The State of PARTIES, and of the PUBLIC; as influenced by those Parties, in this Conjuncture, offered to ENGLISH MEN.  
'TIS a miserable Circumstance, and the General Ruin of prosperous States, when Parties out of Separate Interests and Passions pursue different Ends of their own, without regard to the Public, although the chief Interest of each: But it is a Circumstance beyond common Misery, a Propensity to ruin more than natural, and a Fatality over Mankind, greater than has been ever observed, perhaps, in any Country or Set of Men, that they should be divided into Parties from the Public Interest, when there is not so much as any real particular Interest, in effect, carrying on in any of those different Parties; not any of these discriminating Interests so laid, or so pursued, as that, by all the violent Steps taken by the Engagers, they are any ways advanced: So that although Violence be done, and still doing perpetually to the Public; though all contend for the Promotion of that Interest or Party under which they only look for any Happiness; Yet for all this, not one of these Interests receive any Advantage; not one of these Parties are likely to procure or come any thing near their End.  
Our Nation must be allowed to be in a most complete way to Misery, if this be proved their Case.  
That there are Parties is well known. The first great Division is between King William and King James; which takes in all our present active Men: For as for Commonwealth's-men, which some would have to be a third Distinction; besides the Turn it serves at Court, it has no meaning; unless the quiet Part of England, those tired with Revolutions, and farther Engagements with Men of these Days, or those that are divided in their Thoughts upon the Interests of either King, as they stand to England; unless, I say, these be they called Commonwealth's-men, however absurd it be.  
Of these two Interests, that of King James' does properly make but one Party, though the other two. Those, I say, make but one Party, as they act in the Public: for they having in Prospect only, and as the End of all their Agitations, the Government of King James; they are not now divided, nor can be yet, whilst unprevailing, in any Dispute or Difference considerable about Administration, as how, by whom, or in what Methods, favouring one or other Party, that Government shall be carried on. The side, then, of the now-governing King being divided into Whig and Tory, there are but three Parties that pull different ways, or with any noted Force in the Public Affairs.  
The meaning of all these Men, if they have their main Interest, their Stake, Estate and Friends, in England, is and must be to preserve England, though not from perfect Monarchy, and absolute Power of a Crown at home, (which some approve of, and like the best, whatever Name of Tyranny or Slavery it has heretofore gone by) yet to preserve us, at least from the Yoke of Foreign Power, from being overgrown by States that are about us, and coming down from being the Principal in Power and Riches, to be the last of Europe, or but once inferior to any of these neighbouring one's, which will turn to as much, since it necessarily subjects us to the Miseries of those Invasions we endured of old, as then the Common Prey of all the World, and every rising Nation. This surely, whatever else may be his Interest, is the Interest of every individual Englishman, in all these Parties, to prevent: But if this be what is least done; if this not only be not prevented, but be the only thing that every Party, every Side, though not intentionally, yet really, does draw on, advance, promote, and nothing else, no not their Party-Interest, not any valuable Victory or Triumph that one may gain above another, so much as gratifying a Passion; Then are we in that State I mentioned; in the fairest, most miraculous way that can be thought on to every thing that can be called Ruin or Destruction to a Country.  
That when we lose our Strength, we are more miserable than any other People, the surest Seat of the most various, sharp and lasting War, Experience the most remarkable that ever was, has taught us, from the highest Remembrance of ourselves through Romans, Danes, Saxons, and many Nations more (though less remarked) down to the last Normans, and that concluding Conquest which by the Power of the Conqueror abroad, and the Continuance of his Line here, established us on our own Bottom. And that this was not mere Misfortune, but that it is a Fate peculiar to us, I mean, that it is a natural Evil to us more than any Country, when we are low, who ever studies our Situation, and the Growths of Nations on the Continent, will know, that such a Country as this is more disputable than any other: that the Dominion of it cannot be so fixed, and the immediate Masters of it, however powerful on the Continent, not able to insure to themselves the Possession of it, by holding it out against Strangers, or guarding it from their Enemy, so well as of other Places: that this is, in that Sense, as a Frontier Country; with this Difference, that those that are really Frontier Countries, though they are so this Day, may have the luck not to be so a little while after; but that this Country has always the Nature of a Frontier, ever to maintain War in it, and to be the Subject and Place of Contention amongst those that are stronger than itself;  such there are. In fine; That as we are an Island, and have the Sea round us; so by being Masters of that, (which is, in short, by being in the Practice of it most, and can be no otherwise) we must of Consequence be the strongest in the World, as the World is now turned to Navigation, and each Country by Degrees at length brought to depend absolutely on Trade, by wanting many Necessaries from foreign Places, which once they could live without perhaps, but since cannot; nor can defend themselves without: this being the Change that the improved Art of Navigation has made in the World; tying Countries to a reciprocal Dependency on one another for their Growths, and obliging them to some sort of Correspondency. But on the other side, that as we are the strongest in Situation by being an Island, the Dominion of the Sea supposed to be with us: so that being lost to us, in any other Hands, or divided amongst others, we are of all the most and worst exposed.  
