A DISCOURSE Concerning Generosity.  
LONDON, Printed by H. Clark, for james Adamson, at the Angel and Crown in St. Paul's Churchyard, 1693.   

THE PREFACE.  
SInce we find 'tis so difficult a thing to engage Men to the sincere Love and Practice of Virtue and Goodness; It is but reasonable that we make use of all manner of proper ways and means which may be deemed serviceable to that end. No Consideration that has any weight, should be omitted; nor any fit Argument or Motive left untouched. It is necessary to make our Attempts upon all those Principles of the human Nature, from which Men are wont to act, especially those which are of great force and influence upon them; and to offer such Arguments and Motives as are suited to work upon each of those Principles respectively. Some Principles indeed do operate in Men more powerfully than others: But that need not hinder us from endeavouring, by proper Arguments and Motives, to work upon those which are less powerful: Since none of the Principles of Action which Men naturally have, were put into them in vain.  
We know that the Affections or Principles of Hope and Fear are of vast and universal influence upon men's Actions. Religion could not easily subsist without an appointment of Rewards and Punishments: Nor could the consideration of Rewards and Punishment have such force upon Men as it has, but that it is suited to operate vehemently upon two powerful Principles in them, to wit, their Hope and Fear. And hence it comes to pass, that nothing is more effectual to retain Men within the bounds of their Duty, than the prospect they have of Reward for the observation, and of Punishment for the violation of it. And this shows, that 'tis upon very good reason, that the Scriptures do chief apply and insist on Arguments drawn from this Topick, to engage Men to Virtue and Piety; and that Divines and Preachers have usually taken the same Method. But my Design at present is of a somewhat different nature. And because the Topick of Rewards and Punishments has been; and is, copiously and fully treated on by Divines: To them I shall leave it: To whose Province it seems more especially to belong.  
But besides Hope and Fear, there are some other Principles within us, of which great use may be made, in order to engage us to the love and practice of Virtue. Particularly, from the natural sense we have of Honour and Shame, we may likewise draw good and forcible Motives to Virtue. And by adding the Motives we draw from them, to those which are wont to be drawn from the other Principles that are in us, we may bring ourselves under a more powerful Obligation to do our Duty. This is what I propose to myself in this Discourse. Wherein I do not go about to detract from, much less wholly to exclude those Arguments or Motives which are fetched from the consideration of Rewards and Punishments, or from any other just Topick: But leaving them upon their own bottom, am endeavouring to reinforce them with those additional Arguments and Motives which result from the Principles that are in us of Honour and Shame. I would engage Men to Virtue and Goodness, by working upon their natural Principles of Self-esteem and Ambition, and of Honour and Shame: And, therefore, doubt not but I shall be thought to act in concert with those, who likewise design to engage Men to Virtue, by Arguments and Motives calculated to work upon men's Hope or Fear, or any other of their natural Principles. And since Men are of various Dispositions, and not only different Persons, but even the same Persons at different times, do act upon various Motives: It may be hoped that the greater variety of just Motives are made use of, the better success may ensue; and that, if the Arguments or Motives of the one sort do not take fast hold of Men, those of the other sort peradventure may.  
And I confess I found myself the more willing to engage my Pen on this Subject, because Generosity is not usually taken notice of so much as, perhaps, it ought, and I conceive deserves to be. There is but little mention (for aught I can find) made of it, either in the Systems of Moralists, or the Instructions of ordinary Preceptors and Tutors. And that, if I am not mistaken, is a defect necessary to be in some measure supplied: Since Generosity is a Principle extremely useful, and of so very extensive a Nature, that it does in a sort pervade the whole Body of Morality; as I hope to show by and by.  
In the mean time, I think myself obliged to acknowledge, That I am indebted to the Learned and Ingenious Des Cartes, for that which is indeed the Groundwork of this Essay. I have followed as exactly as I could, the lively, tho' short Description which he has given of Generosity; and some times choose to make use of his words, not being able to find others better, or indeed so good. But whether I have improved any of the Hints which he has given, or represented them to advantage; that I must submit to the Judgement of others; since it is neither needful nor proper for me to determine in the Case.  
The Argument itself, I must confess, is great and noble; and requires a better Head and Genius than I am Master of, to handle it justly. But if I have attempted a thing above my Pitch; I am sure I have done it with a good Intention. Nor can I, upon the Matter, blame myself for the Undertaking: Since the cause of Virtue seems to demand an Attempt of this nature; and the Persons best qualified have not (that I know) engaged in it so fully and particularly as might be wished. Upon that Account, I am persuaded, the Sincerity of my intention in this Matter (which I steadfastly avow, and of which I believe there will be no reason to doubt) will entitle me to the Excuse of candid People for the meanness of my Performance. And I allow myself to hope, that as course as the Picture is which I present you with, it will serve to make the Original appear very Amiable.   

Imprimatur,  
Ra. Barker, Reverendissimo in Christo Patri ac D no. D no. Johanni Archiepiscopo Cant. a Sacris. Feb. 15, 1692/3.   

A DISCOURSE Concerning Generosity.  
WE live in an Age wherein there are great pretensions made to Religion, and no less to Honour. And as these two are in themselves excellent Things, so I must confess 'tis a great satisfaction to me, that they continue to bear so general a Reputation in the World. It cannot indeed be wondered, that Things which are both excellent in their Nature, and likewise of universal Esteem, should be the Objects of most men's aim and ambition; since it's very natural, it should be so. But if Men were as well agreed, what is most truly and properly meant by the Terms, Religion and Honour, as they are agreed, that these two things deserve their Esteem and Prosecution; we might hope for some visible Improvements both in their Sentiments and Practice.  
It is our misfortune, that we are too often carried away by Appearances; and calling things by wrong Names, are insensibly led into error, whilst we think ourselves altogether in the right. We apply to some things the characters that are due to others, and give magnificent Names to things that are, in their nature, either vicious and faulty, or at best but trivial and inconsiderable. Thus it sometimes falls out, that Men call that by the name of Religion, which either is not Religion, or which at best has but little to do with it; and by the name of Honour, that which either is not so, or which, at best, scarce deserves to be considered under that Title. Now he that has, in this manner, entertained mistaken Notions about either Religion, on the one hand, or about Honour on the other, is nearly concerned to rectify such Mistakes; and that, for one plain Reason, among others, to wit, Because the abuse of a very good thing commonly produces very ill effects.  
It is not my design to enter into a large Disquisition upon the Subjects of Religion and Honour; I must content myself to touch on them incidently, so far as they relate to my present Argument: In the prosecution whereof, I hope nevertheless, to make some advantage of the universal Esteem which these two have justly obtained in the World. And since Generosity has a natural Affinity both to Religion and to Honour, I suppose a Discourse upon that Subject, will be thought the more suitable to the Genius of the Times. But, which is of much greater Importance, it may likewise be hoped, that the Man of Religion will be induced to entertain the better thoughts of Honour; and on the other hand, the Man of Honour, to entertain the better thoughts of Religion, when they shall respectively consider, that these two have, in themselves, a natural Relation and Affinity to each other, at how great distance soever the opinion or practice of some Men may seem to have set them. For I am persuaded, it will be no hard matter to reconcile these two, if we will but resolve them into their first and naked Principles, and will but take the pains to separate each from its abuses and the false characters attributed to it: Which being the only occasion of the seeming difference, as soon as those are removed, that seeming difference will vanish, and the natural agreement there is between them will show itself. That there is really such an agreement between them, will, I hope, be made out in the process of this Discourse; at least so far as may be necessary to my present purpose; which I shall think sufficient.  
When I speak of a conformity or agreement between Religion and Honour, it is evident I don't mean by Religion, particular modes or distinctions of Religion, or distinctions of Sects or Professions, which are sometimes called by that Name; nor do I mean by Honour, temporal Dignity or height of Title or Station, ancienty of Family, right of Precedence or Jurisdiction, Gentility, or any of those external Gallantries that are wont to make such a glare in the Eyes of the World; which are likewise sometimes called by the name of Honour. There is indeed difference enough between Religion and Honour taken respectively in these Senses. But by Religion I mean, the Law of the rational Nature, or the complex of these Laws which are given by God Almighty unto Mankind for the Government of their Lives and Actions. And by Honour, I mean, That Principle residing in men's minds, by which they are excited to choose and do those things which are really worthy and becoming, and to refuse and avoid those which are really base and unbecoming: Which Principle, because it gives Men the genuine stamp of Honour, is rightly called by that name. And it is between these two, taken respectively in the latter sense, that I affirm there is such a Conformity: I mean a Conformity between the Rule of Religion, and the Rule of Honour; and between the Principle of Religion and the Principle of Honour.  
If we look into the Composure of Mankind, we shall find that they are naturally endowed with a Principle of Self-love. And this Principle is found to be of vast and universal influence upon them, and the secret Spring as it were of all their Actions. Now one effect of this Principle is, That it disposes Men to value themselves for something or other, and to a certain ambition or desire of having those Qualities or doing those Actions which they account great and admirable. This may be called Self esteem: And is a Principle which operates variously in different Persons, according to their different Application of it, and the different Conceptions which they have of things: Insomuch that it carries some Men into an infinite number of Follies, whilst it proves to others who make the right use of it, a Spur to brave and worthy Actions and Designs: Of which more in its place.  
If any Man think, that all manner of Self-esteem is vicious and condemnable; he may please to consider, that what I here call Self-esteem taken in a Philosophical sense, is a Principle which we have unavoidably, without our own Choice: It necessarily results from the general Principle of Self-love fundamentally implanted in us by Nature, and is far different from what is ordinarily called Self-conceit. Those Principles or Dispositions which we have in us by Nature, ought not, when considered only in their pure Naturals to be deemed culpable; left thereby we obliquely accuse the Author and Lord of Nature himself. It is universally allowed by considering Men, that the Affections which are put in us by Nature, such as Love, Hate, Desire, Joy, Grief, and the like, are in themselves innocent and inculpable; and that 'tis only the excess and abuse which renders them vicious. It is not our Fault, that we have in us the Affections of Love or Hate, for that we have naturally and unavoidably: But our Fault is, that we Love or Hate undue Objects, or Love or Hate immoderately. So it is not our Fault that we have in us the Affection of Self-esteem; for that we have also unavoidably from Nature itself, so that 'tis impossible to erace it out of our minds: But our Fault is in misapplying this Affection, by esteeming ourselves without just cause, or by doing it to excess; in which case, we fall into Pride, Self-conceit, and the like Vices, which are justly condemned by all Mankind.  
Since, therefore, there is put in Man, by Nature, such an Affection or Principle of Self-esteem; and since it is of such vast influence upon his thoughts and actions, it must needs be of huge importance to regulate this Affection rightly, so that it may be applied to just Objects and exerted in a just manner: Especially considering, that 'tis as beneficial to use it right, as 'tis pernicious and dangerous to abuse or misapply it. But we need not think, that we are under any obligation to endeavour to extirpate this Principle or Affection out of our minds, any more than we are, those of Love, Desire, Joy, Grief, Hope, Fear, and such like; we are not obliged to things impossible: But we are under the strongest Obligations in the World, to endeavour to correct in them whatever tends to abuse or excess: And this is not only possible, but is indeed one of the grand businesses of our Life. As for the Affection of Self-esteem, I am persuaded, the Virtue or Principle of Generosity, which I am about to treat of, will be of great use to regulate it, and I think I may say, without fallacy, most of the other Affections too.  
Now in handling the present Argument, I shall endeavour to do these three things.  

First, To explain the Nature of Generosity.  
Secondly, To show the usefulness of the Principle, for the due government of our Actions.  
Thirdly, To show how Generosity may be acquired, or afterwards improved in our Minds.   
First, I shall try to show the Nature of Generosity. Now Generosity may, in general, be considered under a twofold respect, 1. As a Passion or Affection in Man; and this is the more narrow and restrained Notion of it. And next, As a Power or Principle immediately founded in the rational Nature; and this is the more large and comprehensive Notion of it. So far as it is attended with a Commotion in the Blood and Spirits, or with a Sensation more immediately relating to the Body, so far it has the nature of a Passion or Affection. And so far as it depends purely on the rational Nature of a Man, and is attended with such Cogitations as immediately relate to the Soul, so far it may be considered as an intellectual or rational Power. Nor need we think it strange, that having but one Name, it should, under different respects, have the nature of an Affection, and likewise of an intellectual Power. The Names we give to things are not always adequate; and it's scarce possible they should be in Matters of this kind. There is so strict an Union betwixt the Soul and Body of Man, and such a reciprocal operation of the one upon the other, that sundry of his Acts are compounded, partly of Sensations referring to the Animal Nature, and partly of Cogitations referring to the Rational. Since, therefore, those Cogitations of the Soul, which either produce a Virtue in Man or accompany it, are in most Cases either attended with or confirmed by some Perception or Affection of the Animal Nature: And since, on the other hand, some Perfections or Affections of the Animal Nature dispose the Soul to certain Cogitations helpful to the producing in it the acts of some particular Virtues: It is easy to believe, there will be in the effect of this reciprocal Operation, a mixture of the Virtue and Affection; and so we find it falls out. Humility is a known Virtue, and Pride a known Vice; yet each of these are in some sense a Passion or Affection, as well as upon other accounts a Virtue and a Vice. Humility, for instance, has the nature of a Virtue, so far as it is a Power or Principle referring purely to the Soul, and producing such Cogitations and Actions as are commendable by the Laws of the rational Nature; but is still a Passion or Affection, so far as it is accompanied with a commotion in the animal Spirits, or in general with any corporeal Impression. The like might be said of several other Virtues; and, mutatis mutandis, of several Vices.  
