Aut Deus, aut nihi. God or nothing OR A Logical Method, comprised in twelve Propositions, deducing from the Actual Being of what we evidently experience, the unavoidable necessity of a GOD, Against the ATHEISTS of our Age and Nation.  
●y Vincent Hatterliffe, Gent. sometimes Student of Corpus Christi College in Cambridge.  
Dixit insipiens in cord suo, non est Deus. The fool hath said in his heart; there is no God,  Psal. 13. ver. 15. 
〈◊〉, Printed by Ralph Wood for the Author, 〈◊〉 are to be sold by Nath. Brook at 〈…〉   

The Preface.  
Courious Reader,  
VIew, and censure at your pleasure; but you will be deceived, if you think to feed either Eye or Fancy here: it is meat for their Master, the Understanding.  
If you respect the matter of it, it is the voice of Creatures in Gregorian, without Quaver or Cratcher: It is Gold in wedges, the plainer the purer, which flies the fair impressions of the Mint, lest it should be mixed: It is a Lady in her Night-clotheses, without paint or patch; who is so rich in her own, that she disdains to use a borrowed beauty. In a word, it is a Logical Discourse in Mood and Figure; clothed according to the old fashion; fit, but not fine.  
The Peasant persuades himself there is no other Golden Rule in Arithmetic, than what is drawn in Golden Figures. The Pecunious Merchant would choose Geometrical Instruments, not by the proportion of the Lines and Distances, but by the preciousness of the Matter wherein they're drawn: and were a Dairie-maid to choose her Mansion in Heaven, she would take up her Eternity no where, but in the Milky Way.  
The Musician judges of the Ditty's goodness, by the fitness which the Words carry with his Airs and Lessons. The verbal Critic affects no Language, but what is stuffed with Tropes and Metaphors, and blown up with Allusions and Eruditions. The Poetic Vein tastes no stile, but what by continual jumping and quavering in the Air, sympathizes with their Fiddling Fancies. Thus our English Palates are of late become French; nothing pleases but what is larded: yea, and Spanish too; nothing can frame itself to their humours, save mighty Oleo's, heaped up with a numerous variety of Heads and Feet, without head or foot. Thus, like Aesop's greedy one, they lose the Substance for the Shadow, and will never take the pains to possess themselves of the Ocean's treasure, unless they find it prodigiously floating at the top; having neither are nor breath enough to dive, like Negroes, to the bottom to fetch it up. That face is in their eyes the sole beautiful, which is most bedaubed with painting; they judge of the comeliness of bodies by the costliness of their Clothes; and like those foolish Birds, they stand picking at the empty colours of Zeuxis false Grapes, rather than feed on the full substance of true ones, in a Tempe or a Thessaly. All men are drunk in their conceit, who speak not Phrases and Sentences at every breath; they account whatsoever is not Bombast, to be Barbarism; they think there is no Utterance, but in Eloquence; no Reason, but in Rhetoric; no Force, but in Flourishes; no Light, but in Lightness. Hence they prefer an Owen's Epigrams far before an Aristotle's Ethiques, because he out-wits him; and Sidney's Arcadia before St. Augustine's Divine City, because he out-words him; thus they support the tottering Stories of their new Buildings with beams of Ash, rather than of Oak, because it hath a smother Bark; and compose their Walls of Chalk, rather than of Flint or Freestone, because it looks the whiter, and feels the softer: and whilst they in this manner cannot distinguish betwixt Good and Fit, (whereof the Oracle of Christianity, St. Austin, hath made a Treatise) they build Castles in the Air, which fall down as fast as they are set up. Who but a mad man would expect Eloquence in a Syllogism; or esteem it dull and flat, because it hath not the Conceit or an Epigram in place of its Conclusion in the end of it? Who but a fool, will deny a Consequence deduced in lawful form, because it is not delivered in pure Ciceronian; or hold an evident Proposition to be false, because it hath neither Trope nor Figure; or reject a Logic Term as inept and insignificant, because it is not found in Manutius Phrases?  
Let therefore an Orator breathe Eloquence, and a Poet Wit; it is the height of a Philosopher's excellency, to speak Reason in proper terms, and to serve himself of Words, not to serve them; lest by that means he become guilty of disservice to his Reader, by withdrawing his attention from the substance which he pretends to teach him, Reason, to the empty sign and shadow of vain Ostentation and splendid Ignorance. If therefore, Reader, you be one of these Verbals, shut this Book as soon as you have opened it; it is not (I assure you aforehand) for your Palate.  
For if you would know the matter and form of it, It is Reason wrapped up in a common Syllogism, and God (as once he was) in Swaddling-clothes, poor, but pure, re-appearing to the eyes of Infidels; not as then in the midst of Heathenism, but in the heart of Christendom; who, as they have quite put out the Eye of Faith, so have they shut that other of Natural Reason so close, that all things are too gross and blunt to obtain entrance, save the most subtle Evidence of Demonstration and Metaphysical certainty. Hence they reject, as flat, all those Arguments (so much celebrated, and pressed by Antiquity) drawn from the Existency, Order, Beauty, Proportion, etc. of this visible World; because, say these Sages, it is not Metaphysically certain, that we are not deceived, in judging, that there is any real World without us, or Humane body with us; because all these things may haply be Illusions, Fantasies, Dreams, Fictions of the Brain, etc. with such monsters of men as these, I am to encounter in this present Treatise. Therefore to give scope to the Dispute, and way to their Nicety, I abstract from the real Existency of all sensible Creatures which seem to be within us, or without us; let them (for the present) be termed Illusions, Dreams, Fantasies, yet if Atheists only grant me, that they either think in their hearts (with the Fool) there is no God; or doubt whether there be one or no, (which no Atheist can deny to be his thought) I here undertake, from that very thought of theirs alone, That there is no God, to prove there is one.  
View therefore, and censure at your pleasure, but not with a cursory and heedless Eye, as you read Pamphlets and Play books, to gain Pastime, and lose Time; but with an eye fixed and open: weigh each Proposition in an equal balance, without losing a dram of the full weight of them; and that done, if you be satisfied, Yield; if unsatisfied, Answer.   

The Contents.  

The first Proposition. IT seems that there is something now in actual being.  
The second Proposition. Something is now in Actual Being.  
The third Proposition. There hath always been something in Actual Being.  
The fourth Proposition. There shall be always something in Actual being.  
The fifth Proposition. Amongst all things which always have been, are now, and ever shall be, there must be some (I determine not yet whether One or more) which is absolutely, and essentially necessary, and not produced by and different cause; that is, to which it is Essential to be in Actual being, and so cannot but be from all Eternity to all Eternity the same, without the least change, or alteration.  
The sixth Proposition Whatsoever is an Actual Being Essentially, must be of itself; that is, independent of any Cause different from it.  
The seventh Proposition. No Actual Being that is superfluous, defective, inordinate, absurd, or difform from the Rule of right Reason, can be Essentially necessary, or of itself.  
The eighth Proposition. No Actual Being, which is abnoxious to Deordination and Absurdities, can be Essentially necessary, or of itself.  
The ninth Proposition. Nothing can be an Actual Being Essentially, and of itself, which is not endued with the light of Reason.  
The tenth Proposition. Only Actual Reason in its full Perfection and Latitude, that is, Reason itself, is an Actual Being Essentially necessary.  
The eleventh Proposition. Only Actual Reason in its full perfection, or Reason itself, is Essentially an Actual Being of itself.  
The twelfth Proposition. Reason itself, being Essentially necessary, and of itself, is God. 

The first Attribute. The Unity of God.  
The second Attribute. God's Indivisibility.  
The third Attribute. The Spirituality of God.  
The fourth Attribute. The Simplicity of Gods Being.  
The fifth Attribute. The Ubiquity of God.  
The sixth Attribute. The Eternity of God.  
The seventh Attribute. The Omnisciency of God.  
The eighth Attribute. Of God's Omnipotency.  
The ninth Attribute. The Goodness of God.  
The tenth Attribute. The Purity and Sanctity of God.  
The eleventh Attribute. Of the infallible Veracity of God.  
The twelfth Attribute. God's Justice.  
The thirteenth Attribute. Of the ever Blessed Trinity.      

To the Right Honourable HENRY Lord Marquis of Dorchester, Earl of Kingston, Viscount Newark, Lord Pierrepoint, etc.  
My Lord,  
SCarce had this Alien (born in a Foreign, and nourished in this Nation) opened an eye in search of a Noble Maecenas, to naturalise and protect it, when your Eminent Worth and Learning attracted them wholly to yourself: the one assuring a proneness to accept; the other, a power to set a true Estimate of this small Present. As small indeed as Nothing, if you regard the minuteness of the Volume; and yet as great as All things, if you consider what is exhibites, viz. GOD, the Best of All things, whose unavoidable existence it first endeavours to deduce by Logical Consequence, from what every one most evidently experiences; then to shadow out his Essence, and lastly, to give some taste of his Attributes: and this only as a Foundation to a further discovery (in some ensuing Tracts) of his Power, Providence, Revelations, Mysteries, and Conduct of sinful Man to eternal Happiness. May it therefore please your Honour, to deprive your more Serious and Important Affairs of so small a portion of time, as may suffice to cast an eye upon his small Tract: And for the Author of it, as you Justly possess the Ancient Domain of his Name and Family, so you would please Favourably to Patronise those few dispersed Relics which yet remain of it; whereof I am the least and lowest.  
My Lord, Your Honours most Humble 
 (though unknown) Servant, 
 Vincent Hattecliffe.   

Aut Deus, aut nihil. God, or nothing.  

The first Proposition. It seems that there is something now in actual being.  
THis Proposition is so evidently true, that it cannot possibly be denied, or called into question, by any one who ever reflected of what passed by most manifest experience in his own thoughts; and so neither ever was, not ever can be impugned by any who are in their right wits.   

