Memorials to after Ages.  
And the Folly of this I shall at last the more industriously and fully endeavour to represent, because I perceive, that in those men, with whom such a design of Happiness hath prevailed, their intendments have been generally more steadily and constantly fixed and prosecuted, than in any other of the former Pretensions to humane Happiness; where the thoughts of another World have been suspended and superseded.  
And the Reason of this my Observation, is, Because such kinds of Designs as these, are more accommodable to that natural disposition, that is generally implanted in men's Minds, to aim at something that is Future, and indeed (if possible) Immortal. And therefore it is, that those men that have in any kind been governed by that natural temper, are so much the more apt to be pleased with their own mistakes, as that their Designs do bear a nearer assimilation and alliance to the prosecution and attainment of the truly immortal and eternal Happiness; for which (it will appear) Man was principally and designedly made.  
And without doubt, that temper in Man's mind, towards Futurity, howsoever it's abused to such trivial purposes, was wisely and graciously allowed by a Good GOD to him in his very Nature, as a great advantage for his more easy and more natural prosecution of that, which should be really his immortal Bliss, when he should go about that Happy Work.  
Now, an instance of this natural disposition, is very often expressed in Planting, Building, Experimenting, and Writing, and in such like Intendments; even when of the benefits of such Undertake, the very Projectors themselves could not but understand, that they should either never be partakers, or but for some inconsiderable space of time. But, the Reason upon which they founded their Encouragement, was, That they found themselves like to be pleased that their Projections might remain to Futurity, as standing remarks of their Care, and Skill, and Honour, or they know not what. And possibly, these men having before experimented (as it's frequently observed in the World) the defects of all other sensual Pleasures, they adventured upon this last Design in the wiser and declining part of their Lives, as that which did more accommodate the natural Propensity, that is in all men (if they did not overrule it) towards the most substantial Happiness of a Future Life.  
And, I believe, thus were the Thoughts of Solon governed, when he had told Croesus, the rich Lydian King (after he had shown him his vast Treasures, and asked him, Whether he did not believe him to be an Happy man, that was Master of such Wealth and Kingdoms) That no Man ought to be reputed Happy, till after Death. I say, Something of that nature prevailed with Solon to use that Expression, 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Eth. lib. cap. 1.  as appears by the manner of Aristotle's large and industrious confutation of him in the first Book of his Ethics. And it is supposed that Ovid turned it into Verse, in the behalf of Solon's persuasion. 

— Scilicet ultima semper  
Expectanda dies homini, dicique beatus.  
Ante obitum nemo, supremaque funera debet.    
Now, as this mistaken Expedient for humane Happiness hath governed no inconsiderable part of the vain World, and more particularly such, whose Age and Experience might have stocked them with a sounder Judgement, so it hath been mightily endeavoured by Two sorts of men, of whom I must now especially take notice.  
And, the first of those are they, whose design it is to be preparing Monuments of their Skill in Arts and Sciences, and in some very chargeable and laborious Experiment, thereby to survive their mortalities, and to acquire an everlasting Fame to themselves, when they were gone off from their mortal Stations.  
Secondly, I take notice, that there hath been others of another distant temper, who all their days had been drudging in Gare and Toil, and constantly exercising all their skill, and denying themselves all reasonable satisfaction in their own present Plenties, with a design to heap a Fortune big enough to set up a Family of their own Name in vogue and note in the World, when they were gone; thinking thereby to immortalize themselves in their own Posterity; and thereby creating to themselves so much the greater opinion of their own Happiness and Satisfaction, as that they had gone so far towards a perpetuation of their pretended Happiness: Concerning which kind of Happiness, the excellent Author of the Religio Medici hath this Expression. 
Part 1. Sect. 40.  This Conceit and counterfeit Subsistence in our Progenies, seems to me a mere Fallacy, unworthy the desires of a Man, that can but conceive a Thought of the next World: who in a Nobler Ambition should desire to live in his Substance in Heaven, rather than in his Name and Shadow in the Earth.  
