SOME QUERIES Concerning the DISBANDING OF THE ARMY: Humbly offered to Public Consideration.  
Which may serve for an Answer to Mr. A, B, C, D, E, F, G's Argument.  
Printed in the Year 1698.   

IN putting any Nation in a Posture of Defence, Men must consider the Power of its Neighbours, especially those who are most to be feared; and that, instead of being Friends, they may become Enemies, notwithstanding Treaties to provide for a Perpetual Peace; for so all Treaties of Peace are called, though of late they have been found but of a very short Continuance; and that they will be our Enemies when ever there is any Advantage to be got by it, is certain, according to the Maxims of the World. This is the Foundation of the following Queries, and is (I think) an undeniable Postulatum; some of them have not been urged so expressly, and so home to the Point, as they might have been, (which would give them a much plainer Force and Evidence) for fear of writing any thing which might give Offence either one way or tother; but there is enough said to lead the Understanding and Impartial Reader into what may be wanting.   

QUERIES concerning the Disbanding of the Army, etc.  
1. WHether 'tis not as much the Interest of a Powerful Neighbour (both for the Preservation of that Monarchy in the formidable Greatness 'tis at present, and for the Propagation of the pretended Catholic Faith,) to endeavour to subdue England by the Re-establishment of the late King James, now in time of Peace, as it was during the late War?  
2. Whether HE be not more able to do at present in Peace, ●han he was during the War; that he has no Diversion abroad for his Forces, and that consequently he can bend them all upon us?  
3. How long the Treaties of the Pyrenees, Aix la Chapelle and Nim guen, and the 20 years' Truce concluded at Ratisbone after the taking of Luxembourg, have lasted? And whether 'tis not so much the Expresness of Articles and Conditions that makes a Peace lasting and durable, as the putting ourselves in such a Posture of Defence, as to give no Advantage to those who would be willing to break it?  
4. Whether 'tis not fit to consider, in the present Juncture of our Affairs, the Case between Spain and Portugal after the Pyrenean Treaty? And whether, if we do not look to ourselves, it may not become our own Case? For what has been, may be again?  
5. Whether HE being at Peace with the rest of Europe, and in a Condition to bend all his Forces upon us both by Land and Sea, and his Fleet being in the good Condition 'tis at present, we can put ourselves effectually in a Posture of Defence without Land-Forces?  
6. Whether if HE Arms at once at Dunkirk, Breast, and the Hogue, (which Place, as 'tis reported, Monsieur de Vauban has been to visit, in order to fortify it and make it a Royal Harbour,) our Fleet can hinder his Forces from coming upon us from every one or any one of these Places?  
7. Whether we have not found HIM very secret and expedite in his Designs? And whether HE has not his Seamen more at command than we have ours? And consequently, whether HE may not put out all his Fleet, or a competent Squadron, in less time than we can?  
8. Whether we may not be invaded during the vacancy of a Parliament, (which of course must be dissolved every three years, and this the last year of this present Parliament,) when His Majesty can have no Funds ready for the Raising, Clothing, etc. of an Army, nor even for the putting out of our Fleet soon enough for our Defence? And whether the Prince of Conti's present Pretensions upon Poland will not give our Neighbours a fair and plausible Pretext to embark Land-Forces the very next Summer?  
From the Premises, I ask Mr. A, B, C, D, E, F, G, 

1. Whether the present Government, our Religion, Laws, Liberties, etc. considering our present Circumstances, be not in an evident Danger of being Invaded, or of an Attempt towards it without Land-Forces for our Defence? And whether if HE, or the late King, ever land in England with an Army, we shall not be Conquered, without one to oppose them? And whether, under such Circumstances, we are not in a greater Danger of losing our Liberty of Parliaments, and Rights, Privileges, etc. than in having a sufficient Number of Land-Forces for our Defence?  
2. Whether of two Evils the least, and the least likely to happen, is not to be chosen, when we must of necessity expose ourselves to one or tother? And whether 'tis not more certain, considering all things, that HE will Invade us, or attempt to Invade us, if we have no Land-Forces for our Defence, than that the Land-Forces we may provide for that purpose will Invade our Privileges and Liberties?  
3. Whether Salus Populi, or the public Safety of a People, be not the Fundamental Law of ours, and of all Governments? And, if we are in danger of being invaded by our Neighbours, and if invaded, of being conquered by them, unless we have an Army as well as a Fleet for our Defence; whether 'tis then reasonable, just or prudent to object, That 'tis inconsistent with the Nature and Laws of a free Government to have an Army in time of Peace?  