The second Proposition. Something is now in Actual Being.  
Proof.  
THis Proposition, the first being supposed as a most clear undeniable truth, is most evident, for that very seeming to any one, that something is, must be something; for it must be a Representation that something now is: now every Representation represents something either truly, or falsely; if it represent something truly, then there is something; if falsely, yet there is a false Representation of something: now this Representation represents; to represent is to do something, that which does any thing, must be something; for nothing can do nothing: therefore if there seem to be something in Actual Being, there is something in Actual Being; to wit, that very Representation, or seeming that something is.   

The third Proposition. There hath always been something in Actual Being.  
Proof.  
IF ever there had been nothing at all in actual being, then there could not possibly be any thing now actually, which notwithstanding is proved to be true in the former Proposition; for that which should have been after there had been nothing at all, would either have been a being essentially necessary, which is impossible; for such a being must always be, and so there would always have been something: or it must have been a contingent being, that is, which can be at one time, and not be at another: Now every such contingent thing must have some cause to give it its actual existency, or being, which it hath not essentially of itself; for that which once was nothing, or had no actual being, can never become any thing of itself, or without a cause distinct from it: for all things contingent are indifferent, or indetermined of themselves before they are, to be or not to be actually. Now it is impossible, that that which of itself is indeterminate, or indifferent to be, or not to be actually, should determine itself of itself to be; for than it should be indeterminate, and determinate to be essentially, which is a plain Chimaera, and contradiction. Therefore every contingent thing must be determined to be, and be put in actual being by some producing cause really distinct from it: now every cause must be supposed to be actually, before it can be supposed to produce any thing; for to produce any thing, is to do something; but nothing can do nothing. If therefore the time had ever been, when there was nothing, there could never have been any thing, but de facto, there is now something, as is proved: therefore there was always something.  
Neither would this truth be infringed, if one should deny all contingency, and put every thing to flow one after another, and have their beings for such, or such a space of time by inevitable necessity (which I will prove hereafter to be false;) for even this admitted for the present, yet the production of effects by distinct causes remaining still in force, it will remain evident by virtue of the former argument, that there hath been always something in actual being; for had there ever been nothing at all, there could have been no cause of any thing; for nothing can do nothing. Neither can any thing possibly begin to be for such a determinate space of time, through an essential connexion to such a determinate time, as we shall see in the fifth Proposition.   

The fourth Proposition. There shall always be something in actual being.  
Proof.  
THere is now, and ever hath been something, as is proved; if therefore it could ever happen that all things should cease to be; either something essentially necessary (if there be any such being amongst all things) must cease to be, which is impossible; for if it be essentially necessary, it cannot but be; for every thing must always be what it is essentially: or if there be nothing essentially necessary, all things contingent must cease to be; but that is impossible: for seeing every contingent thing must have its being from some cause really distinct from it, so long as that cause is apt, and able to conserve it in being; and that there is no other cause present, and enabled to destroy it, it must remain in its being: If therefore all things being contingent cease to be, they must either lose their beings for want of a cause to conserve all things, or by reason of some cause which destroys all things. Not the first, for nothing can cease to be for want of that which is wholly impossible, and so can confer nothing neither to its being, or not being. Now that it is impossible that any cause can give being to all things, is evident; for seeing that very cause is comprised within the number of all things; if it give being as a distinct cause to all things, it must give being to itself, and so be distinct from itself, and be supposed to have a being before it is; for every cause, as is said, must be supposed to have an actual being, before it can be supposed to do any thing; for nothing can do nothing: and yet if it be its own cause primarily and absolutely, it cannot be supposed to be before it is produced; therefore it will be either supposed to be before it is, or not to be when it is: it is therefore evident, that seeing there can be no cause of all things, all things which are, cannot cease to be, for want of a producing cause. Neither for the like reason can all things cease to be, by reason of some cause destroying all things; for such a cause is wholly impossible: for if all things be destroyed, there can nothing remain in actual being; but that which destroys all things, must be supposed to be whilst it destroys all things; for to destroy any thing is to do something, and nothing can do nothing.  
If it should be replied, that that which destroys all other things distinct from it, may cease to be, after it has destroyed all those things, and so all things will lose their actual beings, and there will be nothing: I answer, If all things, as we now suppose, be contingent, than nothing can destroy all things, save itself: for every contingent thing must have a cause, as is proved; it cannot therefore be supposed to be, unless the cause of it be also supposed to be actually, therefore is cannot destroy all things, save itself, and remain itself in being; for then a contingent thing should be without a cause, which is impossible. And the same argument concludes, admitting, that all things were succeeding one another by way of cause and effect, through inevitable necessity: For then every thing in actual being must suppose the being of its cause, and so could never destroy all things save itself, because it could not be, when its cause is destroyed. Thus the fourth Proposition is made evident, that seeing there is something now, there must always be something hereafter.   