Now, as to both which Designers for any present or after Happiness, (I know not which to call it) were it not that sometimes many commendable things have been done for the benefit of those that are present and to come, so as that their doing Good might turn to some happy account to themselves in a Future State, their design is liable to as many unaccountable Exceptions, as most other the former unfortunate Contrivances for a settled Happiness in this Life, have been subject to.  
1. As for the First sort of these I mention, who had stifled their natural Appetite, designed by GOD and Nature for the better pursuance of something, by which they might be made really futurely Happy; and then would give themselves leave to think of no other Happiness, but what they might acquire by leaving some lasting Monuments of their Skill and Labours after them, What words are little enough to express the fondness of such an Intendment?  
For, if we measure the substance of their Happiness, with respect to such a Futurity, (as is pretended) it can be placed no where else, but in a fond Proposal of something to their own minds, of which (supposing their denial of a Future State) they themselves can never have any possible sense or enjoyment, and of which at present they can have no perception, but as in a pure Romantic notion, and empty imagination: And by which, they shall have just so much real Happiness, as that man can presume himself to have a sufficient defence in a time of Danger, who had studied to build Castles in the Air, by his extravagant Fancy.  
What present real Felicity could Ovid propound to himself in his own perception, as to a future Fame (which was the only thing that he is presumed to aim at) when he flourished his vaunting Epilogue to his Metamorphosis any more, than if his Name had been designed to survive but for his being the Author of such a ridiculous Story as Tom Thumb; or, as if Juvenal had named him among his blundering Poets; or, that his Reputation had been buried with others as considerable as himself, in a perpetual night of Oblivion and nothing?  
And, What more could other the famed Authors of extraordinary experimental Inventions propound to themselves, by the credit of their Operations, when they could not but know, that in a short time they should have far less sense of any happiness or satisfaction by them, as to their own minds, than the Worms should enjoy, who were ready to try fresh Experiments upon their Bodies in those natural Laboratories, their Graves?  
And, if it be said, that possibly it might be some happiness to them, that they could take a certain present satisfaction in their Thoughts, that they should survive themselves in their Reputations; My Answer is, That that Pleasure could be no more or greater than if the same men should, like Knight's Errants, have persuaded themselves, that they should have the honour to be afterwards reputed as Kings, and Princes; and then should take a great deal of silly care to be so recorded in a Romantic Story.  
The Happiness of them both in each respect is much the same. And then, Who but mad men could imagine it to be a Felicity so considerable, as that GOD should allow them no other, or no better enjoyment, to determine their natural desires of being Happy, but in such ridiculous Trifling of their own imaginations?  
2. Then, Secondly, as for the Happiness of those that have all their Lives laid long Trains, to purchase large Territories, and build stately Palaces, on design to perpetuate their Names in a famed Family after them, it is much the same with the former pretensions, and perhaps the folly of it is, in some respects, less accountable, if they also shall have really neglected the Concerns of their future Happiness in another World.  
For, First, The Foundation of this imaginary Happiness to themselves, is not certainly True; for it's yet a Dispute among men, Whether a transmission of a greatly famous Fortune can make Posterity more happy than a lower Plenty; and the wisest men have agreed upon the latter. But then, Secondly, If the Foundation of their fancied Happiness were in that respect really True, yet it were infinitely vain to rely upon it, and that, because it were upon a very great uncertainty and hazard, whether their own Posterity should ever inherit it, or whether any of their near Relations should ever share their amassed Fortunes, when they die: But that their Estates might become, like a rich shipwreck, to be divided among Strangers, or perhaps among such whom they neither loved nor valued. Or, Thirdly, If it be granted, that those which they designed should enjoy them, yet it was still very uncertain, whether they would then preserve those famous Fortunes as they intended, or not ridiculously scatter them, as fast as themselves had gathered them together; or whether otherwise they had not all their lives been providing a vast Stock, for a Sot to play the fool with, or for some unworthy Person, that shall ungratefully, yet justly, deride the Gainers of it, (though perhaps his own Parents) for their ridiculous penury to themselves, to obtain such a fortune for him; or, Fourthly, If it shall happen that their Fortunes shall be possessed by one of an honest and worthy Mind, yet it's possible, that the same Person that enjoys them, may judge himself never the better, if not much the worse for them, in many respects. That is, When he shall find himself subject to more Temptations to miscarry in his Virtue, and to be involved in such encumbrances as may make his life more uneasy; and that especially if he shall be sensible, that that Estate was unworthily and unjustly gotten, or basely & scandalously kept for him.  