Generosity then, considered as an Affection, consists in a just Self-esteem, whereby a Man values himself just so much as he lawfully and fairly may. And under this respect it is a Species of the general Affection, called Admiration, and holds the Medium between the two Passions of vicious Humility and Pride, correcting what is amiss in each. But there are likewise certain other Dispositions or Habitudes (worth remarking, because they are of great use and ornament) which may be referred to Generosity; of which sort are, a masculine Firmness and Constancy, Presence of Mind and Sweetness of Temper. This Firmness and Constancy is of force to compose a Man's Spirits, to establish his Thoughts, and to preserve him steady and consistent with himself; and by those means secures him, not only from many of the Livities and Imbecilities which they are apt to fall into, who are guided by impulse and fortuitous impression; but also, from several of those errors and preposterous actings to which fear or feebleness of Spirit are wont to expose Men. And so Presence of Mind, operates in much the same manner, in case of sudden emergencies; and by preserving the mind intrepid, undisturbed, and present to itself on such occasions, secures the Man from being surprised into things hurtful or indecent. So, likewise, the Sweetness of Temper which accompanies Generosity, serves to render Men pacific, agreeable and easy to themselves and others. And as it tends to overcome the humorous and sour Qualities which make Men uneasy to themselves, and disagreeable in Conversation; so it likewise disposes them to all the decent Expressions imaginable of Civility and Complaisance.  
It is true, the several Dispositions aforesaid may be many times owing to men's natural Temperament. But yet, if Men have them not by the gift of Nature, 'tis in great measure within their power to acquire them, or to cultivate and improve them when acquired; and to correct the contrary Qualities. Some Men indeed have the happiness to be naturally of an ingenuous Disposition, Candid, Sincere, Modest, and of a firm and masculine Temper; having, by the particular vouchsafement of God Almighty, a loveliness and sweetness of Spirit which cannot be expressed, and such a Command over their Spirits as is of extraordinary advantage to them. They who have these and the like Qualities implanted in them by Nature, are in a sort born to Generosity. And even they who have them in a lower degree, are altogether unexcusable if they do not endeavour to cherish and improve them, since the acquisition of Generosity would be so easy, where there is such a natural aptitude for it. On the contrary, some Men are particularly unhappy in their composure, being naturally of a rough and feral Temper, dark and solitary in their Minds, stubborn, haughty, or of feeble and impotent Spirits. He who is concerned in any of these or such like ill Qualities (for one cannot with a good Grace suppose them all in one Man) is, its true, under peculiar difficulties as to the acquiring of Generosity. But as that aught to quicken his diligence and care to overcome those Impediments which his natural Temper puts him under, so if he does overcome them, his Conquest will be the more glorious: But I am not to insist upon that in this place. But from the different Dispositions of People, we may observe in what manner Generosity resides in men's Tempers, and how it mixes itself with their other Affections and Dispositions. And this, I think, does partly tend to show the Nature of it; which is what we have been considering.  
But since my design is, to consider Generosity, not barely as it falls under the notion of a Passion or Affection; but principally, as it is a Virtue or intellectual Power inherent in the Mind, under which respect it is of the greatest use: I must now advance a little further. Now if Generosity be (as I hope to show that it is) an intellectual Power of the Soul, helpful for the good government of a Man's Passions, corporeal Impressions and Appetites, and disposing him to prosecute that which is absolutely best (which is the character and description of Virtue) than we shall be obliged, in reason, to acknowledge it to be a Virtue. And if, moreover, it be (as indeed it is) such an intellectual Power of the Soul, as serves to produce in Men the habit and practice of several particular Virtues; than it will rather fall under the notion of a general Principle of Virtue, than of a particular Virtue. And as such, chief, I mean now to consider it; not singly as a particular Virtue, but in a larger extent, as 'tis a general Principle of the rational Nature, and the fruitful Parent of many particular Virtues.  
But before I proceed further upon this Matter, it will, I conceive, be proper to premise a few summary Considerations, for clearing the way to what follows. It is acknowledged by all Men, who are in their right Mind, That there is an essential difference between Good and Evil; a difference founded in the nature of things, so that some things are essentially Good, and others essentially Evil: That what is Good, is Eligible, Honourable and becoming Man's Nature, and tends to advance and perfect it: And on the contrary, that what is Evil, is to be refused and avoided, is dishonourable and misbecoming, and tends to a Man's Shame, Reproach and Misery. That what is Good, naturally imports in it the character of Honourable, that is, challenges and deserves Honour; and the doing of it, cannot be matter of just shame or disgrace to a Man: And on the contrary, that what is Evil, naturally imports in it the character of Dishonourable, and the doing of it, cannot be matter of just praise or ornament to a Man. And that Mankind are endued with Notions corresponding to the nature of things in this case; and have, by the Principles inherent in their minds, an ability of discerning, in some measure, what is Good and what Evil, what is Honourable and Becoming, and what is Dishonourable and Unbecoming. These things are clear in themselves; and they are likewise confirmed to us by the universal consent of wise Men, who have, in all Ages, esteemed some things Good, and others Evil: The former they have accounted Great, Worthy and Honourable; the latter, Base, Rascally and Dishonourable. Hence they have called Virtue, an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, a Resemblance or Conformity to God, that which is Fit, Equitable, Becoming, Beautiful, Divine, and the like; giving the contrary Appellations to Vice. Hence they always deemed the former worthy of Esteem, Veneration and Reward; and the latter, worthy of Shame, Contempt and Punishment. And hence such Persons as have been endowed with extraordinary Qualifications, and have done great and worthy things, have been in all Ages thought to deserve Esteem and Honour: But on the contrary, such as have been vicious and depraved in their Minds, or guilty of base and infamous Actions, have been thought to deserve Shame and Ignominy. And upon such Principles as these, is founded the very notion of Merit, which implies in it, as well the suitableness and congruity there is, that such as have brave Spirits, and perform brave and worthy things, should be honoured and esteemed, as likewise the right and title they have to such Honour and Esteem, as the just reward of their Virtue. And hence all wise Lawgivers have thought it both necessary and just, to appoint Honours and Rewards for virtuous and heroical Actions: and Shame and Punishments for vicious and infamous ones. The foregoing Considerations amount to this, That nothing can be truly and intrinsically Honourable, but what is according to Virtue: That what is according to Virtue, is truly and intrinsically Honourable: That Praise and Honour are by a natural and indelible Right due to true Merit; and true Merit is founded only in true Virtue and Goodness. Thus it may be seen, what is most truly honourable and conducing to our Happiness, and the Perfection of our Nature. And in regard we have in us, by Nature, a vehement desire of Happiness and Perfection, it highly concerns us to make use of that Principle for the purposes which God Almighty appears to have designed in his implanting it in us; that so we do not abuse or pervert a Principle which is given us for excellent ends, and which is of mighty influence upon our Minds and Actions, and put upon ourselves the fatal Cheat of pursuing an imaginary Good, and an imaginary Felicity, instead of that which is real and solid: But on the contrary, being made sensible in what our true Honour and Happiness consist, we may prosecute that with our utmost intention and diligence. And how serviceable the Principle of Generosity may be to us in that good Design, may be worth our while to inquire.  
Now I come to speak of Generosity, as it is founded in, or more immediately relates to the rational Nature. And under this Notion it may, in like manner as before, be considered, first, with respect to the Principle of Self-esteem, and then with respect to those other Qualifications or Powers of the rational Nature, which it either produces or is wont to be attended withal. So that being now to discourse of it as an intellectual Principle, I must be allowed to take it in a fuller Latitude than I have yet done, or could properly do when I considered it barely as a Passion or Affection. And after I have spoken something concerning the Principle of Self-esteem, I shall endeavour to show, how Generosity is suited to regulate and conduct it rightly, and then shall take notice of some particular Virtues which belong, or may be referred to the character of Generosity.  
Tho' the Principle of Self-esteem be common to all Men, being implanted in them by Nature, yet it is found to operate diversely in different Persons, and even in the same Person at different times. Being of a very lively and moving Nature, it will exert itself one way or other, either for better or worse. If it be not made an Instrument to Virtue, it will prove an Instrument to Vice; and for want of being rightly managed and conducted, will carry Men into those Extremes which are vicious and culpable. Thus it has very different Effects, according as Men use it rightly or amiss. As, when a Man reflecting inwardly upon himself, suffers the Self-esteem that is in him to work upon false grounds or to exceed its just limits, and either imagines that he has in him those good Qualities which he really has not, or swells beyond due bounds those good Qualities which are really in him; and thereupon sets a higher value upon himself than in Justice and Reason he ought; or unjustly prefers himself before other Men: Then that Self-esteem which was in its pure Naturals an innocent Affection, degenerates into Pride, and becomes justly . And on the other hand, when a Man reflecting upon himself, from the contemplation he has of his own imbecilities, and of his inability to conduct his Passions and Actions aright, is depressed in his Thoughts for want of sirmness and steadiness of Mind, aggravates his own Imperfections, and depretiates what is really commendable in him; and thereupon sets a lower value upon himself, at least while this Passion continues, than in reason he ought: Then his Self-esteem (if one may here so call it) degenerates into vicious Humility or Abjectness; which is likewise . But in opposition to both these, when upon the Reflection a Man makes on himself, he sets such a value upon himself as is no more or less than what is just and warrantable, and poises his Mind between the extremes of Pride and Abjectness; then his Self-esteem is rightly tempered and conducted, and the Man is led to that Temper of Mind which is the character of Generosity.  
It will be readily acknowledged, that 'tis much more frequent for Men to err by esteeming themselves overmuch, than by sinking their own value. For though Self-contempt, as well as Pride, proceeds from the operation of Self-love, the former being compounded of Self-love, Admiration and Grief, for the defects which a Man finds or supposes to be in him; as the latter is componed of Self-love, Admiration and Joy, for the Excellencies he finds or supposes to be in him: Yet the Self-love that is in Men, does, as it falls out, more easily and readily produce Self-esteem than Self contempt. There is a stronger Bias on that side than on the other. And therefore 'tis no wonder that Pride, which is a kind of Self-esteem, to wit, a wrongful or excessive one, should be a more common Error than vicious Humility which is a kind of Self-contempt. Nor will it seem strange, that Pride should be the more growing and thriving Vice of the two, if it be considered, that the Self-love that is in Men has not only the greater Bias towards Pride, but likewise operates more vehemently that way; which may easily occasion that Vice to spread further, and run more into the extreme: As when a thing is moving, the stronger its Motion is, the further it is like to run beyond the Lines. Upon which account, it seems necessary, for Men to guard themselves with the greater care and caution on that side where there is the greater danger. But since I am not advising any Body, either to over-rate himself for fear of falling into a vicious Humility, or to underrate himself for fear of falling into Pride; but am endeavouring to point at a Method for avoiding both those extremes: I shall think it sufficient for my present purpose to observe, That both those Extremes are condemnable; and that Generosity is a Remedy against both.  
But in the mean time, is it really a disadvantage and snare to us, that we are naturally more disposed to Esteem than  ourselves? Or, may not that natural Disposition be so tempered and applied as to be of great advantage to us? If it be a disadvantage and snare to us, it becomes so through our own fault; and if it be not made use of to our greater advantage and benefit, it will likewise be our own fault. The disposition to esteem ourselves, is strong and weighing; but what is its natural tendency and use? Is it the natural use of it, to incline us to esteem ourselves upon false or frivolous Grounds, or to esteem ourselves beyond the just measure? Is the natural use of it to lead us to Pride, and the numerous train of hateful and black qualities that are wont to accompany it? Certainly it cannot be. These are Faults which proceed from the gross abuse of this disposition, and therefore cannot be the natural use of it. Or is it designed only to give us the fantastic pleasure of Self-applause? Sure this is too low and mean a Design for a Principle of so great and universal influence as this is upon our thoughts and actions. On the contrary, without doubt the natural use and design of it is, To beget in Men an emulation and ambition for Virtue, to establish and compose their Minds; and in a word, to incite them to worthy and becoming things, and deter them from the contrary. If Men were void of all Self-esteem, they could not be touched with the sense either of Honour or Shame. These would take no hold of them, since they are founded upon the esteem which Men have of themselves, and cannot subsist without it. Now the impressions of Honour and Shame are found to lay a great Restraint upon Mankind; and sometimes work upon them, when other Considerations prove ineffectual. But if Men were destitute of all Self-esteem, they would be lose from this Restraint; which I think 'tis clear would be a great disadvantage to them: And therefore sure 'tis an advantage to them to have such a Principle. So likewise, since Men are so naturally disposed to esteem themselves; that both may and aught to be an Argument to them, to undertake and do those things only which are really Praiseworthy. Seeing they love and are willing to have esteem; that is a proper Motive to them to do those things which may deserve and procure it. But the Self-esteem that is in Men, is also of use, as it serves to compose and establish their Minds. It brings with it a calm and serenity into the Mind, and puts it, as one may say, into a good Humour. It produces in Men such Sentiments as give them a steadiness and assurance of Mind, and secure them from the disorder and embarass which the Affection of Self-contempt is wont to be attended with. And it is likewise of great force to animate and enliven the Mind, and to dispose Men to action and effort. For being in its operation, mixed with a kind of Joy and Complacency, the sensations that are thereby produced in the Man, serve to open his thoughts, and to dispose him to a lively and active temper of Mind: Which is of considerable use. Whereas on the other hand, the Affection of Self-despect tends to deaden and discompose the Mind; and being in its operation mixed with the sluggish and melancholy Passion of Grief (as I before observed) brings upon the Mind such a Languor as is oftentimes very prejudicial. So that seems in itself rather beneficial it than hurtful to Mankind, that they have such a natural Byass and Disposition to Self-esteem.  
