AN EXPLICATION OF THE DECALOGUE OR Ten Commandments. WITH REFERENCE TO THE CATECHISM OF THE CHURCH of ENGLAND. To which are premised by way of Introduction Several GENERAL DISCOURSES concerning GOD'S both NATURAL and POSITIVE LAWS.  
By Gabriel Towerson, sometimes Fellow of All-Souls College in Oxford, and now Rector of Wellwyn in Hertfordshire.  Philo in Praefat. ad Librum de Decalogo. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ΔΙ ' ΑΥΤΟΥ ΜΟΝΟΥ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ΝΟΜΟΥΣ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ν ΟΜΩΝ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΑ, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ΔΙΑ ΤΟΥΠΡΟΦΗΤΟ Υ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ΕΠ ' ΕΚΕΙΝΟΥΣ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
LONDON, Printed by J. Macock, for John Martin at the Bell in St Paul's Churchyard. MDCLXXVI.   

TO The Most Reverend FATHER in God GILBERT By Divine Providence LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY, Primate of all England, and Metropolitan, AND One of His Majesty's most Honourable Privy-Council, etc.  
May it please Your Grace,  
I Have here attempted an Explication of that part of our Church-Catechism which respects the Decalogue or Ten Commandments: Not out of any great opinion of mine own Abilities for such an undertaking, of which they, who know me, know me to be sufficiently diffident; but out of a due sense of the want of a just Discourse upon this Argument, which by no Man that I know of hath been handled according to its worth.  
It was once in my thoughts to have suppressed it, till I could have finished an Explication of the whole Catechism, as conceiving that that would have been more complete, and more acceptable to the World. But considering with myself that it would require some time to revise what I have already done, and much more to add to and perfect it; and since what is now offered to Your Grace, and, with Your Graces Leave, to the Public view also, is entire enough, if I have acquitted myself in it as I ought: I thought I should no way disoblige my Readers, if I sent this part of it before the rest to try the Judgement of the World. Especially since it is not impossible, but that I may entertain a better opinion of my own Labours, than they shall be found by more competent Judges to deserve.  
If any thing may seem with Reason to make such a procedure improper, it is, that I have referred myself to those Parts that are not yet published, for the proof of some things asserted here. But as it is only for such things as have been abundantly proved by others, and which therefore, especially in loco non suo, I might the better wave the confirmation of; so they are for the most part, if not only, such, as by the Laws of Discourse are to be supposed by all that will entreat of this Argument. However, if what is now tendered find acceptance, that blot shall not long lie upon it; and if not, the imperfectness thereof will be the most pardonable quality of my Discourse, or at least will be more excusable than my troubling the World with more.  
In this Treatise I have endeavoured, out of that heap which so copious a subject presents, to select such matter as is most considerable and pertinent; to deliver my sense concerning it in proper and intelligible expressions; and lastly, to confirm that by solid Reasons. For other things I have not been much solicitous, and much less, as Solomon speaks, to find out acceptable words, as conceiving such more proper to persuade than inform, which is or aught to be the Design of an Explication.  
If any taking occasion from this rude Discourse of mine shall oblige the World with a more perfect one, he shall find me among the foremost to return him thanks for it: Both because of the benefit I shall reap in common with others from it, and also because I shall have the satisfaction of considering, that, if I have not been myself so fortunate in Explaining the Ten Commandments, yet I have stirred up those that are, and thereby have fulfilled a Commandment, the observation whereof is of more advantage than the most accurate Explication of them all.  
In the mean time as I hope these my Labours will not be altogether unuseful, so I lay them at Your Grace's feet, as a Recognition of those many favours You have been pleased to confer upon me, and of that Duty I own to the Church of England; for the safeguard whereof, as Your Grace hath with great prudence and conduct happily presided, in an Age wherein You have met with more than ordinary Discouragements; so that God will still preserve Your Grace for the farther benefit thereof, is the hearty Prayer of  
Your Grace's in all bounden Duty and Service GABRIEL TOWERSON.   

THE DECALOGUE OR TEN COMMANDMENTS, As they are described and explained by the Catechism of the Church of ENGLAND.  
Quest. YOU said that your Godfathers and Godmothers did promise for you, that you should keep God's Commandments. Tell me how many there be.  
Answ. Ten.  
Quest. Which be they.  
Answ. The same which God spoke in the Twentieth Chapter of Exodus, saying, I am the Lord thy God who brought thee out of the Land of Egypt, out of the House of Bondage.  
I. Thou shalt have none other Gods but me.  
II. Thou shalt not make to thyself any Graven Image, nor the likeness of any thing that is in Heaven above, or in the Earth beneath, or in the Water under the Earth. Thou shalt not bow down to them, nor worship them. For I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, and visit the sins of the Fathers upon the Children unto the third and fourth Generation of them that hate me, and show mercy unto thousands in them that love me, and keep my Commandments.  
III. Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain: for the Lord will not hold him guiltless that taketh his Name in vain.  
iv Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath day. Six  shalt thou labour, and do all that thou hast to do; but the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God. In it thou shalt do no manner of work, thou, and thy Son, and thy Daughter, thy Manservant, and thy Maidservant, thy , and the Stranger that is within thy Gates. For in six days the Lord made Heaven and Earth, the Sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day; wherefore the Lord blessed seventh day and hallowed it.  
V Honour thy Father and thy Mother, that thy days may be long in the Land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.  
VI Thou shalt do no murder.  
VII. Thou shalt not commit adultery.  
VIII. Thou shalt not steal.  
IX. Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy Neighbour.  
X. Thou shalt not covet thy Neighbour's House, thou shalt not covet thy Neighbour's Wife, nor his Servant, nor his Maid, nor his Ox, nor his Ass, nor any thing that is his.  
Quest. What dost thou chief learn by these Commandments?  
Answ. I learn two things: my duty towards God, and my duty towards my Neighbour.  
Quest. What is thy duty towards God?  
Answ. My duty towards God is to believe in him, to fear him, and to love him with all my heart, with all my mind, with all my soul, and with all my strength; to worship him, to give him thanks, to put my whole trust in him, to call upon him, to honour his holy Name and his Word; and to serve him truly all the days of my life.  
Quest. What is thy duty towards thy Neighbour?  
Answ. My duty towards my Neighbour, is to love him as myself, and to do to all men, as I would they should do unto me. To love, honour and secure my Father and Mother. To honour and obey the King, and all that are put in authority under him. To submit myself to all my Governors, Teachers, Spiritual Pastors and Masters. To order myself lowly and reverently to all my betters. To hurt no body by word or deed. To be true and just in all my deal. To bear no malice nor hatred in my heart. To keep my hands from picking and stealing, and my tongue from evil speaking, lying, and slandering. To keep my body in temperance, soberness, and chastity. Not to covet nor desire other men's goods; but to learn and labour truly to get mine own living, and to do my duty in that state of life, unto which it shall please God to call me.   

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EXPLICATION OF THE DECALOGUE.  

DISCOURSE I. Of the Law of NATURE.  
How it doth appear that there is such a Law, What the general Contents of that Law are, And of what continuance its obligation is. A digression concerning men's misapprehensions in the matter of Nature's Law, and from whence those misapprehensions do proceed. Of what use the knowledge of Nature's Law is, after the superinducing the Laws of Moses and of Christ.  
PRoposing to myself to entreat of the Decalogue, or Ten Commandments, according as the Catechism of the Church of England hath understood them, I foresee it necessary to premise somewhat concerning the Divine Laws in general, and then of the Ten Commandments in particular. For as that Catechism, though it restrains Gods holy will to the Ten Commandments, yet doth it upon supposition of their containing in them all other his Laws and Commandments; so before we descend to the Explication of those Ten, it will be necessary to inquire, By what Authority they stand, how they come to oblige us, and what measures we are to proceed by in the Interpretation of them?  
Now the Laws of God are of two sorts, to wit, either Natural or Positive; by the former whereof I understand such a Law or Laws as are founded upon natural principles, and investigable by them; by the latter, such as have no other visible foundation, at least, than the mere good pleasure of God, and are therefore to be known only by revelation from himself.  
The Law of Nature again hath these four things to be enquired into, which accordingly shall be the boundaries of my discourse concerning it.  

1. How it doth appear that there is such a Law.  
2. What the general Contents of that Law are.  
3. Of what continuance the obligation thereof is.  
4. Of what use the knowledge thereof is, after the superinducing the Laws of Moses and Christ.   
I. It is very well observed by the judicious Hooker, and will be evident to any man that shall consult his own understanding, that all knowledge is at length resolved into such things as are clear and evident of themselves; for all knowledge of things obscure being made by such things as are more known than the things we seek after, either it must terminate in such things as are clear and evident of themselves, or we can have no certain knowledge of any thing: That by which we endeavour to know any thing, requiring still something to manifest it, and so on in infinitum. Now though a resolution into things clear and evident of themselves be not always actually made, nor indeed necessary to be so, the intermediate principles of any Science coming by discourse to be as well known, as those things which are clear and evident of themselves; yet being now to penetrate, as it were, into the very bottom of all Moral Truths, it will be requisite for us to dig so much the deeper, and deduce the being of the Law of Nature, if not from such principles as are the lowest in their kind, yet from such as are nearest to them. I have 
* Explic. of the Apostles Creed.  elsewhere shown, and shall therefore now take it for granted, that there is such a thing as an Alwise and good God, that that God is the Creator and Sustainer of the world, and all things in it; which being granted, it will follow, that there is a right in God to give Laws to his Creatures, in such things as are in their power, and suitable to their nature to execute. For what can be more rational, than that every one should have the disposal of those things which he is the Author of, and consequently, if God be the Author of all things, that he himself should have the command of them? All therefore that will be requisite for us to inquire into, is, whether as God hath the power of giving Laws to his Creatures, and to man in particular, so he hath actually done it, and consigned him to the obedience of them? Now for this we shall need no other proof, than that freedom of will, which God hath given to humane nature; for being man is not carried by any inevitable necessity as other Creatures are, but left to the guidance of his own reason and will, either he must have a Rule set him to proceed by, or it shall be in his power, even by the consent of the Almighty, to disturb the order of Nature. Now forasmuch as it can be no way suitable to the wisdom of any one to put Creatures into a power, that I say not into a kind of necessity, to disturb his own orders and designs, therefore God being Alwise must necessarily have prevented this inconvenience, and given him a Rule to direct his will and operations. Again, being it appears not, that man at the first had any other revealed Law of God than that of not eating the forbidden Fruit, and many Nations of the World have no opportunity to know those Revelations he hath since made, it follows, that God hath implanted in the soul of each particular man a Law by which he is to act, or at least such principles from which he may deduce it. Lastly, forasmuch as there is in all men a conscience, excusing or commending them when they have done any thing they apprehend to be good, but disapproving and condemning them if they have done any thing which they believe to be evil; it follows undeniably that there is a Rule, whereby our actions are to be guided. For if mankind were left at large, what ground could there be of his either applauding or condemning himself, for any supposed either virtuous or vicious actions? Neither is it any prejudice to this inference, that men's consciences do oftentimes condemn them for those things that are no parts of the Law of Nature, or any other. For as we pretend not to infer the goodness or evil of any action in itself, from the consciences either acquitting or condemning the person that doth it, but only, that there is such a thing as good or evil: so cannot any reason be assigned of our consciences either accusing or condemning us, if the notion of good and evil were not planted in the soul of man by that God who form it. For though tradition and education may persuade us to believe many things to be evil, which are in themselves not so, and consequently incline the conscience of him that committeth them, to condemn or disquiet him for so doing; yet could they not (unless they could build without a foundation) incline the man to be troubled for it, but upon supposition that there is such a thing as evil. Again, when the main trouble of conscience proceeds from hence, even from the doing of those things which that assures us to be evil, what reason can be assigned of that trouble, if it were not a truth implanted in our hearts that we ought not to do those things which our conscience assureth us to be bad? For as it is evident, no man could be troubled for acting against his conscience, but upon supposition of his being bound to follow the dictates of it: so is it not to be imagined, that that supposition could have any other root than Nature. For as for all frightful stories of Hell, and the like (which men, who would be thought wise, would have the ground of all Religion) even those themselves, if it be duly considered, will be found to receive their force and efficacy from the conscience's foreperswasion of good and evil, and particularly of its own obligation. For setting aside the nature of good and evil as mere fancies, and my conscience shall not so much be affrighted at the stories of vengeance, as at the shaking of a reed, because conscious of nothing that may deserve it. I conclude therefore with S. Paul in that excellent discourse of his upon this argument, Rom. 2.14. That though the Gentiles have not the Law, that is to say no revealed one, yet they are a Law unto themselves, which show the work of the Law written in their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts in the mean while accusing or else excusing one another.  
II. The being of the Law of Nature being thus demonstrated, inquire we in the second place, what the Precepts thereof are; I do not mean to give account of every particular one (for that were both an infinite and needless task) but of the more general ones, from which the other may be easily deduced. Now there are two ways of investigating any truths, as the forementioned Hooker hath well observed; the one by the causes which constitute it, the other by the signs and tokens which attend it. The latter of these is without doubt the most easy, but withal the most fallible, and therefore quitting that at present, I shall choose rather to pitch upon the former, and exemplify the Precepts of this Law by it. Now there are three things wherein our duty is comprehended, according to those several relations we stand in; our duty to God, our Neighbour, and ourselves. I begin with the last of these because nearest to us, and therefore in all probability most easy to be discerned by us, where the first capital Precept, that presents itself to us, is the preservation of ourselves. Now that this is a Precept of that Law, which we call the Law of Nature, beside our own natural propension to it, will appear from God's giving us a being, and means to support it. For as the destruction of our being is a direct contradiction to that order which he hath set in Nature; so our neglect to preserve it, is, though not a direct, yet a consequential contradiction to that provision which he hath made for us in the world. For what design can we suppose God to have had, principally and chief I mean, in those good things he hath given us, but the support of our being by them? If then it were the design of the Almighty, in the good things of this world, that we should receive support and comfort by them, if this design of his appear from the nature of the things themselves; the preservation of ourselves is a branch of that Law, and we consequently transgressors of it if we neglect it. But from hence we may collect, what we are to think of all self-murthers, excesses, or neglects: for if the preservation of ourselves be a duty incumbent on us by the Law of our Creation, then must that be a sin which either destroys, or impairs, or neglects it, and consequently, all laying violent hands upon ourselves, all intemperance, and sloth, and idleness. From the duty we own to ourselves, ascend we to that which is terminated in God, and see whether there be any footsteps of such a one in that Law whereof we are speaking. Now there are two things wherein our duty to God may be comprehended, our honouring him and obeying him. The former of these is evident from that excellency, which the soul, assisted with the bare light of reason, may discern in God. For being it is a clear dictate of the light of reason, that whatsoever is excellent is to be honoured; God as being the most excellent essence, yea the fountain of all others excellencies, must be much more so, by how much he transcends all others. But from hence it is evident what we are to think, not only of all manifest contempts of him, but of adopting any thing else into equal honour with him; for being God is not only to be honoured, but to be honoured also above all other beings, because so far surpassing them; the adopting of any other into the like honour, must be a diminution of his, and consequently a breach of this fundamental Law, as well as of that which saith, Thou shalt have no other Gods beside me. The same is no less evident concerning that other branch of our duty to God, even our yielding obedience to all his commands; for being (as was before shown) God is our maker and sustainer, he has a right to our obedience, and consequently, we a necessity of obeying him. But from hence will follow, not only our yielding obedience to all other the Laws of Nature, but to all positive and revealed one's; for being the command of God is that which challenges our obedience, and not the manner whereby it is made known to us, whatsoever appears to be such must be equally our duty, whether engraven in Tables of stone, as that of Moses was, or in the more noble Tables of our heart, as this of Nature. The only thing now remaining to be proved, is what we commonly call our duty to our Neighbour, and may be comprised in these two generals, the giving to every man that which is his own, and where that is requisite, the ministering to them of ours. The former whereof as it is so plain, that it hardly admits of any proof, so both the one and the other receive sufficient confirmation from our natural desire of receiving the like charity and justice from others; for being (as the forementioned Hooker well observeth) those things which are equal, must needs all have one measure, if I cannot but wish to receive all justice and requisite charity from the hands of others, I cannot but think it reasonable to afford it; and I must either condemn my own desires, and that nature from whence they flow, or think other men's as necessary to be complied with.  
III. From what hath been said concerning the Law of Nature, it is evident, thirdly, that this Law is unchangeable, or at least must continue of force so long as our nature doth; for being (as was before said) rooted in Nature, and flowing from natural causes, it must consequently have the same continuance with those causes from whence it flows. Thus, for example, to give every man that which is his own, is so a duty that it can never cease to be so; as in like manner, to offer violence to no man, not to take away any man's life or substance. Indeed it sometimes happens, that there seems to be a change in this Law, as in those known instances of the Israelites spoiling the Egyptians, and Abraham's sacrificing his innocent Son. But if it be well considered, it will be found that there is not so much a change made in the Law, as in the matter about which it is conversant; for God having a paramount power over the Creatures, and never so parting with it, as not to reserve to himself a liberty to withdraw it at pleasure, whatsoever he commands to be taken away, doth thereby cease to be that persons whose it was before, and consequently it is no violation of that Law, which commands the giving every man his own, to disrobe such a person of it. The like is to be said concerning Abraham's sacrificing his Son, or the Magistrates putting a Malefactor to death; for it being not simply murder to take away a man's life, but to take it away either without commission from God, or without any just motive; Abraham's sacrificing his Son, and the Magistrates putting a man to death, is no breach of that Law which forbids murder: Because the former did what he did by commission from God, who is absolute Lord of the Creatures; and the Magistrate puts Malefactors to death, by virtue of that general Commission, which empowers those that are in Authority, to execute vengeance upon all that do evil. By which solution all pretence is taken away, of drawing those actions into example, and particularly that of spoiling the Egyptians. For it being evident from the Scripture, that whatsoever any man, how wicked soever, acquires by the ordinary course of God's providence, is truly and properly his, and no diminution of that appearing but by an express command from God, as the Israelites had to spoil the Egyptians; to take any thing away from such a person, without that command, is truly and properly to take away that which is another's, and consequently eternally sinful, because that Law, of which it is a transgression, is eternal.  
But here a question may not impertinently be made, and I shall the rather intent it, because the resolution thereof may confer somewhat to the clearing of that which follows; to wit, how it comes to pass that this Law of Nature hath not only been so much disobeyed, but so much misunderstood by those who were under the obligation of it; for flowing (as I have before said) from natural principles, the truth whereof is evident to all, and being also (as was now shown) eternally obligatory to all mankind, it may seem a wonder how this Law should be so strangely misunderstood, as experience tells us it hath been: The Romans, a polite and civilised people, accounting it no injury to invade the Territories of their Neighbours, as the whole Heathen world strangely offending against that fundamental Law, which forbids the adopting of any Creature into equal honour with the Almighty. In answer to which, we are first to know, that though the first principles of natural knowledge carry sufficient evidence in themselves, and accordingly have been with great consent acknowledged by all (whence it is, that no Nation almost hath been so barbarous as not to own a God, and that God is to be worshipped) yet the deductions from those principles, which are no less a part of that Law, require some care and intention in those that make them; which the world, generally slothful, not being over forward to use, it is no wonder if men have many times erred in several particulars thereof; for let the truth, we are to know, be built upon never so certain and evident principles, yea upon such as are no less evident, than that the whole is greater than the part, yet, if we attend not to the consequences of those principles, we may err in our apprehensions about them, even as he who hath a light to guide him, may either stumble or wander out of his way, if he do not advert to those bright rays that stream from it. 2. But there is yet a more weighty cause of men's misapprehensions in those things which are the Precepts of this great Law; and that is the depravedness of their wills and affections, and their earnest pursuit of such things as promise them any present pleasure or advantage; for finding sin to minister to these, and themselves strongly inclined to obtain them, the desire of so doing makes them first willing to believe that, which leads to them, to be no impiety, and then actually to believe it none; for as Minutius Felix speaks, facilè credimus quae volumus, we easily believe that which we desire to be, our passion for any present enjoyment either wholly stifling or suppressing the dictates of right reason, which should keep us from the pursuing of it. 3. Lastly, (which S. Paul expressly affirms, 
* Rom. 1.28.  and is in truth the best account of this difficulty) the Heathen world liking not to retain God in their knowledge, nor those Precepts of his which this great Law contained, it is no wonder if he gave them over, not only to vile affections, but also to a reprobate and brutish mind; for how can it be but extremely just, to withdraw the light from those who shut their eyes against it when they have it, and to make that their punishment, which was their own choice?  
iv The fourth and last thing comes now to be discussed, to wit, What is the usefulness of this Law? A question which may seem the more necessary to be asked after the superinducing of the Law of Moses, and that of Christ. In answer to which I say, 

1. That though these later Laws should acquaint us with every thing, that the Law of Nature contains, yet would not that Law be unnecessary to be looked into; for being given by God, as the others were, and continuing in full force and virtue, the same reason and piety, which obligeth us to the consideration of those, will put us upon the consideration of this.  
2. Again, though the Laws of Moses and of Christ should contain all the same Precepts, which the Law of Nature doth, yet the reasonableness of those Precepts appearing mostly, if not only, from this, the consideration thereof cannot but be exceeding useful; as well for the commendation of the equity of him that gave them, as for the more vigorous stirring up ourselves to yield obedience to them; for when Law comes assisted with reason, it doth not only convince but persuade, and makes us embrace as well as bear our Fetters.  
3. There is yet another reason, and a much more forcible one, of our study of Nature's Law; for beside that no reason obligeth us to think all things set down so clearly in the other, as not to stand in need of some assistance from this light, in the explication of moral duties; the Law of Moses and Christ both presuppose some things known from this great fundamental Law: for urging the several Precepts therein contained, not so much from the reasonableness of the things themselves, as the authority of God that gave them, and the mighty works whereby he gave witness to those that published them; they must consequently suppose it known from Nature's Law, that there is a God and Providence, and that that God is to be believed and obeyed. Whilst others therefore, with no less danger to themselves, than with folly and unreasonableness, despise this Candle of the Lord, let us on the contrary contemplate and adore it, as being assured, that though it be not the Sun, yet it is the Phosphorus to it, and both foretells and points at it.     

DISC. II. Of the positive Laws of God, and particularly of the Law of Moses.  
The positive Laws of God are either such as were given to man in the state of Innocency, or such as were given to him since his fall. That the Law concerning the not eating of the Tree of Knowledge, is of the former number, What the reason of the giving of it was, and of what concernment it is to us. The like enquired concerning the Law of Eve's becoming subject to her Husband, and of his being obliged to labour; both which are shown to be of universal and perpetual Obligation. Of the Laws given to Noah, and particularly concerning that of not eating Blood, which is shown not to be of present Obligation. A digression concerning the reason and use of Positive Laws, and particularly of such, the matter whereof is moral. Of the Authority and Obligation of the Law of Moses, and from whence our primary Obligation thereto ariseth. In what instances, and in what measure the Law of Moses doth now oblige.  
I Said in the beginning of my last, that the Laws of God were of two sorts, to wit, either Natural or Positive: By the former whereof I told you, you were to understand such Laws as were founded upon natural principles, and knowable by them; by the latter, such as are founded upon the mere good pleasure of God, and consequently to be known only by revelation from himself; for though the matter of some Positive Laws be the same with that of the Law of Nature, and consequently those at least may seem to have the same foundation and deduction with it; yet as that matter is a part of those Precepts which we call Positive, so it is founded upon his mere good pleasure that gave them, and consequently knowable to us, not by their own inward light, but by such outward means as he shall be pleased to manifest them by. Thus for example, Though I may know from the light of Nature, that I ought not to have any other gods besides the true, nor adopt any other person into equal honour with him; yet, as this was part of the Law given in Mount Sinai, so it depended upon his alone good will and pleasure, and consequently could not be known, but by his own public Declaration, and those Writings which have transmitted it unto us.  
Now the Positive Laws of God, we are now in order to entreat of, may be reduced to two heads, 

1. The former whereof were given to man in the state of innocency,  
2. The latter, since his fall from it.    
I. If we look upon man in the state of innocency, so we shall find he had a Positive Law imposed upon him; the Scripture telling us of an express Command of God, Not to eat of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, which he had placed in the midst of the Garden of Eden, Gen. 2.17. Now there are two things which will be requisite to be enquired into concerning this Law, and which therefore I shall endeavour the resolution of. 1. What necessity or expedience there was of giving such a Law? And, 2. How this Law concerns us? The ground of the former Query, is that perfection which seems to be in the Law of Nature before given. For if (as I have before shown) this gives direction to us in all cases relating either to God, our Neighbour, or ourselves, if this Law was at that time clear and manifest to him to whom it was given, what need was there of adding to it another Law? and such as had nothing to commend it to our first Parents, but the authority and pleasure of him that gave it? But to this the answer is easy; and that is, That God therefore gave it, not as a supplement of Nature's Law, which needed it not, but that he might thereby have a firmer proof of man's obedience to himself. For the Law of Nature containing such things, as aught in reason to be done, though there were no Command of God prescribing them, our Obedience thereto might proceed rather from compliance with our own reason, than with his Command who gave it. But giving a Law, the matter whereof had nothing to commend it, but the authority of him who gave it, obedience thereto could proceed from no other consideration, and consequently must be the surest proof of our obedience. The same is to be said, in some measure, of Gods making Positive Laws concerning those things which were prescribed by that of Nature; for God's Positive or Revealed Laws exacting our obedience, upon the score of his authority that gave them, we cannot satisfy those Laws, but by having a principal regard to his Command who imposed them on us. Having thus shown the expediency of Gods giving that Positive Law concerning the not eating of the Tree of Knowledge, proceed we in the next place to show how this Law concern us; which is a Query no less necessary than the former; for if this Law concern not us, the consideration thereof in this place must be very impertinent, because enquiring into our own obligation and duty. In answer therefore to this I say, 1. That this Law being given to Adam, not only in his personal capacity, but as he was the representative of all mankind, (as appears from the Scriptures charging the guilt of it upon all that descended from his loins) this Law must be consequently supposed to have been obligatory to us, as well as to him to whom it was immediately given. 2. Again being it is a dictate of Nature's Law, not only that we should yield obedience to his commands, but also, where we fail, repent of the breach of them; the Law of abstaining from the Tree of Knowledge, as being a Law of Gods to us, must consequently so far concern us, as to oblige us to repent of the breach of it.  
II. From such Law, or Laws, as were given to man in the state of innocency, pass we to those which were given to him after his fall. Where  
1. The first that presents itself, is that command of God concerning the Woman's being subject to her Husband, Gen. 3.16. Unto the Woman he said, I will greatly multiply thy sorrows and conception. In sorrow shalt thou bring forth children, and thy desire shall be to thy Husband, and he shall rule over thee. For though it be true, that this was spoken more particularly to Eve, upon occasion of her transgressing Gods Command: yet as the Curse wherewith this Command is accompanied, was manifestly intended for all of the Female Sex; so it is no less evident, as for that reason, so for the capacity the Woman was in, that the Command was likewise intended. For being Eve was the representative of all Womankind, as well as the Wife of Adam, whatsoever Command was given to her, must be supposed to belong to all of her Sex and condition. And accordingly S. Paul doth not only urge this obedience upon the Corinthian Women in reference to the Law, 1 Cor. 14.34. but yet more particularly, 1 Tim. 1.14. upon the account of this Command, that was given to Eve; for having before said, that he suffered not a Woman to teach, nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence, he adds, as a reason of it, because Adam was not deceived, but the Woman being deceived was in the transgression. Which being the very reason why God gave the forementioned Command to Eve, of being subject to her Husband, it is evident that, when in the Epistle to the Corinthians he saith, that they are commanded to be under obedience, as also saith the Law, his meaning was of that Law which was given to Eve, and consequently that that Law is obligatory to all. The same is to be said of the other positive Law.  
2. The second is that which was given to Adam, upon the account of his disobedience, Gen. 3.19. In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread, until thou return unto the ground; for that that was a Command, as well as a Curse, is evident from the 23. verse, where we find God sending forth the man from the Garden of Eden, to till the ground from whence he was taken. Now forasmuch as Adam was the representative of mankind, as of whose blood all Nations were made, forasmuch as he is here considered, not under the relation of a Husband, but a man, nor is there any thing in the Precept to determine it to him, whatsoever is given in command to him, must be supposed to be intended to all persons according to their capacities and degrees. And indeed, as in the Laws of men, such are presumed to oblige the Generations following, which have nothing in them to restrain them to the present; so there is the same reason to believe that Law of God, which was given to him from whom we are descended, to oblige us also, if there be nothing in it to determine it to him alone; for it being neither suitable to the majesty, nor agreeable to the custom of Lawgivers, to renew their Laws, as often as the persons change that are under them, that which is directed to one Generation, must be presumed to concern the next, and so on to succeeding Ages. Lastly, for there is something particular to the former Laws, which is not common to all others, the subjection of the Woman, and the laboriousness of the Man, being founded upon the transgression of our first Parents, which the Scripture affirms to be imputed unto us, those duties themselves must consequently appertain to us, as well as those transgressions do.  
3. From these Precepts given to our first Parents, pass we to those which were given to Noah and his Sons, who after the Flood were under the same capacity; that is to say, the Representatives of all mankind, because all mankind was then in them. Now there are two positive, or revealed Laws, which the Scripture informs us to have been given to Noah, a prohibition of murder, with a command to put him to death that should be guilty of it, and a like prohibition of eating flesh with the life or blood, Gen. 9.4. and so on. Of the former of these being obligatory to us, there can be no doubt, as because they to whom it was given were the Representatives of mankind, so because the substance of that Law is natural; the Precepts of the Law of Nature both forbidding murder, and settling a Magistracy to punish it. The greatest question will be concerning the latter, even that of not eating blood. For though the Precept be ceremonial, yet it doth not follow, because the ceremonial Law of Moses is abrogated, that therefore that also must be: for (as S. Paul speaks concerning Circumcision) this being not of Moses but of the Fathers, yea of those Fathers which were the Representatives of all mankind, the abolishing of that doth not necessarily draw with it the abolishing of the other. Again it is manifest, that as many Nations of the posterity of Noah did carefully abstain from blood, so the Jews admitted none even to the privilege of being Proselytes of the Gates, (which was the lowest form of their Religion) without an obligation from them to observe it. Which is no more than what we find prescribed by God himself, Leu. 17.10. It is evident, 3. That though the Apostles and Elders of Jerusalem eased the Gentile Christians of Circumcision, yet they laid this Precept upon them of abstaining from blood, Acts 15.20. And accordingly, the Latin Church for above a thousand years, and the Greek Church unto this day do religiously abstain from it. To return now an answer to this difficulty: Where first, I shall readily confess, that this being a Law given to Noah and his Sons, the then Representatives of mankind, it was consequently to oblige all mankind, till it should be repealed. I shall make no difficulty, 2. To grant, that the abolition of the Ceremonial Law of Moses, doth not necessarily draw with it the abolishing of the other, because in time before it. But then 3. I say, that it is manifest enough that the Precept was repealed by Christ; and I allege for my saying to that of S. Paul to the Romans c. 14.14. and a like passage 1 Tim. 4.4. In the former whereof, speaking of meats, it is said, that he both knows and is persuaded by the Lord Jesus, that there is nothing unclean of itself; but to him that thinketh any thing to be unclean, to him it is unclean. In the latter, That every creature of God is good, and nothing to be refused, if it be received with thanksgiving. I know what hath been said, and therefore I am willing to obviate it, that, when it is affirmed by S. Paul that nothing is unclean of itself, as in like manner, that every creature of God is good, we are to understand both of things in their own nature, and abstracting from any positive Law. But how weak this evasion is, it is no hard matter for him to discern, who reads on but to the last clause of each of the forequoted Texts; For when, in the former, the phrase unclean of itself is not opposed to that which is so by positive prohibition, but to that only which becomes so by a man's erroneous thinking it to be so; For I know (saith he) and am persuaded by the Lord Jesus that nothing is unclean of itself, but (or rather 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  unless) to him that thinketh it to be unclean, to him it is unclean; And in the other, after he had said that every creature of God is good, and nothing to be refused, if it be received with thanksgiving, what doubt can remain, but that it is lawful to partake of any, as to any positive Precept of God to the contrary? For if nothing be unclean, but by the erroneous conscience of him that takes it, or some such accident; and again every creature of God is so good as not to be refused, provided it be received with thanksgiving; either there is no positive Law against the partaking of it, or it shall be lawful for us to partake of it though there be. If it be farther remanded, Why, if this Precept of Noah be abrogated, the Apostles should notwithstanding press the observation of it upon the Gentile Christians? I answer, Not because the Precept continued to oblige, but in respect to such of the Jews as had embraced the Christian Religion, who, in those first times of Christianity, were so addicted to the Rites in which they had been brought up, that unless the Gentile Christians had complied with them in some things (those especially which were contained in the Precepts of Noah, which they had all along thought of absolute necessity) they would have gone near to have fallen off from the Christian Faith. Neither is this said without proof, even from that Council itself; S. James, whose advice the Council followed in their Decree, giving this as the reason why he would have the Apostles writ to the Gentile Christians to abstain from things strangled and from blood, even because Moses hath of old time them that preach him, being read in the Synagogue every Sabbath day, Acts 15.21. that is to say, because such of the Jews, as had embraced Christianity, knew by the weekly reading of the Books of Moses, that those things were there forbidden even to Noah and his Sons, and could not therefore but be much startled at the neglect of them. The result of the premises is this, that whatsoever Laws were given either to our first Parents, or Noah, the Representatives of mankind, do oblige all that descend from them, unless peculiar to their persons, or abrogated by a latter Law.  
4. Having considered the Precepts given to Adam and Noah, and shown their obligatoriness to us, the order of the Scripture leads us to the Law of Moses, and particularly to that part of it which is contained in the Ten Commandments. But because it may be demanded (as before concerning that Law given to Adam in the state of innocency) what expediency there was of giving these and other revealed Laws? and no place can be so proper for the resolution of that question as this, because lying as it were in the confines of those primitive Laws, and that of Moses, to each of which it is to be applied; I will, before I proceed to say any thing of the Law of Moses in particular, return an answer to that demand. Two things I have before observed to be the matter of those Laws which God hath superadded to the Law of Nature; either 1. such as are Ritual and Ceremonial, or 2. Moral and Natural. As to the former of these, there may seem to be a double reason of Gods superadding them to the Law of Nature; 1. The first whereof is, that they might be a memento to us of the more substantial Precepts of God; for being, through the depravedness of Nature, not only apt to forget our duty, but to immerse ourselves in the things of sense, it seemed but requisite, that even those sensible things should be so fitted, as to bring the other to our remembrance. And hence no doubt the forbidding of blood to Noah and his posterity, the many purifications and washings enjoined the Jews; in which, as in so many Emblems or Pictures, the world that then was, might plainly behold the abhorrency they were to have for the sin of murder, and that purity of soul wherewith they ought to approach their Maker. 2. The second reason of Gods superadding positive ceremonious Precepts to the Law of Nature and Reason, was that they might be not only as a memento of, but as a fence to those substantial Precepts which he had before given. A thing which those ceremonial Precepts did no doubt serve most excellently for, among those persons to whom they were given: For when men were taught to have blood in so great an abhorrency, as to abstain even from the blood of Beasts, they could not but be thereby kept in a greater apprehension of shedding the blood of man, in whom the image of God resides. But because (as I have before said) this ceremonial Precept ceaseth to oblige us, as in like manner those of Moses; Christ, as he has introduced a different dispensation as to the main, so he has supplied the want of those helps, by the more liberal effusion of his Spirit. I will therefore proceed to such positive Laws of the Old Testament, the matter whereof is Moral and Natural. Now the reason of Gods superadding these Laws to that of Nature, and forbidding those things by positive Laws, which were before forbidden by the other, may appear from what hath been heretofore said, concerning the difficulty of discovering the Precepts of Nature's Law, and the depravedness of humane nature; for being the Precepts of the Law of Nature are not easily to be discerned, and man, partly through evil principles, partly through the corruptness of his will and affections, is become unable to discern them, it seemed but necessary, that those Laws should be proposed anew to him, and he taught that by revelation from Heaven, which his own reason either could not at all, or not so easily discover. Thus when Moses had broken the two Tables of stone, wherein God had written the Ten Commandments, and thereby defaced the characters thereof, the same reason, which prompted him to write them at the first, prompted him to write them a second time, and renew that which Moses had defaced. Which as it was, no doubt, a just obligation to the Jews, to be doubly thankful to the Almighty; so ought it to be no less to us that God hath written that Law in his Word, which he had before graven in the Tables of our hearts; these Tables being defaced, not by an angry Moses, but by ourselves, and by our own either neglect or perverseness.  
The reason of positive Laws being thus discovered, pass we now on in the investigation of the Law of Moses, and particularly of the Ten Commandments; concerning which you may remember I proposed to inquire into these three things, 

1. By what Authority that Law stands.  
2. How it comes to oblige us; and  
3. What measures we are to proceed by in finding out the full importance of it.    
1. To the first of these, or at least so far as the Decalogue is concerned, the Preface to it is a direct answer, telling us that God spoke all these words; and indeed, if any Law can pretend to be of divine Authority, this of the Ten Commandments certainly may. For first of all, when Moses had by the commandment of God assembled all the people of Israel near Mount Sinai, God by a voice from Heaven published all these Commandments in their ears, and with all the signs and demonstrations of his Majesty. Again, when the same people, terrified by the dreadful appearance of his Majesty, desired to have this Law delivered to them by Moses, God, in compliance with their desires, wrote the same words in two Tables of stone, and transmitted them by him unto the people, Exod. 31.8. Lastly, when Moses had broken those two Tables, and thereby put God upon a necessity of transcribing them anew, he wrote upon other two Tables the same Ten Commandments, as you may see Deut. 10.4. So that if the publishing of Commandments from Heaven, or writing them with his own finger, can entitle them to a divine Authority, the Law of the Ten Commandments certainly may, as being notified by both.  
2. But because it is not enough to make a Law obligatory to us, that it hath God for its Author and Promulger, unless it do also appear to have been intended for our direction and obedience; therefore before we proceed to infer our own obligation by it, we must inquire how it comes to do so, and what appearance there is of Gods intending it for our direction and obedience. And here in the first place, it is manifest enough, that what was before said concerning the Laws given to Adam and Noah, cannot have place in those given to Moses and the Israelites; those being not Representatives of mankind, as Adam and Noah were, but only of the Jewish state. Now being the Gentiles were no part of that body, nor descended from the Authors of it, therefore what was given to them cannot be supposed to oblige us for that reason, and consequently some other ground must be looked out for our obligation to it. It is manifest, secondly, that as there is nothing in the persons, to whom this Law was given, to persuade our obligation to it, so is there much in the Law itself to persuade Gods designing it for the Jews alone; for pressing, as he doth, obedience to this Law, upon the account of his delivering them out of Egypt, he doth consequently restrain the Law itself to those who were benefited by it, which none but the Israelites were. And indeed, beside the Preface of the Almighty, and that of Moses before the same Commandments, Deut. 5.1. Hear (O Israel) the statutes and judgements, which I speak in your ears this day; it is the known exultation of that People, and of the most holy persons of it, that these Constitutions were peculiarly theirs; for What Nation is there so great, (saith Moses) which hath statutes and judgements so righteous, as all this Law which I set before you this day, Deut. 4.8? And He showeth (saith the Psalmist) his word unto Jacob, and his statutes and judgements unto Israel, he hath not dealt so with any Nation, and as for his judgements they have not known them, Psal. 147.19, 20. And truly thus much must be yielded to the forequoted Texts, that the Law was intended for the Jews alone, whilst the Church was confined to Palestine; but as there was to be a time, even by the Predictions of their own Prophets, when all Nations should flow unto it, Isa. 2.2. So it is apparent, thirdly, from the same Prophet, That the Law was then proportionably to extend its dominion, and comprehend those new comers, as well as its ancient subjects; the design of their thus flowing into the House of the God of Jacob being, that he might teach them of his ways, and they walk in his paths, as you may see v. 3. of that Chapter. And accordingly, as before this Law was thus to take effect, it was in reason to have a new promulgation suitable to the extent of its dominion; so, if we consult the stories of those times, we shall find God was not wanting in making it known to the Gentile world; partly by the dispersing of the Jews among them, but more especially by that signal act of his Providence in causing it to be translated by the Septuagint into Greek, which was then the most known Language of the Gentile World. By which means that Law, which was before shown only unto Jacob, came unto the knowledge of the Heathen, from whom it had been so long concealed. Now though what hath been alleged from the Prophet Isay, and this universal Promulgation, be enough to establish what we have deduced from it: yet because it may conduce much to our satisfaction, to evidence it from the New Testament, which is the immediate rule of our belief and practice; I will therefore, to remove all scruples, endeavour to show from thence, that (whatever it was, whilst the Church was confined to Jewry) yet, after the coming in of the Gentiles, the Law was intended to take in them also, and oblige them to the several Precepts of it. To begin with the Ceremonial Law, because the most unlikely to concern us, and therefore, if well proved, of more force to conclude the like of others: Concerning which it may suffice to represent the use S. Paul makes of it, 1 Cor. 9.8. Say I these things as a man, or saith not the Law the same also? For it is written in the Law of Moses, thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the Ox that treadeth out the Corn. Doth God take care for Oxen? Or saith he it altogether for our sakes? for our sakes no doubt this is written: that he that ploweth should blow in hope, and that he that thresheth in hope should be partaker of his hope. For not only arguing (as S. Paul there doth) from a Ceremonial Precept to a Christian duty, but affirming expressly concerning that Precept, that it was written for the times of the Gospel, he thereby plainly shows, that though the force thereof were evacuated as to the Ceremony, yet it is obligatory as to the Moral, which it was chief designed to consign, and intended by God so to do. And therefore, if I were to prove in like manner the necessity of purifying our souls, before we betake ourselves to the solemn Worship of God, as it is evident from this of S. Paul, that it were enough to allege a Precept out of the Law, because written for us as well as for the Jews, so particularly from God's frequent enjoining the Jews to wash themselves and their clothes, before they appeared before him; for doth God take care of clean attire, or a smooth skin, any more than he doth of Oxen? and if not, may not I as well conclude, that for our sakes no doubt this was written, that he that presents himself before the Lord should appear with a clean heart, with a soul no way stained by any unrepented sin? Now if even Ceremonial Precepts were some way intended for us, much more those of a higher rank, the second thing to be demonstrated. For the further evidencing whereof, the first thing that I shall allege is that of the same S. Paul, Eph. 6.1. and so on. Children obey your Parents in the Lord, for this is right. Honour thy Father and thy Mother (which is the first Commandment with promise) that it may be well with thee, and thou mayest live long on the earth. For pressing upon the Ephesians not only the duty of honouring Parents, but also upon the account of the fifth Commandment, he thereby plainly showeth, that it was intended to oblige them also, and in them, because they were Gentiles, all other Christians. In like manner, the same Apostle dehorting the Romans from the avenging of themselves, enforceth that dehortation from the Law of Moses Deut. 32.35. for it is written (saith he) Vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord. And not contented with that, he backs it with another out of the Proverbs, c. 25.21. where it is written in like manner, If thine enemy hunger feed him, if he thirst give him drink; for in so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head, and the Lord shall reward thee. To all which if we add the same Apostles affirming, that whatsoever was written aforetime by way of comfort, was written for our learning, that we through patience and comfort of the Scriptures might have hope, Rom. 15.4. as in like manner, that what is storied of God's judgements upon the Israelites was written for our admonition, to the intent we should not offend as they also did; so we shall not need to doubt but that the Precepts of their Law were intended for our direction and obedience: For if God's mercies and judgements upon them were written for our learning, no doubt but his Precepts were, as which the other were designed to enforce. Fourthly and lastly, though the Law of Moses did not oblige us by being given to the Israelites; though in the primary intention thereof it were designed for the Israelites only, and consequently could not so induce an obligation upon any other: yet, as it was secondarily intended for the Gentile world, so soon as God should bring it into the Church, so (which excludes all doubt of our obligation to it) it was adopted by our Saviour into his Law, and by him both confirmed and fulfilled. But because that is too copious as well as too important an argument to find a room here, I will respite the handling thereof to the following Discourses, where I will fully and distinctly consider it.  
These two things only would be added here, to prevent all mistakes, concerning our obligation to the Law of Moses, 1. That when I say it was intended to oblige us, and accordingly adopted by our Saviour into his Law, we understand it so far as it had no peculiar reference to God's dispensation under the Law, or the Polity of the Jewish state: For as, upon the account of the former, I have discarded all ceremonial Rites, as which were intended only to serve to the administration of the Law, so I must also, upon the account of the latter, discard all those Precepts, which concerned the regulation of their State. 2. Again, when I say the Law of Moses was, though secondarily, intended to oblige us, and as such adopted by our Saviour; my meaning is not to affirm an obligation to a perfect obedience, but to a sincere and earnest endeavour, and, where we fail, a due repentance and amendment. For though the first Covenant left no place for repentance and pardon, yet the Gospel doth, and hath accordingly (as hath been elsewhere 
* Explication of the Apostles Creed.  shown) made forgiveness of sins one of the capital Articles of our Belief.   

DISC. III. That Christ came not to destroy, but to confirm the Law of Moses.  
This evidenced in part in the Ceremonial Law, from Christ's confirming of that which was the main intendment of it, and from his retaining some of its usances, and transferring them into his own Religion. The like in the Moral Law, from Christ's Sermon upon the Mount, and from the evidence there is both there and elsewhere of Christ's establishing and inculcating the great Precepts of Piety, Sobriety, and Justice.  
WHat may seem to have been our Saviour's fear concerning himself and Doctrine, where he so studiously averts 
* Mat. 5.17.  any design of destroying the Law and the Prophets, in process of time came to be fulfilled: The Jews representing the Author of it as a friend of Publicans and Sinners, as the Heathen did the Religion itself, as a Sanctuary of all impious persons. For whereas (saith Celsus 
* Vid. Orig. contr. Celsum. l. 3. p. 147. , that great Enemy of Christianity) all other Religions were wont to use such addresses as these, when they invited men to initiate themselves in their respective Rites, Whosoever is pure in hands, and wise in tongue; and again, Whosoever is pure from all impiety, that hath a soul conscious to itself of no evil, and hath lived well and justly, let him come and initiate himself in these mysteries; but— procul ô procul este profani: Christianity on the contrary bespeaks the world after this manner, Whosoever is a sinner or a fool, childish or any way unhappy, let him come, for the Kingdom of God stands open to receive him; the unjust and the thief, the breaker up of Houses and the Vizard, the sacrilegious and the defacer of the monuments of the dead. Indeed these are the men, whom our Saviour came chief to call, For I came not (saith he) to call the righteous, but sinners, Mat. 9.13. But it was, as he himself there telleth us, because those had more need of a Physician, and to invite them, not to continue in their impieties, but to repent; to become as righteous as those others were, whom he there styles so, to make their righteousness exceed those others as he doth elsewhere 
* See the Sermon on the Mount.  insinuate; to be chaste above their measure, to abstain from anger as well as murder; lastly, to suffer injuries as well as do none, and be contented not only with that which was their own, but with the parting with it: It being not his intention to destroy the Law and the Prophets, those great measures of piety and justice, but rather to confirm and add to them.  
But not to stay any longer in the entrance to this discourse, when there are so many weighty things which call for our regard and proof, I shall without more ado proceed to show, 

I. That our Saviour came not to destroy, but to confirm the Law of Moses, and particularly that of the Decalogue or Ten Commandments.  
II. That he came not to destroy that Law, but to fulfil and add to it.    
I. For the evidencing the former whereof, I will begin with such precepts of it as were ceremonial, and which, because such, have the least appearance of having been confirmed by him.  
And here not to insist upon the agreeableness of our Saviour's life to them, because the question is not, concerning his life, but doctrine; nor yet to stand to show, that that law did rather die of itself than was destroyed by him, because the question is, whether or no, and in what measure he confirmed it; I shall observe first of all, that that which was mainly designed in the several precepts of that law, even the pure and pious veneration of God, was confirmed and established by our Saviour. As will appear past all contradiction, from the Sermon on the Mount and other our Saviour's discourses. I say, that which was mainly designed in them; for that the pure and pious veneration of God was principally intended in them, is acknowledged by one of the greatest Authority among the Jews, even Maimonides, 
* Maim. Mer. Nev. part 3. c. 32. pag. 435.  and is evident from the words of the Prophet Jeremy c. 7.21, 22, 23. For thus saith the Lord of Hosts the God Israel, Put your  offerings unto your sacrifices and eat flesh, for I spoke not unto your Fathers, nor commanded them, in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt offerings and sacrifices. But this thing commanded I them, saying, Obey my voice, and I will be your God and ye shall be my people. The meaning of which words is not that God gave the Jews no commandment at all concerning burnt offerings and sacrifices (for he enjoined that of the Paschal Lamb the very night they went out of Egypt, and many other such like afterwards) but that the principal thing required by him was their piety and obedience, and that he enjoined sacrifices and such like, only as instances of obedience, and figures of substantial and real piety. And hence Gods insisting so much upon the circumcision of the heart, even where the circumcision of the flesh was not wanting 3 upon the purity of the Soul as well as the cleanness of the body; his preferring a broken heart before all  offerings and sacrifices, his accounting of it as the only acceptable one, for thou desirest not sacrifice, else would I give it: thou delightest not in  offering. The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit; a broken and a contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise, Psa. 51.16, 17 I observe secondly, that as our Saviour did confirm that which was principally designed by God, even in the law of a carnal commandment; so he did also retain many of its ceremonies and usances, and accommodated them to his own purpose. I instance in both the Sacraments, and Imposition of hands: The latter whereof, as it was used by the Apostles in their Ordinations, who, no doubt, did what they did, by commission or approbation from Christ; so was it borrowed from the Jews, whose Leader Moses consecrated to succeed him by this ceremony of Laying on of hands. For thus we are told Num. 27.23. that, after God had given Moses order for the consecrating of his successor, he laid his hands on Joshua, and gave him a charge, as the Lord commanded by the hands of Moses. The case is the same in both the Sacraments, as we learn from the Jewish writers; the Jewish women and their proselytes of both sexes being entered into covenant with God by the same rite of Baptism with us, 
* Selden. de Jure Nat. & Gent. etc. li. 2. c. 2.  and having also a ceremony of distributing bread and wine upon their solemn feasts, 
‖ Paulus Fagius comment. in Deut. 8.  agreeably to that of ours in the Lord's Supper. For thus, (saith Paulus Fagius) the father of the family among the Jews taking a cup of wine in his right hand, and praying over it this prayer, Blessed be thou O Lord our God, King of the world, who createst the fruit of the vine, tastes of it himself, and then gives it to all the guests. And in like manner afterwards bread, over which when he hath used this prayer, Blessed be thou O Lord our God, who bringest bread out of the earth, he first eats a little of it himself, and then gives a piece of it to each of the guests. Indeed the foresaid Author relates this latter as the custom of the modern Jews; but that it was also of the more Ancient, is probable from our Saviour's blessing and distributing a cup of wine among his disciples, before that of the holy Sacrament; adding thereto, that he would not drink of the fruit of the vine (which is the phrase that is used in the forementioned prayer of the Jews) till the Kingdom of God should come, Luke 22.17, 18. I have one thing more to add in confirmation of the former ceremony, which we learn from 
* Iren. adv. haeres. li. 4. c. 32. sect. 4. Justin Mart. in Dial. cum Tryph. p. 260. edit. Paris.  Irenaeus and other the ancient Fathers; To wit, that the bread and wine, which was consecrated into the Sacrament of our Saviour's passion, was also offered to God, agreeably to our Saviour's precept and example, by way of thanksgiving for those creatures themselves. Which makes it more than probable, that the forementioned custom was both of ancient date among the Jews, and transcribed by our Saviour in the institution of his holy Supper. If then he did not only confirm that which was principally designed, but retained many of the usances of the Jewish law, he ought in reason not to be looked upon as an enemy to it, but rather (as he himself saith of himself) as one who came not to destroy but to fulfil it.  
From the Ceremonial Law pass we to the Moral, the principal thing intended by our Saviour, as will appear if we consider what he both premiseth and subjoineth to his assurance of confirming the Law, and the several precepts he chooseth to insist on. Look upon the words he immediately premiseth, and you will easily acknowledge he meant the Moral Law when he said he came not to destroy, but to fulfil it, the purport of those being to recommend good works to them, even the works of piety and charity. For let your light (saith he) so shine before men that they may see your good works, and glorify your father which is in heaven, that is to say, the works of humility and meekness, the works of purity and peace, these and such like being the only things recommended to them in the beginning of that Sermon of his upon the mount. The same is no less evident, from the words immediately following this declaration of his intention, concerning the Law and the Prophets; for, Verily I say unto you till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled: This being not to be affirmed of the Ceremonial Law, which was to receive its period at our Saviour's death. Lastly, the precepts he chooses afterwards to insist on show manifestly, that he meant principally the Moral law; those being precepts against murder and adultery, against perjury and revenging of injuries, and not against ploughing with an ox and ass, or wearing linsey-woolsey garments. Whatsoever else therefore may be thought to be included under the name of the Law or the Prophets, the principal thing intended was no doubt the Moral law, or the law of the Ten Commandments. But not to content myself with this only proof, when both the nature of this Law, and the particular precepts of Christianity, give a farther attestation to it, I shall in the next place remind you of what hath been before at large confirmed, that this law is unalterable; for being so, it is unreasonable to think our Saviour would go about to destroy it, or free us from the obligation of it. And indeed so far was he from going about to do it, whatsoever some weak or evil disposed minds may fancy, that we shall find him expressly to confirm it, in the matters of piety, sobriety, justice and charity, into which it is usually divided. Though it were a strange Religion which should not teach men to worship God, which is the thing here meant by piety, God being both the Author of religion, and the principal object of it; yet, because we have undertaken to show, that Christ came not to destroy the Moral law in any part of it, I shall begin with that, and show how far our Saviour was from abrogating it. And here not to insist (because that would be endless) upon the several precepts in the new Testament to fear and love God, to believe in him and to obey him, I shall content myself with that, which he returned to a certain Lawyer, that demanded of him what he should do to inherit eternal life, Luke 10.26. etc. For what (saith he) is written in the law, how readest thou? To which when the other had made answer, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyself; Our Saviour subjoined immediately, This do and thou shalt live: thereby plainly showing, that he taught no other way to eternal happiness than by a strict piety, and veneration of the Divine majesty. Neither will it suffice to say, as I think it is said by some, that our Saviour in that answer of his doth rather show what the Law prescribes us toward the attaining eternal life, than what he himself did; for beside that that would make our Saviour's answer impertinent, the question being not what the Law, but what he himself prescribed, besides this I say, it is manifest from S. Matthew c. 19.16. that our Saviour gave the like answer, where he cannot but be thought to speak his own sense, and the conditions upon which he came to offer it: for when a certain young man there demanded of him, What good thing he should do to inherit eternal life? his answer was, that if he would enter into life he should keep the commandments: And again, after he had told him, that he had kept all these from his youth, and was importunate to know whether he lacked any thing yet; that if he would be perfect he should go and sell all that he had, and give to the poor, and then come and follow him. From which words it is evident, that he, as well as Moses, did require the observation of God's Commandments in order to the attainment of everlasting life, and that the young man could not be his follower without it. But it may be, piety would not be so much stood upon amongst the present professors of Christianity; there being not a few of those (who yet are none of the greatest ornaments of it) that can make long prayers, and listen to those that do. That which galls them most is, that they must renounce their lusts and animosities, that they must be sober and just and charitable, which is to them a yoke far more grievous than the Ceremonial law, and from which therefore they are willing to believe, that Christ came to set them free. But how little ground there is for such a surmise, we may soon inform ourselves, if we reflect upon the doctrine of our Saviour in these particulars. For hath not he in the Sermon so often referred to forbidden the adultery, even of the heart and eye? Hath he not told us that the not plucking out of such an offending eye, will endanger the casting the whole body into eternal fire? Hath not one of his Apostles said, that without holiness or purity no man shall see the Lord? and another, that pure religion and undefiled before God and the father, is to keep ourselves unspotted from the world? Again, hath our Saviour delivered aught in prejudice of what is spoken by the Law and the Prophets concerning Intemperance or the promoters of it? any thing in prejudice of that woe, which is denounced against those that rise up early in the morning that they may follow strong drink, that continue until night till wine inflame them, Isa. 5.11? Or of that other, which is levelled at those that are mighty to drink wine, and men of strength to mingle strong drink, v. 22. of that chapter? Nay hath not one of his Apostles told us that the grace, which bringeth salvation, teacheth to deny all ungodly and worldly lusts, and to live godlily, righteously, and soberly in it, Tit. 2.12? That neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor effeminate, nor abusers of themselves with mankind, nor thiefs, nor covetous, nor drunkards, shall inherit the kingdom of God, 1 Cor. 6.10? Lastly (for it shall suffice rather to hint at these things, than to give you a just discourse concerning them) hath our blessed Saviour delivered aught in favour of that covetousness, which the Law and the Prophets do so vehemently decry? Nay hath not he himself forewarned us to take heed of it, Luke 12.15. and his Apostle to content ourselves with food and raiment, 1 Tim. 6.8? So that in this particular it is evident, Christ had no design to thwart the dictates of Nature or Moses, the precepts of the Law or the wholesome advices of the Prophets. The only thing remaining to be enquired into is, whether he came to destroy the precepts of justice and charity, the two last branches of the Moral Law. Concerning the latter hereof I shall say nothing at present, both because I may have occasion to resume it, when I come to entreat of our Saviour's fulfilling the Law, and because the Evangelists and Apostles, as well as the Law and the Prophets, are full fraught with Precepts concerning it. That which I shall bestow the remainder of my discourse upon, is the Precepts of justice, even that justice which commands us to give Caesar and all other our Superiors their due. Which I shall the rather do, because this hath been too often accounted a part of that bondage from which our Saviour came to set us free. I begin with Fathers, because their authority as it was the first, so the foundation even of Regal power. Concerning whom if the Law be express that we should give them honour and obedience, the Gospel of our Saviour is no less; Witness his faulting the Scribes and Pharisees for evacuating that Royal Law by a foolish tradition of their own, Mat. 15.4. His Apostle S. Paul's pressing the Ephesians with the letter of it, Eph. 6.2. His calling upon children in the verse before to be obedient to their parents, his commanding the children of the Colossians to be obedient to them in all things, Col. 3.20. His instructing the children of widows to requite their parents, 1 Tim. 5.4. His reckoning disobedience to parents amongst the foulest crimes of the Gentiles, Rom. 1.30. Than which what more could be said, to show our Saviour's detestation of that crime, and his concurrence with the Law and the Prophets in the contrary virtue? From the Authority of a Father proceed we to that of a Master, and compare the doctrine of the Gospel with the Law of Nature and that of Moses. And here indeed is a manifest difference, but which is to the advantage of the Gospel; for whereas the Law of Moses doth rather suppose obedience to Masters, than go about to enjoin it, the Gospel is full of precepts to this purpose. Servants be obedient to them that are your masters according to the flesh; so S. Paul, Eph. 6.5. Servants obey in all things your masters according, to the flesh; so the same Apostle, Col. 3.22. Let as many servants, as are under the yoke, count their own masters worthy of all honour, 1 Tim. 6.1. And exhort servants (saith the same person to Titus) to be obedient unto their own masters, and to please them well in all things, Tit. 2.9. To the froward as well as the gentle, to the believing master and the infidel, with all cheerfulness, with all simplicity, out of a regard to Christ, whose will it was they should obey, to his Gospel, which would be otherwise blasphemed. Lastly, if the Law and the Prophets called upon the Jews to honour the Fathers of their Country, as well as the Fathers of Families, to fear the Lord and the King, to speak no evil of the Ruler of the people, to curse him no not in their heart; the holy Jesus on the other hand reminds his of giving unto Caesar that which is Caesar's, Mat. 22.21. His Apostle S. Peter, of fearing God, and honouring the King, 1 Pet. 2.17. Submitting themselves to every ordinance of man, or as the Greek reads it, to every humane creature, whether supreme or subordinate, and not making use of that liberty, which Christ hath purchased, for a cloak of disobedience. Thus in every particular doth our blessed Saviour rather confirm than destroy those Moral Precepts, which are delivered by Moses and the Prophets. And therefore, let men pretend what they will upon the account of their faith and Baptism, He is no Christian, who is not a devout adorer of the Divine Majesty, chaste, and temperate in his converse, a dutiful child, an obedient servant, and a faithful subject to his Prince.   

DISC. IU. That Christ came not to destroy, but to fulfil and add to the Law of Moses.  
General proofs hereof from the Sermon upon the Mount; where moreover is shown that the opposition there made by Christ is between his Law and that of Moses. The Law of Moses considered as the Common Law of their Nation, and in what respects Christ added to it. A discourse concerning the same Law as intended for a rule of life; where is shown wherein Christ either did not, or did add unto it. That the additions Christ made to the Law in that latter notion of it do not entrench upon the esteem either of it or of its Author. The allegation of the imperfection of Moses' Law both answered and disproved.  
LET the Libertine and the Antinomian be from henceforth for ever silent; they whose Life, or Doctrine, or both proclaim the ever blessed Jesus to have abrogated the Law and Prophets: for beside that, instead of justifying that wisdom whose children they pretend to be, they show themselves as forward as any in condemning her, giving countenance to that calumny which was sometime fastened on our Saviour by the Jews, behold a man gluttonous, and a wine-bibber, a friend of Publicans and sinners; they do directly oppose his own vehement asseveration, and doctrine, as well as the Law of Moses, unless to destroy, and not to destroy be one and the same thing, or to abrogate the Law and the Prophets, and to fulfil. But so Hercules in the Fable added to the Serpent Hydra's monstrous heads, by going about to take them off; each wound he gave it becoming strangely prolifical, and two heads starting up, where there was one lopped off. For setting aside the Ceremonial, that shadow of good things to come, and which therefore was to vanish at the appearance of the Son of Righteousness; all the Law and the Prophets beside have rather received an increase, than any diminution by his Doctrine. Can any one pretend that he hath abrogated the Law concerning adultery, who hath substituted two in its room, which are no less dreadful than the former? The one forbidding all outward uncleanness, the other the adultery of the heart. If the Law concerning murder be alleged as destroyed by him, he hath forbidden calumnies as well as that, the wounds of a malicious Tongue, as well as the piercing of a Spear.  
II. Having shown in the foregoing discourse, that our Saviour came not to destroy the Law and the Prophets but on the contrary to confirm and establish them, it remains that we show it to have been his design to fulfil, or add to them, according as the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the place so often referred to is generally understood by the Ancient Fathers; the Law, in their opinion, being like a picture rudely drawn, which our Saviour afterwards finished, and gave life and colour to. Wherein how far they were from erring, and much more from speaking impiously, I come now to show, and that both in the lump and the retail.  
1. My general proof shall be taken from the opposition that our Saviour makes in the fifth Chapter of S. Matthew between his own Doctrine and the Precepts of Moses. For if the opposition be between Moses Precepts and Christ's, then can there be no doubt at all of Christ's adding to them; because it is certain, he requires something more, than those Precepts to which he does oppose them. As will appear by considering either the Precepts themselves, or the opposition that is made. I instance for the former in that which we meet with v. 43. of that Chapter. For ye have heard (saith he) that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy; But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, etc. For is it not more to love an enemy as well as a neighbour, than to love our neighbour only? nay is it not a point of greater perfection? And if it be, doth not Christ add to the former Precept, by enjoining us so to do, when the other requires only the love of a neighbour? Again, what opposition can there be between what was said to them of old, and that which Christ saith, if Christ did not add unto thefor mere? especially, when in his entrance upon this argument, he disclaims the publishing of any thing, that might tend to the destruction of it. If therefore there be any opposition, it must be, that the one enjoins somewhat more than the other will be found to do. The only thing therefore remaining to show is, that Christ makes the opposition between his own Doctrine and that of Moses, which accordingly I come now to prove. To begin with that which is first in order, Ye have heard (saith our Saviour) that it hath been said to them of old time, (for so indeed it should be rendered, and not as we by them of old, the Syriack and other versions so rendering it; secondly, the verb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with a dative case annexed to it being 
‖ Vid. Rom. 9.12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. v. 26. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Gal. 3.16. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Apoc. 6.11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 9.4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  ever used in this sense in the New Testament; and thirdly and lastly, the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which we render them of old time, signifying as much 
* Vid. Luc. 9.8.19. Act. 15.21. 2 Pet. 2.5. Rev. 12.9.20.2.  and referring usually to the times of Moses and the Prophets; but no where in the New Testament set to signify Elders, Scribes and Pharisees, whom some are willing to understand here.) Ye have heard, I say, saith our Saviour, that it hath been said to them of old time, Thou shalt not kill, and whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgement: But I say unto you, etc. For is not the former part of these words, Thou shalt not kill, the very letter of the sixth Commandment, and the latter, though not the same in terminis, yet in sense with that of Moses Leu. 24.21. where, instead of what we read here, he that kills shall be in danger of the judgement, it is there, he that killeth a man shall be put to death. Again, whose words are those which our Saviour ushers in with the former preface v. 27. of the forequoted Chapter, Thou shalt not commit adultery, are they not the very letter of the seventh Commandment, as the words before recited of the sixth? If therefore the opposition here made be between Moses' Law and Christ's, if that opposition consists in this that Christ requires more than Moses, it is certain that Christ added to the Law of Moses, which I shall now prove more particularly.  
2. In order to which, I will first premise a distinction 
* Vid. Grot. de Jure bell. etc. lib. 1. c. 2. sect. 6.  concerning the Law of Moses, which I have borrowed from the Most Excellent Grotius. For it may be either considered,  

1. As to that part of it, which was the Common Law of their Nation (if you will give me leave so to express it) and by which their Judges were to proceed; or  
2. As a Rule of Manners, and a measure of Religion.   
I. In the former of these senses the word Law is taken Heb. 2.2. where it is said that every transgression and disobedience to it received a just recompense of reward; that is to say, was punished by the Judge, as the Law itself prescribed. For in as much as many offences against the Law, particularly the hating our Brother in our heart, and the like, were not cognoscible by the Judge, and consequently could not receive a just recompense from him; it follows, that by the Law there spoken of must be meant that part of it which was their Common Law, and that by which their Judges were to proceed. In like manner, when our Saviour saith, Ye have heard that it was said to them of old time, Thou shalt not kill, and whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgement; it is manifest from these last words, that by the Law, of which this is made a part, was meant their Common Law, and that by which their Judges were to be directed. Now in this sense there is nothing more manifest, than that Christ added to it, and required a greater piety than the Law of Moses did. For  
1. First, whereas the Law of Moses, that part I mean by which their Judges were to proceed, looked only at the outward action, commanding, or forbidding it as it did agree with, or swerve from it; the Law of Christ, that much more Noble one, required the obedience of the heart and forbade all impiety there. This to keep close to the former instances, It was said to, or by them of old time, even by one who was as old as Moses, Thou shalt not kill, and whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgement, that is to say, he shall be liable to be brought before the Judge, and by his sentence to receive a just recompense of reward: But I say unto you, That whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause, shall be in danger of the judgement, even that wherewith I shall one day judge the world. If there be any boiling of malice in the heart, if there be a murderous thought in it, or disposition to it, at my Tribunal it shall be taken notice of and punished, as the act of killing is at yours. Again, ye have heard that it hath been said by the same Ancient and the Giver of your Law, Thou shalt not commit adultery, and the man that committeth adultery with another man's wife, even he that committeth adultery with his neighbour's wife, the adulterer and the adulteress shall surely be put to death, Leu. 20.10. But I say unto you, That whosoever looketh upon a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart; and that my Law forbids as well as the outward act, and shall be both tried and sentenced at my Tribunal. If your Law judges no man before it hears him and knows from sufficient witnesses what he hath done, which shows that it hath respect to the outward action only; if it be made not for the righteous, but for the lawless and disobedient, for murderers of fathers, and murderers of mothers, for manslayers, for whoremongers, for them that defile themselves with mankind, for menstealers, liars and perjured persons, that is to say, for manifest and open sinners; my Law, as being a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart, reaches to the impieties thereof, and censures those seeds of murder and adultery which are there. But by this means we may easily avoid the imputation of charging the Law of Moses with imperfection, as forbidding only sinful actions and not sinful purposes; it being no imperfection at all in the Common Law of the Jewish Nation whereof we now speak, to forbid sinful actions only, because those who were to give sentence by it could not take cognizance of any other. Again  
2. Whereas that part of the Law, which was the Common Law of the Jewish Nation, took notice only of grosser offences, such as that of adultery, and murder, in the mean time permitting others of a lower rank, lest too severe a restraint upon them should make them throw the yoke from off their neck; the Gospel of our Saviour, the Christian Law, forbids all deviations whatsoever, the smaller aswell as the greater offences. They are Christ's own words in the 19 verse of the forequoted Chapter. For whosoever (saith he) shall break one of the least of these Commandments, he shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven; They are his sense and meaning, in what he opposes to the forementioned instances. Our Saviour to that crime of Murder opposing the calling of our Brother Raka or Fool; as to that other of Adultery, a wanton look or an immodest dalliance, which are certainly far inferior to the other.  
II. I have considered the Law of Moses as to that part of it which was the Common Law of the Jewish Nation, and shown you how our Saviour added to it; I come now to speak of the same Law, as intended for a rule of manners, and as a guide to the Jews in walking with God. In which sense it is taken, when it is styled a Law converting the Soul, or represented as a means to inherit eternal life. Now in this sense it is chief that question is made concerning it, whether Christ added thereto, and wherein that addition consists. And first of all,  
1. Negatively, we are not to think that Christ added to it by exacting the obedience of the heart, as well as the outward man; for, that this Law of Moses did, no less than the Precepts of our Blessed Saviour. And hence (as was before intimated) it is by the Psalmist said to be a law converting the Soul, Psal. 19.7. and by S. Paul affirmed to be spiritual, Rom. 7.14. yea that if there had been a Law, which could have given life, the Law of Moses had been it, Gal. 3.21. Neither do the Precepts of this Law enforce any thing less, than those Eulogies which are given of it by David and S. Paul, Not the Precepts of Piety, or those which taught the Jews their duty toward God; For hear O Israel (saith the Law) the Lord our God is one Lord, and thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart and with all thy soul and with all thy might, Deut. 6.5. As in like manner, Deut. 10.12. And now Israel, what doth the Lord require of thee, but to fear the Lord thy God, to walk in his ways, and to love and serve him with all thy heart, and with all thy soul? Not the Precepts of Charity; for as our Saviour doth here forbid the malice of the heart as well as killing, so did this Law also, for thou shalt not (saith the Law) hate thy brother in thy heart, nor bear a grudge against the children of thy people, Leu. 19.17, 18. Lastly, not the Precepts of Chastity, and Justice, as they are couched in the Law and the Prophets. For as our Saviour forbids here the adultery of the heart, as elsewhere the desire of that which is another's; so do also the Law and the Prophets. The words of the Proverbs of Solomon being, Thou shalt not lust after the beauty of a strange woman in thy heart, Pro. 6.25. Of the Law, Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife, servant,  or any thing that is his, Exod. 20.17. But as our Saviour added nothing to this Law by calling for the piety of the heart, because that did so as well as he; so neither, Secondly, by forbidding lesser as well as greater sins, because this Law did no less. For thus, as our Saviour forbade a wanton look as well as the act of Adultery, a slanderous tongue as well as a kill hand, so did also the Law and the Prophets. For what man is he (saith the Psalmist, Psal. 34.12.) that desireth life and loveth many days, that he may see good? let him keep his tongue from evil. And yet more particularly, Psal. 15.1.3. Lord who shall abide in thy tabernacle? who shall dwell in thy holy hill? He that backbiteth not with his tongue, as well as he that doth no evil to his neighbour, he that taketh not up a reproach against him. The like severity we may observe in the Proverbs of Solomon, against that lustful eye of which our Saviour forewarns us, Prov. 6.25. Where to the former caution of not lusting after the strange woman's beauty in the heart, he adds, neither let her take thee with her eyelids, which implies a watchfulness over our own. But neither, Thirdly, doth our Saviour require any new virtue of us, which the Law and the Prophets did not before him, for the kind. I instance in the love of enemies, because that seems of all others most peculiar to the Gospel, and most opposite to the Precepts of Moses. Concerning which, for the kind I mean, the Law is as express, as the Gospel can be supposed to be. Thus Exod. 23.4, 5. If (saith Moses) thou meet thine enemy's ox or ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again. And if thou see the ass of him that hateth thee lying under his burden, and wouldst forbear to help him, thou shalt surely help with him. For as the Apostle spoke in another case, Doth God take care for Oxen or Asses? or said he it not rather for this, even to enjoin them to lay aside their animosities and show their enemies all acts of benevolence? And accordingly Vatablus renders those words in the 5. verse, Thou shalt surely help with him, by exonerabis asinum cum eo qui te odio habet; and the Chaldee Paraphrast in like manner, When thou shalt see the ass of him that hateth thee lying under his burden, and wouldst forbear to help him, thou shalt let go the hatred which is in thy heart against him, and shalt lend him thy assistance in the raising him up; referring not so much to the kindness which he was to show to the poor beast (though that also was a duty) as to that which he was to show to the owner of it, and his own enemy. But that of Solomon will put this business out of question, because so fully expressive of the love of an enemy, that S. Paul himself thought fit to represent it to the Christian Romans, when he was entreating of the same argument. 'Tis in the 25. of the Proverbs, verses 21, and 22. If thine enemy hunger give him bread to eat, and if he be thirsty give him water to drink. For thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head, and the Lord shall reward thee.  
2. Having thus shown wherein the Gospel and the Law agree, and consequently wherein we are not to look for any additions; let us in the next place inquire what the Gospel hath added to the Law and Prophets, wherein it hath fulfilled the Law and them. And here  
1. I observe first, that though our Saviour hath required no new virtues, which the Law and the Prophets did not before enjoin; yet he hath enjoined us some new instances which under the Law were left free. We have one in that Sermon of our Saviour to which I have so often referred, and therefore I shall begin with that. 'Tis in the 5. Chapter of S. Matthew, and the 31. verse; where he tells us, that it hath been said, Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement: But I say unto you, That whosoever shall put away his wife saving for the cause of fornication causeth her to commit adultery, and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced committeth adultery. Wherewith agreeth that of the same Jesus, Mat. 19.8, 9 where when the Pharisees demanded of him, why, if God had made the bond so close between man and wife at the first, as he had then affirmed, Moses did command to give a writing of divorcement and to put her away, his answer was, that Moses for the hardness of their hearts suffered them to put away their wives, but from the beginning it was not so, neither should be from that time forward, for whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another committeth Adultery, and whoso marrieth her which is put away committeth Adultery. From which passages compared together it is manifest, that Moses permitted divorces for lesser causes than fornication; but that Christ would not allow of any upon a lower cause. But not to insist upon this, because there is some ground to believe that Moses his permission of divorce was rather such as freed them from punishment in this world than from guilt before God, inasmuch as it is only said that Moses suffered them so to do because of the hardness of their hearts (though on the other side it may seem strange that God should give so uncontrolled a permission to that which he himself then held as sinful, and treasured up against them against the day of wrath) But not (I say) however to insist upon that, I shall proceed to the matter of Polygamy, or the having of more wives than one, which it is certain the Jews were not only permitted, but so far dispensed withal also, that they might do it without the imputation of a sin, the Scripture reckoning multitude of wives to David as a blessing and a gift of God, even to that David, who was a man after Gods own heart, 2 Sam. 12.8. Thus you see it was under the Law, even with the allowance of God himself; but Christ hath now determined otherwise, as is manifest (to go no farther) from that forequoted text of S. Matthew c. 19.9. where our Saviour tells us, that whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth Adultery. For if it were lawful to have more wives than one, his marrying another could not be imputed to him for a sin, and much less for Adultery as it is in the text now quoted. Let it remain therefore for an undoubted truth, That though our Saviour hath required no now virtues, yet he hath enjoined us some new instances, and consequently so far added to the Law.  
2. But beside the enjoining of new instances (which yet alone would have justified our Saviour's assertion) he hath also exacted those virtues in a greater latitude, than they will be found to have been under the Law. For the evidencing whereof I will instance in the love of enemies, as being one of the most eminent virtues of the Gospel. And here not to content myself with that of our Saviour Mat. 5.43, 44. where, having premised after his manner, that they had heard it had been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy, he adds by way of opposition, But I say unto you, Love your enemies; not, I say, to content myself with that, I shall set before you the extent of this Precept under the Gospel, and then show how much the Law falls short of it in its injunctions. I begin with the former of these, even the extent of this Precept under the Gospel; Which I shall not doubt to affirm, first, to comprehend such enemies as are of a different Religion from us, as well as those who are of the same Religion with ourselves, that is to say, the Infidel as well as the Believer, the Schismatic as well as the Orthodox professor. That the Schismatic is not to be excluded from this Love, we have a clear evidence from our Saviour, in his behaviour toward the Samaritans, and in his explication of that question, which was put to him by a Lawyer, concerning the importance of the word Neighbour. For first, when his Disciples would have had him call for fire from Heaven, to consume the Samaritans for refusing to give entertainment to them, Luke 9.54. he both sharply reproved them for that their suggestion, and told them that the son of man was not come to destroy men's lives, but to save them, even of those that were Separatists from the true Church, the Samaritans as well as the Jews; for otherwise those words of his had not touched them at all, whose present zeal was against such persons only. Now if Christ came not to destroy even such men's lives but to save them, we cannot deem it any way acceptable to him for us to pray against them, and make them the objects of our hatred. The same is much more evident from our Saviour's answer to that question, who is the neighbour we are to love as ourselves, Luke 10.29. For there he doth both insinuate a Samaritan to be a neighbour, and enjoin the Jew to imitate him by showing mercy to those of a different profession; the scope of our Saviour's answer (as appears from the question proposed) being not to declare the necessity of showing mercy, but the persons to whom we are to do it. But as Schismatics and Samaritans, by the Discipline of our Saviour, are to have a share of that love, which we are to show to enemies, so also Pagans and Infidels, men who are not only Separatists from, but perfect strangers to, the Commonwealth of Israel; Witness one for all, that known place of S. Paul, 1 Tim. 2.1. where he exhorts that first of all supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks be made for all men, for Kings and for all that are in Authority, that we may lead a peaceable and quiet life in all godliness and honesty. For as it is evident from the stories of those times, as well as from the words that follow, that the Powers that then were, had not attained the knowledge of the truth; so it is no less, that they were the Christians enemies, and made use of that authority, which God put into their hands for the repressing of evil doers, to discountenance and extirpate them. In the love therefore of enemies it is manifest that Christ includes the Heathen and the Samaritan, as well as the Christian and the Orthodox professor. But though such as these are to be loved, whatsoever their enmity may be to us, yet certainly, not when enemies to us upon the account of Christianity, and thereby to the Author of it? Indeed, the present practice of Christians would so persuade a man, that were not studied in the doctrine of our Saviour, there being generally no hatred accounted too great to show to those that are the enemies of our Religion. But what the will of our Saviour was, his behaviour toward the Samaritans, when they denied him entertainment, snews plainly enough, and his own words in his Sermon upon the Mount; for it was not upon any particular grudge to his person that they denied him entertainment, that they refused him that civility which seems due to all strangers; the text itself tells us, Luke 9.53. that the reason of their not receiving him was, because his face was as though he would go to Jerusalem, thereby professing that he looked upon that City as the place appointed for God's public worship, which was the chief controversy between the Jews and the Samaritans. And yet notwithstanding this their rudeness to our Saviour upon the account of the true Religion, our Saviour would by no means hear of calling for fire from Heaven upon them, and checked his Disciples for the motion, intimating withal that they were to be of a different temper from him whose fiery zeal they commended to him. But let us view our Saviour's own words in his Sermon upon the Mount, and see whether our love be not to take in such persons, as are enemies to us for his name sake. But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse your, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that despitefully use you and persecute you; even to those especially which persecute you for righteousness sake, which speak all manner of evil against you for mine. For beside that these are the persecutors and revilers spoken of in the former verses, and therefore in all probability to be understood here; S. Luke hath subjoined the Precept of loving enemies, immediately after that beatitude, which pronounces a blessing upon those that are persecuted for Christ's sake, and the woe that is opposed to it, thereby plainly showing that they who persecute us for Christ's sake are in the number of those enemies whom he obliges us to love and pray for. For after he had said, c. 6.22. Blessed are ye when men shall hate you, and when they shall separate you from their company, and shall reproach you and cast out your name as evil for the son of man's sake; as on the other side, Woe unto you when all men shall speak well of you, for so did their fathers to the false prophets, verse. 26. he adds in the very next verse, to wit the 27. But I say unto you, Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that despitefully use you, by which enemies what other can be meant than those who were so because they were Christians, and hated them not for their own sake but the Son of man's? We have seen the intent of this Precept under the Gospel, let us now look upon it as prescribed by the Law and the Prophets; which if we do, we shall soon discern that the Precepts thereof fall short of those of our blessed Saviour. For first of all whereas Christianity makes no difference between a sound Christian and a Schismatic, or an Infidel, the Law though enjoining the same love of enemies, yet restrains it to such as were of the Jewish Nation or Religion. If he who opposeth thee be of thy own blood or profession, if he be a natural son of Abraham, or one adopted into his family, than thou oughtest to look upon him as thy neighbour, and show thyself benevolent to him. Say I this of myself, or saith not the Law the same? For is not neighbour and children of thy people made synonymous, even where this very argument is entreated of? for thou shalt not (saith Moses, Leu. 19.18.) avenge or bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. Nay doth not our Saviour intimate this to have been the meaning of the Law, when in pursuance of this most excellent Precept he adds, Mat. 5.47. If ye salute your brethren only, what do ye more than others? Again (to resume that place which we before made use of, to show the Jews obligation to this Precept at all) doth not the book of Deuteronomy sufficiently declare the enemy whom they were there obliged to assist, to be one of their own Nation or profession? If you take the pains to compare them together, you will easily discern that that is the due meaning of it. If (saith Moses) in the book of Exodus) thou meet thine enemy's ox or ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again. If thou see the ass of him that hateth thee lying under his burden, and wouldst forbear to help him, thou shalt surely help with him, Exod. 23.4, 5. But in Deut. c. 22.1. Thou shalt not see thy brother's ox or his sheep going astray, and hid thyself from them, thou shalt in any case bring them again unto thy brother; and v. 4. Thou shalt not see thy brother's ass or his ox fall down by the way, and hid thyself from them, thou shalt surely help with him to lift them up; plainly showing that the enemy they were forbidden to hid themselves from, was such an one as was also a brother, which in the Hebrew phrase was an Israelite by Nation or Religion. I observe, secondly, that as the love the Jews were obliged to have for Enemies was restrained to those of their own Nation or Religion, so there were some whole Nations whom they were obliged to hate, nor have any commiseration of. For thus saith God concerning the Amorite and the Canaanite, the Hittite and the Perizzite, the Hivite and the Jebusite, Take heed to thyself, lest thou make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land, whither thou goest, Exod. 34.12. As in like manner of the same Nations and the Girgashites, that when the Lord their God should deliver them before Israel, that he should smite them, and utterly destroy them, that he should make no covenant with them, nor show mercy unto them, Deut. 7.1. and so on. Which what is it less, than to hate those Nations, to account of them, and deal with them as enemies? Indeed (as in both those places is insinuated) the reason of Gods commanding them so to do was for fear the people of Israel should be ensnated by them, and enticed to the worship of their Gods. For we are not to think there is any imperfection in God's commands, or that hatred and enmity is acceptable of itself. But in the mean time here is an enemy which the Israelites were obliged to hate, and such a command for it as the new Testament affords not any. Add hereunto the aversation which the Jews generally did think themselves obliged to have for the Samaritans and the Heathen, a thing taken notice of both by sacred and profane Authors. For the Scriptures first, they observe to us that the Jews had no dealing with the Samaritans, Joh. 4.9. That thereupon a woman of Samaria wondered extremely at our Saviour's ask water of her; that S. Peter himself had taken up so hard an opinion concerning the Heathen, that, even after our Saviour's Ascension, he looked upon them as unclean persons, and such as it was not lawful for him to converse with; that our Saviour, when he would represent to the Jews the aversation they ought to have for those who would not hear the Church, bade them to account of them as Heathens and Publicans; lastly, that the same Holy Jesus, when a woman of Canaan came and sued to him in the behalf of her sick daughter, would not at first vouchsafe her an answer, and when her importunity and the Disciples together had extorted one from him, called her and all her Nation by the name of Dogs; For it is not meet, saith he, Mat. 15.26. to take the children's bread and cast it unto dogs. And yet (as that wittily believing Canaanite replied upon him) it was but some crumbs she begged of him, and such a mercy as the meanest are allowed to partake of. If you consult the Heathen you will find them to have had the same opinion of the Jews, to have experimented the same averseness in them. For thus Juvenal concerning them, 
Non monstrare vias eadem nisi sacra colenti,  
Quaesitum ad fontem solos deducere verpos;  That is to say, that a Jew would not tell a Heathen the way to any place he should ask after, nor lead any but such as were circumcised to what fountain he should inquire for. As in like manner Tacitus, 
* Apud ipsos sides of stinata, misericordia in promptu, adversus omnes alios hostile odium.  that among themselves they were strict in keeping of their faith, and extremely inclinable to pity, but had a perfect hatred for all others. For though it may be those Authors might something over-lash, or (which is as probable) the Jews go farther in this particular than they were either obliged or allowed; yet manifest enough it is from their general practice, and our Saviour's severe language to the Canaanitish woman, that they were not permitted to have any great commerce with them, and much less commanded to show any great kindness to them. Lastly, they were allowed, even by God himself, to take usury of a stranger, though he did most severely forbid it among those of their own Nation. If therefore the Law of Moses restrained the title of Neighbour to those of the Jewish Nation or Religion; if that Love, which they were required to show to an enemy, were, even in the sense of Moses, to be understood of such an enemy as was also a Brother; If they were commanded to show no mercy at all to some whole Nations, and to avoid the converse of all in general but themselves; Lastly, if they might lend upon usury to a stranger, when God had so severely forbidden it among themselves; then certainly that better Lawgiver Christ Jesus hath added to their Law, because requiring us to hold all men whatsoever as Neighbours, yea though they are as far removed from us in the profession of Religion, as many of them are in their habitation.  
3. Having thus shown that our Saviour hath not only added new instances to the Law, but exacted the old virtues in a greater latitude, I come in the third place to show that he hath required them in a higher degree, which I shall evidence first of all in the forementioned instance, and then in the whole encyclopedy of Christian virtues. For, to begin with the forementioned instance, What more frequent even with God's Servants than the breathing out of curses against their own enemies, or those of God? nay what more frequent with David in the book of Psalms itself, which is of all others the most perfect rule of Life and Manners? The whole 109. Psalm is upon the matter nothing else; and hardly shall you meet with any mention of his enemies, without very severe prayers against them. Thus Psal. 59.11. where he speaks of seeing his desire upon his enemies, his words are, Slay them not lest my people forget, scatter them by thy power and bring them down, O Lord our shield, for the sin of their mouth, and for the words of their lips; let them be taken in their pride. Consume them in wrath, consume them, that they may not be— and at evening let them return, and let them make a noise like a dog, and run about through the City. As in like manner, Psal. 35.4. Let them be confounded and put to shame that seek after my soul, let them be turned back and brought to confusion that devise my hurt. Let them be as chaff before the wind, and let the Angel of the Lord chase them. Let their way be dark and slippery, and let the Angel of the Lord persecute them. Again saith the same Psalmist, after he had mentioned the reproaches and injuries he sustained by them, Let their table become a snare before them, and that which should have been for their welfare, let it become a trap. Let their eyes be darkened that they see not, and make their loins continually to shake, Psal. 69.22, 23. And a little after, Let their habitation be desolate, and none to dwell in their tents, for they persecute him whom thou hast smitten, and they talk to the grief of those whom thou hast wounded. Neither will it suffice to say, as perhaps it may be, that many of those execrations relate to the enemies of Christ, particularly those last mentioned; For beside that it is evident enough from the Psalms themselves, that they were also designed against David's enemies; the story of the Gospel shows, that our blessed Saviour, who ought rather to be our pattern, prayed even for those very enemies, for those that gave him gall to eat and vinegar to drink; His own words, as S. Luke tells us, being, Father forgive them for they know not what they do, Luke 23.34. In conformity to which example as no doubt we ought to proceed, who are so often required to set it before our eyes; so if we take a view of his Precepts, we shall find them to enjoin us the same tenderness, wherein he went before us by his example. Thus Mat. 5.44. we have his own express command to bless those that curse us; his Apostle S. Paul's, Rom. 12.14. that we should bless and curse not. Lastly, thus we find him himself checking his Disciples, for having a desire to imitate Elias his zeal in calling for fire from Heaven upon the Samaritans, and moreover insinuating to them that the Spirit of a Disciple ought to be far different from that of Elias, Luke 9.55. And accordingly, saving that Prayer of S. Paul concerning Alexander the Coppersmith, The Lord reward him according to his works, 2 Tim. 4.14. and that other of S. Peter's concerning Simon Magus, That his money might perish with him, Act. 8.20. which yet he seems afterwards to recall, when he admonishes him to repent, and pray to God, if perhaps that thought of his heart might be forgiven him; saving I say those prayers, the former whereof was against one who had greatly withstood S. Paul's preaching, the later against him who offered the Apostles money for the Holy Ghost, I think we shall hardly meet with any of that nature throughout the whole New Testament. Which is to me an evident argument, that the loving of enemies, and praying for them that curse, is at least required of us, in a greater degree, than it was under the Law. But not to confine myself to this single virtue, when there is appearance enough that the like is required in all, I shall desire any man that doubts of it, to consider with me these 3. things. 1. That the Precepts of Christ are much more clear and explicit than those of Moses. 2. That the promises are more clearly proposed, and 3. and lastly, That God hath eased us of the yoke of the Ceremonial Law. Of the first of these as there cannot well be made a doubt by any that shall compare the Law and the Gospel together, so neither hath it I think been actually done by any; and therefore instead of insisting upon the proof of it, I shall make this inference from it, that God exacts of us a more perfect conformity, than he required of those under the Old Testament. For as the publication of a Law makes it obligatory to those to whom that publication is made; so consequently the more clear the publication is, the greater the obligation must be. Of the second particular there can yet less doubt be made, even of the promises of the Gospel being more clearly proposed by it; it being harder to find that there were any such then, than any so clear and express. And therefore as the Socinians do now generally deny it, so we find the like to have been done by the Sadducees of old, wherein though it is true they have erred and that grossly, yet some of the texts they allege do sufficiently prove that there is a clearer manifestation of them than before; Witness that known affirmation of S. Paul, 2 Tim. 1.10. where speaking of the Gospel he tells us that it is now made manifest by the appearing of our Saviour Jesus Christ, who hath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light by it. In fine, the same S. Paul tells us, 2 Cor. 3. that there was a veil upon Moses writings, as well as there sometime was upon his face, but that that veil is done away in Christ, and we may now with open face behold the Glory of the Lord and that Glory which he hath laid up for us. Now if the promises of the Gospel, as well as the Precepts thereof, were more clear than those of Moses, the motives to obedience as well as the rule of it, our conformity thereto is in reason to be proportionably greater, than that to which the Jews were tied. To all which if we add, that God hath now eased us of the yoke of the Ceremonial Law, which the Jews, though they were not able to bear, yet were forced to stand under, so no doubt can remain of a stricter obligation upon us to those most excellent Precepts of the Moral; gratitude itself requiring, that we, who are eased of a heavy yoke, should the more quietly submit our necks to a light and gracious one.  
Now though what hath been said doth sufficiently evidence that Christ came not to destroy but fulfil the Law and the Prophets in the most proper notion of the word; yet because it hath been thought by some that the granting of that would infer the Law of Moses to have been imperfect, before I put a period to this discourse, I will free my doctrine from that imputation, and so much the rather because the charge of imperfection would in fine fall upon the Author of it. In order whereunto the first thing that I shall offer is, that it is no crime at all to affirm it to have been imperfect if compared with the doctrine of our Saviour; that which is less perfect being sometimes as seasonable, as at other times a more perfect one. But 2. I say, that Law is not presently ●o be thought imperfect, which doth not enjoin the highest pitch of virtue. It is enough, if it be suited to the ability and temper of those, for the regulation of whom it was devised. And therefore as one made answer, when it was demanded of him whether he had given such Laws as were absolutely the best, that he had given the best Laws he could find out for those who were to be governed by them; so shall I say concerning the Laws of God by Moses, If they were the very best that people was capable of to whom they were given, if they were the best for that time and State, they were as perfect as any Law need to be, because wanting nothing that was required. But doth any thing that I have said charge the Law of Moses with not being the best that people was capable of? nay have I not already shown, that in regard to the hardness of their hearts, God was fain to remit something in the matter of divorce? For whereas at the first God tied man and wife by a bond, which nothing but Adultery could dissolve, for the hardness of the Jews hearts (as our Saviour tells us) he was forced to remit of that severity, and suffer them to put away their wives for a lesser cause, Mat. 19.8 In fine, the Jews were then but in the state of children, as S. Paul tells us, Gal. 4.2. they had the weakness and peevishness of children, and being such God (as was but requisite) dealt with them as with children; keeping them, as that Apostle goes on, under the elements of the world, and permitting them to think, and speak, and act as such. But now that the world is grown man, now that our Blessed Saviour hath brought abundance of Grace and Truth into it, giving men more wise and understanding heads, more pliant hearts, or at least more grace to make them so; as it was but reasonable he should raise the standards of obedience, and fulfil both the Law and the Prophets, so it will be but necessary for us to make our piety answer them, and fulfil that Law and the Prophets over again in our conversation.   

DISC. V Of the measures by which we are to proceed in the interpretation of the Decalogue or Ten Commandments.  
That the Ten Commandments comprehend more in them than is expressed, and how we may come to investigate the full importance of them. Several rules laid down to direct us in that affair. What ties we have upon us to yield obedience to them, above what the Jews, to whom they were first given, had. A comparison between the Israelites deliverance out of Egypt, by which their obedience is enforced, and our far better deliverance from the bondage of the Ceremonial Law, and Sin, and Death.  
HAving, by way of preparation to our main design, entreated of the nature, and obligations of the Laws of God, and particularly of that Law which we are now about to explain, showing the authority by which it stands, the means whereby it comes to oblige us, and the pitch to which our Saviour hath raised it; it remains only that we inquire what measures we are to proceed by in giving the full importance of the several precepts of it. For as when Solomon's Temple was to be built, all things were so fitted, and prepared beforehand, that there was neither hammer, nor axe, nor any tool of iron heard in the building of it; so, in every methodical discourse, care aught to be taken that the materials be first squared and fitted, before we proceed to the rearing of it, lest the deferring it till then do not only prove a retarding of it, but the noises of axes and hammers disturb and confound us in it.  
Now there are two things, within the explication of which, the resolution of this question will be comprehended.  

1. Whether the Ten Commandments comprehend no more in them, than is expressed. And  
2. If they do, what those things are which they comprehend.   
I. It is commonly supposed both by Jewish and Christian writers that the Decalogue or Ten Commandments is a summary or abstract of the whole Duty of Man. I will not at the first either take so much for granted, or attempt the probation of it; whatsoever is to be said concerning this particular, being best to be learned by a leisurely and gradual procedure. It shall suffice now in the entrance of my discourse to affirm, that more is comprehended in the Decalogue or Ten Commandments, than is expressed in the letter of it. For, first, all that must be supposed to be comprehended in it, which is either employed in it, or necessarily deducible from it. Thus though the letter of the first Commandment doth directly import no more than the rejecting of false Gods, yet inasmuch as God prefaces this prohibition with I am the Lord thy God, and the prohibition itself manifestly implies the having of him for our God, it is evident that when God saves, Thou shalt have no other Gods before me, his meaning is as well that we should have him for our God, as that we should not have any other God besides. Again, when the having of any one for our God implies the fearing and loving and honouring him that is so, according to his several attributes, at the same time he commands us to have him and no other for our God, he must be supposed to command also, that we should fear, and love, and honour him and him alone, though neither of these be expressed in it. But then if the Law be considered not only as proposed by Moses, but as illustrated and enlarged by our Saviour in the Sermon on the Mount, in which capacity there is no doubt we ought to look upon it, because as such a part of the Christian Law; so there is no doubt but many things are comprehended in it, which are not expressed in the letter of it. But because when I show what things are comprehended in the Ten Commandments, beside what is expressed in the letter, I shall at the same time show that something else is, therefore superseding any farther proof of that as altogether unnecessary, I will proceed to the resolution of the other.  
II. It is commonly supposed, and not without reason, though that reason be not often made appear, that when our Saviour reduceth the Law to those two great Commandments, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, he means that principally of the Law of Moses contained in the Ten Commandments. Which if true, it will follow,  
1. That the negative in every Commandment doth include the affirmative, and that when God saith Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal, and the like, his meaning is not only that we should do no injury to our neighbour's person or estate, but that we should love and do him good in both. Now that our Saviour intended those great Commandments, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and Thy neighbour as thyself, as an abstract of the Ten Commandments, and consequently that what is contained in them is also comprised in the Ten Commandments, will appear from Rom. 13.8, 9 where S. Paul doth not only affirm love to be the fulfilling of the Law, according as his Master had done, but particularly of the Ten Commandments. For this (saith he) Thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not bear false witness, thou shalt not covet, and if there be any other Commandment, it is 
* Verba sunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  briefly comprehended in this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. Now forasmuch as Love is the fulfilling of this Law, forasmuch as the several Precepts of it are comprehended in it, as in a recapitulation 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Significat propriè variarum sum marum in unam collectionem, per translationem, antè dictorum repetitionem per capita. Hammond in Eph. 1.10.  or summary; that Law, of which it is a summary, must comprehend love in it, and consequently, not only forbid the doing of any injury to our neighbour, but the doing him all good offices and services. There is but one thing of moment to be opposed to this arguing, and that is what follows in the 10. verse, Love worketh no ill to his neighbour, therefore love is the fulfilling of the Law; for if love be the fulfilling of the Law, in that it works no ill, then may the whole tenor of the Law seem to be comprehended in the not doing of any harm to our neighbour. But to this I answer first, that when the Apostle saith, Love worketh no ill to his neighbour, therefore love is the fulfilling of the Law, his meaning may be, not that love is the fulfilling of the Law merely because it doth no harm, but because of its opposition to all those evils and harms, such as Adultery, Theft and the like, whereby our neighbour is incommodated. Love is a stranger to Murder, Adultery, and Theft, and to whatsoever else whereby our neighbour is incommodated; and being a stranger to all such practices, it doth not only extend itself to this or that Commandment, but to all the Commandments of the second Table. I say, secondly, with Esthius, that though the Apostle say less, yet it was his intention to have more understood, even not only that love worketh no ill, but that it worketh all good to its neighbour. Which (beside the usual forms of Speech in Scripture, and other books, where under negative expressions, such as I am not ashamed, great boasting is often signified) is evident from the verse before. For being it is there said, not only that the Precepts, Thou shalt not kill, and the like, but if there be any other Commandment, it is briefly comprehended in that saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thyself, and consequently, that the command of honouring our Parents is, because that is a Precept of the same Decalogue; the Law cannot be fulfilled by abstaining merely from evil, because that of Honouring our Parents is more than so. When therefore it is here said, that love worketh no ill to his Neighbour and therefore is the fulfilling of the Law, we are not only to understand that it worketh no ill, but that it procureth all the good that can be. In the mean time, if any deem the positive love of our Neighbour to be the fulfilling of the Law, in the same sense in which I have shown the word fulfil is to be understood in the 5. Chapter of S. Matthew, that is to say, as an addition made by Christ to it, to make up its former wants, it will come all to one as to our present purpose. For being the subjects of that Christ, who hath fulfilled it, we are necessarily to look upon the Law in that latitude wherein it is proposed by him, and consequently to believe the Commandments of the Decalogue, not only to require us to abstain from doing evil, but to pursue the contrary good. The argument is much more strong from the affirmative to the negative, that is to say, from the command of any positive duty to the forbidding of the contrary vice. For though, for instance, I may abstain from dishonouring my Parents, and yet never give them honour; yet I cannot honour and dishonour them at once: and therefore that Commandment, which enjoins me honour, must consequently be thought to forbid all dishonour and contempt. Thus far therefore we have already attained toward the importance of the Ten Commandments, that, though some of them, and those the most, seem satisfied with abstaining from evil, and others with the sole pursuing of good; yet both the one and the other are to be understood as obliging to both, to eschew that which is evil, and to follow after that which is good and virtuous.  
2. The second thing observable concerning the Ten Commandments, is, that though the grosser sort of sins only be there expressly forbidden, such as Adultery, Murder, and the like, yet under them are contained also all the lesser ones of the same species. Thus for example, Though the Decalogue take notice only of Murder, and Adultery in the sins of Malice and Unchastity, yet considering those Precepts as proposed by Christ, in which capacity there is no doubt all Christians are to look upon them, so we are to understand all sins of the same kind to be included, how much soever inferior to the other. For I say unto you (saith our Saviour) that whosoever looketh upon a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart, Mat. 5.28. And again, not only that he who kills his Brother, but that whosoever is angry without a cause, especially if he proceed to reproachful language, shall be in danger of the same judgement, to which the murderer is obnoxious, v. 22. of the same Chapter. And indeed, though there appear not any clear indications in the Commandments themselves of their descending to those lesser sins, yet forasmuch as we find the Tenth Commandment descending so low as to forbid the very roveting that which is another man's, and again the other parts of the Law and the Prophets forbidding the lower degrees of unchastity and malice, as hath been before shown; there is reason enough to believe, those lower degrees were intended to be forbidden by it, as well as the higher ones. For the other parts of the Law and the Prophets being but as Comments upon the Decalogue, as appears by Gods laying that as the foundation of all the rest, and its own containing in it the general heads of our obedience; whatsoever is forbidden by the other parts of the Law and the Prophets, must be supposed to be included in those grosser fins of the same kind, which the Decalogue takes notice of.  
3. The third thing observable concerning the Ten Commandments, is, that though all of them, except the last, take no notice of any other than the outward actions; yet the actions of the inward man, or the heart are no less comprised in the several Precepts and Prohibitions of it. For beside that (as was before said) the Law of God is by the Psalmist said to be a law converting the soul, Psal. 17.9. and by S. Paul termed spiritual, Rom. 7.14. That first and great Commandment, in which all our duty to God is comprehended, is expressed by our loving God with all our heart and soul, as well as with all our might and strength, Mat. 22.38. And though the second be not expressed in like manner, to wit, that of loving our Neighbours as ourselves, yet as the affection of the heart is manifestly included in the word love, which is the proper act of it, so the Law is express, that we should not hate our brother in our heart, nor bear a grudge against the children of our people. But because this argument hath been sufficiently exemplified in the several Precepts of the Decalogue, I will proceed to my  
4. Rule which is, That not only the sins here mentioned are forbidden, but all those things that lead to them; as on the other side, not only that the duties there expressed are under command, but all those means that naturally tend to them: for being the end doth depend upon the means, and either follows, or follows not, according as they are made use of, or omitted; he that commands any end must necessarily be thought to command the means, as on the other side he that forbids the end to forbid the other. Thus forasmuch as drunkenness leads to lust, and immoderate anger to murder, were there no other Precepts to make them unlawful, those of Murder and Adultery would, because intemperance and immoderate anger naturally lead to them.  
5. (For to enumerate more particulars, would perhaps serve rather to forestall the ensuing discourse, than to clear our way to it) Whatsoever either the Old, or New Testament, proposeth concerning piety and virtue, as it may fairly enough be reduced to some Precept or other of the Decalogue, as will appear when we come to discuss them; so considering it, as our Catechism doth, as an abstract of all moral duties, it will be necessary to take that course in the explication of it.  
6. Lastly, for though matter of duty be the principal thing here intended, yet that duty hath promises annexed to it; Whatsoever is here annexed by way of promise, though more peculiarly concerning the Jews, doth yet appertain to us also. For being whatsoever was written aforetime was written for our learning, that we through patience and comfort of the Scriptures might have hope, Rom. 15.4. being the Author to the Hebrews applies that promise to all Christians, which was spoken particularly to Joshua, and upon a particular occasion, Heb. 13.5. it is much more reasonable to believe those promises to belong to us, which are annexed to the Ten Commandments, because they are no less our duty, than those to whom they were first given. And therefore, as S. Paul, when to show the equity of Christian child's obedience to parents, alleged the words of the fifth Commandment, Ephe. 6.2. so he forgot not to add the promise annexed of its being well with us, and living long upon the earth; all which had been very impertinent, if the promise as well as duty had not been our concernment as well as the Jews. Allowance only would be made for the difference there is between the Law and the Gospel as to temporal promises, but what that difference is, and what allowance ought to be made for it, will fall in more seasonably, when I come to entreat of the fifth Commandment, to which therefore I shall reserve the distinct handling of it.  
Having thus prepared my way to the explication of the Ten Commandments, by showing the nature and obligation of the divine Laws, and particularly of this, with the measure whereby we are to proceed in the explication of them; it remains that we descend to the Commandments themselves, and consider the several duties that are wrapped up in them. But because the Lawgiver himself, before he proceeds to the several Precepts of the Decalogue, labours to stir up the Israelites to yield obedience to them by the consideration of that great mercy of Gods toward them in bringing them out of the Land of Egypt, I will, for a conclusion of this discourse, show what like ties he hath upon us to the performance of the same duties. And here in the first place, it is not to be forgotten, because that is the first root and foundation of all our obligation to him, that he, who exacts our obedience, is he that made us, he from whom we receive our life, and breath, and all things conducing to the support of it. For as it is but reasonable in itself, that God should exact the obedience of those, who are made and sustained by him, so it is no less reasonable, that we should pay him that obedience, who receive so great a favour from him. But not to insist upon so remote an obligation, who have so many that are much more near and pressing to us Christians, consider we in the second place, that he, who immediately bound this Law upon us, hath bought us with his most precious blood. An argument I the rather insist upon, because it carries with it, an exact correspondency to that mercy, which God made use of to persuade his own people to obedience. For as the deliverance of the Jews out of Egypt was a deliverance from a cruel bondage, and such as neither before nor since any Nation groaned under, so our redemption by Christ was a deliverance from a more cruel bondage, because from a spiritual one. We were in bondage to our own hearts lusts, we were in bondage to Satan and his instruments, a Master, who after all our toil would have paid us no other wages than death, and an eternal separation from God. Again, whereas the Jewish Lawgiver delivered them from their bondage, by the blood of the Paschal Lamb, and of their enemies, he who bond the same Law upon us purchased us, not indeed by the blood of Lambs, or of other men, but (which is much more considerable) by his own. Now if a deliverance out of Egypt were so strong an obligation to obedience, that God himself should lay the stress of the whole Law of Moses on it, how great a one may we suppose it to be to be delivered from sin, and Satan, and death, and that too by the blood of him by whom that Law was imposed on us? Certainly if any redemption be a just incentive to obedience, a redemption from such a servitude, and in such a manner must be, and we who are so bought, obliged to glorify God both in our bodies, and in our spirits which are his. We are not as yet at an end of the obligations the divine goodness hath laid upon us to yield obedience to these his Laws. For whereas God, though he delivered the Jess from their Egyptian bondage, yet brought them into another, from a servitude in making bricks to a servitude in observing many unprofitable Rites and Ceremonies, our Lawgiver on the contrary hath delivered us from the bondage of corruption to the glorious liberty of the Sons of God; that is to say (for what Son is there, that is not under obedience?) to the obedience of Sons, to a service which is both easy and ingenuous. We are not now, as they, under a yoke of ceremonial rites and ordinances, we are not treated as slaves, nor indeed as servants; what becomes a Son to do and a Father to exact, what is just, and equitable, and ingenuous, that and that alone is the rule of our obedience. Which yet neither doth he so exact, as to cast us off for every transgression of it, for every weak or indeed wilful deviation from it; but, after the manner of tender Fathers, passeth by our lesser errors, and upon our repentance, and amendment, receives us into favour after grosser ones. Lastly, as our Lawgiver admits us to an ingenuous and easy service, as he is moreover gracious and merciful in the exacting of it; so he furnisheth us with ability to perform all those things which he doth so mercifully exact. For of his fullness (saith S. John) have we all received, and grace for grace, Joh. 1.16. Now as the assistance of the divine grace removes all pretexts of our inability to perform what he requires, and consequently leaves those inexcusable who come short in the doing of it; so can it not but be a powerful inducement to yield obedience to his Laws from whom that assistance is derived. For when he who is the giver of the Law is also assisting to the doing of it, when he doth (as the Apostle speaks) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and bear a part of that burden which he hath laid upon us, what ingratitude must it be to withdraw our shoulders from it, and refuse to obey him, who doth not only impose a light burden upon us, but contributes also to the sustaining of it? Thus though the deliverance from Egypt cannot be pressed upon us, as an inducement to yield obedience to this Royal Law, yet there want not others of the like nature, but of far greater force, to endear its obedience to us; and then I hope it will be no diminution to it, if instead of I am the Lord thy God who brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage, we substitute, I am the Lord thy God who, beside the common benefit of thy creation, have delivered thee from sin and hell, and both given thee a more ingenuous and easy service, and ability to undergo it.    



THE FIRST COMMANDMENT.  
THE FIRST COMMANDMENT.  
Thou shalt have no other Gods 
* or before me.  but me.  

PART I.  
The Contents.  
The Commandment divided into three Capital Precepts. I. That we have the one true God for our God. II. That we look upon the God of Israel as such. III. That we have no other Gods beside him. Of the first Capital Precept, and what is meant by the having the One true God for our God, which is shown in the General to be no other, than our owning him as such. An address to a more Particular Explication of it, where is premised a brief account of the Nature and Attributes of God, how the knowledge thereof is to be attained, and of what necessity such a knowledge is.  
IT is easy to observe, upon a Superficial view of this first Commandment, that the whole of it may be comprised in these three Capital Precepts. 1. That we have the one true God for our God, 2. That we look upon the God of Israel as such, and 3. and lastly that we have no other Gods besides him. For as the last of these is the very letter of the Commandment, and therefore not at all to be doubted of; so the two former, though not expressed, yet are manifestly implied, in the Commandment, and the preamble to it. For inasmuch as The God of Israel prefaceth it with the declaration of his being the Lord our God, and in the body thereof forbids the having of any other before, or besides himself, he manifestly supposeth the having of himself, and the true, as well as the not having any other. In the mean time, if that alone be not sufficient to persuade, the rule before laid down, and the abstract which Christ hath given of the duties of the first Table will. For if every negative in the Decalogue do include the affirmative, if the loving the Lord our God, which is no other than the God of Israel, with all our heart, and mind, and strength, be the abstract or summary of the Commandments of the first Table; either that, which is an abstract, or summary, must contain more in it, than that of which it is one, or we must be supposed to be obliged to the having the one true God, and the God of Israel, as well as to the not having of any other.  
I. I begin with the first of these, even the having the one true God for our God, prescinding from the consideration of the God of Israel's being he. Where not to insist upon the difference that seems to be between the Hebrew and our English, because the difference is merely verbal, it being all one in sense, There shall not be to thee any other Gods, and Thou shalt not have any other Gods before me, I will proceed to inquire both in the general and in particular, what is meant by the having of a God.  
1. Now the force of that expression (which will furnish us with a general explication) will soon appear, if these two things be considered, 1. That that which is required of us, must be somewhat, that depends upon our will, and 2. That the authority of God depends no farther upon that, than as to our owning or acknowledging it. Forasmuch as nothing can be the matter of a command, but what is in the power of our will, either to embrace or refuse, and the authority of God depends no farther upon our will, than as to our owning or acknowledging it; it follows that when we are commanded to have the one true God for our God, according as the affirmative part of this Precept imports, the meaning thereof can be no other, than that we own him as such: as, on the other side, that when we are required not to have any other Gods beside, that we own no other in that relation. Neither is the expression here made use of any whit disagreeing from what we have said to be intended by it. For as in the language of S. Paul men are said to be the servants of him to whom they yield obedience, so by the same proportion of speech to have him for their God, whom they own and revere as such. And indeed, though in a sense we may be all said to have one and the same God, because we are all subject to the same, yet in strictness of speech no man can be said to have any one for his God, whom he doth not some way revere as such. For the word have supposing our admittance of that which we are said to have, if we do not admit of him and his authority, neither can we be said to have him, and consequently neither to perform that which this Precept requireth of us. Add hereunto, which will farther confirm this notion, what our Saviour hath affirmed to be the sum and substance of the first table of the Decalogue; for if the duties of the first table be comprised in that Precept, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and soul, and strength, according as our Saviour hath affirmed, then must the having him for our God, which is the first and chiefest Precept of it, be our owning him as such, our having that affection and esteem for him which is due unto a God.  
2. Having thus shown in the general what it is to have the Lord for our God, even to own and revere him as such, we are in the next place to inquire more particularly, how that is to be done; and what respect is due unto him as a God. But because that is not to be known, and much less to be performed without the knowledge of the nature and attributes of God, and I have before said, that what is prerequired to any thing enjoined, is to be supposed to be enjoined by the same Commandment; therefore before I proceed to show what respect is due unto him, I must show,  

1. What the nature and attributes of God are.  
2. How the knowledge thereof is to be attained, and  
3. And lastly the necessity thereof.   
1. I begin with the last of these, because the first in order to be known, even the necessity of our knowledge of God, which will appear from what was before intimated concerning the impossibility of our giving him that honour which is due, without it. For all honour being founded in the apprehension of those excellencies which we behold in another, if the excellencies of the divine nature be either not at all, or but superficially known, our honour of it must be accordingly, and consequently no way suitable to the Divine Majesty. And hence Joh. 17.3. the knowledge of God and Christ is set to denote all that which is necessary to eternal life. For this (saith that Evangelist) is life eternal, to know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent. Not that this alone is sufficient to qualify us for Heaven (for Faith, and Love, and all other Graces of the Spirit are necessary to the attaining of it) but that this is the basis and foundation of all the rest, neither can we either love, or trust in him, or adore him, if we have not a due knowledge of him.  
2. The necessity of the knowledge of God being thus evinced, pass we in the second place to the means whereby that knowledge is to be attained; which is either, 1. the light of Reason and Nature, or 2. of Revelation and Scripture. That God may be known by the former of these ways S. Paul evidently declares, Rom. 1.19, 20. For that (saith he) which may be known of God is manifest in them, for God hath showed it unto them; for the invisible things of him from the Creation of the World are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead. It is true indeed, what through the present weakness of humane nature, and Gods just desertion of it, because of our many provocations, we cannot so easily, or so perfectly attain to the knowledge of him by the light of reason and nature: But as this hinders not, but that God may be knowable by it, because the eyes of our understandings are become less apt to discern it; so he, that shall seriously set himself to contemplate the works of nature, will find no contemptible footsteps of the Deity upon them. But because I have 
* Explication of the Apostles Creed.  elsewhere given a specimen of what is knowable by this light, in my discourse upon that Article of the Creed concerning God the Father, and because it is most certain that whatever may be knowable by it, the best of us find it difficult enough to deduce the nature of God from it; therefore consider we in the second place that more certain one, even the light of Revelation and Scripture. For as no one can be supposed to give us a more perfect account of the nature of God than he himself can, and consequently, that which comes immediately from him must be preferred before all other ways of knowing him, so cannot that account but be thought the most easy and intelligible, because added in consideration of our inability to discern it by the help of our own reason. For after that 
* 1 Cor. 1.21.  in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe. Besides, when that which may be known of God from the works of the Creation cannot be deduced but by a long train of consequences, the Scriptures give us direct and manifest notices of it, they present him to us, not as in a glass, that is to say, by reflection and obscurely, but, as I may so speak, face to face. And therefore, being now to set before you the nature and attributes of God, so far forth as shall be necessary to let us know what regard we ought to have for him, I will borrow my description of it from the Scripture, which is more exact and intelligible, rather than from the light of nature, which is both more imperfect and obscure. This only would be premised as well to set bounds to our own inquiries, as to enhance that respect which we ought to have for the Divine Majesty, that being infinite in his nature and attributes, according as hath been elsewhere 
* Explication of the Apostles Creed.  shown, and shall be farther in the conclusion of this discourse, whatsoever knowledge we or any other creature may have of him, yet we cannot hope to comprehend him; in which sense some have with great probability understood that of S. Paul, that he dwelleth in that light to which no man can approach, and that no man either hath seen him or can, 1 Tim. 6.16. Now if it should be demanded (which ought to be the end of all our inquiries in this matter) what this incomprehensibility of God exacts of us, and by what means we may own him as such; I answer, by an humble and silent admiration of this his unintelligible perfection. For as that Painter, who drew a veil over the face of a sad Mother, did thereby better express the passion he was to represent, than he could have done by the saddest aspect he could have delineated, because that veil, which he drew over it, did tacitly insinuate, that the grief was not capable of being expressed; so cannot we give a greater evidence of our owning the immensity of the Divine Nature than by our silent admiration of it. For this shows the Divine Nature to be such as we can never hope to conceive, and much less be able to express.  
3. Having premised thus much as a limit to our own inquiries, and as a supplement to those imperfect discoveries we shall be able to make of the Divine Majesty, proceed we according to our proposed method to the observation of so much as is knowable from the Scriptures concerning the Nature and Attributes of God. And  
1. First of all for the Nature of God the Scripture is express, that it is spiritual, for so our Saviour, Joh. 4.24. God is a spirit, and they that worship him, must worship him in spirit and in truth; that is to say, (for this is the best description we can give of a spirutal nature) he is such a substance as is exempt from the Laws and affections of bodies, he is not capable of being divided or circumscribed. Neither doth it make aught against this assertion, that we find God frequently described with Eyes, and Ears, and Hands, and other the parts of a body. For as he, who would explain any thing to a child or other weak person, must suit his discourse to the capacity of him, whom he hath taken upon him to instruct; so God being to instruct mankind, and particularly the common sort of it who understand nothing beyond what they see and feel, was necessarily to make known his own Nature and Attributes, not by such discoveries as were most proper to declare it, but by such things as the capacity of them, whom he was to instruct, was best able to apprehend. Now as no man would infer from the explication that is made of any thing to a child, that the thing itself is altogether such as it is described to him, because such a one is rather to be instructed by such things as are most obvious to him, than by the proper notices thereof; so neither can any from the bodily representation that is made of God, that God hath indeed such parts and members, as he is there described withal; because the weakness of the common sort requires that the nature of God be represented by the things of sense, which alone they have any knowledge of. Besides, as there was a necessity of Gods describing his power and providence by Hands and Eyes, as in like manner, other Attributes of his by such parts of humane bodies, which hold most correspondence with them, and consequently nothing of corporeity to be attributed to him because of it; so God himself hath given us sufficiently to understand that he would have those descriptions interpreted rather as Emblems and Pictures, than as rigid definitions of his nature. For beside the express affirmation of his being a spirit, with which the affections of bodies are not consistent, he frequently asks the makers of Images, To whom they will liken God, or what likeness they will compare unto him; and this too, as you may see, Isa. 40.17. upon the account of that vast distance, that is between him and all the Nations of the World. Which kind of questions being tantamount to a negation, it follows that however God be sometime described as a humane body, yet he hath no affinity with them, nor with any other how glorious soever.  
2. From the nature of God, pass we to his Attributes, which for our more orderly proceeding, may be reduced to these two heads, to wit, 

1. Either such as are radicated in his nature, or  
2. As result from his operations.    
1. The former of these are again double, commonly called Incommunicable or Communicable, that is to say, such of which there is no resemblance in the creatures, or such of which there is. Of the former of these sorts are these four, his independency, his unchangeableness, his omnipresence, and eternity, each of which hath the astipulation of the Scripture, and therefore to be considered by us. That God is independent of any other, either as to his being or subsistence, S. Paul evidently declares, Act. 17.25. for inasmuch as he giveth to all life and breath and all things, he himself cannot depend upon them for his own, and consequently is independent of any other. There is the same evidence from Scripture concerning God's unchangeableness, either in his nature, or resolutions. For they (saith the Psalmist) shall perish, but thou shalt endure, yea all of them shall wax old as doth a garment, but thou art the same and thy years shall have no end. Psal. 102.26, 27. And again, with him is no variableness, neither shadow of turning, saith S. James, c. 1.17. Lastly, as God is independent and unchangeable, so is he omnipresent and eternal; witness for the former that known place of the Psalmist, Psal. 139.7. and so on; Whither shall I go from thy spirit, or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there. If I make my bed in hell, behold thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost part of the sea, Even there also shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me. For the latter, the same Psalmist, Plal. 90.2. For from everlasting to everlasting thou art God.  
Next to his incommunicable Attributes, consider we his Communicable ones, that is to say, such of which there is some image in the creatures; in each of which we shall find the same consent of Scripture, as we found before in his incommunicable ones. To begin with his Mercy and Goodness, because the Scripture itself tells us that that is above all his works; how did he himself triumph in it when he proclaimed his own Glory? For thus, Exod. 34.6. when he passed before Moses, he proclaimed himself to be the Lord, even the Lord merciful and gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness and truth; Keeping mercy for thou sands, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin. Next to his mercy consider we his Justice, because proclaimed in the same breath, he himself there adding, that he was one that would by no means clear the guilty, but visit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children's children, v. 7. of that chapter. As in like manner, though more fully elsewhere; for all his ways are judgement, a God of truth, and without iniquity, just and right is he, Deut. 32.4. Where we have not only a declaration of his Justice in the largest acception of the word, but a declaration also of his Truth, another Attribute of his, and therefore to be considered by us. But because this as others of them are so frequently mentioned in Scripture, that no man can be supposed to be ignorant of it, I will add only for a confirmation of it, that he is so much a God of truth, that he is by S. Paul said to be, The God that cannot lie, Tit. 1.2. Lastly (for these things are so notorious from the Scripture, that it will be but lost labour to go about to prove them) as he is a God of Mercy, and Justice, and Truth, so he is a God of Glory, and Power, and Wisdom. And more than this I shall not need to add concerning such Attributes, as are radicated in the Divine Nature, unless it be, that whereas in created beings they are finite and limited, in God they are infinite and unlimited. But so that they are, the Scripture gives us to understand, either in express terms, or such as do necessarily infer it; that affirming in one place 
* Psal. 147.5.  that his understanding is infinite, as in another 
‖ Isai. 40.17.  that all nations and their several excellencies are before him as nothing, yea less than nothing and vanity, which is in effect to say, that God himself is infinite: They being not to be said to be as nothing yea less than nothing in comparison of him, who hold any proportion to him, as they must be said to do, if God himself were finite.  
2. One only Attribute remains, even that which we have said to flow from his operations, I mean his Sovereignty and Dominion. Concerning which, to omit others, that of S. Paul may suffice, Act. 17.24. where we have not only the world, and all things therein, affirmed to be made by him, but he himself for that reason styled the Lord of heaven and earth, that is to say (for so both the term of heaven and earth, and the procedure of that argument show) the Lord of all the world, and of all things therein contained.   

PART II.  
That to have the One true God for our God is to own him as such both in Soul and Body, and in all the faculties and powers of each. An account of what acknowledgement is due to God from the Soul, and particularly from that great faculty thereof the Understanding: Which is shown to consist, first in a right apprehension of his Nature and Attributes, secondly in a serious and frequent reflection on them, and thirdly in a firm belief of what he affirmeth. An enquiry thereupon into the just object of Faith, the Congruity or rather essentiality thereof to the Oeconomy of the Gospel, and how we own God for our God by it.  
HAving given you an account in the foregoing discourse of the Nature and Attributes of God, together with the infiniteness thereof, as also shown that to have him for our God is no other than to own him as such, it remains only that we inquire, how that is to be done, and what respect is due unto him as a God. For the resolution whereof 

1. The first thing I shall return is, that we are to own him both in the inward and outward man. For beside that Soul and Body are equally his, by right of creation, preservation and redemption, and consequently, an acknowledgement to be made by each, we are expressly required by S. Paul to glorify God in our body, and in our spirit, which are his, 1 Cor. 6.20. But from hence it will follow,  
2. That we are to own him for our God in all the faculties and powers both of the one and the other. Which is farther confirmed, as to the Soul especially, by Gods requiring us to love him with all our heart, and soul and might, Deut. 6.5. Neither let any man say, that this concerns only the passion of love, and therefore not to be extended to other expresses of it. For as we are elsewhere required to fear and trust in the same God, which shows that the other are not excluded; our Saviour assuring us (as he doth 
* Mat. 22.27, etc. ) that upon that great Commandment hangs all the Law and the Prophets as to our duty to our Maker, it is evident it was intended to comprehend all other ways and means, whereby we are in a capacity to honour him. The only remaining difficulty is, what acknowledgement each faculty is to make, which accordingly I come now to consider.    
1. To begin with the Soul, because the chief seat of piety and all other virtues, and because God professeth especially to require it. Where following the usual division of its faculties I will inquire, 

1. What is due to God from our understanding?  
2. What is due unto him from our wills, and  
3. And lastly, what is due unto him from our affections.    
1. Now to own God in our Understandings, which is the first of the faculties before remembered, implieth in it these three thing. 1. A right apprehension of his Nature and Attributes. 2. A serious and frequent reflection on them, and 3. And lastly a firm belief of what he affirms.  
1. Of the first of these there cannot be the least doubt, that it is required of us towards the owning him for our God. For beside that that is one of the prime acts of our Understanding, and therefore to pay God its acknowledgement, the neglect thereof casts us unavoidably upon that error, against which this first Commandment was principally intended; to fail in our apprehension of God being not to own the nature of God, but a fancy and imagination of our own. And accordingly, as S. Paul stuck not to tell the Athenians, that they ought not to think the Godhead was like unto Gold, or Silver, or stone graven by art, and man's device, Act. 17.29. So he charges upon the heathen in general the vanity of their imaginations concerning him, and which is more, makes that the ground of Gods giving them over to those abominable crimes into which they fell, Rom. 1.29. Taking it therefore for granted, as we very well may, that we ought to have a right apprehension of God's nature and Attributes, nothing remains to be enquired into, but what that apprehension is, from what measures it is to be taken, and what is to be done by us toward the attaining and preserving of it. Of the two former of these I have discoursed already in the foregoing discourse, and must therefore remand you thither for your satisfaction; it shall content me, and may you, to insist upon the last, and show what is to be done by us toward the attaining or preserving it. And here very opportunely comes in that which is generally recommended by the Pythagoreans toward the attaining of Philosophical knowledge, even the purifying our minds from all those earthly and sensual affections, to which we are so fatally inclined. For our understandings being apt to judge of things, not according as they are in themselves, but as they best suit with our corrupt affections, till the mind be well purged from these, it is impossible we should entertain any apprehensions of God, which are not some way or other vitiated by them. And accordingly as some of the Heathen (because led thereto by their own necessities and appetites) have been so stupid as to think the immortal Gods did eat and drink like us, so others so depraved in their conceptions, as to believe them tainted with the lusts of humane nature, to have the same sinful passions and affections with themselves. Witness their reporting them to descend from heaven to enjoy female beauties, to maintain animosities among themselves, and espouse those of men, their making some of them the Patrons of fraud and cozenage, and others again of intemperance and debauchery, their appointing a third sort to preside over the Amours of men, and both to kindle and maintain their lose and sometimes unnatural flames. Of all which misapprehensions the great, if not only cause was, the passion they themselves had for them, and that esteem and value they were wont to set upon them; the Heathen no less fond, than impiously, conceiting, because these things gratifyed their own corrupt inclinations, that they afforded the same gusto to the powers above, and were the object of their affections and desires. Forasmuch therefore as the minds of men are so apt to be debauched by their corrupt affections, it is but necessary towards a right apprehension of God that our hearts should be first purged from them, and we become if not wholly spiritual, yet less sensual in our desires. Now though that may seem a hard task to effect (as I doubt not it may prove so at the first, to those who have been accustomed to indulge them) yet the difficulty will be much diminished, and in fine wholly removed, by considering both how unworthy they are of rational creatures, and with what evil consequences they are usually attended. For as the pleasures before spoken of are more the pleasures of beasts than men, and by them more fully and tightly enjoyed; so the effect of them is no other than to produce in us low and abject minds, crazy, diseased, and at length putrid bodies. The heart being thus purged from all earthly and sensual affections, towards which I have over and above represented the most effectual expedients, we are in the next place, to lift up our minds or thoughts from the contemplation of corporeal beings to the consideration of spiritual ones. For as it is not to be expected, that they who accustom themselves to look no farther than their senses, should ever conceive rightly of a spiritual object; it being impossible for men's apprehensions to rise higher than the fountain from which they proceed: so that depraved custom was no doubt the first original of the Heathens believing God to have a body like themselves, with the infirmities and accidents thereof. They enured themselves to consider of nothing, but what they saw and felt, they chained their thoughts to the things and occurrences of the world, and, having no knowledge of God, but from the Traditions of their fathers, they were thereby tempted to conceive of him as corporeal also, and that he was only a more glorious one. After the same manner, as one hath happily compared it, that people always bred in Country Towns and Villages, judge of those Cities they never saw, by proportion to the Market-Town to which they resort, or of the Palaces of Princes by the houses of their Landlords. Now as to undeceive such people, the only way would be to lead them from their own homes, and show them some more glorious Town or House, than any they had formerly been acquainted with; so I know not a more proper expedient to regulate men's apprehensions concerning God, than by inuring them to the consideration of spiritual things: such as are for example, the nature of our own Understanding and Will, the Sciences which perfect the one, and the Moral excellencies of the other. For as these are the things by which we most resemble him whom we are commanded to own for our God, so by the serious consideration thereof we should at length disentangle ourselves from the things of sense, by which we are fastened to the earth, and make both a more free and prosperous flight to Heaven. Lastly, as it is necessary to have our thoughts lifted up from the contemplation of corporeal beings to the consideration of more refined ones; so also, if we would attain a right apprehension of God, to apply ourselves to a serious and deliberate consideration of his immense nature and perfections. For as few things are rightly apprehended, when either superficially considered, or looked upon with a transient eye; so much less may we think the nature of God will, which cannot be comprehended by us, though we should employ our whole life in the consideration of it.  
2. Having thus dispatched what we have said to be first implied in the owning of God in our Understandings, even a right apprehension of his nature and perfections, I proceed unto a second, which is the recalling of those perfections to our mind, and both seriously and frequently contemplating them. Which duty I do the rather inculcate, as because it is a tribute which God has expressly exacted, 
* Eccl. 12.1. Remember now thy Creator, etc.  and concerning which therefore there cannot be the least doubt but that we are thus to own him in our Understandings; so because the neglect of it seems to me to be the great cause of that irreligion, which is in the Christian world. For as what through the translation of the Scripture into our own tongue, and the constant explication of it, it is hardly possible for us to avoid a competent knowledge of our duty; so we cannot but in our own thoughts assent to the practice of it, and adjudge it both reasonable and profitable to be performed. But to what then can we attribute our neglect of what we are so persuaded of, but to our own want of consideration? For the will naturally and almost necessarily following the dictates of our understanding, what should hinder men from doing that which they know to be both reasonable and useful, if they kept their eye upon it, and contemplated what they could not choose but know? And accordingly S. Peter in the first Chapter of his second Epistle doth not only affirm, that he would not be negligent to put those he wrote to in remembrance of some things though they knew them, and were established in the present truth, v. 12. of that chapter, but in the 13. verse again, that he thought it meet as long as he was in this tabernacle to stir them up by putting them in remembrance, and yet a third time v. 15. that he would endeavour that they might be able after his decease to have the same things always in remembrance; plainly implying by his so frequent inculcating of the duty of remembrance, that it was through the want of that, that men apostatised from their duty, and neglected those things they were not only persuaded to be just, but necessary to their own eternal welfare. And indeed, as men may learn many things from their own practice, no less than from the proper rule of truth, the Scriptures, wherefore do the profane ones of the world so carefully avoid the conversing with their own thoughts, or listening to the advices of religious persons, but that they find the revolving them in their minds would even constrain them to their duty, and make them abandon those lusts that are inconsistent with it? Thus whether we do reflect upon our own practice, or Scripture, or reason, we shall find the great cause of men's irreligion to be the want of such a consideration, and consequently that it is no more than necessary to call the things of Religion to our mind, and particularly him who is both the object and the Author of it. These two things only seem necessary to be added, for our more advantageous performing of it. 1. That though all the Attributes of God call for our remembrance, and accordingly are to have it in their turn, yet we are especially to call those to our mind by which our affections are most likely to be influenced, and our hearts incited to embrace him. For though God do also require to be owned by us in our Understandings, yet more especially in our hearts, and consequently those Attributes to have the greatest share in our thoughts, by which our hearts and affections are most apt to be inflamed. 2. Again, though all the Attributes of God are to have a share in our remembrance, and particularly those which are most operative upon our affections, so such of them especially, as are most suitable to our present necessities and temper, because those are the most likely to advantage us. Thus though the honest but desponding person suffer his thoughts to be taken up especially with the consideration of God's infinite Love and Mercy to sinful man, yet it will be more proper for the presumptuous and disobedient to reflect upon the Majesty and Justice of the Almighty, as by which he may be most effectually drawn to the owning him for his God.  
3. The third act of the Understanding follows, even the believing what God affirms, concerning which I will show these three things.  

1. First of all, its just extent and latitude.  
2. The congruity of this virtue of Faith to our present state, and,  
3. And lastly how we own God for our God by it.   
1. To begin with the first of these, even the extent of Faith, concerning which I shall first of all observe, that it is to reach to every thing which shall be found to be affirmed by the Almighty: Whether it be delivered by way of narration, or prediction, as a thing that either is or was, or shall hereafter come to pass. Thus for example, if God declare to me that he is merciful and just, and that it is his pleasure we should be so also, that he hath in ancient times given instances of both those Attributes in the redemption of mankind and the rejection of the Angels, and that he will give more signal ones hereafter at the great judgement day; I am equally to receive each of these into my assent, and believe that they are, and have, and shall be, according as he himself hath declared. For being alike the subject of God's affirmation, I am in reason to give up my assent to each of them in what manner soever they be delivered. Which observation I do the rather set before you, because, how trivial soever it may seem to be in its self, yet the weakness shall I say, or rather impiety of the present age hath made it necessary to be represented; men commonly conceiving of faith, as an assent only to those gracious promises, which it hath pleased God to make to sinful man. By which means as they have been induced to have little regard to the other Articles of our belief, so much less to the Commandments of the Almighty, which yet, as they are equally the object of our faith, so the practice thereof is the means whereby those promises are to be attained, upon which that Faith of theirs is founded. I observe secondly, that our Faith is not only to extend itself to all God's affirmations, in what manner soever delivered, but also to all of them, whatsoever the subject matter thereof be, and how contrary soever in appearance to the dictates of our own reason. For if God's affirmation be the ground of our belief, wheresoever that ground is, it is equally to be afforded, whatsoever be the subject matter of it. Thus for example, if the doctrine of the Trinity how unintelligible soever to us, do appear to be a revelation of God's, it may and aught to challenge our assent no less than his affirmation of those things, which we have not only no prejudice against, but the dictates of our own reason to confirm us in. Lastly (for this is no less necessary to be observed than the former, because we have now no immediate revelations from God) we are to yield up our assent, not only to what God affirms to us with his own mouth, but also to what he declares by men inspired by him, and witnessed to by miracles from himself; that is to say, by his servants the Prophets and Apostles, and particularly that great Prophet and Apostle the ever Blessed Jesus: What any one affirmeth by another, being equally his affirmation, with that which he affirms by himself. But from hence it will follow, that we are to give up our belief to the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, and to all things therein contained. For these having been 
* Explication of the Apostles Creed.  elsewhere shown to have been written by men divinely inspired, and witnessed to by God himself, they are equally the word of God with that which he himself delivers, and consequently claim an equal share in our belief.  
2. Of the extent of our belief I have spoken hitherto, and shown what is the just object of it; proceed we therefore in the second place to evince its congruity, or essentiality rather to the oeconomy of the Gospel, and our present state under it. For the evidencing whereof not to tell you, which yet I very well might, that the doctrine of the Gospel is every where styled the Faith of Christ, nor yet that the Heathens 
* Vid. Orig. contra Celsum lib. 6. pag. 282.  objected nothing more against Christianity, than its calling upon men simply to believe it, I will remit you to that most full and pertinent saying of S. Paul, 1 Cor. 1.21. Where he tells us, that after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe; plainly intimating, that whereas before God led men to Salvation by wisdom and knowledge, now his intention was they should go to it by Faith, that is to say, by believing what was preached to them, by those whom he commissionated, and witnessed to by miracles. But from hence it will follow, 1. That they do in effect renounce Christianity, who receive not the doctrines of it upon the Authority of him that revealed them, as well as upon the grounds of reason. For that is in truth to disown that Faith we are to walk by, and to yield up our assent, not to Christ whose the doctrines are, but to our own only reason and judgement: Which though it do in fine terminate in God, whose candle that reason of ours is, and consequently doth so far glorify him, yet hath not the least aspect upon the veracity of God in Christ, upon which they are proposed to the world. The same is much more to be said 2. Of those who will walk no farther with their Faith, than the light of their own reason will accompany them. For this is manifestly to subject the Faith to it, and to walk rather by sight than by faith. And hence, when any thing is proposed to them which carries any seeming opposition to it, we find it presently discarded, as is notorious in the instances of the Trinity and of the Incarnation of the second Person in it, doctrines which yet have as clear a foundation in the Scripture, as any other doctrines of it. Hence also (which yet, if duly considered, is not so dissonant to our apprehensions) the resurrection of the dead hath lately run the same fate; men having been taught to believe, that to salve that it is reason enough that some body or other shall be united to the Soul, which how it agrees with the nature of a resurrection and the doctrine of the Gospel concerning it, I shall leave all sober men to judge. But who sees not, that by this means the faith of Christ is manifestly discarded, and they deny that in their opinions and assertions, which in words they profess to believe? For if my faith shall not carry me any farther than my own judgement doth, it is a sign that is the thing that moveth me, and that I walk rather by sight, or, to speak more properly, by an overweening conceit, than by the conduct of a solid faith. Either therefore let men bid defiance to Christianity, as that honest Heathen did, because they would believe nothing but what they could understand, or let them give up their belief to the doctrines of it, I do not say irrationally, but without any immediate assent of their reason to the doctrines themselves. For though the forementioned doctrines have not sufficient evidence to make them known, yet they have reason enough to make them be believed, it being the highest reason in the world to believe God, especially concerning his own nature, as who neither can deceive nor be deceived.  
3. Having thus given you an account of the extent of faith in God, and moreover shown how congruous or rather how essential it is to the oeconomy of the Gospel, it remains only that I explain how we own God for ours by it. For the evidencing whereof the first thing I shall allege, is our owning the truth of God by it. For inasmuch as we neither do nor can give up our belief, but where we are in some measure assured of the veracity of him whom we believe, by believing whatsoever God affirms, we apparently acknowledge him to be true, and as it were set our seal to it. But this is especially visible, when we give up our assent to things unlikely, and such which it may be have a greater appearance of falsehood than truth, because then there is nothing in the thing itself to engage our assent, but on the contrary very much to stagger or supplant it. Which notwithstanding therefore, if our belief be firm and unshaken, it is a sign that it hath a just apprehension of the veracity of the Almighty, and receives it with an assent commensurate to its greatness, so far as humane nature is able to proportion it. Now though this be the only direct acknowledgement of the divine Majesty, which the believing what he affirms presents him withal, yet because what he affirms doth sometime require other Attributes to establish it, hence it comes to pass that indirectly and by consequence we acknowledge those Attributes also. For thus we acknowledge God's power, when like Abraham and the Virgin Mary, we believe God in such things as are above the power of nature to produce; such as are the making a barren woman to conceive by one who was equally unapt, or a Virgin to conceive and bring forth a Son. In like manner, when we believe God assuring us, that, notwithstanding our many errors, he will for the sake of his Son both pardon and accept us, because that cannot have place without an excess of mercy in him that promiseth it, we do by our belief give a testimony to that mercy of his, upon which our pardon and acceptance doth depend. Such are the ways whereby our Understanding gives proof of our owning the Lord for our God, and therefore if we would have ours thought to do so, we ourselves must take the same course, and not only endeavour to have a right apprehension of God, but have him often in our thoughts, and steadfastly believe whatsoever he affirms.   

PART III.  
What it is to own God in our Wills, and in the proper or Elicite acts thereof. This performed either by making God's Glory the ultimate end of all our actions, and acquiescing in it when obtained; or making his will ours both in our Actions and Sufferings: The former whereof imports our choosing to act agreeably to his will, our making that will of his the ground of our choice, and our delighting in it; The latter, our submitting to, and embracing whatsoever he is pleased to lay upon us. All the other powers of Soul and Body in some measure under the Empire of the Will, for which cause it cannot be thought to discharge its own duty, unless it incline them to own God for their God. A discourse in the close concerning Trust in God, wherein is shown, in what faculties it is seated, what the nature thereof is, and how we own God for our God by it.  
BY what ways, and after what manner we are to own God in our Understandings, you have seen already, let us in the next place inquire,  
2. What is due unto him from our Wills, and how they ought to be constituted to own him as our God. For the resolution whereof we are to consider of the divers acts of the Will, which are either, 

1. Elicite, or,  
2. Imperate, that is to say, such as proceed immediately from the Will, or such as proceed immediately from some other power, but are excited by the command of it.    
The Elicite acts of the Will are again double, according to the different objects, about which they are employed. For, 1. Either they respect the end and are called volition or fruition, or, 2. The means, as election and consent. Now concerning each of these I shall inquire, how they ought to be constituted, so as that we may thereby own the Lord for our God. This only would be premised in the general, that to own God in our Wills, is to conform them unto his, that is to say, to that which he Wills in himself, or is the result of his Will concerning us. For as the greatest testimony we can give of our subjection to another, is the conforming our Wills to his, the Will being of all the faculties the most free from the command of others, and the most difficult to be brought to a compliance with them; so nothing less than the greatest testimony of our subjection can be supposed to be due to God, to whom we have so many reasons to submit ourselves, and particularly, because our Wills are no less his than any other faculty. All therefore that will be requisite for us to do, will be to resume each of the acts before remembered, and to show both what Gods own volitions are, and what he wills concerning us.  
1. I begin with the first of these, even that of Volition, whereby we will that which is the end, which in the present case can be no other than the Glory of God, and accordingly is the first thing we are taught to ask of God in the prayer of our Saviour. For as God who is the supremest good, cannot be thought to have any higher end than that of showing forth his own glory, whence it is that the Wise man affirms he hath made all things for himself, Pro. 16.4. So being (as was before observed) to conform our Wills to that of God, we are accordingly to make that glory of his the ultimate end of all our actions, and be carried towards it with the utmost of our desires. But so that it was Gods Will also concerning us, the Apostle doth more than intimate, Rom. 11.36. For not contented to say that as of him, so to him are all things, he subjoins in the close of it, to him be glory for ever and ever, Amen. The same is to be said of that other act of the Will, fruition, or a complacency in the end when it is obtained. For the glory of God being, by the former argumentation, to be the ultimate object of our desires, it is in reason, when obtained, to become the great object of our delight, and we not only to acquiesce, but to please ourselves chief in it. But so we find the will of the Psalmist to have been disposed, Psal. 73.25. Witness that most passionate expostulation of his, Whom have I in heaven but thee? and there is none upon earth that I desire besides, or in comparison of thee. The only thing remaining to be enquired into on this head is what the consequences of, such a desire, and delight are, which are in short these two, 1. To prefer the glory of God before all desirable objects, when they come in competition with it; and, 2. and chief, to subordinate all other our desires and delights to those of the Glory of God. Thus for example, though it be lawful for us to desire health and strength, with other the conveniences of life, and the means of obtaining them; yet the last and chief reason of our desiring them aught to be, not that we ourselves may be thereby made happy, but that we may thereby be enabled to glorify our maker, which is the Supreme end of our creation. Otherwise we make not God, but our own interests, and lusts, the ultimate object of our desires, and consequently make them our God, and not him whom we profess to own.  
From the willing of the end, pass we to the willing of the means the second thing required of us towards the owning the Lord for our God; which as I have already told you, we shall then effectually do, when we make his will ours; so I intent now to show, what it is to make his will ours, and that both in our Actions and Sufferings.  
1. To begin with our Actions, as which are most apparently conducing to the great end of our creation, the Glory of God, concerning which I shall first of all observe, that we are to choose to regulate them, agreeably to the prescript of Gods will. For otherwise we make not his will ours at all, but follow wholly the inclinations of our own. But beside that we are to choose to order our actions agreeably to the prescript of God's will, we are also, if we will make Gods will ours, to choose so to order them, because it is his will to have it so. The reasonableness of which observation will appear if we look into the world, and consider by what motives men are often guided in their several choices. There is a sort of men who weighing the reasonableness of virtue, and the necessity there is of it toward the procuring their both private and public welfare, do upon that score alone apply themselves to it, and give many notable proofs of their proficiency in it. Now though this be by all means to be cherished and encouraged, as being a good step to that perfection which Religion requires, yet if it rise no higher, it is in truth but a more splendid sin, or as a learned 
* Hieroc. in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. v. 49. p. 234.  Heathen spoke in another case, an Atheistical virtue. For so long as the things that are done, how agreeable soever to Gods will, yet are not performed in obedience thereto, but out of the sense we have of the comeliness thereof, or its necessity to humane life, so long we cannot be said to regulate our own Wills by Gods; but by our own conveniencies, as by which alone we are induced to practise them. Thus for example, if, as it often happens, men should choose to abstain from intemperance, not so much out of compliance with the divine will, as because of its prejudicialness to their health, or other such collateral considerations; in this case I say, they should not only not serve the will of God, to which they are required to conform, but substitute themselves in the place of God, which is the thing here expressly forbidden; because regulating their wills by their own conveniencies, and sacrificing not to God, but to their own appetites and desires. Whence it was that Socrates speaking of such kind of temperance's, calls it the being temperate with a kind of intemperance, because abstaining from some pleasures out of a desire of enjoying others, by which they were no less mastered than intemperate men by theirs. [Vid. Plat. Phaed. Sect. 12. edit. Cantab.] Lastly, as if we would make Gods will ours, we must not only choose to act according to it, but make that the chief motive of our choice; so we are (as the Apostle speaks) to delight in it after the inward man, and not only to choose it but do it with complacency. Which caution I the rather add, because there is oftentimes a failure there; it not seldom happening that men content themselves with a bare submission of their wills to God, and rather bear than embrace their yoke, as those persons do who choose the lesser of two evils proposed, and prefer the throwing their goods overboard before the hazarding of their lives. The which as it is an imperfect choice, and by the Philosopher therefore reckoned among such actions, as are mixed of voluntary and involuntary, so can much less be supposed to discharge that debt, which is owing from our Wills to that of God; that man making Gods will but imperfectly his, who consents to it with some kind of reluctancy, or at least doth not afford it the utmost of his delight. And accordingly, as the man after Gods own heart professeth to have a more than ordinary desire for God, yea to pant after him, as the hart doth after the water-brooks, Psal. 42.1. So elsewhere, to have the same passion for his Will, and not only to submit to it but embrace it: Witness his affirming the statutes of the Lord to be his delight, Psal. 119.24. that his soul even broke for the longing it had unto them, v. 21. of the same, that they were better unto him than thousands of gold and silver, and sweeter than the honey to his mouth, verses 72, and 103. All which expressions make it manifest, what ought to be the temper of our Wills in relation to that of God, and that we are not only to consent to it, but with the utmost delight and satisfaction.  
2. From the actions of men pass we to their sufferings, which is another means, especially under Christianity, of Glorifying our Maker. Concerning which I shall observe, first, that we are to submit our Wills to them, and receive them without any regret or discontent. For as otherwise there can be nothing at all of virtue in them, as being bound upon us by an inevitable necessity; so being the will of God, no less than his precepts, they are at least to have the sufferance of ours, and be consented to as well as undergone. But so we find that old Eli, how blameworthy soever as to the doing of Gods will, yet thought himself obliged to submit to the sufferance of it, 1 Sam. 3.18. For though the message that was brought him was no other than the utter extirpation of his house, and, which is more, delivered in the most heart-breaking terms, yet he made no other reply, than It is the Lord, let him do what seemeth him good. Now though this, to some persons at least, may seem a harder task, than flesh and blood can readily undergo, yet it is not all which the making Gods Will ours importeth, and consequently neither all that is required of us towards the owning of God in them. For (as Seneca words it) if we will do that, we must non tantum deo parere, sed & assentiri; embracing, as well as submitting to, whatsoever it lays upon us, and receiving it, how sad soever, with alacrity and cheerfulness. For otherwise (as was before observed) we give God but a part of our Wills, and choose it, not because we will it, but because we cannot avoid it. Neither let any man say, that this is above the proportion of humane strength, and therefore not to be thought to be any part of our duty to the Almighty. For as I readily grant it to be above the proportion of humane strength, when considered without the assistance of the Divine Grace, so that it is not so, when accompanied with it, is manifest enough from the practice of Job, c. 1.21. That holy man, notwithstanding all the sad tidings that were brought him, blessing God for the loss of his , Servants, and Children, as well as for his former bestowing of them. In the mean time, as it is not to be denied to be a very hard task, and such to which we had need have some other incentive beside that of our own duty, so I shall not be unmindful of supplying you when I come to entreat of that petition of the Lords prayer, Thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven.  
2. Having thus entreated of the elicit acts of the Will, that is to say, of such as proceed immediately from it, and withal shown what tribute is due from each of them to him, whom we are commanded to own for our God, it remains we descend to those which are called imperate ones, or rather to the Empire of the Will over them. For though the acts before remembered are the only immediate acts of the Will, yet all the acts of the body and mind are under its control, and move by the guidance of it. Thus for instance, it is from our Wills that our understandings apply themselves to the consideration of Heaven, and Heavenly things, from the same Wills that our affections are stirred up to tend to their proper objects. Lastly, from the same Wills it is that we perform all outward actions, whether of Religion or Civility. In consideration whereof, as it is but necessary they themselves should be rightly disposed, and pay the Almighty that tribute which is due from each act of them; so to the completely owning of God for their God, that they make use of that Empire of theirs, to bring our other faculties to pay God that Homage and Obedience which he requires. For the Will being, as it were, the Vicegerent of God over this little world of man, how can it discharge that trust which is reposed in it, if it do not lay its commands upon those subjects of its own, and Gods to give him that Honour and Obedience that he requires? But from hence it will follow, that the Will is to incite the understanding to meditate upon God, and the affections to embrace and revere him, that it is to lay its commands upon the tongue to chant forth his praises, and upon the knee to bow down to him and adore him. In fine (as its Empire extends to the whole man) to see that each of them perform their several duties, and particularly those of Piety and Devotion. In the mean time you may see, how much they are deceived, who, upon a surmise of their hearts being right with God, take occasion either wholly to neglect, or but perfunctorily perform the outward actions of Religion. For if the Heart or Will be God's Vicegerent over all our other faculties and powers, it cannot be right with him, if it do not stir them up, to pay God that service which he requires of each of them. I have but one thing more to add concerning this Empire of the Will, but it is such, as (if attended to) may be of excellent use in the conduct of our lives; and that is, that as this Empire of the Will is very great, so it will prove very effectual, if it be resolute in what it doth propose: Nothing almost being too hard for a mind so resolved, especially when accompanied with the divine assistance. By virtue of this resolution it is that men overcome many and great difficulties, by the same that they put themselves upon matters of the greatest hazard; by this that they encounter with enemies that are superior to them, both in number and strength, by the same that they oftentimes get the victory of them; that resolution of theirs not only making them to exert their own strength to the uttermost, but damping the courage of their opponents. But so that it fareth with our Spiritual enemies, the Scripture hath given us plainly enough to understand, because assuring us that, however the Devil may press upon the weak and irresolute, yet he will fly from us, if we have the courage to resist him.  
Being now to pass from the Understanding and Will to the Affections, and to show what tribute each of them is to pay to the Almighty, I have been somewhat retarded by the consideration of a duty, which the Scriptures often call for, I mean, Trust in God. For beside that it is generally expressed in Metaphorical terms (such as depending, resting, or staying ourselves upon God) which though they may sometime illustrate that, to which they are applied, yet do no less often serve to obscure it, it may seem somewhat difficult, to those who do more intimately consider it, to what power of the Soul to refer it, or rather, whether it do not some way appertain to each of them. And indeed, upon a serious consideration of the whole matter, I am apt to believe it doth, which is the reason I have chosen this place for it. That the Understanding hath a share in it, is evident to me from that belief which it manifestly implies, and by which it is oftentimes expressed; he that trusts to, or upon any person, doing it upon the account of that credit, which he gives to the affirmation of him upon whom he doth so rely. But neither can the Will be debarred its share in it, if yet it have not the principal one. For what else mean those expressions of staying, leaning, or resting upon God, but that the heart or Will, though it do not presently attain what it trusts upon God for, yet, having Gods promise for its warrant, acquiesceth in it, and hath thereby a kind of antepast of it. Lastly, forasmuch as this trust of ours doth imply a desire of that which we trust upon another for, hence it comes to pass, that it may not unfitly be referred to the affections, and particularly to that of hope, which is commonly and truly enough defined to be a passion of the Soul, by which it is disposed to believe that shall happen to it which it desires. From all which put together we may give this account of it, that it is an acquiescence of the Soul upon the promise of God for the obtaining of what it doth desire. If there be any thing wanting toward the explication of it, it will be what the nature of those promises are, upon which that trust of ours is built. Forasmuch as the foundation of our trust is no other than the promise of the Almighty, that trust, or acquiescence, is in reason to bear a proportion to that promise upon which it is built. Laying aside therefore all other considerations, I will make it my business to show what the nature of God's promises are, I mean as to the generality of mankind, which I shall not doubt to affirm to be upon condition of their cooperating with God toward the attaining of them.  
For the evidencing whereof, I shall first consider the promises of God that relate to the Soul, and then those which relate to the outward man or body. I begin with those which relate to the Soul, which are of two sorts, to wit, such as tend to secure it from sin, or such as propose to it an eternal happiness in the other world. Of the former sort we have an illustrious one, 1 Cor. 10.13. where the Apostle tells us that God will not suffer us to be tempted above what we are able, but will with the temptation also make a way to escape, that we may be able to bear it. Now though it be true that this promise of the Almighty have no clear and explicit condition annexed to it, yet it manifestly enough implies somewhat on our part toward the obtaining the effect of it. For affirming, as the Apostle doth, not that God will not suffer us to be tempted at all, nor yet, when he doth, that he will take the whole work upon himself; but that he will not suffer us to be tempted above what we are able, and that he will with the temptation make a way to escape that we may be able to bear it, he plainly implies, that, in order to our deliverance from the taint of them, we are to exert the uttermost of our ability, and take that way which God shall lay open for our escape. And indeed, wherefore else should God furnish us with natural and spiritual strength, wherefore should he supply us with the whole armature of his graces, and call upon us so earnestly to put it on? For if the whole of our deliverance were to be accomplished by God, all those would be useless, and we might as well be without them as put them on. The same is to be said of those promises of God, which enstate both Soul and Body in eternal happiness. For as the business of our Salvation is generally proposed upon the condition of faith, and repentance, and turning unto God, so the Author to the Hebrews * hath removed all suspicion of the contrary, 
c. 12.14.  by affirming in express terms that without holiness no man shall see the Lord. From those promises which relate to the Soul, or rather to the eternal welfare both of Soul and Body, pass we to such as concern its temporal one, concerning which if we consult the Psalmist, we shall find they all pertain to those that fear and adore the Lord. For as Psal. 34.7. he restraineth the watchfulness of the Angels to them that fear him, and thereupon calleth upon God's Saints to do so, adding, that there is no want to them that fear him, v. 9 of that Psalm; as in like manner, v. 15. that the eyes of the Lord are upon the righteous, and v. 17.19. that they are the persons whom he delivereth out of all their troubles and afflictions: So he tells us, v. 21. that evil shall slay the wicked, and that they that hate the righteous shall be desolate. Which shows, that even temporal promises are upon condition of our fearing God, and yielding him that obedience which he requireth. Now forasmuch as the promises of God are not absolute but conditional, that is to say, upon the condition of our Repentance and Piety, our Trust in him doth consequently imply not only the embracing of the blessing promised, but also of the conditions upon which it is. Which said, I will now proceed to show, how we own the Lord for our God by it, accordingly as this Commandment doth require.  
Now this we do, first, by bearing witness to his truth, as was observed in the matter of our belief. For the promises of God being the ground of our Trust, and his truth the strength of his promises, by trusting in him we must consequently bear witness to his truth, and so far therefore own him for our God. But it is not God's truth alone which we thus acknowledge, by placing our Trust and confidence in him. For though that be the immediate ground of our Trust, yet it presupposeth sufficient wisdom in him to project for our welfare, and power enough to put those promises in execution. Lastly, it presupposeth goodness enough in him to apply himself to the doing of it, and perform those gracious promises he hath made. If therefore we Trust in God, these Attributes also will have their due acknowledgement, and in so much the greater measure, by how much the more improbable, or difficult, it may seem to bring about our deliverance, or we ourselves unworthy to obtain it. And though I make no question, men will be very unwilling to acknowledge their suspicion of the want of any of these Attributes in God, which are the proper grounds of our belief, yet, if they examine their own hearts more narrowly they will find it no difficult matter to discern a suspicion concerning some one or other of them. For wherefore should any man in a straight seek to deliver himself by a sin, but that he thinketh God hath not kindness enough to deliver him without? Or suffer his doubts, in any great exigency, to rise up to a despair, but that the case seemeth to be such, as that God cannot deliver him out of it? It is true indeed, this is not often spoken out, yea it may perhaps be so softly whispered, as not to be understood by that heart that formeth it. But as we do rightly collect that to be the cause of a thing, from other than which it may be evidenced not to proceed, so there are some kind of distrusts, which cannot be thought to proceed from any thing else, than a suspicion of some defect in the Almighty. But such in particular are those fears of ours which put us upon the commission of a sin to free us from them. For if we supposed God to be infinite in power, why should we not be as much afraid of the sad effects of it that are denounced against evil men, as we are of that danger which hangeth over our heads. This however is evident, that he, who trusts not in the Almighty, pays not those acknowledgements which are due to the former Attributes, and consequently, offends against this First Commandment, which requireth the owning of God in them all. Lastly, forasmuch as our Trust in God implies the embracing of those conditions which are required on our part towards the obtaining of the promises, by trusting in him we declare our acknowledgement of the Justice of them, and our readiness to put them in execution.   