So that if all those silly promoters of great Estates, should within a few Years after they were committed to their little tenements underground, rise again, and take a prospect of what becomes of the Issue of all their pinching Frugalities, Cares and Cunning, they would commonly see little else, but the wretched effects of their own folly and mistaken designs, and find, that the happiness they enjoyed upon their projections for Posterity, had all along been nothing but one vain Dream of something, that never was like to come to pass according to their own purposes and expectations. But than lastly, if all things had succeeded according to the measures of their own fancy and design; yet it's certain, that their own dried and broken Skeleton (all that is presumed to remain of themselves, if no Future State) shall no more be concerned in the Flourish of their succeeding Generations, than in the Grandeur of the great Mogul, or the Persian Monarch; and that it shall then be all one to them, whether their Sons be Emperors or Laqueys, or whether they be Sovereigns of the Ocean, or but Admirals of some poor Indian Canoe. For what is the difference to a dead Parent (for any sense he can have of it, supposing no Future State) whether his Child be a Triumphant Tamburlaine, or a Captive Bajazet, a Victorious Caesar, or an unfortunate Pompey, or to have been a Slave to either of them. The drudging projectour may have Joy or Sorrow in his present Portion while he lives, and he does his duty if he provides for them that come after him, but he can't be concerned in the Prosperity of any of them, whom he leaves behind him (as Aristotle observes in his Contest with Solon's Principle); 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Eth. Lib. 1. cap. 10.  They shall be so much nothing to himself, as is the Bliss of another World, which he hath neither believed, thought of, nor endeavoured for.  
And now, what I have said in particular of these two famous sorts of triflers, with their natural inclinations, to perpetuate their happiness on that account, I may say the same in general of all others, who have any other ways proposed a design of felicity to themselves by leaving memorials of their names behind them.  
It's true, the memory of the Righteous is Blessed; that is, to others, whether as some additional honour to relatives, or as exemplary to them and others, but as to themselves, they shall have no more perception of it, or of any happiness by it, (laying aside the thoughts of another World) than the senseless Dust, or the cold Monument that covers them: All the most famously remarked instances of their Virtue, or wisdom, shall be no more to them, than if it were recorded, at what time, or in what Country, they had tied up their Garters, or turned to the Wall for their Natural Ease.  
What real happiness could those famous Egyptians promise to themselves, that their Bones were to lie under the vast Pyramids as their lasting Monuments; more than a poor Roman Soldier, whose Ashes being lodged in an Urn without an Inscription, informs the World, That there was such an one buried there, that was content never to be remembered more?  
And thus I have accounted for some of the various sentiments of those that have studied all that's possible, to six Man's summary Felicity in something enjoyable in his present Mortal Life, or with reference to futurity in the ridiculous sense I have just now represented it; and my design therein is, that it may appear, that such men have sufficiently baffled and condemned themselves by their own confusions of mind, and that by the absurdities of their different opinions, and their several defective methods of endeavouring to be happy in this life, they have expressly convinced the World, that there is no kind of happiness can determine men's minds to an universal agreement, that is founded upon any thing that is proposable or enjoyable in this mortal State.  
And therefore it's very reasonable, and very necessary to be believed, that if God had designed, that such an happiness, as might possibly have answered and fixed all men's Desires and Appetites, should have been attainable in this mortal life, there would have been a proposal of some common and universal Good, which all men might have plainly understood, and in which all minds should have as universally and naturally agreed.  