The fifth Proposition Amongst all things which always have been, are now, and ever shall be, there must be some (I determine not yet whether one or more) which is absolutely, and essentially necessary, and not produced by any different cause; that is, to which it is essential to be in actual being, and so cannot but be from all eternity to all eternity; the same without the least change or alteration.  
Proof.  
IF there were no such essential necessary being as this, there could never either have been, be now, or ever hereafter be any thing in actual being; but there always hath been is now, and ever shall be something in actual being, as is already proved. Ergo.  
I prove the major, or first Proposition. Whatsoever is not essentially an actual being, cannot be of itself; for were it of itself, it must be of its own essence, or essentially; for the essence of a thing is nothing really, but the thing itself. Seeing therefore it cannot be of itself, whensoever it is, it must be from something else, that is, from some cause; now if that cause be not essentially of itself, it requires as much another cause, to have an actual being, as the former required it; and so there will be no settlement nor firm foundation in causing, till one come to some cause which proceeds not from any other, but is essentially of itself: but every thing which is unsettled in itself, that it may have consistency, must have its firmness and foundation from something, which is in itself firm and constant; for other wise it destroys itself, and falls to nothing: therefore seeing that every cause which is not essentially from itself, is as unsettled, and infirm in causing, as was the first cause mentioned in this Argument; there must necessarily be found some cause essentially from itself, to give firmness, as a foundation to all the rest: And to put a concatenation in dependency of causes and effects, without such a firm cause as this, would be as foolish and absurd, as to put a wall of stones, one holding up another in the air, without any firm foundation, whereon some of them are to rest and stand. Neither will the infinite progress in multiplying contingent, or caused causes without end, help the matter: For as a wall composed of infinite stones, one holding up another, without a foundation, would be as absurd, as if it consisted of a finite and determinate number of stones; so will it be in this infinite progress in causes, without being supported by a necessary existent cause; and there will be no other difference save this, that the one will be only a finite, but the other an infinite absurdity. Nay, as the now instanced Wall would not be only absurd, but a mere Chimaera, and fiction of the Brain, unless it were sustained by some power able to supply the want of a foundation; for otherwise it would fall down as fast as it is builded up, and never come to have any frame of a Wall in it: So the  contingent causes and effects, would not only be inept and foolish, but wholly implicatory, and impossible: seeing in the former supposition there is nothing possible, which can supply the absence of that essential actual being, which is to give firmness to all contingent causes, as their foundation in causing; and consequently all things would be impossible, and it would imply a contradiction that any thing should ever be put in actual being: But that is manifestly false; for it is made evident, that something is now in actual being, therefore there is some actual being essentially necessary. Neither will it any way darken the light of this Proposition, if denying all contingency, one should say, that every thing proceeds by fatal necessity, and by an inevitable, and essential exigency one from another in their different successive durances, for such a determinate measure of time: (as hath been above touched, and shall hereafter be examined) For seeing even in this supposition every thing hath its necessity from its causes, and nothing from itself, or of itself, it will be as ridiculous, and implicatory a supposition, as the former supposing contingency. For Exempligratiâ, the effect A, will have no necessity of being now, but from the cause B; nor the cause B, but from its cause C, and so each will be necessary dependently of another cause; therefore unless there be found a cause independent of all others, and having a necessary being essentially from itself, it will be a collection of causes and effects, hanging one upon another, like the stones of a Wall in the air, without all ground or foundation; and therefore as absurd, and implicatory as the former. Whatsoever Systeme therefore be put of causes and effects, the truth of this fifth Proposition stands firm, and , that amongst all things in actual being, etc. there must be something essentially necessary.  
Yet to give it more strength and light, I will endeavour to prove that the Systeme of succeeding subordinate causes, producing one another, without any cause improducible, (whereupon whatsoever cause that is produced, depends either mediately, or immediately) whether they have a contingent only, or a necessary connection with their effects, to be wholly impossible by this Argument.  
If this Systeme be subsistent and solid, than all Causes and Effects, that either are now, or ever have beem are, and have been produced by a Cause; but that is impossible. Ergo, the Major is evident, as containing nothing but the supposed Systeme; for whatsoever is produced by a cause, must have a cause producing it. The Minor I prove. If it were possible, that all the Effects and Causes that are now, or ever were, could be, or have been produced by a Cause, than it is possible that they should be all Causes, and Effects, and yet should not be all Causes and Effects that either are now, or ever were, but that is impossible. Ergo, The Minor is evident exterminis. For it only asserts that both parts of a Contradiction, all, and not all, cannot be true. The Major I prove. Whatsoever is conceived to be produced by a Cause, must be conceived to have a producing Cause; this is clear. But if all Effects and Causes, that either are, or ever were, be conceived to have a producing Cause, they must be conceived to be all, and not to be all. Ergo, This Minor is evident, for they must be conceived to be all, as is now supposed, and affirmed in the Systeme; and yet they cannot be conceived to be all, for the cause which is conceived to produce all, will be excluded from the number of all that are, or ever were produced by a Cause. The force, etc. This Argument cannot possibly be avoided, otherwise then by answering that it proceeds upon a false supposition; for the number of produced Causes and Effects being infinite, it is always false, to say all, for still there will be more, and more without end, and one can never reach to all. To this I reply, by demanding whether the Authors of this Opinion intent by this Answer to elude all universal Propositions de omni, concerning this number of produced Causes, by denying the supposition of all, by reason of the infinity of the number, if it were admitted, exempli gratia, all effects and causes, that either are now, or ever were, are and were, either Corporal or Spiritual; all men that either are now, or ever were, are and were animalia rationalia, all bruits irrationalia, etc. If they intent this, they take away the chief ground of humane discourse, by denying all universal Propositions, upon pretence that they proceed upon false suppositions, there being no such thing as All, in an infinity of things proceeding one from another, in every particular species of them: so, omnis homo, omnis lo, omnis arbour, etc. will be false suppositions, and consequently cannot compose a true proposition; nor will this enumerative argument be of force: Petrus est animal rationale, & Paulus, & Johannes, et idem de singulis aliis, ergo, omnis homo est animal rationale; for it may be eluded by saying I deny the supposition, omnis homo, all men; because all cannot be said in an infinite number. If this be their intention, than they are obliged to give disparity betwixt these forenamed universal propostions, and that proposition which I advanced, of all causes and effects produced, for this being as really and universally true, as the other, if the supposition of all be admitted, they must give a solid reason, why all causes may not be admitted in this, as well as all men, etc. in the other. If they should give this disparity, that omnis homo, all men, etc. in the foresaid propositions, is an abstract from time and place, and so supposes not to signify all men, as constituted in time and place, as omnes causa product &, all produced causes signifies in my propositions; for by omnis homo est animal rationale, is no more signified, then that it is the formal  notion, or essence of a man, to be a reasonable creature: I answer, that this is not a sufficient disparity, for omnis res est producibilis ab aliquâ causâ, abstracts as much from time and place, and (in this opinion which I impugn) is as much signifying the formal  notion of every thing, as animal rationale is of homo, in as much as res in genere is conceived in order to its existency, or actual being: and hence, as from the  notion of a man, consisting in animal rationale, is rightly inferred this Proposition, That all the men that ever yet were, were animalia rationalia, because the same essence is common to all, and every individuum of the same kind, though this second Proposition abstract not from time: so from this Preposition, omnis res est producibilis ab aliquâ causâ, must be rightly inferred this, All things that ever were yet in actual being, were produced from some cause. Neither will it avail any thing to instance in the infinite series of things in possibility to have an actual being hereafter one from another, by way of cause and effect without end, wherein it cannot be said, that all effects shall proceed from causes, or all causes shall produce their effects, because in this infinite series, there is no such thing as all. This, I say, avails nothing, for the comparison is not rightly instituted betwixt all things which have been, and all things which are in possibility, or may be hereafter; for those causes which have been, or which are past, though they be not now any thing themselves, yet they remain in virtute sua, that is, mediately or immediately, in the works which they have produced, and whereof some now remain, by a continual descent of causation, from their efficient virtue; so that the present effect (a) exists by virtue of the cause (b), and (b) by virtue of (c), and (c) by virtue of (d), &c. so that the effect (A) hath so necessary a dependence immediate, or mediate, of every precedent cause in this line of production, that it could not now be, if any of the precedent causes, how distant soever from it, had not been before it; so that from the actual being of any effect now, the authors of this line of produced causes without end, must confess, that a forcible inference is drawn, of the actual praeexistency of all and every cause of the said effect, either immediately or mediately, having a necessary dependence a well of all, as of any one of them, as being a fruit lineally deduced from them all, which cannot possibly be true in an infinite series of produced causes; because in a number infinite, one can never say all, as these Authors affirm. but in the instance alleged, of Causes and Effects possible hereafter without end, and so infinite; those which remain, and shall remain without end in the state of possibility, so long as they remain in that state, are a pure nothing, not having any being at all, neither in themselves, nor in virtute sua; there being nothing in actual or virtual being, save only causes able to produce them; so that they are merely in potentia causae, and no more, neither receiveth the cause any virtue to exist from the effects which it can produce; for that which is yet nothing, cannot give any thing to another thing: whence appears, that the instance objected is defective, there being an evident disparity, betwixt the causes which have been produced heretofore, and the effects which may be produced without end, or time hereafter; for first from the effects which now are existent, by an ascendent successive line, a mediate consequence is forcibly drawn to all the causes, which by connected causalities, have wrought the being of this present effect, which cannot be done possibly in an infinite line, even according to the acknowledgement of these Authors; but contrariwise the actual existence of this present cause, hath no dependence at all of all or any of the effects, which may successively proceed from it; but can subsist actually by virtue of its causes, though it should never produce any effect at all; and therefore there is no necessary dependence immediate or mediate, betwixt the cause and the effect, as there is betwixt the effect and the cause; whence no forcible inference can be drawn, from the actuality of the cause, to the necessary sequel of all possible effects; and consequently, all the causes that ever have been of this effects, mediate or immediate, are demonstrable by this present effect to have had an actual being: but all effects which may possibly proceed mediately or immediately from this present cause, are not inferred from the actuality of this cause, so that all may be said in the one, but not in the other; the first therefore is finite, but the second is an infinite number. If therefore the instance had been rightly instituted, it should not have been put betwixt the effects which are inpossibility to be hereafter, and the precedent causes which already have had their actual being; but betwixt the effects which may be hereafter, per posterius & posterius without end, and the causes which might have been heretofore per prius & prius without end. For both these are eqully infinite, inexhaustible, indeterminate in potentia, and syncategorematical; for as descending from this present effect (A,) there shall or may be always effects one after another without end possible; so ascending from the same effect (a) there might have been causes one before another without end. But as the instance thus stated concludes nothing, that the produced causes have de facto prodeeded one from another without end; so supposes it some improducible cause, which might endlessly have produced causes one before another, and before all those which it actually produced. Or if we turn the comparison another way, it should have been proposed, betwixt the causes which have had actual being, and the effects which shall have actual being, wheresoever they are in actual possession of that being, and then the instance had been of force; for as beginning from the cause (A) which now is in actual being, to all the effects hereafter possible, when they are put in actual being, the number will be determinate, exhaustible, and finite; so beginning from the same effects (A) to all the causes which have had actual being in their several precedences, the number will be exhaustible, and determinately finite: the infinity therefore is only conceivable in the endless succession of possible effects, whereof all can never be in actual possession of their beings à parte post, and an infinite precedency of possible causes, whereof all could never have been in actual possession of their beings à parte ante, which in effect is nothing else, then to say, that there is some necessary improducible cause, which could have produced causes one in time before another without end, and can produce effects one in time after another without end; and as this improducible cause can produce nothing so late, but he can product something which shall exist after it; so could it not produce any thing so soon, but it could have produced something which might have existed before it. Whence follows evidently, that there must be always a first and a last, a beginning and an end, a determinate number, and so a proper all, of things which either have had, or ever shall have had the exercise of their actual being: for the effects which are actual now, are the last of all actual beings which ever were before, and those of the next ensuing moment shall be then the last, and so shall it be without end. Now if actual things have an end, they must have had a beginning; for an infinite actual time without all beginning could never have come to an end, because infinity is that which is without end: seeing then all actual time which hath been heretofore, is come to an end in this present moment, which is the last that hath been, or is actual, it is evident, that it had a beginning. Neither will it avail to say, That it is only infinitum à parte ante, but not à parte post; for I answer, that such an actual infinitum, is a pure Chimaera, that is a thing without an end which hath an end. And it will press as little, to instance in the imaginary moments of precedent time, begore any thing was produced by a cause, which were infinite à parte ante, and yet came to an end à parte post, when things were first caused: For I answer that those moments were pure nothings, and mere fictious or false conceits of our understanding; for time is nothing but either the measure of mutable things, or rather the mutability or mutation itself: (as I shall declare hereafter) when therefore it is supposed that no mutable thing is in actual being, it is impossible to conceive truly that there is any time; for those feigned moments are nothing else, than that improducible, and immutable cause, which hath power to produce something actual and mutable, which should have been before all other things which he hath caused, as the imaginary moment's possible to be hereafter, are nothing save the same cause, either alone or with other causes which can produce mutable effects after all those which shall have been actually produced; by reason therefore that this power of the first cause is without beginning or ending, as being wholly immutable, and so not measurable by time, we conceit that time possible in precedency, and of futurition, is composed of successive moments.  
Thus therefore having passed through these occurring difficulties, I return to my former Argument, and press it thus: All the effects which now are in actual being (even according to the adverse opinion) have necessary dependence, mediate or immediate, of all the causes which have preceded them in the line of their causation; therefore it is a truth and a proper expression to say, that all those causes have concurred mediately or immediately to these present effects; but it is impossible that all those precedent causes should be produced by a cause, for than they would be all, and not all, as I have already proved: therefore amongst the causes which in the line of causation have concurred immediately or mediately to these present effects, there must be at least some one which is a producing only, and not a produced cause, which is my fifth Proposition.  
Hitherto I have only laboured to evince, that such beings as are subject to continual generation, and corruption, and which by a line of Succession follow one another, in production and desition, must have had some improducible cause: some difficulty may yet remain in these greater and more solid parts of this Universe, as the Earth, Water, Air, Heaven, Sun, Moon, Stars, etc. for these still remaining (so far as we can judge by our experience) in that main substantial being which they ever had, may occasion a difficulty how they came to be. Forasmuch therefore as touches this present propostion, either it must be said, that they are of themselves, and never had any producing cause, and then my present proposition is in part afferted, that amongst all actual beings there must be improducible causes: or that they were produced by causes successive one to another, and all caused, which I have already confuted: or that they are causes one above another, and one producing another without end, and all actually and eternally existent, which I have à fortiori, evinced to be false, by my former Argument, against infinite successive causes; for it would be both an actu infinitum, and as hard to understand or believe, as a first improducible cause; and it would destroy itself by being as impossible, as that of succeeding causes, etc. Neither will the instance of infinite divisible parts less, and less without end, in continuo, make a parity with infinitum actu. For first, that opinion is not certain: and secondly, if it be true, I answer, that parts whilst they are in continuo, are only potential, and not actual parts, no nor entia actu; for nothing is an actual being but the totum itself, and when that is divided, of one totum or whole thing, there is made two, and if each of them be divided, they become two less totums, and so without end by each division, a new totum will begin to be, which was only in potentia before; for so long as they are in continuo, they are the continuum without any beginning, ending, term, or determination, save only the terms of the whole continuum; so that it is impossible to say the part (a) is of this determinate length, breadth, or profundity, so long as it remains in continuo, for it hath nothing to terminate it, till it come to the utmost superficies or point of the continuum. And seeing every actual being must be determinate, and no indeterminate thing can be ens actu, there will be nothing actual in continuo, save the totum itself, or the continuum, because that only is ens determinatum, having its fixed and determinate limits: so that in every continuo, there is only one actual thing, containing in potentia, many things, which by actual division may become acta less continuums than that is wherein they are contained; and so every continuum contained in potentia in a greater, will be less than its continent, when it becomes a continuum by a new division, and this without end; there being then no actual determination of different parts in continuo, there can be no actual distinction of them; and if no distinction, no actual number; and if no actual number, there can be no actual infinity, or infinitum actu.  
Thus I have proved my fifth Proposition, and have been something prolix in it, because it contains the mainest difficulty of the whole deduction.  
Against the three last precedent propositions may be objected, that there appears no contradiction, in constituting the essence of something not absolutely and always necessary, but yet having a necessary and essential connection with such a determinate term of time, v. g. that it have an essence requiring necessarily to begin its actual being in the determinate instant (A), and to continue till the determinate instant (G), and the same is of so many determinate hours, days, months, years, etc. and this without any cause at all, but of its particular essence, or of itself: whence will follow, that one thing may begin to be actually in such a term of time, and then cease to be; and after many revolutions of time another thing may begin, and desist from being, in another discontinued portion of time, etc. So that a time may be given wherein there was nothing at all, nor shall be any thing, though there be something now in actual being. I answer, that such an essence as this, implies a manifest contradiction, in our present supposition, of no being at all: for supposing once that there be nothing at all, it cannot be supposed, that there are any determinate instants, or parts of time, to which that being can have any necessary and essential relation; for those instants, or parts, must be something; and so this objection suppose nothing at all to be, and yet something to be, which is a clear contradiction. And hence also follows, that it is as clear a contradiction as the former, to affirm, that any thing essentially annexed to a determinate space of time, should be of itself, ab aeterno; for that limited eternity must be presupposed to be actually, before you suppose that any thing can be actually and essentially annexed to it, seeing the actuality of no being can be essentially annexed to that which is nothing actually; for then something should depend of nothing: now I subsume, but it is impossible to conceive that pretended not beginning, or eternal determinate time designed in the objections to be presupposed as actually existing, before that being commensured essentially to that forenamed space of time, ergo. This Minor I prove because it is wholly impossible to conceive any actual durance of time, whether eternal or not eternal, whether infinite of finite, before we conceive something actually existent, which is a second sign of posteriority of Nature, we conceive measured by such a determinate space of time; for no part of time whatsoever, can have any other proper notion (if it be any reality distinct from the thing which dures) then to be an affect, and (as many think) consequently an effect of that which dures by it; both which suppose either the thing effected to be its subject, or the thing effecting it to be its cause; and by consequence, that thing to be in priority, and this in posteriority of nature, in relation to it: whence it follows, according to the common strain of Philosophers, that it can have no essential dependence of it in its actual being; for what is supposed to be actually, before the actual being of another thing, cannot essentially depend in its actual being upon that before which it is supposed to be actually.  
Secondly, seeing that that which this objection pretends to be eternal, or ab aeterno, must have an essential relation to this or that determinate actual space of time, for which alone, and for no other, it hath a necessary being of itself, and that ended ceases of itself to be any longer, I cannot conceive such an essence without a manifest contradiction; for it is impossible to conceive any thing to have an essential relation to be so soon, or in such a priority of time that no time can be conceived to be possible before it, if it continue only for a determinate space of successive time, and then as it existed (in his supposition) of itself ab aeterno, so of itself it ceases to be in this or that determinate instant of time. For in this supposition, that determinate instant will terminate a time which is determinately finite; therefore from that instant ascending, one may attain to the first instant of that time; and so that time will have a final and last instant, and consequently be finite, and not eternal, wherein no first instant is to be found. Seeing therefore (as we shall see hereafter) successive eternity is but a mere possible indetermination of one priority conceived before another, and that no indeterminate thing so long as it remains indeterminate, or as such, can possibly be, or ever have been ens actu, an actual being; it is also impossible to conceive such an indeterminate successive eternity, to be any actual thing in itself, or any thing else, save the necessary and immutable power of some cause which can produce nothing so soon, but it could have produced something, which might have been before whatsoever it hath actually produced; and if it had produced any thing before that, it could yet have produced another thing which would have been, and so in infinitum, without all term or limit.   