PART IU.  
Concerning the owning of God in our Affections, and how that is to be done: Which is either by conforming them to those of God, or suiting them to those Divine perfections which are the proper objects of them. This last exemplified in the Passions of Fear and Love. Touching the former whereof is shown, what it is, how God is the object of it, the consistency thereof with the dispensation of the Gospel, and its usefulness to the purposes of Religion. A digression concerning superstition, and Carnal Security.  
3. HOW we are to own God in our Understandings and Wills, hath been already declared, it remains only that we inquire how we are to own him in our Affections, which is, 1. First by placing them on the same objects, which we find those of God to be set upon; there being no greater testimony of our Subjection than the conforming to the inclinations of those, for whom we pretend that deference. And accordingly as there is nothing more usual with flatterers, (who are the most exquisite patterns of obsequiousness) than to imitate the passions and inclinations of their several Patrons, laughing (as 
*— Rides? majore cachinno Concutitur; flet, si lachrymas adspexit amici. Sat. 3.  Juvenal speaks) when they are disposed to be merry, and weeping if they behold them in a melancholy humour; so God himself, who certainly best knows how we ought to own him, calls upon us oft to imitate him, and to be holy, and merciful, and benign as he also is. As if, in order to the ends of Religion, we had nothing else to do, than to write after his Copy, and frame ourselves after his most blessed example. And indeed as he is the great Exemplar of Virtue, so we should need no other to contemplate, were it not that the perfection of his nature admits not of some virtues, which in us are both laudable and necessary. (For what is there in God (upon whom all things depend) analogous to those fears which we are commanded to entertain?) But as setting aside that, and other such instances of imperfection, we shall find somewhat in God to answer our own passions and affections, with the virtues that are conversant about them; so we cannot give a greater testimony of their and our subjection to him, than by loving what he loves and hating what he hates, by rejoicing in that wherewith he shows himself well pleased, and mourning for those things by which he professes himself to be grieved, lastly, than by showing the same compassion and tenderness towards the objects of his pity, as, on the other side, the same zeal and indignation against the implacable enemies of his Religion. But because, beside the conforming of our Affections unto his, there may be something in God which may prove a fit object of them, we are also, toward the owning of God in them, to excite those Affections, according as their respective objects shall invite us. For the exemplifying whereof I shall instance in the passions of Fear, and Love, as by which the other may be guessed at.  
To begin with Fear, because the first (saith the Atheist) that gave being to the powers above, but to be sure both the first and most potent incentives to the worship of them, concerning which I shall show, 

1. What it is.  
2. How God is the object of it.  
3. The consistency thereof with the dispensation of the Gospel, and  
4. And lastly, the usefulness of that passion.    
1. Now though the nature of Fear be more evident to each man's inward sense, than is likely to be made out by discourse, yet to show how God becomes the object of it, it will at least be expedient to give some definition of it. And accordingly, I shall define it to be a passion of the Soul, whereby it is disposed to fly from that which may be hurtful to it, and such as is not easily avoided. For though we find it usually added, that it is from such an evil as is also near; yet is that rather a motive to the greatness of men's fear than necessary to the exciting of it. Experience showing us, that men do sometimes fear a great way off, and particularly those evils which are not to commence till the other world. This only may be said in its defence, that, when things so far off are feared, they are made near to us by our own apprehension, and (as our life hangs upon a slender thread) represented to our fancies, under a possibility of falling upon us every moment.  
2. From the general nature of fear pass we to show God to be the object of it, the second thing proposed to be discoursed of; a thing in appearance of more than ordinary difficulty, especially when considered as a duty: Because it may seem hard to look upon God as hurtful, but much more to conceive of it as a duty to fly from him. But as it is no way prejudicial to the goodness of God to be hurtful to the evil, but on the contrary a commendation of it, as being not able to endure them; so to fly from, or draw back, is sometimes so far from a crime, that it may be looked upon as a testimony of our respect. For thus to draw back from a more powerful adversary is a confession of his greatness, and of our own inability to withstand him. The only thing therefore remaining to be enquired into is, what there is in God to oblige us thus to draw back, which are in short the power and justice of the Almighty. For how can we choose but tremble at him, who is not only able to destroy Soul and Body in Hell, but hath moreover declared himself to be just, and consequently one, that without a satisfaction and repentance at least, will by no means clear the guilty; To all which if we add his many and severe threats against those that disbelieve or disobey him, so we shall think it not only no crime at all to fear him, but on the contrary an acknowledgement of his Divinity: Our fear, because arising from the consideration of them, being a confession not only of his great power and justice, but also, that what he hath so threatened he will certainly perform, and consequently of the truth and unchangeableness of his decrees. Then and then only doth our fear become criminal, when it looks upon God as no other than a Tyrant, or as one that will call us to an account for every trifle. For that instead of acknowledging him for our God, attributeth to him peevishness, or cruelty, and makes us not so much adorers as dishonourers of him. And accordingly, as wherever Religion hath had any place, this fear hath been branded under the name of Superstition, so it has betrayed its own rottenness by the pitiful shifts it hath put the timourous man upon; the devotion of such persons usually spending itself in Rites, and Ceremonies, and presenting the Deity not with a rational and sober worship, but a crazy and trifling one. I will conclude this particular with that excellent distinction which Maximus Tyrius 
* Dissert. 4.  makes between a truly Religious man and a Superstitious one. The pious man (saith he) is God's friend, the superstitious is a flatterer of God: and indeed happy and blessed is the condition of the pious man God's friend, but right miserable and sad is the state of the superstitious. The pious man, emboldened by a good conscience and encouraged by the sense of his integrity, comes to God without fear and dread; but the superstitious, being sunk and depressed through the sense of his own wickedness, cometh not without much fear, being void of all hope and confidence, and dreading the Gods as so many Tyrants. From which as it is evident what the true nature of Superstition is, even the fearing of God as a tyrant, or peevish Lord, so also that it may have place as well in the rejection of religious rites, as in an overcurious intention of them. For as the observation of these becomes Superstitious, by our looking upon God as a rigid exacter of them, so the rejection of them may become equally such, when we think him as much concerned to forbid them, as we are to avoid the use of them. But other fear than this, as it is so far from being criminal that it is on the contrary an acknowledgement of God's power, and justice, and truth; so though it make us draw back from him as a judge, yet it puts us upon seeking to him as a father, and endeavouring by all means to obtain his favour. Which said, I will now descend to show  
3. The consistency of this fear with the dispensation of the Gospel, the third thing proposed to be discoursed of. For though it may seem but congruous to the law (which was a state of darkness and horrors) to be attended with that fear which is the usual product or concomitant of them; yet it may seem no less congruous on the other hand, that, when the bright sunshine of the Gospel appeared, that gloominess should disappear, and together with it, its congenial fears. For the solution of which difficulty, the first thing that I shall offer is those clear and express words of our Saviour, Luke 12.5. Where having before dehorted his Disciples from being afraid of them that kill the body, but after that have no more that they can do, lest any should think that passion to be useless, he adds, But I will forewarn you whom you shall fear. Fear him which after he hath killed hath power to cast into hell, yea I say unto you fear him. Which testimony is so much the more considerable, not only because he doth twice repeat it, but (which shows yet farther the importance of his exhortation) whom he doth so exhort, call also by the name of friends. For I say unto you my friends, be not afraid of them that kill the body, but fear him which hath power to cast into hell. Which appellation shows evidently, that this precept of fear is not only for servants or aliens, but for those who are most intimately united unto himself. But so, that I may not dwell too long upon a thing so evident, do the Apostles of that Lord advise, as well as the Lord himself; S. Paul, Phil. 2.12. exhorting men to work out their Salvation with fear and trembling, and the Author to the Hebrews, c. 12.28. to have grace whereby to serve God acceptably with reverence and godly fear, because God is a consuming fire: In which latter place, we have it over and above represented as an effect of grace, and a requisite to make our service acceptable. Now though from what hath been said it be sufficiently evident what we are to think in this particular, and consequently rather to believe, that something else must be meant by those say which seem to contradict it, than that this fear is inconsistent with the temper of the Gospel; yet for the better explication of this fear, as well as for the solution of those difficulties, I will now propose them, or at least that which is most considerable.  
If you please to peruse the first Epistle of S. John, the fourth chapter, and the eighteenth verse, you will there find that Apostle affirming that there is no fear in love, but that perfect love casteth out fear, because fear hath torment; as moreover, that he that feareth is not made perfect in love. For the answering of which difficulty, not to say (as some have done) that by fear in that place we are to understand the fear of men, and of the evils which they may bring upon us; because the perfect love, to which fear is here opposed, is referred to our having boldness to stand in the day of judgement, to which therefore in all reason the opposite fear ought to relate: I answer first, that it is true perfect love casteth out fear: but I say withal that in this world there is no such thing as perfect love, and therefore fear not to be ejected till there is. A thing which this very Apostle may seem to refer to, when, in the words before these, he affirms, that herein is our love made perfect that we may have boldness in the day of judgement, making that perfect love to appertain not to the present times, but to the day of judgement, wherein indeed, those that love God shall neither fear, nor have any cause for it. But let us suppose, as there is some presumption for it, that the perfect love here spoken of is not that love, which is the peculiar portion of the next world, but which is attainable in this; yet even so it may well be said that there is no necessity of casting out that fear for which we are now pleading. For (as was before observed) there is a fear of God as of a tyrant, or at least a very hard master, and another of a father, and a king, but withal a good and gracious one. If we take the word fear in the former sense, that is to say, for the fear of God as of a tyrant, or a hard master, so there is no doubt that love casts it out, especially an Evangelical one; it being impossible that any man should love God, or willingly keep his Commandments, who hath such an opinion of him. But there is no such thing to be affirmed of him who looks upon God, as a Lord and a father, but withal a good and gracious one. For beside that such a fear is enjoined us by him, who doth also lay upon us the command of love, and therefore not to be thought (unless we will make the spirit of God contradict itself) to be cast out by that love which he requires; there is nothing of torment, which is the reason here assigned, if in our fear we look upon God, but as a good and gracious one. For though that may make us careful and wary, yet not distressed and desperate; the consideration of his goodness buoying us up, when we are surrounded with his judgements, and making us, at the same time we have an apprehension of them, to look up to his mercies, and to love and trust in him for them. The same answer, with a very little variation, may be applied to that difference, which is objected between the dispensation of the Gospel and the Law. For though the Gospel reckons us not in the place of servants and vassals, and consequently exacts not their fear of us; yet it reckons us in the place of sons, who are not only to have a love, but a fear also for him that is their parent. Which answer is the more reasonable, because the Scripture itself represents those that were under the first covenant, as the children of the Bondwoman, and such as were therefore slaves themselves; but those under the second as the children of the free. To whom therefore though it do no way appertain to entertain a spirit of bondage, and those fears wherewith it is accompanied, yet to preserve such a reverential regard for the Almighty, as is due unto every father, and much more to their heavenly one.  
4. The fourth particular follows, even the usefulness of that fear of which we are now entreating, which I shall endeavour to evince, 

1. First as to the bringing us to God and Christ, and  
2. As to our continuance in that state.    
1. Now that the fear of God and of his judgements are of very great use to bring us unto God and unto Christ, may appear from that great contrariety that is between the state of Nature and the purity and holiness of God. For that being supposed, as it must, it is not easy to conceive men should be drawn with the cords of love, and affect him who is so contrary to their inclinations. And though it be true that the promises of God may be of more force to draw us to his love, those having not all of them so manifest a contrariety to our corrupt nature, as the Purity and Holiness of God hath; yet as many of them are of a spiritual nature, and so not very likely to be acceptable, so (which is more) they are not to be bestowed, or at least not with any certainty or perfection, till we come to the other world. And who then, naturally speaking, would quit present and sensual enjoyments for them, and leave a love, which he is sure of, for so uncertain and remote a mistress? To induce men therefore to quit their so much beloved transgressions it is necessary to stir up their fears, and make them see that what they pursue will rob them of what they love, and make them miserable as well in their bodies as their souls. And indeed, as it rarely happens that men are reclaimed from their evil courses but by some such disgustful means, so (which is of much more force) we find the Apostles taking this course in converting the unbelieving world; representing to them first, the guilt of their own sins, and the wrath they had incurred, and then the tenders of God's goodness: By that means not only abating of their heat toward their former extravagancies, but even constraining them to take a view of the beauties of Religion, which otherwise they would never have considered.  
2. But beside that the fear of God is of singular use in bringing men to Christ and to God, it is also such after our conversion to him, yea throughout the whole course of our lives. And here not to insist upon the Apostles persuading even such by the terrors of the Lord, their exhorting them to work out their salvation with fear and trembling, and to serve God acceptably with reverence and godly fear; I shall content myself to propose to your consideration the remains of that evil nature, which is in the very best of us, and how much more than in the generality of believers? For these will show it to be as necessary to keep us in the way, as it was to bring us into it. It is true indeed if grace did at once purify the heart from all extravagancies, if it took away both our sins and our affections to them, lastly, if it put us into the condition we were in, when we were created, and made us entirely and perfectly new creatures, so it is not impossible, but we might follow the conduct of our leader, when only drawn by the cords of love. And yet I cannot but observe by the way, that God thought not that enough to preserve Adam in his innocency, but added moreover the terror of dying the death if he persisted not in it. But when it is certain, that, though sin be wounded, yet it is not perfectly mortified, when there are remains of corruption in the very best of us, who can think even the regenerate man to be so good natured, as not to stand in need of terrors to nip those buds, and hinder them from bringing forth fruit unto unrighteousness? For beside that, under such circumstances, all the methods of God are little enough to restrain us, experience showeth that of fear to be often needful; carelessness, and wantonness, being apt to make us forget the obligations of goodness, and not only to forget but to despise them. But when beside the obligations of God's goodness, men have always before their eyes the strictness of his justice; when they consider as well what vengeance will pursue them if they go astray, as how great encouragements they have to walk in that way which God hath marked out to them; then, I say, even flesh and blood will startle at the evil that presents itself, and avoid it lest it become miserable by it.  
Having thus shown both what the passion of fear is, and how God is the object of it; together with the consistency of that fear with the dispensation of the Gospel, and the usefulness thereof both in our conversion to, and walking with God; I may seem to have said enough not only to excite that passion in you, but to discover to you the malignity of the contrary vices. But because men are not overforward to apply the rule of truth to their own obliquities, and by that means oftentimes miss of the knowledge of them; and because too I have already given you a character of Superstition which is one of the extremes of a religious fear; I will for a conclusion of my discourse set before you the malignity of carnal security, which is the extreme in defect. For so far are some men from trembling at the Almighty, that they go on in their sins without the least regret, and neither concern themselves for the judgements they behold on others, nor for those which are denounced against themselves. As if, according to the Prophet Isay, 
* 28.15.  they had made a covenant with death, and were at an agreement with hell; so that, though the overflowing scourge should pass through the Land, it should not come nigh them, nor disturb their peace and prosperity. And here not to tell you, because that is sufficiently evident, that this is in effect to deny God's Power, and Justice, and Truth, because having himself threatened to arm his Power and Justice against them; I shall propose to your consideration the great danger it betrays you to, as to your spiritual or temporal estate. For, to begin with the former of these, he that is thus fearless of God's displeasure is not only at present in a reprobate estate, but likely to be so for ever. For what should move him to return, who is not moved with the threats of the Almighty, nor regards in the least the power of his displeasure? Should the expresses of God's love constrain him? Those indeed are very forcible motives. But how should they prevail with such a one, when even those, who have a veneration for the Almighty, find it so hard to yield to them, without having an eye to the terrors of the Almighty? Add hereunto what the Scripture so often affirmeth, that The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. For what other interpretation can we make of that, than that heavenly wisdom must enter by that passion, and men be brought to a sense of God's Justice and Severity, before they be affected with his love? But it may be such men's estate in spirituals will not much move them, and therefore I shall proceed to the consideration of their temporal one. Concerning which I shall not doubt to affirm, that he who is thus regardless of God's displeasure, is the most likely to fall under the stroke of it. For not to tell such persons, what the Psalmist hath told us, that according to our fear so is God's displeasure, that is to say, more or less according to our awe of him; I shall desire them to consider the affront they offer to the Divine Majesty by this their disregard of him. For what is it but even to dare him to exert that Power and Justice, by which he would commend himself to the world. He doth indeed speak gloriously of his own power and Majesty, he looks big and threatens severely all those that shall but dare to oppose; but as such big looks and bugbear words do not much startle the carnally secure, so he will put it to the trial, whether the effects will answer them, and God be as tremendous in his punishments, as he seems to be in the denunciations of them. Than which as there cannot be a greater affront to the Almighty, who is by this means neglected and contemned, so I shall leave you to judge, what effect it is likely to have upon him, who, besides his own natural aversation of all impiety, is moreover extremely jealous of his Honour.   

PART V.  
Of the Passion of Love, its nature and objects, what the immediate expresses thereof are, and what its opposite extremes; all which are applied to the Love of God. Among other things is censured the being over familiar with God, the pretences for it detected and removed. A necessary admonition concerning the proportioning of our affections to the infiniteness of those perfections upon which they are set, and how that is to be done.  
IF the passion of fear can find something in God to excite it, even under the dispensation of the Gospel, to be sure that of Love cannot want matter to provoke it, and entertain it with complacency and delight; there being in God, either formally, or eminently, whatsoever is the object of our love. For the evidencing whereof I will inquire, 

1. First of all, into the nature of it.  
2. Show what are the objects of that passion: from thence proceed,  
3. To consider the immediate expresses of it, and  
4. And lastly, mark out the extremes on either hand. Applying all as I go to the Love of God, which is that we are especially to consider.    
1. Now though (as was observed concerning fear) the nature of Love be more evident to our inward sense, than can be made out by discourse, yet I think it not amiss for the better explication of the present argument, to give you some definition of it: Which is, that love is a passion, whereby the Soul is disposed to join itself to those objects, which appear to it to be grateful and pleasant. Which definition I do the rather give you, to take away that usual distinction of love into that of Benevolence and Concupiscency; Benevolence, in proper speech, being rather an effect of our love to that which is the object of it, than any real part of it.  
2. The nature of love being thus explained in the general, proceed we in the next place to the objects of it, which in general are such, as are either good in themselves, or such as are good to us. Of the former sort is that love, which we have for all virtuous and excellent persons, how little soever we ourselves may be profited by them: Such as are perhaps those that live in remote parts, and with whom we ourselves have no commerce. For though we are not likely to be benefited by them in our own persons, yet because of the excellencies we hear of in them we conceive a love for them, and never think of them without complacency and delight. The same love we have for all beautiful objects of natures make, and for all such like products of art, these to whomsoever they appertain yet drawing our Soul after them, and obliging it to receive them into her embraces. Now concerning this love there can be no doubt but that God is the just object of it, yea that he may challenge it in the highest degree imaginable; as will appear, if we consider, either the excellencies of the divine nature, or the measure wherein he is possessed of them. Look upon the former, and you will find them to be such, as are the excellencies of the most sublime essence; such as are freedom, from the feculencies of matter, and much more from the infirmities thereof, a discerning understanding, and a rightly ordered will; a being which does nothing that is not becoming its own greatness, which descends not to any lower abject thoughts; which hates nothing without either cause or measure, which loves things lovely, and according to the proportion of it; in fine, which makes things lovely that they may become the object of it, and be worthy to be received into its embraces. And though it be true, that there are some excellencies in the creature (such as beauty and the like) which are not to be found in God, yet as the reason thereof is, because they are much below him, and argue something of imperfection where they are, so he is the Fountain even of those inferior excellencies, and must therefore be much more excellent in himself. From the excellencies of the divine nature, pass we to the measure wherein they are possessed, which will show it yet more to be the object of our Love. For beside that they are all in him without any thing of imperfection, which hardly falls upon any created beings; they are also infinite, as that nature is, to which they have the honour to belong. If God be wise, he is so without measure, and knoweth whatsoever is to be known; if good, he is so without bounds, and proportionably to his own infinite essence. In fine, whatsoever he is, he is so after the rate of a God, and knows no other bounds than what he prescribes unto himself. If therefore that which is excellent be a just ground of love, God is much more so, as not only comprehending all excellencies whatsoever, but also in the utmost perfection and degree. How great reason we have to love God, when considered only as he is in himself, I have discoursed hitherto, proceed we in the next place to consider him as good to us. Under which notion if we look upon him, so we shall not only find that, which may attract our loves, but even constrain us to affect him. For not to tell you, that by him the Authors of mankind were first created, that we ourselves were conceived in the womb, maintained there, and brought forth into the world through his benign influence, that we depended upon him when we hung upon our Mother's Breasts, that we did so no less when we might seem much more able to have made provision for ourselves, that we are indebted to him for all the good things we enjoy, that we are so for the ability of enjoying them, that we are not less nourished by the word of his providence than by the bread we eat, that we own the very nourishment of that to his blessing on us and it, that by him we are delivered from those evils we escape, that by him we are born up, or carried through those evils that do at any time befall us; To say nothing at all (I say) of these, how considerable soever, and how just incentives to our love, I shall desire you only to consider his benevolence to our better part, and the ways he hath taken to express it. For not contented to say 
* Isa. 33.11.  he delights not in the death of a sinner, but that he should repent and live, which may seem to be rather a negative than a positive kindness, or if the latter, an imperfect velleity only; he hath been from all eternity contriving the Redemption of sinful man, he hath from the beginning of time been declaring his gracious purposes concerning it; he sent his Son in the fullness of time to accomplish that most excellent work for us, he hath laid upon him the iniquities and punishments of us all; he hath sent his ever blessed Spirit to fit us for pardon by it, he hath sent his Servants the Prophets to publish the tidings of it, and the means whereby it is to be obtained; he hath called us out of darkness into the glorious light of it, he hath moreover given us eyes to behold the brightness of it; he hath given us grace to abandon our natural corruptions, he hath furnished us with grace to serve him acceptably, and with godly fear and love; he hath reclaimed us by his Spirit when we have been wand'ring out of the way, he hath upholden us by the same Spirit, when we have been ready to faint or fall down in it; in fine he continueth to do so till we turn our backs upon him, and loveth us till we do in a manner refuse to be beloved. All which whosoever shall duly consider, will not only conclude him worthy of our Love, but of the utmost degree and the most immediate expressions of it, the third thing proposed to be discoursed of.  
3. And here in the first place, I shall not doubt to reckon the desire of enjoying his presence whom we love; this being the most natural and immediate expression of our Love, that I say not of the very essence of it. For as Love is nothing else than a passion of the Soul by which it is disposed to unite itself to what it loves; so there is no one thing that is more impatient of the absence, or more passionately desirous of its proper object's presence. It sets the understanding upon contriving how it may attain it, it puts the Will upon a resolution of putting those contrivances in execution; it vigorously endeavoureth the removing of all obstacles to the enjoyment of it, it greedily layeth hold of all opportunities for the compassing of it; in fine, it neither giveth itself nor us any rest, till it attain what it so panteth after, and becometh rather more eager, than any way discouraged by the opposition it receives. But such aught to be, nay such are the effects of our love to God, where that love is implanted in the Soul; witness the Prophet David's impatience when driven from the house of God, his longing desire to appear before him in it. And certainly, if we had the same love for God, that the Prophet had, or it may be think ourselves possessed of, there is no doubt we should be as willing to be found, where he promiseth to present himself, and both desire to hear him speaking to us as he doth by his servants the Prophets, and present our own supplications before him; these being the most natural expresses of our love, and such which I had almost said we can no more be without, than we can hate him whom we cordially affect. The same is to be said, 2. Of our enjoying of God in Heaven, where he doth not only most gloriously, but most intimately present himself. For as it is impossible for a Soul duly affected with the love of God, not to desire the most immediate enjoyment of his presence, so we find S. Paul not to have been without this desire, though he knew he could not attain it, without putting off his earthly Tabernacle; he affirming of himself that he was desirous to be dissolved, that so he might be admitted into the presence of God and of his Son. Which by the way may show, how cold our love generally is, even when it carrieth us only to the enjoyment of what we love. For how hardly are we brought to pant after that presence of his, though we find little on earth to make us desirous of continuance in it, and it may be a long and irksome sickness? As if this life, with all the misfortunes that attend it, were preferable to his presence where there is fullness of joy, and at whose right hand there are pleasures for evermore. Of the first and most immediate expression of our love I have discoursed hitherto, and shown withal how far we are from having that testimony of our own; proceed we now to another, which though not so immediate, yet is as certain a consequent thereof, and that is a desire, so far as in us lieth, to procure the content of him we love. For so far is this from being separable from love, that it is oftentimes defined by it; Aristotle, in that most excellent piece of his Rhetorics 
* li. 2. c. 4.  defining Love to be a passion whereby we wish to any one those things which we think good for him. Now though it be true that in strict speaking this expression can have no place here because God is infinitely happy, yet inasmuch as God declareth himself to be well pleased with the glorifying of his name, which he hath put in our power either to do or not, therefore, to express our love to him, it is requisite we desire that so it may be, by all those to whom his glorious name shall be made known. And accordingly our Saviour makes it the first request we are to ask when we address ourselves to the Divine Majesty, placing Hallowed be thy name with other such like petitions, before the begging of our daily bread, or what is more, the forgiveness of our sins. 2. Again, though God be infinitely happy in himself, and accordingly leaves no place for our wishing well to him, or putting those desires in execution; yet is there place for such desires, and more, toward those who are his Friends, and whose Good, God some way tenders as his own: he who hath told us that our goodness extendeth not to God, yet forgetting not to add, that it reacheth to the Saints that are in the Earth, and to the excellent, in whom is God's delight, as well as ours. To whom therefore if we wish all prosperity imaginable, and, so far as in us lieth, endeavour to procure, we do in a manner lay the same Obligations upon the Almighty; every Friend (as Aristotle 
* Rhet. l. 2. c. 4.  observes) reckoning what is done to his Friend, as a kindness extended to himself. Lastly, As Love prompts Men to wish well to those they love; or, where they themselves stand in no need of them, to their Friends and Relations: so it prompts them to endeavour to walk wellpleasing to them, especially where they have over and above an Authority to command it; no Slave being more obsequious than a Lover is, where his Love is hearty and intense. And accordingly, As our Saviour hath not stuck to affirm, That he who hath and keepeth his Commandments, he it is that loveth him, Joh. 14.21. so that Disciple of his, 1 Ep. 5.3. That this is the Love of God, that we keep his Commandments, and perform whatsoever he requireth. As if this were not only a certain, but the only Consequent of our Love; or rather, as if it had been all one with it. And indeed, as no Lover finds any difficulty in obeying those Commands which are laid upon him by the Party he affects; so the neglect of that Obedience towards God, must argue a greater coldness in us than it could do in any other pretended Lover: because whilst they have nothing but the Tie of Love to engage their Obedience, we have moreover the Obligation of Service, and have God's Authority, as well as Love, to constrain us to it.  
4. Having thus marked out the Love we ought to have for the Almighty, together with the most immediate Expresses of it, I have said enough to caution Men against the opposite Extremes, whether in the excess, or defect. But because the Rule of Right signifies nothing, where it is not applied; and we do not find those, who are most concerned, in any great forwardness to do it; I think it not amiss, as I did before in the Passion of Fear, to point out the Rocks on either Hand.  
To begin with that which is the Extreme in defect, or the want of Love to him who hath so much in him to deserve it; the unreasonableness whereof will appear, if we resume those things which we have said to the Object of Love: For is not Good, that is to say, that which is so in itself, the Object of our Love? nay, are we not in a manner constrained to affect it? And can we then be cold in our Love to him, in whom all Goodness is contained; to him who is infinitely good in himself, and the Fountain of whatsoever is so? Neither will it suffice to say, That no other can be expected, when there is so great an opposition between us and God: For beside that such is the lustre of God's Goodness, that whosoever shall duly consider it, cannot but be some way affected with it; we cannot but know, that it is our own Viciousness which makes the opposition, and which consequently occasions the alienations of our Hearts from him. Which therefore, as it is but reason we should deposit; so there is no doubt, but if we do, we shall find ourselves as much enamoured of him, as we are of those Pleasures which are at present most connatural to us. But then if we consider not only the Excellencies of the Divine Nature in itself, but also its communicativeness of those Excellencies to us, how much he hath obliged us with Temporal Favours, how much more he hath done for us to promote our Spiritual and Eternal Welfare; so certainly we cannot choose but censure our own want of Love to him, by whom we have been so much obliged; he that doth so much to gain our Love, as it were laying down a Price for it, and making it Injustice, as well as Ingratitude, not to return it. Such is the unreasonableness even of our want of love to so good and gracious an Object; how much more unreasonable must it then be, when this want of Love or Coldness passeth into an Antipathy, and we do not only not affect, but hate and abhor so lovely an Object? Which notwithstanding, we find even such in that black Catalogue of Sinners which St. Paul gives, Rom. 1.30. And indeed, it is not much to be wondered that there should, when there are so many in the World, who have so much reason to apprehend his displeasure. But as there is much more reason for them to turn their hatred upon their own Vices, which is that that exposeth them to God's displeasure; so, if they would entertain a less love for them, they would find nothing in God which should give any just occasion to their hatred: For though he be an Avenger of those that do evil, yet it is of such only as continue in it; and as he delights not in their death, so he invites them to live, and makes a tender both of his own Grace, and the Merits of his Son, to instate them in it.  
From the extreme in defect, pass we to the extreme in excess, which is an over-familiarity with our Maker: For as Love among Men doth either find the Parties equal, or make them such, according to that known Saying of Minutius Foelix, Amicitia pares semper aut accipit aut facit; so unwary Men, not considering the distance that is between them and God, have copied out this mode of Love in themselves, and made it pass into an indecent familiarity; being thereto farther tempted, by God's giving his Children the name of Friends, and by his speaking with Abraham as a Man speaketh with his friend. But, as it followeth not from God's speaking to us as Friends, that therefore we are to use the same Modes of Speech; so we shall find those to whom God hath shown the greatest condescension, to have proceeded always with the greatest reverence and respect: for thus that Friend and Favourite of God, Abraham, still observed his distance towards him, and addressed himself to God as his Superior and Maker; in the 23d Verse of the 18th Chapter of Genesis, where he seems most to expostulate with him, styling him the Judge of all the earth; and himself, vers. 27. but dust and ashes in comparison of him: and in the 30th Verse of the same Chapter, beseeching God not to be angry with him, though he spoke; and in Verse 31. confessing it a kind of presumption that he had taken upon him to speak unto God; in the 32d again, begging of him not to be angry, and he would speak but once more for the sinful Sodomites. Which demeanour of his shows evidently, that our Friendship must be mixed with Reverence, and we look upon God as our Superior, as well as our Friend. In like manner, though it be said of Moses, That God spoke to him face to face, as a man speaketh to his friend; yet even then we find Moses demeaning himself as a Subject, and speaking to him in the Language of one: for what else means his so often inserting, If I have found grace in thy sight; as you may see in the sequel of that Chapter? It is true indeed (for I am willing to obviate any thing that can with any show of reason be objected) it is true, I say, there is some difference between their case and ours; I mean in respect of God, as well as us; that God who spoke to Abraham and Moses in his own likeness, or at least in that of an Angel, having since assumed our Nature, to become more equal to us, and dispensing all his Graces through it. But as he who assumed our Nature, doth not therefore cease to be God, and consequently neither our Lord and Master; so by becoming Man, he became our Lord after a more peculiar manner, and thereby gained a new Title to our Obedience; which, as there is therefore just cause for us to own, so our Saviour himself inculcates it, as the only means to attain his Friendship, telling us, Joh. 15.14. That we are his friends, if we do whatsoever he commands us. This only would be added, for the preservation of this Friendship on our part, That we look upon the Commands God lays upon us, as the Commands of a Friend, as well as of our Lord and Master; of one who loveth us, as well as of one that hath Authority to command us: So shall we at the same time preserve both our Friendship and Obedience; be Confidents, and yet Servants of the Almighty. For it is not our yielding Obedience to God, which makes our Works servile; but our looking upon him as a Tyrant, or at least as one who is not our Friend, as well as our Lord. For, as the Text before-quoted insinuateth, that we cannot be Friends, without having respect to our Superiors Commands; so if we have respect to them, for the kindness of the Party that enjoins them, we do rather the part of Friends, than of such as are either Servants or Vassals. But neither is this all which our Friendship with God privilegeth; yea, though an over-familiarity be discarded: For it also licenceth us to come with assurance before the Throne of Grace, and both lay open our wants before him, and beg a proportionable supply; God himself having not only permitted, but called upon us to do it, and that too with earnestness and importunity, giving us farther to understand, that this violence is grateful to him, and that the more importunate we are, provided it be mixed with Reverence, the more ready he will be to receive us. In fine, such as is the behaviour of a Favourite toward his Prince, such aught to be the behaviour of a Friend of God, toward the Monarch of the World; so tempering our Respect and Confidence, as neither to forget our distance, on the one hand; nor, on the other, that Interest which he hath given us in his Love. But if our Love be so qualified, the more intense it is, the more acceptable, and the more likely to advance us to a more intimate Communion with himself.  
Being now to put a period to my Discourse concerning the Passions of the Soul, and that Acknowledgement which is due from each of them to him whom we are to own for our God; it remains only, that I admonish you, That to own him for your God in them, is not only to have your Affections suited to his several Attributes, but also to the infiniteness thereof; this being in truth to own him for a God, and pay him that Acknowledgement which is due unto him, as such. But from hence it will follow, 

1. That we are to fear and love him with all our might; that we are to separate all coldness from the one, all security and presumption from the other: For beside that the Almighty requires so to be loved, even where that Love (as was before observed) is set to denote the whole Adoration of the Soul, it is no more than his own immense Nature, as well as our Obligations to him, call for; the greatest Loveliness and Majesty (such as those of God's undoubtedly are) requiring the greatest Fear and Love. It is no less evident,  
2. That we are to fear and love him above all things, how much soever in themselves the just Objects of them both; because God, whom we are required to own in them, transcends all other Being's in Majesty and Goodness, or whatsoever else is the proper Object of our several Affections. Whence it is, that our Blessed Saviour, speaking of the Passion of Fear, doth not only forbid the exerting of it toward those that can kill the Body, but in a manner confine it to him who after he hath killed, hath power to cast into Hell.  
3. Lastly, Forasmuch as God doth not only transcend all other Being's, but is the Fountain of whatsoever is either dreadful or lovely in them; hence it comes to pass, that, to own him for our God, we are consequently to fear and love all other things with respect to the Divine Majesty, from whom they derive their several Excellencies; at the same time we fear or love them, looking up to the Almighty; and regarding them not so much for themselves, as for that Majesty and Goodness which it pleased the Almighty to imprint upon them.     

PART VI.  
How we may and aught to own God in our Bodies. This done, first, by yielding Obedience to his Commands, and particularly to such as have a more immediate aspect upon him; Of which number are those concerning Invocation, Praise, Swearing by, or Vowing to him. The like effected by presenting God with external Notes of our Submission, whether they be such as are performed within the Body, as Bowing, Kneeling, and the like; or such as though the Body be instrumental to, yet pass from thence to other things: Such as are the Building or Adorning of Temples, and the setting apart certain Times for God's Worship and Service; the Consecrating of certain Persons to preside in it, and respecting them when they are so.  
HAving shown in the foregoing Discourses, what Tribute is due to God from our Souls, and particularly from our Understandings, Wills, and Affections, which are the several Faculties thereof; it remains that we inquire,  
2. What Tribute is due to him from our Bodies, and how we are to own him for our God in them: Which is either, 

1. By yielding Obedience to his Commands, and particularly to such as have a more immediate aspect upon him; or,  
2. By presenting him with some external Note or Sign of our Submission. The former whereof is by some called the Honour of the Deed; the latter, the Honour of the Sign.    
I. Of the former of these, there cannot be the least doubt that it is required of us toward the owning him for our God: For beside that the Name of God is a Name of Authority, as well as Eminency, and consequently implieth a necessity of Obedience in those to whom he hath that Relation; God himself doth here make use of it, as an Obligation to all those Commandments which we are now upon the consideration of; he requiring our having no other Gods besides himself, with other the Duties that follow, upon the score of his being the Lord our God, according as was before observed, in his Preface to the Imposition of them. But so (that I may not stand upon a thing so plain) doth that Lord of ours expressly require us to own him; our Saviour putting by the Temptations of Satan to fall down before himself, by saying, It is written, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him, yea him only shalt thou serve, Matth. 4.10. Now though what hath been said, extend to all God's Commands, because they all bear the stamp of his Authority; yet is it especially to be understood of yielding Obedience to such Commands as have a more immediate aspect upon God, these more immediately implying the owning of that Authority he hath over the Sons of Men. For the fuller declaration therefore of our own Duty in this behalf, I will now set those Commands before you, and show how we own him for our God, by yielding Obedience to them.  
1. To begin with Invocation, or Praeyer, one of the prime Acts of God's Worship, and which therefore is of all others the most frequently and earnestly inculcated; concerning which, it is easy to show, how necessary it is to pay him the acknowledgement of a God: For, inasmuch as all Men desire the Preservation of their own Being; inasmuch as that desire necessarily prompts them to look abroad for it, if they think not themselves able to procure it; in case any Man do not thus seek it of God, it must be because he doth not believe it to come from him, but either from himself, or from mere Natural Causes. But what other is this, than to deny that God from whom every good and perfect gift cometh, and to make a God either of ones self, or Nature? There being nothing more essential to the Divine Nature, than the being the Author of all those Blessings, by which the whole Creation is either maintained or adorned. The same is to be said of that which is sometime reckoned as a part of Prayer, because a necessary attendant of it; that is to say, of giving Thanks to him for those Blessings by which we are at any time made happy: He who refuseth thus to honour God, in effect denying the coming of them from him; because Nature itself hath taught us to make this return, wheresoever we have been obliged. If there be any thing farther to be observed concerning these two Acknowledgements, it will fall in more pertinently when we come to entreat of The Prayer of our Lord, to which therefore I shall reserve the consideration of it.  
2. From Prayer and Thanksgiving therefore, pass we to Praise, another Act of Adoration, and no less frequently enjoined: And no wonder, if we consider either the end for which the Tongue was given, or its aptness to set forth the Excellencies of the Almighty: For as, if we consider the practice of Holy Men, it may seem to have been given for nothing more, than for commemorating the Excellencies of the Divine Nature; so, by the variety of its Expressions, it is fitted to set forth all those Excellencies of which the Divine Nature is composed; as neither wanting Words to express his Justice, and Mercy, and the like; nor yet that which makes them more Divine, the Infiniteness thereof.  
3. To Praising the Divine Majesty, subjoin we Swearing by him, another Act of Adoration, and no less expressly required; for so we find the Prophet Moses distinctly commanding, and that too in the same Period where he prescribes his Fear and Service: for, thou shalt fear the Lord thy God (saith he) and serve him, and swear by his Name, Deut. 6.13. And indeed, if we consider the nature of an Oath, we shall not in the least doubt of the manner of our owning him for our God by it. For an Oath being nothing else than the calling God to witness to the Truth of what we affirm, he that swears by him, doth not only acknowledge God to be superior to himself, but also to be a Witness of infallible Truth, a Searcher of our Hearts, and a most just and powerful Avenger of all Perjury and Falsehood; no one appealing to a Witness that is not of greater Authority than himself; and with much less reason, for the sincerity of his own Affirmations, but where that sincerity may be known, or any deviation from it be punished, if he transgress it. For, what satisfaction could an Oath be to any Man, if Men did not presume God to be an Avenger of Perjury and Falsehood, as well as a Discerner of the Truth? And accordingly, as for the most part such Clauses as this are generally subjoined, as So help me God, according as what I affirm is true; so where it is not expressed, it is always understood to be meant, and God called upon not only as a Witness, but an Avenger. By swearing therefore by the Name of God, we give an evident Testimony of our acknowledging him for such, and particularly, that he is True, and Wise, and Powerful. This only would be added, what is evident from the nature of the thing itself, That though an Oath be an Acknowledgement of those glorious Attributes , yet it is not to be made, but where the thing in controversy is not otherwise to be made out, and the Knot is worthy of his untying. And more than this I shall not need to say concerning Swearing by the Name of God, because I must afterwards resume it, when I come to entreat of the Third Commandment.  
4. Lastly, As we acknowledge the Divine Majesty by Swearing by his Name; so also by Vowing to him, in whatsoever may be the proper Matter of it; such as is the yielding Obedience to all his Commands in general, or the performing of any particular one: For as by so doing we acknowledge God to be conscious to our Resolutions, and (because Vows are always made upon condition of God's giving us some Boon) that he is conscious also to our Wants; so, for the same Reason, that he is able to supply them, and deliver us either from our Fears, or from our Dangers. Which acknowledgement is so much the more valuable, because Vows are seldom made, but when Men are encompassed with the greatest Dangers, and there is little hopes of escaping, but by some signal Providence: for he that in such cases vows any thing to God for his deliverance, showeth he looks upon him to be of an Almighty Power, and that he can act not only in concurrence with Natural Causes, but without and against them. But because the nature of Vows will also fall in more fitly afterwards, when I come to entreat of the Third Commandment, it shall suffice me to have observed, That this is one way of acknowledging him, whom we are required to own for our God.  
II. Of acknowledging God by yielding Obedience to his Commands, I have spoken hitherto; and particularly, by yielding Obedience to such Commands as have a more immediate aspect upon himself: It remains that we entreat of our presenting him with some outward Note or Sign of our Submission, which is the second way of owning him with our Bodies. For inasmuch as God hath commanded us to glorify him with our Bodies, as well as with our Souls; inasmuch as external Reverence is the most immediate expression of it; it follows, that to own him for our God, we are to add external Reverence to our Obedience, and present him with our Respects, as well as Submission to his Commands. Now there are two sorts of Notes or Signs, whereby we are to express our Reverence to the Divine Majesty.  

1. The former whereof are performed within the Body.  
2. The latter reaches to things without it.   
1. Of the former sort are all those humble postures of Body wherewith we find devout Men to have honoured their Maker; such as are, in particular, Kneeling, or Falling down before him, Bowing down the Head, or uncovering it; in fine, the standing at a distance from the Place of his more especial Presence, as we read the penitent Publican did; or casting our pensive Eyes upon the ground: All which, as we find to have been used by Holy Men, so, if we consult the Scriptures, not to have been without the Command of God, for the use of some or other of them: For thus, when the Devil would have wooed our Saviour, by the proffer of the Kingdoms of the World, so to fall down and worship him, our Saviour not only rejected the Motion, but made him answer out of the Scriptures, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve. In which place we do not only find God claiming the Homage of our Service and Obedience, but the paying also of our Respects, in falling down and worshipping our Creator. Neither let any Man say (as there are those who are like enough to do it, how little ground soever there be for such an Answer) let not any Man, I say, make answer, That by Worship in that place, we are to understand an inward one: For as that was not it the Devil asked, but the falling down before him, and consequently no way agreeable to such an Interpretation; so the Greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies External Adoration, and is accordingly, by Hesychius, explained by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or falling at one's Feet. And though it be true, that in the Original of the Old Testament, from whence this Text is borrowed, it be not Thou shalt worship, but Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, which is an Act of inward Adoration; yet inasmuch as what the Devil asked was the outward one, and our Saviour himself, in his citation of it, applied it to that kind of Worship, it is manifest we are to understand both the one and other Adoration, our inward Fear, and the outward Expressions of it. But so that I may put this past all doubt, God hath given us yet more clearly to understand, in the Words of the next Commandment: For, forbidding in that the bowing down before an Image, because he is a jealous God, he thereby plainly showeth, that he challenged that Honour to himself, the Worship of the outward, as well as of the inward Man. And indeed, provided that this Reverence do not degenerate into a Theatrical one, nor swallow up that inward regard which we ought especially to intent, I know not how we can more approve ourselves to him, whom we pretend to adore, than by making every Member some way contribute thereto. For how grateful must our Service needs be, when all that is within and without conspires to it; and, whilst the Tongue is doing its Devotions, the Knee is bowing to the Divine Majesty, or (which was the Custom of the Jews, and is still of all the Eastern Nations) the whole Body, in token of its and the Souls subjection, lies prostrate upon the Ground? Again, What is there which may be thought to engage the Soul's Obedience, that doth not in like manner concur to the Adoration of the other? Is the Soul of God's creation? So is the Body, as being not only form by him in its Protoplast Adam, but curiously wrought by God in that Womb that immediately conceived it. Is the Soul redeemed by the Holy Jesus? So also is the Body, and shall be hereafter to much better purposes: For ye are bought with a price (saith the Apostle) therefore glorify God in your body, and in your spirit, which are so his. Lastly, Hath the Soul a share in the Graces of the Spirit? So also hath the Body; as is evident from the Prayer of the forenamed Apostle, where he not only beseecheth God to sanctify them wholly, but prayeth more particularly, that their whole spirit, and soul, and body, might be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. I conclude therefore (and I think too with much greater force than the Psalmist does) O come let us worship and bow down, let us kneel before the Lord our Maker: For not only is he our Maker, as that holy Man suggests; but our Redeemer and Sanctifier; and that too of those very Bodies whose Reverence he requires.  
2. Of such outward Notes or Signs of Respect as terminate in the Body, I have spoken hitherto, and shown our Obligation to them: It remains only, that we consider those to which though the Body is instrumental, yet pass from thence to other things. Such as is,  
1. The Building of Temples, or Places of Worship, to him whom we own for our God. For though (as St. Paul speaks) God that made the world, and all things therein, seeing that he is Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands, neither is worshipped with men's hands, as though he needed any thing: yet, as the Custom of the World, with the Approbation of God himself, hath in all times led Men to erect such public Places to him; so it was no more than decency, and a respect to the Divine Majesty, prompted them to the doing of. For though (under the Gospel especially) any Place be proper for Divine Worship, because by the Tenor of it we are obliged to have a greater regard to the Thing itself, than to the Circumstances thereof; yet inasmuch as a Set place was requisite to the performance of it, that so all the Worshippers of the Divine Majesty might know whither to resort; inasmuch as it was but suitable to the Greatness of God, that that Place which was appointed for his Public Worship, should be set apart from all common Uses; lastly, inasmuch as the appropriating of that Place to it, was apt to imprint a Reverence of the Divine Majesty in those that resorted thither: for these Reasons, I say, it seemed but requisite that he should have a Temple erected to him, apart from the Places of more Common Uses. And accordingly, as before the Law they had their Altars; and under the Law, the Tabernacle, that famous Temple at Jerusalem, with Synagogues in their several Towns and Villages: so it will be no hard matter to discern the like Places of Divine Worship in the first beginnings of Christianity. As is evident from that known Passage of St. Paul to the Corinthians, 1 Cor. 11.22. What have you not houses to eat and to drink in? or despise ye the Church of God, and shame them that have not? For not only speaking before of their coming together into one place; but opposing the Church of God, not to other Assemblies, but to their own Houses and Places of abode, he plainly showeth his meaning to be, not of the Assemblies themselves, but of the Places wherein they convened. And accordingly, as Mr. Mede hath shown 
* Churches, that is, Appropriate Places for Christian Worship.  that there were such Places in the following Ages, and before the Emperors were Christians; so he hath returned a very satisfactory Answer to what is objected out of some ancient Writers, concerning the Christians not having any Temples, to wit, That they meant Temples in the Heathen sense, that is to say, wherein the Deity was enclosed; as the Heathens, to whom they thus answered, supposed their own to be. However it be, there is reason enough in Nature for setting apart a certain Place for the Solemn Worship of God. And accordingly, when the Church had rest from Persecutions, such Places were every where erected to him, and the Christians declared their owning of the Lord for their God by it. All that I shall add concerning this Head, is that of Sir Edwin Sandys, in his most excellent Piece, entitled, Europae Speculum; That though the Ornaments of such places ought to be rather grave than pompous, yet it could never sink into his heart that the Allowance for furnishing them out should be measured by the scant Rule of mere Necessity (a proportion so low, that Nature itself hath gone beyond it, even in the most ignoble Creatures) or that God had enriched this lower World with such wonderful variety of things, beautiful and glorious, that they might serve only to the pampering of mortal Man in his Pride; and that to the Service of the High Creator, Lord, and Giver (the outward Glory of whose higher Palace may appear by the very Lamps which we see so far off burning so gloriously in it) only the simpler, base, cheaper, less noble, less beautiful, and less glorious things, should be employed; especially seeing, even as in Prince's Courts, so in the Service of God also, this outward State and Glory being well disposed, doth engender, quicken, increase, and nourish the inward Reverence and respectful Devotion, which is due unto so Sovereign a Majesty; which those whom the use thereof cannot persuade, would easily by the want of it be forced to confess. Neither will it suffice to say (as perhaps it may be by some Persons) That that Cost might with much more advantage be employed upon the Poor, those Living Temples of the Holy Ghost: for though it be not to be denied, that those aught more especially to be considered; yet, as it would be enquired, Whether, for the purposes of Charity, a deduction might not be made from the Ornaments of our own Houses, if our Estates cannot reach to the supplying of them both; so also, Whether the House of God ought not in this case to have the precedence of our own; especially when God himself did sometime ask, Whether it were time for the Israelites to dwell in cieled houses, when his lay waste, Hag. 1.4.  
2. But beside the Dedicating of Temples to his Honour, whom we are commanded to own for our God; it is no less requisite to that purpose, that Solemn Times be set apart for the Public Worship of God; and that, when they are so, they should be as Religiously observed: For, as it may seem but a just Tribute, to allot him a Portion of our Time, from whom we have the Grant of the Whole; so being so set apart, it is but reasonable it should be appropriated to his Service, and not, as it too often is, profaned by our own: he that honoureth any Person, naturally paying a Regard to whatsoever hath a relation to him. But because this will fall in more seasonably when we come to entreat of the Fourth Commandment, I will quit the prosecution of it at present, and descend to a  
3. Third Note of Respect, which is, the setting apart a sort of Men to wait at his Altar, and perform the Public Exercises of Religion; nothing making any Person or Thing more cheap and vile, than laying open the Offices that relate to it, to the will of every Man that shall have the hardiness to invade them. And accordingly, as before the Law, the Elder of the Family was Priest, as well as Prince; as under the Law, the Tribe of Levi was in their stead set apart for that Office; so our Saviour, to observe the same Method, chose the Twelve out of his Disciples, and Commissioned them, and them only, to go and teach all Nations, and baptise them into his most excellent Religion; adding, in the close of it, That he would be with them to the end of the world: Which being not to be understood of them in their own Persons, because they are long since fallen asleep, it remains we understand it of Persons Commissionated by them, and so on to the present Age: For all power (as our Saviour affirms) being given unto him, and he Delegating the Ministerial one to those his Apostles; whatsoever Power of that nature can be pretended to, must derive itself from them, unless in case of extreme necessity, or an immediate Commission from Heaven. And accordingly, as the Apostles ordained Elders in every City, and transferred that their Power upon others; so the Chain of Succession hath been maintained by the same means, without any considerable interruption, till of late some have dared to invade it: Which is so much the more to be wondered at, because, as no man among the Jews took that honour to himself, but he that was called of God, as was Aaron; so the Author to the Hebrews (who tells us so much) adds, 
Cap. 5.4, 5.  That even Christ glorified not himself to be made an High Priest; but he that said unto him, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee. Again,  
4. Fourthly, As to own the Lord for our God, it is requisite to set apart some Men to Minister before the Lord in the Congregation; so is it much more, when set apart, to respect them highly for their Work sake, and minister to them of the good things we enjoy. For, as next to the immediate dishonour of the Divine Majesty, there cannot be a greater affront to him, than to throw contempt upon those Persons whom he hath taken so nearly to himself; so Godhimself calls the defrauding them of their Maintenance, the robbing of himself; and, moreover, represents it as a Crime, which even the Heathen did abhor; as you may see Mal. 3.8. Neither let any Man say, That this is to be understood only of the Jewish Priests, whose Maintenance, as well as Function, was immediately appointed by himself: For, as there is no doubt the Evangelical Priesthood is much dearer to him than the Legal, and therefore what was said concerning the former, to be à fortiori applicable to the latter; so St. Paul tells us, in his first Epistle to the Corinthians, That like as they which waited at the Altar were by the command of God to be partakers with the Altar; 
1 Cor. 9.14.  even so hath the Lord ordained, that they which preach the Gospel, should live of the Gospel, 1 Cor. 9.14.  
5. Lastly, (which may comprehend many of the former Acknowledgements, and hath therefore this place assigned it) Toward the owning the Lord for our God, it is requisite we should own him by the Liberality of our Hand, or, as the Book of Proverbs expresseth it, Honour him with our Substance, in token of having received it from him. For, this being grounded upon a natural Reason, and beside that, not only an usual Testimony of Respect to Kings, but a Respect that was sometime paid our Saviour, by the Wisemen that came to worship him; it may seem but reasonable to think, that we are under the same Obligation: especially when we find also the Bread and Wine of the Sacrament to have been tendered as an Acknowledgement of God's Sovereignty over the World, as well as of the Redemption of it by his Son. The only Question that can be made, is, To whom these Offerings do belong, now Sacrifices are banished out of the Church. But as that will not be difficult for him to resolve, who shall reflect upon the foregoing Discourse; so, if we cannot find any other, we have the Poor always at hand, to whom, whatsoever is this way done, our Saviour tells us, is as done unto himself; and therefore also, in some measure, to the Divine Majesty. Such is the having the Lord for our God, as is here enjoined; such the Tribute that is due to him from our Souls, and Bodies, and Substance: And happy they that shall so own him, because they are assured of a reciprocal Acknowledgement; and they shall be owned as his People, who have this Sovereign Lord for their God.   

PART VII.  
That we ought to own the God of Israel both as the True God, and ours; which is the Second Capital Precept: and how that is to be performed. The like enquired concerning the Third, even The having no other Gods beside him: Which is shown to exclude, first, the substituting of any other in his room; where the Heathens worshipping of the Host of Heaven, Dead Men, Beasts, or Inanimate Creatures, is noted, and censured: Secondly, The receiving other Gods into Copartnership with him; where the Papists Practice, in Worshipping Saints and Angels, is considered, and reproved.  
THAT we ought to have the One True God for our God, hath been the Design of several Discourses to show; together with the Ways and Means by which we are to acknowledge him. My proposed Method now leadeth me to evince,  
II. That we are to look upon the God of Israel as such, and to pay him the Acknowledgements before remembered. But so that we are (to go no further for a proof) the Preamble to the Ten Commandments shows; he who requireth us to have no other gods before him, declaring himself, in that Preamble, to be that Lord which brought them out of the Land of Egypt. The only thing whereof there can be any doubt, is, What Grounds there are so to own the God of the Israelites; and how those Acknowledgements ought to be circumstantiated, to refer them unto him: Neither the one nor the other whereof, will be hard for him to resolve, who doth but attentively consider them. For as the Scriptures of the Old Testament furnish us with Arguments enough to believe the God of Israel to be the True; witness those stupendious Miracles it declareth him to have effected, and those holy and equitable Laws which he promulged: so it is easy to see we shall then refer all our Acknowledgements to him, when we pay them in obedience to those Scriptures by which he hath declared himself to the World: For this will show us not to worship an unknown and uncertain Deity, as we find the Athenians, and many other Heathens did; but him, who manifested himself to the Israelites in Egypt, by many Signs and Wonders, as afterwards by bringing them out with an high hand, and by those Wonders which he showed upon Mount Sinai. And having said thus much concerning the owning the One True God, and the God of Israel, I shall now proceed to,  
III. The third and last thing contained in this Commandment, even The not having any other gods but him.  
Now there are three things which are either employed, or expressly contained in the not having any other gods beside the True.  

1. That we should not substitute any other in his room.  
2. That we should not receive any other gods into copartnership with him: And,  
3. Thirdly and lastly, That we should not attribute to any thing else, any part of that Honour which is due unto him.   
1. The first of these is rather employed, than expressed; but so strongly employed, that there cannot be any the least doubt of it: For, beside that the One True God doth here declare himself to be so, and not only so, but call upon us to yield Obedience to all those Commands which we are now upon the consideration of; the very Words wherein this Commandment is expressed, do à fortiori imply the not substituting any other in his room. For, if we may not have any other before or beside him, much less may we admit of any to the utter exclusion of him, and build their Honour upon the Ruins of the other's. But such Transgressor's were the Heathen, or at least a great part of them, after God had for their sins given them over to vain imaginations; as worshipping, in stead of him, all the Host of Heaven, such Men by whom their several Nations had received any great advantage, particularly, Kings and Princes; and in fine, the brute Beasts, yea Inanimate Creatures. But how much they acted against the light of their own Reason, as well as the Precepts of this great Lawgiver, will easily appear, if we survey the several Objects of their Worship.  
To begin with the Host of Heaven, even the Sun, Moon, and Stars, because thought by Learned Men 
* Vid. Grot. Explic. Decal. & Job 31.26.  to be the first Instances of Idolatry in the World: Concerning which, it is easy to show, how unreasonable it was to substitute them in the place of God. For though it be not to be doubted, but that great Benefits come from thence, particularly, from the Sun, by whose Influence this lower World is actuated; yet is there nothing in that glorious Body, which can tempt a considering Man to pay Divine Honours to it; it being evident to our sense, that it moves and acts necessarily, neither can do any other than it doth. Which one thing, duly weighed, will, to all impartial Understandings, evince it not to have the Nature, or deserve the Honour of a God. For, beside that the Nature of God implieth the most Perfect One, and consequently such as is not tied up to Rules, but is free in its Motions and Operations; all the Honour of God (as the Author to the Hebrews observes) is built upon this great Principle, That he is a rewarder of such as diligently seek him: Which Principle can have no place, where there is no freedom in acting; and the supposed Deity is obliged not only to shine alike upon the evil and the good, but either to afford or withhold its shining, as the Laws of its Creation admonish, yea, as it pleaseth those Clouds that are below it.  
From the Host of Heaven, pass we to Men, such as many of those were whom the Heathen worshipped: Where again we shall see how little reason there was to substitute them in the place of God. For as even these could not save themselves from death, but were fain to pass through that, to their supposed Divinity; so, many of them were such as may be supposed rather to have fallen into the state of Devils, to whose nature they bear so great a resemblance, than to be advanced to the Honour of Gods. To say nothing at all, that it appeareth not they had any knowledge of things below, and much less any Power either to reward or punish.  
As little, yea, far less reason was there for the Worship of Beasts, and Inanimate Creatures, which was the particular Error of the Egyptians, and the lowest to which Humane Nature could fall; these having not so much as the Reason of a Man, and much less the Understanding to know the Necessities of those that prayed to them, or the Power to relieve and redress them.  
2. But because the not substituting False Gods in the place of the True, is rather supposed by, than directly contained in the present Prohibition; proceed we to that which the Words do clearly and plainly import, even the not receiving any other into Copartnership with him. Which, as it probably was the Error of the wiser Heathen, so to be sure is that which this Commandment doth more immediately strike at; he that requireth the not having any other gods before or beside himself, both supposing the having of himself, and forbidding the superinducing any other. And in this notion it was that the Samaritans became Offenders against it, as you may see 2 Kings 17.33. it being there remarked concerning them, That they feared the Lord, and served their own Gods, after the manner of the Nations whom God carried away from thence. From which Passage, compared with the present Prohibition, it is manifest, That to admit any Being into a Copartnership with the True God, is enough to make a Man a Transgressor; the Law, at the same time it forbids the having of other Gods, supposing, in some measure, the having of the True. Which said, I shall now inquire, Whether those of the Church of Rome are not justly chargeable with the breach of it, in that Honour which they give both to Saints and Angels.  
To begin with the Honour of Saints departed, because most stood upon by them, and which indeed makes up a great part of their Religion: Concerning which, I shall propose to consideration, Whether the Prayers they make to them, be not, in effect, to set up other Gods? For, is not Prayer a great part of Religious Worship? nay, is it not so considerable, as to give a denomination to the Place of God's Worship; yea, to be an Ingredient in his Titles? He himself calling his House the House of Prayer; and the Psalmist, him that inhabiteth it, the God that heareth it. And is it then any other than the setting up other Gods, to make Saints departed the Objects of it? But it will be said, it may be, That they do not pray to them, or at least not in that manner they do to God; only imploring their Intercession with our Maker, and theirs; but begging no Blessing from themselves. But first of all, Quid verba audio, facta cum videam? What will Words avail, when their Practice is oftentimes so contrary? Neither is there any real difference between their Prayers to them, and those to God. I instance in that which the Rosary of the Virgin Mary presents us with, where we have this very Prayer to the Mother of our Lord: 
Virgo singularis, 
Vid. Jacks of the Original of Unbelief, etc. cap. 28.   
Intrae omnes mitis,  
Nos culpis solutos,  
Mites fac & castos;  
Vitam praesta puram,  
Iter para tutum.  That is to say, O thou who art the chief of Virgins, and the meekest of all, after thou hast freed us from our guilt, make us meek and chaste; make our Life pure, and our Journey safe. Which, what is it, but a Prayer to her, to grant us those Blessings herself, and not to intercede with God for the granting of them? Neither will it suffice to say, That their meaning is only that she should procure it to them by their Prayers, and that accordingly they do oftentimes so express it: For, as it were easy for them to do it always, if they meant not to abuse the World with their Distinctions; so I cannot forbear to say, that they ought to make use of more fit Terms, to express their meaning, if they would free themselves from the imputation of Idolatry. For, inasmuch as God requires to be honoured by the outward as well as the inward Man, how doth that Man satisfy his Duty, who makes not some distinction between the outward Worship he gives to God, and that which he presents to the Saints departed? Our inward Worship being confessedly to be above that we have for others; and our outward Worship, but an Expression of our inward. And indeed, however they may satisfy themselves with such Mental Reservations, in a thing that stands in need of them, I doubt the humblest of them all would not be well pleased, if a Man should beg those things of their Servants, which are wholly theirs; and when he had done so, pretend he meant only they should procure them by their Intercession: Such an Allegation (as the Lawyers speak) being Protestatio contra factum, and such as agreeth not at all with that which they would defend. The Case would be yet more convincing, if we should instance in a Malefactor, that should petition a Romish Princes Servant for his Pardon: For if they are jealous of their Honour, as well as other Princes, there is no doubt they would ill resent it, both from the Petitioner, and the Party that should receive him; yea, though it should be alleged in his excuse, That his meaning was only that he should intercede with his Master for it, and that meaning of his were some way knowable to the Prince. For if Words were intended to express men's Conceits, they ought in reason to hold some resemblance with them, especially in a matter of so great importance.  
But let us suppose, secondly, That they who pray to Saints, neither intended, nor expressed any other, than the begging of their Intercession with the Common Father of us all; yet even so, they cannot escape the imputation of taking them into a Copartnership with the Almighty, because thereby ascribing to them a kind of Omniscience, in supposing them able at that distance to hear the several Prayers that are put up to them in several Places; especially when it appeareth not, that God makes any Revelations to them of the several things that are transacted here below: For as for that speculum Trinitatis which they so much speak of, and their seeing all things in God, it is a groundless and ridiculous Fancy; because it is certain they cannot see the time of the Day of Judgement in it, and therefore neither any thing else, any farther than it shall please God to discover it.  
But be it, thirdly, not only that their Intercession was all that were desired, and that God revealed to them both their Prayers, and other Transactions here below; yet will there lie a just Exception against their addressing their Petitions as often, if not oftener, to the Saints, than to God himself; especially when that is done in Places dedicated to God's Worship, and in the Times set apart for his Worship and Service. For, as this is a Practice too apparent to be denied; so it is, in that respect, not only the having of other Gods, but (which is much worse) the preferring them before the True: a greater Honour being thereby done to them to whom they do so often address themselves, than to him whose Altars are so little frequented. The only thing that can with any show of reason be replied, is, That it is in reverence to the Divine Majesty, that they address themselves rather to his Servants, than to him: For, observing that it is not the manner of Princes to admit every Man to present his Petitions himself, partly for avoiding of Trouble, which would otherwise be infinite; and partly for the preserving of their State; they conclude from thence, That the like or a greater Reverence to God must needs prompt us to take the same course, and present our Petitions rather by the Saints, than by ourselves. But beside that we are not destitute of such a Mediator, if we will acknowledge our Saviour to be so, God himself hath both allowed and enjoined us to come unto him, and promised to accept us if we do. And then certainly it is rather a contempt of him (because against his express Command) to take another course, than any true Reverence to the Divine Majesty.  
From Invocation or Prayer to Saints, pass we to Swearing by them; which is another thing both practised and defended by the Church of Rome. Where, who is there beside themselves, that sees not how it intrenches upon the Divine Honour, yea adopts them into the place of God? For Swearing, as was before observed, being a calling one to witness to the sincerity of our Affirmations, and to punish us if we prevaricate in what we affirm; he that Swears by any Person, makes him the Knower of our Hearts, and an Avenger of those that do prevaricate. Which, what is it but to rob God of two of the fairest Flowers of his Diadem, and to place them in that of the Saints departed? What should I tell you of their consecrating Temples and Altars to them; of their burning Incense before them, and dedicating Festivals to them; of using the same lowly Prostrations before their Images, and of making Vows to them in their distress? For inasmuch as these, and other such like, are the only ways Men have to express their inward Regard to the Divine Majesty, what is it, but (as far as the outward Man is capable of doing it) to admit him into a Copartnership; or, as the Commandment expresseth it, to have other Gods beside the True? It being enough to ground that Charge, to make them Sharers of those Honours, which are the only ones we have to express our Reverence to the Almighty. And though I know this also is not without its Excuse, they pretending not so much to honour the Saints departed, as God, in and through them; yet as there ought in reason to be a difference between the Honour of a Supreme, and of those who are but his Servants and Dependants; so (as 
* De decalog. in explicat. praec. 1.  Philo well observeth) to give equal Things to unequal Persons, is not so much for the honour of the Inferior, as it is to the dishonour of him that is above them. To all which, if we add, That God is a jealous God, and hath declared himself to be so, especially in the matter of his Worship; so we shall not need to doubt of the importance of that Prohibition, Thou shalt have no other Gods before me: Jealousy naturally arising not from manifest espousing of other Loves, but from warping toward them, and entertaining them with the same show of kindness and familiarity, wherewith they are wont to receive the legitimate Object of it.  
From Saints departed, pass we to Angels; concerning whom, the same may be said that was of the other; with this only difference, that there is a greater reason to presume some of them to be acquainted with our Prayers, because they are sent forth by God to minister to us, and appointed to be our Watch and Defence. But as it follows not from thence, that we may pray to them as we do to God, nor entertain them with the same Honours and Adorations; so the Scripture hath particularly cautioned us against making them our Mediators, or giving them the outward Worship of God. For thus, Col. 2.18, 19 we are bidden to take heed lest any man beguile us of our reward, in a voluntary humility, and worshipping of angels, intruding into those things which he hath not seen, vainly puffed up by his fleshly mind: And not holding the head, from which all the body by joints and bands having nourishment ministered, and knit together, increaseth with the increase of God. For, as it is manifest, from the voluntary humility upon which it is grounded, that the Apostles meaning is not to decry the making them equal with God, (that having not any the least shadow of Humility) but the making use of them as Mediators to him; so it is much more, because he affirmeth those that do so, not to hold the head, even Christ Jesus, 
Vid. Grot. in explicat. Decalog. ubi hunc locum ad Colossenses egregiè explicat.  from whom all the body by joints and bands having nourishment ministered and knit together, increaseth with the increase of God. He thereby plainly destroying the making use of any other Mediator between us and God, to procure that spiritual Nourishment which we want. There is the same or a greater evidence against entertaining them with such Honours as either the Consent of some Nations hath appropriated unto God, or some particular Age or Place hath devoted to his Service: For thus, for the former; When Manoah would have detained the Angel of the Lord, whilst he made ready a Kid; supposing there might be some design of Sacrificing in it, he made answer, That if he should detain him, he would not eat of it; and, if his meaning was to offer a burnt-offering, he must offer it to the Lord: thereby plainly removing all Attempts of that nature toward himself, and confining such kind of Services unto God, Judg. 13.16. In like manner, when St. John would have fallen down at the feet of an Angel, to worship him (which I am apt to think, both from this place, and St. Peter's refusing the like Gesture from Cornelius, to have been more particularly devoted by that Age or Place to the Worship of God) when, I say, St. John would have thus fallen down at the feet of the Angel, to worship him, the Angel made answer, See thou do it not; for I am thy fellow-servant, and of thy brethren which have the testimony of Jesus: worship God. Which Passage doth not only destroy the giving of such Worship to Angels, but also remove that Answer which is given by Grotius and others to it; to wit, That the Angel forbade it, not because of any unlawfulness in it, but only for its unsuitableness from an Apostle to an Angel, who was but his Brother and Fellow-servant: For, as he there affirms himself to be a Brother and Fellow-servant also of those that had the Testimony of Jesus, which more beside the Apostles had; so adding in the close of it, Worship God, he plainly shows he had a further reason in forbidding it, even because of its propriety to the Divine Majesty. For though such a Gesture was indifferent in itself, and accordingly had been frequently used even by good Men, toward those of the same make with themselves; yet either that Age had in a manner appropriated it to the Worship of God, or the Angel thought that Reverence might have been liable to misconstruction, in those who should afterwards hear of it: Either of which will tie us up from giving them such outward Adoration, as may but seem to entrench upon the Divine: For, if the fear of the latter, made an Angel refuse it, yea, lay a strict charge upon St. John not to do it; we may be sure God is extremely jealous in this particular, and forbids the very semblances thereof. For, as for those who would have St. John faulted here, for bowing down to the Angel, as to God; it is absurd, yea, impious, to conceive of so great an Apostle, especially after he had been once admonished of it: but much more absurd to believe so of Cornelius (who yet was in like manner chid for falling down at Peter's Feet) because he had no reason to take him for other than a Man, 
See Jackson of the Original of Unbelief, etc. chap. 26.  though designed by God for his Instructor. From all which, put together, it is manifest, That to give either Saints or Angels the same outward Worship with their Maker, is a thing which he abhors, and looks upon as the taking other Gods into a Copartnership with him.  
But leaving the Papists, against whose Errors yet it was but necessary to caution you, especially in a matter of so great importance; let us inquire a little whether some of us are not as guilty of having other Gods before the True: For, do not some Men (as the Apostle speaketh) make their Belly their God, and devote the main of their Endeavours to the satisfaction of it? Do not other Men make a God of their Palate, and make it their chief Business to gratify it? Do not a third sort (as the Prophet Habakkuk 
* 1.15.  speaks) sacrifice to their net, and burn incense to their drag? that is to say, to their own either Parts, or Endeavours, whilst they ascribe their Success and Wealth to them? Again, Do we not fear some Men equally with, yea, more than God? Do not those Fears oftentimes put us upon transgressing his Commands? Do we not love other Persons, or Things, as much or more than our Maker? Do we not love them, as God wills us to do himself, with all our heart, and mind, and strength? In fine, Do we not often trust in the Arm of Flesh, and say unto it, Thou art our confidence? But what is this less than the having other Gods before, that I say not to the exclusion of the True? For, if to Fear, and Love, and Trust, be Acts of inward Devotion, especially when raised above the pitch of Created Excellencies; he that so either loves, or fears, or trusts, turneth the Monarchy of Heaven into a Commonwealth, and makes as many Gods, as there are Persons or Things which he doth so adore.   

PART VIII.  
Concerning the attributing to a Creature any part of the Honour that is due to God; which is the last thing excluded by the Third Capital Precept of this Commandment. That done either directly and expressly, as by giving to it the Name of God, without any diminishing Explication; or indirectly, and by consequence: Of which sort is the attributing to Natural Agents the Success even of Natural Force, or ascribing to them Supernatural one. Upon occasion of which last, inquiry is made into the Lawfulness of Astrological Predictions; of attempting to discover Secrets, whether past or present, by Means equally unapt; or remove Evils by Charms and Annulets. A Conclusion of the whole, with a brief Account of men's transacting with the Devil; where is shown, That we have little reason to question the truth of such Transactions, and far less to allow them.  
3. THAT we ought not to substitute any other Gods in the room of the True, or receive any other into Copartnership with him, enough hath been said to show, where I had those for the Subject of my Discourse. Nothing remains toward a full Explication of the Commandment, but to show in like manner, that we ought not to attribute to any thing else any part of that Honour which is due unto him. A thing which the Words of the Prophet Isaiah 
* 42.8.  (And my glory will I not give unto another) as well as the importance of this Commandment, will warrant us to affirm: He who attributeth to any thing else, any part of that Honour which is due unto him, so far as he doth so, both making that his God, and giving the Glory of God to it. The only thing therefore that it will concern us to inquire into, is, By what ways that is, or may be done; which accordingly I come now to investigate.  
Now there are two ways whereby that may be done, and which therefore are to be supposed to be alike forbidden by this Commandment; the giving of God's Glory directly and expressly, or indirectly and by consequence. In the former of these I place, first, the giving to any Created Being the Name of God, without any diminishing Explication. A thing which hath not been unusual with fawning Persons, in their Addresses to Princes, and other such Great Personages: For thus, when Herod, arrayed in his Royal Apparel, made an Oration to those of his Jurisdiction, the Text tells us, that, at the conclusion of it, they gave a shout, saying, It is the voice of a God, and not of a Man, Act. 12.22. By which means, as they did directly and expressly give the Honour of God to a mortal Man, and consequently became Transgressor's of this Commandment; so God showed so much displeasure at the thing, that he avenged himself upon Herod, for not averting that Blasphemous Appellation from himself. And though the like cannot lightly be thought to happen under the Gospel, especially after so plain a declaration of the displeasure of God against it; yet it is sufficiently known, that some of the Church of Rome have proceeded to so great a degree of Flattery and Blasphemy, as to style the Pope of Rome, Our Lord God the Pope. I place in the same rank, what was no less usual an Extravagancy in former days, the Building of Temples, or offering Sacrifices to mortal Men: Of which kind of Honours the Apostles of our Lord were so apprehensive, that when the Priest of Lystra brought Oxen and Garlands to their Gates, and would have done Sacrifice to Paul and Barnabas, for recovering an impotent Cripple; both the one and the other of them rend their clothes at the mention of it, and laboured by all means possible to divert them from their purpose. But because such kind of Extravagancies are not so usual in our days, unless it be to Departed Saints, for which I have sufficiently accounted already; I will leave both that, and the present Head, when I have advertised you, That it is alike offensive to bear a Man's self as a God, whether by commanding such kind of Honours from other Men, or receiving them when offered by them; he that doth so, making a Deity of himself, and consequently bringing himself within the compass of the Commandment.  
How the Glory of God may be given to another directly and expressly, you have seen already, and might, with a little advertency, have discovered without my help, because it sufficiently betrayeth itself: Proceed we therefore to inquire, how it may be done indirectly, and by consequence; because that is not so obvious and apparent. Where, first, I shall reckon as an instance of it, the attributing the Success of any Enterprise whatsoever, to those Natural Agents which are made use of to compass it: For, it appearing both from the Scriptures, and our own Experience, that whatsoever aptitude there is in the Force we make use of, yet the Success of it depends upon the Blessing of the Divine Providence (it being equally true in other Cases, what St. Paul spoke in a particular one, That Paul may plant, and Apollo may water; but it is God that must give the increase) whosoever shall go about to attribute the Success of any Enterprise to his own or others Endeavours, must consequently be thought to give the Glory of God to another, and therefore so far also makes a God of it. But from hence it will follow, That he giveth the Glory of God unto another, who either before the Event, depends upon Natural Causes for the producing of it; or ascribes it to their Force and Virtue, after it is accomplished. Which latter is so plain and obvious, that when the Prophet Habakkuk 
* Chap. 1.16.  would represent the criminalness thereof unto the Jews, he expresseth it by sacrificing to their nets, and burning incense to their drags; Ceremonies which are sufficiently known to have been made use of by all Nations, to express their Reverence to their Gods.  
From the attributing the Success of any thing to Natural Agents, pass we to the attributing to them Supernatural Force, and such as is proper to God only. In the number of which, I reckon, Foreknowledge of contingent Events; the Discovery of other Secrets, whether past or present, by Means which have no natural aptitude to disclose them; and the making use of the like unapt Means, to prevent or remove Evils. For, though it be not to be doubted, that these may belong to Men, yea, did actually concur in the Prophets and Apostles; for which cause it may seem no immediate entrenchment upon God's Glory, to attribute them to mortal Men: yet as those who were Partakers of them, became so by the Grace of God, to whom alone they do primarily belong; so he who attributes them to any Creature, as such, and without consideration of the Divine Majesty's imparting them, must consequently be thought to give the Honour of God to them, because implying those Qualities to be inherent in their Nature, which are so only in the Divine, and by whom alone they can be imparted. For the more particular evidencing whereof, I will resume each of the Particulars before-remembred; and first, the Foreknowledge of contingent Events.  
Now there are two things manifestly implied in that Foreknowledge whereof we speak; and which therefore are to be carefully heeded, when we affirm it to be peculiar to the Divine Majesty: First, that it be certain, and not conjectural only; and secondly, That it be of such Events as are purely contingent, that is to say, of those that are altogether uncertain, and particularly such as depend upon the variable Will of Man, or the mere Will and Pleasure of the Almighty. Thus to instance in the former of these, though it cannot certainly be known beforehand, by Natural Force, what shall be the Event of any Battle, because the Event of that, and other such like weighty Actions, depend upon an infinity of Circumstances, which it is impossible for the Wit of Man to foresee; yet may it oftentimes be conjectured, by those who have considered of the Preparations of the one and the other Party, their usual manner of, or Courage in Fight, and the Advantages or Disadvantages of either: For though the Victory be not always to the strongest and the wisest, God Almighty, in his Providence, sometime casting it upon the weakest, by the interposition of some unlooked-for Accident; yet inasmuch as God for the most part works by ordinary Means, and gives Success to those Agents which are most apt to produce it, it may not improbably be conjectured, by him who hath considered the Advantages or Disadvantages on either hand, on which Side the Victory shall fall, though he pretend to no other Skill than what Humane Reason furnisheth. In like manner, because those great Lights the Stars have an unquestionable Influence upon Humane Bodies, as the Temperament of the Body upon that Soul which is joined with it; possibly a Conjecture may be made, by those who are well versed in either, what Courses Men shall take who are born under such or such Constellations; because Men do, for the most part, or at least where they are not overruled by the Divine Providence, follow the conduct of their natural Temperament, as that doth the sway of the Celestial Influences. But, as it is one thing to say, That those things may be conjectured; and another, That they may be certainly foreknown, by the Position of the Heavenly Bodies, or other Means: so, that they cannot be so foreknown, needs no other proof, than that Liberty of Will which God hath given a Man, as to his own Actions, and the alterations that are made in Men by Education and Grace, and infinite external Impediments; by means of which, Men naturally ill disposed may become good, or better, as the Divine Goodness shall minister opportunity. Again, As that Foreknowledge, which we affirm to be peculiar to the Divine Majesty, must be supposed to be certain, and such as may deserve the Name of Knowledge, and not only of Conjecture, or Guess; so a Foreknowledge of such things as are purely contingent and uncertain: For of such Effects as are necessary, no doubt there may be a Foreknowledge, yea, such a Foreknowledge, as, the ordinary course of Things considered, is as certain in itself, as the knowledge of those things that are present to us. Thus, for instance, though there be no Foreknowledge of men's Actions, and the Events of them, because the Dispositions of Men are alterable by Custom and Education, and much more by the Divine Providence; yet there may be a Foreknowledge of the Eclipses of the Sun and Moon, and other such the Affections of Heavenly Bodies; because the Courses and the Causes of them are constant and uniform, and may therefore, where those Causes and Courses are considered and understood, be not only preconjectured by us, but certainly and infallibly foreknown. But, as it is one thing to say, That necessary Effects may be foreknown; and another, That purely contingent ones may: so, that the latter cannot be foreknown by Humane Understandings, is evident from the manner of their procedure. For Humane Knowledge proceeding by the consideration of the Causes; where those Causes are uncertain, our Knowledge also must be, and either none at all, or conjectural. And indeed, however the Wit of Man hath arrogated to itself the Foreknowledge of Future Contingents, yet is that not only above the reach of Humane Understandings, but the peculiar Prerogative of the Divine; as is evident from Isa. 41.21. and Isa. 42.8. For arguing, in the former place, the nothingness of the Heathen Deities, from their utter inability to declare the things that shall be hereafter; as, in the latter, asserting the Truth of his own Godhead, from his ability to declare them: he thereby plainly showeth, that the Foreknowledge of future Things is the Prerogative of the Divine Nature, and of those to whom he shall be pleased to impart it. Where therefore that Foreknowledge is pretended to, without a peculiar Revelation from God, he who doth so, must consequently arrogate to himself the Glory of the Divine Majesty; and he who attributeth it to him, so far forth make a God of him. Neither will it avail to say, That that Foreknowledge which we appropriate unto God, hath evidenced itself in Men, by the falling out of several of those Events which they have foretold: For, as it is not at all to be wondered, that they should sometime hit the Mark, who throw so many Darts at it; so they whose both Religion and Education disposed them to an approbation of such kind of Arts, saw the vanity of them, and stuck not to discover it to the World: Tully 
* De Divinat. lib. 2.  in particular affirming, That the far greater part of those things which the Soothsayers foretold, fell out otherwise than they were predicted; and so often, that (as the same Tully informs us) Cato was wont to say, That he wondered very much how such kind of Persons could forbear laughing when they saw one another: That even the Responses of their Oracles were partly false, and partly casually true; That they were many times modelled by the Humour and Bribes of those who did consult them; That they were expressed at some times in such Terms as were not easy to be understood; and at other times, in such equivocal ones as might be adapted to contrary Events: In fine, That the whole Art of Divination was but Conjecture, and subject to more uncertainty than those Events it pretended to foretell. All which things whosoever shall seriously consider, will find the Foreknowledge of Men, not inspired by the Almighty, to be rather overthrown than confirmed by their Predictions; there being little fear of its receiving any countenance from those Divinations, which they, who were highly concerned to propugn as true, did not yet stick to affirm to be fallacious and vain.  
Having thus shown Foreknowledge of Things contingent to be the Prerogative of the Divine Nature, and consequently not to be attributed to any Creature, to which he hath not been pleased to impart it, without giving the Glory of God to another; it remains that we also show the same of the discovery of other Secrets, whether past, or present, by Means which have no natural aptitude to disclose them. Who they are that arrogate such a Power unto themselves, or others, need not be told you, when the generality of the Common sort, to discover any thing lost, or stolen, make use of Magical Arts, or resort to those that do; things which have no natural tendency to the discovery of that which they are made use of to disclose. The only thing worth our while to show, is, That so to do, is to entrench upon the Divine Prerogative, and give the Glory of God unto another. A Charge which it will be impossible for those whom they call Cunning-men to avoid, though we should absolve them from any express or  Stipulation with the Devil. For that which hath no natural aptitude for that purpose for which it is made use of, requiring the creating of one; as that again, the Work of an Almighty Power; he who pretends an Ability in himself, or others, to make it successful to that purpose for which it hath no natural aptitude, must consequently suppose himself, or those others, to have a Power to give it one; which is a manifest Usurpation upon the Almighty. But then, if we consider such Arts as are either  or express Applications to the Devil, under which Notion it is reasonable enough to look upon them (for as the Things such Persons make use of, have no natural aptitude for such a Discovery; so they have no reason at all to expect it from God, especially after the prohibition 
* See Leu. 19.31. Deut. 18.9, 10, etc.  of such Courses, and must therefore expect it from the Devil) so, I say, we shall be less to seek for a proof of their giving the Glory of God unto another, who make use of such unlawful Arts to compass their Designs: He who applieth himself to the Devil for the discovery of any Secret, both supposing him not to be without an ability to do it, and depending and trusting in him for it. Which, what is it, but to exalt the Devil into the place of God, and make him, whom the Scripture styles The God of this World, to be no less our own? For though many things which are secret to us, may yet be known to him, as having possibly tempted the Party enquired after to the committing of them; yet we cannot well suppose, that this or that particular one is, unless we suppose that all Secrets of Men are: Which, though it do not amount to an Omniscience, yet seems too great a Knowledge for any Created Being to be Master of; partly, because we find God, Deut. 29.29. challenging the knowledge of secret things to himself: but more especially, because in one of the Places before-quoted out of the Prophet Isaiah, he argueth the nothingness of the Heathen Deities, as well as the reality of his own, from their being unable to declare the former things what they be, as well as to declare things that are to come, both which he challengeth to himself. Which way of Reasoning would have been fallacious, if to declare the former things what they be, were not the Privilege of the Divine Nature, as well as the declaring of things to come. The Case will be yet more clear, concerning men's exalting the Devil into the place of God, if those Applications which they make to him, be attended with a Compact of giving up themselves unto his Service: for, so doing, they shall not only renounce their allegiance to their Maker, with which the Service of the Devil is inconsistent; but manifestly seat him in God's Throne, and give him that Honour which belongs to him.  
To the discovery of Things secret by such Means as are no way apt to disclose them, subjoin we, as of near affinity with it, the making use of Means equally unapt to procure freedom from those Evils which we either fear or feel. In which number I reckon, not only those Charms, or Spells, or Annulets, which are made use of by the Ordinary sort, to avert any Evils from themselves, or ; but such as are made use of, with more show of Devotion, by the Papists, to avert any Evils either from themselves, or Fruit, or other Substance. That such things as these have no natural aptitude for those Effects which they are designed to produce, is too apparent to be denied; and will, I suppose, not be affirmed by those who make use of them, if it were but for the credit of their own Art or Superstition. It remaineth therefore, if we suppose them to have any Force, (as surely those who make use of them, would not otherwise employ them) that they receive that Force either from God, or the User, or the Devil. To suppose they receive it from God, is highly unreasonable, unless we had the Authority of some immediate Revelation for it: Because those miraculous Effects which the Apostles themselves produced, were the Results of their Faith, which supposeth a Divine Revelation to found itself upon. If therefore the Means before-spoken of receive that Force which we expect from them, it must be either from ourselves, or the Devil: Both the one and the other of which, will involve the Party that useth them, in giving the Glory of God unto another. For inasmuch as the Means we make use of, hath no natural aptitude for that Effect which is designed to be produced by it, it remaineth, that if it receive any from us, it must be created therein by us; which is to attribute to ourselves, or those we apply ourselves to, one of the principal Prerogatives of the Almighty. All therefore that remains to be said, in excuse of such Practices, is, That we expect it from the Devil; which yet is (God knoweth) one of the greatest aggravations of their Gild: For, beside that God hath declared himself an irreconcilable Enemy to the Devil, and cannot therefore but look upon any Application to him, as an Act of Opposition to himself; he who applieth himself to the Devil, for the prevention or removal of any Evil, must consequently be supposed to desire it, both against the Will, and without the help of the Almighty. The former, because there is no Evil which doth or can befall us, but by his Providence: The latter, because God, from whom every good and perfect gift cometh, cannot be supposed to communicate it by his hands, to whom he professeth himself an Enemy; especially when the Boon we expect is asked not of God, to whom we are required to address ourselves, but of him who is no less God's Enemy than ours. Now, who seethe not, that such Applications as these, involve those that make them, in giving the Glory of God to another, if not in setting him far above Him? He who desireth any Boon of another, without the help of God, supposing that other to be self-sufficient; as he who desires and expects it against the will of God, that he is able to control Him. Neither will it avail to say, which yet is commonly pretended, That all who make use of such Arts, have not any intention or suspicion of making any Application to the Devil: For though I am willing enough to believe, that many of them have not; and cannot therefore but acquit them from the purpose of it: yet it is past either my skill, or theirs, to acquit them from the thing itself, or from being looked upon as chargeable with it: Men being justly chargeable with making Applications to the Devil, who make use of such Means for the attaining of their Purpose, the Success whereof cannot rationally be expected from any other; especially when God himself hath cautioned Men against the use of them, and represented them as detestable and abominable, yea, to such a Degree, as to occasion the casting out those Nations who possessed the Land of Canaan before the Israelites. Which how they should be thought to do, if they were rather vain Curiosities, than secret or open Transactions with the Devil, will, I think, be very difficult to determine. And indeed, as some of those Persons have the Title of Dealers with Familiar Spirits, and all of them are represented under the same Gild, and obnoxious to the same Penalties; so it is strange to observe, that some Men should be so highly unreasonable, as to question that Diabolical Commerce, after so many Authentic Stories which have been published to the World concerning it, the free Confession of the accused Parties, and the Sentences of grave and sober Judges; but especially after what the Scriptures of the New Testament have declared concerning the Devil and his Angels: They representing the Devil and his Ministers as encompassing the earth to procure mischief, as the God of this world, and ruling in the children of disobedience, as entering, through the Divine Permission, into men, and speaking in and by them; in fine (for so we read, Acts 16.16.) divining, as well as using other Speeches by them, and suggesting those Soothsay for which such kind of Persons are resorted to. After all which, to question either the possibility or truth of a Diabolical Commerce, is not only to be unreasonably scrupulous, but to be impudently unbelieving; because contradicting the general Sense and Experience of the World, and the clear Declarations of the Scriptures. I will conclude this Affair with a Passage in Leviticus 
* Chap. 20.6.  because both expressing God's detestation of all Magical Practices, and his accounting of them as Idolatry, or the giving of his Glory unto another: And the Soul that turneth after such as have familiar spirits, and after wizards, to go a whoring after them, I will even set my face against that man, and will cut him off from among his people. For representing such Addresses under the term of going a whoring, which, in the Language of the Old Testament, is no other than the espousing of other Deities; he thereby giveth us to understand, that they are in effect an Abrenunciation of himself, and an espousing of other Deities in stead of him.    

THE SECOND COMMANDMENT.  
THE SECOND COMMANDMENT.  
Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven image, nor the likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the water under the earth. Thou shalt not bow down to them, nor Worship 
* or serve.  them: For I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, and visit the sins 
† or iniquity.  of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me, and show mercy unto thousands in them that love me, and keep my commandments.  

PART I.  
The Contents.  
That what we reckon as the Second Commandment, is really such, and not an Appendix of the First. This evidenced by several Reasons; as also that it respects the Manner, and not the Object of our Worship. The Commandment divided into a Precept, and a Sanction; as that again into an Affirmative, and Negative one. The Affirmative, That we worship God after a due manner; which also is there specified: and particularly, That we worship God in Spirit and Truth, the purport whereof is at large declared. Among other things, the Questions concerning Will-worship, and worshipping God with Ceremonies, discussed and stated.  
I Am now arrived at the Second Commandment; for so I hope I may have leave to call it, after the Travels of our Divines upon that Argument: For though the Papists represent it as an Appendix only to the First, and, which is much worse, have, upon that pretence, razed it quite out of their Catechisms; yet is there so little reason for their way of Reckoning, and so much for ours, that I doubt not all impartial Men will cast it on their sides who look upon it as distinct from the former Precept. For beside that all Antiquity 
* Joseph. Antiqu. Judaic. lib. 3. cap. 4: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Sulpit. Sever. Sacrae hist. li. 1. Non erunt tibi dei alieni praeter me. Non facies tibi Idolum. Non sums nomen Dei tui in vanum, etc. See more upon this Head in D. Taylor 's Dust, Dubit. Book 2. Chap. 2. Rule 6.  generally have so accounted of it, or at least have united it to the First upon different grounds; beside, that it seemed but requisite that provision should be made for the manner of our Worship, as well as for the Object of it; beside, lastly, that the worshipping of the True God by an Image, is elsewhere as expressly forbidden, as the substituting of False Gods in his room: beside all these things, I say, which yet are very material Considerations; the very words of the Commandment, to a diligent Observer, show the Manner of our Worship to be the thing aimed at in them: For, forbidding to make or worship the likeness of any thing, either in the upper or lower World, he thereby plainly declared his meaning to be, not to caution them against an undue Object, but against that kind of Adoration; he who worshippeth the likeness of any thing, making not that his God before which he so falls down, but that which it was designed to represent. Which is so true, that the Papists themselves are forced to allege it in behalf of their own Idololatrical Worship. Neither will it suffice to say (as I find it is by them) That what we call the Second Commandment did therefore descend to instance in Images, because those were the chief Gods among the Heathen: For as the generality of the Heathen were undoubtedly too wise to terminate their Worship there, the very Name of an Image directing Men to that of which it is so an Image; so it is not easy to conceive, save of the very Beasts of the People, that they should believe a Stone, or a piece of Wood, to be a God. From our own Account, pass we to that of our Adversaries, which we shall find to be more groundless than the former: For, as without any cogent Reason, or indeed only probable one, they annex this Second Commandment to the First; so, against all Sense and Reason, they divide that into two, which saith, Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house, wife, etc. making the Ninth to be, Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife; as the Tenth, Thou shalt not covet other the possessions of thy neighbour. But beside that our Saviour himself referred the looking upon a Woman to lust after her, to that of, Thou shalt not commit adultery; it is to be observed, That in the Twentieth Chapter of Exodus, which was the Copy of the Decalogue as it was given, Moses reckons the coveting of the house first, and then that of our neighbour's wife: So that, by their Account, the Ninth Commandment should lie in the Body of the Tenth, and the Tenth lie part of it before the Ninth, and part of it after; which (as a Learned Man hath well observed 
* D. Tailor Dust. Dubit. ubi supr. ) is a Prejudice against it, far greater than can be outweighed by any or all the Pretences that can be made for it: Especially when the last Clause of the Commandment, nor any thing that is his, shows the Coveting there forbidden to refer, in every Article of it, to the coveting of another Man's Possessions, which is not the Sin of Intemperance, but Injustice. But because, when I come to entreat of the Matter of the Tenth Commandment, I may have occasion to speak farther of it, I will quit the prosecution of that Particular, to apply myself to the Commandment now before me; wherein you may observe with me these two Parts.  

1. The Precept itself, Thou shalt not make or worship a graven image.  
2. The Sanction of that Precept; God will avenge the Transgression of it upon the children of the transgressors, to the third and fourth generation; as, on the other side, reward the Observance of it to a far greater tract of time and number, in the Posterity of those that shall observe it.   
I. Among the several Rules before laid down, for the Explication of the Ten Commandments, you may remember I assigned this for one, That in every Negative Precept, we were to look out for an Affirmative one, answerable thereto: By which Rule if we proceed here, so  
1. The Affirmative Precept will be, That we worship God after a due manner, and particularly (because the present Prohibition strikes especially at that gross way of Worship, by a Bodily Representation) That we worship him in spirit and in truth. The only difficulty is, what that due manner is; which accordingly I come now to explain. For the resolution whereof, not to descend to Particulars, both because I have in part prevented myself in the foregoing Discourse, and because the labour would be infinite, I shall observe,  
1. First, That to worship God after a due manner, is to square it by his Nature and Attributes. For Worship being nothing else than an Acknowledgement of his Excellencies whom we pretend to worship, it is in reason to be suited to those several Excellencies which are discernible in the Divine Majesty. But from hence it will follow, That to worship God after a due manner, is to fear, and love, and trust in him; because those Affections are suitable to that Majesty, and Goodness, and Fidelity, which are eminent in the Divine Nature. I observe,  
2. That to worship God after a due manner, is to worship him according to his own direction and appointment; that is to say, That we worship him as he hath commanded us to do, and that we worship him after no other manner. Of the former of these, there cannot be the least doubt, to wit, That we are to worship God according as he himself hath enjoined; he that omits so to do, or acts contrary to his will and pleasure, denying that Authority which is inherent in the Divine Nature. The only difficulty is, Whether, provided we worship him according as he himself hath appointed, we may not also worship him according as we ourselves shall judge farther expedient? For the resolution whereof, we must distinguish of the Substantials of Religious Worship, and of those things which are but Circumstances thereof. If the Question be concerning the former, there is no doubt but the Will of God ought not only to be our Rule, but the only Rule whereby we are to proceed. For God having not only given us the Light of Nature to direct us in his Worship, but the more clear Declarations of his Word; to add any thing to his Worship, as a Substantial Part thereof, would be a blemish to those Declarations, because supposing God to have made imperfect ones. The Case is far otherwise as to the Circumstances of Time, or Place, or the Gestures by which it is to be performed: For, it being necessary on the one hand, that some Time, and Place, and Gesture be made use of, for the performance of his Worship; and it being evident, on the other hand, that God either hath not prescribed at all concerning them, or at least not done it with that fullness that is requisite; either the Worship of God must be wholly omitted, or it must be left to the Reason of Private Men, to order their own private Worship, as to the Circumstances thereof; and to the Reason of the Governors of the Church, to order the Public ones. Care only would be taken, 

1. That what is ordered by Private or Public Persons, be agreeable to those General Rules which the Light of Nature teacheth, or the Doctrine of the Scriptures present us withal. Otherwise we do not only set up our own Inventions, but oppose them to the Commands of God. Care would be taken,  
2. That what is so ordered, be not either represented, or enjoined, as the Command of God: For that is literally to teach for doctrines the commandments of men, which our Saviour hath expressly forbidden us.  
3. Lastly, Care would be taken, That what is so ordered in the Worship of God, be not represented as things pleasing to God in themselves; but only as they serve for Order and Decency, and as they are Instances of our Obedience to those whom God hath placed in Authority over us. For, by inculcating them as things pleasing to God in themselves, we fall under the Charge of Will-worship, because not only adding our own Inventions to the Worship of God, but placing them in the same rank with it.    
But these Cautions being observed, there is not any the least doubt to be made, either of the necessity of our Obedience to them, or of our freedom from that Will-worship which the Apostle condemns. For, as the Commandment is express for our yielding obedience to those that have the rule over us, and particularly to such as watch for our souls (which cannot but be supposed to take in all those things which require a determination, in order to the more decent performance of God's Public Worship;) so there is not any just fear of falling into that Will-worship which St. Paul cautioneth his Colossians against. For, beside that he cannot in any Propriety of Speech be said to add to the Worship of God, who represents not what he so adds, in the same condition with it, but only as subservient to it; so (which shows it yet farther to be no Will-worship) he doth what he doth by virtue of the Divine Command, even of that, and other such like, which prescribe, That in the Worship of God all things be done decently and in order. If therefore what is so added, be grounded upon a Divine Command, it is no longer the result of the Wills of Men, at least as distinct from that of God; but a just compliance with his: which is a Will-worship which I hope none of us but will think ourselves obliged to perform.  
Having thus shown at large, not only that our Worship ought to be suited to the Nature of God, but also agreeable to his Commands; it remains only, for the completing of our Design, that we instance in one or two Commandments, by which our Worship is especially to be regulated: Whereof the first that I shall assign, and let that pass for  
3. My third Rule, is, The Worshipping of God in Christ: For, that so we are to do, God hath expressly declared by that Son of his, in whom he hath commanded us to adore him. Is Faith or Trust a part of Divine Worship? Our Saviour's Merits are to be the ground of it, there being no other Name (as the Apostle speaks) whereby we can be saved. Is Hope a part of Divine Worship? The same Jesus is to be the ground of that also, as by whom alone we are obliged to expect the Object of it. Is Prayer a part of Divine Worship? That also is to pass by him, as being to ask what we do in his name, and for his sake. Is Thanksgiving a part of Divine Worship? We are to give thanks unto God and the Father by him, Col. 3.17. In fine, Whatsoever we do in relation to God, or even ourselves, is to be done with reference to him, as God's Instrument both in Governing and Redeeming us: For, wherefore else should God no less than twice declare from Heaven, That he was the Person in whom he was well pleased; and once of that twice, moreover, oblige his Disciples upon that account to hear him? but to let us know (as St. Paul speaks) that whatsoever we do in word or deed, we should do all in the Name of the Lord Jesus? That we should do what we do in obedience to his Commands, and with respect to that Authority which God vested in him; That we should do what we do with respect to his Example, and have an eye to his most holy Life, as well as most excellent Precepts; That we should do what we do with respect to the great Obligations he hath laid upon us, by humbling himself to the death, even the death of the cross, for us; That we should do what we do in confidence of his Assistance, and not rely upon the strength of Nature, or any Moral Acquisitions; lastly, That we should do what we do in confidence of Acceptance in and through the Merits of his Passion? For, as each of these is sometime or other the meaning of acting in his Name, and therefore not lightly to be excluded; so we have great reason to believe them all included in that  Text, because all tending to his Honour, and elsewhere expressly required of us, to make our Worship acceptable.  
4. That to Worship after a due manner, we are to worship him in Christ, hath been already declared; together with the full Importance of such a Worship. The next, and indeed only thing that I shall need to subjoin, is, That we worship him in Spirit and in Truth, according as was before insinuated. For the evidencing whereof, though it might suffice to tell you, That this, if any, is the Affirmative part of the Precept, because the Negative strikes at the worshipping of him by a corporeal and sensible Representation; yet because it is a matter of importance, and indeed one of the great Duties of the Gospel, I shall allot it a more full Probation. In order whereunto, I shall lay for my Groundwork that known Saying of our Saviour, which establisheth such a Worship, with the proper Ground of it: God is a Spirit, and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and truth, Joh. 4.24.  
Now there are two Senses wherein those Words are to be considered, and which therefore are to be distinctly handled: 

1. A Natural or Moral Sense: And,  
2. An Evangelical one. The former, because grounded upon a Natural and Eternal Reason: The latter, because (as I shall afterwards show) the Precept of Worshipping God in Spirit, is opposed to that Worship which was in use under the Law.    
1. To begin with the former Sense, even that which I call the Natural, because grounded upon a Natural Reason; where again I shall consider the Reason upon which it stands, and then the due Importance of it.  
For the Reason upon which it stands, it will cost us little pains to evidence it to be a just Foundation of such a Worship. For, inasmuch as all things naturally are most affected with such Things and Operations as come nearest to their own Nature, it must needs be, that if God be a Spirit, they who would serve him acceptably, must present him with such a Worship as approacheth nearest to his own spiritual Nature. The only thing worthy our inquiry, is, What the Importance of such a Worship is; which therefore I come now to resolve.  
In order whereunto, the first thing that I shall offer, is, That it is not meant to exclude wholly the Service of the Body: For, beside that That is God's by right of Creation, and Preservation, yea, by all other ways by which the Soul is, and consequently to pay God an Acknowledgement of its own Subjection and Obedience; it is the distinct Affirmation of St. Paul, That we are to glorify God with our Bodies, and with our Spirits that are his. I observe, secondly, That as the Worshipping God in Spirit is not to be understood to exclude wholly the Worshipping him with our Bodies; so neither to exclude all Worshipping him by Rites and Ceremonies. For, as the Christian Religion itself is not without such Rites, even of God's own appointment (witness the Sacrament of our Initiation into it, and that other of our Continuance in it) so it is much more evident, that under the Law a great part of the Worship of God consisted in such Rites and Ceremonies: But so it could not have done, had a spiritual Worship excluded all worshipping him by Rites and Ceremonies; because God was no less a Spirit under the Law, than under the Gospel; and therefore no less so to be adored. It remaineth therefore, That by worshipping God in Spirit, we understand, first of all, the worshipping him with our Spirits; and that too in an especial manner. For as it is but requisite, that he who is a Spirit, should have the worship of ours, because most agreeable to his own Nature; so also, that we should for that reason intent that Worship especially, and make it the chief of our Study and Design. And accordingly, though under the Law, for the grossness of the Jews, God appointed them a Worship which consisted much in Rites and Ceremonies; yet he gave them sufficiently to understand, that the spiritual Worship, or the Worship of the Soul, was that which he principally required. Witness one for all, that of the Prophet David, Psal. 51.16, 17. For thou desirest not Sacrifice, else would I give it thee: thou delightest not in burnt-offering. The Sacrifices of God are a broken spirit; a broken and a contrite heart, O God, thou shalt not despise. The result of the Premises is this, That to worship God in Spirit, and consequently to worship him after a due manner, is especially to intent the worshipping him with ours; that is to say, by entertaining honourable thoughts of him, by endeavouring to conform our Wills to his most holy one, and lastly, by suiting our Affections to his several Attributes, by fearing, and loving, and trusting in him. But, beside the Worshipping of God with our Spirits, and that too in a more especial manner; to worship God in Spirit doth also imply the worshipping him without an Image, or any Corporeal Representation: For, beside that this is the very thing here forbidden, and therefore in reason to be supposed to be excluded, by worshipping God in spirit and in truth; to worship God by an Image, is so far from being consistent with a spiritual Worship, that it is but a dishonouring of him, because resembling him to things to which he is no way like, and which indeed are infinitely below the Excellencies of his Nature.  
2. Of the Natural or Moral Sense of Worshipping God in Spirit, I have spoken hitherto, and shown both the Ground and Importance of it: Let us now consider the Evangelical one, according as was before insinuated. For, that such a one was also intended, is evident from that Story to which this Passage is subjoined. If you please to consult the Verse preceding that which I have chosen for the Groundwork of this Argument, you will there find a Woman of Samaria demanding of our Saviour, whether Mount Gerizim, by Sichem, where the Samaritans sacrificed, or Jerusalem, were the true Place of Worship. In answer to which, after our Saviour had told her, That that Question was not now of much moment, because ere long they should neither worship in the one or the other; for a farther proof of that his Assertion, he adds, that the time was coming, and even then was, 
Mr. Mede on Joh. 4.23.  that the true worshippers should worship the Father in spirit and in truth. Which being compared with the foregoing Words, and the State of the Controversy to which they do relate, will show, that by worshipping in spirit and in truth, is meant no other, than the worshipping of God with a spiritual Worship, as that is opposed to the Sacrifices and Ceremonies of the Law. For, the Question being not, whether Mount Gerizim or Jerusalem were the place of Public Prayer (because both Jews and Samaritans had particular Places for them) but, which of the two was the proper Place to send their Sacrifices to; and our Saviour making answer, That in a little time neither of them should be, because the Father sought such to worship him, as should worship him in spirit and in truth; he thereby plainly shows his meaning to be, That to worship God in spirit and in truth, was not to worship him with Sacrifices, and other such Figures; but in spiritual and substantial Worship, such as are the Sacrifices of Prayer and Praise, with other the like Natural Expressions of our Devotion. But, from hence it will follow, not only that we are to worship God without those Legal Rites wherewith it was before sufficiently clogged; but also, that we are not to clog it with other Rites than Decency and Order shall require. For our Saviour not only excluding the Rites and Sacrifices of the Law, but affirming the Worship which his Father sought, to be a spiritual one; he doth thereby cut off the affixing of all other Rites (as being alike contrary thereto) save what Decency and Order shall require. But so the Church of England hath declared itself to understand the Worshipping of God in spirit and in truth; telling us, in one of its Prefaces to our Liturgy, That Christ's Gospel is not a Ceremonial Law, as much of Moses Law was; but it is a Religion to serve God, not in bondage of the Figure or Shadow, but in the freedom of the Spirit; contenting itself only with those Ceremonies which do serve to a decent Order and comely Discipline, and such as be apt to stir up the dull mind of Man to the remembrance of his Duty to God, by some notable and special signification whereby he might be edified. In conformity whereto, as she herself hath proceeded, enjoining neither many nor trifling one's; so, what she hath done, is sufficiently warranted, not only by that Solemnity which Experience shows Things of that nature to add to all Matters of Importance, but (which is of more avail) from the Institution of our Saviour, and the Practice of the Church in the Apostles days. For, if all Rites are to be excluded, what shall become of the Sacraments themselves? But how shall we any way excuse the Apostolical Church, for that holy Kiss wherewith they were wont to conclude their Prayers, the laying on of hands in admitting Ministers to the Church, or shaking off the dust of their feet against those that should not receive them, in testimony of their rejection of them? For that all those things were then in use, even with the allowance of the Apostles themselves, the Scripture is our Witness; to which therefore, if Men will exclude all things of that nature, they must first oppose themselves. Such is the Practice of that Church to which we relate; such the Grounds upon which she proceeds: but, as farther than that, she neither goes, nor pretends to do; so, if she did, there is no doubt she would offend against that Precept which requires the worshipping of God in spirit and in truth. For, how can they be said to do so, whose Devotion spends itself in outward Ceremonies? Which, as they are of no value in themselves, so have this ill property of the Ivy, that where they are suffered to grow too luxuriant, they eat out the Heart of that Religion about which they twine.   

PART II.  
A Transition to the Negative part of the Precept; and therein, first, to that part of it which forbids the making any Graven Image, or other Corporeal Representation. That all Images are not forbidden; but such only as are made with a design to represent the Divine Majesty, or to bow down to and worship. The unlawfulness of making an Image of God, evidenced from the disproportion that is between an Image and the Divine Nature. The Objections against that way of Reasoning, proposed, and answered. The same unlawfulness manifested from St. Paul's charging the Heathen with the making of them, and from the Opinions of the wiser Heathen. An Answer to certain Distinctions which are offered by the Papists, and others, to elude the Force of the Commandment in this Affair.  
WHAT the Affirmative part of this Precept is, you have seen already: Pass we now to the consideration of,  
2. The Negative; wherein there are these two things forbidden.  

1. The making of a Graven Image, or any other Corporeal Representation: And,  
2. The bowing down and worshipping them.   
1. I begin with the former of these, the Prohibition of making a graven Image, or any other Corporeal Representation: Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven Image, etc. Where, 1. I shall show what is not to be accounted the Sense of it; and then, what really is.  
It was the Opinion of Tertullian, and hath since been taken up by some Modern Writers, That God in this Commandment forbade all Images whatsoever; particularly, all protuberant ones. The ground of that Opinion was, partly the Letter of the Commandment, and partly the Jews abhorrency of all. But as the latter of these ought not to have any great stress laid upon it, if we consider the nature of Superstitious Minds, which being once throughly touched with the sense of any Error, do not seldom run into the contrary Extreme; so the former, even the Letter of the Commandment, will as little affect those who consider its Position in the Decalogue. For, being placed as it is, among such Precepts as respect the Almighty, and that Honour and Esteem which we ought to have for him; and being moreover immediately followed with the Prohibition of bowing down to them, and serving them; as that is with the jealousy of God concerning his own Honour: it is in reason to be extended no farther, than the forbidding of such Images as are made with a design to represent the Divine Nature, or to bestow upon them that Honour which is due unto it. And indeed, beside that Nature teacheth, there is no unlawfulness in making an Image, yea, that that Art, as well as others, is one of the Gifts of God; which is farther confirmed by Moses, where he attributeth the Skill of Bezaleel, in working the Work of the Engraver, to his being filled with the Spirit of God, in wisdom and understanding, Exod. 35.31. Beside that, secondly, they who teach all Images to be forbidden the Jews, are forced to confess their admitting of some, and particularly, of Images in their Coins; what shall we say (that may be satisfactory, I mean) to God's giving order for the Cherubims over the Mercy-seat, and for the making of the Brazen Serpent in the Wilderness? for his admitting into the Ark the Five Golden Mice, and Five Golden Hemorrhoides of the Philistines? for the Pomegranates, and twelve Brazen Bulls upon which the Laver in the Temple was placed? For though it be true, that God might dispense with his own Command, especially a positive one; yet as there is no evidence of those Orders of his being a Dispensation, so it is not easy to believe, that, having made so strict a Law against Image-making, he would not only dispense so soon with it, as we see he did in the Cherubims and Brazen Serpent; but dispense with it in a manner for ever, by placing those Cherubims and Bulls for perpetuity. For what were this, but to tempt Men to think he had abrogated the Command, and not only dispensed with it, but taken it away? Neither will it suffice to say, That the Words of the Commandment do only forbid the making them to ourselves, that is to say, of our own heads, and not when commanded thereto by God: For, as it is not unusual, either in the Hebrew, or other Languages, to express that in more words, which might have been expressed in fewer (which, by the way, may serve to show the triflingness of those Observations, that have no other Foundation than the outside of an Expression) so, granting that Addition of to thyself, to have any peculiar force, the meaning thereof would be no other, than thou shalt not make them for thy use; which will afford no ground at all to the former Interpretation. Let it remain therefore for an undoubted Truth, That the making of Images is not universally forbidden; but either, 

1. As was before insinuated, The making of Images with a design to represent the Divine Majesty: or,  
2. To fall down and serve them.    
1. For the evidencing the former whereof, within which I intent to confine the present Discourse, I shall first of all show this to have been the Design of this Commandment: In order whereunto, I shall first produce the Words of the Prophet Moses, Deut. 4.15, 16, and so on: Take heed therefore unto yourselves; for ye saw no manner of similitude in the day that the Lord spoke unto you in Horeb, out of the midst of the fire; lest ye corrupt yourselves, and make you a graven image, the similitude of any figure, the likeness of male or female. For, establishing the Prohibition of Images, upon their not beholding any similitude, that is to say, of God, but only the hearing of a voice; he thereby plainly shows the Design of that Commandment to be the forbidding of such Images as were made with a design to represent the Divine Majesty. To which, if we add that of the Prophet Isaiah, chap. 40. 18. To whom then will ye liken God, or what likeness will ye compare to him? so the Proof will be complete and perfect. For, the Writings of the Prophets being but Comments upon the Law of Moses, it is but reasonable to believe what we find there expressly forbidden, as the making an Image of God is, to be also forbidden by the Law. But because it may be said, That this Prohibition is only positive, and consequently not to be extended beyond the Jews (though how impertinent that Distinction is, I have before shown, where I evidenced it to be the Design of our Saviour to confirm the Law and the Prophets) yet to take away all Cavils in this particular, I will evidence, in the second place, the Prohibition of making Images, to be a part of the Law of Reason and Nature. Now this I shall endeavour, 

1. From the disproportion that is between an Image, and the Divine Nature.  
2. From St. Paul's charging the Heathen with the making of them. And,  
3. And lastly, From the Opinions of the wiser Heathen.    
1. For the first of these, we shall not need to stand long to prove it, or indeed to be a just Ground of the unlawfulness of making them. For, as it cannot but be confessed, that there is a great disproportion between God, who is not only a Spirit, but an Infinite and Incorruptible one, and an Image, which is both Corporeal and Corruptible; so that disproportion cannot but be thought to make it utterly unlawful to make such a Representation of him; because, in effect, denying the Spirituality and Incorruptibility of his Nature, which we so take upon us to represent. For, an Image, or other such Corporeal Representation, being Representations only of Corporeal and Corruptible Being's, he that makes such a one of God, must consequently suppose him to be such, and therefore also in effect destroy the Spirituality and Incorruptibility of his Nature.  
Three things only there are which may be objected against this way of Reasoning; to which therefore, before I go on, I will shape an Answer.  
1. That this way of Reasoning would conclude against the making an Image of an Angel, and consequently against the Cherubims, which are looked upon as such.  
2. That it would conclude alike against the Representation of God to our Understandings, under the shape of a Man; which yet we find in Scripture commonly done, and cannot well be avoided, because of the dulness of men's Apprehensions, especially those of the Common sort.  
3. Thirdly and lastly, That God himself hath sometime assumed those Shapes which we affirm to be so disproportionate to the Divine Nature.  
In answer to the former whereof, I say, 1. That as the Angels, though they are Spirits, yet are Created and Finite ones, and consequently both vastly distant from the Nature of God, and more near to other Finite Being's; as they are moreover Fellow-servants to us, and no other Honour therefore due from us, than what is proper unto such: so, by the Command of God, they have oftentimes assumed Corporeal Shapes, and appeared in them both to men's Fancies and Eyes. In which respect, nothing hinders, but they may be represented in those Shapes, especially when the Command of God is added to it. But, as it follows not from thence, that God may, because God hath carefully avoided the appearing in any such; so neither doth it destroy the Inference we have made, from the disproportion there is between the Infinite Nature of God, and a Corporeal Image. For, though there be a great disproportion between the Spiritual Nature of Angels, and a Bodily Representation; yet they agree in this with them, that they are equally Creatures, and Finite, and consequently more allowable to make a Representation of them. The Case is not the same, as to that disproportion we have said to be between the Nature of God, and a Corporeal Representation; because God, by reason of the Eminency of his Nature, hath nothing common with them, as being Infinite in all his Attributes. Which Answer is the more to be stood upon, because the Prophet Isaiah, in the place before-quoted, lays the ground of his Reasoning against the making an Image of God, upon the Infiniteness of the Divine Nature: For as his ask, To whom then will ye liken God? is manifestly drawn from the former Verse, where it is said of God, that all nations are before him as nothing, and that they are counted to him less than nothing, and vanity; so he pursues that Argument, by saying further of him, that he sitteth upon the circle of the earth, and that the inhabitants thereof are as grasshoppers; which, with those that follow, are popular Descriptions of his Infinite Greatness, and of that infinite distance that is between him and us. However it be, To whom will ye liken God? is the Argument of God himself against Images, as well as the Argument of Reason and Nature: and if so, we may be sure it is of force to conclude what he affirms, though we should not be able to answer all that may be objected against it.  
As little do I find myself incommoded by those Representations the Scripture makes of God under the shape of a Man; it's comparing his Providence to Eyes, his Power to Arms, with other such like Representations of his Perfections. For, as it is confessed on all hands, that what the Scripture doth in this particular, is merely out of compliance with our Infirmities, or rather out of the consideration of our utter inability to understand him, without the help of such Resemblances; so, that alone is enough to show, that the Argument we have alleged, from the disproportion between God and an Image, doth not fight equally against the other. For as, though we cannot apprehend God without the help of the foregoing Resemblances, yet we may without making an Image of him; so, that inability of ours excuseth those Apprehensions from any way offending against the Divine Nature: Because, though it be a Sin to entertain any Apprehensions of God which are not proportionable to his Divine Nature, yet must it be understood with this limitation, so far as it is possible for us to avoid them: For otherwise, all our Conceptions of God must needs be sinful, because it is impossible we should conceive of him as the Excellency of his Nature doth require. The Case is not the same as to the matter of Images, because we may conceive God without them; which is so true, that (as a 
* Varro, quoted afterwards more at large.  Learned Heathen hath observed) the bringing them into use hath made Men think the Deity less tremendous than either his Authority over the World doth, or his future Judgement will show him to be. There is yet more to be said, upon the account of God's Condescension to us, in thus representing himself to our Understandings, with the Parts and Affections of Humane Bodies; because that is so far from being an Argument for Images, that it is, on the contrary, a great Argument against them: For, by how much the more God is pleased to humble himself, so much the less reason is there for us to humble him; and we may well forbear to set up an Image of him in our Temples, because he hath allowed us to serve ourselves of such in our Understandings, when even that could not be done without derogating from the Divine Nature, but that we cannot apprehend him without. Lastly, Whereas Images are apt to lead Men to believe God to be of a Corporeal Nature, and attended with the Imperfections of it; those Representations which the Scripture makes of God to our Understandings, as they are generally borrowed from the chiefest Excellencies, and therefore so much the less likely to debase him in our Imaginations; so being mixed with more spiritual Conceptions, they serve only to lead us to a more just apprehension of his Nature and Perfections.  
There remaineth one Objection more, against our arguing from the disproportion that is between God and a Corporeal Representation; and that is, That sometimes God himself hath assumed those Likenesses which we affirm to be so derogatory to him, and appeared in them to the Sons of Men. And if so, what should hinder us from following his Example, and depicting at least those Corporeal Shapes in which he appeared? Especially when it is elsewhere alleged, as a Reason of God's forbidding Images, That they saw no similitude to make them by: For that may seem to import, That if God should vouchsafe any such, it might be lawful to copy it out in an Image. For answer to which, I say, 

1. That if that were the only or principal Reason of forbidding Images, the taking thereof away, would take away the Prohibition itself. But that so it is not, is evident from the Prophet Isaiah, who grounds it upon the unlikeness that is between God's Nature, and Corporeal ones: Which Reason continuing still, and always likely to do so, the Prohibition must be still of force, notwithstanding any such Appearances of the Divine Nature. I answer,  
2. That though it should be granted, that God assumed those Corporeal Shapes, which it is pretended that he did; yet will not that invalidate our arguing from the disproportion there is between the Divine Nature, and an Image. For, though those Shapes were equally disproportionate to his Divine Nature, yet being of his own assuming, they neither imply any Irregularity in God, nor liberty to us to follow him; there being no doubt but God may humble himself, and as little, that it becometh not us to do so. I answer,  
3. That what is alleged concerning God's assuming Corporeal Shapes, is either not true, or impertinent to the present Business. For, though we read in St. Luke, chap. 3. and 22. That the Holy Ghost descended in a Bodily Shape, like a Dove, upon our Saviour; and in St. Matthew, That John Baptist saw him so descending on him: yet are we not to understand that of the Person of the Holy Ghost, but of his Gifts and Graces, of which those Representations were intended as Symbols. For, as the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are frequently described by that name; so, that the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are to be understood there, is to me abundantly evident, from that Prophecy that went before concerning it, Isa. 11.2. And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge, and of the fear of the Lord. In which place, as we have several distinct Spirits reckoned up, and each of them made a part of the Spirit of the Lord, which shows them to be the Gifts, and not the Person of the Holy Ghost, who is but One: so one of those Spirits, entitled the spirit of wisdom, and of the fear of the Lord; which latter Epithet, though it may well suit a Gift of the Holy Ghost, yet agreeth not in the least with his Person. If there remain any doubt, it must be concerning this of Isaiah's being a Prophecy of that Descent whereof we are now entreating: But that doubt will soon vanish, if we compare it with that of St. John, chap. 1. 32. For who can choose but look upon this Descent as the impletion of that Prophecy, when it is not only certain from the Prophecy itself, that it was intended of the Messiah; but John Baptist had it given to him, for a Mark to know the Messiah by, That he should see the spirit of God descending and remaining on him, which is the same in sense with the spirit of the Lords resting on him. And though the same is not to be said of God's appearing to Daniel in the Habit of an Ancient Person, with the hair of his head like pure wool; yet as that was only in a Vision, and therefore rather to his Fancy, than his Eye; so it had not that effect upon the Jews, or Primitive Christians, as to encourage them to make such an Image of the Almighty.    
2. Having thus shown at large the disproportion there is between God and an Image, and thereupon established the unlawfulness of making any such; we shall the less need to add any thing thereto, to evince it to be a breach of Natures Law. But because I have before promised to add, by way of confirmation, St. Paul's charging the Heathen with it, who had no other Law to guide them, and the Opinions of the Wisest of them; I will, for a conclusion of this Particular, descend to each of them: and first of all, to St. Paul's charging it upon the Heathen. But so that he doth, we have a Proof past all contradiction, Rom. 1.23. where having premised, that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, but became vain in their imaginations; as an instance both of the one and the other, he subjoins their changing the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and fourfooted beasts, and creeping things; adding moreover, which shows the greatness of their Crime, That for this cause also God gave them up to uncleanness, through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour their own bodies between themselves: And, lest that should not be enough, repeats the same Charge again, and the same dreadful delivering them over to vile affections for it, vers. 25, 26. The same is no less evident from that Speech of his to the Athenians, Acts 17.29. and so on; where having premised, that forasmuch as we are the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold or silver, or stone graven by art and man's device; to show this to have been both the Practice and Crime of the Heathen, he subjoins, And the times of this ignorance God winked at, but now commandeth all men every where to repent. Now, forasmuch as repentance supposes a preceding Sin, forasmuch as the making of Images is one of the things the Heathen are commanded to repent of; it follows, That the making an Image of God was a Sin in the Heathen, and consequently, because they had no other Law to guide them, a Sin against the Law of Nature. And indeed, though this Law of Nature was strangely clouded by the contrary Practice amongst them, and the Traditions of their Fathers; yet, if we descend, in the  
3. Third place, to take a view of the Opinions of the wiser Heathen, we shall find them, in their lucid Intervals, to assert the same Prohibition with this Commandment. For thus Seneca, in his Eighth Book, and Thirtieth Natural Question, tells us of God, 
* Effugit oculos, cogitation visendus est.  That he falls not under our Eyes, but is to be seen by our Thought. And elsewhere exhorting Lucilius to make himself worthy of God 
† Finges autem non auro, non argento: Non potest ex hâc materiâ imago Dei fingi similis. Ep. 31. , But thou shalt make thyself such (saith he) not with Gold or Silver; for such Materials cannot be made an Image like unto God. But of all other Testimonies in this matter, that of Varro is certainly the most full, as it is remembered by St. Augustine, in his Fourth Book De Civitate Dei, chap. 31. Where having premised out of him, 
‖ Dicit etiam antiquos Romanos plusquàm annos centum & septuaginta deos sine simulachro coluisse.  That the Ancient Romans did more than an hundred and seventy years' worship their Gods without Images; he adds, as from the same Varro, 
* Quod si adhuc, inquit, mansisset, castiùs dii observarentur. Cujus sententiae suae testem adhibet inter caetera etiam gentem Judaeam: nec dubitat eum locum ita concludere ut dicat, qui primi simulachra deorum populis Posuerunt, eos civitatibus suis & metum dempsisse & errorem addidisse: prudenter existimans deos facile posse in simulachrorum stoliditate contemni.  That if it had so continued, the Gods would have been more chastely observed: They who first set up Images of their Gods, for the People's use, having taken away from their Cities that fear which they ought to have of them, and involved them in erroneous Conceits concerning the Divine Nature: Prudently judging (as St. Augustine there tells us) that the Gods might easily come to be despised in the foolishness of Images. Forasmuch therefore as the Light of Reason furnisheth us with Arguments against the making an Image of God; forasmuch as the Scripture chargeth it upon the Heathen as a Sin, and the wiser Heathen consent with them in the disallowance of it; we may very well look upon the Prohibition now before us, as a part of the Law of Nature; and therefore also, because the Law of Nature is such, of eternal obligation.  
Now, though what hath been said, might, to Minds not prepossessed, sufficiently evidence the unlawfulness of such Images; yet because those Prejudices have taught Men to frame certain nice Distinctions, to evade the force of the former Arguments, I will, for a conclusion of this Discourse, oppose to them some more particular Assertions, answerable to their several Distinctions: Whereof the first shall be,  
1. That painted Images, and such as are described upon a Plane, are unlawful, as well as engraven and protuberant ones: Contrary to the Opinions of the Greek and Moscovitish Church, and some of our own Western Writers. For the evidencing whereof, I shall allege, first, the Words of that Commandment we are now upon. For, forbidding, as it doth, not only any graven Image, but any likeness of any thing that is in heaven or earth, it thereby makes other Representations alike unlawful with carved or protuberant ones. The same is no less evident from the Reason of the Prohibition in Deuteronomy, even because they saw no similitude: For a Picture being no less a similitude, than a Carved Image, that must be supposed to be equally unlawful, when it is designed to represent the Divine Nature. Lastly, Forasmuch as there is the same or a greater disproportion between the Divine Nature, and a Picture; if Carved Images be unlawful, these also must be supposed to be so, when they are intended to represent the Deity. This only would be added, That the making of Graven Images, or other such protuberant ones, are most frequently forbidden in the Scripture: Not that others were not unlawful, as well as they (for the general Reason of the Prohibition, even the likening him to any thing, doth equally strike at all other ways of Representation) but because those Images were most in use among the Heathen, and because by their Figure they were most apt to make the Simple believe that they were those very things they were designed to represent, or at least that they were impregnated with a Divine Spirit.  
2. I observe, secondly, That as Pictures, as well as graven Images, were forbidden; so the Pictures or Images of any Being whatsoever. For what other can we rationally deem to be the sense of those Words, or the likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth? Which caution I the rather add, to confront an Opinion of Grotius, and the Jews, who would have the Figures of Living Creatures only forbidden: For though the Images of Living Creatures were mostly in use, and most dangerous, and therefore probably no other enumerated in the Fourth of Deuteronomy, where this matter of Images is entreated of; yet, as the Expression in the Commandment is too general to admit of such a limitation, so, if we admit of it, we must exclude the Images of the Stars, which are certainly not Living Creatures, but are notwithstanding faulted by God, Amos 5.26. But I have yet another Reason of making the present Observation, and without which indeed I should not have troubled you or myself with it: And that is, the asserting further, against the Greeks, and those that follow them in this Particular, the unlawfulness of Painted, as well as Graven Images. For whereas it had been urged (as it hath been before by us) That not only all Graven Images, but all other Likenesses were forbidden, according as the Letter of the Commandment imports; it is answered by 
* Explic. Decal. praec. 2.  Grotius, That though the Particle we render [or] be in the Hebrew Text of this place, yet it is not in the parallel place in Deuteronomy, nor in the Chaldee Paraphrase here: Whence saith he) it hath happened, that the Hebrews generally thought that of any likeness to be no new Prohibition, but to be added by way of explication, that we should understand, not all graven images to be forbidden, such as was that of the Golden Vine in the Temple, but such as resembled Living Creatures. But to this I have many things to say, and such as I think will make it appear to be very vain. For, first, It is not true, however Grotius came to say so, that the Particle we render [or] is not in the 
* Chald. Paraphras. verba 1. in Bibl. Polygl. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  Chaldee Paraphrase upon this place, as may appear to any that shall consult it. That which I suppose occasioned his mistake, was, that it is not there in Deuteronomy, as neither in the Hebrew Text. I say, secondly, That the Reading in this place ought in reason to be looked upon as more entire than that of Deuteronomy, and consequently, where there is occasion, to give Law to it: Because the Twentieth Chapter of Exodus is an Account of the Law, as delivered by God; whereas that in the Book of Deuteronomy is only a Repetition of it, which therefore needed not to be exact, as having been before set down. I say, thirdly, That if after the Word likeness, there had been only an enumeration of the Living Creatures of Heaven and Earth, and the Waters under the Earth, so there might have been some pretence to make the Temunah or likeness not comprehensive of all Similitudes, but only a determination of the general Word of Carved Images, to such as represented Living Creatures. But the Words are general, of all things in heaven and earth, etc. and so no doubt ought to be understood. I observe, fourthly, that as it is not unusual for such a Particle as the Hebrew 1 to be understood, even where it is not expressed; so the 
* Sept. Deut. 5.8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Septuagint have represented the force of it in that place of Deuteronomy, as well as Exodus. All which put together, will make the Observation of Grotius to be a mere Nicety, and consequently, that all kind of Images, as well as of all sorts of Things, are forbidden by this Commandment.  
3. From that first and second Assertion therefore, pass we to a third, answerable to a nice distinction devised by the Papists; to wit, That we are to understand such Images forbidden as pretend to represent the Essence or Person, not the Properties of the Divine Nature. But beside that the Essence of any thing cannot be depicted, because it cannot be seen but by some proper Representment, which makes that Distinction perfectly groundless; beside that, secondly, it cannot be thought they intent any other than the Representation of the Persons of the Godhead, who describe the Father in the shape of an Old Man, and have a peculiar Picture to represent the Trinity: there is as great a disproportion between the Properties of God, and an Image, as there is between that and the Divine Nature: For, as the Properties of God are not different at all from his Essence, but only in our manner of conception; so all those Properties of his are Spiritual and Infinite, and therefore not to be debased by Material and Finite Representations.  
4. Lastly, Whereas it is said by the Papists, That they intent not those Images they make of God, as perfect, immediate, and proper Representations of the Divine Nature; but imperfect, mediate, and metaphorical ones; upon which account they hope to avoid the Charge of offending against this Commandment: I shall oppose, in the fourth place, That such imperfect Images are as well forbidden, as any other. For, beside that the Law makes no such Distinction, but forbids all Images, and all Similitudes, and must therefore be thought to proscribe those imperfect ones, unless the Law had otherwise provided; it's descending to forbid not only the making the Images of any thing in heaven or earth, but particularly, in Deuteronomy, the making the Images of beasts, and fowls, and creeping things, showeth the former Distinction to be perfectly vain and groundless. For, though it may be thought, that some of the Heathen deemed a Humane Shape to be no improper Representation of the Divine Majesty; yet who can think them so vain, as to conceive a Beast, or a Creeping thing, to be a perfect Resemblance of their Gods? However it be, most certain it is, the Jews could not be so foolish as to think the God that brought them out of the Land of Egypt, to be like unto a calf that eateth hay; which notwithstanding, we find they not only represented God under such an Image, but were charged by the Psalmist with changing the Glory of God into such a Similitude; and by St. Paul, with Idolatry, for holding a Feast to it. So vain are the Imaginations of the Defenders of Images, as well as of the Makers of them; and will prove alike deceitful, when the Judge of all the World shall call both the one and the other to an account.  
I have done with that part of the Prohibition which concerneth the making an Image of God, and asserted the unlawfulness thereof: It remains only (to make it so much the more advantageous) that I address this following Exhortation to the Protestant, wherein he will find himself more immediately concerned; That inasmuch as the Prohibition of Images is grounded upon the disproportion that is between God and all Corporeal Being's, he who pretendeth for that reason to disapprove of all Corporeal Representations, would in like manner remove from his thoughts all Corporeal Conceptions of him; That he would not think God like Bodies, to be confined to a certain Place, and neither to know nor act any thing beyond his own Heaven; That he would not think his arm like that of ours, to be shortened that it cannot save, nor his ear so dull of hearing, that he cannot hear the softest whispers; That he would not think his Eyes like those of ours, to be blinded by the darkness of the Night, or imposed upon by those specious Outsides by which his own are apt to be deceived; in fine, That when, for the help of his dull Apprehensions, he conceiveth of Him under Bodily Representations, he remember, that He is above them, and separate those Corporeal Phantasms again, by thinking him to be a Spirit of infinite Purity and Perfection: Otherwise, though in another way, he falleth into that Crime which he condemneth, and sets up the same Images of God in his Imagination, which the Heathen heretofore, and the Idolatrous Christians now, set up to him in their Temples.   

PART III.  
Of the unlawfulness of making an Image, with a design to worship it; where, moreover, is shown out of Tertullian, the unlawfulness of making any such, to be worshipped by others. The second Part of the Negative Precept proposed, wherein is shown the unlawfulness of worshipping an Image, whether of God, or of Christ, or of his Saints. The Allegation of the Romanists, That they worship not the Image of God, but God in and by it, shown to be both untrue and insufficient: The former, because there are not a few who defend the Worshipping of the Image itself, yea, with a Divine Worship; and because the Common sort terminate their Worship there: The latter, because, first, the Heathen themselves generally were not guilty of any other Idolatry; where another Objection of the Papists is proposed and answered. The like evidenced, secondly, from the Idolatry of the Israelites in Aaron's and Jeroboam's Calves; which is shown to have been no other than the Worshipping of the True God in and by them. The Objections against the foregoing Argument, considered and Answered. A farther Argument against the Worshipping of God by an Image, drawn from Nature's Law; where again some Objections are proposed and answered. Of the Images of Christ, and his Saints: Whether or no, and in what cases they may be tolerated, as also what Honour may be given to them. That all Divine Adoration of them is unlawful; yea, that all such is so, which only bordereth on it.  
HAVING shown, in the foregoing Discourse, that we are not to make an Image with a design to represent the Divine Majesty; proceed we now to show,  
2. That neither are we to make any Image at all, with a design to bow down to it, or serve it; which I have said to be the second Part of the first Prohibition in this Commandment. Now, that so we are not, is competently evident from the Commandment itself, but much more abundantly from an Explication of it in Leviticus: For, as after the Prohibition of making any graven Image, etc. it is immediately added, Thou shalt not bow down to them, nor serve them; so the Prophet Moses, who was certainly the best Interpreter of his own Law, doth more plainly and expressly declare it, Leu. 26.1. For ye shall not (saith he) make you any idol, or graven image, neither rear you up a standing image, neither shall ye set up any image of stone in your land, to bow down unto it: for I am the Lord your God. And indeed, if the Worshipping of Images be a Sin, according as the second Prohibition imports, it will be no less to make them for that end, because in effect a Worshipping of them. Excellent to this purpose is that of Tertullian, where he addresseth himself to some Christians, who thought to excuse themselves from Idolatry, in that they only made those Images which were worshipped by others. 'Tis in the sixth Chapter of his Book de Idololatriâ. Imo tu colis qui facis ut coli possint. Colis autem non spiritu vilissimi nidoris alicujus, sed tuo proprio: nec animâ pecudis impensâ, sed animâ tuâ. Illis ingenium tuum immolas, illis sudorem tuum libas, illis prudentiam tuam accendis. Plus es illis quam sacerdos, cùm per te habeant sacerdotem. Thou pretendest that thou dost not worship them; but thou dost worship them, who makest them that they may be worshipped: And thou worshippest them not with the breath of some most vile Steam, but with thy own; neither with a Soul of a Beast, but thine. To them thou sacrificest thy Wit and Parts; to them thou offerest up thy Sweat, as a kind of Drink-offering; to them thou lightest thy Prudence as a Taper. Thou art more to them than a Priest, because it is by thy means they have one. But because at the same time I show it unlawful to worship an Image, I shall also show it to be unlawful to make an Image for that end; therefore proceed we to evince,  
2. The unlawfulness of worshipping any image; which is the second general Prohibition in this Commandment.  
When we charge the Papists with the Breach of this Commandment, and particularly of that part of it we are now upon, their usual defence is, That, as they worship not the Image of God, but God in and through it; so they worship not the Image of Saints with a Divine Worship, but with such as is suitable only to the Images of glorified Creatures. My Design is at present to show both the untruth and insufficiency of each of these Answers; and first, of their alleging their not worshipping the Image of God, but, on the other side, worshipping God in and by them.  
And first of all, though some of the Church of Rome are so wary, as not to undertake the Defence of Worshipping the Image itself, or at least not with that Worship that is proper unto God; yet there are a considerable number of them, and those too of the most eminent, who roundly assert the giving the same Honour to the Image, which is due to him it represents. Of this sort are Aquinas, Azorius, Cajetan, Lactantius, and Andradius, as Dr. Crackenthorp 
* Defence. Eccl. Anglic. contra Archiep. Spalat. cap. 63.  hath evidenced out of their own Writings. But be it, that what they suggest were really true, as to the wiser and better sort of them, and neither defended nor practised by them; yet (as the same Learned Man hath observed 
‖ Ibid. ) many of the Common sort terminate their Worship in the very Images themselves; which whilst those in Authority go not about either to censure or remove, they must not take it ill if we charge them with the imputation of so downright and stupid an Idolatry; Men being justly chargeable with those foul Abominations which, though they see, they endeavour not to amend. But be it, thirdly, that what they allege were true, both in the better and worse sort; and that they worship not the Images themselves, but God in and by them: yet even so they will not escape the imputation of Idolatry, according as I come now to show.  
For the evidencing whereof, the first thing I shall allege, is, That the Heathen were not guilty of any other Idolatry, than that of worshipping their Gods in and by them. For thus Celsus (as I find him quoted by Origen, in the seventh of those Books he wrote against him.) Now they (saith he 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; , speaking of the Christians) do openly show their contempt of Images: If for this reason, because a Stone, or a piece of Wood, or Brass, or Gold, which such or such a one hath framed, is not God, their Wisdom is ridiculous: For what other Person, that is not perfectly a Fool, looketh upon those things as Gods, and not rather as Things dedicated to, and Images of the Gods? To the same purpose doth Maimonides discourse, in his More Nevochim, chap. 36. Moreover (saith he) as to what concerns Idolaters, you know that none of them worship the Idol with this Opinion, as if they thought there were no other God but that: Nay, there never was any Man, nor will there ever be, who can fancy to himself, that the Figure which he hath made of Metals, Wood, or Stones, created the Heavens and Earth, and governs them. But they worship them, inasmuch as they look upon them as Things intermediate between them and God. And indeed, generally speaking, it is morally impossible for any but the sottish and beastly Multitude, to be guilty of such an Idolatry, as terminateth in the Image itself; an Image, in the very nature of it, referring the Party that useth it to him whom it is designed to represent. If the Heathens, as there is no doubt they often did, worshipped those for Gods, in them, that were really none, that is a Crime of another nature, and subjects them not for that reason to the Crime of Idolatry, or Worshipping an Image; but of having other Gods beside the True. Forasmuch then as the Heathen were not guilty of any other Idolatry, than of worshipping God in and by an Image, either there never was any such thing as Idolatry in the World, unless amongst the very Dregs of the People; or it must be such, to worship God in and by them. There is but one thing, that I know of, which is with any show of Reason objected, as to the difference between the Heathen and Christian Idolaters in this particular; and that is, That the Heathen imagined the Image not only to represent, but to have the Deity inhabiting in, or rather united to it, as the Soul is united unto the Body. But beside that the Papists seem sometimes of the same Persuasion, witness 
* Vid. Crack. Def. Ecclesiae Angl. contr. Archiep. Spalat. cap. 66.  their attributing to their Images the Power of Speaking, with the Working of several Miracles; a 
‖ Reinold. de Rom. Eccles. Idololatr. l. 2. c. 3. par. 77.  Learned Man of our own Nation hath demonstrated, That the Heathens had not that opinion of their Images, unless of some few, that were consecrated by Magic Art: So that still there will remain the same Consent between the Heathens and Idolatrous Christians, and either both be absolved from Idolatry, or neither. It is true indeed, some Passages of the Ancient Fathers 
* Vid. Grot. Explic. Dec. Praec. 2.  give occasion to think, that under those Images some Evil Spirits did sometime lurk, or at least were believed so to do by their Heathen Worshippers: But as it follows not from thence, That the Heathen thought their Images to be animated by them, and like Soul and Body in Man to make up one Person; so the mere lurking of Evil Spirits in the Idols they adored, will make no material difference between the Idolatry of the Heathen and the Christian; the Heathen, as well as the Christian Idolater, passing his Worship through the Image, to that Deity he believed to lurk in it.  
My second Argument against the Worshipping of God by an Image, shall be taken from the Crime of the Israelites in the matter of the Calves, as well that which Aaron made in the absence of Moses, as those which Jeroboam set up in Dan and Bethel. For if each of these were Idolatry, as there is no doubt they were, then is it such to worship the True God in an Image, because they worshipped the True God in them. That the Worship of the Calf which Aaron made was Idolatry, is evident both from St. Stephen, and St. Paul; the former not only terming it an Idol, but affirming the Jews to have sacrificed to it, which is a known part of the Worship of the Almighty; the latter calling it Idolatry in express terms, 1 Cor. 10.7. for exhorting (as he doth) Neither be ye idolaters, as were some of them, as it is written, The people sat down to eat and to drink, and risen up to play; he thereby plainly declares their feasting before the Calf (for that was it he refers to, as you may see Exod. 32.6.) to be pure and perfect Idolatry. Which place is so much the more to be remarked, because it doth not only brand the Jews for it, but caution us Christians against it, and that too under the fear of the like displeasure; lest any should say (as some have done) That this Precept concerned the Jews only, and thereby leave us at liberty to transgress it: For if (as St. Paul afterwards infers) that, and other the Crimes there remembered, were avenged upon the Israelites, to deter us from the like Practices, we may be sure it will be no less Sin in us, than it was in them, to commit the same Practices, and particularly to pay the same Adoration to an Idol. The only difficulty therefore remaining is, whether the Jews worshipped the true God in it; which accordingly I come now to prove. And here I shall allege, first, that Saying of the Psalmist, Psal. 106.20. where speaking concerning this particular Calf, and their worshipping of him, he subjoins, Thus they changed their glory into the similitude of an ox that eateth grass. For if their design in that Calf was to represent their Glory by it, that is to say, the God of Israel, then was it their design also to do honour to the God of Israel, and not either to the Image itself, or some other Deity. But let us come to the Story itself, as it is delivered in Exodus, and see whether it is possible to be any other? Where, the first thing that presents itself, is that Speech of the Israelites immediately upon the making of it; These be thy gods which brought thee out of the land of Egypt, Exod. 32.4. For as it was impossible for the Jews to think the Calf itself brought them up, which was framed after their deliverance out of it; so it would be equally hard to think they meant some of the Gods of Egypt, to which Place they are said in their heart to return. For how could they think the Gods of Egypt would so much favour those who had despised them, and drown those that sacrificed to them? Besides, though it be true, that it is expressed in the Plural Number, which may somewhat favour the interpreting their Words of other Gods; yet as that is not much to be wondered at, because the Word Elohim is Plural; so, that it is to be understood of the One True God, Nehemiah shows, chap. 9 18. where repeating that Passage concerning the Calf, he bringeth them in saying, not These be thy gods, but This is thy God that brought thee out of the Land of Egypt. As for their styling the Calf their God or Gods, 'tis but an usual Metonymy, whereby the Name of the Thing signified is given to the Sign; as the Images of the Cherubin over the Mercy-seat, are called the Cherubin; and in like manner, those of the Oxen and Lions in the Temple, by theirs. The same is yet more evident from that which followeth after in the Story, when Aaron had built an Altar before the Calf: For the Text tells us, that he immediately made Proclamation, To morrow is a feast to the Lord, that is to say, to the True God of Israel; what we render Lord, being the most peculiar Name of God, and to which the Jews bear such a reverence, that they will hardly venture to pronounce it. Neither will it suffice to object (as I find it is by some) That the Psalmist, where he speaks concerning this very Argument, affirms, That they forgot God their Saviour, which had done great things in Egypt, wondrous works in the land of Ham, and terrible things by the Red-sea. For, as that is not of sufficient force against so many Arguments for their meaning the True God, especially when the same Psalmist affirms, That they changed their glory into the similitude of an ox that eateth grass; so they might very well be said to forget God, without altogether casting him off, because forgetting, or at least not remembering to observe that Commandment we are now upon, and to the observation of which they had so many Obligations from his Goodness. For thus, Deut. 8.11. we find God bidding them beware that they forgot not the Lord, in not keeping his commandments, and his judgements, and his statutes, which he had so often enjoined them to observe.  
Having thus shown the Calf which Aaron made to have been intended for a Representation of the True God, and consequently (because their Worship of God in it was reputed Idolatry) that therefore it is such to worship even the True God in an Image; I come now to show the same of the Calves set up by Jeroboam; that is to say, That they worshipped the True God in them, and that that their Worship was Idolatry. That they worshipped the True God in them, is evident from the Proclamation Jeroboam made, when he set up those his Golden Calves: For, it is (saith he) too much for you to go up to Jerusalem; behold thy gods, O Israel, which brought thee out of the land of Egypt, 1 Kings 12.28. For, as it would have been a vain attempt in Jeroboam, to take them off altogether from the Service of that God, to whom they had been so long devoted; so his Words show very apparently, that his Design was rather to change the Place and Manner, than the Object of their Worship; because assigning for the Reason of his Fact, only the tediousness of the Journey to Jerusalem, and moreover representing his Calves as the gods that brought them out of the land of Egypt, which was a known Periphrasis of the God of Israel. And accordingly, though Jehu, who was one of his Successors, departed not from the sin of Jeroboam, as the Scripture observes of him, 2 Kings 10.29. yet is his zeal in the destruction of Baal's Priests styled by himself a zeal for the Lord, ver. 16. and which is of much more consideration, he himself intimated by the Scripture to have walked in the law of the Lord God of Israel, save only in the matter of the calves, ver. 31. of the same: Which could in no wise be affirmed, if he and those of his Sect had renounced the God of Israel, and worshipped either the Calves themselves, or some Foreign Deity in them. To all which, if we add, That Ahab is said to have offended more heinously than all that went before him, because serving Baal, and worshipping him, 1 Kings 16.31. so we shall not in the least doubt, but that the setting up of the Calf was intended only to worship the True God in it. For wherein had the great aggravation of Ahab's sin been, if they that were before him had worshipped either the Calf itself, or some of the Heathen Gods in it? The only thing remaining to be shown, is, That their Worship of the Calves was Idolatry; which will be no very hard Task to evince. For though their Worship is not where expressly styled so, yet are they called Idols, which is enough to make the Worship of them Idolatry. But so that they are, that of Hosea is an abundant Testimony, chap. 13.4. For having premised the Israelites making them molten images of their silver, and idols according to their own understanding, all of them the work of the craftsmen, to let us know what Idols he means, he subjoins, They say of them, Let the men that sacrifice kiss the calves. Forasmuch therefore as the Calves were no other than Idols; forasmuch as one Egg cannot be more like unto another, than the Calves of Jeroboam were to that of Aaron; it must needs be, because they were such, and the Worshipping that of Aaron reputed Idolatry, that that of Jeroboam's was so also; and consequently, that it is Idolatry to worship even the True God in an Image.  
Two things there are which are commonly alleged against the foregoing Arguments, to prove the Idolatry of the Israelites not to have had the True God for its Object. 1. That what they sacrificed to their Idols, they are said to sacrifice to devils, and not to God: And, 2. That the Prophets are frequent in inculcating, That the Gods they worshipped were gold and silver, that they could neither see, nor hear, nor understand; which may seem to import their looking upon the Images themselves as Gods. And indeed, if only one of these things had been objected, possibly it might have served in some measure to shroud an evil Cause; but urging them both, they do but help to destroy it: because urging such things as, taken in the strictness of the Letter, are inconsistent with each other. For if the Israelites worshipped Evil Spirits in all their Images than did they not worship the Images themselves; and if they held the Images themselves for Gods, than did they not worship Evil Spirits in them. The only thing remaining to be said, is, That some Images they looked upon as Gods themselves, and others as Representations of Evil Spirits; both of which being granted, will contribute little to the proving any thing against us. For, nothing hinders all this while, but they might look upon some Images, and particularly upon the Calves, as Representations of the God of Israel. But let us a little more particularly consider both the one and the other Allegation, and see how little force there is in either. It is alleged out of Deuteronomy, chap. 32.17. That they sacrificed unto devils, and not to God: But, doth it follow from thence, that they did so in sacrificing to Aaron's Calf? when there is not only no particular mention of it, but it is also sufficiently known, that they worshipped many of the Heathen Deities besides. But be it, that the Calf of Aaron were there included, as well as their other Idols: Yet, will it follow from thence, that they directly and intentionally worshipped an Evil Spirit in them? For may not a Man serve the Devil, unless, after the Custom of the Indians, he fall down and worship him? But how then could the Widows that forsook the Faith, be said to be turned after Satan, for only breaking that Faith they had plighted unto God? Beside, when the Devil is consessedly the Author and Promoter of all false Worship, what impropriety is there in affirming those who comply with his Suggestions in it, to sacrifice rather to him, than to God, whom they design to honour? Otherwise, what shall we say to reconcile what the Scripture in several places affirmeth concerning the Idols of the Heathen, to wit, That what the Gentiles sacrifice to Idols, they sacrifice to Devils, and not to God (for so St. Paul tells us); and again, That the gods of the heathen are silver and gold, the work of men's hands, as the Psalmist? It being impossible that both should be true in the Letter, and therefore a Qualification to be admitted. The only thing therefore to be accounted for, is, the Scriptures so often inculcating, That their Idols were but Silver and Gold; that they could not either see, or hear, or understand: which may seem to import that the Hebrews looked upon the Images themselves as Gods. But neither will this serve their turn, or enervate the Conclusion before laid down: because it is certain, 1. They worshipped the Host of Heaven, and erected Images to them. It is no less certain, 2. That the Heathen, who are in like manner charged with the same sottish Worship, looked upon, not their Images, but several Dead Men, as Gods, whom they represented by them. From both which put together, it is manifest, That when we find both the one and the other faulted for making Gold and Silver their Gods; as those Gold and Silver Gods again decried, for not being able to see, or hear, or understand: we are to understand thereby, that they dealt foolishly, not in looking upon their Images as Gods (for this few or none were so sottish as to believe) but for thinking such Representations as those to be either proper Representations of the Divine Nature, or fit Passports of his Worship, which could neither see, nor hear, nor understand. What remains then, especially since God hath both licenc'd and commanded us so to do, but that we go immediately to himself, but that we fall down and kneel, not before his Image, but before the Lord our Maker? or, if we will needs worship him in an Image, but that we worship him in his Son, who is the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person? So doing, we shall be so far from dishonouring the Great God of Heaven, that we shall, on the other side, do him actual Honour in it; because he is not only the perfect Image of the Father, but of the same Divine Nature with himself.  
Having thus shown, from the Scriptures, the unlawfulness of worshipping the True God by an Image; and that too, as well from those of the New Testament, as of the Old: I should now, according as the Superstitions of the Church of Rome lead me, proceed to consider the Worship of the Images of Christ, as also of the Images of his Saints. Only to show the Worship of God by an Image, to be as much a breach of the Law of Nature, as of that of Scripture, and the better to plain my way to that which follows, I shall subjoin a Reason drawn from Nature's Law, concerning the Worship of God by an Image.  
It is commonly suggested by the Papists, when they know not what else to say, That though they pass their Worship through the Image, yet they terminate it not there; and do what they do to the Image, not for itself, but in Honour of him whose Image it is. I will not now say, because I have said it often enough already, That such Images of God are unlawful in themselves, and a dishonour to the Divine Majesty, which they are intended to represent: From whence it will follow, not only that they ought not to have any Respect whatsoever, for his sake whom they represent; but that, for his sake, they ought to be rejected and condemned. That which I shall insist upon, is, That 
* See Dr. tailor's Ductor Dubit. ubi supra.  the Worship which is given to the Image, is either different from, and so less than it; or the same numerical Worship with that of him it represents. If the Worshipper gives a different, and consequently a less Worship, he doth not worship God in the Image; but his Worship, such as it is, is terminated in the Image, and then cometh not into this Inquiry, as being no more than loving a Picture for Lesbian is sake, or valuing a Pendant for her sake that gave it me; and must be estimated according to its excess, or temper, and according to the Will of the Person it relates to. For, as if the Person I respect, should signify her dislike of that which I set a value upon, and particularly of some Picture, wherein it may be she hath little right done her; as, I say, in that case I should show but little respect to her, by prising that which she professeth to dislike; so must they be thought to show little regard of God, who set any value upon his Image, both because all Images do but dishonour his most excellent Nature, and because he hath declared his own detestation of them. But, if by the Image a Man means to worship God, as the Papists both profess and practise, and pass his Worship through that, to what it represents; then he gives to both the same Worship, and consequently is guilty of Idolatry, because giving that Worship to an Image of God, which is truly and properly Divine. Neither will it suffice to say (as I find it is by the Papists) That what is done to the Image, is for the sake of him it represents, and consequently doth still set God above them, according to that known Maxim in Logic, Propter quod unumquodque est tale, illud est magis tale. For, first of all, still it will remain for certain, that Divine Worship is given to the Image; which is downright Idolatry, and expressly forbidden by the Almighty, where he saith, That he will not give his honour to another, neither his praise to graven images. I say, secondly, That though, by giving worship to the Image for the sake of him it represents, they may seem to set him above the Image; yet they do he challengeth to himself alone, to that which is confessedly but an Image of him. I say, thirdly, That when it is affirmed Propter quod unumquodque est tale, illud est magis tale, it is to be supposed to hold only where there is a magis & minus, which is not in the present Case; the Divine Nature, and consequently the Divine Worship, which is but a just esteem of it, and expression of that esteem, admitting of no Degrees: for, if it be less than the Highest, it is not Divine. Either therefore let them say, or rather show by their Practice, that they give not Divine Honour to an Image; or let them confess withal, that they are guilty of downright Idolatry, which is that we are endeavouring to prove. For, as for their assigning their doing of it to be for the sake of him it represents, it makes nothing at all for the clearing of them. For, as he who thus answers, confesseth he gives Divine Honour to an Image, and only tells us in what manner he doth it: so either that Manner doth destroy the Thing, and then it is not Divine Worship that is given; or it doth not destroy the Thing, and then, for all the distinctions, it is idolatry. Lastly, If (as they say) there be but one Motion of the Soul to the Image, and that of which it is one; it must consequently be granted, That more cannot be given to the one than the other by it, because one Act cannot be susceptible of both; and therefore also, either that God must have less Honour than he should, or the Image have the same Divine Honour with the Almighty. But concerning this matter, as I think I shall not need to add more, to prove the Worshipping of God by an Image to be Idolatry; so, if any desire further satisfaction, I shall refer them to Dr. Taylor's Cases of Conscience, where this Question is so fully and accurately handled, that no Man unprejudiced can go away in the least unsatisfied.  
To go on now, according to our proposed Method, to entreat of the Worship of other Images; and, first of all, (because he stands between both, or rather is both God and Man) of the Images of Christ. Concerning which, I shall no way doubt to affirm, 

1. That such Images may be lawfully enough made, because he assumed a Nature into the Unity of the Divine Person, which is capable of being depicted or engraved.  
2. I shall not stick to grant, secondly, That an Image of Christ, especially as hanging upon the Cross, may serve to excite in us a just apprehension of his bitter Sufferings, and, by that means, of his immense Love, who stooped so low as to undergo them: Nor yet,  
3. But that they may be so far regarded for his sake whom they represent, as not only not to be defaced, where they are not abused by Idolatry; but have a place, where they are admitted, among our choicest things of that nature. All these things, I say, no sober Man ever did, or can deny to be free from offending against this Law of God, or any other. The only Question is,  
4. In what Place, or at what Times, they may be expedient, or inexpedient; which must be left to Prudence and Authority to determine: consideration being had of the Persons to whom they are permitted, or of those with whom they converse. For thus, if Men be inclinable to Idolatry (as they were extremely in the beginning of Christianity) or are mixed among those that are; in such Cases there is no doubt it would be but necessary either to restrain, or remove such and other Images, especially from the Places of our Assemblies. Whence it was, that when Adrian the Emperor sought to set up Temples for Christ, he dedicated them without Images: And the Council of Eliberis, in regard of the multitude of Idolaters with whom they conversed, decreed, That no Pictures should be had in theirs, lest that which is worshipped should be painted upon the Walls. But as, I say, setting aside where there may be a just fear of falling into Idolatry, there can be no doubt in the least of the making, or having such and other Images, which pretend not to represent the Divine Nature. So the main Question between us and the Papists is,  
5. Concerning the Worshipping of them; which accordingly I come now to assoil. For the doing whereof, I will proceed in this method. 