But you will say, this Self-esteem is apt to exceed its just bounds, and to betray Men into Pride and an extravagant conceit of themselves. But is it therefore in itself culpable? If it be mischievous in its Abuse, may it not be advantageous in its right and regular use? If it produce this effect in us, it does not (as I have already said) do this naturally and unavoidably, but by accident and by our own Fault. There are several Principles or Propensities that belong to our Nature, which will certainly run into extremes if they be not balanced and rightly managed; especially those which are, as this is, vehement and of powerful influence upon us. And if we are not wont to think that they are in themselves culpable and unmanageable, why should we think this to be so? Let us turn our Eyes but to a few Instances. Every Body knows we have in us a Principle of Self-preservation: Which is indeed both innocent in itself, and also of great and necessary use. But this is likewise apt to exceed its just bounds. If Men should give it a lose Rein and follow without reserve its blind Dictates, it would in all probability throw them into such an excess of Fear and Solicitude for themselves, as would render them useless to their Friends or their Country, as would disable them to pursue the Rules of Justice, Charity, Fortitude and all other Virtues, the practice whereof may be attended with danger and hazard, and would perhaps sometimes destroy the very end for which this Principle seems designed, as it befalls them, who hurl themselves into Danger or Death, through excessive Fear of it and Solicitude to avoid it. There is also in Men a vehement desire of Procreation. And that Propensity is innocent in itself, and both may and aught to be so governed, as to answer its end without exceeding the just bounds. Yet should Men let themselves lose to follow its impulse without fear or wit, no doubt but it would carry them into the last Extravagancies. So likewise the innate desire of Happiness that is in Men, is capable of being directed rightly; and we ought to make use of it, as may be subservient to the end for which it was given us. But Men may misapply it; and when they do so, it will, by the prevailing influence it has upon them, carry them far into the Extreme, and inspire them with as great a Fervency in the prosecution of a false or imaginary Good, as of the real and true One. In short, these and other vehement and operative Principles or Propensities are given Men for wise and good Purposes; some of which we are able easily to discover, and if they be rightly managed will be of great use. But if we do not endeavour to conduct them by our Reason and the Laws which God hath given us for that purpose, the blame will justly fall upon our own selves. It will not therefore, I conceive, either turn to so good account, or so well become us, to bequarrel and find fault with our own Nature and Composure, as it will, to endeavour all we can to attemper and conduct the Principles and Propensities that are in us, by the Laws of Reason and Revelation. But I am now concerned only with the Principle of Self esteem, and therefore shall proceed to consider, how it is mixed with Generosity, and conducted by it.  
Whoso exactly observes the Nature of Mankind, will find, that there is nothing which can so properly and absolutely be called a Man's own, as the free disposal of his own Will: And that generally speaking, a Man cannot justly be either praised or dispraised, but for those Actions which depend on this freedom of his Nature: because he has nothing else so entirely in his own power. Now agreeably hereto, the Character of a Generous Man will be such as follows:  
The Generous Man finds in himself a Resolution to use that Freedom of his Will rightly, and thereupon is always inclined to undertake and execute what he shall judge best and most fitting to be done. And then, he values himself upon nothing so much as upon the sincere use of his Natural Freedom, and the firm purposes he makes to prosecute Virtue with an extreme application. He does not value himself upon account of any of those things which are wont to beget Pride in Men, such as Honours, Riches, Wit, Beauty, Success, or the like: but upon account of that, which no Man can, properly speaking, be proud of, because it is not an Excellency peculiar to himself above other Men, but a Property of the Human Nature in general, to wit, The Free Disposal of his own Will. And by this means he is secured from Pride. On the other hand, he is very sensible of the Failings and Imperfections incident to Human Nature, by reason whereof he knows himself to be liable to those Errors and Offences which he sees in other Men. And he considers at the same time, that other Men, as having the free disposal of their own Wills, as well as himself has of his, may use that freedom as well as himself does or better, if they be not themselves in fault. And therefore he is not inclined to entertain big thoughts of himself, or to prefer himself before other Men. And this preserves him in an humble and modest temper of Mind. But in regard he finds in himself (as I have said) a steady Purpose of using his Natural Freedom rightly, and of doing always, as near as he can, that which is really and absolutely best, which he thinks is the main thing that gives Men a real value or worth: He is satisfied, that he ought not to be contemned though he want several of those External Considerations for which Men are generally valued in the World, such as Honours, Wealth, Beauty, or the like. Nor does he much care if he be contemned for the want of them. Much less is he concerned, if he fortune to be disvalue for a defect in some of those trivial things, which in the opinion of some People pass for Recommendations of a Man; such as Garb, Air, Mien, Accent, or the like. And thus he is placed above the reach of Contempt, and secured from a vicious Humility or abjectness of Spirit. And when he surveys, (according to the best of his skill, be it greater or less) both the Human Nature in general, and Himself in particular, he becomes sensible, that he has no absolute need of any thing which it is not in his own power, by the help of God, to acquire and keep. And therefore he is not much disquieted, though he want several of the Ornaments and Accommodations of Life which others have. Thus, if he have not those External Things which Men are ordinarily valued for, he does not upon that account think himself much inferior to those that have them: And if he have, he does not think himself superior upon that account, to those that have them not. He has a low value for External things; and is persuaded, that the possession of them cannot justly advance, or the want of them justly sink a Man's real Price. And therefore in estimating either himself or others, he is satisfied, that these or any other things extrinsical to a Man, or which depend on the circumstances of men's Life and Fortunes, or for which they must be entirely beholden to other Men, ought not to be brought to account. And by such Considerations as these he regulates the Self-esteem that is in him, and makes use of it for good purposes.  
He is likewise persuaded it would be against the Rules of Justice, to value another Man either beneath or above what we know to be his just Desert; and that for the same Reasons it would be against Justice to do so by himself. And this is another Consideration by which he regulates the Self-esteem that is in him, and comes to think of himself as near as he can, neither more nor less than he lawfully and fairly may. But as he is careful not to undertake another, through Envy, Hatred or other sinister Motive; so he is likewise careful not to over-value himself, out of Partiality and Self-love: But in the judgement he passes either on himself or others, endeavours to make all those allowances which Reason and Justice require. And tho' he does not take any more delight than other Men in the Contemplation of himself, and is resolved to make no other use of that Self esteem which he has in him, than only to establish his Mind, and excite him to the more vigorous prosecution of that which is Best and most Honourable; yet when a necessary or just occasion is offered for his passing a judgement upon himself in this nature, than he falls into such cogitations as carry him even between Pride and Abjectness, and secure him from the Errors of both.  
Agreeably hereunto, from the consideration of the Dignity of the rational Nature, and of the Obligations that arise from thence to act suitably to that Character, the generous Man finds himself obliged to make a firm and constant Resolution, not to do any thing that is dishonourable or unbecoming. The just apprehensions he has touching his own Nature, restrain him from doing those things which are, in the concurrent judgement of wise Men, base and ignominious; and excite him to whatever is excellent and praiseworthy. When he considers the character which Mankind bear in the Creation, how that they are placed in a middle rank between the Angelical and the Brutal Nature: This suggests to him, that it is unbecoming and beneath him, to sink himself to a conformity with the latter; and that 'tis no less worthy of his care and ambition, to aspire after a similitude to the former (as far as may consist with the impotency of his Nature) by a just observation of those Laws which the supreme Creator has given the rational World to govern themselves by. And therefore he thinks, 'tis for his Credit and Honour to do those things which tend to advance his Nature, as on the t'other hand 'tis a shame and disgrace to him, to do those things which tend to debase it. But though he have in his Breast an extreme sense of Honour, yet that does not operate within him as a fantastical airy Principle, but as a Spur to virtuous and worthy Actions: For he is far from the empty humour of Popularity or Vainglory, and places true Honour, not in the little niceties or punctilios of pretended Reputation and Gallantry, but in those things which will recommend him to God and good Men, and which import a real and solid Worth. And when (to carry this Consideration a little further) he calls to mind the Relation he stands in unto to God Almighty himself, whose Image and Offspring he, in some sense, is, this lets him see that he is under the strongest Obligations in the World, of Duty, Reason and Honour, to do those things which are Virtuous and Becoming, and to avoid the contrary. And, whereas, by this Contemplation of the human Nature, and of the Powers and Endowments which it hath pleased God to bestow on it, he is made sensible that Virtue is a thing practicable and within his Power: This arms him against the suggestions of those who would discourage him from attempting the prosecution of Virtue and Felicity, under pretence that they are things placed out of his reach: And on the other side, engages him to exert his utmost endeavours to attain as great a Perfection in Virtue as he can; since he sees no reason to despair of an Improvement corresponding to his Endeavours. He is persuaded it is in his power to become Virtuous and Happy; and that if he be not such, 'twill be his own Fault. This excites his Resolution and animates his Endeavours, and makes him with Courage and in good Earnest set about that arduous Affair, in which he has so good assurance of an answerable Success. Thus Generosity helps Men to estimate themselves and others rightly, and inspires them with such Sentiments and Resolutions, as serve both to dispose them to Virtue, and likewise to render them vigorous in their endeavours to improve in that Character.  
Now if any Man should at first be apt to think, that Generosity leads Men to Pride, he may, I believe, without much difficulty, see that there is no such matter, if he will but consider well what Pride is. Now Pride, taken absolutely or with respect to a Man's own self, consists in an unjust or excessive Opinion or Esteem of one's self. Unjust, when a Man either values himself for something that he really has not; which is the worst sort of Pride, and the most gross and unreasonable: Or else for something, which properly speaking, has not in itself any real Worth, and so cannot communicate any to its possessor. Excessive, when he values himself more than he ought, for something laudable, which he has really in some measure in him. But the Generous Man does not do either of these. It is his Character, that he values himself just so much as he ought; neither more nor less than he lawfully and fairly may. Now it is repugnant for a Man to value himself justly or exactly, and at the same time to value himself wrongfully or excessively. That is to be Proud, and not to be Proud, both at once. On the contrary, if we look exactly into the thing, we may discern, that Generosity produces the true and regular Humility, and such a one as is perhaps both less artificial, and better grounded than any other. Thus Generous People are commonly found by experience, more addicted to Humility and Modesty, and the Ungenerous to Pride and Insolence. So also Pride, taken relatively, or with respect to others, is an unjust preferring ourselves before other Men; when we falsely think we excel other Men. But the Generous Man is perhaps less inclined than others, to prefer himself. If he has an asteem for himself, he has so likewise, and that upon the same Reasons, for the Human Nature in general. If he esteems himself for the Resolutions he makes to use his Natural Freedom rightly, he esteems other Men equally upon that account. And if another Man be more punctual in keeping his Resolutions of that kind than himself is, he finds no difficulty to give him the preference. But in regard he does not esteem himself for any thing which is not common to other Men equally with himself; he is the less liable to be proud: Since Pride is grounded upon a conceit, that we have in us something Excellent, which is not to be found in the generality of other Men. Men are not wont to be Proud, (I might say, cannot be so) for their having somewhat which every body else both has as well as they, and may, if he will, use as well as they do. One may be Proud, because he either surpasses other Men in Understanding, Strength, Beauty, or the like; or imagines that he doth so: But I never heard of any Body in his Senses that was Proud, because Mankind at large, are rational and intelligent Creatures, or because they are of a comely and beautiful Figure, or upon the account of those Qualities which are common to the whole Species. If Pride be a kind of Self-esteem (as doubtless it is) it cannot take place in these Cases, which do not relate to ourselves only, but to Mankind in general. And to do right to thegenerous Man I must observe, that he does not desire to compare himself with those who may perhaps come short of him, in order to prefer himself before them, or gain a reputation from their Defects. But he rather chooses to compare himself with those who excel him, to the end he may be thereby excited to an emulation of their Virtue, and to a desire of equalling or exceeding them if he can, in that which is Virtuous and Praiseworthy. In a word, if the generous Man endeavours to value both the Human Nature in general, and himself in particular, just so much as he lawfully may, and no more, than he cannot reasonably be thought more, but indeed much less liable to Pride than other Men.  
They indeed who are desirous to fasten upon the Generous Man the imputation of Pride, upon any Terms, may perhaps carry the Charge a little further, and pretend, that if he be not Proud with respect to Men, by preferring himself unjustly before them, yet he is Proud and Assuming with respect to God Almighty, by arrogating to himself such a freedom of Action, and such a Power of choosing and doing Good, as they imagine does detract from the divine Grace and Concurrence. But I desire it may be considered, that the Generous Man does not assume to himself this natural Freedom and Choice, in opposition to the divine influence and concurrence, but in opposition to a necessity of acting. There is no Man more willing than he, to acknowledge, both the dependence which Mankind have on the divine Being; and likewise, that whatever Powers or good Qualifications they have, they receive the same from God Almighty, from whom, as the Scripture testifies, and all considering Men acknowledge, even upon the foot of natural Theology, Every good Gift cometh. But as he is satisfied, that both the Beginnings and Increases of Virtue and Goodness in Men, are from God Almighty: So he is also satisfied, from his own and the experience of all other Men, that Mankind are free Agents, and are obliged by the Laws of God and Man, to use that Freedom rightly. And therefore he does not think himself much concerned to determine (as some Men venture to do) in what particular manner God is pleased to communicate Virtues and good Qualities unto Men; or how, in particular, the divine Aids work with or upon that natural Freedom which we have, either antecedently or concomitantly, or any, or what other way; or how in particular the Divine Concurrence and our natural Freedom consist together. He thinks these are things, in a great measure out of his reach: And that as he cannot expect to acquire an entire Certainty about them; so he may be as good a Man without the certain knowledge of them, as with it. But being on the own hand assured, that God Almighty is the primary Author of all good, he thinks, Men are obliged to depend on the Divine Majesty, and to ascribe to him the Beginnings and Increases of Virtue and Goodness in them: And being on the other hand assured, that Mankind are free Agents, he sees no reason to doubt, but that they can and aught to use that Freedom rightly, and that that is the way for them to become Virtuous and good Men.  
