NARRATIONES MODERNAE, OR MODERN REPORTS Begun in the now UPPER BENCH COURT AT WESTMINSTER, In the beginning of Hillary Term 21 Caroli, and continued to the end of Michaelmas Term 1655. as well on the Criminal, as on the Pleas side. Most of which time the late Lord Chief Justice Roll gave the Rule there. With necessary Tables for the ready finding out and making use of the matters contained in the whole Book. And an Addition of the Number Rolls to most of the remarkable Cases. By William Style of the Inner Temple Esquire. Ut singulis prosim, opto, precor. Nam Genus et proavos & quae non fecimus ipsi, Vix ea nostra voco. Ovid: Metamorph. lib. 13. LONDON, Printed by F.L. for W. Lee, D. Pakeman, G. Bedel, and C. Adam's, and are to be sold at their shops in Fleetstreet. 1658. To the Honourable JOHN PARKER One of the BARONS Of his Highness the LORD PROTECTORS COURT OF THE Public Exchequer. SIR, IN pursuance of what I not long since intimated in the close of the Epistle Dedicatory prefixed to my Practical Register, and in hopes of as favourable an acceptance of this tender of my respectful service, as you then pleased to afford my weak endeavours, am I now encouraged to make this my second humble address. Though this be but a younger brother, in respect of its time of production, yet in reference to its first conception, growth, & parts, I may justly say, it far excels the elder birth, and is much more fit to do your Honour, and the Public, service, and may be (I conceive) capable of as large, if not of a greater measure of your favour and protection. I will not be troublesome to you in relating the pains & time I have taken and spent in this Collection and Publication, but shall leave it to your judicious consideration. How great soever they have been I repent me not, but am (in myself) abundantly satisfied, and do think it reward enough, that I have thereby gained this opportunity to show my continuing humble respects to your Honour, and my willingness to be some way serviceable to others, whatever I have been to myself (in that Vocation God hath of his goodness been pleased to place me in) and to give an Account to the World (a thing which I hold every good Christian is bound to do) of the expense of my time. It may be objected, that the Press hath been very fertile in this our Age, and hath brought forth many, if not too many births of this nature. I must confess this Truth; but how legitimate most of them are, let the Learned judge: This I am sure of, there is not a father alive to own many of them, and they speak so plain in the Language of Ashdod, Neh. 13. v. 23. that a knowing man cannot believe they ever sprung from Israelitish Parents, but by their pronouncing of Siboleth instead of Shiboleth, Jud. 12. v. 5. may easily collect of what extract they are. What I here present you with, is, (though a Homely, yet) a lawful Issue, and I dare call it mine own, and that (I believe) I may do with as good a right as any ever might a work of the like nature, having had as little (if not less) assistance from others in the bringing it forth, as any that have traveled in this kind before me. I am not so blindly fond, or so opiniastre as to think it free from Errors and Misprisions, I fear there may too many be found in it, and no wonder, for Humanum est errare, labi, decipi; yet this I do knowingly aver, that I have not (herein) ex proposito or willingly injured any, but have been as studious and careful in the penning of this my Collection to do right to every person concerned, and to make the Truth appear clearly in its native colours, as was possible at a throngued Bar to do. Nor have I been less wanting in my best endeavours, to prevent and correct the Errors of the Press, (though I must acknowledge my pains and care are not herein fully answered) that it might appear in public, though not in so rich a Dress as to be a Companion for the best, yet (at least) be by your favour suffered to pass (as tolerable) amidst the crowd of a multitude of Editions, clothed in as ill if not in a worse and more unbeseeming habit, Inner Temple, May the 17th. 1658. Sir, I am yours most obliged, respectively to serve you WILLIAM STYLE. To the Industrious, and Ingenuous Professors, and Students of the Common Laws of England; but more particularly, and affectionately to the Associates of the honourable Society of the Inner Temple. GENTLEMEN. FOr a more noble Epithet I know not how to give you (the greatest & best of men on earth being in truth no more.) These ensuing Reports were at first briefly taken by me in the Law-french, without any thought of making other use of them, then for my one private satisfaction, And they did for some time after lie so confusedly scattered in my Note-books, that as they then lay, they were altogether useless to any but myself, and that not without much expense of time and great trouble, so that what of them my unhappy memory could not retain, (which was not much) was in a manner lost as well to myself, as unto others; to remedy this inconvenience, (if I may so call it,) of the loss of my constant attendance, & pains for so many years together taken at the now upper Bench Bar, with very little profit either to others or myself, than some small improvement of my knowledge in the practical part of the law, and in pursuance of that ancient Moral Axiom, Omne agens agit propter aliquem sinem, I was encouraged to continue my travail, and expense of time in the gathering together, transcribing, and putting of them into that order, and method you now behold them, yet as than not having any intent or desire to make them public, but only more readily useful to myself, and such of my Friends and Acquaintance as should at any time desire to be satisfied in any thing I was able to impart unto them. But this not answering the expectation, and importunities of some of my near relations, and many of my intimate Friends and Acquaintance, nor knowing into whose hands my papers might fall, nor how myself and others be injured in the publishing of them after my decease, which I was uncertain when it might happen, and did believe it could not be many years off, by reason of my declining years; but more especially in respect of the weak and crazy constitution of my Body much macerated by sharp, and tedious sicknesses, and being willing to leave some testimony behind me, that I have not slighted, or wholly neglected my calling, but have ever had an honourable esteem of it, though I have hitherto reaped but little of that benefit, which too too many do so eagerly hunt after, but have been doing something therein, and have not lived altogether a drone for so many years together in so famous a Society amidst so many learned men, to the dishonour thereof, and to my one reproach; I did at last resolve (notwithstanding the unavoidable censures, which I was confident I should meet withal, what ever I have, or could say to avoid them,) to give way to this publication of them, even in this age, wherein most of the Cases, and matters herein reported are yet fresh (I suppose) in the memories of many, who may easily trace me where ever I step awry; But I hope to find them not only just in vindicating of me, in that which I have truly and faithfully reported, but also favourable in censuring, and passing by those slips and misprisions they may herein meet withal, caused either by the Printers negligence, or my own misapprehension of the sense of the matters, and things delivered and spoken unto, and the rather, in regard that I have endeavoured as near as I could to render things in the same expressions they were first uttered, that so I might as much as might be, avoid the danger of injuring of any herein concerned, by putting another sense upon them, than what they intended; and this as it was the old way, so I conceive what ever may be objected to the contrary, that it is the best, and clearest way of reporting. For those, that make it their business to censure, and not to read or understand books, I shall say nothing to them, but leave them to abound in their one sense if they have any, and to please themselves with their own fancies. I have made these Reports speak English, not that I believe they will be thereby generally more useful, for I have been always, and yet am of opinion, that that part of the Common Law which is in English hath only occasioned the making of unquiet spirits contentiously knowing, and more apt to offend others, than to defend themselves; but I have done it in obedinece to authority, and to stop the mouths of such of this English age, who though they be as confusedly different in their Minds and judgements, as the bvilders of Babel were in their languages, yet do think it vain, if not impious to speak or understand more than their own mother-tongue. Some may peradventure, Notwithstanding the reasons I have formerly offered for this my publication, be ready to object that it was vain, glory, and a too confident boldness, and high conceit of mine own abilities that makes me thus appear in public; but those that know me I believe are of another opinion, and dare clear me of this aspersion, and well they may, for the truth is I have always been, and yet am so naturally distrustful of my own parts, that I fall far short of that necessary boldness which is requisite for every man to be armed withal in the excercising of public employments, and what loss I have suffered by the want of this, I myself do best know, and is not unknown to many, some of whom have out of their well-wishes to me, and others to my disparagement (as they thought) been pleased to take notice of it. If any of the Cases and matters herein contained seem common unto any, and are to insipid to please their curious Palates, let them pass them over: It may be they may prove useful to others, and I doubt not but the most curious may find many things that may give them delight and satisfaction. And in the farther vindication of these Reports, I shall desire all to take notice, that first, these were most of them) taken in unsettled times, wherein the Law was almost at a stand, and therefore it cannot be reasonably expected they should be so quick and full of matter, as those that have been gathered when the Laws flowed in a more open, and uninterrupted Channel, when the Courts of justice were full fraught with business, and were in a more splendent and flourishing condition than in these latter times; and next, that this work is not a collection only of some choice Cases taken by several hands in all the Courts of Westminster; but is only a continued narrative of the Cases, and proceed of the new upper Bench Court for 10 years together, and taken by one only hand, without the help or assistance of any other, during which time I have omitted but little, saving when by reason of sickness, I was for a Term or two constrained to be absent. And the more to encourage all to the perusal of them, I dare affirm that there is much various matter contained in them, & different from what is to be found in other Reports taken in former years, occasioned by the many alteration of the face of things, and the changes of government happing at this time, and also by reason of my constant observing, inserting, and interweaving of all the remarkable passages transacted on the Criminal side, with those happening on the Pleas side, which in other Reports hath very sparingly at any time, if at all been performed. I have also for the Readers greater ease and benefit, added hereunto three Alphabetical Tables, the first containing the names of the several Cases; a second containing the several general Heads, or Titles under which the several matters dispersed through the whole book, are properly digested; and the third, and last, being a large Table particularly directing to the Page and Case, wherein you may find the subject matter methodically ranged under those Heads or Titles. And for your further and fuller satisfaction, and making the Cases the clearer proof, and more authentical authority to be cited and given credit unto, you have the number Rolls pref●ixed to most of those that are remarkable amongst them. I might, and would if I had thought it necessary have much enlarged these Reports, and made the volume swell to a far greater bulk: But my aim and endeavours have generally been to take the chief points only, and substance of the matters arising and spoken unto, and the rational parts of the arguments and authorities used and urged, to enforce and prove what was surmised to be Law on either side, and the grounds and authorities upon which the opinions and resolutions of the Court are framed and given, and to pass by all the luxuriant flourishes of wit, and the multiplying of Similary Cases to the Cases in question, as serving more for the most part to prove the curious fancy, & much reading of the Arguer, than the proof of the points of the cases in question, or the satisfaction, or information of the Auditors or Readers judgement; and I have ever (yet with submission to better judgements,) conceived this concise way of taking Reports to be far more beneficial and delightful, not only to the Reporter, but also to those that shall read them, than that long and tedious way, wherein the truth is so overshadowed with multiplicity of words, that it is very difficult through those Clouds to discover, and behold her perfect beauty so well, as when she appears bare-faced in her true and natural complexion. I need not say any thing in commendation of the Common Laws, they do so sufficiently, and clearly speak their own worth, not only in our own land, but even through the Christian, if I may not say the whole known world. The fruit that every one from him that sits on the Throne, to her that grindeth at the Mill, throughout this nation in the tender preservation of our Religion, Lives, Liberties, and Properties do loudly proclaim their excellency, and do justly claim our reverend esteem of them, and their sweet influence which our Neighbour Nations do partake of from their light and heat, hath purchased an honourable name, and repute amongst them. Though no doubt but other Kingdoms, and Republics have many excellent written and established Laws suitable to the particular constitutions of the people, and to their several frames of government, and amongst the rest the Civil or imperial Laws, yet they all want many remarkable excellencies that are in the Common Laws of England, and the proceed therein, and amongst the rest to instance in no more, they are very deficient in this way used in our Law for many ages past, of reporting, and leaving to posterity the learned arguments of council at the Bar, and of the grave and profound resolutions of the reverend judges in the decision of Cases arising, and controverted amongst us; and this way how sightly soever it be now esteemed of by many amongst us, yet is by Strangers much valued, and was heretofore so much set by amongst us, and thought so highly advantageous to the public, that the wisdom of this State did then think fit to appoint grave and judicious men, encouraged by an annual stipend, to attend and perform this task, and therefore I hope that he who hath undertaken this hard labour freely and voluntarily in relation to the public good, without hope of reward, is so far from deserving blame and reproof, that he is rather to be cherished and countenanced in these his endeavours by those in authority, and not to be rashly and uncharitably calumnicated, or censured by any, but to be favourably interpreted, and received as one that makes it his aim to be accounted a true lover of the Common Laws, and really honoureth the profession, and Professors thereof. Inner Temple, May the 19th. 1658. William Style. An Alphabetical TABLE OF THE NAMES OF THE CASES. A SIr Maurice Abbot's case Pag. 13, 14 Abbot and Vaughan Pag. 450 Acton and Ayres Pag. 346 Adston and Hunter Pag. 206 Allen and Reeve Pag. 88 Allens Case Pag. 255 Allen and Holden Pag. 287, 288 Andrews Case Pag. 9 Andrews and Baily Pag. 139 Count Arondels Case Pag. 26 Count Arondel & Shandois case Pag. 371, 372 Archer and Holbidg Pag. 185 Arnold and Floyd Pag. 473, 476 Sir Anthony Ashly Cooper and St. John vid. C, Ashby and Child Pag. 384 Ashworth and Sir Tho. Stanley Pag. 364 Askwiths case Pag. 362 Atwood and Monger Pag. 378, 379 Atlee and the Lady Baltinglass Pag. 475 Avery and Kirton Pag. 175, 176 Aylet and Stellam Pag. 100 Aylet and Oates Pag. 121, 125 Ailet and Watless Pag. 246 Air and Sills Pag. 131 Air and Pimcomb Pag. 164 Air and Hawksworth Pag. 382 B BAcon and Ramsey Pag. 460 Barnaby and Goodale Pag. 1, 2 Basely and Basely Pag. 16 Barker and Martin Pag. 19, 37 Barley and Martin Pag. 20 Barrets case Pag. 23 Baker and edmond's Pag. 62, 63 Banister and Wright Pag. 137 Barlyes case Baker and Denham Pag. 145, 146 Barber and Pomeroy Pag. 175 Barnewell and Grant Pag. 190 Bambury and Basely Pag. 160, 161, 180, 181, 182, 195, 196, 197. Barmeston and Gale Pag. 213 Bernard and Levit Pag. 227 Barcock and Tompson Pag. 281, 288, 323, 324 Batisford and Yates Pag. 195 Bachelor and Parsons Pag. 292, 293 Baker and Smith Pag. 295, 303, 304 Barnard and King Pag. 306, 307 Bainton and Cheek Pag. 353, 354, 355 Baker and Andrews Pag. 357, 358 Barjar and Windham Pag. 385 Barker and Elmer Pag. 412 Banisters case Pag. 405 Baxters case Pag. 35 Banks and Prat Pag. 420, 421, 428 Barker and Weston Pag. 425 Baker and Ramsey Betsworth and Betsworth Pag. 10 Beal and Wyman Pag. 240 Benskin and Herrick Pag. 388 Bennet and the Hundred of Hartford Pag. 233 Bedwell and Fenwick Pag. 393, 394 Bigford and Topsam Pag. 209 Bird and Christopher Pag. 389 Bishop and Fitzherbert Pag. 298 Boomer and Pate Pag. 32 Boone and Shears Pag. 79 Bows and Broadhead Pag. 155 Bolton and Wills Pag. 214 Bowls and Clark Pag. 228 Boomer and Cleve Pag. 231 Bois and Cranfield Pag. 239 Booth and Lambert Pag. 276, 277 Bowyer and Tantulyar Pag. 155 boil and Scarborow Pag. 395, 396, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444 Bocking and Symons Pag. 400 Bond and Martin Pag. 353 Sir William Bronkers case Pag. 16 Burnet and Bird Pag. 54 Burwell and Lancaster Pag. 109 Burges and Dinham Pag. 114, 115 Butler and Long Pag. 117 Burraston and Herbert Pag. 155 Burton and Low Pag. 212, 213, 233 Buckston and Shurlock Pag. 340 Busfield and Norden Pag. 471 Burrel and Lancastre Pag. 109 Burcher and Orchard Pag. 349, 350 Bunnyworth and Gibbs Pag. 419 Blackwell and Ashton Pag. 50 Blackden and Harvey Pag. 220 Bronge and More Pag. 428 Broome and Evering Pag. 8 Sergeant Bradshaw and Procter Pag. 464 Bruer and Southwell Pag. 27, 58, 63 Brook and Brooke Pag. 61 Brereton and Monington Pag. 115 Bragg and Nitingall Pag. 140, 141 Browne and Poynes Pag. 147 Brook and Hogg Pag. 164, 165 Brook and Brooke Pag. 170, 171 Brungy and Lee Pag. 178 Bryan and Stone Pag. 239 Browne and Nelson Pag. 317, 318 Bryan and Twit Pag. 328 Brock and Vernon Pag. 339, 340 Brightwell and Robson Pag. 368, 369 Bromefield and Williamson Pag. 407, 408 Bynion and Trotter Pag. 231 Byron and Stonehowse Pag. 328, 329 C CApell and Alleyne Pag. 49 Carver and Pierce Pag. 66, 73 Castle and Dynely Pag. 92, 93 Cages case Pag. 129 Cave and Oseby Pag. 156 Carew and Bawd Pag. 167, 168 Cane and Golding Pag. 169, 170, 176, 177 Cater and Startu●e Pag. 217 Cane and Pell Pag. 229 Cage and Dod Pag. 233, 234 Cantrell and Stephens Pag. 300 Sir Charles Coot and Plunket Pag. 125 Cook and Fincham Pag. 18 Cook and Alleyne Pag. 20 Conesby and Fairefax Pag. 23, 24 Colson and Bedloe Pag. 58 Cornish and Cowsye Pag. 118, 119 Collins and Page Pag. 124, 125 Coals and Sibsey Pag. 156, 178 Compton and Alleyne Pag. 162 Coswells case Pag. 182 Colson and Rea Pag. 195 Cook and More Pag. 195 Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper and St. John Pag. 130, 131 Cowlye and Lockton Pag. 205 Coleman and Blunden Pag. 255 Collyns and Syllye Pag. 265 Cotterel and theobald's Pag. 297, 298, 313, 314 Comport and Beech Pag. 214 Cooks and Chambers Pag. 439, 440 Conye and Laws Pag. 472, 473 Curtice and Columbine Pag. 19, 20 Cutsworths case Pag. 153, 154 Custodes and Outwell, Newton and Tide. Pag. 178, 179, 180, 184, 185, 191, 192 Custodes and Montague and Lydall Pag. 209, 210 Custodes and White Pag. 227 Custodes and Valconbridge Pag. 228 Custodes and maine and Serjeant Pag. 245, 246 Custodes and Arskott Pag. 243 Custodes and the Town of Colchester Pag. 452 Custodes and Hall Pag. 260 Custodes and Monger Pag. 265, 266 Custodes and Jinkes Pag. 283 Custodes and Rivet Pag. 294 Custodes and the Lord Morley Pag. 295 Custodes and Tawny and Norwood Pag. 312, 313 Custodes and Howell Gwin Pag. 336, 337 362 Custodes and the Parish of Stoneham Pag. 366 Custodes and toes Pag. 374 Custodes and Martin Pag. 374, 375 Custodes and Rickaby Pag. 369, 375, 376, 377 Custodes and Levingston Pag. 403 Cullyer and Iermin Pag. 463 Chadly and Stinch Pag. 33 Chapel and Drew Pag. 41 Cheeks case Chambers and Wollaston Pag. 78, 84, 85 Vill de Charlton in Kent Pag. 14 Chambers and Floyd Pag. 89 Cheevers and Cage Pag. 72 Christopher and How Pag. 158 Chafe and Levering Pag. 220 Child and Gniat Pag. 243 Chapman and Brook Pag. 289 Child and Sir John Lenthall Pag. 330 Cheeseman and Turner Pag. 343 Child's case Pag. 424 Clark and Pew Pag. 18 Clementson and Mountsord Pag. 106 Clarks case Pag. 382 Clark and Fitzwilliams Pag. 482 Creswell and Ventryes Pag. 91 Cressit and Burgis Pag. 296 Crosstwhait and the Hundred of Lowdon Pag. 318, 319 Crook and Samm Pag. 122 Cremer and Burnett Pag. 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271 272 Cydall and Spencer Pag. 341 The Hundred of Crondon Pag. 472 D David and Lister Pag. 19 Dawkes and Payton Pag. 216 Dawkes and Pynder Pag. 232 Davis and Ockham Pag. 245 Davis and the Lord Foliott Pag. 299, 310, 311 Dawkes and Caveneigh Pag. 347, 348 Davis and Matthews Pag. 455, 456 Dersley and Dersley Pag. 57 Denoir and Oil Pag. 166, 167, 172, 173 Dell and Browne Pag. 174, 175, 182 Dewick and Bamber Pag. 208 Denton and Harison Pag. 229 Dethicks case Pag. 233 Denton and Caket Pag. 247 Dentons case Pag. 475 Dekins and Latham Pag. 317, 318 Dekin and Turner Pag. 387 Deacon and Forest Pag. 114 Devereux and Jackson Pag. 477 Dickenson and Preston Pag. 7 Dison and Bartue Pag. 133 Disne and Grigson and Colyer Pag. 227 Dod and Eton Pag. 63, 64 Dowse and Masters Pag. 263 Dod and Herbert Pag. 436, 459 Dorman and Snagg Pag. 411, 412 Dunch and Smith Pag. 139, 146 Dudeney and Colyer Pag. 225 Dudley and Borne Pag. 322 Drinkwater and Pack Pag. 297 Drake and Drake Pag. 363, 364 Drake and Whitaker Pag. 24, 25 E Edwards and Fallows Pag. 213 Eels & Lambert Pag. 37, 38, 54, 55, 56, 73, 74 Elyott and Blague Pag. 283 Elston and Drake Pag. 393 Ellis and Tippin Pag. 346 Elzy and Mawdit Pag. 220, 221, 226 Emerson and Ridly, Pag. 141, 142 Vid R. Erbery and Ernly and Allen Pag. 224 Eston and Manley Pag. 461 Edward and Stiff Pag. 448 Elms and Martin Pag. 475 F. FAirfax and Fairfax Pag. 236, 237, 238 Fanshaw and Bond Pag. 387 Farmer and Laurence Pag. 397 Feilder and Tovy Pag. 241, 242, 257, 258 Finer and Jeffry Pag. 57 Fines and del Pag. 163 Fitton and Richardson Pag. 285 286 Fisher and Jeffryes Pag. 385 Lucye Folthrhies case Pag. 363 Fortescue and Brograve Pag. 8 Fitchet and Wolston Pag. 56, 57 Floyd and Morgan Pag. 313 Fortune and Johnson Pag. 318 Fowk and Boyl Pag. 343, 344, 348 349 Fowk and Prescot Pag. 458 Fowk and Copsye Pag. 439 Fulhams case Pag. 83, 84 Fox and Swan Pag. 482 Fletcher and King Pag. 382, 383 Floyd and Morgan Pag. 327, 328 Frembling and Clotherbook Pag. 48, 49 Freres case Pag. 133 Freeborn and Purchase Pag. 107 Frank and Burt Pag. 149 Frank and Dixon Pag. 153 Freeman and Childeress Pag. 299 Friend and Baker Pag. 339 Franklins' case Pag. 388 G GAwdy and Ingham Pag. 88 Gallop and Simpson, and Chase Pag. 115 126 Gardener and Jolly Pag. 157 Garret and Blizard Pag. 192, 193 Le Gayes case Pag. 464 Garland and Yarrow Pag. 322, 323, 326 Gay and Gay Pag. 258, 272 Gilbert and Stone Pag. 72 Gibbs and Donne Pag. 135 Gill and Cross Pag. 148 Gilbert and Marden Pag. 183 Gibbon and Kent Pag. 212 Gibbs and Price Pag. 231 Giles and Tymberly Pag. 283 Giles and Sowthward Pag. 385 Goffs case Pag. 234 Gowrs case Pag. 261 Goodyer and Shaw Pag. 298 Gossage and Tayler Pag. 325, 326 Godwin and Batkin Pag. 330 Gough and Cann Pag. 342 glide and Dudeny Pag. 109, 110 Greenwood and Price. Grace and Walye Pag. 159 Graves and Drake Pag. 199 Griffith and Thomas Pag. 334 Greenling and Bawdit Pag. 404 Green and How Pag. 323 Grible and Orchard Pag. 164 H HAmond and Kingsmill Pag. 22, 23, 210 Hales and More Pag. 86 Hart and Buckminster Pag. 103 Harris his case Pag. 451 Harwood and Paty Pag. 161, 162, 168, 169 Harris and Gibbons Pag. 172 Hamond and Kingsmill Pag. 22, 210 Hamond and Ireland Pag. 215 Hayward and Williams Pag. 254, 280 Harman and Jacob Pag. 256 Hamond and Ward Pag. 287 Harding and Freeman Pag. 310 Hanslop and johnson Pag. 395 Harris and Tooker. Pag. 371 Hayward and Ducket Pag. 405 Hacker and Newborn Pag. 413, 427 Hamond and Thornhill Pag. 476 Hardress and Proud Pag. 465 The Vill of Hardingham against Brisly Pag. 168 Harley and Mountney Pag. 425 Hellyar and Grace Pag. 9 Hellenaes' case Pag. 11 Heyford and Hobson Pag. 136 Heal and Green Pag. 258, 259, 260, 275, 276, 315, 316 Herd and Read Pag. 335 Heath and Udall Pag. 358 Hither and Bowman Pag. 462 Herbert and Law Pag. 370 Henshaws case Pag. 399 Henly and Baynton Pag. 436, 437, 438 Hill and Harris Pag. 134 Hill and Farmer Pag. 29 Hid and King Hill and Bird Pag. 102 Hill and Dechair Pag. 381, 382 Hicks and Joice Pag. 394 Higgs and Harison Pag. 413, 414 Hogg and Vaughan Pag. 6 Holoigh and Chase Pag. 74, 75, 78, 79 Hobson and Heyward Pag. 88 Hooker and Lamb Pag. 96 Hobard and Boraston Pag. 122 Hobbs and Blanchard Pag. 167 Hodges and Jane Pag. 199 Hobson and Hudson Pag. 199, 200 Hollingworth and Whetstone Pag. 212 Hoffs case Pag. 367 Homes and Bingly Hodges' case Pag. 383 howard's case Pag. 124 Howard and Howard Pag. 454 Hudsons' case Pag. 208 Hurd and Lenthall Pag. 211 Hunt and Popham Pag. 238 Hume and Hinton Pag. 304, 305 Hudson and Dickinson Pag. 416 Hull and Gurnett Pag. 64 Hind and Dell. I GAy and Gay, or Jay and Jay, Pag. 258, 274, 275 Jaques case Pag. 153, 159, 355 Jennings and Lee. Pag. 198, 199 Jenkinson and Porter Pag. 187 Jervis and Lucas Pag. 345, 346 Jennings and Downs Pag. 352 Jennings and Lee Pag. 150, 151, 198, 199, 210, 211 Ingram and Fawset Pag. 463 Jones and Yongue Pag. 15 Jones and Stanley Pag. 38 Jones and Jacob Pag. 142 Johnson and Abington Pag. 163 john's and Levingston Pag. 184 Jones and Blunden Pag. 201, 206 Jones and Graves Pag. 421 Ibson and Beal Pag. 165 Isles and Windsor Pag. 419 Ireland and Michelborn Pag. 171 Izack and Green Pag. 69, 70 Jones and Graves Pag. 427 K KAle and Joselyn Pag. 61 Keniston and Jones Pag. 97 98 Keniston and Cronch Pag. 228 Kerman and Johnson Pag. 281, 282, 293, 294, Kenedy and Fisher Pag. 295, 296 Keckwith and Moyle Pag. 344, 345 Keightley and Nodes Pag. 313 Kemp and Gored Pag. 421 The King and Holland Pag. 20, 21, 40, 41, 75, 76, 84, 90, 94, 95 The King and Place Pag. 25, 28, 29 The King and marshal Pag. 29, 30 The King and ●omerland Pag. 34 Kinpe and Johnson Pag. 70, 71 The King and Hid Pag. 60 The King and Savage Pag. 76, 77 The King and Apsly Pag. 85 The King and Page, and Harwood Pag. 86 The King and Cory Pag. 86, 87 The King and Symons Pag. 87 The King and Andrews Pag. 93 King's case Pag. 100 The King and Ann Camel Pag. 116 The King and Sir Henry Spiller Pag. 108, 109 The King and Doctor Trig Pag. 124, 135, 136 The King and Bellingham Pag. 126 The King and Wood Pag. 145 The King and Bray Pag. 147 The King and Humphryes Pag. 154 The King and Golding Pag. 155 King and Weeden Pag. 264 Kitchinmans case Pag. 374 Kirk and Lucas Pag. 430 Kimlock and Bamfield Pag. 309, 310 Knights case Pag. ● L LAngley and Wibord Pag. 110 Lamb and Duff Pag. 211, 212 Laurence and Harison Pag. 426 Lamplew and Hewson Pag. 435 Lance and Blackmore Pag. 463 The Earl of Leicester and Samford Pag. 15 Lere and Cholwitch Pag. 30, 31 Loving and Gamble Pag. 102 Ley and Anderton Pag. 225 Levingston and Crompton Pag. 359 Leake and Reynolls Pag. 414 Le Pool and Tryan Pag. 470 Liddal and Lister Pag. 278 Le Gross and Hall Pag. 476 John Lilborns case Pag. 96 The City of London and Estwick Pag. 32, 33 35, 36, 42, 43 Long and Bennett Pag. 19 Lodge and Weeden Pag. 50, 51 Lovel and Knatchford Pag. 12● Lovedaies' case Pag. 129 The City of London, and Le Roy Pag. 226 Lockoer and Palfriman Pag. 319, 320, 321 Long and Hebb Pag. 341 The City of London, and Hatton Pag. 357 Locky and Dumiloe Pag. 363 〈◊〉 and the Sheriffs of London Pag. 427 Lord and Michael Pag. 420 Longs Case Pag. 65, 66 London and Wilcocks Pag. 466 London and Craven Pag. 481 Luskins and Carver Pag. 7, 8 Lumley and Nevil Pag. 238 Luddington and White Pag. 350 Lydall and Lister Lyniston and Mawrice Pag. 342 M Mastermans' case Pag. 2 Mack and Cubitt Pag. 49, 50 Matthew and Herle Pag. 65 Mayhue and Baspool Pag. 104 Martin and Miller Pag. 483 Martial and Porter Pag. 113 Martin and Henly Pag. 232 Martial and Ledsham Pag. 246, 282 Masterman and Rusholm Pag. 244 Massey and Aubery Pag. 365, 366 Masters and Wallis Pag. 408 Maynel and Mackally Pag. 459, 460 Matthew and the hundred of Godalming, Pag. 427 Mercer and Rule Pag. 159, 160 Meres and French Pag. 193, 194. 202, 203 Michael and Hepworth Pag. 429, 430 More and Savage Pag. ●7 Morefield and Webb Pag. 39, 40 Monger and Shatterton Pag. 60, 61 More and Clipsom Pag. 71 More and Stone Pag. 94 The Lord Moons case Pag. 118 Mogg and Shute Pag. 123 The Lord Mounteagles case Pag. 257 More and the Earl Rivers Pag. 214 Morden and Hart Pag. 471 N NAyler and Ash Pag. 223 Needler and Guest Pag. 12 Nevil and Mot Pag. 59, 60 Newton and Bails Pag. 120, 121 Nelson and Tompson Pag. 142, 278 Newton and Tydd, and Otwell Pag. 178 Newcomin and Leigh Pag. 249 Needler and Guest Pag. 254, 255 Newton and Goddard Pag. 290 Neve and Cross Pag. 350, 351 Newman and Massy Pag. 378 Newton and Osborn Pag. 387 Nortons' case Pag. 110 Norton and Jason Pag. 398, 399 North and James Pag. 439 Nulls and Cheney Pag. 5 O OSborns case Pag. 158 Oreswick and Amery Pag. 228 Owen and jevon Pag. 274, 277 Oliph and Tong Pag. 389, 390, 391, 392 Oils and marshal Pag. 418 P PAin and Skeltrom Pag. 17 Paradine and jane Pag. 47, 48 Parmitter and Cresly Pag. 49, 74 Pay and Paxted Pag. 97 pain and Prestny Pag. 234 Parker and Cook Pag. 241 Page and Crook Pag. 401 Patnell and Brook Pag. 417 Page and Parr Pag. 432 Pascall and sparing Pag. 198 Pawsey and Lowdall Pag. 249, 273 Peirson and Dawson Pag. 46 Peeling and Ken Pag. 111, 112 Pendarvis and Dawks Pag. 205 Poise and Mablye Pag. 194 Pease and Shrimpton Pag. 261 Perk and Ingram Pag. 263, 264, 273 Peck and Ewer Pag. 381 Pendarvis and St. Aubin Pag. 410, 411 Pitcher and Symons Pag. 113 Pilkinton and Bagshaw Pag. 449, 450 Pimley and Robinson Pag. 122 Pickering and Barkley Pag. 132 Phillips his case Pag. 162 Pickering and Emma Pag. 194 Pitton and Rey Pag. 359 Pinder and Dawks Pag. 232 Pinchard and Fowk Pag. 416 Phillips and Phillips Pag. 420 Pitchet and Wolston Plummer and Sir John Lenthall Pag. 475 Poole and Coply Pag. 64 Popham and Hunt Pag. 140, 234 Poyns and Francis Pag. 181 Popham and White Pag. 232 powel and Hopkins Pag. 247 Port and Midleton Pag. 251 Points Mawrice his case Pag. 356 Porter and Swetman Pag. 406, 407 Phillips his case Pag. 162 Pooly and Markham Pag. 477 Pragnell and Goff Pag. 11● Preston and Holms Pag. 148, 149 Preston and Mortlock Pag. 293 Price and Car Pag. 455 Prior and Hale Pag. 348 Price and Goodrick Pag. 387 The Protector and Streeter Pag. 415, 416 The Protector and Baxter Pag. 418, 419 The Protector and Richardson Pag. 430, 431 The Protector and Cartwright Pag. 431 The Protector and Buckner Pag. 467, 468 etc. The Protector and Lowr Pag. 432 The Protector and Yates Pag. 477, 478, etc. The Protector and Hart Pag. 434 The Protector and Summer Pag. 450 The Protector and the Vill of Colchester Pag. 446, 447, 448 etc. The Protector and Gunter Pag. 448 The Protector and Norice Pag. 454 The Protector and Craford Pag. 457, 458 The Protector and Blackwell Pag. 461 Pym and Morgan, vid. Bambury and Basely Pag. 161, etc. Q. Quatermans' case Pag. 134 R RAwson and Bargue Pag. 36, 37, 51, 52, 81, 82, 83 Raw and Raw Pag. 119, 120 Ralph and Davy Pag. 150 Ratclift and Dudeny Pag. 176 Rawly and Vivers Pag. 385 Remington and Kingerby Pag. 4 Reader and Palmer Pag. 117, 118 Read and Palmer Pag. 106 Sir Tho. nevil's case Pag. 141, 142 Ridley and Emerson Pag. 141, 142, 177 vid. E. The Earl Rivers and More Pag. 186 Ritch and Saunders Pag. 261, 262 Countess Rivers case Pag. 234, 252, 253, 254 Ricot and St. John Pag. 382 Rook and Knight Pag. 9 Robinson's case Pag. 69 Royston and Mees Pag. 79, 80 Roberts and Tucker Pag. 191 Rosyer and Langdale Pag. 248 Ross and Laurence Pag. 263 Rook and Smith Pag. 273, 274 Rogers and Dove Pag. 331, 332, 333, 334 Roby and Twelve Pag. 423, 424 Robinson and Walker Pag. 239 Rounges and Woodyard Pag. 426 S SAvages case Pag. 12 Saunderson and Martin and Smith Pag. 17 sawyer's case Sawnderson and Raysin Pag. 207 Saunders and Ritch Pag. 288, 289 Sawyer and Russell Pag. 59, 264 Sale and Wray Pag. 373 Seaman and Edward's Pag. 63 Segar and Dyer Pag. 31 Siocnhams case Pag. 341 Scoble and Tolye Pag. 102, 103 Shertliff and Timberly Pag. 219 Shurley and Semaign Pag. 255 Shann and Shann Pag. 256, 257, 280 Shayler and Bigg Pag. 171 Shann and Bilby Pag. 280 Sherecroft and Weeks Pag. 379 Shepherd and Grace Pag. 445 sherlock's case Pag. 456, 457 Skerlock and La pere Pag. 265 Skete and Day Pag. 125 Slades case Pag. 138 Smith and Hobson Pag. 112, 113 Smith and Stone Pag. 65 Smith and Hancock Pag. 137, 138 Smithson and Wells Pag. 141 Smith and Hale Pag. 139 Smith and Dunch Pag. 139, 146 Smith and Andrews Pag. 183, 184 Smith and the Earl of Dorset Pag. 277 Smith and Ward Pag. 351 Smith and Holyman Pag. 361 Snelgrave and Bosvile Pag. 327 Somes and Sir John Lenthall Pag. 465 Sowthcott and Sowthcott Pag. 103, 108 Spitlehouse and Farmery Pag. 290 Spry and Mill Pag. 182, 183, 203, 204 Stoughton and Day Pag. 18 Stents case Pag. 127 Sir John Stowels case Pag. 104 straddling and Boreman Pag. 129, 130 Stubs and Manklin Pag. 165 Staples case Pag. 359, 360 Sir Humphrey Style and Tullye, Pag. 286, 287 Starky and Mill Pag. 296 Stroad and Homes Pag. 338 Staples case Pag. 248 Stevenson and Steward Pag. 404 Stavely and Ulithorp Pag. 411, 422 Stephens and Ask Pag. 424, 425 Wolverly Strachyes case Pag. 118 Captain Streeters case Pag. 415 Strewed and Beckwith Pag. 454, 455 Swan and Fenham Pag. 409, 410 Simons and Leir Pag. 72 Syms and Wilson Pag. 214, 215 T TAnner and Laurence Pag. 53 Tailor and Webb Pag. 301, 302, 307, 308, 309, 319, 383 Terry and Baxter Pag. 39 Tench and Cletheroe Pag. 59 Tench and Hubrison Pag. 340 theobald's and Newton Pag. 307 Thomas' case Pag. 461 Thine and Thine Pag. 67, 68, 69, 77, 78, 91, 92 98, 99, 101, 143 Thurle and Madison Pag. 462 Theoball and Conquest Pag. 343 Tison's case Pag. 153 Timbrel and Bullock Pag. 15 Tories case Pag. 15 Toby and angel Pag. 110 Tompkins and Jourden Pag. 131 Toplady and Staly Pag. 165, 166 Townsend and Barker, Pag. 388, 389, 394 Tompkins and Clark Pag. 422 Tost and Day Pag. 431, 474 Torret and Frampton Pag. 434, 435 Tracy and Poole Pag. 143, 144 Treton and Squire Pag. 230 Sir Humphrey Tracy and Bloom Pag. 356 Trundall and Trowel Pag. 273 Trorman and Standart Pag. 284, 285 Doctor Trig and the College of Physicians Pag. 329, 330 Trevilian and Welman Pag. 400, 401 Trevanian and Penhollow Pag. 452 Turner and his Wife's case Pag. 47 Tucker and Cosh Pag. 288, 289 Turner and Trapes Pag. 412 Twig and Roberts Pag. 145 Tyler and Johnson Pag. 41 Tyndall and Harington Pag. 162 F VAndicoots case Pag. 52 Vaux and Vaux versus Steward and Draper Pag. 157, 203 Vincent and Fursey Pag. 43, 44 Vincent and Wallis Pag. 197 Viccary and Barns Pag. 213 Vidian and Fletcher Pag. 472 W Watson and Norbury Pag. 3, 201, 202 Ward and Coggin Pag. 6 Wagstaff and Tempest Pag. 464 Watson and Watson Pag. 28, 56 Waineright and Whitley Pag. 115 Walker and Alder Pag. 117 Waldron and Ward Pag. 449 Watson and Scotson Pag. 121 Ware and Chappel Pag. 186, 187 Watts and Dix Pag. 188, 189, 204, 205 Watts and Lord Pag. 230 Marry and Bond Pag. 256 Wallis and Bucknall Pag. 291, 292, 311, 312 Watts and Lowth Pag. 341 Wall and Buy Pag. 352 Walkenden and Heycock Pag. 425 Weeks and Weeks Pag. 90 Weston and Plowden Pag. 173, 178, 188 Wentworth and Wentworth Pag. 242 Webb and Wilmer Pag. 260 Weld and Rumney Pag. 418 Webb and Washborn Pag. 352, 353, 360, 361 Weeks his case Pag. 371 Welden and Strudder Pag. 379 Webberly and Sir John Lenthall Pag. 454 Whitchurch and Paget Pag. 208 Whitwell and Short Pag. 5, 6 Whitley and Fawset Pag. 12, 13 Whites case Pag. 17 White and Thomas Pag. 38, 39 White and Harwood Pag. 138 Whiteacre and Hillwell Pag. 27 White and Holford Pag. 170 White and Pinder Pag. 22 Whitwely and Pinsent Pag. 300 Whitehead and Buckland Pag. 373, 379, 380 401, 402, 403 Wingfield and Sherwood Pag. 5 Williamson and Henly Pag. 11 Willison and Crow Pag. 75 Pawl Williams and the Custodes, etc. Pag. 244 Williams and Tyrer Pag. 80 Willis and Bond Pag. 260, 261 Winn and Stebbins Pag. 405 Williamson and Coleman Pag. 47 Wyatt and Harby Pag. 200 Williamson and Mead Pag. 207, 208 Winter and Bernard Pag. 221 Withring and Bishopsgate Parish Pag. 260 Willis and Bond. Williamson and Norwitch Pag. 337, 338 Wingfield and Valence. Pag. 414, 415 Wise and Jeoffryes Pag. 429 Williams and Poole Pag. 460 Wood and Salter Pag. 53 Worsely and Worsely Pag. 123 Wood and Clemence Pag. 133, 126, 152 Wood and Holland Wood and Topham Pag. 216, 227, 234, 235, 303 Wood and Mountney Pag. 360 Wood and Markeham Pag. 408 Wood and Gunston Pag. 461, 464, 466 Wrath and Elsy Pag. 16 Wright and Pinder Pag. 34 Wright and Martin Pag. 107 wright's case Pag. 139, 140 wright's case Y YAte and Batisford Pag. 195 Yates and Lynden Pag. 47 Yongue and Petit Pag. 356 Yokehurst and Skot Pag. 439, 440 HILARY TERM 21 Car. Banc. Reg. A Prohibition was prayed to the Admiralty, Prohibition. to stop proceed there, upon a Contract between the parties suggested to be made upon the land within the body of a County, and not upon the high Sea; And the surmise was penned thus. If there was any Contract made between the parties (as the libel supposeth) it was made upon the land within the body of a County, and not upon the high Sea. The Court held this suggestion ill, Suggestion. for the uncertainty of it, and ordered that it should be amended and made absolute, viz. That the Contract was made upon the land, etc. And that the words, if there was any Contract made, should be put out, because they made it uncertain whether there was any Contract or no, and so by consequence did destroy the very ground of the surmise. Barnaby against Goodale, 21 Car. Banc. reg. Trin. 21 Car. rot. 201. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an Action upon the Case in the Court at Owse bridge in York, Error upon a Judgement in an action upon the Caie. and the first Error assigned was in the Process, because it was by summons; whereas the action being an action upon the Case, which is in the nature of a Trespass; the Process should be by Attachment, and Distress infinite, and not by summons. But to this it was answered by Roll justice, that since 10 jacobi this manner of proceeding is no Error, Error. Capias. and that that Court hath no power to award a Capias in an action upon the case by the Statute of 1● H. 7. two other light exceptions were taken to the venire, but not insisted upon. But the main exception was to judgement, which was entered thus, Ideo consideratum est per curiam dicti Domini Regis, whereas (as it was objected) it ought to have been, ideo consideratum est per candem Curiam, or per Curiam praedictam. And at the first the Court seemed to incline, Inferior Courts. that this was a material exception, for these reasons, viz. because inferior Courts ought not to show things only by implication; but they ought to show them expressly, and because surplusages in such Courts are ill: And lastly because inferior Courts ought to keep themselves strictly to their ancient forms, and not to vary from them; yet afterward judgement was a firmed except better matter should be shown, nota. Masterman. 21 Car. Banc. Reg. AN action of Debt was brought in an inferior Court, Error upon a judgement in an action of Deb● upon an Obligation. upon an Obligation, with a Condition, for the payment of a certain sum of money at a certain time therein expressed; but no place was limited in the condition for the payment thereof. judgement was given for the Plaintiff: The Defendant brings a writ of Error in this Court to reverse this judgement, and assigns for Error; That because there appears no place of payment for the money in the Condition of the Bond; so that by that it cannot appear whether the cause of action lieth within the jurisdiction of the Court, where the action was brought or not; therefore it should have been made appear by some part of the Record, that the money was to be paid within the jurisdiction of the Court, Error. which is not here done, and therefore the judgement erroneous: The Court held this for error, and ordered that the judgement should be reversed, if cause were not shown to the contrary before the end of the term. Knight's Case. 21 Car. Banc. Reg. A Lease for years was made of certain houses in York, Error upon a Judgement given in an action of Debt for reat. reserving a yearly rent payable in London, and for the rent behind an action of Debt was brought in the City of York, and judgement thereupon given for the Plaintif: The Defendant brings a writ of Error to reverse this judgement, and assigns two Errors. 1. That the issue upon which the judgement was given was not tryable within the jurisdiction of the Court, where the judgement was given; for the issue was upon the payment of rent, which was payable at London, and not at York, and so payment or not payment ought to be tried at London and not at York. The second exception was to the Venire, Veane. which was the vicineto Civitatis generally, and names not any Parish in particular whence the jury should come: And to prove this to be a good exception, the Book of ● H. 5. was urged; but the Court denied that Book to be Law, and cited Gavel and Gippoes' case, 10 Jac. adjudged to the contrary; that de vicineto Civitatis generally, without naming a Parish in the City, is good: But upon the first exception the Court advised. Watson against Norbury 21 Car. Banc. reg. Mich. 20 Car. rot. 156. Watson brought an Action upon the case against Norbury, Action upon the case. for procuring a Commission of Bankrupt against him, by virtue whereof he broke open his Shop, and took away his goods and Shop-books, whereby he was so discreited that he lost his trade, to his damage, etc. To this the Defendant pleads, that the Plaintiff did heretofore bring his Action of trespass for the breaking open of his Shop, and for the taking away of his goods, and had in that Action recovered damages against him, and demands if he shall not be thereby barred in this Action; And that he should be barred the Defendants Council alleged, that a recovery in one personal Action is a bar in all personal Actions touching the same thing, and that here the Action of trespass formerly brought, and the Action of the case now brought were personal Actions, and that they were both brought for the same thing, and therefore the Plaintiff ought to be barred; It was also urged that an Action of the case lies not in this case, for that, to ground an Action upon the case, there must appear to be malice in the party that did the fact, and prejudice to the party to whom the fact is done, but there appears no malice here, for what was done is said to be done, by virtue of a Commission of Bankrupt which shall be intended a lawful authority to warrant the fact, and not grounded upon malice, so that malice and prejudice do not both appear, but only damage, and that alone will not support this Action, for neither for damage alone without malice, nor for malice without damage will an Action upon the case lie. But to this it was answered (to which the Court enelined) That this Action upon the case was not brought for the same cause that the Action of trespass was formerly brought, for that was only for the breaking open of the Shop, and taking away his goods, and the damages he received thereby, but this Action is brought for the damage he sustained, by the loss of his credit, and hindrance in his trade thereby, caused by the Defendants taking out a Commission of Bankrupt against him, and by colour thereof breaking open his Shop and taking away his goods, and so disparaging him in his reputation, whereby he lost his trade; and though the breaking open of his Shop, and the taking away his goods be named in this Action, as it was in the former Action of trespass, Inducement. yet it is but by way of Inducement to this Action upon his case, and not to recover damages for that wrong, Actions several. and here being two several wrongs done to the Plaintiff which do not one depend upon another, the Plaintiff must bring two several Actions for them, and not join them in one Action, because the damages must be several which are to be recovered, joint Actions. but if they had depended one upon another he might have joined them in one Action, and recovered joint damages for both: joint damages. and besides these two Actions differ in their nature one from the other, and the judgements given in them are several, for the judgement in an Action of Trespass vi et Armis, as the first Action was, is Capiatur, because there is thereupon a fine due to the King, but the judgement in an Action upon the case is ideo in misericordia, and so though the Plaintiff have judgement here in his Action upon the case, it cannot be said he hath had judgement already; for that must beintended, at least a judgement of the same nature, which cannot be in this case. And to that which is objected, that if the Plaintiff should recover damages in this Action, he should recover damages twice for one and the same thing which is against Law; it is answered, that it is not for the same thing but clearly for another, and if he should not have this Action he were without remedy for the damage he suffered in the loss of his Credit, and the damage in his Trade; for in the former Action he recovered no damages for that, for the jury never took that into their consideration, for they had no power to take any damages into their consideration which happened after the Trespass done, for which the Action was brought, but only for the breaking open of the Shop, and the taking away of his Goods; and although he might at the first have brought his Action upon the case as he hath now done, yet he was not commpellable thereto, but had his Election to bring either an Action upon his case, or an Action of Trespass as should most make for his advantage, Election of Actions for this Election of Action belongs to every subject as his birth right, and he is not to be hindered from it. Adjournatur. Remington and Kingerby. Mich. 18 Car. rot. 72. REmington grants a rent out of certain Lands to Fawn with a clause of distress, Error upon a Judgement in an Annuity in the Common plea● and a nomine poenae in the deed for the non payment thereof, according to the time limited, the rent is behind after the time limited by the nomine poenae. Fawn brings a writ of Annuity in the Common Pleas for the Arrearages of the Annuity, and for the moneys due upon the nomine poenae, and hath judgement. Remington brings his writ of Error in this Court to reverse this judgement, and Assigns for Error, that the writ of Annuity did not lie for the nomine poenae, though it did for the rent, for though it was in the Power, and Election of Fawn to charge either the land out of which the rent was to issue with the rent behind by distress, and so to make it a rend charge, or else to bring his writ of Annuity for it against Remington, and so to charge his person; yet he had no such Power for the nomine poenae, because it was in the nature of a rent, and was necessarily to issue out of the Land, Nomi●e you. 1ae. and not to be charged upon the Person; and it was further alleged that a nomine poenae was an uncertain thing and comes not within the Statute of 21 H. 8. touching Avowries as a rend charge doth which is certain. Another exception was, that it appears notin the Record, that Fawn did make a good demand of this nomine poenae upon the Land out of which the rent was issuing, as he ought to have done before he could bring an Action for it, for though there do appear to be a demand, yet if it appear not to be a legal demand it is Null, and the party shall take no benefit by it. Adjourned. Nuls and Cheney 21 Car. B. R. AN Action of the case was brought for these words, Arrest of judgement in in Action upon the case. I do accuse you to be a Witch, and require you to be searched, and a verdict was given for the Plaintiff; the Defendant moves in Arrest of judgement that the words are not actionable, because it is not averred that the party accused had done any hurt to Cattles or otherwise, or hath had any Communication wit the Devil. And so the Court held, because the words spoken did not bring the Party of whom they were spoken within the Statute of 10 Jac, concerning Witchcraft. Wingfield and Sherwood. Wingfield brings an Action of Covenant against Sherwood his Lessee for years, Error upon a judgement in an Action of Covenant. and declares that he had Covenanted by indenture that he would not cut down more timber growing upon the lands demised than sufficient for needful and necessary reparations of the houses and buildings let unto him; and for breach Assigns, that he had cut down timber to the value of ten pounds, and had converted them to his proper use; and upon this hath a Verdict and a judgement against him: Sherwood brings a writ of Error in this Court to reverse this judgement, and Assigns for Error, that there was variance between the Covenant expressed in the lease, and the Covenant set forth in the declaration whereupon the breach was assigned, and so the judgement was not given upon a breach of the Covenant expressed in the lease, viz. That he should not cut down more timber than was necessary for reparations; for by this breach the Plaintiff supposeth that the Defendant had Covenanted not to cut down timber to employ to his own use, which is not the Covenant expressed in the lease, but another: And though the Defendant had cut down timber, and converted it to his own use, Covenant. this was not a breach of the Covenant expressed in the Indenture, except it be averred that he cut down more than was necessary for reparations, and converted it to his own use; and for this Error the judgement was reversed. Whitwell and Short. Trin. 21. Carl. rot. 227. WHitwell brought an Action of Trespass for assaulting, beating, Arrest of judgement in an Action of Trespass. and wounding him, against fowr several persons: three of them plead not guilty, and are found guilty; and the fourth pleads not guilty to part, and justifies for the rest, viz. The wounding, and is found guilty as to the wounding only, yet the verdict was fond generally for the Plaintiff, and entire damages assessed and judgement given, and a writ of Error was brought, and the Error assigned was that the damages ought not to be entire against all, because that the fourth person was only found guilty of part of the trespass, to wit, the wounding, and therefore as to him the damages ought to have been severed, in relation only to the wounding, and not as it is, for so damages should be given twice for the same thing. Several damages. First against the three, and then against the fourth, which the Court granted, and reversed the judgement. Ward and Coggin. Pasc. 22 Car. rot. 257. Ward brings an Action of debt in the Common pleas against Coggin, Error upon an action of Debt. and declares that the Defendant in consideration that he the Plaintiff, at the request of the Defendant, had sold certain wares to I. S. did assume and promise to him the Plaintiff, that he would pay such a sum of money for them; and for non payment accordingly he brings his Action, and hath a Verdict and judgement. The Defendant brings his writ of Error in this Court to reverse this judgement, and Assigns for Error, That an Action of debt lies not in this case, because the debt which the Defendant promised to pay, and for which the Action is brought, was raised, and became a duty before the promise made for the payment of it, and so an Action of debt cannot be grounded for it on the promise. And the words in the declaration do sound merely upon a promise, upon which a good consideration for an Action of the case may be grounded; Case. but not to bring an Action of debt. Hogg and Vaughan. HOgg brings an Action of the Case against Vaughan for these words spoken of him, Arrest of Judgement in an action upon the Case. viz. Thou art a perjured Priest, and hath a verdict. It was moved in Arrest of judgement, that the words were not actionable, for they signified no more than that he was forsworn; But the Court held that they must be meant, that he was guilty of perjury, for which he might be indicted, and therefore were actionable. Mich. 21 Car. I. Assumes and promiseth to B. that if B. will pay 50 l. to C. his son, Action upon the case upon a promise. who was married to D. the Daughter of I. at such a time, that he will pay 100 l. to D. his Daughter at such a time; B. pays the 50 l. to C. at the time appointed, I. fails in payment of the 100 l. according as was agreed; B. dies intestate, and E. administers, and brings an Action upon the Case against I. upon this promise made to B. the Testator; and adjudged that the Action did well lie by the Administrator, though he should receive no benefit if he did recover. Dickenson and Preston. Mich. 22 Car. Banc. reg. Ter. Pasc. 22 Car. rot. 251. A Writ of Error was brought by Preston, Error to reverse a Judgement in York. to reverse a judgement against him at York, and assigns for Error, that the Venire was de Balliva sua, whereas it ought to have been de corpore Comitatus, and it cannot appear by the Venire to what place the Balywick extends; and the Balywick of the City may extend further than the City, and upon this the Court adjudged the Venire naught. More against Savage. 22 Car. Banc. reg. MOre Widow brings an appeal against Savage for the death of her Husband; Savage appears and demurs to the original writ, Demurrer upon an appeal and shows for cause, that in one part of the writ, instead of the word tun● it was tuc, which made the Writ incertain To this the Council of the other part answered, That it ought to be amended by the Statute of 14 E. 3. and that the Writ ought not for so small a fault to be abated; But to this it was replied, that the Statute was only for the amendment of mean process, and not of original Writs; for original writs were not amendable, because the party might purchase a new writ if a former were naught. In justification of the writ it was further urged, that the word tunc in the writ was a mere formal word, and not of the substance of the writ: and that the writ would be good enough without it; and therefore though it were mistaken, it was not so material, as that the writ should be thereby abated: But the Court answered, that an original writ, if it be defective in form, is abatable, if it be not amendable by Statute, and conceived, that here it being in an appeal, where life is in question, the writ is not amendable, though it be defective but in form, neither by the Common Law nor by any Statute Law, nor can the party purchase a new writ, adjournatur; but afterwards, viz. 9 Feb. 22 Car. the writ was quashed for the cause aforesaid, and because it did not appear that the feme who brought the appeal was wife to the party slain at the time when he was slain. It was thereupon moved that the Defendant might be arraigned upon the Count, though the writ was abated; but the Court held he could not, because the Count was founded on the writ which was abated, and these books were cited, 4 H. 6.14. and 18 E. 3.35. upon view of precedents he was afterwards discharged. Luskins and Carver. 22 Car. Banc. reg. THe Case was this, Anne Carver made her last will and testament, Prohibition to the Prerogative Court, and a Mandamus. and makes Luskins her Executor, having bona notabilia in divers Dioceses: Luskins proves the will in an inferior Diocese, and not in the Prerogative Court, as he ought to have done, a stranger sues for Letters of Administration in the Prerogative Court, Luskins desires to prove the will there, and that he may administer, the Court refuseth to admit him to administer the goods, except he will put in security to the Court to pay all the Legacies; but if he shall refuse, will grant Letters of administration to the stranger. Mandamus Luskins moves in this Court for a writ of a Mandamus, to compel the Prerogative Court to grant him the administration, according to the will. The Court ruled the other party to show cause the next day why they should not grant such a writ; and were of clear opinion they might do it, and to prove it, the Countess of Barkshires' case, Hill. 20 jac. and the case of St. Burien in Cornwall was cited, and the same Term the writ was granted accordingly. Fortescue and Brograve. 22 Car. Banc. Reg. T●e Plaintiff brings an action for breach of Covenant upon a Deed, An action upon a breach of Covenant by deed. The Defendant pleads a parol agreement afterwards, in discharge of the former Covenant; but the Court held the plea not good, and took these differences, Plea That a parol agreement before a breach of it, may be discharged by parol, and so pleaded; after a breach it cannot be pleaded in discharge without satisfaction also pleaded; Concord. but a discharge may be pleaded by Deed be the Covenant by Parol or by Deed after a breach, and without satisfaction. Broome and Evering, Hill. 22 Car. Banc. Reg. Hill. 21 Car. rot. 354. A judgement was given against the Testator of the Defendant, Error to reverse a judgement given in a Scire facias to revive a judgement in debt. in an action of Debt for rent, and this judgement was revived by a scire facias against the Executor, and a verdict thereupon, and a judgement was given against him in the Common pleas; upon this a writ of Error was brought in the King's Bench to reverse this judgement, and the error assigned was, that the trial was insufficient, because the Venire sacias was not good, and is not helped by the Statute of jeofails, and to prove this, Baynams' case in the 5th. Report was cited. But Hales answered, that the Venire facias being awarded before it ought, was to be accounted as if not Venire had been awarded, and said it was like to a dedimus to take a fine before the writ of Covenant issued forth to levy the fine, and so concluded, that it was helped by the Statute of Jeofails. But the Court took a difference, ☞ where in truth there was not Venire facias at all, and where there is an ill Venire facis as it is here, for thought it be as bad as may be, yet being it is a Venire facias, it is not helped by the Statute of jeofails; Error J●o● ils but if there had been none, the Statute had made the trial good without it; and thereupon day was given to show cause why the judgement should not be affirmed. Pasch. 23 Car. the judgement was affirmed. Andrews Case. Hill. 22 Car. Banc. Reg. A Recognizance was acknowledged at Sergeants june in Fleetstreet, Where a Scire facias upon a recognizance shall be brought. and delivered and enroled at Westminster. The Court held that it was at the election of the Recognisee to bring his Scire facias either in London, where the Recognizance was acknowledged, or in Midlesex, where it was delivered and enroled: But adjourned. Afterwards, viz. Pasc. 23 Car. the Court held that the Scire facias ought to be where the recognizance is taken, and not where it is recorded; for there it gins to be a Record; but this being in the Common Pleas, it was good both ways, and thereupon the party had his judgement. Rook and Knight. 22 Car. Mich. Mich. 22 Car. rot. 381. A judgement given in the Court at Dim Church, Demurrer to a Scire facias upon a judgement removed out of the Cinqne Ports by Certiorari in the King's Bench. a limb of one of the Cinque Ports was removed by a certiorari into the King's Bench; and thereupon issued a Scire facias for the Defendant, to show cause why the Plaintiff should not have execution upon the judgement; to this the Defendant appears and demurs, and takes these exceptions, 1. That it is not expressed where Dim Church is. 2ly. In the return of the alias certiorari, it is said, sicut prius, and not sicut alias. 3ly, the Sheriff in the reforn is not namned Knight and Baronet; neither doth he name himself by his name of Baptism and Surname; But the Court did overrule all these exceptions, and gave judgement for the Plaintif. AN action of the Case was brought for these words, Action upon the Case for words. Thou hast stolen my wood, and the Court inclined the words were actionable, but not if he had said, thou hast stolen my Trees, and it was said that a praecipe will lie of a wood; for it shall be intended of woody ground; adjourned. Pracipe Helliar and Grace his Wife. Pasch. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. AN action upon the Case was brought by Helliar and his wife, Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit. upon a promise made unto them, during the Coverture; and it was moved, (a verdict being given for the Plaintiffs) in arrest of judgement, that the Action ought to have been brought in the name of the Husband only, and not by the husband and wife; and a case to prove it was cited out of Dyer, Dyer 91. and upon this exception the judgement was arrested till the other should show cause to the contrary; And in this case it was said by the Court, that if an Obligation be made to baron and feme; that it is the better opinion, Joint action that the baron may bring an action upon this obligation in his own name only, and not name his wife, or else he may at his election bring the action in the name of himself and his wife jointly. Betsworth and Betsworth. Pasch. 8 Maii 23 Car. Banc. Reg. It was moved for a Prohibition to the Prerogative Court upon a surmise that the party did endeavour to barstardise one that was legitimate. But the other party answered, that the surmise was not true, and urged, that the suit in the Prerogative Court was only, Prohibition to the Prerogative Court. whether Letters of administration were by them well granted, or no, and not concerning Bastardy as the surmise sets forth, and therefore desires the Prohibition may not be granted; and for confirmation thereof the case was put, which was this: Betsworth had a wife called Bridget, who died; after he takes another wife called also Bridget, and dies intestate; Bridget the second wife takes Letters of administration of the goods and chatels of her husband deceased; the son of Betsworth sues in the Prerogative Court to repeal these Letters of Administration, upon pretence that Bridget the first wife of Betsworth was yet living. In this case the Court delivered these positions following. Jurisdiction, 1. That one ought not to sue in the Ecclesiastical Court, to Bastard an issue, Ordinary but at the Common Law. 2. Where the Ordinary hath granted Letters of Administration to one that ought to have them, they ought not to be repealed by them. 3. Where a suit is in the Ecclesiastical Court for lands and goods, Prohibition a Prohibition may be granted as to the lands; and they may proceed there notwithstanding, as to the goods. 4. That in this Case at the Bar, neither Bastardy of the issue, nor marriage is in question, as is surmised, but only the validity of the Letters of Administration, Incidents and that the other things are but as incident to the matter in question. 5. That wife or not wife is triable at the Common Law; but whether lawfully married or not, Trial is tryable in the Spiritual Court. 6. Where a thing is tryable in the Spiritual Court, and there is also a matter incident to it, which is tryable at the Common Law, there a Prohibition shall not be granted. Prohibition Evidence 7. That a thing concluded in the Ecclesiastical Court touching lands, cannot be given in evidence in a trial at Law for Land. 8. If the Common law differ from the Civil Law, touching the legality or non legality of a thing, if they will proceed according to their Law, a Prohibition lies, because the Common Law is to be preferred. The rule of Court was, Prohibition That a Prohibition should be granted, and that the other should demur upon it; and so it might be debated whether a Prohibition would lie or not, and to stay in the Spiritual Court in the mean time. Pasch. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. ONe brought an Action upon the Case against I. S. for preferring a bill of Endictment against him, Arrest of judgement in an action upon the case. for stealing of a Mare, and that the grand jury found an ignoramus, whereby he was discharged; the Plaintiff obtains a Verdict against the Defendant. The Defendant takes these exceptions to the declaration in Arrest of judgement, 1. That it doth not appear thereby, that the Party who preferred the bill of Endictment gave any evidence to the grand jury touching the bill. 2ly. It appears not that the Plaintiff was bound over to answer the Felony, and consequently was not molested ●y it, and so he can have no Action: But the Court stayed the judgement to another day upon the exceptions taken, Case. and said that an Action upon the Case lies for procuring one to be Indicted, Endictment. although the party himself do it not, and that one may exhibit a bill of Endictment to a grand jury without Oath, grand Jury and they may notwithstanding find the bill, and although it be exhibited upon Oath, they are not bound to find it, if they see cause to the contrary, and that in the case at the bar the Action might be as well grounded upon the scandal, which grew to the party who was Indicted, as upon the trouble which might have befallen him by reason of the preferring the bill against him. Helena, Pasc. 23 Car. B. r. AN Action upon the Case was brought for these words, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the Case. Helena is a great Witch, and a Verdict found for the Plaintiff; It was moved to stay judgement, because the words were not Actionable, for they did not show that the Plaintiff had bewitched any thing, or done any thing that brought her within the compass of the Statute 1. Jac. against Witchcraft: judgement was hereupon stayed. Williamson against Henly. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Trin. 21 Car. rot. 362. AN Action of Debt was brought upon an obligation, Arrest of judgement in Debt upon an obligation. the condition was, that if the Defendant did sell the tithes in Ransom more that he should pay the Plaintiff such a sum of money, but if he sold them not, that then he should deliver an obligation to the Plaintiff, for the payment of a certain sum of money therein expressed at a certain day therein limited, and for non performance of the condition is the Ation brought. The Plaintiff obtains a Verdict; the Defendant moves in Arrest of judgement, Time. that he ought to have convenient time for doing of the things expressed in the condition, and that it appears not by the Record that he had convenient time, and so there is no breach of the condition. But the Court held, that the time between the date of the obligation, and the bringing of the Action was a conveninent time, and that there being a second thing to be performed in case the former were not done, that therefore that former thing ought to be done in some reasonable time, else the party would be too much prejudiced by staying to have the second thing performed, and therefore ruled that judgement should be entered without better matter should be showed. Savages Case, Pasc. 23 Car. B. R. SAvage was Indicted for forging, and publishing of Letters of credence to gather money, Error upon a Judgement upon an Endictment. and was convicted, and judgement given against him upon his own confession, and 100 l. fine set upon him, et quod capiatur. Exceptions were taken to this judgement. 1. That it did not appear where he received any money by virtue of these counterfeit Letters, nor at what time: But the Court answered, that the substance of the offence for which he was Indicted was, Endictment. the forging and publishing of the Letters, and not the collecting of the money; for though he had not collected a penny, yet the Endictment was good. A second exception was, that the Endictment did not say quod Counterfecit falso: But the Court held that the word Counterfecit necessarily employed in it the word falso, and so not material whether falso were expressed or omitted. 3ly. It was objected, that the party was committed before he was convicted; But to this the Court answered, Conviction. that he was committed upon his own confession, which is a conviction in Law, and the judgement held good, and affirmed. Needler and Guest. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Entered Trin, 1649. rot. NEedler brings an Action of Covenant against Guest, Artest of judgement in a breach of Covenant. upon Articles, amongst which one was to allow such a sum of money to an under Clerk, in the six Clerks Office by the sheet, for every choir of paper he should writein copying and engrossing of bills, answers, etc. as was expressed in the said Articles: and upon this Needler obtains a verdict against Guest. In Arrest of judgement divers exceptions were taken and overruled, but one was insisted upon, which was this, that there was more found in the breach of the Covenant assigned then was contained in the Covenant itself, for it was found, that he had not paid for 72 sheets which was 5 choir and a half, and so damages were given for more than aught to be, Breach. for the Covenant was to pay so much the choir and mentions not any half, Damages. and for this the judgement was stayed: for the Court said that the Law would not supply a casus omissus to bring it within the Covenant to ground a breach thereupon, Supply. what ever the intent of the parties was that were parties to the Articles. Whitley and Fawsett. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. reg. Whitley brings an Action of Trover, Action of Proven for distraining & selling his . and Conversion against Fawsett, for taking his by way of distress, and selling them by virtue of a warrant of Commissioners of Sewers for not paying of a tax set by them towards the reparation of Sea walls: the Defendant pleads all the special matter, by way of justification, the Plaintiff demurs to this Plea, and upon the demurrer takes these exceptions to it. 1. To the setting forth of the Commission, in that he shows not that three of the Commissioners were of the quorum. The 2d exception was, that in his Plea he had not s●t forth the Authority of the Commissioners; To that the Court answered it was not necessary. 3ly. That the Plea was but argumentative, which makes it naught. 4ly. It appears that there are 800. Acres of Land which are in the hands of the King, Tax. which are not taxed as by law they ought: and so the tax is unjust, because by the not taxing of them, a greater burden was laid upon the rest of the Land, than of right aught to be; and this the Court held a good exception, and said that the King's Lands are taxable by the Statute. 5ly. The Statute is not pleaded as it ought to be. 6ly It doth not express, that Whitley in whose occupation the Lands are that are taxed, is the Assignee to Lynsee the owner of the Lands, but he may be a mere stranger, and so not taxable, nor his beasts to be sold. 7ly. It is not set forth, that he shown his warrant, before he distrained, as he ought to do: Distress. In this case the Court first said that one may distrain, and sell the of the owner of the Land taxed, or his Assignee, for non payment thereof, Sale. but doubted whether a stranger's might be distrained and sold: Roll justice took these Exceptions to the Plea. 1. Plea. That the Plea did not set forth the limits of the Commission as it ought to do, and was therefore ill. 2ly. He said the Plea ought to have showed, that three of the Commissioners were of the quorum. 3ly. That it did not appear by the Plea that the Lands taxed, where the distress was made, are within the Level, to be taxed by the Commissioners. 4ly. The Tax is of the Land of such an one, and his Assigns, and this is too generally expressed, and cannot be levied equally by such a tax. 5ly. The Plea sets not forth, that there was any notice given to Whitley of the tax made before the distress taken, as there ought to have been, and for these reasons, he concluded that the Plea was not good. Bacon justice held. first, Waiver. that the Party had waived his benefit of the Plea given him by the Statute, by pleading specially, and he ought to make good his plea, as he hath pleaded it at his own peril: He held likewise, that there ought to be notice given of the tax, and a demand of it, before any distress might be taken, and that the Plea was defective in this. 3ly. Notice. That he cannot sell a strangers goods for the tax as Whitley is, for aught that appears in the Plea. 4ly. Demand. By the Plea it appears, that he hath distrained one Acre of Land for all the tax, which ought not to be, and upon these exceptions the rule was for the Defendant to show cause before the end of the Term, why the Plaintiff should not have judgement. Sir Maurice Abbot. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. reg. SIr Maurice Abbot had a judgement against one and dies, Motion to Vacate a judgement. and three years after Execution is taken out in his name, upon the judgement the Court was moved to vacate this judgement. but would not, for they said that there was no help in this case, but by bringing a writ of Error, ☞ Error. except there can be any fraud proved in the proceeddings, and then the Court will take order to help the Party grieved: Fraud. And thereupon ruled to examine the Attorney, and the Parties whether there was due proceed or no. Vill de Charleton in Kent. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. reg. A Man was killed at Charleton in Kent, Motion to quash a presentment and take off Amercements. upon which the Coroner takes an inquest, and returns it into the Crown Office: upon this a presentment was drawn up in the Crown Office against the Vill. of Charleton, and found, and thereupon issues went out against the Vill: It was moved for the Vill to have them discharged, by reason that the presentment was not good, for it was grounded upon the Statute of 3 H. 7. chap. and sets forth that such a person was killed at Charleton, and that the murderer fled away in the night, by which it appears that the Vill. is not liable to be amerced within the Statute: for the murderer ought to escape in the day by the Statute, Amercements and not in the night, and for this it was quashed, and the Amercements discharged. 23 Car. Banc. reg. THe Court was moved to quash an order of sessions, For quashing an order of the Sessions of Peace, for keeping a Bastard. made for the keeping of a Bastard Child, and these exceptions were taken to the order: First the order was, that the Party should pay a weekly sum for the keeping of the Child, whereas no such order could be made without the Parties consent, for by the Statute he is only compellable to secure the Parish, where the Child was born, that it should not be any charge to the Parish. Another exception was, that it appears not that the justices had any power, to make any order at all in the case, for it appears not where the Child was born, and so it may be it was born in an other County, where these justices have no authority to Act any thing concerning it. Upon these exceptions it was quashed. THe Court was moved for a certiorari to the Court of Sandwich, For a certicratio to remove Endictments out of one of the Cinque-ports. to remove four Endictments there for shooting in a Gun, and pulling up of a post, because the facts, for which the Party was Indicted, were not done within the jurisdiction of the Court; But because Sandwich was one of the Cinque-ports, and it had been a question heretofore whether this Court could send such a writ thither, The rule was only for cause to be shown why a certiorari should not be granted. Tory. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. TOry brings an Action of Trespass, and false imprisonment against I. S. simul cum aliis. etc. The Defendant pleads not guilty, Arrest of judgement in an Action of Trespass. and a Verdict is given against him for the Plaintiff; It was moved in Arrest of judgement, that the declaration was not good, because it declares against I. S. by name solely, and it ought to have been jointly against him with the others, naming them also, because the trespass was joint, and not against I. S. alone; but the Court held that the declaration was good, because it was with a simul cum, although the Persons were not named, Declaration. and said that this was the constant course of the Common Pleas: And that an ejectione firmae against one simul cum had been ruled to be good, Ejectio ne ●●mae. and so used in the Common Pleas, although heretofore it hath been adjudged to the contrary: yet the judgement was stayed till the other should move. Jones against Young. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Hill. 22 Car. rot. 1857. IOnes brings an Action of Assault and Battery against Young, Young justifies as servant to I. S. because, Error to reverse a judgement against the Plaintiff in Trespass. that Jones came to fish in the several Piscary of his Master. judgement was given for the Defendant: A writ of Error was brought, and two exceptions taken. 1. That whereas Young, had in his Plea of justification entitled his Master to the several Piscary by the King's Letters Patents, he had not shown that the King was seized of this several Piscary jure Coronae, and so it might be the King had no power to grant it. 2ly, He doth not show his Letters Patents, which he ought to do, because he derives a title by them; Title. The rule was to show cause Saturday next why the judgement should not be reversed. The Earl of Leicester against Mrs. Samford. Pasc. 23. Banc. Reg. IN a Trover and Conversion, brought by the Earl of Leicester against Mrs. Samford for certain jewels, the Trover being laid to be in Kent, but the Offering the goods to sell, being the Conversion of them being in London; It was doubted where the trial should be, and the Court said, that generally a transitory Action is to be laid where the fact was done, Venire. yet the Party is not tied to lay it there, but may lay it in another County, and in this case it was held by the Court, that the Plaintiff may bring his Action where the jewels were sold, and that was in London, as well as in Kent, where the Trover was laid, Trover. for part of the ground of the Action to wit the Conversion was in London, though part of it, namely the Trover, was laid to be in Kent. Basely and Baseley. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in Norwitch, and the Error Assigned was, Error to reverse a judgement in Norwitch. that there did but five of the jury empanelled appear at the trial, and yet a Verdict was given, and judgement thereupon. The Court said that a Corporation cannot grant a tales, neither if they could, doth it here appear that there was a tales granted, and therefore reversed the judgement. Sir William Bronker. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. SIr William Bronker was brought before a justice of Peace, upon an information made, Habeas corpus, for one committed by a justice of peace for refusing to find sureties for the good behaviour that he had choated one at play with false dice: the justice requires him to find sureties for his good behaviour, and upon his refusal commits him to Prison. Sir William Bronker brings his habeas corpus in this Court, and upon the return this matter appeared, the Prisoner prays by his council to be delivered, because there appeared no matter sufficient upon the return why he should be committed, but because the Gaoler desired time to amend the return, the Court granted it, and would not deliver the Prisoner, but took vail for his appearance, viz. the Earl of Dover, Good behaviour. and Earl of Chesterfield. And the Court then said, that a justice of Peace cannot bind one to the good behaviour upon a general information, or commit him to Prison for refusing to find sureties for his good behaviour upon such information. Imprisonment Wrath and Elseye. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Hill. 22 Car. rot. 1224. AN Action of Debt was brought against Elseye an under Sheriff, by Wrath the high Sheriff upon a bond given him to save him harmless, Demurer to a plea in Debt upon an obligation. etc. the Defendant pleads that he hath saved him harmless, to this the Plaintiff demurs, and held a good demurrer, for he ought to have pleaded non damnificatus, and not generally that he hath saved him harmless, for that he may do in many things, and yet the Plaintiff may be damnifyed in some other things where in he was also bound to save him harmless. The rule was to show cause why judgement should not be given for the Plaintiff. White. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. A judgement was given in an Action on the Case brought by an Attorney for these words spoken of him; Error to reverse a judgement in an Action on the Case for words. Thomas White is a perjured Knave, and a suborned Knave. A Writ of Error was brought, and divers exceptions taken, but the principal were two. 1. That the words a●● not well laid, for they are adjective words, and so not positive enough to ground an Action. 2. The words are not Actionable, because it is not declared, that the party of whom they were spoken was of any Trade, or had any office: But Bacon justice overruled all the exceptions, and ordered cause to be shown next day, why the judgement should not be affirmed. The Case of one Nicholas and Webb was afterward cited, Case. where judgement was given in the Common pleas for calling an Attorney Knave, which judgement was said to be afterwards affirmed in the King's bench, 12 Car. Trin. rot. 102. Saunderson and Martin. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Trin. 22 Car. rot. 867. A judgement was given in an Action of Debt upon an obligation, Error to reverse a judgement in Debt to perform such a promise made by the Obligor, to the Obligee; and a Writ of Error was brought to reverse this judgement. The Error assigned was, that the breach of the promise was not well assigned, for it did not appear when this breach of promise was. Bacon justice The breach of promise is the sole cause of the Action, and it appears not to the Court when that was, and for this he reversed the judgement. Pain and Skeltrom. Hill. 23 Car. rot. 740. AN Action of Debt was brought upon an obligation, Demurrer a Plea in Debt upon an Obligation. the condition was, that Skeltrom the Defendant with his Wife should appear at the Marshal's Court, and for not appearing according to the condition was the Action brought; Skeltrom appears and pleads, that at the time of the obligation he was solus et innuptus. To this Plea the Plaintiff demurs. roll justice said, this Plea was not the same with ne unques loyalment accouple, for one extended to a feme de facto, and the other to a feme de jure. The Court then advised of the Plea. but Trin, 23 Car. ruled to show cause tomorrow why judgement should not be given for the Plaintiff. Stoughton and Day. Pasc 23 Car. Banc. Reg. SToughton an undersheriff brings an Action of Debt against Day one of his Bailiffs, Demurrer upon a Declaration in Debt upon an Obligation. upon an obligation with a condition to save the under-sheriff harmless in executing of processes, and other things contained in the condition, and Assigns the breach of the condition to be, that the Bailiff had not Executed such his warrant sent to him upon a process to him directed out of the Exchequer to levy issues upon certain lands. To this declaration the Defendant demurs, and shows for cause, 1. That the warrant to him directed by the undersheriff, was made out of the County where he was undersheriff, and so could not be said his warrant as under-sheriff of that County. 2. It is not alleged, that the manor of Addinson, where he was by the warrant to levy the issues, is within the Hundred where the Bailiff hath jurisdiction; Warrant. And this the Court held to be a good exception, and said, that the breach Assigned is not showed to be within the Condition of the Obligation; because the Bailie cannot execute a precept out of the Hundred where he is Bailiff; and Thereupon the rule was that the Plaintiff Nil capiat per billam, if cause were not shown Tuesday following. Cook and Fincham, Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. A judgement was given for Cook, For vacating a Writ of Execution. upon an information upon a Statute, exhibited by him on the behalf of the King and himself, where the King was to have ten pounds of the penalty recovered: Cook takes out an Execution upon this judgement, to levy the whole sum of money recovered to himself; as appeared to the Secondary upon examination of the matter referred to him. Upon this the Court held the writ of Execution to be ill; Execution. because it was entire for the whole sum recovered to the party, whereas 10 l. was due to the King, and ordered a new Writ of Execution, and to stay the money in Court, till further advice of the matter taken. Clark and Pew. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc Reg. AN Action of Trover and Conversion was brought by Clark, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the Case. against Pew and his wife, and the Declaration was, that the goods were found by the Baron and Feme, and were converted ad usum suum, whereas it ought to be in the plural number, to wit, ad usum eorum, or ad usum of Pew and his wife; for as it was, it supposed the Conversion to be made only by the Husband, which is contrary to the Action itself, which is brought against both. Upon this judgement was stayed till the other should move. Long and Bennet. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. LOng brings an Action upon the Case against Bennet, and declares, that he would not suffer him to take unum Acrum ligni which he had sold to him in such a place. Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the Case. After a Verdict for the Plaintiff, it was moved in Arrest of judgement, that the Declaration ought to have been unum Acrum bosci, and not ligni, for that was uncertain. The Court said, they would Advise of the exception, Declaration. because it was in an Action of the Case The same Term judgement was given, because Damages only were to be recovered, and the words used were but inducements to describe the thing for which Damages only were demanded, yet it might have been more properly expressed. Barker and Martin. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Plaintiff brings an Action of Trespass, Arrest of judgement in an Action of Trespass. and declares against the Defendant for breaking his house, and taking away quinque Instrumenta ferrea, Anglice, Fetters: and a verdict was for the Plaintiff. It was moved in Arrest of judgement, that the word Instrumentum is not a word that signifies Fetters; but that it is so general a word that it may express any other thing as well, and that the Anglice joined with it, to interpret what it means, cannot help it, because there is a proper Latin word which might and ought to have been used to express Fetters by roll justice said, that by the Statute all plead ought to be in Latin. Plead. and every particular thing therein aught to be expressed by a Latin word, if there be a proper Latin word for it, as here there is, and therefore the proper Latin word being not used, but another which cannot signify the thing, the Anglice doth no good; but part of the Declaration shall be judged to be in English, and so it cannot be good. And judgement thereupon was stayed till the other sold move. Curtice and Columbine. Pasc. 23. Car. Banc. Reg. Mich. 22 Car. rot 433. CUrtice brings an Action upon the Case against Columbine upon an Assumpsit by paroll, to find meat, drink, lodging, Error to reverse a judgement in an Action upon an Assumpsi●● etc. for the Plaintiff, and to teach him the trade of a mercer. This agreemet was afterwards by consent of both parties put into writing. Upon the trial the Plaintiff obteins a Verdict upon the paroll agreement, and hath judgement thereupon. The Defendant brings his Writ of Error in this Court, and Assigns for Error, that there was not Assumpsit declared upon, or proved sufficient, to warrant the Verdict and judgement, because that by reducing the Agreement to writing, the paroll agreement became ipso facto void, and so no Action could be brought upon it; but it ought to have been brought upon the Agreement expressed in the deed, and the issue ought to have been joined upon that, and not upon the verbal Agreement, which is void. The rule of Court was to show cause why judgement should not be reversed. Barker and Martin. Pasc. 23 Car. B. R. BArker brings an Action of Trespass for an Assault and Battery against Martin, simul cum, Arrest of judgement in Trespass. etc. and hath a Verdict against him. It was moved in Arrest of judgement, that the Action ought to have been brought particularly, against the other Trespassors together with the Defendant, and not against the Defendant in particular, with a general simul cum against the rest, which is uncertain, and signifies nothing against the rest, and the rather, because the Action is commenced by bill, and not by original; although it could not be good though it were by original: but it was said by roll justice, that it may be the Plaintiff could not Arrest the other Trespassors, Trespass. and that he will do it when he can, and that he may well proceed against them at divers times as he can take them, but that whensoever he shall have had satisfaction for the Trespass done him from any one of them, he cannot proceed against any of the rest; and it was ruled that judgement should be entered. Cook and Allen. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. A judgement given in an inferior Court was reversed in this Court, judgement reversed because the Venire was ill. inferior Court Common pleas. because the Venire was, Venire facias, etc. and did not show from what place the Venire should be, which, by roll justice, aught to have been expressed at large, it being in an inferior Court, and not with an, etc. although the use of the Common pleas be to make the Venire short, with an, etc. The King and Holland Entered 16 Car. Argued Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe case was in effect this. An argument upon a special Verdict. A Copyhold was surrendered to I. S. in trust, that Holland an Alien, should take the profits thereof to his own use, and benefit, upon this an inquisition was taken for the King, and this matter found: whereupon the lands were seized into the King's hands, and upon a trial concerning these lands, a special Verdict was found, comprising the aforesaid matter. The case was argued against the King's Title, by Montague of the Middle Temple, and for the King's title, by Hales of Lincoln's Inn. The substance of Mountagues Argument was, 1. To consider the nature of the trust; 2. The nature of the land out of which the trust was raised: and for the first he held, because it was a trust for an Alien to take the profits of the land, and in that the Alien had no estate in the land; therefore the King could not have it, as he might have had the land if the Alien had had any Estate in it: and he said that this trust was a thing only in Action, and lies in privity, and not to be seized upon by another; and said a Villain was a parallel Person in law to an Alien, in respect of purchasing of lands, and had a Copyhold been surrendered thus in trust for a Villain, the Lord should not have seized it; and this is but a trust not Executed, which is in the nature of a use at the Common law, and not as it is now by the Statute: besides, this trust is raised out of Copyhold lands, and therefore the King cannot seize the lands which the Alien hath not, for if he should, the Lord of whom the land is held, would be prejudiced; and he cited Beverlyes' case 4. rep. 126, and a case in 23 Eliz: Hales on the other side Argued, that the King shall have the trust, and laid these two grounds. 1. That there may be a trust raised upon the surrender of a Copyhold; and 2ly. that the surrender settles the trust in the Alien, and cited 11 H. 4.26. and he said these things were considerable, 1. Whether the King shall have any thing, and what he shall have; 2. Whether he shall have a use for an Alien at the Common law, or a trust; 3. Whether he shall have a trust raised out of a use. And for the first, he said, that the trust was not a thing merely in Action, but an hereditament; and partly in possession. and cited Cooks Institutes 469. and said, the reason why an Alien may not purchase lands is, because that this Kingdom might not be impoverished thereby, by transporting the revenues of the land into a foreign Country, and putting a part of it under the subjection of a foreign Prince, and the same reason comes to the case in question, and therefore is not to be suffered; and every Alien that purchaseth is said to purchase to the use of the King, and so shall it be in this case, and although a thing merely in Action is not transferable to a Common person, yet is it transferrable to the King: but this case is stronger for the King, for here is not a thing merely in Action but mixed with an interest, and it is no reason, but that the law which was made to meet with the subtlety of such Alien purchasers, should take place here; and it cannot be said that that law was made to give remedy to the King for that he had before, and a Feoffment now made in trust for an Alien is all one with a use at the Common law; and he cited 19 Jac. that trusts made to St. john Daccombe of Annuityes for the Lord Summersett attainted of Treason were adjudged to be forfeited: and he held, Daccombe. that there is no difference between a trust raised out of a Copyhold and other lands, and if he hath an interest here in the profits, the seizure is good, though he have no interest in the land, for the land may be seized by the profits; 5 H. 5. fol. 9 Title. But roll justice demanded of Hales, how the King shall be entitled to the profits of the land, where he is not entitled to the land itself? and said, that the Chancery cannot compel one to Execute a trust for an Alien, Chancery. and that a trust was invented only to avoid the Statute of uses, and said, that a trust is not a thing in Action, Trust. but may be an inheritance or a chatel as the case falls out. Adjourned postea. White and Pynder. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. reg. Mich. 22 Car. rot 440. IN an Action of Trover and Conversion, Demurrer upon an evidence. there was a demurrer joined upon the evidence; and thereupon the Court directed the jury to find damages for the Plaintiff, if upon the argument of the demurrer the law should be adjudged for him, and then the parties desired the jury might be discharged, and referred the matter to the judges, to determine the law upon the evidence. In this case roll justice took this difference, to wit between pleading of a Record, Record. and giving a Record in evidence to a Iury. Plea. If it be pleaded it must be sub pede sigilli, or else the judges cannot judge of it. But if it be given in evidence, though it be not sub pede sigilli, the jury may find it, Evidence. if they have other good matter of inducement to prove it. And the parties in this case were advised by the Court for their own expedition, to let there to be issued a venire facias de novo, and to waive the demurrer upon the evidence, because it was not good, nor could bring the matter in question before them that they might determine it, for one party saith there is a writ, and the other saith there is not a writ, which is bare matter of fact, and not for us to determine but for a jury, and the demurrer ought to have been whether the writ be good or whether it be bad, and should have admitted that there was a writ tyel quel, and then had the whole matter come legally before us, to wit, whether the evidence given to the jury be sufficient for them to find a verdict for the Plaintiff upon the issue joined or not. But the Court will advise. Hamond and Kingsmill. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. HAmond brings an Action upon the case against Kingsmill for these words, Arrest of judgement in an Action of the Case for words. spoken of him in relation as he is a justice of peace, to wit Mr. Hamond did put in of his own head these words in an examination taken by him. viz. I. S. did steal twenty sheep of such a man's, and for speaking these other words of him; Hamond was a debauched man, and is not fit to be a justice of peace, and hath a verdict against the defendant, who moves in Arrest of judgement that neither the former nor the latter words were actionable, for for the former words, that he did of his own head put in words into the examination, are words uncertain, and dubious what is meant by them, whether that he added any thing of his own invention, to the examination which was not confessed by the examinant, or that he only put the substance of the matter confessed into words of his own endicting, and if he did no more that was justifiable, and so it shall be taken here rather than in a worse, and strained construction to ground an Action upon: and for the second words, to say that he was a debauched man, and not worthy to be a justice of peace, they cannot be scandalous, for they are spoken of him in relation to what he was in time past, before he was a justice of peace, and not as he was at the time of the speaking, and it is no scandal to say, a man hath been debauched, for it may be he is now otherways. But for the first words it was answered by the Council on the other side, that they were actionable, for they must be taken according to Common construction, viz. that he had added not only words of his own invention to the examination, but the matter itself expressed in those words which was not confessed by the examinant. And as to the latter words, it was answered they were also Actionable: and a Case was cited where judgement was given against the Defendant for saying of one, that he was a corrupt judge. roll justice was of opinion, Case. that the first words were Actionable, but not the second for words saith he ought to be taken according to usual, and Common construction, though they are not to be strained, for otherwise a man may be abused by subtlety, and shall have no remedy, and judgement may be given here for the first words, judgement. and not for the second, the Damages being several, but if the Damages had been entire there if judgement could not be given for both the words, it cannot be given at all. Bacon justice much to the same purpose as roll, and said, that the first words shall be meant, that he added words of his own invention without any instruction of the party, for oftentimes dubious words shall be taken in the worse sense upon consideration of the Circumstances that accompany them, and he was also of opinion that the second words were actionable, and are as scandalous as the former. judgement was given for the former words, and for the latter the Court would advise. Barrett. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. AN Action of Trespass was brought for digging in his land, Arrest of judgement in Trespass. and carrying away a certain number of loads of earth, and a Verdict was for the Plaintiff. It was moved in arrest of judgement that the declaration was incertain, for the Trespass is laid to be done in land, lying in divers Towns. 2ly. It is not showed what kind of soil the earth was that was carried away: but both the exceptions were overruled, and judgement ruled to be entered nisi causa, etc. Conisby and Fairfax. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. A judgement was given in an Action of Trespass in the Court of Owse-bridge in York, Error to reverse a judgement in Trespass. & a writ of Error was brought in this court to reverse the judgement, many exceptions not material at all were taken, and many others that were helped by the Verdict; but the three chief Exceptions were. 1. The Damages were declared to be ad valentiam quingint. librar. instead of quingent. for there is no such word as quingint, to express any number, for if it be meant to express Fifty, it ought to be quinquagint, but quingent. signifies 500 2ly. The Venire was directed Balivis de Wapentagio, whereas there is no such word, for the word to express a Wapentake is Wapentachium, so that it ought to be the Wapentachio, and not Wapentagio. 3ly. The Venire is, Venire. Venire facias de baliva, and says not what Baliwick, which is uncertain, and it cannot be known, whither it extends and upon these Exceptions the judgement was ruled to be reversed, except better matter shown Saturday following. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc Reg. Upon a motion for quashing an Endictmet against a Baker, For quashing an Endictment for using the Trade of a Baker. these Exceptions were taken. 1. He is indicted for using facultatem pistoris, and doth not say panis humani. 2ly. It is for baking panis tritici, Anglice, Household bread, whereas it signifies only bread made of Wheat, and not Household bread, for that may be made of other corn. 3ly. For baking panis Assis without a dash for panis Assisae. Upon these Exceptions it was quashed. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Upon a motion for quashing an Endictment against one for apprehending I S. & unprisoning him, For quashing an Endictment for arresting and imprisoning one. these Exceptions were taken to it. 1. It says that he apprehended & imprisoned the party without a Warrant, whereas it ought to have been absque aliqua rationabili causa, for in some Cases a man may be apprehended and imprisoned without a Warrant, but in no Case without a reasonable cause. 2ly. The Endictment is, that he did not show him the cause why he apprehended and imprisoned the party, and that he is not bound to do, and yet the party may be lawfully imprisoned. 3ly. The Endictment doth not say, that he apprehended and imprisoned the party falsely, as it ought to have done. Upon these Exceptions it was quashed. Drake and Whitacre. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Hil. 22 Car. Rot. 1318. AN Action upon the Case was brought, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the Case for words. and a Verdict found for the Plaintiff for these words, Margaret Whitacre (viz. meaning the Plaintiff) did steal my Wood, and I will send her to Bridewell. It was moved in arrest of judgement that the words were not actionable, for doubtful words as these are aught to be taken in mitiori sensu, and Wood here may be understood standing Wood, and not Wood cut down, and so it could not be Theft but a Trespass: on the other side it was answered, that Wood shall here be understood Wood cut down, and not standing, and being coupled with the words Margaret Whitacre is a Thief, which are scandalous words, they shall be interpreted equally scandalous, Air & Higgins his Case was cited to prove it, where it was adjudged that these words, He is a thief and hath stolen my Corn, shall be understood of Corn cut down, and not standing, and therefore are actionable. Roll Justice said, it was a strong Case that the action will lie. Case. Notwithstanding judgement was arrested till the other should move. This was again moved Trin. 23 Car. and the Court held, that the first words alone were actionable, but whether coupled with the other they were actionable, the Court was divided, viz. Bacon a gain the Action, and Rolls for it. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. Reg IN an Action of Trover and Conversion, and a verdict for the Plaintiff, Arrest of judgement in Trover and Conversion. it was moved in arrest of judgement that the Plaintiff did declare for Books & for Stockings found & converted, and doth not show what Books, viz. whether English, or Latin, or what other Language, nor whether Law books, Divinity, Physic, or of any other Subject, and because he doth not declare what sort of Stockings they were, whether , worsted, or silk, etc. But the Court overruled the Exceptions and said, that Books were not things of divers species, Species. be they of what Language or subject they may be of, neither the Stockings, for were they silk, or , or worsted, they were but Stockings, and so ruled judgement to be entered. The King and Place. Pasc. 23 car. B. R. PLace was indicted before the Lord Finch and justice Crawley for speaking words against the Queen Mother of France, Error upon a judgement given upon an Endictment for words. the words were these, The Queen Mother is the Whore of Babylon, she is a Whore and hath had a Bastard; upon this Endictment judgement was given against the Defendant. A Writ of Error was brought in this Court to reverse the judgement; The Errors assigned were, 1. That the proceed upon this Endictment were too speedy, and so illegal; for the whole proceed upon it were acted in one day. 2ly. The Endictment lies not, for it is founded upon the Statute of Scandalum magnatum, Scandalum magnatum. and here can be no such great Scandal, for that is for words spoken of a Peer of the Realm, and the Queen Mother is not so. 3ly. There is no Capiatur upon the Roll, as it ought to have been, the Defendant being not in Prison at the time of the judgement given. 4ly. The judgement is that the Defendant shall be imprisoned for a year without bail or mainprize, whereas he ought to be delivered upon paying his Fine. Adjourned to the next Term. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. AN action of Debt was brought upon a Bill penal, Arrest of Judgement in Debt upon a Bill penal. and a verdict for the Plaintiff. It was moved in arrest of judgement, That the Plaintiff hath not showed, that the Defendant did not pay the money at the day limited in the Bill, but only says, non solvit, etc. 2ly. He declares, that the Defendant was bound to pay such a sum legalis monetae, and doth not say Angliae, but the Court overruled both the exceptions, and ruled the Plaintiff to take his judgement. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. A Motion was made by one Town against another neighbour bordering Town, For a Writ against a vill to make them keep their Fences. Scire facias. Plea. for a Writ to make them repair their fences; And it was granted, but it was said by the Court, that the Writ so granted should be but in the nature of a Scire facias refornable in this Court, to enable them to plead to it, and not to compel them to do it without being admitted to plead. Notwithstanding the opinion of Noy Attorney General, and he old Record of Ed. the 2ds. time produced heretofore by him to strengthen it Nota. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. A Motion was made upon an Affidavit to stay Process out of this Court against the party for a Deodand, To stay Pracess for a Deodand. because he had paid three pound for it to the King's use to Sub-Deputy Almoner upon a composition made with him, Bacon justice, Certificate. Notice. procure the General Deputy Almoner to acknowledge it and procure his Certificate to the Court, for of the Sub-Deputy we can take no notice. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved to quash a Endictment of forcible entry upon these Exceptions. To quash an Endictment of forcible Entry. 1. There is no addition of the County where the party dwells that made the forcible entry, as there ought to be by the Statute of 1. H. 5. Addition. and without this addition no Process can be awarded to outlaw the party, for it must be directed unto the County where he dwells. 2ly There is no County expressed where the vill lies in which the force was committed. Upon these Exceptions it was quashed. Trin. 23 Car. Banc Reg AN Endictment was preferred 5 years before, To discharge one indicted for Recusancy. against Count Arundel for recusancy. It was now moved that he would plead Conformity, but in regard that he must plead it by Certificate under the hand and seal of the Bishop of the Diocese, and Bishops were now taken away by the Parliament, Certificate. Conformity. he was disabled to do it, but had a Certificate under the hands and seals of the Minister and Churchwardens of the Parish where he dwelled, upon Oath testifying his Conformity, and thereupon it was prayed he might be discharged. But the Court answered, that there is another remedy given by the Statute, which he might have followed, though the former was taken away, to wit, to conform at the Sessions, and it was his own fault that he hath lost that advantage by removing the Endictment hither by Certiorari, and therefore we will not at present deliver him, but will consider of the Statute, and stay the Process in the mean time. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. IT was moved to the Court that there was an Execution duly issued out of this Court and returnable here this Term, Against an Injunction out of the Chancery to stay execution. and that since it issued forth, the Defendant had obtained an Injunction out of the Chancery to stop the execution. The Court answered, that all the judges were agreed that an Injunction out of the Chancery lies not after a judgement, be the Bill put in before or after the judgement it matters not, but if after a judgement there be a Writ of Error brought to reverse it, and pending the Writ an Injunction be obtained, Q. whether it lie or no by the Reporter. Injunction. Bruer and Sowthwell. Trin. 23 Carol. Brewer brought an action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit to pay so much money for Currants sold unto him discomputando for four Months. Arrest of Judgement in an action upon the Case. The Defendant demurs to the Declaration for the incertainty of it, because it is discomputando for four Months, and expresseth not for how much he should discount, and so there can be no certain damages given, and upon this it was stayed till the other party move. Whiteacre and Hillwell. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Hill. 22 Car. rot. 1318. Upon a Verdict had for the Plaintiff in an action upon the Case for these words Magaret Whitacre is a thief & hath stolen my Wood, Action on the Case for words. and I will send her to Bridewell, It was again by the Plaintiff moved for judgement, because the words were actionable, and shall be meant of Wood cut down & not standing; and it was said, though the first words should in themselves be doubtful, yet are they made certain by the words that are coupled with them. But Bacon justice denied it and said, that Bridewell is a Prison for Correction, and not the Sheriff's Prison for felons, and that one may be sent thither although the offence be not felony, and that the cutting of Wood standing is to be punished with whipping, and so the party may be sent to Bridewell for that offence, and said, that the last words are explanatory of the former, that he meant not the fact charged upon the Plaintiff to be felony, but had not the later words been added to explain his meaning, the former alone are clearly actionable. But Roll justice held the words as they are laid to be actionable, and cited Hyfords and Stamps Case, Trin. 11 jac. & Doleman and young's case, 5 Car. and Smith and Wards Case, 21 jac. and said that in the Case at Bar, that the latter words were cumulative and not interpretative, and that where there are express precedent words to make one a Thief, there ought to be violent words subsequent to give them another interpretation, and not words which may be taken by implication, as they are in this Case. Adjourned. Watson and Watson. Trin. 23. Car. Banc. Reg. Hill. 22 Car. rot. 1687. AN Action of Debt was brought upon an Obligation with condition to stand to an award. Action of Debt for not performing an award. The Defendant pleads no Arbitrement made: The Plaintiff replies, and sets forth the award, and Assigns a breach; the Defendant demurs, and for cause shows that the award is uncertain and not final, for it is, that one of the parties shall pay so much money to the other as shall be due in conscience, and that cannot be known how much it may be, and consequently there is no award, but both parties are at liberty to go to law as they were before, An incertain award not good. and so no end is made between them by the award according to the intent thereof, and these books were cited against the award, 20 Ed. 4. fol. 1. et 4.9 H. 7, fol. 14.8 Ed. 4. fol. 20. It was ruled by the Court to show cause why judgement should not be against the Plaintiff per nil capiat per billam. The King and Place. Trin 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Case between the King and Place adjourned, Error to reverse a Judgement upon an Endictment upon the Statute Scandalum Magnatum. Pasc. 23 Car. was again moved, which was this: Place was indicted before Finch and Crawley justices of Oyer and Terminer, for these words spoken against the Queen mother of France, viz. the Queen mother is the Whore of Babylon, and is a Whore, and hath had a Bastard, and all the Noblemen that will not join with me against her, are Rogues and Rascals. To this endictment the Defendant pleaded, and was found guilty by the jury, and judgement given against him: Whereupon he brings his Writ of Error in this Court to reverse the judgement, and Assigns these Errors. 1. against the body of the Endictment itself, and that he ought not to be Indicted for the words, because they are neither spoken against the Common law nor against any Statute law. 2. Against the proceed upon the Endictment, which were against law, being too speedy, for he was Indicted before justices of Oyer and Terminer, and tried in one day, whereas there ought to have been 15. days betwixt the preferring of the Endictment, and the trial. 3. The Venire is against law, for the Court did choose try, and swore the jury, which ought not to be. 4. Part of the judgement is, that the Defendant shall be bound to his good behaviour, which cannot be upon such an Endictment as was before them. 5. The Endictment doth not say, that the words were spoken contra pacem. 6. Part of the judgement is, that he shall be set upon the Pillory, and lose his cares, which no law warrants, but only to be set there to the view of the people, Imprisonment with a paper on his head. 7. The judgement is that he shall be imprisoned for a year without bail, which ought not to be. To this last exception the Court answered, the party might be so committed; But they said, that the justices of Oyer and Terminer cannot try an Endictment the same day, nor justices of peace at the same Sessions in which it was preferred; Trial. and they cited one Barnabyes Case 13 Car. and Pridians' Case, 6 Car. & 22 E. 4. et Blow. 44. But they said justices of Eyr, may try an Endictment the same day; Roll justice said, the King's Bench is a Court of Eyr in the County where it sits, Eyr. and therefore they may try an endictment removed here out of the same County the same day, but not if it be removed hither out of another County, for in that case it is only a Court of Oyer and Terminer. But Bacon denied it, and said so was my Lord Cooks opinion, and it was also said that justices of Oyer and Terminer cannot proceed upon an Endictment which is not taken before themselves, but justcices of Gaol delivery may; and the Court also held, that the juratores electi tryati et jurati by the Court, as it must necessarily be here understood, Iury. was illegal, for the jury ought to be electi by the Sheriff out of the County; and lastly the Court held, that legally there ought to have been 15 days between the Endictment, and the trial, and for these reasons ordered to give notice to the King's Solicitor, or Sergeant, to show cause why the judgement should not be reversed. Hill and Farmer. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Hill. 17 Car. rot. 674. AN Action of Debt was brought in the Common pleas upon an obligation, Error in Debt upon an obligation and a judgement upon a demurrer was given for the Plaintiff; the Plaintiff brings a Writ of error in this Court to reverse the judgement, and Assigns for Error that the Obligation upon which the Action was brought, and judgement was given, is a void obligation by the Statute of quinto and sexto of Ed. 6. made against buying of Offices. But Roll justice answered, that the judgement in the Common pleas was given upon a mispleader there, and therefore you should make that good first before you move new matter. And there is another Error also in the pleading, which was not touched upon in the Common pleas, which is this, first the plea is of the Office of the delivery, within the Office of the Armoury, Declaration. and after he refers the plea to the Office of the Armoury which is another Office, and so she Declaration is double. Another exception was that the word Armentarius was used for Armamentarius. Monday following was given to show cause why judgement should not be reversed. The King and Martial. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Marshal brings a Writ of Error to reverse a judgement given against him upon an Endictment of barratry, Error upon an Endictment. and takes these exceptions. 1. That it doth not appear in the Endictment, before what Commissioners the Endictment was taken, upon which the judgement was given, and so the Endictment is not good for the incertainty of it, and consequently the judgement is erroneous that is given upon it, for it ought to appear by the Endictment that it was taken before the justices of Assize, or justices of Peace, or of the Gaol-delivery. 2. The judgement is, quod solvat tantam denariorum summam, and shall find sureties for the good behaviour, and this is rather an award than a judgement. To this exception Roll justice answered, judgement. if it be a good order it is a good judgement, and the order is part of the judgement, yet let the King's Council have notice, and the Prosecutor show cause why the judgement should not be reversed. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Upon a verdict given in an ejectione firmae it was moved in Arrest of judgement, Arrest of judgement in an ejectione firmae. and the exception was, that the Plaintiff was ejected de uno Crofto, which was said to be of an uncertain signification; and because the Plaintiff conceived the Court doubted whether an ejectione firmae lay of a Croft, he durst not defend it, but moves for a special judgement for the rest of the land contained in the Declaration, and prayed that he might release the damages as to the Croft. roll justice doubted whether an ejectione firmae lies de uno Crofto, Ejectione firmae. Formedon, Assize. and said that a Formedon lies not of a Croft, but that an Assize doth, because it is put in view to the recognitors, but a Praecipe lies not of it. The rule of Court was, that the Plaintiff should take a special judgement as he desired, and release the Croft, and the damages to all, and that he should have his Costs. Lere and Cholwitch. Pasc. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. LEre brings an Action of Debt upon an Obligation against Cholwitch; Arrest of judgement in Debt upon an Obligation. the condition of the Obligation was, that a certain sum of money should be paid to the Plaintiff 40 days after he should return with his Ship to such a Port of discharge for freight for his Ship, and for non payment accordingly is the Action brought; The Plaintiff hath a Verdict, The Defendant moves in Arrest of judgement, and takes these exceptions. 1. That the averment of the breach of the condition of the Obligation is not certain, and therefore not good, Fraight. for it doth not aver that the Ship was discharged of his Goods, or that the 40 days were expired before the money demanded; To this roll Justice said, it is not usual to pay fraight for a Ship, till the owners have their goods delivered, but here the condition of the bond is, to pay the moneys within 40 days after his return to such a port of discharge, Intendment. and it is not intended, that the money shall not be paid till the 40. days be past. The 2d. Exception was, that he doth not say where the Ship was unloaden; To this roll answered, that it shall be intended that it was unladen at the port where she arrived, if the contrary be not shown on the other side. 3ly. There is no notice expressed to be given of the unloading of the Ship, Notice. and this being a collateral thing, and penal to the Defendant, he ought to have notice of it; To this roll said, that one party might as well take notice of this as the other, for the thing to be done is not to be done either by the Plaintiff, or Defendant, and the issue is found against the Defendant, therefore let him show cause Tuesday next why judgement should not be given for the Plaintiff. Afterwards the same Term judgement was given accordingly. Segar and Dyer. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Mich. 22 Car. rot. 125. or 135 DYer brings an Action of Trover and Conversion, Error to reverse a judgement in Trover and Conversion. in the Court at Bristol against Segar, and hath a Verdict, and a judgement against him; Segar brings his Writ of Error in this Court to reverse this judgement, and Assigns these Errors. 1. To the Declaration which was of the Trover, and Conversion, de uno pollo, Anglice a Colt, whereas Pullus signifies not a Colt, but properly a young Hen, and hence we had the word pullet but in a general acception of the word it may signify also other young things, but than it must have an adjective of the species which it is to signify, or a substantive of the gentive case joined with it, as pullus equinus, pullus Asininus or Asini and the like, and ought not to be used alone to signify a colt, with an Anglice joined to it, as it is here. The 2d. Exception was, that it is not well set forth, how the Court was held where the judgement was given, for he doth not show that the Court was held either by letters patents, or by praescription, but saith ad curiam tentam tali die coram A. D. I. H. etc. a tempore cujus contrarium memoria hominum non existit, etc. prescription. which cannot be a good praescription, for a Court cannot be held at such a day, and before such particular persons, if it be not expressed to be secundum consuetudinem. The rule of Court was to show cause Tuesday following why the judgement should not be reversed. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Plaintiff declares that the Defendant had covenanted with him, Demurrer upon a Declaration in an Action of Covenant. to pay him so much money as he should expend for repairing, and victualling a Ship for him, and averrs that he had expended 300 l. in repairing and victualling it, and that he gave the Defendant notice of it at such a day, and for non payment he brings his Action of breach of Covenant. The Defendant protestando that the Plaintiff had not laid out 300 l. in manner and form as he had declared, demurs to the Declaration upon these exceptions. 1. That that the Declaration was not good, because he had not averred a special breach of Covenant: But to this Roll justice said, that this exception had been often overruled. 2ly. It was objected, that in this case the Plaintiff should have brought an Action of Debt, Election of Action. and not of Covenant. But to this also Roll answered, that it was well enough, for it is in the election of the Plaintiff to bring either an Action of Debt, or an Action of Covenant, and that it hath been heretofore questioned, whether an Action of Debt did lie in this case, but it was never doubted but that an Action of Covenant did very well lie. Debt. A third exception was that there is no request alleged to pay the money, and without request he was not bound to pay it. Demand To this Roll answered, that the Plaintiffs Action was not an Action of Debt where a Demand is necessary, but it is an Action of Covenant, and there it is not needful to allege a Demand. Boomer and Payte. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. reg. PAyte the Administrator of the Goods and Chattels of I. S. brings an action of Debt against Boomer, Demurrer upon a Declaration in Debt. and declares, that the Intestate brought an action of Debt in the Common Pleas against three, and had a judgement against them, and a Capias ad satisfaciendum against two of them was directed to Boomer the Defendant, being then Sheriff of the Countywhere the parties lived, to execute, and that accordingly he did execute it by taking the parties, and afterwards did suffer them to escape, and for this the Plaintiff brings his Action. Debt. To this Declaration the Plaintiff demurs. But Roll justice said, he saw no cause for it, for an Administrator may have an action of Debt against a Sheriff upon an Escape suffered of a Prisoner of the Intestate in his life time, and ordered the Defendant to show cause Tuesday next why the Plaintiff should not have judgement. The City of London and Estwick. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. STephen Estwick prays a Writ of Restitution to be restored to the place of a Common-Councel-man of the City of London, For restitution to the place of a Common-Councel-man of London. being put out of it by the Lord Maior and Court of Aldermen, and also committed to Newgate; the Writ is granted and directed to the Lord Maior and Court of Aldermen, who thereupon make a logn return, setting forth at large the causes why he was deprived and committed, and why he ought not to be restored, which in brief was for carrying himself in a tumultuous way at an election of common-councel-men, and disturbing the election; this return was read and filled, and the Council thereupon prayed he might be restored, because there was not sufficient matter showed in the return why he should not be restored, and these exceptions were taken to the return. 1. That it was too general, and shows not what manner of disturbance Estwick made at the Court where the election was. 2ly. Part of his misdemenour is set forth to be clamando & veciferando, which are words very uncertain and not proper to set forth a disturbance. 3ly. It was said he was bidden to withdraw, and refused, and it is not shown why he should withdraw. 4ly. The custom set forth for the Lord Maior and Court of Aldermen to imprison ad placitum is not good, but they should have shown that such imprisonment belonged to them per consuetudinem, or by the Common-law. 5ly. They say, that they had used to imprison for such causes, and do not show where the custom is used. 6ly. They say quaedam quaestio orta est touching the election of one to be a Common-Councel-man, and show not his ability for the place. 7ly. By the incertainty of the return the Plaintiff cannot plead to it. 8ly. It is said, that when he was commanded to go forth, he said he would not, but it is not said that he did not go forth. 9ly. It is said that the Court of Common-Councel tendered the Covenant, whereas they have no power by Ordinance of Parliament to do it. The Recorder of Council with the City desired time to amend the return in matter of form only. And said, that the Plaintiff was removed from his place by a Court of Record, and therefore hoped he should not be this way restored, and that he had no loss by being removed, and therefore the Case was the less considerable; and whereas it was objected against his amending of the Reton, that it was filled, & so too late to move for it, He said, that it was not filled by order of Court, but only ordered that Copies might be taken of it for Council to peruse, and if so then it is not too late to pray it may be amended, but though it were filled he conceived that in a case of this importance it might be amended in matter of form as some Reforms had been formerly in this Court. Roll justice answered the Recorder to this effect, You ought to show some cause upon which the party may have remedy by a Writ of Error, or otherwise, Return. if judgement be wrongfully given against him, which you have not done; and as to the filing of the return, Filing. a return may be filled either upon motion of the party, or by the rules of the Court, and it were good, you consider how this was filled; and as touching the suspension of the party from his place, Suspension. it ought not to be perpetual but for a time only, and said, that after filing of a return, be it upon motion or by the rules of the Court, it cannot be amended. Tuesday next following was given by the Court to hear Council on both parts. Amendment. Chadly and Stinch. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Mich. 22 Car. rot. 556. STinch brought an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit in the Common Pleas against Chadly, and hath a Verdict and a judgement. Error to reverse a judgement in an Action upon an Assumpsit. Stinch brings a Writ of Error here to reverse this judgement, and assigns for Error. 1. That there were 18 returned upon the jury, and but two of them tried the issue. 2ly. Part of Declaration to ground the Assumpsit was in another County, and not within the jurisdiction of the Court where the issue was tried; and for these Errors the judgement was reversed except cause should be shown to the contrary Thursday next. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. IT was moved to quash an Endictment for erecting of a Cottage contrary to the Statute; To quash an Endictment for erecting a Cottage. the exception taken to it was, that he erected a Cottage for habitation, but did not say it was used or inhabited as a Cottage. But Bacon Justice answered, that the very erection of it is an offence against the Statute, and therefore the Endictment did very well pursue the words of the Statute, and therefore would not quash it. Wright and Pynder. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Mich. 22 Car. rot. 440 antea. 22 THe Case of Wright and Pynder was moved again to have the judgement of the Court. Opinion of the Court on a Demurrer upon an evidence. Roll justice said, that matter of fact ought to be agreed in a Demurrer to an Evidence, otherwise the Court cannot proceed upon the Demurrer, for the judges cannot try the matter in fact, for that were for the judges to give the verdict, which belongs to the jury to do, and to waive the matter in Law, Pleading. which they should determine, and he said, that if a Deed be pleaded the party must show it in Court, but if it be given in evidence it is not necessary to show it if it can otherways be proved to the jury, Evidence. and so is it of a Record given in evidence, and cited one Worsseys' Case 17 jac. Rolls justice took also two other Exceptions to the pleading, 1. That the Goods mentioned in the Schedule appear not to be the same contained in the Declaration. 2ly. No Title is made to the Indenture by him who brings the Action, and concluded upon the whole matter that the Demurrer was not good, and that there ought to be a Venire facias de novo to try the matter again. Venire de novo. judgement. Bacon justice much to the same effect, but differed in this, that there ought not to be a Venire facias de novo but said, that judgement ought to be given against one party, to wit the Defendant, for ill joining in Demurrer, to the intent the party that is not in fault may be dismissed, and the parties here have waived the Trial per pays by joining in Demurrer. But Roll answered that no judgement at all could be given, for both parties be in fault, one by tendering the Demurrer, the other by joining in it, and the Defendant might have chosen whether he would have joined or no, but might have prayed the judgement of the Court whether he ought to join. The Court advised to search precedents for a Venire facias de novo after a Demurrer upon an evidence, and if there be any, they held that the same jury ought to come again, and not another. Roll said, Iury. if a special verdict be found insufficient, a new Venire facias ought to issue, and he saw no difference between that and this Case. King and Summerland. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. IN the Case of King and Summerland again moved, the Court held that the pleading of a bargain and sale to be debito modo irrotulatum secundum formam statuti is good enough, Opinion of the Court touching pleading of an enrolment. though it be not pleaded to be enrolled within six months, yet ruled it should be moved again. The same term judgement was given, that the Plaintiff nil capiat per billam, because the Deed was not said to be enroled, neither secundum formam statuti, nor within six months, but only debito modo, which may be an enrolment at the Common law, and not according to the Statute. The City of London and Estwick. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was again moved in the Case between the City of London and Estwick, Argument concerning the Writ of Restitution to a common-councel-mans' place. Amendment. that the return of the City might be amended although it were filled, because there are Precedents where it hath been done. Roll justice answered, there was never any amended after the filing before H. 7ths. time. It was replied by the Council, that the return being of this Term it might be amended, for it rested in the breast of the judges. But Roll justice answered to this, that Acts of the Court remain in the breast of the Court the same Term, but not acts of others, and therefore this being so was not amendable, and said, that inferior Courts cannot amend a presentment in matter of fact, for that were to alter the custom of the courts; and it was then said, that Endictments had been amended after the filing of them. And Alderman Langhams' Case was also urged, where a return of the City was amended after it was filled, yet this was ruled not amendable. Twisden of Council with the City argued that Estwick ought not to be restored to his place of a Common-Councel-man for these reasons. 1. Because it was not a place of profit, and so it was no damage to him to be removed, and therefore his suit was to no purpose. 2ly. It is not a place of Government, and so no dignity in it, but it was a place merely of service and trouble. But Roll justice answered, that a writ of restitution had been adjudged good to restore a Constable to his place, Restitution. which was more a place of service and trouble than this. 3ly. There is a judgement against Estwick in a Court of Record, and it must be avoided either by error or attaint, as the Statute directs, and the party cannot be restored by a Writ of Restitution; and for the objection, that the Return is too general, he answered, that Faith is to be given, that there was a disturbance made by him as is suggested, though it be not so plainly expressed as it might have been. 2ly. Here appears a contempt to the Court, and for this he may be suspended. 3ly. The Custom is well pursued upon the whole matter taken together. 4ly. The Custom is well laid for the commitment ad placitum, for it refers to the words suspendere vel amovere, that is, either one or the other. 5ly. The word require amounts to a command being spoken in a Court of Record, and the disobeying it was a contempt. Hales of Council on the same side argued much as Twisden had done, and added to it as followeh. 1. That there appears a reasoanble cause precedent why he should be suspended, and then it follows they may suspend him ad libitum. 2ly. The alleging of the disturbance is not material, for that is not the ground of his a motion from his place, but only the inducement to it. 3ly. Requisitus shall be understood requisitus per curiam, it being alleged to be in Court. 4ly. Recusavit is more than denegavit, and implies he did not the thing enjoined him, and so might well be committed. 5ly. There may be cause to grant a Writ of restitution, though no cause for the restitution: For a common-Councel-man of Coventry had a Writ of restitution out of this Court, and yet upon his suit was not restored. The Recorder moved for a longer day to be heard for the City, because it was a weighty cause, and said that no restitution could be made, for the Writ was not well directed, and so is not well executed. The Plaintiffs Council desired expedition in the Cause; Whereupon Roll said, here hath been no delay in the business, but the rule is against you, and he took these exceptions to the return. 1. It appears not by the return that the Plaintiff is removed from his place, but only that he is suspended, and then he may well be restored, and it is not said for how long time he is suspended. 2ly. It is not said that he is suspended for a reasonable cause. 3ly. It is not said what the disturbance was that he made for which he is suspended. And further said, that the Court of the Common-Councel is not a Court of Record, Error. Restitution. for no Writ of Error lies there, but is a Court only of Advise. Bacon justice as Roll, and said, that Estwick had only remedy to be restored by a Writ of Restitution, and not by a Writ of Error or an Attaint. Adjourned till Saturday to hear Council for the City. Rawson and Bargue. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Hil. 17 Car. rot. 904. RAwson brought an Action of Debt against Bargue for 15 l. upon the Statute of 2 Ed. 6. for setting forth of Tithes. Argument upon a special Verdict for Tithes in an action of Debt upon the Statute of 2 Ed. 6. And upon the Trial a special verdict was found, wherein the Question was, whether the Church by reason whereof the Tithes were claimed were a free Chapel, and given to Ed. the 6th. by the Statute of 1 Ed. 6. and so discharged of Tithes or not. Walker of Council with the Plaintiff argued, that it was not a free Chapel, because there was a cure of Souls, and so could not be free but presentative, and said that the word free was a word of distinction to distinguish things of different nature one from another, as liber homo is to distinguish a free maa from a villain, Francksold, Francktenement, and the like, and cited Bracton lib. 4. C. 3. 241. He likewise distinguished Chapels into three sorts. 1. Donative. 2ly. Presentative. 3ly. Without cure of Souls, and said, that Chapels presentative were not given to the King by the Statute of ● Ed. 6. and cited Nat. brev. 48. and 13 E. 4. f. ●. and 6 H. 7. c. 14. and 5 H. 7. f. 37. and said, that it is not within the meaning of the Statute of 1 Ed. 6. to give Chapels presentative, because it is not within the mischief which the Statute was made to prevent, and so intends not to give Chapels with cure of Souls, and the word free is but nominal, and doth not make it free if it be not so otherwise. Hales for the Defendant argued, that it was a free Chapel within the Statute of 1 Ed. 6. For first it is called so, and it shall be presumed it is rightly named so. 2ly It is so found to be by the jury, and to prove that it is a free Chapel it is not presentative, and 2ly. It appears not to be within the jurisdiction of the Ordinary. 3ly. The Act of 1 Ed. 6. is an Act which is general and gives all free Chapels, and extends as well to Chapels which are only reputative free Chapbels as well as to them which are so indeed, even as it is of a Chauntery, College, and an impropriation, as the Books are, and it is a free Chapel nevertheless it be presentative and with the cure of Souls, for a free Chapel may now be with the cure of Souls, although by the old Canon law it could not, as was held in Child's case, 1 jac. The Chapel within the Tower is a free Chapel donative, and yet it is presentative and hath cure of Souls, so saith Lynwood of the free Chapel of St. Martin's. It is also the intent of the Statute, that it should be so, for a College and a Chauntery with cure are within the Statute, as may appear by the Exceptions of the Statute of the Free Chapel with cure of Souls in the Isle of Eely called the Chapel of the Sea, and the being presentative with cure hinders not, but that it may be within the Statute, for the presentation might arise at the first by special composition, as it is 13 E. 4. f. 4. and Register f. 307. and it was instanced in the free Chapel of Hastings in Sussex, and it may be a Chapel donative by prescription, and yet presentative. Adjornatur ad proximum terminum to be argued again. Vid. postea. Barker and Martin. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe case between Barker and Martin was again moved, Arrest of judgement in Trepass. which was briefly this, An action of Trespass was brought by Barker against Martin, wherein he declares, that the Defendant had broken his House, and had taken away quinque instrumenta ferrea, Anglice fetters. In arrest of judgement exception was taken to the Declaration. that Instrumenta serrea, Anglice fetters, was not a good expression in Latin (as it ought to be) of Fetters, because there was a proper Latin word for Fetters, namely Compes, so that it ought to have been quinque Compedes, or quinque paria Compedum, and not as it is, for the word Instrumentum is uncertain, and may be used to signify any thing else with an Anglice added to it as well as Fetters, and as it is the pleading is not all in Latin as the Statute directs to avoid Barbarsm, and the word Anglice when it is properly used in a Declaration is to help words of art, which cannot be expressed without 〈◊〉 Anglice, and is not to be used where there is a proper Latin word to signify the thing, as in this Case there is. On the other side it was said, that general words might be good in a Declaration, and barbarous words sometimes, and cited hobart's Reports, 267. and Ward and Smith's Case, Trin. 4. jac. rot. 2305. Roll justice, It is a hard thing to maintain this Declaration, Declaration. for if it should be admitted good it would bring in all Barbarism in plead, Pleading. and any senseless word might be used with an Anglice joined with it, and he said one was indicted for using quandam artem Anglice of a Draper, and it was adjudged naught, and in the case between Tailor and Tailor 9 Car. Trespass, was brought pro Decem caponibus, Anglice Capons, & avidbus domesticis, Anglice poultry, and adjudged not good. Yet the rule of the Court was to argue it again Saturday next following. Eels and Lambert. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Pasc. 22 Car. rot. 1646. Eels brought an Action of Covenant against Lambert the Executor of Sir Molton Lambert, An Action of Covenant against an Executor. and declares that Sir Molton Lambert did in his life time by his indenture let certain lands unto him for years, and covenanted thereby for himself, his Executors, Administrators, and Assigns, that the Lessee should not be put out of possession of the lands let by him during the said Term, and that since the death of Sir Molton Lambert his Lessor, he was put out of possession by such an one, and upon this he brings his Action of Covenant against the Executor. The Defendant pleads, not Assets, upon this an issue was joined, and a special Verdict was found, To this effect, That Sir Molton Lambert did let the lands mentioned in the Declaration to Eeles prout, & that there was such a Covenant in the Deed prout, and that the Plaintiff was put out of possession of the lands prout. They find likewise, that Sir Molton Lambert made his Will, and made the Defendant his Executor, and died; that Sir Molton Lambert by his will gave many legacies of goods, and that the Defendant before the Plaintiff was put out of possession, did pay all the Legacies in kind, and that besides those Legacies he had not Assets to discharge the Covenant. Upon this Verdict the matter in Law was this, whether the Executor ought to have forborn the payment of the Legacies, and to have expected till the end of the Term let to the Plaintiff, or till the Covenant had been broken, and for doing otherwise should not be charged with the Covenant de bonis propriis; or whether the Covenant not being broken in the life of the Testator, nor before the Legacies paid, he had not paid the Legacies as he ought, and should not be freed from being charged with the Covenant de bonis propriis. Upon opening of the Case roll justice said, that a decree in Chancery against an Executor, Decree in Chancery. shall not be satisfied before an Obligation made by the Testator, and become due after his death. Saturday following was set to here Council again. Jones and Stanley. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. IOnes brought an Action of Debt upon an Obligation to perform Covenants of an Indenture against Stanley, Arrest of Judgement in an ACtion of Debt. and hath a Verdict against him; Stanley moveth in Arrest of judgement, and takes these exceptions; 1. That the Goods valued in the Declaration, are not within the condition of the Obligation; 2. The goods are not certainly set forth what they are, for the Declaration is of divers parcels of old stuff; 3. Some of the things mentioned in the Declaration are not goods, and so not to be valued, for the Declaration is of partitions within'nt he house, and of a shed, which are part of the free hold, and not goods; upon these exceptions the judgement was arrested till the other should move it: White and Thomas. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Trin. 18 Car. rot. 1400. WHite binds himself, Error to reverse a judgement in Debt brought by an Heir. his Heirs, Executors, and Administrators, in an Obligation to Thomas for the payment of a certain sum of money, at a certain day, the money is not paid, a judgement is obtained against White for the money, White makes his will, and makes his Heir at law his Executor, and dies leaving lands to descend. White as Heir brings a Writ of Error to reverse this judgement; It was argued by the Council of the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error, that the Writ did lie, because although the Action in the former judgement was but a personal Action, yet in this Case, the Land of the Heir may be charged by the judgement, Heir. Elegit. for an elegit may be thereupon taken out to charge ●is Lands, and therefore the judgement concerns him as Heir as well as Executor, and therefore it is reason he should bring a Writ of Error to reverse the judgement, because he may be prejudiced by it. Executor. And a Case in Trin. 29 Eliz. rot. 631. Banc. Reg. was cited, that the Heir is pridy to the judgement, and therefore shall have a Writ of Error, Error. and he is not merely terr-Tenant 13 E. 4.2. Roll justice, the terr-Tenant sole shall not have a Writ of Error upon an extent; Error. And in the Case at the bar the Heir is not privy to the judgement, and the extent is only upon him as terr-Tenant, and he is not made privy to the judgement by the extent, but after Execution he may have a Writ of Error, and he said, Bail. the Bail cannot bring a Writ of Error upon the judgement given against the Principal, and the same reason is here, and it will be very hard to maintain this Writ of Error. Adjourned to the next term. Terry and Baxter. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Pasc. 23 Car. rot. 394. TErry brings an Action of Debt upon an Assumpsit against Baxter, Demurrer upon an Dclaration in Assumpsit to stand to an award. to stand to an Award. The Defendant pleads nul arbitrement; the Plaintiff sets forth the award, and assigns a breach; The Defendant demurs, and for cause shows that part of the award was to pay 5 l. to the poor of the Parish of D. which was not within the submission, and so the award was not good. roll justice answered, if the award be void to the 5 l. Award good in part i; a good award. awarded to be paid to the poor, yet it is good to the rest, for it is perfect as to the ending of all differences between them which are submitted, and therefore show cause on Monday next, why judgement should not be given for the Plaintiff. Morefield and Webb. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Pasc. 23 Car. rot. 50. Webb brings an Action upon the Case against Morefield in the palace Court at Westminster, Error to reverse a judgement in an Action upon the Case. and hath a judgement; Morefield brings a Writ of Error in this Court to reverse the judgement, and Assigns these Errors. 1. It is not showed in the Declaration that the cause of Action was infra jurisdictionem palatii. But roll justice answered, jurisdiction. that it was showed to be infra jurisdictionem Curiae, and that was good enough, for the Court is alleged to be held by Letters patents. return. A 2d. Exception was, that there was not fifteen days for the return of the Venire facias as there ought to be; But to this roll justice also answered, that the Court is held by Letters patents, and therefore it may be retornable within fifteen days, though by the usual course of the Common law it cannot. And therefore ordered the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error to show better matter, otherwise judgement should be affirmed against him. The King and Holland. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Case between the King and Holland was moved again, For quashing an inquisition for the King. Inquisition. and the Council against the King, moved that the inquisition found for the King to entitle him to the use of the Copyhold might be quashed, because the King cannot be entitled to such a use, because it is a thing in privity only, and cited the Statute of 27 H. 8. of uses, Use. and Cooks 1. rep. 123, and said, that the King cannot be entitled ot Copyhold lands of an Alien much less to the use of Copyhold lands; Copyhold. King. Wrong. Protection. Trust. if he should, 1. The Lord would be wronged, which the King ought not to do, but to protect his subjects, for the protection of the subject, is not only matter of honour to the King, but also of trust in the Crown; 2ly. A stranger is wronged by it; 3ly. The Copyholder of the Manor cannot have remedy for the injury done him, Suit. for he ought to sue in the Lord's Court, and not else where, and here he cannot do it, and the rule in law is de minimis non curat lex, and it is much less for the honour of the King to have a Copyhold estate, Honour. which is a base tenure. But it may be objected, that if the King shall not have this use, he shall be in a worse condition than a subject. To this it is answered, that he shall be so in cases which touch his royalty, and may be a disparagement to him, Copyhold. which indeed doth not make him in a worse condition though it may seem so, but it is more for his honour, and a Copyhold is an estate at the will of the Lord, and aught to be protected by the Lord; and the King cannot be Tenant at will to any, Alien. Trust. and therefore cannot have a Copyhold estate; and an Alien is not capable of a trust, because it is a thing in Action which an Alien cannot have, and therefore he cannot derive it from him. Twisden for the King in his Argument considered, 1. Whether the King can have a use at the Common law which is for an Alien. 2. Whether a trust differs from a use; for the first he said, that an Alien may purchase lands. Alien. Prerogative. and a use at the Common law, but he cannot retain them, therefore the King shall have them by his Prerogative, and a use is not a thing in privity, but is an Ancient inheritance at the Common law. 2ly. There is no confidence annexed to cestui que use, or to the Feoffor, but may be disposed of. 3ly. Things privity in Action may be given to the King, Privity. and a use is an inheritance in the nature of a Chattel. 4ly. A use is grantable over, Privity. and therefore may be given to the King, and the meaning of the word lost, in the Statute, is to be intended that it may be lost for the difficulty of finding such subtle conveyances, and not that the right was really lost: Trust. And for a trust it is but a new name given to a use, and invented to Defraud the Statute of uses, and a trust of a Copyhold is all one with another trust, for it is the taking of the profits of the land, and not the Estate in the land, and the King shall have it; And to that which is said that the King cannot be a Copyholder, it is not so clear; for I conceive the contrary: for a surrender of a Copyhold to him is good, and of a use too: and he cited these books, 9 H, 6. fol. 25.20 B. 3. f. 3.11. rep. 91. roll justice said, that a Trustee or cestuy que trust cannot take the profits of the land, Cestuy que trust. Equity. Outlawry. Law & Equity. but hath only his remedy in equity, for the Estate in the land is only in the party trusted; and the King shall not have the profits of the land upon an Out-lawry against the cestuy que use, or cestuy que trust. And Law and Equity ought not to be confounded; therefore if the King hath equity for a thing, he ought not to sue for it at the Common law, so is it in this case at the bar. Adjourned. Chapel and Drew. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Hill. 11 Car. rot. 921. IN this case the party being attainted of felony, Exception to a pardon for Felony. Pardon. pleaded his Charter of Pardon and Claims, thereby to be restored to his Goods and Chattels forfeited to the King by the felony; and the Question was, whether as the Pardon was penned he should be restored or no? the words of the Pardon upon which the Question grew, were these, pardonavit, remisit, & relaxavit, and it was held, that he was not by these words to be restored to his Goods and Chattels; for the words do not amount to a Surrender in case of a ommon person, much less in case of the King, and there ought to have been the word restituit. Roll justice said, this Pardon was drawn by Noy, Attorney General, and was too short, Felony. Trial. and it was said by him that if one be committed to the Gaol for one felony, the justices may inquire and try the party for another felony for which he was not committed. Tilers Case. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. AN action of Debt was brought against Tyler upon an Obligation to stand to an Award, Demurrer to a Replication and the Plaintiff declares of an Arbitrement made the 28th, day of May in such a year, ready to be delivered up the nine and twentyeth day of May in the same year; The Defendant pleads nullum Arbitrium, The Plaintiff replies, that the Award was made by the Umpire the 28th. of May ready to be delivered up upon the same 28th. day of May, and to this replication the Defendant demurs, and shows for cause, that the Plaintiff had set forth double matter, one in his Declaration, and the other in his Replication; for the Award set forth in the Declaration, and that set forth in the Replication cannot be intended to be one and the same. But Roll justice answered, that the Issue to be tried, is not to be taken upon the day of the Award made, and therefore it requires no answer, Demmurres. and so cannot be double, and one ought not to demur for the doubleness of the matter upon a thing upon which no Issue can be taken, and ●●led better matter should be shown, or else judgement should be given for the Plaintiff. Estwick and the City of London. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Case of Estwick and the City of London was again argued by Sergeant Glynn for the City; Argument in the Case of the Writ of Restitution to a Common-councel-mans' place. Restitution. Custom. in his Argument he insisted upon three particulars why Estwick could not be restored to his place of a common-Councel-man. 1. That a common-Councel-man may be removed or suspended from his place at pleasure by the custom of the City. 2ly. That he cannot be restored by Law. 3ly. No restitution can be in this case as it now stands. First, the custom to remove a common-Councel-man is good, for it first began by agreement, and such a custom is good at the common law, much more here, and it is not an unreasonable custom, although it may seem so prima fancy, like as it is in the case of a Lord that feiseth the Lands of his Villain, and in the case of a Copyholder that for feiteth his Estate by the felling of Timber. A second reason is, it agrees well with the nature and condition of the office of a common-Councel-man to be subject to this Custom, Trial. and we know that many things shall be tried by Custom, contrary to the course of the common law. 3ly. We see that the order of the Parliament is a rule to try matters concerning their Members, and so it is here in the City to try their Members. 4ly. If it should not be so, it would prove destructive to the City, by waiting till such an offender might be removed by a course in Law, which is far more tedious than this customary way. To the second point, he said, that by Law there can be no restitution to this office, and this is proved by the very nature of the Writ of Restitution, which is to restore the party to a freehold or some other matter of profit, neither of which can be in our case, and a writ of Restitution is to restore one to a possession, where one may not be restored by an ordinary way, neither doth the Statute of Magna charta extend to our case: for a common-councel-mans' place is merely grounded upon the custom of the City, and not upon the Common law: and he said there are three grounds for a Writ of Restitution. 1. A contempt to the King. 2ly. A hurt to the Commonwealth. 3ly. Particular damage to the party; but none of these is in our cause, and therefore there is no cause for a Writ of Restitution. The case of Sir james Baggs having a Writ of Restitution was, because he was deprived of his Trade and Freedom, Constable. Church warwarden. & freehold, and our case differs from the case of a Constable, or a Church warden, or any case that can be cited; for a Church warden is an officer in relation to the Common wealth for the execution of justice, whereof the Common law takes notice, and likewise a Constable is a known Officer to minister justice in relation to the public: Recorder. so is it of a Recorder of a Corporation, and so they all differ from our case. For authority to this point in 17. jac. but moved first 16 jac. Warren a common-Councel-man of Coventry was denied upon the return of his Writ to be restored, and our case and return is more strong against the Plaintiff; and Burman a Gentleman of one of the Inn of Court, being expelled, could not be restored by a Writ of Restitution, and lately a common-Councel-man was removed for not taking the Protestation. For the third point, whether upon the Writ itself, as this case is, there can be any restitution made? I conceive not, because it is directed to the Mayor and Commonalty, and Citizens of the City of London, and so there is in it a false recital of the suspension; Recital. for he was not removed by the Citizens, and so the Writ is directed to parties who did not the wrong, and so it is ill directed, and it differs from the direction of the Writ in Sir James Bags case, and it ought to have been directed to the Sheriffs or Ministers who have authority to restore him, as they did remove him, for the party that hath done no wrong ought not to be punished or molested; and for the ill direction of the Writ could not Warren the common-Councel-man of Coventry he restored, and the Corporation of London is responsable for all particular Misdemeanours done within any Courts of justice within the City, or other general Misdemeanours there committed. Misdemeannours. Maynard on the other side argued, that the case was mistaken as it is stated in the return, for it supposeth that the party is removed at pleasure, and yet supposeth also, that there is a cause to remove him, to wit his refusing to go out, and expresseth not that he did not go out, nor that he was commanded to go out, but that he was requested. And whereas it is more than to advise, for he hath a privilege for his own good, and the good of the City. 3ly. The Writ is well directed, and cannot be otherwise for the party to have remedy, and all the Precedents are as this is, Precedents. and Alderman Harris his case is the same in point with this, where it was by three judges resolved, that he should be restored to his Alderman's place, because it was a place of Honour as well as of Burden. Roll Justice said, 1. That the Writ was well directed. 2ly. That the custom was ill recited, 3ly, If it were well recited, yet it is a void custom. 4ly. The return is not good, for the incertainties of it, viz. in the causes shown, why the party was removed, and therefore that he ought to be restored to his place. Bacon Justice to the same intent, and said, that wheresoever a Commissioner or other person hath power given to do a thing at his discretion, it is to be understood of sound discretion, and according to Law, Discretion. jurisdiction. and that this Court hath power to redress things otherwise done by them. The rule was, that the party be restored, if better matter be not shown Tuesday following. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. IN an Action of Trespass for digging in his Ground, Arrest of judgement in Trespass. and carrying away 200 load of soil, It was moved in arrest of judgement, that it should have been of soil inde provenient. and that an intendment cannot make it good. Roll justice said, it seems a good Exception, for as it is it is too generalite laid. Vincent and Fursy. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Hil. 22 Car. Rot. Q. VIncent brought an Action of Trespass against Fursy for breaking open 2 Chests, and taking away certain , and 3 l. in money, Arrest of judgement in Trespass. and had a Verdict for him. The Defendant moves in Arrest of judgement, and takes these exceptions. 1. That the Declaration is too general, for it sets not forth what the were which were taken away, and so the value of them cannot be known as it ought to be, that Damages may be rightly given. 2. In this one Declaration there is an Action of Trespass, joined with an Action upon the Case, viz. the Trespass for breaking open the Chests, and the Action of the Case for taking away the , and money, which ought not to be, for two several Actions ought not to be laid in one Declaration. Wadham Windham of Council with the Plaintiff said it was well enough, and could not be otherwise, and the thing is certainly enough set forth, and shall be interpreted reddendo singula singulis, viz. the spoliavit in the Declaration shall have reference to the , and the cepit to the money. Trover and Conversion. roll justice said, that an Action of Trover, and Conversion for divers sorts of linen had been adjudged good. and 29 E. 3. An Action of Trespass lies for beating of his servant, and in Cletheroes' case, an Action of Trespass was held good for rescuing a prisoner from him whom he had Arrested, Trespass. and the Cook of Gray's Inn brought an Action of Trespass for taking away his wife, per quod consortium amisit, and it was held to be well brought, but if the in the case at the bar had not been in the chest, the Action would not have lain; and he took another exception, namely that Declaration wss for the breaking of 2 chests, Incertainty. and so it appears not where the were when they were taken, whether in one o● in ●oth of them. The rule was to stay judgement till they had seen the Re●ord. Capell and Allen. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Hill. 22 Car. rot. 639. CApell brought an Action Debt upon an Assumpsit to stand to an award, the Defendant pleaded Nal Arbitrement, Demurrer upon an award. the Plaintiff replies, and sets forth the Arbitrement, and the breach, the Defendant demurs, and for cause shows that the award was not good, because it was made but of one part, Award. for it was, that one of the parties should do such things expressed, and that the other party should pay for the making the Bonds of Submission, which cannot be awarded, and so nothing is awarded for him to do, and the Arbitrators cannot award this, because it is not within the submission. Submission. roll justice held this a good exception, and said the Charge for making the writings is not within the Submission, for the bonds were made before the Submission, and it was held 13 Jac. that the words super praemissis in the award will not help an award made but of one part. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. AN Action of Debt was brought upon a Bond, Demurrer to a Declaration in Debt upon a bond to perform Covenants of an Indenture. Breach. Interpretations. to perform the Covenants of an Indenture of a Demise for years. The Plaintiff declares that he made the Lease to the Defendant the 28. day of May, and that afterwards scilicet the 27, of the same Month of May, the Defendant broke the Covenant. To this Declaration the Defendant did demur, because it appears that the breach is set forth to be before the lease began, which could not be, and so there is no cause of Action. But to this Bacon justice said, where the postea and the scilicet are repugnant in a deed, as here they are, the postea shall be good to signify the time of the Covenant broken, and the scilicet shall be void. Therefore show cause why the Plaintiff should not have judgement. Nota. Trin. 23 Car Banc. Reg. A Prohibition was prayed to the Corporation of Lincoln upon a suggestion made, and sworn in this Court, For a prohibition to the corporation of Lincoln. Admission. jurisdiction. Prohibition. Proceed. that the cause of Action if any were arose in the body of the County of Lincoln, and not within the jurisdiction of the City of Lincoln. Hales on the other side said, they had admitted the jurisdiction of the Court in that they had not pleaded to it. But Roll justice said, inferior Courts are limited in their jurisdictions, and aught to be kept in order by prohibitions if they exceed, and if they proceed in matters not within their jurisdiction their proceed are void. Adjourned to the next Term. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved for a Prohibition to an inferior Court, For a prohibition to an inferior Court. Admission. but on the contrary part it was said, that they moved too late, for they had admitted the jurisdiction of the Court by pleading, and cited 9 H. 7.12. and Fitz. jurisdict. 19 Bacon justice said, it is here in a Court of Common Law, and not in the spiritual Court or Admiralty, and therefore a Prohibition may be here granted notwithstanding the pleading there, Prohibition. but had it been the spiritual Court or the Admiralty, it had been otherwise. But roll justice said, it was all one in the spiritual Court, or Admiralty as it is in this case, if they exceed their jurisdiction. jurisdiction. Yet it is mischievous to grant a prohibition in this case, for thereby many judgements will be stopped. Therefore the Court would advise to the next Term, but stayed nothing. Trin. 23 Car. Banc Reg. THe Court was moved that the undersheriff might return a jury, because the Sheriff, For the undersheriff to return a Iury. Return. Surm se. Pedigree. Attorney. and Coroner were of kin to the Plaintiff, the Court thereupon demanded whether they had brought in the surmise, and proved the pedigree, to which they answered, They had, thereupon they were bid to name some Attorneys of the Country, which was done, and thereupon a rule made that they should return the Iury. Nota. Trin. 23. Car. Banc Reg. THe Court was moved for a rule to stay proceed in the Court at Maidston in Kent, To stay proceed g●●● the Court at 〈…〉. because a supersedeas could not be granted, for that nothing erroneous issued out of this Court. But the Court answered; that a supersedeas might well be granted, and so said Hodsden the Secondary, although nothing erroneous be issuing out of this Court, and Bacon justice said that the Writs of the Court are as good, and of as much force as the rules of Court, Writs. Rules. and therefore we will make no rule to stay their proceed, but you shall have a supersedeas if you will. Person and Dawson. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. AN Action of the Case was brought by Person against Dawson for these words, Arrest of judgement in an Act on for words your Son innuendo your Son William, stole a horse, and sold him for ten pounds; The Plaintiff hath a Verdict, the Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement that the words are not actionable, because uncertain, Case. Words. and the innuendo cannot help them; and the judgement was stayed till the other should move. It was afterwrads moved again and the judgement stayed, and this Term judgement given for the plaintiff. Mich. 23. Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment upon the Statute of usury. To quash an Endictment upon the Statute of usury. Pursuance. The exception taken was, that it is not said corrupt agreavit nec accepit, and so the Statute is not pursued; Roll justice said, that it is the corrupt receiving, and the corrupt contract, upon which Endictments are framed upon the old Statute, viz. 3. Jac. etc. but if the Endictment be framed upon the Statute of 21 Jac. there it ought to be upon the corrupt contract, and because this Endictment is framed upon the Statute of 21 Jac. and mentions not the corrupt contract, it is not good, and therefore let it be quashed. Yates against Lyndon. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Marry Yates brought an Action upon the Case for speaking these words of her, Marry Yates is a Sorcerer, and a Witch, and a white Witch, Arrest of judgement in an Act on for words. Case. Statute. Witchcraft. she can witch and unwitch! and hath a Verdict. The Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement that the words are not actionable, because the Plaintiff is not by the speaking of them brought within the Statute of 21. Jac. against Witchcraft: But Roll justice doubted, whether the word Sorcerer did not bring the Plaintiff within the Statute. Yet judgement was stayed till the Plaintiff should move. Hill. the same year it was moved again, and the Court adjudged Nil capiat per billam, for they held the words not actionable. Turner and his Wife. Mich. 3 Car. Banc. Reg. TUrner and his Wife brought an Action upon the Case for these words, Arrest of judgement in an Action for words. spoken of the Wife, she is a Witch, and I will take my oath of it; The Plaintiffs had a Verdict: The Defendant moves in Arrest of judgement that the words were not actionable; for to say one is a Witch, and to say no more, is not actionable, and the last words, I will take my oath of it, do not enlarge the former words. Words. The Court arrested judgement till the Plaintiff should move. Paradine and Jane. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Hill. 22 Car. rot. 1178. PAradine brought an Action of Debt for rend due for lands, Argument in debt for rent upon a lease for years. let for years unto jane the Defendant, and declares particularly how much rent was due, and for what time. The Defendant pleads a special Plea to this effect; as to part of the rent for which the Action is brought he confesseth the Action: As to the rest he pleads, that Prince Rupert an Alien, and an Enemy of the King invaded the land with an Army, and with divers armed men did enter upon him, and did drive away his Cattles, and expelled him from the lands let unto him by the Plaintiff, and kept him out that he could not enjoy the lands for such a time; and demands judgement if for the rent incur during that time the Plaintiff ought to have his Action? Demurrer. To this Plea the Plaintiff demurs, and for cause saith, that it is neither good in matter nor form. The 1. question was, whether a Lessee for years ousted by an Army or Aliens, can plead it in Bar, Plea. Debt. contract. W●st. in an Action of Debt brought for rend due upon the Lease? And to this it was said, that this is an Action of Debt, and lies merely upon the contract between the parties and so this collateral matter pleaded is nothing to the purpose, but had it been an Action of waist, if the waist had been done by Pr. Rupert, and his Soldiers, it may be it might have been pleaded to bar the Plaintiff, & 19 E. s. Brook Covenant 4. was cited. Next the Plea doth not say, that the Armed men with Prince Rupert were Aliens or Enemies of the King, Allen. Enemy. but only that Prince Rupert was so. But to this exception Roll justice answered, that they shall be so intended if they be his Army with which he invaded the Land. Plea. Another exception was taken, that the Plea gives no answer at all for one Quarters rend demanded, which incurred after the time that he was kept out by Prince Rupert. The Council for the Defendant in defence of the Plea, urged that it was not necessary to aver, that the Army with Prince Rupert were Aliens, and cited 3 H. 6. 61. and the Council took a difference between an Enemy and a Rebel; Rebel. and though in the case of a Rebellion this might not be a good Plea, yet in case of an Invasion he conceived it was, Remedy. because he could have no remedy against the party, and resembled this case to cases of like nature cited out of 9 E. 3. 7. 40 E. 3 6. & 33 H. 6. 1. Waste. and said, that where waste is done in the Lands let for years by one, again whom the Lessee can have no remedy over, there the Lessée for years is not chargeable for the waste, except he be bound by a particular Covenant to keep the Lands let without waste. Also by the Law of Reason it seems the Defendant in our case ought not to be charged with the rent, because he could not enjoy that that was let to him, and it was no fault of his own that he could not, Civil law. Canon. Moral. Innundation. and the Civil-law, and Canon-law, and Moral Authors do confirm this, and Dyer 56. & 11. Ass. 13. were cited; and it was said, there is no difference between an innundation and this invasion, and had the Lands been surrounded by water, the Lessee should not have been chargeable for the rent during that time, neither as I conceive shall he be here. Next consider the nature of the reservation, 10. Rep. 1 28. Rent. Payment. A rent is not to be paid until it may be intended that the Lessee might have received the profit of the thing for which the rent is to be paid, 27 E. 3.81. 8 H. 4.6. Fitzh. Execution 146.9 E. 3.16. neither by the Martial law is the Defendant chargeable, Martial Law. Law of Nature. Covenant. and that Law is the Law of Nature as well as of Nations. But Roll justice answered, that the Plea was not good, for he hath not pleaded that the Army were Aliens and unknown, as he ought to have done, and the pleading that it was hostilis exercitus, makes not the Plea more certain than before, and if the Tenant for years' covenant to pay rend, though the Lands let him be surrounded with water, yet he is chargeable with the rent, much more here. Therefore let the Plaintiff take his judgement. Fremling and Clutherbook. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. FRemling and his Wise, Arrest of Judgement in Trover and Conversion. Executrix of A. B. bring an Action of Trover and Conversion against Clutherbook, for Goods of the Testators found, and converted by the Defendant, and obtained a verdict against him. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, and took these Exceptions. 1. That the Declaration was of a joint possession of Goods of the Husband and Wife, and damages are given to the Husband and Wife, whereas the Goods properly belong to the Wife only as an Executrix, and not to the Husband and Wife. Possession. 2ly. It doth not set forth how the Feme came to the possession of the Goods. But to this Roll justice answered. that the possession of the Wife, Damages. as Executrix, was also the possession of her Husband, and that the damages recovered shall be to the estate of the testator, and so may concern them both. And for the second exception, this being a possessary Action only, it is not necessary to show how the possession of the Goods was gained. Stayed till the other should move. Parmiter and Cressy. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. PArmiter brings an Action upon the case upon an Assumpsit, and declares, Arrest of judgement in an Indebitatus Astumpsit. that the Defendant in consideration that the Plaintiff had sold and delivered unto him such a number of pieces of Stuffs, the Defenant did assume and promise to the Plaintiff to deliver unto him the value of the Stuffs in such Pipes of Wine, lying in Bradgates' Cellar in London as the Plaintiff should make choice of; and for not performing the same brings this Action. The Plaintiff obtains a verdict. The Defendant moves in arrest of judgement and shows these causes. 1. That the Plaintiff doth not aver in his Declaration, that he made any election of the Pipes of Wine, Averment. and before such election the Defendant was not bound to deliver them, nay it was impossible for him to perform the agreement before the election. 2ly. Election. The Plaintiff doth not set forth, that he made his election where the Wine was, which he ought to have done, because of the insupportableness of the commodity to be brought to him to make his choice. The Court held, that here aught to be a special request made to deliver the Wines, Request special. because it is upon a Contract, and an Action of Debt lies not for them, and thereupon arrested the judgement till the Plaintiff should move. The same Term judgement was given against the Plaintiff. Quod nil capiat per billam. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Plaintiff brings an Action of the Case against the Defendant, Arrest of judgement in an action upon the Case forwords. Words. Trial. False Doctria. for speaking these words against him being a Minister, He is an Adulterer, Whoremaster, Drunkard, a common Swearer, and a Preacher of false Doctrine. The Plaintiff hath a Verdict. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement that the words were not actionable, because the matter expressed by them is merely Ecclesiastical, and not tryable at the Common law; and it was said, that a man may preach false Doctrine, and not be punished for it, if he be not a beneficed man, and it doth not appear here, Heresy. that the Plaintiff had any living, and besides, it is not said he was a Preacher of heretical Doctrine, but of false Doctrine, which words are more ambiguous. The judgement was stayed till the Plaintiff should move. Mack and Cubitt. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Pasc. 23 Car. rot. Q. MAck brought an Action upon the case against Cubitt for speaking these words of him, Arrest of judgement in an action upon the Case for words. You are a branded Rogue, and have held up your hand at the Bar, Words. and deserve to be hanged, and shall be hanged. The Plaintiff hath a Verdict. The Defendant moves in arrest of judgement that the words were not actionable, for they are all but words of Infamy and disgrace, and not of damage to the Plaintiff. But it was said, that it had been adjudged that an Action did lie for saying one had been indicted of Barratry, where the party that was indicted was acquitted, and for saying one was a Bankrupt Rogue. But because Panel of Council with the Defendant said, Precedents. he could show Precedents that the words are not actionable, the Court forbore to give judgement, but desired to see them, and gave him time to bring them in another day. Panel cited two Precedents, but no judgement in either. Whereupon judgement was given for the Plaintiff. Blackwell and Ashton. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Four several persons were bound conjuctim and divisim in an Obligation to Blackwell, Demurrer to a Scire facias upon a Judgement. Demurrer. Abatement. Blackwell hath a judgement against them, one of the Defendants dies, Blackwell sues out a Scire facias against the 4. and it was demurred to the Scire facias, because one of the Defendants against whom the judgement upon which the Scire facias was granted, was dead when the Scire facias issued forth. In this case it was said, if two be bound jointly in an Obligation, and an Action be brought against one of them only, upon this Obligation the Defendant cannot demur, but may plead in Abatement of the Writ. And if two be bound jointly in an Obligation, and one of them die, and the Obligee brings an Action of Debt against the other that survives, he must in his Declaration set forth that the other is dead. The Plaintiff in the case at the Bar, perceiving the inclination of the Court to be that the Scire facias was not good, Scire facias. moved for his own expedition to have it quashed, which was granted. Lodge and Weeden. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Plaintiff brings his Action upon the Case against the Defendant, Arrest of Judgement in an action upon the Case. and declares, that the Defendant had killed divers infected , and had thrown out the inwards or offal of those upon the Close of the Plaintiff, whereby divers of the Plaintiffs were infected with the murrain, and did die thereof, and shows how many, and declares to his damage so much, and hath a verdict against the Defendant. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, and offers these exceptions, 1. The Declaration is, that the Plaintiffs were infected morbo mortali, Anglice with the murrain, whereas there is a proper Latin word to express the Murrain, Words. namely Lues, which ought to have been used, and not to be expressed by such uncertain words as morbus mortalis is, which signifies only a mortal disease, and so might be any other Disease as well as that. 2ly. The Declaration says that the Defendant did cast interioria, Anglice the innards or off all of the , whereas that is not the proper Latin word for them, but Intestine. 3ly. The Declaration doth not set forth what they were, nor how many they were, that the Defendant had killed, and thrown their inwards or offal on the Plaintiffs Close. But the Court overruled all the exceptions, and ordered the Defendant to show better cause why the Plaintiff should not have judgement. Rawson and Bargue. Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Vid. antea. THe case between Rawson and Bargue upon the special Verdict found in an Action upon the Statute of 2 Ed. 6. for not setting forth of Tithes, Arguments whether a Free Chapel or not within the Statute of 2 Ed. 6. Statute. Free Chapel. wherein the Question was whether the Chapel was a free Chapel, and given by the Statute of ● Ed. 6. to the King or no, was moved again and argued by Maynard that it was a free Chapel given to Edward the 6th. by the Statute, and said, the first reason was taken from the words of the Statute. A second reason from the preamble of the Statute. A third from the reason of the Statute. And a fourth from the meaning of the Statute. First the intent of the Statute was to change Chapels of superstition to pious uses, and doth intent reformation, and not to take away the Chapels themselves, and for this cause it being for so great a good, the Statute shall be generally interpreted, 11 Rep. f. 17. and the words All manor in the Statute, etc. do more oppose a distinction than the word all can do, for they are more emphatically used. 2ly Though it be parochial and with cure of Souls, yet it is not exempted out of the Statute, and this Statute differs from the Statute of 37 H. 8. And in case of free Chapels, all are vested in the King (be they superstitious or not) by the Statute. 3ly. Vesting. It is not within the exceptions in the Statute, and therefore is within the Statute, and he took this difference, Difference. that Donors of Churches are, where Churches are donative; and Patrons of Churches are, where they are presentative. 2ly. The proof of the contemporary exposition of the Statute is here to be considered. 6 H. 7.14. Free Chapels are of two forts, 7 Ed. 3.18.17 Ed. 3.12. Cooks Lit. 44. Division. Donative. A Free Chapel may be presentative, and a Parish-Chucrh donative, and they are so according to the foundation of them at the first. A Parish-Church cannot be a Frée-Chapel, Parish-Church. but a Free-Chapel may be a Parish-Church, 47 E. 3.5.9 E. 3. f. 10. ●0 Ed. 3. and a Church is not a Church if it have not Baptism, and Burial belonging unto it, Derivation. Bract. lib. ●. C. ●. 17 E. 3.5 E. 3. A Chapel may be within a Church, and a Church within a Chapel; and Capella is derived by Rhenanus the Civilian, from a Cap or Covering, and so is to be accounted more superstitious than Churches are, because their very name shows their derivation to be superstitious. Twisden argued on the contrary, that it was not within the Statute of ● Ed. 6. nor given thereby to the King: and that it is not a Free-Chapel, neither by the words, nor within the intent of the Statute. 2ly. If it be a Frée-Chapel, yet it is presentative, and within the jurisdiction of the Ordinary, and so not a Free-Chapel: for it hath no immunity either in regard of jurisdiction or otherwise, and cited Cooks Littleton, f. 94. The Chapels of the King are all Free-Chapels, because they they are exempt from all jurisdiction of the Ordinary, Register, 40, 41. Three are two sorts of Chapels, to wit, Frée-donatives, 6 H. 7. f. 1● 2ly. Presentatives. Nat. Br. 35. A Chapel may be presentative by the foundation of it, or by matter ex post facto, 22 H. 6. f. 26. Matter ex post facto. Presentation. A second reason to prove it to be presentative may be from the finding of the jury who have found it so, and the calling of it otherways is to no purpose to alter it, Institution. Cure of souls. Dyer 81 Next if it be a free Chapel it is presentative, 11. rep. 150. Cowel Tit. free Chapel, Lynwood 149, 150. Grendous Case 4. rep. Institution gives cure of souls, 13 E. 4. f. ●. There may be a benefice with cure not presentative, Words. and if it be with cure than it was not for a superstitious use, and cannot then be within the intent of the Statute. 1. rep. 23. And for the word all, it is not always taken generally. but restrictively. 2 H. 6. To the objection made to the Verdict, that it is not found by whom it is presentative, I answer: Special verdict. This is a special verdict, and it is the expression of the lay gens, and shall be interpreted according to common acceptation. The rule of Court was, to argue it again the Next Term, because it is a cause of great consequence. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. BAron and Feme bring an Action of Trespass of Assault and Battery, Arrest of judgement in assault and battery joining in an Action. and declare of an assaulting, and beating of the Feme, and have a verdict; the Defendant moves in arrest of judgement, and for cause shows that the Baron and Feme ought not to join in this Action, though the Assault and Battery was done to the Feme particularly, but that the Baron ought to have brought the Action alone, because what ever damages should be recovered would go to the Baron only, and cited 9 E. 4. fol. 51. The judgement was arrested till the Plaintiff should move. Vandicoote. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Plaintiff brings an Action of Debt against Vandicoote, Arrest of judgement in Debt for rent against an Executor. Debt in the detinet and debet. the Executor of I. D. for rend due unto him by the Testator in his life time, and hath a verdict. The Defendant moves in arrest of judgement, and for cause shows that the Plaintiff had declared that the Defendant detinet et debet which ought not to be, but in the detinet only, the Action being brought against him as an Executor for rent due in the Testators life, and cited Smith and Nichols case 7 Car. But Wild of Council with the Plaintiff said, it was good enough in the detinet and debet, though it might have been in the Detinet only: Hales on the contrary part said it was not good, for it could not be the Debt of the Executor, though he be to be charged, and so he cannot be said debere, but it is the proper debt of the Testator, and the Executor may be said detinere because he ought to pay it, Executors. Waiver. and doth not. Roll Justice said, that it had been adjudged good both ways, and said, that Executors cannot waive a Term come to them, and yet they cannot be charged in the debet and detinet. And prima fancy in the case at the bar, the Action may be brought in the debet and detinet. Yet put the cause in the paper, and argue it again. Tanner and Laurence. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. TAnner brings an Action upon the Case against Laurence, Arrest of judgement in an indebitatus assumpfit. upon an indebitatus Assumpsit to pay unto him two shillings a piece for every cloth he should buy for the Defendant, and declares for so much money due unto him, and hath a verdict; the Defendant moves in arrest of judgement, and shows for cause, 1. That it is not averred by the Plaintiff, Averment. Notice. that he gave any notice to the Defendant how many he had bought for him, and so it is not certain what is due to him. To this it was answered, that the were bought for the Defendant himself, and he may very well take notice of the number of them, without any notice given him. A second answer was, that here is a request set forth for the payment of the money, and this implies a notice. But Roll justice to this answer replied, Implication. that the request doth nor imply a notice, and so is I wists Case, and besides the notice ought not to be by implication, but must be averred certainly. Yet let it be moved again. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Plaintiff in an Action upon the Case upon an indebitatus declares that the Defendant in consideration of a certain sum of money, Arrest of judgement in an indebitatus assumpsit. due to the Plaintiff by the Defendant, for rend behind upon a lease for years, did assume, and promise to pay the same unto him at a certain day, and had not done it, and for this he brings his Action, and hath a verdict, the Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, and for cause shows that there is no consideration declared to ground an Action of the Case upon, for rent is a real thing, and an Action of Debt ought to have been brought for it, Consideration and not this Action. Roll justice said, that here is only a consideration in law set forth, which is not good to warrant this Action: Debt. But it may be there was some new consideration that sprung from the being of the rent behind that did ground this Action, but no such thing doth appear in the Declaration. Therefore the Plaintiff nil capiat per billam, if cause be not shown within 14 days why he should have his judgement. Wood and Salter. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. IN an arrest of judgement in an Action of Trespass for carrying away 24 load of timber, Arrest of judgement in Trespass. The exception was, that the Timber is not said to be the Timber ipsius querentis, and so no cause of Action. Upon this judgement was arrested. Burnet and Bird. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. BUrnet the Administrator of I. S. brings an Action upon the Case against Bird, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the Case upon a promise. and declares against him upon an Assumpsit made by the Defendant to the intestate, for the payment of a certain sum of money for a marriage portion, at 2 several days of payment equally, and that for not performing the same in the life time of the intestate, he brings this Action. The Plaintiff hath a Verdict: The Defendant moves in arrest of judgement, and shows for cause, that the Plaintiff doth not well set forth the granting of the letters of Administration to him, for he says, they were granted unto him by the of such a place, and doth not say loci illius ordinarium nor cui administratio-pertinuit. 2ly. It is said, that the money was to be paid at 2 several payments, which amounts to two several promises, viz. a promise to pay the first ten pound on such a day, and a promise to pay the other sum at another day to come, and doth not allege any particular request made by the intestate for the first ten pound. But Bacon justice overruled both the exceptions, and said to the first; Notice. Ordinary. Letters of ad ministration-Peculiar. That the law doth take notice of an being a public Ordinary, and therefore it is not needful to express, that the letters were granted per Archidiaconum of such a place, Ordinarium illius loci or cui administratio pertinuit, but otherwise it were if they were granted within a peculiar jurisdiction. Therefore he ordered to show better matter or else judgement should be given for the Plaintiff. Eels and Lambert. Mich. 23 Car. Benc. Reg. vid. antea. THe Case between Eels and Lambert was again moved, Argument up, on a special verdict. which upon a special verdict found was this; Sir Molton Lambert makes a lease of certain lands to Eels for 21 years by deed, and Covenants for himself, his Executors, Administrators, and Assigns, that the lessee shall peaceably, and quietly enjoy the lands let, during all the Term, the Lessor makes his Will, and thereby makes Lambert the Defendant his Executor, and dies, and by the Will divers goods in specie are devised to sundry persons, Lambert the Executor delivers the goods bequeathed to the Legatees, Eels is ousted of the lands by I. S. and thereupon brings an Action of Covenant against Lambert the Executor, who pleads fully administered. The question was, whether the paying of these legacies by the Executor were a devastavit, Devastavit. and so the Executor to be charged de bonis propriis to satisfy the Covenant broken or no, Green of Council with the Plaintiff, argues that it was a devastavit notwithstanding that the devise was of goods in specie, and that the Executor had only delivered them, because that the Legatees had no property in the goods bequeathed them, Property. before the Executor had delivered them, no more than if they had never been devised, and cited 2 H. 6. f. 16. and Cooks Lit. 111. and he said the finding of the Covenant broken was nothing to the purpose, and he said, it was a Devastavit, because it shall be intended, that the Executor might know of the Covenant made by the Testator, which he was bound also to keep, or else to satisfy for the breach of it, Covenant. and the contingency whether the Covenant would be broken or no makes no difference in the Case, for if it should it would prove mischievous in destruction of Covenants, which are to be accounted of as Debts, Doct. & Stud. lib. 2. C. 10. Dyer f. 324. Hob. ●. 363, 397. But it may be objected, that if this should be a Devastavit then Legacies could not be paid, which would be dangerous to Executors, by reason of being liable to suits for them, Executors. 21 E. 4 f. 21. Brook Tit. Process, S. 10. To t●is I answer; It may be dangerous, yet it is not to the purpose, for an Executor should consider of such dangers, when he takes upon him an Executorship, and take notice of them, and he is not compellable to pay Legacies, and the Law will not protect him, if he pay them against Law, Hob. 246. and if the Court Christian endeavour to compel him he may have a Prohibition. Prohibition. 3ly. The Executor peradventure might conceive that there would be Assets afterwards, and in that consideration did pay the Legacies, and if the 5 Rep. Green and Harisons case, and 15 jac. Robsons case be objected, I answer, this Case differs from them: for here the Question is between Legacies and Debts, and there between one Debt and another, to wit, between a Debt of a higher nature, and a Debt of a lower nature. Hales for the Defendant argued, that it was not Devastavit. 1. He agrees, Property. that the Legatees have no property in the Goods, by the devise. 2ly. If the Covenant had been broken when the Legacies were paid, it would have been a Devastavit. 3ly. He held, that the matter is as well found in the special verdict, as it might have been pleaded, and not put at all to the jury to find. The Question here is, whether the administration of the Goods, before the Covenant broken, be good after it is broken, and there is good matter before the Court found in the special verdict, though it might have been found better. The first Argument I will draw from the nature of that, upon which the Action is founded, namely, the Covenant. The Action depends partly upon the Deed of Covenant partly upon the breach of it, and here is no ground of Action at the time when the administration of the Goods was made; and Harisons case cannot be avoided: for a Statute is a present duty, Duty. Star. Obligation. and aught to be paid before an Obligation. Robsons case 14. & 15 jac. And it is as agreeable to Law, to pay a Legacy as a Debt upon a Covenant; and the mischief to the Lessee in our case is not so material, as the mischief may be on the Executors part, & it is not materially objected, that he might take security, Security. for he cannot compel it. For the Objection that our Law takes notice of a Legacy, I answer, that the Law takes notice of a Legacy, as to give an interest in it to the Legatee, Interest. although he may not take it without the Executors consent. 2ly. It takes notice of it as remediable by the Law of the Kingdom, though not by the Common-law: and therefore consider the Statute 21 H. 8. of Administrations; Common law, Civil law. and the Common-law is judge of the Statute, concerning Administration, and not the Spiritual-law, Hill. 17 jac. Hinson & Buttons Case. The Common-law gives not a remedy fora Legacy, Legacy. but the Spiritual-Court is supported by the Common-law to do it: and by the ancient Common-law there was remedy to recover a Legacy, 2 Rich. 3. f. 14. Glanv. lib 7. C. 6.7. and the power of the Ecclesiastical Court is derived from the Common-law, and the Common-law will take notice of a compulsary way in the Ecclesiastical-Court to pay a Legacy. And the payment in our case is executed, and now the Law takes notice of it, because the Defendant was compellable to it. Promise's. If an Executor promise to pay a Legacy, an Action upon the case will lie against him, if he do not pay it. Roll justice, the Testator may defeat all Covenants by this means; and Green's reason is not answered, which is the great doubt in the case. It was Necton & Sharps case, 38 Eliz. that Legacies ought to be paid conditionally, viz. to be restored, if the Covenant should be broken. When you argue again, argue to this point. Bacon justice cited a Case, 32 Eliz. in the Exchequer, against the opinion of Roll, and said, if the Legacies should not be paid, it might be a loss to the Commonwealth: for it may be the Goods will perish with keeping them, and the keeping of them may be a charge to the Executor, and no body shall have any benefit of them, for they may cost more to keep, than they are worth, and a Devastavit lies not against an Executor of an Executor, Devastavit. for the Devastavit of the first Executor. Roll justice, the Ecclesiastical-law ought to make a provision against these mischiefs, Prohibition. otherwise a Prohibition lies against them. Appointed to be argued a gain Tuesday seven-night. Watson and Watson. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Hiill. 22 Car. rot. 1687. Watson brought an Action of Debt upon an Obligation against Watson, Arrest of Judgement in Debt upon an Obligation to stand to an award. Award. the Condition was, to stand to the Award of two Arbitrators, or of the Umpire. The Defendant pleads nullum Arbitrium. The Plaintiff replies, that the Umpire made the Award. The Defendant demurs, and shows for cause, that the Award was not good: for it was incertain, and not final on both parts, for one party was awarded to pay so much money to the other, as in conscience should be due, and no man can say, what that is. The Court said, the Award was insensible. And Bacon justice said, it was a Vicar's Award. Puliston of Council with the Plaintiff cited these Books to prove the Award good, 8 Ed. 4. f. 2.20 Ed. 4. f. 1. 4.18 Ed. 4. f. 2. Pasc. 4 jac. Gosnolls case, & 9 H. 7. and said, these cases proved, that where an incertainty in an Award may be made certain, there the Award is good, and so it is in our Case. 2ly. He said, that the Award here is good, notwithstanding it be to pay so much money as shall be due in Conscience: Conscience. for it shall be meant as is due in Law: for Law and Conscience are one and the same. But Roll justice said, that the Award doth not make a final determination of the matters in controversy between the parties, and so it is no Award. And Bacon justice cited 5 Rep. That an Arbitrament ought to be certain, and final, and this Award wants both these properties; and therefore is not good. Fitchet against Wolston. Mich. 23 Car. FItchet had a judgement against I. S. in an action of Debt, Demurrer to a Plea upon a Scire facias, against an Administrator. Scire facias with a Fieri facias. I. S. dies intestate, Wolston takes out Letters of Administration of the Goods and Chattels of I. S. Fitchet takes out a Scire facias, with a Fieri facias to inquire what Goods of I. S. are in the hands of the Administrator, and to take them in execution upon the judgement Wolston, the Defendant, appears to the Scire facias, and pleads, fully administered. The Plaintiff demurs to this Plea, and shows for cause, that in this Case he should have pleaded non Devastavit, and not fully administered. 2ly. The plea answers not the Writ. The Court answered, all such processes are only to make the Executors, or Administrators to answer, Fully administered. and therefore fully administered is a good Plea, for it is a good answer, and it would be dangerous to plead other ways, And Roll justice said, that this being a Scire facias with a: Fieri facias, according to the new manner of making the Writ, it would be dangerous to plead non Devastavit, and it hath been adjudged a good plea, Non Devastavit. to say fully administered in a Scire facias against an Executor, but it is better to plead nulla bona devenerunt ad manus, Nulla bona. with which he could satisfy the Debt since the Scire facias brought. But this being a new case it is fit to be argued. Therefore let us have Books. Finer and Jeffry. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. FIner brings an Action upon the Case against Jeffry, and declares, Arrest of judgement in an Assumpsit. that the Defendant did assume and promise unto him, that if he would forbear to sue one who had assaulted him and beaten him, that he the Defendant would pay the Plaintiff as much money as he was damnified by the Assault and Battery; The Plaintiff hath a verdict. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, and shown for cause, Consideration. 1. That it doth not appear by the Declaration, that the Plaintiff had any intention to sue the party for the Assault and Battery, and so the Assumpsit in consideration, that he would forbear to sue for it is no consideration. 