blazon or coat of arms of the City of London 
Davies Mayor. Martis quarto die Septembris, 1677. Annoque Regni Regis CAROLI Secundi, Angliae, etc. Vicesimo Nono.  
THis Court doth earnestly desire Mr. Thorp to Print his Sermon Preached at the Guild-Hall Chappel, on Sunday Morning last, before the Lord Mayor and Aldermen of this City.  
Wagstaffe.   

Imprimatur.  
T. Turner, R.P.D. Do Episc. Lond. à Sacris Domest.  
Septemb. 6. 1677.   

A SERMON Preached before the RIGHT HONOURABLE THE Lord Mayor, AND aldermans of LONDON, AT GUILDHALL CHAPEL. By George Thorp, B.D. Fellow of Gonvil and Caius College in Cambridg, and Rector of St. Antholins', and St. John Baptists, London.  
LONDON: Printed by Andrew Clark, for Walter Kettilby, at the Bishop's Head in St. Paul's Churchyard, 1677.   

To the Right Honourable Sir THOMAS DAVIES, Lord Mayor Of the City of LONDON; And the Court of ALDERMEN.  
Right Honourable,  
WHat you were pleased to hear with so favourable approbation, as to enjoin this farther Publication (for so I have learned to interpret the condescending desires of my Superiors) I here humbly present to your like favourable Patronage. I dare promise nothing for my performance; but may (I think) presume so much upon the subject, as to judge him fallen out with himself, as all the World beside, who is not willing to make his frequent appeals thereto. If the Countenance of your Authority, to its own inward Evidence, recommend it more to the Serious Meditations and diligent Observance of all, especially of this Great and Honourable City; I know nothing may contribute farther, under the Divine Blessing, to its most lasting Renown, and the increase of its Felicity to all Generations. Which is the Hearty Prayer of  
Your Lordship's most Humble and Obedient Servant, Geo. Thorp.   
MATTH. seven. 12. 
Therefore all things, whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them; for this is the Law and the Prophets.  
AS among all the Civilised part of Mankind, no Honours, and Commendations have been judged great enough to bestow upon Virtue in general; so no task has been found more difficult and perplexed, than to deduce it readily, and safely into all the single Offices of Humane Life.  
Not to insist at present on the immediate bounden expressions of Piety towards God, about which men always have been, and needs must be at the greatest loss, where his own express declarations conduct them not, from the infinite distance of the object: In the more common, and obvious instances of Justice, and Benignity one towards another, which most acknowledge in the gross reasonable, and advantageous; yet few are thought so happy, or so faithful, as to follow them by strait, and uninterrupted lines in their several deductions, and to accommodate them aright to all the emergent cases incident to our converse one with another.  
After the relief, and directions lent us from Laws Divine, or Humane, the clearest Revelations of God, the most studied, and emprov'd Reasonings of the wisest of men spent therein, whether through ignorance, or prejudice, stubbornness, or malice, scarce any precept hath been found so plain, any conviction so unexceptionable, which some men will not evade, or elude, first make intricate, and then frustrate, dispute themselves into a loss about it, and then conclude with almost a full exemption from it, and that in pursuit of every fancied (however lawless) interest, or groundless humour.  
Farther, The circumstances of our actions are open to such almost infinite variety, and accordingly the reasons, and measures of Commands, and our Obligations altering; It will be found a matter of some intricacy to the most upright and wary, without danger or mistake, duly and hastily to apply all general injunctions to each single act. Wherefore after the largest provisions of particular Precepts of all sorts, some general Rules we have given to direct us, where others may come short, or we seem at a loss about them. Among which, none more full and comprehensive than this of my Text, which hath gained it the most universal admiration and applause, even from those that observe, or those that observe it not; from the Enemies, as Friends to our sacred profession. So that Alexander Severus the Roman Emperor, 
Aelius Lampridius. p. 376. in vita ejus.  is reported to have Engraved it on the Walls of his Palace, and other Public Buildings, as it were a standing Law of his Empire, and the best square of his own, and others proceed in the Administration thereof. As our Lord in my Text declares it to have been of God himself under the Old Testament. He no less Establishing it for future Generations under the New.  
In Treating of which I shall, First, inquire into the proper extent of this Rule, to vindicate it from some false applications, and assign it, as near as I can, its true boundaries.  
2. The apparent Reasonableness, Justice, and Equity thereof.  
3. The plain easiness, and suitableness of it to present use.  
4. The Divine Authority, and Sanction of it from the last words.  
In order to the former I observe, First, This does not make other men's deal with us, the Rule of our dealing with them.  