Thus I have discharged myself of the Second Head of my Discourse, towards the perfecting this Argument for a Future State; that is, I have endeavoured to demonstrate, That there is nothing proposed as enjoyable in Man's mortal Life, by any Objects and Acquisitions whatsoever, that can tolerably answer Man's natural Appetite of being Happy, or that can agreeably suit that Capacity that GOD gave him by Creation to enjoy it.  
And this I have done by an examination of every thing in the World, that is pretended for it in particular; and by showing to what intolerable defects they are all subject in general.  
Therefore it must necessarily follow, or nothing else can reconcile the mind of Man to any kind representation of God's Goodness, that he should give to all men by a necessary instinct, such an unanswerable desire and restless expectation of an Happiness, which cannot be found any where while he remains in this present State; I say, It must then necessarily follow, that there is another State to come, in which all that heartily desire it, and regularly labour for it, upon the performance of such terms as GOD requires, and which a found Reason may suggest as necessary for that end, may be made completely, and satisfactorily Happy. But that is the business of the next Chapter.    

CHAP. III.  
IN this Chapter I shall throughly demonstrate, That the supposal of the real Existence of a Future State, and of a sufficient Happiness there attainable, will naturally solve all those intolerable consequences, which must reflect upon the Honour of the Divine Attributes, as GOD hath of His own Will and Pleasure created Man, qualified in his mind with those restless and importunate Desires and Appetites of Happiness, and yet, that He hath allowed him nothing in this present World, by which its possible it should be attained to. And the same supposal will also as naturally answer all manner of Exceptions against the unsufficiency, transiency and uncertainty of all those Good things, which GOD allows Mankind to enjoy in their present mortal Lives. And this will be discoursed of in these Three Sections.  

Section I.  
IN this First Section, I shall plainly manifest, that whatsoever may be suggested against the Honour of the Divine Attributes on that account, will be perfectly solved by the acknowledgement of a future State. And to evidence this great Truth, and to show how naturally all those Attributes in this case are solved by the supposal of such a State, I need not here go about to advance the Happiness of it, by any conjectural Excellencies. The nature and measures of it are a reserve with GOD, and it were a criminal Curiosity, and a great Immodesty, to be too inquisitive into it, as I have discoursed the case more fully in my First Argument; I shall here therefore only offer by way of illustration, what the present universal Experience of the Virtuous and Pious can evince and verify.  
For, whosoever he is, that shall set his Heart to exert those natural and strong inclinations of his Mind, for the attainment of that Great end, and shall affectionately place his Thoughts and Desires, his Designs and Hopes upon it, and then shall accordingly live up to such terms and conditions, by which it is agreed upon all common reason, that it is to be expected and attained at the Hand of GOD, (upon whose good Pleasure and free Donation it perfectly depends) I say, That man shall find such a fitness and suitableness of all those his natural qualifications to those excellent Objects, that in time he may be made sensible, that Almighty GOD might have denied him any other temper of mind whatsoever, rather than that natural powerful Appetite after his own Happiness; which he now observes to be so necessary, to drive him on through all the adventures of what he is to do and suffer, for the attainment of that future State of Bliss.  
So that he shall be so far from complaining and objecting against God, for creating him with such a temper, and (otherwise) troublesome disposition of mind, that he shall find pregnant Reasons, not only to justify, but to love and glorify His Goodness, for making him such a Creature as he is, and with a mind so naturally qualified.  
For though, while his inclinations and desires were trifling with the vain Objects of this Life, and were engaged in their natural Vigour, for the attainment of a present pretended Happiness by them, they were uneasy and unquiet, as being employed about an end, for which they were not naturally disposed, yet they were once terminated upon the concerns of a Happiness to come, and then exercised about the Actions and Offices that tend to it, they will be found to all purposes so approvable, as they will appear needful to enliven his Courage against all Temptations to his own abuse, by the choice of every trifling Object; and to heighten his earnestness in the performance of all such good actions, as reasonably tend to its attainment.  