This being granted, it follows, that whatever Circumstances of ours admit other Nations, Foreigners, whatsoever to grow, (though at the same time we were granted to grow too) so, as in Proportion, above us in Navigation and Trade; this necessarily subjects us to all the Miseries before pointed at, and is the direct way leading to a Consequence that is no ways to be evaded: for when that Work is done, and the Advantage once given up; what ever Party do (as they think) their Work; 'tis altogether vain to imagine that any such Party, or any Party whatsoever prevailing in this Nation, or all of them united in one, can call it back, or by any Means, Arts of State, Treaties or Engagements whatsoever, to be able to turn off that inevitable Evil that must light on All at once. And if this be the Consequence of all the Actings of every one of these Parties at present; if in the seeking of their own Ends they are likely not so much to prevail either of them over another, as to reduce us into this State, this irrecoverable Consumption and Debility, with all the Consequences proved; then will it be found that in the Methods now taken they act constantly against, but for no Interest that can be called their own.  
All Men naturally follow their Good: and it might be well objected that it were only a Notion, and in effect impossible, that Men should act thus, as I say, were it not through Ignorance; such as is indeed in our Case, the Want of a sufficient Conception and real Sense at Heart, of what is the sole Safeguard and Support of our Country; the want of truly considering how Matters stand, as to that, and how amidst all, that is likely to be affected, which must (as I have said) affect us, at last, above every thing else. And such a Blindness as this it is that Men are kept in by their Passions, by the Heat of Party, and the Animosity of personal Quarrels, or so that by the Resentment of some present Uneasinesses, Men are hindered from thinking on greater Evils at some Distance off, and not yet absolutely felt, though just impending.  
Now to charge every Party singly, according to what I have said, and the Imputation of Inconsistency that I lay on them; I instance first in those, as to the Generality, who carry on King James' Interest in their Endeavours, and make his Party.  
First, then suppose that 'twere a Service to his Interest to have us weak at Sea, sunk in our Trade, in Loss of Seamen, Ships, Builders, and all Materials and Arts-men belonging; what would it avail to his Friends, (if Englishmen, and to no others do I speak) to have him here fixed in his Government, nay fixed even with every one's Consent here at home; if suddenly we found ourselves thus low? How should we e'er regain this Loss? how  come up again with other Nations? Will they stand idle; see us take Breath, and let us rise; or will they stay for us, and stop so long as till we grow again into our Place above them? If not; how shall we avoid the Consequences above set down, and taken (I suppose) for granted; viz. that if we lose the Practice of the Sea, we are then revolved again into our old State, mere Naked Britain's; his that can take us; and (according to the natural and constant Practice of the Sea, we are then revolved again into our old State, mere Naked Britain's; his that can take us; and (according to the natural and constant Practice of Mankind) by their Station about us, and their then readier Access to us than any other Place, by lying so fair, and so on all sides open; the assured common Prize that every Nation fights for, when aiming above others, or when but in the slightest Quarrel?  
When once the Stroke is given that brings on this Condition; when once our Naval Sinews are cut; How is it that King James shall be fixed here? How is it that either His or any Government shall be said to be fixed here with us; when we ourselves, as a People, should then belong to others, or lie at Power to belong to them: which, as Mankind and States are constituted, is not far different; since Power to take, and taking, are in those Cases never far asunder: and since Parties are now easily made within a Nation considerable enough to serve a turn, and for any Invaders to ground upon: and that all Invasions, though as perfectly so, as those of Goths or Vandals, can be coloured, now, with Reasons of Religion and Justice, and as though even for the very Benefit of the invaded People? For no Countries hardly now are ever conquered but by a Force (as Manifesto's and Declarations set forth) intended for their Relief and just Establishment: And the Name of Conquest, that comes to be established after full Success, is found to have been preceded by, and own its Production to the very Names, however dissonant, of Assistance or Deliverance.  