It is not whatsoever men do to you, but, Whatsoever ye would they should do to you, etc. Which otherwise might open a gap to all injustice, fraud or violence. It must not pass for a Maxim here, whatever it do in men's Practice, Fallere fallentem non est fraus. Men are very apt to think it a warrantable excuse, in the worst of their Actions, if they can but with any pretence say, I do but to him as he did to me, and give him, as they call it (I know not by what Figure) as good as he brought. So injuries, as well as animosities, are multiplied, and bandied from one to another, and contrary to all other violent motions, lose nothing, but gain still more and more in their rebound. Another man's injustice or cruelty doth not warrant, or alter the nature of mine, and though he began first, yet no Reason or Precept will justify my following him therein, which the more I complain of, the greater distance I ought to keep from it: and if in some instances it be no more than what may be just for him to suffer, yet in all, it's more than I have power to inflict; not to mention how partial Judges, and Executioners men would be in their own Causes, while the justest punishment, where it goes no farther, is not committed to every one's management; and private Revenge, in all Societies especially, stands convicted by the Laws of God, Nature, and Compact; and can have no shelter from this. If in any case of extreme violence, I may, Vim vi repellere, rather Kill than be Killed, when openly Assaulted, against the common rights of Human Society, by Thiefs and Murderers; It is not so much their desert as my necessity, that must bear me out, wherein all Reason, and all Laws of God and Man judge it more equal, that the guilty should suffer, rather than the innocent, where one must presently, and in such an unavoidable exigence, may have affixed somewhat of a Public Character on the last for his most necessary defence. But where this may be otherwise secured, I must make my recourse, and yield up my cause to the common guard, and most impartial determination of the Community, and of Him above all that judges therein, who hath said Vengeance is mine: So I should be willing to have done unto me, and if this seem to leave me under disadvantage with those who will not yet deal so with me; as it justifies them not in the least, so will it more severely condemn them for it hereafter; and in the mean time this restraint however uneasy, may be looked on as part of that Self denial, and taking up the Cross, necessary not only to follow our Lord, but to ensure the peace and welfare of Humane Society.  
2. Our own will and desire for other men's deal with us, taken in the gross may be oft an unwarrantable, and at other times an incompetent Guide to ours with them. As if through any Distemper of body, or mind, prejudice, or misapprehension, I wish for any thing that is really hurtful to myself, I may not hence justly force it upon another. In opposition to which the Ancient Latin Copies, 
T. 4. De Sermone Domini in monte. l. 2. p. 1168.  as St. Augustin observes, read it quaecunque bona, etc. But because it will be yet controverted, what these good things are, and how to distinguish them; and besides the case of those who are uncapable of judging of any Law; and for whom another restraint is provided; beside the case of Inferiors, and Superiors, as such, which admits different considerations, that I shall meet with in my next; The misapplications of this Rule in which our own inclinations may be aptest, to impose on us, I reduce chief under this particular to two instances. I do not as I would be done unto, if I urge that upon another which he thinks hurtful, though I do not; because I do not put myself in his circumstances, entirely, and so not to him, what I would expect from another, were I in his place, as this supposes.  
Again, When the ground of my desire, or expectation is some other by-consideration, and not the equity of the Case itself. As when I am willing any should do somewhat to me, that I may have the advantage of doing the like to him; which in effect proves not the same. If I think myself stronger than another, and so should desire he might take from me, what he could, that I might have the same liberty towards him, or others; here I do not really, what I would be willing to suffer, and yet where this may be materially the same, it varies much in the different condition of persons and other circumstances, too many to reckon up. In all which, as in the case before, I do not truly, and fully put myself in his place, and stead. In opposition to them, the order of the words is exactly to be observed; the first part to be considered by itself absolutely, and not to follow any sinister respect to the last, that is, abstracted from other aims and designs: Whatever I should choose, and think  in itself, and due to me in the same case, that I hereby bind myself to, towards another, at least when in my power. But not to invert the order of the words; Do what you will to any one, so you be willing they should do it to you: Wherein we shall be easily mistaken and blinded with prejudice and partiality, when we begin with that, and so proceed to this; as appears by too woeful experience.  