1. I shall show, That all Divine Adoration of them is unlawful: And,  
2. That all Adoration is unlawful, that only borders upon it.      
1. That our Saviour is to be worshipped with Divine Adoration, we, as well as the Papists, hold; because we do equally hold him to be God: But, that Divine Honour ought to be done to his Image, we do constantly deny; because his Image is not his Person. If it be said (as it may) That their intention is not to do Honour to his Image, but to Christ, as God, in it; they who remember the precedent Discourse, will soon discern the insufficiency of that Answer, as to the freeing the Worshippers thereof from Idolatry; because I have before shown it to be such, from the example of the Israelites, to worship the True God in an Image. The only Question therefore that can be made, is,  
2. Whether it be lawful to fall down or kneel before them (which borders upon Divine Adoration) which therefore I come now to resolve. In order whereunto, the first thing I shall observe is, That whereas the Reason of forbidding the having of any other Gods before the True, is, because he is the Lord our God; 
Dr. Taylor 's Ductor Dubit. ubi supra.  when he comes to forbid the Worshipping of Images, he subjoins another Reason, to wit, because he is a jealous God. Of which procedure, what other account can be given, but that his intention was to cut off not only the giving of Divine Honours to them, but of any thing that might be thought to be like them? For, if the former only had been his intention, it would have been sufficiently forestalled by his declaring himself to be the Lord our God: That, without any other Reason, being a sufficient Argument, not to pay Divine Honour to another. The same is no less evident, secondly, from the nature of jealousy, upon which Quality of his, God grounds his Prohibition of Image-Worship. For, would it satisfy any jealous Person, think you, to tell him, that she of whom he is jealous did not go so far as to commit Adultery with her Paramour; or, if she did, that she did it only for his sake, and because of his likeness to him? Nay, doth not jealousy naturally arise from an over-familiarity with other Men, and the making frequent use even of the usual Testimonies of Civility and Friendliness? But how then (especially when God is pleased to assume the Person of one) can we make any other Interpretation of his being jealous concerning those Persons whom he hath espoused, yea married to himself? For be it, that they keep their Hearts from wand'ring after other Deities; that they do not entertain the same respectful Thoughts of, nor have the same inward Love and Affection for them: Yet if (as the Prophet speaks) their eyes are after their Idols; if they bow down to them upon every approach to the Place of God's Worship; if they kiss the calves, as often almost as they do behold them; who can think a jealous God will brook such Testimonies of Kindness and Respect, any more than a jealous Man would such a deportment in his Wife?  
The same is much more true, concerning the Images of God's Creatures, and our Fellow-servants, the Saints and Angels, together with all other things any way relating to them; as the Relics of the one, or those things which are dedicated to God's Service. For when such things as these have (not as with us the Bible, in the Administration of an Oath before a Magistrate, but) upon every occasion that is offered, our Kisses and our Cringes; when Temples are dedicated, and Altars erected to Saints and Angels; when we bow before them, as often, if not oftener, than before God and Christ; when we do it in the Places and upon the Times appointed for Divine Worship; what Deity, that were in the least jealous of his own Honour, and of the Affections of his Servants, would not be impatient of such Affronts, and revenge them upon the Heads of the Authors of them?   

PART IU.  
Of the Sanction of the Precept, by a Threat, and a Promise. What is meant by God's threatening to visit the Sins of the Fathers upon the Children. That God neither will nor can make one Man bear the Punishment of another's Sin. From which, and other Reasons, it is made evident, That God's intention in that Threat is either, first, That he will punish the Fathers in the Children, as he doth sometimes in their Persons and Estates; or, That, to show his displeasure against Sin, he will lay some Affliction upon the Child, but which yet (if that Child be innocent) shall turn to his Spiritual good; or, thirdly and lastly, That he will take occasion from the Parent's Sins, to punish the Children for their own. What appearance there is of God's thus visiting the Iniquity of the Parents upon the Children, and particularly upon those of Idolatrous ones. The Explication concludes with that part of the Sanction which containeth a Declaration of God's showing mercy unto thousands in them that love him: Where the exuberance of God's Mercy, above the severity of his Vindictive Justice, is noted and exemplified.  
II. OF the Precept now before us, what hath been said may suffice: Proceed we therefore to the Sanction of it, which is made by a Threat and a Promise: Whereof the former imports, That God will avenge the Transgression of the Precept upon the children of the Transreward the Observance of it to a far greater tract of Time and Number, in the Posterity of those that shall observe it. For though the Iniquity God here threatens to visit, be expressed under the Name of hatred, which comprehends other Sins beside those which are here forbidden; as, on the other side, that Piety which he promiseth to reward, by the love of God, and the keeping of his commandments, which is no less comprehensive than the former: Yet as it is but reasonable to understand both the Promise and the Threat with a more particular relation to the observing or not observing of that Commandment to which they are affixed; so there was reason enough to express that Observance, or Nonobservance, by the loving, or hating of the Almighty. For God assuming to himself the Person of an Husband to his People (as the styling of himself a jealous God shows) it was but agreeable to that Married Estate to which he alludeth, that he should express the Fidelity of his Spouse to him by that Love which is the ground of it; as, on the other side, her going a whoring after Images, by the hatred of himself: because it is from the loathing those Companions which they have assumed, that adulterous Women seek out to themselves new and forbidden Loves. Forasmuch therefore as both the Threat and the Promise, though in appearance of a greater extent, do yet, if not only, yet in a more peculiar manner, belong to the Violators or Observers of this Commandment; I shall not only deem this to be the most proper place of handling them, but consider them more particularly with reference to this Commandment, to which they are affixed by the Almighty.  
Having given an account in my last of the Jealousy of the Almighty, so far as that is useful to show the nature of the Crime here forbidden; we are now to consider it with reference to that Penalty which it prompted the Lawgiver to denounce. For my more orderly explication whereof, I will inquire, 

1. What is here meant by visiting the Sins or Iniquity of the Fathers upon the Children: And,  
2. What appearance there is of God's executing this Threat upon the Children of evil Parents, and particularly upon those of Idolatrous ones.    
1. Now lest any should imagine, that when God threatens to visit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, his intention is to make one Man suffer the Punishment of another's Sin; I think it not amiss to admonish, in the first place, That that is so far from being any part of his intention, that it is perfectly inconsistent with his own Declaration elsewhere, and indeed with the Justice of his Nature; as having not only declared his dislike of that peevish Proverb, That the fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge; but moreover affirmed, in express terms, Ezek. 18.20. That the soul that sinneth, it shall die; that the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son; in fine, that the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked upon him. Than which, what could be said with greater evidence and conviction, to remove all suspicion of God's making one Man to bear the Punishment of another's Sins? Though setting aside that Declaration, the sole Justice of God would oblige us to an abhorrence of all such Surmises: For, what, I beseech you, makes any Punishment just, that is inflicted either by God or Man? Is it any other than a Right in the Judge to punish, and an Obligation in the Criminal to suffer? And if so, is it not alike evident, that it can be no way consistent with God's Justice to make one Man bear the Punishment of another's Sin? For, as no one can have a Right to punish, where a Fault did not precede; and therefore neither to extend it, where that Fault doth not; because, as to any other, it is as if there had been no Fault at all: so neither can any Man be under an obligation to Punishment, who was not some way or other Partaker of the Sin that caused it; because that Obligation ariseth from demerit, which we have already supposed to be the peculiar of another. And indeed, however some Actions of God seem to proclaim the contrary, and particularly his imputing to us the Sins of our first Parents, and laying on Christ the Iniquities of us all; yet neither do the one nor the other contradict it in the least, if they be seriously and warily considered. Not the former, because the same Scriptures which affirm that God imputeth to us the Iniquities of our First Parents, do also assure us (as I shall show more largely hereafter 
* Explication of the Doctrine of the Sacraments, and particularly of that of Baptism. ) that we all offended in him, and consequently, that God doth not so much impute to us their Sin, as our own: As neither the latter, because Christ voluntarily undertook the suffering of that Punishment, which our Sins had deserved from the Almighty. After which, to lay upon Christ the Iniquities of us all, was not so much to make him suffer for others Sins, as for those which he made his own, by taking the burden of them upon himself. Whence it is, that St. Paul tells us, 
2 Cor. 5.21.  That God made him sin for us, who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him.  
It being thus evident, That God neither doth, nor can make one Man bear the Punishment of another's Sin; and consequently, that that cannot be thought to be the importance of the Threat here used: it remains that we pitch upon such a sense of God's visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, as doth not imply any thing of that nature. In order whereunto, it will not a little conduce to affirm (what I shall by and by show hath sufficient warrant in the Commination) That when God either threatens, or actually visits the Sins of the Fathers upon the Children, it is not so much his intention to make them bear the Iniquity of their Fathers, as to punish their Fathers in them, as he sometimes doth in their Houses or Estates, or whatsoever else they place their Happiness in. By which means God doth not so much make the Children suffer the Punishment of their Father's Sins, as make the Fathers suffer for their own, through the sides of those Children whom he afflicts. Now, that this is the intention of the Almighty, in such kind of Comminations, and particularly in that which is the Subject of my Discourse, is evident from the end of all such Comminations, and a particular Passage in this: For, the design of them being manifestly to deter Men from those Crimes to which these Comminations are affixed; to make those Comminations of any force, they must consequently be thought to bring some Evil to that Criminal against whom they shall be found to be denounced: No Man, and much less a sinful one, being like to be reclaimed by those Evils, in which he himself shall not have the greatest share. From whence, as it will follow, That the principal Design of the Almighty was to let those Idolatrous Persons know, that he meant to punish them in their Children; so it may not obscurely be collected from God's extending this Threat of his no further than to the third and fourth Generation, those being Generations which the Parents may live to see, and therein their own Bowels (as the Apostle calls those that descend from our Loins) tortured for their Impiety against their Maker. Though, supposing that they should not; yet if they have any thing of natural Affection in them, they very thoughts that so it shall be with their Posterity, cannot but stagger them in their Impiety, how strongly soever they may be tempted to it; it being not a little Evil, to die with an apprehension of our Posterities becoming miserable through our procurement.  
Now though this be true, and in part also satisfactory, because the Punishment is properly the Parents, the Calamity of the Child being made use of only to punish the Parent by; yet, because it is evident that such Inflictions cannot happen but by the Calamity of the Child, as it is no less from the phrase of God's visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, that the Calamity of the Child must happen by the procurement of the Parent; therefore, to show the full importance of this Commination of the Almighty, as well as its freedom from involving the Child in the Punishment of the Parents Sin, it will be requisite to affirm, in the second place, That when he threatens to visit the Iniquity of the Fathers upon the Children, his meaning is, not only that God will punish the Fathers in them; but that, in order to that end, he will make the Children miserable, and that too for the sake of the Father's Impieties: But yet so, that if those Children tread not in their Father's steps, they shall be free from the Effects of it; of which there is a sufficient presumption from Ezek. 18.14. and so on: or, that that Calamity of the Children shall turn to their spiritual and eternal advantage (for so St. Paul tells us, that all things shall, to them that love God, Rom. 8.28.) or, that if the Children tread in their Father's steps, or be any other way Irreligious, yet they shall not be punished, even by occasion of their Father's Sins, but for their own, and according to the demerit of them: Which will at the same time both show how God visits the Iniquity of the Fathers upon the Children, and how far that Visitation of his is from making the Child bear the Punishment of the Fathers Sin. A familiar Instance will clear my Sense in the second of the Particulars beforementioned, and together with it, the uprightness of God's Proceed. For, let us suppose, as we very well may, having oftentimes observed it; let us suppose, I say, a fond Mother punished in the Sickliness of that Son toward whom she hath showed an immoderate affection, her love to him transporting her into the neglect of her other Children, or any other sinful action. Here, I say, it is manifest, supposing the Child also to be pious, and no way to desire or approve of such an unreasonable fondness, that the Child becometh miserable by the procurement of the Mother; or, if you had rather I should speak in the Language of Moses here, that her iniquity is visited upon him: But yet so, that that Calamity of the Child's is, in respect of him, no Punishment, but, on the contrary, a signal advantage; God Almighty having promised, that all things shall work together for good to them that love him; and if so, this Calamity also. By means of which, at the same time he punisheth the Mother, yet he only afflicts the Child, or rather out of her Punishment procures a great Advantage to him; which is so far from being an act of Injustice, that it is an act of Grace and Mercy to him. But let us suppose, as in the third Instance, that the Child whose Calamity God maketh use of for the punishment of the Parents, treads in their steps, or at least is irreligious another way; in which case, the Calamity inflicted cannot but be looked upon as a Punishment, yea even to that Child on whom it is so; yet even so, a way may be found out to verify God's Threat of visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, without granting them to suffer the Punishment of their Parents Sins: For, as that Threat can no way be verified, without affirming the Punishment of the Child to befall it by the Iniquity of the Parents; so, that may well enough be affirmed, without granting the Child to bear the Punishment of his Parents Sins; it being enough to the verifying of the former, and indeed as much as is consistent with Justice, that the Rebellious Son, by occasion of his Father's Sins, is punished for his own; for which, but for his Father's Sins, he had either escaped unpunished, or not been punished after that manner wherein he is: For it is in this Particular (as 
* Sand. third Sermon on 3 King. 21.25. sect. 24.  one hath happily compared it) as it is with a Man, who having contracted many vicious and malignant Humours, happens to ride abroad in wet Wether, and taketh cold, falleth thereby into a shaking first, and anon into a dangerous and lasting Fever. For, as there the Parties malignant Humours were the true Cause and Root of his Distemper, and his taking cold the Occasion only of its breaking out; so the Personal Sins of the Son are the Cause of his Punishment, the Fathers the Occasion only of the inflicting it: which is far from inferring God's making one Man to bear the Punishment of another Man's Transgression: This importing no more, than that by occasion of the Father's Sins, the Son may be sometime punished according to the demerit of his own. In the mean time, we may see with how little reason some have condemned that Prayer of our Church, which, agreeably to the Doctrine of this Commandment, teacheth us to beg of God not to remember the offences of our forefathers: For though those Offences shall never be charged upon us, yet they may be a Motive to God to punish us for smaller ones of our own, which is that which is here meant by visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, to the third and fourth generation.  
2. What is meant by visiting the Sins or Iniquity of the Fathers upon the Children, hath been at large declared, together with the Justice of God's Proceed in it: Inquire we now (as our proposed Method obligeth us) what appearance there is of God's executing this Threat upon the Children of evil Parents, and particularly upon those of Idolatrous ones. For the resolution whereof, I will take this Threat of the Almighty asunder, and show the Completion of it in every Particular thereof. Now, that God doth often visit the Iniquity of the Fathers upon the Children, which is the first of those things which are affirmed, the Scripture will afford many signal Instances; whereof the first that I shall allege, is that of Samuel, 2 Sam. 12.18. In which place we do not only find God threatening, but actually visiting David's Adultery upon that Child which was the Offspring of it; and that too, notwithstanding the Father's deep Humiliation, and earnest Supplication for his Life. For well may we conclude, that God will not ordinarily be wanting in visiting the Iniquity of a Parent upon a Child, when so pious a Man as David could not avert it, though he sought it carefully with tears. But so that it is also with a Father of a Country, no less than with a Natural one, the same David, how eminent soever for his Piety otherwise, will afford us a no less convincing Proof: the Scripture giving us to understand, that for his numbering of the people, God slew in one day no less than seventy thousand of them, 2 Sam. 24.15. For though there be appearance enough that the Subjects of King David contributed not a little to the procuring of this their Destruction, the same Book of Samuel informing us, in the first Verse of that Chapter, That because the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel, he permitted Satan to move David to do that Act which procured it; though it be also probable, because there is no mention of their doing it, that the People of Israel, when numbered, omitted to give each of them half a shekel for the ransom of his soul, the neglect whereof God had long before told them he would punish with a Plague, Exod. 30.1. and so on; by which means the Destruction of that People will appear yet more particularly to have been drawn upon them by themselves: Yet inasmuch as David taketh the guilt of it upon himself, and desires of God that he would rather turn his hand against him and his father's house, than against those sheep of his, as he calleth them, who had no hand in the procuring the numbering of themselves; inasmuch as the Book of Chronicles gives us to understand, that the numbering of the People, which was David's own Act, was the thing which displeased God, and for which he smote Israel, (for the Text tells us in express terms, that God was displeased with this thing, even with the Word and Command of David for the numbering of the People, and therefore he smote Israel, 1 Chron. 21.7.) it is plain, that though the Israelites were not without their guilt, and such as might provoke God to the sending of that Pestilence among them; yet the chief occasion of their Calamity was the Sin of David: and though they were punished for their own Sins only, yet it was by his means that they came to be so, who might otherwise have been respited at least from it. Add hereunto God's involving the innocent Children of the Sodomites in the same Calamity with their Parents; and in fine, all National Calamities, wherein Experience showeth good Men have no less suffered, than those who were the Procurers of them. But because it is not only affirmed, that God will visit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, but that he will also visit it to the third and fourth generation; therefore inquire we, in the next place, what appearance there is of God's extending it either to the one or the other. Now though this be not so easy to be made appear, nor indeed absolutely necessary to be, partly because God never so threatens to visit, but he leaveth himself a liberty to suspend the execution of it, as the Repentance of the Children, or some other Purpose of his Divine Providence shall require; and partly because in this Commandment he doth rather insinuate his own likelihood of taking that Revenge, than absolutely assure them that he will: yet that it was not without example, especially as to the Children of Idolatrous Parents, the many Evils which God laid upon the Jews, and their being carried Captive into Babylon, may serve for an abundant evidence. For as there is nothing more evident from the Sacred Writers, than that Idolatry was the chief cause of that and other their Calamities; so, that the Idolatry of their Forefathers had not a little hand in the procuring of their Captivity, is evident in part from that Lamentation of Jeremy, which was written after, and upon occasion of it; he expressly affirming there, That their fathers had sinned, and were not, and they had born their iniquities, Lam. 5.7. If there be any thing of defect as to that particular proof, it is, that there is mention only of the Sins of their Fathers, without specifying whether he meant their immediate Fathers, or other their preceding Ancestors. But beside that it is not easy to confine this Speech of his to the Sins of their immediate Predecessors, when it is apparent those that went before them yielded not to them in Idolatry; it is evident enough from other places, that God looked farther back than the immediately foregoing Generation; yea, that this very Prophet did so; the Author of the Books of Kings 
* 2 Kings 24.3.  assuring us, that God had a respect to the Sins of Manasseh, who was four removes from those of the Captivity, as the Prophet Jeremy 
‖ Jer. 25.4.  reproaching them with his sending, and their refusing to hear all his Prophets; which must consequently, because all his Prophets lived not within that or a few foregoing Ages, show him to have intended the Sins of more ancient Times, and of those their Forefathers that lived in them. And indeed, well may we reckon the Fathers of more than four Generations backward, as the occasioners of their Captivity, when the present Jews impute much of their present Distress to Aaron's Calf; it being a Proverbial Saying among them, That there is no bitter 
* Fagius in Exod. 32.2. ex Mose Gerundensi. Non accidit ribi, o Israel, ultio aliqua in quâ non sit vel uncia de iniquitate vituli.  Cup they drink, which hath not some of the Ashes of that Calf mixed with it. If God doth not at all times proceed to the execution of so severe a Threat, that is imputable to his alone Will and Pleasure, which is uncertain as to us, and therefore not to be depended upon by us, especially as to the Iniquities of our immediate Forefathers: There being not a few Instances of the Miseries of those Children who have had the ill fortune to be descended of Irreligious Parents.  
Having thus given an Account of that part of the Sanction which concerneth the Violators of this Commandment, it remains that we descend to that which respects the Observers of it: Concerning which (because it contains nothing of difficulty in it) it shall suffice me to observe, That as God is not wanting to encourage our Obedience to, as well as to discountenance the Transgression of this Commandment; so, that those gracious Expresses by which he endeavours it, transcend those of his Justice, and particularly of his Vindictive one: For, whereas God threatens to visit the Iniquity of the Fathers upon the Children to the third and fourth generation only, he promiseth to show mercy unto thousands of them that love him, and keep his commandments. But so that God proceeded, as well as promised, the Scriptures do abundantly declare, they giving us to understand, that for the sake of David, and other such pious Persons, God was often entreated both for his Successors, and the Land of Israel; and averted from them those Judgements which they had abundantly deserved, and which he himself was otherwise in a disposition to inflict. For thus, when Solomon had by his Sins, and particularly by his Idolatry, given occasion to the Almighty to rend the Kingdom from him and his Son; yet in respect to David, who had been more faithful in keeping of his Commandments and his Statutes, he preserved the Kingdom entire to him all the days of his Life, and left his Son, for the same David's sake, the Tribe of Judah, and those that followed it, 1 Kings 11.34, and so on. In like manner, though in the time of Jehoram, both Judah, and he himself, had made themselves ripe for destruction, by treading in the Idolatries of Ahab, yet the Text gives us to understand, that for David's sake, as well as for his own Covenant, God would not then destroy them, nor give them over to those Calamities which they had deserved, 2 Kings 8.19. Which, as it is a sufficient Proof of the reality of God's Intentions, in that Promise which he hath here made to the Observers of this Commandment; so cannot but, if attended to, prove a potent Inducement to the Observation of this, and all other the Commandments of the Almighty: as by means of which, not only we ourselves may be made happy, but a Blessing be thereby entailed upon many succeeding Generations.    

THE THIRD COMMANDMENT.  
THE THIRD COMMANDMENT.  
Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain: for the Lord will not hold him guiltless that taketh his Name in vain.  

PART I.  
The Contents.  
The Affirmative Part of the Commandment, the Hallowing of God's Name; for which cause the handling thereof is reserved for that Petition of the Lords Prayer which prompts us to desire it: Only the Negative Part thereof, with its appendent Sanction, considered here. The thing principally forbidden in it, Swearing, and Swearing falsely. Other Profanations of God's Name, and particularly in Oaths, reducible thereto, especially in the Christian sense of it. An Inquiry what Oaths are to be looked upon as forbidden by our Saviour: Where is shown, first, against the Anabaptists, That all Oaths are not forbidden; as, in like manner, against the Libertines, That other Oaths are, beside what are made by a Creature; particularly, all Oaths in common Conversation, yea, for which there is not a great necessity. The Grounds of that Determination, and of the unlawfulness of such Oaths.  
HAVING in the Preamble to my Discourse upon the Decalogue laid it for a Ground, That every Negative in it includes an Affirmative, Reason would that I should take notice of the Affirmative of this Precept, which can be no other than the Hallowing of that Name which we are forbid by it to take in vain. But because I shall say enough concerning the Hallowing of God's Name, in that Petition of the Lord's Prayer which hath that for the Object of it, I will proceed without more ado to show, 

1. The meaning of the Prohibition: Together with,  
2. That severe Sanction wherewith it is bound upon us.    
I. I begin with the Prohibition, Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain: Where again these two things are to be enquired into.  

1. Whether Swearing be the thing here forbidden, at least principally: And,  
2. If it be, What kind of Swearing is.   
1. That Swearing is the thing forbidden, at least principally and chief, beside the Consent both of Jewish 
* Joseph. Ant. Jud. li. 3. c. 4. ubi sic exprimit tertium mandatum. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Philo de special legibus.  and Christian Interpreters, we have the Phrase that is here made use of, to attest; to take, or rather lift up the Name of God: because they who swore by it, were wont to lift up their Hands to Heaven, being no other than to swear by it. And accordingly, as the Chaldee Paraphrase, together with the Syriack and Arabic Versions, render those Words, Thou shalt not take the Name of God, Swear not by it; so the Phrase of lifting up is so peculiar to the business of an Oath, that it is sometime set by itself to signify it, and elsewhere with the addition of Soul. For thus, Isa. 3.7. what is in the Hebrew, In that day shall he lift up, saying, is in our Translation, and indeed cannot be well otherwise rendered, In that day he shall swear; and the Psalmist, after he had said, Who hath not lift up his Soul to vanity, to let us know what he means, adds by way of explication, nor sworn deceitfully, Psal. 24.4. In the mean time, as it is not to be denied, that the taking the Name of God may also signify the making mention of it (after the same manner that it is, where God asks of the Wicked what he had to do to declare his statutes, or take his covenant into his mouth, Psal. 50.16.) so the Rule before laid down, That under the grosser Sins, the lesser also are forbidden, will warrant our Understanding the Prohibition to extend to the irreverent use of the Name of God, as well out of an Oath, as in it. But because I shall say enough concerning thus taking the Name of God, when I come to entreat of that Petition which prays for the Hallowing of it, I will confine myself at present to the matter of taking God's Name in an Oath; and, because that is the next thing to be discoursed of, inquire what kind of Swearing is here forbidden.  
2. And here, in the first place, if we look upon the Commandment only as a part of Moses Law, it is not in the least to be doubted, that all kind of Swearing is not forbidden. For, as the Prohibition restrains itself to the taking of God's Name in vain; so, that Restriction is so far from proscribing all sorts of Oaths, that it doth on the contrary establish those that are not so qualified: according to that known Axiom of the Lawyers, That exceptio firmat regulam in non exceptis. It is not to be doubted, secondly, if we regard the Commandment under the former notion, that the principal design of it was to forbid the taking of God's Name unto a lie: For as that is frequently the meaning of the Word shave or vain, especially in the matter of Oaths, as you may see in Grotius upon the Decalogue; so, I think, we cannot otherwise give a satisfactory Account of the opposition our Saviour makes between his own Doctrine, and that of the Law; he representing the purport of the latter to be, Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but of his own, Thou shalt not swear at all. For, wherein lies the opposition between them, if the principal Design, at least, of the Commandment were not to forbid the taking of God's Name unto a lie? In the mean time, though I affirm the Swearing falsely to be the principal thing struck at; my meaning is not to deny, but that vain Oaths may also be condemned with them; partly because that is the prime importance of the Word shave, and partly because I have before laid it for a Ground, That under the greater Sins, the less also of the same species are forbid. But then, thirdly, if we look upon the Commandment as all Christians ought to do, as either explained or enlarged by our Saviour, so no doubt can remain of the unlawfulness of other Oaths beside false ones; our Saviour's Words, after his rehearsal of the Doctrine of the Law, being, But I say unto you, Swear not at all. For the elucidation of which Doctrine, and together therewith, of our own Obligation from this Commandment, I will proceed in this method.  

1. I shall inquire what Oaths are simply and absolutely forbidden.  
2. Whether it be lawful in any case to swear by a Creature.  
3. Whether the Magistrate hath power to exact an Oath.  
4. Whether, and how far, he may exact one of the Accused Party.  
5. What is the Obligation of Oaths.  
6. And lastly, (because that is of kin to them, and therefore in reason to have a place here) entreat of the Nature and Obligation of Vows.   
I. There are a sort of Men who minding more the Letter, than the meaning of the Scripture, have professed to believe themselves, and endeavoured to persuade others, that all Oaths are now forbidden. What the ground of their Scrupulosity is, shall by and by be declared. This only would be observed in passing, That they who in this matter are so tenacious of the Letter, are in other things as regardless both of the Letter and the Sense. For what hath more the astipulation both of the one and the other, than Obedience to Magistrates, which yet these scrupulous Persons do as irreligiously cast off? But because it matters not much what the Persons are that propugn the Opinion, if it have any Foundation in Scripture; leaving the Persons of the Objectors, we will descend to the Texts on which they rely, which are especially that of our Saviour, and of St. James: The purport of the former whereof is, That they should not swear at all; but that their communication should be yea, yea; nay, nay: the latter, That they should not swear, neither by heaven, nor earth, nor any other Oath; but simply affirm or deny whatsoever fell into discourse. For the clearing of which Texts, or rather of the former thereof, (for every body may see that that of St. James is borrowed from the other) I shall first of all propose the contrary Example of St. Paul, in those Scriptures which God handed to the Church by him: For, who can think it our Saviour's intention to forbid all Swearing whatsoever, when we find such a one as St. Paul doing so, in those Writings wherein he was Divinely inspired? Now, for the Practice of St. Paul in this particular, we have several Instances in those Epistles that bear his Name. Thus, Rom. 1.9. we find him vouching God for a Witness (which is the very Formality of an Oath) that he did without ceasing make mention of them always in his prayers: For God (saith he) is my witness, whom I serve with my spirit in the Gospel of his Son, that without ceasing I make mention of you in my prayers: as, in like manner, Gal. 1.20. where he gives an account of his Conversion, and calling to be an Apostle: Now the things which I writ unto you, behold, before God, I lie not. Lastly, Where he speaks of the several Persecutions and Troubles which he suffered for the Gospel's sake, he doth appeal to the same God for the truth of what he said; For the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ (saith he) which is blessed for evermore, knoweth that I lie not, 2 Cor. 11.31. Which Texts are plain and evident Proofs of St. Paul's swearing; and consequently, that our Blessed Saviour hath not universally forbidden it. Let it remain therefore for a certain truth, That all Swearing whatsoever is not forbidden by our Saviour, which is the first thing proposed to be proved. But as, on the one side, we are not to think all Oaths whatsoever forbidden; so neither only such (which may perhaps be the Refuge of some Men) that are made rather by Creatures, than by God; the opposition in that fore-alledged place being not between swearing by a Creature, and by God; but between Swearing, and a naked Affirmation and Denial: For, I say unto you (saith our Saviour) swear not at all, neither by heaven, for it is God's throne; nor by the earth, for it is his footstool, etc. But let your communication be yea, yea; nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these, cometh of evil. And accordingly, as St. James, where he enforceth the same Prohibition, to the mention of swearing neither by heaven nor by earth, adds, neither by any other Oath; so it is easy to assign a Reason of our Saviour's instancing in such kind of Oaths, without restraining the Prohibition to them; even because such kind of Asseverations were less scrupled by the Jews, as may appear from a Tract 
* Lib. de specialibus legibus.  of Philo: Where dehorting Men from swearing at all, he yet adds, That in case they did, they should not swear by the Name of God, but by the Health or Memory of their Parents, the Sun, the Earth, and the like; these being, in his Opinion, much more excusable than swearing by the Name of God. Whatsoever therefore is the meaning of those Words, Swear not at all, something more is meant than that we should not swear by the Creatures; which what that is, I come now more directly to show.  
1. And here, in the first place, I shall not doubt to reckon (because the thing principally forbidden) all Oaths in our common Conversation: For what less can we think meant thereby, unless we would have our Saviour's Words signify just nothing? Especially when he himself adds, by way of explication, Let your communication be yea, yea; nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these, cometh of evil. And here give me leave to take up a Lamentation, especially in an Age which seems to bid defiance to our Saviour's Precept, and that August Name which it would preserve inviolate. For, as if, I do not say, Christ had given no Command concerning it, but our lips were our own, and we had no Superior to control us, every Man almost, from the oldest to the youngest, calls God to witness in the most trivial and impertinent Affairs; at a Game at Tables, at a Deal of Cards, when a Health is passing about, and it may be Intemperance together with it: For, let the least question be made of any thing that is then acting, and an Oath shall presently be brought to confirm it, and God be called to witness that we threw twice Six, or that we have been as intemperate as any that have kept the Round. Nay, to so great an intemperance are the Tongues of Men now come, that God must be called to witness, even where there is no question at all made of any thing, nor it may be likely to be, unless it be whether the Party be a brave resolute Sinner, and have as little fear of God as Man. For what other Interpretation can any Man make of such men's swearing, but that they are afraid of being thought Religious, or rather of not being thought to have bid defiance to it? But as all Oaths in common Converse are forbidden to us Christians, and Yea or Nay substituted in their room; so, if the wisest of the Heathen or Christians may be credited,  
2. All Oaths whatsoever, for which there is not a great necessity. And accordingly, we find the Fathers 
* Tertul. de Idol. c. 11, & 23.  of the Church condemning Swearing, as a thing generally unlawful; and the Ecclesiastical Stories 
‖ Euseb. Eccl. Hist. l 6. c. 5. Loquitur de Basilide Martyr in Alexandria.  telling us of one, of whom when his Fellow-soldier demanded an Oath, his Answer was, That it was not lawful for him to swear, because he was a Christian. But, which is admirable to observe, some of the Heathen sweetly consenting with them, and with him whose Religion they propugned: For thus Epictetus 
† Enchit. c. 44.  in particular adviseth, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is to say, to avoid swearing, if it were possible, wholly; but if not, at least as far as they might: And Hierocles 
* Hierocles in illam clausulam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. , upon the Golden Verses of Pythagoras, That the best way to preserve the Reverence due to an Oath, was not to use it frequently, or upon trifling occasions, to fill up the vacuities of our Discourse, or procure credit to a Tale; but, as far as they might, to use it only in things necessary, and when there was no other way to secure them but by the help of an Oath. And, to the shame of us Christians be it spoken, (for this Divinity was not only in their Books, but in their Practice) there is mention of one Clinias 
‖ Vid. Grot. in Mat. 5.34. , a Pythagorean, who, when he might have avoided a Mulct of three Talents, by only taking an Oath, yet chose rather to suffer the loss of those, than take the other. Such was the one and the others Opinion of the Sacredness of an Oath, and of the unlawfulness of making use of it, unless where there was a great necessity: Which, that it was not without ground, I shall show immediately, when I make those the matter of my Inquiry. In the mean time, it is evident, that all Oaths in common Converse are unlawful to Christians, and much more the intermingling of Oaths with every Sentence we utter, which is so frequent both with the Base and Honourable. And God grant, that, as the Land hath mourned because of them, so it may mourn for them, and we propitiate that Name by our Humiliation and Reverence, which others and ourselves hitherto have only dishonoured and blasphemed.  
To go on now to show the Grounds of the Prohibition of unnecessary Oaths, and to establish it by Reason, as well as by Authority: Where, first, I shall allege the providing that every Man speak truth with his Neighbour, and be punctual in the performance of their Words and Promises: For, as our Saviour is thought to intimate by those Words of his, Whatsoever is more than these, cometh of evil, the use of Oaths had undoubtedly its original from men's falseness and perfidiousness in their Words and Promises; neither would any Man be desirous of an Oath, if he thought the Party he addressed himself to would speak truth without. And accordingly, our Law doth not generally exact an Oath of those of the Nobler sort, because supposing their Birth and Education to set them above any untruth and persidiousness; and the Word of an honest Man (as Philo 
* De spec. leg.  speaks) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is to say, It hath among those who deem him so, the nature of an Oath, it is free from the suspicion of any falsity or change: Whilst he who is put to an Oath (as the same Philo 
‖ De Decalog.  speaks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, lies under the suspicion of unfaithfulness. Now forasmuch as it was manifestly our Saviour's Design to implant Faithfulness and Truth in the World, at least in that part of it which embraced his Religion; and the use of Oaths (as hath been already shown) is a sign of the want of that, and only occasioned by it; it is easy to suppose, that the recovery of Truth and Faithfulness, was the Reason of his forbidding them in common Converse; yea, that he meant to forbid all that were not strictly necessary; all Oaths that are not such, being a sign of want of Truth in them of whom they are exacted. The second Reason which I suppose induced our Saviour to forbid Swearing generally, was to keep Men from swearing falsely; it being an hard matter for a Man to allow himself in the one, and not be guilty of the other. We learn thus much from the forementioned Philo; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for from much swearing (saith he) ariseth perjury and impiety: But much more clearly from Hierocles 
* Loco prius citato. , whose Words I shall now subjoin: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Now the words Reverence an Oath, do not only enjoin swearing truly, but the avoiding of swearing, as much as may be; for so shall we best observe the Precept of swearing truly, if we seldom allow ourselves to swear at all: For by swearing frequently and lightly, a Man may easily fall into Perjury; whereas he that swears seldom, never. For, either such an one will not swear at all; or, if he doth, he will swear truly, and neither through an evil Custom suffer his Tongue to run before his Understanding, nor his Understanding to be hurried away by the intemperance of his Passions. And truly, what else can be expected from a common Swearer, than that he should sometime swear falsely, and as well violate, as profane the Oaths of God? For beside that such men's frequent swearing is a certain Argument that they do not esteem an Oath as Sacred (for then certainly they would reserve them for Matters of importance, and where (as the Poet speaketh) there is a knot worthy God's untying) beside that, I say, the heat of Passion or Inconsiderateness may make such Persons, ere they are ware, set an Oath to that, of the falseness whereof they themselves are convinced; which is to call the God of Truth to witness to a Lie, which of all other things he professeth to abhor. And if this be the consequent of customary swearing, no wonder if our Saviour have generally forbidden it, and enjoined Men as much as may be not to swear at all. But beside the Perjury which unnecessary Swearing doth naturally draw after it, and for which cause therefore, if there were no other, it were in reason to be avoided; it offers an affront both to God, and to his Name, which we do thus take in vain. For, can it be other than an affront to the Divine Majesty, to call him to witness to every Trifle, to interpose his Testimony in every slight and impertinent Affair? That is to say, in such wherein it would scarcely be decent to call in a Man of any Repute to witness? Beside, when we call God to witness to the truth of what we affirm, our meaning is, because there is no other way of witnessing it, that he would either witness to the truth of what we say, by some extraordinary Accident; or to our falseness, by some remarkable Judgement upon ourselves. Now can any Man think it other than an affront, thus unnecessarily to call upon God to show Miracles, and alter the common Course of his Providence; when even God himself makes not any such alteration, but in Matters of importance, and to evidence the truth of a Revelation, or other such like Affair? If a Heathen could affirm of his Deity, That he was not at leisure to intent small matters, we may very well think that the True will not be well pleased to be called to witness, in Matters that are neither serious nor important. It is true indeed, where the Matter is weighty and important, and the Glory of God some way concerned in the clearing of it, such as is the doing Right between Man and Man, or the procuring Credit to that Doctrine which he himself hath commanded us to promulge; in those, I say, and such like Cases, especially when we have the Warrant both of his Word and Apostles Practice, we may well presume it not unacceptable to God, to call him to bear witness to them. But to do it, as is commonly done, upon every slight and trifling occasion, when the question is only, Whether we have thrown so much at Dice, or which of the Bowls lie nearest to the Jack; in such Cases, I say, to call in God to Umpire the Difference, must argue a mean Opinion of him, and may seem more proper for those Dice we sport withal, and for those Reeds we are wont to measure the difference that is between the other. But be it, that there were nothing of all this in an Oath (which yet is the very Formality of it); yet, is it not some affront to the Divine Majesty, thus unnecessarily to make mention of the Name of God, and to interlard every Sentence we speak, with it? For though his Name be not his Person, yet (as shall be elsewhere 
* On that Petition of the Lord's Prayer, Hallowed be thy Name.  observed) there is some Respect due to it, for the relation it hath to him; and accordingly, not either slightly, or regardlessly to be mentioned. But because, where I shall make this Observation, I shall say enough to confirm it, and the unlawfulness of unnecessary and trifling mention of the Divine Names; in stead of prosecuting it, or the matter of Swearing any further, I will see if I can provoke your Emulation, by what I find observed by Philo 
* De Decalog. & de specialibus legibus. , concerning some of the more sober Jews: Which is, That in case necessity prompted Men to it, they should not presently have recourse to the First Cause, and swear by the Name of God, but rather by Heaven, or Earth, or some other Creature; That in case they swore by God, they should rather do it tacitly, than expressly; as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is to say, By the, leaving the Name of God, by whom they swore, to be understood: That they should show some kind of backwardness and aversation to it, even where there seemed to be some necessity for an Oath: That they should consider well, before they made Oath of any thing, whether it were a matter of importance, whether it were true, and such as they had sufficient knowledge of; whether they themselves were pure in Soul, in Body, and in Tongue; it being a great Impiety to let any thing of filthiness pass through that mouth which made mention of the Name of God. Lastly, That they should take care not to swear in any profane and impure Places, in which it seemed hardly decent to make mention of our earthly Parents. For, is it possible, after all this, for Christians, who have been so much more obliged, and better instructed by God, to have less regard to it; nay, to profane and blaspheme that holy Name, to call him to witness to every Impertinence, to vouch his Authority for a Throw or a Card? If it be, it is a sign we have as little of Emulation as Religion, and are equally regardless of our own Honour, and that of God. Lastly, (which is a Consideration by no means to be forgotten, because made use of by God himself to dehort us from it) As there is little of Honour or Religion in thus taking the Name of God in vain; so there is all the reason in the World to believe, though we had not the Scripture to assure us, that God will not hold him guilt less that doth it. For, who can think, but that he who hath been so often summoned to come down among us, and witness to our Extravagances and Impertinencies, will at length come down, though to a quite different purpose, and make us feel the dreadfulness of that Name, which we do either trifle with, or blaspheme.   

PART II.  
Concerning false Oaths, and the Impiety thereof, which is evidenced from the affront they offer to the Divine Majesty, and the prejudice they bring to Humane Society. This last evidenced at large, both in Assertory and Promissory Oaths. Of Swearing by a Creature; and whether or no, and in what sense it may be lawful. That it is unlawful to make a Creature the Term of our Oath, or the Thing we swear by; but not so, to make mention of them in an Oath (though in the common Form of one) when intended only as relating to the Divine Majesty, or devoted unto him as Pledges of our Fidelity. That it is lawful for the Magistrate to exact an Oath of his Subjects. This evidenced in part from the nature of an Oath, which becometh so much the more lawful for being extorted; from the Practice of Holy Men in Scripture, who have required an Oath from their Children and Servants; and, in fine, from the necessity there is oftentimes of it, for the securing both the Magistrate and the Commonwealth.  
3. THAT all Oaths in common Converse are unlawful, that all vain and unnecessary ones are so, you have seen already: Proceed we now to the consideration of False ones, or such as are applied to a Lie. For that these also are unlawful, the Letter of the Commandment shows, and may à fortiori be concluded from our Saviour's Prohibition of the other. The former of these I shall now take for granted, as having sufficiently established it in the foregoing Discourse: It remains therefore that I evidence the truth of the latter, which will not cost me much time or pains to manifest. For, if we are to have an Oath in such veneration, as not to use it in common Converse, nor indeed where there is not a great necessity; how cautious ought we to be in setting it to a Lie, which this very Decalogue hath forbidden, and which, beside that, God doth elsewhere profess to have a great abhorrence of. To all which, if we add that of St. Paul to Timothy, 1 Tim. 1.9, 10. so there will not remain any the least doubt, I do not say of the unlawfulness, but of the great enormity of setting the Oath of God unto a Lie; because not only affirming the Law to have been made for perjured Persons, but reckoning them among Parricides, and other such Monsters in Nature, as their Crime, together with those of their Associates, among the things that are contrary to sound doctrine.  
Now though this might suffice, at least amongst reasonable Men, to evince the unlawfulness of setting the Oath of God unto a Lie: yet because, as was but now intimated, it is a Crime of a very high nature, and yet by many Men as little scrupled as vain and unnecessary ones, I think it not amiss a little to explain the Nature of it, and the fatal Consequences wherewith it is attended.  
I have before shown, and shall therefore now take it for granted, that an Oath is a Religious Affirmation, wherein God is invoked as a Witness, and by consequence also as a Revenger, if we be found to falsify in it. From whence it will follow, That whosoever swears falsely, calls God to witness to a Lie. Now, that no Man can do, without believing God to have no regard at all to Humane Affairs, or that he is false, and a Patron of those that are so; neither the one, nor the other of which, can be entertained into our thoughts, without the highest Impiety in the World. Not the former, because not only denying an Article of our Faith, but striking at the Root of all Religion; He that cometh unto God (as the Author to the Hebrews 
* 11.6.  instructs us) being not only to believe that he is, but that he is a rewarder of such as diligently seek him; which implies a more than ordinary Regard. But let us suppose him that swears falsely, to believe God to have a regard to Humane Affairs; though I am sure he that doth so, will in the end give us no thanks for the Supposition; yet can it not be denied, but that he must believe God to be such as himself, even a Liar, and a Patron of those that are so. For will any Man call those to witness to a Lie, of whom he hath not a strong presumption that they are false themselves? Nay, will he be so unmindful of his own Interest, or rather take so much pains to ruin it? For, if the Party whom he invites to give Testimony, be no false or deceitful Person, he will undoubtedly give Testimony rather against than for him, and discover his falsehood to the World. Now forasmuch as it cannot be supposed any Man will be so far an Enemy to himself, as to seek a Testimony which shall only make against him; he who thus calls God to witness, must be presumed to believe that God will witness for him; and consequently, because a Lie is that he is called to witness to, that God is false, and a Patron of those that are so. But what Impiety can be greater than such a Belief, or more dishonourable to the Divine Majesty; who hath every where represented himself as True and Faithful; who hath, in several places, affirmed Lying to be one of those things to which his Power, though Almighty, cannot reach; lastly, whose Veracity is the stay of all those that trust in him, of all that come unto Christ by him? For, let God's Veracity be destroyed, and all Trust in him must perish with it, and he be accounted as vain a Confidence, as any which himself decries.  
From the Affront which false swearing offers to the Divine Majesty, pass we to the Consequences thereof, and the harm it doth to Humane Society; which will appear, if we reflect upon the several sorts of Oaths, which are either Assertory, or Promissory. For Assertory Oaths, such I mean as are brought to witness the Truth of any thing that is past or present, the Author to the Hebrews tells us (and we may learn it from our own Experience) that they are an end of strifes between Parties at variance; this being that by which all Controversies are voided, and without which it is impossible they should ever be. For, as it is not to be presumed, they who judge between Man and Man, should have cognisance of their respective Interests, but from the report of others; so the bare Affirmations of Men are generally too fallacious to ground a sound Decision on; there being nothing more usual, even for those who make some conscience of speaking Truth, than to stretch it beyond its bounds, to serve the Necessity or Interest of their Friends. Either therefore Differences must never have an end, which Religion, as well as the Interest of the World, forbids; or they must be ended by that, which the Scripture hath represented as the proper way to terminate, and which all the World hath made use of to compose them. Now forasmuch as the Welfare of Mankind depends upon the Composure of Differences, as that again upon the Religion of an Oath; he must needs be a great Enemy to Humane Society, who shall subvert this surest Prop of it, and call God to witness to a Lie. For what were this but to bring a scandal upon those so necessary means of deciding Controversies; and consequently, to leave Men either to differ without hopes of accord, or (what was sometime in use in our Forefathers days) to decide their Differences by the Sword. Which, as it is in itself a very unequal Umpire of Differences, so serves only to create greater, and precipitate Men into that confusion which they sought to avoid by it. The like is to be said of Promissory Oaths; such, I mean, as are brought to assure Men, that they who make them, will perform what they promise. For, let these once be vitiated and disgraced, and there can be no assurance to any Man, of any thing that is yet to come. For, if an Oath will not hold a Man, much less will a bare promise, because that contains a Promise in it, and beside that, an Appeal to the Judge of Heaven and Earth. If it be said, as it may, That the Laws and the Punishments annexed, may make them perform their Oaths, whom the Religion of an Oath cannot; I answer, first, That there were such Oaths made, must be confirmed by another, to those to whom the execution of the Laws is committed. If therefore Oaths do once become cheap and vile, that also may be suspected of falsehood, and consequently render the Proceed of all Courts of Judicature suspected, because directed by them. Again, What security can we have that Judgement shall be rightly administered, if Oaths have not their due regard? For, inasmuch as Judges are subject to the same Infirmities and Passions with ourselves; and the Laws, by which they proceed, neither are nor can be so made, but they may, notwithstanding them, injure some Persons in their Cause: what security can there be of their not actually doing so, if that Oath restrain them not, which they gave to him whose Vicegerents they are? Sure I am, nothing else can restrain the Prince himself, because he is obnoxious to no Tribunal, but that of God. And therefore the condition of the World must needs be bad, if those Oaths become contemptible, by which alone their Exorbitances can be bounded. So pernicious to Humane Society, is the setting an Oath to a Lie; so destructive to the Honour of God, and the Being of Religion. And having said and evinced so much, I shall not need to say any thing more to aggravate the Criminalness thereof; because transforming the perjured Person into the Cruelty of a Wild Beast, and the gross Irreligion of an Atheist.  
II. Having thus shown what Oaths are simply and absolutely unlawful, that is to say, all Oaths in common Converse, all unnecessary, and false ones; I come now to inquire, Whether it be in any case lawful to swear by a Creature; the second thing proposed to be discoursed of. For the resolution whereof,  
1. The first thing I shall propose, is, That it is not lawful in the least to make them the Term of our Oath, or the things which we swear by, in strict and proper speech; that being to give them the Honour which is due to God, and consequently to look upon them as such. For inasmuch as the Scripture requires the swearing by his Name, Deut. 6.13. and, which is more, imputes to the Israelites for a Crime, their swearing by them that were no gods, Jer. 5.7. inasmuch as an Oath is in its own nature the calling him to witness who is of infallible Truth, a Searcher of Hearts, and a most just and powerful Avenger of Falsehood (which cannot be affirmed of any but God); he that in strictness of speech swears by any Creature, must consequently be supposed to give it the Honour that is due to God, or rather look upon it as such: A thing which it is manifest many of the Heathen did, and accordingly swore by them. Thus Euripides brings in Aegeus swearing after Medea, in these following Words.  

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   
That is to say, I swear by the Earth, and the bright Light of the Sun, and all the Gods whatsoever, that I will be constant to what you enjoin me. And an Assyrian ginger (as a Learned Man 
* Joh. Selden. Prolegom. ad Synt. De DIS Syris, cap. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  of our own Nation informs us) binds his Readers not to prostitute the Secrets of it, under this following Oath. I adjure all those that light upon this Book, by the holy Circle of the Sun, and the irregular Courses of the Moon; by the Virtues of the other Stars, and the Zodiac; to keep these things secret, and not either impart them to the unlearned, and such as have not been entered into them; or be unmindful of paying Respect to the Memory of me their Instructor. Let the forenamed Gods be propitious to those that keep this Oath; but contrary to them that break it. From both which Passages it is manifest, that many of the Heathen looked upon the Powers of Heaven and Earth as Gods, and accordingly swore by them. And therefore, as some pious Men have, through the fear of such like Idolatry, advised wholly to forbear the use of such Oaths, wherein there is mention of Created Being's; so I shall so far concur with them, as to advise the same, where there is any danger of our own falling, or drawing others into the like Crime; it being one of the highest Impieties, to give Divine Honour to the Creatures, and swear by them, as if they were Gods themselves. But from hence we may guests what is to be thought of the Practice of the Papists, who, beside the erecting of Temples, making Prayers, and other such Acts of Adoration, do not infrequently swear by the Saints also. For, what other is this, than to give them that Honour which, in all other men's opinion, and even in their own, is proper to the Almighty? Neither will it suffice to say, That they do it not for themselves, but with respect to him to whom they do belong: For still it will follow, because Swearing is a part of it, that they give them that Adoration which the Almighty hath challenged to himself, and which, unless they were Searchers of Hearts, can in no wise belong to them. As little is to be said in its defence, from those common Oaths by Heaven, our own Life, and the like: For though these (as we learn from our Saviour) have the Nature of Oaths; though the Expressions themselves may seem to persuade those Things to be the Things we swear by: yet, as they are not in the least invoked as Witnesses, but God to whom they do belong, or are devoted by us; so they are made use of only to express either some Attribute of God's, or our own readiness to resign them up to his Vindictive Justice, if we be found to falsify in them.  
2. For the evidencing whereof (and together with it, in what sense it may be said to be lawful to swear by a Creature) I shall instance, first of all, in those forms of Oaths which have in them the force of an Execration, as By our Health, Upon our Salvation, and the like. The meaning whereof, in the general estimate of the World, is no other than this; So let God grant me Health and Salvation, as I speak what I think, or mean to perform what I promise; and consequently is but an abbreviation of that Oath of St. Paul, 2 Cor. 1.23. Moreover I call God for a record upon my soul, that to spare you I came not as yet unto Corinth: Which doth manifestly make God the Term of our Oath, and not either our Soul, or any thing else that appertains to it. The same is to be said of those Forms of Oaths which are made by our Hand, Hands, or any other Part of the Body; the intention thereof being only to devote them unto God, as Pledges of the Truth of what we swear. In like manner, secondly, for those Oaths that are made by Heaven, or any other Thing wherein the Power or Truth of God is conspicuous; the meaning thereof, in the intendment of Christians, can be no other, than to call him to witness, whose Glory shines forth in them; as may appear both from Reason and Practice. For, can any Man be so senseless, as to call those Creatures to witness to the sincerity of his Intentions, which he himself is persuaded of not to have the least sense of any thing? Nay, would not the so doing give Men cause to suspect, that he himself was as stupid as they? It is true indeed, we read in Genesis, of Jacob and Laban's rearing a Pillar and heap of Stones, for a Witness of the League between them, Gen. 31.48. Nay, we read further, (which is of more consideration) of Laban's addressing himself to them after this manner; This heap be witness, and this pillar be witness, that I will not pass over this heap to thee, and that thou shalt not pass over this heap, and this pillar, to me, for harm, verse 52. of that Chapter. But, as the meaning thereof can be no other, than that they should serve for a Memorial of the League then made, which is quite different from the business of an Oath; so, that Laban had no other intention, may appear from his own Words immediately before it: For, if (saith he, vers. 50.) thou shalt afflict my daughters, or if thou shalt take other wives beside my daughters, no man is with us, see, God is witness betwixt me and thee. Which Words do not only show him to refer the Matter to the Testimony of God; but so, as to exclude all other Witnesses; because professing to refer it unto God, for that there was no other to attest it. I conclude therefore, That where there is mention of a Creature in an Oath, the design thereof is not in the least to call that Creature to witness, but God, to whom it doth belong. Which, as it is no way like the swearing by the Saints departed, who are presumed by the Papists to have knowledge of what we swear; so shows the swearing by Heaven, or the like, according as was before understood, to have nothing at all of unlawfulness in it, because not so much the Term of our Oaths, or That we swear by, as the Adjuncts of it, and only inserted in it, to represent the more strongly to our minds the Majesty of that God by whom we swear, or our own extreme danger, in case we falsify in them. And accordingly, as in the Old Testament we find Jacob 
* Gen. 31.53.  swearing by the fear of his Fahter Isaac, and Elisha 
† 2 Kings 2.2.  by the life of his master; so 
‖ Apol. cap 32. Sed & juramus sicut non per Genios Caesarum, ita per salutem eorum, quae est auguslior omnibus Geniis.  Tertullian tells us of the Christians of his time, and such too as would rather die than swear by the Genius of the Emperor, because apprehended by them to be an Heathenish Deity, that they would not refuse to swear by the safety of their Lord, which was more August than all Genii. The result of the Premises is this, That as it is not lawful to make a Creature the Term of our Oath, because so giving Divine Honour to them; so it is not unlawful to make mention of them in our Oath, when they are represented as Adjuncts of the Deity, or devoted unto God as Pledges of the Truth of what we affirm.  
III. The Order of my Discourse now leads me to inquire, Whether the Magistrate may not exact an Oath of his Subjects? A Question to be wondered at, if it had not been also made a Question, Whether there ought to be any Magistrates, or those Magistrates ought to be obeyed? For,  
1. First, Whereas other Acts of Adoration, by how much the more voluntary they are, the more acceptable they are to the Divine Majesty; an Oath, on the contrary, requires something of a necessity, to make it only lawful; and how much more then, to make it acceptable to the Divine Majesty? And accordingly, as it is a Proverb 
* Andrew's Determine Theolog. de jurejurando 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  among the Greeks, That Oaths and War are evil, when spontaneous; and only good, when they are extorted from us; so that Proverb of theirs stands confirmed as to an Oath, by the Veneration we ought to have for it, and the end for which it is given. For, Scripture and Reason requiring that Oaths should not be lightly used, and the end thereof being for the satisfaction of those to whom it is given; it follows, that they become good only when they are extorted from us by the hardness of those men's belief whose satisfaction is intended in them. If therefore an Oath become so much the more legitimate by being extorted; if it may be extorted from us by the incredulity of the Party to whom we give it; how much more, when there is just cause for it, by the Command of the Magistrate, to whom God hath commanded every Soul to submit itself?  
2. My second Argument for the lawfulness of the Magistrates exacting an Oath, shall be taken from the Practice of Holy Men, toward those who were subject to their Commands, and that too where there was less Authority to constrain. For thus Abraham made his Servant swear, that he would not take a wife unto his son of the daughters of the Canaanites, but of his own Kindred and Country, Gen. 24.3, 4. and Jacob made his Son Joseph swear that he would carry his body out of Egypt, and bury him in the Buryingplace of his Fathers, Gen. 47.29. and so on. In fine, thus Jacob made Esau swear to part with his birthright, Gen. 25.33. Now, if (as Bishop Andrews 
* Determinat. Theolog. supra citat.  well argues) it were lawful for the Master to put his Servant to an Oath, as it was to Abraham; if to a Father toward his Son, as in the case of Jacob and Joseph; if to a Brother over a Brother, as to the same Jacob over Esau; how much more shall it be lawful for him to require an Oath of his Subjects, whose Empire is more excellent than all other Empires? To all which, if we add,  
3. In the third place, the necessity there is of his so doing, in order to the Security of himself, and the Commonwealth, so no doubt can remain of the Power of the Magistrate to exact, and consequently of the Subjects Duty to comply with his Commands. For, is it any thing less than necessary to the Security of the Magistrate, to require an Oath of Allegiance to himself, when Men through the pride and perverseness of their Nature, are so hardly brought to afford it? Especially when in his Honour and Security, the Security of the Commonwealth is bound up; neither can that be safe, unless his Person and Authority be preserved inviolate? The same is to be said of that other sort of Oaths which the Magistrate tenders to decide Controversies between Man and Man. For, being it is for the Interest, yea Being of the Commonwealth, that Controversies be determined; being (as I have before shown) those are not to be determined without an Oath; it remains, That either the Magistrate is not furnished with full Power to determine Controversies between Man and Man (which would make the Institution of Magistracy vain) or it shall be lawful for him to exact an Oath to determine them by. And indeed (as the forenamed Bishop well argues) well may they exact the Oath of God, 
Ibid.  who have both his Name, and his Authority; who, as they represent his Person, so do also judge for him; and, which is more (for so the Psalmist tells us) who have him standing in their congregation, and judging in their Tribunal.   

PART III.  
Whether it be lawful to require an Oath of the Accused Party. This evidenced in part from what God directed among the Jews in several Cases, which is shown to have been conformable thereto. An Objection from the supposed unreasonableness of a Man's accusing himself, proposed, and answered. The reasonableness of exacting an Oath of the Accused Party, evidenced from several Topics and particularly from the impossibility there sometimes is of the Magistrates doing Justice without it. The Cases of Life and Limb to be excepted, and why. Of the Obligation of Oaths, and what that Obligation is, both in Assertory and Promissory ones. That an Oath obligeth even where drawn from Men by false and deceitful Stories, where it is to the Swearers disadvantage, or extorted by Threats and Violence. If an Oath oblige not, it is for the most part from the inability of the Sweater, or the undueness of the Matter; that is to say, when it is either impossible, or unlawful to be performed.  
HAVING shown it to be lawful for the Magistrate to exact an Oath; and moreover, that in many Cases it is necessary for him to do it; ●nquire we, in the next place,  
IU. Whether he may require an Oath of the Accused Party? which may seem to have more of difficulty in it; because, by means of that, a Man may be obliged to be his own Accuser; which may seem contrary to each Man's Natural Liberty. For the resolution whereof, I will proceed in this Method.  

1. I will show what God himself directed among the Jews.  
2. Examine the Grounds upon which the Negative is founded.  
3. Produce the Reasons of exacting an Oath of the Accused Party. And,  
4. And lastly, Declare in what Cases it may be done.   
1. If Men were always as willing to be regulated by the Scriptures, as they do for the most part profess themselves to be, there would not long be any doubt, whether it were lawful for the Magistrate to exact an Oath that may condemn the Party that gives it: For there are two Instances wherein God expressly requires the giving of an Oath to the Accused Party; the first whereof is, where the Accused Party hath any Goods committed to his Custody; the second, where there is a suspicion of Falsehood in a Wife. For thus, Exod. 22.10, 11. If a man deliver unto his neighbour an ass, or an ox, or a sheep, or any beast to keep, and it die, or be hurt, or driven away, no man seeing it; then (saith the Text) shall an Oath of the Lord be between them both, that he hath not put his hands unto his neighbour's goods, and the owner thereof shall accept of it, and he shall not make it good. In like manner, Numb. 5.18, 19 if a Man had a suspicion of his Wife's dishonesty, and accordingly brought her before the Priest for Judgement, it is commanded, that the Priest shall charge her with an Oath concerning that whereof she is suspected. And though there be not the like Evidence concerning any other Crimes, wherein the Oath of the Accused Party might be requisite; yet, as it is apparent enough from Levit. 6.2, 3. that an Oath might be exacted also, where there was a suspicion of dealing deceitfully in Fellowship, or of violent taking away, or deceit, or concealing what a Man had found, all these being there joined with a Man's lying unto his Neighbour in that which is delivered him to keep, and an Oath supposed to have passed concerning them: so it appears highly probable, from 1 Kings 8.31. That it was lawful to exact an Oath of the Accused Party, in any Difference between Man and Man; that place not only supposing the laying of an Oath upon the Accused Party, but supposing also (because expressing it in those indefinite Terms, If any man trespass against his brother) in any Crime whatsoever. However it be, most certain it is, from the forequoted places in Leviticus, that an Oath might be laid upon a suspected Party in Matters of Estate; which is as much, I think, as is ordinarily claimed by any Magistrate: and if so, so far at least it may be lawful to lay an Oath upon the Accused Party, whatever Pretence there is from men's Natural Liberty. For, though (as was before observed) the Judicial Law, of which that was a part, be not of present Obligation; yet being a Law of Gods making, it cannot be supposed to contain any thing in it, that is contrary to the Law of Reason and Nature.  
2. From what God directed among the Jews in this Affair, pass we to the Grounds whereupon it is pretended to be unlawful to exact an Oath of the Accused Party; which (as was before insinuated) is its seeming contrariety to each Man's Natural Liberty, to be obliged to accuse himself. In answer to which, I say, 1. That though, as it may happen, a Man may by such an Oath be obliged to accuse himself; yet if he be innocent, he may have an opportunity thereby to clear his own Innocency to the World, and so advantage, in stead of condemning himself. I say, 2. That whatsoever is pretended concerning men's Natural Liberty, yet is it not to be understood to reach any further than is consistent with the Rules of Government. For, as no Man can be born any other than a Subject, because by his very Birth obliged to be so to those from whom he received his Being; so God himself, to whom we are certainly Subjects, hath appointed Governors over us, and commanded us to be subject to them. Whatsoever Liberty therefore we have, it must be supposed to be limited by the necessary Ends of that Government to which he hath commanded us to be subject. If then the Ends of Government do sometime require the administering of such an Oath, the Pretence of Natural Liberty can be no Plea against it, because by the Command of God subjected to the other. And this Particular will minister to me a fair entrance into  
3. The reasonableness of exacting an Oath of the Accused Party; which is the third thing proposed to be enquired into. Which I shall ground upon the impossibility of the Magistrates doing Justice sometimes, where such an Oath as we are now speaking of, is not administered. For it often happening, through the cunning of those we deal with, that proof cannot be made of their deceitful dealing with us; either it shall be lawful for them to keep that which they have deceitfully gotten, which is against the Rules of Justice and Equity; or, the Magistrate must have a Power to administer an Oath to the suspected Party, concerning that which he is supposed to have unjustly gotten. Which whosoever shall seriously consider, will not be very forward to think it unreasonable to put a Man sometimes upon the accusing of himself. For as hard as it may be, and contrary to his supposed Liberty; it may seem much more hard, and more contrary to the Liberties of us all, that Men, for the close carriage of their Injustice, should go away with the Properties of other Men, and there be no Judiciary Course to retrieve it from them. The Pretence of Natural Liberty will appear yet more vain, if we consider, that all Men are liable to have the same Oaths exacted of them: For, inasmuch as I have the privilege of laying an Oath upon other Men, as they have upon me in any thing I am suspected of; though such an Oath be prejudicial to me, yet it may be compensated to me upon other Men, with whom I have occasion to deal. Add hereunto (which is of great consideration, unless a liberty to sin may be reckoned among our Natural Liberties) That as through the fear of such an Oath I may be restrained from unjust dealing, lest I be afterwards obliged to make my own Mouth witness against me; so I may be obliged, by the taking of it, to make confession of my Sin, and make satisfaction for it to my Neighbour and the World; which, without the obligation of such an Oath, it is probable I should never have done, and thereby have shut myself out from the Pardon of the Almighty.  
4. It having been thus demonstrated, That it is not unlawful for a Magistrate to take an Oath of the Accused Party, concerning that of which he is so accused; it remains only that I inquire, in what Cases it may be done; which is the fourth thing proposed to be discoursed of. Now, for that, nothing, I think, can be said with more Reason and Judgement, than is by the Reverend Person ; and that is, That it be administered only in such Cases where the Crime which it is designed to detect, do not lay a Man open to Death, or loss of Limb. Not perhaps because it is utterly unlawful in such Cases (for what shall we then say of the Oath wherewith the Woman suspected of Adultery was charged, together with the Water of Jealousy she was made to drink?) but, 1. For the Oath of God's sake, which by being administered in such Cases, is in great danger of being violated. For, since Life and Limb, but Life especially, is so dear to us, that, as the Devil told the Almighty, a Man will part with all to preserve it; there is just reason to suspect, if Men were put to their Oaths in such Cases, they would forswear themselves, and thereby offer an affront to the Oath of God, which ought as much as may be to be preserved inviolate. There is as much reason, secondly, for the not administering it in the forementioned Cases, because of its ineffectualness to attain the End which is designed by it. For the End of such an Oath being the discovery of that Crime, which he to whom it is tendered is suspected to be guilty of, it can hardly escape the imputation of a Sin, to tender it there, where in all probability he to whom it is so tendered will forswear himself, rather than expose himself to so great a severity. But as (setting aside these Cases, where there is danger of Life or Limb, or if there be any other of equal consideration with it) there appears not the least reason why an Oath should not be administered to the suspected Party; so there is less exception against our Courts of Judicature, where such Oaths are in use: because as the Complainant has the liberty of laying an Oath upon the Defendant, so the Defendant has Power to interrogate the other upon the same Sacred Tie.  
V I am now arrived at my last Particular concerning Oaths, to wit, the Obligation of them; where, first of all, I shall show, that they induce an Obligation; and then, what that Obligation is. That they induce an Obligation or Tie to the performance of something, the Prophet Moses shows, in the thirtieth Chapter of Numbers; where we have not only an Oath frequently styled by the Name of a bond, but the design thereof, vers. 3. said to be to bind the soul with a bond. The only difficulty is, to what they do oblige or bind us; which is different according to the different sorts of Oaths, which (as hath been before insinuated) are either Assertory, or Promissory. Assertory Oaths are such as are given to attest the Truth of any thing, that is either past or present. Now the Obligation which those induce, is, That what is so sworn to, be agreeable to the mind of him that utters them; by virtue whereof, not only all false Oaths are proscribed, but all Oaths which pretend to assert that which we swear to, with any greater degree of certainty than we ourselves are persuaded of. Thus, for example, if a Man should swear peremptorily to the truth of any thing which he is only probably persuaded of, in this case his Oath would be sinful, because his Words carry a greater certainty in them, than is in the Conscience of him that swears to it. When therefore we give an Oath of this nature, care would be taken, not only that the thing we sear to, appear to us to be true; but that it appear to us in that degree of assurance, with which it is affirmed by us: For otherwise our Affirmation must be concluded to be false, and consequently (which is evidence enough of the criminalness thereof) that God Almighty is called to witness to a Lie. And though, as I shall afterward show, those Oaths which we call Promissory ones, by reason of the Matter about which they are conversant, have a particular obligation; yet they also have this common with Assertory Oaths, that they oblige those who swear, to take care that their Words be agreeable to their Thoughts, that is to say, that they do not swear to do any thing, but what they have at that time an intention to perform. For, though the thing they swear to perform be somewhat future, yet the immediate Object of their Oath is their present Resolution to perform it; and consequently, if they will free their Oath from Falsehood, at that instant to resolve upon, what they swear in due time to perform.  
To go on now to show the Obligation that is peculiar to Promissory Oaths, or such Oaths as are affixed to a Promise; which, if Reason itself did not teach us, we might learn from the Scripture, to be no other than the performing of what we so swear to. For thus, Num. 30.3. it is the express Commandment of the Almighty, That if any man vow a vow unto the Lord, or swear an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his word, he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth. Which is so true, that it holds even where the Oath was drawn from us by false or deceitful Stories; where the thing sworn to, is to the disadvantage of him that swears; or lastly, where the Oath is extorted by Threats and violence. For thus,  
1. When Joshua and the Israelites had given their Oath to the Gibeonites, That they should be suffered to live among them; notwithstanding they who induced them to take it, drew it from them by false and crafty Pretences, yet the Sentence of the Princes of the Congregation was, That they might not touch them, because they had sworn to let them live, Josh. 9.19. Neither was this a causeless Scruple of Joshua, and other the Princes of the Congregation, (though who can easily think those Men guilty of any such, who were the most eminent for Knowledge and Authority among them?) for when, many years after, Saul slew the Race of those Gibeonites, with whom the Oath of the Lord had passed, God was so displeased with the whole Nation for it, that he visited it with a three years' Famine; neither would he be entreated for the Land, till David had delivered up seven of Saul's Sons to the Gibeonites, to be by them hanged up unto the Lord, 2 Sam. 12. ver. 1. and so on. This only would be added, That what we have said of an Oath drawn from us by Craft, be understood to hold only, where that in which we are imposed upon, is not expressed as the Ground of our Oath: For, if that in which we are imposed upon be expressed as the Ground of our Oath, there is no doubt that an Oath so drawn from us doth not oblige. Thus, to instance in the former Example, though the Israelites were bound by their Oath to the Gibeonites, although they were no Foreigners as they pretended, because the supposition of their being such, was not expressed as the Ground of their League; but the thing, hand over head, taken for granted: yet, if the same Israelites had made a League with them under the Name of Foreigners, in that case there is no doubt (because that was expressly the Ground of their League) that the Oath given by them had not obliged them: For the Oath being given to them as Foreigners, could not in reason be construed to relate to any but Foreigners, and consequently, not to advantage the Gibeonites, when it appeared they lived among them. For the further evidencing whereof, I will instance in a Case which is produced by a Learned Casuist 
* Sanders. de Juram. obligat. Praelect. 4. Sect. 13.  of our own, though by him somewhat otherwise explained. For suppose (saith he) that a Man should swear to a certain Person, under the Name of Titia, that he would marry her, supposing her to be Titia, when indeed she was not: In this Case the Oath would not oblige him, because the supposition of her being Titia was expressly the Ground of what he swore. Which Resolution will appear yet more clear, if we do farther suppose, that the true Titia should upon that Oath of his claim him for her Husband. For, as the Laws of God and Man forbidden him the marrying of them both; so there is more reason she should have the Benefit of his Oath, who was the Person expressed in it, than she who had no other concernment in it, than as supposed to be the Person. In this case therefore, that is, where that wherein we are imposed upon is expressly the Ground of our Oath, an Oath drawn from us by deceit obliges not: but otherwise, as the Instance of the Gibeonites shows, it ought to be held as Sacred, and we to do whatsoever proceedeth out of our mouth.  
2. Again, As an Oath obligeth, unless in the former Case, where it is drawn from us by the Craft of him we swear to; so it obligeth also, though the Matter thereof should prove prejudicial to him that taketh it: the Prophet David reckoning it among the Characters of him that shall abide in God's Tabernacle, That he sweareth to his own hurt, and changeth not, Psal. 50.4.  
3. Lastly, As neither the Craft of him we deal with can generally rescind an Oath, nor yet the Disadvantage that comes to ourselves by it; so neither, thirdly, the Violence of those Persons that forced it from us: as for example, the Threats of Thiefs or Pirates, who have, it may be, compelled us to make Oath of paying them such a Sum of Money for our Ransom. For, as it is evident from the Psalmist, That it is the Office of a Good Man not to change, though he swear to his own hurt; and consequently, an Oath given to a Thief or Pirate not to be rescinded upon that account: so there is no reason it should be upon the account of the Swearers unvoluntariness, which is that which is most stood upon in this Case: For though we would not have so sworn, if we could have helped it; and consequently, our Oath was not perfectly voluntary: 
Sanders. de Juram. oblige. Praelect. 4. sect. 16.  yet being under a fear of Death or Bondage from them, we chose to oblige ourselves, and therefore so far willed to be obliged. Now, having willed our own Obligation, what should hinder us from performing it, and doing that which we not only promised, but called God to witness we meant, and would perform? And indeed, though some Men, consulting more their own Profit, than the Sacredness of an Oath, have made light of those Oaths, when they have delivered themselves; yet if they would more attentively consider it, they would not be very forward to excuse themselves, for not performing even such an extorted Oath. For, I demand of any such, Whether, to deliver himself from Thiefs or Pirates, he doth not think it lawful to make Oath of paying such a Sum of Money for his Ransom? If he saith he doth, (as I know not any that thinks or says otherwise) he saith that which will conclude him guilty of Perjury, if he violate it: For, whatsoever it is lawful to swear, rebus sic stantibus, it is necessary to perform; because an Oath, in the nature of it, is a Tie to that to which it is affixed. Generally speaking therefore, as it is in the Place of Number's before-quoted, If a man swear an Oath to bind his soul with a bond, he ought not to break his word, but to do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth. If an Oath at any time oblige not, it is for the most part through 

1. The inability of the Taker: or,  
2. The undueness of the Matter.    
1. Thus, to instance in the first; If the Person swearing be under the Power of another, the Law is express, That it shall be in the Power of those to whom they are subject, to rescind that Oath which they have made. For, if (saith the Scripture, Numb. 30.3. and so on) a daughter shall vow a vow, and bind herself by a bond, being in her father's house in her youth; if her father disallow her in the day that he heareth it, none of her vows or bonds shall stand. The same is afterward affirmed, if a husband disallow that of his wife: And how much more then, if a Prince (whose Authority is certainly far greater than that of a Father or a Husband) shall disallow the Oath of his Subjects, especially in Matters relating to the Public. Which makes it strange, that the Solemn League and Covenant should be pretended to oblige, which was so early and so hearty disallowed by the late King, that most indulgent Father and Husband of his Country.  
2. From the inability of the Taker, pass we to the Undueness of the Matter: Where again there are these two things to take off the Obligation of an Oath.  

1. The Impossibility: And,  
2. The Unlawfulness thereof.   
1. Thus, for example, in the former Instance; If a Man should swear to pay a certain Sum of Money at a time appointed; if he neither have, nor can procure such a Sum, there is no doubt his Oath obligeth not thereto, so long as that Impossiblity continueth: It being an undoubted Principle of Reason, 
Impossibilium mulla obligatio est. Leg. 185. tit. de Reg. Juris.  That there can be no Obligation to that which it is impossible to perform. Care only would be taken, that as we make not Oath of such things as appear then impossible (for so we should be found to take God's Name in vain in the strict and literal sense) so also that the thing sworn to, prove not impossible through our neglect (for then it will oblige to Punishment) and that if it be not utterly impossible, we perform so much of it as is possible to us. For, since the only Reason of the Obligations ceasing, 
Sanderson. de Juramenti Oblige. Praelect. 2. sect. 12.  is the Impossibility of the Thing; it must consequently cease only so far as the Thing sworn to is impossible, and therefore also continue in full force, as to what is possible to be done. Again,  
2. In the second Instance, If a Man should swear to do a thing which is unlawful, either by God's Law or Man's, such as was that Oath of David, that before the morning light he would cut off from Nabal every one that pissed against the wall: In that Case, I say, there is no doubt that the Oath obligeth not, save to a due Repentance for it. And accordingly we find David not only not performing it, but blessing God for diverting him from it, 1 Sam. 25.32. Now the reason why such Oaths are not binding, is, because the Party, at such time as he swore, 
See sanderson's Case of a Rash Vow deliberately iterated. p. 65, etc.  lay under a former Obligation to the contrary: By which means the Party swearing was divested of all Power to it; and consequently, till freed from the former, could not by any Oaths whatsoever bind himself to the performance of it. He might indeed (as we see Men too often do) swear to act contrary to it; he might lay all the Curses of God upon himself, for the performance of what he swore: but as such Oaths are unlawful to be taken, so they bind not where they are, because prevented by a contrary and far greater Bond. Besides, it being impossible to be at the same time bound to contrary things; if he who swore the performance of any thing sinful, should be obliged to it, he must consequently be supposed to be freed from his former Tie to those Laws which he swore to act contrary to. But by this means we might cassate all our Obligations to the Almighty, and, provided we would so swear, be at liberty, or rather obliged, to follow our own Lusts and sinful Inclinations as our God. But because the late Reverend Bishop Sanderson hath said all that is necessary to be said upon the matter of a Promissory Oath, in his Book of the Obligation of Oaths, I will remit those who shall desire further satisfaction, to his learned and accurate Labours. It shall suffice me to admonish you, That the Non-performance of your Oaths is most properly to take God's Name in vain.   

PART IU.  
The affinity of a Vow with an Oath. What a Vow is, and what the proper Matter of it. Things under Command the Matter of a Vow, as well as those which are left free. That the Thing Vowed aught to be something morally good, or conducing to it; and not either trifling, or sinful, or what exposeth to it. That it is at least behoveful that the Thing Vowed have some cognation with that Blessing in consideration whereof it is made. That Vows are not only lawful, but sometime necessary to be made; both because a Part of Natural and Evangelical Worship, and because we stand in need of them. That the Persons who Vow be of Years of Discretion; that they come to it with due deliberation; and that God's Glory, and not the gratifying of a discontented Humour, be the Motive which draweth them to it. Of the Obligation of Vows, and particularly to a Single Life.  
VI AS a Vow, whereof we are in the next place to entreat, is near of kin to an Oath, in respect of the Obligation which it induceth; so it serves equally to hollow or profane that Name of God, which here we are forbidden to take in vain. Reason would therefore, before we leave this Third Commandment, that we should afford it a place in our Discourse, and, if not allow it a just handling, (which my designed brevity will hardly permit) yet show so much concerning it, as is generally necessary to be known. In order whereunto, I will proceed in this method.  

1. I will show in the general, what a Vow is.  
2. Inquire into the proper Matter of it.  
3. Demonstrate our own Obligation sometime to make Vows.  
4. Describe the due Qualifications of the Maker.  
5. The Obligation they induce, when made. And,  
6. Lastly, Show what Vows are here forbidden.   
1. Now a Vow (as was before insinuated) is, in the general, nothing else than a Promise to God of the performance of something on our part, either to obtain some Blessing of him (which is for the most part the ground of it) or in acknowledgement of some already received. I call it a Promise, for so indeed it is properly, and in the common acception of the Word; though sometimes, abusively, the Word Vow signifies no other than a strong Asseveration of what we affirm: And, a Promise to God, wherein indeed the very Formality of it consists, and by which it is distinguished both from a Promise to Man, and from an Oath; the former, unless improperly, having only the Title of a Promise; the latter, even an Oath, citing God only as a Witness to what is transacted between us and other Men: whereas in a Vow we transact with God as with a Party. The only thing remaining to be explained, is the End of a Vow, said before to be most commonly to obtain some Blessing of the Almighty, or in acknowledgement of some we have received. Of the former of these, we have not only the Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for a Witness, which signifies equally a Prayer and a Vow; but also the most, if not all those Vows which we meet with in the Old Testament. For thus, Gen. 28.20. we find Jacob vowing a Vow, and saying, If God will be with me, and will keep me in the way that I go, and will give me bread to eat, and raiment to put on, so that I come again in peace; Then shall the Lord be my God, and this stone which I have set up for a pillar, shall be God's house; and of all that thou shalt give me, I will surely give the tenth unto thee. Of the same nature is that Vow of the Israelites, concerning the destruction of the Canaanites, Numb. 21.2. as, in like manner, that of Hannah, concerning the dedicating unto the Lord that Child which should be born to her, 1 Sam. 1.11. the former being upon condition of God's delivering the Canaanites into their hands; the other, upon God's giving her a Manchild. Again, As a Vow may be made to obtain some Blessing of the Lord; so also, in acknowledgement of some already received; to wit, when it is not in the power of him who makes it, to make that return of Gratitude to God, which it is no less his desire than duty to perform: For otherwise, no doubt the receipt of a Blessing is a more proper ground of paying our Vows, than of making any such unto the Lord.  
2. The Nature of a Vow being thus explained in the general, pass we to a more particular Explication; which will best be performed by enquiring into the Matter of it, the second thing proposed to be discoursed of. For the resolution whereof,  
1. The first thing I shall offer, is, That things under command, no less than those that are not, are a proper matter for our Vows. For though those things which are under command, do oblige us by being so, and consequently may seem no way proper to be the matter of a Vow: yet as nothing hinders, but one Bond may be added to another, whence it is that we see Positive Laws every day made for the observation of that which was before commanded by the Law of Nature; so the superinducing of a Vow binds it so much the faster upon our Consciences, and therefore a thing under Command no way improper for the matter of a Vow. Again, though a Command oblige to the performance of what it doth so; yet inasmuch as it takes not away our Natural Liberty of acting contrary to it, it may seem but reasonable, the more to oblige us to Obedience, to add to it the Bond of a Vow, and tie ourselves by Promise to what we are otherwise obliged to perform.  
Now the Matter of such a Vow is again double, that is to say, General or Particular; or (to speak yet more plainly) Obedience to the whole Law of God, or only to some Particular one. Of the former sort is, first, the Vow of Baptism, whereby we oblige ourselves to the whole Duty of Man: For, as this is actually done by all that are initiated into Christianity, at least where Baptism is rightly administered; so, that it is the Design of Baptism itself, is evident from St. Peter, who entitles it the Answer 
* 1 Pet. 3.21. , or rather Stipulation of a good Conscience toward God. Of the same nature is, secondly, (as I shall afterward show more largely) that other Sacrament of the Supper of our Lord. And accordingly, as for this Reason both the one and the other have the name of a Sacrament, which in the proper acception of the Word is no other than a Military Oath, whereby Soldiers bound themselves to their General; so, that it was really looked upon as such, or rather as a Vow to God, to whom they so obliged themselves, is evident from that Account which Pliny 
* Li. 10. ep 97.  gave to Trajan, of what was done in the Meetings of the Christians: Where, among other things, he tells him, That he had been informed by some of them, that when they met together, they obliged themselves by a Sacrament, not to perpetrate any Villainy; but, that they would not commit Thefts, Robberies, or Adultery; that they would not falsisie their Trust, nor, when examined, deny any thing that had been deposited with them. Which Passage, as it is a manifest evidence of their making such general Vows; so also, that it was their Design in the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper: the Word Sacrament not only so persuading, but the Celebration of the Lord's Supper being always an Attendant of their Public Service, and the no mention there is in Ecclesiastical Story, of any other such general Vow in it. Again, As a Vow may have the whole Law of God for its Object, so also some particular one: And is not unusual with good Men, when they find themselves pressed with the Conscience of some particular Sin committed by them; in order to the appeasing of God's wrath, and the security of their own Souls, binding themselves with a Vow to the avoiding of it, and practising the contrary Virtues.  
2. Having thus shown a thing under Command to be no less the Matter of a Vow, than that which is not enjoined by any; for the further explication thereof, I shall add, secondly, That it ought to be something morally good, or conducing to it. For, the Design of a Vow being to please God, to whom all Vows are directed, that can be no proper Matter of a Vow, which is not morally good, or conducing to the promoting of it. But from hence it will follow, first, That we ought not to make Vows of any thing sinful, such as was that of Jeptha, who bond himself by a Vow to offer up to God whatsoever came forth of the Doors of his House to meet him, Judg. 11.31. This being in effect to promise we will break his Laws, which is certainly a very improper way to please him, or obtain any Blessing at his Hand. It will follow, secondly, That we ought not to make a Vow of any thing that may expose us to the Commission of a Sin: Of which nature, in particular, is the Vow of Single Life, especially in younger Persons: For so doing, they vow that which may expose them to the danger of Fornication without remedy, which is certainly no proper way to please God, when he himself hath appointed Marriage for it, and obliged those that cannot contain, to enter into it. Lastly, it will follow, That we ought not to make Vows of any thing light or trifling, such as are 
* See Balduin. de Casib Consc. lib. 2. c. 8. cas. 4.  the Vows of not eating the Heads of any Animal, in honour of John the Baptist; or, of abstaining from broiled Flesh, in respect to St. Laurence, who was so used. For beside that such things as these are not much conducing to Piety, they are too light to become the Matter of a Vow, and involve the Maker of them in the taking God's Name in vain, which is the very thing forbidden in this Commandment.  
3. Thirdly and lastly, As the Matter of a Vow ought to be something good, or conducing to it; so it is highly expedient at least, that it should have some relation to that Blessing, in consideration whereof we make it. For thus we find Hannah vowing, That if God would give her a Man child, she would dedicate, not some of her Possessions, or it may be of her Servants, but that very Child, unto the Lord: as, in like manner, Jacob, That if God would be with him, and give him bread to eat, and raiment to put on, and in fine bring him back to his father's house in peace and prosperity, he would, out of the Plenty which God should afford, build a Temple to his Honour, and moreover give the tenth of all to him. Both which Vows, as they had very eminent Persons for their Authors, and such whose Example alone might invite us to the imitation of them; so they have this farther to commend them, that they are more clearly expressive of our intended Gratitude to the Almighty, because obliging the Parties vowing to make that very Blessing, in consideration whereof they are made, to become a Testimony of their Thankfulness unto God.  
3. But lest all that hath or shall be said concerning Vows, should fall under the censure of Impertinence, as there is no doubt it would justly, if Christians had no concernment in them; I will now, according to my proposed Method, demonstrate our own Obligation to the making of them. In Order whereunto, I shall show them, 

1. To be a Part of Natural Worship; and,  
2. Of the Evangelical one.    
That they are a part of Natural Worship, is evident, first, from the Nature of a Vow, according as before described. For it being but reasonable we should do what in us lies toward the pleasing of him from whom we either expect, or have received any signal Favour; it is no less reasonable, if we are not at present in a capacity to do it, that we should go so far towards it, as to oblige ourselves by Promise to the performance of it; he that cannot do all he would, being to do what he can, or at least express a readiness to perform it. Which as it is best done by a Vow or Promise, because that leaves no place for the omission of it; so that Vow or Promise goes a great way toward the pleasing of the Almighty, because consigning the Will of the Vower, which is that God looks chief after, to the Will and Pleasure of him to whom it is made. Again, Forasmuch as a Vow supposeth him to whom it is made, to be conscious to our Wants, and the Author of those Blessings in consideration whereof we make them; what should hinder us, or rather how can we excuse ourselves from giving God this Testimony of our Adoration, and vowing what may be acceptable to him? The same is no less evident from the Scripture, which not only joins it with Prayer and Praise, but opposeth it to Ceremonial Worship, as you may see Psalm 50.8. and so on; where having at large decried the Offerings of the Law, in the fourteenth Verse of that Psalm, the Psalmist calls upon Men, instead of that, to offer unto God thanks giving, and pay their vows unto the most High. Which Passage is so much the more to be remarked, because it affords us a Proof not only of Vows being a part of Natural Worship, but also of the Evangelical one. 
Mede Serm on Psal. 50.14.  For if (as Mr. Mede shows) that Psalm be also a Prophecy of the Times of the Gospel, and the Service which should be offered up in them, the making of Vows is properly and strictly Evangelical, and the first Service (as St. Paul speaks in a like Case) taken away, that the second might be the more firmly established. Neither will it avail aught to say, That that is not to be thought Evangelical, of which there is not the least mention in the Gospel: For as the great Design of the Gospel was to re-establish Natural Worship, and free it from those Encumbrances wherewith the Ceremonial Law had clogged it; so the Nature of Vows was so well known, both from Reason, and the Scriptures of the Old Testament, as not to need to be insisted on by the New: Upon which account also it is, that we find so little therein concerning Oaths, unless it be as to the sparing use of them. Beside, when (as was before insinuated) the Sacraments of Baptism and the Lords Supper are on our part Vows of Obedience unto God; when we are initiated into, and confirmed in our Religion by them; when the Law and the Prophets speak much and often concerning Vows, and our Religion professeth to establish all that is not Ceremonial in them; lastly, when we ourselves stand in need of Vows to confirm our wavering Minds, and establish us in that Course of Life we have undertaken; what can be more apparent, than that we should vow Obedience to God's Commands, and the use or forbearance of all such Means as are apt either to promote or hinder it? And who knows whether the omission of this be not one principal Cause why oftentimes we speed no better in our Requests? For though we are importunate enough in ask, we are more than cold enough in promising any Returns of Gratitude, if ever it should please God to grant the Petitions we ask of him.  
4. Having thus shown our own Obligation to the making of Vows, proceed we, according to our proposed Method, to the Qualification of those that make them, the next thing proposed to be discoursed of. Where first I shall reckon as a necessary Qualification in those that make them, That they be of years of discretion. For a Vow being a matter of importance, and so much the more, because it is transacted between us and God; they are in reason to abstain from the making of them, who, by reason of their want of Discretion, understand not the Nature of it, nor the Obligation which it induceth; lest haply, in stead of honouring God thereby, they dishonour his Sacred Name, by vowing such things as are either no fit Matter for them, or such as afterwards they will not care to perform. The same Reason will infer, That as the Persons that vow should be of Years of Discretion, so those that are, should come to the making of them with all requisite consideration; it being all one, as to the purposes of Religion, to be without Discretion, and not to make use of it. Lastly, A Vow (as hath been before shown) being an Act of Religion, and a part of God's Worship and Service; they that vow, are to take care that God's Glory be their End in making them, and not, as it too often happens, the gratifying of their own peevishness and discontent: A thing not unusual with the Papists, whom the loss of a Mistress, the disappointment of a Place, or other such like Cause, is the chief, and sometimes only Motive, to vow a Religious Life. Which said, I should now  
5. Proceed to the Obligation of them, as I did before in the matter of Oaths. But because the Prophet Moses hath delivered the same Rules concerning the Obligation of them both; and because what I have before said, concerning the Obligation of Oaths, may without any the least violence be accommodated to the Obligation of the other; I will content myself with the proposing one only Case concerning Vows, which will find no Resolution from what was there said: And that is, Whether or no a Man having made a Vow of Single Life, be not obliged to the keeping of it? For though (as was before said) the making of such Vows be generally unlawful; yet it follows not from thence, that they may be broke when made; because many things which ought not to be done, are yet of force when they are. For the resolution whereof, the first thing I shall offer is, That there is no doubt such a Vow obligeth those to the keeping of it, who (as the Apostle speaks) have power over their own Bodies. For a Single Life being not only lawful in itself, but, where it is preserved inviolate, a great opportunity of Religion; there is no doubt, a Vow concerning it is so far from being null, that in that Case it ought to be Religiously observed. But from hence it will follow, secondly, That he who hath so vowed, aught to use all means possible to keep to that State which he hath so vowed. For if (as the Prophet Moses instructs us) we are generally to do whatsoever proceedeth out of our mouth, we are in reason to make use of all requisite Means to enable us to the performance of it; he that is obliged to the End, being ipso facto obliged to the Means, because there is no attaining the End without them. Neither will it suffice to say (as perhaps it may be) That a Single Life hath Temptations attending it, and therefore rather to be discarded, than continued in: For inasmuch as there is no State or Thing which is without them, if for that reason our Vow might be rescinded, no Vow at all could oblige, because there is nothing in the World which may not expose us to Temptations. If there be any thing which may rescind such a Vow, it must be some imminent danger of falling into Sin, notwithstanding all our Endeavours to the contrary: And in this Case, there is no doubt a Vow so made aught to be broken, with how much deliberation soever made: he that forbids us a Sin, consequently forbidding all those things which fatally incline us to the commission of it. Care only would be taken, that Men pretend not imminent danger, when in truth that is not the thing that moves them, but the gratifying of their own Carnal Appetites: For, generally speaking, Whosoever vows a vow, to bind his soul with a bond, aught, for his Vows sake, and the Honour of him to whom it is made, to do whatsoever proceedeth out of his mouth.  
6. Having thus shown all that concerns the Affirmative part of the Precept, as to the Making and Observation of Vows, nothing remains to the completing of my Discourse concerning them, but that I descend to the Negative, and point out those Vows that are forbidden. A Task which as I have in part already discharged, so I am now qualified to complete, because having before shown what is requisite to make them lawful. For if (as was shown in my second Inquiry) the Matter of a Vow ought to be good, or conducing to the promoting of it; those Vows must be unlawful, the Matter whereof is neither: such as are the greatest part of the Vows now made. For what more ordinary, than to vow that we will not come into such a House, or use any Communication with such or such a Person? Things which whether a Man do or no, it matters not as to the Business of Religion, and therefore not to be made the Subject of so Sacred a Tie as a Vow. The same is much more to be said of such a Vow, or Vows, which have something sinful for the Matter of them: that which is sinful, being not only different from the proper Matter of a Vow, but directly contrary to it. Lastly, If (as was observed upon the same Head) the Matter of Vows ought to be weighty and important, those Vows must be concluded to be unlawful, which are made in trifling Instances, and such as for the levity thereof are hardly worthy to be made the matter of a Promise. As if a Man should vow to pair his Nails upon a certain day, or not to take up a Straw that lay in his way. Again, If (as was observed upon the fourth Head) they who vow any thing to God, aught to be of Years of Discretion, and actually employ it when they have; those Vows must be looked upon as unlawful, which are made by Persons before they arrive at it; or rashly, and without consideration, by those that are. Which makes it strange, that the Church of Rome should admit to Vows of Single Life those that have attained to sixteen Years of Age: As if that Age, though not without the use of Reason, were fit to judge what State of Life were profitable for them, and what is possible for them to observe. Lastly, If (as was insinuated in my sixth Head) a Vow be of the same Obligation with an Oath, if it oblige to all that is not impossible or sinful, it must be looked upon as in like manner unlawful to break those Vows we have made, and dishonourable to the Divine Majesty to whom they are: he that thus breaks his Faith to God, supposing him either to have no knowledge of his Perfidiousness, or to be a tame Spectator of the Affronts that are done unto him. The contrary of which, as we are assured of by him, who commands us not to do dishonour to his Name; so it will be much better for us to believe upon his Affirmation, than venture the trial of: For, if God be but just to himself, to be sure he will not hold him guiltless that any way taketh his Name in vain.   

PART V.  
Concerning the Sanction of the present Precept. What the importance of God's not holding a Man guiltless is; and that it implieth not only the punishing him, but punishing him with severity. What appearance there is, both from Reason and History, of God's executing what he hath here denounced; particularly, upon Blasphemers, Common Swearers, Perjured Persons, and the Violators of their Vows. The Conclusion.  
II. IT being certain, that though Laws oblige, yet they prevail little upon the Conscience, where they have nothing but the Authority of the Lawgiver to enforce them; it hath pleased God not only to fortify the Body of his with Threats and Promises, but sometimes also to annex them to particular Precepts; lest haply whilst they are divided among so many, they should prove lauguid and ineffectual, and rather give a weak force to all, than a considerable energy to any one. And accordingly, (to go no further than the Decalogue) as the Second Commandment hath both a Promise and a Threat, and the Fifth a Promise to enforce it; so, that we are now upon, is strengthened with the Threat of God's not holding them guiltless who shall presume to take his Name in vain.  
In the handling whereof, I will proceed in this Method: 

1. I will show what it is not to hold one guiltless: And,  
2. Prove, That God will not hold them such, who any way take his Name in vain.    
1. If the Phrase wherein this Sanction is expressed, were the same in the Original Hebrew, as it is in our own English Translation, our Account of the meaning of it would be then much shorter, than it is now likely to prove. But because though the Hebrew be the same in sense, yet it is somewhat different in Expression from that we have made use of to explain it; it will be requisite, in the first place, to give an account of the Expression there, if it were only to establish the Propriety of our own.  
Now the Hebrew phrase 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or, The Lord will not make him clean, is capable of a double Explication: For it may either refer to that Cleanness which is opposed to the Filth of Sin, or to that Purification which came by the Blood of Sacrifices. And in which sense soever we take it, we shall find it to be much the same with that by which we have chosen to express it. For though our Translation determine it to that Purity or Cleanness which imports a freedom from Gild; yet, as to hold one for clean, or innocent, is the same in sense, because those that are so, are free from the imputation of the other; so, though the Letter of the Hebrew be, The Lord shall not make him clean, yet it may signify no more than the not accounting of him as such; after the same manner that the Word justificare in the Latin, though literally it signify to make righteous, yet in the forinsick and most usual sense, denotes the absolving one from Gild, and not so much the making him righteous, as so esteemed. And indeed, as such a sense is most proper in this place, because the Matter entreated of is the Penalty of a Law; so if we take it in the literal sense, it would hardly pass for a Penalty in the judgement of those whom it was designed to restrain: It being not to be thought, that they who make it their Pastime to take God's Name in vain, would be deterred from so doing, by only telling them, that God will suffer them to go on in it, and not purify them from a Sin in which they so much delight. Forasmuch therefore as the Words Lo Jenakkeh may import the not accounting of the Offender as clean; forasmuch as that sense is the most proper in this place; lastly, forasmuch as the literal one carries nothing at all of dread in it; it is but reasonable we interpret the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Lord will not account of him as clean; which is all one with He will not hold him guiltless. From that first Notion of the Hebrew phrase, pass we to the second, and consider the Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with reference to the Purifications of the Law; with analogy to which, if we understand it, so the meaning will undoubtedly be, That God will not hold such an Offender as a guiltless Person. For it being certain on the one hand, that the Cleansing here spoken of, must refer to the Sin before forbidden; as on the other, that the Design of the Purifications of the Law was not to take away the Sin itself, but the Gild Men contracted by it: to say, The Lord will not cleanse such or such a Person, is as much as, That he will suffer his Gild to rest upon him, and consequently, That he will not hold him guiltless. Which showeth, that though there be some difference between the Hebrew and the English in the Expression, yet they are the same in sense; and consequently, whatsoever is the importance of The Lord will not hold him guiltless, the importance of the other.  
Now there are two things implied in those Words, The Lord will not hold him guiltless.  

1. That God will punish him that taketh his Name in vain: And,  
2. That he will do it with rigour and severity.   
For inasmuch as there is no Mean between Guiltiness and Guilty; inasmuch as Punishment naturally follows the guilty Person; it must needs be, that if God will not hold us guiltless, he will account of us as guilty, and accordingly proceed to punish us. Again, Though those Words will not hold him guiltless, do not necessarily, and of themselves, import any extraordinary severity; yet, as it is not unusual for such Negative Expressions, by a Figure the Rhetoricians call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to signify much more than they seem to intent; so, that that Figure ought to have place here, beside the Consent of Interpreters, is evident from the heinousness of the Sin against which it is denounced, and the little dread it carries in it, if taken in the literal sense. For, who can think God would threaten so great a Crime as Perjury, with a Threat which is common to it with the meanest Offences in the World? Or what likelihood is there, if he had (which yet is the End of all Penalties) that the False Swearer should be thereby deterred from taking God's Name in vain? It being not to be thought, that he who hath the impudence to call God to witness to a Lie, should be much affrighted by only telling him, that God will look upon him as an Offender. How small soever therefore the taking of God's Name in vain may seem, and how mildly soever the Penalty wherewith it is threatened is expressed; the true intent of that Sanction is, That God will severely punish such an Offender, and not only not hold him as a guiltless Person, but as one of the greatest Criminals in the World.  
2. Having thus shown the Importance of the present Penalty, proceed we to the Confirmation of it: For my more advantageous performance whereof, I will apply it to the several Persons whom I have said to take God's Name in vain. Where,  
1. I shall set before you such as speak dishonourably of him, and either attribute to him such Qualities as do no way belong to him, or deny him those that really do. For, that God will not hold such Persons guiltless, may appear, if we consider only the End for which the Tongue was given: For the Tongue being given Man not so much for any other end, as for the glorifying the Maker of it, it must needs be, that God should hold him as highly criminal, who shall turn that Tongue against him, and not only not glorify, but dishonour him therewith. The Threat will appear yet more reasonable and certain, if we apply it to such a Person who shall proceed to downright blasphemy against the Almighty: For beside the enormity of the Crime, we have Instances in the Scripture of God's displeasure against the Authors of it. Thus when the Son of an Israelitish Woman proceeded to so great an Impiety, as to blaspheme the Name of the Lord, he himself was not only stoned to death for it, but a Law thereupon made, That whosoever should offend in like manner, should be put to death, as well the stranger, as he that should be born in the land, Leu. 23.11. and so on. Again, when the King of Assyria sent Rabshakeh to reproach the Living God, as one who could not deliver his People, any more than the Gods of other Nations, God was so displeased with the contumely, that he sent an Angel to destroy his Army, and delivered up the King himself into the hands of his Sons, who slew him, 2 Kings 19.35. and so on.  
2. From blaspheming the Name of God, pass we to the dishonouring it in an Oath, which I have said to be the principal thing forbidden in the Commandment; where again I shall consider those who take it in an Oath vainly and unnecessarily, and then those who cite it to procure credit to a Lie.  
That God will not hold the former of these guiltless, will appear to any who shall consider only the nature of the Crime: For inasmuch as such an Oath is nothing else than the calling God to witness to those Impertinencies to which they are affixed, it must needs be a great temptation to the Almighty to revenge it upon the Authors of it, lest his Name should be contemptible in the World. And indeed, as where it hath otherwise happened, it ought to be imputed to the Mercy of the Almighty, and his willingness that even such Sinners should come to repentance; so God hath not left himself and Name without witness of the dreadfulness of them both, lest any should think him tamely patiented. For thus it is storied, by an Author of good credit 
* The Life of the Duke of Espernon, lib. 4. pag. 190. , concerning one Grillon, a famous Captain in France, and as famous; or rather infamous, for his profaning the Name of God by frequent Swearing; That many years before his death, though he had perfect strength and vigour in all his other Parts, yet he had so great a weakness in his Tongue, that he could not articulate or bring out one word that any Body could understand: God (as that Author remarks) being doubtless pleased by a manifest Judgement to punish him in that Part, which by so many Oaths and Blasphemies had so often offended against his Divine Honour and Holy Name. Which Story is the more to be credited, because the forecited Author relates it from the mouth of that truly Noble Person the Duke of Espernon, who had that Captain long under his Command.  
But leaving the Common Swearer to ruminate upon God's threatening not to hold him guiltless, and upon this and such like Instances of his Judgements upon the Associates of his Crime; let us go on to inquire, how little reason there is for the False Swearer, or perjured Person, to expect to be free. In order whereunto, I will first allege a Parallel, shall I say, or rather much more severe Denunciation of the Almighty, against those who shall thus take his Name in vain. 'Tis in the fifth of Zachary, and the fourth Verse; where speaking of a Roll of Curses, he brings in God threatening that he would cause it to enter into the house of the thief, and into the house of him that sweareth falsely by his Name; as also that it should remain in the midst of the House it did so enter, and consume it with the timber and stones thereof. Than which, what more could be said to express the height of God's displeasure against such Persons, and the certainty of his not holding them guiltless in any measure? For, to be sure he will not hold them such, whom he will not only visit for their Transgression, but bring an utter devastation upon. Agreeable hereto is that of the Oracle in Herodotus, though expressed under another Metaphor.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
That is to say, An Oath has a Child which hath neither Hands nor Feet; howbeit it passeth quickly into the House of the perjured Person, and laying hold of it, destroys his whole Race and it. Neither doth the Event (I speak as for the most part) fall short of what is suggested, either by the one, or the other Oracle: For, as I shall afterward produce from the Scripture remarkable Instances of God's Judgements upon those who have thus violated the Oath of God; so the verification of this Threat was taken notice of, where God was little known, and where therefore one might think God would be less careful to secure the Honour of his Name: Hesiod, and ancient Greek Poet 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , affirming of an Oath, That it doth for the most part destroy those who either swear falsely, or act contrary to it when they have sworn. But because the Scripture, upon which we may most securely rely, is not without eminent proofs of God's displeasure against the perjured Person; setting aside the Proofs which might be brought from Heathen Authors, I will betake me to the Scriptures, and prove from thence, That God doth not hold them guiltless who thus take his Name in vain. And here, in the first place, I shall allege that known Story of the Gibeonites, with whom the Oath of the Lord had passed. For though that Oath had been drawn from the Israelites by the false Pretences of the Gibeonites; though those who had given them that Oath, had now a long time been laid in their Graves, together with those Gibeonites to whom it was, and a new Generation sprung up, which neither knew those Gibeonites, nor their own Ancestors; though what Saul did to them, was out of his Zeal to the Children of Israel and Judah, and not out of any private grudge, or worldly Interest whatsoever; lastly, though that Saul was laid in his Grave also, and, as one therefore might well imagine, his Wickedness and Gild together with him: yet was his Destruction of the Gibeonites, with whose Ancestors the Oath of God had passed, so displeasing to the Divine Majesty, that he visited them with a three years' Famine, neither would he be entreated for the Land, till David had delivered up seven of Saul's Sons to the Gibeonites, to be by them hanged up unto the Lord. All which Circumstances, whosoever shall consider, will not doubt in the least of God's holding him guilty who taketh his Name in vain. For, what question can there be of that, when, to say no more, we see the Gild of it to have descended upon the Children of the perjured Person, yea, to have involved a whole Nation in it? So very great reason is there to interpret the Threat of not holding guiltless, to a sense more severe than the Words do of themselves import: The forementioned Story showing it to be alike, or rather more severe, than the visiting of the Iniquity of the Fathers upon the Children to the third and fourth Generation, with which the former Commandment is enforced. From the Business of the Gibeonites, pass we to a no less famous Instance of God's displeasure against Zedekiah; who after he had given an Oath of Fidelity to the King of Babylon, yet no less impiously than foolishly broke it, by rebelling against him: For, Shall he (saith God by the Prophet Ezekiel) prosper? Shall he escape, that doth such things? or shall he break the Covenant, and be delivered? As I live, saith the Lord God, surely in the place where the King dwelleth that made him King, whose Oath he despised, even with him in Babylon shall he die, Ezek. 17.15, 16. And again, vers. 18. and so on, Seeing he despised the Oath, by breaking the Covenant, (when lo, he had given his hand) and hath done all these things, he shall not escape. Therefore, thus saith the Lord God, As I live, surely mine Oath that he hath despised, and my Covenant that he hath broken, even it will I recompense upon his own head. And I will spread my net upon him, and he shall be taken in my snare, and I will bring him to Babylon, and will plead with him there, for his trespass that he hath trespassed against me. Which accordingly we find to have come to pass: For the same Scripture informs us, That, because Zedekiah rebelled against King Nabuchadnezzar, who had made him swear by God, God brought upon him the Army of the King of Babylon, which took him and brought him to their Master, where he had Judgement given upon him, and after he had had his Sons slain before his Eyes, had those miserable Eyes of his put out, as you may see in Jeremiah, chap. 39 Such was the displeasure of God against King Zedekiah, for violating the Oath of God: And if so, we may be sure God will not hold any Man guiltless that so taketh his Name in vain. The only thing remaining to be proved, is, That God will not hold him guiltless who dishonoureth his Name in a Vow; which accordingly I come now to evince. In order whereunto, I will consider, first, those who make unlawful or trifling Vows; and then, those who violate what they have made.  
That God will not hold him guiltless who sins in Vowing, will manifestly appear, if we reflect upon his displeasure against the Profaner of his Name in an Oath. For inasmuch as a Vow is more Sacred than an Oath, because whilst in the latter God is only cited as a Witness, in a Vow we contract with him as a Party; he who holds the Swearer guilty, must be thought to do so much more to him who profanes his Name in a Vow, and doth not only apply it to a Sin, or to an Impertinence; but, as I may so speak, doth it to his face. The Reason is the same in him who breaks the Vow he hath made, and acts contrary to what he hath most solemnly promised to the Almighty; he that so does, as he contracted with God as with a Party, so falsifying to him directly and immediately, and consequently (because so much the more dishonouring him) the more liable to the severity of his displeasure. And accordingly, when Ananias and Saphira had, agreeably to the Custom of those Times, by a Vow dedicated the Price of their Possessions unto God, God, for a partial breach of that their Vow, inflicted a sudden death upon them, and made them feel the dreadfulness of that Name which they had profaned. So true is that of Solomon 
* Prov. 20.25. , even in the Times of the Gospel, That it is a snare to a man to devour that which is holy, and after vows to make inquiry: The forementioned Offenders having not only been taken in the Snare, but made to feel the Hands of the Fowler. Thus, which way soever Men take the Name of God in vain, they incur the displeasure of the Almighty; and though they are not always immediately punished, yet they are so often enough, to show that God doth not hold any of them guiltless; and that, whom he now spares, he will punish so much the more hereafter, when he comes to render to every Man according to his Works.  
What remains then, but that I admonish, if not for the Sacredness of the Name of God, yet that at least for the security of their own Souls and Persons, Men would not take that Name of his in vain. For if either the Threat of God, or the Exemplifications of it in those that have offended, may be credited, the taking of his Name in vain, however such as to what it is applied to, yet will not be vain as to the Consequences thereof: For, as it shall be with effect, so a very direful one to those who are the Authors of it, They shall not (as they do often with Men) find Commendation and Applause; they shall not be looked upon as so much the better bred, or the greater Wits for it; lastly, they shall not (as they do for the most part here) find an Excuse for their Profanations, and be absolved either from all Offence, or all that is notorious: God, whose Name they take in vain, and who is the most competent Judge of their Actings, having promised, or rather threatened, that he will look upon them under another notion, and not only not hold them guiltless, but look upon them as notorious Offenders. And indeed, thus far the Judgement of the World hath concurred with that of God, as to condemn the taking of it to a Lie; False Swearing and Perjury having not only been branded with reproachful Punishments, but the Authors thereof excluded from giving Testimony in any Courts of Judicature. If other Profanations of God's Name have not found the like Censure, it is not so much because they imagined them specifically different, but because they are not so immediately destructive to Humane Society, which Humane Judicatures are more particularly obliged to preserve. But as that is accidental to the taking of God's Name in vain, or at least makes the Crime to which it adheres only gradually different from the other; so the Judgment-seat of God takes notice of all that entrencheth upon his Honour, and will therefore be sure not to hold them guiltless who any way take his Name in vain.    

THE FOURTH COMMANDMENT.  
THE FOURTH COMMANDMENT.  
Remember that thou keép holy the Sabbath day. Six  shalt thou labour, and do all that thou hast to do; but the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God. In it thou shalt do no manner of work, thou, and thy son, and thy daughter, thy manservant, and thy maid-servant, thy , and the stranger that is within thy gates. For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day; wherefore the Lord blessed the 
* or, Sabbath day.  seventh day, and hallowed it.  

PART I.  
The Contents.  
The general Design of the Fourth Commandment, the setting apart a Portion of our Time for the Worship of God, and particularly for the Public one. The particular Duties, either suh as appertain to the Substance of the Precept, or such as are only Circumstances thereof. Of the former sort are, 1. The Worshipping of God in private, and by ourselves; the Morality whereof is evidenced from the particular Obligation each individual Person hath to the Divine Majesty. 2. The Worshipping of him in consort with others; which is also at large established upon Principles of Nature and Christianity. 3. The setting apart a Time for the more solemn performance of each: As without which, Religious Duties will be either omitted, or carelessly performed; but to be sure no Public Worship can be, because Men cannot know when they shall meet in order to it. 4. Such a Rest from our ordinary Labours, as will give us the leisure to intent them, and free us from distraction in the performance of them.  
BEING now to enter upon the Fourth Commandment, about the Nature whereof there hath been so much Contention in the Church of England, I cannot forbear to say, There is all the reason in the World to believe it to be Moral in the main, as having a place among those Commandments which contain nothing in them which is not confessedly Moral. But because, when we come to understand its general Design and particular Precepts, we shall be much better able to judge whether or no, and how far the Matter thereof is Moral, I will without more ado apply myself to the investigation of them, and show to what Duties it obliged.  
Now the general Design of this Fourth Commandment is, the setting apart a Portion of our Time for the Worship of God, and particularly for the Public one. That it designs the setting apart some Portion of our Time, the very Words of the Commandment show; as not only acquainting us with God's sanctifying a Seventh part, but obliging the Jews, in conformity thereto, to rest from their ordinary Labours and observe it as holy unto the Lord. The only difficulty is, Whether it designs the setting apart of that Time for the Worship of God, and particularly for the Public one. For the proof of the former part whereof, though I cannot say we have the same clearness of Evidence from the Letter of the Commandment itself, yet I shall not scruple to affirm, That it may be inferred from thence by necessary consequence, and not only be proved to be a part of the Precept, but the principal one. For how is that day kept as holy, which hath nothing holy performed in it? Or what reference can it have to God (as the Word holy implies) where God is not at all honoured in it? Neither will it suffice to say, That the very Resting on that day, is of itself a Consecration of it unto God: For as it becomes a Consecration only by the Parties so resting in compliance with the Command and Ends of God; so it supposeth at least, that they should on that day order their Thoughts to him, and rest from their ordinary Labours, in contemplation of his Command, and in remembrance of his resting from that great Work of the Creation. Again, Though to rest from their ordinary Labours, especially as was before understood, were a kind of devoting it unto God; yet there being other and more acceptable ways of keeping it holy, than by a simple Rest from them, it is but reasonable to think, when God cautioned the Jews so to remember it, he designed no less to be honoured other ways. Lastly, Forasmuch as God not only commanded to keep it holy, but in this very Precept represents, it as his own 
* But the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God. , as in Isaiah 
‖ Isa. 58.13. , under the Title of his holy day, and the holy of the Lord; he thereby manifestly implies, that it should be dedicated to his Worship, and not only not be profaned by ordinary Service, but hallowed by his own. For how is it God's Holy day, but by being dedicated to his Service? or how observed as such, but by giving him his proper Service in it? Whence it is, that where the Prophet Isaiah gives it those Eulogies, he infers our honouring him from them, as well as the not pleasuring of ourselves. Though therefore so much be not directly and in terminis expressed, yet it is clearly enough employed, that God designed his own Honour and Service in it, and commanded it to be set apart for the performance of it. Lastly, As God designed the setting apart of a certain Time for his own Worship, so more especially for the Public one: Of which, though there be no Indication in the Commandment itself, yet there is proof sufficient in the 23d Chapter of Levitious, where we find not only the forementioned Rest required, but the day itself appointed for an holy Convocation, as you may see ver. 2. of that Chapter. And accordingly, though the Jews did generally look no farther than the Letter of the Law, and some of them (as is probable here) content themselves with an outward Rest, as by which they thought to satisfy the Commandment; yet the generality of them have in all times looked upon the Service of God as the End for which they were commanded to keep the Sabbath. For thus Josephus, in his second Book against Appion, tells us, 
Thorndike of Religious Assemblies, ch. 2. where this of Josephus, and that of Philo are quoted.  That Moses propounded to the Jews the most excellent and necessary Learning of the Law, not by hearing it once or twice, but every seventh day, laying aside their Works, he commanded them to assemble for the hearing of the Law, and throughly and exactly to learn it. As in like manner Philo, in his Third Book of the Life of Moses, That the Custom was always when occasion gave way, but principally on the seventh day, to be exercised in Knowledge; the Chief going before and teaching, the rest increasing in goodness, and bettering in Life and Manners. I will conclude this Particular with that of St. James, Acts 15.21. where, to fortify his Opinion concerning the prohibiting of Blood to the Gentile Christians, he allegeth for a Reason, That Moses had in old time them that preached him, being read in the Synagogues every Sabbath-day. From all which put together, it is evident, that the Service of God, and particularly the Public one, was the Thing designed in this Commandment. The Jews themselves, who were none of the most quicksighted, being able to discern it; and accordingly, both of old and in latter days, framing their Practice after it.  
The general Design of the Commandment being thus unfolded, proceed we to the Particular Things under Command; which, for my more orderly proceeding in this Affair, I will rank under two Heads, to wit, 

1. Such as appertain to the Substance of the Precept: Or,  
2. Such as are only Circumstances thereof.    
I. Of the former sort again are these four things.  

1. The Worshipping of God in private, and by ourselves.  
2. The Worshipping of him in consort with others.  
3. The setting apart a Time for the more solemn performance of each. And,  
4. Lastly, Such a Rest from our ordinary Labours, as may give us the leisure to intent them, and free us from distraction in the performance of them.   
Now concerning each of these, there cannot be the least doubt of their being Moral, and consequently of Universal Obligation.  
1. That so it is to Worship God in private, the Obligation each of us have to the Divine Majesty, and the Words of the First Commandment show. For being he is the Creator and Sustainer of each Individual, as well as of Humane Nature; being there is no individual Person which hath not some peculiar Obligation to the Divine Majesty, whether in respect of some Blessing received, or Evil averted from him; lastly, being (as was before shown) those Expresses of the Divine Goodness lay a necessity upon the Person that hath received them, to honour the Author of them; it follows, because each individual Person hath been so obliged, that each of them do for himself acknowledge those Obligations, and pay God that Service and Adoration which is due because of them. Again, Forasmuch as the First Commandment doth not only exclude the having of other Gods, but enjoin the having and owning of the True; forasmuch as it requires that of every individual Person, as the expressing it in the Singular Number shows; lastly, forasmuch as the Matter of that Commandment is Moral; it follows, That to worship God in private, and by ourselves, is a Moral Duty: Which was the first thing to be proved.  
2. From the Private Worship of God, or that which is due from each particular Person, pass we to the Worshipping him in Public; which we have before shown to be the Design of this Commandment. Where, first of all, I shall show it to be a Moral Duty; and secondly, a Christian one.  
To worship God in consort with others, being generally looked upon as so much a Duty, that no Sect of Christians, for aught I know, have ever made a question of it, I have often wondered with myself, whence so general a Persuasion should arise, since the New Testament hath said so little by way of Precept concerning it: But considering with myself, that the same Persuasion hath prevailed wherever the Worship of God hath taken place, I entered into a suspicion, that the same Common Principles had been the Author of it in both, even those which Reason and Nature teacheth. And indeed, that there is enough in them to oblige Men to a Public Worship, will appear to any that shall consider, 1. Not only that God hath made Man a Sociable Creature, but that Men have actually entered themselves into Societies. For as it was but reasonable, that those whom God had made Sociable Creatures, should, in return for so great a Blessing, give a proof of it in his Service, and with joint Forces worship him, who had both inclined and fitted them so to associate; so, actually entering into Societies, they thereby became Sharers of the good or evil Fortune of those respective Societies which they espoused. In consideration whereof, as they were obliged either to pray or give thanks, according to the several Fortunes which befell them; so, to do both those Duties, not only apart and by themselves, but in conjunction with those to whom they were so associated; common Sense requiring, that where the Blessing obtained relates to any Body, that Body to which it so relates should pay its Thanks for it; as on the other side, that where the Evil either threatened or undergone, relates to a Community, that that Community to which it doth so, should offer up its joint Prayers to God to avert that Evil from it. My second Argument for the Morality of Worshipping God in Public, shall be taken from the Obligation that lies upon us to provoke each other to the Adoration of him. For being by the Design of our Creation not only to glorify God in our own Persons, but, as much as in us lies, to procure the Glorification of him by other Men, we are accordingly (as our Saviour speaks) so to make that light of ours to shine before men, that they seeing our works of piety, may glorify our Father which is in heaven. Now forasmuch as it is no way proper that our Personal Devotions should be so laid open, because of necessity containing such Petitions as are not fit to be communicated to the World, Reason requires that there be a Public Worship instituted, by our diligent attendance whereof, we may provoke each other to the more devout Adoration of our Maker. Which Argumentation I do the rather make use of, because the Author to the Hebrews useth the same, where he speaks of the Public Service; in pursuance of his exhorting to 
* Heb. 10.24.25.  consider one another, to provoke unto love and to good works, adding, not forsaking the assembling of themselves together, as the manner of some than was; but exhorting one another, and so much the more, as they saw the day approaching. Lastly, Forasmuch as on the one hand there is a necessity of instructing the Generality in the Duty they own to God, and every one that stands in need of Instruction, cannot have a particular Teacher assigned him; as, on the other, all of us do stand in need of each others help in promoting our Petitions unto God: it is but necessary we should sometimes meet together, that they who stand in need of Instruction may receive it, and both Teacher and Taught put to the utmost of their Endeavours to obtain of God those Blessings which they need. For, as (God knows) our Devotion is at best but weak, and consequently may well require the twisting of some others with it; so there is none of us which may not be sometime indisposed to ask as we ought, or unlikely, by reason of some Sin, to prevail, though we should. By which means, as our own Prayers must needs be very defective, so that defect naturally prompts us to adjoin ourselves to other Men, as by whom it will be best supplied: What St. Paul spoke concerning Charity, being no less true in the matter of Devotion, That the abundance of such or such particular Persons may be a supply for the want of others; as, on the other side, that when their abundance fails, the abundance of the other may be their supply, and so by turns be assisting to each other.  
The Morality of Public Worship being thus established, proceed we, according to our proposed Method, to show it to be a part of Christianity; which will bind it so much the faster upon our Consciences. In order whereunto, I shall allege, first, its being a part of Moral or Natural Religion, according as was but now declared. For it being the design of Christianity to establish Natural Religion, and oblige us to be pious, and just, and temperate, which are the general Heads of it; whatsoever is a part of Natural Religion, is eo nomine to be looked upon as a part of the Christian one, though it be not expressly commanded: The confirmation of Natural Religion inferring the confirmation of all those Duties which are clear and undoubted Portions of it. The same is yet more evident, from the confirmation of those Grounds upon which the Public Worship of God is founded; such as are the making our Piety to shine before others, and the need each of us stand in of one another's help in Prayer: For our Saviour in express Terms enjoining the observation of the former, and St. Paul giving testimony to the truth of the latter, where he affirms us to be members of each other, they do thereby consequently establish the necessity of Public Worship, because (as was before shown) naturally arising from them. But because what hath been hitherto alleged from Christianity, is rather constructive of the Morality of the Public Worship of God, than any immediate or direct proof of its own enjoining it; for the fuller declaration of our Duty in this Affair, I will proceed to more immediate Proofs, and such as are properly Christian.  
1. Now the first that I shall allege, shall be taken from those Spiritual Gifts which God bestowed upon his Church; and particularly, the Word of Wisdom, the Word of Knowledge, Prophesying, Interpretation of Tongues, and Praying by the Spirit, or Immediate Inspiration: For these being given to those that had them, to 
* 1 Cor. 12.7.  profit withal, or (as the same St. Paul elsewhere 
‖ Ephes. 4.12.  more expressly declares) for the work of the Ministry, for the edifying of the Body of Christ, suppose the meeting of that Body to receive profit by them, and consequently (because that is the End of those Gifts) for Public Instruction and Prayer.  
2. My second Argument for the necessity of the Public Worship of God, shall be taken from the Rules St. Paul often gives for the right management of Christian Assemblies; such as are, That no man should speak in an unknown tongue, if there were not one by to interpret; That when they spoke, they should do it by two, or at the most by three; and in fine, That all things should be done decently and in order. For what need were there of all this stir about the management of Christian Assemblies, if the Author of our Religion had not at all enjoined them, but left Men to their own Private Worship? Neither will it avail to reply, as possibly it may be, That the Rules laid down for the management of Assemblies, do rather suppose them useful, than necessary to be held: For, as what is so hugely useful, cannot be supposed to be other than necessary, if we consider the many Precepts that enjoin us the edifying of one another: so he that shall consider St. Paul's Accuracy in laying down Rules concerning Christian Assemblies, will not doubt of their being necessary to be held: it being not to be thought, that he who is so careful elsewhere to distinguish between his own 
* 1 Cor. 7.8, etc.  Advices, and the Commands of the Lord, would take so much pains in prescribing Rules for the management of Christian Assemblies, without so much as taking notice, that those Assemblies, concerning which he gave Rules, were no other than Advices of his own. Add hereunto,  
3. The perpetual Practice of the Church, and that too at such times when those Assemblies were perilous to those that held them: For that shows plainly, that the holding of Assemblies had some higher Original, than only the usefulness thereof: It being not to be thought, that the Christians of all Times, and even of the most dangerous ones, would have held such Assemblies, if they had not looked upon themselves as straight obliged to them.  
4. But to come up yet more closely to the Ground of holding Assemblies, which I think I may not without cause establish in that of our Blessed Saviour, Mat. 18.20. to wit, That where two or three were gathered together in his Name, he would be in the midst of them. For, as those Words of his are an assurance to those who should be so gathered, that Christ would be in the midst of them, that is to say, (as the foregoing Words import) to grant them the Petitions they should ask, and more particularly such as were of Public concern 
* For he speaks before of Men that neglect to hear the Church, and of God's confirmation of the Church's Censure of them. ; so the same Words do imply, that he would not be so present to those who should not so assemble together. Otherwise the Reason wherewith he recommends the Assembling in his Name, would be weak and null; because so it might be affirmed, that they might have Christ present to them without. Now, forasmuch as Christ not only promises that he would be in the midst of those who should so assemble, but insinuates also, and that clearly enough, that he would not be so present to those that did not; he thereby lays a necessity upon Christians of so meeting in his Name, for the welfare of the Church, and particularly for the imploring of such Blessings as are necessary for it. I will conclude this Particular with that of the Author to the Hebrews, chap. 10.23. Where having exhorted in the foregoing Verses, that they should hold fast the profession of the faith themselves, and provoke others to the same love and good works, which are undoubted Precepts of the Gospel; he adds in the same breath, and by way of explication, not forsaking the assembling of yourselves together, as the manner of some than was; but exhorting one another, and so much the more as they saw the day approaching. Which Words, as they are a manifest condemnation of the neglect of Assemblies, and consequently an establishment of the necessity of Worshipping God in them; so such a condemnation of the forsaking of them, as to make it in effect not only a breach of Charity, but a renouncing the Profession of our Faith. However it be, most certain it is, that Apostle manifestly condemns the forsaking the assembling of ourselves together; and if so, we may be sure the serving God in the Solemn Assemblies is a part of a Christians Duty; and therefore the Fourth Commandment, wherein it is enjoined, so far obligatory.  
3. I am now arrived at the third of those Things which I said before to appertain to the Substance of this Commandment, and that is, The setting apart some portion of our Time for the more solemn performance of God's Worship; this being so much of the Substance of the Commandment, that it is the only thing clearly expressed in it, and may seem at first sight not only to be the Main, but the Whole. Now that this also is Moral, will appear, if we consider it with respect to the Worship of God in general, or with respect to the Public one. For, inasmuch as the Worship of God, as well as all other Actions, requires some Time for the performance of it; and Experience shows, that what is left at large for the Time, is either very rarely or perfunctorily performed; there ariseth from thence a necessity of appointing a certain Time, that it may not be either altogether omitted, or carelessly celebrated, when it is not. And accordingly, as all Nations have agreed in the owning of a God, and in their own Obligation to worship him; so we find them also universally to have set apart certain Times for the Adoration of that Deity they professed to own: Not perhaps without some hint from the Tradition of better Times, or from the Example of God's peculiar People, (for even in Natural Precepts the dull Mind of Man may sometime need to be excited by the instigation of others;) but, without doubt, for the main, out of their own consciousness of the necessity of fixing a certain Time, that so it might not either be omitted, or carelessly performed. There is yet another Reason of setting apart a certain Time, if we consider it with respect to the Public Worship; and that is, That they who are so to worship, may know when they are to meet for that purpose: For, if 
* 1 Cor. 14.8.  the trumpet give none, or an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle? or know when (as Tertullian 
‖ Apol. c. 39 Coimus ad deum, quasi manu facta precationibus ambiamus. Haec vis deo grata est.  speaks) they are to meet to besiege God, and extort from him those Blessings which they need.  
4. But beside the setting apart of a certain Time for the Celebration of the Worship of God, there is also requisite such a Rest from our Employments as may give us the leisure to intent it, and free us from distraction in the performance of it. For as the Mind of Man cannot at the same time intent Things of so distant a nature as Sacred and Civil are; so, if there be not some Interval between our Employments and our Devotions, the Businesses of the World will be apt to insinuate themselves into our Thoughts, and thereby divert us from intending of the other. Such are the Substantial Parts of this Fourth Commandment of the Decalogue, such their Nature, and the Obligation which they induce. What the Circumstances thereof are, and what their Nature and Obligation, is another Question, and will therefore require a distinct Consideration.   

PART II.  
Concerning such Duties as are only Circumstances of the Precept, which do either respect the determination of the Time wherein we are to worship, or the manner of the Observation of it. That there is no Obligation upon us, either from Nature, or the present Precept, to observe a Just day, a Seventh day, or that Seventh day which is here prescribed. The Ancient Christians Observation of the Jewish Sabbath, together with their own Lord's-day, considered, and answered. A Transition to the Observation of the Lord's-day, where is shown, That much less than a whole day cannot be deemed a competent Time for the solemn performance of God's Private and Public Worship; That since God exacted of the Jews a Seventh part of their Time, we cannot give less, who have far greater Obligations to the Almighty; and, That Christ's Resurrection upon the Lord's-day, is as just a Motive to consecrate it unto God, as that of God's Resting the Jewish Sabbath. The Observation of the Lord's-day founded in the Universal Practice of the Church, which is there also deduced from the days of the Apostles, down to the Times of Tertullian. That such a Practice is of force to infer an Obligation; partly because declaring the Consent of that Body wherein it is, and to which therefore it is but reasonable that particular Men should subject themselves; and partly because an Argument of its having been instituted by the Apostles: According to that known Rule of St. Augustine, That what the Universal Church holdeth, and always hath, if it appear not that the same was first decreed by Councils, is most rightly believed to have been delivered by the Authority of the Holy Apostles. The Reason why, when God gave the Jews so clear a Precept for the Observation of their Sabbath, he should leave us, who live at so great a distance from the Institution of ours, rather to collect it from the Practice of the Apostles and the Church, than to read it in some express Declaration.  
II. HAVING shown in the foregoing Discourse what the Substantial Parts of this Precept are, together with the Morality thereof; it remains that I proceed to those which are Circumstantial, which may be reduced to two Heads.  

1. The Determination of the Time wherein we are to Worship: And,  
2. The Manner of the Observation of it.   
1. In the handling of the former whereof, I will proceed in this Method.  

1. I will inquire whether the Determination of the Time, according as it is here fixed, be directly obligatory to us Christians.  
2. Whether, if not, any thing may be inferred from it toward the establishing of the Lord's-day, and by what it is further to be strengthened.  
3. To which I shall add, in the third place, an Account of other Christian Festivals; and show their Lawfulness, Usefulness, and the Esteem wherein they ought to be held.   
1. Now there are three things which this Commandment prescribes concerning the Time of the Solemn Worship of God; That it be a Day; That it be a Seventh day; and, That it be that Seventh day on which the Jewish Sabbath fell, or Saturday. Concerning each of which, I will particularly inquire, Whether they are morally, or otherwise, obligatory to us Christians.  
And first, If the Question be concerning a Day according as the Jews reckoned it, and as they were commanded to observe their Sabbaths 
* Leu. 23.32. , that is to say, of that space of Time which is between the Evening of the foregoing Artificial Day, and the Evening of the following one; so no Reason appears, either from Nature, or otherwise, why such a Day should be looked upon as obligatory to us Christians. For be it, that that Account is most agreeable to the Order of Nature, in which, as the first Chapter of Genesis assures us, Darkness had the precedency of Light, and accordingly had the precedency both in the Scriptures, and the Jews Account; Be it, secondly, as was before insinuated, that the Jews were obliged so to reckon their Sabbaths, as the forementioned Precept, and their own Practice show: Yet, as no Reason in Nature can be given, why the Worship of God should begin rather with the Evening than the Morning, according as it constantly doth with us; so, that this Commandment binds not such a Day upon us, the perpetual Practice of the Church, and the Occasion of that Festival we weekly observe, show. For, the First day of the Week, or Lord's-day, being set apart by the Church in Commemoration of the Resurrection of our Saviour, it is in reason to begin when that Resurrection did, which we find to have been when it began to dawn towards day. All therefore that can be meant in respect of us, must be the Observation of such a portion of Time as their Day amounted to, which is the space of Twenty four Hours, or the Natural Day. But even here it will be a hard matter to find any thing in Nature to evince our Obligation to it: For though Nature itself persuade, that a competent time be appointed for the Public Worship of God; yet that the Time so appointed should consist of just so many Hours, this no Principle in Nature teacheth, so far as I have been acquainted with them. The only thing that can found the Observation of such a Time, is that Positive Law which is now before us: But, as I have already shown the Letter thereof not to concern us as to the Day here required; so, Christianity being apparently not so nice as to the observation of Circumstances, we are in reason to measure our own Obligation as to the time of our Worship, rather by the Equity than Letter of the Commandment; which what that is, I shall in due place declare.  
Now though, from what hath been said, a Judgement may be made, what we are to think of the Observation of a Seventh day, and particularly of that Seventh day which was the Jewish Sabbath; yet to make my Discourse so much the more complete, and because there want not particular Arguments to propugn my Opinion in those Particulars, I will make it my Business to show, That there is no Obligation upon us Christians, either from the Law of Nature, or this particular Precept, to observe either a precise Seventh day, or that Seventh day which the Jews observed.  
To begin with the former of these, even the Observation of a Seventh, which hath by some Men been pleaded for with so great earnestness; concerning which I shall show, first, That it hath no Foundation in the Law of Nature; and secondly, That it hath as little in this, if considered in respect of us. That it hath not in the former, this one Character of the Law of Nature may suffice any sober Man to conclude: For the Law of Nature prescribing only such things to our Observation, as are in their own Nature good, before the superinducing of any Positive Law; it would follow, that the Observation of a Seventh day had a peculiar Goodness in it, and that it ought to be observed, though God had by no Positive Law enjoined it. But what Goodness can even they who profess to believe it Moral, show in a Seventh day, more than in a Sixth, or Eighth, or any other Day whatsoever? unless it be, that God rested upon it from the Works of the Creation, which is the Reason here alleged for its observance. But, first of all, if God's resting upon it gave it any peculiar Goodness, what need was there of his adding his Blessing, and Command, to oblige Men to the Observance of it? For the Day being Holy without and before it, it would have sufficed to have declared, That that was the Day on which he rested. Again, Forasmuch as Blessing and Sanctifying supposeth that which is so blessed and sanctified to have been before in the common condition of Things, God's so blessing and sanctifying of the Seventh day, supposeth that to have been of the nature of other Days, and consequently not to be consecrated by his bare Resting on it. Lastly, Forasmuch as whatsoever Goodness there is in any thing, it must be supposed to descend upon it by the Influence of the Divine; if we suppose the Seventh day to have had any peculiar Goodness and Holiness, we must also suppose it to have received it from the same Influx: which cannot be affirmed in the present case; because that to which it is ascribed, is not any Influence of the Divine Goodness, but only the Suspension of it. I conclude therefore, That God's Rest upon it did not give the Seventh day any peculiar Holiness; and consequently, because that is the only Reason alleged, that there is nothing of Morality in the Observance of it. From Nature and Morality therefore, pass we to the present Precept, and inquire whether that induceth any Obligation upon us to observe it. Give me leave only to premise, That the Question is not (as is commonly deemed) Whether One in Seven be of necessity to be observed; but, Whether a Seventh day after Six days of Labour. For, though it be true, that he who requires a Seventh day, requires One in Seven; yet requiring it with reference to God's Rest from his Six days of Creation, he determines it to the last of those Seven, because no other beside the last can answer it. Which said, I shall not stick to affirm, That there is no Obligation upon us as to a Seventh, because the Precept, so considered, related only to the Jews. For the evidencing whereof, I will allege that of Exodus, chap. 31.16, 17. Wherefore the children of Israel shall keep the Sabbath, to observe the Sabbath throughout their generations for a perpetual Covenant: It is a sign between me and the children of Israel for ever. For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and on the seventh day he rested and was refreshed. For, as it is sufficiently known, that the Covenant between God and the Israelites left no place for any that was not of their Nation or Religion; so the Sabbath being for a Sign of that Covenant, was consequently to extend no farther than the Covenant did, and therefore also to no other than themselves. The only difficulty is, Whether what is affirmed of the Sabbath in particular, be to be understood also of a Seventh day in the general. For the resolution whereof, we shall need to go no further than the close of that Place we have now before us: For affirming the Sabbath whereof he speaks, to be a Sign between him and the Children of Israel, as it was an Image of his own Rest after his Six days work of Creation, he thereby appropriates to them, though not the Remembrance of the Creation, yet the keeping such a Memorial of it, and consequently, of a Seventh day. And indeed, however some Men contend eagerly for a Seventh day, as supposing thereby to advance the Authority of that which we Christians think ourselves obliged to observe; yet the granting of it to them, would serve only to discredit that Day for which they so contend. For though the Lord's-day be One of Seven, yet it is the First of those Seven, and is not preceded by Six days of Labour, but followed: By which means it holds no analogy with the Design of the Institution, because intended to commemorate the Six days of the Creation, and that Rest which followed. Neither will it suffice to say (as perhaps it may be) That the Analogy between it, and that Rest it is proposed to imitate, may be salved well enough, by making it look back to the Six foregoing days of Labour: For as by so doing we must alter our Account, and make the Lord's-day not the First, but the Seventh; so, though this way of Computing should agree well enough to the rest, yet it hath no place at all in the First and Chief; the Day of our Saviour's Resurrection being not only the First of the Gospel Age, but the First day after the Jewish Sabbath; which leaves no place for any preceding Days of Labour.  
From the Observation of a Seventh day, pass we to that Seventh on which the Jews kept their Sabbath, even the Seventh from the first falling of the Manna in the Wilderness, and, as is probable also, from the Creation of the World: Which, that it is not obligatory to us, is sufficiently evident from the foregoing Considerations; but will be rendered yet more clear from those which follow. Whereof the first that I shall allege, is its being instituted to remember God's giving them Rest after their sore Travels in Egypt: For, that so it was, the Prophet Moses doth more than intimate, Deut. 5.15. where repeating the same Precept we are now upon, he allegeth the Reason of God's commanding it, to be, to put them in mind of their Bondage in Egypt, and of God's wonderful delivering of them from it. Now forasmuch as that Mercy had relation only to the Jews; forasmuch as their Sabbath was appointed to commemorate it: it follows, that the Jews only were concerned in the Observation of it, and consequently, that it is not obligatory to us. Add hereunto that of St. Paul to the Colossians, chap. 2.16, 17. where not contented to forbid the judging of any one in meat and drink, in respect of an Holiday, or of the New-moon, or of the Sabbath-days, which yet shows their Obligation to be null; he affirms moreover, and particularly concerning those Sabbath-days, That they were shadows of good things to come, and therefore to disappear when they actually were. Now if any should demand (as the Question is not unseasonable) wherein the Sabbath was a Shadow of things to come, according as St. Paul affirms; I think we cannot more rightly place it, than in that Rest which it enjoined, because that was one great End of its appointment; as neither the Typicalness of that Rest, than in its shadowing forth that Eternal Rest which we shall be possessed of in Heaven. For beside that the Author to the Hebrews not only compares those Rests together, but calls that Eternal Rest by the Name of 
* Heb. 4.9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc.  Sabbatism, as it were on purpose to show it to have been typified by the other 
‖ Vid. Lud Capell. in locum. ; the Jews themselves may seem not to have been without some knowledge of it, because calling that Eternal Rest the day which is all Sabbath. The only thing that can with reason be objected against this and the foregoing Argument, is, the Christians so long and so generally observing the Jewish Sabbath, as well as their own Lord's-day, or Sunday. But as it is to be observed, that that Custom had no place in the 
* See White's Treatise of the Sabbath-day, p. 72.  Churches of Rome, and Alexandria, and throughout Africa, the first whereof was anciently the most Eminent in the Christian World; so, where it had, it may seem to have proceeded not so much from any firm belief of its Obligation, as from weakness in some, and compliance in others, and in both an unwillingness utterly to shake off that Day which had by God himself been set apart for Religious Exercises: Witness their prescribing not to observe it after a Jewish manner 
‖ Interpolat. Epist. Ignat. ad Magnesianos. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Vid. Vser. Ign. p. 57 , who advised the Observation of the Day; the 
* Vid. Vsser. in notis ad loc.  Observation of it in such Places where the Jews most were, as in the Eastern Parts, and not in the other; in fine, the 
† See Bishop White ubi supra. andVsser. in Proleg. ad Ign. Epist. c. 13.  Romans and Alexandrians converting the Sabbath-day, or Saturday, into a day of fasting; and the generality of the Christians at last agreeing with those of Rome, in the abolishing of it. I will conclude this Particular with that of St. Paul, Gal. 4.10, 11. where having twitted them with the Observation of days, and months, and times, and years, agreeably to the beggarly elements of the Law, to let them know how much he was concerned about it, he immediately adds, I am afraid of you, lest I have bestowed upon you labour in vain; thereby intimating (as Grotius speaks) his fear of their falling back to Judaisme, (to which the Observation of their Days was a great step) and casting off that Religion they had received from him. I speak not this to invalidate the Authority of the Lord's-day, which some, I know, have endeavoured to establish upon such Grounds as I have laboured to decry: For, as I mean by and by to give such an Account of it, as shall oblige any sober Man to the Observation of it; so, next to that, I know not what better Service I could possibly do it, than by taking Men off from adhering too much to the Letter of this Commandment; because, whilst some Men have gazed too much upon it, they have been induced thereby, and not without reason, to observe the Saturday rather than the Sunday, as which indeed the Commandment enjoins. Again, As by inculcating the Letter of the Commandment too far, occasion hath been given to prefer the Jewish Sabbath before the Christian; so there is no doubt the like occasion may be given, if not to admit of the Jewish, yet to think very meanly of the Christian: It being not very likely that Day should be much esteemed, which hath nothing brought to establish it, but the Letter of a Commandment, that establishes another day, and such a one as by the Design of God was a Shadow of that Body which we enjoy.  
2. But not any longer to defer the paying of that Debt which our Lord's-day, as well as my own Promise, exacts of me; I will proceed, in the second place, to inquire, Whether, though the determination of the Time, according as it is here fixed, be not directly obligatory to us Christians, yet somewhat may not be inferred from it, toward the establishing of the Lord's-day; and by what that is farther to be strengthened? For the resolution whereof, the first thing I shall offer, shall respect the appointing of a Day. For being (as I have before shown) it is necessary that a competent Time be set apart for the Worship of God; being less than a Day, or at least the major part of it, cannot be deemed a competent Time for the Solemn Performance of the Private and Public Worship of God; lastly, being God required of the Jews to set apart a Day, to give him that Worship which is due unto him; we cannot think a less Time incumbent upon Christians to observe as Holy, who have both a much greater Obligation to the Almighty, and a much more weighty Service to intent. Again, Forasmuch as it is no less necessary under the Times of the Gospel, than it was under the Law, that a Time be set apart for the Public Worship of God; forasmuch as it is but reasonable, that under the Times of the Gospel an equal portion of Time, if not a far greater, should be allotted for the Performance of it; the same Reason requires, that since God exacted a Seventh part of the Jews, we are not to content ourselves with a less, or imagine that God himself will be. For, though there be no Morality in the Observation of a just Seventh; though the specification of a Seventh, proceeded from a Reason which was never cogent in itself, but to be sure is not now obligatory: yet, as whatever the Reason thereof was, it is certain God required a Seventh part of the Jew, in order to his own Service; so it is both Moral and Christian, that they should not go less than a Seventh, who have much greater Obligations to the Almighty. And indeed, well may we think so, when we find the Primitive Christians in the Acts meeting every day to worship, and not only giving God a Seventh part of their Time, but the greatest. Lastly, If the Creation of the World, 
Acts 2.46.  and God's Rest from it, were a just Motive to consecrate that Day into a Holiday, wherein God so rested from the Creation; to be sure that is no less, upon which the Hopes of a Christian do so much depend, even the Resurrection of our Blessed Lord and Saviour. So that thus much may be inferred from the Equity of this Commandment, That as much less than a Day, and a Seventh day, cannot be thought necessary to be set apart for the Christian Worship; so, that which is set apart by us, even the First day of the Week, had a juster Motive to the Consecration of it, than that which was sanctified under the Law. But because what hath been hitherto, or may be inferred from this Commandment, doth rather persuade than necessitate the Observation of that particular Day which we observe, and I have promised a farther strengthening of its Authority; therefore, to give the greater force to it, I will produce the Practice of the Church from the Apostles days; and when I have done so, show the Obligation it induceth.  
That it had the Observation of a Christian Festival in the Apostles days, that of St. Luke shows, Acts 20.7. where we find the Disciples met together upon the first day of the week to break bread; that is to say, one Species being put for all the rest, to communicate with each other in the Public Exercises of their Religion: The breaking of bread not only referring either to the Lords Supper, or the Love-teasts that closed it; but joined by this very Author with doctrine, and fellowship, and prayer, Acts 2.42. The same is no less evident from that of St. Paul to the Corinthians, 1 Cor. 16.1, 2. where, according to an Order he had before given to the Churches of Galatia, he enjoins those of Corinth, That upon the first day of the week every one should lay by him in store, that so there might be no collections when he came. For, wherefore (as St. Chrysostom observes 
* Chrysost. in 1 Cor. Hom. 43. ) should St. Paul appoint that day to the Churches of Galatia and Corinth, for the laying by of what God had prospered them, for charitable uses, but that that day, by the rest it afforded, gave them opportunity to do it? and moreover, by the Blessing which it remembered, and the Sacred Offices that were performed in it, was apt to incite them to a more cheerful and liberal distribution? To all which, if we add the Title which St. John gives it, Rev. 1.10. so no doubt can remain of the Churches observing it as Holy. For as it is evident from the Consent of Interpreters, and the Language of the succeeding Age, that what St. John there calls The Lord's-day, was no other than what we now style so; so the least that can be made of that Appellation is, That it was set apart by the Church in memory of the Lord Christ's Resurrection, and dedicated to his Honour and Service: The Lord's-day importing his having a peculiar propriety in it, which must be either by his own Institution of it, or the Consecration of it by his Church. From the Apostles days, pass we to those that immediately succeeded; where we shall find yet more clear Testimonies of the Observation of it. For thus Ignatius, the Contemporary as well as Successor of the Apostles, in his Epistle 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ed. Voss. p. 35.  to the Magnesians, doth not only make mention of the Lord's-day, but exhort them, that laying aside the Observation of the Sabbath, they would keep the Lord's day for a Festival, wherein our Life risen also. To the Testimony of Ignatius, subjoin we that of Justin Martyr 
‖ Apol. 2. pro Christianis, p. 99 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. , as nearest to him, and to the Apostles; where we have not only an Account of the Christians assembling on the Sunday, but the Business of those Meetings at large declared, to wit, the reading of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, Preaching, Praying, and other such Religious Exercises. And though, in that known Passage of Pliny 
† Plin. Epist. li. 10. , where he gives an Account to the Emperor Trajan concerning the Assemblies of the Christians; though, I say, in that Passage there be no express mention of the Day wherein they were held: yet affirming from the Mouth of some Christians, whom he had examined, that they were wont upon a set day to meet together before the Morning-light, and sing a Song unto Christ, as unto God; it is but reasonable to think that day was meant, the Observation whereof we are now establishing. What should I tell you of Tertullian's affirming in one place 
* De Idololatr. cap. 14. Si quid & carni indulgendum est, habes, non tamen dies tantùm sed & plures. Nam Ethnicis semel annuus dies quisque festus est, tibi octavus quisque dies, etc. , That the Christians had every Eighth day for a Festival? and in another 
‖ Apolog. cap. 16. Aeque si diem Solis Laetitiae indulgemus, alia longe ratione quam religione Solis, secundo loco ab eis sumus, qui diem Saturni otio & victui decernunt, exorbitantes & ipsi ab Judaico more, quem ignorant. , That the Sunday was the Day? For, as that is so certain, that, as the same Tertullian intimates, the Heathens accused them for it, as Worshippers of the Sun, whose Name that Day bore; so, in and after his Time, there is so little doubt to be made of its Observation, that I must but light a Candle to the Sun, if I should go about to prove it. The only thing worthy our consideration, will be, what use may be made of it, to infer our own Obligation to observe it.  
And here, in the first place, I shall allege the Practice itself, as a sufficient Argument to evince it. For, as an approved Custom hath the nature of a Law, because declaring the Consent of that Body wherein it is, and to which it is but reasonable that particular Men should subject themselves; so St. Paul gives it that force in the Church, where disputing against the Corinthian Woman's praying uncovered, he alleges, That they had no such custom, nor the Churches of God, 1 Cor. 11.16. For if the Argument from a Custom negative be good and valid, much more from the same positive, and especially when there is so general an one. But because such arguments as these, through the contempt Men now have of the Church, may possibly not have their due efficacy, I will allege, in the second place, that there is reason enough, even from that Practice, to believe it to have been of Apostolical Institution. For, it being morally impossible, that the Christians of all Places should so unanimously agree to the Observation of it, if there had not been something of a Law to constrain them to it; and there appearing no such Law of the Church itself, antecedent to the Practice of it; it is but reasonable to believe it to have been Instituted by those who were the first Founders of it; according to that known Rule 
* Quod universa tenet Ecclesia, nec Conciliis institutum, sed semper retentum est, non nisi Authoritate Apostolica traditum rectissimè creditur.  of St. Augustine, That what the Universal Church holds, and always hath, if it appear not that the same was first decreed by Councils, is most rightly believed to have been delivered by the Authority of the Holy Apostles. And higher than that we shall not need to go; because he, who had all power in heaven and earth given him, did at his departure hence delegate so much of it to them, as was necessary for the regulating of the Church. The only thing that may seem to have any difficulty, is, Why, when God gave the Jews so clear a Precept for the Observation of their Sabbath, he should leave us, who live at so great a distance from the Institution of ours, rather to collect it from the Practice of the Apostles and the Church, than to read it in some express Declaration. But even this, how difficult soever in appearance, will not be hard for him to unriddle, who shall remember what hath been before brought to establish it: For the Law of Nature, and this of Moses, evidencing the necessity of a Set Time; and the Equity of Moses Law, and our own Obligations to the Divine Majesty, that we cannot give God a less proportion of our Time, than what he exacted of the Jews; nothing remained for God to declare, but whether he would require more than a Seventh (of which there is not the least Indication); or if not, which of those Seven he would make choice of: which an easy hint might suffice to discover. For the Saturday, which is the last of those Seven, being expressly abolished, and no other having the like Pretences to succeed it, it was easy to guests God meant that Day, which had not only our Saviour's Resurrection to adorn it, but was moreover by the Apostles, and those that followed them, kept as holy unto the Lord.   