2ly. He doth not set forth, that he gave any notice to the Defendant, Notice. what damages he had sustained by the Battery. But the Court held, that the Plaintiff needed not to allege, that he had an intent to sue the party, for that the Defendant took notice of, when the Assumpsit was made: and for the notice what damages the Plaintiff had sustained, the request to perform the Assumpsit implies that sufficiently, and so gave judgement for the Plaintiff. Dersly and Dersly. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THree are indicted of Conspiracy and forgerg, Arrest of judgement upon an Endictment of Forgery. and one of them only is found guilty by the Iury. The party found guilty moved in arrest of judgement, and offered these Exceptions. 1. The endictment is for a joint forgery, and so one only cannot be guilty: but if one be acquitted, all must be acquitted. 2ly. The endictment is for forgery, and causing to forge, which are two several and different Acts. But to these the Court said nothing; But took another Exception, namely, Conspiracy. that the Conspiracy is not found upon which the Endictment is grounded, according to the Statute, for 2 are acquitted, and so there cannot be a Conspiracy in the third person, nor in any of them, for one cannot conspire alone. Bruer and Sowthwell. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. IN this case it was moved again in arrest of judgement, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon an Assumpsit. Nudum pactum. Consideration. upon the exception formerly taken, namely, that the words in the Declaration discounting for four Months were uncertain, and so there is no consideration for the Assumpsit, and then it is but nudum pactum. Roll justice said, the Declaration is insufficient for the incertainty: for it cannot be known what is meant by the word discounting. Yet he said, that though part of the Consideration, upon which the Assumpsit is grounded, be against Law; yet if the other part be good, and it may be divided, the Assumpsit is good notwithstanding. Yet we will hear Council on both parts, before the Plaintiff shall have judgement. Colson and Bedloe. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Entered Mich. 22 Car. rot. 434. COlson brought an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit against Bedlore, Arrest of judgement in an action upon the Case upon an Assumsit. and declares, that in consideration of so much moneys, paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant, the Defendant did assume and promise to deliver so many loads of Hay unto him at such a place, and for not performing his promise he brings his Action. The Plaintiff hath a Verdict; The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement upon these Exceptions. 1. The Declaration doth not set forth, Jurisdiction. that the place where the promise was made was within the jurisdiction of the Court, which ought to have been, because it is the ground of the Action. To this Roll Justice answered, that it doth not appear, that it is out of the jurisdiction of the Court, and it shall not be intended to be so, if it be not alleged by the other party. A second exception was, Intendment. Request. that there is not a special Request set forth for the Defendant to carry and lay the Hay in the place alleged. 3ly. The pleading is out of Court, for want of a continuance to the Court, for the continuance is not to the Court, Discontinuance. Verdict. but to such a day only. 4ly. The Verdict is informal, and shows no cause why damages are given. Roll justice to the first exception said, that the party ought to have taken advantage in pleading, that the cause of Action was out of the jurisdiction of the Court, Pleading. and not to move such matter in arrest of judgement, for it is improper. But the Court ruled the Plaintiff to show cause why judgement should not be arrested upon the third exception. Afterward the same Term judgement was given nil capiat per billam against the Plaintiff for the discontinuance in the Process. Tentch and Cletheroe. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Pasc. 22 Car. rot. 332. TEntch brings an Action of Covenant against Cletheroe, Error to reverse a Judgement in an Action of Covenant. & declares, that the Defendant had covenanted with him to pay such a sum of money into the Exchequer at such a time, and for not performing this Covenant he brings his Action. The Plaintiff hath a Verdict, & a judgement. The Defendant brings his Writ of Error, & assigns for error, that the Plaintif had not set forth in what County the Exchequer is, and citys Hobbs his case, Pasc. 8 Car. County. and a case 22 Car. C. Banc. That the County is material to be alleged, by reason of the Venue, 1 E. 4.3. Cooks institut. 210.21 H. 6. f. 4. The Court held that the County where the Exchequer was aught to be alleged, Exchequer. because the Exchequer is transitory, and not fixed to one place, Venue. and so there can be no Venue, because it appears not in what County it is. And for this cause the judgement was reversed. Sawyer and Russell. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. SAwyer brought an Action upon the Case for speaking these words of him, Thou art a Witch, and hast bewitched my Cow. Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the Case for words. Witchcraft. The Plaintiff hath a Verdict. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement for these reasons. 1. Such bewitching as is mentioned in the Declaration is not punishable by the Statute of 1 lac. for it comes not within any of the branches of that Statute, neither that which speaks of death by Witchcraft, nor of the other branch: for it is not averred, that the Cow was hurt or destroyed by the bewitching, and so the party is not punishable. Intendment. And it shall not be intended to be so, for the party shall not be punished by an Endictment by an intention, neither shall he be here in this Case. And 2ly. words ambiguous of this nature, shall be taken in mitiori sensu. Roll justice said, that these words, Words. Thou hast bewitched my Mother's Milk and Drink have been adjudged actionable, and here is a scandal of the party of whom the words are spoken; and the words thou hast bewitched, implies hurt done to the thing bewitched; and this case differs from an Endictment: for an Endictment must be more certain, than these words need to be. And a violent intendment as here is, may bring one within the compass of an Action. Therefore let the Plaintiff have his judgement, if better matter be not shown Monday next. Nevil and Mott. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. NEvill brought an Action upon the Case against Mott, and declared, Arrest of judgement in an action upon the Case for words. that the Defendant being in company with him with a Constable, did speak thus of the Plaintiff to the Constable, There he is, take him, for I charge him with flat felony, and after spoke these words of him also, Mr. Nevil hath taken my Sheep with a felonious intent. The Plaintiff hath a verdict; The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, that the words are not actionable, and cited Poland and Masons case, Hob. Rep. and alleged these reasons also. 1. Because the words were spoken to a Constable in prosecution of justice, which shall not be taken hold of by a private person as a particular injury meant to him. Averment. 2ly. It is not said the words were spoken falso & malitiose, as it ought to have been. But to the second Exception, Roll justice said, It is not not necessary to say, they were spoken falso & malitiose, where they appear to be scandalous, for there the Action lies well, though it be not so expressed, and if one charge another with suspicion of Felony, and speak such words of him, if they appear to be maliciously spoken, an Action very well lies. The rule was for the Plaintiff to take his judgement, if better cause be not showed to the contrary. King and Hide. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Hid moved for the quashing of an Endictment taken before Commissioners of Sewers, For quashing an Edictment before Commissioners of Sewers. wherein he was indicted for a nuisance made in the high way by reason of penning of water in the River, at his Mill, whereby the water overflowing the Banks did annoy the way and he took this exception to the Endictment, that it did not say it was a navigable River. But to this Roll justice answered, it was not necessary to say it was navigable: for if it be a common passage for water it is sufficient, and lies within the conusance of the Commissioners. But Roll took another exception to the Endictment; That it sets forth this overflowing of the water to be a nuisance to the high way, Nusance. and for this the party is indicted, whereas Commissioniers of Sewers have no power to meddle with such nuisances in the way, but only with passages by Water. And for this cause the Endictment was quashed. Monger and Shaterton. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Trin. 23 Car. rot. 569. A Writ of Error was brought in this Court to reverse a judgement given in the Barrow-Court of Southwark, Error to reverse a judgement given in the Burrow-Court of Southwark. and the Error assigned was, that in the Venire facias one of the jury is called Richardon, and in the Habeas Corpora he is called Richardson, which are two several names, and so it is incertain what the proper name is. To this the Council on the other side said, that this fault is helped by the Statute, it being after a Verdict. But Bacon justice said, Verdict. he doubted whether it could be helped now in this Court, though it might have been helped in the inferior Court, where the Action was brought by examination of it, and therefore ruled to show cause why judgement shall not be reversed on Friday next. It was this Term reversed at the Defendants motion for his own expedition. Brooke and Brook. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Trin. 23 Car. rot. 580. Brook brings an Action of Debt upon an Obligation against Brook, the condition was, Demurrer to a plea in debt upon an Obligation. that the Obligor should make an Estate of inheritance to the Obligee in such lands at such a day, and place, and for not doing it, he brings his Action. The Defendant pleads that he was ready at the day, and place, to make the Plainiff an estate of inheritance in the lands; The Plaintiff demurs to the plea, Notice. and for cause shows that the Defendant doth not show that he gave notice to the Plaintiff of his being there. To this Roll justice said, it is not necessary to give notice of the day or place. A second exception was that he had not showed that he gave the Plaintiff notice what estate of inheritance he would make him. To this Roll justice said, he ought to have shown, Time. Place. that he gave notice what estate he would make him, and therefore let the Defendant show cause why the Plaintiff should not have judgement. Kale and jocelyne. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Trin. 23 Car. rot. 1282. KAle brings an Action of Debt against jocelyne an Executor, Demurrer to a plea by an Executor in Debt for re● brought against him. Plea. Executor. Waiver. Covenant. and declares for rend grown due since the death of the Testator, by virtue of a lease for years made of certain lands by the Plaintiff unto the Testator which yet continues, and declares, that the Executor debet & detinet, etc. The Defendant pleads fully administered, the Plaintiff demurs upon the plea; For pleading in the debet and the detinet: Bacon justice said, it was good, and so had been adjudged. To which Roll justice answered it had been adjudged pro & con, to be good and to be bad, and he said, that an Executor cannot waive a Term let to the Testator, for he is bound by Covenant to hold it, and said that the Declaration was good in the debet and detinet prima fancy; for it shall be intended that the land let to the Testator is worth as much by the year, as the rent that is paid for it, till the contrary be shown, and then it is reason that the Executor be charged; Bacon justice said, that the Executor may waive the possession, if he find that the rent is more than the land is worth, otherwise it may be mischievous to him. Roll. justice said, that the Declaration must be in the detinet and debet, otherwise it will be mischievous to the Plaintiff, and said, that a specialty shall be satisfied before a rent reserved upon a lease by deed, Allets. which Bacon denied, and it was said, that a lease for years shall be assets in the hands of an Executor, although the rent reserved be the full value of the Lands let by the lease. The Defendant was ordered to show cause why judgement should not be given against him. Baker against edmond's. Mich. 23 Car. B. Reg. Hill. 22 Car. rot. 222. BAker brings an Action upon the Case against edmond's, Special verdict in an Action upon the Case whether a verdict maintains the issue joined. and declares, that whereas I. S. was indebted unto the Plaintiff in a certain sum of money, and afterwards being so indebted became a Bankrupt, and that a Commission upon the Statute of Bankrupt was taken out by him, and other creditors against him, and that it was found that the Defendant was indebted to the Bankrupt, the Commissioners of the said Commission did assign over the Debt of the Defendant mentioned in a certain schedule, amounting to such a sum, unto the Plaintiff, in part of satisfaction of the Debt owing unto him by the Bankrupt, by virtue whereof he demands the said Debt of the Defendant, who did assume, & promise to pay the same, and for not performing his promise, he brings his Action, the Defendant pleads non Assumpsit, and thereupon an issue was joined, and a special verdict was found to the effect, as the Plaintiff had declared, but they further find that the Debts mentioned in the schedule, and assigned over to the Plaintiff amounted to such a sum, whereas they find that the Defendant did not owe unto the Bankrupt so much as that Debt assigned is, but a less sum. And upon this verdict the question was, Verdict. Issue. Assignment. whether the verdict did maintain the issue, which was non Assumpsit, if it did, than they find for the Defendant, if not, then for the Plaintiff. In the breaking of the Case it was moved whether the Assignment were good or no, in regard that the Commissioners had mistaken the Debt, for the Debt assigned by them was greater than the Debt found by the jury, and so might be another Debt. But to this Roll justice said, that the assignment was not judicially before them in question, for if it were, it would be judged an ill assignment, but here it comes not in issue but only whether the Defendant did assume, and promise or no, and the special verdict concludes not upon the assignment, but whether the special matter found do maintain the issue or no, & therefore he was of opinion that the Plaintiff ought to have his judgement. Bacon justice differed in opinion, & said, that it is dangerous for Commissioners of Bankrupt, to assign Debts particularly. Commissioners. The rule than was to argue it the next Term: At which time Ward of Council for the Defendant argued, that the verdict was for the Defendant for this reason, viz. Because the Debt laid in the Declaration, and the Debt found by the verdict are not the same, and so the Defendant did not assume, and promise that which is laid in the Declaration, for there is no such Debt found, and if he should be charged with that, he might be doubly charged, Averment. for he may be again charged for the debt found by the verdict, and circumstances of quantity, time and place are averred in a Declaration to make things certain, and if they fall the Declaration is not good, 18 E. 3. fol. 25. 1. rep. 74. Palmer's Case. 2ly. The Declaration is insufficient, for it expresseth not what the sum is, but saith, a sum mentioned in a schedule of Debts, which is incertain: Roll justice interrupted Ward. and said, all that you have argued is out of doors, but the last matter touching the Declaration, and to that Hales of Council with the Plaintiff said, the Declaration is good, and certain enough, for there appears no other sum in the schedule than is mentioned in the Declaration. Bacon justice, The assignment is of the debt of this man due to the Bankrupt, be it more or be it less, and hath no reference to the account, and reckoning between them, & so the Assignment is good, though it agree not in the sum with what is justly due, and the issue is upon the Assumpsit, Issue. Admittance. and not upon the Assignment, for the Assignment is admitted by the Defendant, and so not material whether it be an Assignment of the true sum or not. judgement was given for the Plaintiff. Bruer and Sowthwell. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Plaintiff in this Case moved again for judgement, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the case upon an Assumpsit. notwithstanding what had been formerly spoken to arrest it, for though the word discomputando in the Declaration be insensible, yet there is enough in the declaration to ground the Action, and that is the breach of the Assumpsit assigned to deliver the Currants bought of the Defendant, and the word discounting shall not hurt it. Bacon justice was of the same opinion. But Roll justice said, Assumpsit. Contract. all the bargain is here set forth upon which the Assumpsit was made, and if the bargain be ill, the Assumpsit is not good. Hales of Council with the Plaintiff said, if part of the bargain be insensible, and part not yet a good Assumpsit may be grounded upon that part which is good, But Roll said the bargain here is entire, and if part of it be not good it is all naught: yet he said if part of a bargain be good, and part void, yet an Action may be brought upon it. The rule was, That it should be argued again on both parts. Seaman against Edward's. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Trin. 23 Car. rot. 920. SEaman brings an Action against Edward's, Demurrer to a plea pleaded by an Executor. Plea. Executor. and declares against him as Executor of I. S. (whereas the truth was, that I. S. made 3 others Executors, and not the Defendant.) The Defendant pleads that he is not the same person named in the Will. To this plea the Plaintiff demurs, and for cause shows that he may be an Executor de son tort demesne, though he be not named in the Will, and so may be chargeable, and therefore he ought to have pleaded ne unques Administered come Executor, and of this opinion was the Court, and ordered the Defendant to show cause why judgement should not be given against him. judgement was given for the Plaintiff. Dod against Eton. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. DOd brings an Action upon the Case against Eton for speaking these words of him, thou hast the French Pox, Exception to a special verdict. the Defendant pleads not guilty, the jury upon this Issue find a special verdict, viz. That the Defendant had said, thou hast had the French Pox, whereupon the Defendants Council said, that the Verdict doth not maintain the words laid in the Declaration, and that the words that are found in the verdict are not actionable, and so the Plaintiff can have no judgement, and cited 15 Jac. Nutcombes Case, Verdict. and the words found are not issuable, and so the verdict is imperfect, 40 Ass. 41. Kelway. 6. 18 Ed. 3. fol. 19 Pasc. 33 Eliz: Banc. Reg. Dame Ratcliffs Case. Dyer Sir, john Burges Case prove that the verdict is too short. Roll justice said, if the verdict be imperfect, there may be a new venire facias, Venire de novo. and so it is against the Plaintiff, for he cannot have judgement. Panell of Council with the Plaintiff cited Osborn, and Brooks Case that the verdict was for the Plaintiff. But Roll justice said, that the jury cannot find a thing that is not within the Declaration to maintain the Declaration, for they ought to hold themselves to the issue, and that they have not here done, and therefore the verdict is imperfect, and there must be a new venire facias to try the issue again, for judgement cannot be given upon this verdict, for they do not find that he spoke not the words in the Declaration which are the most material, so that the matter is not found fully enough for us to proceed to judgement one way or other. Adjourned. Poole against Coply. Mich. 23. Ca Banc. Reg. POole brings an Action of Trespass against Coply, Arrest of judgement in Trespass. and hath a verdict against the Defendant. It was moved in arrest of judgement that the Declaration is incertain, for the Plaintiff declares that the Defendant cepit et asportavit decem coria, anglice hides, and the word Coria is uncertain, for it may be coria equorum, or coria ovium, or of any other . To this Roll justice said, Anglice. that it is well enough, for the Anglice had made the word certain, and it is the usual manner to plead it thus. The Court ordered the Plaintiff should have his judgement, if better matter were not shown to the contrary. Hull against Gurnet. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. HUll brings an Action of false imprisonment against Gurnet, Demurrer upon a special plea in false imprisonment. the Defendant pleads a special justification, that he took, and imprisoned the Plaintiff by virtue of a Commission granted out of the Court of the Admiralty, to examine the taking away of certain goods which were wracked by the Sea. Custom. To this plea the Plaintiff demurred, and shown for cause; That the Defendant hath not set forth the Custom of the Admiral Court, that the first process thereof is a Capias, and so it appears not, whether he have proceeded right or no. Admiralty. 2ly. It doth not appear that the matter for which the Commission was granted is Maritime, and other matter they ought not to meddle withal. The Rule of Court was to show cause why judgement should not be given against the Defendant upon this plea. Smith against Stone. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. SMith brought an Action of Trespass against Stone pedibus ambulando, Special justification in trespass pedibus ambulando. Trespass. the Defendant pleads this special plea in justification, viz. That he was carried upon the land of the Plaintiff by force, and violence of others, and was not there voluntarily, which is the same trepasse, for which the plaintiff brings his Action. The Plaintiff demurs to this plea: In this case Roll justice said, that it is the Trespass of the party that carried the Defendant upon the land, and not the Trespass of the Defendant: as he that drives my into another man's land is the Trespassor against him, and not I who am owner of the Cattles. Matthew against Herle. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Trin. 23 Car. rot. 1554. MAthew brought an Action of trespass against Herle for breaking his Fence, and entering into his Close, etc. Demurrer to a plea in trespass quare clausum fregit The Defendant pleads that I. S. was seized of this land, wherein the Trespass is supposed to be done, in fee, and so seized did demise the same for years by deed to the Plaintiff reserving rend, in which deed was a clause of reentry for non payment of the rent, and afterwards made his last Will in writing, and died; by which will be gave the said land in qua, etc. to the Defendant, and that after the rent was behind, and that he for the non payment of the rent according to the Covenant in the deed, by virtue of the clause of reentry did enter intot he lands, which is the same breaking of the Fence, and entry for which the Plaintiff brings his Action, and demands judgement if the Plaintiff ought to have his Action. To this Plea the Plaintiff demurs, and shows for cause: That it doth not show that the lease made to the Plaintiff is a lease of the land, in which the Trespass is supposed to be done, 2ly. Licence. The Defendant doth not show that he did ●nter into the land by leave of the Executor, which he ought to have done; for though the land was devised to him by will, yet he cannot enter into the land without leave of the Executor. The Court ordered the Defendant to show cause why judgement should not be given against him upon his plea. and Long. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Plaintiff brought an Action upon the Case for these words spoken of him, Arrest of judgement in an action for words. Long is a murderer, and hath bewitched my Child, and was the death of my Child, and obteins a verdict. The Defendant moves in arrest of judgement, and takes these exceptions to the Declaration. 1. That it is not said, that the Child was bewitched to death. 2ly. It doth not express whether the Child bewitched was born alive or not. To this the Court said, Felony. that the bewitching of the Child is Felony, though it do not die by it. And to the second exception, That the Court doth not take notice of a Child if it be dead-born, and they will intent it was born alive; and Roll justice said, that these words Thou didst kill my Master's Cook, Averment. have been adjudged actionable, although the Plaintiff did not aver, that his Master had a Cook. Therefore let the Plaintiff take his judgement, if better matter be not shown Saturday next. Carver against Pierce. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. CArver brings an Action upon the Case against Pierce for speaking these words of him, Arrest of judgement in an action for Words Thou art a Thief, for thou hast stolen my Dung, and hath a Verdict. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, that the words were not actioanble: for it is not certain whether the Dung be a Chattel, or part of the , and if so, it cannot be Theft to take it, but a Tresspass, and then the Action will not lie. Chattel. Bacon justice, Dung is a Chattel, and may be stolen. But Roll justice answered, Dung may be a Chattel, and it may not be a Chattel; for a heap of Dung is a Chattel, but if it be spread upon the Land it is not, and said, the word Thief here is actionable alone, Felony. and there are no subsequent words to mitigate the former words: for the stealing of Dung is Felony if it be a Chattel. Bacon justice said, It doth not appear in this Case of what value the Dung was, and how shall it then be known, whether it be Felony or petty Larceny? To this Roll answered, the words are scandalous notwithstanding and actionable, though the stealing of the Dung be not Felony. The rule was, to move it again Tuesday next. Mich. 23. Car. Banc. Reg. A Writ of Error was brought in this Court to reverse a judgement given in the Marshal's Court, Error to reverse a judgement, for discontinuance in the Process. Discontinuance. and the exception taken was, that there was a dicontinuance in the process, and so there aught to have been no judgement, and therefore the judgement given is erroneous; and that there was a Discontinuance it thus appears. The Continuance was ad proximam Curiam, and it appears upon the return of the Venire facias, that that was no Court day, for it was the three and twentyeth day of the Month, whereas Friday, on which day the Court was held, was not the 23 day, and so there is Error in the continuance. Roll justice said, the former Continuance was to the 9th. day, and from thence to the 15th. and that is but six days, and so wants of the time. judgement. Bacon justice, Where there is a Discontinuance the Court hath no power to give judgement, and so the judgement is here erroneous, and therefore let it be reversed, nisi causa, etc. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. LEssee for years of Lands by Deed, Demurrer to a Plea in an action of Covenant. brings an Action of Covenant against the Lessor, and declares, that the Lessor had covenanted, that he should peaceably and quietly enjoy the Lands let during the Term, and that a Stranger entered upon him, and ousted him within the Term. To this Declaration the Defedant demurs. Roll justice said, that the Covenant in this Case is broken, though it be a Stranger that entered and ousted the Lessee. Walker of Council with the Defendant took this difference, where a Stranger enters upon the Lessee and doth a Trespass, and where he enters and outs the Lessee; in the former Case he said, Covenant. the Covenant is not broken: but in latter it is broken. judgement was given for the Plaintiff except cause should be shown Monday next. Thynn against Thynn. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Hill. 23 Car. rot. 1658. THynn brought an Action of Dower against Thynn, Error to reverse a judgement in Dower. Return. Proclamation. and hath a judgement by default, and thereupon a Writ of Enquiry issued out to the Sheriff, who delivered seisin of the Dower recovered, and returned the Writ; upon this judgement, The Defendant brings a Writ of Error, and assigns these Errors in the Record. 1. The original Writ appears not to be returned according to the Statute; for the year doth not appear when it was returned. 2ly. The Proclamation made by the Sheriff appears not to be where the Land lies. 3ly. Summons. The return doth not mention that the Proclamation was after the Summons, as it ought to be, as it is Hob. Reports, in Allens Case. 4ly. It is not said that he did make Proclamation upon the Land. 5ly. It appears not that the Proclamation was in the Parish where the Summons was, as the Statute directs. To these exceptions Hales of Council on the other side, answered. To the first, Return. that the return of the original Writ shall be intended to be in the year of the Reign, and not of the Age of the King, though the word Reign be omitted. To the second, the Lands lie in divers Parishes, and Proclamation at the Church of any of the Parishes is good enough. 2ly. It doth not appear, that there are divers Churches in New-Sarum where the Proclamation was made. To the third exception, the Proclamation is said to he made prout breve postula●, and that shall be supposed duly done, and implies all requisite circumstances, and he cannot make another return, and it is impossible to be otherways. To the fourth, it is not necessary to return the place of the Summons, and it is said that it was made secundum formam Statuti, which supplies the rest. And to this the Court said, that the words secundum formam Statuti extend far. And Roll justice said, that Proclamaiton in one place was good in all. Holhead of Council with the Plaintiff, in the Writ of Error proceeded, and took these exceptions in the demand of the Dower. 1. The demand is generally de rectoria, which is not good, Demand; Rector. for the incertainty of it: for there may be a Rector of a College, of a Province, & of a Bishopric, as well as of a Parish-Church, and therefore it ought to have been de Rectoria Ecclesiae parochialis de etc. 12 H. 4. f. ●9. pl. 1. 2ly. The demand decimarum is too general, and not good, and it ought to have been decimarum granorum, soeni, etc. for the demand de omnimodis decimis quibuscunque is too general, 11 Rep. Herbert's case. 1. To these exceptions Hales answered, that a demand in a Writ of Dower need not to be so exact as in other original Writs: for original Writs are not alterable, but aught to answer the forms in the Register. To the second he said, that rectoria shall be intended the Rectory of a Church, and the Statute extends not to this: besides the place of the Rectory is described, which makes it certain enough. To the third, it is not necessary to express the Tithes particularly, and the demand being of the Rectory it compriseth all the Tithes, also the demand is de omnimodis decimis which is a general demand, and compriseth all, and is not the decimis only, for that might be incertain. Holhead, The demand is de rectoria & de omnimodis decimis which is a demand of one thing twice, and that is not convenient, for by this means the party may recover damages twice, and the Court will be also inveagled by this means, and it matters not though we have not pleaded to this: for the Court ought to take notice of it, Notice. because it is in the original Writ. Next there is no form in the Count, for cum pertinentiis is informal, for it refers to the Parish, and not to the Manor, 27 E. 3. f. 86. Pl. 3. Hale●, This is but a variance in form, and is not material, and also it shall be intended to refer to the Manor, and not to the Parish. Holhead, The demand is not warranted by the Writ, for the Vill and Parish are not named in the Writ, but are named in the demand, 11 Rep. Arondels case. Hales, The demand is not the rectoria in Tymsbury, but the Tymsbury, and is the denomination of the thing demanded, Tithes. Parissi. and not of the Vill where it lies. Holhead, It is not said, where the Tithes extend, and they may extend to divers Vills, as a Parish may, 19 E. 3. f. 9 Hales, Here is one demand, and it includes all the Tithes. Roll justice, You have demanded the Rectory in Timber, and not the Rectory of Timber, and by the grant of ones Manor in Dale, no more of it passeth than what doth lie in Dale, and here it shall be intended so much of the Tithes as are in Timber. Holhead, Here is a demand of Dower of such things whereof Dower lies not, viz. of a quarry of Stones, and it appears not that the Quarry was open in the life of her Husband; and if it were, yet it is improper to demand it by the name of a Quarry. Hales, the word Quarry is a good word, & well-known what it means: for Quarrera is an old wel-known Latin word for it, Dower. and she is as well dowable of it as of a Mine of Coals, and it shall be intended to be open, because she demands it by that name of a Quarry. Holhead, The demand of the Dower is also of a Hundred, of which a Woman is not dowable, because it is an entire thing, and cannot be divided, and the demand should have been de tertia parte proficuorum hundredi. To this Roll justice answered, then by your reason she shall never keep a Court. Hales, It is well enough demanded, for a demand shall be of the thing itself, and not of the profits of it, for the profits were not in the Husband, but he was seized of the Hundred, and the profits are a thing incertain. Holhead, The execution of the Habere facias fesinam is not well executed, for by it two third parts are assigned for Dower, and that is more than the demand. Hales, That is but a repetition of the thing demanded. Holhead, A thing not demanded at all is assigned for Dower, viz. view of Frank pledge. Hales, That is but an incident to another thing that is demanded, viz. the Hundred, and by the demand of the Hundred the view of Frankpledge is demanded, and all other incidents to the Hundred. Holhead Here is an assignment also of all tenors, and she cannot have Homage, because she is a Woman. Hales, She shall have all tenors which she is capable of, and so all shall be understood in this place, and no other she shall have. Holhead, The judgement is also if 15 Copyholds & Tenements which lately were Copyholds. Roll justice, This is good enough, and what loss have you by it? Holhead, The Assignment is also of the 3d. part de Copicia & de Structuris, and other words there are which are also incertain. And there is error in the assignment of damages: for the damages are assigned ultra valorem terrae, which is against the Statute. Roll justice, Damages. judgement. the Statute is an addition of the value and damages, for the judgement is perfect without returning the Writ of the damages, and so hath been adjudged in the Common pleas. Holhead, Here is an ill suggestion of the Feme, for the suggesteth, that her Husband died seized in fee of all the Lands out of which she demands her Dower, and that is not true, for he died seized of part of them in tail. To this the Court said, that is not material if he died so seized, that she ought to have Dower. Holhead, Damages are given ultra valorem, which I conceive is not good. Roll justice, It is well enough: for damages are given, and the value by the Statute. Holhead, The return of the Elegit is not good. Hales, That is another Record, and appears not now in the Court. Roll justice, The Elegit hath no reference to the former Record. Holhead, There is one error in fact, and that is confessed by your joining in demurrer. Doubleness. Roll justice, You might have demurred for this doubleness, for one cannot assign an error in fact, and another error in Law in a Writ of Error, for this is double. Hales, It is true, but we have lost that advantage. Adjourned to be argued again the next Term. Robinson against Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. RObinson brought an Action of Trover and Conversion against T. B. Arrest of Judgement in Trespass. and hath a verdict. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, and shown for cause, that the Declaration was not good, for the Plaintiff amongst other things declares, that the Plaintiff had found and converted to his own use unum vestigium, Anglice a Footstool, whereas it signifies a Footstep, or a print of the foot, and not a Footstool. 2ly. The Plaintiff declares pro decem ponderibus Aeris, meaning ten pound of Brass, whereas it should be aeris with a Dipthong, for Aeris is of Air, and not Brass. But this exception was overruled by the Court, because in the writing of Court-hand, in which hand Declarations are written, No Dipthongs in Court-hand. there are no Dipthongs used, and so the word Aeris might as well signify Brass as Air. But for the other exception, judgement was stayed till the Plaintiff should move. Izack against Green. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Izack brings an Action upon the Case in London against Green, For a Procedendo to try an action in London. for calling her Whore. Green removes the cause by a Habeas corpus into this Court, and hath a Supersedeas to stay the Plaintiffs proceed in London. The Plaintiffs Council moved for a Procedendo, that he might proceed in London, because that in London, by a special Custom there an Action doth lie for calling a woman Whore, though out of London it lies not, and cited Pascal and Barber's Case 21 jac. to prove it. Bacon justice, The custom of London is to be certified that we may judge of the reasonableness of it, and we are not to take notice of it upon a surmise, and it seems that a procedendo should not here be granted, Procedendo, Notice. because the matter with which she is charged by the words belong to the Conisance of the Civil law to try it, and not to our Law, as it is 2 H. 4. Roll justice, One may in some Cases have an Action at the Common law, where he may have remedy also in the Ecclesiastical Court; for the Common law is to be preferred, and by a special custom as the Case here is, an Action may be maintained where it lies not at the Common law, and so was it held 8 Car. and 13 Car. And if there should not be a procedendo granted in this Case, the Plaintiff would be tied up by the habeas corpus, but if it be granted the matter may be tried, and upon that if the judgement be erroneous a writ of Error may be brought in the Hustings in London, and so all the matter may come in question to be argued, Action. and he said that a Charter cannot give an Action, which the Common law allows not. But let the matter rest as it is till we can agree. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Plaintiff brought his Action upon the Case, Arrest of judgement in an action upon the case. for these words, thou muttron-monger thief bring home my stolen hay. The Defendant makes a special justification, that the Plaintiff had stolen a sheep, and upon this was an issue joined, and a verdict for the Plaintiff. The Defendant moves in arrest of judgement that the Declaration was not good; for it only chargeth the Defendant with speaking of the words, and doth not say dixit de querente, and though those words be in the replication, yet that makes not the Declaration good. Roll justice, The Declaration is not good, for the words may be spoken of any other body, as well as of the Plaintiff. Bacon justice agrees with Roll, and said, that the word dixit was not in the Declaration, and so it appears not whether the Defendant spoke, or writ, or thought the words, and which is more it is not said, that the words were spoken in the presence of any body, and then they cannot be scandalous; Roll justice said, one cannot rejoin upon words, which are not in the Declaration nor in the plea; for if the Declaration, and the plea be naught, Replication. the replication cannot make them good. The rule of Court was nil capiat per billam, except cause shown Saturday following. Kinpe against johnson. Mich 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Pasc. 23 Car. rot. 154. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in Hull, Error upon a Judgement in Hall. Continuance for these Errors assigned. 1. That one of the continuances was to a certain day of the mouth, where it ought to be ad proximam curiam; 2. The Declaration was pro se decem bestiis, Anglice Cows or Whyes, which is too general; for the word bestia may signify any beast whatsoever as well as a Cow. The judgement was reversed except cause shown to the contrary. More against Clipsam. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. MOre brings a Replevin against Clipsam, Argument upon a Replevin. and declares of a hundred oves Matrices et vervices distrained by Clipsam. Clipsam demurs to the Replevin for the incertainty of it; for it appears not how many of the hundred sheep distrained, and replevied, were Matrices, or ewes, and how many were vervices, or weathers; Maynard moves for judgement in the Replevin for the Plaintiff, and held that centum oves alone was good, and certain, and the addition Matrices, and vervices, shall not make an incertainty, Incertainty. and the writ of Replevin doth not show the cattles distrained particularly, but the help of the party, and the view of the Sheriff must concur to show what are to be delivered by the writ. 2ly. Here is a good issue argumentative, although it be not so formal. 3ly. Issue. There is no more in the issue at the Bar, than in the avowry, for all the Term is but one day, & there is no division of time in it, & it is dangerous to make fractions, Term. & a Statute acknowledged in the Term relates to the first day of the Term. Statute. Relation. Hales on the other side agreed that centum oves without saying any more had been certain enough, but as they are here distinguished into Matrices, & vervices, there is no certainty at all; for the in kind are demanded, and aught to be delivered as they are demanded, so that if the demand be incertain there can be no certain delivery. 2ly. The issue is ill, and is not helped by the verdict; for 1. the title made is not answered. 2. Traverse. The traverse is only to the conclusion, and so is but by way of inference, and is not helped after a verdict; for the plea is not answered: Advantage. for the words fuit et adhuc est sesitus is not good, for it is not material whether he were seized at the time of the distress or no, but whether he were seized at the time of the replevin, and there is a distance between the replevin, and the avowry, and there is a prius and a posterius in it. Roll justice said, it is made up in the return, and there is no distinction of time, and if one plead an ill plea, Plea. and the issue upon it be found against him, he shall not take advantage of his own ill plea, and if there be a negative, and an affirmative, though the issue be not well joined, it is helped by the Statute of jeofailes, otherwise, if there be not an affirmative, and a negative; for then there is no issue at all joined to be helped. Bacon justice, Oves matrices et vervices is ill; for the Sheriff knows not what return to make; Roll accords, and said, you have made that which was certain, to be incertain by the specification you have made, and a replevin is a demand, and aught to be as certain as a praecipe. judgement was given against the Plaintiff in the case at the bar, because the Declaration was ill, and uncertain. Gilbert agaiast Stone. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Trin. 23 Car. rot. 1703. GIlbert brought an Action of Trespass quare clausum fregit, Demurrer upon a plea in Trespass. and taking of a gelding, against Stone. The Defendant pleads that he for fear of his life, and wounding of twelve armed men, who threatened to kill him if he did not the fact, went into the house of the Plaintiff, and took the gelding. The Plaintiff demurred to this plea; Roll justice, This is no plea to justify the Defendant; Trespass. for I may not do a Trespass to one for fear of threaten of another, for by this means the party injured shall have no satisfaction, for he cannot have it of the party that threatened. Therefore let the Plaintiff have his judgement. Symons and Low. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Trin. 23 Car. rot. 650. SYmons brings an Action upon the Case against Low for speaking these words of her, Error upon a judgement for words. Plaint. She, innuendo the Plaintiff, is perjured, and hath a verdict, and a judgement; the Defendant brings a Writ of Error to reverse this judgement, and assigns for Error that the plaint was entered the same day that the words were spoken, which was said ought not to be, because the Action should be brought after the words spoken, Fractions. which shall not be intended to be if it be the same day, because the Law admits of no fractions of time, which will be, if a day be divided into several parts, as it here must be, for there must be one hour supposed when the words were spoken, and another hour when the plaint was entered. But Roll justice said, it was well enough, and ordered the Plaintiff to take her judgement, if cause were not shown before the end of the Term. Cheevers against Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Upon a rule of Court to show cause why a scire facias to revive a judgement was not good, To quash a scire facias. This was offered for cause, that it doth not show before whom the judgement was given, which was to be revived by the scire facias, and consequently there appears no judgement to warrant the scire facias. To this Roll justice answered, that in the Common pleas the course is to set forth before whom the judgement is given, but in this Court the course is not so: But how comes the Record hither? The Council answered, That there was a judgement in Canterbury, and upon that a Writ of Error was brought in this Court, and the judgement affirmed upon that Writ of Error, Scire facias. and then a Scire facias issued out here upon the judgement against the bail, and upon this the bail moves upon the record, that there is error in the scire facias. Roll justice, The Record is well enough; In a scire facias it is not requisite to say Consideratum est per curiam. Therefore let the scire facias stand. Carver and Pierce. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Case between Carver and Pierce was again moved by Hales, Arrest of judgement for words. wherein it was moved formerly in arrest of judgement that these words Thou art a thief, and hast stolen my dung are not actionable: That the words are actionable for these reasons 1. The first words are actionable, and the second words are accumulative, and aggravate the former words, and do not mitigate them. 2. It may be felony to steal dung, and the violence of the words do enforce it to be so intended. Bacon justice, I hold that judgement is to be given for the Plaintiff, and so it was for these words, thou art a thief, and hast stolen my Corn. Roll justice was of the same opinion, and said that the second words are not violent enough to allay the first words, and are not explanatory, and by way of mitigation; for the words are not, for thou hast, but they are, and thou hast stolen my dung. judgement was given for the Plaintiff▪ antea. Eels and Lambert. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Case between Eels and Lambert was again argued by Latch for the Plaintiff, and by Twisden for the Defendant, Latch argued to this effect, Argument upon a plea by an Executor. Legacy. That the Legatee hath no right in the legacy, until it be delivered unto him by the Executor, 2 E. 4 fol. 13. but if a legacy be given in this manner, if I die let my Cousin have such a thing, there the Legatee may take the legacy without the delivery of the Executor, and a thing which cannot be divided cannot be administered. Bracton l. b. 2. C. 26. 7 H. 6. Administration. Devise. A devise is void if there be not sufficient goods besides to satisfy the Debts of the Testator. 2. The disposition of the Testator ought to agree with the law of God, the law of nature, and the Law of the Land, and whereas it is objected that there will be an inconvenience, if the legacies shall not be paid, I answer, the Law regards not this inconveniency; But 2ly. this inconvenience is none in respect of the inconvenience will be on the other side if the legacies be paid, namely the breaking of the Law of God, the Law of Nature, and of the Land, and the inconveniences supposed are helped by the Civil Law, Caution. for it takes caution in paying of legacies to repay them in such accidents as are in our Case. Twisden for the Defendant argued, that it was a good administration of the goods, and that there is no assets in the hands of the Executors, and he agrees that a devise of goods in specie, and a devise of money is all one; but this is not a Debt, and so is not to be paid; for in judgement of Law, it is presumed that the Covenant shall not be broken, and that it shall not be respected in regard of the incertainty whether it shall be broken or no, but the Law takes notice of the Will, and it is of temporal conusans, 2 Rich. 3. 11 H. 7. f. 12. and it takes notice of a legacy to try the right of it, and to discharge it, and the Executor here is compellable to pay the legacies, and cannot refuse it neither by the Common law, nor by the Spiritual law; Covenant. but it is objected that it is inconvenient that one shall avoid his own Covenant by his own devise. To this I answer, he might have done it in his life by giving away all his goods; and 2ly. There shall not be intended to be fraud in the Will, and there are more inconveniences of our part in not paying the Legacies, than on their part by paying them: for by this means, men shall have no power to dispose of their own Goods by Will, by reason of Covenants in Leases and Deeds made by them; and the Spiritual Court cannot compel a Legatée to put in security for his Legacy, Security. as is surmised. Adjourned to the next Term to give judgement. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved to deliver their opinion in a Case formerly moved, Whether an Attornment good or not. wherein the Question was, whether an Attornment made by a Lessée for years the same day that the rent was due to be paid upon his Lease to him that had purchased the reversion of the Land let unto him, and for which the Purchaser had brought his Action, Attornment. be a good Attornment. Roll justice said, that it is a good Attornment by the averment made, and by the finding of the jury, and that judgement ought to be for the Plaintiff. Bacon justice agrees, and said, the Attornment shall be intended to be before Sun set, and not afterwards. Therefore let the Plaintiff take his judgement. Parmiter against Cressey. Mich. 23 Car. Banc Reg. THe Defendants Council upon a former rule of Court to show cause, Cause why judgement should not be given in an Action upon an Assumpsit. Averment. Notice. Request. offered for cause why the Plaintiff should not have judgement. 1. Because the Plaintiff had not averred that he did make any election of the Wines that the Defendant was to deliver unto him. 2ly. He doth not aver, that he gave the Defendant any notice of his election, and there being a Condition precedent to be performed on the Plaintiffs part, employed, the Defendant cannot perform the Bargain, without notice of that performance. 2ly. Here is no good request expressed either in substance or circumstance, for for the circumstance there is but two days to do it, in which it cannot be well intended it could be done. 2ly. It is said, he did not deliver vinum praedictum, which is an incertain implication of a Request: for the word deliberare is not a proper term to express the Request, and the verdict doth not help it. Bacon justice, There aught to be an election by the Plaintiff, but the Defedant ought first to show the Wines, and it was of his part to have appointed the time when he would show them. Roll justice, The Promise and Request was at Norwitch, and it was sufficient for the Plaintiff to make the Request there: but the Defendant ought to show the Plaintiff the Wines, Election. without which the Plaintiff can make no election, and the substance of the Declaration is to this intent. judgement was given for the Plaintiff. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. BY the rule of the Court, W●● a Prohibition should not be granted. this day cause was offered to be shown why a Prohibition should not be granted to the Ecclesiastical Court, for granting Letters of Administration to a Sister of the half-blood, when there was a Brother of the whole-blood who sued for them, and was denied. The cause showed was, that it is in the power of the Ordinary to grant Administration, either to the Brother of the whole-blood, or to the Sister of the half-blood, at his election, because they are in equal degree of kin to the Intestate. And to this the Court agreed. But Bacon Justice said, that in the Case at the Burr, Letters of Administration are granted to the Husband and his Wife, and so to one, viz. the Husband, who is no kin at all to the Intestate, but a Stranger, and if he survive his Wife, he shall have all the Goods, and all the kindred will be defrauded, which is not reasonable, and therefore the Administration is not good. And for this reason a Prohibition was granted. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. IT was moved in arrest of judgement, Arrest of judgement in Trover and Conversion. that the Plaintiff had declared of the Trover & Conversson, of a cetrain number expressed in the Declaration of pieces panni lanii, Anglice, of red, yellow, and black Coath, which is incertain, and cannot be used, as it is here, to express of divers colours, for panni lanii signifies only . But Bacon justice said, all is but Cloth, though they be of divers colours, and therefore it is good enough. Hodsden the Secondary said, sometimes the colours are used to be expressed, and sometimes not. Bacon, It is better to express the Colours than not, yet it is good enough without the expressing of them. Therefore let the Plaintiff take his judgement. Willison and Crow: Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Willison brought an Action upon the Case against Crow, Arrest of judgement in an action for words. for speaking these words of him, You are a bankrupt Skrub, and hath a verdict; it was moved in arrest of judgement, that the words are not actionable, because they are Adjective words, and so are not positive enough to ground an Action. But the Court held, they were actionable, for the word Bankrupt in itself was not an Adjective, and the joining of it with Skrub made it not so, but it should be understood as much as to say, You are a Skrub, and also a Bankrupt. And judgement was given accordingly. The King against Holland. Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court delivered their opinions in the Case between the King and Holland formerly argued; And first Bacon justice said, judgement given in the Case between the King and Holland. that there can be no judgement, for there is a mis-tryal in it; for first, there is no Venire facias: and secondly, there is a discontinuance, because the Venire should be to return duodecem probos & legales homines quorum quilibet habet 40 s. lands by the year at the least, & it is every of whom, having 4 l. lands by the year, which is contrary to the direction of the Statute. To this Roll answered, that he held the Venire to be good, and so the trial good, for if the jury hath every of them 4 l. a year in Lands, he hath 40 s. a year in Lands at least, and more, and therefore it is a better jury, and more sufficient; and by this the verdict shall not be vitiated, though the Venire be not quorum quilibet habet 40 s. per annum ad minus, as the Statute directs, and he cited 21 jac. Philpot and Fielders Case to be so adjudged; and he said, that Lands in the hands of a Trustee may be extended for the King's debt, Extent. but that he did not conceive how the King can have Copyhold-lands that are in trust for an Alien. Seisuie. Bacon justice, The Commissioners that found this inquisition for the King had no power by their Commission to seize the Lands into the King's hands, but only to inquire what Lands the Alien had. The Court ordered, that cause should be shown Tuesday following, why the party shall not be restored to his Lands, which were seized into the King's hands by virtue of the Inquisition. Postea. Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an Action upon the Case, Error upon a judgement in an Action up-the Case. Incertainty. Trial. upon an Assumpsit, brought by two at Maydston in Kent, and the Error assigned was, that the Plaintiffs in their Declaration do say unde dixerunt quod deteriorati sunt, etc. whereas it should be unde deteriorati sunt, and not dixerunt, etc. for that is positive, and the other not, for they may say they are damnified, and be not, and there can be no trial upon such uncertain words. Roll justice said, the words are not well laid; yet if there were other words sufficient to express the damage the Plaintiff had received it would be good enough, but these words here govern the whole sentence; Therefore let the Defendant in the Writ of Error consider how he can make the Declaration good. The King against Savage. Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. ONe Savage was arraigned in this Court upon an Endictment of Felony, For quashing an Endictment for Felony. for killing of a Woman within the Verge. The truth of the Case was, he beat and wounded the Woman at Lesne Abbey in Kent, which is within the Verge, but the Woman died at Sevenock in Kent, which is out of the Verge. The Prisoner prayed the Court he might have Walker of the Inner-Temple assigned him for Council, for matter in Law, which the Court granted. Walker for the Prisoner, prays the Endictment may be read, which was done accordingly; Whereupon he took these exceptions to it, 1. That the Endictment doth not show upon what part of the body particularly the Woman was wounded, but it saith only generally, that it was upon the hinder parts of her Body. 2ly. It says the Woman died the diversis plagis, but it doth not show of what length and breadth the wounds were, as it ought to do, nor doth it say of which of the wounds she died, and so it is uncertain, Incertainty. and cannot be known whether the Wounds were mortal or no. 3ly. By the Statute de Articulis super Chartas, in this Case where the party was wounded within the Verge, and died without the Verge, the Coroner of the Verge, and of the County ought to join in taking the juquisition super visum Corporis, Inquisition. which is not here done; but the Inquisition is taken by the Coroner of the Verge only. Bacon justice said, the party is said to be slain where he dies, not where he was wounded. The Court ordered the Prisoner to appear a week after, and in the mean time to give notice to the King's Council of the Exceptions taken to the Endictment, and know whether they will maintain the Endictment; Bail. the same Term the Endictment was adjudged not good, and the party was bailed. Thine against Thine. Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Hill. 22 Car. rot. 1638. DAme Katherine Thine brings a Writ of Dower in the Common-pleas against Sir james Thine, and hath a Verdict, and a judgement; Error in a Writ of Error. return. the Defendant brings a Writ of Error to reverse this judgement in this Court, and assigns for Error; 1. In the return made by the Sheriff, for he doth not say, that the Proclamation was made at the Church of the Town, where the Summons was made, Summons. and a Summons upon any one part of the Land, as hath been objected on the other side, is not good, neither by the words, nor the intent of the Statute: for then the words in the Statute should be surplusage and idle, that particularly directs how it should be. And as to the Objection, Fiction of Law. Statute. That a Summons upon one part of the Land is good in fiction of Law, for the rest of the Land, I answer, That this is not so where the Statute directs the Summons, and the words secundum formam Statuti cannot help where the Statute is not showed to be pursued; and so saith Dyer, That substantial words ought to be mentioned, Hill. 24 jac. H●b. Pl, 179. Allen and Walkers Case. 2ly. Demand. There is Error in the Demand of the Dower for the certainty of the Tithes demanded aught to appear, and it doth not so here, 11 Rep. Harper's Case, f. 25. And for that which is said in answer unto this, That a Demand of Dower is different from other Demands, I agree it to be true, 8. H. 6. 3. Yet the things demanded in Dower must be certainly demanded, 11 H. 7. f. 25. as it is in an Assize, for an Assize de uno tenemento is not good for the incertainty, Assize. 4 E. 2. Fitzh. Assize, 45 1. Estovers demanded aught to be showed particularly; so is it of a Corrody, 11 E. 3. Fitzh. Dower, 85. Dyer, f. 84. 7 E. 6. Pasc. 5 jac. the Countess of Oxford's Case; and whereas there hath this difference been taken between a Demand of Tithes in gross, and of Tithes appendent, and that Tithes in gross must be particularly demanded, but it is not necessary to demand Tithes appendat particularly, I answer, This is not so, for their appendancy doth not make them not to be demanded particularly, no more than if they were in gross, 18 E. 2. Asise, 377. A Corrody must be particularly demanded, and all the Precedents prove it, and it was so held, Pasc. 8 Car. rot. 271. in Bruer and Drakes case in a writ of Error in this Court, upon a judgement given in Dower in the Common-pleas. A 2d. exception to the Demand of the Dower is this, the Writ of Dower is de manerio de Imber, and the Demand is of Dower in parochia de Imber, and so it is larger than the Writ: Parish. for a Parish may comprehend many Vills. Stat. 1 H. 5. C. 5. 22 E. 4. C. 2. Mich. 34 Eliz. rot. 1537. Brad and Bishop's Case in the Exchequer, Pasc. 38 Eliz. Bedel and Scarborows Case in an Ejectione firmae in this Court. It is true, that generally a Parish shall not be intended larger than a Vill, if the contrary do not appear: but here the contrary doth appear by the words of the Demand, which are de rectoria de Imber & Tymesbury infra parochia de Imber, 3, & 4 Philip & Mary, Dyer, 142. and the different penning and expression of the Demand is to be observed: Grant. Abatement. Variance. for by that it appears there is a difference between Imber, and the Parish of Imber, Grants, Fitzh. 87. by granting a Manor with the appurtenances, an Advowson will pass, 19 E. 2. Tit. brief, the Writ abated, for variance between the Writ and the Count A 4th. Error is to avoid the execution, because of the Error in fait: for the Hundred of Warmister doth extend to Sutton parva which is not named in the Writ, and so the damages are given for more than is demanded, Damages. Intendment. and it shall not be interpreted by Intendment, and the Hundred is not demanded: for the Vill relates to the Land and not to the Hundred, 6 E. 3. 12. 8 Rep. 119. bonham's Case, and prays judgement for the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error. Maynard of Council with the Defendant desired time to argue, and it was granted. Postea. Chambers against Wollaston. Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Mich. 22 Car. rot. 21. CHambers brought an Action of Assault and Battery, Demurrer upon the Custom of London pleaded. and false imprisonment against Wollaston, Wollaston pleads a special Plea of justification, by virtue of a Custom in the City of London, whereby he had authority to take and imprison him for disturbing an Election of Wardens of a Company, and until he would promise not to disturb such Elections afterwards. To this Plea the Plaintiff demurs, and takes these Exceptions, 1. Custom. The Custom pleaded is against Law, for it appears not that there was any suit depending either by Bill, or Endictment, or otherwise, and so the Custom is against Law, Stat. 25 E. 3. C. 4. 25 E. 3. C. 3. and so was the Petition of Right, 3 Car. And though the Customs of the City of London are confirmed by Statute-law, yet illegal Customs are not confirmed. 2ly. judgement. The judgement is against Law, for by the judgement no remedy is given for the offence committed to the party against whom it is committed, but only that the offendor shall be imprisoned until he promise not to disturb Elections again. 3ly. The party committed is not within the Custom by the Defendants own showing. 4ly. The Custom set forth is not prosecuted: for the commitment is not for the Disturbance, but because the party will not promise not to disturb again. 5ly. The detension of the party in prison is against Law. Hales of Council with the Defendant, desired time to argue, and the Court desired to have Books. Holdigh against Chase. Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Pasc. 23 Car. rot. 326. HOldigh brought an Action of Debt against Chase, A special Verdict upon Non est sactum, pleaded to a bode. as an Executor, upon an Obligation made to the Testator. The Defendant pleaded non est factum, and upon this Plea an Issue was joined, and a special Verdict found; upon which Verdict the Case appeared to be this, The Defendant Chace was bound in an obligation for the payment of a certain sum of money unto A. B. and to I. S. jointly. I. S. dies, A. B. survives, and makes Holdigh his Executor, and dies, Holdigh brings an Action of Debt in his own name against Chase the Defendant, and declares upon this obligation made to the Testator, and to I. S. and doth not aver that the Testator did survive I. S. The Defendant pleads non est factum, and the question was whether this be a good plea or no, and to prove that it is no good plea, Plea. but that it was the deed of the Defendant, the Council for the Plaintiff cited these books, 3. H. 6. 4. 35 H. 6. fol. 39 46 E. 3. 7. 14 E. 4. fol. 4. 18 E. 2. 2. and put this case. Two enfants joint-tenants alien, and one dies; The survivor brings a dum fuit infra aetatem, and counts of the Feoffment of one of them, and there the right was adjudged not to be severed by the Feoffement, and so the writ good, and in our case the matter of variance alleged goes to the writ, and not the Action, and it is now too late for the Defendant to take advantage of it, and prays judgement for the Plaintiff. Roll justice said, the issue is whether it be the Defendants deed or not, and without doubt it is his deed, and therefore let him show cause why the Plaintiff should not have judgement. Boone against Sheers. Hill. 23. Ba. Reg. Trin. 23 Car. rot. 288. Boon brought an Action of Debt upon an obligation of 400 l. Demurrer to a Plea. against Sheers, and declares that the condition of the obligation was, that the Defendant should make such a voyage with a Ship, and pay certain monies at his return, and other conditions mentioned, and for not performing the conditions he brings his Action. The Defendant pleads in bar that the Ship was taken in the voyage per homines bellicosoes, Plea. and demands judgement of the Action: To this plea the Plaintiff demurred, and shown for cause that the Plea did not give answer to all the Declaration. Demurrer. Yard of Council with the Defendant said, the plea was good; for the plea answers the whole condition of the Bond, which was first to make the voyage with the Ship, and then at his return to perform the other conditions, and being hindered in the one, he was not bound to perform the other. Bacon justice, Let us see a book to consider of. Royston against Mees. Hill 23 Car. Banc. Reg. ROyston makes a lease for years of certain lands to I. S. rendering rend, Arrest of judgement in Debt. the lessee makes his will, and makes Mees the Defendant his Executor, and dies, the Executor possesseth himself of the remainder of the term of the lands let, and after the rent is behind. Royston brings an Action of Debt against the Defendant, and declares against him for the rent so behind in the debet and detinet, and upon this an issue is joined, and a verdict for the Plaintiff. The Defendant moves in arrest of judgement, Declaration. and shows for cause that the Declaration is not good, because the Action being an Action of Debt brought against the Defendant, as an Executor, it ought to have been in the detinet, and not in the debet and detinet. But Wild of Council with the Plaintif argued that the Declaration was good, and the Action well brought in the debet and detinet, and cited Brook title extinguishment 34. and the comment 526. and said, it is an Action founded upon a lease by deed which was made by the Testator, and cited 20 H. 6.10 H. 7. fol. 50. And that it is the constant: form of charging Executors in such cases, 14 H. 4. fol. 29. Fitzh. Tit. responder, 7 E. 6. Dyer 81.10. rep. 128. And said the verdict hath found it in the debet and detinet which shall be intended to be true, 9 Ed. 4.41.17 Jac. Paul and Mordyes Case in the Common pleas, and 7 jac. Smith and Nicholas Case, and prays judgement for the Plaintiff. Hales for the Defendant argued that the Declaration is not good. 1. He said, the Action is good in the detinet, because the profits of the land let, which are over and above the rent to be paid for it, reserved upon the lease, shall be only assets in the Executors hands. Difference. Contract. 2. It cannot be good both ways, and the Term is in him as Executor, not the rent, and there is a difference between contracts Executory, and contracts Executed; but it may he said, the rent to be paid may be more than the profits of the land is worth, ● answer, this shall not be presumed in law if it be not so showed. 43 Ass. pl. 23.16 H 7. fol. ●. The Action is brought for all the rend incurred; therefore it shall not be presumed that the land is not worth the rent that is paid for it: Verdict. and as for the verdict it shall help nothing; for a verdict shall not supply a necessary part of a Declaration omitted, and if he owes than he detains, and I conceive Hargraves Case to be good Law, though denied by the Council on the other side, and here the privity of the contract is not determined, and so prays judgement for the Defendant. Roll justice, It is for the advantage of the Executor to bring the Action in the detinet; for than he shall be charged only for the goods of the Testator, and not for his proper goods and it may be the land is less worth than the rent, and that the parties have consented the Action should be brought in this manner. Bacon justice cited Pawls Case Mich. 17 jac. But entered Pasc. rot. 346. That the Action may be brought in the debet and detinet, and if the Plaintiff will bring his Action here in the detinet it is not for your disadvantage, and he may at his election bring it either way. Roll justice, Here the verdict answers the point of the issue, and therefore is good. The Court ruled the plaintiff to take his judgement, except better cause shown to the contrary. William against Tyrer. Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Pasc. 23 Car. rot. 224. William brought an Action of Trover and Conversion against Tyrer for certain goods of the Plaintiff the Plaintiff hath a verdict, Arrest of judgement in Covenant. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, and took these exceptions to the Declaration. 1. The Plaintiff declares pro tribus duodenis fili, Anglice dosens of thread, Declaration. which is incertain; for it may be three dozen pound of thread, or skins of thread, or ounces of thread. To this it was answered, that it cannot be otherwise expressed, and the words dosens of thread is used amongst Merchants, and well known unto them what is meant by them. 2ly. He declares for so many pounds Muscat. in stead of Nucum Muscat. ram, Anglice Nutmegs. But this exception was mistaken, for the record was otherwise, and besides it was with an Anglice which makes it certain. The Court ruled judgement to be entered except cause showed for the Plaintif. Rawson against Bargue. Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Case between Rawson and Bargue being an Action of Debt upon the Statute of 2 E. 6. for not setting forth of Tithes, ● Arguments whether a free Chapel or no, and the judge's opinions. wherein upon a special verdict, the question was whether the Church were a free Chapel given to the King, within the Statute of 1 Ed. 6. was again argued by Latch for the Plaintiff, and by Brown for the Defendant, Latches argument was to this effect. 1. He said, that the Law says it is presentative although it be not; and 2ly. It is sufficiently found to be a parochial Church, yet it is not material whether it be found so or no. Next the words of the Statute do not extend to give donatives to the King. 3ly. It is not given to the Crown, and although the Declatation and verdict be that it is a free Chapel, yet it is not comprehended as a Chapel presentative. Lit. 94. The word free makes a distinction of things, and the party ought not to confound things, Free Chapel. and a free Chapel is always interpreted for a Church donative, and not presentative. The right investiture of Churches was challenged from the foundation of them, until within this 400 years it was altered by the Common law; Seldens History of Tithes, fol. 392. and upon that alteration the name of a free Chapel came. Reg. 41. It is said to be free from ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Fitz. tit. Brief 6.0.3 Ed. 3. Fitz. Tit. Aid du roy 33.14 H. 4.11.22 H. 6.25.22 H. 6.27. by Danbye 26 H. 6. Fitz. grants. 12. Nat. brev. 33 E. 34. f. 27 E. 3.84. cowel's interpreter, Tit. free Chapel. And in all Statutes the word free Chapel is meant of donatives. Stat. 26 H. 8. cap. 3. Stat. 37 H. 8. cap. 4. Stat. 1 Ed. 6. cap. 14. Regist. 307. But it is objected that free Chapels extend to presentatives, Presentation. Donative. because they are with cure, Lit. Com. 344. a donative may be parochial, 7 E. 3. f. 4. To this I answer, Churches had cure of souls, when they were donatives. To the 2d. point, by the meaning of the Statute it appears, Tenure. Frank-almoigne. that only donatives were intended, as the preamble of it doth declare; And all Chapels are held in Frank almoigne as well as donatives, and so all may be given to the King by the same reason. Another objection is that the word Capella is superstitious, and therefore being of a superstitious foundation it is given to the King, and cowel's Interpreter is urged to prove the word to be so derived, To this I answer, that Sir Henry Spelman as learned an Author as cowel, in his glossary rejects cowels derivation of the word Capella, and saith that Capella is used promiscuously for any upper covering; And though the name were superstitious, yet that makes not the Chapel to be so; for so the Church of St. Andrew, or St. Dunstan, should be superstitious, and given to the King by the Statute. There is a double preamble of the Statute, 1. A recital of another Statute, Preamble. and the taking away of other superstitious uses. Preamble of the Statute, 37 H. 8.22 Ed 4. cap. 7.8. rep. 137. beasts of the Forest are not , 3. rep. The marquess of Winchester's Case, Com. 204. That some generals may be taken in a restrained sense, 9 H. 6.36. Interpretation. Words of a Statute ought not to be interpreted to destroy natural justice. The stile also of the Act doth not show that donatives are only intended, and the Crown hath not granted this away, 37 H. 8. and so not destroyed them. Donatives usually pass as lay fees, and the passing of them as lay fees altars not the nature of the chapels, and the Statute gives it to the King as the incumbent had it, Lay fee. and there is a saving of the nature of it in the Statute. It is objected, that he hath not been presented ratione lapsus. To this Hob. 337. in Green's Case gives an answer, and Potter's Case 9 Car. in the Common pleas, and it is well found here in the verdict for the Plaintiff, That it is not within the Statute. Brown for the Defendant in his argument said, the question is whether it be a free Chapel, given by the Statute of 1 Ed. 6. and 1. It is within the words of the Statute; and 2ly. It is within the meaning of the Statute; for the words they are simplicitur generalia, and so large as can be, and all Chapels are given by them, and none excepted. And here 1. The nature of a free Chapel is to be considered; For Cowel he is not fit to be cited, Cowel● Book. for his book was condemned by Parliament, and burnt as erroneous, Divers sorts of Chapels. and scandalous, in 4 E. 3.28. Peter Corbets Case, a Chapel is part of a Church, 8 H. 6.32.37. Bracton 241.17 Ed. 3.58.9 Ed. 3.11. these are not within the Statute of 1 Ed. 6. 2ly. There is Capella parochialis which is subject to the jurisdiction of the Ordinary, 14 E. 3. Fitz. quare impedit 183. Lynwood 142.8 Ed. 3 60. The book of entryes 542. Long quinto 26. 3ly. A Chantry is taken for a Chapel. 4ly. A free Chapel is nomen comprehensivum, and comprehends much, 13 Ass. pl. 2.15. Ass. pl. 8. The essential matter of a free Chapel is to be free from ordinary jurisdiction, and not to be visited by the Ordinary, and one comes regularly to a free Chapel by donation, but being in, he is free from ordinary jurisdiction, 18 E. 3. Fitz. scire sac. 11.17 E. 3. f. 45. Brook praemun. 21. It hath been objected that it is presentative, and so it is not free; I answer it may be free though it be presentative, and so the verdict finds it to be in the foundation of it. 2ly. The Plaintiff brings the Action as Rector of a free Chapel, and now he shall not be suffered to deny his own Declaration. 3ly. The admission, institution, and induction implies jurisdiction till the contrary appear, viz. that it is a free Chapel notwithstanding it be presentative, 16 E. 3. Fitz. brief 660. None but the King can found a free Chapel, and although it be free by prescription, Foundation. yet it shall be intended to be at first so founded. Institut. 44.9 H. 6. f. 17.20 E. 3.56. The King by foundation of a free Chapel, may grant that it shall be presentative, and yet when the party is in, that it shall be free from the jurisdiction of the Ordinary. Fitz. nat. ●r. 48. C. jurisdiction. The dean of Battle in Sussex is presentative to the Vicarage of Battle by the Bishop of Chichester; but when he is in, he is free from the jurisdiction of the Ordinary, Davyes Rep. fo. 72. Cooks instit. 344. A lapse may incur of a free Chapel by the foundation of a thing may alter the law, 7 E. 3. fo. 18. The old book 316. The essential difference of a free Chapel from another, is to be free and exempt from the jurisdiction of the Ordinary, 17 E. 3. close roll in the Tower. Seldens book of tithes 441. regist. 40, 41. Pasc. 3. Jac. in this Court Fachell and Gaires Case. There are divers writs in our books to discharge free Chapels from visitations, and therefore it appears they are exempt from the Ordinaries jurisdiction. But it is objected that the presentation makes it presentative, though it were not so before. This is answered, 14 E. Fitz. 9 E. 3 ●●. 27 E. 3.34. It is not the presentation made by the party, but the foundation that makes it presentative. 2ly. It is objected that it is parochial, and therefore is not free; I answer, it is not so found although it be so claimed, and though it be so claimed it makes nothing to the purpose. The parish Church of St. mary's in Shrewsbury was parochial, and yet given to the King by this Statute, 13 H. 4. Fitz. brev. 807. Hil. 17. jac. in this Court in Grubbam and Gales Case adjudged, that a Chapel may be founded in a parish Church, and such are given to the King, Dyer 267. o Car. Pasc. in the Common pleas Rawlins and Yaxlyes' Case. 2ly. For the words of the Statute this is not one of the free Chapels excepted in the Statute, and therefore it is within the Statute, and there appears no visitation in the verdict found, and exceptio in non exceptis format regulam. For the meaning of the Stat. Interpretation Brook prebend. 2 d. 10. rep. 128. All parts of a Statute ought to stand together if it may be, and one part of it ought not to destroy another part, generale dictum generaliter est intelligendum; The exceptions of the Statute show the meaning of it. It is objected, that the being a free Chapel makes it not to be superstitious, I answer, if it be a free Chapel by Common intendment it is superstitious, but though if it be not, yet it is given by the name of a free Chapel. By the verdict it was taken for a free Chapel, and that it was seized into the King's hands. There is much light to be had in interpretation of laws, by consulting with those that made them, and to know how they had interpreted them; for expositio contemporanea est optima. Plow. 466. Pasc. 35 El. Clark and Mark in the Common pleas. If it be not a free Chapel, yet being found so, it shall be taken to be so in reputation, Reputation. and enough to give it to the Crown: And the presentation to it is ad rectoriam sive liberam capellam, and so not certain, and so it is not a good presentation, Presentation because the King was not rightly informed what it was he presented to, Regist. fol. 203. 19 E. 3 Fitz. quar. imped. 360. and so prays judgement for the Plaintiff. Roll justice, There is a difference where a Chapel is founded within a Church, and where the Chapel is Parochial. Bacon justice held, that it was given to the King by the Statute; for it is found to be a Chapel paying tenths, and this Statute looks backward to the Statute of 37 H. 8. and to things in being, and the Chapel was within that Statute, and by it he might have seized it, and it is within the words, and intent also of the Statute of 1 Ed. 6. and the proviso of the Statute shows the meaning of it, and Capellae dependentes, or Chapels of ease are not given by the Statute. Roll justice to the same effect, and said, This Statute of 1 Ed. 6. was made to supply something omitted in the Statute of 37 H. 8. and it is plain, that it is within the words, and we have no warrant to interpret it otherwise, since it doth not appear that it is excepted; also it is not found to be a Parish Church, but that they claim it to be so, and if it were it would not help. 2ly. It may be presentative, and yet a free Chapel according to the foundation, and endowment of it, and a free Chapel, may become a Church by presentation of the Patron, but it appears not to be so to us. The proviso of the Statute shows that it was not the intent of the Statute, to exempt all free Chapels, but those only which are named, and no more: And the intent of the Statute was that the King shall have it as a lay thing, and he was not compelled to present, and here the Patron hath taken the profits, and there are no inhabitants within the Parish, for the signory compriseth all the parish, and if the King presents by lapse where he ought to do it pleno jure, the presentation is not good. For these reasons, The judgement was given for the Defendant, if better matter be not shown before the end of the Term. Fulham. Hill 23 Car. Banc. Reg. FUlham had a judgement in this Court against 3 Defendants, For Execivion notwithstanding a writ of Error brought in parliament. two of the Defendants bring a writ of Error in Parliament. Fulham that had the judgement moves the Court, he may have Execution upon his judgement notwithstanding the Writ of Error brought in Parliament, because the Record is not well removed, for the Writ of Error is not good, for the judgement is against three, and the Writ of Error mentions but two of them. Roll justice, I doubt you cannot have execution, but the Writ of Error must be abated in Parliament, Abatement. Execution. and then you may come here and move for execution, for now it is not safe to grant it. Move it in Parliament to have it abated, or move here again at your own adventure. The King and Holland. Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. IN this Case between the King and Holland, For an Amoveas manum to the Chancery. Amoveas manum. after divers arguments at the Bar, and the opinion of the Court delivered, The Court was moved for an Amoveas manum to the Chancery, that the party may have his Land out of the King's hand. The Court answered, The judgement is to be given here, if there be cause for the King, if not against him, and you ought not to go to the Chancery. And all that we can say is, that the King shall not have judgement. judgement. Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment of forcible Entry upon these Exceptions. For quashing an Endictment. 1. That it did not say, that the forcible Entry was contra Coronam & dignitatem, but this the Court overruled. A second exception was, That it doth not show that the party was felted at the time until the Defendant entered by force upon him. 3ly. The Endictment concludes, contra formam Statuti, and it ought to be statutorum, for the Statute of 8 H. 6. upon which this Endictment is framed, relates to other Statutes. To this the Court said, if the Endictment be so it is ill. 4ly. The Endictment saith, Endictment. he entered peaceably and detained with force, and such an Endictment hath relation to two Statutes. To this it was answered, that the Statute of 8 H. 6. is sufficient to found the Endictment without relation to other Statutes, for this clause upon which this Endictment is framed, is a new Law, and hath no relation to precedent Statutes, for it is here only for a forcible deteyner. Roll Justice doubted of this, for it is said, that the Statute of 8 H. 6. shall be added to the new Statute. Bacon justice differed in opinion and said, the Statute of 8 H. 6. was not made to piece up the other Statute, but is a new Law as to this clause. The Court will advise further. Chambers against Wollaston. Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THis Case was again moved and argued by Ward of Council with the Plaintiff. Argument upon a special Plea. The Action was an Action of Assault and Battery, and false imprisonment, The Defendant pleased a special justification by virtue of the Custom of the City; To which Plea the Plaintiff demurred, six points were spoken to by the Plaintiffs Council in his Argument. 1. Custom. He said, the proceed against Chambers were neither agreeable to the Common law, nor to Magna Charta, and therefore illegal, and not warrantable, notwithstanding the Custom pleaded to back them. 2ly. The Custom itself is not well pursued, Bracton, 55.5 Rep. 64. The King cannot grant power to a Court to commit against the Common-law, or Statute-law, Magna Charta, 54.42 Ass. Pl. 5. and though one submit himself to be committed, Submission. for a thing for which he is not committable by Law, this submission is void. 3ly. The Custom pleaded is against Magna Charra, and divers other Statutes, Stat. 9 H. 6. cap. 5. 8 E. 3. Cooks Magn. Chart. f. 16. Bracton, 334, 335.43 E. 3. f. 32. Plead. and it appears not the plead were in Latin, as they ought to be, 36 E. 3. neither was the Confession legal, nor entered upon Record. 3ly. judgement. The judgement varies from all other judgements in Law: for the Commitment was, that he should stand committed until he would promise that he will disturb no more; And ●ly. until the Court should take further order, and this is against Law, 8 Rep. f. 59.2 Instit. 52. 5ly. The Statute of Rich. 3d. confirms not the Custom, for if it was before Magna Charta it is taken away by that Statute, for it is not excepted in it, Magna Charta cap. 19 29. Miror of justice, cap. 5. Long Quint. 40, 41. 6ly. The Custom is not well pursued in the Return, for the Oath extends to be obedient to the Bailiff, return. etc. for the time being, but the Return is not so: but it said, that he be obedient to good Laws, and this is not in the Oath. And the return is against their Custom, and judgement for the Commitment, and so he prayed judgement for the Plaintiff. Roll justice said, That the judgement and the return are contrary: tor the judgement was, that he shall be committed, because he would not promise, not to disturb: and the return is, that he promise that he will not disturb. 'Cause was to be shown why the Plaintiff should not have judgement. The King and Apsley. Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Rep. APsley removed certain orders made against him by the Commissioners of Sewers for Westminster, by a Certiorari into this Court. To quash orders of Commissioners of Sewers. And upon the return these exceptions were taken. 1. That it doth not say the Commission of Sewers was under the Great Seal, as it ought to express, 7 Car. Allen and Carter, & 5 Car. Rail and manning's Case, and Pasc. 14 Car. Hungates Case, and because it is not so set forth there can no Issue be taken, whether they be Commissioners or not. 2ly. The Commission is not well pleaded, for it appears not that three of them were of the quorum, as the Statute appoints there should be. 3ly. The return is in English, and it ought to be in Latin. But to this Roll justice answered, return. That the return is good notwithstanding, for the Commission is in English. 4ly. It doth not appear, that Hartshorn lane, touching which their orders were made is within Westminster, and so it cannot be well-known, whether it was within their power▪ by virtue of their Commission to make any orders touching that place. Hales of Council for the Commissioners moved, the return might be amended. But the Court answered, It could not be, Amendment. because the return was made the Term before. And it was ordered, that cause should be shown Tuesday following, why the return and Proceed should not be quashed. The King against Page and Harwood. Hill. 23 Car Banc. Reg. THree men were indicted at an Assizes in the Country for Felony, Qustion upon the Statute of Stabbing, whether Principle or Accessary, Principle. Accessary. for killing of a man, the Endictment was framed upon the Statute of 1 jac. made against Stabbing; They were all found guilty. He that did the fact was condemned, and executed: but because the justice of Assize doubted whether the other two were Principles within that Statute, or but Accessories, they would not proceed to judgement against them; Whereupon they were brought to this Bar to be proceeded against for the Felony, and the doubt was, in regard they were only present, and abetting the person that did the fact, and used no Action towards the death of the party, whether they were Principles within the Statute, or but Accessories, Roll justice said, They are not Principles, Clergy. but Accessories, and aught to have their Clergy: for the Statute of Stabbing being a penal Law, it shall be taken strictly and not extended to equity, and in Swinertons case Bramston, Barkley, and jones, three of the judges of this Court directed the jury, the Case being of the same nature with this, to find the parties only accessary. But the jury in our Case have found them guilty as Principles, and I doubt upon that, whether the Trial be good or no. Trial. Walker of Council against the Prisoners said, the Statute of Stabbing makes no new offence, and therefore it is doubtful, End ctment. wheher it be necessary for the Endictment to conclude contra formam Statuti. Roll justice said, it ought to be so. But Bacon justice doubted. The Court admitted the Prisoners to their Clergy, and they were burnt in the hand in view of the Court by the Hangman of London, and the Prisoners bound each for the other to their good behaviours, and to appear in Court the next Term. Hales against More. Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Mich. 23 Car. rot. 382. A judgement was given in an inferior Court in an Action of Debt, Error upon a judgement in Debt. Demand. Venire. and a Writ of Error brought in this Court to reverse it. The Errors assigned were, 1. The plaint is entered generally de placito debiti, which is uncertain, so that the Defendant cannot know what is demanded. 2ly. In the awarding of the Venire, it is duodecim, etc. and doth not say probos & legales homines. Bacon justice, Duodecim in the Venire, with an etc. is not good in an Inferior Court, but this is in the awarding of the Venire, and therefore well enough, but the first is a good Exception in my judgement. Therefore let the judgement be reversed, except cause shown to the contrary. The King and Corye. A Writ of Restitution issued out of this Court for one Corye to be restored to the Recorders place of the City of Norwitch, To be restored to a Recorders place. which was returned and filled. Hales of his Council opened the return and cited Stroods Case, that one ought not to be removed from any office without showing good cause why he is removed, which is not here done, but only a Custom set forth, whereby they show they had authority to elect a Recorder for a year only, and at the end of the year to elect another, and that by virtue of this Custom, Custom. they had chosen another Recorder in the party's place, he having been in a whole year, which he conceived to be an ill Custom. Roll justice said, If this be a void Custom, none of the two Recorders were well elected, and so Cory cannot be restored. And Bacon justice did also doubt, whether any of them were well chosen. It was said, that the return is not traversable, but shall be taken to be true. Bacon justice held, Traverse. return. That the return was not good, and you must have an Alias, that we may have a better Answer before us: for nothing can be done upon this. But the Court inclined, that a Recorder may be elected for one year. It was said. If a Custom be entire you cannot make one part of it good, and another part of it ill. The rule was, for the party to take an Alias, because this return is not good, and it is too late to amend it, because it is filled. Amendment. The King and Symmons. IN an Endictment of forcible Entry upon the Statute of 8 H. 6. divers Exceptions were formerly taken. To quash an Endictment u●on the Statu●e of 8 H. 6. Roll justice answered to that, that the Endictment did not say, contra Coronam & dignitatem, it was well enough without those words. Another exception was now taken, that the Endictment is ad tunc & ibidem, which is repugnant. This Roll justice overruled, but he doubted whether the Endictment ought to be contra formam Satutorum, or contra formam Statuti as it is, because this Endictment is framed upon divers Statutes. Bacon justice cited the 4th. Rep. the Case of Appeals, and said, it is good as it is contra formam Statuti, and said, that a forcible Entry and Deteyner is punishable at the Common-law. Common law. The Court desired to see Precedents. Antea. Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. MAynard shows for cause why a Prohibition should not be granted to the Admiralty, For a Prohibition notwithstanding a Consultation granted. That the parties have moved this matter in the Common-pleas, and did there join issue upon the same, and a verdict passed against the Prohibition, and a consultation was thereupon granted. The Council on the other side makes another suggestion, viz. that the sentence in the Court of Admiralty, was against a person that was dead, and that one of the parties who had the sentence had released. To this the Court said, you might have pleaded this in the Admiral Court. Hill of Council for the Prohibition said, it is not material what the parties have done in the Common-pleas, for this Court is not bound by it. Roll justice, If the matter of your surmise here be tried already in the Common-pleas, why should you move here upon the same surmise. Surmise. Arbitrary. Conclusion. But it is not arbitrary to grant a Prohibition or not to grant it, if there be cause to grant it, and the Trial in the Common-pleas is no conclusion to us, and if it be mischievous as is objected, Prohibition. to grant a Prohibition after a Consultation granted, the Parliament may make a Law to prevent that mischief, for as the Law now is it may be done; Yet we will advise. Gaudy against Ingham. Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. IVdgement was given against an Administrator in an Action of Debt brought against him, Error upon a judgement against an administrator. judgement. in the Common pleas, upon fully administered pleaded, and a writ of Error was here brought to reverse the judgement. The Error assigned was, that judgement was given for the whole Debt, whereas the verdict found that the Defendant had assets only to discharge a part of it. To this the Court said, if it be found he have any assets, judgement must be given against him, for the whole debt upon his false plea, but if he have no assets it is otherwise Allen against Reeve Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Mich. 23 Car. rot. 88 ALlen brings an Action of Covenant against Reeve, Arrest of judgement in an Action of Covenant. and his wife, upon a lease expired made of certain houses by deed unto the wife dum sola suit, wherein was a Covenant to keep the houses in repair during the term, & for breach of this Covenant is the Action brought, and declares as to one of the houses that it was burnt by negligence. The Defendants plead a special plea to this effect; That the house which was burnt was not burnt by negligence, In arrest of judgement. nor with Common fire as the Plaintiff hath declared, and as to the rest they plead the general issue, that they were in good repair at the expiration of the term; the Plaintiff hath a verdict. Nicholes of Council with the Plaintiff said, it contains a negative preignans; for there are two matters offered in issue, one that the house was not burned by common fire. Negative preignans. Demurrer. 2ly. That it was not burned by the negligence of the party. Roll justice, If it be a negative preignans, as you say it is, you ought to have demurred unto it as to a double plea. But let us see the book, and stay in the mean time. Hobson against Heywood. Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Trin. rot. 791. HObson brings a writ of Error in this Court to reverse a juhgement given against him at Bristol in an Action of Debt for rent, Error to reverse a Judgement in Bristol in an action of Debt. Error. and assigns for errors, that the sum demanded to be due for rent was in figures, and not in words, as it ought to be. 2ly. It is said, that the jury Assideint damna for Assident damna. The Court held they were both material exceptions, and reversed the judgement, except cause should be shown to the contrary Saturday following. Chambers against Floyd. Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Upon a rule on the Crown side to show cause why an Attatchment should not issue out against two justices of peace for not allowing a certiorari directed to them out of this Court to remove an endictment of forceible entry taken at a private Sessions before them. 'Cause against issuing of an attatchment. The Council for the justices urged, that they had not contemned the Process of this Court as is surmised; for the certiorari ought to have been delivered in open Sessions of the peace, and there allowed; Allowance. but this was delivered at a private Sessions, and so they were not to allow it. 2ly. The party who procures the certiorari, aught according to the Statute, to put in security, Certiorari. at the delivery thereof, to prosecute, or else it is not to be allowed, but that was not done here, and therefore they were not bound to allow it: And the certiorari is to remove an Endictment of forcible entry; but the return is that it was a peaceable entry, and a forcible deteyner, return. so that there being no such Endictment before them as the certiorari mentions, they could not make a return according to the writ, and therefore it is no contempt in the justices not to make a return. The Court answered, Contempt. that it is the usual course of the Court to make certioraries in this form, and therefore this is no excuse; The Council against the justices urged, that this case is within the Statute, though it were at a private Sessions of the peace, and therefore the justices are in contempt. Roll justice said, I conceive that this is casus omissus not provided for by the Statute, and if so, then are they not in contempt, Casus omissus, and if some justices take an Endictment of forcible entry, other justices cannot give restitution upon this Endictment. Bacon justice, Restitution. The Statute is a remedial Law, and made for the ease of the subject, and ought not to be construed strictly: And said, Construction. that a private Sessions is a Sessions; but security ought to be put in at the quarter Sessions, for it shall be intended that all the justices of the County are there. Roll justice said, Security. that a private Sessions ought to take security, and the Endictment ought to be returned there; but the certiorari is not good, for it mentions not the title of the Act, yet the general practice of the Court seems to warrant it as it is. The Court ordered the party to have restitution, and the contempt to be spared by consent of parties if cause not shown to the contrary before the end of the Term. Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved upon an Assidavit for a prohibition to the Court at Doncaster, For a prohibition to the court at Doncaster. Prohibition. Attatchment. and for an attatchment against the Mayor for refusing to allow of a foreign plea, tendered by the Defendant in an Action of Debt brought against him for rent for lands, that lie out of the jurisdiction of the Court, and for proceeding against him notwithstanding the tender of the plea. The prohibition and attatchment were granted if cause not shown to the contrary before the end of the Term. David against Lyster. Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved by the Plaintiff that the Defendant might be ordered to plead an issuable plea, For the Defendant to plead an issuable plea. which he had not done, for the Action is an Action of ejectione firmae in which the Plaintiff hath declared, and the Defendant hath emparled, and after emparlance he pleads that the lands are ancient demean, Plea. which is a dilatory plea. Roll justice, It is a good plea after imparlance, for it goes in bar of the Action itself, and not, in abatement of the Writ. The King and Holland. Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. ROll justice said, Opinion of the Court for restitution in this Court & not in Chancery. judgement. Restitution. that in this case formerly argued, restitution ought to be given to the party, for the same judgement shall be given here which should be given in Chancery, and all the Record is here before us, and they in Chancery cannot do any thing in the cause, for they have nothing before them. And it appears to us that the Declaration was insufficient, and so we cannot give judgement for the Plaintiff; but against him, notwithstanding the inquisition found for the King. Therefore let the party have restitution, except cause showed the first Friday in the next Term. Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved to discharge a prisoner brought to the Bar, For discharge of a prisoner. by a habeas Corpus committed by the Committee of plundered Ministers, and these exceptions were taken to the return. 1. There is no time expressed how long the party shall stand committed, Commitment. so he is committed without limitation of time, which is not legal. 2ly. He is committed by the name of Mr. Smith, and his name of baptism is omitted, which ought not to be. Upon these exceptions the Court held the commitment illegal, and discharged the party. Weeks and Weeks. Hill. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Upon the return of a certiorari to remove orders made by Commissioners of Sewers, Against a return of orders of commissioners of Sewers return. Notice. It was moved that the return was not good, because it was not made by the parties to whom the certiorari was directed, for it was directed to the Commissioners, and the return is made by the Clerk of the Sewers. But the Court said the return was good enough, for all the retorns are so, and the Clerk is an officer of whom the Law takes notice of, and it belongs to him to do it. Pasc. ●4 Car. Banc. Reg. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an inferior court in an Action upon the case, Error to reverse a judgement in an inferior court in an Action upon the case. return. Day in court. and the Error assigned was that the habeas corpus was not well returned, for it is not returned to be in omnibus servitum et executum as it ought to be, and as the usual form is. Maynard of Council against the Writ of Error argued, that it was well returned notwithstanding those words were omitted, because the jury did appear full, and no issues were lost, and the jury have day by the roll, 3 H. 7. 14. per Hussey, and 9 E. 4. 14. it is made a question but not resolved. 2ly. Though it be a Sisp yet it is within the Statute of 21. jac. and is helped by it, for that Statute extends to more than Writs, as may appear by the Statute, and the Statute of 18 Eliz. Bill. Original writ. receipt. touching original Writs extends to faults of bills, although original Writs are only named, for a bill is the same in substance with a Writ, so here the Writ, and precept are of the same substance. 3ly. it is the intent of the Statute, and the Statute shall be taken by equity, Hill. 13. jac. in this Court in Gregory and Brookes case, this question was stirred but not resolved, and Hobart denies the 5th. report f. 61. to be Law, and there is no proceed properly in superior Courts by plaint. Roll justice, The Statute extends not to point of equity in inferior Courts, for their proceed are not so regular, as the proceed in the high Courts here at Westminster, but they are by short notes. Bring us books and move it again. Creswell against Ventryes. Pasc. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. CReswell brought an Action upon the case against Ventryes for speaking these words of him; Arrest of judgement in an action upon the Case for words. Thou didst, and dost receive thief stolen goods, witness a feather bed tick in thy house, and the cloth which thy man's suit was made of, and thou knewest they were stolen. The Plaintiff hath a verdict, the Defendant moves in arrest of judgement that the words are not actioanble, for one may receive stolen goods, and yet not be guilty of Felony. Becon justice, The receiving of stolen goods is not felony; but the receiving, and comforting of the Felon is Felony. Felony. The judgement was stayed till the other should move. Thynn against Thynn. Pasc. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THynn brings an Action against Thynn to reverse a judgement given in the Common pleas in a writ of Dower; Error to reverse a judgement in Dower Hales of Council with the Defendant in the Writ of Dower in answer to the exceptions formerly taken said, that the summons was well enough returned as it is, because it was made upon some part of the land within the Vil, Long quint. E. 4. 2 H. 4. 13. 39 E. 3. 7. 2ly. It is not necessary to make the Proclamation, Proclamation where the summons is, for the Statute intends not to alter the course of the summons. 2ly. The words of the Statute are satisfied, for the actual summons in one Vill is a summons in the other Vills. 3ly. The meaning of the Statute is satisfied, and the mischief intended to be satisfied by the Statute, Hob. 173. Allen and Walkers Case. Demand. For the 2d. exception to the Demand he held it good enough, for in a Writ of Dower a Demand needeth not to be so particular as in other Writs, so is it in an Assize, 11 E. 3. 18. 43 E. 3. 6. 3 Ed. 2. Dower, 161. and the reason is, because the Wife demands not the whole Land, nor can have the Charters which concern the Land to enable her to make so precise a Demand as may be in other Writs. And as to Harper's Case that is objected, I answer, it agrees not with our Case, Regist. f. 36. 16 E. 3. Fitzh. Quar. Imp. 147. and it is certain enough, because it is of a Rectory, and not of Tithes in gross. 3ly. The demand of Tithes is surplusage, and it is all one as to say, the Rectory cum pertinentiis. Then as to the Objection that one thing is twice demanded, I answer, it is not so, ●●a●ement. Damages. but demanded as part of a thing demanded in the Writ, and a Demand in a Writ of Dower shall not abate the Writ, though one thing be twice demanded, for damages shall not be twice recovered, 4 E. 3. f. 52. Mich. 9 jac. in the Common-pleas agreed so by the whole Court; In Bluers' Case, 8 Car. one thing was twice demanded, and yet the Writ was not abated. To the 3d. exception, That the Demand is more large than the Writ, because a Parish may be larger than a vill, and the Demand is the Parish of Imber; I answer, That the Vill and Parish shall be intended to be of the same extent, if the contrary do not appear, Cooks lit. f. 125. 2ly. Although the Parish may be larger than the Vill, yet it may lie in the Vill, and the contrary doth not here appear, and the Case is so, that it is impossible that the Parish should extend into another Vill, 1. The office of the Writ is to restrain the Demand, and the Writ ascertains the Demand, 19 E. 3. Fitz. Dower, 95. 9 E. 4. f. 16. by Chock. 2ly. There is a restriction within the body of the Demand, for the Demand refers to the Writ, and is bounded by it, 42 Eliz. Wook and Godins Case, a small implication will make a Vill and Parish to be all one, Implication. and so it is here, 42, 43 Eliz. Com. Banc. Hob. 12. Case Brook and Spencer, Trin. 16 jac. in this Court, rot. 504. Marks and Marks. And as to the Exception taken to the execution, Execution. that damages are given for more than is demanded, 1. Here is no confession as it is supposed on the other side, that the Hundred in demand doth lie in another Vill. 2ly. It is impossible for damages to be given for more of the Hundred than lies within the Vills mentioned in the Writ, and so are there no damages given for that part of the Hundred which lies in Sutton parva, as is objected on the other side: for no more shall be recovered than is contained in the Writ, 9 E. 4. ●, 16, 17. The Question there was, whether it were a Plea to the Writ, 17 E. 3. f. 44. The Court desired to hear another Argument. Castle against Dinely. Pasc. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Trin. 23 Car. rot. 1078. CAstle brings a Writ of Error to reverse a judgement given against him in the Court at Owse-bridge in York, Error to reverse a judgement in an action upon the Case. in an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit; The Error assigned was, that the day of the Month in which the promise was made is in Figures, To this the Council on the other side said, that heretofore it had been held to be Error, Error. but now since the Statute of jeofailes after a verdict is no Error. But I. Turner of Council with the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error said, That it is a material exception now: for the Assumpsit is the ground of the Action, and therefore the day must needs be material. Another exception was, that the Venire was Venire facias duodecem, etc. de Riliva tua, and the Venu was in the City of York. But to this exception it was answered, that the Record is de Civitate Eborum in Baliva tua, and so it is well enough: and of this opinion was the Court. But the Court held the first Exception to be good; Whereupon the Council for the Defendant in the Writ of Error prayed, the judgement might be reversed for his Clients dispatch, and so it was. The King against Andrews. Pasc. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. ANdrews was indicted for Murder, and outlawed upon the Endictment, Arraignment upon an Outlawry for Murder. and taken upon the Out lawry, and brought to the Bar, and demanded what he could say, why judgement should not be given against him; The Prisoner said, he had brought his Writ of Error to reverse the Outlawry, and prayed it might be allowed, which was granted, and the Writ read by Broughton the Secondary on the Crown-side. The Prisoner desired he might have Walker, Hales, and Pepes, assigned him for his Council, which the Court granted. The Council prayed they might have a Copy of the Record. Roll justice said, that the Prisoner himself ought to show matter in Law for Error, which the Council doubted. Error. But the Court overruled it, yet agreed, that the Record should be read unto them, which was done; Upon the reading Walker took these exceptions. 1. The Process is not well awarded, for the Capias is not praedict. Andrews, and so it appears not who was outlawed, whether the Prisoner or another of the same name. 2ly. It is not said, that the Process is awarded by the Court, nor at what Sessions it was awarded. Roll justice, It is necessary, for it is recorded there. 3ly. It appears not what party is dead, whether he that was struck or another. 4ly. It doth not appear in what part of the body the Wound was given, nor with what weapon. The Court said, that they will hear the King's Council before they would conclude any thing. The Council moved, that the Prisoner might be bailed, because it was fourteen years ago since he was indicted. The Court answered, till you are assigned of Council upon Record, we cannot bail him at your prayer. Bayl. Then the Council desired a Copy of the Record, ad quod non suit responsum, but the Court said to the Council take more time to consider of other Exceptions, for if these shall be overruled your Client is gone, viz. must be hanged. At another day he was bailed by four persons, and bound to prosecute his Writ of Error with effect. Pasc. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. AN Action of Debt was brought upon an Obligation for 3000 l. Arrest of judgement in Debt upon an obligation. the Defendant pleads that he had paid the money on such a day, whereas the truth of the Case was, that there was two days of payment limited in the Obligation, and the Defendant had paid part of the moneys upon one of the days of payment, and the rest upon the other day, and not all at one day. The Plaintiff replies that the Defendant did not pay the money upon the day alleged by the Defendant in his Plea, and upon this an Issue is joined, and a verdict found for the Plaintiff; Verdict. the Defendant moves in arrest of judgement, and shows for cause, That the Verdict is imperfect, because it doth not find that the Defendant had two days of payment, but concludes that he did not pay the money upon one of the days. Roll justice, If you have two days of payment to plead, and you rely upon one day in your pleading, Champerty. and issue is joined upon that, and it be found against you, you must be barred by it. Hales urged, That here was a champertous agreement, for there was no consideration for the assignment of this Obligation and Indenture to the Plaintiff, upon which the Action is brought by him. The judgement was stayed till the other part should move. More against Stone. Pasc. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. AN Action of Trespass of Assault and Battery, was brought by the Plaintiff for assaulting and beating, and taking his Servant for two Months, Arrest of judgement in Trespass by Assault and Battery, and taking away his Servant. Retainer. per quod servitium amisit; The Defendant pleads not guilty, and thereupon is an Issue joined, and a verdict for the Plaintiff. The Defendant moves in an arrest of judgement, and for cause shows, that the Plaintiff hath not set forth how the party was his Servant, whether as an Apprentice, or by retainer, as he ought to have done. But the Court said, that the Record imiplies that he was his Servant at the time when the Trespass was done, and that is enough, and this is the usual form of declaring in this Action in the Common-pleas, and in this Court also (and so many of the Council at the Bar affirmed) and therefore let the Plaintiff take his judgement. The King against Holland. Pasc. 24 Car, Banc. Reg. HAles offered to the Court these reasons why judgement should not be given here in this Case between the King and Holland formerly spoken to. To stay judgement upon a Memorandum of a Record out of the Chancery. judgement. 1. That the Record is not here in this Court, but only an extract of the Record out of the Record which is in Chancery, and therefore judgement cannot be given here: for a judgement must be given upon the Record itself. 2ly. It would be inconvenient if it should be otherwise, for the Chancery is judge of the Inquisition, and so there may be judgement one way in Chancery, and another way here, if the Record be not removed hither. And there is difference where a transcript of a Record is removed out of a Court which cannot proceed upon the Record itself, and where it is a transcript of a Record, Transcript. upon which Record the Court may proceed, as it is in our Case, 39 H. 6. 6. 14 E. 4. 1. & 7. 3ly. It appears not to this Court how the Commission and Inquisition are executed, whether well or not, and therefore it cannot judge of it. Maynard on the other side prays, that judgement may be given here, upon the memorandum of the Record sent hither out of the Chancery for these reasons, 1. Every Court ought to give judgement on the one side or other; therefore if the King may have judgement here, the party may also have judgement. 2ly. The Record is here in this Court virtually by sending of the Memorandum of it hither, and that is enough to give judgement upon. 3ly. The Chancery and this Court as to the giving of judgement here, are as it were one Court, 24 E. 3. f. 77. 4ly. There is a ground for judgement to be given here, and it cannot be given elsewhere, for an Award in Chancery is no judgement, Award. and so there cannot be two several judgements, one in Chancery, and another here, as Hales supposeth; and in latham's case, the Record was removed as it is here, and judgement given upon it in this Court. 5ly. The Chancery is not to be judge: for the Tranverse was there, and the cause removed hither, and we cannot go back thither again: for if we should do so, we should have judgement in no Court; If it had been upon a Demurrer in Chancery, than there might have been a judgement there, but not now the Cause is removed by Traverse, and a Patent shall not be corrected by the Enrolment, but the enrolment by the Patent under Seal. Hales on the other side said, That it is the Record of the plea that is transmitted out of the Chancery hither, but not the Record of the Inquisition or Commission upon which it is found, and how then can there be any judgement? Roll justice said, That the Amoveas manum is but a consequence of the judgement, Amoveas manum. and not the judgement itself, and we may give judgement without the Inquisition against the King, And the Record is transmitted hither to determine whether the King or the party hath right, and the Chancery cannot intermeddle: for by this means the Courts will clash, which would be inconvenient. Bacon justice spoke to the same effect. Roll justice added this, If an Office be found to entitle the King in the Chancery, and it be transmitted hither, and it appears to this Court that the office is not good, shall not we give judgement against the King? certainly we shall. But the Court would advise, and desired to hear the King's Council what they could say for the King. Pasc. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. AN Action of Trespass was brought for taking away divers parcels of Household stuff, and upon non Culp pleaded, the Plaintiff had a verdict, Arrest of judgement in Trespass for taking away Goods. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, and shown for cause, that the Declaration was not good, because divers words in it were insensible, as 1. The Plaintiff declares, for taking away unum Lenat, Anglice, a Mat, whereas Lenat is no word in any Language to signify any thing, and therefore the Anglice cannot help it. To this the Court answered, That it is all one as if it were left out of the Declaration, because it signifies nothing in it, Damages. and so there is no damages given for that thing which it should signify. 2ly. He declares for taking away tria suspendia, Anglice, Pot-hooks, or Hakes, But the Court held this good enough. 3ly. He declares for taking away unum Adustum ferreum, which are two Adjectives and signify nothing. To this the Court said, if they signify nothing, than no damages are given for it, and therefore let the Plaintiff take his judgement. Pasc. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Upon reading of the return of Colonel Tichborne Leiutenant of the Tower of London upon an habeas corpus directed to him, For an alias habeas corpus with pain. on the behalf of John Lilborn committed by order of both houses of Parliament for his contempt to them, Cook of Council with the Prisoner moved for an Alias habeas corpus with a pain, because the Lieutenant had only returned the Writ; Alia. but not brought the body of the Prisoner. Bacon justice, If there be sufficient matter expressed in the return to detain the Prisoner, to what purpose should we grant an Alias, return. therefore if the return be insufficient, move your matter against it. But Roll justice said, the Lieutenant ought to make his return either against the jurisdiction of this Court, or else he must bring the body of the Prisoner hither, and it is in our power to set a fine upon him, Fine. for making an insufficient return. Therefore the Court ordered that he should amend his return, or else they would grant an Alias with a pain. Hocker against Lamb. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Trin. 23 ar. rot. 1592. HOcker brought a Writ of Error in this Court against Lamb to reverse a judgement given against him, Error to reverse a judgement for error in the venire. Licu c●nus. Hundred. Ward. in the Court at Colchester in Essex; and assigns for Error, 1. That the venire is awarded larger than the Declaration. To this Roll justice said, the Ward within Colchester mentioned in the Declaration is but a lieu conus; but in London the Ward is in the nature of a Hundred, and so differs from this Case; a second exception was, that the time of the Assumpsit, upon which the Action in which the judgement was given was founded is expressed in figures, viz. the time for the delivery of the goods promised to be delivered, as also the time of the request for the delivery of them, as also the costs, and damages adjudged. Upon these exceptions the Court ordered the judgement to be reversed except very good cause should be shown to the contrary. Pasc. 24 Car. Banc. Reg THe Court was moved to discharge two prisoners committed for suspicion of murder, 〈…〉 at the 〈◊〉 by habeas corpu and brought to the bar by a habeas corpus returned for the insufficienty of the return, and upon two certificates offered to the Court, That the parties who did the murder, for which these prisoners were committed, were Executed for the same, and had confessed that they did it. Discharge. But Roll justice answered, if the return be touching Felony, though it be insufficient we cannot discharge the parties. The Court thereupon was moved, Bail. that they might be bailed, which was granted, and they were bailed by four in 200 l. a piece that the prisoners shall appear at the next assizes at Berry in Suffolk. Pay against Paxted. Pasc. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an inferior Court; And the Error assigned was in a continuance, Error to reverse a judgement for a d f. continuance. Discontinuance. which was ad proximam curiam, scil. 16. die, whereas the Court was not held that day, but 26. die. Roll justice said, peradventure the scilicet may be void. Yet the judgement was reversed, antea Keniston against Jones. Pasc. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Mich. 23, Car. rot. 587. AN Action of Debt was brought upon an obligation with condition to stand to an award; the Defendant pleads nullum arbitrium; Argument upon a special verdict in debt upon on obligation to stand to an award. Recital. Conclusion. the Plaintiff sets forth the award, and assigns a breach, and upon that an issue is joined, and a special verdict is found, and upon the special verdict 2 questions was, whether a misrecital of the date of one of the obligations of submission by the Arbitrators in their award, shall avoid the award. Philip's of Council with the Plaintiff argued that it should not, because that now the parties are concluded by the plea, and the verdict found upon it. 2ly. Whether the Arbitrators have exceeded the submission; he held they had not; for the first point he said, 1. That the submission was the submission of the parties, and the mistaking of the Arbitrators of the time when it was made is not material, nor shall hurt it, for the bond of submission is not in the custody of the Arbitrators, and so they might easily mistake the date, because they had it not to ulew, Blow. Com. 79. Crokers' case, 2ly. Date. The date of the obligation is not an essential part of the obligation, for an obligation may be good though it have no date, & therefore the mistaking of the date is not much material; 3ly. There is sufficient certainty of the bond expressed in the award, though the date be mistaken, & a void additional description of it shall not avoid a good description of it set forth in the award. Doughtyes case Cook 3. rep. & Dyer 292. 4ly. The misrecital is not in words affirmative; but merely in words relative. 5ly. The clause of misrecital refers to the deed recited by the prout, which is certain enough, and the law rejects the miscrecital as a thing impertinent, 6. rep. 36. Dyer 116. For the second point, although the submission should be void, yet by the issue joined the submission is confessed, and it is now contrary to the submission to plead nul award, Dyer 32. 28, 29 H. 8. 2. rep. 4. and the parties in our case do differ only whether there be an award or not, and not whether there be a submission or no. And as touching the award itself, I hold that the submission is not exceeded, Award. for all matters in difference between the parties are submitted; but not the bonds of the submission. 2ly. It stall not be taken to be alleged expressly of the matters only submitted, and not of others, if the contrary do not appear either by the Plaintiffs allegation or doubt of the Iury. 3ly. All the award is performed before the discharge of the obligations of submission. 4ly. The award is at least good in part, and it being not performed in this part that is good, the obligation is forfeited, Cook 10. rep. Kel. 43. 45 Hob. pag. 267. N●bys case, and so prays judgement for the Plaintiff. Latch for the Desendant. 1. The verdict is not contrary to the issue, nor admission in pleading, nor out of the issue, but within it, for the issue is whether the award be good modo et forma, and the submission is an essential part of the Award, and aught to be alleged in the Award, otherwise the Award is not good, and it is here alleged in the issue also Dyer 216. 9 H. 7. 3 and the negative here implies nothing. Another question is, whether the jury have found the Award set forth in the replication, or whether they have found any Award at all, ad if any Award be found, it is such an Award which is not in issue in the replication, and so the verdict is for the Defendant. And as to the Award itself, I hold it void, for the parties have not submitted to the Award that is made, for there is no submission to the determination of matters arising between the time of the sealing of one Bond, and of the other Bond, and so the Arbitrators have exceeded the submission, for they have awarded to make releases at the sealing of the last Bond, which compriseth all the time between the sealing of one Bond, and of the other. Next, part of the Award is not good by exceeding the submission, and this makes all the Award naught, for all the parts of this Award do so depend one upon another, that if one be naught all is naught. And the last part of the Award is naught, and so the Award is made but on the one part (which cannot be good,) for if the release be not made, all Actions between the parties cannot cease according to the Award, and so the Award is not final; And there is no verdict here for the Plaintiff, although the verdict should not be for the Defendant, for it appears not whether the 15th. of April be before or after Easter, and so prays judgement for the Defendant. Roll justice said, if there appears a material variance between the Award ●et forth, Notice. and the Award pleaded, it is ill: And it is a question whether we be bound to take notice of the Almanac, and the feast days there set down or no. It was adjourned to be argued again the next Term. Thynn against Thynn. Pasc. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. IN this Case wherein exceptions were formerly taken to the Writ of Error, Opinion of the Court concerning a return. and argued, Bacon justice said, he had read over the book, and doubted whether many of the Errors formerly assigned are not out of dore●, because the certiorari is not well returned before us, for the certiorari is directed to the Recorder, and it is returned by the Deputy Recorder in his own name. return. Roll justice doubted also, for he said, all the old precedents were against this return. But if the Writ be directed to a Recorder, who is custosbrevium, or to a Recorder, and his Deputy, than the return as it is will be good. TWisden of Council with the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error in the Wiltshire cause took these exceptions. The first exception take was, Error and exceptions offered to a judgement in Dower. that he demand of Dower, is larger than the original Writ, for that the demand is of the Parish of Timesbury, and the Writ is of the Vill of Timesbury, which is not so large by intendment as a parish, because there may be divers Vills in one parish; and he said, that in some case a Writ shall restrain a demand; in other cases it shall not, namely where they cannot stand together, and so is it here, 21 E. 4. f. 24. 3 E. 3. f. 56. Demand. A second exception was, that the nature of the tithes demanded are not set forth, although they be not in gross, but appendent as they ought to be, Dower. and a feme was not dowable at all of tithes before the Statute of 32 H. 8. and a feme is dowable of Common appendent, but not of Common in gross. A third exception was, that Dower is recovered of a thing not dowable, viz. of a quarry of stones, for if she should be dowable of a quarry of stones, this would be to the destruction of the inheritance, and indeed it is impossible, for a quarry of stones cannot be divided by meats and bounds, which must be if she should be endowed of it. And also if the mine, and quarry should be divided, the Tenant of the Land would be prejudiced; and that a quarry cannot be divided, see Cooks Lit. 164. and so was it adjudged 2 jac. upon a reference to the judges. Next, there is also Error in fact, for the Hundred of Warminster extends into the Hundred of Sutton parva, Error in fact and so if she be endowed of the Hundred of Warminster, she will be endowed of the third part of two Hundreds, which is more than she demands by her Writ of Dower. Maynard of Council with the Defendant in the Writ of Error said, as to the summons he held there is a good summons, and cited Hob. 137 Dalt. f. 86. And there may be divers parishes in one Vill, as well as divers Vills in one parish; And to the exception that the demand of the Dower in the Writ is general, whereas it ought to be a special demand; he answered, the demand in Dower differs from other demands, and is more favoured in Law; for as Dower itself is favoured in Law, so are the proceed in Law to recover it, 6 E. 3. 45. 16. E. 2. 7. 8 H. 3. 11 Ed. 3. 85. 25 E. 3. bre●. 412. Fitz. Dower 8 E. 3. Sect. 434. Reg. 39 And as to the surplusage in the demand, this shall not abate the Writ 4 E. 3. 52. Fitz. brei. 14. Abatement. And that the parish should extend out of the Vill, is a foreign intendment, and shall not be so taken against an Averment, and when a Vill, and a parish are named by one name, one of them shall not be intended larger than the other, if the contrary be not shown. Long quint. Ed. 4. f. 20. And he argued that a feme is dowable of a quarry, and that it may be divided by meats and bounds, for it may be divided by the profits, although it cannot be divided by the quantity of the thing. Roll justice said, By no manner of pleading can one abate a Writ after judgement, and how should it be so here? And 2 Cases were cited by the Council that bis petita shall not abate a Writ. Mich. 9 jac. Bolstrod and Brooks case, and Easton and Styles case in a Writ of Dower. Pasc. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Plaintiff brought an Action of Trespass quare vi et armis for rescuing of a Prisoner out of his possession, Arrest of judgement in an action of Trespass vi et armis, for rescous. and hath a verdict against the Defendant. The Defendant moves in arrest of judgement, for that the Plaintiff ought to have brought his Action of Trespass upon the Case, and not an Action of Trespass quare vi & armis. But Roll justice answered, that he might have an Action upon the Case, or a Trespass vi & armis at his election, Election of Action. and therefore the exception is null. Another exception was taken, that there was 4 years between the time of the Trespass done, and the time of bringing the Action. Roll justice answered, you should have pleaded this matter if you would have had advantage by it, but it is to no purpose to urge it. Another exception was taken, that the Declaration says that he took him in his possession out of his possession. But the Court overruled this also, and ordered the Defendant to show better matter why judgement should not be given against him. King against Pasc. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. KIng brought an Action of the Case in London against the Defendant, For a Procedendo in an action upon the Case removed our of London. Custom. for speaking these words of her, Thou art a Whore, and Cantrels Whore, and hast been so this forty years. The Defendant removed the Cause into this Court by a Certiorari; the Plaintiff moved for a Procedendo. But nothing was done in it, for the Court was divided: for Bacon justice held the words not actionable. But Roll justice held, that by the Custom of London they were, though not at the Common-law. Aylett against Stellam. Pasc. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. TWisden upon a rule of Court to show cause why there should not be a new Trial, Cause why no new Trial. said, that two things were alleged on the other side that there ought to be a new Trial. 1. That two of the jurors were of kin to the Plaintiff. And 2ly. That there was notice given to the Defendant of a second Venire facias. To the first of which he answered, that the jurors were not of kin, and produced an Affidavit for proof. Roll justice interrupted him, and said, it is not now material whether they be of kin or no, for the Defendant should have taken advantage of that upon his challenge at the Trial. Challenge. Advantage. And for the second, it matters not whether he gave notice of the second Venire or no: for the rules of the Court do not enjoin him to give notice. Maynard of Council with the Defendant urged, that two of the jurors were of kin, and produceth an Affidavit to prove it, and said, that the Defendant was also surprised for want of notice of the second Venire. Roll justice said, the second Venire ought to be entered here, and if it were not entered, how can the Defendant know whether it be altered or no? Yet here is no breach of the rules of the Court, and so the proceed are fair: for the Venire may be entered, Entry. or it may not be entered, and if it be not entered, the party may go to the Attorney, and procure a Copy of it before the Trial: and though the Venire be not entered till after the Assizes, it is well enough. Therefore let the Plaintiff take his judgement. Thine against Thine. Pasc. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. LAtch of Council with the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error argued again, Argument in Dower. Demand. and held, 1. That the nature of the Tithes demanded in the Writ of Dower ought to have been expressed, for the demand may peradventure be of such Tithes, whereof the Feme is not dowable. 2ly. Where the thing itself is demanded of which the Sheriff is to give possession, there the Demand of it ought to be certain: for as it is in a Demand in an Ejectione firmae, or an Assize, so ought it to be in a Demand in a Writ of Dower, Dyer, f. 116. & 258. 11 Rep. Harper's Case, Dyer, 83. the Sergeants Case, 44 B. 3.5. Cook's Entries, tit. Dower plac. 2d. and though the Demand be of all Tithes, yet they ought to be specified, as it is in Harper's Case; and so it is of Tithes in gross, 11 Rep. savil Case, Mich. 12 jac. Bales and Hamond in this Court. And as to the return, a Chapel is demanded, return. and judgement given for it, and yet the return doth not mention it; and it is not enough to comprise it in other words, and it is doubtful whether a Chapel be a Tenement or no: for it is not a temporal Inheritance, as an Advowson is, Tenement. Writ. Dyer, 83. In some Case the Writ may be general, and the Count special: but that is where there is not a special form of Writ. 2ly a Chapel is not conveyed in Fines and Recoveries, or Entries, by the name of a Tenement, nor in any judicial proceed, but Tenementa in a Grant may contain a Chapel. 3ly. The particular enumeration of other things, and the ●mitting of the Chapel makes it ill; and so would it be in a Grant by such in enumeration, Dyer 161. The Case of the Hamlets, 36 Eliz. Ewer & Heydon, 21 & 22 Eliz. the Bishop of Norwitches case, 8 Rep. 18. Doctor bonham's Case, 12 Ed. 1. Grants 87. Other exceptions he took to the judgement and execution. First to the judgement, Hundred. that a Hundred cannot be delivered by meats and bounds: for a Hundred is but a jurisdiction, and is entire. 2ly. The execution is ill: for a Court of Frank pledge cannot be divided by meats and bounds, Cooks Instit. 32. and Dower is assignable either by meats and bounds, or in common or in special manner. lib. Intrat. 18. He took also Exceptions to the second judgement, Damages. that damages of the value of the Tithes are not to be given in Dower; next the Inquisition doth not find, that the Husband died seized of the Tithes, and then there can be no judgement given for them. And the dying seized of the Rectory, is no dying seized of the Tithes, nor is the dying seized of the Chapel, a dying seized of the Tithes appurtenant to it, for the Chapel is but the Chapel-House, or Dilatory, 11 Rep. Harper's Case. Then for the Error in fact, the demand is of the Manner of Lullington, and this extends out of Lullington, and it is not repugnant to the Record to assign this Error in fact, and it could not have been pleaded in abatement of the Writ, 8 E. 3. 68 A Nuper obiit resembles a Writ of Dower, Nuper oblit. 7 E. 3. 28. 7 E. 3. pl. 5.12 Ass. 20. 26 E. 3. 72. 29 Ass. 55. 10 E. 4, 11. 9 E. 4. 3. 9 E. 4. 17. And so prayed the judgement might be reversed. It was adjourned to be argued again the next Term. Hill against Bird. Pasc. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Upon a rule of Court to show cause why a Prohibition should not be granted to the Prerogative. Cause why no Prohibition to the Prerogative Court. Latch stated the Case to be this: A man died intestate, the Daughter of the Brother of the Intestate (her Father being dead) procures Letters of Administration, and a Son of the Sister of the Intestate sues in the Prerogative to revoke the administration, or to have distribution of the Goods; the Administrator prays a Prohibition; and hereupon he prays, that either no Prohibition at all is to be granted, or else it must be special. Prohibition. Roll justice, The Daugther of the Brother, and the Brother of the Sister of the Intestate are in equal degree of kindred, and the Ordinary may grant administration to which he pleaseth. Administration. Latch urged, that the administration was not yet settled: for it was granted upon Condition, and if the Administrator will not bring in an inventory, the Ordinary may alter the administration. Hales on the other side prays, there may be a general Prohibition cuiliber, etc. Roll justice, The Prohibition must be against some certain person; but if divers have appeared to sue, there a Prohibition shall be against all of them, and the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be enlarged by the agreement of the parties, Revocation. Hob. Tucker and Bo●es Case. And an administration cannot be revoked, for the not bringing in of the Inventory and Account by the Admnistrator. The libel was afterwards read, which was to have distribution of the Goods, or else to reverse the Letters of admimi●●●tration, and upon this the Court granted to a Prohibition, if cause be not shown upon notice to the contrary, as to the Distribution, but not generally. Leving against Gamble. Pasc. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. IN arrest of judgement it was urged, Arrest of judgement in Trespass. that the Declaration was incertain; for the Plaintiff had declared pro quinque pecias stanni, anglice Pewter-dishes, whereas pecias stanni did not signify Pewter-dishes; for it might be Spoons, Pots, or any other sort of Pewter as well as Dishes. But the Council on the other side said, Anglice void. it was well enough, and prayed for judgement. Roll justice said, the Anglice shall be void, and then the Latin is good, for it is five pieces of Pewter, and it matters not what pieces they be: For it is ad valentiam, which makes the value certain enough to the Iury. Therefore let the Plaintiff take his judgement. Scoble against Tolye. Pasc. 24 Car. Banc Reg. SCoble brings an Action of Trespass against Toil, Demurrer upon a Replication in Trespass. for taking away his . The Defendant pleads that the Plaintiff was possessed of the jointly with another not named in the Writ, and demands judgement of the Writ. The Plaitiff replies, that the other with whom he was jointly possessed was dead at the time of the Action brought; The Defendant demurs for delay. The Court ruled a respondes ouster. Maynard of Council with the Plaintiff said, it was peremptory; Peremptory. But the Court was against him, and ordered the Defendant to plead in chief Saturday following. Hart against Bucminster. Pasc. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Hill. 23 Car. rot. 225. Heart brought an Action of Debt upon an Obligation of 200 l. judgement demanded of a Plea. against Buckminster, and sets forth that the condition of the Obligation was to this effect, That whereas Hart had carried so many thousand of Billets and delivered them at Dartford in Kent, for the use of Buckminster, amounting at so much by the thousand, to a hundred pound in the whole, if therefore the Defendant should pay the said hundred pound at such a time and place, that then the Obligation to be void, or else to be in force; and for nonpayment was the Action brought. The Defendant says that the Plaintiff did not carry and deliver so many thousand of Billets to Dartford (as the Plaintiff had declared, and demands judgement of the Action. The Plaintiff by way of replication demands judgement if the Defendant shall be admitted to pleadt his Plea, which is contrary to the averment of the Obligation, which is his own Deed, and shall not be estopped thereby. Estople. To this the Defendant demurs. And the Court held that this recital in the Obligation is an Estople to the Defendant to plead the contrary; and the rule was, for him to show cause why judgement should not be given against him upon his Demurrer. Southcott against Southcott. Pasc. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. SOuthcott brought an Action upon the Statute of 2 Ed. 6. for not setting forth of Tithes against Southcott, Arrest of judgement in an Action for Tithes upon the Stat. of 2 Ed. 6. and hath a verdict The Defendant moves in arrest of judgement, and shows that the Declaration was too general and incertain: for it is for such a quantity of Grain, and doth not set forth what sort of Grain, and so it may be for Grain not titheable. Maynard of Council with the Plaintiff held, that in this Case the Declaration was well enough, although it would not have been so in an Action of trespass, for that Action requires more certainty. A 2d. Exception was, that it is not said whether the Corn was in Garbs or Sheaves. To this Maynard said, it is well enough notwithstanding, for it shall be intended only of such Grain as is usually put in Garbs. Hales of Council with the Defendant said, the word Grain was too general a word to be used, Incertainty. and no certainty in it, for it extends to Mustardseed, Cole-seed, Rape-seed, etc. and the genus ought to be expressed, and it shall not be intended of Corn put in Garbs. The Court would advise, but inclined the Declaration was too general, and not good. Postea Pasc. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. SIr john Stowell indicted in the Country for high Treason was brought to the Bar by a Habeas corpus to be tried, Proceeding against a Prisoner for high Treason. and desired to hold up his hand, which he refused. But the Court admonished him to do it, because that before he did so he could not plead, and if he were to plead a pardon for Treason, he could not do it, till he were first charged with the Endictment. And Doctor Stories case, 32 Eliz. was cited, and it was said, that though in an Endictment for Felony, if the Prisoner refuse to plead he is to be pressed; Yet in Treason it is not so, for if the Prisoner indicted of Treason will not put himself upon his Trial, Pressing. or answer impertinently, which is not answering, but nugation, judgement. Pro confesso. judgement shall be given against him as taken pro confesso that he is guilty. Pasc. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. AN Action of the Case was brought against one for causing the plaintiff to be indicted of Rebellion and Felony. Arrest of judgement in an action upon the Case. The Defendant moves in arrest of judgement, and shows, that the Declaration was incertain, for it sets forth an Endictment in quo crimen rebellionis ei imposuit & felonii, which words are so incertain, that it appears not what the Plaintiff was charged with in the Endictment, and so there could never have been any judgement given against him. Maynard on the other side said, it was well expressed, and could not well be otherwise expressed than it is. Bacon justice said, Rebellion. Intention. there may be Rebellion which is not capital, as Rebellion in Chancery. But Roll differed in opinion, and said, the intent of the words spoken is to be considered. The rule was, to bring Books to the judges. Mayhue and Baspool. Trin. 24 Car Banc. Reg. BAs●ool brought an Action upon the Case upon a promise against Maybue, Error upon a judgement in an Action upon the Case. and hath a judgement against him. The Defendant brings a Writ of Error in this Court to reverse the judgement, and assigns for Error, 1 It is not said in the Declaration, that the promise was made within the jurisdiction of the Court. But Roll justice answered, that it was, that the Desendant was indebted tunc & ibidem, which shows, that he became indebted within the jurisdiction of the Court. jurisdiction. Assumpsit. and the being indebted there is an Assumpsit in Law, that he will pay the Debt, and therefore it is not needful of show expressly that he did promise there to pay it, 2ly. The Venire is duodecim probos & legales homines, whereas it should be liberos, etc. But the Court overruled this exception also, and affirmed the judgement except better matter should be shown. Winn against Stebbins Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Upon a rule of Court for a reference to the Secondary, Whether a contempt to the Court or not. whether the party, and the Sheriff were in contempt to the Court for taking out of Execution, and executing it after a Writ of Error brought upon a judgement, it was moved that he might make his report, who thereupon reported to this effect; That there was a writ of Error brought upon the judgement before Execution taken forth; Notice. but there was no notice thereof given to the party, nor any supersedeas taken forth to stay Execution, and therefore the Plaintiff might take out Execution, Contempt. notwithstanding the writ of Error brought, and that thereby he is not in contempt to the Court. Roll justice said, Then is the Execution now well executd, Execution. and the Sheriff is in no fault. Maynard of Council with the Plaintif in the writ of Error, moved that the Execution was awarded improvide, and therefore the Court may restore the party to his goods taken in Execution, although the Sheriff be not in fault. Roll justice, The party ought to take notice of a recipitur upon the Record if it be entered, and if the party take out Execution after the writ of Error is allowed, he is in contempt to the Court, else not, and the Attorney is not bound to view the Record whether a writ of Error be brought; but may take out Execution if there be not a Supersedeas, Supersedeas; or notice given to the party. Therefore there is no help here, for the proceed have been according to the course of the Court, for by the delivery of the writ of Error to the Officer of the Court, the hands of the Court are closed. Yet let us see the Precedent that Wood ward hath to show, and let the Secondary examine it again. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. AN Action of account was brought touching the freight of a Ship, For a scire facias against manucaptors. and a judgement that the Defendant shall account, and Auditors assigned, and Manucaptors found to appear before the Auditors, the Court was moved for a scire facias against the Manucaptors, because that the Defendant did not appear at the day before the Auditors assigned, and secondly it was moved that the Court would assign a day peremptory, Certificate. Auditors. for the party to appear before the Auditors. But Roll justice said, a day cannot be assigned until a certificate be made to us from the Auditors, for they are trusted, and are judges of the cause, and have power to excuse the non-appearance of the party at the day, if they see cause, and to give longer day or shorter, for the party to appear as they think good, end therefore till they certify, neither can you have a day assigned, Scire facias, nor a scire facias against the Manucaptors. Clementson against Montford Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Hill. 23 Car. rot. 1493. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement in an Action upon the Case brought by an Administrator in the Court at Esham; Error to reverse a judgement in an action upon the case. The Errors assigned were. 1. The Plaintiff doth not declare that the administration was granted unto him per loci illius ordinarium. 2ly. The Plaintiff saith in his Declaration, producit litteras Administratorias intestati, whereas it should be ordinarii, and not intestati. 3ly. The Court cannot by its privilege being an inferior Court, Capias. and that but newly erected, award a Capias upon entering the plaint, as it is here done. 4ly. The Court began first to be a Court, but 9 jac. and yet it is said to be held per usum et consuetudinem curiae. Twisden to the 1. exception said, that it is helped by the verdict. Roll justice asked how doth it appear that Esham is within the Diocese of the Bishop that granted the Letters of Administration, for if it be not, the Letters are not well granted; And said, that in a Declaration it is not necessary to say that Letters of Administration are granted per loci illius ordinarium, aut cui pertinuit, Administration Declaration, Plea. although they ought to be so pleaded in a plea in Bar. To the second exception, Twisden answered, that the words mentioned are not necessary, and the Declaration would be good enough without them, and therefore they shall not hurt it, though they he mistaken, and if it should be otherwise, yet they are helped by the verdict; and to the first exception he said, that the words secundum usum et consuetudinem shall be intended to be meant according to the Law, and not according to ancient usage, as is urged by the Council on the other side. The rule was that judgement be affirmed except better matter should be shown Monday next. Read against Palmer. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. REad brings an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit to stand to an award against Palmer, Arrest of judgement in an action upon the case. and hath a verdict. The Defendant moves in arrest of judgement, and shows that there was an amendment in the consideration, and the promise after the issue joined. Twisden answered, it is not material, though it be so, for the matter of the Assumpsit is employed, and the words altered are idle, and cited 37 ●l. Heydons Case, for it is de et super praemissis, Amercement. which implies all the matter. Roll justice said, that the words de et super praemissis go not to the time, but to the matter submitted, and said that the words postea, scilicet eodem die, Contract in law. special contract upon a contract in Law shall be intended the time of the contract, but here is a special contract and collateral, and it ought to be otherwise intended, and desired to see a book. Freeborn against Purchase. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Hill. 23 Car. rot. 1575. FReeborn brought an Action upon the Case against Purchase, Demurrer to a Declaration in an action upon the case. and declares that the Defendant in consideration that the Plaintiff had paid unto him such a sum of money, did assume, and promise to joy in the surrender of certain Copyhold Lands, and that for not performing this promise he brings his Action. The Defendant demurs upon the Declaration, Request. and shows that the Plaintiff doth not allege that he made any request to the Defendant to join in the surrender, which he ought to do, for it was not a single Act to be done by the Defendant alone; but he was to join in the Act with another. Roll justice said, the promise is that the Defendant shall join in the surrender, Breach. and he doth not say that he did request him to join, which he should have done. And besides the breach is not well assigned, for you have assigned a particular way how he should surrender, namely into the hands of 2 Tenants of the manor, whereas he did assume only to join in a surrender, which may be in Court, or into the hands of the Lord, as well as into the hands of two Tenants; so is Syms and Walkers Case, 9 Car. Also the Plaintiff ought to have showed that there is such a particular custom in the manor, Notice. that a Copyhold Tenant may surrender into the hands of two Tenants of the manor, or else such a Custom cannot be taken notice of. Therefore let a nil capiat per billam be entered against the Plaintiff. Wright against Martin. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved to change the venue in an Action for an escape, To change a venue in an action for an escape. Local. upon an affidavit that the escape touching which the Action was brought was in another County, and not in the County where the Action was brought. But Roll justice said, that an escape in one place is an escape all England over, and is not local; therefore the venue is not to be tied to one place more than another. Yet let the other party show cause why the venue should not be altered. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Upon a rule to show cause why judgement should not be stayed in an Action upon the Statute of 2 Ed. 6. for not setting forth of Tithes, Exceptions answered offered in arrest of judgement in an action upon the Statute of 2 Ed. 6. for not setting forth of tithes. Recital, these exceptions for merly taken were answered. 1. It was said the Statute was misrecited, for the day when the Parliament began wherein the Statute was made is mistaken; but to this it is answered, that the Declaration doth not say per Statutum in Parliamento inchoat. tali die, but in Parliament. tento tali die, and the Parliament was held by prorogation the day that it is mentioned, though it were not then first begun, and so that is well enough. To the second exception, that the Declaration doth say that the Plaintiff was primo die occupator ac postea eodem die, etc. So that it appears not, Proprietor. that he was proprietor, and so the Action may not lie, for he may be occupator wrongfully, and so not proprietor. It is answered, that the Declaration is, that he was tali die possessionatus et ab eodem die occupavit, and this shall be judged of a rightful estate, and it is said, that he is rector ecclesiae, and so he shall be intended proprietor of the Tithes, if the contrary be not shown. The rule was to show better cause Friday following, else Judgement for the Plaintiff. Sowthcott against Sowthcott. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg, IN this Case formerly moved, Exceptions answered taken to arrest judgement in an action for tithes. Tithes. and judgement stayed till the Plaintiff should move: Maynard for the Plaintiff moved for judgement, and to the exception taken on the other side, that the word grain used in the Declaration is too general, and may extend to grain not titheable, viz. to rape-seed and cole-seed, etc. as well as to titheable, and so the Declaration is incertain; De said it is well enough, for it is said grain growing in such a field by name, which makes it certain, 2 rep. lib. Int. 176. 2d. Coment. f. 161. b. and for the word grain in common understanding it is meant for corn, and not for seeds, though in a large exception it may extend to seeds also. Hales on the otherside said, that the word grain is incertain, and signifies more than corn, and also the word Garbae is too general, for it may extend to more than sheafs of Corn, for bundles of any thing bound up may be said to be Garbae, as well as Corn bound in sheaves, and may extend also to grain not titheable. Roll justice held, the words in the Declaration, Seminavit cum grano proper enough, Common intent and that by common construction it shall be meant with Corn, and not with seeds, 10 Car. Goldsmith's Case, Hill. rot. 8. And for Garbae, it is also well enough, for it shall be taken according to common construction, which is to signify corn bound up, and shall not be taken in the large extent of the word for bundles of any thing else. And the jury hath taken notice of it, for they have found debet, which had they not they could not have found the verdict so. The rule was for the Plaintiff to take his judgement, if cause were not shown Friday following. The King and Sr. Henry Spiller Trin. 24 Car. ●anc. Reg. THe Court was moved for the quashing of divers Endictments wherein Sr. Henry Spiller was indicted for not repairing a bridge; For quashing divers Endictments for ●or repairing of a Bridge. the exception to the first was, that it doth not set forth in what County the bridge lies, and for that exception it was quashed. Another Endictment was for not repairing of Mays Bridge, and it doth not show that the bridge is in the Highway. But to this Roll justice said, that the Endictment doth say it is a Common bridge, and that is enough, and it is needless to say it is in the Highway. Another exception was taken to this Endictment; that it did not show whether the bridge were a cart bridge, or a horse bridge, or a foot bridge, or what other passage was over it, and for that exception that Endictment was quashed. To a third Endictment for not repairing the same bridge, this exception was taken, viz. It says that Sr. Henry Spillar was bound to repair the bridge ratione manerii, which cannot be good; but it should be rationae tenurae manerii. Roll justice said, It ought to show that he is owner of the manor, and although it do express that he is bound to repair it ratione manerii sui, that is but implication that he is to repair it, Implication. and makes it not appear that he is possessed of the manor, and upon this exception was this Endictment quashed. Addition. To a fourth Endictment for not repairing the same bridge, this exception was taken, that there is no addition of the County, where Sr. Henry Spillar dwelled, as the Statute directs, and for this it was also quashed. Yet afterwards because there was no certificate that the bridge was repaired, the Court would quash none of them, but said, let him plead to them: The Defendants Council moved that he might plead but to two of them, and that process might be spared to the rest. Roll justice, Appear to all, and plead, and proceed in two of them, and process shall be stayed to the rest. Burrel and Lancaster. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. BUrrell brought an Action of Trespass quare clausum fregit against Lancaster, Arrest of judgement in Trespass quare clausum fregit. Variance. Nomen aggregativum. and had a verdict; the Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, and for cause shows that there is a variance between the writ, and the Declaration, for the writ is quare clausum fregit in the singular number, and the Plaintiff declares of divers Closes; But Roll justice said, That it was well enough, for the word clausum is nomen aggregativum, and may contain many Closes, and so may well enough agree with the Declaration, And therefore let the Plhintiff take his judgement. Glide against Dudeney. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Pasc. 24 Car. rot. 426. GLide brings an ejectione firmae against Dudeney in the Common pleas, Error upon a judgement in an ejectione firmae in the Common plea and hath a judgement by default against the Defendant, whereupon a writ of enquiry issues out to inquire of the Damages, and before the return thereof, the Defendant brings a writ of Error, the question was, whether the writ of Error were well brought, in regard that the course of the Common pleas is not to make up the judgement until the writ of enquiry be returned. Roll justice said, that a writ of Error may be brought before the writ of enquiry be returned in an ejectione firmae, for in that Action the judgement is complete at the Common Law before it be returned, judgement. Error. for the judgement is but to gain possession, and so is it in a writ of Dower; but in an Action of Trespass where damages only are to be recovered, there the judgement is not perfect till the writ of enquiry is returned, nor can be made up before as in this case it may, but in regard that here is no complete judgement entered, for there is no capias which ought to be in all Actions quare vi et armis, that the King may have his fine which else he cannot have if the party do not proceed in his Writ of Enquiry, Error. Execution. the Writ of Error is brought too soon, and you may proceed to execution in the Common-pleas, for the complete Record is not here. Therefore advise what to do in the Common-pleas, for it is mischievous qua cunque via. Norton against Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. NOrton brought an Action of Assault and Battery against the Defendant, Arrest of judgement in Assault and Battery. Mis-sworn. and had a verdict against him. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, that in the Venire facias one of the jurors was returned by the name of Edmund, and it appears by the Postea, that he was sworn by the name of Edward, which cannot be intended to be the same person. Roll I●stice said▪ Amendment. if the Clerk of the Assizes, in returning of the Postea have mistaken the name, it may be amended here in Court by his notes, by which he made the Postea; and therefore let him be examined here whether it be a mistake or no. Toby against Angel. Trin. 24 Car. Banc Reg. THe Court was moved for a reference in this Cause to the Secondary, because the suit was commenced upon two Counter-bonds, For a reference. which are both canceled. Roll justice answered, then why should it be referred: for you may plead non damnificatus, if the truth of the matter be so: but the party may peradventure be damnified, notwithstanding the Bonds be canceled, and may have good cause of Action. Langly against Wybord. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. LAngly brought an Action of Debt upon an Obligation to stand to an Award against Wybord. Demurrer to a Replication in Debt upon an Obligation to stand to an Award. Award. The Defendant pleads nullum Arbitrium. The Plaintiff replies, that the Arbitrators did make an Award, and sets it forth in haec verba; The Defendant demurs and shows for cause, that the Award is not well set forth: for he doth not show, that the Award was delivered up by the Arbitrators, according to the submission. Roll justice answered, it was well enough, though it be not. A second cause was, that it is not said touching what suits the Award was made. Roll Justice answered, the Award is said to be de praemissis, and that is good enough. 3ly. The Award is, that all suits shall cease. Roll justice, This is well enough. 4ly. The Arbitrators have exceeded their submission. The rule was to bring the Roll into Court, and till then the former rule to stand. Afterwards the Award was judged good, and the Plaintiff had his judgement. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an Inferior Court, Error to reverse a judgement in an Inferior Court. and the Error assigned was, That the plaint was entered before such an one Mayor and the suit was continued before another Mayor, and it is not shown that the first Mayor was removed, and that the other Mayor was lawfully elected and sworn. Roll justice said, that the Continuances in Inferior Courts ought to show the manner of the Continuances, Continuance. and it ought not to be expressed generally. And it is not said tunc majori, Trial. which would have made it more incertain. I doubt the Venire facias is discontinued, and then there is no Trial; therefore it is good to advise. Pragnell against Goff. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. GOff brings an Action upon an Assumpsit against Pragnell, Error upon a judgement in an Action upon an Assumpsit. and hath a verdict, and a judgement against him. The Defendant brings a Writ of Error to reverse this judgement. The Case was this, Pragnell did assume and promise unto Goff, that in consideration that Goff would marry the Daughter of Pragnell, that he would be bound to give over his Shop unto him, and not use his Trade in Basingstoke, and would lend unto him fifty pound, and for not performing this promise he had his judgement. The Error assigned was, that there is a breach ●aid of all the promise, Assumpsit. which consists of divers parts, and one part of it is against Law, namely, the Promise to be bound not to use his Trade, and yet damages are given entirely for all, which is not good. Wild on Council on the other side said, that in 2 H. 5. urged is no judgement given, and in our Case it is not that he shall be bound not to use his Trade generally, but only in the Town of Basingstoke, and he may use it any where else, and therefore it is not against Law. Roll justice, If the words be general, that he shall not use his Trade in such a place without any consideration, this is ill: but it is otherwise if there be a consideration, for a man may sell his Liberty & Privilege for a Consideration, and it shall bind him. The rule was to show cause Saturday next why judgement should not be affirmed. This was afterwards moved & objected, Damages. that part of the Assumpsit was to turn over the Defendants Trade, and damages given for that which is impossible. Roll justice said, if damages entire be given for some things with others whereof some are impossible, the damages shall be deemed to be given for those that are possible, and void to the rest, The judgement was affirmed. Peeling against Ken. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Pasc. 24 Car. rot. 89. PEeling brought an Action of Debt upon an Obligation to stand to an Award against Ken. The Defendant pleads Nullum Arbitrium. Demurrer to a Replication in Debt upon on obligation to stand to an award. The Plaintiff replies and sets forth the Award in haec verba, and assigns a breach. The Defendant demurs to the Replication, and the Plaintiff joins in the Demurrer. The causes assigned for the Demurer were, 1. To the Award itself, Award. which is that whereas it appears that there was six pound and a shilling due by the Plaintiff unto the Defendant; the Arbitrators had awarded, that the Plaintiff should pay unto the Defendant six pound in full satisfaction thereof: which is less than they acknowledge to be due, so that it cannot be a satisfaction, 9 H. 7. f. 11. 46 E. 3. f. 7. 2ly. The Award is, that one of the parties shall deliver Dimissionem praedictam, whereas it ought to be Indenturam dimissionis; for the dimission is but the consent of the party to the Indenture, and not the Indenture itself, Cooks Instit. 43 6. 3ly. They award to deliver dimissionem praedictam in the House of a Stranger, which ought not to be: for the party must commit a trespass to do it, if he cannot get leave of the Stranger, which he is not bound to do, 9 H. 7. 16. 18 Ed. 3. 23 19 Ed. 4. 41. The words are, that it shall be delivered at the House, and in and at are all one in grammatical construction, Mich. 23 Car. Coleman and Painter's Case. 4ly. They award one of the parties shall release three years rend to the other, and there was but two years rend due, so that it is impossible to be done. 5ly. They have made their Award upon a thing not submitted, viz. that there should be a release of all Actions which might concern the rent; Averment. and lastly, the party ought to show he hath performed the Award on his part, which he hath not not done, 8 H. 6. 18. Brook Arbitrement. Twisden of Council on the other side, to the first Exception said, it is not to the purpose: for Arbitrators may award a less sum than is due, in satisfaction of it, and though it be ill, yet the Award is good as to so much, whereof a good breach is assigned. To the second he answered, that the words dimissionem praedictam refer to the Indenture pleaded, and so that is well enough. To the third he said, that the Award is that the Indenture shall be delivered at the House, and it is lawful for him to go to the House, though not into the House of a Stranger. The the 4th. he answered, that the words are to be understood that the party shall not pay the rent, and not that he shall release it. To the fift he said, that the words alleged are no part of the Arbitrement. And if the Obligation be released it is not material, for the Arbitrement is performed, and the words Premises restrain the Arbitrement to the Submission. And to the sixth it is not necessary to show how the Arbitrement is performed: for if it be not, the other party hath his remedy. Roll justice said, that in 12 jac. it was adjudged, that if an Arbitrement was for a thing to be done in or at the House of a Stranger, it was well enough: for it may be intended to be done at the House without doing a Trespass, though not in the House, except the contrary be showed by the party. In Lynyn and Williamson, Hoofs Case; and as to the words dimissionem praedictam, that is also well enough: for it shall be intended the Indenture of demise. But let us have Books and move it again. It was moved again, and another exception taken, that the promise was released; Upon which the Court would advise. Smith against Hobson. Trin. 23 Car. rot. 1078. SMith an Inn Keeper in Warwick brought an Action upon the Case against Hobson, Arrest of judgement in an action upon the Case. for speaking these words, Colonel Egerton had the French pox, and hath set it in the House (meaning the Plaintiffs House) and William Smith and his wife (meaning the Plaintiff and his Wife) have it, and all you. The Plaintiff hath a verdict. The Defendant moves in arrest of judgement, and for cause shows, that the words are not actionable: for the words are, that Colonel Egerton hath set the French pox in the House, which is impossible: for the House could not have the pox, and the words William Smith and his Wife have it, shall not be meant that they have the pox, but the House, for that is the next Antecedent to the words, to which they shall refer. And also where words are spoken doubtfully whether they be spoken true or false, they shall be taken to be true: and it may be here the words are true, and then no Action lies for speaking of them: also the Baron and Feme ought to join in the Action, if they be actionable, join in Action. for they are spoken to both their prejudice, and the Action is not to be brought by the Husband alone, as here it is. Also in this Case the words being spoken of a House, the Writ of Enquiry of Damages must be what Damages is come to the House, which cannot be. Roll justice, If an Action be brought for words, and part of them be actionable, and part are not, yet an Action lies for them which are actionable. And in this Case the Husband alone may bring the Action for damages to himself, and he may afterwards bring another Action for the damages done to his Wife. And he held the words here actionable, and bid the Plaintiff take his judgement, if cause were not shown to the contrary Saturday following. judgement was afterwards given accordingly. Martial against Porter. Hill. 23 Car. rot. 769. Marshal brings an Action of Trespass Quare vi & armis for taking away his . Demurrer to a special plea in Trespass. Quare vi & armis. The Defendant pleads none Cul. as to the vi & armis, and as to the taking of the he pleads, that he bought them in a Market-overt. The Plaintiff demurs to this Plea, and the Defendant joins in the Demurrer. The Exception taken to the Plea was, that the Defendant doth not show what day the Market was kept, nor whether it were out of Lent, according to the Patent for the keeping of the Market. Roll justice said, this aught to have been averred in the Plea, and therefore the Plea is not good. Averment. Therefore let the Plaintiff have his judgement if cause be not shown to the contrary. Pitcher against Symons. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Hill. 23 Car. rot. 189. SYmons brought an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit in the Compleas against Pitcher, and hath a verdict, and a judgement. Error to reverse a judgement in an action upon an Assumpsit. Issue. Amendment. The Defendant brought a Writ of Error here to reverse the judgement. The Error assigned was, that there was no issue joined between the parties to the suit: for it is & praedictus Iosephus similiter, whereas it should be praedictus Robertus. Roll justice cited 9 Eliz. Dyer, and said, if it be praedictus Richardus where it ought to be Robertus, it cannot be amended, because the Issue is altered: for it is joined between other parties, and so is it in this Case. But move it again Friday next. Deacon against Forest. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. DEacon brings an Action in this Court against Forest. Whether a Plea was peremptory, or that there might be a Respondes ouster. Peremptory. Plea. The Defendant appears in Michaelmas Term, and imparts to Hillary Term, and before the day of Continuance pleads a Plea in abatement; to which the Plaintiff demurs. Yard of Council with the Plaintiff said, he conceived the Plea was peremptory to the Defendant, because it comes after an imparlance, & a Continuance, and so comes in lieu of a Peremptory: for the Law admits but one delay, and therefore the Defendant should have pleaded in Chief, and not having done it, his Plea shall be as if it were a Plea in Chief overruled, and cited Long Quit. E. 4. f. 139. Roll justice, You cite not the Book as it is, here is but a Plea in Abatement, and the Continuance makes it not peremptory, 2 Ed. 4. f. 10. A second Exception was, that the Plaintiff hath not demurred upon the Plea, but pleaded to issue, and here is a departure from the general issue, Departure. 34 H. 6. f. 8, 9 Roll justice, The Book is against you, for upon a Demurrer a Plea dilatory is not peremptory: but upon an issue joined it is. Yard, The delay of the Demurrer makes it peremptory, 22 H. 6. f. 55. Roll justice, The Book cited is against you, and in 50 E. 3. f. 20. Difference. There is a difference taken between the delay of the Court, and the delay of the party; and here is no delay in the party, for he might have been forced by the rules of the Court to hasten the proceed, and the Book of 34 H. 6. is against you. The Plea in Abatement ought not to have been received after imparlance, but if it be received, & a Demurrer upon it, it cannot be helped and if one plead a Plea after imparlance, Plea. which ought not to be pleaded, the Plaintiff may pray the Court to overrule it: but if he demur upon it, he admits that the Plea may be; and one may plead a Plea in Bar by way of abatement, & e contra. Therefore let the Defendant plead in Chief, if cause be not showed on Friday to the contrary. Burges against Dynham. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Hill. 23 Car. rot. 1191. BUrges brought an Action of Trespass against Dynham for taking 24 load of Timber. Demurrer upon a Plea of justification. The Defendant justifies, that he took the Timber as a Deputy of a Purve your to the King, for the reparations of the Mansion houses of the King. To this Plea of justification, the Plaintiff demurs, and for cause showeth, that it doth not appear, that the Defendant hath any authority by the Common-law, or by Statute to take this Timber: for the Commission which gives this authority ought to be renewed every sir Months, Commission. and it doth not appear that it was so in this Case, 2 Institut. f. 545. 10 E. 4. 2, 3. 2ly. He hath not showed that the Houses were in decay when he took the Timber, and he cannot take it to make a Common stock, to repair them afterward when they should fall to decay. Purveyors. 3ly. Purveyors ought to pay ready money for the commodities they take, and he doth not show in our Case that he paid ready money for the Timber, by the Stat. 36 Ed. 3. C. 2. 47 Ed. 3. f. 8. but by 22 Ed. 3. Tit. Bar. 259. it seems to be otherwise: but the Case there differs from this Case, for there it was that a Purveyour may take Horses to use for a time, without paying money: but it was not to alter the property. 4ly. He hath not showed that he endeavoured to agree with the Plaintiff for his Timber, as he ought to have done. Plea. Hill. 2 Car. rot. 509. Parker and Sturgens case. 5ly. The plea is huddled up, and is not pleaded particularly and distinctly as it ought to be, so that the Plaintiff knows not how to take an issue, 10 H. 7. The rule of Court was to bear the other side Friday next. Brereton and Monington. Trin 24 Car. Banc. Reg. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an inferior Court, and the Error assigned was, Error to reverse a judgement given in an infetiour court. Plaint, Amendment. that the Plaint was entered against Francis, and the proceed were against john. Roll justice said, that it was not good, for a Plaint is in the nature of an original writ, and therefore if that be erroneous it cannot be helped though it be after a verdict. And therefore show cause Saturday next why the judgement should not be reversed. Gallop against Symson. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. CHase brings an Action of Trover and Conversion against Gallop, Error to reverse a judgement in a trover and conversion. and his wife, and a stranger, in the Common pleas, and hath a verdict, and a judgement against them. The Defendant brings a writ of Error to reverse this judgement, and assigns for Error that the Plaintiff declares that the goods for which the Action is brought, venerunt ad usum ipsorum, viz. of the Husband, and his wife, and the stranger, which cannot be, Declaration. for they cannot be said to come to the use of a Feme covert. Roll justice, This is not good, for he ought not to declare that the goods came to the use of the Feme, but to the use of the Husband only. And therefore reversetur judicium, except cause shown to the contrary Saturday next. Wainewright and Whitly. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Wainewright brought an Action upon the Case against Whitly, Arrest of judgement in an action upon the case. for these words spoken of him; Thou art a thief, and hast broke my Chest; The Plaintiff hath a verdict, The Defendant in arrest of judgement moves that the words are not actionable. But Roll justice said, notwithstanding my Lord hobart's opinion, he held the words are actionable, for the word and is cumulative, and aggravates the former words, Cumulative, Explanatory. are not barely explanatory, and the subsequent words are violent, and may very well stand with the former. Therefore let the Plaintiff take his judgement. The King and Camel. Trin. 24 Car. Banc Reg. ANn Camel indicted at Southwold in Suffolk for Felony and Witchcraft was brought to the Bar by an habeas corpus, An arraignment for witchcraft. and was here arraigned. The prisoner desired Walker for her Council. Roll justice asked her for what cause and matter she did desire Council; To which the prisoner making no answer, Roll justice viewed the Endictment, and upon that assigned her Walker for her Council, and gave him the next day to show his exceptions against the Endictment, at which time Walker desired that the Endictment might be read, which was done, and upon the reading of it he took these exceptions. 1. To the caption wherein it is expressed, that the Endictment was taken in pena cessione, Endictment. where it should be in plena cessione. To this Roll answered, if the word pena be left out, the Endictment is good enough without it, and therefore passes ouster. A second exception was, that the Endictment doth not say that the justices before whom it was taken were justiciarii ad pacem tenendam in villa praedicta, and then they might have no power to find the Endictment; but this exception was also overruled by the Court. A third exception was, That the Endictment is too general, for it only says that the prisoner practicavit diabolias arts, and doth not express what. To this Roll Justice answered, that the employing of wicked spirits to any intent whatsoever is Felony within the Statute, Felony. and the intent why they were employed is well expressed in the Endictment, and if an Endictment fail in one part, it may be good in another: and therefore the Endictment is good, and the prisoner must plead; Whereupon the prisoner pleaded not guilty. Upon this Walker moved the Court that this was an old Endictment, and that the prisoner had been twice acquitted upon other Endictments of the same nature, and that this was prosecuted for malice, and prayed that the prisoner might be bailed, which was granted. And she was bailed by her Husband, and by one Zachary Baggs a sufficient Citizen and Fishmonger of London, and two others, to appear at the next Assizes to be held for the County of Suffolk. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment exhibited upon the Statute of perjury at Kingston upon Thames for these exceptions. To quash an Endictment upon the Statute of perjury. 1. It is not expressed in what County Kingston is; and 2ly. the Endictment doth not express how the party is perjured, for it shows not in what cause it was nor that it was in giving any evidence upon oath as a witness in any cause. Upon these exceptions the Endictment was quashed. Nota Butler against Long. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Pasc. 24 Car. rot. 496. LOng brought an Action of Trespass against Butler in the City of _____ and hath a verdict and a judgement, Error to reverse a judgement given in an inferior Court. the Defendant brings a writ of Error to reverse this judgement, and assigns for Error, 1. That the Declaration doth not show in what Parish within the City the Trespass was done, as he ought. To this Roll justice answered. That it shall not be intended that there are more Parishes within the City than one, Intention. except the contrary be showed. 2ly. The Declaration est quod cum talis, viz. the Defendant, etc. which is not an express averment, Declaration. Trespass. that the Defendant did the Trespass; but it is set forth only by way of circumstance that he did it, which is not good, for he ought to be charged directly with it. Roll justice, The setting forth the Trespass by a Quod cum is not good, though gh in another Action it may be good. Therefore let the judgement be reversed, except cause shown to the contrary Saturday next. Walker and Alder: Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg: ALder had a judgement and an Execution against Walker, Auditaquereld for one taken twice upon one execution and thereupon he was taken, and in custody in the King's Bench prison. Alder the Plaintiff afterwards consented that the Defendant Walker should come to him out of prison to the Horshoe Tavern, which was out of the Rule, without a Keeper or rule of Court, thinking to make some agreement with him. The Defendant accordingly went thither, but because no agreement could be made, The Plaintiff takes the Defendant again upon the same Execution, and lays him again in the King's Bench, Audita querela. Discharge. the Defendant thereupon brings his audita querela; And adjudged by the Court to be well brought for the Execution was discharged by the Prisoners going at large, and therefore he could not be again taken upon it. Reader against Palmer. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. REader brought an Action upon the Case against Palmer, Arrest of judgement in action upon the case for altering the Declaratio and hath a verdict, the Defendant moved in arrest of judgement that the Plaintiff altered his Declaration in the consideration of the promise, and in the promise itself, after he had pleaded, so that thereby the same issue which is tried, is not that which was joined. Twisden of Council with the Plaintiff said, that the issue was not altered, for the words altered are not material words. Wild of Council with the Defendant said, the issue was altered by alteration of the words, for the Action is brought upon a special promise, and not upon a promise in Law, as the altering of the words have made the promise to be, and therefore it is a material alteration. Roll justice said, it is a material thing that is altered, and it ought not to be amended; An Actual promise, and a consideration continuing, Amendment. cannot be taken to be at another time. Hodge and Vavisors case, 14 jac. Barton and Shurlyes' case, Mich. 15 Car. And therefore give new rules to plead, and so proceed according to the course to a new trial. Wolverly Strachy against Trin 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Wolverly Strachy brought an Action upon the Case against the Defendant, Demurrer upon a plea in an action for scandalous words. Plea. & declared, that whereas she was a woman of agood fame, and honest reputation, etc. The Defendant spoke these words of her, viz. she is a common Whore, and I will prove her one, by reason whereof she lost her credit and reputation, and her marriage. The Defendant pleaded that she was not of an honest reputation at the time when he spoke these words of her, as is alleged in the Declaration: The Plaintiff demurs generally to this plea. judgement was given for the Plaintiff, except cause should be showed Saturday next to the contrary. Antea and the Lord Moon. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. MY Lord Moon had a Suit commenced against him in this Court, For a supersedeas for a Peer of the Realm. Supersedeas. Privilege. and thereupon he moves by his Council upon an affidavit that he was a Peer of the Realm, and a Lord of the Parliament, and therefore ought not to be sued, and prays for a supersedeas to stay the proceed. Roll justice, Plead your privilege, for upon an affidavit we will make no rule, or else acquaint the other party that he is a Peer of the Realm, and it is like he will forbear to proceed thereupon. But you ought not to trouble the Court with such motions as these. Cornish against Cowsye. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Trin. 23 Car. rot. 1434. COrnish brought an Action of Debt against Cowsye an Executor, Special verdict in Debt for rent against an Executor. for arrearages of rent incurred, part in the life of the Testator, and part in the time of the Executor. The Plaintiff declares upon a lease made by him to the Testator by his Indenture made the first of May in such a year, etc. The Defendant pleads nil debet, and upon this a special verdict was sound to this effect, That the Plaintiff did upon the first day of May, make the Indenture of lease to the Testator of the lands let, to have and to hold a die datus, for and during the term of 7 years, from our Lady day last passed, from henceforth fully to be complete and ended, upon this verdict, the question insisted upon by the Council was, whether there be not such a variance between the lease, upon which the Plaintiff hath declared, and the lease found in the verdict, Variance. that they shall be said to be several leases, or whether it shall be adjudged one and the same lease. Twisden for the Defendant held that there is such a variance between the lease in the Declaration, and the lease, found in the verdict, that they cannot be the same, and so the Plaintiff can have no judgement, and he urged this ground of Law that a deed shall be so construed that all parts of it may be made to stand together if it be possible without forced construction of the words; but this cannot be here, and a Lessor may make a lease to begin when he pleaseth, and end when he pleaseth, notwithstanding the date of it, and a lease made to begin at a day past, doth begin in interest in present, Lease for years. though not in computation, and he cited Musgraves case, Hob. rep. where two computations are in a lease for years, and one is repugnant to the other, the last shall be rejected. Hales of Council with the Plaintiff held, that the lease gins in point of interest from the day of the date, and that there is no variance, or repugnancy between the lease mentioned in the Declaration, and the lease found in the verdict, and therefore the verdict is for the Plaintiff. Roll justice said, it would be hard for him to maintain it, and said, Presumption. that in presumption of Law, when a thing is to be done upon one day, all that day is allowed to do it in for the avoiding of fractions in time, Fraction. which the Law admits not of, but in case of necessity, Hill. 14 Jac. More and Musgrave Mich. 10 jac. rot. 76 in the Exchequer. A Demise the 5 of May, by Indenture dated the 4 of May, habendum from the feast of the Annunciation last passed, for 21 years, to have and to hold from the day of the date of these presents. But there are other points in the Case at the Bar to be considered of, for the Action of Debt is for rent, part incurred in time of the Testator, Detinet. and part in time of the Executor, and it is in the detinet, which ought not to have been; but I conceive that that is here helped by the verdict, yet it is worth consideration: Waiver. And he said, that an Executor cannot waive a Term if he have not assets, but if he have he may. Another thing here considerable is, that the Action is brought in the detinet, and the Defendant pleads nil debet; Yet he said, that after a verdict it might be good enough, for it is a Debt though the Action be brought in the detinet, Trin. 10 Car. 1289. Porter and jarvis Banc. Reg. and he said that the Plaintiff hath mistaken his lease, yet I will advise by reason of the opinion in Musgraves case, Hob. rep. Lease. Livery and Seisin. It is a lease in computation of time, from the sealing, and according to the habendum a livery and seisin habendum a die datus delivered the next day is good, if it be made by the party; but it is questioned whether it be so, if it be made by an Attorney. An ancient deed which cannot be proved, shall be intended to be delivered the last hour of the day, to make good the conveyance. But I will take a little time to advise. Raw against Raw. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. RAw had a judgement in an Action of Debt brought for arrearages upon an account in Newcastle upon Tyne against Raw, Error to reverse a judgement in Debt upon arrearages of an account. Venire. the Defendant brought a Writ of Error to reverse this judgement, and assigned for Error, 1. In the issuing out of the venire, it is not said to be per Majorem praedictum villae praedictae; but per Majorem generally. 2ly. It is said, ad re co cognoscendum instead of recognoscendum. 3ly. It is said the jury assidunt damna de predict. who is not named before, for it is assidunt damna ipsius Katharinae Carr, whereas she was before called Katherine Raw, and so damages are given to no certain person, for they have different names. Roll justice said, the surname Carr is void, Damages. and it shall be taken as if it had been said ipsius Katharinae only, and that is good enough. But examine the transscript by the Record, whether the word be re co cognoscendum or not, for if it be so, it is not good. lovel against Knatchford. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Pasc. 24 Car. rot. 348. KNatchford had a judgement in the Common-pleas against Lovel. Error to reverse a judgement for Error in the Postea. Commission. The Defendant brings a Writ of Error to reverse this judgement. The Error assigned was in the Postea, in that it is not said that the justice of Assize Associato sibi, etc. as it ought to be by the Statute. Roll justice said, the justice of Assize may have a special Commission to go the Circuit alone, and then it must not be said so, but if it be per formam Statuti, it ought to be associato sibi, etc. But the Clerk of the Assize may bring in his notes by which he made the Postea, and amend it by them: for it is his fault to make the return so. Amendment. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. AN Action of Debt was brought upon an Obligation to stand to an Award; Plaintiff moves to discontinue his action. Discontinuance. The Plaintiff showed to the Court, that the Award made was not under hand and seal, according to the submission, and therefore he had no cause of Action, and prayed that he might discontinue his Action. Roll justice answered, it is in an Award, and I will do nothing in if; but if it were upon a Debt, it might be the Debt remains, though the Award be ill, but judgement is not demanded. I will do nothing in it. Newton against Bales. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Pasc. 24 Car. rot. 183. or 178. BAles had a judgement against Newton, Error to reverse a judgement in an Act on on the Case. in an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit in the Court at Owse-bridge in York. The Defendant brings a Writ of Error to reverse this judgement, and assigns these Errors, 1. It is said, the Defendant was to deliver certain commodities ad ratum, instead of secundum ratum. But to this Roll justice said, that ad ratum & secundum ratum are all one in signification. 2ly. There is no time set forth when the promise was made, for it is set down in figures, which is all one as if it were not set down at all. Roll justice, The Record is not so, though the transcript be, Amendment. therefore that may be amended. 3ly. There are two several promises, and they are both alleged. Roll justice, It's well enough. 4ly. The Venire is not returned, for it is not returned to be in omnibus servitum & executum. return. To this the Council on the other side answered, it appears that there is a panel returned, and therefore it is well enough, though those words be omitted. Roll justice, The panel is not returned, nor annexed according the Statute, and therefore it is no return in Law. Therefore let the judgement be reversed for this cause, except cause showed to the contrary. Watson against Scotson. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Upon a suit between Scotson and Watson in the Court of Admiralty, To discontinue an action, and to discharge the Bayl. Discharge. Scotson entered into an Obligation to Watson. Watson brings an Action of Debt upon this Obligation in this Court against Scotson. Scotson appears, and puts in bail to the Action, and after moves the Court, that Watson may be ordered to proceed in the Admiralty upon this Obligation, in regard the Bond was given there, and that the bail here may be discharged. Roll justice, I will not release the bail: for it is filled, and it is a Record here, Bayl. and it is not unduly done. Aylet against Oats. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Pasc. 24 Car. rot. 397. A judgement was given in the Common-pleas in an Action of Assault and Battery against three. Error to reverse a judgement in Assault and Battery. The Defendants brings a Writ of Error to reverse this judgement, and assigned for Error, that the Action was brought against three, and that they all appeared by Attorney, and pleaded, whereas one of them was an Infant within age, and aught to have pleaded by his Guardian, and that judgement was entirely given against them all, which must be void against the Infant, and so it being entire is void also to the two other Defendants. Wild of Council with the Defendant in the Writ of Error argued, that the judgement may be reversed in part, judgement. viz as to the Infant, and yet may stand good against the other Defendants: for the Action might have been brought against them severally as well as jointly, 35 H. 6. f. 21. 5 Ed. 4. f. 7. Roll justice said, it is ruled contrary. Where a judgement is reversed for an error in Law against some of the Defendants, it is reversed against all of them: but it seems to be otherwise where it is reversed for an Error in Fact, 35 H. 6. 2. Hales on the other side moved to reverse the judgement wholly; Discontinuance. for it is an entire judgement and cannot be reversed in part only: for all the Defendants are equally concerned in it, and a discontinuance against one of them reverses the judgement against all of them, and he denied the Book of 5 Ed. 4. Error. and cited 29 Ed. 3. f. 39 Roll justice said, if it be a judgement at the Common-law, or a judgement where costs are given by the Statute, if it be reversed as to one, it is reversed to all. And here is an entire judgement given by the Common-law, and it cannot be helped. But bring me the Book. Postea. Crook against Samm. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Mich. 23 car. rot. 311. SAmm had a judgement in the Common-pleas upon a Nihil dicit in an Ejectione firmae. Error to reverse a judgement in an Eject. firmae. The Defendant brought a Writ of Error to reverse the judgement, and assigned the general Error. The Plaintiff in the judgement prayed it might be affirmed. Roll Justice demanded of him, if it be a judgement upon a Nihil dicit how can it be of this Term? Therefore give notice and move again. judgement. But the judgement is, ideo consideratum est quod recuperet, and there wants & defendens capiatur, and therefore the judgement is erroneous, and how can it then be affirmed? 3 Car. in the Exchequer. Mich. 5 jac. rot. 269. Allens Case, 17 Car. Stewart and Stewart in the C. B. Error. and though it be a judgement by default, yet it is a judgement, but being erroneous it cannot be affirmed. Therefore advise what you will do. Hobart against Boraston. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. IN an Action of Debt brought upon the Statute of 2 Ed. 6. for not setting forth of Tithes, Arrest of judgement in Debt upon the Stat. of 2 Ed. 6. for not setting forth of Tithes. Copy. after a verdict, It was moved in arrest of judgement, that the Statute was not well recited: for the Parliament began in the first year of Ed. 6. and was prorogued, and the Act was made the 26th of November, and not the fourth, as it is set forth to be. For proof of this a Copy of the Parliament-roll, and an Affidavit to prove the Copy to be true were read in the Court. Hales of Council on the other side said, that the Copy was taken out of the Parliament-Iournal-book only and not out of the Writ for prorogation of the Parliament, as it ought to be. Roll justice said to the Council on the other side, Advise you how to answer this, and let the judgement stay in the mean time. antea. Pimley against Robinson. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Pasc. 24 Car. rot. 476. RObinson brought an Action of Trespass against Pimpley, Error to reverse a judgement in Trespass vi & a●mis in York. for entering into his Close, and taking away a Mare and a Bridle, in the County of York, and had a verdict, and a judgement against the Defendant. The Defendant brings a Writ of Error to reverse this judgement, and assigns for Error, that the Court was said to be held on Saturday the ninth of November, whereas the Saturday on which the Court was held, was not the 9th. day of November, Error, but the 7th. and so there is no Court alleged to be held, for on the 9th. day there was none held, 1 H. 7. 11 E. 4. 10. Roll justice, It should seem they did not look well into the Almanac, if they had, this mistake had not been. Let the judgement be reversed, except cause be shown Monday next. Mogg against Shute. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Trin. 23 Car. rot. 2097 IVdgement was given in an Action of Trespass, Error to reverse a judgement in Trespass. and a Writ of Error thereupon brought to reverse this judgement, and the Error assigned was, that the Venire was returned by one that was not Sheriff at the time of the return. To this it was said by the Council on the other side, that this matter ought not to be assigned for Error, Error. because it is against the Record: on the other side it was inssisted upon, that he may assign it for Error. Roll justice said, it may be assigned for Error, but it is a Question how it shall be tried: for it is not upon a Demurrer, and so the matter is not before us, 11 Car. Smith and Smith. And this cause ought not as it is to have been put into the Paper. Worsely against Worsely. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Pasc. 24 Car. rot. 489. Worsely brought an Action of Account against Worsely. Demurrer upon a plea in an action of Account. Bar. The Defendant pleads that the Plaintiff stands convicted upon the Statute made against Recusancy, and demands judgement Si actio. The Plaintiff demurs upon the Plea. Wild of Council with the Plaintiff said, that this matter ought not to be pleaded in Bar of the Action, but he ought to conclude only judgement if he shall be answered. The Council on the other side desired time to speak in it. Roll justice, Show cause Monday next why judgement shall not be given against you. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved for the quashing of an Endictment upon the Statute of 8 Hen. 6. against forcible entries. For quashing an Endictment. County. Liberty. The exception taken against it was that the Endictment doth not show in what County the forcible Entry was upon which the Endictment was grounded. Roll justice answered, if it be within a Liberty, it is not necessary. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved to quash an endictment of Perjury against Stephen Burton. The Exceptions taken to the Endictmment were these, For quashing an Endictment of perjury. 1. The Endictment is said to be taken in plena Sessione pacis, and it doth not appear to be the Quarter Sessions as by the Statute it ought. 2ly. It is said, that the Defendant dixit, etc. and doth not show where or in what Plea he gave the evidence wherein the perjury was committed. 3ly. It doth not say, that the Defendant gave the evidence corruptive, as it ought to do. 4ly. The prejudice is not said to be ad grave damnum of any body, and so no body being prejudiced by it, none ought to be indicted for it. Roll justice said, it is not enough to say the Endictment was taken in plena Cessione generally, but it must appear in what Sessions it was. Therefore let cause be shown why it should not be quashed. It was afterwards quashed, because it did not show, that any of the justices before whom it was taken were of the Quorum, and not for the other exceptions. Howard & Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. A judgement was given in an Action of Debt in this Court. Error in the Exchequer-Chamber to reverse a judgement given in Debin this Court. Bar. The Defendant brings a Writ of Error in the Chequer Chamber to reverse this judgement, and removes the Record thither. The Plaintiff brings an Action of Debt in this Court upon the judgement given here. The Defendant pleads in bar of this Action Nul tiel record, and upon this the Plaintiff demurs, and the Court after motions and arguments on both sides, was by the Plaintiffs Council moved for judgement for him upon the Demurrer. But Roll justice answered, judgement. If you will have a Curia advisare vult, you shall have it, if not, take your course, for the Record is not here before us; Therefore we can give no judgement. The King against Trigg. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved to quash a Presentment against Trigg for not going before a justice of Peace to take the Oath of an Headborow, For quashing an Endictment for not being sworn a Headborow. to which office he was chosen at a Léet. The Exceptions taken against it were, 1. That it doth not appear that any notice was given to him, to go before the justice. ●ly. it appears not that the justice had authority to administer the Oath. For the first exception the Presentment was quashed. Collins against Page. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Mich. 23 Car. to 269. A Plaint was entered in the Court of Plymouth against Page for threescore pounds, Error to reverse a judgement in Debt, upon a Custom in Plymouth. and a pone taken out against his Goods, and upon this a default, and thereupon another pone issued out to attatch the Defendants Goods; and the Defendant, at three other Courts successively makes default, and upon the fourth default judgement was given against him; Whereupon the Defendant brings a Writ of Error in this Court to reverse the judgement, ●and assigns for Error, that here is a judgement given before any appearance, which cannot be, but in this Case the Goods attatched are only forfeited for the default made by the Defendants non-apparance. Forfeiture. The Council on the other side desired time to answer the exception. Roll justice. The Custom upon which this judgement is given is not reasonable. Custom. Therefore if you answer not the exception Tuesday next, the judgement shall be reversed. Sketes against Clay. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Pasc. 24 Car. rot. 180. CLay brought an Action of Trespass against Sketes for taking away his goods, and had a verdict and a judgement in the Common Pleas. Error to reverse a judgement in Trespass. Declaration. The Defendant brought a writ of Error to reverse this judgement; and the Errors assigned were to the Declaration, because it had not proper latin words to express the goods; for 1. it is said that the Plaintiff took away decem Velamins, Anglice Coifs, whereas Velamina signifies cover generally. 2. Pilum is used for Pileum, in English a Cap. 3. Decem Colores, Anglice Neckbands. 4. Cruralia, Anglice Garters. 5. He declares de uno instrumento, Anglice a Plate, for a jack. And 6ly. Pro uno operimento, Anglice a Rail. But Roll justice said, We must not be too curious to express all things in Latin words in all Cases, for it cannot be done, Description. and therefore a description with an Anglice must serve, and so it may here, therefore let the Plaintif have his judgement. Aylet against Oats, Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THis Case was moved again, Error to reverse a judgement entire, good in part, and ill to other part. and upon view of the Book Roll justice held, that the judgement was entire, and aught to be reversed for the whole, although it be good in some part of it; and he cited Trin. 14 Car. Scudamore and Scudamores' Case, 8 Car. Gritewel & morefield's Case, & Trin. 11 Car. Eltonhead and Deerhams Case, and Trin. 7. jac. rot. 566. Bird and Ormes case, and 5. Rep. Specots' Case, and 13 Car. Dye and Atkins Case, and upon these authorities the judgement was reversed. Sir Charles Coot against Plunket. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved on the part of the Defendant, To be discharged upon Common Bail. that the Plaintif had declared upon an obligation with a condition, but had not set it forth in the Declaration, and therefore desired that he may either have Oyer of it, or else that the Declaration being imperfect, so that he cannot plead, and he being now in prison, may otherwise be set at large. Roll justice, We cannot compel the Plaintiff to set forth the condition of the Obligation; but till he doth the Defendant shall not be compelled to plead, Plea. and let the Plaintiff show cause upon not ice given to him, why the Defendant shall not go at large upon Common bail. It was moved again, Common Bail. and then Roll justice said, If you arrest one, and do not proceed in three Terms, he ought to go out upon Common Bail. But move it again to morrow. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment upon the Statute of 5 Eliz. To quash an endictment of perjury. against perjury. The exceptions taken against it, were, 1. The Endictment saith, the Oath was taken before Baron Atkins and Serjeant Turner, but it doth not say where, viz. whether it were at the Sessions, or Assizes. 2ly. It saith the Oath was taken Coram justiciariis Domini Regis, but it doth not express what justices they were. The Endictment was quashed for the first Exception. The King against Bellingham. Trin 24 Car. Banc. Reg. BEllingham was indicted upon the Statute of 5 Eliz. For moderation of a sine upon conviction for perjury. against perjury, and pleaded Not Guilty, and was found Guilty. The Case was this, Bellingham had a Process delivered him out of the Court of Wards to serve upon one, which he did accordingly; and upon the return thereof he made Oath that he served the Process upon the party the 8th. day of the Month, whereas it was the 9th. day, but it appeared upon examination of the matter, that the Oath was not taken maliciously, but only rashly; and upon this the Court was moved to set a moderate fine. Fine. Roll justice said, because it was so, therefore let the fine be but 10 l. Gallop against Chase. Trin. 24. Car. Banc. Reg. Pasch. 24. Car. rot. 250. THe Case of Chase and Gallop was again moved, Error to reverse a judgement in Trover and Conversion. which was this. Chase brought an action of Trover and Conversion in the Common Pleas against Gallop and his wife, and a Stranger; and declares that the Baron and Feme and the stranger converterunt ad usum suum proprium. The Plaintif had a Verdict and judgement. The Defendant brings a Writ of Error to reverse this judgement, and assigns for Error, that the Declaration is not good, for it declares of a Conversion made by the Feme to her own use, which cannot be, she being a Feme Covert. Roll justice said, The Declaration doth intent, that all the Defendants did convert the goods, Declaration. Feme Covert. Conversion. which cannot be, for the Feme cannot convert them, and cited Crow and Baker's case 1 Caroli & 7 H. 7. f. 3. Therefore let the judgement be reversed. Trin. 24. Car. Banc. reg. THe Court was moved for a Certiorari to remove an Order of Sessions made for the electing of one to be a Constable, For a Certiorari. that the Order may be confirmed here, and the Constable compelled to be sworn. Roll justice answered, That by granting it the execution of justice by the justices in the Country will be hindered, therefore appeal to the justices of Assize, for we will not grant a Certiorari. Upon this a writ was prayed out of this Court to compel the Constable to be sworn, which was granted. Mandamus. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. A judgement was given in the Common Pleas in an ejectione firmae quod recuperet, & writ of Enquiry taken out; Whether a Writ of Error good. but before it was executed and returned the Defendant brought a writ of Error; and the question was whether the writ of Error lay or no. Turner of Council with the Defendant in the writ of Error argued, that it did not lie, because the Original writ was not determined when the writ of Error was brought, and so the judgement was not perfect or complete, and consequently a writ of Error could not be brought to reverse it, and that the writ is not determined nor the judgement perfect, is proved, because the Action being an ejectione firmae here is no costs and damages found, nor is there any habere facia● possessionem returned, which are the fruits of the judgement, and and he cited 34 H. 8. f. 18. 39 H. 8. Fitz. Error 40. 36 & 37 Eliz. in the Common Pleas, Year and Peverells Case, & 6 Car. Banc. Reg. But Roll justice said, here is ideo consideratum est quod recuperet, Judgement. which is a perfect judgement, but it had not been so if the judgement had been quod recuperare debeat, and it is in your power whether you will have a writ of enquiry or not, and if he judgement be affirmed here upon the writ of Error brought you may have a writ of enquiry here in this Court. Brev. d'enquiry. The Council thereupon moved for a Certiorari. Roll justice, Take it but it will do you no good, for the judgement is well. Stint against Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Stint brought an Action upon the case for speaking these scandalous words of him, Arrest of Judgement in an Action for scandalous words. Thou art a pick pocket Rogue and hast picked thy master's pocket and his Money-box, and I will prove it. The Plaintif had a Verdict. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement that the words are not actionable, for that they are too general and uncertain. The judgement was arrested till the Plaintif should move. Trin. 24. Car. Banc. Reg. A Certiorari was granted out of this Court to removed certain endictments of forcible entries, For a Supersede●s to a Certiorari. whereas in truth there were no Endictments of forcible entry found against the party; upon this a Supersedeas was prayed to supersede the Certiorari. Roll justice, This Certiorari was gotten by way of pervention for what might be done, Procedendo. but take a Procedendoto the Justices to proceed notwithstanding the Certiorari. Trin. 24. Car. Banc. Reg. A Scire facias was taken out to revive a judgement, For the Defendant to plead in chief after imparlance. and to have execution: The Defendant appears and imparls, and after imparlance pleads in abatement of the Scire facias, that the Plaintif had taken out a former Scire facias for the same cause, which is yet depending. It was moved for the plaintiff, that the Defendant ought not to plead this plea in abatement after imparlance, but that he ought to plead in chief. Roll justice, Let him plead such a plea as he will abide by within a week, or else let the Plaintif take his judgement. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. A Copyholder being sued in this Court for certain lands, moved, that the Steward of his Lord's Court, For a Steward of a Court to bring in the Court Rolls. to whom he was a Copyholder, might be ordered to bring in the Court-Rolls into this Court, that by them he may be the better enabled to defend his title to the lands. But Roll justice said, He cannot be ordered to do it by this Court, therefore we will make no rule in it. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. AN Action of Debt was brought for Rent in the Common Pleas, Error to reverse a judgement in the Common Pleas fortent. Misnosmer. where the Plaintif had a Verdict and a judgement, and a Writ of Error was brought in this Court to reverse this judgement: The Errors assigned were, 1. There is an Indenture recited to be between the plaintiff and john Barber, whereas it should have been john Barker. Roll justice answered, It may be that he is known by the one name, and the other, and then it is well enough. A second Exception was, It is said per indenturam signatam, and doth not say deliberatam, and then it is no deed if it be not delivered. To this Roll justice answered, Deed. If he say per factum suum, it is well enough, notwithstanding, for that implies it to be a perfect deed. 3ly. He declares for Rent of Houses in Kent street, and doth not show in what Parish Kent street is. Adjourned. Trin. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved for a habeas corpus for a Prisoner in the King's Bench Prison, that he might be a writnesse in a cause to be tried at the next Assizes in Derby Shire. But Roll justice answered, we will grant no habeas corpus, for this is but a trick of the party himself to gain his Liberty that he may go a hawking and hunting this long vacation. But I have known it granted for one to be a witness at a trial at Yield Hall; but at the charges, and peril of the Party, for whom he was to be a witness, if he escape. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Upon a motion for a habeas Corpus for one in Execution upon a sentence given against him in the Court of the Admiralty, For a habeas corpus for one in Execution upon a sentence in the Admiralty. It was said by Roll justice, That if one be sued in the Admiralty to a sentence, and be in Execution upon it, and be brought hither by a habeas corpus; if upon the return it doth not appear that the Admiralty had not jurisdiction of the cause, but it appears only that they had proceeded to a sentence against the rules of their own Court, This Court will not deliver the Prisoner out of Execution, Appeal. for he ought to have made his appeal, before he was taken in Execution. And so is it touching the proceed in other Courts of equity. Cage. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. ONe Cage was in Execution in the King's Bench upon a judgement had against him for a hundred pound, To vacate a satisfaction acknowledged upon a judgement. The Plaintiffs Attorney by fraud without the consent of his Client acknowledgeth satisfaction upon this judgement, afterwards the Attorney of the Defendant without the consent of his Client acknowledgeth another judgement for the same Debt. The Plaintiffs Council moved, that the Defendant might be in Execution upon the first judgement, and that the satisfaction acknowledged thereupon, might be vacated. Roll justice answered, Commitment. The Attorney ought to be committed for acknowledging the second judgement without Warrant; But here are two frauds, one of each side, so that there is fraud against fraud, and so the parties are left to their remedyse one against the other, but both the Attorneys shall be committed for their false practie. And we will examine the whole truth of the matter Saturday next. against Loveday. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved upon an affidavit that one of the jurors that gave the verdict against the Plaintiff had a suit in law depending at that time with the Plaintiff, and therefore that the trial was not indifferent, For a new trial after verdict because a juror not indiste. rent. Challenge. Trial. and therefore it was prayed there might be a new trial. But the Court said, it could not be, and asked the party why he did not challenge the juror for this cause at the trial, for want of which he had now lost that advantage. straddling and his wife against Boreman. Mich. 24 Car. ●anc. Reg. Straddling and his wife brought an Action of Trespass of Assault and battery, Arrest of judgement in Trespass, join in Action. and taking of a horse, agianst Boreman, and the Plaintiffs declare ad damnum ipsorum, and have a verdict; the Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, and shown for cause that the Baron and Feme cannot join in this Action, but aught to bring several Actions, for the wrong done to each was several. The judgement was thereupon stayed till the Plaintiff should move. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. AN Action upon the Case was brought for speaking these words, Arrest of juogement in an action upon the Case. He is gone and dares not show himself for Debt, and he is a Bankrupt, for aught that I know; the Plaintiff had a verdict, the Defendant moves in attest of judgement that the words are not actionable, because they are general, and uncertain. But the Court held that all the words taken together are actioanble, but stayed the judgement for a week. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. IVrors who appeared for a trial at the Bar which fell off for want of a full jury, jurors move for their charges. prayed the Court they might have their charges, because they came a great way, and had attended long in town. The Court answered them, that it was their neighbour's fault, who did not appear, that the trial went not on, for both the parties are ready, and if the cause had been tried, you should have had all your charges. But now we can order nothing. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Upon a return of a certiorari to remove an order of Sessions made against a Parish for not repairing of a high way, Exception to an order, and fine of Sessions. Hales of Council for the Parish took this exception, viz. That the fine was set upon the Parish without any process issued out against the Parish, only upon a certificate of one of the justices of the peace made upon his own view that the way was not repaired, and so the Parish was condemned before they were heard. To this the Court answered, That a justice of Peace may make a certificate upon his own view, Certificate. of the want of reparations of a Highway, by the Statute. Therefore bring a certificate that the way is repaired, else we will do nothing, for we must not be too hasty to overthrow such presentments which so much concern the public good. And in this case if there be a conviction in law, Conviction. Travers. and the fine levied, we cannot help it, and now you cannot traverse, for it is too late. Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper against St. john. Mich. 4 Car. Banc. Reg. SIr Anthony Ashley Cooper brought an Action of Trespass upon the Case for false imprisonment of him against St. John, Arrest of Judgement in an action on the case. and hath a verdict against him; the Defendant moves in arrest of judgement, and takes this Exception to the Declaration that it wanted vi et armis which ought to have been, because this is not a mere Action upon the Case; but in its nature it is an Action of Trespass, and therefore he ought to have been declared in with vi et armis. Roll justice answered, what say you to the Case, Declaration. quare fregit suum mill dam, which hath been adjudged good without vi et armis as, well as with vi et armis? and in one case it shall be said to be an Action of Trespass, viz. with the vi et armis, and in the other an Action upon the Case, viz. without the vi et armis; and Bacon justice cited the 9 rep. The Earl of Shrewsburyes Case. Roll justice, It is a plain Action upon the Case, as it may appear by reading of the Record, for it is with an et quod cum. Bacon justice said, one cannot have an Action of Trespass for the breaking of another man's fence; but if he be damnifyed by the breaking of it, Tresasse. Case he may have an Action upon the Case against the party that broke it. Air against Sils'. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Air brought an Action upon the Case against Sils, Arrest of Judgement in an action upon an assumpsit. Case. upon a promise to pay certain arrearages of rent appearing due unto him upon an account made between him and the Defendant: The Plaintiff had a verdict. The Defendant moves in Arrest of judgement, and for cause shows, that an Action upon the Case doth not lie upon a promise to pay rend appearing due upon account, for the rent was due by a real contract, and upon that the Plaintiff had remedy without the promise. To this the Court said, that this Action doth not lie for rend alone due upon a real contract, but for the rent with other things it doth lie, yet let the judgement be stayed, for there is here no new consideration appearing to ground this promise upon but only the old consideration of Law for the payment of the rent, and upon that an Action of the Case doth not lie, for it is in the realty. Tomkins against Jourden. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Trin. 24 Car. rot. 96. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an inferior Court, & these Errors we are assigned. Error to reverse a judgement given in an inferior court. 1. It is said in the stile of the Court that the Court was held per consuetudinem et literas patences, which is not good, for the Court cannot be held by both. Roll justice, This is not good, 2ly. Against the writ of Error it is objected by the other side, that the writ of Error is directed to one, and is returned by another, for the certiorari was to certify a judgement given before the Mayor, Aldermen, and Recorder, and the judgement certified, is a judgement given before the Mayor and the Aldermen, and the Recorder is left out, so that the Record is not removed, and then the judgement cannot be affirmed. Roll justice said, the pleading is confused, and Bacon justice said, you have changed the stile of the corporation by your pleading; If a Court be held by Custom, Custom. and after a patent be purchased to hold it, and they hold it by the patent, the Custom is gone; but bring us a Copy of the certificate of the stile of the Court, and in the mean time we will advise. Pickering against Barkley. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Pasc. 24 Car. rot. 154. PIckering brought an Action of Covenant upon a deed of Covenants of Charter-party, Demurrer upon a plea in an action of covenant. whereby it was Covenanted that the Defendant in consideration of a certain sum of money agreed to be paid to the Defendant, for freight of a Ship, should make such a voyage, and bear all losses and damage which should befall the Ship, or Merchandises in her, excepting only perils of the Sea, and declares that the Defendant had not performed his agreement, and for this he brings his Action. The Defendant pleads, that in the making of his voyage upon the Sea, the Ship was taken per quosdam ignotos homines bellicosoes, whereby he was hindered in making of the voyage according to his agreement; to this plea the Plaintiff demurs. The question was in regard that in the Charter party perils of the Seas were excepted, whether the taking of the Ship by these, unknown men of War should be accounted a peril of the Sea, or not according to the meaning of Merchants. Twisden of Council with the Plaintiff held it should not, and so the plea was not good, and that therefore the Plaintiff ought to have judgement, and said, this was not a danger of the Sea, but a danger upon the Sea. 2ly. He said, the party (it may be) might have prevented it by vigilancy, or by making resistance, and so it may be it was his own fault the Ship was taken. 3ly. The men of War that took the Ship were peradventure English men, and then the Defendant is not to be excused, for he may have his remedy for what he is damnified, against them, and cited 33 H. 6. f. 1. and prayed judgement for the Plaintiff. Hales of Council with the Defendant held, that to be taken and rob by Pirates is a danger of the Sea, even as tempestuous winds, and Shelves, and Rocks are. And 2ly. To that it is said, the pirates may be English men, we are not able to say of what Nation they were, and therefore our plea is good in that point also, and prayed judgement for the Defendant. Roll justice said, it was not well pleaded to say per homines ignotos. Bacon justice said, The Defendant doth not show that he and his Ship was carried per locos incognitos, as he should have shown; Plea. but Roll justice answered, that it may be the Ship is yet kept upon the Sea, but I suppose that Pirates are perils of the Sea, and to this purpose a certificate of Merchants was read in Court, that they were so esteemed amongst Merchants. Yet the Court desired to have Granly the Master of the Trinity house, and other sufficient Merchants to be brought into the Court to satisfy the Court viva voce Friday next following. judgement was given this Term nil capiat per billam, because the taking by Pirates are accounted perils of the Seas. Wood against Clemence. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Hill. 22 Car. rot. 804. Wood brought an Action of Debt upon an Obligation to stand to an award, against Clemence. Demurrer upon an award pleaded. The Defendant pleaded that the Arbitrators made no award: The Plaintiff replies that the Umpire made an award, and sets it forth at large. The Defendant demurs, and for cause shows that it appears by the pleading that the Umpire was chosen before he ought to be; for it appears not that the Arbitrators could not agree in making the award, or that they had any power to make an Umpire. 2ly. The Award is made for satisfaction to the Owners and Mariners of the Ship, concerning which the submission was made, Award. and one of them is the Plaintiff in this Action, and they cannot arbitrate that the moneys which concern one shall be paid to another, and so all the award is naught. Also here is nothing arbitrated concerning john Acton the Master of the Ship, who is one of the parties within the submission. Roll justice, As to the first Exception it is not a material one, as I conceive. But give a note of your exceptions to the Council of the other side, and bring us Books. Postea. Frere and others against Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. AN Action of Debt was brought for 1500 l. upon a deed of Charter-party. Arrest of judgement in debt. The Plaintif had a verdict. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement. and offers for cause, that the Declaration was insufficient, for it appears not by it that the Defendant is indebted to the plaintiff, and then there is no cause of Action; for the Declaration only says, that he is indebted, as it appears, but shows now how. Roll justice said, it is by indenture, and well enough. Dyer 2, 3 Phil. and Mar. f. 148. Plowden 121. 122. Debt. Covenant. Buckleys case 143. Browning and Beestons' case 21 E. 4. f. 29, he said, either an action of debt, or an action of Covenant lies here, for it is upon a Charter-party. Here is not indeed a perfect allegation, yet it is well enough, for it hath been usually thus pleaded. Speak to it again Wednesday next. Dison against Bartue. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. DIson brought an action of Assault and Battery and taking of his goods, Arrest of judgement in Assault and Battery. against Bartue, and had a Verdict; the Defendant moved ●● arrest of judgement, and shown for cause that the Declaration was ●●● good for it is with a quod cum, etc. which in an action of trespass, vi et ●●mis, is not good; for it is not a direct affirmative, that the Defendant did the Trespass; but it is only an implication that he did it, but as it is it might have been good if the action had been an action of Trespass upon the case. The judgement was stayed till the Plaintif should move. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. AN Action of Debt was brought upon an Obligation to stand to an Award. Demurrer upon an Award pleaded. The Defendant pleaded nullum arbitrium. The Plaintiff replies, and sets forth the Award, and assigns a breach; The Defendant demurs; The Plaintiff after demurrer moves the Court, that he might discontinue his Action. But the Court said, that after a demurrer upon an Arbitration, it is not usual to discontinue the Action. Discontinuance. But let nil capiat per billam be entered, if cause be not showed to the contrary. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. AN Action of Debt was brought by Baron and Feme upon an Obligation made to the Feme dum sola fuit, Arrest of judgement by Baron and Feme. and the Declaration is ad damnum ipsorum, The Plaintiffs had a verdict; The Defendant moves in arrest of judgement, and for cause shows, that the Declaration should not be ad damnum ipsorum, Declaration. but only ad damnum of the Husband only. But the Court held that the Declaration was well enough, and said, it is the usual way of declaring in such Actions and the money due upon the Obligation not being paid to the Feme whilst she was sole, it was damage to her; and now being Covert it is a damage to the Baron also, and so it is ad damnum ipsorum 16 E. 4. Therefore let the Plaintiff take his Judgement. Quatermans' Case. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. IN the Case of one Quaterman, Ancient use of practic altered. Roll justice said, that out of indulgence to the Bail, it hath been the use of later times, that if the Bail do bring in the principal before the return of the second Scire facias, which was taken out against the Bail, Discharge. thereupon to discharge the Bail: but anciently it was not so, but it was then counted too late to bring him in. Hill and Harris Micst. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. AN Action of Debt was brought against divers Executors. Arrest of judgement in an action of Debt against Executors. The Defendants plead fully administered, and upon this an Issue was joined, and a verdict found for the Plaintiff. The Defendants moved in arrest of judgement, that there is contrariety between the issue joined, and the verdict found: for the Action is entire against all the Executors, and they had all pleaded fully administered, Verdict. and upon this the issue was joined, and the veredict finds that some of the Executors had fully administered, and that others of them had Goods in their hands, whereas the verdict should have been that they had not fully administered. The judgement was stayed till the Plaintiff should move. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Upon a rule of Court to show cause why restitution should not be granted upon an Endictment of forcible entry, Cause why no restitution upon an endictment of forcible entry. exception was taken to the Endictment, that it did not say, that the party entered illicite & manu forti, as the words of the Statute direct, and it was said, that in a forcible entry there ought to be an entry, expulsion, and deteyner. Roll justice said, that there ought to be manu forti in the Endictment, according to the Statute, to distinguish this kind of Entry from an ordinary Trespass by entering into another's Land, which is not so violent as a forceable entry is supposed to be. But let us see the Copy of the Endictment. Gibbs against Dunn. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. GIbbs brought an Action upon the Case against Dunn, Arrest of judgement in an action upon the Case for words. for these several words spoken of him by the Defendants Wife at several times, viz. thou art a thief for stealing my corn out of my Barn, and at another time for saying thou art a thief. The Plaintiff hath a verdict; The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, that entire damages were given for both the words; whereas the first words were not actionable: Damages entire. Intendment. for the Feme being a Feme Covert could have no Corn of her own, for it was her Husband's Corn, and so there could be no stealing of her Corn. But the Court answered, that in common intendment the Corn is hers and her Husband's Corn, though in legal construction it be not so, and the Scandal is great, although it appear that the words were spoken by a Feme covert. Therefore let the plaintiff take his judgement, except cause be shown to the contrary. judgement was given the same Term, because the last words were held to be accumulative. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Clerk of the Errors in the Common-pleas attended here upon a rule of this Court, Clark of Court ought ●o● to move the Court. Whereupon one of the Clarks of the Court gave notice of it to the Court, and prayed he might be heard. But the Court answered, that Council ought to move it, and not be. The King against Doctor Trigg. THe Court was moved for Doctor Trigg to estreate the Fine into the Exchequer which was set upon him by the Court upon his conviction upon an informaiton preferred against him upon the Statute for practising Physic in London, without a licence from the College of Physicians. For the estreating of a Fine. Hales of Council with the College of Physicians moves it may not be estreated, for it is not necessary, and here the judgement is not only for the King: but it is tam pro rege, quam pro, etc. Fine. Estreat. and so part of the Fine doth belong to the Subject, and for that part the Prosecutor may have a privy Seal here to recover it: Estreat. but if it be estreated into the Exchequer be cannot there have it, and so he shall lose his reward, and therefore he desired the Fine might be respited. But the Court answered, we cannot respite the King's part, nor the other part: for there is an execution out for the whole Fine which cannot be stayed. Heyford against Hobson. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. HEyford brought an Action of Trover and Conversion against Hobson in the Common-pleas for taking away and converting of divers of his Goods and Chattels particularly named, Arrest of judgement in Trover and Conversion. and had a verdict. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, that the Declaration was incertain, for amongst other things the Plaintiff in his Declaration declares for the taking de duobus castoribus, Anglice Hats, whereas castor is not a proper word for a Hat. 2ly. de uno servitio argenteo, Anglice one silver Salt, and there is no such word for a Salt, but there is another proper Latin word for it, viz. salinarium. 3ly. De duobus, catenis, Anglice two silver Dishes, which is no word for a Dish, much less a silver Dish. Roll justice said, one may describe a thing in a Declaration, Declaration. if there be not a proper word to express it, and if it be so described that the jury may know what is meant by it, it is well enough. But let the judgement be here be stayed, for we will advise. Wood against Clemence. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THis Case formerly (viz. this Term) moved and spoken to touching the validity of an Award made touching the freight of a Ship, Exceptions to an award. was again moved, and Exceptions taken to the Award. 1. That the award is repugnant in itself. And 2ly. It is not final, and so not good. The Court answered, if the Award be ill, as of your own showing it is, than you have no cause of Action, judgement. Submission. and so you cannot have judgement, although the Defendants bar be not good, and a submission made by one for himself, and another, is good to bind the party that submitted. But move it again, and we will advise in the mean time. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment of forcible Entry after the party indicted had pleaded, To quash an endictment of forcible entry. and a verdict against him. Roll justice, We must not be so curious in the framing of Endictments, as to quash them for every small fault, and in this Case it was said by him, that if one interrupt a long possession by force, and the other regain it with undue means, an Endictment lies not against him for this, for this is but vim vi repellere, and after a verdict, and before judgement upon an Endictment of forcible entry, Restitution. the party ought not to move for restitution. Banister against Wright. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. IN a Trial at the Bar between Banister and Wright in an Action upon the Statute of 2. Ed. 6. for not setting forth of Tithes, Lands free from tithes. It was said by the Court that Tithes which lie not within any Parish are due to the King, and that Lands must be parcel of a Parish, either by prescription, or by Act of Parliament, and that Lands lying within a Forest, and in the hands of the King do not pay Tithes, although they be within a Parish: Tithes. but if the Lands be does afforested, and be within a Parish, they ought to pay Tithes, for their not paying Tithes being in the hands of the King, is but an immunity for that time only. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. A Baker was presented in a Court Leet for selling Bread under weight, Arrest of judgement in an action for a Fine set at a Court leet. Fine. Amercement. Presentment. and a Fine set upon him, and an action brought against him for this Fine, and a verdict given against him. It was moved in arrest of judgement, that the presentment upon which the Action was founded was not good, and so there was no ground of Action, and so there aught to be no judgement. But Roll justice answered, that the Action is for the Amercement which is a collateral thing, and the presentment is not now to be called in question, if it be only avoidable for some fault in it: but it were otherwise, if the presentment were utterly void. But speak again to it at another time. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved for a Habeas Corpus for one committed at Norwitch for Treason in speaking words against the Queen, For a Habeas corpus to remove a Prisoner committed for Treason. Endictment. Trial. because be could not be tried there. Roll justice answered, he cannot be indicted here, except the fact were done in Middlesex, therefore advise with the King's Council, and prefer a Bill of Endictment where the fact was, and then you shall have a Writ ad delibrandum directed to the place where the fact was, and this is at the King's suit, and the Sheriff shall be allowed his charges upon his account, or else the justices may try him by their Commission of oyer and terminer. Smith and Hancock, and others. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. SMith brought an Action of Trespass against Hancock and others, For a new trial, because of a mistryal. for taking away divers parcels of Ribbin from him. The Defendants pleaded by way of justification, the Custom of London against Hawkers, viz. to take away wares from any that sold them up and down the Streets. The Plaintiff replied, that there was no such custom, and issue was taken upon it & thereupon the custom was certified by the mouth of the Recorder, & a trial upon it in London & a verdict for the Defendants. The Plaintiff moved in arrest of judgement, that it was a mis-tryal, because it was before them that were interes●ed in the cause, and therefore desired there might be another trial. Roll justice said, it is against natural equity, for one to be judge in his own cause, Trial. although the other party admit it to be so, and therefore it is a mistryall, though it were at the request of the Plaintiff, because it is against natural reason, 8 E. 3. f. 69. 5 Ed. 3.8. 9 H. 7. f. 21. Hil. 38 Eliz. in the Exchequer. The prayer of the Plaintiff cannot help the trial, for the consent of both parties cannot change the Law, much less the prayer of one of the parties. Hales of Council with the Defendants argued that it was not a mis-tryall, and said this concerns them in point of privilege of the City, and not merely in point of interest, before whom the judgement was gieun. 2ly. The consent of the party hath barred him of the advantage which otherwise he might have had. But Roll justice answered, here is point of interest as well as point of privilege, for part of the goods taken come to the benefit of the City, and therefore they ought not to be their own judges, for this is against natural reason, and so it is a mistryal. But it doth not appear here whether the Mayor and Aldermen be another Corporation or not, and distinct from the Corporation alleged, which certified this custom by the mouth of the Recorder, and this is the sole doubt in the Case. The Court ordered that there should be a new trial except cause shown to the contrary: Q. whether there shall be a Repleader, or a new venire. White and his wife against Harwood and his wife. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. WHite and his wife brought an Action upon the Case for standerous words, Whether a writ abated by death of one of the defendants. Abatement. against Harwood and his wife; the Defendant dies, the Feme takes another Husband pending the suit. It was moved that the writ was abated. The Court inclined that because the Defendant had by her marriage changed her name, therefore the Writ was abated, but took time to advise. Slade. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved for judgement formerly stayed upon a certificate made by Baron Atkins, For judgement stayed upon a judge's certificate. that the verdict passed against his opinion, Bacon justice said, judgements have been arrested in the Common pleas, upon such certificates. Hales of Council with the Defendant prayed, that this judgement might be arrested, and that there might be a new trial, for that it hath been done heretofore in like cases. But Roll justice held, it ought not to be stayed, Attaint. 9 though it have been done in the Common pleas, for it was too Arbitrary for them to do it, and you may have your attaint against the jury, and there is no other remedy in Law for you; but it were good to advise the party to suffer a new trial for better satisfaction. And let the Defendant take four days from hence to speak in arrest of judgement if the postea be brought in, if not, then four days from the time it shall be brought in. Andrews against Baily. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Upon a trial at the Bar between Andrews and Baily, Denisation by Letters parents do enable to purchase not to inherit lands. Denization. Inheritance. upon an ejectment lease touching Sir john Prowds title to Lands. It was said, that a man cannot be a subject to two several Princes. And that denisation by letters patents do enable the party to purchase Lands, but not to inherit the Lands of his Ancestor as Heir at Law; But as a purchasor he may enjoy lands of his Ancestor. Dunch against Smith and others. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Hil. 23 Car. rot. 37. DUnch brought an Action of Debt as an Executor for arrearages of a rent charge due to the Testator, Demurrer to a Declaration in Debt. against Smith and others the occupiers of the Land. The Defendants demur to the Declaration, and for cause show that it doth not set forth what estate the Defendants have in the lands charged with the rent, and so it appears not that they are to pay the rent. Hales of Council with the plaintiff answered, that it is not necessary for the Plaintiff to set it forth, for he is a stranger to the Estate, & cannot know what Estate it is. Roll justice said, It doth not appear by the Declaration whether the Defendants claim under him that granted the rent or no. But move it again Saturday next. Postea. Smith against Hale. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. SMith brought an Action of Debt against Hale for rent; Demurrer to privilege of Parliament. The Defendant pleaded that he is Tenant and Servant to the Lord Moon a Lord of the Parliament, and prays his Writ of Privilege may be allowed. The Plaintiff demurs, It was argued by Barton of the middle Temple, that the plea was ill, for the very matter of it for the privilege is against the Common Law, and also against the Statute Law, and for proof cited 1 E. 1. f. 26. 2 E. 3. f. 3. 2 Ed. 6. C. 8. Roll justice answered, Privilege. you ought not to argue generally against the Privilege of Parliament, for you know that every Court hath its privilege, as this Court also hath, therefore apply yourself particularly to this question, Admittance. whether a Writ of privilege belongs to a Parliament man so far as to protect his Lands and Estate, and I conceive he is so privileged; And you have admitted his privilege by your own Demurrer. But we will advise. Wright. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. AN Action of Debt was brought upon an Obligation to perform Articles; Plaintiff after a verdict for him moves for a new trial. The Defendant pleaded Covenants performed: The Plaintiff had a verdict, and after verdict, and before judgement, he moved for a new trial, because it appeared that there was no issue joined; the Plaintiff moved it for his own expedition, for he feared if he should enter judgement, that the Defendant would bring a Writ of Error. The Court answered, that there was a perfect issue joined; but the pleading is not good, and it was your own fault to join issue upon such a pleading, when you might have demurred. Trial. Yet let the Defendant show cause why he should not consent to a new trial, and a Repleader. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. MEmorandum on Wednesday the 14 of November 1648 Henry Roll Sergeant at law then one of the justices of this Bench took his place in Court as Lord chief justice of England, and Twisden moved for a day to plead between Dunch and Smith being the first motion that was made in Court after he took his place. The Lord chief justice Roll first took his place. Popham against Hunt. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg: Mich. 23 Car. rot. 558. POpham brings an Action of Covenant upon an Indenture against Hunt, Demurrer to a Declaration in an action of Covenant. the Defendant demurs to the Declaration, and the Plaintiff joins in the Demurrer: Upon the pleading the Case appeared to be this, a Feme sole delivers a certain sum of money into the hands of I. S. and the Defendant thereupon Covenants with the Feme to pay unto A. B. 100 l. a year, so long as the money should continue in the hands of I. S. The Feme takes Baron; The hundred pound per annum is arrere. The Baron makes his Executor, and dies, and after his death the 100 l. a year is behind also. Popham the Executor brings this Action of Covenant, Covenant. and the question was whether the Action was well brought, and the Court held the Action did lie, for the Covenant doth concern the Executor, because he represents the Testator; but the question here is whether the rend due after the death of the Husband ought to be paid, and how it shall be known whether he be dead for it is not specially alleged, and if he be not dead there is no cause of Action. Therefore consider of this. Bragg against Nightingale: Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Trin. 24 Car. rot. 601. BRagg brought an Action of Covenant against Nightingale upon an Indenture. Demurrer to a Declaration in an action of covenant. The Defendant demurs to the Declaration, The Case was this. The Plaintiff let by Indenture certain houses for divers years to the Defendant, and covenanted with him to repair the houses by such a day expressed in the Indenture. The Defendant by the same Indenture covenanted with the Plaintiff, that from the time that the Plaintiff was to repair the houses, unto the end of the Term for which they were demised, he would well & sufficiently repair and leave them so repaired at the end of the Term; for not performing of this Covenant, on the Defendants part the Plaintiff brought his Action. The cause shown for the demurrer to the Declaration was, that the Plaintiff had not showed that he on his part had repaired the houses according to his Covenant, and so the Defendant supposed he was not bound to repair, because he was to repair from the time the Plaintiff had repaired them, and not before, and so there is no cause of Action. After divers motions Roll chief justice said, That here was a reciprocal Covenant to be performed on each part, Covenant and although one do not perform the Covenant on his part, this doth not excuse the other party, but he is tied to perform his Covenant nevertheless, and if he do not an Action lies against him, and he may bring his Action also against the other that first broke his Covenant, and therefore the Action lies here against the Defendant, and so the demurrer is not good upon the cause shown. But if this were not a reciprocal Covenant the Law would be otherwise, and cited Hays and Hayes Case 11 Car. and Skippon and Lucas his case 10 Car. But Bacon justice held the contrary that the demurrer was good, for that it appears that it was the intent of both parties that the Plaintiff should first repair, and after that the Defendant should keep the houses in repair. The Court would advise. Smithson against Wells. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. SMithson brought an Action upon the Case upon a promise against Wells, A special verdict in an action upon the Case upon a promise. and declared upon a promise made to save the Plaintiff harmless from such an obligation when he should be thereunto required. The Defendant pleaded non Assumpsit, and upon this a special verdict was found, viz. generally that the Defendant did make promise to save the Plaintiff harmless from the Obligation, & that he had not done it. The question hereupon was, whether the verdict had found the same promise set forth in the Declaration, because that was to save harmless upon request; Verdict. but the promise in the verdict mentions no request to be made, but finds a promise generally to save one harmless. The Court held that the Plaintiff ought to have judgement, for that it was the same promise found in the verdict, which was set forth in the Declaration, for if one promise to save one harmless from a thing, he that made the promise ought to do it at his peril without request, Request. Covenant. and the request is not material although the promise say upon request; But if he be damnified if I do recompense him upon request made, the Covenant is not broken. Emerson against Ridley. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Pasc. 24 Car. rot. 400. RIdley brought an Action of Debt upon an Obligation against Emerson; Error upon a judgement in Debt upon an Obligation. The Condition of the Obligation was, that the Defendant should not put his upon such a Common before a trial and proof, for the Common should be for the Commoners, and assigns a breach, that he did put on his upon the Common before the Trial for the Commoners; upon this an Issue was joined, and a verdict, and a judgement for the Plaintiff. The Defendant brings a Writ of Error, and assigns for Error, that the breach of the Condition assigned doth not agree with the Condition of the Obligation, and so the action being brought upon the Obligation, and no breach of the Condition being rightly assigned, there appears no cause of Action, and so the judgement is erroneous. But it was said by the Council with the Defendant, that trial and proof of a matter in common intendment is all one, Intendment. and so the difference alleged was only verbal and not real, and it shall be taken to be a breach of the Condition, and so there is good cause of Action, and the judgement thereupon given is well enough. Holhead on Council on the other side denied it to be all one in sense, for that a Trial may be, and yet the Title may not not proved, and there may be a judgement upon a Nihil dicit, where is nothing proved, and so concluded the Writ of Error did lie. The Court desired to have Books. Postea. Jones against jacob. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. IOnes a Citizen and Pewterer of London, judgement in an action upon the Case. brought an Action upon the Case against jacob for these words spoken of him. He is gone, and doth hid himself for debt, and for aught I know he is a Bankrupt. The Plaintiff had a verdict, and upon the Defendants motion the judgement was formerly stayed. The Plaintiff moves for judgement notwithstanding: for that the words are actionable. The Court said the words are scandalous, and by them he is disgraced in his Trade. Hales of Council with the Defendant said, that there were other words in the Declaration which are not actionable, and yet damages are given for both, Damages. which ought not to be, and therefore no judgement could be given. The words said not to be actinable were these, Have a care, and do not trust him, for he will run away and pay you nothing. But the Court held, that both the words taken together are actionable, and ruled the Plaintiff to have his judgement for both the words, if better matter be not showed. Nelson against Tompson. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Trin. 24 Car. rot. 343. NElson brought an Action of Debt against Tompson upon an Obligation with a Condition to save the Plaintiff harmless. Demurrer to a replication in Debt upon an Obligation. The Defendant pleaded non damnificatus. The Plaintiff replied and shown a breach on the Defendants part, whereby he was damnified. The Defendant demurs to the replication, and for cause shows, that the breach was assigned to be at Westminster, Place. and doth not show in what County Westminster is. The Court held, that though Westminster be a City, yet it ought to be showed in what County it lies, because it is not a County of itself. Therefore advise what you will do, for the Action is fit to be discontinued. Discontinuance. Thine against Thine. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. LAtch moved again in this case, that the Summons doth not appear upon the return to be well made: Whether a Summons well returned. for it is not said to be made at the Church-door, as the Statute directs. To this nothing was answered. But Bacon justice said, the return was naught for another reason, and so there is no Record before us to proceed upon; in the Writ of Error the fault is this, The Custos brevium ought to make the return here, and it is mentioned to be made per unum deputatorum suorum; return. whereas his Deputy had no authority to do it. Therefore you had best to take a new Writ of Certiorari, and certify the same matter by it, and this the Court may grant though it be very rare: for if one will assign an Error in a Record and pray a Certificate, and nothing be done upon it, we cannot proceed. Consider which way you can help this fault. Tracye against Poole Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. TRacye brought an Action upon the Case against Poole upon a promise, Arrest of judgement in an action on the Case upon a promise. and declares, that Poole the Defendant in consideration of a marriage to be had between the Plaintiffs son, and the Defendants daughter, & of settling so much Land upon him upon the marriage, He did assume and promise that within such a time after the marriage had, he and his Son should be bound per scriptum suum debita juris forma fiend. unto the Plaintif, for the payment for 3000 l. for a marriage portion, & assigns the breach that the Defendant & his son did not become bound per scriptum suum Obligatorium: for the payment of the 3000 l. and for this he brings his Action. The Plaintiff had a verdict. The Defendant in arrest of judgement moves that the breach was not well assigned: Breach. for the Assumpsit was that the Defendant and his Son should be bound per scriptum suum debita juris forma fiend. and the breach is, that they did not give security per scriptum suum Obligatorium, which agrees not with the Assumpsit: for the Defendant might give security by a judgement, which is not scriptum suum; yet it is debita forma juris factum, upon this the judgement was for that time stayed, though then Bacon justice inclined, that the breach was well assigned, because in common construction it shall be intended, that the Defendant assumed to give his own and his son's bond for security. Hales of Council with the Plaintiff at another day moved for judgement, and held, that the breach was well assigned, for that it expresseth the substance of the promise, though not the very words of it, and this was held good, 7 Car. in Michill and Cars case. 2ly. If the meaning of the promise be considered, it will appear that the Defendant and his Son were to be bound by Obligation 6 Car. Courtny and Gavills Case, and indeed the promise cannot be satisfied by any other way than by an Obligation, for a judgement or a Statute will not do it; for by them he is not said to be bound; and though all this be admitted against me, yet it is now after a verdict, and the jury have found the breach Maynard for the Defendant argued, that the breach was not well assigned: for the breach assigned tends to a personal engagement for paying the 3000 l. which is not so expressed in the promise, but only a general security to be given for the moneys, and a recognizance, and a judgement are not properly scriptum, as in 9 Car. Goldsmith and Sydners Case, and the Declaration doth not set forth the death of Sir Henry Poole by whom the security was to be given, and so it cannot appear whether he had a convenient time to do it as he ought to have, and he held, that the Plaintiff was bound to do the first act, viz. to tender the Obligation to the Defendant, or else he is not bound to seal, and deliver any, Request. and also he ought to make a particular request to him to seal and deliver it. Hales replied if a man plead a Statute, it is true, that he ought to say per scriptum suum, Pleading. but pleading aught to be more nice than common parlance. 2ly. The living of Sir Henry Poole is expressed, and there appears time convenient between the promise and the time of his death for performing of it. 3ly. It is not necessary for us to tender a bond, but the other aught to have done it at his own peril, for it is to be done at his charge and not at ours. Roll Chief justice held, that judgement ought to be given for the Plaintiff, and said, that for the laying of the promise it is not necessary to pursue the very words of the promise, but the substance, so that there may appear to the Court, that there is cause of Action. 2ly. He held that there is no variance in the substance: for the intent of the parties is to be considered, which was, to have another act done by Sir Henry Poole and his Son, per aliquod scriptum, and not by a verbal promise, and we are to consider if the breach assigned agree to this, and he held, that the promise will extend to a judgement, or a recognizance: for a judgement, Statute, or Recognisance is scriptum, and for the time, the Defendant ought to have alleged, that he bade not convenient time, Tender. if the truth were so: but here doth appear convenient time, and it is not necessary for the Plaintiff to tender the Obligation: but the Defendant ought to do it at his own peril, and to pay the money in convenient time after the marriage, and the other is not bound to demand it, Intendment. nor to be at the charge to make the Obligation. Bacon justice to the same effect, and said, the words ought to be intended of a writing obligatory, according to common intendment, Time. and the meaning of the parties; although it be not so expressed, and it cannot be meant of a promise by parol, for there are no precedents in Law for verbal securities, but only for securities in writing, and the word in debita juris forma implies so much, otherwise here would be only one promise to make good another promise, Pasc. 9 jac. rot. 361. Banc. Reg. & 21 jac. upon a Writ of Error in the Exchequer-Chamber, the former judgement was affirmed, and the breach here assigned meets with the Assumpsit, for it is that he did not become bound per, etc. and so the breach is well assigned. 2ly. Here appears in the Declaration to be two Months for the performing the promise, which is a convenient time, and there doth not appear any hindrance, and the Defendant was bound to do it without request, and there is no necessity for the Plaintiff to make an election of the time when he will have it done. The Court bid the Plaintiff take his judgement, except better matter were showed on Monday following. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment of forcible entry. To quesh an Endictment. The Exception was, that the forcible entry is said is to be made in messuagium sive tenementum, which is incertain. But Roll Chief justice doubted, whether the exception was good or not, because it was messuagium sive tenementum, and the word Message may be good though Tenemen tum be not. But it was quashed upon another exception. The King against Wood Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment taken at a Sessions against one Wood for getting the horse of another man into his possession, To quash an Endictment. by using another man's name, and a false token. The exceptions taken against it were, 1. The Endictment doth not say that it was contra Statutum: But to this the Court answered that it was an offence at the Common Law, and the Endictment lay at the Common Law, and therefore it need not to be expressed to be contra formam Statuti. 2ly. It doth not show what the false token was, nor in whose name it was used. But Roll chief justice took another exception, viz. that the Endictment was that the Defendant did the fact nuper, and that is so general a word that no answer can be given to it. And for that it was quashed. Twigg against Roberts. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Hil. 22 Car. rot. 956. AN Action of Debt was brought against an Executor in Bristol upon a Custom of concessit solvere by him to pay a Debt due by the Testator upon a simple contract, and a verdict and a judgement for the Plaintiff. Error to reverse a judgement in Debt against an Executor. The Defendant brought a Writ of Error in this Court to reverse the judgement, and the Error assigned was, that the custom of bringing an Action of Debt upon a concessit solvere is not a good custom, Custom. Wager of Law because it hinderers the party to wage his Law, as by the Law he may do. Walker of Council with the Defendant in the Writ of Error argued that it was a good custom, because the party is not thereby hindered of a trial, and there are customs in London which are against the Common Law, as for example for the Recorder to give judgement upon an exigent. The Court desired to see the book, and to have precedents brought them: And said, This Custom had been allowed against the party that made the contract; but the doubt is whether it be good against an Executor, for a concessit solvere is without any consideration. And Roll chief justice said, that this custom doth break three rules of the Law. Barker against Denham. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Trin. 23 Car. rot. 1280. BArker brought an ejectione firmae against Denham, Special verdict in an Ejectione firmae. and upon not guilty pleaded an issue was joined, and the reupon a special verdict was found that by the Custom of the manor, whereof the Lands in question were held, a Copyholder might surrender his Copyhold out of Court into the hands of two customary Tenants, to the use of another, and at the next Court the party to whose use the Copyhold was so surrendered used to be admitted, and That there was such a surrender made here, but that the party to whose use the Copyhold was so surrendered died before the next Court, and so was not admitted. The question was whether he dying before his admittance, shall be said to be a Copyholder by the Custom of the manor or no. Descent. Hales Argued, that he is not a Copyholder within the Custom, and then if this Custom hinder not, the Lands shall descend according to the rules of the Common Law, for so is it of all Copyhold Lands if a special custom hinder not, and here 1. the words of the Custom are to be considered, and 2ly. Custom. how they are to be expounded, and for this he cited 49 E. 3. f. 19.22 E. 3.2 E. 4. f. 24. A Custom shall be construed according to the Common apprehension of the lay gens, and a Custom shall be interpreted according to the most effectual operation of the Law, 3 H. 7.5. Doct. and Stud. 48.21 H. 7. f. 33.44 Ass. f. 10.4 H 8. Dyer 28. A denial actual by a Copyholder to pay his rent is a forfeiture, Forfeiture. not an implicative denial, lib. intrat. f. 238. And by a surrender of a Copyhold before admittance the surrendree hath no real possession, and the heir of a Copyholder before his admittance holds by the Copy of his Ancestor, and so he hath title; but the surrenderee can have no title before admittance, Title. and he cited Rawlins and jones his case, and Spurlins' case. A surrender before admittance, is but a a consent of the party to part with the estate, but passeth it not, and after administration it should have no relation to the surrender. Twisden for the Defendant. Relation. 1. He agreed that a Copyholder before admittance is not perfect in his Estate; but yet the admittance shall relate to the surrender, and both shall be accounted one entire Act, contrary to other learn. 2ly. The Son is in by descent, and the descent must be ruled by the custom, and he is now really a Copyholder, and cited Shellyes case, and prayed judgement for the Defendant. Roll chief justice said, This Case differs from surrendering into the hands of Tenants, for it is into the hands of the Steward out of Court, Surrend. Admission. which is good, and the Lords acceptance of his rent is an admission. But Bacon doubted, and therefore the rule was for the Case to be argued again the next Term, and then by reason of sickness I was absent. But that Term held not by reason of the King's death. Dunch against Smith. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. DUnch brought an Action of Debt as Executor for arrearages of a rent charge due to the Testator against Dunch, Arrest of judgement in Debt brought by an Executor. an occupier of the land, out of which the rent was issuing, and hath a verdict. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, and for Cause shown that the Plaintiff doth not show any title that the Defendant hath in the Land; but only says generally that he entered into the Lands, and so it appears not that he is to pay the rent. To this the Council on the other side answered, that the Plaintiff being but an Executor cannot know the title, and therefore is not bound to show it. Roll chief justice said, there can be no judgement, for the Declaration is too general. But Bacon justice held the Declaration good enough. Antea. Brown against Poyns. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Case was this a man made his last Will, and made two Executors, For a prohibition to repeal an administration. Prohibition. Appeal. the Executors die in the life of the Testator, the Testator dies having two Sisters, the eldest Sister procures Administration, the younger Sister moves for a Prohibition to repeal the Administration, because she being in equal degree of king ought to have equal share of the Administration. But the Court answered that a prohibition lies not, for you may appeal if the Administration be not rightly granted, Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. A Process issued out of this Court for a Cart and Horses that were cause of a man's death, as a deodand. 12. jac. To stay process for a deodand. and it was moved that there hath been a general pardon by Parliament since that time, by which deodands were pardoned, and therefore it was prayed the process might be stayed. General pardon. The Court asked whether there be not an exception of deodands or the Almoners interest in the pardon: The Council answered there is not: The Court demanded by what words in the pardon are deodands pardoned; The Council answered by the general words. The Court ordered thereupon it should be stayed till the Almoner be heard what he can say. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved for a habeas Corpus for one that was taken in Execution by the Sheriff, and was afterwards set at liberty, For a habeas corpus for one taken upon one Execution. Audita querela. and after that retaken upon the same Execution. The Court answered, take it, but you are in the wrong way, for you ought to bring your audita querela. The King against Bray. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment of forcible entry made upon a Lessee for years, upon the Statute of 21 jac. To quash an Endictment of forcible entry. The exceptions taken to it were, 1. It doth not appear by the Endictment that the Lessee had any title to the Land at the time of the force committed, for the force is supposed to be done before the lease commenced. 2ly. The lease is supposed to be a lease for so many years, if I. S. shall so long live, and it is not averred that I. S. was alive at the time of the forcible entry made. Averment. Roll chief justice cited the Lady Morlyes case, that there ought to be a direct allegation of the life. Therefore let it be quashed. Mich. 24. Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment of Assault and Battery of an overseer of the poor villae de A. in executing of his office: The exceptions taken to it were, To quash an Endictment for assaulting a Collector for the poor. 1. That there is no such officer as an overseer of the poor villae, but it ought to be parochiae; but the Court said it was well enough, as it was, though it had been more proper the other way. 2ly. The Endictment is for the Assaulting, and beating a Collector for the poor in executing his office, whereas there is no such office appointed for any one particular man by the Law, for the Statute is, that there shall be two Collectors for the poor in every Parish, and so the office is joint, and not several; But the Court overruled this exception also; 3ly. It wants vi et Armis. Upon this exception the Court bid the Council move it again. Gill against Cross. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Plaintiff brought an Action of Debt against two as Administrators, upon fully administered pleaded issue was joined, Special verdict in Debt against Executors. and a special verdict was found to this effect, viz. that one of the Administrators had fully administered, and that the other Administrator had assets. It was urged against the Verdict that the issue that was found is impertinent and impossible; Verdict. judgement. and so there can be no judgement given upon it. But the Court answered that the verdict is good, yet if judgement should be given upon it, the judgement would be ill, and nevil's and Greenwoods' case, Hill. 7. Car. in the Exchequer. rot. 1189. was cited, and it was said that judgement may be against that Executor who hath assets, and nil capiat per billam against the other that hath fully administered. But take judgement at your peril. Preston against Holmes. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Trin. or Mich. 24 Car. rot. 2052. Upon a special verdict found the Case in effect was this, Arguments upon a special verdict upon a Will. one in see having one Son by one venture, and another Son by a second venture, did by his last Will devise all his Lands to his wise for life, and after her death to I. his eldest Son, and to his Heirs and the question was whether the Son shall take these Lands by the devise or as Heir at Law, and so the devise to be of no effect to make him come to the Lands by purchase, Christopher Turner held, that the devise is void, because it says no more than the Law says, for if there had been no such devise, john & his Heirs should have had the Land, and he cited Paramour and Yardlves Case in the Commentaries, and Hob. rep. Counden and Clarks case. But it is objected, that in this case the Law speaks one thing, and the devise another thing, and so the devise says not the same thing. To this I answer, there is no difference concerning the alteration of the Estate, between what the Law directs, and what the devise directs, all the difference is in the manner how his Son john shall come to the Estate, 3 & 4 Phil. & Mar. Dyer, 134. & 37 Eliz. A man seized in fee had issue two Daughters, and devised the Lands to them, and to their Heirs, and it was questioned whether they were joint tenants, and I conceive they are, and where one omits a thing in a conveyance which the Law supplies, this shall not hurt, and he cited jenning's and pollard's Case, 6 Car. Hales on the other side argued, that the Son takes by purchase, and not by descent: for the devise is not to the Son in present, but after the death of the Testators wife, and if he had the Lands by descent, he should have them presently. Waiver. It is true the Son might have waived the taking by purchase, and might have taken by descent: but here prima fancy he shall be intended to be in by purchase, and not descent, for here doth not appear to be any actual waiver of the purchase, and the Son doth here as I conceive, take by way of remainder, and not by way of reversion. And as to the verdict I conceive it is not good, for it doth not show how the lands are held, whether in Chivalry or Socage, and so it appears not whether the Testator had power to devise all of them or not, for if they be held in Chivalry, he can devise but two parts of them, as the Statute directs. 2ly. It appears not, that the Testator had but one Son by his first wife. 3ly. It is not showed, that the Lands are parcel of the Manor, 4ly. It doth not appear in whose possession the Lands are. Roll chief justice said, Lands that are given by Will shall be intended to be socage tenure, Intention. if the contrary do not appear. And he held that the devise is void, and that it is not in the power of john the Son, to make the election to take by descent or by purchase at his pleasure, but he must of necessity take the Land as the Law directs. which is by descent; Maxim. and it is against a maxim in Law to give a thing to such a person to whom the Law gives it, if it had not been so given, 3 & 4 Phil. & Ma. Dyer, 134. and therefore the plaintiff aught to have judgement; And as to the verdict he hath primer possession, Verdict. and therefore if the other make no title, the verdict is for him, and good enough. Bacon justice to the same intent, viz. that the Heir doth here take by descent, and not by purchase, for this the Law says, and he cannot alter it, and cited Foscues Case, 4 Car. and a Case in 7 jac. And so judgement was given for the Plaintif. Frank against Burt and others. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Plaintif brought an Action of Trespass for breaking of his House, For costs for the Desendant upon non-sute of the Plaintif. and carrying away his Goods, at the Trial the Plaintif was non-sute. The plaintiff moved, that there was error in the Declaration, and therefore there could have been no judgement, and prays that he may be spared costs. Roll chief justice answered, that heretofore it hath been made a question, whether the plaintiff being non-sute should pay costs, Cests. but since the Statute of 4 jac. it is clear, he ought to pay costs for the vexation of the Defendant, and so it hath been ruled here, and you are out of Court now by being non-sute, and therefore you must pay costs; And therefore except better matter be showed, let them be paid. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved for a Prohibition to the great Sessions of Carnarvan in Wales to stop a suit in an English Bill of Equity exhibited there, For a prohibition to the great Sessions at Carnarvan in Wales. whereas by the Bill it appears there is no matter of Equity in the Case, but only matter tryable at the Law. The Court answered, if they proceed there against Equity, we cannot hinder them. There was wont to be an Agent here from the Commissioners there for us to confer with in such cases as these, but it seems there is not any here now. Therefore give notice, Prohibition. and let them show cause the next Term, why a Prohibition should not be granted. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Upon reading of a return made by the Sheriffs of the City of Norwitch upon a Habeas corpus directed unto them for one Chambers, It was said by the Court, How a Habeas corpus to an inferior Court should be returned. return. that it hath been ruled, That upon a Habeas Corpus to an inferior Court to remove Corpus cum causa, they ought to return all the causes that are depending there concerning the party that hath the Habeas Corpus, if any of the causes depending be for above five pound of which they ought not to hold Plea, and therefore because all the causes were not returned here upon the return of this Habeas Corpus, The Court held, the return was not good, and ordered that it should be amended upon pain of ten pounds by Monday next. Ralph against Davye. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. RAph brought an Action of the Case against Davy for speaking these words of her to the Plaintiffs mother, Arrest of judgement in an action for words. viz. Your Daughter, innuendo the Plaintif, is a brazen faced Whore, and deserves to be hanged, and for speaking these other words to the Plaintif herself, viz. you Huswife are a Thief, and have stolen my Purse. The Plaintif had a verdict; The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, Averment. that the Plaintif doth not aver, that her Mother had not any other Daughter besides herself, and so it is uncertain, whether the words were spoken of her or no. But the Court held, it was well enough without such averment, because the Declaration is, that the Defendant habens colloquium of the Plaintif did speak the words, and that makes it certain enough; And therefore bid the Plaintif take her judgement. Jennings against Lee. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. jenning's brought an Action of Assault and Battery against Lee. The Defendant pleads a special plea, Arrest of judgement in an action of assault and battery. and justifies. The plaintiff replies de injuria sua propria, and upon this an Issue is joined, and a verdict found for the Plaintif. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, that the replication was not good, because it answers not the special matter pleaded, nor takes any traverse by an absque tali causa as it ought to do, and so there is no issue joined, and consequently there can be no judgement. Roll chief justice said, that the replying the injuria sua propria, Traverse. Issue. jeofails. and not traversing absque tali causa is not good, for there is not an affirmative and a negative, and so there is no issue joined, and therefore there can be no judgement; and it is a direct jeofail, and it is not helped by the Verdict, for it is no trial, and not a mistryal which a verdict may help. If there be two or three things in a Declaration upon which an issue may be joined, if an issue be joined upon any of them it is well, but here is no issue joined at all: for the replication doth no more but affirm the wrong done, as the Count did. Therefore consider how you can help it. Postea. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Upon the reading of a return of a Writ of privilege granted for one to be restored to the place of an Alderman of the Town of Stafford, Exceptions to a return of a Writ of Privilege. Hales took these exceptions to the return, 1. that one cause showed for the disfranchising the party was, that he had done contrary to his oath, Disfranchisement. which he said was no sufficient cause for the dis-franchising of the party, for their Letters patents do not warrant it. A second cause returned is, for that he did not make an account of such moneys, as he had received for the use of the City, and this concerns not the party as an Alderman, and therefore his misdemeanour in that office can be no cause to put him from his place of Alderman. 3ly. It is returned for cause that he did mis-behave himself in his place whilst he was Mayor of the City, and this as the former is no cause to put him from his Alderman's place. A fourth cause returned is, for speaking contemptuous words against the Mayor and Aldermen, viz. Knock your heads together till I come, which words cannot be so contemptuons as to be put out of his place for them, return. for they are not so much as actionable. 5ly. He held, that if any of these causes singly, or all of them together were sufficient to dis-franchise him, yet they have not showed, that they have lawfully removed him, for it appears not that he was summoned to answer any of the things objected against him, neither doth it apyear, that he was dis-franchised by those that aught to have done it. The return was ordered to be filled, and time given to answer these exceptions till the next Term. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Upon an Affidavit read, For a Procedendo. that the cause was removed hither by the Plaintif, The Defendant moves for a Procedendo, that the Court may proceed where the plaintiff first brought his Action. But the Court answered, that the Plaintif may remove his cause hither by Certiorari, and upon the return of the Certiorari the Defendant ought to tender bail, and if the Plaintif will not accept of it a Procedendo may be granted. Wood against Clement. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Case of Wood and Clement formerly spoken unto, Arguments of Council, and the judges opinionstrouching an Award. was again moved and spoken to, first by Twisden, who argued, that the Award set forth is void for two reasons. 1. Because it is not final, for it awards one to pay money to I. S. to the use of another, without his consent, and this cannot determine the matter in controversy, but doth beget suits. 2ly. It is against reason, that the money due to the Mariners should be paid to any, but the Mariners themselves, and this is not submitted, and if it were, yet it is ill, for the Mariners include not the Master. Maynard held, that the Award was void to this clause, and so there is no breach assigned, and consequently there can be no judgement given, although some other part of the Award be good, and here is nothing awarded concerning john Acland, who is one of the parties that submitted to the Arbitration, and so as to the money he hath no satisfaction by the Award, 2 Rich. 3. f. ●●. Hill moved, that the Arbitrators have made an Award touching a thing not submitted: for the differences submitted are touching the Ship called the Salvadore, and they have made an Award touching the Ship, and the proceed thereof. Hales on the other side held, that john Acland is not party to the submission no more than the Mariners, and that the other parties have submitted by him. 2ly. He said there is something awarded for john Ackland, for he is comprised within the Mariners, and so he hath satisfaction, and if he be not included, than it appears not that there is any difference touching him to be arbitrated, and here is a joint trust for all, and one may take upon him for all, and make a discharge for all. Roll chief justice said, the Mariners, and owners of the Ship are all parties to the submission; but the plaintiff and Defendant in this action are only bound to perform the Award, for they only entered into bond to do it. And the Master of the Ship is the chief Mariner, Award. and he comes in in this notion and so the Award concerns him, 7 E. 4. f. 14. And if the party have power by the Award either in Law or Equity to compel the other to perform it, the Award is good though the party be put to his Action to get it performed. Bacon justice agreed with Roll, and held judgement ought to be given for the plaintiff, for that all the parties are included within the submission, although but some of them only are bound to perform the Award, and he said that the Master of the Ship is a Mariner. jerman justice said, he would advise, because it was a great cause, but he inclined that judgement was to be given for the plaintiff, because the Award seemed upon the pleading to be good. Brown justice was of the same opinion, and said, that the Master was a Mariner, and that there is a trust between all the parties, and a good remedy for them all by the Award. Whereupon the rule was, that the Plaintif should have judgement except better matter were shown Monday next. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Plaintif brought an Action upon the Case upon a promise; The Defendant pleaded non Assumpsit, Arrest of judgement in an action up on the Case upon a promise. and thereupon an issue was joined, and a verdict found for the Plaintif. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, and took exception to the setting forth of the promise, which was this, that the Defendant upon a consideration moving from the Plaintif, did assume and promise unto the plaintiff to pay a certain sum of money cuidam Fountain, and leaves out his name of baptism, and so it is incertain who the money should be paid unto, or whether it he now paid or no, and consequently whether there be any cause of Action, and so there can be no judgement. But Roll chief justice answered, Assumpsit. the Assumpsit was grounded upon a consideration past, and peradventure the Plaintif may not know the party's Christian-name to whom the money is to be paid, though both the Plaintif and Defendant know the person of the man well enough. Therefore let the Plaintif have his judgement. Frank against Dixon. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. FRank brought an Action of Trespass against Dixon for entering into his House and breaking open his Chest, and taking away his Goods. Arrest of judgement in an action of Trespass. The Defendant pleaded a special Plea, viz. that he did it by way of a distress for rend due unto him; The Plaintif replied the injuria sua propria absque tali causa; upon this an Issue was joined, and a verdict found for the Plaintif. It was moved at amicus Curiae that no judgement could be here given for Costs for the plaintiff, because the Plaintif had made no title to the Goods, Costs. and these Cases were cited, 44 Eliz. Trin. 7 jac. Frith and Blackmans' Case, and 5 Car. Davis and Evans. But Roll chief justice answered, that he wondered why any body should so move, for it is against the known practice of the Court, and said that he must pay Costs, otherwise there shall be vexation without amends. Therefore let the Plaintif take his judgement. Tyson. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an Action of Trespass, and exception was taken to the Writ of Error, Error to reverse a judgement in Trespass. in that it was not brought by the same person against whom the judgement was given: for the judgement was given against Evison, with the addition of Gentleman, and the Writ of Error is brought by Ivison Yeoman. Addition. Roll chief justice answered, that Evison and Ivison sounded but as one and the same name, and for the additions of Yeoman and Gentleman it is not material, though they differ here: but if it were the addition of Knight, or Baronet, there the difference would be something, for that is made part of the name, but the additions of Yeoman or Gentleman are additions ad placitum. Cutsworth. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Plaintif declares against two Defendants, against one of them, Error to reverse a judgement in assault and battery. for an Assault and Battery, and against the other, for taking away his Goods, and upon not guilty pleaded the Plaintif had a verdict, and a judgement against them both jointly for damages, and this was assigned for error to reverse the judgement. Roll chief justice said, the Writ cannot be helped, for the two Defendants cannot be joined in one Action, join in action. because the Trespasses are of several natures, and against several persons, and the parties cannot plead to this Declaration. Therefore the plaintiff nil capiat per billam. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved to quash an order of Sessions made, To quash an order of Sessions. that one should keep his reputed Child, because he had kept him heretofore, and it doth not show either that he is his Bastard, or his lawfully begotten Child. The order was quashed, because not made according to the Statute. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in the Court at Exeter in an Action of Debt for rent. Error to reverse a judgement in Debt. The errors assigned were, 1. That the names of the jurors were not returned upon the panel. To this Roll chief justice answered, it is not necessary to return their names, though it was the old way to do so. return. A second exception was, that the Writ of Error is not well returned, for it is directed to the Mayor and Bailiffs of the City of Exeter, and it is returned by the Mayor and two of the Bailiffs, whereas it should be by all of them. Adjourned to the next Term. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. A return of an order of justices of peace, To quash an order of justices of the peace. for keeping a Bastard-Child, removed hither by a Certiorari was read, and upon the reading the Court was moved to quash the order upon these exceptions. 1. It doth not appear, the order was made by two justices of the peace, whereof one was of the quorum. 2ly. It doth not appear that the justices did inhabit near the place. 3ly. The order doth not direct how long the party shall keep the Child, as the Statute doth direct it should. The order was quashed upon the last exception. The King against Humphryes. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved to quash an order of Sessions made at Derby for Parents to relieve their poor Children. To quash an order of Sessions. Deputation. The exception taken was that the Statute appoints that the justices in the Sessions shall set the rate that is to be paid for their maintenance, and that the justices here have not done, but have transferred their authority over to other justices to do it, which they cannot do, and so the order made by the other justices is not good. The Court said, this is all one as if an Arbitrator should arbitrate another to make the arbitrement, which is not good. Therefore let the order be quashed. The King against Golding. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Defendant showed for cause why restitution should not be awarded against him upon an Endictment of forcible entry, Cause why no restitution upon an Endictment of forcible entry. That he will appear and plead to the Endictment. Rull chief justice answered, Then you must go to trial the next Term, and at your own charges. Mich. 24. Car. Banc. Reg. Upon view of the Parliament Roll of the Statute of 2. Ed. 6. for payment of tithes, Parliament Roll brought in court to examine a Declaration by. Recital. Parliament Roll. journal Book. and comparing it with the Declarations in the causes between Bows and Broadhead, and Burraston and Herbert, it was found that the Statute was rightly recited, notwithstanding what had been objected, and the journal Book of Parliament produced to the contrary; and thereupon judgement was given in both cases, and the Court said that they were to be ruled by the Parliament Roll, and not the journal book. And the same day, in the Case between Bowyer and Tantulyar, for the same reason, the Court ordered the Parliament Roll to be brought in Court the next term, to make it appear whether an adjournment of Parliament was well recited, and would not credit the journal book. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Phillip's moved the Court to quash an Endictment, To quash an Endictment for Assault and Battery. for an Assault and Battery made upon Baron and Feme, and for pulling down of the house of the Baron, and he took these exceptions. 1. That the Endictment did conclude ad damnum ipsorum, whereas it should be ad damnum of the Baron only. But the Court answered, that the Endictment is good, though the words ad damnum ipsorum be left out. A second Exception was, that the Endictment doth not show the time, and place, when the Assault was committed. 3ly. It is said intulit and expulsit in the singular number, Endictment. whereas it should be intulerunt and expulserunt in the Plural number, because the Endictment is against divers, and so it is false Latin. 4ly. False Latin. The Endictment uses the word lignum for the timber of the house, whereas it should be maremium. Twisden on the other side answered, that the Endictment was good at least to the Assault and Battery, though it fail in the other particulars. The Court ordered the Defendants to plead to it, and would not quash it. Mich. 1649. Banc. Sup. THe Court upon the return of a Sheriff of a rescous made, To quash a Rescous. and read was moved to quash it for these exceptions taken to it. 1. It is said feci warrantum meum Thomae Tailor, and doth not say that Thomas Tailor was his Bailiff. 2ly. He doth not say for what cause he made his Warrant, Warrant. and so it appears not whether it was lawful or not. Upon these exceptions it was quashed. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Vaux and Vaux against Steward. Upon a verdict found for two Plaintiffs in an Action upon the Case upon an assumpsit, Arrest of Judgement in an action upon an Assumpsit. join in action. The Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement, and for cause shows that the Plaintiffs ought not to have joined in the Action; but aught to have brought several Actions. The Case was this, the several of the two Plaintiffs were distreyned; The Defendant upon consideration of ten pounds paid unto him by the Plaintiffs, did assume and promise unto them to procure the to be re-delivered unto them, and because they were not re-delivered acordingly they brought their Action jointly. Promise entire. Roll chief justice said, the promise here is entire, for the consideration is entire, and so the Action may be jointly brought. Yet let judgement stay till the other move. Postea. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. IN a Trial between Cave and Osby, Observations upon a Trial. Presentation. Licence. Grendons case, 11 Rep. Impropriation. Vicarage. for not setting forth of Tithes according to the Statute of 2 Ed. 6. These things were delivered by the Court. 1. That the King may present to a living by a Letter, but it is a question whether he can do it by paroll. 2ly. There aught to be the King's licence to make an appropriation of a Church, and to endow a Vicar. 3ly. The King cannot make such a licence without matter of Record, and it ought to be with a Condition to endow a Vicar, and the endowment of the Vicar may be by a distinct instrument from the appropriation, so that it be made at the same time when the appropriation was. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. IN the Case of one Wright, Robbery of the servant may be robbebery of the Master. Robbery. brought upon the Statute of Hue and Cry, Roll chief justice said, that if a man's Servant be rob of his Master's Goods in the sight of his Master, this shall be taken for a robbing of the Master. And if one cast away his Goods to save them from a Robber, and the Robber take them up, and carry them away, this is a robbery done to his person. Coals against Sibsye. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Trin. 1649. rot. 148. Coals brought an Action of Trover and Conversion against Sibsye, The Defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitation of actions in bar of the Action. A Latitat in nature of an original. The plaintiff replies, that he took out a Latitat out of this Court against the Defendant within the time limited by the Statute, which yet continues depending. Roll chief justice said, a Latitat out of this Court is in the nature of an original in the Common pleas, and so hath been always held to be. Original. Adjourned. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to quash divers Endictments against the Inhabitants of the Parishes of Shoreditch and Hackney in Middlesex, To quash Endictments of Parishes for not repairing the high way. for not repairing the High ways. The exception taken was, that the Parishes are jointly indicted, whereas their offences are several, and also not equal, and yet both fined alike. The Court quashed the Endictment, and discharged the issues which were not returned, but not those that were returned. Gardner against Jollye. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Pasc. 1649. rot. 189. jolly brought an Action upon the Case against Gardner for causing him to be indicted of Felony as accessary, Error to reverse a judgement in an action on the Case. for suffering a Prisoner to escape that was convicted of Felony. The Plaintif had a verdict, and a judgement; The Defendant brought a Writ of Error to reverse this judgement, and the error assigned was, that the party was indicted for a matter which is but a Trespass, and not a Felony, and so the Declaration is mistaken, and an Action upon the Case lies not. Case. But the Court answered, that the charge of the Endictment is for Felony, although the matter the party is charged with be not Felony, and a scandal lay upon him by it, and therefore the Action lies. Vaux and Vaux against Steward. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. THe Case between Vaux and Vaux, and Steward, Arrest of judgement in an action upon an Assumpsit. was again moved in arrest of judgement. The objection made was, that the promise made amounted to a double promise, and therefore the parties to whom the promise was made aught to have brought several Actions, and not to have joined in the Action, as they have done. But to this it was answered by the Council on the Plaintiffs part, that the promise is entire, and is not double: for the consideration of the promise is entire, viz. the ten pound which moved from them jointly and not severally. Roll chief Justice held. joint promise. that it is an entire promise, and a joint consideration, though the taken were several, and therefore the Action may be joint, and if one lay out money for a thing assumed to be done for a third person, if it be not done an Action shall be brought upon the Assumpsit by him who laid out the money; Rippon and mortons case, f. 1. but because a Case was cited out of yelverton's Reports to be against the opinion of the Court, therefore the Court ordered the Council to bring that Case, and in the mean time they would advise. Antea. Mich. 1649. Banc. super. Christopher against How. CHristopher brought an Action on the Case upon an Assumpsit against How an Executor, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the Case. and declared upon a promise made by the Testator to the plaintiff, to deliver certain goods in the possession of the Testator unto the Plaintif upon request, and because the Testator had not delivered them accordingly, the Plaintif brings his action. The Plaintif had a verdict: The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, and for cause shows, 1. That the breach of this promise was in the Testators life time, and therefore the Action should have been brought against him, and is not now to be brought against the Executor. 2ly. The Testator did not promise that his Executors should deliver the goods, but that he would deliver them upon request; Request. and there appears no request to be made to the Testator, as there ought to have been. 15 jac. Hob. rep. f. 300. Bodwells Case. But Roll chief justice answered, Executor. That an Executor may be charged upon a collateral promise, if there were a breach of it in the Testators life time, and here is a good request, and goes to all: Therefore let the Plaintif take his judgement, except better matter be showed to the contrary. and Osborne. Mich. 1649. 1 Reipub. Ang. Banc. super. THe Plaintif brought an Action upon the Case upon two several promises, the Defendant pleaded non assumpsit, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the case. Issue. and upon this an issue was joined, and a verdict found for the Plaintif. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, and for cause shows, that there is no issue joined as to the second promise alleged, for he doth not conclude with petit quod inquitatur per patriam. and yet there is a verdict found upon both the promises. The judgement was arrested till the other should move. Mich. 1649. Banc. super. Upon a special Verdict the case was this: A Case upon a special verdict argued. Tenant for life, the remainder for life, the remainder in tail, the remainder to the right heirs of him in the remainder for life; the remainder man in tail levies a fine in the life of tenant for life; And the question was, whether by the levying of this fine the estate tail were discontinued or no. To prove that the estate tail was discontinued, these Books were cited, 1 H 7.22. Lit. Cap. Descents, Sect. 34.14 Ed, 3. Fitz. Av●wry 117.3 Ed, 3. Fitz. grants 60.15 Ed. 4 9.2 Rep. Butler's case 5. Cooks Lit. f. 25. Pasch. 13 Car. Hungates Case. Banc. Reg. Dyer. 339. Twisden to the contrary argued, that the estate is not altered, neither to the right nor by way of Estople, 46 Edward 3. f. 23. Estople. An Estople supposeth a thing to be done; and therefore if the thing be impossible which is alleged by way of estople, it can be no estople. And one shall not be construed to do wrong by an Act which may be interpreted so, that by it he may do no wrong. Brooks Abridgement Grants 49. Roll chief justice, The matter here is not how the estates shall pass, and how to make them good; but the Question is upon the forfeiture: Forfeiture. for he levies the fine as of an estate in possession, and not of a reversion in fee; and this is not upon the rule in Bredons' case, 13 Car. Sir Julius Caesar's case; an Acceptance of an estate, or an Attornment by Tenant for life to a stranger, is a forfeiture. Jerman justice held there was no forfeiture. But the Court said the Verdict was ill sound: and therefore ordered it should be amended, that the whole matter in Law might come in question. Amendment. Grace against Walye Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Walye brought an Action upon the Case against Grace, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the case. for speaking these words of him, viz. jack Walye was questioned for stealing of a grey Mare with a snip in her ear, and hue and cry went out after him, and he durst not show his face hereabouts. The Plaintif had a Verdict; and the Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement, that the words were not actionable, because they were general and uncertain words, and it doth not appear the party was damnified by them, nor how long ago they were spoken. Roll chief justice said, that the party was defamed by speaking of them, and he hath laid it that he lost his Credit thereby. Therefore let the Plaintif have his judgement, except better matter be shown. But Nicholas justice doubted whether they were actionable or no. And Ask Justice nihil dixit. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. AN Attorney of this Court that was within age, Error against at Attorney in Court, for appearing propria persona, being within age. Error in fact. appeared to an Action propria persona, and pleaded to issue, and had a verdict and a judgement for him: and upon this a writ of Error was brought here, it being an error in fact; because that being within age did not appear per guardianum, nor by his Attorney; and it was said, that it is not helped by the Statute of jeofails, though it be after verdict. And thereupon the Court stayed the Execution. Mercer against Rule. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved, For a Supersedeas & attachment for taking out execution after a writ of Error brought and allowed. Supersedeas. Attachment. Execution. That a writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement, and that it was received and allowed: and notwithstanding the plaintiff that had the judgement had taken out execution; and thereupon it was prayed for a supersedeas to supersede the execution, and for an Attachment against the party for his contempt to the Court. And it was urged by the Council that moved, That after a writ of Error is received and allowed, the hands of the Court that gave the judgement, are foreclosed from granting out execution, and that the writ of Error is in itself a Supersedeas, and cited Dyer 283. and therefore concluded, that the execution is not well issued forth. Twisden of Council on the other side said, that the writ of Error was not duly pursued, because the roll was not marked; and therefore the party might well take out execution. But Roll chief justice answered, that the writ was well pursued, though the roll were not marked; Yet if neither the roll be marked, Notice. nor notice given to the Attorney on the other side of the bringing the writ of Error, if the party proceed to take out execution, it is no contempt to the Court: otherwise it is a contempt; Contempt. Supersedeas. And it is the duty of the Clerk of the Errors to mark the roll, and not the Attorneys; and therefore take a Supersedeas, quia improvide emanavit, to stop execution. Pym against Morgan, alias Bambery and basely. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Hill. 24 Car. rot. 1062. IN an Ejectione firmae brought for the Manor of Caledown, Argument upon a special verdict in an Ejectione firmae. The Defendant pleads Not guilty; and upon this the jury find a special verdict to this effect, That Sir Thomas Morgan was seized in fee, amongst other lands, of the lands in question, and that in 13 Car. he made a settlement of these lands to himself for life, the remainder to his daughter Mary for life, the remainder to the heirs of the first Tenant for life, with a power of revocation, to alter all or any part of the settlement made at any time during his life: The verdict finds further, that there was an Ordinance of Parliament made in the year of our Lord, 1645. that Sir Thomas Morgan should forfeit all his lands and estate which he was then seized or possessed of, or had been seized or possessed of from the year 1641. and that by the same Ordinance the lands in question were given to Mr. Pym; & that by virtue of the said Ordinance he encred & was seized pro ut; & that Mr. Pym died so seized, after whose death the Plaintiffs lessor, as his heir, entered, & made a lease to the plaintiff, & after that Sir Tho Morgan died. & Mary the Defendant claiming as tenant in remainder for life after the death of Sir Thomas her father, by virtue of the settlement made 13 Carol. entered into the lands in question, and the plaintiff as lessée of Pym brings the action. Upon this special verdict, the Question was, Whether by the Ordinance of Parliament made not till the year 1645. yet looking back to the year 1641. the remainder of the lands in question, which was settled 13 Car. being before the making of the Ordinance, and also before the time to which the Ordinance looks back, be forfeited by the Ordinance or not? Forfeiture. Latch of Council with the Defendant argued That it was not forfeited; 1. Because that the Ordinance is penal, and retrospective or looking back; and therefore it is odious in Law, and shall not be largely interpreted but as strictly as may be. 2ly, The preamble of the Ordinance sets forth 2. things, as the reasons why the Ordinance was made; 1. Mr. Pyms deserts, to whom the lands were given; 2ly, Morgan's offences, for which he was thus punished: and both these grounds for making the Ordinance can extend no further than to the year 1641. and so not to the time of the settlement made 13 Car. by Sir Thomas Morgan; for then neither of these causes alleged were in being; 2ly, The purview of the Ordinance is double; 1. punitive: 2ly, remunerative. 1. the punitive part, which concerns the punishing of Sir Thomas Morgan: 2ly, the remunerative part, concerning the rewarding of Mr. Pym; and the punitive part made in the year 1645. cannot reach the estate settled upon Mary his daughter so long before, viz. 13 Car. for it can reach no further back than to the year 1641. at the most to which time, and no further, the Ordinance is retrospective: and in the Statute of 23 H. 8. general words of an Act are restrained. Besides, there is a demonstration in the Ordinance, that shows the Ordinance doth not extend to the estate of the Defendant, as may appear by the provisoes contained in it; for although the children of Morgan are to be punished within the Ordinance by the second proviso of it, yet this extends not to so long time as to 13 Car. when the estate was settled, but only to the estate, as it was in the year 1641. And therefore prayed judgement for the Defendant. Wadham Windham on the other side argued, that the estate of Morgan, though it was said to be settled 13 Car. was forseited by the Ordinance. Because the estate was not absolutely settled at that time, for there was a proviso in the conveyance to revoke the settlement, so that at the time of the Ordinance made the estate was in Sir Thomas Morgan absolutely to dispose off as he pleased, and by the words of the Ordinance all Morgan's estate is passed without any saving, and the provisoes of the Ordinance do prove, that the Children of Sir Thomas Morgan were excepted out of the save made to preserve the estates of others. Also Boons and Favours bestowed use to be amply expounded, and this being a Boon bestowed by the Parliament shall receive as large a construction as is possible. Besides Morgan was a Papist, & therefore it may well be supposed, that he intended not this for any real settlement, but only by way of subtlety for some private reasons: for we know that Papists do use to make such settlements as this was to preserve them from penalties of the Law. And the words of the Ordinance are accumulative to convey all Morgan's estate, and there are no restrictive words, and if there were they should be void here: for the Manor of Callidown, being the Lands in question are expressly given by the Ordinance, and as to these Lands the rights of all men are bound, and therefore if there were a saving it would be void, as it is Cook rep. Alton Woods Case. And an act of Parliament sometimes is as a conveyance, sometime as a judgement, and both ways a saving in it is void and srivolous, 1 Rep. 4. A conditional estate or a right may be saved by judgement or fine, but not an entire estate or interest, Saving. and therefore the estate of Mary in the Manor of Callidown, cannot be saved by any proviso, and he cited Alton Woods Case for authority in the principal Case, f. 51. But admitting a general saving had been good to save Mary's estate, yet as the words of the Ordinance were penned, her estate is not saved by it, for the words were put in the Ordinance for the advantage of Pym, and not to provide for Mary: for she claims from Thomas Morgan, and so prayed judgement for the Plaintif. Roll chief justice said, that the provisoes in the Ordinance are not void to all persons, as Windham argued, for Strangers are clearly provided for by them. But let the Case be argued again Saturday fortnight. Postea. Hatwood against Payte. Mich. 1649 Banc. sup. Entered Hill. 24 Car. rot. 78. THe question insisted upon in this Case was, Whether Tithes be extendible upon an Elegit. whether upon a recovery in an Action of Debt against a Parson, the Tithes be extendible by Elegit. Hales of Council with the Plaintif held, that they are, because that Tithes may be said to be Tenements, and the Parson hath a in them, although he hold them jure Ecclesiae. But Roll chief justice said, Elegit. that a Parsonage cannot be extended, but that the Debt may be levied out of the profits of it by the Sheriff, as it was wont to be done: Extent. for now there being no Bishops the profits cannot be sequestered by the Bishop of the Diocese, Sequestration as they used to be. But jerman and Nicholas justices doubted. Clergy. Ask justice agreed with Roll, and said, that by the Common-law the Clergy are no more privileged from paying their debts, than Lay men are. Roll chief justice said, it hath been heretofore questioned, whether a Clergyman be subject to watch and ward, or to contribute to satisfy for a robbery done within the Hundred: but now it is no question but they are subject, and shall contribute. Adjourned till Saturday to be argued again. Postea. Tyndal and others against Harington. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. TYndal brought an Action of Debt against Harington for arrearages of rent due to him as Lessee of a Vicarage, Arrest of judgement in Debt for arrearages of an annuity. Debt. Annuity. and upon nil debet pleaded, there was an Issue joined, and a verdict found for the Plaintif. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, that an Action of Debt did not lie, but that he ought to have brought a Writ of Annuity, because it was for arrearages of an Annuity, which yet continues, and 6 H. 4.7. & 9 H. 6.94. were cited. The judgement was arrested till the Plaintif should move. Compton against Allen. Mich 1649. Banc. sup. Entered Trin. 1649. rot. 348. COmpton brought an Action of Covenant against Allen his Lessee for years upon a Covenant of the Indenture, Demurrer upon a Plea in an action of Covenant. for not keeping the House let unto him in repair. The Defendant pleads, that the House was burnt by casualty. The plaintiff demurs to this Plea, and for cause shows, that the Plea was contrary to the Defendants express Covenant by his Deed, and therefore was not good. Roll chief justice said, that a Lessee that covenanteth to repair, Covenant. aught to do it if the House be burnt, be it by negligence, or by other means. Therefore let the Plaint if have judgement except cause showed to the contrary. — against Phillips. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. AN Action upon the Case was brought against Phillips for suffering one to escape; Arrest of judgement in an action upon the Case. Escape. The Plaintif had a verdict; The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, and for cause shows, that the Declaration was insufficient. For 1. it shows, that the party was arrested that made the escape, but it doth not show by what process he was arrested. 2ly. The Declaration saith, that he was arrested virtute Querelae, which cannot be: for he is arrested by virtue of the Writ, and not of the Plaint. 3ly. The Declaration doth not show by what authority the Prison was kept, out of which the escape was made. Escape. Roll chief justice said, that the second exception was material, and then if the party be not well arrested, there can be no escape, and so the Action lies not. Therefore nil capiat per billam, if cause be not showed to the contrary. johnson against Abington. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. IOhnson brought an Action of the Case against Abington, and declared, Arrest of judgement in an action upon an Assumpsit. that the Defendant in consideration that the Plaintif would deliver unto the Defendants Son such wares as his Son should desire, did assume and promise unto the plaintiff that he would pay the Plaintif for them, and avers that he had delivered certain wares unto his Son, and that the Defendant did refuse to pay for them, and for this he brought his Action. The Defendant pleads non Assumpsit, and upon this an Issue is joined, and a verdict found for the Plaintif. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, and for cause shows, that it doth not appear, Averment that the Son of the Defendant did desire the Goods that the Plaintif delivered unto him, and for which he brings his Action, and the Assumpsit being to pay for such as his Son should desire, the Declaration ought to set forth an actual desire of the Son, to have the wares delivered. But Twisden of Council with the Plaintif answered, that the delivery of the commodities by the Plaintif, and the acceptance of them by the Defendant employed a desire, and it is not necessary to show an actual desire. jerman justice said, there ought at least to be a verbal desire. But Roll chief justice said, that the acceptance of the wares is an actual desire, and that is more than a verbal desire, Declaration. Assumpsit. and it is not necessary here to affirm the punctual words of the promise: but only the substance of it. And therefore let the Plaintif have his judgement, if better matter be not showed. Mich. 1649 Banc. sup. Walker moved to quash an endictment against the Inhabitants of Mile-end, To quash an Endictment. within the Parish of Stebenhoth for not repairing the high way, and to take off the issues upon a Certificate read, that the way was repaired, and upon this exception taken to the Endictment, viz. that the Inhabitants of Mile-end within the Parish of Stebenhoth are indicted, and Mile-end is but a Hamlet within a Parish, and a Hamlet within a Parish cannot be charged to repair a high way, except it be by prescription, or for some other special reason: for of common right the whole Parish is charged with it; Common right. High way. and here is no such prescription or particular reason showed in the Endictment, and therefore it is not good. Roll chief justice answered, that of common right a Hamlet is not so charged, but a vill is; and therefore let it be quashed, but the issues shall stand: for few will repair the high way till they be forced. Fines against Dell. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. FInes brought an Action of Debt upon an Obligation to perform certain Covenants contained in an Indenture. Demurrer to a Plea in Debt upon an Obligation to perform Covenants. Plea. The Defendant pleads performance generally; The Plaintiff demurs to the plea, and for cause shows, that divers Covenants are comprised in the Indenture, and that some of them are in the Affirmative; and others of them are in the Negative, and therefore a general pleading of performance to all is not sufficient: for as to the Covenants in the Affirmative he ought to plead a special performance, and to show how he hath performed them. The Court bid the Plaintif take his judgement, except cause be showed to the contrary. Mich 1649. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved that there might be a rule of Court for the party upon satisfaction made of a judgement obtained by him, For a rule to: acknowledge, satisfaction. to acknowledge satisfaction. But the Court denied it, and said there was some trick in the business; For no doubt but the party upon receipt of what is due to him will acknowledge satisfaction without a rule to compel him. Crible against Orchard. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Entered Trin. 1649. rot. 30. ORchard brought an action of debt against CRible upon an Obligation, Error upon a judgement in debt upon an Obligation. the Defendant pleaded per minas; upon this an issue was joined, and a Verdict and a judgement given in the Court at Barnstaple for the plaintiff, and upon a Writ of Error brought three Errors were assigned: 1. That the Declaration was insufficient. 2ly. The Common Error. 3ly. That the Venire was not good; but these were overruled. And Roll chief justice upon Oyer of the Record found this Error, That the jury in the assessing of damages say pro missis & Custagiis, etc. but do not not say circa sectam et expenditis, Damages. judgement. and so it cannot appear for what the costs and damages are assessed, and said, It is true that the judgement is right entered; but there is no Verdict to warrant the judgement, and therefore it cannot be good, and therefore let it be reversed if cause be not shown to the contrary. But we will not pronounce it now except the party desire it for his own expedition. Air against Pyncomb. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Air brought an Action upon the Case against Pymcomb for surcharging of a Common, and for treading the Grass: Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the case for surcharging a Common. Assize. Trespass upon the case. The Plaintif had a Verdict: The Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement, That an Action of the Case doth not lie in this case, but an Assize. 2ly. That an Action of Trespass doth not lie for a Commoner for treading of the Grass. 3ly. The Trespass is alleged to be done in quibusdam peciis pasturae, and the quantity of them is not showed. To the first Exception Roll chief justice answered, That the Plaintif may have an Assize or an Action upon the Case at his election, although here be a disturbance of the Plaintiffs freehold, although that the ancient books say the contrary: And thereupon the Court gave judgement for the plaintiff, except cause shown to the contrary. Brook against Hogg. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Hill. 24 Car. rot. 660. A judgement given in an Action of Debt upon an account in the Court of Knaresborough was reversed here, judgement in an account reversed for Error in it. because the Venire facias was Venire facias, etc. which in an Inferior Court is not good, Venire. but it ought to say Venire facias duodecem probos et legales homines de, etc. & so express all at large in words, and not with an, etc. Note, Many judgements given in Inferior Courts have been here reversed upon the same exception: But I only mention this for an authority to be cited upon occasion. Ibson against Beale. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Hill. 24 Car. rot. 625. IBson brought a Writ of Error to reverse a judgement given against him for Beale in the Court at York, in an Action of Debt upon an Obligation, Error to reverse a judgement in debt. and assigned for Errors. 1. That the party hath not entitled himself to the Action. 2ly. The issue is not well joined; for the Plaintif saith, ideo ponit se super patriam, where he ought to say, Issue. petit quod inquiratur per patriam. 3ly. He concludes, to his damage of l. 1. (i) fifty pounds expressed in numerical Letters, viz. l. for fifty, and L. for pounds, Damage. instead of quinquaginti librarum. The judgement was reversed upon the last Exception. Stubs and Manklyn Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in the Court at Owse-bridge in York, Error to reverse a judgement in debt. in an Action of Debt upon an Obligation, and the Common Error only assigned. But Roll chief justice upon Oyer of the Record took this exception, That the Record was ideo praeceptum est Vicecomiti, and it is not said in Curia, and so it doth not appear to be the Process of the Court; And for this Error the judgement was reversed. Venire. Topladye against Stalye. Mich. 2649 Banc. sup. Mich. 24 Car. rot. 596. TOpladye brought an Action of Trespass quare clausum fregit & pedibus ambulando etc. against Stalye: Demtirrer and argument upon a plea in Trespass. The Defendant makes a special justification, That he did enter into the Plaintiffs Close to search for Sheep that were stolen from him. To this Plea the Plaintif demurred, and for cause shows that the justification is not good, for it is not said by the Defendant that the Plaintif had stolen the Sheep, or that he had any suspicion that he had stolen them, or that any other had stolen them & driven them upon the Plaintiffs land, and so had no colour to come there to search for them, and the Books of 17 E. 4. f. 1. and 27 H. 8.23. & 6 E. 4.7. & 21 H. 7. f. 10. & 22 H. 6. f. 36. & 38 E. 3. f. 10. were cited. justification. Another exception was also taken, That the Defendant doth not say that the Gate of the Close where he entered was open; and though he may justify to search for his Sheep in the Close, yet he cannot justify the breaking of his Close to do it. But Roll chief justice overruled this exception: And for the matter in Law, whether the Defendant had made a good justification or no. He held that he had not, for all that he hath alleged by way of justification is but matter of private profit to himself, Distress. Damage feasant. and not for the public good; for he went not thither to find or apprehend the Felon, but to look for his Sheep; And if be stolen and put into my ground, I may take them damage pheasant, or bring an Action of Trespass against the owner, and the owner cannot take them away without the licence of the possessor of the ground, Licence. for if he might, by that means the possessor of the ground would be without remedy for the damage the had done him: And he said, That when one hath suspicion of another for felony, he ought to show the cause of his suspicion, Arrest. otherwise the party suspected ought not to be arrested upon it; and concluded that the plaintiff aught to have judgement. jerman Justice held, that the Defendant ought to have judgement, because a private injury as this Trespass is, aught to give way to the public good, viz. the discovery of Felony; and here is a public good intended, and it ought to take place of the Plaintiffs inconsiderable injury. And he said that one may be arrested for Felony only upon Common fame, if there be a felony committed: Otherwise it is if there be no Felony done. Ask Justice said the Case was hard on both sides. But the Court gave judgement for the plaintiff except cause should be shown to the contrary. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Wild moved the Court that the return of a Habeas Corpus granted for certain rioters called the Diggers that were committed by justices of Peace upon finding the Riot upon their view might be filled, To quash a return of a Rescous. which was granted, upon which he moved that the prisoners might be discharged, but the Court commanded the return to be read, upon the reading of it Wild took this exception, viz. That the prisoners were committed contrary to the Statute of H. 4. c. 7. for by that Statute the Sheriff ought to be present at the finding of the Riot, which was not so here. Walker held that the justices had power by the Statute without the Sheriff to inquire of the Riot, and to commit the Rioters. But Roll chief justice said, that there is no enquiry made in this case, for the Riot is found upon the view, View. Record. and so there needs no enquiry, and the Record ought to be made up by the two justices that had the view, and by the Sheriff, and it is not made by them as justices but as judges joined with the Sheriff by the Statute, & justices that find a Riot may either bring in the Record in Court propriis manibus of their own accord, or may send it into Court, as they have done here. The prisoners committed upon the first Record read (for there were two here read in Court) were bailed but not discharged, Discharge. although the return was not good, because the Court said it was not usual to discharge prisoners at the first reading of the return; For the other prisoners, The Court advised. Bendir against Oil. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. For a Prohibition to the Court of Policy of assurance. A Prohibition was prayed to the Court of the Commissioners of policy for assurance upon a surmise that they proceeded there in the trial of the Assurance of a man's life, which was said to be tryable at the Common law, as it was before the Statute made that erected that Court, Assurance. as may appear by the preamble of the Statute. Roll chief justice said, that the Assurance of the life of a man is not within the Statute of Assurance, as the Assurance of a man's life upon the buying of an office; but this case is different, for the man whose life is here assured is going to sea upon Merchant's affairs, and his life may be as well assured, as the safe return of the ship he goes in. But let Council be heard on both sides Wednesday next; but we will stay nothing in the interim. Postea. Mich. 1649. Banc. super. AN Information was exhibited against the Inhabitants of the Town of Burmingham, for not repairing Burmingham-bridge; To amend a Record after verdict. two of the Defendants plead to issue, and a verdict was found for them in paiis. It was moved for the Defendants, that Mr. Attorney General had mistaken the Christian name of one of the Defendants in his replication; and prayed that the Record might be amended before judgement entered, Amendment. that the judgement may not be erroneous by reason of this mistake. The Court answered, Bring a Copy of the Record to us to advise upon; Issue. but they said they did not see how it could be amended, for that they conceived there was no issue joined. Hobbs against Blanchard. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Pasch. 20 Car. rot. 220. BLanchard brought an action of Trespass in the Court at Norwitch against Hobbs, and had a verdict and a judgement. Error to reverse a judgement in trespass. The Defendant brought a writ of Error to reverse the judgement. The error assigned was, that the jury had not found the issue joined; for the issue joined is, de injuria sua propria absque tali causa, and the jury have found not guilty generally. Panel of Council with the Defendant in the writ of Error said, that the jury have found the effect of the issue, though they have not found the very words, and therefore it is good enough, and he cited Fabian & Kingstons' case, 32 Eliz. and Wingrave & Homes his case 3 Car. entered 2 Car. rot. 632. Roll chief justice answered, That the verdict found the issue argumentatively only, and not directly; and therefore it is not good. Verdict. jerman justice was of the same opinion: and the judgement was reversed, except better cause shown. Carew against Bawd. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Trin. 24 Car. rot. 1607. CArew brought an Action of trespass against Bawd for entering into his ground, and taking away a certain parcel of Tynn. Demurrer to a plea of privilege of Parl. in an action of trespass. The Defendant pleaded that he was servant unto the Lord Moon, who was a Lord of the Parliament, and that he took the Tynn by his Command, and claims his privilege as his servant, not to be impleaded: to this plea the plaintiff demurs, and for cause shows, that the Defendant doth not show that he was the Lord Moons menial servant, Privilege. and attending upon his person: and it may be he was his Carter or Ploughman, and such servants are not privileged. Roll chief justice said, The privilege is not claimed here merely as his servant; but he justifies here as his servant in defence of his Master's title to the Tynn, Waiver. which he took by his command. But let the Defendant plead in Chief, and let the plaintiff waive the Demurrer: Or else let the Plaintif enter his suggestion upon the roll, that the House of Lords is now dissolved, and so let them take issue and go to trial: Or else let the party plead what he will upon record, and we will advise in the mean time. Paroch. de Hardingham versus Paroch. de Brisley. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. AN order of Sessions made for the settling of a poor woman in the parish of Hardingham was returned hither by a Certiorari granted to the said parish, For quashing an Order of Sessions for the settling of a Vagrant. and upon the return read, and opening the matter by Council, the case was this. An inhabitant dwelling within the parish of Brisley, did hire a maid servant for a year, and Covenanted to give her Forty shillings for her wages, and entertained her into his service. The maid servant some time after fell sick in his service; her Master thereupon turns her out of his service, without giving her any thing: the maid, for necessity, in travelling from Brisley toward Hardingham where her friends lived, and where she was born, was forced to beg for relief: whereupon she was sent as a Vagrant to Hardingham, where she was born. The Vill of Hardingham send her back to Brisley, where she was entertained as a Covenant servant: whereupon they of Brisley procure an order of Sessions to settle her at Hardingham. The Question was, Whether this were a good order, or not, for settling her at Hardingham according to the Statute? Or, whether she ought to be settled at Brisley, where she was entertained as a Covenant servant and turned out of service, and forced to beg by that means. Roll chief justice said, That here seems to be fraudulency in the Master to make his servant a Vagrant, Vagrant. that so he may be rid of her; but if one beg meat and drink, for necessity, in passing between one Town and another, this is not begging to make one a beggar within the Statute. And therefore the Court ordered that the party should be settled at Brisley, Setlement. where she was entertained for a Covenant servant, and not at Hardingham where she was born, if cause were not shown to the contrary. Harwood against Paty. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. THe case between Harwood and Patye was again spoken unto, Argument in trespass, whether Tithes be extendible. by Wild of Council with the Plaintif, wherein the Action being an Action of Trespass for taking away wheat, rye, and wood, upon an Elegit taken out against a Parson, The Question was. Whether Tithes are extendible upon an Elegit by the Statute, or not? And he held that they are not extendible, first by the Common law confirmed by Mag. Charta they are not extendible. Extent. Cook upon Magna Charta, 37 & N. Brev. 227. Tithes are merely Spiritual things, and exempt from all Lay consideration, 11 Rep. 14. Pridle and Nappers' case. Cawdries case, 5 Rep. f. 15.35 H. 6.39. where rights of Tithes are in dispute, the Common Law shall take place; but not where the Tithes themselves are in dispute: Seldens History of Tithes, cap. 14. 2ly, The Statute of Westminster makes no alteration of the Common law in this point, and non usage is a good argument to prove it; for if they had been extendible, it would sometime or other have been put in practice; and by the express words of the Statute of Westminster, the 2d. Tithes are excepted, and the process usually before that directed to the Bishop for sequestration, is not taken away by the Statute of 5 Ed. 3.53. N. Brev. 66. Though it be a freehold, yet is it not within the Statute; and if it be within the words of the Statute, yet is it not within the meaning of it, as Cook upon the Stat. of Wesim. 2. doth prove, 35 H. 5.50. 9 E. 2. Clergy men anciently were not included in general Acts of Parliaments, because the Church was accounted as an Infant always within age, Clergy. and so favoured and protected by Law. Next the late Ordinance of Parliament hath made no alteration in this case; for the Ordinance intended not to punish the Parsons of Churches, although it do out Bishops of their Bishoprics and dignities. And as to the Objection, That if the Tithes should not be here extendible, there would be a failer of justice. I answer, That our case is out of the Common law, upon which, the rule, that extraordinary courses are to be taken, rather than there should be a failer of justice, is grounded. Roll chief justice said, that there are two Questions in this case, 1. Whether Tithes are within the Statute? 2ly, Whether now that Bishops are taken away by the Parliament, the Sheriffs may levy the debt of the Clergy as the Bishops used to do? and I conceive they may, Levari. by a levari facias. But the great question is, Whether the Elegit lie? And the Court inclined it did. But you will argue it again, therefore we will deliver no opinion in it. Elegit. And the Court clearly held with Mr. Selden, That Tithes are not due jure divino; and directed to search precedents, Tithes. if a Recognisance had ever been extended upon Tithes. Cane against Golding. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Can brought an Action upon the case against Golding for slandering his title, by speaking these words, viz. His right and title thereunto is naught, Arrest of Judgement in an action upon the case, for slandering the Plaintiffs title. and I have a better title than he. The Plaintif had a verdict. The Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement, that the words were not actionable. Twisden of Council with the Plaintif argued that the words are actionable; for though the words spoken of themselves may not be actionable, yet here they are alleged to be spoken falso et malitiose, and that will make them actionable, 43 B. 3. f. 33. N. Br. 95. Hob. Rep. Water and Freeman's Case; and as to the Objection that is made, that the Declaration is only quod fuit verisimilis vendere, and that he was hindered by the words; and therefore there might have been no bargain made, though the words had not been spoken: The answer is, That it is well enough set forth as it is; for all treaties upon Contracts are but likely to proceed, and are not certain till the Contracts be made; but which is more, it is further alleged here, that by reason of the speaking of these words he could not receive his Tithes, which is an express loss. Hales for the Defendant argued, that the words of themselves are not actionable, although they be said to be spoken falso et malitiose, except a special damage be alleged to come to the party; for such words as these differ from words that are spoken of the person of a man: And though there be damage, yet they are not scandalous; for the Defendant claims a title as well as the Plaintif: and the saying that the words were spoken falso & malitiose, doth not make them to be so spoken, nor makes them actionable, if they be not so in themselves. Roll chief justice said, there ought to be a scandal and a particular damage set forth; but it is not so here. But move it again Saturday next. Postea. White against Holford. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Trin. 1649. rot. 1214. A Writ of Error was brought upon a judgement given in an Action of Debt upon an Obligation to stand to an Award, and the Error assigned was, Error to reverse a judgement in Debt upon an Obligation. that the Arbitrement exceeded the submission; for the submission was to stand to the award touching all matters in difference between the parties, and the award was, that the parties shall make general releases each to other of all demands; and the word demands, is a word of a larger signification than the word differences. Award. But Roll chief justice answered, That if the release be more large in words, yet it is good enough: for it shall be intended only of all matters in debate between the parties, and if there be other matters, you ought to have shown them in pleading, otherwise the Court will not intent there are any; to which the other judges agreed, and gave judgement for the plaintiff, except better matter should be shown. Brook against Brooke. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Mich. 24 Car. rot. 287. BRook brought an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, & for eating of his grass with , Error to reverse a judgement in trespass, quare clausum fregit. etc. against Brook: Upon Not guilty pleaded, an issue was joined, and the Plaintif had a verdict and a judgement. The Defendant brought a writ of Error to reverse this judgement, and assigned for Error, that the Declaration was incertain; For the Plaintif declares of breaking his Close, and eating his grass, cum quibusdam averiis, and doth not say what ; and so he may recover damages in this action, and bring another action for the same trespass, because it cannot be known what did the former trespass. Barr. Averment. Hales of Council with the Defendant, said the Declaration was good enough; for it is good in substance, although it might have been better in form, and it being after a verdict, the incertainty is helped. And the Defendant, if the Plaintif should bring a new action for this trespass, may plead by averment that he hath satisfied the trespass done already, and aver with what it was done. Jerman justice said, the beasts ought to be named particularly; for averia is a large word, and signifies of divers kinds; and it is too general a word to declare upon. But Roll chief justice answered, where the thing itself is in demand, and an action is brought for it, as it is in an action of trover and conversion, the thing ought to be particularly named; but here the action is brought for damages for breaking his Close, and eating his grass. And if you had demurred to the Declaration, Demurrer. it had not been a good Demurrer; but now it is after a Verdict which makes it stronger against the Defendant. Nicholas and Ask Justices concurred with Roll, so the judgement was affirmed. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved for a Prohibition to the Admiralty upon a surmise that one was arrested there for rescuing one out of the hands of a Messenger of the Admiralty, For a Prohibition to the Admiralty. who was taken by him by the warrant of the Court, Contempt. for a contempt to the Court in a suit depending there betwixt him and another. Roll chief justice answered, if the cause were maritine which was depending, there the Court may examine a contempt to the Court in that cause, but they cannot proceed criminally against the party that rescued him that did the contempt. Therefore give them notice that they show cause why we should not grant a Prohibition. Prohibition. Ireland against Michelborn. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Entered Mich. 24 Car. rot. 111. MIchelborn brought an Action of Trespass against Ireland, Error to reverse a judgement in Trespass vi et armis. quare vi et armis clausum suum fregit, and for driving and beating his ; The Plaintif had a judgement; the Defendant brought his writ of Error to reverse this judgement. The Errors assigned were, 1. That it appears not by the Continuando how long the Trespass continued. 2ly. There is a discontinuance to part of the plea, and a departure also. Discontinuance. Windham in answer to the first Exception said, that it is diversis diebus et vicibus, and it is without an usque, and the continuance is but in aggravation of the Trespass, and the Action itself is for the first Trespass, which is the original, and the diversis diebus et vicibus shall be intended before the Action brought. 20 H. 6. f. 15.35 H. 6. s. 4. Hob. rep. 377. and the party may well enough aver in another Action brought for this Trespass that the Plaintif had recovered for it in an action formerly brought, and for the new assignment he said it was but as a new Declaration. But the Court bid the Defendant in the writ of Error advise concerning the second exception. Roll chief justice said, he believed the case cited out of Hobard was not well printed, but something left out: for it hath been ruled that after a verdict it is good enough to say, one had imprisoned him for a long time; but here is a judgement upon a nihil dicit, which will alter the Case. jerman justice said, it was considerable, and fit to be advised on. Holhead of Council with the Plaintif in the writ of Error took another exception, viz. that there was an issue joined as to the beating of the , and that is not tried nor continued, and yet damages are given entire for the chase and beating of the . Harris against Gibbons. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Pasch. 1649. rot. 303. GIbbons brought an Action upon the Case against Harris upon an Assumpsit, Error to reverse a judgement in an Action on the Case. and declared that the Defendant, in consideration that the Plaintif should let unto the Defendant a Booth in Sturbridge-fair, did assume & promise to pay the plaintiff ten pound for the same, and to pay the Plaintif for all such Wine and Hops as should be spent in the Booth during the Fair. The Plaintif had a Verdict and a judgement. The Defendant brought a writ of Error to reverse this judgement, and assigned this Error, that it did not appear in the Declaration that the Fair was ended when the Action was brought, and consequently that there was cause of Action. But Twisden of Council with the Defendant in the writ of Error said, it shall be intended it was ended; for the standing there during the Fair is the cause of Action. Declaration Notice. Roll chief justice took another exception. That the Declaration doth not express that the Plaintif gave notice how much Wine and Hops he laid into the Booth during the Fair, nor that he made any demand of the payment of any sum of money due, and so the Defendant could not know how much money he should pay, and therefore the Declaration is not good, because it is too general. Therefore advise whether you will maintain it or no, and because the Council desired not to be farther heard in it, the judgement was reversed. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. AN Action of Covenant was brought upon an Indenture for the payment of a certain sum of money at a certain time. Arrest of Judgement in an action of Covenant. The Defendant pleaded payment at the time, and upon this an issue was joined, and a Verdict found for the Defendant: The plaintiff moved in arrest of judgement, and alleged for cause that the Issue was mis-joyned, because the place of the payment was not alleged, which is material, and so there can be no judgement. Maynard for the Defendant moved for judgement, and said that the issue was well joined, and that it was not material to allege the place of payment, because it is a personal Action, and the place shall be intended where the Action is brought, 1 E. 5. f. 3. And here he cannot allege an immaterial place, and so it must necessarily be intended to be where the Action is brought. Roll chief justice, If you will argue it put it in the Paper. But there is a difference between finding the money paid, and the finding it not paid. Denoir against Oil. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Upon a Rule formerly made in this case to show cause why a prohibition should not be granted to the Court of Policy for assurances. For a Prohibition to the Court of policy for assurance. Hales opened the case, as formerly had been done, and prays that there may be a Prohibition granted, because the party may have remedy here as well as in that Court, and so this Court ought to be preferred; and the contract here hath no relation to merchandizing, and so it doth not properly belong to that Court. Serjeant Glyn of Council with the Defendant prayed that there might be no prohibition granted, because it hath not been known that even such a prohibition was granted, and he recited the Statute made for assurances of 43 Eliz. and said this Case was within that Statute, and is to be tried by the Court of Policy, and that this case doth properly concern merchandizing, and is within both the Letter and reason of the Law. And by the words of the policy it appears plainly that the Contract concerns merchandizing, & the party ought not now to suggest the contrary against his own words in the policy. Roll chief justice said, the words of the policy are not material, for the words may be false; and the Contract may be for things not touching merchandizing notwithstanding, and the intent of the Statute is for things merchantable, and if it appear they be not so, a prohibition ought to be granted. Sergeant Glyn replied, Prohibition. that the voyage depended upon the skill of the party, whose life was assured by the policy, and although the party were indebted, and there were security given by bail for his debt, to the intent he might go the voyage, yet this is within the Statute. Roll chief justice answered, This is a far fetched construction, and we cannot avoid the granting of a prohibition; but ●raw the suggestion and deliver it on Monday next, and join issue and try it this term. The Case in which this prohibition was moved for and granted was this, Denoir and Oil were baile● for one Captain Parr (whose life was assured by the policy) in a suit against him in the Admiralty brought by one Bushel for 100 l. for freight due by Parr unto him, Assurance. and upon that Parr having part in a plantation in the Barbadoss, and a quarter part in the ship he was to make his voyage, and his life was assured by Denoir and Oils who were his bail. Weston against Plowden. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Rot. 505. THe Court was moved for time for Sir Edmund Plowden the Defendant to plead, For time to plead. because the Plaintif had declared against him by the name of Sir Edmund Plowden Knight, whereas he is by Creation Count Palatine of Nova Albion, and that is now part of his name, and he must also plead a special plea. Roll chief justice answered, he is also called a Count of Ireland, and neither the one nor the other is part of his name, as is suggested; and therefore if you will plead in Chief take a weeks time more for it; otherwise plead at your peril; for a Count Palatine of Nova Albion, or a Count of Ireland, are not additions in England. Addition. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. A Petition was presented to Commissioners of Sewers against one for obstructing a navigable River, Against an Order of Commissioners of Sewers. and prayed that the Commissioners would remove the obstructions; upon which an Order was made by the Commissioners to make a view, and to certify the matter to them, and upon this certificate a jury was returned to inquire of the nuisance, and a verdict was given by the jury upon Articles presented unto them to inquire of it. This Order of the Commissioners, and the proceed thereupon were removed hither by a Certiorari; and these exceptions were taken upon reading of the return. 1. That it doth not appear by what authority the Commissioners did sit. 2. The presentment made was not good, for it is said that anciently the river was so and so, and this is incertain. 3ly. The presentment is, that they know not when the Mill was made, which is supposed to be an obstruction; and if the Mill were made beyond time of the memory of man, the Commissioners have no power to inquire concerning it. Roll chief justice, Give notice to the Council for the Commissioners of Sewers to answer the exceptions Wednesday next. Shayler against Bigg. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Mich. 24 Car. rot. 90. Big brought an Action of Trover and Conversion of a Horse, Writ of Error brought by the bail. and had a Verdict and a judgement. The bail for the Defendant in the Action brought a writ of Error to reverse this judgement given against the principal. The Court was moved to abate the writ: The Court answered, If the writ of Error be brought upon the principal judgement it ought to be abated. It hath been a question heretofore, whether a writ of Error brought upon the principal judgement, Error. and also upon the judgement given against the bail together be good in part, and ill for other part. But of later times it hath been ruled that it ought to abate for all. Therefore let the party show cause why the writ shall not be abated here. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment for a forcible Entry, For quashing an Endictment. upon these Exceptions. 1. The party hath made no title. 2ly. The Endictment is not said to be found by the jury, but by the justices. 3ly. It doth not say that the force was contra pacem publicam, as the late Act of Parliament directs, but contra pacem reipublicae. The Court answered, it was a foul riot, and deserved no favour, yet the Endictment was quashed upon the 1 and 3 exceptions. Dell against Brown. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. BRown brought an Action of Trespass against Dell in the Common Pleas, Error. for taking away three Cows, and had judgement against him upon a nihil dicit. The Defendant brought a writ of Error in this Court to reverse the judgement. Entire damages. The Error assigned was, that for two of the Cows there was no value declared, and yet entire damages were given for them all, which was not good. Roll Chief justice, This is a judgement upon a Nihil dicit, and so there is no Verdict to help it. Postea 136. Barber against Pomeroy. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Entered Hill. 24 Car. rot. 595. or 1095. BArber brought an Action of debt against Pomeroy for arrearages of rent due for 7. years, and for 7. Capons; the Defendant pleaded nil debet; Arrest of judgement in an action of debt for rent. upon this an issue was joined, and a verdict found for the plaintiff; the Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement, and took this exception, that the Plaintif of his own showing had demanded more than was due, & so ought not to have judgement. The Question here was, Whether the plaintiff might not relinquish that part which is not due, and have judgement for so much as is due? Yard of Council with the Plaintif held that he might, Relinquishment. and cited Godfryes case, 11 Rep. f. ●5. b. and Hubbards' case, 4 Rep. and prayed for judgement. Twisden of Council on the other side, prayed judgement might not be given, and he agreed the cases cited by Yard, and cited other cases of the same nature, where the Plaintif may release part, and have judgement for the rest. But he said, that here the thing is entire and cannot be apportioned, for than he shall falsify his own writ, 1 Ed. 4.24. But Roll chief justice held, Release. Damages. that the relinquishing of part is not the falsifying of his own writ, although the thing demanded be entire; for he may as well release after the writ brought, as before; and there was no question but he might have released part before, and he may release where there is an ill demand, as well as where a demand is good. Jerman justice held, that judgement ought not to be given; for he said, that the reasons of the cases cited, are not like to the reason of this case; for here the verdict is not given for the same sum which is demanded, and it doth appear that here is an unjust demand, and it is his own fault: and if the Defendant had demurred upon the Declaration, it would have been adjudged no good Declaration. But Nicholas and Ask justices, agreed with Roll chief justice, and so judgement was given for the plaintiff, except better matter should be shown on Saturday next. Avery against Kirton. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Mich. 23. Car. rot. 239. KIrton brought an Action of trespass against Avery, Error upon a judgement in trespass. and declared upon an original, for imprisoning him till he entered into a bond of 600 l. upon Not guilty pleaded, the Plaintif had a verdict and a judgement. The Defendant brought a writ of Error, and upon the Certiorari to remove the Record, the Record was certified, and in nullo erratum pleaded, but the original in the Record certified was, that the Defendant kept the plaintiff in prison till he entered into 2. bonds of 300 l. a piece, whereas the right original was till be entered into one bond of 600 l. whereupon the party brought a new writ of Error, and by that, had the true original certified. The Council for the Defendant in the writ of Error said, That original after original may as well be certified before in nullo est erratum pleaded, Certificate. as afterward; but here the parties are at issue, and the first original is certified, and issue joined upon that, and there cannot be a new original certified; and the original here doth not agree with the other parts of the Record, and so cannot support it, and our original certified stands with the Record, and here is no Certiorari to warrant the original here certified, and it is a material variance, 3 jac. Banc. Reg. Cummins case, 9 H. 6. f. 38. Pasch. 1649. Kedgwins' case. Yard on the other side answered, that now the original is certified, and is before you in this Court, and you ought to judge as it is, and not as it ought to be; and it is agreeing with the former process. And both the originals were before the Declaration, and the Court shall take the right original, and the other shall be intended for another cause. Roll chief justice said, The Certiorari is general, and not inter parts predict, but the certificate is inter parts predict. And the Court may take the right original that is certified, and the judges are not bound by the plea in nullo est erratum that is pleaded, but may grant a new original writ of Error, but the party cannot require it, for he is concluded by his own plea; Original. Certiorari. and if he discontinue his original, he may have a new, but not if he plead, and the Certiorari is good, and well certified, and therefore judgement ought to be affirmed. jerman, Nicholas, and Ask to the same effect; and so judgement was affirmed, except better matter should be showed Saturday next. Ratcliff and Dudeny. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Entered Hill. 23 Car. rot. 369. Upon a special verdict, A question upon the case falling out upon a special verdict. the case was this, A lease of a house and lands was made to I S. for 99 years, the remainder to I D. for 99 years, the remainder to A. B. for 99 years; provided, that if the lessees do not inhabit in the house let during the whole term, that then the lease shall be void. The question here was, How long the lessees were bound to inhabit in the house? whether for the first 99 years? or for that term, & also during all the years in remainder? and which of the lessees were to Inhabit? Windham held, that the two first lessees only ought to inhabit during the first 99 years, and no longer. But Roll chief justice held, that those in the remainder were not bound to inhabit before the remainder falls to them; but reddendendo singula singulis they ought to inhabit successively one after another. And he took an exception to the verdict. That the lease being to begin after the death of one Robert Dudeny, it did not find that Robert was dead, and so it appears not that the lease is yet begun; and so there can be no question stirred as yet: Venire. and thereupon the case was not argued, but a Venire facias de novo was to issue, because the special verdict was imperfect. Cane against Golding. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. THis case, Opinion of the Judges upon an arrest of judgement in an Action of the case. formerly spoken to and argued, being an Action of the case for slandering the Plaintiffs title, was now spoken to by the judges: And first by Roll chief justice, who held that the Action did not lie, although it be alleged that the words were spoken salso et malitiose; for the plaintiff aught to show a special Cause: But that the verdict may supply. But the plaintiff aught also to have showed a special damage, which he hath not done, and this the verdict cannot supply. The Declaration here is too general, upon which no good issue can be joined: and he ought to have alleged, that there was a communication had before the words spoken touching the sale of the lands whereof the title was slandered, and that by speaking of them, Case. the sale was hindered, and he cited 13 jac, Tuer and Bailyes case, B. R. & 21 jac. Doctor Edward's and Balls case, and 4 Car. Roe and Harwoods' case, a judgement in it in Windsor Court, and reversed here; and 12 Jac. Sell and Paryes case, B. R. jerman justice to the same effect: and he said, that there ought to be damnum et injuria alleged to maintain the Action; for one without the other is not enough, and here doth not appear any damage, because there appears no communication of selling of the land. Nicholas and Ask justices of the same opinion: So the rule was, Nil capiat per billam, except better cause shown. Roll justice said, that there is digitus Dei in the case; for there was a strange verdict found. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved for a Supersedeas for the Earl Rivers, For a Supersedeas for a Peer of the Realm denied. Privilege. Notice. who was Arrested by a bill of Middlesex, and is in custody of the Marshal of this Court, because he is Peer of the Realm, and ought not to be arrested. The Court answered, You must plead your privilege if it be so; for we cannot take notice of it upon a motion. Ridley and Emerson. 1649. Banc. sup. Pasch. 24 Car. rot. 400. THe case between Ridley and Emerson was again spoken unto. Argument in a writ of Error to reverse a judgement in debt upon an Obligation. It was in a writ of Error to reverse a judgement given in an Action of debt upon an Obligation in the Common Pleas. The Condition of the Obligation was, that the Defendant should not put upon a Common, viz. Ransom Moor, before the proof and trial of the title of the Common were had. The Defendant pleaded, that he did not put in his . The Plaintif replied, that the Defendant did put three Mares there before the proof or trial. An exception was taken, that there is variance between the Replication and rejoinder, and the Condition of the Obligation, Variance. and so it is not good. Twisden of Council on the other side, held that it was good enough notwithstanding, because it is after a verdict, and there is a good issue joined. Holhead on the Contrary held it ill; 1. Because the Replication doth not assign a breach of the Condition of the Obligation. 2ly, It is said in the Condition, he shall not put into our Common; and the Replication is, that he did put into such a Common, naming it, and doth not show where the Common lies. 3ly, There is variance between the Declaration and the writ of error. 4ly, There is a name mistaken, for in one place it is Matheum, and in another it is Mathiae. The Court bid them advise, and bring Books to the judges. Brungy against Lee. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Trin. 1649. rot. 1491. BRungy brought an Action of Trespass against Lee, Demurrer upon a Plea in Trespass. for taking of a Mare and impounding her till the Plaintif had paid 10 l. The Defendant pleaded by way of justification, that he did distrain her by virtue of an order made by Commissioners of Sewers, for a tax assessed by them upon the Plaintif. The plaintiff demurred to this Plea, and shown for cause, 1. That it doth not appear, that the Commissioners who imposed the Tax had authority to do it, for it ought to be done by six of them, and it doth not appear here, that they were more in number than four. 2ly. It doth not appear, that they were all of them of the Quorum, as they ought to be. Plea. 3ly. There doth not appear to be any fault in the plaintiff, why he should be taxed. 4ly. The number of the Acres of Land doth not appear upon which the Tax was laid. 5ly. It doth not appear, that the Land taxed did lie within the jurisdiction of the Commissioners. Upon these Exceptions the Plea was overruled. Coals against Sibsye. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Coals brought an Action of Trover and Conversion against Sibsye; Demurrer upon a replication in Trover and Conversion. The Defendant pleads the Statute of Limitation of Actions in Bar. The Plaintif replied, that he took out a Latitat such a Term against the Defendant for this cause now depending, which was within the time limited by the Statute. To this replication the Defendant demurred, and for cause shown, that it was incertain, and so no issue can be joined upon it: for it only says, that he took out a Latitat such a Term, and doth not show what day of the Term he took it out, and so we cannot take issue upon it, and the usual form is to show the day. Latch maintained the replication, and said, it was good in matter of substance, and the Latitat shall be intended to issue forth the first day of the Term: Term. for all the Term is but one day in construction of the Law, and the Defendant may take a certain issue, as it is pleaded. Roll chief justice answered, you ought to have showed the teste of the Latitat: Time. for the time is material in this Case, viz. to know whether it were sued forth within the time expressed in the Statute for the limitation of Actions, or without, namely within six years or no, and you might have made it certain by your pleading it specially. jerman differed in opinion; and thereupon the Court took time to advise. Vid. antea. Custodes, etc. against the Inhabitants of Owtwell, Tide. Newton, etc. 1649. Banc. sup. Upon a return read of certain orders made by Commissioners of Sewers, For exceptions and answers to them, upon a return of Commissioners of Sewers. against the Inhabitants of Outwell, removed hither by the said Inhabitants, by a Certiorari, These exceptions were taken, 1. There doth not appear to be any adjournment of the Commission. Adjournment. But to this the Court answered, that it needed not. Hales said, that the charge of reparation of a breach in Sea-walls, which happens by inevitable necessity, aught to be repaired by the whole Level, and not by any particular Vill or person. And 2ly. the charge ought to be laid indifferently: but here is a particular Custom of which the Commissioners of Sewers may take notice, and therefore the Commissioners are not compelled to lay the tax equally upon the Lands within the Vill, for the Custom may be to the contrary, and yet have a reasonable construction, Custom. and this is the Custom of Marshland for the speedy repair of breaches to prevent public danger, and afterwards the tax is equally distributed upon the Vills' adjacent. And an implication in a return made by Commissioners of Sewers is good enough. return. Maynard on the other side held, that the Custom was well set forth for the general charge for the present necessity, and afterwards the particular Inhabitants charged shall have remedy against the other Inhabitants to make them contribute, as it was in Doctor Lamb's Case, that was slain in an uproar in London, where the City was fined generally, but the Citizens afterwards contributed to the payment of it: for all are liable to the charge by the Common law, and it may be also by the prescription. 10 Ed. 3. f. 8, 9 The Court reproved the Council, and said, you ought not to argue two of you at one time on the same side, except it be upon conclusion of the arguments at Bar in the cause. Roll chief justice said, the tax ought to be particular, but it is not to be laid upon the Township, if there be not a Custom for it, and such a Custom may be reasonable, and it is dangerous to destroy it, for fear of the public danger that may arise by doing it. return. And for the return of the Commissioners it is not necessary it should be so strict as our plead are. The Court gave Twisden time till that day seven night to be heard on the other side. At which time to the exception that was taken, that it appears not that Lynn Regis is within the limits of the Commission by virtue of which the tax is made; It was answered, that it doth appear. To the second exception taken, that here is a new Bank or Wall ordered to be made, and not the repairing the old, and this is not within the Commission; It was answered, that the making of the new Bank is but to strengthen the old Bank, and so is but a repairing of an old work, and not the making of of a new. 2ly. The Wall is to be made by consent of all the Inhabitants interessed in the benefit, which may accrue by the making of it. As to the exception that it appears not that Tide and Newton are within the Hundred of Witsbitch, touching which only this Commission of Sewers was granted; It was answered, that it shall be so intended, and it is also so found. To the exception, that the new Bank was made in another manner than the old Bank, and so it is a new work, and it appears not that the parties taxed have any benefit by it; It was answered, that it doth not appear that the maintainers have done any thing for their own benefit in the making this Bank, nor were any cause of making the new Bank. To the exception that it is not presented where the Bank is; It was answered, it is certain enough set forth in the Presentment, and Presentments are not required to be so precise as other plead are. To the exception that Tide and Newton ought not to make the Bank because other Towns use to do it; It was answered, that for making it in the new manner, the other Vills are not bound to make it alone, but those also that receive the benefit by it. These exceptions following were also taken to the laying of the Tax. 1. That all the Lands within the Vills of Newton and Tide are not charged, but so many Acres in one, and so many in another. To this it was answered, that it doth not appear that there were more Acres than are taxed either in Tide or Newton. 2ly. The high grounds and the low grounds are equally taxed, which is not indifferent: for some acres are of a greater value than others are. To this it was answered, that for aught that doth appear they are of an equal value. 3ly. They ought not to sell the distress taken, because the Vills did not bring in the number of acres, by the Officer appointed by the Commissioners to do it. It was answered, that they may sell the goods, or allow a Replevin: And secondly here appears not to be any distress or impounding of the goods. Sergeant Barnard on the other side: First he said, that all the exceptions are not opened, and the first exception is not answered; for it appears not by averment that the Vills taxed are within the extent of their Commission, as it ought do, 2 H. 7. f. 13. Nor is the second Exception answered; and although the Council might at the finding of the Commission have taken it, yet it may be taken now; and it is not showed how the old bank was insufficient, nor what the charge would be to repair it: Nor is it shown how Tide and Newton are in danger by the not repairing and making of the new bank. Also the Commissioners have exceeded their authority in exceeding the ancient manner of taxing for the maintenance of this bank, and the tax aught to be laid according to the quality and quantity of the lands, which are to be taxed, and here doth not appear how many acres are in the several Vills, nor whether the tax do extend to all, and the good land and bad lands are also equally taxed, neither aught there to be a new tax imposed upon one Vill to ease another, which by the custom ought to repair the bank: And they have also made a new Officer here, which by the Statute they have not authority, and have made an order to punish one for refusing this Office, by distress of his goods, which ought not to be; and they ought not to refuse a replevin of the distress taken, as they have here done, and the lands only that are liable to the tax are to be distrained for it, and not the goods of another that is not within the extent of the Commission, and upon these exceptions he prayed the presentment might be quashed, Roll chief justice answered, we will not make all the law void for some exceptions, therefore give notice upon what exceptions you will stand upon. Maynard answered, upon these. 1. That there ought not to be such a tax laid, because the lands taxed are not within the extent of the Commission; for it appears not that they are within the Hundred of Wisbitch. 2ly. All the Inhabitants within all the Vills are not taxed, which ought to be, because they have equal benefit, as it appears by the presentment. The Court ordered it should be moved again the next term. And Roll chief justice asked why the drainers should not discharge this charge, who have been the cause of it, and they receive benefit by their draining; and it is not fit they should prejudice others by it. Postea. Pymm and Morgan, alias Bambery and Basely. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. THis case was again moved upon a special Verdict in an Ejectione firmae, wherein the question was, Argument upon a case upon a special verdict in an Ejectione firmae. Whether the estate of Mary Morgan that was settled 13 Car. is taken away by the Ordinance of Parliament made 1645. and which looked back to 1641. which was after 13 Caroli. It was held by the Council that argued against the Ordinance that it was not, because the Ordinance is made against a dead man. 2ly. The estate of Morgan was forfeited to the State, and they out of it do make an estate for Pymm, with retrospection to the year 1641, and no further; and therefore the estate settled before that time is not taken away: And if a Statute have a double sense, one against Common justice, and the other with Common justice, in equal balance, it shall be interpreted in the better sense; and that that hath been objected, that there is a power of revocation in the settlement is not material; for Morgan is now dead, and so this personal power is now gone, and shall not hurt the settlement. A second reason is taken from the scope of the Ordinance, which consists of three parts: 1. The Parliament injured. 2ly. Morgan the Offender punished, 3ly. Pymm rewarded, and the Ordinance shall not be stretched to punish Mary, who hath a particular interest, although there be not an express saving for her in the Ordinance, 21 H. 7.4. Blow. Comment. 487 7 Car. Porter and Bellingham, and that this is the meaning of the Ordinance may appear, because the remainder is reserved to the Common wealth; and in doubtful Constructions of Statutes and Ordinances, that shall be taken, Interpretation. which makes all parts of the Ordinance or Statute stand together, and such is the Construction here in not interrupting the estate of Mary. But it is objected, that the right of the Daughters is provided for if they claim from another Ancestor, and not from Morgan their Father. It was answered, that there is the same reason to provide for Morgan's state that was rightly conveyed from him before the year 1641. as of a strangers so deriving from Morgan. It is also objected that the trusties for Pymm and the Common wealth shall have Morgan's lands, and they shall not be said to be forfeited. It was answered, that the Act distributes no more than is forfeited, which can be no more than Morgan had at that time. 2ly. The Parliament took no notice that Morgan was seized in fee simple, nor what estate he had. 3ly. After the estate of Mary Morgan ended, the reversion in fee returns to Thomas Morgan, so that Mary hath but a particular estate, and the Ordinance may be satisfied though Mary Morgan's estate be not forfeited; for the reversion may be forfeited, and the particular estate preserved, as Cleres' Case is; and the saving is not here repugnant, as it is objected, nor destroys the generality of the Ordinance, for it is here satisfied. And the Parliament doth not take notice of the conveyance made by Thomas Morgan, nor of any other estate than that he had at the time of the making of the Ordinance; otherwise there would be a great inconvenience; but it is objected, that the Sons claiming under Thomas Morgan are excluded out of the saving. It was answered, that although they are, yet they are not excluded out of the body of the Act, Dyer 273 ● o Eliz, and here the excepting of the interest of the Daughters in the saving hath its effect, viz. the estate which they have of Thomas Morgan after 1641. which shall be given by the Ordinance, and not that which they had before, and so prayed judgement for the plaintiff, viz. Mary Morgan's lessee. Maynard for the Defendant, viz. Pymms heir said, That the Act is the rule to measure our case by; and that the Act doth take away the right of all the Children, and that the saving helps none but strangers, and notwithstanding the recompense reserved for Pymm, if the estate shall be short, it is intended of such an estate not within the saving; and the estate of the Children is not within the saving, and here is not a general gift, but these lands particularly; And in this case Morgan had power to revoke his settlement, and so there is no breach made by the Ordinance of Common justice, as is objected; because he had an interest in the estate, notwithstanding the settlement. And all parts of the Act stand very well here together upon the best construction of it, according to the maker's intent. If I grant all my trees, fruit-trees will not pass; but if I except all my Appletrees, all other fruit-trees pass, and the inheritance in Morgan doth not satisfy the Act, and so prayed judgement for the Defendant. Roll chief justice said: Mr. Maynard you mistake the first part of the Ordinance, for do you think that the Ordinance looks further back than 1641. in other lands not expressed? and he seemed to incline for the plaintiff, but the other judges for the Defendant. But the Court concluded that it was a great case, and deserved great consideration, and therefore ordered, That it should be argued again the first Saturday the next Term. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved upon an Assidavit for a Habeas Corpus for one committed for suspicion of felony, For a Habeas Corpus for one commited for suspicion of felony. for uttering counterfeit money, because the justices will not bail him. Roll chief justice said, It is dangerous to remove such a prisoner, and there is a Commission of Oyer and Terminer to try such Offenders; and we have no Copy of the Mittimus now, but if you bring it we will make some rule in it. Mittimus. If the prisoner be bailable, if the justice will not bail him, Case. bring your Action against him. Coswell. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. ONe Coswell outlawed moved to reverse the Outlawry upon these exceptions. 1. Instead of proxim, there is used px. for an abbreviation of it, To reverse an Outlawry. Abbreviation. without any dash. 2ly. Instead of Infra scr. the abbreviation of infra scriptam there is used infra sir. And for these exceptions it was quashed. del and Brown. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. IT was moved formerly to reverse a judgement in an Action of Trespass for the taking away of three Cows, because the Declaration doth not say neither pretii nor ad valentiam as to two of the Cows. Error upon ● judgement in Trespass. Sergeant Earl moved for judgement notwithstanding that exception, for he said it was not necessary to express either, and urged 19 E. 2. br. f. 842. and Pas. 20 Ed. 3. f. 2.8 H. 6. reg. 97. b. But Roll chief justice answered, That which you urge is against the received opinion; Declaration. for if they he live that are taken, it ought to be pretii; but if dead, it ought to be ad valentiam. Therefore show cause before the end of the Term why the Judgement should not be reversed. Spry against Mill. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Pasc. 1649. rot. 208. SPry brought a writ of Error to reverse a judgement given against him upon a nihil dicit in an Action of Trover and Conversion for a Mare, in the Court at Lanceston in Cornwall, Error to reverse a judgement upon a nihil dicit in a Trover and Conversion. and these Errors were assigned: 1. In the judgement it is said ideo ad eandum Curiam consideratum est; whereas it ought to be per eandem Curiam. 2ly. It is recuperare debeat, whereas it ought to be debet. But Roll chief justice answered, that is well enough in a judgement upon a nihil dicit. 3ly. In the awarding of the Venire, it is praeceptum fuerit. 4ly, It is for the jury to inquire in forma praedicta. 5ly, The Defendant is not demanded. To this Roll chief justice said, The Defendant did appear, and so that is not material. Judgement. 6ly. It is said Consideratum suit, and it should be Consideratum est. Roll chief justice said, that was a good exception for the incertainty of the words. Upon this, Error. Prestwood the Council on the other side moved, that the Record is not removed; Certiorari. for the Certiorari to remove it was directed to the Mayor and the Recorder, and the Record is returned by the Mayor and Deputy recorder. Roll chief justice said, It appears not to us that the Recorder hath power to make a Deputy. Therefore advise upon it, and so will we. Postea. Mich 1649. Banc. sup. A return made by an Officer of the Admiralty for one committed by their warrant, was read, To discharge a prisoner upon a return by an Officer of the Admiralty. and it was prayed by Hales of Council with the Prisoner, that the return might be filled, and the Prisoner discharged for these reasons: 1. the party was committed for rescuing himself: and 2ly, for a Contempt to the Court, and because he would not find ball: and it appears that the warrant for his commitment is not good: for he is not committed for matter arising upon the Sea, and so they have no jurisdiction. But the Court bid them proceed upon their prohibition, Bail. for they would not release the prisoner. But if you will you may move it again Friday next. Gilbert against Marden Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Trin. 1649. rot. 942. A Writ of Error was brought to remove a judgement given in the Common pleas in an Action upon the case. Upon opening the record, Error upon a judgement in the Common Pleas. Twisden took exception that the record was not removed; for the judgement in the Common pleas was given Coram Petro Pheasant, and the writ of Error was to rectify a record, quod coram vobis reside. The Court abated the writ of Error for this exception. Abatement. Smith against Andrews. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. ANdrews, an Attorney, brought an Action upon the case against Smith, Arrest of Judgement in an action on the case. for speaking of these words against him, He, meaning the plaintiff, stirs up men to suits, and promiseth, that if he recover not for them, he will take no fees; and yet in a suit which he so undertook for me wherein I was overthrown, he took Charges of me. Upon not guilty pleaded, there was a verdict and a judgement for the Plaintif. The Defendant brought a writ of Error, and for cause it was showed by Maynard, that there are entire damages given for divers words spoken at one time, whereof some are Actionable, and others not, which ought not to be: and 2ly, The words in themselves are not actionable; for an Attorney may stir up men to suits, if their suits be lawful; (which Roll chief justice denied) 17 Car. Gibson and Baxter. Maintenance. And he said, that an Attorney may prosecute his Client's cause without seed, and yet it is not maintenance. Trin. 16 Car. Hill and Sands his Case. Hales on the other side held that the words are Actionable; for the words shall be taken in the worst sense: and he also shows how he had stirred up suits in an unlawful manner, viz. by making of bargains with men at Markets. Roll chief justice said, that such words shall be taken mitiori sensu, and this is a special maintenance, for it is in the case of an Attorney, and therefore lawful; but here are other words spoken to show that he stirred up suits unlawfully; and the stirring up of suits and making bargains to follow them, is in itself unlawful, and great inconveniences do grow by such manner of practising, and all the words ought to be taken together, and not dividedly; for so you may make any words not actionable. jerman justice held the words were actionable; because they are a great scandal, and trenching to destroy the Plaintiffs livelihood & practice. And said, that Attorneys ought not to go to Markets to get practice, & the words spoken are to show he is a stirrer up of suits, and to show that he was a false dealer, and the words shall be taken in the Common acception, and not mitiori sensu. Nicholas as jerman; and that the words taken together are actionable. Ask justice to the same effect. Whereupon judgement was affirmed, except better matter should be shown Monday next. John's against Leviston. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. ●Ohns brought an Action of debt against Leviston upon an Assumpsit that the Defendant would enter into a judgement unto the Plaintif for so much moneys as Sir john Hall did owe unto the Plaintif, if the Plaintif would take Common bail of him the Defendant, Arrest of Judgement in an action upon an Assumpsit. if Hall should dse before such a day, and for not performing this promise the Action was brought; upon non Assumpsit pleaded, there was an issue joined, and a verdict found for the Plaintif. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, and shown that it doth not appear that there was any notice given by the Plaintif to the Defendant, how much money was due to the Plaintif from Sir john Hall, as there ought to be. Roll chief justice answered, You did undertake to know, at the time of the Assumpsit, how much money he did owe, and notice is not necessary, Notice. and if it were, he might have gone to Sir john Hall to tell him, and so it shall not only be intended to be in the knowledge of the Defendant himself, but that he might have also knowledge of it by others. jerman justice doubted, but Nicholas and Ask judges were of Rolls opinion, and the Plaintif ordered to take his judgement, if better matter were not shown. Custodes Libertat. etc. against the Inhabitants of Outwell. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. THis Case was again moved: Exceptions u●on an order of Commissioners of Sewers, and answers to them wherein upon a presentment made to Commissioners of Sewers, an order was made by them to reimburse the Dike-réeves, for money expended in repairing a Sea wall, by laying a tax upon divers Vills, amongst which Owtwell was one: divers exceptions had been formerly taken to the presentment and order. At this time it was 1. objected, that the Commissioners cannot alter the usual custom for making the tax, as they have here done: and therefore their Order is not good. It was answered, that there is no custom here presented; but if there be, yet the tax cannot be laid generally upon the Vill, but distributively; for every one of the inhabitants have not an equal share of the land, nor are all the lands of equal goodness: And there is no custom for the Vill of Owtwell to approtion the tax, so that they have no authority to do it. Windham on the same side said, that there is no prescription or custom here found, and so the tax ought to be ruled by the Common Law, and other Towns ought thereby to be Contributory, which receive benefit by the making of the bank; and the Commissioners of Sewers have not here pursued the direction of the Statute of Sewers as they ought to do. And here the presentments, upon which this order for the tax was grounded, were made by three juries of several Hundreds, and the breach to be repaired doth not appear to be within any of the Hundreds whence the juries come, as the Statute doth direct, neither is it shown how the inhabitants are chargeable, whether by tenure, or custom, or how else. Holhead on the same side said, It is not said how the lands are liable to the tax. 1. It is not showed in what part of the Poe-Dike the breach happened. Maynard on the other side said, that the Commission of enquiry finds by what default the breach happens, but they cannot tell how many acres every one holds, to charge them several; and it may be intended that they hold jointly, and it shall be intended that the lands are liable to the tax by prescription, and it is not necessary to show in what place of the Poe-Dike the breach happened, Roll chief justice said, the prescription here is waived; for you say that it was not an inevitable breach, and so you are at the Common law, and not upon a custom, and then the tax aught to be equal, and according to the number of the Acres, and it is not so here. And it appears not that the breach is within the Hundreds whence the jury came and so they have no authority to inquire. Hales said, that there is a clause to help this, for there is a power in the Commissioners to ease them that have wrong done to them. Roll chief justice, This will not help, Tax. for the tax ought to be well and equally laid, according to the Statute, viz. upon the number of the Acres, and here it is laid upon the persons of the inhabitants. Therefore make a new tax. Archer against Holbidg. Mich 1649. Banc. sup. IN this case the Action being an Action brought upon the Statute of 1 R. 3. Cap. 3. and a verdict for the plaintiff, Arrest of judgement in an action upon the Stat. of 1 R. 3. cap. 3. it was formerly moved in arrest of judgement, that the Statute was misrecited; whereupon it was ordered the Parliament Roll should be brought in Court, which was now done, and read, and upon the reading it appeared that it was misrecited; for the Statute was for suspicion of felony, and the Declaration was for felony: Misrecital. whereupon it being held by the Court to be misrecited in matter of substance, whereupon the Action was grounded, The Court ordered a nil capiat per billam. Mich. 1649 Banc. super. AN Indictment was found against one for a forcible entry: The Defendant traverseth the Indictment, For restitution upon an Indictment of forcible entry Restitution. and enters his traverse & pleads. The Plaintif moved the Court upon a suggestion that there had been divers verdicts found for this land for the plaintiff, that the Plaintif might have restitution. But the Court would not grant restitution before the trial, because the Defendant had traversed and pleaded. Mich. 1649 Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to discharge the issues set upon the inhabitants of Bridgwater, To discharge issues for not repairing the high way, Quash. for not repairing a High way, and to quash the Indictment, upon a Certificate that the way was repaired. The Court answered, that further process should be stayed, and the issues discharged; But we cannot discharge the Indictment, if you have no exception to take against it. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to quash an Indictment against a Baker for selling of bread under the Assize. To quash an Indictment for selling bread under the Assize. The exceptions were, 1. That it doth not say what Assize, whereas there be divers Assizes of bread. 2ly, The Indictment doth not show where he sold the bread, not to whom. Roll chief justice said to the first exception, It is good enough to say he sold the bread contra assisam, although it say not what assize; but upon the second exception the Indictment was quashed. Earl Rivers against More. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. THe Earl Rivers was taken by a Latitat and committed to the Marshalsea; The Earl by his Council pleaded his privilege of Peerage, and prayed he might be set at large. Privilege of Parliament pleased. Roll chief justice asked, How is the plea now amended? for yesterday you pleaded in abatement of the writ, and now you pray to be delidered upon a bare suggestion. Wild of Council with the Defendant held, that a Capias doth now lie against an Earl; for comes dicitur a Comitando-rege, Capias. & cessante rege cessat comes, And demurred to the plea for want of form. Roll chief justice said, That Earls, and Barons are ancient titles of the Realm. But let him plead as he will stand to it, and advise well of the plea before the Demurrer joined; for we can give leave to amend the plea. Amendment. Ware against Chapel. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Ware brought an Action of Debt for 500 against Chapel, Demurrer to a plea in Covenant. upon an Indenture of Covenants between them, viz. That Ware should raise 500 Soldiers, and bring them to such a port, and that Chapel should find shipping and victuals for them to transport them to Gallicia; and for not providing the shipping and victuals at the time appointed, was the Action brought. The Defendant pleaded, that the Plaintif had not raised the Soldiers at that time; and to this plea the plaintiff demurs. Windham of Council with the Plaintif, held, that the Defendant ought to have provided the shipping and victual against the time, though the Soldiers were not raised; for the not raising of the Soldiers can be only urged by way of mitigation of damages, and not pleaded in discharge of the breach assigned. Yard of Council with the Defendant, held the plea was good in bar of the Action, for the Covenants of each part have relation one to the other, and there is a condition precedent made by the words, to find shipping for the Soldiers: so that the Defendant was not to find shipping, Precedent condition. except the Plaintif raised the Soldiers, neither is there any notice given us how many Soldiers he had raised. Roll chief justice held, that there was no condition precedent; but that they are distinct and mutual covenants, and that there may be several actions brought for them: Notice. and it is not necessary to give notice of the number of the men raised, for the number is known to be 500 and the time for the shipping to be ready, is also known by the Covenants; and you have your remedy against him if he raise not the men, as he hath against you for not providing the shipping. jerman and Nicholas justices, held against Roll, that there is a precedent condition. Ask justice was of Roll the Chief justice's opinion, Nicholas changed his opinion, and so judgement was given for the plaintiff, except better matter were shown. Jenkinson against Porter. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. Pasch. 1649. rot. 237. THese Errors in the Record were assigned, to reverse a judgement given in the Court at York in an Action of debt. Error to reverse a judgement in debt. 1. That the time of the judgement is in figures. 2. The sum recovered is in figures. 3ly, Venire is not good, for it is Venire facias duodecim, etc. which is not good with an etc. in an inferior Court. 4ly. It doth not appear that the cause of Action is infra jurisdictionem Curiae. And for these errors the judgement was reversed, nisi, etc. Weston against Plowden. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. Mich. 1649. rot. 503. THis case formerly spoken to, was again moved, which was this in effect: Plea in abatement, after imparlance. Weston brought an Action of debt against Plowden, upon an Obligation of 2000 l. for the payment of 1000 l. The Defendant appears and imparls, and after imparlance, pleads in Abatement of the writ, that he is Earl of Nova Albion in Ireland, and aught to be impleaded by that name, and not by the name of Edmund Plowden Knight: upon this plea the Plaintif demurred; 1. Because it came in after imparlance, whereas a plea in abatement of a writ, aught to be pleaded before imparlance. 2ly. Plea. The plea is s●ivolous; for he pleads that he was Earl of Nova Albion before he entered into the bond, which he cannot now plead, Estoppel. for he is estopped to plead so by his own deed, which testifies the contrary. Roll chief justice said, it is a dilatory plea, for he is but a Knight here, though he be an Earl in Ireland, and his own Obligation stops him from pleading as he doth. And therefore let him show cause why he shall not plead in chief within a week, otherwise let judgement be entered. Vid. antea. Wat's and Dix. Hill. 1649 Banc. sup. Entered Trin. 24 Car. rot. 1529. AN ejectione firmae was brought for certain lands in Lincoln Shire and upon not guilty pleaded, Argument upon a special verdict in an ejectione firmae. there was a special verdict found to this effect. I. S. being seized of the Lands in question in Fee made a Feoffment there. of to A. B and C. D. and to their Heirs till they should maite a Lease of the said Lands for divers years to certain uses, to begin at the Feast of Philip and Jacob next coming; The Feoffees enter, and make a lease for years of the Lands to begin from the Feast of Philip and jacob next. The question was whether the Feoffees have made such a Lease as the deed of Feoffment directs, and so the uses are raised thereupon, or whether it shall be intended another lease, and not warranted by the Feoffment, and so no uses raised; Latch held that the Lease is not warranted by the deed of Feoffment, and that there are no uses raised, for the words at the Feast, and the words from the Feast make several beginnings of the Lease, and so here is another Lease made than the deed intended. 2ly. It is not in effect and intention the lease of the parties, because it is not made according to their directions, and so there are no uses raised, for the authority is not pursued, nor the precedent condition observed, and so the lease hath another beginning, and another ending, and so it must be another Lease, Fitzh. grants 63. And here is not the same reversion intended to the party, viz. his Son Watson, because it is upon another Lease, and so a different reversion. And although the jury might have found the intent of the party, and so the same Lease, yet they have not found it. 2. rep. Crumwells' case. 5. rep. Earl of Rutland's case, and if the jury find evidence only, and not matter of fact, the Court can give no judgement, 9 rep. downham's case, the meaning of the party ought to be found, Oxford's case 10. rep. 11. jac. Banc. Reg. Isaac and Clerks case, 3 Ed. 6. Bendloes Reports. As to the second point, viz. whether the use shall result to the Feoffor or remain in the Feoffees, he held that it doth result to the Feoffor, and remains not in the Feoffees; For first there was no other thing intended to be in the Feoffees than to make the lease good, and that is not here done, and Dyer 300. cited is not to this purpose. The intention of the parties is not prevalent in directing of uses, and Dyer 300. may be applied to our case to determine the use, 4. rep. 82. Barber's case, Mich. 2, & 3 Eliz. Bendloes Reports the use reverted: Dyer 16 Eliz. Humphrestons' case. An estate ought to be made in convenient time, otherwise the use is to revert out of the Feoffees to the Feoffor, according to his first estate. 3ly. For the question whether a good estate pass to Elizabeth, and the others, he held that there did a good Estate pass either by bargain and sale, or otherways. But it is good by bargain and sale, notwithstanding it be upon consideration past, which is no consideration, and the other consideration expressed to raise the use hurts not, and here is a good consideration, Mich. 8 jac. Gosman and Carington, C. B. There was no good consideration; but a courtesy, 13. and 14 Eliz. Horwoods' case there was a good consideration, although there be no moneys paid, but land for land. 2ly. If it do not pass by way of bargain and sale, yet it shall pass by way of Covenant to stand seized to uses, and the consideration expressed is good to raise the uses: Beadles case 7 Rep. these considerations cannot be silenced by the considerations of bargain & sale; nor shall the intent to pass it by way of bargain & sale hurt it, & if he take by way of use, yet it makes not the join tenancy operate as a tenancy in Common, & so it is the same lease declared upon, and not divers; and there is no disseisin by the entry of the Lessee at election; for though he be not Lessee by the Lease intended, yet he is Lessee by the one Lease or the other; for the Lease is made either by the Feoffor, or by the Feoffee, and so he prayed judgement for the Plaintiff. Pannell for the Defendant put the case at large, and made these questions. 1. Whether here be such a Lease as the first Indenture doth direct. 2ly. If the use do not arise where the estate is. 3ly. Whether there be a good bargain and sale. 4ly. Whether there be a good consideration to make a bargain and sale. 5ly. If there be not a good bargain and sale, whether it shall enure by way of Covenant to stand seized to a use; and he said, if all these points be not for the plaintiff, all is against him, and he held that the words at and from are all one as to signify the intent of the parties. The words have here an extraordinary signification, according to time and place, and at or in a place are all one, and the word at may be satisfied with time precedent or subsequent, & quae incontinenter fiunt inesse dicuntur, et instans est indivisibile, and he denied Berwicks' case in the 5th. Report to be law. And here is no need of a forced construction; for the intent of the party appears by the case 8 rep. 91. For the second point, if the Lease be not good, and no use raised, then where the estate of the land is? And he held that it is in the Feoffees not withstanding; for here the use is limited, but not in the cases put on the other side. And here was a fee simple determinable; but it being become impossible, it is a fee absolute. Trin. 18 Car. Roll and Bois, and Dyer 300. is mistaken in putting of the case on the other side: And it cannot result, for there is no use here to result, but the party is in by the Common Law. To the 3 point, if the use doth result, yet the estate of Hamond hinders the bargain and sale; for he is a wrong doer, because that the fee being determined by his holding over he is a wrong doer; but if not, yet his Estate is paramount. For the 4th, he held that the bargain and sale is not good upon the consideration expressed, because it is not made for moneys paid nor secured to be paid. 37 E●z. Ward and Lambert's case C. B. For the 5th. point he held, that it doth not enure as a Covenant to stand seized, because here are no words of Coveliant. Boyntons' case. Blow. Coment. 301. 2ly. There are plain words to show the intent of the party to be against it, and also actions following thereupon. Fox's Case, ● Rep. 15 Car. Pitfield and Pierce, Banc. reg. 17 Eliz. Gallards' case. And whether the use ariseth or not, it matters not, if the use ariseth, Lease. Watson hath title, if not, Cumberland hath the estate, and so it is an ill feoffment, and prays judgement for the Defendant. Roll chief justice said, there is a variance, Variance. and it cannot be the same lease; yet it is a good lease to raise a use, because the feoffor joins in it. jerman justice to the same effect, and he held that the words at and from are all one. Nicholas justice doubted. Use. Roll chief justice said, that it is a distinct lease; but the party hath made such a lease and more, and a feoffment made habendum a die datus, if the seisin be not made at the last instant of the day it is not good. Feoffment. The Court ordered it should be argued again Tuesday seven-night following. Postea. Hill. 1649. Banc. super. Upon an Endictment preferred 22 Car. at the Assizes in Kent against one for engrossing Apples, Arrest ●f judgement in an Action upon the Stat. against engrossing Victual. Pears, and Cherries, framed upon the Statute made against engrossers of Victuals, the Defendant pleaded and was found guilty, formerly judgement was arrested, and the Council heard. Edward johnson of the Inner Temple prayed for judgement for the Keepers of the liberty, &. notwithstanding what had been objected formerly; and that upon these reasons. 