Some THOUGHTS CONCERNING THE BETTER SECURITY OF OUR Trade and Navigation, And Carrying on the WAR AGAINST FRANCE MORE EFFECTUALLY. Humbly Offered to Consideration.  
LONDON: Printed in the Year 1695.   

Some Thoughts concerning the better Security of our Trade and Navigation, and carrying on the War against France more Effectually: Humbly Offered to Consideration.  
I Always thought it the Duty of every Man to contribute what in him lies to the Happiness and Welfare of his Native Country, and therefore at a time when the Nation is engaged in a Necessary and Expensive War, and struggles under Difficulties to maintain it as it ought, many from time to time have divulged their Notions and Apprehensions, some for raising of Money, some for the better or more thrifty Management of sundry Particulars relating to the War; some one thing, and some another, and whether they are in the right or wrong, I think whilst they modestly give their Opinions, they do not deserve blame. But it seems to me that none have yet throughly discovered the Malady under which we labour, or proposed the full and proper Remedy. Perhaps in time it may, and in order thereunto I have resolved to offer my Thoughts to the Public in the following Discourse.  

1. And First, I shall consider what, according to my Apprehension, is the true Interest of England in general, and with respect to the present War with France in particular.  
2dly, What has been the Reason that hitherto we see no better Effect of this War.  
3dly, By what means it may be advantageously continued, and at length arrive to its desired Issue.   
And as to the First, it is to be considered, that the strength of England, or rather of Great Britain and Ireland, lies in the number and strength of their Fleets at Sea, and those Fleets are always stronger or weaker in proportion to those of our Neighbour Nations: Heretofore before Trade was driven to the East and West Indies, the European Nations were not so Powerful and Numerous in Ships of Force, nor was there need of it. When the Dutch fitted out but 40 Ships of War, and the French but 20, it sufficed then that England fitted out 60, or a few more; but since both the Dutch and French, as well as we, have enlarged our Trades to the East and West Indies, more Seamen have been bred in each Nation, and they thereby enabled to fit out greater Fleets in time of War than formerly. The French King well considered that he could never expect any considerable Success against England or Holland, unless he had a Fleet able to deal with theirs; and therefore wisely for himself provided so considerable a Navy, such as not many thought he would ever have been able to fit to Sea, viz. 100 Sail or near of Capital Ships; but still they proved too few against England and Holland united, because they were able to send out a greater. And I think I may confidently enough affirm, that at what time soever either of the three Nations (for no other stand in Competition in these Seas) shall not be able to set forth a Fleet of Ships capable to Engage the Fleets of the other two Nations in Conjunction, that Nation must one time or other give up the Sovereignty of the Seas, and be exposed to Invasion and Conquest, or at least to great Disturbance and Annoyance in time of War. And because England alone (by which I all along mean Great Britain and Ireland) is able to do this, whilst it understands and pursues its true Interest; therefore in such case by consequence neither Holland nor France can, but are subjected to the like hazard and danger, when England is in Conjunction with either of those other Nations, as it is now with Holland: And therefore it seems to me that France might some time ago have been brought down, if proper Methods had been prosecuted: Not that I would hereby go about to blame or censure the Conduct of Affairs, but as all Humane Actions are subject to various Casualties and Events, and many Difficulties occur in great Transactions, which are not easily obviated; so it is no wonder if the same Fact has befallen this Kingdom. The French, 〈…〉 〈…〉 steps during this War; some by Land, but more by Sea; or perhaps they might still have been in a better condition, and we in a worse: And whoever shall consider well the late Revolution, the great Difficulties the King has encountered, not only in forming and carrying on the Confederacy abroad, but in managing the different Interests and Factions at home, may rather think it strange to see things look with so good a face in the general as they do. The King has done his part, all that was for him Personally to do, to a Miracle, in carrying on the War with invincible Courage and Resolution, and has never lost a Minute's time, or any Opportunity to Prosecute it with Vigour, which I wish could be said of all his Subjects. But the discussing things in order to a yet more successful Prosecution of the War, and not Complaints, is the Province I am now engaged in, and in order to that, I may say that. I am, and always was of Opinion, that the Parliament have been so far from giving the King too much Money from time to time, that the first three Years if they had given him half as much more, it would have saved the Nation a great deal, in bringing the War sooner to a good end. And I think still that it is better, and more for the Advantage of the Nation, to give 8 Millions a Year than 5, provided it be well laid out, which is no difficult