3. I may reasonably suppose this Rule given not so much for a complete System of all Justice, and Equity: But rather as a convenient relief, and Additionary Supply to all others, wherein seems to be the best, and safest, and constant use of it; where we are to seek for any other, or wholly at a loss about its interpretation, there this may extricate us out of a great many doubts. For though I suppose most of the Precepts, which concern our converse with each other, may be fairly deduced from this (of which more in the Close,) yet if any do not presently appear so, they do not thence lose their Obligation, neither are we free to every Action, which our judgement may make reconcileable herewith. For the Authority of God, which binds antecedently to this, or any other Law, may lay many engagements of Duty upon me towards other men, which I may be apt to think I should not require from any, nay be unwilling to receive. Again I may have somewhat imposed upon me by my Lawful Superiors, which I may be inclined to judge, I should not enjoin on them. In which the Case is not left to even debate, or my judgement to be determined by the reason of the thing alone, as it seems in the Text. In which also mankind are known naturally partial, and I may be supposed also more easily mistaken than they, who stand upon much higher ground, and have a fuller and larger Prospect of all about them, however the necessary Rights of just Authority to guard, and advance the true Honour and Service of God, and his Religion, with the Public Peace, weigh much more (that I say not oblige much farther) than any private judgement, or interest: and wherein nothing absolutely unlawful is enjoined, he that has the Commanding Power clears himself fully of this Rule, if, after all others, he do as he would be done unto, others cannot without that Reverence, and Obedience, which in like circumstances they would expect from all, though they now obstinately deny it. However the wills and inclinations of men in their own concerns, as well as others, are oft fickle, and various, received upon very uncertain grounds, and governed by very unaccountable prejudices, and it seems no way convenient, that the strength of all Laws Divine, as Humane should stand, or fall with such weak and tottering supports, and be so long precarious, till they have stood their trial, and received their doom from so frequent a partial, but always an inferior Judg. This Rule may superadd a farther Obligation, but was never designed to exclude, or excuse us from any former; where others fail this may supply the place of a particular injunction, and engage us to somewhat beyond what we thought ourselves bound to before, not discharge us of any other Duty, seeing we can hardly imagine any good beyond what we wish to ourselves, and are hereby so far engaged to others.  
4. Some have thought this rather a Rule of Justice, than Charity. Indeed one of the Oriental Translations renders it quicquid aequum ducitis. The ground of their limitation is, that I may lawfully desire, or be willing another should give me all he can without prejudice to himself; But am not hereby bound to do so to every other man, nay cannot. Yet I am not willing so to restrain it, seeing the use, and design of it seems to reach Acts of Charity, as common Justice, it may be to join them in one. So the way of our Saviour's introducing, and connecting it to the former Verse, may more clear under the last particular. In the mean time, for the mentioned instance, I may be willing to receive, what I do not think another bound to give. So Whatsoever ye would in my Text, is, whatever ye think or judge reasonable, and equitable to expect from others, or that they are any way obliged to bestow; that reciprocally binds, and that in Justice too. But in Acts of Liberality, I ought even in my desires to leave another, as free, as I would be myself, to lay them out where the best Prudence may direct him. Charity is a large, and diffusive Principle, not to be tied up to one Method, or confined always to the same measures; seeketh not her own, much more with common Justice restrains our coveting what is other men's. He that desires always to be forgiven, and to be ever receiving, had need be as free in giving to, or forgiving others; or else he will not only fall short of the Mercy, he asks, but fall under the stroke of that Justice, he violates. So I think I may determine, I ought to bestow that upon another, which interchangeably in the like case, I should think it reasonable for me to hope, and expect from him; or else my desires, or actions will be obnoxious to more guilt, than ordinary partiality. So far of the Explication in General, which it would be endless to pursue into extreme niceties, more apt to perplex, and confound, then explain the Precept to our readier observance.  
Yet more particularly by way of Paraphrase. No man is willing to be defrauded, or injured; to be imposed on by falsehood, or treachery. None is desirous to be reviled, or despised: every man is supposed to wish well unto himself; to have his person, and all that appertains to him safe from outward violence, or secret fraud; an evil eye, or as bad a Tongue, to have his Actions interpreted in the most favourable sense, they are capable: all his good things advanced; his evil as much as may be diminished: In all instances go and do likewise. (Nemo cùm ignorantiâ tenetur, non cupit doceri; quum libatur, amanter ac secretò moneri, potius quam traduci; nemo quum eget, non velit sibi subveniri: Nemo velit obtrectari famae suae; Nemo fraudari, etc. Erasmus par.)  
I am in the second place to consider the apparent reasonableness, justice, and equity of the Rule, which has all the evidence possible to recommend it to the Universal approbation of mankind. Indeed it lies so near the first Principles, and Originals of all right Reason, and Equity, that it seems hard to derive it from any more clear, and self-evident, and so far difficult to prove, as to find any other proposition, that less needs proving: and yet some such immediate ones, we must have recourse to, or else all discourse must be fruitless, we can have no foundation whereon to begin, or end to stop at. It hath oft fared the worse with very important Truths, for lying near the Fountain head of all; while through Pride, Obstinacy, or vain Curiosity, some men will hardly receive the prime verities of Nature, as well as Religion, without requiring a previous proof, which all men are not alike happy in managing, nor bind themselves to the same Methods therein: Neither are under the same apprehensions of Principles, and their consequences; of which others, (though most unreasonably) have taken such advantage, as more to distrust, or contemn that proved, which barely propounded, they could not but Reverence. The proposition in my Text, seems as liable to run this hazard (if it have not already suffered thereby) as most others; which therefore I rather premise, that it may undergo no prejudice by my short offers, which I reduce to a small compass: and in which every ones own Meditations may add what possibly to him may seem more convincing.  