PART III.  
A Digression concerning the Fasts and Festivals of the Church; where the Lawfulness of their Institution is evicted, and vindicated from the Exceptions of their Adversaries. That they are of signal use to insinuate the main Articles of our Religion into the Understanding of the Weak, to bring the Occasions thereof to the Memories of the Strong, and prompt us all both more particularly, and with greater edification, to consider them. That being instituted by the Church, they ought to be Religiously observed by all that are the Members of it. Of the Manner of the Observation of the Jewish Sabbath, which is another of the Circumstantials of this Commandment. Of the Strictness of the Rest enjoined the Jews on it; and that, as such, it is not only not obligatory to us, but superstitious. What Rest is now obligatory to us by virtue of this Commandment; where that Rest is considered, both in the Letter, and in the Mystery. To whom, and in what manner the Jewish Rest appertained; with an application thereof to our own Concernments. A particular Inquiry concerning those who are under the Power of others; and whether or no they are obliged to Rest, where they are constrained to Labour by Threats or Stripes. Of Recreation on the Jewish Sabbath, and our own; and that, rightly disposed, it is not only not unlawful, but useful. An Objection from Isa. 58.13. proposed, and answered. A Restriction of Recreations to such as are neither unsuitable for the Kind to the Gravity of such a Solemnity, nor take up too much time in the Exercise thereof. A Caution against profane neglect of the Lord's-day, with the necessity that lieth upon the Generality of Men, more than ordinarily to intent their Eternal Concernments on it.  
3. THE Lord's-day being, as you have seen, established upon Christian Principles, and thereby equally secured from a Judaical Observance, and a profane Neglect; the Commandment I am now upon, no less than my proposed Method, obligeth me to entreat of other the Festivals and Fast-days of the Church. For though these have not the Authority of a Divine Command, as the Jewish Sabbath had; though there is not the same clearness of Evidence for their Apostolical Institution, as there is for the Lord's-day, or Sunday: yet they have this in common with the Jewish Sabbath, and our own, that they have the same Worship of God for their End, and the like signal Acts of God for the Occasions of their Institution; even those which have the Title of Saints-days, looking through them to the Mercy of God, who made them what they are, and dedicated to his only Worship and Service. Having therefore so much affinity with the Day here enjoined, I shall think it no way impertinent to my present Argument, to inquire into the Lawfulness of their Institution, their usefulness, and the Esteem wherein they are to be held.  
1. It being certain, that that is to be looked upon as lawful, which is not forbidden by any Command; nothing can be required to establish the holidays of the Church, but the taking off those Objections which may be made against the lawfulness thereof. Now there are two things commonly objected against them, and to which therefore, before I proceed, I will shape an Answer; the former whereof strikes at the Observation itself, the other at the Injunction of it. The ground of the former is laid in those Words of St. Paul, Gal. 4.10, 11. where the Apostle not only finds fault with their observing days, and months, and times, and years, but so far as to affirm, he was afraid he had bestowed upon them labour in vain. As if the very Observation of such things, were inconsistent with Christianity, or at least were in the way to destroy it. And indeed, if (as is pretended) those Words of his were to be construed of the Observation of all Days whatsoever, there is no doubt the Observation of those I am now speaking of, were to be looked upon as inconsistent with Christianity. But he that shall seriously compare these Words of the Apostle with the foregoing and following ones, will find them to strike either at the Jewish only, or at their Manner of Observation of them: For, asserting, as he doth in the beginning of the Chapter, their having been in bondage under the Law, and the Son of God's Redemption of them from it; asserting moreover, ver. 21. That they were desirous to be under the Law, and remitting them to the Law for their satisfaction; what can we in reason think meant by their turning again to the weak and beggarly elements wherein they desired again to be in bondage, but their return to the beggarly Elements of the Law, and consequently (because that is given as an Instance of it) either to the Observation of such Days and Times as were laid upon them by the Law, or observing them after the manner prescribed by it? The Case is yet more plain in that other commonly alleged Text, Let no man judge you in meat and drink, or in respect of an Holiday, or of the New-moon, or of the Sabbath-days, Col. 2.16. Not only the mention of Sabbaths, which every one knows to have been peculiar to the Jewish Nation, determining it to their Fasts and Feasts; but St. Paul's affirming moreover, that they were shadows of things to come, which is to be affirmed only of Legal ones. To make these Texts therefore of any force, it must be proved, either that ours are the same, or at least of the same nature with the Jewish; or that a like Observation is required. But as the Festivals of the Church are so far from being the same with the Jewish, that, on the contrary, they proclaim the actual exhibition of those things which the other did only foreshow; so there is nothing, either in our Canons, or Practice, which can minister an occasion of suspicion, that a Judaical Observation is required. For, beside that the Offices thereof are all purely Christian, and not mixed with Incensing, as the Jewish were, and the Popish are; neither is their number so great, as to be a burden to the Observers; nor those few that are imposed, imposed upon them as Divine Commands. In fine, neither is the Duty of the Day so appropriated to it, as to make it unacceptable upon others; nor yet exacted with so much rigour on it, as not to leave place for necessary Occasions. All therefore that can be supposed to lie against the Festivals of the Church, must be drawn from their being instituted by Men, and that Will-worship which it is conceived to involve. But as I have heretofore said enough to take off that Charge, even as to this particular Affair; so, having done so, I shall in stead thereof set before you the Practice of the Jews, which in this Particular deserves hugely to be considered. For, if it were lawful for the Jews, notwithstanding the many Festivals God had instituted among them, to add others thereto upon occasion; how much more for Christians, where, setting aside the Lord's-day, there is not any thing to determine the Time of their Solemn Worship. Now that this was their Practice, is evident, first, from that of Esther, chap. 9 and 27. where, upon occasion of their great Deliverance from the Mischiefs intended against them by Haman, Mordecai wrote to the Jews, and accordingly they ordained, and took upon them, and upon their seed, and upon all such as joined themselves to them, that they would keep those Days in which they rested from their Enemies, according to their Writing, and according to their appointed Time, every Year. In like manner, when the Altar of God had been polluted by the Heathen, but was repaired and dedicated again by Judas Maccabeus; the same Judas and his Brethren, with the whole Congregation, ordained, That the Days of the Dedication of the Altar should be kept in their Season from Year to Year, 1 Mac. 4.59. Which, as accordingly we find to have been observed even to the days of our Saviour; so, which is more, to have been graced by his presence, as you may see Joh. 10.22. As to the Lawfulness therefore, either of the Institution, or Observation of Festivals, there is not the least doubt to be made; and much less can we suppose there will, if they be also useful: which accordingly I come now to show.  
2. For the evidencing whereof, the first thing I shall allege, is, that Instruction which might thereby accrue to the weaker sort, if they were but attended to as they ought. For the Church having appointed particular Days for the Commemoration of the Chief Things that either were performed by, or happened to our Saviour, if the Plain Man (as a Reverend Person hath expressed it) would but ply his Almanac well, that alone 
* Bishop Hall's Remains, Serm. on 1 Joh. 1.5.  would teach him so much Gospel, as to show him the History of his Saviour. For there, even upon the Feast of the Annunciation, might he see his Saviour's Conception, declared by an Angel; and him Born forty Weeks after, upon the Feast of the Nativity: He should see him eight days after that, Circumcised on New-years-day; then Visited, and Adored by the Wisemen, in the Epiphany: He should see him presented to God in the Temple, on the Day of Purification; then Tempted, and Fasting forty days, in Lent: He should see him ushered in by his Forerunner John the Baptist, six Months before his Birth; attended by his Twelve Apostles in their several Ranks, and Thomas the last for his Unbelief: And at last, after infinite and beneficial Miracles, he should see him crucified upon Good-fryday, Rising from the Dead on Easter, Ascending to Heaven on Holy-Thursday; and, to supply the want of his Presence, the Holy Ghost descending upon the Apostles, and the Church. In fine, there he should see the Belief of all these summed up in the Celebration of the Blessed Trinity, on that Sunday which bears its Name. All which, whosoever shall duly consider, will not think such Institutions unuseful, nor the Church much beholden to them who have endeavoured to remove them. For, as it is apparent the foregoing Days carry Marks upon them of the principal things which it is necessary for a Christian to understand; so, by their separation from other days, they do naturally prompt those that are ignorant, to inquire into the Occasion of them: By which means, they who fly other ways of Instruction, would be in a manner constrained to receive it here, and either be wrought upon to glorify God for the Benefits they receive from them, or be rendered inexcusable if they did not. But then, if we add farther, That they who have instituted those Days, have moreover fitted them with such Services, as may both explain their meaning, and the use we are to make of them; so it will be impossible for those who shut not their Ears as well as their Eyes, to be ignorant of those Truths, the Notices whereof they are intended to convey.  
But beside that such Institutions minister to the Instruction of the weaker sort, which (God knows) are both the most, and most carefully to be provided for; they are also of excellent use to bring the Occasion thereof to the remembrance of the Strong, and oblige them to consider what they know. For being placed (so near as the Church can fix them) upon the Returns of the same Periods of Time wherein they are recorded to have happened; and being moreover distinguished from other Days by visible Solemnities, and the Commemoration of that remarkable Work which they sometime produced: the notice of them is in a manner thrust upon us, whether we will or no: And though we may be so brutish, as not to remember them with those Affections which becomes us; yet it is made impossible for us to forget them. Lastly, As the setting aside particular Days for particular Accidents, is of excellent use to bring them to the remembrance of the Strong, and oblige them to consider what they know; so they minister an occasion shall I say, or rather an incitement to us all, more particularly to consider them, and improve them to our utmost advantage. For, as it is easy to suppose, those things will be but superficially considered, which are not allowed a distinct consideration; so the thus separating them from each other, lays a kind of necessity upon Men to look more nearly and narrowly into them, and weigh all the Advantages which they contain: By which means, they who otherwise perhaps would have had but a slight taste of any, shall suck them in in greater proportions, and not only find in themselves a fuller perception of their Sweetness, but a more grateful sense of his Goodness from whom they come. Thus, for example, whilst the Feast of our Saviour's Nativity doth not only admonish us of that, but in a manner determine our Thoughts to it, we have thereby both an opportunity and an engagement, I will not say so much to dive into the Mystery, as to contemplate the Goodness of him who was so incarnate; passing through all those Stages through which his Goodness and Condescension did, from the Assumption of a Humane Body, to all those humble and even contemptible Circumstances in which he was pleased to assume it. Such are the Advantages of the Fasts and Feasts of the Church, wheresoever they are diligently intended. It remains that we inquire in what account they are to be held, the third thing proposed to be discoursed of.  
And here not to tell you, because no Man, for aught I know, hath ever taken upon him to affirm it, That such Days have no inherent Holiness in them; nor yet (because the Church doth not) represent them as Apostolical Institutions, (though the Feast of Easter have a fair pretence to it) and much less as Divine Commands; it shall suffice me to represent them as set apart by the Church of God, for the Commemoration of those Things whose Titles they bear. For though this do not make them equal to such as have the Command of God for their Institution, nor yet to that Lord's-day which with great probability pretends to an Institution by the Apostles: yet, as it separates them from the Rank of Ordinary Days, and consequently obligeth us so to look upon them; so it particularly obligeth us to intent those several Offices for the performance whereof they are set apart. For if, for instance, it be in the Power of the Church to set apart certain Days for the Commemoration of the Divine Goodness towards us, there is no doubt but it is the Duty of particular Members to comply with their Institutions, and make the Mercies which they so commemorate, the Occasion of their Thanks and Praise. This only would be added, That as what is so determined by the Church, may by the Laws of the same be taken away, if the Profit or Necessity thereof do so require; so particular Persons may without Sin omit the Solemnisation of them, if the necessity of their Affairs shall so require. For if the Sabbath itself was to yield to Necessity, much more those Festivities which pretend not to the Institution of the Divine Majesty. Care only would be taken, 
Vid. Daven. in Col. 2.16.  that, under a false pretence of Necessity, Men violate not the Order of the Church: For, so doing, they shall offend against God, as well as it; because profaning those Days which were set apart for his Worship and Service.  
2. Having thus considered the Determination of the Time of our Worship, which I said to be one of the Circumstantials of this Commandment; proceed we in the next place to consider the Manner of its Observation: where again these three things would be enquired into.  

1. What kind of Rest it was to be observed with.  
2. Whether it admitted of any Recreation: And,  
3. Lastly, With what Holy Offices to be celebrated? Subjoyning to each, as being the principal thing we are to aim at, how far we ourselves are concerned.   
1. I begin with the first of these, even the Rest enjoined the Jews in the Observation of their Sabbaths: Concerning which, I shall show, 

1. What kind of Rest it was.  
2. To whom, and in what manner it appertained.    
1. For the Rest enjoined the Jews, it was evidently strict enough, and such as excluded all kind of Labour which was not either plainly Necessary, or was not grounded upon Pious and Charitable Considerations; such as were the Circumcising of Children upon the Sabbath, slaying of Oxen for Sacrifices, or lending Help to the Distressed. For, beside that here, and elsewhere, the Voice of God is not, as it is in some others 
* See Lev 23.7, 8. , That they should do no servile work; but, that they should do no manner of work upon it: beside, secondly, that they were forbidden so much as to kindle a fire on it, as you may see Exod. 35.3. the Rest seems to have been so strict, as not only to restrain Men from Labour, but even from moving from their Places: For, abide ye (saith God, Exod. 16.29.) every one in his place; let no man go out of his place on the seventh day. And though there is no doubt this was to admit of some relaxation, because that would have hindered them from resorting to the Solemn Assemblies, for the holding whereof I have shown the Sabbath to be set apart; yet it is apparent enough, from the End of its Institution, and the Jews 
* Vid. Act. 1.12. & Selden. de Jure Nat. etc. l. 3. c. 9  Practice, that there was somewhat more than ordinary enjoined, even as to their not stirring from their Habitations. Now concerning each of these Rests, I shall not stick to affirm, that, according as before-stated, they are not only not obligatory to us Christians, but superstitious. That they are not obligatory, will appear, if we consider, that the Sabbath itself is not: For the Sabbath (as was before-shewn) being peculiar to the Jews, to whom it was given as a Sign of the Covenant between God and them; that Rest which gave it its Name, and a great part of its Nature, must be looked upon as in like manner peculiar to them, and consequently not obligatory to us. But neither is it less evident that such a Rest would be superstitious, if either imposed or observed as Religious; because placing Religion in that, which however it might have some place in the Jewish, yet is no part of the Christian, because exhibiting that better Rest of which the other was a Type. If therefore there be any Obligation upon us, from the Rest here commanded, it must be either to the Observation of that Spiritual Rest of which it was a Type, or to such a Bodily one as is requisite to the Solemn Performance of God's Worship; each of which I come now to consider. Of the former of these Rests, there is not the least doubt to be made; that is to say, of a Spiritual one, or Rest from Sin. For it being evident on the one hand, that the Law of Moses was written for our Direction and Obedience, as well that which is 
* See the Discourse concerning the Positive Laws of God, etc.  Ceremonial, as that which was Moral and Substantial; and it being no less evident on the other, that that of it which was Ceremonial, was not written to oblige us to the Ceremony itself: it follows, because it was written for our Direction and Obedience, that it was intended to oblige us to those Spiritual Duties of which the other were Types and Shadows. Now forasmuch as the Rest enjoined the Jews was a Type of some Christian Duty; forasmuch as there is no Duty in Christianity, which can better answer it, than a Rest from Sin; it follows, that though we look not upon ourselves as concerned in the Rest enjoined the Jews, yet we look upon ourselves as concerned in that Rest of which it was a Type, and accordingly cease from our Sinful Works, as they did on the Sabbath from the Works of their several Employments. Again, Though the Rest enjoined the Jews, oblige us rather to the Thing signified by it, than to the Rest itself; though, in the Circumstances in which it was enjoined, it was apparently Legal, and consequently one of those Bondages from which Christ came to set us free: yet so far forth as that is requisite to the performance of God's Worship, there is no doubt it doth oblige us, even as to the thing itself: Because (as was before shown 
* See Part 1. of the Explic. of this Commandment. ) a part of the Moral Law, and subordinate to the main End of this. But from hence (as was there observed) it will follow, that we are to rest from our Employments, both in, and some time before the Time of God's Solemn Worship; the Mind of Man being neither able to intent them both at once, nor yet the Service of God alone, with that freedom which it ought, where the Cares of this World press too near upon it. Which though it amount not to the strictnesses of the Jewish Sabbath, yet will oblige us to such a Rest, as will leave little leisure for other earthly Thoughts, than what the Necessity of our Affairs, or the Conveniences of Life will take up. But, as farther than this I neither shall nor dare press upon you the Rest enjoined the Jews; so even they who are more severe, will not know how to free themselves, if they should be pressed with their own Actions: For who of them thinks himself a Sinner, for gathering a few Sticks on the Christian Sabbath, or going about to kindle a Fire on it? The 
* Exod. 35.3.  latter whereof was yet expressly forbidden the Jews, as the 
‖ Num. 15.36.  former punished with death.  
2. Having thus shown what kind of Rest was imposed upon the Jews, and withal how far we ourselves are concerned to observe it; inquire we in the next place, To whom, and in what manner it appertained, or rather into the latter only; the Commandment being express not only for the resting of all sorts of Persons, but also of the very Beasts themselves. And first of all, if the Question be concerning those who were sui juris, or permitted so to be as to the Rest here enjoined; so there is no doubt that Rest appertained to them, not only as a Privilege, but a Duty: the Rest here spoken of being the Matter of a Command, and consequently intended to oblige all those who were in a capacity to yield obedience to it. On the other side, if the Question be concerning , which by the Tenor of the Commandment were to have a share in it; so there is no doubt the rest here spoken of appertained to them only by way of Privilege: For being uncapable either of understanding, or giving obedience to Laws, they must be supposed to have been free from this, and consequently, what is said concerning their Rest, to have appertained to them only by way of Privilege. Setting aside therefore both the one and the other, as whose Case admits not of the least difficulty, we will consider, first of all, the Case of Parents and Masters: 2. Of Children and Servants: And 3. and lastly, (because there is something particular in his) of the Stranger that was within their gates. For the first of these again, there is no great difficulty in explicating their particular Concerns, because the Commandment is clear, not only that they should rest themselves, but oblige those who were under their Power to do so: For those being more in their Parents and Master's Power, than in their own, the Command is in reason to be supposed to have appertained chief to them in whose Power their Labour or Resting was. From Parents and Masters, pass we to Children and Servants, and inquire into their particular Concerns: Where, first of all there is no doubt, for the Reason before alleged, that it was no less their Duty than Privilege, to rest from their Labours, where they might be permitted so to do. The only doubt is, whether it were incumbent upon them so to do, though their cruel Masters should have used Threats or Chastisements to constrain them to their ordinary Labours. For the resolution whereof, I shall desire you first to consider that of Deut. 5.15. For it being manifest from thence, that the great Design of the Rest enjoined, was, that Servants should have ease from their Labours, it is hard to suppose, God would oblige them so to rest, when a far greater Evil than their Labour impended on them: For, by this means God should not only not have consulted their Benefit, but brought upon them a far greater Evil than their own Pains. The Case will be yet more clear, if we remember, that the principal End of Rest, was the attending to the Worship of God: For it being not to be thought, that they would suffer their Servants to intent the Worship of God, who would be so wicked as to constrain them to their ordinary Labours, the main Reason of the Commandment must have been taken away as to them, and consequently the Command also. All therefore that remains to be considered, is the Concernment of the Stranger, who was not of the same Religion with the Jew: Where, in like manner, it must be said, That the Precept of Rest appertained rather to the Jew that had Authority over him, than unto him: For the Sabbath (as was before said) being a Sign of that Covenant which God made between the Jews and himself, it is in reason to be construed to have laid an Obligation upon such only to whom the Covenant appertained. All the Obligation that a Stranger could be supposed to lie under, must have risen not from the Law of Moses, with which he had nothing to do; but from the Law of Nations, which prescribes, that they who live in any Place, should be obedient to the Orders of it. By which means the Stranger's Obligation became rather Civil, than Religious; and consequently, tied him not to the Observation of it upon a Religious account, but only upon a Civil one. The same, mutatis mutandis, is to be said of the Concernment of Christians, unless it be as to the Rest of : For though it be a matter of Morality to allow them Rest, yet neither Morality, nor Christianity, ties us to allow it them on that day wherein we are to rest ourselves. This only would be added, That as the doing it at that time is generally necessary, because we cannot well deny them Rest, but we must abridge ourselves; so it is no unhandsome Expression of our Thanks to God for the Benefits we ourselves enjoy, to make our Fellow-creatures at the same time to taste of ours. But as, setting aside this particular Case, little need to be added, to show in what sort the Rest here spoken of appertains to us and ours; so I will not trouble myself, or you, with making any Application of it: Only because what I have said concerning Servants, may be liable to misconstruction, I will resume that Matter anew, and apply it to our own Case. And first of all, when I say, That Servants are not obliged under Sin to rest from their Labours, if they who are their Masters shall constrain them to it by Threats or Stripes, my meaning is, provided they use all due Means to free themselves from them, which in a Christian State are not ordinarily wanting to them that look after them: For so long as the State forbids such Labours, it is in the power of Servants to complain to those that are in Authority, and thereby procure both a freedom from their Labours, and a Liberty to attend the Worship of God. Where therefore such a Redress is to be had, there no doubt it ought to be endeavoured after: otherwise the Servant becomes accessary to his own Profanation, as well as the Master that compels him. But when, as it may sometimes happen even in Christian States, the Servant is in no capacity of delivering himself from so great an Evil; or when (which is, God knows, the Case but of too many) a Man falls into the Hands of Turks, who it may be will exact a greater Service from him on that Day, than on any other: in such a Case, there is no doubt he need not expose himself to danger, by refusing that Service which is imposed upon him: It being not to be thought God will punish him for those Labours, which are rather his Unhappiness than Choice, and by the refusal whereof, he should not only not have the more freedom for Religious Actions, but the less. It may suffice such a one to lift up his Heart to God, which no violence of Men or Devils can restrain him from: For, as that is all he is able to do, so it is the best part of that Worship for which the Jewish Sabbath of old, and the Christian now, is commanded to be set apart. I will conclude this Particular with that known Affirmation 
* Mark 2.27.  of our Saviour, That the Sabbath was made for Man, and not Man for the Sabbath: For if it was made for Man, to be sure it was not meant to ruin him, and bring upon him a greater Evil than all his Toil or Travel.  
2. Of the Rest here enjoined I have spoken hitherto, and shown both what it is, and to whom, and in what manner it appertains: It follows, that we inquire whether either that, or the Day, admitted of any Recreation. For, as nothing hinders, but at the same time Men might cease from Labour, and yet not cease from Recreation; so he that shall consult either the Jewish Writers, or their present Practice, will find them not to have understood it to have extended to the prohibition of it. 
Vid. Seld. de Jure Nat. & Gent. li. 3. c. 9  Whence it is, that Lyra, a converted Jew, speaking of their permitting a Sabbath-days Journey, allegeth for the Reason of it, That such a Walk was more a Recreation, than a Labour; for which cause it was not against the Rest enjoined. And indeed (however some Mens Prejudices have made it otherwise thought) neither is Recreation, provided it be moderate, any way unsuitable to their Feasts, or ours. For, as it is but reasonable that the Body should share with the Soul in its Joys, as well as be afflicted in its Griefs; so Recreation, rightly disposed, may make the Mind so much the more apt to intent the Offices of Religion. In fine, take away all Recreation, and you make the Sabbath to afford little Refreshment to Servants, and other such Labouring People, for whose Benefit we find it to have been in a great measure designed; a continued Intention of Mind, especially to those who know not the pleasure of Contemplation, being no less wearisome to the Flesh, than the Labour of the Body. The only thing that can in reason be offered against the allowance of Recreations, is that of Isa. chap. 58.13. where we find the doing and finding of one's own pleasure, joined with the doing of a man's own ways, as equally unlawful on the Sabbath. But beside that the Word we render pleasure, doth also signify 
* Vid. Eccl. 3.1. ubi quod in Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 LXX. reddunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Chald. Omni negotto, sensu etiam id postula●te.  purpose, which, if admitted here, would convert it to another sense; beside, secondly, that no other may be meant, than the forbidding of Pleasures in excess, and when they are used rather to thrust out the Worship of God, than to fit Men the better, and render them more apt for the Practice of it; both the Chaldee 
* Chal. pro eo quod est in Hebr.— faciendo voluntatem tuam,— ut non facias necessaria tua, pro— ab inveniendo voluntatem tuam— neque provideas in eo quae tibi necessaria sunt. , and the 
‖ LXX. pro— à faciendo vias tuas, ab inveniendo voluntatem tuam,— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Septuagint, understand it of the pleasure of gain, of making provision for their necessities and commodities. Which restriction is the rather to be admitted, as because the Sabbath was ordained for 
† Vid. Exod. 23.12. ubi LXX. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc.  refreshment, so because there is not the least mention elsewhere of forbidding Recreation on it. Add hereunto, what will farther confirm the former Notion, that of the same Prophet, vers. 3. Behold, in the day of your fast you find pleasure, and exact all your labours. For as it is probable from what he there subjoins concerning the exacting of their labours, that he meant no other pleasure than the pursuing of their profits; so, that he could not mean pleasures, in the proper acception of the Word, the fifth Verse of the same Chapter shows, he there intimating, that they were not wanting in afflicting their souls, which shows they were far from finding pleasure. This only would be added, That as Recreation, how lawful soever in itself, may upon other Days become unlawful, according as it may happen to be circumstantiated; so it will become so more especially upon this, if either it be unsuitable for the Kind to the Gravity of such a Solemnity, or take up too much Time in the exercise thereof. Upon which account, I should make no difficulty to condemn, (as the Statute 1 Caroli, chap. 1. did) all Meetings, Assemblies, or Concourse of People, out of their own Parishes, for any Sports or Pastimes whatsoever, or any Bear-baiting, Bull-baiting, Interludes, or Common Plays, within them; these latter, as they are rarely managed without either those Vanities or Heats which are very unsuitable to the Day, so both the one and the other being not well to be either provided for, or attended to, (according as that Statute remarks) without entrenching upon those Duties for which it was set apart. Besides, when it is apparent how great the Necessities of Men's Souls are, and how little leisure the Common sort have to consider them upon other Days; when it is farther apparent, how ill the other Festivals of the Church are observed, and consequently how little likelihood there is of men's supplying those Necessities in them, by a conscionable discharge either of Public or Private Duties of Religion; lastly, when it is apparent how apt Men are to exceed, and, upon a pretence of the lawfulness of Recreation on it, to convert that Day, which was set apart for God's Service, into a Day of Sloth or Merriment; it is easy to see how much it concerns Men to set Bounds to their Recreations on it, and avoid a profane neglect, as well as a too nice and superstitious observation of it.   

PART IU.  
By what Religious Offices the Jewish Sabbath was sanctified; which, beside the offering of Sacrifices, and other such Legal Ministrations, are shown to have been, the reading of the Law and the Prophets. An Explication of, and Exhortation out of them, Praying to, and Praising God. A Transition to the Public Sanctification of the Lord's-day, where the several Offices thereof are commemorated, and evidenced at large, both from Scripture and Antiquity. Of Reading the Scriptures in the Public Assemblies, and the both Necessity and usefulness of continuing that Practice in them. That the Reading and Hearing of the Scriptures is no improper part of God's Worship. A Caution against those who reject the Reading of the Scriptures, as insufficient to convert Souls unto God. Of the Explication of the Scriptures, and Exhortations out of them. What the Ancient Form of Sermons was, and the usefulness of all. Concerning Prayer and Praise, both which are at large evidenced to be Parts of the Lord's-day Service. The vanity of those men's Pretences, who absent themselves from our Public Prayers, because (as they think) they can make as good at home. The Administration of the Lord's-Supper, a great part of the Office of the Day.  
3. BEING by the Order of my Discourse to inquire by what Offices the Jewish Sabbath was, and ours is to be sanctified after its example; I must admonish you in the general, That it is especially by such as are strictly and properly Religious: For though God may be honoured by other Offices, yet those tend more directly towards it, and consequently also to the Sanctification of those Days which were set apart for his Honour. Setting aside therefore, for the present, what place other good Offices may have in it, I will make it my business to inquire, what Religious ones were required toward the Sanctification of the Jewish Sabbath, and what are to the Sanctification of our own.  
And first of all, if the Question be concerning the Sanctification of the Jewish Sabbath, and particularly concerning the Sanctification of it in Public; so, beside the offering of Sacrifices, and other such Legal Ministrations, we shall find they had,  
1. The Reading of the Law and the Prophets. For that this was a great part of the Business of their Sabbath, is evident from what was 
* See Part 1. of the Explic. of this Commandment.  heretofore alleged out of the Jewish Writers, and a Passage of St. James; but may be made yet more clear from Acts 13.27. where St. Paul not only affirms the Prophets to have been read every Sabbath-day, but makes it an aggravation of the Jews ignorance in the matter of our Saviour, concerning whom they so clearly foretold.  
2. But beside the Reading of the Law and the Prophets, which yet was always a part of their Service, they had, at least for the most part, an Explication of them by those who were the most eminent in Knowledge among them. And accordingly, as we find our Saviour, after the reading of a Passage in Isaiah, proceeding to the Explication of it, Luke 4.16. so the Rulers of the Synagogue of Antioch, after the reading of the Law and the Prophets, sending to Paul and Barnabas, to tell them, that if they had any word of exhortation to the people, they should say on, Acts 13.14. Agreeable hereto is a Passage of Philo, concerning a Sect among the Jews called Essenes'; to wit, 
Thorndike Rel. Assembl. ch. 3. p. 60.  That coming to their Holy Places called Synagogues, they sit down in Ranks according to Years, the Younger under the Elder, with fit decorum disposed to hear: Then one taketh the Book and readeth; another of the best practised cometh afterwards, and recogniseth that which is least understood, that is, expoundeth it. From all which it appeareth, that the Exposition of the Law and the Prophets was a part of their Sabbath-Service, as well as the Reading of it.  
3. The Case is no less plain as to the Duty of Prayer, which is one of the most proper Acts of Divine Worship; St. Luke not only telling us of a Place built for Prayer, but of certain of the Jewish Women also resorting to it on the Sabbath-day; and St. Paul taking occasion from thence to open his Doctrine to them, Acts 16.13. Which Passage is the more to be noted, because where there were no Synagogues, yet they had their Places 
* Grot. in Act. 16.13.  of Prayer, which shows they looked upon that as one of the more especial Parts of God's Worship, and such as ought not to be neglected, though the Reading of the Law and the Prophets should.  
4. Again, As Prayer was a Part of the Business of the Sabbath, so also Praise and Thanksgiving, even by the Directions of God himself. For, as we find it to have been the Office of the Levites to stand every Morning and Evening to thank, and particularly 
* See the Septuag. Version of that place; and Thorndike of Rel. Assem. c. 7. p. 219, etc.  upon the Sabbath-days, 1 Chron. 23.30. so the Title of 92 Psalm proclaims it to have been made for the Sabbath-day, as you may see if you please to peruse it. And indeed, well may we think Praising God a part of the Business of the Sabbath, when the Sabbath itself was instituted in remembrance of the Creation, and therein both of their own Being, and the Means which that furnished for their Support. Such were the Offices by which the Jewish Sabbath was to be sanctified; and not unlike, it is probable, was their way of Sanctification of it in private: But because we have not the like Evidence for it, we will leave Men to their own Conjectures, and pass to the Sanctification of the Christian one; for my more orderly Explication whereof, I will consider it, 

1. As to the Public; And,  
2. Then, as to more Private Concerns.    
1. And, first of all, if the Question be concerning the Sanctification of it in Public, for which both the one and the other Sabbath were chief separated, so we shall find the Reading of the Scriptures to have had a place in it, as well as in the Jewish one. It is true indeed, if we look no farther than those slender Narrations which the New Testament gives us of the Lord's-day Service, we shall not be able to discover any thing which may warrant us to affirm, that the Reading of the Scriptures had any place in it: But as that is not much to be wondered at, when we see so little there concerning the Observation of it at all; so there want not Reasons to believe, however there be no express mention of it, that the Reading of the Scriptures had a part in it, even then. For, as it is not easy to suppose (especially when there were so many newly converted Jews) that they would lightly departed from the Custom of the Synagogue, where the Scriptures were constantly read; so it is probable they did not, because there was the like necessity of Reading them, that there had been in the Jewish Synagogues. For though, since Printing came in use, the Scriptures are become more common, yet anciently they were in few Persons hands; and consequently, if they had not been read in Public, the generality of Christians would not have had Knowledge enough of them, to have guided them in their Opinions and Actions. Since therefore it was but necessary they should be read, it is but reasonable to conclude they were, especially when we know our Saviour to have exhorted to the search of them, and St. Paul to represent them as able to make a man wise unto salvation. But it is not only Probability we have to ground ourselves upon, as to the Scriptures being made a part of the Lord's-day Service: For though (as I said) there be no mention of Reading them upon that Day; yet there is mention of Reading them in their Assemblies, which that Day was set apart for the holding of. For thus, Col. 4.16. we find St. Paul giving in charge, that when that Epistle of his had been read amongst them, they should cause it to be read also in the Church of the Laodiceans, and in like manner read that from Laodicea themselves. And thus too, though with much more earnestness, he gives a Charge to the Thessalonians, that that Epistle of his should be read unto all the holy Brethren, 1 Thess. 5.27. But because Customs, like Rivers, are beheld with the greatest advantage at some distance from the Springs from whence they flow; from the Practice of the Church in the Apostles Times, pass we to those that immediately succeeded, where we shall find clearer Expresses of it: For thus it is the Affirmation of Justin Martyr 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Apol. 2. pag. 98. , one of the Ancientest Writers the Church hath, That upon the day called Sunday there was an Assembly of all that abode in the Cities, and the adjacent Countries, where the Commentaries of the Apostles, or the Writings of the Prophets were read, so far as Time and other Duties would give leave. Agreeable hereunto is that of Tertullian, in Chap. 39 of his Apologetic, where speaking of the Business of Christian Assemblies, which is principally to be understood of those of the Lord's-day, because the Chief, he hath these Words: 
‖ Coimus ad literarum divinarum commemorationem; siquid praesentium temporum qualitas aut praemonere cogit, aut recognoscere.  We come together to the repeating of the Divine Scriptures, according as the condition of the present Times enforceth, either to forewarn, or look back. In like manner, the same Tertullian 
† De Animâ, cap. 9 Jam vero prout Scripturae leguntur, aut Psalmi canuntur, aut Adlocutiones proferuntur, aut Petitiones delegantur, ita inde materiae Visionibus subministrantur.  speaking of a certain Virgin, who had Revelations during the Solemn Service of the Lord's-day, affirms, That the matter of her Visions was ministered as the Scriptures were read, or Psalms sung, or Exhortations produced, or Prayers preferred. Which shows the Reading of the Scripture to have been a part of the Public Service, and particularly of the Day of the Christian Sabbath.  
Now, though what hath been said, be sufficient to show the Reading of the Scriptures to be a part of the Public Service; and as such, to be diligently attended to: yet because some have rejected it, as of none, or of little Edification; and others, as more proper for the Closet than the Church; I will, before I proceed, obviate each of these Opinions, and show the groundlesness thereof. For, be it, first, that the main Design of the Scriptures is to teach us how to live, and particularly in reference to God; upon which account, the Reading of them may seem rather a Means to instruct us in, than any Part of the Worship of God: yet if it be with a regard to the Author of them, so we shall find both the Reading and Hearing thereof to be no improper Parts of God's Worship: He that reads or listens to them, as to the Word of God, no less acknowledging his Authority over us, than he who either prays to, or praises him. And accordingly, as Prayer and Praise (as being immediate Parts of God's Worship) were always accompanied with some outward Testimony of Respect; so we find also, that the Reading of the Law and the Prophets sometime was, as is evident from a Passage in each Testament: The former giving us to understand, that when Ezra opened the Book of the Law, not only he himself, but all the People stood up, Nehem. 8.4, 5. the latter, that our Saviour used the same Posture at the Reading of the Prophet Isaiah, and sat not down till he closed it: both the one and the other thereby declaring their Acknowledgement of his Authority by whose Spirit each of those Books was dictated. Whilst therefore the Scriptures are thus attended to, we do no less worship God, than learn how to do it; and the Reading and Hearing of them, is not only the way to, but a part of that very Worship to which it leads. But because there are some who, though they question not the Reading of the Scriptures upon that account, yet reject it either as unedifying, or at least not very proper for the Public Assemblies; in stead of prosecuting the former Argument, we will consider each of these Pretensions, and first that which excludes it as no way proper for the Public. For, be it, which is commonly alleged, that Men may read the Scriptures at home, as well as at the Public Assemblies: yet as there are a great number of Men who cannot read at all, and others who have no leisure for it, though they could, by means whereof they must have been ignorant of the Scripture, unless God had provided for them by the Public Reading of it; so it is apparent, that they who both can read, and have leisure for it, are too apt to omit it, and consequently, were it not for the Public Reading of it, would have had no farther knowledge of it, than they should have received from the Discourses of their Instructers: By which means they might not only have sucked in their Infirmities together with it, but sometimes also their Errors and Extravagancies. Again, If the Scriptures had been confined to Closets, and no more of them produced in Public, than what might serve either for the Subject or strengthening of a Sermon, it had been no hard matter (especially before Printing came in use) to have corrupted the Scriptures, without remedy as to the Common sort, and made them speak, not what they ought, but what every perfidious Heretic would have had them: for so those that are unlearned would have had no means to inform themselves, whether that which was suggested to them as Scripture, were genuine or no. But when the Scriptures were not only in the hands of Private Persons, but preserved in Churches, and, which is more, publicly read in them; as there was not the like encouragement to evil Men to corrupt private Copies, as knowing that their Corruptions might be detected by those Books which were in the custody of, and publicly read by the Church; so, if they had been so bold, what was read in the Assemblies would have helped Men to have discovered the Fraud, and preserved them from the Attaque of it. This only would be added, That though there be not the like danger since Printing came in use, and Men were appointed by Authority to preside over it; yet there would be danger enough, if the same Custom were not continued, of Reading the Scriptures in the Assemblies. For, as corrupt Copies may come abroad, notwithstanding all the diligence of those who have the Charge of the Press; so, if they should, the Common sort of Men would have nothing left to fence themselves against them, if the Reading of the Scriptures were banished out of the Assemblies. Add hereunto, which, though but an Argument ad hominem, may perhaps prove more prevalent, than those that speak to the Thing itself; and that is, the abhorrency that even they who would not have the Scriptures publicly read, profess to have for the Papists robbing the People of it: For, what do they less, who would have them banished from the Public Assemblies, where alone the Ignorant sort are in a capacity of receiving them? So slight, or rather so dangerous, are the Pretensions of those, who would have the Reading of the Scriptures appropriated to men's Closets: How much more then, the rejecting of the Reading of them, as if, when only read, they were not able to convert a Soul unto God? For as whatsoever force there is in Sermons, is for the substance of them derived from the Scriptures, and therefore the Power of converting Souls to lie chief there; so, if those Scriptures have not lost their credit, as well as their converting Faculty, the bare Reading of them, through God's Blessing, may be a means to convert Souls unto God. Otherwise, why should God, as he did, command the Reading of the Law, that the children of Israel might hear and learn, and fear the Lord their God, and observe to do all the words of this Law? Deut. 32.11, 12. or St. John affirm of his Gospel, that it was written that we might believe, and that believing we might have Life through his Name? For, if it was written that Men might believe, there is no doubt it is able to effect it when read, because that is enough to let Men into the Sense of it. And indeed, as, if Sermons prove more effectual, it is oftentimes because they are more attended to, their novelty and spruceness engaging our attention, whilst the plainness of the other makes it less regarded; so, if they have any advantage in themselves, it is not so much for the Arguments they allege, which are the same in both, but by the order wherein they are disposed, and the manner of application.  
Having thus shown the Reading of the Scriptures to be one part of the Public Service, and thereby asserted it from that Contempt into which it is now fallen; I proceed to inquire, Whether, as in the Service of the Jewish Sabbath, so also in the Christian, the Explication of the Scriptures is to have a part. Now that so it is, will appear if we look into the Service of the Church, as it was in the first Institution of it. And here, not to tell you, that the first Account we have of the Public Service, presents us with the mention of the Apostles Doctrine, I shall begin my Proofs with that of Acts 20.7. because speaking of the First day of the Week, or Sunday: For there we are told, That, among other the Exercises of that Day, the Disciples had a Sermon from that excellent Preacher St. Paul. All the difficulty is, what kind of Sermon that was, and whether it were not made rather in regard to his being to departed the next day, than out of a belief of its being a Requisite of that Days Service. But as the former will be easily voided, if we consider what he elsewhere 
* Acts 26.22.  affirms of his Preaching, That he said no other things than the Prophets and Moses did say should come; thereby making his Sermons but an Explication and Confirmation of the Prophets: so, that it was in regard to the Day that he so preached, as well as to his being to departed the next, the mention of the Apostles Doctrine before, among the Parts of their Public Worship, as well as the subsequent Practice of the Church, shows. If, as that Text manifestly implies, his purpose of going away the next day had any influence upon it, it was not so much for the producing of it at all, as for his drawing it out to that length to which it was; and would therefore more agreeably to the Sense, and no way dissonant to the Style of the New Testament, where such like Trajections 
‖ Vid. Knatchbull, Animadv. in Nou. Test. speciatim in Annot. ad Act. 13.27.  are used, be rendered, That on the forementioned day St. Paul preached unto them; and, because he was to departed the next, continued his Speech until midnight. From the Apostles Days, pass we to the subsequent Age, where again we shall have a pregnant Proof from Justin Martyr 
* Ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. , who continuing his Account of the Sunday-Service, adds, That after the Reader had done, the Precedent or Bishop, in a set Discourse, made an Admonition and Exhortation, to the imitation of those excellent things they had before read; agreeably to the Customs of those Times, as Mr. Thorndike 
‖ Religious Assembl. ch. 6.  hath observed, where the Sermon or Discourse was not, as now, upon any Subject indifferently, but to the Explication and Application of that which was read in the Assembly. From the Testimony of Justin Martyr, pass we to that of Tertullian 
† Apol. c. 39  fidem sanctis vocibus pascimus, spem erigimus, fiduciam figimus, disciplinam praeceptorum nihilominus inculcationibus densamus. , where we shall find a Proof of the same usance: For after he had given an Account of their coming together to rehearse the Scriptures, he adds, which, to my seeming, plainly refers to their Sermons, However, we fail not with holy Speeches to feed men's Faith, erect their Hope, fix their Confidence; neither forget we in the mean time to thicken the Discipline with the frequent inculcation of Precepts: This thickening of the Discipline with the inculcation of Precepts, being more proper to Sermons, where there is liberty to heap up many to the same purpose, than to the Reading of the Scriptures, which pass from one thing to another. However it be, as it there follows, that there also are 
* Ibidem etiam exhortationes, castigationes, & censura divina.  Exhortations, Castigations, and a Divine Censure; so, in the Place before-quoted out of his Book de Animâ, among the Solennia Dominica as he there calls them, he reckons Adlocutiones, or Speeches, as distinct from the Reading of the Scriptures. And indeed, though the Word barely read might suffice to Edification, if it were but attended to as it ought; yet forasmuch as some Men are dull of hearing, or rather of understanding, and a greater number are backward to make application of it to themselves, hence it comes to pass, that, to make them the more prevalent, it is at least very behoveful, that they to whom the Office of Preaching is committed, not only open their Understandings in them, but bring such things especially to their remembrance, as it most concerns them to consider; thickening them moreover (as Tertullian speaks) by the frequent inculcation of those several Precepts which lie dispersed in the Scriptures. But other advantage than this, as Sermons have not above the Word read, so to give them any other, were to set up the Compositions of Men (for such all Sermons are) above the pure Dictates of God's Spirit.  
From the Word Read or Preached, pass we to Prayer, an Office of the Jewish Sabbath, and no less undoubtedly of the Christian: For, as in the place before-quoted out of the Acts 
* Act. 2.42. , it is expressly reckoned as a Part of the Public Worship; as, before that, by our Saviour 
‖ Mat. 18.19, 20. , for one of those things in the performance whereof he would be present to them when they met; so, that it was one main Business of the Lord's-day Service, those very Ancient Author's before-quoted, largely show: Justin Martyr 
* Apol. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  after the ending of the Sermon, mentioning their all rising up to Prayer, and praying not only for themselves, but for all the World; of Prayer again, at the Consecration of the Eucharist, which he moreover affirms the Precedent or Bishop to pour forth with all his might. In like manner Tertullian 
‖ Coimus ad deum, quasi manu facta precationibus ambiamus. Haec vis Deo grata est. Oramus etiam pro Imperatoribus, pro ministris eorum ac potestatibus, pro statu seculi, pro rerum quiet, pro mora finis.  not only affirms the Christians to come together to God, as it were to make up a Party, by which to besiege him with their Prayers; adding moreover, that therein they recommended also the state of Emperors, and their Ministers: but in the place so often quoted out of his Book de Animâ, makes mention of the preferring of Prayers, as one of the Lord's-day Solemnities. Which Testimonies I do the rather inculcate, because though Public Prayer be one of the Chief, and always so accounted, yet it is now neglected and contemned; upon how small a pretence, we may easily judge, by what we often hear from some, That they can make the same, or as good Prayers at home: For though they could, yet not with the same advantage, either to themselves, or others, because wanting the concurrence of the Devotion of other Men, which is that that makes Prayer so acceptable. And I cannot but upon this occasion call to mind a Saying of Maimonides, remembered out of him by 
* Thorndike Rel. Assembl. chap. 6.  a Learned Man of our own Nation, to wit, That he that dwelleth in the City where there is a Synagogue, and prayeth not there with the Congregation, this is he that is called a Bad Neighbour. For, as he may well be called a Bad Neighbour (as the same Learned Man goes on) that will not lend his Neighbours Prayers the strength of his own; so he himself findeth the Fruit of his own bad Neighbourhood, when his own Prayers want the assistance of his Neighbours.  
Next to Prayer, subjoin we the Duty of Praising God, whether in or out of a Song: For that this was a part of the Public Service at the Assemblies, and consequently of the Lord's-day, which was appointed for the holding of them, the Scriptures do abundantly declare. For beside that St. Paul calls upon the Colossians, that they should teach and admonish one another in Psalms, and Hymns, and spiritual Songs, Col. 3.16. it is evident from several Passages in 1 Corinth. 14. that it was a great part of their Public Service. Thus when the Apostle, vers. 15. and so on, says, I will sing with the spirit, and I will sing with the understanding also. Else when thou shalt bless with the spirit, how shall he that occupieth the room of the unlearned say Amen at thy giving of thanks? he plainly supposeth, (because speaking all along of their Assemblies) that the Blessing and Praising God in a Song, was a part of the Public Service at them. In like manner, when he saith, vers. 26. How is it then, Brethren? when ye come together, every one hath a Psalm, a Doctrine, and a Tongue, etc. Let all things be done to edifying; though he finds fault with the disorderly performance of those several Duties, yet he supposeth them to be Duties, because prescribing Rules for the right ordering of them. From the Times of the Apostles, pass we to those that immediately succeeded, where we shall find yet more express Testimonies of this being a part of their Lord's-day Service. For thus Pliny 
* Lib. 10. Ep. 97. Adfirmabant autem hanc fuisse summam vel culpae suae vel erroris quod essent soliti state die ante lucem convenire, carmenque Christo quasi Deo dicere secum invicem. , giving an Account of what the Christians did upon the Set-day of their Assemblies, which, as was before shown, could be no other than the Lord's-day, tells us, from the mouth of some of themselves, That it was, among other things, to say one with another, by turns, a Song or Hymn to Christ, as unto God; thereby not only showing that to have been a part of their Public Service, but, as a Learned 
† Ham. Pres. to Annot. on the Psalms.  Man hath well observed, confirming that way of alternate Singing, which is still in use in the Church of England. Neither is Pliny alone in this Testimony, either as to the Singing of Hymns upon that Day, or Singing Hymns unto Christ, as God: For, as Tertullian expressly reckons the Singing of Psalms among the Lord's-day Solemnities, so Eusebius 
‖ Eccl. Hist. lib. 5. c. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  alleges against those who denied the Divinity of our Saviour, certain Psalms and Songs, written anciently by the Brethren, wherein they magnified Christ as God. It is true indeed, he saith not in that place, that they were sung in the Church, which may seem to render that Testimony so much the more defective: But as it is evident from Tertullian 
* Apol. c. 39 Post aquam manualem & lumina, ut quisque de Scripturis sanctis, vel de proprio ingenio, potest, provocatur in medium deo canere. , that Men were invited to sing in their Assemblies, as well their own Compositions, as those of Scripture; so Eusebius elsewhere 
‖ Eccl. Hist. lib. 7. c. 30. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  gives us plainly to understand, that the Psalms before spoken of were sung in their Assemblies: He there charging Paulus Samosaetenus with causing them to cease, and Songs in honour of himself to be sung in the Church. For how could Paulus Samosatenus cause those Songs to cease, unless they had been publicly sung? or, what likelihood is there, if they had not been so, that he would have introduced Songs concerning himself? I will conclude this Particular with that famous Canon of the Council of Laodicea 
* Can. ult. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. , where the Canonical Books of Scripture are enumerated: For, forbidding, as it doth, the use of such private Psalms in the Church, it shows them to have been before in use; and much more, that the Singing unto God was.  
But of all the Religious Exercises wherewith the Christian Sabbath was to be celebrated, there is certainly none which hath more to be said for it, than the Administration of the Lord's Supper, that real Thanksgiving and Praise of the Almighty, for the Blessings of the Creation, but more particularly for the Death of our Saviour. For, as we find it to have been the Attendant of the Public Assemblies of the Christians, both in the Acts, and in the First Epistle to the Corinthians; so, to be so much a part of the Lords-days Business, as to be set to denote the whole: St. Luke, Acts 20.7. making the end of the Disciples meeting together upon the First day of the Week, to be to break Bread, that is to say, as the Syriack interprets it, the Bread of the Eucharist. Agreeable hereto is that of Pliny 
* Ibid. Seque sacramento non in scelus aliquod obstringere, sed ne furta, ne latrocinia, ne adulteria committerent, ne fidem fallerent, ne depositum appellati negarent. , in the Testimony so often produced, he there telling us, That upon the Set-day spoken of before, they obliged themselves by a Sacrament, not to any wickedness, but that they would not commit Thefts, 〈◊〉 ●●ries, Adulteries, etc. Which (as hath been before shown) 〈…〉 be understood of any other than the Sacrament of the Eucharist, which we know to be an Obligation to that purpose. And though it be true, that Tertullian makes no mention of it in his Apologetic, probably because it was not his purpose to make known the manner of it to the Heathen, lest the misunderstanding of it should bring it into contempt; yet, as in his Book de Coronâ militis 
‖ Cap. 3. Eucharistiae Sacramentum, & in tempore victus & omnibus mandatum à Domino, etiam antelucanis coetibus, nec de aliorum manu, quàm praefidentium sumimus. , he mentions it as a part of the Business of those Assemblies before day, whereof we have mention in Pliny; so Justin Martyr 
† Vid. Apol. 2. loco prius citato.  not only mentions it as a part of the Lord's-day Service, but describes the Manner of the Celebration of it. From all which put together, it is evident, I do not say, how much we have departed from the Devotion of the Apostles Times, and those that succeeded; but even from the due Observation of that Day which we pretend to keep as Holy unto the Lord.   

PART V.  
An History of the due Observation of the Lord's-day, both in Private and Public: Where, among other things, is shown the Excellency of our Church's Service, and with what Affections it ought to be intended; the unsuitableness of Fasting to so joyful a Solemnity, and the great inconvenience that must necessarily ensue from the not relaxing of our Intentions: In fine, The both necessity and benefit of Meditating upon what we have heard, and applying it to our own Souls. That the Visiting and Comforting of the Sick and Distressed, the Reconciling of Parties that are at variance, and the begetting or maintaining Friendship, by kind and neighbourly Entertainments, are no improper Offices of the Day.  
2. BY what Public Exercises of Religion the Christian Sabbath is to be celebrated, hath been at large declared, both from the Precepts and Practice of the Apostles: It remains, that we inquire how it is to be sanctified in Private, which is a Duty no less incumbent upon us, than the former. For the multitude of our Affairs not permitting us on other Days to intent the Matters of Religion with that freedom and solemnity which becomes them, there ariseth a necessity, when we have both leisure, and so fair an Invitation to it, to apply ourselves to the performance of it, and supply those Defects which the Necessities of the World have made. Taking it therefore for granted, that such a Sanctification is required, I will make it my business to inquire wherein it doth consist, and what particular Duties it exacts. Only because I have not told you how we are to intent the Public Exercises of Religion, I will mix that with the Consideration of the other, and so give you a kind of History of the due Observation of the Day.  
The Lord's-day saluting our Horizon, and admonishing us both of the Blessings and Duties which it brings; it is but reasonable, where the Labours of the foregoing Day have not made it necessary to do otherwise, that we should be up betimes to meet them, and pay them that Regard which they deserve; as remembering, that the Christian Sabbath is rather a Day of Business, than of Rest, though of an easy and a gracious one. Now the first Business that presents itself on that Sacred Day, is the offering up our Sacrifice of Praise for the Resurrection of our Lord, and the Opportunity we ourselves have to celebrate it. And herein it becomes us to be so much the more hearty, because it is the Ground of its Institution, and that which gives it both its Being, and its Name. Next to the Sacrifice of Praise, subjoin we that of Prayer for the Assistance of God in the due Celebration of it; not only our own unaptness so requiring, but the importance of the Business we are to intent, and particularly of the Public one. For now we are not, as upon other Days, barely to worship God, but to do it with a more than ordinary fervour, as being thereby to supply the Defects of our past Piety, and lay a firm foundation of our future one. The Sacrifice of Prayer and Praise being thus offered up to God, and thereby an entrance made into the Sanctification of the Day, there is then place for those Businesses which our own Necessities or Conveniences invite to the performance of; but so, as that we remember we have a weightier Business to intent, and particularly our looking back into our past Impieties: For inasmuch as we are assured that God heareth not sinners, such I mean who continue in them without remorse, we are in reason, before we address ourselves to the Duty of Public Prayer, to break off our sins by repentance, and, like the Prophet Moses, to put off our shoes before we tread upon holy ground. Not that it were not convenient that this should be done at other times, and we to inquire every Night (as Pythagoras his Scholars were obliged) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Wherein have I offended? what good have I done, and what omitted? and accordingly, as that Philosopher 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Vid. Pythag. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  adviseth, either to afflict, or cheer ourselves: But that, howsoever it should, either through the necessity of our Affairs, or inadvertency, be omitted at other times, we should not fail to do it then, when we are to address ourselves to Public Prayer, by which, if by any thing, we must hope to obtain God's Favour.  
Imagine now the Bell calling you to the Public Assemblies; or rather, because both the Jewish Sabbath and ours was instituted for the holding of them, that you hear God himself doing it: In answer to which Call, you are to bring both yourselves and your Dependants, and that too at the Beginning of God's Public Worship. The former, because though other Persons may sanctify the Sabbath by their own single Piety; yet they who have Children and Servants, are to see to the Observation of it in them, as being under their direction and command: Though, were they not so obliged, the Advantage that might arise from the doing of it, might be a sufficient inducement to endeavour it; that which made Abraham so great a Confident of God, being, that God knew he would command his children, and his household after him, to keep the way of the Lord, as you may see Gen. 18.19. But neither is there less reason that the Beginning of God's Service should have both their Company and ours, than there is that it should have it at all; an imperfect Service arguing a slight esteem of him, and that we are no farther his Servants than we ourselves please: And it calls to my mind that Expostulation of God in Malachi, chap. 1.8. And if ye offer the blind for sacrifice is it not evil? and if ye offer the lame and sick, is it not evil? Offer it now unto thy Governor: Will he be pleased with thee, or accept thy person, saith the Lord of hosts? For what is that, but a blind and a lame Service, where it may be the best part of it is wanting? or, how can we think God will be pleased with that which an Earthly Prince would disdain to accept? We may suppose, by this time, the Man who desires to sanctify the Lord's-day aright, entered the Church; where having prostrated himself before the Divine Majesty, and implored his Blessing upon his Endeavours, he will need little other direction than to mind that which he comes about, and not either drowsily or irreverently to perform it: Only, that I may set the better edge upon his Devotions, I will apply my Instructions to some of those particular Duties which the Day, and the Order of our Service doth require. With admirable reason doth our Church, and almost 
* Thorndike Rel. Assembl. ch. 10.  all the Reformed ones, begin their Service with Confession of Sins, as knowing how likely they are, whilst thus bewailed, to separate between us and God: And there is the same reason we should bring to the Rehearsing of it, that due Remorse and Sorrow which the consideration of our several Offences call for; otherwise we rather dare God to avenge himself upon us, than take the way to appease or please him. But when we, who are vile enough in the eyes of God, make ourselves such both in our own esteem and expression; when we frankly lay open the Errors we have committed, and acknowledge them to be such, by our inward Contrition, and outward Sorrow; then our Confession is no less sure to be followed by the Absolution of God, than it is by that of the Priest; or rather, that God will confirm that which the Priest pronounceth: it being not certainly for nothing, that our Saviour hath said, Whosesoever sins ye remit, they are remitted; and whosesoever sins ye retain, they are retained. From the Confession and Absolution, pass we to the Lord's Prayer, according as our Liturgy doth; in the Repetition whereof, there is but reason we should rally together all the Forces of our Soul, and intent it with all our Heart and Strength; I say, not only in respect of its Author (though that certainly should procure its Regard) but in respect of its signal Use and Advantage. For whereas in our other Prayers we may ask amiss, whether in respect of the Things themselves, or the Order of our Petitions; here we are sure not to offend, because the Prayer we so utter contains all that is to be desired, and in that manner and order wherein it ought. Again, whereas in the long continuance of our Devotions, our Thoughts may be apt to flag, or wander from that Subject which they have before them, we have an opporunity to make some amends for it, by intending this excellent Prayer, wherein all those Petitions are summed up. The Mind being thus prepared by Confession of Sin, and the Devotion which the forementioned Prayer suggests, it may not be unsuitable for us to sound forth the Praises of God, which is the next thing the Liturgy suggests. For though the Psalms which it makes use of for this purpose, are generally read, and therefore looked upon by some as only matter of Instruction: yet as care hath been taken that they should be sung where they may be, which shows for what use they were designed; so it is apparent from the Psalms themselves, that they were intended not so much to instruct us, as to be Instruments in praising God for the several Blessings they commemorate. And indeed, as its Strains are all admirable, and worthy that Spirit by which they were first suggested; so they are fraught with such variety of Matter, that there is no State or Condition of Life which may not find somewhat in them suitable to it. If we lie under the Conscience of Sin, the 51 Psalms will fit us, as containing both an ingenuous Acknowledgement of it, and an earnest Prayer for the Pardon of it. If we find in ourselves that Pardon, the 32. will be a fit matter for our Devotion, because composed by David after an Absolution from his. If we lie under any Sorrow, by reason of the Prosperity of the Ungodly, we have the 72 Psalms to entertain us, the Subject whereof is no other than to show both the certainty and suddenness of their downfall. If we have received any great Deliverance from them, the Eighteenth will furnish us with Words to express our Resentment of it, as being David's Triumphant Song, when God had given him rest from his. In fine, whatever it be, here our Condition may be fitted, from the sorest Evils we lie under, to the greatest Blessings we are in a capacity to enjoy. Neither will it suffice to say, That each particular Psalm cannot fit all the Conditions before remembered: For, as it is not to be expected that they should, so an Advantage may be made of them, even by those States and Conditions with which they seem but ill to accord. Thus, for example, if the Psalm be a Psalm of Joy and Thanksgiving, and it may be too for those very Mercies under the want whereof thou now labourest; yet being agreeable enough to the Condition of other Men, thy Charity will teach thee how to make use of it, by prompting thee to rejoice with those to whom it is more accommodable. In like manner, though the Psalm should spend itself in Complaints, which thou, through the Mercy of God, findest little cause for; yet so long as there want not such to whose Condition they are agreeable enough, there is place for the same Charity, and an Invitation to mourn with and for them. Which Answer is of so much the more force, because we are not now entreating of Private Worship, which, as much as may be, aught to be adapted to our own particular Concerns; but of the Public Worship of God, which is to extend itself to the Concernments of all. As little ground of Exception is there against the use of the Magnificat, because in the strictness thereof proper to her that made it: For, beside that the Repetition of it is one of the most signal Completions of all Generations calling her Blessed, according as she there foretold, each of us hath so much Interest in the Birth of our Saviour, especially if he be also born in us, that it can be no way improper to say, My soul doth magnify the Lord, and my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour. If there be any thing in that, or other the like Psalms, peculiar to the Makers of them, it will be no hard matter for a diligent Observer so to accommodate them to himself, as to make them fit his Mouth, provided he take care to suit his Heart to them, and to that Heavenly Spirit wherewith they were framed. Sure I am, what is now thought an Objection against them, was not thought so by St. James, or St. Paul; the former whereof invites to the Private Singing, the latter to the Teaching and Admonishing one another, in Psalms, and Hymns, and spiritual Songs: For what other Psalms can we think intended, than those of David, which before and since that time have in a manner appropriated that Title unto themselves? I will conclude this Particular with that Doxology wherewith they are closed, of giving Glory to each Person in the Trinity: For whilst we thus direct them to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost, as well as to the Father, we fit them yet more to our Mouths, because making them to proclaim the Honour of our Saviour, and of that Spirit which he hath poured out upon his Church. Such are our Concernments in the Duties before remembered; and not unlike are those, in the Duties that remain: and therefore, in stead of prosecuting them any further, I shall subjoin this general Advertisement, which each one may make use of as occasion requires; to wit, That as the Remainder of our Service doth ordinarily consist in Reading, or Preaching the Word, in Confession of Faith, and in Prayer; so Men will satisfy the first by a diligent and affectionate Intention; the second, by a Resolution to adhere to that Faith which they profess; and the third and last, by a hearty and fervent Devotion.  
The Morning-Sacrifice being thus offered up to God, Custom, and our own Necessity's licence us to retire to our own Homes, there to give ourselves that Repast, and other Relaxation, that is due. Which Particulars I the rather allege, to confront the Practice of some Men, whom Superstition, more than any well-guided Zeal, hath influenced. For is it any other, to turn a Festival into a Fast, and keep that Day as a Day of Humiliation, which was the happy Parent of the greatest Joy? Nay, is it not in some measure an Affront to that Blessed Work, by which it became separate from others? For, if that were a matter of rejoicing, why should we make it a matter of Sorrow? and when God calls so loudly to Joy and Gladness, present him with all the Expressions of Grief? And it calls to my mind that known Passage of the Book of Nehemiah, where the People of Israel wept sore at the hearing of the Law: for, in stead of encouraging them in it, Ezra, who read the Law, bade them go their way, eat the fat, and drink the sweet, and send portions to them for whom nothing was prepared, because that day was holy to the Lord, Nehem. 8.9. plainly intimating, that such a Return was no way becoming a Day of Gladness; and if so, neither a Christian one. Sure I am, as the Ancient Church 
* Tertull. de Coronâ. Die Dominico jejunium nefas ducimus, vel de geniculis adorare.  religiously abstained from fasting on the Lord's-day, as no way suitable to the Business of it; so the Apostles, and the Church in their time, not only held their Lord's-Supper on it, but those Feasts of Charity also which were the Attendants of it. But neither is it less unreasonable, if Men would consider it without prejudice, to enjoin Men so to keep up their Intention of Sacred Things, as not to allow a Relaxation of it at their Meals. For, as it is absolutely impossible, so long as we carry about us the Infirmities of Humane Nature, to have our Thoughts always fixed upon Heaven, and Heavenly Things; so, by imposing it either upon ourselves, or others, we make ourselves the more unapt for the Public Worship of God, when we are called to the Celebration of it: our preceding Intention taking off from that Vigour and Spriteliness which is requisite to the performance of it. On the contrary, if we would but for some time unbend our Cares, or divert them to less serious purposes, like those who run back to make the more advantageous Leap, we should come on with the greater vigour, and not only not dishonour this Sacred Day, but sanctify it the more.  
Having thus given ourselves some respite from Religious Exercises, and thereby fitted ourselves for the more advantageous performance of it, it will be time for us both to look back to the Duties we have passed, and forward to the Duties that remain: the former, that if any thing have been amiss in them, we may retract and bewail it; the latter, that we may come prepared to the due performance of them. But of all the Duties that are to take up our Thoughts, between the Morning and the Evening Sacrifice, there is none which is more incumbent on us, than a serious Reflection upon those we have received from the Mouth of our Instructor: For, as otherwise they will be apt to slip out of our Minds, and thereby deprive us of those Advantages which might otherwise accrue, so, unless we meditate upon them, like Meat unchewed, they will contribute little to our Nourishment, in those Spiritual Graces wherein we are to grow. From a Reflection upon what is past, pass we to a Consideration of that which is to come, even those several Public Duties we are again to pass: Where, setting aside all other Thoughts, we should endeavour to imprint in our Minds how much it concerns us to intent them: For, as by so doing we should be the more excited to implore the Divine Assistance, without which it is impossible to be done, so we should be much more apt to pay them that Regard which the Importance thereof doth require: It being no slight Consideration, where it is well inculcated, that our Eternal Welfare doth depend upon it, and that, as we observe this Temporal Sabbath, we may either attain, or come short of that Eternal Sabbath in the Heavens. For, as there is no doubt our Eternal Welfare depends upon the performance of Religious Actions, and particularly of those wherein the Honour of God is immediately concerned; so there will be little likelihood of our intending them at other times, if we slight them over then, when we have both leisure, and all other requisite means, to help us in the performance of them. By these, and such like Considerations, if we arm ourselves, we shall be in a good disposition to offer up the Evening-Sacrifice; which supposed, we shall neither need any Incitement to the performance of it, nor Direction after what manner we are to doit; it being not hard, especially after what was said concerning the Morning-Service, to read our own Qualifications in those Duties which we are summoned to perform.  
Suppose we now, having laid down Rules for the Observation of it so far, that the Religious Man hath assisted at the Evening Sacrifice, and thereby acquitted himself of the Public Duties of the Day; yet, even so, there will not want wherewith to exercise himself, till he commit himself to his Rest, and unto God. Not but that there is place for necessary Occasions, and a moderate Relaxation of himself; but that his Heart ought to be in a disposition to embrace all Occasions to do Honour to God, and to the Day. Among which, I reckon chief the Meditating upon what he hath heard, and Applying it to his own Soul; it being for want of this, that so many Souls perish, which might otherwise have proved glorified one's. They hear indeed what they ought, and what they ought not to do; they listen to the Judgements which God denounceth against the one, to the Promises whereby he encourageth the performance of the other: but taking no care afterwards to consider how far they are concerned in either, both the one and the other quickly vanish, and they go on as securely, as if they had nothing to fault in themselves, or there were no other World to punish them, though they had. But not any longer to entertain the Mind of the Religious Man with such Things wherein God's Glory is immediately concerned, let us see whether he may not find Matter enough for his Lord's-day Service in visiting the fatherless and widows in their affliction, in which St. James makes Religion in part to consist: For though it be true, that those are no part of the Worship of God or Christ, for which especially this Day is set apart; yet they draw so near towards it, that they may not only be thought to be a part of the Business of it, but a considerable one; our Saviour having told us, that what is done unto the Sick and the Distressed, he takes as done unto himself. And accordingly, as Justin Martyr 
* Apol. 2. p. 98. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  tells us, that Charity had a constant place even in their Public Assemblies upon it, the Rich, according as they saw good, contributing to that Stock out of which the Poor and the Necessitous were to be relieved; so, that that and other such like Works were no way improper to the Day, St. Paul shows, where he commands the Corinthians, as he had before the Churches of Galatia, to lay by them on that day, as God had prospered them, toward the relief of the poor Saints at Jerusalem. The same is to be said of reconciling Parties at variance, of endeavouring to beget or maintain Friendship, as by other ways, so by a kind and neighbourly treating of each other; witness those Feasts of Charity of which St. Judas speaks, which were anciently an Appendix of the Lord's Supper, as that was of this Sacred Day. Care only would be taken, that whilst these have their due Regard, we forget not those higher Purposes for which the Day was set apart; such as are the Reading of the Scriptures, and other such Books of Instruction and Devotion; our instilling into those who are under our respective Charges, the Precepts of a Holy Life; and, in fine, the Commending both of ourselves and them, by Prayer, to the Protection of that God to whose Service this Day was set apart.     



AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EXPLICATION OF THE FOLLOWING Commandments.  
IN A DISCOURSE Concerning that Most Excellent RULE OF Life and Manners, Which prescribes The doing as we would be done by; And is moreover Represented by OUR SAVIOUR AS The LAW and the PROPHETS.  
LONDON, Printed for John Martin, at the Bell in St Paul's Churchyard. M.DC.LXXV.   

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EXPLICATION OF THE FOLLOWING COMMANDMENTS. In a DISCOURSE concerning that Most Excellent RULE of Life and Manners, Which prescribes The doing as we would be done by.  
The Contents.  
Of the Nature of the present Rule, and that it is neither the Primary, nor an Absolute Rule of Humane Actions. The former hereof evidenced from our Saviour's recommending it as the Sum of the Law and the Prophets; but, more especially, from that Divine Law's being the Primary Rule of them: The latter, from the possibility of our Desires becoming irregular, and so far therefore no legitimate Measure of our Actions. Inquiry is next made into the Sense and Importance of it; where is shown, first, both from the Nature of the Rule, and particular Instances, That we are to understand thereby The doing unto others what we ourselves can lawfully desire to be done unto ourselves by them. An Objection against this Limitation, answered. It is shown, secondly, That we are to understand by it, The doing unto others what we should desire to be done unto ourselves, if we were in their place and condition: As, thirdly, That we should do to others what we should desire to be done unto ourselves, by those particular Persons, or any other. A Transition to the Consideration of the Equitableness thereof; which is evinced, first, from the Reputation it hath either procured to itself, or met with among Natural Men; from its being so esteemed of even by those who do most transgress it; and from the Equality of all Men, both in their Nature, and Obligation to the Divine Laws. Of the Comprehensiveness of the present Rule, and in what sense it may be affirmed to be the Law and the Prophets. In order whereunto, is shown, first, That it is not to be understood as an Abstract of that Part of the Law and the Prophets which contains our Duty to God, as which the present Rule is neither any proper Measure of, nor intended by our Saviour as such: Secondly, That it comprehends in it the whole of our Duty to our Neighbour, and particularly all those which are comprised in the following Commandments. A Conclusion of the whole, with a Reflection upon that more usual Rule of Humane Actions, even of doing to Men as they have done to us; the Iniquity whereof is noted, and censured.  
THOUGH Abridgements, where they are rightly ordered, do only pair off unnecessary Things, and, like Pictures in little, present us with all the Lineaments of that Work they pretend to abridge, without taking notice of its Dress, or the Embellishments thereof: yet they are for the most part so ill managed, that they do rather maim than contract it; and, in stead of giving us a just Prospect of the Whole, present us with no one Part entire. But as we cannot lightly presume those Abridgements to be such, which have the Wisdom of the Father for their Author; so, if we carefully survey the Abridgement that is now before us, we shall find it to be as comprehensive as our Saviour hath represented it, and not only a Compendium of, but the very Law and the Prophets: There being no one Precept of the Second Table, to which this Great Rule of Life and Manners will not reach, and lead us both to understand and practise. Only as in reason Men ought to have a distinct knowledge of the Rule itself, before they proceed to consider it as the Abstract of others; so I intent accordingly to inquire into its Nature, Importance, and Equity, before I attempt to show the Comprehensiveness thereof.  
1. That the Rule we have now under consideration, is no primary Rule of Humane Actions, is evident both from that Argument whereby our Saviour hath enforced it, and the Measure from which Humane Actions receive their Rectitude or Obliquity: For our Saviour pressing upon his Disciples The doing as they would be done by, upon the score of its being the Sum of what the Law and the Prophets taught, he gives us thereby to understand, That the Law and the Prophets are the Measure of that also, no less than of our Conversation and Obedience. And though, to Minds not prepossessed, this one Consideration might suffice to persuade, that the Rule now before us is no Primary Rule of Humane Actions; yet I cannot forbear to say, it will become much more apparent, if we consider from whence Humane Actions receive their respective Rectitude or Obliquity. For receiving both their Denomination and Quality from the Law and Will of God, to whom, as being our Lord and Maker, we are in reason to conform; the doing as we would be done by, can be no farther a Rule of our Deportment, than as those Desires of ours shall appear to be conformable to his Laws, and consequently those Laws of his, and not our own Desires, the Primary Rule of Humane Actions. Of what use this Observation is, will hereafter appear more clearly, when I come to declare the due Importance of the Rule now before us: It may suffice here to note, That, being no Primary Rule of Humane Actions, it cannot have place but either in the want of some express Law, or where we are under any prejudices against it. For, the Law and Will of God being the Primary Rule of Humane Actions, there is no doubt but, if that give us information, we ought to be guided by it, and not seek direction elsewhere: Otherwise we do like those who take directions from a Clock, at the same that the Sun stairs them in the Face, and, by a Language that is easy to be understood, calls upon them to look up to him, or upon those Dial's whereon he shines: For, as it would be absurd for any Man to take his Directions from such Helps, when he may know the Hour of the Day from the other; so it would be no less for us to investigate our Duty to our Neighbour, by what we ourselves would desire to be done to us, when at the same time we may read that Duty in God's express Declarations concerning it. Only, as it may sometime happen, (and I wish I could say it doth not often do so) that what is clearly enough revealed, may yet be obscure to us, or at least difficult to be practised, through the Prejudices we have against it; so, in that case, I should no way doubt the forementioned Rule may be made use of to instruct us in our Deportment to our Neighbour: He who in such a case considers, what he himself could be content to have done unto himself, if he were in the same Circumstances with his Neighbour, making use of it, not so much to detract from the Honour of the Primary Rule of Virtue (which, so far as he understands it) he faileth not to consider) but in compliance with his own Infirmities, and that he may be the more easily induced to yield Obedience to it; Men being more apt to see what is just and equitable, when their own Concernments are interwoven with it, than they are in the condition of a Stranger.  
2. It is to be observed, secondly, That as to do as we would be done by, is no Primary Rule of Humane Actions; so neither is it, though in a secondary sense, an absolute and unlimited one: Because, though we cannot desire any thing which comes not unto us under the notion of Good, yet we may take that for Good which is far from being such, and consequently make it the Object of our Desires. For, what through the weakness, or rather crazedness of our Understandings; what through the Power our Affections have to corrupt and debauch their Sentence, it happens not infrequently, that even these also do 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and prophesy rather what is suitable to the corrupt temper of those that ask, than what is agreeable to Truth and Equity. Upon which, as there will necessarily follow a like Irregularity in our Desires, because moulded and fashioned by our Understandings; so those Desires of ours therefore can no more be an absolute Rule of our Deportment, than they can be supposed to be the Primary one. But from hence it will also follow, that when we make the present Rule our own, we understand the doing unto others as we ourselves can fairly desire to have done unto us by others. For, to do as we would be done by, being not the Primary Rule of Humane Actions, nor yet an absolute and unlimited one, it is in reason to be bounded by that Law of God which is the Primary Rule both of our Desires and Actions, and therefore also the Measure of this Rule, no less than of our Conversation and Obedience.  
It being thus evident of what nature the Rule before us is, that is to say, a Secondary and a Limited one; inquire we, in the next place, into the due Importance of it. Where,  
1. First, The Premises so persuading, we are necessarily to understand the doing unto others what we ourselves can Lawfully desire to be done unto ourselves by them: For if our desires be irregular, those Actions will be also such which receive their Measure from them, and consequently cannot be supposed to be any part of our Saviour's meaning. Thus, for instance, if a Woman should consent to comply with another's Lust, upon the score of her own desiring that that other should so comply with hers, we are not to think that Action of hers to be therefore legitimate, or indeed to admit of any Excuse; because her Desire being sinful, that Action must also be so, which is influenced and directed by it. In like manner, if it should be pleaded, as it sometimes is by those who call for Liberty of Conscience, That we ourselves, if we were in their Circumstances, would not be well pleased to be restrained; I should think it no hard matter to prescribe against that Plea, from the Limitation before laid down: For, the Question is not, Whether we ourselves, if we were in their Circumstances, should not desire a freedom from Punishment, (for what Malefactor doth not, how obnoxious soever to the stroke of it?) but, Whether we can lawfully desire it, and whether the Supreme Magistrate ought not to punish those who seem to him to transgress the Rules of Christianity, whatsoever their Pretences be? Which, if true, that other Plea will come to nothing. For, as it ceaseth not to be lawful for the Magistrate to inflict a Punishment upon Malefactors, because it is not unlikely that, if he were in their Condition, he would not be over-willing to suffer it; so, neither for the same Person, supposing as was before supposed, to restrain those who live in disobedience to the Laws of Christianity, because if he were so affected, he would be desirous to be freed from it. It is indeed an excellent Rule to do as we would be done by; it is of great advantage to the right ordering of our Lives, and of like necessity to be considered: But as it is not either the Primary, or an Absolute Rule of Humane Actions; so, there is no doubt it is a much more excellent Rule, to do to other Men what God hath particularly directed us to do, and what we ourselves, if we were well advised, would desire they should do to us. This only would be added, That when I say, we are to understand by doing as we would be done by, the doing what we ourselves can lawfully desire to be done unto us by others, we understand this Limitation only where some particular Rule may appear to judge of the Lawfulness of the Action by: For though there may, and no doubt ought to be place for the consideration of the Lawfulness of our Desire, where any such Rule appeareth; yet there is no necessity at all for such a Consideration, where no such particular Rule appeareth: partly, because in that case we may reasonably presume the Desire to be lawful, and therefore need not make any scrupulous Inquisition into it; and partly because the Rule now before us having place especially in the want of a more particular one, it is in reason to have its full force in the directing of our Actions, where no such particular Law appeareth to control it.  
But because it may be said, That, if the foresaid Limitation be at all admitted, the Rule we have now before us will be so far forth of no use; it seeming as easy to discover what we ought to do unto others, as what we may lawfully desire to have done unto ourselves: Therefore, before I proceed to any new Limitations, I will endeavour to remove that Umbrage, which the following Considerations will effect. For, though it may be as easy in itself to discover what we ought to do unto others, as what we may lawfully desire to have done unto ourselves; yet it is not so, considering the Prejudices we lie under against the Improvement of their Happiness: what we do toward the Improvement of their Happiness, for the most part detracting from our own, and therefore not likely to be very favourably considered by us. Again, Though it should be as easy to discover what we ought to do to others, as what we ourselves may lawfully desire from them; yet will not the former Discovery be of equal force to incline us to the doing of it: because, whilst that hath mere Duty to bind it on us, this hath Self-interest also to recommend it, which is one of the most potent Incentives to Obedience. And indeed, as Experience showeth, that we do never with greater advantage consider the Concernments of other Men, than when we do consider what we in the like case should desire to be done unto ourselves; so we do not infrequently take that course, not so much to satisfy ourselves concerning our Duty to them (as, which is oftentimes apparent enough) but the better to inculcate the Practice thereof upon us. In which case, the bounding of our Duty to our Neighbour, by what we ourselves may lawfully desire, will be no hindrance to its use; because there can be no doubt, that what we ought to do unto others, may lawfully enough be desired by ourselves. Thus, without leaving the Rule in that generality wherein it is delivered, it may be of signal use to us in directing our Deportment to our Neighbour; he who makes his Neighbour's Case his own, as the present Rule obligeth, being both most likely to discern the Equitableness of what he demands, and most likely to be prevailed upon to comply with it.  
2. I observe, secondly, That when question is made concerning the Importance of the present Rule, we are to understand the doing unto others what we would should be done to us if we were in their place and condition. For, it being manifestly its intention, that we should take our measure of doing to others, from what we ourselves should desire to have done unto ourselves; it doth consequently suppose, that their Case and ours be brought to an equality, because otherwise there could be no equality in the Measure. Thus, for example, if a Man be well provided of this World's Goods, and consequently neither needeth nor desireth to borrow aught from others; yet it will not follow from thence, that he may lawfully hold his hand from the dispensing of those Goods to the Necessitous: because the Question is not, Whether a Rich Man, as such, would content himself without any Contribution from others; but, Whether or no he would be so contented, if his Case were as necessitous as theirs, who address themselves to him for Relief. On the other side, if a Man be of mean and private Condition, and agreeably thereto content himself with it, and neither aspire after Honour and Obedience from others; yet it will not follow from thence, that he may withhold that Respect and Obedience from those who are his Superiors in Birth or Place: because, the Question is not, Whether, under the present Circumstances, he can content himself without them; but, Whether, if he were in the Quality and Condition of those that are above him, he would not expect that Respect and Obedience which is due to their Place and Birth. A thing which is not hard to be divined by those who have seen the World, or made any Observations in that Part of it in which they live themselves. For thus we have seen Men, who, when low, walked with downcast Looks, and breathed nothing but Mortification and Self-denial; but being advanced to Places of Eminency, looked as high as those whom they before condemned, and called for that Respect and Obedience which before they thought it so indifferent to show.  
3. Lastly, When it is said, (for so our Saviour, whose this Rule is, hath expressed it) Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you do ye also to them; the meaning thereof is not, Whatsoever ye would that this or that particular Person should do to you, do you also to those particular Persons; but, Whatsoever you would should be done to you by whomsoever, do you also do to all in the like Circumstances. For, the force of our Saviour's Words consisting in this, that we should make our own Desires the Rule of our Deportment unto others, it matters not whether we desire the Thing in question of this or that particular Person, so we desire it at all under the same Condition. And therefore, if there be any so fond, as not to afford Relief to a distressed Enemy, because he himself would, it may be, be so haughty as not to desire it from any such, he is not therefore to think himself to be disobliged from this Rule of doing as he would be done by: For if he could not but desire to be relieved under the same distressed Condition, the Rule obligeth to the affording of it, because making our own Desires to be the Measure of giving unto others. And more than this I shall not need to say concerning the Importance of the present Rule, and may therefore go on to show the Equity thereof, the third Thing proposed to be discoursed of.  
Now the first thing that I shall allege for the Equity of this Rule, is the Reputation it hath either procured to itself, or met with among Natural Men, and such as had no other Light than their own Reason to direct them. For, though it be apparent, that the Heathen borrowed many of their Say from the Scriptures, and we therefore not lightly to look upon every thing that proceedeth from them, as a pure Dictate of Reason and Nature; yet I know not how we can avoid the looking upon this Rule as such, because used by a Heathen long before our Saviour's time, and indeed before there was any clear mention of it in the Scripture. For thus we are told by Diogenes Laertius 
* Lib. 5. in vita Arist. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. , of Aristotle, That when he was asked how we ought to carry ourselves towards our Friends, he made answer, That we are so to carry ourselves towards them, as we ourselves could wish they should carry themselves to us. And though the Emperor Severus, who had this Saying often in his Mouth, Whatsoever thou wouldst not should be done unto thyself, do not thou unto another; though he, I say, be known to have borrowed that Saying either from the Jews, or Christians; yet the great esteem he, though a Heathen, had of it, showed that it was agreeable to Reason; and though his own Understanding helped him not to discover it, yet it taught him to approve it.  
I allege, secondly, (For in things of this nature such kind of Proofs are allowable, partly because things so clear will hardly admit of any other Proof, and partly because the last Appeal in things of Reason and Morality, must be made to the Consciences and Persuasions of Men.) I allege, I say, for the Equitableness of the present Rule, That it is so esteemed of by all sorts of Persons, yea even by those who do most transgress it. For, as Tertullian 
* De testimony animae, cap. 2.  concluded it to be the Testimony of a Soul naturally Christian, That there is but One True God, because they who worshipped Many, could not yet forbear, in their common Discourse, to say, God grant, and If God will, and God seethe all things; so may we, That this Precept is a Dictate of Nature; because even those who transgress it themselves, do yet acknowledge the Equity thereof. For though in the Concernments of others, such Persons cannot, or will not see it; yet when the Tables come to be turned, and their Adversaries deal more harshly with them than they think themselves to have deserved, there is nothing more usual than to object, That they themselves would not be contented to be so used, if they were in the same Circumstances with them.  
Lastly, (For I am unwilling to let any thing pass without a more direct Proof, which may be supposed to be capable thereof.) I allege for the Equity of the present Rule, the Equality of all Men, both in their Nature, and Obligation to the Divine Laws. For, being there is no difference between one Man and another in their Nature, and much less in their Obligation to the Divine Laws; being whatsoever difference there is between us in Condition, is by God's setting one above another, and placing him in a higher State and Degree: if, that Difference set apart, as the present Rule supposeth, and the Change that happeneth in Humane Affairs obligeth us to do; if, I say, that Difference set apart, I could not but desire, that he who is better furnished with this World's Goods, should afford some Relief to me in my necessity, I cannot but think it just to afford the same Relief to him who is under the like Circumstances. For, it being but reasonable, that those things which are equal, should have an equal measure; If I, who am but equal to my Brother in Nature, and, by my own supposition, now equal to him in Condition, could not yet but desire Relief myself, from those that are able to afford it; there is the same reason for his desire of it, and consequently the same necessity of his being gratified in it, by me, or any Man else that is in a Capacity to afford it.  
The last thing comes now to be spoken to, even the Comprehensiveness of the Rule now before us; a thing which our Catechism doth not obscurely insinuate, when it premiseth it to those Duties we own unto our Neighbours: but our Saviour much more clearly, when he affirms it to be the Law and the Prophets. Now there are two sorts of Duties which the Law and the Prophets contain, and to one or both of which therefore this Rule is to be supposed to have a regard; the Duties we own to the Great Creator of the World, or the Duties which are owing by us to our Neighbour. The former of these are no way pertinent to the present Rule, or at least not in those Terms wherein it is delivered by our Saviour; because the Persons from whom we expect a favourable deportment, and to whom accordingly we aught to be ready to afford it, are by our Saviour 
* Mat. 7.12. Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that Men should do unto you, do ye even so to them.  supposed to be Men, or rather in express Terms declared so to be. Not to tell you, that it would be a kind of arrogancy to apply it to the Duty we own to God, or attempt to judge of that Duty by it; because so we could not do, without seating ourselves in the Place of God, which is too great a Presumption to do, even by a Supposition. If the doing as we would be done by, may with any propriety be referred to God, it is only as the desire of his dealing favourably with us, is considered as an Argument to prompt us to the like deportment towards our Brethren. And in this sense there is no doubt it hath the countenance of Equity, as well as the Suffrage of the Almighty. For, as God hath not allowed us to expect Mercy from him, upon any other Terms than the showing the like Mercy to our Brethren; so they who consider the little reason we have otherwise to expect it, will think it but equitable to afford it. For, if we would that God, who is no way obliged to us, yea, who is many ways disobliged by us, should yet afford some Relief to our Necessities; how much more reasonable must we think it to be, to allow the same unto our Brethren, to whom we are even by that God obliged?  
But not to insist any longer upon so remote a Sense, especially after that we ourselves have declared it so to be; proceed we to consider it with reference to the Duty we own to our Neighbour, and as the Sum of the Law and the Prophets concerning it. For my more advantageous Explication whereof, I will apply it to all those Precepts of the Decalogue, which respect the Welfare of our Neighbour.  
To begin with that which gives beginning to them, even that which calls upon us to Honour our Father and Mother, whether as that imports the Honour that is due unto Superiors, or as it doth also connote that Fatherly and gentle Usage which those Superiors are to show to those that are under their command. For, who that carries about him, I do not say the common Infirmities of Humane Nature, but even the most innocent Affections of it; who, I say, that is only such, but would expect Honour and Obedience, if he were advanced to that Dignity, to which his envied Neighbour is? Shall we suppose the lowliness of his Mind to repress such Desires? But as that requires no more than such an humble Opinion of a Man's self as is answerable to his own Quality and Condition; so we see but too frequently, that a change of Fortune produceth a change also in the Mind, yea such a change as is also superior to the other. Shall we then say (and indeed more than that we cannot say) that the present lowness both of his Fortune and Mind may keep him at least from thinking that he should give entertainment to more lofty Desires? But even that will not be a bar to the discovery of other Inclinations, if he will but advert to his present Demeanour under it. For, as there are few so low, who have not some also under them, whether in the relation of Children or Servants; so we see but too apparently, that even they cannot without regret receive from the other any Disrespect or Disobedience. Now forasmuch as it is impossible for any Man not to desire Respect and Obedience, supposing himself advanced to that Dignity which doth require it; forasmuch as that Impossibility will easily discover itself to him who shall but reflect upon his own Demeanour toward those that are below him; it will not be hard to collect, That, if he have also a regard to this Rule of our Saviour,, he will find himself in a manner necessitated to pay the same Respect and Obedience unto others: He who doth as he would be done by, being not in a condition to deny it; because, if he were in their Circumstances, he could not but desire it. And though they who are in any Place of Eminency, will be as apt to forget their respective Duties, and treat their several Inferiors rather as Slaves than Subjects; yet would they not continue so to do, if they would but suppose those their Subjects Condition to be their own, and reflect withal upon that Demeanour which such a Supposition, and the present Rule inferreth. For it being not to be thought that any Man will be so much an Enemy to himself, as not to desire to be favourably treated, though in the Condition of a Subject; the very supposition of such a Condition, and the Rule we have now before us, will oblige him that maketh it, to show the same favourable Treatment unto others: He doing not as he would he done by, who treats his Subjects as Slaves, when it is manifest, that, if he were in their condition, he would both desire and expect a more gentle usage. And indeed, if even the Greatest Princes would consider the Inconstancy of all Earthly things, and how often it falls out that they who are now at the Top, are brought down to the lowest Round, they would not think it any way unreasonable to suppose themselves in the condition of Subjects, or, doing so, to learn Clemency by it; it being certainly more eligible to learn Clemency by so easy a Supposition, than by their own sad and dear-bought Experience. So easy a matter were it both for Superiors and Inferiors to read their respective Duties in this short Aphorism of our Saviour. And if so, we may well allow it to be a Comprehensive one, yea, so far as the former Persons are concerned, the whole Law and the Prophets.  
To that Commandment which enjoins the Honour of Superiors, subjoin we that which forbids the kill of any Man; whether we understand it as taking care for the Lives and Persons of Men, or forbidding either greater or lesser violations of them. For who seethe not, that the present Rule hath equal place here, yea that it extends itself to the several Injunctions and Prohibitions of it? For, is there any Man who would not desire all requisite Love and Benevolence to his Person, or at lest who would not be in some measure provided against the several Necessities and Exigencies thereof? Is there any Man who would not be secured from any greater or lesser Violences, who would not desire to have his Life preserved to him, yea the Pleasures and Happinesses thereof? But, so if there be not, let the Transgressor of this Commandment see, how he will answer either his own Uncharitableness or Maliciousness to other men's? his withholding from them the Offices of Humanity, or bringing upon them Misery and Death? For whatever this may otherwise be, to be sure it is no way answerable to his own Expectations or Desires; and he must give the Lie to his own Conscience, as well as to the common Sentiments of Humane Nature, if he pretend to act herein as he desires to be dealt withal himself.  
I will not so much as ask, or only ask, if I do, whether the Adulterer or Adulteress would be content to fall under that Injury and Reproach which they stick not to bring upon another: for as there is no one thing which Humane Nature doth more passionately resent, than the Violation of the Marriagebed; so it is not at all rare, to see those exalt the Fidelity of their Consorts, who are not over-guilty of it themselves. Instead therefore of insisting any longer upon this Commandment, I will go on to those that follow, and see whether they also do not stand or fall, according as this most excellent Rule is either observed or neglected.  
For to address myself to that which is next in order, though that no more than the other will require any long Discussion; Is there any Man who could be contented to have his Property either invaded or purloined, to have it extorted from him by force, or drawn away from him by deceit? Nay, is not the contrary apparent enough in those who are most concerned to inquire, because, without any scruple, preying upon the Properties of Men? For, as it hath been of old observed, that Justice is so necessary a Virtue, that even Thiefs think themselves obliged to preserve it among themselves; so, how ill pleased they would be with the loss of their legitimate Properties, their ill resenting of any unfaithful dispensation of the Common Booty, proclaims both to others and themselves.  
Lastly, (For in so large a Subject it is harder to know when to make an end, than to want proper Matter for a Discourse.) As there is no Man who can well brook the being falsely spoken of, or that his Neighbour should covet his Possessions; so the Rule we have now before us, obliging us to frame our Deportment by what we would should be done unto ourselves, doth consequently restrain us from bearing false witness against, or coveting the Possession of our Neighbour. For, whatever guilty Men may say or think, he certainly that cannot keep his Mind from hankering after his Neighbour's Possessions, would be much less satisfied to have that Neighbour of his cast an evil eye upon his own.  
Now though having said thus much concerning the Rule that is now before us, I may seem not to have omitted any thing which may be of force to recommend it; yet because there is another Rule which pretends to Rival it, and which therefore, whilst it continues in reputation, may not a little impede the espousing of it; I deem it but necessary to bring that also before you, and examine the legitimateness of its Pretensions. For, do not the generality of Men think it reasonable enough to do to others as they have done to them, and return upon them those Violences they have offered? Doth not the Magistrate proceed conformably to that Rule, in his several Decrees and Judgements? and all Men look upon those as receiving but their Deserts, who suffer no other than what they inflicted? And though Tully be a Person who hath certainly done more right to Morality, than any or almost all that preceded or followed; though the Precepts he delivers be generally very conformable to those of Nature and Christianity: yet even he seems to advise, or at least not to forbid the doing unto other Men as they have before done themselves; where he represents it as a part of Justice, 
* De Offic. l. 1. Sed justitiae primum munus est, ut ne cui quis noceat, nisi lacessitus injuriâ.  not to hurt any Man; adding by way of exception, unless before provoked by an Injury: which shows at least, that he thought it no way unlawful to retaliate. But as the Scripture, which is more to be credited, hath taught us another Lesson, because forbidding us to say, 
‖ Prov. 24.29.  I will do to my Neighbour as he hath done to me, I will render to the man according to his works; so it hath elsewhere assigned such Reasons of it, as both show the unlawfulness of such a Procedure, and take off from the force of its Pretensions: For giving us to understand, that God, to whom Vengeance originally belongeth, reserveth that part of Justice to himself 
† Rom. 12.19. , and to those whom he hath entrusted 
* Rom. 13.4.  with his Authority; it doth consequently make it unlawful to any other than such, to assume to themselves the Execution of it, and therefore also to do to Men as they have before dealt with them. If he who hath his own Injuries returned upon him, receive no more than he doth deserve; yet will not that warrant our retaliating them, because we have no Authority to chastise him. The more Equitable, as well as more Christian Rule, is certainly, Do to other Men as ye would they should do to you; as you yourselves, if you were in their Circumstances, would be forward enough to desire from them. So doing, you will not only not usurp upon the Prerogative of God, or of his Vicegerent; but comply with the Sentiments of Nature, and Revelation; with the several Precepts and Intimations of the one; with the Law, and the Prophets, and Gospels of the other.    

THE FIFTH COMMANDMENT.  
THE FIFTH COMMANDMENT.  
Honour thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.  

PART I.  
The Contents.  
A Transition to the Duty we own to each other, whether considered only as Men, or under a more near Relation. The latter of these provided for in this Fifth Commandment, which is divided into a Duty and a Promise. An Essay toward a general Explication of the Duty; where is shown, That under Father and Mother are comprehended, 1. Grandfather and Grandmother, and other the Ancestors from whom we came; because, though at a distance, Authors of our Being. 2. Kings and all that are in Authority; partly because in the place of Parents to their People, and partly because their Authority is a Branch of the Paternal one, and succeeded into the place of it. 3. Our Spiritual Pastors, because begetting us to a better Birth: And, in fine, All that are our Superiors, whether in Authority, Dignity, or Age. The like Comprehensiveness evinced in the Honour that is required; which is shown also to include Fear and Love, together with the Expressions of them, and Honour. The Duty of Superiors connoted in the Honour that is to be paid to them; and how that Duty may be inferred. An Address to a more particular Explication of the Duty; where the Honour of Parents is resumed, and the Grounds thereof shown to be, first, Their being under God the Authors of ours, and, secondly, the Maintainers of it. The Consequences of the former Ground proposed, and shown to preclude all Pretences of Disrespect.  
OUR Duty to God being provided for in the first place, as which is both the Foundation and Limitation of all others; proceed we, according as the Decalogue invites, to consider the Duty we own to each other; which may be reduced to two Heads, that is to say, such as we own to one another as Men, or such as arise from some more intimate Relation between us. The latter of these is my Task at this time, because the Design of the Commandment that is now before us; for the Explication whereof, I will consider, 

1. The Duty enjoined: And,  
2. The Promise wherewith it is enforced.    
I. Now though, if we look no further than the Letter, we could not be long to seek what that is which is here bound upon us; yet because I have before shown, that many things are contained in a Commandment, beside what is expressed in it; to attain the full importance of this, we must enter into the very Bowels of it, and extract that Sense which is wrapped up in it, as well as that which is apparent. In order whereunto, I will inquire, 

1. Whether any Superiors are here meant, besides Fathers and Mothers.  
2. What is the importance of that Honour which is here required.  
3. Whether the Commandment provide for the Behaviour of Superiors towards Inferiors, as well as of Inferiors towards them.    
1. And first of all, though Father and Mother be the only Persons expressed, to whom we are required to give Honour; yet the general Reason of the Commandment obligeth us to extend it to Grandfathers and Grandmothers, and other the Ancestors from whom we are descended; because, though they contributed not immediately to our Birth, yet mediately they did, as being the Authors of those from whom we derived it. Whence it is, that in the Scripture they have often the Name of Fathers; as, Your Father Abraham rejoiced to see my day, and was glad.  
But beside that Grandfathers and Grandmothers are to be understood, and other the Stocks from whence we came; there is no doubt but Kings, and all that are in Authority, are included in the same general Names: Witness first, their being in the place of Fathers to those who are under their Dominion. For though, as Moses sometime told God, they do not beget their People, if we understand it with reference to their Natural one; yet as their Civil Birth is from them, so they carry them in their bosom, as a nursing Father beareth the sucking Child, as the same God commanded the angry Moses, Num. 11.12. Again, As Kings are in the place of Fathers to their People, especially in respect of their Tuition, so the Authority of Kings is a Branch of the Paternal one, and succeeded into the Place of it. Of which, beside the Testimony 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Vid. Sanders. de Oblige. Conscient. Praelect. 7. sect. 16.  of Aristotle, who was no Friend of Kingly Government, and the great number of Kings that was anciently in every little Country, and particularly in the Land of Canaan; we may discern evident Marks in the Authority of Fathers, even after the Empire was otherwise disposed of: these having anciently the Power of Life and Death, which is one of the principal Flowers of the Regal Diadem. Now forasmuch as Kings are not only in the place of Fathers to their People, but vested in that Authority which was originally and naturally theirs; it is but reasonable to think, that when God commanded to honour these, his Intention was to include the other, as who, beside their resemblance to them, had also the best part of their Authority.  
Next to Kings and Princes, consider we our Spiritual Fathers, even those who beget us to Piety, and to God; concerning whom, there can be no place for doubt, that they ought to be understood in those Fathers we are here commanded to revere: For if our Earthly Father is to have Honour, those certainly ought not to go without it, who beget us to an infinitely better Being. To all which, if we add, that the Decalogue is a Summary of all Moral Duties, as well those which respect our Neighbour, as those which have an aspect upon God; so there can be no doubt, not only that the former are included, but all other our Superiors, whether in Authority, or Dignity, or Age: Because, as the Honour of these may be fairly reduced to this Commandment (as I shall show more at large, when I come to handle them apart) so there is no other Commandment to which they can, if you except only the Honour of Husbands, which may have a place in that Commandment which forbids violation of it.  
2. Having thus shown what is meant by that Father and Mother which this Commandment requires us to honour, I come now to inquire what is the importance of that Honour, which we are under an Obligation to exhibit; it being likely enough, where the Objects thereof are so various, that there is some variety in that Honour which is due. To find out therefore the full importance of it, I will inquire, 

1. Whether under the Affection of Honour, any other be understood: And,  
2. Whether the Expressions thereof be not equally due with the Affections themselves.    
For the Resolution of the former whereof, the first thing I shall offer, is, the primary Notion of the Hebrew Word we render Honour, which the Masters of that Language inform us signifies to be heavy, or weigh so, and consequently in Piel, not to account lightly of, to esteem of as a thing of weight and moment. Now though in the common acception of the Phrase, that be most accommodable to that Honour by which we have chosen to express it; yet it contains within the compass of it, all other Respects which arise from any considerable Quality of the Thing we so value, that is to say, as well those which arise from its loveliness or terribleness, as from the eminency of its Nature and Authority. For, if we give any Thing or Person its due weight and moment, we must also, if they be lovely, afford them as great and intense a Love; or, if terrible, fear them proportionably to it. Whence it is, that what is here, Honour thy father and mother, is in Leu. 19.3. expressed by fear or reverence them; and accordingly, is no less usually set to denote the Duty we own to our Parents, than that which is here made use of to express it. But beside the Comprehensiveness of the Hebrew Word, with the Addition of God's expressing our Duty as well by Fear as Honour; it is to be observed, that there is not in Parents a greater ground for any thing than Love; witness the tenderness they have over us, and particularly that which the Mother hath: For, if so, Love must be supposed to be as much a Duty as any thing, and consequently to be included in that Affection which is required. To all which, if we add, That it is not unusual under one Species to understand all of the same Genus, so no doubt can remain, but under the Name of Honour all the former Requisites are contained. For the Commandment we have now before us, being one of those which were intended as an Abstract of the whole Duty of Man, it is in reason to comprehend the whole of our Duty to our Superiors; and therefore also, because not otherwise to be done, to set that Species of our Duty for all the rest.  
But beside that the Affection of Honour includes all the rest that are due from us to our Parents, they are in like manner to be supposed to include the Expressions of them, and particularly the Expressions of Honour; of which, beside the usual acceptation of the Word Honour, which, together with the Esteem of the Mind, connotes the Expressions of it, we may fetch a Proof from the Nature of the Affections of the Soul, and the necessity of their exerting themselves in outward Acts: For, as the Affections of the Soul are naturally operative, and seek out proper ways to express themselves; so, unless they do, they are of little, or rather of no use to whom they are commanded to be exhibited. For what avails Charity to a distressed Person, if it show not itself in Alms, and other such like Expressions of it? Or, what satisfaction can an honourable Esteem bring to our Parents, if it contains itself in the Mind, where it is neither to be discerned, nor can produce any Advantage to them? But because, to make it evident that the Expressions of Honour are required, no better way can be taken, than by instancing in the Expressions themselves; before I leave this Head, I will attempt the Probation of it in each, beginning with the Expression of it in Outward Gestures: For thus Leu. 19.32. we are commanded to rise up before the hoary head, and to honour the face of the old man. For, if we are to do that before the Face of the Old Man, much more before the Face of our Natural Parent, or him that is the Father of our Country. From Reverence in Gesture, pass we to the same testified in Words, which we shall find to be no less a Duty than the former; witness the several Cautions that are given against cursing our Natural, or speaking evil of our Civil Parent: For, that shows our Words to be under a Law as to that particular, and consequently, because they are equally capable of honouring our Parents, that they ought to be employed to that purpose. The same is much more evident concerning our Actions, and particularly concerning yielding Obedience to their Commands: For, as a due apprehension of their Authority doth naturally lead us to yield Obedience to those Commands that have their Authority stamped upon them; so, that this Expression of our Honour was intended, St. Paul plainly shows, Ephes. 6.1, 2. For inferring, as he doth, the Justice of Obeying our Parents from this very Commandment we have now before us, he supposes Obedience to their Commands, to be a part of that Honour which this Commandment requires us to give. In like manner, forasmuch as where submission to chastisement is not, there can be no due apprehension of their Authority, the opposing ourselves thereto being a denial of it, and therewith of the Justice of their Proceed; it follows, that to honour our Parents, includes that Expression also; and we are not only to be obedient to their Will, but suffer without murmuring under the Inflictions of it. Such are the Superiors whom we are required to honour, such the Honour and other Duties which we are by the same Commandment enjoined to pay. Nothing remains toward a general Explication of it, but to inquire,  
3. Whether Superiors may not read their Duty also in it? Which Question is the rather to be asked, because, setting aside this Commandment, there is no other to which it can be reduced. But, as, for that cause, it is but reasonable to seek it here, where the Duties of their several Correlatives are described; so it will be no hard matter for Superiors to read it in that Honour which is commanded to be paid unto themselves: For though, as I shall afterwards show, their very begetting of us require our having them in esteem; yet, if it be not also accompanied with a Paternal Care over us, it must needs be a great Stumbling-block to us, and, if not destroy, yet very much diminish their Esteem. Again, Forasmuch as our Honour, though built in part upon their giving us a Being, yet is also founded by the Scriptures themselves upon their lending us their Assistance to support it; hence it comes to pass, that, to obtain a complete Honour from us, they must show us the way by their Kindness, and feed us with the same Kindness that the Stork doth her Young ones, that Emblem both of Paternal Affection, and Filial Duty: It being impossible for Children to 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  requite their Parents, as the Young ones of the Stork do theirs, where the Parents have not showed themselves Storks before.  
Having thus given you a general Scheme both of this Commandment, and my Design; and shown both who, and to what they are obliged: I intent now to present them to you a second time, and allow them a more distinct Consideration. In order whereunto, I will begin with Parents, because expressed in the Commandment; and show both, 

1. What is due from their Children unto them: And,  
2. What is due from them unto their Children.    
I. Now there are Five things, within the resolution whereof, all that is necessary to be known concerning the former of these Obligations, is comprehended.  

1. The Grounds of our Honour.  
2. The Kind's of it.  
3. With what variety it is to be exhibited to either Parent.  
4. Whether or no, and how far a Child may be freed from it.  
5. To which I shall subjoin, in the fifth place, somewhat concerning Fear and Love, which I have said to be a part of children's Duties.   
1. And here, though I very well might, not to establish it upon this Commandment, nor yet upon that Strength which Christianity hath added to it by its own; I will make it my Business to inquire, whether Nature itself hath not afforded Grounds enough to establish that Obligation upon. Now there are two things upon which the honouring our Parents is grounded, and which indeed do each of them evince its necessity: how much more then, when as for the most part conjoined? The former whereof is, their being under God the Authors of ours; and, secondly, the Maintainers of it.  
That they are the Authors of our Being, is too evident from Experience, to admit of any the least doubt: That, as such, they ought to be honoured, will be no less evident, if we consider either the Excellency thereof, or the Authority that it naturally infers. For, inasmuch as Excellency is a just Object of Honour (Honour, as was before observed, being a just Valuation of that which is so); inasmuch as there is a peculiar Excellency in being the Author of another's Being, he who is so, thereby partaking of one of the great Prerogatives of the Divine Nature; it follows, because our Parents are Partakers of that Prerogative, that they are to be looked upon as the Objects of Honour, and next to him to be regarded by us. And accordingly, as some have not stuck to call them visible 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Philo de Decal.  Gods, in respect of that resemblance which they have to the Great Creator of us all; so, if it be cautiously understood, it is not without Warrant, even from the Scriptures themselves; God himself so styling both the Angels and Magistrates, for that Image they have of his Nature and Authority. However it be, there is a great Resemblance between our Earthly Parents and God, as being each in their measure the Authors of our Being: and if so, there can be little doubt of their being the just Objects of our Honour, if God may be allowed to be a just Object of it. But then, if we add moreover, That the Authors of our Being have eo ipso a Natural Authority over those to whom they are so; Nature and Reason dictating, that the Maker of any thing should have the disposal of it: so there will not only follow a necessity of honouring them, but of giving them such an Honour as includes Obedience to their Commands. But besides the Resemblance there is between our Parents and God in that particular, and that Authority which it naturally infers; we are also to consider, according as was before insinuated, that they are God's Instruments in the producing of us. For, if so, they cannot be neglected without casting a contempt upon God, 
‖ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Philo de Decalog.  whose Instruments and Ministers they are; the Virtue of an Instrument being not so much its own, as that Causes by which it is managed. And accordingly, as among Men, what is done or not done unto an Agent, is by the Prince, and all others, interpreted as done or not done unto himself; so there have not wanted, even among the Heathen, who saw the legitimateness of making such an Interpretation of the Dishonour that is done to God's Instruments, our Earthly Parents: Menander 
† 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  in particular affirming of him who reproacheth his Father, That though his Words go no farther than him, yet he aims at the Divine Nature. The same is no less evident, in that the Honour of Parents hath even in the New Testament the Title of 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 1 Tim. 5.4.  Piety. For that being the proper Word to express our Duty to our Maker, shows the thing to which it is attributed to have a peculiar aspect upon him, and that it is Sacrilege, as well as Injustice, to deny it. I have insisted so much the longer upon this Head, as because the Scripture seems to found our Obligation upon it, when it requires us to hearken to the father that begat us, Prov. 23.22. so also because it cuts off all Pretences of doing dishonour to those whom this Commandment obliges us to revere. For, be it, first, that thy Parents may prove unnatural, and thereby so far divest themselves of that Honour which is due from other Children unto theirs; yet so long as that which is passed cannot be recalled, they cannot cease to be thy Parents; and it is eternally true, that the one is thy Father that begat thee, and the other thy Mother that conceived thee. Be it, secondly, which is another Pretence of Disobedience, that though they gave Being to thee, yet they designed not that so much as the gratification of their own Appetites, which will consequently cut off all Moral Right to that Honour which they exact of thee; yet inasmuch as they were the Authors of thy Being, they have a Natural Right to it, and therefore ought not to be denied it, any more than we may deny Honour to a Man of Natural Parts, or to one who was born a Prince. Be it, thirdly, that all other Obligations could be fully requited, and consequently we ourselves freed from any Tie of Honour which might be supposed to arise from them; yet unless (as 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Philo. de Decalog.  Philo speaks) we could beget those who begat us, that of our Birth will remain uncancelled, and together therewith, our Obligation of honouring them because of it. Lastly, Be it, that thou hadst no Obligation to thy Parents in themselves, as neither intending any other than their own Pleasure in the Begetting, nor concerning themselves for thee when thou wert; yet so far as they were God's Instruments in bringing thee into the World, they call for thy Regard; neither can they be neglected, without casting a Contempt upon God himself: So that still, if our Honour have this ground, it will be of eternal necessity; and we may as soon cease to be Children, as cease to be obliged to those whom we are required to honour.  
But because there are few Parents who contribute no farther to their Children than their Birth, and much less like the Ostrich, which Job speaks of, that leaveth her eggs in the earth, and warmeth them in the dust; forgetting in the mean time that the foot may crush them, or that the wild hest may break them, Job 39.13. and so on: Because, I say, there are few Parents that show themselves so unnatural, nay, which do not, on the contrary, dandle their Children in their Arms, and in their Heart, and never leave off providing for them, till they are in a capacity to provide for themselves; hence there ariseth another Obligation to pay them Honour and Obedience, and such a one as we must be very ungrateful to forget. For, if we think it a just ground of Honour, that we feed those whom we retain, and furnish them with all other things necessary for their support; in the mean time not concerning ourselves any farther, and much less making them the Subject of our perpetual Care, and the End of all our Toil and Travel: what Ground of Honour may we think it to be, when we have infinitely much more done for us by our Parents, to make us happy, both in this World, and in the next?   

PART II.  
Of the Kind's of that Honour which is to be given to Parents, which are shown to be, 1. An awful Esteem of them, as which is the very Soul of Honour. 2. An outward Declaration of it, whether it be in our Gesture and Behaviour, where the general necessity of such Expressions of Honour is evinced; or in our Language to or of them, the Nature whereof is also declared; or in our Actions. These last divided into such as minister directly and immediately to their Honour, or indirectly and by consequence. Of the former sort are, first, Our administering to them in their Wants, which is shown both to be a Duty, and, as it may, and aught to be managed, an Expression of our Honour: and, secondly, ministering to them in their Weaknesses. Of the latter sort are such Actions, whatever they are in themselves, which are done with their Consent, in compliance with their Advice, or in obedience to their Commands. The Question concerning the Consent of Parents resumed, and that shown to be generally necessary in the Principal Actions of our Life, such as are, in particular, the disposal of ourselves in Marriage, or entering upon any lasting Course of Life. The Advice of Parents also considered, and shown to have the nature of a Command, where the Parent may be presumed to make use of that Form of Speech for Love's sake only; but however not to be departed from, where we have not a considerable Reason to the contrary. Of the Commands of Parents, and by what our Obedience to them is to be bounded; where is shown, That their Commands are of no force against the Commands of God, or the Magistrate; in things that carry an invincible Antipathy to our Inclinations, or such as are greatly dishonourable to the Child. Submission to the Chastisements of Parents, the fourth and last Declaration of our inward Esteem.  
2. THOUGH this, and other such like Precepts, whilst they continue in their generality, do carry Conviction with them where-ere they come; yet they have not the like success when drawn down to particular Instances, and applied to each Man's immediate Concern: The Reason whereof is, partly their pressing so hard upon Men, and partly that Relief which the consideration of General Precepts gives. For finding themselves pinched with so particular an Application, and, what such a Pressure doth naturally produce, desirous to free themselves; and considering moreover, that there is no Precept almost so general, which doth not admit of some Exceptions; the forementioned Pressure, and their desire to free themselves from it, makes them first willing to believe their own case to be one of those Exceptions, and after that actually to do it. In consideration whereof, as the Masters of Morality have ever thought it their chiefest Business to be as particular as they could in describing and confirming the several Duties of it; so I intent at this time to follow their Example, and show what particular Duties the Honour of Parents does involve.  
1. And here in the first place, because that is the very Soul of Honour, and gives Life both to it and all the Expressions of it, we are to entertain in our Minds such an awful Regard of them as the Dignity of their Relation doth require; that is to say, we are to account of them as so many Mortal Gods, as by whom, under the True, we live, and move, and have our being: lastly, we are to account of them as his Images and Agents, as Resemblances of the Great Creator, or rather Cooperatours with him: For, as the Notion of a Parent involves all this, and therefore in reason to regulate our inward esteem of them; so the consideration thereof is of excellent use to stifle all those Conceptions which the weaknesses of our Parents might suggest. For, be it that our Parents are either of crazy or deformed Bodies, that they have weak Understandings naturally, or have lived to see them die before them, either of which may tempt unsettled Minds to abject thoughts concerning them; yet if we remember they were under God the Authors of our Being, and thereby, as Moses sometime was to Aaron, a kind of Gods to us, such thoughts as the other will quickly vanish, and we shall, in spite of all their Infirmities, look upon them as in the place of God, and next to him to be honoured and revered.  
2. But beside the entertaining honourable Thoughts of our Parents, to which I have over and above represented the most proper Motives; we are also, as was before shown, to express those Conceits of ours by some sensible declarations of them: Whereof, 

1. The first I shall represent, is, that which of all others seems to be the most natural, even that of our outward Gesture and Behaviour. For, as Nature itself hath prompted us to such an Acknowledgement, because inclining us to show forth in the Behaviour of our Bodies those Affections and Passions we have within; so the Custom of the World, which is the most proper Judge of Affairs of this nature, hath made it a necessary part of that Acknowledgement; I say, not only in respect of the Esteem of the World, but also in respect of God: For requiring, as he doth, an Acknowledgement of our inward Esteem, and such a one as may satisfy the World concerning it, he doth consequently leave it to the Judgement of the World to determine after what manner it is to be done. Now forasmuch as the Judgement of the World hath determined the showing our Respects by our outward Gesture and Behaviour, it follows, that to the due honouring of our Parents, we are to take that course, and make our outward Behaviour bespeak our inward Reverence and Esteem. But from hence it will follow, that according as the Custom of the Country is, we are to rise up or bow before our Natural Parents: Which is the rather to be represented, because a Generation of Men have sprung up, with whom all these things are either superfluous or superstitious; never considering in the mean while, that they not only run counter to the Judgement of the World (which yet, as was before observed, is the most proper Judge of Affairs of this nature) but also to the Judgement and Practice of the best of Men, and such whose Carriage is not lightly to be despised; among whom we find nothing more usual than bowing down before their Superiors, and sometimes throwing themselves as low as the Earth they trod on. Now though the omission of such like Expressions of Reverence be a sufficient breach of this Commandment, which enjoins us the honouring of our Superiors, and particularly of our Parents; yet certainly that is much more, because contrary to it, which presents them with contemptuous ones: Of which nature is the receiving their Advices with Laughter, or a less composed Countenance, pointing at them with the Finger, or winking with the Eye; there being no doubt a Child may be as undutiful in his Looks, as either in his Words or Actions. That of Solomon 
* Prov. 30.17.  shall serve both for a Proof and a Conclusion of this Affair, because showing both the undutifulness of such a Behaviour, and the displeasure of God against it: The eye that mocketh at his father, and despiseth to obey his mother, the ravens of the valley shall pick it out, and the young eagles shall eat it.  
2. Next to honouring our Parents in our outward Gesture, proceed we to the honouring of them with our Tongues, which is another requisite Expression of it; the Tongue being of all the other Members the most apt to express our inward Conceits, and therefore not to be wanting in this. Now this the Tongue may do, by speaking honourably to or of them; by proclaiming their Virtues, and our own Obligations to them; by extenuating, as much as may be, their supposed Defects; by taking off the several Objections that are made against them; in fine, by not suffering any thing to fall from it (for even such a Silence is expressive) which may any way offend or grieve them. Agreeable hereto is that excellent Advice of the Hebrew Masters 
* Vid. Seld. de Jure Nat. & Gent. l. 7. c. 2. , when the Children had occasion to represent to their Parents any of their Miscarriages: For, in such a case (say they) a Man was not to say to his Father, You transgress the words of the Law; but rather, It is written in the Law thus or thus; and so as if he meant rather to consult them about the meaning of it, than to admonish them of their Transgression. But so, which is of much more force, St. Paul insinuates, 1 Tim. 5.1. For requiring Timothy not to rebuke an elder, but to entreat him as a father, he plainly supposes, that Fathers ought to be treated with respectful Language, even when they do offend; and how much more then, when they are not guilty of any Miscarriage?  
3. From Respectfulness in our Language, pass we to Respectfulness in our Actions, which is another Requisite to the honouring of our Parents; as because they are the most effectual Expressions of our Thoughts, so because they are the clearest Acknowledgements of that Authority which God hath vested in them, and of our own readiness to comply with it. The only thing worthy our pains, will be to point out those Actions whereby we may do Honour to them. Now there are two sorts of Actions whereby we may and aught to do Honour to our Parents, the former whereof minister directly and immediately to it, the latter indirectly and by consequence, that is to say, as they are Instances of our Compliance with their Will and Pleasure.    
I. Of the former sort is, first, the administering to them in their wants, and furnishing them with all things necessary to their support. For beside that the Law of Gratitude requires this of us, and therefore in reason to be supposed to be included in that Commandment which entreats of our Duty to our Parents; it is by the Jewish Masters 
* Vid. Seld. de Jure Nat. & Gent. l. 7. c. 2. p. 834.  resolved to be the very Formality of that Honour which here we are required to exhibit: Wherein though perhaps they too much overlashed, because the Word is of a more general signification; yet that they thought not amiss, when they made it a principal part of Honour, the language both of the New Testament and Heathen Writers show; St. Paul expressing the relieving of Widows, by the Title of honouring them, and Hierocles 
* In Carm. Pyth. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc.  declaring that we shall then honour our Parents exceedingly, when we afford them the ministry of our Bodies, and the assistance of our Wealth. But so, when our Saviour recommended the Virgin Mary to St. John, saying, Behold thy Mother; St. John, as knowing that to be a part of the honour that is due unto a Parent, expressed his Obedience to it by taking her to his own home, Joh. 19.27. And indeed, however the notion of Honour may seem no way to agree to this affair, because maintenance of itself contributes little honour to him that receives it; yet, if we look more narrowly into it, we shall find it oftentimes to be a mark rather of Honour than Contempt. For first of all, Though Kings are of all others the greatest Almsmen, if we should judge of their Quality by their Receipts; yet inasmuch as what they so receive, they receive by way of Homage, and as an Acknowledgement of their Authority over their respective Kingdoms; the maintenance they receive, is not only not lessening of their esteem, but on the contrary, an aggrandizing of it. The case is much the same as to those of whom we are discoursing, and to whom we are required to give honour as well as to Kings and Princes; that maintenance which we afford them, being not, like other Gifts, the results of a voluntary Bounty, but a Tribute which we own them, and an Acknowledgement of our Obligations to them: It being but just, as Hierocles 
* Loco prius citato. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  speaks, that Parents should make use of those whom they have begotten and bred up. From that first instance pass we to another, which will yet more fully evidence the propriety of this Notion of Honour, and that is the large Pensions which Kings bestow upon their Subjects in consideration of some signal Service they have done them. For these are so far from being a dishonour to the parties that have them, that on the contrary they are a credit, because marks of his Esteem by whom they are bestowed. Whence it is, that among the Latins they had the Title of Honoraria; as if you should say, The honourable gifts. But such will our Liberality to our Parents prove, if it be in some measure answerable to the many Obligations they have laid upon us. For thereby we shall declare we give them not as Alms, but as a mark of that esteem we have for them. Our Liberality to our Parents will prove yet more an Honour, if it be transmitted to them with that respect which is due from a Child unto his Parents. For so doing, be the Gift never so small, it will be looked upon as an honourable maintenance, and be an instance of our esteem, as well as of our Love and Tenderness. And I cannot but upon this Occasion call to mind some custom of the Spaniards 
* See Howels Letters. Vol. 1. Sect. 3. Lett. 31. , who, however a proud Nation otherwise, do in this give a great testimony of their Humility; it being reported of them, that when they give an Alms they pull off their Hats, and put it into the Beggar's hands, with a great deal of Humility. For whatever may be due from us toward indigent Persons, this is but due from us to our Parents, and we cannot hope our Liberality will be accepted, if we consult not their reputation in it, because obliged as well to honour, as relieve them.  
Next to the administering to our Parents wants, place we the ministering to them in their weaknesses, according as Hierocles 
* Loco supra citato.  doth; for so doing we shall yet more declare the honour we have for them, and consequently our observation of this Commandment: It being far more irksome to part with our ease than wealth; to lend them our personal Services, than some of the good things we enjoy. And indeed, as whosoever shall consider the Care and Pains of a Father, the Fears and sleepless Nights, and homely Offices of a Mother; as, I say, whosoever shall consider these things, will not think much to minister to them, in the meanest employments which their several Infirmities may exact; so I know not whether it be possible to give them a greater testimony of our Honour, or requite that Care and Pains towards us. For, by thus ministering to them by our personal Services, we do in a manner outdo ourselves, and show ourselves not their Children but their Servants. The only thing wanting to make us completely such, is, that love draws us to it, and that we embrace as well as submit to the Employment. That known story of Aeneas shall put a period to this Argument, because a noble Instance of his Piety. For when others, after the Destruction of Troy, took care to rescue other things, this man took up his Household-gods first, and after that his aged Father upon his shoulders. By which last, as well as by the former, as he very well deserved the Title of Pius, which is given him by the Prince of Poets, so he therein acted the part rather of a Father than of a Son, because carrying him, who was now become a Child as he had been before borne himself.  
2. But beside such Actions of ours as minister directly and immediately to the honour of our Parents, such as are especially those before remembered; there are other that minister to it indirectly, and by consequence, that is to say, as instances of our Compliance with their Will. Of which sort are all those that are done with their consent, in compliance with their advice, or in obedience to their commands; whatsoever is so done, being a manifest acknowledgement of their Authority with whom we do so comply. The only difficulty is, how far we are bound to comply with our Parents in each of these, which accordingly I come now to consider.  
And first of all, If the question be concerning the consent of Parents, which is the first of the Instances before remembered, so I shall not doubt to affirm that it ought to be had in the principal Actions of our Life. Among which I reckon particularly, children's disposing of themselves in Marriage, or entering into any lasting course of Life. That the consent of Parents is generally necessary, in the former may appear, not only from hence, that Children are not sui juris, but those in whose power they are; but also from the power which God hath given them over their Children, as to this particular affair; witness the Scriptures prescribing Rules for Parents taking Daughters unto their Sons, and again, for giving their Daughters in Marriage unto others, as you may see, Exod. 34.16. and 1 Cor. 7.38. For the Scripture there and elsewhere attributing the Marrying of Sons and Daughters to the act of their respective Parents, supposeth them as to that particular, to be more in their Parent's power than their own, and consequently their Consent at least to be requisite to the making of it. Generally speaking therefore there is no doubt, the Consent of Parents is necessary to be had, to make the Marriage lawful before God. Then, and then only may it be wanting when the Child is in imminent danger of falling into sin without it, in which case, though the Consent of Parents may and aught to be sought, yet it is not necessary to be obtained. From the Consent of Parents in Marriage, pass we to the necessity of it toward the taking any lasting Course of Life; which we shall find to stand upon as firm Grounds as the other: For the Son, till freed by the Father, being more the Fathers than his own, he is in reason to be disposed of by him to whom he doth so belong, or at least not without his Consent. If the Son do at any time fall into his own disposal, as I will not say but sometimes he may, it must be, when the Father takes no care at all of him, which is a kind of emancipation of him.  
From the Consent of Parents, pass we to their Advice, and consider what Regard is due to it in our several Actions; where again we are to consider, whether the Father intends it only as an Advice, and leaves it to the liberty of his Son either to follow it, or not; or whether or no, for Love's sake, he chooses to express his Will in the form of one, as St. Paul did his to Philemon in the form of an Entreaty. If the latter of these be it, there is no doubt it is not only obligatory, but much more obligatory than any Command: For, beside that it hath in effect the nature of a Command, it hath over and above the addition of the Parents Kindness, which cannot be resisted without a great Ingratitude. The Case is somewhat different, and our Obligation also, if he who doth advise, leaves it to the liberty of his Child either to follow it, or not: For, in such a Case, there is no doubt, if our own Reason leads us otherwise, it is lawful for us to departed from it. This only would be added, That as we are to receive it with respect, and to show some kind of unwillingness even in our departing from it; so we are not to departed from it, where we have not a considerable Reason to the contrary, and such as may absolve us before God, and all disinteressed Persons, for not adhering to it. For though an Advice have not the nature of a Command, and therefore neither the departure from it the nature of Disobedience; yet the neglect of it, where there is not a weighty Reason to the contrary, hath the nature of a Disrespect, which is equally a breach of this Commandment.  
The third and last Rule follows, even the Command of our Parents, which is much more cogent than the other; this being a Natural Effect of that Authority they have over us, and therefore not to be despised, without a manifest violation of their Honour. And accordingly, as among the Jews Disobedience to them was punished with Death, as a kind of abdication of their Parents; so the Scriptures of the New Testament represent it among those things that are worthy of death, as you may see Rom. 1.30, 32. The only thing of difficulty is, how far our Obedience is to extend; which accordingly I come now to consider. For the resolution whereof, the first thing I shall offer, is, That it ought not to extend to those things that are forbidden by a Power Superior to that of our Parents: For the Ground of Obedience being the Authority of him that commands, it is in reason, where it cannot be given to more, to be given unto him, where is the greatest Authority to require it. But from hence it will follow, first, That we are not to obey our Parents in things before forbidden by God; God being not only Superior to all other Powers, but the Fountain and Author of them. Whence it is, that though St. Paul in one place exhort Children to be obedient to their Parents in every thing, Col. 3.20. yet, as he assigns for the Reason of it, its being wellpleasing to the Lord, which shows, that it was not to extend to things of a contrary nature; so elsewhere 
* Ephes. 6.1.  he limits it to Obedience in the Lord, that is to say, so far as our Obedience to him is consistent with it. It will in like manner follow, secondly, That we are not to obey our Parents in things forbidden us by the Magistrate: For, though his Authority be not like that of God, yet it is superior to theirs, as having by the command of God the Souls even of Parents subject to it. But beside that Obedience to Parents is to cease there, where either God or the Magistrate have laid a Prohibition, it is also to be supposed not to be required, where the thing under command carries an invincible Antipathy to our Inclinations. Thus, for example, if a Father offer such an Husband to his Daughter, whom, though she has endeavoured, yet she can by no means bring herself to like of; in this case, there is no doubt she is not obliged to marry him, how strongly soever her Father enjoins it on her: It being not to be thought, that where the Children themselves have not power over their own Affections, the Parents of the Children should. Lastly, As our Obedience is not to be thought to be required, where the thing under command carries an invincible Antipathy to our Inclinations; so, neither where it is greatly dishonourable to the Child upon whom the Command is imposed. Thus, for example, If a Father, for the hope of Lucre, or any such like cause, command his Son to marry a Person who is of an ill Fame, or to enter into some Trade that is infinitely below his Quality; as, for example, if a Person of Noble Rank should command his Son to be a Cobbler: In these, and other the like Cases, there is no doubt he may refuse that which is so imposed upon him; because the Son, where the Father's Ability will suffice, hath a Natural Right to be bred up in some measure answerably to that Condition wherein he was born. Care only would be taken, that, as we pretend not such a disparity, where in truth there is no other but what our Pride and Self-conceit makes; so, in this, and all other Refusals of Obedience, we proceed with Modesty and Humility, and rather seem to decline the Task that is imposed upon us, than contemptuously reject it. But as other Carriage than this is not consistent with that Honour, which we own to the Authors of our Being; so other Commands than those before-remembred, we cannot think it lawful to disobey, if we consider, that the Apostle enjoins us to be obedient to our Parents in all things.  
4. One only thing remains to fill up the measure of that Honour which we have said to be due from us to our Parents; and that is, that we express our Esteem of them by submission to their Chastisements, as well as by yielding Obedience to their Commands. But because that will fall in more pertinently hereafter, when I come to entreat of the Chastisements of a Father, I will defer the prosecution of it till then, contenting myself at present with that of the Son of Sirach 
* Ecclus. 3.8.  as it lies in the Vulgar Latin, Honour thy father and thy mother in work, in word, and in all patience, that a blessing may come upon thee from them.   

PART III.  
With what variety the Honour here required is to be given to either Parent: Where the giving the Father the priority in our Honour, and, when they draw different ways, the obeying him against the Mother, is asserted against Mr. Hobbes, and his Objection answered. The Honour of our Parents otherwise equal. The Case of a Mother, who is either a Princess or a Christian, when the Father is either a Subject or Heathen, proposed and stated. A Caution against despising our Mother, even when we depart from her Advice or Command; and with what Humility and Modesty that is to be done. Inquiry is also made, whether or no, and how far a Child may be freed from the Obligation of Honour; which is considered with relation both to Deceased and Living Parents. That even Deceased Parents ought to have all those Honours of which they are capable in that State, which also are there enumerated. Whether any Regard be due to their past Advices and Commands; which also is answered, and our Regard limited to such Commands wherein the Honour of our Parents is concerned; or such as enjoin few things, and easy of practice. The like Regard not due to those Commands which relate peculiarly to the Child, or to such as enjoin things many and burdensome. The Case of the Rechabites proposed and considered. That Children cannot be altogether free from the Obligation of any Honour, so long as their Parents are alive, because their Parents are as much such at one time as at another. All the Exemption that they can plead, is either in the Manner or the Measure; the Exemptions in both which, are exemplified and proved. That those Exemptions arise from a straighter or more important Obligation, and therefore are no farther pleadable against the Honour of a Parent, than those Obligations shall be found to contravene it. Of the Fear of Parents, what the Ground of that Fear is, and how it ought to be expressed. A brief Account, in passing, of the Dreadfulness and Efficacy of their Curses. What Obligation we also have to love our Parents, and how that Love of ours is to be expressed. That our Honour, or Fear, or Love of our Parents, is not to terminate in their Persons; because a Parent may be honoured, or feared, or loved in others, as well as in himself; as, on the other side, so disregarded and hated: The Consequences whereof are, 1. The paying Honour to them that stand upon the same Level with our Parents, and particularly, to Uncles, Aunts, and Mothers-in-law. 2. The showing Affection to those who do alike descend from their Loins, as Brothers and Sisters. 3. The affording it, though not in an equal degree, to Cousins, and other remoter Kindred, because issuing from the same Grandfathers and Grandmothers. As also, 4. To those Friends or Servants they set a value on.  
3. HAVING in the foregoing Discourses established the Grounds, and shown the several Kind's of that Honour we are to exhibit; the Method before laid down prompts us to inquire, with what variety it is to be given to either Parent: For though, as Grotius hath observed 
* Explic. Decalog. Leges à viris factae ferme solis consulunt patribus, ut Persica memorata Aristoteli Romana descripta in Digestis ac Institutionibus, Graecis etiam Philosophic, Epicteto primum deinde & Simplicio memorata neque minùs Philoni Judaeo libro de legatione. , the Laws made by Men provide mostly, if not only for the Honour of the Father; yet the Commandment we have now before us, makes the Mother also the Object of it: And not without Reason, if we consider, that the Mother hath a great share in the begetting, a far greater share than the Father in the first Education, and, if not an equal, yet a considerable part in the succeeding one. Taking it therefore for granted, that the Mother ought to have a share in it; we will inquire, whether Honour be to be exhibited to both alike, or, if not, with what proportion to each. That it is not to be exhibited to both alike, we need no other Argument, than that it impossible it should be: For the Father and the Mother drawing different ways, it is impossible they should be both complied with; and therefore either both to be disobeyed, which were a strange way of honouring our Parents; or one of them of necessity to be preferred. The only Question therefore is, which ought to be preferred, and how. A Modern Writer 
* Hobbes Leviath. ch. 20.  of our Nation, whether out of his kindness to the Female Sex, or rather to new and uncouth Opinions, prefers the Mother, because of the surer side; and possibly not without reason, if there were any such Natural State as he, though groundlessly, fancies. But as in reputation of Law both Parents are alike certain, and therefore that Suggestion of his of no force in the present Affair; so God himself, in the very Beginning, subjected even the Mother to the Father, and thereby plainly showed, that he ought to be preferred: There being no doubt (as that Author himself afterwards acknowledges) that he who is Head even of the Mother, is, to a far greater purpose than she, the Head also of her Child. If it be sometime otherwise, as, for example, when the Mother is a Princess, and the Husband a Subject; yet is not that so much because she is a Mother, in which respect she is Inferior; but because she hath over and above the addition of the Regal Power. One only Case remains, to wit, Where the Father is Heathen, and the Mother Christian, which of the two ought to be preferred? But as in Civil Matters there is no doubt the Father ought, because Christianity doth rather confirm than destroy the several States and Conditions in which it found us at our Conversion; so, if in Religious Matters the Mother be preferred, as for example, in the Educating her Child in Christianity, it is by the Prerogative of God and Christ 
* Vid. Taylor. Dust. Dubit. l. 3. c. 5. Rule 4. , who is the Head of the Church, to which all Earthly Powers are to yield. It being thus evident, that generally the Father ought to be preferred; we are in the next place to inquire, after what manner that is to be done. In answer to which, I say, first, That it ought not to be done to the contempt of the Mother: For both of them being by Nature's Law, and God's, to be the Object of our Honour, neither is to be despised; yea, though one of them, and particularly the Father, should be so wicked as to oblige the Son to it. I say, secondly, That so far as they may be both honoured, so far there is no doubt they ought to be; both of them being Sharers in the begetting of us, and in like manner in our Education. I say, thirdly, That so far as our outward Behaviour can declare it, they are both to have an equal share of it, because the Father is honoured in the honour of the Mother, as the Mother again in the honour of the Father. Only as the Father ought to have the precedency, as being but due to him for the Order wherein he stands; so, where they command different things, there is no doubt those of the Father ought to be preferred, as because for the most part the most capable of judging what is fit; so because the head of the other Parent. Only a good Child will so far take care to honour both, as never to despise either; and at the same time he prefers the commands of his Father, show by his humble and modest behaviour to his Mother, that he does it not in the least wise to aggrieve her.  
4. The fourth Question follows, to wit, whether or no, and how far, a Child may be freed from the obligation of Honour. For the resolution whereof, I will consider the Child, 1. As bereft of his Parents by death, and 2. As having them still living.  
And first of all, if the Question be concerning deceased Parents, who may seem, and no doubt have the least tye upon their Children, so I shall not stick to affirm that they ought to have all that honour of which they are capable in that state: Not only the Law of Gratitude so requiring, but the Honour of Almighty God whose Instruments they were, and to whom they live, though they be dead to us. Of this nature is the bestowing upon them a Funeral answerable to their Condition, speaking honourably of their Persons and Actions; in fine, esteeming those persons for whom they had a regard, and especially such as they upon their Deathbeds commended to ours; for as these are no other than their Relation, and our Gratitude doth require, so they are such of which they are equally capable as when alive. The only difficulty is, what regard is due to those Advices or Commands which they laid upon us when alive. For as on the one side it may seem unreasonable, that the Father's authority on Earth should abide after he himself hath no further place on it; so on the other side it hath been observed, that God hath strangely blasted those Children who have gone contrary to the Commands of their deceased Parents; and as strangely blessed those who have been obedient to them; witness for the latter, that known story of the Rechabites who are not only commended by the Almighty for abstaining from Wine, and dwelling in Tents, in obedience to their Ancestor Jonadab's command, but promised moreover that their Generations should abide, Jer. 35.14.19. For the reconciling of which two, so as neither to depress the authority of the Son, who succeeds into the Father's Rights, nor yet to despise the Authority even of a deceased Father. I will first of all distinguish between such commands wherein the Father's honour is concerned, and such as relate peculiarly to the Son. Now in the former of these it is, especially, wherein a Father is to be heeded, because he hath an equal concernment in them. Thus for Example, if, as it sometime happens, a 
* Fuller's Worthies, Hertfordshire, Speaking of the Horseys, observes that one of them disobeying such a command of his Father prospered no whit the better for it; not one Foot of Land in Hertfordshire now remaining to his Posterity.  Father should command his Son, if need were, rather to sell an Estate that came to him by others, than that which came to him by descent from himself; in such a case I should not doubt the Son were obliged to observe his command, and rather sell any thing than that his Patrimony; because by selling the latter he should do dishonour to his Family, and therein in particular to his Father from whom it immediately descended. In like manner, if a Father should charge his Son not to marry into a Family which hath been at enmity with himself; in this case I do no way doubt but the Son is bound up to observe the Commands of his Father, because as the matter of it hath nothing of evil in it; so the acting contrary thereto, unless where there is a great necessity, would be a dishonour to his Father, inasmuch as it may give that Family occasion to triumph over the memory of him whom they before hated. I say not, the same of that command, which the Father of Hannibal laid upon him with an Oath, to prosecute the Romans his Enemies with an immortal hatred. For though it be not unlawful to avoid an intimate alliance with some persons, yet it is both inhuman and unchristian to prosecute any person with an irreconcilable hatred, and therefore no fit matter for a Son's obedience. But let us suppose the command laid upon the Son, relate to his person only, (which is the other member of the distinction) as for Example, not to be a Bishop, a Priest, or a Magistrate; in which case, though a pious Son will be well advised before he transgress it, and consider what reason his Father might have so to advise or command him, yet he will not suffer himself to be so far over born by it, as to neglect his own Reason and great Conveniencies. For (as a Learned man 
* Tayl. Ductor Dubit. Book 3. Chap. 5. Rul. 6.  hath well observed) in those things wherein a mans own mere Interest is concerned, his own Understanding must be his guide, and his Will his Ruler. For he alone does lie at Stake, whether it be good or bad, and it is not reasonable that he should govern, who neither gets nor loses, nor knows. Again, the things that are commanded (those I mean that relate to the Sons person only) are either few, and easy of practice, or many and burdensome. If the things commanded be either few, or easy of practice, or both, they cannot be omitted without a dishonour to our Parents, whose memory we will not gratify in so small a matter. But if they be many, and burdensome, the omission thereof is not to be looked upon as a dishonour to them, but as a just compliance with our own reasonable Conveniencies. The only thing that will give us any trouble, is, the Instance of the Rechabites, who may seem to have had no very easy load imposed upon them. But beside that, the story is only mentioned on the By, by which means we cannot so easily judge of the intention of Jonadab in it; beside secondly, That it is not improbable it was enjoined in order to Religion, which if it were, will determine such lasting commands to the things of Religion only; it is apparent enough they did not think themselves so tied, but when there was a just cause, such as the fear of the Chaldeans, they dispensed with their own dwelling in Tents, which was one of the things enjoined them. And indeed, as it will become Children not lightly to departed from their deceased Father's commands, lest they be thought to have a less regard for them than they should. So it will no less become Parents, when they extend their Authority beyond their own time, to see that the things they impose be neither many nor unreasonable; as remembering that after their decease, they are at their own disposal for the main, and have reason enough for the most part to guide them in the management thereof.  
From the honour of deceased Parents, pass we to that of those that are alive, and consider whether or no, and how far Children may be freed from it. In answer whereunto, I say first, that they can never be absolutely freed from any of the kinds of Honour before remembered: Because our Parents are as much such in our riper years, as in our greener, when we are departed out of their Houses, as whilst we continued in them. And indeed, as no question hath been made of that part of honour which is usually styled Reverence, that is to say, of thinking honourably of, and expressing it in our words and gestures; as moreover, no question hath or can be made of that part of Honour which hath the name of Piety, because Children must generally be supposed both to be of years, and of a distinct Family, before they can be in a capacity to relieve their Parents; so as little question would be made of Obedience, if men did but consider that the principal ground of it doth always abide: for it being alike true at all times, that the one is thy Father that begot thee, and the other thy Mother that conceived thee; it must be alike true, because that is the ground of thy Obedience, that thou art always to give obedience to their commands. If therefore Children be at any time free from the tie of Honour, it must be as to the manner or measure, which accordingly I come now to consider. Thus for instance, Though Reverence be always due from us to our Parents, and accordingly hath by good Children been always paid to them, yet there is no necessity it should be expressed after the same manner by one of full age, as by one who is still under Pupillage; because the same gestures become not one of full age, that are suitable enough to the tenderness of the other. Whence it is, that though Children in their minority are always bare before their Parents, yet those of Riper age have by a general custom (which must be judge of matters of this nature) been indulged a greater liberty as to that particular, even by the consent of Parents themselves. In like manner, that I may instance in the measure, Though Children dwelling in their Parents houses, and under their power, be to yield Obedience to all their commands, and particularly those that concern the Family whereof they are Members; whence it is, that we find the Father in the Parable, Mat. 21.28. commanding his Sons to go and work in his Vineyard; yet there is not the same tie upon those that are sent out of it, that have a Wife and Family of their own to provide for, that are delivered over to the tuition of other persons, or in fine, have any public charge upon them. Not upon those that are sent out of the Family, because as sent out with their leave, so of necessity to intent their own proper Affairs. Not upon those Children that have a Wife and Family of their own to provide for, because, beside the forementioned reason, by the command of God himself to forsake Father and Mother, and cleave unto their Wives, Gen. 2.24. The same is to be said much more of Daughters, when Married, because not only equally obliged to cleave to their Husbands, but also subjected to their commands. Whence it is, that when Pharaoh's Daughter was brought to be a Wife to Solomon, we find her exhorted to forget her own people and her Father's house, and to look upon, and worship Solomon as her Lord, Psal. 45.10, 11. But neither thirdly, is there the same tie upon Children that are subjected to the Tuition of others, as to those that are under their Father's roof and power, as will appear if we consider them as made Servants to another, or passed over into another Family by Adoption; for being by the Parents consent subjected to other Masters or Fathers, they are now no more theirs who gave them Being, but those Masters or adopted Fathers, to whom they are so transferred. This only would be added, That as the Children spoken of in the former Instances, are only free from their Father's commands by means of those new Relations they have contracted; so they are consequently no farther free from yielding Obedience to their Father's commands, than the necessity of serving those Relations doth exact. And therefore if a Son or Daughter that is sent abroad to intent their own Affairs, or one that is entered into Marriage, or made a Servant, or a Son, and Daughter by Adoption; if (I say) any of these have opportunity and power to serve their natural Parents, there is no doubt they ought to do so, no less than those who continue under their Roof. For the exception of their obedience being only in regard to those new Relations they have contracted, according to that known Rule of the Lawyers, Exceptio firmat regulam in non exceptis, it must strengthen the tie of Obedience where those Relations do no way hinder. The only Children to be accounted for, are such as have a public charge upon them, whether in the Church, or in the State. For though Children are not to enter into these without the consent of their Parents, if under their Father's Tuition, or at least not without the call of their and their Father's Superiors; yet being entered, they are in reason to prefer the discharge of their Place, before any Commands of their Father; the Private Good being in reason to yield to the Public; the Commands of Parents, to those of Kings and Princes. Only, as if the Child can, without the neglect or debasement of his Charge, fulfil his Father's Commands, there is no doubt he is obliged so to do; so there is so much of Authority in the Name of a Father, that no Dignity whatsoever will make a good Son forget it, where it is not contrary to a more important Concern.  
5. The Duty of Honour being thus explained, and shown in what manner and measure it is incumbent upon Children; it may not be amiss to subjoin somewhat concerning Fear and Love, which I have said to be also a part of their Duty. Only because they are rather Accessaries, than Principal parts of children's Duties, I will be so much the shorter in describing the Obligation they have upon them.  
That we are to fear our Father and Mother, the Scripture hath told us, Leu. 19.3. and not without cause, if we consider, either that it is a part of Honour, or that there is in Parents a just Object of it. For, as Fear is a confession of the Power of those whom we have such an apprehension of; so there is Power enough in Parents to excite that Passion in us, and make us as well to dread as esteem them. Of this nature is, first, the Power of Chastisement, whether as to the Body or Possessions of the Son: For, as I shall afterwards show, that Parents have Authority to inflict either; so, Experience makes it evident, that they want not Power, especially as to the latter Chastisement; it being ordinarily in the power of Parents to withhold their Possessions from such as are disobedient to them. But of all the things we are to fear in a Parent, there is certainly nothing more requiring it, than the Power they have with God to procure a greater Punishment of our Disobedience, than they themselves are able to inflict. For, though (as the Scripture speaks) the Curse causeless shall not come; yet both Reason and Experience warrant us to believe, that the Curses of Parents shall not be without effect, where they proceed upon a just Cause. For be it, which is true enough, that such Curses are not lightly to be used; be it, that generally they are not suitable either to the Tenderness of a Father, or the Spirit of the Gospel, which will render them so much the more unlikely to have effect: yet, as it is evident from St. Paul's denouncing a Curse against Simon Magus, and Alexander the Coppersmith, that Superiors are not wholly forbid the use of them; so, that it is not improper for Fathers towards their disobedient Children, their being a kind of Gods to us, may serve for abundant evidence. But then if we add thereto, Noah's cursing the Posterity of Cham, for making a mock of his Nakedness, and that Effect which it had upon them in aftertimes; if we moreover reflect 
* Jer. Tailor, Dust. Dubit. l. 3. c. 5. Rule 1.  upon the sad Examples which Heathen Stories have represented to us in the Children of Oedipus, Amintor, and Theseus, who grew miserable upon their Father's Curses; lastly, if we add, that the same thing was observed by the Jews, one of whom, even the Son of Sirach, observes, that the Curse of the Mother rooteth out Foundations, Ecclus. 3.10. so we shall not need to doubt of the Effect of their Curses, and therefore neither of their being the Object of our Fear. For if, as the Greek Poet observes, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Curses of Parents are grievous upon the Earth, we have reason enough to fear lest their Curses should sometime fall upon our Heads. The only thing worthy our farther inquiry, is, how this Fear of ours ought to be expressed; which is, in short, by our carefulness to please them in all things: For, as by so doing, we shall best declare the Fear we have of them, Fear naturally prompting Men to seek the Favour of those they have such an apprehension of; so we shall thereby secure ourselves from the Effects of their Displeasure, and (which is more to be dreaded) from the Effects of that of God.  
From the Duty of Fear, pass we to that of Love, which we shall find to be no less incumbent upon us than the former, as because our Saviour hath reduced the Whole of the Law to Love, so because our Parents are of all others the justest Object of it: Witness the extraordinary Love they have naturally for us; their many, and weighty, and constant Demonstrations of it; their taking care of us, when we are not able to provide for themselves; their continuing that care over us, even when we are; their furnishing us from time to time with all things necessary for our Temporal Happiness; their instilling into our Minds what may make for our Eternal one; their bearing with the weakness and peevishness of our Infancy and Childhood; their enduring, with much long-suffering, the disobedience and stubbornness of our riper Years; lastly, their perpetual fears lest any Evil should betid us, their frequent and importunate Prayers to avert any Evil from us. For, as out of the Bowels of a Parent such a Love will hardly be met with, though you should search for it even in the most tender and affectionate ones; whence it is, that God, to commend the Love he hath to us, doth for the most part assume to himself the Person of a Father: so, for a recompense in the same (as St. Paul speaks) it is but requisite that our Hearts should be equally enlarged, and express itself in the same or the like Instances; that is to say, in providing for them, when they are not able to provide for themselves; in endeavouring to lessen their Care and Trouble, when they in some measure are; in bearing with the weaknesses and peevishness of their declining Years; in doing what in us lies either to remove or abate them; in furnishing them, when they lie upon their Sick-beds, with our Assistance and Comfort; in supplying the defects of our Endeavours, by begging the Aid of the Divine; lastly, in giving them the satisfaction of seeing their Care and Labour successfully employed, whilst they behold those for whom they have thus laboured, travelling equally for their Happiness, and reflecting back upon them that kindly Heat which they sometime gave. So doing, we shall at the same time give a proof both of our Love, and of our Honour; pay them the Affection which is due to the Bowels of a Father and a Mother, and the Respect which belongs to their Authority.  
Now though, if we look no further than the Person of our Parents, what hath been already said concerning their Fear, and Love, and Honour, will comprehend within the compass of it the whole of our Duty to them; yet because a Man may be loved and honoured in his Relations and Dependants, as well as in his own proper Person; and in like manner hated and despised: hence it comes to pass, that to complete our Duty, we are to extend our Love and Honour unto them, according as their several Relations do exact. The sequel whereof will be, 

1. The paying Honour unto those which stand upon the same Level with our Parents. Thus, for instance, though an Uncle or an Aunt can claim no Reverence or Love by virtue of the Letter of this Commandment; yet inasmuch as they are the Brothers and Sisters of my Father or Mother, and the Sons and Daughters of the same Common Parents, if I either love or honour my Parents, or theirs, I must afford these a portion of it, because of their near Relation. In like manner, though a Mother-in-law can claim no Reverence or Love of herself, because none of the Stock from whence I came; yet a Regard is due to her, as being made one with him whom this Commandment requires me to revere. Which Particular I the rather observe, because, contrary to all right, those are usually both hated and despised: For, how can he honour his Father, who despises the one half of him, yea, such a one as by the Laws of God and Man is become one Person with him?  
2. Again, As Love and Honour is due to those who stand upon the same Level with my Parents, by reason of their Proximity to them; so an Affection, though not an Honour, is due from us to our Brethren and Sisters, because descended from the same Common Parents, and no less the Object of their Love: To whom therefore, as it concerns me to show myself affectionate, if I would oblige my Parents; so, if I show myself churlish to them, I wound my Parents Bowels through their Sides, if those Parents be yet alive; but, if they be not, their Honour.  
3. It is to be observed, thirdly, as the result of the forementioned Principle, That though the same Love be not due to Cousins, and other remoter Kindred, that is to Brethren and Sisters; yet there is a Love due to them, by reason of those Common Grandfathers and Great-grandfathers from whom both they and we are descended. For, inasmuch as they, though at a greater distance, contributed to our Being, and consequently are to have a proportionable Love and Honour from us; so, if we have a Respect and Kindness for them, we must have a Love for those who are equally descended from them with ourselves.  
4. Lastly, If Love and Honour do naturally diffuse themselves from those that are the immediate Objects of it, to those that are their Relations and Dependants; if we have a Respect for our Parents, we shall show some portion of it to those, whether Friends or Servants, whom they made the Object of theirs.     

PART IU.  
A Discourse of what is owing by Parents to their Children; which is shown to be, first, the providing for their Subsistence. This evidenced from the common Consent of Mankind, that Natural Affection which God hath implanted in Parents, and from the Scripture. The same farther evidenced from the Intention of God and Nature, in that Being which he conferreth upon Children by them, from that Dignity to which Parents are advanced, and from that Self-love which God hath implanted in their Hearts. That the Provision Parents are to make for their Children, aught to be as large as their Necessities, till they come of Years to provide for themselves; yea, to continue always such, if they prove impotent or foolish. The like not to be affirmed, where there is no such Inability. Consideration only to be had, whether the Ability of Children can reach to such a Provision as is suitable to their Condition; for otherwise it ought to be supplied by the Parents. That the Provision of Parents ought to extend beyond their own Times, and they accordingly either to lay up for them, or put them into a Vocation whereby they may provide for themselves. A Caution against Parents suffering their Care for them, to entrench upon the Duties of Justice or Charity; because these are alike incumbent on them, and the best Legacies they can bequeath their Children. Institution of Children in Life and Manners, a second Duty of a Parent, as is made appear both from Nature and Scripture. The particular Duties implied in it, Instruction, Command, and Example; the first being necessary to teach them how to live; the two latter, to oblige them to the Practice of it. Chastising of Children, a third Duty of a Parent, and therefore also largely insisted on. That it extends not now to Death, or the cutting off a Limb; as neither to a total Disinheriting, or the setting a lasting Note of Infamy upon them: Because either the Peculiar of Princes, upon whom a great part of the Parents Authority is derived; or not so agreeable to Paternal Affection; or tending rather to provoke than amend the Parties chastised. Corporal Punishments less than those, within the power of Parents; but yet not to be inflicted upon those of riper Years, or not in the same manner wherein they are upon younger Persons. Of the Measure in which Chastisements are to be inflicted upon Children. That a principal Regard ought to be had that they be within the Quality of the Offence; and how they may be known so to be. The Strength of the Child, another Measure of Chastisement; and that that, and that alone, can be looked upon to be within it, which doth not disable the Child from the performance of those several Offices which Nature or Religion doth exact. The Relation of the Chastiser, another Measure; and what that Relation leads to: which is either, first, the reforming of the Party chastised, or the deterring other Children from the like Offences. To correct either for ones own Pleasure or Revenge, not suitable to a Parent. That all possible Submission is due to those Chastisements which are within the forementioned Bounds; but however, no other Resistance to be made, than by Flight, or an Appeal to the Magistrate. An Inquiry into the supposed Obligation of the Mother's Nursing her own Child; and the Arguments for it proposed, and answered.  
II. OF the Duty of Children to their Parents, what hath been said may suffice; proceed we therefore to consider the Duty of Parents towards them, or rather unto God concerning them. Where, 

1. First, I shall consider those that are common to each Parent: And,  
2. After that inquire, Whether there be any peculiar to the Mother.    
1. Now there are three things incumbent upon Parents, in order to the Welfare of their Children.  

1. Providing for their Subsistence.  
2. Institution of them in Life and Manners: And,  
3. Chastisement.   
1. I begin with the first of these, even Parents providing for their children's Subsistence; where again these three things would be enquired into.  