matter to see to. I have often heard it said, that the Parliament have always given the King what he asked, but the reason seems plain why the King or his Ministers ask no more, and that is, because it comes with so much difficulty; whereas if the People did well consider how much it is the Interest of England to bring down the Exorbitant Power of France, they would give more freely and readily than the King could ask. For what Security has any in England of enjoying their Religion, their Laws, their Liberties, and Properties, whilst France has a Fleet and Armies able to overcome us, if we were singly engaged against them, at least they had at the beginning of this War? And how Fatal would it have been to us, if England and France had joined together first to ruin Holland, and then to set up an Arbitrary Power in England, as it was designed, had the late Reign continued, and as yet the intention of some is, if they could break the Confederacy, or take off the King, or raise a Civil War in England before the Power of France is abated? It is true, the 
* A Ship so called, burnt with the rest at La Hogue.  Royal Sun of France is set, and since their Fleet has sailed by Moonlight, and so has wandered and lost its way, and cannot yet recover it; but they hope to see their Natural Sun rise again, and break forth, and bring a Glorious Day along with it. Though perhaps Lewis XIV. may fall asleep in this Cloudy Night, and (if it should happen at any time hereafter) may never wake to see it. It lies upon us then, now to improve the Opportunity which Providence has put into our hands. And that brings the Second thing I proposed into consideration; and that is, Why the War goes on so heavily, and so many Difficulties attend the Prosecution of it, and in raising Money; and that many People complain so heavily of Losses, want of Trade, bad Money, rise of Guineas, etc. Some find fault with the Bank, some with the Million Lottery and Annuities, and some with borrowing Clauses: And they would be in the right, if they could propose any other ways and means that are really better. It must be acknowledged, that by them the Nation pays dear for Ready Money, but Ready Money must be had for the Prosecution of the War, and bringing down the Power of France, which is the first Interest England has at present, and such ways to that end must be taken as can be found, till better offer.  
Now, I do not find that the Cure of this Disease has been throughly discovered; it has been indeed proposed how the value of Lands may be raised, and the Interest of Money lowered, which is a way to prejudice those that have Money at present, but does not at all enrich the Nation: For suppose 100 l. per An. in Land be now worth 20 Years Purchase, which is 2000 l. and Interest of Money is 5 per Cent. If Land come to 30 Years Purchase, than that Land will sell for 3000 l. and if at the same time the Interest of Money be at 3 per Cent. then the Gentleman who has Sold his Estate for 3000 l. makes 90 l. per An. of his Money; whereas before if he Sold it for 2000 l at 5 per Cent. Interest, he made 100 l. per An. which is loss to him. So that 〈…〉 I do not see how this will help the Landed Rich or Poor only in comparison with our Neighbours; for to that purpose Riches and Strength are all one, whilst Riches will procure Strength. I am ware that some will say, that People are a great part of the Strength of a Nation, which I own; and I include them in what I call Riches, as will appear presently. And therefore it is not the raising the Value of Lands, or lowering the Rate of Interest by Law or otherwise at once by a kind of Hocus Pocus, or slight of hand, but the increasing the Wealth and Stock of the Nation, which will necessarily draw along with it those good Consequences; and that is done by these two ways, and no other: First, By Importing more from abroad in Money or Money's worth than we send abroad. Secondly, By a greater Production in value by the Land and the Manufacture of the People in England, than the whole People consume in Clothing, Diet, and all other Expenses. And it is so, and no otherwise in the Estate and Stock of the whole Nation, as it is in the Estate and Stock of a Private Family; the spending out of the Principal, or main Stock, lessens a man's Estate; and so the spending or losing out of the Principal Stock of the Nation, lessens that, and weakens the Nation, and that we have been doing all this War; and it is the Remedy of that only which I conceive can Redress the Inconveniences complained of, and that will help the Land and all things else; for unless you bring it to pass, that the Land will produce more Corn, Hay, Grass, Butter, and Cheese, or whatever it be, than it used to do; and that the said Product will Sell for the same Price it did, or that the Country Gentleman can buy what he has occasion for at lesser Prizes than now he does; nothing else will Advantage him. For if you by a Law, or any other way at once (except it happens by the necessity of Trade arising from the increase of the Stock of the Nation) lower Interest, and raise the value of Lands, it is only an imaginary Advance, and will rob Peter to pay Paul; that is, wrong those that have Money, to serve those whose Lands are engaged, and at the same time, not better or increase the true or real value of the Lands, nor increase the Stock of the Nation, which alone can Remedy all the Evils complained of.  