1. Because that Apples, Pears and Cherries are Victuals within the Statute, and that because the Statute is not to be abridged. And the Statute of 2 Ed. 6. made concerning fruiterer's expounds this Statute, that Apples and Pears, &. are Victuals, for the Fruiterers are called sellers of Victuals; and for Bois his case that is objected that Apples are not Victual, it is not to be meant of all sorts of victual in a general acception, and without doubt engrossing of them is engrossing at the Common Law, 26 Eliz. Salt is no Victual per se, nor is used as Victual in any Country; yet it is there said to be Victual. But Apples are Victual per se, and Costermongers are called Victuallers by their Charters. Roll chief justice said, That 4 jac. Apples were adjudged no Victuals; and after upon a writ of Error this judgement was affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber, and therefore that judgement is not to be lightly passed over; and if they should be adjudged Victuals, the trade of the Costerwongers would be destroyed: and for Salt it is no Victual, but a preservative of Victual; and Hops was adjudged to be no Victual, 20 jac. upon a reference made to the judges. Neither are Apples to be accounted Victual within the Statute. jerman justice differed, and Nicholas justice held, that Apples are Victual within the Statute, because they are better than Fish. Ask justice held, that Apples are Victual, but not within the Statute, for a Statute cannot alter by reason of time, but the Common Law may. It was adjourned. Barnwell against Grant. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. Entered Trin. 1649. rot. 791. THe Court was moved for their opinion in this cause, whether the writ of Error did lie or not. Error to reverse a judgement where some are found guilty, and others acquirred. Abatement. Error. It was said that a writ of Error is not like another writ; for another writ may be abated for one person, and stand good to another; but if the writ of Error will not lie, it is abated in all. Hacker and Wotton Pasch. 24 Car. rot. 342. And Roll chief justice asked the Counsel what he could say to the Books of 2 Ed. 3. and 3 Ed. 3. Privies in Record may join in a writ of Error, so is it here, and an inconvenience may come to all the parties by this judgement, although but some of the parites against whom the action was commenced are found guilty, and others are acquitted, and therefore they may all well join in the writ. And therefore let the judgement be reversed if cause be not shown Wednesday next to the contrary. Robert's against Tucker. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. Pasch. 18 Car. rot. 116. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in the Court at Bridgewater in an Action of the Case upon an Assumpsit to pay such a sum of money at the Defendants return out of Ireland. Error to reverse a judgement given in an action upon an Assumpsit. The Court held that Bridgewater hath no power to inquire of a thing done beyond their jurisdiction, and Ireland is out of their jurisdiction, whence the party upon the Assumpsit was to return. Jurisdiction. Latch of Council with the Defendant in the writ of Error said, that the writ of Error is returned by the Mayor, and Deputy Recorder, and their Letters Patents give not power to have a Deputy Recorder, Return. and the writ of Error is directed Maiori Aldermannis et Recordatori. quashed. The Court ordered cause to be shown why the Writ of Error should not be quashed. Postea Poynes and Francis. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. Mich. 24 Car. rot. 222. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in the Common Pleas, in an Action of Trespass, Error to reverse a judgement in Trespass. and the Error assigned was, that in the postea there is no association to the justice of Assize expressed, as aught to be. Roll Chief justice answered, this is the fault of the Clerk of the Assize: Therefore let him attend and show cause why the Postea shall not be amended, Amendment. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment for a riotous entering into certain land, and carrying away 4 loads of Hay. To quash an Endictment for a riot. The exception taken was that the Endictment saith asportavit duo Car●cat. sceni, instead of duo Charectat. soeni. Roll chief justice answered, If the party be culpable for the entry into the land, although he carried away no Hay, yet the Endictment is good, therefore plead none cull. to all the Endictment, and it may be if it prove not good in all parts it will be naught in all. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. THe Case of the Vills of Newton and Tide concerning the presentments made to the Commissioners of Sewers for the Hundred of Wisbitch, For quashing presentments, and Orders of Commissioners of Sewers. and their order made thereupon was again spoken to. Twisden against the presentment said, That it is not a presentment by jury, as it ought to be by the Statute; for the jury have only power to inquire of things within the Hundred of Wisbitch, and it doth not appear that Newton and Tide are within that Hundred. 2ly. The substance of the presentment is not good; for the Commissioners cannot order that Newton, and Tide which have no benefit by the repairing of the bank shall contribute to the reparations, 18 E. 3. f. 22. 3ly. They cannot order to make a new wall notwithstanding Calais his opinion in his reading upon the Statute of Se●●ers. 4ly. The Tax is not well laid, for it is not laid upon all the Lands within Newton and Tide, as it ought to be charged, if any aught to be. Holhead answered to this last exception, that it does not appear there are more Lands in Tide or Newton than are charged. And Roll chief justice said, that is well enough. To the third exception, Holhead said it is not wholly a new work, and therefore they may order to make it. To which Roll chief justice assented, and said it was so notwithstanding the Case of the I'll of Ely, for that was for the making of a new work totally. To the 2d. Exception he read the words of the presentment, by which it appears, that because the adventurers had no Lands to be charged, and it is found necessary to be repaired, that therefore it is to be repaired by Newton and Tide for the present necessity. Maynard answered that they are not bound to repair for the Act of a Stranger. Taxes. Roll chief justice answered, Newton & Tide may take there remedies against the strange adventurers, and it seems there was a present necessity to repair it for public safety. If one be bound by prescription to repair a wall, yet to prevent the present, and public danger, the Commissioners may tax others to do it, and the Law is just that is here made by the Commissioners. But the 1. Exception is not answered, and so the Commissioners have exceeded their authority. Therefore let their be a new Law made by consent, and quash the presentments, except better matter be showed. But we cannot order you to have your monies again. But for that take your remedy at Law. Garret against Blisard. Hil. 1649. Banc. sup. Hill. 24 Car. rot 983. Upon a special verdict found in an ejectione firmae, The Case was this, Grandmother Tenant for life, Arguments upon a case upon a special verdict in an ejectione firmae. the remainder to the Father for life, the remainder to the Son for life, the Son levyes a fine come ceo, etc. of the Land, the question was whether it be a forfeiture of his estate or not. Hales argued that it was a forfeiture, but I could not hear him well; He cited these books 41 Ed. 3.10. 24 E. 3. f. 70. Pasc. 11. Car. Banc. Reg. Huttens reports, Trin. 7 Car. Banc. Reg. and adjudged 11 Car. in King and Edward's case: Dyer 339. And he said that a fine sur conisance de droit come ceo, etc. as it is in our case, is a Feoffment upon Record, and doth imply a Livery: And said, that a remainder may be forfeited by levying such a fine, and concluded it was a forfeiture. Wadham Windham on the other side argued that it was no forfeiture; Forfeiture. And cited Mich. 24 E. 3. and Dyer 139. and laid this for a ground, that where a Feoffment in Fee made by a Tenant for lise, doth displace any remainder, that such a Feoffment is a forfeiture, but it is not so in this Case, and therefore it can be no forfeiture. If Tenant for life of a rent or of an Advowson levy a fine, it is a forfeiture, although that no remainder be displaced, this is the great objection, 15 E. 4. f. 15 by Littleton, and the fine fur conisance de droit implies a Fee simple, 40 Ed. 3. But there a Fee simple really passed with the estate for life; But here it passes by way of interest, and not by way of estopel, and the Conusee may confess and avoid, and therefore here is no estopel, and so it differs from the Cases, objected 6 Rich. 2 Estopel 211. But it is objected, that he hath taken upon him to pass all the estate, which is more than he hath to pass, and this makes it a forfeiture, 43 E. 3. f. 22. It is good for the reversion in Fee, and not for the other estate, 37 H. 6. f. 5. 41 E. 3 f, 14. by Thorpe. It was answered, that he hath not taken upon him to pass all the estate, but only his own estate: It is objected, that the fine joins all the estates together, and purports the passing of them whole and entire; It was answered, that the fine doth not purport the entire estate, 44 E. 3. f. 10. so much shall pass by the fine as may rightfully pass, and no more, and so the estate passes by fraction, Cooks Instit. 345. The Law construes the effect of the fine according to the intent of the parties, and that wrong shall not be intended so is it here; And if there be Tenant for life, the remainder in fail, the remainder in Fee to Tenant for life, if Tenant for life levy a fine it is no forfeiture, 10 H. 4. f. 2. Tenant for life may pray in aid of all in the, remainder, and he said, that in this case is no forfeiture nor estopel, nor hath he passed more than he hath, & there is no wrong by the fine; but it shall only pass what may be passed, and he said, a fine is a Feoffment when the thing to pass by it lies in Livery, otherwise it is but a grant, and devests no estate as a Feoffment doth. And in Baker and Hackers Case in this Court, Bredons' Case was denied for Law by Bramston, jones and Barkley, Hob. 388, 389. It is no discontinuance, and such estate shall first pass, by which no wrong shall be done. The judges ought to be A●tuti to invent reasons to support estates, and to defend from injuries, and where the Conusee of the fine hath an interest to pass by it to satisfy the operation of it, such a fine is good, and doth no wrong, as it is in our Case. It is objected, that there is a Fee simple here, but it is of no value, for it is after an estate tail, and shall not be assets in the Heir; It was answered, It is but of little value, but it hath more than a right in it, and so he prayed judgement for the Defendant. Forfeiture. Roll chief justice held, it was a forfeiture although there be no displacing of estates, because it puts an estate in a stranger, who ought not to have it, as Bredons' Case is, where one doth acknowledge another to have the inheritance by the fine, this is a forfeiture: By the fine here the Conusor acknowledges more to the Conusee than he hath, and he might have expressed in the fine the estate that he hath in the Land, and no more, and so there is an estate in possession here. jerman justice said, the fine shall not be construed to do wrong; but the Case is of consequence, therefore he would advise. Nicholas held it was no forfeiture. Ask was of the opinion of the chief justice. Roll chief justice said estopels will make forfeitures in many Cases. Q. what judgement was given. Meers against French. Hil. 1649 Banc. sup. Entered Hil. 24 Car. rot. 24. AN ejectione firmae was brought for ejecting the Plaintiff out of a rectory, Arrest of judgement in an Ejectione firmae. and declares of a lease thereof made unto him by Indenture. The Plaintiff had a verdict, the Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement, that the Plaintiff had declared of a lease per Indenturam, Declaration. and doth not say in curia prolatam. The Court answered, if an Indenture be pleaded but by way of inducement, it is not necessary to say in cruia prolatam, otherwise if it be pleaded to entitle the party by it. 2ly. He declares, that the Defendant did eject him out of such a close, and doth not say whether it was pasture or arable land, nor how many Acres it was. Roll chief justice said, it is not good if it be of a close of Land, if he do not give it a name, nor declare of what nature the land is. 3ly, He declares that the Defendant ejected him the uno Crofto, which is incertain. But Roll chief justice said, That a writ of Dower and an Assize will lie de uno Crofto, and so will an Ejectione firmae, Dower. Assize. although a Formedon will not lie de uno Crofto. And therefore let the Plaintif take his judgement, except cause be showed to the contrary Monday next. Postea. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. Entered Trin. 24 Car. C. B rot. 1010. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in the Common Pleas in an Action of Trover and Conversion of divers goods, Error to reverse a judgement in Trovers & Conversion. for many improper words used in the Declaration to express several of them, as 1. Argentum servitium is used to express a silver Salt-cellar, which is not good; for servitium is Latin for service: And in Parker and martyn's case in this Court, Instrumentum ferreum, anglice a Horse-lock, was held not good, and 3 jac. Robotums case, Hama, anglice a Crow of Iron, was adjudged naught; 2ly, He declares de duobus Castoribus, anglice two Hats. 3ly, De duobus Catents pro patinis, anglice Dishes. 4ly, De duodecem Crinalibus et plagulis, anglice Coifs and Crosscloaths. Ed. Turner prayed for judgement notwithstanding these exceptions: Because as to the 1. there is no proper word for a silver Salt-cellar, and it is here well enough described by divers words. 2ly, There is no proper Latin word for Hats called Demy-castors', and therefore it is lawful to frame words, & so for the rest, being new things not known to the Romans, there are no Latin words for them, & so words may be invented well enough to express them, and servitium argenteum is here with an anglice, and therefore it is a good description of the thing: and de instrumento ligneo Composito, anglice a screen, hath been adjudged good, because there is not a proper word to express it. But the Court doubted of the words used for Coifs and Close-clothes, because they are divers things. jerman justice said, argenteum servitium, anglice, a silver Salt-cellar, cannot be good, for servitium is Latin for service. But Roll chief justice said, if servicium signify nothing, than the jury gave no damages for that, and then the rest may be good. But yet the judgement was ordered to be reversed, except cause showed, and was then at the prayer of the Council pronounced; which if it be not prayed, the judge will not do it. Quod nota. Poise against Mablye. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. Pasch. 1649. rot. 222. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given at Launceston in an Action of trespass upon the case, Error to reverse a judgement in an action upon the case for words. for these words, These Town weights in George's possession (meaning the plaintiff, who was the Common weigher of the Town) are false and cozening weights. The 1. exception was, that here was no Communication had of the plaintiff, but the words are only spoken concerning the weights. 2ly. The judgement is not well entered; Case. Judgement. for it is said to be given ad eandem Curiam, whereas it ought to be per eandem Curiam. Upon these exception the judgement was reversed. Colson against Ree. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. Hill. 24 Car. rot. 561. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in the Court at Newcastle upon Tyne, in an Assize of Novel disseisin. Error to reverse a Judgement given in an Assize. Assize of Nuisance. The Error assigned was, that the Plaintif doth declare that the Defendant did disseise him de uno muro lapideo, and that the Defendant had erected a house in the place to his nuisance. The Court answered, The plaintiff aught to have brought an Assize of Nuisance for this wrong, which because he hath not done, let the judgement be reversed. Batisford against Yate. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. Pasc. 1649, rot. 289. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an Action of Trover and Conversion for these errors: Error to reverse a judgement given in a Trover and Conversion. Venire. 1. It is said of the jurors in entering of their verdict, Dixerunt pro querente: and aly, In the awarding of the Venire it is ideo praeceptum fuit, with an, & and so it is not certain whence the Venire issued, as it ought to be. The rule was, the judgement should be reversed, if cause were not shown to the contrary. Cook against More. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. Trin. 1649. rot. 645. Cook brought an Action upon the case against More upon an Assumpsit, Demurrer to a plea in an action upon an Assumpsit. to pay for certain barrels of béer, sold and delivered unto him such a day. The Defendant pleads specially, that he did not assume as the Plaintif hath declared. To this plea the plaintiff demurs, because that by thus pleading the Plaintif is tied up to a particular day: whereas he may give in evidence for any other barrels of beer sold at any time before the Action brought. The Court ordered cause to be shown why the plaintiff should not have judgement upon this demurrer. Banbury against Basely. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. Hill. 24. Car. rot. 1062. THis case arising upon a special verdict found in an Ejectione firmae, Argument upon the Case concerning the Manor of Callidown given to Mr. Pym. touching the title of the Manor of Callidowne, being part of Sir Thomas Morgan's estate that was given to Mr. Pym by Ordinance of Parliament, and heretofore argued on both parts, was again spoken to: First by Twisden, who argued for the plaintiff; who said, the Question is, Whether the estate settled by Sir Thomas Morgan before the year 1641. be forfeited by the Act of Parliament, and consequently well given to Mr. Pym, or no? And he said, the intent of the Parliament in making this Act is first to be interpreted: and he held, that according to the Act no estate passeth, but such estate as Morgan had in the year 1641. and no more; for no man can forfeit a thing that he hath not, but only that which he hath; but Morgan then had not this estate: and therefore he could not forfeit it. 2ly, There is a priority of vesting the estate in the Parliament, and next from the Parliament to the trusties, and the trusties can have no more than is forfeited to the Parliament, and the estate settled before the year 1641. is not forfeited to the Parliament. 3ly, The penning of the Act is considerable; The Act saith all the said lands, that is all the said lands that Morgan had in the yeart 1641. and not all the lands that Morgan ever had before that time, and had settled; for the precedent words are restrained by the words subsequent, Althams' case, 8 Rep. Dyer 369. and from the preamble of the Act to make a construction to punish innocent persons, is against the Law of God, Man, and Nature, Nichols case, f. 398. Of rewards and punishments consist the essence of Commonwealths, and it could not be the intent of the Parliament to punish innocent persons, 3 Ed. 4. 2. The Parliament did not intent to give more of Morgan's estate, than what he had 1641. for then they might give that which might be evicted, which they intended not. And whereas it is objected, that there is a clause of Revocation in Morgan's settlement and so the estate was not absolutely settled; It is answered, That notwithstanding this power of Revocation, the estate is not given by this Act unto Pym; for it cannot give a power, 7 Rep. 13. and a power cannot be forfeited, and Mary Morgan had an interest in the land, notwithstanding the power of Revocation. And notwithstanding there is no saving for Mary, yet the estate is not passed; for Mary Morgan is not intended to be punished, Nichols case, Com. f. 483. and so there needs no saving for her, 14 H. 8. f. 2. and it cannot be intended because there is no saving for her, that therefore she shall forfeit her estate, and the saving is not therefore idle; for it hath an operation another way. The saving is not intended of the estate of a Collateral Ancestor only, for this is the begging of the question, for the saving saves not any thing, and the penning of the words are against this exposition: and so he concluded, that nothing was given by the Statute to Mr. Pym, but the estate of Morgan which he had in the year 1641, and prayed judgement for the Plaintif. Steel, the Recorder of London, for the Defendant, said, he would only answer the argument of Twisden, because he had heard no other arguments. And first he held, that the Ordinance reaches all the estates that Morgan had, as well before, as at the time 1641. and the estate settled by Morgan before 1641. was the estate of Thomas Morgan in the year 1641. 2ly The lands are expressly named which are given by the Statute, & it is not material who hath the estate in them for certitudo nominis tollit demonstrationem, Dowbey and Dudingtons' case, and Mildmayes case, 1 Rep. do interpret how the word others shall be interpreted. And here cannot be said to be any injustice in the Parliament. The Question here is, Whether the estate be settled by the Parliament? and if it be settled, it would be a supposition of injustice, to suppose it is not rightly done. The Law hath invested the Parliament with a power to dispose of all lands, and therefore it cannot be intended injustice; And the estate is not in Mary Morgan notwithstanding the Conveyance, because there is a clause of Revocation in it; for it is a void Conveyance as to her estate, by reason of the clause of Revocation, for that makes it fraudulent. And the estate of Mary Morgan is not passed by the Statute, notwithstanding the clause of eviction in the Ordinance, an if or an an are no saving of an estate, and here is no eviction in the case: and here is no saving, otherwise their estate cannot be saved, for then the lands are all passed, And the saving extends to the lands descended to the Children of Thomas Morgan, from Collateral Ancestors, and not from Tho. Morgan the Father; and as reasonable a Construction ought to be made of an Ordinance of Parliament as this is, as of an Act of Parliament, and so he prayed judgement for the Defendant. Roll chief justice said He did not doubt of the power of the Parliament in this case, but of their meaning, whether they intended these lands should be forfeited, or not: And the Ordinance was made by the House of Commons without any proviso in it, and the proviso was put in by the House of Lords, and he inclined that Mary Morgan's estate was saved. But Jerman justice said, he conteived that Mary's estate was not saved, but only the estate of strangers. The Court was divided, and said they would consider till next Term, and then give judgement in this and the Case of Garret and Blizard. Quaere, What judgement was given in both cases, for I was not in Court at the day they were spoken to again. Vincent against Wallis. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. Hill. 24 Car. rot. 966. rot. 906. IN a Replevin for distraining of the Defendant emparled, A Demurrer to a plea in a replevin after imparlance. and afterwards pleaded that the lands are ancient Demesne where the distress was taken, and to this plea the Plaintif demurred. Sergeant Parker for the plaintiff, and against the Demurrer held, that the plea is not to be admitted, because that the party hath made his defence, Plea. and cannot therefore afterwards plead to the jurisdiction of the Court, and cited 11 H. 4. f. 47. 2 H. 7. f. 17 b. That freehold only is to be sued for in ancient Demesne. And 2ly, the plea is not sufficient, for it doth not appear that the lands are held of the Manor, but only are parcel of the Manor, and such lands are pleadable in other Courts, 20 H. 6. Nat. Brev. 11 M. 41 Ed. 3. 3ly, It is not said that the land are pleadable by Writ of Droit Close, which ought to be 2 H. 7. f. 17. 3 H. 6. f. 14. 4ly. He prescribes that the lands are not pleadable elsewhere, which is not true, for in some cases they are pleadable here in this Court Nat. Brev. 19 D. and so prayed judgement for the Plaintif. Roll chief justice demanded, why is there not a special demurrer here? Special Demurrer. After imparlance one may plead that the lands are ancient demesne, for a plea of lands in ancient Demesne to the jurisdiction of the Court differs from other pleas pleaded to the jurisdiction of the Court. It is true that parcel of a Manor of ancient demesne is pleadalbe at the Common Law; but lands held of the Manor are pleadable in the Court of the lord Adjourned to be heard Tuesday following. Afterwards it was moved again, and Roll chief justice said, that after imparlance this plea is not good; because by it he hath admitted the jurisdiction of the Court, And therefore l●● him show cause why he should not plead in chief. Pascall against Sparing. Hill 1649. Banc. sup. Pasch. 1649. rot. 75. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an Action in Bristol upon a Concessit solvere by the Defendant. Error to reverse a judgement in Debt for Concessit solvere. Declaration. Roll chief justice said, that an Action of Debt did well lie upon a Concessit solvere by the custom of Bristol, and so is it in London, 28 H. 6. 1 E. 4. f. 6. Another Error assigned was, that it is said that the party recovered the damages per juratores Compert, whereas it ought to be Assess. for this is the proper word; but this exception was also overruled. Latch took another exception, that there wants the words pro misis et custagiis in the assessing the damages; and so it doth not appear for what the damages are assessed. And for this the judgement was reversed except better matter shown. Damages. jenning's against Lee. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. genning's brought an Action of Trespass of an assault and battery against Lee and his wife; Whether an issue well joined. for an assault and battery made by the wife, the Feme pleads a special plea of justification, that it was in defence of her Husband: The plaintiff replies de injuria sua propria, upon this there was an issue joined, and a verdict for the plaintiff; it was moved in Arrest of judgement that the issue was nor well joined, because the replication was not good, and so the verdict not good, and so there can be no judgement. Sergeant Parker prays judgement for the plaintiff, for he held the replication was good, and so a good Issue joined, and if there be not, yet it is helped by the Verdict, Issue. or else by the Statute of jeofails, or if not, yet it is at least good in part. And the issue here doth imply a negative, although there be not a direct negative, but an affirmative in the words of it. And 6 E. 4, 16 b. in a Replevin, and 9 H. 5. f. 1. b. there are good issues joined in the affirmative, because they imply a negative. Trin. 18 Jac. Banc. reg. Aldridge and Walthalls case: and here wants only a Traverse; which is but only matter of form, and not material. 2ly. The Verdict hath made the issue good, although it be not well joined, 5 H. 7. f. 15. 3ly If the Verdict helps it not, yet the Statute of jeofails helps it, 5 Rep. Nichols case, 19 Eliz. Dallisons Reports, 8 & 9 Eliz. Bendloes Reports, and 14 Car. Banc. Reg. 4ly. If the Statute help not, yet it is well enough, because it is good in part, and for part it is well found, and damages shall be intented to be given for that which is well found, Damages. 9 H. 7. f. 4. 16 H. 7. f. 1●. 10 Rep. James and Osburns case, 3 jac. Banc. Reg. Bigrane and Selling, Mich. 1649. Desmond & Osborn (this case the Court denied.) Roll chief justice said, Issue. if there be 2 issues, and one issue is not well joined, and damages be given entire, this is not good, but will make all naught, 40 Ed. 3. f. 40. 18 jac. Aldridges case. 16 jac. jones and Gates adjudged, and he said that the material thing is not here put in issue, and so the issue is immaterial, and there is a jeofail, and the damages being given entire there can be no judgement given. Jeofail. jerman justice did differ in opinion, and said, if the Defendant plead an immaterial thing, and the Plaintif join issue, and it be found for him, he shall have judgement; otherwise where the plea is partly material, partly immaterial; for there the issue ought to be upon the material thing, otherwise there can be no judgement. It was adjourned till Thursday following. The Case was this, An Action of Assault and Battery and wounding was brought; the Defendant pleads none cull. to the wounding, and justifies the Assault and Battery in defence of her Husband, in keeping possession of certain lands. The Plaintif replied the injuria sua propria, and doth not traverse absque tali causa. The jury find entire damages for all, whereas there is not a perfect issue joined as to the Assault and Battery for want of the Traverse. Postea. Hodges' against jane. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. IN an Arrest of judgement in this case, the question was, Whether debt lie against an Executor sur concessit solve of the Testator. Wager of Law. Debt. Executor. Whether an Action do lie against an Executor upon a Concessit solvere of the Testator upon a special custom. Roll chief justice held that it doth not, for this would be to charge an Executor in an Action of Debt, where he may by the Law wage his Law, and an Action of Debt lies not against an Executor upon a simple contract made by the Testator. And he said that the reason for Ley gager is, because it is intended that as well as the contract to pay money may be in private, so may also the payment be made in private. Adjourned. Giaves against Drake. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. IN an Action of Trover and Conversion for divers parcels of Household stuff, an Exception was taken to the Declaration, Arrest of judgement in a Trover and Conversion. because the Plaintif amongst other things had declared pro sex parcellis plumbi cinerii Anglice Pewter Porringers: whereas the word parcellis is uncertain; for a parcel doth consist of many things in number, and so sex parcellis cannot be properly applied to six Porringers, but if it had been sex peciis it had been better, though that be also incertain. Hales held it was all one as if it had been pro sex peciis plumbi Cinerii. Roll chief justice inclined it was well enough, because, though the words are not so proper, yet the description is good enough. Declaration, Words. jerman justice was of the same opinion. But Nicholas justice held that the Latin is not good, for if there be proper words for a thing, they ought to be used, otherwise Barbarism will be induced; and circumlocution ought not to be used where there is a proper Latin word to be had to express a thing. Ask justice agreed with Roll the chief justice: And the Plaintif was bid take his judgement, except better matter were shown to the contrary. Hobson against Hudson. Hil. 1649 Banc. sup. HObson brought an Action upon the case against Hudson for speaking these words of her, viz. She went to the Wells to be cured of the French Pox. Upon Not guilty pleaded, and a verdict found for the plaintiff, Arrest of judgement is an action for words. the Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement, that the words are not actionable, because they are incertain words, and do not express that the Plaintif had the French Pox at the time of the speaking of them, and the causa dicendi shall not make them actionable. Shaftoe on the other side said the words are actionable; for these words thou hast been laid of the Pox, have been adjudged actionable, which are not so scandalous as these, Mich. 7 jac. Thou art a Pocky whore, and the Pox hath eaten out the bottom of thy belly, were held actionable. Roll chief justice said the words required consideration; but the words seem to imply that the party did believe that she had the French Pox, else the would not have gone to be cured, and so they are scandalous. jerman justice said, intentions shall not make words actionable, and therefore he conceived they are not actionable. Nicholas justice said, he conceived them prima fancy to be actionable, for words shall be taken according to the common intendment, and an Action on the Case may sometimes be brought upon words spoken by implication and interrogation. A●k justice held they were actionable. But the Court said they would advise. Posten. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved for the quashing an Endictment, For quashing an Endictment. for suffering one to escape that was taken for Felony; But the Court would not quash it though there was cause, but ordered the Defendant should plead to it, because they believed he had compounded with the Felon. Wyatt against Harbye. Hil. 1649. Banc. sup. Mich. 1649 rot. 426. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in the Court at Barnestable in an Action of Debt upon an Obligation. The Error assigned was, Error to reverse a judgement in Debt at B. r●estable. that the place alleged for the payment of the money, sued for is out of the jurisdiction of the Court. It was answered, that it is said to be at Chitlehampton aforesaid, and it doth not appear whether Chitlehampton be within the jurisdiction of the Court, or where it is, and therefore it shall be intended to be within the jurisdiction. Roll chief justice said, the Declaration is, that the Obligation was at Barnestable, and the plea is that it was at Chichley which is a foreign plea, and the plea is not sworn, neither is there any demurrer upon the plea; but the plea is received, and day given to swear it, and for not swearing it accordingly, a judgement is given against the Plaintiff by default, judgement. whereas it ought to have been a judgement upon a nibil dicit for want of a plea, and he said also, Fere●n plea. that if one plead an insufficient plea, although it be a foreign plea, it is not necessary it should be sworn. The judgement was ordered to be reversed, except cause showed to the contrary. jones against Blunden. Hil. 1649. Banc. sup. Mich. 1649. rot. 34. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in the palace Court at Westminster in an Action of Assault and Battery. Error to reverse a Judgement given in the palace Court at Westminster. Trial. The Case was this, an Action was brought for an Assault and Battery in Surry; The Defendant pleads a plea of justification in Middlesex: The Plaintiff replied that he beat him in Southwark, (which is in Surry) de injuria sua propria absque tali causa, and this issue was tried by a jury of Midlesex The question was whether it were a good trial. The Court would advise. Postea. Watson against Norbury and others. Hil. 1649 Banc. sup. Watson brought an Action upon the Case against Norbury a Commissioner upon the Statute of Bankrupt and others, Demurrer to a plea in Trespass upon the Case. for the breaking of his house, and taking away his goods upon pretence of the said Commission, whereas he was no Bankrupt, by reason whereof he was impaired in his credit, and hindered in his Trade, and declares to his damage, etc. The Defendant pleads that the Plaintiff had heretofore brought an Action of Trespass against him for the same trespass, and goods taken, and had recovered damages against him. To this plea the Plaintiff demurred; And upon the demurrer the question was whether this plea pleaded by the Defendant be a good plea in abatement of the writ of Trespass, upon the Case now brought, or not? Abatement. Shafto of Council with the Plaintiff argued that the plea was not good, because the matter in this Action upon the Case, and the matter of the former Action of Trespass are not all one; but are several and various matters, and therefore several Actions may be brought for them, 15. rep. f. 43. Sparies' case, Hob. 493. The Earl of Bedford's case, 4. rep. ●lades case, Petty Brook 105. 4. rep. f. 43. Hudsons' case, 11 Ed. 2. Fitzh. Trespass 207. 2 R. 3. f. 14. 18 E. 4. f. 23. 20 H. 7. f. 9 12 E. 4. f. 13. Fitzh. estopel 78. 7 H. 4. f. 44. And the variances here between the Action upon the Case, and the Action of Trespass prove that they are not all one: And that there is a difference it is plain; for in this Action upon the Case, it is said that the Defendant did enter into the Plaintiffs house malitiose; but in the former Action of Trespass it was said, that he did enter vi et armis, which is a plain difference and variance, 8 H. 6. f. 27. Cook's Entries fol. 39 And the matters pleaded upon Record in these several Actions do not destroy one another; but may well stand together, Pasc. 2 Car. Laicon and Barnard's case: And here this Action of the Case is to repair the Plaintiffs credit; but the former Action was to recover damages, for his goods taken from him. An abduxit of will maintain a chase, and one may therein recover for the chase, and the value also, so here both Actions may stand together. And there is matter for both Actions, and the matter pleaded in Bar is but to increase the damages, and if the special matter alleged in the Action of Trespass alleged in the Action upon the Case had been less, yet it is well enough, and it is but surplusage, and only by way of inducement to prove the scandal, and the Defendant here is not at any mischief, for the words here are only put in agrravation of damages, 7 H. 6. f. 34. and so prays judgement for the Plaintiff. Green of Council with the Defendant prayed the Writ might be abated. Because 1. here is not any thing laid, that the Defendant hath positively affirmed the Plaintiff to be a Bankrupt. 2ly. There are general words in the former Action, namely alia enormia, which words do comprehend the matter for which this Action is now brought, and he denied the differences taken by the Council on the other side. And it doth here appear to the Court, that the former Action of Trespass was brought for the same things, and damages were therein given for them, and it is unreasonable to punish one twice for one and the same offence, and the averment is good, and doth show that both Actions are for one and the same cause, and he hath recovered damages already for all the wrong he sustained, and here is no conversion alleged in the Case, nor is it vi et armis, and the Law hates double vexation, 2. H. 6. f. 54. Brook brev. 397 3 H. 7. 4. Brook brev. 77. and damages might well enough be recovered in the first Action, for all the damages sustained, 19 H. 6. f. 44. And if this Action now brought, had been brought for calling the Plaintiff Bankrupt, the Action would have lain; but not as it is here brought, and one entire Action shall never be divided to put the party to a double vexation, as it is in our case, 41 Ass. pl. 16. Brook brev. 309. ●. rep. Hudsons' case, and in the first Action the words alia enormia were purposely put in, that all matters touching that Trespass might be brought in question, to increase the damages, 9 E 4. Brook Tresp. f. 1●9. and so all the damages were recovered in the former Action. And he agreed Laicons case put by Shafto, that the Plaintiff might recover damages as well for the value of the Sheep, as for the chase of them, and prays the Writ may be abated. Roll chief justice said, it is hard to maintain Laicons case; for cepit er abduxit intends that the owner hath not the Sheep again, otherwise it would be if the Action had been for the driving of them only. And Mr. Shafto hath taken a good ground, viz. that the Actions are for several things, and the Declaration is in part but an inducement to increase the scandal, and to prove it, and the words alia enormia shall not be intended of collateral matter, but of matter incident to the Act done; And one and the same thing may give several causes of Action, and one Action is not to be confounded with another Action. jerman justice said, Laicons Case was not like this Case for the question here is whether the Plaintiff can recover damages in this second Action, which he hath by intendment recovered in the former Action, and he inclined that it may be so here, and that there is a recovering of the same damages in divers manners for the same thing. Nicholas justice said, he may bring several Actions, although he might have joined them both in one. Ask justice said, That one Act may be divided into divers Actions, and so it is here, and well enough. Roll chief justice said, the Plaintiff in this Action cannot recover damages for his Goods, so that this Action is brought for another matter. Therefore plead in chief if cause be not showed to the contrary, for the Action doth well lie. Meers against French. Hll. 1649. Banc. Reg. IN an ejectione firmae, Arrest of judgement in an ejectione fi●●ae. and a verdict for the Plaintiff, The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, that there is no certainty in the Declaration neither of the place nor of the quantity, nor of the quality of the Land whence the Plaintiff was ejected, for it is e●dnobus Acris fundi, Anglice, a hopground, which is not warranted by the Latin, and so it is incertain, and it is also dimisit unum croftum, and a piece of Land, and the quantity is not expressed, for it is per estimationem sive plus sive minus, & medietatem sive unam partem is also incertain. Twisden answered, it was certain enough, because it is expressed by a certain name. Declaration. Grant. But Roll chief justice said, it is good in grants; but not in a Declaration! for there is required more certainty, and the Anglice here doth not help it, for the Anglice is not to interpret a Latin name by which it is called. And the sive plus sive minus is also ill; but if it had been so many Acres per estimationem, it had been good. Therefore advise better of it. Antea. Vaux and Vaux against Draper. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. Entered Trin. 1649. rot. 1104. VAux and Vaux brought an Action upon the Case against Draper, Arrest of judgement in an action upon the case, upon a promise. upon a promise, and declared, that the Defendant in consideration of ten pounds paid by the Plaintiffs unto the Defendant, did assume and promise unto the Plaintiffs, to procure certain of the Plaintiffs taken from them by a third person, to be redelivered unto them by such a time, and for not performing this promise they brought their action. Upon Non assumpsit pleaded, there was an issue joined, and a verdict found for the Plaintiffs, after this case had been twice spoken unto, The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, that th●● Action was not well brought jointly by the Plaintiffs, but that they ought to have brought two several Actions, Joint action. in regard that the promise upon which the Action was founded was not an entire promise, but was a several promise made to each of the Plaintiffs. The Council on the other side prayed for judgement, and said the promise was entire, made to both, and not several, and so the jury have found it, which shall be intended to be true: and if it should not be so, it would be disadvantageous for the Defendant. Hales said on the other side, that the assumpsit is several, and the acts to be done by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs are several, although the assumpsit sounds as a joint assumpsit. Roll chief justice said, That the Consideration given is entire and cannot be divided, and there is no inconvenience in joining in the Action in this case; but if one had brought the Action alone, it might have been questionable. Nicholas and Ask justices of the same opinion. But Jerman justice differed, and said, that they are several promises, viz. to deliver such severally to each of them, as did belong properly to them, and so there must be two several Actions. But judgement was given for the plaintiff, except better matter showed. Antea. Spry against Mill. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. Pasch. 1649. rot. 208. IN a Writ of Error brought to reverse a judgement given in a Trover and Conversion at Launceston in Cornwall, upon a nihil dicit, Error to reverse a judgement in a trover and conversion. Prestwood moved, that the record is not certified; for it is returned by one who is not judge there; Abatement. for it is returned by the Mayor, Aldermen, and Deputy-recorder, whereas the writ of Error was to return a record before the Mayor, Aldermen, and Recorder, 1 E. 5. f. 3. Jordan and Tompkins case, 1648. Upon this the writ of Error was abated. Wat's against Dix. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. Trin. 24. Car. rot. 1529. THis case was again argued, Argument whether a lease well made according to direction of Deed in trust. by Hales for the plaintiff, and by Twisden for the Defendant. I could not hear Hales but imperfectly; Therefore I omit his Argument. Twisden, that argued for the Defendant, put the case briefly thus. A Feoffment was made of lands to I. S. in fee, until he should make a lease of 21 years to A. B. from the feast of Philip and jacob; I. S. makes a lease for 21 years, to begin at the feast of Philip and jacob, And he held this was a good Lease, made according to the direction of the Deed. 2ly, If it be not a good Lease, yet the use shall not revert to the Feoffor. 3ly, He held that there is neither a good bargain and sale, nor doth it work by way of use. For the first point he held, if it had been by way of pleading, it had not been good in pursuance of the Agreement: otherwise it is being found by verdict; but here the agreement and the intention of the parties is satisfied, and the variance is not considerable, & de minimis non curat lex, 10 jac. Hob. f. 120. 38 E. 3. f. 7. Waste 35. 2ly, In the judgement and estimation of men, at and from are accounted to be all one in signification. In the Stat. of 32 H. 8. it is so taken, and in the Stat. of 27 H. 8. of enrolments, and words shall be construed according to common intendment. And if there be a variance, yet the use rests in the Feoffees, and shall not revert to the Feoffor: for the word until, is an Adverb of time, boraston's case; Sir Andrew Corbets case, ●1 Rep. f. 85. Dyer 300. 3 Eliz. Moor's Reports, 3 jac. Sir Guy Fairfax case: if they make not the estate, the estate remains in them. And if it do not remain in the Feoffees, yet it cannot revert to the Feoffor, for he hath conveyed from himself all the estate that he had, and if it return to the Feoffor, it is a disseisin, 2 Rep. Butler's case; And for the bargain and sale, that cannot be good; for here is no Consideration, but that which is past, and not continuing, which is no good Consideration, Blow. Com. 302.15 Car. Burton and Shirley. 2ly, The Consideration, if there be any, is not meritorious, for aught any thing appears, the moneys may not be discharged which are laid out, and so the Defendant remains unsatisffed, and so there can be no Consideration, Allens case, 23 Car. 3ly, If the debt be discharged, yet it cannot raise a use, for here is no moneys, paid but a debt; And a use is not raised here, because it was the intent of the parties to pass the land by way of bargain and sale, Ed. Foxes case, 13 Eliz. Plowd. 32. 11 Car. Whitfield and Pierce, rot. 438. And if one intent to pass an estate out of himself, he may do it either by the Common law or by Statute law. Roll chief justice said, if lands are passed for money only, the deed ought to be enroled; but if it be for money and natural affection, enrolment. Use. it is not needful to enrol it, but the lands will pass without enrolment. And so here the land passes one way or other; and if the use will rise all the other points are out of doors. And there is here a continuing consideration to raise a use. But the main question is whether the use riseth to the Feoffor, if not, all the other points are gone. And he held that here was only a mere matter of trust, & the intent is not that the Feoffees shall have any thing by the not performing the trust, but the use shall be to the Feoffor. And there can be no disseisin in the case. And here is a material difference in point of law, in the making of this lease, Lease. for it is made for one day more than was agreed by the deed, for that lease was to begin from the feast of Philip and jacob; and this lease is made to be begin at the Feast of Philip and jacob. jerman justice held, that the intent of the parties is performed, and that there is no material difference, and held for the Defendant. Nicholas justice said, here is no performance of the agreement, for all the parties agreed not to this Lease, for it is made for longer time than was agreed; and he held that the use shall be to the other parties by contingency, and that here is no disseisin. Ask justice said, all the difficulty is whether the lease be made or not; and he held it was a good lease according to the agreement, and said that the intent is not that the Feoffees shall have any thing, but that it shall result to the Feoffor. Roll chief justice said, Intent. the intent of the parties shall not be employed against the direct rules of Law. Nil capiat per Billam nisi, etc. Pendarvis against Dawkes. Hill. 1649. Banc. reg. PEndarvis brought an Action of Account against Dawkes for divers sums of money as his receiver. Arrest of judgement in Account. The Defendant pleads that as to all except ten pounds ne unques receptor; upon this an issue was joined, and a verdict found for the Plaintif. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, that it doth not appear what ten pounds they are that are menrioned in the plea; and so it is incertain whether they be part of the moneys, for which the Action is brought, Roll chief justice said, he ought to have expressed what ten pounds it is, for as it is, it is incertain, and so not good. Venire de novo. Therefore take a venire facias de novo, for though the issue be not well joined, yet the Declaration is good. Cowley against Locton. Hill. 1649. Banc. reg. Trin. 24 Car. rot. 932. IN a writ of Error to reverse a judgement given in an Action of Debt upon an Obligation the case was this. Writ of Error to reverse a judgement meant in Debt. One was bound in an Obligation (for the payment of certain sums of money) to a Feme sole, the Feme takes Baron and dies. I. S. takes out Letters of Administration of the goods and Chattels of the Feme, and brings an Action of Debt upon the Obligation against the Obligor. The Obligor pleads that by the entermariage of the Feme the Debt due upon the Obligation became due to the Baron, and demands judgement Si Actio, Chose in Action. To this Plea the plaintiff demurs. The Court said this Debt due upon the bond became not due to the Husband, for it is a thing in Action, and therefore the plea is not good. jones against Blunden. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. Mich 1649. rot. 34. THis Case formerly spoken to was again moved by Wild, Whether a good trial or no. who held, that in regard that the matter triable ariseth from two places, and so the venire may be from both places; yet it is well enough if it be from any of them, and the Court hath jurisdiction in both places, and therefore the trial is well enough in this case. Twisden on the other side said, that here are two issues in trial, and so it is not within the Statute of jeofails; for that is of force only where one issue is tried. Roll chief justice answered, here are not two issues, for you have made them one by pleading, and so it is within the Statute of jeofails, and helped by it. jerman Justice to the same intent: Issue. jeofails. and so Nicholas and Ask justices. Roll chief justice said, that the issue is joined upon the matter arising in both places, and yet it is well enough; for the principal matter was in S●. Clement's Danes. Therefore let the judgement be affirmed, except better matter be shown. Antea. Adstone against Hunter. Hill. 1469. Banc. sup. ADston brought an Action upon the case against Hunter and his Wife for these words spoken of the Plaintif by Hunter's wife, Arrest of judgement in an Action on the Case. viz. jane Adstone did bewitch my good man, innuendo her Husband. Upon Not guilty pleaded, and a Verdict found for the plaintiff, it was moved in Arrest of judgement that the words were too general, and uncertain, to raise any scandal, and therefore an Action could not be brought for speaking of them. Shaftoe of Council with the Plaintif held that the words are actionable, because they declare an Act or thing done, and the party is scandalised by the words, 4 rep. ●eames his case, and the words my good man are words well known to express her Husband by, as 7 jac. to say, Thou art a healer of Felons, was well understood to mean a Concealer of Felons; and if the words good man be incertain, yet they are certain enough to show that some body is bewitched, for the Act done is certainly enough expressed, and the Plaintif is thereby scandalised, and besides it is after a Verdict, and by it they are made certain, and damages are given for speaking them, Mich. 15 Car. Com. Banc. Stones case rot ●36. Roll chief justice said, These words, Thou hast bewitched a man are actionable, & it is a scandal to say, One hath killed a man by Witchcraft, and he held the words actionable. jerman justice said, they could not be actionable, because by them there is no act of witchcraft expressed. Nicholas justice said, the words are not actionable for thou hast bewitched one may be spoken in a good sense, & words are but wind, & spoken in passion sometimes, and other times in jest or merriment. Ask justice said, that the words tend to scandal as they are spoken, Averment. and shall be intended that she hath bewitched one by Diabolical Art. And Roll chief justice said, It is not necessary to aver what Act of Witchcraft was done. And these words, Thou hast bewitched me and my Aunt have been adjudged Actionable in this Court. It was adjourned to be argued again the next term. Hill. 1649. Banc sup. THe Court was moved to quash an Order of a private Sessions of the peace, that was removed hither by Certiorari. The Order was, To quash a Order of a private Sessions of Peace. that one should contribute to half the charge towards the keeping of a Bastard Child, because he did suffer a Soldier to get the Child upon the body of his Maid servant. The Court said this was not within the Statute of 18 Eliz. and therefore let the Order be quashed. Hill. 1649. Banc. super. A Prohibition to the Court of the Admiralty was prayed for Bi●ckes a Clerk of this Court for libelling against him there for prosecuting a matter at the Common Law, which they pretend to belong to their Court, For a prohibition to the Admiralty. and for granting an injunction against him to stop his proceed. The Court answered there is no libel here, this is but a citation to appear, and is no Injunction against him; but because upon the citation there appeared to be matter of Prohibition contained in it, A Prohibition was granted. Saunderson against Raisin. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. Upon a rule to show cause why a judgement should not be reversed, To amend a Record after Errore assigned. the Court was moved that the Roll wherein the Error assigned was might be amended according to the Original which is right, though the Nisi prius Roll be not so. Holhead on the other side prayed there might be no amendment, but the judgement reversed, for if judgement be given upon an erroneous Declaration, which is the ground of the Action, as it is here, it is not good, nor is amendable. The Court answered, this is the fault of the Clerk, who had the original before him, which is the ground of all, Amendment. and by which he ought to form the Declaration. But the matter is that here it is after a Verdict, and it will be perilous to attaint the jury, though it being the Clarks fault, it be amendable. But let it rest till the next term, and in the mean time we will advise. Williamson against Mead. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. Mich. 1649. rot. 428. Williamson brought an Action upon the Case against Meade, Arrest of Judgement is an action upon an Assumpsit. and declared upon three Assumpsits made by the Defendant to the plaintiff, that the Defendants son should pay such a sum of money to the Plaintif for his boarding with him, when he should be thereunto required; upon non Assumpsit pleaded, and a verdict for the plaintiff, the Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement, That the Plaintif doth not show that he did require the Son to pay the sum of money, which the Defendant did assume should be paid upon request; but only saith that the Defendant licet saepius requisitus non solvit. The judgement was arrested till cause should be shown to the contrary. The same day it was moved again, and the Council urged that the request was not necessary to be made, and prayed for judgement. But Roll Chief justice answered, that this was a collateral promise, Request. and therefore the request must be averred to be made to the Son. Therefore the Plaintif can have no judgement, and so nil capiat per billam was ruled to be entered. Hudson. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved that there was a scire facias issued out to certify Errors, For time to assign Errors. and time was desired to assign them. But the Court answered, the bringing of the writ of Error is delay enough; and therefore if you have not assigned the Errors according the rules of the Court, they shall not be now accepted. Dewick against Bamber. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved upon an Affidavit that the Defendant might plead and go to trial, That an Attorney might be forced to plead. Plea. Appearance. because his Attorney hath appeared; and now he saith he is not an Attorney of this Court, and doth refuse to plead. Roll chief justice answered, If he hath appeared, and yet will not plead, enter your judgement against this Client, and though he have not appeared, if he did promise to appear we will force him to do it Whitchurch against Pagot. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved in the behalf of Whitchurch a Clerk of this Court, To be restored to a Clerks place in the Casts Brevium Office. that he might be restored to his Office in the Office of the Custos brevium, according to an Order of this Court, otherwise that he may have liberty to bring his Action against the Custos brevium. The Court answered, that the Master of the Office is answerable for all his Clerks, and hath power over them, and they are not Officers but mere Servants, and therefore there is no remedy to be had in Law against him, Restitution. but in Conscience he ought to restore him. Therefore let him show cause next Term why he should not be restored. In Michaelmas Term 1654. After divers motions and hearing what was objected on both sides upon his submission in Court to Mr. Paget the Master of the Office he promised to restore him. Mich 1649. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved in Arrest of judgement that the Plaintif was 19 years old, Arrest of judgement for pleading per Guardianum. and sued per guardianum, which ought not to be; for after he is 17 years' years old he ought to sue per Attornatum suum. The Court answered, this is no good exception, for if he be within the age of 21 years, he may sue per guardianum, and he is admitted by the Court to do so. And therefore let the Plaintif take his judgement. Bigford against Topsam. Pasc. 16●●. Banc. sup. Mich. 1649 rot. 85. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an Action of Debt upon an obligation with the condition for the payment of a certain sum of money after the return of the Ship, Error to reverse a judgement in debt. to the Port of Plymouth. The Defendant pleaded a special plea, to which the Plaintiff demurred, & upon this demurrer the judgement was given for the Plaintiff, upon which judgement the writ of Error was brought. Wadha●● Windham assigned for error, 1. That there issued a pone out of the Cou●● of Plymouth, returnable the 1 of March, and the Defendant did not appear till the 8 of March, and so there is a discontinuance. Hales of Council on the other side, answered, that the Plaintiff had accepted of a Declaration, Discontinuance. and so that fault is helped. The Court answered, the acceptance of the Declaration doth not help it; But the Record is not so, therefore passes ouster. A 2d. Exception was, that there is no bail taken, Bail. for it is erroneous bail, and so shall be accounted no bail. The Court answered, this is not material here. A 3d. Exception was, that it is said that the plea was held before the than Mayor, and doth not show that he was elected. The Court answered, it is well enough as it is, though it might have been otherwise. It was adjourned. Custodes Libertat. etc. against Mountain and Lydal. Pasc. 1649. Banc. sup. AN information was exhibited by the Attorney general against the Defendants for engrossing divers Acres of Corn. Demurrer to a plea to an information for engrossing They pleaded that they had been heretofore prosecuted in the Court of the Exchequer, and were acquitted thereof. To this plea the Attorney general demurred, and these reasons were showed why the plea was not good. 1. It is not pleaded that they were acquitted by judgement, or upon a verdict, or upon a former information exhibited against them. 2ly. It doth not appear that the Exchequer had jurisdiction of the cause. 3ly. There could be no information duly exhibited, for it is said to be the 10. of September, which is out of the Term, and so the Court did not sit. 2ly. there is no issue joined, for the Plaintiff saith, ponit se, &c whereas it being by way of recital, aught to have been posuit se, and the other saith petiit quod inquiratur per patriam. 3ly. There is no verdict in the Case, for the issue is none culp. contra Statutum, and the verdict is non est culp. juxta Statutum. 4ly. There is no judgement, for it is eat ad praesens, and it ought to be iret ad tunc. 5ly. There is no averment, that the first information was for the same offence. 6ly. The information ought to be in the same County, by the Statute of 21 Jac. and the Barons of the Exchequer are not judges by the Statute, and so prays judgement against the Defendant. Hales of Council with the Defendant answered to the third exception. That in the Exchequer there is a Court the 10. of September to receive informations, although it be out of the Term time. And he said there is a good issue joined, and a good verdict, for the words juxta et contra in this place have one and the same sense. And the judgement is also good. And the information was well brought in the Exchequer, notwithstanding the Statute of 21 Jac. for the offence was in Midlesex where the Exchequer is. Also if the judgement be not good by reason of Error, yet it shall be accounted good, till it be avoided by plea: And although it be erroneous, yet here is a discontinuance; for Mich. 24 Car. St. john was chief justice of the Commons Pleas, and not solliciter, as the plea supposeth. The Court answered, that they cannot take notice of that: And here is no issue joined, nor any continuance to part of the plea pleaded by the Defendant, and the demurrer goes not to the plea, upon which the party puts himself upon the Country, and there is no demurrer to that. The demurrer is referred to the last plea, and not to all, and so there is a discontinuance to part, and the first judgement is not void, until it be avoided by plea, and here the fact was done in the County where the Exchequer is, Void and ●oideable. Discontinuance. C●r●●orari. and so the Barons are judges of it by the Statute, and a fine that is voideable is not void, until it be made so by pleading. And if you cannot answer the discontinuance, all the rest is to no purpose, therefore take time to answer that. It was said also by the Court, that the Defendant may remove an information exhibited against him, out of any County to the Courts at Westminster, notwithstanding the Statute. Hamond against Kingsmill. Pasc. 1649. Banc. sup. HAmond a justice of peace brought an Action upon the Case against Kingsmill, Arrest of in an action ●●r words. for speaking these several words of him, viz. Mr Hamond did of his own head put into Moor's confession that he stole the Lambs. And 2ly. That he was a debauched man, and is not fit to be a justice of Peace. Upon not guilty pleaded, and a verdict for the Plaintiff, The Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement that none of the words were actionable, or at least the last words are not, and so judgement cannot be given. For the first words he said, they ought to be taken in mitiori sensu, and they may have a good construction, viz. that he framed the confession without being helped by any other body. And for the second words that he was a debanched man they cannot touch his office at the present; Mich. 24, & 25. Eliz. C. Banc. 1. because they are spoken in the preterperfect tense, & not in the present tense. The Court said that the words, was a debauched man, are incertain words. Therefore take judgement for the first words, and nil capiat per billam for the second, except cause showed to the contrary. jenning's against Lee. Pasc. 1649. Banc. sup. jenning's brought an Action of Assault and Battery against Lee, For a repleader because an immaterial issue joined. The Defendant pleaded none cull. to the Battery, and pleaded a special justification as to the Assault. It was prayed there might be a repleader granted, because the issue joined is immaterial. The Council on the other side prayed for judgement. Wild held, that there is an Issue joined, for the Record faith so, and the jury have found the Issue, and if it be ill, it is not helped by the Statute, and so there can be no judgement. All issues are not joined by an express affirmative, and an express negative, for if it be but by implication it is good enough. An immaterial Issue is not helped by the Statute; but an informal issue is helped, and here the issue is immaterial, 32 Eliz. Lovelace and Griffin, rot. 934. Trin. 22 Car. Coles case, rot. 932 Banc. Reg. 23 Car. More and Clipson, and prays for a repleader. Sergeant Parker on the other side said, the cases cited were not to the purpose as to the Case at the Bar, for here is a good issue joined to one thing pleaded, if not to the rest. Roll chief justice held, that where there is an immaterial issue, there ought to be a Repleader, and it is not helped by the Statute, and there can be no judgement, for the matter is not putin trial, Repleader. and for this cause, it would be unreasonable to give judgement, jeofail. Issue. and this is an immaterial issue, Trin. 9 Car. entered Mich. 8 Car. rot. 366. Tailor and Sparks, an affirmative and an employed negative make a good issue, though it be not an express negative. Therefore replead. Hurd against Lenthall. Hill. 1649. Banc. sup. Entered Mi h. 1649. rot. 568. Upon a special verdict in an ejectione firmae, Question upon the words of a will whether a joint-tenancy or a tenancy in Common. The Case upon the words of a Will was this, Lands were devised to two daughters equally to be divided, and to the Survivor of them, and to the Heirs of the Body of the Survivor of them. Maynard held that here is a joint-tenancy, because otherwise the Will cannot take effect in all parts. Hales held that there is a tenancy in Common, and not a joint-tenancy, nor any cross remainders. Roll Chief justice said, That the words equally to be divided in a Will, joint-tenant. Tenant in common. do make a tenancy in Common by construction, but in a grant it would be otherwise; but here upon the entire Will it doth not appear that the Lands should be divided; but that there should be a Survivor. And the Land was intended for a security for a portion, and that the devise should stand till the monies should be paid. And in a Will the last words of it do explain the first words; but it is not so in a grant. Will. Grant. All the judges agreed in opinion with the chief justice, and judgement was given for the Plaintiff nisi causa, etc. Pasc. 1649. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved for a Certiorari, For a certiorari to the Lord Mayor's court. of London. Certiorari. to the Lord Mayor's Court of the City of London to remove an information exhibited in that Court, against a Woodmonger of London, grounded upon an Act of Common Council. The Court answered, we cannot do any thing in it, if it should be removed hither, if it be grounded upon an act of Common Council; but if the Act of Common Council be against Law, we may grant a Certiorari. Adjourned till Friday next to hear Council on both sides. Lamb against Duff. Pasc. 16●●. Banc. sup. Upon an Affidavit the Court was informed that Lamb had arrested Duff after a verdict found for Lamb against him, to the intent, For false practice. that he may have him in Custody, when the judgement is entered against him, and for no other cause, as appears by his own confession, & it was therefore prayed the party may be set at large. The Court made answer, that this was a strange and an irregular course, and ought not to be. If one take out a latitat against one, and have no cause of Action against him, the party may have an Action of the Case for it. Case. Parliament. Take an attachment if he will not discharge the party, or else let him show cause to morrow why he should not discharge him. Hollingworth against Whetstone. Pas. 1649. Banc. sup. HOllingworth brought an Action of Debt upon a single obligation against Whetstone, Demurrer to a plea in debt upon a single obligation. Bar. Abatement. The Defendant pleaded payment of part of the sum, since the Action brought, in Bar of the Action. To this Plea the Plaintif demurred. The Court answered the plea was not good in Bar of the Action; but in abatement of the Writ it had been good. Therefore let the Defendant show cause why judgement should not be against him upon the demurrer. Gibbon against Kent. Pasch. 1649. Banc. sup. Pasch. 24 Car. rot. 60. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in the Common Pleas, Error to reverse a judgement in debt upon the Statute of 2 Ed. 6 in an Action of Debt brought upon the Statute of 2. Ed. 6. for the not setting forth of Tithes. The Errors assigned were, 1. That it doth not appear that the Lands sowed do lie in the Parish that is laid in the Declaration. 2ly. The Plaintiff hath not entitled himself well to his Action, for the Statute of 3● H. 8. is taken away by the Statute of 13 Eliz. 3ly. The Statute is not well pleaded, for it is pleaded too generally, and not in the several circumstances thereof, as it ought to be. The Court commanded the Record to be read, and upon Dyer of it, answered, That 2 Churches united by the Statute, are both of spiritual promotion. And the Statute of 12 Eliz doth not repeal the Statute of 38 H. 8. But let the party show cause why the judgement should not be reversed, Repeal. and let us see a book. Burton against Low. Pasc. 1649. Banc. sup. Mich. 1649. rot. 27. AN Action of Debt was brought upon a Bond taken by a Sheriff, Demurrer to a plea in debt upon a Sheriffs Bond. for the Defendant to appear in Chancery upon an Attachment issued out thence against him. The Defendant pleads the Statute of 23 H. 6. That the Sheriff ought not to take Bonds of any, but in special cases, and that this Bond is void, because it is taken against the Statute. To this plea the Plaintiff demurred. The question was whether an Atatchment out of the Chancery, be within the Statute of 23 H. 6. The Court ordered cause to be shown why judgement should not be given for the Plaintif upon this Demurrer. Postea. Edward's against Fallows. Pasch. 1649. Banc. sup. Edwards' brought an Action upon the Case against Fallows for speaking of these words of him, viz. Arrest of judgement in an Action for words. Edward's hath stolen my Axe from my Wood Pen, and for causing him to be bound over to the Quarter-Session. It was moved in Arrest of judgement that the words were not Actionable. But the Court held they were actionable, and gave judgement for the plaintiff, Nisi causa, etc. Viccarye against Barns. Pasch. 1649. Banc. sup. rot. 1724. VIccarye, being a Mercer by his Trade, Arrest of judgement for words. brought an Action upon the Case against Barns for speaking these words of him, viz. Thou art a Cuckold, and a Cuckoldly Rascal, and dost owe more than thou art worth, and are not able to pay thy debts: Upon non culp. pleaded, and an issue joined, and a verdict found for the plaintiff, it was moved in Arrest of judgement, that the words are not actionable; for, for the first part of the words they are clearly not actionable, and for the latter words they do not imply any shifting fraud or falsehood, and so cannot imply him to be a Bankrupt; for though he do owe more than he is worth, and is not able to pay his debts, yet he may be an honest man, and he may have credit and friends to support him in his trade. Apes and More, Pasch. 15 Car. and jones and jacob, ●4 Car. The Court answered, here is no fraud or deceit employed, which do make a Bankrupt within all the Statutes touching Bankrupts; and if there be a special loss alleged, the words will be actionable, otherwise not. Bankrupt. But let judgement stay till the other side move, and bring us a book, for the words are worthy consideration. Postea. Barnestone against Gale. Pasch. 1649. Banc. sup. AN Action of Trespass was brought for chase of the Plaintiffs Hogs; Arrest of judgement in Trespass. the Defendant by way of justification pleads a special plea, viz. That he did hunt them with a Dog by the command of his Master, because the Plaintif did put them into his Master's ground to eat the Acorns there. The Plaintif replied that he had Common there: Upon this an Issue was joined, and a Verdict found for the Plaintif. Replication. The Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement upon this exception, that the Plaintif in his replication hath not answered the bar, for he prescribes only for Common of Pasture, and pannage is no pasture, and so he hath no right to the Acorns. But Roll chief justice said, If they have cause to eat the Grass, they may also eat the Acorns there, for they may be on the grounds, and therefore it is a good justification. And therefore let the Plaintif have judgement, except cause be shown to the contrary. Bolton against Wills. Pasch. 1649. Banc. sup. AN Action upon the Case was brought upon an indebitatus Assumpsit for a hundred and ninety Wethers sold by the Plaintif unto the Defendant at 18 s. Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit. a sheep, which in all amounts to 190 l. Upon an Issue joined, and a Verdict for the plaintiff, It was moved in Arrest of judgement that the Declaration is not good, but mistakes the promise, for the Wethers promised to be paid for, do not amount to the sum for which the Declaration is laid. And also the issue is taken upon the immaterial part of the plea, and the matter well pleaded is waived. The Court answered, That mistaking of a judgement is a mistake of the Clerk, and is not material; Amendment. but here the Declaration itself is mistaken, and that is material; for the Action is grounded upon the promise in Law, upon the sale of the Sheep, Declaration. and not upon any new Contract, and by the sale there wants 2 s. in every Sheep to make up the sum demanded, therefore the Declaration is repugnant. Nil capiat per billam, nisi, etc. More against the Earl Rivers. Pasch. 1649 Banc. sup. Mich. 1649. rot. 588. Wilson of Council with More the Plaintif, argued against the Plea of Péerage pleaded by the Earl Rivers, as it is pleaded, and took these Exceptions. Argument against the plea of Peerage. 1. It appears not here by the return by what Warrant the Earl was committed, and brought hither, and so he hath no day in Court, and so the Plea is not good. 2ly. It is not showed by virtue of what Warrant he was taken. 3ly. The Plea is, 1. In abatement of the writ. 2ly. In avoidance of the Act of the judge, and the latter ought not to be questioned by Plea. 3ly. There is no Plea, but bare words, for he pleads the Common Law. 4ly. He pleads his Patent as Earl, only by way of Argument. 5ly. He ought to show the writ under the Seal, testifying the matter, 8 H. 6. f. 9 6ly. The investiture of the Earldom is the livery and seisin of the Earldom, and he hath omitted the pleading the Ceremonies of the investing, and so he doth not show that he is an Earl. By the Statute Law, Capias. viz. of E. 3. a Capias was given in debt, and before that a Summons was the process. The Council on the other side said they had demurred to the Plea, Summons. and shown the cause of their Demurrer; but the Court reproved them, because they had ruled the matter in Law should be argued at the Bar to inform their own judgements. Adjournatur Postea. Syms against Wilson. Pasch. 1649. Banc. sup. Pasch. 23 Car. rot. 120. SYms brought an action upon the Case upon the Statute of Monopolies against Wilson. Demurrer to a Plea in Bar in an Action upon the case. The Defendant pleaded the Statute of limitations of Actions in Bar of the Action to this Plea, the Plaintif demurred. Hales held that this action grounded upon the Statute is not within the Statute of limitations of Actions of 21 jac. because it is not a mere Action on the Case at the Common Law, but an Action upon the Case grounded upon the Statute of Monopolies. But Twisden on the other side said that a Monopoly is an offence at the Common Law, Monopoly. for which an Action of the Case did lie before the Statute, and that the Statute was made but to inflict a greater punishment for the offence, and so it is within the Statute of limitations of Actions. And 2ly. the very words of the Statute say, that all Actions shall be brought within six years, and he that says all without limitation, Statu●e of limitations. excludes none, and by consequence this Action is not excluded. 3ly. The end of the Statute of limitations was to quiet sales, and therefore the Statute shall be largely interpreted, because made for so public a good. Adjourned to the next term to be argued again. Pasch. 1649. Banc. sup. Upon a verdict given against a Hundred, that was sued in an Action upon the Statute of Winchester of Hue and Cries, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the Statute of Winchester. Bill. Original. It was moved for the Hundred in Arrest of judgement, that the Hundred was sued by Bill, whereas it ought to have been sued by Original. But the Court overruled the Exception, and said that there are many Precedents to prove that such Actions may be commenced as well by Bill as by Original. Pasch. 1649. Banc. sup. LEtchmore moved to quash an Inquisition taken against one upon the Statute of West. 2. for the throwing down of Enclosures. To quash an Inquisition denied. But the Court answered, that it was not proper to move to quash the Inquisition, because the Defendant came in upon process, and therefore he must either traverse or plead to the Inquisition. Letchmore replied, that the Inquisition was so uncertain, that the Defendant could not tell how to plead to it. Plea. Traverse. But the Court answered, he might plead to the Distringas, And that the moneys already levied for the offence should rest in the Sheriffs hand until the trial. Hamond against Ireland. Pasch. 1649. Banc. sup. Hill. 1649. rot. 818. Upon a Verdict given in an Ejectione firmae, Arrest of judgement in an Ejectine firmae. It was moved in Arrest of judgement, that the Plaintif declares that the Defendant ejected him ex uno Cottagio, whereas an Ejectione firmae lies not of a Cottage, no more than a praecipe quod reddat lies of a Cottage. But the Court answered, that an ejectment doth lie of a Cottage, because the description of the thing by that name is sufficient and certain enough to show the Sheriff of what to deliver the possession of; Ejectment. Recovery. yet it was said that a recovery lies not of a Cottage. Rhetoric and Chapels case 10 jac. was cited that an Ejectione lies of a Cottage, and also a praecipe quod reddat. Wood against Topham. Pasch. 1649. Banc. sup. Wood brought an Action upon the Case against Topham, quare filium suum & haeredem rapuit et maritavit, Arrest of judgement in an action upon the case. and obtained a Verdict against the Defendant. In Arrest of judgement moved for the Defendant, these exceptions were taken against the Declaration. 1. That it doth not say haeredem apparentem, but only filium & haeredem. 2ly. It doth not say rapuit contra voluntatem, but only rapuit. 3ly. It doth not set forth that the heir was within age. 4ly. It doth not say Cujus maritagium ad ipsum pertiner. But the last Exception only was insisted upon. Wilmot of Council with the Plaintif, to prove that that Exception was not material, cited one Gray's case Pasch. 29 Eliz. Banc. reg. and the Books of 12 H. 4. f. 16. and 23 E. 3. Brook Tit. Trespass 43. But Hales urged that the last Exception was not answered. Case. Roll chief justice said, That an Action quare filium & haeredem suum rapuit will lie, although the heir be of full age; for the Father hath the marriage of his Son although he have no estate to leave unto him. Adjourned to the next Term. Postea. 227. Dawkes versus Payton. Pasch. 1469. Banc. sup. Pasch 1650. rot. 306. AN Infant brought an Action in this Court, Error brought in the Upper Bench upon a judgement given there. and had a Verdict and a judgement, the Defendant brought a writ of Error in the same Court to reverse this judgement, and it was assigned for Error that the Infant brought his Action in propria persona, whereas he ought to have sued per guardianum, and this is Error at the Common Law, and is not helped by the Statute of jeofails; and it was argued that the writ of Error may be well brought in this Court to reverse a judgement given here, if the Error assigned be matter in fact, as it is in this case, for by such a writ of Error the judgement of the Court is not called in question, as it would be if the Error assigned were matter in Law; and these Books were cited, Error. viz. 7 H. 6. 28. Dyer 196. Mich. 25, & 26. Eliz. Banc. reg. Hales on the other side argued that the writ of Error did not lie. And he made 2 questions, 1. Whether the writ of Error did lie at all. 2ly. If it did lie in an other Term; and he said, that admitting the writ of Error doth lie, yet it ought to have been brought the same Term wherein the judgement was given; but so it is not here, and therefore it is not well brought: And 2ly. If the Error assigned be Error, yet it is helped by the Statute of 21 jac. of jeofails. But if it be not, yet the Error assigned here is not assignable; for it doth not appear whether the party appeared per guardianum or not, for the party is a privileged person. The Court answered, we cannot know whether the party be within age or of full age, and therefore know not whether he ought to appear by Attorney or by Guardian; but for Error in matter of fact, in a judgement given in this Court, a writ of Error will lie here well enough, and it is all one whether the writ be brought the same Term, or in another Term. But bring us Books and we will advise, Postea. Viccarye against Barnes. Pasch. 1650. Banc. sup. AN Action upon the case was brought by a Mercer against the Defendant, for speaking these words of him, Thou art a Cuckold, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the Case for words. and a Cuckoldly Rascal, and art not able to pay thy debts, and art not worth a Groat. The Plaintif had a Verdict, and upon a motion in Arrest of judgement, because the words were supposed not actionable, the judgement was formerly stayed till the Plaintif should move. At this day Pepes for the Plaintif prays for judgement, because he held the words were actionable, and cited one Brags Case, adjudged, and said that the Plaintif had laid a special damage by the words. Windham on the other side said, That the Plaintif had not laid any special damage as Pepes supposeth, but only allegeth a general damage, namely, that he by speaking of the words lost his credit, and could not buy wares upon trust as he used to do before, but only for ready money, and so there can be no issue joined. jerman justice held the words actionable, and also Roll the chief justice, for he said it was a hindrance to him in his Trade to be so spoken of, although they bring him not within the Statute of Bankrupt, and he cited 11 Car. jackson and Hewes his case, where an Action was brought by jackson being a Grazier, against Hewes, for saying of him Thou art a base beggarly Rogue, and art not able to pay thy debts. Nicholas Justice held the words actionable, but Ask justice doubted, for such words may peradventure be true, it they be spoken of a young Tradesman that gins with little. And said that the chief question is whether the averment of the damage be well alleged; and he held it was not, because it was so general that no issue can be joined upon it. Roll chief justice said, the words are found by the Verdict to be spoke falso et malitiose, And therefore let the Plaintif have his judgement except better matter be showed. Pasch. 1650. Banc. sup. AN Information was exhibited in this Court against one for engrossing of Hay, the Defendant appeared and pleaded to the information, For the Defendant to try an Information at his own charge denied. Indictment. Information. the Plaintif moved that the Defendant might, be ordered to carry the cause down to be tried at the Assizes at his own charge. But the Court answered that they could make no such Order, because the suit was not upon an Endictment, which is at the suit of the Custodes, but upon an information, which is at the suit of the party. Cater against Startute. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. Hill. 1649. rot. 1025. THe Plaintif brought an Action of Debt upon an Obligation to stand to an award: The Defendant pleaded that there was no award made; Demurrer to a replication in debt upon an Obligation to stand to an award. The plaintiff replies that there was an award made, and sets forth the award, and assigns the breach; Upon this the Defendant demurs, and for cause shows that part of the award was, that one of the parties should make such a general release to the other as Council should advise, so that the Council are made Arbitrators, in regard that a judicial act is referred to them, which ought not to be; for the Arbitrators cannot delegate their authority to others, Ministerial. Act Judicial. and 8 E. 4. f. 10. was cited to this purpose. But Wild on the other side said, that the referring of the making of the releases to Council was warrantable, because it is but a ministerial act, and not a judicial, as is objected. Roll chief justice said, that there is no judicial thing left for the Council to do, but only a ministerial act, and therefore it is well enough; but it had been otherwise had it been a judicial act, for that had been for the Arbitrators to delegate their authority to others, which is not warrantable, because it is contrary to the submission of the parties, but to delegate a ministerial act is not contrary; And with him the Court agreed, and ordered the plaintiff to take his judgement, except better matter were shown Saturday next. Dawkes against Payton. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. Pasch. 1650. rot. 306. AN Action was ordered out of the Chancery to be tried in this Court; Whereupon the cause was tried, Error to reverse a judgement in the Upper Bench. upon an issue directed out of the Chancery. and a judgement upon a Verdict was given for the Plaintif. The Defendant brings a writ of Error here to reverse this judgement. The first question was, whether it did sufficiently appear by the Record, whether the party did appear in person or by Guardian. Hales held that it did not appear, but that it belongs to the other party to show it; for he ought to have all the Record upon which the Error is assigned. A second question was, Whether the Error assigned, if it be Error, be not helped after a Verdict by the Statute of 21 jac. Hales held, that however the party appeared, whether by Guardian, or in proper person, it is helped by the Statute of 21 jac. and cannot be assigned here for Error, and the writ of Error that is brought is as well to reverse the judgement given here, as the former judgement given in Chancery, which cannot be, for this Court cannot reverse their own judgement, except it be for Error in process, 1● H. 6. 2. 44. 7 H. 6. f. 28. nor can this Court reverse their own judgement for Error in fact, because it is to overthrow their own act, yet the Chequer chamber may do it; yet there it is more proper to appeal to the Parliament; and he said, that the Cases of 2 Rich. 3. f. 1. and Dyer 1●5. cited, to be resolved, have been since disputed, and so prayed the writ of Error might abate. Roll chief justice said, that for the first matter, whether it appears by the assignment of the party, whether the appearance were per Guardianum, Appearance. or otherwise, we will not imagine either Attorney or Guardian in the Case, but that he appeared in propria persona, because nothing to the contrary appears by the Record, Error. and if it be otherwise you ought to have shown it. And for the matter, whether it be Error to appear by Attorney, where the party ought to appear by his Guardian, he held it was Error, and that it is not helped by the Statute of 21 jac. because it is more dangerous for an Infant to appear in propria persona, or per Guardianum, than per Attornatum; for against an Attorney he may have remedy, but not against himself or his Guardian; and this is casus omissus out of the Statute. And as to the question, Casus omissus whether this Court may reverse their own judgement, he held, that they may for Error in matter of fact, as the case here is, though they cannot for Error in matter in Law, as was adjudged, Mich. 25. rot. 96. and Mich. 5 Jac. in Watkins and Giffins case, and if it should not be so here, the party would be without remedy, for he can have no remedy in the Chequer Chamber, and there is no precedent in Parliament be to relieved there, and it is neither against reason nor any Rule of Law for this Court to do it. Upon this the Council moved to quash the writ of Error upon an exception taken to it, as it was entered in the Record, but because it was but a mis-entry, the writ itself being right, Amendment. the Record was ordered to be amended by the Writ. Roberrs and Tucker. Trin. 1650 Banc. sup. Pasch 18. Car. rot. 116. THe Court was moved to quash a writ of Error, because the writ was to remove a Record coram Majori et Recordatori, To quash a Writ of Eror. whereas the Record certified was a Record coram Majori et Deputato recordatori. Roll chief justice, the Record is not well removed, why may you not have a new Certificate upon the same writ? But that cannot be, and therefore you must have a special writ directed to remove the Record before the Mayor and the Deputy Recorder; Alteration. for if there be a special cause to alter the usual form of a writ, the Cursitors ought not to hold themselves to the old precedents, but are compellable to alter them if the case require. Abatement. Therefore let the writ be abated, and take another Writ. Vid. ante●. Shertlife against Tymberlye. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. Hill. 1649. rot. 438. SHertlife brought an Action of Debt against Tymberlye upon an Obligation, Demurrer to ● Plea in debt upon an Obligation to save harmless. the condition whereof was, that the Defendant should save the plaintiff harmless from such a person, & should release unto him all his right in certain goods: The Defendant pleads that he had saved the plaintiff harmless, and had released unto him all his right in the goods, and to this plea the Plaintif demurred, and shows for cause that the Defendant ought to have showed how he had saved the plaintiff harmless, because the condition was in the affirmative. To which the Court agreed, because he might have pleaded generally in the negative, viz. non damnificatus, and that had been good, and therefore judgement was given against the Defendant. Non damnificatus. Hobson against Hudson. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. HObson brought an Action upon the Case against Hudson for these words, Thou goest to the Wells to be cured of the Pox: Arrest of Judgement in an Action for words. The Plaintif had a Verdict against the Defendant, who moved in Arrest of judgement that the words were not actionable, because they were too general and uncertain. But Roll chief justice, and Nicholas and Ask justices held they were actionable. But jerman justice doubted, because the party that went to the Wells to be cured might suspect he had the Pox though he had them not, But judgement was given for the Plaintiff. Elsy agginst Mawdit. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. Pasc. 1650. rot. 409. ELsye brought an Action upon the case against Mawdit for speaking these words of him; Arrest of judgement in an action for words. Thou Sirrah art a rogue and a runaway rogue, and didst run away from Oxford, and art a rogue upon Record at Oxford. The Plaintiff upon not guilty pleaded had a verdict, the Defendant moved in arrest of judgement that the words were general, and uncertain, and not actionable the Court thereupon stayed judgement till the Plaintiff should move. The Plaintiff at another day moves by, Hales of his Council for judgement, who said that the words are actionable, or at least some of them, for thou art a rogue upon Record are actionable words, and that is part of the words. The Court inclined also that they were actionable, yet would advise. Postea. The same Term judgement was given for the Plaintiff. Chase and jones against Lovering. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. CHase and jones brought an Action upon the case against Lovering, Arrest of judgement in an action upon the case upon a pr●mise. upon a promise made by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs to pay unto them 84 l. out of the freight of a Ship and for not paying it the Plaintiffs bring their Action. Upon non assumpsit pleaded there was an issue joined, and a verdict found for the Plaintiffs. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, & allegeth for cause that the Plaintiffs averment in their Declaration of the non payment of the 84 l. is not good, Averment. for it doth not appear by the averment that there was any freight due for the Ship, out of which the moneys were to be paid. Roll chief justice answered, that the Plaintiff ought to have averred that there were moneys due for the freight of the Ship, otherwise how can it be known whether there be any money's due to be paid out of them, therefore the averment is very incertain, to whom jerman Nicholas and Ask justices agreed. Roll Chief justice added, that it is part of the promise that the money shall be paid out of the freight, and as the averment is; the matter cannot stand together, and here is no demand for the monies to be paid out of the freight. Therefore against the Plaintiff let there be a nil capiat per billam entered. Blackden against Harvye. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. Hill. 1649. rot. 928. BLackden brought an Action upon the Case, upon an indebitatus assumpsit to pay unto him 9 l. upon delivery of certain Cloth against Harvy as Executor of I. S. Demurrer upon a plea of er imparlance. The Defendant appeared and imparled; and after imparlance pleads in abatement of the Writ, that I. S. made other Executors together with the Defendant, who ought to have been named in the Writ. The Plaintiff denturs, and for cause shows, 1. That the Plaintiff doth not show what goods the Defendant administered, nor at what time he administered any, as he ought, and 6. lac Edwards and Foyes case was cited to prove it. A second cause of the demurrer was, that the plea in abatement of the Writ is after imparlance, which is not good, because it is touching a thing in the Defendants knowledge, and so he might have pleaded it before imparlance, as it is 35 H. 6. f. 36. jerman justice absent Roll answered, that the first exception is not material; Abatement. but he held that the second was a good exception, and that the Defendant cannot plead in abatement after imparlance, for by his imparlance he hath admitted the Writ good. Therefore'plead in chief if cause be not showed to the contrary on Friday next Winter against Barnard. Trin. 1650. Banc. up. Winter brought an Action upon the Case against Barnard, Arrest of judgement in an action for words. and declared, that upon the rumour that a Bastard Child was drownded. The Defendant said to the Plaintiff, I do verily believe the Bastard Child was thine, nay it was thine; upon not guilty pleaded an issue was joined, and a verdict found for the Plaintiff: It was moved in arrest of judgement that the words are not actionable, as they are laid for that it doth not appear that there was a Bastard Child drowned, for the Declaration is that there was only a rumour, that a Bastard Child was drowned. But all the Court agreed, that by the conference set forth in the Declaration, it is agreed that there was a Bastard Child, and it is a scandal to the party, whether there were a Bastard Child or no, and if there were none, you ought to show it on the Defendants part. Therefore let the Plaintiff have his judgement. Elsy against Mawdit. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. Pasc. 1650. rot. 409. THe Case of Elsy and Maw dit was again moved, Arrest of judgement in an action for words. wherein the Plaintiff had a verdict against the Defendant, in an Action upon the Case brought against him, for speaking these words of him; Thou Sirrah art a rogue, and a runaway rogue, and didst run away at Oxford, and art a rogue upon Record at Oxford; upon a motion in arrest of judgement; judgement was stayed till the Plaintiff should move. Hales now moved for judgement, because the words are actionable, for they make the Plaintiff to be such a Rogue as may be indicted within the Statute, and receive corporal punishment; But Twisden denied it. Roll chief justice held it was within the Statute. Yet the Court would advise. In this case jerman justice said, That if one say that another is forsworn in a Court of Record, the words are not actionable; but if he say that he is forsworn upon Record, the words are actionable. But Roll chief justce held there was no difference between the words, but that they are both Actionable. Antea et Postea. More against the Earl Rivers. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. Mich. 1649, rot. 588. MOre Arrested the Earl Rivers by a bill of Midlesex in a plea of Debt. The Earl was thereupon brought before Mr. justice Nicholas to put in bail, Earl Rivers case touching privilege of pecrage. and not being able to put in sufficient bail according to the course of the Court, was committed to the custody of the Marshal of the Marshalsea, the Earl being in custody brings himself into Court by a habeas corpus, and there pleads his privilege of his peerage, and says, that he ought not to be arrested, and demands judgement of the Writ, and prays to be delivered; to this the Plaintiff demurred. Hales of Council with the Earl argued to divers points, but I could not hear him well. But the main question he insisted upon was, whether that by taking away the house of Lords in Parliament, whereby their voice and place in Parliament was gone, the Privilege of his peerage not to be arrested for Debt, was also taken away, and he argued that it was not, for he said, that at the Common Law, no capias did lie against a Peer, Capias. and the Statute of E. 3. which gave a capias for Debt against others, did not give it against a Peer, and it doth appear here that the Defendant is really an Earl, and not in nomination only, and he cited 27 H. 8. f. 22. b The reasons he said why an Earl had the privilege not to be arrested, are two. The first is in respect of the dignity of his person, being called comes a comitando rege (as some have thought,) and he is called by the King consanguineus noster. The second is in respect of the presumption of his sufficiency of estate in lands to be summoned by, and not by reason of his place in Parliament, for they have the privilege not to be arrested, as well in the vacancy of Parliaments, as when the Parliament doth sit, and the privilege of Parliament is that he shall not be sued; but the privilege of peerage is, that he shall not be arrested in his person, and so they are distinct privileges, and by taking away the Lords house, the former privilege is taken away, but not the latter, and this privilege (annexed to the person) not to be arrested, may belong to a person that hath not the privilege of Parliament, as for example unto Widows of Peers which could not be arrested, and yet had no place in Parliament, so that the excluding them from the Parliament doth only take away their privilege of Parliament, and not their privilege of peerage, and Neulils case is, that the privilege not to be arrested belongs to them in respect of the dignity of their persons, 9 Rep. Salops case. And it hath been a question whether comes be so called a comitando rege, or in respect of their Counties whereof they were Earls, and I conceive the latter derivation is the truer, and then the taking away the King takes not away their privilege, for the Counties remain. 2ly. Earls have by intendment sufficient fréehold to enfcore them to come in, and answer at this day, and therefore are not to be arrested, and imprisonment of a man's person for debt, was but a supplement to make him answer where he had not sufficient freehold, which we cannot intent here, Nat. brev. f. 93. And an Earl shall be amerced higher than another man, in regard of the presumption of his freehold, and Earls are called majores Barones in this respect, 7 E. 4 Nevil's case, and the widow of an Earl had the privilege not to be arrested, for the two very reasons that her husband had it, so was it of a Bishop, Abbot, and Prior of England; but otherwise it was of a Bishop that had a Bishopric out of England. And the late Statute that takes away the Kingly office, doth not take away their names, and dignities, nor the presumption that they have fréeholds, and therefore they are not to be arrested, and their will be since the Act, no more a failer of right than there was before, and so he prayed the Writ might be abated. Abatement. Roll chief justice answered, your Client ought to have prayed the Writ might have abated, before he was turned over to the Marshal of this Court●, for than he was in Midlesex where he was arrested; but now it is too late, for now he is in custodia Marescalli, Declaration. and any body that hath cause of Action against him may declare against him. jerman justice said, that the Writ is now determined, which you pray to have abated, so your prayer is to no purpose. Roll chief justice said, that the dignity of the person of an Earl may relate to him as he is Peer of the Parliament, and the other presumption that he hath sufficient freehold may also fail; but it doth not appear here by averment that he hath not freehold, therefore it may be a question whether there shall be intended a sailer of justice, for want of freehold, if the party should not have been arrested, and he agreed that an Earl as a Peer of Parliament had a double privilege, one of his person to be free from arrests, Arrests. the other of his Estate to be free from suits, and he said, if it had appeared by averment that the party had freehold, it had been good without doubt to free him from arrests. jerman justice said he is now in custodia, and the Declaration against him is good, and now it is too late to claim his privilege. Nicholas in all points was against the privilege. Roll chief justice asked, what say you to them that have Declarations on the by against the Earl, Declaration. for certainly they are good whether he be rightly committed or not, for they are not to examine his commitment, and therefore surely it is now too late to speak in abatement of the Writ. Nayler against Ash. Trin. 1050. Banc. sup. Hill. 23 Car. rot. 611. NAyler brought an Action upon the Statute of 5 Eliz. against Ash in this Court for using the Trade of a Draper, Arrest of judgement in ●n action upon the Statute of 5 El. or using the ●ade of a Draper. and upon not guilty pleaded there was an issue joined, and a verdict found for the Plaintiff. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, and took two exceptions to the Plaintiffs Declaration. 1. That the Statute doth not name the trade. 2. That it being a popular Action, it ought to have been brought in the County where the offence was committed, and not in this Court. To the 1. Exception the Council on the Plaintiffs side answered, that the trade is comprised in the meaning of the Statute, because it was a trade used at the time of the making of the Statute. And to the second he answered, that notwithstanding that the original process issued out of this Court, yet the trial thereupon was in the County where the offence was done, and the remedy that the Statute intends, is made use of by the trial being in the County where the offence was done. Roll chief justice answered, we directed you to search for precedents, but you have not done it. But I conceive the Statute is not satisfied, for it says that the party shall not be compelled to appear out of the County, and here he is compelled, Appearance. and this is not helped by the verdict, to which the Court agreed. Ernely against Allen. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. Mich. 1649. rot. 351. ERnely brought an Action of Trover and conversion against Allen, Error to reverse a judgement in a Trover and Conversion. for taking away, and converting to his own use divers of his goods, and Chattels, and amongst others he declares for the Trover and Conversion de ducentis ponderibus, anglice weight, medicamenti, anglice drugs; the Plaintiff had a verdict, and a judgement, and entire damages given for all the things laid in the Declaration. The Defendant brought a Writ of error to reverse this judgement, and assigns for Error, that the words de ducentis ponderibus, anglice weight, medicamenti, anglice drugs, mentioned in the Declaration are incertain, and so the damages being given entire for all, it was not good. Wadham Windham of Council with the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error, held the words to be incertain, both in respect of quantity, as also in respect of the quality or nature of the drugs, for the word pondus may signify a pound, an ounce, a dram, a scruple, or any other weight, so that the weight cannot be known. And the anglice weight is as incertain as the Latin word pound, for weight may signify as many different weights as the Latin word pondus may; But it might have been otherwise, if it had been anglice a stone, or a weigh, which were words certainly known what they mean; but here a weight of drugs is not understood by the Drugster's. And for the words they shall not be said to be void, so that there are no damages given for them, for the words are not like to the words duodecem duodena fili, for they are adjective words; but the words here are substantive, and signify by themselves. And the word medicamentum also is as incertain as the other words, and the anglice drugs doth not make it more certain, for a drug is of as an incertain signification as the word medicamentum, for all vegetable creatures, and extractions out of them, as also out of the living creatures, made use of in physic, either by themselves, or else compounded one with another, are called drugs, and so he prayed the judgement might be reversed. Maynard on the other side said, that the words joined with the anglice were certain enough, for pondus signifies a weight, which word is well and commonly known amongst the Drugster's how much it contains, and he cited one Pennyes Case, where decem ponderibus without an anglice was held good; and one Wardners' Case 21 jac. in this Court. Next for the word medicamentum being joined with an anglice, it is a good word to express drugs, for of itself it is no Latin word to signify any certain thing, and here is no incertainty in the matter, for if I may be brought to a certainty to the juries' understanding, and it is not necessary to express the matter like a Scholar, or a Philosopher, but only as they are known by tradesmen according to common understanding. And in an Action brought amongst other things, for a Library of Books, which is more incertain, judgement was given for the Plaintiff, and Melbuis Case, where the Declaration inter alia was pro decem ponderibus ferri, ten tuns of Iron, was agreed between the parties, and Laurence and Turner's Case, Mich. 23. jac. in Trover and Conversion, pro tribus ponderibus lani, was naught, because it was without an anglice. Sergeant Glin argued to the same effect on the same side. Hales on the otherside said, that notwithstanding the anglice the Declaration was incertain. And it is not like the cases de tribus ponderibus, Anglice, weights of Cheese, or Salt, or stone weight of Cheese. And the word medicamentum is as uncertain as the other word, for it signifies divers species of things. But Roll chief justice held, that the Drugs were well expressed by the words in the Declaration in the vulgar and usual acceptation of the words; Declaration. and for the word weight it is also well known amongst Tradesmen. Nicholas justice said, we must not frame niceties to overthrow judgements, and here is certainty enough in both the words to describe the thing, and it is impossible to express them aptly and particularly. Roll chief justice said, the Declaration is two hundred weight, and every one knows the meaning of a Hundred. jerman justice held the Declaration certain enough, and cited a case where one declared pro decem doliis spirituum, Anglice, ten Hogsheads of Spirits, and adjudged good. Ask of the same opinion, and so the judgement was affirmed, nisi. Dudeny against colyer. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. Hill. 23 Car. rot. 156. DUdeny brought a writ of Error against colyer to reverse a judgement upon a nibil dicit given against him at the Court of Barnestable in an Action of debt brought upon an Obligation, and assigns for Error, Error to reverse a judgement upon a Nihil dicit in debt upon an Obligation. that the Condition of the Bond was for the payment of money at Wotton Courtney, which is not within the jurisdiction of the Court, and so they cannot hold plea for it at Barnestable, and the judgement was given upon a nihil dicit, because the Plea being foreign the Defendant would not swear it, which in this case he is not bound to do. Roll chief justice, If it appear by the Declaration that the money was to be paid out of the jurisdiction of the Court, jurisdiction. the judgement is not good, and it is not necessary to swear the Plea, if it appears upon the Obligation that the moneys were to be paid out of the jurisdiction of the Court, Plea and he plead payment according to the Condition; judgement. but if one will not swear a foreign Plea where he ought to do it, the Plaintif may enter judgement upon a nihil dicit; for such a foreign Plea not sworn, is no Plea upon the matter. The judgement was reversed nisi, etc. Ley against Anderton. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. Pasch. 1650. rot. 524. Lay brought a writ of Error to reverse a judgement given in the Common Pleas for Anderton in an Action of Debt upon an Obligation, Error to reverse a judgement in debt upon an Obligation. and Assigns for Error that the Obligor in the Obligation upon which the Action was brought made his wife his Executrix, and died, and that the wife being Executrix died intestate; and that the plaintiff in the Action took administration of the goods and Chattels of the feme, and brought the action of Debt upon an Obligation, as Administrator to the wife; whereas the plaintiff aught first to have taken Letters of Administration de bonis non administratis of the Testator, and so to have brought his Action. Administration. To which the Court agreed; and said it is a plain fault, and reversed the judgement nisi, etc. Elsy against Mawdit. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. ELsy brought an action of Assault and Battery against Mawdit an Attorney of this Court, Whether the Hu●band must put in bail for his wife in assault and battery. and his wife. The Defendant Mawdit appeared in propria persona, and his wife was in custodia, and so the Plaintif declared against them; the question here was whether Mawdit the Defendant ought not to put in bail for his wife. Burrel of Council with the Defendant argued, that the Declaration was not good, because that the Husband Mawdit aught to have put in bail for his Wife, and cited Smith and Smith's case, and Mich. 17 Car. Simon fanshaw's case, and Dyer 377 a. and Brook title Privilege, 353 a. and 9 rep. Roll chief justice said, he ought to put in bail; therefore the plaintiff nil capiat per billam, Bail. because his Declaration is not good against her in Custodia. The City of London against De roy. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. LAtch shows for cause why a procedendo should not be granted to London against De roy, Cause why a a procedendo should not be granted to London. who upon a trial against him was committed in London for using the Trade of a working Goldsmith, and a working jeweller, not having served as an Apprentice to the Trade, and was brought hither by a Habeas Corpus. 1. That the Declaration is founded upon a By-law, and that By-law is founded upon a Custom, and if either the Custom or By-law be not good in all patts, the Declaration is naught; and here the Custom is certified in the negative, and this is oppositum in subjecto, and merely contradictory in itself, By-law. 8 E. 3. 77. and the By-law also that is certified is not certain, and it is also unreasonable, for every stroke the Defendant strikes, is using of his Trade, and it is unreasonable he should pay five pound for every stroke. 2ly. The Declaration is not applied to the By-law upon which it is grounded, for the doing of a thing one day is not using to do it, and the words diversis vicibus do not help it, for they are not applied to his working as a jeweller but to his working as a Goldsmith only; also it doth not appear who is to have the forfeiture for one third part of the fine set upon him; and it is not said that he gained his living by the Trade or sale of the commodity wrought, and the words of using it pro lucro et proficuo do not help it, for it may be he uses it for his private use, and that is to his profit, though he sell not the commodity. Next it is unreasonable that a stranger an Alfen shall be restrained by a By-law made 40 years ago, Notice. where of he had no notice, and that by reason of such a Law he should be punished for doing a thing which the Common Law allows, namely to get his own living. It is also said, Non existens liber homo usus est arte, etc. which are words very incertain; for by the offence so expressed every Apprentice may be punished for working, for an Apprentice is not Liber homo. Maynard on the other side cited 5 E. 3. that a negative with an affirmative employed is good, and that it is exclusive of Strangers, and inclusive of the Citizens. And the offence is the matter, & not the time of the Defendants using the Trade, & it is also well designed in all points to what use the fine is to be put; and if there be Error they ought to bring a writ of Error, and to except to the Declaration; And this case cannot be likened to an Apprentices working, for he uses the Trade not for himself but his Master's benefit. The Court desired books, and adjourned it till the next Term. Custodes libert. etc. against White. White was outlawed in an Action of Trespass, To reverse an Outlawry. Abreviation. It was moved to reverse the Outlawry, because in the exigent it was Utlest, being put for an abbreviation of utlagatus est, and upon this exception it was reversed. Disne against Grigson. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. Hill. 1649. rot. 98. DIsne brought an Action of Debt upon an Obligation against Grigson, Demurrer after an issue joined. the condition was for the payment of a certain sum of money upon the resignation of a living, and a certain annual sum at two payments. The plaintiff aseigns a breach in not paying such a sum at such a day, upon this the issue was entered, and after the Defendant demurs. Roll chief justice, The Defendant is a Madman, and we cannot give judgement against him, stay therefore till he is recovered. Yet take your judgement, nisi, judgement. Error. etc. for the other may bring his writ of Error if he will. Nota. Bernard against Levit. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. BErnard brought a writ of Error against Levit to reverse a judgement given against him in the Common Pleas in an action upon the case for speaking these words of him, Thou Bernard art a base fellow, Error to reverse a judgement in an Action upon the Case. and didst kill thy first wife. The Error assigned was that it doth not appear in the Declaration that the Plaintif was married before. But the Court affirmed the judgement, and said, the Defendant hath confessed it by joining issue non culp. upon the words. Wood against Topham. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. THis case being an Action upon the Case quare filium suum cepit et abduxit, Error to reverse a judgement in an Action on the Case. et maritavit, was again moved, and the exception insisted upon was, that the Plaintif doth not say Cujus maritagium ad ipsum pertiner. But Roll chief justice said, that it could not be otherwise intended, but that the marriage belongs to him, and it doth not appear that his Son was married before, and the value of the marriage is not here material; for the marriage of his Son belongs unto him as a parent, Marriage. in regard of his protection and advice. jerman differed, and said, that if he were married before, he was then Pater Familias, and is out of the protection of his Father. Protection But Nicholas and Ask justices agreed with Roll, and Roll said, the matter here is not the loss of the marriage, for that is but to increase the damages, but the Action lies only, quare cepit et abduxit. Adjourned to be argued the next Term. Antea et Postea. Oreswick against Armery. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. Mich. 1649. rot. 354. OReswick brought a writ of Error against Armery to reverse a judgement given against him in Bristol, Error to reverse a judgement in an Action of Debt. Debt. Custom. in an action of debt upon a Concessit solvere, according to the custom of the City; but the judgement was affirmed, for the Court said, an action of debt will lie by a custom upon a Concessit solvere, but not if it be brought against an Executor. Custodes Libertat. etc. against Valconbridge. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment of Assault and Battery. To quash an Endictment of Assault and Battery. The Exception was, that the Endictment was taken before the justices of Assize and Gaol delivery, and Oyer and Terminer, and so it doth not appear by virtue of what Commission it was taken. Roll chief justice, He ought to show by virtue of what Commission particularly it was taken, and therefore let it be quashed, and a fine of 40 s. set upon the Clerk of the Assizes for his negligence. Fine. Bowls against Clark. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. IT was she wed for cause upon a rule of Court, why a Prohibition should not be granted to the Prerogative Court, Why a Prohibition should not be granted to the Prerogative. That in the will which the Prerogative Court endeavoured to repeal, there were lands given to the Executor. The Court answered. If the Prerogative have power to prove a will, they may also repeal it by appeal; but if lands be devised, together with goods, they have no power to repeal it as to the lands, but if they should have no power to repeal it as to the goods it would be mischievous. But they have no authority to make the devise good or ill, as to the lands. Prohibition. And the Court was at first agreed to grant a Prohibition as to the lands only. But afterwards the Court held that there could be no such division made of the will by Prohibition, as to stand good in part, and to be repealed for the rest, and so would not grant the prohibition. Nota. Keniston against Crouch. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved that upon a Judgement given in the Common Pleas, For a rule to enter judgement in the Common Pleas denied. since the Act that a writ of Error shall be no supersedeas, a writ of Error was brought in this Court, and the record removed, but that depends undetermined, and that the party had moved for execution in the Common Pleas; but the Clarks refuse to make out execution, without the rule of this Court, Rule. and therefore a rule was prayed to them to make out execution. But the Court answered, proceed as the Act directs, we will make no rule; But we conceive there is no writ of Error now depending, and therefore you may take out execution of Course. Q. Tamen, Execution. for it was doubted at the Bar. Denton against Harison. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. DEnton brought an Action upon the Case against Harison in London, For a Procedendo to London. for speaking these words, Thou art a Whore, and my Husband's Whore, and he doth maintain thee. The Defendant removed the cause into this Court by a Habeas Corpus, whereupon the Plaintif moved for a procedendo. Roll chief justice was of opinion that a procedendo ought to be granted; for if it should not, the party hath no remedy to proceed; and if they do proceed in London, and the judgement he thereupon erroneous, the party grieved may bring a writ of Error in the Hustinges, and reverse it. jerman justice said, here is a wrong done, and the remedy is given according to the custom of the City, and it is a good custom, Custom. because it is for the preservation of the Peace of the City, and it is the custom of the City to whip a Whoremonger, and to Cart a Whore; and this may be the ground or reason why an action lies in London for calling of a woman whore there, thought it do not lie in other places. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. Upon an Issue joined, and a Trial thereupon, That judgement might not be entered. a Verdict was found for the plaintiff, and the Postea was delivered to the Clerk of the judgements to enter the judgement; but through the Clarks neglect execution was taken out, the judgement being not entered, upon this the Court was moved that the judgement might not be entered, judgement. because it should have been entered before Execution issued forth, and therefore it was suggested that now it was too late, and prayed to supersede the Execution, Supersedeas. because there was no judgement to warrant it. But Roll the Chief justice answered, that this being but a neglect of the Clerk, judgement might be well enough entered, though the Execution were issued forth, and because the trial between the parties is right, therefore let it be entered. Cane against Pell. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. Can brought an Action of Debt upon the Statute of 2 Ed. 6. for substraction of tithes, against Pell, and hath a verdict against the Defendant: Arrest of judgement in an action upon the Statute for tithes. The Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement, and took an Exception to the Plaintiffs Declaration; That it did not appear by it in what Parish the lands lie, out of which the tithes grew due. On the other side it was said, 〈◊〉 appeared well enough by implication; but if it did not, it is not now material, there being a verdict in the case by which it is helped. jerman justice said, there is only an implication to show in what Parish the lands lie, and that is not a violent implication neither, and therefore the Declaration cannot be good. But Roll Chief justice answered, What if the Plaintif had only said, that the tithes belonged unto him? And it is here after a verdict, and the Declaration is helped by it; Declaration. but if you had demurred to the Declaration, it would have been ruled to be naught. Demurrer. And if the tithes do belong to the plaintiff, why may it not be employed that they belong to him as Parson of the Parish, and are of lands lying within the Parish: But let us see a Book, and speak to it again the next Term. Robinson against Walker. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. Pasc. 1650. rot. 251. WAlker brought an Action upon the Case upon an indebitatus Assumpsit for wares sold. Demurrer for doubleness in a replication: The Defendant pleaded the Statute of limitations of Actions in Bar. The Plaintif replied, that he is a Merchant, and was in Ireland, and did not return thence till such a time, and shows precisely when, and that within six years after his return he brought this action Upon this Replication, The Defendant demurred, and upon the Demurrer judgement was given for the Plaintif. The Defendant brought a writ of Error to reverse this judgement, and assigned for Error, 1. That the replication of the plaintiff, upon which the Demurrer was joined, is double; For first he allegeth that he is a Merchant, & so is a person out of the Statute of limitations: And secondly he shows that he brought his Action within 6 years after his return, which is needless. 2ly. He saith, That he did not return into England, whereas the Statute is general, If he return, and he may return into Wales. But to that the Court answered, that to return into England, or into Wales, was all one as to the intent of the Statute. 3ly. The Action was an Action upon the Case, & that Action is not mentioned in the Statute. But Roll chief justice said, this is no new Case; for it hath been ruled that an Action upon the Case is within the Statute. Case. jerman justice said, the Proviso of the Statute is intended to be as large as the body of the Act. Nicholas justice to the same effect, and said, that the word Trespass mentioned in the Act doth comprise in it an Action upon the Case. The judgement was affirmed, nisi. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. AN Endictment was quashed, To quash an Endictment. because it was said to be taken ad generalem Sessionem Pacis Custodum libertatis Angliae, where it ought to be Sessionem Pacis publicae, by jerman justice, absent Roll. Treton against Squire. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved that a Prisoner in the Marshalsea might have liberty by rule of Court to be at a trial to give his testimony as a Witness in the cause. To have a Prisoner to testify at a Trial. jerman justice, absent Roll, answered, Bring him thither by a Habeas Corpus, but take a good guard with him, for it shall be at your peril if he escape, Habeas Corpus. and he shall be brought thither, and carried back again at your own charge. Gibs against Price. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. GIbs a Barrister of Lincoln's Inn brought an action upon the case against Price for speaking these words of him, Arrest of judgement in an Action for words. William Gibs hath dealt falsely with me being his Client, and hath joined with mine Adversary. Upon not guilty pleaded, there was an issue joined, and a Verdict given for the Plaintif. The Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement that the words were not actionable. But the Court held clearly the words were actionable, and were ordering judgement to be entered for the plaintiff, Case. but because another exception was taken, That the Plaintif doth not aver that he was a Practiser at the time of the bringing of his Action; Averment. and because it was also objected that the Plaintif was now sequestered, Therefore the rule was, that the Record or the Postea should be brought into the Court, and that Council should again be heard. This was moved again, And Roll chief justice said, That the plaintiff aught to aver he is a Practiser, for he may be a Barrister and not practise. But the Court would advise. Boomer against Cleve. Trin. 1650. Banc. sup. IN this Case in Arrest of judgement upon a verdict given for the Plaintif in an Action upon the Stat. of Winch. 12 E. 1. of Hue & Cries, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the Statute of 12 E. ●. of Hue and Cries. Recital. the question being, whether the plaintiff in his Declaration had misrecited the Statute or not, Roll chief justice took this difference, that if one bring an Action upon a Statute, and in his Declaration mis-recite it, in words which go to the ground of the Action, though there be a Verdict in the case, yet it is not helped; but if the mis-recital be in words which do not go to the ground of the Action, it is helped after Verdict by the Statute of jeofails. jeofails. Bynion against Trotter. Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. BYnion brought an Action upon the Case against Trotter for speaking these words of him, Arrest of judgement in an Action for words. He is a Thief, and hath stolen my Turnips and my grass. Upon a Verdict given for the plaintiff, The Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement that the words are not actionable, because the grass might be growing upon the ground, and the Turnips in the ground, Case. and so part of the Freehold. But Roll chief justice held, the words are actionable, for the Turnips shall be intended to be pulled up, and the Grass mowed, & the last words are not cumulative. Therefore let the Defendant show cause why the plaintiff shall not have his judgement. Pinder against Dawkes. Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. Pinner brought an Action of Trespass against Dawkes, Error to reverse a judgement in Trespass quare clausum fregit. and declares, quare clausum fregit contra pacem publicam, et postes et palos suos ibidem nuper inventos cepit et asportavit. The Plaintif hath a Verdict and a judgement, the Defendant brings a writ of Error to reverse the judgement, and assigns for Error, 1. That the Trespass was done in the late King's time, and therefore the Declaration should have been contra pacem Domini Regis, and not publicam. 2ly. That the Declaration is incertain; for it appears not whether the Posts and Pales were fixed to the ground or no, nor how many of them there were, and so the nature of the offence cannot be certainly known. But the Court held that the first exception was but a mistake of the Clerk, and so may be amended, and as it is there is no repugnancy in it. And as to the second, the Court held that it shall be intended that the Posts and Pales were not fixed to the ground; Amendment. and there is no necessity to express how many Posts and how many Pales the Defendant took, Intendment. and it is not material whether they were fixed or not. But the Court would advise, and ordered Council to spoke again to it. Popham against White Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. AN Action of Trover an Coversion was brought, Exception to a Declaration in a Trover and Conversion. wherein the Plaintif declared pro Arboribus. Twisden of Council with the Defendant argued that the Declaration was not good, because a Trover cannot lie de Arboribus. Roll chief justice, he may declare de Arboribus, if he say that he was possessed sicut de Arboribus suis propriis. But jerman justice doubted Therefore the Court would advise. Martin against Hendlye. Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. MArtin brought an Action of Debt against Hendlye a Sheriff for an escape, and had a Verdict against him. Arrest of judgement in an action of Debt against a Sheriff for an escape. Advantage. The Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement, and took these exceptions. 1. That the Action was brought by the plaintiff as an Administrator, for the escape, which was made in the life of the Intestate only. 2ly. That there is no Capias issued to the Sheriff. The Court answered, That the Sheriff cannot take advantage of an erroneous process; but the first exception is good, for the Action ought to be brought in the Detinet only, the plaintiff being but an Administrator, Detinet. who recovers not to his own use. Therefore stay judgement till the Plaintif move. Dethick against Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. DEthick moved for a Prohibition to the Admiralty for preferring an Endictment there, For a prohition to the Admiralty: Prohibition. Certiorari. which is not within the Statute touching the Admiralty, and so they have no jurisdiction of the cause. The Court answered, that a Prohibition lies not in cases of Felony, but if there be 'Cause it may be removed by Certiorari. But we will advise. Bennet and the Hundred of Hartford. Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. IN a trial at Bar between the inhabitants of Hartford and Bennet a carrier upon an Action brought against them upon the Statute of Winchester, Evidence by one of the jury to the rest, Evidence. for a robbery committed within that Hundred upon his servant; It was said by the Court, that if either of the parties to a trial desire that a juror may give evidence of something of his own knowledge, Examination, Where a hundred shall be charged for a robbery or where not. to the rest of the jurors, that the Court will examine him openly in Court upon his oath, and he ought not to be examined in private by his companions, And it was also said, that if a robbery be done in crepusculo, the Hundred shall not be charged; but if it be done by clear day light, whether it be before Sun rise or after Son set, it is all one, for the Hundred shall be charged in both cases. Mich. 1649. Banc. sup. Sergeant Earl, A jury being ready at the Bar for a trial, challenged the Atray for want of Hundreders, A challenge of the array f r want of Hundredors', the manner of it. and delivered in the challenge in writing to Woodward the Clerk of the Court to be read; But the Court interrupted him, and said to the Sergeant, you ought first to read it yourself in French, which he accordingly did, and afterwards Woodward read it in Latin. Twisden of Council on the otherside said, that the challenge was taken to no purpose, for the jury was returned by the Secondary by rule of Court, and the Hundreders were put out by the consent of the parties; But the Court answered, that the consent of the parties was to no purpose to avoid the challenge, but that it was a good challenge, Consent, Challenge. Tales. and there cannot be a tales granted upon a challenge for default of Hundreders, and therefore the panel was quashed, and a new jury ordered to be returned by the Sheriff. In this case it was said, that after the first man of a jury is sworn, the Array cannot be challenged. Cage against Dod. Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. Upon a trial between Cage and Dod touching a Copyhold it was said by the Court, that a Copyholder for life cannot prescribe against his Lord; What copyholder may prescribe against his Lord, and what nor. but a Copyholder in fee may, for he hath the Copyhold in the nature of Land of inheritance. And also that if a Copyholder for life cut down timber trees, the Lord may take them. And that if an under Lessee for years of a Copyholder cut down timber, Forfeiture. it shall not be a forfeiture of the Copy-holders' estate. The Countess Rivers. Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. THe Countess Rivers put in her plea of Privilege of Peerage into Court, A Plea of privilege of peerage by Countess. Privilege. and prayed by Sejeant Glin of her Council that it might be read, and allowed. Upon which it was read by Woodward Clark of the Court. After which Roll chief justice said, it is questionable whether a Countess made so by patent only for her life be privileged or no, therefore let her remain in the Custody of the Sheriff till Saturday, and not be turned over to the Custody of the marshal, and then move it again. Postea. Burton against Low. Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. BUrton brought an Action of debt against Low, Demurrer in debt upon a Sheriff's bond. upon a Sheriff's bond given by Low to the Sheriff, being arrested by him by virtue of an Attatchment directed to him out of the Chancery, the condition of the Bond was, that the Defendant should appear on such a day in Cancellaria apud Westmonasterium ubicunque suerit. The Defendant pleads in Bar the Statute of 3 H. 6. she Plaintiff demurred to this plea. Moseley of Council with the Defendant argued that the Bond upon which the Action was brought was void, and against the Statute. 1. Because the party is bound to appear in a Court, which is not a fixed Court, and so incertain, namely the Court of Chancery at Westminster, whereas the Chancery is a movable Court, and not fixed to Westminster or any other place. 2ly. The condition of the Obligation is impossible, for it is that the Defendant shall appear in the Chancery at Westminster wheresoever it shall be, and it is impossible for him to appear at Westminster, and at another place at the same time. 3ly. The Bond varies from the Statute in some things, and enjoins more than the Statute requires in other things. Wilmot on the other side held that the Bond is not within the Statute, because the King is not within the Statute, as was held 13 Car. &. 7 H. 4. f. 44. 5 rep. Whelpdales' case, Dyer 119. Roll chief justice held; that a Bond given to appear upon an Attatchment out of the Chancery is within the Statute; but it hath been heretofore a question whether a Sergeant at Arms of Wales were within the Statute; but it hath been since ruled that he is not, and here is a material variance in the Bond, which makes it void, and neither the upper Bench nor the Chancery are fixed Courts, Obligation. and therefore the Defendant ought not to be bound precisely to appear at Westminster, and then to add ubicumque fuerit is a material variance, Chancery. Variance. and makes the Bond naught. jerman justice to the same effect, and said, that the Chancery may sit at any time out of the Term when they please, and their not sitting in the Vacations, is for the ease and conveniency of the people. Nil capiat per billamn si, etc. Antea. Pain against Prestny. Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. Pain brought an Action upon the case against Prestny, Arrest of judgement in an action for words. for speaking these words (to a Constable) of him; Take charge of him, and carry him away, for I lay flat Felony to him, and for speaking these words to the Plaintiff himself, I will make you hold up you hand at the Bar: upon not guilty pleaded an issue was joined, and a verdict found for the Plaintiff. It was moved in arrest of judgement that the words are not actionable; but the Court held them clearly actionable, and ruled the Plaintiff to take his judgement, except other cause were showed to the contrary Friday following. Popham against White. Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. Upon a verdict found for the Plaintiff in a Trover & Conversion, Arrest of judgement in a Trover and Conversion. the Defendant in Arrest of judgement took exception to the Declaration because the Plaintiff had declared of a Trover & Conversion de decem arboribus, whereas the trees were Timber trees that were felled, & so they are not well expressed, for the word arbour properly signifies a tree that grows, and not one cut down, according to the old verse, Arbour dum crescit lignum dum crescere nescit, and so a Trover cannot be brought pro arbore. But Roll chief justice said, that they were well enough expressed by the Declaration, Declaration. Description. and that they ought not to be too strict in scanning some words where the thing is well described. Goffs Case. Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. CLement Goff of Greenwich in Kent, A pardon for Felony pleaded and allowed. arraigned of felony at Maidstone in Kent, and there condemned, was brought to this Bar, and there it was demanded of him by the Clerk on the criminal side, what he could say why he should not suffer death according to his judgement? whereupon the Prisoner pleaded he had a pardon, and produced it, and it was read openly, the Prisoner kneeling on his keees in the mean time; after reading of it, he was asked what it was he demanded besides of the Court? he answered, that he prayed his pardon might be allowed, which, after jerman justice had made a grave speech to exhort him to a better carriage for the future, was done accordingly. Wood against Topham. Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. THe case between Wood and Topham being an Action of Trespass, Arrest of judgement in trespass quare filium et heredem rapuit & maritavit. quare filium et heredem suum rapuit et maritavit, was again spoken unto, and in arrest of judgement Green took these exceptions to the Declaration. 1. That it is too short, because that after the words quare filium suum & heredem rapuit & maritavit, there ought to have been added cujus maritagium ad ipsum pertinet, for else it appears not that the Plaintiff hath cause of Action, Instit. f. 20. & 35 El. Child and Towers case Banc. Reg. 2ly. The Declaration doth not say filium suum apparentem, which it ought to do, because the Father is alive. 3ly. It doth not express the Heir to be infra aetatem. 4ly. It doth not say the Heir is in custodia sua. 5ly. It doth not show that the Heir was not married before. 6ly. It doth not show that the Plaintiffs Father is dead, 12 H. 4. f. 16. Broo● Tit. Trespass, 101 Nat. brev. 142. Reg. 163 Nat. Brev. 140. 20 H. 6. f. 44. And he said, that a Declaration ought to be certain; but that here was no certainty, by reason of the former exceptions. Declaration. Trespass. Wilmot on the other side said the Declaration was certain enough, and according to the precedents, and cited the Register, f. 88, 89. & ●. rep. Ratcliffs case. Roll chief justice said, It is a Trespass to take away a man's Son and Heir, although he be not within age; but if it be another Son it is not so. Nicholas justice to the same effect; But because the Court was not full, & in regard that the damages given by the jury were excessive, the Court deferred to give judgement that time, and persuaded the Plaintiffs council to go to a new new try all. Antea et Postea. Martial against Ledsham. Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. Marshal brought an Action of Debt as an Administrator against Ledsham, Arrest of judgement in debt by an Administator. and obteins a verdict against the Defendant. It was moved for the Defendant in arrest of judgement, That the Plaintiff had not showed in his Declaration by whom the Letters of Administration were granted unto him, as he ought to do, according to the books of 26 H. 6.29. & 35 H. 6. The Court answered that he ought to have set it forth, and therefore the Plaintiff might have demurred to the Declaration; but it now being after a verdict, Demurrer the question is, Whether that fault be not helped by it? And therefore they would advise. Postea. Wat's and his wife against Lord. Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. Wat's and his wife brought an Action of Trespass of an Assault and Battery against Lord, Arrest of judgement in an Assault and Battery. and obtain a verdict. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, That the Declaration was by the Baron and Feme, for an Assault and Battery made to the Feme, and they also declare that the Defendant alia enormia eis intulit, which ought not to be, for the wrong being but a personal wrong done to the person of the Feme only. could not be said to be done to the Husband. To which Roll chief justice agreed. Fairefax against Fairfax. Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. IN a writ of Error brought to reverse a judgement given in a writ of Dower these exceptions were taken; Error to reverse a judgement in down. 1. That the original was not well returned, for their appears not to be any return of the Proclamation of the summons, and though the party do appear, yet it was said that it is not helped thereby. 2ly. The demand is incertain, for the demand is de tertia parte decimarum garbarum in Colton, and by this demand the Kind of the Tithes demanded is not made certain, for the word garba admits of divers constructions, and so Lynwood the Civilian shows. 3ly. It is not expressed whether the Defendant be terr-Tenant, or heir. 4ly. The demand is ac etiam de rectoria de Acerstall Malvis, which is incertain, for it ought to be de rectoria ecclesiae. Roll chief justice to the 1. Exception said, Miscontinuance. that the appearance of the party will help miscontinuance of process, and so it doth here. Hales to the 2d. exception said, that decimae garbarum is certain enough to common understanding. To the 3d. Exception he held it not necessary to say de rectoria ecclesiae, for it must be so necessarily intended. The Court desired to see books, and so it was adjourned. At another day the case was again moved, and these spoken to and answered, 1. As before that decimae garbarum is certain enough so common intendment. 2ly. That it is not necessary to express the setting forth of the dower in the tithes by meats and bounds, for tithes cannot be so set forth, and it is not constant to use the expression per metas et bundas. Latch took another exception that it was improperly expressed, for one to enter into an Advowson. And to the exception formerly taken, he held that the Proclamation of summons ought to have been returned, and that fault is not helped by the late Act, because it is matter of substance, and not mere matter of form, and he said that appearance of the party doth salve a discontinuance of mean processes; but not of original process as this is, which is the very foundation of the Action, and that though the want of a summons be helped by the parties appearance; yet the want of returning the summons is not helped by the parties appearance. Next he held, as formerly, that decimae garbarum is incertain, and that the nature of the corn ought to be showed. Roll chief justice said, Return. that the not returning the proclamation of summons is not material, for the summons is only to make the party appear, and he hath appeared in this case, and the late Act extends to it if it were not good without it. And the demand of tertiam partem garbarum is certain enough by common intendment, but it seems more certain here than so, for it is tertiam partem garbarum granorum which signifies corn; And it is not necessary to express the setting forth of the dower per metas et bundas, but it is well as it is without that expression. And lastly, It is well enough said, ingressus est into the advowson, although it be not so proper an expression as might have been used, for it is good enough to make the party tenant. jerman justice to the same effect, and said, that if there be two Tenants in Common, and one of them die, it is a great question how the wife shall be endowed, viz. whether per metas & bundas or no. And he doubted whether the Writ of error here brought were good or not, for it is retornable coram custodibu● libertatis, etc. apud Westmonasterium, whereas as it ought to be coram custodibus ubicunque, for they are not fixed to Westminster. Nicholas justice to the same effect. Error. Roll chief justice said it was a good exception that jerman took to the Writ of error But the Court was here at Westminster at the return of the Writ, and the Writ was made by the Custodes themselves, and the parties did appear upon it, and therefore he questioned whether it might not be made good for these reasons. jerman justice held it could not. Roll chief justice said that all the Latin precedents are agreeable to this Writ, and it would be dangerous to alter them; But let the cursitors attend, Precedents. and give their reasons why they do not alter this form, and if the Writ be good, me thinks the judgement should be affirmed. Yet we will advise a little of the writ, and whether the demand of decimam partem garbarum, without granorum, be good or not Postea. Lumley against Nevil. Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. IN a writ of error brought upon a Judgement given in an ejectione firmae, Error in an habere facias Possessionem. It was said by Roll chief justice, That if the writ of habere facias possessionem do contain more Acres of Land than are expressed in the Declaration, that it is error. But if the Sheriff do give possession of more Land than is contained in the writ of habere facias possessionem, an Action of the case lies against the Sheriff, or an Assize lies for the land. It was also said, that if a judgement be affirmed upon a writ of error in the Exchequer Chamber, Error. Case. Assize. Execution. yet they cannot grant out execution there; but it must be in this Court. Hunt against Popham. Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. IT was moved for the Defendant to have the rule of Court for the Plaintiff to bring in the postea, The court not to be moved for a rule where it may be given in the office. Nonsuit. that the Defendant may move in Arrest of judgement. The Court answered they would make no rule, for the Defendant may give rules in the office to force him to it, and if he will not bring it in he is to be nonsuit. Fairefax against Fairefax. Mich. 1630. Banc. sup. THe Case between Fairefax and Fairefax was moved again, Whether a demand in down good or not. and Hales held that the demand of dower de decimis garbarum was certain enough, though it be not garbarum granorum, and he cited the Register 46. and Dyer, f. 84. and one Cavendishes case, 8. jac. Roll chief justice took a difference between a demand of Tithes, and the suing for a recompense for Tithes, upon the Statute of 2 Ed. 6. and cited the Regist. 165 and he held the demand here to be good, with whom concurred the other judges. Ask justice said, that a garb is a french word, and signifies any thing bound up into a bundle; but by cowel the Civilian it signifies Corn bound up, and so is the word commonly used at the Common Law. Demand. Roll chief justice said, that a demand in a praecipe ought to be more certain, than it is necessary for a demand in dower to be. Latch said that the words coram nobis apud Westmonasterium is part of the stile of the Court, which Roll chief justice denied, yet he said it was well enough, because the Court was there at the return of the writ of Error. To which the other judges agreed, and the rule was that the judgement should be affirmed nisi, etc. antea. Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved that one was arrested upon a day of appointed by the Parliament, Moved to discharge an arrest and that he was forced to put in bond to the Sheriff for his appearance, and therefore it was prayed that the party arrested might be discharged, and that the bond given to the Sheriff might be delivered up. Roll the chief justice answered, Endict the Bailies that made the Arrest, or bring your Action against them if you please, Discharge. for we will not discharge the party arrested. Bois against Cranfield. Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. rot. Q. BOis as Executor to another brought an Action of Debt upon divers Obligations made to his Testator. Debt upon divers Obligations by an Execution. The Defendant pleaded that he did pay a lesser sum than is expressed in the Obligations to the Testator during his life, and that he did accept there of in full satisfaction of the said Obligations. To this plea the Plaintif demurred. Roll Chief justice upon opening the matter said, that the question here is, whether the payment, or the acceptance of the money paid in satisfaction be to be traversed. And he held it was indifferent to traverse either of them; Traverse. but he said it was more proper to join issue upon the payment, but the Court would advise. It was then also said, that if one pay money in satisfaction of an Obligation, and the party to whom it is paid saith that he will receive it for another cause, Satisfaction, payment. yet if he receive it it shall be judged to be paid in satisfaction of the Obligation; for he must receive it upon such terms as the other will pay it. Brian against Stone. Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. STone moves the Court for an Attachment against Brian and others, For an Attachment. for that he was arrested by a Latitat out of this Court in the County of Wilts, and thence carried into the Town of Malborow, and there arrested by a Sergeant of that Town by a writ out of that Corporation, and the Plaintif proceeds there against him upon that writ, and not upon the latitat, by which he was first arrested, which is a contempt to this Court. Attachment. Habeas Corpus cum causa. The Court ruled the party should have an Attachment, nisi, etc. and also should have a Habeas Corpus cum causa. Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. THe Recorder of London moved for the Inhabitants of Bishopsgate against one Withringes; For the setting a moderate fine upon one that submitted to a fine. who for refusing to serve upon the Ward mote Enquest was indicted for his refusal in London, and convicted and fined 20 l. the Defendant being committed for not paying his fine, removed himself hither by a Habeas Corpus, but now hath submitted himself to a fine, it was therefore prayed he may be moderately fined here. The Court thereupon fined him 20 l. Beal against Wyman. Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. Trin. 1649. rot. 849. Upon these words of a will, Question upon words of a Will. viz. I give and bequeath one half of my lands to my wife, & after her death I give all my lands to the heirs males of any of my Sons, or next of Kin, Latch made these questions in the Case, 1. Whether there were a good estate created by these words of the will. 2ly. Whether the estate were destroyed by the fine levied of the lands. For the 1. he held, that the heirs males of any of his Sons, are words certain enough to create an estate; for it is all one as if he had said to the heirs males of all his sons, if they have heirs males, or to those who have heirs males, and the words, or to the next of Kin, are also certain enough, being joined with the precedent words, and shall be meant to the next of Kin, and their heirs males, if his sons have no heirs males; For in a Win if there be words to express the meaning of the Testator it is sufficient enough, though the words be not apt. And he cited 21 Rich. 2. Devise 27. and 8 Rep. 46, and said, that the case in 30 Ass. pl. 47. is the same with this in terminis. And here is no contingent remainder, but only a contingent devise, & there is no necessity for a particular estate to support it; for it ariseth out of the estate of the Devisor; yet if there were need of a particular estate here to support the remainder, here is a particular estate in the wife, who by implication of the will doth take all the land during her life, as it is 13 H. 7.29 H. 8. Br. Devise 48. Trin. 3 Ed. 6. Bendloes. Blow. Com. 521. Whelpdales' case, Pasch. 25 Eliz Com. Ban. To the 2 point he spoke not, holding it not material. Hales of Council on the other side held, that the wife had not an estate for life in all the land by implication of the will, but only an estate for life in a moiety of the land, and so there is no particular estate to support the contingent remainder, which he held was in this case; & that it is not a contingent Devise as Latch urged; for the remainder here depends by way of remainder, and not as a contingent Devise. And he held the Devise itself to be void, admitting all the precedent matter alleged to be true. 1. Because the devise is uncertain; for the intent of the deviser doth not appear; for it appears not what heir male shall have the land, whether the heir male of his son, or the heir male of his next of Kin; for the words are disjunctive; 41 & 42 Eliz. Com. Banc. in the Case of Tailor & Sawyer land devised to a Man's Issue was adjudged a void devise for the incertainty of it. And he held that the intent was that the heir male of his son should inherit before the heir male of the next of Kin, otherwise the further off of Kin should have the land before the nearer of Kin. And he said that Hill. 2. Car. Rot. 1288. Com. Banc. in Hunt and Fisher's case, the case at the Bar was adjudged in point. Roll chief justice said, That the intention of the Testator here is coeca & sicca, Intention. and senseless, and cannot be known, Will. and we ought not to frame a sense upon the words of a Will, where we cannot find out the Testators meaning. jerman justice held, that the devise was not void, but that the words are to be interpreted as they may stand with Law, and as the words will bear. Nicholas justice prima fancy that the devise is void, but yet it is questionable. Ask Justice to the same intent. Roll chief justice said, that there is too much way usually given to ambiguous devises. But let it be argued again the next Term. Parker against Cook. Mich. 1650. Banc. sup. Hill. 23 Car. rot. 660. THe Action was an Action of Trespass quare Clausum fregit: Upon a Demurrer the question was, whether a Copyhold were forfeited or not. The Defendant pleaded a special plea of justification, viz. That the Plaintif was a Copyholder to his Manor, and that for refusing to appear and do his service at his Court he had forfeited his Copyhold, and that therefore he did enter. The Case was this, The Defendant being Lord of the Manor, and holding of his Court, the plaintiff being Tenant, and being in the Court, and there being a question whether the Court were legally then held or no, and being asked if he did appear or not, he answered, If it be a legal Court, I do appear, but if it be not a legal Court, I do not appear. The question was, whether this be an appearance, or such a refusal to appear whereby the Copyholder shall forfeit his Copyhold, or not. Latch held it was no appearance, and that therefore the Copyhold was forfeited, and cited 43 Ed. 3. f. 25. And he said, though it be not expressed by the Defendant, that the Plaintif was legally summoned to appear in Court, it is not material, seeing he was present in Court, and did refuse, being demanded, to appear. And that this was a sufficient contempt to make a forfeiture. And he said that the rejoinder is ill; for it is dixit comparuit, and he doth not answer to the fact alleged, viz. That he denied to do his suit and service. Wild on the other side said, that it is no forfeiture; for if the Court be well held, than he doth appear, as his words do plainly manifest, and so there is no contempt; and if the Court were not well held, his not appearing shall not hurt him, for he is not required to do it. 37 Eliz. Est and hardings case, and 4 rep. 27. Hobard and hamond's case: And besides, this cannot be a voluntary contempt, because he did appear conditionally, and did not absolutely refuse. And the Replication hath not entitled you to a forfeiture. Besides it appears not here that the Court was legally summoned, as it ought to do, nor that there was any proclamation made for the holding of the Court, nor any notice given to the Tenants of the holding of the Court, 38, 39 Eliz. Banc. Reg. Crisp and Dyer. Roll chief justice, This case hath depended long. Forfeiture. It is a hard thing to make a forfeiture of the Copyhold, if there was a real controversy whether the Court was well held or not; but if not, and that the words were used only as a shift to avoid the Plaintiffs suit and service, it is a forfeiture; for the words are like jack in a Box, and no body knows what to make of them. jerman, Nicholas, and Ask inclined that it was no forfeiture. Adjourned to the next term. Fielder against Tovy. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. Pasch. 1650. rot. 430. FIelder brought an action of debt upon a bond given to the Sheriff by Tovy the Defendant, to appear to the Plaintif in the Upper Bench, Demurrer to a Declaration u●on a Sheriffs Bond. to an Action there brought against the Defendant, The Defendant appears, and demurs to the Declaration, and shows for cause, that the Bond upon which the plaintiff declares, and the Declaration do not agree, for the Plaintif declares pro quadragint. libris, and the Obligation mentions, that the Defendant is bound in quadragent. libris. Divers cases were put to resemble this, viz. Massam and jollies case, where sexigint was put for sexagint. and yet held good, and Water's case, where septuagint. was put for septingent. And Downs and Hussies case, 12 Car. Banc. Reg. where quingint. duabus libris was used instead of quinquagint. and yet held good, because it might be an abreviation of quinquagint. jerman justice held the Declaration not good, because the condition of the Obligation is to do a collateral thing, and so it cannot appear by it what the sum is in which the party is bound, as it may where the condition is for the payment of money. Roll chief justice held the Declaration not good, Declaration. because the Bond upon which it is grounded doth not warrant it, and the meaning of the word cannot here be known, and if the Condition were not collateral it would not help it. Nicholas justice differed, and said, it would be hard to make it no Obligation for the mis-writing of a word, and therefore it were good to search precedents, for it as a considerable case. Ask justice said, the meaning is obscure, and this makes the difficulty. Adjourned, Postea. Wentworrh against Wentworth. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. Mich. 1650. rot. 531. Wentworth brought an Action of Debt against Wentworth upon an Obligation; The Condition of it was this in effect, That whereas the Defendant had granted an annuity to the plaintiff, that the Defendant should make further assurance to the Plaintif for the enjoying thereof within one month, when he should be thereunto required: Upon a special verdict the question was from what time the month should begin, whether from the date of the Obligation, or from the time of the request to be made. Latch held it should begin from the request, and not from the date of the Obligation, because a month from that time is too small a time to do the thing required, but if it shall be after the request it will be a proportionable time fit for the doing it. Roll chief justice, If there be an indifferent construction, which may be taken two ways, Interpretation. we will take it that way which is most reasonable to make the Obligation stand in force, and me seems the words here are plain, namely, that the assurance shall be made within a month after request, & not after the date of the Bond. jerman justice to the same effect, and said, that although the request for further assurance were not within one month after the date of the bond, yet the party may require it after the month is ended, and within a month after such request the assurance is to be made, and the Obligation shall be intended for the benefit of the Obligor. Nicholas and Ask justices to the same effect, so judgement ruled for the plaintiff, Nisi, etc. Child against Guiat. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. Hill. 1649. rot. 153. IN an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit made by the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff a certain sum of money, at a certain day. Special verdict. Q. whether a variance between the declaration, and the promise on which it was granted. Upon a special verdict, The question was whether there were a variance between the promise, and the Declaration, which question grew from the doubt, whether the day of payment in the Assumpsit shall be intended according to the old stile, or according to the new, for if it were intended one way there was no variance, if the other way there was a variance. Hales held that there was no variance, and though there should be, yet he said the Plaintiff ought to have judgement; because the time in this case is not material, for the debt for the payment whereof the promise was made, appears to be due upon an Account made between the parties, which time is past, and grows not due upon the Assumpsit, for this is no new promise in Law, and it is all one here as if the promise had been set forth that he promised to pay, when he should be thereunto required. And whereas it hath been objected, that the debt upon the Account appears to be due by two, and that the Action therefore aught to have been brought against them both, and not against one of them as it is here, he answered, that the Action may be brought against both, or any one of them at the election of the party, and the custom of Merchants makes no difference in the case, for the Law creates the debt and makes both liable, though the custom give election to sue one or both of them, and so one may here be sued, for the debt is by the custom transferred upon one, although it be the debt of both. And here both the days, viz. according to the old stile, and according to the new were passed before the action brought. Roll chief justice held, Date. that the Plaintiff ought to have judgement; but that day shall be taken according to the old stile, Averment. if there be not a special averment to the contrary, and so there is variance between the pleading, and the verdict; but this doth not hurt here, for the Action doth not fail, although the day be limited upon the evidence, otherwise than it is in the Declaration, for the debt is the duty arising upon the account made between the parties, Time. and the day upon the Assumpsit for the payment is not material, for the Action lies though no Assumpsit had been made, Actual promise. Debt. and here is no need of an actual promise; But if an Assumpsit be made upon a contract, there is no precedent duty, and so there is a difference between one case and the other. And if two be found in arrearages of account, Custom. by the custom of Merchants one may be charged to pay all the debt as well as both. jerman justice as Roll, and said, that where the day is part of the contract, it ought to be alleged to be passed at the time of the Action brought: but it is not so here, and also both the days are here past. Nicholas to the same purpose, Roll chief justice, If the Action be specially laid, and the day made part of it, there if the Plaintiff fail in the day, his action also fails. And if one declare generally for 100 l. upon an indebitatus, and it appears upon the evidence, that the Defendant did owe the Plaintiff but 10 l. yet the Plaintif shall recover; But if the Plaintiff declare specially, Declaration. General. Special. viz. for a horse sold for so much, and by the evidence it appears he owed a less sum, there the Plaintiff shall not recover, for it shall be intended another contract, and not that, upon which the Action is brought, and so judgement for the Plaintiff nisi, etc. Maynard spoke again to it; But judgement was given for the Plaintiff upon the former reasons. Paul William's and his wife against the Custodes. etc. Hill 1650. Banc. sup. PAul Williams and his wife had a judgement given against them at the Sessions at Hickes Hall, Error to reverse a judgement at the Sessions for speaking words. upon an endictment for speaking words against the Lord Fairefax, whereupon they brought a Writ of Error in this Court to reverse the judgement. The Exceptions taken were these, 1. That the justices there had not power to hold plea for words spoken. To this the Court answered that they have power to hold plea for such words, because they tend to breach of the peace, and the speaking of them is a great misdemenour. The second exception was, that it is said juratores jurati electi triatiad veritatem dicunt, & ad dicendum is left out. 3ly. There issued out a capias pro fine against the parties, whereas there was no fine set upon them. The Court to that answered that a fine was set. Wild took another exception, viz. that the endictment ought not to be joint against two, for words spoken by them both; Endictment. but several endictments, for the words of one are not the words of the other, though they be the same words; But the Court answered, Case. that a joint endictment was good enough, although a joint Action of the Case cannot be brought against two, for words spoken by them both. He took also this Exception, that it doth not appear that the parties were tried in the Court, for it is only said that they were ducti ad barram, and then that they were removed from Hickes Hall to Newgate. The Court answered, that the words ducti ad barram were sufficient, and it is needless to say they were tried in Court. And therefore the whole matter rests upon the 2 d. Exception, whether the want of the words ad dicendum be Error, and for that let the Clerk of the peace be here on Wednesday next, and then speak again to it, and then by the whole Court the Exception was adjudged good. And the Clerk of the peace was fined 40 l. Masterman against Rusholme. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. Pasc. 1650. rot. 594. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit, Error to reverse a judgement in an Action upon an Assumpsit. to pay Mariners wages, the Exceptions taken were first that the plaint was for 10 l. and the Declaration is to the damages of 20 l. and so there is variance between the plaint, and the Declaration. Next the promise is laid to be made the 1. of May, 1641 to serve the Defendant for a year, and he saith that he served him from the 1. of May for a year, whereas the 1. of May ought to be excluded, so that he ought to say that he served for a year, from the making of the promise. Roll chief justice said, Variance. that there is variance between the plaint, and the Declaration; but it is helped by the verdict, for that finds that he hath served a whole year. But two other exceptions were taken at the Bar. 1. That the Declaration was pro salore instead of Salario. And 2ly. It is said deserviret for deservivit. Error. And upon these the Court ordered the Defendant in the Writ of error to show cause why the judgement should not be reversed. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. AN Action upon the Case was brought in London for calling a woman whore, the Defendant removed the cause into this Court, For a Procedendo into London. whereupon the Plaintiff moved for a procedendo to try it in London, where the action was first brought. Roll chief justice held, that a procedendo was to be granted, for we cannot determine the Custom; but if a judgement be given in London, if it be erroneous, a writ of Error may be brought in the Hustings to try the custom, therefore take a procedendo nisi causa ostensa fuerit in contrarium. Antea. Davis against Ockham. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. Mich. 1650. rot. 557. DAvis brought an Action upon the Case against Ockham for speaking these words of him; Demurrer to a plea in an Action for for words. The knave the Apothecary that married my sister hath poisoned my Uncle, and I will have him taken up again to hang him. The defendant pleaded an accord betwixt him, and the Plaintiff, that whereas the Plaintiff had done a Trespass against him, that one Trespass should be set against the other. To this plea the Plaintiff demurred, and Twisden said the plea was not good, and cited 16 Ed. 4. f. 89. and prayed judgement for the Plaintiff. Latch of Council with the Defendant said that the Accord was executed on the Defendants part, and therefore may be pleaded in Bar. To this Roll chief justice answered, Bar. how have you discharged the Accord? for you do not show it. Latch took Exceptions to the Plaintiffs Declaration. 1. That the words set forth are not actionable, for it doth not express that the Plaintiff wittingly poisoned the Defendants Uncle, or that he did die of the poison, and cited Hob. rep. 8. Miles and jacobs' case. and 275. Fleetwood and Caveleys case. 2ly. There is no Communication expressed in the Declaration to be of the Uncle, and it may be spoken of another Uncle, and the innuendo will not hel● it, because he may have divers Uncles. Twisden answered, that it is employed in the sense of the words, that he poisoned him feloniously, and so consequently wittingly. And 2ly. He saith that he will have him digged up, and so it must be intended that he died of the poison. Roll chief justice held that the words are actionable. Case. Bar. And 2ly. That the Defendants plea in Bar is not good, jerman justice held the plea in Bar not good, but he doubted whether the Declaration was good, for it doth not appear thereby, whether the party died of the poison, and the latter words help it not. Nicholas justice, and Ask justice agreed with 〈◊〉 Roll in all, and thereupon the r●le was judicium nisi, Lundi Suivant. Custodes &c against Maine and Serjeant. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. A joint Information was exhibited against Main & Serjeant 2 justices of Peace, for not enquiring of a Riot, and a verdict found against them. Arrest of judgement upon an information found. The Defendants move in Arrest of judgement, and by Hales show for cause that the information ought not to have been joint against them, but several, because their offences are several and not joint, and here one of them is acquitted, and so judgement cannot be given against the other that is found guilty. Roll chief justice answered, That as an Attachment in a Prohibition is several, Execution. so the execution here may be several, and it is not material though one be acquitted, and the other found guilty. jerman, Nicholas, and Ask justices to the same purpose. It was then said, that it is not necessary that the next justices only should remove a force, but all the justices of the County are bound to it: Force. And these words in the Statute, viz. That the 2 next justices shall do it, are put but for conveniency, and the more speedy execution of justice. Nicholas justice doubted of this. Judicium nisi, pro custodibus. Ailet against Watless. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. Trin 1649. rot. 200. IN an Action of Trespass and Ejectment, Special Verdict in Trespass and Ejectment. there was a special verdict found, upon which the case fell out to be this. An Infant bargains and sells land, and is vouched to warranty, and comes in upon the Voucher, and thereupon a common recovery is had, and upon this the question was, whether this be such a recovery, that the Infant cannot avoid by Entry. Hales held it could not be avoided, but did bind the Infant during his life, but I could not hear his reasons. Wild of Council on the other side argued, that the Infant was not bound by the recovery, because as an Infant cannot alien his lands, so neither can he suffer a common recovery, and cited 6 rep. 28. 2ly. No record made by an Infant can bind him, and for this he cited 26 Ed. 3. Fitz. per que serv. 24.41 E. 3. f. 3.44 E. 3.10.9 Ed. 4. 3● and though it be breve Amicabile, and by consent, yet it binds not, and 9 Car. Newports case, where a recovery suffered by a Guardian was adjudged good, comes not to our case; and for the intended value in a recovery, that is not material to make it binding, for it is but a fiction, and not a real value. Roll chief justice demanded whether a fine be not breve amicabile; Fine. Error. Recovery. and yet he said that that binds an Infant until it be avoided by writ of Error. And he said that the Infant is not bound here, but the question is whether he can avoid the recovery by Entry, or must bring a writ of Error to avoid it. And he held that a recovery suffered by a Guardian is not good, notwithstanding the opinion in Newports case. Hales replied, that the recovery here is binding till it be avoided by a writ of Error, and that the Infant cannot avoid it by his Entry, though an Infant may avoid a deed by Entry, although it be enroled. And here appears no consent of the parties, and the party cannot show it, and here is a formal judgement given, which binds till it be reversed by a writ of Error. Roll chief justice, Entry. An Infant may avoid a matter in paiis by Entry, but not a matter of Record, and here is a proper way by the law to avoid it, namely by a writ of Error, which is also matter of record, and of as high a nature. jerman, Nicholas, and Ask justices to the same effect, and so judgement pro Defendente, nisi. powel against Hopkins. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. Hill. 23 Car. rot. 787. IVdgement was given in an Action of Trover and Conversion for the Plaintif: The Defendant brought a writ of Error, Error to reverse a judgement given in a Trover and Conversion. and the Exception taken was to the Declaration, wherein the plaintiff among other things declared of a Trover de ducentis ponderibus aeris, & ducentis ponderibus plumbi, Anglice of Brass and Lead, and there wants an Anglice for the ponderibus, so it is uncertain what the quantity of either are. And upon this Exception the rule was, that the judgement should be reversed, nisi, etc. Denton against Caket. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. Trin. 1650. rot. 150. DEnton brought an Action upon the Case against Caket for speaking these words, Demurrer to a plea in Bar of an Action upon the case for words. He and his fellows have stolen her (having speech of a Cow of the Defendants) and I do charge him with flat felony: By reason of which words he was taken and imprisoned. The Defendant pleaded an award made (by Sir John Rivers, and Sir Nicholas Miller two justices of Peace) between the parties in Bar. Twisden of Council with the Plaintif said, that the award doth not bind the Plaintif, for the award concerns only the speaking of the words, and speaks nothing of the imprisoment: And 2ly. the Award is not good, for there is not satisfaction made by it on both parties. Wild of Council with the Defendant held, that the Declaration was not good, and that therefore he needs not to justify the plea; for though it should be ill, yet the Plaintif can have no judgement, and he said the Declaration was naught, because it alleged no day when, nor place where the Defendant charged the plaintiff with the felony, and made him to be imprisoned. Twisden answered that there is a place alleged, and that though there were none, yet it is well enough for part, and judgement may be given for that. To which Roll chief justice agreed. Wild replied, than the plea is good. But the Court answered, it is not, and what say you to the Arbitrement? Wild answered, it was good, to which jerman and Ask justices assented. Roll chief justice answered, It is a benefit to the Parish; and so to the Overseers of the poor. Nicholas justice to the same purpose. Roll chief justice said, that the Declaration is ill, and the Plea also, for the Plea is entire, Declaration. Plea. and yet goes not to all the matter alleged in the Declaration, but the plea is only to part of them, and therefore if any part of the Declaration be good, judgement ought to be given against the Defendant for that part, and the plea in Bar is naught, so judgement ought to be entirely for the Plaintif. But it is to be considered concerning the damages. Rosyer against Langdale. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. Pasch. 1650. rot. 100 ROsyer an Executor brought an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit against Langdale a Feme Administratrix, Error to reverse a judgement in an Assumpsit by an Executor against an Administratrix. and declares that the Defendant, in consideration that he would forbear suit until she had taken out Letters of Administration, did assume and promise to pay unto him the plaintiff a certain sum of money owing unto him by the Intestate. Upon Issue joined, and a Verdict and a judgement for the plaintiff, The Defendant brought a writ of Error to reverse the judgement. And Baldwin of his Council took these Exceptions. 1. That the Plaintif had set forth no consideration in his Declaration for the Assumpsit; for all that is alleged is, that the Plaintif should forbear suit till the Defendant had taken out Letters of Administration, which is no consideration at all, for the Defendant was not liable to be sued as Administratrix, until she had taken out Letters of Administration, except there were a cause depending, as here is not. And he cited Hob. rep. Bidwell and Cottons case, That if there be a suit commenced, though there be no cause for it, yet forbearance to sue is a good cause to ground an Assumpsit upon. Assumpsit. A second Exception was that the Venire facias is not awarded per Curiam, nec in Curia. Roll chief justice held the 1. a good Exception, for the Defendant was not chargeable before Letters of Administration taken forth, if she do not intermeddle with the goods of the Intestate, and it doth not appear here that she did, neither is the Defendant compellable to take forth Letters of Administration, for they may be granted to the next of Kin if the Ordinary pleaseth, according as the Statute ordains. jerman, Nicholas, and Ask justices to the same intent, thereupon the rule was reversetur, nisi, etc. But because Day being of Council on the other side took some Exceptions to the writ of Error and the return thereof, It was adjourned. Staples. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to supersede a scire sacias brought by a prisoner of the Marshalsea, For a Supersedeas to a Scire sacias. upon the late Act for discharging of poor prisoners, because the Certificate of the cause for which he was a prisoner was false, and so the proceed erroneous, for the party was in execution for Trespass, which is not within the Statute made for the prisoners. 2ly. Because there was no due notice given to the party, at whose suit he lay in execution, as the Statute doth direct there should. The Court ordered to view the Certificate, 〈◊〉. Den une●. and to file it, otherwise there should be no proceed upon the scire facias, and directed the party to demur upon the scire facias, if it be not good, because the matter alleged cannot be pleaded to it. Custodes against Arskot. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. MAynard moved the Court for one Arskot that was outlawed for murder, For time to bring a Writ of Error. and had leave to bring his writ of Error, that he may have longer time to bring it, because the King uses to sign the writ, and the Parliament had not ordered who shall do it now, and therefore the Attorney General must advise with the Parliament about it, which cannot speedily be done, Thereupon time was granted till the Attorney could conveniently do it. Newcomin against Leigh. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. Pasch. 16●0. rot. 52. LEigh did assume and promise unto Newcomin, Whether a good Assumpsit. that if Newcomin would take one Lo for his Debtor, in the room of one Cooper, and would spare Lo until such a time for the money, that then he would pay the money to Newcomin, if he did not, and upon this Assumpsit Newcomin brought his Action against Leigh. The question was whether this were a good Assumpsit. And the Court held it was not, because it is a collateral thing, and he doth not say that he will discharge Cooper, and so Newcomin may sue Cooper notwithstanding the Assumpsit; For though it may be it was the intention of the parties to discharge Cooper, yet it appears not so by the words of the Assumpsit set forth: And it was then said by Roll. That if I promise to pay to john a Down a Debt which john a Style oweth to john a Down; Nudum pactum. this is nudum pactum. Bawsy and Lowdall. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. Pasch. 1650. rot. 275. Upon a special verdict in an Action of Trespass and Ejectment, Special Verdict upon the devise of a Copyhold in Fee. the case in effect was this. A man seized of Copyhold lands in fee, devisable by Custom, deviseth them in this manner, I give and bequeath my lands, etc. to my son Richard, during his natural life, and after to the heir of his body for ever. Hales of Council with the Plaintif made these questions, 1. whether by the words of the Will a Fee-simple at the Common Law passeth because there is an estate to Richard for life, and after to his heir in the singular number. And he argued that the word heir includes heirs, because it is Nomen Collectivum: Next, Whether the devising the land to Richard for his natural life, and after to his heir for ever, makes any difference in the Case, and he held it did not, and said, that Archers case that is objected by the other side differs much from this, for there the words are restrained; for it is Proximo Haeredi, and not Haeredi generally, as it is in our Case; and there the words next heir are not words of limitation, but of purchase, and to decipher the person, but not to limit the estate; and in our case if there should not be a limitation, Richard should only take for life, which is not the intent of the Will, as may appear by the passages, and clauses of it. And Thomas and Kemishes case, in 5 Car. in this Court makes an end of our Case. Neither doth the adding of the word in perpetuum make a difference in the Case, for if the words had been omitted, the same estate had passed to the Tenant, Richard and his Estate is not enlarged by them. 2ly. The words in perpetuum relate to all the Estate, and not to any particular Estate, and so the surrender made by R. Hunt is good. Next of all, supposing that it be a limited Estate, and a contingent remainder, the question will then be whether this contingent remainder be destroyed or no, and I conceive it is, because the particular Copyhold estate, which must support this contingent remainder is destroyed, and the Law is the same in that point in Copyhold cases, as it is in other cases at the Common Law, for Copyholds are directed by the rules of the Common Law, 13 jac. Banc. Reg. It is also held, that there is the same rule to support a contingent remainder of a Copyhold as there is of Land at the Common Law. Next it is to be considered whether the particular Copyhold estate, be extinguished or not. And it is cléer that it is, for the customary Estate is in the Lord who hath the Fee simple, which cannot both stand together, and so there is no estate to support the contingent remainder Copyhold, and consequently all objections are by this answered. 1. That the surrender shall not do wrong. 2ly. That the surrender destroys not the Custom. Turner on the other side argued, that only an estate passeth to Richard for life, and that the word Heir is not a word of limitation, to make the Ancestor take a Fee simple, neither shall the word Heir be taken Collective here but singulariter, and so according to the common sense, number, and matter ought it to be construed. And Nouns Collective in the singular number do not signify the same thing, that they do in the plural number, as may be proved by other examples, and there is no proper name to signify one particular Heir in Law, if the word Heir in the singular number shall not do it, Shellyes case, 1. Rep. f. 101. & ●ooks institut. f. 8.1. Rep. Archers case. And there are two judgements in the Common pleas in the very point, as I am informed by the Attorney on our side. In a Will the word Heir shall not be taken Coliective; out in the natural grammatical sense, and not as a word of art; but it is otherwise taken perchance in conveyances, which are made by men of Art, and learned in the Laws, whereas wills are made commonly by lay gents, and unskilful in the Law; And the rule is, that words shall be interpreted to make all the parts of a deed in which they are to stand together, and to bear sense, and to be in esse, and effectual, which cannot be here if the word heir shall be taken Collective; but may be if it be taken singulariter. Hob. rep. Stukely and Butler's case. Next if the word heir should be taken Collective, than the Estate for life would merge, 30 El. C. B. Hill. 3 jac. C. B. Hiller and Lewis his case. 3ly. Rich. hath only an Estate for life, if it were otherwise the Testator would have otherwise expressed it and he hath well expressed an estate for life, and no other Estate in him. If one grant 4. parts of his manor, it shall pass 4. parts of 5. and not all. For the other point the contingent remainder is not here destroyed by the destruction of the Copyhold Estate, for Copyhold Estates do not depend one upon another as Estates of the Common Law do, and here is one in esse to take the Estate. Another question he spoke to, viz. whether a Lessee at will being ousted by a stranger can reenter, and he held he cannot, for he hath but a mere right, 38 H. 6. f. 27. Fortescue and Yeluerton, 3. jac. Banc. Reg. rot. 501. Carpenter and Collins. But to this Roll chief justice, Entry. and Nicholas justice answered, that he may enter notwithstanding it hath been heretofore controverted, and the reason is, because he hath the primer possession. Roll chief justice inclined that the contingent remainder is not destroyed, because it doth not here depend upon the particular Estate; but it ought to expect till the remainder happen; and he conceived that the word heir, and heirs, were all one here by the intent of the parties, and the frame of the conveyance. Ask justice said, that it is a good Estate of Fee simple conditional executed in Richard. jerman justice, The intent in a Will, if it be not contrary to Law, aught to be taken, and there must be words to make the intent appear, and these words must stand together, and shall not be made void, and he conceived the contingent remainder not destroyed. Adjourned till the next Term. Postea. Port against Midleton. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an Action of debt upon an obligation, Error to reverse a judgement in debt and the Error insisted upon was in the entering of the judgement, which was quod recuperet Debitum suum, and doth not say praedictum. Roll chief justice answered, Delivery. Escrow. that the debt is confessed by the party, and the question is whether the deed was delivered as an escrow or not; but it was delivered to the party himself, and therefore could not be delivered as an escrow. jerman justice said, that debitum suum without praedictum is not good, for the word praedictum is verbum operativum. Ask justice as Roll, and there is but one debt, Implication. and the word ideo in the record implies it to be the same debt. Nicholas to the same effect. The rule was affirmetur nisi causa die junae sequenti. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. AN administrator had a judgement against one to recover a debt due to the Intestate, and then the Administrator died Intestate, For a scire facias to revive a judgement denied. Scire facias. and another took out new letters of administration de bonis non of the first Intestate, and after moved the Court that he might have a scire sacias to revive the judgement obtained by the former Administrator. But the Court answered, that he could not have it; but must begin a new Action, for the debt against the party. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. ONe was indicted for speaking these words against a Mayor of a City, To quash an endictment. viz. you are a forsworn man, and have broken your oath. Hales moved to quash the endictment, because the words have no reference to the Mayor in respect of his office. jerman justice answered, that the speaking of the words is a breach of the good behaviour, and thought it fit the Defendant should plead to the endictment, to which the Court at first inclined. But afterwards ruled the other party to show cause on Monday following why it should not be quashed. The Countess Rivers case. Hil. 1650. Banc. sup. THe Countess Rivers was arresten by a bill of Midlesex, and prays in Court by her Council that the Writ may abate, Arguments touching privilege of peerage not to be arrested. and the Precept, and pleads her patent, whereby she was created a Countess, and so pleads that she ought not to be arrested. Latch of Council against the Countess argued that her patent was not good, because it wants the words of investiture, which are material words in the making of an Earl or Countess, for although the Act of investiture may be omitted, because she is a woman and she cannot be girt with a sword, yet she may be clothed with a mantle, as it is in the Institutes, f. 16. and so was it in the case of Ann Bullein that was made Marchioness of Winchester by King Henry the 8. and of the Lady Finch, made Countess of Winchelsea by King james, 6 jac. Pasch. 1. but in this Case there was a non obstante, to dispense with the clause of investiture, and in the viscount Barkleys' case, the patent whereby he was made Earl of Nottingham was adjudged naught, for want of this clause. 2ly. It doth not appear by the patent, that she is made an English Countess, and then she hath no privilege, 8 Rich. 2. Banc. Reg. 204. 11 E. 3. Banc. re. 473. Neither is there any relation to the patent to any place, of which she is made a Countess. For although the patent be sealed with the English broad Seal, this is not material, for outlandish honours may be granted by the broad Seal of England. 3ly. The cause that she shall have privilege of an English Countess is not material, because she is not made an English Countess, and she is no Countess to have privilege against the Common Law, although she may (it may be) have her privilege in point of honour in the Marshals Court and Herald's office, because there is no public good and service in making her a Countess, 43 E 3.4. for being a woman she cannot be employed in Arms, or otherwise for the public. And an Ambassador cannot have privileges granted him, which do not concern him as an Ambassador, Dyer 60. and 1.1 H. 7. rot. 24 C. Banc. The King cannot grant one to be exempted from arresting, as it is in Cooks Mag. Char. Pasc. 7 H. 8. rot. 66 C. B. for the reason of that clause of Magna charta nulli negabimus justiciam. The King cannot grant a Sanctuary to protect men from the arrests of his subjects, 29 Ass. 34. Keiw. 190. And there is no instance to be given of a woman made a Countess, that was ever free and protected from arresting. In the Statute of 20 H. 6. C. 9 for Earls wives, and 21 H. 8. to qualify Chaplains, there is no notice taken of Countesses by creation, but only of Countess' dowagers, or Countesses by descent, 6 rep. 9 C. de Rutland's case, and Ann Bullein was tried per pares as she was Queen, and not as she was Marchioness of Winchester. And further the privileges of Earls and Countesses are now extinct, for the cause of those privileges, viz. the King and house of Lords are extinct, and gone, and the privilege of being free from arrests is a privilege executory, and not executed. Neither doth the sufficiency of their possessions only give them the privilege not to be arrested; but their public scrvices to the State, which is the final cause of the privilege, and the other was but a partial cause, and not the sole cause. Reliefs were paid by Barons and Earls, when Earldoms and Baronies were created; but they are not now paid as they were then, but according to the value of the possessions now, and Amercements of Earls and Barons were equal. The privileges of Earls and Barons was derived originally from Soldiers, after it was derived to Bishops, and great Counsellors, and so it appears that they were privileged in respect of public employments, and not by reason of their revenues. All the Abbots and Priors had the privilege not to be arrested, yet all were not Lords of the Parliament, 21 E. 3. Mich. 59 Tres. Mich. 7 H. 7. pl. 7.31 E. 3 process. 54.27 H. 8.7.7 H. 6.11.29 E. 3. f. 30. Dyer 315. And a judgement without a Capiatur was in Trespass against a Bishop, because the King was to have no fine, 14 H. 7.21. But it is not so in a temporal peer, where the King is to have a fine. The privileges have several expressions, and the reasons for the privileges of the lay peerage is fully expressed in the Writs directed to them, Regist. 287.247. Rast. Exigent. Britton 88.10 H. 4.15. per Hull. 14 H. 6.2. per Newton. 39 E. 3. f. 35. Hill. 14 Eliz. Dyer 314.3 H 6. f. 38.48 E. 3. f. 3.35 H. 6.46. for other privileges they are not allowable: And now also all tenors as well as the House of Lords is taken away by the late Act; and though her privilege do continue, yet she hath not taken the right way to have it allowed; for she ought to have brought a writ out of the Chancery to have it allowed, and not to have done it die a dilatory plea, 8 H. 6.9 & 10. and the Patent cannot try whether she be a Countess or not, 9 rep. 31. Inst. 16 b. 6 rep. 63. And lastly mischief and misery will ensue to many, if this privilege should be allowed, and the very matter speaks for itself, and so he prayed judgement for the Plaintif. Hales of Council on the other side prayed the privilege might be allowed, and he followed Latch in the points of this Argument: And first he said, that the thing grounded by the Patent is only in creation of the dignity, and there is no need here of investiture, for if there were, than a recital of it should be also necessary, but because it needs not, therefore it needs no recital of it in the Patent. Seldens Tit. of honour, f. 876.21 R. 2. There is a recital of an Investiture, but there was no Investiture, and so it was not material, and a non obstante is to no purpose to dispense with the want of Investiture, if it were necessary, and the reason of the making the new Patent of the Lord Barkeley was not for the want of the Clause of Investiture, for the Investiture is a ceremony of the Heralds, and not essential to the Honour. And although there be no certain place of denomination of the place of the Earldom, yet is the Patent good, for it may be out of England, and yet she may be an English Countess notwithstanding, Although I agree that foreign honours may be granted by the Broad Seal of England; but here be sufficient words to express her to be an English Countess, & the most proper that can be, viz. the Patent. Creations of such honours have been frequent, & she hath also a sufficient estate to support her dignity: I confess that it is true that no person can be privileged from Arrest by grant; but here the privilege ensues the Patent of her Counteship by Custom and Law, as incident to it. The King cannot grant a privilege to imprison, but if he grant a Court, the power to imprison follows necessarily upon it; And the privilege which the Law gives to the person of a Countess, is that which exempts her from Arrest, as it appears in the Case of a Countess by Marriage, and a Countess by Creation is more honourable than a Countess by Marriage; and therefore aught to have as high privileges as the other; and the Statute made concerning Countesses, the wives of Earls and Barons do appertain to a Countess created; for those Statutes were but an affirmance of the Common Law, and did introduce no new Law. This privilege is not taken away, for it arose by Custom and by the Common Law, and not from Foreiners, as Latch conceives, and so the reason of that cannot be as he urgeth, but by the privilege of the person which endures as well when there is no Parliament, as when there is, and this privilege is during life, and not like to a privilege granted by reason of employment. For a Countess Dowager hath no more reason to be privileged, in relation to military employment than a Countess by Creation, and by the late Act no employment is taken away; And for the Clergy they were privileged from Arrests, not because of employment, but by reason of the eminency of their persons. There may be an Earl or a Baron by writ or by prescription, and there it ought to be certified by writ; but here the honour being by Creation, the Patent may be pleaded to certify it, as well as if it were certified by writ, and to plead it thus is the more proper way. A Baron ought not to be styled Dominus in a writ, but by his Christian name, and addition of Knight, if he be one, if he have no special name of Barony in his Creation. Roll chief justice demanded, if one be made a Baron, and be not called to the Parliament by writ, or comes thither by virtue of some clause in his Patent, shall he be exempted from Arrest? quasi diceret non. And if one heretofore had had twenty Knights fees, Privilege. could he have come to the Parliament by reason of them? And held that the privilege is not allowable, for she never had reference to the Parliament, or to do any other public service. jerman, Nicholas, and Ask Justices agreed with Roll in all. Roll said, If the King grant a Town to be a Burrow, the grant gives it not privilege to send a Burgess to the Parliament, except there be special words in the Patent to warrant it; but if he make a County it is otherwise by Statute. Adjourned. Hayward against William's Hill 1650. Banc. sup. Hill. 1649. rot. 824. THe Case was this, Whether a Writ of Error well brought. A Feme was sued as a Feme sole, but by the surname of her Husband, she being Covert Baron, and judgement was given against her, and the Baron brought a writ of Error. The question was, whether the writ of Error was well brought by the Baron. It was then said, That if a Feme Covert levy a fine as a Feme sole, if her Baron die she shall not defeat it, but the Baron may defeat it during her life. 18 E. 4, 40.7. Roll chief justice to the case at the Bar said, how can the Baron bring a writ of Error here, who is no party to the Record, neither is chargeable by the judgement? But let us see books, for the case is considerable. Postea. Needler and Guest. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. Trin. 1649. rot. Q. A Writ of Error was brought in the Chequer Chamber to reverse a judgement given in this Court. Whether Execution may be notwithstanding a Writ of Error brought in the Chequer Chamber. Execution. The question was, whether now, since the late Act, that a Writ of Error shall be no supersedeas of Execution, this Court may grant execution. Roll chief justice said, it may, for otherwise the Act is to no purpose. Latch said, the Record is not now in this Court, and therefore there can be no Execution granted here. Roll chief justice answered, you have confessed by your pleading, namely by your Demurrer, that the Record is here so far as to grant Execution. Therefore let there be Execution, except cause be showed to the contrary the day the next term. But afterwards the Court said, they would not grant it, but said the party might take execution at his peril. and Alleyn. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. A Certiorari was directed to the County Palatine of Chester to remove a cause into this Court. They make a special return, Whether a Return good out of the County Palatine of Chester. viz. that they have jurisdiction of the cause, and that therefore they are not to certify it. Sergeant Glyn argued, that this return was not good, for this Court hath jurisdiction over all the Courts in England in writs mandatory, 34 Ass. 7.19 H. 6.12. And an Act of Plarliament doth not take away the power of this Court, if it run not in the negative; but in writs remedial it is not so general as it is in this case, & the cause may be well enough tried here, notwithstanding it be concerning a matter which ariseth in the County Palatine, as the Statute 9 Ed. 3. C. ●. is. 2ly. It appears that the Mayor and Citizens of Chester are parties, and so they will try their own cause, and this appears by the Record, and this they ought not to do, 21 H. 7. f. 33. lib. Ass. 332. 