To this I may add, that the current Notions which Men have in cases of this Nature about Self-esteem; and about Pride and Humility, agree very well with what I have before spoken touching the Sentiments which accompany Generosity. We are not wont to blame Men, or account them Proud (nor can we indeed justly so do) for resolving (which in the mean time supposes Freedom and Choice) to become as Virtuous and Good as they possibly can; or for believing, that their Resolution and Endeavour to be such, is a proper and conducive means to that end: For thinking it beneath them, to revenge an Affront or Injury; or to commit a vile and ignominious thing: For having an ambition for that which is Virtuous, Decent and Venerable, and an abhorrence of the contrary, or the like. These we esteem laudable Principles and according to Virtue. And are wont to make use of the innate emmulation and desire of Glory, which we find in ourselves or others, in order to excite ourselves or them to things of a worthy and becoming Nature. And on the other side, we cannot reasonably, and, I think, usually do not, esteem it a Part or Instance of true Humility, for Men to disparage and degrade the human Nature without grounds: Torepresent Mankind as a company of necessary Agents, or of Being's either not at all Superior to Brutes, or (which will render them much worse than Brutes) void of all Goodness. Humility does not require that which is against Justice or Truth. So also we do not count it an instance of true Humility, that a Man can descend to the vilest Actions, and thinks nothing unbecoming or beneath him. But we rather, and no doubt very deservedly, esteem him to be in a profligate State, who has no regard to his Reputation or Honour.  
But further, as to those Virtues or good Dispositions of the Mind which belong to Generosity, and by the Method before proposed, come to be considered next: I shall touch upon some of them now, and shall by and by have occasion to speak of some others, when I come to give a further Interpretation of this Principle, by showing the Affinity and Connexion there is between it and several other Virtues of considerable Note. Now Generosity does in general draw to it all those Virtues which bespeak a Manly temper of Mind, and produce a tenor of Action becoming the human Nature; which Virtues I shall not go about exactly to enumerate: But there are some which I must not omit naming particularly, because they seem to have a nearer cognation to it than ordinary. Of this sort are, Firmness of Mind, Goodness and Ingenuity of Temper, Liberality in distributing Favours, Sincerity and Rectitude of Spirit, Dispassionateness or Tranquillity, Evenness of Temper and Judgement, exact Observation of Decorum; in a word, an extreme Love and Veneration for Virtue.  
Wherein this Firmness of Mind principally consists, may perhaps be most commodiously seen by considering the Qualities opposite to it. Now Firmness of Mind is opposed to that impotency of Spirit which lays Men open to the incursions of Fear and Affrightment; by which their Reason is sometimes rendered useless to them, and the Men subjected to the Torment, Perplexities, and other innumerable ill effects of that extravagant Passion. It is opposed to that softness or vicious Modesty, which inclines Men to comply with others in things evil and dishonourable (sometimes even against their own Judgement) only to avoid their Confrontments or Reproaches. It is also opposed to another kind of impotency of Spirit, whereby a Man for want of Judgement and of Resolution to use his natural Freedom rightly, is either held from acting, by continual fluctuation of Mind, or can never keep a consistency with himself in the course of his Actions, but is oftentimes inclined to do and actually does those things, of which he knows at the same time he shall afterwards have cause to Repent. It is also opposed to that sort of impotency of Spirit, which keeps Men servilely under the power of Custom and Prepossession; and renders them unable to quit those Errors which are fixed in them by Custom, Education, or the power of fancy and corporeal Impression, though upon the clearest Reasons and fullest Conviction that can be. There are some People, who are very unhappy in this particular. They are oftentimes guided by Fancy and Humour; by the cogitations which are raised in them by their Passions or corporeal Impressions, which though never so slight and trivial, they have accustomed themselves to attend unto; not considering so much, whether they have any solid reason for what they do resolve to do, as whether their Humour, Fancy or Prepossession incline them to do it: And not distinguishing the Impressions that are made upon them by external things, or by their own Imagination, and the Perceptions which are by these means excited in their Brain and Spirits, from the Principles of the rational Nature, or the Cogitations that purely relate to the Soul, suffer themselves to be carried away by uncertain and fortuitous Impressions, in so much that they act as it were by chance, without being able in many things, to give a tolerable reason for what they do. This habit betokens a great Infirmity: And as it is most incident to Women and People of effeminate and feeble Spirits, so it is directly opposite to Generosity. It is opposed also, to another kind of Impotency of Spirit, whereby Men are unable to demean themselves steadily and evenly in the two different states of Life: But are either transported to an excess of Levity and Folly by Prosperity, or confounded and dispirited by the access of Adversity. It is also opposed to that sort of Impotency of Spirit, which discovers itself by Trepidity upon the approach of Danger, by a dulness and drowsiness of Mind, and by an aversion to undertake or go through those Posts and Employments which are attended with labour and hazard. These and such like are the Qualities opposite to it. So that if we turn the Tables, we shall easily see wherein this firmness of Mind consists: To wit, in Courage and Constancy, in a judicious Uniformity of acting, in the presidence of Reason over our Prejudices and corporeal Impressions, in a constancy and evenness under every State of Life, in a discreet boldness and activity. And since these Qualities which I have mentioned as opposite to firmness of Mind, discover an imbecility of Spirit, and dispose Men to act upon childish and weak Principles; the contrary Qualities may, not improperly, be thought to belong to the Character of Generosity.  
The goodness and ingenuousness of Temper which I just now mentioned, consists in that Candour and Humanity which renders Men peaceable, agreeable and well humoured, willing to pass by Injuries upon reasonable Terms, and to put the most favourable construction that may fairly be upon things; which fills Men with sentiments of Tenderness and Compassion, and of Clemency and Mercy; which makes them obliging and civil in Conversation; and inclines them to render not only unto their Friends and Neighbours, but likewise to Strangers and others, as occasion may be, the respective offices of Courtesy and , and to do all that lies in their power to preserve and maintain amity and good understanding with those with whom they converse. For the Generous Man has an esteem for the human Nature in general; and therefore thinks, that all Men are entitled to those respects and good Offices which identity of Blood and Nature challenge from him. He remembers likewise the imbecilities that belong to human Nature; that no Man is wise at all times; that there are a great many accidents and emerging Circumstances which lead Men insensibly into Error, insomuch that the most vigilant and cautious are sometime or other deceived and entrapped: And therefore he is not apt to be severe in his Censures, or to condemn Men of improbity or insincerity for a single unadvised Action. The knowledge he has of his own Infirmity, restrains him in that particular, and makes him willing to give other men's Actions that connivance or favourable Construction which he himself may desire or stand in need of for his own. And when he considers, that other Men, as well as himself, have by Nature the free disposal of their own Wills, he is disposed to believe, that they resolve as well as himself does, to use that power rightly, and thereupon that the Errors or Faults which they commit, are owing rather to want of Judgement or to Incogitancy, than to ill Will or sinister Intention. And when he observes on the one hand, how much the several social Virtues contribute to make Conversation agreeable, delightful and orderly; and on the other hand, how much the contrary Qualities contribute to disturb and bring it into disorder: He thinks himself obliged by these Considerations, and likewise by the Rules of Good-breeding and Decorum, to endeavour to exercise those Virtues which are of so great Use and Ornament.  
Liberality in distributing Favours, is another Qualification belonging to Generosity. This is so far acknowledged by most Men, that in ordinary Discourse, the liberal Man is most usually honoured with the name of Generous. But tho' Liberality does not give us a complete Idea of Generosity; for Generosity is not to be restrained within so narrow a compass: Yet it is true, that this is one of its Characters. Now this Liberality is, in a Generous Man, attended with such Sentiments as these: An Esteem for Mankind on general, which makes him look in them as proper Objects, not only of Justice, but also of Kindness and Beneficence; a serenity of Mind mixed with the Perceptions of Kindness and Gratitude, and a sense of Decorum; which kind of Sentiments serve to open his Heart, and to dispose him as well to make suitable acknowledgements of Favours and Obligations, as likewise to do these and other things in such a manner as may seem most becoming a great Mind.  
To Generosity do likewise belong Sincerity and Rectitude of Spirit: Of which I shall have occasion to speak more particularly anon.  
And to it likewise belong Dispassionateness and Tranquillity. 'Tis well known, that men's Passions and unbridled Appetites do ruffle and disorder them to a very great degree, and by disturbing the regular use of their natural Freedom, and raising Storms and Tempests in their Minds, impel them to the commission of many foolish, extravagant and wicked things, which afterwards bring upon them shame, regret, remorse of Conscience, and many other Inconveniences. Now Generosity is adapted to remedy these Evils. For the Generous Man, by the Command he has over his own Spirit, and the Government he maintains over his Passions and Inclinations, is the better secured in that Tranquillity, which the regular use of men's natural Freedom is wont to produce: And since he endeavours to do nothing whereof he shall have just cause afterwards to Repent, he is the more likely to escape Remorse of Conscience; than which there is nothing that gives the Mind a more sharp and tormenting Pain.  
Evenness of Temper in Judging and Acting is another Property of Generosity. This is much the same with that which is sometimes called in one word Moderation. And is produced or maintained by that Firmness of Mind and Tranquillity, which I have before mentioned. It is easy to discern, that the due government of a Man's Spirit, and of his Passions, corporeal Impressions and Inclinations, the irregularities whereof do so much pervert men's Judgements concerning things, and betray them into so many weak and wicked Actions, must needs conduce very much to establish him in this even Temper of Mind.  
Exact observation of Decorum, is likewise another Property of Generosity. We know there are several things, either Lawful or at least countenanced by the general Practice of Men, which yet are really not expedient or fitting to be done; as being against Decency and good Grace. In such Cases, the Generous Man considers, not barely what is lawful or practicable, but withal what is decent and seemly. The respect he has for the Humane Nature, inclines him to conceal its imperfections; to cover what is uncomely with the vail of Modesty; and to submit quietly to the laws of the animal nature without violating Purity or Decency internally in his Mind, or openly in his words or actions. He will not offer unhandsome things to Matrons or Virgins, or put modest persons to the blush; and endeavours in general, to avoid such words and gestures as are ungraceful. So likewise he is not apt to be assuming, impertinent, or troublesome in company; to put the banter and ridicule upon others; to reflect upon them or insult over their weakness and imperfection; to pry into other men's secrets, or meddle with matters which do not concern him. He bears with many things, connives at, and passes many things over in silence. In a word, he considers his sex, his age, his station, his character, and the circumstances of his condition, and endeavours with respect to them all, to comport himself as near as he can by the rules of Decorum. And since Decency is a thing of a refined and delicate nature, and the perfection as it were of Right and Lawful, as Equity is the perfection of Justice: The Generous Man, who resolves to do, to his power, that which is best and most becoming, and to attain as high a degree in Virtue as he can, must needs find himself under an obligation to observe the rules of Decency.  
In short, Generosity imports an extreme Love and Veneration for Virtue. The Generous Man looks upon Virtue and Goodness to be the most honourable and becoming thing in the World, and the greatest Ornament and perfection of the Human nature. It is to him the great index and rule of Honourable and Dishonourable. And therefore when he looks round about him, he can see nothing that deserves to be the object of his esteem and ambition in comparison of it: Being satisfied, that there is nothing so worthy of his care and regard, as that which tends to advance him to a conformity unto the supreme and most perfect Being, and which leads him in a direct line to the truest and highest Felicity his nature is capable of. So that when he resolves to use his natural Freedom rightly, and to prosecute with all his might that which is simply and absolutely best; he does so, for the sake of Virtue; That is the secret Spring of his motions, and the Butt of his Ambition.  
This may serve for a general explication of the nature of Generosity. In the next place I am to speak somewhat, to show the agreement and affinity there is between it, and several other Virtues which have been deservedly esteemed of the first rank; and likewise between it, and some of those excellent rules of conduct which have been approved by the common consent of mankind in most ages of the World. And after that, I would consider briefly the influence it has even upon what is more strictly called Piety and Religion. By all which it may appear, that the sentiments and dispositions of mind which Generosity is attended with all, do entirely correspond and are in effect the same with those sentiments and dispositions which the most eminent Virtues and approved rules of Action serve to produce in us. And the doing of this will, I conceive, not only afford us a fuller interpretation of the Principle which we are now considering, but likewise be of considerable use to us in our Practice.  
Now there are six Principal Virtues, which I shall take particular notice of in this place; to wit, Prudence, Sincerity, and Patience; which are called Primitive Virtues: And Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance, which are called Derivative ones.  