And further, Such a man shall not only think well of GOD, that He gave him such natural dispositions of mind, merely because they adapt him for those better Enjoyments in future, but also for the present ease and complacency, which he shall find in the very use of them to that Great end, by the proemial repasts of a most easy, and sometimes a ravishing Expectation. That is, Such a Pious man's Desires will be qualified with Contentment, while he is in the way, as well as be completely satisfied at his Journeys end. So that, as he would not refuse the Objects of his religious desires for any other whatsoever, that can be offered him besides, so he would not exchange the very Comfort and present Happiness of those expectations, for the real Possession of all the Pleasures and seeming satisfactions which this World can afford him.  
The sum is, If these Experiences be duly considered, What can be alleged to justify the least unkind Thought or Opinion of GOD's Wisdom and Goodness, in putting Man's nature into such an order, or that He implanted in him such a Disposition? When it appears, that it is so subservient for, and so suitable to, his Chiefest Good; that is, that it is so fitted for the use of all the methods of attaining it here, and that it renders him so adequately capacitated, for the better reception of it hereafter.  
A faint Desire would not have encouraged so great an Engagement, nor have been receptive of so mighty an Object.  
And this solves the First Doubt which concerned GOD, as Creator: About which something hath been offered in my Second Argument.   

Section II.  
IN this Section it will appear, That the supposal of that State will also solve all those Exceptions, (which we have already discoursed) that are so earnestly managed against the forementioned Enjoyments of Wealth, Honour, and Pleasure, and all other the Accommodations which God hath set in man's view, for his present entertainment.  
All which, as they will then be believed in themselves to be Ordinations of GOD's Great Wisdom, to preserve Mankind in their general order and well-being, during their mortal Lives; so a Good man will as easily find Reasons to account them the effects of his Love, and considerable Arguments of his Favour to him, whensoever he is possessed of them.  
And then, the Outcries that are raised by Philosophers, Poets, and some contemplative Persons against them, and the ordinary clamours of idle men's experimental dissatisfactions by them, (whereby oftentimes unkind Reflections are made against the Providence of God, in his ordinary dispensations of them) will be found to arise from no other cause, but from their not believing, or not sufficiently considering the certainty of a Future State and Happiness, (for whose Interest they may be improved) to determine their higher desires and appetites.  
For, all those Exceptions and Complaints would then appear to take their Original from men's promising and endeavouring to make those present Enjoyments their principal End, and summary Felicity (which God did never intend they should, for the Reasons already given) and then finding that they came short of their expected satisfactions, have rendered them obnoxious to such undecent accounts and representations.  
Had they believed, and made (as in reason they ought to have done) the Bliss of a Future World their Chiefest end, and proposed it to themselves, as their Supreme Happiness, and then had looked upon those outward Temporary Enjoyments, to be desired and used in a manner, and with a value answerable to their kind, and no more; that is, to serve their natural present needs, and for the conveniences and decencies of their mortal Lives; they would soon have found them good and acceptable in their kinds and qualities, received them at God's Hand with Thankfulness, and possessed them with ease and contentment in all proportions.  
And then, all their Complaints of their uncertainty, transiency, and unsufficiency, to make men completely Happy, would soon have been confuted by such a Virtuous and Religious Mind, as is resolved on the greater aims, and that hath entertained the noblest designs of attaining the Bliss of a Future State: To which he knows, that all the Enjoyments of this Life may (one way or other) be made considerably subservient, notwithstanding their proclaimed and adjudged imperfections.  
Upon which account, when a Good man once understands they were chiefly given him, and then endeavours only to use them for that end, he will soon be satisfied with their enjoyment in every different degree, and must approve GOD's Wisdom and Goodness in making them, as they are, (whilst they serve those purposes) the Objects of His present Care, Desire, and Usage.  