37 E. 3. f. 7.6 jac. C. Banc. and Smith and Hancocks case, 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Roll chief justice answered, If the cause were come to trial this were good cause to remove it, but it is not so here, and it appears not by the return that the matter of the suit did arise within the jurisdiction of the City, what say you to that? jurisdiction. for they have not shown any cause why they should have jurisdiction. Return. Trial. Therefore let them show cause before the end of the Term, upon notice, why they should not make a better return. Roll said, the Action may be well brought there, although they cannot try it there, for the Original is good. Shurlye against Semaign. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved upon an Affidavit that two writs of Execution were executed upon one judgement, For a supersedeas to an Execution. therefore it was prayed that the last execution might be superseded, because there ought not to be two executions for one matter, but where the party is prejudiced by death, or Act of Law, that the party cannot take benefit of the former execution, 28 H. 8. Dyer, and 13 Eliz. Dyer. Roll chief justice, If the first writ of Execution be returned and filled, there cannot be a second Execution, Execution. otherwise it is if it be not returned and filled. Therefore take your Course. Coleman against Blunden. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. Mich. 1650. rot. 447. COleman brought an Action upon the case upon an Assumpsit against Blunden, and had a verdict against him; Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the Case. In Arrest of judgement it was moved that it doth not appear by the Declaration to whom the Assumpsit was made, but it only says super se assumpsit, and upon this Exception The Court ruled a nil capiat per billam. Marry against Bond. Pasch. 1651. Banc. sup. IT was moved in Arrest of judgement in an Action of Debt brought upon an Obligation to stand to an Award, Arrest of judgement in debt upon a Bond to stand to an Award that the submission to stand to the Award was conditional, viz. so that the Award were delivered up the 27 day of such a Month: And it appears that the Action brought is for not performing an Award made the 24 day of the same Month; so it appears not whether the Award were delivered upon the 27 day, or no, and so it may be that the condition is not broken. Roll chief justice answered, the question is whether it be an Award before the delivering it up or no. Therefore let the judgement stay till the Plaintif move, Award. for it is worthy of Consideration. Harman against jacob. Pasch. 1651. Banc. sup. IN an Arrest of judgement upon a verdict given against an Alien in an Endictment upon the Statute of 22 H. 8. C. 1●. for using a Trade, Arrest of judgement upon an Endictment. exception was first taken, that the Endictment doth not say that the Defendant was born out of the power of the Commonwealth, but only that he was born out of England, To this Roll chief justice answered, if it say that he is Alienigenus, Alien. that emplyes all. 2ly. The Endictment doth not say that he is Alienatus extra Angliam, and this was held a good Exception. Sir Humphrey Tracye against Bloom. Pasch. 1651. Banc. sup. IN Arrest of judgement upon a Verdict given in an Action of Debt for rent upon two leases, Arrest of judgement in Debt for Rent. one for years, and the other at will, The Exception taken was that the Plaintif declares upon a demise made to the Defendant the 7th. of October 1646. at will, and sets forth that the Defendant held the lands let for 2 years, ending at Michaelmas 1648. and so for two years rend behind he brings his Action, whereas there cannot be such a rent due for such a Term; for although the rent be due for the whole year at Michaelmas, yet the term of 2 years is not ended at Michaelmas, for that is upon the 29 day of September, whereas the 2 years end not till the 6 of October following. Roll chief justice answered, the rent for the 2 years was due at Michaelmas, Rent. and take all the words together the Declaration is good enough, although the expression be not so proper as it might have been. Nicholas and Ask as Roll, and so the rule was judicium nisi. Shann and Shann. Pasch. 1651. Banc. sup. SHann brought an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit against Shann, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon an Assumpsit. and declares, That in Consideration that the Plaintif would surrender to the Defendant, and his heirs, a Copyhold according to the custom of the manor, the Defendant did assume and promise unto the Plaintiff to pay unto him 500 l. and for breach of this promise he brought his Action, and obteins a verdict against the Defendant. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, and took this exception, viz. that the consideration on the Plaintiffs part was not performed, for the consideration was, that he should surrender the Copyhold to the Defendant and his Heirs, and he hath set forth the surrender to be into the hands of a Copyhold Tenant of the manor to the use of the Defendant, which is no surrender, Surrender. until it be presented at the next Court, and so it is incertain, whether it shall take effect or no. Roll chief justice said, It is expressed to be secundum consuetudinem manerii, yet this is not sufficient, for it is not an effectual surrender until it be presented at the Court. Therefore let judgement stay till the Plaintiff move. Lord Mont-Eagle. Pasc. 1951. Banc. sup. THe Lord Mont-Eagle was arrested by a bill of Midlesex, and for want of bail was turned over to the Marshal of this Court, For the Defendant to plead in chief. Plea dilatory. and being in Custodia Mareschalli, the Plaintiff declares against him in Debt upon an obligation. The Defendant pleads his peerage, and prays to be discharged. The Court was moved that he might be ordered to plead in chief, and not this dilatory plea. The Court thereupon ordered that he should show cause, why he should not plead in chief, and said his plea was dilatory, and so it had been ruled lately in the case of the Earl Rivers. Fielder and Tovye. Hill. 1650. Banc. sup. Pasc. 1651. rot. 430. FIelder brought an Action of debt upon an obligation, Demurrer to a Declaration in debt upon an obligation the Defendant prayed Oyer of the Bond, and upon view thereof demurs to the Plaintiffs Declaration, and for cause shows that the Plaintiff declares for quadragint. libris, and the Bond is quadragent libris, and so there is a variance. To this it was answered by Green, that this is no material difference, for the words sound alike, and there is more difference between dra and drin than between ginta and genta, & between dra & drin hath been held no material variance, and quadragent. is not utterly incertain here, for either it must be 40. or 400. and the condition of the obligation explains the sum, and the Plaintiff here declares but for 40 l. and so it appears in the Record. In Osbornes case octogenta was for octogint. and yet held good, and Hob. 18. Logards case Trigintat instead of triginti, and in Walter and Pigot's case Septingent. is used for septuagint. and Pary and Day's case quinquegent. for quinquagint. and these held no material variances. Latch on the other side said the word in the Bond is uncertain, and the condition hath nothing in it, to reduce it to a certain signification, and if it make any certainty in it it must make it signify 400 l. and then the Plaintiff hath failed in his Declarasion, and hobart's case differs from this, and as for Osborns case it is variously reported, and so not to be relied on. Roll chief justice, What say you to sessanta? But the question here is, what shall be meant by the word whether 40. or 400. And in Fi●z●● berts case, judgement was given upon a demurrer, Variance. that gent for gint was a material variance, and our case is all one with that. If the doubt be whether it should be 40. or 400. how shall we know the intent of the parties? and if it be certain it must he understood 400. and the Action is brought but for 40. l. 44 Eliz. Mich. rot. 1301. Grace and Davis case, Sexgint. was adjudged to be a Bond of 60 l. and not of 600 l. And it is the gentleman and gint. in all the cases that makes the difference. And the case of sessanta comes not to our case, and so concluded judgement to be against the Plaintiff. jerman Nicholas, and Ask justices of the same opinion. Nicholas justice said, that false Latin in a Bond doth not make it naught; but he held this Bond was for 400 l. and not 40 l. and it is not incertain for the grammar rule, ginta notat decem, sed genta numero centum, doth hold here. Antea. Gay against Gay. Pasc. 1651. Banc. sup. Trin. 1650. rot. 1350. Upon a special verdict found in a replevin; Whether an estate tail or fee conditional. The case was this, A man seized of a Copyhold Borough English, devised it to H. his grandchild, and to his Heirs, and if he die during the life of his mother, the remainder to H. his younger brother, and to his heirs. The question here was whether here be an Estate tail in H. or a Fee simple executory. If it be an Estate tail, than the devise was said not good, because it is of a Copyhold, but if it be a Fersimple, Limitation. than it is a good devise. Roll chief justice said, that a limitation of an inheritance after an absolute Fee simple is not a good limitation, for this would be to make a perpetuity, which the Law will not admit, Perpetuity. but if it be upon a contingent Fee simple it is otherwise. Adjournatur. Postea. Heale against Greene. Pasc. 1651. Banc. sup. Hill. 649 rot. 370. IN an Action of Trespass and ejectment, Case upon a special verdict in trespass, and ejectment. upon a special verdict sound, the case proved to be this. A man seized of a manor that had divers Tenants that held for lives by old rents deviseth it to his wife, during her life, with power to let and set, and make estates out of them, in as ample manner as the Testator might, if he were living. The questions were made by Latch. 1. Whether this power given her to set, and set, etc. doth not alter her Estate for life in the Lands devised to her. 2ly. Whether this power given her by the Will, adds any power to her estate for life, to make estates, and he held for the first, that the power given her did not alter her Estate. And 2ly. that it adds no power unto her Estate, because the clause in the Will, is one entire clause, and not double and accumulative, and so she can make no greater Estates, than her estate for life will bear. And for the objection that is made. That then the words that limit the power to her are void, and idle. He answered, that it is not necessary that all the words in a Will should give something; but some words may be explanatory of other words, and so are these words here, and yet the words here may add something to her Estate, viz. to enable her to make Estates without impeachment of waste. And the words shall not be intended of the time of Execution of the Estates made by the Feme, for than they are idle, Hill. 1 Car. Banc. Reg. Danyel and Vplins case. One may dispose an estate by Will for life, with power to make Estates to continue after the death of the party that made them. But here the estate is made only out of the interest of the wife, which cannot endure after her life, Pasc. 44. Eliz. Bible and Dringhouse, and so prays judgement for the Plaintiff. Hales for the Defendant made these questions, 1. What power was given by the Will; 2ly. Whether it were well executed; and he held the feme being executrix hath but an Estate for life; But she hath a power to make estates, as she hath done. There is no question but such a power may be added. The question only is if this power be added here in our case, and he said it was added by the express words of the will, for else those words are frivolous, and operate nothing. In Danyel and Vplins case cited, which was entered, 20 jac. Hill. 720. there is no express Estate given to the party, but a mere power only, and it was not by reason of the words added, for they are only conjunctive words. And justice Whitlock held there that the first words gave the power; Though justice jones differed in opinion, and that case is the very same with ours; The reason in our case, That the words give power to the feme, may appear by the comparing this part of the Will with the other parts of it. In other parts of the Will where things are devised to his wife, these words here used are not added, and that argues that the Testator intended the Feme more power, than in other things devised to her, and the words themselves being a devise of a manor, proves by the nature of the thing, that the Testator intended to give power to the Feme, to make Estates out of the manor. And it cannot be intended, that the words In as ample manner, &c, do only give the feme power to assign over her term, Vaughan and Longs case, 24 C. the words were adjudged to be words to enlarge the power of the Legatée, and so are they here. And the subsequent clause during the term of her life, restrains not the power, for these words may be either referred to the Estates to be made, or to the time of making them, and here they are referred to the execution of the power, and this is more suitable to the intention of the party in ordinary reason, and they are added to expound the intent, viz. that the remainder limited over shall not hinder the feme, for he hath not barred her out, and hath imposed this trust in her as Executrix, and as Legatee. And for the 2d. point here is a good Execution of the power, for it ariseth partly out of her interest, and partly out of her Authority, and both may well stand together, and the Estate made out of both is a good Estate, or if not, the Estate may be intended to arise out of the power given her to make such an Estate, and not out of her interest, and the joining of her daughter is not material, though no good estate be derived from her, and so he prayed judgement for the Defendant. Roll chief justice, It is usual in the West of England to make Estates for lives upon the old rent; but it is not here expressed of what nature this manor is, or whether it used to be let, and here is no limitation to let for lives. But here either the lastre words are idle, or else the Feme hath such a power, that she may destroy the remainder. And itsh all not be intended that he trusted his Executrix, with more than he gave her, and the words of the Will do not express that, and the question is how it shall be interpreted. The words may be interpreted Cumulative. Interpretation. otherwise the feme hath power to destroy the remainder, which would be a hard construction. To which Nicholas assented. Roll chief lusty, The intention of the Testator is not clear to give this power to the Feme; but if it did appear to be his meaning, it might be otherwise; and here it is in a Will. And the Verdict is not well drawn up, for the Case might have been made better; for all the land may be in Demesite for aught appears by the Verdict. Adjourned to be argued again, Postea. Webb against Wilmer. Pasch. 1651. Banc. sup. Hill. 1650. rot. 309. Webb brought an Action of Debt for rend reserved by him upon a lease for years made to Wilmer, Arrest of judgement in Debt for rend reserved upon a Lease for years. and obtains a Verdict. The Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement, and alleged for cause that the Plaintif had abated his writ. The case was this, Webb leaseth certain lands to Wilmer for years, reserving a rent, with a clause of reentry for not payment, the rent being behind, the Lessor brings an Action of Debt for the rent, and pending the suit reenters into the land, and after the Lessee reenters. The question here was, whether the writ once abated by the Plaintiffs entry, Reviver. Abatement. pending the writ, were revived by the Defendants reentry. Roll chief justice held it was not. Twisden argued, that the writ is not abated, but only abatable by plea, and so this matter is not to be offered to stay the judgement, 5 H. 7. f. 47. and he hath pleaded nothing in abatement, but to the Action only, and he said that it now being after a verdict, it is helped by the Statute. Hales on the other side said, that it doth here appear that the Plaintif hath no cause of Action, for he was in possession when he brought the Ejectment. Roll answered, If one declare having no cause of Action, Declaration. Departure. if there be cause afterward, it is well enough. But here is a departure, and the 1. Ejectment is not revived, for it is purged by the re entry. The rule was nil capiat per billam, nisi. The Custodes Libertatis, etc. against Hall. Pasch. 1651. Banc. sup. HAll was indicted for forestall of Butter, Error to reverse a judgement upon an Endictment for forestall. and pleaded, and had judgement given against him; whereupon he brought his writ of Error, and took these exceptions. 1. That it doth not appear that the Endictment was at the Quarter Sessions, as it ought to be by the Statute of 5 Ed. 6. for it is only said to be ad generalem Sessionem. Roll chief justice answered, if it be ad generalem Sessionem it may be intended the Quarter Sessions. Intendment. 2ly It was objected that there is no Capiatur awarded in the judgement, as there ought to be. The Court answered they would advise. Willis against Bond. Pasch. 1651. Banc. sup. Mich. 1650. rot. 86. BOnd an Administrator brought an Action of Debt in Bristol against Willis upon an indebitatus assumpsit, Error to reverse a judgement in debt. and had a judgement: The Defendant brought a writ of Error, and took these Exceptions. 1. That the Plaintif declares for a thing, the conusance whereof lies out of the jurisdiction of the Court, jurisdiction. for it is for wages to be paid upon the performance of a Voyage to be made in locis transmarinis. Roll chief justice said, this was a good Exception, for they cannot inquire at Bristol whether the party hath performed his Voyage or not. The 2d. Exception was, that the Plaintif declares that the Defendant was indebted to him in such a sum of money, to render him an account. The Court answered, this is not good, Account. Debt. for in such case an Action of account lies, and not an indebitatus assumpsit, And for these causes the judgement was reversed, nisi; and pronounced by jerman justice (at the prayer of the Plaintiffs Counsel) in English, being the first that was pronounced so in this Court, according to the late Act for proceed in Law to be in English. Quod nota. Gowr against Pasch. 1651. Banc. sup. IN Arrest of judgement upon a Verdict found for the plaintiff, Arrest of judgement in a Trover and Conversion. Demand. Trover. in a Trover and Conversion brought by Baron and Feme, for goods of the Feme dum ipsa sola suit. The Exception was, that it is not expressed that the goods were demanded by the Feme. Roll chief justice said, the Demand of the Feme is good to found the Action, and it was then also said, that a Trover and Conversion lies for goods found and converted, although they come afterwards to the hands of the party that lost them. The Rule was judicium, nisi. Pasch. 1651. Banc. sup. MEmorandum, The first rule of this Court made in English was between White and Keblewhite. Pasch. 1651. Pease against Shrimpton. Pasc. 1651. Banc. sup. Hill. 24 Car. rot. 191. THe Court was informed by Council that the Habeas Corpus and Bail-piece were lost, and therefore it was prayed that there might be a new Habeas Corpus, and that the old Bail put in may be allowed by the rule of Court. Roll chief justice answered, make a new Habeas Corpus, Habeas Corpus. Bail. and a new Bail-piece; but first let Tutt the Attorney that was Clark of the Bails attend here to be examined whether the Habeas Corpus & Bail-piece be lost as is suggested. Ritch against Sanders. Pasch. 1651. Banc. sup. Hill. 1649. rot. 758. Rich brought an Action of Trespass against for taking away his Corn set forth for tithes; Special verdict in Trespass for tithes upon the words of a Will. upon issue joined a special Verdict was found, whereupon the case fell out to be upon the construction of the words of a will, which were these, I give all my free lands wheresoever to my Brother john Sanders and his heirs, upon condition that he suffer my wife to enjoy all my Freelands in Holford for life, the Testator having only a portion of tithes of inheritance in Holford, and no lands. The question here was, whether this portion of tithes shall be accounted free lands within the intent of the will, and so the wife be to have them during her life. Twisden held, the tithes were not devised by the will to the Feme; for if I devise my fee-simple lands to john a Style and his heirs, tithes do not pass by this devise, for tithes are a collateral thing arising out of land, and not part of the land itself. 42 Ed. 3. f. 13. 10 jac. Moyle and Ewers case, 31 Eliz. Perkins and Hinds case. In the will here they pass not, for there are no words in the will to devise them, nor can the words he so expounded, and here are other lands devised to satisfy the words of the will. A term for years hath more relation to land than tithes; and a term could not have passed by the words of the will. Next, the second Clause doth not pass the tithes, for there is no such thing as is expressed in it; but if it should pass to the wise by implication, yet it cannot pass to john Sanders the Brother; for there are neither express words nor any implication to devise this portion of tithes to him, but the contrary rather is to be collected from the Will. Wadham Windham on the other side answered, that the Testator calls the tithes in Holford his free lands. It is true generally, that by the devise of lands tithes do not pass, but in a will by the intent of the Devisor they may pass, and the word land includes all real things in common intention and legal construction, as Lutrels' Case is, 1 Mar. Bro. Tit. Elegit. An Elegit may be of a rent, and tithes have a nearer relation to land than rend have. 2ly. Here is an apparent intention to devise the tithes; for he explains his meaning in his second clause of the Will, that he intends tithes by the word lands. 44 Eliz. Com. Banc. Gery against Gery, the question there was, what passed by the word rends, whether lands passed. The words were, as to all my lands in Dale I devise my rents, etc. and here the matter comes in by a Proviso, which enlarges the matter, Trin. 3 jac. Fitz. William's case; One devised all his goods, jewels, and Plate, excepting his lease in C There it was adjudged that all his other Leases passed. 4 Ed. ●. Br. grants 51. Another circumstance in the Will enforceth this construction, viz. the word wheresoever, which word expresseth the intent of the Devisor to be so, otherwise that word will be idle, and to no purpose. Hob. rep. Stukely and Butler's case: It may also appear out of the body of the Will: for it appears thereby that his Daughter was provided for in his will by his personal estate● and that the intention was to dispose of his lands to the Heir, and his Copyhold lands which he had in Holford were surrendered at the time of the making of the Will, and so the devise cannot refer to them; and besides this is called free lands, which distinguisheth them from Copyhold lands, and so he prayed judgement for the Plaintif. Roll chief justice, There is a Condition annexed to the Devise, Condition. that his wife shall enjoy this land, though the words in the Will are not very proper to erpress it; but we must consider them as used in a Will, & not in a conveyance. Nicholas justice said. the Devisor himself calls them free-holds, and this distinguisheth them from Copyhold lands. Adjourned till Saturday following to be argued again. Dowse against Masters. Pasc. 1651. Banc. sup. DOwse brought an Action of Debt upon an Indebitatus Assumpsit against Masters for five pound, Demurrer to a plea in Debt upon Indebitatus assumpsit. in which the Defendant pleaded that he did deliver bills to the Plaintif to the value of 6 l. in which the plaintiff was indebted to him, which bills the Plaintif did accept in full satisfaction; the Plaintif replied protestando that he was not indebted to the Defendant, that he did not receive bills to the value of 6 l. in satisfaction: Upon this a Demurrer was joined. Roll chief justice said, Plea. the Plea of the Defendant is ill, for he doth not say that he delivered the Bills in full satisfaction, but that the Plaintif received them in full satisfaction, which is not good, for the Plaintiffs receiving of the Bills must be as they were delivered, and not other ways, and that is not expressed: Therefore let the Plaintif take his judgement, nisi, etc. Ross against Laurence. Pasch. 1651. Banc. sup. ROss brought an Action of the Case against Laurence for speaking these Welsh words of him, viz. Dedingues Will Rolls in mudon, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the case for Welsh words Englished. which are in English, William Ross hath forsworn himself, upon Issue joined, and a verdict for the plaintiff, the Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement that the words are not actionable, as they are rendered in English, and so the Action lies not. Roll chief justice, If the words sound in Welsh that the Plaintif was perjured, yet if the Plaintif do English them in English, which doth not amount to perjury, it is ill, Case. and an action will not lie for them, Therefore let judgement be stayed. Perk against Ingram. Pasch. 1651. Banc. sup. PEck brought an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit, and declares, Arrest of Judgement in an action upon the case upon an Assumpsit. that the Defendant, in consideration that she the Plaintif would leave her Father's house, and come to the House of the Defendant in such a place, did assume and promise unto her that he would marry her, and that thereupon she did leave her Father's House, and did come to the Defendants House, et obtulit se in maritagium conjungi, and because he had not performed his promise Actio accrevit: Upon issue joined, and a verdict found for the plaintiff, the Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement, and took Exceptions, that the Plaintif did not show in her Declaration when she left her Father's House, and came to the Defendants house, nor that she gave him any notice thereof. Wild moved for judgement, notwithstanding the Exceptions; for, he said, though it be not expressly said that she gave the Defendant notice when she came to his House, yet it is said, quod obtulit se in maritagium conjungi, which implies the Defendant had notice; and besides here is no need of notice; for the Assumpsit is, that if she will come to the Defendants house he will marry her, and it is not said that when she comes he will marry her, so that he is bound by his promise to take notice of her coming. Roll chief justice answered, if all the Declaration be considered together, here is a good consideration expressed; for this is not like to the case of tender of money. And the words obtulit se in maritagium conjungi shall be intended to the Defendant himself, Consideration. and then he must needs have notice of her coming thither. D ves of Counsel with the Defendant took this Exception, that the Plaintif in setting forth her offer of marriage doth not say tunc et ibidem, so there is neither place nor time set forth. Roll chief justice answered, it is after a Verdict, and you move this Exception too late, Advantage. and you have now lost the advantage of taking it. If there be a sufficient notice, it is well; if not, it is not good; for there aught to be a notice, for she may come to his house in private, so that he cannot take notice of her coming thither. Notice. The question only is this, whether notice be sufficiently and necessarily employed in the words obtulit se in maritagium conjungi. Curia advisare vult. Postea. King against Weeden. Pasch. 1651. Banc. sup. IN Arrest of judgement upon a Verdict found for the Plaintif in an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit brought by an Administrator, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the Case. 2 Exceptions were taken, 1. That the Plaintif did not show his Letters of Administration, and 2ly. That there is no good consideration set forth to ground the Assumpsit upon: for it is that the Defendant did promise, that if the Plaintif would forbear to take his course for the moneys, he would pay them, which words are uncertain, and he should have said his course in Law, and not generally his course. Roll chief justice to the 1 answered, It is not necessary here to show the Letters of Administration, for they are but inducements to the Action, and not the ground of it; And for the second exception the consideration is certainly enough set forth, Consideration. although the Latin be not very proper. Therefore let the Plaintif have his judgement, nisi, etc. Sawyer against Russel. Pasc. 1651. Banc. sup. SAwyer brought an Action upon the case against Russel, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the Case. for taking away certain , and obtained a Verdict against the Defendant; The Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement, and took exception to the Plaintiffs Declaration for the incertainty thereof. The plaintiff declared of a Trover and Conversion, de ducentis Averiis. viz. bobus, juvencis, Anglice Steers, juvencis, Anglice Runts, & juvencis, Anglice Heifers, which is uncertain, and so judgement cannot be given, for it is uncertain for what number of each of the Steers, Runts, and Heifers judgement should be given. Roll chief justice inclined that it is certain enough, Averment. and that the number may be averred, and the are all of one kind; yet, The Court would advise, afterward it was ruled, judicium, nisi. Shedlock and La. Pere. Pasc. 1651. Banc. sup. Hill. 1650. rot. 211. IN a Writ of Error brought to reverse a judgement given in an inferior Court, The Error assigned was, Error to reverse a judgement in an interior Court. judgement. Error. Abatement. that the judgement is quod recuperare debeat, whereas it ought to be recuperare debet. Roll chief justice answered. That if it be so, there is no judgement given, and so no Writ of Error lies, therefore let the writ be abated. For the Writ of Error supposeth a judgement, for the words of it are si judicium redditum sit, and in 3. jacobi in the Exchequer Chamber the very case was adjudged so. Collins against silly. Pasc. 1651 Banc. sup. Hill. 1650. rot. 302. THe Case was this; Demurrer upon an entry upon Lessee for years. Lessée for years by indenture covenants with the Lessor, that he will not assign over the land let, nor any part thereof, without the consent of the Lessor. The Lessor during the term enters into part of the land let, the Lessee assigns over the remainder of his term in the rest of the land, without the consent of the Lessor, and the Lessor thereupon brings an Action of Covenant against the Lessee; the question was whether it did lie in regard that the Lessor had entered into part of the land. Covenant. Roll chief justice held that the Covenant was collateral, and therefore it is broken by the assignment, notwithstanding the Lessors entry into part of the land. And the rule was judicium nisi. Custodes against Monger. Pasc. 1651. MOnger was indicted for forgeing a presentment to a jury in a Court held before Commissioners of sewers, Exceptions to the setting forth of a presentment. against Monger for casting of 10 loads of soil into the Thames. Exceptions were taken that it doth not appear by the endictment, by what authority the Court was held, where the presentment was found. 2ly. It is not averred that the presentment did present the casting in the soil to be any annoyance. 3ly. There doth not appear to be any process in the case against the party upon the presentment. To the first it was answered by council on the other side, that it is not necessary to show by what authority the Court was held, for their Authority is by Act of Parliament, and it is a public Act to be taken notice of. Roll the chief justice answered, That it is a private Act made for the City of London, and concerned the Lord Maior, though part of it be public, Statute. for part of an Act may be public, and another part of it private, and of that part which is private we are not bound to take notice, and it was here said that in criminal causes, Errors in proceed are not helped by a verdict. Notice. Roll took an exception that the endictment was only contra pacem publicam, jeofail. Indictment. whereas at that time when it was preferred, it ought to have been contra pacem nuper domini Regis & contra pacem publicam nunc. Adjourned. 23 Car in the King's Bench. Pasc. 1650. rot. 414. Cremer Plaintiff in a Replevin. Burnet Avowant in a Replevin. THe Plaintiff complains for the taking of his Cattles, Whether a copyhold estate be extinct by the Kings leasing it for life. to wit a Horse, Colt, and three Mares, the 13 of january, 21 Car. at Chingford in the County of Essex in a close there called Pipers down. THe Defendant avows the taking of the in loco quo, etc. as Bailiff unto Thomas Boothbye, as damage pheasant in the Close aforesaid, being the soil and the freehold of the said Thomas Boothby. Upon the pleading, the case appeared to be as followeth. KIng Henry the 8. being seized in Fee in the right of his Crown in the manner of Chingford Comitis in the County of Essex, of which manor a certain tenement called Lormiers alias Heriots with the appurtenances, whereof the said Close called Pipers Down was parcel, which tenement and Close were parcel of the said manor, and was then, and had been time out of mind demised, and demiseable in Fee by Copy of Court roll, of the said manor, did build a new message upon the said Tenement, and did afterwards by his Letters patents, under the great seal grant the office of Keeper, and keeping of the said message, to john Gate, for term of his life, with all the Lands, Tenements, etc. thereto belonging or adjacent, and did also by the same Letters patents give and grant unto the said john Gate amongst other things, the Lands belonging to the said new built message, whereof the said Close called Pipers down was part, for Term of his life, for the exercising of the said office, with an averment in the plea, that before that time there was no such office of the keeping of the said house, and that the King did not know, nor was at the time of the grant informed, that the said Tenement and Lands whereof the said Close was parcel were Copyhold of the said manor. After the grant made to john Gate, as aforesaid, H. the 8. died seized of the said manor, & of the reversion of the said Message and Close after the death of john Gate, and thereby Ed. the 6. became sof●ed of them in like manner, and from Ed. the 6. they came to Queen Mary. Then john Gate dies, and after his death. Queen Mary enters upon the said manor and Message whereof the said Close was a parcel, and afterwards by her Letters Patents under her broad Seal, doth grant the Manor and Message and Premises unto Susan Tong, and her heirs for ever. From Susan Tong by mean conveyance, the said Manor Message and Premises, came to Humphrey White and his heirs, and afterterwards Humphrey White being seized thereof in Fee, did by his indenture of lease demise the said Manor Message and Premises to Leigh for 60. years, to begin from Mich. before the making of the indenture, afterward Humphrey White grants away the reversion of the said Manor Message & Premises to Sir John Branch, afterwards Sir john Branch grants this reversion to Udall, Udall grants it to Bathurst, and Bathurst grants it to Thomas Boothby the Ancestor of Thomas Boothby, whose Bailie doth here make the avowry. Afterwards Robert Leigh who had the lease of the said Manor and Premises as aforesaid. for 60 years, deviseth the residue of this lease then unexpired, by his last Will and Testament unto Robert Leigh his Son, and dies, Robert Lee the son being possessed of the residue, or remainder of this Term for 60. years, by virtue of the said Will did at his court, held for the said Manor of Chingford, grant the said Message with the appurtenances, and Lands thereunto belonging, whereof the said Close was parcel, unto Edmund Lee his brother, to hold of the same Manor in Fee, at the will of the Lord by Copy of Court Roll of that Manor, Edmund Lee was thereupon admitted accordingly. Afterwards the said lease for 60. years made by Humphrey White unto Robert Leigh, the Father, expires: Afterwards Thomas Boothby, who had the reversion of the said Manor and Premises as abovesaid, entered as in his reversion upon the said Manor and Premises, and died seized thereof, leaving issue Thomas Boothby his Son, Thomas Boothby the Son enters into the said Manor and Premises, and claims the said Message with the apurtenances with the lands thereunto belonging, whereof the Close called Pipers down was parcel, (and was granted by Robert Leigh unto Edmund Leigh by Copy of Court Roll as aforesaid, as parcel of the domains of the said Manor of Chingford, and doth deny it to be Copyhold, and to the intent to try the title thereof, did by the Avowant his Bailiff distrein the in the said Close, as damage pheasant in his soil and Freehold. This Case was argued first by Arthur Harris of Lincoln's Inn, who argued for the Plaintiff, viz. he that brought the replevin, and in his argument, he made the general question in the Case to be whether the close called Pipers Down in which the distress was taken, were at the time of the distress taken demiseable by Copy of Court Roll, or whether the Custom was not destroyed, and he held it was demiseable, and that the custom was not destroyed, and hereupon he made four questions. 1. Whether the grant of the new house to Sr. john Gate per nomen officii of keeper thereof were a good grant. 2ly. Whether the King not being informed at the time of the grant, that the house was Copyhold tenure, he was not deceived in his grant. 3ly. Whether by this grant the Custom was not destroyed. 4ly. Whether the Kings Patentee hath not the same privilege to grant this house, etc. again by Copy of Court Roll after the death of Sr. john Gate, And as to the 1. of these 4. questions, he cited 8 E. 4. by Chock, and 21 E. 4.79. and Mich 5 Car. Banc. Reg. Monsons' case, and Pasc. 14 Car. Banc. Reg. Messand and Butterfields' Case, and 5 E. 4. f. 8. and Dyer 269. Savages Case. To the 2d. question he held, that the King was not here informed of his right, and consequently he was deceived, and therefore ought not to be prejudiced by his grant, which he should be if he had not liberty to demise this house again by Copy of Court Roll, after the death of Sr. john Gate, and he said that there are two rights in the King, 1. At the Common Law, and 2ly. a customary right, and of this Customary right, or his jus concedendi he was not informed, and he cited these books, 3 H. 7.10. rep. 49.8 H. 625 Br. Aid 45 4. H. 6.1, 2 R. 3. Hunsons' Case, and he said that the book of 5 H. 7. f. 1. which is objected is not to purpose, for the protestation is not well taken, 19 H. 6. a protestation is to supply a matter, which is not so here, 41 E. 3. Fitzh. protest. 9.22 H. 6.37. Br. protestation 6. Ploughed. Coment. Gresbrooks and Fox's Case, and 20 Eliz. Burrell and Holcrofts Case. 2ly. The King is not informed here in his grant in matter in Law, as he ought to be, and therefore his grant shall not turn to his prejudice, 1 rep. 52.18 H. 8. Lovels. Case, Pasc. 2 Eliz. Sr. Thomas Moor's Case, 1. rep. ●3. 16. Jac. Needlers' case; and whereas it is said that the words ex certa scientia in the patent do declare that the King was informed, I answer, that those words do intent no more but that the King was informed of matters of fact, and not of matters in Law, and the King's grant shall only be taken secundum intentionem; and whereas it may be objected that by the granting of the Estate for life unto Sr. john Gate, the custom is destroyed, I answer, that this being in the Case of the King, it is an extraordinary Case, and not to be measured by ordinary rules of Law. And 2ly. Ancient grants are to be construed as the Law was at that time when they were made, 9 rep. 27.6. rep. 48. 〈◊〉 H. 7. 〈◊〉. 14 E. 3. Fitzh. Scire facias 23. and the King is not bound, by a general custom as Common persons are, 35 H. 6.29. by Prisot, 22 Ed. 3. The King shall not pay a heriot upon the purchase of heriatable Lands, and we shall find that many maxims of Law upon serious scanning of them, are not so certain to be relied on, as they are commonly held to be, 5. rep. Knight's Case, Pasc. 3 Eliz. B. R. Conisby and Risby, Dyer 10 Eliz. and the patentee of the King shall have the same privilege, that the King should have had if he had not granted the Letters patents, 27 Eliz. Stubs and Rigfords case. At another day Arthur Harris spoke again to the point, that the King had no legal intent to destroy the Copyhold Estate by his patent, and therefore it should not be destroyed, and cited Grotius de jure belli et pacis, 343. and that no such intent can appear in the words of the patent, and cited 7. rep. Inglefields Case, and 17 E. 3. f. 19 and Cooks Institutes 373. and 1. rep. 46. and Plow. 333. and as to the last point he argued, that the Patentée of the King, shall be in the same condition, as to the reviving of the Copyhold Estate, as the King should have been if he had not made the grant, because that the King hath the Fee, and he may grant it as he pleaseth, Dyer 16 Eliz. 337.1. rep. 31.10 Eliz. Dyer 266.24 Ed. 3. Fitz. Tit. guard 27. and no priority can be pleaded against the King, nor against his Patentee, Hill. 30 Eliz. Stubs and Rightwayes Case, an Action of Account against Executors doth lie only for the King. It is true that prerogatives inseparable, and annexed to the person of the King, cannot be granted away by the King, but prerogatives separable may be granted away 12 H. 4. Fitzh. guard 81. The Grantee of the Grantee of the King shall have the prerogative of the King, by reason of the thing granted by the King, Brook praerog. 17. 21 H. 7.2. Br. entre congeable 4●● The King may distrein for a rent seck; but not his Grantee, because it is a prerogative executory, and not executed, for in such case it is otherways; and as to the objection to the cause of the demurrer set forth, that the Concessit is not answered, because it only says mentionat. esse concessum, I hold it well enough; but if it should not be, yet it is helped, for both parties do agree in the setting forth of the Letters Patents, 34 Eliz. B. R. in Har● and Smith's case, and the grant is confessed in our rejoinder, and though the demurrer should not be good, yet the Avowant cannot have judgement, for he hath not entitled himself to the Action as appears by his grant, for his grant is void, and cannot take effect rep. 46.8. rep. 201.39 Eliz. in the Chequer Chamber. Where 2. Manors are granted by the name of one of them, the grant is not good. And in our case Thomas Boothby had nothing in the land at the time of making of the deed of Covenant to stand seized to use, as it appears by the Avowants own pleading, and the postea cannot help it, Dyer 111. Clarks Case, Hill. 15 jac. entered Trin. 15 jac. rot. 29. Desmons' case, 20 H. 615. Hales on the other side argued for the Avowant, and prays a return of the distreyned; first, he put the Case at large. And he said that the Plaintiff hath not well set forth the Kings grant in his bar, and so it is all one, as if he had not set it forth at all, Plowd. 563. and he hath disputed that which we have not alleged, and the sur rejoinder is but argumentaive, and not positive, and nothing appears to the Court, and he hath quite mistaken his course and way. But admitting the case, and the points to be as they are made, viz. 1. Whether the new Office be well granted, because the word Constituimus is omitted. 2. Whether the grant for life be good. 3. Whether the grant of the Copyhold for life be a suspension of the Copyhold estate, or an extinguishment of it, which is the great question in the Case. For the 1 point I hold that here is a good grant of this new Office, and that the word Constituimus is not necessary, because that there are special fees also newly granted. 2ly. This is not an Office in gross, consisting and resting upon itself; but it is a relative Office or an employment incident in the interest of the house granted, and therefore the word. Constituimus is not here necessary, Dyer 200. 3ly. If it be not a formal Office, yet here is a good grant of an employment, to which a recompense may be added; although an Assize cannot be brought for it. 3 Ass. Trin. 6 jac. Abercromies' Case: And here the protestation that the King was not informed that this was Copyhold land is unnecessarily alleged, and therefore it is not of necessity it should be answered; and if it be not well set forth it is not material. For the 2 question whether the King was deceived in his grant, he said that the King needed not to take notice of any former estates, and that the Statute expresseth, that it is not necessary to recite them, 24 H. 8. 2● To the 3 point & the chief question, whether the Copyhold estate be suspended or extinguished, he held it was extinguished, and cited Knights case, & Alton woods case, and said, that the rules of the Civil Law ought not to be applied to the Common Law, nor to be cited to perplex the proceed thereof, and were this in the case of a Common person, without doubt the Copyhold estate would be destroyed, 20 Eliz. by Popham and Fenn, and the King here hath the Fee simple, and there is no difference between the case of the King, and of a Common person in this regard; a thing which will not pass by the King without notice; will not pass with notice, and here is no prejudice to the King in not taking notice whether by the Patent the Custom to grant Copyhold estates be destroyed or not; and here is a necessary consequence in Law, that the custom is destroyed, because the King that had the fee in the Manor hath suspended the Copyhold by his grant. All the Arguments used on the other side are to destroy the Kings grant, and the cases put do all differ from our case, and do stand upon their own bottoms: Nor shall the King be intended to be mis-conusant of his particular grant, such as this is, although he may be in a general grant. lib. Ass. 21. pl. 19 Pasch. 12 Car. C. B. Glover and Edgar's case, and it would be a great mischief if the Copyhold estate should be revived. As to the last point, whether the Patentee shall be in the same condition as the King was, he said that it is not material whether he be or no, as to the Case in question, and rested upon the 3 question. If the King hath free, warren in land, and grants the land, and mentions not the warren, yet the warren passeth by the grant: And here out Avowry stands pro confesso, because the Plaintif hath made no title. A grant of a Manor per nomen maneriorum is a good grant of the Manor, and here is a good grant, and if not, yet it is helped by the Statute of 3 & 4 Phil. & Mar. C. 1. 1 H. 7. f. 28 and the Postea here refers not to the grant of the Copy, and here is no ouster alleged, and if there be, there is do disseisin, but it passeth an estate for will between the parties. Roll chief justice, It would be dangerous to make the Patent void, because the King took no notice of the Copyhold estate, and this point is not fit to be argued: A thing not materially alleged in pleading is not necessarily to be answered, and it is not necessary to create such an Office as this is, for it is but an employment. The great question is, whether after the death of Sr. john Gate, the Copyhold estate can be revived or not in the case of the King. It may be dangerous whether it be one way, or the other. As to the pleading we will not make it ill, if it may be good. Argue the great point again, for it is a difficult point, and of great consequence. jerman justice to the same effect, and inclined, that the King had no intent to destroy the Copyhold, and he held that the Office was well granted, because it was but an employment. Nicholas justice inclined, that the Copyhold was destroyed. At another day Wadham Windham argued for the plaintiff; and first he put the case at large, and then said, that 1. It appears by the replication that the Avowant hath no title. 2. He confesseth that the Plaintif hath a Title. Queen Marry seized of the Manor of Chingford Comitis, whereof Pipers Down is parcel, grants it per nomen duorum illorum maneriorum, and it is not averred that she had two Manors. First, it is considerable, whether the Patent be good by the Common Law, 2ly. Whether, if not, yet it be made good by the Statute of H. 8. and he held, 1. That it is not good at the Common Law, because it is incertain, and wants sufficient words, and here is an apparent falsity, for he hath two Manors, and he grants but one; and if the King have two Manors, and grant them per nomen Manerii, this is not a good grant; As tithes belonging to a Rectory cannot pass by the name of a portion of tithes, neither do all the Statutes of Confirmation of Patents, confirm less or greater values granted, than are comprised in the Letters Patents, 41 Eliz. Pasons case in the Exchequer. A presentation to a Rectory where it ought to be ad Medietatem Rectoriae is not a good presentation, 2. rep. Dodingtons' Case, Dyer ●31. An ill grant is not helped by the Statute, because it is not named. 2ly. A false suggestion is not helped by the Statute of 34 H. 8. 3 Car. Sir Hatton Farmer's case, and in our case here is a mistake of a thing, and not of the name, for it is a Manor for Manors, and so there is no true meaning, and therefore it cannot be helped by the Statute, Pasch. 1 jac. rot. 216. C. B. Dawson against Pickering. The Queen was seized of two Manors, viz. of Rushworth, and of Dale, and granted the Manor of Rushworth, habendum the Manor of Rushworth, with the Manor of Dale, and it was held an ill grant at the Common Law, and not helped by the Statute. But it is objected that this Manor may be known by the name of two Manors, and so in our case, although the King was seized of one Manor, and granted this Manor habendum per nomen duorum Maneriorum, this is good, Mich. 22 H. 6. pl. 16. f. 13. To this the answer is, that it cannot be pleaded per nomen without an averment that there are two Manors, 2 Ed. 4. f 28. the last case: There is a difference between a feoffment and a release, a feoffment may be pleaded per nomen without an averment; but a release cannot be so pleaded, for in a feoffment the livery operates to pass the land, 22 H. 6. Hill. f. 39 pl. 9.13. and Dyer, the Sergeants Case; where there is certainty there needs no averment; but it is not so in our Case 1 H. 7. f. 28. and it is a foreign intendment to suppose that one Manor of Chingford Comitis shall be known by the name of the two Manors of Chingford Comitis, and we need not plead by a non concessit, because the Avowant hath made no title, and so he can have no return, 1 H. 7. f. 28. 6 H 7. f. 6. and here is no certainty added to make it certain by the words illorum quod nuper perquisivimus de, etc. To the second point, The Avowant hath confessed the Plaintiffs title, for he hath confessed, that K. H. the 8th. hath made it a Copyhold, and if the Copy be good, our title is good. As to the question, whether when a Copyhold comes to the King, and he leaseth it, this doth not so destroy the Copyhold, that when the lease is out it may not be Copyhold again. I hold, that if a Common person lease a Copyhold, the Copyhold is destroyed; but it is not so where the King leaseth it, as it is in our case, which ought not to be measured by the Common rule of Law, for the Law of the Crown overrules the Common Law, and the Law of Custom, 22 E. 3. The King is not bound by Custom as a common person is, 35 H. 6. The King having Gavelkind lands may destroy the Custom which runs with such lands pro tempore only, and the King's grant shall not enure to a secondary operation, as Knight's case is; and here is no prejudice to any person that the Copyhold estate should be revived, here the consequence may be severed, and it is not necessary; and therefore the lease of the Copyhold, not naming it Copyhold, is good. As to the Objection made, that it is no benefit to the King to make it Copyhold again; the answer is, That it is a prejudice to take away a man's privilege and liberty, if there were no other inconvenience; but here is more, for there may be prejudice by losing the Common, etc. And the rule, that a Custom is an entire thing and cannot be apportioned, shall not bind the King, although it do bind common persons, and the Statute makes not the grant good as to the reversion. The Copyhold is demised, and yet shall be demisable hereafter, and so it may be pleaded, for pleading follows the Law: A Custom interrupted in the right is gone for ever; but if it be interrupted but in part, it is not so, as it is in the case cited, where the King hath Gavelkind lands, Com. Plowd. 114. and so prays judgement for the Plaintif. Adjourned. Latch at another day argued for the Avowant, and said, that the Plaintif in his rejoinder hath made no title unto Susan Tong, from whom he claims. It is objected, that by the grant of the Manor of Chingford Comitis per nomen duorum illorum maneriorum, etc. that Tongue cannot be entitled. It is answered that the other side hath confessed, that Tong hath a title, for they derive from her also, and the contrary doth not appear to the Court, and it being agreed, the Court will not make a doubt of it. He made 3 Questions, 1. Whether the Manor of Chingford Comitis passeth per nomen duorum illorum maneriorum de, etc. 2ly. Whether if the grant be ill it be aided by Statute. 3ly. Whether it be helped by the Averment. For the 1. he held, that here is a good grant, without any averment or aid of the Statute; for if the King grants two Manors one shall pass, and e converso, it shall not be so in the Case of the King, but it is good in the case of a Common person with an Averment. The grant of the Manor of Saperton cum Rippen is an ill grant for the incertainty of it; but here is no such incertainty, here is no non nosmer of the thing, for the word nomina requires not a proper name; but it is all one, as if it had been expressed by words comprehending it, and the word Manors doth comprehend it. If the King grant his two Acres of Land lying in a Common field, although but one Acre is to be found, yet the grant is good, and it is not like to the grant of a Manor with the Advowson, where the King hath but a moiety of the Advowson, or a moiety of the Manor, for the Moiety is not actual in the whole, but one is actually in two, and so it is well named here. 2ly. Whether it be good, without an averment that the land was in the Lord Darcy, and he held it was. If the words were general in the grant, all of them ought to be true, otherwise nothing will pass by the grant, as Dodingtons' case is; but here is a proper name to express it, and therefore the grant is not destroyed, although the latter description do not agree to it, 10. Rep. Harper's Case. 2 H. 4. f. 2. If the King grant all the lands in the Patent annexed, bearing date 10 of june, though the Patent bear date the 10 of july, yet is the grant good; for veritas nominis tollit errorem demonstrationis; and if the grant should not be good at the Common Law, yet it is aided by the Statute of 3. & 4 Phil. & Mar. and here is a full and a strong averment in the pleading, for it is Manerium praedictum, and not Manerium generally, and here is not only a possibility, but also a facility for it to pass, and it may be called Manor, or Manors; and in a feoffment a thing may pass per nomen, because that the livery passeth it, where one pleads per nomen he is to make the Plea agree with the Record or specialty, otherwise per nomen shall not be pleaded, and Newtons' opinion against this is but a single opinion, 33 H. 8. Br. Averment 42. The word praedict. makes an averment in the name of the Feoffor, ●4 H. 4.30.22. H. 6.40. Barton and Escott, & here is also a full averment of the thing granted, & this is in grants, 7 E. 4.24.33 H. 6. f. 22, 26 Ass. 2.24 Ass. 6. so in Letters Patents, Dyer 86. the Sergeants case, and if this be authority it is in the very point, Dyer 207. praedict. per nomina is a good averment, Pasch. 7. jac. Rot. 430. B. reg. Stonehouse and Reeds case, where there was not so much as a per nomina, but only decimas predict, and yet adjudged to be a good intitling, by the word predict, because it was held a good averment, although it was not led on by a per nomina, and there admitted to be clear if it had been with a per nomina, as the Case here is, & so Tong is well entitled. 2ly. The Plaintiffs title is well avoided, and we have well destroyed his Copy; without doubt if a Common person had granted the Copyhold for life, the Copyhold had been thereby extinguished, and our case is not a prerogative case, for the King is bound by the Custom of the Manor, and the Custom is here destroyed, and the prerogative cannot create the Custom anew, and it is against the King's Prerogative to have things drawn out of the King, without matter of Record; and it is prejudice to the King to have the Custom revived, for the lands are now made free, and shall never return again to the Vassalage. The King's Prerogative exalts him above a Common person, but this custom makes him equal to a common person, 2ly. The Custom here cannot be supported; but here is an absolute extinguishment of the Copyhold, so that it cannot be regranted. The law will confirm things necessary to the grant of the King in some cases where it is prejudicial to the King, 16 H. 7. f. 8. Nicholas case Plowd. 489. The king seized of a donative makes it presentative, if he do but once present unto it, so if he turn an Annuity into a rend charge by taking a distress: And the nature of this Custom here ought not to be examined with other Customs, for it is more strict than in other cases, for if it be once destroyed, it is always destroyed, and cannot be suspended, and it is not for the King's dis-advantage to have the Copyhold destroyed; but it is for his advantage and conveniency, and so he prays judgement for the Avowant. Roll chief justice. All will come and rest upon the last point, for all the other things are admitted: The grant is good by the per nomen, and it is only nominal, and doth not imply that there are two Manors, and it may stand well enough with reason that it may be known per nomen: But the last point is considerable; he inclined to Latch. Nicholas justice to the same effect, and that the predict is a good averment. The last point is considerable, but prima fancy, here the custom is not destroyed. Ask justice to the same effect, and that it appears that the King intended to grant but one Manor. Roll, We will take time till the next term to speak to the last point, which is only doubtful, and to deliver our opinions. jerman justice, the pleading of the party per nomen helps not the Patent, if it be not good in itself. The next Term Roll chief justice for himself and the rest of the judges, who he said concurred in opinion with him, delivered the opinion of the Court to this effect. 1. That they were agreed that the grant of the Office of the Custody of the house is a good lease for life, notwithstanding it was Copyhold, and it is not necessary to recite in the grant that it is Copyhold. 2. That after the estate for life is determined, the King may grant the house and land again by Copy of Court Roll, because the King's grants shall be taken favourably, and not extended to two intents, where there is no necessity for it, as there is not here, and we are not here to intent a collateral intent, and so the Copyhold is not destroyed; for the Law takes care to preserve the inheritance of the King for his Successors, and it may be a benefit to the King to have it continue Copyhold, viz. to have Common, etc. and his election is also destroyed, if he may not have it Copyhold. So judgement was given for the plaintiff, nisi. Pawsey and Lowdall. Pasc. 1651. Banc. sup. Pasc. 1650. rot. 275. IN this Case formerly argued, Roll chief justice, judgement reversed upon a special Verdict touching a Devise of Copyhold lands. and Nicholas and Ask justices agreed, that the devise of the Copyhold here is a devise to the Heirs of the Father, and so a Fee-simple, and that the party comes not in as a purchaser, and for this cause the judgement was reversed, nisi. As to the other point, whether the surrender of a Copyhold by a Tenant for life be good in this case, the Court delivered no opinion, Antea. Trundall and Trowel. Pasch. 1651. Banc. sup. Hill. 1650. rot. 670. IN this Case it was held that Tenant in ancient Demesn cannot after imparlance plead ancient Demesn, for he hath made a full defence, Where ancient Demesne cannot be pleaded. for he says Defendit vim et injuriam quando, etc. which implies all the rest, Mich. 22 Car. Banc. Reg. Yet it was ruled to be again spoken to. Perk against Ingram. Pasch. 1651. Banc. sup. THis Case formerly spoken in was moved again, and Latch held, Whether a good notice. that the words obtulit se in maritagium conjungi, was a good notice upon the whole matter, and therefore that the Action did well lie. Roll chief justice answered, this is a personal thing, and aught to be offered to the party himself, otherwise it is no notice, and that doth not appear here, and if there be no notice employed, than the Action lies not; and Holmes and Twists case is, that there ought to be notice if the thing be to be done by the party himself, otherwise if it be to be done by a stranger, so is it here; but the question only is, if notice be employed here or not? jerman justice said, there is no tender of marriage if the other party be not there. The rule was for the plaintiff to take his judgement. Rook against Smith. Pasch. 1651. Banc. sup. ROoke brought an Action upon the case against Smith for speaking these words of him, Thou art a poor fellow, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the Case for words. and art not able to pay 2s. in the pound, and art not able to pay thy debts. Upon an Issue joined, and a Verdict for the plaintiff, the Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement, that the words are not actionable; for 1. the Plaintif is not by them charged with the crime of being a Bankrupt, and so there is no particular loss to him. 2ly. It is not showed that the Plaintiff got his living by buying and selling, or that he is indebted, and 11. jac. Brook and Clarks case, was cited. Twisden on the other side answered, that the Plaintiffs credit was impaired by the words, and by his credit his livelihood is in part maintained. And he cited Viccary and Barns case. Adjourned to the next Term. Wild afterwards moved again for judgement, because the words being spoken of a tradesman, he conceived them to be actionable. Maynard on the other side held them not actionable, because there is no particular damage alleged to grow to the Plaintif by speaking of them, and because there is no crime objected against the Plaintiff; for poverty is no crime; but a man may be poor and honest at the same time, and he cited two cases to be adjudged, that a particular damage ought to be alleged. And said that these Actions are not favoured in Law, and therefore if the words be not clearly Actionable, it was not reason to make a forced construction of them to make them so. Next the Plaintiff hath not averred, that he was able to pay all his debts for all the things bought; but only of a debt contracted by the buying of the Oil mentioned. Twisden denied the cases put by Maynard of the particular damage, and held the words actionable. Roll chief justice said, a man may be a Bankrupt, and yet be honest, for he may become so by accident, Averment. and not of purpose to deceive his creditors. But here is no need for the Plaintiff to show he had a particular loss by the words, for it is enough that he is generally scandalised by them, neither is it necessary for him to aver, that he was able to pay all his debts as Maynard hath alleged, Therefore let the Plaintiff have his judgement nisi. Antea. Owen against Jevon. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. Pasc. 1651. rot. 211. OWen brought an Action of the case against jevon for speaking these words of her, Arrest. ●f judgement in Action for words. viz. This is the whore that my man cowel begat a bastard on, and spent all my money upon, and the quean hath been too long in Town to my ease; Upon an issue joined, and a verdict for the Plaintiff, Twisden for the Defendant in arrest of judgement urged that the words are not actionable, because there is no special loss or damage alleged by the Plaintiff happening to her by reason of the words, & said that in one Lighfoot and Pigot's case it had been ruled that an Action lies not for saying a woman had a Bastard, and he cited also Winter and Barnard's case, Trin. 1650. in this Court. Upon these reason's judgement was stayed till the other side should move. jay against jay. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. Trin. 1650. rot. 1350. THis case formerly put and spoken to, Argument in a special verdict touching the consideration of the words of a will. was again spoken unto by Latch, wherein he made this question, viz. whether the limitation to I. and his Heirs were good or not? and he held it was not good; for he said that such limitation in case of a freehold is void. He confessed that in the case of Pell and Brown 17 jac. rot. 44. the contrary was adjudged; but that there did appear such apparent inconvenience in it, that upon it the Court was afterwards divided, and 21 jac. in the Sergeants case it was made a flat quaere, and ever since it hath been disputable, whether a contingent devise be good or not, and in jacob and Telling case it is not determined, and Hanbury and Cookrells case is not adjudged; but if it be, it is on my side, and Mich. 37 & 38. C. B. rot. 1149. It was adjudged upon solemn argument at the Bar, and on the Bench, contrary to the judgement in Pell and Brown's case, if lands be devised to one and his Heirs, and if he die without issue, that the land shall be to another, and his Heirs, this is no Estate tail; for it cannot stand with the rules of Law to devise ●uth an Estate, for it is but a possibility, and if it should be more, it must be a Fee upon a Fee, and so a perpetuity, and it cannot be known within what bounds it shall end, either in case of years, or life, or other contingencies, and the comparison of Lampets' case is not like to this case, for that was or a Term, but this is of a freehold, and a contingent devise of a freehold is not good since the Statute of 32 H. 8. and Brook tit. devise, 2 Dyer, 28 H. 8. f. 3●. is not an opinion against this. And though there could be such a devise of other lands, yet Copyhold lands cannot be so devised as the case is here, for there cannot be so much as a possibility of reverter, for there is no custom to warrant it, Hill. 5. Car. King and Leyden in this Court, and Dyer 264. and though there might be a reverter; yet he cannot devise it by will, and if he could, yet here the conbeyance is made up by surrender, admittance, and devise, and the party is here in by the surrender, and not by the devise; and so is a Copyholder in by Act executed, and not upon the contingency, and the will is but to direct; and though all this be otherwise, yet the Plaintiff cannot have judgement, for it appears not that the surrender is presented at any Court at all, and here is nothing but a recital found. jerman justice said by the Common Law there ought to be a presentment at the next Court. Roll chief justice, and Nicholas justice. There is no certain time for the presentment; but it is according to the Custom of the Manor, so that it be within the life of the Tenant. Roll chief justice said, it is an inconvenience to devise such a contingent Estate. Nicholas doubted, for he said it would shake many wills, if it might not be, and so said Hales. The Court would advise. Hales confessed the verdict was imperfect, but prayed it might be amended; But Latch answered it is good enough for us the Defendants, for we have primer possession. The Court answered it would be good to have it amended, and not to have a venire de novo, Venire. for that will be chargeable; but if the verdict be imperfect to bring the matter in Law into question, we can grant a new venire, although it hath been heretofore doubted. Therefore be advised, so that it may be argued. Antea. Heal against Green. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. Hill. 1649. rot. 370. THe case between Heal and Green upon a special verdict formerly argued by Latch was again spoken to, and argued by Twisden, Argument upon a special verdict upon construction of words of a Will. and he held that the Feme had power by the Will to make the lease, notwithstanding that she hath but an Estate for life, and cited 11 Car. B. R. Hill. rot. 810. job and Whites case, and 21 jac. Danyel and Vgnel, and he said that the remainder limited to the daughter doth not hurt, for it may very well stand with the will, and the intent of the Testator appears upon the whole to be to give such a power to his wife to make this lease, and cited 8 Car. Perd and Bensams' case. And there is a clause in the will that shows that the Testator did intent to advance his wife by this devise. And the Feme shall be in by the power, which shall make the estate of the lease good, and it is not necessary to recite the power, as it is held in Roger's case. Maynard on the other side said, he would not dispute the power; but here is no such power given to the wife as it appears by the express words of the Will, which doth only describe that she shall only make Estates but for her life, otherwise she might make Estates in Tail, or in Fee, and if this should be the last part of the Will, which doth limit, the remainder would be destroyed, and generals in a Will shall not revoke an express devise; but they ought so to be construed that all the Will may stand together, as bonham's case is 8. rep. Roll chief justice, It is a difficult thing to show the meaning of the Testator here, but the general must not destroy the particular devise to which Nicholas justice assented, and Roll inclined that the Feme had power by the Will to make this Estate, otherwise the words of the Will must be idle, and void, and it may be the Baron intended to give his wife such a power, that she might destroy the remainders, and otherwise there cannot be any construction made of the Will. Ask justice differed in opinion, and said it was unreasonable the remainder should be destroyed, which is expressly limited by the Will, and a Will doth differ from a conveyance Nicholas justice said, that the words shall be expounded to show his bounty to his wife; but not to give her power to destroy the remainder. jerman justice, There are express words, for the Feme, and the daughter and the Feme hath a power; but not to destroy the Estate of the daughter. Curia advisare vult. Antea. Booth against Lambert. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. Hill. 1649. rot. 201. Upon a special verdict upon these words, Argument and judgement upon special verdict, the question whether dower well assi●g●ed or not. viz. I do endow you of a third part of all the lands my Cousin I. S. your husband died seized of. The question was whether the feme were well endowed by these words, because he doth not say that he endows her by meats and bounds, Chase held she was not well endowed, and cited 8 Ed. 2.15. and said that here is incertainty which begets dissension, which ought not to be, and the thing is not here entire; but may be divided. And this is an assignment of dower, which differs from a demand of dower, for a demand may be general as in the cases of Thine and Thine in this Court, and of Fairefax and Fairefax, and so the book of 8 E. 2. entry congeable (S) 5. which seems to prove the contrary, that is not to our case, for it differs from it. Merifield of Council on the other side held the feme was well endowed, and agreed the cases put by Chase. That of Common right a feme ought to be endowed by meats and bounds, yet sometimes it is otherwise, as 3 Eliz. Dyer 27. a feme endowed in Common. And the feme that is to be endowed, and the pacty who is to assign the dower, may agree that the dower shall be assigned without bounding it. For consensus tollit errorem; But dower ad ostium ecclesiae must be more certain, Dower. Mich. 43, & 44 Eliz. Bullock and Finches case, Hill. 4 jac. C. B. Roll chief justice, Of Common right a feme ought to be endowed per metas & bundas, where the Sheriff assigns dower, who is an officer of the Law, and aught to prevent encumbrance, and disputes; But it may be assigned generally of the third part in some cases, Consent. and the parties may agree against Common right, and here both parties agreed to take dower in this Manor. And though here the termer for years of the land who is a third person, be prejudiced by this assignment, yet this altars not the case, because it is only an estate for years, and toucheth no freehold. Nicholas and Ask justices as Roll. jerman justice, If dower be of a third part, it ought to be by meats and bounds generally; but if it be of a moiety it is not so, or if the parties consent it shall be otherwise. Roll if the Sheriff assign dower and do it not per metas & bundas it is Error, Error. if it might have been so assigned, and where a feme cannot be endowed per metas & bund as she may enter without assignment. judgement was given for the Defendant nisi, etc. Smith against the Earl of Dorset; Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. SMith moved the Court against the Earl of Dorset, Motion for an attatchment for disobeying a rule of Court. Attatchment. for an attatchment for disturbing of him in the possession of certain Lands, contrary to the rule of this Court, for the Plaintiff to have possession. The Court answered that for only disturbing his possession, there ought not to be an attatchment granted; but if he be put out of possession, he shall have an attatchment. The Council replied that the parties were driven off from the land, which they conceived was an ousting of the party from his possession. To this the Court answered, that this seemed to be a putting out of possession, And therefore ordered that the Defendant should show cause why an attatchment should not be granted. Owen against jevon. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. Pasc. 1651. rot. 211. THis case formerly spoken unto in arrest of judgement, and then stayed, judgement prayed in an Action for words. was again moved, and judgement prayed for the Plaintiff by Sergeant Glyn, who argued that the words were actionable, because if they were true, the party of whom they are spoken is punishable by the Statute of 7 jac. with corporal punishment and besides the words were spoken since the last Statute made against Adultery, which doth aggravate the words and make them more actionable. judgement was given for the Plaintiff, nisi. In this case it was said by the Court, that it was adjudged in one Thecker and Duncombes case, that a woman may have a child in 38. weeks, and that a woman by cold, or hard usage, may go with child above 40 weeks, Antea. Nelson against Tompson. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. Trin. 24 Car. rot. 343. NElson brought an action of the Case against Tompson, Demurrer in an Action upon the Case upon a promise. and did declare that the Defendant, in consideration that the Plaintif would cease to prosecute a suit in Law against him, did assume and promise unto the plaintiff that he would pay unto him 8 l. & the charges of suit which he had been at, & for breach of this promise Actio acrevit, & sets forth his damage. To this Declaration the Defendant demurs in Law, & takes this Exception, viz. That there is no time nor place set forth where or when he did forbear to sue the Defendant, as it ought to be, because it is a traversable matter. But Roll chief justice answered, It is not necessary to allege a place of a negative thing to be done, viz. to say that he did not prosecute the suit in such a place, or at such a time, for he ought to surcease prosecution in all places, and at all times. Therefore let judgement be for the plaintiff except better matter be shown Friday next. Lyda●e and Lyster. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. Mich. 1650. rot. 387. AN Action of Debt was brought upon an Obligation made to a Bishop and his Commissary for the payment of Debts and Legacies, judgement in Debt upon a Bond reversed. the Action was brought by an Executor, and judgement given by Default against the Defendant, the judgement was reversed by a Writ of Error because the Action was brought in the Debet and Detinet, whereas it ought to have been brought in the Detinet only, because it was brought by an Executor. Saunders against Ritch. Trin. 1651 Banc. sup. Hill. 1649. rot. 758. IN an Action of Trespass and Ejectment upon a special verdict found. The Case fell out to be this. Special Verdict in Trespass and Ejectment. A man by his last Will and Testament devised all his Fée simple land wheresoever to his Brother, upon condition that he suffer his wife to enjoy all his free lands in Holford during her life; and the jury found that the Testator had only a portion of tithes in Holford: The question was, whether the portion of tithes did pass to the wife by this devise. Merifield held, That the Tithes passed not by the devise, because the word lands cannot extend to tithes, for that would be a very forced construction, and cited Trin. 17 jac. Banc. Reg. Knight and Knight's case, and Mich. 39 & 40 Eliz. Entered 38 Eliz. rot. 269. You and Hardings case Banc. Reg. That Houses are not devisable by the name of lands, and he said, that the word wheresoever makes no difference, as to make the tithes pass; and though there be an implication and an intent in the Testator here to dedevise the tithes, yet that will not serve, because there wants words to express this intent, and though this be in a will, yet there must be words used to support the intent of the Testator, for wills must be ruled by the rules of the Common Law. Ashinghurst and Curtice his case, Mich. 7 jac. Hob. rep. 34. the last Edition. Mich. 42 & 43 Eliz. Banc. Reg. a devise of Lands extend not to tithes, for tithes are not lands, but a mere collateral thing to them, and have no relation to them, Mich. 1. jac. rot. 192. Mills and Hides case, Banc. Reg. 11 Rep. Bridle and Napers case, f. 13. b. Trin. 42 Eliz. B. Reg. Sherwood and Winston held, that tithes cannot be appendent to a Manor, 1 Rep. 111. Albanies' case, and here are no words in the Proviso to pass the tithes. It is true that tithes may lie in tenure, and that an Action of debt lies for them, but that is by the Statute 19 Eliz Dyer f. 354. The word land in a will doth not extend to tithes, and heirs ought not to be disinherited by doubtful and ambiguous words, as it must be here, if these tithes should pass. Next, as to the verdict, he said, that it is not thereby found that the Testator died possessed of the tithes, as it ought to have been, as it hath been adjudged 43 Eliz. and so he prayed judgement for the Plaintif. Maynard of Counsel with the Defendant argued, That the tithes did pass by the Will, otherwise part of the Will must be void, which ought not to be, if all parts may be so construed that they may stand together, and he agreed that lands and tithes are distinct things; but in Wills it is not to be so much considered whether the words of them be proper, but what was the intent of the Testator in them, and whether they do declare his meaning or not; and here by construction of the words by freelands inheritance is meant in opposition to Copyhold lands, or terms for years. 2ly. Here is a positive assertion of the Testator himself, that in his understanding he had free lands in Holford, for he had no other lands there, 35 Eliz. Robinson's case, rot. 504. Banc. Reg. by a will things of one nature may pass by words which are proper to pass things of another nature, 44 & 45 Eliz. rot. 125. A devise of lands and tenements will pass leases for years, if there be no other lands, to pass by those words in the place expressed in the Will, and so prayed judgement for the Defendant. Verdict. Roll chief justice asked what he said to the exception, that it is not found that the Testator died seized of the tithes, without doubt it had been ill upon a Demurrer, therefore see if you cannot help it by the notes by which the Verdict was drawn up. But for the matter in Law, me thinks it is a strong case that the tithes do pass, for we are in the case of a Will, where the meaning of the party shall be observed, if it may be found out by any means, though it cannot be collected ex vi Terminis, and should it not be so here, part of the Will would be void, which may not be, if we can make it otherwise by a reasonable construction. But I will consider of the Verdict, and do you consult with your notes. jerman justice, The Verdict ought to find the dying seized, and till I am satisfied from the Notes I will deliver no opinion. Nicholas justice held both the devise good, and the Verdict also, but said it had been otherwise upon a Demurrer. Demurrer. Ask justice to the same intent. jerman justice, It is clear that the Testator intended to devise the lands in Holford, and it is a good devise, but if the Verdict be imperfect it is for the plaintiff, but if otherwise it is for the Defendant. The Court would advise touching the Verdict. Hayward against William's. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. Hill. 1649. rot. 824. THe Case was this, a Feme was sued as a Feme sole, but by the Surname of her Husband, Who may bring a Writ of Error, who not. she being then Covert. The, Feme appears and pleads, and judgement is given against her, and the Baron and Feme join in a writ of Error to reverse this judgement: The question was, whether the Baron, who was a Stranger to the Record, might join in the writ to reverse the judgement? It was moved divers times, and the Court advised, and at last they said, that a Stranger to a Record may not bring a writ of Error to reverse it, but that is only where he may have another remedy to avoid the prejudice he may receive by it; but in this Case the Baron hath no other remedy, for his Wife is taken in Execution, and by this means he shall lose her society; And therefore reversetur, nisi, Antea. Shann against Bilby. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. Hill. 1650. rot. 1065. SHann brought an Action upon the Case upon a promise against Bilby, Arrest 〈◊〉 Judgement in an Action upon the Case upon a promise. and declares, that in consideration that the Plaintif should surrender a Copyhold unto I. S. and his heirs, according to the Custom of the Manor, the Defendant did assume and promise to pay unto him 100 l. and that he did surrender the Copyhold into the hands of a Customary Tenant of the Manor, according to the Custom of the Manor, to the use of I. S. and his heirs, and that the Defendant had not paid the hundred pound according to his promise, and declares to his damage, etc. Upon non Assumpsit pleaded, and Issue thereupon joined, a Verdict was found for the Plaintif. It was moved in Arrest of judgement by Latch of Council with the Defendant, that the Declaration is not good. 1. Because it doth not set forth to whom the promise was made, and if it do not appear to be made to the plaintiff, it is nudum pactum, for the promise here is the consideration. 2ly. The Consideration is Executory, and the Plaintif doth not show that he hath performed it, and then he hath no cause of Action; The Consideration was, that the Plaintif should surrender a Copyhold to I. S. and his heirs, according to the custom of the Manor; and he only shows that he did surrender the Copyhold into the hands of a Customary Tenant, according to the Custom of the Manor, to the use of I. S. and his heirs, and doth not show that this surrender was presented at the next Court, and so it appears not to be a good surrender, Surrender. for it is uncertain whether it shall be presented or no, and till it be presented it is imperfect: To which the Court assented, and ruled against the plaintiff a Nil capiat per Billam, nisi, ● c. In this case it was said that if a man covenant to convey lands, Covenant. it ought to be done at the charge of him that covenanteth to do it, except the contrary be agreed; Consideration. And that if there be a double consideration alleged for a promise, if one of them be good, and the other be not, yet an action will lie upon the promise that is broken, which was grounded upon these consisiderations. Barcock against Tompson. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. Mich. 1650. rot. 444. A Writ of Error was brought by the Bail to reverse a judgement given against him upon a scire facias, & the Error assigned was, Error brought by the Bad. that there was not Capias taken out against the principal, and therefore the scire facias against the Bail is not good. Hale answered, that it was too late to urge this now for Error; for the judgement is upon two nichils returned, and cited 21 E. 3. f: 13. 6 Roll chief justice said, that two nichils is as much as a scire feci returned, and it is no Error to give judgement upon it; but it had been a good plea upon the scire facias to say that there was not Capias against the principal, but now there is a judgement well given, Plea. and it is too late to assign it for Error. But the Court advised. Postea. Kerman against johnson. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. Trin. 1649. rot. 153. KErman brought an Action of Trespass and Ejectment against Johnson, Special verdict in Trespass and Ejectment. and upon a special Verdict found the Case was this. A man devised to I. S. his whole estate, paying his debts and Legacies, and dies possessed of Goods and Chattels, to the value of five pounds only, and died also seized in fee of divers lands, and was indebted forty pounds at the time of his death. The question was, whether the lands passed by the Devise? Barry of Council with the Plaintif argued, that the lands did pass, because that wills ought to receive a favourable construction; And 2ly. The intent of the Testator is to be considered, who by the words all his estate, did mean to comprehend as well his land as his goods and chattels, for there is no restraint of the words here, 7 Ed. 3.10. The word estate is a word of large extent, and extends as well to the real as personal estate, if it were in Case of grant. much more in the case of a Will. And there is another word used here to explain the Testators meaning to be to devise his lands as well as his goods, and that is the word All, which comprehends all manner of estates, without exception. Next if the land should not pass, his debts and Legacies cannot be paid, according to the express intent of the Testator, and the intent of the party ought to be satisfied, although the words be not proper, because it is in a will, though it might be other wise in a grant. And whereas it is objected that the juries finding of the value of the debts and Legacies, is to no purpose, because the will cannot be helped by the averment of the Iury. I answer that averments if they stand with the will, may be received to make the Testators intent to appear. But besides this is not an averment only, but a true stating of the Case, to the intent to find out the Testators meaning. 3ly. The devisee of the land is not made Executor, but Trustee, or Devisee, & this is since the Statute of Devises 32 H. 8. The 2. question is, what estate the Devisee hath in the lands? & I conceive he hath Fee. simple, because he hath all the Estate, which must be the largest, and that is Fee-simple. Hob. rep. pl. 280. The word whole goes both to the quantity and quality of an estate also. And here the consideration that he is to pay all his Debts and Legacies, is a good consideration to pass the fee-simple of his lands, and though there may be a surplusage after the Debts and Legacies paid, this hinders nothing; for it is his intent that the Devisee shall have that surplusage, and so he prayed judgement for the Plaintif. Twisden for the Defendant argued, that either nothing passeth by the Will, or if any thing, then only an estate for life passeth. He agreed that improper words may sometimes pais things, yet sometimes proper words will not pass things; viz. if the intent of the party appear to be contrary, 24 Eliz, in the Earl of Northumberlands case. A Devise of all his jewels, did not pass his Collar of Esses, and his jewels annexed to his Parliament Robes, and the words here are not that he deviseth all his estate in his lands, but his whole estate generally, and if the words here should pass the lands, yet the fee simple passeth not, but only an estate for life in the lands, which do pass; nor do the words paying his Debts and Legacies cause the Fee-simple to pass, for here is no likelihood of any loss to the Executor; for the words are not, that he shall pay all his Debts and Legacies; and if he be an Executor, as the contrary appears not, he shall not be charged with more than the personal estate will discharge. The words do amount to a Condition, and it is not found that there are any Debts or Legacies paid, and so it is not performed, and the heir may well enter into the lands in question, for the Condition broken. 2ly. The Verdict doth not find how the lands are held, whether in Socage, or by Knight's service; and so it appears not whether they can be devised or no, and they shall not be intended to be Socage lands, Dyer, f. 207. Hill. 32 El. rot. 2. and Pell and Brown's case. 3ly. It is not found that the Testator died seized of the lands, as it ought to have been, and he prayed judgement for the Defendant. Special Verdict. Roll. chief justice to the second Exception to the Verdict answered, that in a Special verdict it is not necessary to find whether lands be held in Sorage, or by Knight's Service, and he said that the words in the Will do go to the nature and extent of the estate, as Barry urged, and he doubted how the verdict shall supply the Will if it be defective, for that is only to make the intent of the Will certain. Adjourned to be argued again. Postea. Marshal against Ledsham. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. MArshal as Administrator brings an Action of Debt for rent; Arrest of Judgement in Debt. and upon a Verdict found for the plaintiff, the Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement, and takes exception, that the Plaintif had not shown by whom the Letters of Administration were granted unto him, as he ought to do, but only says that the Administration debito more commissa fuit. But it was answered that it is too late to move this Exception after a Verdict, for the jury have now found that the Administration was duly granted, and the Letters of Administration were produced in Court, and therefore not necessary to show who granted them; Declaration. and it was said, that in a Declaration it is not necessary to show by whom Letters of Administration are granted, or to say they were granted by him, Cui pertinuit, or per loci illius Ordinarium: But in a Plea in Bar it is otherwise, for this is not the cause of the Action, Plea. and effect of the suit, but to show they have been in the Spiritual Court. Judicium nisi pro quaerente was afterwards given: Antea. Giles against Timberley. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. Mich. 1650. rot. 176. AN Ejectione firmae vi et armis was brought in the Common Pleas, Error to reverse a judgement in an Ejectione firmae. and a judgement given for the Plaintif upon a nihil dicit, and in a writ of Error brought in this Court to reverse the judgement, the Error assigned was in the judgement, which was entered thus, Ideo consideratum est quod recuperet, and the word Capiatur was omitted, which ought not to be, because the Action is a Trespass vi et armis. Roll chief justice said, It is an ill course they use in the Common Pleas, to enter the judgement so in this Action, judgement. for by this course the Plaintif shall gain his possession of the land, and the Defendant cannot bring his writ of Error until the writ of Enquiry returned, and the judgement perfected, Error, which it may be will never be; for when the plaintiff hath gotten possession of the lands he will little regard the damages. Therefore let the judgement be reversed. Antea. Elyott against Blague. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. ELyott brought an Action upon the Case against Blague for speaking these words of him, viz. Thou art a Bastard getting Rogue, Arrest of judgement in an Act on for words. and hadst a Bastard at Oxford, and art a pocky rogue, and for aught I know thou hast filled my Bed full of the French pox, and no such pocky rogues shall lie with me: Upon not guilty pleaded, and a Verdict found for the plaintiff, it was moved in Arrest of judgement that the words were not actionable, because some of them were adjectively spoken, and others uncertain, and some of them clearly not actionable: But Twisden answered, that if the words were taken together as they were spoken, they were very scandalous and actionable, and cited one Colyers and Lydyers case, 1 Can To which the Court agreed, and ruled the plaintiff to take his judgement except better cause should be shown. Custodes against jinkes. Trin. 1651 Banc. sup. Sergeant Bernard moved to discharge an Order of Sessions made against a Feme Covert, to keep a Grand child of hers, To discharge an Order of Sessions. Order of Sessions. because a Feme Covert was not bound by such an Order. Roll chief justice answered, that her Husband is bound to keep his wife's Grandchild by the Statute; but in regard that the Husband is not charged by the Order, but the wife who is covert is only charged, Therefore let the Order be quashed. Trotman against Standard. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. Trin. 1650. rot. 1768. IN an Action upon the case a special verdict was found, Special verdict in an action on the case. upon which the case fell out to be this. Two being seized of lands in Fee, did make a charter of feoffment unto two others, and to their heirs, and in the deed was a letter of Attorney to enter into the lands in the name of the seoffors, and make livery and seisin according to the effect of the deed, and livery of seisin was made to one of the Feoffees by the Attorney in the absence of the other Feoffee. The question was, whether here were a good livery and seisin, or not? 2ly. Whether the letter of Attorney was good or no, in regard it had false latin in it, for the letter of Attorney was made by two, and the words of it are pro me, & in nomine meo to make livery which are words of the singular number, whereas they ought to be of the plural? Hales as to the 2d. question held the letter of Attorney good enough, because the authority given to the Attorney proceeds from both the Feoffors, and therefore the words shall be intended to be the words of both of them, as spoken by them severally. And he also argued that the letter of Attorney was well executed to both the Feoffees, because it was by deed, and he cited 15 E. 4 f. 18. and he said, if the livery had been made by the Feoffor himself it had been good without question, and there is no difference, between that and our case, because it is made according to the effect of the deed, and the Feoffee who is present is Attorney for the Feoffee that is absent to receive livery for him, and the effect of the letter of Attorney is executed, although the words are not, Cooks Lit. f. 5. and Hoxon and Polts case, in the Exchequer, 34 Eliz. Boltons' case, Livery made to the husband, was held a good Livery to the wife also. Latch of Council on the other side made two questions. 1. Whether here was a good authority? 2ly. Whether it was well executed? For the first he argued, that here was no authority given to the Attorney to enter into the lands in the name of both the Feoffors, for the words are that he should enter in nomine meo, which cannot comprehend both of them, the words being in the singular number, and he agreed that Livery made by the Feoffor himself to one, in the name of both had been good; but here the livery is by Attorney, and an Attorney hath nothing but a bare authority given him, which ought to be strictly pursued, especially it being to pass away an Estate. He also took exceptions to the special verdict, and said that the trial upon which the verdict was found, was directed out of the Chancery to discover a fraud, and the verdict finds nothing according to the direction, and so it ought to be set a side, besides the verdict in itself is incertain, for it is of 300 Acres of land generally, which is incertain, and so the Plaintiff can have no judgement, for the Declaration warrants not the verdict, for the Declaration mentions Houses, and Cottages, besides the 300 Acres of land. 2ly. The verdict doth not find the date of the Indenture, and the Title to the land is to commence a die datus. Hales answered 1. It shall be intended the day of the date. 2ly. It shall take effect after the delivery, if there be no day of the date expressed. And to that exception to the verdict, that there are not so many Acres contained in it, as are expressed in the Declaration; he answered that the judgement shall go to all which is land in kind only, and shall not extend to Houses, and Cottages, and there appears to be a residuum, or surplusage. Verdict. Roll chief justice said, that it is incertain by the verdict what lands are meant, for there are 400 Acres of land, and four messages, and four Cottages, and 40 Acres of meadow in the Declaration, and so there appears to be a residuum, besides the land found in the verdict, which makes it to be incertain what is found. And though it should be a verdict for part, and be uncertain for the rest, although the Plaintiff will relinquish his damages for the rest, this will not help it, for there must be two judgements, and the verdict is ill as to that which is found, yet he held that it might be good without relinquishing the damages at all, because the verdict is good for so many Acres as are in the Declaration, and it shall be intended that the jury mistook the number of the Acres, and intended by the verdict no more than the arable land. jerman and Nicholas justices doubted whether there be a verdict at all, because the jury have not found the things contained in the Declaration. Roll chief justice, and Nicholas, mutate opinion, held the verdict good; but said it would have been otherwise upon a demurrer, and it was said that if one declare for 40 l. and the verdict finds 100 l. the Plaintiff may relinquish 60 l. and have judgement for the rest. Ask justice said that his opinion was, that the verdict is incertain, and conceiveth that the jury intended all in the Declaration. The Court took time to advise. Afterwards judgement was given for the Plaintiff. Fitton against Richardson. Trin 1651. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved for a prohibition to the County Palatine of Chester, For a prohition to the County Palatin of Chester. upon a surmise that they did proceed in the Court of equity at Chester touching the payment of rent reserved upon a lease for years, which is a matter tryable at the Common Law, and not in a Court of equity. The Court answered we will see the Bill, whether there be any matter of equity laid in it or no, for if there be we will not grant a prohibition, and let us also see some precedents if there be any, for granting of a prohibition in such cases. Powis who moved for the prohibition replied, That in Chester they hold two Courts, one for matters of Common Law, and another for matters of equity, and so they ought to observe the due proceed in each Court, according to the nature of the cause, 2ly. This Court of the upper Bench is the superintendent Court over all other Courts, and a writ of Error lies out of this Court to Chester, and by consequence a prohibition also to restrain the Court of equity there, if they shall proceed irregularly. 3ly. There would otherwise be a faller of justice, for the Court of Chancery here cannot grant a prohibition, because the matter they proceed in there is no matter of equity, Nat. brev. f. 44 H. I. Cook rep. Corbets case, Hob. rep. case 98. Owen and Holts case. And though a writ from hence doth not run there nor in Wales, yet a prohibition is grantable to Wales, and therefore why not to Chester, Mich. 2. Jac. B. R. a habeas corpus was granted to the County Palatine of Durham, and to Barwick, and Trin. 1650. C. B. rot. 1966. in jones and Lennards case a prohibition was granted to Chester. Nicholas justice cited a case to be adjudged in this Court by Cook chief justice that it will not lie de brevi ordinario; but in Wales it will lie, Hales answered, that there is more here than matter of equity, and writs mandatory will lie in all places. Roll chief justice said that Chester hath a Court of upper Bench, and they may grant a prohibition there, and it appears not to us whether they will grant it or not, Prohibition. so that we know not whether we need to intermeddle. Hales replied, that every one is bound by the Common Law, and therefore writs mandatoryly at the Common Law, which generally concern men as subjects, and not concerning private things. And 1. It is to be considered that Chester's jurisdiction is derived from this Court, and so it is supposed to be subordinate to it, and is to be regulated by it. 2ly. When the matter concerns common right, it is not affixed to Chester, because it concerns men as subjects at large, 20 jac. Grigs case, C. Banc. And this Court sat in Chester in the 22 year of Ed. 1. as may appear by the roll, Hill. 31. Mich. 29. E. 3. rot. a habeas corpus was granted to Durham, and the liberty seized into the King's hands for disobeying it, and this Court is the conservator of the liberties of Chester. Roll chief justice demanded, can we grant a prohibition to the Court of equity in Ireland? Prohibition. If there did appear to be any failer of justice here, we would grant a prohibition; but there appears not any failer, for it may be the party may have a prohibition in the upper Bench there. Therefore it is good for us to hear the other party, and in the mean time we will advise, and then let us see the bill in Chancery. In this case Hal●s said that a prohibition had been granted to the Lord Mayor's Court of London. Style against tully. Trin. 1651, Banc. sup. Hill. 24. Car. rot. 587. SIr Humphrey Style brought a writ of Error to reverse a judgement given against him in an Action of debt upon an obligation in the Common pleas for Tullye and Acton Executors of the last Will and Testament of one William tully. Error to reverse a judgement in debt upon an obligation. The case was this, Sir Humphrey Style, and one Thomas Brook were jointly and severally bound unto William tully, in an obligation of 120 l. for the payment of 60 l. at a certain day. After the day of payment, and the money not paid, Thomas Brook makes his Will, and makes Mary Brook his wife his Executrix, and dies, afterwards William tully makes his will, and makes tully and Acton the Defendants in the writ of Error his Executors, and dies, and by his will he releases unto Mary Brook all the debts, which Thomas Brook her husband, did owe unto him at the time of his death. tully and Acton prove this will, and after bring an Action of debt against Sir Humphrey Style in the Common pleas, upon the obligation of 160 l. Sir Humphrey Style demurs to the Declaration, and for cause shows that William tully by his will, had released the Debt to Mary Brooks, and upon this demurrer judgement was given against Sir Humphrey Style, and thereupon he brings his writ of Error; wherein the question was, whether the debt was released by the will or no? Latch of Council for Sir Humphrey Style argued, that here was an actual release, and he cited 21 E. 4. f. 8. and a case Trin. 10. Car. and said that a will amounts to a release, although it be not made of incorporeal things, and the assent of Mary the Executor is not necessary here, for this is not like the assent to the accepting of a Legacy, and a debt due upon an Obligation made to the Testator, is not assets in the hands of an Executor, until it be recovered, and this is more than in the nature of a Legacy, and here was a great personal Estate, and no other creditors are deceived by this release, and a devaslavit cannot be here supposed, 19 H. 8. Dyer 8 E. 4. f. 5. Dyer 139, Cranmers' Case, and here is only an exoneration of a thing, and no donation of any thing by this release, Sergeant Hen. Clark of Council on the other side argued, that the debt was not discharged by the will, because this release made by the will cannot take effect till after the death of the Testator, and so not at all; and such a release was revokeable by the Testator during his life, and therefore it cannot be said that it was ever an absolute release; But if this release had been in the realty, it might peradventure have been otherwise; but it is not so here; for the debt now rests in the Executor, and it is a devastavit in the Executor to release it, for this is but a Legacy, and it may be there are debts owing, which are to be paid before Legacies, and here doth not appear to be any assets in the Executors hands, besides this debt, and if the Testator would have released it, he ought to have done it by a deed. Roll chief justice, What shall the Executor do in this case? I conceive it is a strong case for the Executor; and that it is very unreasonable that the Testator should make such a devise, and here is no consent of Mary the Executor expressed to this release, besides a will cannot release a thing created by deed, and so discharge Creditors. Nicholas and Ask justices concurred; But jerman justice doubted. For a fault in the writ of Error, and imperfection in the record certified, the judgement was not then affirmed. Afterward Sir Humphrey Style preferred his bill in Chancery to be relieved herein, and obtained an injunction till hearing; but upon a hearing at the Rolls could get no relief; but was ordered to pay 100 l. or else the injunction to be dissolved. Q. Nota. Hamond against Ward. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. Pasc. 1650. rot. 58. AN Action of debt was brought against the Defendant, Error to reverse a judgement in debt upon an insimul computaverunt. upon an insimul Computaverunt, and a verdict and a judgement given against him, whereupon he brought his writ of Error, and assigns for Error, that the Action was brought against him for rent as a Tenant of land, and not as a receiver, and that therefore an account did not lie. Roll chief justice cited 20 H. 6. that rent alone lies not in account, because rent is a certain thing, and it is also in the realty; but if rent be mixed with other things an account will lie; Account. but here it appears the Action is brought against the Defendant as a receiver, and if one receive money due to me upon an obligation, I shall have either an Action of account, Debt. or an Action of debt against him, so if he receive my rents without my consent. Therefore let the judgement be affirmed. Alleyn against Holden. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. Entered Pasc. 1650. AN Action of debt was brought against an Heir, who pleads riens per descent, Error to reverse a judgement in debt against an Heir. & judgement was given against him upon a nihil dicit, & a writ of enquiry was awarded without the prayer of the party, and a special judgement thereupon given against the Defendant. Upon a writ of Error brought to reverse this judgement, it was alleged for Error, that the judgement ought to have been a general judgement, and there ought not to have been a writ of enquiry, except the party had prayed it, and to this the Court inclined, and Roll chief justice said, that it is otherwise in an Action against an Executor, for there assets may be found. At another day Roll chief justice said, Writ of inquiry. if the Heir plead riens per descent, and if it be a false plea, a general judgement ought to be against him, and there shall be no writ to inquire what lands he hath, and it is not necessary, as here it is, to have a special judgement, judgement. that the Plaintiff shall recover of the lands descended, for the judgement ought to be that the Defendants body and goods be liable, and half his lands, and not as it is here a writ to inquire, and find what lands he hath by descent. Reverset. nisi. Barcock against Tompson. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. THis case was again spoken unto, Error brought by the Bail to verse a judgement given against the principal. which was this, A judgement was given in the Common pleas against the principal without an original, & upon this judgement there issued out a scire facias against the Bail, & two nichils returned, and thereupon judgement was given against the Bail, & a writ of Error was brought by the Bail to reverse this judgement. And it was now argued by Hales of Council for the writ of Error, that the judgement was erroneous, because it being given upon a scire facias, which is a judicial writ, it ought to be grounded upon an original, and it not being so here, it is Error in fact, although it be not Error in Law. To this it was answered, that two nichils returned upon a scire facias, amount to a scire seci, and a judgement given thereupon is good, and therefore it is too late now to say, that the scire facias was not well executed, Brook Sc. fac. 96. 28. 17 Car. C. B. To this Hales said, there was a judgement against us in the Common pleas, so that we could urge nothing against the scire facias. there; but here we may. Roll chief justice answered, it is to some purpose to make up the record upon the two nichils, otherwise there would be no end of things, and the judgement is well given by the judges, and how can you now make Error in it? judgement. and if you be inconvenienced by the judgement, you are not without remedy, Error. for you may bring an Audita querela, and you might have pleaded to the scire facias, nul tief record, for it is not matter of fact. And therefore show better matter why the judgement shall not be affirmed, Audita querela. and take liberty to bring an Audita querela. Antea. Tucker against Cosh. Trin. 1651 Banc. sup. Entered Trin. 1650. rot. 388. TVcker brought a replevin against Cosh, Special verdict in a replevin. for distreining his . The Defendant makes conusance as Bailie to I. S. and upon the Avowry the case fell out to be this. A tradesman, in consideration of marriage, made a conveyance of his lands to the use of himself, and of his wife, and afterwards becomes a Bankrupt, and a commission of Bankrupt is taken out against him, and the lands of the Bankrupt are sold by the Commissioners to the avowant that took the distress. The question here was, whether this conveyance made by the Bankrupt of his lands was within the Statute of fraudulent conveyances or not, and the sale made by the Commissioners of this land were good. Maynard for the Plaintif argued, that it is not within any of the Statutes of Bankrupts. The Deed here is without fraud; and so it is not within the Statute; for a valuable consideration is only expressed in the Statute, and not a conveyance upon consideration of marriage, as it was in our case. 2ly. The Feme is but one person with her Husband. 3ly. By comparing the Statutes together it appears that the wife is not comprised within the Statute of 1 jacobi, which looks back to other Statutes touching Bankrupts, for the wife is not named in the Statute of 1 jacobi, but only children and other persons, otherwise the words of the Act which do enumerate children, and other persons, would be frivolous and idle, Roll chief justice said, the Case is of great consequence, and Crisp and Prats case doth somewhat resemble this. Bankrupt. The Law intends a Bankrupt which is so by fraud, as well as a Bankrupt who becomes so by accident, and for this cause is he called an Offender in the Statute, and here the year of our Lord 1637, is the 13 year of the late King; & the recovery suffered by the Bankrupt was then, and within half a year after the recovery, he became a Bankrupt, so that me thinks there plainly appears to be fraud in the Conveyance, Fraud. but the fraud is not expressed in the pleading, as it might have been. The Statute of 1 jac. is somewhat doubtful as I conceive, and I do not see any provision made in it against the wife, if fraud do not appear, for here is no valuable consideration mentioned. Nicholas justice said, it is doubtful, yet he conceived it within the Statute of 1 jac. which ought to receive a large construction, because it was made for the good of the Commonwealth. jerman and Ask agreed with Roll in omnibus. Roll, Here the matter in dispute is not in a special Verdict, but comes in question upon point of pleading, Pleading. which shall be taken most strong against him that pleads it, and he hath not expressed any valuable consideration, as he might have done, by saying in consideration of a portion, or in recompense of marriage, or in performance of Articles made upon marriage, or that the wife had joined in selling some part of the land. The Court would advise, but inclined judgement ought to be for the Avowant. Afterwards judgement was given accordingly, for the Court held the wife was within the Statute of 1 jac. and the providing for wife and children to be providing for himself. Chapman against Brook. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. Trin. 1650. rot. 200. IN an Action upon the Case the Plaintif declared upon a Custom of commoning in such a place. The Defendant demurred to the Declaration, Demurrer to a Declaration in an Action on the Case. and for cause shows that the Custom was not well laid; for the Plaintif declares of a Custom of commoning, pro averiis; viz. pro equis, bobus, equabus et pullis, and the word pullis is of an uncertain signification, for it may signify a Calf, a Lamb, or any other young Beast or Foul, and 23 Car. Segar and Dyers Case was cited. The Court held the exception good, and said, that it is incertain what is meant by the word pullus, and said, that if the prescripsion had been pro omnibus averiis, it had been good, Prescription. and the viz. should have been void; but here it is only pro averiis. Therefore, nil capiat per billam. Newton against Goddard. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an Action of Debt at Ipswitch. Error to reverse a judgement in debt. The Case was this. There issued out a Capias against the Principal, and a judgement was given against him; and after a scire facias issued out against the Bail, and a judgement thereupon was given against the Bail; Then the Plaintif takes out an Execution, viz. a fieri facias against the Principal, and Bail, upon both the judgements, to levy the debt recovered upon the goods and chattels of the Principal and Bail, or either of them. It was alleged that the execution thus taken out was not good, for there aught to have been several executions upon the several judgements, Execution. and not one execution, and to this the Court agreed, and ordered the Defendant in the writ of Error to show cause why the judgement should not be reversed. In this Case Roll chief justice took an exception to the scire facias, Abreviation. because it was scire fac. with a dash, which might be as well scire faciatis as scire facias. Spittlehouse against Farmery. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup: Hill. 1650. rot. 43. AN Action of account was brought against a Feme Covert an Administratrix and her Husband in the Common Pleas, Error to reverse a judgement ● ven in an Action of Account. and judgement given against the Defendants quod computent. The Feme dies, and the Husband brings a writ of Error in this Court to reverse this judgement. Roll chief justice held, that the writ of Error did not lie, because the Record cannot be removed by it, for that would disturb the proceed in the Common Pleas, and the party would have no fruit of his suit, if the Record should be removed, nor any remedy to recover the arrears due unto him: Original. Scire facias. Yet the Original is determined by the judgement given quod computent, and a scire facias lies by the Executor, as the case here is. jerman justice to the same effect, and cited 1 H. 7. f. 2. Nicholas justice to the same intent; and said, he did not much regard the Book of 21 Ed. 3. because there are other Books against it. Ask justice ad idem. Roll chief justice put these cases. A judgement was given in Dower for the Demandant, and another judgement that she shall recover her damages, and this second judgement for the damages was reversed by a writ of Error, because she did not aver that her Husband died seized, in which case she is to have no damages; judgement yet the first judgement for the Dower stood unreversed, and Hill. 43 Eliz. C. B. in one Williams and Whites case, in an ●●ction of Account 2 judgements were given, and the second w●s reversed, and the first stood unreversed. In the principle case the rule was judicium; nisi. Wallis against Bucknal. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. Trin. 1649. rot. 600. Upon a special Verdict the case fell out to be this. Special verdict upon a Custom of a Manor. Oneself d of Copyhold lands of inheritance made a Letter of Attorney unto two jointly and severally, to surrender the lands after his death to certain uses, according to the Custom of the Manor. The question was, whether this was a good Custom or no. Ellis of Council with the Plaintif argued, that it was not a good Custom, because a Custom ought to be reasonable, but this Custom is unreasonable, because it is not only against a particular Law, but it is against the general rule of Law to pass estates of inheritance in such a Manor; and although particular Customs may be against public interest pro bo●o publico, yet this is nothing to our case, for this is not for the public good, and therefore it is not good. 2ly. An authority ought to be countermandable, and to determine by the death of the party that gives the authority; but here it is not so, but it is to continue after his death. Next, no man can give authority to another to do a thing which he himself could not do, but here it is otherwise, and therefore it is not good. Also by the death of the Copyholder the Law settles the lands in the heir, and an authority cannot divest them out of him; this is not like to the surrendering of Copyhold lands into the hands of the Lord, for such a surrender cannot be revoked, but this authority may be revoked: But which is more, the Verdict here doth not find that the two Attorneys are customary Tenants of the Manor, but only by way of recital, which is not good, for they ought to have been found to directly; nor doth it appear that they were customary Tenants at the time of the admittance of the party, neither is there any possession or title found in the Defendant, and so the Plaintif having primer possession, the Defendant is culpable; neither is it found that the Customary Tenant, who gave this authority, had an estate in fee-simple in the lands, and if he had but an estate for life, he could not make such a Letter of Attorney; neither is the authority given warranted by the Custom, and so he prayed judgement for the Plaintif. Wilmot for the Defendant, As to the authority, he said that it was good, and did well enough survive the party that gave it, because it is supported with a special direction from the party that gave it. 1 H. 7.8. and this is the reason that an Executor may sell lands of the Testator after his death, viz. because his authority is so supported, 21 E. 4. f. 8. 31 E. 1. Fitz. Grants 45. And here in our case the heir hath neglected his advantage, and therefore shall not now be admitted to take it. But besides the authority here given is more than a bare authority, for it is backed, with the circumstances of time, persons, and of a Custom, which is not of a slight esteem in Law, and by such a Custom which is very reasonable; for it is but to enable the party to dispose of his own lands; and far more unreasonable Customs than this are allowed in our Law, as that in Kent for an Infant of 15 years of age to have power to sell his lands; neither is this Custom contrary to any positive rule of Law; for it is here to create the authority to begin after the party's death that created it, and so it is not to determine with his death, for till then it gins not, and the Custom here is but to alien lands, which is no strange thing, and this Custom extends but within the Manor, which is but to a small compass of ground; and so the public is not much concerned in it, and the case of 17 Car. in this Court, Bambridge and Whaddons case differs from our Case; for that was not supported with a custom as this is. And it doth appear by the Record, that Dalby the Attorney is a customary Tenant, and the admission is also found by the Verdict to be secundum consuetudinem Manerii, and so that is well enough, and then one cannot gain a Copyhold estate by disseisin, and so no primer seisin shall be intended, as was urged on the other side, and it is also found that the Copyholder was seized. Roll chief justice, It will be a hard matter to maintain the Custom, Custom. if it be not found that the Copyholder was seized in fee of the Copyhold lands. 2ly. It is not here found that the land is demisable, according to the will of the Lord, and so it may be free land, and then the custom doth not extend unto it, nor is it found that the parties to whom the Letters of Attorney were made were Copyhold Tenants. Disseisin. And the primer possession will make a disseisin here by the Defendant, if the custom be notwell found, and so judgement must be for the Plaintif. Devise. And I cannot see how the Custom can be good, it being against the rules of Law. Surrender. A man cannot devise Copyhold lands, and this case is worse, but he may surrender to the use of his last Will. If you will not consent to a new trial we will advise, for it is a hard case, and my Brothers have not been attended with Books. Mich. following judgement was given for the plaintiff, nisi. It was moved again, and the Court would advise. Postea. Bachelor against Parsons. Trin. 1651 Banc. sup. Mich. 1652. rot. 381. Bachelor brings a writ of Error to reverse a judgement given against him for Parsons in an Action of Debt in the Common Pleas, and the Error assigned was, Error to reverse a judgement in debt. that there are two Declarations in the Record, one in the Emparlance Roll, the other in the Plea Roll, and the Original certified upon the writ of Error doth not warrant the first Declaration, for it was filled after it. Hales answered, that the Record is good enough, if the Original dowarrant the last Declaration, for this is the common course used in the Common Pleas, as the Clarks there do inform me, & there are many Cases like this in the Common Pleas. Wild of Council on the other side answered, that this is a strange course, for they ought first to file the Original, because it is the beginning and groundwork of the suit; and it not being so done here, the judgement is given without an Original, & this is a judgement by default, and the imparlance is part of the suit. Roll chief justice, Imparlance, Intendment, Certiorari. The Imparlance Roll is the principal part of the suit, and to confound things by intendment, that the imparlance may be touching another suit, is not good, and it matters not what the Custom is in the Common Pleas, if it be against Law, and both Rolls ought to be certified here. jerman justice ad idem. Roll chief justice, All the Record in the Common Pleas, which is in the custody of the chief justice there, aught to be certified by him upon the return of the Writ of Error, and here the Imparlance Roll is in his custody, and therefore he ought to certify it; and if there be two writs of Error, Error. and one is good and the other naught, we will take the best to affirm the judgement. The Original ought not to be fitted to the Declaration, but the Declaration to the Original, because the Original is the foundation of the suit, and therefore the course used in the Common Pleas is a preposterous course, Original. viz. to declare against the Defendant, and after to file an original against him, to warrant the Declaration. It is here certified to be one Record, and how can we take the emparlance Roll to be part of the Record, it being not certified with it? and if there be variance between the emparlance Roll, and the plea Roll, Variance. it is Error. We will advise; but we must not suffer new ways, yet we are loath, notwithstanding to reverse judgements given in the Common pleas. Therefore show cause next term, why the judgement should not be reversed. Kirman against johnson. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. IN an ejectione firmae brought by Kirman against johnson a special verdict was found, and upon it the case sell out to be thus, Special verdict in an ejectione firmae. A having lands in see simple, and also goods and chatels to the value of 5 l. only in Tavestock, made his Will, and devised to his wife totum statum suum, viz. his whole Estate paying his Debts, and Legacies, and his Debts and Legacies did amount to the value of 40 l. Hales made 2 questions, 1. Whether the lands pass to the wife by the Will or not. 2ly. If they do, what estate passeth to her in the Lands. For the first he argued, that the lands do pass to the wife. 1. Because the generality of the words do include the lands, as well as the goods, for the words are his whole Estate, so that nothing is excluded, 9 E. 4. a release of all Actions, is held a release of all Actions that the party had in all his capacities. 2ly. The ordinary manner of speech doth show that he intended to devise his lands, as well as his goods, Riches case, Mich. 45. Eliz. C. Banc. A devise of all his rents was held to pass all the parties lands. Also the subject matter in fact doth prove this to be his intent, and although here is not a collateral averment to prove the intention, but a collateral proof to declare the Testators intent, this may be admitted to ascertain the Court of his meaning, as it is in the case of proving an Act of Parliament. In the Lord Cheneys case, an averment standing with a Will was accounted allowable, though an averment against a Will be not; In Cooper and Lanes case, 35 Eliz. a devise seigniori puero, where the Testator had a Son, and a Daughter, was held a good devise to the Son, although puer signifies as well a Daughter as a Son, and the Daughter there was elder than the Son, and Hill 8. Car. In Bartler and Rhodes case in B. R. a devise of all his lands in Dale, if he had leases, as well as lands, there passed not the leases. For the 2d. point he argued that a fee simple passed. 1. Because his whole Estate is devised, and that is to be applied as well to the lands, as to the goods. 2ly. Because in regard that there is a consideration for it, to wit that the wife shall pay his Debts, and discharge his Legacies; and whereas it is objected, that it is not said she shall pay all his Debts, I answer, that it shall be so intended. Here is land and goods mentioned, and not land only, and it is found that the goods only are not sufficient to pay the Debts, and also the goods were liable to the payment of the Debts, without this expression in the Will, and therefore the land must be intended to be devised. And for the verdict it is not material to find the lands to be held in socage, for they shall be intended to be so held, because it is the most ancient Tenure, for where the Law creates a Tenure, it shall be socage Tenure. 2ly. Lands may possibly be deviseable, although they be not held in socage, for if they be neither held by socage, nor chivalry, yet they are deviseable, Dyer 307. Neither is it material to find the Debts, and Legacies paid, for it is a condition here, an not a limitation, and there is a person to take advantage if the condition be broken, & this is a special verdict, & the breaking of the condition if it had been broken, would have appeared upon evidence, & therefore it is not necessary to aver it, & it is in case of a Fee simple, which is an Estate intended to continue. Devise. Roll chief justice held, that the lands did pass, for so he said the common understanding imports, and the words do go to the value of the estate. 1. It comprehends the thing, to wit the land. 2ly. The extent of the Estate given, viz. Fee simple, and so it shall be here intended, and the words paying his Debts and Legacies doth enforce this construction, for they are to be paid presently, which cannot be, if the lands pass not in Fee, and so the aberment it is but to supply the meaning of the Testator, and stands very well with the Will, and is not so collateral, as it is in Cheyneys' case. And for the verdict the lands shall be intended to be socage lands, Intendment. as being the most Common Tenure, except the contrary were showed on the other part, Denham and Bakers case, Mich. 24 〈◊〉. entered Trin. 23. rot. 12.80. and the words paying his Debts, and Legacies, are words of condition, and not of limitation. jerman ad idem, and said, Condition. Limitation. when we say a man is a man of a great Estate, we mean his Estate in lands, as well as goods. Nicholas and Ask justices to the same effect; but Ask said he doubted of the verdict, because no Legacies are found, and this is part of the case. judicium pro querente nisi, Antea. Pickering and Emma. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. EMma obtained a judgement against Pickering, For a supersedeas upon an audita querela. brought. and had satisfaction upon it, and gave a release to the Defendant, yet afterwards takes out a capias ad satisfaciendum against him, whereupon he brings his Audita querela, and moves the Court that he may have a supersedeas to the capias ad satisfaciendum. The Court desired to see the release, and upon view thereof. The rule was, that the party should proceed in his audita querela; but said they would grant no supersedeas, because the release was ambiguous. Custodes etc. against Rivett. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. Upon a rule of Court to show cause why an Attatchment should not be granted against one, Cause why an Attatchment should not be granted. for proceeding to a trial in an iuferior Court, notwithstanding a habeas corpus directed to remove the cause, An Affidavit was made, that the proceeding to trial was, because it was supposed the habeas corpus was against the Statute of 21 jac. The Court answered, you ought to have returned this matter upon your return, and not to have proceeded against the habeas corpus; but let the Secondary examine the matter, and then move again. Return. But it is dangerous to execute the judgement; if the Statute be not against the habeas Corpus. The Custodes against my Lord Morley. Trin. 1651. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved on the behalf of the Lord Morley for a Certiorari to remove an Endictment preferred against him at the Sessions of Peaco at Hicks Hall upon the Statute against hearing of Mass. For a Certiorari to remove an Endictment. The Court answered, that they would advise, but that they did not see how a Certiorari could be granted at the prayer of the party, but they said, at the prayer of the Council for the State it may be granted. Baker against Smith. Trin 1651. Banc. sup. BAker brought an Action upon the Case against Smith, and declared, Arrest of Judgement in an action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit. that whereas there was a speech concerning marriage between her the plaintiff, and Smith the Defendant, in consideration that she the Plaintif would marry the Defendant, the Defendant did assume and promise to her the plaintiff, that he would marry her, and that afterwards the Defendant, in consideration that the Plaintif would discharge the Defendant of this promise, the Defendant did assume and promise that he would pay unto her the plaintiff, a thousand pound, and that she did discharge the Defendant of his promise of marriage; and yet the Defendant had not paid the 1000 l. according to his promise. Upon non assumpsit pleaded, and a verdict found for the plaintiff, It was moved in Arrest of judgement that there is mention of two promises in the Declaration, and that it is incertain to which promise the Declaration relates. 2ly. That there is no temporal consideration alleged, but only a promise to dissolve a Contract of Marriage, which is a thing illegal, and so no consideration. Roll chief justice answered, that here is a mutual promise made by both parties, Promise. Case. and there have been divers actions of late times brought for this cause, and they have been adjudged good, and the engagement to marry is not merely a a spiritual matter, and this Action is not to compel the marriage upon the Contract, but to recover damages for not doing it, and it is like to a wager, and here is a temporal loss, and therefore a temporal Action doth lie. But it was adjourned till next Term to be argued again, and then judgement was given for the plaintiff, for the Court held, that the dis-engagement shall be intended to the party himself, and here is no need to express notice given of it, Postea. Kenedy against Fisher. Mich. 1651. Banc. sup. KEnedy declared in an Action upon the case against Fisher for speaking these words of him, he lost his Feet by the Pox, Whether a Plea of privilege was to be allowed. innuendo the French Pox: The Defendant demurred to the Declaration, and after imparled, and then pleaded a plea of privilege. Hales desired the opinion of the Court, whether this plea were now allowable, because the Books differed about it. Roll chief justice answered, that the plea is not allowable, because there is but a privilege claimed by it, and the Plea goes not to the jurisdiction of the Court, Therefore let the Defendant plead in chief. Starkey against Mill. Mich. 1651. Banc. sup. Entered Trin. 1651. rot. 170. STarkey brought an Action upon the Case against Mill upon two several Assumpsits, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon an Assumpsit. and obtains a Verdict upon both, and entire damages are given: It was moved in Arrest of judgement, that one of the promises was not good, because there was no consideration to ground it upon; and so the damages being entire upon both the Assumpsits, & one failing, judgement cannot be given. The case was this. The Father gave goods to his Son, in consideration that the Son should pay the Plaintif in this action 20 l. It was urged that this can be no consideration for the plaintiff to bring his action, because here is no debt due to him, but only an appointment for the Son to pay money to him, in consideration of the goods given him by his Father. But Hales on the other side said, that if there may be a debt by any intendment due to the plaintiff, Consideration. than the Assumpsit is good, and here is a debt due to him, therefore the Assumpsit is good. Roll chief justice held, that it is good as it is, for there is a plain Contract, because the goods were given for the benefit of the plaintiff, though the Contract be not between him and the Defendant, Case. and he may well have an Action upon the Case, for here is a promise in Law made to the plaintiff, though there be not a promise in fact, & there is a debt here; and the Assumpsit is good. jerman and A●k justices agreed, but Nicholas doubted, But judgement was given for the Plaintif. Cressit against Burgis. Mich. 1651. Banc. sup. AN Action of Debt was brought upon the Statute of 2 Ed. 6. for tithes, Arrest of judgement in Debt upon the Statute of 2 Ed. 6. for tithes. Upon nil debet pleaded, and a verdict and damages given for the plaintiff, it was moved in Arrest of judgement that the damages given are for tithes growing upon 71 Acres of land, whereas the plaintiff in his Declaration declares but for tithes growing upon 70 Acres of Land, so that the damages are given for more than is declared for, and contrary to the demand. To this it was answered, that this is but the mis-counting of the jury, and is not material, Damages. because by the whole Declaration it appears there was but 70 Acres, and this is but a description by the jury how the several parcels of land were sown, viz. with what Corn. Roll chief justice said, The Declaration is that the Defendant was seized of 70 Acres of Arable land, and that so many Acres were sowed with Wheat, so many with Oats, so many with Messing, so many with Beans; and as to the 5 Aeres residue sowed with Barley, which all amounts to 71 Acres; and it ought to have been as to 4 Acres residue, so that this is but a mis-counting of the jury, for the jury cannot be deceived, for the land is called but 70 Acres in the Declaration, and no damage ariseth to any by this mistake. To which the rest of the judges agreed, and judgement was given for the plaintiff, nisi. Mich. 1651 Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to reverse an Outlawry for want of Proclamation; Motion to reverse an Outlawry. Appearance. the question was whether it may be done by Attorney, the party himself, by reason of infirmity of body, being not able to come in person: Upon view of the Statute, Roll chief justice said, he must come in person, otherwise it cannot be done; yet the Court would advise. Afterwards it was overruled, that it could not be reversed except he come in person. Drinkwater against Pack. Mich. 1651 Banc. sup. DRinkwater brought an action upon an Escape against Pack one of the Sheriffs of London, and obtains a Verdict against him. Arrest of judgement in an Action for an escape. It was moved in Arrest of judgement, that the Plaintif declares that the party was in the custody of both the Sheriffs, and yet the Action is brought against but one of them, the prisoner that escaped being in Ludgate, in the custody of the Defendant Pack, Latch answered, that the Exception is not good, because in Law the prisoner that escaped is in the custody of both the Sheriffs. Hales on the other side said, that it doth not appear upon the Record, that he was in the Custostody of both the Sheriffs, and it shall not be supplied by a foreign intendment, and the party shall be intended to be in custody, according to the Custom of London, and not by the Common Law. Declaration. Roll chief Justice held the Declaration good, for the prisoner was in custody of both the Sheriffs, although he was in the Custody of Pack, and it stands well enough with the Record, and the words ut praefertur do not hurt the averment, Averment. and the words existent. in custodia is a good averment, that he was in custody, as in an endictment, Tunc existens tenementum is good; and it is also here found by the jury that he was in custody; for how else could they find for the Plaintif. jerman ad idem: But because the two other judges had no Books delivered them, they would deliver no opinion then. Afterward judgement was given for the Plaintif. cottrel and his Wife against theobald's. Mich. 1651 Banc. sup. COttrell and his Wife brought an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit against theobald's, and declared that the Defendant, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon an Assumpsit. in consideration that the Plaintif would marry A. that is now the Plaintiffs wife, did assume and promise to the plaintiff to make good a Legacy given unto her by her Father's Will, and would also give unto her 40 l. more out of his own part given unto him by the said Will, at her age of 18 years, and declares further, that thereupon he did marry her, and that the Defendant had not performed his promise, and so concludes, to his damage so much. Upon non assumpsit pleaded, and a Verdict for the plaintiff, the Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement, and took divers Exceptions, but the Court insisted but upon one of them, and that was held material, and it was this, That the Wife did here join in the Action with her Husband, Action, which she ought not to do, because the promise was made to the Husband only, and for his benefit, and the sole consideration for the promise doth arise from the Husband, namely his marrying the Feme; And Bafield and Collins his case, 22 Car. and Cheesman and Wat's case 23 Car. were cited, and Roll chief justice put this case. A promise was made by one to a Feme Covert, that if the will procure her Husband to levy a fine of such lands, that he would give her a riding suit; And it was adjudged that the Baron and Feme cannot join in an action for breach of this promise; and he said that in the case at Bar it was a mere covenant, and no duty grew thereby to the Feme. Case. Postea. Goodyer against Shaw. Mich. 1651. Banc. sup. Mich. 1650. rot. 633. GOodyer brought an Action of Trespass for an Assault and Battery, Demurrer to a plea in an Action of Trespass. and wounding of his Servant, and taking away 12 plate locks, against Shaw. The Defendant Shaw pleaded not culpable to the Assault and Battery, and wounding, and as to the taking away of the locks he pleaded a special plea of Justification, by virtue of Letters Patents of incorporation granted to the Lock-smiths of Durham by Cuthbert Bishop of Durham, who had jura regali● within the County Palatine of Durham, and that by virtue of this Charter the locks being not good, he as Warden of the Company did take them. To this Plea the Plaintif demurred, and for cause it was showed, that it appears not by the Plea that the Black-smiths are a Corporation created by the Bishop, but only that the Customs used amongst them in Order to the regulating of their Trade were confirmed by the Bishop, which doth not make them a Corporation, Blow. f. 199. Long quint. f. 40, 41. 2ly. It doth not appear by the Charter that they have any authority to take away ill made locks; and therefore judgement was prayed for the Plaintif. Roll chief justice said, That here doth not appear any Order made by the Corporation to take away the Locks, Corporation. and therefore it was done without warrant, though the Corporation had such a power; But besides it will be very hard to maintain the Lock-smiths to be a Corporation, because the Bishop confirmed their Orders. Therefore let the Plaintif have his judgement, nisi. Bishop against Fitzherbert. Mich. 1651. Banc. sup. BIshop brought an Action upon the Case against Fitzherbert, Arrest of judgement in an Action for words. for speaking these words of him, thou art a Thief, and hast stolen Horses: Upon not guilty pleaded, and a verdict found for the plaintiff, It was moved in Arrest of judgement, that as the words are laid in the Declaration they are not A●ionable, for it is incertain of whom they were spoken: The Declaration was thus, That the Defendant Colloquium habens cum querente in the presence of others, dixit, meaning the plaintiff, Thou art a Thief, and hast stolen Horses. The Court at th● first moving of this Case inclined the words were actionable, because it shall be intended they were spoken of the plaintiff, though it be not directly said so: And afterward it being moved again, the Court held the words well enough laid to bear an Action, because upon the whole Record the words plainly appear to be spoken of the plaintiff, and therefore judgement was given for him. Freeman against Childeress. Mich. 1651. Banc. sup. Entered Trin. 1651. rot. 45. FReeman brought an Action upon the Case against Childeress for speaking these words of her, She is a Whore, and I will prove her a Whore, Arrest of judgement in an Action for words. and an arrant Whore. Upon not guilty pleaded, and a Verdict found for the plaintiff, it was moved in Arrest of judgement that the words are not actionable, because they are but words of choler, and spoken in passion, the judgement at the first moving of it was stayed, yet it was then doubted whether the words did not import more in them than to say barely of a woman, she is a whore: But afterwards it being again moved, Roll chief justice said, that the words were too generally spoken to be actionable, and that they are but words of passion, and that before the Act made against Adultery, prohibitions have been granted to the Prerogative Court for libelling against persons, for calling of women whores, Prohibitions. and therefore Nil capiat per Billam, nisi. Preston against Mortlock. Mich. 1651. Banc. sup. AN Action of Trespass was brought against 4 Defendants, and before a Verdict one of them died, and the Verdict was found against the Defendant: judgement. Twisden prayed the Plaintif might have judgement against the other three. Roll chief justice answered, If you will relinquish your damages as to the person that is dead, you may have judgement against the rest. Davis against the Lord Foliot. Mich. 1651. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to grant the good behaviour against the L. Foliot, Motion for the good behaviour. because he was indicted for a foul Battery at the Sessions in London and the Bill was found against him. But Roll chief justice answered, It cannot be granted upon a motion; Good behaviour. but you must prefer Articles against him here upon Oath, and then you may move for it, and if there appear cause in the Articles it shall be granted. Mich. 1651. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved for a writ to swear one in the Office of a Mayor, For a Writ to swear one in the Office of a Mayor of a Town. to which he was elected for the Borough of Trevenny in Cornwall, because the old Mayor did not swear him in due time as he ought to do, but did adjourn the Court before it was done. Roll chief justice answered, that there is no precedent to swear such an Officer, yet ordered, that notice should be given to the Town, and precedents to be brought into Court, if any were to warrant it. Whitway against Pinsent. Mich. 1651. Banc. sup. Pasc. 1651. rot. 61. A Man made a lease of lands for years by deed, Demurrer to a plea in Covenants. and covenanted that the Lessée & his Assigns should enjoy them during the Term, the Lessor made the Defendant his Executor & died. The Lessee assigns over his Term, a Stranger enters upon the Assignee, the Assignee takes 40 l. in satisfaction for his being ejected of the Assignor, and afterwards brings an Action of Covenant against the Executor of the Lessor the Defendant. The Defendant pleads the acceptance of the 40 l. of the Assignor in satisfaction of the wrong done him in Bar of the Action, and to this plea the Plaintiff demurred. Bar. The question here was, whether the Action of Covenant did lie against the Defendant, since that the Plaintiff had received 40 l. of his Assignor in satisfaction. Roll chief justice said, that here is a double Covenant, one of the Lessor, and the other of the Assignor, and therefore the party may have two Actions, Action. and therefore he is not here barred, to bring this second Action, though he have barred himself by the acceptance of the 40 l. from bringing an Action against his Assignor, and the Defendant hath not pleaded that the 40 l. was given in satisfaction of both the Covenants, for than it had been otherways. jerman justice to the same effect, That they are several Covenants, by several deeds, and both the parties are severelly bound, and satisfaction given by one of them, is not the satisfaction of the other. And he said if Lessee for years assign over his Term the Lessor having notice thereof, and he accept the rent from the assignee, he cannot demand the rent of the Lessee afterwards, yet he may sue other Covenants contained in the lease against him, as for reparations or the like. The rule was for the Plaintiff to take his judgement, nisi. Mich. 1651. Banc. sup. Sergeant Glyn moved for a certiorari to remove an endictment of forcible entry that was once before removed hither, For a certiorari to remove an endictment. and after sent down by a procedendo, because the justices below will not grant restitution. Roll chief justice answered, There is a plea put in, and in such case it is not usual to grant a certiorari, yet it may be that it may be granted, therefore let the other side show cause on Monday next why it should not be granted. Cantrell against Stephens Mich, 1651. Banc. sup. CAntreli brought an Action upon the case against Stephens for stopping his way in a Meoow called Madbrook in the parish of Redriff in Kent; Arrest of judgement for an Action upon the case for stopping a way. upon not guilty pleaded, and a verdict found for the Plaintiff, It was moved in arrest of judgement that the Plaintiff as Lessee, to the Haberdasher's company of London, claimed to have a way for them, whereas they having let the land cannot have the way, but the Lessée in possession. 2ly. The prescription is not rightly applied, for it ought to be for them to have a way pro tenentibus et occupatoribus suis, which is not so here. Twisden answered it shall be intended Tenants, and Occupiers to the Haberdashers, though it be not said suis. Latch said that a prescription per que estate is good in an Action upon the Case, because no land is claimed, and Green on the same side said, the exception taken was helped by the verdict. Wild on the other side said, that it doth not appear that the Tenant who brings the Action, comes in by the Haberdashers who claim the way, and so he cannot prescribe to have it, Prescription. and the prescription ought to be laid pro tenentibus & subtenentibus, which Roll chief justice denied, and said that it is laid that the Haberdashers were seized in Fee, & postea huc usque and so they have the Fee at the time, and may prescribe; but it had been better for the party to have showed that he was their Tenant▪ but it being after a verdict, the question is whether it be not helped, Upon reading the Record, Roll chief justice observed, that it appeared not whose Occupyer and Tenant the Plaintiff is; but only by way of argument; but said the question is whether the verdict do help it, and he inclined it did not, Verdict. because the Action is brought by the Tenant, who hath not entitled himself to the Action, for he hath made only a title to the way in the Haberdashers; Title. but hath derived no Estate from them to himself. At another day Roll chief justice said, we must not take things by intendment, and here is a failer in the very gist of the Action, for the Plaintiff hath not entitled himself to the Action, for he hath no interest, for it appears not how he is Ocupyer of the land, for he doth not say he is Ocupator suus, and as he hath laid the Declaration, the Company ought to have brought the Action. jerman justice to the same effect, and said that upon a demurrer it had been clearly naught and the verdict here doth not help it, for no title appears for the Plaintiff, and the verdict cannot give him that he had not before. Nicholas and Ask justices to the same effect. Roll, If it had been Ocupator suus, I doubt it would not make the Declaration good, because it shows not by what title So The rule was nil capiat per billam, nisi. Tailor against Web. Mich. 1651. Banc. sup. Hill. 1650. rot. 240. IN an ejectione firmae upon a lease for 7 years there was a special verdict found, Special verdict in an ejectione firmae. and the questions in the Case grew upon the words of a Will that were false orthography, viz. I do make my Cousin Giles Bridges my Solle Ayeare and my Yexecutor, meaning my sole Heir, and Executor. Powis of Council with the Plaintiff held, that the Will was good to make Giles Briges the Testators Heir and Executor, notwithstanding the mis-writing of the words, and that by the Will the Land and personal Estate passed unto him, for he said, if by my Will I make one my Heir, This is a devise to him of all my Lands in Fee, for the Devisee is put in loco haeredis, and shall be like an Heir by descent, for he is haeres factus, although he be not haeres natus, Mich. 31 & 32 Eliz. rot. 235 Godfrey's Reports, Hob. rep. f. 34. b. Coundens case, Hob. new edition 75. Spark against Burrell, the very case in point adjudged, 7 E. 6. Br. Done 44. and Devise 48. and in this Case the Devisee had annuities to pay, and moneys for Legacies, which shows the intent of the Testator to be, that he shall have his Lands and Goods, neither shall the misspelling of the word Heir hurt the Will, for the intent of the Testator shall be followed, if it may be known, as it may well be here, Hob. f. 32.15. H. 7. f. 12. Cooks Lit. f. 323. Dyer 325. 2ly. Misnaming in a Will shall not hurt the Will, Dyer 323.21 Rich. 2. Fitzh. devise 27.10. rep. 57 3ly. False Latin shall not destroy deeds nor plead, though it will abate writs, a fortiori false English shall not destroy a Will, 9 H. 7.16.10. rep. Osborns case, Hob. 227.10. rep. 133. a. 9 H. 6.7. a. and here is only vitium scriptori●, and that cannot destroy a Will, Hob. f. 162. Walkers case. f. 104, & 104.9. rep. 48. a. Dyer. 17 Eliz. f. 342. Digbyes case. Another reason is, the word Heir is here written according to the pronunciation, and sound of the word, though it agree not in letters, and H. that is left out is no letter, but an asperte note, and the language in England as it differs in time, so it differs in place, for men speak not, nor write, English in all parts of England alike, and a Will in latin or greek is a good Will within the Statute, so that it is not necessary for a Will to be good English, and the Testator was bred in France, and could neither write nor speak good English, and his Will so much the rather is to be favoured. And false English hath been allowed in a Bond, viz. senteen for seventeen pounds, 9 rep. 48. a. much more may it be in a Will, and so he prayed judgement for the Plaintiff. Latch for the Defendant argued that the Will was not good, he considered 2. points. 1. When a man makes one his solle Ayeare and Yexecutor what construction the words shall have. 2ly. What Estate is conveyed by them. And first he said that Hoberts' Case cited by Powis was not to the purpose. 1. Because it is not the principal case. And 2ly. It is but an opinion there, and an Heir may be without land. And for Counden and Clarks case that was cited, as it was urged, it is for me, and not against me, and there can be no authority cited, that if one make a man his Heir, that his lands are thereby conveyed to him in Fee simple. But in our case there can be no certain intent of the Testator found out, and the making of one his Heir in France, where the Testator was bred, according to the Civil Law there used, is but to make him his Executor, and so the Testator might mean it. And if one in his Will say, I make one of my Daughters my Heir, and do not say of his Lands, this shall not disinherit the other Daughters, and if there should be any Estate conveyed here, it cannot be but an Estate for life. Brook Done 44.8 Jac. C. B. Inkersalls case. 3ly. The ill orthogrophy here makes the Will naught, for a Will cannot be made good by conjectures, Hob. 34. Mich. 23 Car. Robinson's case, the judgement was reversed for writing the word Aeris instead of aeris with a dipthongue. Trin. 17 Car. C. B. rot. 74. and in Skirret and Skinner's case libis with a dash over put for libris was adjudged ill, and in our case here are divers words miswritten. And for the variation of our English dialect which is objected it is to no purpose, because this will was lately made & the dialect altars not in so short a time, and the dialect of the County where the Will was made, viz. Gloucester Shire agrees not with the Will. And Hill. 6. Car. this Will came in dispute in the Court of wards, and a decree there passed against the Will in this point. The Court said, the case is doubtful, Will. because the Will doth not say, I make him heir of my Land, but generally my heir and Executor, but the false writing hurts not a Will, if the Testators mind may be found out. Adjourned to be argued again. Wood against Topham. Mich. 1651 Banc. sup. Wood brought an Action of Trespass upon the case quare filium & baeredem rapuit et maritavit, against Topham, Arrest of judgement in an Action on the case. upon not guilty pleaded, and a verdidict found for the Plaintiff, the Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, and takes these exceptions to the Declaration, 1. That the Plaintiff doth not say cujus maritagium ad ipsum pertinet. 2ly. That he doth not say that the Heir was within age; and Maynard of Council with the Defendant said that the exceptions are not to the writ, but to the Declaration, and the Action being a Trespass to recover the Damages, the Plaintiff ought to entitle himself to the marriage for the loss whereof he would recover damages, for the Heir it may be is not Heir apparent to him, and then is no marriage due to him, and here is a special Declaration, for the loss of the marriage. Roll chief justice answered, Writs. Declaration. the writs are good both ways, and so may the Declaration be either with those words, or without them, and he makes not the ground of his Action, to be that the marriage belonged to him; Common right. but of Common right it doth belong to him, and the words are used to be alleged, only to increase the Damages, and the ground of the Declaration is only quare filium suum & haeredem rapuit, and for this the Plaintiff ought to have his judgement. jerman justice differed, and said, the Plaintiff doth not show he had any damage by the marriage, & it may be that he had been married before, or was of full age & so no cause of Action. Nicholas justice, as Roll, and said that by the Law the marriage belongs to the Father, and it may prove a dishonour to the family to have his son taken away, and married without the Father's consent. Ask justice to the ●ams effect, and so judgement was given for the Plaintiff, nisi. Antea. Mich. 1651. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to mitigate fines, Motion to mitigate fines for riots, that were to be set upon rioters that were found guilty upon an information exhibited against them, for the riotous cutting down of wood. But Wild on the other side prayed there might be good fines set upon them according to the fact found upon the Record, because it was a foul riot. The Court answered, they are found guilty of the riot, Fine. and therefore the fine cannot be less than ten pounds at the least for the principal, there being a verdict in the case, and so let it be, and 4. marks a piece for the rest. For we must preserve the peace of the County. Baker against Smith. Mich. 1651. Banc. sup. THe case of Baker and Smith formerly spoken to was again moved, In answer to a matter spoken in arrest of judgement and Maynard answered the exceptions offered in arrest of judgement. 1. It was objected that here was not a mutual promise set forth between the parties, for there is no agreement made by the Feme, for it is only said, that she consented to marry the party, which is not a binding agreement. To this he answered, here was a mutual, and binding agreement, though it be not so plainly expressed in words as it might have been, 3 H. 6.36, 37. A verbal promise may be discharged by words, and so it is here, London and Stokes case, Trin. 10 Car. rot. 236. Next it is not necessary here to give notice of the discharge of the promise, though if there be notice it is well enough, because the thing to be done upon it, to wit the payment of the 1000 l. is certain, and the discharge shall be intended to be in the presence of the party to whom it is given; for the Declaration is exoneravit ipsum, which shall not be intended in his absence. Pasch. 10 Car. Harvy and Inglethorps' case, and Mich. 8 jac. Martin and Wilbie, Hodges and More, Pasch. 1 Car. Banc. Reg. 7 jac. Bradlyes' case. 14 jac. Beedly and Goodrose. Latch on the other side argued, that here is no binding promise on the behalf of the woman to marry with the Defendant, and so the discharge of it can be no consideration; for this is not a reciprocal, but a bare acceptation of the promise made by the other; and an action of the case lay not against her if she had refused to marry with the Defendant, because here is no repromission made by her. 2ly. It appears not that the discharge was in convenient time, for it was 2 years after; but admitting that to be so, yet here is no notice of the discharge, and that is necessary to be given, and it shall not be intended to be given without showing it, for the Declaration ought to be certain, and here is no inducement in it that there was any notice given in his presence, and if it were given in his absence, he ought to have notice given him of his discharge, else how should he know it: and it were unreasonable to charge him if he had no notice, and by a third person he cannot receive notice, as it is in the Cases put by Mr. Maynard on the other side. In the Case of Peck and Ingram in this Court adjudged that the party ought to have notice when the Feme left her Father's House and came to such a place. Roll chief justice said, here are two promises, 1. The Feme assumed, that if the Defendant would marry her, she would consent to him; Consideration Promise's in Law. Mutual Contract. Implication. and here is a consideration, although there be not an absolute mutual promise, for it is a promise in law, and the Action may be laid by way of consideration, or by way of mutual Contract. 2ly. Here is but a promise de futuro, and there may be a temporal loss, although the thing to be done, viz. the marriage, be spiritual; And the dis-engagement of the party doth not imply notice; but the demand of the 1000 l. now implies a discharge, nor can the party here take notice of a third person, and therefore it is necessary to give him notice; Notice. for where the party cannot take notice from any but the party himself, there notice must be given him. jerman justice held, here was a good mutual promise to raise a consideration, and by the words exoneravit ipsum, it shall be intended to be to the person, himself, & this implies a notice, especially it being after a verdict. Nicholas Just. much to the effect as Roll chief Just. but he doubted whether the words do imply a personal notice, for it may be it was in his absence, and the verdict will not help it, and so there can be no judgement. A●k justice said, here was a good promise, but the words exoneravit ipsum do not imply a notice, so the Court was divided, and would advise. Hume against Hinton. Mich. 1651. Banc. sup. HUme brought an Action upon the Case against Hinton, A●rest of judgement in an Action upon the case upon a promise. and declared, That whereas the Son of the Defendant did in his life-time own unto the plaintiff 8 l. and died intestate, the Plaintif did demand the said 8 l. of the Defendant, being Mother to the intestate; whereupon she being satisfied of the justness of the debt, did assume and promise unto the Plaintif, that if he would stay for the money till Mich. next, that then she would pay it. Upon non Assumpsit pleaded, and a verdict found for the plaintiff, the Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement, that here was no consideration to ground the Assumpsit upon, because it was not the debt of the party that assumed to pay it, neither was she Executor or administrator nor consequently liable any way by law to pay it, and therefore an Assumpsit to pay a remediless debt, if the Plaintif would stay for it, is no good Assumpsit, as in 6 Car. in this Court, in Morgan's Case. An Assumpsit to pay the rent of the land behind, if the party would forbear to distrain Corn in the shocks, was adjudged no good Assumpsit, because such Corn is not distreinable, and it appears not here what person the Son was, or where he lived, or that he either had or lest any goods, and the mere ground of the Action is the piety of the Mother, and no other matter, And here appears no person liable to pay this debt, neither plainly, nor by intendment, and the Ordinary is not chargeable if no goods come to his hands. And 2ly. There is now no Ordinary, for it is taken away by the Parliament, and 9 rep. Bains case is not like to this case, neither is jones and smith's case, Trin. 8 jac. rot. 192. like to this case, for there was a person liable to be sued, but it is not so here, so that this is a stronger case. But if there should be a good consideration, yet the averment of the performance of it is not good, for it is not certain how he stayed, Wild for the Plaintif held, that here is a good consideration, because the Plaintif is hereby tied not to sue any person whatsoever for the debt till Michaelmas, and so it is a prejudice to him to forbear: And it shall be intended here that the Intestate did leave sufficient goods to the debt; and though there be no Ordinary, yet the party that takes the goods may be sued, and the Case of Homes and Smith cited is for the Plaintif in my Report, and the judgement is not there entered in the Roll, but in the Margin only, it is entered pro Defendente, and the case of Hill and Baily is since that, and that is with me, and is to be preferred before the other, because it is a later judgement. 2ly. The averment is good in substance, although it be not so express in words as it might have been, and it is now after a Verdict. The Court for the first point held, here was a good consideration, Consideration. for it is that the Plaintif shall forbear to sue for the money generally, which goes to all the world, and it is not only to forbear to sue a particular person, but to forbear to sue for the money; and this forbearance may be a prejudice to the party, and a loss in not suing till that time. But for the latter exception Roll chief justice said, if the breach be not well assigned the verdict will not help it; Breach. and you say that you stayed in expectation of the money, and do not say absolutely that you stayed. Therefore let us see a book, Ordinary. and speak to the last point again on Saturday next. In this case Roll chief justice said, where there is no body else to be sued for a Debt, the Ordinary is to be sued, Debt. although he is not to be charged, if he have no goods, and in London it is usual to do it; and now Sir Nathaniel Brent is in place of the Ordinary throughout all England, Afterward judgement was given for the plaintiff, because the consideration and the averment were held both good. Mich. 1651. Banc. sup. ONe Harding was indicted 21 Car. for an Assault and Battery made in Westminster hall, and the party found guilty: For a rule to enter judgement. the Court was moved for a rule to enter judgement against him, because it was so long since the Verdict. But the Court said, if you may do it by the rules of the Court enter it, for we will make no rule without hearing the other side, therefore give notice, & then move it again. Mich. 1651. Banc. sup. AN Action of Debt was brought upon an Obligation of 2000 l. for performance of the Covenants of an Indenture. Demurrer to a Declaration in D bt upon an Obligation to perform Covenants. Discontinuance. The Defendant demurs to the Declaration, and the Plaintif joins in the Demurrer; and after reading of the Record, and the Exceptions opened, Twisden moved the Court for the plaintiff, that he might discontinue his action, because there was a fault in the laying it. Roll chief justice said, Let it stay as it is this Term, for this is in our discretion, and it is but a slip in pleading, and in the mean time we will advise. Barnard against King. Mich. 1651 Banc. sup. Pasch. 1651. rot. 467. BArnard brought an Action of Debt upon an Obligation of 500 l. to stand to an Award, D murrer to a repsication in Debt upon an Obligation to stand to an Award. The Defendant pleaded nullum arbitrium. The plaintiff replies that the Umpire made the award, and sets it forth, and assigns a breach: To this Replication the Defendant demurred, and takes exception, that the Plaintif sets forth that the Arbitrators could not agree, and after they had denied to make the Award, the same day the Umpire made the Award. Latch of Council with the Defendant held this Award set forth in the Replication to be naught, because the submission was, that if the Arbitrators shall not make the Award to morrow, than the Umpire shall make the umpirage; and here the umpirage is made upon the same day that was given to the Arbitators to make the Award, and they have the whole day by the submission to make it in, and although they cannot agree to make it one part of the day, they may agree afterwards the same day to make it, and this disagreement is not a giving up of their authority, and Wood and Clement's case, 24 Car. is not against this, 2ly. It is not said that the arbitrement was delivered, 3ly. The matter awarded is not within the submission, namely the payment of the rent expressed. Hales on the other side argued, that the Umpire might make the Award upon that day that is set forth; and the Condition here is all one, as if it had been said, if the Arbitrators make the Award to morrow, or if the Umpire make the Award to morrow. Pasch. 14 jac. Barry and Fells case. And the words here Postquam denegassent, et deseruissent is a direct averment that the Arbitrators could not agree to make the Award; and Arbitrators may make an award after they have chosen an Umpire; and although the Umpire had power to make the umpirage a day after they made it; yet it it be made before it is a good umpirage, if the Law permit it, and the umpirage here is well delivered, for the submission is not that it shall be delivered to both parties, but generally that it shall be delivered, and therefore it is well if it be delivered to one, it being ready to be delivered to the other: And for the payment of the rent, although it be a future Act, yet being matter of satisfaction, it is good, although it be not expressed in the submission. 〈…〉 Roll chief justice said, for the last matter the words super praemissis brings the payment of the rent within the submission, otherwise the awarding of the payment thereof would not be good by way of satisfaction: But here the Controversy is for the land for which the rent is to be paid, and the matter doth not appear to be out of the submission, and it is not necessary to aver that the land was in Controversse. Averment. 2ly. For the delivery of the Award it is well enough as it is, for it is not specified to whom the Umpire shall deliver the umpirage, although it be expressed to whom the Arbitrators were to deliver their Award, if they had made it. But the main question here is, if the Umpire could make the umpirage the day it was made; and for that I hold he could not, Umpirage. because the authority given by the submission to the Arbitrators was not determined when the umpirage was made; Award. and by the submission the Arbitrators have no authority to make an Umpire, for than it had been good, and it appears not that the Umpire had concurrent authority with the Arbitrators; for it is not said if the Arbitrators make no arbitrement then the Umpire shall make it; but here is a Condition for the Arbitrators to have all the day precedent to make the arbitration in, and no concurring power is given to the Umpire that day, for the Arbitrators have all of it to agree in, and till it is ended the Umpire hath no power at all, otherwise the submission would be repugnant in itself. The rest of the judges concurred in all, and so ruled, That the plaintiff all capiat per billam, nisi. theobald's against Newton. Mich. 1651. Banc. sup. ONe was sued upon the Statute of Inmates, and the distringas jurata bare date on a Sunday, and out of Term, and so is erroneous, The question here was, whether it be not helped by the Statutes of jeofails, of 18 Eliz. and 21 jac. Roll chief justice held, jeofails, that the Statutes extend not to penal Laws, although it be ambiguously penned, nor to any processes grounded upon them, for the Proviso exempts the Original action, and by consequence all processes depending upon it are excepted, Venire de novo. so that here is no good trial, but there shall be a venire de novo, nisi. Tailor and Webb. Mich. 1651. Banc. sup. THe Case of Tailor and Webb which arose upon a special verdict upon these words of Will, Special Verdict upon the words of a Will. viz. I make my Cousin Giles Bridges my sol air and yexecutor, was again moved and argued by Hales, and he made three questions. 1. Whether any estate passeth by the words of the will. 2ly. If any. what estate passeth. 3ly. Whether the false Orthography doth hurt the Will. For the first he said, that by making one his sole heir his land passeth to him. The word heir is to be considered either in relation to an Ancestor, and so one cannot make one his heir, or it may be considered in relation to a thing to be inherited, to wit lands or tenements, and so one may make another his heir, and thus a Custom may make one a man's heir, as it is in Borough English; and an accident may thus also make one a man's heir, as it is in the Case of possessio fratris, Coundens case, Hob. Rep. Case 947. And here it is all one to make one his heir, and to make hint heir of hislands; and the reasons are, First, the word heir here cannot have any other relation than to the Testators lands, for he cannot make him his heir otherwise, and the words may be more reasonably intended so. 2ly. The words carry in them the plain intention of the Devisor, that the party should have his lands, although the words are not very proper ● H. 7. A devise of lands to his son after the death of his wife, passed an Estate for life to the wife, although no such Estate was expressed in the Will; so here, although no express Estate of land be devised, yet the Devisee shall have the lands by the intent of the Devisor. 3ly. In ordinary speech, if one make such an one his Heir, it is intended that he gives him his lands, 8 Car. in the C. B. in Spurt and Bends case. A devise of his inheritance, was held a devise of his lands, and Trin. 3. jac. in Terryes' case, A devise of all his rents in tail passed his lands, because in vulgar acceptance it is the rents of lands, and in Pits and Sands case in this Court. A devise of all his free lands in Holford did pass a portion of Tithes, and in the case of one johnson, a devise of all his estate passed all his lands. And the words cannot bear the fence to make him Executor, according to the Civil Law, as hath been objected, for the Will shall be intended as it is, to be an English man's Will, and so the word Heir in it shall he interpreted according to out Law, and not the Civil Law, and even in the Civil law to make one his Heir doth convey unto him all his lands, for he is haeres testamentarius, although not haeres legitimus. And in this Will here are two expressions, for the party is made Heir and Executor, which two words cannot signify one thing, for that would be an idle expression. 4ly. There are some clauses in the Will, which show the intent of the Testator was to convey his lands, if it were needful to make use of them. 1. There are several annuities for the Devisee to pay. 2ly. He directs him where the conveyances and assurances of his lands were laid up, which plainly show he meant he should have his land. 3ly. The words Heir and Executor are joined together, to show that he gives him all his lands and goods, else one of the words must be imperfect, and ineffectual, which shall not be intended. For Authority 7 E. 6. Br. devise 38. by devising that one Son shall be Heir to the other, it shall be intended of lands, so in construction of law it shall be here intended that the Devisor made him Heir of his lands, Hob. Reports. in Sparkes and Burnells case, William and Anthony shall be each others Heir, and it is not said of land, yet adjudged that it shall be so meant, and so is it in our case, and if I have lands in see simple, and make one my heir, it shall be intended that he shall have my lands in see simple, although I say not that I make him Heir of my lands. For the second question, the reasons before expressed do also show that the lands are passed in Fee, as it is in Purnells and Hambletons' case, for the word Heir shall relate to the same Estate, that the party had in the land, who makes the other his Heir, 8 jac. Inkersals case. For the 3d point, whether here shall be any good devise at all, by reason of the false English, he said it was all one, and to as good effect as if the words were all true English, and neither the incongruity, nor the insufficiency of the words shall hurt the Will, as it is pretended. For 1. This is not in case of pleading or of writs; but in conveyance of lands. It is true that in the former it doth hurt, because writs and plead may be amended, if they be naught; but it is fatal in conveyances, for they cannot be amended, as in Trotman and Standards case, Trin. 1651. in this Court it was held that impropriety of words shall not hurt, it they can admit of a good construction. Desinet in piscem mulier formosa superne. 2ly. This is in a Will, which is such an instrument, that is much favoured in Law and therefore to be favourably construed. 3ly, This is an English Will, and admits of much variety of dialects, and therefore is not to be critically interpreted. Neither are there here any insignificant, or missignificant words, as hath been objected, but significant, for the sound of the word as it is written is the same as if it had been rightly spelled, for Air and Heir sound both alike. As in 3 H. 4. f. 4 Baxter and Baxster sounded alike. 2ly. If the word Heir might receive any other sense, yet it cannot do so here, because there are other words joined to it, to declare and signify that the Testator meant Heir of his Lands, and not the element of Air, or a year, as hath been strangely objected, and would prove a ridiculous construction. Osborns case 10. rep. in Thyns case in this Court a demand of dower de capella, although the word were of doubtful construction in itself, yet by the subject matter, it was held to be made certain enough, so the word Ayeare here shall receive construction according to the subject matter, and the coupling of it also with the word Yexecutor, which is also falsely written, shows the Testators intent. For answer to the main objection, viz. that in 6 Car. there was a decree made in the Court of wards, by advice of the judges, that this was a void and senseless Will, I say that that decree is not of so great weight, as is a judgement given in a Court of judicature at the common Law, and this was but an opinion delivered in Court, where the judges were not judges, and the decree was made as I am informed. because they believed the Will to be nonsense, Heir. the contrary whereof doth appear by my argument. The Court inclined strongly that the Testator intended to make the Devisee Heir of his lands, and that the words can receive no other construction, for other constructions would be very strange, Will. and forced, and the party that made the Will, is to be considered as one that was inops consilii, and also that wanted a scribe, and his intent seems plain, and shall not be taken according to the Civil law, and if it should, the word Heir will as well extend to the lands as goods. Adjourned to be argued again. Kymlock against Bamfield. Mich. 1651. Banc. sup: Mich. 24. Car. rot. 592. KYmlock brought an Action upon the case upon an indebitatus assumpsit against Bamfield, for making of apparel. The Defendant pleaded, Demurrer in an action on the case upon an indebitatus assumpsit. that he became bound in a Bond of 60 l. to the Plaintiff in satisfaction of the Debt, and that the Plaintiff accepted of it, the Plaintiff replied that he did not accept of it, to this replication the Defendant demurred; & shows for cause, that the Plaintiff had tendered an issue upon the non acceptance of the Bond, whereas it should have been that the Defendant non devenit tentus. On the other side it was said that it is well enough, & that it is sufficient to say none accep it, and it is not necessary to say he refused the obligation, and though the replication be not good, yet the plea is also naught, and therefore no judgement can be for the Defendant. The plea is quod devenisset tentus, whereas it ought to be devenit tentus. And 2ly. He shows not in what sum or place; nor that he became bound in satisfaction. Roll chief justice said, that by entering into Bond the former contract is gone, if you do not refuse it, and it is not sufficient to say you did not accept of the Bond, for you may yet accept it if you please, and the party cannot plead non est factum, Contract. if you bring an Action upon it, until it be absolutely refused, and the contract here is turned into a Bond, and the law determines the contract, Plea. and it is not all one with pleading of the acceptance of a horse in satisfaction, or or any other thing as a collateral satisfaction, and the Plaintiff ought to show that he refused the Obligation, and doth yet refuse it. And here is a negative preignans, Negative preignan●. for you imply by saying that you accepted not the Obligation in satisfaction, that he gave you the obligation, and you might have said, Non devenit tentus, and for the other exceptions they are to no purpose, Discontinuance And therefore judgement ought to be given against you; but by the favour of the Court we can give you leave to discontinue your Action. Harding against Freeman. Mich. 1651. Banc. sup. HArding brought an Action upon the Case against Freeman, and declared against him, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the case upon the sale of a Horse. that the Defendant did sell unto him a Gelding, and upon the sale did falsely affirm unto him, that the Gelding was his own Gelding, and that he bred him of a Colt, whereas he bred him not of a Colt, neither was it his own Gelding, but another man's Gelding, and so concludes to his damage. Upon not guilty pleaded, and a Verdict found for the plaintiff, the Defendant moved in Arrest of judgement, 1. That in this sale of the Gelding, the Defendant had made no warranty of him; and therefore though the sale were not good, yet the Action lies not. 2ly. The Plaintif doth not declare that the Defendant knowing the Gelding to be another man's, did affirm him to be his own, and so here doth not appear to be any fraud in the sale. Twisden answered, that the words are sufficient to imply a deceit, though they express not, that he knowing it to be another man's horse did make that affirmation, for the words are that he did it falso et fraudulenter, and affirmed the Horse to be his own. But the Court stayed the judgement, for they said, that here is no direct affirmation, but only an intendment that scienter fecit, yet afterwards, judgement was given for the Plaintif. Davis against the Lord Foliot. Mich. 1651. Banc. sup. DAvis brought an action of Assault and Battery and wounding against the Lord Foliot, and had a verdict against him, and a writ of enquiry of damages, For a new writ of Enquiry of damages. and upon the writ of Enquiry 200 l. damages were found. The Plaintif moved the Court for a new writ, because by reason of the wilfulness of the jury the damages were found too small. Twisden on the other side urged, that it could not be, because there was no miscarriage proved in execution of the writ, but it appears to be well executed. Roll chief justice answered, though we grant not a new writ, yet we can increase the damages upon view of the wound, and here appears to have been a foul Battery by the dagger produced in the Court, Damages increased by the Court. and by the party himself that is wounded, and it is not fit that a wilful jury should prejudice the party, therefore either consent to a new writ, or else bring your witnesses on both sides and we will hear the motion again. At another day Wild said, the Court cannot increase damages upon a view of the party, if he be not maimed, and here is no maiming, but only a Battery and wounding: But the Court answered that they would advise upon that point, for it seems there is the same reason for increasing of damages in both cases. At another day Green moved for increase of damages upon the view, and urged 9 H. 4. f. 1. 3 H. ●. ● 10 H. 4. and Bret and Middletom case in this Court. Twisden on the other side confessed the Books were so, but here the Battery is not apparent, and the wound is internal, and not to be viewed by the Court. Roll chief justice said, 3 things are considerable, 1. whether the Court can increase the damages, 2ly. Whether the wound be apparent? and 3ly Whether the damages given be too small? The Court upon view of the party, and examination of Surgeons and Witnesses on both sides upon Oath, did conclude that they might increase the damages, and that the wound was apparent, and that the damages were too small, and therefore they increased them to 400 l. and said they would not increase them more, because they could not inquire into all the circumstances of the fact, as the jury might, but they thought fitting to increase them in some proportion, because the offence was great, and such outrageous Acts are not to be slightly punished. Wallis against Bucknal. Hill. 1651. Banc. sup. Upon a special verdict found in an Ejectione firmae the case sell out to be this: Special Verdict in an Ejectione firmse. A Copyholder of inheritance made a Letter of Attorney to two jointly and severally to surrender his Copyhold lands in Fee to certain uses, after his death, according to the Custom of the Manor. The question made by Ellis of Council with the Plaintif was, whether the Custom was good or not? & he argued, that it was not a good Custom. In Sir john Davis Reports it is said, a Custom must be reasonable, and a Custom may be reasonable, when it is but against a particular Law, and not a general Law; but the Custom here thus to convey land, is against a general Law. Particular Customs may be against public interest, pro bono public but if they be not, as in our case they are not, they are not good. Pro bono publico. Next an authority given aught to be Countermandable, and to determine at the death of the party; but this is not so, and therefore it is no good authority, 19 E. 3. f. 5. 2ly. None can give an authority to another to do a thing which he could not do himself; but here it is otherwise, and therefore it is not a good authority. 3ly. By the death of the Copyholder the lands are settled in the heir, and this authority given shall not divest them, and this is not like the surrendering of lands into the hands of the Lord; for a surrender cannot be revoked, but this authority is revokable. Next, the Verdict doth not find that the 2 Attorneys are Customary tenants, but only by way of recital, which is not good; nor doth it appear they were customary tenants, at the time of the admittance; and here is not found any possession or title in the Defendant, and so the Plaintif having primer possession, the Defendant is guilty; neither is it found that the customary Tenant had seesimple in the land; And if he had but an estate for life he could not make such a letter of Attorney. Also the authority given is not warranted by the Custom set forth. Wilmot of Council with the Defendant, said, That this authority here is supported with a special direction, which may survive the party that gives it, 1 H. 7.8. And an authority may survive the party that gives it; else how can an Executor sell lands by the authority given unto him, 21 E. 4. f. 8. 31. E. 1. Fitzherb. 45. and as for the heir he hath neglected his advantage, it he had any, and cannot now take it: But besides, the authority here given is more than a bare authority, for it is backed with circumstances of time and person; and here is also a Custom to support it, and this Custom is a reasonable Custom, for it is but to enable a man to dispose of his own lands: and there are far more unreasonable Customs than this allowed in our law, as the Custom of Kent, for one of the age of 15 years to be enabled to sell his lands, and this Custom is not against any positive rule of Law, for the custom is, to create the authority to begin after his death, and so it is not to determine by his death; for till then it gins not; and the Custom here is but to alien lands, which is no strange thing, and it is extended but within a small compass of land, and so cannot be very prejudicial to the public. And Bambridge and Whaddons case 17 Car. in this Court, cited on the other side doth differ from this case, for t●ere was no Custom to support it. And it doth appear here by the Record, that Dalby the Attorney is a customary Tenant, and the admission here is found to be secundum consuetudinem Manerii. And one cannot gain a Copyhold estate by disseisin, and so here can be no primer seisin intended, and it is found the Copyholder is seized. Roll chief justice said, It will be hard to maintain the Custom, Custom. if it be not found that the party was seized in see of the Copyhold lands. But 2ly, it is not here found that the land is demisable, according to the will of the Lord, and so it may be free land, & then the custom doth not reach it. Neither is it found that the 2 Attorneys were Copyhold Tenants, and the primer possession here will make a disseisin by the Defendant, if the Custom be not well found, and then it is for the plaintiff, and I cannot see how the Custom can be good, it being against the rules of Law; for a man cannot devise a Copyhold, and here the case is worse, Devise. but he may surrender to the use of his last Will and Testament. At another day Wilmot to the Exception taken, That it is not found that the two Attorneys were Tenants of the Manor, said, there is so much found as shall make them be presumed to be Tenants of the Manor, for it is found that the party is admitted secundum consuetudinem Manerii, which cannot be a good admittance if they were not Tenants. Roll chief justice answered, to be admitted secundum consuetudinem, goes ●o the Admittance, not to the Letter of Attorney: But we will advise. At another day Twisden prayed judgement for the plaintiff, and insisted upon the Exception that the two Attorneys were not found customary Tenants; for one of them is not mentioned at all, and the other is found so only by way of recital, and so they have not entitled themselves to the Custom, and then the Defendant hath no title. The Court ruled to show cause Saturday following why the plaintiff should not have judgement. Antea. Custodes against Tawny and Norwood. Hill. 1651. Banc. sup. TAwny and Norwood were jointly indicted for blasphemous words severally spoken by them, Endictment for speaking blasphemous words. upon the late Statute made against blasphemy, and were convicted, the parties being removed hither by Habeas Corpus. It was urged that the Endictment was not good, because it was joint, whereas the words being spoken by them severally, they ought to have been indicted severally; for the words spoken by one of them cannot be said to be the words of the other. But Roll chief justice said, The Endictment was good enough, though it be joint, as it is in the case of several perjuries, and several batteries, where a joint Endictment doth lie, although it do not for several felonies, and here the Endictment is upon one and the same Statute, and for one and the same offence, and therefore the judgement given upon it is also good, and it shall be taken reddendosingula singulis (i) the words to each of them as they spoke them. Floyd against Morgan. Hill. 1651. Banc. sup. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an Action of Trespass, for taking away divers goods, Error to reverse a judgement in Trespass for taking away goods. Anglice. and the Error was that there were the words instrumentum ferri used in the Declaration to express divers things, viz. de quodam instrumento ferri, Anglice a Grioiron, & de quodam instrumento ferri, Anglice a Brandiron, et de quodam instrumento ferri, Anglice a Mortar, whereas there are proper Latin words for them, & therefore are not to be so uncertainly described. Darcy against the writ of Error said it was certain enough as they were described, & cited the Reg. f. 45. and said, if it be not certain in the Latin description, Description. yet the Anglice helps it. Roll chief justice demanded, what say you to the Case of instrumentum ferri, Anglice a Horse-lock, adjudged naught lately in this place? and there are proper Latin words for the things you describe, which you ought to have used, therefore this description is not good; for where a Latin word signifies many things, there an Anglice is proper to be added to it, otherwise not, and if there be no Latin word to express a thing, one may invent a word, and interpret it with an Anglice, but it is not so here, therefore let the judgement be reversed, nisi, etc. Postea. Keightley against Nodes. Hill. 1651. Banc. sup. Trin. 1651. rot. 869. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement in a Trespass vi et armis at Doncaster, And the Error assigned was, Error to feverse a judgement in Trespass vi et armis. That the Plaintif declared that the Defendant took certain Cows of his out of the jurisdiction of the Court, and brought them within the jurisdiction, and there disposed of them to his own use, In which case, in regard that the taking of the , which is the ground of the Action, was without the jurisdiction of the Court, although the disposing of them was within, yet the Court had no jurisdiction of the cause. To which Roll chief justice agreed, Trover. and said, if the Action had been a Trover and Conversion if had been good, but being a Trespass vi et armis it is naught, and therefore let the Judgement be reversed, nisi. cottrel and his Wife against theobald's. Hill. 1651. Banc. sup. THis case was again moved, & spoken unto by Turner, judgement prayed in an Action upon a promise. who prayed judgement for the plaintiff, because, as he conceived, the Action was well brought by the Husband and Wife, and to prove it he cited these books, 39 H. 6. f. 45.9. H. 6. f. 4. Nat. Brev. 131.28 H. 8. Dyer f. 21. Pasch. 5 Car. Brown and Floyds case, Pasc. 13 Car. Oldhams case, and said, That the consideration here did move from both parties, and not from the Husband only. 2ly. It is not necessary to give the Defendant notice that his wife had attained to the age of 18 years, at which time he was to pay the money, for he might take notice of it himself. Latch on the other side prayed that the judgement might be arrested, because the promise was made to the Husband only, that he would make good the Legacy given to his wife by her Father, and give 40 l. more to the Baron and Feme, and the Husband is only to have the benefit of the promise, and the consideration, namely the marriage, moved only from the Husband, and therefore the Action is to be brought by the Husband only, and not by the Husband and his wife, and this promise is not like a promise made to a servant to pay money to the use of his Master, and it is not here laid that the promise was made to both, as it might have been, and it is not reasonable to turn over the wife's portion, for which the Husband hath made her a jointure unto the Feme; for if it should have been so, the wife might have released it before the marriage, and the Case cited of Rippon and Norton was otherwise laid, 37 Eliz. Banc. Reg. 2ly. Here aught to be notice given when the Feme came to her age of 18 years; for here the Assumpsit is to make good a Legacy, which was to be paid to her at such an age, and he ought to give notice of her age as he ought to an Executor, and this case is not like as where one binds himself in an Obligation to pay another such a sum when he comes to such an age, and the legacy here is to be made good in that manner as the Executor is to pay it. Roll chief justice said, that the party is not bound to give notice, Notice. but the other must take notice at his peril. But the promise is here laid to be made to the Husband only, and though the money is to be paid to doth, yet it would be inconvenient to entitle the Feme to it, and here it was the folly of the Husband to join his wife in the Action, for he might have brought it alone if he would. jouning in Action. for he hath alleged that the promise was made to him alone, and therefore the Action is not well brought; and it appears by the Declaration that the Feme was of age before the marriage, and so the notice is out of Doors: The rest of the judges agreed with Roll chief justice in all, and so the Court ruled a nil capiat per Billam nisi. Antea. Hill. 1651 Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment, because it was for a private Trespass, To quash an Endictment for a private Trespass. Endictment. viz. for stopping an ancient watercourse, and the Endictment doth not conclude ad commune nocumentum, but ad grave damnum, which shows it to be no public nuisance. & so he is not to be indicted. But Roll chief justice answered, A man may be indicted for a private Trespass, but the party here hath made himself no title to the watercourse, and therefore let the Endictment be quashed. Comport against Beech. Hill. 1651. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved on the Defendants behalf, For a reference touching a Trespass. That he was a very poor man, and in making of a Ditch for another man, he had unwillingly committed a Trespass against the Plaintif, in taking away 2 or 3 wheele-barroughs of Earth of the Plaintiffs soil, and therefore it was prayed that the matter might be referred to the Secondary to tax the damages and Costs for the Trespass, which he was ready to pay, & that the proceed might be stayed. But Roll chief justice answered, It cannot be, but you may confess the Action. Reference. He'll against Green. Hill. 1651. Banc. sup. IN an Ejectione firmae a special Verdict was found, upon which the Case fell out to be this, A man being Lessee of a Manor for 199 years, Special Verdict in an Ejectione firmae. deviseth the Term to his wife for life, with power to make such estates in as ample manner as he himself might have done, during her life, and the remainder in Tall to his Daughter, and dies, the Feme proves the Will and accepts of the Legacy, and after makes a Lease for 99 years, and dies, and the daughter brings an Ejectione firmae against the Lessee of the Feme. The question was, whether this Lease made by the Feme were a good Lease or not. Merifield argued, that the Lease was not good after the death of the Feme, because she having but an estate for life, Lease. and the Lease for 99 years being derived out of it, when the estate for life ends, the estate derived out of it must end also. And 2ly. If the Feme had any power to dispose of any part of the Term longer than for her life, by the same reason she might have disposed of all of it, which cannot be intended; for the Testator did not mean that she should have power to destroy the entail made upon his Daughter. And as to the Objection that she hath dissposed of but part of the Term, and therefore hath not destroyed the entail: I answer, It matters not what she hath done, but what she might have done, for by the same reason that she disposed of part she might have disposed of the whole; The rest of the Argument I could not hear. Henage Finch on the other side argued, That the Lease made by the Feme continues after her death, because the Feme had a power given her to make such a Lease, and by virtue of that power the Lease continues, for the power given unto her relates to the Estates to be made by her, and not to the continuance of her life. And here the intent of the Testator is to be considered, which was, that his wife should have the power to dispose of all the Term if she would, for he trusted her with it, because she was his Wife, and Mother of his Daughter, to whom the entail was made, and the very subject, matter shows his intent to be so, and because there is no other power expressed against this in any other part of the Will, and the words that give her this power would be idle and trifling if they should receive any other Construction, 2 Car. Banc. Reg. Danyel and Ogleys case, and Gibs and Whites case, 1 Car. nor does the assent of the Feme to the Legacy, to have the Term for life, destroy her power to make estates. 2ly. She hath well executed this power, for the jury have found that it is the Lease of the Feme, 9 jac. Suckham and Hawkins case, a power given to an Executor may be executed by parts. Roll chief justice held, Lease. the Lease was good; for a Will aught to be so interpreted, that all the parts of it may stand together, and if the Feme here have not power to make this Lease, the Clause of giving her this Lease is idle, and the meaning is so, without doubt the Feme hath the sole estate in Law in her, and the power given here is but a restoring to her of that, which she had before by the Law, and her consenting to the Legacy, doth not take away her power to make Estates. And this limited power, and the remainder to his daughter may stand together, for it might be that the wife would not make such a lease, and then the daughter should have had the land in tail; but if she dispose of it the daughter shall not have it. jerman as Roll. Nicholas justice held, that the Feme could only dispose of the land during her life and that the Testators intent by the words was, that the Feme should not be tied to occupy the lands herself during her life; but might dispose of them. Ask as Nicholas, that she can dispose of the lands only during her life, for the power is only given during her life, and this interpetation will make all parts of the Will stand together, better than the other interpretation. Adjourned. Antea. Dekins against Latham. Hill. 1651. Banc. sup. Entered Hill. 22 Car. rot. 946. IN an ejectione firmae a special verdict was found, Special verdict in an ejectione firmae. upon which the Case fell out to be this. One seized of lands covenanted to levy a fine to the use of himself, and his wife for life, and after he leased the lands for 21 years, for 3 l. rent per annum by equal portions, and after the death of I.S. to pay a gross sum of 125 l. by way of fine, payable by 5 l. a year quarterly, with a proviso in the Indenture, that for default of payment of the rent or fine, or for want of reparations, it should be lawful for the Lessor to re-enter. After the Lessor levyes a fine, and assigneth over his interest in the reversion. The question here was, whether the condition of entry be transferred over to the Assignee, by the transferring over of the reversion, Hales of council with the Plaintiff held that the lease proceeds from the Husband only, and not from the Baron and Feme, and the condition is transferred over, for the condition runs jointly as well to the fine reserved, as to the rent, and is as it were a several condition in Law, although it be comprised but in one clause, and not several clauses, and the condition as to the rent is transferred, though not as to the fine. In 19 E 4. f. 7. The law makes a several distribution of one praecipe, and so may it do here of one condition, and Rawlins case in the ● rep. cited against this comes not to this case, for there the question was of the suspension of a condition; but here it is of the transferring over of a condition. 