And having thus prepared my way, I come without scruple to declare, That it has been the want of a proper Method in carrying on, and preserving the Foreign Trade of the Nation, and the Losses sustained by that, which has been the true Reason of the decay of Trade at home, the scarcity of good Money, and plenty 〈…〉 rise of Guineas, and the great difficulty in raising Money for carrying on the War. For if the Foreign Trade were promoted and secured as it might be, we might easily find Money to carry on a lasting War with France, and perhaps increase in Wealth at the same time. We have in that respect by our Situation a great Advantage of all European Nations, with respect to the Fishery, etc. if truly prosecuted; and by our Settlements in, and Trades to the West-Indies, have got very much the start of them, if we do not by our own Improvidence and undue Management give away the Advantages we are possessed of; we have done a great deal towards it in the East-India Trade, which might easily be retrieved, not only to the Nation's Honour and Advantage, but to the Adaantage and good liking both of the Company and Interlopers, if they were in a Temper to hearken to moderate Proposals; but it seems it is not yet the time, for I know that it has been offered to Men considerably concerned in the Companies, to make such Proposals as would be highly to their Advantage, and Satisfactory to the Interlopers, and of such general Advantage, as that there is no doubt but the Parliament would confirm: But they cared not so much as to hear or receive them. What the Mystery is, I cannot tell, or rather I do not think fit to publish. I hope it will not fall out so with what concerns the Nation in general, whose Wealth and Strength, as I have said, is increased by the increase of Foreign Trade, and the Advantages which that brings with it; and this seems so evident, as I do not remember that I have heard any one contradict or deny it: For it carries out all our own Product and Manufacture, and makes England a Mart for Foreign Commodities, and imports them in greater plenty and cheaper, and adds to the Number of our Shipping, and Navigation, and Seamen, and brings in Foreigners into our Nation; 〈…〉 most of the Traders have either lost their Estates, or drawn them out of Trade to lend the Government and Employ at home, which serves a present Occasion, and would have been a good Expedient for a War of a Year or two; but for a lasting War as this is, the Government and the People will find it Fatal, if not timely remedied.  
And in order to establish a means whereby the Foreign Trade may be increased and secured, it must be considered, that the present War with France is not like to a War with Holland or Spain, or other Nations; and therefore aught to be managed after another manner: The Situation of Holland, with respect to England, is such, that they cannot on a sudden send out any great number of Ships of War to intercept Fleets of Merchant's Ships going and coming with Convoy, especially in the Entrance into the Channel, where our greatest Danger is; neither can other Nations do it, not having Ports near to Friend, and therefore in Wars with those Nations, the securest way of Trading is probably to send out and return Trading Ships in Fleets with Convoys. But in the present War, if other Measures be not taken, than hitherto have been, our Trade is like to be wholly ruined, and when that is effected, the Fleet of Ships of War cannot be long maintained. Our Island may be compared to a Garrison, which may be distressed and starved, and by that means as well as by downright Force, constrained to Surrender. It is to be seen therefore what the danger and inconvenience is of carrying on our Trade with Fleets, and two or three Convoys, as hitherto, and if it may not be made more large and secure by another Method.  
The greatest danger of losing our Ships is in and near the entrance into our Channel, as has been too apparent, for that above three quarters of the Ships lost since the beginning of this War, have been taken there; and the French having so Commodious Ports, as Breast and St. Malo's, &c. to pop out and in at any time with what number of Ships they please, it is rather to be wondered they have not taken more of our Ships, than that they have taken so many. The Inconvenience and danger attending our Trading in Fleets this War, I shall represent in the following Particulars.  