Now with respect to those who (if any) are most like to object against it, I may begin by considering how reconcileable it is with their own dearest (if not only) Principle of Self-Love supposed therein, and truly confirmed thereby: than which nothing with such may, sooner conclude it reasonable. For because it's taken for granted, that as we do, so we ought to wish well unto ourselves, and can hardly knowingly do otherwise, therefore it's made the fairest Rule, but not the only or best ground of our dealing so with others. Wherefore they who most contradict the purport of it towards them; are as rigid, and hasty as any, in exacting it towards themselves. When we are bid to love our Neighbour as ourselves, it's implied as we do, so we must and cannot but love ourselves: Whereto infinite Appeals are made in all parts of Religion; and were it not presupposed inviolably strong, and universal, the Bands of Humane Society, and Commerce, as Converse would be much loosened, which are now more straightened by this Precept: We are hereby more than warranted to will what is good to ourselves, while our doing it to others is ruled thereby; which (as all commands rightly considered) is so far from clashing with true Self-Love, that it proves its safest guard. We do not what we ought by this Rule to others, if we wish not what is really best to ourselves. But if this reach not the evidence of an entire proof, it may remove a considerable prejudice out of its way, which not done, scarce any other would be admitted.  
2. To proceed gradually in matters wherein there is no necessary competition between my own and my Neighbours concerns, that is, where men's interests do not really interfere, or what I do to another takes nothing properly from myself, which yet oft happens, there nothing can carry more unexceptionable Evidence, than the Precept before us. As for instance to give good words, rather than bad; candid, and benign, rather than peevish, and fretful; to be more forward to comfort, than to vex; to heal, than to wound, to lift up, rather than to beat down; to conceal, rather than to expose another's imperfections; to defend, sooner than to accuse; yea in many Offices of Beneficence, wherein I may relieve another's necessity, or much promote his convenience, by that which I cannot keep, or if I do, it must be useless, or so insignificant, that I shall be ashamed to own it.  
In these and such like instances, what can carry greater conviction, than that the one part is more excellent, and eligible than the opposite, and yet almost as soon, and easily done? For I appeal to the most stupid, and prejudiced, is it not better to save Life, than to destroy it? to be an instrument of another's happiness, than misery? to love, than to hate? etc. that is, to do good, than to do evil? If there be no difference in things at all, but only in our Opinions: if, abstracted from other considerations, one includes as much perfection as the other (for what dare not some men assert?) Why in our own behalf are we so constantly determined in our choice to the one? so fearful of, and ready to fly from the other? needing neither force of Argument, or length of Meditation to secure our preference. An immediate Conviction, that they are as opposite in their own Natural tendency as our thoughts; and that we can as soon cease to desire what is good, as such, as not think it to be placed in those things, which this Rule directs us in to all. Now if what I wish to myself, or would have others do to me be better than the opposite (or else why do I choose it?) then by the same reason it is better to all, and at least when my own prejudice, or interest comes not between, I have no pretence of objection that involves not a contradiction; and accuse myself of the breach of all the Laws of Conscience, Reason, and Equity, if I do not what I cannot but judge, and do so every day, really best, and most eligible.  
3. In other Cases where my thus dealing may seem to restrain those benefits, which otherwise I could wish to myself, yet is it most reasonable, and equal, that the conveniencies of Humane Life should be distributed by such measures, while no axiom upon which Mathematical demonstration is built can plead clearer evidence than the Foundation of this. If there it must be received as undeniably and immutably true. Si aequalia aequalibus addas, tota sunt aequalia. Si ab aequalibus aequalia demas, quae remanent erunt aequalia. The same is this, at least on the one side, changing but things into persons, paria paribus conveniunt: like things agree to like persons. So that whatever is fit for, or due to me, must be by the same reason for, and to another in the same circumstances. All men naturally, as such, are equal, stand upon even terms, and level ground; and if Society, Compact, and the consequences thereof have made any difference in the conditions of men, that altars not the Case here; because the present Precept puts, or supposes us entirely in the same state, or capacity, ere it determine, or equalise our mutual deuce, and obligations.  
So that as sure as there is any such thing as right or wrong, reasonable, or unreasonable, equal, or unequal, and those must be as certain, and evident as any other Relation whatever; of agreeable, or disagreeable; beneficial, or hurtful; true, or false; strait, or crooked, etc. which all Self-Love must derive from the supposed difference of, and subsist by: So unavoidably must the better part be involved in this direction.  
But that I may begin, and end with same persons here (who too oft before make violent attempts upon those fixed boundaries, and so are like to be little moved by such Topics) I add in the Fourth and Last place, in their own way of reasoning, There is no other possible Foundation of Society, and so of Peace, and Self-preservation involved therein, than the supposed observance of this Law. For if you love yourself, so does every one beside, and may do as much, and therefore can never be supposed to agree in any thing, which provides not equally for his concerns as yours, and puts him not in a like capacity of enjoying what he desires. I appeal to the most partial, whether all persons are like to meet in what only takes care for one, or whether any other Rule, or misapplication of this, give so large as well as so equal, a provision for more, yea for all; so that it has not only as much of abstracted reason, but of private interest, and safety, as it's possible for any general one to have; wherein alone the concerns of the community are most nearly united: and does not only follow that order in which God, and Nature have placed us: But the other fancied Originals of Society fall in pieces without it. 