2ly. If it be but one condition, yet it is well transferred by the Statute of 32 H. 8. C. ●4. an extinguishment in part, is not extinguishment of all, although a suspension of part be a suspension of all, and the Grantee of the reversion shall have advantage of the condition, because 1. He is within the words of the condition as to the condition. 2ly. The clause of reentry is within the words of the Statute; and Knights case objected comes not to this case, for there was a grant but of part of the reversion of the land, which case comes not within the Statute, for the Grantor cannot have advantage by the Statute, where he grants but part of the reversion, and it is not literally without the Statute, and therefore it is within the equity of it, otherwise it would be mischievous to the Grantor, and here is no disadvantage to the Lessée by the transferring of the condition, for the same Statute that gives benefit of the condition, gives benefit of the Covenants, and the Grantée of a reversion shall have benefit of a Covenant to be transferred, although they are entire in words at the beginning, and hath one common conclusion. Wild of Council on the other side, held the condition to be entire, according to Rawlins case, and goes to payment of the rent, and the fine, and reparations also, and the reversion being assigned with which the rent passeth, the condition is gone also to the fine, Dyer 309. and this is a stronger case than that to destroy the entire condition, by grant of the reversion, 17 El. Brightmen case, C. B. The fine here is a sum collateral, and is not incident to the reversion, and so the condition is collateral, and cannot be apportioned, 5. rep. Spencer's case, 34.8. Br. Cou. 93. 2ly. The Statute of 32 H. 8. cannot help it for the purview of the Statute explains the large preamble of the Statute, and shows the intent of the makers of it to be, for forfeitures incident to lands, and reversions, and a covenant is here as general as a condition, and the Statute extends not to a collateral covenant, and therefore not to a condition collateral, 35 H. 6. f. 56. Condition. and the cases put on the other side come not to our case. And as for the mischief which may ensue by this it matters not, for it might have been prevented by providence of the parties, and the inconveniences which may happen to them must not alter the Law. Roll chief justice said, if he release the fine, the condition will not stand as to the rest, otherwise if the fine expire by effluxion of time, or if he release the reparations the condition is gone as to the rest, for the condition here is entire, and goes in the destruction of the Estate, and it is the Act of the Lessor himself to assign over the reversion, and by that all is passed away that is incident to it, and by consequence the condition. jerman justice demanded, What if the Lessor shall pay all the fine presently? Roll chief justice answered, it may be it will destroy the condition. Nicholas justice said, the condition is odious in Law, because it goes in destruction of the Estate. Adjourned to be argued again, because held a case of consequence. At another day the case was moved again, and argued by Latch for the Plaintiff, who made the question to be whether the condition as it is penned may be severed or no, and said, that as it respects the rent, it is not a condition in gross; but as it respects the fine, it is a condition in gross, and a condition which is entire in words, may by acts of Law receive distributions. Where the penalty of a condition is entire, there the condition cannot be apportioned; but the condition is not so here, and therefore may be apportioned, Dyer 30● Knights case, ● H. 7.6. Perkins, 162. 7. H. 7 Kelm 60. Dyer 334. Popham in Dumports case is contrary to Dyer, Cook. Lit. 203. 2ly. It is questionable whether the Statute may help in our case, and he said it doth, for the name of rent is not altered, nor the condition attending upon it, nor any thing done to alter the execution of the condition. 3ly. By the assignment there is no injury done to the Lessée, for by it here is a freeing of a thing to be done, and the Statute is a favourable Statute, and to be extended with indifferency. Finch on the other side argued much to the same effect as he did formerly. Roll chief justice said, it is not necessary for the party to express how the condition relates to all, viz. the reentry for non payment of the rent, and of the fine, and for not repairing, and he said a man cannot by his own Act divide a condition, for we must keep the rule of law, which is, not to divide a condition, which goes in destruction of an Estate, and this case is not within the Statute of 32 H. 8. All the rest of the judges concurred with Roll, and so the rule was judicium pro defendente, nisi. Brown against Nelson. Hill. 1651. Banc. sup. Trin. Hill. 1650 rot. 897. AN Action of Debt upon the Statute 7 Ed. 6. for selling of wine without licence, Whether a judgement given against one of two Defendants were good. was brought against 2. Defendants, they both plead nil deb●t, whereupon issue being joined, a special verdict was found, viz. that as to one nil debet, and that as to the other he had drawn a pint of wine without licence, and upon this, judgement was given against him that was found culpable, It was questioned whether this were a good judgement. But Roll chief justice concluded it was à good judgement, and cited many cases adjudged in point to prove it, and one in particular in an action upon the Statute for dying with Logwood, and he took a difference between an action grounded upon a joint contract, or a joint trespass, and an Action brought jointly upon a Statute against two, or for a tort done by two, as this is upon the Statute. In the first case judgement cannot be given against one of the contractors, in the other it may. Weld against Rumney. Hill. 1651 Banc. sup. Hill. 1650. rot. 1193. A Writ of error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an Action upon the case against two Executors, Error to reverse a judgement in an action on the case. and the error assigned was a matter in fact, viz. that one of the Defendants was within age at the time of the Action brought, and did appear, and plead by his Attorney, whereas he ought to have done it by his guardian. Twisden for the Defendant in the writ of Error said, that it is not all one to appear within age in his own right, and in another's right, for where he appears in his own right, he ought to appear by his guardian; but where he appears in altar droit, as he doth here being an Executor, he may appear by Attorney, and cited Draytons' case 9 Car. Appearance. But Roll chief justice denied the difference, and said, it may be that the Executor may be charged of his proper goods, as in case he have wasted the Testators goods, and then it is not reason but he should plead by his guardian, and he is not within the Statute of 21 jac. for that Statute was made for the Plaintiff, and this is in case of a Defendant, therefore he should have appeared by his guardian, and therefore let the judgement be reversed, nisi. Fortune against Johnson. Hill. 1651. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved for an attachment against johnson upon an affidavit, For an attachment for putting one out of possession. that he had ejected one out of possession, that was put in by a habere facias possessionem, and that in a very riotous manner, and had imprisoned the party, so put out of possession, and others. Windham on the other side by way of answer said, that the party came into the land by virtue of an eign judgement, and an extent upon it. Roll chief justice answered, here is title against title, therefore take your course in law, for we will make no rule in it. Crosthwayt and the Hundred of Lowdon. Hill. 1651. Banc. sup. CRosthwayt brought an Action upon the Statute of Winchester of robberies, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the Statute of Winchester for robbery. against the Hundred of Lowdon, for being rob of 160 l. and had a verdict against the Hundred. It was moved in arrest of judgement, that the Action upon the Statute, did not lie for the party that brought it, for it appears that he was not rob; but that the money was taken out of a portmantle, which was carried by the postboy, and that only the Plaintiffs hand was upon one end of the portmantle, so that the post-boy was rob, and not the Plaintiff. But Roll chief justice answered, Robbery. Possession. there is no question but that this was a robbery of the Plaintiff, and it is all one as where my Servant is rob in my presence, and there the goods shall be said to be in my possession, and so is it here, and therefore let judgement be entered, nisi. Tailor and Web. Hill. 1651 Banc. sup. THis case formerly argued at the Bar, and broken on the Bench, Special Verdict upon the words of a will. and some opinion delivered in it, was again moved by Maynard, and argued by him. And he said that by the Will no land passeth, because lands are not mentioned in it, neither is there any necessary implication, that the Testator intended to devise his lands, for the making one his Heir, and enjoining him to pay an annuity doth not convey the lands to him, and the Will doth not say that he makes him his Heir of his lands, but generally his Heir, which by the civil Law may be of goods; and for the enjoining him to pay the annuity, this may be out of other lands in consideration of the personal estate given unto him. In Danyel and Vblies case, a gift made by a Feme coparcener of her purparty of land, did not convey the lands in Fee. In Marshes case, the Father gave his lands to his two Sons to be equally divided, it was adjudged there, that only an Estate for life passed, and here is nothing at all expressly given. In Gilbert and Withers case, Mich. 20 jac. It was adjudged that there ought not to be made such a construction of a Will, as is not agreeable to Law. And this is only a logical Will by way of argument, and not a grammatical, Construction or Interpretation. and positive Will. Roll chief justice answered, to make a construction of a Will where the intent of the Testator cannot be known, is intentio caeca & sicca; but here although the words of the Will be not proper, yet we may collect the Testators meaning to be, by making of the party his Heir, that he should have his lands, and it is all one as if he had said Heir of his lands, and here he not only makes him his Heir, but his Executor also, Will. and therefore if he shall not have his lands, the word Heir is merely nugatory, and to no purpose, for by being Executor only, he shall have the goods, and as it hath been observed, he is in this case haeres factus, though not natus. jerman justice to the same effect, and said that the word Heir implies two things. 1. That he shall have the lands. 2ly. That he shall have them in Fee simple. Nicholas and Ask justices concurred, and so it was ruled that judgement should be given for Sir john Bridges the Devisee, nisi. Lockoe against Palfriman. Hill. 1651 Banc. sup. Hill. 1651 rot. 1002. Upon a special verdict found in an ejectione firmae, Special verdict in an ejectione firmae. the case fell out to be this, Tenant for life, the remainder to Baron and Feme, and their Heirs, Baron and Feme suffer a recovery, The question was, whether the Heirs of the Feme were bound by this recovery, because the Feme being covert it was conceived she was not Tenant to the praecipe, because it appears not she was examined, and so nothing was recovered from her. It was argued that this recovery did bind the Feme. 1. because if a praecipe be brought against one who hath nothing in the land, the writ only is abatable, Fitz. Tit. Droyt 29. Next an Estople with recompense excludes not only parties and privies, but also strangers, as it is in Shellyes case and 3 jac. C. B. in Duke and Smith's case, 15 E. 4 f. 28 In 43 Ed. 3. f. ●8. was the first mention of examination of a Feme upon a Recovery, and she shall be intended to be examined here, if it be requisite; for it is not found she was not examined, and in Br. Abridg. recovery in value 27, 23 H. 8. It is held that a Feme Covert is barred by a Common recovery, and this hath been the continual practice since that time; and whereas it is objected, that a colourable recovery doth not bind a Feme Covert, it is answered, that this is not a colourable recovery, but a judicial matter of Record, and is brought upon an original, and there is an intended recompense to the Feme, and to urge that there is no Tenant to the praecipe, is an objection which reaches to the common practice of assurances, and therefore not to be admitted, and in time they might have counterpleaded the voucher; but now they cannot avert this matter against the Record, 19 E. 3. estople 9 and though the Feme be not examined, yet she shall be bound by this recovery, though in a fine it is otherwise, where there is no recompense in value, as here there is, and in a fine the judge ex officio is bound to examine the Feme, but not in a recovery, nor is there any practice of it in Law, 13 Ed. 3 judgement 29. A partition made by writ shall bind a Feme Covert, because she hath a recompense, so is it upon a partition made upon Record in Chancery. And by the Barons surviving the Feme here, the recompense both not survive to the Baron, but shall go to the Heirs of the Feme, Br. recovery in value 27 2 jac. C. B. here is a real Estate in the Baron and Feme. Hales on the other side made the question to be, whether by a recovery had where the Feme being Covert is not Tenant to the praecipe, she shall be bound by it, and he said she is not In other cases the party may be bound by estople, namely where he might have pleaded to the writ, or might have counterpleaded the voucher; but here the Feme is not subject to be admitted to these things, 17 E. 3. f. 37. and the Feme Covert here, is not so concluded by her admission, that she shall not be admitted to speak against this recovery if she survive her husband, neither are her Heirs concluded if she do not survive, although peradventure as to the warranty they may be concluded, ●0 Ass. pl. ●. 11 E. 3 Fitz. voucher 1432 E. 3. Fitz. estople, 246. 21. E. 3 13. and the recovery here, is not duly had, because there is no tertenant. Roll chief justice said, it is not to be questioned whether a recovery bind a Feme, Recovery, Examination, Averment. for it is the Common practice. 2ly. It is not necessary to examine a Feme Covert upon suffering a recovery, although it be a prudential thing to do it; but if it be not done, it is not averrable that it was not done; but the single question material here, is whether the Feme be Tenant to the praecipe or not, Feme Covert so that she shall be estopped to speak against the recovery, and he held she was estopped, for she joins in the recovery with her Husband, and here is no default made by the Baron, and now the record is perfect, and a thing contrary to it ought not to be averred against it; but before the Record was perfect she might have pleaded, Plea. and the recompense in value here shall go to the Heirs of the Feme, and the Tenant for life is also bound by this recovery, and the Feme is party, and also privy to the recovery, Party and privy. and therefore if it will bind her, it will bind her Heirs also. If a stranger had been Tenant to the praecipe, and the Baron and Feme had been vouched, the Feme had been bound, and this is a stronger case, and this case may concern many men's estates, and therefore such recoveries are not to be questioned. Therefore let the Plaintiff have his judgement, nisi. Hill. 1651 Banc. sup. ONe Turner and Marian were Bail for one by the names of Turner and Mary, Motion to alter the name of a Bail. Amerdment. Bail. the Court was moved that the name Mary might be made Marian. But Roll chief justice answered, let the party come and find other Bail, for upon the matter this is no Bail. Hill. 1651. Banc. sup. AN Endictment was removed by a certiorari into this Court, For a procedendo. and the Court was moved for a procedendo, because no Bail was put in here. Roll chief justice answered, If no Bail be put in, you may proceed below without any procedendo. Hill. 1651. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to supersede an Execution against one, quia erronice, To supersede an execution. because he was taken in Exeeution, whereas there was no declaration given against him in the Term time as it ought, because the party was in custodia, and the Declaration against him was upon the by, viz. at another man's suit, and not at his at whose suit he was in custody. Roll chief justice answered, if it be a Declaration on the by, it ought to be given in the Term time. Hill. 1651. Banc. sup. Upon a rule to show cause why an attatchment should not be granted against Cox an Attorney of this Court, and Mayor of Newberry, Cause why no attatchment. for issuing out of Execution upon a judgement given there, after a writ of Error brought, and allowed there, Wild showed for cause that the Malor was informed by Council, that the Record was not removed thence, because the writ of Error was not good. This was allowed for cause, and the former rule discharged, quod nota. Hill. 1651. Banc. sup. LEtchmore moved the Court that the word publicae might be put into an Endictment which was removed hither by a certiorari. To mend an endictment, Amendment, Fine. But the Court answered it could not be; but because the endictment was of another Term, the Clerk of the peace was fined at 10 l. for his carelessness, and gross oversight. Pasch. 1652. Banc. sup. THe court was moved for a habeas corpus, For a habeas corpus for one committed by an order of Sessions of the peace, Surety. for one that was committed to prison by an order of Sessions of the peace, until he should find sufficient sureties for the peace, whereas he had tendered sureties which would not be accepted; but extraordinary sureties were required, such as he was not able to procure. Roll chief justice answered, a thousand pound bond may be required, for the keeping of the peace as, the case may stand, viz. if the party to be bound be a dangerous person. Yet take a habeas corpus, but be sure you bring good sureties. Pasch. 1652. Banc. sup. AN action of debt was brought against one for 50 l. due for divers pieces of lixnen cloth sold to the Defendant. Wager of law waived and a plea put in. The Defendant was ready at the Bar to wage his Law; but the Court being informed that the Defendants wife kept a shop, and used to buy and sell by her husband's privity and allowance, and that these parcels of cloth were bought by her to furnish her shop, and that the Defendant her husband, although he was a Sea man, and meddled not in buying and selling of any of the wares in the Shop, yet his wife did it by his allowance; Roll chief justice advised the Defendant to take heed he waged not his Law, for that he could not do it with a good conscience, because his allowance of his wife's buying the wares was all one, as if he had bought them himself, and counselled him to plead, to which the Defendant consented, and the ley gager was waived by consent of the parties, and an emparlance given till the next Term. Emparlance. Dudley against Born. Pasc. 1652. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved on the part of the Defendant that in regard, Motion to put in security for costs denied. the Plaintiff had obtained the cause between them to be tried at the Bar, that therefore he might be ordered by the Court, to give security to pay the costs, in case the trial should be against him; But the Court would make no such rule; but said, if he will not pay the costs in case the verdict be against him he shall take no benefit here, afterwards upon it. Garland against Yarrow. Pasc. 1652. Banc. sup. Hill. 1651. rot. 1295. THe Plaintiff brought his Action upon the case against the Defendant for speaking these scandalous words of him, Arrest of judgement in an Action for words. viz you are a knave, and keep a bawdy house; after a verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in arrest of judgement that the words are not actionable. 1. Because the words spoken are of spiritual conusance, and punishable in the Ecclesiastical Court, and not at the Common Law. 2ly. The party may keep a Bawdy House, and not know it to be such, and then he is not punishable for it, and so cannot be prejudiced by the speaking of the words. 3ly. Case. There is no Statute against keeping of a Bawdy house as the Declaration lays it, but for keeping of a Common Bawdy house. But jerman, Nicholas, and Ask justices, (Roll chief justice being absent) held that the words are actionable, for the keeping of a Bawdy house is an offence punishable at the Common Law, as being a misdemeanour and breach of the peace, and therefore ordered judgement to be entered, except cause should be shown to the contrary Saturday next. Green against How. Pasch. 652. Banc. sup. Entered Hill, 1651. rot. 1295. Q. PAnel moved for How the Defendant to arrest judgement after a verdict given against him for Green the Plaintif in an action upon the Case brought, for speaking these words of her, viz. Arrest of judgement in a● Acti ●n upon the Case for words. You are a Whore and a jade, and a strumpetly Whore, and I will prove you a Common Whore; his Exception was, that the words are not in themselves actionable, for they are but words of choler and heat, and the Plaintif is not brought within danger of the late Statute made against whoredom, by the speaking of them, and he cited for authority Freeman and Childers case, Trin. 1651. rot. 45. where these words, viz. You are a Whore, & I will prove you an arrant Whore, were adjudged not actionable. The rule was to stay judgement till the Plaintif should move. Barcock against Tompson. Pasch. 1652. Banc. sup. Mich. 1650. rot. 444. IN an Audita querela the Case was this, Where an Audita querela lies for the Bail upon an erroneous judgement against the principal. An Action of Debt was brought against the Principal, and a judgement upon a nihil dicit obtained, but no capias ad satisfaciendum issued forth against him; Afterwards 2 scire facias were taken out against the Bail, and 2 n●chils thereupon returned, and thereupon judgement was given against the Bail, who thereupon brings his Audita querela. The Question was, whether the Audita querela did lie or not, in regard that the scire facias issued forth against the Bail before any capias ad satisfaciendum was taken forth upon the judgement, upon the nihil dicit against the Principal. Green of Council with the Defendant held, that the Audita querela did not lie, because that the party hath other remedy to relieve himself, and therefore the Audita querela lies not, for that is given only where the other party hath no other remedy, 21 E. 3. f. 12. Brook Audita quer. 18. And besides here are two nichils returned against the party, which do amount to a scire feci, and so the party is warned, and therefore he comes now too late to have his Audita querela, for here is as much as a judgement by default after an appearance, and here is no release, and there is a judgement executed and in force, and not reversed by the Principal, Green and Le Grices case, Pasch. 39 Sir Francis Mores Reports. Wild for the Plaintif held, that the Audita querela did well lie, because that no scire facias ought to have issued against the Bail, before a capias ad satisfaciendum taken forth against the Principal: And an Audita querela is in the nature of a suit in Chancery, and the party comes soon enough here to be relieved, though the scire facias be returned, for the return thereof shall not bar him from his Audita querela, although it be now too late for him to reverse the judgement by a writ of Error, and the books 21 E. 3.13. and Kelw. 23, 24. are in the very point. And the party by the return of the 2 nichils is not in Court; And in Moor's Reports, in Hobbs and Todcasters' case 38 Eliz. it is adjudged that an Audita querela doth lie. Roll chief justice, when one is Bail in the Common Pleas, he is bound to bring in the body of the Principal, Bail. or to pay the debt: And Pomeroys' case is, that until a Capias be returned against the Principal the Bail cannot forfeit his Recognisance, Recognisance. Forfeiture. for the non-appearance of the Principal, for the filing of the Capias is not sufficient, but it must be returned. And this was the ancient course there, and the Law so held to be; but by usage of later times and out of indulgence showed to the Bail it hath been held sufficient for the Bail to bring in the principal after the return of the Capias, and now at this day, out of greater indulgence afforded unto the Bail, it is well enough if the Bail bring in the Principal at any time before the return of the second scire facias, but after it is returned, than it is too late for him to bring him in, Error. and that is the reason that in such Case a writ of Error lies not for the Bail to reverse the judgement against the Principal. If a scire facias be brought against the Bail, and he pleads that the Principal died before the return of the Capias against him, it is adjudged to be a good plea for the Bail to discharge himself; Plea. but to plead he died after the return, is not good: And it is a good plea for the Bail in a scire facias brought against him to say, that no capias was returned against the Principal; And here is a good discharge in Law against the Bail. But the question here is, whether the return of the two Nichils' be not a Bar to him now, and that he hath not thereby lost his advantage to bring his Audita querela, Audita querela. because by the return thereof the party is supposed to have notice, and therefore a writ of Error clearly lies not to reverse this judgement, though it be upon a nihil dicit. And as to that, in as much as the party hath no other remedy to help himself, and it is apparent that he is damnified by an undue judgement, it is reason he should bring his Audita querela. Barns and Corbets case. The Bail cannot say the Principal hath paid the money, if he have not an acquittance or matter of Record to prove it; and in Sir John Mounsons' case upon two nichils returned adjudged, that the party might have his Audita querela, and therefore the plaintiff aught to have his judgement. jerman justice dissented. But Nicholas justice, absent Ask, agreed with Roll and said, that for want of the return of the Capias the judgement was erroneous, and the 2 scire facias might be returned behind the parties back, & therefore it could not be said to be all one, as if the party had appeared, for if he had appeared the Case would have been otherwise, So judgement was given for the plaintiff, nisi, etc. Pasch. 1652. Banc. sup. MEmorandum, One brought by Habeas Corpus from the Fleet rema●●ed. One was brought into the Court by the marshal of the Fleet, by virtue of a habeas Corpus directed to him out of this Court, and because it did appear upon Record that the party was charged with divers debts, when he was turned over to the Fleet, he was not suffered to put in Bail here, but was remanded. Gossage against Tailor. Pasch. 1652. Banc. sup. Hill. 1650. rot. 117. IN an Ejectione firmae upon a Lease for years of a Message, Special verdict in Trespass and Ejectrue●●. and certain lands in Hatfield Broad-Oak in the County of Essex, upon a special verdict found the case fell out to be this, Rich. Frank seized amongst other lands and Tenements of the Message and lands in question, upon the marriage of his Son Leventhorp Frank with Susan. Cotele, levies a fine of the lands to the use of himself during his own life, and the life of Leventhorp his Son, and after during the life of Susanna Cotele the wife of Leventhorp, the remainder to the use of the heirs to be begotten upon the body of Susanna by Leventhorp her Husband. The question here was, whether the word heirs shall be intended the heirs of Leventhorp and Susanna his wife, or whether the estate shall be intended to be limited to the heirs of Susanna only, and that Leventhorp shall have barely an estate for life in the lands. Sergeant Glyn of Council with the Plaintif held, That Susanna Cotele hath an estate tail executed in the lands, and that the word heirs shall relate only to the heirs of Susanna, and not to the heirs of Leventhorp, 1. Because that here is an estate limited for life unto Susanna by an express limitation, and her heirs shall take immediately after the estate for life ended, and they shall not come in as purchasers. By express Terms the word heirs is not limited to any person, but it is left to the construction of the Law, and that doth apply it to Susanna, as to a person to whom Richard that settled the lands hath expressed most affection, as appears by the Deed, Lit. f. 6. Sect. 28. There is an expression of the party to whom the word heirs shall relate, but so is not here, and therefore the cases differ. In 3 Ed. 3. f. 31, 32. It is ruled that both parties have an estate tail, because the estate is limited to both, but so it is not in our case, so those books are not against me. In our case, it doth not appear that Richard did intent to advance the Husband of Susanna, and therefore it is not reason that the word heirs should relate to him, but to Susanna his wife only, for in case of limitation of estates the intention of the party is to be considered, and doth direct the matter, and the preceding limiting of the estate to Susanna, and not to Leventhorp, doth show that the party did mean to promote the heirs of Susanna. Lit. Sect. 27. Dyer 27. A second reason is drawn from the penning of the deed, which in the limitation of it doth incline more, that the word heirs should be applied to Susanna than to Leventhorp; for the words upon her is as much as to say of her, and then it is the same case with Littleton's case. 3ly. The Intention of the Donor appears to be such by the circumstances of the entire limitations, which do show that he did intent that Leventhorp should not have such an estate whereby it should be in his power to deprive his issue, and therefore the word heirs are to be applied to Susanna, and not to Leventhorp; for if it should be applied to both, then Leventhorp might destroy the estate of the issue, contrary to the Donors' intent; And whereas Dyer 99 is objected against me. I answer, that case is not against me, for there the word heirs is expressly limited to a certain person, viz. to the heirs of the body of both of them, but so it is not in our case; and whereas Hill. 13 jac. Lane and Panels case in this Court is also objected against me, I answer, that that case is in effect the same case with Dyer, and the question in our case came not in dispute. And the will of the Donor in deeds is to be ohserved. Lit. 22. C. Tayl. 1. rep. Shelleys case 103. 〈◊〉 Notwithstanding in gifts in tail this rule holds not, so that a gift in tail may be limsted contrary to the rule of the Common Law. And I know not of any authority in print, or writing against me; but in 13 Ed. 3. Fitz. tit. variance 81, there is an express authority for me, and 4 H. 4. Fitz. br. 448. & in my experience I have known many estates limited as this is in the Southern parts, & held good estates tail, & if it should be otherwise, many estates would be shaken. Roll chief justice. We have delivered our opinions before, against you, viz. that it was not the meaning of the donour, to apply the word Heirs to the body of Susanna only, for this construction would offer violence unto the words, as appears by Littleton, who interprets that they are to be applied to the Heirs of both the parties, and your reason is founded upon a wrong ground, and expressly against Litletons' case; and for your second reason it is of no weight, for the words are all one as if he had said to the Heirs of the Husband and wife begotten upon the wife. 3ly. We are not to frame a meaning against plain words, which show the Donors' intent to be against you. And the Baron cannot Bar the Estate tail as you suppose, Tayl. for the Feme hath an Estate for life, and if she survive she may revive the remaining Estate, and we must not consider of inconveniences, which possibly may happen against the express words of the deed, and the multitude of conveyances made in this manner, are of no force to alter the Law. jerman justice as Roll. That the word Heirs shall be applied to the Heirs of both parties, because voluntas donatoris secundum formam chartae expressa est observanda. Nicholas and Ask justices of the same opinion. Garland against Yarrow. Pasc. 1652. Banc. sup. THis case being in arrest of judgement (formerly spoken unto) in an Action upon the case for these words, Arrest of judgement in an Act on for words you are a knave, and keep a Bawdy house, was again moved by Christ. Turner, who held that the words are not actionable. 1. Because they are of spiritual cognisance. 2ly. It is not said that he kept a common Bawdy house. 3ly, here is no special damage laid, 10 Car. These words he is a pimp adjudged not actionable in Lewis and Whittons case. 4ly, It is not alleged that he willingly kept a Bawdy house, and then he is not punishable. Pepes on the other side held the words to be actionable, and cited Hill. 3 Car. Elsey and Harisons case, thou art a whore, and a Bawd to thy daughter, and keeps a Bawdy house, which words were adjudged actionable, 24 H. 6.14.38, 39 Eliz. In the Lady Barkleys' case, the keeping of a Bawdy house is an offence punishable at the Common Law, and therefore the words spoken are actionable. Case. Roll chief justice, To call one whore in London is Actionable, And the words here are actionable, for the keeping of a Bawdy house is a crime punishable at the Common Law, for the party may be indicted for it, and it shall be intended to be a common Bawdy house, although it be not so expressed, Endictment. and the Plaintiff is scandalised by the speaking of the words. jerman Nicholas and Ask justices were of the same opinion. judgementt was given for the Plaintiff, nisi. Snelgrave and Bosvile. Pasc. 1652. Banc. sup. Mich. 1651. rot. 200. BOsvile brought an Action of debt against Snelgrave, Debt against an heir upon an obligation as Heir unto his Father, upon an Obligation entered into by him unto the Plaintiff, the Defendant pleads riens per descent jour del bref, the Plaintiff replies, that he had lands by descent, and upon this an issue is joined, and the jury find he had lands by descent, and name them particularly, and upon this a judgement is given for the Plaintiff in the Common pleas, that he shall recover his debt of the lands descended, upon this judge meant a writ of Error was brought here, and the Error assigned was, that the judgement ought to have been given generally against the Defendant, and not particularly of the lands descended. 2ly the jury ought not to have found what lands particularly the Heir had by descent; but generally that he had lands by descent, because the issue is general, whether he had lands by descent or not, and therefore the judgement given upon this ill verdict is not good. Roll chief justice, The judgement is unwarrantable, for the verdict is against the issue joined, judgement. Verdict. and the judgement here ought to have been general of all the lands and goods, and against the person of the Heir for his false plea, and not particular to recover of certain lands, as it is here, for this is not so good a judgement for the Plaintiff, as the general judgement is, and this judgement may be against the Plaintiffs mind, Error. for any thing doth appear to the contrary, and a like judgement was reversed in Alle●n and Holdens case in this Court. jerman Nicholas and Ask of the same opinion. And thereupon the judgement was reversed. Floyd against Morgan. Pasc. 1652. Banc. sup. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement in an Action of Trespass, for taking away of certain Household stuff, Error to reverse a judgement, a trespass for taxing away of of goods. and the Error assigned was, that the Declaration was incertain, for that it wanted latin words to express the things, for which the Action was brought, for the Declaration is for the taking away of quoddam instrumentum ferri, Anglice a gridiron, et quoddam instrumentum ferri Anglice a mortar et quaedam instrumenta ferri Anglice brandirons, which are words utterly incertain for the generality of them, what they may signify. Roll chief justice, My judgement is that the judgement is erroneous, for we must not take meanings; because we are bound up to proceed by the rules of the Law, and Statutes, and we are to consider here whether there be Latin words in the Declaration, as there ought to be to express the things, for which the Action is brought, and certainly this word quoddam instrumentum ferri is too general to express any thing, and the Anglice added to it will not help it; for if the word precedent, in itself, be not fit Latin to express the thing the Anglice subsequent is little to be regarded, Anglice. Declaration. and these words being incertain the Declaration must be incertain, and so the Defendant cannot know what to answer to it, or how to defend himself as he ought to do, which may prove very prejudicial to him. jerman justice, Issue. The issue cannot be certain, if the Declaration be incertain, and by the Common Law and Statute Law our plead must be Latin, and where there are not elegant Latin words to express things, we may use those which they call barbarous words, if they be known, for use makes a language, and where there are no Latin words, we may coin words, and add an Anglice to them, and here the Declaration is as incertain also, for the number of the things, as for the nature of them, for here is quaedam instrumenta ferri, which may signify any number be it more or less, Nicholas and Ask ad idem. And so the judgement was reversed, nisi. Antea. Brian against Twit. Pasc. 1652. Banc. sup. AN Action upon the Case was brought for speaking these words of the Plaintiff; Arrest of judgement in an Action for words. you are a whore, and have played the whore with so many men you cannot number them; upon not guilty pleaded, and a verdict for the Plaintiff, it was moved in arrest of judgement that the words are not actionable, for the saying the party had played the whore are words incertain, and do not enforce any Act of whoredom to be done by her; but jerman justice gave judgement for the Plaintiff, for he said the words should be construed to a common intendment. THe Court was moved for judgement, upon a verdict given 2 years since, Motion for judgement denied. and the cause stayed till now by the Committee of indemnity; but it was denied, because it was the last day of the Term. Nota. Pasc. 1652. Banc. sup. IT was showed for cause why a certiorari should not be granted to remove an indictment of battery, Certiorari to remove an endictment. against an Attorney of his Court, preferred at a Sessions of the peace in the Country, that the bill was found there, and the party hath entered into a recognizance there to go to a trial the next Sessions. Roll chief justice, The recognizance may be also removed by the certiorari, and what hurt can it be if the endictment be removed, and the trial had at the assizes, and if it be removed hither, we will not quash the endictment; but the party shall plead and carry it down, and try it at the next assizes at his own charge. Byron against Stonehowse. Pasch. 1652. Banc. sup. Trin. 1651. rot. 1658. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in a writ of dower in the Common Pleas, Error to reverse a judgement in dower in the common pleas. the Errors assigned were, that the judges of the Common Pleas had set a side the verdict given by default by the judge of assize, because it ought not to have been taken, but a petite cape of the lans awarded, whereas though this was a fault in the judge to take the verdict, yet this is to be amended by a writ of Error, for the judge of assize, and the judges of the Common pleas in this case are but as one judge, Dyer f. 194. f. 76. and here is a waiver of the default, because the inquest was taken at the prayer of the party, 27 H. 8. f. 18. 10 H. 7. f. 21: And the Demandant may release the default either expressly, or implicitly, 3 H. 6. f. 48. 10 H. 7. f. 21. 3ly. Here is a discontinuance which is not helped, because the Enquest is taken, by default, and the Tenant by the judges taking advice is out of the Court, 7 H. 4. f. 14. pl. 13. Here is day given in Court to the Demandant, but not to the Tenant, and the judges cannot advise afterwards. And here the judgement is given upon a default after a default, whereas the 2d. default was the same day with the 1. & not at another day, as it ought to have been. Hales on the other side held that the judgement was not erroneous, for here is no judgement, but only an awarding of the Enquest, and if it be not good, it is done by those that had no power to do it, and so not material, and the judges of the Common place have a distinct authority from the judge of the nisi prius. 2ly. Here is no release of the default nor Enquest, nor can the judge of the nisi prius take a release of the Default; for by awarding the default the power of the judge of the nisi prius is determined: And the release ought to be of the default, upon which the judgement should be given, and it is not so here. Next here is no discontinuance, for it is not necessary to give day to the Tenant by the Curia advisare vult, for then there could be no petite Cape; And the judgement here is good, for there is no other day of default. Roll chief justice, Verdict by default. Petit Cape. The judge ought to have called the Tenant, or to award a petite Cape of the land, and not to have taken the Enquest by default; but here the judge of Assize did not award a petite Cape. For the 1 Exception, The judge of the nisi prius had no authority to take the verdict, and so that is done coram non judice, and so the nullo habito respectu to the Enquest by the judges of the Common Pleas is good enough, Error. and so they may in that Court award a petite Cape, and they may also advise, and there is no need for them to give a day of continuance to the party, for that were to take away that of which they would advise, and the ad alium diem is also good, and so there is no Error in the judgement. Affirmetur nisi. Doctor Trigg against the College of Physicians. Trin. 1652. Banc. sup. Hill. 1651. rot. 1143. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in the Common Pleas for the College of Physicians against Doctor Trigg in an action of debt brought upon the Letters Patents, Error to reverse a judgement for practising Physic without Licence. and Stat. of 3. H. 8. for practising Physic without licence. The 1 Error assigned was, that it is said that quidam Willielmus Trigg, and so it may be intended another party, and not the same, whereas it ought to have been praedictus Willielmus Trigg. But to this Roll chief justice answered, that the party came in and pleaded, and so he must needs be the same party. The 2 Error was, that the judgement was wholly given for the Precedent of the College of Physicians, wheress it should have been given part for the Precedent, and part for the King. Hales in maintenance of the judgement answered, that the judgement is to be given for the party who brings the Action, and if the Action had been brought by the King only, judgement should have been given for him only, yet the money recovered shall be distributed as the Statute directs. Roll chief justice, The King may be better trusted than a Common Informer; So the Case is not alike, where the King brings the Action, as where the Informer brings it, for the King may receive all the money, and the Informer may have his part by Petition to the King, and here neither the Information nor the Verdict is pursued, for that is tam pro Domino Rege quam pro seipso, etc. and here the judgement is only for the Informer. judgement. The King may if he will, sue alone and have judgement for all, if he begin his suit before the Informer, but if he begin it afterwards, the Informer shall have his part. And if the King do inform tam pro seipso, as for the College, there the College shall have its part. For these reasons the judgement is not good, Therefore let it be reversed, nisi. Trin. 1652. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to vacate a latitat that issued out of this Court erronice, To vacate a Latitat. Supersedeas. for that it was made retornable two days before the Term jerman justice, Take a supersedeas. Godwin against Batkin. Trin. 1652. Banc. sup. Hill. 1650. rot. 1477. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an Action of Trespass upon the Case in the Court at Burton upon Trent, Error to reverse a judgement in an Action upon a promise. wherein the Plaintif declared, that the Defendant, in consideration that he was indebted unto the Plaintif in 20 l. did assume and promise to deliver divers to I. S. to the use of the plaintiff, and for non performance of this promise he brought his Action, and had a Verdict and a judgement. But the judgement was reversed, because the Court held that here is no consideration expressed which can relate to the discharging of the debt of 20 l. and so the promise is but nudum pactum, Consideration. Nu●um p●ctum. and the Plaintif is, notwithstanding the promise, at liberty to bring his Action against the Defendant for the money. Child against Sir john Lenthall. Trin. 1652. Banc. sup. AN Action of Escape was brought against Sir john Lenthall as marshal of this Court, Arrest of judgement in an Action for an escape. wherein the Plaintif declared, that whereas I. S. was indebted unto him by Obligation in a certain sum of money, and was thereupon by a latitat out of this Court arrested, and did thereupon put in Bail, and did appear to the Action, and the Plaintif obtained a judgement against him, who thereupon in discharge of his Bail did render himself to Sir john Lenthall in Execution, and that afterwards Sir john Lenthall had suffered him to escape, per quod, etc. to this Declaration Sir john Lenthall pleaded, and a Verdict was had against him. Wild in Arrest of judgement takes these Exceptions to the Declaration. 1. It saith that the Principal rendered himself in Execution to discharge his Bail, and saith, that afterwards he escaped, whereby he could not have him in Execution, which seems contradictory to what he formerly said. 2ly. He saith that he rendered himself to the marshal, whereas he ought to say that he rendered himself to the Court; for it is the Act of the Court that turns him over to the Marshal. Roll chief justice, He cannot render himself to Sir john Lenthal in discharge of his Bail; Bail. for only a judge can take and discharge a Bail, and not Sir john Lenthall; but here it is that he did it in Court, and therefore it is well enough; for he may render himself to Sir john Lenthall in Court, though out of Court he cannot, and therefore let the Plaintif have his judgement. Rogers and Done. Trin. 1652. Banc. sup. Pasch. 1652. rot. 354. IN an Action of Trover and Conversion for 3 Cart loads of Dats, Arguments upon a Demurrer to a Plea to the jurisdiction of this Court. Barley and Pease. The Defendant pleaded a special Plea to this effect. That the land where the Trover was supposed to be is 5 acres of land lying in B. and that is within the County Palatine of Chester and that he holds the land for term of years, and by virtue thereof did sow and take the Corn thereupon growing, and traverseth the Conversion out of the County Palatine, and avers that there are Courts of justice held within the County Palatine, so that justice may there be had, and says, that he ought to be sued within the County Palatine, and not elsewhere, and therefore demands judgement if he ought to be sued in this Court. To this plea the Plaintif demurred, and shown for cause, that the Action being for a transitory matter, it may be tried out of the County Palatine as well as within, although if it were for a local matter it would be otherwise, and the party here hath pleaded not guilty, which may be tried any where, Cooks Instit. 282. In some Cases an Obligation hearing date at Chester may be sued in another place, 19 E. 3. Fitz. Oar. 29.45 Ed. 3. Fitz. visne 50.9. jac. C. B. Richardson and Meres, a Battery in Chester tryable out of it, 11 H. 4. f. 40. Crompton jurisdiction of Courts, f. 213. Transitory things emergent in the County Palatine of Chester may be tried elsewhere, 45 E. 3. f. 17. And so it was prayed the Defendant might plead over. Sergeant Glyn on the other side held, that this plea was a good plea to the jurisdiction of the Court. Here are many matters of fact confessed, and the matter in Law is, whether the title of the land within Chester shall be tried out of that jurisdiction. In 31 Ed. 1. in the Exchequer it is clear they have conusance of Pleas. Roll chief justice to that answered, but it is not that they shall not be removed thence; Sergeant Glyn proceeded & said, that also upon a reference to 4 judges by Queen Elizabeth, it was certified, that all Actions real and personal arising in Chester are tryable there, and not elsewhere, 22 E. 4. Fitz. Iurisd. 61. 21 H. 7. f. 23. 1 H. 7.26. 10 H. 6.14. a H. 4. f. 25. As to the Objection, that this is a clear personal Action, and therefore transitory. 1. I deny the authority of Cook in his 4 Institutes cited on the other side. Next the Action here by the pleading of it is made real, and then though Cook's opinion should be Law, it comes not home to our case, and a transitory action may be made real by the pleading of it, 27 H. 6. f. 1. Hill. 38 Eliz. Banc. sup. Hill. 2 Car. in Belamy and Bolthorps' case in this Court, 6 rep. 14. A thing is tryable there where the best conusance of it may be had, 6 H. 7. 3 2ly. The averment of the party here is, that all actions personal and real within Chester are tryable there, and this being matter of fact is confessed by the Demurrer, 9 H. 7. Porter & nichols in the Exchequer 10 Car. And it would be a great inconvensence to try the title of lands lying within Chester out of it, for so all causes real may as well be tried in foreign Counties, even through all England, which would be very mischievous. Roll chief justice, Trial. If we can avoid it, it is not good to try causes in foreign Counties; but here you have by your demurrer confessed, that all causes real and personal shall be tried there, and what say you to that? 2ly. Traverse. Waiver. Issue. It is to be considered whether your Traverse be not repugnant to your Plea, for you have waived the plea to the jurisdiction of the Court, and put yourself upon an issue by the traverse, which you ought not to have done; but you ought to have relied upon your plea to the jurisdiction of the Court, for as the traverse is taken, until a trial be had in the cause, we cannot tell whether the Trover and Conversion be within the County Palatine, or out of it, and this is matter of substance, and tryable, and therefore it would be hard to maintain your plea. At another day the case was argued again, and first by Twisden for the Plaintiff, and he took three things into consideration. 1. Whether the plea were a mere plea to the jurisdiction. 2ly. Whether it be made good by the demurrer. 3ly. Whether the traverse have not spoiled the plea. 1. He held the plea was not good, because the Action is merely transitory, and may be laid in any place, 2. Mar. Br. traverse 983. Cooks Lit. f. 202. and the Defendant cannot plead that the cause of Action lies in any other place, than where the Plaintiff lays it, Cooks Iurisd. of Courts is full authority in point, what ever is objected against it, 30 H. 6. f. 6. I admit of the jurisdiction of the County Palatine; but yet it must not entrench upon the Common Law, and I admit all the books cited; but they are of other local matters, or of things transitory, which are fixed to Chester by the pleading of them, and Dyer 122 comes not to our case, nor crosses the case of 10. jac. 3. rep. Ridgwayes case, and here it shall be intended that the jury may there have best conusance of the matter where the Action is laid, and not elsewhere, although the Action do savour of the Land. For the second matter the demurrer makes not the plea good, for the law says it is not good, and the parties cannot alter the Law, Burtons' case. 5. rep. f. 59 5 H. 7.1. 3ly. The traverse makes not the plea good, for the traverse is waived, and he relies upon another matter, 5. Car. rot. 817. Burton and Cornish, the traverse taken, took away the justification before pleaded, so doth it here, and the traverse here is not good, because it is in a transitory matter. Where one justifies a thing done, it ought to be confessed that he did it, so if he traverse that he hath not done a thing here, it implies it is done some where else. Latch for the Defendant made this question, whether upon the matter as it is here pleaded, the jurisdiction of this Court be taken away, and he held it is. It is the honour of this court to imaintain the jurisdiction of all other Courts and therefore I hope, it is not misbeseeming me to put it in mind of this honour that belongs to it, I believe that according to the ancient Law of the land, actions ought not to be laid elsewhere, then where the matter that caused them did arise, although that now by custom it is grown otherwise. Although the Plaintiff may fix a transitory Action, where he pleaseth in ordinary matters, yet he cannot do it where the matter ariseth within a special jurisdiction, as the case here is. It is not a good allegation that binds up the jurisdiction of this Court, except where it appears that the allegation is true, & the allegation here may well stand with law, it being in the Case of a County Palatine, which hath such a jurisdiction incident to it, & this Court Ex Officio ought to take notice of the jurisdiction of the County Palatine and that they have authority to hold pleas, 45 Ed. 3. f. 10. 50 E. 3. pl. 1●. 10 H. 6.16. The averment is, that the party remains within the jurisdiction of Chester, that there may not be intended to be a failer of justice, by the parties going out of the jurisdiction where the offence was done, 44 & 45 Eliz. Crisp and De●●●. Neither is the plea by the traverse become so vicious, as to retain the jurisdiction of this Court thereby; For the County Palatine cannot give up their jurisdiction to this Court, as ancient Demesn Courts, and other Courts may by the mispleading of the parties, for their pleading is coram non judice, 10 H. 6.13. b. 9 H. 7.12. 45 E. 3. f. 7. 22 E. 4.23. 31 H. 6.11. Nor doth the traverse here waive all the precedent matter, but stands with it although it be made narrower by it; but nothing is here waived, Dyer 165 Here is an issue in substance, which is good, although not in the letter, and the straightening of it shall not hurt, and the Court is neither inveigled, nor the party wronged by it, Dyer 369 Hob. 119. This traverse binds not the other party to join issue upon it; but there may be a traverse upon a traverse, and he may plead another plea, Hob. 18. New man's case. Roll chief justice, In your prescription you have averred that he was an inhabitant; but you have not averred that they ought to hold plea of transitory matters, if the party inhabit out of the jurisdiction, and here the party ought to be summoned, and if he dwell out of the jurisdiction, what remedy can be had against him then, for how can he be summoned? And we cannot judge of the jurisdiction; but by your pleading, Trial. and by your traverse you have tripped up your own heels. The reason why transitory actions may be laid in any County is, because that otherwise justice might fail, for the party may do a fact in one County, and then remove to another, so here the party may do wrong within the County Palatine, and then go out of it to avoid justice. At another day Wild argued for the Plaintiff, and Shafto for the Defenddant. Wild held that the plea was ill, 1. In the inducement 2ly. It is ill in the substance of it, 3ly. The traverse is not good. The inducement is ill, because it doth not confess a conversion; but here is a general issue only pleaded, 9 E. 4.5. 12 E. 4.12. It is ill in the substance, because the usage pleaded is against Law, and will cause a failer of justice, which ought not to be, for the Law leaves no person wronged without a remedy, 19 E. 3.29. Fitz. Iurisdict. 50 E. 3. pl. 1●. 44. 45 Eliz. Crisp and Verols case, 2 R. 3.4. Harid and Paytons' case. 24 Car. 48.2. instit. 4. Cook jurisdict. 213. 14 E. 4.25. Next the traverse hath waived all the matter pleaded before, and because the plea was good before, there was no necessity to take it, 20 E. 4.2. and the traverse is also too strait, for it hath tied up the matter to Wellington, and so he prayed a respondes ouster. Shafto on the other side held the plea good, and argued much to show in the jurisdiction of the County Palatine, and cited Cook jurisdict. f. 219. 22 E. 4.34. per collow, Dyer 156. Hill. 8 H. 7. rot. 228. and he said the plea is good, though it be not confined to the inhabitants within Chester, for there was no necessity to plead thus, and it had been enough to have pleaded generally, because this Court takes notice of the jurisdiction of Chester, 11 Rich. 2. Fitz. brief. and the pleading hath always been in this manner, as may appear by the Book of entryes, 1 E. 4. f. 11. and this custom by construction of law, is necessarily to extend to the inhabitants within the jurisdiction, 21 H. 7.40. Dyer 46. Rastall 128, 129. the privilege of Chester follows the persons of the inhabitants, and so there can be no failer of justice as is objected. And for the traverse, though it be ill, it shall do no hurt in this case to take away the custom, for upon the entire record, it doth appear that the Action lies within the jurisdiction, and if judgement be given here, it is coram non judice, and so the traverse is nor material, 9 H. 7.12. 37 H. 6. f. 26. Cooks Mag. Char. cap. 247 Mag. Char. f. 241. Westm. I. C. 35. Bract. 260. Hill. 7 jac. Dymocks case in this Court. Notice. Nicholas justice answered the justices of this Court are not bound to take notice of the custom of Chester, otherwise than as it is alleged. Roll chief justice, The matter is whether we can take notice of your case, otherwise than you have pleaded it, and your plea is naught, and the party may demur upon it, for it appears not whether the custom extends to Wellington where the trover was, because it appears not whether Wellington lie within the County Palatine of Chester or no, Plea. and the Plea cannot be good in part, and ill in other part, as is supposed. jerman justice, The Declaration here is good, and if the plea be not good to answer it then it is ill. Nicholas justice, The Plea is contrary to law and reason, and Common sense, and there ought not to be a failer of justice. Ask of the same mind. Confession. Roll chief justice, We must take all the matter as it is pleaded, and if the Plea be ill, the other party shall not be said to confess any thing. And here you have pleaded a plea in Bar, viz. Not guilty, and you have also Pleaded to the jurisdiction of this Court, which cannot be; and we are not now to examine the jurisdiction, but the pleading. Therefore, show cause Monday next why you shall not plead in Chief. Griffith against Thomas. Trin. 1652. Banc sup. Mich. 1651. rot. 340. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in the Common Pleas in an Action of Debt upon an Obligation to stand to an Award, Error to reverse a judgement in deb in the C. B. and the Errors assigned were, 1. That whereas the Award was to pay a certain sum of money, at or before the 25 day of December, the breach assigned is, that he paid it not at the 25 day. 2ly. Whereas there are 2 parties of one side, and one on the other side that submitted to the Award, The Award is that one party shall not prosecute the other. 3ly. The Condition is that the Award shall be made the 20 day of such a month, and it is set forth that the Award was made before the 20 day, and doth not say what day it was made; But the Council relied upon the 1 Exception; And to that Latch on the other side answered, Award. That if it be paid before the 25 day, it is then paid at the 25 day. 2ly. The Condition requires the award to be made under their hands, & the subsequent averment is to no purpose, And as to the 3. the words Altar partium extends to all parties, and besides, the breach is not assigned upon that. Roll chief justice, If it be paid before the day, it is paid at the day, and so that is certain enough. 9 H. 7. Another exception was taken, that the condition was that the Arbitrement should be put in writing by the Arbitrators, and it is not so here expressed, but only generally that it was put in writing. Roll chief Just. It is not to be necessarily understood that it must be put in writing by the Arbitrators themselves, Another Exception was taken that here is an Outlawry after judgement, & there is a fault in the Outlawry, for in the Writ to the Sheriff it is praecipipimus vobis, instead of praecipimus vobis, & the year of our Lord is in Figures. And 2ly. it is secundum consuetudinem regni Angliae, whereas it was in the time of the Keepers of the Liberty of England. Roll chief justice, If the word be praecipipimus, then there is no command to the Sheriff, for that word signifies nothing, Therefore let the Outlawry be reversed, and judgement affirmed. Trin. 1652. Banc. sup. IN an Action upon the Case, the Plaintif declared, Demurrer to an evidence. that in such a Highway the Defendant digged a hole, and that by reason of that hole, as he was travelling in the way with his Gelding, his Gelding did fall and hurt himself, to his damage, etc. Upon not guilty pleaded, and issue joined at the Trial, this evidence was given to the jury, namely, That the Plaintiffs Servant was driving his Master's Gelding in the way, being loaden with Lead, and that by reason of the hole he fell, etc. To this evidence it was demurred, and for cause it was showed, That by the evidence it neither is proved that there was such a way, nor what person digged the hole, both which are part of the issue to be tried, and so the evidence proves it not, and therefore is not good to find the Verdict for the plaintiff, as the jury have done. Roll chief justice, This evidence is no more than a special Verdict, and it ought to find the way and the hole digged, and all the matter conducing to the issue, and therefore it is not good as it is, Verdict. Venire. Therefore let the Verdict be quashed, and a new Venire awarded. Herd against Read Trin. 1652. Banc. sup. IN an Action upon the Case for words, the Case was this, Arrest of judgement in an Action for words. the Defendant being brought before a justice of Peace to answer a crime objected against him, the Plaintif appeared as a witness to testiffe against him, whereupon the Defendant to weaken his Testimony did speak these words of the Plaintif before the justice of Peace, Thou hast been a contentious man this 30 years, and a Breeder of strife, and hast taken a false Oath against my Brother and Sister in a matter of incontinency, and hast taken 20 s. for it, and I will show it upon Record. Upon not guilty pleaded, and a Verdict for the plaintiff, It was moved in Arrest of judgement, that the words were not actionable, because it is not said that he is perjured in any Court of Record, but, that he will show if upon Record, And 15 Car. Morton and Clapams' case was cited; but on the other side it was said, that take all the words together they are actionable, and Trin. 22 Car. Osborn and Brookes case was cited. Roll chief justice, The words are said to be spoken falso & malitiose, and it is not said in the Record that the party spoke them in his own defence, and it may be they were spoken by the by, and not in the judicial proceed, but it appeared upon reading of the Record, Case. that they were spoken to disable the Plaintiffs testimony: Whereupon Roll chief justice said, That the Action did as well lie in this case, as it doth lie for endicting one falso et malitiose, for Endictments are more: avoured in the Law than private matters between parties. Therefore let the Plaintif have his judgement, nisi. Custodes against Howell Gwinn. Trin. 1652. Banc. sup. HOwell Gwinn was indicted of perjury, Arrest of judgement in an Endictment for perjury. for taking of a false Oath in an Affidavit made before a Master of the Chancery, and was found guilty. It was moved in Arrest of judgement, 1. That it doth not appear by the Record that the Oath made was any thing material to the suit depending in that Court, and so it is but an extrajudicial Oath, and is not perjury either by the Common Law, or by the Statute. 2ly. It doth not appear that the party took a false Oath, for it appears not whether the Master of the Chancery had any power to take this Oath, and if he had not, than it cannot be perjury. Latch enforced the 2 Exception, and said, That a Master of the Chancery hath not power ex Officio to take an Oath, and therefore the party ought to show that he had power to take this Oath; but if he hath power he ought not to take it upon the holy Evangelists, as it is here expressed, but it ought to be upon the holy Evangely, for the form is super sacro sancto Evangelio, and not Evangelistis. Maynard on the other side prayed judgement, and that the party may be fined, and answered, that it doth well appear that the Oath was made touching the cause in question, and the Endictment is here laid at the Common Law, and not upon the Statute. Next it is not necessary to show that a Master of the Chancery hath authority to take an Oath, for it is the common course and practice of the Court of Chancery for the Masters to take oaths, and the Chancery being a Court of Record here, this Court is bound to take notice of the Customs used in it. 3ly. The taking of the Oath upon the Holy Evangelists, and the taking of it upon the Holy Evangely is all one in effect. Roll chief justice, The most material Exception is, whether a Master of the Chancery hath authority ex Officio to take an Oath, and certainly antienly he had not, and therefore you should have expressed that he had authority to take an Oath. At another day Hales said, that it doth well appear by the Record, that the Master had authority to take the Oath of the person, Oath. and many precedents are, as our Case is. Roll chief justice, The Precedents are, that he hath authority to take an Oath prout per Recordum, etc. but it is not so expressed here. Nicholas justice, A Master of the Chancery of common right hath no power to take an Oath, and therefore in this Case you should have pleaded precisely that he had authority, otherwise it cannot be good. Hales at another day answered another Exception taken, that it did not appear that the Affidavit in which the false Oath was made, was filled, and then it was not upon Record, and so could be no perjury, and said it is all one whether the Affidavit be filled or not, for the forswearing is before the filing, & the party who takes the oath may choose whether he will file it or no, and therefore it is not necessary in the pleading to say, as it appears by the Record. Green on the same side, It may be that it was filled, and afterwards taken off from the file, and then he cannot say as it appears by the Record, and it would be mischievous if the party should not be punish▪ d for the perjury, because the Affidavit was not filled. Sergeant Glyn on the other side said, that the Precedents which are shown to prove that a Master of the Chancery may take an Oath, are, that the party hath made an Affidavit, as it appears by the Record, and this is not so pleaded here, and therefore the Precedents make for us. An Endictment cannot be at the Common Law for perjury in an Affidavit, if it be not filled, Filing. for the filing of it makes it a ground to frame the Endictment upon, and so is it in other Courts, for the filing of it gives power to the Court to make rules, and orders upon it. Wild on the same side said, that it appears not here positively, that the Affidavit was made in this cause alleged, but only by way of argument, which is not good. Roll chief justice, If it be in the same business, it shall be intended to be between the same parties: Perjury. Perjury at the Common Law is intended to be in some Court, and legal proceed, for a false oath made before us not touching the matter in question between the parties, an endictment of perjury lies not, Endictment. and it appears not here, that the Chancery took notice of this Affidavit, for nothing was done upon it, and the words as it appears by the Record are material words, and do make up the business, but they are here omitted. If one make a false oath, the party is punishable for it by an action upon the case, in case it be not perjury, for which he may be indicted for it. Case. False Oath. A false oath is one thing, and perjury is another thing, for one is judicial, and the other is extrajudicial. And the Law inflicts greater punishment, for a false oath made in a Court of justice, than if it be made elsewhere, because of the preservation of justice. jerman justice said, that perjury takes its name from perverting of justice, and therefore it is intended to be in a Court of justice. The Court held the endictment ill, and gave judgement against the Custodes. Postea. Trin. 1652. Banc. sup. Upon a return of the Coroner of an inquest found before him that one had killed another man with a gun by misadventure, Whether one might plead the general pardon. Manslaughter The question was whether the party might plead the general pardon. Thereupon Roll chief justice said, if one kill another by doing an act which was needless for him to do, it is man slaughter, and so was it adjudged in Sir John Chichesters' case lately, who killed his man by misadventure in fenceing with him; but if he kill another in doing an act which belongs to his calling, Pared on. it is not man slaughter, therefore men must be wary not to do things, which concern them not to do. And therefore this Act is not within the general pardon; but he must purchase his pardon. Williamson against Norwitch. Trin. 1652. Banc. sup. Hill. 1651. rot. 1668. IS was indebted to Williamson the Plaintiff by a contract, and to Norwitch the Defendant upon an obligation, and dies intestate, Demurrer to a plea in debt against an Executor descu court demesn. Norwitch intermedles with the goods, Williamson brings an Action of debt against him as Executor of his own wrong, Norwitch takes letters of administration of the Goods, and Chatels of I. S. and then pleads that I. S. was indebted unto him by Obligation, in the sum of 50 l. and that he had taken out letters of administration of the Goods and Chatels of I. S. and by virtue thereof doth retain Goods and Chatels of I. S. to the value of the said debt, and besides those hath nulla bona, etc. To this plea the Plaintiff demurred, and the question here was whether the Executor of his own wrong, afterwards taking out letters of administration pendente lite, may retain the goods of the intestate, to satisfy his own debt due upon Bond, or aught to satisfy the Plaintiffs debt due by contract. It was urged that he could not plead this plea, and these books were cited, 5. rep. Cowlters case, and 21 H. 6. f. 8. and 38 Ed. 3. f. 17. and it was said that this case is stronger, because the administration was taken pendente lite, 5. rep. Midletons' case, 2 E. 4.7. Latch on the other side held the plea good, and agreed Cowlters case 5. rep. and that the taking of letters of administration shall not destroy the Plaintiffs writ; but here is a legal administrator, and he might have retained the goods if he had been Debtor but in equal degree with the other; but he is a Debtor of a higher nature than the other, for his debt is by Bond, and the others but by contract, and the law requires his debt to be first satisfied, 2 H. 4.21. Coment. 545. If he have more goods than will satisfy himself, he ought to make election what goods he will have, and alter the property; but where there are not more goods, it is not necessary to do it. And the law should do wrong, if he should not be first satisfied, for now he is a lawful administrator, and also a creditor of a higher nature than the other, and because he cannot bring an Action against himself for his debt, therefore he may by law retain the goods in satisfaction. And he may satisfy a debt upon a specialty, before a debt due upon a contract, although a suit were commenced for the debt due upon the contract, so here he may retain the goods. Roll chief justice, Why shall not here the administration purge the wrong which he did as Executor of his own wrong? It is true indeed that he shall not abate the writ, by taking letters of administration; but he may plead this plea in bar of the Action, and here it doth not appear but he is rightly Executor, Abatement. Bar. without doubt the plea here pleaded, had been good to a stranger without letters of administration, and the law shall supply the retainer to him here, and there is no wrong to the Defendant; at another day it was moved again, and the Court held the plea good, and ordered judgement for the Defendant, nisi. Strode against Homes. Trin. 1652. Banc. sup. Hill. 1651. rot. 999. STrode brought an Action upon the case against Homes, Arrest of judgement in an Action for words. for speaking of these words of him in relation of his office, he then being Churchwarden of St. Clement's Parish in Oxford; Thou art a cheating knave, and hast cozened the Parish of 40 l. Upon not guilty pleaded, and a verdict for the Plaintiff. It was moved in arrest of judgement, that the words were not actionable, because here was no special loss alleged by the Plaintiff, nor is he in any danger of corporal punishment, by speaking of the words, Pasc. 10. jac. Hopper and Baker. Roll chief justice answered, the matter is not so much the loss of his office, as the loss of his credit in being accounted a cheater. At another day Crook Senior moved for judgement for the Plaintiff, and said the words are actionable, for a Churchwarden is not merely a spiritual officer, but an officer by the Common Law, and also by the Statute, Yarly and Ellis case, Sir Miles Fleetwoods' case, Hob. rep. Bray and Haynes. Crook junior on the other side urged that this is not an office of profit, but of trouble and burden, and no special loss is alleged. Roll chief justice. Officers which have no benefit by their offices have more need to be repaired, if they be scandalised in their Execution of them, and here the scandal is great loss, to an honest man, and what other remedy can he have to repair himself, Case but by his Action on the case? jerman Nicholas and Ask of the same opinion. And so judgement was given for the Plaintiff, nisi. Trin. 1652. Banc. sup. Upon an Affidavit read in Court made by divers prisoners in the upper Bench-prison against Colonel Keys a prisoner, that he is very unruly, Motion to remove a prisoner out of the upper Bench prison to Newgate denied. & abuseth his fellow prisoners, it was moved he might be removed to Newgate; But Roll chief justice answered, if he be unruly, the Gaoler must put on irons upon him, and keep him safely there, for this is no cause for us to remove him, for he lies there under many actions, and we must not remove him to another prison. Trin. 1652. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved that the party might not have a trial at the Bar until he had paid costs upon being nonsute in a former action for the same lands. Roll chief justice, He shall not proceed to another trial, Against a trial at the Bar till costs paid upon a former nonsute. Costs. until he have paid his costs, for by this means we shall encourage men to be vexatious. Friend against Baker. Trin. 1652. Banc. sup. Wild moved to amend a Record wherein a judgement was given in the Common Pleas, For amendment of a record denied. after the Record was removed by a writ of Error into the Chequer Chamber, the fault to be amended was, that there is day given over to the parties from Easter Term to Michaelmas Term, and so Trinity Term is left out, which he conceived was but a misprision of the Clerk, and but a miscontinuance in giving a wrong day to the parties, 2 H. 7.11. 22 E. 4.3. But Roll chief justice answered, Discontinuance. that this is the act of the Court, and by your reason you may skip over 3 or 4 Terms one after another, without any continuance. The giving of a day more than is necessary, is no discontinuance, but here wants a day, which makes it not a miscontinuance, but a discontinuance, and so was it adjudged, 1 Car. at Reading Term. Nicholas justice cited 21 H. 6. f. 16. to be adjudged that it is a discontinuance. Roll chief justice, A miscontinuance is where one process is used for another, and so the process is mistaken; but this is a discontinuance, and cannot be amended. Amendment. For this is not upon a writ of Error out of the Common pleas as we supposed it to be, and that the Record had been amended there, for than we would have advised whether we would amend it here; Miscontinuance. but it is upon a writ of Error brought in the Chequer Chamber upon a judgement given here. Brock against Vernon. Trin. 1652. Banc sup. BRock brought an action of Debt against Vernon as an Executor upon a bond entered into by Vernon unto the Testator of the Plaintiff, Arrest of judgement in debt upon a Bond. the Defendant acknowledgeth the bond, but says that he gave another bond in satisfaction of that Bond unto the Testator, which the Testator did accept of in satisfaction. Plea. Th●ng in Action. The Court held this plea ill, and that the party might have demurred upon it, and needed not to have joined issue, and put it to the jury, for it is no good plea to say, that one did accept of one thing in Action, in satisfaction of another thing in Action, and here the Defendant hath confessed the debt, and therefore his plea being ill, judgement ought to be against him, and judgement at another day was given accordingly. Buckstone against Shu●lock. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. Entered Trin. 1652. rot. 177. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a given judgement in the Common Pleas upon an information, Error to reverse a judgement in the Common Pleas upon an information for selling of Wine without licence. for selling of Wine without licence, contrary to the Statute. The Error assigned was, that the information was brought in the Court of the Common Pleas, which is in the County of Midlesex, whereas the offence is alleged to be done at Lambeth in the County of Surry, which ought not to be, as Davisons case is in Hob. rep. Roll chief justice, How do you prove this to be within the Statute of 7 Ed. 6. If the Statute give liberty to justices of peace, and Oyer and Terminer, or justices of assize to inquire of this offence, than an information cannot be preferred in a County where the offence was not done, and the meaning of the Statute, 21 jac. is not to put the party without remedy, and if he cannot sue by the Statute of 7 Ed. 6. in the County where the offence was committed, than this Statute of 21 jac. bars him not to prefer an information in another County. Latch of Council against the enformer said, that by the Statute of 7 Ed. 6. an information lies before justices of Peace, or Assize, or Gaol delivery. Roll chief justice, I deny that by the Statute of 7 Ed. 6. the information could not have been brought in any other place, but in the Courts at Westminster, and therefore that it is not necessary to bring it in the County where the fact is done, notwithstanding the Statute of 21 jac. ● it is reason it should be so, because that no jurisdiction is given by the Stat. of 21. jac to justices where they had no power before. And the Court of Record expressed in the Stat. of 7 Ed. 6. shall be intended one of the Courts at Westminster, and not a Court of Record elsewhere. Therefore show cause why the judgement shall not be affirmed. Tench and Hubrison. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. IN the Case of Tench and Hubrison upon a motion for a prohibition to the Court of Admiralty, The Court of the Admiralty cannot proceed criminally. It was held by the Court, that the Court of Admiralty, cannot proceed criminally against one that is in contempt to the Court. Yet the Court said, they would here the Civilians if they would speak in it Saturday following. Cydall and Spencer and others. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. IN the Trial between Cydall and Spencer and others, Where one may have Election. in an Ejectione firmae it was said by the Court. That if one do disseise me of part of a house, and I am in possession of the rest of it. It is at my election whether I will admit myself out of possession of the house or not. Long and Hebb and others. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. IN a Trial between Long and Hebb and others, To what time Letters of administration shall relate. Relation. Trespass. Trover. it was said by Roll chief justice, that Letters of Administration do relate to the time of the death of the Intestate, and not to the time of granting of them, and therefore an Administrator may bring an Action of Trespass or a Trover and Conversion for goods of the Intestate taken by one before the Letters granted unto him, otherwise there would be no remedy for this wrong done. Mich. 1652 Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to change the Venue in an Action brought for an escape: But Roll chief justice said, it ought not to to be changed, Where the Venue may not be changed. for an escape is not local but transitory, for an escape in one place is an escape in all places. Sidenham. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. IN the Case of one Sidenham Roll chief justice said, Where one may vary from his plea. It had been a question, Whether if one plead payment at a day, he shall be admitted afterwards to plead another plea. Watts and Lowth. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. AN Action upon the Case was brought upon divers Assumpsits, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon an Assumpsit. and a Verdict given for the Plaintif. It was moved in Arrest of judgement that the jury had given more damages than were laid in the Declaration, whereas it was but a mis-casting in the quae in toto attingunt. Roll chief justice said, That the mis-casting is nothing if the damages given by the jury be not more than the Plaintif hath laid in his Declaration. Verdict. And therefore let him have his judgement. Gough and Cann. Mich. 1652. Banc. sp. IN an Action brought for a Rescous, Arrest of judgement in an Action for a Rescous. and a Verdict found for the plaintiff, these Exception were offered in Arrest of judgement, 1. whereas he speaks of the next Court, he doth not show where that next Court was held. 2. The time of the Arrest is not showed, upon which the Rescous is supposed to be made. 3. It is not showed that the party rescued was in custody of the Sergeant from whom he was rescued. 4. It is not showed before whom the Plaint was, upon which the Arrest was made. 5. The venire is ill awarded, for it is to the Coroners, where it ought to be to the other Sheriff, if one be a kin to the party, and Latch offered this Exception, that the Declaration sounds in Trespass, which Action doth not here lie for the party. Election. Trespass. Case. But to that Roll chief justice answered, that it is in the election of the party to have an action upon the Case, or an Action of Trespass; for an Action of the Case or an Action of Trespass lies at the election of the party against one for taking away his Wife. And he demanded whether the two Sheriffs of Bristol where the Rescous was brought were not one Sheriff, and whether the venire was not helped by the Statute And it does also appear that the party was in custody by virtue of the Process, and it is now after a Verdict: And he said, that if one rescue the party who is arrested at my suit, because that after the party is arrested I have an interest in the body of the party, Rescous. this Rescous is a Trespass to me, for which I may well maintain an Action of Trespass. And jerman justice said, Pledge. that the body of the party arrested for debt is a pledge for the debt itself. judgement was given for the Plaintif. Liniston and Maurice. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. THe Case was this, Arrest of judgement in an Action of Trespass for not carrying away tithes. An Action of Trespass was brought against a Parson for not carrying away his Tithes in due time. The Defendant pleads that the Plaintiff gave him no notice to fetch away his Tithes; the plaintiff replies that he did give him notice, but doth not show where he gave him notice, and upon this Exception judgement was stayed: Afterwards Baldwin of the Inner Temple moved for judgement, and alleged that the not alleging the place was no Error. Nicholas justice, what say you to Durdens Case? Roll chief justice, There are many cases where the place is not material, yet, it must be alleged for the Venue. Place. If Debt be brought against an Executor, and he plead fully administered; if the Plaintiff reply that he hath assets, he ought to allege the place where he hath assets: And I conceive that there ought to be a place alleged here, Repleader. that a jury who are nearest the place, and so may have the best knowledge of the matter, may try it, although it may be tried in another place; but if the trial be ill the Verdict will not help it, but there must be a new trial, Therefore it were good to replead as to the place. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. ONe took out a Latitat out of this Court and arrests the party, Attachment for abusing the process of the Court. and refuseth to take Bail of him, but carried him into another liberty to charge him with an Action there; Upon this the Court was moved for an Attachment, for abusing the process of this Court, And it was granted, nisi, etc. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. IN a trial at the Bar between cheesman and Turner and others in Trespass and Ejectment, Roll chief justice said, Where ne unques Executor is a good Plea. Revocation, Reviver. That if there be divers Executors of one Will, and one of them refuse to prove the Will, he may plead ne unques Executor. And that a Will in writing may be revoked by parol, and revived again by parol. Theoball and Conquest. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. Trin. 1652. rot. 1999. AFter a Verdict in an Action of Trespass and Ejectment it was moved in Arrest of judgement, that the Lease was altered after pleading. Arrest of judgement in Trespass and Ejectment. On the other side it was moved for judgement. 1. Because the Lease was only amended in matter of form, and not in substance 2ly. Because by the rule of Court the Defendant is to confess the Lease, and so it is not material whether the Lease be good or no. But Roll chief justice answered, that the Lease was amended in matter of substance, and if the Lease be defective we can give no judgement, Amendment, judgement. Confession. and by your own showing it is not good, and the rule of the Court doth not bind the Defendant to confess the Lease otherwise than you have made it, and therefore let the judgement be stayed. Fowke and boil. Mich 1652. Banc. sup. Trin. 1652. rot. 460. THe Plaintif brought an Action upon the Case for selling unto him false Bills of public faith to the value of 800 l. knowing them to be false, Demurrer to a Declaration in Action upon the case. with an intent to deceive him: The Defendant demurs upon the Declaration, And Babington of the Inner Temple offered these Exceptions to it. 1. That the Ordinance of Parliament for the bringing in of money & plate into Guild hall, and giving the Commissioners authority to give these bills to them that brought it in for re-payment thereof with interest at 8 l. per centum, per ●●num, was misrecited; for it is said that the Ordinance was made by both Houses of Parliament, whereas it should be by the Lords and Commons in Parliament, for the Houses are the places where they sit, and can make no Ordinances, and he cited Mich. 13 Car. Tydalls case. 2. The Aldermen that are the Commissioners are not called by their Christian names, as they ought to be, but only by their Surnames. 3ly. It is not showed in what manner the Bills were assigned to him, but he says only that they were assigned in due form of Law, which is too generally expressed, and to this he cited Mich. 10 jac. Banc. Reg. Glass and Gowes' case. To these exceptions Latch answered, That the mentioning of the Ordinance of Parl. and of the Aldermen, is but by way of inducement to the Action, and nothing to the ground of it, and therefore there need not be so punctual a recital as is surmised, neither is it necessary to show how the Bills were assigned, and they are the Defendants own words, nor is it material how the money was to be paid. R●● chief justice, The ground of the Action is the deceit in assigning over false Bills, and affirming them to be true, Indictment. Confession. and the other matters are merely matters of inducement, and used only by way of recital, and not material to the Action. And you have confessed the deceit for which the Action is brought by your general demurrer upon the Declaration. And therefore let judgement be for the plaintiff except better matter be shown. Postea, Wood against Holland. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. Trin. 1652. rot. 1061. Wood brought an Action of Trespass and Ejectment against Holland, Demurrer to a Replication in Trespass and Ejectment. The Defendant pleads that the Plaintif did disseise I. S. of the Land, and then made a lease of it to him, and that afterwards the land did descend to the Plaintiff, The Plaintiff replies that he was seized of the lands, and traversed the disseisin supposed to be made to I. S. And to this the Defendant demurs, add for cause shows that he ought to have traversed the descent, and not the disseisin. But Roll chief justice said, That the traversing of the disseisin makes an end of all, and therefore it is well taken, as being the most material matter, Traverse. See sin. Descent. although that the descent might have well enough been traversed. And therefore let the Plaintif have judgement, nisi. Reckwitch and Moyle. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. Trin. 1650. rot. 503. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an Inferior Court, A Writ of Error to reverse a judgement given in an inf riour Court. and the Writ of Error was to remove a Record, quod coram vobis residet de placito in Curia manerii de Cuttingbye, whereas the Record was, de placito in Curia Custodum libertatis Anglae authoritate Parliamenti de Cuttingbye. And therefore against the writ of Error it was objected, that there was a variance between the writ of Error and the Record, and therefore that the writ of Error was not good; But against this was cited Lodge and Goodales Case in this Court 23 Car. that it is not necessary to recite in a writ of Error all the words 〈◊〉 the description of a Court, and here the writ is not to remove a Record out of an inferior Court, but the writ of Error is to reverse a judgement in a Record, quod coram vobis residet. Hales answered, That here is a right description of the Court, in regard of the place where it was held, and of the judge of it, but not in regard of the Lord of it, and therefore he conceived it a material objection, because a part of the stile of the Court is mistaken, & not only an additional description of it. Roll chief justice answered, Variance. If it be but an additional addition or description, it is well enough as it is; but we will see what hath been done in like Cases heretofore; but me thinks that it shall be intended here to be Curia Custod. libertatis Angl. etc. for here it is in a Writ of Error which will not lie if it be not a Court of Record. But Nicholas and Ask justices said, It cannot be intended a Court of Record, but a Court Baron, and so the stile implies common by intendment. The Court advised till the next Term. This Case was afterwards moved by Latch, who said, That here is no variance between the Writ and the Record, although the Writ be not so full as it might have been to describe the Record, and it is agreeable to the ancient and usual practice at this day, and cited the old book of Entryes 171, and said, that in Paytons' case the Record was in Curia Domini Regis Civitatis, and the writ of Error was in Curia Civitatis Glocestriae, Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. rot. 569. and all Courts of Record are originally the Kings. Hales on the other side said, that the writ of Error ought to show whose the Court is, and the rather, because it is said to be Curia Manerii. Wadham Windham, The Register is both ways, and by direction of Parliament the Common Pleas is styled Curia de Communi Banco. But here the Record appears to be Custodum, etc. Civitatis, and the Writ doth not mention that. The Court would advise o● the Precedents. This case was again moved, and Lodge and Woodhalls case, 22 Car. urged, that the Return of the Certiorari upon the writ of Error was not good for the variance formerly alleged, but Wadham Windham held it good enough, and relied upon Precedents showed to Hern the Secondary, as the Court had directed. Hales on the other side urged that the variance made it not good, for it cannot be intended the same Court. Roll chief justice, here is no di●● opposition between them, for they may both stand together, and the writ of Error intends it to be a Court of Record, and yet it is the Court of the Manor also, and therefore it is good in substance, De facto it is the Court of the Lord of the Manor, but virtually and in dignity it is the Court of the King; but the Venire is clearly vicious, and therefore let the judgement be reversed for that cause. Jervis and Lucas Mich. 1652. Bane. sup. THe Court was moved for one jervis, Motion for the Court to view a wound to increase damages. that the Court might view his wound, and increase the damages given him by the jury, because they had given him but twelve pence damages for his wounding, whereas the parties Arm was broken, and he was in great danger still to lose the use of it. But Roll chief justice answered, it appears not by his Declaration what manner of wounding it was he received, as it ought to have been, and how can we know how he was wounded? But we will advise, and hear Council on both sides. At another day Serjeant Parker moved the same matter again, and cited 3 H. 4. f. 4. and 18 H. 4. f. 23. and Dyer, to prove the Court might increase the damages. Twisden answered, That the wounding aught to have been particularly expressed in the Declaration, that the Court might judge of it by the Record, and the party is not to be viewed by the Court upon the bare averment of the party made at the Bar. View. To which Roll chief justice agreed, and said, how can it appear to us that he was wounded so as you aver by this Battery? for it may be he was wounded since your action, neither can you now discontinue the Action, because it is after a verdict, Discontinuance. so that you are now without remedy. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved for a prohibition to the Prerogative Court, Motion for a Prohibition to the Prerogative Court. because they do proceed to examine witnesses there, to disprove a will that was proved there 20 years since, by which Will lands were devised, and the lands are sold, and this they do to prevent a trial at Law touching the title of the land directed out of the Chancery. Roll chief justice answered, they may examine the probate there; for you have libelled there to take benefit of the probate, and therefore the other party may disprove the probate if he can, as far as concerns any goods devised by the will, And therefore we will grant no prohibition. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved for the Parishioners and Officers of the Parish of Clarkenwell, Motion to make Scavengers execute their Office. By-laws, Mandamus. to make Scavengers that are elected in that Parish to serve the Office. Roll chief justice answered, It is marvel that the City of London do not look to this, for they have power by their by-laws to make men serve such offices, yet take a mandamus for them to be brought hither to show cause why they will not execute the Office. Acto● and Ayres. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in the Common Pleas in an Ejectione firmae, Error to reverse a judgement in the Common Pleas in an Ejectione firmae. judgement. and the Error assigned was, that the judgement was quod querens recuperet, & the words quod defendens capiatur are omitted. And upon this Exception the Court reversed the judgement, for they said in this judgement thus entered there is no return of damages, nor a Capiatur, and so the Commonwealth is cozened of the fine, and the Defendant barred from bringing his writ of Error. Dawkes and Coveneigh. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. Hill. 1650. rot. 653. COveneigh was indicted for felony for breaking the house, and taking 250 l. Special Verdict in an Action of Trespass quare clausum ir●g●t. out of the house of Dawkes, and found guilty, and was burnt in the hand, afterwards Dawkes brings an Action of Trespass quare clausum fregit, and for carrying away the 250 l. against Coveneigh, who pleads not guilty, and thereupon a special verdict was found to this effect, that the Defendant did feloniously break the house, and carry away the 250 l. and was indicted for it, and was found guilty, and burnt in the hand for it, and if upon the whole matter, etc. The question upon the special verdict was, If after the Defendant was indicted and found guilty, and burnt in the hand for this fact at the suit of the keepers of the libertyes of England, etc. an Action of Trespass quare clausum fregit, and for carrying away the money, be maintainable by the party, who was thus rob against the party that rob him or no. Latch of Council with the Plaintiff held, that the Action did well lie, and that the Plaintiff ought to have judgement, and that this special matter found by the jury, is no bar to the Action, for if he had been attainted for another Felony, it would not have barred the Plaintiff from his Action, after he had been discharged; but otherwise it is if the party bring his Action, whilst the party stands attainted, or the party be attainted pending the Action of Trespass, 33 Eliz. Wade and Prescots' case in this Court, and 34 Eliz. Trussels case in this Court, and 6 Ed. 4. 4. and in our case the Action was not brought till after the party tried; But it is objected, that the Trespass here is brought for the same fact for which the party was tried, and therefore it is unreasonable that he should be doubly punished for it. To this I answer, that it was at the party's election at the beginning either to endict him, or to bring his Action of Trespass, Hudsons' case, 4. rep. 43. And here the party hath made no election, for the party was indicted at the suit of the Common Wealth, and not at the prosecution of the party, and so he hath made no election until now. And if the Action might not be brought, it might prove very mischievous, for the party might get himself indicted, and so cousin him that is rob of this money, Dyer 50. ●. rep. 13. And the highness of the nature of the endictment doth not drown the Action of Trespass, although that treason doth drown Felony, R. 3. 6 H 7. 5. And although the moneys here stolen be for feited to the State, by the conviction of the Felony, yet an Action of Trespass lies against the Felon to cause him to render damages pro tanto, although he cannot recover the money in specie. And the special verdict doth not find, that any evidence was given for the Plaintiff upon the endictment, but only for the State. And for authority he cited Markham and Cobs case, Trin. 2 Car. Entered 1 Car. rot. 112. Roll chief justice said, That justice Doderidg, and justice Whitlock held, that the Trespass lies; Trespass. But justice jones held the contrary, because if the party rob might have his election, either to endict the Felon, or to bring his Action of Trespass, many Felonies would be smothered, and this would prove very dangerous, and though the party rob had indicted the Felon he might have had his goods, or he might have brought an appeal against him, and so there is no inconvenience to him, 4 jac. In Higgins case it was adjudged where an Action of Trespass was brought by the Husband for beating his wife, by reason whereof she died, that the Action did not lie, because it was Felony. jerman justice differed from Roll chief justice, and said, that the inconvenience on the other side would be greater than is alleged, if the Felon shall so take advantage of his one wrong, and in 2 Car. it was held that the Action doth lie. Roll chief justice said, if the Felon have not wasted the goods, when he is hanged the party shall have restitution, but if he have wasted them, Restitution, and hath other goods he shall have restitution in value. But let Wild argue it again the next Term. Accordingly it was again spoken too by Wild, who argued that the Action of Trespass did not lie, first because the party did not make fresh suit after the Felon, according to the Statute, 21 H. 8. which was made to encourage the prosecutor; but the party hath not prosecuted here, and it is all one to recover damages for the goods, and to recover the goods themselves, so that I conceive that is no difference. And the great inconvenience which might come to the Commonwealth if the Action should lie, doth countervail the damage that may accrue to the party, if the Action lie not, And it matters not that it is said the Trespass is a distinct offence from the Felony, for it is drowned in the Felony, and therefore the party can have no satisfaction for it, Mich. 21 jac. Ayers and Higgins case, C. ●. 31 H 6. B●. 15. trespass 415. 4. jac. Higgins and Butcher's case, B. R. Roll chief justice, This is after a conviction, and so here is no fear that the Felon shall not be tried; Bat if it were before conviction the Action would not lie, for the danger the Felon might not be tried. And there is no inconvenience if the Action do lie, and since he could not have had his remedy before, he shall not now lose it, and now there is no danger of compounding; for the wrong; the rest of the judges agreed with Roll, and so judgement was given for the Plaintiff. Ellis and Pipin. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved that an outlawry might be discharged, Motion to discharge ●n outlawry. because it is now pardoned by the Act of oblivion, for notwithstanding it were not pardoned if it were an outlawry after judgement, except the money's due, for which the party is outlawed, be paid to the party, as the book of 6 H. 7. f. 21. is, yet outlawryes before judgement are pardoned, and besides the parties here did submit to an arbitrement, touching the matters in difference between them, and an award is made. But the Court answered, that the outlawry cannot be discharged until the party have brought his scire facias upon the Act, Scire f●cias Interest. and it was also said, that the party at whose suit another is outlawed, hath an interest by the outlawry, as well as the State. Prior and Hale. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. A Letter of Attorney for one to appear to an Action is good enough by paroll to support a judgement given thereupon. A letter of Attorney by pa●oll good to some intent. By Pinsent protonotary of the Common Pleas. Nota. Fowke and boil. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. FO●ke brought an Action upon the case against boil, Demurrer to a Declaration in an Action on the case. for selling of false bills of public faith unto him, to the value of 800 l. the Defendant demurred to the Declaration, and took these exceptions to it. 1. That the ordinance of Parliament, upon which these bills of public faith were grounded was misrecited, for it is said, to be made by both houses, whereas it ought to be by the Lords and Commons. 2ly. The Aldermen who were authorised by the ordinance to give these bills of public faith, are not named by their Christian names, but only Alderman such a one, naming the surname. 3ly. There is 70 l. expressed to be paid, as is mentioned in the papers, and it is not expressed at what time or place, as it ought to have been, 16 E. 4. f. 3. and 28 H. 6. f. 3. 4ly. Here is an assignment set forth to be made in due form of Law; but doth not show in what manner, 10. jac. Mich. Glass and Gowr in this Court. Latch on the other side said, that the mentioning of the ordinance, and of the Aldermen was but inducement to the Action, and there is no necessity to call the Aldermen by their Christian names, but as they are called in the Ordinance; nor is it necessary to show how the assignment was made, and these words are the words of the party; nor is it needful to show how the moneys were to be paid. Roll chief justice, The cause of the Action is the deceit in assigning the false bills and affirming them to be true, Inducement. and all the other matters are but matters of inducement, and by way of recital, and not material, and you have confessed the deceit by your demurrer, and therefore let the Plaintiff have his judgement, nisi. Upon which rule Ba●ington at another day moved the matter again, and urged that here was an assignment of papers mentioned, which could not be, for that it is a thing in Action, which is not assignable, nor can the Ordinance of Parliament give authority to assign a thing in Action. Roll chief justice, Assignment. The ordinance of Parliament doth give authority to assign the papers. Latch the paper may be assigned. Green, The Action is brought for the deceit grounded upon the ordinance, and it is not necessary for the Ordinance to name the Alderman's Christian names, and these may be true bills though not subscribed, which is the deceit here alleged. Twisden on the other side said, that the acqu●ittance is in nature of a bill, according to the intent of the Ordinance, for it is not only an acquittance of discharge, but to recover moneys upon them, and so the Defendant calls them, and by the assignment the paper is assigned, and the Action is grounded on the deceit, and not upon the Statute. judgement was given for the Plaintiff. Burcher and Orchard. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. BUrcher brought an Action upon the Case for words, Arrest of judgement in an Action on the case for words. against Orchard and his wife, the jury find that the Baron was guilty, but that the Feme was not guilty, Wadham Windham moved in arrest of judgement, because that the Action is joint, and one of them is found not guilty, and said, it might have been otherwise if the Feme had been found gvilty, and the Baron not guilty, and cited 9 Ed. 4. f. 51. Yard on the other side said, that the verdict hath made this exception good, and if the Defendant would have taken any advantage of it, he should have demurred to the Declaration. Roll chief justice denied the difference taken by Windham, and said, if any of the Defendants spoke the words and be found guilty, the Action will well lie, and it is all one here, as if the Defendants were two strangers, the Action being joint; but the doubt is, whether it being after a verdict, this matter may be offered in arrest of judgement. At another day Hales moved for judgement and said, it was all one if any of the Defendants be found guilty, as if both of them were found so, and although it do appear by the Declaration, that the Action could not be brought jointly against them both, because the wrongs are several, and now one is found guilty, and the other is acquitted, 8 Ed. 4. f. 21. 11 H. 4. f. 5. 9 E. 4. f. 1. and damages are assessed against one only. And now the verdict hath madei the Declaration good, otherwise it had been if both had been found guilty and entire damages given against both jointly, Latch on the other side said, that the speaking of the words cannot be a joint Act, and therefore ought not to be so laid in one Declaration, for they are several Acts, and several offences, as the words do proceed from them severally, and this case is not like the case of a decies tantum, nor the case of a joint endictment against two, for a joint endictment shall be accounted as several endictments, and here if the Feme had been found culpable, perchance it might have been good, because though the wise only speak actionable words, yet the Action ought to be brought against the Husband and the Wife. Roll chief justice, The Declaration is not well laid, for this cannot be a joint speaking of the words by the Husband and Wife, and therefore they ought not to be joined in the Action, therefore there ought to be several judgements and damages if you recover, viz. One against the Husband, another against the wife, but here is a verdict found which helps it, and this case is all one with the Case of 9 Ed. 4. for there the Declaration was not good as it is not here, and here is not a verdict against both, but only a discharge, and he cited Rhetoric and Chapels case, where an Ejectment terrae & haered is did not lie, yet there by releasing of damages to the heir judgement was given for the land, and here might have been a release of damages as to the wife if both had been found guilty, but here in effect is a judgement but against one of the Defendants. jerman, Nicholas, and Ask justices to the same effect, and so judgement was given for the Plaintif. Luddington and White. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. Mich. 1651. rot. 458. LUddington brought an Action of debt upon a bill against White, Demurrer to a plea in debt up on a Bill. the Defendant pleaded, that after the money became due, he and the Plaintif did by parol submit to an award, and that there was an award made, that the Defendant should pay 8 l. to the Plaintif at such a house, and thereupon the Plaintif should give him a general release, and accordly he tendered the money; to this plea the Plaintif demurred, and for cause shown that here is a submission by paroll pleaded after the day of payment expressed in the Bill, which is not good being by paroll, to discharge a debt due by specialty. Discharge. But Wild answered, here were other things submitted besides this, and that may make the submission good. Roll chief justice, I see not what authority you have for this, Reference. nor how it can be, and 4 H. 6. if one be awarded before auditors to account, this cannot be referred, and here would be an inconvenience to take away a duty created by bond by paroll, therefore let the Plaintif have his judgement. Neve and Cross. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. NEve brought an Action upon the case against Cross for charging him with felony, Arrest of Judgement in an action upon the C●se● in nature of a Conspiracy. and causing a Constable to carry him before a justice of Peace, and accusing him to the justice in these words, viz. He did come to my door, and set a Pistol to my Breast, and demanded money of me, and I for safeguard of my life did give him what money he desired. Upon not guilty pleaded, and a Verdict for the plaintiff, it was moved by Fletcher of Lincoln's Inn, that the words were not actionable, and therefore that the Plaintif ought not to have judgement, and that for these reasons, 1. Because there is but a matter of Trespass alleged in the words. 2ly. They are but argumentative, and do not charge the plaintiff directly with felony, and it may be the money demanded was due to the Defendant, and the jury have found all that which sounds to charge the party with felony against the Plaintif. Twisden on the other side said, that the words ought to be taken together, and so they are actionable, and ought not to be severed; And the ground of the Action is for charging him with felony, and bringing him before the justice, and speaking the words there. Roll chief justice, If the words found to charge him with felony, the Action will lie, and we cannot conceive otherwise but that he would have rob the party, and we ought not to divide the words, for this were to argue a male divisis, Case. And you might have pleaded specially, or have given the special matter in evidence. jerman justice differed, but Nicholas and Ask justices agreed with Roll, and so judgement was given for the plaintiff, nill, etc. Smith and Ward. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. IN an Action of debt upon an Obligation to stand to an award, Arrest of Judgement in an Action of Debt upon an Obligation to stand to an Award. and a verdict for the plaintiff, it was moved in Arrest of judgement that the Award was not good, 1. Because here is money awarded to be paid to Baron and Feme, whereas the Feme is no party to the submission. 2ly. Here is 50 l. awarded to be paid, but it is not expressed for what, or that it is to be paid in satisfaction of any thing. 3ly. The submission is of all matters in difference till April 1652. and the Award is of all matters till December following. Latch answered, as to the 1 Exception, That the Baron did submit to the Award, as well for his wife as for himself, and the Award is to make an end of matters which do concern the Baron and Feme. 2ly. It is not requisite to show why the 50 l. is to be paid, yet it is showed here, viz. for the ending of all differences. 3ly. It doth not appear by the Record that any matter is awarded but what is submitted. Roll chief justice, The Husband may submit for his Wife, Submission. and here is an Award on both sides, and if the Award be good in part it is well enough, nor is it necessary to show why the money, is to be paid, Award. for all differences are to be concluded upon payment of the money, and the release is to be made after this, therefore let the Plaintif have his judgement, nisi. Mich. 1652 Banc. sup. THe Court was moved for a Certiorari to remove divers informations preferred by an Informer at the Sessions held at the Guildhall in London upon the Statute of primo jac. concerning Leather. Motion for a Certiorari. Roll chief justice, The Informations were exhibited before the justices of Peace, but it is a question whether the Defendant cannot remove them. I believe there are precedents to prove he may, otherwise the Defendant might be prejudiced; but inform us what the course is in the Common Pleas in such cases, In the mean time we will advise. Wall and his wife against Buy. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. Pasch. 1652. rot. 70. IVdgement was given for the Plaintiffs in an Action upon the Case brought in Bristol for these words spoken of the Wife: judgement in an Action upon the Case for words reversed. Error. She is Lews Reads Whore, and he knows her as well as her Husband. This judgement was reversed upon a writ of Error brought in this Court, because it did appear by the Record that the words were spoken before the late Act made against adultery and incontinency, before which time such words had not been actionable. jenning's and Downs. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. Trin. 1652. rot. 546. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement sur non sum informatus given in the Common Pleas in an Ejection firmae. Error to reverse a judgement upon a non sum informatus in an Eject one fi●mae. Certiorari. The Error assigned was, that it appeared by the Record that the Declaration was before the Plaintif had any cause of Action. Wild answered, It doth not appear so, but if it do, than we say that there is a wrong original certified, and we pray that we may have a new Certiorari to have the true original certified. Roll chief justice, Take it, for it is in affirmance of a judgement, which ought to be favoured. Webb and Washborn. Mich. 1652. Banc sup. Webb brought an Action of Trespass for entering into his house and taking away divers goods against Washborn, Arrest of judgement in Trespass. and obtains a Verdict against him. It was moved in Arrest of judgement, and these Exceptions taken to the Declaration, First, That the Plaintif had declared for the taking away of a Trunk with writings, and doth not show what the writings were. To this Wadham Windham answered, that the Declatation was good notwithstanding, and cited a Case adjudged, where an Action was brought for taking away of two Trunks with , and it was not said what , and yet held good: And a Case in 43 Ed. 3. 24. Another Exception was taken, That the Plaintif declared for the taking away of a great Beam, Scales and weights generally, and shows not what weights. To this Windham answered, that was well enough, because the Beam and the Scales and Weights do all go to the making up of one and the same thing, and have all a relation one to the other, as an Action of Trespass brought for the taking away the Caruca cum apparatu is well brought, as appears in the old Book of Entries. Latch on the other side said, that the Declaration is uncertain, and that it is not like the case of the Trespass de Caruca cum apparatu, for the Weights are nothing tending to make the Beam perfect, and it is as incertain as to bring an Action for the taking away of five locks and keys, which hath been held to be naught. Hales on the other side said, that there is certainty enough, because it is all one to say a Beam with Scales and Weights, which makes all but one thing, as to say a Beam, Scales and Weights, or as to say a Ship with Anchors and Cables. Roll chief justice, How can we reduce the Weights to any certainty as the Declaration is laid? Incertainty. and if the Declaration had not been with the word and, it would not have helped it, for it may be there were a hundred weights, or a thousand weights, And therefore let the judgement be arrested n●si. Another Action of Trespass was brought by the same party, Declaration. wherein he declared for the taking away of two great Trunks locked, full of Linen, Woollen, Pewter, & amongst other things, for 4 pair of hang, against which also, exception was taken in Arrest of judgement for the incertainty. Roll chief justice, I conceive that four pair of hang is certain enough, but here is no vi et armis mentioned, in the Declaration, which ought to be in an Action of Trespass for entering into his house, and taking his goods, as the case here is, and therefore for this cause let the plaintiff show cause why a nil capiat per billam shall not be entered against him. Postea. It was said by Roll chief justice, That if one find my goods, Action on the Case for goods found. and refuse to deliver them to me, an Action upon the case lies against him, although he convert them not to his own use. Bond and Martin. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. BOnd brought an Action of Debt upon a Bond given unto him as Sheriff to save him harmless, The Defendant pleaded a special plea, Special plea to an Action of debt upon a Sheriffs Bond. which amounted unto no more than that he had saved him harmless; to this Plea exception was taken, because he did not show how he had saved him harmless. To this Wadham Windham answered, If it be that he hath from time to time saved him harmless, it is well enough. Roll chief justice, It is not so here, and therefore let the Plaintif have judgement, nisi. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. IT was said by Roll chief justice, Where an express averment ought to be. Averment. that in an Action of Trespass quare vi et armis, etc. There aught to be an express averment in the Declaration of the force, and it ought not to be expressed with a whereas there was such a force. Baynton and Cheek. Mich 1652. Banc. sup. Trin. 1651. rot. 574. BAynton brought an Action of Account against Cheek, as his receiver. Plea to an Action of Account. The Case in sum was this, Baynton deposited two hundred pounds laid upon a horse-race in the hands of Cheek, to be delivered to the party that should win, according to Articles made betwixt the parties. Baynton supposing he had won the money, demands it of Cheek, who had delivered over the money to another whom he supposed had won the wager, and the money being not delivered to Baynton, Baynton brings this Action against Cheek; Cheek the Defendant, as to one hundred pounds pleads, Ne unques receptor, Plea. upon which plea he was adjudged to account before Auditors, and before the Auditors he pleads in discharge of the account, that he had delivered over the money to another that won the wager. The Plaintif replied, That there was foul play used by the other party, in striking one of the horses that ran the race upon the Nose, which was foul play, and against the Articles made betwixt them, and so he ought not to have delivered the money. The question was whether this was a good plea in discharge of the Account before the Auditors. Roll chief justice said, The plea was not good, in regard that the Defendant was adjudged to account, which doth imply that the money was fairly won by the Plaintif. Latch on the other side urged, that the replication was not good, but is impertinent, and therefore that the Plaintif can have no judgement, though the plea in Bar be not good, but that there ought to be a Repleader. At another day Green moved for judgement for the plaintiff, and cited Hob. 112. Ta●kers case, That an issue joined upon impertinent matter is not helped by the Statute, and Kent and Hall's case in Hob. Rep. but here is only an informal issue, which is helped by the Verdict, as are Rawden & Tuts case, and Napper; and Dawkes case in Hob. Reports, and Mich. 2 Car. Giggon and Purchases case, and said, that at the Common Law a Trial upon a double issue was good, Broke Issue 30. 2ly. This plea of the Defendant ought to have been pleaded in bar of the Action, and not in discharge before the Auditors, 1 Ed. 5. 2. Brook Account 83. and Dyer 196. Hungerford: case. Latch on the other side said, that the Replication is imperfect, and that the Verdict helps it not, the Defendant alleges the Articles made upon the wager, and the replication is about striking of the Horse, and answers not the matter pleaded in Bar for the Act, of the Rider, viz. the striking of the horse is not the Act of Bish who made the Articles, and besides here is no breach of Articles, for they do not prohibit to strike the Horse, or to ride foul, according to the Laws of a Horse-race, and the Rider doth not appear to be Bish his Servant, but a third person, and an Action of the Case lies against him, and not against Bish, who for aught appears hath done nothing against the Articles, and the matter in bar of the Account is well pleaded, and could not be otherwise, as the Case is, and it is well enough, though it be not pleaded in bar of the Action, for he could not have pleaded ne unques receptor pur account render, 9 E. 4. 1●. Dyer 19 H. 6. 5. As he could not have pleaded the general issue, and given the special matter in evidence; And he cannot plead thus in bar of the Action of Account, and there is not one book that says otherwise, 41 E. 3. 31. 5 H. 5. 5. 19 H. 6. 5. 22 H. 6. 49. 21 E. 4. 67. 5 H. 5. 1. 5 E. 4. 41. 1 E. 5. 2. 27 H. 7. 35. Which books do show it may be as well pleaded before the Auditors, as before in bar of the Action, 14 E. 3. Fitz. Account 68 21 E. 4. 54 By these books he is compelled to plead these matters before Auditors, and the other books are not expressly against it: And in this case here is not a bailment purely to deliver over, but there is subsequent matter which directs how it shall be delivered over, and this matter he must plead. But admitting the Bar to be ill, if the replication be impertinent, and that he hath confessed that he hath no cause of Action, than it is with us, and here is no pertinent matter pleaded to avoid the matter confessed, and so the judgement ought to be against the Plaintif, 3 Report, Ridgeways Case is, That if impertinent matter be in a replication, which answers not the bar, judgement ought to be given against the Plaintif, and the matter confessed is not in bar of the Action of account as is objected. 1 H. 7. 2. 21 H. 6. 26. Hales, The matter of delivery makes not the matter. The subsequent matter is grounded upon the Condition made upon the delivery, Dyer 169. and here is an insufficient bar, and the matter of the replication is good, according to the matter alleged in the bar, for the Articles ought to be interpreted according to the intention of the parties, which was, that the race should be fairly won, which is not so here, 18 E. 4. 4. matter of Covenant by deed may be discharged by subsequent matter of fact; and the Riders here shall not be accounted mere strangers, for they are Instruments made by the parties, and there is confidence put in them to perform the act of riding, and their acts shall be the acts of the parties; And here is nothing showed in the replication which destroys the Action. Roll chief justice, If you have confessed the Articles, and alleged impertinent matter in the replication, how can you take advantage of an i●● bar, and how can you interpret the intent of the Articles otherwise than is expressed by them? And how can we take notice here, that there was not fair play in the running of the race? and I doubt of the books cited by Latch, Bar. Auditors, Account. for where matter may be pleaded in Bar, the party shall not be compelled to come before Auditors, for that were unreasonable. If I deliver goods to deliver over, and the party do it not, he is accountable to me, but if he deliver them over, he is not, for he may plead this in bar of the Action, and so is it in the Case at the Bar, and you might have given the special matter in evidence here by the meal Act, Plea. and this plea here before the Auditors is clearly void. The main doubt here is, whether there be apparent matter to the Court to hinder the Plaintiff from his judgement, I conceive the Articles shall be interpreted fairly, and that there ought not to be fowl play according to Common intendment, and it is material to show there was fowl play in the replication, and so the issue is well joined, and judgement ought to be for the Plaintiff. jerman and Nicholas justices to the same purpose as Roll. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. IT was moved for Colonel Baxter, that he was elected high Steward of the Town of Colchester in Essex, Motion for a mandamus to Colchester to swear the high Steward there. and therefore that the Court would grant a mandamus to be directed to the Mayor there to swear him in that place. Roll chief justice, If he be duly elected, and he refuse to swear him, take a mandamus. jaques. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. IN the case of one jaques in an Action of Trespass quare vi et armis, What plea amounts to not guilty. for the entering into his Land, It was said by Roll chief justice, That if in an Action of Trespass vi & armis for entering into land, the Defendant plead his entry by virtue of a lease for years, this amounts to no more than not guilty, and the Plaintiff may demur upon the Plea, Demurrer● and show it for cause of demurrer, that it amounts to no more. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. IN the case of one Poynes Mawrice it was said, Where one cannot be declared against in Custodia. that if one be committed to the upper Bench prison, for a misdemenour, and not for debt, one cannot declare against him, as against one in Custodia. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved on the behalf of the Defendant, Motion for a certiorari to remove endictments. for a certiorari to remove certain endictments preferred against him in London, for selling of leather, to the end he may have an indifferent trial, notwithstanding the Statute, which directs that the endictment be preferred in the County, were the offence was committed. Roll chief justice, The Statute was made for the ease of the Defendant, and therefore he may remove the endictment, otherwise he shall be in worse case than he was before the Statute. Therefore take a Certiorari. Yongue and Petit. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. Pasc. 1652. rot. 159. YOngue brought an Action of debt against Petit upon an Obligation and declares, Demurrer to a replication in debt upon a Bond. that whereas at the request of the Defendant he did become bound with a third person, for the payment of a certain sum of money unto I. S. at a certain day, the Defendant became bound in an Obligation to the Plaintiff, the condition of which Obligation was, that if the Defendant did pay the money unto I. S. at the day limited, for which the Plaintiff was bound, and in the mean time should save him harmless, that then the Obligation should be void, and for not performing this condition he brought his Action. The Defendant pleads that he caused the party, with whom the Plaintiff was bound, to submit himself to Prison, and that the Plaintiff was not damnyfied. The Plaintiff replies and denies not the Bar; but says that a latitat was sued out against him, and that he feared to be arrested, and upon this replication the Defendant demurs, and these exceptions were taken to it. 1. That he doth not say he took out a latitat prout patet per recordum. 2ly. It was questioned how the words in the mean time shall be understood. For the first exception Latch held it not material, Relation. and for the second he held that they refer to the whole condition. Roll chief justice said, it is not necessary here to plead non damnificatus if the party be in prison, and the words in the mean time refer to the last words only of the condition; But one hath pleaded an ill plea, and the other hath alleged an ill breach, therefore nil capiat per billam, nisi. Yet we will advise. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. AN endictment was quashed for not repairing a highway, Endictment, quashed. because it did not set forth from what place to what place the way did lead. The Mayor and Commonalty of London against Hatton. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. THe Mayor and Commonalty of London brought an Action of Covenant against Hatton, Demurrer to a Plea in Covenant. for not paying a rent reserved by them upon a lease for years made unto him of the Garblers' office. The Defendant pleaded that this office was an office of trust reposed in the City of London, and could not be let for years, and consequently there was no ground of Action. To this plea the Plaintiff demurs. Hales held that this office may be let for years, because the Mayor and Commonalty of London have a Fee simple in the office by their charter, and that they have not only a mere trust reposed in them to execute it. And 2ly. If it could not be granted, yet here is no forfeiture, for this lease shall be accounted but a deputation, and not a granting over of the office. And 3ly. The Lessees covenant shall bar him from pleading this plea. Wadham Windham prayed a day to be heard. Roll chief justice, It will be hard for you to maintain the Defendants plea, Deputation. Lease. For without doubt the Mayor may make a Deputy to execute this office; But here he hath a Fee simple in it, and may thereby make a lease of it, and the Lessees Covenant will bind him to pay the rent. judicium pro querente, nisi. & At another day Wadham Windham put the Case, and argued that the office of Garbler is not grantable, because that this office is an office of trust reposed in a corporation, and it is so reposed for the public good, and the office itself is not vested in the Mayor, and therefore he cannot grant it, although he may make a Deputy to execute it, for there the Acts of the Deputy do light upon the Master to be answerable for, 29 H. 6 44. Dyer 238. a Mayor of a Town may make a Deputy; but he cannot grant this office or make a revenue of it. Roll chief justice, It is considerable in regard it is an office of trust, whether it may be leased out, although he may make a Deputy. Therefore argue it again the next Term. Baker and Andrews. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. Trin. 1650. rot. 1469. BAker brought an Action of Trespass, quare vi & armis clausum fregit, Demurrer to a replication in Trespass vi et armis. and for taking his ; the Defendant as to the force and arms pleads none cull. and as to the rest he justifies that the went in through the defect of the Plaintiffs enclosures; the Plaintiff replies that the came in through another man's fence into his ground; to this replication the Defendant demurs, 〈◊〉 shows for cause that the Plaintif doth not assign where the place of the other Close lies, through which the came through. Yard said it is not necessary to show where it lies, for they went not in where the Defendant hath alleged, & so the traverse is well taken Wadham Windham on the other side answered, here is a new assignment, and he answers not the Trespass for which the Action is brought, and because it is a new assignment, we must give a new answer; and therefore you must show the place where your new assignment lies. Roll chief justice, He pleads no more but that the came in at another place, than is pleaded, and he needs not show the place, But here the Defendants plea is not good, Plea. for he pleads a prescription where it ought to be a custom, that the occupiers of the land ought to make the senses, and he ought not so prescribe in the person. judgement for the Plaintiff, nisi. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. BY Roll chief justice, Who may take advantage of a fault in a Plea, Advantage. If there be a fault in a plea in matter of form, and after there is a fault also in the replication, and the Defendant demurs to it, but shows no cause of demurrer, he shall take no advantage of this fault in the replication; but he who joins in the demurrer shall take advantage of the ill plea, and so was it adjudged, Pasc. 1. Car. in this Court in Prat and Thimblethorps ●ase, and he said that all faults in pleading are incurable at the Common Law, and therefore those that are not helped by Statutes are left as they were at the Common Law. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. ONe was made Constable by order of a quarter Sessions, but the party refused to serve, Motion to quash a● order of Sessions. and removed the order hither by Certiorari, & moved to quash the order but the Court would not do it although there were material exceptions taken against it, but ordered him to plead, because they perceived the party was stubborn, and they would not give encouragement to such persons. Heath and Udall Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. HEath a carrier brought an Action of the Case against Udall, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the case and declares among other things for plundering of him of viginti fardellas Anglice packs, and in arrest of judgement it was moved that the words vinginti fardellas Anglice packs is uncertain; But Maynard argued that it might be good, because the carrier could not declare otherways, for he could not know what was in the packs, and he cited one bedingfield's case, Trin. 10. Car. Declaration. where an Action was brought for a library of books, and for apparel, and adjudged good; But Roll chief justice said, it could not be good for the apparel. Wadham Windham on the other side held the words uncertain as they are, and said he ought to have showed that they were packs with goods, or have shown what was in them, for a pack is but a measure of a thing. Roll chief justice answered, if it be but a measure of a thing, than no damages are given for them, and then the Action is good for the rest; But we will advise. Afterwards in the same Term Maynard moved for the opinion of the Court, and thereupon the Court held, that the words are incertain as they are, for he ought to have expressed what was in the packs, and ruled a nil capiat per billam to be entered. Levingston and Crompton. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. LEvingston brought an Action in this Court against Crompton, Exceptions to a plea of privilege. The Defendant pleads that he is a Clerk of the Chancery, and that all Clarks of the Chancery ought to be sued in the Chancery only, and not elsewhere, and demands judgement if he ought to make any other answer in this Court. Two Exceptions were taken to the plea, 1. He saith, That all Clarks of the Chancery have used to be sued in the Chancery, and not elsewhere, and doth not say, nor any of them have been used to be sued elsewhere, and though all of them have not been used to be sued elsewhere, yet that hinders not but that some of them have been sued elsewhere. 2ly. He pleads that he is a Clerk of the Chancery, and aught to be impleaded in the Chancery held at Westminster, before the Keepers of the liberty of England, etc. time out of mind, which is not true. Hales answered, That this Court ought to take notice of the privilege of Chancery, Notice. Privilege. although it be not well pleaded; But Roll chief justice denied that they ought to do it, and said, That it is the Custom for the Clarks of the Exchequer, when they plead their privilege, to bring the red book wherein their privileges are written into the Court, and upon sight of their privilege there written, it is used to be allowed, but it is not so of the privileges of the other Courts, but they must be pleaded, and so here, And because it is not well pleaded here, therefore show cause why you should not plead in chief. Pitton and Rey. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. PItton appeared to an Action brought against him at the suit of Rey, Motion for the plaintiff to declare speedily. but no declaration was put in against him. Upon an Affidavit that the Defendant was a Merchant, speedily to go to Sea, It was moved for him that the Plaintif might forthwith declare against him, that thereby he might direct his Attorney what to plead, and might have his liberty to be gone. Roll chief justice, By the course of the Court he hath three terms liberty to declare, but this is an extraordinary Case, Therefore let him declare Thursday next, otherwise he shall not declare till he come back. Nota. Mich. 1652. BY Roll chief justice, A private Sessions of the Peace is not said to be held for the County. Staples Case. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. A Rule was read on the Capital side for Staples a justice of Peace of Sussex, Cause why no Attachment against a justice of Peace. to show cause why an Attachment should not be granted against him for proceeding upon an Endictment of forcible entry, and fining the party, after a Certiorari was delivered unto him to remove the Endictment into this Court, and thereupon it was prayed that it might be granted, and Sir Tho. Styles, and Sir john Sidleys' case 8 Caroli was urged, where an Attachment was granted in the like case. Wild on the other side prayed it might not be granted, because the parties indicted did not tender sureties to proceed to a Trial upon the Endictment, as the Statute directs, and because the fine was set upon the parties before the Certiorari was delivered, and it is in the election of the justice to set a fine upon the party, Fine. Traverse. Plea. and refuse to admit the party to his traverse, as some do hold. Roll chief justice, Upon view of the force the justice may set a fine upon the party, and refuse to admit the party to his traverse, or plea, at his pleasure; but the case is not so here; and in 15 Car, it was resolved, that if a Certiorari be brought to the Sessions to remove an Endictment of forcible Entry preferred against divers persons, if some of them come in and find sureties for the damages, it is good for them all to remove the Endictment for the rest, else it would be mischievous for them that find the sureties. And he said, that if any thing be done at a private Sessions of Peace, it ought to be returned to a Quarter Sessions, or into this Court, Upon view of the force the justices of Peace are judges, Error. and may set a fine, and if there be Error a writ of Error may be brought. The rule was, that Staples be examined upon interrogatories, and make a return of the Certiorari Monday next, and that he restore the fine to the party. Wood and Mountney. Mich. 1652. Banc. sup. IN the Case of Wood and Mountney, Bail not discharged by the death of the Principal. Bail. Roll chief justice said, That if the plaintiff in a writ of Error die before the matter be determined, yet his Bail are not thereby discharged. Webb and Washborn. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. THe Action was an Action of Trover and Conversion for divers goods; Arrest of judgement in a Trover and Conversion. The Defendant pleaded not guilty, and upon issue joined, a Verdict was found for the Plaintif. It was moved in Arrest of judgement that the plaintiff amongst other things had declared for a Trunk with writings, which is uncertain. Wadham Windham for the Defendant said, the Declaration is certain enough, and cited a Case where an Action was brought for two Trunks of , and doth not say what , and yet adjudged good. Another Exception was taken. That the Plaintif declares for a great Beam, Scales, and Weights, which is also incertain. To this Windham answered, It was certain enough, because they all make but one thing, by reason of the relation they have one to the other; And in the old Book of Entries we find, that an Action of Trespass was brought pro Caruca cum apparatu, and adjudged good. Latch on the other side, as to the last Exception said, It is not answered, for the words are very incertain, and it is not like the case of the Trespass cited, de Caruca cum apparatu, for the Weights go not to the perfecting of the Beam, as the apparatus doth of the Blow, and it is as uncertain as to bring an Action for five Locks and Keys, which is not good. Hales answered, it is certain enough, for it is all one as if he had said, A Beam, Scales, and Weights, which is as certain as to say, a Ship with Anchors and Cables. Roll chief justice, How can we reduce the Weights to any certainty as the Declaration is laid? and if the word and had been added it would not have helped, for they may be a hundred Weights, or a thousand. Another Exception was taken that the Plaintiff in another Action had declared for four pair of Hang, which is uncertain: But Roll chief justice said, That that might be well enough understood. Green at another day insisted, that four pair of hang is very uncertain, but if it had been said four suits it had been well; Besides, the very word hang is a doubtful word, for it shows not whether the hang were Silk or Stuff, or what else they were made of, as it ought to be. He also took an Exception that the Plaintiff had only showed that here was a denial and refusal to restore the goods, but no conversion of them is showed. To this Hales answered, That the Action being an Action upon the Case, It is not necessary to show the Conversion, and for the four pair of hang it is well enough, for a pair is a couple when the word is used of dead things, and not like a pair of tongues which make but one thing nor is it material to express of what the hang are made, as it is not in an Action brought for divers pair of stockings material to say, whether they were of thread, silk, worsted, or , as hath been adjudged, and the word hang is certain, for any one will conceive them to be meant of hang of a room. Roll chief justice, The Action is an Action upon the case, and it is not necessary to show a conversion, for the Action is not brought for the conversion, and if it were so, if a demand, and a denial be proved, doth not this prove a conversion? Case. Trover and Conveision. As an Action of the case lies for keeping one out of possession, although the party doth enter afterwards, and the four pair of hang is certain enough, and it is not like as where Latin words are mingled with English in a Declaration, and the words being taken in the English construction shall be understood to be eight hang. Nor is it material to express of what the hang are made; But the great doubt is, whether the words be meant of hang for a room or not, and I suppose they cannot be meant of other hang, the words being in English, and not in Latin with an Anglice, and I believe you cannot show me any thing else, that the words can by common intendment signify. judicium nisi. The case was again moved at another day by Latch, who urged that four pair of hang are words incertain; but if it had been four suits it had been well, so that here is a misaplication of words to express the thing meant, and he might as properly have said a suit of Shoes, or a suit of Coneys. If one say he hath lost a hanging, this is incertain of itself, for it is the predicament of situs and not of substance, for a hanging is a posture, and the word pair makes it more incertain than it was without it. Hales answered, that it is certain enough, for the word hanging is used here substantively, and not as a participle, and the common use of the word is only applicable to the hang of a room, and the four pair shall be understood eight hang. Roll chief justice, A pair is properly when one of the things so called, cannot be properly used without the other; but yet the words may be also understood so many couple, and here you cannot intent the words to mean so many suits of hang, and you might have expressed your meaning by so many pieces of hang, and therefore it seems doubtful. jerman justice, Here the words do not express the number of the things, as they do when you say a pair of Oxen or the like. Nicholas as jerman, Ask justice, A pair is incertain, for that word may be meant more than two in number, as when you say a pair of cards, and a pair of hang in some places is meant a suit of hang. Roll chief justice, If it be so, than it is more incertain, the word hang may be good enough; but how can the number be known? Curia advisare vult. Afterwards the Court moved the Defendant to suffer the Plaintiff to amend his Declaration, and to plead anew, and to consent to a new trial. Askwiths' Case. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to quash an order of Sessions made at Durham against Askwith, Motion to quash an order of Sessions. for not serving the office of a Constable, or finding an other able person to serve the place for him, being elected according to the custom of the place where he was elected to serve. The Exception taken was, that it is not showed that he was elected at a Court Leet, and the Sessions have no power to elect a Constable. Roll chief justice, He is a Constable elected by a by-Law, By Law. & it is not necessary there should be any other election then according to the custom, and he must serve in his turn, or contribute to the charge for another to serve for him, Custom. and this is a good custom & used in many places, and I do find one myself in my turn in one place, and make no use of my privilege to avoid it. Another exception was taken, that the complaint made of the party was, that he would neither serve the office, nor contribute for another to serve it, and the order is only that he refused to contribute and so is not warranted by the custom, by which he hath an election to serve or contribute. Quashed, nisi, etc. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. A Prisoner was brought into Court (by a habeas corpus) out of the Fleet to the intent to turn him over to the Marshalsea to charge him with an Action here, Creditor examined upon oath it his debt, were real. whereupon the creditor was examined upon his oath whether the debt was real, for which he surmised he would bring his Action, and upon making oath thereof the Prisoner was turned over accordingly. Nota. Smith against Holyman. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. IT was moved in arrest of judgement in an Action upon the case upon an Assumpsit, Arrest of judgement in Assumpsit. False English and Exceptions taken. 1. That the Defendants Christian name was mistaken. And 2ly. That the jurata was erroneous, for it says in a plea of dept, instead of a plea of debt, and the judgement was arrested for dept written with a P. is no word, though it sound like debt written with a B. Custodes and Howell Gwin. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. HOwell Gwin was brought to the Bar being convicted for forgeing of a deed, judgement against one convicted of forgery. and was demanded what he could say why judgement should not be given against him. Boynton of Council with the Prisoner moved the Court, that in regard there was an information of perjury depending here against the witnesses, upon whose Testimony the Prisoner was convicted of the perjury, and that the Prisoner doth endeavour to proceed with all the speed that is possible against them in this information, that the judgement may be stayed in the mean time against him. Roll chief justice answered, if they be found guilty of the perjury, they shall be punished; but we will give judgement against your Client in the mean time, which was done accordingly in these words following, judgement for forgery. viz. you are convicted of forgeing a deed, by putting a dead man's hand unto it, therefore the Court gives this judgement against you, that you are fined at a hundred pound, and shall stand on the pillory two hours before the Hall door, with a paper on your head showing the nature of your offence. Memorandum the party cut off a dead man's hand, and put a pen, and a seal in it, and so signed, and sealed, and delivered the deed with the dead hand, and swore that he saw the deed sealed and delivered. Mich. 1652 Banc. sup. MRs. Lucy Fotherbie was brought into Court to be turned over into the Marshalsea out of the Fleet with an intent to charge her with an Action of debt. Against this it was urged that she was a Prisoner in the Fleet, A Prisoner turned over. committed thither by an order of the Court of Chancery. Prisoner. But Roll chief justice answered, this order is nothing to hinder her turning over, if the debt be real, and so upon proof that the debt was real she was turned over. Locky and Dumiloe. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. Hill. 1650. rot. 1462. Upon a special verdict in an ejectione firmae, the case fell out to be this, Special verdict in an ejectione firmae. I. S. seized of lands in Fee makes a lease of it to I. D. at Will, A. B. puts the Tenant at Will out of possession, and after the Tenant at Will enters, and takes a lease at Will of him that put him out of possession, the question was, whether he should hold the land by virtue of his first lease, or by virtue of his second agreement. To this Roll chief justice said, if one make a lease at Will to one, and he be ousted, Will. Determination. and then enter again and take a new estate, the Will is determined; but a stranger cannot determine his Estate without his consent; but here he hath determined his first Estate by his new contract with the disseisor of his Lessor. And he said, if Livery and Seisin be made upon one Acre of land in the name of two Acres, it is good for both the Acres, for it is not necessary that the party that gives the livery should go to all the land mentioned in the deed of Feoffment. Livery and Seisin. And he also said, that if Tenant at Will cuts down a tree upon the land, which he holds at Will, by this Act he hath determined his Will. Drake and Drake. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. DRake brought an Action against Drake for these words, Arrest of judgement in an Action for words. viz. Thou hast preached lies in the Pulpit; the Plaintiff being a master of Arts, and incumbent of a living. Wadham Windham held the words actionable, because they were spoken of the Plaintiff in relation to his professision, and cited one Hinkes case, where these words spoken of the Plaintif being a Brazier were held actionable, viz. Thou hast cozened me of a Pan. And if one say to another, Thou hast poisoned a man. If the man be dead, the words are actionable, although he do not say that he did it wilfully. The Court inclined the words are actionable, because they are scandalous. And the rule was judicium nisi, etc. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. Wadham Windham moved for a Certiorari to remove an Endictment preferred against one in Newgate. Motion for a Certiorari to remove an Endictment. Roll chief justice, He lies there for murder, and is outlawed thereupon, yet take a Certiorari to remove the Record, for his fact was the stabbing of a man, and stabbing is in its nature but felony, Felony. Murder. and is not murder, although the party cannot have his Clergy for it, by reason of the Statute made by King james against Stabbing, else by the Common Law he might have had it. Ashworth and Sir Tho. Stanley. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. Upon a Verdict given for the Plaintif in an Ejectione firmae, Arrest of judgement in an Ejectione firmae. Damages. Ejectione firmae. It was moved in Arrest of judgement, That the Ejectment is laid to be of three Messages or Tenements, and a Toft, which as to the Messages or Tenements is incertain. Roll chief justice, You move too soon, for it may be the Plaintiff will release the damages as to the Messages or Tenement, and take his judgement only for the toft, and the Action lies well enough for that. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. TWisden moved to discharge Sir Thomas revel and others of their recognizances for the peace in which they were bound the last Michaelmas Term, Motion to discharge recognizances of the peace. because the Affidavit upon which they were bound was only to this effect. That the Prosecutor goes in fear of his life when he goes into such parcels of land, whereas in truth those lands are settled upon Sir Thomas Revel by decree in Chancery, and the Prosecutor hath also brought 18 several Actions against the Tenants of the lands, and hath declared against none of them, and there are four Affidavits against the first Affidavit. Green on the other side said, that the party is in Court, and says he is still in fear of his life, Peace. and prays he may not be discharged. But because upon reading the Affidavits and examining the matter, it appeared to the Court that they were bound to the peace upon malice, and for vexation, they were discharged. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. BY Roll chief justice, Who ought to repair Highways of Common right. All High ways of common right are to be repaired by the Inhabitants of that Parish in which the way lies. But if any particular person will enclose any part of a way or waste adjoining, he thereby takes upon him to repair that which was so enclosed. Massey and Aubry. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. AN Action of Debt was brought upon an Obligation to stand to an Award: Arrest of judgement in debt upon an Obligation to stand to an Award. The Defendant pleaded that the Arbitrators made no Award; The Paintif replies that the Umpire made an award, and sets it forth, and assigns the breach, and upon issue joined, and a verdict for the plaintiff, It was moved in Arrest of judgement that the assignment of the breach was not good, for the incertainty of it, for the breach is assigned upon but a part of the Award; for the breach assigned is, that the Defendant should pay the Arrears of rent due after the purchase of certain lands; and doth not show what these Arrears are. But Roll chief justice said, That the words since the purchase thereof seem to make this certain, yet stay till the other moves. At another day the case was moved again, and the same exception insisted upon by Barry of the Inner Temple who formerly moved it. Hales held the Exception not good, and that the breach was well assigned, because though it seem uncertain of itself, yet it relates to a thing which makes it certain; As an Award for one to deliver to another all the goods in such a Shop which belonged to him, hath been held to be good. But Barry answered, That it is utterly incertain, and that there is nothing in the Award which can make it certain, and here is a incertainty in the Award. 1. It cannot be known what these arrears are that are awarded to be paid. 2ly. It appears not by the Award for what lands these arrearages of rent awarded to be paid are due, for there are no lands mentioned, but only two leases of land. 3ly. It appears not by whom the arrearages are due. 4ly. It appears not to whom the arrearages are due. Roll chief justice, All the matter is, whether it appears that these arrearages of rent awarded to be paid were in question or no, and it seems they were, because the lease and the rent thereupon reserved are both in question; but it is not certain what these arrears of rent are, and so the party that is awarded to pay them, cannot tell what sum of money he is to pay. jerman justice said, he may know, because he was Tenant of the land. Barry replied he cannot know when the purchase was made, and the arbitrement is that the party shall pay all the arrears since the purchase. Curia advisare vult. At another day the case was again moved by Barry, and exceptions taken that the breach was assigned upon a thing not submitted unto, or awarded to be performed. And secondly. The award is incertain in many things. First, It appears not what rent was due to be paid, but only by implication, which is not good. Secondly, It appears not for what the rent is due; nor 3ly. How much rent is due, and Salmon's case, in the 5. rep. was cited. Also it was objected that the award was not final, and concluding, and therefore not good: Also the Award is unreasonable, and for that cause also it is not good, and he cited 21 E. 4. f. 40. and 17 E. 4. f. 51. and prayed for the Defendant that judgement might be stayed. Hales on the other side prayed for judgement, & said, That the Arbitrators were not to ascertain particularly the rent to be paid, but it is sufficient for them to make the Award touching all the differences betwixt the parties, and an averment may ascertain the particular things, being they are only matters of fact, although one may not be admitted by an averment to supply an Award in a matter, wherein it was in the substance of it defective before, Roll chief justice, What certainty is there by the Award that the party shall enjoy all his right in the two leases in difference between the parties? for the payment of the rent, Both parties know what rent is due, reserved by the leases, but how can the party know what the arrears are which are accrued since the purchase? Award. for how can he know when the purchase was made? for it is made by a stranger, and what if the stranger will not tell him when he made it? so that me thinks the Award is unreasonable, and then it cannot be good. The rule was, Nil capiat per Billam, Nisi, etc. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. THe question being upon a motion in Arrest of judgement in an Action brought for money paid upon a Bill of Exchange brought by a wrong person, Question in Arrest of judgement in an Action upon a Bill of exchange. to whom the Bill belonged not, and a verdict for the Defendant, Twisden said, That if money be paid to a wrong person upon a Bill of Exchange, if the wrong person do show the Bill, by the Custom of Merchants this is a good payment, and the party that paid it shall not be charged again. Wild, It is doubtful whether the Custom be so or not. But Roll chief justice said, Custom. here is a verdict for the Custom, and therefore it were well if the parties would agree to a new trial, but if they will not, take your judgement, because the verdict hath found it a good custom. Custodes against the Inhabitants of Stoneham in Suffolk. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. THe Inhabitants of the Parish of Stoneham in Suffolk were indicted for not repairing a Highway, Motion to set a fine upon a conviction for not repairing a Highway. and a verdict found against them. The Court was moved that a good fine may be set upon them, because the way is not yet amended, and a Traveller that passed that way hath lost his horse since the Trial, by reason the way was so bad, so that the Horse broke his Leg. Twisden on the other side moved the fine might be respited, because there was a contest between this Parish and another which of them ought of right to repair the way, and in regard this Parish is very poor, and lastly, because the way cannot be amended until Summer, and then it shall be done. Roll chief justice, The fine shall be set upon you for not repairing it already, because the verdict found you ought to do it, and the Country suffers by your neglect, Fine. Distringas. Therefore take a Distringas to levy a fine of twenty pounds of the Parishioners for not repairing it. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. Wild moved the Court that paying costs the Plaintiff might have a rule to discontinue his Action, because there is such a travers now taken that the title of the land in question can never come to be disputed. Roll chief justice, Motion for the plaintiff to discontinue his Action. You may do this by the course of the Court without motion, therefore why move you for it? But I conceive your reason is, because there is a peremptory rule of Court upon you to try the cause this next Term, and now you move to avoid the contempt you may fall into, for disobeying that rule, Contempt. if you should not go to a trial. Yet pay good costs and discontinue your Action. Q. Nota. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved that a Feme that was sued only as an Executrix might be discharged upon putting in Common Bail. Motion that Common bail might be accepted. Roll chief justice, It is the common course if there be no special cause of Action against an Executor, as a Devastavit, or the like, for Common Bail to be admitted. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. HOdsden One of the Attorneys of this Court, For an Imparlance. was together with another made a Lessee in an Ejectment Lease, and would not grant an Imparlance to the Defendant, as the usual course is, because he is an Attorney of this Court, and so claims his privilege, Privilege. that the Defendant may answer him this term, or else he will enter judgement against him for want of a plea. Q. what was done hereupon. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. IN the case of one Hoff the Court was moved to confirm a rule made between the Plaintiffs Attorney and the Defendants, Motion to confirm a rule. for a Trial at the Bar. Roll chief justice, Let it be so, for if the Attorneys agree to reasonable things, we will not oppose them, Rule. But the Attorneys ought not to make rules of themselves. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. BOynton moved for a Deer-stealer that was convicted at the Sessions in London upon an Endictment preferred against him upon the late Act made against stealing of Deer, and removed hither by a Habeas Corpus, Exceptions to a return of a Habeas Corpus. that the return might be filled, and took this Exception, viz. That it appears not in what Parish the offence was committed, as it ought to do. Roll chief justice, Here is a conviction and a judgement in the Case, and the party is in Execution, and therefore bring your writ of Error if the judgement be erroneous, for we will not overthrow it for a fault in the return of the Habeas Corpus: But because it did appear to the Court that the party was convicted behind his back, they moved the Council to advice of a way how he may come to a fair trial for the satisfaction of the party, Error. and of the people; For it is a hard case, and let the Marshal take him in the mean time, And we will also advise. Hill. 1652 Banc. sup. BY Roll chief justice. If a sum of money be to be levied upon a Corporation, it may be levied upon the Mayor or chief Magistrate, How money is to be levied upon a Corporation. or upon any person being a Member of the Corporation. This was spoken in the Case of the Town of Colchester in Essex. Nota. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved that a Sheriff might be ordered to return a Writ upon a pain. Motion for a Sheriff to return his writ. Pain. Affidavit. Sugestion. But Roll chief justice answered, let him return it, but not upon a pain, because here is no Affidavit to prove that he refused to return it; but only the suggestion of the Council at the Bar. Hill. 1652. C. B. BY Pinsent protonotary of the common place. Who may defend a title in Trespass and ejectment. If one move that the title of land doth belong unto him, and that the Plaintiff hath made an ejector of his own, and thereupon prays that giving security to the ejector to save him harmless, he may defend the title, this Court will grant it; but will not compel the Plaintiff to confess the lease, entry, and ouster, except he will be ejector himself; But it is not so in the Court of the upper Bench, for there in both cases they will compel him to confess lease, entry, and ouster. But Q. for I have not known it so ruled. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. AN order of Sessions made at Arondell in Sussex for paying so much money weekly to a Parish, Order of Sessions quashed. towards the keeping of a Bastard Child, was quashed, because it did not appear by the order, that the Child was born in that Parish to which the money was awarded to be paid. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to discharge the plea of not taking the engagement pleaded to a Soldier in the State's service in Ireland, Motion to discharge the plea of engagement. Certificate. upon a certificate under the hand and seal of an officer in the Army there, under whose command he was, that he had taken it, and also upon a certificate under my Lord General Cromwell's hand, and Colonel Whaleys hand, that they did believe the other certificate was true. Roll chief justice answered, we cannot help you, for our hands are tied up by the Act, from which we must not vary. Nota. Hill. 1652. Banc. sup. ROll chief justice said, Whether one indicted of perjury be bailable. that he doubted whether one indicted of perjury may be bailed, although the clarks of the criminal side said he might. Q. Brightwell and Robson, Pasch. 1653. Banc. sup. AN Action upon the case was brought for delivering in a false note of goods, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the case. for which excise was to be paid into the office of excise, whereby he was compelled to pay 50 l. to his damage, etc. upon not guilty pleaded and a verdict for the Plaintiff. Green moved in arrest of judgement, because that the Declaration did not set forth the Act of Parliament, which gives authority to the commissioners of excise. And 2ly. The damage is not coupled with the fraud, nor is it exppessed how he was compelled to pay the 50 l. and the Court is not bound to take notice of the Ordinance of Parliament touching the officers of the excise, because it is not a general law. But Roll chief justice answered, that the fraud is the ground of the Action, and all the other matter set forth in the Declaration is but matter of inducement to the Action, and it is not requisite to be so punctual in setting that forth as is surmised, and we are bound to take notice of the Ordinance, Inducement, Notice. and the Action brought is to recover damages caused by the fraud, and it is no more necessary to set forth all the circumstances occurring in acting of the fraud, than for one to set forth all processes in an Action grounded upon a fraudulent judgement obtained against him, by which he is damnified. judicium nisi, etc. pro querence. Pasch. 1653. Banc. sup. BY Roll chief justice, Endictment for breaking the Peace. If one that is bound to the Peace do break his recognizance, he may be indicted upon it, for this is a new offence. Pasc. 1653. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved upon an Affidavit to discharge a Prisoner brought to the Bar by a habeas corpus, Motion to discharge a Prisoner. because he was arrested on the Sabbath day. Roll chief justice, plead this matter to his Action that arrested you, for we cannot discharge you upon an affidavit. Custodes and Rickaby. Pasch 1653. Banc. sup. RIckaby convicted of Felony for killing a man during the wars, Motion to discharge a Prisoner upon the general pardon. Surmise. and brought hither by a habeas corpus; moved by his council to be discharged upon the Act of the late general pardon. Roll chief justice, It appears not to us, whether you are excepted out of it or no. But enter your surmise upon the Roll by the advice of your council as you will stand to it. Postea. Pasch. 1653. Banc. sup. BY Roll chief jutice, One cannot answer for an infant as Guardian, Who may answer for an Infant as Guardian, Motion. Prochein amy Infant. either in the Chancery or in any other Court, except he be asigned Guardian by the Court, for if he might that were to make himself his Guardian, and that might prove to the damage of the infant, therefore if one will sue an Infant, he must move the Court to assign a Guardian that may answer for him; But an Infant may sue per prochein amy, though his prochein amy cannot answer for him. Pasch. 1653. Banc. sup. BY Roll chief justice, Who may be a witness. although upon a Trial, one who is a Legatee by a Will may not be admitted for a witness to prove that will, yet he may be examined as a witness to prove a deed or other thing, which hath not relation to the will, in respect of the interest which he claims by the Will. And he then also said, that Deeds were enrolled at the Common Law, Eorollment. for the preservation of them, although not to pass any estate, as it is now by the Statute of Enrolments made, 4 H. 7. Pasch. 1653. Banc. sup. BY Roll chief justice, How a disseisin is taken away. Entry. If one disseise me, and a Stranger enter upon the disseisor for me, this Entry takes away the disseisin; and if a Copyholder of a Manor enter as a Commoner, it is in right of the Lord, although it be not by his command, nor he have any notice of it. Nota Pasch. 1653. Banc. sup. AN Action was brought for not paying moneys upon the receipt of a bill of exchange according to the custom of Merchants, Arrest of judgement in an Action to non paying moneys upon a bill of exchange. and upon a verdict found for the Plaintiff it was moved in arrest of judgement, and the exception taken was, that it appears not whether the demand of the money sued for was according to the old stile, or according to the new, and so it is incertain whether the money was due, when it was demanded or no, for if it were demanded according to the new stile 〈◊〉 as not due; but if according to the old stile than it was due for the new stile is 10. days before the old. Twisden answered, it shall be accounted according to the old stile, for that is used here in England, and he said, if there be two Perchants that have a joint trade, and one of them accept a bill of Exchange, if he do not pay it, an Action lies against the other. Roll chief justice, If the bill of Exchange be accepted there is no necessity to allege a demand, Demand. and the demand here is not laid as part of the custom, upon which the Action is founded. Therefore let the Plaintiff have his judgement. Herbert and Lane. Pasch. 1653. Banc. sup. HErbert a Carrier brought an Action upon the case against Lane an Innkeeper, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the case. for goods lost out of the Inn, viz. certain packs full of linen cloth and other goods, and after a verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in arrest of judgement that it doth not appear by the Declaration, what sort of cloth was in the packs, nor of what value the cloth and goods were, and so the Declaration is incertain. But Roll chief justice answered, that the Declaration is good enough, especially now there being a verdict in the case. Pasch. 1653. Banc. sup. BY Roll chief justice, Where a Certiorari may not be granted. Affidavit. Surmise. A Certiorari to remove a Record ought not to be made but to a known Officer who is known to have the custody of Records, and upon a surmise that he hath such a Record in his hand; and therefore We will not upon an Affidavit grant a Certiorari, but upon a surmise made upon the Roll. Pasch. 1653. Banc. sup. COunt Arundeland my Lord Chandois, Bail den●ed for Manslaughter. to whom Count Arundel was second in a duel being formerly indicted at Surrey Assizes before justice Ask & justice Warburton for killing Mr. Hen. Compton, & found guilty only of Manslaughter, by the grand Inquest were brought to Bar to be arraigned for it, and were not admitted to be bailed, but were delivered over to the Marshal to be brought again at another day, Nota. Pasch. 1653. Banc. sup. IOhn Weeks who had been indicted and convicted upon the Statute of King james made against stabbing, Pardon allowed. being formerly brought to this Bar did plead the general pardon which he had sued forth, and prayed it might be allowed; But then the Court said they knew not whether he were excepted out of the general pardon or not, and ordered him to enter his averment upon the Roll; that he is not excepted, Surmise entered, and then to appear again at another day; at which time he was brought again, and then he declared he had entered his Averment, and produced his pardon, and prayed it might be allowed, which after a grave admonition made to him by Mr. justice jerman, exhorting him to repentance and amendment of life, was done. Harris and Tooker. Pasch. 1653. Banc. sup. HArris brought an Action upon the Case against Tooker for turning of an old Watercourse from his Mill to a Mill which the Defendant had lately erected, and obtains a Verdict. Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the Case. The Defendant moves in Arrest of judgement, 1. Because it appears not by the Declaration what estate the Plaintif hath in the Mill, for he only says that he hath been seized of it. 2ly. It is not showed from whence the water runs, as it should be. 3ly. The erecting of the new Mill is not actionable, but the diverting of the water to his damage, and therefore ought not to be jumbled together. Case. Roll chief justice, It is a damage to turn the water out of its ancient course, and it is not needful to say that there is a new Mill erected. But what say you to the first Exception, viz. That you have not showed what estate you have in the Mill. Wild answered, they had showed it. Roll chief justice, Be it so or not the Action lies, for what estate soever he hath an Action of the Case will lie, therefore take your judgement. Pasch. 1653. Banc. sup. MEmorandum, Arraignment for Manslaughter. This day by Rule of Court my Lord Chandois and Count Arundel were again brought to the Bar and arraigned for Manslaughter. Chandois as Principal, and Arundel as accessary for killing Mr. Henry Compton in a duel. They confessed the fact, and craved their Clergy and Peerage by the Statute of 1 Ed. 6. But because the Court doubted whether the Statute was repealed or not, Clergy. and in regard the prisoners were not willing to lie longer in prison, the Court refusing to bail them, because the fact was notorious, they waived their Peerage, and prayed their Clergy as Commoners of England; Whereupon the Ordinary was called, who appeared, and brought his Book, which was a fair Latin Psalter. The Court called for the Book, and seeing it to be Latin, commanded him to bring an English Book, which he did. But because the Officer was not provided who should have burned the Prisoners in the hand, the Court would not then hear them read though the prisoners urged it; But they were ordered to be still in Custody till another day, and then to be brought again. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. TWisden moved for a reference to Hern the Secondary, and put the case to be this. Motion for a reference to the Secondary. A Scire facias issued forth against Executors, and the Sheriff returns nulla bona: After, upon a supposal by a testatum, that the Executors had wasted the goods, a new scire facias with a fieri facias in the same writ issued out, according to the new way used, and upon 2 nichils returned a judgement was given against them de bonis propriis, and the parties were never summoned or had any notice of the proceed. Audita querela. Reference. Roll chief justice, If you be condemned upon 2 nichils returned; whereas you were never summoned, you may help yourselves by an Audita querela, But it is not to be helped upon a reference. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. A Man brought an Action of the case against one for causing him to be indicted for stealing of a Mare, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the Case and hath a verdict against the Defendant. It was moved in Arrest of judgement, that upon preferring of the Bill to the grand jury, they found an Ignoramus, and so there is a repugnancy in the Declaration, which sets forth that the Plaintif caused him to be indicted, and yet says that an Ignoramus was found, so that upon the matter it was found no Endictment. Wild on the other side said, the Declaration is well enough, and there is no repugnancy, for the words shall be taken according to the common construction. Hales, There is another Exception. viz. That all the proceed mentioned in the Declaration are expressed to be before the judges as Commissioners for the Gaol delivery, and not as Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer. Roll chief justice, We will intent that the Endictment was before them as justices of Oyer and Terminer, Endictment. and in truth it is not material before what authority he was indicted; and in this case the trouble the party is put unto by reason of this endictment, is the cause of his bringing this Action, and not his Trial upon it, Cure. and therefore the authority is not material; nor is it material whether the endictment be good or no, and the words here are to be construed according to common intendment, viz. That he was indicted though the endictment was not found, but an Ignoramus, and so by consequence in Law it is no Endictment upon which he could be tried to come in danger of his life. Hales moved that they might amend the Declaration, and go to a new Trial. Roll chief justice, It would be good to do so, Amendment. for it is doubtful how we shall take the matter as it stands before us upon the Record. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved for an Attorney of the Common Pleas that was sued in this Court to allow his writ of privilege. Motion to allow an Attorneys privilege of the common pleas. But Roll chief justice bid him plead his privilege, for we cannot allow it upon a motion, and his showing of his writ of privilege. Whitehead and Buckland Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. Hill. 1652. rot. 121. Whitehead brought his Action of Trespass against Buckland for taking of his , Demurrer to a replication in Trespass for taking . The Defendant pleads the Stat. of limitations of Actions in Bar, the Plaintif replied that he sued forth an Original within the time limited in the Statute: To this replication the Defendant demurs, and shows for cause, 1. That he saith he hath sued out his Original, but doth not say prout pater per Recordum, as he ought to do. 2ly. He doth not plead the continuances upon the Roll, Maynard answered that the pleading is good, and we cannot take a traverse upon their plea, which is surplusage, nor is it necessary for us to show in our plea all the continuances, but to plead so much of the Record only as goes in Bar. Plea. Roll chief justice, The plea is plain, and it is not necessary to allege the continuances, for here is an appearance. Postea. Sale and Wray. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. Wild moved the Court that the Defendant in an Action of Covenant might be ruled to swear his plea, Motion that the Defendant might swea● his plea. because it is a foreign and dilatory plea, pleaded to out this Court of its jurisdiction and to hinder a Trial; for he pleads that he was at Lisbon in Portugal at the day of the payment of the money which he had covenanted to pay. Roll chief justice, you may reply that he was in England, Replication. and you need not traverse absque hoc that he was in Portugal. But the question is, whether the plea be foreign, Traverse. and I am of opinion that it is foreign, and aught to be sworn. Howell answered, it is not foreign, for it may be tried in the County where the Action is brought. Plea. Roll chief justice, Let him swear his plea, except better matter be shown. Kitchinman. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. Upon a Verdict given for the Plaintif in an action of the Case brought for preferring a Bill of Endictment of felony against him. Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the case. It was moved in Arrest of judgement, that it was not laid in the Declaration to be done falsely, but that the Attorney of the Plaintif hath interlined the word falsely in the Postea. 2ly. It is not said that the Endictment preferred was delivered to the grand jury, but to the Court. Roll chief justice, It is said to be preferred malitiose, Endictment. and it cannot be malitiose except it be also falsely, and here is falsely expressed in the beginning of the Record, and it is not necessary to say so through the whole Record, for the words subsequent are coupled to the precedent: And a Bill of Endictment is to be delivered to the Court, and the grand jury receives it from thence. johnson, Lancelot took another Exception, viz. That there is a variance between the Venire and the Distringas, for in the Venire one of the jury is called Cargenter, Variance. and in the Distringas Carpenter. Roll chief justice. Let it be stayed for this fault, And let Williams the Solicitor be committed for enterlining the Postea; Commitment. But upon a voluntary confession of the fact, and submission, the Solicitor was released, and only ordered to pay the charge for the motions in the Cause, Amendment. and the Postea was ordered to be amended by the Paper book. Custodes and Troos. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to stay judgement in an Endictment of perjury found against one for perjury in an evidence given by him in an Action of Trover and Conversion. Motion to stay judgement in perjury. The Exception taken was, that the Oath is not averred to be made concerning the matter in issue in the action, & so it cannot be such perjury, for which an Endictment lies. Roll chief justice, Is the Endictment grounded upon the Statute, or is it an Endictment at the Common Law? The Council answered, It is an Endictment framed upon the Statute. Roll chief justice, Than it is a material exception, but if it had been an Endictment at the Common Law it would have been otherwise, for at the Common Law one may be indicted for a false Oath in an Affidavit. Endictment. Perjury. False Oath. Therefore let judgement stay till the Plaintif move. Custodes and Martin and Long Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to quash two Endictments against Martin and Long, Motion to quash two Endictment. as Lords of the Manor of Clarkenwell for not repairing the Stocks and Whipping Post, and not making of a Pound. The Exception was, Endictments. Stocks. Whipping Post. that the making the Pound was not a public thing, and therefore an Endictment lies not for not doing it. Roll chief justice. That is true. And he took another Exception, That the Endictment doth not show that Martin and Long are Lords of the Leet; And if they be but Lords of the Manor, and not Lords of the Léet, they are not bound of common right to repair the Stocks and Whipping Post, and therefore the Endictment must show how they are bound to do it, viz. either as Lords of the Leet, or otherwise, or else the Parish is bound to do it. Custodes and Rickabye. Mich. etc. 1652. Banc. sup. Upon an old rule of this Court, made in the beginning of King Charles, Arguments and judgement whether a pardon for murder was well pleaded. The Court was moved to deliver their opinion in the Case of Rickaby that had been indicted for murder, and had obtained his pardon, whether the pardon was good and to be allowed, or that he should be tried notwithstanding his pardon. Roll chief justice answered, This Case was argued often at the Bar 8 Caroli, which was long ago, and before our times, therefore let us have books, and argue it again, for we have yet heard no Arguments in the Case. At another day by rule of Court the Case was again moved, and argued by Wadham Windham for the Keepers, that the pardon was not good, nor aught to be allowed, because by the pardon murder was not pardoned, and in his argument he made these questions, viz. 1. Whether the King could pardon murder by the Common Law. 2. Whether he might do it by the Law of God. 3. Whether he might do it by the Statute. 4. Whether the pardon be made good by the non obstante included in it. For the first, the King ex Officio may pardon Manslaughter by the Common Law, and in some cases he might pardon murder, viz. Where there is but only malice employed in the Murderer, but wilful murder he could not pardon, because it is against the Law of God, and he cited 12 H. 8. f. 5. Brudenell. By the Law delivered to Noah, Gen. ver. 6. shedding of blood was made unpardonable, and that is a perpetual Law, Stat. 13. R. 2. C. 1. The King may delegate administration of justice to his Ministers, but not dispensation of mercy. By the Statute of 13 R. 2. c. 1. The King was admonished not to pardon murder so generally as he used, but enacted, That if in his pardons he did not express the word Murder, the pardon should not be good, and the word Murder is not expressed in this pardon, and therefore it is not good, nor to be allowed, 3 Instit. 236. 8 H. 6. 20. 9 H. 6. 8. Kel. 9 Nor doth the King in this pardon recite the Endictment itself, for than it may be it might have altered the Case, but only recites the fact generally, and though the words in the pardon be general, and seem to include murder, yet they cannot make the pardon good, because it wants the express word itself, viz. Murder, and although the Charter be not void, yet it cannot be allowed for want of that word, nor can the general non obstante in the pardon dispense with the Statute of 13 R. 2. for all non obstantes are good only where the King takes notice of the Law wherewith he dispenseth. And as to the Statute of 13 R. 2. First, By it the just power of the King is made certain, and aught to be strictly pursued. 2ly. That Statute was made of grace, and as a boon, to the people, in which they have a special interest, and is not to be abridged. 3ly. It was made for the more free administration of justice, with which the King may not dispense, Hob. f. 214. Here & Lyliars case 11 Rep. f. 88 And although the party here be prosecuted at the suit of the King, yet the prosecution is for the benefit of the people, and therefore the King cannot pardon him, 3 Inst. f. 337 and so he prayed the pardon might not be allowed. Hales appointed by the judges to argue ad informandum conscientiam, as Windham also was, argued for Rickaby, that the pardon was to be allowed, for the question now is not whether the pardon be to be granted or no. And 2ly he held that here is a good non obstance in the pardon to dispense with the Statute, and he argued that murder at the Common Law was pardonable by other words, as well as by the word murder, viz. by the word Felony, and by the word Death of a man, for murder is but Felony in a high degree, and majus et minus non variant spe●iem, 4. rep. Holfords' case, and the Statute of 13 R. 2. makes this clear, and that Statute is dispensed with by the non obstante. For that Statute was not made to disable the King from pardoning murder, but to direct and inform the King, and with that the King may dispense by a non obstante, 16 R. 3. Tit. grants, 34. & 5 jac. in this Court, Baker's case. And here is a dispensation by the Statute of R. 2. that this may be said a pardon at the Common Law, for it appears by the words of the pardon, that the King intended thereby to break through the Statute, and to pardon the party what ever his offence was, for although the non obstante do not expess the word murder, yet it is good, for there are equivalent words to murder in the pardon, for the non obstante to dispense withal. As if the King grants a pardon notwithstanding the Statute of Rich. 2. It is necessary to be referred to that clause in the Statute, which is to be dispensed withal, and so is it here, for there is no other end for the King to dispense with the Statute of R. 2. C. 13. but for this clause, and besides here is a special non obstante, and not a general, and for authorityes he cited Stamford 101. pleas of the Crown, 236. and for precedents 31 Eliz. 4 jac. 5 jac. 6. jac. and many others, and said, that he found none against them. Roll chief justice, Were it not for the precedents I hold there would be but little question in the case; but some of these questions have been debated in some times, although we cannot question the King for granting such pardons, yet it is questionable whether he may grant them by the Law of God; but the King may do it in some cases, Pardon. but here is a Statute that says he shall not do it, if he do not take notice of the fact in his pardon by the name of murder, and here is no such expression, but the words are general; if the King pardon malum ●se with an non obstante it is not good; But let us see Precedents, and we will advise till the next Term. The next Term Roll chief justice in the behalf of himself, and the other judges, delivered the opinion of the Court in this case to this effect. We are all of one opinion, and my brothers have desired me to deliver the reasons of th●irs, and my opinion. First I will open the Record, which in effect is this, Rickaby was indicted at Durham for murder, and the endictment was removed into this Court by a certiorari, and Rickaby brought hither by a habeas corpus, and being demanded what he could say for himself, why he should not be adjudged to die, he pleaded the pardon of the late King, which pardons the death of Curtain in very general words; but the pardon doth not express the word murder, and in his plea he mentions not the Statute of 10 Ed. 3, by a non obstante, and this is set forth for confirmation of his plea, and the Statute of 13 R. 2. is alleged with a non obstante. The case in brief is, Rickaby and others indicted for kill George Curtain, and brought bither pleads his pardon, as is before expressed. The question is, whether the pardon is to be allowed or not: This case hath been well argued, and the like case with this was never called into question, or argued before this, and therefore if we shall not allow this pardon now, we have better reason to move us to it than others have had to do the contrary, and therefore we shall send him into the Country to receive justice there for his offence, for we are all of one opinion, that the pardon is not to be allowed, and that for these reasons, the question here is not whether the King will pardon murder; but Cook saith, the King will not pardon it, if he know it to be murder; but the first question is, whether the King can pardon murder without a non obstante: 2ly. Whether he can do it with a special non obstante. 3ly. Whether he can pardon it by this non obstante in this Charter of pardon. 4ly. Whether Rickaby hath pleaded this non obstante, so that he may take advantage of it. For the first point we do not absolutely disallow the pardon; but we are to inquire whether here be murder or not, it there be murder, that it may be disallowed, otherwise that it may be allowed. Murder. The Statute laws were made for preservation of the public peace, and to restrain pardons for murder, so that after the making of the Statutes, murder could not be pardoned without a non obstante in the pardon, though before it might have been pardoned in general words. And the Parliament hath made divers Statutes to restrain pardons, and that murder should not be so generally pardoned as before. 2 E. 3. 4 E. 3. 14 E. 3. 27 E. 3. C. by which Statutes it may appear, that the opinion was, that the King could not dispense with the Statutes with a non obstante, and the end of all these Statutes was to inform the King to examine whether the fact he intended to pardon was murder, and that he should not grant a pardon for murder, without expressing the word murder in the pardon, and with a non obstante also, Non obstante. Dispensation. 22 H. 7. 91. Kelway. 8 H. 6. f. 20. 9 E. 4. f. 26. Cook, Pleas of the Crown 236. and so the Law is, without a non obstante. 2ly. Whether the King can pardon murder with a non obstante, where the word murder is not expressed. To that I say, that if it had been so, yet the pardon would not have been good, for the Statute cannot be dispensed with by a non obstante, because the Statute was made to reform public abuses, for the benefit of the Commonwealth, 11. rep. Cook's Pleas of the Crown, 237. the King cannot pardon a common nuisance. 2ly. The King hath bound himself by express words in the Statute, and he cannot dispense with them with a non obstante, for then such Statutes made for the advancement of justice would be void, and the King cannot pardon a recognizance for the peace before it is broken, and the King may bind himself in such manner by express words, as my Lord Barkleyes' case is, with the Statute of 1 jac. concerning Bishops the King cannot dispense, but with the Statute of 1 & 13 Eliz. he may. Doctor Hutchinsons' case, Mich. 10. jac. C. B. Hob. 103. the King cannot dispense with this Statute, because it was made for the advancement of justice. For the third point, though the King might dispense with the Statute by a non obstante, yet not with this non obstante in this pardon, for the King doth not take notice of the offence in the non obstante, and the King is deceived here, which the Law will not suffer, and here is a hiding of the offence from the King, which is against the meaning of the Statute. 2ly. This manner of pardoning is against all manner of practice for two hundred years, and was never used till 2 jac. but only in Spencer's case, which was carried with a strong hand, and allowed only pro hac vice, 21 Eliz. by Popham the Attorney general by the special command of the Queen, & until 2 jac. for 200. years no non obstante used of the Statute of 13 R. 2. but this is grown up of late years, and a judge of our own times hath told me that he hath disallowed it. 3. Inst. 105. it hath been used of late times to make a lease of the party's life. viz. to respite execution until the time of 2 jac. and that allowance I formerly mentioned pro hac vice, may be questioned whether it were good or no. For the fourth point the pleading of the pardon is not good, for he hath not pleaded a non obstante for the pardon of the murder, but only to dispense with the binding to the good behaviour, and the pardon is only recited to prove the plea, and therefore it is not to be allowed. Therefore let the Prisoner ire sine die, and let the matter be inquired in the County where the fact was done. Yet we will consider whether he shall be tried in the Country or here, in the mean time, Marshal cake care at your peril that you keep him in salva custodia. Newman and Massey. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. NEwman brought an Action of debt upon an obligation against Massey as an Executor; Special verdict in debt upon an obligation against an executor. Plea. The Defendant pleads generally plene administravit, and after issue joined be gives in evidence a judgement against the Testator to make good his plea, upon which a special verdict was found. The question thereupon was, whether this judgement may be given in evidence upon the late meal Act to maintain the issue, or whether it should not have been pleaded specially in bar of the Action. Roll chief justice, The question is, whether the giving the judgement in evidence can stand with his plea of plene administravit, and it seems it cannot, for now you show an administration in an other way than you pleaded upon a new matter alleged. Adjourned. At another day Hales argued that a plene administravit is a plea in Bar, although it be not a perpetual Bar, and it is a general issue, because it compriseth many things which may be given in evidence, 27 H. 7. 2. 11 H. 6. 35. and it is styled a general issue, Br. gen. issue 91. & Hob. 106, case f. 227. and it would be mischievous if it should be otherwise. Roll chief justice, If upon the general issue one should give in evidence non est factum, would it be good? certainly the Act for the general issue in itself is mischievous, Issue. and we will not enlarge it, and this is not the general issue intended in the Statute, although it be a common issue, for the general issue intended, aught to be an issue proper to the Action that is brought, and which he might have pleaded at the beginning, and who can tell upon this plea what you will give in evidence, Evidence. and so the Plaintiff can never be provided for you at the trial, and therefore you must rely upon your special plea of plene administravit, and not dairy from it by showing new matter. Therefore let the Plaintiff have his judgement. Atwood and Monger. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. ATwood brought an Action upon the case against Monger, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the case. for causing a false presentment to be made against him before the conservators of the River of Thames, for suffering 8. loads of earth to fall into the River of Thames, and obteins a verdict; the Defendant moved in arrest of judgement that it doth not appear by the Record what authority the conservators had to take the presentment, and if they had no authority, than it was coram non judice, and the Plaintiff could not be prejudiced by it. Twi●den answered it is well enough, though their authority appears not by the Record, because they have authority given them by the Statute of 13 R. 2. C. 9 which is a general Law, and aught to be taken notice of; but if not, yet the Action is well brought, for it is brought for the vexation the Plaintiff was put unto by reason of the presentment, and the other matter alleged, is but by way of inducement to the Action. 2. Car. in De●t and O●ifes case in this court so held, and though the conservators had no authority, yet the Action lies for the malicious prosecution, and for unjustly vexing him, and so adjudged. Trin. 16 Car. in this Court in Damon and Sheremans' case. Hales on the other side said, that this Court is not bound to take notice, that the Lord Mayor of London hath this jurisdiction of conservatorship, for the Statute which gave it him is a particular Law touching him only, and so not to be taken notice of without it be shown, and then if he have no such authority, all the proceed against the Plaintiff are void. Roll chief justice, An Action upon the case lies for bringing an appeal against one in the Common Pleas, though it be coram non judice, Case. by reason of the vexation of the party, and so it is all one whether here were any jurisdiction or no, for the Plaintiff is prejudiced by the vexation, and the conservators took upon them to have authority to take the presentment. And I hold that an Action upon the case will lie, for maliciously bringing an Action against one where he had no probable cause, and if such Actions were used to be brought, it would deter men from such malicious courses as are to often put in practice. Sherecroft and Weeks. Trin. 1953. Banc. sup. SHerecrost brought an Action upon the case against Weeks, Arrest of judgement in an Action for words. for speaking these words of him; He, meaning the Plaintiff, got Mary Nab with Child, and the Child is his, and I have tried it with a sieve and a pair of shears; It was moved in arrest of judgement, that the latter words are insensible, and so the Action not maintainable; to which it was answered, that the first words are Actionable, & it matters not though the latter words be nonsense, because they have no reference to the former words, and therefore shall be rejected as senseless. But Sergeant Barnard on the other side said, the latter words do take off the force of the former words, as the case is 4. rep. f. 19 2ly. It is not said here, when he got her with Child, Nor 3ly. Doth he aver that there was any such person as Mary Nab. Roll chief justice, Case. The Action doth well lie, for the former words are positive scandalous words, and the subsequent words are not material, and if they be, than they are in confirmation of the former, for it seems he put confidence in the sieve and the shears, and that made him speak the words, and it matters not whether his confidence be true or false. Therefore judicium nisi pro Querente. Weldon and Strudder. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. IT was moved to the Court that the Plaintiff after he had obtained a verdict, and before judgement entered, died, Motion to enter the death of the Plaintiff on the Roll. and prayed that this might be entered upon the Roll; but the Court denied it, and said it could not be. Whitehead and Buckland. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. THe case of Whitehead and Buckland was again spoken unto, Demurrer to a replication in Trespass by Original. which was this; Whitehead brought an Action of Trespass by original writ, for taking his ; the Defendant pleaded the Statute of limitations of Actions in Bar; the Plaintiff replies that he took forth an original writ against the Defendant for this Trespass within the time limited by the Statute, and upon this replication the Defendant demurred, and for cause shows, that he doth not show what writ he sued forth, as he ought to do, otherwise it cannot be known whether he be rightly thereby entitled to his Action or no. 2ly. He hath not showed the continuances upon his proceed, and so it cannot be known whether his Action be discontinued or no, that if it be we may take advantage thereof. 