It is men's esteeming them too much their Happiness, that makes them found to be too little, and their using them unworthily, that makes them none at all.  
And therefore would men have studied the true notion of their Nature, and as they are qualified in their proper kinds, and learned, that the uncertainty, unconstancy, and unsufficiency to complete men's present satisfactions in them, were but the necessary and natural dispositions, and inseparable qualities of all earthly Enjoyments; and then would have laboured for, received, and relied upon them but as such, they had never understood what discontent, frustration, or disappointment had meant; nor ever had they been tempted to make such passionate Complaints against them, so much to the disparagement of the incomparable Order of the Divine Pleasure and Providence.  
They then would have been no more displeased with them, because they found them so qualified, than they would think it reasonable to be angry with Horses or Dogs, because they can't speak to them, or can't keep their accounts, or will not last always, as well as be at present instrumental to their pleasure or profit in their kinds.  
Nor would they have thought the worse of their Money, that GOD gave them as a Blessing, for many good purposes of Life, because it could not furnish their minds directly with knowledge and discretion, nor secure their bodies from Diseases and Torments, or that it could not be its own defence against Loss and Cheats, or that it would not be a constant Possession, when themselves threw it away, to serve their Pride, Folly, and Sensualities.  
Hence it is, that when the silly Worldling is plaguing himself with his insatiate Desires of grasping more than will properly suit his needs and conveniences; and is unkindly crucifying his Mind, because of this or that disappointment of greater improvements; or for the news of some unlucky miscarriage in his Affairs: The easy Soul of him that hath fixed his design and hopes upon a future Happiness, (when such things happen to him) is as unconcerned as a common Spectator.  
And when the uncertain turns and cross contingences of the World, do keep the Good man down to a lower Fortune, he is so far from finding Reasons to murmur or complain, that he can frame Arguments in his own mind, by which he can represent his present condition to himself, whatsoever it is, with the same contentment and satisfaction, as if it were the issue of his own choice, and as if he had carved it out for himself, by the Rules of his own and other men's most deliberate Counsels.  
And then, if at any time this Good man hath reason to foresee any approaching dangers, to disturb his present order, he presently atones his fears with his greater hopes: And if those dangers do really come to pass, it is but treating his mind with more lively apprehensions, and his advancing the expectations of his future Bliss to a higher pitch, and immediately he is discharged of the afflictive sense of all those interruptions of his present quiet, whatsoever they be.  
So that he that hath once espoused the designs of, and fixed his hopes upon the Happiness of a future State, will be so far from permitting himself to murmur or complain, that he will always be studying to furnish his mind with Reasons to think, that the nature (such as it is) of all the outward Enjoyments of this Life, is most approvable, and that the manner of their dispensation is to the best purposes, for his present and future Good and Happiness.  
And then also he may find Reasons to believe, that the Great GOD will one day convince the World, that His Wisdom and Goodness did in no part of His Creation, and of His constant course of Providence, appear more illustrious, and designedly propitious for the good of Mankind, than that by His ordination, those their present Enjoyments should pass in the same unconstant and unsatisfying order, as they ordinarily do.  
And that all vain men will one day be forced to acknowledge to their own shame, how many advantages they had received and rejected, by their admired Enjoyments universal insufficiency to give them full contentment, to have in time attended to better Counsels for their own good, and to have relied upon more certain Hopes and Blessings, for their own happiness and satisfaction.  
And, Lastly, That all Good men, to GOD's everlasting Glory, shall proclaim to all the World, that had they not been convinced by the many changes and unsatisfactions in their Temporal Enjoyments of their certain Vanity; and that they had found no reason to expect any complete Happiness from them, they had neither loved nor valued, hoped nor endeavoured for the higher Blessings of another World, as they ought to have done: but might have lived and died in their own folly, and in the loss of those incomparable Provisions for their future Bliss and Happiness. And this concludes the Second Section.   

Section III.  