The sixth Proposition. Whatsoever is an actual being essentially, must be of itself, that is, independent of any cause different from it.  
Proof.  
THis Proposition is already proved, for the essence of a thing is really the thing itself, as is evident; if therefore any thing exist actually from, or of its essence, it must exist actually from, or of itself: now every thing which is essentially an actual being, exists actually of its own essence; therefore every thing which is essentially an actual being, exists actually of itself. If it should be instanced, that supposing an inevitable necessity of all things, all things would essentially be actual beings for that measure of time wherein they are, and yet they would not be of themselves, but from their determinate causes unavoidably producing them; I answer, that this necessity (were there any such) proceeds not from the essence of the effect, but from the determination of the cause; for therefore only the effect is necessary, because the cause cannot but produce it: for the effect being purely nothing before it is produced, cannot possibly necessitate the cause to produce it; for to necessitate any thing, is to do some thing, but nothing can do nothing: it is not therefore the essence of the effect to be actually in such a space of time, but rather the essence of the cause to produce such an effect in such a time. So that even this false supposition admitted, what soever is an actual being essentially, must be of itself; for the supposed inevitable necessity of all things is only  from the cause, and so not essential, or intrinsecal to the thing in actual being: neither indeed can either the beginning to be, or perseverance in being for such a determinate time only, be essential to any thing; for time being nothing but a measure of mutability, or rather mutability itself, (as we shall see hereafter) whatsoever is essentially in or for such a determinate space of time, will be in time, and not in time, for that whole space wherein it is supposed to be: in time, as is supposed; and yet not in time, for whatsoever it is essentially it is immutably, for nothing can change its essence: To say therefore, that any thing can be essentially for, or in such a determinate time, is to affirm that is is mutable whilst it is not mutable, and necessary whilst it is not necessary, which is a plain contradiction. Nay farther, it is to affirm, that such a being is tota simul, because it cannot but be for such a time, and yet not tota simul, but by succeeding parts, because it is in time, which is another contradiction.   

The seventh Proposition. No actual being that is superfluous, defective, inordinate, absurd, or difform from the rule of right Reason, can be essentially necessary, or of itself.  
Proof.  
FOr what necessity can there be of absurdities or defects, etc. seeing their not being is better than their being, and the works of nature are better without them then with them? For if any thing absurd and contrary to reason could be essentially necessary, and of itself, and all thing must proceed from that being which is essentially necessary, and of itself, as is above proved, than all things which have a being must be absurd and contrary to reason. But it is evident that all things which have a being are not absurd and contrary to reason, ergo. The Minor is evident by the Reasonableness, Order, Beauty, Perfection, Connection, and Symmetry which are found in those things which we experience to be. The Major I prove, for nothing can give that which it hath not itself, therefore, if that which gives, that is, produces all things, be absurd and contrary to reason, it cannot give, that is, produce any thing which is perfect and according to reason. For if that which is contrary to reason could work according to reason; (and whatsoever gives or produces any thing which is according to reason, must work according to reason) then that which is contrary to reason will be according to reason; for whatsoever works according to reason, must participate of reason, and so be according to reason. Again, whatsoever is, there must be some reason why it is: But there can be no reason, why any thing which is contrary to reason should be, ergo. The Minor is evident, for if there were reason for it, it could not be contrary to reason, unless you make the same thing to be according to reason and contrary to reason. I prove the Major, for if any thing could be without any reason why it is, than any one may put what he pleaseth to be, or not to be, without any reason: and so all humane discourse will be frustrated, which gives reasons for what it affirms, and deduceth all things from reason. But of this more hereafter.   

The eighth Proposition. No Actual Being, which is oboxious to Deordinations and Absurdities, can be essentially necessary, or of itself.  
Proof.  
SEeing no absurdity can be essentially necessary, as is proved, nothing which can be subject to any absurdity can be essentially necessary; for whatsoever actual being is essentially necessary, must always be necessary; but that which is subject to such deviations, may at some time not be necessary; for it may happen that it falls into some of those absurdities to which it is obnoxious, and then it becomes abfurd and inordinate; but nothing which is absurd can be essentially necessary: seeing therefore every actual being essentially necessary excludes all absurdities, nothing which can be absurd, can be an actual being essentially necessary.   