Prudence is a Virtue, whereby a Man judges rightly of things. And this no Man can well do, who is not competently free from the power of Prejudice, Passion, and the other imbecilities which hinder Men from the clear discernment of what is good and true. Now it is the generous Man's constant endeavour to overcome, and keep his Mind free from those impediments; as I have before noted: And by that means he is very much secured from several of those errors which are opposite to Prudence, such as Rashness, Precipitance, Levity, Credulity, Obstinacy, blind Zeal, Partiality, and the like: And on the contrary is disposed and enabled to judge and choose rightly. To explain this, I shall at present only make use of the following instance, waving others which might be given. We find, there is a sort of Imprudence which Men are betrayed into by an unaccountable gaiety of temper that sometimes befalls them. And though this be commonly most incident to young People, who by reason of the fire and briskness that is in their Blood and Spirits, are most apt to be carried away by vehement and sudden emotions; yet there are many who retain this levity and gaiety of temper, till they come to be far advanced in years. Now Generosity helps to correct the Irregularities of this temper; as it ballasts and poises the Mind, and excites Men to do those things only, which are grave, manly, and discreet; that is, to act according to the rules of Prudence. And in regard 'tis part of the character of a Generous Man, firmly and advisedly to resolve to prosecute, in all his actions as near as he can, that which is ultimately and simply best: Whilst we suppose him to do that, we must suppose him to be competently conusant and capable of judging what is best: that is, to be at least a competently Prudent Man.  
Sincerity is a Virtue, whereby a Man is disposed, sincerely and uprightly to prosecute that which he deems to be simply best. This Virtue is one of the brightest characters of the Soul: 'Tis the life and Spirit of other Virtues; And that which is in a particular manner pleasing and acceptable to God Almighty, as we may judge from the nature of the thing, and as sufficiently appears from several express Declarations in the Gospel of our Saviour. So that 'twill be a great Recommendation to Generosity, if that be found to have a Cognation with it. Now Sincerity has an especial relation to the Will. It consists in a simplicity of Mind, and a Rectitude of Will and intention. It is that Purity and uncorrupt Chastity of the Will, whereby a Man is engaged to adhere unto that which appears to be best. But Generosity is likewise accompanied with the same disposition of Mind, which Sincerity produces in Men. For Generosity has in like manner an especial relation to the Will. It is attended with that Rectitude of the Will, whereby a Man is continually engaged to endeavour to use his Natural Freedom rightly, and to choose and do, to his power, in all cases, that which appears to be best. The very description of these two correspond mutually, and enter into one another. Since that which appears to be best, is for an inviolable Law both to the sincere, and to the Generous Man; these two Virtues must needs have the strictest Connexion imaginable.  
As for Patience, which is a Virtue of the Soul, whereby a Man for the sake of Virtue and Goodness is contented to endure those things which are difficult and unungrateful to the Animal nature: This Virtue evidently appertains to Generosity; and may in partitular be referred to the Masculine Firmness of Mind, which makes part of that character. For Patience does not reside in a feeble Spirit; or in a Breast agitated with untamed and impetuous Passions. It dwells in Masculine and firm Minds; which are able to endure the shock of Hardships; and think it inglorious to shrink when they are engaged in the Cause of Virtue. Thus also the Generous Man confirms himself in a resolution to bear the injuries of Men and other misfortunes that may befall him; And though he does not throw himself rashly into dangers or misfortunes; yet he resolves to go through them with an even and undaunted Spirit. Nor indeed can the Generous Man, without a due Proportion of the Masculine Virtue of Patience, execute those resolutions which he makes of pursuing the highest good. Without it, the formidable prospect of Death, Pain, Poverty, Shame, on the like, would quickly break his Measures, and dissolve his Resolutions. And therefore he thinks he is obliged to arm himself with this Virtue, that he may be able the more constantly and steadily to put in are the just Resolutions he makes of acting upon the Principles of Honour and Virtue. So likewise we may observe, that there are a great many things which put Men into disorder and impatience, that do befall them unavoidably and without their own choice; such as neither their Industry or Foresight can prevent: And that on the other Hand, Men do oftentimes, by their own folly and peevishness, create Vexations to themselves, when it is in their power to be in quiet. And whether Men are under misfortunes of the First or Latter sort, we find by experience, that the greatest part of the uneasiness they endure in those cases, is owing to the impatience and ungovernableness of their Spirits, by means whereof that which would otherwise be easy to be endured, becomes intolerable to them. Now as to the vexations which we voluntarily bring upon ourselves, I need not say that Generosity helps us to endure them, for (which is much better) it does really help to prevent them. It tends to cure Men of those little freaks and imbecilities of Spirit which are the cause of them: And so by taking away the cause, takes away the effect. And as to the other sort of misfortunes which 'tis less in our power to prevent, Generosity, which helps us to govern our Passions and Appetites, which arms our Minds with Masculine Resolutions, in a Word, which makes us sensible that there is all the reason in the World to submit patiently to the sovereign and wise Government of Almighty God, whether he distribute sweet or ungrateful things, and to suffer hardships for the sake of Virtue: I say, Generosity which operates within us in this manner, must needs conduce very much to beget in us a patience and constancy of Mind.  
Next consider Justice, which is a constant and uniform purpose of giving to every one his due. Now the Generous Man pursues the dictates of this Virtue. And is willing to do right, both to himself, and likewise to every body else. For he neither envies nor hates any body. He thinks it a dishonourable part to do an unjust thing to another, either by detracting from his just desert, or by wronging him in his Estate, his Bed, or his Person. And so he is kept from several Vices, which are opposite to Justice, such as Slander, false Testimony and Subordination, Bribery and unjust Judgement, Covetousness, Extortion, Murder, Adultery, Rapine, Oppression, fraud, Cruelty, and the like. Nay, he is not content to do strict Justice to other Men; But chooseth to render them more than what is in strictness due, rather than less. He relaxes and qualifies, as far as he lawfully may, what is rigorous and extreme; and exerciseth Justice with that Moderation and Equity which is indeed the Flower and perfection of it. And since it is part of his character, that he has no mighty value for Honour, Riches, or the like external things, he is under the less temptation to wrong others in order to advance or enrich himself with their spoils. So likewise he esteems it a mean and abject thing, to be ungrateful to such as have obliged him or done him good offices: And therefore is careful to show, upon all fit occasions, his gratitude to his Benefactors; accounting it a piece of Justice and Honour so to do. And he is likewise careful to demonstrate an entire Fidelity to those who have committed to him a Trust; accounting it both unjust and mean-spirited, to be treacherous or unfaithful. And whilst he considers the straight alliance and consanguinity there is between Man and Man, upon account of the common nature they are all partakers of; and likewise the just Title that all Men who are not fallen from the common Rights of their nature, have, not only to his esteem and good will, but also to all those good offices which 'tis in his power upon reasonable terms to render to them: He finds himself engaged, even in point of Justice, to be courteous, affable, easy of access, humane, candid, and obliging to all Men; and to exercise, as far as he fairly may, the respective offices of Charity, Beneficence, Hospitality, and Philanthropy, towards them. And as he thinks himself obliged to do those things which Justice requires with respect to mankind: So he considers also the Justice that is due to Almighty God: And this engages him to the exact performance of the respective Offices of Piety which relate to Almighty God. So likewise he remembers, that he owes a duty and Respect to Truth also. And this obliges him to an entire Veracity; and makes him punctual to his promises and contracts, as far as lies really and bona fide in his power. And considering, that Lying, Equivocating, or Dissembling, are mean and rascally actions, and for the most part the tokens of an abject Spirit; he finds himself obliged to avoid these and such like little Arts, if he would pursue the Character of a Just and Generous Man.  
As for Fortitude, whereby Men are enabled, for the sake of Virtue and Goodness, to achieve and undergo great and difficult things, and even to suffer Death itself with a firm and intrepid Mind: It is so nearly allied to Generosity, that several of the Characters of Generosity have been wont to be ascribed by Moralists to it; and to be represented under the name of Fortitude or Magnanimity. Now Fortitude or Magnanimity consisting in that true Gallantry of Mind which qualifies Men for great undertake, which enables them to encounter with a constant and serene mind, the difficulties and dangers that attend elevated employments both in Peace and War; and all this, in general for the sake of Honesty and Virtue, and in particular for the good and safety of their Country: Generosity and It appear to have an undivided cognation. And as Fortitude has in most ages been esteemed and honoured in a peculiar manner; insomuch that the other good habits or powers of the Soul are called Virtues from the proper name of this: So the Generous Man has a Genius peculiarly suited to make good the characters of that Virtue. And though he be as sensible of Pain and misfortunes as other Men, yet he endeavours to keep his Spirit from being oppressed or softened by them; and in a word, to support himself under all, with a steadiness and constancy becoming his character.  
Then for Temperance, which is a Virtue, whereby Men are restrained in the use of sensitive pleasures, that they may the better pursue things more sublime and noble: This is evidently of kin to Generosity; which likewise suggests, that we ought to postpone all manner of sensitive Gratifications to those other exercises of the Mind whereby it is led to that which is simply and absolutely best. He cannot prosecute that which is absolutely best, with a just Vigour, who is continually inclined to gratify the Body in its several Appetites; because there is nothing that does, more than that, hinder Men in the pursuit of Virtue and Goodness. But the Generous Man is sensible, that 'tis unbecoming the dignity of the Rational nature; for a Man to indulge himself too much in corporeal pleasures, or gratify the extravagant desires of the Body: That this would be to set the Rational and the Animal nature upon the same Level, or perhaps to prefer the Latter before the Former: And being satisfied, it is no part of true Humility, to condescend so low, he endeavours to maintain the dignity of that rank and order, wherein God Almighty hath placed him. And all this he does, not out of a Contempt of other Creatures more ignoble than himself, but out of a just esteem of the Dignity of his own Order, and out of a sincere regard to Virtue. And when he observes, how much, Voluptuousness tends to bewitch men's Minds, to render Men soft, terrene, and degenerate, and to extinguish the Seeds of goodness in them: He concludes, that if he be not temperate and discreet in the use of sensual pleasures, he shall be in apparent danger of forfeiting those Virtuous habits and dispositions of Mind, wherein he places his greatest Honour and Happiness. And thus he is armed against several Vices that are opposite to Temperance, such as Lasciviousness, Excess in Meats and Drinks, Vanity in Behaviour or Apparel, and other softnesses wherein there is any thing of Luxury or Abuse.  
But further, as touching those excellent Rules of conduct, which I before took notice of, let us see how Generosity stands with respect to them. Of this sort there are two principally to be considered. Do as you would be done by: And, Know thyself.  
As for the former of these, Do unto others as you would they should do unto you; and, Do not to others what you would not they should do unto you: They are so easy to be understood and applied, that I need say no more of them, than that they contain the Sum of Natural Justice and Equity; and being of a comprehen five and delicate nature, do not only direct us to act according to the Ordinary Rules of Justice, but likewise serve to guide us by the Rules of Equity and Mercy, where those of Justice seem to be either obscure or defective. And this is one great use of Generosity, which is also a Principle so comprehensive, that as I have already observed, it imports in it the Sum of that Justice and Equity which Men owe to one another, and is of so fine and delicate a nature, that it restrains Men from doing many things, which according to human Laws or the ordinary Rules of Justice, may appear lawful, and inclines them oftentimes, as the circumstances of things may be, to do more than those ordinary Rules in strictness require at their hands.  
As to the latter Precept, Know thyself. This we are told was formerly had in great Reverence, insomuch that 'twas supposed to have been immediately communicated unto Men from Heaven— E Coelo descendit, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And it well deserves to be esteemed and observed at this day. Now the Knowledge of ourselves is of use principally two ways: To wit. As it makes us sensible on the one hand of the Imperfections, and on the other of the Dignity of our Nature. First, by Knowing ourselves, and by contemplating the Infirmities and Imperfections that adhere to our Nature, we are taught to be humble and modest, patiented, temperate, submissive to the divine Will, beneficent and merciful, and the like. When we we consider, that our Knowledge and other Abilities are comparatively imperfect, how many things we are ignorant of, and in how many we err and do amiss: This and such like Considerations help to keep us from being Proud and Presuming with respect to ourselves, and from being rigid, censorious and illnatured, with respect to others whom we find offending or mistaken. And, on the contrary, dispose us to Charity, Goodness, Forbearance, Candour and Mercy towards them: Since we are thereby made sensible, that we ourselves are liable to many, or all, of the Errors and Offences which we see in other Men. So likewise when we observe, how helpless and impotent we are, how unable to foresee or prevent the accidents, revolutions and changes that attend our Lives, and either to procure to ourselves many of those external good Things which we want, or to avert those Misfortunes which we suffer or apprehend, it suggests to us a notable Lesson of Patience and of Submission to Almighty God, as the most effectual means to keep a serenity in our Minds, notwithstanding all that may befall us. And further, when we consider the frailty and abjectness of our Bodies, that being the meanest and most despicable part of us, they do not deserve we should be so very intent upon the gratifying of them, much less that our Solicitude about them should either exceed or hinder our care and concern about our nobler and better Part: This instructs us to avoid Covetousness, Intemperance and Excess in the Love or Use of things relating to the Body. And, further, when under the consideration of this Infirmity of our present State, we become sensible, that there are many things necessary to the support and well being of Men, and that therefore such as are destitute of these things, deserve to be considered by us, as far as we are fairly able; that is an Argument to us, to give them help and and relief: Especially when we remember, that by reason of the mutability of our condition in this World, we ourselves, tho' perhaps at present in a flourishing State, may be an easy turn of Affairs, be brought into the same necessitous condition we see others in.  