In short; if once we are exhausted in a War, so as that our Navigating Art and all the means of it be shared amongst Foreigners, and the Current of our Trade drawn into other Channels; which by no Art can be retrieved, nor any Change of Fortune; but by a turn that may give us the Advantage that we gave, and when all else are fight, give us Peace; an Accident the hardliest to imagined; since, when once weak, we are above all others the surest to feel every Dispute, and often like to be the chiefest Subject. If this come ever to be our Condition, as it is endeavoured to be now made; let any Nation whatsoever give us, or return us a King; if this be the Terms of such a Gift, ( other Terms be made); if this be that that is to bring it about; any English-Man will have but a sorry Bargain, and such a King will be of little worth to us, or we to him. Grant that the Nation we receive him from be not, in the end, upon the account of the Lowness we shall be reduced to, left Masters at Sea of all the World; and grant that they were not near so by Land either; Yet of what benefit will this be to us? If any Benefit, it will be this; That that Way 'twill not be determined whose we shall be; the other Way it will: the one Way we are a Province, and must serve immediately; the other Way we remain to be fought for, and the Dispute must be in our own Land, perhaps by more than two at once.  
If this be right, than not only they who serve this Court in the Present Way, serve England ill, but they too who serve King James in such a way as is sure to sink us; set any other Neighbours over us in Navigation, and do our work as to that business: They, in effect, I say, do nothing for themselves as English Men, nothing for King James as an English King.  
But then that these Sort are doubly mistaken, appears by this: For that it is not the likeliest way to introduce King James (unless for England to be absolutely conquered by another Nation, be the easiest way; and such a Throne, so gained to him, be thought most valuable, and most a Throne.) Because that if, by the Nation's Choice, he would come in, it can be only when they find an Evil in this Government greater than they felt in that they changed from; or that they think they would feel by his return; and then only, when the dread of that Power, that now supports him, hangs less upon them, and that they can be freed from their Jealousy of th● King of France's governing by King James. Now, whilst we are losing every day at Sea; whilst the King of France's Fleets, and Privateers grow, and the Terror of this spreads; there can be nothing left to give a more absolute Horror of King James than this; and when an Invasion comes, to drive the body of the People from an Easiness and unconcernedness, (which otherwise they would be in towards any such Revolution carrying on) into a very Desperation; which will produce the uttermost Resistance, when it may be expected they should be forced to yield.  
The Hint that I have given may show, I think, how much the Common Jacobites are besides their Interest, and how well they know to wish as well for their King's particular Interest, as for the general Interest of their Country; and what Mighty Service they do King James, and Dis-service to King William, by their common way of Talking about the Force of France at Sea, and their Endeavours to give still greater Grounds for such Terror.  
But to come now to the Behaviour of the other two Parties that are shut up within that of K. William's.  
Every Body knows there are two Sorts of Men; in each of which, there are such as are engaged to K. William's Interest, as absolutely and without reserve, as he has required of them, or can require of them, in any prostitute Sense: and yet these Two are perpetually opposing one another, and make two Sides, which are commonly distinguished by the Names of Whig and Tory. According to the too good Success that the Courtier has had; we see that, notwithstanding any Interest that the Patriots (as many as there are) can make; and notwithstanding that Odium which so many of the Court-Followers have incurred, yet there is still this Fatality, that Those continue the mainly prevalent in each; those move the Herd of both these Parties; those have, in effect the sway, that are with all that Latitude I have said, engaged in the Interest of this Court: For whoever calls this Court in question; whoever doubts its good Intention to English Men, to English Liberties and Government; whoever quotes past Declarations, or instances a present Grievance; nay, or that in Discourse is but lukewarm towards the State; a Way is found (and it seldom fails) to make that Man ill thought of by the Herd, suspected by the Vulgar of his Party, and shunned as a Deserter: For with one Party he is insured a Commonwealth's Man, and with the other, a Plain Jacobite. For what else should he be, that acts against this Government? Thus with one short Question, and that equivocal Term of Government, as it is put there, the Courtier does his business.  
This shows what is understood here by Whig and Tory, meaningly as the Court is prevalent over both those Parties. And as thus, let us consider how they act: whether as likely to obtain their common End in the support of this Government, in the manner 'tis suffered to be carried on by them; or whether, when that's done, as likely to obtain either of them their separate End, (in prospect of which they so assist, and court this Government) and as likely to carry their expected Advantage over their opposite Party.  