The ninth Proposition. Nothing can be an actual being essentially, and of itself, which is not endued with the light of Reason.  
Proof.  
WHatsoever is an actual being essentially, must essentially exclude all disorders and abfurdities, as is proved in the two former Propositions, but nothing save that which is endued with the light of reason, can essentially exclude all disorders and absurdities, ergo. I prove the Minor: whatsoever excludes essentially all disorders and absurdities, must have something essentially repugnant to all disorders and absurdities; this is evident. But nothing is essentially repugnant to all disorders and absurdities, save the light of reason: Therefore, what soever hath not the light of reason excludes not essentially all disorders and absurdities. I prove the Minor.  
Therefore only is any thing disordered and absurd, because it is contrary or difform to the light of reason is essentially repugnant to all disorders and absurdities. The antecedent is evident; for why is any thing disordered or absurd, then because it is otherwise then reason dictates it should be? I prove the consequence, for if disorder be nothing save a repugnancy to the light of reason, than nothing but the light of reason is essentially repugnant to all disorders.  
I will give force and light to this Argument, by propounding it in another manner, thus. Whatsoever is not capable of itself, to govern and direct itself perfectly according to the rule of reason, cannot of itself preserve itself from all inconverniences, disorders, and absurdities; this is evident, But whatsoever hath not the light of reason, cannot of itself govern itself perfectly according to the rule of reason, ergo. The Minor is clear; for who can possibly conceive, that that which hath no knowledge nor understanding of itself, which neither knows whether it be good or bad, right or wrong, well or ill, orderly or disorderly, according or contrary to reason, nay, nor whether there be any such thing as reason or no, should be capable to govern perfectly itself of itself, according to the rule of reason? Thus were the Sun constituted so far from the Earth, that it could neither heat not enlighten it; or so near, that it blinded all who saw it, and burnt up all before it; or that the Earth were removed so far off, or near to the Sun, that the same inconveniences and disorders followed; if neither any Tree ever bore fruit, not any sensible Creature exercised any faculty of his senses; if all bodies were weak, feeble, diseased, and deformed; if all things were put out of order, place, time, number, weight, measure, proportion, beauty, filled with nothing but horrid disorders, defects, deformities, disproportions, absurdities, fooleries, (which certainly, if we respect only the course of Nature, are main transgressions against the rule of Reason, foul blots upon the beauty of creatures, and prodigious monsters in the progress of natural causes) yet what soever had not the light of reason, could neither prevent them, nor resent them, nor redress them of, and by itself, or by any thing included essentially in the actuality of its being; but every thing would actually exist as before, if some external cause did not destroy them, which could not be, if they were essentially actual beings, as is already proved.  
It will be said this Argument proves too much, and so in effect proves just nothing: for it concludes not only, that actual beings devoid of the light of reason cannot free themselves from all disorders and defects, but that they can free themselves from none at all; for if the light of reason be only that which is essentially repugnant to disorders, they will have nothing essentially repugnant to any disorder whatsoever, and so will be exposed to all, and unable to preserve themselves from any one. Which notwithstanding appears manifestly false, to all who cast an eye upon the constant Symmetry, Splendour, and Proportion of this Universe, and the specious progress of natural causes and effects; which though wholly empty of the light of reason, digest all things conformably to the rule of reason. I answer, that the Argument contends not, that actual beings not enriched with the use of reason, cannot conform themselves to the prescript of reason in many things, but that they cannot effect it of themselves in all things, as not retaining any thing essentially repugnant to all inconveniences (which may be cast upon them) in the actuality of their beings; for if they had any such perfection, they could not possibly be obnoxious to the least disorder: that conformity therefore which they have to reason, and the resistance to many accidents of disorder thwarting the laws of reason, they enjoy not from themselves, but from reason, and that only so far as they flow from reason, and are certain particles and participations of reason. That this may be understood, I divide reason into two branches; the one active, the other passive; the one working, the other wrought; the one conceiving, the other expressing what it conceives; the one may be termed not unfitly. Ratio ratiocinans, Reason reasoning, the other, Ratio ratiocinata, Reason reasoned. Thus the Idea of some curious and sumptuous building framed in the mind of a skilful Architect, is Reason reasoning; that is, contriving, working, acting, ordering, digesting, the perfect proportion of that building within itself. But the building itself accomplished according to the Idea, will be Ratio ratiocinata, Reason reasoned, that is, wrought, expressed, form, and framed according to the thoughts of that Idea. Thus a learned person composes a Treatise both according to be sense and words, by his inward thoughts, which are Reason reasoning; and after couches it in writing, which is Reason reasoned; and though whosoever contemplates with a considerate eye, the strength and art of reason, comprised in such expressions, yet he plainly discovers that neither the parts of the Building, nor the words of the Treatise had it from themselves, but from a working and active reason expressing itself in them: and though those parts and words, so long as they remain conform to that reason which framed them, cannot swerve from reason, nor fall into disorder, or nonsense, yet they contain nothing in their actual beings which essentially repugns against the disordering and depraving them, but would retain them no less being dissipated and disordered, than they did before. And if the reason from whence they issued were so vigorous and active, that it constituted them in so firm a consistency of that posture and order, which it imprinted upon them, that no natural cause should have power to deface or sully it; yet even that immobility would disclose itself to a piercing eye, no more to proceed from it, than it proceeded from itself. And though such a constant beauty and decorum could not be interessed by the force of nature, or disturbed in its course; yet that touches not the essential, but the natural, or well-being of it; not that it would lose its being, were it put in some disorder, but that nothing in nature is impowered to disorder it.  
Thus though the career of the Sun and Heavens find not obstancle or remora in nature, yet were they kerbed in their full speed, they would not in a moment fall to nothing.  
By this distinction thus illustrated, (whereon I will more insist hereafter) it is evidenced, that the light of reason is only essentially opposed to all inconveniences and deordinations; and that whensoever that which is not illustrated with this active light, preferves itself from any of them, it proceeds not originally, or essentially, from it, but from that participation of passive reason, which the active hath infused into it.  
Seeing therefore that all the beauty and decorum of irrational beings, is only a copy drawn by the alive hand of Reason, the ninth Proposition remains evident, That nothing can be an actual being essentially, and of itself, which is not endued with the light of Reason.  
Hence therefore follows first, the implicancy of that old, deceased, buried, rotten, and consumed Error, now lately raked out of the ashes of Heathenish Ignorance, and Poetical Fictions, That there is an universal Matter, infinite in extent, and eternal in durance, without beginning or ending, whose being is essentially actual, and of itself, incapable of being produced, or destroyed by any cause whatsoever. For seeing this supposed matter is not endued essentially with the actual light of reason, nay, is so far from it; that it is in the least capacity of all other things, to preserve itself from disorders; as being nothing but a compact of disorders, a chaos of confusion, and a being so rude and deformed, that were not there some intelligent cause to order and digest it into some form and fashion, it would remain the most absurd of all beings, and the very next to nothing; having, as they coin it, all things in power or possibility and yet being nothing of any thing which it hath. In a word, it is no better, when these new inventors have made the best of it, than all things in disorder: it is the Mirror of misule, the Embryo of beings, the World in a lump, Heaven and Earth in mortar; and the first edition of Absurdities written in the large volumes of infinty. For whether they make it consist of Atoms, as the Ancients did, or of different Spirits, as others lately have conceited, it is nothing but infinite confused mixtures both of the one and the other, till brought into some fixed posture and proportion, some determinate being is drawn out of it. Is it then possible to conceive, that such anear alliance to nothing, as this Matter is, should arrive to that infinite height of perfection, to be essentially and actual being, of, and from itself? Were it of itself, it must be essentially and absoluterly necessary, as is proved; but what absolute necessity is there of absurdities and disorders? Were it wholly necessary, it could admit of no change or alteration; for whatsoever is essentially necessary, is, and must be always, what ever it was: but this supposed Matter is, and ever was, and will be subject to infinite alterations, putting on perpetually new forms, postures, proportions, mixtures, distances, approximations, places, figures, correspondences, conjunctions, separations, unities, divisions, continuations, contiguities, and a thousand more, so that it is constant in nothing but inconstancy; were it an actual being essentially, it must be a rule of rectitude to itself, and so be essential rectitude, excluding all disorders; when this Matter has disorder coeternal with it, and coessential to it. How came it alone of itself to give being to itself, when of itself alone it can give a determinate being to nothing else, but only suffer other active and efficient causes, to make out of it, determinate beings?  
Let therefore the authors of this most pernicious and Antichristian novelty, either prove that this infinite, eternal, and uncreated matter, had from all eternity a most perfect actual light and use of understanding, to rectify itself according to the perfect rule of reason; or confess that it must essentially depend in the actuality of its being, of some cause endued with such a light: or all the world will see that they speak against reason, and deceive themselves, and others, by a vain and senseless fiction.  
Hence also it follows evidently against Arislotle, that the whole Moles, or fabric of this visible World, could not be of itself, or essentially, an actual being, without any cause; for neither the Earth, whereof all inferior visible things are naturally composed, nor the other Elements, nor the spacious body of the Heavens, nor that glory of the Sun, not that beauty of the Moon, nor that lustre of the Stars, nor that admirable composition and proportion of the bodies of Men and Beasts (seeing they are so far from possessing the light of Reason, that have neither sense nor life: nor Plants and Trees, though they have some degree of life) nor Beasts, Birds, and Fish, though they have life and sense, because none of these have the light of Reason: no nor the Souls of men, nor the Angels themselves, though endued with the light of Reason and Understanding, can possibly have been essentially actual beings, and from themselves; for the actual light of reason which they have, is not essential, but accidental to their beings; because, as appears in Infants, they can be actually, without the actual use of reason. All therefore that is essentially included in the actual being of an Angel, or humane Soul, is to be a power, or virtue, able to use reason and understanding; so that they are truly conceived to be, before they are conceived to exercise reason: wherefore, they can be actually no more of themselves, than any other thing which hath no such power; for it is not the power to use reason, but the actual use of reason, which enables any thing to exclude essentially all disorders, and defects against reason from itself. Seeing therefore Men and Angels must be supposed to be actually, before they can be supposed to produce any act of reason, (for the being of all causes must be presupposed to the production of their effects, for nothing can produce nothing) their beings include not essentially the actual use of reason, and so cannot essentially exclude all deviations and deordinations from reason, which can be only effected by an act of reason.  
Hence also follows, the actual use of Reason, or the acts of Reason, as they are experienced and actuated amongst men, (and the same is of Angels) cannot be of themselves, or essentially necessary, both because they presuppose the beings of Men and Angels, as their producing cause; as also, because such acts of reason being limited and finite, though they may essentially exclude sorne disorders, yet they are still subject to a thousand, or rather infinite others, which by reason of their narrowness and shallowness, they can neither foresee, nor prevent, nor remedy. These truths therefore being settled, I come to the tenth Proposition.   

The tenth Proposition. Only Actual Reason, in its full perfection and latitude, that is, Reason itself, is an actual being essentially necessary.  
Proof.  
THis Proposition follows evidently from the precedent; for seeing there is now, ever was, and shall be something in actual being, and that this could not be, unless there had been always some thing, or things, essential necessary; and that nothing frustrate, disordered, defective, or absurd, actually, or possibly, can be a necessary actual being: and that whatsoever hath not the light of reason, actually exercised, nay, even acts of reason limited and imperfect, cannot essentially exclude all disorders and inconveniences, etc. from their actual beings; it follows inevitably, that actual reason in its full perfection, or reason itself, and that only, is an actual being essentially necessary: which Argument may be thus framed by way of resolution. If actual reason itself, or in its full perfection, be not essentially a necessary actual being, all other things would be subject to disorder; if all were subject to disorder, nothing could be essentially necessary; if nothing were necessary, nothing could have been which is not essentially necessary; that supposed, no actual being could be now; but is most manifest that there is now some actual being, therefore from the first to the last, Reason itself, must be essentially a necessary actual being.  
Or yet more briefly and clearly thus: Something must be essentially necessary, as is proved in the fourth Proposition; but nothing (as is proved in the following Propositions) which is not reason in self, or in its full perfection, can be essentially necessary; therefore only reason itself in its full perfection is essentially necessary.   