But then the Knowledge of ourselves is likewise of use another way, viz. as it makes us sensible of the Dignity of our Nature; and by that means engages us to the doing of such things as are becoming the Character we bear in the Creation, and deters us from doing whatever is disparaging or disagreeable to that Character. For since Virtue is in its Nature Noble and Honourable; and Vice the quite contrary: Upon that Principle, the Knowledge of ourselves serves to excite in us on the one hand that laudable Ambition, whereby we aspire after those things which are Virtuous and truly Honourable, and on the other hand that commendable Shame which deters us from things of the contrary Nature. Now Generosity operates both these ways. It confirms Men on the one hand in a just Humility, Meekness, Patience, Charity, and other like Virtues, as may appear from what has been already said: And on the other hand, disposes Men to those Virtues which are produced and maintained by the consideration of the Dignity of the human Nature, and of the Obligations that result from thence to act agreeably to that Character: But it is more peculiarly suited to operate this latter way: As it excites in Men that noble Ambition, which is grounded on the consideration of the honourble Nature of Virtue, and of the auspicious and happy Consequences it brings after it, and that virtuous Shame which is grounded on the turpitude and dishonourable Nature of Vice, and of the mischievous and unhappy Effects which attend it. For the Generous Man, according to that excellent Precept, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Above all Revere thyself, would be ambitious of Virtue, tho' he had no prospect of acquiring external Reputation by it, and would be touched with a sense of Shame, if he went about to commit a vile Action never so privately, even where he could be in no danger of public disparagement. So that the Sentiments which are raised in Men by the just Knowledge of themselves, agree with those which are raised in them by the Principle of Generosity: Both serving to spur them on to virtuous and becoming Actions, and to deter them from foul and vicious ones, from much the same Considerations.  
But Generosity enters also into that part of Religion which more immediately relates to God Almighty; and mixes itself with the habits of Piety and Devotion. There are three great faults, to wit, Superstition, Hypocrisy, and Profaneness, into one or other of which, those who err with respect to Religion, commonly fall. And Generosity is suited to help against each of these. Against Superstition; as it excites in men's minds manly and becoming thoughts of Almighty God, such as are suitable to the Divine Nature: By which means it serves to rid their Minds of those light and childish conceptions touching the Nature and Worship of God, which are the Seeds of Bigotry and Superstition. For when Men have by the Divine aid, and by due care and exercise, habituated their Minds to just apprehensions of the Pure and Excellent Nature of God: They cannot think it sufficient, to express the veneration and service which they owe unto him, by those trivial and insignificant instances of Devotion and Worship, or that partial and reserved Obedience, which superstitious and weak People are wont to content themselves withal; or indeed by any thing less than an entire dedication of their Souls and Bodies to him, in pure and ardent Devotion, joined with an entire and hearty Obedience to his Laws; that is, by adjusting both their Worship and Conversation unto a conformity to his most Excellent Nature And when likewise, they have possessed their Minds with manly and Rational thoughts of Religion: they will be the less subject to be carried away by the errors of Enthusiasm and pretended Spirituality; which is also a kind of Superstition.  
And for Hypocrisy, which is another great Abuse of Religion; Generosity is naturally suited to cure or prevent it. For Generosity is wont to be accompanied with such a Sincerity of Mind, as is not consistent with Hypocrisy. And whilst it teaches Men to act upon the true Principles of Honour, it will easily make them sensible; that 'tis an unworthy and base practice, to go about to delude other Men with a Pretence of Religion, when at the same time they are conscious to themselves, that they have nothing of that Principle within them; and that Religion is a thing of so noble and elevated a nature, that it ought not to be made subservient to the little ends of Worldly profit and interest.  
So also Generosity helps against Profaneness. For since Generosity is founded in the just knowledge of ourselves; from the consideration, that we are comparatively frail and impotent Creatures, and entirely dependant on God Almighty for our Being and all that we have; it serves to suppress in us those extravagant and big thoughts of ourselves, which would lead us to profaneness and contempt of God; and on the contrary to engage us to love and gratitude to his Divine Majesty, from whom we continually receive so many demonstrations of Bounty and Philanthropy. And from the consideration of the infinite distance there is betwixt God and Men, it serves to awaken the innate Principle we have in us, of honouring and reverencing whatever person or being appears to be Great and Excellent; and so engages us to express that Honour and Reverence we have for Almighty God (who is infinitely the greatest and most excellent Being) in such ways as are most proper to signify and declare the same; to wit, by Worship, Reverence of him, and all that relates to him, and by Conformity to his Nature and Laws, as far as we are able. Which is indeed the Sum of Religion.  
From these short instances it may be seen, that Generosity is a Principle nearly allied to the several Virtues of the Divine Life, and likewise extremely accommodated to preserve Men strait and even in the practice of true Religion. And these considerations will, I conceive, serve both to explain the Notion of Generosity, and likewise to show the intimate Agreement there is between Religion and Honour, being rightly understood and applied. So much then for what I proposed to speak in the Interpretation of Generosity.  
But now I am well ware, that 'tis likely, that such persons as have been accustomed to frame a narrow and restrained notion of Generosity, and to think it consists only in Liberality, or what is commonly called good breeding, or such like, may imagine, that I do amiss, in taking it in so large and comprehensive a sense, and attributing to it such noble Characters, as I have done. But I am persuaded, that when things come to be weighed, I shall be acquitted of blame in that particular. I have been considering Generosity, not barely as a particular Virtue or good quality, but chief as such a Principle in the Rational Soul as is of a Metaphysical and universal nature. Now the Principles of this kind are such that they may be applied as variously as there are various actions in human life: And so must needs be of a large and comprehensive nature, since they pervade the whole Body of a man's Cogitations and Actions, and are the Principles from which he Acts, not only in some few but in very many cases. And that Generosity is a Principle of this kind, may appear from what I have already said. Even men's Natural Temper, discovers itself in most of their actions, in Natural, Civil, Moral and Religious ones. And so far as it hath influence upon the Mind, produces as great a variety of sensations and dispositions in the Man, as there is great variety of Objects about which he is conversant. But the Principles immediately referring to the Mind, are much more accommodated to spread through all the actions of a Man: For as the Mind is the seat of a Man's Thoughts, and his Thoughts the Spring of his Actions: So the Principles of the Mind, which have the nature of universal Cogitations, are as universal in their Operation, as they are in their Root; or if you will, as universal considered objectively, as they are, considered formally. Thus Sincerity taken as a general Principle of the Mind, extends itself to most of the actions of Ruman Life, to those which fall under a Civil, Moral or Religious Consideration: And may be exerted by Men of all Faculties, Professions, Trades, Orders and Degrees, in the actions which relate to the several conditions of Life, by which they are diversified from one another, and in those which are common to them all. The same may be said of the general Principle of Prudence: And likewise of the general Frinciple of Generosity. And if Generosity be such a Principle, as is, not only of a large and extended Nature, but is likewise in an extraordinary manner congenial and agreeable to the most refined Principles of our Minds, and is accompanied with, or serves to produce in us, those sentiments and dispositions of Mind, which tend to the advancement and perfection of our Nature: I say, if the Case be so, I am persuaded, I cannot be justly accused of having extended the Notion of it too far, or having given it too high Characters.  
But I think I need not be very solicitous about this Matter. 'Tis sufficient for me, that however some Men may dislike or quarrel with the Name of Generosity, because perhaps they have been used to speak of those things which make up its Character, in other Terms than those I here use, or for other Reasons best known to themselves: Yet they cannot, without doing some violence to their own Minds, but admire and esteem the Thing, and acknowledge that the Characters which I have said do belong to it, import that which is really Noble and Illustrious. And peradventure, they may discern that Mankind do universally agree in these Sentiments, when they observe how naturally and readily Men are wont to describe Persons or Actions that are eminent for their goodness and rectitude, by the Name of Generous, Great, Noble, and such like Epithets, which properly belong to this Character.  
If then the ancient Philosophers and Moralists do not make mention of Generosity under that particular Name, or, describe it with exactly the same Characters which I have herein attributed to it, that ought not to be any Prejudice against what I have said upon this Head. We all speak the same thing in substance and effect, and sometimes in much the same words. What is Generosity but an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a fortitude or manliness of Spirit, a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or greatness of Soul? What is it but a Compositum jus fasque animi, a steady rectitude of the Mind, a Generosum honestum, a generous Virtue? What is it but a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a goodness of Temper, a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or divine Principle accommodated to the human Nature, and residing in human Breasts? The like might be said in many other Particulars.  
Suppose also that the sacred Writers themselves do not make mention of Generosity under that express Name, or under the selfsame Characters by which I have described it; neither will that, I conceive, justly prejudice what I have said upon this Subject. If there be in Men such Principles as Self-love and Self-esteem, as Ambition, as Honour and Shame: If these Principles may and aught to be made use of for the purposes of Virtue: If the just use of these Principles serves to produce Generosity in Men: If Generosity, by operating upon these Principles and conducting them rightly, be helpful to advance Men in Virtue and Goodness: If the Characters herein ascribed to Generosity be consonant to the purest Principles of our Minds, and to the clear and undoubted Notions which wise Men have all along had of things: Then the main of what I have before offered, will not, I conceive, be shaken by a side-wind Objection. It was not, nor is it necessary, or indeed possible, that Men in all Countries or Ages of the World should follow just the same Modes of conception or expression, or the same Methods of Discourse. There is, no doubt, a great Latitude that may be fairly taken, in the manner of discoursing about the particular Virtues, and of referring them to certain general Principles of the rational Soul. Accordingly, we find that the Holy Writers themselves do fall into that variety in this Case, which the nature of things so easily admits. They often vary from one another in their Expressions, and in their Methods of Discourse and Exhortation upon much the same Subjects. They give us diversely the descriptions or characters of particular Virtues: Sometimes in such manner as seems agreeable to the true nature of them, and at other times in such manner as is mostly suited to the present Argument or Purpose of the Writer, or to the Principles of the Mind to which they are for that time referred. Let us for the present only take notice, how many several ways Virtue in general, or Religion, or Holiness, or Goodness, (call it by what suchlike Name you will) is represented to us by the several Writers of the holy Books. Sometimes it is represented under the name and characters of Wisdom, as in the Writings of King Solomon. Sometims under the name of Righteousness (that is, Justice or Rectitude) as in several of the sacred Books. Sometimes it is comprehended under the general Phrase, The Fear of the Lord, as in many of the sacred Books both of the old and new Testament. Sometimes under that of Love or Dilection, comprising in it the love of God and of our Neighbour, as in some of the Books of the old Testament, and most of the Books of the new, particularly in the Writings of St. John and St. Paul. Sometimes under the general Term, Faith, exhibiting to us the sum of our Duty, as in several Books of the new Testament, especially in the Writings of St. Paul. If therefore the several holy Writers vary from one another in this manner, we need not wonder that others should vary from them in things wherein there is naturally so much Latitude. Admit then that some one or more of the holy Writers intimates, that Faith is a Principle serving to produce in Men several particular Virtues, we must not think that that contradicts or excludes what is spoken by such one or more of the holy Writers as intimates, that Love, or the Fear of God, are Principles serviceable to that end. Here are now, suppose, before our Eyes four things which may be deemed Principles of Virtue and Goodness; viz. Faith, Love, Fear of God, and Generosity. But surely the saying that Faith is such a Principle, does not exclude Love from being such too. And saying that Love is such a Principle, does not exclude the Fear of God from being such too. And saying that the Fear of God is such a Principle, does not exclude Generosity from being such too; because they are, each of them, more or less such. Nor on the other side, will Generosity exclude the other Principles of Faith, Love, or the Fear of God, or they exclude it, any more than they exclude one another, or any more than they exclude Prudence and Sincerity (considered as general Principles of Virtue) or indeed any other general Principle besides, which serves for producing Virtue in Men. The Principles aforementioned may be all of them jointly and severally Principles productive of Virtue. And accordingly, to them, as such, either to all of them together, or to any of them apart, several particular Virtues may properly be referred. And of this we have, in the case of Faith, a great Instance in the 11th Chapter to the Hebrews, where we find attributed to Faith, a great number of Virtues which distinguished and signalised the Heroes and good Men in several Ages of the World. So that upon the Matter, the consideration of the Style, or the manner of Writing, used by the holy Penmen of the Scripture, will not, I conceive, afford any just exception against what I have before offered, or give any occasion to doubt but that Generosity is such a Principle of Virtue and Goodness as I pretend it is. But to speak freely, why indeed should we think, that none of the holy Writers take notice of the Principle of Generosity; when we find that St. Paul gives so lively a description of it, in which he concludes and sums up his other particular Exhortations, Phil. 4.8. Finally, my Brethren, says he, whatsoever things are True, whatsoever things are Honest [or Venerable] whatsoever things are Just, whatsoever things are Pure, whatsoever things are Lovely, whatsoever things are of good Report; if there be any Virtue, and if there be any Praise [that is, if they be Virtuous and Praiseworthy] think on these things. And, when we likewise find in general, that the several Virtues which I have shown do belong to its Character, are by frequent and earnest Precepts and Exhortations inculcated upon Men throughout their Writings, tho' in other Words perhaps, or under other Heads and Relations; I say, when we find the Case to be thus, why should we think, that the holy Writers take no notice of this Principle? We need not be much concerned about a Word or Name, when we have the Thing and Substance. If the Thing may in the Substance of it be found in Scripture: Or if it be not really and materially repugnant to what is delivered there: Or if (which is all one in effect) it may be demonstrated by rational and convincing Considerations, to be a good and useful Principle; that aught, as I take it, to content us.  
II. In the next place I should endeavour to show the usefulness of the Principle of Generosity for the due Government of our Actions. But from the Interpretation of this Principle, which I have before offered, we may pretty well discern that it is like to be of great use for that purpose. And this will in great measure supersede what I intended to speak under this Head; at least, will oblige me to handle it with the more brevity.  