The Tories have it for their End to see the Church established in as high Power as ever; to see it freed from the Eyesore of Dissenters and fanatics: to remove the ill Precedent of Scotland: to set up Episcopacy in such strength as is required by the Clergymen themselves, to put them out of fear of every thing; and to have a King governing with as large a Prerogative as may be; but still by the Means, and under the Tuition of such a Church. The Whigs dread such a Power in the Church, and are so dissatisfied with what it has of that kind already, fearing what may come, that they expect a greater Security than is given them at present, that those who are Dissenters from, or under the Mark of the Church for being ill Friends to it, may never see It in a condition to take its Revenge, or give them any Disturbance. These Men exclaim generally against all Arbitrary Bower, but more especially That which the Church would introduce, and that their Enemies would most profit by.  
Neither of these two Parties, towards the Satisfaction they desire, go now about the making of any new Laws, or attempt any Alteration in the Present Settlement: But their Labour is, the gaining of the King, and the getting those of their Fraternity ( otherwise they be) into the Government. This is the only Means by which they, at this time, think to serve their Interest. This is the only Pledge they now ask for the Success of their respective Parties; Each promising to themselves that within a little, or  his Majesty has made an end of his Enemies, He will declare for them, and for the future employ only the Men of their Stamp. Now, though all this while, according to the Methods kept up between these two Parties, the Government were like to stand, yet it is ridiculous and foolish what either of these Men expect.  
We may, I think, be satisfied that ( we may expect from any other) this Court is not likely to be at a stand, and rest contented with the allotted Revenue and Prerogative; much less to agree to a Diminution of either; though there be a considerable Party in England that think, and will still think, (which will cost the Court some Opposition) that the Prerogative is at a height in some Points very prejudicial to England, and likely to overturn the Ancient Government of it, one time or other; especially, since the Nobility is now so sunk from what it formerly ever was. It must therefore be supposed, that when this general Victory is obtained, and King William is established, either he will be immediately Absolute, and have it in his Power to act as he fancies, or he will be as he now is, under the Restraint of Laws, and Parliaments to be struggled with. If it be the First; What is it that will move his Fancy towards the Churchmen, when under no Obligation, to reverse all the Scotish-Affairs; act contrary to the Principle of Holland, and all his Protestant Calvinist Acquaintance and Relations abroad, and exasperate so great a Body as the Dissenters and Whigs here? The Churchmen must be wonderfully conceited, and have a strange good Opinion of themselves, or a very wrong one of the King's Principle and Conscience, to think He would be thus serviceable to them out of Affection merely. On the other side; If the Court be not (by being fully Absolute) freed from these Restraints, but be to work its way through, and that the Prerogative be in a craving State, and wants to gain upon the People, What can more satisfy it than the present Construction of Whig and Tory in Parliament? Is there any thing that the Court cannot carry? Whereas, if one Party were declared for, it would not be so. As to the Whigs, the thing is the same. This Balance that the Court has got is too useful, and shall never be departed from, (so as that the Whigs shall be a jot more advanced) whilst the Court must use a Parliament: and if that time once come to be over, though it is not to be thought that the Court will ever act for the zealous Churchmen according to their Expectations, as above mentioned; yet on the other side, to think that then any thing will be done more for the Whigs, for the Advancement of their Persons, or in favour of their Principles, is what the least of all can be imagined, and is the most absurd.  
Thus, as a Party, not either of them are likely to obtain their Ends: but their Contention to be still improved against themselves, and they made Accessaries in their own private Loss; as subject to all the Inconveniences of such a constant Feud, without prevailing any thing by it: And, as English-Men, instead of profiting themselves, they are only like to be made Accessaries also in the general Public Loss, which we shall suffer as a free People, by losing all our Privileges; and as a People, by falling, at length, under Foreign Subjection, and all the Miseries that make even that State worse to us than other Countries.  
But to know this last; Why this Government cannot stand upon its present Basis (which it is so unlikely to change;) nor the Methods succeeds that the Parties take to support us by this Court against our Enemies; why even this is truly impracticable; so as that they will prove in the very utmost disappointed: We must consider what it is that the Court Does, and intends to do; and what means the Parties approve, or admit of, in the Court, to carry on this War, in order to subdue the Enemy, obtain the Peace required, and settle Europe, so as that we, with the other States of Europe, may not fear one common Enemy; nor we, singly here, an Enemy either secret or open, that may undermine or ruin us alone.  