The eleventh Proposition. Only Actual Reason in its full perfection, or Reason itself, is essentially an actual being of itself.  
Proof.  
THough I use only in these and the former Propositions the word, Actual Reason, because it is the fittest in our language to express my meaning, yet I take indifferently for Synonoma's, or words of the same signification, Actual Reason, Understanding, Knowledge, Wisdom, and the like; all being in reality the same thing: this premised, I prove the Proposition.  
This Proposition is manifest: first, from the precedent and sixth Proposition, wherein is proved, that whatsoever is an actual being essentially necessary, is of itself. Secondly, from the Arguments for proof of the former Proposition. Thirdly, a priori, or from the very nature of Reason itself, thus: That must necessarily be of itself, which must be, and cannot possibly be conceived to be from any thing else: But reason itself must be, as is proved from the former Proposition, and cannot possibly be conceived to be from any thing else, Ergo, etc. The Major is most evident; the first part of the Minor is already proved; I prove the second part of the Minor. If reason itself could possibly be conceived to be from any thing else, that from which it is conceived to be, must be either wholly devoid of reason, or endued with imperfect reason, or reason itself in its full perfection. It cannot be from reason itself as from any thing distinct from itself I for reason itself cannot be any thing but what it is, to wit, reason itself. Neither can it proceed from imperfect reason; for no cause can totally produce any thing perfecter than itself; for nothing can give that to another which it hath not itself: now it is evident, that reason in its full perfection, is perfecter than imperfect reason. Neither can it be produced, by any thing devoid of reason, for the same reason; for that which is reason itself, is more perfect (according to all Philosophers) then that which hath in it no reason at all, and the reason hereof is evident; for that which essentially excludes all imperfections, as is already proved, reason itself does, must be more perfect than that which excludes them not, as is above demonstrated, that nothing devoid of the light of reason can exclude them all essentially; therefore reason in its full perfection must be of itself. Fourthly, I prove the said Proposition by another Argument, a priori, in this manner. Whatsoever hath in itself all things essentially required to be of itself, must necessarily be of itself; this is evident: But reason in its full perfection, hath all things essentially required to be of itself, in itself; Therefore it is of itself. I prove the Minor. All that can be conceived to be essentially required for any thing to be of itself, is, that itself be a most perfect actual rule of Rectitude to itself; for this is to be its own rule, it's own measure, it's own direction, it's own rectitude, light, knowledge, life, being, existency; for were such a being from any thing save itself, that from which it proceeded, as from a different cause, would be the rule of rectitude and perfection to it, and not itself to itself; for the total cause must always be the rule and measure of all the perfections which are in the effect; for whatsoever is in the effect, must have been precedently in the cause, for nothing can give that which it hat not: whatsoever therefore is a most perfect actual rule and measure to itself, must be equivalently as much to itself, as if it were its own cause; and be as truly and adequately of itself, as other things are from their total causes: so that if it have no other rule, nor measure of rectitude and perfection than itself, it can have no cause at all different from itself, and so must have its actual being essentially of itself. Now I subsume, but actual reason in its full perfection, is a most perfect actual rule of rectitude to itself; therefore actual reason in its full perfection, is an actual being essentially of itself. The consequence is clear, I prove the Minor Actual reason itself, or in its full perfection, is a most perfect actual understanding and comprehension of itself; it is, Intellectio ●psius intellectionis, An actual understanding of actual understanding: it is Cognitio cognitionis, A knowledge of knowledge. For it would not be reason and understanding in its full perfection, if it were ignorant of any thing; and if it know not itself, it must be ignorant of something, nay, of the best of all things. Seeing therefore it is a most perfect knowledge of itself, it is a guide and rule unto itself; and being reason itself, which is the original rule of all rectitude, it must be a most perfect rule of rectitude to itself, and so must be its own rectitude, and rectitude itself; for it is impossible to conceive, that reason itself either should be contrary to reason, or admit of any thing in itself contrary to reason; for then reason should not be reason. And thus I have made way to the twelfth and last Proposition.   

The twelfth Proposition. Reason itself, being essentially necessary, and of itself, is God.  
Proof.  
THis Proposition is clear, ex terminis, by the bare notion of the terms wherein it is propounded; for the true God was never conceived by any who had a real notion of him, to be any thing, save actual Intellection, or Reason if self, essentially necessary and of itself; an essential rule of Rectitude to itself; a most clear comprehensive Knowledge of itself, or necessary exclusion of all defects and deformities from itself; the Quintessence of all true perfection within itself, and the source of all beings without itself. Seeing therefore I have evidently proved in the former Propositions, that there is now something in actual being; and thence evidently deduced, the necessity of the actual being of Reason itself, beautified with all these admirable perfections; I have made evident, what I intended and promised in the Title of this small Treatise, that there is a God: and therefore may safely conclude, there is either A GOD, OR NOTHING; but it is evident there is something, therefore it is evident there is A GOD. From this truth that God is reason itself, or in its full perfection, I draw these ensuing Corrollaries, or Deductions; of the Attributes of God.   

The first Attribute. The Unity of God.  
SEeing God is Reason itself, that is, all the perfections of the Reason summed up and identified in one and the same actual being, it is impossible to conceive, that there should be more true Gods ' then One.   

The second Attribute. God's Indivisibility.  
Whatsoever is divisible may be divided into parts, as is clear; but Reason itself cannot be divided into parts: for whensoever any whole is divided into parts, the whole is destroyed but Reason itself cannot be destroyed, for it is essentially a necessary actual being, which cannot but be, as is proved; therefore God, being Reason itself, is not divisible.   

The third Attribute. The Spirituality of God.  
GOd is Reason itself; therefore he essentially excludes all things which are obnoxious to disorders, or deviations from Reason: but every corporeal substance is of itself obnoxious to such defects, as is proved; therefore God is no corporeal substance; therefore he is onesy spiritual.   

The fourth Attribute. The Simplicity of God's being.  
GOd is Reason itself; Reason itself is reason in abstracto; things abstracted are simple essences, or beings, without all concretion or composition; therefore God is most simple and pure in his being, without all commixtion or composition of parts, essential or integral; for had he any parts, those parts could be nothing but different Reasons; for Reason can consist of nothing but Reason; and then he would be a compound of differen Reasons, and not Reason itself: which is a most simple identity, without all composition of different things united together, but not identified, in one imperfect compound.   

The fifth Attribute. The Ubiquity of God.  
ALL things must proceed immediately from Reason itself; therefore Reason itself must be in all things, for nothing can produce any thing immediately, if it be distant from that thing which it produces; for if it be distant, it must work by some efficient virtue, or quality, issuing from it though that distance, and then it works not immediately, but by interjection of that diffused virtue, which only works immediately: if therefore all things must proceed from Reason itself immediately, Reason itself can be distant from nothing; and because it cannot in itself be contiguous to any thing, by reason that it hath no corporeal Quantity to fill any place, it must be in the very essence of the thing which it produces: if therefore that which it produces be a corporeal thing and actually fill any place, because Reason is in that thing, it is said truly to be in that place, where that corporeal thing is, and consequently to be every where, that is, in all real places, where any thing capable of itself to be in a place is collocated. The difficulty is in the first Proposition: viz. That all things must proceed immediately from Reason itself. This I prove. Every thing must proceed from Reason itself, therefore every thing must proceed immediately from Reason itself. The ancecedent is already proved: I prove the consequence. Whatsoever proceeds from Reason itself cannot contain any thing contrary to Reason, for Reason itself can do nothing contrary to Reason; for so Reason should be contrary to Reason, and then it would not be Reason; but whatsoever proceeds not immediately from Reason itself, may contain something contrary to Reason; therefore whatsoever proceeds from Reason itself, must proceed immediately from Reason itself. I prove the Minor. Whatsoever proceeds totally and adequately from any other immediate cause then Reason itself, may contain something (viz. in its actual being, at least according to some circumstance or other) which is contrary to Reason; therefore nothing can proceed totally from any immediate cause, save Reason itself, if all things proceed from Reason itself, and nothing which proceeds from Reason itself, can contain any thing contrary to Reason, as is now proved. That whatsoever proceeds totally and adequately from any immediate cause save Reason itself, may contain something contrary to Reason, is already made evident; for seeing all such causes are subject to Ignorance, and devoid of infallible directive knowledge of all circumstances which may occur in the immediate total production of such effects, they are obnoxious to fall into some imprudent and unprovident proceeding in the production of them, left wholly to themselves: Seeing therefore all things must proceed from Reason itself lest this imprudence committed in the production of any effect should be ascribed to reason itself, as an effect to its cause, it is plainly necessary; that all other causes (I speak of necessary, not free causes, of which we shall treat hereafter) should be immediately directed, and preserved from such errors and deviations, by the infallible, allseeing Wisdom, and Providence of Reason itself; so that all circumstances and things considered, and compared together, there will be no real being, produced contrary to reason, or sullied with the least disorder. Now this direction of reason itself, seeing it must reach to all, and every the least action of all necessary causes, is the immediate influence and concourse of reason itself into every effect; for it contains a decree of reason itself, that such effects be actually produced in such determinate circumstances, and by means of such causes: for it is not possible to conceive the concourse of God, to be any thing, save reason itself effectually decreeing, and defining the actual being of all things which ever were, are, or shall be, in their fit circumstances, all things and occurrences considered, as I shall hereafter make manifest. Thus therefore I have proved, that reason itself produces immediately all things, and so is in all things; and consequently by reason that all places are filled with these things, in which reason itself is, by means of them it is in all places; and if corporal thing could be in infinite places, it would also be in infinite places, which is the proper notion of God's Ubiquity: for that is nothing else, then that it is impossible that any place should be, in which God is not, And I add farther, that if place, or ubication, be any thing distinct from the thing which is in place, that God is in that also, for the same reasons, as he is in all other things; not as locally contained immediately in these places, but as being the immediate producing cause of those realities, or modifications, which are called places, or ubies: and this presence of God in all things is to be considered for the first instant, or priority of Nature, (as the School speaks) which respects the actual being of every thing in itself, or before it be considered in time and place; so that it is not a local, but a causal presence, not including place, but yet excluding local distance from any thing which supposes place.   