Diog. Laert. ●. 5. p. 313. Compare Aristotle de moribus. l. 9 c. 4. p. 148. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Dion Cassius ●. 52. p. 492. 493. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc.  Whence Aristotle in his Life by Laertius, is made to give it as a Rule of Friendship, which would most difficultly be reduced to any other; and Maecenas in that famous Oration of his to Augustus in Dion Cassius (one of the Monuments of Antiquity of greatest name left us from the common Deluge) concerning the undertaking, and management of the Roman Empire; gives it him as the great and compleatest Rule of Government, which challenges an eminency of all most transcendent, So govern others as you would be governed yourself. But our Blessed Lord more wisely, and charitably prescribes it, as an universal Law to all, while he supposes, or makes them mutually cordial Friends, and entirely concerned for each others good, and welfare, as their peculiar care and trust.  
3. What may yet farther commend this Rule is its plain easiness, and suitableness to present use; while Laws, if otherwise never so rational, and useful, if withal obscure, perplexed, and over-numerous, may prove a snare, rather than a support; make more Controversies than they decide; lose much of their strength, and force by being spun out into nice and subtle disputes: and fall short of their aim by not reaching the greater part of them, whom they designed to direct: who either have not leisure sufficient to attend, or capacities to understand them, or ready sagacity to apply them in opportunities of Action. In contradistinction to which, and such like inconveniencies, here is a Law always at hand, which every man carries about in his own breast, legible to him that knows no Letters, open and obvious to the most rude and ignorant, which the worst memory cannot forget, the suddenest surprise prevent, nor the most wilful blindness conceal: to come at which, we are not forced to search Ancient Records, or dark Repositories; to revolve and ruminate upon old dark sentences, or new finer glosses; not to rove about the world to examine the various Customs and Constitutions of Countries; not to soar as high, as Heaven, or dive as low, as Hell, in quest of our Duty; after all other pains return into yourself, and look into your own heart, where you may oft find it sooner, and read it clearer than any where beside. The Gentiles, says St. Paul, Rom. two. 14, 15. Having not the Law, do by nature the things contained in the Law, these having not the Law, are a Law unto themselves, and show the work of the Law written in their hearts, their Conscience in the mean time accusing, or excusing one another. Where can we discern more lively Characters, and a fairer Transcript of this non scriptae sed natae legis, 
Tom. 2. p. 545 orat. pro T. Annio Milone. Tom. 2. edit. Savil. p. 165.  as the Orator styles it, than in this Maxim? whence St. Chrysostom on my Text, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc.  
Of which what farther evidence can be expected than the experience of the even Infant Age, where the knowledge of other Laws never yet came, amidst the little transactions of which, how oft do we hear such like complaints and expostulations with each other when aggrieved? This I would, or this I would not have done to you; implying their native sense of a like obligation on the other.  
Again, this will readily descend to each single Case, and may be easily accommodated to every emergence thereof, which other Precepts must infinitely, and endlessly multiply in their attempts towards: However involved with difficulties, or full of various wind and turn, this question is soon asked, and almost as soon answered, What we should desire, and expect to be done unto us (rebus sic stantibus)▪ that if not always absolutely, yet is most likely to be our present Duty to others; if not what we are strictly bound to, yet is usually what is most safe and innocent; if no other command bind it upon us, yet our own choice generally does, and convicts us of guilt in the Breach.  
This proves the most faithful, and impartial Monitor, a voice still sounding in our Ears, flee we never so fast from it, This is the way, walk in it. Every man may soon, and is very ready to put himself in his Neighbour's circumstances, and is as quick in determining what he would have done unto him, you need not doubt his choice, or that he should take up short of his due; less we cannot ascribe, more we may add to him.  
And because we are so sagacious in finding, and improving every hint, that makes for our own interest, therefore we are here most advantageously directed to put ourselves into his Case; which, if any thing, is like to give us the fairest, and fullest prospect of his due, and the most pathetic motive not in the least to detract from it.  