1. How it appears to be a Duty.  
2. Whence the Obligation thereof ariseth: And,  
3. What Provision they are to make.   
1. Now though the Duty of Parents in this Affair would most naturally be made out by pointing at the Grounds from whence it ariseth; yet because there are other ways to make the necessity thereof to appear, and such too as are more intelligible to the Common sort of Men, I think it not amiss to begin with them; whereof, the first I shall allege is, the Common Consent of Mankind concerning it: For, it appearing not how all Mankind should so unanimously agree upon the Necessity of Parents providing for their Children, if there were not some Principle in Nature to lead them to it; it is in reason to be presumed to be a part of Natural Duty, and such as Reason, no less than Revelation, doth tie upon them. From the Consent of Mankind, pass we to that Natural Affection which God hath implanted in the Breasts of Parents: For, as that doth naturally lead Men to make Provision for those toward whom they have so strong an Affection; so it is a sufficient Proof of the Intention of the Almighty to oblige Parents to the Practice of it: no other account being to be given, why God should implant in them so strong an affection, but to be as a Spur to them to make Provision for them. But so that Parents are naturally obliged, St. Paul declares in his Epistle to the Romans, and the Second to the Corinthians: Witness for the former, his charging upon the Heathen, among other things, the 
* Text. Graecus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Quod propriè significat expertes naturalis affect●● erga liberos.  want of natural affection to their Children, Rom. 1.31. for the latter, his express Affirmation, that Parents ought to lay up for them, 2 Cor. 12.14. For, inasmuch as nothing but a Sin could be the matter of a Charge; as nothing could be a Sin to the Gentiles, which was not a breach of Nature's Law; by charging the want of natural affection upon the Heathen, he manifestly implies it to have been a transgression of Nature's Law, and consequently that the contrary was commanded by it. The same is yet more evident from that other place, where he affirms in express terms, That Parents ought to lay up for them, for, though (as a Learned Man 
* Sanderson. Two Caser of Conscience, pag. 72  hath observed) St. Paul speaks it, but upon the By, and by way of illustration of another Argument, yet is that so far from lessening the importance of it, that on the contrary it adds a greater Force to it; such illustrations (as the forequoted Person remarks) being ever taken à notiori, and from such common notions as are granted and consented unto by all reasonable men.  
2. Having thus shown it to be a natural duty of Parents to provide for their children's subsistence, which is the first of those things we proposed to consider, proceed we in the second place, according to the method before laid down, to show from whence the Obligation thereto ariseth; which is first of all from the intention of God and Nature, in that Being which he conferrs upon Children by them. For the Intention of God and Nature being to make those to whom he gives it happy, he must consequently be supposed to have enjoined the adding of those things which may serve for the procuring of it. Otherwise our Birth would have been rather an Infelicity than a Benefit, because exposing us to those Evils which but for our Birth we should never have received. Now, forasmuch as God intended our Birth for our benefit, forasmuch as that cannot be, where the conveniencies of Life are wanting, he must consequently be supposed to have enjoined the adding of them also, so far as it is in the power of Parents to procure them. From the intention of God and Nature in our Birth, pass we to that dignity which we have before said, Parents to be advanced to; that is to say, to be as Gods to those whom they were the Authors of. For as that dignity of theirs doth oblige those who are their Children, to look upon and revere them as such; so it doth no less oblige the Parents to do things becoming that divine dignity to which he hath advanced them. Otherwise they shall not only bring a scandal upon themselves, but upon him whose Images they are. Now forasmuch as it is no way becoming that dignity to which they are advanced, to cast off those creatures which they have produced, God whose Image they bear no less, providing for his Creatures when made, than contributing to the Being of them at first; it follows, that as Parents are a kind of Gods to us, by the Being which they gave us, so they ought to show themselves to be farther such, by preserving what they have made, and continuing what they before gave. Lastly, forasmuch as Children are not only the workmanship of their Parents, but also like that of the Spider, woven out of their own Bowels. Hence there ariseth another Obligation of making provision for them so far as they may stand in need of them. For, inasmuch as no man yet either did, or could without a great unnaturalness, hate his own flesh, no man can without the like unnaturalness withhold nourishment from those who are no other than a portion of it.  
3. That Parents ought to make provision for their Children, together with the grounds of that Obligation, we have seen already; proceed we now to consider the provision they are to make. In order whereunto, I will consider their several stages through which their Children are to pass. And first of all, If the question be concerning Children, before they have either Ability or Reason to provide for themselves, so, there is no doubt the provision of Parents ought to be as large as the necessities of their Children. For as the weakness of Children in that state takes away all pretence of putting any part of it upon them, so the same reason, which obliges Parents to provide for their Children at all, obliges them to provide for them altogether, where there is a like necessity of it. The same is to be said of Children, who, however of years of strength and discretion, are yet by reason of some defect in Nature, either impotent or foolish; these being as much Children, as those of younger years, and therefore to have a like Interest in our care and providence. From Children which have not arrived to Ability and Discretion, pass we to those that have, but continue still in their Father's Family, or at least have the opportunity of their Father's Assistance and Advice. Where first, I shall not stick to affirm that there is no necessity the provision should be as large, as for Children of a lower state. For the general ground of making provision for others, being the necessities of those we provide for; our obligation to make provision must so far cease, as we see their necessities do. And therefore if a Child be in some measure able to provide for himself, there is no doubt but a Father may oblige him to it, and subtract so much of his own providence. But to those very creatures, whom God hath sent us to learn Providence of, have taught us by their example to proceed. For how great soever their affection to their young ones is, yet they generally leave them to their own conduct, when they are able to shift for themselves. This only would be added, which hath no place in other creatures, that consideration ought to be had of the quality of Children, or rather of those from whom they are descended. For, as, the provision Parents ought to make for their Children, aught to be answerable to the condition, both of themselves and of their Children; so if the ability of their Children will not reach to such a provision, the Parent is to supply it by his care and providence, and not only furnish him with such things as are necessary for a Son, but for the Son of such a Father. For by the same reason a man is to provide more for a Child, as being of a nobler Nature, than we find other Creatures do for their young Ones; by the same, a Man of more noble Condition, is to provide more largely for his Child, than if he were the Son of a more Inferior Person. But because what hath been hitherto said, doth rather concern the making provision for a Child in his Father's House, or at least during his Life, then after his Father's decease; and because St. Paul hath represented this last as no less the Duty of Parents, where he tells us, that they ought to lay up for them: therefore inquire we, in the third place, Whether or no Parents are obliged to do it, and after what proportion. Now, that so they are, (which is the first thing to be shown) beside what was alleged out of St. Paul, will appear from the necessity Children generally stand in of it. For, beside that after their Parent's decease they must needs be less able than before to attain to such a condition of life as is suitable to their respective qualities, they wanting in that state, that Advice and Assistance of their Parents which might have facilitated their way to it; so it is but requisite, that, to supply that defect, Parents should either train up their Children to some Calling by which they may be able to provide for themselves, (which is indeed an excellent Portion) or, if that will not suffice, or be not suitable to their Condition, that they lay up for them that which Solomon tells us answers all things? Otherwise they will leave them unprovided for, as to that state, which stands most in need of it. Neither will it avail to say, there is no reason the Father's care should reach beyond his own life, when we have before said, that the Child's obedience generally ought not. For as I have before shown, that the Honour of a Parent ought to abide after his death, and Obedience to his Commands also, so far as that is concerned in it; so it is but requisite, that, answerably to that, a Father's care should extend beyond his own time, and not only provide for his Children during his own life, but as much as in him lies afterwards; especially when the necessities of his Child, which is the ground of making provision for them, is then likely to be greater than before. The only thing to be enquired into, in this affair, is, after what proportion a Father is to provide for them. For the resolution whereof, though I might have referred you to what was said before, concerning making provision for them in the Parent's life time, because giving us to understand that both the one and the other aught to be according to the condition of the Father, yet I thought it not amiss to bring it anew before you, if it were only to add this necessary limitation to a Father's care; to wit, that he ought not so to see to the providing for his Children, as to forget to minister of his substance to the more public concernments of Church or State, or the pressing and instant necessities of those charitable Objects he hath before him. For, as both the one and the other ought rather to be regarded, than the leaving to our Children a pompous and glorious Estate, so he that forgets not to do good and to communicate, provides much better for his Children, than he who will not suffer any, the least part of his Estate to pass away from them; Money lent to God, as all that is so employed is 
* Pro. 19.17. , being (as Master Herbert hath well observed 
‖ Country Parson. chap. 10. ) placed surer for the Child's advantage, than if it were given to the Chamber of London, which was in his time the best security in the world.  
2. The second duty of Parents follows, even the institution of their Children in Life and Manners, which is a provision for their better part, their Souls, concerning which, therefore, I will show first, the Authority by which it stands, the Duties it contains, and the Inconveniences that attend the omission of it. And first, if we inquire by what Authority the Institution of Children stands, we shall find it to be by the same whereby all other moral Duties do, that is to say, by the Law of Nature and Revelation; both the one and the other binding it upon the Consciences of Parents, and that too, more stronger than the former. That the Law of Nature doth, the Argument before alleged for Parents making provision for their Subsistence, is to me an abundant Evidence. For the design of God in our Birth, being the happiness of those to whom he gives a Being, he must consequently be supposed to have enjoined the adding of those things which may serve for the procuring of it: Which being in an especial manner to be understood of a holy Institution, because our Eternal happiness doth depend upon it, will make the addition of that, even by Nature's Law, more incumbent upon Parents, than the providing for their Temporal one. The same is no less evident from the positive Laws of God, as well those of the Old Testament, as the New; in the former whereof 
* Deut. 6.7.11.19.  we find Parents commanded to teach God's Commandments diligently unto their Children, and to talk to them of them when they sit in their House, and when they walk by the way, when they lie down and when they rise up; in the latter 
‖ Eph 6.4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quod significat institutionem per poenas. vid. Grot. in loc. , which is tantamount, though expressed in fewer words, that they should bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord. From the Authority by which this Duty stands, pass we to the particulars it contains, which may be reduced to these Three Heads, Instruction, Command, and Example; the first to show them how they ought to Live and Act, the two latter to induce them to the practice of it. For as it is impossible for Children to live well till they know what it is to do so, or know it without a precedent Institution, they neither bringing with them into the world a knowledge of their Duty, nor being able through the tenderness of their Understandings to find it without the help of others; so the pravity of their Natures makes it but necessary that they should be Obliged as well as Instructed, and Encouraged as well as Obliged. The former whereof, as it is best done by the Parent's commands, which, till the minds of Children come to be debauched, have a mighty influence upon them; so the latter, by the Parents showing themselves a Pattern of those things which they bind upon them by their Instruction and Commands; nothing prevailing more with Children than Example doth, nor any Example more than that of a Father. Which therefore, as it is but necessary that Parents should superadd to complete the Institution of their Children, so woeful experience shows, that the want of that alone makes all other ways of Institution fruitless; it being rare to find a Child, who is not more debauched by his Father's ill Example, than regulated by his wholesome Instruction and Commands. Having thus shown, as well what the Institution of Children implies, as by what Authority it stands, it remains only to give it so much the more weight, that I represent some of those inconveniencies which attend the omission of it. For, to say nothing at all, that that Father is like to be ill served himself, who hath not taught his Children to revere his and their common parent God; nor yet that the omission of a Holy Institution may expose them to the taking such Courses as will bring little comfort, either to their Children or themselves; I shall desire such Parents to consider how they will be able at that great day to look those Children in the face, whom they have begotten only to Eternal Torments. For, as, if they have the bowels of a Father, it cannot but be an infinite affliction to them, to see those who are a part of themselves plunged in Eternal Torments; so, if they have any the least shame, it will be an equal confusion to them to consider, that they became so by their means, even by theirs who ought in reason to have done their utmost to make them happy, and enstate them in God's Kingdom, as well as in their own possessions. For by how much greater their obligation thereto was, so much the more reproachful must be the violation of it, and though it could be supposed possible to bear up against the reproaches of a stranger, yet it will be a hard matter certainly to hear a Son, and that justly, cursing his Father for giving him a Being, which hath only helped to make him Eternally miserable.  
3. To the Institution of Children in Life and Manners, subjoin we the chastizing of them, for so both the necessities of Children and the Scriptures require; there being no Children so towardly, which may not stand in need of it, nor any other thing more enjoined upon Parents when they do. Of which, beside the many Precepts that the Scriptures afford us, and particularly the Proverbs of Solomon 
* Prov. 13.24.19.18.22.15.23.13. , that of the 
‖ Heb. 12.8.  Author to the Hebrews, If ye be without chastisement, whereof all are partakers, then are ye Bastards and not Sons, may serve for an abundant evidence. For well may that be looked upon as a duty of a Parent to his Child, the omission whereof must put the Child into the number of Illegitimate ones. The only thing of difficulty in this affair, is to what evils it may extend, what ought to be the measures of the inflicting of those which it doth, and what submission is due from Children to them. And first of all, If the question be concerning the Evils to which a Father's chastisement may extend, so I shall not doubt to affirm first, that it ought not to go so far, as the taking away the Life of the offending Son. For, though Fathers anciently had power of Life and Death, yet it was then only when they were also Princes; which Authority being now vested in other hands, the power of Life and Death must be supposed to pass over to them, and consequently, not now to belong to Fathers. The same is to be said of taking away a Limb, however, no doubt, anciently in the power of Fathers. For beside that, this would be an entrenchment upon the Prerogatives of Princes, to whom by the Institution of God, the Sword of Justice is committed, it is neither agreeable with the nature of a Father, which is kind and affectionate, nor with those bounds which the Apostle hath set to a Father's chastisement; there being, no doubt, such an Evil would rather exasperate Children against their persons, than prompt them to yield them a more ready obedience to their commands. The same is to be said Thirdly, of cutting off an offending Son from any Right in his Father's Estate, that is to say, not only from being his Heir, but from enjoying any part of his Possessions. For, however such Actions as these may well suit with the Authority of Kings, yet not with that of Fathers, which is an Authority mixed with Clemency, and designs not so much the execution of Vengeance, as the reclaiming of the Offender. Lastly, though it may be suitable enough to the Authority of Princes, to set a lasting note of Infamy upon the Disobedient, yet it is no way agreeable to that of Parents, because, though allowed to chastise, yet not to provoke their Children, which such a Brand would infallibly do. But other Chastisements than these, as I see no reason to forbid Parents, provided they be used with moderation; so, the Charge of Chastising being general, it is in reason to extend to all those Evils which there is not some peculiar Reason to restrain Parents from; especially when it is certain they have the power of Corporal Punishment 
* See the places before-quoted out of the Proverbs. , which is the highest they are in a Capacity to inflict. This only would be added, That in the inflicting of Corporal Punishments, respect aught to be had to the Age of the Party chastised: For though, as was but now said, Corporal Punishments are within the power of Parents, if we consider it in the full Latitude thereof; yet they are not to be inflicted upon Children of full age, or at least not in that manner, in which they may be upon younger Children: such Chastisements, by the reproachfulness thereof, being more likely to provoke Persons of Years to show themselves undutiful, than incline them to yield a more ready Obedience to their Commands.  
Having thus shown to what Evils the Power of Paternal Chastisement doth extend, inquire we, in the next place, into the measure of inflicting them: For the resolution whereof, I observe in the general, That consideration ought to be had of the Quality of the Offence, of the Strength of the Offender, and of the Relation of the Chastiser: He that chastiseth his Child beyond the merit of his Offence, being certainly unjust; he that chastiseth him beyond his Strength, cruel; he that doth beyond the measures of a Father, unnatural. But because it may be still enquired, when the Chastisement is within the aforesaid limits, that is to say, within the Quality of the Offence, the Strength of the Offender, and the Measures of a Father; I think it not amiss, for the farther elucidation of this Affair, to say somewhat to each of these. For the first of these, to wit, when the Chastisement is within the Quality of the Offence, much must be left to the Conscience of the Chastiser, because of the variety of Circumstances wherewith they may be attended: Only, that I may not leave it altogether uncertain, I will subjoin this general Rule, which may serve for a competent Direction in it; that is to say, That consideration be had of the Contumacy of the Offender, and the general Custom of Parents. For, as one and the same Crime may admit of Degrees, according to the Degrees of Contumacy wherewith it is committed; so, what Chastisement is due to each, will be best judged of by the general Custom of Christian Parents; a general Custom being, for the most part, the result of an approved Reason, and therefore no unfit Rule for particular Persons to proceed by. From the Quality of the Offence, pass we to the Strength of the Offender, which will minister less Matter for our Inquiry: For, as it will be easy for Parents, upon the knowledge they have of their children's Constitutions, to discern what they will be able to bear; so, that, and that only, is to be concluded to be within their Strength, which does not disable them from the performance of those several Offices which Nature or Religion does exact. The only thing requiring a more accurate Examination, is, What are the Measures of a Father; which are, in short, these two: First, and chief, the Reformation of the Party chastised; and secondly, the deterring his other Children from the like Offences. For, as it is evident from the 
* Prov. 13.24.— But he that loveth him, chasteneth him betimes. Heb. 12.6, 7.  Scripture, that the Parents Love of the Child is the most proper Ground of Chastisement; so, the Places before-quoted out of the Proverbs, show the Reformation of the Child to be the principal, if not only end of Gods obliging Parents to chastise them. But from hence it will follow, not only that Parents ought not to chasten Children for their own pleasure, or to gratify their Anger and Revenge; but also, that, where a less Chastisement is likely to have effect, the Parent is not generally to inflict a greater: I say, generally, because a greater one may be sometimes necessary, to deter his other Children from the like Offence: Which, as there is no doubt the Parent ought to have a regard to, as being concerned for the welfare of them all; so the offending Son hath no just Cause to take exception at it, provided the Punishment be within the measure of the Offence: It being but reasonable, that he should instruct those by his Chastisement, whom by his evil Practice he hath given a temptation to offend. Which said, nothing remains to account for, but what Submission is due from Children to the Chastisement of their Parents; which will require no great pains to resolve. For, as no doubt can be made, but where the Chastisement is within due Bounds, all possible Submission is due from the Children to it; the same Authority that licenseth the Parent to chastise, obliging the Child to acquiesce in it: so, even where the Chastisement is exorbitant, no other Resistance can be supposed to be lawful, than what is made either by flying from it, or appealing to those to whom even Parents ought to be subject; other Resistance than that, overthrowing that Subordination which God hath ser between a Child and a Parent.  
2. Of those Duties which are common to both Parents, what hath been said may suffice; proceed we therefore to inquire, whether there be any peculiar to the Mother. The Ground of which Quaerie is an Opinion that hath prevailed, of women's being generally obliged to nurse their own Children. What Reasons there are for such a Surmise, may be seen in a Dissertation of Favorinus 
* Vid. A. Gell. N●ct Atric. l. 12. c. 1. , where that Matter is argued with great Eloquence and show of Reason. The sum of his Argumentation is, That Nature doth as it were prompt the Mother to it, by that Nourishment which it sends into her Breasts; that the Milk of the Mother is most agreeable to the Child that is to be maintained by it; that ill Dispositions of Mind may be contracted from the Nurses they make use of; and in fine, that much of that Affection which is due from the Child to the Mother, and, on the other side, from the Mother to the Child, may be taken off, by putting them out to Nurse to Stranger Women. Which Reasons, how plausible soever in appearance, seem to me not to have that force which they are commonly apprehended to be of: For though it be true, in the first place, that Nature commonly furnisheth the Mother with an Ability to perform that Office to the Child; yet as that may be looked upon rather as the Kindness of God and Nature, than any Obligation to the doing of it; so, that it induceth no Obligation to the Undertaking of it, will need no other proof, than that the Nourishment of the Child may be otherwise as happily procured. For the Means of any thing becoming valuable by its subserviency to that End which it is made use of to procure; where the End may be attained by more Means than one, there, no doubt, it shall be lawful for the Party concerned to make use of either, according as their own Conveniences, or other Circumstances shall persuade. All therefore that it will concern us to show, is, That the End may be as happily attained by other Means; which will consequently lay the stress of Mother's Obligation (if indeed there be any) upon the less aptitude of other Means, which the following Objections are intended to establish. To bring therefore the Controversy to an Issue, let us consider those Objections, and first of all that which pretends, that the Milk of the Mother is most agreeable to the Child that is to be maintained by it. Now, that so it is not, will appear, if either we compare it with the Bringing up of Children by Hand, as it is commonly called, or with the Milk of other Women. For beside that late Experience shows, that many Children have been brought up the former way, without any considerable inconvenience; the same Experience gives us to understand, that Nurses, if healthful Women and stirring, (as the greatest part of them are) do perform that Office with as great or greater success, than the Mothers themselves do, especially if (as most of those are that put out their Children) they be Women of more nice Constitutions, and more dainty, and therefore less healthful Feeding. As little or less am I moved with that following Suggestion of Favorinus, of children's contracting ill Dispositions of Mind, and particularly Poorness of Spirit, from those mean Persons Women make use of for their Nurses. For beside that the contrary is frequently seen in the Children of greater Personages, who are all upon the matter nursed by Women of meaner Birth than their Mothers, there want not even among the poorer sort, Women of Spirits above their Fortunes, and, to whom therefore, if that be all, they may put their Children. By which means, all the force there is in women's being obliged to nurse their own Children, must be grounded upon the presumption of the Affections of the Mother and the Child being likely to be abated, by making choice of a Stranger to perform the Office of a Nurse to them. But as that is on the part of the Child a groundless Presumption, it being not at all rare for those Children who have been nursed by their Mothers, to show as little affection to them, as those that have been nursed by others; so, that it is otherwise on the part of the Mother, will be hard to be believed by those who have made any Observations upon it: Women of better Fortunes, and who therefore for the most part place their Children abroad, being generally as fond or fonder of their Children, than Women of meaner Birth and Fortunes, who for the most part are their own Nurses.   

PART V.  
Of Kings or Princes, and all that are in Authority. The Ground of the Honour of Princes, their being, 1. God's Ministers and Vicegerents; and, 2. Of his Designation and Appointment. The former of these evidenced from their being styled Gods, as their Throne the Throne of God. That this was not peculiar to the Jewish Princes, evidenced from St. Paul, who styles the Powers of his Time the Ministers of God. An Answer to what is objected out of St. Peter, concerning their being styled the Ordinance of Man. That Princes are of God's Designation and Appointment, as well as his Ministers and Vicegerents; because that Authority wherewith they are invested, cannot become theirs, but by the Grant of him to whom they do originally belong. How it may appear, that the Princes that now are, are of God's Designation and Appointment; where is shown, first, That they neither do nor can pretend to any Immediate Appointment, as those of the Jews might; but only a mediate one: And secondly, That that Appointment is marked out to us by the Dispensations of his Providence, which are moreover shown to be a sufficient Testimony of it. Evidence of that Appointment in such Princes as arrive at their Authority by the ordinary Course of Things, or such as arrive at it by extraordinary Means, and particularly by Fraud and Violence. By what Means these last become legitimate Powers; and particularly, by what Means the Roman Emperors came to be so. Of the sorts of Honour which are to be paid to Princes, which are shown, as before in Parents, to be, 1. An Inward Esteem of them; and, 2. An Outward Declaration of it. This latter evidenced in the Declaration that is made by the Gesture, and by the Tongue: where moreover is shown at large, the Sinfulness of speaking evil of Princes, even where there want not real Failings in them.  
IT being evident from the general Explication of this Commandment, that Kings, and all that are in Authority, are included in the Name of Fathers; and it being no less evident from St. Peter, 1 Pet. 2.17. that the Honour of Kings is a part of Christianity; for the fuller Explication of this Commandment, I will allot them a place in my Discourse, and therein inquire, 

1. What the Grounds of Honouring Kings or Princes are.  
2. What Honours are to be exhibited to them.  
3. Answer the Objections that are commonly made for the denial of those Honours, and particularly that of Submission to their Censures.  
4. After which I will descend, in the fourth place, to consider of the Honour of Inferior Magistrates, and show upon what Grounds, and after what Manner and Measure, that Honour is to be paid.  
5. And lastly, Speak a Word or two of their Duty.    
1. Honour, as was before shown, being nothing else than an Acknowledgement of his Excellencies whom we honour; to know what the ground of the Honour of Princes is, we must inquire what those Excellencies are by which they stand commended to the world. In order whereunto, I know not what shorter course to take, than by having recourse to the 13. Chapter to the Romans, where this matter is both largely and perspicuously handled. For exhorting, both once and again, that every Soul should be subject to them, and that too, not only for Wrath, but for Conscience sake; the Apostle assigns for the reason of that subjection, that they are men of Power or Authority, that they are invested with that Authority by God, that they are appointed by him over those that are under their subjection, that they are Gods Ministers and Vicegerents in the governance of them, that they have both Authority and Command to reward and encourage the good, and to draw out the Sword of Justice against Evil doers; from all which put together, it is evident that the ground for which a Prince is to be honoured, is, that he is God's Minister and Vicegerent here on Earth, and of his designation and appointment.  
For the further evidencing the former, whereof, as in which it concerns us to be well satisfied in regard of some evil Opinions that have been lately opposed to it; the first thing that I shall allege, is, Gods giving them his own August name. For thus, Exod. 22.28. after he had said, Thou shalt not revile the Gods, to let us know what Gods he means, he subjoins in the next words, nor speak evil of the Ruler of thy people. But so we find them elsewhere more apparently styled, Psal. 82.6. For as his words there are express, I have said ye are Gods, so it is apparent from the whole Psalm that they are Princes to whom he thus speaketh, such, to whom it belongs to judge the causes that are brought before them, to do justice to the afflicted and needy, by defending and delivering them, and ridding them out of the hand of the wicked. Which Offices, though they may, and for the most part are communicated to Inferior Magistrates, and particularly to those that have the name of Judges; yet as they are originally in the Prince by whom they are so communicated, and executed in his Name, and by his Authority, so that they are a part of his natural Power, Solomon shows, 1 Kings 3.7.9. he upon Gods making him King in the stead of David his Father, begging of him that he would give him an understanding heart to judge his people, and to discern between good and bad. And accordingly as we find Solomon himself, in consequence of the Royal Authority, giving judgement between the two Harlots that contended for the Living Child, vers. 27, & 28. of the forequoted Chapter; so that the Kings of England heretofore sat personally in judgement, is notorious from Story, and the Bench whereon they sat, for that very reason styled to this day, The Upper or King's Bench. But beside that, Princes have the name of God, which is no contemptible indication of their being his Substitutes and Vicegerents; we find moreover, that God judgeth among them, yea, that their Throne is no other than Gods. For thus, what is in 1 Kings 2.12. Then Solomon sat upon the Throne of David his Father, is elsewhere expressed, Then Solomon sat upon the Throne of the Lord as King, instead of David his Father. 1 Chro. 29.23. And, which comes yet more home to our purpose, what was said by Jehosaphat to the Judges he had appointed, that they judged not for man but for the Lord, 2 Chron. 19.6. for what greater proof can we desire of Princes, being God's Substitutes and Vicegerents, than the bearing of his name, and sitting in his Throne, and that they who judge for, and under them, judge not for Man, but for the Lord? Neither will it avail to say, that how true soever this may have been of the Kings of Judah, which had sometime the Title of a Theocraty, yet the like cannot be affirmed of other Princes. For as it is apparent enough that they were not such at the time of their Kings (God himself having told Samuel, that when they went about to desire a King, they rejected him from being King over them, and the Word of God, that they both desired and had a King after the manner of other Nations) So what is in the Old Testament affirmed of the Jewish Kings, St. Paul sticks not to affirm of the powers that then were, where he calls them the Ministers of God. But from hence it will follow, whatever hath been pretended to the contrary, that Princes do not derive the power they have from the people. For, if they be God's Ministers, it is his Authority by which they shine, neither have they any other Fountain of their Power, than that 
* 
Irenae. l. 5. c. 24. Cujus enim jussu homines nascuntur, hujus jussu & reges constituuntur.  
Tertul. Apol. c. 30. Ind est imperator, unde & homo antequam imperator; inde potestas illi unde & spiritus.   which is the Fountain of their Being. And though I know the contrary hath been pretended from the Scripture, inasmuch as those Powers are by our Translation of it styled the ordinance of man, 1 Pet. 2.13. yet, as the words which they render, Submit yourselves to every ordinance of Man, import no other than 
‖ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. See Ushers Power communicated by God to the Prince, etc. pag 3. & seq  the doing of it to every humane creature, that is to say, (for so both the Subjection enjoined, and the Persons 
† 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  into whom it is branched shows) to every humane creature that is in Authority; so what the same St. Peter adds, as the grounds of our so doing, doth plainly overthrow that counterfeit interpretation. For, requiring the subjecting ourselves to them for the Lords sake, he shows it is his Authority which commends them, and for which they are to be revered.  
That Princes are Gods Vicegerents here on Earth, hath been at large declared, it remains that we also show them to be appointed by God as such. For as no one taketh to himself the honour of Priesthood, but he who is called of God, as was Aaron, so undoubtedly no one can assume to himself the honour of God's Vicegerent, unless he be thereto appointed by himself: That which is originaly another's being not capable of becoming ours, but by the grant of him to whom it doth so belong. To make out therefore the rightfulness of Prince's Pleas, we must inquire after the donation of the Almighty, and by what means both they and we may be assured of it. That the Princes of the Jews were appointed by God as his Vicegerents, no doubt can be made, because he, whose Vicegerents they were, declared them to be such by men immediately inspired by himself, and assured them of that declaration by his word: After the former, whereof as it was not in the power of their people to doubt, so it would have been extremity of madness, as well as of Impiety to deny it. But because there is not the least appearance of any such immediate appointment of other Princes, and, beside that, they who arrogate to themselves the same Authority, do not in the least pretend to it; therefore to make out the legitimateness of their Plea, some other course must be taken, which accordingly I come now to attempt. In order whereunto unto, the first thing that I shall allege, is those words of St. Paul before remembered, that the powers that then were, were ordained of God. For, though that will give us little light into the manner of their appointment, and consequently contribute little to the understanding of that of our own; yet thus far it will contribute to it, as to give us to understand, that those Princes may be appointed by God who have no immediate designation. For, inasmuch as it is notorious both from the Scriptures and Profane Authors, that the Powers that then were, were no other than the Roman Emperors, of whose immediate appointment by God there is not the least footstep either in the one or the other; it will follow, that those Princes may be appointed by him as his Vicegerents who have no such immediate call. I observe, secondly, That as the Powers that then were, though they had no immediate call, yet are affirmed by St. Paul to have been ordained by God; so that they who know nothing of God, or of their own appointment, are styled the Anointed of the Lord, which, if any thing, may seem to have been peculiar to the Jewish Princes. For thus in particular, Isa. 45.1. We find God styling Cyrus his anointed, though, as the same God immediately after tells us, he had then no knowledge of him. I observe, thirdly, which will bring us yet more near to the thing intended, that though the Powers, that now are, have no such immediate appointment as the Jewish Princes had, yet is there as good Authority for the being of such Power, though there be no such designation of the persons that are to be invested with it. For it being the voice both of Nature and Scripture, that God is not the Author of Confusion, but of Peace and Order; and it being no less evident from experience, that Peace and Order cannot be either had or maintained without the Institution of Rulers; it is necessarily to be presumed to be the will and pleasure of God that there should be such Rulers in every Nation. Which said, a way is opened to the discovery of that appointment, which we have said the Powers on Earth to stand by. For, it being of Divine appointment that there should be Rulers in every Nation, and God Almighty having not by any immediate Revelation signified his pleasure concerning the Persons that are to be so; it follows, that to attain the knowledge of his Will in this particular we are to have recourse to his Providence, which is the only way besides to come to the knowledge of it. For, though the Providence of God be no Rule against his revealed Will, because that is the proper measure of Good and Evil; yet, inasmuch as that also is a declaration of his Will, nothing hinders, but it may have place, where the other is not contradicted, and mark out the appointments of our great Master to us. But from hence it will follow, first, That those Powers are to be looked upon as ordained by God, which come to that Power they have, as without any fraud or violence, so by the ordinary course of God's Providence. For that Authority, to which they arrive, being consigned into their hands by his alone Providence, in whom all Authority in Heaven and Earth is vested; it is in reason to be presumed to be appointed by himself, and accordingly to be looked upon as such. Upon which account all those Powers must be looked upon as ordained by God, that either come to the Throne by a lineal descent from former Kings, where the Kingdom is Hereditary; or by a free and unconstrained Choice, where it is Elective. It will follow, secondly, That those also are to be looked upon as ordained of God, which, however they do at first attain to their Power by Fraud or Violence, yet are confirmed in it by the Submission and Acceptance of those in whom the Government formerly was, and over whom it is to be exercised. For, it being the Appointment of God, that there should be Rulers in every Nation; and, which is more, where there is no other Declaration of his Will, that we should have recourse unto his Providence: it follows, that where the Throne becomes empty, as it is by the Rendition of those that before sat in it, he is in reason to be presumed to be appointed to it, who is not only permitted by God to ascend to it, but those to whom it formerly belonged, together with those that were governed by it, moved by God to accept of him for their Governor, who was so advanced to it. And upon this account it is, that the Powers St. Paul spoke of, became legitimate, and the Christians were so earnestly exhorted to submit themselves to them: Because, though the Authority of those Powers were founded in Violence, yet it was submitted to and accepted 
* Justinianus in Instit. lib 1. tit. 2. Sed & quod Principi placuit, legis habet vigorem; quum lege Regia, quae de ejus imperio lata est, populus ei & in eum omne imperium suum & potestatem concedat. Vid. & Strabonem in fine Operis, cit. à Grotio in Flor. sparsione ad Jus Justinianeum. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  by the Senate and People of Rome, who were both the Governed and Governors. In which Case, as there could not be any pretence for any other Powers to interpose; so God Almighty sufficiently intimated his Pleasure concerning the Roman Emperors, by not only suffering them to rise to that Creatness, but by moving the Hearts of the Senate and People quietly to submit to, and own them as their Lords and Governors.  
2. Having thus shown that there is in Princes a just Foundation of Honour; and moreover described at large what are the proper Grounds of it: my proposed Method leads me to inquire, what Kind's of Honour we are to give them; which we shall find to be much the same, though in a greater degree than that of Parents. Of this nature is,  
I. The entertaining an awful Apprehension of them, and regarding them in our Thoughts both as God's Vicegerents, and of his Appointment. For, the very Life of Honour consisting in our Inward Esteem of those whom we pretend to honour, it is in reason to be given to those who are a kind of Gods on Earth, and appointed as the Representatives of the only True and Immortal One. The same is no less evident from the Influence which the want of it is apt to have upon our Outward Actions: For, it being impossible for Men to give the best and chiefest Expressions of Honour, where there is not a due Apprehension of the Excellencies of the Party honoured; where such an Esteem is wanting, those Outward Expressions will naturally fail, and consequently our Honour together with it. For though a Man may bow down before, or speak with submission to those whom he honours not in his Heart; yet it is impossible he should submit his Actions to be guided by their Laws: which I shall afterwards show to be a great part of the Honour that is required.  
II. From our Inward Esteem, pass we to the several Acknowledgements which the Honouring of any Person doth manifestly involve: among which, I reckon, first, the honouring them with our Outward Gesture and Behaviour, Bowing down to them, or falling down before them. For, as Nature itself hath prompted us to such an Acknowledgement, because inclining us to show forth in the Behaviour of our Bodies, 
Vid. Part 2. of the Explic. of this Commandment.  those Affections and Passions we have within; so, where the Custom of the Place hath made them necessary, they cannot be omitted without a manifest violation of their Honour; it being impossible for him to think himself honoured, who wants those Expressions of it, which the Custom of the Place, and of the World, hath appointed as Declarations of it. Whence it is (as was before observed) that we find all Good Men have ever given it, and that too in such Instances as would be looked upon by us as Notes of Servitude; witness one for all, their falling flat upon their Faces before them, and thereby in a manner professing themselves their Footstools.  
Next to the honouring them with our Gesture, proceed we to the honouring them with our Tongues, and giving them those Titles which their High Place and Authority doth exact. Which is the rather to be inculcated, as because the Tongue was given us to express our inward Conceits, so because we find the Apostles thus honouring even the Heathen Powers, and such by whom they were at that very instant called in question. For thus, when St. Paul answered for himself before King Agrippa and Festus, he did not only give Agrippa frequently the Title of King, as you may see in the 26 Chapter of the Acts; but when Festus told him he was beside himself (which had been enough to have stirred an ordinary Patience) yet gave him the Title of most Noble Festus, as you may see vers. 25. of that Chapter. But from hence we may collect, I do not say, what is to be thought of those who omit such Acknowledgements, but in stead thereof, employ their Tongues to defame and to disgrace them. For, if we are to honour Princes with our Tongues, to be sure we are not to revile them, as being directly contrary to the other. And accordingly, as in the Law of Moses, which to be sure was so far Moral, because containing no other thing in it, than what the Light of Nature doth confirm; as, I say, in the Law of Moses, Men were expressly forbidden to revile the Gods, or speak evil of the Ruler of the People, Exod. 22.28. so, that it was of force to St. Paul when converted, and consequently to us Christians, his Acknowledgement before the Jewish Sanhedrim shows: For having been charged by the Jews for calling the High Priest Whited wall, in stead of going about to excuse the Fact, any other way than that it was done through inadvertency, he acknowledges it for a Fault, as being committed against that known Rule, Thou shalt not speak evil of the Ruler of thy People, Acts 23.5. Which Passage is the more to be remarked, because it shows the Prohibition to extend not only to Calumnies or unjust Reproaches, but also to the speaking reproachfully even of the real Failings of our Governors; there being no doubt he was no better than a Whited wall, who pretending to judge according to the Law, did, in contradiction to that Law, cause an undeserving Person to be stricken. Neither let any Man say, That these are trifling Matters, or at least not so criminal as we have endeavoured to represent them: For, beside that we are not lightly to esteem of any thing which God hath thought fit to make the Matter of a Prohibition, and much less of what he hath so in relation to those to whom he hath given the Name of Gods, and moreover imparted to them of his own Authority; beside that the speaking evil of Princes is apt to expose them to contempt, as that Contempt to the resisting of them, which St. Paul hath pronounced to be damnable; beside these things, I say, St. Judas hath represented it as the Character of those Ungodly ones, which he placeth in the same Rank with the Apostate Angels, and filthy Sodomites: For, likewise also (saith he, vers. 8.) these filthy dreamers defile the flesh, despise dominion, and speak evil of dignities; adding, vers. 9 (which shows yet more the heinousness of the Crime) That Michael the Archangel had it in such abhorrence, that when contending with the Devil, who was sometime a glorious Angel, he disputed with him about the Body of Moses, yet he durst not bring even against him a railing accusation, but said, The Lord rebuke thee. I will conclude this Particular with that of St. Peter, as well for the affinity it hath with the forequoted Passage of St. Judas, as because it will add more strength to the Prohibition of Evil speaking. 'Tis in 2 Pet. 2.10, 11. For, as he there reckons those that despise Government amongst such unjust ones whom God hath reserved to the day of Judgement to be punished; so, resuming their Character anew, he tells us, among other things, that they are not afraid to speak evil of Dignities; plainly intimating the so speaking to be a thing which is not only unlawful for a Christian to do, but to such a degree also, as that he ought to tremble at the very thoughts of it; adding moreover, that the Angels themselves, however mightier and greater, do not bring a railing accusation against them before the Lord. They may perhaps, according to their Office, represent their Crimes before the Almighty; they may, for God's Glory, and the sake of the Oppressed, invoke the Divine Majesty to avenge himself upon them: But remembering that, how criminal soever they may be, they are God's Vicegerents, and of his own Divine Appointment, they abstain from all reviling Speeches, and rather accuse their Enormities than their Persons. Now forasmuch as even the Angels, who are mightier either than us, or Princes themselves, do yet religiously abstain from all reproachful Language of them; forasmuch as Michael the Archangel durst not so treat the Devil himself, because, as anciently a glorious Image of the Almighty, so, at this very time, an Instrument of his Vengeance upon ungodly Men; forasmuch as both St. Peter and St. Judas reckon those who speak evil of Dignities amongst the worst, yea the most obnoxious to the Divine Justice; and St. Peter moreover intimates the so speaking to be a thing which a Christian ought to tremble at the thought of: it is easy to guests, that Princes, as they are in no small consideration with God, so they ought to be had in no small veneration with those over whom God hath appointed them to preside.   

PART VI.  
Of that Declaration of our Esteem which is made by Obedience to the Commands of Princes; the Necessity whereof is evidenced from their Legislative Power, as that again from the Scriptures attributing that Power to Princes, and from the impossibility of compassing otherwise the Ends of their Institution. The same Obedience evidenced to be necessary, from express Precepts of Scripture. That every Soul whatsoever is under the tie of this Obedience, as well of the Clergy as the Laity. The only particular Limits of this Obedience, an express Prohibition from the Almighty, or those which the Prince hath set to himself. Of the Authority of Princes in Religious Matters, which is either Indirect, or Direct; the former whereof is evidenced from the Influence Religious Matters have upon the State, and which therefore are to be so far under their Inspection, as the Weal of the State is concerned in them. The Result of this Power, the Calling or Limiting of Religious Assemblies, the Appointing those that shall serve at the Altar in them, or putting by those that are. That Princes have also a Direct Authority in Religious Matters; that is to say, an Authority in them considered as such: Where is also shown, what that Authority is, and that it consists rather in encouraging or compelling those that preside in Religious Matters, to do their respective Duties, than to take upon themselves the Administration thereof. The Result of which Authority is, the Defending the Church from all both Foreign and Domestic Enemies, the keeping the Members of it within their respective Duties, and punishing with the Civil Sword those that shall refuse so to do; the calling Councils to determine of Matters of Religion, and giving force to those Things that shall be rightly determined by them. The Accordance both of the Practice of this Kingdom, and of the Doctrine of the Church, with the foregoing Determination. Of Submission to the Censures of Princes, which is another Declaration of our Inward Esteem. The Necessity thereof evidenced from the Power of Coercion in them; which infers a like Necessity in the Subject, of submitting to it. Whether this Submission be to be understood, where the Coercion is ill employed; which is answered by distinguishing of Submission; to wit, as that is opposed to all Means of avoiding it, or only to forcible ones. The former Submission no way necessary, as appears by our Saviour's exhorting Men to flee in Case of Persecution; and the Liberty that is given by the Laws to appeal to the Prince's Courts of Judicature. The latter Submission is of indispensible Duty, as appears both by the Scripture, and the Practice of the Ancient and Purest Church. The like evidenced from the inconsistency of Resistance, with Princes being the immediate Ministers of God, with the End of their Institution, and the Counsels of the Divine Providence: The first, because he who resisteth them, endeavours to subject those who are God's immediate Ministers, and therefore subject to no other, so far at least unto himself, as may secure him from the Effects of their Violence: The second, because leaving it in the power of the Subject to resist when he will himself; which will make the Power of the Prince precarious, and consequently, because, that depends upon it, the Weal of the People; which is the end for which all Governors were instituted: The third, because the Counsels of the Divine Providence are no less interessed in the Violence of Evil Princes, than in the Power of Good. Of the paying of Tribute to Princes, and that it is both a Duty, and a Declaration of our Esteem. What Tribute to be paid, to be judged of by the Laws.  
IT having been before shown, That Honour, in the Latitude of the Word, comprehends Obedience to Commands; it remains, that we now inquire, whether the Honour of Princes does so also, by whom, and in what measure that Obedience is to be paid.  
1. That Obedience is part of that Honour we are to give to Princes, is evident from that Legislative Power which God hath given them over their respective Subjects: For Laws being nothing else than Rules prescribed by those that give them, for the regulating the Actions of those to whom they are; if it be in the power of Princes to prescribe such Laws, it must be the Duty of the Subject to obey them; because that Power would be otherwise in vain. Now, that it is in the power of Princes to give such Laws to their Subjects, will appear, first of all, from the Scriptures annexing this Power to them, as the main of that Authority by which they shine. Thus, for instance, when Jacob would describe the continuance of the Regal Dignity in Judah, till Shiloh or the Messiah should appear, he expresses it by affirming, that as the Sceptre (which is an Ensign of Regal Power) should not departed from Judah, so neither a Lawgiver from between his knees, Gen. 49.10. In like manner as Homer (if we may join Profane Authors with Sacred) where he speaks of the same Regal Dignity. 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
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〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  But so also, that I may return to the Scripture, after it had been said, that Moses commanded a Law to the Inheritance of the Congregation of Jacob; to let us know by what Authority he did so, the Scripture adds, And he was King in Jesurun, when the Princes and Tribes of the People were gathered together to receive it, Deut. 33.4, 5. But not to content myself with these or the like Texts, which attribute the Power of Making Laws to Princes; let us (which will be a yet more convincing Topick, at least to some Men) consider the End of their Institution: For, if that End be not to be compassed without the Power of Making Laws, Princes must consequently be supposed to be invested with that Power, and their Subjects under a necessity of obeying them. It is the Affirmation of St. Paul, Rom. 13.3, 4. That Rulers are appointed by God for the encouragement of those that do good, and the avenging of those that do evil. Now though each of these Ends may seem to be compassed by having a regard in them to the Laws of God and Nature; yet, if we do more nearly consider it, we shall find they cannot compass either, unless they have a Power of Making Laws. For, the Laws of Nature and Scripture descending not to all those Particulars which are necessary to be observed in order to the attaining of them, hence there ariseth the necessity of a Power to draw them down to particular Instances, and accommodate them to the Exigencies of their respective Governments. Thus, for instance, though the Laws of God require the Judging of Offenders, and inflicting on them such Punishments as they shall be found to deserve; yet inasmuch as they prescribe nothing concerning the Manner or Time of Judging them, and much less mark out the Punishments which are to be inflicted on particular Offenders, hence there ariseth a necessity in Princes to prescribe when and after what manner they shall be judged, and what Punishments they shall undergo, if they be found guilty of the Crimes laid against them. In like manner, though the Laws of God and Nature prescribe the encouraging of the Good, and doing (as much as lies in Princes) toward the securing and advancing of their several Properties; yet inasmuch as they prescribe nothing at all by what Means that is to be done, nor indeed can do, by reason of the multiplicity and variety of Humane Affairs; hence there ariseth a necessity of making Laws, by which they may be secured in their several Properties, or enabled to improve them to their and the State's advantage. Forasmuch therefore as without Laws the Good cannot be secured, as neither Evil-doers either judged or condemned, it follows, that they who are appointed both for the one and the other, are invested with a Power of Making Laws, and consequently the Subjects under a necessity of obeying them. But so that they are, is yet more evident from the express Declarations of the Scripture: For, beside that in the forequoted place of St. Paul, Men are required to be subject to them, which, as Grotius hath well observed, imports 
* Rom. 8.7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ephes. 5.24. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1 Pet. 3.5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc.  Obedience to their Commands, as well as Submission to their Coercion: Beside that disobedience in Things lawful, is a resisting of their Authority, and therefore the contrary to be thought to be intended in that Subjection which is there required: Beside, lastly, that he who requires every Soul to be subject, doth it upon intuition of their receiving Praise from them, as well as not receiving Vengeance, the former whereof cannot in reason be expected, where there is no compliance with their Commands: to cut off all doubt concerning Obedience to them, the same St. Paul admonisheth Titus, chap. 3.1. not only to put his Charge in mind of being subject to Principalities and Powers, but to obey Magistrates, and to be ready to every good work, in compliance with their Commands, as well as far from doing so much evil as to oppose themselves against their Power and Government.  
2. That Obedience is to be given to Princes, we have seen already; inquire we now by whom, and after what measure. For the resolution of the former whereof, it may suffice to allege that of St. Paul, Rom. 13.1. ●or requiring there every Soul to be subject to the Higher Powers; and neither he, nor any other of the Apostles, elsewhere making any Exception from it; he thereby plainly shows, that all are to be so, of what Rank and Condition soever. And accordingly, as whatever is now pretended by the Papists for an Exemption of the Ecclesiastical Order, yet no such Plea was ever made by the Priests or Prophets of the Old Testament; so till Luxury and Wantonness made the Clergy forget their Duty, they also were of the same mind, and declared it both by their Actions and their Writings; St. chrysostom 
* Hom 2.3. in Epist. ad Rom. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉—  in particular explaining every Soul by the Soul of an Apostle, as well as of a Layman; of one in the highest rank in the Church, as well as of the most inferior Members of Church or State.  
3. From the subjects of this Obedience, therefore pass we to the measure of it, which is both a more important question, and more difficult to be resolved. Where, first of all I shall observe, that it must be in such things as are not forbidden by the Almighty. For, as where God and Man's commands come in competition; it is so clear we are to prefer those of God, that St. Peter permits it to the judgement of those who commanded him to act contrary to it, Act. 4.19. So that we ought to obey God rather than Princes, the place they hold under God, may serve for an abundant Evidence. For, inasmuch as Princes are only the Ministers of God, they are in reason to be postposed to him whose Ministers they are. Care only would be taken, first, That we do not fond, and without just ground, pronounce those things as forbidden by God, which are imposed upon us by the commands of Princes. For though we may be excused for not obeying where the thing commanded by Princes is so forbidden, yet we cannot without sin refuse our Obedience to such commands, as are not any where countermanded by the Almighty. Again, though we are not to obey, where the matter of the Command is evidently against that of God, because the Inferior aught to give place to the Superior, yet there is not the same reason, where the thing commanded is not evidently against the Law of God, but only doubted of, whether it be so or no. For, it being certainly a duty to obey the Magistrate in all things not forbidden, and but uncertain, whether the thing commanded by him be forbidden; reason would that that which is the more certain, should be preferred before that which is uncertain; and consequently a clear and express Command, before an uncertain scruple. But, as where the thing commanded by Princes, is apparently against that of God, there cannot be the least pretence of yielding Obedience to it; so other limits of our Obedience I know none (saving those  
* Vid. Part 2. of the Explic. of this Commandment.  where we entreated of the Obedience due to Parents, and which are no less appliable here) unless it be where the Prince hath set bounds to his own Power by Laws, or accepted of them when tendered by others. In which case (because the Prince's Laws are the most Authentic declarations of his Will) it is to be presumed, that he wills not my obedience in any thing, which is contrary thereto, and consequently that in those things it is no sin to refuse it.  
Now, though what hath been already said concerning the measure of our Obedience, may suffice any reasonable man in civil matters, yet because Princes do also challenge to themselves an Authority in Religious ones, and we of this Nation, in particular, are obliged under an Oath to acknowledge it; it will be necessary to inquire farther, whether they have any such Authority, and what obedience is due from us to it. Now, the Authority of Princes in Religious matters may be twofold, indirect or direct; by the former whereof, we are to understand that which pretends to have an oversight of them only in relation to the State; by the latter, that which pretends to have an Interest in Religious matters as such. If the question be, whether Princes are invested with such an Authority as pretends to an oversight of them in relation to the State, so no doubt can be made by those who shall consider the influence Religious matters may have upon the State. For, inasmuch as on the one hand the powers of the world were before the Church, and the Church itself is by the command of God obliged to revere them, and on the other hand, the things of Religion, according as they are constituted, may be profitable or hurtful to the State which is committed to their custody; those Powers must of necessity be invested with such an Authority therein, as may preserve the peace of the State entire. But from hence it will follow, That Princes have a power, so far, of calling or limiting Religious Assemblies, of appointing who shall serve at the Altars in them, or putting by those that are. For, inasmuch as the Peace of the State may be concerned in all these particulars, they are of necessity so far to fall under the cognizance of those to whom the Government of the State doth appertain. And accordingly, as all Princes, of what persuasion soever in Religion, have in Profession or Fact, arrogated such an Authority to themselves; so, provided they do not entrench upon the Laws of Christianity, they cannot in the least be faulted for the exercise thereof, nor be disobeyed without a violation of the Ordinance of God that constitutes them: Because what they do is no more than necessary for the preservation of that State, which God hath committed to their charge. Thus for instance, inasmuch as by means of the Assemblies of discontented Persons, there may arise great prejudice to the State; no man in his right wits can deny but it may be lawful for a Prince to retrench the number, or appoint the manner of the holding of them. For, though Christianity enjoin upon Christians the assembling of themselves for Religious Worship, yet no Law of Christianity appoints, that they should meet by Thousands, but on the contrary assures them, that where even two or three meet together in his name, there Christ is in the midst of them. From the indirect Authority of Princes in Religious matters, pass we to that which we call direct, which interests itself in Religious matters as such. For the establishing whereof, I shall desire you in the first place to reflect upon that of St. Paul to Timothy, 1 Tim. 2. from Verse 1. to 4. I exhort therefore, first of all, that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks be made for all men: For Kings, and all that are in Authority, that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty. For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour, who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth. From which words, as it is evident: that it is acceptable to God that Kings become Christians, (this, as will appear by comparing the first Verse and the fourth, being the thing he instructs Timothy to beg of God for them,) so also, that being made Christians, they should by their Authority procure to other Christians, a peaceable exercise of that Religion whereunto they are called: The reason assigned by the Apostle for praying for their Conversion, being, that under them, and by their Arbitrament they might lead a quiet and peaceable Life in all godliness and honesty. From the exhortation of St. Paul, pass we to that of David, which will both lend light to the former Exhortation, and more clearly discover to us that Authority which we seek. Be wise now therefore, O ye Kings; be instructed ye Judges of the Earth, serve the Lord with fear, and rejoice with trembling. Kiss the Son, lest he be angry, and ye perish from the way, when his wrath is kindled but a little:— For herein (as St. Augustine observes) do Kings serve the Lord as Kings, if in their Kingdom they command those things that are good, and forbidden evil, and, that not only such as appertain to Humane Society, but such as appertain also to the Religion of God. And elsewhere, Wherein then doth Kings serve the Lord in fear, but by forbidding and punishing with a Religious severity those things which are done against the commands of the Lord Jesus? For one way doth a King serve the Lord as a man, and another way as a King; And a little after to the same purpose, though yet more closely; Herein therefore do Kings serve the Lord as Kings, when they do those things to serve him, which they could not do unless they were Kings. Add hereunto that known Prophecy of Isa. 49.23. where speaking of the times of the Church, he affirms that Kings should be its nursing Fathers, and Queens its nursing Mothers. Which, what other is it than that the Church should be taken care of by them, and consequently, that it should be committed to their trust? But from hence we may collect what the Authority of Princes in Religious matters is, and wherein it ought to be exerted, to wit, not in determining of them according to their own will and pleasure, and much less in invading the Office of the Priesthood, which we know he that attempted was strucken with a Leprosy for, but in defending the Church from all, both Foreign and Domestic Enemies, in keeping the Members of the Church within their respective Duties, and punishing with the civil Sword those that shall refuse so to do, in calling Councils to determine of matters of Religion, and giving force to those things that shall be rightly determined by them. For, as more than these cannot be legitimately inferred from those places we have made use of, to establish the Authority of Princes by, so that they cannot rightly claim more, the nature of the Church (according as I have before stated it) shows. For, since the Church, by the Institution of Christ is endowed with a power in determining in things relating to itself, since also the secular Powers, as well by their Baptism as the precepts of the Scripture, are bound to be defenders of it, (for he who gives up himself to the Christian Religion, doth thereby profess that he will perform his proper part in it, and therefore, if he be a King, the part of a King) it must needs be, that their Authority in sacred matters, should consist rather in obliging the several members of it to their respective duties, than in determining of their own head concerning them. The same is no less evident from the practice of Christian Princes, in calling together a Council, as often as any thing hath stood in need of a definition. For, as Mr. Thorndike 
* De ratione ac jure finiendi controversias.  hath well observed, he who calls a Council, of Bishops to make a Decree, to receive a civil sanction from himself, doth thereby profess, as well, that it belongs to the Church to determine in it, as to himself to pass that Decree into a Law: Which is so true, (as the same Mr. Thorndike 
‖ Ibid.  hath observed) that though Constantius the Emperor would fain have undone what had been decreed by the Council of Nice, yet he never attempted it, but by Decrees of other Councils, which shows what opinion was had of the Authority of the Church, even by the Enemies of the Church itself. These two things only seem necessary to be subjoined, that we may give Christian Princes the whole of what is due to them.  
1. That it belongs to Princes to judge what is rightly or not rightly decreed by the Church, and according as they shall judge either to give or withhold their assent, and  
2. That though in things dubious, or not at all determined by Councils, the Prince is to expect the decision of the Church, yet there is no necessity of so doing, where the thing is evident from the word of God, or hath been generally defined by former Councils. For as where the word of God is clear, the Prince need no other warrant, who by that word itself is called upon to serve the Lord, and add the force of his Sanction to the general Injunctions of it; so where the thing hath been generally defined, little doubt can be made of Princes passing what is so into a Law, partly because it hath been in some measure defined by the Church, and partly because it is to be presumed the Church gives way to a more particular determination, where the thing doth require a present definition, or is not of such moment to require the calling of the Bishops from their several charges, with the far greater detriment of the Church over which they are appointed to preside. In the mean time, as it is not to be denied that those Princes shall best provide for the peace of their own Consciences, who shall not ordinarily determine of Ecclesiastical affairs without the consent of the Church, or at least of some of the principal Bishops of it; so we can never sufficiently commend the Institutions of this Kingdom, whereas in the Parliament, the place where all Laws are framed, the Bishops have the principal place; so the commands of King and Parliament in Ecclesiastical Affairs, do for the most part follow the Canons dereed by our Convocations. For after this manner, both now and heretofore, the Book of Common Prayers underwent the Examination of a Convocation before the use of it passed into a Law, and extraordinary Forms of Prayers are approved by some Bishops, before they have the King's Mandate affixed to them. I will conclude this Discourse with the Doctrine of the Articles of our Church, because exactly according with what I have before delivered. For as the 20th. of those Articles declares the Church to have power to decree Rites or Ceremonies, and Authority in controversies of Faith, so the 37th. not only excludes from Princes the ministering either of God's word or of the Sacraments, but makes their Supremacy to consist in ruling all Estates and Degrees committed to their charge by God, whether they be Ecclesiastical or Temporal, and restraining with the civil Sword the stubborn and evil doers. To which, as I know not what any reasonable man can oppose, because so exactly distinguishing between the Church's Power and that of Princes; so I see not how any reasonable man, where the Authority of Princes keeps within these bounds, can think himself exempted from yielding obedience to it. He who commits the care of the Church to secular Princes, necessarily allowing them a superintendency over it, and consequently also, where that superintendency is not manifestly made use of to the prejudice of Religion, obliging all the Members of the Church to yield obedience to their Commands.  
How we are to honour Princes by our Obedience, hath been at large declared: It remains that we also show, both that we are, and how we are to honour them with submission to their Censures: Which will appear, first of all, from that Authority wherewith they are invested, of drawing the Sword of Justice against Offenders. For, as an Authority to Command, infers a necessity of Obedience in all those that are subjected to it; so, a Power of Coercion, a like necessity of Submission to it, in all those who are subjected to it. The only thing of difficulty is, Whether that Submission be necessary, where the Power of Coercion is used against those who seem to themselves, and it may be not without reason, to have done nothing to deserve it: For, inasmuch as the Sword of Justice is committed to Princes for the avenging of such only as are Eyil doers, it may seem but reasonable to infer, that they who are not Evil doers, are free from submitting themselves to the Stroke of it. And indeed, if the Question be concerning the avoiding of it by Flight, there is no doubt it is in the power of the Subject, who conceives himself not to have deserved it, so to avoid, if he can, the falling under the Power of it: Our Saviour having expressly given leave, that if we be persecuted in one City, we should, to save ourselves, flee from that unto another. As little difficulty should I find, if that were the thing in question, to licence the avoiding of the Prince's Severity, by appealing to his own Courts of Judicature, where that is by Law so allowed, as it is in several Cases here; that being not to be looked upon as a Resistance, and much less as an injurious one, which is with the leave of him against whom it is directed. But if the Question be concerning resisting by Force of Arms, and so avoiding the Severity of the Prince; so it is as certain, both from the Scripture, and Reason, that we ought not to avoid it, but rather with all readiness submit to the Strokes of it. That it is certain from the Scripture, that known passage of St. Paul may serve for an abundant Evidence; he not only affirming, Rom. 13.2. that whosoever resisteth the Power, resisteth the Ordinance of God; but also that they that resist, shall receive to themselves damnation. For though it be not there expressed in totidem terminis, that it is not lawful to resist where the Party suffers undeservedly; yet to resist being in that place indefinitely forbidden, and no Limitation being in that Chapter or elsewhere affixed, nor deducible from any Principle of Reason or Nature, it is but reason it be understood in its full Latitude, that is to say, so as to exclude all Cases whatsoever; especially if we add thereto that of another Apostle, even St. Peter, where Resistance, even by an innocent Person, is forbidden: For, What glory is it (saith that Apostle, 1 Pet. 2.20.) if when ye be buffeted for your faults, ye shall take it patiently? But if when ye do well, and suffer for it, ye take it patiently, this is acceptable with God: for even hereunto were ye called; because Christ also suffered for us, leaving us an example that ye should follow his steps: Who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth: Yet not withstanding, when he was reviled, reviled not again; when he suffered, he threatened not: but committed himself to him that judgeth righteously, as to whom only it was lawful for him to appeal, even from the unjust Sentence of the Highpriest and Pontius Pilate. Which Instance shows by the way, that though the Apostle primarily intended to proscribe Servants resisting of their Tyrannical Masters, yet it is alike to be understood of resisting the Supreme Powers, because they were such, whom our Saviour is commended for suffering patiently under. And though it be true, that few now follow his Examples, and Men of all Professions almost take upon them to resist the Secular Power, as often as his Commands thwart either their Persuasions or Interest; yet it is clear from Tertullian and others, that the Ancient Christians were of the same temper with their Master Christ, and submitted themselves to the Penalties of those Laws, whose Injunctions they thought it not lawful to observe. And this they did too, not, as a Seditious Person would have the World believe, when they were not in a capacity to resist; but, as the same Tertullian instructs us 
* Apolog. c. 37. Si enim & hosts exertos, non Tantùm vindices occultos agere vellemus; deesset nobis vis numerorum & copiarum. Plures nimirum Mauri & Marcomanni, ipsique Parthi vel quantaecunque, unius tamen loci & suorum finium gentes, quam totius orbis. Heslerni samus & vestra omnia implevimus, urbes, insulas, castalia, etc. Vid. ibid. , when there were great numbers of them, and such too against which, if they would have rebelled, their Persecuting Princes would not have been able to have stood. And accordingly, when the 
‖ Vid. Hug. Grot. de Jure Belli, etc. lib. 1. cap. 4. sect. 17.  Thebean Legion, which consisted of Six thousand six hundred sixty six Christian Soldiers, were by the Emperor Maximian commanded to offer Sacrifice to the Heathen Gods, though they refused to obey his Commands, yet when the Emperor, upon that refusal, commanded every Tenth Man to be slain, they suffered themselves to be so, without making any the least resistance. In like manner, when the Emperor, not satisficd with the former Slaughter, gave command to those that survived to offer Sacrifice; though they refused, as their Fellows had done, to offer Sacrifice, yet they submitted themselves to his Coercion, in these following Words: We, indeed, O Caesar, are thy Soldiers, and have taken up Arms for the Defence of the Roman Commonweal; neither have we ever been Deserters of the Wars, or Betrayers of the Soldiery, or fallen under the imputation of any base and sluggish Fear. We would also obey thy Commands, if we were not forbid by the Laws of Christianity to pollute ourselves with the Worship of Devils. We find that thou hast resolved either to pollute the Christians with them, or terrify us by the slaughter of every Tenth Man. Do not inquire any longer after us, as Men that would conceal ourselves; know, that we are all Christians. All our Bodies thou shalt have subjected to thy Power; but our Souls thou shalt never have, because remembering they belong to their Author Christ. In conformity whereto, as we find they did proceed, preserving themselves pure from the Sacrifices of Idols, so that when the Emperor gave order for the Slaughter of the rest, they threw away their Arms, and offered their naked Bodies to the Fury of his Executioners. What the Voice of the Scripture is, together with the Comment of the Primitive Christians, both Opinion and Practice, you have heard already: It remains that we evidence the same to be the Voice of Reason and Nature. In order whereunto, I shall first of all allege Princes being the immediate Ministers of God: For, being his immediate Ministers, they are subject to him only whose immediate Ministers they are. Now, forasmuch as no Man can resist a Prince, without an intention of subjecting him so far to himself, as may secure him from the Effects of his Violence; it will follow, that no Man can, without Sin, resist him in any case, because endeavouring, by that Resistance, to subject the Minister of God to him. And here very opportunely comes in an Answer to that Objection, which I before alleged, in behalf of resisting the Prince, where he endeavours to inflict an undeserved Punishment. For though it be true, that a Prince hath no Authority to inflict an unjust Punishment; yet he is privileged by the Place he holds under God, from being subjected unto Man; and ought not therefore, by any Force, to be brought into subjection to him. From the Place which Princes hold, pass we to the End of their Institution; which we shall find to be equally inconsistent with making resistance to them. For, as if it be allowed the Subject to resist in case of Innocency, you must leave it at liberty to him to resist when he will himself, because it must be also left to him to judge whether his be such or no: so, if you leave it at liberty to the Subject to resist when he will himself, you make the Power of the Prince precarious; and consequently, because that depends upon the Power of the Prince, the Safety of the People; which is the End for which all Governments were ordained. Lastly, As Resistance in any case is inconsistent with the End of Government, and therefore to be rejected by all those, I do not say, who believe it to be the Ordinance of God, but who believe it only to be necessary to the Wellbeing of the World; so it is equally inconsistent with the Counsels of God's Providence, which are no less interessed in the Violence of Evil Princes 
* Cujus enim jussu homines nascuntur, hujus jussu & Reges constituuntur apti his qui in illo tempore ab ipsis regantur. Quidam enim illorum ad correctionem & utilitatem subjectorum dantur, & conservationem justitiae; quidam autem ad timorem & poenam & increpationem; quidam autem ad illusionem & contumeliam & superbiam, quemadmodum & digni sunt. Dei justo judicio, sicuti praediximus, in omnibus aequaliter superveniente. Iren. adv. Haeres. lib. 5. cap. 24. , than in the just Administration of God. For, as whosoever believes that there is no Evil in a City which God hath not done, must believe also, that Evil Princes are from God, no less than Good: so, he that so believes, must conceive also, that God, who acts nothing without Advice, must have some peculiar End in it, whether it be, as in the Case of Saul and many others, for the punishment of an Evil People; or, as is most probable in the Case of the Roman Emperors, for the trial of the Primitive Christians Faith, and the Honour of that Gospel which they believed. In consideration whereof, as whoever resisteth Evil Powers, must be thought in a particular manner to fight against God; so I will leave you to judge, what a disappointment must needs have been to the Counsels of the Almighty, if it had been permitted Christians to resist. For where then had been all those glorious Examples of Meekness, and Submission, and Patience, for which the Faith of Christ was then so renowned, and by which we, who live at this distance from its first Institution, are in a great measure induced to embrace it? Forasmuch then as Evil Princes are from God, no less than God; forasmuch as God, by their injurious Actions, doth not only punish an Evil Nation, but brings Glory both to himself and to his Son: I think it not only lawful to say, as Tacitus sometime did, 
‖ Quomodo sterilitatem aut nimios imbres, & caetera naturae mala, ita luxum vel avaritiam dominantium tolerate. Hist. l. 4.  That they ought to be tolerated as we do Barenness and Rains, and other such, the Evils of Nature; but submitted to with cheerfulness, and as such; which, however now afflictive, may prove hereafter Matter of excess of Joy. If there be any thing that can enervate such an Inference, it must be, that such a Ground of Subjection would oblige us to make no resistance to the injurious Actings of Private Persons. But as I do no way doubt, that we are in some measure so obliged, and shall not therefore go about to avoid the force of it altogether; so there is not the same reason for the not resisting of Private Persons, though injurious, as there is for the not resisting of injurious Princes; because these are appointed by God for the Government of the World, which the other have no pretence to.  
One only Species of Honour remains, even the Honour of Tribute; concerning which I shall say the less, because it is so evidently both our Duty, and a Species of Honour. Witness for the former, not only the reasonableness of our Contributing to the Maintenance of those who watch for the Public Good, but also the clear and express Precepts of the Gospel: Our Saviour 
* Mat. 22.21. , where he speaks of this very thing, commanding us to give unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and St. Paul 
‖ Rom. 13 6, 7. , to render to all their deuce, and particularly, Tribute to whom it is so, even to those Ministers of God who attend continually upon the Public Welfare. But neither is there less Evidence of Tribute being a Species of Honour, and consequently a part of that Duty which the Commandment calls for; the forenamed St. Paul representing Tribute not only as due to the Higher Powers, but due to them as the Ministers of God, and as a Testimony of our Subjection to them. The only difficulty is, what Tribute we are to pay: For the resolution whereof, we of this Nation shall not need to go any farther than our own Laws, by which that Tribute is exacted, and beyond which our Princes do not pretend at all. For, as those Laws are a formal Declaration of the Pleasure of the Prince, who is the most competent Judge of the Necessities of that State, which is by God committed to his Tuition; so they do moreover involve in them the Consent of those by whom that Tribute is to be paid; whether Implicit, as all those Tributary Laws do, which stand by the Usances of the Kingdom; or more Explicit, as those which are consented to by their several Representatives in Parliament. After which, to inquire whether we may pay a less Proportion, were to inquire whether it might be lawful for us to departed from that which we ourselves have consented to perform: The Consent of particular Persons being sufficiently employed in a general one, or in the Consent of those who are empowered to act for them.   

PART VII.  
An Answer to certain Pleas which are made in the behalf of Resistance; where, first of all, is considered the Magistrates setting himself against our Religion, the Cause whereof may seem preferable to all Considerations whatsoever. That that Plea is not strong enough to justify a Resistance, is made probable, 1. Because Submission to Princes is an undoubted Duty of Christianity, and consequently, the contrary thereof no proper means to defend. 2. Because God, who hath commanded that Submission, hath not derogated from it by the Exception of any Case. 3. Because the Princes to whom the Apostles required Men to submit, were both foretold by our Saviour to be Persecutors of Christianity, and showed themselves such in an extraordinary manner; which made it reasonable for the Apostles to except the Case of Religion, if that had been intended by God so to be. 4. Because to allow of Resistance in the Case of Religion, would open the gap to all manner of Seditions; because Religion comprehending within it the whole Duty of a Christian, that Pretence may be adapted to infinite Cases. An Address to a more direct Solution of the Difficulty; where is shown at large, That Religion gains more by a patiented Submission to Persecuting Princes, than it can be supposed to do by opposing them. The like evidenced from the prospering of Christianity under the Primitive Persecutions. An Answer to that Plea which is made for Inseriour Magistrates resisting, upon the account of their being Public Persons, and by the Prince himself Commissionated to execute Justice. The former of the two Pretences evidenced to be vain, because though the Inferior Magistrate be a Public Person, in respect of his Fellow-Subjects; yet he is but a Private one, when considered with relation to the Supreme. The Case of the Decree of a Judge prevailing against any private Order of the Prince, shown not to make at all for Inferior Magistrates resisting the Supreme; because the Prevalency of that Decree is founded upon the Presumption of its being the Will of the Prince, rather than any private Order against it. The latter Pretence, of Inferior Magistrates being Commissionated by the Supreme to punish Offenders, shown to be more vain than the former; because it is not to be presumed, that he who by Divine and Humane Law is Supreme, will Commissionate any Person against himself. That famous Saying of Trajan to the Praefectus Praetorio, Hoc pro me utere, si rectè impero, si malè, contra me, rather a piece of Ostentation, than any real Intendment of his; but however, no way suitable to the Mouth of the Supreme Magistrate. Another Plea for Resistance, drawn from Princes swearing before their Coronation to Govern according to the Laws; that seeming to imply a Compact between them and their Subjects, upon the breach whereof on their part, the Subjects may departed from their Allegiance, and resist them in the Execution of their Power. This Plea evidenced to be vain as to the Kings of England, because fully such before their Coronation; and the Reason of such Oaths declared. The like Vanity shown in that other Plea, which allegeth, That some Kings are such rather in Title than Reality, and consequently not Supreme in their Dominions: Where the Supremacy of our own Kings is evidenced, both from their Titles, and their Actions. Of the Honour of Inferior Magistrates, and what the Grounds thereof are, which are shown to be, The Authority they have from God for the Deputing of Inferior Magistrates, and their actual Deputation of them. The former of these evidenced from the impossibility of their discharging the Duty of their Place without it; as the latter, from their being God's Ministers in solidum, in those Places where they are appointed to Preside. Those Inferior Magistrates which are invested by lesser Powers, no prejudice to the forementioned Ground; because those Powers do what they do by Commission from the Prince. The Honours of the Inferior Magistrate the same upon the matter, for the Kind, with those of the Supreme; but different as to the Measure, which also is there declared. That the Honour which is to be paid to them, be with subordination to that of God, the Supreme Magistrate, and those of Higher Authority than themselves; in fine, that it be according to the Measure of that Authority which is imparted to them, and according to the Pleasure of him by whom it is imparted. The Result whereof is, 1. That if the Inferior Magistrate command any thing which is not within his Commission, it is lawful to disobey him. 2. That in case of hard Measure showed by him, we may appeal from him to the Superior. 3. That as they who have a greater Authority, aught to have a greater Honour; and they who have a less Authority, a less: so the precise Measures of them are best learned from the Laws, because the clearest Declarations of the Pleasure of the Prince. A short Paraenesis to Inferior Magistrates, where somewhat also of their Duty is described.  
3. HAVING in the foregoing Discourses established the Grounds, and shown the Kind's of Honour, that are due to Sovereign Princes, nothing more seems requisite to be done, than to show why, and in what manner or measure we are to honour those Persons that are Commissionated by them. But because some men's impatiency of the Yoke of Government hath made them willing to find out Reasons to licence them to shake it off, and after that, actually to believe them; I think it not amiss, before I proceed any further, both to propose and and answer their Objections.  
That it is not lawful to resist the Supreme Powers, even when they make use of their Power against the Innocent, hath been at large declared, and confirmed both from Reason and Scripture; and possibly not without effect, as to the Resisters themselves, if there wanted not some specious Reasons to take off the force of it, as to some particular Cases. Of this nature is, first, those Princes opposing themselves oftentimes against God, and against that Religion which he hath established in the World: For, though we may be obliged to sit down tamely under the Violence of Evil Princes, when that Violence reacheth no farther than our Persons; yet, who can think the same Patience necessary, when Religion itself is struck at, which we are in reason to prefer before all other Considerations? In answer to which, not to tell you, as I well might, that Submission to Princes is an undoubted Duty of Christianity, and consequently, that the contrary thereof is no proper Means to defend Christianity by: Not to tell you, moreover, that that God who hath commanded our Submission to the Higher Powers, hath no where derogated from that Command, by the exception of any Case; (And what reason have we to distinguish, where the Law of God doth not?) Not to tell you, thirdly, that the Princes to whom the Apostles required Men to submit, were both foretold by our Saviour 
* Mat. 10.18.  to be Persecutors of Christianity, and showed themselves to be such in a more than ordinary manner; which made it reasonable for the Apostles to except the Case of Religion, if that had been intended by God to be so: Lastly, not to tell you, that to allow of Resistance upon colour of Religion, would have opened the Gap to all manner of Seditions, both because it had been easy to adapt that Pretence to a thousand Cases, and because Religion comprehends within it the Whole of a Christians Duty: But not, I say, to insist upon any; or all of these, which yet are a sufficient Prejudice to the Exemption pleaded for, I shall choose rather to show (which will come up more closely to the Objection) That Religion gains as much or more by a patiented Submission to Persecuting Princes, than it can be supposed to do by opposing ourselves against them. For the evidencing whereof, I will first inquire, What Religion may rationally be supposed to gain by opposing Persecuting Princes? 2. What it may hope for from submitting to their Coercion? And, 3. and lastly, compare them both together. I begin with the first of these, even What Religion may be supposed to gain by opposing the Persecutors thereof. For the resolution whereof, the first thing I shall return, is, That the utmost it can be supposed to gain, above what Submission doth, is only the free Exercise thereof in Public; the Inward Acts of Religion, and all private External one's, being equally secure when we submit to all those Severities that are laid upon us. I observe, secondly, That as the free Exercise of Religion in Public, is the only peculiar Advantage that can be supposed to arise from making opposition to Persecuting Princes; so, it is very uncertain, whether we may be able to attain it, notwithstanding all the opposition we can make. For, as Princes seldom want a competent Assistance against those who oppose them in the Administration of their Government; so Experience shows, that in tract of Time they rarely fail to reduce those to Obedience, who have set themselves against their Authority. Upon which, what can any one expect, but that they should lay a more severe Restraint upon those, by whom they have been so opposed? I observe, lastly, That as it is very uncertain whether the free Exercise of Religion in Public may be compassed by all our Resistance; so it is very hazardous, that that Resistance may draw those that do resist into more than ordinary Cruelties and Extravagancies; no Wars having been observed to be more bloody and exorbitant, than those which have been made upon pretence of Religion. From the Advantage that may arise to Religion from opposing the Persecutors thereof, pass we to inquire what Advantages may accrue from a patiented Submission to their Coercion: Which are, first of all, the glorification of it; I do not say, only by those that submit (who do so obey a Precept of it) but also by others, yea Strangers: It being impossible not to think honourably of that Religion by which Men are induced to suffer the extremest Evils the Persecutors thereof are able to inflict. In consequence whereof, as it is easy to suppose many that were Enemies to it, may be brought to the embracing of it (which may pass for a second Recommendation of it); so also, which may serve for a third, that those Persecuting Princes may be thereby mollified, and induced to permit, if not an unlimited, yet some tolerable Exercise thereof: That which generally draws Princes to the persecuting of those that are of a different Religion from themselves, being not so much any hatred of their Religion, as the jealousy they have, lest, under the Pretences of that, and the Assemblies which are made for it, some secret Design against the State should lurk. Which Jealousy must needs be taken away, when it appears to them from undoubted Experiments, that they who do profess it, will not attempt any thing against them, how severely soever they may be handled by them. The Advantages both of the one and the other being thus unfolded, in order to the showing on which side they do preponderate; let us now, if you please, put them into the Scales, and make our own Eyes the Judges, which of the two is most conducible to Religion. On the one side indeed, even on the side of Resistance, there is a possibility of attaining the free Exercise of Religion in Public, which is of very great advantage to the welfare of it, as by means of which, God may not only have the Tribute of his Public Worship, but the weak Christian be encouraged to grow in Grace, and our Religion be transmitted to Posterity inviolate. But as it would be considered, that it is very uncertain, whether Men by all their Resistance shall be able to attain that Freedom, and much more, whether it be worth attaining, if it be not likely to be compassed without enormous Wickednesses; so it would be considered on the other hand, that there is a possibility of attaining by submission some tolerable Exercise thereof, and that too not only without any Enormity, but by our Graces; a patiented Submission to the Censures of Princes, being no improbable means to mollify their Hearts, and induce them freely to grant what the others are forced to contend for. But let us suppose, that Submission fell short of Resistance, as to this particular, that is to say, as to the freedom of Public Worship, or the probability of attaining it; yet even so it would not follow, that it does at all yield to it, as to the Great Concernments of Religion: For, beside that God is glorified no less by our Sufferings, than by our Actions, which is the main thing we are to look at in the Business of Religion, (he who suffers for the sake of it, not only fulfilling the Precepts thereof himself, but inviting other Men to think honourably of it, and embrace it, which it is not at all likely Resistance should ever effect) there is as great a probability of its securing the weak, and transmitting of Religion to Posterity: The former, because as those Weak ones may be strengthened by the Constancy of the Strong, and that Patience wherewith they shall behold them to undergo all their Sufferings; so there is reason to believe, that God, who is not wanting to any, will furnish them with Grace proportionable to the greatness of their Exigencies. The same is to be said as to the transmitting of Religion to Posterity inviolate, however that may seem peculiar to the free Exercise of Public Worship; it being not at all improbable, that our Constancy in suffering for it, may induce our Posterity to look upon it as so much the more worthy their embracing. To all which, if we add the story of the Primitive times, so we shall not need to doubt of Religion's being more than secured by a Patient submitting to persecuting Princes; it being manifest from thence, that Christianity was so far from being destroyed by the blood of its many Martyrs, that on the contrary it thrived and propagated itself by it.  
Having thus taken off the plea of Religion, which seems of all others to be the most plausible ground of making resistance, I proceed to that which is made in the behalf of Inferior Magistrates, to whom some men have been willing to indulge it, though they have denied it to private Persons; as because they are public Persons, as well as the Supreme, so, because by the Supreme Magistrate himself obliged to draw the Sword of Justice against Offenders. But first of all, as in Logic 
* Grot. de Jure Belli ac pacis. l. 1. c. 4. s. 6. , though the intermediate species be a Genus in respect of those species that are subjected to it, yet it is but a species if considered with relation to a superior one; so, though inferior Magistrates are public Persons in respect of their Fellow-subjects, yet they are private Persons only, if considered with relation to the Supreme. For all the power of governing, that is in inferior Magistrates, being derived to them from the Supreme, and consequently subordinate to his, whatsoever is done by them contrary to his Will, must be supposed to want that Power, and consequently, they so far to be looked upon as private Persons. Whence it is, that, though St. Peter oblige all men to be subject to these, as well as to the Higher Powers; yet with this difference, as you may see 1 Pet. 2.13, 14. To the King as Supreme, but unto Governors as them that are sent by him: Making the Authority of inferior Magistrates to result from the will of the Supreme; and consequently not to be made use of against it. Neither will it avail to say, that the constitution of our Nation bears witness to the contrary; as by which the Sentence of a Judge, in matters of Estate, shall be of force, not only against any private Order of the Princes, but even where his own property is concerned. For, as on the one side that Constitution neither reacheth any farther than matter of Estate, neither hath any farther power to pass it, than the Posse comitatus will afford it, which at the most extends no farther than the County where the Sentence is to be executed; so the reason why a Decree of the Judge shall prevail against any private Order of the Kings, is not because our Law allows the inferior Magistrate to oppose the Supreme; but because, the Judge being commissionated by the King himself, to judge between Him and his Subjects in matters of Estate, what is so sentenced by him is rather to be presumed to be the will of the Prince, than any private Order against it. As little of force is there, as to what is pleaded for inferior Magistrates resisting the exorbitant power of the Prince, because commissionated by him to draw the Sword of Justice against Offenders. For as St. Paul, after he had affirmed that God had put all things under our Saviour's feet, yet ceased not to add, as a limitation of that affirmation, that it was manifest he is excepted which did put all things under him, so we may, that when the Prince commissionates the inferior Magistrates to punish Offenders, it is no less manifest, that he is excepted who did so commissionate him; it being not to be presumed, that he, who by the Laws of God and Man is constituted as supreme, will commissionate any person against himself. As for that saying of Trajan the Emperor when he delivered a Dagger to the Praefectus Praetorio, Use this for me, if I govern rightly, but if ill, against me; it is but agreeable (as Grotius 
* De Jure Belli ac Pacis. l. 1. c. 4. Sect. 6.  hath observed) to that Princes other demeanour, who made show of behaving himself not so much as an Emperor, but as the Servant of the Senate and the people; In which case there is no doubt, but it might have been lawful for the Praefect to oppose him, if the Senate and people should upon the Emperor's default have so commanded him: Because so the Emperor should not be the Supreme, but that Senate and people, to whose judgement he professed to subject himself. But as it doth not follow that the like may be done to Sovereign Princes, whose Supremacy is a bar to all attempts of the inferior Magistrate; so if Sovereign Princes should give such a Power, they should neither consult their own honour, nor the welfare of that Kingdom which is committed to their trust: He who gives another a power against himself if he govern ill, not only making him the judge, whether he govern so or no, but giving him a power against the Commonwealth, which depends on the well-being of him that administers it.  
From that second plea pass we to a third, which is taken from those Oaths which Kings do commonly make (before they are solemnly crowned) of governing the people by the Laws; the government (as some think) seeming thereby to arise from a compact between them and their Subjects; upon the breach whereof on the King's part, it may be lawful for the Subject to departed from their Allegiance, and resist him in the execution of his Power. For answer to which, not to tell you what intolerable mischiefs would ensue from such a Tenent, as often as any seditious man should go about to persuade the people, they were not so well governed as they ought; I will allege in behalf of our own Princes (farther than which we shall not need to look) that which will cut the throat of this objection; to wit, that our Kings are to as full purpose such before their Coronation as after: Witness, not only their peforming all the Acts of a King, but that known Maxim in our Laws, that the King of England never dies. From whence as it will follow, that the Kings of this Nation own not their being such to any compact between them and their people, that upon any supposed breach thereof it might be lawful for the Subject to resist them; so also that the Oaths taken by them at their Coronation, are not to procure them that Power, which otherwise they could not have; but for the encouraging the people to yield the more ready obedience to them, which they may very well do, when they, who are to govern, plight their Faith and Reputation, to govern them according to their own Laws.  
There is but one Objection behind, that is any thing considerable, which allegeth that there are many Kings in Title, which are not so in Reality, as being not Supreme in their several Dominions: In which case, nothing hinders, they may be resisted, because the command of every Soul's being subject to the higher powers, is by St. Paul himself limited to those that are Supreme, that being the true notion of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. But neither will this plea be of any avail, if considered with relation to our own Princes, beyond which we shall not be concerned to inquire. Because it is certain from the Laws and Customs of this Realm, that they are both the Supreme and the only Supreme. Witness, not only the several Titles 
* See Lord Chief Baron Bridgman's Speech at the Trial of the King's Judges.  that are given them, such as that beforementioned, The Lieutenants of God, immediate from God, and the heads of the Commonwealth, as to their Crown of being an Imperial Crown, and immediately subject to God and to no other Power, but also that Power wherewith they are Invested. All Laws are made by them, (their Le Roy le Veult inscribed upon all Acts of Parliament evidently showing it) all Proceed in Law run in their name; To them it belongs to Treat of War and Peace; By them Parliaments are at Pleasure called, and dissolved again when they think good to do it: In fine, all jurisdiction flows from them, and is bestowed as they are pleased to appoint. All which put together make it evident that the Kings of England are Supreme, and therefore to be reckoned among those higher Powers, to whom St. Paul hath commanded every Soul to be subject. And indeed, as so to be is the interest of the People, whatsoever the Prince is, it having been happily observed, that, how bloody soever Nero was, yet there was not so much Blood spilt in his fourteen years' Reign, as there was in a few months after his death; so by resisting the Supreme Powers they make God their enemy (I speak as to the present world) whom otherwise they might experiment as their friend. For, as on the one hand there is no doubt but he will avenge the contempt of his Vicegerents, because it is his Authority, and his alone by which they shine, so there is as little doubt on the other hand; but if men would submit their Necks to the Yoke, God Almighty himself would sooner or later ease them of it: It being not to be thought but that he, who is no respecter of Persons, would be as ready to avenge the Exorbitances of Princes, as of those who are subjected to their commands.  
4. Having thus shown what Honour is due from us to the Higher Powers, and moreover removed those Objections which are commonly made against submitting to their Censures, nothing remains upon this head, but to inquire into the honour of Inferior Magistrates, what are the grounds of it, the kinds, and in what measure it is to be exhibited. For that these also are to have our honour, St. Peter shows in the place by me so often quoted, where he requires not only that we should submit ourselves to the King as Supreme, but to Governors, as those that are sent by him. Now, though it be not to be denied, that these also are Gods Ministers, and as such to be revered by us; yet, because it is certain that these are neither Gods immediate Ministers, nor immediately appointed by himself, therefore to make out the grounds of their Honour, we must take another course, than what we before did in that of Sovereign Princes. Now there are two things upon which the honour of Inferior Magistrates is grounded, and into which therefore it is to be resolved by us; The Authority Princes have to constitute Inferior Magistrates, and their actual constitution of them. Of the former of these we need no other proof than that the ends of Government are not to be attained without. For it being impossible for any one man, especially where his Dominions are any thing large, to distribute justice to all those that are committed to his charge; there ariseth a necessity of conferring part of the care upon other men, as without which it is impossible to be discharged. In conformity whereto, as we find Jethro, the Father-in-Law of Moses, advising him for his own ease, and the benefit of the people to set such inferior Rulers over them, Exod. 18.21. and so on; so we find the same Moses constituting such Rulers over them, from Rulers of Thousands to Rulers of Fifties and of Ten, vers. 25. of that Chapter. Now, forasmuch as the ends of Government are not possible to be attained, unless there be Inferior Rulers as well as others, it is to be looked upon as the intention of God, who doth nothing in vain, that such Rulers are to appointed, and where they are, to be revered and obeyed. As little doubt is to be made of Princes constituting the Persons that are to be so, to procure them that honour which is due unto them. For being appointed by God as his Ministers in solidum, in those places where they are authorized to preside, witness St. Paul's both commanding every Soul to be subject to them, and representing them as God's Ministers, for Reward and Vengeance, which comprehend within them the whole of all Civil jurisdiction; whatsoever other Powers there are, must derive their Authority from them, whom he hath entrusted with that command. Whence it is that St. Peter himself, where he speaks of submission to them, requires it upon this score, even because they are sent, or rather commissionated by the Supreme. It is true indeed, that designation is not always apparent, not only the Election of Inferior Magistrates being permitted to several Societies, but those Magistrates formally Invested in that Authority by some of the members of it: But as the Election or Constitution of such is indulged to those several Societies by the Laws or Charters of Princes, so being such, they who are so Elected or Constituted, are to be looked upon as the Ministers of the Prince, and appointed by his Authority and Command: He who is appointed by those, who are comissionated by the Prince, being to be looked upon, as appointed by himself.  
Having thus shown the ground of honouring Inferior Magistrates to be, that they are with the approbation of God constituted by him whom he hath immediately appointed, and consequently that they are Gods Ministers in a secondary manner,; the next thing to be enquired into, is, what kind of Honours are to be afforded them: Which we shall find to be much the same with those we are to pay unto the Supreme, because, though in an inferior manner partaking of that Authority with which the Prince himself is vested. Of this nature is first esteeming of them according to their several places, demeaning ourselves respectfully toward them, and speaking honourably to and of them, so far I mean, as their respective Dignities do exact, no Authority being likely to have its due force and efficacy where these are not duly paid. Of the same nature is, secondly, yielding Obedience to their Commands, and submitting ourselves unto their Censures; otherwise we do in effect oppose ourselves to the Authority of the Prince, from whom they have their Commission, and consequently also to that of God. Add hereunto, where any such thing is made their due, the ministering to them of our substance; as being but a just reward for their attending upon the affairs of the Republic, and a just regard to him by whom they are appointed over us. The only thing of difficulty is, in what measure these Honours are to be paid, which accordingly I come now to resolve.  
In order whereunto, the first thing that I shall offer, is, that it ought always to be with subordination to the Divine Majesty. For if we are to obey God rather than Princes, how much more ought we to do so, rather than those who are but their Ministers? As little doubt is to be made, in the second place, but that the Honour which is to be paid to Inferior Magistrates, is to be with subordination to the Supreme. For being, as St. Peter instructs us, to be submitted to, and honoured as Persons that are sent by him, that Honour is in reason to be subordinate to his, by whom they are so sent or commissionated: That, by which any thing is such, being much more such itself, and consequently to be preferred before it. Excellent to this purpose is that of St. Augustine, as I find him quoted by the late Reverend Primate of Armagh 
* Power Communicated by God to the Prince, and the Obedience required of the Subject. pag. 116. . If thy Curator command thee any thing, must it not be done? (yes questionless.) And yet if the Proconsul countermand (and thou obey him) thou despisest not the power of thy Curator, but servest a greater. Neither ought the lesser to be angry, if the greater be preferred before it. Again, If the Proconsul does command one thing, and the Emperor does command another, is there any doubt, but that contemning the one, we are to serve the other? I observe thirdly, That as the Honour of Inferior Magistrates is to be with subordination to that of the Supreme; so also, as was before noted out of St. Augustine, with subordination to such Powers as are in higher place than the other; the lesser being in reason to give place to the greater, and consequently the honour of the former to be limited by that of the other. Lastly, (which will upon the matter acquaint us with the full measure of our duty) We are to honour Inferior Magistrates according to the measure of that Authority which is imparted to them, and according to the pleasure of him by whom it is so imparted. For, inasmuch as they are to be honoured as persons that are sent by the Prince, they are consequently to receive honour from us according to that Authority which they receive from him, and according to his pleasure from whom they do. But from hence it will follow, First, That if the Inferior Magistrate command us any thing which is not within the power of his Commission to do, in that case I may, without sin, withdraw my obedience from him; because, so far he hath no Authority to command. It will follow, Secondly, That, if I think I have received hard measure from the Inferior Magistrate, I may, without breach of submission, appeal from him unto the Superior, even as we find St. Paul to have done from the Provincial Governor to Caesar: Because he, by whom those Inferior Magistrates are commissionated, does not ordinarily commissionate them so far, as not to leave an appeal from them unto himself. Care only would be taken, that we appeal not from them but upon just cause, and where it appears to us they exceed the bounds of their Commission and the Law. For, otherwise we show ourselves refractory to that supreme Authority by which they are constituted, and consequently also unto God. Lastly, it will follow from the premises, That as they, who are invested with a greater Authority, are to have a greater honour; and they, who are invested with a less Authority, a less: so the precise measures both of the one and others honour will be best learned from the Laws, because most evidently declaring the pleasure of the Prince that constituted them. And more than this I shall not need to say concerning the honour of Princes, or of those who are commissionated by them.  
5. The order of my Discourse now leads me to inquire of the duty of Princes toward their Subjects, and of Inferior Magistrates toward those, over whom they are appointed to preside; the Commandment as was before shown, being intended no less for their regulation, than of those who are subjected to their commands. But because I have to do, not with Princes, but with Subjects, and but little with Inferior Magistrates, and, because too, for the most part they are too intelligent to stand in need of an Instructor, and have more than enough of Monitors, even among those who ought rather to obey than to advise: it shall suffice me to address this general exhortation to all those who have any Authority in the Commonwealth; That they would remember themselves to be God's Ministers, and act with respect to his glory, the Prince's Ministers, and make use of their Authority, for and with him. That they would remember they are the Ministers of both, for the encouragement of the good, and not make use of their Authority to vex and worry those that are so, the Ministers of both for the punishing of evil-doers, and therefore neither to connive at, or protect them. That they would remember the Oath they have taken, which binds their duty so much the faster on them, and for the violation whereof, if the Prince does not, God whose name is invoked in it, will call them to a severe account. Lastly, That they would remember that all profanation of God's day by Tippling and Idleness, all profanations of his Name by vain Oaths and Execrations; In fine, That much of the violation of the Laws of God and Man will lie at their doors, if they suffer them to go unpunished. For, inasmuch as all that the Prince can do, is to look after the great affairs of State, and the appointing of Inferior Magistrates for the punishing of Offenders; the whole of the guilt of private men's Offences must be chargeable upon them, who are appointed to take cognizance thereof. Which however those men may now make light of, because, considering not to what judgement it doth expose them, yet will appear to be of more importance, when God shall render to every man according to his works, and particularly to those to whom he hath committed the Sword of Justice. For where shall they appear, who, beside their own personal miscarriages, shall have to answer for so many and great miscarriages of other men?   

PART VIII.  
Of the honour of Spiritual Parents, which is shown to be their due from Reason and Scripture. The Grounds of that Honour, their begetting us unto God, and being appointed by God as his Ministers in things pertaining to the Conscience. All power in Spirituals vested in our Saviour, and from him therefore to be derived, through those to whom he transmitted it. The kinds of Honours, either such as are more peculiar to their Function, or such as are common to them with other Parents. Of the former sort are, 1. The resorting to the place where they Teach, and attending both to them and to their Doctrine. 2. The yielding Obedience to their Commands, so far as the nature of their Function, and the measure of their Office doth require. This evidenced from Scripture, and from the nature of their Authority, which is shown at large to be Imperative as well as Doctrinal. That that Authority of theirs extends no firther than to matters of Religion, and is bounded as to them also, within the discipline of our Saviour, and the edification of the Church. 3. The deferring to them in their Decrees concerning matters of Faith; whether it be by aquieseing in them, so far as to make no public opposition to them, which is the duty of all; or by contenting ourselves to be debarred any public employment in it, unless we declare our cordial assent to such Articles of Religion as they shall judge expedient to be publicly Professed and Taught. 4. Submission to their respective Censures, where the Church's power of inflicting such is also shown. An enquiry concerning such Honours as are common to them, with other Parents, which also are shown from Scripture to be their due, and particularly an honourable maintenance. The like evidenced from the impossibility of their being otherwise in any esteem with the generality of men, and from the improbability of drawing Men of Worth and Parts into that Function. The whole concluded with a short Prayer to God, to direct those that are our spiritual Parents in the discharge of their respective duties.  
FROM our Natural and Civil Parents, pass we to our Spiritual ones, under which name I comprehend the several Governors and Ministers of the Church; because, however the Title of Fathers may belong more peculiarly to some of them, yet all of them do in their measure contribute to our Spiritual birth, which is the proper foundation of their Paternity. Now concerning these, I shall show, 

1. That they ought to be honoured by us.  
2. Inquire into the grounds of that Honour we are to pay them.  
3. And Lastly, what Honours we are to afford them.    
I. That our Spiritual Parents are to have a share of our Honour, much need not be said, to show, whether we do consider the necessity of Honouring our Earthly Parents, or the ample Testimony the Scripture gives to the Honouring of our Spiritual ones. For, as, if our Earthly Parents be to be honoured, Reason would that they should much rather be so, who beget us to an infinitely better Being; so especially if the Scripture hath added her Suffrage to it, and not only given Testimony to that their Paternity, but expressly required an honourable Acknowledgement of it. Now, that so it hath, is evident from 1 Tim. 5.17. and 1 Thess. 5.12, 13. In the former whereof, St. Paul gives in charge, that the Elders that rule well, be accounted worthy of double honour, especially they who labour in the Word and Doctrine: In the latter, that the Brethren should know them which laboured among them, and were over them in the Lord, and admonished them; and esteem them very highly in love, for their Works sake. To both which, if we add that of Heb. 13.17. so the proof will be full and cogent; St. Paul, or whoever was the Author of that Epistle, obliging those he wrote to, to obey them that had the rule over them, and to submit themselves; which are the Highest Expressions of Honour we can give.  
II. The necessity of Honouring our Spiritual Parents, being thus evinced from clear and express Places of Scripture; proceed we now, according to the Method before laid down, to inquire into the Grounds of it: which we shall find to have something common with the Grounds of honouring our Natural Parents, and something with those of honouring of our Civil ones. With the former, because by these it is we are begotten unto God through the Laver of Regeneration, and nourished afterwards by the Word of Truth: With the latter, because appointed by God as his Ministers and Vicegerents in things pertaining to the Conscience: Not indeed immediately; for so none but Christ, the Apostles, and other the Primitive Doctors of the Church were: but by those who were their lawful Successors, and to whom they had delegated their Spiritual Power: Which Particular is necessarily to be added, because without one or the other Designation, we can have no Title to that Honour. For however some may think that Honour due unto themselves, for travelling together with us in the Dispensation of the Word and Sacraments, and other such like Offices, by which Men are to be begotten and conserved unto God; yet inasmuch as all Power in Spirituals was vested in our Saviour, and by him transmitted to his Apostles (our Saviour not only affirming, that as the Father sent him, so he sent them; but appointing them for the Teaching and Discipling of the World) no Man can ordinarily assume to himself that Honour, without an immediate Call from God, or from those whom he hath entrusted with the Management thereof. Which said, nothing remains to do, but to inquire what kind of Honours we are to give to these our Spiritual Parents.  
III. For the resolution whereof, I will instance, 

1. In such Honours as are more peculiar to their Function; and after that,  
2. In those that are common to them with other Parents.    
I. Of the former sort is,  
1. The resorting to the Place where they teach, and attending diligently to them when we do; the laying up what we so learn from them in our Memories, and in our Hearts, and copying them out in our Lives and Conversations. For, being appointed by God the Teachers of his People, as their Teaching, for the instructing and bettering of those that are; he that doth any thing to the prejudice of either, must consequently deny them the Honour of Teachers, and so far therefore offend against this Commandment. Of the same nature is,  
2. The yielding Obedience to their Commands, so far as the nature of their Function and the measure of their Office doth require. For being appointed by God, not only as Teachers, but as Rulers; and, as you saw but now, out of the Author to the Hebrews, we obliged to obey them; (for, Obey, saith that Apostle, them that have the rule over you, and submit yourselves; for they watch for your souls, as they that must give account, that they may do it with joy, and not with grief.) Being therefore, I say, appointed by God, not only as Teachers, but as Rulers, and the People obliged to obey them; he that refuseth so to do, denies them the Honour of Rulers, because that implies Obedience to their Commands. The only thing that hath with any show of Reason been objected (if yet that itself may be allowed to have any show of Reason) is, that the Rule whereof the Scripture speaks is only doctrinal and declarative, and consequently, no necessity of Obedience, properly so called. But beside that such violence is not lightly to be offered to the Signification of Words, because, if it might, there could be nothing certain, either in the Scriptures, or other Authors; Beside that these our Spiritual Parents are more often represented under such Titles that imply Authority, than in those that imply Teaching only; witness the Title of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and the like, which are usual Titles of Authority: Beside, lastly, that in the place before quoted out of St. Paul, a difference is made between those that rule well, and those which labour in the Word and Doctrine; which what were it but a mockery, if all their Ruling were labouring in the Word and Doctrine? Beside these, I say, and a great many other things that might be produced, which I pass the rather over, because I think the Objection deserves no farther Confutation out of the Scripture; the very Being of the Church implies that Power of Commanding, which those novelists are so willing to discard. For the New Testament prescribing nothing particularly, or at least very imperfectly, as to the Time, or Place, or Manner of holding Assemblies, which, for the orderly management thereof, are of necessity to be determined; either Christian Assemblies are not to be held, which is directly contrary to the Precept of our Religion; or there must be a Power in the Church to determine them, and consequently, a necessity of yielding Obedience to them. The only thing that can admit of a Dispute, is, What are the Limits of their Power? Which it will not be hard for him to discern, who comes to it with an unprejudiced Mind. For, inasmuch as that Society whereof they are Governors, is instituted by God, for the Conservation of Religion; it will follow, that the only Authority to which they can pretend, is to extend no farther than to Matters of Religion, or what is necessary to the Conservation of it. Which makes a strange, that the Church of Rome should pretend to a Power of taking away the Civil Rights of Princes, or their Subjects; especially when he, who is Head even of their Head, hath so frankly declared, that his kingdom is not of this world. If the Governors of the Church claim any Power of that nature, it must be by the Indulgence of Princes, and to it they are to ascribe it. Again, Forasmuch as the Governors of the Church are but the Ministers of him who is the Great Shepherd and Bishop of our Souls; whatever Authority they have, must be within the Limits of his Discipline, who is the Author no less of their Power than it. Lastly, Forasmuch as that Power which the Governors of the Church have, was given for the edification, and not for the destruction of those that are to be ruled by it, 2 Cor. 10.8. it will follow, that that ought to be the Limit of their Commands, and consequently also of our Obedience. Care only would be taken, that we do not rashly, nor indeed without great and manifest reason, pronounce of any thing they enjoin, as either not for edification, or to the destruction of the Church; partly because what is for edification of the Public, is not easily to be judged of by Private Persons; and partly, because there are few things more destructive to the Being of the Church, than the dissolution of that Discipline by which it is tied together.  
3. From the Commands of the Governors of the Church, as which do for the most part respect things to be done, pass we to their Decrees in such Controversies as do arise concerning th●se ●●ings which are to be believed; where at the same time I shall set down what Authority those our Spiritual Parents may pretend to, and what kind of Honour is to be paid by us to it. For the resolution whereof, I shall no way doubt to affirm, first, That it is in the Power of those Governors to come to a decision in them, and oblige the several Members of the Church not to make any Public Opposition to them. For, the Peace of the Church being broken, not so much by any thing, as by Controversies which may arise concerning those things that are to be believed; the Governors of the Church, to whom the preservation of the Peace thereof is committed, must consequently be supposed to be furnished with such a Power of Decision, as shall bind up the several Members thereof from making any Public Opposition to what they do so decide. Which is so reasonable a thing, that there is no form Church in the World, which doth not claim such a Power; nor any reasonable Man in them, which doth not think himself to be so far bound up by it: provided the Decision do not entrench upon an Article of Faith, nor be imposed upon ours, but recommended as such only, to which Men shall not openly oppose themselves. For, though it be not lawful for any Man to abjure that which he does believe to be a Truth; yet it may be lawful, and sometime necessary, not to make profession of some Truths, if the Peace of the Church be like to be broken by it. But beside that the Honour of the Governors of the Church may require an Acquiescence in their Decisions, where those Decisions, though it may be not exact, do not entrench upon an Article of Faith, nor are imposed upon our Belief; I do no way doubt, but it may also require the exacting a cordial Acknowledgement of them from those that are the Ministers thereof. For, it being of great importance to the Welfare of the Church, that those which are its Teachers should be well persuaded themselves, lest (as is but too frequent) they disperse their Errors among the People; it cannot but be thought requisite for those who are the Governors, to exact of those Teachers, before they be approved, a cordial Acknowledgement of such Articles of Religion, as they shall deem expedient to be publicly professed and taught: For, how shall they otherwise provide for the Welfare of that Church which is committed to their Charge, and for which they shall be accountable to Almighty God? or those Candidates of the Ministry provide for the Honour of their Governors, who shall not be content to make such an Acknowledgement, if they do hearty believe the things proposed; or to be excluded from the Office of Teachers, if they do not? Honour implying an Acknowledgement of all such Power and Authority as is requisite in a Governor, for the conservation of that Society, over which he is appointed to preside.  
4. One only Species of Honour remains, of those which are more peculiar to their Function; and that is, Submission to th' Censures of these our Spiritual Parents. Of which, beside the Admonition of the Author to the Hebrews, where he requires us not only to obey those that have the Rule over us, but also to submit ourselves, a Proof may be fetched from the Authority those Governors are invested with, of excluding them from the Communion of the Church, who shall not show themselves faithful Members of it. For, beside that every Member of the Church covenants in Baptism to show himself a faithful Soldier of Christ Jesus, and consequently cannot be thought to have any injury done him, if he be debarred the Communion of the Church, upon the breach of that his Covenant; beside that the Scripture doth so far enjoin it upon particular Persons, as to oblige them to withdraw themselves from every Brother that walketh disorderly; beside, lastly, that God hath committed to the Governors of the Church the power of binding and losing, and promised that what they do so bind and lose on earth, shall be bound and loosed in heaven, which the Church of God hath ever understood with reference to the Power of Excommunication and Absolution; that Power is no more than necessary, for the conservation of the Church in obedience to God, and to the wholesome Commands of their Superiors. For, who will generally be very careful of keeping the Covenants they have made in Baptism, if it be not in the Power of the Governors thereof, to debar them the Privileges of that Communion which the more sound Members of the Church enjoy? Now forasmuch as it is in the Power of these our Spiritual Parents, not only to command such things as are salutary, but to exclude from the Communion of the Church all such as are disorderly walkers; if we will give them that Honour which is due to them, we must of necessity acquiesce in that their Censure, if justly inflicted, so long as they shall think fit to continue it; and, because that their Censure is in order to our Amendment, give them such Proofs of our Sorrow and Repentance, as may oblige them to receive us again into the Bosom of that Church, out of which we have been ejected for our disorderliness.  
2. Now, though it were to be wished, that even these kinds of Honour were paid unto the Clergy; partly because they are more proper to their Function, and partly because the welfare of Religion is more immediately concerned in them: yet forasmuch as by the Consent of the World, they have been thought worthy of other Honours, even such as in themselves savour more of Earth than Heaven; I think it not amiss to make these also the Subject of my Inquiry; and the rather, because they have been of late denied them. In order whereunto, I shall lay for my Foundation, that which, if it had been heeded, would perhaps have made this Question unnecessary; I mean, the Behaviour of those of Melita to St. Paul, and them that travelled with him, Acts 28.20. concerning whom, St. Luke there tells us, that they honoured them with many Honours; and when they departed, laded them with such things as were necessary. For, there appearing not any the least intimation of those Islanders conversion to the Faith, that we should think the Honours they bestowed upon St. Paul were other than Civil ones; and St. Luke, who writes the Story, and had a share in those Honours, remembering this Act of theirs with Commendation and Applause, it is evident that Civil Honours are not only not disagreeable to their Function, but also (because we are indefinitely commanded to honour them) in the number of those that are to be paid. For, how should we think those other than due, which we find both St. Paul and St. Luke to have willingly received, and the latter moreover to have transmitted the Cognisance of to the World, as it were by their Example to incite others to the like. And though it be true, the Text particularizeth not the Honours that were bestowed upon them, and leaves us to collect, that they were, for the kind, Civil ones; yet forasmuch as it makes mention of their honouring them with many Honours, and moreover expresseth in the same Period, their furnishing them with such things as were necessary at their departure; I think it but reasonable to collect, that whilst the Apostle and his Company were with them, they treated them with all kind of Respect, in Gesture, Language, and Entertainment; and when they departed, no less officiously than courteously accompanied them to their Ship. But because, in this particular, we have to do with envious Men, who will not easily be convinced of what they are unwilling to believe; and because the thing whereof we speak, is a matter of Interest, in which (whatever professions we may make) Men will be apt to think, we will be partial to ourselves; therefore, to make our Cause so much the more plausible, I will both instance in one kind of Civil Honour, and show from Reason the Equity of others. Now the Honour that I shall instance in, is that of Maintenance; because St. Paul hath so expressly asserted the paying of it to the Ministers of Religion. Witness, first of all, that Affirmation of his, 1 Cor. 9.14. Where having premised many Arguments concerning this Affair, and enquired in particular, whether the Corinthians were not very well satisfied, that they who ministered about Holy Things in the Temple, were Partakers with it; he subjoins, in the next Words, Even so hath the Lord ordained, that they which preach the Gospel, should live of the Gospel. In which place, not only affirming the necessity of a Maintenance, but arguing that necessity from what God had established among the Jews, he gives us plainly enough to understand, that he meant an Honourable one, because the Priests among the Jews were so provided for. But so the same Apostle gives us yet more clearly to understand, 1 Tim. 5.17, 18. where he exhorts, that the Elders that rule well, be accounted worthy of double honour, especially they who labour in the Word and Doctrine; because (as he there subjoins) the Scripture hath said, Thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the Ox that treadeth out the Corn, and the Labourer is worthy of his Reward. From which Reason, as it is manifest, that the thing whereof he entreats, is the Maintenance of those who labour in the Word and Doctrine; so it is no less manifest, from his before expressing it under the Title of Honour, and a double one, that he meant such a Maintenance as should not only afford them a Subsistence, but above the common Condition of Ordinary Men. Of which, even some of those, who were otherwise no great Friends to the Clergy, were so sensible, that one of them did not stick to affirm in the late Long Parliament, That they were Scandalous Live, that made so many Scandalous Ministers in the Church.  
Now though from this one Topick, because the Reason is the same of all, it were easy to infer, that those of whom we speak, are susceptible of other Civil Honours; yet I think it not amiss, especially having before promised it, to add the Suffrage of Reason also. Now there are two things which Reason offers toward the confirmation of those outward Marks of Honour, which this Church, and almost all others, have set upon the Ministers of Religion; whereof the former respects the generality of those that are under their respective Charges; the other, the Invitation of such as are to be admitted into them. For though (to begin with the former) there be enough in that Sacred Function, to engage men's Esteem; though it had nothing to commend those who were of it, beside the Dignity of their Office, and the Honourableness of their Work: yet forasmuch as the Common sort judge rather by their Eyes, than by their Understandings, and indeed cannot well do otherwise, unless they had more exalted one's; how is it possible to think, they should ever hold such in reputation, upon whom they discern no outward Marks of Honour? Especially when they see all other Governors adorned with the like, and appearing outwardly as Specious, as they are inwardly Great and Glorious? For by how much the more their Eyes are dazzled with that outward Pomp and Splendour which they do every day behold those Ministers of God in the State to be compassed with, so much the less regard must they be supposed to have for his Ministers in the Church, upon whom they discern none of the same Greatness: Unless (as it happened in the Apostles times) they could bear themselves above the Condition of Men, and outshine the Laity as much by the miraculousness of their Works, as they do them by the outward Marks of Majesty and Greatness. There is the same, or far greater reason for the Confirmation of those outward Marks of Honour, if we consider the necessity there is of them to invite Men of Worth and Parts to enter themselves into the Sacred Function. For, though that which ought chief to draw Men, be the Nobleness of the Work, and the Honour they may thereby do both to God, and to his Church; yet inasmuch as the Candidates of this Function carry about them the Infirmities of Men, by means of which it is not impossible they may stand in need of other Motives, it is not easy to believe, that, quitting those Worldly Employments, for which they are equally fitted, and to which they are tempted by the pleasing Baits of Advantage and Honour, they will betake themselves to a Function, in which they shall live poorly and contemptibly, and not only miss of the former Rewards, but be trampled upon, and despised. Of which, what can any Man imagine to be the consequence, but that the Office of the Priesthood become a Prey to the meanest both in Parts and Quality, and both That, and Religion itself, thereby fall into the contempt of all.  
I have done with the Honour of our Spiritual Parents, and shown both upon what Grounds it stands, and to what Expressions it is to extend: It remains, were the generality of Men so proper for it, or indeed I proper for the Work, that I should entreat of the Duty of those Spiritual Parents, toward such whom they beget unto their Maker. But because I have to do, not with those Parents, but with the Children; and beside that, am more fitted to learn of them, than to instruct them; I shall choose rather to turn my Discourse into a Prayer, and call in your Devotion to assist me in it; Beseeching God, whose the Clergy are, and from whom every good and perfect gift cometh, That he would give them Abilities answerable to the weight of their Employment, and Grace and Tenderness proportionable to their Abilities; That he would incline the Governors of the Church to lay Hands upon such, and such only, as may give their Children their Meat in due season, and both teach and prompt the Inferior Clergy rightly to divide it; That he would inspire both the one and the other to go before them by their Example, as well as by their Doctrine; and show them how to live virtuously, as well as instruct them what it is to do so. So doing, however they may be contemned by the ignorant and the disobedient, they shall see of the travel of their soul upon the truly Religious, and (which will be an ample Reward of all their Labours, and an abundant Compensation of their Contempt) be admitted to the participation of their Master's Joy and Crown.   

PART IX.  
An Appendix to the Honour of our Spiritual Parents, in an Inquiry concerning the deference that is to be used to the Doctrine of them and others, in the framing of our Conceits about Religious Matters. Of the Ancient Fathers, and particularly of such of them as had any Eminent Place in the Church of God: Where is shown, that much is to be deferred to them, even in our Belief, where they deliver what they do, as Apostolical Tradition; and that too, either unanimously, or without any material difference: This being but due to the Rank they held in that Purer Church, and the Opportunity they had, by their nearness to the Apostles Times, to know the Sense both of them, and of our Saviour. Of what consequence this is in the Question concerning the Government of the Church by Bishops, Priests, and Deacons. Where those Fathers speak their own Sense only, yet, caeteris paribus, to be preferred before those of later date for the same Reasons. Of the Judgement of Learned Men in general, and what deference is to be given to it in our own: Where is shown, first, That it ought not to prescribe against the clear and express Dictates of Reason and Scripture; as neither, secondly, against a strong and very probable one. Where there is no such Evidence or Probability, it is but reasonable to incline to the Judgements of Learned Men, as being but a just Respect to their Learning, and to God, who is the Donor of it. This acknowledged by all, in Matters of Health and Estate; and no doubt equally due in Things relating to the Discipline and outward Oeconomy of the Church. Where Learned Men are found to differ, as they often do, regard is to be had, in the first place, to the Judgements of those whom we apprehend to be right in the main; as, secondly, where there is no difference, there to the Judgements of those, upon whom we can discern the clearest Footsteps of Peaceableness, Humility, and Obedience; and, thirdly, to that Party which hath the most and best Learned— Of the Honour of the Aged, and what the Grounds thereof are: Which are shown to be, first, That Wisdom which doth generally adorn them. 2. That Testimony which God gives by their Age, of his approbation of their Actions, or at least of his Forbearance. 3. Their freedom from those Lusts wherewith younger Years are agitated: And, 4. Their being, by the similitude of Years and Dispositions, the usual Companions of our Parents; and who, as such, cannot be despised, without the dishonour of the other. Of the Kind's of Honour that are to be given to the Aged: Where is shown, That we ought to rise up before them; to withhold from speaking, till they have delivered their Sense, and speak to them, when we do, with submission and respect; to afford them that Relief and Assistance, which either their Necessities or Weaknesses require; and, in fine, to submit to their Reproofs with all patience and meekness— Of the Honour of those who are Superior to us in Dignity; whether it be, 1. Upon the account of their Parts and Endowments: Where is shown, what the Ground of their Honour is, even those Gifts of God that are in them; and in what order such Dignified Men ought to be honoured by us. 2. Upon the account of the Nobility of their Birth, as which cannot be despised, without an Injury to the Merits of their Ancestors, yea to Virtue itself. 3. Because of the Amplitude of their Fortunes, as which bespeaks the Favour of the Divine Providence, and the Virtues either of them or of their Ancestors. 4. Upon the account of those Marks of Honour which are bestowed upon them by the Prince, and to which therefore, though they had no Personal Merits, a just Respect is due. A short Paraenesis to those who have any of the former Dignities to commend them; where also their respective Duties are not obscurely intimated.  
THE Business of my last Discourse being to show what Honour is due from us to our Spiritual Parents, I think it not amiss, by way of Appendix, to show what deference is to be used to the Doctrine of them and others, in the framing of our Conceits concerning the Matters of Religion. For though, when the Authority of Men opposes our particular Interests, it is with contempt enough rejected and despised; yet is there none who thinks not the better of his Cause, if he can confirm it by the Suffrages of those who have been eminent for their Learning or Piety in the World.  
I begin with the Ancient Fathers, both because the first in Time, and because they have been most unanimously esteemed: For the judging of whose Authority, and consequently of the Honour that is to be given by us to them, I will first of all consider them as Witnesses of Ecclesiastical Tradition, and then as delivering their own Sense in Matters of Religion. If we consider them in the former notion, so little doubt can be made of their Authority; especially if we understand by Fathers, such of them as had eminent Places in the Hierarchy of the Church, as Mr. Thorndike 
* Socrates Hist. Eccl. li. 2. c. 40. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Vid. eundem, lib. 2. cap. 10. & Hilar, in fine libr. de Synodis, cum observat. Thorndic. lib. de ratione ac jure finiendi controversias, cap. 25. pag. 489, etc.  hath shown out of 
* Socrates Hist. Eccl. li. 2. c. 40. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Vid. eundem, lib. 2. cap. 10. & Hilar, in fine libr. de Synodis, cum observat. Thorndic. lib. de ratione ac jure finiendi controversias, cap. 25. pag. 489, etc.  Ancient Writers, that we ought to understand the Name of Fathers, For, living so near as they did to the Times of the Apostles, by which means they had opportunity to know what things had been delivered by Christ and his Apostles; and being moreover thought worthy in those purer Times to be set in the highest Places of Dignity and Authority in the Church; the Prerogative of that their Rank, and their nearness to the Apostles Times, is in reason to oblige us to look upon them as competent Witnesses of the Tradition of the Apostles, and consequently, to give up our Belief to what they shall so testify; especially if we find them to have so testified with one consent, or with no material difference in it. Whence it is, that all reasonable Men must look upon the Government of the Church by Bishops, Priests, and Deacons, as instituted by the Apostles; because, with one consent, so declared by the Ancient Fathers. And though the same Authority be not to be given to them, where they pretend to speak rather their own Sense, than the Tradition of the Church, which is the second Notion under which I promised to look upon them; yet even there they are, caeteris paribus, to be preferred in their Opinions, before those of later date: both because, as was before said, they were of eminent account in the Church, and because of the opportunity they had, by their nearness to the Apostles times, to know the sense both of them and of our Lord and Saviour.  
Of the Fathers of the Church, what hath been said may suffice, at least, as to those who are most like to be my Readers, proceed we now to consider how far the judgement of Learned men in general is to prevail with us in the squaring of our own in matters of Religion. In order whereunto,  
1. The first thing I shall represent, is, that whatever Authority the judgement of Learned men ought to have with us, yet ought it not to be of any account, against the clear and express Dictates of Reason and Scripture. Because, whatever their judgement is, it is but the judgement of men, whereas the voice of Reason and Scripture is no other than the Voice of God. To which therefore, there is but reason the other should yield, because it is but fallible, whereas Reason and Scripture is the voice of him whose property it is, not to be in a capacity to be deceived. Again, forasmuch as, whatever force the judgement of Learned men may be of, it is upon the presumption of the concurrency of their judgements with Reason and Scripture which they have such ability to discern; the voice of Reason and Scripture must consequently be of more force itself, as, which gives all the force it hath to the judgement of Learned men. Against the clear and express dictates of Reason and Scripture, therefore the judgement of Learned men can be of no avail, and consequently in that case, no Honour to be given to it.  
2. But neither, secondly, is any such Honour to be given to the judgement of Learned Men, where there is a strong, or very probable reason against it. For, besides that, Learned Men may be bias by Interest, and other such like considerations which serve rather to corrupt than inform their judgements, a reason (as a Learned Man 
* tailor's Ductor Dubit. l. 1. c. 4. Rule 9  observes) is an , proper, and apportioned Motive to the Conscience; but humane Authority, or citation of consenting Authors, is but an , accidental, and presumptive Inducement, and a mere suppletory in the destitution of Reason; Truth (as the forenamed Person observes from Socrates) being not to be weighed by Witnesses, but by Argument; not by the Authority of Authors, but by the Reasons they allege.  
3. But because, what the voice of Scripture or Reason is, is not always apparent of itself, nor yet with any great probability to be collected, or at least not by men of ordinary Capacities; hence there ariseth a necessity of having recourse to the judgement of the Learned, and a reasonableness of things of that nature, of being bound up by it. For, as it is but reasonable to yield to the judgements of others, where our own will not serve to extricate ourselves; so it is but a just respect which we own to their Learning, and indeed to God himself, who is the Author of it. For, what other is it than a contempt of their Gifts, and of God who is the Donor of them, not to submit to their judgements, whom God hath so well furnished with an ability to inform us? Whence it is, That, though in matters of Religion, men are generally more headstrong, yet in matters relating to their Health or Estate, there are none of Common Understanding, which do not square their Opinions and Actions by the advice of those who are the Sages, either of the Law or Physic. But, so the same Reason will oblige us to proceed in things relating to the discipline and outward oeconomy of Religion. For, what can be more reasonable (especially in things of that nature) than to square our judgements by theirs whom God hath blessed with an ability to discern? The only scruple in this Affair, is, what is to be done, where we find Learned Men to differ. Where, first, little doubt is to be made, but we are to follow the judgements of those whom we apprehend to be in the right, as to the main. Thus, for example, Though there be as much Learning among the Papists, as the Protestants, in all sorts of knowledge relating to Religion; yet, inasmuch as, I believe the latter to be in the right, as to the main, and the other not, I think it but reasonable to defer to their judgement, whom I am so well persuaded of: There being more reason to believe them to be in the right, as to the particular whereof I inquire, who are so in the main, than those who show their Ignorance or Prejudice in matters of the greatest weight. Again, If the difference be between men of the same Protestant Profession, and of the same Belief in the main matters, wherein we have separated from the Papists, I think it but reasonable to incline to the judgement of those upon whom I can discern the clearest Testimonies of Peaceableness, Humility, and Obedience: It being but just to presume, that God, who promiseth his Grace to the humble, will bestow the light of his Truth there, where that Grace, and other such like, do most prevail. Lastly, Forasmuch as, in any difference between Learned Men there is a greater presumption of Truth, where there are the most and best, than among the fewer and the worse; Reason would, that we should pay them so much respect, as to choose to opine with them, rather than with others that are both fewer in number, and less Learned than they. All which I say, not to invite you to have the Faith of our Lord Jesus Christ with respect of persons, which I know that very Faith doth forbid, but that, where that Faith or Reason is not apparent, we should choose rather to follow the conduct of those whom God hath blessed with an ability of discerning, than our own groundless Fancies, or the Fancies of those whom God hath not endued with the like Abilities: That being but a necessary result of an humble opinion of ourselves, and an Honour, which we own to the abilities of those, whom God hath blessed with a more exalted Understanding.  
To go on now to show the Honour that is due from us to other Superiors, to which I told you in my entrance upon this Commandment, that the Precept is to be thought to extend; Where, first I shall inquire, what Honour is due from us to the Aged, as, because by a general consent they have acquired to themselves the name of Fathers, so also because St. Paul hath commanded us to treat them as such: His Injunction to Timothy being, not only that he should not rebuke an Elder, or a man of Years, but that he should entreat him as a Father, and the elder Women as Mothers, 1 Tim. 5.1, 2. Now concerning these, following my usual Method, I will inquire, 

1. Upon what grounds the Honour of these Fathers is built, and  
2. What kind of Honours we are to afford them.    
1. It is the affirmation of Solomon, Prov. 16.31. That the hoary head is a crown of glory, if it be found in the way of Righteousness; and so indeed it is, because, beside the Honour of its Grey Hairs, it doth also connote a long continuance in Piety, which is of all other things the justest ground of Honour. But because, as Old Age is sometime found without this attendant; so the precept of rising up before it, is without any such limitation, as you may see, Leu. 19.32. therefore it may not be amiss to inquire after such grounds as are separate from the way of Righteousness, or at least as do not necessarily involve a perfect one. Of which number is,  
1. That Wisdom which doth generally adorn it, and is indeed one of the fairest Jewels of its Crown. For, as, according to the saying of Elihu in Job, it is but reasonable that Days should speak, and multitude of Years teach Wisdom; so experience shows, that Wisdom is not where found more perfect, nor any where else a more clear and solid Understanding: Partly through the manifold experience they have had of those things that fall under Consideration, and partly through the advantage of their Temper; Old Men having neither any of that heat which is natural to younger Persons, and by which they are precipitated to act, before they have sufficiently considered, nor yet of those Lusts by which their judgements are either perfectly debauched, or at least very much clouded in their perceptions. Which by the way (as Tully 
* Tullius de Senectute. Nihil igitur afferunt, qui in re gerenda versari senectutem negant: similesque sunt, ut siquis gubernatorem in navigando nihil agere dicat, cum alii malos scandant, alii per foros cursent, alii sentinam exhauriant: ille autem clavem tenent quietus sedeat in puppi.  observes) may make amends for that weakness of body wherewith the Hoary Head is commonly attended, and for which it is so oft despised as useless. For, who (as the same Author 
* Tullius de Senectute. Nihil igitur afferunt, qui in re gerenda versari senectutem negant: similesque sunt, ut siquis gubernatorem in navigando nihil agere dicat, cum alii malos scandant, alii per foros cursent, alii sentinam exhauriant: ille autem clavem tenent quietus sedeat in puppi.  there speaks) will say the Master of the Ship does nothing, because younger Men perhaps climb the Mast, run over the Decks, or empty the Pump? whilst in the mean time the good Old Man sits at the Helm, and directs both the Ship, and all that manage it. And accordingly, as in all Nations, Men have generally made choice of the Elder sort for the managing of the most Important Affairs of State, so the Custom hath so prevailed, that in all Nations almost, the word Elder hath been set to denote a Counsellor or a Governor, and they have born the Name who have not had Years to answer it, nor any thing but their Place and Wisdom. As if Wisdom were so peculiar to the Ancient, that Young Men must become Old to learn it, and not be admitted to govern, till either Time had planted Hoary Hairs upon their Head, or the Elder Ones made them a Periwig of theirs.  
2. But beside the wisdom of the Hoary Head, which yet is no contemptible ground of that Honour which we are to afford them; the Hoary Head hath also to commend it, the favour of God towards it, above and beside, what greener Ones have: Those Hoary Heads betokening God's Approbation of their Persons and Actions, or at least his Compassion and Forbearance. For, as that Crown of theirs generally shows them to be free from those enormous Vices, concerning which, God hath said, that they which do them, shall not live out half their days, Psal. 55.23. So where it doth not, yet at least that God hath a favour to them, and desires their Conversion and Amendment: In order thereunto, whilst he cuts off younger Persons in the midst of their Years and Sins, yet continuing them to Grey Hairs, that so they may have opportunity to return. And it brings to my Mind what is to be seen in a Medal of Theophylactus a Christian Emperor, even a Hand betokening that of Heaven, putting a Crown upon his Head. For, if this Crown of Glory on the Hoary Head be a mark of the favour of the Almighty, it may very well have the same device, because planted on the Ancient head by the hand of God, no less than that of time. Which as it ought in reason to call for our regard, (for, how should we not honour those, whom God hath so signally vouchsafed to do so?) to excite the gratitude of such who have the honour, as well as the happiness to wear it.  
3. From the favour of God, wherewith we have said the Hoary Head to be no less encircled than with its Grey Hairs, pass we in the third place, to that which is no less a ground of Honour, even its freedom from those Lusts wherewith younger years are agitated: That however among some Persons passing for a reproach, yet being indeed its Privilege and Honour; or, that I may speak with Solomon, in the place so often alluded to, its Crown of Glory. For, is there any thing in the world more dishonourable than Vice? nay, doth not the World itself confess so much, by making some Vice or other always the matter of its reproach? or any Age which is more freed by Nature from the temptations to it, or more instructed by it to abhor it? It hath either none, or very languid inclinations to the pleasures of Sense; it hath no perception of them, or such as is easily corrected. It is dead to the World even before it is so, it is a stranger to its delights and recreations. As if it had already passed from Earth to Heaven, where all those Earthly delights perish, and that Crown of Glory, which it wears, were a Crown of Glory indeed; that is to say, an Immortal and Immarcessible one. But then, if to the no inclinations of that age to sensual pleasures, we add its experience of the vanity of them all; its knowledge how little of satisfaction there is in them, and with how many and how great evils they are commonly attended; so we may very well pronounce it to be a very glorious age, and to carry away the Crown from all the rest. For, where there is not only no gust of sensual pleasures, but an experimental Knowledge of their Vanity and Vexation, how can such persons but despise them, and pursue those which are more spiritual and heavenly? Not but that the contrary may, and sometimes doth happen (for God knows there are Boys of above Threescore years of Age) but that that is the usual attendant of Old Age, and that their Grey Hairs do always dispose them to it.  
4. Add hereunto (and more I shall not need to add, to show the ground of honouring the face of the Old Man) such persons by the similitude of their years, and likeness of disposition, are the usual Companions of our Natural Parents; and being such cannot be despised without a dishonour to our Parents, into whose society they are assumed.  
2. Having thus shown the grounds of honouring the face of the Old Man, according as the Scripture prescribes, inquire we in the next place, what kind of honours we are to afford them. And, here not to tell you, that they are to have a share in our inward esteem, because without that (as hath been often said) all expressions of Honour are but a mockery; I shall without more ado descend to those expressions of Honour, which either the Scripture or Reason do prescribe. But such is.  
1. The honouring them with our outward gesture, rising up, or falling down before them; the injunction of God in the place before quoted out of Leviticus being, Thou shalt rise up before the hoary head, and honour the face of the old man, and fear thy God, I am the Lord. In which place we have, not only an express command for rising up before the hoary head, but what is of much more importance, the so doing joined in the same period with the reverence of God himself.  
2. To respectfulness in our outward behaviour, subjoin we the reverencing them with our Tongues; whether it be (for that is no small sign of honour) by suspending the expressions of it, at least till Elder men have delivered their sentence, or speaking with submission and respect. For so (that I may begin with the former) we find Elihu in Job to have proceeded, Job. 32.7. he there telling us that, because he was young, and those other Friends of Job very old, he was at first afraid, and durst not show them his opinion; and not without reason, because (as he afterwards intimates) Wisdom is the privilege of Old Age; in consideration whereof, it is but reasonable that the Younger and less wise should give them leave to speak before them. But neither is it less evident, or rather much more, that when we do speak, we are to speak with Submission and respect; St. Paul in the place before quoted, admonishing Timothy a Governor of the Church, (and how much more than inferior Persons?) that he should not rebuke an Elder, but entreat him as a Father, and the elder Women as Mothers, 1 Tim. 5.1, 2. and though there be no obedience due to Aged Persons as such, because their Superiority implies rather a preeminence than Authority, yet inasmuch  
3. As they are capable of Honour in Deed, as well, as in Gesture and Language, we are in reason to make our Actions to bespeak our Esteem of them no less than our behaviour and words; to that end giving them that assistance which their bodily weaknesses, and that relief which both their weaknesses and necessities may require: St. Paul in the forequoted Epistle, commanding the thus honouring of Widows, and particularly the elder ones.  
4. The only Species of Honour to be spoken of, is that of submission to their censures, which we shall find to have a place here, no less than in other Fathers. For though these Fathers, as such, have no Authority to command, and therefore neither to punish; yet their great Wisdom and Experience privilege them to rebuke the disorders of younger persons, to which therefore if we give them that Honour which is required, we must submit with all patience and meekness. Care only would be taken (that I may not leave those elder ones without an exhortation) that they behave themselves with that Wisdom, and Gravity, and Sobriety which becomes them. For much of the Honour that is due to them, being founded upon the presumption of their Wisdom, Gravity, and Sobriety; Reason would, if they expect Honour from the younger sort, that they should give proof of those in their behaviour, and not, as too often happens, pursue their youthful Lusts, or fall into their Follies and Indecencies.  
Of the Honour of Parents, whether properly or improperly so styled, what hath been said may suffice, and, because that is principally intended, of the main concernments of this Commandment. But, because (as was before said) it was also intended to comprehend the honour of all that are in any Dignity or Authority, therefore, for the fuller explication thereof, it will be requisite to subjoin somewhat concerning both the one and the other, and first of all of those that have any thing of Dignity to commend them.  
Now there are Four things, that procure dignity to Men, as that is set to denote a preeminence without Authority, 

1. Their Parts and Endowments.  
2. Their Birth.  
3. Their Fortunes,  
4. And Lastly, The Titles and Characters that are bestowed upon them by Princes and Societies.    
1. The the first of these aught to have our Honour, and consequently the Persons that are endued with them, needs no other proof than that they are the Gifts of God. For, being so, they are in reason to be respected by all those who think God a due object of it. The only thing worthy our enquiry, is, in what order they are to be honoured, and what kind of Honours we are to afford them: the former whereof, will best be judged of by the Honour they bring to God, or the use they are of unto the World. For thus, because Piety doth most immediately tend to the honour of God, as being nothing else than an immediate regard, both of him and of his Laws; the Parties in whom it is, are, caeteris paribus, to be honoured before those that are Masters of any other Endowments. In like manner, because Divinity ministers more directly to that end, than any other kind of Learning or qualification in the World, Reason would that those who are eminent in it should be preferred before the Learned of other Professions. Lastly, because Learning contributes more to Religion than Courage or Strength, and is generally more useful to the World, hence it comes to pass, that by the consent of Nations Arms yield to the Gown, and the Laurel of the Conqueror to the Eloquence of the Tongue. All therefore that remains to inquire, is, what kind of Honours we are to afford them, which in general is, the giving them that Respect and Encouragement which their several Endowments and Usefulness in the World doth require; in particular, the attending to their particular Excellencies, and demeaning ourselves answerably thereunto. Which we shall do, if we imitate the Virtues of the Pious, follow the directions of the Learned in their several Faculties, and as much as in us lies, promote the welfare of those who hazard their Lives for the safeguard of the Public.  
2. From men's Parts and Endowments, pass we to the nobility of their Birth, which we shall find to be another ground of Honour; this being but a just tribute to the merits of their Ancestors, and a necessary means to promote Virtue and Piety in the World. For who would willingly Travel for the Public good, if the reward thereof should reach no farther than himself? or think himself well paid, if the Children of less deserving Persons should enjoy the same Privileges with his: especially when it often happens that they who deserve so well of the World, are either by the suddenness of their death, or the constancy of their Travels, debarred the enjoyment of them in their own persons.  
3. To the Nobility of men's Birth, subjoin we, the amplitude of their Fortunes, as which, next to that, is a just ground of Honour. Not that it is simply Noble, to be Rich; but that it bespeaks, on the one hand, the Virtues of them, or of their Ancestors; and on the other hand, the Favour of the Divine Providence. For, though Men do sometimes acquire Wealth by evil means, and such as therefore make their Wealth rather a Reproach, than a Mark of Honour; yet ordinarily it is by Industry and Wisdom, by the Eminency of their Learning, and the Greatness of their Valour: things which are so Honourable, that they may very well cast a Lustre upon those very Fortunes that are acquired by them. And though Grace and Virtue be undoubtedly a greater Mark of God's Favour, than any outward Acquisitions whatsoever; yet inasmuch as even these happen not to Men without the Divine Providence, they cannot but be looked upon, as Testimonies of his Favour, where they are honestly acquired; and those that have them, upon that score to be reverenced and esteemed. Lastly,  
4. As men's Parts, or Birth, or Fortunes, do call for that Honour which is here required; so the same Honour is due to those Dignities that are conferred upon Men by the Favour of the Prince; or under him, by the indulgence of those Societies or Corporations which are by the Prince privileged to bestow them: Such as are for the former, the Dignities of Dukes, Marquesses, and the like; as for the latter, the Degrees that are bestowed in Universities. For, as these are generally the Rewards of their Virtue upon whom they are bestowed; so they are, in all, the Marks of the Favour of those whom God hath commanded us to honour. In consideration whereof, as it cannot but be thought reasonable to honour them, because otherwise, through their Sides wounding the Honour of the Prince; so all fear is removed of paying Respect to their Worthlesness whom Princes do sometime promote: He who pays a Man respect for the Dignity which the Prince bestows upon him, doing it not so much to him, as to the Prince by whom it is conferred. In the mean time, though that may be some satisfaction to the Honourer, and, where Men are wise, take off from those Prejudices which the Vices of Noble Persons give; yet, as it can afford little satisfaction to the Honoured, who thus sees himself made only an Instrument of another's Honour; so we are not to expect, that he should signify so much with those who have not the like faculty of discerning. For, inasmuch as Excellency is the proper ground of Honour, it will not be easy to procure them any perfect Honour, who have not some Personal Excellency to deserve it. What remains then, but that they who are thus dignified, show themselves worthy of their several Titles, and be no less glorious in their Actions, than in the Characters that they bear? That the Learned and the Valiant, employ their Learning and Valour for the Public Weal; and the Man of high Birth, do Things worthy of those Ancestors from whom he sprang? That the Man who is truly Pious, continue, and add to it, and not make it a pretext for a future slothfulness, or to be able so much the more securely to deceive? In fine, That he who is rich in this World, show himself rich in good Works, and be as virtuous in the dispensation of his Wealth, as he or his Ancestors have been happy in acquiring it? So doing, they shall not only have Honour among Men, but be respected by the Almighty; and when all their Earthly Honour shall be laid in the dust, be advanced to a Crown, and such a one, whose Lustre no Time or Malice shall be able to impair.   

PART X.  
Of the Honour of those who are Superior to us in any Private Authority or Dominion, whether it be that of a Lord of a Manor over his Tenants, or of a Master over his Servants. The Ground of the Honour of the former, that Emolument the Tenants receive by him, and their own Oath and Compact, as the Honours they are to pay, those Rents, Services, and Homages by which they hold their respective Emoluments. The Duty of the Lord, to afford them again that Protection, Assistance, and Redress which the Laws of the Land, the Custom of the Place, or the Nature of their Dominion doth require. Of the Honour of Masters, and what the Grounds thereof are. In order whereunto, inquiry is first made concerning such of their Servants as become so by Constraint, and particularly by Conquest, by Sentence, or by Purchase. Where the Servants become such, either by Conquest, or a Condemnatory Sentence, those to whom they do belong, have for the Ground of their Honour, their giving them that Life, which it was in their power to have taken away. Where Servants become such by Purchase, there is the Title of those, whether Conquerors, or Princes, to whom they did originally belong; and that Valuable Consideration which the Purchaser paid for it. If the Servant become such by his own free Consent, as it is in Days-men, Menial Servants, and Apprentices; there is not only his own free Consent, to entitle his Master to Honour from him, but those Wages and Nourishment which the two former receive, and that Skill or Craft which the latter is instructed in. An Address to the Declaration of what Honours are due from Servants to their Masters, and in what measure and proportion: Where entrance is made with the Consideration of such Servants as become so by constraint; and all sort of Honour shown to be due from them, which they are in a capacity to pay. This evidenced both from Scripture, and the Life which they receive from their Masters. A Digression concerning the Abolition of Servitude in the Christian World; where is shown, That it was neither founded upon any just Reason, nor is much for the Commodity of it. Of the Honours that are due from such as become Servants by Consent, which are shown to be in a great measure determinable by their own Compacts. Certain Rules laid down for the more certain investigation of them, such as are, That they show respect to their several Masters in Gesture and Language; That they yield Obedience to their Commands, and particularly, in all such things as are expressly covenanted, or are by Law or Custom imposed upon them; yea, even when the matter of the Command is harsh, provided it be not eminently such. An Account of the Qualifications wherewith this Obedience of theirs is to be attended; which are Singleness of Heart, and a Cheerful Mind. Submission to the Censures of the Master, another part of the Servants Duty, even where they are rather frowardly than justly inflicted; provided they be not often repeated, nor prove intolerable. An Appeal to the Magistrate, in that case allowable; but no violent Resistance, in that, or any other. Of the Duty of Masters to their Servants, and particularly to such as are Servants by Constraint, or Slaves: Where is shown, first, That they ought to furnish them with Food and Raiment, in such a proportion as may suffice the Necessities of Nature: Secondly, That they impose such Tasks upon them, as are not above their Strength to undergo: Thirdly, Not to punish them above the demerit of their Crime, or above what their Strength will bear: And, in fine, That neither their Commands nor Punishments be extended any farther than the Laws of the Place give leave, or Equity and Christian Charity permit. It is however necessary for such Servants, to submit to whatever is imposed, provided it be not above the proportion of their Strength; partly upon the account of St. Paul's commanding Subjection to the Froward, and partly upon the Account of that Life which is indulged them. Of the Duty of Masters to Servants by Consent, which, to be sure, comprehends, 1. All things that are owing from them to Slaves. 2. What they expressly covenant to afford them, whether that be Wages or Instruction. 3. To treat them agreeably to the Nature of that Service into which they are admitted. 4. The exacting of due Labour from them; and, where they fail, Chastisement. 5. The restraining them from Vicious Courses, and both prompting and obliging them to the Practice of Religious Duties: Where both the Ground and usefulness of the Master's so doing is declared.  
WHAT Honour is due from us to those that have any thing of Dignity to commend them, hath been already declared; together with the Grounds upon which it stands. It remains only, that we entreat of the Honour of such as are also in Authority, and may command our Obedience, as well as Respect: I do not mean, by virtue of any Public Employment (for what Honour is due to such, hath been before sufficiently declared), but by virtue of some Private Dominion, such as is that of a Lord of a Manor over his Tenants, or of a Master of a Family over his Servants.  
Of the former of these much need not be said, whether as to the Necessity or the Kind's of Honour that are to be paid. For, holding their Lands from them, upon condition of certain Rents, Services, and Homages, to which they do moreover by Promise and Oath oblige themselves, at their several Admissions to them; the Benefit they enjoy by them, and their own Compact, shows the necessity of honouring them: as the latter, because particularly expressing them, the Kind's of Honour they are to pay. In consideration whereof, as no Man of Conscience can pretend to withhold them, were it only for the Oath of God, by which the Payment thereof is bound upon them; so those who challenge this Honour from them, are in reason to afford them that Protection, Assistance, and Redress, which the Laws of the Land, the Custom of the Place, or the Nature of their Dominion doth require.  
From this first Dominion, pass we to that which is more general; I mean, that of the Master over his Servants: Where, first of all, 

1. I shall show the Duty of Servants honouring their Masters.  
2. The Grounds upon which the Honour of them is built.  
3. What Kind's, and Measure, and Quality of Honour, is due unto them.  
4. And lastly, What is due from them again to their Servants.    
1. I begin with the first of these, even the Duty of Servants honouring their Masters; concerning which, the Scriptures of the New Testament speak much and often, as to that part of Honour which consists in Obedience and Submission. But because, when I descend to show the Kind's of Honour they are to give them, there will be a necessity of producing those Texts anew, I shall content myself at present with that general Proof which St. Paul gives us in his First to Timothy, and with that which this Commandment, if well considered, will be found to do. For, though the Letter of it specify only the Honour of Parents, yet it sufficiently implies the Honour of other Superiors, and particularly that Honour which is due from Servants to their Masters; there being certainly a far greater Preeminence of a Master over his Servant, than there is of a Father over his Child. But so, that I may strengthen this Inference with the Doctrine of Christianity, St. Paul doth expressly enjoin, willing as many Servants as are under the yoke, to count their Masters worthy of all Honour, 1 Tim. 6.1.  
2. The necessity of Servants honouring their Masters being thus evinced, both from St. Paul, and the general Reason of the Commandment; my proposed Method obligeth me to inquire into the Grounds of it, which are different, according to the different sorts of Servants: For, either they are such as become so, 

1. By their own free consent: or,  
2. Such as become Servants by constraint.    
The latter of these are again of three sorts, according to the different means whereby a Man may come to have Dominion. For, either he may acquire it, 

1. By the means of Conquest; or,  
2. By Sentence; or,  
3. And lastly, By Purchase from those who have either the one or the other Title to their Service.    
If the Question be concerning the first, that is to say, of such as become Servants by Conquest; so the Ground of Honouring their Masters, is the giving them their Life, when it was in their power to have taken it away. For, being by the Law of Nations privileged to take away the Life of those which should be taken by them in the Wars, it seemed but reasonable, and indeed is no other, that, if the Conqueror give them their Life, they should, for so great a Benefit, dedicate that Life unto his Service. Whence it is, as 
* Institut. lib. 1. tit. 3. sect. 3.  Justinian observes, that Servants, among the Romans, had the Name of Mancipia, and Servi; the former importing their being taken by the Hand of the Enemy; the latter, the saving of them by those that took them, when it was in their Power to have destroyed them. In like manner, if the Magistrate, when for any Offence he might take away the Malefactor's Life, condemns him to a perpetual Slavery; that Indulgence of his is a sufficient Ground to oblige the Malefactor to submit his Neck unto the Yoke. The Tie is much the same, though with the addition of a farther one, upon such Servants as become so by Purchase: For the Conqueror and the Magistrate transferring their Title unto another, and moreover taking a Valuable Consideration for it, Reason and Equity would, that he who is so passed over, should look upon himself as obliged to serve the Purchaser, because succeeding into their Rights, and moreover paying a Valuable Consideration for that Honour and Service which he exacts.  
From such Servants as are made so by constraint, pass we to those which are made so with their own free consent; such as are Days-men, Menial Servants, and Apprentices: Concerning whom, it will be no hard matter to show, that there is a just Ground of giving Honour to their Masters; nor yet, what those Grounds are: The two former having for the Ground of their Honour, those Wages and Nourishment which they receive; the latter, moreover, that Skill or Craft which their Masters profess; all of them, the Astipulation of their own Consent and Compact, by which that Honour and Service is bound so much the faster on them. For, what can be more reasonable, than the paying them Honour and Service, who give them a Valuable Consideration for it? especially when they do moreover oblige themselves thereto, and covenant for the paying of it? It being a known and undoubted Maxim, That there can be no Injury there, where that which is exacted is with the free Consent of him that is to pay it.  
3. Having thus shown the Grounds of that Honour which Servants own unto their Masters, and thereby evinced the Reasonableness, as well as Necessity thereof; nothing remains, on the part of Servants, but to inquire, what kinds of Honour they are to pay, and in what measure and proportion. For the resolution whereof, we must recall the forementioned Distinction of Servants by Constraint, and such as are made so by their own Consent and Compact. If the Question be concerning the former, that is to say, of such as become Servants by right of Conquest, by the Condemnation of them for some notorious Wickedness, or by Purchase; so, little doubt can be made, but all Honour is due from them to their several Masters, which they are in a capacity to pay. For, beside that St. Paul, in the place before-quoted, commands such Servants to think their Masters worthy of all Honour; it is no more than is due from them, for the Benefit they enjoy from those to whom they are subjected: I speak not only as to their constant Sustenance, but the granting them that Life which it was in their power to have taken away. And though, since Christianity took place in the World, such kind of Servitude or Slavery hath been more rare, especially in such Persons as are of the same Profession with their Masters; yet I think so general an Abolition of it was neither founded upon any just Reason, nor hath proved much for the Conveniency of the World. Not the former, because (as Busbequius 
* Busbeq. Tut) cic. Epist. 3.  well observes) neither can all Men bear a Liberty that is attended with Poverty; neither are all Men so fitted by Nature, as to know how to govern themselves, without the Conduct and Command of others; being herein not unlike to certain Beasts, whose Fierceness would be always to be dreaded, unless they were restrained by Bonds. Which supposed, what can be more reasonable, where a just Cause precedes, than the introducing of such a Servitude as we speak of; as by means of which, the Master may live by the Servants Labour; and the Servant, on the other side, not only be maintained by it, but be restrained from those Exorbitances, to which either his Ignorance, or the Pravity of his Nature may incline him? But neither hath so general an Abolition of Servitude been much for the Conveniency of the World: For, as the same Busbequius 
* Busbeq. ubi supra.  observes, if it had still continued, neither would the Wars nor the Gallows take off so many Men, which might otherwise be of great use unto the World; that Profit which might arise from the Use or Sale of them, being likely to make the Conqueror less cruel, and the Magistrate less severe in his Executions. To say nothing at all, that through the fear of that, some Men might be more effectually restrained from those Exorbitances which the World labours under; a constant Slavery being undoubtedly more terrible to the idle Gallant, than either a Gibbet, or an Ax. Add hereunto (and more I shall not need to add) that St. Paul himself doth not only no where disallow this Servitude, but commands those that are under it, to think their Masters worthy of all Honour; such Servants as are under the yoke, being no other than Bondslaves, as you may see, if you compare that Phrase with Leu. 26.13. and Isa. 9.4.  
But because, at least in this corner of the World, there is but little of such kind of Servitude; and because, when I come to entreat of the Duties of Masters to their Servants, I shall have occasion to say somewhat of the Measure of those Servants Subjection and Obedience; therefore supersedeing any farther consideration of it for the present, I will go on to show, what Kind, or Measure, or Quality of Honour is due to their Masters, who are Servants not by Constraint, but by Consent and Compact. For the resolution whereof, though much need not be said, because what Kind's or Measure of Honour is due from them, is in a great measure determinable by those Compacts by which they become their Servants; yet because those Compacts do sometimes run in more general Terms, and because Servants are generally backward enough in the apprehending of their Duty, I think it not amiss to be a little more particular in describing the several Portions of it. In order whereunto, the first thing I shall offer, is, the showing Respect to them in Gesture and Language; because, as that is the primary Notion of that Honour which Servants are obliged to think their several Masters worthy of; so, without that, much would be taken off from the readiness of that Submission and Obedience, which are the principal and undoubted parts of their Duties: Men being not overforward to submit themselves to those, whom they have not an honourable Esteem of; nor to entertain such an Esteem long, where they are suffered either to bear themselves as their Master's Fellows, or talk to them as to their Equals. From Respect in Gesture and Language, pass we to Obedience; concerning which Duty, the Scriptures speak much, and often: Witness, to omit others, Ephes. 6.5. and Col. 3.22. In the former whereof, St. Paul commands Servants to be obedient unto them that are their Masters according to the flesh: In the latter, to obey them in all things, and that too with such Qualifications as are there subjoined. The only thing of difficulty is, what ought to be the Measure of their Obedience, and with what Qualifications to be attended. And here, not to tell you concerning the former, that it ought to be in things lawful, and possible; because to other than such, there can be no Obligation: that supposed, I shall affirm, 1. That their Obedience ought to extend to all those things that are expressly covenanted between their Master and them; there being nothing more reasonable or necessary, than to pay their Masters that Service, which they expressly promise to afford them. But from hence it will follow, that there can be no pretence for withholding their Obedience in the Matters of that Employment or Trade for which they are more particularly hired; because, however other things may be set down in more general Terms, these are always expressly covenanted by them. There is the same necessity, secondly, of yielding Obedience in all those things which, though not particularly expressed in the Agreement, yet are by Law or Custom imposed upon them; partly because of that Obedience we all own unto the Law, and partly because their Masters stipulating with them in the general, to be obedient to their Commands, it is in reason to be understood of all such Commands as either the Law or Custom privilege them to impose: It being but reasonable to suppose that to be understood, which is not only too long to express, but is by the generality of the World presumed as due. But from hence it will follow, not only that Servants are to obey their Masters in such things as relate to that Employment, for which they are more particularly covenanted with; but also, that, if they be required, they are to tend upon them, and do other such like Offices about them; after the same manner that we find those Servants in the Gospel, after they were come out of the Field, obliged by their Master to make ready first for him, and gird themselves and serve him, before they sat down themselves, Luke 17.8. Which is the rather to be taken notice of, because ordinary Servants now adays look upon their Employment rather as an Office, than a Service, and consequently, do but in part give obedience to their Master's Commands. Thirdly, As Servants are to yield obedience in such things as are expressly covenanted for, and in such as are by Law or Custom imposed upon them; so they are to do the like even where the Matter of the Command is harsh, provided it be not eminently such; the Precept of St. Peter being, That Servants should be subject, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward, 1 Pet. 2.18. Which said, nothing remains to account for, but the Qualifications of that Obedience which both Nature and Scripture exacts of them; which is either, first, the doing it with singleness of Heart; or, secondly, with a ready and a cheerful Mind: The former whereof excludes all Eye-service, and such as studies rather to avoid the Master's displeasure, than to do him true and faithful Service; the latter, all obeying with murmuring and repining. Both which Vices, as they are plainly enough condemned by St. Paul, Col. 3.22, 23. and the contrary Qualifications enjoined; so the latter (as the same St. Paul 
* Vers. 23, 24. & Eph. 6.6, 7.  observes) have this farther Reason to bind them upon Servants, that that Obedience which is required of them, is imposed upon them by God and Christ, as well as by their Earthly Masters. Which latter, however Servants may think to put off with a deceitful or repining Service, yet they cannot hope so to satisfy God, who both sees them, when their Masters do not, and requires nothing more than a willing and a cheerful Mind. Lastly, As Servants are to be obedient to their Masters, so also to submit unto their censures, yea such as are rather frowardly than justly inflicted, the command of St. Peter being, that Servants should be so subject to the froward, as the Reason he subjoins, shows, even because, as he there goes on, That and that only is thankworthy with God, if a man for Conscience toward God endure grief, suffering wrongfully, 1 Pet. 2.18, 19, This only would be added, that though Servants are by the command of God to submit even to unjust Censures; yet it ought to be understood, provided they be not often repeated, nor prove intolerable, when they are. For in that case, though the Servant may not violently resist, yet there is no doubt he may endeavour to avoid them, by making his appeal to the Magistrate, to whom the redressing, even of Servants unjust sufferings doth appertain. Whence it is, that by the Rescript 
* Vid. Justinian Institut. l. 1. tit. 8. s. 2.  of Marcus Antoninus, even Slaves had the privilege of flying to the Temple, or the Statues of the Prince, and the Precedents of the Provinces were commanded to take cognisance of their Complaints, and deliver them from their Master's cruelties. But, as where the Chastisement is neither intolerable, nor often repeated, it cannot be thought reasonable, when St. Peter commands Submission to the Froward, for Servants to oppose themselves, so, if they should be allowed to do so, it would introduce a greater confusion in Families, than either the Peace of them, or of the State would be consistent with.  
4. What Honour is due from Servants to their Masters, hath been at large declared, and thereby, so far as this particular is concerned, the main intendment of the Commandment discharged; But because I have often said, that the Commandment which is now before us, was intended also to comprehend the duty of Superiors toward Inferiors, as well as of Inferiors toward them: I think it not amiss to speak somewhat of the duty of Masters toward their Servants, and the rather, because oftentimes they stand as much in need of an admonition as the other. In order whereunto, following the division before laid down, I will consider the duties of Masters toward their Slaves, and and then of their duties toward such, as though their Servants, yet are so in a more ingenuous way.  
Now, though the Authority of Masters over Slaves be undoubtedly much greater than that over other Servants, though anciently, as Justinian 
* Institut.  tells us, they had the power of Life and Death, and were not accountable for it, though they put them to death unjustly; yet as the Roman Laws 
* Lib. 1. tit. 8. sect. 2, 3.  set bounds to that exorbitant Power of theirs, and our own hath yet more retrenched it; so if we consult the Laws of Nature and Christianity, we shall find there is more owing from them unto their Slaves, than is ordinarily thought fit to be paid. Of this Nature is, first, Furnishing them with Food and Raiment, in such a proportion as may suffice the necessities of Nature; this being absolutely necessary to enable them to the performance of that Service and Labour which they exact. Of the same nature is, secondly, The imposing such Tasks upon them as is not above their strength to perform; this being no more than common humanity requires, of which Slaves are equally partakers with ourselves. But such also is it, thirdly, Not to punish them above the demerit of their Crime, nor above what their Strength will bear; Justice requiring that the Punishment do not exceed the Proportion of the Offence, and common humanity that it pass not the bounds of their Natural Abilities. In fine, for so St. Paul plainly intimates, where he commands Masters to give unto their Servants that which is just and equal; their Commands and Punishments ought to extend no farther than the Laws of the place give leave, or Equity and Christian Charity permit; which to be sure will not only exclude all Cruelty and Injustice toward them, but impose a necessity upon the Master, of showing such Compassion to them, as their Weakness or Necessities may at any time require. In the mean time, though I no way doubt but Masters are to give unto their Slaves that which is just and equal, and consequently to abstain from all Cruelty, either in their Commands or Censures, yet I think it necessary for them, to submit both to the one and the other, where the burden which is imposed, is not above the proportion of their strength: partly, because St. Peter commands subjection to the froward and difficult, and partly, because that they have so much as their life is, owing either to the mercy of their present Masters, or of those from whom they were purchased.  
From the duties of Masters to their Slaves, pass we to the duties of the same to their Servants, such I mean, as are so in a more ingenuous way. Where, first of all, I shall make no difficulty to affirm, as I suppose, neither will any man so grant, that all those things are undoubtedly owing to Servants, which are from a Master to his Slave; the condition of Servants being much better than that of Slaves, and therefore, to be sure, not to require less of their Masters than the other. As little difficulty can be made, that all that is owing to them from their Masters, which at the entrance upon their service, they do expressly covenant to afford them, a Promise, even where there is no other Obligation, making the party promising a Debtor; and how much more then, where there is a valuable consideration to engage him? But from hence it will follow, first, Where there is any such thing covenanted, that they are to give them the promised reward or wages, and that too, at or near the time wherein they become due to them; he paying less than he ought, who pays not at or near the the time, because depriving the party to whom he owes it, of that use and advantage which he might, and which, because it is his own, it is fit he should receive by it. It will follow, secondly, where that is a part of the Contract, that Masters carefully and faithfully teach their Servants that Trade, for the Learning whereof they become Servants to them; which is the rather to be observed, because it is oftentimes through sloathfulness omitted, or basely and invidiously concealed, at least as to the chiefest Mysteries thereof; as if a Contract could be satisfied by paying one half the thing contracted for, and it may be too, the less considerable one. I observe, thirdly, That in such Servants as are by Contract to receive their whole maintenance from their Masters, a regard is to be had, not only of what necessity, but what the condition of that Service, into which they are assumed, requires. For by how much the more Ingenuous the Service is, so much the more free in reason ought to be the entertainment of those that are in it; especially, when as it mostly happens, paying accordingly to their Masters for it. Whence it is, that no Man of reason doubts but that the Apprentice of a Merchant, or other such more liberal Profession, should be treated in a better fashion, than one of a man of a more inferior one, or an ordinary Serving Man to the same. I observe, fourthly, That as care is to be taken on the one hand, that they afflict not their Servants with immoderate Labours or Punishments, so also on the other hand, that they suffer them not to be Idle, nor be sparing of just Chastisements, when they deserve them; the omission of that not only proving the bane of their Servants, but being a falsification of that Trust which is reposed in them by their Servants Parents, and an injury to the Commonwealth, which by their slothfulness or cowardice is like to have so much the worse Subjects. Fifthly and Lastly, (more than which I shall not need to say, unless it be to exhort them to the practice of what they are thus bound to) It is incumbent upon all Masters of Families to restrain their Servants from all Vicious Courses, and both prompt and oblige them to the practice of Religious Duties; not indeed by any direct obligation upon them from their Authority, which reacheth, rather to Temporal than Spiritual matters; (whence it is that they are called Masters according to the Flesh) but by virtue of that Great Law of Christianity, which commands Men, as much as in them lies, to promote the business of Religion: Which lying more in Master's powers than in other Mens, by means of that Authority they have over them; there doth from thence arise an Obligation upon them to promote Religion by their commands in all those which are subjected to their Dominion. And indeed, as that which is honest will very rarely be found to be separate from profitable, if Men would estimate the advantageousness of a thing by that which is most certainly and lastingly so; so there cannot be a more compendious way to promote our Interest in the World, than by endeavouring as much as in us lies, to make those Religious whom we employ: Because, as what such do is most faithfully and diligently done, so it is most likely to be prospered by the Divine Providence, from whom, as all other good Gifts, so this World's Wealth will be found to come.   