IN this Section, I shall plainly represent, That those men who have really espoused the Interest of that State, and that do actually apply themselves to those methods that are designed of God for its attainment, shall not only be able to possess those Temporal Blessing's contentedly and thankfully, and bear all their natural inconveniences and insufficiences, patiently and cheerfully, but they shall also enjoy a very real Happiness from every part of them, in their own kinds, and that in such a degree of perception (though inferior to their advanced expectations of a future Bliss) as other men could never be affected with, that had enjoyed them in their largest accommodations, with designs to set their minds upon them, as their principal Felicity.  
And this will easily be acknowledged, by examining again the several mentioned constitutives and parts of all present humane Prosperity.  
First, As to Wealth, (so far as a Good man is furnished with it) when thereby he finds himself enabled to do good with it; that is, to support the necessities and decencies of his own Life, and in a tolerable manner to provide for those that depend upon him, and can spare any Portions of it for the relief of others, it will make him sensible of the Happiness of being Rich, and shall admit his mind to a mighty contentment in his own Plenties, whatsoever they are, such as no man can enjoy, when they are made instrumental of Splendour, Greatness, and Pleasure: 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Plut. Sept. Sapien. p. 155.  He shall go into his fine Habitation with Joy, because he knows it's so qualified, as Solon would have a Rich man's House; that is, Because there is nothing in it that is unjustly gotten, or kept with Fear, or spent with Repentance.  
And, as he may thus refresh himself in the very enjoyment of his Plenties, so he may also solace himself with the fairest hopes of their Constancy, and allow himself the most reasonable expectations of their Increase, that can be given. No man is truly Rich, but he that is Good and Virtuous.  
And, Secondly, as to Honour, It will in despite of all his neglects of it, be a certain consequence and result of his Virtuous and Religious Actions, incomparably above all that can be attained to, by the most ambitious pursuits of it on all other accounts. For he that governs his actions exactly by the conduct of that Religion, which secures his Future Happiness, cannot, must not, but always do that which is civil and truly worthy, and in some respects, that which is greatly brave and noble; and that, upon the most generous occasions (when there is need) for the preservation of his KING and Country. His Principle obligeth him to do so, beyond all the advantages of Birth and Breeding, where the Concerns of another World are not considered.  
Then, as to the Last general reputed Constitutive of humane Prosperity, Pleasure; No man knows what's truly such, but the Virtuous, and the Innocent, and he that lives in the hopes of a future Bliss; he only sweetly and serenely enjoys it, when the pretended Voluptuary shall not possess the least shadow of true satisfaction from his sordid Sensualities. It is the Temperate that enjoys the true pleasure of his Meals, and the refreshment of an undisturbed sleep; and that can methodically delight in making an orderly distinction of the Night and Day, for the ends they were naturally intended: He drinks Waters out of his own Cistern, and his chaste Bed is full of sweet Love, that bounds his Desires to his own satisfaction. And if at any time, his want of Health or Plenty, or the troublesome Scene of public Affairs, shall interrupt the delight he might have taken in his honest Enjoyments, his Religion can raise his mind to a pleasure that is intellectual; he hath that in reserve, by which he can take such a satisfaction in his Hopes, that in the midst of all his natural sorrows and saddest circumstances, he can contentedly smile upon the expected Objects of his future Happiness.  
Now, from what I have been able thus to say in the instant case, we are in Reason as well as Duty, prepared to admire the Mercy of God, and the Wisdom of His Goodness, that He hath in His Gracious Care so fully provided for Man's universal Happiness both here and hereafter. And this was the Design and Reason of our Saviour's Promise, 
Matt. 6. 33.  when He assured all those that would seek the Kingdom of GOD, and His Righteousness; that is, that should direct their natural Desires of being Happy to the Blessedness of another World, and then should always endeavour to persist in that religious way of living, that tends to it, all those things, that is, all that concerns their present Happiness in this World, shall be also added to them in the Sense that I have represented it.  