Neither lies there any exception against so suitable a Precept, according to which we are made our own Judges, and our own Lawgivers; our own Accusers, or our own Compurgators; can you desire more kind, and indulgent, one's? Can you complain of that Burden, which you impose on yourself; and think that a grievance, with which your own happiness is so twisted? Must your will be a Law to others, and ought it not to be so first to yourself? What you have already judged best, when to be done to you, is it quite contrary, when to be done by you, and the case in nothing else altered? So that whatever suspicion, or prejudice may lie against any other, none sure can against our own voice, and determination, which this only ties us up to. Wherefore no Precept can be conceived pressed with fewer encumbrances, darkened with less intricacy, open to larger use, readier to present application, more obvious to all apprehensions, fit to supply all other defects and losses, and more safely to interpret most other injunctions, than this of my Text. Summa omnium quae docet lex, & Prophetae, quos si aut non vacat, aut per inscitiam non potest evolvere, habet domi regulam, etc. as Erasmus in his Paraphrase.  
Which brings me to the Fourth and Last particular, and part of my Text, the Divine Authority, and Sanction of this Rule expressed in the last words, This is the Law and the Prophets.  
I have hitherto considered it as the dictate of uncorrupt Nature, and unbyast Reason by its own innate light, and so have purposely omitted other confirmation thereof. But if any thing seem still wanting to complete the farther establishment of it for a Law, and to raise a more Religious Veneration to its Observance, that is abundantly supplied by this last clause: this is not only to act agreeably to the most improved Reason, but also Divine Revelation; nor merely to follow the Laws of Nature, but of God over and above: being strengthened by this his double Sanction, which twofold Cord sure is not easily broken; to its own intrinsic loveliness, it hath all the positive enforcements, and authority of an immediate Heavenly injunction, This is the Law; etc.  
In which words our Saviour seems to go farther yet. It is not only a single Command, however solemnly Enacted in the Law, confirmed, and renewed by the succeeding Prophets; but as it were the sum, and recapitulation of the whole: As if all together reduced into one short Epitome, and Breviate, running through every Precept, and almost as oft repeated, as there are any Instructions given; So that go through the entire Scripture, at least that part of it which concerns our deportment towards each other, wheresoever you pitch, on whatsoever you sit, you cannot but meet the true purport, and design of this; though not in the same terms, yet in sense. So that if all the Offices, and single Duties of Humane Life scattered in the Sacred Volumes, may be included in one common direction, it can hardly be done in fewer words, and more comprehensive of all, than this.  
Also it's not only the Law, and the Prophets, but the Gospel too, where our Lord most expressly enjoins it, here, and in St. Luke vi. 31. and some Copies added it to the Apostolic Cannons, Acts xv. 29. His Precepts also are more nearly suited, and accommodated thereto, where there seems any difference, being more covertly, and by consequence delivered of old. Wherefore some Copies Read it in my Text 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, so, or to this effect are the Law, and Prophets; others, as we, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, This is the Law, etc.  
Here I shall, (1.) mark out some general Commands of each Testament, which seem of the same import with this.  
2. The Universal extent ascribed to such Commands.  
3. How far involved in other more particular and remote.  
4. The relation it may stand in to, and the influence it hath upon even the Duties of the First Table, which we own most immediately to God himself, to give it so great a Character, as in the close of my Text.  
In order to the first may be observed indeed, that it is no where in express terms in the Old Testament, or the Canonical Books; that which comes nearest, is in the Apocryphal, Tobit v. 15. Do that to no man which thou hatest, where the negative part of it, is somewhat the same. But the positive sense is in many places, as Levit. nineteen. 18. Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thyself, oft referred to in the New Testament. Now no consequence can be more direct and natural, than that if we love him as ourselves, we shall do to him what we would have done to ourselves, that only in the strictness of the Letter, determining the inward Principle, and Disposition of the mind; this the outward suitable Expression thereof, and Action. To the same purpose may be Interpreted those many places concerning not only their Just, but Charitable, Humane, and Friendly deportment towards all, especially the Poor, the Widow, the Fatherless, Deut. xv. 12, etc. Yea, the stranger, and their very servants, Deut. xuj. 11, 12, etc. While it comes in so often in the close, and as the strongest enforcement of all, Thou shalt remember thou was a bondman, or a stranger in the Land of Egypt; implying their obligation to recollect, what though they had not, yet they could not but have wished for, and might reasonably have expected to have been done to them, and therefore so should now do to others; nay this very consideration is expressly annexed to the forecited Precept of loving our Neighbour as ourselves, Levit. nineteen. 34. Alike may be applied that concerning helping an Enemy in his distress, Exod. xxiii. 4. Yea most in the beginning of that Chapter, so also concerning not rejoicing at his calamity. Prov. xxiv. 17. Yea rather multiplying benefits upon him. Prov. xxv. 21. So the Psalmists appeal and profession, Psal. seven. 4. If I have rewarded evil to him that was at peace with me, etc. See also Heb. xiii. 3. Remember them in bonds as bound with them, and them which suffer adversity as yourselves in the body: To omit others in the New Testament, where many things seem added; to return Good for Evil; Blessing, for Curses; to love them that hate us, to be merciful and kind to all, even the unthankful; less cannot, more may, be included, than what is here expressed.  