4. Whether, during this Peace, we can compound with our Neighbours, that whenever they attempt to invade us, they shall only bring their Arrierban along with them? If not,  
5. Whether the Militia, (which was at first a very useful Institution when there were hardly any Standing Regular Troops in the World, and which may be still useful against a sudden rising of Irregular Forces,) can ever be made Defensible against Regular, Veteran, Well-disciplined Troops, if they land upon us? Or whether any Person, that knows what Armies are or can do, be of this Opinion?  
6. Whether if the Militia can be made Serviceable, to this effect, it will not be an incomparably greater Charge and Burden to the Nation, than a sufficient Number of Land-Forces, which may be maintained for our Defence?  
7. Whether the proposing to make the Militia Serviceable, be not an acknowledging, that 'tis at present Unserviceable for our Defence? And if so, then whether 'tis safe (considering the present Juncture of Affairs) to disarm, at least till it be made Serviceable?  
8. Whether if the Militia can be made Serviceable for our effectual Defence, if invaded, and if Men will go to the Charges mentioned to make it so, this can be done without subjecting the Militia to Military Discipline and Orders? And whether this can be done without intrusting the King with more Military Power than our Author desires to see him have, or than he could have with only a competent Number of Disciplined Regular Forces?  
9 Whether in all other respects 'twill not be worse for the Country to have the Militia up in every County so often as must then be required, besides the Regular Exercising of every private Company or Troop, (without which it cannot be imagined to make it Serviceable, if with it,) than to have a sufficient Number of Regular Old Troops under such Regulations as may be established in Parliament?  
10. Whether Land-Forces raised and maintained by Parliamentary Funds, and increased, diminished, or continued every Session, according as a present Conjuncture of Affairs in Christendom shall then (or from time to time may) require, can be called A Standing Army, and inconsistent with the Nature and Laws of A Free Government?  
11. Whether the Horse, as may be thought convenient for our Defence, (in the manner now specified) may not, whilst our Neighbours are quiet, be employed for the Guard and Security of Highways, and consequently for the Ease and Encouragement of our Inland Trade?  
12. Whether the Foot may not then be employed in the Fortifying of our Seacoasts, in the repairing of Highways, and other public useful Works, with a small addition then to their Pay; which Works cannot be done otherwise without a vast Expense; and not in the laudable Occupations our Author is pleased to compliment the Army with.  
13. Whether the Parliament may not find Methods for the keeping of Land Forces necessary for our Defence, so as to be no Burden to Inns, or any other public Houses, unless upon Marches?  
14. Whether, if we have a great Fleet at Sea, (as we must of necessity without Land Forces) it can effectually shelter us from an Invasion by our Neighbours from any of their Seaports whatsoever, notwithstanding they should Arm at once at D— k, in the Channel, and Western Ocean.  
15. Whether we can keep such a Fleet without Pressing Seamen, and forcing them out of Merchant Ships to Man it?  
16. Whether this can be done without bringing a great prejudice to the Trade and Commerce of the Nation, and consequently increasing the Trade and Wealth of our Neighbours?  
17. Whether this will not be a fair and just pretext for HIM to bring the main of his Forces upon his Frontier Seacoasts towards England, and consequently of projecting and effecting our Invasion with more Ease and Secrecy? And whether we can have great Fleets at Sea without giving a Jealousy to those who will only seek for an opportunity to break with us?  
18. Whether the Admiralty may not prove as bad in time of Peace as our Author supposes it (I hope injuriously) to have been in time of War? Whether there may not happen Treachery, besides many Accidents of Sea, Wind and Wether, (which 'tis reasonable to expect and provide against) which may spoil all the Precautions that can be taken in relation to our Sea Defence? And whether His Majesty did not come clear from the Maese to Torbay, notwithstanding that my Lord Dartmouth's Fleet was then in a Readiness, which is much a greater distance than HE has to come upon us?  
19 Whether these Dangers, to which we must expose ourselves without an Army, may not cause Fears and Jealousies among the trading part of the Nation, and the People in general, who thereupon may be apprehensive of an Invasion? Which consequently may tend to the crying down the public Credit of the Government, and thus bring a general Loss and Detriment upon all Trade and Trading.    
In Relation to the Army I ask Mr. A, B, C, D, E, F, G.  

1. Whether, as 'tis necessary, notwithstanding the Peace, (considering the present Conjuncture of Affairs,) to provide for our Defence, we are not in a better posture of Defence with an Army than we can be without one? and if so, then consequently, whether a competent Army for our Defence will not be a means to make the Peace more lasting and durable? And whether from thence we may not expect a better support from Allies abroad, against the exorbitant Power of HIM?  
2. Whether the having no Army for our Defence may not expose His Majesty's Person to the Attempts of Wicked Men, who have already taken hold of such a Conjuncture to put such a horrible Design on Foot, when we had but few Land Forces in England, and this without any regard to the greatness of our Fleet then at home?  