The purpose of this Government, the Conditions on which it risen, and the Ends for which it was erected, are known to be; For the rescuing us from a Power in the Crown, advanced by evil Ministers and corrupt Judges, to be Superior to all our Laws; To secure us from such an Insatiableness of Prerogative as would swallow Liberty and Property, and take away the Privileges of the Subject; To free us even from such a Disposition of a Court as could not but tend to this Effect, and from such a Ministry as nothing else could be expected under, at any time: And lastly, To remove that under which all Laws and Constitutions can make but a ridiculous Safety for us; to remove, I say, a standing Army. This being so; I say it is impossible to think how this Government can stand, if these Ends are not answered; except it fix itself here by absolute Conquest; which cannot be but with a Foreign Help: and that reduces the thing to this; That we must be a Province to that Prince or State that is in the greatest Power abroad; however we may please ourselves with calling this our own Government, or our King that then shall govern us.  
I say, though this Government could free itself from the Enemy it is now engaged with; yet, not answering its Ends, as abovementioned; but directly on the contrary, pursuing those others it was set up in opposition to, and so (as I may call it) subverting its own Foundation, it cannot stand: For if the Foreign Force and Power of a dreaded Neighbour be no longer on foot, so as to fright Men (as at present) into the support of this Government at any rate or prospect; nor that a Foreign Force, in the hands of these Governors, overpower and conquer us; 'Tis not to be thought, that the Spirit and Principle that brought in this Government, through all the Impediments of a then so heightened Prerogative, and of Passive-Obedience Principles, that are so much levelled since that time; 'Tis scarce to be imagined, I say, that that Spirit of Impatience against a Government, setting up the enslaving Attempts and Ministers, should be so sunk, against that comes, (when it has had, all this while, such Means of growing) as that it could not make its way towards a new Change, and act another Revolution; when the same Need, with an additional Resentment and Shame for having been abused, together with a readier Means, and the Way so much facilitated by the foregoing Precedent, invites them to it. Or, if by themselves the Party for Liberty and the Discontented would not be able; yet whilst there was any of the excluded Branch remaining, they would by that means make an Effort which would perpetually shake, if not quickly overturn, this Government.  
But that we may prove, how that but to get through their present Enemies, and reduce the Power of France, is a Work but vainly expected from this Government in the Posture that Affairs are in; let us consider how this War is managed; How our Administration stands in respect of it; and whether, at our rate, we can so much as continue a defensive War.  
Let us compute what are the Expenses of the Nation in this War: What are the Losses and Charges we suffer by it; and what are the Reparations we make ourselves, by the Prejudice drawn from thence to the Enemy.  
Our Losses are, the exhausting of the Wealth, the Stock of the Nation, in the vast Sums drawn out from thence, for the Use of Foreign Countries, and the numerous Troops paid in those Countries: And at the same time that our Sustinence goes out, it is hindered from coming in to us; We losing every day in Trade; the Profit of that still cut from us; and that of it which remains amongst us, turning, in a manner, against us; it being the Importation of Foreign Commodities that now chief drives it; and our own Part begun to be managed by Foreigners: by which means, we abandon to others what we are every day losing in the Navigating Practice, and the breed of Sailors and other Arts-Men belonging, that should be raising amongst us here. And this must needs be so, since the French, to all Effects, in prejudice of us, remain, in reality, the Masters of the Sea, notwithstanding that Advantage which another Providence than that of Men, gave us over them: A Providence which turned that into a Victory on our side; which (according to the surest Consequences of Humane Affairs, by the whole Disposition of Matters, and the Grounds, and Form of that Enterprise on foot) should have proved the Interception and Ruin of a great part of our Fleet, and the Execution of a Descent which then surely would have made itself been felt. Now, if with such an Assistance of Fortune, so far from being ever to be hoped again, we are not able to maintain the Sea for English Ships to stir without being taken; that French Squadrons still, Mounsieur Du-Bart, and all the other numerous Privateers, with Vessels some of 50 Guns and upwards, lie in our Channel, from off Ireland, and round our Coast, do what they please, take us whole Fleets of Merchantmen together, supply their King largely with what they take of ours, make Fortunes for themselves considerable, and enrich the Seaport Towns of their Country, that flourish now, and grow prodigiously with our Spoils; If this, by our Management, be now so, and not prevented; If it be thus now, this very Season, after what has happened for us, How will it be henceforward? How are we like to put a stop to this? And if we do not put a stop to what already is of this kind, (though it should grow no more upon us) where must we be within a little?  
Here than we see our Losses, and where our Wasting is. And as to what Reparations it may be expected we should make ourselves; we are so far from aiming at the Ruin of our Enemy, or the offending of him in this way, that we are not so much as in any prospect of being in a Condition of preventing that Ruin which comes in upon ourselves this Way; though it be properly our chief and only Ruin that comes thus.  