2. The large extent ascribed to such Commands, especially in the New Testament, suitable to the declaration in my Text, Matth. xxii. 36, etc. in answer to that question, Which is the great Commandment of the Law? Our Lord replies, first, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, etc. and the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thyself, on these two Commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets. So Mark xii. 30, etc. suitably St. Paul, and more close to my Text, Gal. v. 14. For all the Law is fulfilled in one word, even in this, Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thyself; which St. James, c. two. 8.9. calls the Royal Law, which fulfilling we shall do well. Again others particularly are summed up in it, Rom. xiii. 9 After reckoning up the five negative Precepts of the second Table, he subjoins, If there be any other Commandment, it's briefly comprehended, or recapitulated in this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thyself; In the Verse before, He that loveth another hath fulfilled the Law; in the Verse after, Love is the fulfilling of the Law. So our Lord seems to sum up many in it, Matth. nineteen. 18, 19  
3. Other Precepts more remote severally involve the same sense with this, whatever expressions of Justice, and Charity are provided for in them singly, are here universally, and together; that is for instance, just Weights and Measures, an equal Balance, that we have not an Ephah, and an Ephah, as the Hebrew phraseth the false and deceitful, one to buy, and another to sell with, so in all other cases most straightly forbid, as a plain entrenchment upon this Rule, not doing as we would be done by. So to be true to our trust, to speak as we think, and act as we speak, to do violence to no man, to defraud, defame, or reproach none, to preserve every one's deuce, and secure his right, what is it but to keep close to this Rule? Also to find pity, and relief in our distress, and extremity; to have our wounds closed, and not widened; our distractions composed, and not heightened; our misery as much as may be diminished, and our happiness advanced, are every one's choice for himself, and so more become his Duty to others. It were easy to go through most Commands, take almost any of them severally, and consider what it is they enjoin upon all, and bethink yourselves whether you would not choose it rather than the contrary; in all cases to receive your due, oft over and above, good will, and friendly assistance from all; and can any thing be as more equal, so more desirable?  
If there be any case like an exemption, it seems that of severe, especially capital punishments, which as they are not excluded by all the Precepts of Christian mercy, and compassion, which would be cruelty to the far greater, as better part (and this must not as I said, be interpreted to certainly vacate, and frustrate any other;) so though he that suffers may possibly always desire pardon, and think himself as ready universally to give it: Yet he that inflicts it, being under less prejudice, may conclude that were he in the same case, he ought not to expect it, and that where so many others are concerned, by this Rule barely, it can hardly be in his power always to give it.  
4. In order to the enlargement of this Rule, and it's truly Religious, and Spiritual, as mere Moral worth, may be considered the respect it bears to, and the influence it hath upon even the Duties of the First Table immediately towards God, which though not directly, yet by some consequence may be included, or supposed therein. This contains an universal Principle of Justice, and Equity; of giving to every one what belongs to him, is due and proper to his state; and so may be applied to all acts of Piety indispensably due to God, as such, without the almost Blasphemous presumption of but supposing ourselves in his place. Also the true love of our Neighbour, which this supposes, and expresses, must be founded in, and can only be preserved, and quickened by the true love of God, which is the sum of the first Table: But these I need not pursue, nor yet St. Augustine's Argument in the matter in hand, Qui proximum diligit, 
T. 3. De Tri●ate l. 8. c. 7. p. 355.  ipsam diligit dilectionem, Deus autem dilectio est, according to that, John i 4, 8, 16. which especially as improved by the Schoolmen, would lead to somewhat too nice, or too mystical for me.  
In the mean while may be observed, the Scripture seems much more frequent, and partial in stating the mutual Offices we owe each other in acts consequent on this Rule, than the immediate outward expressions of Devotion towards God; seldom expostulates the want of these, but the defect of those fill the Law, and the Prophets, and the Gospels too with complaints. See the first of Isaiah throughout, and many more exhorting them to show the truth of their Religion, that Faith, that Fear, and Love of God in acts of Justice, and Mercy, rather than Pompous Oblations, or Adorations, of which among others may be consulted, Prov. xxi. 3. Jer. seven. 4, 5, etc. xxii. 16. Hos. vi. 6. Mich. vi. 7, 8. Mark xii. 33. So in the account which our Saviour gives of the proceed of the last day, (Matth. xxv. latter end) all the sentences to the good or bad, are proportioned to the observance, or breach of these.  