PART XI.  
Of the Promise wherewith the Duty of this Commandment is enforced, and what the due importance of it is. Where is shown, 1. That the Blessing here promised, is a long and happy Life, and particularly in the Land of Canaan. 2. That that Blessing is to be expected from our Parents as well as from God; partly by that sustenance and encouragement which our Honour will prompt them to afford, and partly by their Intercession with God for us. Upon occasion whereof, the efficacy of a Parent's blessing is declared, and the reasonableness of Child's desiring it of them is asserted. 3. That the Blessing here promised, implies a contrary Curse to the Violators of the Commandment, as is evident both from the ineffectualness of a single Promise to persuade, and the denunciations of God elsewhere. Whether or no, and how far the promise belongs to us Christians. Evidence of its belonging to us from the obligation of that Duty, to which it is annexed, and from St. Paul's making use of it to persuade the Ephesians to the performance of the other. An Essay toward the showing in what manner and measure it appertains to us. Where, first, is made appear, that it appertains not to us in the same manner and measure wherein it did unto the Jews. Evidence hereof from its referring to the Land of Canaan, which was the proper Portion of the Jews, and from the nature of those earthly promises that were made to them; those, as they were not clogged with the same exceptions wherewith they are now, so intended in a great measure, as shadows of more substantial Blessings. That this and other such like Promises appertain to us, First and chief, in the Mystery or Substance; where withal is shown, what the Mystery here adumbrated is, even a Happy and Immortal Life in Heaven. That they appertain to us also in the Letter, but not without the exception of Persecutions, nor yet any farther than they shall be found to be subservient to our Spiritual welfare, and the Glory of God and of his Gospel. Enquiry is next made, whether or no, and in what proportion the present Promise doth belong to the Observers of the several Duties of this Commandment. That it belongs in some measure to all, is evidenced from the extensiveness of the Duty, which the Promise is in reason to answer; But first, and principally, to the Honourers of Parents, because that is the only Duty expressed, and because that tye, which Parents have upon us, approacheth nearest unto that, whereby the Honour of God is bound upon us. The honourers of other Superiors more or less entitled to it, according as those Superiors approach nearer to, or are farther removed from our Natural Parents. The consequence whereof is, that it belongs more to the honourers of our Civil and Spiritual Parents, than to other Superiors; as again, more to the honourers of our Civil than Spiritual ones, because the former have a greater Interest in our Temporal Being. The Explication concludes with enquiring, what appearance there is of the literal completion of this promise. Evidence hereof in the Honourers of our Natural Parents from the observations both of Greeks and Jews; As in the Honourers of other Superiors, and particularly of our Civil or Spiritual Parents, partly from the orderliness of their behaviour, which is more likely to be successful than Turbulent and Seditious ones, and and partly from their preventing those Wars and Confusions, which do principally occasion the shortening of men's days.  
II. HAVING entreated at large in several Discourses, of the Duty here enjoined, as well that which we own to our Civil and Spiritual Parents, together with all other kinds of Superiors, as that which we own unto our Natural ones; it remains that we proceed to the Promise, wherewith it is enforced, of the prolongation of our days. For though the words wherein it is expressed, look rather like a Motive drawn from the Consequents of our Honour, than a Promise of what God will bestow upon it; yet, as that Lawgiver, who proposeth any thing under the Notion of a Motive, must, if he Act like a Lawgiver, both represent that which is advantageous, and moreover, if the thing depend upon his Will, an assurance of his own readiness to contribute towards it, which is the very formality of a Promise; so that that which God proposeth under that Notion, was intended as a Promise, St. Paul gives us to understand, Ephes. 6.2. He there styling this Commandment, a Commandment with a Promise, and the first of that Nature, meaning thereby, the first of the Decalogue, to which there was any express and special one. Taking it therefore for granted, that the words now before us have the nature of a Promise to the due observers of this Commandment, I will make it my business to inquire, 

1. What is the due importance of it, and  
2. Whether or no, and how far it appertains to us Christians upon the performance of the duty enjoined.  
3. Whether, and in what proportion it belongs to the several duties therein contained.    
I. Now there are three things, within the resolution whereof, the answer to the first of these will be comprehended.  

1. What the Blessing here promised is,  
2. From whom it is to be expected. And  
3. Whether it implies any thing of a Curse to the violators of the Commandment.   
1. What the Blessing promised is, we shall not be long to seek, because so particularly expressed in this place, and in the parallel one of Deuteronomy, chap. 5. 6. it being evident from them both, that a long life is promised, from that of Deuteronomy 
* And that it may go well with thee. , that that life shall be happy as well as long; and from both, again, that that long and happy life should be spent in their own Country, and particularly, in the Land of Canaan: that being the Land promised by God unto the Israelites, and to which this Promise, and in a manner all the Promises in the Old Testament do refer.  
2. From the Blessing promised, pass we to the Persons from whom we are to expect it, which is no doubt, first and chief God; both the Commandment and the Promise being perfectly his, and therefore the completion of the latter to be expected from him. But because, even in those things, of which God is the first and principal Author, there are other less principal and subordinate causes, and, because, though our Translation and others read only that thy days may be long, or be prolonged; in the mean time taking no notice of the means by which it is to be conveyed, yet the Hebrew, which is in reason to give measure to them all, reads 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  that they, even thy Father and Mother may prolong them, therefore I think it but reasonable to collect from thence, that that long and happy Life, is next under God, to be expected from our Parents; partly by means of that Sustenance and Encouragement which our Honour will invite them to afford us, but more especially, (because every good and perfect Gift cometh from above) by their Intercession to God for us, from whom they receive such Honour. For, though (as Grotius 
* Explicat. Decal●gi. Not. ad Praec. 5.  hath observed) it be not unusual for Verbs of an Active Form, to be taken in a Passive or Reciprocal Sense, in which Sense, both the Septuagint and most other Translators understood the Hebrew Verb here; yet, inasmuch as it is certain from the Scriptures, and particularly from the Story of Jacob and Esau, that the Blessing of the Child depended much upon the Prayers of the Father, inasmuch as that wise Author of the Book of Ecclesiasticus 
‖ Eccl. 3.9.  represents it as a known truth, That the Father's Blessing establisheth the Houses of Children, but the Curse of the Mother rooteth out Foundations, I think it no way improper to understand the Hebrew in its literal sense, and upon that account, though in a secondary sense, to ascribe the prolongation of children's days to the blessing, or devout Prayers of their Parents. But be there sufficient ground or not, in this particular place, for the influence the Parents Prayers may have upon the happiness of the Child, and particularly upon his length of days; yet as it is not without ground, if we take the practice of the Patriarches for one, and the observation both of Jews and Gentiles, so it wants not that, the force whereof will be more hard to resist, I mean the astipulation of Reason, the Prayers of Parents for their obedient Children, being not only, through the affection from which they proceed, likely to be more than ordinarily intense, and therefore so much the more likely to prevail; but the clearest attestations that can be of that respectful behaviour of the Child, to which a long and happy Life is promised. Which attestations, however, God stands in no need of, and much less can the want of them be thought to be able to divert him from his purposes, yet may very well be presumed, when concurring with them, to quicken the execution of them, and press him to perform what he himself hath promised. Upon which account, I cannot but wonder that Children should now be taught not to beg those Prayers which have such visible advantages, especially when the so doing hath had the general approbation of Christendom, and is moreover no contemptible testimony of that Honour which they are to pay; The Author to the Hebrews having told us, That without all contradiction, the less is blessed of the better, and consequently, that the begging of a Father's Blessing is a testimony of Honour, because implying a confession of his Superiority from whom they desire it.  
3. The only thing to be accounted for, is, whether the Promise annexed to this Commandment, implies any thing of a Curse to the violators of it. Which, that it doth, will evidently appear, if we mean no other by a Curse than the shortening of those Child's Lives that disobey. For, as that naturally follows, from the sole withdrawing the Influence of the Divine Providence; so, that God will withdraw that Influence from disobedient Children, needs no other proof, than that he hath particularly promised to continue it to obedient ones. For, what great encouragement could it be to honour our Parents, to have the Promise of that, which those who do not honour them may be alike Partakers of with ourselves? Neither will it suffice to say, (as perhaps it may be) That the certainty which a Promise inferreth, makes it reasonable to perform that to which it is annexed, rather than run the hazard of failing of it. For, how reasonable soever it may be to prefer a Certainty before an Uncertainty, where no other Considerations intervene; yet is it not to such a degree, as to be likely to prevail, where there are any present Temptations to the contrary: Experience showing it a hard matter to resist such, even where there is an assurance of our Loss; and how much more hard than (that I say not, the weakness of Humane Nature considered, impossible) where there is a possibility of avoiding it? To all whlch, if we add the many Expressions of God's displeasure against the Violators of his Laws, and particularly of that Law which is now before us; so, no doubt can remain, but that at the same time God promiseth a long and happy Life to the dutiful, he meant the contrary to disrespectful and disobedient Children. For, how can we think otherwise, when there is a Command to the Magistrate to put him to death who curseth his Father or Mother? Exod. 21.17. and the People, Deut. 27.16. are taught to invocate the Curse of God upon them that set light either by the one or the other?  
II. The second Question follows, to wit, Whether or no, and how far the Promise that now is before us appertains to us Christians. That it doth appertain to us, much need not be said to show, because I have already 
* See the Discourse of the Measures whereby we are to proceed in the Interpretation of the Decalogue.  prevented myself in that Argument: It may suffice here to say, That as it is reasonable enough to believe the Promise doth, because that Precept, to which it is annexed, is bound upon us by our Blessed Saviour; so it is no less reasonable to believe so, because St. Paul, where he inculcates the Precept, forgets not to add, that it is a Commandment with a Promise, and the first. For, what would it have signified to Christians, to have told them of its being a Commandment with a Promise, if that Promise which belongs to it had been none of their Concernment? Taking it therefore for granted, or rather as sufficiently proved, that the Promise now before us appertains to us, we will proceed to inquire, (as in which the main difficulty lies) Whether it appertains to us in the same manner and measure it did unto the Jews; and if not, in what.  
That it appertains not to us in the same manner and measure, is evident, first, from hence, that it particularly refers to the Land of Canaan; the Promise being not only of a long and happy Life, but of a long and happy Life in the Land which the Lord thy God giveth thee; which we know to have been the Land of Canaan. Whence it is, that the Septuagint, which oftentimes act the part rather of Paraphrasts, than strict Translators, add to the Name of Land, the Title of Good; which we know, from Deut. 8.7. to have been the peculiar Elegy of the Land of Canaan. Now forasmuch as the Land of Canaan was particularly promised to the Jews; forasmuch as it doth not appear, that it was ever intended for Christians, nor was capable of containing the thousandth part of those who have or do give obedience to this Commandment; it follows, that so far at least we have no concernment in the Promise, and must therefore look out for other ways of the completion of it. But so St. Paul gives us plainly enough to understand, in the place before quoted out of the Ephesians; that Apostle, though he represent the Promise, yet 
* Ephes. 6.3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  leaving out that Clause of it, which the Lord thy God giveth thee. But neither is it less evident, but that, abstracting from the Land of Canaan, the Jews to whom it was first made, had a far greater Title to it, if it be strictly and literally understood: partly because those earthly Promises which were made unto the Jews, were not clogged with those Exceptions which we find those of the New Testament to be, and partly because they are represented by the Writers of it, and particularly by St. Paul, as the Shadows of those things to come, which the Gospel exhibited. Which reason alone, if well considered, will be found to make a great difference between the Times of the Law and the Gospel. For, the Substance being come, it was but reasonable to think the Shadow was to disappear, or at least not so to prevail, as it did before the appearing of it. All therefore that remains to inquire, is, in what manner and measure this, and other such Promises, are to be construed to appertain to us, and what kind of Completion we are to expect. Where, first, no doubt can be made, that this, and other such like Promises, appertain to us in the Mystery or Substance. For, the Gospel proposing to exhibit that of which the Law was a Type or Shadow, those Temporal Promises which the Law proposed, must consequently be supposed to be fulfilled in the Mystery or Substance, to all those which are under its Oeconomy: Which, by the way, will not only confirm the truth of those Promises belonging to us, but moreover take off from those discontents we are apt to conceive upon the difference there often is between us and the Jews, as to Temporal Promises. The former, because the main Intendment of all Symbolical things, is the Mystery which is represented under them: the latter, because exhibiting a more substantial Good, though less apparent, than that which the Law doth. For, what just ground of complaint can there be, if the Gospel, though it provide not alike for our Temporal welfare, yet provides much more for our Spiritual one, and exhibits the Substance of that of which the other had but the Shadow? Which said, nothing remains to do, but to point out the Mystery or Substance of those Earthly Promises which were by God in this Commandment made to the Honourers of their Parents. But such is, first, Heaven, in respect of that Land which was to be the Seat of their Life, who among the Jews were due Observers of this Commandment; the Author to the Hebrews not only styling it a better and a heavenly Country, in respect of the Land of Promise; but affirming moreover, that Abraham and Sarah looked through that Land of Promise, to the Heavenly Country, and set up their Rest in it, and in that City which God hath there prepared; which shows, that this Heavenly Country was figured in the Land of Promise, and consequently, to be bestowed upon all such, under the Gospel, who should show themselves faithful Observers of this Commandment. The Mystery will be yet more easy to be discovered, as to the residue of that Promise which is here made to the Religious Honourers of their Parents. For, as, in order to that, nothing more can be necessary, than to instance in such Evangelical Blessings, as bear a perfect resemblance to the promised ones (an Antitype being nothing else, either in the Literal or Christian sense, than that which bears the same Signatures with its Type) so it will be no hard matter to point out such of the Evangelical Blessings, as do exactly accord with those which the Law promised. For, as that Heavenly Country which the Gospel promiseth, hath not only the Name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Patria; but our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Citizenship affirmed to be there, Phil. 3.20. because (as is elsewhere affirmed) that New Birth, which we have, is from thence, and our Original is not Earthly, but Heavenly; so, correspondently to that long and happy Life which the Law proposeth, we have the promise of a Life which doth infinitely surpass it in both, because devoid of any thing which may interrupt our Happiness; and, beside that, not only simply long, but of such a duration as shall never have an end.  
From the Blessings typified by Earthly Promises, pass we to those Earthly ones themselves, and inquire, whether or no, and how far they appertain to us Christians. For the resolution of the former whereof, we shall not be long to seek, because so distinctly stated by St. Paul; he expressly affirming, 1 Tim. 4.8. That Godliness hath the promise of the Life that now is, and of that which is to come. The only thing of difficulty is, in what measure they belong to us; which accordingly I come now to resolve. In order whereunto, the first thing I shall offer, is, That however the Jews might expect a perfect Completion of them, upon the performance of their Duty, yet the like is not to be expected by us, as being proposed with an exception of Persecution: Our Saviour, where he makes the largest Promise of things of that nature, yet forgetting not to add that Alloy to it. 'Tis in Mark 10.29, 30. And Jesus answered and said, Verily I say unto you, there is no man that hath lest house, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my sake, and the Gospels; but he shall receive an hundred fold now in this time, houses, and brethren, and sisters, and mothers, and children, and lands, with persecutions; and in the world to come, eternal life. From which place, as it is manifest, that a Christian may be sometime obliged to part with all Earthly Blessings; so, that though he may hope to retrieve them with advantage, yet not without Persecutions for the sake of that Religion which he professeth. But beside that what Promises soever there may be of Earthly Happiness, yet it is not to be expected we should enjoy an uninterrupted one; so neither any portion of it, any farther than may be subservient to our Spiritual and Eternal one, which is that which the Gospel chief promiseth. For, as otherwise Earthly Blessings should be rather an Infelicity, than a Happiness, and therefore not to be looked for from him who professeth a more than ordinary Kindness for us; so being less principally intended by the Gospel, which is said to be built upon better Promises, they are in reason to give place, where they cannot be performed without entrenching upon the Completion of those more principal and better ones. Lastly, As whatsoever Earthly Happiness may be thought to belong to us, yet it is of necessity to be understood with subserviency to our Spiritual welfare; so also, to the Glory of God, and of his Gospel, which may be sometime much more promoted by our Happiness. Upon which account, I conceive, it was, that, in the Times near to our Saviour and his Apostles, the most faithful Disciples of our Lord did not only meet with little of Earthly Happiness, but were moreover, beyond measure, persecuted and destroyed; God Almighty, by their exemplary Patience and Humility, giving the Heathen to understand, how admirable a Religion they had espoused. But, as where the Glory of God, or our own Eternal Welfare is consistent with it, I see not how we can avoid the thinking of Earthly Promises to be our Portion, when St. Paul hath so distinctly affirmed it; so I cannot forbear to say, that the want of Earthly Happiness is in a measure imputable to our neglect of that Piety to which it is even now promised: Partly, because I see the generality of Christians falling short of that Piety which they profess; and partly, because of that ill use which they generally make of that Plenty and Prosperity which God often heaps upon them. Upon which account, there is a necessity upon God, if he will provide for our Eternal Welfare, to withdraw those Earthly Blessings, which otherwise we might have quietly enjoyed.  
III. The third Question follows, to wit, Whether or no, and in what proportion the Promise of a long and happy Life belongs to the Observers of the several Duties of this Commandment. That it belongs to all, much need not be said to prove, after what hath been said to show their several Concernments in the Precept of Honour: For, it appearing from the former Discourses, that the Commandment is to be extended as well to the Honour of our Civil and Spiritual Parents, together with all other Superiors, as to the Honour of our Natural ones; the Promise which is annexed to it, is in reason to be extended to all the Observers of it, in their several measures and proportions. The only thing of difficulty is, what those Measures and Proportions are; which yet will not cost either much Time or Pains to void. For, as the Promise is in reason to be thought principally and especially to belong to the Honourers of their Natural Parents, partly because the Honour of our Natural Parents is the only thing expressed, and partly because that Tie which they have upon us, approacheth nearest to that whereby the Honour of God is bound upon us: so, the same Reason obligeth us to think it to belong more or less to the Honourers of other Superiors, as those Superiors approach nearer to, or are farther removed from our Natural Parents. Upon which account, the Promise of a long and happy Life must be thought to belong more to the Honourers of our Civil and Spiritual Parents, than to those of other Superiors; as again, more to the Honourers of our Civil, than Spiritual ones: Because, though our Spiritual Parents give us a much better Being than any of the former, yet our Civil ones have a greater Interest in our Temporal Being, and consequently, the Honour of them more likely to partake of the Promise of Earthly Happiness, as being more commensurate to it.  
iv One only Question remains, of those before proposed; with the resolution whereof, I will put an end both to this Argument, and the Commandment: and that is, What appearance there is of the Literal performance of that Promise which is here made to the Honour of our Superiors. For my more orderly solution of which, I will instance, first, in the Honour of our Natural Parents, because the Promise of a long and happy Life is expressly annexed to it. Now though it be not to be doubted, but even good Children have been sometime unfortunate, and have found their Days either few or evil; yet, that generally it hath happened otherwise, we have the Experience of the World to attest, as well of that part of it which was most removed from the true Religion, as of that which had the clearest sense of it. Witness, for the former, those Sentences of the Greeks remembered by Grotius, in his Notes upon the second Verse of the sixth to the Ephesians. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thou shalt live long enough, if thou nourish thy Parents in their Old age: And, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Assure thyself, that it shall be well with thee, if thou honour thy Natural Parents: Than which, what could be said more agreeably to the Commandment? though, for aught appears, they had nothing but their own Experience to prompt them to the affirmation of it. The same is to be said for the People of the Jews, among whom the same Prosperity of obedient Children was observed: Witness the Saying before remembered, out of Ecclesiasticus, with others that precede and follow it; For the blessing of the father establisheth the houses of children, and the curse of the mother rooteth out foundations. And though among Christians there is not the like certainty to be expected, because our Religion leads us to Promises of a higher nature; yet I doubt not, but they who either have or shall observe the World, may find Instances enough to justify the generality of the Completion of the long and happy Life of obedient Children; as, on the other side, of the misfortunes and shortlivedness of the disobedient and unnatural: According to that ancient Observation of Homer, concerning Simoisius, in the fourth Book of his Iliads. 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  He did not afford Sustenance to his Parents, and therefore he had but a short Life.  
From the Honourers of Natural Parents, pass we to the Honourers of Civil and Religious ones, and all such as are in Dignity and Authority; for whom, that God Almighty is not without thoughts of kindness, even as to the present Life, may appear from hence, that he hath so constituted the World, that Men cannot reasonably expect either a long or happy Life, without giving Honour to them: Disrespect of Superiors not only introducing Confusion and Sedition, from whence naturally arise Wars, and all the Mischiefs that attend them; but obliging Superiors, for their own safety, and that of the Commonwealth, to cut those off which shall be found to withdraw Obedience from them. And though it sometime happen, that the Peaceable and Obedient meet with a Fate no way answerable to their Merit; yet as, generally speaking, they are more likely to be successful, than turbulent and seditious Men; so, where they are not, they have the Conscience of their own Goodness to support them, and the certain expectation of a Reward in another World: That being a Blessing which, as no Violence of Men can obstruct, so God hath, without any Exceptions, obliged himself to bestow.    

THE SIXTH COMMANDMENT.  
THE SIXTH COMMANDMENT.  
Thou shalt 
* or, not kill.  do no murder.  

PART I.  
The Contents.  
Of the Duty we own to each other as Men, and particularly to each others Persons and Lives, the violation whereof, this Commandment forbids. The Affirmative part of the Commandment, the showing Humanity or Benevolence unto all; the Grounds whereof are also declared. Those either, first, our descending originally from the same Common Parents, the ignorance whereof was probably the cause of the Heathens not extending their Humanity usually beyond their own Nation: Or, secondly, our descending from the same Celestial Parent, God; and being created by him in his own Image: Or, thirdly, that Natural Compassion which God hath implanted in all our Hearts, that necessity we stand in of one another's Help, and that Ability which we have, by means of Reason and Speech, to afford it. The particular Duties this Humanity includes, an inward Affection to, Praying for, and doing all those things which may promote each others Happiness: Of which nature, are the assisting one another with our Advice, lending one another the Assistance either of our Persons or Fortunes; and, where there is a necessity of punishing, using moderation in it. This Humanity to extend in some measure to all, unless where there is a Command of God to the contrary; which is not to be supposed under the Gospel. Of the Measure wherein this Humanity is to be extended; where is shown, first, That it ought to be extended even to evil and unjust Persons, so far as is consistent with the Glory of God, the Public Good, and the Good of our own Souls. What the Result of that Determination is, and that it no way hinders, but Offenders may be brought to condign Punishment; because Glemency to them, is Cruelty to the Innocent. Inquiry is next made in what proportion this Humanity is to be extended to the several sorts and degrees of Men; where is shown, That where it cannot, or not alike, be afforded unto all, those of the same True Religion with us, are to be preferred before those of a False; as those who are nearly related to us, before those who are more remote. Ourselves, caeteris paribus, to be preferred before other Men; but not so, where there is an Inequality: our own Pleasure being to be postposed to the necessary Support of a Neighbour; and our own Welfare, as well as Pleasure, to that of the Society whereof we are.  
WHAT is owing from us to each other upon the account of any near Relation, was the Business of that Commandment to show, which entreats of the Honour of Parents: It remains, that we inquire what we own to one another as Men, which is the purport of the following ones. In the investigation whereof, following the Order of the Decalogue and Nature, we will inquire, first of all, what is owing from us to each others Persons and Lives.  
Now, though, if we look no farther than the Letter of the Commandment that is now before us, the Whole of what is required of us may seem to be no other, than the not invading each others Lives, or at least offering no violence to them; yet because it is certain, from the Laws of God and Nature, that a positive Benevolence is also required; and because both our Saviour, and St. Paul, reduce the whole of the Law to Love, which could not be done with any congruity, if Benevolence had not a portion in it; therefore I think it not amiss to allot it a place in my Discourse, and inquire, 

1. Upon what Grounds it stands.  
2. What Duties it contains.  
3. To whom; and,  
4. In what measure it is to be extended.    
1. And here not to tell you that Benevolence to all Mankind is so confessedly a Duty, that it hath obtained the name of Humanity; because though that be a proof of the World's believing it to be such, and consequently, that it hath a foundation in Nature; yet it gives no account of the Grounds upon which it stands: I shall, without more ado, apply myself to the investigation of those Principles, from which both so general a Persuasion, and the Obligation thereof doth arise.  
Now the first Obligation we have of showing Humanity to each other, ariseth from hence, that all of us, though at at a greater distance, descend from the same Common Parents, For, being by the former Precept obliged to give Honour to our Parents, as well those which are farther removed from us, as those which are more immediate to us; 
See Explicat. of the Fifth Commandm. Part 1. in the beginning of it; and Part 3. towards the end—.  being also (as was there observed) we cannot give Honour to them, unless we have a regard to those that are alike descended from them; it follows, that if we are all descended from the same Common Parents, we are to look upon one another as of the same Family, and consequently, to afford one another a share in our Affections. And though, in tract of Time, the Tradition of our Descent from the same Common Parents was in a manner quite forgotten among the Heathen, which is probably the reason why they showed so little Humanity out of their own Nation: yet, as, where there was a persuasion of descending from the same Common Stock, there was always a Religious Friendship between them, yea, though Necessity, or some other 'Cause had separated them, as to the place of their abode; so Josephus 
* Antiqu. Judaic. lib. 12. c. 5.— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc.  tells us, That, when the Lacedæmonians found by a certain Writing, that they and the Jews descended from the same Stock, as being both of the Posterity of Abraham, they did, in a Letter of their Kings to Onias the High Priest, both offer and require a mutual Friendship, as the result of that Cognation that was between them: It being but just (as the Words 
‖ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Joseph. ibid.  of their Letter are) that since you are our Brethren, you should send to us for such things as you desire, as in like manner we shall do, and both look upon your Possessions as our own, and have our own in common with you. From which Ratiocination of theirs, it is apparent, that, though the Heathen had not the knowledge of all men's descending from the same Common Stock, yet they judged it, so far as it could be proved, a just Foundation of Humanity; and accordingly, where they discerned any such, looked upon themselves as obliged to afford it. In the mean time, you may see, with what reason God premiseth the Precept of Honouring our Parents, before those others of showing Kindness to the generality of Mankind; that being not only a straighter Obligation, but the Fountain and Foundation of the other.  
But because, as was now intimated, how rational soever it may seem to be, to show Humanity to each other, upon the account of our descending from the same Common Stock; yet that Reason could not appear to all who were persuaded of the Obligation of it, because the Tradition of that Descent was almost obliterated among the Gentiles: Therefore it may not be amiss to inquire, whether there be not some other ground of it, and such too as was more discernible to the Heathen: Of which nature I reckon, our descending from the same Celestial Parent, God; and being created by him in his own Image. Which Ground is the more to be stood upon, because God himself assigns it for the Reason of the Prohibition that is now before us: For thus, after the signification of his displeasure against the shedding the Blood of Man, he assigns for the Reason of it, and of that Vengeance which he inculcates, that in the image of God made he man, Gen. 9.6. Neither will it suffice to say, That this is a sufficient ground of Humanity to those to whom the Scripture, where it is recorded, was made known; the Honour, and much less Love of God, being by no means to be salved, where a Regard is not had to those that are both of his Offspring and his Image. For, as the same Truth is deducible from Natural Principles, even from those which evince God to be the Creator of the World, and the worth of those Souls of ours in which his Image doth most shine forth; so, that the Heathen were not without the knowledge of it, is evident from several Passages of their Writings 
* 
Aristides dixit, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.— Manilim.  
a quoqu in genites nisi coelo credere far est  
Esse homines?— Idem de animâ humanâ.— Coelo scrutatur in alto  
Cognatúmque sequens corpus se quaerit in aliris.  Vid. plura apud Pricaeum in Act. 17.28. , and particularly from that which St. Paul quotes out of one of their own Poets; For we are also his offspring. Now forasmuch as even by the confession of the Heathen, we are all the Offspring of God; and that too to such a Degree, as to have his Image plainly shining on us: it cannot but be looked upon as a dishonour to Almighty God, not to have a regard to those, who are both descended from him, and of the same glorious Image with him. But what speak I of the Heathens acknowledging all to be the Sons of the same God, when it is evident from Arrian, that they did no less acknowledge the conclusion we have deduced from it, and the reasonableness of that Humanity which we commend? For, what (saith he, in the person of Epictetus, to a Master who was more than ordinarily displeased with his Slave) wilt 
* Arrian in Epictet. lib. 1. cap. 13.— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. M. Antoninus. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, l. 2. s. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  thou not bear with him who is thy Brother, who hath God, no less than thyself for his Ancestor? who as a Son, is procreated of the same Seeds, of the same Celestial Emission? But, what if thou wert placed in the supremest dignity, wouldst thou therefore presently make thyself a Tyrant? and not rather remember what thou art, and over whom thou rulest? that thou rulest over thy Kinsmen, thy Brethren, and the Offspring of God. From all which it is evident, both that the Heathen themselves looked upon all Mankind as the Offspring of God, and upon that account the just object of their Humanity.  
Add hereunto, that natural compassion which Nature hath implanted in the hearts of all men, that necessity which they stand in of one another's help, and that ability which they have, by means of their Reason and Speech, to afford it. For, inasmuch as all those things must be acknowledged to be from God, inasmuch as they naturally prompt men to the showing of that humanity, which it is the design of my present Discourse to establish; it must be looked upon as the intention of God, who makes nothing in vain, to oblige us to exert it to all those, who are partakers of the same Nature and Infirmities with ourselves. And, though having established the former grounds, there lies no necessity upon me, to reflect upon those other Hypotheses, upon which the Ignorant and the Atheistical have thought fit to erect the frame of Humane Society, and those actions that tend to the conservation of it; yet, even so, we should not find ourselves without a proof of that humanity which this Commandment was intended to suggest. For, be it, that at first Men lived a wand'ring and a savage Life, and had no Bond, either of Laws or Speech to conjoin them; Be it, that their own danger, whether from Wild Beasts, or as Wild Men, obliged them to have recourse to others, and by dumb Signs at first, and afterwards by Speech, which necessity put them upon the invention of, both to implore the assistance of others, and promise them their own: Yet, even so, as Lactantius 
* Lactant. l. 6. c. 10.  observes, no contemptible proof might be found of showing kindness and humanity to one another. For if, according to that hypothesis, men entered into, and established a Society with one another for their mutual assistance and support, it must be looked upon as the highest wickedness, either to violate or not observe those compacts, whereby, from the beginning of their Being, Mankind was so linked together.  
2. Having thus shown upon what grounds that Benevolence or Humanity stands, which we are obliged to show to all mankind, proceed we to inquire what duties it contains, so far at least as this Commandment is concerned in it. Where, first of all, no doubt can be made but we are to have an inward affection for them, and to begin our benevolence to them in our souls; not only the word Benevolence so persuading, but that abstract of the second Table which we learn both from our Saviour and St. Paul; for, both the one and the other summing up the duties of that Table in the loving of our Neighbour as ourselves; it is apparent we cannot satisfy the several precepts of it, unless we have an inward affection for those who are the objects of them. As little doubt can be made, but we are to wish well to them, and employ our Prayers to God on their behalf; this being not only a natural result of Love, but a duty which is particularly bound upon us by Christianity, by which we, at least, are to take our measures of the Commandments. In fine, because the lives and persons of Men, are the things this Commandment aims at the felicitating of, we are in reason to do all that may any way tend to the promoting of their welfare and happiness. Now, though, what those things are, is not hard to be discovered, and much less by those, who will make their Neighbour's case their own, according as Christianity obligeth; yet because all men will not use that advertency which is requisite, and much less be so just as to suppose their Neighbour's case their own, lest they should be forced to love them as themselves, I think it not amiss to instance in some of those things which tend to the happiness of Mankind. Of this nature is, first, the giving them the assistance of our advice in all those straits and exigencies, into which they may often fall; this being not only an useful part of Humanity, but of the nature of those offices of it, which bring not the least prejudice to the Doer; Such as are the suffering a man to drink of the Waters of our Fountain, or to light his Candle at ours: 
* 
●●omo qui erranti comiter monstrat viam,  
Quasi lumen de suo lumine accendat, facit.  
Vr nihilominus ipsi luceat, cum illi accenaerit.  Ennius' apud Tull. de Officiis l. 1.  He who courteously shows an erring person his way, or gives him faithful counsel, being like him who suffers his Neighbour to light his Candle at his, which shines never the less to him for what the other borrowed. Again, forasmuch as, though our advice may be of signal use to promote the happiness of our Neighbour: yet, it may so happen sometime, that it may be of no more force, than Be warmed and filled, and other such like wishes to distressed persons, the inability of their persons requiring the assistance of our bodies, as the slenderness of their fortunes, an addition to them from our own, hence it comes to pass, that our benevolence is to extend to the lending them our personal assistance, where their distresses do so require, as the assistance of our Fortunes where their necessities do. Lastly, forasmuch as Justice and the necessities of the Public may require the inflicting of punishment upon Offenders; hence it comes to pass, that our Humanity is to express itself in such a moderate infliction, as may suit with the ability of the sufferer.  
3. The order of my Discourse, now leads me to inquire to whom the Humanity here spoken of is to be extended, a question which may seem at first sight unnecessary, because the title of Humanity extends it to all those, who are partakers of the same nature and infirmities with ourselves. And indeed, simply speaking, no doubt can be made, but all men whatsoever are to have a share of it, because, as was before shown, all men are descended from the same common Parents, and are no less the Offspring and Image of God than ourselves. But as Benevolence to Men is in reason to yield to the Commands and Glory of God, by whom even that Benevolence is made a duty; so it may sometime happen that they may interfere in some persons, in which case there is no doubt our Humanity is to be so far suspended. Thus for example, There being a command of God to the Jews, not only, that they should generally abstain from Commerce with other Nations, but that they should show no pity to some of them, and particularly to those who Inhabited the Land of Canaan before them, there is no doubt but such Persons were out of the compass of that Humanity, which this Precept is supposed to enjoin. But, because, however the Jews might be forbidden the expressions of Humanity to some persons; yet there appears not the like interdict to the Christians; yea, because the like Interdict is so far from appearing, that Christ hath commanded us to look, even, upon a Samaritan as a Neighbour; therefore, if we speak of Humanity in the general, there is no doubt but all men whatsoever are to be allowed to have a share of it, and that, not only because of the foregoing Precept of our Saviour, but because (which is a far greater endearment) he laid down his life for all, yea, even for those that deny him. All therefore that can be said, as to us Christians, is, that there may be some Offices of Humanity, which may be denied at some times, and to some persons, which will best be considered in the resolution of that question.  
4. In what measure our humanity is to be extended, the fourth and last thing proposed to be entreated of. Now there are three things, within the resolution whereof, I suppose, all that is necessary upon this Head will be comprehended.  

1. What Humanity is to be shown to evil and unjust persons.  
2. In what proportion it is to be extended to the several sorts and degrees of Men. And  
3. Lastly, what the measure thereof aught to be in comparison with that love which we own unto ourselves.   
1. I begin with the first of these, to wit, what Humanity is to be extended to evil and unjust persons, concerning which, I shall not doubt to affirm, that all such is to be afforded them, as shall be found to be consistent with the glory of God, the public good, and the good of our own souls. For Humanity being bound upon us, not only by the Laws of Nature, but by the Laws of Christ, and of his Religion, nothing can be supposed to conceal its obligation, which is not some way superior to it, such as are those before mentioned. But from hence it will follow, that we are to wish well to, and pray for them, to give them our assistance where they are unjustly oppressed, to relieve them in their wants and necessities; in fine, to converse with them so far, as that may be done without danger of infection to ourselves, or scandal to others, and our Religion; none of these in any measure thwarting the Glory of God, or our own, or others welfare, but on the contrary, very much promoting both: Partly because a means to work upon those evil ones, and partly because an innocent compliance with that Humanity which Nature and Christianity hath bound upon us; He who thus showeth mercy to an Evil man, as Aristotle 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Laertius in vita Aristor. l. 5. p. 118. & p. 119. de eodem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  sometime answered an importunate Caviller, having a regard, not to his Manners, but to the Man, or, as it is expressed by some others, not to the Man, but to Humanity. But as, where the offices of Humanity are inconsistent with a higher good, there is no doubt, the obligation thereof doth so far cease; so nothing hinders, but they, who have Authority, both may and aught to draw the Sword of Justice against Offenders, and not only cut them off, but with severity; Clemency to Offenders being Cruelty to the Innocent, who ought in all reason to be preferred. Only as Humanity may be shown in punishing, as well as in redress or relief, care would be taken, where either the enormity of the Crime, or the deterring of others doth not so require, that the punishment, which is inflicted, be not attended with that cruelty wherewith it too often is.  
2. Having thus shown in what measure our Humanity is to extend to evil and unjust persons, proceed we to inquire with what proportion it is to be exhibited to the several sorts and degrees of Men. For, though it be not to be doubted, but that it is to be extended unto all, in as great a proportion as we are able to afford, yet, inasmuch as, according 
* De Officiis Lib. 1. Loco post citato.  to Tully, our stock is but mean, and the multitude of those that want, infinite; hence it comes to pass, that our Humanity must be with some variety, and though all are to have it, yet all must not have it in the same proportion. Thus for example, Though I can wish well to, and pray for all men whatsoever, yet it is impossible for me, either to be liberal or assistant to all that may stand in need of my support, hence it comes to pass, (because otherwise my benevolence would be ineffectual to any) that ●●e stream thereof must pass more fully to some, than it can be supposed to do to others. The only thing worthy an enquiry, is, where the excess of it is to go, which yet will not cost much pains to resolve. For, inasmuch as, caeteris paribus, those are a juster object of our benevolence, who are of the same true Religion with us, than those who are of another, and of a false; it will follow, as St. Paul hath taught us, that though we are to do good to all, yet, especially to those that are of the household of Faith, Gal. 6.10. In like manner, though I can wish well to, and pray for all Mankind, as well such of them, as are farthest removed from me in Conversation and Nature, as those that are nearest to me in any, or all, yet, inasmuch as I cannot 
* Sed quoniam copiae parvae sineulorum sunt: eorum autem, qui his egeant, infinita est multitudo, vulgaris liberalitas referenda est ad illum Ennii finem, Nihilominus ut ipsi luceat, ut facultas sit, qua in nostros simus liberales. Gradus autem plures sunt societatis hominum.  enim ab illâ discedatur infinitate, propior est ejusdem gentis, nationis, linguae, qua maximè homines conjunguntur, interius etiam est ejusdem esse civitatis, multa sunt enim civibus inter se communia— Arctior vero colligatio est, societas propinquorum: ab illa enim immensâ societate humani generis in exiguum angustumque concluditur. Tull. de Officiis, Lib. 1.  transmit the outward effects of my benevolence to all, or at least not in the like proportion, Reason would that the preference be given to those of my own Kindred, and Country, and Converse, because, having a straighter tie upon me than the other. For, if all men are to have a share in my benevolence upon the account of their descending from the common Parents of Mankind, to be sure, if a difference be to be made, it ought to be to the advantage of those, who, beside that general cognation, have a straighter and more particular one to us.  
3. One only Question remains, relating to the measure of our benevolence, and that is, what proportion it is to bear to that which we own unto ourselves, concerning which, no doubt can be made, but that it ought to go less, than that which we own unto ourselves. For though the Commandment be, that we should love our Neighbour as ourselves, according as Moses first, and after him our Saviour enjoins, which may seem to import an equality, yet as nothing more can be inferred therefrom than a similitude in our benevolence, which may be, where there is not an equality; so every man according to the usual saying, being nearest to himself, is in reason to give himself the preference, and love himself both before and above another. This only would be added, that when we speak of giving ourselves the preference, it is to be understood where the comparison is ad idem, both in respect of the thing, and the Person. For who either doubts, or can doubt but that a man should forego his own pleasure, rather than suffer a Neighbour to want necessaries. For, as it were a strange kind of Humanity that would not postpose a pleasure to the sustentation of a Neighbour; so it is, in truth, no better than an injustice, which no love of ourselves can warrant; he, who gave the earth to the Children of Men, by that act of his, entitling all that are so, to some portion in it, and consequently, where they are not actually enstated in it, obliging those that are, to communicate so much of their enjoyments to them, as may serve them for their support. In like manner, though I say, that in the matter of Benevolence, a Man is, caeteris paribus, to prefer himself before any other, yet, I say not the same, where the comparison is made between Us and those Societies, of which we are, either by Compact or the Institution of God, Members. For, as it is impossible for any Society to subsist, where they, who are the Members of i●● subject not their particular Interests to it, so, to do so is no more, than what upon due consideration will be found to be owing from particular men to it; whatsoever we are, or have, being next under God owing to those Societies whereof we are Members.   

PART II.  
An Address to the Explication of the Negative Part of the Commandment; where is shown, That that which is literally and expressly forbidden, is the Murdering of our Neighbour. The Criminalness thereof evinced from the Affront it offers to God, whose Image it thus violates; from the Injury it doth to Humane Society, but especially to the Party murdered. The like Criminalness evidenced from the Consequences thereof, and particularly from its clamorousness in the Ears of God, and of our own Conscience. An Inquiry what Killing is to be looked upon as Murder; where is shown, first, That all kill is not; and particularly, that that is not which is inflicted by the Magistrate, where the Authority is competent, the Manner legal, and the Party that is killed deserves it. All other designed Killing, even by him, to be looked upon as Murder, whether accomplished by the Hands of the Executioner, or in War. An Exception in the behalf of those who serve Princes in War; where is shown, That it is not necessary that they should know the Quarrel wherein they engage to be just; it being enough to them, that they know it not to be , that they are commanded by the Prince to serve him in it, and that they pass not the Bounds of his Commands. All designed killing by Private Persons, to be looked upon as Murder, unless what a Man is put upon in his own necessary Defence. A brief Censure of Duels.  
THIS Commandment, with those that follow, rather pointing at such things as we are to avoid, than at those which we are obliged to pursue; Reason would that we should employ the main of our Endeavours in the discovery of those Sins which this and the other Commandments do forbid. Having therefore in my last set before you what regard we ought to have for one another's Persons and Lives, I think it not amiss to consider by what means they may be prejudiced, as from which the present Precept aims especially to secure us. In order whereunto, because that seems to me to be the most natural way of procedure, I will, 

1. First of all, entreat of that which is literally and expressly forbidden: and,  
2. When I have done so, proceed to inquire, Whether any other Sins are included in it, and what those Sins are.    
1. To begin with that which is literally and expressly forbidden; concerning which, no doubt can be made but it is the kill of our Neighbour: because, however the Commandment expresseth no more than Thou shalt not kill, yet this, and those that follow, are resolved by St. Paul to be comprehended in loving our Neighbour as ourselves. Which Resolution of his could not have truth in it, if the Crimes that are forbidden, had not our Neighbour for the Object of them. Taking it therefore for granted, that the kill of a Neighbour is the thing here forbidden, I will inquire,  

1. Wherein the Criminalness thereof doth consist.  
2. What Killing is to be supposed to be understood: And,  
3. And lastly, What is to be thought of Self-murder, and how that is reducible to this Commandment.   
1. Now though, for the Criminalness of Murder, it might be enough to allege, that it is a violation of this Commandment; and, which is more, of one of those which were given to Noah, which I have shown to be in themselves of Universal obligation: yet because I have undertaken to show, that this, as well as the rest, is a Violation of the Law of Reason and Nature, as well as of God's Positive ones, waving the consideration of the other, I will betake myself to such Topics as the Light of Nature will afford us. Whereof, the first that I shall assign, is, the particular Affront it offers to the Divine Nature: For though Man, as such, be the immediate Object of its Injuriousness, and accordingly so resolved by us; yet inasmuch as Man is no other than the Image of God, and acknowledged so to be, no less by the Heathen, than by ourselves; what is thus done to Man, must be looked upon as an Affront to God, whose Image is thus defaced in him. Excellent to this purpose is that of Philo 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. De spec. legibus.—  in the entrance of his Discourse upon this Commandment: Murder hath indeed the name of Manslaughter, because Man is the Person slain; but it is in truth Sacrilege, and the greatest of Sacrileges, because than Man there is not any thing more Sacred, or which is a more express Image of the Divine Reason and Perfection. And indeed, if even the Images of Emperors have had such a Veneration, that it hath been looked upon as a violation of their Majesty, to draw those from them who had fled thither for Succour, or (which is an Instance better known to us) to deface them in their Coins; it is easy to suppose, it ought to be looked upon as no mean Crime, to deface the Image of God in Man: not only because of the Eminency of the Person represented, but of the Representation itself, which is of the same nature with its Archetype. But let us suppose, for once, that Murder reached no further than the Man, and that, as it is properly a breach of the Second Table, so it had no evil Aspect at all upon the First; yet even so we should find it to be criminal enough for all considering Men to stand aghast at; because of that Injury which it offers to Humane Society, which is the Band and Cement of the World. For, beside that Murder robs it of one of its Members, and consequently doth so far weaken it; it doth by its evil Example tempt others to do the like, and by its noxiousness beget a diffidency in Men towards each other: Upon which, what can any Man imagine, but that others should be drawn to offer the like injury to it; or, if all cannot be prevailed upon so far, yet to avoid each others Converse, and treat with Men, not as their Brethren, but as their Enemies? Which, what is it, but to bring in that State of War, which some, though fond, have imagined to be the State of Nature? Lastly, (more than which I shall not need to allege from the Law of Reason and Nature) As Murder offers a great injury to Humane Society, so it offers an irreparable one to the Party murdered; there being no return from the State of Death to Life, and much less (if the Person have been taken away in his Sins) to a possibility of obtaining Pardon from God, which is a thing not to be thought of without horror. For, though an Italian, it may be, may hug himself so much the more in it, concerning one of whom it is reported, that he made his Enemy abjure his God before he murdered him, that so he might at the same time destroy both Soul and Body; yet none that hath the Bowels of a Man, can think of it without regret, that by his means Men have not only been deprived of the present Life without remedy, but condemned to an endless Torment.  
Now though this alone might suffice to deter Men from the commission of it, which is the reason I have taken no notice at all of the Consequences of Murder, in the general Scheme of my Discourse; yet I think it not amiss, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to represent some of them also to the Consciences of those that are not yet infected with it. Whereof, the first that I shall assign, is, the clamorousness thereof, in calling for vengeance upon the Murderer. For, however it may be with other Sins, none of which yet is without a Voice, this is importunate for Vengeance; and, if God will not descend to Earth, that will ascend to him, and fill his Ears with the News of the Crime, and Prayers for a Judgement on the Committer of it. 'Twas thus (as we learn from Moses, Gen. 4.10.) when Cain had killed his Brother Abel; Heaven itself was filled with the Outcries of the Murder, and the many loud Anthems that are sung by those thousands of Angels that inhabit there, were drowned by that single Voice; God himself there telling him, that the voice of his brother's blood cried unto him from the ground. It is true indeed (For what should hinder me from making an Objection which it is so easy to assoil?) It is true, I say, that the Subject of that Voice is not expressed, and much less is it affirmed, that it called for Vengeance: But, as it is not to be imagined, that that should call for any thing else, when we find God himself subjoyning so severe a Curse against him that had been the Shedder of it; so, that it did not, will be made more than probable by the cry of the souls under the Altar, even the Souls of those Persons that were slain for the Word of God, and the Testimony that they held, Rev. 6.9, 10. the Subject of their Cry being no other than How long, holy and true, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood upon them that dwell on the earth? But so we find also (which may serve for a farther confirmation) that because the cry of Sodom and Gomorrha was very great, or rather, of the Sins of their Inhabitants, as you may see Gen. 18.20. therefore the Lord sent Angels to destroy them, Gen. 19.13. For, as it is apparent from thence, that the Subject of their Cry was no other than the Vengeance of the Sinners; so, that the Cry of foul Crimes is so loud and earnest, that God cannot be at rest, till he hath dispatched the Instruments of his displeasure. The result of the Premises is this, That all heinous Sins are in Scripture said to have a Voice, and that that of Murder is as loud as any; and then we may have leave to conclude it to be one of the first Magnitude, because it is so importunate for Vengeance.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
But Murder is not more clamorous in the Ears of the Almighty, than it is in his who is guilty of it; which though intended only to represent the Horrors it creates in the Conscience of the Man of blood, was yet literally true in him of whom Plutarch speaks in his Book De serâ Numinis vindictâ. For, passing one day by a Nest of chattering Swallows, he thought he heard them upbraiding him with the Murder he had committed; and his Ears were no less filled with the noise of his own horrid Act, than his guilty Conscience was. And indeed, if, as the Scripture speaks, Sin lies at any Persons doors, the Sin of the Murderer doth, being ever ready to fly in his Face, and afflict him with the remembrance of it. Of which, though it were easy to allege other convincing Proofs, and particularly those Spectra, or Representations of the murdered Party, which they themselves have often complained to have disturbed their Repose; yet I shall choose rather to represent, as being both more apparent and more convincing, their own easy discovery of the Murders they have been guilty of. For, well may we think the disquiets of those men's Consciences to be great, who choose rather by such a Discovery to expose themselves to the Severity of the Law, than lie any longer under the secret Lashes of the other. What should I tell you of the inquisition God is said in Scripture to make after it, of the strange and unusual ways he makes use of to discover it, of the discovery that hath been sometime made by the Corpse 
* Thuan Hist. l. 32. pag. 159.  of the Murdered Party, of the sure and certain Vengeance that attends it? For, as these are so known, both from History, and our own Experience, as not to admit of any the least doubt; so all of them do sufficiently proclaim God's detestation of the Crime, and what dread it ought to be held in by us.  
2. The Criminalness of Murder being thus explained, proceed we to inquire, what killing is to be accounted such. In order whereunto,  
1. The first thing I shall observe is, That all kill is not so to be esteemed; because, where God first of all forbids the shedding of Blood, he doth not only except the shedding of the Blood of the Murderer, but enjoins the effusion of it. For thus, Gen. 9.5. not contented to affirm, that he himself would require the life of man at the hand of that, whether man or beast, that should invade it; he subjoins in the next words, that whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man should his blood be shed. Neither will it avail to say, That, if any Limitation be admitted, we must find out other Reasons for the prohibition of Murder, than those we have before laid down. For, beside that the kill of the Murderer is not only not injurious to Humane Society, but, on the contrary, a great Safeguard to it, as by means of which other Men may be deterred from offering the like Injury to it; beside that the slaying of the Murderer, though it take away his Life, yet doth it not without just cause, and cannot therefore be said to offer an irreparable Injury to him; it offers no Affront to the Divine Nature, by the violation of that Image of God which is supposed to be upon him: Partly, because the Murderer hath in a great measure defaced that Image, as well upon himself, as the Party slain; and partly, because the slaying the Murderer conduces to the Glory of God himself, which is in reason to be preferred before the preservation of his Image. The Murderer hath indeed the Image of God upon him, though much defaced; and, upon that account, aught to be looked upon with a proportionable Respect; but as an Image is in reason to yield to the Honour of that of which it is so, because deriving all its Lustre from it; so it ceases to be Sacred, where it cannot be preserved without the violation of his Honour whom it was designed to represent.  
2. That all Killing is not Murder, or the Killing here forbidden, enough hath been said to show: Proceed we now to inquire, what is, or is not to be accounted such. For my more orderly resolution whereof, I will consider the Act of Killing, 1. As purposely effected; or, 2. As casual, and beside the Intention of the Doer. The former again will require a double Consideration, according to the different sort of Persons by whom it may be effected; which are either such as are invested with Public Authority, or such as are only Private Persons. If the Question be concerning the former, killing by such as are invested with Public Authority, so it is not to be looked upon as Murder, or as the Killing here forbidden, where the Authority is competent, the manner legal, and the Party that is killed deserves it. For, beside that where God first forbids the shedding of Blood, he commands the shedding of the Murderers, to wit, as the Chaldee Paraphrase well interprets it, upon proof made by witnesses, and by the Sentence of the Judge; beside that under the Law, of which this Commandment was a part, there was both leave and command to those that were in Authority, to take away the Lives of Offenders, which shows, that that Killing was not here intended; we are told for Christianity by St. Paul, that the Powers that are, have the Sword of Justice committed to them; for what reason, think we, but to make use of it upon occasion, and, as it follows in that Apostle, to execute vengeance with it upon all those that do evil. Neither will it avail to object, That the same St. Paul forbids Christians the avenging of themselves, and, which is more, upon the account of Vengeance belonging to the Lord. For, as immediately after that, he admonisheth Magistrates to execute Vengeance; which shows, that so far they were not intended in the former Prohibition; so, the Reason that is alleged doth not only not include Magistrates, but, on the contrary, show them not to be intended. For, though Magistrates are not Gods, unless in a secondary sense, and as the Images and Substitutes of the True; yet being his Ministers, and Ministers to execute Vengeance, what is inflicted by the Magistrate doth not only not cease to be God's, but is, on the contrary, to be looked upon as one of the ways of God's repaying it, which shows it rather to be their Duty, than their Offence. Care only would be taken, that as it is God's Vengeance which they execute, so they do it with regard to the Command of God, and not to gratify their own Malice; otherwise they avenge not God, but themselves, which is a thing no where permitted to them. What Killing is lawful on the Magistrate's part, hath been shown already: proceed we to inquire, what killing is forbidden; which will not be hard to judge, after the explication of the other. For, it appearing from the Premises, that no other Killing is lawful to them, than what is annexed to their Authority; it will follow, that all that is forbidden, which either proceeds from an incompetent Authority, or is illegally and undeservedly executed. The same is to be said of killing in War, as is of that which is effected by the Hand of the Executioner, For, as no doubt can be made, but that it is lawful for Princes to make War, and consequently to kill, where the State which is under their inspection cannot otherwise be secured; so it is no less unquestionable, that War is not, where they who make it have either not Authority so to do, or levy it without a just provocation. For, Vengeance (as St. Paul tells us) belonging unto God, and to those whom he hath entrusted with the Execution thereof; it can be no farther lawful for the Magistrate to execute it, than is within the power of his Commission to do. Upon which account, all unprejudiced Men must condemn the War of the late Long Parliament, because it is sufficiently known, the Power of War was not in them, till they did in an unlawful manner assume it unto themselves. In like manner, the Execution of Vengeance being entrusted to Princes, to make use of against those that do evil; that, and the Actions that attend it, must be looked upon as unlawful, where it is directed against those who have done nothing to deserve it. This only would be added, for the sake of those who are by Princes appointed to draw the Sword in War, That it is not necessary for them to know the Justness of that Quarrel in which they do so kill and slay: For, inasmuch as Private Persons neither do nor can well understand the Justness of any Public Quarrel, because, to the understanding thereof, it is requisite they should be acquainted with the great Transactions of their own State, and of that against which they make War, (which it is not to be supposed Private Persons should be able certainly to attain) either it shall be lawful for them to withdraw their Assistance from the Prince, which must prove the bane of the State; or they must be content to serve him in his Wars, without any such knowledge of the Justness of his Quarrel. Again, Forasmuch as the making of Wars, and other such Public Matters, belong properly to him, to whom God hath committed the Sovereign Power, it must be left to him to judge, whether that Quarrel wherein he engageth, be such as is just and warrantable. It may be enough to the Subject, that he doth not know it to be unjust, and that he is commanded by the Prince to serve him in it: For, however he may thereby be sometimes engaged in an unjust Quarrel, yet the blame thereof shall fall not upon him, who is neither concerned nor qualified to judge of it; but upon the Prince, who is both, and by whose Authority the War is levied. This only would be added, That, as the Commission 
* Tull de Officiis, lib. ●. Pampilius Imperator tenebat provinciam in cujus exer●i●u Catonis filius tiro militabat. Cum autem Pompi to videretur unam legionem d●mittere, Catonis quoque filium, qui in eadem legione militabat, dimisit. Sed cum amore pugnandi in exercitu remansisser, Cato ad Pompilium scripsit, ut si eum pateretur in exercitu remanere, secundo cum obligaret militiae sacramento: quia, priore amisso, jure pugnare cum hostibus non poterat. See also Sanderson's Case of a Military Life.  of the Prince is the only Warrant the Subject hath to interest himself in War; so it will become him, for that reason, to take care, that private Revenge do not push him on to do further mischief, than it is the intention of the Prince he should. Upon which account, I cannot but highly commend the Carriage of one of Cyrus his Soldiers, as which is a noble Instance both of his Humanity, and observation of Discipline. For, having (as Xenophon informs us) in the time of Battle lift up his Hand to strike his Enemy, when he heard the Trumpet begin to sound the Retreat, he let fall his Arm, and willingly lost his Blow, because he thought the time of striking past.  
Of killing by Public Persons, I have spoken at large, and both shown what is, and what is not to be accounted Murder: It remains, that we inquire concerning kill by Private Persons; which will require no great pains to resolve. For, the Execution of Vengeance being challenged by God to himself, and to those to whom he hath committed the Sword of Justice, it will follow, that the Execution of it belongs not to private Persons, and consequently, that generally all Killing by them is Murder. If there be any Case wherein it may be lawful for a Private Person to kill another, it must be when a Man is set upon by another, and forced to it in his own defence: In which Case, as we have the Warrant of the Law of God in part to secure us, which acquits that Person from Murder, who should slay a Thief that was found breaking in upon him in the Night, Exod. 22.2, 3. so it will be found not to be without Licence from the Law of Reason and Nature; partly, because in the Case of a sudden Onset, we can have no recourse to the ordinary Means of Defence, I mean, the Patronage of the Magistrate; and partly, because those whom God hath entrusted with the Power of Vengeance, do empower Private Persons to slay the Invader, where there is no other Means to secure themselves. But as, setting aside the Instance of a Man's own necessary Defence, it will be hard to find any wherein it may be lawful to kill a Man; so the pretence of Honour, upon which Duels are commonly grounded, is so pitiful a one, that I wonder it should so long abuse the World. For, beside that, as one hath well observed 
* John Hales Sermon of Duels, pag 95. of his Remains. , Drinking, Gaming, and Whores are those rotten Bones that do, for the most part, lie hid under this painted Sepulchre and Title of Honour; beside that there are other ways to recover men's Honour, than by killing them that do affront them, which makes it different from the Case of killing a Man in his own defence; it is a part of our Profession, as we are Christians, to suffer that wrong and disgrace, which these Men are so hasty to revenge. From whence, as it will follow, that disgrace is so far from being a just ground of killing, that, on the contrary, an easier Revenge will hardly be found to be allowable; so it would be considered, by those especially who stand so much upon their Reputation, whether it be any Honour to them, to bid open defiance to that peaceable and gentle Religion which they have so often and so solemnly made profession to embrace.   

PART III.  
Of Casual Homicide; and, first of all, of that which is Casual only as to the Effect; which is also shown to have the nature of Murder, though a less criminal one. The like enquired concerning that Homicide which is perfectly Casual; where, if the Act from which it proceeded were conversant about something ludicrous, the Party killing is in some measure declared to be guilty of it; as, on the other side, if it were conversant about serious or necessary Business, to be chargeable, or not chargeable with it, as he either neglected or used all requisite Means for the preventing of it. Of Self-murder, and how it is reducible to this Commandment. The Criminalness thereof evinced from its contrariety to that Natural Inclination there is in us to preserve ourselves; from its Usurpation upon the Prerogative of God, at whose disposal we are; from the Injury that is thereby done to the Commonwealth, which is deprived of a Member; and, in fine, from the dissatisfaction it implies with the present Dispensations of the Divine Providence, or despair of a Redress from future ones. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Account is given of the Doctrine of the Stoics in this Affair; and of the Weakness, as well as Criminalness, of those that lay violent Hands upon themselves. Inquiry is also made, whether all kill of ourselves be to be looked upon as Self-murder; where is shown, That all such Killing is, which we have not a Call from God to; but that there wants not such a Call oftentimes, or at least not to that which is interpretatively a kill of ourselves: Amongst which Calls, I reckon the Preservation either of our Friend or Country, a secret Impulse from God's Spirit (which was the Case of Samson, and some of the Primitive Martyrs) and the asserting the Honour of God, and of our Religion.  
OF such Killing as is done purposely and with Design, I have spoken hitherto, and shown both what is, and what is not to be accounted the Killing here forbidden: Proceed we to inquire as much of Casual Homicide, or such as, though effected by the Slayer, yet is beside his intention. Where again we are to consider, 

1. Whether it be Casual only as to the Effect; or,  
2. Perfectly and entirely such.    
If the Question be concerning the former, even concerning that Homicide which is Casual only as to the Effect, so no doubt can remain, but that though inferior in Gild to that Killing which is designed, yet it is to be looked upon as one of the Killings here forbidden; because, by the Law of the same God, if a man, only in his haste, struck another with a weapon or a stone, so that he died, though the Striker intended only to hurt, he was to die for it, as you may see Numb. 35.16, 17, 18. It is true indeed, it is not there added, though he intended only to hurt; which may give occasion to some Men to understand it of designed Murder: But as the Text speaks only of smiting so that he die, in the mean time taking no notice of an intention of killing; and beside laying the stress of the Threat upon the Death that did ensue: so, both here, and elsewhere, the Scripture distinguishes 
* See Namb. 25.20 & Deut 19.1, 2. Exod. 21.14.  it from presumptuous and designed Killing, which shows, that Casual Homicide was intended. That the Person who slew his Neighbour did it in his anger, that he did it in his drink, that he did it provoked, or in defence of his Honour and Reputation, none of all these Pretences (as a Learned Man 
‖ John Hales Serm. of Duels, p. 83. of his Remains.  hath observed) might excuse him from that Death which God had denounced against the Murderer. For, though the Effect that ensued were not voluntary, because beside the intention of the Slayer; yet the Cause of it was; which is enough to make a Man guilty before God: Men being justly chargeable with those Effects which are but the natural Results of those Inordinacies from whence they proceeded.  
From such Homicides as are Casual only as to the Effect, proceed we to those that are perfectly such; that is to say, where neither Homicide, nor any the least Hurt was intended. Where again we are to consider, whether the Act from which the Homicide proceeded were conversant about any serious or necessary Business, or only about something ludicrous and vain. If the Question be concerning the latter, as, for example, if a Man should rashly shoot of a Gun, not considering whither the Bullet might flee, or not knowing whether it were charged or no; in this Case, if Murder follow, there is no doubt, but the Party doing it is in some measure guilty of the Offence; because, as in things of such consequence Men ought to be well advised, so it is the less excusable, because it proceeds from such an Act as is perfectly ludicrous and vain. From such Homicides as ensue from ludicrous Actions, pass we to those which follow upon more serious ones, such as are the Actions of men's Vocations: Where again we are to consider, whether Men have used all requisite diligence for the preventing of Mischief, or whether something have been neglected by them. Thus, for instance, if a Man who is either building or repairing a House, should make use of unsound Materials to make up his Scaffolds with; in this Case, there is no doubt, if any Mischief should ensue by their fall, the Party by whom it is occasioned is chargeable with it, because it is through his neglect, that they who passed by have come to those untimely Ends to which they did. The same is not to be said, if the Workman have made use of sound Materials, or at least such as were not easily to be discerned to be other; nothing having the nature of a Sin, which is not some way voluntary in him who is the Committer of it. Upon which account, we find God himself excusing him from the guilt of Murder, who, fetching a stroke with his Axe to cut down a Tree, had the ill luck to have the Head of it fall off from the Helve, and so slay his Neighbour unawares, Deut. 19.5. In the mean time, as it is not to be denied, but even such a one might be slain by the Avenger of Blood, if he could not first recover one of the Cities of Refuge, or afterwards, if he were found out of it before the death of the High Priest, (God thereby declaring, how precious the Life of Man was with him, and that it ought to be no less with us) so even Casual Homicide hath been looked upon with so evil an eye, that in the days of our Fathers, 
Archb. Abbot.  an Archbishop of this Nation was sometime suspended from his Charge, for having only unfortunately killed a Man, as he was shooting at a Deer.  
3. Being now to enter upon my third Inquiry, to wit, what is to be thought of Self-murder, and how that is reducible to this Commandment, I think it not amiss to speak first unto the latter, because, till that be shown, my Discourse upon the former must be looked upon as impertinent and unseasonable. And here not to urge (what St. Augustine doth 
* De civitat. Dei, l. 1. c. 20. ) that the Commandment saith not, Thou shalt not kill another, but, Thou shalt not kill; which doth equally include the not killing of ourselves: because (as was before observed) this, and other the Commandments that follow, are to be understood with relation to our Neighbour, in the Love of whom St. Paul resolves the whole of them to be comprehended; I shall choose rather, with the same Father 
‖ Loco prius citato. , to evidence the pertinency thereof to this Commandment, from that general Rule of loving our Neighbour as ourselves. For, inasmuch as we are to receive the measure of loving our Neighbour from ourselves; if we are not to kill our Neighbour, much less are we to kill ourselves, the Love whereof is the Measure of the other. From all which, as it is easy to infer, that the not killing of ourselves hath no direct place in this Commandment, because primarily intended to deter us from invading the Lives of others; so also, that though it hath no place in it directly, yet it has by consequence; and such too, as, because drawn à fortiori, shows it to be more criminal than the other. Taking it therefore for granted, that Self-murder hath a place here, I will proceed to inquire, 1. Wherein the Criminalness thereof consisteth; and, 2. Whether all kill of ourselves is to be accounted such  
Now though, for the resolution of the former, it might be enough to allege those Reasons which I before produced for the Criminalness of the Murder of our Neighbour; Self-murder being no less a Violation of the Image of God, a great Injury to Humane Society, and an irreparable one unto ourselves: yet I shall choose rather to insist upon such as are more proper to this Affair, whereof the first shall be taken from that natural inclination there is in every one of us to the preservation of ourselves. For that which is natural in us, being, as such, the Work of God, who is the Author no less of Nature than of Grace; it must be looked upon as an Act of opposition to God, not to comply with it, and much more to act contradictorily to it. But beside that Self-murder is a contradiction to our own Natural Inclination, and consequently also to God, who is the Author of it, it is an Usurpation upon the Prerogative of God, at whose disposal we are. A thing which even the Heathen, how blind soever in other things, were not yet unacquainted with; it being a Saying of Pythagoras, as I find him quoted by Cicero 
* 
De Senecture. Vetárque Pythagoras injussu Imperatoris, id est Dei, de praesidto & station vitae discedere.  
Ad idem alludit Plato in Phoed. ubi haec habet verba 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Sect. 5. edit. Cant.  , that no Man ought to departed from the Garrison and Station of Life, without the Command of his Great General, God. And indeed, as a more apt Similitude could not possibly be found out, to express the nature of Self-murder; so it is no less convincing a Proof of the unlawfulness thereof, than an apt Illustration of it. For, inasmuch as God hath full Power and Authority over us, as he is the Great Creator of the World; it will follow, that in what Station soever he hath set us, therein we are to abide, till we are discharged by him. Since therefore he who hath such Authority over us, hath placed us in this World, it will be necessary for us to abide in it, till he shall be pleased to call us out of it. Add hereunto, because near of kin unto the other, that Interest which the Commonwealth, whereof we are Members, hath in every one of us. For, being (as was shown in the entrance upon this Commandment) born for others, as well as ourselves, and particularly for those to whom we are nearest conjoined in Nature, Habitation, and Laws; we cannot make away ourselves, without an Injury to those who have a Right to our Service and Assistance. But to return to God, against whom (as all Offences either mediately or immediately are, so) this of Self-murder is in a more than ordinary manner in both: For the evidencing whereof, I shall allege, in the next place, the Affront this Sin of Self-murder offers to the Divine Providence: Which will appear, if we consider the dissatisfaction it implies with the present Dispensations of it, or the distrust and despair of a Redress from a future one. For, are not the Evils Men either labour under, or fear, the great cause of their laying violent Hands upon themselves? Nay, are they not assigned by the Stoics (the great Patrons of Self-murder) among the Grounds of that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which they so inculcate? I appeal to the Doctrine and Practice of Zeno the Father of that sullen Sect: Concerning the former whereof, as Diogenes Laertius 
* Lib. 7. in vitâ Zenonis, p. 195. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  tells us, that it was his and his Follower's Opinion, that a wise Man might rationally quit the World, if he laboured under any great Grief, mutilation of Members, or an incurable Disease: So, for the latter, that having lived to a very great Age, and without any the least of Sickness or Infirmity, it happened 
*‖ 
●b. p. 171. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   that going out of his School, he stumbled, and broke his Finger: Whereupon striking the Earth with his Hand, he used that out of Niobe, I come, why do you call me? and accordingly went and strangled himself; or, as Menagius observes out of Lucian, pined himself to death. But who, save a Stoic, could think so small a matter a just Ground of making away one's self? Or what may be looked upon as a disgust of the Divine Providence, if such a kind of departure is not? But with much more reason did Marcus Antoninus 
† 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, lib. 2 sect. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  (though a Stoic, and one who in several places 
* Lib. 3. sect. 1. lib. 5. sect. 29.  propugns the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) represent it as a part of Philosophy, to receive all Accidents whatsoever, as coming from him from whom we ourselves do; and Job interrogate his querulous Wife, Shall we receive good at the hand of God, and shall we not receive evil? chap. 10.20. For, beside the Ingratitude which the contrary Practice involves, it is a manifest reluctancy to the Dispensations of his Providence, to whose Will the Authority he hath over us, obligeth us to submit ourselves. What should I tell you of the many Precepts Christianity suggests concerning the bearing of Evils and Afflictions? For, as those Precepts are no less obliging to us, than the Laws of Reason and Nature; so they require us rather to maintain, than quit our Station; to bear up against Evils, than endeavour to withdraw ourselves from them. The same is to be said of Self-murther's opposition to the Divine Providence, if you consider it as to that distrust of it, which it involves. For, as it is apparent enough, that one great occasion of Self-murder is men's despair of a recovery from those Evils they labour under; so, by that despair of theirs, they manifestly call in question, if not the Justice, yet at least the Goodness of the Divine Providence. For, what cause can there be of despair, where that hath a place in our Belief? or what necessity of making an escape at that door 
* Arrian. in Epict. li. 1. c. 24. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  which Self-murder opens, and which the Stoics do so often point us to? Especially when, beside the Goodness of the Divine Nature, we have the assurance of his Promise, that he will make another way for us to escape. For thus, after St. Paul had told his Corinthians, that no temptation had taken them, but such as was common to man, he subjoins, in the very next Words, But God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above what ye are able, but will with the temptation also make a way to escape, that ye may be able to bear it, whether it be by lessening of that Burden under which you groan, or giving you proportionable Strength to bear it, 1 Cor. 10.13. And though, after I have thus shown the unlawfulness of Self-murder, no necessity lies upon me to consider of that Magnanimity which it is thought by some to involve; it being rather to be considered (as St. Augustine 
‖ De civet. Dei, l. 1. c 22.  insinuates) whether a thing be well done, than whether it be done magnanimously; with soundness of Wisdom, than with greatness of Spirit: Yet as many things appear otherwise than they will be found to be, if they be examined as they ought; so, as the same Father 
* 
Aug. loco citato. Quanquam si rationem diligentiùs consulas, nec ipsa quidem animi magnitudo reclè nominatur, ubi quisque non valendo tolerare vel quaeque aspera, vel aliena peccata, seipsum interemerit. Magis enim mens infirma deprehenditur, quae ferre non potest vel duram sui corporis servitutem, vel stultam vulgi opinionem. Majorque animus merito dicendus est, qui vitam aerumnosam magis potest ferre quàm fugere, & humanum judicium maximè vulgar, quod plerumque caligine erroris involvitur, praeconscientiae luce ac puritate contemnere.  
Rebus in angustis facile est contemnere vitam:  
Fortiter ille facit qui miser esse potest.  Martial. Epigr. l. 11. ep. 57  observes, if we look more narrowly into this, we shall find it rather to be poorness than greatness of Spirit, to lay violent Hands upon ourselves, to avoid the pressure of Afflictions, or other men's Offences: That Mind being to be looked upon as infirm, which cannot bear the hard Servitude of its Body, or the foolish Opinion of the Vulgar; as, on the contrary, that truly great, which can rather bear, than fly a miserable Life; and prefer the Light and Purity of its own Conscience, before the Opinion of the Common sort, which is, for the most part, clouded with Error. And though the Roman Stories are full of the Commendations of Cato and Lucretia, the former whereof killed himself, that he might not fall into Caesar's Power; the latter, that she might not be thought in the least to have approved of that Rape which was committed upon her: yet as there wanted 
† Aug. de Civit. Dei, lib. 1. cap. 23.  not those of Cato's own Friends, who dissuaded him from the Attempt, as a sign rather of a weak than a strong Mind; so he himself 
† Aug. de Civit. Dei, lib. 1. cap. 23.  gave sufficient Indications of it, by advising his Son to live, and to hope well of the Mercy of the Emperor. For if (as the same Father 
† Aug. de Civit. Dei, lib. 1. cap. 23.  observes) he had thought it any thing of turpitude to live under the Power of the Emperor, why did he not rather compel, or at least advise his Son to fall under the same Fate with himself? especially when, as Ludovicus Vives 
‖ Not. ad loc. praed.  observes, no Persuasions of Cato could make his Son leave him before his Death. The like Judgement is to be made (in the Opinion of the same Father 
* De Civit at. Dei, l. 1. c. 19 ) of that no less celebrated Fact of Lucretia; it being a weak bashfulness so to fear the ill Opinion of Men, as to run upon an evil Action to avoid it; especially when we have the Testimony of our own Conscience, and both the Inspection and Approbation of God, to support us.  
Of the Criminalness of Self-murder, what hath been said may suffice: Proceed we to inquire, whether all kill ourselves be such. Where, first of all, I shall make no scruple to grant, that all such kill of ourselves is so, where we have not a Call from God to it: Because (as was before said) we are his, and not our own; and therefore not to departed from those Stations wherein he hath placed us, without his leave. The only difficulty is, whether we can have any Call to it, beside what God's usual Messengers of Death give? which yet is not so much a Call, as a Compulsion, because forcing us from these our Earthly Tabernacles. For the solution whereof, not to bring again before you those Evils and Calamities which the Stoics made a just ground of a voluntary Departure, because Christianity and Nature both oblige us to the bearing of them; I will choose rather to inquire, whether there be any thing of truth in those other Grounds assigned by them, even the Profit of our Country or Friends 
* Vid. locum ante citatum ex Laertio de Dogmatibus Zenonis, etc. ; as also, in what they little dreamed of, the Instinct or Impulse of God's Spirit, and the asserting of his Glory. This only would be premised, because necessary so to be, inasmuch as all the Instances to be alleged do not reach the kill of ourselves in the strict and most obvious acception of the Words, that when we speak concerning the kill of ourselves, we mean not only that wherein we are the immediate Instruments of our own Execution, but where we expose ourselves also to such dangers, from which nothing, in all probability, but Death is to be expected. For though, in strictness of speaking, this is not to be accounted the kill of ourselves; yet it is interpretatively as much, because putting ourselves into such a Condition, from which in all probability it will ensue. Now that one or other of these ways, a Man may not only with the leave, but also with the approbation of God, procure his own death, will appear, if we resume the former Grounds, and, first of all, the Advantage of a Friend.  
It is a known Story, and by all that I know of, whether Christians or Heathens, remembered with applause, That there were two Pythagoreans of so fast a Friendship 
‖ Damonem & Pythiam Pythagoreos ferunt hoc animo inter se fuisse, ut cum eorum alteri Dionysius tyrannus diem necis destinavisset, & is, qui morti addictus esset paucos sibi dies commendandorum suorum causâ petivisset, vas factus sit alter ejus sistendi, ut si ille non revertisset ad diem, morierdum esset ipsi, etc. Cicero de office. 3.  that when one of them had by Dionysius the Tyrant been condemned to die, and begged only a few days respite to dispose of his Affairs, the other became Surety to the Tyrant for his Friend, so that, in case he should not return at the time appointed, he himself would die for him. What the Sequel of this Story is, I will not now tell you, because not pertinent to our purpose, though it was both to the one and the others glory: I demand only, whether he who thus offered himself to be the others Surety, did that which was lawful and commendable? If we say he did, we have what we desire, even an Instance wherein it may be lawful to make ourselves a Prey to Death, upon the account of Friendship. For, beside that the Person  did expressly stipulate to die for him, in case he did not return, which without doubt he ought not to have done, if it had not been lawful to lay down his Life for him; he exposed himself to such a hazard as was not common, and from which there was more probability of Death, than of the contrary: Because, what confidence soever he might repose in his Friend's Justice and Kindness, yet as it was not impossible some Accident might detain him beyond the time appointed, so there are few Friendships so sacred, as to oblige Men to prefer Death before it; St. Paul having told us, Rom. 5.7. that scarcely for a righteous man will any one die, and but peradventure, which must be also a great piece of Courage, for one who is also good and benign. Which Words, as they are a manifest confirmation of the danger that Person run, who made himself a Surety for a condemned Man; so seem to me to declare such an Act to be, in the Opinion of the Apostle, an Heroical one, and not only not deserve to be condemned, but to be applauded. For, however the Rarity of such a Love among Men might serve in some sort to commend the Love of Christ to us, who, as he had power to lay down his Life, as well as take it up again, so laid it down for those that were Enemies; yet would it have been some diminution to its Commendation, if it had not been lawful for one Man to lay down his Life for another; because it might have been objected, That the rarity of such an Accident proceeded not so much, or at least not altogether, from the impossibility of a Love strong enough to do it; but from the unlawfulness thereof. In the mean time, if the forementioned place will not be looked upon as conclusive, I see not in the least how that of St. John can be evaded, 1 Joh. 3.16. where he tells us, that as Christ laid down his life for us, so there may be Instances wherein it may be our Duty to lay down our lives for one another. For, though (as Grotius 
* Annot. in loc. & Joh. 10.11.  interprets it) nothing else should be there meant by laying down our lives for the brethren, than exposing ourselves to danger for them, (though, as he himself observes, our Saviour, who is proposed for our Example, must be confessed to have done more than so) yet even that would not prejudice the Conclusion I would commend, nor hinder it from being reputed a kind of destroying of ourselves: He being in truth a Felo de se, though no criminal one, who shall, for the sake of another, object himself to a Danger from which, in all probability, his Death may ensue. But let us instance, if you please, in a Case which is more clearly one of the Stoics 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and see whether it contains any thing dissonant either to Reason or Religion: As suppose, for example, that after a Shipwreck a Man light upon a piece of a Plank, which will suffice only for the Security of one Person; and suppose withal, that, seeing a dear Friend of his ready to perish, he should quit his Plank to him, and commit himself, being moreover unable to swim, to the mercy of the Sea: Will any Man now say, that such an Act is not properly enough a casting away of a Man's self; or condemn him that doth so, for it? nay, will he not rather look upon it as a noble Act of Virtue and Friendship; especially, if we also suppose the Friend for whom he does it, to be of more use to the Public than himself. For, though a Man may, and perhaps ought, caeteris paribus, to prefer himself before any other; yet nothing hinders him (as I have before shown) to prefer a Public Good before a Private, and therefore also, another Man's Welfare before his own, if that other be in a greater capacity to promote it. I will conclude this Particular with a Saying of Seneca 
‖ Succurram perituro, sed ut ipse non peream, nisi si futurus ero magni hominis aut inagnae rei merces. , as I find it cited by Grotius in his Notes upon the forequoted place to the Romans: I will (saith he) secure a perishing Man, but so, that I myself do not perish, unless I may thereby purchase the security of a Great Man, or a Great Thing. Then belike he thought, and so, I think, do all rational Men, that he might without any Crime, lay down his Life for them.  
From the Utility of a Friend, pass we to the Welfare of our Country, which, as it is a more Public Good, so may therefore (if necessity require) command the submitting our own to it, and even our own Life. Upon which account, I think, no Man can do other than commend (so far is it from being to be looked upon as a criminal slaying of one's self) if, as it sometimes happens in War, Men choose rather to blow up or sink themselves, and the Ship they go in, than suffer it to fall into the hand of the Enemy. For, where such a Loss may not more prejudice our Country, than disadvantage the Enemy, I see not where the evil of it consists; nay rather how it can be looked upon as other than a lawful, yea honourable departure out of this World; there being nothing too dear for any Man to part with for his Country, from which he had his Birth, and by which not only he himself hath been hitherto secured, but all his Relations both have and must be. And indeed, though all that go Volunteers into the Wars do not thus much, which may seem to make the Instance the less pertinent, yet as all Men that do, expose themselves to mortal danger, and consequently make a step towards a voluntary Death, or a kill of themselves; so those may well be said to come up to it, who, to recover a Battle almost lost, do, though few in number, rush in among the thickest of the Enemy. For, inasmuch as the foremost of them can expect no other than to perish, they must upon that account be looked upon as Felo's de se, or the Authors of their own death; there being no material difference, as to this Affair, between running upon a Mans own Sword, and running upon as mortal a one of an Enemy. For, if David were rightly accused by the Prophet, for the death of Vriah the Hittite, though he were slain by the sword of the children of Ammon, according as the Scripture 
* Thou hast killed V●iah the Hittite with the Sword— and hast slain him with the Sword of the children of Ammon, 2 Sam. 12.9.  itself expresses it, there is no doubt he may be as rightly said to be the Author of his own, who rushes upon the Swords of those, from whom he cannot rationally expect any other.  
The Grounds of the Stoics being thus explained, proceed we to those, which as we learn from far better Masters, so are more accommodable to the Facts of Christians; who, if they have at all exceeded as to a voluntary Death, may seem to have done it in the point of Martyrdom: For, not contented to suffer when seized upon by their Enemies, and even to provoke those Beasts, to which, according to the Custom of those days, they were cast; we find, that some 
‖ Pearson. Vindiciae Epistolar. S. Ignatii, Parte posterior. cap. 9 p. 111.  of the Primitive Martyrs, unasked, unsought after, offered themselves to it, with the general approbation of the Age they lived in; I will not say all altogether without fault, (it being hard in Heroical Actions to keep a Mean) but many of them certainly unblamably, and not only unblamably, but commendably. For, as Holy Men of God heretofore acted, as well as spoke, as they were moved by the Holy Ghost; so, no doubt can be made, but if that pushed any of them on to do aught toward the destruction of themselves, that was warrant enough to them for the doing of it. Upon which account, St. Augustine 
† Nec Samson aliter excusatur, quôd seipsum cum hostibus ruinâ domns oppressit; nisi quia spiritus latenter hoc jusserat, qui per illum miracula faciebat. De Civitare Dei, l. 1. c. 21.  anciently, and most other Writers after him, have justified the Act of Samson, in pulling down the House he was appointed to make sport in, upon the Head of himself and the Philistines; it being easy to believe, that was not without an intimation from God, which was accompanied with his miraculous Power in the accomplishing of it. And though, I know, there is not the same consent among Authors, for those men's acting by a Divine Impulse, who, among the Primitive Martyrs, rather sought than expected their Trial; yet am I not in the least discouraged thereby from alleging it in their defence, because there appear to me so just Grounds for the asserting of it. For, who can think they acted without a Divine Impulse, who, as they had nothing to blemish them in their Lives, so showed so much Christian Fortitude and Generosity in their Deaths? especially when it is certain, not only that the extraordinary Illuminations of the Spirit were not then ceased, but some of thee Martyrs themselves have alleged the immediate Call of that Spirit to them. For, thus Ignatius, than whom no Man seems to have been more desirous of Martyrdom, in his Epistle to the Romans 
* Vivens enim scribo vobis, desiderans mori. Meum desiderium crucifixum est, & non est in me ignis amans aliquam aquam: sed vivens & loquens est in me, intus me dicit, Veni ad Patrem. Vetus Versio Armachana. , tells us, that as his Love, even Christ, was crucified for him, so he was not without the like ardent Affections, both for him, and a conformity to his Death. Not that he run upon it of his own head, but that he was moved to it by God's Spirit, who living and speaking in him, said unto him, Come unto the Father. Though, setting that aside, I no way doubt, but many of the Martyrs might be justified in their Zeal, from the necessity there was sometimes of it, toward the asserting the Honour of God, and of their Religion. Witness the Behaviour of that Deacon 
‖ Vid. Euseb. li. de Martyribus Palaestinae, c. 2. cum notrs Valesii ad locum.  of Caesarea, Romanus by Name; who seeing many of Christ's Soldiers forsaking their Colours, and choosing rather to Sacrifice to the Heathen Gods, than to bear witness to their own; out of zeal to the Worship of the True God, and impatience of the Devil's Triumph, offered himself to the Judge, as a Soldier whom he should not so easily overcome. For, what louder or more importunate Call to a voluntary Death can we have, than when we do not only find in ourselves a readiness to undergo it, but may by it, as in the forementioned Case, not only vindicate the Honour of God, and of our Religion, from contempt, but make it conspicuous and illustrious? Especially when our Saviour, who, to be sure, laid down his Life voluntarily, is proposed to our example, and we called upon to take up his Cross, and follow him.   

PART IU.  
That there are other Sins included in this of Murder; together with an Account of what are so included: Whether they be such as are more near of kin to it, or are farther removed from it. Of the former sort are, the commanding or instigating Men to Murder, or assisting the Murderer in it; the using such Means as are likely enough to produce it, or entertaining any murderous Intention or Desire. Of the latter, the procuring of Abortions, even where the Child is not Quick; wounding or maiming; and, in fine, all Violences whatsoever, unless in the case of a Man's own necessary Defence. All Violences that are vindictive, perfectly unlawful, whether accomplished by our own Hands, or sought at those of the Magistrate. The Passion of Hatred considered, as to its lawfulness or unlawfulness; and shown to become unlawful only when it is placed upon a wrong Object; such as is that Hatred which hath Good Men for its Object, or Evil Men any otherwise than as they are such. The same Hatred considered with reference to this Commandment; where is shown, both its opposition to that Love which the Commandment enjoins, and its cognation to that Murder which it forbids. The like unlawfulness and murderous cognation evinced in the envying the Prosperity of another, in wishing ill to him, or rejoicing at it; in fine, in causeless and immoderate Anger, and contumelious or reproachful Speeches.  
II. THAT the kill of another is the thing expressly forbidden in this Commandment, you need not be told, because the place this Commandment hath in the Decalogue, sufficiently informs you; as neither, after my last Discourse, that the kill of ourselves hath a place in it indirectly and by consequence. It remains, that we inquire whether any other Sins are included in them, and what those Sins are.  
For the former of these, much need not be said, after what hath been alleged in the general, to show the Comprehensiveness of the Ten Commandments: Only, that it may more clearly appear, that this particular Prohibition includes others also, I will allege a Saying of our Saviour, and another of his Beloved Disciple St. John. From the former whereof we learn, that, however the Letter of the Prohibition, or at least 
* Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not kill, and whosoever shall kill, shall be in danger of the judgement.  the Notion of it in the Jews Courts of Judicature, extended only to the kill of a Man; yet in the Spirit and Evangelical Sense, it reached to the forbidding of Anger and Reproach, Mat. 5.21, 22. From the latter, that Hatred is not only included in it, but a part of it; and that he who harbours it in his Heart, is as truly a Murderer, as he who unjustly takes away a Man's Life, 1 Joh. 3.15. Taking it therefore for granted, that the Prohibition now before us includes that of other Sins, we will inquire, what those Sins are; and first of all (because that is principally intended in the Prohibition) what Sins are included in the Murder of another.  
1. And here, in the first place, I shall not doubt to reckon, as forbidden, the commanding or instigating other Men to do it: Because, as he who sets another upon the doing of any thing, is to be looked upon as the principal Cause of it; so, it is but reasonable to suppose, that he who forbids the doing of any thing toward the taking away a Man's Life, which hath only the nature of an Instrumental Cause, doth much more forbid the Efficacy of the Principal. Whence it is, that we do not only find David praying to be delivered from bloodguiltiness, though he only put another upon the setting Vriah so, that he might die by a third Person or Persons; but the Prophet Nathan, in the Name of God, charging him with the Murder, and affirming him to have slain Vriah with the sword of the children of Ammon, 2 Sam. 12.9.  
2. As little doubt is to be made, secondly, that it is alike unlawful by this Commandment to assist the Murderer, either by our Counsel or Actions; he who doth so, contributing in part to that which it forbids, and consequently so far chargeable with the violation of it.  
3. I observe, thirdly, That though Killing be the only thing expressly forbidden; yet inasmuch as he who forbids any Effect, is in reason to be supposed to forbid the Means whereby it is apt to be procured; he that makes use of destructive Means, whether they take effect or no, is chargeable with the violation of this Commandment. By which way of reasoning, he shall be concluded to be a Murderer in the sight of God, who should, after the corrupt Custom of the Heathen, expose a helpless Infant in a Desert place, where it may be in danger of perishing either by Wild Beasts or Famine.  
4. In fine, Forasmuch as the Consent of the Will is the principal thing in all Actions, and so estimated by God himself, both in the Old and New Testament; he is in reason to be looked upon as a Violator of this Commandment, who shall entertain any murderous Intention or Desire; after the same manner that he who only looketh upon a woman to lust after her, is affirmed by our Saviour to commit Adultery with her in his heart.  
Of such Sins as are more near of kin to that which is expressly forbidden, I have spoken hitherto, and shown them to be included in it: Proceed we to inquire the same of those which, though of the same cognation, yet are farther removed from it. Where,  
1. First of all, I shall reckon the procuring of Abortions: I do not mean, where the Child is perfectly formed, and quick, (for then, if Death follow to the Child, it is Murder properly so called) but before the Child is animated. Concerning which, before I deliver my own Opinion, give me leave to give you that of the Ancients, as it is set down by Tertullian. After the forbidding of Murder (saith he 
* Nobis vero homicidio semel interdicto, etiam conceptum utero, dum adhuc sanguis in hominem deliberatu, dissolvere non licet. Homicidii festinatio est, prohibere nasci, nec refert natam quis eripiat animam, an nasientem disturbet Homo est, & qui est futurus Etiam fructus omnis jam in semine est. Apolog. c. 9 ) it is not lawful to us Christians to dissolve that Offspring which is conceived in the Womb, even while Nature is only in consultation to make a Man of it. It is a committing of Murder beforehand, to hinder any thing from being born: neither matters it whether a Man take away a Soul that is already born, or disturb it in its Birth. He is a Man, which is in a disposition to be so; and the Fruit is already in the Seed which produceth it. Now though, to speak mine own Opinion freely, I cannot but look upon this of Tertullian as somewhat hyperbolically expressed; there being no place for Murder there, where there is not a Life to take away: yet, as what he saith, is proof enough of the Ancient Christians believing it to be included in this Prohibition, because here, and all along, pretending not so much to deliver his own Sense, as theirs; so the Reason by him insinuated, is a sufficient Argument, that they were not out in their Belief. For, though that be not a Man, which is only in a disposition to become so; yet it is the Rudiments of one, and consequently also of the Image of God: To which therefore, whilst Violence is offered, a Violence must be supposed to be so far offered to the Image of God, which is the Fundamental Reason of the Prohibition. Now, forasmuch as the Fundamental Reason of the Prohibition hath place in Abortions, as well as in perfect Murders; it is to be supposed, though not expressed, yet to be understood in it; especially being one of those Precepts which were intended as General Heads of Moral Duties. In like manner, because one great Reason of the Prohibition of Murder, is the great Injury it doth to Humane Society, by robbing it of one of its Members; it is but just to think it to have been the same God's intention to forbid those Abortions, by which Humane Society is, though in another way, deprived of those which should help to maintain and propagate it.  
2. But because, beside Murder, or what approacheth very near to it, there are other things pernicious to the Lives of Men, such as wounding, maiming, and the like, which are commonly reduced to this Commandment; therefore inquire we, in the second place, what ground there is to believe that these also are forbidden by it. In order whereunto, I shall allege, first, That those do oftentimes procure that very Murder which is here forbidden: In consideration whereof, as they are to be looked upon as no other than Murder, where they have that effect upon whom they fall; so, it is but reasonable to believe, that God, who professeth to hold Murder in such detestation himself, and forbids it so severely to others, intended the Prohibition of such Violences by which they do often ensue.  
2. And though the same cannot be said of all Violences that are offered, which will oblige us to look out for some other Reason of the Prohibition of them; yet inasmuch as all Violences whatsoever are contrary to that Love which I have before shown we ought to have for the Persons of Men, even by the force of this Commandment, it will follow, that those also are to be thought to be forbidden by it, and consequently, that it is our Duty to avoid them. Which Inference is to be looked upon as of so much the more force, because he who in this Commandment forbids only to kill, if we understand it strictly and literally, doth in the very next Chapter forbidden the doing of lesser Mischiefs, such as Burning, Wounding, Stripes, and Mutilating, and gives command, that they who are guilty of them, should suffer the like in their own Persons, Exod. 21.24. and so on.  
Now though what hath been said upon this Argument, may seem to suffice, because showing lesser Violences to be equally forbidden with Mortal ones; yet because, when we discoursed before concerning Killing, we excepted that from the number of forbidden ones, which is done in a Mans own necessary defence; therefore it may not be amiss to inquire, whether even in those lesser Violences some exception be not to be made in the like case,; and whether or no, because such Courses are commonly looked upon as lawful, it be lawful to retaliate those Injuries we have before received.  
Of the former of these much need not be said, I mean as to the Case of a Man's own necessary defence. For, as where such Violences are not resisted, a Man's Life may sometime come to be endangered by them; in which case no Man thinks it unlawful to resist: so more encouragement would thereby be given to violent Persons, than is consistent with the Peace and Advantage of Humane Society: Because, however the Law have provided Punishments against such Violences, yet they are long before they can be procured, and oftentimes are too weak to deter Men from the like Practices. This only would be added, That, when we affirm it to be lawful to use Violence to defend a Man's self from the Violences of others, we are necessarily to understand, where no more is used on our part than is necessary to defend ourselves; because by this Rule made only lawful in our own defence, and therefore not to proceed beyond what is necessary to it. For, as for that Exception which may be made from out Saviour's forbidding us to resist evil, it is nothing at all to the present purpose, because, as Grotius 
* Annot. in Mat. 5.39.  hath observed, the opposition being made between that, and Moses' his Assertion, of an Eye for an Eye, and a Tooth for a Tooth, we are necessarily to understand by the not resisting of Evil, the not returning of Evil by way of Punishment, because that of Moses was manifestly such.  
The Case of a Man's own necessary Defence being thus dispatched, proceed we to inquire, whether it be lawful to retaliate by way of Punishment, and return those Evils we have received. Concerning which, I say, first, That no question can be made of the unlawfulness of retaliating with our own hands; partly, because Vengeance is by God claimed to himself, and to the Magistrate; and partly, because a private retaliating was not permitted even to the Jews; the Law of an Eye for an Eye, and a Tooth for a Tooth, being left to the Execution of the Judges, upon complaint made to them thereof, as you may see Exod. 21.22. and so on, and Deut. 19.16. and the following Verses. The only thing of difficulty is, whether a Man may seek a retaliation from the Magistrate; because our Saviour opposes his Doctrine to that of the Law, which gave such a permission to the injured Party. And indeed, if we speak of a Retaliation properly so called, that is to say, of seeking the avenging of ourselves of the injurious Party, by procuring to him the like Evils he hath inflicted; so, no doubt can remain, but that it is absolutely unlawful to a Christian; and that not only because of the former Prohibition of our Saviour, but because the Scripture hath forbid us the returning Evil for Evil, and enjoined us to be patiented under it, and ready to forgive; which that Man can in no sense be said to do, who shall seek to avenge himself, either by himself, or the Magistrate. The only thing that can be lawful to a Christian in this Affair, is, 1. To seek a Reparation of the Damage he hath sustained; which yet must be in greater Instances, and such as cannot well be born: of which nature are those Injuries which either disable the Body, or bring any considerable Pain to it. For, what place can there be for Patience, where they who suffer Violence will have Satisfaction made them for every the least that is offered? or how can he be said to endure an Injury or Affront, who will not be content unless he have amends made him for every one? But because it may sometime happen, that the Violence which is offered may be such as may, to deter others from the like, require the delating it to the Magistrate, and imploring the drawing of the Sword of Justice against the Offender; therefore it must be added farther, That where the Case is such, it is not only lawful, but necessary for the injured Party to do it; provided, that Zeal of Justice and the Public Weal be the thing that prompts him to it, and not either in whole or in part the gratifying of his own Revenge; that being, in the highest sense, rendering evil for evil, because not only returning Mischief for Mischief, but with the same malicious purpose and intent: Which, as Seneca 
* Immane verbum est ultio, & ab injuria distans tantum ordine Qui ulciscitur, non nisi excusatius peccat.  well observes, differs only from an Injury in the order of its commission; and is only a more excusable Sin, because provoked by, and following after the other.  
To go on now to show what other Sins are included in that of Murder, beside those before rehearsed: Where,  
1. First, I shall present you with that of Hatred, because it is the Parent of all that follow. Now there are two things which will be necessary to be enquired into, for the better explication of this Passion.  

1. What Hatred is to be looked upon as sinful; and,  
2. How that which is such, is redneible to this Commandment.   
That it is not unlawful simply to hate, is evident from hence, that it is a Natural Passion of the Soul: it is no less evident, because evil is the proper Object of it, that when it is employed about that, it is not only not unlawful, but just and commendable. To make it therefore at any time a Sin, it must be employed about a wrong Object; which how it may be, as to the present Affair, I come now to show. And here, in the first place, I think no Man will make any difficulty to grant, that it must necessarily be sinful to hate a Good Man, as such: because, as Evil, and not Good, is the proper Object of Hatred; so, much less that which is Good, as such. Now, that such a Hatred as this hath found place in the World, is evident from that of Wisdom, chap. 2. 12. and so on; where he doth not only represent it as the general Character of Evil Men, to hate and persecute those which are better than themselves; but fortifies that his Opinion with such a Reason, as puts it past all contradiction. For, it being usual with Men to hate those which are not only of a contrary temper, but do, by that temper of theirs, make the others to be the worse thought of; it is easy to suppose, that Evil Men will hate Good, because (as the Wise Man there speaks) they are not only contrary to Evil Men's do, but tacitly upbraid 
† Sulpitius Severus Sacrae Hist. li. 2. p. 368. Hic primus [nempe Nero] Christianum nomen tollere aggressus est. Quip semper inimica virtutibus vitia sunt, & optimi quique ab improbis quasi exprobrantes aspiciuntur.  them with their Impieties and Transgressions; that Virtue by which they shine, at the same time it shows forth its own Worth, discovering the Deformity of the other. From that first sort of Hatred, pass we to another, which hath the Good Man also for its Object: I do not say simply for his Goodness, and that Reproach which it naturally casts upon the contrary Temper; but because, as the same Wise Man speaks, he expressly objecteth, to their infamy, the transgressions of their Education, and chargeth them with those Impieties they are guilty of. Now, that even this Hatred is not without a Crime, is evident from hence, that as he who tells them of their Faults, doth it out of kindness; so that very Act of theirs is the greatest Kindness in the World: because, by such an Act they may not only come to know their own Errors, but be thereby provoked to discard them. And indeed, so far is it from an Unkindness, however commonly so interpreted, to reprove Men for their Errors and Extravagances, that God himself reckons the neglect of it as a sign of Hatred, as you may see Levit. 19.17. Forasmuch therefore as to rebuke is not only not evil, but the greatest kindness a Man can do to a wicked Person; it must needs be looked upon as a Sin, to make it the ground of our Hatred: which was the second thing to be demonstrated. Next to the Hatred of Good Men, consider we that of the Evil and Injurious, which may seem to have nothing Criminal in it: And indeed, neither would it, if it had only their Injuriousness for its Object, or the Persons of wicked Men merely for it; because every thing that is evil, either in itself, or to us, is a just ground of hatred and aversation. But, as it would be considered, that he who hates a Person for his Injuriousness, can be privileged no farther by that hate, than to discountenance him in it; so also, that there may be more in him to excite our Love, than there is to stir our Hatred: in which case, there is no doubt, but that our Hatred is to be bounded by it, and go no farther than is consistent with the other. Now, that this is the Case of all evil and injurious Men, will appear, if we consider, that they are God's Creatures, and adorned with his Image; that they are the Subjects of his Providence, yea, for whom he sent his Son to die. For, having all these Relations to God, who is the Supremest Good, both in himself, and to us, they must needs be looked upon as a juster Object of our Love, than all their Evil and Injuriousness can be a ground of Hate. Though therefore Evil Men, as such, may and aught to be hated; though, so far as we can separate their Injuriousness from their more lovely Qualities, they may lawfully enough become the ground of our aversation: yet inasmuch as they have more to commend them to our Love than Hatred, as we cannot hate them altogether, so neither any farther than is consistent with those things which are the just Object of our Love. The result of which Consideration will be, that though we may hate them as Sinners, yet we may not hate them as Men, but, on the contrary, love, and pray for their conversion, and prosperity in all their lawful Undertake.  
What Hatred is to be looked upon as sinful, we have seen already; inquire we in the next place, how that which is so, is reducible to this Commandment. A Task which will not be difficult to perform, if we consider this Sin of Hatred either with relation to that Love which the Commandment enjoins, or to that Sin of Murder which it forbids. For, if (as we learn from the Apostle) this, and other the Commandments that follow, enjoin the loving of our Neighbour; they must consequently be supposed to forbid the hatred of him, as being contrary to, and inconsistent with it. And though it be true, that Hatred is not Murder, or other the like Injuriousness, if we mean thereby those of the Hand; yet it is either the murder and injuriousness of the Heart (which I have shown to be equally forbidden) or at least the Producer of it: he who hates any Person in the least, naturally wishing some ill or other to him; but he who perfectly hates him, Death: According to that Saying of Ennius, remembered by Tully 
† Tull. de office li 2. Pra. clarè Ennius, Quem metuunt oderunt, quem quisque odit periisse expetit. , Quem quisque odit periisse expetit; He who hates any Person, desires his destruction. To all which, if we add, That St. John, in the place before-quoted, affirms the hater of his Brother to be a Murderer, and that 
* Deut. 19.4. etc.  God absolved that Manslayer from the guilt of it, who hated him not in time past; so, no doubt can remain, but that the same Commandment which forbids the murdering of a Man, forbids also the hating of him: That being in reason to be thought to be forbidden, to which the Scripture doth not only give the Title of Murder, but absolves even that Manslayer in whom it should be found not to be.  
2. That great Crime of Hatred being thus dispatched, proceed we to that of Envy; which is, in short, nothing else than a Grief of Mind for that Good which happens to another. I do not mean, as that Good may become the Instrument of much Mischief, by the Possessors abuse; for in that case a good Man may be grieved: but because he whom we envy is like to be advantaged by it. Now, that this, no less than the former, hath the nature of a Sin, and particularly against the present Prohibition, will require no great pains to prove. For, beside that such a Grief, Spider-like, sucks its Poison from the choicest Flower, because, contrary to Nature, making that which is the proper Object of Joy, the matter of its own Sadness and Discontent; beside that it is a manifest reluctancy to the Dispensations of the Divine Providence, from whence, as all other Good proceeds, so that particular one which we so much envy; beside, lastly, that it is a natural effect of Hatred, and consequently to be supposed to be forbidden with that Hatred from which it ariseth; it is oftentimes the cause of Murder, and other injurious Actions; but, to be sure, doth always dispose Men to it; The first Murder that was ever committed, proceeding from hence, that the Sacrifice of the murdered Person was more accepted by God, than that of the Murderer was.  
3. The same is to be said of wishing any Evil, and particularly Death, to any Person, or of rejoicing in it when it doth befall him; of being angry with our Brother without a cause, or above measure; of proceeding to contumelious or reproachful Speeches to or of him: these, as they are but the fruits of Hatred, so disposing Men to Murder, and consequently to be supposed to be forbidden with it: He that forbids any Action, or at least with any severity, being in reason to be thought to forbid that which disposeth Men to it; because, where that is not carefully avoided, it will be hard to avoid the other. Only because Anger, and that reproachful Speaking which proceeds from it, is by our Saviour himself particularly referred to this Commandment, I think it but a just respect to him, and to his Authority, to allot them a more distinct Consideration. But of that, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in my next.   

PART V.  
Anger reduced by our Saviour to the Commandment we are now upon; and therefore the Consideration thereof resumed anew: Where is shown, first, what Anger is, and that it is not absolutely sinful; as is made appear from its being a natural Passion, from St. Paul's admonishing to be angry and sin not, from our Saviour's giving entertainment to it, and the unavoidableness thereof. The Objections that are made against this Determination, proposed, and answered. An Inquiry what Anger is to be looked upon as sinful; where is shown, first, That no other Anger is, than what is avoidable by Deliberation; where the motus primo-primi of that Passion are absolved. An Address to a more particular discovery of sinful Anger, which becomes such, 1. When it is rash and precipitate, the inordinacy whereof is at large declared. 2. When it is causeless, or at least without a sufficient one; such as are those which arise from things done casually, or inadvertently; from Provocations that bring with them no considerable Detriment, or greater ones, provided they be not many, from a Friend. 3. When our Anger exceeds the measure due to it: Of which sort are those which exceed the Merit of the Cause, which transport Men beyond the Bounds of Sobriety and Prudence, or continue longer than they ought; as they do, when they continue after Satisfaction offered, after the Punishment of the offending Person, or when they continue in their Heats to the usual times of Prayer and Meditation. The Remedies of this disorderly Passion pointed at.  
YE have heard (saith our Saviour) that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not kill; and whosoever shall kill, shall be in danger of the judgement. But I say unto you, That whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause, shall be in danger of the judgement; and whosoever shall say unto his brother, Racha, shall be in danger of the Council; but whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hellfire, Mat. 5.21, 22. It seems, that however in the forinsick sense this Commandment extended no farther than Killing, yet Anger and Reproachful speaking had a place in it, as it was intended for a Rule of Piety and Manners, or at least was so reckoned by our Saviour: And not without cause, if we consider the Nature either of the one or the other, and the occasion which they minister to that Murder which is here forbidden; Anger naturally inclining the Person in whom it is, to malicious, and sometimes murderous Purposes; as Reproachful speaking, those who are the Objects of it, both to take them up, and prosecute them against the Reviler. Fro whence, as it will follow, that both the one and the other have too much affinity with Murder, to suffer us to doubt of their being forbidden by this Commandment; so, that being supposed, I will go on to inquire into the Nature of them, and show wherein the Criminalness thereof consisteth.  
I begin with Anger, because our Saviour doth so, and because it is the Fountain from which those bitter Streams of reproachful Words issue. Where, 

1. First of all, I shall inquire, what Anger is.  
2. Whether all Anger be to be looked upon as sinful: Or,  
3. If not, what Anger is to be accounted such. And,  
4. And lastly, What are the most proper Remedies thereof.    
1. Of the first of these much need not be said, because Men are pretty well agreed concerning the Nature of it; Anger being nothing else than a mixture of Hatred 
* Arist. Rhet. li. 2. c 1. in initio. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Idem fere apud Cartesium de Passionibus, parte 3 art 199. nisi quod (ut nos) definiat esse speciem odii aut aversionis, quam habemus erga eos qui aliquid malum fecerunt, etc.  and Grief, arising from an Opinion of some injury done to us, or to those in whom we have an interest, and accompanied with a desire of revenge. This only would be added, That though any sort of Injury may serve to excite that Passion, yet it ariseth mostly from Contempt, as which of all others we are least able to bear, and most desirous to revenge.  
2. The Nature of Anger being thus unfolded, proceed we to inquire, whether all Anger is to be looked upon as sinful. A Question which, among Christians, might perhaps be looked upon as needless, were it not, 1. That however we read in the forequoted place, whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause, others anciently read it without any such limitation: And, 2. Because of that desire of Revenge which we have affirmed all Anger to involve. For, who otherwise could lightly condemn that Passion altogether, which is not only a Natural Affection of the Mind, but supposed by St. Paul to be lawful, even where he cautions Men against the excess of it? He who bids us be angry and sin not, supposing it to be lawful in itself, because otherwise we could not be angry without offending. To all which, if we add the Example of our Saviour, so the simple condemnation of Anger will appear yet more unreasonable. For, as it is certain from the Scripture, not only that he did no Sin, but that he was in himself of a most sedate temper; so, it is no less certain from thence, that notwithstanding that, he was sometime provoked to Anger, and that Spirit of his ruffled by it, which was generally smooth as the face of the Deep, when there is not the least breath of Wind to discompose it: St. Mark telling us of him, chap. 3. 5. that he looked upon the Pharisees with grief and anger, when he considered the hardness of their hearts. But his Passion swelled much higher, when he found Men buying and selling in the Temple, and converting a Church into a Den of Thiefs: For then, like the troubled Sea, it overflowed its Banks, and overwhelmed those Persons that had disturbed it; that Zeal or Fiery Indignation wherewith he was then possessed, prompting him to overthrow the Tables of the Money-changers, and scourge both them and others out of it, Joh. 2.13. and so on. And indeed, when the Love of any thing hath taken possession of the Soul, and insinuated itself into its Temper, it can no more brook any the least Affront that is offered it, than the Eye, which is the tenderest part of the Body, can the piercing of a Needle, or of a Thorn. Forasmuch therefore as there is so much evidence, both from Scripture and Reason, concerning the lawfulness of Anger in itself; nothing could be pretended for the simple condemnation of it, or indeed so much as for the making a question of its lawfulness, if it were not for the Exceptions before-remembred. Which, though they are not so slight as to be despised, yet neither so strong as to overthrow the contrary Evidences; as will appear upon a Survey of them. For, be it, first, that the Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or without cause, were wanting heretofore 
* Vid. Drusium in locum.  in several Greek Copies, as we learn both from St. Jerome and St. Augustine; be it, that it is not to be found in a Greek Copy in the Vatican Library, as Lucas Brugensis 
‖ Notae ad varias Lectiones edit. Graec. novi Yeast.  informs us; nor yet in the 
† Vid. Biblia Polyglotta.  Arabic and  Versions: nay, be it (which is more than either is, or can with Justice be affirmed by any) that it were not even now to be found in any one Greek Copy: yet even so it could not be reasonably concluded, that all Anger is forbidden by our Saviour; because, as there are few indefinite Propositions which do not admit of an Exception, so Anger is only forbidden in this place, as a step towards, or disposition to that Killing which is forbidden by this Commandment: Which (as was before-shewn) being not all Killing whatsoever, neither can all Anger be looked upon as unlawful, but only that which is a disposition to that Killing which is forbidden by it. And though I think it becomes not me to call in question the Sincerity or Diligence of the Parties , who have given so clear a Testimony concerning the Ancient Readins; yet as I cannot forbear to say, that all 
* Vid. Luc. Brug. Notas ad varias Lect. edit. Graec. Novi Test.  our present Greek Copies have it, except that beforementioned, as also the 
‖ Vid. Bibl. Polygl.  Persian and Syriack Versions, the latter whereof thought the Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so proper and significant, that it chose rather to retain than interpret it; so neither to add, that that, and other the Arguments alleged by Grotius 
† Annot. in loc. , are much to be preferred before the other. For, as it is not lightly to be thought, that the Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 should be so generally received, if they had not found upon examination that it ought to have a place in the Greek Copies; so both they and we have the more reason to suppose it to be the true Reading, because (as the same Grotius hath observed) the Greek Interpreters, who were most likely to know the true Greek Reading, generally read it so themselves; as also Irenaeus 
* Adu. Haer. li. 2. c. 56. Et non solum qui occidit, reus erit occisionis ad damnationem, sed & qui irascitur sine causâ fratri suo. Li. 4. c. 31. Et qui irascitur fratri suo sine causâ, reus erit judicio. , in two places of his Book Adversus Hereses, and Justin Martyr 
‖ Just. in dict. epist. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  in his Epistle to Zenas and Serenus, as I myself have found upon examination, and as the Words themselves by me alleged show. If there lie any just Exception against the lawfulness of Anger in itself, it must be from that desire of Revenge which we have said it to involve, and which therefore I will in the next place consider.  
Now though it be not to be denied, that the desire of Revenge is generally unlawful to a Christian; yet may it be so circumstantiated, as to have nothing of Criminalness in it, yea moreover, to be good and commendable: as for example, when we are angry to see God dishonoured, or any of his Commandments trangressed; he who desires the punishment of these, and in his Station endeavours it also, where there is no hopes of amendment, doing no more than what the Love of God will naturally prompt him to. For, how can we love God with that ardency which becomes us, and not desire the punishment of those by whom he is slighted and contemned? And though, especially since Christianity came in place, we cannot so safely desire the punishment of those who have been injurious to ourselves; yet as nothing forbids us to desire that also, where Zeal of Justice prompts us to it, so neither in respect of ourselves, where we seek no more by their Punishment, than the redressing of our own Wrongs: it being not simply evil to desire the Punishment of Offenders, but to desire it with a mischievous intent, that is to say, for the afflicting of our Brother; or to desire the inflicting of it otherwise than God and Reason do allow: Which is for the most part when we desire the inflicting of it with our own Hands; because, as the Scripture hath told us, God hath challenged the Execution of it to himself, and to those who have his Authority in the World. If (as I for my own part neither can nor will deny) few angry Persons keep within these bounds; for which cause, of all the Passions of the Soul, I think it ought the least to be indulged: yet I no way doubt, a good and virtuous Man may so restrain his Anger, as not to desire the Punishment of the injurious Party, any farther than the Glory of God doth require, or the Reparation of his own Losses Witness such Persons easy admittance of a Satisfaction, and sometimes of a mere Verbal Acknowledgement; whereas, on the other side, evil Men will not be appeased, unless they see the injurious Person suffer as much, or more than they themselves have, yea, though there doth not thereby accrue to them any Reparation of their own Losses. Now, forasmuch as Anger, generally speaking, hath not only the Verdict of Reason and Scripture to evince it to be lawful, but is fairly defensible from those Exceptions which are made against it; I think it but just to suppose, that all Anger is not sinful: and, upon that account, go on to inquire,  
3. What Anger is to be accounted such, the third thing proposed to be enquired into. For the resolution whereof, we must distinguish between such Motions of it as the Philosophers call motus primo-primi, or the first stir of Anger, and the more deliberate efforts of it. If the Question be concerning the first stir of Anger, which the same Philophers compare to the twinkling of the Eyes, upon any sudden Violence that approacheth them; so, no doubt can remain, but that they are generally lawful, because no less necessary than that twinkling of the Eyes before spoken of, and antecedent to any free Consent of the Will: It being difficult 
* Hieron. ep. ad Demetriadem. Difficile quin potius impossibile perturbationum initiis carere quempiam, quas significantiùs Graeci 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vocant. Vid. Grot. in Mat. 5.22. , or rather impossible, to be without those beginnings of perturbation which the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, when any thing is offered to excite them. Only, as Custom, which is a second Nature, and Grace, which is above it, may contribute not a little to the repressing of them; so, if we do not make use of the one, and implore the other, in order to the restraining of them, they will be so far looked upon as voluntary, and therefore also as sinful, if they pass the bounds of Reason. But then, if the Question be concerning those efforts of Anger which precede not the free Consent of the Will, but, on the contrary, are subject to its control; these, as they are not purely natural, so they may be either lawful, or unlawful, according as they shall be found to be circumstantiated. Forasmuch therefore as these are capable of being vicious, we will now inquire when they do become so: Which is,  
1. When they are rash and precipitate. For, beside that that Anger which is so, is a direct contradiction to the Scripture, which commands in one place 
† Jam 1.19.  to be slow to wrath, and in another 
‖ Eccl. 7.9. , not to be hasty in our spirit, it lays us open, as Aristotle 
* Nicomach. l. 4. c. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  observes, to the commission mission of all those irregularities whereof the Anger of Man is capable. For, Anger naturally hurrying Men to the prosecution of all those things which are grateful to its own Vindictive Humour, what should hinder it, where it stays not to deliberate, from venting its own Inordinacies, as well against whom, and for what, and after what measure it doth not become it to be severe, as where there is a just ground for it in all? Neither is the Voice of Experience any whit different in this Affair from the Voice of Reason and Discourse: For, who ever yet saw a hasty Person observe a Mean in any thing, so long as his Passion continued? If we inquire concerning those who are to be the Objects of our Anger, these make all Persons such, yea even bruit Beasts, nay, inanimate Creatures: if concerning the Grounds of it, they are angry for any thing, for nothing, for but coming in their way, or speaking to them, though upon never so just and necessary an occasion: lastly, if of the Measure, they are angry beyond Reason, and against it, they commit all the Indecencies which it is possible for any rational Man to be guilty of, they fall into absurd, reproachful, and sometimes blasphemous Speeches. If there be any thing good in a hasty Spirit, it is, as the same Aristotle 
* Arist. ubi supra 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  observes, that as as their Fury is very extravagant whilst it lasts, so it is not of any long continuance: Which yet (as he 
* Arist. ubi supra 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  there goes on) is not so great a commendation of it, as is commonly both thought and represented; it being not much to be wondered, that their Passion should not be of long continuance, who retain not their Wrath at all, but do immediately wreck its Fury upon their Opposites.  
2. Next to the precipitateness of Anger, subjoin we the causelesness thereof, as in which our Blessed Saviour particularly placeth its Inordinacy: by which I do not mean its being without any cause at all (for who is there that is so provoked?) but the being angry vainly and foolishly, as Hesychius 
‖ Hesych. Lex. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc.  interprets the Word, and without any rational ground for such a Resentment; as if a Man should be angry because another treads upon his Shadow, or it may be throws Straws in his way; things which a wise Man would either take no notice of, or pass by with contempt and pity. But such, though not of the same trifling nature, is that Anger which is stirred by a great but casual Mischief, or by Words that proceeded from the mere inadvertency of the Speaker; by men's differing from us in Opinion in matters of no great weight, or expressing their Conceits after another manner: these things having nothing of real evil in themselves, and much less of injuriousness to us. Of the same nature is, secondly, that Anger which ariseth from slight provocations, such I mean as bring no considerable detriment either to our Persons, or Reputations, or Fortunes; from an unkind word let fall in the heat of Discourse; or, in fine, from any thing else that is a common Infirmity of Humane Nature. Not but that these things are evil in themselves, and to us; but that they are in a manner unavoidable, and such as we ourselves are sometime or other guilty of. The former whereof, as it leaves no place for Anger, which supposeth, that that which stirred it, might have been avoided by the injurious Person; so the latter carries its own Excuse in it, and such as will either exempt the injurious Person from blame, or reflect it upon the angry one. For, if the Error by which we are stirred, be a common Frailty, it ought in reason to have a common and uniform reception, and we must either be contented to be condemned 
* Justin. Martyr. in ep. ad Zenam & Serenum.— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  ourselves, which we shall hardly think reasonable, considering the infirmity of our own Nature; or acquit those that are but alike guilty. Add hereunto, thirdly, (because though just enough in itself, yet is not so, if we consider the Person by whom it is stirred) that Anger which ariseth from some one or two greater provocations of a Friend, or of one by whom we have been much more obliged. For, as Friendship and Beneficence are things of so great worth, that whosoever is sensible of them, must think much aught to be pardoned to it; so especially when the Errors are not many, and have been much outdone by the Kindnesses we have received. For though the Injury, as such, may be apt to stir us; yet surely not when there is so much more to restrain us, and for one real Unkindness, we have received many signal Favours. From whence, as it will appear, that it was not without great reason that Aristotle makes the Persons with whom we are angry to be a necessary part of our consideration; so, that it ought to be a very great provocation, which can licence a deliberate Anger against a kind and indulgent Parent, a gracious Prince, or one who hath been the Author of our Fortunes.  
3. We are now arrived at the last Vice of Anger, which is when it exceeds the measure due to it: For the understanding whereof, we are to consider it, 

1. With relation to the Cause.  
2. To the Rules of Sobriety and Prudence: And,  
3. Lastly, To the Continuance: Because in each of these our Anger may exceed, and so pass into unlawful and disorderly.    
I begin with the first of these, because nearest of kin to the foregoing Vice, and because we shall need no other Argument to evince our Anger to be unlawful, when it exceeds the merit of the Cause. For, if we may not be angry without a cause, neither may we be angry beyond it; all Anger being so far causeless,, as it exceeds the Provocation which occasioned it. The only difficulty will be to know when our Anger doth so exceed; which must be left to every Man to determine. This only may be said in the general, That as a lesser Provocation must have a lesser Anger, and a greater Provocation a greater; so, whether the Provocation be greater or lesser, will best be estimated by the consideration of the Circumstances of the Time when it is given, of the Persons by whom, the Place where, and the Mischiefs that accrue to us by it. But other determination than that, as it will be impossible to give, amidst the variety of Circumstances wherewith a Provocation may be attended; so I will not add any thing more, save that Prudence, as well as Equity, will advise, rather to go less in our Anger, than more, and to proportion it not so much by the Dictates of our own distempered Breasts, which are for the most part very unfaithful Counsellors, as by the Advice of disinteressed Persons, and the Examples of good and prudent Men.  
From that Anger which exceeds the Merits of the Cause, pass we to that which transports us beyond the bounds of Sobriety and Prudence, and makes us absurd in our Behaviour. Of which nature are all those actions which are before observed in hasty men, but are common to other angry persons with them; such as are the being angry with any man whatsoever that comes in our way, yea, even with Inanimate Creatures themselves. Which, if not sins in themselves, yet are infallible indications of one, inasmuch as they declare the mind within to be more than ordinarily distempered, and to have passed those bounds which God and Nature have set it. So true is that which the Heathen Poet hath taught us, that Anger is a short madness. Herein only they differ, that Madness is oftentimes innocent, but both of them offer violence to our Reason.  
One only excess of anger remains, by which we have said our anger to become vicious, and that is, when it continues longer upon us than it ought. Which is first, when it continues with us after a satisfaction is offered, or, where that cannot be made, an humble and hearty acknowledgement is: The former in its own nature, taking away the cause of our anger, the latter, by virtue of the precepts of Christianity, which enjoins upon us the forgiving of injuries, if they, who have committed them, return and repent. The same is to be said of that anger which continues, even after it hath procured the due punishment of the injurious Person; such an anger being unjust, because importing a desire of a farther revenge, than is due to the measure of the offence. And though I am of opinion that Grotius spoke not amiss, when he interpreted that of the Apostle, Eph. 4.26. Let not the Sun go down upon your wrath, by, let it not be protracted longer than its due time, supposing the Apostle to allude to that of Deut. 24.15. where command is given by God, not to let the Sun go down upon the Hirelings wages, meaning thereby (as the foregoing words persuade) that it should be given him at his day, and when it was due, lest for the want of it he cry unto the Lord against his Master: Yet when I consider with myself, that the former part of those words, Be ye angry and sin not, is taken out of the 4th. Verse of the 4th. Psalms, according to the Septuagint version, the latter part whereof adviseth that men should commune with their own hearts upon their bed and be still, I cannot but conclude with a Learned Gentleman 
* D. Norton Knatchbul in loc. Animadvers. in libros Novi Testamenti.  of our own Nation, that more than that is intended in it, even, that the heat of our fury should pass over before the Eventide, because that is a time of Prayer and Meditation which require a sedate and well composed Soul, as also that we should be by that time in a disposition to forgive, because, in those and all our other prayers, taught to beg forgiveness of God upon no other terms, than the forgiving of our Brethren.  
4. The order of my Discourse now leads me to inquire into the remedies of this disorderly passion; which are 

1. As much as may be to forbid entrance, especially in our own Concernments. For though anger be not in itself sinful, yet it aproacheth so very near to it, and is so hardly to be kept from it, that it were much better for the most part not to be at all, than to venture those evils to which it exposeth us. Now this we may in some measure procure by reflecting upon the evils which usually follow where it is admitted; but more especially by preventing that which may prove an incentive to it. After the same manner that we find Pomponius to have done, who having intercepted the letters of Sertorius, wherein he knew were the names of his chiefest enemies, threw them into the fire, and would not read them, lest he should meet with somewhat in them that might stir his indignation; Or he in Plutarch, who, having several curious Glasses sent him, threw them presently against the ground, lest (as he answered one who enquired the reason of it) he should be afterwards angry with his Servants who sometime or other would have done the same.  
2. But because, as was before said, it is both lawful to be angry, and sometimes impossible not to be so, I shall choose rather to advise the moderation of it by all those ways which Reason or Religion can suggest; Such as are the representing to ourselves how ill immoderate anger becomes others, and into what indecencies it doth ordinarily betray them; the weaning of ourselves from the love of earthly things, from which, as all other Wars, so this of anger doth proceed; the entertaining (as becomes us) a modest opinion of ourselves, because anger doth mostly arise from an overweening conceit of our own excellencies. In fine, the reflecting upon our own errors, which are oftentimes not inferior to theirs with whom we are displeased, and the both great need we have of the pardon of the Almighty for them▪ and the impossibility of attaining it, without affording the like to others. For certainly that man must be more displeased with himself than others, if he can be immoderately angry, when it is so much more to his own prejudice.     

PART VI.  
Of reproachful Speeches, where is shown from the Example of our Saviour and his Apostles, that all reproachful Speeches are not unlawful, as, from our Saviour's annexing the Prohibition of them to that of Anger, that such only are so as arise from the Anger by him condemned. The ground of their Prohibition here; their taking away that which is the life of Life itself, even men's good Name, and not seldom tending towards, if not actually procuring the destruction of the other. The murder of the Soul to be reckoned to the present Prohibition, as both properly enough such, and more pernicious than the other. This effected by tempting men to destructive courses, by giving then an ill Example, by Scandal, or forbearing of Reproofs. An address to the declaring of what sins are included in Self-murder, which are, The neglect of our health, The exposing ourselves to unnecessary dangers, Intemperances' and Debauches, Eating or Drinking such things as are prejudicial to our health, Taking immoderate Cares, or using immoderate Labours or Studies; In fine, the neglect of such Remedies as Nature or Art have taught men for the removal of their Distempers. The conclusion of the whole with the criminalness of Murder, in order whereunto is alleged Gods requiring the life of Man, even of Beasts, and the Athenians sitting in judgement upon that wall which should happen to be the destruction of it.  
HAVING entreated at large in my last of the passion of Anger, and both shown it to have a place in the present prohibition, and discovered its Malady and its Cure; it remains that we address ourselves to the consideration of reproachful language, as being alike reckoned by our Saviour to it. For my more orderly explication whereof, I will inquire, 

1. Whether all reproachful speaking be to be looked upon as forbidden by him, or  
2. If not, what reproachful speaking is, and  
3. Lastly, How that which is forbidden by him, becomes a violation of this Commandment.    
1. That all reproachful Speeches are not to be looked upon as forbidden by our Saviour, the frequent use of those compellations in Scripture which he expressly prescribes, may serve for an abundant evidence. For did not our Saviour himself, than whom no man ever spoke, either more calmly, or more considerately, did not he (I say) bestow the titles of Fools and blind upon those who accounted it something to swear by the gold of the Temple, but not so by the Temple that sanctified it? Mat. 23.17. As in like manner upon those who thought it of force to swear by the Gift, but of none at all by the Altar that sanctified it, vers. 19 of the same. Nay did he not even after his Resurrection, and when he may be supposed to have put off so much as their innocent infirmities, call his Disciples themselves fools, for not believing what the Prophets had spoken Luke? 24.15. But it will be said it may be, that our Saviour was an extraordinary person, and so not obnoxious himself to those Rules which he prescribed to others. Yet certainly the like cannot be said for his Disciples, and much less for those upon whom his commands were immediately laid. Which notwithstanding, we shall find, that even these were not sparing upon occasion of those reproachful compellations which were expressly forbidden by their Master. I appeal for the proof hereof to that of St. James where he gives the title of Rakah or empty 
* Hesych. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 seu potius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 LXX. Jud. 11.3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pro 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  person to those who relied upon a naked Faith. For wilt thou know (saith he) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that Faith without Works is dead, chap. 2. 20. Nay I appeal to St. Paul who gives the Galatians the title of Fools, that much more reproachful term, and threatened with a severer penalty. For, O Foolish Galatians (saith he) who hath bewitched you that you should not obey the truth? Gal. 3.1. And again, vers. 3. Are ye so foolish and unreasonable, as having begun in the Spirit, to think to be made perfect by the Flesh? For though the Apostle doth not make use of the same word that our Saviour, or at least the Evangelist did, yet he useth one 
‖ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hesych. Lex. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. sen potius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  that is tantamount, if yet it be not more piquant than the other. Add hereunto, which are alike, or more contumelious, our Saviour's calling the Scribes and Pharisees by the name of Hypocrites, and a generation of Vipers, as St. Peter by the name of Satan, his Apostle St. Paul's styling Elymas a child of the Devil, and an enemy of all righteousness; all which, with the like expressions, show plainly enough, that neither did the Master himself mean to adjudge all, calling Rakah or Fool, to the danger of the Council and Hell fire, nor those that were his Scholars understood him so. Forasmuch therefore as all reproachful speaking cannot be looked upon as forbidden, as having been sometime used, both by our Saviour himself and his Apostles; proceed we to inquire what is to be looked upon as such, the second thing proposed to be discoursed of.  
2. For the resolution whereof, we shall need to go no farther than the words immediately preceding the prohibition of it. For, forbidding not simply and absolutely that Anger from which reproachful Speeches flow 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ar●s●●. apud Grot. A●not. in Mat. 5.22. , but such only as was either rash, or causeless, or immoderate, he must consequently be supposed to forbid no other reproachful speaking than which had such an Anger for its Parent. Which by the way will not only show what reproachful speaking we are to understand, when we find our Saviour condemning it to the danger of the Council and of Hell-fire, and St. Paul 
‖ 1 Cor. 5.11.— 6.9.  excluding those that are guilty of it from the Society of Christians and Heaven, but with how little reason also the Examples of our Saviour and his Apostles are sometime alleged in patronage of our own excesses in this particular. For, beside that, our Saviour and his Apostles were public Persons, and to whom therefore it appertained, as well to chastise Offenders with reproaches, as to execute other severities upon them; those reproaches of theirs were far from being the issue of that Anger which we have shown to be forbidden by our Saviour. Not of a rash and precipitate one, because many of them let fall by them in their writings; but all of them when they were employed about Sacred matters, wherein it is hard to conceive but that they had their wits about them; Not of a causeless anger, because having some notorious crime for their ground 
* See Mat. 23. throughout. , or some opinion 
‖ See the fore-alledged places out of St. James and the Epistle to the Galathians.  which was destructive of that Religion which our Saviour came to commend. Lastly, not of an immoderate Anger, because at the same time giving no contemptible testimonies of the love they bear to the reproached parties. Witness our Saviour's admonishing the Pharisees in that very Chapter, where he calls them Fools, and Blind, and Hypocrites, and a Generation of Vipers, to cast off their hypocrisy, to 
* Mat. 23.26. compared with Luke 11.41, etc.  cleanse the inside as well as the outside of the Platter; Witness St. John Baptist's calling upon the same Pharisees, and with the very same breath, he gives them the title of Generation of Vipers, to bring forth fruits meet for Repentance, Mat. 3.7, 8. Lastly, witness St. James and St. Paul's instructing those Fools they wrote to, to deposit those their distempers, and become wise unto God and unto Salvation. Which shows that their anger, and consequently reproachful speaking, was not without a mixture of kindness, or rather that it had that in part for the fountain of it. And indeed, as Origen 
* Philocal. c. 27.  sometime spoke concerning God, that those whom he is not angry with when they sin, he is therefore not angry with them because he is extremely such, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; So may we of our Saviour and his Apostles: If they had not applied those Goads of Racha and Fool to the dull and drowsy sinner, they had showed themselves much more displeased with them, because suffering them so to continue unmolested in those Errors and Impieties, which would have infallibly exposed them to the danger of the Council and of Hell fire. The result of the premises is this, that as there is not the least appearance of the lawfulness of those Reproaches, even to public Persons, which are the issues of a rash, or causeless, or immoderate Anger, so there is far less appearance of their being lawful to private Persons, who are generally to leave the chastising of Offenders to the other.  
3. What reproachful Speeches are forbidden, you have seen already, even those which proceed from a rash, or causeless, or immoderate Anger; inquire we therefore in the next place, how those, which are so, become violations of this Commandment. Where not again to tell you, that they incline the Person against whom they are directed, to take up murderous purposes against the Reviler, because, though that may be enough to reduce it to the Commandment, yet it makes rather the reviled, than Revilers the direct violatours of it, as neither to insist upon our Saviour's making the prohibition of Rakah and Fool an Appendix to it, because that rather proves it to be a violation, than shows how it doth become so; I shall consider, 1. The nature of that good name which reproachful Speeches blast. For, though a Good Name be not the life of the possessor of it, yet is it so necessary to the well Being of it, that he, who endeavours to take it away, may be looked upon as a Murderer for so doing; because robbing a man of that which is the life of life itself, and without which whosoever is, is dead to all happiness, and to the world. Again, 2. Though the Sword of the reproachful person (I mean his reviling tongue) be not ordinarily of force enough to cut that knot which God and Nature hath knit between the Soul and Body; yet as instances might be produced where it hath actually done it, and where men have died of no other wounds than what a malicious Tongue gave them; so, where it hath not that effect upon the reproached Party, it is rather for want of ability than will, so to wreck their fury upon the Enemy: It being not so much, because they are otherwise resolved, but because they either cannot, or dare not show their fury in effects, that they revenge themselves of their Enemies with their tongues. Whence it is, that no persons have been observed to be of more intemperate tongues than those of the Female Sex, or weak and pusillanimous men. The sequel of which discourse will be, that though the reviler be not always a Murderer in fact, yet he is in heart, which is enough to bring him within the compass of the Commandment.  
Of Murder, properly so called, and of the Sins included in it, what hath been said may suffice, and therefore I will supersede all farther consideration of it. But because the Scripture makes mention of another Murder, even the murder of the Soul, by which, though it be not altogether deprived of Life, yet it is of the comforts of it, and thereby made much more miserable than if it were not at all, therefore it may not be amiss to inquire, whether that also have not a place in the prohibition, and how men become guilty of it.  
Now there are two things which persuade the Murder whereof we speak to come within the compass of the prohibition now before us. 1. That what we call the murder of the Soul, is properly enough such, and 2. That it is a more pernicious one, than the other. That the Murder whereof we speak, is properly enough such, is evident, not only from the Scriptures giving that State the name of death into which this Murder brings men, but also from the very nature of it. For, as Murder properly so called, becomes such, not by the taking away of all Life; for the Soul, which is the chiefest part of Man, lives no less after that than before, but by the destruction of that natural Life, which he, from whom we take it, enjoyed as to the present World; so the murder of the Soul, as we commonly express it, though it introduce not a perfect insensibility, yet it despoils it of that spiritual Life which it enjoys in this present state, and which is more, of that also of which it is capable in the next. It is no less evident, Secondly, That, supposing what we speak of to be a Murder, it is a much more pernicious one than the other, because, as that Life which it takes away is a much better one than the other, so it draws after it an eternity of torment. Now, forasmuch as the Murder whereof we speak, is not only properly enough such, but a much more pernicious one than the other, it is easy to suppose, or rather impossible to suppose otherwise, than that he, who forbade the one, intended also the avoiding of the other; especially having before shown, that the Commandments, of which this is one, were intended as a summary of the whole Duty of Man. All therefore that remains to inquire into, upon this head, is, how men become guilty of it, which will require no very accurate consideration to resolve.  
For to say nothing of those who have the cure of Souls (though of all others the most obnoxious to it) partly, because they are not under mine, and partly, because they are better able to inform themselves, I shall content myself at present with pointing out those ways whereby private persons may come to be guilty of it, which is 

1. By prompting men to, or encouraging them in those sinful courses which draw after them the destruction of the Soul: That which gave the Devil the title of a murderer from the beginning (as he is called Joh. 8.44.) being no other, than that, as the story of Genesis informs us, he solicited our first Parents to eat of that Fruit from which both their temporal and spiritual Death ensued.  
2. The same is to be said of giving an ill example, and thereby drawing other Men into the commission of the like Crimes: an evil Example not only having the Nature of a Temptation, but being also of greater force than any other; inasmuch as it doth more undiscernably instill its Poison, and finds Men more ready to receive it: It being a known and undoubted Truth, that Men regard not so much what they ought, or what they are advised to, as what they see others do before them.  
3. Add hereunto, because of near affinity with the other, the doing any thing, how innocent soever, whereby our weak brother may be tempted to do the like against his own Conscience: Such as was, for example, the eating of Meats sacrificed to Idols, in the presence of those who were not so well informed of their Christian Liberty. For though, as St. Paul spoke concerning it, 1 Cor. 8.4. there was no unlawfulness in the thing itself; and consequently therefore nothing in it, but the Conscience of the Idol to unhallow it: yet might the doing thereof by a strong Christian, be a temptation to a weak one to do the like, if not against, yet without a due assurance of his own Conscience: Which as St. Paul hath elsewhere 
* Rom. 14.23.  pronounced to be damnable, and so destructive of that Soul which is guilty of it; so both there 
† Rom. ver. 15.20. , and here 
‖ 1 Cor. 8.11. , he chargeth the guilt of its destruction upon those who should so embolden it to offend.  
4. And though the like care of other Men be not incumbent upon private Christians, as is upon those Persons whom God hath more particularly entrusted with the inspection of them; yet inasmuch as by the Laws both of Nature and Christianity, they are commanded to reprove an offending Brother, and not suffer sin to be upon him; he that shall suffer such a one to perish for want of a seasonable and just admonition, shall be so far chargeable with his destruction, whom he did not endeavour to reclaim.    
What is meant by Thou shalt not kill, as that is to be understood of the kill another, hath been at large declared, together with the several Sins that are included in it: Nothing remains toward the completing of my Discourse, but to show what Sins are included in the kill of ourselves. Where,  
1. First of all, I shall reckon the neglect of our Health, because a step to that Self-murder which is here forbidden. For, though that for the most part be looked upon as an Imprudence, rather than any violation of the Commandments of our Maker; yet it is because Men consider not that there is a Duty owing by them to themselves, or rather unto God concerning them. They are (as I have before remarked) placed in this World by God; they are put into a capacity of, and enjoined the serving of their Maker in it; and being so, are in reason to intent the performance of it, and (because that cannot otherwise be procured) to intent also the preservation of themselves: the neglect of that not only making Men more unapt for it whilst they live, but cutting them off before their time.  
2. To the neglect of our Health, subjoin we the exposing ourselves to unnecessary dangers, and where nothing but vainglory, or the desire of filthy Lucre, prompts us to it: such as are many of those Dangers which they who profess Feats of Activity, do without the least scruple involve themselves in. For, as it is rare for such Persons (to what Agility soever they may have attained) not to procure their own destruction in the end; so, many of the Dangers to which they expose themselves, are so imminent, that they must always be thought to run the hazard of their own destruction: Which, though it be not a Self-murder, yet is in a disposition to it, and consequently to be thought to be forbidden with the other: He who forbids any Action, at least with any severity, being in reason to be thought to forbid that which hath a natural tendency to it; because where that is not carefully avoided, it will be hard to avoid the other.  
3. The same is to be said, and with far greater reason, of all great Intemperances' and Debauches. For, beside that the intemperate Man, no less than the former, runs the hazard of his Life oftentimes, partly by that Quarrelsomness to which his Intemperances' do incline him, and partly by that Stupidity and Insensibleness which he does thereby contract, his Intemperance doth of its own nature help to shorten his Life, and so make him more literally a Murderer of himself: Witness the Consumptions, and other fatal Diseases, which such Persons do often fall into, through the mere force of their Intemperances' and Debauches: Of which, as Death is sure to be the consequent, so it matters not much, as to the Crime of Self-murder, whether it happen sooner or later: He being no less truly a Murderer who (after the manner of some Italians) gives a Poison which shall not have its effect till after many Months, than he who gives one which shall kill within an Hour.  
4. Add hereunto all eating or drinking such things as are prejudicial to our Health, however not such either in themselves, or to other Men; and (which is not so often thought of) but ought equally to be considered, the taking of immoderate Cares, or using of immoderate Labours or Studies. For, beside the other Irregularities wherewith these things are commonly attended, they do all of them confer to the destruction of those by whom they are used, and consequently become Violations of this Commandment. And I cannot but upon this occasion call to mind a Saying 
* The Life of Father Paul, etc. p. 169.  of a Venetian Gentleman to the famous Father Paul, with whom he had contracted a Religious Friendship: For, observing that most excellent Person always confining himself to his Cell, and there wearing away himself with perpetual Study, he ●●uck not to tell him in plain Terms (as he was never wont to speak to him in a Mask 
‖ Lodato iddio, che ho pur trovato uno che mi parla non in maschera. Ib. , as the same Father Paul was wont to express it) That that unintermitted course of reading and writing was a kind of Intemperance, as was heretofore his Amorettes and Wantonnesses. Here only was the difference, that Opinion gave a Title of Lewdness to the one, but to the other Names of Honour. And indeed, as that more sober Intemperance shows a Man the Indulger of his Affections, no less than they who addict themselves to more ignoble Pleasures; so it contributes alike to the shortening of our Lives, and consequently to the violation of the Commandment. This only would be added, That as there may be some Works of great importance to Religion, which require a more than ordinary dispatch; so, if those whom God hath fitted with proportionable Abilities, shall shorten their Lives in the composing of them, as it is said of the Judicious Hooker, as to his Books of Ecclesiastical Polity, they shall be so far from being to be looked upon as Felo's de se, that they ought to be had in the reputation of Martyrs.  
5. There is but one Sin remaining of those that are included in Self murder, and that is, the neglect of such Remedies as Nature and Art have taught Men, for the removal of those Distempers into which we fall: He who honoureth not the Physician in such a Case, being a kind of Murderer of himself, because neglecting those Remedies whereby he might be preserved. And though the Book of Ecclesiasticus be not Canonical one, nor as such represented by that Church whereof we are Members; yet I cannot forbear to say, that it contains in it many Canonical Truths, and particularly, as to this matter whereof we are entreating. For, inasmuch as St. James tells us, Every good and perfect gift is from above, what should hinder us from concluding, as that Author doth, that 
* Ecclus. 38.14.  God hath created both the Medicine and him that prescribes it; that 
‖ Ecclus. ver. 6.  he hath given Men Skill, that both they and he may be honoured in those happy Effects which it produceth, and 
† Ecclus. ver. 7.  those which stand in need of it, may be preserved by it? Care only would be taken, as the same 
* Ecclus. ve. 9, etc.  Wiseman adviseth, that we neglect not to seek unto God by ardent Prayer for our Recovery; to which I shall add, neither the imploring of theirs whom God hath appointed to mediate on our behalf; that we leave off from sin, and order our hands aright, and cleanse our heart from all wickedness. For, as these are both the primary and most sovereign Remedies of our Distempers, because it is from God that both those Distempers and the Redress thereof cometh; so, the neglect of them must therefore be looked upon as the pulling of Death upon us with our own Hands, and (which is more to be dreaded) of Eternal Ruin.  
Being now to put an end to my Discourse upon this Commandment, and those Sins which I have shown it to forbid, Reason would that, since I cannot do the like for all, I should endeavour to stir up in you a just abhorrency of that Crime which this Commandment doth especially condemn. Now, though that might be competently procured by the repetition of those Arguments whereby I have before evinced the Criminalness thereof; yet because I am unwilling to present you with the same things again, and thereby rather nauseate than invite your Attention; and because there is yet an Argument of the Criminalness of Murder, beside what I have before insisted on; I think it not amiss to set it now before you, and leave you to guests at the heinousness of that Sin by it: Which is, That however unreasonable Creatures cannot be said to sin, because whatsoever they do, they do by the force of that Natural Instinct by which they are guided in all their Actions; yet if at any time they happened to kill a Man, they were by the Law of God to fall no less under the Hand of Justice, than those who had both Reason and Religion to restrain them from it. For, to say nothing at all of the Law of Moses, by virtue of which if an Ox gored a Man that he died, the Ox itself was to be slain, and the Flesh thereof cast away as an abomination, Exod. 21.28, 29. By that more Catholic Law given to Noah, the Blood of men's Lives was to be required of Beasts, no less than of the Owners of them: For, Surely (saith God, Gen. 9.5.) your Blood of your Lives will I require: at the hand of every Beast will I require it, and at the hand of Man; and at the hand of every Man's Brother will I require the Life of Man. And though, after the Law of God, we need not make any farther Inquisition, because we know all such not to have been without just Grounds; yet I think it not amiss to add, if it were only for its affinity thereto, a like Law 
* See Hales Sermon of Duels, p. 82. of his Remains.  of the Commonwealth of Athens, the purport whereof was, That if only a Wall had by chance fallen down and killed a Man, the Judges of that place were to sit upon and arraign it, and, upon conviction, throw the Stones thereof out of the Country. By which procedure of theirs, as they gave sufficient testimony how sacred a thing they esteemed the Life of Man to be; so when we have a more convincing testimony from the Laws of God, we must be strangely unreasonable, if we allow ourselves in offering violence to it.    

THE SEVENTH COMMANDMENT.  
THE SEVENTH COMMANDMENT.  
Thou shalt not commit adultery.  

PART I.  
The Contents.  
The Crime here forbidden, the Violation of the Marriagebed; for which cause, as well as for the discovery of the Affirmative part of the Commandment, inquiry is made into the Importance, Institution, and Laws of Marriage. That defined to be A Compact between a Man and a Woman, of Cohabitation during Life, for the comfort of Society, and the propagation of Children: And inquiry thereupon made, Whether it be of Divine Institution. This resolved, by considering that Institution, either with reference to all that are of years to enter into that State, or to such only as intent a Cohabitation with the Female Sex. In the former of which respects is made appear, That though in the Infant-state of the World it was of universal concernment, yet it is not now; as because there is not now the same reason for it, so because our Saviour hath declared our absolution from it: In the latter is shown, That it originally was, and now is of universal Obligation; as is evidenced at large in every Branch of its Definition. Inquiry is next made into the Laws of Marriage, and particularly into such as respect the due contracting of it: Where is shown, first, in respect of the Persons contracting, That the Marriage ought to be between one Male and one Female, and the Polygamy of the Patriarches answered; That it ought to be between those who are not too near of kin; where the Degrees prohibiting Marriage, and the Grounds of that Prohibition are declared; That the Persons contracting be of years sufficient to understand the Nature of it, of ability of Body where there is a desire and expectation of Children, and free and unconstrained in their Choice: In fine, That they be so far at least of one Persuasion in Religion, that they may join both in Private and Public Prayers; the general necessity whereof is at large exemplified and demonstrated. A Consideration of those Laws that respect the Contract itself; where is shown, That it ought to be made before one or more Witnesses, and agreeably to the Constitutions of Church and State; That it is at least highly expedient, that it be solemnised by a Priest, and with such significant Actions as the joining of Hands, and the like.  
THE Persons of Men being secured by the former Precept, from the attaque of greater and lesser Violences, Reason would that this Law of Love should proceed to secure them from any Injury in those who are joined to them by Marriage; because, as in reputation of Law they are one with them, so they are naturally tendered by them as themselves. In conformity whereto, as we find the Decalogne proceeding, because subjoyning the Prohibition of Adultery to that of Murder, (bearing witness thereby to its Author's Prudence, in the disposition, as well as in the framing of his Laws); so having observed so much to you, I will descend to the consideration of that Precept which intends the securing of us in those our other selves.  
In order whereunto, because that Crime which it forbids is nothing else than a Violation of the Matrimonial Vow, I will, 

1. First of all, entreat of the Importance, Institution, and Laws of Marriage; which will discover to us the Affirmative part of the Precept.  
2. Show the Nature and Criminalness of Adultery: And,  
3. Lastly, inquire, Whether any other Sins are included in the Prohibition of Adultery, and what those Sins are.    
1. Of the Importance of Marriage much need not be said, at least as to that sense wherein we are to take it in this whole Discourse; the general Notion of Marriage, as well as our own private one, being, That it is a Compact between a Man and a Woman, of Cohabitation during Life, for the comfort of Society, and the Propagation of Children. The only thing which will require any large Explication is, Whether such a Compact be of Divine Institution, and by what Laws it ought to be governed.  
2. For the resolution of the former whereof, these two things must be again enquired into, because alike comprehended in it.  

1. Whether or no it be of Divine Institution for all Persons to enter into it, which are arrived to years of maturity: Or,  
2. If not, Whether it be of Divine Institution for them who intent any such Cohabitation with those of the other Sex.   
In the handling of both which (as in like manner of all that follows) I will use all the cleanness of Expression imaginable, as judging it ill becoming those who persuade Purity to other Men, to offend against it in their own Discourses concerning it.  
I begin with the first of the Questions proposed, to wit, Whether or no it be of Divine Institution, for all Persons to enter into Marriage, which are arrived to years of maturity. Which Question I the rather put, as because the Jews 
* Vid. Selden. de Jure not. & Gent. l. 5. c. 3.  were generally persuaded that Marriage was of universal obligation, so also because that Persuasion of theirs was not without some colour, even from the Scripture itself; he who made them Male and Female, bidding them be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it. And indeed, if we inquire concerning the Infant-state of the World, and before it came to be Peopled as it is, so no doubt can remain but Marriage was under command to those who were in a capacity to enter into it, because otherwise they should have frustrated the Design of God, who proposed by that means not only to continue a Succession of Men, but to diffuse the Race of them throughout the World, that they might enjoy those Blessings wherewith his most liberal Hand had furnished it. But, as there is not the same reason, now that the World is Peopled, and there are enough that have espoused that State to continue the Succession of it; so, that it is not at present of universal obligation, whatsoever it before was, is evident from that of St. Matthew, chap. 19.12. where we have it from our Saviour himself, in that very Chapter where he inculcates the Institution of Marriage, That as there are some Persons who are incapacitated for it by Nature, and others who have been made so by Men; so there are some who for the Kingdom of God's sake have abridged themselves of the use of it, and those that can receive it, permitted by our Saviour to do it. When therefore the Question is concerning the Institution of Marriage, it is requisite we understand it with relation not to all Persons whatsoever, but to those who intent such a Cohabitation with the other Sex, as Marriage doth naturally involve.  
Now that Marriage, so understood, is of Divine Institution, and all other Cohabitations unlawful, will appear, if we consider either that Cohabitation we have affirmed it to covenant for, or the Covenant itself. For, it being evident from the Book of Genesis, that God at the beginning made Male and Female for each others mutual help, and the propagation of Children by them; and it being further evident, both from the Words of the Institution, and our Saviour's Explication of it in the place before-quoted, that God intended not either a promiscuous or desultory Enjoyment of each other, but of 
* Mat. 19.4, 5.  certain Persons, and such to which they should be obliged to cleave; it being evident, thirdly, from our Saviour, that that Adhesion is to be understood not of one to more Persons, but of one to one, because he afterwards subjoins, 
‖ Mat. 19.5.  And they twain shall be one flesh: lastly, it being evident that our Saviour doth not only not rescind that first Institution, but confirm it 
† Mat. 19.4.8, etc.  and bind it upon the necks of his Disciples: it will follow, That the individual Cohabitation of a Man with a Woman, for the purposes before spoken of, is so of Divine Institution, that all others are utterly unlawful. Again, Forasmuch as both the Scripture 
* Pro. 2.17. Mal. 2.14.  every where supposeth in Marriage the entering into covenant concerning it; and that Adhesion which Marriage involves requires it; there being no assurance to either Party of so long a Cohabitation, if they did not bind themselves to it by promise: it is but just to suppose, however not expressed in the Institution, that the same God who instituted such a Cohabitation, did also appoint their entering into Covenant for it, to give each other an assurance of it. Which Particular is the rather to be added, lest (as the Fashion is now adays) Men should think it enough to assume a Mate, with intention, it may be, if all things answer their expectation, to adhere to her during Life; but without any Obligation upon themselves to do it. For, though such an Adhesion should happen to continue, yet inasmuch as it is without any Tie upon the Parties, it can be none of that which is appointed, and is rather a long Fornication, than a Marriage.  
3. Of the Importance, and Institution of Marriage, I have spoken hitherto, and both shown what it is, and that it hath God for the Author of it, it remains that we inquire by what Laws it is to be governed, which, after the explication of the former, will be so much the more easy to resolve. In order whereunto I will inquire, 

1. What is required to the due contracting of it.  
2. What is requisite to the maintaining of it when it is so: And  
3. Lastly, Whether or no, and by what means, it may be dissolved.    
I. Now there are two things, within the resolution whereof, all that is necessary to be known, concerning the first of these, may be comprehended.  