We find, there is a vast variety of Circumstances wherein Men may be placed when they come to choose and act. Men fall at times under different Relations to one another; and their Cases come to be diversified by Circumstances and Accidents emerging. By which means it comes to pass, that they are oftentimes at a loss how to choose and act, even in Cases, which, if they were stripped of several of their Circumstances, would seem plain and clear. And thus being in a kind of suspense, they are many times impelled one way or other by very light Moment's, and often choose and act for the worse. Men often encourage themselves to the doing of what they acknowledge in general to be unlawful or unfitting, by little excuses and pretences which they fetch from the Circumstances of the Case they are in; and being by assed and inclined to comply with their Passions and Interests, make use of these Arts to vindicate their Reputation with Men, or avert the checks and reproaches of their own Minds; and so insensibly beguile themselves into base and vicious Actions whilst they pretend both to know and practise better. So likewise, there are many Cases wherein a thing, about the doing or refusing whereof we come to deliberate, may in strictness be lawful to be done, but peradventure may not be expedient, fitting, or honourable. Again, some things lie as it were between the Confines of Virtue and Vice, lawful and unlawful. A little excess or defect may make the Action either virtuous or vicious, as the Case may be. Now in such Cases as these, it is of mighty use to lay before ourselves some Rules or Principles of universal extent, which will reach our Case whatever almost it be, and bring us under their obligation, where particular ones either would fall short, or may seem to be less clear and undoubted, or are capable of being eluded by the subtlety which we are wont to make use of for the more secure and uninterrupted gratification of our Desires. And such a Principle is this of Generosity: Which they that are accustomed to put it in practice, sensibly find to be of great and universal influence, and to be as well a Restraint upon them from committing of many things which perhaps might upon the foot of particular Virtues or Rules of Action, be deemed lawful, as likewise an incitement to them to the doing of many things which particular Virtues, considered strictly, or as they are ordinarily wont to be, may not absolutely require.  
Another considerable use of this Principle is, That it easily and without labour of Thought opens itself to our Minds; and so is always ready and at hand for our direction. It sometimes falls out, that when we come to act, we are unresolved whether we shall do a thing or not, and before we can well resolve, are obliged to argue and consider with ourselves (more or less, as the Case may be) and so come gradually to a Resolution, by a train of inductions, to the making whereof is required some intention or application of Mind. And on the other side, it sometimes falls out, that the nature of the thing before us is such, that it will not give us leave to spend much time in debating the Matter with ourselves, but requires an immediate Resolution to be taken. Now it must needs be of great advantage to us in such Cases, to propose to ourselves, some such Principle or Principles, as do easily and instantly open themselves to our Minds, and without labour of Thought suggest what is fit to be done, 'Tis easy to discern, that one considerable use of that excellent Rule, Do as you would be done unto, consists in this, that it gives us a ready direction on the sudden, and quickly clears the thing in hand from many of the Difficulties which our prepossessed Affections or Inclinations would mix with it. For by making the Case our own, we quickly discern what we ourselves would desire to have done to us, and by consequence, how we should carry it to others in the same circumstances. Thus it is with respect to Generosity. It operates by plain, simple and easy Suggestions: It leaves us only to resolve upon the single Point, whether the thing be decent and honourable; whether it be fit for a Man of Spirit and Temper, to do that about which we deliberate; whether, admitting it be lawful to do the thing, it would not be much better and more honourable to do otherwise; or the like. It operates in Men upon these Occasions, by such a Sincerity of Mind as disposes them to prefer that which is best and most becoming. And tho' it helps them to resolve on the sudden, yet it helps them to resolve rightly. Now I believe it will be readily acknowledged, that a Principle which works this way, must needs be of great use. And this will be further confirmed to us, if we consider the easiness and advantage there is in acting by a Principle that is homogeneous and all of a piece, beyond what there is in being guided by a great many particular Rules, which lie broken and piece-meal in the Mind; and not having a straight connexion with one another may easily slip from the Memory when they should be put in practice, or if we remember them, are likely in many Cases to be defective and inadequate. Proverbs and Maxims well applied, are profitable to ripen our experience in things, and to help us in our Practice; and particular Precepts of Virtue have their use: But there seems to be nothing more effectual to render the tenor of men's Actions straight, even and uniform, than a general Principle of the Mind that is entire and one; which operates without varying or mixing of Ideas; and as it cannot easily be absent from the Mind when they come to act, so neither is it likely to prove short and defective. And such a one is the Principle now before us.  
Another considerable use of this Principle, is, That 'tis a mighty help to men's improvement in Virtue. I do not mean barely, that 'tis in general accommodated to serve this end, as several other things are: But if I am not mistaken, it has something extraordinary in it, effectual for that purpose: Insomuch that he who will pursue its Dictates, may promise himself such improvements in Virtue, as are not to be expected from any other but a lively and vigorous Principle. For the truth of this I may safely appeal to the experience of those who have accustomed themselves to act upon this Principle. But it will appear to have nothing of improbability in it, if we consider well on the one hand the nature of Generosity, and on the other hand the course and order wherein men's cogitations and actions were wont to be produced and conducted, together with the Principles they naturally act upon. We shall not perhaps think it strange, that Generosity should have this effect, if we consider that it opens men's Minds to great and exact Thoughts; that it steers and directs the Will in its right course; that it serves to represent Virtue as a lovely thing, and puts Men into a Method of doing and repeating virtuous Actions with Delight; and by that means, as also by exciting in them a commendable Ambition of excelling in Virtue as the most honourable thing in the World, engages them vehemently in the pursuit of it. But since there is nothing so likely to convince Men in this Matter, as their own trial and experience, that is it which I shall principally recommend to them. And there is the greater encouragement to make a Trial, because they cannot reasonably think, that, supposing it be not a help, it will be any impediment to them in a virtuous course; or that the measures it puts them into will be harsh and undelightful, when the Principle itself is so congenial, and so agreeable to the purest and most uncorrupt Sentiments of their Minds.  
In sum. If this Principle were well pursued, there would in all appearance be a great deal more Justice, Order, Quiet and good Agreement in the World, than now there is. It is in its nature extremely accommodated to produce these auspicious effects. And being of a very large and extended nature, it reaches to all orders and degrees of Men. It enters into the Laws of Nature and of Nations: Which cannot well subsist without a regard to the Rules of Humanity, Decency and Honour. It mixes itself with the Laws of particular Polities; and by disposing Men to a regular performance of the respective Duties relating to Government and Subjection, tends to preserve that Order and Quiet which is the last end of Government. Thus a Generous Prince will endeavour to administer his Government with an even and steady hand, to protect his Subjects strenuously, to maintain the just Honour of the Crown and Faith of the Treasury, to shun those little Arts which are sometimes made use of to amass Wealth, or to encroach on the Rights of Subjects or Neighbours. He will think himself obliged to avoid whatever is mean, dishonourable. and unbecoming his Character: And by how much he is elevated in Power and Dignity above other Men, will esteem himself by so much the more engaged to observe, as near as he can, the Rules of Conduct and Honour. And on the other side, Generous Subjects will not be peevish and illnatured towards their Prince, or rashly put on his Actions an unfavourable Construction: They will not envy him for his Greatness, or his just Rights and Prerogatives: They will cheerfully render him his Tribures and Duties: In a word, they will honour his Person and obey his Commands; and where they cannot bona fide in Law or Conscience do the latter, they will meekly submit and pay a Deference to his Authority, tho' they cannot actively obey it; choosing rather to suffer in their own private Concerns, than by opposition to affront their Prince, or disturb the repose and tranquillity of the Public. Thus the Principle of Generosity is of great benefit to the State.  
And so it is likewise to the Church. It will dispose the Clergy to be Manly, Grave and Discreet in discharging the Offices of their Function; to exercise Discipline with a Courage and Exactness, mixed with Temper and Moderation; to be vigilant and careful in looking to their respective Charges; to perform the Offices of divine Worship with such a Decency, Order and Devotion, as may be suitable to the nature of the thing, and helpful to maintain it in that just esteem which it ought to have in the World; to shut out of their Discourses and Instructions, precarious Hypotheses, pious Frauds, Pedantry and Ostentation of pretended Learning, indecent Expressions, and whatever is disagreeable to true Reason and the holy Scriptures; to avoid Simoniacal Arts and mean Compliances; and, in a word, whatever is really unbecoming their Order. And on the other side, a Generous Man of the Laity, will respect and esteem the Clergy for their Office-sake; he will neither envy them their Revenues nor defraud them of their Deuce; he will cover their Faults, and candidly receive their Instructions; he will not for slight and trivial pretences make or countenance a Separation from the Church under which he was born, or break its Communion and disturb its Peace for the sake of things confessedly harmless and indifferent in themselves; and as he is not in his Temper inclinable to oppose his Governors, so he has no Temptation either to think himself exempt from their Authority, or to imagine that a thing indifferent in itself can merely by the command of a Superior be rendered unlawful. In short, Generosity opens men's Minds to such Sentiments as dispose them to Modesty, Peaceableness and Goodness of Temper: Which cannot but be of great Benefit both in Church and State.  
But Generosity is also of great use to the Public, by its suitableness to influence all Orders and Degrees of Men. It is indeed a Principle in which the Nobility and Gentry seem to have in some sort a more peculiar Interest than other Men. Yet there is no Man, tho' of meaner Fortunes, but he is more or less concerned in it. All Men have equally a natural freedom of acting, and are, as far as relates immediately to the Laws of Virtue, equally engaged to use that Freedom rightly; being equally entitled to the Rewards of using it rightly, and subject to the Punishments which ensue the Abuse of it. And so also all Men who are not fallen from the Rights of the human Nature, are interessed in that Reputation and Esteem which is due to virtuous and worthy Actions; and are concerned to maintain a Reputation accordingly. However there seem to be additional Obligations lying upon the Nobility and Gentry, to act upon the true Principles of Honour, which affect them more peculiarly than other Men: The honourable Style and Titles that belong to them, as well as the Eminence of their Station and Degree should put them continually in Mind of acting upon these Principles, and of endeavouring to surpass others therein. For what can be more disagreeable, than for a Gentleman or Man of Quality, to be of a pitiful sordid Spirit, to be rough and illbred, and destitute of all sense of Honour and Virtue. And on the contrary, it must needs be a great Ornament to such Persons to have that firmness and rectitude of Mind, that candour and goodness of Temper, that Civility and decent Address, and that conformity to the Laws of Decorum, Honour and Virtue; which are Properties of Generosity. And herein, those of ancient Families, and those of later Creation, are both concerned. He that is Noble by Descent, has great Obligations to spur him on to Generous and Worthy Actions: He has the Obligations that arise from the Dignity in which he is placed, and likewise the Example of his brave Ancestors; which ought to inspire him with a just emulation of their Virtue, and make him afraid of incurring the Character of Degenerous,— Magnorum indignus Avorum. And he that has acquired Nobless by his own Merit, has, not only the Obligations which arise from the Dignity of his present Station, but also those concurrent Reasons which should engage him to act suitably to the Character he has gained; lest he should afterwards forfeit by Ignoble Actions, the Esteem and Dignity which he had before so worthily acquired, and should as it were degenerate from himself. These are Considerations which as they more particularly affect the Nobility and Gentry, so they ought to be of great weight with them. It is true, that the most solid Obligations of all, to Generosity, are those which result from the Nature of Things, and which concern all Men equally of whatever degree. For 'tis undoubtedly more honourable to imitate God Almighty himself, than the most virtuous and excellent Men that ever were: And there are stronger Reasons to engage Men to a generous and virtuous Behaviour, which may be fetched from the nature of Virtue itself, than any that arise barely from the consideration of secular Dignity and Eminence, or the Example of Ancestors. Nevertheless, where there are concurrent Reasons, some of higher, others of lower Obligation, they ought all to be allowed their just force, and all made use of to engage Men to honourable and virtuous Courses, since all the Arguments of both sorts which can be brought, are commonly found hardly effectual for that purpose. But as Generosity is a Principle of acting, very much becoming Persons of elevated Character and great Fortunes; and they have additional Arguments above many other Men, to engage them to the practice of it: So it is easy to discern, that the practice of it is like to be more illustrious in them, and more beneficial to the World, than the practice of the same in Men of inferior Condition. The Vices of great Men are more conspicuous than those of meaner Folks: And so are their Virtues. Their Character and Station is more Public, and their Example both of greater force and of more diffused Influence: And the greater is their Power of doing either good or hurt, They have commonly many Tenants, Clients and Dependants, to whom their Generous Behaviour is like to bring great Advantage, and the contrary, great Mischief and Damage: And perhaps the well or ill-being in the World, of these People, must be in great measure owing to the generous or ungenerous disposition of their Patrons. So that it must needs be of very diffusive Benefit, for Men who have high Characters or great Commands, who are Governors of Territories, or Lords of great Demeans, or who have great Offices and Entrustments in the State, and in Proportion, for others of lesser Quality or Power, to be of a true and generous Temper. And this will be, not only of great Ornament, but likewise of great use to themselves. It will gain them the Affection and Esteem of their Dependants and Neighbours, and likewise their Prayers and good Wishes; it will give them Power and Sway in their Countries; it will engage all that know them to stand by them, and render them all the good Offices they can: In short, it will procure them the satisfaction and pleasure of Mind that attends generous and worthy Actions in this Life, and the Rewards of Virtue in the future Life.  