If this Way, then, we do no good; How, in what manner is it, that, in bearing all this, and by what we pay so deeply for, we are to make even with our Enemy, and more than so? How is he to be made come off at length the greatest Sufferer, in order to oblige him to yield? Where, if not here, are we to make the Impression upon him that must give him the worst in the War?  
There are none except those who dream of a Descent; (which though but for the same Reasons that made it last Year unsuccessful, cannot be expected but to prove so this next, and is likely to prove more fatal to us, if so;) there are none, I say, except those that under such Councils, such Ministers entrusted, and such an Administration as ours, do flatter themselves that a Descent shall be able to be made and be supported, so as to turn to the Enemy's Ruin and not our own; there are none besides this sort of Men, that go about confidently to give any Hopes of Matters to be done by making an Impression any where on France with our Land-Armies. Which notwithstanding, let us examine, since it is what we rely on. For being not in a way so much as to preserve ourselves at Sea; much less are we in the Design of ruining our Enemy that way, destroying his Trade, and cutting off his Supply of Riches by which he bears up in the War: although indeed, those very Riches come only into him by his Shipping, and the Exportations that way of his Country's Products: the Money that he gets for them in a Land-Trade, with any Country joining to him, being in comparison very inconsiderable, and much overbalanced by the Charge he is at, in those Countries, for many Necessities of his own, (especially in War;) and by the vast Sums of Money continually distributed there in Pensions; as by considering only Switzerland, will plainly appear. But we, I say, do not apply ourselves this way towards the Reduction of France. To ruin him in his West-India Trade, and cut him off his Seamen; To shut up his Commerce Northwards, through our own Seas; To spoil him (as might be) some of his chief Harbours and Seaport Towns; destroy the rest of his Ships of Force, and ruin his Trading even in the Mediterranean: This is what we either think not of at all, or think is insignificant, or not so noble (nor so saving, or of dispatch, it may be) as the Campaining Method at Land: Or as being less suitable to the Genius of our Prince, so also less suitable to that of our Nation: Which, besides, will be raised to high Esteem and Power, and have its Liberties best guarded by the Establishment of a Noble Army of its own, thus trained up; by that time they, joined with the Foreigners, Dependants on our King, have made us victorious over the Enemy, and brought on for us our so wished-for Peace, which then their Interest will endure.  
The Sea therefore we leave as it is; and our Work being not to be done, or not convenient to our Present Court it should be done, that way; our Dependence is upon another. Now to know how this Other is like to succeed with us; let us consider in what Places of France it is that we may expect to make the Impression at Land.  
The Hopes of Savoy are over. The ill Success which that Attempt had at a time so advantageous, leaves indeed little to hope for any future time, after that this Baffle has given the French so great Security, cut off our Expectation from an Assistance of Protestants there, and given the occasion to the French to put themselves in another posture on that side, strengthen their Frontier, and secure those Passages: and to do, at least, so much for themselves there; although it were not likely that they should be found to carry in a War this Summer into Piedmont, that shall oblige that Prince to make his Terms.  
It is not on the Rhine surely, that we expect our Enemy should be Sufferer; when, instead of being put to use the Strength he has provided for his Defence there, he can every Year raise Contributions on that side sufficient to maintain the Armies he employs there; and take, with Countries, whole Regiments at a time; so as the Duke of Wirtemberg and his Troops, were taken, lately, without so much as fight, and about 3000 of the best Germane Horse taken.  
We do not expect, I suppose, that an Army from Spain will enter France, or that that Nation is in a Condition to make an offensive War against France. So that the stress of all lies now in Flanders. And do we expect to see ever any better Armies there, more numerous, more united, or more animated than they have been these last Campaigns? The Confederacy may soon be lesser; But what can make it greater?  