3. Whether the Army has not been very Instrumental in procuring to us the present Peaceable Enjoyment of our Religion, Laws, and Liberties, by the Glorious Reduction of Ireland; and in the whole course of the War in Flanders, where they have not only put a stop to the French King's Carrier, but taken one of the most impregnable Places of Europe; and where, in other Wars, without us, his Progresses went on like a Flood and an Inundation?  
4. Whether this be the only Service of this kind performed by our Land Forces for the security of the Protestant Religion, and of the Rights and Privileges of the People of England? But may be our Author owes them no thanks for some of these Services, and 'tis hard to know, whether for the Services of 1660. or those of 1688.  
5. Whether the Army has not for the two years' last passed, not to mention other times, served the King and Government (notwithstanding the great Necessities to which all the Officers have been reduced among Strangers for want of Pay) with an inviolable Fidelity and Constancy? Of which Fidelity and Constancy, His Majesty has given a Royal and most solemn Testimony and Acknowledgement in His most Gracious Speech at the opening of the last Sessions of Parliament.  
6. Whether our Author does believe in his Conscience, or any Man in his Wits can believe, that this Army (if kept in Pay for our Defence) will bring in the late King, as he extravagantly advances it in his Argument?  
7. Whether His Majesty in the whole Course of His Life has acted like a Man of Arbitrary Principles? Whether on the contrary, He has not refused the Sovereignty of a Powerful Republic, when (may be) he had a fair opportunity at home, but certainly the offer of a Powerful Assistance from abroad, and that even a whole Province had freely chose him for their Prince?  
8. Whether such a King can make any other use of such an Army as may be necessary for our Defence, than for the Safety and Protection of His People? Or if he would, Whether 'twould be safe, or even possible for him to attempt it, considering the present Conjuncture of Affairs both at home and abroad?  
9 Whether, Considering the late King James, and the pretended Prince of Wales after him, 's Claim to the Crown of England, and their Support from Abroad upon a favourable occasion, it be even feasible, for an Army raised for our Defence, to offer any Violence to our Rights and Liberties under the present Government, without bringing manifest Ruin upon it and themselves too? From whence I offer, by way of Conclusion, to those who may be given to change amongst us, That no Change can happen in England (arguing from Human Probabilities, according as Affairs are at present in Europe, and likely to continue for many yeats) from the present Government, but for Tyranny and Popery.  
10. Whether the Land Forces we have had Quartered in England during this War, have answered the  Character given 〈◊〉 a Standing Army by our Author? Whether on the contrary, they have not behaved themselves with all Submission and Obedience to the Laws, and Honour and Respect and Zeal for the Constitution of Parliaments? And whether we had not in the year 1696. above 17000 Men Quartered in England besides Officers, and at other times more or less? Whether the Troops Quartered in England during the late War, have endeavoured in the least to Byass or offer any manner of Violence to the Freedom of Elections? And whether, considering what has been said in the precedent Query, it be not more difficult for the Army to offer such a Violence now, than during the late War? For France would always profit of those Distractions which such Attempts would certainly cause in England.  
11. Whether, upon Cashiering of the Army (which has gained so much Honour and Credit to the English Nation abroad, where they have passed for the bravest and the finest Troops in the World) we can propose to ourselves to have such another at any time, if threatened with an Invasion, at a month or two's warning at the most; or even, one then fit for our Service?  
12. Whether this will not be a Temptation to good and serviceable Officers and Soldiers (unless their Zeal and Fidelity to the King and Government carries it against their Interest) to go where they may find Rewards and Advancements suitable to their Profession; and whether 'twill not make Officers in another War, careless and backward in our Service to prolong a War? For the Experience of near forty years' last passed tells us, That Treaties have not been of a long continuance.  
13. Whether 'twill not be the Interest of our Neighbours to Invite, by good Rewards and Encouragements, our best Cashiered Officers and Soldiers? and if it is their Interest, Whether they will not do it?  
14. Whether, considering this, and the late King's present Forces 
* They are his, if his upon any Occasion. , and that our Neighbours Ships may assist him under our own Colours, we do not run a Risque of being Invaded and Conquered, and Popery and Tyranny introduced by our own selves, if we have not a competent Army for our Defence?  
Lastly, I shall ask Mr. A, B, C, D, E, F, G, in the gross of his Book, Whether all the Jacobites of the Land, or any others who may wish for, or imagine the alteration of the present Government, be not of his Opinion in this Point? But God forbidden I should say, that all those who are of his Opinion are such Persons; no doubt a great many good Men, and well-meaning Persons are of his mind, and who, I hope, (when they are sensible of the fatal Consequences of it) will be of another Sentiment; and if our Author himself be amongst these well-meaning Men, I doubt not but he will forgive me freely, when nothing but my Zeal, Sincerity, and Affection for our Safety, has put me upon this Work.   
FINIS.