1. The Enemy knows the strength of our Convoys, and their times of setting out and returning, and can more easily contrive to intercept them, as has been too evident.  
2. Many Goods laden for long Voyages are perishable, and decay whilst the Ships wherein they are laden attend on the Convoys.  
3. Greater Wages are given to Seamen, and greater Charges in sitting out so many Ships together, which causes excessive great Freights to be paid, to the extreme Prejudice of Trade, for Workmen and Seamen on a Glut will have their own Price.  
4. The time taken up in attending on Convoys at home and abroad increases the Charge of the Voyage to double what it otherwise would be.  
5. Buying Goods all at a time here makes them very dear, and coming together in a glut to the Markets abroad, causes them to be sold cheap, whereby the Advantage that might be made by Trade is lost.  
6. Embargoes being continued most part of the Year, or Pressing of Seamen, which is the same thing in effect, our Ships cannot then go out, and in the mean time Foreign Ships come and carry away our Trade, and earn vast Sums for Freight by their Ships and Seamen.  
7. During the Embargoes, the fair Merchants, who submit to the Orders of the Government, must lie still, whilst many by Private ways and means get out Ships under various Pretences, which can never be prevented.  
8. The Fleets to the West-Indies that go out in the Winter for the Crops, can never return with that Years Crop in time to serve His Majesty's Royal Navy with the Seamen the following Summer.  
9 Going out in Winter, and at unseasonable times, the Ships and Cargoes are subject to great hazards by Storms, etc. and the Ships themselves spoilt; and great Mortality happens to Seamen by lying long abroad, as has been too fatally experienced. For   
〈…〉 will Yearly add mightily to the Stock of the Nation, which consists in People, Land, Houses, Money, Plate, Jewels, and all sorts of Merchandise. And though to many this need not be explained, yet I do not think it improper for the sake of others, to add the Explanation. For instance,  
Suppose in England, Scotland, and Ireland (reckoning certain Numbers for uncertain) there is in this Year 1695. in People 10 Millions. in Land the value of 1 Year 10 Millions. in Houses 4 in Money 6 in Plate and Jewels 2 in Corn, Woollen, and Home Goods 6 in Foreign Goods 2  30 Millions.  
Now, if by any Accident you lose any People, or Land or Houses abate in their Yearly Produce and Value (and not in an imaginary Value,) for the Nation was not any thing the Richer for Guineas rising to 30 s. apiece, unless in Foreign Nations they would have sold for 50 per Cent. more than they did before, and brought so much overplus into England (which by the alteration of the Exchange it did not do.) Or again, if there be less Money, Plate, Corn, etc. or Foreign Goods, in the Year 1696. Then will the Nation be so much the poorer and weaker next Year than it is this: And on the other hand, if any or all the things , wherein the Riches of the Nation consists, shall be increased, so as that the whole amounts to more, then will the Nation be richer and stronger. As if a man has one Year Ten Bags with each 50 l. in them, which is together 500 l. it is not the taking out 10 l. apiece out of 5 Bags, and adding it to the other 5 Bags to make them 60 l. each, that increases his store, but an addition to the whole by any sort of Improvement.  