1. What Persons may contract Matrimony.  
2. What is requisite to a legitimate contracting of it, where there is no irregularity in the Persons.   
And here in the first place I shall not scruple to affirm, that to make the Marriage lawful in respect of the Persons, it ought to be not between one and more, whether Males or Females, but between one Male and one Female. For beside that that Law which enjoins the cleaving to the Married party, implies it to be the cleaving of one to one, because affirming not in the general, that the Married parties shall be one flesh, but they twain shall be one flesh; beside that the assuming of another Husband or Wife to the former must divide that Unity, and make him or her that Contracts, a new Relation to separate in part from the former, whereby they can no longer be one flesh but more; our Saviour, in the close of his Discourse concerning the Institution of Marriage, adds such an assertion as shows evidently the unlawfulness of Marrying more than one: That I mean, which saith, that whosoever shall put away his Wife, except it be for Fornication, and shall marry another, committeth Adultery, and who so marrieth her that is put away committeth Adultery, Mat. 19.9. For how could it be Adultery in him, who put away his Wife to marry another, if it were lawful to assume another to her, even before she was so; but what shadow of Adultery in him who should only marry her that was so put away? That being not to be looked upon as a violation of Marriage, and consequently not Adultery, which might be done even when the Marriage was entire. To all which, if we add that of St. Paul, 1 Cor. 7.4. that the Wife hath not power over her own body, but the Husband, nor again, the Husband over his, but the Wife, so the marrying of more than one will appear yet more unlawful. For it being not ordinarily to be thought, that either the Wife or the Husband will consent to the admission of a Copartner, it must upon that account be looked upon as unlawful to assume a new Relation, because, beside those persons consent who have the power over them. And indeed so clear is the Divine Institution for the marrying of only one, especially after our Saviour's explication of it, that I persuade myself there had not arisen the least scruple concerning it, were it not that we find Polygamy frequently practised by the Fathers of the Old Testament, and, which is more, multitude of Wives reckoned to David as a blessing. But beside that, in the infancy of the world such a practice might be more allowable, because necessary to the peopling of it; beside, that God might dispense with his own Institution afterwards, if not for the hardness of men's hearts, as he did in the matter of Divorce, yet in regard to that infancy of Grace, which was under the pedagogy of the Law; the question is not, whether polygamy were sometimes lawful, which I for mine own part do not in the least doubt of, but whether or no it were lawful by the first Institution of Marriage, and whether it be at all lawful now. The contrary of both which, as I have already demonstrated, both from the words of the Institution, and those of our Blessed Saviour, so having done that, the former exception must be looked upon as trivial in respect of that Gospel state under which we are; the Law of that both remitting us to what Marriage was from the beginning, and adding its own suffrage to it. I will conclude this particular with that of Malachy, because standing as it were in the confines of the Law and Gospel. 'Tis in the 2. Chapter of his Prophecies, Vers. 14. and so on, Where having alleged against the Jews, Gods regarding not their Offering, nor receiving it with good will at their hands, he not only assigns for the reason of it, their dealing treacherously with the Wife of their Youth, but combats that with this following Argument. For did not he, even God, make one, yea though he had the residue of the Spirit? that is to say (as Drusius glosses on the words) did he not make one Male and one Female, and when he had done so, make them one flesh? yea though, if he had pleased, as wanting not breath to animate them, he might have made and given more Wives to our Father Adam. And wherefore one? as the Prophet there goes on, but that he might seek a godly seed, that is to say (as the forequoted Drusius glosseth it) that from that one flesh, into which those two were combined, a lawful progeny might descend.  
The second Law of Marriage relating to the persons, is that those between whom it is contracted, be not too near of kin to each other. For the understanding whereof, we will first of all entreat of such as are to one another in the place of Parents and Children: As if a Father, for example, should marry his Daughter, or his Sons, or Daughter's Daughter, or a Mother her Son, or her Sons, or Daughters Son. For that such Matches are unlawful, even by the Law of Nature, is evident from hence, that they destroy that reverence, which we have before shown to be due from their Children to them. Thus for instance, When a Mother marries her own Son, or Grandson, from whom, by the Laws of Nature, there is the highest reverence due, inasmuch as, by virtue of her marriage she subjects herself to him, she leaves no place for that reverence which was before due unto her as a Mother. And though the like seem not to happen, where a Father marries his Daughter, or Granddaughter, because he, who was before Superior, continues so still, inasmuch as he is the head of her whom he so takes unto his Wife, yet doth it in part destroy that reverence, which was due unto him as a Father: Because, though as Husband he be still head of his Child, yet he is not in the same measure as a Father, because Marriage induceth a kind of parity between those who enter themselves into that State. The same is to be said in some measure, where the Son marries his Father's Wife, or the Niece and Nephew their Uncle and Aunt; because (as was heretofore shown) they are unto the former in the place of Parents, and consequently must needs lose the reverence of such by being assumed into such a State as induceth such a Society that excludes it. Whence it is, that we find St. Paul not only declaiming against that person who had Married his Father's Wife, and representing it as a Fornication that was not so much as named among the Gentiles, but, in prosecution of that power wherewith he was armed, to chastise Offenders, commanding the Church of the Corinthians to cut him off from their Society, and so deliver him into the power of Satan for his Chastisement, 1 Cor. 5.1, 5. As for those other degrees, whether of Consanguinity or Affinity that are forbidden in the 18th. of Leviticus, such as are the Marrying of a whole or half Sister, a Brother's Wife, or a former Wife's Daughter, which are all, besides those before mentioned, that are expressly forbidden by it; though the two former, at least, have not the same exception to be made against them, inasmuch as they seem to contain nothing contrary to natural equity, yet because they are forbidden by that Law of God, which our Saviour professeth to have come not to destroy but to fulfil, and that too (as appears by his injunction concerning divorces) in the business of Marriage; and because the ground of the prohibition is not peculiar to the Jewish Policy or Religion, but the nearness of Kindred, which holds as much among us as among them. Lastly, because if such Marriages were permitted, there might be danger of Fornication, by reason of the free and perpetual converse that such Persons have with each other, therefore I think no man of Conscience but must account such Marriages as unlawful to him, as if the prohibition thereof had been entered into the Christian Law. But other degrees than those, or at least such as are in the same order with them as the Law of God condemns not, so neither doth our Church or State do, and therefore they, who keep within those bounds, are so far secure from offending, as to that Marriage which they contract. One only thing would be added concerning marrying the Brother's Wife, because it relates to a famous instance of one of our own Kings, and that is, that as the Law of Moses did not only permit, but command, the taking of the Brother's Wife, where there was no Child left behind; so it seems hard to suppose among Christians, that it should not be lawful to do the like, where not only the case is the same, as to that particular, but (as it was in the forementioned instance) it was inconvenient to the Kingdom to let the Brother's Wife's Dowry, either be spent out of it, or at least go away from the Crown.  
The third Law of Marriage relating to the Persons that enter into it, is, that they be of years sufficient to understand the nature of that compact which they make, and to estimate the humour of those Persons with whom they are to associate: lest otherwise, that, which was intended for a help, prove a snare, and an encumbrance, and Marriage become not only a yoke but an insupportable one. Whence it is, that though Custom and the Laws do sometime give way to the joining of Children in Marriage, especially of the Nobler sort, yet the same Laws give leave to the Persons afterwards to rescind their formmer Contract, if they find not themselves in a disposition to confirm it.  
Add hereunto hability of Body, where there is a desire and expectation of Children, and a freedom of consent in those that are so to be conjoined. Which latter is the rather to be inculcated, because of those fatal inconveniencies which arise from constrained Matches; it being very rare to find a tolerable accord in those Matches, to which young Persons are rather compelled than invited.  
But of all the qualifications relating to the Married persons, the want whereof doth not null the Contract between them; I think there is none more considerable than that they who Mary, be so far, at least, of one persuasion in Religion, that they may join together both in public and private Prayers. For though (as a Learned Man hath observed 
* See the Case of Marrying with a Recusant, by Dr. Sanderson. ) it would be hard to condemn the contrary Matches (how distant soever their Religions are) as simply evil and unlawful, inasmuch as there may be causes imaginable, wherein they may seem not only lawful but expedient; such as is, for Example, The Marrying of a Christian with a Pagan, where there is none other to adjoin himself self to, or of a Protestant Prince with a Popish Princess, where the good of the State doth necessarily require it; yet I think it would be as hard to free such Matches from the imputation of sinfulness, where there is not something of necessity to prompt the Persons to it: Because, beside the perpetual 
‖ Tert. ad Vxorem, lib. 2. Quis enim dubitet obliterari quotidie fidem commercio infideli? Bonos corrumpunt mores, confabulationes malae: quanto magis & convictus, & individuus usus? ib. cap. 3.  danger the Orthodox party is in, of being enticed from the true Religion, there is little probability of that entire affection and accord which the tie of Marriage doth require. For to say nothing at all of that alienation of affection, which difference in Religion is apt of itself to produce, there is a necessity upon the differing parties (if they will be faithful to their several ways of Worship) to frequent different Companies, to resort to different Assemblies, and in fine, to place their Charity upon different Objects. Upon which, as Jealousies and Suspicions must needs arise, whether of their fidelity to each others Beds, or of their justice in the dispensing of the common Goods; it is impossible to think, but that those Jealousies will also prompt them to give a check to each other in their several courses, which will be the parent of farther differences between them. For who (as 
* Tertull. ad Vxorem lib. 2. p. 189. Quis autem sinat conjugem suam, visitandorum fratrum gratiâ, vicatim aliena & quidem pauperior a quaeque tuguria circuire? Quis nocturnis convocationibus, si ita oportuerit, a latere suo adimi libenter feret? Quis denique solennibus Paschae abnoctantem securus sustinebit? Quis ad convivium illud Domin cum quod infamant, sine sua suspicione dimittet? Quis in carcerem ad osculanda vinculae martyris reptare patietur?  Tertullian speaks) would suffer his Wife upon pretence of visiting the Brethren, to run up and down from house to house, and particularly to those of the poorer sort? Who will willingly bear her being taken from his side, to be present at nightly meetings, if occasion do so require? Who will suffer her to lie from him at the Solemnities of Easter, or be present at that Banquet of our Lord, which the Heathen do so defame? In fine, Who will suffer her to creep into Prison, there to kiss the Bonds of the Martyrs? Rather than so (as the same Father immediately before discourseth) if he do not restrain her by his Authority, yet he shall find out some means or other whereby to divert her from her purposes. If a Station 
‖ Yertull. ib.  si statio facienda est, maritus de die condicat ad balneas: si jejunia observanda sunt, maritus eadem die conurvium exerceat: si procedendum erit, nunquam magis familiae occupatio obveniat. , or more solemn Assembly for Prayer, be to be held, it is ten to one but the Husband will appoint her that day to accompany him to the Bath. If a Fast be to be observed, but that he will hold a Feast upon it. Lastly, If she be to go abroad, whether to visit the sick, or for other such like purpose, but that there shall then be somewhat more than ordinary to busy her about at home. On the other side, when Husband and Wife are of the same persuasion in matters of Religion, when they are one as well in Spirit as in Flesh, than there is not only no dissent as to Civil matters, but a perfect accord as to Spiritual ones, they think, and speak, and act the same things. As Tertullian expresseth it in the place before quoted, They Pray, they roll themselves in Ashes and Fast together, they Teach, Exhort, and bear alike with each other 
* Simul orant, simul volutantur, & simul jejunia transigunt, alterutro docentes, alterutro hortantes, alterutro sustinentes. In Ecclesia Dei pariter utrique, partier in convivio Dei, pariter in angustiis, in persecutionibus, in refrigeriis. Neuter alterum celat, neuter alterum vitat, neuter alteri gravis est. Liberè aeger visitatur, indigent sustentatur. Eleemosynae sine tormento, sacrificia sine scrupulo, quoti diana diligentia sine impedimento. Non furtiva signatio, non trepida gratulatio, non muta benedictio. Sonant inter duos Psalmi & Hymni, & mutuò provocant quis meliùs Deo suo canter. Talia Christus videns & audience gaudet. His pacem suam mittit. Vbi duo, ibi & ipse: ubi & ipse, ibi Malus non est. Tertull. ad Vxor. lib. 2. in fine. . They are both alike in the Church, and at the Feasts of the Almighty, they are alike in straits, in persecutions, and resreshments. Neither goes about to conceal aught from other, neither avoids the others converse, nor is burdensome to the other, when they afford their own. The sick is visited freely, and without the least hindrance from the other, and the indigent person relieved. Alms are given without any fear of the others displeasure, the Christian Sacrifices resorted to, without giving the other the least scruple of their unfaithfulness, the daily Prayers attended without any impediment. There is no need of crossing one's self by stealth, of a fearful salutation, or a dumb benediction. Psalms and Hymns sound between them two, and they provoke each other who shall sing best unto his God. The result of which blessed harmony is, That Christ who sees and hears all this rejoiceth at it, and forasmuch as he is a lover of Peace and Unity, adds his Peace and Society to theirs, and both excludes the company of the evil one, and makes up a kind of Trinity in Unity with them.  
Having thus shown what Persons may contract Matrimony, and with whom, proceed we to inquire what is requisite to the contract itself. And, here to say nothing at all how far the consent of Parents is required, because I have sufficiently accounted for that, where I entreated of children's duties to them, I shall first of all represent, as necessary to the legitimateness thereof, that the compact be made before one or more witnesses. For beside that, otherwise a way might be opened to either Party to withdraw themselves, and to dissolve that Contract which God would have to be inviolable, occasion of Scandal would thereby be given to those with whom they converse, because ignorant of the grounds of that freedom of Commerce which they observe to be between the Parties. And accordingly, as all civil Nations have provided that Marriages should be solemnised in public, thereby both to cut off from the Married Persons all pretexts of withdrawing from each other, and all scandal from those with whom they converse, so I see not how they can be so legitimate as they ought, where they are less public than the Law requires. For though the presence of one or two Witnesses may be of force enough to oblige the parties to a Cohabitation, yet they cannot take of the scandal, which may arise from the clandestineness thereof.  
But neither is it less requisite, that Marriages should be made agreeably to the constitutions both of that Church and State whereof the married Persons are Members. The latter, because the welfare of the State may depend much upon them, as particularly in those that are Heirs or Heiresses to great Estates, and as it sometimes happens, to a Kingdom: by the former whereof, great Estates may come to be embezzled, by the latter, a Kingdom to be prostituted to the arbitrement of those, who are no way in a capacity to manage it. The same is to be said of the necessity of their being made, agreeably to the constitutions of the Church. For the Law which God hath given concerning Marriage being general, or at least not so particular as to determine all questions that may arise concerning it, there is a necessity of referring them to the determination of those who are by God and the Church entrusted with the welfare of it, and consequently, in particular Persons, of acquiescing in it.  
I observe, Thirdly, that though the solemnisation of Marriage by a Priest, be not absolutely necessary to make it good and valid, upon which account we find all those to have been confirmed 
* See the Stat. of 12 Car. 2. c. 33. , which in the late miserable confusions had been made another way, yet is it of so great expediency, that I see not how any Christian State can introduce any other, and much less how private Persons can. For beside that the consunction of Marriage is the act of God 
‖ Mat. 19.6.  and not of the Contractors, and therefore most meet to be dispensed by those who are the Ministers of God to us in things pertaining to God, the thing itself is of so great importance, as to our whole life, that it cannot but be thought to require the blessing of the Priest to make it happy to the Contracters, and his exhortations to make it holy and unblameable. For, if so sacred a tie as Marriage be so lightly regarded, even when it hath the Solemnities of Religion to procure it respect and veneration, how may we think it would be contemned, if it were only looked upon as a civil one, as there is no doubt it would be, if it had not the Ministeries of Religion to accompany it. And accordingly as in this, and I think all other Christian Nations, the Solemnisation thereof is committed to the Ministers of Religion, so that it was so in the first and purest times of Christianity, is too evident from Ancient Records to admit of any the least doubt. For thus Ignatius, that most holy Man, and a Disciple of the Apostles, in his Epistle to Polycarp 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. pag. 13. edit. Voss. , another Apostolical Person, tells him. It becometh those Men and Women that Mary, to enter into that conjunction with the consent of the Bishop, that the Marriage may be according to God, and not according to lust. And Tertullian another Ancient Writer, and one of great Authority in the Church, in more places than one declares the same usage and belief. For not contented to say in his Book de Pudicitiâ 
* G. 4. Ideo penes nos occultae quoque conjunctiones, id est, non prius apud Ecclesiam professae juxta moe hiam & for nicationem judicari periclitantur. , That among them, even Clandestine Marriages, that is to say, those that were not professed before the Church were in danger to be censured next to Adultery and Fornication: in another Tract of his, he speaks yet more plainly, both as to the usage and the reason of it. How 
‖ Ad Vxor. lib. 2. c. ult. Vnde sufficiamus ad enarrandam felicitatem ejus matrimonii, quod Ecclesia conciliat, & confirmat oblatio, & obsignat benediclio, angeli renunciant, pater rato habet.  may we be able to declare the happiness of that Marriage, which the Church joins, and the Oblation or Sacrament confirms, and the Blessing seals; in sine, which the Angels (those he means which are present at, and behold our Devotions) proclaim, and our Father which is in Heaven ratifies. For neither upon earth do Children rightly and lawfully Marry, without the consent of their Parents.  
I observe, Fourthly, that as it is expedient, and in a more than ordinary manner, for Marriage to be celebrated by a Priest, so it is also expedient, and, where Authority hath commanded it, necessary to be solemnised with such significant Actions, or Ceremonies, as the joining of Hands, and the giving and receiving of a Ring. Because, though Marriage, and all other Contracts, may be made by Words only; yet they neither do, nor can make so firm an Impression upon the Minds either of the Parties or the Witnesses, as those visible Declarations do. Whence it is, that in all Civil Contracts almost such Actions as those have place, and Men think not themselves well assured, unless, beside a Declaration by Word or Writing from those with whom they have to do, they have also a Turf of that Land which they contract for, put into their Hands by the Seller, or at least those Deeds whereby it is conveyed. But what speak I of other Contracts, when even in this particular one they who professed themselves the Church's Adversaries, showed themselves to be at an Accord with it? For however that Convention which banished Marriage by a Priest, did also discard the Ring; yet they retained Joining of Hands, which is no less a significant Ceremony than the other.   

PART II.  
Of such Laws of Marriage as concern the preserving it inviolable, after it is contracted: and first of all, of such as respect both the Parties. Where is shown, first, That there is a Tie of Love upon both; and the Grounds of that Love declared: which are, first and chief, that Unity which Marriage conciliates; and secondly, its being intended as a Figure of that Affection which is between Christ and his Church. Of the Importance of that Love, and what the due Effects thereof are; which are shown to be, 1. The doing all things that may any way contribute to each others contentment; as, on the other side, the avoiding all things that may displease. 2. The seeking one another's Profit; the Means whereof are also declared. 3. The endeavouring each others Spiritual Welfare. 4. A mutual forgiving and forbearing, where Differences do arise. That there is a Tie of Fidelity, as well as of Love; the purport whereof is also declared. That the Married Parties are to give each other Honour; and particularly, what that Honour is which is due from the Husband to the Wife. In fine, That in respect to God, whose Institution Marriage is, they ought to possess their Vessels in Sanctification and Honour, as well between themselves, as toward others. An Address to the declaration of such Laws as concern the Married Parties severally; where is shown, upon the part of the Husband, that the Authority he hath over the Wife, is not coercive, but directive; that accordingly it ought to proceed rather by the way of Love than Empire; as lastly, to restrain itself to such things as are within the Bounds of Religion, and to such as are suitable to that Fellowship whereinto she is admitted; where the Management of Household Affairs is shown to be the Woman's Province. On the part of the Wife is shown, That she ought not in any measure to usurp Authority over the Man, but endeavour rather to gain him by Meekness and Compliance; That she ought to do him Honour both in Language and Gesture, and obey him in all things that are not contrary to Religion, or to that Condition of Life into which she is admitted by him. A more particular Declaration of the Duty of the Wife in the matter of Obedience; where is shown, That though she hath no Tie upon her as to such things as are contrary to Religion, yet she ought to be directed by her Husband in judging of Religious Matters, and, where they are not manifestly contrary to the Scriptute, to submit to, and follow his Advices; That though she be not under obedience, as to such things as are sitter for a Servant than a Wife; yet what is fit, or not fit for a Wife to do, ought not to be judged of by the Deportment of the most, and much less by the Caprichio's of her own Brain; but by the Example of Godly Matrons; That though the Management of Household Affairs be the Wife's peculiar Province, and therefore no proper matter generally for the Husband to interpose his Commands in; yet she ought to comply with him even there, where there is any just fear of his being discredited or undone by her evil Management. An Exhortation to the Married Parties, to perform their respective Duties.  
II. IT being so rare for Popular Discourses to entreat of the Duties of Married Persons, that it is almost become an Absurdity to mention them, I may perhaps fall under the Censure of Indiscretion, for going about to make them the Subject of mine, though the Design I am now upon do naturally lead me to it. But because I cannot give a satisfactory Account of the Nature of Adultery, and much less of the due Importance of that Commandment which forbids it, without entreating of the Laws of Marriage, which Adultery is a Violation of; and because, how nice soever Men are now grown, and how fearful soever of incurring the Censure of Indiscretion, St. Paul made no difficulty of interlacing almost all his Epistles with Discourses of it; lastly, because there is neither that Fidelity between some Married Persons, which the Divine Institution and their own Covenants, nor that Accord between others, which so intimate a Relation doth require; I hope it will not be looked upon by sober Persons as any Imprudence, if (as I have in the former Discourse shown what is necessary to the legitimate Contracting of Marriage, so) I make it the business of this to demonstrate, what is requisite to preserve it inviolable, after it is so contracted. In order whereunto, I will represent, 

1. Such Duties as are common to the Married Parties: And, after that, descend to  
2. Those which are peculiar to each of them.    
Now though what both the one and the other are, be competently evident from those Covenants into which the Parties enter, at the Solemnisation of Matrimony between them; yet because it is not impossible some Duties may be more obscurely expressed there, than will be requisite to give each of them a due understanding of them; and because those which are more clearly set down, will be looked upon as more forcible, if it can be made appear, that they have the Obligation of the Divine Command, as well as of their own Contract, to bind them on them; therefore I think it but necessary to investigate them by the purport of the Divine Commands, as well as by the tenor of their own Compacts.  
1. To begin with those which are common to the Married Parties, because the most natural Results of that intimate Conjunction into which they enter. Where,  
1. First, I shall represent the Parties loving of each other, as both their own Compacts, and the Divine Commands bind them. For, though Love be most usually made the Duty of the Husband to the Wife, as, on the other side, Obedience and Reverence that of the Wife toward the Husband; yet, as it is evident from St. Paul's enjoining the aged Women to teach the younger to love their Husbands, that Love is no less due from them, than it is from the Husband to them, Tit. 2.4. so the ground which he elsewhere assigns for the Husbands loving of the Wife, infers equally the returning of it by her. For, the Love of the Husband to the Wife being founded by him in that Unity, or Identity rather, which Marriage conciliates between the Parties, Ephes. 5.28. and so on; if the Wife be one with him, as well as he with her, there must be the same tie of Love upon her, as there is upon the Husband to her. Here only is the difference, that whereas the Husband, by the Prerogative of his Sex, hath no other tie than that of Love, which is the reason why the Duty of Love is in a manner appropriated to him; the Wife, because subjected to the Husband, is to temper hers with Reverence and Obedience: for which cause we hear so little of any Love to be paid by her, and so much of Reverence and Obedience.  
It being thus evident, that Love, how peculiar soever it may seem unto the Man, is yet alike the Duty of them both; proceed we to inquire, what is the due Importance of it. Where, first, no doubt can be made, but that it implies an inward Affection; as because Love, in propriety of Speech, denotes the Affection of the Heart; so, because all Effects, without it, are but Hypocrisy and Dissimulation. As little doubt is to be made, secondly, but that that inward Affection of Love is to exert itself in suitable Effects; partly because Love is naturally operative, and partly because St. Paul, where he exhorts Husbands to love their Wives, proposeth Christ's Love to the Church for the Pattern of it; which, as it was not without an inward Affection, so showed itself in effect; because, as the same St. Paul observes, prompting him to give himself for it. The only thing of difficulty in this matter, is, What is the Ground of that mutual Love, and what Effects it ought to manifest itself by.  
As to the former of these, much need not be said, especially if we have an eye to the principal Ground of it; the Words of St. Paul in the place before-quoted, no less than those of the Institution of Marriage, showing the ground of the Parties Love to be no other than that Unity into which the Divine Institution hath conjoined them. Only, as so much was necessary to be observed here, because the proper place for it; so, the rather to take them off from laying the main stress of their Love upon the Aimiableness, or other Qualities of those with whom they are so conjoined. For, as though these, and other such like, are a just ground of Love between them; yet they are neither the only, nor the principal ones: so, he who makes them such, is in danger of overthrowing that Love which God would have to be firm and stable: Because, however the Word of God may endure for ever, yet Beauty, and other such like Qualities, perish, and come to nought, and consequently draw after them the destruction of that Love which hath no other ground to stand upon. I say not the same of that Affection which is between Christ and his Church, of which St. Paul tells us Marriage was intended for a Figure; because, though that be not the principal Ground of Love, yet it is a necessary and a lasting one. For, inasmuch as Marriage was intended to represent that Affection and Unity which is betwixt Christ and his Church, that Affection and Unity ought in reason to be an inducement to ours, as without which we shall but profane the other.  
The Grounds of our mutual Love being thus declared, inquire we, in the next place, into the due Effects of it: Which are, first, the doing of all things that may any way contribute to each others contentment; as, on the other side, the avoiding of all things which may displease. Both the one and the other of which, as they are so easy to be understood, that it will be unnecessary to explain them; so they are, for the most part, such, that it will be much better to leave them to the Consciences of the Parties to inform themselves in, than to give any distinct explication of. It may suffice here to say, 1. That as Marriage was intended for such a Society as the Parties that enter into are by Nature most fitted for; so it cannot but be looked upon as a Violation of Marriage, and of that Love which it involves, to refuse that Society to each other. Again, Forasmuch as all Love, and particularly the Conjugal one, excludes the doing of any thing that may displease the Party loved; it will follow, that they who are entered into that State, are to avoid all unkind or contumelious Words, all contemptuous and injurious Actions, but more especially all such as may minister an occasion of suspicion to each other, of their having a greater Affection for a Stranger.  
Next to the Contentation of each other, subjoin we the seeking one another's Profit, as being a no less necessary Effect of Love, and of that Union that is between the Parties. For, as Love, where it is, naturally seeks the good of those whom it makes the Object of its Affection; so, by so much the more, by how much the nearer they are to it: but how much rather then, when they are in a manner one with it. Which, as it is the case of the Married Couple, who, by the Institution of the Almighty, are no more twain, but one flesh; so, being such, it must be looked upon as unnatural, not to have the same care for each other, not to seek each others Profit and Advantage. Because, however Men may sometimes have little regard to Strangers, yet (as the Apostle argues in the place before-quoted) no man yet ever hated his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it, even as the Lord the Church. Which place, as it is a convincing Argument of the Love they ought to have for each other, and, which is more, of seeking each othert advantage; so directs us withal to the Means they are to make use of, in order to the procuring of it: that is to say, providing for each others Welfare, whilst it is yet entire, by Food, and Raiment, and all other things that are necessary for their support; as, when it is any way impaired by Sickness or Trouble of Mind, endeavouring to restore it, by the application of inward and outward Remedies, by Advice, and Comfort, and Assistance. Both the one 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, enutrit, educat, sic Lexicographi.  and 
‖ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Hesych 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Idem. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc.  the other of these, as they are the purport of those Words by which St. Paul illustrates the Effects of the Husband's Love; so being alike common to each, as both the Union that is between them shows, and the aptitude that is in either to promote them. For, though the Care of Provision lies especially upon the Man, as being best fitted for it by ability both of Mind and Body; yet as the Woman oftentimes is in some measure fitted for it, and consequently under a proportionable Obligation to intent it; so there is a Provision within-doors, which is her peculiar Province, and without which the Provision of the Man will be of little or no avail, either for himself or her.  
But because the Married Parties are Spirit as well as Flesh, and no Provision can secure the Welfare of that, but that which Religion furnisheth; therefore it may not be amiss to inquire, whether that Love which ought to be between them, be not to extend itself also to the seeking each others Spiritual Welfare. For, though Marriage, in its own nature, look no farther than a Temporal one, as for the promoting whereof it was first ordained; yet, as nothing hinders, but it may be carried much higher, by the Precepts of Religion, and particularly of that which we have the Honour to profess; so, that it is so, we have not only the general Commands of procuring each others eternal Welfare, (and how much more than theirs who are so nearly conjoined to us?) but such as do more particularly direct the procuring of theirs who are united to us by the Band of Marriage. For, wherefore should St. Paul, 1 Cor. 14.15. direct the Wife, if she understood not what she had learned in the Public Assemblies, to ask her Husband at home concerning it; but that (as Bishop Davenant well argues) it is the Duty of the Husband to direct his Wife in Spiritual as well as Temporal Matters? Or the same St. Paul oblige the believing Wife to cohabite with an unbelieving Husband, upon the hopes of gaining him over to her Religion, 1 Cor. 7.13. but that he supposed it to be the Duty of the Wife, so far as in her lies, to procure her Husbands Spiritual Welfare? And indeed, as it is scarcely possible for those who have any great love for each other, not to desire and endeavour each others Welfare, in that which most especially concerns them; so they who remember Marriage to have been intended as a Figure of that Mystical Union that is between Christ and his Church, will not think they have paid a just Respect to that Mystery which it adumbrates, unless they endeavour to their power to make the Conversation of each other approach as near as may be to it.  
Lastly, Forasmuch as there is nothing more contrary to Love, or to that Union from which it results, than Strife and Contention between the Married Parties; it will follow, that it is their Duty, as well as Interest, to prevent them what they may, or, if they happen at any time to break out, to suppress them: The former whereof will be done by avoiding all occasion of Offence; the latter, by a mutual forgiving and forbearance, where such Offences do arise. Which whilst some Persons have imprudently neglected, they have but helped to make themselves miserable, and made the Yoke of Marriage as uneasy to themselves, as to those whom they designed to revenge themselves upon. It being not to be thought, they should reap any advantage to themselves, who either kindle or maintain a War within their own House and Bowels?  
2. To the Duty of Love, subjoin we that of Fidelity, which is another necessary Result of that Union which Marriage conciliates; he or she no less violating that Unity, who bestow their Affections upon a Stranger, than they who deny it to the proper Object of it. Upon which account, as Adultery must needs be looked upon as highly criminal, because violating it in that particular for which it was especially ordained; so also, though in a lower degree, the frequenting the Company of others, more than their own Consorts, or using more familiarity with them, than the Laws of Decency and Modesty do allow; in fine, the spending upon others any considerable part of their Estates, to the prejudice, or without the consent of the other Party; he who joined them so closely to one another, as to make them one Flesh, consequently forbidding all Commerce with Strangers, which either exceeds, or rivals, or prejudiceth that Commerce which the Society into which they enter obligeth the Married Persons to.  
3. Thirdly, As Love and Fidelity to each other are the indispensible Duties of the Married Parties; so also, though in a different measure, the giving each other Honour, according as they expressly stipulate. For the evidencing whereof, we shall need only to instance in the Deportment of the Husband to the Wife, because (as I shall afterward show) there cannot be the least doubt of Honours being to be paid to the Husband by her. Now, that the Husband is to give Honour to his Wife, is evident from that of St. Peter, 1 Pet. 3.17. where he exhorts the Husband not only to dwell with his Wife according to knowledge, but to give honour to her as to the weaker vessel. Which Words, as they are a convincing proof of that Honour which we have affirmed to be due to her from her Husband; so show the Honour that is to be given her, because the Honour of the weaker Vessel, to be such as is proper to that State in which God hath placed her under her Husband. The purport whereof is, not that the Husband should subject himself to her, who is but in some respects his Equal, and much less his Superior; but that, inasmuch as she is assumed into a Copartnership with him, he should treat her not as a Servant, but a Companion; and not only so neither, but as the Companion of such a Person, and according to his own Quality or Dignity; that he should permit her (as in reason he ought) to bear herself as a Mother over his Family, and not either subject her to, or abridge her the exercise of her Authority over it; in fine, that he should permit her, whilst she lives, to partake of his Worldly Goods, and after her and his Decease, to permit her Children to succeed into them. For, though I know, even among us, there are other kind of Bargains made, and such as do in truth make the Woman rather a Concubine than a Wife, as shall hereafter be more at large declared; though I know also, that in Germany there is a sort of Marriage wherein the Husband gives the Wife the Left Hand in stead of the Right; that is to say, expressly stipulates with her, not to take her as a Wife of equal Condition: by means of which, as 
* Vid Mylerum in Gamologia seu de matrimonio Personarum Imperii illustrium, &c citat. in le Journal de Scavans, part 1.  Mylerus observes, neither hath she all the Rights of a Wife, neither do her Children succeed either to the Father's Name, or Arms, or full Inheritance: Yet as I cannot but look upon such Matches among us, as a contradiction in adjecto, because the Husband in Marriage endows her with all his Worldly Goods; so, upon all such, whether here or elsewhere, as contrary to the Divine Institution of Marriage, and particularly to that Honour which St. Peter requires Men to exhibit to them. For, how are they either one with their Husbands, or in the esteem of Wives, which are set at so great a distance from them?  
I will conclude this part of my Discourse with a Duty, that is indeed alike common with the former, to each of the Married parties, but which hath not themselves, but God for the object of it: And that is, that, forasmuch as God is the Author of Marriage, they would, in respect to him, whose institution it is, possess their Vessels in Sanctification and Honour, as well among themselves as toward others. Which they shall do, if to give themselves to Fasting and Prayer, they shall for a time defraud one another with consent, as at all times use that moderation in their enjoyments, as may show them studious of more refined ones, and that reservedness and modesty in their outward deportment, which may neither tempt others to any impurity, nor censure the Divine Institution because of them.  
2. I have hitherto insisted upon such Duties as are common to the Married parties, and which for that reason it is to be hoped will not be distasteful to either of them. It remains that I entreat of those that are peculiar to each of them, and where, if any where, I must expect a censure from my Readers. But as that rarely happens to a Teacher, from the Sober and the Virtuous, where his own indiscrete managery thereof gives not occasion to it: so he must very much forget his own duty, and the dignity of his Employment, who shall value any thing of that nature, when coming from the Ignorant and Profane. Setting aside therefore any farther discourse concerning that, I will betake myself to my Task, and first of all to  
1. Those Duties which are peculiar to the Husband. I have heretofore shown, and shall by and by have occasion to confirm it; that God hath endued the Husband with Authority over the Wife, and commanded her to pay Obedience to it. But because it is not impossible Men may arrogate to themselves a greater Authority than ever God intended them, or exercise it more fully, and with greater rigour than they ought; therefore it may not be amiss in describing the peculiar duties of the Husband, to show him what kind of Authority he hath, how it is to be exercised, and about what.  
For answer to which, I say first, that the Authority of the Husband over the Wife, is not coercive but directive, that is to say, an Authority which privileges him to command, but not to constrain her to Obedience. For being given by God to Man, as a Companion 
* Malach. 2.14  and a helper, and, which is more, in such a degree as to become one with him; it is unreasonable to think he should have such a power over her, as to constrain her to a compliance by force and violence. A forcible Treatment degrading her from the condition of a Mate, and ranking her among Subjects or Servants. Neither will it suffice to say, that so also will the laying of Commands, because according to the usual saying, par in parem non habet potestatem, which is alike true as to Commands and Coertions. For beside that, by the Divine Institution, the Man is privileged to rule over her, as you may see, Gen. 3.16. beside that, in this case there is not a perfect parity, as the rule before spoken of shows; the power of Command is not only not destructive of the conjugal Society, but absolutely necessary to the maintaining of it. For, inasmuch as the Married parties may both entertain different apprehensions concerning such things as are to be done, and also take up different resolutions concerning them; if there were not a power of ruling somewhere, it would be in the power of either party to obstruct the common good of both. But as there is not the same necessity of a coercive Power, partly because the Husband hath the Law of God to back his Commands, and partly because not without a sufficient Power, from the Laws of the place he lives in, to be able to effect his own purposes: so it is perfectly inconsistent with that Society and fellowship, into which the Wife is assumed by him. It may suffice the Husband, that he hath the power of Commanding, and in case of refusal, that of Reproof and Admonition, as which, those of far less Authority are not excluded from: but other coercion than that no Law of God gives him, and is not therefore to be arrogated by him.  
The Authority of the Husband over the Wife being thus explained, and shown to consist in Commands, Admonitions, and Reproofs; proceed we to inquire how this Authority is to be exercised, the second thing proposed to be discoursed of. For the resolution whereof, though I might again take my measures from that Partnership into which we have said the Wife to be admitted; yet I shall choose rather to shape my Discourse by that Love, which the Husband is every where commanded to show her who is so admitted by him. For Love, where it is either finding, or making Persons equal, especially where there is not too great an imparity between the Parties, it will follow that the Commands or Admonitions of the Husband are not generally to be delivered in imperious terms, and such as savour more of Authority than Kindness: St. Paul having taught us by his own behaviour toward Philemon, that though a Man may have power to Command, yet, where that will serve the turn, for Love's sake he should rather entreat, and not so much constrain, as invite them to a compliance. I say not the same, where she whom God hath commanded to obey, shows herself utterly averse from a compliance. For in such a case, to be too officious were to make himself contemptible; and not only so, but that Authority which God hath vested in him: Only (as we learn from St. Paul elsewhere 
* Col. 3.19. ) even here also a mean is to be used: and though nothing hinders him to express himself in terms suitable to his own Authority; yet no Law, either of God or Man, allows him to be bitter against her.  
The third and last particular comes now to be discoursed of, even about what the Authority of a Husband is to be conversant, which, if we may judge of by the obedience the Wife is required to pay, appears to be every thing, as you may see, Eph. 5.24. But as the same Apostle elsewhere, where he entreats of that very Argument, adds by way of limitation, as it is fit in the Lord, Col. 3.18. thereby manifestly restraining the Authority of the Husband to all such things as are within the bounds of our Religion: so Reason requires the limiting it to such things also as are suitable to that fellowship into which she is admitted. From whence as it will follow, that the Husband ought not to impose upon her such things as are more proper for a Servant, or Vassal, than a Wife: so also that he is generally to leave the administration of Household affairs, to her alone care and management: Because, as I have often said, she is admitted into a Copartnership with him, which cannot well be salved, if that should be taken from her; and because both St. Paul, 1 Tim. 5.14. and the Laws of Nations appropriate the guiding of the house to her. According to that known Proverb which the Roman Matrons were wont to use, when they were brought home to their Husband's Houses; Vbi tu Caius, ibi ego Caia, Where you are a Master I expect to be a Mistress, and enjoy the privileges of such.  
2. Having thus shown the Duty of the Husband to the Wife, as to that Authority wherewith he is invested over her, it remains that we inquire what is due from her to him, as well in respect of his Authority, as her own necessary subjection to it. Now though that be easy enough to infer from the foregoing Discourse, and may therefore seem to require the less pains in the investigating of it, yet I think it not amiss, if it were only to observe a due proportion between them, to be as particular in the declaration of it, as I was before in that of the Authority and Duty of the Husband. In order whereunto I say,  
1. That inasmuch as God hath invested the Man with Authority over the Wife, it must be looked upon as highly irreligious in her to be so far from submitting to it, as, on the contrary, to usurp Authority over him: Such a Behaviour bidding defiance to the order of God and Nature, because not only thwarting, but perverting it. And accordingly as St. Paul not only proscribes it as a thing unlawful, but moreover represents it as a thing not to be suffered, 1 Tim. 2.12. So he hath also given us there to understand, what is to be thought of women's laying Commands upon their Husbands, of entertaining them with Reproofs, or offering violence to them. For if (as he there discourseth) it is not so much as lawful for them to take upon them to instruct their Husbands, how much less may we suppose it to be to command or check them, or, in fine, to offer violence to them; the two former being more apparent marks of Authority than Instruction, the latter of so high a nature, that it is not lawful from the Man to the Wife, though invested by God with Authority over her. It may suffice the Wife, where the Husband behaves himself otherwise than he ought, to expostulate with him in the most becoming terms, to exhort, entreat, and persuade him to an amendment; in fine, to endeavour it by the piety and winningness of her behaviour, and particularly by a meek and quiet spirit. For as other courses than such are not likely to prevail with Men that understand themselves, so St. Peter not only represents it as the means they are to make use of, to win those who obey not the word to yield obedience to it, but giveth hopes withal, by affirming it to be in the sight of God of great price, that it is the most probable means to procure it.  
2. Again, forasmuch as God hath not only invested the man with Authority over the Wife, but represented him as the head of her, even as Christ is the head of the Church, Eph. 5.23. it will follow as St. Paul infers, vers. 33. that she ought to reverence her Husband, and express it both in her behaviour and language; even as Sarah declared hers to Abraham, by calling him Lord, 1 Pet. 3.6. But from hence we may collect what is to be thought of those reproachful titles, which Women of haughty spirits do oftentimes bestow upon them. For if by the precept of the Scripture they are not to speak to their Husbands without respect, how much less may we think it lawful for them, to use such contumelious terms, as are scarcely fit to be given to a Slave?  
3. Lastly, Forasmuch as God hath not only invested the man with Authority, but obliged the Woman to yield obedience to it, it will follow not only that she is under a necessity of obedience, but of such an obedience also as is proportionable to that Authority wherewith we have said him to be invested. The result whereof is, that she is to obey him in all things that are not contrary to Religion, or to that condition of life, into which she is admitted by him. These three things only must be added to the former exceptions, as exceptions of those exceptions, or rather necessary explications of them.  

1. That though the Wife hath no tie upon her to comply with him in such things as are contrary to Religion, yet she is to be directed by him in judging of Religious matters, and where they are not manifestly contrary to the Scripture, to submit to, and follow his advices. For as there is not a more proper notion of that headship 
* Daven. in Vol. 3.18, 19  which is attributed to the Man, than that which imports a power of direction, so that that direction is to be understood with reference to Religious matters also, St. Paul plainly shows, 1 Cor. 14.35. he there obliging the Wife, if she doubted of the sense of any thing delivered in the public Assemblies, to ask her Husband at home, and if so, to take directions from him in doubtful cases. Which course (as a Learned Man 
* Dr. Tayl. Sermon on Eph. 5.32, 33. Part 2.  observes) hath this farther to recommend it, that though if she be deceived alone, she hath no excuse, because not attending to her instructor, yet if she should happen to be deceived with him, she hath much pity, and some degrees of warranty under protection of that humility and deference which she shows towards him, who is by God appointed over her.  
2. Secondly, Though it be true that the Wife is not under any tie of Obedience, where the things commanded by the Husband are more fit for a Servant than a Wife; yet as there may be a time (particularly that of Sickness) wherein the Husband and Wife both may be obliged by turns to be a kind of Servants to each other, so what is fit, or not fit, for a Wife to do, is at all times to be judged, not by the deportment of the most, which in each Sex are always the worst, and much less by the caprichi'os of their own brain, but by the examples of godly Matrons, as which are most likely to direct them best in judging of it.  
3. Lastly, Though it be true, that the management of Household Affairs is the proper Province of the Wife, and therefore no proper matter generally for the Husband to interpose his commands in; yet as no man is obliged to be imposed upon as to his own particular, or discredited, or undone by her to whom he is appointed as a head; so if there be any danger of either of these by her imprudent or wilful management of Affairs, there is no doubt in such a Case he hath Authority to control her, and consequently she also a necessity of submitting to it.   
Having thus shown at large the Duties of Married Persons, as well those which are peculiar to each, as those which are common to them both, nothing remains for me to do but to exhort them to a performance, and particularly of such duties as are peculiar to each of them. For, beside that by so doing they shall each of them comply with the Divine Commands, and (because that is a natural consequent of the other) procure the peace of their own Consciences; beside that they shall thereby consult the peace and welfare of themselves and families, which for want of a just compliance are oftentimes torn in pieces, and beggary and confusion introduced; the Married parties have this farther inducement to it, that they shall thereby provide for their own reputation, which is a thing that prevails often, where neither Interest nor Religion can. For what credit can it be to the Husband to domineer over his Wife, who as well by the weakness of her Sex, as by the Divine command, is obliged to subject herself to him? or what credit to the Wife to detract her Husband's just commands, or usurp Authority over him? when she cannot do either, without proclaiming herself to be proud and insolent, and her Husband to be a fool for permitting it. Which last title, if such persons cannot with patience hear others affix unto their Husbands, because of that straight tie which is between them; let them see how they will absolve themselves in their own breasts, who by their imperious carriage give occasion to the reproach of both. On the other side, when Man and Wife perform their respective duties, and his will looks more like a desire than a command, and her actions like the result of his will than of her own; when the Man avoids as much as may be the interesting himself in her affairs, and the Wife not only intermeddles not with such as are proper to his cognizance, but endeavours to approve herself to him in the management of her own: Lastly, when the Man treats the Wife as his associate, or rather as himself, and the Wife demeans herself to him, as her director and superior; then there is not only a happy compliance with the Divine Institution, and with one another, but a just foundation of universal applause: and all wise and good persons think themselves obliged to honour the Man for knowing how to temper his Authority so as to make it acceptable and pleasant, as the Wife for being able by the obligingness of her behaviour to transform him into an adorer of her, and make him change his sovereignty into kindness and condescension.   

PART III.  
Whether or no, and by what means Marriage may be dissolved, which are resolved to be no other than either the Death of one of the Parties, or Fornication. Of that Liberty which our Law allows to Marry again, where the Parties have been Seven Years absent from, and ignorant of each others being, which is shown to proceed upon the presumption of the absent Parties death. That Fornication is a just ground of dissolving the Marriage, and that nothing in God's Law hinders either the Innocent or Nocent Party to Marry again; but that the cognizance of the cause belongs to those who are in Authority. An Essay toward the showing that there is no other just ground of a Divorce than Fornication, or some uncleanness that is equal thereunto. This evidenced, First, in that among the Jews, where there was manifestly a greater Liberty, a Divorce proceeded not but upon supposition of something of Uncleanness. The like evidenced more fully from the words of our Lord in this affair. When other crimes appear, they ought either to be born, or a separation made only for so long time, till Time or God's Grace shall bring the Parties to a better mind. The matter of Divorce, rather of Permission than Command, and alike common to the Woman and the Man. A Transition to the Negative part of the Commandment, where is entreated first of all of that Adultery which lies on the side of the Married Parties, and the Man that is false to his Wife, shown to be as truly guilty of Adultery, as the Woman that is false to her Husband. The like evinced on the part of those by whom the Married Parties are debauched, with a large account of the criminalness both of the one and the other Adultery.  
III. WHAT is requisite to the due contracting of Marriage, or the preserving it inviolable, when it is so, enough hath been said to show in my former Discourses upon this Argument: it remains only that we inquire whether or no, and by what means it may be dissolved, which will cost no great pains to resolve. Not the former, because at the same time I point out the means by which it may be dissolved, I shall also prove it to be capable of being so; as neither the latter, because however men have been willing to find out others, yet Christianity generally allows only two grounds of the dissolution of it, the former whereof is the Death of one of the Parties, the latter Fornication or Adultery.  
1. Now that the Death of one of the Parties dissolves the Contract, and puts the living one in the same condition they were in before, is evident first of all from the expressed declaration of the Scripture. For not contented to say, Rom. 7.2. that the Woman which hath an Husband, is bound by the Law to her Husband, so long as he liveth: but if the Husband be dead, she is loosed from the Law of her Husband, which may be interpreted as to that relaxation which the Law of Moses gave: we find the like affirmation elsewhere, and with such an addition also, as shows it equally to hold under the dispensation of the Gospel. For St. Paul affirming, as he doth, 1 Cor. 7.33. that though the Wife be bound by the Law as long as her Husband liveth, yet if her Husband be dead she is at liberty to be Married to whom she will, only in the Lord, he thereby plainly intimateth, because entreating of the Marriage of Christians, that death dissolves the Contract, no less under the Gospel than the Law. The same is no less evident from the end of Marriage, and the terms of the Contract, at least as they are expressed among us. For both the end of its Institution being for the comfort of this present life, and the terms upon which it is contracted being expressly during the continuance of it; it followeth avoidable, that where the Society is interrupted by death, the contract must also fall, because intended only for the comfort of the present life, and covenanting for no more than the time of the continuance of it. The only thing on this head that can admit of any just scruple, is that liberty which our Law 
* 1 Jac. 11.  allows to Marry again, where the Husband or Wife shall be continually remaining beyond the Seas, by the space of Seven Years together, or where the Husband or Wife shall absent him or herself the one from the other by the space of Seven Years together in any part of his Majesty's Dominions, the one of them not knowing the other to be living within that time. But even this also, if duly examined, will not be found in the least to contradict the forementioned Precepts. For as it is necessary, in many cases, and particularly in the present one, to proceed by presumptions oftentimes, unless we would have very material controversies to remain undecided, which is not for the peace or interest of the world: so there is a just presumption of his or her death, where during so long a time, the party, that is certainly alive, knows nothing at all of the others being so.  
2. It being thus evident that Death dissolves the Contract of Marriage, and leaves the living Party to the liberty of a second Marriage, it remains that we inquire concerning Fornication, which we have affirmed to be another just ground of a Dissolution: where again we are to inquire, whether Fornication be such a ground, and whether it be the only one; both the one and the other of which will receive a solution from the words of our Blessed Saviour. For affirming (as he doth) that whosoever shall put away his Wife, except it be for Fornication, and shall marry another, committeth Adultery, and whoso Marrieth her which is put away, committeth Adultery, he both implieth that Fornication is a just ground of a dissolution, and declareth it to be the only one. The only difficulty that hath been made as to the first head, is, whether or no after such a Divorce there be a liberty to Marry again at all, or if so, whether for the Nocent as well as the Innocent. But beside that (to speak first unto the former) there appears not any reason, why, if Fornication be a just ground of dissolving the Marriage, it should not also leave a liberty of a second Marriage, after the dissolution of the former; beside that Divorces, both among the Jews and Heathen, were ever understood to have this effect, and therefore in reason to be so taken by our Saviour, unless he had otherwise declared himself to have intended: we may as well question by the words of our Lord, whether Fornication be a just ground of the dissolution of the former Marriage, as whether it makes way for a second. For arguing the unlawfulness of Divorces, except where they are for Fornication, from the Adultery which a second Marriage involves the Parties in, he plainly implieth liberty of Marriage to be a proper consequent of Divorce, and consequently, that where the Divorce is lawful (as it is for Fornication by the words of our Lord) the after Marriage also is. And though there be not as much reason for the liberty of the offending Party, because it is by their fault that the former Contract was rescinded: yet as it is evident that among the Jews both Parties were at liberty to Marry after a Divorce had passed; so I see not how by the Law of our Lord the knot of Wedlock can be tied to the one Party, though the offending one, and lose unto the other; the offending Party after a Divorce being no more to look upon the other as a Husband or a Wife, than the innocent Husband or Wife is upon the offending one as either. This only would be added, That though it be not unlawful by the Law of our Lord for the Divorced Parties to Marry, and much less for the innocent one; yet is the liberty of Marrying again of such dangerous consequence, in respect of the Collusion that may be between the Parties, where oftentimes they are alike weary of each other, that our Church hath thought fit to take sufficient Bond of them before Divorce, that neither of them should Marry again whilst the other lives. But whatever be the effect of a Divorce for Fornication, which is not so well agreed upon among Divines; most certain it is, which is a thing that would be added to the former Considerations, that not the Parties themselves, but they, who are entrusted with the Authority of God in Affairs of this nature, are to pronounce the Divorce between them; partly because it is God that joined them together, and partly because neither together nor apart are they competent persons to make that separation between themselves; It being not impossible, where the separation is desired by one only Party, for that Party to pretend Adultery in the other when there is no such thing, as, where it is desired by both Parties, to agree together to offend, that so they may have the liberty to espouse new and more desired loves.  
But because the Question is not so much concerning a Divorce for Fornication together with its effect or pronouncer, as whether there be any other just ground of the dissolution of Marriage, therefore proceed we in the second place, to make that also the subject of our enquiry, or rather to show that there is not any just ground of doubting in it. In order whereunto, the first thing I shall represent is, that though among the Jews there were a greater liberty as to this matter by the permission of God himself, yet even there, as appears from 
* Deut. 24.1.  Deuteronomy, a Divorce was not allowable, save where there was some Uncleanness in the Party Divorced. For how is it possible to think that Christ, who pretends to so much more strictness in this matter than Moses did, should allow of a Divorce for less than Fornication, when even Divorces among the Jews were not allowable, save where some kind of turpitude preceded? I observe secondly, that as there is reason to believe, both from the purport of Moses Law and our Saviour's setting his own above it, that less than Fornication cannot be looked upon as a ground of Divorce; so our Saviour, in the place before quoted, hath proscribed all other causes, save that of Fornication only. So that to make it out that there are other allowable causes of Divorce, it must be said, either that the Greek word is not rightly rendered Fornication, or that other sins are included in, or deducible from it. But beside that the proper notion of the Greek word is no other than Fornication, as that imports the highest act of Uncleanness, and consequently, where it is in a Married Person, that which we call Adultery; 
See Hammond's Six Queries, and particularly that concerning Divorces.  beside that the Christian Church have ever so understood it here, even by the confession of those who have endeavoured to oppugn it: where it is taken otherwise, as I deny not but it sometimes is, it either imports that which is above it, as unnatural Lusts, or is taken not strictly, but metaphorically; the former whereof, as it will not at all avail those who would find out some lower Causes of Divorces, so it is not to be imagined, that the latter should be of any force here, because our Saviour is discoursing of a Man's putting away his Wife; for the Ground whereof it is certainly more proper to assign a literal Fornication, as being an express Violation of the Marriage-Vow, than that which is but metaphorical, and consequently of less affinity with it. All therefore that remains to be said toward the evacuating the force of our Saviour's Testimony, is, That other Sins are to be supposed to be included in it, or deducible from it; it being not unusual for one thing only to be named, where others are intended to be understood. And indeed, if they who thus argue, mean no other than Sins of the same kind, and such too as are of as foul or fouler a nature than Fornication; so I think they should say nothing but what the Text itself would well bear, and the Suffrage of Reason warrant. For, as a better Reason cannot be rendered of our Saviour's making use of the Word Fornication in stead of Adultery, which is otherwise more proper, than that he intended under that name to comprehend unnatural Lusts, as well as the Act of Adultery; so Reason requires the looking upon such Sins rather as a ground of Divorce, which are not only of the same kind, but of a much more criminal nature than the other. But as the same is not to be said of lesser Sins, though of the same Species, because it was manifestly our Saviour's Design to set his Law above that of Moses, which allowed not of Divorces, where lesser Uncleannesses preceded not; so, much less is it to be said of Sins of another Species, though no way inferior in guilt to Fornication: because God, by whom the Married Parties are joined, and who hath commanded not to separate them without his leave, hath both in the Old Law and New restrained the making of Divorces to greater or lesser Uncleannesses. It may suffice, where other Crimes appear, for the Married Parties to bear with each other, where they are of such a nature as to be born; or endeavour by good advice the removal of them, 

Vxoris vitium tollas opus est, aut feras  
Qui tol lit vitium, uxorem commodrusculam  
Stbi praestat; qui fert, sese meliorem facit.   which will be most for each others advantage: as in like manner, where they are not to be born, as when they seek each others destruction, to separate from each other, till Time and God's Grace have brought them to a better mind. But other Course than that cannot be supposed to be lawful, because God hath restrained Divorces to the case of lesser Uncleannesses among the Jews, as among Christians to the greater ones. What should I tell you, that the Jewish Divorces, by the Sentence of our Saviour, were rather permitted than commanded; and permitted too, not so much out of the kindness of the Grantor, as for the hardness of the Jews Hearts, and for fear lest greater Mischiefs should ensue to the hated Party? That God professeth, by his Prophet Malachi, that he hateth putting away? and that our Saviour made no other Answer to his Disciples, when they inferred from this his Doctrine, that if the case of the Man were so with his Wife, it was not good to marry, than all Men were not able to receive it? These, and many other Arguments which might be alleged, showing an ill Choice, whether of the Man or of the Woman, to be, as Nazianzen expresseth it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an Evil which being got, is not to be let go, save where a far worse, even the Violation of the Marriagebed intervenes.  
But because (as was before intimated) the Judgement of Divorces is not permitted to the Parties concerned, but to the Governors of the Church, and I have all along made it my business to speak only to Private Persons, as which alone are under my inspection; therefore I shall add no more upon this Head, than that as Divorce for Fornication (which is the only allowable one among Christians) is not of command, but permission, and consequently left to the Prudence of the Married Parties, either to endeavour it, or not, as they shall judge most expedient; so the permission, whatever it is, is alike common to either Party, though it appears not to have been so among the Jews; not only the mutual Power which God hath given them over each other, so persuading (for how should a Divorce be more lawful to the one than the other, when by means of that Power which they have over one another's Bodies, the cause for which a Divorce is allowed, must equally touch both Parties?) but also a Passage of St. Paul, and the Practice of the Primitive Church, which is the best Comment both upon that and other Texts. Of which latter, as we have an illustrious Testimony, in the first Apology of Justin Martyr, who both tells of and commends a certain Christian Noblewoman, who sent a Bill of Divorce to her Adulterous Husband, after she had but in vain endeavoured to wean him from his Extravagances; so, that it was not without ground, even from the Principles of our Religion, that of St. Paul shows, 1 Cor. 7.10. For, what place were there for that Advice of his to believing Women, not to leave their Infidel Husbands, if they were pleased to dwell with them, if it were not lawful by the Christian Law, as well as by that of the World, for a Wife to part with her Husband at all, yea though Fornication gave occasion to it? In the mean time, as it is not to be denied, that those Matches shall be most happy, where a Separation shall be neither occasioned nor desired; so they shall act most agreeably to the Institution of Marriage, and the Laws of Christ, who shall know no other Divorce than that which shall make a Separation between a Man and himself, as well as between him and the Partner of his Bed.  
II. Having thus entreated of the Importance, Institution, and Laws of Marriage, and therein both given you an Account of the Affirmative part of the Precept, and cleared my Way to the Explication of the Negative; proceed we now, according to our proposed Method, to investigate the Nature, and show the Criminalness of that Sin which the Negative doth forbid.  
Now though what Adultery is in the general, be not at all difficult to explain, because it is agreed upon to be no other than the Violation of the Marriagebed; yet inasmuch as that Violation is not without some variety, in respect of the several Actors in it, in order to a more particular knowledge of it, it will be requisite to mark out the several ways whereby that Violation may be perpetrated. To begin with that Adultery which lies on the side of the Married Parties, as which is without doubt the most criminal, because all Adultery receives its denomination from them. Now, though Custom, which is the Master of Language, have in a manner appropriated the Title of Adultery to the falseness of the Wife, and to him that should solicit her thereunto; though the Roman Laws 
* Lactant. li. 6. c. 23. Non enim sicut juris publici ratio est, sola mulier adultera est, quae habet alium; maritus autem, etiamsi plures habeat, à crimine adulterii solutus est. Sed divina lex ita duos in matrimonium, quod est in corpus unum, pari jure conjungit, ut adulter habeatur, quisquis compagem corporis in diversa distraxerit. Vid. Notas Anton. Thysii ad locum.  have spoke the same Language, and absolved the Husband from the imputation of it, where he did not defile another's Bed; yet, as 
* Lactant. li. 6. c. 23. Non enim sicut juris publici ratio est, sola mulier adultera est, quae habet alium; maritus autem, etiamsi plures habeat, à crimine adulterii solutus est. Sed divina lex ita duos in matrimonium, quod est in corpus unum, pari jure conjungit, ut adulter habeatur, quisquis compagem corporis in diversa distraxerit. Vid. Notas Anton. Thysii ad locum.  Lactantius hath well observed, Christianity and Reason both require the charging it upon the offending Husband, no less than upon the offending Wife. For, it appearing both from St. Paul, and that Unity which Marriage conciliates, that the Woman hath no less power over the Husband's Body, than he over hers; and from the Terms of the Covenant into which they enter upon Marriage, that the Husband doth no less plight his Troth unto the Wife, than she to him: that Husband which shall offend, shall be equally chargeable with the violation of the Marriagebed, and consequently with the Crime of Adultery. And though it be not to be denied, for Reasons afterwards to be declared, that the Consequences of the Wife's Adultery are much more fatal than that of the Husbands: yet, as it is evident from the Premises, that the Adultery is the same in both, by reason of their mutual Interest in, and Obligation to each other; so there is very little reason 
† Lact. lib. 6. c. 23. Servanda igitur fides ab utroque alteri est; imo exemplo continentiae docenda uxor, ut se castè gerat. Iniquum est enim ut id exieas. quod praestare ipse non possis. Idem paulo post.— Cavendum igitur, ne occasionem vicits nostrâ intemper antiâ demus; sed assuescant invicem mores duo●●●n, & jugum paribus 〈◊〉 seront. Nos ipsos in al●●●● cog●●em●es, Nam fere in ho 〈◊〉 summa consist●●, ut non 〈◊〉 dieri, quicquid ipse ab al●●●● 〈◊〉 non possis.  for the Husband to exact that Fidelity of the Wife, which he himself is not careful to observe: Partly, because 
† Lact. lib. 6. c. 23. Servanda igitur fides ab utroque alteri est; imo exemplo continentiae docenda uxor, ut se castè gerat. Iniquum est enim ut id exieas. quod praestare ipse non possis. Idem paulo post.— Cavendum igitur, ne occasionem vicits nostrâ intemper antiâ demus; sed assuescant invicem mores duo●●●n, & jugum paribus 〈◊〉 seront. Nos ipsos in al●●●● cog●●em●es, Nam fere in ho 〈◊〉 summa consist●●, ut non 〈◊〉 dieri, quicquid ipse ab al●●●● 〈◊〉 non possis.  there is the same Tie upon them to each other, and aught therefore to proceed by the same Measures; and partly, because the Husband hath generally more Reason to restrain his exorbitant Passions by. From that Adultery which lies on the side of the Married Parties, pass we to that which lies on the side of those by whom they are corrupted: For, that that also is Adultery, the general use of the Word, and our Saviour's Interpretation of this Commandment, shows. For, subjoyning by way of Appendix to it, that whosoever looketh upon a Woman, or Wife, to lust after her, hath committed Adultery with her already in his heart; he thereby plainly shows, that Adultery is no less on the part of him that doth so corrupt her, than on the Wife who is corrupted by him. Here only is the difference, that though both violate the Marriagebed, yet she doth it more criminally, because obliged by Promise to preserve it spotless, which the other is not under the Obligation of.  
The Nature of Adultery being thus unfolded, and shown wherein it doth consist; proceed we, in the next place, to show the Criminalness thereof, which I shall do with respect to each of the Adulteries before spoken of.  
And first of all, if the Question be concerning that Adultery which lies on the side of the Married Parties, so we shall find Evils enough to sour all that Happiness which the Adulterer or Adulteress promise themselves from it. For, is it nothing, nay, is it not a Crime of a very high nature, to violate the Institution of the Divine Majesty, and make a Separation there, where he hath enjoined a strict and indissoluble dissoluble Unity? Is it nothing to violate that Faith which they have given each to other, and without the observation whereof, not only the Peace of Families, but even Humane Society, could not subsist? Is it nothing to rob each other of that Society which both the Divine Institution, and their own Compact, have given them an undoubted Interest in, and which is so inseparably theirs, that they cannot, even with consent, transfer the Right thereof unto another? Is it nothing, where all the tenderness imaginable is due, yea, such a one as a Man naturally hath for his own Flesh; is it nothing there, I say, to give the highest occasion of grief and distaste, and fill each other with those discontents which do not only destroy the Peace of the injured Party, but prompt them to Malice and Revenge? Is it nothing, in stead of that Honour which they are obliged to exhibit to each other, to repay one another with Reproach, and make their Partner, as well as themselves, the scorn of their Rival, and all contumelious Persons? Is it nothing, on the Man's part, to derive his Estate from his Wife and legitimate issue, toward the maintaining of a strange Woman, and the Product of her Lust? as, on the Woman's part, to bring a Bastard-brood to inherit the Estate of the Legitimate; and not only so, but bring those Legitimate ones into the same suspicion of Bastardy, and rob them of their Honour, as well as of their Substance? Lastly, is it nothing to turn that which was designed by God as a Figure of the Mystical Union that is between Christ and his Church, into the unhallowed Rites of Venus; and not only profane the Divine Institution of Marriage, but that much better Union which it was designed to represent? But if any, or all of these be something, as undoubtedly they are, yea, Crimes of a high Nature, I will leave you to guests, how foul that Falsehood is which is the unhappy Parent of them all. The Adultery of the Married Parties being thus dispatched, pass we to that of those by whom they are corrupted: which, as it is equally criminal, where they themselves are under the same Band of Marriage; so doth not fall much short of it, where they are free from it. For, beside that they give occasion to all those Evils which we have affirmed to be the Consequents of the Falsehood of the Married Parties, they are not themselves without a share of almost all those Impieties which they tempt the Married Parties to. If we inquire concerning the Divine Institution of Marriage, it is no less violated by them than by the other, because separating between those whom God hath made one: if concerning the injured Party, they are in a great measure the Authors of his Sufferings, because invading his Bed, and bringing his Person into reproach; in fine, because robbing his Children of their Subsistence, and, which is more, oftentimes of their Father's Love and Care, as well as of the Honour of their Birth. Lastly, If we inquire concerning that Sacred Mystery which Marriage was designed to represent, their Impurity offers an affront to it; and at the same time they solicit the Married Party to profane it, they profane it themselves, by abusing them to Lust and Intemperance: All which, whosoever shall consider, will find Adultery to have somewhat more than the breach of one Commandment to make it odious, as being in truth an Affront to God and to Humane Nature, to the greatest Mystery of our Religion, and the chiefest Band of Humane Society. And accordingly, as among the Heathen 
* Sharrock. Judicia, seu legum censurae de variis incontinentiae speciebus, c. 1. art. 2.  Adultery hath been sometime time punished with Death, and that too with such Circumstances as were more terrible than Death itself; as moreover Liberty hath been given to the injured Party 
‖ Agelli. Noct. Attic. li. c. 10. c. 23.  to kill the Adulteress in the Act of her Uncleanness, and not to stay for the Formalities of Justice to wreck his Revenge upon her; lastly, as by the Jewish Law Capital Punishment was adjudged to it, and both the Adulterer and the Adulteress commanded to be put to death, Deut. 22.22. so Christianity, though in another way, hath showed itself as severe against it, and those who are the Committers of it; St. Paul having in more places 
† 1 Cor. 6.9. etc. Gal. 5.21.  than one reckoned it among those Sins which they who do, shall not inherit the Kingdom of God. Which however to the generality of Men it may appear a light Censure, because they rarely consider any thing which is not exposed to their Eye or Touch; yet, as it cannot but be otherwise thought of by those who have a Prospect of the World to come, and that Eternity of Weal or Woe which it infers: so the Adulterer and the Adulteress will be forced to confess it, when they shall not only find themselves shut out of that Kingdom, but, which follows necessarily upon the former, have their unhallowed Fires punished with a more scorching and continual one.   

PART IU.  
Of the Sins that are included in that which is here expresty forbidden; which are shown to be, All preternatural Lusts, as being alike or rather more contrary to the Institution of Marriage; All Incestuous Mixtures, the unlawfulness whereof is further declared; The defiling of a Person betrothed, Simple Fornication and Concubinacy, the unlawfulness of the former whereof is evidenced from its contrariety to the Institution of Marriage, and to the Positive Laws of God, both in the Old and New Testament: And, in fine, All Excesses even in Lawful Mixtures. The like unlawfulness, even by the force of this Commandment, evinced in lesser Vncleannesses. and in the Incentives either to those or greater ones: Of the former of which sort are, The unclean Desires of the Heart, All such Looks, Gestures, or Touches as result from them; as also, All unclean Communications: Where moreover is shown, against Tully and the Stoics, that there are such Expressions as are really dishonest, and their Objection against it proposed and answered. Of the latter sort are Sloth and Ease, Luxury or Excess in Meat and Drink, Converse with Persons of lose or immodest Behaviour; and, in fine, the reading of lose Books, listening to impure Songs, or resorting to offensive Plays: Whereunto is subjoined, as an Antidote against the ●emptations to Uncleanness, the rather fleeing from the consideration of them, than going about to combat with them ●● and the setting before our Minds the excellency of the Pleasures of the Mind, above those of the Flesh or Body.  
IT being impossible, on the one hand, to discharge that Duty we own to God, without marking out all those Sins which this, as well as the other Commandments, doth forbid; and it being little less than impossible, on the other, to enter into a just Discourse concerning them, without leaving some kind of Pollution upon the Minds of those to whom it is directed; I have thought it the most prudent, as well as most pious way of procedure, to hold a middle course, and neither be altogether silent concerning them, nor very particular in the handling of them. Which persuasion I am the more confirmed in, as because Men may with less danger to the Public fetch the Resolution of extraordinary Cases from the Mouth of those of whom they are commanded to seek the Law, so because what is generally necessary to be known concerning the Vices here forbidden, may be easily inferred from what we have before said concerning the Nature, Institution, and Laws of Marriage. For, if the Divine Laws do not only set Bounds to the Enjoyments of Marriage, but proscribe all Enjoyments out of it; all those must be looked upon as unlawful, which shall be found to be without it, or to pass those Bounds in it which the Divine Majesty hath set. Besides, having not only entreated at large of the Nature, Institution, and Laws of Marriage; but, as occasion offered itself, pointed out also several of the Violations of them: I have left little else for myself to do, than to make a more exact and orderly enumeration, and to add such farther Arguments against the Sins it forbids, as were not before taken notice of by me.  
III. Having snewn at large, in my last, the Nature and Criminalness of Adultery; to which I know nothing to add, unless what was then also insinuated, that Adultery hath place, not only where the Marriage which is violated continues undissolved, but also where it is dissolved for a less cause than Fornication: it remains that we inquire, Whether any other Sins are included in the Prohibition of Adultery, and what those Sins are.  
Of the former part of this Quaerie much need not be said, after what hath been produced to show the Comprehensiveness of the Decalogue in the general. For, it being evident from a former Discourse, that the Decalogue, or Law of the Ten Commandments, was intended as a Summary of the several particular Laws set down in the Book of God (as Philo 
* De Decalogo. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  also hath observed) we are in reason to understand the Prohibition of Adultery to include in it all such Sins as are of the same kind with it, or leading to it. The only thing which it will concern us to inquire, is, What those Sins are; which therefore I come now to investigate.  
1. And here, in the first place, I shall not doubt to reckon, as included, the prohibition of all preternatural Lusts; such, I mean, as are transacted between a Man and a Beast, or between those of the same Sex. For, beside that God hath provided against these by special Laws, and not only so, but condemned the respective Offenders to suffer death, as you may see Leu. 20.30, etc. beside that before the Law, he made Sodom and Gomorrha a desolation, for thus following after strange flesh; and that too (as St. Judas hath observed) to deter us by their example, ver. 7. of that Epistle: the unlawfulness, or rather prodigiousness thereof, is sufficiently evident from the Institution of Marriage, and the prohibition of that violation of it, which is now before us. For, God having not only at first appointed Man and Woman to be Associates to each other, but forbidden also the adhering to any other Person than those which we have joined ourselves to in Marriage; he must consequently be thought much more to forbid, because more contrary to his own Institution, the defiling of ourselves either with other Creatures, or those of our own Sex. But because (God be thanked) how depraved soever we are in other Particulars, such Crimes as these are rarely heard of among us, it shall suffice me to represent that of St. Paul to the Romans, where he censures such Extravagances as these, as vile and unnatural, and such as God suffered the Heathen to fall into, as a just Punishment of their Idolatry. For, for this cause (saith he) even because they changed the Truth of God into a Lie, God also gave them up unto vile affections: for even their Women did change the natural use into that which is against nature: and likewise also the Men, leaving the natural use of the Woman, burned in their lust one towards another, Men with Men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet, Rom. 1.26, 27.  
2. But neither shall I say much of Incestuous Mixtures, that is to say, where Persons assume to themselves, though in the Band of Wedlock, such as are too near of kin to them, and particularly those that are to them in the place of Parents, or stand upon the same level with them. For, beside that (as was before observed) God hath provided against such Uncleannesses by special Laws, and they therefore, by the Rule before laid down, to be reckoned to this Prohibition; beside that (as was before also observed) they pervert the Order of Nature, and destroy that Reverence which is due from Inferiors to Superiors, by the Law of Nature, and this of Moses: that such Mixtures are no less unlawful to Christians, St. Paul evidently declares, in the Case of the Incestuous Corinthian; he, by virtue of Christ's Power, and his own Apostolical one, commanding to deliver him up unto Satan, which undoubtedly he would not have done, if it had not been a Transgression of the Christian Law. And though it be true, that all that hath the Name of Incest, is not of the same Nature; as particularly, when the Man marries his own Sister, or Brother's Wife: yet as there want not Instances among the Heathen 
* Ocellus Luc. De naturâ Vniversi. parte pol. text. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Vid. not. Vizzanii ad locum.  of the dislike of such Matches, and particularly of that of Brothers and Sisters; so they are sufficiently prejudiced by the Inconveniences they draw after them, and such as the Light of Nature prompts us to avoid. For, beside that if Marriage were permitted betwixt such as are so near of kin, that free and continual Intercourse that is between them, would, in all probability, take off that Shame which is the Guard of Chastity, and prompt them to unlawful Desires and Enjoyments; it would also, as Philo 
‖ De special. legibus. Ti 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  expresseth it, (from whom I have borrowed both the one and the other Reason) shut up within the Walls of a Private Family, that Charity and Communion, which might otherwise diffuse itself to Continents and Islands, and, in fine, to the whole World: Marriage with Strangers (as the same Philo goes on) producing new Relations and Kindred, and such as fall not short of that which nearness of Blood produceth.  
3. From Unnatural and Incestuous Mixtures, pass we to that which is neither, but comes up more close to the Crime that is expressly forbidden; I mean, the defiling of a Person, which though not married, yet is betrothed to another. For, beside that she and her Paramour, no less than the Adulterer and Adulteress, are commanded by God to be put to death, Deut. 22.23, 24. which shows, that their Crimes are of near affinity with each other; the Reason there given of God's severity to the Defiler, is, because he had humbled his Neighbour's Wife; plainly intimating, that as when Persons are betrothed to each other, though they have not passed the Solemnities of Marriage, yet they are in the account of God as Man and Wife; so being such, both she and her Paramour are by the same God looked upon as Adulterers, and consequently direct Transgressor's of this Commandment. This only would be added, (because what Betrothing is, is not commonly understood, as being little used among us) that by Betrothing we understand not a Promise of future Marriage, according as it is vulgarly taken; but the actual passing over that Interest they have in themselves, to those to whom they are so betrothed, and receiving back a Power over them: As if a Man should say to the Woman, I take thee for my lawful Wife; and the Woman to the Man, I take thee for my lawful Husband. For though a promise of marriage may oblige to the performance, if it be not rescinded by the joint consent of both Parties, yet it doth not actually pass over to the Party, to whom it is made, that Power which we have over our own Bodies, and consequently neither makes the Parties promising to be in the Relation of Man and Wife, nor is that Betrothing which we speak of.  
4. How the sins before mentioned are reducible to this Commandment, hath been at large declared, together with such other Reasons from the light of Reason and Nature, as show them to be really criminal: Inquire we therefore in the next place what is to be thought of simple Fornication, that is to say, where the Offenders are both single Persons. Where first of all I shall take it for granted, that it is to be looked upon as here forbidden, if it can be otherwise made appear to be an unlawful Lust, because as was before said, this, and other the Commandments of each Table, were intended as Summaries of the Law of God, and of its several both Precepts and Prohibitions. Now that simple Fornication is an unlawful Lust, and as such to be avoided and abhorred, will appear first, from what we have before said concerning the Institution of Marriage. For it appearing from thence, that God hath appointed that, as the means whereby both to prevent the evils of Solitude, and to propagate the World, all other Commerce must be looked upon as forbidden, and particularly that which simple Fornication doth involve; this (as Grotius observes) not only being distinct from Marriage, but driving Men from it, because promising them the same satisfaction at an easier rate. I observe secondly, that as simple Fornication is inconsistent with the Institution of Marriage, and as such therefore to be looked upon as unlawful, so it is directly contrary to the Laws of the same God, by which the Decalogue was given; there being not only an express prohibition that there should be no Whore of the Daughters of Israel, Deut. 23.17. but command given by God for the stoning of that Damsel, which should be found to have been corrupted before Marriage; because, as there follows, she had wrought folly in Israel to play the whore in her Father's House, Deut. 22.21. And though I know it hath been thought that there was not the like prohibition of the use of stranger Women, which, if true, would have absolved the Men from the imputation of Fornication, where an Israelitish Woman was not their complice in it, yet as the Proverbs of Solomon set a Brand upon such Persons, and upon all communication with them, so that such a Fornication was no less interdicted than that with Israelitish Women, St. Paul plainly shows, 1 Cor. 10.8. he there ascribing that slaughter which we read of in the 25th. of Numbers, to the Israelites committing Fornication with the Daughters of Moab, and exhorting those he wrote to to take warning by their Example. But so that the more sober Jews were also persuaded, is evident from Philo 
* Philo. tractatu 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ubi sanctum illum virum introducit, sic importunitati herae suae repugnantem. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  and 
‖ Maimonid. More Nevochim, part. 3. c. 49. Ad impediendum itaque ista mala, & è contrà ut hoc bonum promoveatur, distinctio scil. familiarum, prohibitae sunt meretrices & meritorii vel cyvadi, nec ullus concubitus per missus est, nisi cum propriâ uxore, quae publicè in matrimonium ducitur.  Maimonides, both the one and the other representing all cohabitation as unlawful, which was not within the state of Wedlock. Now though from the unlawfulness of simple Fornication among the Jews, it be not difficult to collect that it is much more unlawful among Christians, because our Saviour came not to destroy the Law but to fulfil it, and particularly as you may see, Mat. 5.27, 28. as to that Commandment we are now upon; yet because there want not more direct proofs of the unlawfulness thereof among us, than any we have before produced, I think it not amiss to add them unto the former, and so much the rather because all we can allege will be little enough in this licentious age to stop the progress of it. Now that there want not such proofs of the unlawfulness of Fornication among Christians, is evident from several places of the New Testament, such as are that of 1 Cor. 6.18. and Heb. 13.4. in the former whereof St. Paul tells us, that neither Fornicatours, nor Adulterers, shall inherit the Kingdom of God: in the latter, the same St. Paul, or whoever was the Author of that Epistle, that Whoremongers and Adulterers God will judge: For as the word which we render Fornicatours and Whoremonger, signifies properly the former, and is not therefore to be construed in any other sense, where there is not something in the Text to determine it otherwise; so, that it is to be taken in that sense which our Translatours affix to it, is evident in each of the places alleged; St. Paul both in the one and the other distinguishing it from Adultery, as in the latter opposing it to the state of Marriage, and consequently neither denoting any deviation from the worship of the True God, which is sometimes, though Metaphorically, the sense of the word Fornication, nor yet any irregularity in contracting Marriage, such as is an Incestuous Match, which is at other times the signification of it. But neither is there less force in that of the same St. Paul, 1 Cor. 6.18. where he doth not only command fleeing Fornication, which is in reason to be construed in the proper sense of the word, because he speaks immediately before of a Man's joining himself to an Harlot; but moreover represents it as a defiling of the Temple of God, which whosoever doth, God will be sure to destroy. All which whosoever shall consider, will easily believe that simple Fornication is unlawful, as well as Adultery, or any other act of Uncleanness: For what other Fornication can be supposed to be intended, where an Harlot is made the object of it, and Men are moreover, in the beginning of the next Chapter, commanded to Marry to avoid it? And though it be true, that the Law of Nature affords not such evident proofs of the unlawfulness thereof, as of Adultery; yet as they, who had no other light to guide them, saw enough in it to make them detest it, as the sinners themselves to oblige them to hid their wickedness; 
* Chrysipp. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Verba sunt, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Vid. Origen. adv. Celsum, li. 4. p. 206.  Chrysippus giving us to understand, that such kind of cattle at first exercised their Trade out of Cities, and were wont to cover their Faces with a Veil, that in process of time they threw away their Veils, but were not suffered to enter into Cities till after the World came to be more depraved: so, that the Light of Nature is not without some proof of its unlawfulness, is evident from those inconveniencies, which naturally arise from the permission of it; the Children of such mixtures through the uncertainty of their Father, being apt to be rejected by all her Paramours, or at least not to be provided for by any, with that affection and care which is due from a Parent to a Child. Neither will it avail to say that that inconvenience may be avoided, by appropriating such a sinner to a Man's self. For though I deny not that such an one may be faithful to her Paramour, and thereby give no real cause of the uncertainty of his offspring: yet as there is little reason for any Man to hope it of her, who hath so little consideration of her own reputation, as to take up so infamous a Trade; so it cannot at all be hoped for, unless there be a Covenant between the Parties, which makes it little different from a Marriage, but however rather a Concubinacy than a Fornication. Which, that I may add that by the way, though it have not much from Nature to oppugn it, yet is contrary to the Institution of the Almighty; that, as was before said, not only requiring the union of the Man unto the Woman, but such an union also as might procure her respect as well as fellowship, and a right of participation in all he had. The former whereof as Concubines could not lay claim to, who are made by the Civil Law 
* L. Item legato, Sect. Parvi D. de legate. 3. Parvi autem refert, uxori an concubinae quis leget, quae ejus causa empta parata sunt, sane enim nisi dignitate nibil interest. Vid. & L. Donationes D. de donationibus.  to differ from a Wife in Dignity, according as the Judicious Hooker 
‖ Eccl. Polity, li. 5. Sect. 73.  hath also observed; so, that they were devoid of the latter, the small Portions their Children were put off with show; the Scripture telling us of Abraham, Gen. 25.5, 6. that whereas he gave all that he had to Isaac the Son of his lawful Wife, he gave only gifts to the Sons of his Concubines, and sent them away from him.  
5. Lastly, (for Adultery is a fruitful crime, and comprehends not only all Deviations from the Institution of Marriage, such as Fornication and Concubinacy, but also all Excesses in it) he who is immoderate 
† Adulter est uxoris amator acrior.  in his love toward a lawful Consort is no less an Offender against this Commandment than he who placeth it upon an unlawful one; both the one and the other arising from an intemperate 
* Philo de special. leg. pag. 600 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  appetite, which converts even our Meat and Drink into a sin, and taking us off from more spiritual pleasures.  
Of the grosser sort of Uncleannesses what hath been said may suffice, and therefore so far of the Commandment that forbids them. But because (as hath been more than once intimated) the lesser sort of sins are forbidden in this Commandment, as well as the greater, and together with them, all Incentives to them either in ourselves or others; therefore, to make my Discourse complete, I must make them also the subject of my enquiry, and both discover and censure them. And here in the first place I shall make no difficulty to represent, that the  desires of the Heart are no less forbidden by the Commandment, than any of the expressions of it; partly because the consent of the Heart is that which corrupts even our outward actions, but more especially, because our Saviour himself hath told us, that he who looks upon a Woman to lust after her, hath committed Adultery with her already in his heart, Mat. 5.28. But neither, secondly, shall I make any difficulty, upon the score of the foresaid affirmation, to represent as forbidden all such looks, gestures, and touches, as result from such irregular desires. For if, as our Saviour there intimates, but St. Peter 
* 2 Pet. 2.14.  doth expressly affirm, the Eyes may be full of Adultery, there is no doubt the same charge may fall upon the Lips or Hand, if they be guided by the same inordinate passion. There is less doubt, thirdly, especially after the Declaration of Christianity, of the prohibition of the Uncleanness of the Tongue; St. Paul exhorting in one place to lay aside all filthy communication, Col. 3.8. as in another, to wit Eph. 5.4. All filthiness, and foolish talking, and jesting which are not convenient: in fine, that they should not suffer any corrupt communication to proceed out of their mouth, Eph. 4.29. And though I know the Stoics, who were otherwise a Grave and Sober Sect, made little, or rather no account of such kind of expressions, they arguing (as Tully 
‖ In Epist. ad Papirium Paetum. li. 9 Ep. 22  tells us) that if there were any expressions really dishonest, they must become such, either by the subject matter of them, or the words themselves; the former whereof could not be, because the same thing might be honestly enough expressed in other words, as neither the latter, because the very same expressions might in another sense commendably be used, both which the same Tully doth at large exemplify: though therefore I say, the Stoics made not account at all of such expressions, yea moreover represented the dislike of them as foolish and unreasonable; yet as they could not for all their subtlety draw the generality of Men into their opinion, nor I am persuaded satisfy their own Consciences; so, that that Argument of theirs was vain and fallacious, may appear from hence, that beside the principal Idea 
† Vid. Lafoy Logic, ou, L'Art the Penser. 1 Party. 13 Chap.—  or notion of words, there is oftentimes an accessary one, which doth not only much vary the signification of them, but give them a different estimate in the World. Thus for example, though to say you lie, signifies no more in the principal Idea of it, than to say you know the contrary to what you speak: yet inasmuch as in the estimate of the World which gives Laws to Speech, it doth moreover connote the Speakers contempt of him he gives the lie to, it is justly looked upon as a more reproachful expression, and accordingly so resented in the World. In like manner, though unclean expressions contain no more in their principal Idea, than what is or may be expressed in more civil ones; yet inasmuch as together with that they do also connote that pleasure which they give to our corrupt Nature, the Idea whereof will be apt to excite irregular motions and desires in the Hearers, they are justly looked upon as vile and abominable, and as such to be abhorred by all modest and civil Persons. Which said, I shall answer more directly to that Dilemma of the Stoics, by which they seem to themselves to have driven all Modesty out of the World. For be it, which is the proof of their first allegation, that the thing couched under unclean words may be honestly enough expressed in others; yet it will not thence follow (which is the thing they desire to infer from it) that an expression can receive no pollution from the subject matter of it, and consequently, as to that particular, is not capable of being unclean. For though that which is the matter of unclean words, may be honestly enough expressed in other, if you consider it as to the substance or principal Idea of it; yet can it not so, if you take in also the modus or accessary Idea, which is that which makes an expression to be unclean. Again, though it be also true, which is produced for the proof of the second Allegation, that that expression which is looked upon as dishonest in one sense, may yet be commendably used in another; yet will not that at all avail to show that no expression can be dishonest, which is the thing for which the dilemma is produced; because we do not pretend to evince the dishonesty of an expression from the sound it gives, but from the sense which is couched in it, which therefore where it is different, may give it a different estimate, and at the same time it makes it dishonest in one sense, make it to be looked upon as commendable in another.  
But not to insist any longer upon the forementioned Argument of the Stoics, because however it may have amused some Persons, yet it hath hardly convinced so much as themselves, (so great a disgust is there in Nature against all impure and immodest expressions) I will choose rather to go on to show the incentives and occasions of Uncleanness, as which we are no less obliged to avoid. Of this nature is Sloth and Ease, because disposing the Body to it, and giving the Devil an opportunity to frame our Minds to the approbation of it: Of the same nature is Luxury or Excess in Meat and Drink, because exciting, nourishing, and corroborating our Natural Propensions to it. Of the same nature again is converse with Persons of lose or immodest behaviour, as by whose Example or Communication it will be almost impossible not to be depraved: Of the like, the reading of lose Books, or listening to impure Songs, or resorting to offensive Plays: The two latter, by how much the more grateful they are to our Sense, and Passion, and Understanding, becoming so much the more pernicious, when instead of ministering to the ends of Virtue, and an innocent Pleasure to which they are admirably fitted of themselves, they are forced to serve the purposes of Ribaldry and Profaneness. And though that may perhaps be thought to be no furtherer of Uncleanness, but on the contrary the repressor of it; yet Reason as well as Experience shows, that to combat an impure Temptation when it is strong and present, though with never so rational Arguments, doth rather irritate than extinguish it; because we cannot frame our Minds to dispute against it, but we must bring its allurements into our view, which under such circumstances will prevail above all our Reason and Resolution. The most safe, as well as most easy method of Conquest is, to fight as the Parthians do fleeing, and either to run from them into Company or to other Thoughts; which if we do, we shall not only defeat theirs and the Devils purposes, but be thereby better qualified to look them afterwards in the face, and not only avoid but subdue them. Such are the Incentives to that Impurity which is here forbidden, and which therefore it will concern us as much as in us lies to avoid; as it will also to take care, lest we draw upon us the guilt of other Persons, by ministering these or other such like Incentives to them. In which number, as there is no doubt an immodest attire is to be reckoned, as by which Women of ill Fame seek to train unweary Persons into their Snares; so what is modest or immodest is to be judged of by the custom of the place, and by the example of Religious Persons in it.  
I will conclude this Discourse, and my explication of the Commandment, with an admonition to set before you the excellency of the pleasures of the Mind above those of the Sense or Body. For as it is for want of this consideration, that Men pursue the latter with so much earnestness, as if there were not only no pleasures comparable to them, but none beside them; so they would be quickly taken off both from that conceit and pursuit, if they adverted only to the duration of the other. For whilst the pleasures of Sense by being repeated become dull and insipid, that I say not also irksome and afflictive, the pleasures of the Mind, and particularly that of Knowledge, increase with their enjoyment, and do not only not satiate our appetite but intent it.    

THE EIGHTH COMMANDMENT.  
THE EIGHTH COMMANDMENT.  
Thou shalt not steal.  

PART I.  
The Contents.  
The Explication gins with a discourse concerning Property, which this Commandment both supposeth and professeth to maintain. That defined to be such a Right or Title, by which the thing enquired after doth so become one either Person's or Societies as to its use or emolument, as not to be common to them with others: And is either with a power of Alienation, as all plenary Properties are, or without, as the possessions of Usufructuaries properly so called. Enquiry is next made what foundation it hath in Nature, which is shown so far to enforce it as to persuade the introducing where it is not, and the confirming and cherishing it where it is: As is made appear both as to those things which are immediately instrumental to our support, and those which are only mediately, and by virtue of what they do produce; the former being wholly useless, where they are not impropriated, as the latter not likely to have their due cultivation otherwise, or be peaceably enjoyed. Property more truly resolved into the Divine Institution, and particularly into that grant of Dominion which was made to Adam first, and then to Noah and his Sons. The Properties of Men as they now stand resolved into those original Grants, The disposition of the Divine Providence, and, where they have been before filled, into the will also of the precedent Possessor. An Answer to such Objections as are made, either against the being of Property, or our way of establishing it. As to the former whereof is shown, that the Community which was in the Primitive Church was neither of Divine Institution as to it, nor induceth any Obligation upon the present: As to the latter, that Dominion is not founded either in Power or Grace. That Dominion is not founded in Power is evidenced from its supposing Men at liberty to seize upon what they please, without consideration of those who have the same Interest: Which is both contrary to that love which Men ought to have for one another, and destructive of that Community which it supposeth. That Hypothesis which found'st Dominion in Grace evidenced to be alike unsound, from the dishonour it doth to God who professeth himself to be kind to the unthankful and the evil; to our Religion, which is thereby made to serve to evil and covetous purposes; and (because Grace is a thing not easily to be known, or made out) to uncertainty, contention, and confusion; in fine, from Gods subjecting the believing Servant to the unbelieving Master, the believing Subject to the unbelieving Prince, yea, obliging him to pay Tribute to him out of his own. An Inquiry whether the Properties of Men are limited, and what those Limitations are. That they are limited by God, is made appear, from that Original Grant of Dominion which God made to Adam and Noah, and the Laws he hath since made concerning the Use and Disposition of them: such as are those which enjoin Sobriety, the honouring of God and his Priests with our Substance, and the being charitable to the Necessitous. The Properties of Men alike limitable by those that are in Authority, so far as their own Necessities, and those of the Public do require; but not so by private Persons, without their own consent.  
THOUGH I am well ware I shall find work enough in explicating the Nature, and investigating the Species of those Sins which are forbidden in this Commandment; yet I foresee it necessary, even to the right stating of those, to premise something concerning Property, which the Interdict of Stealing doth suppose. For, Stealing being nothing else but the clancular taking away of that which is another Man's, neither can we suppose such a Sin as Stealing, unless there be such a thing as Property; nor judge of the Quality of the Theft, without respect had to that Property which it is an interversion of. Taking it therefore for granted, that to the due knowledge of the Nature of Stealing, it is necessary to have a competent one of Dominion or Property, I will allot this Discourse to the Investigation of it, and accordingly inquire, 

1. What Property is.  
2. What Foundation it hath in Nature.  
3. By what means it was at first introduced.  
4. By what ways Men do now come to attain it. To which I shall subjoin, in the  
5. Fifth place, The Examination of those things which have been alleged either against the Being of Property, or for the establishing it upon other Principles.  
6. And lastly, inquire, Whether the Properties of Men are subject to Limitations, and what those Limitations are.    
1. Of the Nature of Property much need not be said, at least as to that sense wherein we are to take it in this whole Discourse: It may suffice therefore to define it to be such a Right or Title, by virtue whereof, the thing enquired after doth so become one, either Persons, or Societies, as to its Use or Emolument, as not to be common to them with others; and is either with a Power of Alienation, as all plenary Dominions or Properties are; or without it, as the Possessions of Usufructuaries, properly so called, and other such like imperfect Properties. The only difficulty will be, as to the Foundation it hath in Nature, its Original, and the Means of acquiring of it, with other the things before proposed.  
2. For the resolution of the first whereof, we must distinguish of such things as are immediately instrumental to our Support, and such as are only mediately, and by virtue of those things which they produce or maintain. If the Question be concerning the former, of which sort are Food, and Raiment; and the like; so, no doubt, Reason and Nature do so far enforce a Propertyin them, as the Necessities of Nature do require. For, the Life of Man being not to be supported, without such an Application of them to ourselves, as makes them perfectly useless to others; there will arise a necessity of appropriating such a Portion of them to every Person, as may suffice to the support of him. And though I will not affirm as much concerning those things by which the former are produced or maintained, of which nature are Trees to the Fruit, and the Earth to those and all other the Supports of Humane Nature; yet I shall not stick to maintain, that the same Nature dictates the expediency of a Property, and persuades to the observation of it: Partly, because if Men had not distinct proportion in the Earth, from whence all the Supports of Humane Lise receive either their Being or Subsistence, they would not be overforward to give it that Cultivation which it requires, as fearing lest what they had so cultivated should be reaped by others; and partly, because men's Necessities and Desires being in general the same, there would otherwise, especially since the Peopling of the World, have arisen among Men perpetual and irreconcilable Discords, concerning the enjoying of those Benefits which it affords. But other Foundations in Nature, as it will be hard to find, so I think it extremely vain to seek; because (as I shall by and by show) Property had its Original from Divine Institution, and because those Principles which I have alleged from Nature, may suffice to persuade those to whom the Divine Institution is unknown, to introduce it where it is not already, and to confirm and cherish it where it is.  
3. It being thus evident what Foundation Property hath in Nature, proceed we to inquire, how it was at first introduced. For the resolution whereof, though it be commonly alleged out of the Ancient 
* 
Justinus historicus, li. 43. statim ab initio. Italiae cultores primi Aborigines fuere, quorum Rex Saturnus tantae justitiae fuisse traditur, ut neque servierit sub illo quisquam, neque quicquam privatae rei habuerit, sed omnia communia & indivisa omnibus fuerint, veluti unum cunctis patrimonium esset. Cicero de Officiis, lib. 1. Sunt autem privata nulla naturâ: sed aut veteri occupatione, ut qui quondam in vacua venerunt: aut ofctoriâ, ut qui bello potiti sunt: aut lege, aut pactione, conditione, sort. Virgilius Georgicorum lib. 1.  
Ante Jovem nulli subigebant arva coloni,  
Nec signare quidem aut partiri limit campum  
Fas erat; in medium quaerebant— De eodem saeculo Seneca, in Octavia. Act. 2.  
— Pervium cunctis iter,  
Communis usus omnium rerum fuit.   Heathen, and particularly the Poets, that all things at first were common unto all, and continued so to be, till either the Prevalence of some had appropriated what they pleased to themselves, or the general Consent of Mankind, led thereto by the former Considerations, put them upon a distribution of them: yet, as 
† Instit. Divin. li. 5. c. 5 Quod Poetae dictum [illud nempe prius citatum ex Virgilio] sic accipi oportet, non ut existimemus nihil omnino tum fuisse privati; sed more Poetico figuratum, ut intelligamus tam liberales fuisse homines, ut natas sibi fruges non includerent; nec soli absconditis incubarent, sed pauperes ad communionem proprii laboris admitterent.  Lactantius hath well observed, that possibly nothing else was meant by that ancient Community, than that the Men of elder Times were so liberal, as to admit the Poorer sort to a participation of their Possessions and Labours, all Expressions of Poets being not strictly to be understood; so, that there was such a thing as Property from the beginning, even by the Institution of the Divine Majesty, I doubt not to make appear from that first Grant of Dominion, from which it may seem more rational to infer a Community. 'Tis in Genesis 1.28. and the Words these. And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth, as well as over the Earth itself. For, beside that Man and Woman are by the Institution of the Divine Majesty but as one Person, and therefore that Dominion which God gave to Adam and Eve to be looked upon rather as a Property, than a Community, (whence it is, that in the repetition of this Grant to Noah and his Sons, there is not the least mention either of Noah's Wife, or of theirs; which in all probability there would have been, if they had had an equal Interest in it with their Husbands, or were to be looked upon as distinct Persons from them) beside this, I say, the Woman being by the condition of her Sex subjected to the Man, makes her rather an Usufructuary, than a Proprietary strictly so called, or as an inferior Proprietary under a Chief, by means whereof there is not so much a Community, as distinct but subordinate Properties. Now, as that Property wherewith our first Parents, or rather the one of them, was invested, gave them Authority, under God, to dispose of it to their Children, according as they themselves should judge expedient; so, that they did accordingly dispose of it, and that too in distinct Properties, the Story of Cain and Abel shows; the former whereof, as the Book of Genesis 
* Ch. 4.2. etc. & Seld. Mare Claus. l. 1. c. 4.  informs us, had  and Meadows for his Property; the latter, Tillage and Corn. For, that these were not only their Employments under their Father, but their Properties, appears by their bringing of each for an Offering, and passing them away, as well as having an inspection of them. Now, though what hath been said concerning Adam, sufficiently shows what the Original of Property was, and by whom and after what manner it was at first introduced; yet because Humane Kind had as it were a second Beginning in Noah, all but him and his Family being destroyed by the Flood, I think it not amiss to show the same to have been the Original of Property, amidst this second Race of Mankind. To the evidencing whereof, though that of Genesis may seem very repugnant, where renewing the forementioned Charter of Dominion, God directeth it to Noah and his Sons, Gen. 9.1, 2. whereby this lower World may seem to have been given to them in common; yet as it is not easy to suppose God would make Noah and his Sons equal, because that would have taken off from that Reverence which was due unto the Father; so, that Noah did not look upon himself as such, the Blessing which he pronounced upon Japhet shows, Gen. 9.27. For, the Blessings of Fathers being anciently with Authority, and conferring those Advantages which they pronounced, Noah blessing Japhet with the enlarging of this Borders, shows him not to have been without Authority of enlarging or confining them. Whence it is, that though in the Old Testament there be no mention of Noah's interessing himself in that Division of the Earth which was made between Noah's Sons, in the tenth Chapter of Genesis; yet a Tradition hath prevailed, (as Mr. Selden 
* Mar. Claus. l. 1. c. 4.  observes out of Eusebius and Cedrenus) that Noah, by direction from the Almighty, was the Author of it, and consigned it to them by his last Will and Testament; admonishing them moreover, that no one should invade his Brother's Territories, nor do any injury to him. Which is the more probable, because otherwise Dissensions might have risen among them, which it is not to be supposed but so good a Father as Noah would provide against; and much less is it to be supposed, but the God of Peace and Order would. This only would be added, though more than once before insinuated, that though God made those two Heads of Mankind the Proprietors of this sublunary World, yet not so as to licence them to confine it wholly to themselves whilst alive, or to make any other distribution of it after their Deaths, than the Laws of God and Reason should allow. For, beside that this Charter of Dominion is by God directed to Noah and his Sons, which cannot by any means be salved, unless they had a Title in him; both in that and the former Grant, premising the Admonition of Increase and multiply, and replenish the earth, to that Charter of Dominion which he gave them over it, he thereby plainly intimated an Obligation in those two great Heads of Mankind, to impart of that Dominion to their Posterity, and a Right in that Posterity to enjoy it: As indeed without them neither could they have subdued the Earth, nor exercised that Dominion over it which they had. The Result of which Observation is, that all the Descendants of Adam and Noah have a natural Right in it, as being given not only to them, but in and by them to their Descendants, or (as the Psalmist hath expressed it, Psal. 115.16.) to the children of men.  
4. But because whatsoever Distribution was made in those elder Times, it is certain that the Bounds of men's Possessions have been often and greatly confounded, by that Avarice and Injustice which have since overspread the whole Earth; but however, there are no Records extant of Donations and Successions, whereby Men might be assured of the Legitimateness of their several Acquisitions: therefore it will be necessary to inquire, in order to our own particular satisfactions, by what means Men do now come to have a Property in their several Estates. For the discovery whereof, not to tell you, because that is sufficiently apparent, that God being the Great Landlord of the World, men's Proprieties, and the Modifications thereof, must receive their Being from his Will; as neither, because that is alike evident from the Premises, that the distinction of Properties is of his own blessed Institution: I shall choose rather to inquire, how this Will of his may appear, as to the several Properties we either do or may enjoy. In order whereunto, I will inquire, 1. Concerning such Lands or Goods as are without any present Possessor; or, 2. Such as are already occupied. If the Question be concerning such Lands or Goods as are without any present Possessor, so the common Consent of Mankind hath attributed the Right to those who should first possess themselves of them: And not without reason, if we remember, that such Impropriations are not only not displeasing to the Divine Majesty, but of his own Blessed Institution. For, being so, it is but reasonable to think it to be the Will of God, that those should have the Property of it, to whom he by his Providence hath both made the first Discovery, and given the opportunity of possessing themselves of them. Whence it is, that things left, or thrown away, do by the same general Consent of Mankind become the Property of the Finder; as in like manner things casually lost; unless either the Owner thereof doth appear, in which case it doth not, because (as the Lawyers speak) there was in the Owner a Purpose of retaining it, which is by the same Law of Nations a kind of Possession; or it be otherwise determined by the Laws of the Place we live in, by which, as I shall afterwards show, men's several Properties are tempered and bounded. But because the World is already so fully Peopled, that there is little room for such kind of Acquisitions, especially in that Part of the World in which we inhabit; therefore it may not be amiss to inquire rather concerning Property in those things which are already possessed, both as to those that do possess them, or desire the possession of them. Concerning the former whereof, as much need not be said, after I have already shown you, that the seizing upon any thing that is free, becomes the Property of him that seizeth it; so, much less of such Possessions as are by the Lawyers called Bonae fidei, or such as do not appear to have been acquired by any evil Arts: It being to be presumed to be the Will of God, that those should have the Property of any thing, who are not only without any evil Arts, but by the course of his Providence put into the Possession of it. And though the same be not to be said of such Possessions as are acquired by evil Arts, because, though the Providence of God may pass for a Declaration of his Will and Approbation, where it is not contradicted; yet it cannot be looked upon as such, where it crosseth his Revelations, because those are both the Primary and most direct Interpretations of it: yet there are two things which may and must be said, as to the evidencing of that Property which we have said to arise from them. 1. That Possession, of what sort soever, is to be esteemed good against him that is not able to show a better; and consequently, that the evil Arts whereby any Man hath attained it, cannot excuse him from Sin who shall either fraudulently, or violently, endeavour to take it from him. 2. That Possessions which they call of Evil faith, if corroborated by the continuance of some Ages, (but how many, must be left to the Laws of the Place, or the Law of Nations, to determine) may give the Possessor a Right or Property in them: As because otherwise there would be little Security to the Consciences of Possessors, considering the great and violent Alterations that have happened in all States and Kingdoms; (For, 
Majorum primus quisquis fuit ille tuorum,  
Aut pastor fuit, aut illud quod dicere nolo.)   
so also because there would otherwise arise endless Controversies about Possessions: both which Inconveniences it is to be supposed the God of Peace and Order hath provided against. To all which we may add, That as it is God who sets up one and pulleth down another, so it is in reason to be presumed to be his Will to keep both the one and the other in their several Conditions, when he gives him whom he hath advanced so long a continuance in his Station, and suffers not the other in all that while to be able to remove him from it.  
From the Possessor of any thing, pass we to the Expectant of it, and inquire by what means he may come to have the Property of it. In order whereunto, I say, first, That it must be ordinarily by the Act of the present Possessor of it. For, the Possessor of any Estate acquiring thereby a Property in it, that is to say, a Right whereby the thing possessed is so his, as not to be common to him with others; it is necessary to its becoming the Right and Property of another, that he who hath the present Property, transfer that Property of his unto the other, whether it be by Gift, as all Deeds and Legacies; or by Contract, whether explicit or implicit; the former whereof is, when Men either sell or mortgage their Property for a Valuable Consideration; the latter, when they oblige themselves to an Act, as for example, to the Payment of a certain Sum of Money, which is not to be attained without the Alienation of the other, either in whole or in part: he who so obligeth himself, because otherwise the Obligation would be null, tacitly contracting to part with so much of his Property as will satisfy the Obligation he hath taken upon him. Ordinarily therefore no Man can acquire the Right and Property of another, without the Act of the Possessor of it. But, as it may sometime happen, that the Party may pass out of this World, without making any such Act, in which case it doth not only cease to be his, but naturally falls to the next of Kin, it being to be presumed, that it was the will of the Person dying to have it so, as being most obliged to gratify them; so it may also happen (as I shall afterwards show) that the Party may by some Misdemeanour forfeit that Property of his to the State, of which he is both a Member and a Subject. In which Case, though without, yea against his present will, the Property of the Delinquent may accrue to the State, and by it be either preserved in its own power, or passed over to another. This only would be added, That even such a Translation cannot be said to be altogether without the will of the Person that offends: For, every Man, either expressly or tacitly, binding himself to submit to the Penalty of the Laws of that State of which he professeth himself to be a Subject, doth, eo nomine, where the Penalty is the Forfeiture of his Property, consent to the transferring of it, and consequently makes it the Property of another.  
5. Having thus shown as well that there is such a thing as Property, as by what means it was at first Instituted, or comes now to be acquired; I think it not amiss, for the clearing both of the one and the other, to examine those things which have been alleged against the Being of Property, at least under the Times of the Gospel, or for the establishing it upon other Principles.  
There are who supersicially considering that place in the Acts of the Apostles, where it's said, that the multitude of those that believed were not only of one heart, but had all things common, have from thence made bold to conclude, That the Law of Christianity obligeth all Believers to have all things common among themselves. In answer to which, not to tell you, that Example is no Law, and consequently, that the Practice of those first Believers doth not induce an Obligation; as neither (though I might) that what may be of force in a Society, which is but yet in its beginning, ought not to be drawn into example in a settled one: I shall choose rather to allege a Passage in the same place, which shows this Community of theirs to have been the Result of their own free will, and not of necessary Obligation: That, I mean, which was uttered by St. Peter to Ananias, who sold his Possessions upon a pretence to make them common to other Believers. For St. Peter demanding, Acts 4.5. Whilst it remained, was it not thine own? and after it was sold, was it not in thine own power? plainly shows, that Christianity did not oblige them to renounce their Properties, but that they might, if they had so pleased, for any thing in Christianity to the contrary, have kept their Lands as they were; or, after they had sold them, kept the Prices of them.  
But because that Dust which hath been raised in this Argument, doth not arise so much from the questioning of a Property, as from the proper Bases upon which it ought to be established; I will, without more ado, apply myself to consider of two Hypotheses, which have been set up in opposition to my own; whereof the former found'st Dominion in Power, the latter in Grace and Piety. As to the former of these, much need not be said, because it doth not only proceed upon the supposition of such a Community as never was, but doth farther suppose Men at liberty to seize upon what they please, without consideration had of those that have the same Interest: Which is not only contrary to that Love and Affection which the Sons of Men ought to have for one another, as the Product of the same Common Stock; but destructive of that very Community which it supposes. For, if all Men have an equal Right to all Things, they are in reason to take such a course for the accommodation of Affairs between them, that all Men may have their due proportion; which must be by permitting the Determination to the Judgement of the major part, or to the more impartial Arbitrement of a Lot. Otherwise, they do not only challenge an equal Right with other Men, but suppose their own to be the best, which destroys that Community which they suppose. And though it should so happen, as in such a Community no doubt it may, that a Man should be constrained by force to assert his own Proportion; yet as Reason and Nature forbids the use of such a Remedy, till it do appear that more mild ones will not succeed; so it ought not to be employed to the vindicating of any thing which is above the Proportion of him that useth it. For, if all Men have an equal Right to every Thing, every Thing is to continue in its Community; or, if that cannot be done without prejudice to every one, they are of necessity to agree upon a Distribution, but however not to challenge above their Proportion in it. But because this Hypothesis is so wild and extravagant, that a Man must throw off his Reason, as well as his Religion, before he can assent to it; I will proceed forthwith to the consideration of the other, which found'st Dominion in Grace and Piety.  
Now though this Hypothesis looks more demurely than the other, because clad in the Habit of that which of all others doth most deserve our Respect; yet as it hath little countenance from that Religion which it dissembles, so it is equally pernicious to it with the former, and particularly to the Christian one. For the evidencing whereof, I will allege, first, the dishonour it doth to its Author, upon whose Honour the Reputation of Religion doth depend. For, whereas there is nothing which God more challengeth to himself, or is indeed more worthy of him, than the being kind to the unthankful and to the evil, causing his Sun to shine upon the evil and the good, and sending his Rain upon the just and the unjust; that Hypothesis which found'st Dominion in Grace, confines this Love of his to the Good and Just, and consequently spoils him of that Noble Prerogative of his Nature, in being kind to the unthankful and rebellious. But neither is it less dishonourable to that Religion which we profess, if we consider either the Spirituality of its Motives, or the Peaceableness of its Principles. For, whereas our Religion professeth to allure Men, not by the Bait of Earthly Pleasures, but by the more noble Pleasures of the Mind, and that Spiritual Happiness which consists in the Sight and Enjoyment of God; thereby removing all suspicion from itself, of seeking to promote itself by mean Arts, or standing in need of them: that Hypothesis which found'st Dominion in Grace, subjects the Purity of Religion to the mean Enjoyments of the World, and makes it look more like a Design upon men's Estates, than upon their Souls. Again, Whereas our Religion professeth nothing more than the procuring of Peace, as well of the Professors thereof with one another, as with those that are Strangers or Enemies to it; that Hypothesis which found'st Dominion in Grace, is so far from contributing to it, that it hardly leaves place for Peace even within our own Bosoms. For, true Peace being so secret a thing, that we cannot certainly understand it in another, and not without difficulty in ourselves; if (as a Learned Prelate 
* Bramhall's Vindication of himself and Episcopal Clergy, from Mr. B's Charge of Popery, c. 1.  doth well argue) Grace should give every one that pretends to it an Interest in that which is another Man's lawful Possession, no Man's Title could be certain to another, scarcely to himself: From whence must necessarily follow an incredible Confusion, and an inevitable Perturbation in all Estates. To all which, if we add, that God hath expressly subjected the believing Subject to an unbelieving Prince, and the believing Servant to the unbelieving Master; that he hath moreover enjoined the former to pay Tribute to his unbelieving Prince, as an Acknowledgement of that Authority which God hath given him over him: so we shall not only be fully convinced, that Dominion is not founded in Grace; but that somewhat else was intended in that, and such like Texts, which assure us that the meek shall inherit the earth, which are the most plausible Grounds of that Hypothesis. And indeed, as such like Promises are necessarily to be understood with subordination to God's Glory, and the eternal Welfare of our Souls, (both which are oftentimes more promoted by Poverty and Afflictions, than by the affluence of Temporal Benefits) partly, because otherwise they would be rather a Curse than a Blessing, and partly, because, in the strict understanding of them, they are but rarely fulfilled to the Meek; which would undoubtedly not have happened, if God, that cannot lie, had meant them in the literal notion of the Words: so, whatever be the sense of them, they rather show what the meek Person may promise himself from God's Providence, than any Right in him to challenge it from the World, and much less possess himself of by force. Such Actions as those being very inconsistent with that Meekness to which the Inheritance of the Earth is promised.  
6. But not to insist any longer on the subversion of an Hypothesis, which will find little credit among any other than the Indigent and Discontented; as neither among them, any longer than till those Indigences and Discontents be removed; I will choose rather, following the Method before laid down, to inquire whether the Properties of Men are subject to Limitations, and what those Limitations are.  
It is a common Opinion, at least amongst the Vulgar sort, that when they have acquired a Property in any thing, it becomes so entirely theirs, that they cannot at all be abridged in it without injury. Now, though I am willing to believe, that those who are so persuaded, understand this Absoluteness of theirs with reference only to Men; yet I think it not amiss, and so much the rather, because all just Limitations of men's Properties are originally from God, to show, first, that they are limited by God, and how they are limited by him.  
That they are limited by God, needs no other Proof than that Original Grant of Dominion which God made to Adam and Noah, and those Laws which he hath since given concerning the use or disposition of them. For, inasmuch as that Original Grant was not to the Persons of Adam and Noah only, but to all that descended from their Loins, as appears from the preceding Discourse; it will follow (as was there also shown) that all the Sons of Men have a natural Right to a Portion of it, and consequently, that particular Properties are limited by the Necessities of those of the same Stock; whether it be by obliging the Owners to impart of them to those their needy Brethren, or, as I shall afterwards show, by warranting the Necessitous, in the faileur of all other Means, to extort so much from the other, as may serve to the Support of them. But neither is it less clear from the Laws which God hath since given, that men's Properties are limited by the Almighty. For, a Law, where it is imposed, retrenching men's Liberty, as to that particular which it enjoins; if God hath prescribed Laws concerning the use or disposition of them, our Property will be so far limited, as the Laws which are imposed do direct. All therefore that will be requisite to do, will be to instance in those Laws, which will at the same time acquaint us how they are limited by him. Of this nature is, first, that Law which enjoins Sobriety; a Law which is no less written in the Hearts of Men, than in the Divine Scriptures. For, Sobriety being nothing else than a Moderation in our Enjoyment of those Good Things which he hath given us, he who prescribes such a Moderation, doth consequently so far retrench our Property, which consists in a Right to use and enjoy them. Of the same nature are those Laws which require the honouring of God with our Substance; whether as in the Old Law, by offering part of it in Sacrifice; or as in the new, by imparting of them to those who minister about Holy things: He who prescribes such a Law, so far impairing men's Properties, as the Service of Religion doth require. Lastly, Forasmuch as the same Law of God doth enjoin ministering to the Poor out of them, that Right which we have to use and enjoy them, must be so far retrenched, as the Law of Charity doth exact.  
But because, how unwilling soever Men may be to have their Properties limited by the Divine Majesty, yet they will be ashamed to speak it out; therefore proceed we to inquire, whether or no, and how they may be limited by Men; which is a Confinement Man can less patiently endure. In order whereunto, I will entreat first of all of Princes, and then of less Public Persons.  
Of the Authority of Princes in this Affair, no doubt can be made; as because that Law of God which constitutes them, empowers them to lay a Tribute upon their Subjects; so because every Man doth, either expressly or tacitly, stipulate to contribute toward the Support of that State whereof he professeth himself to be a Member: by means of which, though their Properties come to be limited, yet it is in effect by themselves. Again, Forasmuch as the Public Weal, as well as Charity, requires the Support of those who have not wherewithal to maintain themselves, hence it comes to pass, that it is in the power of those to whom the Care of the Public weal is committed, so far to abridge the Properties of Private Persons, as the Necessities of those distressed ones shall require, whether it be by permitting the lose Ears of Corn to the gathering of the Poor, as the Custom of all Christian Nations doth prescribe; or by exacting a Contribution from their Purses, by means of which such a part of their Properties passeth over to the Poor, and the Proprietary himself, and not they, becomes a Thief for detaining it. In fine, Wheresoever the Public Good cannot be either procured or maintained as it ought, but by setting Limits to, or serving itself of the Properties of particular Persons, there, no doubt, it shall be lawful for those who have care of it, both to set Bounds to, and serve themselves so far forth of them: He who prescribes any End, consequently warranting the use of such Means as shall be found to be conducing to it. Which said, nothing remains to be enquired into, but whether the Properties of Men may receive a Limitation from more Private Persons. To the Affirmative whereof, as no Man hath or can pretend, save where he who conferred them hath affixed a Limitation, or the Proprictary himself hath consented to it; so, in each of those Cases no doubt a Limitation by Private Persons is not only possible, but reasonable: It being but just (because the natural Consequent of Property) that he who invests another Person with it, should have the modelling of his own Grant; as, on the other side, that they who consent to any such, should be bound up by it: He who consents to any Limitation, making it his own Act, and consequently receiving no Injury by it.   

PART II.  
Of the Negative Part of the Commandment, which is shown to import the not usurping upon, or any way diminishing of our Neighbour's Property. This evidenced, not from the force of the Word Steal, which is acknowledged to signify only the clancular taking away of that which is another's; but from the general Design of the Decalogue, the Comprehensiveness of the two foregoing Precepts, and the Fundamental Reason of the Prohibition of Theft. An Address to a Declaration of the Crimes that are included in it; which are such as are distinguished from each other, either by the manner of their commission, or by those Objects about which they are conversant. Of the former sort is, 1. The Theft of the Heart, or that Covetousness whereby it is inclined to commit it; as is made appear, both by God's having a principal regard to the Heart, and the Analogy of the two former Commandments. 2. That Usurpation which the Tongue is instrumental to, whether by its Silence in the concealing of Defects (where is shown, what Defects may, or may not be concealed) or by its Expressions; such as are those who put too fair a Gloss upon our own, or cast a Disparagement upon the Commodities of others. 3. The Theft of the outward Work, which again is made to consist in the taking away, or detaining, or corrupting the Properties of our Neighbour. Under the first of these are ranked, all open and violent Rapines, the using unequal or deceitful Measures, the making use of false Lights, or other such like Artifices; the wearying a Man out of his own with unjust Vexations, the exacting or taking of immoderate Use; where is shown withal, that all Use is not unlawful: and, in fine, the monopolising of Commodities. The detaining or corrupting the Properties of our Neighbour, shown to be, in like manner, Thefts; and the several Species thereof enumerated.  
HAVING entreated at large in my last concerning Property, which this Commandment both supposeth, and (as I shall by and by show) professeth to maintain; it remains that we inquire, what it prescribes concerning it: which may be reduced to two Heads.  

1. The former whereof imports the not usurping upon, or any way diminishing the Property of our Neighbour; which is the Negative part of the Commandment.  
2. The latter, (which is the Affirmative) 

1. The using of all due Means for the procuring and maintaining of our own; and,  
2. The contributing, what in us lies, to the procuring, defending, or enlarging the Property of our Neighbour.     
I. I begin with the former of these, even the Negative part of the Commandment, affirmed by us to be the not usurping upon, or any way diminishing of our Neighbour's Property: Where again these five things would be enquired into.  

1. How it doth appear that the Negative part, or Prohibition, comprehends in it all usurping upon, or any way diminishing of our Neighbour's Property.  
2. What particular Crimes are included in it.  
3. What Actions are to be looked upon as exempted.  
4. Wherein the Criminalness of those things which are included in it doth consist. And,  
5. And lastly, What Punishments may be inflicted on them by the Civil Magistrate.   
I. There being nothing more prejudicial to the strength of any Assertion, than to suffer it to rest at all upon weak or fallacious Principles; I shall not only wave the arguing the generality of the Prohibition from the Latitude wherein the Word Stealing is sometimes taken, but profess myself to agree with those who understand no other by Stealing, than the clancular taking away of that which is another Man's; that being the proper signification of the Word, and so understood by all the Translators of the Decalogue. And indeed, as I shall by and by show, that there is no necessity at all of understanding it in a more general sense; so, that we ought to take it in a more restrained one, the Style of the Declalogue, and particularly of the two foregoing Precepts, shows. For, making use of Murder and Adultery, which are only particular Species of Injuriousness and Uncleanness, to denote all those which are of the same Genus; it is but reasonable to think (especially when the Hebrew phrase inclines us to it) that the Commandment we are now upon, made use of one particular Crime in the matter of Injustice, to express all those that are of the same nature with it. Which Observation, as it establisheth the proper Notion of the Word Steal, for which it was primarily produced; so withal affords no contemptible Argument of God's intention to forbid in it all Usurpations whatsoever, or diminutions of the Properties of our Neighbours; especially if we add thereto the general Design of the Precepts of the Decalogue, and the Agreement of others with that which is here expressly forbidden. For, with what shadow of Reason can any Man think God intended no other Injustice than that which is expressed in the Commandment, when (beside the general Design of the Decalogue, which I have shown to have been intended as an Abstract of the whole Duty of Man, and the Comprehensiveness of the two foregoing Prohibitions) those Injustices which are not mentioned are alike Usurpations upon, or Diminutions of men's Properties, which is the Fundamental Reason of the Prohibition. I will conclude this Particular with that of Philo 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 prope finem. , in his Tract De Decalogo, where he makes this short Remark upon the present Precept. The Third Commandment, saith he, (for so it is, in his account, of those of the Second Table) is of not stealing, under which is to be ranked whatsoever hath the estimate of defrauding of Creditors, or denying those things that have been deposited with us; of meddling with those things which belong to the Public, and which consequently ought not to be shared between Private Men; as also of shameless Rapines; in fine, of such Covetousnesses whereby Men are induced, either openly or privily, to withdraw those things which belong to others.  
II. Now though what hath been said, may give us a competent understanding of those things which are forbidden by the Commandment; it appearing from the Premises, that all such are, whereby the Properties of our Neighbours are any way impaired: yet because Men are seldom so wise as to apply any general Direction to their own particular Concernments, or at least are not over faithful in the doing of it, I think it not amiss to draw it down to particular Instances, and show the several Crimes which are here included: For my more orderly enumeration whereof, I will represent, first of all, such Usurpations or Diminutions of the Properties of Men, as are distinguished from each other by the manner of their commission; and after that, proceed to those which receive their denomination and distinction from those Objects about which they are conversant.  
And here, in  
1. The first place, I shall not doubt to reckon, as included in the Prohibition, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Covetousness, whereby (as Philo speaks) the Heart of Man is inclined to usurp upon the Property of his Neighbour. For, though the bare coveting of that which is another Man's be the Subject of another Commandment, and shall accordingly be there considered by us; yet when it includes in it a Desire or Resolution to get from another that which is his, by any fraudulent, oppressive, or any other unjust Proceeding, it is in reason to be reckoned to that Commandment which we are now upon; as because the Heart is that which God principally looks after, and which strikes the greatest stroke in absolving or condemning our outward Actions; so because our Saviour hath reckoned to the Prohibitions of Murder and Adultery, those injurious or unclean Purposes that are in it. For, by the same reason that a Man of malicious or unclean Desires is to be looked upon as a Murderer or an Adulterer; he who hath either a desire, or purpose, to defraud his Neighbour, is to be looked upon as a Thief, and consequently within the compass of the Commandment. But so that they who were Strangers, yea Enemies to the Christian Faith, were also persuaded, is evident from a Saying of Julians 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Grot. d. l. Annot. ad c. 1. , which is recorded by Grotius in his First Book de jure Belli ac Pacis. The second Law (saith he) and which is no less Divine than that which enjoins the acknowledging and worshipping of a God, is that which commands wholly to abstain from the Properties of other Men, and permits not to confound them either in Word, or Work, or in the secret Operations of the Heart. Words worthy of a better Mouth than that from which they proceeded; but however not rendered unworthy of our regard by that blasphemous one from which they came: there being nothing which the best of Religions, even our own, stands more commended for, than the restraining of the Heart of Man from all irregular Purposes or Desires.  
2. But because (as Julian intimates in the place before-quoted) there is a Theft or Usurpation which the Tongue is an Instrument in, therefore it may not be amiss to show by what ways and means this little Member prejudiceth the Properties of its Neighbour. For the more distinct explication whereof, I shall consider, 

1. First of all, of its Silence; and then,  
2. Of its Words or Expressions.    
1. There is a famous Question in Tully's Book the Officiis 
* Lib. 3. , a Book indeed read by Boys, but worthy, if we may believe the Learned, of the consideration of the wisest Men, yea of the gravest Theologues, as being styled 
‖ Le Journal des Scavans, vol. 1. p. 249.  by Monsieur le Feure, Master to the late King of France, His Casuist; and by Monsieur de Hayes, and eminent Advocate of that Kingdom, The Gospel of the Law of Nature: But there, I say, there is a Question whether a Man be bound to reveal the Faults of the thing he sells. On the one side, there is Profit, and some show of Reason also: For what (saith the same Tully) can be so absurd, as for the Master of any House to make a public Proclamation by the Crier, that he sells an infected one? On the other side, there is a greater appearance of Ingenuity, and Clearness, and Simplicity, which are things not to be wanting in him that pretends to Justice and Honesty, but however not to be wanting in those who pretend to the Profession of Christianity. Where the Truth lies, is not possible to determine all at once, because Circumstances may alter the Case; and therefore I shall proceed to it by degrees, offering, first of all, as an undeniable Maxim of Justice, That it is not lawful for any Person by his concealment to screw more out of the Person he sells to, than the thing is really worth; he who so does, undoubtedly stealing from him so much as the things he sells are overrated. But neither, secondly, can it be denied, that it is equally unlawful to conceal such Defects as make the thing sold of little use 
* Tull. de Offic. lib. 3. Neque enim id est celare, quicquid reticeas; sed cum, quod tu scias, id ignorare emolumenti tui causa velis eos, quorum intersit id scire. Hoc autem celandi genus quale sit, & cujus hominis, quis non videt!  non aperti, non simplicis est, non ingenui, non justi, non viri boni: versuti potius, obscuri, astuti, fallacis, malitiosi, callidi, veteratoris, vafri.  to him that buys it; because such a thing is really little worth to him, and consequently the Buyer in a manner defrauded of the Money he paid. Upon which account, if a Man should sell a Horse to him who buys him for this or that particular use, whether of Saddle or otherwise, for which he knows him to be unapt; in such a case I no way doubt the Seller is a Thief, because taking the Buyers Money for that which is unuseful to him, and consequently not worth to him what he gives for it. But as where the Defect neither makes the Thing worth less in itself than it was sold for, nor unuseful to the Party that buys, I see not what Obligation can lie upon the Seller to reveal the defects of his Commodities; partly, because there are few things that have not some defect or other, which makes it but reasonable that the Buyer should bear a share with him; and partly because a revelation of all Defects would, by the Scruples which it is apt to raise in the minds of Men, be an impediment to Commerce, especially with conscientious Men; which it is for the interest of the general Weal to keep up. This only would be added, That though it may be lawful to conceal some Defects, yet it is not such to deny any; this being an injury to Truth, as well as to our Neighbour; which (as I shall afterwards show) ought to be preserved inviolable.  
2. And here a fair opportunity is ministered to me, to enter upon those Usurpations or Thefts which are made by the mediation of the Expressions of the Tongue. Whereof, the first that I shall assign is, when Men by their Tongues set a fairer gloss upon a thing, than it has real worth to deserve. An Illustrious Instance hereof we have in the forequoted Tully, which it may not be amiss to transcribe. One C. Canius, a Roman Knight, having for his pleasure retired to Syracuse, gave out that he would buy some Gardens, where he might recreate himself with his Friends. Pythius, a Banker of that Place, hearing of it, sent him word, that he had no Gardens to sell, but that those he had were at Canius his service, if he pleased to make use of them; and accordingly the next day invited him to Supper. Which Invitation as soon as he understood to have been accepted, he appointed the Fishermen of that Town to fish the next day before his Gardens. Canius comes at the time appointed, and is nobly entertained: The Fishermen also come with their Boats, and lay down what they had caught at Pythius his Feet. To him Canius; What, I pray, meaneth this, so many Fish about this place, and so many Boats? And what wonder, replied Pythius? hereabouts are most of the Fish that are in the River of Syracuse, this Place the Fishermen cannot be without. Canius being taken with the supposed Commodity of the Place, importunes Pythius to sell it. He at first seems unwilling, but at length sells it him at his own Rate. The next day Canius invites his Friends, comes early himself to his Gardens, but sees no Fisherboat. He inquires of his next Neighbour, whether it were any Holiday, that he saw no Fishermen there? Not, replied he, that I know of: but here none are wont to fish, and therefore yesterday I wondered at what happened. Now who sees not, that Pythius was as very a Thief with his Tongue, as those who with their Hands take away their Neighbour's Goods? That Commendation which he gave to his Gardens, drawing that Money from Canius, which he would not otherwise have given, (Which what is it, in truth, but a Theft?) and that too, in all probability, which was above the real Value of the Thing. Again, For that of St. James is in nothing more true than in this, that the Tongue is a World of Iniquity; as the Tongue may play the Thief by putting too fair a Gloss upon a Man's own Commodities, so it may do also by casting a disparagement upon those of other men's. A thing too usual among the Men of Trade, but which cannot certainly escape the Censure of this Commandment: He who disparageth his Neighbour's Commodities, hindering him in the sale of them; which is in truth no better than a Theft, because depriving him of that Advantage which he might make of them, in the Right whereunto men's Propriety consisteth. What should I tell you of raising false Accusations against Men, whereby their Properties come to be forfeited; of giving false Testimonies in Judgement; and, which is of the same force, and is employed to supply the place of the Tongue, the forging of Deeds and Wills, or being by our Subscriptions instrumental to the authorising of them? For, who sees not, that these are not only Thefts, because depriving the true owners of their Properties; but generally of the foulest nature, because stealing away whole Estates at once?  
3. From the Usurpation or Theft of the Heart or Tongue, pass we to that of the outward Work, as which is the only thing expressed in the Commandment: Where again these three Species of Thefts offer themselves to our consideration; such as consist in the taking away, or detaining, or corrupting the Properties of our Neighbours. Under the first of these Species I reckon,  
1. First, That Prejudice which is done to the Properties of Men by open and violent Rapines. For, though this be not Theft in the proper Notion of the Word, yet it agrees with it in that Injury which is offered to the Property of our Neighbour, and hath over and above the imputation of Impudence and Violence, which serves so much the more to enhance it. But neither,  
2. Secondly, shall I stick to reckon, as included, that Theft which is made by unequal or deceitful Weights and Measures; as because it is not only a withdrawing of so much as those Weights and Measures fall-short of their due Proportion, but also a clancular one; so because such Courses as these are represented as abominable in the Eyes of that God with whom we have to do: Witness for the former that of Prov. 20.10. That divers weights and divers Measures are an abomination to the Lord; meaning thereby, as Moses 
* Deut. 25.13.14. Thou shalt not have in thy bag divers weights, a great and a small. Thou shalt not have in thine house divers measures, a great and a small. But thou, etc.  himself hath interpreted it, a bigger and a less; and (as a Learned 
† Baynus in Prov. 20.10.  Man hath farther observed) a bigger to buy by, and a less to sell by. By means of which, as there is not that equality in our Commerce, which that most excellent Rule of Doing as we would be done by, enjoins; so there is, if not a prejudice to both Parties with whom we deal, yet at least to him of whom we purchase; the bigger to be sure being greater than the just Standard, and consequently taking more from him, than either Justice or our own Contract doth allow. The same is much more to be said of deceitful Weights and Measures, that is to say, of those which are less than their due proportion: as because they do manifestly withdraw as much from the Buyer, as the Weight or Measure which it wants amounts to; so because the Scripture doth frequently and earnestly express its detestations of such Practices: For beside those Places in the Proverbs, which though simply, yet roundly affirm, that a false Balance is an abomination to the Lord, we find God expressing a more than ordinary displeasure against his own People, for such like Injustices in their Deal: For, Hear this (saith God, Amos 8.4.) O ye that swallow up the needy, even to make the poor of the land to fail; saying, When will the New-moon be gone, that we may sell corn? and the Sabbath, that we may set forth wheat? making the Ephah small, and the Shekel great, falsifying the Balances by deceit. The Lord hath sworn by the excellency of Jacob, Surely I will never forget any of their works. Agreeable hereunto is that of Micah, and cuts off from such Persons all pretences of Purity, which yet many of them have the hardiness to lay claim to, chap. 6.10. and so on. Are there yet the treasures of wickedness in the house of the wicked, and the scant Measure, which is abominable? Shall I count them pure with the wicked Balances, and with the bag of deceitful Weights?— Therefore also will I make thee sick in smiting thee, in making thee desolate because of thy sins. Add hereunto,  
3. Thirdly, for the affinity it hath with the former, the making use of false Lights, or other such like Artifices, to disguise the thing they sell; they who do so, picking the Pockets of those they deal with, because taking Money of them for such Commodities as, were it not for their Disguises, they would not have bought at all, or at least not have paid such Rates as they demand, as being no way recompensed by their Purchases.  
4. Of the same nature is, fourthly, though little considered by those that practise it, The wearying a Man out of his own with unjust Vexations. For, inasmuch as Theft, considered in its due Latitude, is nothing else than the taking away of that which is another's, without his will or consent; he that shall by any vexation put a Man upon a necessity of parting with that which is really his, is as verily a Thief, as he who slily nims any thing out of his House; yea though (as Ahab was) he should be disposed to give him a Valuable Consideration for it, which yet few such Persons are inclined to do: The taking of one thing for another, being then only a lawful Contract, when it is with the free consent of the Party from whom we take it; which is not to be supposed there, where a Man is compelled to it by force and violence. But so also is,  
5. Fifthly, The exacting or taking of immoderate Use for Money lent: For, I say not the same of taking Use in itself, howsoever heretofore Men have been otherwise persuaded. For, beside that there is no more real Injustice in taking Money for the Use of Money, than there is in taking it for the Use of a Man's House or Land, during the time wherein another enjoys it; Money, though it perish not in the Use, as House and Land does, yet, for so long time as it is out of the Owners hands, perishing to him, who might otherwise have made an advantage of it: Beside, secondly, that there appears not any the least shadow of forbidding it in the Books of the New Testament, no not in those Places where Avarice, and the like Crimes are censured: He that shall consult the Law of Moses, where Usury is forbidden, and by the notion whereof we ought in reason to judge of the nature of it in other places, will find no other Usury forbidden, than that which is taken of a poor man, and whom a Man ought therefore rather to give to, than take any thing from: as is evident from Exod. 22.25. and Leu. 25.36. For, as for that place in Deut. ch. 23.19. where it is simply and plainly affirmed, Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother; it is in reason, being only a Repetition of the former Laws, as that whole Book of Deuteronomy is, to be limited by the former, and consequently the Poor to be understood: He who repeats a thing, for the most part contenting himself with a rude and imperfect Account, as supposing such an one enough to recall the thing into men's minds; but however leaving no place for doubt, but that that which he models his Repetition by, especially if more full, is to be the Interpreter of his Words. To say nothing at all at present, though it might be reasonably enough insisted on, that our Case is not the same with that of the Jews, who were forbidden all Commerce with other Nations, which we are not only no way forbidden, but in a manner under a necessity of. For, such a Commerce being not to be maintained without a proportionable Purse, which that of professed Merchants cannot be supposed to be; there is a kind of necessity toward the carrying of it on, that they should borrow of other Men; and of equity too, because advantaging themselves with their Money, to make them a reasonable Compensation for it. But as immoderate Use (which what it is, the Law of the Place is the best Judge) hath no such thing to plead for itself; so I doubt not to reckon it among those Thefts which are forbidden by this Commandment: That Usury which is above the due proportion, being the proper Right of the Borrower, and consequently not to be taken by the Lender, without infringing of his Property, or, that I may speak more intelligibly, without taking that which is another Mans. Add hereunto,  
6. Sixthly, The engrossing all the Commodities we can find of one kind, that so we may have the peculiar Privilege of selling them; he who so doth, not only intending to rob all that have occasion of them, but actually robbing those of his own Profession, of that Advantage which the Laws of the Land, and their common Profession, give them an equal Interest in with himself. More, I doubt not, might be added; but these, I suppose, may suffice to judge even of the residue by: and therefore, in stead of heaping up any more, I shall content myself with a place or two in St. Paul, where the Doctrine of this Commandment is clearly enough delivered. The former whereof 
* Ephes. 4.28.  admonisheth him that stole to steal no more, but rather to work with his hands, to procure the Supply of his own Necessities; which shows all kind of encroaching upon other men's Possessions to be forbidden: the latter 
† 1 Thes. 4.6. , that we should not go beyond or defraud our brother in any matter, those secret, and therefore less understood Thefts; adding moreover, that God is the avenger of all such, as he himself, when he was with them, had forewarned them and testified.  
We have insisted hitherto upon such Thefts as are most visible, in the taking away of that which is another Man's: it follows that we inquire, whether there may not be a Theft in detaining, and what the several sorts of such kind of Thefts are. For the resolution of the former whereof, we shall need only to have recourse to the fundamental Reason of the Prohibition of Theft, properly so called. For, that which makes Theft, properly so called, Criminal, being nothing else but the infringing the Properties of other Men; if that may be done by detaining, as well as taking away, there is no doubt it ought to be reckoned to it, or at least as equally condemned with it. Now, that so it may, will appear, if we consider the several Species of them, the second thing proposed to be discoursed of. For, doth not he infringe the Property of another, who keeps that away from the Owner, which was by him only deposited for a time, and till he should either call for, or satisfy that Obligation for which he deposited it? Doth not he do the like, who detains in his Hands the Wages of the Hireling; and which the Promise of the Detainer, as well as the Labour of the Hireling, hath given him a Title to? Doth not he do so in part, who detains that, or any other Debt, beyond the time wherein it ought to be paid; when it is a Maxim of Reason, as well as of the Civil Law 
* Instit. lib. 4. tit. 6. de Actonibus. Qua enim ratione qui tardius solvit quàm solvere deberet minus solvere intelligitur, etc. , That he pays less than he ought, who pays not at his Day? Lastly, Doth not he do so more apparently, who having taken away any thing from his Neighbour, either by fraud or violence, refuseth to make Restitution? But if so, to be sure they are to be accounted of as Thefts, or at least of near affinity with, and under the like guilt and condemnation. And indeed, as the generality of Casuists have looked upon this Theft as so Criminal, that it is become a Maxim among them, That the Theft is not remitted, unless the Thing taken away be restored; as God hath moreover set a more than ordinary Brand upon it, by punishing those Detainers who came to it only by the Injustice of their Predecessors: so, if it be duly considered, there is no wonder at all in the Dispensation of God, or yet in the Resolution of the Learned: He who restores not, when he can, continuing in and approving the former Theft, and consequently making himself unmeet for the Divine Grace, which requires at least the disallowing of our former Wickednesses.  
One only Species of the former Thefts remains, which consists in the destroying or any way prejudicing the Things of our Neighbour; as when Men, out of malice or envy, set fire to their Neighbour's Houses or Corn, maim their , or, by not observing due Seasons, wear out those Grounds they hire. For, that this hath the nature of Theft, and that too not of the lowest nature, needs no other evidence than the consequence of our own Actions, as by means of which the Proprietary is either deprived of his Goods altogether, or of that Use and Advantage which might accrue to him, in the Right whereto (as hath been often said) the Nature of Propriety doth consist: It mattering not at all, toward the constituting a Man a Thief, whether he himself be benefited by those things he steals; but whether he deprives his Neighbour of it. Otherwise St. Augustine had been no Thief, who, when a Boy, robbed his Neighbour's Orchard; because he threw away those Apples which he stole.   

PART III.  
An enumeration of such Thefts as are distinguished from each other by their Objects; where is shown, 1. Both from the Fundamental Reason of the Prohibition, and the Consequences of such kind of Usurpations, That there may be a Theft of things immovable, as Lands and Houses, as well as of those that may be clancularly carried away. 2. Of Public Goods, as well as of Private; the several sorts whereof are also reckoned up. 3. Of Persons, as well as of Things. 4. Of that which is not in our Neighbour's Possession, as well as of that which is; as again, of the Use of a thing, as well as of the thing itself. Inquiry is next made, what Actions are to be looked upon as exempt from the present Prohibition; in which number are reckoned, the Israelites spoiling the Egyptians, those Thefts which were permitted by the Lacedæmonians to their Youths, and those which extreme necessity prompts Men to; the due Limitations whereof are also carefully described. An Account of the Criminalness of the Things here forbidden; which is shown to consist, first, in their contrariety to the first Institution of Property, and the present Dispensations of the Divine Providence: Secondly, in their being prejudicial to Humane Society: And, thirdly, in the discouragement they give to Virtue and Industry. The Negative part of the Commandment concluded with an Inquiry concerning the proper Punishment of Theft; where is shown at large, That Capital Punishment is neither unjust nor inconvenient.  
THERE being nothing wanting to a just enumeration of the several Thefts that are here forbidden, but to reckon up those which receive their denomination from, and are distinguished from each other, by those Objects about which they are conversant; I purpose to begin this Discourse with the Investigation of them, and both show that they do, and how they come within the compass of this Commandment.  
In order whereunto, I observe,  
1. That Theft may be as well of Things , as Lands or Houses; as of those which, as Gellius speaks, may be clancularly carried away and withdrawn. For, though Theft, in the vulgar Notion of it, extend only to such things as may be clancularly carried away and withdrawn; though that also be the Notion of Theft in the Civil Law 
* Dig. de Furtis, leg. Verum est, quod plerique probant, fundi furti agi non posse.  (as we now have it) as is evident from the Law Verum est, in the Title De Furtis: yet as there wanted not Men of Note, even in that Faculty, who had another Notion of it, as is evident from Sabinus 
‖ In quo [nempe Sabini libro, cui titulus est, De Furtis] id quoquê scriptum est, quod vulgo inopinatum est, non hominum tantùm neque rerum moventium, quae efferri occulte & surripi possunt, sed fundi quoque & aedium fieri furtum. A. Gell. Noct. Attic. lib. 11. cap 18.  in Gellius; so, that in the Natural and Theological sense there may be a Theft of  as well as movable Things, will be evident to any Man, who shall consider either the formal Reason of this Sin, or the consequence of men's usurping upon Things . For that which makes any Theft, properly so called, a Crime before God, being the Invasion of another's Property; it were extremity of Madness to think him a Thief, who should rob a Man either of his Fruit, or Household Goods; and not him who should possess himself of that Ground from whence the Fruit ariseth, or of that House wherein the other are deposited. Again, Forasmuch as he who spoils a Man of his Land or House, doth consequently spoil him of the Fruit of the one, which is confessedly a thing movable; and of the Use of the other, which, even in the Notion of the Civil Law 
* Dig. de Furtis, leg. Furtum à Furvo, paragr. 3. Furtum est contrectatio rei fraudulosa, lucri faciendi gratiâ, vel ipsius rei. vel etiam usus ejus, etc. , may be the Object of Theft: he who doth so, must for that reason also be looked upon as a Thief, and consequently within the compass of the Commandment. Upon which account, as the late Learned Dr. 
‖ Answer to Fountain's Letter.  Stuart doth not undeservedly deride that famous Lawyer, who at the same time he owned the taking away a Communion-Cup to be Sacrilege, did yet deny it to be such to take away the Lands of the Church, because they are not things movable; so I know not with what better to silence such frivolous Exceptions, than with the Instance which the same Learned Man makes in Ahab's seizing on Naboth's Vineyard. For, by the same way of arguing, we might have concluded Ahab to have been a Thief, if he had robbed Naboth of his Grapes; but Elijah was too harsh to that good King, for passing so severe a Censure on him, because he only took away his Vineyard.  
2. Of the Theft of things movable and , what hath been said may suffice; and consequently of the two first Species thereof: Proceed we therefore to consider another pair, which are differenced from each other by the publickness or privateness of the Things taken away. For, inasmuch as the Public is capable of a Property, as well as Private Persons; inasmuch as it is not only capable of a Property, but cannot subsist without it: hence it comes to pass, that there may be a Theft of Public Goods, as well as of Private; and consequently, that, as well as the other, to be concluded within the force of the Prohibition. But from hence it will follow, that we are to reckon as such the denying of just Tribute, or converting that which is already gathered to our own private Uses; the taking away of those Lands which were given for the Maintenance of Societies, clipping, or any other way impairing the Public Money: these being Entrenchments upon the Goods of the Public, and consequently proper Thefts of them. And though it be true, that all Thiefs of this nature do not reap the due Reward of their Desert; but, on the contrary, some of them bear themselves high, even against that Public upon which they do usurp, (it being an ancient Complaint of Cato 
* Fures privatòrum furtorum in nervo atque in compedibus aetatem agunt: fures publici in auro atque in purpura. A. Gell. loco pr. citato. , That whilst the Thiefs of private men's Goods spend their days in Chains and Fetters, the Public Thiefs pass away theirs in Gold and Purple:) yet as the Mischief which ariseth from Public Thefts, is much greater than that of Private ones, and consequently renders them much more criminal; so they who found lower Punishments for other Thefts, looked upon this as so heinous, as to pronounce 
‖ Instit. de publs. Judiciis, leg. Item lex Julia peculatus.  Capital Punishment upon its Authors or Abettors, if those Authors were Judges; but if not, Deportation. I reckon not under this Head, though so reckoned by the Civil Law 
† Instit. ibid. , as neither within any other of this Commandment, that Theft which is made of Sacred Things; partly because the Property thereof is vested in God, and consequently He, and not Man, rob in it, as God himself complains Mal. 3.8. and partly, because St. Paul, Rom. 2.22. couples Sacrilege with Idolatry, which shows it to be a Crime of a higher nature, as being an Usurpation upon the Rights of the Divine Majesty.  
3. From those second sort of Thefts, pass we to another, because the Injustice of Men hath done so; that, I mean, which brancheth itself into a Theft of Persons and Things. The former so much the Concernment of this Commandment, that many of the Hebrews (as Munster 
* In Exod. 20.15.  tells us) have reckoned it to be the only Intendment of it. Wherein though I can by no means concur with them, because the Tenth Commandment, to which they refer the Theft of our Neighbour's Goods, is not to be understood of Theft; or, if it were, were to be extended also to the Theft of Persons, because God forbids alike the coveting of our Neighbour's Servants and Goods: yet I think it but reasonable to reckon it among those Thefts which are forbidden in this Commandment; partly, because God, in the very next Chapter to that which is the Subject of my present Theme, forbids the stealing of a Man, and that too under no less Penalty than that of Death, Exod. 21.16. and partly, because the Persons of Men are no less a part of the Owners Property, than either his Lands or Goods; as both yielding him the same Advantage which Goods do, and among the Jews themselves, when a Man became insolvent, liable to a Sale 
* See Exod. 22.3. 2 Kings 4.1. Mat. 18.25. , to satisfy that Debt which he had contracted. Now forasmuch as Men, no less than Things, may become a part of a Man's Property; forasmuch as by those, no less than by Things, Men may attain that Vsusfructus, in the Right whereto Propriety consisteth: it followeth, that the stealing of men's either Children or Servants is to be looked upon as one of those Thefts which are by God forbidden in this Commandment. All which I say, not only to obviate the evil Trade of those Men, who by Toys, and other Artifices, train men's Children and Servants into Ships, and, when they have done so, sell them for Slaves in Foreign Parts; but their Practice also, who by fair Words and Promises tempt Men from their Masters, to become in the same Condition to themselves. For, what other is this, than to rob a Man of his Servant, and it may be too, if that Servant be an useful one, of one of the best parts of his possessions. Add hereunto, because differing from the former only in circumstance, the Servants withdrawing from his Master, whilst he is with him, that labour and service to which his own Contract and the Master's Wages bind him; he who doth so, becoming a kind of Thief of himself, because robbing his Master of that advantage which he might and ought to have by him.  
4. Lastly (which I shall only name, because I have prevented myself in them, and shown them both to be Thefts, and such as are forbidden in this Commandment) there may be a Theft of a thing which is not in our Neighbour's possession, as well as of that which is, as again of the use of a thing, as well as of the thing itself: Upon the account of the former whereof, he is a Thief, who detains any thing in his hands which was either committed to him to keep, or is otherwise due to his Neighbour from him; as upon the account of the latter, he who makes the goods of his Neighbour unserviceable to him, or deprives him of the use of them, whether it be by detaining them some time in his hands, or hindering him from making use of them. All which having before at large exemplified, I shall content myself with subjoining this one general Remark, which will serve as a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to judge of these and all other Thefts by; to wit, That all that is to be looked upon as such, which doth any way impair the property of our Neighbour, where it is truly such, and not abridged by some of those limitations which were before reckoned up by us: The properties of men, as to those particulars wherein they are limited, being rather equivocally than properly such, and consequently the entrenchments on them not within the compass of this Commandment.  
III. Now though that general Note might serve us for an answer to that third question, which we before proposed to discourse of, that is to say, What actions are to be looked upon as exempted from the prohibition now before us; yet I think it not amiss to instance in two or three of that nature, because there may seem to be some difficulty in exempting them from the imputation of Thievery. I begin with that which is the most obvious to all, because recorded in the Scripture, that I mean which the Israelites are found to have done, even by the command of God himself: For what other can we make of the Children of Israel's borrowing of the Egyptians those Jewels, which they did not only not restore, for aught as we can learn, but are by that act of theirs said to have spoiled or rob the Egyptians? Exod. 12.36. But neither will this action of theirs be found to be a Theft, if we understand thereby, as we ought to do, an usurpation upon another's property, where it is free from any limitation or alienation: Because though those Jewels, which they borrowed, were the property of the Egyptians, both before and at the time of the Israelites borrowing them; yet were they, by the Command of God, to whom all men's properties are subject, passed over to the Israelites, and consequently their detaining of them, though in semblance a Theft (for which cause it is called a spoiling by Moses) yet really and formally none. Next to this act of the Israelites, consider we another of the Lacedæmonians, approved and encouraged by their Laws; it being recorded of them by 
* A. Gell. ubi supra, cum notis Ant. Thysii J. C.  Gellius out of Authors, neither few nor inconsiderable, that their young men were allowed to steal certain things, and particularly, the Fruit of their Orchards, and the Messes of their Feasts: Not, as the aforesaid Author admonisheth, to encourage them to the desire of filthy lucre, but to make them crafty and watchful, and thereby the more apt to serve them in their Wars, which was, upon the matter, that Commonwealth's whole profession. Now though for my own part I cannot approve of such practices, as by which unwary Youths may be tempted to stealths of a more criminal nature, yet I am of opinion with the learned Selden 
* De jure Nature. & Gent. l. 6. c. 2. , that where such practices are countenanced by Law, the perpetrators of them cannot in reason be charged with Theft properly so called, or usurping upon the properties of their Neighbours; for the properties of particular men being limitable by the public Laws, and more particularly by such to which each Proprietor consents, if the public Laws make it lawful to withdraw certain things from the owners, those things are so far common to those that can withdraw them, and consequently their withdrawing of them not so much an usurpation upon the property of the owners, as a just and lawful acquisition. And it seems to me not altogether unlike the gleaning of Corn in a field, the property whereof, as of the Fruit that ariseth of it, though invested in a particular person, yet is not so entirely his, but that the lose Corns which fall from the Reaper become the property of him that shall first seize upon them. But because however such kind of Thefts might be countenanced by the Laws of the Lacedæmonians, yet they are not, that I know of, received in any Christian Nation, nor it may be at present in any unconverted one, therefore, quitting the prosecution of that, I shall inquire into the nature of that Stealth which extreme necessity prompts men to. In order whereunto, I will put the case of a man travelling in a foreign Land, and there reduced to extremity of hunger; for the providing against which, though he hath not failed to use earnest entreaties, nor yet to make a tender of his labour and service, yet he hath not for all that been able to procure himself so much repast, as might satisfy the necessities of Nature. This supposed, I demand whether the taking away of so much, as may serve for the purposes before specified, be to be looked upon as a Theft, and consequently unlawful. Now though it be not to be doubted, but such an act looks very like one, because differing nothing in the matter from that which is really such, yet that it is not formally such, is evident from what was heretofore said concerning Gods giving the Earth to Adam and Noah, and in them, to all the Children of men; for this general Grant of the Almighty being antecedent to any particular property, which any of the sons of men is now possessed of, it is in reason so far to prevail above the present properties of particular men, as to make it lawful to the extremely necessitous, to withdraw so much from them, as may serve to satisfy these necessities. This only would be added, That as those extremely necessitous aught to premise both entreaties, and the tender of their service, partly because the present properties of men stand by the divine Grant, and are not lightly therefore to be derogated from; and partly because God obligeth men for the prevention of it, to work with their own hands the thing that is good, that they may have wherewithal to support themselves, as well as to give to others: so the case before remembered cannot lightly be supposed in any Christian Nation, and much less in that wherein we live. As because of the multitude of charitable persons wherewith the Land abounds, so because the Laws of our Nation have made provision for those, who are not able by their own endeavours to support themselves: They enjoining the Officers of the place, where they shall be found to be, to relieve them and send them back to the place of their last abode, as those, who are within the Precincts of it, to contribute to the maintaining of them. Where therefore there is such a provision as this, there cannot lightly be any place for such a necessity as we speak of, and consequently neither for the serving of ourselves, without the violation of the Divine Command. And indeed, as those necessities, which we sometimes fall under, do mostly arise from sloth and idleness, or a living above that condition wherein God hath placed us; so, that bare necessity can be no warrant to us to invade our Neighbour's Goods, the Prayer of Agur doth abundantly declare, Give me (saith he) neither poverty nor riches: feed me with food convenient for me, lest I be full and deny thee, and say, who is the Lord? or lest I be poor and steal, and take the name of my God in vain; for grounding his request against poverty, upon the fear he had lest he should thereby be tempted to steal, and take the name of God in vain, he thereby sufficiently intimated, that simple poverty doth no more privilege a man to steal, than the same poverty can to take God's name in vain, or swear falsely, when examined upon Oath concerning the fact; or fullness, to deny him, and say, Who is the Lord?  
iv Having thus shown the Prohibition now before us to comprehend in it all usurping upon, or any way diminishing of our Neighbour's property; having moreover shown what particular Crimes are included in it, and what actions are to be looked upon as exempted; we are in the next place to inquire, wherein the criminalness of those things which are included in it, doth consist, which will cost no great pains to resolve. For, inasmuch as the Crime here forbidden is nothing else than an interversion of property, which I have shown to stand both by the Divine Institution at first, and the disposition of the Divine Providence; he, who shall go about so to intervert it, must be thought to fight against God, by whose appointment it was both instituted and continued. And indeed, as there is no sin against man, which is not in some sense against God, because forbidden by his Laws; so the sin we have now before us, is more peculiarly such, because, over and above the violation of his Laws, destroying that order which he appointed from the beginning in the world, and hath approved ever since by the disposition of his Divine Providence. But beside the contrariety which this sin of Theft carries in it to the institution and disposition of the Almighty, it is no less prejudicial to humane Society, which next to the Divine Majesty ought to be accounted sacred; partly because it is an interversion of those properties, for the preserving whereof it is that men have been so willing to enter into Societies; and partly because it prompts the injured party to endeavour a recovery by force and violence, which puts all into confusion and disorder: The injurious, no less than the injured party, being not like to want partners in his quarrel, till at length the whole Society be of a flame. And though it may be some unjust persons would not be of so exorbitant appetites, as to endeavour to attain a sovereignty over the possessions of all their fellows, and much less over their persons, yet inasmuch as the desire of this world's goods increaseth with the acquisition of them, as (because that acquisition is not otherwise to be maintained) a desire of power also, it is not easy to be imagined, but that they who indulge themselves in the invading of this or that particular man's property, would in fine, if they had ability 
* Grot. in Decal. , invade the goods of all, and make even the Commonwealth their own; injustice, where it hath acquired a proportionable strength, easily passing into tyranny, which is the bane of those Societies which it invades. Lastly, for that also would be considered, where there is any respect for virtue and industry; if either secret or open usurpations were permitted, men would for the most part leave off to do virtuously, because without hope of enjoying the rewards of it.  
V Now as every thing that is criminal doth by its own nature, and the Decree of God, bind over the Author to punishment, and that too in this world, if it be prejudicial to humane society, which I have shown the Sin of Theft sufficiently to be: so it may not be amiss to inquire, and the rather because it hath been a matter of controversy, what punishments may be inflicted on it by the Civil Magistrate. For the resolution whereof, because there are different sorts of Thefts, I will proceed by degrees, and consider first of all of that Theft which is of Children or Men. Now though I know it be questionable, whether other Thefts may be punished by death, and the rather, because God in the old Law prescribed a more easy punishment; yet as to this whereof we speak, no doubt at all can be made, but it may be censured with death, because God, who observes exact justice, commanded such an one to be put to death, Exod. 21.16. for he that stealeth a man (saith God) and selleth him, or if he be found in his hand, he shall surely be put to death. And not without reason, as because of the great value of the thing stolen, as being no other than the Image of God, so because of that slavery and hardship, which he, who steals a man, intends, which, as it is often managed, is not inferior to death itself. From the Theft of Persons pass we to that of Things, as which is most confessedly intended. Where again we are to distinguish of such things or goods as belong to the Public, or such as belong to Private persons. If the question be concerning the former, especially in any eminent instances, so I should not doubt to affirm, that it may be justly sentenced with death; as because the Roman Law, which draws nearest to that of Reason and Nature, inflicted capital punishment upon Judges that should be found to do so, and upon all that were instrumental to them in it; so because the public weal, wherein all private men's is concerned, depends much upon the stock it hath to maintain it. The great matter of controversy is concerning the stealing of the goods of private persons, which therefore I shall address myself to resolve. And here indeed hath been great variety, according to the inclinations or exigences of those States wherein they have been committed, the quality of the Theft, or the condition of the persons; some punishing Theft with restitution of the thing stolen, and an overplus, as the Law of Moses, and that of Solon; some with stripes and servitude; and some, in fine, with death, as Draco did all Thefts whatsoever; which made Demades afterwards say, that Draco wrote his Laws not with Ink, but with Blood. My purpose is not at this time to give an exact account of that variety, which whosoever list to be satisfied in, may read an excellent Chapter in Aulus Gellius; as neither to scan the propriety of those several punishments, and the proportion they bore to the Crime of Theft, because all of them may be reasonable enough; according to the different exigences of circumstances: the only thing which I pretend to inquire into, as which indeed is the principal controversy, is, whether Theft may be punished with death. For the resolution whereof, we will consider of such Thefts, as are openly and violently committed, best known among us by the name of Robberies; and then of clancular ones, or Thefts properly so called. If the question be concerning the former, so I know not what any reasonable man can oppose against the punishing them with death, as because of the boldness of the fact, which requires a more than ordinary severity to repress it, so because those Thefts, by the violence wherewith they are attended, strike no less at men's lives than fortunes, which it is but reasonable to secure by the death of the Offender. All the difficulty, to my seeming, is concerning clancular Thefts; where again we are to distinguish of nocturnal and diurnal ones; that is to say, of those that are committed in the night, or those that are committed in the day. That the former of these, even such Thefts as are committed by night, may be punished with death, will appear not to be unreasonable, if we consider with ourselves, the leave that was given by the Law of God first 
* Exod. 22.2, 3. , and afterwards by that of the 12 Tables 
‖ Vide A. Gell. l. 11. c. 18. , to kill the Thief in the very act; for how should not that be much more lawful to the Magistrate, upon a mature consideration of the fact, than to the injured person in his heat? Neither will it avail to say, that that leave was given to the party rob, upon presumption of the thieves adding violence to his Theft, and the likelihood of-securing himself and purchase by the death of the injured party, which therefore where it is passed all danger, the nocturnal Theft ought in reason to be otherwise chastised; for inasmuch as in punishment consideration ought to be had of what may probably happen hereafter by such kind of Thieveries; if there be a just presumption of such persons adding Murder to Theft, it is but reasonable, for the security of innocent persons lives, to put those to death, who are likely to take away the lives of other men. Which said, I will proceed to the consideration of diurnal Thefts, or such as are committed in the day: Now though simply considered a fourfold restitution may seem to be a proportionable punishment, because laid upon it by the Law of God, who best understands the proportion of things; though, if that will not do, the bringing in of servitude possibly may; 
Explication of the Fifth Commandment, Part. 1●.  the abolition whereof (as I have elsewhere shown) hath not been much for the conveniency of the world: yet I doubt not there may be instances wherein it may be both lawful and necessary to punish such Offenders with death; as for example, when such Thefts are frequently committed, and cannot lightly be restrained with milder punishments: The quality of a Theft being not to be judged of merely by the prejudice it doth to the injured party, but by the harm it doth to humane society; which it is both the Magistrates interest and duty to secure. Now forasmuch as it may sometime happen, that Humane Society cannot be maintained without inflicting a punishment, which is above the measure of the offence, if considered only as to that prejudice which it doth to the immediate object of it; in such a case I see no reason why the Magistrate may not inflict it, and particularly the extreme punishment of death; that I say not also, that I cannot see how he can avoid it, without a greater injury to that Society which he is appointed to defend. Upon which account as it is but reasonable to judge favourably of our own Laws, by which death is so often made the punishment of Theft, respect and charity both obliging us to suppose, that the Makers of those Laws, together with those that have succeeded them in their Office, have found by experience, that a lesser punishment will not serve the turn; so there is this farther inducement to make that supposition, that even that severity which they have used hath not deterred men from the commission of it. But be that as it will (for such things as these must be left to the determination of Public Persons, and not to Private ones, who are rather to submit than dispute) most certain it is, that the matter of Theft is so criminal before God, that the committers of it are by S. Paul 
* 1 Cor. 6.10.  reckoned among those persons, who shall not inherit the Kingdom of God.   