3ly. He doth not say that he hath taken out an Original, prout apparet per Recordum, as he ought to do, for we do not agree the writ that he pleads he hath taken out. 4ly. He hath concluded his plea, so that it amounts to a new assignment, and hinders us from objecting against it by way of rejoinder, and he joins an issue of his own head of a matter not alleged before, and 5ly. The Action is for a Trespass done in 1645. and yet he concludes it to be contra pacem publicam, which being in the late King's time could not be, but aught to have been contra coronam et dignitatem nostram. Latch on the other side said, that both parties agree to the Original, and the disagreement is only in the time of the execution thereof, and it is not necessary to say prout patet per recordum; nor is it necessary to show the continuances of the process, for this would make the Record too long, and here is no hindrance but they may rejoin if they have cause. P●●a. Error. Roll chief justice, As to the first Exception it is not necessary to set forth the particulars of the writ, and if the writ be not good you may have a writ of Error; and for the second exception, the plea is good without showing the continuances, and there is no inconvenience by not setting them forth, and we will intent that all is rightly done, because you have appeared, and you are not hindered from replying, but may do it if you will, and have cause, and the Record here shows that you have appeared to this writ; but it is not good to conclude the plea super totam materiam as you have done, for by this he is hindered from replying, and then he hath good cause to demur, because you have concluded him, and what say you to that? Latch, The party may strike out the words Et querens similiter. Roll chief justice, He cannot strike out that which belongs not to him, Replication. Demurrer. and you cannot go back, and the other is compelled to demur. Therefore, Nil capiat per Billam nisi, etc. or waive the Demurrer, Postea. Trin. 1652. Banc. sup. IT was said in the case of Homes and Bingley, Who may make a lease to try a title. that Tenant at will may make a lease for years to try a title of land, and so may a Copyholder. Q. Trin. 1652. Banc. sup. BY Roll chief justice, What plea an Attorney may plead without a special warrant. An Attorney who hath warrant to appear for his Client, may plead for him without warrant. But the Clarks in Court said, he may plead no other plea without a special warrant, but a non sum informatus, ideo Q. Perk and Ewer. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. Pasch. 1653. rot. 116, or 117. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an Action of debt for rend arrear upon two leases for years, Error to reverse a judgement in debt for rent. viz. upon a lease for 3 years of divers Copyhold Lands, and upon a lease for 31 years for other lands. Howell assigns for Error. 1. That the Declaration is not good, because that it is for an entire rent reserved for 2 several terms, whereas one of the terms is expired, & here cannot be made any apportionment of the rent, because it appears not which of the lands are Copyhold, and which are Free lands. Roll chief justice, He ought to show how much of the lands are Copyhold, and how much Freehold. Hales, Here is but one entire rent reserved, and it shall be paid as well after the expiration of the Copyhold lands as before. Roll chief justice, Discontinuance. Then for what term shall the rent be reserved? for it doth not appear to us, Therefore you were best to discontinue your action, otherwise if we give judgement upon the Exception taken, you may lose your rent. Hill and Dechair. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. AN Action of debt was brought for 5 l. for selling of Wine without Licence, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the Statute for selling wine without licence. and a Verdict was found for the Plaintif. It was moved in Arrest of judgement, That the Action is not well brought, because it is not by Original, as it ought to be by the Statute of 18 Eliz. Wild on the other side answered, that it is not necessary to be by Original; for a Bill of debt as this is, is in the nature of an Original writ, if it should be otherwise the Statute would be repugnant: for the debt one by Statute may be recovered in this Court by Information, and this is the usual practice of this Court. Twisden took a difference between a penal Action, and a popular Action; A penal Action he said may be by Bill, but not a popular Action. 2ly. It is not showed that the party was not licenced to sell Wine. 3ly. The Verdict finds him guilty for selling of 5 pints of Wine between such a time and such a time, Relation. Action. part where of was before the Information brought, and part after the Information brought. To the last exception, Roll chief justice answered, The matter shall relate to the filing of the Bail, for then the Action beginneth, & not before. But what say you to the other Exception? Wild, That is mistaken, for the Action is upon another branch of the Statute. Roll chief justice, By an original Action it is meant in the Statute that the offence shall not be tried upon a plaint in an Inferior Court, & not to distinguish it from an information; for a Writ & Bill is all one in this Court, Stat. 2 R. 3. A Bill is not an Original writ, Writ. Bill. but an original Action, and it is the common practice to sue in this Court, in this manner. But we will advise. At another day the Court was moved for judgement, because the Action is well brought, though it be not brought by original, and the Case urged of Winston against it is not to the purpose, for that Case was not upon an information, as our Case is, but it was brought by the party grieved to recover his triple damages, and in that case the party did not pursue the manner of suing for them as the Statute directed, but we have here done it, and it is the constant practice of this Court. Twisden answered, that Winstons case is not answered; for that was a popular Action, as our case is. Roll chief justice, The question here is, whether there be an original Action or not upon the Statute of 18 Eliz. C. 5. And I say it doth not appear whether that Statute meant to out this Court of its jurisdiction or not, but it is left at large in the Statute, and me thinks it is an original Action, jurisdiction. and Plaits Case is, that an original Action may be by Bill, And I conceive the Statute intended only to exclude inferior Courts, and the constant course is, that the party being in Custodia Marescalli he may be proceeded against by Bill, and we will not suffer this Court to be excluded from its jurisdiction by obscure words in the Statute, Therefore let judgement be for the plaintiff, nisi, etc. Ricott and St. john. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. IN Action of Trespass an Ejectment brought by Ricott against St. john, Motion that the Defendant may plead as a third person shall direct. the Court was moved for a third person, that he will save the Defendant harmless, and prays that giving him security so to do, the Defendant may be ordered by the rule of this Court to plead as he should direct him, and that he be not suffered to confess a judgement. Roll chief justice, It is out of the way for you to give such security, for there yet appears no collusion, But you shall be made a party to defend the title, and then move again. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. IN the Case of one Clerk it was said by Roll chief justice, Where a day is taken inclusive, where exclusive. Arbitrement. That if the submission to an Award be, that the Award be made six days after the submission, the day of the Award is to be taken inclusive and not exclusive, so that if the Award be made the same day on which the submission was, it is a good Award. Air and Hauxesworth. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. Air brought an Action of Trespass against Hauxesworth for his Cattles damage pheasant in D. the Defendant justifies in another County, Whether a Traverse was well taken. and traverseth absque hoc, that he is guilty in D. or in any other place. The question was whether the traverse be well taken or not. Roll chief Just answered, he must take a traverse as this case is, because the justification is local: Traverse Discontinuance. Therefore let the Plaintif take nothing by his Bill, for he may not discontinue his Action because it is in Trespass. Nota. Fletcher and King. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in the Common Pleas in an Action of debt 〈◊〉 ●●●ght upon an assumpsit to save one harmless, Error to reverse a Judgement in debt upon an Assumpsit. in disposing of certain good ●s●ised by an Order of th● Commissioners of Haberdasher's Hall; 〈◊〉 ●●sendant 〈◊〉 that he had saved him harmesses; The Plaintif replied that he was damnified, the Defendant rejoins by protestation, that there was no Order of Haberdasher's Hall, for plea saith, non damnificatus, and upon this the Plaintif demurred in the Common Pleas, and a judgement was given there upon the Demurrer for the Plaintif. In the writ of Error here the Error assigned was, that the rejoinder is a departure from the plea, and here it doth not appear that john Pitcher named in the replication is the same john Pitcher that is named in the Declaration, for it is said quidem johannes Pitcher, and not the said I. Pitcher. Latch said, This is not material, whether he be the same or no; but upon the entire matter it doth appear that he is the same person, for there is an averment afterwards that makes it so appear, viz. That it is the same person and goods mentioned in the plea, and in the condition made upon delivery of the goods, and it cannot be otherwise understood, and their bar is naught both in matter and in form also, for he is to be saved harmless of goods. Hale on the other side makes a difference between saying one I. P. and saying I. P. and saying of divers goods, and saying of goods generally; and the goods mentioned here cannot relate to the goods mentioned in the condition, and though the plea be not good it matters not, for the replication assigns not a breach. Roll chief justice, If your plea be not good, than the Declaration is not answered. Traverse. Intendment. Bar, Replication. It may be intended the same person, yet it is not well expressed to say quidam I. P. for how can a traverse be taken upon an intendment? nor doth it appear they are the same goods but by intendment, so that the bar is ill, and the replication also. Affirmetur nisi, etc. Nota. and Hodges. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in the Town of Newberry in an Action upon the Statute of 5 Eliz. brought by an Informer for using a Trade, not having served an Apprenticeship therein, Error to reverse a judgement given in an Action upon the Stature of 5 Eliz. and two Errors were assigned, 1. That the Action ought not to be brought in an inferior Court, but must be brought in one of the Courts at Westminster. 2ly. The Venire is not good, for it is only praeceptum est, and doth not say per curiam as it ought to be. Roll chief justice, The Action ought not to be brought there, but it ought to be brought in some of the Courts here and the second is a good exception also, therefore reversetur, nisi, etc. Action. Venire. Tailor and Webb. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. IT was resolved by the Court, that the delivering of a breviate of the Case to the jury before the verdict, and their reading it, What Act may make a Verdict void. did make the verdict given by them to be void, for the jury ought not to have any other writings given them to peruse than such as are given in evidence, for it would be dangerous if it should be otherwise, and to confirm this, Mich. 31 et 32 Eliz. Metcalves and Deans case, and one Viccary and Farthings case were cited by Roll chief justice. Ashby and Child. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. Mich. 1652. rot. 686. Upon a Demurrer in an Action of debt the case was this, A man died intestate, and a Stranger possesseth himself of the Intestates goods after Letters of Administration were granted to a Creditor of the Intestate, who brings an Action of debt against the stranger for the debt due to him by the Intestate, as Executor of his own wrong. The question was, whether the Creditor by taking the Letters of Administration had not suspended his Action for the time he should continue to be Administrator. Twisden held that his Action is suspended, and cited 8 Rep. St. john's case, because the goods of the Intestate shall be assets in his hands, Hob and Longs case; and the Plaintif is at no prejudice, for he may recover the goods by an Action of Trover or Trespass, 12 H. 4. f. 21. Hales on the other side held that the Action is not suspended; for though he may bring Trespass or a Trover and Conversion for the goods, yet they are not assets till they are recovered, and a Creditor may bring an Action against an Executor de son tort, although Letters of Administration be granted to another, and the subsequent administration doth not suspend the Action which accrued before, and here can be no retainer to satisfy himself, because he hath not the goods, and it is not the bare Letters of administration that chargeth the Administrator, but the Assets also, Com. 7. Basset's case, An Action of debt is maintainable by an Administrator who hath not assets. Roll chief justice, There is a book against that, that the heir is not chargeable. Hales prima fancy, It is a good plea, otherwise it would be mischievous, for all the goods may be wasted before he hath administration granted him; and though he may bring an action of Trespass for the goods, yet he may bring his Action to which he was entitled before the administration granted unto him. Trover and Conversion. Roll chief justice, It is clear the Administrator may bring a Trover and Conversion for the goods, and here is but a right to assets in the Administrator, Assets. and no assets to charge him withal, and it would be mischievous if it should be otherwise; and the granting unto him Letters of Administration hinders him not from bringing his Action, because the goods were not taken away after the Administration granted but before, Trespass. Debt. and if they had been taken away afterwards, he might have had a Trover and Coversion, or an Action of Trespass, but in the case at the Bar he may have an Action of debt, and he cannot sue himself, therefore his Action is not suspended, Suspension. Retainer. and he cannot retain the goods to satisfy himself, because he hath no goods, and he may sue the heir here if he will, and he shall not take advantage against him by reason of the administration, because he hath no assets to retain or sue himself for, and so it is in his election what Action he will bring, Election. otherwise it would be dangerous, and we must support men in their just Actions. jerman, Nicholas and Ask ad idem. And so judgement was given for the plaintiff, nisi. Fisher and jeoffryes. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. FIsher brought an Action of debt against jeoffryes as Executor to another; What may not be pleaded after imparlance. the Defendant imparis, and after imparlance he pleads that he is Administrator cum testamento annexo, and not Executor, and that he ought to be named so in the writ, to this Plea the Plaintif demurred. Roll chief justice, Upon the matter he pleads a misnosmer after imparlance, Plea. which he cannot do, and therefore let the Plaintif have his judgement, nisi, &. Giles and Southward. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. IN this case it was said by Roll chief justice, That if the Defendant do plead an insufficient bar, and the Plaintif do join issue upon it, judgement though the plea in bar not good. and obtain a Verdict, the Plaintif shall have judgement though the Bar was not good. Rawley and Vivers. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. A Writ of Error was brought upon a judgement given in an Action of Trespass, quare clausum fregit, etc. The Error assigned was, Error to reverse a judgement in Trespass quare clausum fregit. Value. that the Plaintif did declare quare clausum fregit, and for pulling down of his house, but doth not show the value of his house. Roll chief justice, It is not necessary, the Action being a real action. Affirmetur, nisi. Bariar and Windham. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. IT was held by the Court that the Engagement taken before 2 justices of Peace in Ireland is well taken, What engagement is well taken. and that the Engagement ought not to be pleaded to an Alien born, and subject to any foreign Prince in amity with England, because he is under another obedience, and thereupon the Engagement pleaded to such an one was discharged in the Case of one Bariar and Windham. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. ONe who was a witness in the cause for the Defendant being bail for him, upon motion to the Court was taken off from the file, Who may not be bail. and another bail taken in his room in Court upon examination of his sufficiency. Nota. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to dispauper the Plaintif in an Action of Trespass and Ejectment, Motion to dispauper the Plaintif. for that it was proved by Affidavit that he was a very vexatious person, for he had been thrice nonsute in this Action, & would never pay costs, or make a sufficient Lessee able to pay them, and had also sealed a general release to the Defendant. Roll chief justice, Let him be dispaupered, and let him put in an able Lessee to pay the costs, or otherwise he shall not proceed in his Action. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. BY Roll chief justice, Laws of England and Ireland all one. Error. The Laws of Ireland are all one with the Laws of England, and a writ of Error lies in England to reverse a judgement given in Ireland. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. A Declaration was filled in the Ofice against one in custody of the Marshal, What is not good notice to a prisoner of a declaration against him. judgement discharged. and a Copy of it was left with the Clerk of the prison, but the prisoner had no notice of it. Upon the prisoners showing of this matter to the Court, and reading an Affidavit to prove it, a judgement by a nihil dicit obtained against him was discharged, and ordered that the Plaintif should accept of a plea. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to discharge a prisoner out of the Upper Bench that had lain there ever since 14 Caroli, To discharge a prisoner that had long lain in prison. upon a judgement obtained against him in an Action of Debt, where only common bail was filled, and because no execution was ever taken out upon that judgement, and the plaintiff in the Action was now dead. Roll chief justice, Let him be discharged nisi causa shown to morrow. Nota. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. BY Roll chief justice, Matter of Record not alterable without motion to the Court. A matter entered upon Record cannot be altered without a motion made, and the Consent of the Court first obtained, though the Attorneys on both sides consent to it. Trin. 1653. Banc sup. THe Court was moved to quash an Order of Sessions for one to pay 3.5. a week to keep a Bastard Child. To quash an Order of Sessions. Roll chief justice, Let it be quashed, for they can make no such Order, for the party may keep the Child himself, if he will, and then he need pay no money to keep it. Trin. 1653. Banc. sup. BY Roll chief justice, When the Venue may not be changed. The Venue cannot be changed after a Plea pleaded in abatement of the writ, much less after a plea pleaded in Bar. Q. Fanshaw and Bond. Mich. 1953. Banc. sup. IN this Case it was said, That if a Copyholder refuse to pay a reasonable fine, or to be admitted to the Copyhold, How a Copyhold is forfeited. This is a forfeiture of his estate. Dekin and Turner. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. Upon a motion in Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the Case for these words, Thou art a whore, and I will prove it, Arrest of judgement in an Action for words. It was said by Roll chief justice, That the words are not actionable, although spoken since the Act made against Adultery, because they are but words of heat and choler, but if a special damage be laid by the speaking of them, as per quod maritagium amisit, or the like, there they are actionable. Price and Goodrick. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. IN this Case it was said by Roll chief justice, Where an Audita querela lies. If there be a judgement against three, and one of them is taken in Execution, and be afterwards set at large by the Plaintiffs consent, if any of the other two be afterwards taken in execution upon the same judgement, he may have an Audita querela, Motion. but he cannot be relieved upon a motion in Court, though grounded upon an Affidavit. Newton and Osborn. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. NEwton brought an Action of Covenant against Osborn an Executor to a Lessee for years for nonpayment of rent reserved upon the lease upon the general words yielding and paying in the lease; Whether an action of Covenant did Fe or not against an Executor. there being no express Covenant therein for the payment of the rent. The question was, whether this Action did lie against the Executor. Latch argued that it did not lie, because it is a mere Covenant in Law comprised only in the words yielding and paying, and not an express Covenant, and so only binds the Testator, but not the Executor. But Roll chief justice answered, That an Action of Covenant doth lie against an Executor upon a Covenant in Law, Covenant. Executor. although he be not named, but it is otherwise of an heir, for he is not bound by such a Covenant. And the reservation of the rent here doth seem to be an express Covenant, for it is the agreement of both parties, viz. of the Lessor and Lessee, judicium nisi. Benskin and Herick. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. BEnskin brought an Action of Debt upon an Obligation against Herick. A Plaintiff lost his money by joining false issue, a Verdict against him. The Defendant pleads that he tendered the money due upon the Obligation at the day and place of payment, and that the Plaintiff refused to receive it. Upon this the money was brought into Court by rule upon the Defendants motion, the Plaintiff joins issue that there was no tender and refusal; and upon this a Trial was had, and a verdict found for the Defendant, that he did make tender, and that the Plaintiff did refuse to receive the money, and thereupon the Defendant moved to have the moniés out of Court. Roll chief justice, Peremptory. The Plaintiff hath lost his money ●y this verdict, therefore let him show cause why the Defendant should not have them, for it is peremptory to the Plaintiff. Franklin. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. IN an Action of Account the Defendant was adjudged to account, Motion for Merchants to be joined to Auditors assigned to receive an account. and Auditors were assigned. The Court was moved that they would order to join some Merchants to the Attorneys on either side to help them to manage the Account, because the Attorneys were not skilful in such businesses. Roll chief justice, We can make no rule for this, but you may by consent advise with Merchants to assist you in drawing up the Accounts, Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. BY Roll chief justice, One burned in the hand may be a Witness. one that hath been burned in the hand for Felony, may notwithstanding be a witness in a Cause: for he is in a capacity to purchase Lands, and his fault is purged by his punishment. Townsend and Barker. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. Trin. 1653. rot. 743. TOwnsend brought an Action upon the Case against Barker, Arrest of judgement in an action for words. that had been a Copartner with him in trade, for speaking these words of him, You are a cozening Knave, and did cozen me of 1200 l. at one time, and that was in making an account in the year 1648. Upon a verdict for the Plaintiff, it was moved in arrest of judgement that the words are not actionable, because though they he spoken of a Tradesman, yet they are not spoken of him in reference to his Trade, but in reference to an Account, and although by way of reduction and consequence they may reflect upon his honesty, yet they are not actionable, and though his reputation be impaired by speaking them, yet he cannot be indicted for cozening in his Trade by reason of them, because they are spoken of a singular and particular abuse, and not of a general cozening used in his Trade, and an Action upon the Case lies not for words which are only scandalous by way of reduction, and if the words should hinder the party to get a Partner hereafter to trade with him, yet he may use his Trade, and so cannot be prejudiced: nor are the words that he cheated him, but that he cozened him, which are not of so violent a construction. Wild on the other side said, that here is a Partnership which is necessary to the driving of a Trade, and without which it cannot be so well driven, and the Account is incident to all Partnerships, and prayed for judgement. Roll chief justice. If the Copartnership continued, the words were actionable without doubt, for than they must be spoken of him in the way of his Trade: Case. but here the Partnership being ended makes the matter more considerable; but yet as it is the words are scandalous, and may hinder him from getting a Partner for the time to come, and it may be he cannot manage his Trade without a Partner; and although an Account be a private thing, yet the Plaintiff is disgraced by the speaking of the words, and none will deal with a man that will cozen his own Partner; and we must countenance Trade and Traffic, and men's credits; and the Account is not so collateral a thing to trade as Hales objects, as is the hiring of a shop to trade in, or the like. German justice ad idem, and said, that Copartnership is necessary to support Trade, and the keeping of a true Account is the principal thing between Partners. Nicholas and Ask justices ad idem. Judicium nisi pro querente. Bird and Christopher. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. IN this Case upon giving of an evidence in a Trespass and Ejectment, Extinguishment of a Proviso, in a Deed. it was said by Roll chief justice, that if I do enfeoff I. S. with a Proviso contained in the Deed, that it shall be lawful for me to revoke this Feoffment, and afterwards I levy a fine to I. S. of the same Land, this is an extinguishment of the Proviso of revocation. Olive and Tongall Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. Trin. 1651. rot. 1426. Upon a special Verdict in an Action of Trespass and Ejectment, Special Verdict in a Trespass and Ejectment. the Case in effect was this, One whose Surname was Mills seized of Gavelkind-lands in Kent in fee, by his last Will and Testament devised these Lands to Elizabeth his Daughter in tail, with a Proviso in the Will, that if his Daughter Elizabeth did marry one of his own Surname that then she should have the Lands in fee-simple. Elizabeth married one whose Surname was Mill, but commonly called and known by the name Mills also. The question was, whether she had married one of such a Surname, where●● according to the Proviso in the Will she had a fee-simple in the Lands ●evised unto her, or whether his Surname should be accounted a distinct name from the Testators, so that Elizabeth by the Will could only have an Estate in tail in the Lands devised unto her. It was argued first, that the name Mill and Mills shall not be said to be one and the same name, no more than if she had married one of a clear differing Surname in sound, yet commonly called also Mills, could she have been said to have married one of his own Surname, and the Proviso here is not a particular pointing out of the person whom his Daughter should marry, but a general limitation directing her to marry one of his own Surname, and this aught to have been punctually followed, because the name was used to induce the affection of the Devisor to enlarge the estate given by him. If he had devised his Land to his Daughter E. if she shall marry a Protestant or an Earl, she must marry one that is really so, and not one called or only reputed so. And as to the objection, that this construction would make contrariety in the Will, which is not to be admitted; this will not be, if the Will be taken compositive as it is penned, or together, and not abstractive and taken to pieces, and if it should not be intended that she should marry one who in truth was of his name there would be a contradiction in the Will; and here is an Emphasis in the word Own, which must be meant his real name, and not of a reputative name. Roll chief justice, If a juror be returned by the name of Mills, and is sworn by the name of Mill, shall this be a mistryal, quasi non? and the words found alike as Baxter and Backster. At an other day the Case was put again by Hales, and argued for the Plaintiff, and he made divers points in the Case, but I could not well hear him: but the only point insisted on was the point formerly spoken to, and the sum of his Argument was, that we are in this Case upon the construction of a Will, which must be favourably taken, and the variation here betwixt Mills and Mill is small and inconsiderable to defeat an Estate, for it is only in the termination of the word, and is as little as the difference between Baxter and Backster, or Hasting and Hastings, 9 E. 4.42, 44 Eliz. Molyn and Molyns, or Pitt and Pitts, which differ but in one letter, and is not a material difference. 2ly. It appears by the Verdict that he was commonly called Mill and Mills, and common reputation we know doth give names to things. 3ly. It is found that he was known by one name as well as the other, and this will satisfy the Testators intent well enough to carry the Estate. 4ly. The party himself was known to the Testator at the time of the making of the Will by the name of Mills, as appears in eight several places of the Will. And if one devise Lands and Goods, and excepts one Lease, if there be other Leases they are devised. 5ly. It appears by the Will and the Verdict, that the marriage was intended by the Father with this very person that is called Mills, and a settlement of Lands made upon it, and it shall not be intended that the Testator thought that this marriage would be dissolved and another marriage be had. And the devise in the body of the Will doth not make the Proviso in the end of the Will repugnant, but if it did the last repugnancy shall stand: for here is no dependency of the last Proviso upon the other part of the Will, but it is a substantine clause which revokes not the other, Doctor Butts Case, 10 Rep. and this shall be counted his last Will, and it is the more strong, because it appears by the very words, that it is a plain substantive clause made to declare the new intent of the Testator, and it shall not be intended that this Proviso shall be applied to another person, although there be a particular title given to him by the Will, and the Estate altered by the Proviso, and the former devise is derogated by it, Hob. 2d. Case, Harding Case, and the strength of the Proviso to have one of the true name of Mills is not to be intended, for it appears that the intent of the Testator was, to have one of his name in reputation, and this appears by the former limitation in the Will, and the provision made in the last Proviso to preserve his name, is no more than that he had done before: and the former limitation is as well for the Testators advantage as the latter Proviso, and more, and his intent was not to sell the Lands, but to preserve them, and it is no more to say of my own Surname, than to say of my Surname, nor is the videlicet any thing to the purpose. Roll chief justice, if the question were only upon the Proviso, there would be no difficulty but that Mill and Mills should be all one, and it would be good in a Conveyance also, as I suppose, and if it were apparent that he intended one and the same person, Proviso. than the last Proviso would be good to revoke the former part of the Will: but the doubt is, whether he intent the same person or not, because he makes such an alteration of the Estate by the Proviso, and puts these words mine own name in it, by which it seems he intended to advance his own name, and he seems exact in it by the great alteration of the Estate made by the Proviso in the settlement of the Estate. At another day the Case was again moved and argued by Wadham Windham, that Mills & Mill are both one name, and differ but in sound, as Abacock & Habacock, and the Verdict finds that both the names are his true Surname, though it could not be so in Christian names, 6 Rep. 66. Surnames are altered by time and Custom of places, and being so altered do become true names, as the name of Cromwell. is now become a true name, though anciently the name was Williams; but I agree, that Christian names cannot be altered by time, no more than things can be altered from one thing to another. 3ly. By the construction of the Will, and by the finding of the Verdict, the names are made one name, although by the Testator he was known by no other name than the name of Mills, for he is so called, and this answers the Proviso in the Will, that he should be of his own Surname with whom his Daughter was to marry. 4ly. Here is a particular devise made to her in the body of the Will of the Lands, if they should not be devised here, 8 Rep. Clausa generalia non extendunt ad ea quae sunt specialiter recitata; and there is a difference between a Will and a Deed, for all the words in a Deed are spoken together: but it is not so in a Will which is ambulatory, and may have several constructions, and one clause may control another, Instit. 11 2. and the Proviso here in the last part of the Will controls the former part of the Will, as a Codicil might have done, if there had been any, and the very words express the party's meaning, 1 Rep. Porter's Case, Dyer 255. If in a Will a clause may receive a doubtful construction, than a verbis non est recedendum, nor shall there be a particular supplement of words added to expound it, except to prevent an absurdity, which must not be admitted, though in a Will. Maynard on the other side made two questions. 1. Whether Mills and Mill should be intended to be one and the same Surname, and so to be the Testators Surname. 2ly. Whether Elizabeth take the Lands by the first clause in the Will, or by the Proviso or latter clause. For the first he held, that Mills and Mill is not one and the same Surname, because the Testator had a particular eye to his own true Surname, and the Cases put of names that differ, yet sound alike, do not come to our Case, because there was no such special eye or regard as here is, 2ly. Suppose that his true name be Mills, and that he is provided for particularly by the Testator in his Will, than the Proviso cannot extend to him, for this would be senseless, and it is as much as to make the Testator in one breath to speak contradictories, and it would be hard to make such constructions of such words that would argue the party to be irrational that spoke them, and the words in the Proviso are in nature of an exception in construction of Law, 12 Ed. 1. Fitzh. Grants 87. and Carter and Ringsteeds Case is not yet answered by the other side, Bolton and the Lady Staffords case, 8 jac. C. B. 1. rep. Mildmayes Case. The words in a Proviso in a Will or Deed may be supplied with other words, rather than to interpret it so, that it shall contradict the former part of the Will or Deed where it is, and by the construction that we make of the Proviso all the Will may stand together, but by another construction it cannot. Elizabeth shall have a special entail with her Husband by the last clause, and yet the general Estate tail given in the former part shall stand; and we are in the interpretation of Wills to consider circumstances and conjectures, and there are two publications found in this will, although this doth not appear upon Record, and so comes not in judgement. Roll chief justice, We are all of one opinion, that judgement ought to be given for the Defendant. If the first clause in the Will continue uncontrolled by the Proviso, it is for the Defendant, but if it continue not uncontrolled it is for the plaintiff, and we hold that the first clause is not controlled, for we ought not to make any part of a Will void, if all the parts of it may stand together, and this cannot be here if the Proviso should control the former part, Revocation. and to make it repugnant, but if the Proviso could stand with the former part of the Will it might revoke the former part, and if this Proviso had been made after the Will, it might have altered the Case, but that appears not; And we must collect the Testators meaning by the Will, Intention. and by the Will it cannot be understood that the Proviso should be void, and the common reputation of Mill and Mills to be the same name, shall not make Mill to be the Testators true Surname, and the Testator intended his Daughter should marry one of his own true Surname, and not one of his reputative name, for this is a special case, and goes not according to the ordinary rules of names that sound alike, and it cannot be intended that the Testator did mean to destroy one part of his will by another part. A general clause in a grant shall not extend to a particular thing provided for in the grant, much less shall it do so in a Will. Therefore let judgement be for the Defendant, nisi. Mich. 1652 Banc. sup. AN Action of the Case was brought by one that kept a Victualling house, Arrest of judgement in an Action for words. for speaking these words of her, There was a man killed in her house, and she concealed the murder. Upon a rule to stay judgement till the Plaintif should move; Wild moved for judgement, because he held the words to be actionable, in that they amount to a scandal of the plaintiff, as well as they tend to cause her to be fined and imprisoned. Roll chief justice, Fine. Imprisonment. She shall not be fined and imprisoned except she receive and comfort the party that killed him, but the words are scandalous, and the Case differs from the Cases put on the other side. Twisden for the Defendant urged, that it was not averred that the Plaintif did know of the murder. Roll chief justice, The words imply she knew of the murder, for how else could she be said to conceal it. Bowlstrode for the Defendant said, That it doth not appear by the Record that any man was killed in the house, nor any time when, nor is it said the Defendant spoke the words of the plaintiff, Case. but only by an innuendo. Roll chief justice, The words are actionable to say that thou hast murdered a man, without averring that he is killed; but if it appear by the Declaration that the man was alive after the words spoken, it is otherwise; And here if no man be murdered the feigning of a false thing makes the words the more actionable, by saying she concealed a murder, where there was in truth no murder done; But the greatest doubt here is, whether because admitting a murder were done, the Plaintif is to be but fined and imprisoned for the concealing it, the words can be actionable; And I hold they are actionable notwithstanding, because they are scandalous; Endictment. Declaration. and he said that in an Endictment, a thing must be expressed to be done false et malitiose, because that is the usual form, but in a Declaration those words are not necessary. Therefore let the Plaintif have his judgement, nisi. Mich. 1653 Banc. sup. IT was held by the Court that a Constable cannot be sued out of the County where he is Constable for a thing done by him in execution of his Office; A Constable not to be sued out of his County. but for other matters he may. Elston and Drake. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. ELston brought an Action of Debt for rend due upon a lease for years, Error to reverse a judgement in debt for rent. as being Administrator to I. S. and declares for rend due since the death of the Intestate, and hath a verdict and a judgement in the Common Pleas. Drake brings his writ of Error here to reverse this judgement. The Exception taken was, that it doth not appear by the Declaration whether this rent sued for doth belong to the Administrator or not, for he makes himself no title to it, and for aught doth appear it may belong to the heir and not to him. Wadham Windham on the other side, This is no Exception now after a Verdict, but if it had been upon a Demurrer it would have been good, and we do not declare that the Intestate was seized in see who made the lease, and so it may well be understood, that he had but a lease of this land, & did let an under lease to the Defendant; and the better construction shall be made for us. Hales on the same side said, non detinet is pleaded, and the jury hath sound detinet, which would be impossible if the Intestate had been seized in fee, and there is a double intendment that the rent is reserved upon a lease, for it is reserved to Executors, and not the heir. Maynard on the other side said, the Verdict helps nothing, because the Declaration is naught in substance in our case; for the plaintiff therein hath made himself no title to the rent, and all that is in the Declaration to entitle him is expressed but by way of inference or conclusion, and for the reserving the rent to the Executors, this had been good if the rent had grown due during the time of the Intestate. The Court moved the parties, Amendment. Trial. Costs. that by consent the Declaration might be amended, paying costs; and that a new trial might be had by consent, which was agreed unto, and so ruled. Bedwell and Fenwick. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. BEdwell brought an Action upon the case against Fenwick, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon a promise. and declares that the Defendant, in consideration that the Plaintif would marry E. his Sister, he would give his Sister 300 l. for her marriage portion, upon his marriage with her, and for breach of this promise brings his Action, and obtains a verdict against the Defendant. The Defendant in Arrest of judgement urged, that the breach assigned in the Declaration was not well assigned, for it recited another promise than upon which the plaintiff had declared, for he declares of a promise made to give 300 l. in marriage to the Plaintif with his Sister E. and he assigns the breach in not paying the 300 l. unto the Plaintif, so that the breach doth not answer the promise, for if the money be paid to the wife, which for aught appears may be, the promise is not broken though she be married. But Hale 〈◊〉 other side said, that it is all one as it is alleged, and that it is equ●●●● and reciprocal, and here is a refusal to pay the money, assigned for a breach, and this is a good breach. Roll chief justice, I suppose it is all one as if he had expressed the very words of the promise, for the Husband is to give the acquittance for the money, Acquittance. and the moneys are to be paid unto the Husband, and the Verdict finds that they are not paid: And if moneys be due to a Feme upon a Contract dum sola suit, and after, and before the payment thereof she marry, the moneys are to be paid to the Husband, and not the wife, Payment. and the moneys here are intended to be paid for a marriage portion, which doth properly belong to the husband, and they were not to be paid unto her before the marriage, and it is all one in this Case as if the Plaintif had said, that the Defendant had not paid the moneys to the Husband with his Wife in marriage; Curia ad idem, The Rule thereupon was, that the Plaintif should take his judgement, nisi. Hicks and Joyce. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. AN Action of the Case was brought for these words, Arrest of judgement in an Action for words. She, meaning the Defendant, is a whore, and I will prove it, and her plying place is in Cheapside, and she gets 40 s. a night by playing the whore. It was moved in Arrest of judgement, that the words are not actionable, because they are but words of choler, and very general words, and may receive divers constructions, and at the first moving the judgement was stayed; but the matter being moved again at another day, Roll chief justice said, that these words import more than the bare calling of a woman whore, by reason of other particular circumstances set forth to aggravate the matter, and therefore let the Plaintif take her judgement. Townesend and Barker. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. Trin. 1653. rot. 743. AN Action upon the Case was brought by a Churchwarden of a Parish, Arrest of judgement in an action for words. for these words spoken of him, Thou dost make Lowns (i. e. taxes or assessments) thyself, and makest 5 quarters in the year, and dost cheat and cousin the Parish. It was moved in Arrest of judgement that the words are not actionable, because they are spoken of a Churchwarden, which the Common Law takes not notice of: And 2ly. In that it doth not appear they were spoken of him in relation to his being a Churchwarden; But it was answered, That a Churchwarden is an Officer of Trust, and taken notice of by the Common Law, and so was it adjudged in Stroade and Homes his Case in this Court, and the words must be intended to be spoken of him in the relation to his Office, for that is employed by his making of Lowns and his cozening the Parish. The rule was for the plaintiff to have his judgement. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. AN Endictment of one indicted for refusing to serve in the Office of a Headborough was quashed, Endictment quashed. Addition. because it did not show that he was chosen to the 〈◊〉, and because the party indicted wanted an addition. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to discharge one Cullins, that was arrested as he was attending the Court to give testimony as a Witness in a Cause, To discharge one arrested attending th' Court as a Witness. Supersedeas. Attachment. and for an attachment against the parties that did arrest him. German justice absent Roll chief justice, Take a Supersedeas, and let the parties show cause why an Attachment shall not be granted against them that arrested him. Hanslop and Johnson. Mich. 1953. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to change the venue in an Ejectione firmae laid in London, because the Lands in Question did concern the Poor of London, To change the Venue in an Ejectione firmae. and therefore it was supposed there could not be an indifferent Trial in London, for by consequence in that it concerns the Poor, it concerns the whole City. But Roll chief justice answered, the Action is local, Action local. Venue. and it cannot be removed, except you can draw it from thence by your Plea. boil and Scarborough. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. Hill. 1652. rot. 226. AN Action of Debt was brought by boil against Scarborough, Error in reverse a judgement in Debt upon a Promise. wherein the Plaintiff did declare, that the Defendant in consideration that the Plaintiff would forbear to sue forth a ne exeat regnum against the Defendants Son, who did owe unto the Plaintiff five hundred pound, did assume and promise unto the Plaintiff a certain sum of money expressed in the Declaration, upon non assumpsit pleaded, and a verdict and a judgement given for the Plaintiff, the Defendant brought a Writ of Error, and it was assigned for Error; That there appears no consideration to ground the promise upon, & so no ground of Action, for he doth not show that he had done any thing in prosecuting the Writ of ne exeat regnum, and Rolyer and Langdales Case 1650. in this Court was cited, and Hob. 216. Bedwell and Cottons case, and there is no such Writ in the Register, as a ne exeat regnum, and therefore there could be no forbearance to sue out such a Writ, but there is a Writ to give security not to go out of the Realm to the public prejudice of the King and his people, and here is no such matter expressed, but only that his Son owed him 500 l. & Nat. Brev. 85. was agreed; and it was farther objected by Wild who argued against the judgement, that though the consideration should be good, yet the replication is not good and sufficient to tie the second Writ to the first: for it is not said that the second Writ is pro una & eadem causa, and so it is incertain, Br. Trespass 85. 9 H. 6, and there may be several promises made in one day, and if the replication is good, yet the rejoinder is not good, 19 H. 8.43. for he only admits, that he being a Knight is the same person which was sued by the name of Esquire, Hob. 171. Stukely's Case. And here is a judgement by a Nihil dicit; and no warrant of Attorney, for it is Latin, and so it is nul, it being since the late Act made for the proceed in Law to be in English. Latch on the other side prayed that judgement might be affirmed, and said, that here was a good consideration to ground the promise upon, for there is a Writ of ne exeat regnum, and any one may move for it, and it is a benefit to the party, that the Plaintiff will forbear to sue it forth, and he had cause enough here to move for this Writ in order to recover his debt, and although it be in the discretion or the King, whether he will grant it or not, yet it is for his honour to grant it, and the Register 193.134. and Brit. 102. make montion of this Writ, Instit. 130. There is a caution used to be taken of parties licenced to go beyond Seas, that they shall pay their debts. 2ly. The replication is good, for it is not necessary to say, that the second original sued forth is for the same cause that the former was, because it is in an Action upon the Case set forth at large, which shows verbatim that it is for the same cause, and so it is plain in itself. 2ly. It is said, that he sued out the second Original pro causa praedict●, which is a sufficient averment, if there needed any, and the variance in the damage is no argument that there is another cause of Action, for when the second Original was sued forth, the damages were increased by the increase of the time, being a whole year afterwards. For the rejoinder, it is to be considered, 1. whether the party be assopped. 2ly. If not, whether the matter set forth be good. For the first he held, that he is estopped by his coming in formerly gratis as an Esquire, and being not brought in in custody, for Dyer, 192. there he shall not plead another name: but here this is not alleged as it ought to be, for he ought to have concluded absque hoc, that he is an Esquire, but he hath affirmed himself to be an Esquire, by saying of praedictus, etc. and he ought to have alleged this specially, viz. that Richard Boil Knight, which was sued by the name of Richard Boil Esquire; and the Book 2 E. 4. f. 3. is against the other Books, and the Law is otherways, and the old Book of Entries, and other Precedents which are against me, they passed sub silentio, and the Law generally is against these Precedents, Rastal Brief. 54.19 H. 6.1.36.44. say, that he is estopped if he so come in, and so is Br. Tit. Defence, 15 & 26.32 H. 6.3.35 H. 6. and many other Books; and the Book of 19 H. 6.43. urged on the other side is against them; and though he should not be estopped, yet we can take advantage of the first Original, for it is but abateable by the Misnosiner, and is not abated, and there is a slaw in the rejoinder, for he ought to have traversed that he was not an Esquire. And 2ly. the 26th. of March is after the Original sued forth, and it is incertain as to the time when he was a Knight, Plowd. 27. by Morgan 7. H 7.5. a And the Warrants of Attorney are good, though they be in Latin, and if they w●re in English they would be erroneous, and the nonentry of them is not material, for the constant practice is not to enter the Warrant of Attorney before the Issue, Trin. 8 jac. Morley and Morley in this Court: here is not the entry o● the Warrant itself, but only an entry that he is Attorney by Warrant, and so he prayed the affirmance of the judgement. Roll chief justice, If one bring a Writ of 1000 l. and it be abated, and brings another Writ for the same debt, Damages. can you increase the damages accrued between the first and the second Writ? It cannot be, for the second is but the reviving of the first Writ, and not a new Writ; but here are divers points considerable, and fit to be spoken unto A ne exeat regnum is a Writ usually sued forth although that originally it was only used in Cases of State businesses therefore the forbearance to sue it forth is a good consideration. Writ. The Court advised to take a new Plea to try the matter. Postea. Mich. 1653. AN Endictment was preferred against one for reading the Book of Common prayer, and if was moved to be quashed upon this exception, An Endictment quashed. viz. that the Endictment did not say that he read it publicly: but only said, that he read it voluntarily. And upon this it was quashed. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. ONe Captain Streeter committed by the Council of State, Prisoner appeared upon a Habeas Corpus. and by the Parliament, for publishing seditious Pamphlets, to the ●ate house at Westminster, was brought into Court by a Habeas Corpus, and the return read and prayed to be filled by the Prisoner, which was granted, whereupon he prayed he might have a Copy of it, which was granted; then he prayed he might be bailed, but was denied, and he was turned over to the Marshal of this Court, and not remanded, because upon filing of the return the Court was seized of the Record, and the Prisoner, and he was ordered to be brought again Friday following, to be heard what he could say against the return. Farmer and Laurence. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. FArmer let a Chamber and a Closet within it to Laurence from such a time, to hold as long as she should please, Arrest of judgement in Action of Debt for rent. paying therefore yearly as much as it should be reasonably worth, and this was by paroll; afterwards Farmer brought an Action for the rent of this Chamber and Closet, and declares upon this Lease, and avers, that she held the said Chamber and Closet from such a time to such a time, and that for that time it was reasonably worth so much, and for not paying that rent he brought his Action, and obtains a Verdict against the Defendant. It was moved in arrest of judgement, that it is alleged in the Declaration that she held the Chamber and Closet from such a time to such a time, but it doth not aver, that she held it as long as she pleased, as the agreement was. Roll chief justice. The old Books are, if I let Land to one for as long as he pleaseth, Lease at will. it shall be intended as long as both parties please, and here shall be intended that the Term was determined, except you had showed that you would have held the Chamber and Closet longer, and if the time be determined, you ought to pay presently as much as it is reasonably worth, if no time be expressed for the payment thereof; Averment. and the averment ought to be on the Defendants side, viz to allege that the Plaintiff did not suffer her to hold the Chamber and Closet so long as she pleased, judgement was given for the Plaintiff, nisi. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. MEmorandum Colonel Barksteed Lieutenant of the Tower of London, Why a Prisoner was not b ought upon a Habeas Corpus. came into the Court and produced an Order of the Counsel of State, that he should not bring john Lilborn to the Bar upon a Habeas Corpus directed to him out of this Court. Norbury of Counsel with the Prisoner prayed for an Alias habeas Corpus to be directed to him. Roll chief justice, Take it, for no matter of Record appears before us to hinder it, and let it be returned Saturday next, which was three days after. Norton and Jason. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. Trin. 1651. rot. 935. IN an Action upon the Case for entering into the Plaintiffs house, Arrest of Judgement in an action on the Case. and making an assault upon his Daughter, and getting a Bastard Child upon her, the jury found a special verdict, upon which the Case was this. Norton sojourned in the house of Jason, and during his sojourning there he got his Daughter with Child; Four years after I●son brought an action upon the Case against Norton for assaulting his Daughter, and getting her with Child, per quod servitium amisit. The question here was, whether because no Action was brought by the Daughter for the wrong done to her within four years, and thereby she was barred by the Statute of limitations of Action's to bring her Action, jason the Father might now bring his Action upon the Case for the damage done to him by the loss of his Daughter's service, or should be also barred by the Statute. Powis argued, that he was not barred though the Daughter was, because in many cases the Law gives two Actions for one thing, and cited 19 H. 6.45, 46. a. and Hill. 1649. Norburies' case adjudged in this Court, and said, that though the Trespass and the Assault was done to the Daughter, yet here is a per quod servitium amisit declared of, which doth belong to jason the Father. Roll chief justice, This Action is an Action brought for the damage done to the Master, and though the servant will release the battery, yet the Master may have an A Aion for the damage caused to him by the Battery, and although the Daughter cannot have an Action, her Father may, although not for entering into his house, because it was with his leave, nor for assaulting his Daughter, and getting her with child, because this is a wrong particularly done to her, yet for the loss of her service caused by this, he may have an Action, but it is a pretty case, and fit to be argued, therefore bring us books, and we will advise upon it. At another day the case was again spoken unto by Baldwin of the Inner Temple on the Defendants part, and he made the question to be, whether this be an Action of Trespass vi et armis, or an Action upon the Case which is here brought, and he argued that it is a Trespass vi et armis, and not an Action upon the Case which is here brought, Case. and cited Nat. Brev. 86. & 17 Ed. 3. and 12 H. 4. and the 9 Rep. the Earl of Shrewsbury case, and said, that the matter here alleged is not Causa causans, but Causa causata, and he agreed that one may be liable to divers Actions for one Trespass in divers respects, but here all the matter is jumbled together, and it cannot be an Action upon the Case, for the judgement ought to be quod defendens capiatur, which is the judgement in a Trespass vi et armis, and not in a Trespass upon the Case, Hob. Rep. Wheatly and Stones Case, And although the Action conclude with a per quod servitium amisit, yet it sounds more in Trespass than to be an Action upon the case and then he is barred by the Statute of limitations, for not bringing it within 4 years, and here are ●ntire damages also given for all, which ought not to be, for the Defendant was a sojourner in the Plaintiffs house, and had licence to enter into it, & by consequence is is not guilty of the vi et armis declared, of Hob. Andrews and de la hope, 22 Eliz. Dyer 369. 20 jac. Rhetoric and Chapels Case, and therefore no damages ought to have been given for the domum fregit, because he entered with Licence. Roll chief justice. It may be the entire damages are given by the jury, for the trespass, of which they make doubt and refer to the judgement of the Court, and not for the entering with Licence: but if the entire special matter had been found and left to the Court, it had been otherwise. But if they had not made a doubt, they might have found him culpable, Damages. and so I doubt that it is not good to find the damages entire, because as to the Trespass for entering vi & armis he is not guilty. But for the other point the cause of action is per quod servitium amisit, and for this he hath brought it within the time limited by the Statute, for it is an Action upon the Case, although the causa causans is the vi & armis which is but inducement to the Action, and the causa causats, viz. the loss of the service is the ground of the Action. Hales è contra said, that the damages shall be applied to the other matter. Roll chief justice, this is the sole Question, whether the damages refer to all the Trespass or not, and upon reading the Record he said, that it referred to all, Venire. Trial. and so is not good. The rule was to show cause why a new Venire should not issue forth to try the matter de novo. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to quash an order of Sessions made for the committing of one Wade and another, Surveyors of the Highway, To quash an order of Sessions. until they should pay the arrearages of money collected by them upon the Statute of 2 & 3. Phil. & Mar. C. 8. for amending of Highways, and it was prayed the Prisoners might be bailed. These exceptions were taken by Twilden against the Order, first to the Mittimus, in that the parties were not convicted before the justices as they ought to have been. 2ly. The Mittimus is repugnant in itself, for they are committed for not paying of illegal rates levied upon the Parishioners, and if they be illegal they are not to be paid. Next they are committed for not paying all the money by them levied, whereas they are to deduct 8 d. in the pound out of it for their pains in collecting of it, and so they are committed for more than is due. Roll chief justice, The order is not good, yet let them on the other side take time to maintain it if they can, because it is an order for repairing of the Highway, Order of Sessions. which is for the good of the Common wealth. Henshoe. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement in an Ejectione firmae; it was moved for the Defendant in the Writ of Error, Error to reverse a judgement in an Ejectione firmae. that the Record was not yet transcribed, and therefore prayed he might amend the judgement by making it recuperet instead of recuperare debet, because it was only the fault of the Clerk in mis-entring. Roll chief justice, This is a matter of substance, and we cannot tell whether the judgement be final or not. If it be not final it ought to be recuperare debeat: Amendment, judgement. but if it be final, it ought to be recuperet. Therefore we will make no rule in it. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup. BY Roll chief justice, Upon what promise an Action lies, Averment. If one make a lease for years of land, rendering rend, and after the Lessee promiseth the Lessor to pay the rent, an Action lies upon this promise, if the promise was made at the time of the Lease made, but in the Action brought this promise must be expressly averred to be so. Bocking and Symons. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in the common Pleas, Error to reverse a judgement in the Common Pleas. and the Error assigned was, that the Action was brought against 3 persons, one of whom was within age, and that they all appeared by Attorney, whereas he within age ought to have appeared by his Guardian, and so the judgement was erroneous as to him, and consequently to the rest because it was a joint judgement. Roll chief justice, judgement. This is a good exception, for it being a joint judgement, if it be naught in part, as without doubt it is, it is naught in the whole, And so it was reversed. Hill. 1653. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment for not repairing a Highway. To quash an Endictment for not repairing a High way. The Exception taken was, that the Endictment did conclude, that the party ought to repair it by reason of his tenements, which was said to be uncertain, and it ought to have said, that he, and all those whose estate he hath in the Tenements used to repair it. And 2ly. It should have said, that by reason of the tenure of his Tenements he ought to repair, and not by reason of his tenements, And upon these Exceptions it was quashed. Trevilian and Welman. Hill. 1653. Banc. sup. TRevilian brought an Action upon the Case against Welman for speaking of these words of him, Arrest of judgement for words. viz. He did put in two Horses to Colonel Windham, meaning Colonel Windham that was Governor of Bridgewater, and as soon as any warrants came for the pressing of men for the service, he acquainted the Cavaliers, by reason whereof none could be pressed that were fit, and he doth hold constant correspondency with the Cavaliers. Upon Issue joined, and a Verdict found for the plaintiff, It was moved in Arrest of judgement that the words were not Actionable, because utterly uncertain, either when Col. Windham was Colonel, and when the Horses were put in, and the other words are as incertain as these. But it was answered, that if all the words be taken together, they are certain enough to ground an Action, for if they be true the plaintiff thereby will be expressly made a Delinquent, and have his estate sequestered for adhering and assisting the King against the Parliament, and of this opinion was the Court, and thereupon the Plaintif had his judgement. Hill. 1653. Banc. sup. IN the Case of one Page and Crook, it was said by the Court, Who may be Witnesses. That it an Action of Trespass be brought against one with a simul cum with others, if nothing be proved against the others, they may be examined as witnesses in the cause. Whitehead and Buckland. Hill. 165● Whitehead brought an Action of Trespass by Original against Buckland, for taking away 400 Sheep, and 26 Bullocks, Demurrer to a replication in Trespass et armis. the Defendant pleads the Statute of 21 jac. of limitations of actions in Bar, the Plaintif replied that he sued forth and Original writ within 6 years, and that the process thereupon was duly continued, upon this the Defendant demurred, and for cause shows, that the replication is not good; for when the plaintiff says that he sued forth an original, he ought to have added prout patet per Recordum, which is omitted. 2ly. He hath not pleaded the continuances of his process upon the Record. Maynard answered, that the replication is good, for we cannot take a traverse upon their plea, which is surplusage, and we need not plead all the continuances but it is sufficient if we plead as much of the Record as goes in Bar. Roll chief justice, The plea is plain, and it is not necessary to allege the continuances, for here is an appearance. At another day Maynard said, the plea in Bar is not good, for he pleads an immaterial thing, for it matters not when the original was sued forth, but he ought to plead not culpable within six years before the Original sued forth. Roll chief justice, This is the usual way of pleading, and it is but to put you to a new assignment, Plea. and the plea is good, for you are not tied up by it, for you are not forced to join issue, for you may make a new assignment; but waive the Demurrer on one part, and the pleading of the Statute on the other part, and take a new plea and go to a trial, otherwise we must give judgement for the Plaintif. But the Court would advise. Latch at another day said, that the replication is naught for the uncertainty, for it doth not appear where the Original was sued forth, nor the time when, for it is only said he sued forth an Original in Michaelmas Term, and part of Michaelmas Term may be within six years, and the other part may be after the six years, and so it cannot be known whether it was sued forth in due time or no, and because no place is showed there can be no Venue. Adjourned to the next term, At another day the Case was moved again, & then the 2 exceptions taken, that it was not said prout patet per Recordum, and had not shown the continuances of the process, were over ruled by the Court; and then another Exception was taken to the replication, that it concluded & hoc perit quod inquiratur per patriam, which is not good, for it hinders the other party to rejoin, and he is compelled either to join issue, or to demur. Latch answered, That the party may not be admitted to take advantage of this fault now upon a general demurrer, and he is not tied up from rejoining, although an issue be offered him, for though the plea be informal yet he may pass over and rejoin, Hob. f. 80. Newman and Stones case. Notwithstanding an unnecessary traverse the party may plead over, and is not bound to join issue, and the impertinency of the plea shall remain but only as a blemish in form of the plea, and shall not be accounted a fault in the substance of it. And 2ly. their bar is not good, and therefore it matters not though the replication be not good, for it is impertinent to set forth an Original, but he ought to have pleaded generally that he was not guilty within 6 years before the Original brought, but here he hath impertinently set forth the time of bringing the Original, and this answers not the Statute, and the matter alleged destroys his own plea, and here can be no good Issue joined without departure from his plea, to wit from his bar, and this is not to be suffered in pleading; and here is neither certainty nor congruity in the parts of the pleading, for the beginning of the term is uncertainly alleged. 2ly. He shows not what day of the Term he issued forth his original, but only says generally in Michaelmas Term, which in Cole and S●bs●ys case in this Court was lately adjudged naught. Hales on the other side said, that the bar is good, and that the replication is insufficient, because the Defendant is tied up by an issue, and is not suffered to rejoin, and it is insufficient in substance, for he hath not made a proper conclusion, for he ought to have concluded, et hoc est paratus est verificare, and as it is it is impertinent, and the Plaintif cannot pass over to rejoin as Latch supposeth, and this case is not like the case of the traverse cited by him, where he may pass over, it being but in matter of form, but it is not so here, for the Travers avers the plea, and concludes not the party as here he is concluded, and can do no other thing but demur or join in the Issue tendered; And the bar also is good and sufficient, notwithstanding the time of the Originals issuing forth be alleged, although it was in his election to have showed the time, or not to have showed it, and his showing it makes not the plea worse but more certain, and although it be not the truth of the Case as he hath alleged it, I doubt whether it should be a departure for the plaintiff to reply to a new Original assigned, and it may be there were two Originals, and the Defendant relies upon the last Original, and if the other Original be pleaded he may reply to it afterwards. 2ly. Admitting he cannot departed, this will do no hurt, for the plea is not worse for him although it be better for the other. 3ly. It is not incertain to say that it issued forth in Michaelmas Term, for all the Term is but one day in Law, and it is said when the Term began, namely the 23 of October, and if it be not so certainly expressed as it ought to be, yet by the replication this advantage is lost, and it is not like to Cole and Sibseys case cited on the other side, for there was a special Demurrer, but here the Demurrer is general, and there it was of the parties own setting forth. Latch, If the Assignment of the Original be at his peril, if he set it not forth right it is ill, and it is not well here assigned, for there is neither time nor place alleged when it issued forth. Roll chief justice, I conceive the replication is not good, for the party is bound up that he cannot rejoin, Replication. but must either demur or join in Issue with you, and I have not heard of passing over in the Case, as may be done in the Case of a Traverse which concludes not the party, and here you aver not your plea as you ought, and the other aught to be left at liberty to re join if he please, Averment. which he cannot do here; but it is doubtful whether the Plea in Bar be good or not, because there is no time certain alleged of issuing out the Original, for it is said generally in Michaelmas Term, whereas an Original bears Teste at a day certain, and may issue forth out of the Term, Original. Teste. and it is not like a judicial writ, and it is questionable whether this be matter of form only, or of substance, and me seems it is matter of substance to be averred. The Court would advise. At another day the Case was again put and spoken to by Wadham Windham, who, upon putting the Case urged, that the Defendant here sets forth another original not set forth by the Plaintif, and this is not brought within the time limited by the Statute; and upon this the Plaintif rejoins, and he cited Coals and Sibsyes' Case, and insisted, that the Defendants plea in bar is not good in the matter of substance, for he shows no time nor place when he first sued forth his Original, and he ought to show when he took it forth, that the Court may judge whether it was done in due time or no, 7 H. 7. f. 150. as the Statute requires, and not to put the Court to make enquiry when it issued forth, and although it be but surplusage to show it, yet now having taken upon him to show the time, he ought to show it precisely, Dyer, 365. Lakes Case. Hill. 10 jac. Westby● and Rookes Case in this Court, the mis-pleading of a Statute is not good, though the party was not bound to plead it, and so it is here. And the replication doth us no harm: for there is no matter in it that makes against us, for the Court ought to judge upon the whole Record, and consider who made the first fault, and that hath the Defendant done in his bar, and that in matter of substance, and he cited Cardinal Pools Case, and Hob. rep. Baspooles Case, and prayed judgement for the Plaintiff. Wild on the other side said, that the bar is only vicious in form, and so it hurts not, and if so, than the other party hath lost his advantage of it by the Statute, for he hath not demurred upon us, but we have demurred upon him, to wit, upon his replication. Roll chief justice, I am of opinion that the setting forth of the Original by the Defendant, and concluding that he is not guilty within six years from that time is not good: but now that is waived by the replication, and is made matter of form, as it is in the Case of a new assignment, and the Common bar is now out of doors. It had been good to have shown the precise day of taking forth the Original, but it is not absolutely necessary to do it, and this is not like the mis-pleading of a Statute which must be precisely pleaded and is matter of substance: but this is matter of form only, and besides this matter is here waived, and nothing is showed by the Plaintiff which can bar him of his Action, Demurrer. nor hath the Defendant pleaded any thing to bar him. And by the replication you have hindered the Defendant to plead to you, for you have concluded ad patriam, and stopped him from proceeding further in pleading: but the principal matter is, that you have waived the matter pleaded in bar, of which you might have taken advantage, and I conceive that he who demurs upon matter of form ought to show the special matter wherefore he demurs: Advantage. but if it be waived by the other by his replying, he shall not afterwards take advantage for the not showing it, notwithstanding the Statute, and divers opinions upon it, for the Statute enjoineth to set forth the matter of form pleaded insufficiently. Nil capiat per billam, nisi. Hill. 1653. in the Upper Bench. MAster Attorney General moved the Court after issue joined in an Endictment preferred against Mrs. Levingston, To stay a Trial upon an Endictment. and the Trial being to be the next day, that the Trial might be stayed by rule of Court, because the Endictment is erroneous in many things, and the Trial thereupon will be fruitless, for no judgement can be had upon it, and we may prefer a new Endictment, and one fault in it is, that the Bill was found by a Grand jury, whereof some of them were outlawed when they found it. Wild on the other side prayed the Trial might go on, because the Issue is joined, and the jury returned, and many Witnesses, viz. a hundred at least are brought to Town, some a great way off, and are kept here at a great charge. Roll chief justice, Waiver. Demurrer. The Attorney may waive the Issue if he please though it be joined or he may demur if he will, therefore let him make what entry he thinks good upon the Roll, Entry. Rule. for we will make no rule in it. Stephenson and Steward. Hill 1654. Upper Bench. STevenson brought an Action of Debt against Steward for rent, Exception to a Plea of Privilege of Parliament. the Defendant pleaded in abatement of the Writ that he was, in regard of moneys which he had lent to the Parliament, protected by their special order from all arrests. The Plaintiff replied, that this order was afterward repealed by another general order of Parliament. Carew urged that the Defendants plea was not now good, because the Parliament being dissolved, their orders are of no force; and prayed judgement for the Plaintiff. Roll chief justice, If the plea was good when it was pleaded, your Action must abate, Abatement. Peremptory. and you must begin again: for the plea is but in abatement, and not peremptory to the party; and therefore let the Writ abate. Hill. 1653. Upper Bench. By Roll chief justice, Where may be a new Original. If an Action of Battery by Original be against two, and one comes in upon the Exigent, there may be a new Original brought against the other with a Simul cum, and those who are waived may be Witnesses in the Cause, and this is usual practice: but those who are declared against with a Simul cum cannot be Witnesses. Witness. Greenling and Bawdit. Hill. 1653. Upper Bench. GReenling brought an Action upon the Case against Bawdit, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon an Assumpsit. and declared, that the Defendant in consideration that the Plaintiff would marry such a Woman, did assume and promise that upon his marriage with her, he would pay the Plaintiff 50 l. and would also give unto him yearly one firkin of Eggs, and a flitch of Bacon during the life of the Plaintiff; and upon a Nihil dicit the Plaintiff obtains a judgement, and upon a Writ of Enquiry of damages executed, great damages were found for the Plaintiff. It was moved in arrest of judgement, 1. That it doth not appear for what breach of promise the Action is brought, whether for the not paying the 50 l. or not paying the Eggs and Bacon. 2ly. It is not averred in what year the Defendant was to begin to pay the Eggs and Bacon. Intendment. To this R●ll chief justice answered, that it shall be intended to begin within the year next after the marriage shall take effect. 3ly. It was excepted against, that it doth not appear for how many years the Eggs and Bacon were unpaid, and the promise was made anno 1647. and the Writ of Enquiry was executed anno 1653. But Roll chief justice overruled the Exceptions, and to the last answered, the Record is huc usque, and so it is certain enough. Therefore let the Plaintiff have his judgement, nisi, etc. Hill. 1654. Upper Bench. IN the Case of one Banister where the Action was an Action of Debt brought against an Executor, Roll chief justice, said, What is an affirmative plea and not negative. That riens inter mannes pleaded by an Executor is an affirmative plea in substance, though it sound something in the negative, for it is in effect the same with plene administravit, and such plea must be averred, and he put this difference, Averment. viz. where an Issue is joined up upon a negative plea without any replication, it is not necessary to aver the plea, but if there be a replication it must be averned. Hayward and Ducket. Hill. 1653. Banc. sup. Pasch. 1653. rot. 196. HAyward brought an Action upon the Case against Ducat that was Executor to another, and declares, Arrest of judgement in an action upon a promise. that whereas the Testator did owe unto the plaintiff such a sum of money, which the plaintiff did intent to sue the Defendant for, the Defendant did assume and promise to the plaintiff, that if he would forbear to sue him for the money, and would suffer him to go into the Country, he would pay the money, and for breach of this promise he brought his Action, and obtains a verdict. It was moved in Arrest of judgement, that there appears no consideration in the Declaration to ground the promise upon, whereby to make the Defendant liable to pay the money which he promised to pay, for it doth not appear that he is Executor, and Rosyer and Langdales' case, Anno 1650. in this Court was cited. To this it was answered by the Council on the other side, That a good consideration doth appear well enough, for when he saith that he was to forbear to sue him as Executor, it shall be intended that he was Executor at the time when he should so forbear to sue him, and the promise is so laid. Plow. 128. Roll chief justice, To say that I will forbear to sue one as Executor, is not an affirmance that he is Executor, and there was such a case as this ruled in the Exchequer, and it is no more, nay not so much as if he had said, that he would not sue him at all. judgement pro Defendente, nisi. Hill. 1653. Banc. sup. BY Roll chief justice, In an Action upon the case vi et armis, Where one needs not conclude contra pacem publicam. It is not necessary to conclude contra pacem publicam, but in an Action of Trespass quare vi et armis, the conclusion must be contra pacem publicam. Hill. 1653. Upper Bench. BY Roll chief justice, What Bailie must show his Warrant. A special Bayly is bound to show his warrant to the party whom he is to Arrest, otherwise the party to be arrested is not tied to obey him, but he is not bound to show his warrant to a Stranger, but a known Bailie is not bound to show his Warrant to any. Hill. 1653. Upper Bench. BY Roll chief justice, What Writ of Error is good. If an Action be brought against three, and one of them is an Infant, and they all appear by Attorney, and an entire judgement is given against them all, and they all join in a writ of Error to reverse this judgement, this writ is well brought, for the judgement was erroneous, judgement. because it is an entire judgement, for as to the Infant it cannot be good, & so it is naught to the rest, and he cited one Byres case 9 jac. in the point. Porter and Swetnam. Hill. 1653. Upper Bench. Trin. 1653. rot. 723. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given upon a non sum informatus in the Common pleas in an Action of Covenant brought upon a Lease for years for not paying the rent reserved, Error to reverse a judgement upon a non sum informatus in debt for rent. and not repairing, and this was against an Executrix of the Assignee of the Lessée for years, and it was brought as to the nonpayment of the rent upon the words yielding and paying, and not upon an express Covenant, and for that the words yielding and paying are but a Covenant in Law, and only an employed Covenant, and ariseth but from a personal Covenant, and not upon a real contract, as Latch held, who argued for the Plaintif in the writ of Error, Therefore he said the Action of Covenant could not here lie against the Execuirix, as a warranty in Law binds only the party, and not privies, as Spencer's case is, Dyer 257. 2ly. The plaintiff in the Action doth not declare that the Defendant was made Executrix, and if she be but Executrix de son tort demesne, she is not liable to this Action. Wadham Windham on the other side held, that the words yielding and paying in the Lease are an express Covenant, and the A●ion here is for rend become arrear in the time of the Executrix, and this Covenant being a Covenant which makes the rent payable ratione terrae, it doth concern her, and an Executrix de son tort is bound to pay the rent. Roll chief justice, take time to answer both Exceptions, but I conceive at present, that the words yielding and paying are an express Covenant, for if they were not, what remedy else would there be to recover the rent? Covenant. for if she be a disseisor, neither debt nor Covenant will lie against her. At another day Windham argued that the Action was well brought, because this is an express Covenant, and not a Covenant in Law. 2ly. It is not material to show how she is made Executrix; and for the first this must be an express Covenant, because it is by Indenture, although the word Covenant be not expressed, for that word is not a word of Art, and so not essential to the constituting of a Covenant, Dyer 57.27 E. 4. f. 6. And for the second it is well set forth, that she is made Executrix, for it is said she entered as an Executrix: 2ly. She hath admitted herself to be Executrix by pleading. Latch on the other side held, That here is only a Covenant in Law, and so is the book in Dyer cited by Windham, and the Executrix is not bound here, because it is against the Assignee of a Term, and the very words do show that here is no express Covenant, for the words yielding and paying are not the words of the Lessee, but only by construction of Law, but are the words of the Lessor enjoining the Lessee to pay the rent. Roll chief justice, How prove you that this Action lies not against an Assignee? Latch The case of Overton & Sidney proves it, for it proves that Debt lies not, and by consequence Covenant lies not. And for the second matter, the Defendant is not entitled to the lease in privity, because it is not showed that she is made Executrix, and so she shall be taken but as an Executrix of her own wrong, and so is not chargeable, because she hath no privity of estate but by her entry, nor is it any where ever mentioned that any can be Executrix de son tort of a Term. 2ly. She cannot be a Termor, but she must be a Disseiseress, for she cannot apportion her own wrong. 3ly. She cannot make a title to the Term by her entry, as it may be by a que estate, and therefore it is against reason that she shall be a Termor, and there is no authority against this, Pasch. 25 Eliz. in this Court. King and Burges in Mores Reports Dyer 254. Upon a Demurrer, adjudged that it was not showed how one was Executor. Roll chief justice, What say you to the Objection, that the Action is brought against you as an Executrix, and you appear and plead, and so admit yourself to be an Executrix? And I hold that here is an express Covenant, for the words are the agreement of both parties to the Indenture, and then the Executor is chargeable by them, and it is not like to the Case of a Demise, and there is no difference here between a Covenant in Law, and an express Covenant, because it is touching a thing which ariseth from the land, and so the Assignee is bound by it, and this Case is not like the case cited out of Dyer, for there the estate was determined, but here it continues. And as to the last point, I conceive prima fancy, that she shall be accounted a true Executrix; and you by pleading have admitted it; and if one enter as an. Executor upon a Term, he may have the Term if the other will admit him to be a Termor, and he shall not be accounted a Disseisor to the Lessor, and to strangers he shall be accounted an Executor in Law, if they bring Actions against him, and the Term shall be assets in his hands; As if one receive my rent without my consent, I may charge him as my receiver, Assets. or make him a disseisor at my election. Curia ad idem, and so the judgement was affirmed. But afterwards it was moved again, and the writ of Error was quashed for a variance betwixt it and the Record, for the Record is against the Assigns, and the writ of Error is to remove a Record against the Assignee. Postea. Bromefield and Sir john Williamson. Hill. 1653. Banc. sup. Mich. 1651. rot. 353. BRomefield brought an Action of Debt upon an Obligation to perform the Covenants of a Lease for years against Sir john Williamson, Demurrer to a replication in debt upon an Obligation. the Defendant pleaded that he had performed the Covenants, the plaintiff replies, and sets forth a breach, and upon this the Defendant demurred, and upon the Demurrer the Case was this: A Lease was made for one year, the Lessee covenants for him and his Assigns to pay the rent, so long as he and they shall have the possession of the thing let; the Lessee assigns over his Term, the Term expires, the Assignee continues the possession after the Term expired, and for rend behind by the Assignee after the expiration of the Term, the Lessor brings the Action, and the question was whether here be such an Assignee that the Action will lie against, or not, Roll chief Just. held, that though here be not an Assignée, strictly, Assignee. Covenant. according to the rules of Law, yet that he shall be accounted such an Assignee as is to perform the Covenants made between the parties, and ruled the Defendant to show cause why the plaintiff should not have judgement. Nota. Wood and Markham. Hill. 1653. Banc. sup. Upon an Ejectione firmae brought, For a restitution after an habere facias possessionem executed. and a Trial thereupon had, a Verdict was found for the plaintiff; but upon an agreement made between the plaintiff and the Defendant, the Defendant was to hold the land recovered the remainder of his Term to come, and according to this agreement he held it for 2 years, but afterwards, before his term expired, the Plaintif takes out an habere facias possessionem, and executes it. Serj. Bernard moved for the Defendant upon this matter showed to the Court, That the Defendant might have a rule for restitution. But Roll chief justice answered, It cannot be, Restitution. but you must have your Action upon the Case against the plaintiff for not performing his agreement, Case. for the Act seems to be unconscionable. Masters and Wallis. Hill. 1653. Banc. sup. Pasch. 1652. rot. 581. A Writ of Error was brought in this Court to reverse a judgement given in the Common Pleas in an Action of Trespass quare vi et armis, and the Error assigned was, Error to reverse a judgement in Trespass quare vi et a●mis. that the Trespass is concluded to be contra pacem, etc. but doth not say publicam. Twisden answered, that it is well enough, because the Action was commented by Original, but if it had been by Bill it would have been otherwise. Roll chief justice, It is the use in the Common Pleas to make such short recitals, but in the beginning of the Record here it is recited, at large, and, if it were not recited at large it would not be good; Recital. but for the matter itself it is matter of substance, and generally it ought to be concluded to be contra pacem publicam, yet it is good here as it is for the reasons before alleged. Affirmetur judicium nisi, etc. Hill. 1653. Banc. sup. Wild moved against a Sheriff, that he may not be admitted to file the return of a writ directed to him, Against filing a return of a writ. because an Action upon the Case is depending against him for not returning this writ, and if he should now be admitted to file the return, he would thereby abate our Action. Roll chief justice, If the writ be not filled, it shall not be filled till the Court be moved; but he cannot file it as of this Term, though he should file it for the return of the writ, (as it seems) is long since past, but if the return be already filled you move too late. Swan and Fenham. Hill. 1953. Banc. sup. Trin. 1650. rot. 1072. IN an Action of Trepass and Ejectment a special Verdict was found, Special verdict in Trespass and Ejectment. and in it this Custom, viz. That the Owners of Houses in the Town of Newcastle in fee simple may devise them by Paroll, but not Tenants in tail, and it was further found, that the Testator was seized of the Houses in question in fee tail in possession, and of the remainder of them in fee-simple, and so seized did devise them by Paroll. The question was, whether this devise was warranted by the Custom. Shafto argued, that the Custom did not warrant this devise, because Customs are not to be enlarged by construction, but are to be taken strictly, and according to the letter, because they run in abridgement of the Common-law, and so are not to be favoured, 9 E. 3. f. 38.11 H. 4. f. 33.5. H. 6. f. 51. Next here are immaterial words found in the Verdict, for if it be the Custom for Tenant in fee-simple to devise, yet this extends not to tenant in tail, 27 H. 6. f. 5.21. E. 4. f. 24. and a devise of rent to be issuing out of these Houses is not good within the Custom, although that a rent doth follow the nature of the Land, 22 Assis. pl. 78.26 H. 8.54. It is true, Cook in his Littleton, f. 111. saith, that one may devise a rent in remainder, but I deny this, for the authorities of the Books are against him. An estate in remainder is not Assets, nor can be devised, 3 H. 7. f. 23, 24. a condition goes to an Estate. tail, not to a fée-simple in remainder, 6 Rep. f. 33. And here is but a power of an Estate, and not an Estate in possession, Lit. sect. 137. And the finding here that the Tenant in tail did die without issue is not material, for this could not be known at the time of the devise, and the devise takes its effect in the time of the Devisor, 27 H. 8. Dyer 45.5. Eliz. Dyer, Bishop's Case, 1 Rep. Archers Case, f. ●6. 2ly. Here is no Custom found to entitle the party: for a Town cannot have a Custom as it is here found, though a Borough may, 22 Ass. 178 and this is not found to be an ancient Vill, 7 H. 6. Dyer, 22 H. 6. Fitzh. prescript. 47. Next the Custom is not found, that Burghers may devise as it ought to be. Turner john on the other side held, that some Estate doth pass by the Will, and it matters not what Estate passeth, and the Owners of Houses in our Case shall be intended to be Tenants in fee-simple, and it is not necessary that they be Tenants in fee in possession, Perkins devises, Plowd. 262. Dyer 22.22 Eliz, 371. p. 5. and the Custom here found is no more, but an ordinary Custom common to other Boroughs, and it shall not be intended a special Custom. And this case may be resembled to Cases upon the Statute of 32, & 34 H. 8. for devising of Lands, 10 Rep. f. 81. Trin. 34 Eliz. Benefilds Case there cited and 35 Eliz. howard's Case, which prove, that reversions may be devised, Nat. brev. 199. a. Perkins Devises, Pl. 540. is the very Case in question, and the Cases put on the other side come not to our Case. Roll chief justice, It is not necessary in a special Verdict to be so precise as in pleading, Special verdict. but something may be supplied, and the verdict hath found that he was Owner, and that the Owner may devise, and the Custom is, that every Owner in fee-simple may devise, and the Custom shall go to Land, and holds to reversions as well as to lands in possession. At another day it was argued, that the devise was not good, for the word Owners cannot extend to all sorts of Owners, for it extends not to an Infant Owner of such Houses, for he cannot devise, therefore the words must receive a limited construction, and therefore I conceive the word Owner extends only to an absolute Tenant in fee-simple, and not to a reversioner in fee: for a Custom must, as hath been said, be taken strictly, 12 E. 4. f. 3.21 E. 4. f. 24. 2ly. In true construction this Owner in fee in remainder shall not be said Owner, but the Tenant in tail is Owner, and so here is not Owner ex vi termini. 3ly. Here is but a possibility of fee-simple in him, which is not grantable or devisable, 2 Ed. 4.1. and the Statute of Westm. 2d. helps not to the Custom: for that Statute is within memory of man, 26 H. 8. f. 4.22 Ass. Pl. 78. And upon the very finding of the verdict it cannot be good, for by the Verdict no title is found for the Defendant. Latch on the other side held, that here is a good devise warranted by the Custom, for here is an Estate within the very letter of the Custom, for he is true Owner of the House in fee-simple, although it be not in present possession, for he hath fee-simple in it, and hath it to his own benefit in such an Estate as it is, and the word Owner is a general word, and comprehendeth all manner of Ownerships. 2ly. It is within the reason of the Custom, for it intends the same benefit to Owners in reversion as it doth to Owners in possession, and is indifferent unto all Estates. And although a Custom shall be taken strictly, yet it shall also be taken reasonably, as having respect to the benefit of the party, and there can be no reason alleged to be against this devise; 26 H. 8.4. A remainder in fee shall go according to the Custom, whether by the Custom Lands in fee shall go, the Custom shall go to all things issuing out of the Land, and so to all Estates in the Land, Dyer 148. and here is more than a possibility devised, 4 & 5 Phil. & Mar. Benloes. It is ruled, that a fee-simple expectant shall go to the youngest Son by the Custom, where the Custom was, that the youngest Son should have the Lands of which his Ancestor died seized; and as to the Verdict here is a good title found for the Defendant. Roll chief justice, The verdict is imperfect, for the Ejectment is against Baron and Feme, and the Feme is found Ejector by the verdict, and nothing is found concerning the Baron, Venire de novo. therefore you must have a Venire de novo, if you will not agree to amend the Verdict according to the notes, if the notes will warrant it. Afterwards a Venire de novo was awarded by consent. Pendarvis and Saint Aubin. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. Trin. 1653. rot. 723. IN an Action of Account the Defendant pleads ne unques receptor, Plea before Auditors. upon this an Issue was joined, and an imperfect verdict found, and thereupon a Venire de novo was awarded, and the jury found for the Plaintiff, and the Defendant adjudged to account before Auditors. The Defendant pleads before the Anditors, that he had delivered over part of the moneys. To this the Plaintiff demurs, and shows for cause that this Plea is contrary to the Verdict, for that is, that he should account for all, and here he would account but for part only. Windham for the Plaintiff argued, that this cannot be a good plea before Auditors in discharge of the account, but it goes in bar of the account, Dyer 196. 41 E. 3. f. 31.22 H. 6.25. and in Boynton and Cheeks Case lately in this Court such a Plea was adjudged not good. And it would be michievous if it should be otherwise, in reserving such matter to be tried again. Twisden on the other side said it is a good plea before Auditors, to say, that he received the moneys to deliver over, and there are four opinions in the Books how this matter should be pleaded, ●o E. 3. Br. Acc. 8●. hold ● that this Plea is pleadable before Auditors, and this plea is in discharge of the Account, and therefore pleadable before Auditors, 12 H. 4.18. and in Baynton and Cheeks Case cited, the judgement was not given upon this point. Roll thief justice, The Books generally are, that this plea is in bar of the Account: Plea. Bar. but here your plea of delivery over, hath made it a plea in bar, and it would be mischievous to plead it now, for this would cause one and the same issue to be twice tried, and then there may be contrary Verdicts, which would be inconvenient. Therefore let judgement be for the Plaintiff. Stavely and Ulithorp. Hill. 1653. Banc. sup. AN Action of Debt was brought upon the Statute of 2 Ed. 6. for not setting forth of Tithes; and a Verdict was given for the Plaintiff. Arrest of judgement in an action for not setting forth of T●hs. It was moved in arrest of judgement that the Statute was misrecited, because it was not said the Parliament in which it was made was held by prorogation, as in truth it was. But Latch answered, that it is not misrecited, for it is true that the Parliament was held, upon the 9th. of November, Recital. as we have alleged, though we have not expressed it to be held by prorogation, and we conceive it is not necessary to express it to be so held, for the Precedents are contrary, as in Cook's Entry, tit. Prohibition. Roll chief justice, The Parliament is not said to be begun and held, but only to be held, and therefore it is well enough. judgement was given for the Plaintiff, nisi. Postea. Dorman and Snag. Hill. 1653. Banc. sup. AN Action upon the Case was brought upon two promises, Arrest of judgement in an, Action upon two promises. viz. to pay so much money upon a certain day: and 2ly. to save the Plaintiff harmless, etc. Upon issue joined and a verdict found for the Plaintiff, it was moved in arrest of judgement, that the Plaintiff did not show how the Defendant hath not saved the Plaintiff harmless, but only says generally that he did not save him harmless, and so he may bring another Action for the same thing. The Court was then of opinion that it was not good to say generally, that the Defendant did not save him harmless, but he ought to show in what particular; as if I assume and promise to one to give him all the money in my Purse, I must show how much money was in it, and aver that I gave it him. At another day Sergeant Clark moved for judgement, whom Latch seconded, and said, here is a good breach assigned: for it is that he paid not the money for which the Plaintiff was bound with him at such a day, according to his promise. Twisden on the other side said, that the consideration is to pay the usury for the money for which the plaintiff was bound with the Defendant, which is not a good consideration, for it is against the Common-law to let money for usury, and so it was adjudged 2 Car. and the Statutes do but tolerate the taking of usury for moneys. 2ly. Here is no time of the consideration set forth. Latch, The usury here is no more than the Statute allows, and so it is a good consideration. Alleyn, The promise declared upon is double, 1. to pay money. 2ly. To save harmless, and the breach is assigned generally, Case. and not particularly as it ought to be. Roll chief justice, If two breaches be assigned, and the one well assigned, and the other not, yet the Action lies well enough: but here is but one breach assigned, viz. the nonpayment of the money at the day. And for the other matter I hold it a good consideration to assume to save one harmless from paying of Usury, Consideration and the usury here expressed is lawful by the Statute, and so it hath been resolved since 2 Car. and therefore let judgement be for he Plaintiff, nisi. Turner and Trapes. Hill. 1653. Banc. sup. TUner brought an Action of Debt upon a recognizance in the Pettibagg. The Defendant prayed oyer of the Condition there, Motion to alter a Plea in the Pettibagg-Office. and had it, afterwards he shows this matter to this Court, and prays, in regard he had mistaken his plea, that he may replead. Roll chief justice, This cannot be granted upon motion here, for if the issue be joined in the Pettibagg, you must try it, we can make no rule but by consent. Hill. 1653. Banc. sup. Wadham Windham moved for his Client, To plead specially. that he might have liberty to plead secially in an Action of Trespass and Ejectment, and not generally not guilty. Roll chief justice, For what cause? Windham, Because there hath been matter given in evidence at a former Trial, which ought not to have been. Roll chief justice, proceed according to the course of the Court, if the other will not consent you shall not plead specially, yet let him show cause why you may not plead specially. Barker and Elmer. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. THe Case was this, Whether a Mis-tryal or no. one of the justices of Assize falling sick, and dying at Chelmesford in Essex, the Assizes were adjourned to Brentwood in the same County; afterwards, and before the sitting at Brentwood the other judge fell sick, and died at London, and a new Commission issued forth to authorize another judge to sit at Brentford according to the adjournment, and there a Trial was had upon the old jurata returned before the other judges. The question was, whether this were not a mistryal, in regard there was not a new jury returned; The Case was divers times moved, and the Court took time to advise: but at length Roll chief justice delivered the opinion of the Court, Mis-tryal. that this was not a mis-tryal, because the death of the justices was not material to make it void, for the justices are not named in the jurata: but the Cause is expressed generally to be tried by the justices. And he said, that he held it for a rule, that if a Clerk mis-enter a thing usual in matter of form, Mis-entry. Amendment. it is to be amended: but the error of the judge may not be amended, and he cited these Precedents, Mich. 13 Car. Sawyer and Hortons' Case in this Court, and Hill. 15 Car. Belch and Fates case in this Court. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. AN Action of Assault and Battery was brought against two, Motion to strike one Defendant out of the Declaration. one of them pleads his privilege of Parliament, and the other non cull. The Plaintif moved the Court the he might strike him out of the Declaration who had pleaded the privilege, and might proceed against the other only: But the Court would make no rule, but bid the Plaintif proceed as he pleased at his own peril, Hill. 1653. Banc. sup. ONe Cock was committed by the Court for delivering a Bill of Midlesex to arrest one as he was coming to the Court about his occasions, Commitment for contempt to the Court. but was presently released, paying the fees and discharging the party arrested, and the Bailif was reproved, but not committed, because he said he knew not that the party had any business in Court, and that he arrested him out of the Hall. Nota. Hacker and Newborn. Hill. 1653. Banc. sup. IT was showed to the Court that the Plaintif had heretofore had a trial at the Bar for the same thing, for which he now brings his action, To stay proceed till costs paid in a former Action. and that it went then against him, but he hath not yet paid the Defendant his costs, and now brings a new Action; It was therefore prayed that he may pay the Costs taxed in the former Action before he be suffered to proceed in this Action. Roll chief justice, Let it be so ruled. Higgs and Harrison. Hill. 1653. Banc. sup. Mich. 1653. rot. 429. HIggs brings an Action of Trespass quare clausum fregit against Harrison an Attorney of the Common Pleas. Demurrer to a plea of privilege by an Attorney. The Defendant pleads his privilege by an Attorney, and to this plea the Plaintif demurred; the question was whether he may plead this plea by Attorney, or aught to plead it in proper person. Latch argued. That he ought not to plead it by Attorney, for this plea is not a plea to the jurisdiction of the Court, but it is only a prayer to the Court, and he might have done it o'er tenus, and pleading it by Attorney his plea cannot be entered, for then the plea of privilege would be destroyed in making him to attend. Every one by the Common Law ought to appear in person, and there is no Statute, Law nor usage that authoriseth an Attorney to make an Attorney to demand his privilege. 2ly. It is against the dignity of this Court that he should be admitted to do it. 3ly. By making of an Attorney he destroys the very reason why he claims his privilege, which is to be spared of his attendance, which he needs not if he make an Attorney, and his making of an Attorney here is a general warrant to defend other causes as well as this, and the Case of an Essoign objected makes for me, which is but to pray an excuse, and after an Attorney made one cannot cast an essoign, except it be where the Attorney cannot answer, 4 Ed. 3.34. And there is no authority can be showed that he may make an Attorney. But on the contrary part there are many precedents where Attorneys have prayed their privilege in person, and these me seems should make the Law in this Case, Dyer 33 H. 8. is the express case, Attorney. 20 H. 6.32. The Court advised. At another day Roll chief justice said, That the opinion of the Court was, that an Attorney may plead his privilege by an Attorney, and there is no inconvenience follows by doing it; but it is true the Precedents are both ways, and it is not contrary to any thing he hath done, and it may be he is sick, or hath business in another Court, where he is necessarily attend. Therefore let his plea be allowed, nisi. Leake and Reynolds. Hill. 1653. Banc. sup. LEake brought an Action of Debt upon an Obligation against Reynolds, Special verdict in debt upon a bond. The Defendant pleads non est factum, the jury upon issue joined find a special verdict to this effect, That the Plaintiffs Declaration is upon an Obligation dated the 24 day of the month, and they find that the Obligation was sealed and delivered the 27 day of the month, but bears date the 24 day, and whether this shall be accounted the same Obligation upon which the plaintiff declares or not, is left to the Court to determine. Green for the Plaintif said, that this case is the same with Goddards case, and there it was adjudged a good deed, 12 H. 6. f. 1. Dyer 247. and in the end of Goddards case the case in point is adjudged. Roll chief justice, This is a plea in Bar, Plea. and not in abatement, therefore take your judgement. Hill. 1653. Upper Bench. BY Roll chief justice, What is not slandering a title. If one hath colour of title to land, an Action of the Case will not lie against him for saying, I have better title to the land than you, though his title be not so good as the others title is. Nota. Wingfield and Valence. Hill. 1653. Banc. sup. Hill. 1650. rot. 1409. LAtch moved to have restitution of moneys out of the hands of a Sheriff, For resti ution of moneys in the Sherif-hands. which he had levied upon an execution taken out of this Court, because it issued forth erroneously, for before the Execution taken forth the Defendant brought his writ of Error in the Chequer Chamber to reverse the judgement, and the Record was removed thither, and although the late Statute say, that a writ of Error shall be no supersedeas to stay execution, yet the Record being removed into the Exchequer Chamber, no execution can be granted out here, for here is no Record to warrant it. Roll chief Just. The case being moved again at another day, till when the Court would advise, said, The Record is removed by a writ of Error in the Exchequer Chamber, and is not now before us, nor was at the time when the Execution issued forth, and this being after a verdict and a judgement the writ of Error is no supersedeas, and so it is mischievous both ways, Mischief. Supersedeas but how can we help it? yet take a supersedeas quia erronice to supersede the execution, for it was ill awarded, and take the moneys out of the Sheriffs hands. Nota. The Protector and Captain Streeter. Hill. 1653. Banc. sup. CAptain Streeter was brought in Court by habeas Corpus, For delivery of a Prisoner appearing upon a Habeas Corpus. and upon the return read and filled, it appears that he was committed by an Order of Parliament, for publishing scandalous and sedilious books. Twisden moved that the prisoner might be bailed, because that the Parliament is now dissolved, and by consequence the Order by which he was committed, is of no source. Mr. Attorney General on the other side urged, that the Parliament was not dissolved, but only the meeting of those persons in Parliament was dissolved, for the Parliament by the ancient Law is to be every year, so that this is but in effect an adjournment, and not a dissolution, and besides, this matter for which the prisoner stands committed cannot be here inquired of, and so the cause of his commitment shall be intended to be good, and the Parliament may commit without showing the cause of the commitment, and this commitment may be in order to his Trial, and the Prisoner is not without remedy, for he may apply himself to the supreme Authority, to whom the Parliament have resigned their power. Twisden for the prisoner confessed, that this Court cannot be judge of the Parliament; but this Order by which he is committed differs from an Act of Parliament, for this is temporary, and determineth; and although the authority of Parliament ceaseth not, yet a particular Parliament may be dissolved, as this was. Wad. Windham, When a Parliament is dissolved, the proceed there are determined. Flowrdews case 1 H. 7. the Latin case, and the Parliament is now dissolved, and not adjourned, and a Parliament dissolved is not like the Courts of justice here in the Vacation time. Wild, This case is not like to the case where this Court remaunded a prisoner committed by the Parliament sitting the Parliament, for the prisoner here is coram Protectore who may deliver him. Captain Streeter, Mr. Attorney labours to afperse me, but shows no cause or crime for my commitment, and I am here before the Protector in his own Court. Attorney General, Only the persons and their convention is dissolved, but not the Court, no more than this Court is, by the demise of the King, or in the Vacation time, and I must refer it to the Court how far you will intermeddle in this case, and this Order by which he stands committed may be his judgement there, and then he cannot be delivered; and I know no difference between an Order and an Ordinance of Parliament, and the stamp and authority of Parliament is upon this order; and if the prisoners Counsel say true, than he may have an Action of false imprisonment against his Gaoler. Twisden, Here is no Order of the Parliament returned, but it expresseth that he was committed by the Speaker by virtue of an Order of the Parliament. Roll chief justice, We examine not the Orders of Parliament; but the question is whether the Order doth now continue, Order of Parliament, Dissolution. and I conceive it is determined by the dissolution of the Parliament, and so would it have done by prorogation of the parliament, because there is another Session, and we can judge no otherwise of Orders of Parliament, but by the words of them. Ask justice, If one that is committed by Order of Parliament cannot be delivered until another Parliament, the people's liverty will be lost, for there may not be a Parliament in many years. Roll chief justice, A new Parliament hath not reference to the old, but it is a new Court created upon new Summons, and why may not the Prisoner be bailed without these disputes? although he may apply himself elsewhere; But the Court would advise, because they perceived the prisoner stubborn. At another day, Mr. Attorney, upon the prisoners appearance again upon his Habeas Corpus said, that he had no more to say than what he had formerly offered, only he added that it was a tender and a leading case, and therefore to be well advised of. Roll chief justice, For the first part of the return, Return. I conceive it too general, for it doth not appear in what the books are scandalous, for the publishing whereof he was committed. 2ly. I conceive that the Order of Parliament ceaseth with the Parliament, Order. which is dissolved, as an Order of one Session of Parliament ends with the Session, Committee. and is not like an Act, which continues after the Parliament; and all Committees made by order of Parliament do cease by dissolving of the Parliament, but those which are made by Act of Parliament do continue afterwards; and this individual Parliament being dissolved, they can now make no further order, Bail. and so the prisoner may lie perpetually in prison, and he hath already lain long in prison, and therefore it is reason he should he bailed. The prisoner was admonished to be quiet, and not henceforth to disturb the State. The prisoner was ordered to bring sureties to be bound in 500 l. for his appearance here the next Term, and sic de die in diem until Mr. Attorney will proceed against him, if he will proceed at all. Hudson and Dickenson. Hill. 1653. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved on the behalf of the plaintiff, For entry of a Nil capiat per Billam for expedition. that a Nil capiat per billam may be entered against him for expedition in an Action of Trespass for taking away his , wherein he had obtained a Verdict, because he had declared for taking away 6 Mares and Colts, and did not show how many Mares, and how many Colts particularly. Roll chief justice, Let a Nil capiat per Billam be entered. Pinchard and Fowke. Hill. 1653. anc. sup. PInchard brought an Action upon the Case against Fowke, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon an Assumpsit. upon an Assumpsit, and declares, that the Defendant, in consideration that the Plaintif would forbear to protest a Bill of Exchange drawn upon the Defendant, that he would pay the moneys when he should next come to London: And upon an Issue joined, and a Verdict found for the plaintiff, it was moved in Arrest of judgement, that here is no consideration set forth to ground the promise upon; for he doth not show that he came to London, but shows that he died at Plymouth, and came not to London. Roll chief justice, Consideration. Duty. The coming to London is alleged to no purpose, for the payment of the money was a duty, and the moneys to be paid were received beyond Sea, and so is a duty, and made a good consideration, therefore let the Plaintif take his judgement. Pasc. 1654. Banc. sup. IT was said by the Court that when an Informer hath attached his Action in a Court, another Informer cannot inform for the same thing, A good plea against an Informer. and it he do, it is a good plea in Bar to the second Informer, that an information is depending against him for the same thing. Note. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. BY Roll chief justice, A Bailif of a liberty hath return of writs, How a rescous is to be expressed. Bailif. and therefore a rescous made from him must be expressed to be out of his hands, but a rescous made from the Sheriffs Bailif must be expressed to be out of the hands of the Sheriffs Bailif, for the Bailif is but the Sheriffs servant. Patnell and Brooke. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved upon an Affidavit to stay Execution upon a judgement given for an Administrator, To stay execution upon a judgement. Audita querela. because the Letters of administration were repealed before the judgement entered. Roll chief justice, The matter comes not legally in question before us, you must bring your audita querela, yet let Hern the Secondary examine it. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved for a writ of Distringas against the Inhabitants of a Town in Huntingtonshire, For a Distringas against Inhabitants of a Town. Plea. for throwing in of banks of the Earl of Bedfords in his drained lands. Roll chief justice, Take it, but at the return of the writ the Inhabitants may plead to you, notwithstanding Noy the late King's Attorney would not have suffered it. Note. and the Sheriffs of London. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. AN Action upon the Case was brought against the Sheriffs of London for not returning a fieti facias: The Defendants plead not guilty, Moved that the Defendants might plead specially. and a jury was returned to try the issue, and after the Defendants filled the return of the Scire facias. Wadham Windham moved, that the Defendants might waive their general plea of not guilty, and might plead specially, viz. That they had executed the writ. Roll chief justice, Amendment. You have pleaded already, and it is in our power whether we will suffer you to alter your plea or not, and we will not do it without the Plaintif will consent, therefore make the best of that plea you have pleaded upon your trial. Oils and Marshal. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. Wild upon a rule to show cause why a Prohibition should not be granted to the Court of Policy of assurance in London, Against granting a Prohibition to the Court of Policy of assurance. shows for cause, that the Defendant had pleaded there, and the Plaintiff had replied, and that the cause was ready for Trial, and that the principal matter was fit to be tried there, and they had authority to try it. Roll chief justice, If they have jurisdiction of the principal matter, they have also jurisdiction of all matters incident thereunto, jurisdiction. Trial. and they may try them according to the course of their Law, so that it be not contrary to the Common-law. Therefore discharge the former rule. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. BY Roll chief justice, Who of common right are to repair a Sea-wall. If no particular person by Custom be bound to repair a Sea-wall wherein a breach is made, the whole Level are bound to do it. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. Upon evidence given in a Trial at the Bar between Sir john Bridges, How a Will may be revoked. and my Lord Chandois, it was said by Roll chief justice, that one may revoke a Will in writing by Paroll, and may revive it again by Paroll. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved for a Habeas Corpus for one outlawed in felony, For a Habeas Corpus. because he cannot be tried there where the felony was done, until the Outlawry be reversed. But it was prayed for the Protector that a Habeas Corpus may not be granted, because the Prisoner stands committed for divers felonies and rapes. Roll chief justice, He shall be brought hither by a Habeas Corpus to reverse the Outlawry, but we will remand him to be tried where he is. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved for one brought out of Wales by a Habeas Corpus, That one might be bailed. Quo warrante● that he may be bailed, because they have no Gaol-delivery there. Roll chief justice, It were good a Quo warranto were brought against them for not using their privileges duly. Let the Prisoner be bound to answer his offence at the next Assizes. The Protector and Baxter. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. ONe Baxter indicted upon suspicion of Robbery was outlawed upon the Endictment, Error to reverse an Outlawry in felony, and prayed to be allowed. and taken upon the Outlawry, and committed to Finsbury Gaol; afterwards he brings a Writ of Error to reverse the Outlawry, and obtains a Habeas Corpus to be brought hither to prosecute his Writ of Error, and upon the return thereof was brought to the Bar, and prays to have his Writ of Error allowed, and to have Counsel assigned him, and that he may have a Copy of the Record, and that he may be bailed; and he took two exceptions to the Outlawry, 1. That he was in Prison at the time he was outlawed, and knew nothing of the Outlawry. 2ly. That the charge against him is too general, and there is no body prosecutes against him, and prayed he may go with his Keeper to his Counsel. Roll chief justice, You cannot be bailed, nor have a Copy of the Record, Bail. Copy. but you shall have Counsel assigned you, but you must be remanded. Isles and Windsor. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. Trin. 1653. rot. 360. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given by default in the Common-Pleas in an Action of Trover and Conversion, Error to reverse a judgement in Trover given by default. and the error assigned was, that the Plaintiff had declared for two pieces of Cloth, and did not express whether they were linen or cloth: But the exception was overruled, and the judgement affirmed, nisi. Bunniworth and Gibbs. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. Mich. 1653. rot. 50. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in the Court at Peterborough in an Action upon the Case upon a promise, Error to reverse a judgement in an action upon an Assumpsit. wherein the Plaintiff declared, that in consideration that the Defendant had received 5 l. which was due by the Plaintiff unto the Defendant upon an account made up betwixt them at such a time, the Defendant did assume and promise to the Plaintiff to pay unto him a certain sum of money when the Defendant shall set up an Apothecary's shop in Peterborough, if the Plaintiff be then living there. The error assigned was, that here is no consideration laid in the Declaration to ground the promise upon: for the consideration is the receipt of five pounds, which was his own money, for it was due to him upon the account, and this can be no good consideration. But Roll chief justice answered to this, that a little consideration will serve to ground a promise upon, Consideration and it may be the Plaintiff would not have acknowledged so much as 5 l. to have been due upon the Account, if the Defendant would not have made this promise. A second exception was taken that the Plaintiff doth not aver, Averment. that when the Defendant set up the Apothecary's shop in Peterborough that he was living there Roll chief justice. This is a good exception, for the intent of the Plaintiff appears to be, that he would not have another of his own Trade in the Town to lessen his trading. Therefore let the judgement be reversed, nisi. Lord and Michael. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. Trin. 1653. rot. 358. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given upon a Nihil dicit in the Common-pleas in an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit; Error to reverse a judgement by a Nihil dicit in an action upon an Assumpsit. the consideration was laid, that if the Plaintiff would forbear to sue the Defendant, that then the Defendant would pay such a sum of money. Two errors were assigned to reverse the judgement, 1. That whereas the consideration is laid generally, that if the Plaintiff should forbear to sue the Defendant, he would pay the money; the Plaintiff hath not averred this consideration, but saith in facto that he did forbear to sue till june, which cannot be the same consideration. 2ly. The Writ of Enquiry is said to be enquired of by twelve lawful men in the County, whereas it should be of the County, for the jurors for aught appears may be of another County, and then it cannot be well. Averment. Roll chief justice, This is but an inquest of Office, but you have not averred the consideration as you ought to have done, and this is error. Therefore let the Judgement be reversed, nisi, etc. Phillips and Phillips. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in the Court at Newport in an Action upon the Case for these words, Error to reverse a judgement in an action for words. Thou art a whoreson Bankrupt-Rogue, and they were laid to be spoken of a Farmer. The errors assigned were. 1. That it doth not appear by the Declaration that the Plaintiff gets his living by buying and selling. And 2ly. It appears not that the words were spoken of him in relation to his profession. And upon these Exceptions the judgement was reversed. Banks and Prat. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. Hill. 1653. rot. 603. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in the Common-pleas for an Attorney in an Action upon the Case, Error to reverse a judgement in an action upon Promise. grounded upon a promise that the Defendant would pay him such fees as should grow due to him as an Attorney in prosecuting such a Suit for him in the Common pleas, and for prosecuting another suit for him in Chancery as his Solicitor. The Errors assigned were, 1. That he doth not show particularly how he hath laid out the money, but only expresseth it general, that he had expended, and there was due unto him such a sum of money. 2ly. The Promise is, that the Defendant would pay him the fees so long as he should continue to be his Attorney and to prosecute for him, and it doth not appear that he continued to be his Attorney, and to prosecute for him during the suit, and to make the first exception good Took and Sir Tho. Walsinghams' Case lately adjudged was urged. But as to that exception Roll chief justice answered, it is not necessary to show particularly how the money became due, and was expended, for this would make the Declaration too long; and though the Plaintiff; as hath been objected, should bring another Action for the same thing, yet you may plead this recovery in bar generally against him. Plea in bat. Intendment. And as to the second exception it shall be intended he continued to be his Attorney, if it appears as it doth, that he prosecuted for him. Therefore show cause Friday next why the judgement should not be affirmed. Postea. Kemp and Gord. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. Hill. 1653. rot. 840. AN Action upon the Case was brought by the Mayor and Commonalty of the Town of Lyscard in Cornwall against Gored for not grinding at their common Mill. The Defendant demurs to the Declaration. Demurrer to a Declaration in an action upon the Case for not grinding at a Mill. And Wadham Windham for the Defendant urged, that the Custom is not well alleged upon which the Action was grounded. For first it is not showed, that the House where the Defendant inhabiteth, and by reason whereof it is supposed he ought to grind at the Mill is held of the Mayor and Commonalty. 2ly. It is not showed, that the Mayor and Commonalty are bound to repair the Mill, and do constantly keep Grinders and Loaders. And for the first, this Custom ought to be affixed, by reason of the tenure of the House, or in respect of the Corn growing upon the ground used with the House, and it is not proper to say, a man is bound to grind by reason of his House, 8 Rep. Farmer's case, f. 125. Hob. Harding and Green's case, 19 Ed. 2. Fitzh. Ass. ●●9. For the second, this grinding at the Mill is a personal service, and if the Mayor and Commonalty be not bound to repair the Mill, and to find Grinders and Loaders, than there is not quid pro quo, and the Custom will be unreasonable, and a mere oppression, 22 Ass. Pl. 58. Latch on the other side said, here is a good Custom alleged, and it is not necessary to show any tenure in this Action, being but an Action upon the Case, and not a Secta ad molendinum, and so is it agreed in Harding and Green's Case. And in 9 jac. Hill. rot. 691. an Action was brought for this very Cause, and the Custom was then allowed to be good. Roll chief justice, I believe this is a good Custom, and the Corporation is bound to repair the Mill, Custom. and there can be no prejudice for the party to grind here, and the Custom hath been already tried and found good. Therefore let the Plaintiff have his judgement, nisi, etc. jones and Graves. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. IN the Case of one jones and Graves, It was said by Roll chief justice, Where a Writ is abated, where it is abateable. That if a Writ of Covenant be brought against three, and one of them die, the Writ is abated only to him; but is not abated to the rest, but only abateable: but Latch fortment that it is abated to all. Tompkins and Clark. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in the Court at Newcastle upon Tyne, Error to reverse a judgement in an action for words. in an Action upon the Case for these words, He, meaning the plaintiff, is a base beggarly Rascal, and hath cozened the Parliament a hundred times, and deserves to ride on the wooden horse, standing on the Sand hill. The Exceptions were, that the words are not actionable, for the Plaintif is at no loss or damage by speaking of them, nor is thereby endangered of his life, or to be punished corporally. 2ly. The words are not said to be spoken of the plaintiff, nor to the Plaintif. 3ly. The Venire is not well issued. Roll chief justice, Reversetur, nisi, etc. Stauley and Ulithorp. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. LAtch moved again for judgement in this case formerly spoken to, For judgement in an action on the Statute of 2 Ed. 6. concerning tithes. notwithstanding the exception insisted upon by Shaftoe after the Court had delivered some opinion, viz. that it was not expressed that the Parliament was held by prorogation, because it is not necessary it should be so expressed. 2ly. The Action is here brought upon the second branch of the Statute, which is, that all persons shall set forth their tithes, and the word subject is only mentioned in the first clause. Maynard on the same side said, that this mis-recital, if it be a mis-recital, affirms the Statute, and it is not a false recital, and therefore it doth not hurt. Roll chief justice, It is not good to make such recitals of Statutes in a Declaration, Recitals. nor would I have any recital made hereafter more than is necessary for the gist of the Action. Shaftoe insisted upon it, That the mis-recital here is a material Exception, for the recital is not true; for it is not all one to say the Subject of the King, and to say the Subject of the then King, for the former words go to the politic capacity of the King as King, and the latter words go to the natural capacity of his particular person. Roll chief justice, But what say you to that which is said on the other side. That the Action is brought upon the second clause of the Statute, which is, that all persons shall set forth their tithes, and not upon the first Clause, which speaks of all Subjects of the King: And the recital here is not material to the Action. It is true, here is a mis-recital, and if the Action were brought upon the first Clause of the Statute, it would not be good, but it is not so here. Therefore let the Plaintif have his judgement, nisi. Antea. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved for an Attachment against the Sheriff of Staffordshire, For an Attachment. for making a frivolous return of a Habeas Corpus, viz. That the Committee for poor prisoners had ordered, he should not bring the body till they had consulted with the Lord chief justice. Roll chief justice, Take an Alias habeas Corpus, with a pain of 80 l. Roby and Twelves. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. Trin. 1652. rot. 502. IN a special Verdict in an Ejectione firmae, it was found, Special verdict in an Ejectione firmae. that there was a custom within the Manor of Castle Dunnington, that any Copyholder of that Manor may make a writing in the nature of a Letter of Attorney to two Copyholders of the same Manor, to surrender his Copyhold after his death. The question was, whether this was a good custom or not. Alleyn argued for the custom, that it was a good custom; because such customs are not to be governed by the rules of the Common Law, but by the rules of natural reason, and are considerable in themselves, and such customs may restrain the Common Law, and the Common Law doth tolerate them. And this custom that gives power to make this surrender after the Copyholders death, is not unreasonable, for the power given is not countermanded by his death, no more than an Attorney is restrained by his master's death to act in the cause. And in Butler and Ba●ers case, by the delivery of a deed after the death of the party, the estate may pass by Attorney, and so although here be but a bare power given, yet it is well executed, notwithstanding his death that gave it. 2ly. This Letter of Attorney was not countermandable by the Copyholder himself during his life, and therefore it shall not be countermanded by his death, and though it had been countermandable during his life, yet it being not countermanded by him in his life, his death shall not countermand it, and the custom doth strengthen this power. Next, this custom is not contradictory, for here is no Attorney made, but a writing made in the nature of a Letter of Attorney, and a power to surrender given by it, and it is no more than for one Copyholder to surrender for another, which is usual, and in Cooks 9 Rep. f. 76. A Copyholder is called an Attorney; also Copyhold estates are made by customs, and therefore such customs which are to confirm estates are to be favoured in Law, although they do differ from conveyances of estates at the Common Law, and this custom is not only reasonable, but convenient also for the passing of Copyhold estates. And this custom enlarges the power of alienations, and such customs have generally been admitted good, though different from the Common Law; And when a custom is become a Law it is very dangerous to alter it, and the doing of it would overthrow many estates. Ellis Solicitor General on the other side argued, That the custom is not good, because it is against the rule of Law, That an authority given should survive the party that gave it, and a custom cannot strengthen it, for a custom ought to be reasonable, and agreeing to the nature of the thing which it concerns, otherwise it cannot be good, for Ratio est formalis causa consuetudinis, Dalisons Rep. 32. 1 Instit. f. 59 And this cause cannot be reasonable, because it cannot give an authority to another to do such a thing for him after his death, which he could not do during his life; And this custom doth purely destroy the nature of the Common Law, and therefore cannot be good; And it is against the very nature of an authority to survive, and so consequently it is against the nature of the thing, Dyer 357. 10 E. 3. f. 5. 18 Rep. Vnyers case. The party in his life time might have revoked this authority, and therefore his death doth revoke it; and by the death of the Copyholder the Copyhold is descended, and cannot be surrendered by a dead man, and here was no incoation of the estate of the party that is dead, and I hold there is a difference betwixt a will and an authority; And also here the Letter of Attorney is not pursuant to the custom, and therefore it is a void Letter of Attorney, 16 jac. rot. 530. Greenwood and Onslaes' case. Customs are to be taken strictly, Copyhold. and to be so pursued, and it is not so here, for here is an addition to the custom, and this makes all void. Roll chief justice, Copyholds are much led by the customs of the Manor, and, me thinks, here is little difference betwixtt surrendering into the hands of another Copyholder, to make a surrender for him, and this case, and the variances are not so considerable as to make it void here. The Court would advise. At another day the case was again put, Custom and the Court delivered their opinion, that the custom was good; and Roll chief justice said, that the death of the party doth not revoke this writing made in the nature of a Letter of Attorney, Revocation. for it is strengthened by the custom, and it is not like an ordinary Letter of Attorney which becomes void by the death of him that made it, Authority. Executor. for this custom is a Law, and the authority here survives, as an Executor may sell the Testators lands, it he be impowered to do it by the will, and therefore the Custom is good, and let the Plaintif have judgement, nisi, etc. Child Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. AN Action upon the Statute of 5 Eliz. was brought for using a Trade not having served an Apprenticeship in it. That the Defendant might not plead to the Action. Sergeant Fletcher moved that the Defendant might not be compelled to plead, because he ought not to be sued out of the County where he useth the Trade. Roll chief justice, proceed according to Law, and plead this matter, or move it in arrest of judgement, Rule. for we will make no rule. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. BY Roll chief justice, Where an Action on the Case lies, and where not. an Action upon the case doth not lie against one for causing another to be indicted for a Trespass, but for causing one to be indicted for a thing which deserves corporal punishment, or a thing which sounds in scandal of the party indicted, an Action upon the case will lie. Nota. Stevens against Ask. Mich. 1654. Banc. sup. Stephens' brought an Action upon the case against Ask for these words, Action on the Case for words. Arrest of judgement. Adjective words. Thou art a common Bastard-bearing Whore, and hadst two Bastards by a Butcher, and I will prove it. Upon not guilty pleaded, and a verdict found for the plaintiff, Twisden moved in Arrest of judgement that the first words, viz. Thou art a common Bastard-bearing Whore are not actionable; because they are adjective words, and are not positive; And for the other words they are not actionable, because they were spoken of a Feme Covert, who cannot have a Bastard. Upon this the judgement was arrested till the next Term, and then Wild moved for judgement, for that he conceived that the words taken together are actionable, and cited Owen & levons case adjudged in this Court to prove it. Roll chief justice, If she were married at the time of the words spoken she could not have a Bastard; but yet why should not the words be actionable, for the words purport that she was not married when she had the Bastards, and the jury hath found for the Plaintif. Therefore let her take her judgement, nisi. Barker and Weston. Mich. 1654. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved that the bail to an Action might be discharged, To discharge Bail. because they had now brought in the principal, and it was but one day after the return of the writ. But Roll chief justice answered, that it may not be, because they come in upon the return of the second Scire facias. Harvey and Mountney. Mich. 1654. anc. sup. IN this Case the Action being a Trespass and Ejectment, and the title concerning Hugh Audley of the Inner Temple, the Defendant was by rule of Court, at the trial, which was to be at the bar, to appear and confess the lease, entry, and ouster, and to stand upon the title only, plaintiff non-sute and yet judgement for him. yet at the trial he would not appear, upon which the plaintiff was non-sute, and yet the judgement was for the Plaintif upon the rule, and he was ordered to pay the Iury. Nota. Walkenden and Haycock. Mich. 1654. Banc. sup. Upon a Verdict given for the Plaintif in an Action upon the case for these words spoken of a Milliner in London, Action upon the case for words. viz. Thou art in a breaking and decayed condition, and I will prove it, and if you question me, I will prove it to your disgrace. Twisden moved for judgement for the plaintiff, because he held the words are actionable; for by the speaking of them the Plaintif is disgraced in his profession; for in common understanding the words amount to as much as if he had said that the party is a Bankrupt, and it is so averred in the Record, and found by the jury, and he cited Mich. 1651 Tailor and Keisers case, and Smith and Rookes case 24 Car. Wild on the other side said, that the words are not actionable, Adjective words. for they are adjective words, and of an incertain signification, for the words may as well mean that he is broke or burst in his body, as that he is a Bankrupt or broken in his estate; and there is no averment that the words were spoken in the hearing of tradesmen, and though they were, yet they may not tend to his disgrace, for a Tradesman may be in a decaying condition, in respect of what he hath formerly been, and yet have stock enough left to trade withal. The Court then inclined that the words were actionable, but for that time gave no judgement; judgement. but the case being moved again the same Term, judgement was given for the Plaintif. Lawrence and Harrison. Mich. 1654. Banc. sup. AN Action upon the Case was brought by Laurence against Harison his Attorney for delivering a Fieri facias against him, Action upon the Case for breach of trust. in the suit wherein he was Attorney for him, to the under-sheriff, and procuring it to be executed against him, contrary to the trust reposed in him. Upon not-guilty pleaded, and a verdict sound for the Plaintiff, It was moved in arrest of judgement for the Defendant by Windham, That there appears not in the Record to be any combination between the Defendant and the Plaintiffs adversary against his Client, and so no breach of trust appears to ground the Action upon. 2ly. Here being a judgement in the Case, the suit in which he was entertained to be Attorney is ended, and consequently the trust reposed in him is determined, and so no breach of it, for he is now discharged from being Attorney, and the Plaintiffs averring the contrary doth not alter the Law, and besides, this delivery of the Fieri facias is in pursuance of justice, which since that the suit is ended cannot be called a breach of trust. Roll chief justice, But you did not only deliver the Writ against your Client to the under-sheriff: but did also procure it to be executed against him, which shows there was a combination against him. The only question is, Whether a Warrant of Attorney determined. whether the Warrant of Attorney be determined by the judgement given in the suit wherein he was retained; and I conceive it is not, for the suit is not determined, for the Attorney after the judgement is to be called to say why there should not execution be made out against his Client, and he is trusted to defend his Client as far as he can from the execution. Therefore let the Plaintiff have his judgement, Judgement. nisi, etc. Roungs and Woodyard. Mich. 1654. Banc. sup. ROungs a Farmer in the Country brought an Action upon the Case against Woodyard for speaking these words of him, Action of the Case for words against a Farmer. You are a Beggar, and a Bankruptly Fellow, and if every one had his own, you are not worth a Groat. Sergeant Fletcher moved in arrest of judgement that the words are not absolute and positive words, but are spoken adjectively, and also they are not spoken of a Merchant, or of one that gets his living by buying and selling, and so are not scandalous: for a Farmer cannot be a Bankrupt, and here is no damage to the party by the speaking of them. Roll chief justice, Particular damage. Though it appear not that the Plaintiff is a Tradesman, yet here appears to be a particular damage to him by the speaking of the words, viz. that by reason of the speaking of them he was discredited with his Landlord, and his Landlord had given him warning to be gone out of his Farm, and it matters not though the words generally considered are not actionable. Therefore show cause Saturday next why the Plaintiff shall not have his judgement. jones and Graves. Mich. 1654. Barc. sup. AN Action upon the Case was brought by jones against Graves for entering upon the possession of a Term, Action upon the Case for entering upon the possession of a Term. after he had recovered it by a verdict given for him. Upon not-guilty pleaded, and a verdict for the Plaintiff, it was moved in arrest of judgement, that the Plaintiff hath not showed that there was any Term continuing in him at the time of the Defendants entry into the Land, for though the Term might have a continuance at the time of the recovery, yet it may be ended at the time of the Plaintiffs entry into the Land. 2ly. It is not expressed when the entry was, and so it appears not whether it was before or after the recovery, so that it cannot be known, whether the Plaintiff hath cause of Action or not. Latch also doubted, whether this kind of Action ought to be in this Case or not, and whether he ought not to have brought an Action of Trespass, and not an Action upon the Case. Roll chief justice, Election of Action. He may bring an Action upon the Case, or an Action of Trespass at his own election. Wild on the other side held, that the Declaration was good enough, for by it there appears to be good cause of Action, for the time of the entry is expressed, viz. that it was after the recovery. 2ly. The entry is found to be vi & armis, which implies an unlawful entry, and so the jury have found it to be, Implication. The disturbing a possession actionable. viz. that he is put out of his possession recovered. Roll chief justice, Though the Plaintiff had no title, yet he had a possession, and it is actionable for the Defendant to disturb him. Therefore let the Plaintiff have his judgement, nisi, etc. Matthew and the Hundred of Godalming in Surrey. Mich. 1654. Banc. sup. IF a Carrier's man or Son conspire to rob him, and accordingly do it, Action upon the Statute of Winchester against a Hundred. Mitigation of damages. the Carrier not being privy to it, The Carrier may bring an Action against the Hundred, upon the Statute of Winchester for this robbery, but this conspiracy may be urged in mitigation of damages. Per Roll chief justice, In a Trial at the Bar, between one Matthew, and the Hundred of Godalming in Surrey. Hacker and Newborn, a Sussex Cause. Mich. 1654. Banc. sup. IF a Man make his Will in his Sickness, What shall be a Will by compulsion. by the over-importuning of his Wife, to the end he may be quiet, this shall be said to be a Will made by constraint, and shall not be a good Will. By Roll chief justice, In a Trial at the Bar in the Case of one Hacker and Newborn, Mich. 1654. Bronge and More. Mich. 1654. Banc. sup. MAster Solicitor general moved in arrest of judgement in a replevin, Arrest of judgement in a Replevin. and took these exceptions-to the avowry. 1. That the party did avow the taking of the dammage-feasant in a Common, where he had Common, and doth not show that he hath Common for his levant and couchant. 2ly. He doth not show, that he was damnified by the that were distreyned dammage-feasant, and it may be there was common enough for him notwithstanding the other distreyned were there, What distress lawful without averment of damages. and so he was not damnified by their being there. Roll chief justice answered, if one who hath no right to Common do put his upon the Common, he who is a Commoner may take the dammage-feasant upon the Common, and it is not necessary for him to aver, that he hath damage by them, for he hath an interest which doth authorize him to remove the nuisance, Interest. but he must make a Title to the Common, and if he have made it here but by implication, it is well enough: for it is now helped by the verdict, Title by implication. and you have passed over your advantage by not demurring to him. Mich. 1654. Banc. sup. BY Roll chief justice, A Deed good in part, and fraudulent in part. A Deed may be fraudulent in part, and good in part, and so he said it had been adjudged in the Case of one Lydal of the Middle-Temple. Banks and Prat. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. Hill. 1653. rot. 603. PRatt brought an Action upon the Case against Banks upon an Aumpsit, Error in an action of the Case by an Attorney so fees and soliciting. to pay him such fees as should be due unto him as his Attorney in prosecuting a suit for him in the Common-pleas, and such moneys as he should lay out in soliciting a suit for him in the Chancery, and upon non-assumpsit pleaded, a Verdict was given for the Plaintiff, and a judgement thereupon. The Defendant brought a Writ of error in this Court, and assigns for error, that the Plaintiff did not show particularly what sums of money he had laid out for him, nor to whom he had paid it, as he ought to do, and took and Sir Thomas Walsinghams' case in this Court was cited to prove it. 2ly. The Assumpsit was that he should pay him his fees, so long as he should continue to be his Attorney, & it appears not that he continued to be his Attorney in the suit wherein he supposeth he prosecuted for him. But for the first exception Roll chief justice said, A general Declaration good. that it is not necessary to set down particularly, the several sums of money he had laid out, for this might make the Declaration tedious, and if the Plaintiff should (as it is objected he may) bring another Action for some part of the moneys recovered in this suit, you may plead this recovery generally in bar of such Action. And as to the 2d. exception it shall be intended, that he did continue to be his Attorney if it appears, as it doth, Intention. that he prosecuted for him. The case was moved again the next Term, and the former exceptions only insisted upon. judgement affirmed. But Roll chief justice overruled the exceptions, and affirmed the judgement. Antea. Mich. 1654. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved, To change the Bayl. that two that were bail for one in an Action might be discharged and two others accepted of, because the party was to examine them as Witnesses in the Cause, which was granted upon consent of the parties. Wise and Jeffryes. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. Mich. 1654. rot. Q. Wise a Corn-Merchant and a Baker in London brought an Action up-upon the Case against jeffryes for speaking these words of him, Action for words brought by a Corn-Merchant. Adjective words. viz. Thou art a broken fellow, and hast cheated me of 200 l. Upon a verdict for the plaintiff it was moved in arrest of judgement, that the words are not actionable, because the words are adjectively spoken, and are not positive words, nor of a certain signification, for they may be meant that he was broken in his body, and not in his estate. But Wild answered, that 1. The words are spoken of a Tradesman, which may be a Bankrupt; and 2ly. Here is an averment that the words were meant to signify that the Plaintif was a Bankrupt, and besides here is a verdict for the Plaintif. Green replied, that it doth not appear that the words were spoken of him in relation to his Trade or Profession, and to say, that thou hast cheated me, were adjudged not actionable in Hills case, 2 Car. and in one johnsons' case. Roll chief justice, I do not agree the Case of 2 Car. cited, but to the Case in question, take all the words together as they are laid they imply he is broken in his Trade, and the word cheated enforceth this sense, and the words are very scandalous, and the averment, judgement. and the verdict makes it more strong. Therefore judicium pro querente, nisi, etc. Fowkes and Copsye. Hill. 1654. IT was said in this Case, that if there be divers breaches of an Award, One breach of an Award assignable. you may assign but one of them in an Action brought for breach of the Award. Michill and Hepworth. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. Trin. 1654. rot. 717. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in the Common-pleas in an Action of Trespass for an Assault, Error in judgement in Trespass. and taking away of the Plaintiffs Goods, and amongst other for taking away of Writings, and two Errors were assigned, 1. That the Declaration was with a quod cum, A quod cum not good in in Trespass. Otherwise in Trespass on the case. which was said is not good in an Action of Trespass. 2. That the Plaintif did not set forth what the writings were which were taken away; but the first exception was only relied upon, and to that Roll chief justice, answered, That if the Action were an Action of Trespass upon the case, though it were with a vi et armis, it might be good with a quod cum, but the Action here is a mere Action of Trespass vi et armis, Therefore show cause why the judgement shall not be reversed. Kirk and Lucas. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. Hill. 1653. rot. 579. Church brought an Action of Account against Lucas, What shall be a good plea in an account before. Auditors. the Defendant Lucas pleads ne unques receptor, and upon this Issue there was a verdict for the plaintiff, that the Defendant shall account, whereupon Auditors being assigned, he pleads before them in discharge of the Account that he received the money of the plaintiff to deliver over, and accordingly he had delivered it over; The question was whether this plea pleaded before the Auditors was a good plea in discharge of the Account. Twisden said. It was not a good plea in discharge of the Account before the Auditors, but it had been a good plea in bar of the Action, and here it is not showed that there was any direction given to pay the money over. Roll chief justice, If he plead that it was paid by his consent it is a good plea before the Auditors, and this is a good plea in bar if the money be paid accordingly, Therefore take your judgement, judgement. nisi. The Protector against Richardson. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. A Writ of Error was brought by Richardson to reverse a judgement given against him, Error upon a judgement upon an Information for Extortion. being by profession a Tailor, upon an information of extortion exhibited against him at Oxford, at the Assizes there, for taking more money of one that bond himself Apprentice with him, than by Law he ought; and the Error assigned was, that the justices of Assize have no power to determine offences of this nature, and Metcalves case 11 Rep. was urged, and the Statute of 22 H. 8. C. 5. and 28 H. 8. C. 5. But Crook Signior answered, That as they are justices of Oyer and Terminer they have power by their Commission to determine offences of this nature, and it shall be intended they proceeded here by virtue of that Commission, and in 7 Eliz. in Dyer it is a quaere whether the Statute be meant of the Courts at Westminster, Certainty is required. or no, and it would be inconvenient if the justices should not inquire of such offences at the Assizes, and he cited Gregory's case, and Cooks jurisdictions of Courts, to prove they have authority Roll chief justice, But it appears not here by virtue of which of their Commissions you have tried the offence; but you have jumbled the Commissions together in the Record, and they have not authority by all their Commissions; and besides there is another fault in the judgement, for it is not said it is considered by the Court, but only it is considered. By the Statute of 22 H. 8. the justices of Assize by virtue of their Commission of Oyer and Terminer, have power to try divers offences, if they be not restrained to certain Courts; but for the reasons aforesaid, Show cause why the judgement should not be reversed. Protector and Cartwright. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. IT was moved on the behalf of Cartwright that he might have allowance of his Plea confessed by Mr. Attorney general pleaded to a quo Warranto brought for the Protector against him for certain liberties which he claimed within the Manor of Offingham in Nottinghamshire; For allowance of a plea confessed by the Attorney. general. the Exception to the plea was, that he claimed the Assize of Wine, to which it was answered, that it is intended only of the measures for Wine, and that the Plea had been read and examined by justice Ask, Roll chief justice, Let justice Ask examine it again. Tost and day. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. Trin. 1653. rot. 547. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an Action upon the Case brought against a Sheriff for restoring of goods taken in Execution to the party from whom they were taken, Error to reverse a judgement in an action upon the Case. and for endorsing of nulla bona upon the writ of Execution, and delivering over the writ so endorsed to the new Sheriff his Successor. The Errors assigned ware these. 1. It is not said in the Record that he returned nulla bona, but only that he endorsed nulla bona upon the writ. 2ly. It is said that he delivered the writ thus endorsed to the new Sheriff, but doth not show that the writ was delivered over by Indenture betwixt the new Sheriff and the old, to be returned by him. 3ly. It appears not whether there were any return at all made of the writ by the new Sheriff or the old. And 4ly. The Action is not laid in the County where it ought to be, for it is neither brought in the County where the writ was endorsed, nor where it was delivered over. Latch answered, that the Action was brought for re-delivering the goods taken in execution back again to the party, judgement reversed. and not for the endorsing of the writ, and delivering it over to the new Sheriff. But the judgement was reversed, nisi, etc. Postea. Porter and Swetnam. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. Trin. 1654. rot. 393. IN this Case upon a writ of Error brought upon a judgement given upon an Action of Covenant for not paying of rent reserved upon a Lease for years by Indenture, Error in Covenant. Express Covenant. Writ of Error quashed, and judgement affirmed. After the opinion of the Court was delivered that the words yielding and paying in the Indenture made an express Covenant, and were not a bare Covenant in Law, and that an Action of Covenant did well lie upon them, the writ of Error was quashed for a defect in it, and a new writ of Error brought, and thereupon the judgement was again prayed to be affirmed, which was done, nisi, etc. Nota. Antea. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved for a Habeas Corpus to remove a Prisoner in Northampton Gaol, Habeas Corpus. that was convicted of felony, and had been burnt in the hand, Endictment. Action upon the Case. upon an Affidavit that the Gaoler used him hardly. But Roll chief justice answered, that it could not be, but they might either endict the Gaoler, or bring an Action against him. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved upon an Affidavit for a new trial, For a new Trial. because the jury were not kept together till they had given their verdict, as they ought to be. But Roll chief justice answered, this is a misdemeanour, yet the verdict is a good verdict notwithstanding, The juries' misdemeanour spoils no● the Verdict. yet we will hear the Council on both sides before we conclude any thing: The same Term judgement was given, upon another motion made for a new Trial. The Protector and Lowr. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. BArton moved to quash an Endictment preferred against Lowr at the Assizes at Cornwall, To quash an Endictment. for speaking of scandalous words against the Parliament; The Exception taken was, that it did not appear in the Endictment that the Parliament was sitting at the time when the words were spoken. But Roll chief justice answered, Denied. It appears not to us but that the Parliament was sitting at the time; and peradventure it will be made appear at the trial. Therefore plead, and go to trial, and then move in Arrest of judgement if you have any thing to move. Page and Parr. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. Trin. 1654. rot. 1687. PAge brought an Action of Covenant upon a Covenant contained in an Indenture of a demise for years, Covenant upon an Indenture. for the not paying the rent reserved by the Indenture, according to the Covenant. The Defendant pleads in bar that the Plaintif entered into part of the land demised before the rent due, for which the Action was brought, and so had suspended his rent: The Plaintif replied, the Defendant did re-enter, and so was possessed as in his former estate, Suspension of ren. and to this replication the Defendant demurred, and for cause he shown, that here was no confession and avoidance, or traverse of the plea in bar. Roll chief justice, Have you showed that he continued in possession until the rent grew due; for you ought to show that he entered and was possessed until after the rent-day, but here you have only said that he was possessed in his former right, Nil capiar per Billam. Therefore nil capiat per Billam, nisi. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. Upon an Affidavit read in Court, Not to plead till costs paid assessed in a former Action. that 20 l. costs were taxed upon a non-sute in an Action of Trespass and Ejectment brought to the Bar, and that the Plaintif had not paid them, nor was to be found, and yet had brought another Action for the same land, The Court was moved that the Defendant might not be ruled to plead to this second Action, until the Plaintif had paid the costs taxed upon the former non suit, and that another Plaintif might be named, or that security might be given to pay the costs if the Plaintif should be non-sute again. Show cause. The rule was to show cause why it should not be so. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. DArcy moved that an Endictment of Michaelmas Term last might be amended in the Caption. But Roll chief justice, answered, To amend an Endictment of a former Term denied. It cannot be if it be of the last Term, but had it been an endictment of this Term it might have been amended. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment for entering forcibly upon a Tenant for years, against the Statute of 21 jacobi, To quash an Endictment. and the Exception was, that the Endictment doth not say that he entered manu forti. Roll chief justice answered, The Statute is only, that if one enter by force; and the words manu forti are not expressed in the Act, Therefore move it again if you will. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. A Habeas Corpus cum causa was granted for Elizabeth Bayne, To discharge a prisoner turned over to the Marshal. For a habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. to the intent to charge her with an Action, and upon the return thereof she was committed to the Marshal. Wild moved that she might be discharged, because the return of the Habeas Corpus is erroneous. But Roll chief justice answered, It could not be; whereupon he moved for another Habeas Corpus for her ad subjiciendum to be directed to the Marshal, which was granted. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment preferred against one for practising Physic, not being skilful in the profession, To quash an Endictment for practising Physic without licence. and not having a Licence to practice from the College of Physicians. The Exceptions were, 1. That no Endictment at the Common Law lies for the offence supposed to be committed, for it is not an offence against the Common Law, and 2ly, an Endictment upon the Statute lies not, and so no Endictment lies, And upon these Exceptions it was quashed. The Protector and Hart. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. ONe Hart committed to the Gatehouse appeared in Court upon the return of a Habeas Corpus granted for him, To remand a prisoner appearing upon a Habeas Corpus, and turned over. Denied. and upon the prayer of his Council the return was filled, upon which it was moved on his behalf that he might be remanded to the Keeper of the Gatehouse, and not turned over to the Marshal, to the intent to save his fees, but the Court said it could not be, because upon filing of the return there ought to be entered upon it a Committitur to the Marshal, whereby he becomes his prisoner. Torret and Frampton. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. Trin. 1653. rot. 178. Upon a special Verdict the Case was this, Special verdict upon a Devise. A man deviseth his lands to his wife for her life, the remaindar to A. B. and C. and their heirs respectively for ever. The question was whether A. B. and C. were joint tenants, or tenants in common. Sergeant Twisden held, that they were joint renants, Whether joint tenancy or a tenancy in common. and that this case differs from Radcliffs case, and cited Wild's case in the 6 Rep. that a Will must be clear and conspicuous, but so it is not here, and here is no enforcement by these words respectively, and they do relate to the persons, and not to the lands bequeathed, and a Covenant made by three respectively is a joint Covenant, and not a several Covenant, and the word respectively hath relation to the survivorship which may happen betwixt the parties, and a devise to one and his heir is a fee-simple. Latch, For the Defendant held, that here is a tenancy in Common, and not a joint tenancy, for the Estate ought to be whole out, either a tenancy in Common, or whole out, a joint tenancy, and this of necessity; for there cannot be a joint tenancy for life, and several inheritantes in the remainder, and Littleton's ground proves this to be so. And 2ly. It is against all construction to be otherwise, as the word respectively is here placed, and Ratclifs case, which is not so strong a case as this case proves it to be so, and although the word respectively may sometimes make a distribution of heirship; as hath been objected, viz. of several heirships; yet here the placing of the word respectively shows it cannot be so, Distribution of heirship. and this using of the word is not operative, but idle, if here should be a joint tenancy, for the law says as much, though the word respectively were left out, and the word would be the more idle in explicating a thing so obvious to common understanding, and no ways doubtful, and therefore we cannot think but that these extraordinary words do enforce an extraordinary construction, and not a common one, and an idle application; and this comes not within the rule objected for the certainty for this word hath a proper meaning to make a several distribution, Operative words. which makes it certain enough, & the word is used here absolutely, & shall be so taken in 3 Car. jaques and Thorowgood's case in the Common pleas, the word equally was taken operatively, and not in common construction, and in Lewin and Dods case in the Common pleas, 36 and 37 Eliz. the word equally was held by two judges to make a joint-tenancy, and not a tenancy in common; and in this Court also the judges were divided at the first; but afterwards Popham changed his opinion, and it was adjudged a tenancy in common, and afterwards a writ of Error was brought in the Exchequer Chamber, and there the judgement was affirmed, Pasch. 41 Eliz. B. r. rot. 270. Also the subject matter here is apt to receive a tenancy in common, here being intended a provision for children, and their several posterities, which a survivorship would destroy, 37 H. 8. Bro. Devise 29. and the very intent of the Devisor appears in the will to be as I have argued. Roll chief justice, I hold here is a tenancy in common, and that it shall go throughout, Words not to be construed to make them idle. and is not to be divided, and the intent of the devisor appears in the will that every one shall have his part, and their heirs, for here is a provision made for Children, and the word respectively would be idle, if another construction should be made, judgement for the Plaintif. and would signify no more than what the law said without it. Ask and Newdigate ad idem, and Newdigate cited Dyer 316 Huntlyes' case, so judgement was given for the plaintiff, nisi. Shepherd and Grace. Hill. 1654. Banc sup. Trin. 1654. r. 672. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an Action upon the Case in the Court at Doncaster, Error in Action upon the Case. and the Error assigned was in the judgement, which was entered thus, and the said Shepherd, to wit the Defendant, shall be in mercy of W. Grace, to wit the Plaintif. Roll chief justice, This is erroneous, for he ought not to be in mercy of the plaintiff, but of the State, Therefore let the judgement be reversed. Reversed. Lamplew and Hewson. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. AFter a verdict in an Action upon the Case brought for these words, Arrest of judgement in an Action for words. viz. I was never a Traitor to the State as you have been: It was moved in Arrest of judgement by Turner for the incertainty of the Declaration, for that it appears not thereby that the words were spoken of the plaintiff, or to the plaintiff, and because it is not said that the words were spoken falso et malitiose. Shafto of Council on the other side answered, that it appears the words were spoken upon conference betwixt the parties, and thereby doth appear a sufficient averment, that the words were spoken of the Plaintif. Roll chief justice, The Declaration implies that the words were spoken falso et malitiose, Employed averment good. judgement. & there needs not an express averment that they were so spoken, as there ought to be in an Endictment, and this Declaration is laid two years after the words were spoken, Therefore take your judgement except better matter be shown. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. A Foreign plea, To swear a foreign plea. which is to out the Court of the jurisdiction in the cause depending aught to be sworn to be true, or else is not to be allowed by the Court. So ruled by the Court. Dod and Herbert. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. Trin. 1655. rot. Q. DOd brought an Action of Debt against Gregory Herbert an Attorney of this Court upon an Obligation to stand to an Award. Debt upon an Obligation to stand to an Award. The Defendant pleads no Award made. The plaintiff replies and sets forth the Award, which was, that the Defendant should pay unto the plaintiff 100 l. at two several days of payment, and assigns the breach in not paying the 100 l. accordingly. To this replication the Defendant demurs, and the exception taken was, that it doth not appear in the Award, that the Award is reciprocal: but that is only made on one part. It is true by the allegation in the pleading it doth appear: but this helps it not, for it ought to appear in the Award itself. Award de & super praemissis. Breach not well assigned Roll chief justice, the Award appears to be made de & super praemissis, and that may help it. But the Plaintif hath not well assigned the breach, for the breach is not assigned upon a good part of the Award, for there is no cause set forth in the Award why the Defendant should pay the 100 l. Therefore nil capiat per billam, nisi, etc. Henly and Baynton. Trin. 1654. Banc. sup. Trin. 1654. rot. 1384. HEnly brought an Action upon the Case against Sir Edward Baynton, Arrest of judgement in an Action up- the Case for words. for speaking of these words of him, viz. You have cozened the State of 20000 l. and I will prove it, for you have received five and twenty thousand pounds profits of the Office, and not compounded for it, and have foisted in words into the order for your composition. After a verdict found for the plaintiff, it was moved in arrest of judgement, that the words as they are laid in the Declaration are not actionable: for the Plaintif doth not entitle himself to the Office, but only to eleven parts of the profits of the Office, and so he cannot be scandalised by the words as an Officer, & Hob. 267, 268. Sir Miles Fleetswoods case was cited, and Hob. 76. Bray and Humes case, and 4 jac. Cars and Rans case, and Hill. 14 jac. Snails case, and 20 jac. Curl and Tucks case. 2ly. Here is no averment that Whitwick during whose life he claims the office was alive when the words were spoken, and if he were dead then he was no officer. And the subsequent words do qualify the former part of the words, for the receiving of the money is not an offence or cozening of the State, 14 jac. Goddard and Gilberts case in the Common-pleas, and for the word foisting it is an insensible word, Insensible word. and therefore cannot be actionable, and the Plaintif doth not aver, that he did not foist in words into this order, No Action where no damages. but only says, he did not foist in words into any order. And though the words were actionable, yet at the time when the Action was brought Henly was pardoned by the Act of Oblivion if he had done it, and so could not be damnified by the Defendants speaking the words if they were true, and so no Action lies, for no damages could be recovered, Hob. 82.294. Chuddington and Wilkins case, 1 E. 3.3.12 Eliz. barton's case, 20 Ass. Pl. 7.6 Rep. 13.16 jac. Serles case. Shafto on the same side urged, that it appears not by the Declaration that Henly was an Officer, or that Sir Edward Bay●ton knew him to be so, and so here is an ill inducement, and Sir Miles Fleetwoods' case is, that he ought to know that he was an Officer, and there the words were positive and certain, but so they are not here, nor do relate to his Office and the words are to be construed as they lie together, and so some of them are of a very ambiguous construction and uncertain, and others of them are insensible, and an averment cannot make senseless words to be sense. And in the case of Curl and Tuck, 20 jac. no judgement was ever given, and yet that was stronger than our case. It was also urged by Powis on the same side, that it appears not that the money spoken of did belong to the State, or was to be compounded for, for it may be he received the moneys before he was a Delinquent, and then he was not to compound for them, Hob. 3.23. Bradshaw and Walkers case cited. Sergeant Twisden for the Plaintif held the words to be actionable, and cited 8 Car. Culme and denham's case, where it was adjudged, that to say a man was a cozening Knave are actionable words, and 16 jac. Sir William Brunkers case, and Hill. 1651 Strode and Homes case in this Court, and Trin. 1653. Townesend and Barkers case; and in this Case is an instancing wherein the Plaintif hath cozened which makes it more plain, and it is also aggravated by saying he had cozened, the State, for he hath thereby incensed the State against the plaintiff; and the words in themselves are scandalous and prejudicial also, for if he hath not compounded he is no Officer, but hath lost his Office, being liable to be sequestered, and the words here, shall be taken in sensu composito, and not in sensu diviso, Sensus compositus et sensus divisus. for they are positive words, 8 Car. Redwood & smith's case, and the last words are only spoken to instance the Cause of speaking of the former, and it is not material whether they be actionable or not, but the meaning of the word foisting is not so doubtful, but is very well known, and shall be intended that he had falsely put in words into the order, and so they are scandalous as well as the former, 5 Car. Alleyns' Case. And there is no necessity here to aver the life of Whitwick as is objected on the other side, for the Office was for the life of Henly and Whitwick, and the survivor of them, and if the averment were necessary in some Cases, yet here it is not, because Whitwick is an Officer upon Record in this Court, where the Action is brought, and seen to be alive here in Court; and besides, the Statute of 21 jac. would help this if need required, it being after a verdict, and not upon a demurrer; and besides, here is an averment, that he hath not foisted words into this order in effect, for he hath averred, that he hath not foisted words into any order, and so consequently not into this, 2 R. 3. f. 7. 12 H. 7. f. 23. And the Act of oblivion hath not pardoned this offence, as is also objected, and though it should, yet it must be pleaded, that the party may appear not to be excepted on't of it, as many are, and the jury have here found for the plaintiff, and so it shall be intended that he is out of the Act, and he ought to have averred it before, or have given it in evidence, and so he prayed judgement for the Plaintif. Roll chief justice, you mistake the exception, for they say that Mr. Henly is pardoned by the Act, and so cannot be damnified by the words if they were true, and so they are not actionable. Twisden, By their pleading it appears not, that Mr. Henly is within the pardon, for there are many persons excepted out of it. Roll chief justice, But if it be so, yet if the words do not relate to him as an Officer they are not actionable. Wild, The words are spoken intentionally in relation to his Office. Roll chief justice, He was not an Officer at the time of the words spoken, for he was sequestered, and then what scandal can they be to him. Wild, The jury hath found that he was damnified, though the words were true. The first question here is, whether the words, as they are laid, relate to his Office, for he is not an Officer, nor can the Action be brought by him as he is so, but this is not much to the purpose: but the deceit alleged to be done to the State charged upon him is the cause of the Action, and it is said that he deceived the State in his composition, for his fine, and for foisting words into the order, and if he foisted not any words into any order than he did it not into this. Averment. And there is no need to aver Whitwicks' life, for he could not receive the profits of the Office if Whitwick were dead, and therefore he shall be intended to he alive; and there doth damage arise to the Plaintif by the speaking of the words, for he is in danger thereby of sequestration by such foisting of the words; and in the common understanding of the words they shall be taken to be meant of falsifying of the Committees order, and one man ought not to slander another; and say that you had not notice of the Ordinance touching which he is slandered, it is not to the purpose, for you ought to take notice of the Ordinance. Newdigate justice, to the same effect, that the words are actionable, for as they are laid, Henly is brought thereby within the compass of Sequestration, and the words in themselves are actionable, because they instance in what thing he cozened the State, and the subsequent words do not qualify the former, but aggravate the matter, judgement for the Plaintiff. and I conceive it not necessary to aver Whitwicks' life, but if it be, it is averred here; and so judgement was given for the plaintiff, nisi, etc. North and james. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. Trin. 1651. rot. 1666. A Writ of error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an Action of Trespass in the Common-pleas upon a demurrer, Error to reverse a judgement in Trespass. Discontinuances. the error assigned was, that there were discontinuances in the Process, and it was showed by Howell of Council with the Defendant in the Writ of error that this is helped by the late Statute, which says, that no Writ of error shall stay execution, and judgements upon Demurrers, as this is, are within the Statute. Roll chief justice. By your reason a Writ of error will not now lie for any thing. The branch of the Statute is to be intended of matter in form only, but this is matter of substance notwithstanding the branch of the Statute alleged. Reversed. Therefore let the judgement be reversed, nisi, etc. Yokehurst against Scott. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. Hill. 1653. rot. 35. YOkehurst brought an Action of Debt upon an Obligation against Scot, Debt upon an Obligation, and a special verdict. the Defendant pleaded non est factum. Upon this a special verdict was found, wherein the question was, whether it was his Deed or no, because the Obligation was, that he was bound in centem libris instead of centum libris. Green for the Plaintif held it a good Bond notwithstanding this mistake, False Orthography. because centem doth sound like centum, and he cited many Cases to prove, that mis-writing of words in an Obligation shall not hurt it, as Hob. 34. Trigintat. for triginti, and sessanti for sexcenti and Osborns case, sewenteen for seventeen, 9 H. 6. f. 7. and Pinder and Tugs case in this Court and 2 Car. Davis his Case, and the jury in our case have found that the Defendant did seal and deliver the bond as his Act and Deed. Roll chief justice, The condition of the bond doth set it forth to be 100 l. wherein the Defendant became bound, therefore show cause the next Term why the plaintiff should not have judgement. Judgement. Cooks and Chambers. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. cooks moved for a Prohibition to the Prerogative Court for proceeding against him there by way of attachment for not obeying the Decree of that Court. For a Prohibition to the Prerogative Court. The Case was this, Cooks and Chambers being in suit in the Prerogative Court for Letters of administration of the Goods and Chattels of one that died intestate, at last they agreed by consent, that Cooks upon putting in bond to perform the decree of the Prerogative Court, touching the distribution of the Intestates estate should have the administration granted unto him whereupon he did enter into bond, and had the Letters of administration granted unto him, and afterwards the Court made an order or decree that he should distribute the estate in such and such manner, and for not-performing of this decree Chambers proceeds against him in the Prerogative Court by way of Attachment. It was urged against the Prohibition that this Court is now absolute by the late Statute, and that there is no appeal from it, and that the decree made was made by consent of the parties, and therefore it was no reason to grant a Prohibition to hinder that Court from forcing the party to perform the decree, Sergeant Twisden answered, that the consent of the parties cannot give a juridiction to that Court which they had not before. Roll chief justice, That is true, but by consent peradventure it may be as it is here, but they cannot compel them to consent, and they have no authority given them by the late Statute, but they have only their old authority, and it would be dangerous to out the old, and here is a decree made by consent of both parties: Administration by consent. but bring us Precedents where a Prohibition hath been granted after an administration granted by consent as this is. At another day Latch moved again for the Prohibition, and said, that the attachment was granted beyond the Condition of the Bond given in Court, and they have no power to award it, notwithstanding the distribution of the estate be not made according to the bond, for the Ordinance of Parliament gives them no such authority. 2ly. They cannot order such a distribution of the estate, notwithstanding our consent, for our consent was, that the clear estate only should be distributed, and not the whole estate, and we have six precedents here to prove that they ought to proceed upon the Bond, and not as they have done, & we could have brought a hundred to the same purpose if we had thought it needful; And their giving of us the administration upon the bond given, doth abridge them from making any order to distribute the estate, or to proceed by attachment, and Slaynyes' case, Hob. f. 85. and Tucker and Loans case, Hob. 191. were cited. Wild on the other side agreed the books cited, but said, here is the consent of the parties, that the administration should be as it is here, and that agreement was before the administration granted. Roll chief justice, Will you consent to bring an Action upon the Bond, and waive the prohibition. Answer to this to morrow. No Attachment. At another day it was moved again, and then Roll chief justice answered, Proceed upon the Bond, for they cannot grant an attachment for not performing the decree, although it was made by consent. Wild replied, This being a Decree made by consent, they have submitted to it, and the attachment is granted for disobedience to the Court who made the decree, and the late Ordinance doth give them power to commit such as shall disobey the decrees and orders of the Court. Roll chief justice, appear, and plead to it, and try their power that way, I believe that if parties will consent that administration shall be granted in trust, it may be so granted, although it be not in the usual way, Prohibition granted, and as the Statute doth direct, but the taking of the Obligation ties them up to that remedy, and they cannot proceed by way of attachment, Therefore take a prohibition as to the attachment, and appear to it, and try the matter. boil and Scarborough. Hill. 1655. Banc. sup. Hill. 52. r. 296. SCarborough brought an Action upon the case in the Common pleas against boil, Action upon the Case upon a promise and judgement upon a Demurrer and writ of Error to reverse it. upon a promise, that whereas his son William did owe unto Scarborough 500 l. and Scarborough did intent to sue a ne exeat regnum against him, to hinder him from going out of England till he might recover his debt. Boil the Defendant did promise that if he would forbear to sue out an ne exeat regnum against his son William, he would pay the debt; Upon this Action the Plaintif obtains a judgement upon a demurrer. Whereupon boil brings a writ of Error to reverse this judgement. The pleading in the Common pleas was thus, the Defendant in the Action in the Common pleas was sued by the name of of Robert boil Esq who appears and pleads the Statute of limitations of Actions of 21 jac. The plaintiff replies that he took out an Original against him within 6 years out of the Chancery by the name of Robert boil Esq and outlawed him upon that Original, and that afterwards the Defendant boil came in and reversed the Outlawry, the Defendant rejoins and says protestando, that he took not out such an original within 6 years, for plea says, that he was a Knight at the time of the Original sued forth, the plaintiff sur-rejoyns that he came in and reversed the Outlawry upon that Original, for want of proclamation, by the name of Robert boil Esquire, The Defendant by way of Rebutter says, that he was a Knight at the time of the Outlawry reversed; the plaintiff by way of sur-rebuttter says, he reversed the outlawry by the name of Robert boil Esq upon this the Defendant demurred, and upon the demurrer judgement was given for the plaintiff, and upon this the writ of Error was brought in this Court. The Errors assigned were, Consideration to ground a promise. 1. That here was no good consideration for this promise, for there is no ground of Action showed against the son, nor that he had been at any charge in the prosecuting any action against him, and Rosyer and Landales case 1650. in this Court, and Bedwell and Cottons case Hob. 216 was cited; Ne exeat regnum. and 2ly. there is no such writ as an ne exeat regnum in the Register; but only a writ to give security not to go out of the Realm to the public prejudice of the King and his people; and here is no such matter but only that he owed 500 l. and therefore he would sue out the writ, and though the consideration should be good, yet is not the Plaintiffs replication good to tie the second writ to the first, for he doth not say that the second is pro una et eadem causa, and so it is incertain, Brook Trespass. 85.9 H. 6. and there may be several promises made here in one day, and if the replication he good, rejoinder. yet the rejoinder is good, 19 H. 8.43. He only admits that he being a Knight is the same person which was sued by the name of an Esquire, Hob. 171 Stukely's case. And here is a judgement by a nihil dicit, and no warrant of Attorney, for it is in latin, Warrant of Attorney. which being since the Act for Law proceed to be in English, is not good, and so it was prayed the judgement might be reversed. Latch on the other side prayed to affirm the judgement, and he argued, 1. That here was a good consideration to ground the promise upon, for this writ of ne exeat regnum may be sued forth by any one, & here is a benefit to the party in the forbearing to sue it forth, and here is good cause to move for this writ, and it is in the discretion of the King to grant it or not, but it concerns him in his honour to grant it, Regist. 193, 194. Brit. 182. Cooks instit. 130. There is caution to be taken of persons licenced to go beyond Seas, that they pay their debts. 2ly. The replication is good, Averment. and it is not necessary to aver that the second Original was for the same cause; first, because it is in an action upon the case, and is set forth at large, which shows verbatim that it is for the same cause, and is plain in itself; and 2ly. it is said that he sued out the second Original pro causa praedicta, which is a sufficient averment, if an averment be necessary, and the variance in the damages argues not that there is another cause of Action, for when the second Original was sued forth, the damages were increased by increase of time, it being a year after the suing forth of the first; For the rejoinder it is to be considered, 1. Whether the party be estopped thus to plead. 2ly. If he be not, Estoppel. yet whether the matter set forth be good. For the 1. I hold he is estopped by coming in gratis as an Esquire, to say that he was a Knight, and he not being brought in custody, Dyer 192. There he shall plead no other name; but here he hath not alleged it as he ought, for he ought to conclude absque hoc that he was an Esquire, and he hath affirmed himself to be an Esquire by saying & praedictus, etc. but he ought to have alleged specially that Robert boil Knight, who was sued by the name of Robert boil Esquire: and 2 E 4. f. ● is against the other books, and the law is otherwise. It is true that the old book of Entries, Title Trespass, and some other Precedents which passed sub silentio are against me, but the Law generally is against those Precedents, as Rastal entries brief 54.19 H. 6.1.36, 44. which say, if he come in he is estopped, Br. Tit. De●● 15 & 26.32 H. 6.3. 35 H. 6. and many other books, and the book of 19 H. 6.43, which is objected on the other side is against them, and Dyer, f. 58. But though he were not estopped, yet we may take advantage of the first Original writ, for it is but abatable by the misnosmer, and so not abated; and here is a flaw in the rejoinder, for he ought to have traversed that he was not an Esquire, which he hath not done. Abated. Abatable. Traverse. 2ly. The 26 of March is after the original sued forth, and so it is uncertain in respect of time, when he was a Knight, Plow. 27. by Morgan, 7 H. 7.5. And the warrant of Attorney is good, though it be in Latin, and if it were in English it would be erroneous, for the entry is material, and the constant practice is not to enter the warrant before the issue, Entry. Trin. 8 jac. Morley and Morley in this Court, and here is not the entry of the warrant itself, but the Entry is that he is Attorney by Warrant. Roll chief justice, If one bring a writ of 1000 l. and it be abated, and then he bring another writ for the same debt, may he increase the damages accrued betwixt the first writ and the second? Certainly no, Increase of damages. for the second writ is but the renewing of the first writ, and is not a new writ; But here are divers points considerable, therefore speak again to it. But a ne exeat regnum is usually sued forth in such cases as this, Prerogative Writ. although that originally this writ was only used in businesses which concerned the State, and not in private cases; and the forbearance to sue it is a good consideration to ground an Action upon. At another day the Case was again put by Christ. Turner, and he prayed the judgement might be reversed, and in his Argument he made these questions. 1. Whether there be a good consideration to raise a promise, Consideration. and he held there in not, because it doth not appear that the Plaintif had any cause of Action Nat. Brev. 85. A. a ne exeat regnum is at the suit of the King, and not at the suit of a common person; and whereas it is objected that the King may stay any one from going beyond Seas, I answer that he cannot stay any one for every cause, but for a cause which concerns the State; and if there were in our case a good cause to sue out this writ, Agreement. the agreement betwixt the parties not to sue it out is not a good agreement, Hob. 154. Dyer 29●. Every one may go out of the Kingdom at his pleasure. 2ly. Here is no averment that both the Originals were sued forth for one and the same cause, although that they agree literally, Hob. Rep. Foster and jackson's case. Averment. 3ly. Here is no good averment, because it cannot be thereby known for what cause the last Original was sued forth, Cook Inst. f. 20. 4ly. Though there he an averment, yet it is void by the parties own showing, 45 E. 3.2. 21 H. 7.24. And our case differs from the case of 10 lib. Ass. objected, for there the averment was the Defendants averment, but here it is the Plaintiffs. Also the damages in the first Original, and the damages in the second Original do differ, which ought not to be; but they should agree, otherwise the Originals shall not be presumed to be both of them for one and the same cause, 6 Rep. Spencer's case, Estopple. 12 H. 7.4. 3 H. 6.9 And the party shall not be estopped here, to say that he was a Knight, and this misnosmer is well pleaded, for there are but two ways to plead misnosmer, Misnosmer pleased. and we have pleaded it one of those ways, Cooks Entries 689, 690. Tit. Outlawries, Rastal brief 608. Tit. Trespass 610, and the precedents of 1 E. 4.3. and 21 H. 7. are with us, that he shall not be estopped, and he pleads not expressly that he was an Esquire, but only by way of implication. Implication. Consideration. Sergeant Twisden on the other side prays for judgement, and he argued, 1. That here is a good consideration, for he is entitled to have this writ by Fitz. Nat. Brev. 85. where it is said any person may make a surmise to have this writ, for it conduces to the benefit of the plaintiff, and of the Defendant also, and the King may hinder any one from going beyond Sea, 9 Car. Meads case, 18 jac. C. B, Hall and Wollers' case citeb by Hobart to be adjudged, Replication 43 & 44 Eliz. Rippon and North. 2ly. The Replication is good notwithstanding the Objection against it that here is not an averment, Averment. that the second Original is for the same cause as the first was, for it is not necessary to make such an averment, because that this is a special particular Action, and not a general Action, yet here is an averment if it be necessary. Thirdly. Here is no variance though the damages do differ, for the wrong done is properly the cause of the Action, 'Cause of Action. and not the damages suffered by the wrong, and the increase of time hath made the damages to increase, and so to differ, 26 H. 8. f. 6. in a second deliverance, Hill. 8 Car. entered 5. Car. in this Court, this point was resolved in Theophilus Finch and Laws case; and the Misnosmer objected is not material, Misnosmer. Estoppel. for he is estopped to plead it, because he appears gratis by the name of Esq & not upon the Sheriffs return, Dyer 19●. he must be admitted to be the same person, and so is estopped to say the contrary, 19 H. 6. f. 65. the Book of 19 H. 6. f. 43. is not against me, for there the party came in upon the return of the Sheriff, and not voluntartly as he doth here. Appearance. Also the warrant of Attorney entered in English doth no hurt notwithstanding the objection that all plead ought to have been in Latin at the time of the giving of the warrant, Entry. for a warrant of Attorney may be entered at any time, because there is no precise time directed for the entering ot it, 1 E. 3. f. 1.24 E. 3. f. 62.15 H. 7. f. 14.4 Ed. 4. f. 13. Stat. 32 H. 8. C. ●. a warrant of Attorney entered at any time pending the plea is good, & at the time of the entering of it by the late Statute it ought to be in English. Roll chief justice mutata opinion said, he may, Increase of damages. increase his damages by his second Action, otherwise it would be unreasonable, for he hath been delayed twenty years by the Outlawry of the Defendant. And here is also a good consideration to ground the Action, Consideration viz. the forbearance to sue out this Writ of ne exeat regnum, for it is beneficial to the Defendant, and it is for the King's honour to grant it, and the party by forbearing to sue it, is freed of trouble, by not being stayed in England to be sued here. And here is no need of an averment, Averment. for it appears that both the Originals were sued forth for one and the same cause. But the question is, touching the manner of the pleading, whether he be not estopped to say that he is a Knight, Estople. and not an Esquire, and I see no reason why he should be estopped to say so, notwithstanding his voluntary coming in to reverse the Outlawry, for he comes in to save himself from arresting, and the lying under an Outlawry, and it would be mischievous if he did it not, Construction. and take all the plea together, methinks it is good, and the entry in English is good, for it is to affirm a judgement, and being good both ways, we will take that which makes the judgement good. Yet let it be argued again. At another day the Case was put again, and argued by Sergeant Glyn that the judgement was not good, and first he admitted, Consideration Averment. that here is a good consideration to ground the Action upon. 2ly. He made question whether there be a good averment touching the going beyond Sea, and touching the sum, and he said, that the judgement given in the Common-pleas was for the reason that he came in to reverse the Outlawry by the name of Esquire, and this is by Estople: Estople. But I conceive it is no Estople, for Knight is part of his name, and so the Outlawry is not good, 26 H. 6. there is no Estople made by the word praedict. But if it be an Estople, yet the Plaintif relies not upon it in his plea, but upon other matter, and that for these reasons, 1. Because the course of pleading is generally so in reversing of Outlawries, as it is here, Pleading. and so is the old book of Entries, although some Precedents run the other way, and in the Common-pleas it hath been adjudged good as it is here pleaded, and he may well aver, that he is not the same person. 2ly. Estoples' are taken strictly against him that pleads them, and are not favoured in Law, and shall not be therefore taken by implication, Implication. Cooks lit. f. 252. B. but if there should be an Estople here, it must be by implication only, and there ought not to be an Estople against an Estople in the same Record, as it would also be here, for he may as well be estopped to say that he is a Knight, as to say that he is an Esquire. Next the Plaintiffs conclusion is not good, Conclusion. for he relies not upon the Estople, and a good plea with an ill conclusion is not good, 18 H. 6. f. 33. ●● Rep. Rawlins case. Roll chief justice, Makes he not the conclusion upon the Record? let it be tead; upon the reading it he said, that he relies not on the conclusion and so the Estople is relied upon. Sergeant Twisden, In our Surrebutter we rely upon the Estople, although we do it not in our rejoinder, and so it is good, Sergeant Glyn, But you do not conclude upon the Record, to wit, whether you shall be received against the Record, as you ought to do, 22 H. 6. f. 26. Roll chief justice, It is in effect said so, though it be not in express words. Finch Henage on the other side argued in affirmance of the judgement, and said, the question is, whether his coming in by the name of Esquire to reverse the Outlawry shall not be an Estople to him to say afterwards that he was a Knight, and I conceive it is, Estople. because he that comes in gratis to reverse an Outlawry shall not plead Misnosmer, Misnosmer. 6 E. 4. f. 9 he who comes in gratis is not prejudiced if he be not allowed this plea, but it is otherwise if he come in upon process to reverse it. 2ly. It is less mischievous to deny the plea of Misnosmer, than to allow it where it is not allowable, the pleading of the Misnosmer if it be not true may invegle the Court, 10 E. 4.12. 12 E. 4. f. 6.19 H. 6. f. 8. There are 4 kinds of Misnosmer, 4 Misnosmer. to wit, misnosmer of the Christian name. 2ly. Of the Surname. 3ly. Of addition of Profession. 4ly. Of addition of place, and in none of them shall misnosmer be pleaded where the party comes in gratis, Br. Misnosmer 48. & 3 E. 4.5. 27 H. 8. f. 1.15 H. 6. Statham pl. Error, Dyer 192.21 E. 4. f. 8. Fitzh. tit. Misnosmer 8.39 H. 6.1 E. 4. and as the case here is he is estopped to plead misnosmer by reversing of the Outlawry which is a matter of Record, Estople. and by it he hath confirmed his name to be so, 19 H. 6. f. 1.7 Ed. 4. f. 1. Although he might plead Misnosmer if he came in by a Cepi, yet there he may also plead another way specially if he will, and it will be good also, 19 H. 6. f. 1. Nor hath he here relied upon his Plea of Misnosmer, but upon the want of Proclamation, and he reversed the Outlawry by the name of Esquire, and yet now he will say that he was a Knight, which is unreasonable, 34 H. 6. Fitzh. Protest. 