Thus we may be satisfied, that all that's called humane Prosperity in every part of it, was not given and allowed to Mankind in this World in vain: It is only the Evil and the Inconsiderate that makes it so; but Good men may, and do commonly enjoy it to as many purposes of Happiness, as themselves would desire and wish for, with respect to that of another World. And they are not concerned in the Three former Arguments, to prove the insufficiency of all present Enjoyments for Man's summary Felicity; it was that they never aimed at; and in that they were never disappointed; so it's evident, that notwithstanding their imperfections, though they could not make them completely Happy, yet they might, in other respects, make them really so in their kinds in this present Life.  
And thus I have got over the Third part of my intended design, by which it may demonstrably appear, that the acknowledged Existence and Belief of a future State, doth throughly solve all Objections against GOD, for giving Man naturally such an impatient inclination and desire of Happiness, and against all present Enjoyments, because their Imperfections might render them uncapable of making Man completely Happy in this World.    

THE CONCLUSION.  
NOW the Conclusion is, because GOD hath made no other Provisions in this mortal State, to give satisfaction to Man's natural Desires and Appetites of being Happy, but such as are subject to such imperfections, it necessarily follows, that there must be such a Future State in real Existence, the sufficiency and immutability of whose Bliss and Happiness, should fully answer Man's natural Desires and Appetites, and become a Blessing suitable and proportionable to all the lofty Capacities of his being a Rational Creature.  
And if all this were not to be considered as infinitely True, but that Man's Being here were designed to be concluded within the short span and inconsiderable space of Time, (far exceeded by many Vegetable and sensible Creatures) between his Birth and Death, and that nothing else had been provided for him, to answer the earnestness of his natural Desire and Appetite of being Happy, but what is here offered to his present view and possession; it were not too severe to think and say, that Mankind (especially as to the far greatest part of it) would seem to have lived here, to a very little better purpose, than to be always baffling themselves with the fair Promises, and the deluded Hopes of something that they could never arrive at, and of a Happiness that hath always fled from them upon their nearest approaches to it; and that a great part of the humane World were never like to be much happier, than one that is continually tossed up and down with the reciprocations of Fears and Hopes, Expectances and Disappointments: Or, to be resembled by an Hydropic Person's condition, who is always drinking, and yet always thirsty, burnt and drowned at once.  
Every other Creature, without Sense of any defect or disappointment, necessarily attains its end: The Brute Animals are satisfied (according to the capacity of their faculties) with what they are, and what they have: Only poor Man (upon a supposal that there is no Future State) must pass away his days in dragging about a Mill of constant Toil, to serve his natural Needs, and to be always a Drudge to his inferior Appetites; and then being wearied with a few Annual Circlings of Care and Labour through the time of his strength and vigour, must at last, in his Age, be left to languish under the Unhappy apprehensions of the frustration of all he sought for, and for the little purposes, for which he had ever been reckoned among the Living.  
How reasonable then is the Sacred Revelation! and, How much doth it approve itself to be Truth, when it declares and tenders such a Future State of Happiness, as may fully answer all the Reasons of Man's Creation, and that can only be adequate and adapted to his Minds natural frame and inclinations?  
Had Man's real Happiness and complete satisfaction been attainable from any Enjoyment here, (which GOD wisely designed it never should) all the suspicions that the Modern Atheist can allege, might with some Justice be objected against the Scriptures incomparable Manifestations of GOD's Blessing to Good Men in another World.  
But since it appears by all Experiences and universal Agreement, that the contrary is True, I cannot conjecture whence the denial and disbelief of a Future State, or the unaccountable neglect of it, by them that do believe it, should gain so many Proselytes, except it be found among such as are resolved to live and die like Fools, that is, with a brutish inconsideration of any thing that is beyond the present survey of their Senses; or among such, who desperately purposing to live debauched Lives, can no otherwise avoid the Reproach of being the most Irrational Creatures in the World, but by endeavouring to hector down the Belief, or at least the Concern of a Future State, and the dreadful Thoughts of a Following Account.  
FINIS.