The sixth Attribute. The Eternity of God.  
ETernity may be taken either improperly, for a succession of time without beginning or ending; and in this sense, God is not in himself eternal, because he hath no change of being, of parts, or properties, which may succeed one to another, and be measured by time: so that according to this improper acception, he can only be said Denominative, or by way of denomination, (supposing that any changeable beings have been always, or in all times, without beginning) to be in all times, or eternally by succession, because he hath (if this supposition were true) been in all those beings which have been from successive eternity; no otherwise then I have declared in the former Attribute, that he is said to be in local and divisible places. Or eternity is taken properly, for an unsuccessive, and simultaneous, or indivisible durance, whereby God at once is what he is totally, and unchangeably; so that as he sums up all perfections in his indivisible being, so he sums up all instants and parts of time, in one indivisible point of his eternal durance. God therefore being reason itself, and that being essentially a necessary actual being, as is proved, it is impossible that he should ever be truly conceived, either not to be, or to be any thing but what he is, and consequently in himself, and according to his essence he is most properly eternal.   

The seventh Attribute. The Omnisciency of God.  
REason itself can be ignorant of nothing; for were it ignorant of any thing, in that whereof it is ignorant, it might admit, or do something contrary to reason, as not being an essentical rule of rectitude to itself, in such things whereof it is ignorant; for if it knew them not, it could not determine, whether they were conformable to reason or no; but reason itself can neither admit into itself, nor do any thing contrary to reason, for then Reason should not be reason, Ergo, etc.   

The eighth Attribute. Of God's Omnipotency.  
Whatsoever hath, or can have any finite being, must be squared according to reason; therefore it must be a participation, or expression of the first reason; therefore it must proceed from the first reason, or reason itself; therefore God being Reason in self, whatsoever hath, or can have a being must proceed from God; therefore God is Omnipotent. Or thus. It is reason that whatsoever reason itself judges to be put in actual being, should be put in actual being; this is clear: but whensoever it is reason (all things considered) that any thing should be done, that is to be done; therefore whensoever reason itself judges that any thing should be put in actual being, it is to be put in actual being; therefore it cannot but be, then when reason judges it should be; therefore reason itself, which is God, is Omnipotent, seeing every thing must be done, which he judges to be done. The difficulty will be in this Minor, viz. whensoever it is reason (all things considered) that any thing should be done, that is to be done, or must necessarily be done. Which I prove thus: All things must proceed immediately from reason, as is proved; therefore all things must be done according to reason, for reason can do nothing contrary to reason; but it would be contrary to reason, not to have that done which reason dictates, (all things considered) should be done; therefore whatsoever reason dictates or judges (all things considered) should be done, that must necessarily be done. Seeing therefore, whatsoever can be, must be capable to be judged by reason itself, that in some circumstance or other it may be done, God can produce every thing, save himself, that can have can actual being; which is to be omnipotent.  
Hence follows evidently, that those who put any necessary actual being of itself, save God who is reason itself, take away the omnipotency of God; for they put some actual being distinct from God, and so not God, which God cannot produce: and hence appears the vanity and blasphemy of that new revived Opinion, of an Eternal Infinite Increated Matter, which I have already confuted.   

The ninth Attribute. The Goodness of God.  
TO be good is to be communicative of itself to others; therefore what which is most communicative of itself, hath the greatest goodness; but seeing all things must proceed immediately from Reason itself, which is God; God is the most communicative of himself to others; therefore God is the best of all things, or hath the greatest goodness.   

The tenth Attribute. The Purity and Sanctity of God.  
GOd is reason itself; therefore he can do nothing contrary to reason: but all sin is contrary to reason; therefore God can do no sin, for then reason should not be reason; therefore God essentially excludes all sin, and so is more opposite to sin then any thing else; for whatsoever is not reason itself, being endued with imperfect understanding, hath nothing essentially in its actual being, which excludes all sin; for every thing, which is not reason itself, can act contrary to reason, being left to self, and so may sin. But the highest Purity and Sanctity consists in the greatest opposition to all sin; therefore God hath the highest Purity and Sanctity of all other things. And by reason of this sovereign Sanctity, God can neither command, nor counsel, nor approve, not be any way Author or favourer of any the least sin in others; for all these proceed being contrary to reason, cannot be done by reason itself.   

The eleventh Attribute. Of the infallible Veracity of God.  
IF God could speak any the least untruth, it must either proceed from Ignorance or Malice; not from Ignorance, for Reason itself being Knowledge itself, can be ignorant of nothing: Not from Malice, for all Malice is sin, and we have proved that Reason itself cannot sin; therefore God essentially excludes all untruth in speaking; therefore his Veracity in speaking is most infallible.   

The twelfth Attribute. God's Justice.  
His Justice may be proved by the same argument: for all Injustice done to others, either proceeds from Ignorance or Malice; neither of which, as is proved, can be in God. But particularly because all Injustice is directly against reason, and reason can do nothing against reason.   