Are we to find any other Generals of that Confederacy than what we have? Or will these come to be abler, and out-grow the French one's at length by Experience? If it be an Absurdity to think thus; is it not a great one to think we shall have other Success than what we have had? And what has that been? At Flerus we receive a Rout, where we lose a good Part of an Army. Another Year, if we are not beat in the Campaign time, we are charged in the Rear, and a Mark given us at going off. Mons is taken one Year, and Namur the next; (with what Attendance is notorious.) So that if our strongest Towns, we see, go off before our strongest Armies; what are we to expect will be the Fate of the other Towns that are as yet remaining with us, and are the last that keep the Barrier? They too, if not immediately, must in a Campaign or two more, go the same way of course: though at the closing of our Campaigns (which cannot keep us up but a defensive War) we endeavour to take a kind of Revenge by attacking the French with as much Advantage and Success as we did now lately at Steinkirk. But can we think, notwithstanding this, that by recruiting our wasted Troops, and by raising other n●w ones, proportionable to what France raises, we shall prevent all this; and not only so, but after having retaken Namur and Mons, with what else we have lost, be able to pierce into France through triple Ranks of Garrisons, by taking of them one by one, or all at once, or leaving 'em behind, and marching through 'em? Surely Men of thought will stick at this.  
But notwithstanding all this; The Engagers with the Court, carrying a Majority in this Parliament with 'em, are giving the Government this ineffectual Assistance, and are drawing from us vast Sums to supply Confederate Armies, and Armies of our own abroad: As if this were really to do us good, would avail any thing, and were our proper Method of securing ourselves; Whilst our Sea-Practice (whence should be drawn the French's Ruin, but whence our own is now) lies in the shamefullest Condition that can be. What signifies it, that we have a number of huge Ships to sail about together a Month or two in the Summer; if still the French keep all they have in the West-Indies, and the Means that they have there (if not taken from 'em) of breeding Seamen, above all the World besides; if here, in our Seas, they breed vast Numbers, and set out numerous and mighty Ships out of the spoil of us and our Ships? If Trading be not safe for us; our Seas being to us shut up, and Sweeds, Danes, Portugees, and other Nations to whom the Sea is free, growing into Trade, and carrying all Supplies (which thus we cannot hinder) into France.  
'Tis plain, that if we cannot after this, we certainly must sink. 'Tis against this, that we should turn all our Power, our Riches; which would not then be doubly lost in being given amongst Foreigners, from England, never to return thither; and being given besides, in vain. 'Tis towards this we should turn all our Care and Counsels; and therefore, if the good Genius of England has not Power enough, by Patriots within it, to alter this Administration, all is in vain, and we must fall.  
That, in this respect, we do now every thing so improperly, every thing so wastefully that we pretend to do; and that there is so little a Part aimed at or intended, of what might farther be done by us than is attempted under the present Management; there is indeed no wonder. When of all Parts of our Government, there is not any more lose, more inconsistent, more corrupt, than that Part which regards our Sea-Affair. We have no Council, no Committee for Trade established, nothing of any Office instituted, or Officers properly qualified and empowered to inspect our Trade, to report the Condition of it, and propose the Regulations necessary, to our Parliament; insomuch, that that Assembly is forced, upon Occasions, to have recourse to the Merchants themselves, to be instructed, and are often at a loss, and (as in the East-India Business) in a likelihood of ruining Trade, by having their only Information in those nice Matters from such as are surely interested one way or ther. Our Offices of Admiralty and the like, are disposed of in Gifts to Men of Intrigue: and (as the World has now sufficiently remarked) he that by his Skill can work a Party, delay or bring on a Business in the Parliament, and has the House-Craft, is recommended to the steering of a Fleet, and the ordering of our Naval Force. All is of a piece; and throughout all the Places, any ways relating to this great Trust, down to the very inferior Officers, in single Ships, Bribery and Cabal does every thing.  