7. and this is an allegation contra factum suum proprium. Here is a second original, Original. and that is a good Original within the Statute; and it appears, that this second Original is against the same party, and so he acknowledgeth by the Record, by which the Court may be ascertained, that he was the same person, and his Addition misnamed shall do no hurt. And the second Original is good as the Court hath agreed upon opening of the Case. Roll chief justice, he reverseth the Outlawry as an Esquire, and afterwards says he is a Knight. He may come in without Process to reverse the Outlawry, Outlawry. where his person or estate is endangered by it, 39 E. 3. in Debt, 38 E. 3. but he cannot plead Misnosmer, yet he may protest, that he is a Knight, and save himself in another suit which may be brought against him. If he have pleaded right you agree, that he is not estopped here, and it appears that he is the same person, and comes in gratis by this name, Original. yet it is no estople. And the second Original is good, for it appears that he is the same person, and that by the Statute, notwithstanding the variance, and he may come in gratis without process, and take advantage of the error. But argue again to the point, whether he may bring a second Original by the Statute. At another day it was argued again, but I could not hear, but 33 H. 6. f. 19 & 50. was cited, that there ought to be a mutual Estople, Mutual Estople. viz. on the part of the plaintiff, and of the part of the Defendant. Roll chief justice, It appears to be one and the same party, and we must maintain Actions against the Statute of Limitations, because by that Statute the benefit of the Law is taken away in part. judgement affirmed. Therefore let the judgement be affirmed. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. MEmorandum the two Sheriffs of London appeared in Court, To show cause why execution not done. return of the Sheriff. in their proper persons upon a rule of Court to show cause why they did not grant out execution upon a judgement given in their Court, or else to make a sufficient return of a Certiorari directed to them, because they had made three insufficient retorns. Upon this, their return now made was read, the effect whereof was, that there is no such judgement as the Writ mentioneth to make out execution upon. View of the Record. Roll chief justice, This is a good return, as it now is, and if the tetorn be false, you may take your remedy against them for making a false return. Upon this the Council prayed that the party might have a Copy of the judgement out of the Sheriffs Office. Roll chief justice, You may have a sight of the Record, and if they will not suffer you to have it, you may have your remedy against them. The rule was, that the party should have a Copy of the Record. Pasch. 1655. Banc. sup. Upon a motion for a new Trial grounded upon an Affidavit, For a new Trial. Trial of an Issue. Order of Chancery. Venire de novo. Roll chief justice said, That if there be a Trial and a verdict given upon it, The same issue cannot be tried again by the same jury, although the Chancery do order such a Trial, but if there be a mistryal the party must move the Court where the Action was commenced for a Venire de novo to summon a new Iury. Nota. The Protector and Bruster. Pasc. 1655. Banc. sup. CArew upon a rule to show cause why an attachment should not issue forth against Commissioners of Sewers in Suffolk for setting a Fine upon one for not obeying their orders, Cause why no Attachment. after a Certiorari was delivered unto them to remove the orders made against the party in contempt of this Court, showed for cause, that the Fine set was for disobeying a new Order of theirs made against the party after the Certiorari was returned, Certiorari. and not for disobeying the Orders removed by the Certiorari, and so it was no contempt to this Court. Roll chief justice, The Certiorari doth not remove the Commission of Sewers, and therefore they may proceed upon the Commission notwithstanding the Certiorari. Therefore let no Attachment issue against them. Pasch. 1655. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to quash a return of rescous, Return of a Writ of restitution. the rescouser being in Court, Upon this exception, viz. that the Endictment sets forth that the party rescoved was arrested on or about the fourth day of February, and says not certainty when, and upon this it was quashed. Pasc. 1655. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved upon an Affidavit for an Attachment against four that were served with a Subpaena out of this Court to appear as Witnesses for the Protector at a Trial upon an Endictment of Perjury, For an Attachment. and did not appear, whereby the Trial could not go on. The rule was, that an Attachment should issue forth except cause showed to the contrary. Granted, nisi. Nota. Pasc. 1655. Banc. sup. Upon evidence given in a Trial at the Bar in a Trespass and Ejectment betwixt Good son and Jones, It was said, Evidence to a Jury. That one may not show in evidence to a jury an Inspeximus of a Deed enrolled in Chancery, if it be not a deed of bargain & sale enroled there, for if it be a deed of feoffment, the party must show the Deed itself, for the inspeximus is no matter of Record. Matter of Record. But by Roll chief justice, Though the inspeximus be the inspeximus of the Enrolment, and not of the Deed itself, yet if it be an ancient Deed it may be given in evidence. Feoffment. It was then also said, that if it do not appear by the fabric of a Deed that lands are to pass thereby by way of feoffment yet the land may pass by way of use, Use. if there be a sufficient consideration expressed in the Deed to raise a use. It was also then said, that if a Deed do run thus, Indenture. Deed Poll. This Indenture made, whereas in truth the Deed is not indented, yet may this Deed operate as a Deed Poll. It was likewise said, that if one make a voluntary conveyance upon consideration of natural affection, Badge of fraud. and is not at that time indebted unto any, nor be in treaty with any for the sale of the lands, such conveyance hath no badge of fraud, but otherwise it is if he be indebted or in treaty for sale of the lands. It was then also said, Voluntary Affidavit. that a voluntary Affidavit made before a Master of the Chancery cannot be given in evidence at a Trial. Pasch. 1655. Banc. sup. IN a Trial at the Bar in a Case between Briers and Lake in an Action of Trespass for cutting down and carrying away wood, Trespass and Ejectment. and the Defendant justifying as a Commoner for Estovers, It was said, That if an ancient Cottage which had Common be fallen down, and another Cottage is erected in the place where the old Cottage stood; New Cottage. Common by prescription. this is no new Cottage, but it may claim common as an ancient Cottage by prescription. Nota. Timbrel and Bullock. Pasch. 1655. IN a Trial at Bar in a Trespass and Ejectment between Timbrel and Bullock it was said, Trespass and Ejectment. Suspension of rent. Rend revived. that to make a suspension of rent reserved upon a lease for years, the Lessor must out the Lessee of part of the thing let at least, and hold him out till after the day on which the rent is made payable by the lease, and if the Lessee reenters the rent is revived. It was also then said by Roll chief justice, That if one have a lease for years of land by Deed, and during the term the Lessee accepts to hold the lands for a lesser term by parol, Surrender of Lease. this is a surrender of the Lease by Deed. It was then also said, if there be a lease for years rendering rend at a day, with a clause of reentry for not payment; If the Lessor do enter into part of the lands let before the day of payment, and at the day he makes a demand of the rent; Notwithstanding this demand, and a non payment of the rent follows thereupon, whereupon the Lessor reenters, Avoidance of a Lease. yet shall not this reentry make the Lease void, for the rent was suspended at the time of the demand. The Protector and the Town of Colchester. Pasch. 1655. Banc. sup. BErnardiston being removed from his Recorders place of the Town of Colchester in Essex by the Bailiffs and Common Council of the said Town, Return of a Writ of restitution to a Recorders place. prayed for his writ of restitution to the Bailiffs and Common Council thereof to be restored, and hath it, and upon the return they set forth the causes why they removed him, and why he ought not to be restored, which were to this effect. First, that he being Recorder of that Town, at a quarter Sessions held there before him and others, one Good-all was indicted for having two wives, and convicted thereof, and prayed his Clergy, and was denied it by Bernardiston the Recorder, and was condemned to die, & was reprieved, & a●ter at another Sessions held, there he was notwithstanding his former judgement admitted to his Clergy. 2. That he neglected to sit at the public Sessions of the Peace, which ought to have been held for that Town, whereby the Sessions could not be held. 3. He made one his Deputy, who was not an utter Barister, as he ought to be, and contracted with him for 40 l. a year to execute his place. 4ly. He neglected for along time to sit in Court, whereby causes ready for trial could not be tried in delay of justice. Latch of Council for Bernardiston to the first exception answered, That though he had proceeded erroneously to deny the Clergy to Good all, yet this being not done as he was Recorder, but as he was one amongst others of the Commissioners of Oyer & Terminer, which Commission was but to endure for a year, Distinct power. & was a distinct power from the Recorders power, & was executed by him together with other Commissioners, it was no cause to remove him. To the 2 he answered, that there doth not appear by the return that any body received any prejudice by his not sitting in Court to hold the Sessions, Prejudice. nor that there was any cause to hold a Sessions, and the Sessions which they suppose was appointed to be held was an illegal appointment of them, for it appears not to be appointed by those that had authority to appoint, or to hold them, Authority. and so no fault appears in the Recorder for not holding them. 3ly. The justices are misnamed, for they are called the justices of the Borough, Misnosmer. whereas it should be the justices of the King. 4ly. Here doth not appear to be any appointment at all of any quarter Sessions, and so there can be no fault for not holding them; and it is not necessary (as it is suggested) for him to make an utter Barister his Deputy, Deputy Recorder. General accusation. Malum in se. but saying he was not a fit person to be his Deputy is too general an accusation, for they ought to show in what he was insufficient, neither doth his contracting with him for money to execute the place for him, any ways concern the corporation, nor is it malum in se, but is only punishable by the Statute of 5 Ed. 6. and as to the not trying of the issues joined in that Court, at the days they were to he tried upon, this is no cause to deprive him of his place, which is a freehold, Freehold. for few Stewards of Corporations do otherwise than he hath done, for they usually stay till they have a competent number of causes to try before they will sit to try them, and there appears to be but 5 causes untried, which is no great number, neither doth it appear that be had any notice that these five were ready for trial, Notice. and so here cannot be so great an offence as is supposed, and he cited Semaigns' case Rep. ●3. nor doth it appear that any trial was disappointed by his absence, for it appears not that any issue was joined in any of the causes, or any warning given for trial during the time that is surmised for him to neglect to fit in Court; And besides, though these were sufficient crimes for to deprive him of his place, yet they have not proceeded against him in a legal way, Illegal proceeding. Defence. for he was never called to answer the crimes objected against him, but is deprived without hearing his defence, which is illegal, as Sir james Baggs case is. Roll chief justice, he ought to be heard what he could say for himself, else how could it be known whether there were just cause to remove him or no, and it is very hard to deprive one of his freehold without hearing him. At another day Serjeant Twisden moved the Court for their opinion, whether Bernardiston ought to be restored or no, and answered the exceptions formerly taken much to the effect as Latch had done. Whereupon Roll chief justice said, you ought to have convented him before you put him out, to hear what excuse he could make for his absence, otherwise how could you know whether he had just cause or not for his absence, Restored, nisi, etc. Therefore let him be restored except cause be showed to the contrary Saturday next. Postea. Edwards and Stiff. Pasch. 1655. Banc sup. MEmorandum, Trial in Trespass and Ejectment, Jury suffered to drink at the Bar. Upon a trial at the Bar in a Trespass and Ejectment between Edward's plaintiff, and Stiff Defendant, the evidence being long and the Weathet hot, the Jury desired they might have drink, which the Court granted, but said they should have it at the Bar, whereupon drink was sent for for them, and they drunk it there before they went out to consider of the evidence. Roll chief justice did then reprove the Attorneys and Solicitors for the great charges they used to put their Clients to, in feasting the Jury, Feasting of juries. and ordered that thenceforth no more thou 3 s. 4 d. should be allowed to any juryman to pay for his dinner. Nota. Pasch. 1655. Banc. sup. Upon an Affidavit read in Court, For a new trial. Death of a Witness. that a material witness in the cause that was served with a subpoena to give his testimony at the trial, and died before the trial: The Court was moved on the Defendants part for a new trial, but the Plaintif opposed it, much insisting upon this, that there was no miscarriage on his part: Whereupon Roll chief justice answered, here is the Act of God in the Case, Act of God. which cannot be resisted, and this trial is final to the Defendant, Therefore if the Plaintif will not consent to take his costs, New trial paying costs. and go to a new trial, we will not be hasty to give judgement, but will advise upon it. The Protector and Gunter. Pasch. 1655. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to quash two Endictments for continuing of purprestines in the high way, To quash two Endictments. and it was urged by the Council that there were 4 Endictments preferred against his Client, two for erecting the purprestures, and the other two for the continuing of them, and upon a trial we were found not guilty of the erecting them, and therefore we cannot be guilty of the continuing of them, and he took this exception to the caption of the Endictments, viz. That it is said that the Endictments were preferred at the Sessions held at East. Grinsteed in the County of Sussex, where it ought to have been at the Sessions of the Peace held at East-Grinsteed for the County of Sussex. Roll chief justice answered, You may be guilty for continuing of that which another did erect, and not you, but if the erecting and continuance be mentioned in one and the same Endictment you cannot be guilty. Denied. But plead to them, for no such thing appears in the Record, but only that you kept the Highway stopped, but says not who stopped it. Pasch. 1655. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment grounded upon the Statute of 5 Eliz. preferred against one for using the Trade of a Draper, To quash an Endictment. not having served as an Apprentice in that Trade, according to the Statute, upon these 2 Exceptions, 1. It is said he used the Trade in the year 1653. and doth not say the year of our Lord. 2ly. It is not said that the jury was returned, nor whence they were, and both exceptions were held good by Roll chief justice, and the Endictment was thereupon quashed. Quashed. Pasch. 1655. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment against one Peers, To quash an Endictment upon the Ordinance against Duels. for speaking provoking language to one, contrary to the late Ordinance of the Lord Protector and his Council, upon these Exceptions. 1. It is said the Endictment was at the Sessions held at A. and doth not say in what County. 2ly. It is said by an Ordinance of the Protector made such a day, and doth not say in that case provided. Quashed. And upon these Exceptions it was quashed. Pasch. 1655. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved for a tales to a Northumberland jury returnable this Term, because but 8 of the panel returned did appear. For a tales. But Roll chief justice answered, Take it returnable in Michaelmas Term next, Return of a tales. but this Term you cannot have it. Waldron and Ward. Pasch. 1654. Banc sup. IN a trial at the bar between Waldron plaintiff, and Ward Defendant, Trial at Bar. A Counsellor at the Bar examined as a witness. One Mr. Conye a Counsellor at the Bar was examined upon his Oath to prove the death of Sir Thomas Conye. Whereupon Sergeant Maynard urged to have him examined on the other part, as a witness in some matters whereof he had been made privy as of Counsel in the cause. But Roll chief justice answered, He is not bound to make answer for things which may disclose the secrets of his Client's cause, Not to disclose a Client's cause. and thereupon he was forborn to be examined. Pilkinton and Bagshaw. Pasch. 1655. Banc. sup. Upon a trial to be had at the Bar between Pilkington and Bagshaw, Trial at the Bar. the Plaintif would not put in his writ that the trial might go on; Whereupon Roll chief justice bid the Crier to call the Attorney of the plaintiff to appear, and to bring in the writ upon pain of 20 l. and said, Pain of 20 l. Attorney put out of the Roll. Non-sute upon the Record. that if he brought it not in he should be put out of the Roll. Serjeant Maynard moved, that if he brought not in the writ that the Plaintif might be called non-sute upon the Record, which Roll chief justice answered might well be, because the parties have day in Court by the Record or Roll; afterwards the Solicitor who had the writ brought it in; yet Roll chief justice said, There shall, notwithstanding the writ be brought in, be 20 l. fine set upon him for his trifling with the Court. The Protector and Sumner. Pasch. 165●. Banc. sup. Sergeant Bernard moved that Sumner that appeared in Court upon his habeas corpus directed to the Keeper of Northampton Gaol might be bailed, To bail a prisoner denied. for that having killed two men upon the Highway the jury had found it Manslaughter se defendendo. Roll chief justice answered, The juries' conclusion is contrary to their premises. Therefore let the prisoner be sent to Northampton Gaol whence he came, yet that may not be, for the fact was done in Peterborough, Trial. Writ ad re●piendum. and therefore he cannot be tried at Northampton, therefore let him be sent to Peterborough Gaol with a writ ad recipiendum to the Gaoler there to take charge of him. Pilkington versus Bagshaw. Pasch. 1655. Banc. sup. IN a Trial at the Bar in a Trespass and Ejectment betwixt Pilkington and Bagshaw, Trespass and Ejectment. the question being whether Copyhold lands may be entailed by the custom of the Manor, It was said that if Tenant in tail, and the issue in tail of Copyhold lands in tail join in a surrender in a Court Baron of the Copyhold lands, Estopel. Copyhold lands in tail. Customary entail. Fine. State enjoyed. Seizure of Cepyhold lands. that this is not an estopel, for it ought to be by fine or deed indented. And Roll chief justice said, that Copyhold lands in tail are not within the Statute of Westm. 2. but it is a Customary entail like in its nature to another entail, and such an estate must be docked by fine, or by some other customary way. It was also said by him, that if Copies of Court Rolls be showed to prove a Customary estate, the enjoinment of such estates must also be proved, otherwise the proof is not good. It was also said upon the evidence, That a seizure by the Lord made of Copyhold entailed lands within the Manor of Wakefield in Yorkshire is in the nature of a recovery to deck the entail, and that the manner of doing it is either for the Copyholder to let his Copyhold for more years than he ought, or to refuse to do his service, and then the Lord seifes the lands for a forfeiture, and grants it to another by the consent of the Copyholder that made the forfeiture. It was then also said by Roll chief justice, Custom. that a Custom cannot be urged for a thing that had its beginning since Rich. the 1. if a Record can be showed to the contrary. Common recovery. Recompense in value. Custom. Copyhold destroyed. It was also said by him that a common recovery suproseth a recompense in value to all persons who lost the estate by the recovery. He said also that he conceived that there could be no such Custom to cut off entails of Copyhold lands by the forfeiture and seizure of the Lord, for his seizure upon the forfeiture destroys the Copyhold estate by the Common Law, for it is in the Lord's election after the seizure whether he will grant the estate again or no, and you do not prove that the Custom binds him to it. Nota. Harris and Pasch. 1655. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved in the Case of one Harris, To amend an old judgement. Denied. that the entry of a judgement twelve years passed might be amended upon the Roll. But Roll chief justice answered, It cannot be after so long time past. Pasch. 1655. Banc. sup. Upon a writ of Error brought to reverse a fine levied by an Infant being a Feme Covert. Day to inspect an Infant. The Court was moved for a day to bring in the party that levied the fine to be inspected by the Court, which was granted, and at the day she was brought into the Court, and viewed, and two witnesses deposed that she was within age at the time of the fine levied, Entry upon the Roll. which was entered upon the Roll, upon which the Issue was tried. Pasch. 1655 Banc. sup. IT was said by Roll chief justice, Election. That if there be two Kinsmen in equal degree of kindred to the Intestate, it is in the election of the Ordinary to which of them he will grant Letters of Administration. Pasch. 1655. Banc. sup. AN Outlawry was reversed, Outlawry reversed. because the place where the County Court was held is not showed in the secundo exactus. Pasch. 1655. Banc. sup. IT was moved that there was a judgement given in the Common Pleas, To affirm a judgement a writ of Error depending. and thereupon the Defendant brought his writ of Error to reverse the judgement in this Court, and since pending the writ of Error the partses were agreed, and therefore they desired the judgement might be affirmed, because that otherwise satisfaction of the judgement cannot be acknowledged upon the Roll, because the Court of Common Pleas were forclosed to do any thing further upon the judgement given there by reason of the writ of Error. But Roll chief justice answered, It cannot be, Denied. for you show no cause why we should affirm the judgement, and therefore we will make no rule in it, but enter satisfaction upon the Roll if you will at your own peril. Pasch. 1655. Banc. sup. IT was said by Roll chief justice that an Action upon the case will lie against one that brings vexatious actions against another, Action upon the Case for vexation. or for entering of Actions of a great value, to force his adversary to put in great bail, where he hath but small cause of Action. Nota. Trevanian and Penhollow. Trin. 1655. TRevanian brought an Action upon the case against Penhollow for speaking of these words of him, Plea to an Action on the Case. Thou hast taken a false Oath at the Assizes, and art false forsworn. The Defendant pleads that the Plaintif had agreed to accept of 3 juggs of Beer from him in satisfaction. The plaintiff demurred to the plea, Demurrer. and for cause shows that it doth not appear that the three juggs of Beer were paid or tendered by the Defendant; judgement. and upon this exception judgement was given for the plaintiff, etc. MEmorandum, Trinity Term 1655. beginning the 15 of june being Friday justice Ask late alone in the Court of the Upper Bench, being then the sole judge there, The late Lord chief justice Roll having surrendered his Patent the Tuesday seven-night before, being the 5 of june, as I was informed. MEmorandum, Afterwards the same day john Glyn his Highness the Lord Protectors Sergeant at Law took his place of Lord chief justice of England in this Court, and the Lord Lisle one of the Lords Commissioners of the great Seal of England made a Speech unto him, according to the Custom, and Sergeant Twisden moved for a trial at the Bar the next Michaelmas Term, which was granted, nisi, etc. The Protector and the Town of Colchester. Pasch. and Trin. 1655. Banc. sup. Upon a Mandamus to the Bailiffs of Colchester to restore Bernardiston to the Recorders place of that Town, Exceptions to a return of a Mandamus to the Town of: Colchester. upon the return they certified the causes for removing him, and why he ought not to be restored. 1. That one Good all being indicted upon the Statute for having two wives, and convicted thereof did pray his Clergy, and was refused it by Bernardiston, and was condemned to die, and after at another Sessions he admitted him to his Clergy, and so he was burnt in the hand. 2ly. That he neglected to sit at the Sessions, whereby the Sessions for the Town could not be held duly as they ought to have been. 3ly. That he appointed a Deputy Recorder to execute his place for him, who was not an utter Barrister, and contracted with him for 40 l. per annum. 4ly. That he neglected to hold Courts whereby causes could not be tried, to the prejudice of many. Latch of Council with Bernardiston to the first cause answered, That although it was an Error in judgement to deny the Clergy where it should have been granted; yet this was not committed as he was Recorder of the Town, but as a Commissioner of Oyer and Terminer, which was to endure but for a year, and was a distinct power from his power as he was Recorder, and executed by him, with other Commissioners that were joined with him in Commission. To the second he answered, that here doth not appear to be any prejudice to any by his not holding the Sessions, nor that there was any cause to hold them, and besides, it doth appear, that the Sessions where he neglected to sit were not legally appointed to be held, for they were appointed by them that had no authority to do it, viz. by the Mayor and Bailiffs, whereas they ought to be appointed by the Mayor, Bailiffs, and Recorder; and next the justices are misnamed, for they are called the justices of the Borough, whereas they ought to be called the justices of the King. 4ly. Here doth not appear any appointment at all of the Quarter Sessions. To the 3d. he answered, that it is not necessary that he should appoint a Barrister to be Deputy-Recorder, and to say that he was not fit to be Deputy-Recorder is too general a charge, but it ought to be showed in what he was unfit, and his contracting with him for money concerns not the Coporation, neither is it malum in se, but is only punishable by the Statute of 5 Ed. 6. And as to the last, viz. his neglecting to try the issues joined at the days appointed it is not a crime material to deprive him of his free hold, and few Stewards do otherways, for they do usually stay till they have a competent number of Causes to try, before they will sit; and here are but six causes alleged to be untried, and one of them was not tryable in that place, nor is it averred, that he had notice given him of any issues to be tried, and so the offence is the less, 5 Rep. Semaignes case, nor doth it appear, that any trial was disappointed by his absence, for it appears not that there was any issues joined, or any warning given for trial in any of the Causes during the time alleged, wherein it is said he did for bear to sit to try them. Lastly, here is no just way of proceeding to deprive him of his place though he might be deprived, for he was never summoned to appear to answer the matters objected against him, as he ought to have been, and so is Cook in Sir James Baggs case. Sergeant Glyn on the same side insisted only upon the last matter urged by Latch, which he said went through the whole Case. Roll chief Justice, He ought to have been heard, how else can it be known whether they had just cause to remove him or not, and it is very hard to deprive one of his freehold without hearing him make his defence. The Court was moved at another day for their opinion, and then Sergeant Twisden endeavoured to answer some exceptions taken to the return by Windham, and to make good the exceptions taken against Bernardiston, much to the same effect as formerly. Whereupon Roll chief Justice answered, you ought to have convented him before you had put him out, that you might have heard what excuse he could make for his absence, else how can it be known, whether he had a just cause of absence or not. Therefore let him be restored, nisi, judgement nisi. etc. At another day, being in Trinity Term 1655. Sergeant Maynard shown for cause why he ought not to be restored, 1. That he held not the Courts duly, but did absent himself for sixteen months, without any cause, to the endangering of the forfeiture of the Charter of the Town, and s●●d, that if an Officer of Record do wilfully and without cause absent himself from his Office, it is a for feiture thereof, for by so doing the Charter is forfeited, Forfeiture of an Office. and here is no supposition of any excuse. 2ly. The return is good, though no notice was given him, for he ought to take notice of himself as he is an Officer of that Court, and endict him they cannot, and if his offence be true de facto they may put him out of his place, as a Master may put away his Servant, and this their Charter warrants them to do Twisden on the same side said, he hath contracted with another for his place, and so is disabled by the Statute. Wild, He could not be here convented, for it is expressly said, that he went to unknown places. Glyn chief justice, The main business insisted on was his absence, but here was no notice given to him, and you ought not to proceed against him, and never hear him, though the crime objected against him be true, for it may be he was sick or had some other just excuse for his absence, and he ought also to be heard to all the other crimes objected against him. Therefore let him be restored, nisi, etc. to morrow. judgement nisi. Howard and Howard. Trin. 1655. Banc. sup. MY Lord Howard being taken by a Latitat out of this Court appeared upon the day of the return of the Writ in Court, Peerage pleaded. and pleaded his privilege of Péerage, and demands in judgement of the Writ, and thereupon to be discharged. Powis of Council against him moved, that he might put in special bail. Bayl. Demurrer. Glyn chief justice, You ought to demur to his Plea, for he is now in Custodia, and therefore he need not put in bail. Nota. The Protector and Norrice. Trin. 1655. Banc. sup. NOrrice being committed to prison for speaking words against the Parliament in the year 1650. was thereupon indicted, To discharge a Prisoner upon the Act of Oblivion. and was convicted and fined 100 l. and ordered to lie in prison until he could find Sureties for his good behaviour; afterwards he was brought into Court by virtue of a Habeas Corpus, and his Council moved on his behalf that he might be discharged, because he was pardoned by the Act of Oblivion. It was urged against this for the Protector, that he may be a person excepted out of the Act, Surmise. and therefore ought not upon this surmise to be delivered. Glyn chief justice, It doth not appear to us that he is not excepted, and therefore we cannot deliver him. Thereupon it was moved for the Prisoner for a Certiorari to remove the Record hither, Certiorari. Entry. whereby he stands convicted, that he might enter the suggestion upon it, that he is pardoned by the Act. Glyn chief justice, Tax it. Webberly and Sir John Lenthall. Trin. 1655. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved for Webberly against Sir john Lenthall, Motion against Sir john Lenthall for detaining a Prisoner discharged. Action money. False imprisonment. Endictment. that whereas he being a Prisoner in the Upper Bench prison for Debt. and having agreed with his Creditors was discharged by them, yet Sir john Lenthall did keep him Prisoner till he should pay him Action money. Glyn chief justice, You have two remedies against Sir john Lenthall for this, for either you may bring your Action of false imprisonment against him, or you may endict him for extortion. Yet let Sir john show cause why he should not discharge him paying his fees. Strewed and Keckwith. Trin. 1655. Banc. sup. Mich. 1653. rot. 119. Strewed brought an Audita querela against Keckwith. Audita querela. The Case was this, Strewed acknowledged a judgement 17 Car. for 2000 l. upon which judgement an Elegit was taken forth against Strowds lands in the County of B. and lands thereupon were found and extended, and delivered to the Counsee, and the Elegit filled, and the lands enjoyed accordingly for six years, than the Counsee dies and makes his wife Executrix, who takes out a Scire facias upon the judgement for 2000 l. directed the Sheriff of the County of C. being another County, and upon two Nichils returned hath judgement and execution against Strewed for the same Debt, who thereupon brings his Audita querela. Wadham Windham held, that the Audita querela did lie and cited 15 H. 7.7. & L. Q. f. 40. and said this was an illegal proceeding against Strewed, because that after an Elegit executed not other execution lies, but where there bathe been no execution of lands in the same County or in another upon the first Elegit, but here is land found, Execution. and the Elegit filled, and the lands enjoyed, Elegit to divers Counties. No Elegit after an Elegit. judgement. 18 E. 12. Fitzh. tit. Execution 240. Dyer 1●2. an Elegit may be prayed to divers Counties. Glyn chief justice, The Case is adjudged in Hobard● Reports, that one cannot have an Elegit after a former Elegit, if lands be thereby found, and the Elegit filled. Therefore show cause why judgement shall not be given for the Plaintif. Price and Carr. Hill. 1654. Banc. sup. PRice brought an Action upon the Case against Carr for speaking these words of her, A pox upon you for a Welsh whore, Arrest of judgement in an Action on the Case for words. for thou goest into the Country and emptiedst thy Ca●k of a Bastard. After a verdict for the plaintiff it was moved in arrest of judgement, that the former words videlicet, the saying the was a Welsh Whore are not actionable, because no Action lies at the Common-law for calling a woman Whore, and the last words are uncertain words, and less actionable. The judgement was then stayed till the Plaintif should move. Whereupon at another day the Plaintif moved for judgement, and a Case in 1● jac. in this Court was cited, and 41 Eliz. Wheeler and Angels' case, and it was urged, that the words shall be interpreted according to common intention and understanding of the hearers, and shall be adjudged very scandalous. Wild on the other side said, they are frivolous words and not to be regarded, for they do not say positively she is a Whore, nor that she had a Bastard, but the words are of a very uncertain meaning, for it appears not when the words were spoken, or when she went into the Country, nor is there any averment what is meant by the words. Glyn chief justice, Words actionable. Now since the Act, the calling of a woman Whore, and saying the had a Bastard will bear an Action, and here are words certain enough to fix a particular Scandal upon the party, by application of the words, and they are made more than general words or words of heat and passion, for there is a general application of them, and a sufficient averment, and for the time of speaking them we will not presume they were spoken four years since, which was before the late Statute made against Adultery. judgement. Therefore let the Plaintif have her judgement. Davis and Matthews. Pasch. 1655. Banc. sup. THe Case was this, Bond put in sure in the Prerogative Court. There being a controverste in the Prerogative Court between the Widow of one that died intestate, and one of the intestates next kindred, who should have Letters of Administration of the goods and Chattels of the Intestatè, It was at length agreed betwixt the parties, that the widow should have Letters of administration, and that thereupon she should enter into Bond in the prerogative Office, to make an equal distribution of the goods and chattels of the intestate amongst his kindred, whereupon Letters of Administration were committed unto her; and she afterwards entered into bond accordingly, and for not performing the condition of the bond in making an equal distribution of the estate, the bond was put in suit in the prerogative Court, Prohibition. upon which a prohibition was prayed, and a rule thereupon made for the Defendant to show cause why it should not be granted, and of the day it was offered for cause that there ought to be no prohibition, because where an administration is granted to one unto whom the Ordinary is not bound by the Statute to grant it, as it is in this case, there the Ordinary may take a bond of the party, with condition to make an equal distribution of the goods; but otherwise it is where Letters of administration are granted to one to whom by the Statute they ought to be granted, and one Sharp and sympson's case 14 jac. was cited, Ordinary. and Hob. 191. On the other side it was urged that the Ordinary hath no authority to take such a bond for the equal distribution of the goods, and the difference put on the other side was denied, and it was said, that when the Ordinary hath once committed the Letters of Administration to the party, Power determined. Administration upon condition. his power is then determined, and he cannot grant Letters of Admistration upon Condition. Glyn chief justice, The taking of the Bond is against the Statute, for the wife ought to be preferred before the next of the Kin, notwithstanding the Statute, and so is the common practice, except there be a special cause for the contrary, as where the wife hath had a former provision made for her by her husband, Prohibition granted. etc. Therefore let there be a prohibition, nisi. Trin. 1655. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved on the behalf of an Infant to discharge a Guardian assigned by the Court, To discharge a Guardian. with an intent to make Richard Somers Attorney of this Court Guardian in his room, and that the former inspection may be discharged, Inspection. and that the infant may by now inspected again, because when the former inspection was and the Guardian assigned, there was no action depending in Court against the Infant. Glyn chief justice, Let it be so for the cause you have alleged, and give notice of it to the former Guardian Sherlock. Trin. 1655. Banc. sup. rot. 1320, or 1315. ONe Sherelock a Widow of the Parish of Earth in Sussex, Error by an Infant to reverse a fine. an Infant, brought writ of Error to reverse a fine levied by her of her lands whilst she was a Covert Baron, and the Court was moved that she might have a Guardian assigned her to prosecute for her, and that she might be inspected by the Court, Inspection. and that the inspection might be recorded; and there was an Affidavit made by one in Court, that he knew the Infant who was there present, and the time of her birth and baptising, and swore the times precisely; the Church book was also produced in Court, and proved by Oath, wherein the time of her baptising was entered, and that she was the same person upon which she had by her own election A●twood an Attorney of this Court assigned for her Guardian, Guardian assigned. Entry. and the Affidavits were ordered by the Court to be recorded, and the inspection to be entered, and a scire facias awarded against the heir. The Protector and Craford Trin. 1655. Banc. sup. Upon a return of a Mandamus directed to the Master and Fellows of Gonvile and Cayus College in Cambridge, A Mandamus to restore one to an Ushers place in a Free-school, and the return and exceptions to 〈◊〉 Au hority. Notice. Action at Law. Extraordinary course. to restore one to an Ushers place of a Free-school in Cambridge, of which they are visiters. It was excepted against it, that they had not showed that they had any authority to deprive the party of his place; And 2ly. It doth not appear that they gave him any notice of their proceed against him, whereby he might prepare to defend himself. Sergeant Twisden made question whether a Mandamus did lie in this case, because a School master's place is a temporal Office, and an Action at the Law lies for the party to recover it, and therefore it seems a Mandamus, which is an extraordinary course ought not to be granted, and he rited 8 Ass. and Sir james Bags case, and Dyer 200. and said it is not like an Office without see. Latch on the other side answered The Mandamus is allowed already, and the legality of it is not now to be disputed, and Sir james Bags case is not repugnant to this case, for this is a public office, and not a private, and tends much to the public good, Office public, private. and is like to the case of an Alderman, or Freeman of a Corporation, or a Fellow of a College. Glyn chief justice, A Mandamus to restore one to a Churchwardens place hath been adjudged good. It is true that for a private office a writ of restitution doth not lie, but if the public be concerned in the office it doth lie; and though it be an office with a fee belonging to it, that makes no difference; for a Recorders place is an office with a fee, and yet a writ of restitution lies for it; But it appears here that the Schoolmaster hath much abused himself, and therefore we will advise. Writ of restitution. Office with and without a Fee. Mandamus. Freehold. At another day this case was moved again, and then Glyn chief justice said, I doubt whether a Mandamus doth lie in this case, for it lies not for every taking away of a man's freebold, as in the cases of a Keeper of a Park, or a Stewardship of a Court Baron. Wild questioned to whom the Mandamus could be here directed, for he said that the Master and Fellows are no Corporation; and he cited Boremans' case of the Middle Temple, Corporation, Inns of Court voluntary societies. who prayed a Mandamus to be restored to that society, where it was held that the Inns of Court are not Corporations, but only voluntary societies. Latch on the other side said that it was very proper to have a Mandamus in this case, for it is a public office, and not a private, as a Keeper's place of a Park, or a Steward's place of a Manor are; jurisdiction. and a Steward of a Court Leet is a public Officer: And this Court hath jurisdiction to reform all grievantes of this nature, and to keep other jurisdictions in good order, that they do not entrench one upon another, & here is no Visitor to whom the party may appeal, and it were very unreasonable to leave him without remedy, and Mandamusses have been granted for places of less consequence than this as in Pasch. 2 Car. a Mandamus was granted to restore one to the place of Town Clark, which is a private office, and 19 jac. a Mandamus was granted to restore one to a common Clarks place of a Will, and 5 Car. and 18 Car. to restore the parties to Parish Clarks places. And if the place be public this Court will not leave the party to seek his remedy at Law, and Alderman Estwicks' case is well known, who was restored to the place of a Common Council man of London, and here the party hath an employment for his life, Employment for life. though he have not a freehold in it, and there is a settled profit accrueing to him, and so prayed he might be restored. Wild on the other side held, that a Mandamus lies not in this case, and said, this case differs from the cases put on the other side; for the Schoolmaster, Durante beneplacito. though he have a freehold, yet it is but durante beneplacito, and he is in truth no more than a servant, and in all the cases put on the other side the public is more concerned than in this case 11 H. 4. f. 47. A Schoolmaster hath no freehold as Skreen there held, and it is not like the case of a Churchwarden, Churchwarden. which is an Office that the common Law takes notice of, 12 H 7. and a Town Clark is a public officer of the Town, and Boremans' case is very like to this; and the office of a high Steward is a public office, and so is a Steward of a Leet, and one may put away a servant retained for his life, and so may the Schoolmaster here be discharged, and this School is a private School, and is not a Corporation as Westminster School is. Glyn chief justice, by the same rule that the Schoolmaster should be restored may ever Scholar claim to be restored, and I conceive the Visitors may remove the Master of the School, if he observe not the rules for government of the School, and it seems as reasonable for them to turn out the Masters, as to receive them into the place. But let the whole matter be referred to the Justices of the Assize, one of whom, viz. my Lord chief justice St. john, Reference is the Chancellor of the University of Cambridge, where the School is. Fowke and Prescott. Trin. 1655. Banc. sup: FOwke brought an Action upon the case upon a promise against Prescott. The Case was this, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the case upon a promise. Prescott being a Coachman did by careless driving of his Coach break a pipe of wine of Fowkes which lay in the street, whereby much of the wine ran out; and was lost: Fowke apprehends the Coachman, who thereupon promiseth that if he would for bear to sue him for the wine, that he would pay him as much as he had damnified him, and for breach of this promise he brings his Action, and obtains a verdict against the Defendant. It was moved in Arrest of judgement, 1. That the Plaintif had not averred how much the wine was worth that was spilt, and so he could not tell what satisfaction to make the plaintiff for it, Averment. for he knows not the value. Request. 2ly. Here doth not appear to be any request made for the satisfaction by the Plaintif. Sergeant Twisden answered, Here doth appear to be an apparent damage, and he hath not satisfied the damage we have laid in our Declaration, nor hath the Defendant pleaded any tender of damages at all, Tender of damages. Implication. Notice. and the jury have found the damages. 2ly. We say that we have forborn to sue him, and this implies no satisfaction made at the time of the Action brought. Alleyne on the other side, The Plaintiffs Declaration doth not entitle him to the Action, and the finding of the jury cannot make this good. Glyn chief justice, Both parties did see the wine, and the Defendant is bound to take notice of the damage, and the Plaintif is not bound to give him notice, judgement. and the jury hath made it certain, Therefore let the Plaintif have his judgement. Dod and Herbert Trin. 1655. Banc. sup. DOd brought an Action of Debt upon an Obligation to stand to an award, Demurrer in debt upon an Obligation to stand to an Award. Satisfaction Charges. Submission. In Curia prolata. against Herbert, the Defendant pleaded nil debet, and upon a Demurrer these exceptions were taken to the Award, why it should not be good: 1. That here is 100 l. awarded to be paid to the party, and it doth not appear that it is to be paid unto him in satisfaction of the wrong done unto him. 2ly. Here is 8 l. ordered to be paid for charges and expenses, which thing is not submitted unto by the parties, and so no Award ought to be made for them. 3ly. The Action here is merely grounded upon the Award, and therefore the award ought to have been brought into Court, which is not done for aught appears here. Wild on the other side answered, that upon the penning of the whole Award, it appears that the 100 l. is to be paid for the wrong done to the party by the speaking of the scandalous words, and the Award is set forth to be made de et super praemissis, De & super praemissis. which makes it good, as my Lord chief justice Rolls opinion was upon the first opening of the Record, and so was Burbidges case 16 Car. And as is the second Exception he held, that the 8 l. awarded to be paid for charges was within the submission, for the Arbitators have power to allow charges: And as to the last Exception, he said it is not necessary to produce the Award in Court. Glyn chief justice, It is to be intended that the 100 l. is to be paid for the wrong done, Intendment. and the 8 l for costs is as well within the submission as the other, and the Award is recited, and it is said to be made de et super praemissis. The only question is, whether the Award ought to be produced in Court, and I conceive it is not necessary to do it, although he must plead the Award in writing, for the Action is not brought upon the Award, but upon the submission, for the Award is but the inducement, and the Court hath nothing to do with the Award, Submission. Inducement. but to see whether it be in writing or no; For a Deed, that must I confess, be produced in Court, that the Court may judge whether it bind the party or not, and you yourselves have here set forth the Award in your pleading, But speak to it at another day, at which time the case being only put, Glyn chief justice said, if an Action of debt be brought upon an Obligation, Where a thing must be produced. the Obligation ought to be produced and in all other cases where things cannot be demanded but by Deed; otherwise is it, if they may be demanded either by Deed, or without Deed; but here is no Deed in the case, for an Arbitrement under seal is no Deed, & the arbitrement may be made without a Deed, Deed. Arbitrement. Writing. judgement nisi. & therefore it is not necessary to be produced in Court, for it is but a writing under hand and seal. judicium nisi pro quereute. Maynell and Mackallye. Trin. 1655. Banc. sup. MAynell brought an Action upon the Case against Mackallye, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the case upon a promise. and declared, That whereas he had an intent to enter an Action against the Defendant, and to arrest him at such a time, the Defendant in consideration that the Plaintif would forbear to arrest him at that time did promise that he would put in bail to him at any time after when he shall enter his action against him, and for breach of this promise he brings his Action. Upon non assumpsit pleaded, and a verdict for the plaintiff, it was moved in Artest rest of judgement, That it is not said how long the Plaintif should forbear to arrest the Defendant, Consideration. Declaration. Reasonable construction. Judgement. and it may be for so little time that it will not be a good consideration to ground the promise. But it was answered, that it is well enough, for the declaration pursues the words of the agreement between the parties, and cannot be better expressed. Glyn chief justice, It is a good consideration, and we must make reasonable construction of words, Therefore let the Plaintif have his judgement. Abbott and Vaughan. Trin. 1655. Banc. sup. Pasch. 1655. rot. 557. ABbott brought an Action upon the case against Vaughan and his wife, for words spoken of the Plaintif by the Defendants wife, Error upon a Judgement in an Action upon the case for words. and upon not guilty pleaded, and a verdict found for the plaintiff, and a judgement thereupon given, upon a writ of Error brought this Exception was taken, that the verdict found the wife only guilty, and yet the judgement was given against Baron and Feme, which was urged to be Error, but 9 E. 4. was cited on the other side, that the judgement is well given. Glyn chief justice, The jury have found the wife guilty, and so the Declaration is true, and therefore just cause of Action, and the judgement well given. Williams and Probe. Trin. 1655. Banc. sup. William's brought an Action upon the case for speaking these words of her, Arrest of judgement in an Action for words. viz. Thou art a Whore, and I will prove thee a Whore, and thou hast made my house a Bawdy house. After a verdict it was moved in Arrest of judgement that the words are not actionable, because they do not imply that she had played the whore herself, though she had made the Plaintiffs house a Bawdy house. But Glyn chief justice answered, If we take all the words together as they are laid they are actionable, for they are particular applicable words, Particular applicable words. judgement. relating to the parties playing the whore; Therefore let her have her judgement. Bacon and Ramsey. Trin. 1655. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved for Bacon a Barrister of Gray's Inn that he might have his privilege to lay an Action transitory in Middlesex, For a Barrister for his privilege to lay his Action in Middlesex. whereas it was laid in Northumberland, and Franklin and Sir William Butler's case, and Bear and jones his case of the Middle Temple were cited to prove that a Barrister ought to have this privilege, that where any transitory Action is brought against him, he may have it laid in Middlesex, wheresoever the cause of Action was. The Court advised, and desired to see the precedents cited. At another day it was moved again, and upon the precedents produced, Granted. It was ordered to lay the venue in Middlesex accordingly. The Protector and Blackwell. Trin. 1655. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved for a melius inquirendum to be directed to the Coroner of Middlesex to inquire of what goods one Tooms that hanged himself did die possessed of, For a melius inquirendum. because the Inquisition returned did only find his goods he was possessed of in London. Glyn chief justice, You may have a melius inquirendum, it being for the Protector, if the practice of the Court will allow it, but it must be directed to the Sheriff, Sheriff. Coroner. because the Coroner hath done his office already, and hath nothing now to do with it. Eston and Manley. Trin. 1655. Banc. sup. IT was moved in Arrest of judgement in an Action of Debt upon an Obligation, Arrest of judgement in debt upon an Obligation. that the Obligation upon which the Action was brought was for the payment of 100 l. and the Plaintif declares for 80 l and so the Declaration varies from the bond. 2ly. It is said that the Action was entered in the same Counter, whereas there was no mention of any Counter before, neither doth it appear that the Counter is a Court. Glyn chief justice answered, the first exception is to no purpose, and for the second it is but an exception to a surplusage, which might have been left out of the Declaration, and it is also after a verdict. Surplusage. judgement. Therefore let the Plaintif have his judgement. Thomas and Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. THe case was this, one promised to the Father, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon a promise. that in consideration that he would surrender a Copyhold to the Defendant, that the Defendant would give unto his two daughters 20 l. a piece, and after a Verdict in an Action upon the case brought by one of his daughters for breach of this promise, It was moved in Arrest of judgement, that the Plaintif had declared upon a joint promise made which concerned another with the Plaintif, and yet the Action is brought but by one of them, Joint promise. whereas they ought to have joined in the Action. But Glyn chief justice answered, that the parties have distinct interests, and so any one of them may bring an Action. Turner replied, The Declaration mentions the promise to be a joint promise. Distinct interests. Glyn chief justice, But the Law doth distinguish the interest, though the Declaration be general. Sergeant Bernard, Here aught to be a several Action, Distinction of Law. judgement. and so hath it been lately adjudged in the Common pleas: But it was answered, that the Action is brought but for one twenty pound due to one of the Daughters, and so judgement for the plaintiff, nisi, etc. Wood and Gunston. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. IN a Trial at Bar in an Action upon the case for words between Wood plaintiff, No Action for scandalous words. and Gunston Defendant, It was said by Glyn chief justice, That if a Counsellor speak scandalous words against one in defending his Client's cause, an Action doth not lie against him for so doing, for it is his duty to speak for his Client, and it shall be intended to be spoken according to his Clients instructions. Hither and Bowman. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. IN a trial at Bar between Hither and Bowman in Trespass and Ejectment it was said by the Court, Instrument in Law. Copyholder. Admission. That the Lord of a Copyhoyld is but an Instrument to admit the Copyholder, and aught to admit him according to the surrender, or otherwise the admittance is not good. Thurle and Madison. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. IN a Trial at the Bar between Thurle and Madison, Enrolment of a Deed. It was said by Glyn chief justice, that if divers persons do seal a Deed, and but one of them acknowledge the Deed, and the Deed is thereupon enroled, this is a good enrolment within the Statute, and may be given in evidence as a Deed enroled, Evidence. at a Trial. It was then also said, that if a deed express a consideration of money upon the purchase made by the Deed, yet this is no proof upon a trial, Consideration. that the moneys expressed were paid, but it must be proved by witnesses. MEorandum. Copy proved. That upon the same Trial an Act of Parliament produced in point for the selling of Delinquents estates, was sworn to have been examined by the Parliament Roll, and that it was a true Copy before it was read in evidence. Nota. Wood and Gunston. Mich. 1655. Upon a motion for a new trial between Wood and Gunston, Memorandum. New trial for miscarriage of the Iury. upon a supposition of excessive damages given by the jury in an Action upon the case tried at the Bar for words, viz. Calling the plaintiff Traitor, etc. 1500 l. being the damages given, It was said by Glyn chief justice, that if the Court do believe that the jury gave their verdict against their direction given unto them, the Court may grant a new Trial. And a new Trial was gronted in this Case after a full debate had by Council on both sides. Culliar and Iermin. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. CUlliar brought an Action upon the Case upon a promise, and declared, Arrest of judgement upon a promise. that the Testator of the Defendant in consideration, that the Plaintif would marry such a Woman did promise that he would leave him half his Estate at his death, and thereupon he did marry the party, and yet he did not leave him half his estate at his death. Upon a verdict found for the plaintiff, it was moved in arrest of judgement, that the Declaration was not good, for whereas the promise was, that the Defendant should leave him half of all his estate, which might be intended both of his real and also of his personal Estate, and of any estate in reversion, as well as of an estate in possession, the plaintiff only says, that the Testator died worth 3000 l. in possession, and that he did not leave him half of that estate, and it may be he left him part of his real estate, or estate in reversion to the full value of half his whole estate. But Glyn chief justice disallowed the exception, and gave judgement for the Plaintif. judgement. Launce and Blackmore. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. Hill. 1654. rot. 191. LAnce an Executor brought an Action upon the Case against Blackmore, Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the Case upon a pro- and declared, that in consideration that the Testator would suffer the Defendant to enjoy such a Close of land, the Defendant did assume and promise to pay 53 s. a year for the rent thereof for so long time as he should enjoy it, and for so much rend due for it for so long time in the Testators life time, and for so much rend due since his death he brings the Action. Upon non assumpsit pleaded, a verdict was found for the plaintiff, and entire damages given. It was moved in arrest of judgement, That an Action of the Case doth not lie, it being for the nonpayment of rent, which follows the nature of the land, and doth sound in the realty, for which a personal Action lies not. 2ly. Here doth not appear by the Daclaration, Personal act on. Consideration to the any consideration to ground the promise upon, for the Declaration is that if the Testator in her life time would permit the Defendant to enjoy the Close, then. etc. and it is not averred, Averment. that the Testator did in her life time suffer the Defendant to enjoy the Close. Glyn chief justice, If a promise be made to the Testator, the Executor may have an Action, Executor. and it is a good consideration as to him, for the executor is representative of the Testator. And 2ly. An Action upon the Case will not lie for rent upon a promise in law, but upon a special promise of the party to pay it, Promise in Law, Special. as our Case is it will lie. Ingram and Fawset. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. IN this Case it was said by Glyn chief justice, Administrator must show how Administrator. That if an Administrator bring an Action against an Administrator, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show by whom the letters of Administration were granted unto the Defendant, but he must show by whom the letters of Administration were granted to himself to entitle himself to the Action, for if it appear not to the Court that he is Administrator, he cannot sue by that name. Mich. 1635. Banc. sup. IT was said by Wild, and agreed by Whitwick one of the Masters of the Upper Bench office, How far special bail is liable for the principal. that if an Attorney do appear for one in the Upper Bench, & special bail is entered for his Client, to that Action, that that Bail is not bound to stand Bail to all other Actions that shall be declared in against the party upon the by, but the Attorney for him is bound to appear for him in all such Actions, and to put in Common bail. Wagstaff and Tempest. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. IT was said by Glyn chief justice upon evidence given in a Trial at the Bar, Dispensation with a forfeiture of an Estate bail. between Wagstaff and Tempest, that if tenant for life do levy a Fine of the Lands he is so seized of, whereby he should forfeit his estate, yet if he in the remainder will join with the Tenant for life in declaring the uses, this is a dispensation with the forfeiture. and Le Gay Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. THe Court was informed, For a time to account before Auditors. that in an Action of Account brought there was a verdict, that the Defendant should account before Auditors, and that Auditors were assigned, and the parties were now before the Auditors, and thereupon it was moved on the Defendants part, that this Court would grant him time to account, for the reasons alleged. But Wild answered, that it was not proper to move here, for the Auditors are now judges of the matter, Auditor's judges by the Statute. and may give time if they see cause. To which Glyn chief justice agreed, and said, the Auditors are judges by the Statute, and therefore move before them, and trouble not us with it. Sergeant Bradshaw and Procter. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. IN the Case of Sergeant Bradshaw and Mr. Procter of Grays. Inn. Challenge to an array no part of the Record. It was said, that a challenge to the array is no part of the Record, but aught to be determined whether it be good or not by the judge, before whom the trial of the Cause should have been, By whom to be determined Demurrer to a challenge. if the challenge had not been taken; and so hath it been ruled upon serious advice in the Common-pleas; and it was then likewise said, if there be a demurrer to a challenge at the Assizes, the judge of Assize may determine it there, or overrule it, or adjourn it to be heard at another time. Sums and Sir John Lenthall. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. THe Court was informed that an Action of Debt was formerly brought against Sir john Lenthall, and that there was judgement, For Sir john Lenthall the marshal to appear, that he might be in execution. and an execution thereupon taken out against him, but that he absconded himself, that be could not be taken, and therefore it was prayed in regard he was an Officer of this Court that the Court would order him to appear here, that he may be committed in execution to the Sheriff of Middlesex. But Glyn chief justice answered, if Sir john Lenthall do appear here, and you pray him in execution, we can commit him to no other prison but the Marshalsea, for that is the prison of this Court, and to commit him to that prison of which he is the Keeper, without securing the Prisoners there, before we do it, will be an escape in Law of all the Prisoners. Therefore let Sir john show cause why he should not pay the Debt, for it is neither for his own credit, nor the honour of this Court, that he should not satisfy his Debts. Fardres and Proud. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. HArdres brought an Action upon the Case against Proud, Arrest of judgement in an action upon the Case upon a promise. and declared, that whereas he at the instance and request of the Defendant had taken pains to reconcile differences betwixt the Defendant and I. S. and others, the Defendant did assume and promise unto the plaintiff to pay unto him 100 l. at a certain day, and for not paying the money accordingly he brings his Action. And upon non-assumpsit pleaded, and a verdict found for the Plaintif. The Defendant moved in arrest of judgement, 1. That here is no consideration set forth in the Declaration to ground the promise upon, for it is only said, that in consideration that the Plaintif had taken pains, etc. Consideration executed. he did promise, etc. and this is a consideration executed, and not sufficient to ground a promise upon, and one Hunt and Dier case was cited for proof. 2ly He doth not show what pains he hath taken, and so it cannot be known whether his pains were sufficient to ground the promise upon. 3ly. He says, that he took pains to reconcile differences betwixt the Defendant, and I. S. and others, and doth not show who these others were. The two last exceptions were overruled without speaking to; and to the first Wild answered, that here was a continuing consideration, Continuing consideration. though the pains taken were passed, for it is said he took the pains at the instance and request of the plaintiff Glyn chief justice, It is as you say, Voluntary courtesy. for here is more than a voluntary Courtesy, upon which no consideration for a promise can be grounded, for the pains here were undertaken at the instance of the Plaintif. judicium, nisi, etc. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. BY Glyn chief justice, Where one may appear by Attorney, where not. If one come in upon the E●igent he may appear by his Attorney, but if he come in upon the Outlawry he must appear in his proper person, and not by his Attorney, and so is the constant practice of the Common-pleas, and of this Court also. Nota. London and Wilcocks. Mich. 1655. Banc sup. LOndon brought an Action of Trespass against Wilcocks inter alia, Arrest of judgement in Trespass. for taking and carrying away 40 loads of Corn in the Straw. Upon a verdict found for the plaintiff, it was moved in arrest of judgement that the Declaration was uncertain, for the Plaintif had declared for 40 loads of Corn in the Straw, and it doth not appear, whether they be Horse-loads or Cart-loads, or what other loads of Corn they are But Glyn chief justice answered; that it is well enough expressed, for it being of Corn in the Straw, it shall be intended Cart-loads, and therefore let the Plaintif have his judgement. Judgement. Q. If the Action had been laid in the County of Cornwell where it is usual to carry Corn in the Straw upon Horses whether the Declaration would have been good. Wood and Gunston. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. Would brought an Action upon the Case against Gunston for speaking of scandalous words against; For a new trial in an action of Trespass for 〈◊〉 words. and amongst other words for calling him Traitor, and obteyns a verdict against him at the Bar, wherein the jury gave 1500 l. damages. Upon the supposition that the damages were excessive, and that the jury did favour the Plaintif, the Defendant moved for a new trial. But Sergeant Maynard opposed it, and said that after a verdict the partiality of the jury ought not to be questioned, nor is there any Precedents for it in our Books of the Law, and it would be of dangerous consequence if it should be suffered, and the greatness of the damages given can be no cause for a new trial, but if it were, the damages are not here excessive, if the words spoken be well considered, for they tend to take away the Plaintiffs estate, and his life. Windham on the other side pressed for a new trial, and said it was a packed business, else there could not have been so great damages, and the Court hath power in extraordinary cases, such as this is, to grant a new trial. Glyn chief Justice, Discretion of the Court. Discretion Judicial, Arbitrary. The Court not to be intended partial. It is in the discretion of the Court in some cases to grant a new trial, but this must be a judicial, and not an arbitrary discretion, and it is frequent in our Books for the Court to take notice of miscarriages of juries, and to grant new trials upon them, and it is for the people's benefit that it should be so for a jury may sometimes by indirect deal be moved to side with one party, and not to be indifferent betwixt them, but it cannot be so intended of the Court; wherefore let there be a new trial the next Term, and the Defendant shall pay full Costs, and judgement to be upon this Verdict to stand for security to pay what shall be recovered upon the next verdict. Granted. The Protector and Buckner. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. BUckner was indicted upon the Statute of 1. jac. Special verdict upon an endictment upon the Statute of 1 Jac. against stabbing. made against Stabbing at the justice. Hall in the Old bailie for killing of Horwood, and upon the evidence given for the Protector, the jury found a special verdict, which was to this effect, viz. that Horwood and another man with him came into the lodging of Buckner being. Drury-lane, and when they were come into the lodging, that other man took down a sword in the Scabbard which hung there, and stood at the Door of the Chamber with this Sword undrawn in his hand, and kept the Door to keep Buckner from going out till they might bring a Bailif to arrest Buckner for a debt which he owed Horwood, whereupon upon some discourse between Buckner and Horwood, Buckner takes a Dagger out of his pocket, and stabs Horwood and kills him, and whether this was within the Statute of Stabbing was doubted by the jury. Upon which Buckner was committed to Newgate, and after the Body and the Cause was removed into this Court by a Habeas Corpus and a Certiorari, and argued divers times at the Bar and at last on the Bench; and first Arthur Harris of Lincoln's Inn opened the Record, and only put the question, and then on the behalf of the Prisoner it was moved, that he might have a Copy of the Record, and Council assigned him such as he desired, which the Court granted, than it was prayed he might be bailed, but that the Court would not grant, but turned him over to the marshal, and gave day for the Protectors council to be heard; At which day Twisden for the Protector made this question, whether Buckner was to have his Clergy in this case, or were debarred by the Statute or not, and he said, this question should not have been made by the jury as they have done upon the special Verdict, but the Court ought to have made it, for the jury are only to proceed upon matter of fact, and not upon matter in Law, and he argued, that he ought not to have his Clergy, for the Statute of 1 jac. doth not create the offence, but leaves it to the Common law, and only takes away the Clergy from the party that commits it, and to prove this, 1. It is not within the words of the Statute, and 2ly, it is not within the meaning of the Statute, neither in its preamble, nor in the body, or in the provis● thereof, for Buckner was not first struck, nor had he a weapon drawn against him, although he was kept a prisoner in his Chamber, which was not a considerable but a slight provocation of him to move him to so fowl a fact. And within the body of the Act, there are no Acts expressed, but having a weapon drawn against him, or being first struck, and this enumeration of the Acts excludes all other, as it is in the Statute of Fines, and in the Statute which takes away Clergy. Also the reason of Law requires to allow the Clergy to one that is first stricken: but here is no such reason, and the party might have had his remedy against Horwood for coming into his Chamber and imprisoning of him by an Action of Trespass; And the having a weapon drawn was a reason for the other to defend himself. Finch Henage for the Prisoner argued, that the Prisoner was only guilty of felony at the Common-law and is not within the Statute by which his Clergy should be taken away. For first the Statute is to be liberally interpreted, Interpretation. because it is made in restraint of the Common-law, and it was made only to prevent feuds betwixt the English and the Scotish. Nation, which were then apt to break forth, and the quarrel here was not a drunken and sudden quarrel, but acted upon deliberation, and here is an Assault so great used against the prisoner, that it amounts to a striking of him, 43 E. 3. f. 41. 42 E. 3. f. 7. and the imprisonment of him is more than an assault, and here is found a forcible entry into his Chamber, and the sending for a Bailif, and the standing at his Chamber door with a sword in the party's hand, though not drawn, which is as much in effect as if it had been drawn, and 23 Car. the Clergy was allowed to two persons that aided and assisted a third person in stabbing of a fourth man, Intendment. and that because the Clergy shall not be taken away by intendments. Glyn chief justice. The Statute hath not been so favourably construed as hath been argued, for here is no stroke, nor weapon drawn for his present defence, as the Statute intends; and stabbing with a Tobacco pipe, and with a Hal●●● hath been adjudged to be stabbing within the Statute, and the Statute doth not say being first assaulted, as this case is, but first stricken, and I conceive not that there are any words in the Statute that will keep you out of it. Day was given over to the next Term. At which day the special verdict was again repeated by Sergeant Maynard, and by him it was argued for the prisoner, that he was not within the Statute of 1 jac. of stabbing, because first here was an unlawful imprisoning of Buckner in his own Chamber, and this could not be without an assault, next this Statute is not to be literally interpreted, for if there be Acts of terror used against on●, although a weapon be not drawn, yet he is not within the Statute although he kill another, for the taking up of a Candlestick to strike another hath been adjudged a weapon drawn, and he cited Patye and Horwoods' case, and all the persons that came into his Chamber were Trespassors, and one of them taking the sword in his hand how could it be known what mischief might have been done with it, Cooks case 14 Caroli, One may do a lawful act by unlawful means, and although Buckner did ill yet is he not within the Statute. Arthur Harris on the other side argued that the act was stabbing within the Statute, and ousted the prisoner of his Clergy, and that he is within the meaning and words of the Statute. The Statute intended to prevent the kill of men suddenly, which is the worst of all other killing, for it is as it were to destroy not only the body, but even to kill body and soul also, and therefore though the Statute be penal, yet it is not to be favourably interpreted, it being made for the peace and quiet of the Nation. The kill is the matter aimed at in the Statute, and it matters not whether the party be killed with a Fancheon or a Pistol, as Williams case was, that killed another by throwing a Tailor's Goose at him, and he is not within the saving of the Statute though he was assaulted, and the other stood with the sword in the scabbard in his hand, 36, 37 Eliz. Hanger and Molins' case in the Exchequer Chamber, The words of the Statute are, not being first struck, but an assault is not a striking, and so he is out of the Letter of the Statute, and here was no weapon drawn, for the sword was in the scabbard, which is no more than a staff in a man's hand, Stat. 5 E. 6. C. 4. and it is like to a Pistol uncockt, and if the sword had been drawn it would not have altered the case, because it was not in Horwoods' hand, who was slain, but in another's, and you cannot extend the Statute further. Glyn chief justice, Will you have it argued any more? Finch, No. Glyn chief justice, I have considered of the Verdict, and consulted with the Statute, and advised with all the judges, and they are of mine opinion. This is a good Law, and to be interpreted strictly, yet I hold the prisoner is not within it; for the scope of the Statute appears by the preamble, the body, and saving of it, which do all confirm my opinion: My first reason is, because I find that the intent of the Statute is against sudden kill, but here was nor a sudden kill, and the Statute takes not away the Clergy from all manner of Manslaughter, and here was a Trespass and an imprisnoment acted against the prisoner before he killed Horwood, and so the act was not suddenly done. 2ly. The body of the act seems to mean, that there ought to be malice in the case, and it doth not intent we should stick to the very words of it; and here the party slain might have forséen the danger, and defended himself. 3ly The proviso excepts divers particulars out of the Law, and the word killing is only in the proviso, so that there is provision made how the Statute shall be interpreted, viz. That it must be sudden kill, which is not so here, for there so provocations, and time intervenient betwixt them and the stabbing, and the Verdict finds no praeconceived malice, and the Statute extends to no other killing by the proviso. And if one be assaulted by Thiefs which have no sword drawn, and the party assaulted stabs one of the Thiefs, he is not within the intent of the Statute, although he be within the words of it, or if one be assaulted in his house, and the Assaultor hath no weapon drawn, and one of the Assaultors be shot, yet the party assaulted is not within the Statute, 15 Car. in Davy and Williams case it was adjudged by all the judges that he that killed another by throwing a Hammer at him was not within the Statute, because there was a preceding provocation of him. And i● two assault a third person, and one of them strike the third person, and the third person kills the other that did not strike him, I do not conceive he is within the Statute, for it is the assault of both, and shall also be adjudged the striking of both. Ask Justice held he was within the Statute, because it was not unlawful to come to arrest him, and here was no weapon drawn, and so it was adjourned to another day. At which day Buckner was again brought to the Bar, Ask Justice reputes the special verdict, & made the question whether this fact of Buckner be within the Statute of 1 jac. enacted against stabbing, and he argued that it was, and that Buckner could not have his Clergy, because the Statute shall be taken beneficially for the Commonwealth, and not for the prisoner, who is a particular person, and the intent of the Statute is to take away the Clergy for some felony; Neither by the common Law, nor by the Law of God is there Clergy given for killing a man, and it was the Popish power that introduced the Clergy to be given for Manslaughter, and also for murder, in diminution of the Common Law, and of regal power, yea, and of the Law of God also, and if a woman kill one she shall not have her Clergy, but be hanged, which shows that by the Common Law the Clergy was not given for Manslaughter. And by the Law of God I find no difference between Murder and Manslaughter, for it makes no difference between hot blood and cold blood, as we do now distinguish; and every word in the Statute me thinks doth take away the Clergy by way of argument, even from the title of the Act to the very end of it, and here is a great sin to be punished, and great inconveniences would follow to admit of the Clergy in such cases as this is, and here was a sudden kill as the act expresseth, for it was done with a dagger which was not seen, but suddenly drawn out of a pocket, and no weapon was drawn against him, for the provocations alleged, they cannot amount to the drawing of a weapon, or such a provocation as the Statute intends, for all the acts done by Horwood amounted but to a Trespass, and cannot be such a provocation as should cause Buckner to fear his death, for no violence was used to his person by striking, or drawing of a weapon, or other ways, and the sending for Bailiffs to arrest him cannot be such a provocation as the Statute intends, which is to put the party in fear of his life, and the party knew that Horwood came with an intent only to arrest him, and not to kill him, nor did the party slain do any thing against Buckner to provoke him; and there is by presumption of Law a prepensed malice in Buckner to kill Horwood, which is seen by his sudden manner of stabbing him, and Davye and Williams case urged on the other side is not like to this case. I grant if one kill a Thief suddenly it is not within the Statute, for such kill was never intended to be prevented by it. The worst words one man can give another are not a sufficient provocation within the Statute, for speaking of words doth much differ from drawing of a weapon: Nor is this a killing se defendendo, or by misfortune, but a kill at the Common Law, and so the Clergy is taken away by the Statute, and those of Sergeants Inn in Fleetstreet, amongst whom are Barkly and Foster, and Roll, who have been judges, are of my opinion. Glyn chief justice held it not within the Statute, he argued long much to the effect as formerly, but having taken cold I could not distinctly hear him, Adjourned. This Case was again argued Trin. 1656. to inform justice Warburton who was called to that Bench, after the former arguments and opinion of the Court delivered much to the same manner as formerly, By Finch for the prisoner, and Baldwin for the Protector, and thereupon my Lord chief justice Glyn, and justice Warburton were of opinion against justice A●k, and so judgement was given for the prisoner, that the stabbing was not within the Statute, but was only felony at the Common Law, and the prisoner was admitted to his Clergy, and burnt in the hand accordingly. Williamson and Coleman. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. Upon evidence given in an Action of Trespass between Williamson and Coleman at the Bar, Iustification in Trespass. It was said by Glyn chief Justice, that if one make a ditch, or raise up a bank to hinder my way to my Common, I may justify the throwing of it down, and the filling of it up. Mich. 1655. BY Glyn chief justice, Damages in Dower. If a Feme bring a writ of dower, and recover, and the Defendant die, the feme shall have her damages against the Terr-Tenants, Mich. 1655. A Writ of Error quod coram vobis residet is when a writ of Error is brought to reverse a judgement given in the Common pleas, Error quod coram vobis residet, what it is. or other Court where the Record was formerly removed into the Court of the Upper Bench, and by reason of the death of the party, or for some other cause rests undetermined, by reason of the abatement of the former writ of Error. Le pool and Tryan: Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. Wild moved for a prohibition to the Court of Admiralty to stay a trial there in a Trover and Conversion, For a prohibition to the admiralty. in which they proceed upon a pretence that the goods in question were taken upon the High Sea, and that by the late Act they have exclusive power in all such cases, which is not so, Glyn chief Justice, It was resolved in Cremers and Cokelyes' case & so adjudged, that they have no such power, Therefore take a prohibition, nisi, etc. Morden and Hart. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. MOrden brought an Action of debt upon an Obligation to stand to an Award against Hart. Upon nil debet pleaded, Arrest of judgement in debt upon an Obligation to stand to an Award. and a verdict for the plaintiff, it was moved in Arrest of judgement, and the exception taken was, that the Award was made but of one part, and so not binding to all the parties submitting. The case was this, One Stephens and Body on one part, also Hart on the other part submitted to stand to the Award. The Arbitrators awarded that Body should pay a certain sum of money unto Hart in satisfaction for the differences betwixt Body and Stephens on the one part, and Hart on the other part, which was objected could not be good, for the money paid by one could not be in satisfaction for another, and so the Award is not made to conclude all the parties submitting, for Stephens was not concerned in it, and the Award is with an Ita quod, which ought to be a general Award, and include all parties, and therefore if it be void in part it is void in all. But Green on the other side answered, though the Award should be naught in part, yet it may be good as to Body that paid the money, and the moneys ought to be received as they are paid, and that is for Body and Stephens, and may be well in satisfaction for both of them. It was also urged by Howell on the same side, that it appears that Body and Stephens are partners, and this will make an end of the matter, for then the money paid by one of them may satisfy for the other. Award in part. Glyn chief justice, Here is a good Award between two of the parties that submitted, but there appears nothing to be awarded as to Stephens, the third party, for it doth not appear that he can take any benefit by the Award of the money to be paid by Body, or that it can be any satisfaction for him, but only for Body. judgement for the Defendant. judgement for the Defendant, nisi. etc. Busfield and Norden. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. A Writ of Error was brought by Busfield against Nordon to reverse a judgement given in the Court Military of Rippon in an action upon an indebitatus assumpsit for wares sold, Error to reverse a judgement upon an indebitatus assumpsit by the Bail. wherein there being a judgement given against the principal, a scire facias issued out against the Ball, and a judgement was thereupon and against him, the bail thereupon brings a writ of Error to reverse both these judgements, and assigns for Error, that there was no issue joined in the first judgement, and that being erroneous, Bail cannot reverse the principal judgement. The writ abaed. and being the ground upon which the scire facias did issue forth, whereupon the second judgement was given, the second judgement cannot be good. Glyn chief justice, But the principal judgement ought to be reversed by the principal, and not by the bail, and therefore the writ of Error is not well brought by the bail, therefore let it abate. Vidian and Fletcher. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. Upon view of an Infant brought into Court of to be inspected, Scire facias for an Infant to reverse a fine lev●ed outing Coverture. who had during coverture joined with her husband in levying a fine of her lands she was by the Court adjudged within age, whereupon a scire facias issued out to the Terr-tenants who came in and pleaded that she was of full age at the time of the fine levied, upon which plea issue was joined, and a trial was had at the Assizes, and a Verdict for the plaintiff, who now came in Court and prayed for judgement upon the Verdict. Glyn chief justice; The Court is to judge of the Infancy, jury not to try Infancy. and not the jury, and therefore you have not proceeded duly, but the proceed do no hurt, for we judge she was within age, Fine reversed. Therefore let the fine be reversed, nisi, etc. Nota. and the hundred of Crondon. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. AN Action of Trespass upon the case was brought against the Hundred of Crondon in Hampshire upon the Stat. of Winchester, Arrest of Judgement in an Action upon the Statute of Huc and C●yes. Case. Statute. by one that was rob within the hundred, & upon the trial a verdict passed for the plaintiff, It was moved on the behalf of the Hundred in Arrest of judgement, 1. That the Plaintif had mistaken his Action, for whereas he hath brought a general Action of Trespass upon the case, he ought to have brought an Action upon the Statute. 2ly. He declares that he took his Oath before I. S. a justice of Peace in the County, Whereas it should be for the County. 3ly. He hath not expressed that he took his Oath before a justice assigned to keep the Peace. 4ly. There is no issue joined. 5ly. He saith that he took his Oath 20 days. but doth not say next before, as the Statute directs. Windham on the other side answered to the first Exception, that it is usual of latter times to declare in an Action upon the Case generally. To the second he said it is no exception, for a justice of Peace is not an Officer aff●red to a place. Sergeant Twisden, But it doth not appear that you took your Oath 20 days before your Original sued out. Glyn chief justice, That appears well enough upon the Record. Variation. But the writ here is in an Action upon the case generally, & yet he declares in an Action upon the case upon the Statute, which is not all one, and so the Declaration varies from the writ, for an Action upon the Case upon the Statute is an extraordinary Action upon the case, Recital judgement. but I believe it is well enough, notwithstanding, it being after a Verdict, and not being a material variance, but a bare recital, Therefore let the Plantif take his judgement. Conye and Laws. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. Hill. 1655. rot. 251. Laws brought an Action upon the case against Conye upon an indebitatus assumpsit upon an account, Error to reverse a judgement in an Action upon a promise the Defendant pleaded non assumpsit, and upon issue joined, a special verdict was found for the plaintiff, and a judgement given for him, upon the special verdict the case appeared to be this, the plaintiff Laws married a Feme unto whom moneys were owing dum sola fuit, and the Baron, and the Debtor come to an account for the money, the Debtor being found in arrere promiseth the Baron to pay him the money due upon the account at a certain day, & for not performing this promise the Plaintif brought his Action. Upon the writ of error brought it was urged, that the Plaintif did not show how the moneys became due to the wife, and that the account did not alter the Case, and Hernden and Palmers case, Hob. 88 was cited to be like this case, and Done and Thorns case, 24. Car. in this Court was also cited, and 20 H. 6. f. 20. b. Wild on the other side said, that the Declaration is true, and the verdict contradicts it not, for by the marriage the debt is due to the Husband, and therefore he ought to bring the Action, and the case differs from hobart's case. Glyn chief justice, hobart's case is not like this, it is true the account altars not the nature of the Action, but here the verdict finds that there was a special promise made to pay the moneys to the Husband, Special promise. and there may be an actual promise in an insimul computaverunt, although the law doth create a promise where a special promise is not showed, and here is a distinct day for payment of the money alleged, and the consideration is good, Consideration Release. for it is a debt due to the Husband, and he may release it, and the doubt made by the jury is, whether the Action be well brought by the Husband alone or not. At another day Green urged, that here doth not appear a consideration for the special promise, Promise in law. and then it can be taken but for a promise in Law, and upon such a promise the Action cannot lie, for the debt is due to the wife notwithstanding the marriage, Wild answered, the account is good to the Baron to ground the promise upon, and he cited Partridges Case, and the promise here to pay the money at a day is a special promise and not created by the Law, and this makes the consideration good, and the Declaration is true, for it is the Husband's debt, and the verdict confirm it, and if the wife die the administration belongs to the Husband, which proves it is his debt, and the writ of error is not good, and so the Record is not removed, the writ of error is directed to the Mayor and Sheriffs of Lincoln, and the Court is said to be held before the Sheriffs only. Glyn chief justice, Debt changed. The nature of the debt is not changed by the account, no more than the accounting with an Executor, but a special promise may alter the debt: Here is a promise made to the Husband, and he hath brought the Action as if the Defendant were indebted to him, yet he is not indebted to him generally, but sub modo, viz. jure uxoris. There is another point in the Case, I conceive here is cause of Action, but whether it be applicable to make it a special debt is the question. Writ of Error quashed. But the writ of error is naught, therefore let it be quashed. Arnold and Floyd. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. ARnold a Brewer brought an Action of Debt upon a Bond to perform Articles against Floyd his Clark. Arrest of judgement in debt upon an Obligation to perform articles. The effect of one of the Articles was, that the Defendant should deliver weekly such Ale and Beer as should be delivered unto him to such Customers as he had in his charge, & to receive the moneys of such Customers as were due for the same, and the excise, and should account every Saturday wéekly unto the Plaintif for such moneys as he should receive for the same, for breach of Covenant the plaintiff assigns that the Defendant did not account with him for such moneys as he had received upon Saturday the 26th. of july 1654. and for this he brings his Action. Upon issue joined, and a verdict found for the plaintiff, it was moved in arrest of judgement, that the breach was uncertainly alleged, because the Plaintif doth not show, that the Defendant had any Customers in his charge, or who they were, or that he had delivered Ale or Beer to them, or received any money of them. Glyn chief justice, The charge is too generally set forth, Incertain charges. for you ought to have showed what moneys he hath received, and that it was of those Customers in his charge, for the Plaintiff may have several Clarks, and some Customers may be in the charge of one Clark, and some in the charge of an other, judgement Nil capiat per billam. so that the charge is not certain. Therefore let Nil capiat per billam be entered for the Defendant. Toft and Day. Mich. 1655. Upper Bench. AN Action of Debt was brought in the Common-pleas, Error to reverse a judgement In an action upon the Case for making a false return of a Writ. and a judgement given for the plaintiff, who thereupon takes out execution, viz. a Fieri facias, and delivers it to the Sheriffs of Norwitch, who executed it by levying the debt upon the goods and chattels of the Defendant, after which the Sheriffs were discharged their Office, and new Sheriffs elected in their places. Whereupon the old Sheriffs redelivered to the party the deeds taken in execution, by virtue of the Fieri facias, and endorsed nulla bona upon the writ of Fieri facias, and delivered it so endorsed unto the new Sheriffs, and for making of this return an Action upon the Case was brought in the Common-pleas against the two old Sheriffs, and a judgement obtained against them; whereupon a writ of error was here brought to reverse this judgement, and these exceptions were taken, 1. That the Plaintif in his Declaration in his Action upon the Case doth not say, that the old Sheriffs did return nulla bona, return. but only that they did endorse nulla bona upon the writ, which is not a return, and so the Action cannot lie for a false return. 2ly. He says that the old Sheriffs delivered the writ thus endorsed to the new, but doth not say that they did deliver it to be returned, viz. by Indenture, Indenture. as the use is. 3ly. It doth not appear whether there were any return of the writ made either by the old Sheriffs or the new. 4ly. The Action is brought in a wrong County, Venue. for it is not brought in the County where the endorsement and delivery over of the writ was. Latch of council on the other side answered, that the Action was brought for delivering the goods back again to the Defendant after they had taken them by virtue of a Fieri facias, and not for the endorsement made upon the writ. The rule was to reverse the judgement, except cause showed to the contrary. At another day the Court was moved to affirm the judgement, and the council on the other side insisted upon the former exceptions to reverse the judgement. Glyn chief justice caused the Record to be read, and upon Oyer thereof said, I conceive it is well, and according to the course in that kind, for the old Sheriffs to make the return, and to deliver the writ over by Indenture to the new Sheriffs, and here is also a verdict in the Case, and a return is not properly a return until it be filled here, yet it is the return of the Sheriff in the County where he is Sheriff. Show cause upon notice why the judgement ought not to be reversed. Antea. Q. Denton. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. AN order of the public Sessions made against one Denton for the keeping of a Bastard child was removed into this Court by a Certiorari, To quash a return of an order of Sessions. and the party also who was committed to Ailsbury gaol for disobeying the order, was brought into Court upon a Habeas Corpus granted unto him, and upon the reading of the return of the Habeas Corpus, this exception was taken to the return, that it appears by the return that the order made for Denton to keep the Bastard-child was made by the justices at the Quarter Sessions, and that for not obeying this order he was committed to the Gaol by two justices at a private Sessions of the peace, whereas the justices of the Quarter Sessions had no authority by the Statute to make such an order, for it ought to have been made by the next two justices of peace to the place where the Bastard was born. And to this Glyn chief justice agreed, but would not release the Prisoner till he was bound over with good bail to the next Quarter Sessions for the County of Buckingham, to appear there and to answer the fact. Att Lee and the Lady Baltinglas. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved on the Defendants behalf, To discharge a feme covert upon common bail. that there was an Action upon the Case brought against Baron and Feme, and the Feme had appeared, but the Baron would not, and that the Plaintiffs Attorney stood to have special bail for her, which she could not procure, and therefore it was prayed, that she might be delivered upon common bail. But Glyn chief justice answered, Denied. if there be cause to have special bail the wife must lie in Prison, until the Husband appear and put in bail for her, for she cannot put in bail for herself being Covert Baron. Elms and Martin. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved, For time to demur to a plea. for the plaintiff that in respect that the Defendant had put in a special plea, and pleaded a very long Award, which made the plea very long, that therefore he might have time granted unto him by the Court to demur to this plea. But Glyn chief justice answered, you need not have time to demur to the Plea, for you may do that presently: Denied. rejoinder. but if you desire time to rejoin in respect of the length of the Bless, you shall have it. Plummer and Sir john Lenthall. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. THe Plaintif showed to the Court by his Council that he had brought an Action of escape against Sir john Lenthall the marshal of the Marshalsea of this Court, To put Sir john Lenthall out of his Office. and had thereupon a judgement and an execution on against him, but that Sir john though as being Marshal he ought as an Officer of this Court daily to attend the Court, did yet nevertheless absent himself, so that the Plaintif could not take him upon the execution, and that if he were present he doubted, whether he might take him, for fear it would be an escape of the Prisoners committed to him, and therefore prayed that Sir John Lenthall might be put out of his place of marshal, that so he might take him in execution. Glyn chief justice, This is very mischievous, Cause. let Sir john show cause Friday next why he should not pay the moneys. Le Gross and Hall. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. IN a writ of Error brought in this Court to reverse a judgement given in an Action of debt The Defendants Council in the writ of Error moved, To reverse a judgement for expedition. that the Court would reverse the judgement because they conceived it was erroneons, for their own expedition, that they might bring a new Action. Glyn chief justice, You have not yet confessed the error upon the Record, neither have you pleaded in nullo est erratum, as you ought to do, Denied for moving o● soon. and therefore you move too soon to have the judgement reversed. Hamond and Thornhill. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. IN the Case of one Hamond and Thornhill in a trespass and ejectment tried at the Bar, Whether Gavelkind-lands held by chivalry he deviseable. upon the evidence given it was affirmed by Sergeant Twisden, that Gavelkind-lands though they be held by Knight-service tenure, might be all devised by Will by the custom of Kent. Q. for other Council doubted of it. Arnold and Floyd. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. THis Case formerly spoken unto, and after a Nil capiat per billam, nisi, etc. ordere● to be entered against the Plaintif was again spoken unto, and the Case put, and the exception formerly taken that the Plaintif had declared of a general receiving of money of such and such Customers, and had not accounted for them, whereas the Articles for breach of which the Action is brought do express that he should account for such moneys as he should receive of the Customers, which were in his charge only. But Green answered, that though it was not so expressed, yet it should be intended that he had not accounted for all such moneys as he had received of the Customers in his charge, and as to another exception which was also formerly taken, viz. that the Plaintif had not showed what moneys he had received, for which the Defendant had not accounted, and so he knew not what answer to give, Green answered, that the Plaintif is not bound to show it precisely, for he cannot tell what the Defendant had received, and what not, but the Defendant doth know it well enough. Glyn chief justice, I doubt of that, for the Plaintif must know that the Defendant hath received some moneys which he hath not accounted for, otherwise there is no cause of Action, and though it be not necessary for you to show all the particular sums the Defendant hath received and not accounted for, yet you must express some sum with which to charge him withal, and therefore as to this exception, I think it material, and the Declaration is too general to charge the Defendant by, for what issue can be joined upon this? for here doth not appear to be any breath of the Articles, but only by implication that he hath received some moneys unaccounted for, and an issue cannot be tried upon a presumption. Issue. Presumption. Green prayed leave to discontinue the Action But Wild on the other side said it ought not to be, because the Action is brought against a Surety only that was bound for the Defendant that he should perform Articles. Glyn chief justice, If he do discontinue the Action, Discontinuance. he hath no further remedy against the Defendant. But show cause why he should not appear upon the Articles, and to pay so much as it shall be found that he is damnified by breach of them, and then he shall discontinue. Devereux and Jackson. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. Hill. 1654. rot. 835. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an Action of Debt, and the exception taken was, Error to reverse a judgement in debt. that the Plaintif had brought his Action for 14 l. and he declares of a Debt due to him for wares sold by him unto the Defendant, which by his own showing come but to twelve pound. Glyn chief justice, I conceive it is not good for the variance, and therefore let the judgement be reversed, Variance. Reversed. nisi, etc. Pooly and Markham. Mich 16●5. Banc. sup. THe Court was moved that the Secondary might return a jury upon Affidavit that the plaintiff in a former trial between the parties had feasted four of the jury, For the Secondary to re●orn a Iury. and had allo feasted some of the jury that are returned upon this trial. Glyn chief justice, Let the Freeholders' book be brought to the Secondary, and let him return a Iury. Granted. The Protector and the Town of Kingston upon Thames. Yates his Case and others. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. YAtes and four or five other persons, Upon the return of a writ of Restitution to Freement places in Kingston upon Thames. Freemen of the Town of Kingston upon Thames, being disfranchised by the Bailiffs, etc. of that Corporation, moved for a writ of restitution to be restored to their freedoms and places in that Town, and had it granted, which writ was accordingly directed to the Bailiffs, etc. of that Corporation, who thereupon do make return of the writ, and therein set forth at large there Charter and privileges of the Town, and the cause of the disfranchisement of Yates and the others, and reasons why they were not to be restored. And by the return the matter of fact for which they were disfranchised appeared to be in substance this, viz. that there was a difference amongst those of the Corporation about making an Attorney of their Court, at a Court held for the Town, that there was like to be a tumult and uproar about this matter; whereupon the Bailiffs that held the Court did adjourn the Court, and commanded all persons there to departed, and then they with the rest that were of their party went away. But the other parties on the contrary side, whereof Yates and the rest that were disfranchised were a part stayed still in the Town-Hall, and said, the Court was not dissolved, and did affirm they were a Court, and did thereupon make divers orders or acts of Court, and caused them to be entered in the Court book where all the orders used to be entered To this return many exceptions were taken, and first by Sergeant Twisden, 1. That here was no sufficient matter of fact returned to be done by Yates and the others, to cause them to be disfranchised. 2ly. That the return did not show, that the Customs of their Corporation did warrant them to disfranchise any for such offences, or did show that any person had at any time been disfranchised for such offences, 3ly. The return mentions that the persons disfranchised had broken their oaths as Freemen of the Town, but doth not set forth this oath at large as it ought to be. 4ly. They do not show in the return that they had any authority to hold that Court which they dissolved, nor before whom it was held. 5ly. It is not showed in the return that Yates and the others were at all convented to answer their offences, and so they are condemned without hearing of them, which is illegal. To these exceptions Green of Council to maintain the return made this answer, for the first he said, there doth appear a sufficient fact to be done by Yates and the rest to cause them to be disfranchised, viz. their tumultuous going into the Court, and staying there after it was dissolved, and making of orders, and entering them into the Book, and cited Sir james Bags case, that this their fact was a corrupting the orders of the Town. For the second the return doth sufficiently express, that by their Customs they may remove persons from their places in the Corporation for such offences, for the return saith, Removable. that persons have been from time to time removable, which is all one as if it had said, they have been removed. 3ly. It is not necessary to set forth the whole oath of a Freeman, and here is as much of the oath mentioned as is needful to show that the oath was broken by them. 4ly. It is showed in the return, that the Court was held according to their Customs, and so it shall be intended to be a good Court, and rightly held, and it needs not to be expressed before whom it was held. 5ly. It is expressed that they were convented, and that they had also notice of the dissolution of the Court. Mr. Attorney General on the same side said, Here is cause to disfranchise the parties; for here appears by their fact to be a setting up of government against government, Opposition of government. and this is corrupting of government, and done by knowing persons that well understand the Custom of the Town, which makes their crimes the greater, and it is better returned, that such persons are removable, than to say they have been removed, and here is more than an opinion of one of the parties against the opinion of the others, for they have reduced their opinion into an Act to disturb the government. Mr. Recorder of London on the same side said, that here is a fact done to eradicate the whole government of the Town, for doing whereof the parties justly deserve to be disfranchised, and their entering of orders into the Register-book is a corrupting of the Customs of the Town, and tends to the subversion of the Corporation, and he cited 28 H. S. Maleverers case in Dyer. Alleyn on the same side, Here is sufficient cause showed in the return to turn the parties out of their offices, unto which they pray to be restored if there should not appear sufficient matter to disfranchise them. Roll who when this case was first moved was chief justice said, here is one Groves that prays to be restored, concerning whom the return shows no cause at all why he was removed, No cause of disfranchisement. but only that he was indicted of Felony, which is not a sufficient cause, for he may be indicted falsely, and it doth not appear that any thing hath been as yet done upon the: Endictment, and yet they allege this for cause why they will not restore him, and if you have no cause to remove him, than he is unjustly removed, and aught to be restored, and this cause you have showed, such as it is, was after that he was removed, and so could be no cause of his removal. But for the rest there is no question but that here is a high contempt, and just cause to disfranchise the parties, for here is more than an opinion, as hath been urged for them, for there is an Act of a high nature tending to evert all government in hindering the proceed of justice, and the profit and welfare of the Town, and a greater offence of this nature cannot be imagined, and therefore for the matter there is cause to disfranchise them. But the question is, whether the return be good, and as to that I conceive it not necessary to set forth the whole Oath, or to aver the swearing of the Attorney. But the return aught to have been, that by their Custom they have used to remove persons for such offences, Have used to remove. and not to say they are removable, and of this I doubt and will advise. At another day Latch of Council for Yates urged that the return was not good, for they have not shown any Act done to remove any person for misdemeanours, according to the custom, as they have alleged it; for the return says only that such parties have been removable, and this is only a possibility of an act, and it appears not how they are removable, Possibility of an Act. either by their Custom, or by their Charter, and consequently here is no ground for their removal returned, Pasch. 33 Eliz. C. B. a potential Custom returned is not good, Potential custom not good. possit & potuislet adjudged not good in Sir William Hattons case, and 21 jac. usus fuit held naught. And as to the Objection that it is not necessary to return their power to remove, because it is a thing incident unto their Corporation, I answer they have returned a power, but have not made it good by the return. Madge Chart. 25. and to the Objection that a return needeth not to be so formal as a pleading, and that therefore if their power do appear upon the whole return it is good enough, I answer, that they have failed in the very matter of their prescription, and not in the form only, and they must certify a good cause of their removal, that the Court may judge of it; and as to that which is objected, that their Charter is a very ancient Charter, and therefore cannot be pleaded, I answer, Charter pleaded and not given in evidence. that they may give it in evidence, and also a Charter made time out of mind may be pleaded as an old deed may, although you cannot plead that it was made time out of mind. Sergeant Twisden on the same side, All customs ought to be alleged in facto, 9 Car. Fletcher and Bagnals case, Licitum fuit for a Londoner to use any trade by the custom of London adjudged to be ill pleaded, and though it may be good in an evidence, yet it is not good in a return. Alleyn on the other side said, that the return is good in the returning of the custom, though it would have been ill in the pleading, Pleading. return. which is stricter than a return need to be, and here is matter enough returned to remove the parties, and the whole customs need not to be returned, and the informality of the return shall not make it ill, for this Court is to judge of the matter of fact returned, and so is Giles Bags and Wagoners case, and they have returned a custom to remove, and by consequence some have been removed, or else the return is false, which is not to be presumed. Windham, Every custom is presumed by the Law to have a lawful beginning, and shall be intended many times to be by ancient Charter, namely, for such things as are not to be claimed without a Charter, but if they may be claimed without a Charter it shall be intended otherwise. Ancient Charter. An ancient Charter doth not lose its force by not being confirmed in Eyre, as Latch hath said, 24 H. 6. and there may be a prescription for things which have never been acted, if it began by Charter, 22 E. 4. f. 9 Green on the same side The very words of the return do enforce that persons have been removed. Glyn chief justice, I have no books delivered me in this case; And this Exception was moved the last Term, and it is very doubtful to me, and my Lord Roll would not deliver his opinion, I could wish the business might be composed for the peace of the Corporation. To say that the lands have been demised and demisable, the words shall be taken distributive. But me seems here is no matter of fact returned for removing of any. At another day the case was spoken to again, and against the return it was excepted as formerly, Prescription in fieri. that the Town had not by the return entitled themselves to any power to remove the parties, for here is a prescription only in fieri and not in facto returned, viz. That such persons have been accustomed to be removable, and it doth not say they have been removed, and these cases, viz, 20 E. 4. and Mich. 7 Car. Flower, case, and Mich. 9 Car. Fletcher and bagshaw's case, and Skipwiths' case, 25 Eliz. C. B. were cited by Wild on Council for Yates. Windham on the other side as formerly distinguished betwixt a pleading, and a return, which needs not be so formal as a pleading, but shall be taken good to a common intent, and said that Wagoners' case, which was as this is, was adjudged to be well upon good advice, and the substance of the prescription is well set forth in the return, and the formality is not to be much stood upon, Substance. or regarded. Alleyn on the same side said, that the rule in Wagoners case comes home to this. Glyn chief justice, There is an Action upon the case brought by Yates for this matter, and if it be found for him we will restore him, be the return as it will. Custom is the main hinge upon which all disfranchisements do move, and if that be not well alleged, it will be hard for the disfranchisement. Try your cause this Term, otherwise we will deliver our opinions upon the return. At another bay the Court was moved for their opinion upon the return, by Yates his Council, whether it was good or not. Whereupon Glyn chief Just. answered, It were good you would agree as the Court hath advised; But since you will not we will give our judgement, for the cause hath depended long. And first I conceive that here is good cause to disfranchise the parties for entering of orders made by a pretended Court, 'Cause of disfranchisement. which in truth was no Court, for their entry of such orders is very prejudicial to the corporation, and is to the ill example of others, to disturb the government. But Custom is the main cause of disfranchising any person, for by the disfranchisement the party loses his freehold, which is no small loss, and therefore not to be put in practice but upon very good warrant; & yet in some cases for the advancement of government one may be put out of his freehold without a legal proceeding against the party, as Sir james Bags case is. But there must be a Custom or a Statute to warrant it. But here appears no such Custom upon the return, for the return is that for such offences the parties have used to be removable and dischargeable, which is merely imaginary, and a thing in fieri, Thing in fieri not in facto. and not in facto, or in usage, and so it is as a dead thing in the womb which never had birth, for you have not showed that it was at any time put in practice, or have made any direct affirmance of the Custom, as all Customs use to be pleaded. All Customs imply two things, Possibility and use. to wit, a thing possible to be done, and that the thing hath sometimes been done, and so are all our plead, and the return ought to have in it certainty enough to inform the Court of the master returned, although it is not required they should be so precise as plead ought to be, Return should be certain. for both the Court and the party must abide by the return, and it is to be acknowledged as true. In Wagoners' case cited, It was touched whether the Custom there was well alleged, and concerning the Customs of London also, which do differ from other customs, they being confirmed by Statute, and there they allege a special act of Common Council by Custom, and a Statute also to enable them to do as they did. I have considered well of the return, and I hold the return to be naught, Ill return. and therefore let him be restored. Ask justice concurred in opinion. The Court was moved to restore the rest, who were 4 in number, because all their cases were alike. Glyn chief justice, Let them be restored also, nisi, etc. Restored. London and Craven. Trin. 1655. rot. 44. LOndon and Craven entered into Articles by Indenture betwixt them, Arrest of Judgement in an Action of Covenant for breach of Articles wherein London did article to pay 110 l. at a certain day to come unto Craven, & Craven did article that upon the receipt of the 110 l. unto him from London, that he would give unto London an acquittance for the 110 l. and would also enter into an Obligation of 400 l. unto London to save him harmless from all claims which should be made unto certain lands in the possession of the said London, in pursuance of these Articles London doth tender the 110 l. unto Craven at the day limited in the Articles, but Craven refuseth to receive the 110 l. of London, and to give him an acquittance, and also to enter into the bond of 400 l. Whereupon London brings an Action of Covenant against Craven for breach of the Articles, and assigns the breach to be, that he did not give him an acquittance for the 110 l. nor enter into the bond of 400 l. according to the Articles, and upon issue joined a verdict was found for the Plaintif. It was moved by the Defendant in Arrest of judgement, That here is no breach of Covenant showed by the Plaintif, for the Declaration is that the Defendant upon the payment of the 110 l. was to give the acquittance, and enter into the bond of 400 l. and here is no payment but only a tender and a refusal of the 110 l. mentioned, and it was in the Defendants election, either to refuse the 110 l. and to give no acquittance, nor enter into the bond of 400 l. or else to receive it, and give the acquittance, and enter into the bond, and so his refusal is no breach of Covenant. On the other side it was urged that it was not in the Defendants Election to receive the 110 l. or to refuse it, but he was bound by the Articles to receive the 110 l. and to give the acquittance, and enter into the bond of 400 l. Glyn chief justice, Here is a Covenant grounded upon Articles indented, and it is the mutual Covenant of both the parties, so that he is bound by the Articles to receive the 110 l. at the day limited, & it is not in his power either to receive it, or to refuse it, as hath been objected, & the Defendant had remedy by the Articles to recover the 110 l. Mutual Covenant. if it had not been paid at the day, and therefore he is bound to receive it, and to give an acquittance for it, and to enter into the bond of 400 l. and we must make a reasonable construction of the words of the parties, But we will advise. At another day the case was again put, and the opinion of the Court desired, And Glyn chief justice thereupon said, here is no breach of Covenant alleged to ground the Action upon, for the Articles express, that upon the receipt of the 110 l. the Defendant would give the acquittance, and enter into bond, and the breach alleged is, that the Plaintif tendered the 110 l. at the day, and the Defendant refused to receive it, and hath not sealed the acquittance, nor given the bond of 400 l. and it may be it was the intent of the parties, that it should be in the election of the Defendant either to receive the 110 l. or not to receive it, and the Plaintif is not prejudiced by the Defendants not receiving of it; for if he should sue for the 110 l. the plaintiff may plead this tender and refusal against him, and that will be judged a payment, and when he sues you for the 110 l. you may sue him for the acquittance and the bond. Ask, I have not a book, but I think the case is as it hath been put, and here is no Covenant that the Defendant should receive the 110 l. at the day, Nil caplat per Billam. Glyn chief justice, Nil capiat per Billam, nisi, etc. Clark and Fitzwilliams. AN Action of Trover and Conversion was brought by Clerk against Fitzwilliams for divers goods and household stuff, and amongst the rest the Plaintif declared of a Trover and Coversion of 6 Tuns. Arrest of judgement in a Trover and Coversion. After a Verdict for the plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of judgement, that the Declaration was uncertain, for it cannot be known what is meant by 6 Tuns, and upon this the judgement was stayed till the Plaintif should move. Whereupon Sergeant Twisden at another day moved for judgement and said the Declaration was good enough, for it is known that the 6 Tuns are Brewer's Vessels, or else they signify nothing, and then no damages are given for them, according to Osborns case, and the case where the Action was pro viginti ulnis instead of ulmis. Windham on the other side said, that a Tun is a measure, and well known so to be, and you ought to show certainly of what you do demand the quantity of six Tuns, and it cannot be said that the six Tuns shall signify nothing, as Sergeant Twisden supposeth, for here the words are substantive, and signify by themselves, and not adjective, and Osborns case cited was adjudged upon another reason; for fulcrum lecti signifies a Bedstead, and the Anglice which was added, viz. Curtains and Valence were a mere addition, and no part of the Declaration, and besides they were in English which ought not to have been. Glyn chief justice, The Court hath delivered their opinion already, That it is incertain what the plaintiff doth mean by the words 6 Tuns, for this case is not like the cases put, where a thing is mentioned, which doth signify nothing, for there damages cannot be given for such a thing, for the word Tun doth signify divers things, but it is incertain what it doth signify here, Nil capiat nisi. and therefore Nil capiat per billam, Ask justice ad idem. Fox and Swann. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. IN a Trial at the Bar in a Trespass and Ejectment betwixt Fox plaintiff and Swann Defendant exception was taken against a witness that was produced to prove the lease of ejectment, Exception against a w●●nesse. because he had the inheritance in the lands let, but it was urged by the Council on the Plaintiffs side, that the Defendant did claim under the same person that the Plaintif did, and thereupon the witness was admitted to be sworn, and in this case it was also said that if Lessée for years do covenant with the Lessor not to assign over his Term without the Lessors consent in writing, A Devise is not an assignment. and do afterwards without such consent devise the Term to J. S. this is not a breach of the Covenant, for a devise is not a lease. It was also said, that if a lease for years be forfeited, and the rent for the land let be afterwards received by the Lessor or by his assent, the lease is made good again by this Act of the Lessor, Lease forfeited revived. and the forfeiture is dispensed withal. Nota. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. Upon Articles exhibited in this Court against one Alwin an Attorney of this Court for false practice and Barratry, Attorney convicted upon Articles, turned over the Bar. and proved against him by divers Affidavits read in Court, judgement was pronounced against him by the Court, that he should be put out of the Roll of the Attorneys, and be fined 50 l. and turned over the Bar, and stand committed. He was turned over the Bar accordingly at the West end of the Bar by the Tipstaffs of the Court. Martin and Miller. Mich. 1655. Banc. sup. THere were two several causes tried betwixt Martin plaintiff, Arrest of Judgement upon an Error of a Clark. and Miller Defendant, and thereupon there were two venires, and two Distringasses taken out, and by the mistake of the Sheriff a wrong Distringas was filled to the Venire, viz. that which should have been filled to the Venire in the first cause, was filled to the Venire in the second cause, and this was moved in Arrest of judgement. Glyn chief justice, This is as if there was not Distringas, and is therefore helped by the Statutes of jeofails, but if it were an erroneous Distringas it could not be helped, and here was a good issue joined, and a good trial of that issue, and it was but the mistake of the Sheriff, and may be amended by taking off the wrong Distringas from the Venire, and fixing the right Distringas in the room of it, No Rule. and therefore this is no cause to arrest judgement. FINIS. An Alphabetical TABLE OF THE SEVERAL HEADS Contained in the following TABLE. A ABatement 1 Abreviation 2 Action 3 Accessary vid. Principal 4 Account 5 Acquittance 6 Addition 7 Adjournment 8 Administration and Administrators 9 Admission 10 Admiralty 11 Affidavit 12 Alien 13 Amendment 14 Amercement 15 Amoveas manum 16 Annuity 17 Appearance 18 Appeal 19 Appendent and Appurtenant 20 Arraignment 21 Arbitrator 22 Arbitrary 23 Arrest 24 Arrest of judgements, vid. judgements 25 Assets 26 Assize 27 Assignment 28 Assumpsit vid. Promise 29 Attachment 30 Attaint 31 Attorney and Attornment 32 Audita querela 33 Auditor vid. Arbitrator 34 Averment 35 Authority 36 Ancient demesne 37 Award or Arbitration 38 B BAnkrupt 1 Baron and Feme 2 Bargain and Sale 3 Bastard 4 Beggar vid. Vagrant 5 Bail 6 Bailif 7 Breach vid. Promise 8 By-law vid. Law. 9 C CApias 1 Case 2 Certificate 3 Certainty and Incertainty 4 Certiorari 5 Cestuy que use 6 Champerty 7 Challenge 8 Chancery 9 Chapel 10 Charges 11 Chattel 12 Clergy 13 Common and Commoner 14 Commissions and Commissioners 15 Commitment vid. Imprisonment 16 Common right vid. right 17 Confession 18 Condition 19 Confession 20 Consent 21 Consideration 22 Conspiracy 23 Construction 24 Contempt 25 Continuance 26 Contract 27 Copyhold and Copyholder 28 Copy 29 Corporation 30 Costs 31 Covenant 32 Courts 33 Custom 34 D DAmages 1 Date vid Time 2 Declaration 3 Decree 4 Deed 5 Delivery vid. Deed 6 Demand 7 Demurrer 8 Denison and Denisation 9 Departure 10 Depopulation 11 Devastavit 12 Devise 13 Debt 14 Descent 15 Discharge 16 Discontinuance 17 Discretion 18 Description 19 Disfranchisement 20 Dispensation 21 Disseisor and Disseisin, 16 Distress 22 Distringas 23 Destruction vid. Extinguishment 24 Donative 25 Dower 26 E Ejection firmae 1 Election 2 Elegit 3 Endictment 4 Engagement 5 Engrossing 6 Enquiry 7 enrolment 8 Equity 9 Error 10 Escape 11 Estople 12 Estreate. 13 Evidence 14 Examination 15 Executor 16 Execution 17 Exposition vid. Interpretation 18 Extent 19 Extinguishment 20 F FEe-simple 1 Felony 2 Feofments 3 Feme vid. Baron and Feme 4 Filing 5 Fine 6 Forseiture 7 Forgery 8 Formedon 9 Fraction vid. Time 10 Franktenement 11 Fraud 12 G Gaol vid. Prison 1 Good behaviour 2 Grant 3 Guardian 4 H HAbeas Corpus 1 Habere sacias possessionem 2 Heir 3 High way vid. way 4 Homage 5 Honour 6 I IEofails 1 Imparlance 2 Implication 3 Imprisonment 4 Impropriation 5 Infant 6 Information 7 Inheritance 8 Injunction 9 Inquisition 10 Intendment 11 Interest 12 Interpretation 13 Issue 14 Issues 15 judgement 16 jurisdiction vid. Courts 17 jury 18 justice of Peace vid. Peace 19 justification 20 K KIng 1 L LAtitat 1 Law 2 Legacy 3 Lease 4 Levari facis● vid. Execution. 5 Licence 6 Livery 7 Limitation 8 Local and Transitory 9 M MAintenance 1 Mandamus 2 Manslaughter 3 Marriage 4 Maxim 5 Melius inquirendum 6 Merger 7 Miscontinuance vid. Process 8 Monstrans de droit 9 Motion 10 Murder 11 N NEgative preignans 1 Ne excat regnum 1 Nomine poenae 2 Non obstante 3 Non suit 4 Notice 5 Nudum pactum 6 Nuisance 7 O OAth vid. Affidavit 1 Obligation vid. Deed 2 Offences 3 Office 4 Order 5 Ordinance of Parliament vid. Parliament 6 Ordinary 7 Original 8 Outlawry 9 Ousting 10 P PAin 1 pain fort et dure or pressing 2 Payment 3 Panel vid. jury 4 Pardon 5 Parish 6 Parliament 7 Paroll 8 Party and Privy 9 Patent and Patentee 10 Pauper 11 Peace 12 Peer and Peerage 13 Peremptory 14 Perjury 15 Perpetuity 16 Place 17 Plaint 18 Plea and Pleading 19 Possession 20 Postea 21 Praecipe 22 Prerogative vid. King 23 Prescription 24 Presentation 25 Presentment 26 Principle and Accessary 27 Prison and Prisoner 28 Privilege 29 Precedendo 30 Procecdings 31 Process 32 Proclamation 33 Proof 34 Prohibition 35 Promise 36 Property 37 Protection 38 Protestation 39 Purchase 40 Q QUashing of Endictments and Orders, etc. vid. Endictments, Orders, etc. 1 Quo Warranto 2 R REcital 1 Recognisance 2 Record 3 Recovery 4 Recusant 4 Reference 5 rejoinder 6 Relation 7 Release 8 Repeal vid. Statute. 9 Repleader 10 Replication 11 Request 12 Rescous 13 Rent 14 Restitution 14 Retainer 15 return 16 Reversal 17 Reviver 18 Revocation 19 Right 20 Robbery 21 Rule 22 S SAle 1 Satisfaction 2 Saving 3 Scandalum Magnatum 4 Scire facias 5 Security 6 Seizure 7 Sequestration 8 Settlement 9 Sewers 10 Statutes 11 Submission 12 Sureties 13 Suggestion 14 Suits 15 Summons 16 Supersedeas 17 Superstition 18 Supply 19 Surmise vid. Suggestion 20 Surplusage 21 Surrender 22 Suspension 23 T TAles 1 vid. fee-tail 2 Tax 3 Tenant and Tenancy 4 Tenement 5 Tender 6 Term 7 Tenure 8 Tithes 9 Title 10 Transferring 11 Transitory vid. Local 12 Traverse 13 Treason 14 Trespass 15 Trover 16 Trial 17 Trust 18 Time 19 V VAgrant or Beggar 1 Value 2 Variance 3 Venire and Venue 4 Verdict 5 Vesting 6 Viccarage 7 Victuals 8 View 9 Void 10 Use 11 Utlawry vid. Outlawry 12 W Wager of Law vid. Law 1 Waiver 2 Warrant 2 Warren 3 Waste 4 Ways 5 Will 6 Witchcraft 7 Witness 8 Words 9 Writ 10 An Advertisement to the Reader in explanation of the method observed in the Table following. BE pleased to take notice the Table following generally refers to the pages in the Book, which you are directed unto by the first figures; and the Letter C set after those figures refers you to the number of the Cases contained in that page, that is to say the first, second, third, etc. Case; but if the Case begin on one side, and go on to another, you are directed to that page and Case where the Case gins, and for your greater ease you may find most of the matters you are to look for expressed in the Margin to that Case, whether you are directed, but if you do not you shall be sure to find it in some part of the Case. A large TABLE OF ALL THE SEVERAL MATTERS Contained in the whole BOOK. Alphabetically digested under proper and particular heads, agreeing to the various matters therein contained. 1A Abatement. Where a writ of Error is abatable; and where not, but may be amended p. 7. C. 2. p. 78 Where one may plead an abatement of the writ, and where not. vid. writ. 2 Abreviation What abreviations are good, and what not 182 C. 2. 227 C. 2. 290 3 Action For what causes an Action upon the case will lie, and for what not, p. 3. vid. Case. Where an Action may be joint, and where there must be several actions, p. 3. 153, 154, 156 C. 1. 157 C. 2. 190 C. 2. 203 C. 1. 297 C. 3. 481 C. 2. Where one may have his election of action, and the reason of it, p. 4. 19 C. 4. p. 31 C. 2. 99, 100 342 C. 1. 347. Where an action of the case lies for words and where not; vid Case Where Baron and Feme are to join in an action, and where not, p. 9 C. 4. p. 52 C. 1. 112, 113. 129 C. 4. 313, 314. Where an action of Trespass lies, and where not, vid. Trespass. Where one is well entitled to an Action and where not, 107, 108, 300, 301, 393 C. 2. 401, 402, 461 C. 3. 472, 473. Where an Action may be discontinued by the Court, where not, 120 C. 2. 134 C. 1. 477. Where one may plead in bar of an Action, and where not, and what, and what not, 428 C. 3. Where election of action lies, and where not, 131 C. 2. 164 C. 3. 287 C. 1. 384, 427 C. 1. Where divers actions may be brought for one thing, and where not, 201, 202, 300 C. 1. 398, 399. Where actions are to be laid, and where not, 460 C. 3. What actions are barred by the Statute of limitations of actions, 21 jac. and what not, 214, 215, 388, 389, 401, 402. Where an action is well commenced, and where not, 215 C. 1. 223 C. 1. 301, 331, 332, etc. 349, 350, 381 C. 2. 383 C. 1. 3●3 C. 1. 424 C. 1. Where an action lies upon a Statute, and where not 318, 319, 424 C. 1. 427 C. 2. 467, 468, etc. By what acts an action may be suspended, and by what not, 384. 4 Accessary, vid. Principal. 5 Account. Where an action of account lies, and where not, 160, 161, 287 C. 1. 353, 354, 355. 407. What plea is good before auditors in an account, and what not, 353, 354, 355, 410 C. 1. 430 C. 1. 6 Acquittance. What acquittance is well given, and what not, 394. 7 Additions. Where an addition is to be given to the party, and where it needs not, p. 26 C. 3. p. 19, 151 C. 2. 394 C. 3. What are additions to be given to the party, and what not, 173. C. 1. Advantage. Where one shall take advantage of a thing and where not, p. 71. 100 C. 2. 129 C. 3. 232 C. 3. 358 C. 1. 403. 8 Adjournment. Where an adjourment is necessary, and where not, 179. 9 Administration and Administrator. What Actions an Administrator may. bring and what not. p. 6 C. 3. 341 C. 2, 384. Where letters of Administration may be repealed, and where not. p. 10. C. 1. 102 C. 1. How letters of Administration ought to be pleaded 54 C. 1. 236 C. 1. 282 C. 1. 463 C. 3 What are good pleas for an Administration, and what not. p. 56, 57 What letters of Administration are good, and what not. p. 74, 75. 102 C. 1. 439, 440. 451 C. 3. 456. What things may be administered, what not. p. 73 C. 2. 10 Admiralty. What proceed in the Admiralty are good, and what not. 170 C. 1. 340 C. 1. 12 Affidavit. What things the Court will grant upon an Affidavit, and what not. 371 C. 1. 387 C. 4. 417 C. 3. What Affidavit is good, and what not. 446. 13 Alien. What things an Alien may have, and what not. p. 20, 21, 40, 41. 14 Amendment. Where amendments may be made in writs, processes, and plead, and where not. p. 7 C. 2. p. 32, 33. p. 35. p. 85. C. 1. p. 96. C. 1. 110. C. 2. 113. C. 2. p. 115. C. 1. 116, 117, 120. C. 1. 167. C. 1. 186. C. 4. 191. C. 2. 207. C. 3. 313. C. 1. 218. 232. C. 1. 321. C. 1. 5. 339. C. 3. 373. 374. C. 1. 386. C. 5. 399. C. 2. 412. C. 3. 413. C. 1. 417. C. 5. 433. C. 2. 451. C. 1. 483. C. 2. 15 Amercement. What is good cause to discharge Amercements, and what not. 14. C. 1. 16. Amoveas manum. Where an Amoveas manum lies, and where not. 84. C. 1. 17 Annuity. Where a writ of Annuity lies, and where not. 162. C. 1. 18 Appearance. Where the Court will compel the party to appear, and where not. 207. C. 2. Where one may appear by an Attorney, and where not. 465. C. 3. What is a good appearance, and what not. 218. C. 2. 241. 318. C. 1. 400. C. 2. 19 Appeal. In what cases an Appeal from one Jurisdiction to another lies, and where not. p. 129. C. 1. 147. C. 1. Where an appeal of Robbery, etc. lies, and where not. 347. 20 Appendent and Appurtenant. What things shall be said Appendent, and what not. 279. 21 Arraignment. Where an arraignment may be, and where not. p. 7. C. 2. 22 Arbitrators. The power of an Arbitrator. p. 105. C. 2. What Arbitrators may do, and what not. 217, 218. 23 Arbitrary. What things are arbitrary, and what not. 78. C. 2. 24 Arrest. Where one may be arrested, and where not. 166. 222, 223, 405. C. 4. 25 Arrest of Judgements vid. Judgements. 26 Assets. What shall be Assets in the hands of an Executor or Administrator, and what not. p. 6. C. 2. 384, 407. 27 Assize. For what things an Assize lies, for what not. p. 30. C. 2. p. 77. C. 1. 164. C. 3. 194, 195. C. 1. 238. C. 1. 269. Of what matters Justices of Assize may take notice, and of what not. 430. C. 2. 28 Assignment and Assignee. What shall be a good assignment of a Debt or other thing, and what not. p. 62, 63, 349. Who shall be said an Assignee, and who not. 407. C. 1. 29 Assumpsit vid. Promise. 30 Attachment. Where an attathment lies, and where not. p. 84. C. 1, 2. 211, 212. C. 3. 239. C. 2. 277. C. 1. 318. C. 2. 321. C. 4. 243. C. 1. 359, 360, 395. C. 1. 422. C. 3. 439, 440, 445. C. 2. 4. 31 Attaint. Where and for what causes an attaint lies, and where and what not. 138. C. 2. 32 Attorney and Attornment. What is a good attornment, and what not. p. 74 C. 1. 284, 285. What letter or warrant of Attorney is good, and what not. 284, 285, 291, 292, 348 C. 2. 423, 424, 426 C. 1. 441. What pleas an Attorney may plead, and what not 380 C. 2. What things may be done by an Attorney, and what not. 267 C. 1. 367 C. 3. 386. C. 5. 413 C. 4. 426 C. 1. 33 Audita querela. Where an Audita querela lies, and where not. p. 117 C. 2. 149 C. 3. 288 C. 1. 323, 324, 372 C. 2. 387 C. 4. 417 C. 3. 454, 455. 34 Auditor vid. Arbitrator. The power of an Auditor, p. 105 C. 2. 464 C. 3. 35 Averment. What averment is good, and what not. p. 30, 31. p. 39 281 C. 2. 293 C. 1. 297 C. 2. 305, 307, 353 C. 1. 440, 441, etc. Where an averment is necessary, and where not. p. 49 C. 1. 50 C. 1. 53 C. 1. p. 59, 60, 62, 66, 74 C. 2. p. 107 C. 1. 111, 112, 113 C. 2. 147 C. 4. 150 C. 3. 163 C. 1. 206 C. 2. 220 C. 2. 231 C. 1. 270, 274, 320, 371 C. 3. 397 C. 3. 400 C. 1. 405 C. 1. 419 C. 2. 420 C. 1. 427 C. 1. 458. 135 C. 2. 441. 36 Authority. What it a good authority to do a thing, and what not, 291, 292, 311, 312, 336, 337. 37 Ancient demesn. Where ancient demesn may be pleaded and where not. 609 C. 1. vid. plea. 38 Award or Arbitrament. What shall be said a good award, and what not. p. 28 C. 1. p. 44. C. 1. p. 56 C. 1. 97, 98. p. 110 C. 3. 111, 112, 133 C. 1. 152 C. 1. 178 C. 1. 217, 219. 256 C. 1. 306, 307, 334 C. 1. 35 1. C. 1. 365, 366, 382 C. 1. 436 C. 1. 436, etc. 452 C. 1. 459 C. 1. 471 C. 1. What breach of an award is well assigned, and what not. 429 C. 3. 436 C. 1. B 1 Bankrupt. By what acts a man is made a Bankrupt. 213 C. 2. 289. What acts done by one that afterwards becomes bankrupt is good, and what not. 288, 289. 2 Baron and Feme. What things shall bind a Feme Covert, what not. 254 C. 1. 320, 321. Where the Baron and Feme ought to join in an action or doing any other thing, and where not. 297 C. 3. 3 Bargain and Sale. What shall be said a good bargain and sale, and what not. 204, 205, 288, 289. 4 Bastard. Where a Child may be said to be a bastard, and where not. 277 C. 2. 5 Beggar vid. vagrant. 6 Bayl. Where Bail is grantable, and where not. p. 63 C. 1. 116 C. 1. 125 C. 3. 166 C. 1. 324 C. 1. 368 C. 5. 371 C. 2. 372 C. 1. 397 C. 2. 415, 418 C. 5. 418, 419, 450 C. 1. Where Bail is to be given, and where not, and, what bail. 226. C. 1. 261. C. 3. 321. C. 1. 322. C. 1. 452. 1. 464. C. 2. 475. C. 1. 475. C 2. Where the bail may be discharged, and where not, and how. p. 121. C. 1. 134 C. 3. 324, 330, 331, 360. C. 1. 385. C. 5. 425. C. 1. 429. C. 1. What actions do lie for the bail, and what against the bail, and what not. 3●3. 324. How far bail is liable for the principle. 464. C. 1. 7. Bailiff. In what manner a Baylif is to execute processes directed to him. p. 18 C. 1. 405. C. 4. 8 Breach vid. Promise. What breach of covenant or promise is well assigned, and what not. p. 107. C. 1. 393. C. 3. 9 By-Law vid. Law. What By-Law is good, what not, and where it binds, and where not. 226, 362. C. 1. C 1 Capias. Where and by what Courts a Capias may be granted, and where not. p. 1. 186. C. 4. Where a Capias lies, and where not. 222, 223. 2. Case. Where an action upon the Case lies for words, and where not. p. 5. C. 1. p. 6. C. 2. p. 11. C. 2. p. 17. C. 1. p. 22, 23. p. 24, 25, 27. C. 3. p. 46. C. 3. 47. C. 1, 2. 49. C. 2. p. 49, 50. p. 58. C. 2. 59, 60, 63, 64, 65, 66. 66. C. 2. 70. 70. C. 1. 75. C. 2. p. 91. C. 2. 100 Where an action on the Case lies for words, & where not. p. 112, 113, 115. C. 3. 118. C. 1. 127. C. 2. p. 130. C. 1. p. 135. C. 2. 142. C. 1. 150. C. 3. 159. C. 1. 169. 170, 176. 177, 183, 184. 194. C. 2. 199, 200, 206. C. 2. 210. C. 1. 213. C. 1. 217. C. 1. 219 C. 1. 220. C. 1. 211. C. 1. 2. 227. C. 3. 229 C. 1. 231. C. 1. 231. C. 3. 35. C. 1. 245. C. 1, 2. 247. C. 1. 262. C. 2. 273. C. 4. 274. C. 1. 274 C. 12. 283. C. 2. 295. C. 3 298. C. 2. 299. C. 1. 304, 305, 322, 323, 325. C. 1. 326. C. 1. 328. C. 1. 335. C. 2. 338. C. 1. 350, 351, 352. C. 1. 363, 364. 379. C. 1. 387. C. 3. 388, 389, 382. C. 1. 394. C. 1. C 2. 400. C. 4. 414. C. 2. 420. C. 2. 422. C. 1. 424. C. 3. 425. C. 3. 426. C. 2. 429. C. 2. 435. C. 2. 436, 437, 451. C. 1. 455. C. 1. 460. C. 2. Where an action upon the case lies upon a promise and where not. p. 6. C. 1. p. 3. p. 53. C. 2. p. 55, 57 C. 1. p. 62, 63, 131. C. 1. 141 C. 1. 143, 142, 158. C. 1. 162. C. 1. 203. C. 1. 213. C. 1. 243, 248. C. 1. 256, 257. 262. C. 3. 264. C. 2. 273. C. 3. 278. C. 1. 280. C. 2. 295. C. 2 296. C. 1. 297, 298, 303, 304, 305, 395. 396, 400. C. 1. 405. C. 2. 411, 412, 416. C. 2. 419. C. 2. 420. C. 3. 440. C. 2. 463. C. 2. 472, 473. 841. C. 1. Where an action upon the case lies in nature of a conspiracy, & where not. p. 10, 11. 157 c. 2. 372 c. 3. 408. c. 1. 424 c. 2. 432. c. 1. Where an action of Trespass upon the Case lies, and where not. 99, 100, 131, 862. C. 3. 164. C. 3. 169, 170, 182. C. 201 202, 212, 214, 215, 216. C. 1. 227. C. 4. 230. C. 1. 238. C. 1. 244. C. 1. 310. C. 1. 335. C. 1. 342. C. 1. 343. C. 4. 348, 349, 353, 370. C. 3, 4. 371. C. 4. 378. C. 2. 398, 399, 421. C. 1. 426. C. 1. 427. C. 1. 431. C. 2. 451. C. 6. 463. C. 2. 472. C. 2. 474. C. 1. What is a good Plea in bar to an action upon the Case, and what not. 245. C. 2. 247. C. 2. Where an action on the Case lies upon an Indebital as Assumpsit, and where not. 160, 161. 3 Certificate. What is a good Certificate, what not. 130. C. 3. 131. C. 2. 137, 138, 175, 176, 183, 292. C. 2. 368. C. 4. 4. Certainty and Incertainty. 5 Certiorari. In what cases a Certiorari lies, and in what not. p. 9 C. 2. p. 14. C. 3. 125, 126, 127. C. 3. 143. C. 1. 151. C. 2. 210, 211. C. 2. 233. C. 1. 295. C. 1. 300. C. 2. 328. C. 3. 351. C. 2. 352. C. 2. 356. C. 2. 364. C. 1. 371. C. 1. 454. C. 2. What Certiorari is well granted, and what not. 89. C. 1. 176, 371. C. 1. 6 Cestuy que use. 7. Champerty. What shall be Champerty, what not. 93, 94. 8 Challenge. What is good cause of Challenge to a Jury or Juror. 100 C. 2. 129. C. 3. 133. C. 3. How the array is to be challenged, and how not. 233. C. 3. How a challenge to the array is to be tried, and how not. 464. C. 4. 9 Chancery. What things the Chancery may compel to be done, and what not. p. 21. 10 Chapel and Church. Of Churches and Chapels and their several natures, and the reasons thereof. p. 36, 37. p. 51, 52. 81, 82, 83. 212. C. 2. 11 Charges. Where Jurors or other persons, shall have their charges, where not. 138. C. 2. 137. 12 Chattels. What things shall be said to be chattels, and what not. p. 86. C. 1. 13 Clergy. Where the Clergy is to be granted, and where not. p. 86. C. 1. 364. C. 1. 372. C. 1. 467, 468, etc. In what things the Clergy are privileged, in what not. 161, 162, 168, 169. Common and Commoner. Who may claim Common, and who not. 436. C. 1. 14 Commission and Commissioners. Of what things Commissioners of Sewers may take conusance of, and of what not. p. 59 C. 1. vid. Sewers. What things Commissioners of Bankrupt may do, and what not. p. 62, 288, 289. 15 Commitment. What is a good Commitment, and what not. p. 90. C. 3. 434. C. 1. 465 C. 1. vid. Imprisonment. For what offences the Court will commit one, and for what not. 129. C. 2. 374. C. 1. 413. C. 2. 483. C. 1. 16 Common right, see Right. 17 Confession. Where one ought to confess and avoid, or traverse, or where not. 432. C. 4. 18 Condition. What shall be said a Condition, and what not. 294. Where a Condition shall be said to be entire, and where not. 316, 317. Where a Condition is transferrable to another, and where not. 316, 317. 19 Confession. What things one shall be said to have confessed by pleading, and what not. 334, 343. C. 3. 20 Consent. What consent of parties is good to alter things, and what not. 233. C. 3. 277. 386. C. 5. 417. C. 5. ●● Consideration. What shall be a good consideration to ground a promise upon, and what not, vid. Promise. 22 Conspiracy. What shall be said to be a conspiracy, and what not. p. 57 C. 2. 23. Construction. 24 Contempt. What shall be said a contempt of the Court, and what not. p. 89 C. 1. p. 105 C. 1. 159, 160. 241. 25 Continuance vid. Discontinuance. Where Processes shall be said to be well continued, and where not. 111 C. 1. 328, 329. Where continuances are to be pleaded, and where not. 373 C. 2. 401, 402. 26 Contract. 27 Conviction. What shall be said a good conviction, what not. p. 12 C. 1. 28 Copyhold and Copyholder. What shall be a good surrender of a Copyhold, what not. p. 107 C. 1. 145, 146. 256, 257, 273. C. 1. 450 C. 2. By what Acts a Copyhold may be forfeited, by what not. 387 C. 2. What Acts a Copyholder may do, and what not. 380 C. 1. By what Acts a Copyhold-estate may be destroyed. 450 C. 2. Who shall be said a Copyholder, and who not. 145, 146. Of Copyholds entailed. 450 C. 2. 29 Copy. What copy of a Deed, Record, etc. is authentical, and what not. 122. C. 2. Where the Court will grant a copy of Record, etc. where not. 397 C. 2. 418, 419, 444 C. 1. 30 Corporation. Where a Corporation is well created, and where not. 298 C. 1. How to levy money upon a corporation. 367 C. 5. 31 Costs. Where costs are to he paid, and where not. 149 C. 1. 153 C. 1. 366 C. 3. 413 C. 3. 32 Covenant. For what an action of Covenant lies, for what not, and where. p. 67 C. 1. 73, 74. 140 C. 2. 140, 141. 162 C. 2. 186, 187. 265 C. 2. 357 C. 1. 387 C. 5. p. 31 C. 2. 37, 38. 54, 55, 56. 300 C. 1. 406, 407. 407 C. 1. 431 C. 3. 481. What shall be said a breach of Covenant, and what not. 483. What shall be a good plea in bar of an action of Covenant, and what not. p. 67 C. 1. p. 86 C. 2. p. 132 C. 1. 162 C. 2. 187, 357 C. 1. 406, 407, 432 C. 4. What is a good Covenant in fact, and what but a Covenant in law. 406, 407, 431 C. 3. Council. Where the Court will assign Council and where not. 418, 419. 33 Courts. How inferior Courts ought to proceed, and how not. p. 1, 2. 171 C. 1. 191 C. 2. 340 C. 1. 418 C. 1. 439, 440. The cause of Action must lie within the Jurisdictition of the Court where it is tried. p. 2. 213 C. 2. Where one may sue in the Ecclesiastical Court, and where not. p. 10. C. 1. Where the Jurisdiction o● a Court shall be said to be admitted, and where not. p. 45 C. 3. What Acts the Court may do, and what not. 310 C. 1. What Juridiction the Court of the Upper bench hath, and what not 255 C. 1. 381, 382, 457. What authority is good to hold a Court, what not. p. 31 C. 1. 477, 478 etc. What Courts are fixed, and what not. 234 C. 2. Jurisdictions of Courts vid. Pleas. What Court is a Court of Record, and what not. p. 35, 36. Where a Deed or other writing is to be produced in Court, and where not. 459 C. 1. What Jurisdiction the Court of Admiralty hath, and what not. 470 C. 4. 34 Custom. What shall be said a good Custom, and what not. 42, 43 p. 78 C. 1. 84 85, 87. 124, 25▪ 137, 138, 145 C. 2. 179. 229 C. 1. 243. 291, 292. 311, 312. 262 C. 1. 366 C. 1. 409, 410. 421 C. 1. 423, 424, 450 C. 2. Where and how a Custom ought to be set forth. p. 64 C. 2. 421 C. 1. 477, etc. By what Acts a Custom may be extinguished, and by what not. 131 C. 2. 266, 267, 268, 269▪ 270, 271, 272, 273. How a Custom is to be expounded, 145, 146. 409, 410, 476 C. 2. D 1 Damages, Where damages ought to be given severally, and where jointly. pag. 56 C. 3. 135 C. 2. 174 C. 3. 198 C. 2. Where damages shall be said to be well given, and where not. pag. 12 C. 2. p. 23, 24. p. 48. 49. p. 69. p. 78. 92. 111 C. 2. 119, 120. 135 C. 2. 164 C. 2. 198 C. 2. 224 C. 1. 296 C. 2. 341 C. 5. 398, 399. 478 C. 2. How damages shall be found upon a demurrer to an evidence, pag. 22 C. 1. Where damages shall be ●●overed, and against whom. 470 C. 2. Where damages may be released, and where not. 175 C. 1. 299 C. 2. Where particular damages are to be alleged, where not. 273, 274. C. 1. 426 C. 2. Wh●re part of damages given may be relinquished, and judgement given for the rest. 185. Where the court may increase the damages given by the jury, and where not. 210, 2 1. 345, 346. 441. What may be alleged in mitigation of damages, and what not. 427 C. 2. 2 Date vid. Time. 3 Declaration. Where a Declaration ought to be joint, and where it is good against one with a simulcum, etc. p. 15. C. 1. p. 20 C. 1. What Declaration is good, and what not. p. 18 C. 3. p. 19 C. 1, 2, 3. 28 C. 2. p. 37 C. 1. p. 43, 44, 45 C. 1. p. 50, 51. 53 C. 3. p. 70 C. 1. p. 75 C. 1. p. 79, 80. 94 C. 2. p. 101, 102 C. 2. 3, 104 C. 2, 3. p. 106 C. 1. p. 107 C. 1. 109 C. 2. 117 C. 1. 5. 2. 118, 119. 124, 125, 126 C 3. 128 C. 3. 130, 131. 133 C. 1. 2, 3. 134 C. 2. 136 C. 1. 139 C. 2. 146 C. 1. 170, 171, 172 C. 1. 176, 177, 182 C. 3. 186. 117. 193, 194, 194 C. 1. 199 C. 2. 201, 202, 203. 214 C. 1. 223. 223 C. 1. 224, 225, 226 C. 1. 226, 227, 229 C. 3. 232 C. 2. 235 C. 2. 4 236 C. 1. 2. 242 C. 2. 243 C. 2. 247 C. 2. 255 C. 3. 256 C. 3. 257, 258. 260 C. 1. 263 C. 3. 264. C. 2. 274. 282 C. 2. 292, 293. 297 C. 2. 298 C. 2. 300, 301. 303 C. 1. 313 C. 1. 327, 328. 337, 338, 341, 343 C. 4. 348, 349. 350, 352, 353. 356 C. 1. 358 C. 3. 360, 361. 368, 369. 370 C. 3. 4. 372 C. 3. 381 C. 1. 385 C. 2. 386 C. 3. 382 C. 1. 393 C. 2. 397 C. 3. 404 C. 3. 408 C. 2. 411 C. 2. 414. C. 1. 416 C. 1. 420, 421, 422 C. 2. 428 C. 3. 429, 430. 435 C. 2. 458 C. 1. 459. 460, 461 C. 2. 463 C. 1. 466 C. 1. 472 C. 2. 473, 474 474 C. 1. 476 C. 3. 177 C. 2. 481 C. 1 4 Decree. How far a decree in Chancery is to be satisfied, and where not. p. 38. 5 Deed. How a deed must be pleaded, and how given in evidence. p. 34 C. 1. C. 2. What writing shall be said to be a deed and what not. 459. What is a good deed, and what not. p. 97 C. 1. 428 C. 2. 462 C. 3. How deeds shall be said to operate, and how not. 445, 446. Where a deed is to be enroled, and where not. vid. enrolment. What delivery of a deed is good, and what not. 251 C. 2. 6 Delivery vid. Deed. 7 Demand. What is a good demand of a rent, nomine poenae or other thing. p. 4. 26, 67, 68, 69. 77, 78. 86 C. 2. 92. 99, 101 236, 237, 238 C. 3. Where a demand is necessary, and where it is not. p. 131 C. 1. p. 32. 172 C. 1. 220 C. 2. 370 C 3. 8 Demurrer. What is good cause of demurrer to a declaration, plea, etc. what not. p. 61 C. 1. 2. 64 C. 2. 65 C. 2. 67 C. 1. p. 72 C. 1. 188 C. 2. p. 110 C. 3. 113 C. 1. 114, 115, 124 C. 1. 139 C. 2. 3. 140, 141, 142 C. 2. 170 C. 2. 178 C. 1. 2. 187, 188, 195 C. 3. 197 C. 1. 205 C. 2. 209, 210, 212 C. 3. 218 C. 2. 220, 221, 222, 223, 229 C. 3. 230 C. 1. 234 C. 2. 236 C. 1. 2. 239 C. 1. 242 C. 2. 245 C. 2. 248 C. 2. 57, 258 262 C. 1. 287 C. 1. 288 C. 1. 289, 286, 287, 289, 298 C. 1. 300 C. 1. 309 C. 1. 331, etc. 335 C. 1. 343 C. 4. 344 C. 1. 348, 349, 350 C. 1, 355 C. 2. 356 C. 2. 373 C. 2. 379, 380, 382, 383, 385 C. 1. 403, 432 C. 4. What shall be said a good demurrer, and what not. p. 22 C. 1. p. 34 C. 1. p. 41 C. 2. p. 50 C. 1. 118 C. 1. 163 C. 3. 401, 402, 403 C. 1. 407 C. 1. 410 C. 1. 413 C. 4. 452 C. 1. 452 C. 1. 459 C. 1. 9 Denizen Den●sation. What things a denizen may have, and what not. 179 C. 1. 10 Departure. Where shall be said to be a departure. and where not. 260 C. 1. 11 Deputation. Where one may make a deputation, and where not. 154 C. 4. 217, 218, 357 C. 1. 12 Devastavit. What shall be said a devastavit, and what not. p. 54, 55, 56, 286, 287. 13 Devise. Where and what devise is good, and where not. p. 73 C. 2. 148, 149, 240, 261, 262, 274, 275, 278, 279, 281, 282, 292, 293, 294, 311, 312, 409, 410, 476 C. 2. 14 Debt. Where an action of debt lies, and where not, and for whom. p. 6. C. 1. p. 31 C. 2. p. 132 C. 2. p. 53 C. 2. 163 C. 1. 198 C. 1. 199 C. 1. 205 C. 2. 228 C. 1. 234 C. 2. 279, 286, 287, 287 C. 1. 305, 307 C. 2. 407 C. 1. What is a good plea in bar of an action of debt, and what not. p. 47, 48, 56. 57 p. 79 C. 1. 93. 94, 103 C. 1. 124 C. 1. 205, 134 C. 2. 239 C. 1. 263 C. 1. 286, 287, 339, 340, 350 C. 1. 353 C. 1. 356 C. 2. 378 C. 1. Where an Action of debt may be brought in the debet, where in the detinet, and where in the debet and detinet. p. 52 C. 2. p. 61 C. 2. p. 79, 80, 119, 232 C. 3. 288 C. 1. In what order debts ought to be paid. p. 55. p. 61 C. 2, 337, 338. 15 Descent. Where one shall be said to be entitled to lands by descent, and where not. 148, 149. 16 Discharge. Where a prisoner may be discharged and where not. 96, 97, 129 C. 1. 166 C. 2. 183 C. 1. 186 C. 4. 211, 212, 222, 223. 238 C. 5. 369 C. 2. 395 C. 1. 418 C. 4. Where bail may be discharged, and where not. vid. bail. 16 Disseiser and Disseisin. Who may be a disseisor, and who not. 407 C. 17 Discontinuance. Where processes shall be said to be discontinued, and where not. p. 58 C. 2. p. 70, 71, 97 C. 2. 111 C. 1. 122 C. 3. 171 C. 2. 209 C. 1. 209, 210, 339 C. 3. By what acts an estate tail shall be discontinued, by what not. 192, 193, vid. Fee tail. Where an action may be discontinued, where not. p. 120 C. 2. 134 C. 1. 142 C. 2. 306 C. 1. 309 C. 1. 346, 366 C. 3. 382 C. 3. 477. 18 Discretion. 19 Description. When things shall be said to be well described, and when not. p. 25 C. 1. 125 C. 1. 136 C. 1. 194 C. 1. 199 C. 2. 235 C. 2. 313 C. 1. 20. Disfranchisement. For what causes one may disfranchise, and for what not. 151 C. 1. 446, 447, 448, etc. 21 Dispensation. What dispensations are good, and what not. 335, etc. 375, etc. 464. C. 2. 22 Distress. In what cases a distress may be taken, and in what not, pag. 13. 166 C. 428. C. 1. Where a distress may be sold, and where not. p. 13. C. 1. 23 Destringas. In what cases a Distringas lies, and where not. 366 C. 2. 417 C. 4. 24 Destruction vid. Extinguishment. 25 Donative. 26 Dower. How Dower ought to be demanded, and of what. 67, 68, 69. 92, 99, 194. 238 C. 3. 276. C. 1. What assignment of Dower is good, and what not. p. 67, 68, 69. 236, 237. 276, 277. Where there needs no assignment of Dower. 277. E. 1 Ejectione firmae. For what things an Ejectione firmae lies, and for what not. p. 30 C. 1. and in what cases. 160, 161. 194. 215. C. 3. 364 C. 2. 2 Election. Where one may have election of action, vid. Action. 346, 347, 348, 384. Where an election is necessary, and where not. p. 49 C. 1. 338. Where one may have an election, & where not. p. 80. 149. 341 C. 1. 450 C. 2. 451 C. 3. 481 C. 1. 3. Elegit. Where an Elegit lies, and where not, and against whom, and against whom not. 38, 39, 61, 62, 168 169, 262, 455. 4 Endictment. How a bill of Endictment is to be preferred, p. 11. C. 1. p. 46. C. 4. 173 C. 3. 374 C. 〈◊〉. For what things an endictment lies, and for what not. p. 12. C. 1. p. 25 C. 2. p. 33 C. 2. 244 C. 1. 36 C. 3. 145 C. 1. 190 C. 1. 238 C. 5. 25. C. 3. 312 C. 1. 314 C. 1. 326 C. 1. 336, 337, 369 C. 1. 374 C. 2, 3. 394 C. 3. 397 C. 1. 432 C. 1. 433 C. 5. 454 C. 3. For what causes and faults an endictment may be quashed, for what not. p. 24 C. 1, 2. p. 25 C. 2. p. 26. C. 3. p. 29, 30. p. 33 C. 2. p. 46 C. 4. p. 59 C. 2. p. 60 C. 1. p. 76. C. 2. p. 84. C. 1. p. 87 C. 1. 108, 109, 116 C. 1, 2. 123 C. 3, 4. 126 C. 1. 135 C. 1. 136 C. 3. 144 C. 1. 145 C. 1. 147 C. 4. 148 C. 1. 155 C. 3. 157 C. 1. 163. C. 2. 174 C. 2. 186 C. 2, 3. 191 C. 3. 228 C. 2. 230 C. 2. 244 C. 1. 256 C. 2. 265 C. 2. 314 C. 1. 356 C. 3. 367 C. 4. 374. C. 1. 374 C. 2, 3. 394 C. 3. 397. C. 1. 400 C. 3. 432 C. 3. 433 C. 3. 433 C. 5. 445 C. 3. 4. 448 C. 3, 449. C. 1. Where an endictment may be amended, where not. 463. C. 2. In what manner endictments ought to be proceeded in. p. 28 C. 2. 217 C. 2. What endictment is good, and what not. 244 C. 1. 312 C. 1. 372 C. 3. 382 C. 1. The difference between an Endictment and a● Information, 217 C. 2. Where the Court will not quash an erroneous Endictment. 200 C 2, Entry. Where an entry into Lands is lawful, and where not. p. 65 C. 2 246 C. 1. 250, 251. To what intent enttries into land shall opperate, and to what not. 370 C, 2. What things may be entered u●on Record, and what not. 379 C. 1. 403, 404, 451 C. 2 454 C. 2. 457. Of the entry of Process, and where it is necessary, and where not. 100 C. 2. 396, 441, etc. 5 Engagement. Where the plea of the engagement may be discharged, and where not. 368. 6 Engrossing. Enquiry. Where a writ of enquiry lies, and where not. 288, 310 C. 1. 8 enrolment. How an enrolment of a Deed shall be pleaded. p. 34 C. 2. Several enrolments of Deeds, and their operations. 370 C. 1. Where it is necessary to enrol a Deed, and where not. 204. Where a Deed is said to be well enroled, and where not. 462 C. 3. 9 Equity. Where there shall be said to be equity, and where not. 41. Law and equity not to be confounded. p. 41. 10 Error. What may be assigned for error, and what not. p. 60, 61, 69, 381 C. 1. 70, 71. p. 72 C. 2. 86 C. 2. 91, 92, 96 C. 2. 97 C. 1. 113 C. 2. 121, 122 C. 1. 131 C. 2. 145 C. 2. 153, 154, 157 C. 2. 164. C. 2. 164, 165 C. 2. 167 C. 2. 170 C. 1. 174 C. 2. 187 C. 2. p. 16. C. 2. p. 17 C. 1. p. 19 C. 2. p. 40, 59 C. 1. 122 C. 1. 218 C. 2. Where variance betwixt one part of a pleading, and another part of it makes error, where not. p. 5 C. 2. Error caused by giving damages entire where they ought to be several. p. 56 C. 3. Where a writ of error lies, and where not, and for whom, and for whom not. p. 13 C. 1. p. 25 C. 2. p. 28, 29. p. 38, 39, 420 C. 1. p. 50. C. 2. 60. 61. p. 66. C. 2. 67, 68, 69, 86 C. 2. p. 106 C. 1. 109, 110, 115 C. 2. 117 C. 1. 119, 120 C. 1. 120, 121, 122 C. 3. 124, 125, 126 C. 3. 127 C. 1. 128 C. 3. 141, 142, 154. C. 2. 159 C. 2. 170, 171 C. 2. 172 C. 1. 174 C. 1. 182 C. 3. C. 4. 183, 184, 187. C. 1. 190 C. 2. 191 C. 2. 194. C. 1, 2. 195 C. 1. 195 C. 2. 200 C. 2. 201 C. 1. 209 C. 1. 212, C. 2. 216 C. 1. 218 C. 1. 224 C. 1. 225 C. 1 2. 227 C. 3. 228 C. 1. 230 C. 1. 232 C. 1. 238 C. 1. 244 C. 2. 246 C. 1. 247 C. 1. 248 C. 1. 251 C. 1. 254 C. 1. 260 C. 2, 3. 265 C. 1. 180. C. 1. 283 C. 1. 285 C. 1. 286. C. 1. 287 C. 1. 288 C. 1. 290 C. 1. 290 C. 2. 292. C. 1. 313 C. 1. 313 C. 2. 318 C. 1. 327 C. 1. p. 327 C. 1 p. 327, 328, 328, 329. 329, 330. 330 C. 1. 334. 340 C. 1. 346 C. 3. 352 C. 1. 360, 382 C. 4 383 C. 1. 385 C. 3. 386 C. 2. 393 C. 2. 395, 396, 400 C. 2. 406 C. 1. 420 C. 1, 2. 420 C. 3. 422. C. 1. 428 C. 3. 429, 430 C. 2. 431 C. 2. 435 C. 1. 438 C. 1. 440 C. 1. 460 C. 1. 474, 475 477 C. 2. How errors ought to be assigned and prosecuted. 93 C. 1. 100, 159, 160, 208 C. 2. 419 C. 1. Who may bring a writ of error, and who not. 471 C. 2. What writ of error is good, and what not. 153 C. 2. 174 C. 1. 175, 176, 183 C. 2. 190 C. 2. 191 C. 1. 203 C. 2. 216 C. 2. 229 C. 1. 265 C. 1. 344, 345, 407, 471 C. 2. 463. What a writ of error quod coram vobis residet is. 470 C. 3. Who may join in a writ of error, and who not. 406 C. 1. 11 Escape. Where an Action of Escape lies, and where not. 162 C. 3. 330 C. 3 What will make an Escape, and what not. 465 C. 1. 475, 476. 12 Estople. What shall be an estople, and what not. 103 C. 1. 158 C. 3. 187 C. 2. 192 C. 1. 396, 441, 450 C. 2. 13 Estreat. Where a fine may be respited and not estreated, and where not, vid. Fine. 14 Evidence. What things may be given in evidence upon a trial at Law, and what not. p. 10 C. 1. 378 C. 1. 445 C. 5. 450 C. 2. 562 C. 3, 4. 479. What shall be a good evidence to prove the issue, and what not. 335 C. 1. 383 C. 2. In what manner things are to be given in evidence. p. 22 C. 1. p. 34 C. 1. 233. C. 2. 15 Examination. What Examination is good, and what not. 233 C. 2. 16 Executor. Where an Executor shall be charged de bonis propriis, and where not. p. 54, 55, 56. What pleas an Executor may plead, what not. p. 56, 57, 63 C. 2. 337, 338, 243 C. 2. 378 C. 1. 405 C. 1. What Actions an Executor may have, and what not. 140 C. 1. 286, 287, 463 C. 2. What actions may be brought against an Executor, and what not. 158 C. 1. 199 C. 2. 228 C. 1. 290 C. 2. 387 C. 5. 406, 407. 17 Execution. Where an execution may be entire, and where not. p. 18 C. 2. 290 C. 1. Where one may have execution upon a judgement, and where not. 83, 84. 228, 2 9, 238 C. 1. 246, 254, 255, 465 C. 1. Upon what grounds an execution may be stayed, and upon what not. 417, 438 C. 1. What execution is good, and what not. 100 p. 10 5. C. 1. 169, 229 C. 2. 255 C. 2. 290 C. 1. 321 C. 3. 414, 415. What is a good discharge of an execution, and what not. p. 117 C. 2. 18 Exposition vid. Interpretation. 19 Extent. What things are extendible, what not. p. 75, 161, 162, 168, 169. 20 Extinguishment. By what Acts an Estate or other thing may be extinguished, by what not. 249, 250, 251, 266, 267, etc. 389 C. 1. F 1 Fee simple and Fee tail. By what acts a fee tail may be discontinued, by what not. 158, 159, 192, 193. What shall be said an estate in fee simple, and what not, 249, 250, 251, 278 C. 2. 273 C. 1. 281, 282, 434 C. 1. What shall be a fee tall, and what not. 278 C. 2. 325, 326, 450 C. 2. 2 Felony. What things are Felony, and what not. p. 66. and C. 2. p. 75 C. 1. p 91 C. 2. 116 C. 1. 364 C. 1. Where one may be arrested for Felony, where not. 166. 3 Feoffment What is a good feoffment, and what not. 189, 193. 4 Feme vid. Baron and Feme. 5 Filing vid. process What things may be filled, and when, and how. pag. 33, 292, 293, 336, 337, 3. 408 C. 3. 6 Fine. Where the Court may impose a fine, and where not. p. 96 C. 1. 125 C. 2. 228, 239 C. 3. 244 C. 1. 303 C. 2. 321 C. 5. 449 C. 4. 483 C. 1. Where and by whom a fine is well imposed, and where and by whom not. p. 130 C. 3. 359, 360, 366 C. 2. 382 C. 1. Where a fine may be respited, and not estreated, and where not. 135, 136, 366 C. 2. Fine. Whee a fine levied of lands, etc. is good and shall bind, where not. 246 C. 1. 254 C. 1. 472 C. 1. 7 Forfeiture. What shall be a forfeiture of a Copyhold, or other estate. 146, 148, 149, 160, 161, 192, 193, 195, 196, 197, 233 C. 4. 241, 287 C. 2. 446 C. 2. 453. By what acts a forfeiture may be dispensed with. 464 C. 2. 483. 8 Forgery. The form of a judgement given upon a conviction of forgery and perjury. 363. 9 Formedon. For what things a Formedon lies, for what not. p. 30 C. 2. 10 Fraction vid. Time. 11 Franktenement or Freehold. What shall be said a freehold, and what not. 161. 12 Fraud. What conveyance shall be accounted to be fraudulent, and what not. 288, 289, 428 C. 2. 446. G 1 Gaol vid. Prison. 2 Good behaviour. Where one may be bound to the good behaviour, and where not. p. 16 C. 2. 299 C. 3. 3 Grant. What things shall pass by a grant, and what not. p. 68 p. 78. 203. How the words in a grant shall be interpreted. 211 C. 1. What grants are good, and what not. 252, 266, 267, etc. 4 Guardian. Who may be a Guardian to an Infant, and how to be authorised, and who not. 369 C. 4. 456 C. 3. How and where a guardian may be discharged, 456 C. 1. H 1 Habeas corpus. Where a habeas corpus lies, and where not. 128 C. 4. 173. C. 3. 147 C. 3. 182 C. 1. 230 C. 3. 239 C. 2. 261 C. 3. 285, 286, 322 C. 1. 397 C. 1. 397, 398, 418 C. 4. 432 C. 1. 433 C. 4. 2 Habere facias possessionem. What writ of habere facias possessionem is good, and what not. 238 C. 1. Heir. Where a man shall be said to be an heir, and where not. 307, 308, 309. 4 Highway vid. way 5 Homage. 6 Honours. Of the creation of honours and privileges belonging to them. 252, 253, 254, 372 C. 1. 452 C. 1. I 1 Jeofails. What things and faults in pleading are helped by the Statute of Jeofails. p. 70 C. 1. vid. Stat. 151, 206 C. 1. 218 C. 2. 223 C. 1. 2 Imparlance. Where an imparlance may be granted, where not. 367 C. 2. 3 Implication. Where a thing may be supplied by implication, and where not. 53 C. 1. 251 C. 2. 428 C. 1. 4 Imprisonment. For what causes one may be imprisoned, and for what not. p. 16 C. 2. 382 C. 1. Where an action of false imprisonment lies, and where not. 454 C. 3. What shall be said a lawful imprisonment, and what not. p. 90 C. 3. 399 C. 1. 5 Impropriation. 6 Infant. What acts of an infant are good, and what not. 121 C. 2. 208 C. 4. 318 C. 1. 472 C. 1. How an Infant may sue, and be sued, and how not. 369 C. 4. 400 C. 2. What acts shall bind an Infant, and what not. 246 C. 1. Inspection of an Infant. 451 C. 2. 456, 457, 472 C. 1. 7 Information. The difference between an information, and an endictment. 217 C. 2. For what things an information lies, and for what not, and where and where not. 217 C. 2. 245, 246, 417 C. 1. 430 C. 2. In what Courts an information is to be preferred, and in what not. 340 C. 1. 8 Inheritance. Who may inherit lands, and who not. 139 C. 1. 9 Injunction. Where an injunction out of the Chancery is not to be admitted to stay proceed at the common Law. p. 27 C. 1. 10 Inquisition. What shall be a good inquisition, what not. p. 40, 41. p. 75 C. 2. Where an inquisition may be quashed, and where not. 285 C. 2. 11 Intendment Where things shall be supplied by intendment, and where not. p. 30, 31, 43 C. 1. 58 C. 2. p. 59 C. 2. p. 78, 119, 149, 205, 260 C. 2. 292 C. 1. 293, 294, 404 C. 3. 421, 428 C. 3. 466 C. 1. 12 Interest. Where one shall be said to have an interest in a thing, and where not. 348 C. 1. 428 C. 1. 13 Interpretation. How words shall be interpreted, vid. words. How Statutes and Ordinances shall be interpreted, vid. Statutes and Ordinances. 14 Issue. What shall be said a good issue, and what not. p. 70. 113 C. 1. 151, 172 C. 2. 198 C. 2. 210, 211, 239 C. 1. 378 C. 1. How the general issue is to be taken upon the meal act. 378 C. 1. Where one may join issue, and where not. 401, 402, 477. 15 Issues. Where the Court will discharge issues, where not. 157 C. 1. 186 C. 2. 16 judgement. How judgements ought to be entered. p. 1. 2. 208 C. 2. 229 C. 2. 251 C. 2. 283 C. 1. 399 C. 2. 130 C. 2. Difference between a judgement in an action of trespass vi et armis, and a judgement in an action upon the case, and the reason of it. p. 3. Where a judgement may not be affirmed. 451 C. 5. For what causes judgements may be arrested, and for what not. p. 12 C. 2. 19 C. 1. p. 38 C. 2. p. 58 C. 2. p. 64 C. 1. p. 69 C. 1. p. 75 C. 1, 2. p. 80 C. 2. 93, 94, 95 C. 1. 106 C. 2. 108 C. 1. 117, 118, 129, 130, 131, 133 C. 3. 134 C. 2, 4. 136 C. 1. 138 C. 1. 146 C. 1. 150. C. 3. 150, 151, 152, 153, 153 C. 1. 156 C 1. 158 C. 2. 159 C. 1. 162 C. 1. 162 C. 3. 163 C. 1. 169, 170, 172. C. 2. 194, 195, 203 C. 1. 206 C. 2. 208 C. 4. 217 C. 1. 229 C. 3. 137 C. 2. 164 C. 3. 235 C. 1, 2. 261 C. 1. 263 C. 2. 263 C. 3. 264 C. 1, 2. 273 C. 4. 274 C. 1. 277 C. 2. 280 C. 2. 283 C. 2. 295 C. 2. 296 C. 2. 297 C. 1. 297 C. 3. 298 C. 2. 299 C. 1. 300 C. 3. 303 C. 1, 3. 304, 305, 310 C. 1. 338 C. 1. 342 C. 2. 349, 350, 352, 353, 358 C. 3. 360, 361, 362 C. 3. 364 C. 2. 365, 366 C. 1. 368, 369, 370 C. 3. 371 C. 4. 272 C. 3. 374 C. 2. 378, 379, 379 C. 1. 381 C. 2. 387 C. 3. 388, 389, 393 C. 3. 394 C. 2, 3. 397 C. 3. 398, 399, 400 C. 4. 404 C. 3. 405 C. 2. 411 C. 1. 411 C. 2. 416 C. 2. 424 C. 3. 425 C. 3. 426 C. 2. 427 C. 1. 428 C. 1. 429 C. 2. 435 C. 2. 436, 437, 438, 455 C. 1. 458 C. 1. 459, 460, 460 C. 2. 461 C. 2, 3. 463 C. 1, 2. 465 C. 2. 466 C. 1. 471 C. 1. 472 C 2. 473, 474. 474 C. 1. 481 C. 1. 482 C. 1. 483 C. 2. What matters may be moved in arrest of judgement, and what not. p. 58 C. 2. 99, 100, 102 C. 2. 102 C. 2. 109 C. 2. 105 C. 1. 184 C. 1. 185 C. 1. 207 C. 1. 213 C. 1, 2, 3. 215 C. 3. 216 C. 1. 219 C. 3. 220 C. 1, 2. 221 C. 1, 2, 223 C. 1. 231 C. 1. 231 C. 2. 232 C. 3. 245, 246, 255 C. 3. 256 C. 2. 256 C. 3. 260 C. 1. 296 C. 1. 322 C. 4. 323 C. 1. 326 C. 1. 328 C. 1. 230 C. 3. 335 C. 2. 336 C. 1. Where judgement may be given in part only, and where not. p. 22, 23, 175 C. 1. 210 C. 1. 247 C. 2. 341 C. 5. 342 C. 1. Where no judgement can be given. p. 34 C. 1. 75, 76, 90 C. 2. 124 C. 1. 136 C. 2. 227 C. 2. 343 C. 3. What judgement is well given, and what not. p. 29, 30. p. 69. p. 84 C. 1. 84, 85, 88 C. 1. 94, 95, 101, 104 C. 1. 109, 110, 121 C. 2. 122 C. 1. 124, 125 C. 2. 127 C. 1. 148 C. 2. 164 C. 2. 167 C. 2. 194 C. 2. 200 C. 2. 225 C. 1. 225 C. 2. 285, 288 C. 1. 292 C. 1. 316 C. 1. 327 C. 1. 329, 330, 346 C. 3, 385 C. 2. 386 C. 3. 400 C. 2. 406 C. 416 C. 1. 425 C. 2 435 C. 1. Where a Judgement may be reversed in part only, and where not. p. 121 C. 2. Judgement against an Attorney for false practice. 483 C. 1. Where there ought to be a special judgement, and where not. 287, 288, 299 C. 2. Where and for what a judgement may be reversed by a writ of Error, and where not. 217 C. 1. 290 C. 2. 471 C. 2. 476 C. 1. 17 Jurisdiction vid. Courts. What jurisdiction justices of Assize, and Oyer and Terminer have, and what not. 430 C. 2. 18 Iury. Where one may try a cause twice, and where not. p. 34 C. 1. 232 C. 3. 445 C. 1. Where the panel of the jury may be quashed, and where not. 233 C. 3. Of what matters a jury may inquire, and of what not. 472 C. 1. What things the jury may do by leave of the Court. 448 C. 1. Where the Sheriff shall not return the Iury. 477 C. 2. 19 justice of Peace vid. Peace. 20 justification, What shall be said a good justification by way of plea, vid. Plea. What things one may justify the doing of, and of what not. 470 C. 1. K King. Of the duty of a King. 40. Of the King's Prerogative, and what privileges he may have thereby, and what not. p. 40, 41, 266 267, etc. 375 376, 377. What the King may grant, and what not. 252, 266, 267, etc. 375, 376, 377. What grants of the King are good, and what not. 266, 267, etc. What things the King shall be said to be entitled unto, and what not vid. Title. L 1 Latitat. The nature of a Latitat. 156 C. 4. 2 Law. Of what things the Law takes notice of, and of what not. p. 55. The Laws in Ireland the same with the Laws in England. 386 C. 2. What things are recoverable at the Common-law, and what not, vid. Recovery. Where wager of Law lies, and for whom, and where not. 199 C. 1. 322 C. 2. What By-law is good, and who it binds, and who, and what not, vid. By-law. 3 Legacy. Where and in what orders Legacies are to be paid, and where not. p. 37, 38. p. 54, 55, 56. 4 Lease. From what time a Lease for years shall be said to begin. 118, 119, 188, 189, 204, 205. What shall be said a good Lease at will, and what not. 397 C. 3. What shall be said a good Lease, and what not. 188, 189, 204, 205, 315, 316, 357 C. 1. 380 C. 1. 383. By what Acts a Lease at will may be determined or forfeited, and by what not. 363 C. 2. 446 C. 2. 5 Levari facias vid. Execution. Where a Levari facias lies, and of what, and where not. 69. 6 Licence. Where one must show a Licence for doing of a thing, and where it needs not. p. 65 C. 2. 156 C. 2. 166. What shall be said a good Licence, and what not. 156 C. 2. 7 Livery and Seisin. What Livery and Seisin is good, and what not. 119, 284, 285, 363 C. 2. 8 Limitation. What shall be a good limitation of an Estate, and what not. 240, 274 C. 2. 294, 325, 326. 9 Local and Transitory. What Actions and things are local, and what transitory. p. 107 C. 2. M 1 Maintenance. What shall be said Maintenance, and what not. 184. 2 Mandamus. In what cases a writ of Mandamus lies, and in what not. p. 7, 8 C. 3. 299 C. 4. 346 C. 2. 355 C. 1. 451, 452, 453, 457. 458. 3 Manslaughter. What shall be said Manslaughter, and what not. 337. C. 1. 4 Marriage. To whom the Marriage of persons belongs, and to whom not, 227 C. 4. 5 Melius inquirendum. Where a Melius inquirendum lies, and where not. 461 C. 1. 4 Maxim. Maxims of Law are not to be broken. 149. 6 Merger. Where a thing may be said to be merged in another thing. 347, 348. 7 Miscontinuance vid. Process. 8 Monstrance deal faits, etc. Where Deeds, Letters Patents are to be produced in Court, and where not. p. 15 C. 2. 264. C. 1. 9 Motion. What Motions are to be made in Court, and what not. 135 C. 3. 386 C. 5. What things the Court will take notice of upon a Motion, and what not. 177 C. 1. 373 C. 1. 387 C. 4. 464 C. 3. 10 Murder. What shall be said Murder, and what not. 364 C. 1. N 1 Negative pregnans. Where a plea contains a negative pregnans and where not. p. 66 C. 2. 309 C. 1. 1 Ne exeat regnum. Where a Ne exeat regnum lies, and where not. 395, 396, 440, etc. 2 Nomine poenae. The nature of a Nomine poenae, and how it is to be demanded and recovered. p. 4. 3 Non obstante. How Non obstantes shall be taken to inure, and how not. 375, etc. 4 Non-sute. Where the party shall be non-sute, and where not. 238 C. 2. 449 C. 4. 5 Notice. Where notice ought to be given of a thing, and where it needs not, and what is a good notice, and what not. p. 13 C. 1. p. 30, 31. p. 53 C. 1. p. 57 C. 1. p. 61 C. 1. p. 74 C. 2. 100 C. 2. 172 C. 1. 184 C. 1. 187, 263 C. 3. 273 C. 3. 295 C. 2. 303 C. 3. 213, 214, 342 C. 2. 386 C. 3. 458 C. 1. Of what Officers the Court of the Upper Bench will take notice of, and of what not. p. 26 C. 2. p. 54 C. 1. 90 C. 5. p. 98, 456, 457, 458. Of what things the Court will take notice of, and of what not, and how. p. 70, 265 C. 2. 331, 332, 333, 334, 359 C. 1. 368, 369, 378, 379. 6 Nudum pactum. What shall be said to be Nudum pactum, and what not. p. 58 C. 1. 249 C. 2. 330 C. 2. 7 Nuisance. For what an Assize of Nuisance lies, for what not. 195 C. 1. O 1 Oath vid. Affidavit What Oath shall be said perjury, what not, vid. Perjury. 2 Obligation. How a breach of the Condition of an Obligation ought to be assigned, p. 18 C. 1. What is a good Obligation, what not. p. 28 C. 1. p. 97 C. 1. 212 C. 3. 234 C. 2. 241 C. 2. 277, 278, 438 C. 2. 3 Offences. What are offences at the Common law, what not. p. 87 C. 1. 215, 323, 326 C. 1. 4 Office and Officers. What Office shall be well granted, what not. 266, 267, etc. What Offices and Officers the Common-law takes notice of, and what not. 338 C. 1. 394 C. 2. 457, 458. What Offices may be executed by a Deputy, and what not. 357 C. 1. 5 Order. For what causes orders of Sessions, and other orders may be quashed, and for what not. p. 14 C. 2. p. 85. C. 1. 130 C. 3. 154 C. 1, 3, 4. 168 C. 1. 173, 174, 184, 185, 191, 192, 207 C. 1. 283 C. 3. 362 C. 1. 368 C. 3. 386 C. 6. 399 C. 1. 475 C. 1. Where the Court will not quash erroneous orders. 358 C. 2. What Orders the Upper Bench will take notice of, and what not. 363 C. 1. 415, 416, 445 C. 1. 6 Ordinance of Parliament vid. Parliament. 7 Ordinary. What Actions lie against the Ordinary, and in what cases, and where not. 305. What things the Ordinary may do, and what not. 451 C. 3. 456. 8 Original vid. writ. When an original writ aught to be filled. 292, 293. Where one may have a new original writ, and where not. 404 C. 2. 9 Outlawry. What outlawry is good, and what not. p. 93 C. 1. 182 C. 2. 227 C. 1. 297 C. 1. 334 C. 1. 418, 419, 451 C. 4. How an outlawry ought to be reversed. 297 C. 1. 348 C. 1. 10 Owsting. What shall be said an ousting one out of possession, and what not. 277 C. 1. P 1 Pain. Where the Court will enjoin a thing upon a pain, and where not. 368 C. 1. 449 C. 4. 2 pain fort et dure, or pressing. Where pressing is used, and where not. 104 C. 1. 3 Payment. What shall be said a good payment, and what not. 366 C. 1. 393 C. 3. 482. What shall be a good proof of payment of money, and what not. 462 C. 3. 4 Panel vid. Iury. 5 Pardon. How a pardon shall be construed. p. 43 C. 1. 375, 376, 377. How a pardon is to be pleaded, and allowed. 235 C. 3. 337 C. 1. 369 C. 2. 371 C. 3. What things are pardoned by a general pardon, and what not. 147 C. 2. 348 C. 1. What pardon shall be said to be good, and what not. 375, 376, 377. 6 Parish. Of a Parish, and of what it consists, and of its extent. p. 77, 78, 91, 137 C. 1. 7 Parliament. How an ordinance of Parliament is to be interpreted. 160, 161, 195, 196, 197. When orders and ordinances of Parliament shall be said to be in force, and when not. 415, 416. 8 Paroll. What things may be done by Paroll, what not. 343 C. 2. Party and Privy. Where one shall be said to be party or privy, and where not. 39 10 Patent and Patentee. What the Kings Patentee may do by virtue of his Patent, and what not. 246, 247, etc. 11 Pauper. For what causes one suing in forma pauperis shall be dispaupered, and where not. 386 C. 1. 12 Peace. What things justices of peace may do, and what not. 166 C. 1. 244 C. 1. 245, 246, 322 C. 1. 359, 360, 475 C. 1. What things done shall be said a breach of the peace, and what not. 323. Peer and Peerage vid. honour. Where Peerage shall be allowed, and where not. 372 C. 1. 14 Peremptory vid. Plea. What pleas are peremptory, and what not. 388 C. 1. 404 C. 1. 15 Perjury. What oath shall be said to be perjury, and what not. 336, 337, 374 C. 2. The manner of giving judgement upon a conviction for perjury. 362, 363. 16 Perpetuity. What is said a perpetuity, and what not. 278. 17 Place. Where it is necessary to allege a place, and where it is not. p. 26 C. 3. p. 59 C. 1. 142 C. 2. 172 C. 2. 287 C. 1. 342 C. 2. 357, 358. 18 Plaint. What is a good plaint, and what not, and its nature, p. 86 C. 2. 115 C. 1. 19 Plea and Pleading. What plea is good in discharge of a Covenant, and what not. p. 8 C. 2. 163 C. 3. What plea is good to justify a distress taken, and what not. p. 13 C. 1. 178. C. 1. A Plea that is too general is not good. p. 16 C. 3. p. 17 C. 3. 218 C. 2. Where and when one may plead to the jurisdiction, where not. 197 C. 1. 331, etc. What plea and plead are good, and what erroneous. p. 19 C. 2. p. 37 C. 1. p. 56, 57, 64 C. 2. p. 78, 79. p. 90 C. 1. p. 96 C. 2. 104 C. 1. p. 106 C. 1. 114 C. 1. 114, 115, 123 C. 2. 128 C. 1. 159 C. 2. 163 C. 3. 167, 168, 177 C. 2. 178 C. 1, 2. 187, 188, 195 C. 3. 197 C. 1. 205 C. 1. 206 C. 1. 209, 210, 214 C. 2. 218 C. 2. 220, 221, 222, 223, 225 C. 1. 243, 245 C. 2, 252, 253, 254, 257. C. 1. 270, 273 C 2. 281 C. 1. 282 C. 2. 288 C. 1. 289, 295 C. 3. 298 C. 1. 300 C. 1. 309 C. 1. 324, 331, 332, etc. 337, 338, 353 C. 1. 373, 378 C. 1. 379, 380, 382 C. 4. 385 C. 1. 385 C. 4. 401, 402, 403. 405 C. 1. 405 C. 3. 408 C. 2. 410 C. 1. 411 C. 1. 413 C. 4. 430 C. 1. 440, etc. 452 C. 1. What is a good plea in debt, vid. debt. What in Trespass, vid. Trespass. What in covenant. vid. covenant. What in Trespass on the case, vid. case. What in action upon a promise, vid. promise. What in account, vid. account. For what causes one may demur to a plea, and for what not, vid. demurrer. Where one may plead specially, and where not. 412 C. 2. 417 C. 5. Of what things one may take advantage by pleading, and what not. p. 58 C. 2. p. 324. 403, 479. Where one may plead by way of justification, and where not. 470 C. 1. What pleas an Attorney may plead, and what not. 380 C. 2. What pleas are to be allowed, what not. 431 C. 1. Where one may plead his privilege, and where not, and how. 222, 223, 257 C. 1. 295 C. 3. 359 C. 1. vid. privilege. Where a plea is to be sworn, and where not. 225 C. 1. 373 C. 3, 435 C. 3. Where one may vary from his plea, and where not. 341 C. 4. Where one shall not be compelled to plead. 433 C. 1. What is a good plea in bar of the Action, and what in abatement of the writ, and what not. 90 C. 1. 114 C. 1. 123 C. 2. 187, 188, 212 C. 1. 22●, 252, 253, 254, 338, 404 C. 1. 410 C. 1. 414 C. 1. 417 C. 1. 421. What plea is foreign, and what not. 373 C. 3. 435 C. 3. What plea is peremptory, what not. 102, 103, 114 C. 1. 388 C. 1. 404 C. 1. 20 Possession. How a possession ought to be set forth in pleading, p. 48, 49. What shall be said a putting out of possession, and what not. 277 C. 1. Where and who shall be said to be in possession of a thing, and who not. 318, 319, 341 C. 1. 21 Postea. What postea is good, and what erroneous. 120 C. 1. 22 Praecipe. Where and for what a praecipe quod reddat lies, and where and for what not. p. 9 C. 2. p. 30 C. 2. 23 Prerogative vid. King. Where a subject may take advantage of the King's Prerogative, where not. 267, 268, etc. 24 Prescription. What is a good prescription, what not. p. 31 C. 1. 233 C. 4. 289, 300, 301, 446 C. 1. Where a prescription is well alleged, and where not. 477, etc. 25 Presentation. What presentation shall be good, and what not. p. 83, 156 C. 2. 270. 26 Presentment. What presentment is good, and what not. p. 14 C. 1. 124 C. 2. p. 130 C 3. 173 C. 2. 191, 192, 275. 27 Principal and Accessary. Where one shall be said to be principal, and where but accessary. p. 86 C. 1. Prison and Prisoner vid. Bail and discharge. Where a Prisoner may be discharged, and where not. 96, 97, 129 C. 1. 238 C. 5. 369 C. 2. 369 C. 3. 386 C. 4. 395 C. 1. 418 C. 4. 433 C. 1. 454 C. 2, 3. 475 C. 1. 475 C. 2. vid. discharge. Where a Prisoner may be bailed, and where not. 96, 97, 166 C. 1. vid. bail. Where a Prisoner may be removed, and where not. 339, 362 C. 2. 363 C. 1. 397 C. 2. 434 C. 1. 450 C. 1. 29 Privilege. Where a writ of privilege lies, and where not, and for whom, and for whom not. 139 C. 3. 234 C. 1. Where one may claim or plead a privilege, and where not. 167, 168, 214 C. 2. 222, 223, 234 C. 1. 252, 253, 254, 295 C. 3. 373 C. 1. 413 C. 1. 454 C. 1. 460 C. 3. vid Plea. The privilege of the Clergy, vid. Clergy, The privilege of Peers, vid. Honour. 30 Procedendo. Where a procedendo lies, and where not. p. 69, 70. p. 100 C. 1. 127 C. 3. 151 C. 2. 226, 227, 229 C. 1. 245 C. 1. 321 C. 2. 31 Proceed. What proceed of Courts are good, and what not. p. 45 C. 2. p. 91 C. 1. 125 C. 2. Where the Court will stay proceed, and where not. 413 C. 3. How to proceed in an endictment, and how in an information. 217 C. 2. 32 Process vid. Filing. For what things process may issue out of the upper Bench Court, for what not. p. 26 C. 2. What return of process is good, and what not. p. 330 C. 1. Process how to be directed. p. 26 C. 3. Where processes shall be said to be discontinued, and where not. p. 58 C. 2. p. 66 C. 2. p. 70, 71, 97 C. 1. p. 111 C. 1. 122 C. 3. 209 C. 1. 210, 339 C. 3. Where processes shall be said to miscontinue, and where not. 237, 339 C. 3. Where the Court may discontinue processes, where not. 306. Where process may be stayed, and where not. 147 C. 2. 185 C. 2. 33 Proclamation. What proclamarion is good, what not. 91, 92, 237. 34 Proof. What shall be accounted a good proof of of an Act of Parliament or other matter of fact. 155 C. 2. 462 C. 3, 4. 35 Prohibition. Where a Prohibition to the Prerogative Court or other Court may be granted, and where not. p. 10. C. 1. p. 55 56 74, 75. 87 C. 2. 102 C. 1. 147 C. 1. 228 C. 3. 299 C. 1. 346 C. 1. 439 440, 455, 456. Where a Prohibition lies to an interior Court or Jurisdiction, and where not. p. 45 C. 2. 45 C. 3. 89 C. 2. 150 C. 1. 166, 167, 170 C. 1. 172, 173. 183 C. 2. 207 C. 2. 233 C. 1. 285, 286, 418 C. 1. 170 C. 4. 36 Promise. How a breach of promise must be assigned, p. 17 C. 2. p. 107 C. 1. How one must declare in an Action for a breach of promise, where a promise by paroll is reduced into writing. p. 19, 20. What is a good consideration to ground a promise upon, and what not. 57 C. 1. p. 58 C. 1. p. 63 C. 1. 131 C. 1. 248 C. 1. 264 C. 1. 280 C. 2. 295 C. 2. 296 C. 1. 303 C. 3. 304, 305, 330 C. 2. 395, 396, 411 C. 2. 440 C. 1. 459, 460. 472, 473. Where a promise may be said to be discharged, and where not. 303 C. 3. What is a good promise to ground an Action upon the ●afe, and what not. p. 63 C. 1. p. 104. C. 3. 111 C. 2. 152, 153, 1. 5. 7 C. 3. 249 C. 1. 291 C. 2. 303 C. 3. 304, 305, 330 C. 2. 405 C. 2. 416 C. 2. 419 C. 2. 420 C. 1. 440 C. 1. 459, 460, 465 C. 2. 472, 473. Where a promise shall be said to be joint, an● where several. 23 C. 1. What is a good plea in discharge of a promise, and what not. 309 C. 1. 37 Property. Where one shall be said to have a property in a thing, and where not. p. 54 C. 2. 55, 73, 74. Where one may alter the property of a thing, and where. 338. 38 Protection. Of a Protection, and the benefit of it. p. 40. Where and from whom Protection is due, and where not, and to whom, and to who not. 227 C. 4. 39 Protestation. Of the nature of a Protestation, and what is a good Protestation, and what not, and where it lies, and where not. 266, 267, etc. 40 Purchase. Who may be said a Purchaser, and who not. 139 C. 1. 273 C. 1. Who may purchase lands, and who not. 388 C. 3. Who shall be said to be entitled to lands by purchase, and who not. 148, 149. Q 1 Quashing of Endictments, Orders, etc. vid. Endictments, Orders. etc. 2 Quo Warranto. For what a Quo Warranto lies, and for what not. 418 C. 5. R 1 Recital. What Recital shall be good, and what not. p. 107, 108, 185 C. 1. 344, 345, 408 C. 2. 411 C. 1. 421. C. 2. 2 Recognisance. Where a Recognisance may be discharged, and where not. 364 C. 3. 3 Record. How a Record is to be pleaded, and how given in evidence. 22 C. 1. What is matter of Record, what not. 464 C. 4. Where one may have view of a Record, and where not. 444 C. 1. Where a Record may be amended, and where not. vid. Amendment. 4 Recovery. What things are recoverable at the Common-law, and what not. p. 55. Of what things a Recovery lies, and o● what not. 215 C. 3. 450 C. 2. Where a Recovery shall be good, and where not. 246 C. 1. 319, 320, 321. Recusant. How a Recusant ought to conform since Bishops taken away. 26 C. 4. 5 Reference. Where the Court will make a reference, and where not. 110. C. 2. 214 C. 2. 372 C. 2. 6 rejoinder. Upon what a rejoinder ought to be, and upon what not. p. 70 C. 1. Where one may rejoin and where not. 401, etc. 440 C. 1. 7 Relation. How and to what time things shall be said to relate, and to what not. 341 C. 3. 356 C. 2. 381 C. 2. 8 Release. What Release is good and what not. 175 C. 1. 286, 287, 473. 9 Repeal vid. Statute. What things may be repealed, and what not. 228 C. 3. 10 Repleader. Where there ought to be a Repleder, and where not. 210, 211, 412 C. 1. 11 Replication. What Replication is good, and what not. p. 41 C. 2. 110 C. 3. 309 C. 1. 356 C. 2. 373 C. 3. 379, 380, 396, 401, 402, 432 C. 4. 440 C. 1. 12 Request. Where a special Request is necessary, and where it is not. 49 C. 1. p. 54 C. 1. p. 4 C. 2. 107 C. 1. 141 C. 1. 143, 144, 207 C. 4. 458 C. 1. What shall be said a good Request, and what not. 138 C. 1. 13 Rescous. For what causes a writ of Rescous may be quashed, for what not. 155 C. 4. 417 C. 2. 14 Restitution. In what cases a Restitution lies, and in what not. p. 35. p. 41 C. 1. p. 42, 43, 87, 88 p. 89. C. 1. p. 90 C. 136 C. 3. 151 C. ●. 155 C. 1. 186 C. ● 208 C. 3. 347, 408 C. 1. 414, 415, 446 C. ●. 452, 453, 457, 458, 477, 478, etc. 14 Rent. Where a Rent shall be suspended, and where not. C. 2. 15 Retainer. Where a Retainer of Goods doth lie and where not. 338, 384. 16 return vid. Process. What return of Process is good, and what not. p. 32, 33. p. 35, 36. p. 39 40, 42, 43, 67, 68, 69 77, 78, 84, 85. p. 85 C. 1. 89 C. 1. 90 C. 2, 4. 91 C. 1. 96 C. 1. p. 98 C. 1. 120, 121, 143 C. 1. 150 C. 2. 151 C. 1. 154 C. 2. 155 C. 4. 173, 174, 178, 179, 180, 191 C. 1. 203, 304, 236, 237, 255 C. 1. 294 C. 2. 330 C. 1. 343, 415, 416, 431 C. 2. 444 C. 1. 445 C. 3. 446 C. 3. 452, 453, 457, 458, 474 C. 1. 475 C, 1. 477, 478, etc. Where Processes shall be returned in an extraordinary way, and where not. p 46 C. 1. Where a Jury may be returned by the Secondary, and not by the Sheriff, 477 C. 2. 16 Riot. What enquiry and finding of a Riot is good, and what not. 166 C. 1. 17 Reversal. For what faults an Outlawry may be reversed, and for what not. 227 C. 2. 418, 419. Where a Fine levied may be reversed, 472 C. 1. vid. Fine. 18 Reviver. How things may be revived and how not. 418 C. 3. 446 C. 2. 483. 19 Revocation. What is a good Revocation, and what not. 418 C. 3. 424. 20 Right. What things belong to one of Common right, and what not. 303. Where persons are bound to do things of Common right, and where not. 364 C. 4. 374, 375, 418 C. 2. 21 Robbery. What shall be said a Robbery, and what not, and of whom. 156 C. 3. 318, 319. 22 Rule. What Rules the Court will make, and what not. 164 C. 1. 217 C. 2. 228 C. 4. 238 C 2. 3●5 C. 1. 318 C. 2. 322 C. 3. 328 C. 2. 359 C. 2. 36● C. 3. 368 C. 2. 382 C. 1 388 C. 2. 403, 4●4, 412 C. 1, 2. 413 C. 1. 434 C. 1. 451 C. 5. 464 C. 3. How far a rule of Court will bind, and where not. 343 C. 3. S 1 Sale. 2 Satisfaction. What shall be accounted a good Satisfaction to plead in bar of an Action of Trespass, what not. p. 20. C. 1. vid. Trespass. What Debts ought by Law to be first satisfied, vid. Debt. What shall be accounted a good satisfaction of a Debt, etc. 239 C. 3. 3 Saving. To what intent a saving in Statutes, Ordinances of Parliament, etc. shall inure. 160, 161. 4 Scandalum Magnatum, 5 Scire facias. In what place a Sciri facias ought to be brought. p. 9 C. 1. For what Causes a Sciri faa s may be brought, and for what not. p. 26 C. 1. p. 50 C. 1. p. 105 C. 2. 251 C. 2. 290 C. 2. 348 C. 1. 456, 457. What Plea is good to a Scire facias, and what not, vid. Plea. What Scire fac●as is good, and what not. p. 72 C. 3. 290 C. 1. 6 Security. Where one may take security, and where not. p. 55. p. 73, 74. p. 89 C. 1. Where security shall be put in for doing of a thing, and where not. p. 322 C. 3. 433 C. 1. 7 Seizure. Of what things, and where a seizure may be made, and of what not. p. 75. 233 C. 4. 8 Sequestration. What things are sequestrable, & by whom. 161, 162, 169. 9 Setlement. What setlement of poor people is good, and what not. 168 C. 1. 10 Sewers. Of what things Commissioners of Sewers may take conusance of, and of what not. p. 62 C. 1. What Commissioners of Sewers may do, and what not. 178, 179, 180, 184, 185, 191, 192, 445 C. 2. 11 Statutes. What Statutes are repealed, and what not. 212 C. 2. Where an action may be brought upon a Statute, and where not. vid. Action. What actions are barred by the Statute of limitations, of 21 Jac. and what not. vid. Action. What faults in plead are helped by the Statute of Jeofails, and what not. p. 8. C. 2. p. 62, 63. p. 71. p. 91 C. 1. 115 C. 1. 151, 159 C. 2. 170 C. 2. 174, 175, 198 C. 2. 206 C. 1. 210, 211, 218 C. 2. 223 C. 1. 231 C. 2. 236 C. 1. 265 C. 2. 307 C. 1. 401, etc. 438 C. 1. 472 C. 2. 483 C. 2. How Statutes shall be interpreted. p. 81, 82, 83, 84 C. 2. p. 91 C. 1. 180. p. 181, 182, 190 C. 1. 195, 196, 197, 230 C. 1. 289, 307 C. 1. 335. etc. 381, 382, 430 C. 2. 438 C. 1. 467, 468, etc. 12 Submission. What is a good submission, and what not. 85, 136 C. 2. 306, 307, 351 C. 1. 13 Sureties. 14 Suggestion or Surmise. A suggestion to ground a prohibition upon must be positive, and not argumentative. p. 1. Where there ought to be a suggestion, or surmise made, and where not. 371 C. 1. 15 Suits. 16 Summons. What shall be a good summons, and what not. p. 67, 68, 69, 77, 78, 91, 92, 99, 143 C. 1. 17 Supersedeas. In what cases a supersedeas lies, and in what not. 46 C. 2. p. 118 C. 2. 159, 160, 177 C. 2. 248 C. 2 255 C. 2. 294 C. 1. 321 C. 3. 330 C. 1. 395 C. 1. 415. 18 Superstition. What shall be said a superstitious use, and what not. 36, 37, 51, 52. vid. Use. p. 81, 82, 83. 19 Supply. What things the Law must supply, and what not. p. 12 C. 2. 20 Surmise vid. Suggestion. 21 Surplusage. 22 Surrender. What words amount unto a surrender, and what not. 41 C. 1. What shall be a good surrender of a copyhold, or other estate, and what not. 280 C. 2. 291, 292, 446 C. 2. 450 C. 2. 23 Suspension. What shall be a good suspension from an office or other thing. p. 35, 36 T 1 Tales. Where a tales may be granted, and where not. p. 16 C. 1. 233 C. 3. 449 C. 2. C vid. Feetayl. 3 Tax. What is a lawful tax, and what not. p. 13, 14 138, 139, 180, 185, 191, 192. 4 Tenant and Tenancy, What shall be said a tenancy in common, and what a joint-tenancy. 211 C. 2. 434, 435. 5 Tenement. What shall be said to be a tenement, and what not. 161, 162. 6 Tender. 7 Term. 8 Tenure. What things may be said to lie in tenure, and what not. 179. 9 Tithes. Where tithes are to be paid, and where not, and to whom. p. 137 C. 1. 10 Title. Where in pleading one ought to show another's title to a thing and where not. 15 C. 2. What things the King shall be entitled to, and what not. p. 20, 21, 40, 41, 51, 52, p. 75, 81, 82, 83. Where one ought to entitle himself to a thing, and where not. 393 C. 2. 426, C. 1. 11 Transferring. Where and by what acts a thing shall be said to be transferred to another, and where not. 216, 217. 12 Transitory vid. Local, 13 Traverse. What things are traversable, and what not. p. 87, 239 C. 1. Where it is necessary to take a traverse, and where not, 150, 151, 198, 199, 373 C. 3. 382 C. 3. 432 C. 4. What traverse is well taken, and what not 332, 344 C. 1. 382 C. 3. 14 Treason. How and when judgement shall be given in high treason. 104 C. 1. 15 Trespass. How to declare in action of trespass vi et armis. p. 20 C. 1. 408 C. 2. Where an action of trespass lies vi et armis, and where not, and for what, and for what not. 43, 44. p. 94 C. 1. 99, 100, 166, 235 C. 4. 313 C. 2. 341 C. 2. 342 C. 1. 346, 347, 348, 357, 358. What is a good plea in bar of an action of trespass, and what not. p. 65 C. 1, 2. p. 72 C. 1. 112 C. 2. 165, 166, 201, 202, 213 C. 3. 313 C. 2. 346, 347, 348, 355 C. 2. Where an Action of Trespass upon the Case lies, vid. Case. 16 Trover. Where an Action of Trover and Conversion lies, and where not. 44, 235 C. 2. 261 C. 2. 313 C. 2. 341 C. 2. 361, 184, 482 C. 1. 17 Trial. Where an Action is to be tried, and where not. p. 2. p. 10. C. 1. 191 C. 1. 331, 332, etc. 460 C. 3. Where one may be hindered from a Trial, and where not. 339 C. 2. 403 C. 1. Where the Court will grant a new Trial, and where not. 448 C. 2. 462 C. 5. 466 C. 2. What Trial is good, and what not. p. 33 C. 1. p. 34 C. 1. 42 C. 1. p. 75 C. 1. 86 C. 1. 110 C. 2. 111 C. 1. 129 C. 3. 137 C. 3, 4. 139, 140, 191 C. 1. 201 C. 1. 206 C. 1. 342 C. 2. 412 C. 3. 430 C. 2. 432 C. 2. 345 C. 1. 18 Trust. Of what things a Trust may be, and of what not. p. 2. What a Trust is, and why it was invented. p. 21, 40. What things a Trustee, or cestuy que trust, may do, and what not. p. 41. 19 Time. The Law allows convenient time to do a thing, p. 11 C. 2. 143, 144. Where the time for doing or not doing a thing is to be set forth, and where it is not necessary, 17 C. 2. 178 C. 2. 243. Where fraction of ti●e is allowable, and where not. p. 72 C. 2. 119. How time for doing of a thing is to be computed. 170 C. 3. 382 C. 1. Where the Court will allow time to do a thing, where not. 208 C. 1. 249 C. 1. 475 C. 3. V 1 Vagrant or Beggar. Who shall be said to be a Vagrant, who not. 168 C. 1. 2 Value. 3 Variance. What variance in pleading makes error, and what not. p. 5 C. 2. p. 109 C. 2. 118, 119, 141, 142, 177 C. 2. 188, 189, 243, 244 C. 2. 277, 278, 344, 345, 374 C. 1. 378 C. 1. 472 C. 2. 477 C. 1. 4 Venire or Venue. Whence the Venue ought to be upon Trial of an Action. p. 2. p. 7. C. 1. p. 15 C. 3. 341 C. 3. 393 C. 1. 460 C. 3. What Venire is good, and what not. p. 8. C. 2. p. 20. C. 2. p. 23, 24. p. 28, 29. p. 34 C. 1. p. 60, 61. p. 86 C. 2. p. 96 C. 2. 107 C. 2. 111 C. 1. 119, 120, 164, 165. 165 C. 2. 195 C. 2. 383 C. 1. Where there may be Venire de novo, and where not. p. 63, 64, 176 C. 1. 205 C. 1. 275, 307 C. 1. 335 C. 1. 399, 410. C. 1. 445 C. 1. Where the Venue may be changed, and where not. 387 C. 1. 395 C. 2. 5 Verdict. Where a verdict is well given, and where not. p. 61, 62, 63, 64, 93, 94, 134 C. 4. 141 C. 1. 148 C. 2. 167 C. 2. 176 C. 1. 188, 279, 311, 312, 327 C. 1. 328, 329, 383 C. 2. 432 C. 2. 450 C. 1. 460 C. 1. What things in pleading may be helped by a Verdict, and what not. p. 80, 115 C. 2. 170, 171, 176, 177, 198 C. 2. 229 C. 3. 231 C. 2. 236 C. 1. 265 C. 2. 301, 307 C. 1. 342 C. 1. 349 C. 1. 370 C. 4. 461 C. 2. 472 C. 2. What special Verdict is good, and what not. 282, 284, 285, 335 C. 1. 409, 410. 6 Vesting. 7 Viccarage. 8 Victuals. What things are accounted Victuals, and what not. 190 C. 1. 9 View. What things may be done upon a View, and what not. 166 C. 1. 346, 451 C. 2. 472 C. 1. 10 Void. What is void, and what voidable. 209, 210. 11 Use. What shall be said a superstitious use, and what not. 36, 37, 51, 52, 81, 82, 83. Where a use shall be said to be well raised, and where not. 188, 189, 204, 205. 12 Utlawry, vid. Outlawry. W 1 Wager of Law, see Law. 2 Waiver. Where a thing may be waived, where not. p. 52 C. 2. 61 C. 2. 119, 403 C. 1. 417 C. 5. 2 Warrant. Where a Warrant is to be showed, and were it needs not to be. 405 C. 4. When a Warrant of Attorney shall be determined, and when not. 426 C. 1. 3 Warren. 4 Waste. What is a good plea in bar of an Action of Waste, and what not. 48. 5 Ways. Who ought to repair Highways, and who not. 163 C. 2. 364 C. 4. 6 Will. How a Will shall be interpreted 211 C. 1. 240, 249, 250, 251, 258, 559, 260, 261, 262, 275, 276, 278, 279, 293, 294, 301, 302, 307, 308, 309, 316, 317, 319 C. 1. 389 C. 2. 409, 410, 434, 435. What shall be said a good will, and what not. 240, 427 C. 3. Where a Will may be repealed, and where not. 228 C. 3. How a Will may be proved, and how nor. 370 C. 1. How a Will may be revoked, and how revived, and how not. 343 C. 2. 418 C. 3. What Acts a Tenant at will may do, what not. 380 C. 2. Witch craft. What is Witchcraft within the Statute of 1 Jac. and what not. p. 59 C. 2. 8 Witness. Who is a good witness, and who not. 370 C. 1. 388 C. 3. 401 C. 1. 404 C. 2. 482 C. 2. Who may be examined as a witness, and who not, and upon what matters. 449 C. 3. vid. Trial. 9 Words. How words which are doubtful shall be construed. p. 22, 23, 24, 25, 27 C. 2, 3. p. 31. c. 1. 41 c. 1. 43, 44 c. 1. 59 c. 2. 63 c. 1. p. 69 c. 1. p. 75 c. x. p. 80. c. 1. 81, 82, 83. p. 106 c. 1, 2. 108 c. 1. 112, 115 c. 3. 188, 189, 194 c. 1. 199 c. 2. 199, 200, 203, 204, 205, 224, 225, 235 c. 2. 237, 238 c. 3. 240, 241, 242 c. 1. 249, 250, 251, 277, 278, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 279, 281 c. 2. 301, 302, 307, 308, 309, 319 c. 1. 325, 326, 356 c. 2. 358 c. 3. 360, 361, 362, 389 c. 2. 407, 410, 447 c. 2. 434, 435 c. 3. 436, 437, 438 c. 2. 460. How words are to be used in pleading. p. 37, 327, 328, 481 C. 1. Where words shall be adjudged void. 45 C. 1. 102 C. 2. 334 C. 1. 10 Writ. Where a writ shall be said to be well directed, and where not. 42, 43, 237. To whom writs are to be directed, to whom not. 461. Where one may plead in abatement of a writ, and where not. p. 50 C. 1. p. 84, 99, 201, 202, 260 C. 1. 538, 404 C. 1. 421 C. 2. Where a writ is to be abated, and where but abateable, 421 C. 2. 441. For what causes a writ shall be abated, and for what not. 92, 138 C. 1. 190 C. 1. 19 C. 1. 203 C. 1. 204, 218 C. 1. 221, 223, 237, 260, 265 C. 1. 303 C. 1. 407, 421 C. 2. Where a writ of Ne exeat regnum lies, and where not. 440, etc. Where a writ of enquiry of damages lies, and where not. 127 C. 1. 288, vid. Enquiry. Where the ancient forms of writs may be altered, and where nor. 218 C. 1. When an Original writ ought to be filled, 292, 293. Where one may have a new Original writ, and where not. 404 C. 2. To the Reader. BE pleased to take notice that notwithstanding my more than ordinary care in Correcting the Press, these ensuing Erratas have happened in the Prenting, but many of them are but literal, and altar not the sense, and for the others I hope you will pardon them, and correct them by the Errata as you meet with them. ERRATA. PAge 20. l. 5. for Barker, read Barley. p. 76. r. for Bendir, r. Denoir. p. 204, 205. r. 104, 105. p. 208. r. Paget for Pagort. p. 8. l. 3. r. facias for facis. p. 8. l. last but one and last. r. reversed, for affirmed. p. 25. l. 8. r. against, for again. p. 26. l. 11. r. for to Sub-deputy, to the Sub-deputy. p. 27. l. 31. r. for at Bar, at the Bar. p. 48. l. 15. r. against, for again. p. 75. l. 25. r. him, for hinn. p. 106. C. 2. in the margin put out Amercement. p. 166. r. Denoyr, for Bendir. p. 172. l. 24. r. bail, for bailed. p. 183. l. 27. r. certify, for rectify. p. 96. l. 11. r. jenning's, for genning's. p. 213. C. 3. r. Barmestone, for Barneston. p. 226. l. 43. r. and not to, for and to. p. 228. C. 4. in the margin, r. to have Execution, instead of to have judgement. p. 243. l. 25. r. but that the, for but that. p. 249. l. c. 3. in the title, r. Pawsye, for Bawsye. p. 258. r. jay and jay, for Gay and Gay. p. 264. l. 13. r. employed, for employed. p. 265. 1. c. in the title, r. Skedlock, for Shedlock. p. 270. l. 15, 16. r. she, for he, p. 285. r. mutata, for mutate. p. 294. l. 2. for an, r. and. p. 299. l. 15. r. Defendants. p. 306. l. 16. r. replication. p. 311. l. 19 r. publico. p. 325. l. 5. r. Susanna. for page 324. r. 336. p. 344 in the margin, for indictment r. inducement. p. 345. 1. 10. for common by intendment, r. by common intendment. p. 348. r. Tippin, for Pippin. p. 349. l. 16. r. acquittance, for acqwittance. p. 353. l. 19 r. it, for l. p. 371, l. 8. for to bar, r. to the bar. p. 374. for Troos, r. toes. p. 388. after Newton and Osborn, r. Trin. 1653. 101. 1780. p. 409. for Fenham, r. Fenwick. p. 398. l. 22. r. action, for aation. p. 410. l. 45. For Boynton, r. Baynton. p. 423. l. 39 for cause, r. custom. p. 432. l. 19 for was sitting, r. was not sitting. p. 440. l. 2. for of of, r. of. p. 446. l. 9 for fidavit, r. Affidavit. p. 447. l. 13. for ttd, r. to. p. 448. l. 8. for thou, r. then, p. 462. l. last, for gronted, r. granted. p. 477. for jackson, r. johnson. p. 474. l. 18. for deeds, r. goods. p. 180. l. 9 for books r. book. and l. 12. 1. that lands, for that the lands. p. 481, 482, 483. in the head of the page, for Trin. r. Mich.