The thirteenth Attribute. Of the ever blessed Trinity.  
THis is a Mystery above the reach of all created capacity, and so can neither be demonstrated, nor expressed fully by humane understanding. Only endeavours may be used to invent the easiest ways to frame a right notion of it, as Christian Faith delivers it; which I conceive, in this expression which we have made of God, to be Reason itself in its full perfection, may with some more than ordinary facility be explicated. God therefore is Reason itself in its full perfection; therefore he is essentially a comprehensive actual Knowledge of himself, and contains all true and right reason essentially. Now this comprehensive knowledge, which reason itself is of itself, is not a mere contemplative, barren, weak, fruitless, and inefficacious Knowledge; but practical, working, strong, lively, vigorous, fecunde, and acting within itself: for if the weak acts of created understanding have power to express themselves both to others, by signs and words, and to the understanding which hath them, by occasioning the production of reflex acts upon them; it cannot be conceived, that the most perfect, nay perfection itself, in understanding, should be devoid of this perfection: and so by the infinite strength, vigour, and power of it, express itself to itself; and is no less its own expression, than its own knowledge; and because this expression, being most perfect, is most perfectly adequate and commensurate to itself; that which is expressed is that very thing, which that which expresses; for were it not that very thing, there would be some difference, and so some dissimilitude betwixt that which expresses, and that which is expressed; and than it were not (as I have showed it must be) a most perfect and adequate expression of itself.  
This infinite perfection therefore thus adequately expressing itself within itself, must also be its own approbation, love, satisfaction, joy, repose, and infinite content, which the expresser and the expressed take mutually and indivisibly one in the other; so that Reason itself is no less a love, joy, and full repose, in this expression, than it is an expression of itself: for it is not possible to conceive, that Reason itself should not approve, love, joy, and rest, in that expression which is the most absolute, complete, perfect, beautiful, lovely, and ravishing expression which can be thought on: seeing therefore Reason itself, must always proceed according to reason, it must necessarily love, joy, and satisfy itself in this expression. And because this joy, and satisfaction, etc. must be perfectly adequate to that wherein it joys; for were it less than that wherein it joys and quiesces, it were not most perfectly conform to reason; and yet reason cannot but be most perfectly conform to reason; it must be of equal perfection with that which expresses, and that which is expressed; neither can it be different, or dislike in any regard to the expressing and expressed reason; for as imperfect accidental love is an accidental union of two different lovers, so the most perfect substantial love, or quintessence of love, (such as that of God is) is a substantial unity of the lover and that which is beloved; so that both, as one principle, breathe out a love which is one with them both. So that there is in this most hidden and Divine Mystery; Cognitio exprimens, Knowledge expressing; and Cognitio express a, Knowledge expressed; there is Intellectio intelligens, an intellectual act understanding; and Intellectio intellecta, an intellectual act which is understood; there is Sapientia concipiens, Wisdom conceiving, and Sapientia concepta, Wisdom conceived; there is Ratio ratiocinans, Reason reasoning; and Ratio ratiocinata, Reason reasoned: and yet all that is signified by all these terms is one and the same thing; for it neither expresses, nor understands, nor conceives, nor reasons any thing in these Divine acts, but most perfectly, and adequately what itself is; so that both what is expressed, understood, conceived, reasoned, and the formal expression, understanding, conception, ratiocination whereby we conceive that to be expreed, etc. is one and the same thing; for the action being specificated by the term, when the term is one thing (as it is here) with that whence it proceeds, the action must be the same when them both; so that it is its own expression, intellection, conception, ratiocination. In like manner, there is in this mystery Dilectio diligens, and Dilectio dilecta, Love loving, and Love loved; and the same is of Satisfaction, Joy, and full Repose, active and passive, (as the School speaks) but I find neither words nor time to express them; and yet this loving beloved love, etc. of this expressing and expressed expression, is (for the same reason) the very one selfsame thing; for it loves nothing (in these acts) but what it is itself, as it expresses nothing, but what it is itself. Whence appears a most perfect and simple Unity in the Essence and Nature of God, in all those productions, and processions; which is that main fundamental Point, which Christians believe, and profess against Heathens and Infidels, in this high Mystery of the ever blessed Trinity. This Unity therefore established, I proceed to deduce briefly from the same Principles, the most sacred Trinity of the Divine Persons, which all Orthodox Christians maintain against Jew, Turks, and Heretics; which I deduce thus: There is the same thing expressing and expressed; therefore there is the same thing producing, and produced. I prove the consequence, for every expression of any thing, is a production of something, as appears in all expressions which we know; if therefore this expression be a production, it must produce something; but (as I proved) it expresses nothing, save that very thing which expresses, for it is an expression of itself; therefore it produces nothing, save that very thing which, that is, which produces. It may be replied, that to understand any thing, is as much to produce the intellection of it, as to express any thing is to produce the expression of it; and therefore God by understanding himself essentially, produces himself essentially. I answer, by denying the parity; for even a created intellection may and does understand itself, without producing itself; for an intellection, so far as it is only Contemplative and Theorical, is only the sight, and not the production of its object; and rather supposes its object, and is the sight of it, than either produces its object, or the sight of it; but whatsoever expresses any thing, works upon that which it expresses; and either produces it, or the expression of it, if it be different from its expression. Now I proceed. If therefore this expression be a production, and so there must be that very thing produced which produces, there must be a true distinction betwixt the producer and the produced; so that the producer is unus, and the produced alius, and consequently must make a number, and be two: and because actiones sunt suppositorum, and suppositum in rationali natura (as that of God is in the first place) is termed rightly Persona, a Person; therefore these must be two Divine Persons: So that there is in this expression and production, Principians, and Principiatus; One who is the Principating, and another who is derived from him who principlates. There is Originans, & Originatus; Gignens and Genitus, Pater & Filius, etc. Now it is impossible to conceive, that one and the same Person should be both Father and Son, generating and generated, principiating and principiated, producing and produced, expressing and expressed: for seeing these notions found real references, respects, and relations, betwixt the producer and the produced, etc. it is not possible to conceive them, without a real personal distinction, and duality in number; for one sole Person can never found a real relation to himself, but only relationem rationis; and the same reason proves the same distinction betwixt that Love, Joy, and Repose, etc. which indivisibly proceeds from this producing and produced duality: so that there must be a triality, or number of three, in one reality; that is, one real thing thrice suppositated, and personated; or one real thing subsisting thrice; and by thrice subsisting hath a true numerality, or distinction of three. The Mystery therefore seems to me (I crave pardon, if I either think or speak amiss, and refer my judgement to those, who are impowered to allow or condemn it) to be One thing thrice over, and that necessarily and essentially, by force of its infinite vigour, activity, fecundity, and perfection; whereas all other things finite and limited subsist but once, as not having strength and perfection enough to give themselves a double, or a triple subsistence: which power of duplifying and triplifying itself supposed, all those seeming contrarieties and contradictions, which natural humane Reason raises up against this Mystery, will clearly appear to be mere illusions and misconceipts of our weak capacity; which imagines that to be a contradiction in one thing subsisting thrice, because we find it to be one in created things, which subsist but once: for this triality of subsistence consisting in a real distinction, numerosity, and multiplication of the same thing, makes that to be equivalent to different things, whereof each have no more than one sole subsistence, or subsist but once. Thus in this Mystery there is as truly a Father and a Son, two distinct. Persons, the one ingenerate, and generating the other, as father and son are two amongst men: Thus there is as real a procession of the holy Ghost from the Father and the Son, as Heat proceeds from Light and the Sun. Thus the Nature of God is perfectly one, and the Persons perfectly three; because this one Nature subsists thrice: Thus the Divine Nature is communicable, because it is one in three; and the Personalities incommunicable, because they are three in one. Seeing therefore number is an absolute perfection in created and finite beings; for two things of equal perfection are better than each of them taken solely by itself; and the same perfection twice repeated, is better than only once; why should this perfection be wanting to God? And seeing fecundity, to produce something of like nature to it , is an absolute perfection in created beings; why should not God have it? And seeing Love, Charity, Joy, and Content, is an absolute perfection amongst men and Angels; why should not God enjoy that perfection properly, and perfectly, to whom no absolute perfection can be wanting? For seeing there are three ranks of perfections amongst men; The first in the rank of Essence, and intrinsecal and radical being; which may be termed Essential. The second, in ordine naturae, or active power of such an Essence, which are termed Natural. And the third, in ordine humano; or of Sociability, and mutual Communication one with another, which we call Moral: I see no reason, why all these ranks of perfection should not be found both perfectly and formally in God. His Unity, Omnipotency, etc. may be called his Intrinsecal, and Radical, or Primary Essential perfections, as he is considered in ordine Essentiali; his Fecundity and expressive Production, his Natural Perfection, as he is considered in ordine activo; and his Love, Friendship, Charity, Joy, etc. in the procession of the holy Ghost, his Moral Perfections, in communication and society of the Divine Persons. And yet all this is nothing but Reason itself, and in the full latitude of its perfection; his essential and intrinsecal notion, is the fullness of Reason; his natural activeness, is nothing but an adequate expression of that very Reason which is his Notion; his Love, Joy, Repose, etc. is no other thing, than the plenary Satisfaction in that expressing and expressed Reason; which can be no other than a perfect conformity to Reason, and so nothing but Reason. Thus by some dark and flashing glimpses we have discovered this ever blessed Trinity, in an ever blessed Unity; one in three, and three in one; three Persons in one Nature; a number in an Unity, and one and the same thing subsisting thrice over. O most Sacred and Divine Mystery, thou art as sweet and delicious, as thou art high and inconceiveable; the more I contemplate thee, the more I know thee; the more I know, the more I admire thee; the more I admire, the more I love thee; the more I love, the more I praise and adore; and the more I adore thee, the more I aspire and languish to enjoy thee! And if any of you, dear Christians, have learned (by perusing this small Tract) to know there is A GOD, OR NOTHING, give me leave to exhort you, conformably to your knowledge, to admire, love, praise, adore, and covet to enjoy, as your last End and Bliss, A GOD, OR NOTHING: for (as devout A Kempis says most truly) Quicquid Deus non est, nihilest, & pronihilo reputari debet; in a Christian estimation, whatsoever is not God, is nothing, and is to be reputed as nothing.  
FINIS.    

The Index of the principal Matters contained in this Tract.  

A.  
Some Actual Being is essentially necessary page 13, 16  
Actual Being essentially necessary is of itself page 65  
Actual Being essentially necessary is always necessary page 45  
Angel, what the notion thereof imports essentially? page 60  
Attributes of God deduced from his necessary existence page 71   

B.  
TO Be actually of itself, it to be essentially page 10  
For a Thing to Be of itself, what is essentially required page 67   

C.  
THere can be no Cause of All Things which are, and ever have been page 15, 16, etc.  
No Cause can destroy allthings page 8  
Infinity in causing is impossible, as well in simultaneous as successive causes page 30, 31  
No Cause can totally produce a thing perfecter than itself page 66  
The being of All Causes is ever to be presupposed to the production of their effects page 60  
There must be always a determinate number of Causes, which have produced effects page 20, 21  
No settlement in causing without a cause not caused page 11  
Causes caused in infinitum; is a pure Chimaera, or impossibility page 11  
All Causes of Things past, or present, must remain either in themselves, or in virture sua page 20, 21  
All Causes and Effects, which shall or may be hereafter, are now nothing at all, save the power of their Cause, which is now page 22, 23  
Nothing which proceeds inevitably from a Cause, can exist alone page 9  
Nothing that is Contingent, can be alone page 9  
Nothing, that is Contingent, can be of itself page 12, 13   

F.  
ETernity twofold page 80  
Gods Eternity what it is page 81   

G.  
GOd is Actual Intellection, or Reason itself page 70  
The Notion of God what it imports universally, or in the understandings of all men. page 70  
God hath no mixtion, or composition of parts, and why? page 74  
God how he is said to concur to all particular effects. page 78, 79  
Gods Omnisciency demonstrated page 82  
Gods Indivisibility demonstrated page 72  
To be Good, what it imports page 85  
Divine Goodness demonstrated to be the greatest of all page 86   

I.  
WHatsoever is Indeterminate, can be no Actual Being page 32   

K.  
KNowledge purely contemplative, presupposeth its Object page 95   

M.  
MAtter neither Eternal, nor Infinite, nor of itself page 55, 85   

N.  
NOthing can do nothing page 2  
Nothing can be absolutely necessary, which can have a Cause page 13  
Nothing can be without some reason, why it is page 44  
Number why found in God page 99, 100   

O.  
GOds Omnipotency demonstrated page 83, 84   

P.  
PErfections threefold, Essential, Natural, Moral; all in proportion found in God, and how? page 100, 101  
No Actual Parts, whilst they remain in Continuo page 33   

R.  
REason itself cannot but be actually page 65, 72  
Reason in its full Perfection cannot but be of itself page 67  
Actual Reason in its full perfection, what page 68, 69  
Reason itself produceth all things immediately; and why? page 75, 76  
Reason itself how said to be every where, or in all things page 75  
No real Effect in the world contrary to Reason, all Circumstances considered page 78  
How Reason itself concurs to every effect page 78  
Reason itself can do nothing contrary to Reason page 76  
Reason itself is its own Rule, Knowledge, Light, etc. page 68, 69   

S.  
THe Spirituality of God demonstrated page 73  
His Sanctity, or Purity, also page 86  
Soul of man, what the notion thereof imports essentially page 60   

T.  
NO actual Time, can have been abaeterno, or without beginning page 35  
Time for the future may be without end, because it shall never be all actual page 3  
Time imaginary is nothing real, save the power of the first Cause. page 28  
All Time past, which was once actual, must be finite. page 26  
No Time can have an Actual End, which had not an Actual Beginning page 27  
Time is nothing, but the Mutability of actual Being's page 28  
All things which are actually in this moment of Time, depend in their Being's of all the Causes, which mediately or immediately produced them page 29  
No Being can be limited Essentially to such determinate instances of Time, if no such instances be actually page 34, 35  
No Being can depend Essentially of Time, seeing Time is consequent to the thing during page 37  
Whatsoever is supposed to be Essentially for such a space of Time, will be in Time and not in Time page 41  
How the Trinity of Persons in the Unity of the Divine Nature, or Essence, may be best represented to our capacity page 89, etc. 94, etc.   

V  
THe Unity of God demonstrated page 71  
Gods Ubiquity demonstrated page 74  
Gods Ubiquity, what it imports page 79  
Gods Veracity demonstrated page 87   
FINIS.