It is to be considered further, that the Interest of Trade and Land are the same, for the mutation frequently happens; the Moneyed Man to day is a Landed Man to morrow; and the Landed Man to day becomes a Moneyed Man to morrow: Every man according to his Sentiments of things turns and winds his Estate as he 〈…〉 will be most Advantageous to him; and therefore if it could be supposed that Land would come to 30 Years Purchase by any Stratagem, unless, as I have said, the Land itself would produce more, some would Sell till money grew scarce to Purchase, and Land plenty to Sell, and then the Scales would turn, and it would fall again; and nothing but the increase of money in the Nation, or of the Stock of the Nation in other things would or will lower the Interest of money, and increase the Value of Lands: And when Money and Goods are more plentiful, then there will be more buyers of Land, and so it will rise of course and necessity, and consequently the Interest of money fall. And nothing but a large Foreign Trade, especially when we are engaged in an Expensive War, as at present, can add to the value of Land. And therefore the general state of the Nation ought to be considered, and that will help all: For till money be more plenty, and the Stock of the Nation increased, as it has been decreased, you will find the Interest of money keep up in general; and it is not some few little Devices that will effect it in the main. It is true, if I have 1000 l. in my hands of another man's without Interest, I may lend it at 3 per Cent. Interest, and get well by it. And the Bank, that has 8 per Cent. Interest from the Nation, and has great Credit, may lend at 3 per Cent. And this is some Advantage to some particular Persons, but not very considerable to the Nation in general, it bearing no proportion to the Charges or Losses occasioned by the War; but it must be a real plenty of Money which enforces a necessity of taking a low Interest, because they cannot do better, which will Cure the Malady: And this can be effected by no other means than increasing the Stock of the Nation, and that by Foreign Trade, as has often been said. But the greatest difficulty is, how to promote and carry on this so securely, that many may rather be induced to continue Trade, it is Humbly Proposed,  
That all Ships may be permitted to go and come when and as often as they please, whereby the aforesaid Inconveniences in Trade will be removed, and a far greater Trade driven, and thereby His Majesty's Customs will be much augmented, many more Seamen bred, (for that Landmen would go out in Summertime, and be made good Seamen against the following Year) and better Provision made for Manning His Majesty's Fleet; and I doubt not but the Security of the Ships so Trading might be provided for, and the before mentioned dangers in great measure prevented by the following Method.  
1. That a sufficient Number of Fourth Rate Frigates, with some Third Rate and Fifth Rates, as occasion offers, may be appointed to Guard the Channel, and the Entrance into it, and to Cruize off Cape Clear in Ireland: And this I conceive may be done by 16 or 20 Frigates, two whereof Sailing continually between the Downs and Plymouth and Falmouth, and so back again; taking under their Charge all Merchant's Ships that shall be ready to Sail with them: And 14 or more may be constantly Cruzing from Plymouth to the Soundings and Cape Clear, 3 or 4, or sometimes 5 in a Squadron, plying to and again in proper places by turns, that when some must come in to recruit, the others may be in their stations, and once a Month bringing the Ships from Kingsale that shall put in there. And by this means the French Privateers will be frequently snapped up if they adventure abroad, and they will soon find that it will hardly be worth their while to come out.  
2. That Ships of War may remain at the Islands in the West-Indies for the Security of the said Islands, and of Ships going to and coming from thence; and as some Ships of War must be often coming home from thence, and others in their room going thither, such may serve as Convoys going out, and coming home, to such as shall desire to embrace that Opportunity. And it might not be difficult to contrive how the Mortality of so many Seamen in the West-Indies might be prevented.  
3. That some Ships of War might Cruise on the Coasts of Spain and Portugal, and whilst we have a strong Fleet at Cadiz, or in the straits, as we now have, and aught always to have, and should have had sooner, it is very easy to contrive the carrying on, and security of the Trades to Spain, Italy, and Turkey.  
〈…〉 Trades to the Northward, it is best carried on with Convoys, because in those Seas only small Privateers use, against whom the Convoys are a sufficient Guard, and there we cannot be easily surprised by any great strength, as to the Southward we may.  
It is not to be expected that in this short Scheme all the Particulars should be set forth that are necessary to the through Management of the Trade in this manner; but if the general Notion find Entertainment, the Author is ready to answer all Objections, and in all particular Instances that may occur, to demonstrate that it will be Practicable, etc. with more Security to the Trader, and less Charge to the Crown, than hitherto it has been. And then the want of Money will be supplied, the Stock, and consequently the Strength and Riches of the Nation increased, and without much difficulty the French Navigation may be destroyed, on the strength whereof that Monarch has for some time passed founded his hopes of the Accomplishment of his Great Atchivements; and without which (as the case now stands in Europe) he will always fail succeeding in great Erterprises, unless England become again so blinded, or rather corrupted, as to contribute to the Increase of his Naval Force and Power.  
FINIS.