It would moreover be of great Advantage to the Public, if Men in their several Professions and Employments would pursue this Principle more exactly. And the more reputable a Man's Profession is, he has in a sort the greater Obligation upon him so to do. Thus, for Instance, a Generous Lawyer would think it dishonourable to betray a Cause he is entrusted in; to plead in a Cause, after he is fully satisfied 'tis unjust, with that warmth and application which is due only to a just one; to give Advice with a regard rather to his own Profit, than either to the Law or the Suitors Benefit; to blow the Coals of Contention, or encourage litigious and frivolous Suits which he knows beforehand will be of no Fruit to the Party; or in more just or colourable Causes to spend the Client's Money unnecessarily in skirmishing and playing of Prizes about Matters wherein Justice or the Merits of the Cause are nothing concerned; to apply the Law to the contriving or defending of Frauds and Oppressions, or pervert it to the hurt or ruin of the innocent and honest Person whom it is ordained to protect. These things, and such like, a Generous Man, whether he be of higher or lower Character in the Profession, will think himself obliged to avoid as dishonourable nourable and base. And the same Principle will influence the Physician and Men of other Professions, in their respective Employments. And likewise the Merchant and Tradesman in his Deal and Commerce. It would be a means to restrain Men from the injurious Arts of Monopoly and Exaction, from Lying, Dissembling and other insidious and ill Practices that are too often used in buying and selling. And as the several ill Practices before mentioned, are dishonourable in themselves, contrary to the Rules of Sincerity and Justice, and prejudicial to the good Order and Prosperity of the Public: So the Virtue's opposite thereunto, which Generosity is suited to produce, are both excellent in themselves, and likewise of great benefit to the Public.  
Nor is there indeed any Body of so inferior a Station in the Commonwealth, but what is capable of acting, in some measure, by this Principle. The meanest Artificers and Countrymen have a Reputation as well as other Men, and are concerned to preserve it inviolate. They are all under the Laws of Virtue and Decorum. They have all a Freedom of Nature, and can resolve to use it for the best Purposes. And sometimes are found to act upon better and nobler Principles, than Men of Character and Education. It must be confessed, that Generosity does not consist in bearing the Port of a Gentleman, or making a Figure in the World. It is compatible with all Conditions of Human Life. And is indeed more effectually demonstrated by submitting to a mean Fortune for the sake of Honesty and Virtue, than by seeking a higher Character or Station at the Price of good Conscience or Discretion. It is exercisable by all Men in their several Degrees, whether they be in higher or lower Capacity; and serves to distinguish Men by their Minds and Spirits, rather than by their external Character or Station. Particularly, it may be exercised in the state of Marriage or single Life, of Mastership or Service, of Travel or Residence, of Plenty or Penury; in Offices Judicial or Ministerial, in Employments Civil or Military, in Peace or in War, in Victory or Defeat, in Honour or Disgrace, in Health or Sickness, in Safety or Danger. It is of use to preserve Peace and good Understanding between Domestics and Kinsfolks, between Neighbours and Townsmen, and People that have mutual Intercourse; by engaging Men to that Civility, Complaisance and Decency of Deportment, which is of great force to prevent Quarrels or Misunderstandings, and the ill Consequences of them; by deterring Men from a sordid or provoking Carriage towards one another; by cureing or preventing that Envy and Ill-nature which too often happen between Men of the same Callings or of the same Families or Neighbourhoods; and which sometimes produce mischievous Effects. It will help to give a Sweetness and Ornament to Conversation: And make Friendships and Correspondencies delightful, orderly and lasting. In a word, there is no State of Life, or Relation that Men stand in to one another, which excludes the exercise of it. Thus it is very ample and extended in its Influence, and helps Men to govern their Actions in such manner as is very conducive to preserve Virtue, Order, Quiet and good Agreement amongst Men. As to several other particular Uses of this Principle, they may, many of them, be so evidently collected from what has been spoken in the Description and Interpretation of it, which I am not willing to repeat; and others may be so easily supplied from any Mans own Observation; that I think it needless to enter upon detailing them. So much then for the Usefulness of this Principle.  
But after all, if any Man, upon comparing the Temper of Mind and Course of Action of those who are or pass for Generous Men, with the Description which I have given of Generosity, should pretend that Generosity, as I have described it, looks rather like an airy Idea than a thing practicable by Mankind; since it would be hard (if not impossible) to find a Man endued with all those Qualities which I have ascribed to it: I say, if any Man should object in this manner, he may please to observe, that I do not say, he cannot be a Generous Man who has not every particular Qualification which I have ascribed or which may be ascribed to that Character. A Man may, no doubt, be a Generous and Virtuous Man, though he be not perfect in Generosity and Virtue. The Habits of the Mind are capable of several degrees, or receive (as they speak) Magis & Minus. There is confessedly a great deal of difference between Virtue considered formally or in its pure Nature, and considered subjectively or under that Alloy in which it is wont to appear in human Actions. It were indeed much to be wished, that Mankind could as easily express the Purity and Sublimity of Virtue in their Spirits and Actions, as they can represent it in Words and Descriptions. But this is not to be expected. For my part, I am as ready as any one, to acknowledge the Imbecility of our Nature, since I find so many sensible Proofs of it in other Men, but particularly in myself. And, I believe, it is a subject of great Grief to those who sincerely aspire after Virtue, to find so many Obstructions and Impediments in their Progress, arising from their own Nature: To find themselves divided as it were against themselves, so that whilst one part of them is inclined to make its Efforts after Virtue, another part of them retards and hinders by its revulsive Motions. This is the conflict of the Flesh and Spirit, which gives Men so many difficulties, and renders their practice of Virtue so feeble and imperfect. But as this shows only the Imperfection of our Nature, so it can be no just Argument against the excellency of this or any other Virtue considered in itself. If then we would take an Idea of any Virtue, we must not take it barely from the practice of particular Men, or the feeble Representations which they are wont to give of it in their Spirits and Actions, but from that and from the nature of Virtue itself together. We are to consider the nature of things, and to frame a Notion of the excellency of the Principles of our Minds by the consideration of their abstracted Nature, and of their Conformity to that Exemplar of Perfection which is in the divine Mind. If therefore we find the Characters of Generosity agreeable to the noblest and divinest Principles of our Minds, in conformity to that original Perfection which is in the divine Nature itself (to which all Virtues and good Qualities that are in Men, are in their measure and degree conformable and correspondent; otherwise they could not be such:) We cannot reasonably deny it to be in itself of that Excellency and Usefulness which I have mentioned, how faintly or imperfectly soever it may be exhibited in the Spirits and Practice of particular Men. But it ought to be thought sufficient, that all the Characters which I have attributed to it, are to be found upon some ones or others of that Body of great and good Men which have been or are in the World; and consequently have had, and now have, a real Existence. From hence then we may conclude, that there is in reality such a Principle, and that it is in some degree attainable by us. And the more excellent a Principle it is in itself, we ought in reason the more earnestly to endeavour to attain as great a Perfection in it as 'tis possible for us: Not fainting though we cannot make good in our Spirits and Actions all the Characters of it, but endeavouring to make good as many of them as we are able; and labouring throughout the course of our Life (which will be a noble Ambition) to make continually further Advances.  
Having thus given a Description of Generosity, I think it superfluous to use Arguments to engage Men to the Love and Practice of it. If it be of so lovely and excellent a Nature, as I have set it forth to be, that is the most forcible Argument in the World, why we should endeavour after it. One need not take pains to incite Men to love a beautiful Object; they do it naturally, and cannot help it. Demonstrating that a thing is such, is beyond all the collateral Arguments of Persuasion that can be used. If in the process of this Discourse, I have done that with respect to Generosity, there will be no need of further Persuasions: And if I have not, Persuasions would be insignificant.  
III. In regard, therefore, Generosity is a thing so excellent in its Nature, and so beneficial in its use, 'tis like to be worth our Pains to inquire, How it may be acquired, or afterwards improved in our Minds. Now when I speak of acquiring it, I do not suppose that there is any Man, by Nature, totally void of it, or at least of some Predisposition to it. All Men have the Seeds and Rudiments of it so far as they have a sense of Good and Evil, Decency and Indecency, Honour and Shame. But since those Rudiments cannot properly, of themselves, give Men the denomination of Generous; for nothing can do that, but some degree of the habit of Generosity: He who would acquire that Character, must improve those Rudiments to that degree, at least, which may be effectual to denominate him such. Now to discover how this may be done, there is not, I conceive, need of any extraordinary Art. The thing is plain and obvious to any Man's Understanding.  
First, therefore, we must address ourselves in a due manner to God Almighty, beseeching him to bestow upon us this Virtue. And, Secondly, we must firmly and maturely resolve to do all that we can possibly to attain it. The Consideration, that God Almighty is the Sovereign Author and Giver of all Virtues, shows the necessity of the former: And the Consideration, that Men cannot ordinarily become Virtuous or Happy, without their own Choice and Endeavour, shows the necessity of the latter. And indeed the reasonableness and necessity of doing these two Things is so evident, that I think it needless either to insist upon proveing it, or to use Arguments to engage Men to put them in practice. But it must be observed, that these two ought to go hand in hand. And both must be performed with that Sincerity of Mind which is necessary upon so just an occasion. As for what relates to our own Endeavours, the Method we take in other Cases, will serve in this. If we would acquire a Habit of Justice, Temperance, or the like Virtues: We steadfastly resolve, and excite ourselves, to perform those Offices which pertain to Justice, Temperance, etc. and endeavour to avoid the contrary Vices: If we offend, we renew our good Resolutions, and with doubled care and diligence endeavour to put them in Execution. The like we must do in this Case. And herein we have this further Encouragement, that the same Methods which serve for acquiring this Habit, will likewise serve for our improveing in it. But more particularly, let us consider briefly, in what manner our Endeavours upon this occasion may be exerted.  
First; because we find it natural to Mankind to act agreeably to the Notions which they have conceived of things: And because Men cannot Choose, nor by consequence Act, rightly, till they can competently distinguish between things, and know what is fit to be chosen and what is to be refused: It is necessary, therefore, that we endeavour in the first place to possess our Minds with just Sentiments concerning the nature of Things; particularly, concerning the Differences between Good and Evil, Decent and Indecent, Honourable and Dishonourable. So also, because it is found by experience, that there are many things which Men will not set about in good earnest, till such time as they are convinced that they are under some Obligation to the doing of them, or that it is for their Honour or Interest to do them: It is necessary, that we represent to our Minds with all the force and perspicuity possible, those Considerations which demonstrate, as well the honourable and becoming nature of Virtue and its happy Consequences, as likewise the firm and indispensable Obligation we are under, to act according to the Rules which it prescribes. And, because, on the other hand, it is found by experience, that 'tis of great use to restrain Men from the Commission or Practice of several things, to convince them that they ought not to do those things, and that the doing of them will be both very Pernicious and very Dishonourable to them: It seemeth necessary, that we likewise represent to our Minds, with all the force and perspicuity possible, those Considerations which serve to make us sensible, that Vice is really Base and Dishonourable, that it draws after it the bitterest and most pernicious Consequences that can be imagined, and that we are under the most solid Obligations in the World, to refuse and avoid it with all our Power. And this is to be done so frequently, that the wholesome Conclusions we draw from these Considerations may make a deep Impression upon our Minds, and beget in us an habitual and  Conviction of the reasonableness and necessity of acting accordingly. Having, therefore, opened our Minds to a just and exact Consideration of the true nature of Things, and thereupon form certain general Judgements or Rules by which we may conduct our Actions so, as to choose that which is Good, Decent and Honourable, and to shun and avoid the contrary; and even to prefer that which is more Good, Decent and Honourable, before that which is less so: It will only remain, that we firmly and advisedly resolve with ourselves to go, in all Cases, as near as we can, by those Rules; and whether we be more or less knowing, endeavour to act according to the best of our Skill and Knowledge. And by this means we shall be put in a way of making the right and best use both of our Understandings and our Wills, which are the two great Springs from whence our Actions do proceed.  
But, further; because it is found, that Men are naturally bend to desire and prosecute those things which appear to be lovely and amiable; It seemeth proper, that we should likewise take all fit Occasions to contemplate and represent to ourselves the amiable nature of this Virtue of Generosity; that as it is very beautiful in itself, so it may appear, in a lively manner such to our Minds. A Beauty will not Charm, if concealed or unobserved. Nor will Generosity appear to us Lovely, as it is, unless we turn the Eyes of our Minds towards it. It is necessary, therefore, in this Case, that we apply ourselves as well to consider the Characters of Generosity in the Theory, as likewise to observe, how beautiful it appears to be in such as exercise it in a just manner; what a Charm and Engagement it carries with it; how Decent, how Venerable, how Agreeable to our best Thoughts, it is. By this means we shall be inspired with the Love and Admiration of it, and consequently be engaged to pursue it with Vigour.  
In a word; though it be of good use to set before ourselves, in general, good and wholesome Rules of acting, and to make general Resolutions of pursuing them, and to strengthen those Resolutions with such Considerations and Motives as are proper for that purpose: Yet it seems material to be observed, that this will hardly be effectual, unless we likewise enure ourselves, actually to put in execution the Resolutions which we make, and reduce those Rules into Practice in particular Cases. Experience shows, how heedless and unvigilant Men are wont to be, and how ineffectual and ill usory their general Resolutions often prove: Insomuch, that for want of confirming themselves in the Habits of Virtue by particular and repeated Acts, they sometimes fall into the contrary Habits of Vice, and undo all the good Resolutions they had formerly made. It is found, that Habits are gained by the frequent repeating of particular Acts, and are confirmed and improved by Use and Practice; nor can indeed long subsist without it. And so in particular is the Habit of Generosity. And, therefore, we must of necessity enure and accustom ourselves to particular Acts of Generosity, if we desire to acquire the Habit of it, or to continue or improve in that Character.  
FINIS.   

ERRATA.  
PAge 11. line, 12. add 1. p. 13. l. 5. for Perfections read Perceptions. p 14. l. 8. after [esteem] make a; p. 28. l. 8. r. compounded. p. 33. l. 24, after that, add it. p. 36. l. 13. r. make such use of it, as that it may, p. 42. l. 25. f. undertake r. undervalue. p. 65. l. 24. f. on r. in. and l. 25. f. in r. on.