If this go on, as has been shown, England sinks, whoever rises; We are exposed to the last Misery, and a Foundation, at this rate, is laying for such a State as was before represented. And now, at this present time, if the House of Commons carry not what they have begun upon the Admiralty, to a real through Reformation in all those Affairs, however the others are suffered to lie; if our Force at Sea, and the natural Strength that way, which we have yet left amongst us, be not by their ordering otherwise exerted; other-guess Encouragements set up for Seamen; the Sea Souldiering, the very Vocation itself, by a better Usage of those that follow it, made more advantageous than as it now stands, that it may draw in more than any other, and not be, as it is, the most justly declinable, and ready to be abandoned by those that are already in; if there be not an other-guess rewarding of those that serve well; the proper Methods set up to clear us of the French-Cruisers, and their Privateers; fit Ships, with right Regulation, applied to that Work; The Dealing with them not left (so as it now is) as an ungrateful Work only, but the Reducing of them made (by Rewards fitted to such Service, as well for Privateers and Adventurers of our own, as for the Ships of the Public) an Employment most advantageous, and which may be hearty undertaken by those that so expose themselves; In short,  ill Performance, Unskilfulness and Corruption be suffered in any other Part of our Government; However Matters may go in Westminster-Hall; however the Chancery be filled, or any Offices in the Nation that are to do Right amongst Particulars of that Body; however any other Part of the Ministry stand, according to whatsoever Party; If our Parliament do not now right our Country in this Concern; do not redress and assure this part of our Administration, in Hands they can intrust, and shall have Power over to make Faithful; and by their own Management (for it will be by no other) save thus what we are losing not only to the French, but to all other Foreigners that use the Sea; If they do not thus much, and suddenly set us in another Course to regain what's past, and do our utmost here; However great these Armies and Confederacies sound, that fill so many Heads at present; whatever Pomp and Grandeur in this Government hinders them from dreaming any Insecurity in it; I fear they will not long be Possessors of the Power that accompanies them now in their Seats at Westminster, nor be the Masters long of those Estates that give them now the Places they have there. Their giving Millions so liberally, will but hasten the Business: though many give their Concurrence to this most unprovident way of giving, and to the Methods proportionable, of raising what is thus given: not as unsensible of Mismanagement; but out of mere Fear of being overrun. But it is ordinary to see Men in their Fears run more directly upon their Ruin; when terrified they strive most earnestly to avoid it. Yet if they would act rationally, according to what they fear, why is not the Fleet first secured? why is not that Money first found out, secured on the best Funds, and well appropriated, that the Money really given to that may not least serve that purpose; that it may not run a common risk with the other Money expected to be raised; nor the necessary Charge of our Navy run the same Danger of being unsupplied, as any of those exorbitant and unnecessary Charges we are to be at besides? What if there be found Stops and Difficulties; if the Money fails for these latter Expenses, must it fail too for our Great and perhaps only necessary Expense, that of our Ships and Seamen?  
 be, this must be looked to. And (to join all to what I have shown before) he that is an Englishman in any Party, and forgets this, knows not that he is drawingon his own and Country's Ruin, in the Prospect of establishing his Country by means of that Party, or together with that Party's Interest which he follows: for though a Peace should be concluded at last, according to the Scope of K. James' Party, by which that King should be made to be acknowledged; or though the Adherents to K. William that are supporting him his Way, should see him prevailing with his Land-Forces, and France reduced to such a Peace as should cause the Acknowledgement of King William here; yet at the end of all this, if by that time, the Work that is now doing apace be brought to its effect, and we left Inferiors at Sea, cheated and beaten out of our Trade, and perished in our Naval Power, with nothing but a Power at Land to defend us: All the Advantage that the Party of English Men then prevailing will obtain, besides their Triumph, or their Revenge over their Adversaries, will be to hold a Government under the Force of a Foreigner, and which can be held no otherwise; and to give us ever after for a Government, that which shall be enforced by the Nation, or Prince left with the strongest Force abroad, together with the Honour of being thenceforward constantly the Test of Power and Precedency to the contending States of Europe, by falling always to their Lot who can force others hence, and place themselves.  
Now if there be any English-Man in these Parties, that will thoroughly think; I appeal to him, if what we do altogether in Parliament, or what each Party drives at singly, is like to bring any Happiness to one, whose Country is England. If the removing one Ministry for another; the getting Men, or keeping Men in place for only Party-Merits: The driving in the common Manner, for the Interest of this Court or that; for the Court now undermost, by endeavouring to embroil our Sea-Affairs, bring us Loss of Trade and Ruin of Shipping, that by such Misery the People may (as those think) be induced to abandon this Government: And for the Interest of the Present Court; by complying with any sort of Methods it takes, however censured at other times; by advancing Prerogative at a time which is the only Ever to be hoped for to bring it down from its Encroachments, and to confirm the Rights of the People, which are hardly supportable under the Weight yet left in some Fundamental Points: By gaining Acts for multiplying of Treasons, instead of securing us from the Power that the Crown now has of making Treason too easily out of anything: By the justifying any Commitments as well as Trials; the setting on foot (to a vexatious End, and no other) needless severe Oaths, so extensive and generally to be enforced, for the Punishment only of men's Consciences, or the taking away of all Conscience, so as to lose the Benefit of all Oaths in any Case; a Thing so destructive to all Government, and (to our great Misery) begun already to be felt amongst us, and increasing daily by the Commonness that Oaths are exposed to, in serving every Turn. In fine, By the giving away all our Wealth to the Managers of the Court in prodigious Sums; such as, if possible, would suffice their Greediness, and surmount their Lavishment; whilst still the Matters of our Ocean (that Ocean that should be ours) stand