And as our future doom, so the success of our present Prayers, and Devotions is made much to depend on this performance. In which may be observed the connection of this Verse to the foregoing, in that it is, If ye being evil know how to give good gifts unto your Children, how much more shall your Father which is in Heaven, give good things to them that ask him? Therefore all things, etc. As if he should say, there is nothing wanting to secure your petitions from disappointment, but your not answering other men's equal requests from you. God is infinitely more good, and so more ready to supply you, than the most indulgent Parent his own Son. But if you expect God should fulfil your desires, you must (if I may speak it with reverence) his. He is far removed in person, and can receive nothing properly from you; in part therefore transfers his right to his Creatures, for their necessary support, and makes your dealing with them, the ordinary Rule, and Measure of his Dispensations to you. That this is no forced interpretation (insisted particularly on by St. Chrysostom, on my Text) appears by other express places; our Lord's reflection upon his own prayer, Matth. vi. 14. 15. If ye forgive men their Trespasses, your Heavenly Father will also forgive you, etc. and to the same purpose he denounces upon the omission, Ch. xviii. 35. In which also may be farther consulted, Matth. seven. 1, 2. Luke vi. 37, 38. Rom. two. 1, 2, 3. By which and divers like, he shows how much he makes our actions dependant on this Rule, the square of his distributions, whether of Justice, or Mercy; and that he measures chief our performances even of Piety to himself, and mainly proportions our after-rewards, and hopes from him by these like Offices, more than by other even director and immediate outward expressions of Devotion to himself; which he seems sparing in requiring or commending; cautious in extending to their utmost bounds; or cherishing every plausible pretence thereto, farther than may strongly guard, and minister Spiritual Life to the other; knowing how oft we are mistaken, how easily seduced out of the way, how soon transported beyond our line in pretences to such raised, and still aspiring Passions; and how unfit ordinarily we are to manage, and govern them, especially in the highest transports towards such objects, so much above the level of Human circumstances: that when sincere, but not the best grounded, or guarded, yet rarely are they unmixed with some Alloy of Superstition, or Enthusiasm. But when heedlessly indulged, and let lose, soon pass into the most Phrensical extravagances. Wherefore the Scripture seems to take more care to fence in, than minister fuel to those however sacred flames; and expresses mostly our Duty to God in general terms, and inward acts of loving him with all your heart, fearing him, walking humbly with him, etc. But Offices of Righteousness, and Charity fill every page, are more positive, punctual, and express; the chief subject matter of Laws respecting us in society, wherein we stand upon even terms one with another; and the effects of which are presently, and sensibly beneficial, the stay and support of mankind; the common conveyance of all the comforts of this Life, and the most advantageous opportunity of provision for the next. So though this Precept seem literally, and most strictly to respect the Second Table only: yet hath it many signatures, and evidences of the completion of the First: The Bond of all Society, and nearest Original of all Justice, and Equity: The grand Pattern, and exemplar of all Laws, and Constitutions: The Epitome of our whole Duty revealed, or innate: The Law, Prophets, and Gospel in one: The end of the Commandments: The fairest transcript of the first, and everlasting Righteousness: The most perfect summary of God's will, and the exactest measure of his present, and after Dispensations; which may justly give it so high a Character in the close of my Text. This is the Law and the Prophets.  
From whence we may, first, admire the most apparent Equity, and impartiality of the Divine Laws, that so unexceptionably, and universally as much as possible provide for the good of all: God As one common Parent producing all alike, so equally takes care of, and guards the Concerns of all; and made their happiness run in the same Channel, that one part might not rejoice alone, nor be put to seek, nor hope to find it apart from others: Thus forcing us into all amicable Society supposed, and much strengthened by these prime dictates of God and Nature: adding all the force of his authority and injunction to fasten our mutual dependences, and enlarge the most diffusive felicity. He has thus given every other man as sure hold of, and as good an interest in you, as you in him; and made your willingness to receive, an equal obligation in you to give, and so may appeal to your own judgement, Are not my ways equal? shows that he is no respecter of persons in what he commands, no more than in what he distributes.  
2. Here also we ought to adore the infinite condescension of our great Lawgiver, that not only makes his own will, but our will our law; and shows how tender he is of our good, that he makes our own desires the frequent measure of his Precepts; and how far he delights in the welfare of his creatures, in that he abridges them not the loving and doing good to themselves, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Orat. 13. ● Pop. antioe p. 549.  but makes it the matter and pattern of their actions to others; and never finds fault with the excess of the one, when not perverted to obstruct or vacate the other. He is pleased you should love yourself as much as you can, the more the better, so you love your Neighbour as yourself. St. Chrysostom proving in us a natural knowledge of good and evil, and that from my Text, as before, subjoins this excellent gloss thereon, There is no need of many words, long laws, or various instructions, let your own will be your Law. You would receive good, do good to another: you would find mercy, show it to your Neighbour: you would be praised, praise others: you would be loved, love: you would enjoy pre-eminence, or advantages, be as forward to yield them first to others: Be you thus your Judge, and Lawgiver of your own life.  
Nothing may more ingratiate unto us his most Divine and excellent Precepts, than the consideration how, as near as possible, they stoop to our own wishes, and desire nothing may more shame, and confound, convict, and condemn all obstinate disobedience thereto, or transgression thereof, than to consider it as a violence offered to ourselves, as God: and one way, or other the not doing as we would be done unto.  
FINIS.