PART IU.  
Of the Affirmative part of the Commandment, which is declared to be, First, The using all due means for the procuring and conserving to ourselves a Property: Secondly, The contributing what in us lies to the procuring, defending, or enlarging the Properties of others. The former of these resumed, and evidenced to be a part of the Commandment, from the necessity the omission thereof puts us upon of invading the Property of our Neighbour. An address to a more particular consideration of it, in an enumeration of the means we are to use to procure or conserve to ourselves a Property. Labour assigned the principal place among them, and upon occasion thereof enquiry made I. From whence our obligation thereto ariseth, which is shown to be that Command which God laid upon Adam, to dress that Garden into which he was first put, more especially that both Curse and Command, which was laid upon him after his fall, of eating his bread in the sweat of his brows, and the necessity there is generally of it toward the procuring of a subsistence. II. To what Persons the obligation of Labour doth extend; where is shown from the former grounds, that it extends to all that are not unapt for it, and particularly to those of the Female Sex. III. Whether the labour of the body be incumbent upon all, which is answered in the Negative, and evidenced both from Reason and Scripture. iv About what things this labour of ours is to be conversant; which are shown in the general to be such as have no moral obliquity in them, nor are any way instrumental to those that have; as moreover such as are some way or other useful to ourselves or others; where the Trade of Fiddlers, and other such like Persons, is considered: In particular, such things to which we have a call from the Almighty, where both the necessity of such a call, and the means of knowing it, is also declared.  
II. OF the Negative part of the Precept what hath been said may suffice, proceed we now to the consideration of the Affirmative, which I have said to consist in these two things:  

1. The using all due Means for the procuring and conserving to ourselves a Property.  
2. The contributing, what in us lies, to the procuring, defending, or enlarging the Property of our Neighbour.   
I. Touching the former of these, no doubt can be made of its being included in this Commandment; because, without that, it would be morally impossible to keep Men from stealing, which the Commandment doth expressly forbid: he who useth not all means requisite for the procuring or conserving to himself a Property, being under a necessity of invading that of others. The only thing worth our inquiry is, what those due Means are: which accordingly I come now to investigate.  
1. I begin with Labour, because laid upon all Mankind for this very end and purpose, and because expressly prescribed by St. Paul, to procure to ourselves a Subsistence, and so keep us from the Sin here forbidden: At the same time he exhorts him that stole to steal no more, exhorting rather to labour, and to work with his hands the thing that is good, Ephes. 4.28. For what reason, think we, but that (as Grotius hath well explained it) he may have wherewithal to live himself, as well as to give to him that needeth? that being ill to be done, but however with little effect, as to the keeping of Men from stealing, where they themselves are not first in some measure provided for. Now concerning Labour, I will inquire, 

1. From whence our Obligation thereto ariseth.  
2. Whether the Obligation to it extend to all Persons whatsoever.  
3. Whether the Labour of the Body be incumbent upon all.  
4. About what this Labour of ours is to be conversant.  
5. And lastly, Whether it admit of a Relaxation, and after what manner and proportion.    
1. Now though in investigating the Grounds of this Obligation, it might suffice to look no farther back, than that both Curse and Command which was laid upon fallen Adam, of eating his bread in the sweat of his brows, Gen. 3.19. because, as I have before shown, that both Curse and Command is to be looked upon, as of Universal concernment; yet I think it not amiss (to make the Obligation appear so much the straighter) to look as far back as the time of Man's Innocency, and when neither any Curse, nor any thing that could deserve it, can be supposed. For, as it is evident from that short Account we have of it, that that State of Pleasure and Innocence was not without an admixture of Labour, he who put Adam into the Garden of Eden, obliging him to the dressing of it, Gen. 2.15. so it is no less evident, that, if that State had continued, all that descended from his Loins would have been under the same Tie; partly, because Adam was the Representative of all Mankind; and partly, because such a Cultivation would have been necessary for the preservation of those Fruits which were given to Adam and his Posterity for their Support. But because that Labour, whatsoever it was, would undoubtedly have been without that Toil which the present Condition of Mankind doth require; therefore quitting that first Ground of our Obligation to labour, we will seek out such an one as is proportionable to that Labour which is established on it. Now for this we shall need look no farther than that Saying of God to fallen Adam, Gen. 3.19. In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground. For, that Saying (as I have before 
* See the Discourse concerning the Positive Laws of God.  shown) being no less a Precept than a Curse, and such a Precept too as comprehended in it Adam's Posterity, as well as himself; we are in reason to deduce from thence that obligation to Labour, which we have said to be incumbent upon Mankind. Lastly, Forasmuch as Labour is more or less necessary to the procuring or conserving to ourselves the Means of our Support, hence there ariseth another Tie, proportionable to that Supply which men's respective Necessities do require.  
2. It being thus evident what the Grounds of men's Obligation to Labour are, inquire we, in the next place, to what Persons the Obligation doth extend: A Question which will receive an easy Solution, after the Solution of the former. For, it appearing from thence, that that Obligation hath no other Grounds, than either the common Necessities of Humane Nature, or such Positive Laws of God as were laid upon Adam and his Posterity; it is of necessity to be looked upon as of equal extent, and consequently no Child of Adam to be exempted from it. Only because it doth not appear how the Female Sex comes to be concerned, as having another and no less heavy Burden laid upon it, I think it not amiss, before I proceed to any new Matter, both to show how it comes to oblige them, and add farther Proofs for the confirmation of it. For, be it that those of the Female Sex had another, and no less heavy Burden bound upon them, for the Transgression of her that was the Original of their Sex; yet will it not thence follow, that they are therefore to be exempted from that Burden which was laid upon the other: partly, because that Sex, both in its Original and Descendants, had its Being in part from the Man; and partly, because the Transgression of her, who was the Original of it, was greater than that of the Man's, as being both the first, and the Occasioner of the others. Upon which account, as it is not to be wondered that God should add that Burden of Labour to the other, as being but proportionable to their own Extraction, and the Gild of the Foundress of their Sex; so, much less, if we consider, that this Burden of Labour had not only nothing in it peculiar to the Man (as that which was laid upon the Female Sex had) but is of equal necessity to the Support of both. And though they that shall but superficially consider the Character that Solomon gives of a Virtuous Woman, Prov. 31.10. and so on, where, among other things, he describeth her as one that seeketh wool and flax, and worketh willingly with her hands; though they (I say) that shall but superficially consider these and the like Passages, may imagine they hear that grave King reading a Lecture of Economics, and rather admonishing what may make for their Husband's Profit, than for the Interest of Religion, and the Peace of their own Souls: yet as that Imagination will be in part removed, by considering, that the Book of Proverbs is no less a part of Scripture than any other; so also by adverting, that he pretends not to describe a Thrifty, but a Virtuous Person, and, as it is in the thirtieth Verse, a woman that feareth the Lord. For, if so, such Works as those must be Works of Duty and Religion, and concern the Consciences, as well as the Profits of those to whom they do belong. And indeed, so far is the Industriousness of that Sex from being a part of Economics only, that St. Paul, who certainly never dreamed of any thing of that nature, insists upon the same thing, calling upon those whose Age gave them Ability for it, to intent their Household Affairs; and reproving such as were idle and negligent in it, 1 Tim. 5.13, 14 Which with what reason he could do so earnestly as he does, if it were not of Divine Obligation, I am not able to conjecture, and I suppose better Wits cannot. You will pardon me, you of the Female Sex, if I have, beside my wont, thus seemed to trespass on your Affairs: For, as I knew not how to avoid it, without giving countenance to the Practice of those Women, who, amidst all their Pretensions to Religion, seem to have little consideration of this Affair; so I have insisted the rather on it, to encourage the Diligence, and establish the Consciences of those who are more industrious in it. For, if St. Paul may be believed, it is not the idle, and busybody, and wanderer from house to house that is the Religious Person; but she that diligently guides her own: and though there be other more immediate Acts of Religion, yet they serve God in these also, if they do them with respect to the Divine Command, and shall no doubt receive a Reward for them. This only would be added, because understood in all Laws, That the Obligation to Labour reacheth no farther to either Sex, than where there is an Ability to discharge it: Upon which account, all sick, and impotent, and aged Persons are to be looked upon as exempted so far as their respective Indispositions make them unapt for it. Which last Restriction I do therefore subjoin, because even those, though not apt for the severer sorts of Labour, are yet oftentimes well enough qualified for casier ones. And I cannot but upon this occasion call to mind a Story which Busbequius 
* Turcic. Epist. 8.  tells us of a certain Spaniard, who had been a Commander among those of his own Nation, and was by himself redeemed from a Turkish Master, to whom he was a Slave. For though, by reason of the Wounds he had received, he was miserably impotent in all his Limbs, and one who therefore seemed more proper for an Hospital than an Employment; yet his Turkish Master found a way to set him on work, and received a considerable Emolument by him. For, passing him over into Asia, where great Flocks of Geese are kept, he made use of him (as the same Busbequius tells us) for the feeding of them, and received no contemptible Benefit by it. But be that as it will, because I hasten to other Matter, and such as will more deserve our consideration: as other Persons than those before remembered, it will be hard, or rather impossible to find, who can plead an Exemption from the common condition of Mankind; so the search will be looked upon as unprofitable by those who consider that of St. Paul, that if any man would not labour, neither should he eat, 2 Thess. 3.10.  
3. From the Persons therefore that are under this Obligation, pass we to the Kind's of Labour to which they are obliged; or rather to inquire, whether that of the Body be incumbent upon all. A Question which is not of so easy a resolution as the former, if we consider either the several States and Degrees of Men, or the Tenor of those Precepts by which Labour is bound upon us. For, as on the one hand, to oblige all Men to the Labour of the Body, would overthrow those several Orders which God hath set in the World, and, which is more, take off the better sort from intending the Labours of the Mind, which are of no less necessity to the Support of Humane Society; so, on the other, to exempt any from it, seems equally repugnant to that Primitive Law, by which we have said Labour to be bound upon us, and the several Precepts of St. Paul: The former importing, the eating of our bread in the sweat of our face; the latter, working with our own hands for it. But as it would be considered, that it is no way unreasonable for a Law to be expressed in such Terms as have a more peculiar Aspect upon the major part (the major part as it is most to be considered, so standing in need of a more particular direction); so the Law of Labour, as it is worded both by God and St. Paul, though not holding in all Particulars, is yet accommodable to the greater part of Humane Kind: The common Supports of Nature being not to be procured, where the greater part of those that are concerned do not contribute to it with the Work of their own Hands. From whence as it will follow, that there is no necessity of understanding the Laws  in that strictness of sense wherein they seem to be delivered, so especially, if either Reason or Scripture do persuade an Enlargement of it. Which that they do, will appear, if we consider them apart; and first of all, that which Reason offers to us. For, inasmuch as all are not qualified by Nature for Bodily Labour, or at least not so much as for the Labour of the Mind; and they who are, are not yet at leisure to intent it, by means of much more important Concerns: inasmuch as the Labour of the Mind is no less necessary to the Support of Humane Society, nor less an Instance of that Travel which God hath laid as a Burden upon Humane Nature: it seems but reasonable to infer, That the Command of God is no less satisfied with that kind of Labour, than it is by the sweat of our face, or working with our hands. Forasmuch, secondly, as even by God's appointment there are Men of High Degree, as well as Low, and such whose Education and Birth seems not well to correspond to those meaner Labours to which the greater part of Mankind are obliged; it seems but reasonable to allot them such a Labour as is suitable to that better State in which the Almighty hath placed them. Lastly, Forasmuch as though both the Curse and Precept of Labour be laid upon all Mankind, yet it is in the power of God to release it; forasmuch as those Persons to whom God hath given more liberal Fortunes, are in reason to be looked upon as in part released, because without those Necessities for the redress whereof Labour was principally enjoined: it seems but reasonable to infer, that they are neither obliged to the same degree of Labour with Persons of meaner Fortune, nor to the same Species or Kind. And more than this, if those whom the old Saxon Tongue styles ydlemen, but our present Dialect by a Name more suitable to their Quality, did not challenge, I know not what any reasonable Man could oppose against their way of living, or endeavour to reduce them to the Condition of meaner Persons; consideration being always to be had of the Condition of the Persons, in order to the adjustment of the Obligations that lie upon them. It is a known Observation, and therefore I shall not fear to have the truth of it called in Question, That among the Turks Persons 
* Busbeq. Tursic. Epist.  of the Noblest Quality, and most ingenuous Education, are yet brought up to some Manual Art, in which they ever after employ some portion of their Time; the Great Turk himself, amidst his most important Affairs, yet allotting some portion of his Time to the intending of it. I do not pretend to lay this Burden upon any ingenious Person, and much less to represent him as unuseful in the World, who should not think fit to follow their example; but certainly it must be a great reproach to those who are far better instructed, so far to forget either the Design of their Being, or Descent from Adam, as to think themselves privileged to live in ease, and spend that Patrimony in Sloth and Luxury, which their Renowned Ancestors acquired either by their Wits or by their Swords. It may be enough to such, that they are freed from all servile Labours, that they have an Education and Parts answerable to those glorious Heroes, from whom they derive both their Fortunes and their Blood. And certainly, where they are well employed, as they will be no less useful to the World, so neither less acceptable to God, than the sweat of the others brows. But because Scripture, no less than Reason, would be enquired into there, where the Obligation, whose Relaxation we seek, hath its principal Foundation in it; therefore it may not be amiss, that I say not in some measure necessary, to inquire whether the Scripture affords any ground for the qualifying of that severer Precept which God laid upon Mankind for its disobedience. Now that it doth, will sufficiently appear from that Question which St. Paul put concerning himself and Barnabas, 1 Cor. 9.6. For, demanding, as he does, whether he and Barnabas only had not power to forbear working, as well as other Apostles, and as the brethren of the Lord, and Cephas, (for so the Word only, and the connexion of that Demand with the former Words oblige us to supply it) he both supposeth that other of the Apostles, and the brethren of the Lord, and Cephas, abstained from Manual Labours; and that it was alike in his power to do so, if he pleased to make use of it, that so he might the better intent that more noble Work of the Conversion of Souls. And indeed, as the Labour of the Brain, whereby that is to be done, is no less useful to Humane Society, nor (which makes it approach nearer to that Curse upon which it is founded) less wearisome to the flesh, if we may give credit to Solomon 
* Eccl. 12.12. , who was more than ordinarily exercised in it; so they who would reduce us to that toilsome estate of St. Paul, and others, who stuck not to addict themselves even to the meanest Artifices, must also bring back again into the World those miraculous Gifts and Graces whereby St. Paul, and other such like Persons, were enabled to discharge their several Provinces; the Work of converting Souls (as it is now to be managed) requiring all that Labour and Industry which the Necessities of the World will suffer us to afford it. The same is to be said, and upon the strength of the forementioned Demand, concerning all those whose Brains are employed in the management of State-affairs, or are any other way useful to the conservation of men's Persons or Estates. For, St. Paul pleading his Exemption from Bodily Labour, from his diligence in his Apostleship, and the good he thereby did to those Persons who were under his inspection, to which he thought it but just that at least a Maintenance should be allowed; insinuating moreover, in the ninth and tenth Verses, by his comparing his Labour to the ox's treading out the corn, and to ploughing and reaping, that it was not unfitly styled a Labour, and such a Labour which privileged him to partake of carnal Things, no less than that which is attended with Sweat and Toil: he thereby gave us sufficiently to understand, that as the Labours of the Mind are no less properly such, than those which are exercised by the Hands; so, where they are conducible to the Benefit of Humane Kind, they give a Man the same Privilege to the enjoyment of this World's Goods, and consequently satisfy the intent of the Commandment.  
4. Being now, according to my proposed Method, to inquire about what things this Labour of ours is to be conversant, I shall propose, first, such Directions as concern the Labours of Men in general, and then those which relate to the Labours of particular Persons.  
As to the former of these, we shall need no other Instruction than that which St. Paul gives in the forequoted place to the Ephesians, to wit, that it be about those things that are good. By which I mean, first, such things as have no moral obliquity in them, nor are instrumental to them. Of the former sort, in particular, is the Trade of Harlots, who prostitute their Bodies to furnish themselves with a Support; the Arts of Witches and Wizzards, who inquire into things secret, and such as are not only knowable to God alone, but 
* See Deut. 29.29.  challenged to himself: Of the latter, all those which are instrumental to Uncleanness, or to any other Sin whatsoever; such as are to the former, the Trade of Bawds and Panders; to Drunkenness, the keeping of Houses not for the covenience of Travellers, or the moderate refreshment of others, but to invite and cherish intemperance; in fine, to Idolatry, the making of those Images which are to be the Object of it. Whence it is, that the Fathers inveigh so much against it, and (as I have before shown 
† Explicat. of the Second Commandm. Part. ) reckon it little inferior to that it ministers to. But beside that those things about which our Labour is to be conversant, aught to be free from all Vice, or from being instrumental to it; I shall not doubt to reckon, in the second place, that they ought to be some way or other useful to ourselves or others; partly, because this is the lowest Notion the Word Good, in the proper acception of it, is capable of; and partly, because we find Labour instituted for the Support of ourselves and others. Among these I reckon first, because undoubtedly Good, such Labours or Arts as conduce to the welfare of men's Souls, or Bodies, or Estates: such as are the Labour of the Brain, or Tongue, or Pen, in converting or building Men up in Piety; the cure of their Bodies when distempered, or the defending of their Properties; as, in like manner, those which conduce to the producing of Food and Raiment, the protecting Men from Hunger, or the injury of the Wether; in fine, all such as are any way instrumental to them, or employed about the producing of them; and that too, not only in such Instances whereby the Necessities of Nature may be served, but the distinction of Degrees preserved and maintained. The only difficulty, in my opinion, is concerning such Arts or Labours as are conversant about Matters of Delight and Recreation; such as are, the making of Cards or Dice, the Trade of Fiddlers, Tumblers, Stage-players, and other such like Persons, whose Life consists wholly in gratifying the Eyes and Ears of other Men. Concerning which, though I shall not be forward to pronounce of them as devoid of all usefulness, because Recreation, to which they serve, is no less needful to Humane Nature, than Labour; yet I cannot forbear to say, that Men of such Professions, of all others, ought both to avoid the committing of any Sin in the Exercise of their several Trades, and endeavour, what in them lies, and so far as their own Necessities will permit, the doing of such things also as are more useful to themselves and others; because, as if that about which their Labour is conversant be good, it is in the lowest proportion such; so they are very rarely managed without prejudice to their own Souls, or to theirs whom they are intended to procure the gratification of.  
Having thus shown, in the general, about what the Labours of Men are to be conversant; inquire we, in the next place, about what the Labours of particular Men are, and what choice they are to make to themselves out of the former Heap. For the resolution whereof, as it is necessary to premise, that that, and that only, is to be looked upon as the proper Subject of our Labour, to which the Divine Majesty shall be pleased to call us; partly, because St. Paul, in the seventh Chapter of his first Epistle to the Corinthians, presupposeth 
* See ver. 20. of that chap. as also ver. 24. with the Sermon of Dr. Sanderson upon the latter.  such a call of God to every Man; and partly, because it is not to be thought, that God, who superintends over the World, and particularly over Men, will be wanting in directing them to such Courses as may make most for their good, and his own Glory: so a compendious way is thereby opened for Men to judge of that Subject about which their Labour is to be conversant: All that is left for Men to do (supposing a Call of God to every one) being no other than to inquire, which way the Divine Majesty calleth them. For the investigation whereof, forasmuch as extraordinary Inspirations are now ceased, but however are not lightly to be expected in Matters of this nature, and where, for the most part, if not always, lower Methods will serve the turn; recourse must be had to what his Word, and our own Reason, (which is the Candle of the Lord) shall dictate to us. Which if we do, we shall find (as a 
† Sanderson ibid.  Learned Man hath largely proved) that the best way to judge of the Divine Calling, and consequently of the proper Subject of our Labour, is by our Education, Abilities, and Propension; especially when we find them all to concur. For, as we are to presume in reason, that he who commands us to honour our Parents, doth thereby oblige us to the making that the Subject of our Labour, which they, out of their Prudence and Care, have trained us up for (the detrecting of their Choice, being a questioning of their Wisdom, but to be sure a derogation to their Authority); so we can much less think that Choice any other than the Call of God, where a Man's own Inclination and Abilities do concur, because both of them the Results of his Providence, and, where his Revelations do not contravene, the Interpreters of his Will. Whatsoever difficulty there is in this Affair, is undoubtedly where there is a contrariety between them, and where Men are trained up to those Courses to which they have not only a natural averseness, but it may be too, little aptitude or ability. The resolution of which, though I had much rather Men should fetch from the forequoted 
‖ Sanders. ibid.  Learned Person, in whom it is distinct and full; yet I shall contribute so far toward it, by affirming, That as the first place ought in reason to be given to our Education, because the Act of those whom God hath commanded us to obey; and next to that, (because Parents may sometime command things unfitting) to our Parts and Abilities, because pointing out, as it were with the Finger, what Employments God designs us for: so that consideration ought to be had, in some measure, of men's Inclinations and Propensions, because both the Effects of the Creator's Power where they are purely Natural; and, where they are also strong, difficult to be overcome: I do not say, so far as to yield a perfect compliance with them, where our Abilities and Education run counter to them; but a partial one, and such as may make the Task imposed more easy to be born. Thus, for example, if a Man's Abilities and Education should prompt him to the Study of Sacred Things, at the same time his own Inclinations lead him to Humane Literature; if those Inclinations cannot be overcome, though there is no doubt they often may, the most prudent course, as well as most acceptable to God, would be undoubtedly to apply a Man's self to the study of the Civil Law, which is a rare Contexture of both. And more than this, as I shall not need to say concerning the choice of that Subject about which our Labour is to be conversant; so I shall conclude with an Exhortation, to be more than ordinarily diligent in it; but so, as neither to suffer our diligence about the Meat that perisheth, to transport us into any Injustice, or thrust out our Endeavours after that Meat which endureth for ever. For, though it be not to be imagined, that an ordinary diligence can satisfy that Precept which requires the moulding our Bread with the Sweat of our own Brows; yet much less can it be supposed, that that diligence of ours can licence us in any Injustice, or the neglect of our Eternal Welfare: Because, as Labour was imposed to procure to ourselves a Property, and thereby take away all temptation from entrenching upon the Properties of others, which a diligence that is attended with Injustice doth very ill comport with; so Reason, as well as Scripture, adviseth the postposing of those Commands which enjoin the pursuit of Earthly Blessings, to those which are infinitely above them.   

PART V.  
The last question concerning Labour is, whether it admit of a relaxation, and in what manner, and proportion. That it admits of a relaxation is made appear from the necessity there is of it, both to the support of Humane Nature, and to dispose men the better to continue it; as also, from the countenance that hath been given to it by Gods both Dispensations and Laws. That it admits of such relaxations as have the name of Recreations, is in like manner evidenced from the little refreshment that accrues from a mere rest from labour, & from the both leave and approbation God hath given to the other: From thence the Explication descends to entreat more particularly concerning the due manner, and proportion of our relaxation. In order whereunto, enquiry is made concerning such Recreations as are conversant about Lots, as Cards and Dice, the motion of the body, as Dancing, and particularly that which they call mixed; and the imitation of other men's gestures and speeches, as Stage-Plays. Touching the first whereof is shown, that there is not that sacredness in a Lot as is commonly deemed, and an answer returned to that of Solomon, Prov. 16.33. Touching the second, That Dancing hath both the leave and approbation of the Almighty; and that that which they call mixed may not only be used inoffensively by sober persons, but that there is more danger from the converse of young persons out of it, than in it: Touching the third, That Stage-Plays are but a kind of Picture of men's behaviour and speeches, and therefore no more unlawful than the depicting of their Faces. Consideration is next had of the Time that may be employed in them, and of the Money that may be bestowed upon them. In order to the former whereof is shown, 1. That they ought to have no more of our Time, than may serve for a relief after labour, or to quicken us to future ones. 2. That they ought not to entrench upon that Time which the Duties of Religion, or those of our Employments, call for. 3. That ordinarily they ought not to have the Morning at all, where they may be as well used at other times. As to the latter is made appear, that more Money ought not to be either expended or hazarded about them, than can well be spared from more important occasions, such as are those of Charity, and the sustentation of ourselves and Families; and that it is much less lawful to acquire, or design to acquire, a livelihood by them. The whole concluded with an Admonition, not to play at such Games, or for such Sums of Money, under which men cannot ordinarily contain themselves from heats of passion.  
5. OF the Questions before proposed concerning Labour (which how it appertains to this Commandment, needs not again be told you) the last, and only one remaining to be resolved, is, whether it admit of a relaxation, and in what manner and proportion. For the clearing whereof (how slight soever the matter of it may appear to be) yet I think myself obliged to use as much care and circumspection, as in matters of greater moment; Superstition on the one hand having endeavoured to abridge men of their lawful liberty, as Profaneness on the other hand to convert it into licentiousness.  
Now that our obligation to labour admits of a relaxation, (which is the first thing in order to be discussed) will appear, if we consider the necessity there is of it, or the countenance which hath been given to it by him, by whom the Obligation was imposed: For it being evident from Experience, that neither men's brains, nor bodies, are of ability to undergo an uninterrupted travel, there will arise from thence a necessity of remitting of our labour, as well as of intending and prosecuting it; he who acts beyond his ability offering an injury to his nature, and consequently, whilst he endeavours to keep one Commandment, engaging himself in the violation of a much more important one. But neither is there a less necessity of remitting some time of our labour, if we consider it only with reference to that labour which is bound upon us; for the due performance of that depending upon the hability and promptness of him that laboureth, as that hability and promptness upon his giving himself, at due times, rest and ease; he who would labour as he ought, must sometime remit of it, and slacken his Bow as well as bend it. And it calls to my mind the fact of Aesop, who, when twitted with playing among Children, contented himself for his defence, to lay before him that did so, an unbended Bow. Of which, whilst he and the spectators laboured to find the meaning, Aesop himself gave this rational account, as we learn from the most ingenious Phaedrus 
* Lib. 3. fab. 14. 
Cite rumps arcum, semper si tensum habueris.  
At si laxâris, cum voles, erit utilis.  
Sic lusus animo debet aliquando dari,  
Ad cogitandum melior ut redeat tibi.  ; that as a Bow if it be always kept bend will be quickly broken, but if sometime slackened, will be more useful to him that useth it; so, he that sometimes gives recreation to his mind, will find it afterwards better disposed to exercise those operations, which it is by God and Nature both fitted and intended for. And well then may Labour, though imposed upon man by the straitest obligations, admit of a relaxation, if it rather gain than lose aught by affording it. It being thus evident, that there is a necessity of a relaxation, as well as labour, yea to the undergoing of that labour which we are required to intent; proceed we to show what countenance it hath from him, by whom Labour was imposed. For the evidencing whereof, I will allege in the first place, that relaxation which sleep gives: for sleep being manifestly the work of God and Nature, because naturally flowing from that weariness which the exercise of our natural faculties produceth, and including moreover in it a relaxation from labour, because binding up those faculties by which it is to be intended; he who makes sleep a necessary adjunct of Humane Nature, must consequently be thought to give countenance to that relaxation, which is the natural and necessary effect of it. But neither hath the Divine Majesty given less countenance to it by his Laws, as will appear from that known one of the observation of the Sabbath; for that day (as was before shown 
* See Explic. of the Fourth Com. Part. ) being appointed for the rest of the body, as well as for the intending of the more important actions of Religion; he, who gave leave to, yea imposed such a rest, shows it to be no less acceptable to himself, than those days of labour which he required. I conclude therefore with the Author to the Hebrews, though in another sense, that there remaineth a rest to the People of God, yea to all who have no other title to that name, than their original from him, upon whom the burden of Labour was imposed.  
But because the question is not so much, even amongst the most scrupulous, Whether our obligation to labour admit of a relaxation; as whether it admit of such relaxations, as are best known by the names of Recreations or Plays: therefore I think it not amiss (before I proceed any further) to show these to have the same Authority with those other relaxations before spoken of. In the doing whereof, I will make use of the same Topics, by which I before evinced the lawfulness of the other. To begin with Nature, because that, which we speak of, is but a refreshment of it; where who is there that sees not an equal necessity of Recreation, with those other relaxations before spoken of? For, to say nothing at all of Sleep, because what refreshment soever it may give, yet it is perceived rather by its Effects, than by itself; a mere Rest from Labour being not without its tediousness, considering the natural propension there is in men to be always exercising their respective Faculties: were not Humane Nature sometime indulged the use of more busy refreshments, it is impossible to think but they would apply themselves to their Labours with less vigour and cheerfulness, than is requisite to the due performance of them. And indeed, however some more scrupulous than wise, yea even in those sacred things, to the knowledge whereof they most pretend, though such (I say) have by their practice and advice recommended a simple Rest, before those Refreshments which Recreations give; yet hath that recommendation of theirs proved as little to the advantage of Religion, as to the encouragement of those Labours which it was principally designed to promote: both themselves, and others who follow their Example, employing the most part of their time of Rest in uncharitable censures of other men, which are certainly more repugnant to Religion, than any Recreation whatsoever. Beside, whilst he, who is busied about some innocent Recreation or other, hath his thoughts as well as hands employed, and consequently is not obnoxious to those evil suggestions, which the Devil is apt to instil into idle minds; he who contents himself with a simple Rest, makes himself a prey to all those evil thoughts, which the advantage of a mind not employed gives him the temptation to suggest. Thus whilst men, out of a vain fear of those inconveniences which do sometime attend upon innocent Recreations, avoid wholly the use of them, they do not infrequently run into another, and a worse extreme. With how little countenance from Scripture as well as Nature, that of Solomon in Ecclesiastes, as well as another of the Prophet Zachary shows: The latter whereof represents it as the consequence of God's intended restauration of Jerusalem, that the streets of the City should be full of young persons, of either Sex, playing in the streets thereof, Zach. 8.5. The former, that as there is a season for more sad and serious purposes, so there is a time to laugh and dance 
* Eccl. 3.4. ; and consequently, that such like Recreations, where they are separated from the abuses thereof, are not without the leave, yea countenance of him, by whom times and seasons are appointed.  
Having thus returned an Answer to the first part of the Demand, and shown our Obligation to Labour, not only to admit of a relaxation, but of such relaxations in particular, as have the name of Recreations; we are in the next place to inquire, in what manner and proportion it admits of them, which will show the several limitations thereof. In order whereunto, I will first of all consider of the matter of them, as without the due qualification of which they cannot by any means be accounted lawful.  
Now though, if question had not been made about the lawfulness of some Recreations that are much in use, it might suffice for the resolution of the conscience, to propose only some general Rules, such as are, that they be conversant about such things, by which the mind or body or both may be better disposed to Labour, and neither the one nor the other corrupted; he who keeps within these bounds being out of danger of offending, as to the matter of his Recreations: yet in regard of the weakness of some, and the peevishness of others, I will proceed to more particular considerations, and inquire what is to be thought of such Games as are conversant about Lots, as Cards or Dice; the motion of the body, as Dancing, and particularly that which they call mixed, and the imitation of other men's gestures and speeches, as Stage-Plays: Intending afterwards (because it is not to be denied that all these both may and are often abused) to subjoin such necessary Cautions, as may preserve men from the several abuses thereof.  
Of all the Recreations, wherewith the minds or bodies of men have been exercised, I know of none which scrupulous persons have both more avoided, and impugned, than those which are conversant about Lots, as conceiving that there is something so sacred in a Lot, as not to be a proper matter of merriment. What ground they have so to opine shall be afterwards examined, when I come to consider that Text on which they chief bottom their persuasion; give me leave only, before I proceed to that, to show you the nature and use of a Lot, as which will conduce not a little to show it a lawful matter of Recreation. Now a Lot (as Mr. Gataker 
* Of the natural use of Lots. ch. 1.  hath shown at large) is nothing else but a casual event applied to the deciding of a doubt, and hath place 
‖ Ibid. c. 5. pag. 125, etc.  not in things of moment (for such undoubtedly ought not to be put to that hazard, save where there is an express command of God for it) but in things indifferent, and concerning which it matters not, whether they be done one way or another. But what is there in all this, that can hinder a Lot from being made matter of disport, and consequently from becoming an ingredient of those Games to which it is commonly applied? Is it the casualty of the event? But who (as the same Mr. Gataker 
* Ibid. ch. 6. pag. 170.  reasons) is so excessively austere, or so extremely superstitious, as to deny, but that a man may make sport with such casual events as do usually occur? May not one lawfully take pleasure in seeing a man shoot, or catch, at aught blindfold? Or may we not please ourselves with our own or others tripping on the way, when no hurt ensueth, or in their treading in some unclean thing unawares? Lastly, Is it not equally warrantable to make Game of a Hare that casually crosseth us, as of one that we advisedly light upon? If with these and other the like Casualties than we may lawfully sport ourselves, why not as well (as the same worthy person goes on) with the shuffting of Arrows, or the drawing of Tickets, the dealing of Cards, or the fall of a die? There being as much of casualty in the one as the other, and therefore either both to be condemned, or neither. But it may be, the Crime lies in applying of this casualty to the deciding of a doubt; as for Example, who shall play or stay out, who begin or follow, or what Cards each person shall have to make advantage of. But neither in this can any the least Crime be supposed, if it be duly adverted to: For Christian liberty 
* See Gatak. of the nature, etc. of a lot. chap. 6. Sect 8  implying a free use of all God's Creatures, to employ them unto such purposes as they are by natural power enabled to; what should hinder men, upon consent, to employ a Lot to the determining of a doubt, which that Lot, by the consent of men, is enabled to determine? especially when, as it afterwards follows in the account before given of a Lot, the use of it is only in matters of indifferency, which are the proper subject of Recreation. All therefore that can in Reason be objected against the use of Lots in sports, is that of Solomon, Prov. 16.33. The Lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing, or (as it is in the Hebrew) every judgement of it is of the Lord. From whence though some have endeavoured to infer, that there is an immediate providence in every Lot, and consequently, that he, who makes use of it in trifling matters, puts God upon exerting such an immediate providence in them; yet, as all that can be necessarily inferred from thence is, that there is a Providence of God in all things, even in the least, in the most casual things, and among the rest by name in a Lot, (what is here said concerning a Lot, being elsewhere 
* Prov. 16.1.9.19.21.20.24.21.30, 31.  affirmed of all men's thoughts, and ways, and words, and works, in all which certainly no man will affirm an immediate Providence to interpose) so, that we cannot with reason infer an immediate Providence in every Lot, is evident, partly 
‖ Gatak. ibid. ch. 7. Sect. 4.  in that the lighting of the Lots in this or that manner ordinarily cometh immediately from the act of the Creature, whose motion determineth it to that manner after which it happeneth; and partly, that if there were any such immediate Providence in 
* Gatak ibid.  them, it should be in the natural power of the Creature, because in his natural power to cast Lots at pleasure, to put God upon the exerting of an immediate Providence, which it were little less than blasphemy to affirm. Against such Games therefore as are conversant about Lots no just exception can be made, unless where they are abused, which it is not only none of my design to defend, but, as I shall afterwards show, to detect and condemn.  
From such Recreations therefore as are conversant about Lots, pass we to those that are conversant about the motion of the body, and particularly that of Dancing. A Recreation, which, however some zealous people have inveighed against, yet if used with sobriety cannot in the least be faulted; for beside that it doth not appear, how it should be more unlawful to Dance than Sing, Dancing being but a harmony in the motion of the Body, as Singing is in that of the Tongue; beside that he, who affirms there is a time for every serious purpose, hath not stuck in like manner to affirm, that there is a time for sporting one's, and particularly for that whereof we speak, (which how he could reasonably do, if Dancing were unlawful in itself, will be found not easy to determine?) With what face can any man condemn that as unlawful, which is not only foretold by God as the joyful effect of his redeeming Israel, Jer. 31.13. (for then, saith he, shall the Virgin rejoice in the Dance, both young men and old together) but is affirmed by the Scripture to have been the expression of David's joy, at the bringing up the Ark to Jerusalem; and (which is more) Psal. 149.3. is recommended by the same David to others, to express the praises of God by? And though it be true, that all Dancing is not equally innocent, and those which they call mixed Dances, may administer matter of temptation, where they, who are lewdly disposed, are joined together: yet as I doubt not there is a far greater danger of temptation from the converse of young persons out of it, as having nothing else but one another's persons to take up their thoughts, whilst the others are diverted by intending of those measures they are to tread; so neither can I imagine but where persons of sober education are mixed, they may use it with the same innocency, wherewith they may do other Recreations which are less condemned.  
One only Recreation remains, of those which we before instanced in, to wit the Recreation of stageplays; concerning the unlawfulness whereof in themselves, as I could never yet see any convincing Argument, with what clamour soever they have been decried, (for why should it not be as lawful to represent the actions of men in our own, or behold them when represented by others, as it is to depict their Faces upon a Tablet, or please ourselves with looking upon them when they are?) so I could hearty wish the enemies of stageplays had forborn the arguing against them from men or women's putting on the apparel of the other sex; partly, because if it have any weight in itself, it is accidental to them, and partly, because it may have in part occasioned the bringing of Women upon the Stage, which our own lamentable experience hath shown to be rather for the worse than for the better. If there be any thing offensive adhering to some particular Plays (as it is too too apparent there are) that is nothing to the Recreation itself, and persuades only, as a Learned Man hath well observed, that the Master of the Revels (who according to the ancient constitution ought to see that nothing be spoken but what is fit to be heard) expunge out of them whatsoever is offensive, and that, till that is done, all sober persons would forbear the sight of such, there being no doubt but in that and all other Recreations, men ought not only to take care that those they use be innocent for their kind, but lawful for the particular, and such as are free from that immodesty, and profaneness, and scurrility, wherewith they say the compositions of this latter age abound.  
But beside that to make our Recreations lawful, they ought to be conversant about such things, by which, either the Body, or Mind, or both, may be less indisposed to labour, but neither corrupted or depraved; we are to take care that we use them as Recreations, because otherwise we convert them to another use than what they were designed to by God. The only thing of difficulty is, what it is to use them as Recreations, which may be comprehended in this general Aphorism. For then, and then only, do we use Recreations as such, when we use them as things on the by, and not as the main business of our life, for a moderate refreshment, and not as the means of our support, and much less to overthrow it. For Recreations (as was before shown) having no other end than to relieve us after Labour, or dispose us for it, they must consequently be looked upon, and accordingly used, as things on the by, and not as the main; to procure to us a Refreshment, and not a Livelihood (which God hath appointed Labour for) and much less to destroy it. The result of which observation will serve us for a direction both as to the Time which may be allotted to them, and the Money which may be either expended or acquired at them. I begin with the former of these, even the Time which may be allotted to them; concerning which, these Three things are easy to be observed, because naturally flowing from the former observation.  

1. That our Recreations are not to have either the greatest, or an equal share of our time with those Employments to which we are designed; yea, on the contrary, that they ought to have no more of it, than may serve us for a relief after labour, or to quicken us to our future ones. A caution which I would to God I had no occasion to mention, amongst the other necessary ones which this debauched age calls for. But as it is too apparent that some men's lives are in a manner one continued Recreation, or if mixed with any thing of business, yet as but a Parergon to the other; so those who are not so vain, nor it may be can afford to be so, yet spend whole days and nights in it; by that means converting that into their repast, which was intended only as Physic, or (if you had rather I should so express it, because Recreations were no doubt intended for a moderate delight) converting that into meat which was intended but as sauce to it. Which as it is apparently contrary to the design of Recreation, and consequently not without a great degree of guilt, yet hath this farther mischief attending it, that it engageth us in a second. He who hath thus wearied himself with Recreations, (for even these, if continued in, are not without a burden to those that use them) being of necessity to refresh himself by ease or sleep, before he can betake himself to his employments. And though I will not deny but sometimes one or more whole days may be borrowed from our employments, the general consent of Nations having indulged such a liberty, and the pains of the laborious person seeming not without reason to require it, (for what satisfaction could it be to men in perpetual travail to have Recreations only by snatches and in smaller portions?) yet I think it but a just consequent of the former observation, that ordinarily our Recreations should be meted by smaller portions; as because a less portion of time may generally suffice for the refreshment of Nature, so because it is but a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and therefore rather to have a share in so large a portion, than to devour it all.  
2. It is to be observed Secondly, that as we are not to spend more of our time in Recreation than may serve for a relief after labour, or to quicken us to the following one; so neither to give way to our Recreations at any time, when either the duties of Religion, or those of our several Employments, call upon us to intent them; that which is but on the by being in reason to give place to the main, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to that which is Business and Employment. Upon which account, as all those must be looked upon as Criminals, who can so easily suffer their Recreations to trespass upon the time of their devotions; so next to them such who can intent them, when the care of their several Families, or the business of their Employments call for their regard.  
3. I observe Thirdly, and more than that I shall not need to observe as to the Time, that our Recreations, where they may be as well used at another part of the day, ought not ordinarily to have the morning of it; partly, because the rest of the foregoing night supersedes the use of them, and partly, because that part of the day, through the Agility which the foregoing Rest gives, is the most opportune for business, which is in reason to be preferred before the other.   
From the matter of Time proceed we to that of Money, where again these two useful Cautions present themselves: The former whereof respects the expense or hazard of it; the latter, the acquiring or designing it. For though I see no more reason to proscribe all Play for Money, than for Glory and Reputation, which he must be an extraordinary person who should be able perfectly to separate from it; yet I cannot forbear to say, upon the strength of the grounds before laid down, that it is utterly unlawful either to expend or hazard more Money about it, than can well be spared from more important occasions, such as are those of Charity, or the relief of ourselves or families: Partly, because that which is only a thing on the by aught to yield to more important occasions, and partly, because such expense or hazard engageth Men in that sin which this Commandment expressly forbids; he who thus entrencheth upon the occasions before remembered, robbing the Poor of that charity which is due from him to them, as himself and family of that support, which is no less incumbent on him, even by the force of this Commandment: He who forbids to steal, commanding also to take care that we may have wherewithal to minister to our own necessities and those of others. Upon which account, as it will be necessary to look upon all those as offenders, who play away Manors, Estates, yea and their own Liberty, being not unlike herein to those Ancient Germans, whom 
* De moribus German. Aleam, quod mirere, sobrii inter seria exercent, tantd lucrandi per dendive temeritate ut cum omnia defecerunt, extremo ac novissimo jactu de libertate & de corpore contendunt. Victus voluntariam servitutem adit.  Tacitus speaks of, who, after they had played away all they had, were wont to stake their own persons to become slaves to them they played with, if they should happen to be overcome: So we are to look upon such also as offenders, who either hazard, or tempt others to hazard such sums of Money, as by the loss whereof they may be either straitened in their own or families support, or disabled in any measure from ministering to the necessities of the Poor. Again, as it is utterly unlawful either to expend or hazard more Money about our Recreations, than can well be spared from more important occasions; so it is no less unlawful either to acquire or design to acquire a livelihood or any part thereof by it, as because by so doing we shall but entrench upon the Properties of others which this Commandment doth expressly forbid; so because God hath no less expressly commanded the working with our hand the thing that is good, that we may have wherewithal to support ourselves. Whence it is 
‖ See Jer. Tayl. Ductor Dubit. li. 4. c. 1. p. 477.  that Holy Men have not only represented such acquisitions as unlawful to be detained, but some Nations also confiscated them to the public. I will conclude this Affair and my Discourse with an admonition not to play at such Games, or for such sums of Money, under which we cannot ordinarily contain ourselves from heats of Passion and those intemperances' of Language which do for the most part attend them. For as that, which is never so lawful in itself, may yet become unlawful to us, if it prove to us an occasion of falling, and particularly into contention and reproachful language; so there is no doubt such recreations ought to be forborn by us, where, through the peevishness of our own nature, we cannot so far command our own passions, as to preserve us from them. For though recreation be not only lawful, but in some sort necessary, yet this or that particular one is not, and therefore in reason to be discarded, where we find upon observation that we cannot intent them with that indifferency and dispassionateness, which the levity thereof requireth.   

PART VI.  
Frugality or Good-husbandry as necessary for the conserving of our Properties, as Labour is towards acquiring them, for which cause it is assigned a place here. That considered, either as to our own use of those good things we are possessed of, or as to the imparting of them unto others. In the former of which senses it requires the bounding of our expenses ordinarily by our yearly income, the keeping in some good proportion within it, the reasons of both which are declared; and in fine, the using of our several Properties with moderation and care. In the latter, the using of a moderation even in our Charity, the reasons whereof are also assigned. An exhortation to the practice both of the one and the other Frugality from religious considerations. A transition to the consideration of such means, as are necessary to the defending or retrieving of our Properties, when either taken away or attempted, or to the supplying thereof when perished and come to nought. In order to the former whereof is represented, the appealing to the Magistrate by a Suit, and such appeals both manifested to be lawful from Gods constituting of Magistrates for the redressing of injuries, and an answer returned to those say of our Saviour and St. Paul, which seem to forbid Suits at Law altogether, but do indeed proscribe only scandalous, vexatious, and trifling ones. As to the latter is recommended and enjoined the using of entreaties to those who are in a capacity to supply us.  
2. SINCE one and the same thing, under divers considerations, may become the subject matter of different Sciences (for thus Heaven itself, though the proper concernment of the Divine, as it is the Seat of the Blessed, and the Hope of the Religious, may yet be the Province of the Astronomer, as to the Revolution of it, and of those Lucid Bodies which it contains) I hope it will not be thought strange, if I, who am a Preacher of Religion, and profess now to explain it, represent that Good Husbandry, which worldly wisdom teacheth, as a part also of Heavenly one, yea of that Commandment which I have now chosen to illustrate. For inasmuch as he who forbids the invading of others Properties, must be supposed also to command the intending and conserving of our own, as without which we shall be under a necessity of invading those of others; inasmuch as Good Husbandry is no less necessary to the conserving of our several Properties, than that Labour, which we before insisted on, is to the procuring of them; he who is acknowledged to oblige to the one, must be confessed to oblige us to the other, and consequently to look upon it as a duty that is hereby enjoined. Here only is the difference between our consideration of Good Husbandry, and that of the worldly man, that whilst the latter intends it only for the securing to himself this world's happiness, we on the other side, recommend it as a duty laid upon us by the Almighty, and as a means to preserve us from the temptation of invading others Properties; which the prodigal spending of that which is his own, doth not infrequently put the unwary Spendthrift on.  
Now though wherein Frugality or Good Husbandry consisteth were not difficult for men to learn, if they would apply themselves to the consideration of it; yet because men are slow of understanding, in all things of duty, and particularly in this whereof we speak, I think it not amiss, especially having shown it to be enjoined by this Commandment, to spend some time in the investigation of it. For my more orderly effecting whereof, I will consider Frugality or Good Husbandry, 

1. As to our own use of those good things we are possessed of: And,  
2. As to the imparting of them to others.    
1. And here not to propose to you those strict measures whereby our Ancestors proceeded, partly because the recalling of them is rather to be wished than hoped for, and partly because they are not of absolute necessity to be observed, I shall represent,  
1. First, as a necessary part of it, the bounding our Expenses ordinarily by that yearly income, which our several Properties do afford us; he who exceeds those limits, not only diminishing his Property, instead of conserving it, but treasuring up an arrear of debt, which will make him afterwards less able to support himself. Upon which, as there will necessarily ensue a substraction in some measure of our Charity, which I have shown heretofore, and shall more hereafter, to have the nature of a Theft; so also a temptation to supply ourselves with invading the Properties of others, which is the very formality of one. It is true indeed (for, for that very reason I subjoined the word ordinarily, when I represented it as a necessary part of men's Frugality, not to exceed the bounds of their yearly income,) it is true, I say, the so doing is not always possible, nor yet where it is, of absolute necessity to be observed, because there may be a just expectation of an addition to our several Properties, the intuition whereof may make it reasonable to exceed the present one. But as there is no repugnancy between affirming that there may be instances where the like measures either cannot or need not be observed, and that ordinarily they ought to be; so that ordinarily they ought to be so, the forementioned arguments sufficiently evince, and the experience of the world doth abundantly confirm; it being rare to see any, who exceed those bounds, not to make havoc of their Estates, and at length to end in want and beggary. Lastly, For though that be  to the matter of Frugality, yet it hath the astipulation of that which is of greater necessity to be regarded; he who suffers his Expenses ordinarily to exceed the bounds of his yearly income, shows a dissatisfaction with that portion which the Divine Majesty hath allotted him; which though no violation of the Precept of Frugality, yet is of a more important one, even of that which enjoins submission to the Divine Will.  
2. But let us rise yet higher (for so, as I shall by and by show, the Virtue we have now before us doth oblige) and inquire whether frugality do not as well tie us to keep in some good proportion within the bounds of our yearly income, as not to exceed or surpass them. For the evidencing the affirmative whereof, I shall desire you to consider the necessities that may happen to every man, whether it be by casualties, which no man how fortunate soever is wholly exempt from, or by changing his condition from single life to marriage, which most persons either choose or find themselves necessitated to, or by the infirmities of old age, which are in a manner an inevitable evil: For inasmuch as all these bring their necessities along with them, and such as that state to which they appertain wants either strength or revenue to provide sufficiently against; it must be looked upon as a necessary piece of Frugality ordinarily to provide ourselves beforehand, as without which neither our Properties, nor we ourselves can well be conserved. Upon which account, as all those single persons must be looked upon as violators of it, who, however they design to enter into the state of marriage, yet make not the least provision against those necessities which it brings (for which cause, if they succeed ill, as generally such persons do, they ought to thank their own want of Frugality, and not the disposition of the Divine Providence:) So those also are to be reckoned to the number, especially if persons of meaner fortune, who in the strength and vigour of their years lay by nothing in store to support them under the infirmities of old age, as if it were a rare thing for men to fall under such infirmities, or God were obliged to support them by an immediate Providence. And indeed (for what should hinder us from making profession of a truth, which every days experience gives so clear an attestation to?) from hence for the most part proceeds that scantness of Fortune, which is such a burden to the needy person, and all that live near him: It rarely happening that men, who are so frugal of their present Properties, as to keep in a good proportion within them, are reduced to that necessity in any ordinary condition of life, as not to find a competent means to support themselves under it. But of all the necessities which it is incumbent upon men to provide against, there is certainly none which doth more require the not living up to the height of our income, than that which Children bring; for inasmuch as these do not only require a present subsistence but a foundation for their future support, it will be little less than impossible for us to provide for them as we ought, where we do not only not exceed the bounds of our yearly income, but not keep at a good distance from them. The only difficulty is, what distance we are to keep; which must be left, in a great measure, to the judgement of every particular man to determine. This only would be said, That as that distance we are to keep is to be proportioned by those necessities we have cause to apprehend; so the greater the distance the better, especially where the necessities are like to be pressing. Provided first, that that which invites us to it be the command of God, and not any base covetousness; and, secondly, that our way of living be answerable to that of sober persons, which are of the same condition and fortune with ourselves. Lastly,  
3. And more than that I shall not need to say, as to that frugality which respects our own use of those good things which God hath bestowed upon us, it is a necessary part of Frugality to use them with moderation and care, and neither spoil them by intemperance or neglect; he who so doth, destroying instead of conserving his Property, and consequently making himself less able to support himself, if he should fall into any distress, or minister to the necessities of others.  
2. From that Frugality which respects our own use of the good things we are possessed of, pass we to that which respects the imparting of them to others, and which is equally necessary to the conservation of them. Where who is there that sees not how conducible it is to the observation of this Commandment; whether we respect that charity which it does, though covertly, enjoin; or that stealth which it manifestly forbids? For as by immoderate largesses men do not only destroy their several Properties, but put themselves out of a capacity of long continuing that beneficence in which they seem to take so much content, than which (as Tully 
* De Officiis li. 2. Nonnunquam tamen est largiendum, etc. Sed diligenter atque moderaté. Multi enim patrimoniae effuderunt inconsultè largiendo. Quid autem est stultius, quàm, quod libenter facias, curare ut id diutiùs facere non possis? Atque etiam sequuntur largitionem rapinae. Cum enim dando egere coeperint, alienis bonis manus afferre coguntur.  speaks) what is there that can be more absurd; so they put themselves upon a temptation, shall I say, or rather inevitable necessity of invading the Properties of others. For, when (as the same Tully 
* De Officiis li. 2. Nonnunquam tamen est largiendum, etc. Sed diligenter atque moderaté. Multi enim patrimoniae effuderunt inconsultè largiendo. Quid autem est stultius, quàm, quod libenter facias, curare ut id diutiùs facere non possis? Atque etiam sequuntur largitionem rapinae. Cum enim dando egere coeperint, alienis bonis manus afferre coguntur.  speaks) they begin to want by giving, they are compelled, for the supply of those wants, to lay hands on the goods of others, and show themselves as greedy of theirs, as they were before prodigal of their own. All that I can observe to require any thing of a discussion, is, what kind of largesses the Frugality here spoken of extendeth to, and by what measures it is to be conducted. Neither the one nor other of which will be difficult to be solved by him who shall attentively consider them. For though Frugality be mostly construed with relation to such Largesses, as are the fruits rather of humour than beneficence, and consequently rarely applied to those of Charity; yet that it extends to the moderation of those also, needs no other Argument, than that prohibition we have now before us. For how is he any other than a Thief, who substracts from the necessary support of himself and Family (for which all Properties were primarily bestowed) to minister to the necessities of others? And though it be true that there are few such kind of Thiefs (for which cause that caution may seem the less necessary to have been inserted) yet inasmuch as vainglory doth sometime mix itself with men's Charity, and tempt them to be profuse, in giving above what the necessities of themselves or Families will well permit, I thought it not amiss to admonish, that Frugality ought to have the inspection and moderation of them, as well as of those Largesses which have no other Fountain, than either humour, or some other the like worldly motive. The only thing of which there can be any doubt, is, by what measures that Frugality is to proceed, which the grounds before laid will afford an easy solution of. For inasmuch as the end of Frugality is the conservation of men's Properties, as the end of those Properties primarily the ministering to our own and Families necessities; our Frugality in giving is to guide itself by those necessities of ours, for the supplying whereof men's several Properties were primarily intended. Otherwise we become prodigal, rather than charitable, and in stead of being benevolent to others, prove unjust to ourselves and ours. But because it is not impossible, when I come to entreat of the Measures of our Charity, I may have occasion to bring this Argument again before you, because suggesting a Limitation of it; therefore contenting myself at present with what hath been already said concerning it, I will employ the residue of my Discourse in exhorting you to the Practice both of the one and the other Frugality.  
Now though I am not ignorant, I might furnish myself with Motives for that purpose, from that Love which all Men naturally have for the conservation of their own Being and Happiness; yet I shall choose rather, especially being so amply furnished from the foregoing Discourse, to recommend it to you upon the score of that Religion which my Profession, as well as present Task, obligeth me to display. For, is it not a part of Religion, yea an important one, to acquiesce in the disposition of the Divine Providence, and content ourselves with such a portion of this World's Goods as he is pleased to allot us? And if so, is it not of like importance to bond our Enjoyments by those Portions, which is one main part of that Frugality which we commend? Is it not a part of Religion, in like manner, to provide against future Necessities, and particularly those Necessities which Children bring? And must it not then be looked upon as such, to keep in a good proportion within the Bounds of our present Properties, which the same Frugality, as well as the providing against those Necessities, doth command? Lastly, Is it not a part of Religion, as well as Providence, to be temperate in all things, which the same Frugality, no less than the Precept of Sobriety, doth enjoin? But what then can be looked upon as a part of Religion, if this be not? or where shall we find any thing, of that nature at least, that hath a juster Foundation in it? Especially, if we add to the former Considerations, that without Frugality we cannot well either be just to ourselves, or contain ourselves from doing Injustice unto others: Prodigality, though at first blush it look like an excess of Indulgence to ourselves, yet being Cruelty and Injustice, because both spoiling us for the future of the necessary Means of our Support, and, which is no less Injustice to ourselves than others, putting us upon a necessity of invading the Properties of others, and so undoing our own Souls, as well as making havoc of our Brother's Fortunes. From whence as it will unavoidably follow, that Frugality is a great part of Religion, because diffusing itself into so many and so important Duties of it; so it cannot at any time cease to be such, unless where it degenerates into Sordidness, which is rather Covetousness than Frugality, or is taken up upon purely prudential Considerations.  
3. Of Labour and Frugality I have entreated hitherto; and I have entreated so much the more largely of them, because they are the only ordinary Means of procuring or conserving our several Properties. But because it may so happen, that our several Properties may be taken away, or at least attempted by others, or by some sinister accident perish and come to nought; therefore it will be necessary for us to inquire, what other Means there are whereby the former may be either retrieved or defended, and those which are perished may be supplied.  
Now though, if Magistrates had not been constituted, no doubt at all could be made, but we might even by forcible means defend or retrieve our several Properties, no natural Reason forbidding the vindicating to ourselves what God by his Providence hath made our proper Portion; yet the same is not to be said after the Constitution of Magistrates, and that Power wherewith they are invested, of doing Right to the Injured Party: partly, because he who constitutes such a Power, must be supposed also, because it would be otherwise in vain, to oblige private Persons to seek their Remedy there; and partly, because Force could not be lawful, were there no Magistrate to defend us, if more peaceable Means could be able to protect us. From whence, as it will follow, that we are not ordinarily to right ourselves, and much less to do it by force of Arms; so, that it may be both lawful and necessary (because necessary sometimes to the conserving of our several Properties) to appeal for redress to the Magistrate, and sue the injurious Person at his Tribunal. For, if (as I have heretofore shown, and shall hereafter more largely) Magistrates were appointed by God for the redress of Injuries, what should hinder the injured Party to appeal to the Magistrate for it, especially when there is no other way left to compass it? Which said, I shall the more confidently apply myself to the consideration of what the Gospel teacheth, as which is the only Objection against this way of defending or retriving our several Properties. For, inasmuch as the same Gospel doth both approve and assert those Powers which claim to themselves the power of Redress; it is impossible to think it should proscribe all Appeals to them, and enjoin Men rather to suffer any thing, than to do it: A power of Redress being in vain, where it is unlawful to be appealed to, by those who are most concerned to seek it. Taking it therefore for granted, that such Appeals are both lawful, and sometimes necessary; I will make it my business to inquire, what our Saviour meant, when he said, If any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also: as also what St. Paul did, where he represents going to Law as a fault, and advises rather to suffer ourselves to be defrauded: Both which Passages I will be so much the more particular in the consideration of, because they will discover to us the due Limitations of that which we have affirmed to be lawful in itself. I begin with that of our Saviour, because no doubt the Foundation of the other, but however the most to be considered, for his sake from whom it fell; toward the explication whereof I shall offer, first, That his meaning possibly was, not that we should not seek a Redress of our Wrongs in any case, but that we should not seek it with a revengeful mind, and with a design more to punish others, than right ourselves. Which Notion is so much the more probable, because it is urged as an Instance of our not resisting evil, after the same manner that the Jews are found to have done, when, by the permission of God, they required an Eye for an Eye, and a Tooth for a Tooth. For, such resisting of evil as is there spoken of, serving only for the punishment of those from whom the evil proceeded, all that can justly be inferred from that Doctrine which is opposed by our Saviour to it, is, that we are not either to defend or retrieve our several Properties with the same vindictive Mind which those Persons cherished, who required such a Retaliation as served to punish the injurious Person, but not at all to afford redress to themselves. For, what advantage, save the satisfying of a vindictive Mind, could the plucking out another Man's Eye, or knocking out another's Tooth, procure to him that had lost his own? But let us suppose, that this were no part of our Saviour's meaning, or at least that it were but the less principal one; yet it will not thence follow, that he forbade absolutely the defending or retriving our several Properties by a Suit of Law. For, his meaning possibly might be, yea undoubtedly was, that we should not take such a Course in trifling Instances, and when nothing but a Coat or Cloak is the foundation of it. For, what Patience or Meekness (which Graces the New Testament doth infinitely commend) what Patience or Meekness (I say) can that be, which will have satisfaction made it for every the least Injury it sustains? But as it is one thing to condemn the going to Law for trifling Matters; and another, the so doing for the conservation of those things which are necessary to our own Families Support, or at least to the maintaining of us in that condition wherein he hath placed us: so, that it was not the intention of our Saviour to forbid the last, is sufficiently evident, from the obligation his Gospel lays upon us, to make provision for our own. For, being thereby obliged to make provision for our own, and that too under no less penalty than of being reputed worse than Infidels if we do not; it must consequently be thought lawful, where other means fail, to appeal to that which is but his own Ordinance, for the defending of that which is to maintain them. Lastly, our Saviour might mean (for so largely oftentimes do the Penmen of the Scripture, and other Authors speak, when the thing which they condemn is not intended to be wholly banished) our Saviour (I say) might mean, that in regard of those heats and other inconveniences which do commonly attend Suits of Law, we should avoid them both as long and as much as is possible for us, choosing rather to suffer somewhat, than to take such a suspicious course; but however resolving to try all other ways, before we betake ourselves to that. Which Advice, as it is no wonder our Saviour should give to his Disciples, when we find Tully 
* De Officiis lib. 2. Convenit autem tum in dando munificum esse, tum in exigendo non acerbum: in omnique re contrahendâ, etc. aequum & facilem, multa multis de jure suo concedentem: à litibus vero, quantum liceat, & nescio an panlo plus etiam, quàm liceat, abhorrentem. , who was an Advocate, advising to abstain from Suits of Law, as far as Men well can, or rather farther; so neither that he should express it with such Terms of dislike, as if he meant to banish all: that which is for the most part bad, looking so like that which is simply and universally such, that it may very well be expressed in the same general Terms of dislike with the other. From that Passage of our Saviour concerning Suits of Law, pass we to another of St. Paul, in which yet we shall find far less difficulty than in the other. For, beside that that which he chief condemns, 1 Cor. 6.1. was their going to Law before Heathen Tribunals, by means whereof Christian Religion, pretending so much as it did to Peace, could not choose but hear ill among those who were Enemies to it; he seems to me rather to approve than condemn going to Law, where that and other Inconveniences were separated from it. For, not only questioning with them, in the first Verse, for going to Law before the unjust, and not before the Saints; but demanding of them, in the next Verse, whether those Saints should not judge the world, and if so, whether they were not worthy to judge the smallest matters, such as all Earthly matters are, in comparison of the other; he seems to me plainly to insinuate, that, provided the ground of the Suit be a matter of moment as to this World, and such the loss whereof could not well be born, an Appeal might lawfully enough be made to Christian Tribunals, for the redress of those Injuries we sustain. For, though there are, who have understood St. Paul to mean no other in this place, than the referring of their Debates to the Arbitrations of Christians (which yet, that I may add that by the way, is not much different from going to Law before a Judge, a pious Judge (as 
* Annot. in Mat. 5.40.  Grotius hath well observed) especially if appealed to by the consent of the Parties at variance, differing little from an Arbitrator, but that he is chosen to that Office by Public Authority) yet as that Interpretation of theirs is not without violence to the Text, which represents those supposed Arbitrators under the Title of Judges, and pleads their fitness for the Office, from those Thrones of Judicature whereupon they shall be hereafter placed; so, with much more violence to the Command of Christ 
‖ Mat. 18.15. , who, in case of difference between Man and Man, commands the telling of it the Church, and the practice of the Church 
† Thorndike of the Right of the Church in a Christian State, cap. 1. pag. 37. etc.  upon it: Which, whilst the Emperors continued Heathen, decided Differences in matters of Estate, between those of their own Body; and after that, and when therefore there was not the like Reason of making the Church a Judge in matters of that nature, continued so to do, in some measure, by the Indulgence of Christian Princes. All which things I have laid together, not to give countenance to Contentions, from which I know our Religion is most averse; but to show, that as Suits of Law may be sometime necessary to the conserving of our Properties; so, where they are so in any great measure, they are no way contrary to the Doctrine of the Gospel, which however it may disallow of scandalous, vexatious, and trifling Suits, yet doth not disapprove inoffensive, charitable, and important ones.  
4. But because the Properties of Men may not only perish to the Owners, but in themselves, and consequently put Men upon a necessity of seeking a new Supply; therefore it may not be amiss to subjoin the Means of effecting that also; which, where ordinary Means fail, is no other than that of Ask: our Saviour both supposing as much, when he requires us to give to them that ask; and that Order which God hath established in the World, confirming it. For, though (as I before 
* See Explic. of this Commandment, Part 1.  observed) all Men have a Natural Right to such a Portion of this World's Goods as is necessary to their Support, by means of that Grant of them which was made to Adam and his Posterity; yet inasmuch as particular Properties stand by the same Divine Will by which that general Charter did which was made to Adam and his Posterity, no Man is ordinarily to supply his Wants, but by making suit to those Persons into whose Hands God hath by his Providence put the possession of this World's Conveniences. But so that we are to proceed, the Scripture gives us sufficiently to understand, even where it doth most strongly assert the Right of the Poor to a Subsistence. For, though Solomon, where he requires the not withholding of good from the necessitous, as both the Septuagint Version 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉— , and the following Words oblige us to explain it; though he, I say, Prov. 3.27. calls those necessitous ones such to whom that good is due, or, as it is in the Hebrew 
† 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the Lords or Owners of it: yet advising afterwards, as he does, that we should not say to them, Go, and come again, and to morrow I will give, when thou hast it by thee, he plainly shows, that that Right of the necessitous is to be sued out by Entreaties, and not either clancularly withdrawn, or extorted: That which is properly a Gift, depending upon the good will of him that is to bestow it, and consequently not to be attained without the use of such Means as may make that Will of his propitious to us.   

PART VII.  
Concerning the contributing, what in us lies, to the procuring, conserving, or enlarging our Neighbour's Property, which is the Second Branch of the Affirmative part of the Commandment. The Means of effecting that, the Liberality of our Endeavours, or of our Purses: The former whereof is recommended upon the score of its both general practicableness and use; the latter, for its immediate subserviency to the advantaging of our Neighbour. The Liberality of the Purse more particularly considered, and shown to imply the remitting of what is due, or at least not exacting it with rigour; the giving of what we are actually possessed, or lending; and, in fine, an Hospitable Entertainment. Inquiry is next made, whether the use of the formentioned Means be to be extended unto all, and in what order, and manner, and proportion. For the resolution whereof, the Reader is in part remanded to the Affirmative part of the Sixth Commandment, and in part afforded Satisfaction here. In order thereunto, the several Liberalities before spoken of are resumed, and such remarks made upon each of them as were before omitted. Concerning the Liberality of men's Endeavours, is noted, That inasmuch as it takes little from our own Properties, we ought to be the more free of it; but yet not so free, as for the sake of one, to offer any Injustice unto others. Concerning the remitting of what is due, which is the first Species of the other Liberality; That it cannot be omitted without a manifest resistance of the Divine Will, where the Person concerned becomes insolvent by the sole disposition of his Providence; provided that the Remission be not prejudicial to others, nor draw after it any intolerable prejudice to ourselves. The Explication more particular in the Liberality of Giving, as observing concerning the Objects of it, that they are such, and such only, who are under any need of it, and are beside that in an incapacity to provide for themselves; by which means all wealthy or slothful Persons are excluded from any share of it: concerning the Order which it ought to observe, that though those of the Household of Faith ought, caeteris paribus, to be preferred before other Men; yet not before those of a Mans own Family and Kindred; as moreover, that, where the necessitous Persons are many, the preference ought to be given to those whose Necessities are most pressing: concerning the Proportion this Liberality is to observe, that it ought to be according to men's Ability, and that no one ought to value that at less than the Thirtieth part of his yearly Income; that where the Necessities of those that are about us cannot otherwise be provided for, we ought to give above our Ability, if we understand thereby an Ability to provide for ourselves according to that Condition wherein God hath placed us: concerning the Manner of our Giving, that it ought to be without superciliousness and contempt, as also with cheerfulness, speed, and secrecy. A Transition to the Liberality of Lending, and of Hospitality; concerning the former whereof is observed, That though there be no necessity of lending gratis to such as borrow only for the Improvement of their Fortunes; yet that we ought so to do, where those that borrow, borrow only to procure or continue to themselves a bare Subsistence: Concerning the latter, That it ought to be extended to Strangers, as well as to those of our own Neighbourhood, yea to all whom we are in a capacity so to minister to; That, though it minister to men's Necessities, yet it ought not to minister to their Intemperance: where also the means of retrenching that is described. The Conclusion of the whole, with the Promises that are made to the Charitable Man, and that his own Property is more likely to be improved, than any way diminished by his Liberality.  
II. IT having been often said, and largely proved, that every Negative in the Decalogue includes an Affirmative, and that that Affirmative is Love; it is easy to infer, That the Negative we are now upon, forbidding the invading of others Properties, the Affirmative doth principally suggest the contributing what in us lies toward the procuring, conserving, or enlarging them. For then, and then only, can we be said to love our Neighbour in the Instance that is now before us, when we do not only abstain from the invading of his Property, but endeavour to procure him one if he wants, or to conserve and add to it, if he hath. Taking it therefore for granted, that so to do, is in part the Affirmative of this Commandment, I will make it my Business to inquire, 

1. By what means it may and aught to be effected.  
2. Whether our Endeavours of thus doing good to others, ought to extend to all sorts of Persons; and in what Order, and Manner, and Proportion.    
1. Now there are two ways (as Tully 
* De Officiis, l. 2.  well observes) whereby Men may become useful to others, as to the procuring, or conserving, or enlarging of their several Properties; the Assistance of their Endeavours, or of their Purses: Whereof, though the latter be most taken notice of, and so far as in a manner to appropriate to itself the Name of Liberality; yet the other doth no doubt alike deserve our consideration and regard, that I say not also more importunately require it: As being, 1. in the power of the Poorer, as well as the Richer sort; of those whose Properties are as straight, as theirs whom they desire to enlarge or conserve. For, though, as St. Peter sometime spoke concerning himself, Gold and silver have they none; yet they are not oftentimes without an Ability of giving that Advice, and Encouragement, and Assistance, which may be alike useful to the procuring, improving, or conserving of others Properties: Solomon 
* Eccl. 9.14, 15.  having told us of a poor man, who, however he was not afterwards regarded for it, yet by his wisdom delivered the City wherein he dwelled from the Power of a Great Monarch, who had used no contemptible means to make himself Master of it. But neither, 2. as was but now intimated, is the Liberality of our Persons less to be considered, for the use it is of toward the forementioned purposes, as will appear, if we consider it with reference to men's Labours, or the conciliating the Favours of other Persons towards them. For, Labour (as was before said) being not only appointed by God for the procuring of this World's Happiness, but not without a natural aptitude to it; he must be looked upon as no unuseful Person, who shall either direct Men in the management of it, (which in all Employments is of great weight) or encourage and assist them in the performance of it. In like manner, when, as it often doth, the Properties of Men depend, either as to their being, or well-being, upon the Benevolence of others; it is easy to see, that he who is no Niggard of his Person and Endeavours, may by his Authority or Intercession procure the Favour of those who have the collation of Benefits, or by his Wisdom and Eloquence (if those Properties Men have be attempted by others) defend them from their Rapine, or recommend them to those by whom they may. All which Beneficences, as they are undoubtedly of great use toward the advantaging of our Brother's Properties; so they have this farther to commend them to us, that whilst the Liberalities of the Purse, as Tully 
* De Officiis, lib. 2.  speaks, exhaust the Fountain of it, and make Men less able to be liberal for the future, that Liberality which exerts itself in our Endeavours, doth not only suffer no detriment by its being often used, but gains so much the more by it, because making Men both more apt for the exercise thereof, and more ready to intent it.  
From the Liberality of our Persons and Endeavours, pass we to that of our Purses, as being more immediately subservient to the advantaging of our Brother's Property, and therefore no doubt more especially required. Now there are four ways whereby we may be thus liberal; by remitting of what is due, or at least not exacting it with rigour; by giving of what we are actually possessed of, or lending; and lastly, by a Hospitable entertainment. Of the first of these much need not be said, whether we consider it as a Duty, or as a Means to procure or conserve our Neighbour's Property. For, as the latter of these is so apparent, that it seems not to stand in need of any Proof, Men being often undone, where they who are their Creditors will neither remit aught of what is due to them, nor allow them a competent time to discharge the Debt; so the latter needs no other proof than that Love and Benevolence wherein our Saviour hath summed up this and other the Precepts of the Second Table. For, though the exacting of what is due in its full proportion, be no way contrary to the Precept of Justice; yet it may be sufficiently repugnant to that of Love, especially as urged upon us by the Gospel: Love prompting Men to forgive, as well as give; to remit of what it may require, as well as to part with what it is possessed of. And not without Reason; he who forgives, giving away what he doth so, because it is in his power to exact it. To the Liberality of Remitting or Forgiving, subjoin we that of giving; a Duty no less necessary to the forementioned purposes, nor less necessary to be observed, whether we do respect that subserviency of it to the advantaging of our Neighbour's Properties, or that right we have often said the necessitous person to have to such a portion of this world's goods, as may afford him a subsistence: for it being apparently the intention of God, and so declared in his first grant of Dominion, that each of the Sons of Men should have a share in them, it is of necessity to be looked upon as the duty of those, into whose hands God hath put the possession of them, to communicate them to such as shall be found to stand in need of them; he, who refuseth so to do, as much as in him lies, defeating God of his intention, and men of that right which accrues to them by it. Whence it is no doubt that Almsgiving both 
‖ 
See for the Old, Deut. 24.13. Where the Septuagint render the word righteousness by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as also, Psal. 112.9.  
For the New, Mat. 6.1. according to some Greek Copies.   in the Old and New Testament hath so frequently the name of Righteousness; that being not improperly styled Righteousness, which he, who is the Object of it, hath the original grant of Dominion to warrant his title to. Thirdly, as there is a liberality in forgiving and giving, so there may be a liberality in lending; that no less than either of the other tending to the advantaging of men's Properties, and oftentimes much more to the welfare of their Souls: For whereas giving many times relieves men's idleness as well as wants, and makes them careless in the discharge of the Duties of their several Callings; lending puts the necessitous person upon a necessity of being industrious, if it were that he might be in a capacity to repay that which he hath borrowed of us. Lastly, for though that be a species of giving, yet it deserves a particular mention for the commendation is given to it by the Scripture; There is a liberality in entertaining, as well as in giving, or lending, and particularly in the entertaining of Strangers. To the practice whereof, though there be other inducements, and such as are it may be of more affinity with that Commandment which I have now chosen to entreat of; yet it may suffice to mention that which is used by the Author to the Hebrews 
* Heb. 13.2. , that thereby some men have entertained Angels unawares: that being to be looked upon as no contemptible piece of Liberality, to which God hath sometime vouchsafed so excellent a reward.  
2. It being thus evident what are the means of bringing that advantage to our Neighbour's Property, which I have affirmed to be incumbent upon us by the affirmative part of this Commandment; my proposed method obligeth me to inquire, whether the use of those means be to be extended unto all, and in what order, and manner, and proportion. But because in my account of the Affirmative part of the fixth Commandment, I have in a great measure prevented myself in most of the queries proposed, and particularly so far as the liberality of our persons or endeavours is concerned, I will only touch at such things in each of them as were there wholly omitted, or obscurely and imperfectly delivered. Now there are two things observable, beside what were before noted, concerning that Liberality which exerts itself in our endeavours: 1. That inasmuch as it takes little from our own Properties, that Liberality especially which consists in giving good advice, we ought to be the more free in bestowing it upon those that need it; it being a strange piece of niggardliness, that I say not of envy and maliciousness, which will not impart of such boons, as bring little or no prejudice to him that gives them. And though the reasonableness of that which follows, seemed so evident to the great Master of Morality 
* Tull. de Officiis ●. 2. Jam illud non sunt admonendi (est enim in promptu) ut animadvertant, cum alios javari velint, ne quos offendant. , that he hardly thought fit to make it the matter of an admonition; yet inasmuch as men are often peccant in it, I thought it not amiss to observe, in the second place, that we should not so endeavour to promote some men's welfare, as to offer any the least injustice to others; he, who forbids the doing injury to any man, consequently prescribing that Liberality, which cannot take effect without it. Upon which account, all those must be looked upon as Offenders, who, to promote the welfare of some one or more persons, by calumnies or other such like courses endeavour to obstruct their rise, who have the same pretensions with their Favourites.  
From the Liberality of our Persons or Endeavours, pass we to that of the Purse, and consider the several species of them before set down. Where who is there that sees not first, I do not say how necessary it is to remit sometimes of our own right, but to remit of it especially there, where the person concerned in it becomes unable for the satisfying of it, by the sole disposition of the Divine Providence? Extremity in such cases arguing as little regard of God, as consideration of the calamities of our Brethren: For inasmuch as inability puts a man out of a capacity of discharging that debt which he hath contracted; where the inability proceeds merely from God, it must be a kind of resistance of his Will to be over rigid in exacting it. I will not add, though pertinent enough, that how incumbent soever it may sometime be to remit of our own right, yet it is to be understood where such a remission is not prejudicial to others, nor draws after it any intolerable prejudice to ourselves: as because, though we may part with our own right, yet we cannot do so with those of others; so the parting with our own right is ever to be understood with subordination to our own necessities, to which, as I have before shown, the Law of Reason as well as Charity obligeth us to have the first regard. Setting aside therefore that Liberality which consists in remitting of that which is our due, I will proceed to that of giving, as being more apparently subservient to the welfare of other men. And here not to tell you, because sufficiently evident from the forequoted discourse, that no qualification whatsoever can exclude those from our Charity, whose condition makes them proper objects of it; it shall content me to observe, because not before noted, that the condition of those and of those only is such, who are under any need of it, and are beside that in an incapacity to provide against it: by the former whereof are excluded all persons of better or equal fortunes with ourselves; by the latter, all idle or slothful ones. For as Reason and Charity both oblige us to give the first place to ourselves, and consequently not to part with that to others, which we are under a like necessity ourselves; so the Command of God, and the Precept of S. Paul, debars those of any relief, who will not contribute aught to their own subsistence. Upon which account as our Laws have spoken the same thing, and, which is more, made it penal to relieve them; so, that they are at any time relieved by considerate persons, is only imputable to their importunity, and the neglect of those in Authority who suffer them to use it. Which neglect is so much the more criminal, in that it doth not only encourage those idle persons in their sloth, and many other wickednesses, which slothfulness draws after it, but makes the charitable person less able to minister to those necessitous ones, who are either wholly incapacitated for labour, or cannot by all their labour compass a tolerable subsistence. But because, even of those who are fit objects of Charity, all cannot be relieved by all, by means of the shortness of our Fortunes; therefore I proposed also to inquire in what order we are to relieve them, and which of the many necessitous ones ought to be preferred. Which demand, though I have in part satisfied already, in the place so often referred to by me, yet there are two things of moment which were not there observed, and will therefore be fit to be taken notice of here: 1. That though those of the Household of Faith ought, caeteris paribus, to have the precedency of other men, yet not when the necessitous ones are of our own Family or Kindred, Justice as well as Charity obliging us to give to these, and consequently to prefer them before such, who, however better deserving otherwise, yet have nothing but the Law of Charity to oblige us to the relief of them. Again, though all necessitous ones are fit objects of Charity, and consequently, where our faculties will permit, to be relieved by us; yet Reason as well as Charity oblige that, where our Faculties will not permit the extending of it to all, we give the preference to those persons whose necessities are the most pressing: For, if the necessities of men make them fit Objects of Charity, those persons must be looked upon as the fittest Objects, and consequently they to be preferred, who labour under the most pressing ones. And more than this, as I shall not need to say concerning that order which is to be observed by the charitable person in giving, so I shall therefore proceed to inquire after what manner and proportion we are to do it, the next things in order to be considered. For the resolution of the latter whereof, as being the most important Query; the first thing I shall offer, is, That it be generally according to our ability, and not either above or below it; not only Tully 
* De Officiis lib. 2.  so advising, where he requires the referring of our bounty to our Faculties, but he, whose judgement is more considerable, even S. Paul, he enjoining the Corinthians, 1 Cor. 16.2. that every one should lay by him in store for the supply of the necessitous, according as God had prospered him. By virtue of which Rule, as the Charity of wealthier persons must be concluded to be in a greater proportion than those of meaner ones; so, that the Charity of both the one and the other ought not either to fall below or exceed it: he who offends in the defect being unjust to the necessitous, to whom, as I have before shown, God hath made our Charity due, as he who offends in the excess, unto himself. But because, through that self-love which prevails in the most of us, men will be apt enough to think they give according to their ability, when in truth they do nothing less, I will propose to your consideration, in the second place, what measures God prescribed the Jews in the exercise of this great Duty of Charity; which was, that beside the Tithe payable every year to the Priest, as you may see, Deut. 14.22. they should every third year 
* See Hammond's Serm. on Deut. 26.12, 13. and Seldens History of Tithes, c. 2. sect. 3. , as it is in the 29. v. of that Chapter, set apart another Tithe for the poor, which being resolved into a yearly rate will amount to the Thirtieth part of our yearly income: For though this Law do induce no direct Obligation upon us, as being a part of the Jewish Polity; yet inasmuch as Charity is no less required of us than of the Jews, and our Saviour professeth not to have come to destroy, but rather to fulfil the Law and the Prophets, we cannot in reason deem ourselves obliged to set apart less for the poor than the Thirtieth part of our yearly income. Lastly, as consideration ought generally to be had of our ability, and of those measures which God hath given us to judge both of that and our own duty by; so I see not how we can sometime avoid the giving even beyond our ability, if we mean thereby an ability to provide for ourselves according to that state and condition wherein God hath placed us, and not an ability to serve our own necessities. For as we find that S. Paul, who doth generally refer men to their ability, yet mentions it with commendation that the Corinthians, whom he wrote to, gave not only according to their ability, but above it, 2 Cor. 8.3. so I see not how we can avoid the abating of our own enjoyments, where the necessities of those that are about us cannot be otherwise in any tolerable measure supplied: he, who gave the Earth for the support of all, consequently obliging those who are possessed of it, to communicate thereof to the necessitous; and therefore also, where the support of those is not otherwise to be procured, to abate of those Enjoyments, which the place we hold in the World might otherwise warrant the enjoyment of. One only thing remains, relating to the liberality of giving, and that is the manner after which we are to do it; concerning which I say, first, That it ought not to be with that superciliousness and contempt of the poor, wherewith it is too often attended: Not only their descent from the same common Parent forbidding it, but the particular regard which God professeth to have to all necessitous persons, and that relation wherein our Saviour hath owned them. For, what place can there be for superciliousness, where those, to whom we give, are not only of our own blood, and the same common stock, but under the particular care of and relation to God and Christ, and that too in such a proportion, that what is done or not done unto them, he interpreteth as either done or not done unto himself? But neither, secondly, are we to give with grudging and repining, as it is but too frequent with those who are not otherwise peccant; as because God, to whom we are obliged for being in a capacity of giving, professeth to love 
* 2 Cor. 9.7.  a cheerful giver, and should not therefore be so ill requited, as to find a grudging one; so because (as hath been often said, but can never be too much repeated) that Charity is no more than is due to the poor from us. For, what place can there be for grudging, where that, which we are to give, is but the right of those to whom we are required to impart it? Thirdly, as we ought to discard from our giving all superciliousness and grudging, so also all slowness in the doing of it, not only Solomon so requiring, where he forbids us to say to the necessitous person, Go, and come again, and to morrow I will give, when we have it by us, but also the design and end of Charity; the deferring of a benefit making it of little use to him that craves it, and sometimes also of none at all. I will conclude this head, and my discourse concerning the Liberality of giving, with admonishing, in the fourth place, that it be done secretly, and so (as our Saviour speaks) that the left hand may not know what our right hand doth; lest that, which was intended for a benefit to our Neighbour, prove an exprobration to him, either of his necessities or obligation to us, and to ourselves a temptation to pride and vanity. Which as it is enough to sour the most excellent Charity, and make it disgustful both to God and Man; so hath this farther inconvenience attending it, that whilst it seeks the praise of Men, it debars the charitable person of the praise and reward of God; he who forbids us to do our Alms before men to be seen of them, 
Mat. 6.1.  assigning for the Reason of it, that so doing, we shall have no reward of our Father which is in Heaven. And indeed, as to give secretly hath Reason as well as the Precept of our Saviour to oblige us to the observation of it; so there wanted not among the Heathen, who saw the reasonableness of it, and inculcated it almost in the same terms; Marcus Antoninus 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. li. 5. sect. 6.— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  not only insinuating the so giving, that we ourselves may not know what we ourselves have done, but resembling the benesicent person, among other things, to a Vine, which is neither sensible of its own fruitfulness, nor makes any noise of it, choosing rather to superadd in their proper season new clusters to its former, and to continue its truitfulness, than to be esteemed for it.  
Of the Liberality of giving, what hath been said may suffice; proceed we to that of lending, a Liberality which I have already shown to be no less necessary in its self than the other, and might also be no less incumbent upon us, by the Precept of our great Master Christ; in the very same breath 
* Mat. 5.42.  wherein he commands the giving to every one that asks, forbidding to turn away from him that would borrow of us. Now there are two things observable concerning this Liberality, proportionably to the twosorts of persons with whom we have to do: For either they may be such who want it for the improving of their Fortunes, or such as borrow it of us to procure or continue to themselves a bare subsistence. Now though I doubt not (as hath been before declared) but that he who lends to the former persons, may require what he does so with a valuable Consideration for it, especially where the money lent is needful enough to a Man's self: yet as such persons may sometime prove unfortunate in the management of it, in which case it may be but requisite to remit somewhat of our own demands; so it cannot at all be accounted lawful, where we ourselves can possibly be without it, to take the like Use of those who borrow what they do, merely to procure themselves a subsistence, not only the Law of Moses forbidding so to lend to a poor Brother, but the Law of Nature and Christ: He who lends to such a person upon Use, being so far commonly from advantaging him, which is the end of Charity, that he only helps to plunge him so much the deeper in necessity and calamity. The same is to be said of the taking of Gifts of such persons, or making any other advantages of them; it mattering not at all, under what notion it comes, so a Consideration be paid, which changeth it from Liberality into a Contract, and, in the present case, an unmerciful one.  
I am now arrived at the last species of Liberality, best known by the name of Hospitality; concerning which, as the Scripture hath not been wanting in furnishing us with Examples 
* Gen. 18.3. Gen. 19.2. Judg. 19 20. , so neither in inculcating the Fractice thereof upon us: S. Paul in his Exhortations joining Hospitality with distributing to the Necessities of the Saints, Rom. 12.13. as S. Peter 
† 1 Pet. 4.9.  with that Charity which covers a multitude of sins. And not without Reason, if we consider, I do not say how much it immediately conduceth to the conserving of the Properties of meaner persons, but to the encouraging of them to undergo that labour and travel which God hath been pleased to lay upon them. Now though even here that Caution is to have place, which refers the Benevolence of Men to the measure of their several abilities; yet I cannot forbear to say, that, provided it keeps within those bounds, it ought not to content itself with extending to a few, or indeed to those of its own Neighbourhood; as because the word, which we render Hospitality, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  imports the entertaining of Strangers, so because it is a Virtue of those whom God hath blessed with more liberal Fortunes, and from whom therefore he expects a more than ordinarily comprehensive Charity. And I cannot but upon this occasion call to mind the Story of Henry 
* Spotiswood's History of the Ch. of Scotl. l. 2. p. 57  Wardlow, sometime Archbishop of S. Andrews in Scotland, who, agreeably to his own Function, and the Precept of the Apostle, employed that Revenue, which God had given him, in the entertainment of other persons: For, being prevailed with for the ease of his Servants, to make a Bill of Household, that they might know who were to be served by them; when he was asked whom he would first name, he answered Fise and Angus, which are two large Countries in Scotland, containing many millions of People. By which answer of his, as he wisely freed himself from their importunity, who would for their own ease have retrenched that good Man's Hospitality; so he gave an evident testimony of a truly Christian and generous mind; and such as it will concern those of the richer sort, but especially of the Clergy, to show themselves diligent imitators of: That and no other being truly Christian Charity, which, so far as in it lies, extends itself to all, I do not say that are the Children of the holy Jesus, though that be a large Family, but the Descendants of our common Parent Adam. Care only would be taken (as being in a manner the only blemish which adheres to this most excellent Virtue) that that which is intended by the hospitable person for the refreshment of Strangers and others, be not converted into luxury and intemperance; that, as it often happens, not only proving no Charity to their Bodies, but the destruction of their souls, which is the greatest cruelty we can be guilty of. And indeed, as those times which were most famous for Hospitality, found a way both to prevent and retrench all such intemperances'; so if we could live to see the simplicity and plainness of those ancient days recalled, there is no doubt we might live to see their Hospitality also recalled, without any of those inconveniences which do now attend it; they arising for the most part from that, which hath been also the bane of Hospitality, even a desire of gratifying our Palates with curious and costly Entertainments. For as those things which are most plain are also procured at the easiest rates, by which means men may be better fitted to be liberal towards other men; so, at the same time they gratify the appetite, they do also satiate it, and not like the curiosities of latter time produce a thirst which is equal to the other, and which nothing but intemperance can aslake.  
Such are the means whereby we may contribute to the subsistence of others, and to the procuring or conserving or improving of those Properties from which they derive it: in which as I have often said, and I hope sufficiently proved, that the Affirmative part of the Commandment doth consist; so they have this farther to commend them to our consideration and use, that they would if duly observed, not only not abridge our own Properties, but preserve us from the temptation of invading those of others, which the Negative part of the Commandment doth forbid. It being not to be thought, especially after such glorious Promises 
* See Prov. 11.25. Prov. 19.17. Prov. 28.27.  as are made to the charitable man, that he should be under any necessity of invading the Properties of others, who, in obedience to the Divine Command, hath been so liberal of his own.    

THE NINTH COMMANDMENT.  
THE NINTH COMMANDMENT.  
Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.  

PART I.  
The Contents.  
This Ninth Commandment both refers to, and supposeth Humane Judicatories; upon occasion whereof, inquiry is made, 1. By what Divine Right they now stand. 2. What Persons intervene in them, and what their respective Duties are. The former of these evidenced from the necessity there is of determining Controversies, from the Precept given to Noah of shedding the Blood of the Murderer, and from the Divine Right of Regal Power, of which the Power of Judicature is a part. The latter of the forementioned Questions brought under consideration, where both the Parties that intervene in them are enumerated, and their respective Duties described. Those of the Plaintiff shown to be, not to raise a false Report, not to mix untrue Reports with true, nor prosecute even a true one in trifling Instances. Those of the Defendant, to own justly imputed Crimes, not to charge his Adversary with the same or the like Calumnies, nor show himself morose in his Deportment to him. The Duties of the Advocate, not to espouse such Causes as are apparently evil, (though probable ones they may) nor yet to make choice of them merely by the Purses of those that present them; as, after they have espoused them, to manage them with all fidelity, and diligence, and dispatch: in fine, to content themselves with a simple Narration of the Cause, and neither to be lavish in the commendation of their own Clients, nor in the reproach of the Adversary. A more large Account concerning Witnesses; where, after a Declaration of the use of them in Judgement, their requisite Number, and necessary Qualifications, their Duty is shown to be, not to deliver any thing that is false, not to conceal or transpose any thing that is true, as, in fine, not to deliver what they deem to be so, with any greater assurance than they themselves are persuaded of in their own Bosom. A Conclusion of the whole, with a Reflection upon the Duty of Judges, whether they be Judges of Right, or of Fact: where, among other things, is shown, 1. That they ought to pass Sentence according to the Proofs that are made before them, whatsoever jealousy or private knowledge they may have of the thing in controversy. 2. That, in doubtful Cases, they ought to incline to such Determinations as are favourable to the Accused Party.  
THAT it may the better appear what that is which is here forbidden, what Crimes are comprised under it, and what Duties enjoined by it, I foresee it necessary to premise something concerning Humane Judicatories, which this Commandment doth both refer to, and suppose; not only the use of Witnesses so persuading, which every one knows to have been introduced to decide Controversies between Man and Man, before a competent Judge; but that Phrase which the Hebrew makes use of to express the bearing of false Witness, and the manner of the Jews Procedure in their several Courts of Judicature. For, it appearing from Leu. 5.1. that Witnesses were interrogated upon Oath, concerning that particular Affair which they were called to bear witness to; it is but reasonable to think, especially when the Hebrew Phrase 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  imports the not answering falsely, that the intent of the Commandment was to forbid the bearing of false witness before a Judge, in any Controversy that should occur. Which, as it plainly supposeth the being of such Judicatories among the Jews, and God's approbation of them; so makes it but necessary to inquire, because otherwise the Prohibition would be null, 

1. By what Divine Right they now stand.  
2. What Persons intervene in them, and what their respective Duties are.    
1. For the evidencing the first whereof, even the Divine Right of Humane Judicatories, I shall allege, in the first place, that which is antecedent to, and the Foundation of all other Laws, even the Law of Nature: For, that persuading the determination of all Controversies between Man and Man, as without which Humane Society could not subsist; it must consequently be supposed to enjoin, because there is no other way of ending them, the constituting of some indifferent Persons to do it; no Man being to be thought a competent Judge in his own Case, and much less likely to be thought so by him with whom he hath to do. Upon which, as there will follow a necessity of referring them to the determination of another, which is that for which Humane Judicatories were appointed; so also (which makes them properly such) the furnishing them with a Power to constrain the Parties at variance to submit to their Determination and Sentence. Otherwise, among contentious Persons at least, the Controversy would recur, and involve them in new and greater Heats. To the Law of Nature, and its Dictates, subjoin we that which is called the Law of Noah, or rather that which was given by God to him and his Posterity; concerning which, though, saving in the 
* Vid. Selden. de Jure Nat. & Gent. l. 7. c. 4.  Tradition of the Jews, there be no express mention, as to any Precept which imports the constituting of Humane Judicatories; yet as a Tradition so received as that, is not lightly to be despised, especially when as to some Precepts it hath a certain Foundation in Scripture; so that it is not without ground, even there, as to this Precept whereof we speak, may be competently evidenced from Gen. chap. 9 vers. 6. Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed. For, God not only decrying there the shedding of Man's blood, but requiring the shedding of his that did it by another; he seems to me plainly to intimate the constituting of a Magistrate which should both take cognisance of, and punish it: as because otherwise the Blood of Men might continue unrevenged, if he who were the next of kin (whom Grotius 
* In locum. & De jure belli, etc. lib. 1. cap. 2. sect. 5.  supposeth to have been impower'd) should have wanted Courage or Ability to execute it; so because, Murder being for the most part secretly committed, there was a kind of necessity of authorising some to make inquisition after it, and draw both the suspected person and others to their Tribunal. Otherwise it should have been lawful for the avenger of blood to have followed his own uncertain conjectures (which it is not very likely God would ever have permitted) or the Fact must have continued unrevenged, which the Precept before mentioned was intended to provide against. Whence it is that the Chaldee Paraphrast 
* Per testes ex sententiâ judicum sanguis ejus fundetur. , agreeably to the design of a Paraphrast, and his own custom elsewhere, explains those words, Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed, it shall be shed by the Sentence of the Judges, upon the evidence of Witnesses. Lastly (for against that to be sure no exception can be made, whatsoever there may be supposed to be against either of the former Laws) the Law of Christ bearing witness to the Divine Institution of Regal Power, of which I have heretofore 
* Explicat. of the fifth Commandment, Part 5.  shown the Power of Judicature to be a part, and moreover declaring those, to whom that Power is committed, to have been appointed by God for the welfare and praise of the good, and the avenging of such as do evil; it must also be supposed (because that is not otherwise for the most part to be attained) to privilege them to inquire into the causes both of the one and the other, and accordingly either to encourage or punish them. In conformity whereto, as we find all, whether Christian or Heathen Magistrates, to have proceeded, with the general approbation of the Word; so, which is more, S. Paul not only submitting himself to the Tribunal of Caesar, but professing himself to be under an Obligation 
* Acts 25.10.  to be judged by it. And more than this I shall not need to say of the Divine Right of Humane Judicatories, and may therefore have leave to go on to inquire,  
2. What Persons intervene in them, and what their respective Duties are. As to the former part of this Query little need to be said, because every man's own observation can inform him, that the Persons principally concerned, are the Plaintiff, the Defendant, their respective Advocates, the Witnesses, and the Judge. The only thing worthy an investigation is, What their respective Duties are; which accordingly I come now to inquire into.  
To begin with the Plaintiff, because it is he that gives beginning to all that is done in Courts of Judicature; where, first of all, I shall recommend that of the Prophet Moses, Exod. 23.1. Thou shalt not raise a false report. A Caution extremely necessary, whether we consider the Practice of the World, or the mischiefs that accrue to our Neighbour by it: For, as it is too usual with men, whether out of maliciousness, or some such sinister end, to lay to their Neighbours charge things that they know not; so the iniquity thereof will easily appear, if we consider the inconveniences that do naturally, and almost necessarily, flow from it: The Properties and Lives of Men being not seldom blasted by it, but their Reputation always; he who boldly calumniates, though he attain no other end, yet seldom failing to leave a stain upon the good name of him he doth so. But neither, secondly, is it less necessary, even upon the score of the  Caution, to proscribe and condemn the mixing of untrue with true Accusations, or making a worse construction of them than they deserve: he who adds to, or perverts any Man's Words or Actions, being so far guilty of a false Report, as he does either add to, or pervert them. Lastly, For though that have been intimated before, yet it may seem but necessary to repeat it, to obviate the too common Practice of it; As it will concern him who is the Plaintiff not to raise a false Report, either in whole or in part; so neither to take up and prosecute a true one, where the matter of the Complaint is only in trifling Instances, and such it may be which, though contrary to the Letter of the Law, yet are not so to the Intent of the Lawgiver, and are capable of a favourable Interpretation. For, where is that Meekness, and Kindness, and Forbearance which Christianity so often and so earnestly inculcates, if it may be lawful for him that makes profession of it, to draw his Brother before a Tribunal for every petty Trespass, or harsh Word, or for every the least deviation from a Statute?  
From the Plaintiff or Accuser, pass we to the Defendant; who is either rightly accused, or not. If the former, the Principles of Justice and Charity, as well as those of Prudence, will persuade him to agree with his Adversary, whilst he is in the way with him, lest the Adversary deliver him to the Judge, and the Judge to the Officer, and so he be cast into Prison. For, what Justice or Charity can it be, to put a Man to the vexation or charge of a Suit, to recover that which we ourselves cannot but acknowledge to be his due? But let us suppose the Right either to lie, or at least to be supposed to lie on the Defendants part (as who is there that is not willing to believe it to be on his own?) yet will not that exempt him from a possibility of offending, and therefore neither from the necessity of a Caution. Such as is, first, That that supposed Right of his do not transport him into the like Crime, and make him charge the adverse Party with the same or the like Calumnies wherewith he himself is loaded. For, as it is but too usual with Men, otherwise of good behaviour, to endeavour by false Accusations to blast the Credit of those by whom they think themselves unjustly worried; so, beside the imitation of the others Injustice and Falsehood, it is the result of Revenge, which our Religion hath no less severely interdicted than the other. Alike criminal, and therefore alike necessary to be cautioned against, is the avoiding of all civil Converse with those by whom we are impleaded, or entertaining them when they come in our way, whether with rude Gestures, or ruder Language. For, beside that it is not impossible, but that he by whom we are impleaded may be in the right, or at least may be as strongly persuaded of it; in which case the forementioned rudeness will be unjust, as well as uncharitable, because bottomed either upon unsound or uncertain grounds: it is ill agreeable with that Kindness to an Enemy, which our Religion so much talks of, but which so few that make profession of it give any tolerable proofs of.  
But because, though the Plaintiff and Defendant furnish Work for Courts of Judicature, yet they commonly leave that Work to be managed by Men Learned in the Law, who may overshoot themselves, as well as those whose Causes they espouse; therefore I judge it but necessary, that these also should have a share in those Instructions which concern the Regulations of Courts of Judicature. Now there are two things which such Persons are to intent, and to which therefore our Instructions ought to be adapted: the one, the Choice of those Causes that come before them; the other, the Management thereof. Now though, as to the former of these, little scruple be generally made, where there is a probability of a proportionable Reward, to excite and encourage their Endeavours; yet I cannot forbear to say, that it can no way be deemed lawful to espouse such Causes as are apparently evil, and which tend more to usurp upon other men's lawful Right, than to vindicate the Clients own. For, beside that by so doing Men shall ill requite the Divine Majesty for that Ability and Eloquence which he hath furnished them withal, they shall only lend their assistance to the promoting of Contentiousness and Injustice, and to the subverting of peaceable and just Possessions: which how it agrees with that Justice and Equity for which Courts of Judicature were appointed, but which to be sure the Law of Nature and Christianity have laid upon all Mankind, I dare venture to the judgement of the most prejudiced Advocate, to give a satisfactory Account of. I say not the same, where the Cause that is presented to them hath a fair and probable appearance, however it may prove when it comes more closely to be examined. For, as the Men of that Profession have seldom the leisure to look narrowly into the Merits of a Cause beforehand, and cannot therefore be thought to be obliged to refuse any Cause that hath a fair and specious appearance; so, if they should be over-scrupulous in admitting such, they might not only prejudice themselves in the exercise of their Profession, which is a weighty Consideration, but prejudice the Rights of that Person which addresseth himself to them, by refusing him the assistance of their Endeavours. To say nothing at all, that to be too peremptory in judging of a Cause beforehand, would be to exceed the bounds of their Profession, and assume the Person rather of a Judge, than of an Advocate. But as it is one thing to lend a Man's Assistance to a probable Cause, which (as Tully 
* De Officiis lib. 2. Judicis est, semper in causis verum sequi: patroni nonnunquam verisimile, etiamsi minus sit verum, defendere: qu●d scribere, praesertim cum de Philosophiâ scriberem, non auderem, nisi idem placeret gravissimo Stoicorum Panaetio.  well observes out of Panaetius) may be the part of an Advocate to defend; and another, to lend his Assistance to one that is apparently evil and unjust: so having cautioned Men against the latter, I shall only add, that they would not choose their Causes merely or mostly by the Purses of those that present them, nor detract those of the Poor and Indigent: Charity, as it hath a tie upon the Learned in the Laws, as well as upon other Men, so having, as to them, no more proper Field 
† Tull. de Offic. lib. 2. Diserti igitur hominis & facile laborantis, quodque in patriis est moribus, multorum causas & non gravare & gratuito defendentis, beneficio & patrocinia latè patent. , or larger, to exercise itself in, than a ready and gratuitous defending of the Poor from the Oppressions of the Wealthy, by that Reason and Eloquence which makes their Profession to be had in Honour. From the Choice they are to make of Causes, pass we to the Management of those they choose; where again many useful Rules present themselves: Such as are, those that enjoin Fidelity and Diligence in the Administration of what they undertake, Watchfulness against all Disadvantages which may any way prejudice it, and Dispatch. But because these, how little regarded soever, are so apparently both the Duties of Justice, and of the Advocate's Profession, that he must be wilfully blind that doth not own their Obligation; I shall choose rather (having thus barely mentioned them) to caution the Men of that Profession against a Practice, which, how common soever, yet is of too pernicious consequence to be passed by: I mean, the passing from the Merits of the Cause, to the defaming of the adverse Parties Person, and making him as odious or ridiculous, as it is in the power of Art to make him. For, though a wise and considerate Judge will not lightly be moved with Discourses of that nature, or rather will use his Authority to repress them; yet as even they may be sometime tempted by them, to press more hardly in their Sentence upon those whom they have been instructed either to despise or abominate: so such Discourses may be of more force to pervert the Judgement of a Jury, who are not generally so much Masters of Reason as Judges are, and much less of their Passions and Affections. And though I will not say, there is as much reason to forbear all Rhetorical Insinuations, and particularly such as spend themselves in the commendation of that Person whose Cause they have undertaken to defend; yet as the grave Judges of Areopagus have been remembered with applause, for forbidding at their Tribunal any other than simple Narrations, and such as served rather to discover the Nature of the thing in question, than to adorn or disgrace it; so if other than such simple Narrations were not lightly countenanced, the Truth of a Cause would more easily appear, and they to whom the Determination thereof is committed, would have no temptation to resist the force of it, from the suggestions either of Love or Hatred.  
Being now, by the Order of my Discourse, to entreat of the Duty of Witnesses, the only Persons directly concerned in this Commandment, I suppose it will be neither unacceptable, nor unprofitable, to premise something concerning the use of them in Judgement, their requisite Number, and necessary Qualifications; the knowledge of these helping not a little to discover their Obligations, or to bind them so much the faster on them. Of the Use, or rather necessity of Witnesses, much need not be said, as being apparent and obvious: For, it being not to be supposed, on the one hand, that Men will ordinarily confess that Fault, which they have not been careful to keep themselves from the commission of; and it being evident, on the other, that a Judge hath not Eyes enough to discover all, nor is well qualified to pass Sentence upon them, though he had (it being easy for a Judge, if he were allowed to witness as well as sentence, to make whom he pleased Criminal) there will arise a necessity of determining the thing in controversy, by the Testimony of some indifferent Persons, who shall either be called to that Office, or voluntarily present themselves. And accordingly, as all Nations, led thereto by the Light of Reason and Nature, have both used and generally approved this way of procedure in Judgement; so I know none to rival it, but the Ordeal Purgations of our Saxon Ancestors (which yet were not used but in the defect of other Proofs) and the extorting a Confession from the accused party: The former whereof was no better than a presumptuous temptation of the Divine Providence; the latter injurious to Humane Nature; and, beside that, no way proper to produce the desired effect: Few persons, how innocent soever, being of ability to resist the force of Torture; and those that are of ability to resist, being as likely to deny the Crimes, wherewith they are justly charged, as those that are not, are ready enough to own falsely imputed ones. From the use or rather necessity of Witnesses, pass we to the number; which by the Law given to the Israelites ought to be no less than Two; especially where the life of a Man is concerned. And not without Reason, if we consider the weight of the thing in question, and the danger of passing a wrong Judgement, where one Man's testimony may be admitted. Which as all wise people will be careful to prevent, lest whilst they seek to punish a supposed Malefactor, they make themselves really such; so especially, if they consider, that it is better to let a bad Man escape, than run the hazard of punishing a good; it being certainly and always an injury to punish a good Man, but not such to let a bad go free. In the mean time, though I say that two Witnesses ordinarily aught to pass to the condemning of any person to death; yet as I will not affirm the same to hold in matters of Estate, especially where the thing in Controversy is of no very great concern; so neither universally in criminal matters, and particularly in the case of Treason. For, as the presumptions many times may be such, that they may well make the testimony of a single Witness credible, especially if that Witness be an unstained one; as moreover it may so happen, that a single Witness may be of so fair a reputation, that he may be looked upon of equal weight with two or more ordinary ones: So the life of a Prince, and the welfare of a State, are things of so infinite concern, that the machinations of Evil Persons against them are not lightly to pass unrevenged, where there is an apt proof of the contrivance of them. In cases extraordinary therefore, or where the matter is of no great concern, there may be place for a single Testimony; otherwise there is no doubt, the exacting of two is both more reasonable and safe: As because God himself did sometime require it; so because there is not that danger of the corrupting of two, which there may be of one; or, if there were, that corruption might more easily be discovered, by examining them apart, as we see in that famous instance of Susannah. The only thing farther to be premised, is the qualification of the Witnesses, concerning which I intended to be much more large, than I have upon second thoughts resolved to be. But considering with myself, that I had all along avoided the instructing of Public Persons, whose it is to judge of the qualification of those Witnesses they will admit; and considering moreover, that things of this nature are better judged of by Men versed in Judicial Proceed, and the necessities of the World, than by one who converseth only with Books, and his own Thoughts; I deemed it but reasonable to leave this head, with advertising only, that they ought to be persons of competent understanding, of honest Fame, and without all suspicion of love or hatred or corruption. It being thus evident what use, or rather necessity, there is of Witnesses in Judgement; what number of them is requisite, and in general also how they ought to be qualified: it remains, that we inquire to what Duties they are obliged, which are these four especially: 1. That they deliver nothing that is False. 2. and 3. That they neither conceal nor transpose any thing that is true: And, 4. And lastly, That what is true, or at least deemed by them to be so, be delivered with no other degree of assurance, than they themselves are persuaded of in their own bosoms. The first of these is the very thing which this Commandment doth inculcate, and will hereafter be more largely exemplified, when I come to show the sins that are forbidden by it. The second and third (as I shall afterwards show) are included in the former; and the fourth a necessary consequent of it. For, inasmuch as moral falsehood consists not in the disagreeableness of the thing we utter with that which it concerns, but with our own estimate of it; he must be looked upon as giving a false Testimony, who shall utter any thing with a greater degree of assurance, than he himself is persuaded of it. And more than this I shall not need to say at present concerning the Duty of Witnesses, because I must resume it in my following Discourse; and may therefore with Reason go on to the Duty of Judges, the last thing proposed to be discoursed of.  
Now there are two sorts of Judges, at least in the most of our Courts of Judicature, and which therefore are to be considered apart; whereof the former are (if I may so speak) the Judges of Right, the other the Judges of Fact. Judges of Right I call those, who are commonly, and indeed only known among us by the Name of Judges, and to whom it belongs to inquire into the Fact that is brought before them, to declare the sense of the Law, and to pass Sentence upon Verdict given. Judges of Fact (for so indeed they are) those which are best known by the Name of Jurymen, and to whom it belongs, upon the hearing of the whole matter, to umpire differences between Man and Man, and either to absolve or condemn the person accused. An Institution (as Dr. Bates 
* Elench motuum nuper. in Anglia, part. 2. p. 359. Sed sciant tam exteri quam posteri, consuetudin●m hanc duodecimvir alis inqu●sitioni● ex aquo & bono petuam singulart Regum tum Saxonico 'em tum Normannorum indulgentiae dehitam, ab omni retro memoriâ ad nos traductam, hâc aet eaten, cum aliquantisper intermitteretur, publicis desideriis maxi mè comprobatam. Aequissimi Plebis aestimatores Plebeii, Nobilitatis Nobiles; siquidem ejusdem loci atque ordinis hominibus inest charitas, abest invidia. Praeterea, si quos Praetor ediderit tibi infensos, licet etiam atque etiam rejicias. Nec imprudentes appellare fas, facti rationem à testibus, rem omnem cordm allegantibus & probantibus, juris naturam à Judice Legum studiis innutrito, edoctos. Caeteras partes simplex & incorrupta mens rectiùs examinat, quàm calliditas alienae libidinis administra.  observes) for which we are beholden to our Saxon and Norman Kings, and which is indeed none of the least commendations of the Government; none being more proper Judges of Men, than those who are of the same rank and condition, and who may therefore be supposed to be equally estranged from hatred and envy. And though it be true that these also may not be without their affections, but however may seem less qualified for Judgement by their own unskilfulness; yet as the former inconvenience is in a great measure superseded, by that liberty which our Law allows to the person accused, to reject to a certain number, such of them as he may suspect to be ill affected towards him; so, the latter is perfectly removed by that account which they have from the Witnesses of the manner of the Fact, as from the Judge of the nature of the Law; other things (as the same Learned Man observes) being more rightly seanned by a simple and uncorrupt mind, than by craft, which is but too often the instrument of another's lust. Of the Duty of the former Judges I will not say much, because they do not stand so much in need of an Instructor, nor am I so proper for it, though they did. It shall suffice me therefore briefly to admonish, or rather pray, that inasmuch as the design of their place is to administer Justice, they would do what in them lies to discover where the Right is, and not spare any pains or patience to investigate it. That they would not receive Informations beforehand to forestall their judgements, and much less suffer them to be blinded by the intercession of Friends, the solicitations of great Persons, or the receiving of Rewards. That they would restrain both the Litigants and their several Advocates from personal aspersions, and such as serve rather to hid, than discover the truth of the thing in question. That they would examine such Witnesses, as show themselves crafty and reserved, with all dexterity and accuracy; and help out and encourage such, whom bashfulness, and the awe of so great a presence deters; that they would bear with the impertinences of those of the meaner sort, and who know not how to tell a story, without interlacing things of little concernment to it; lastly, that they would carefully and faithfully recapitulate the whole matter, and with all uprightness and perspicuity deliver the sense of that Law which respects it. So doing they shall not only fulfil their own parts, but help the Jury in a great measure to satisfy theirs. Who as they are in Reason and Law to receive the sense of the Law from the Judge, and the knowledge of the Fact from the Depositions of the respective Witnesses, so shall at least free their own Souls; if, without favour, or hatred, or any such corrupt affection, they shall set themselves to consider of all that hath been proposed, and impartially deliver their own sense: For though even thus they may sometime happen to err in Judgement, yet they shall not offend; because governing themselves by the best light, which the Evidence that hath been given, and the Dictates of their own Judgements have afforded them.  
These two things only seem necessary to be added, for the better explicating the Duty of these and all other Judges, 

1. That they ought to pass sentence according to the proofs that are made before them, whatsoever jealousy or private knowledge they themselves may have of the falsehood of the thing attested to.  
2. That in doubtful cases, and where the truth doth not appear, they ought to incline to such determinations as are favourable to the accused party.    
1. Now though the former of these Assertions be generally allowed of, even when the Person who ought to pass sentence, hath a strong suspicion of the falseness of the Witnesses, for the Reasons before given of the use and necessity of them in Judgement: yet as there hath not been the like accord, where (as it may sometime happen) he who is to pass sentence knows the contrary to what hath been deposed; so it may seem but necessary for that Reason to inquire, whether a Judge in that case ought to pass sentence according to what hath been attested? For the resolution whereof, the first thing I shall offer is, That if he do pass sentence at all, he ought to pass sentence according to what hath been deposed; yea though his own private knowledge do contradict it. For, beside that a Judge, as such, exerciseth a Public Authority, and is therefore in Reason to guide himself in it by a Public Knowledge, and such as comes to him as a Judge, and not as a Private Person, (otherwise he who takes Cognizance, and he who passeth Sentence shall not be the same;) beside that a Judge by the nature of his Office, and the Oath which is laid upon him, is indefinitely obliged to square his Judgements by the Laws and Manners of the place, which do every where make it necessary to proceed according to what is made out to him in Judgement: That he ought so to proceed, may be abundantly evidenced from the force of those proofs, which the Testimony of Witnesses gives; for those making the thing proved to be looked upon as Truth, even in the opinion of 
* Joh. 8.17.  God himself, it is but reason that a Judge, who is obliged to judge according to truth, should pronounce agreeably to them, and consequently not according to his own Private Knowledge. Neither will it avail to say (which is one of the things that is usually objected) that so doing he shall act against his own conscience: For, beside that there is a difference between acting against a Man's Knowledge, and acting against his Conscience; the former importing only a speculative Knowledge, which induceth no obligation of itself; the latter connoting a practical one: there is no necessity at all that the Judge of whom we speak, should act against his own Conscience. For the force of Conscience arising from the persuasion of the Judgement, that such or such a thing ought to be done or omitted by us; he who can settle it in his mind, that he ought to proceed secundùm allegata & probata, as there is no doubt every Judge ought to do, may take the course before spoken of without any reproach from his own Conscience. As little am I moved with what is further objected against this Assertion; that Positive Laws, and particularly those of men, aught to yield to the Law of Nature, which requires of us, for instance, the absolving of an innocent person, whatsoever Testimony may be made against him. For, beside that it is the voice of Nature, no less than of Positive Laws, that in the mouth of two or three Witnesses every word shall be established, there being otherwise no end of Contentions, if what such suggest may not be admitted to determine them; neither is he to be reputed as innocent in foro humano, who shall have such Allegations attested against him, and shall not be able to wipe them off. I conclude therefore, That whatsoever a Judges Private Knowledge may inform him, he ought, if he pass Sentence, to guide himself by what appears to him in Judgement. But neither, secondly, shall I stick to affirm, that he both may and aught to pass Sentence, if the Prince shall oblige him to it. As because there is really no iniquity on his part so to do, inasmuch as he only condemns him whom the Law pronounceth nocent; so, because it is a greater inconvenience than the condemning of an innocent Person, to detract the Commands of him, by whom he is constituted a Judge: He who so doth, beside the scandal of his Example, opening a way for himself and others, to avoid the passing of a Sentence, whensoever they shall please to pretend that they know the contrary to what hath been alleged and attested. It may be enough for such persons to endeavour the avoiding of it, if it may be with the Princes Will; or, if that cannot be done, to use their art to convict the Witnesses of falsehood; which by ways best known to Men versed in those Affairs hath oftentimes been accomplished, when the Judge hath had only a suspicion of their Treachery; or, if that cannot be done, after Sentence to signify it to the Prince, in whom as the power of Pardoning is, so it is hardly to be imagined, but he will gladly make use of it upon such an occasion, which will absolve both the Judges own Conscience, and the accused party.  
2. I will conclude this Affair and my Discourse, with admonishing those to whom the Power of Judging doth belong, That in doubtful cases they ought to incline to such determinations as are favourable to the accused party. For every one being in Reason to be presumed to be innocent, till the contrary thereof be made appear; it is but just, where the Proofs are not very clear, that the Judgement should be with favour towards him who hath been convented at their Tribunal.   

PART II.  
An Address to the Explication of the Negative part of the Commandment; where the Errors of Witnesses, and the Criminalness thereof, are first of all enquired into; as, after that, what Falsities are comprised in them, whether in or out of Judicial Proceed. The first Error of Witnesses, the bearing of a false one, whether as that imports such a Testimony as disagreeth with the Nature of the Thing attested to; but principally and chief as it imports such a one as disagrees with our own Opinion concerning it. The Criminalness thereof, the Prejudice it doth to him against whom it is alleged, the Assistance it lends to the Injustice of the Accuser, its hindering those from doing Justice who are otherwise disposed to do it, and Perjury. The second Error of Witnesses, the concealing of any thing that is true; the Criminalness whereof is evinced from the prejudice it may bring unto our Neighbour, and from its contrariety to that great Precept of Love, which commands us to advantage him, as well as no way injure him. The like Criminalness evinced in the transposing of that which is true, or affirming what we deem to be so, with any greater degree of assurance than we ourselves are persuaded of in our own Thoughts. An Inquiry into the Falsities and other Errors which are comprehended under those of Witnesses; which from the general Design of the Decalogue, as well as of the present Commandment, are shown to be all Falsities in Judicial Proceed. An enumeration thereupon of the several Falsities committed in them; and an Inquiry whether the Defendant may plead Not guilty to what he is justly charged with. Extrajudicial Falsities to be looked upon as alike forbidden by this Commandment, where they are also pernicious ones.  
BEING now pretty well provided, by what I have premised concerning Courts of Judicature, to give an account of those Sins which are by this Commandment forbidden in them; Reason would I should give the first place to those of Witnesses, 
Negative part of the Commandment.  which the Commandment doth expressly condemn: As because what is so condemned, aught to be looked upon as principally intended; so, because whatsoever else may be supposed to be forbidden by it, must be upon the account of its affinity with that which it principally intends. Taking it therefore for granted, that the Errors of Witnesses in Judgement are principally struck at, I will inquire, 

1. What those Errors are, and wherein the Criminalness thereof consisteth.  
2. What Falsities are comprised under them, whether in or out of Judicial Proceed.    
I. Now there are four things (according as was before observed) which this Commandment doth either expressly, or by consequence, forbidden in those who are Witnesses in Judgement.  

1. The uttering of any thing that is false.  
2. and 3. The concealing or transposing of that which is true.  
4. The affirming of any thing which is deemed by them to be so, with any greater degree of assurance than they themselves are persuaded of in their own Breasts.   
1. Of the first of these little need to be said, I mean, as to show it to be forbidden by this Commandment; the Letter of the Commandment forbidding the bearing false witness against our neighbour, which is to me the same in sense with the uttering of any thing that is false. For though I deny not but a false Witness may be for the advantage of one Party, and therefore in that respect not a bearing false witness against our Neighbour; yet inasmuch as what is for the advantage of one, is, eo nomine, to the prejudice of the other that contendeth with him in Judgement, he who gives a favourable, but false Testimony for the one, must be supposed to bear false witness against the other, which is the very thing forbidden by this Commandment. All therefore that will be requisite for me to show upon this first Head, is, what a false Witness is, and wherein the Criminalness thereof consisteth. Now there are two Notions whereof the word Falshood is capable, as shall be more at large declared 
* Vid. Part 3. Explicat. of this Commandment. , when I come to entreat de industria of the nature of Truth and Falsehood: that which importeth the disagreement of our Words with the nature of the Thing whereof we speak, and that which imports the disagreement of them with our own Opinion of it. Both the one and other of these Falsehoods is intended in this Commandment; but the latter principally and chief. For, though a Man may be, and no doubt is, obliged to inform himself well of what he speaks, because Words were intended to express the Natures of Things, as well as our own Conceptions of them; though he may also, for that reason, be chargeable with the Crime of Falsehood, if that whereof he speaks have not been duly weighed beforehand by him: yet inasmuch as it is not in the power of the Speaker to give other account of any thing, than according to that Opinion which he himself hath conceived concerning it; that Falsehood is in reason to be looked upon as chief forbidden, which consists in the disagreement of our Words with our Thoughts, as which alone we are entirely in a capacity to prevent. It being thus evident what we are to understand by Falsity, and particularly by that Falsity which cleaves to a Testimony in Judgement; proceed we to show wherein the Criminalness thereof consisteth, and for which it is forbidden by this Commandment.  
And here not to allege its contrariety to Truth, which, as I shall afterwards show, aught to be preserved inviolable, partly because false witnessing hath a farther Criminalness in it, and partly because I shall have a more opportune place to entreat of that; I shall desire you to consider,  
1. That which seems principally here intended, even the prejudice it doth to that Person against whom it is alleged. For, inasmuch as necessity requires, that they to whom the Power of Judging doth belong, should proceed in their Sentence according to what hath been attested; it cannot be but where the Witness is false, the Judge should pass Sentence against the accused Party, and deprive him of that, whether Estate or Life, which is called in question by the Accuser: The former whereof is, on the Witnesses part, a Violation of the Eighth Commandment; the latter, a Violation of the Sixth. For, as it is by his Testimony that the Judge does what he does, and therefore he, and not the Judge, chargeable with the Consequence of the Sentence; so I know not whether I may not represent him as more chargeable with that Consequence, than him by whom he is suborned: Because, though the latter give beginning to the Accusation, yet it is his Testimony, that gives occasion to the Sentence, by which the Accusation becomes effectual. Whence it was, that if the falseness of a Witness happened to be discovered, he who forbade the bearing of false witness, required the retaliating upon him that did so, that mischief, whatsoever it was, which he thought to do unto his Neighbour by it, Deut. 19.18, 19  
2. But beside the prejudice which a false Witness doth to the accused Party, which alone would suffice to render his so doing Criminal; it would also be considered, which is not without a Crime, that he lends his Assistance to the Injustice of the Accuser: As because he so far interests himself in the Gild of that Fact to which he becomes so assistant; so because he encourageth him, and other such like Persons, to the perpetration of new Injustices: He who prospers by his Villainy, being not likely to give it over, where there is so ready a means to give success to it.  
3. I observe, thirdly, That as he who bears false witness, gives assistance to the Injustice of the Accuser, and promotes that Wickedness which he ought rather to discountenance; so he hinders those from doing Justice who are otherwise disposed to do it, yea makes them instrumental to the contrary: Which however no way prejudicial to the eternal Welfare of the Judge (because no Man can become Criminal but by his own consent) yet is prejudicial to his Fame, which by that means is often called in question; to his Office, which it renders useless, yea pernicious; but much more to Humane Society, because corrupting those Judgements, upon the right proceeding whereof, the Safety of men's Persons and Fortunes doth depend.  
4. Lastly, Forasmuch as Men are not any where admitted to bear witness, without adding the Oath of God to what they so bear witness; he who bears any false witness, adds Impiety to his Injustice, and profanes the Name of God, whom he doth so invoke, as well as his who is his Vicegerent, and whom he does by his false Testimony elude.  
2. Of the first thing forbidden in a Witness, what hath been said may suffice; where I have shown what it is to bear false witness, and wherein Criminal: Proceed we now to show the same concerning the concealing of any thing that is true, the second thing affirmed to be forbidden by the Commandment. For the evidencing whereof, though it might suffice, as to our Courts of Judicature, to allege the Oath which the Witness takes to speak the whole Truth, as well as nothing but the Truth; because he who so promiseth, makes himself a false Witness, if he conceal any part of it: yet I think it not amiss, because that will add more force to the Admonition, to evict it from the Commandment itself. A thing which will be no way difficult for me or any Man to do, who shall consider the End of the Commandment. For, the Design thereof being apparently to secure the Persons and Estates of Men from receiving any prejudice by the Testimony of Witnesses; if Men may be prejudiced by a partial Witness, as well as by a false one, there is no doubt that also aught to be looked upon as forbidden, because equally contrary to its design. Now that the Persons and Estates of Men may no less suffer by the concealing of a Truth, than by giving attestation to a Falsehood, will appear if we consider how much the concealing of a circumstance may alter the nature of the thing in question. Thus for Example, Though it be criminal, and so declared by our Laws, to take away the life of our Neighbour, yet it is not so, nor aught to be so reputed, to take away his life if it be only to defend our own; he who shall depose the kill of the party, but withal conceal that parties first invading him that slew him, shall make a murderer of him who is perfectly innocent, and who ought rather to be defended than condemned. In like manner, he who shall depose the lending of such a sum of Money to the accused party, as the Plaintiff demands, but withal conceal, what he well knows, the paying of it back to him, shall make him obnoxious to the penalty of the Law, who ought rather to have the encouragement of it, as having discharged that obligation which he had contracted. And indeed as a bad cause may become specious and plausible by paring off those things which show it to be monstrous and deformed, (for thus (as Palavicino 
* Istoria del Concilio di Trento, li. 1. c. 26.  well resembles it) out of a misshapen stone men frame a comely Statue, not by adding to it, but by taking away) so there is as little doubt to be made, but a fair and plausible Cause may become odious and detestable, by paring off any part of it; monstrosity arising no less from the defect of a necessary Limb, than from the addition of a superfluous one. But neither is this all which may be said against the concealing of a Truth, though indeed it be the main, and what ought more especially to be considered. For as though the Letter of the Law forbidden only the prejudicing of our neighbour by our testimony, yet that love which is the spirit of it, and to which the whole is reduced by our Saviour, requires also the advantaging of him thereby; so he who shall omit so to do, (as he who conceals any part of it may) must be looked upon as alike offending against the Commandment; he who conceals any part of the Truth 
* Vterque enim reus est, & quî veritatem occultat, & qui mendacium dicit: quia & ille prodesse non vult, & iste nocere desidederat.  showing as much unwillingness to profit, as he who utters that which is false doth a desire to do harm. I will conclude this particular when I have said, that, though when we affirm it to be criminal to conceal a Truth, we mean only such Truths as are pertinent to the matter in debate; yet men ought to be very well satisfied, that what they do so conceal is no way pertinent to it: that which appears to us to be inconsiderable, being oftentimes of moment if it be judged of by more competent understandings.  
3. From the concealing of a Truth, pass we to the transposing of it, the third thing affirmed by us to be forbidden by the Commandment; and not without cause, if we consider how much greater affinity it hath with that falsehood which it expressly condemns for falsehood (as was before said) consisting in the disagreement of our words with the nature of the thing we speak of, or at least with our apprehension of it; he who shall give in an account of any Fact, in any other order than he knows the fact to have been committed, shall be as guilty of falsehood, as he who adds fictions of his own, and it may be too no less prejudicial to his Neighbour. It may seem ludicrous, but it was a sad truth of a noble English Gentleman sent Ambassador into Foreign Parts, and with him an honourable Espy under the notion of a Companion: By whom he was accused at his return to have spoken such and such things, and at such and such times. The Gentleman pleaded ingeniously for himself, that it might be he had spoken some of those things, or it might be all those things, but never any of them in that order nor in that sense. I have (said he) several suits of Apparel, of Purple Cloth, of Green Velvet, of White and Black Satin. If one should put my two Purple Sleeves to my Green Velvet Doublet, and make my Hose, the one of White Satin, the other of Black, and then swear that it was my Apparel, they who did not know me would think me a strange man. I cannot tell how this Plea fitted the Person of whom we speak, because as his charge so his name is altogether unknown to me, having borrowed the forementioned story, in the generality wherein I have delivered it, from Bishop Bramhal 
* Replication to the Bishop of Chalcedon touching Schism, pag. 46 , but certainly the Plea was reasonable in itself, and extremely pertinent to the case we speak of. For it being notorious to all men, that the good or evil of any action depends much upon the circumstances wherewith it is clad: he that shall go about in his testimony to confound the order wherein they came, may make as unseemly an alteration, as he who should so piece together the parts of different coloured Garments.  
4. Lastly, As it is unlawful by this Commandment to conceal or transpose any truth, as well as to utter that which is contrary to it; so it must be looked upon as alike forbidden by it, to affirm that which we deem to be so, with any greater degree of assurance, than we ourselves are persuaded of it: As because by so doing we shall fall into the crime of falsehood, inasmuch as the words we make use of exceed the measure of our own persuasions, in the disagreement wherewith I have shown falsehood to consist; so because by this means we may bring that condemnation upon our Neighbour, which otherwise neither would nor ought to be inflicted on him; confident asseverations leaving no place for presumptions of the accused's innocency, which are of force under fainter ones. A familiar instance will clear my meaning, and show the necessity of this caution. For suppose we (what doth not infrequently happen) that a company of honest men are set upon in the Road by Robbers, and one of them in the fray murdered by them. And suppose we also, which is alike common, that though the Robbers escape for the present, yet some one or more persons are taken upon suspicion for them. In this case, I say, it will concern those who were present at the fact, not to affirm those suspected persons to be the men, with any greater degree of assurance, than they themselves are persuaded of in their own bosoms. For as by too confident an asseveration they may bring condemnation upon a person, who it may be is no way worthy of it; so they will undoubtedly cut off from the accused party, that which is the birthright of all men living who are not convicted of any Crime, even the alleging for himself the former orderliness of his life, and other such like presumptions of his innocency. For though these may be of force, where they who are produced as Witnesses, do only attest their own suspicion of those being the criminal parties; yet they are of no force, nor aught to be, where the Witnesses shall swear peremptorily, that they know them to be the men that set upon them. By which means as it hath sometime happened, that persons wholly innocent have undergone an unjust sentence; so they who consider how heinous a thing it is to take away the life of an Innocent, will beware by their example, how they affirm any thing in Judgement, with any greater degree of assurance, than they themselves are persuaded of in their own bosoms.  
II. Having thus given an account of the Falsities and other Errors, which the Commandment we have now before us cautions Witnesses against; my proposed method obliges me to inquire, what Falsities are comprised under them, whether in or out of Judicial Proceed. The ground of which Question, is that latitude which I have often shown the Commandments we have now before us aught to be construed in: For, inasmuch as the Decalogue was intended as an Abstract of the whole Duty of Man, or at least of so much of it, as concerns the regulation of our Manners; inasmuch as all the foregoing Precepts have been shown to extend to the commanding or forbidding of several other things, beside what they particularly express: it is but reasonable to think, that what we are now in the Explication of is of the same comprehensive nature, and extends to the forbidding of other Falsities, beside those of Witnesses; which what they are I come now to declare. In order whereunto,  
1. The first thing that I shall offer is, That little doubt can be made, but all other Falsities in Judicial Proceed are alike condemned with those of Witnesses: Partly because it is usual in the Decalogue to set one particular Species to denote all that are of the same Genus; and partly because other Falsities in Judgement are alike prejudicial to our Neighbour, with those that are expressly forbidden. But from hence it will follow,  
1. That it is alike forbidden to the Plaintiff by it, to raise a false Report, or mix untrue Reports with true; these as they are alike Falsities, and prejudicial ones, so giving occasion, shall I say, or rather producing those Falsities, which the Commandment doth expressly condemn: For were it not for false Accusers false Witnesses could have no place, as being only abettors of what the other raise. Now forasmuch as in Reason that is to be looked upon as forbidden by a Commandment, which is, if I may so speak, the Cause of what it doth: if False Witnesses be forbidden by it, False Accusations must be so much more; because not only alike prejudicial to our Neighbour, but the Parent of the other. It will follow,  
2. That it is alike forbidden to the Defendant, to deny that in Judgement which he is justly charged withal; this as it is certainly a Falsity, so, if the Accusation be in matters of Estate, alike prejudicial to our Neighbour; if in matters Criminal, to the State; that being thereby obstructed, or at least retarded in the Execution of Justice, upon which the welfare of it doth depend. Neither will it be of force to say, that no Man is bound to accuse himself; which whether he be or no I will not at present concern myself to inquire, having in another 
* Explic. of the Third Commandm. Part 3.  place spoken sufficiently to it. For, in the present case (as a learned 
† Jer. Tailor Ductor Dubit. l. 3. c. 2. p. 91.2.  Man observes) the Man is accused already, and he is not called to be his own Accuser, but to defend himself if he be unjustly charged, but if not, to confess it. Which particular I the rather add, because the only pretence which hath been alleged for such persons pleading of Not Guilty, is, that the ask of Guilty or Not Guilty is a matter of formality, and intended only to usher in the Judicial Proceed. The contrary whereof, as it is to me sufficiently evident, from the Law's passing Sentence upon the Criminals pleading Guilty, so will appear yet more reasonable, from what we have before said of the ground of Witnesses in Judgement: For Witnesses having no other foundation, than the supposition of the obscurity of the Fact, or the accused Party's denying it, it is but just to suppose, that they who put the Question of Guilty or Not Guilty, intent it not as a mere Formality, but as a thing in the order of Nature antecedent to the production of Witnesses, and by which Sentence ought to pass if the Fact be acknowledged. Otherwise (as the forequoted person remarks) Trials of Criminal Causes, between the Judge and the Thief, would be like a match at Fencing, and the accused party by that question forewarned only to stand upon his guard; which whether it be agreeable with the gravity of those Tribunals, or the design of their Institutions, I will leave to all sober Men to judge. In the mean time, if they, who better understand our Law or the practice of it, look upon it only as a Formality, I will not gainsay them in it, or in the consequence they deduce; provided that in matters of Estate they privilege not the Defendant to deny that Usurpation wherewith he is justly charged; that, as it is a continuance of the old injury, so producing a new prejudice to our Neighbour, because putting him to a farther trouble and charge, to evict his own confessedly lawful demands.  
3. The same is to be said, thirdly, of the Advocates defending of a false Cause, or making use of false Pretences to uphold it; these as they are alike false, so tending equally to the prejudice of him, who is by their respective Clients injured in his Cause. But neither,  
4. Fourthly, will it be at all difficult to infer from the prohibition of false Witnesses, that the Judge is much more forbidden to pass a false Judgement; a false Judgement as it is equally opposite to Truth, so tending more immediately and effectually to the prejudicing of the party concerned; inasmuch as it is by his Sentence that the Controversy is decided, and justice or injustice executed.  
5. Lastly, Forasmuch as though the Judge passeth Sentence, yet that Sentence of his is oftentimes, through Bribery or otherwise, misrepresented by those into whose hands it is put to draw it up or record it; they also, by what name soever they are known, are to be looked upon as violators of the Commandment, because both alike Falsifiers and prejudicial to their Neighbours in Judgement.  
2. From Judicial Falsities pass we to extrajudicial ones, and inquire, whether any of them are forbidden, and what. For the resolution of the former whereof, 
Philo de Decalog. prope finem. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  I shall lay for my ground that short descant of Philo upon this Commandment; he in his so often quoted Tract de Decalogo affirming to be contained in this Commandment, the prohibition of deceiving and of false accusing, of being assistant to Malefactors, and an hypocritical perfidiousness; all but the second whereof have place in other proceed as well as Judicial ones. Now though I do not intent to rely upon his Authority, as which alone will not suffice to show the Commandment to be so comprehensive: yet as I thought it not amiss to allege it to show the opinion not to be novel, nor propugned only by such as are of little esteem among learned Men; so, having so done, I shall fortify it by the Authority of Reason, which is an Authority Men cannot so easily gainsay. For is it not reasonable to think, especially in so comprehensive a Law as I have shown that of the Decalogue to be, that those sins are forbidden by a Commandment, which however not particularly mentioned, yet are of the same nature with that which is? And if so, may we not reasonably reckon to this, at least all such Falsities as are prejudicial to our Neighbour, whether they be committed in Judgement or not? Especially when (as the same Philo adds in the place before quoted) he who contents himself in this Commandment with the Prohibition of False Witnessing in Judgement, hath in other places as expressly interdicted the other. But from hence it will follow, which is the second thing to be spoken too, that we are to look upon as included in this Prohibition, all such Falsities or Lies, as have the name of pernicious ones; particularly those which wound our Neighbour's reputation, as Calumnies and the like; or prejudice him in his Estate, as breach of Promises or Compacts. I say not the same at present of such Falsities or Lies as have the name of officious or jesting ones; partly because the perniciousness thereof is not so apparent, and partly because I reserve the discussion of them to another place. Only as if it do appear that those Lies no less than the former are condemned by the Law of God and Nature, little doubt can be made but they ought to be reckoned to this Commandment, because they will not elsewhere find a more commodious place; so it will become more pardonable to inquire into them here, if we consider their affinity with the other in the point of Falsehood, or the opinion of our own Church concerning them: That Catechism of its, which I have chosen to explain, bringing within the compass of it evil speaking, lying, and slandering, without any exception or restriction. In the mean time, let it remain as certain, because abundantly proved, that all Lies whatsoever, which bring any prejudice to our Neighbour, are to be looked upon as forbidden by this Commandment, whether they be such as are committed in Judgement, or such whose subject matter hath no affinity with it. For though the former may be more Criminal, in respect of that Oath which is affixed to them, and the quality of those Tribunals which they are intended to elude; yet the latter may be no less, if we consider either their dissonancy to Truth, which is one part of the others evil character; or their prejudicialness to our Neighbour, whose either Life, or Fame, or Fortune, the Commandment we have now before us was intended to secure.   

PART III.  
A Digression concerning the Nature of Truth and Falsehood: The several Species thereof, and our Obligation to pursue the one, and avoid the other. An Inquiry in the close, whether the Truth be always to be professed; and, if not, how, and in what Cases, it may be either suppressed, or concealed, even when we make a semblance of declaring it.  
THOUGH I had it sometime in my thoughts to defer my Discourse of Truth and Falsehood, till I came to entreat of those Falsities which had nothing to make them criminal but their being such; yet considering with myself, that Falsehood is a part of the Character of those Sins which this Commandment professeth to condemn; as moreover, that I should be thereby obliged, to make my Account of them complete, to scatter here and there some remarks concerning the Nature of them, which afterwards I should be forced to repeat; considering, lastly, that by a present discharging myself of that Obligation, I might both free myself from those remarks, and at the same time I explicated the nature of Truth and Falsehood, give light to all those Falsities which have or shall be the matter of my Discourse: I resolved with myself, not to defer any longer the paying of that Debt, which the Argument I have now before me, no less than my own Promise, hath bound upon me. Setting aside therefore, for the present, the prosecution of those Falsities, which I have said to be forbidden by this Commandment, I will make it my business to inquire, 

1. Wherein Truth and Falsehood do consist: where I shall moreover enumerate the several Species of them.  
2. What Obligation there is to pursue the one, and avoid the other.  
3. And lastly, Whether the Truth be always to be professed; and, if not, how, and in what Cases it may be either suppressed, or concealed.    
1. Now Truth is nothing else than an Agreement of those things to which it is attributed, with the Nature of those things which they are designed either to resemble or express; and is either intrinsecal, or .  I call that which resideth in the Mind of Man, and consisteth in the agreement of its several Apprehensions with the Nature of those things which it pretends to judge of. But this, as well as the contrary thereof, even Error, is no part of our Inquiry here, because the Commandment we have now before us is of the number of those which profess the regulation of our Deportment to our Neighbours, and not the right ordering of our own private Concerns.  I call that which either resides in our Words, and other such like Expressions of our own Mind or Things; or, that which resideth in our Actions. Whereof the former consists in the agreement of them with the Mind of him that useth them, and hath the name of Ethical or Moral Truth; or, with the things about which our mind and the expressions thereof are conversant, and hath the name of Logical. The former of these is again double, according to the different faculties of the Mind, which are either its Understanding or Will: In respect of the former whereof that Speech is said to be true, which is agreeable to our Thoughts and Apprchensions; as in respect of the latter, that Speech which is agreeable to our purpose and resolution. Lastly, Forasmuch as our words may not only look backward to our apprehensions or purposes, but forward to some particular action to be done by us; hence it comes to pass (as was before noted) that there may be a truth in our actions, as well as in our words, or other the like notes of our thoughts or meaning, which is, when we act agreeably to those promises or compacts which have proceeded out of our mouth, or been any other way declared. Which said, it will be no way difficult to discover those several falsities which are committed in the world, and which this Commandment was intended to discountenance. For inasmuch as Falsehood is nothing else than a contrariety to Truth; hence it comes to pass that if the question be concerning that truth which resides in our words, or other the like expressions of our own mind or things, that Speech is said to be false respectively, which agreeth not with our own conceptions, or with the nature of those things which are the proper subject of them. If the question be yet more particularly put concerning that truth, which consists in the agreement of our words with our conceptions; that Speech is to be looked upon as false, which either agreeth not with our thoughts, and hath for the most part the name of a lie, or with our own purposes and resolutions, and may for distinction sake be termed treachery. Lastly, If respect be had to that truth which resides in men's actions, and which consists in the agreement of them with their promises or compacts; so that action shall be looked upon as false, which doth not agree with the purport of those promises or compacts.  
2. The nature of Truth and Falsehood being thus explained, proceed we, as our proposed method obligeth us, to inquire into the obligation we have to pursue the one, and avoid the other. For my more advantageous resolution whereof, I will resume each of those species of Truth and Falsehood, into which I have before divided them.  
To begin with that truth which I have said to consist in the agreement of our words or other such like significant notes, with those things they are intended to express. Where again I shall show, both that there is an Obligation to it, and what the measure of that Obligation is. That there is an Obligation upon men to intent this Truth, will need no other arguments than what I shall afterwards allege, to show the Obligation there is upon them to make their words agree with their conceptions. For the end of Speech being to convey by the means of our own Conceptions, the nature of those things which we have taken cognisance of; if there be a tie upon us to make our words agree with our thoughts, there will be also a tie upon us to make them agree with the nature of those things for which those our Conceptions are transmitted. These two things only would be added to that assertion, because but just limitations of that and our obligation. 1. That the obligation of making our words agree with the nature of the things we speak of, is to be understood only so far, as it is in our power to make them so, by a previous information, or recollection of ourselves concerning it; As that too, 2. in such things only which we are under an obligation to understand, whether from our Religion or Profession, or the Office we take upon us: It sufficing in other things to give such an account concerning them, as our present thoughts shall suggest. For whereas, if we are obliged at all to make our words agree with our thoughts, it must be supposed to be absolutely, because no man of common understanding can be ignorant of his own thoughts, or want words to express them; the obligation to make our words agreeable to the things we speak of, can extend no farther than it is in our power to make them so, by a previous information or recollection of ourselves; the weakness of Humane Nature making it impossible to conceive rightly of all things, and therefore also (because our words must be regulated by our conceptions) to speak with exact truth concerning them. From whence as it will follow, that it may be many times unavoidable, to speak dissonantly to those things which are the subject of our Discourse; so that that Falsehood can be no farther imputed to us for a crime, than it was in our power to have prevented it by a due information, or recollection of ourselves. Again, forasmuch as no man can be bound to inquire into the nature of any other things, than those which he is under an obligation to understand; it will follow, that he is under no farther obligation to make his words agree with any other, than his present thoughts shall suggest; there being no need of any scrupulous diligence, where the thing we speak of is not necessary to be known. Thus for instance, though it may concern a Divine to see that he deliver such doctrines in Religion, as are agreeable to that word, which is or aught to be the rule of them; yet there is not the like tie upon him, to speak with that care and consideration concerning those things which are perfectly  to it. Upon which account, at the same time he shall be chargeable with Falsehood by reason of the former, if they be found to be dissonant to the Scripture; yet he shall not be chargeable with the like Falsehood upon the score of the erroneousness of the latter, if he speak what his present thoughts do suggest. In like manner, though it may concern a man, when summoned as a Witness, to inform himself well beforehand, or at least to recollect himself, before he pretend to give a testimony in judgement, because for want of that he may prejudice a man in his Cause; yet there cannot be the like tie in extrajudicial matters, and where there is not the same consequence of what we speak: It sufficing in such cases, because not concerning us to know them, to speak agreeably to our own Conceptions, into the obligation whereof I am next in order to inquire. For the evidencing whereof, though (if that could be made appear) it would be the most compendious method to allege, that words are naturally signs of men's conceptions, because so (as Aquinas 
* 2.2 ae. quaest. 110. art. 3.  hath argued) it must be looked upon as unnatural, to make show of that in our words, which we have not in our minds; yet, because how true soever that may be, there is no natural reason to make it appear, or at lest none which occurs to my observation, I shall take a farther way about to evince the obligation of it, and such as shall be less liable to exception. In order whereunto, I will lay for my ground, what in a former Discourse hath been sufficiently proved, that God hath laid upon all Mankind an obligation to profit each other in those several ways, whereby they are capacitated to contribute to it. For as from thence it may be easily inferred, that they are to communicate of their conceptions to each other, because both a remedy of Solitude, which is extremely prejudicial to Humane Nature, and of necessary use to direct those they have to do with in their Lives and Actions; so it will also follow that they are both to agree of certain external marks of notifying their own conceptions, and having so agreed of them, to abide by them, as without which, what they speak would be uncertain to the hearers, and consequently neither delight nor profit them. Now forasmuch as men are not only fitted to communicate their conceptions to each other, but have also (whether led thereto by the Divine Spirit at first, which I for my own part believe, because we find Adam making use of his tongue as soon as he had a being, or conducted thereto by the aptitude there is in the tongue so to do) agreed upon words as the declarers of their conceptions each to other; it will follow, that being thus agreed upon as the declarers of men's minds, they should observe them as such, and consequently make them correspond to those several conceptions which they were instituted to declare. The same is to be said, for the reason before mentioned, of the blots of the Pen or Printing Press, whether they be such as were intended to represent words figured by the tongue, as the characters of most Nations in the world, or the sense and importance of them as those of the Chinese. For these being no less useful to persons at distance, than the other to those that are present; and beside that, by the same general consent appointed declarers of men's conceptions; there is the same necessity of making them to correspond with those conceptions, which they were so agreed on to express. And though Nods, Gestures, and Habits, and other such like things, are not with the same general consent appointed to declare our thoughts: yet as these are alike expressive of them, and made use of oftentimes either out of necessity or choice, (for thus dumb men speak to each other by signs, and those who have the faculty of speaking, do so too to them that have not the use of hearing) so there is no doubt where they are alike agreed on to notify men's thoughts, there is the same obligation to make them correspond to them. For the clearing whereof, I will instance first in a thing which is in use among the Turks, and after that descend to another which is of more general observation. 
Epistol. Turcic. 3.  From Busbequius we have it, an Author of good credit, and one who spent many years among them in an Embassy from the Emperor, that one of the causes of the Turkish women's repudiating their Husbands, is their endeavouring to abuse them contrary to the prescript of Nature: A crime, which, however rare among other Nations, is yet it seems very familiar among them. Now forasmuch, as St. Paul speaks, that is a sin not fit to be named, and much less by that Sex which hath modesty for its particular ornament; instead of putting them to the blush of speaking out so foul a fact, they are by a custom among them instructed to pull off their Shoe, and turn it the inside outside. Upon the sight whereof the Judge proceeds to a Divorce without any more particular Declaration. Now if any of those Women should without cause use the same Ceremony, when they were demanded a reason of their desire of being Divorced; there is no doubt they would be as much guilty of Falsehood in it, as those who should falsely charge their Consort with their Tongues; because that Ceremony is equally agreed on, as an expression of their meanings, as words both with them, and all other Nations are. In like manner, where it is Customary, as I think it is with most Nations in War, to declare the desire of a Parley by the hanging out of a White Flag upon the Walls of that Town which is besieged; if, as some perfidious People have done, they should use it only to entrap their Enemy, they ought to be looked upon as Falsifiers, and as such to be severely chastised: For words themselves becoming signs of men's thoughts, by that sense which is put upon them by the consent of those by whom they are used; where there is the same consent, there will be the like obligation to make them correspond with the mind of the user; and therefore also the like Falsehood, if Men prevaricate in them.  
Being now by my proposed method to entreat of our obligation to that Truth, which is conversant about Promises or Compacts, I must desire you to call to mind that there is a double Truth; whereof the former consists in the agreement of men's Promises with the Purpose and Will of them that make them; the latter, in the agreement of their Actions with the Promises they make. Our obligation both to the one and the other of which is founded in their necessity to the maintaining of Humane Society. For Humane Society being not to be maintained without a Commerce of benefits, because no Man is so happy as not to stand in need of another's help, and benefits being not always in our present power to bestow, or not needful at the present time to the party that craves them; there will arise from thence a necessity of declaring our purpose to bestow them afterwards, and of performing in due time what we have so declared we will; as without the former of which there can be no assurance, to the party we deal with, of enjoying what we contract for, no more than without the latter there can be an actual enjoyment of them. And more than this I will not say at present, concerning our obligation to make our Promises agree with our Purposes, as our Actions to agree with those Promises; because whatsoever will be farther necessary to be said concerning them, will fall in pertinently enough afterwards, when I go on to show what falsehoods are here condemned. Only because there are some Promises which are voluntarily made, and to which there is no forcible inducement on the part of him to whom they are so; it may not be amiss, because these are different from the Promises before spoken of, to show that they induce an obligation to performance, and how they come to induce such an obligation. That they induce an obligation upon the party promising, is sufficiently evident to all, who acknowledge the authority of the Scriptures, they 
* Vid Neh. 9.8. Heb. 6.18.— 10.23. 2 Tim. 2.13.  assuring us that God himself is bound by them to perform what he hath promised to us: For the Promises of God being perfectly voluntary, and so voluntary, that, if he pleased, he might inflict upon us those evils which are contrary to them; it will unavoidably follow, that such Promises, no less than others, will much more oblige us, who are much more capable of being obliged. The only difficulty is, how they come to oblige: which (though a question rarely resolved, or endeavoured so much as to be so) yet seems to me not uncapable of one. For inasmuch as a voluntary Promise is an indication of a benevolent mind in him by whom it is so made, it cannot but give hopes to him to whom it is so, of enjoying that boon which is so voluntarily promised him; from whence if there doth not ensue (though that often does) a neglect of supplying himself some other way; and consequently, if the Promise be not performed, a want of what he needs; yet there will undoubtedly follow a grief and trouble of mind, upon the disappointment of such hopes. By which means, the party, to whom the Promise is made, is not only bereft of the promised benefit, but suffers a real prejudice, which that Love which one Man owes to another doth forbid. Now forasmuch as even a voluntary Promise cannot be violated, without prejudice to him to whom it is made; it will follow, because we are obliged to avoid the prejudicing of our Neighbour, that we ought to perform those Promises, as without the performance whereof the other cannot be done.  
3. Having thus shown wherein the nature of Truth and Falsehood do consist, as also what obligation there is to pursue the one, and avoid the other; the next thing to be enquired into, is, whether the Truth be always to be professed, or if not, how and in what cases it may be suppressed, or concealed. That the Truth is not always to be professed, needs no other evidence, than that men are not bound to discover all things to all persons, as being oftentimes no way profitable to others, and not a little prejudicial to themselves. In which case no man can doubt but they may be suppressed, or concealed by some Artifice or other. The only difficulty is, how and in what cases the Truth may be concealed, which accordingly I come now to investigate. In order whereunto, because no doubt can be made but it may be lawful sometime to hold our tongues, and so suppress that Truth which we are unwilling to discover, I will spend the main of my enquiry, in finding out those ways whereby it may be concealed, even when we make a semblance of declaring it. Now there are two ways whereby this may be effected, proportionably to the two ways there are of declaring our minds to each other, Gesture and Speech. The former, when we make use of some Gesture, which though not agreed upon to have such or such a sense, yet is apt to be interpreted as an indication of it. An Example hereof we have in our Saviour, and from whose practice therefore we may collect the lawfulness of the usage; for meeting after his Resurrection with two of his Disciples going to Emaus, and to whom after he had adjoined himself, he discoursed at large of the Death and Resurrection of the Messiah, and the evidence there was of them out of the Prophets, when they drew near to the Village, he made a show 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Luc. 24.28.  by his Gesture as if he would have gone farther, when no doubt his intention was (and so the Greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 insinuates) to stay some while with them, and reveal his own person to them: That which is said to be feigned, or dissembled, importing the absence of that which it feigns, and consequently that our Saviour did not intent at that time to proceed farther. In like manner, when Joshua in order to the taking of Ai had laid an ambush behind the City, before he betook himself to an Assault, the Text tells us, Josh. 8.15. that the better to draw the Inhabitants out of the City, Joshua and all Israel, immediately after their first onset, made as if they were beaten by them, and, to continue them in that error, fled by the way of the Wilderness; though, as it appeared afterwards, to return upon them with the greater force, and by the help of their Ambush to him them in. But what speak I of such kind of Dissimulations being lawful in War, where according to that of the Poet, Dolus an virtus quis in host requirat? when they may be of no small use in the management of Religion, and are adopted by S. Paul into it? he both by his Practice and Exhortation recommending to us the becoming of all things to all men, that we may by any means save some; which is in other words (and accordingly S. Chrysostom 
* Not. ad 1 Cor. 9.20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  glosses it) that by making show by our practice as if we were of their mind in some things of Religion, we should procure ourselves a good opinion among them, and by that means an opportunity to insinuate our own Doctrines. This only would be added, though intimated before, That when we affirm it to be lawful, to make use of certain Gestures, to conceal our Minds from other Men, we intent it only of such Gestures as are not by general consent appointed to declare that which we make semblance of, those that are (as was before noted) being not to be made use of, but where our Purposes agree with them. Thus, for instance, though it may be lawful by such a dissembled flight to draw our Enemy into a snare; yet it is not so, by the hanging out of a White Flag, or other such like usance, to make show of a Parley, when we mean it not; this being by a general consent appointed as an indication of it, and therefore not to be made use of, but where we are real in it.  
From Gestures, and other such like indications of our Minds, pass we to Words, and inquire how the Truth may be concealed in them: In order whereunto, two methods present themselves, which, where they are used with discretion, contain nothing unlawful in them: To give in only some part of that Truth which is demanded; or cloth that we do in ambiguous terms. Thus to resume the former method; If a Man should be demanded an account of any Action, the chief Reason whereof he were unwilling to discover; I should no way doubt, if he were moved to that Action by more Reasons than one, but he might give in a less principal one, without taking any notice of the chief: He who so does, unless he give it in as the only, or principal one, offending not against Truth, because suggesting that which really moved him to it. Agreeably whereto, when Jeremiah the Prophet was questioned by the Princes of Judah, concerning a Discourse that passed between him and King Zedekiah, the chief subject whereof had been by that King forbidden to him to reveal; Jeremiah, instructed beforehand by the King, told them, that he presented his supplication before the King, that he would not cause him to return to Jonathan's House to die there: Which, though true enough, yet was neither the only, nor the principal part of their Discourse, Jer. 38.24. and so on. As little doubt is to be made, but, where we are to deliver some unpleasing Truth, it may be sometimes lawful for us to wrap it up in ambiguous terms; and such as in all probability will be construed to another sense than is by us intended. Because there is nothing more frequent with holy Men in Scripture, yea even with our Saviour himself; who, to keep his Disciples from being surprised with sorrow, represented Lazarus 
* Joh. 11.11.  his death at first under the name of sleep; as his own 
‖ Joh. 2.20.  Body to the Jews under the notion of a Temple; telling them that if they destroyed that Temple, without yet specifying what he meant, in three days he would raise it up. Of the same make are the several Parables delivered by our Saviour in the Gospel; that of Nathan to David 2 Sam. 12.1. and another of one of the Sons of the Prophets to Ahab, 1 King. 20.39. The only difficulty is, how these latter ones may be saved from the imputation of a Lie: For Nathan telling the story of a rich Man who took his poor Neighbours only Ewe-lamb, not as the cover of some concealed Truth, but as a thing really acted, which he himself knew not to be; he may seem thereby, instead of a Parable, to have told a false story, and (as Seneca speaks of an Hyperbole) to come to the Truth by a Lye. But because, when I come to enumerate the several Falsities that are here forbidden, I shall have a more opportune place to return an Answer to that Objection, I will put an end to this Affair with an advertisement of the Hebrew Masters, that, if any man know how to use ambiguous speaking, he may be allowed so to do, but if not, he ought rather to hold his peace altogether; he who useth words in such a sense in which they are not commonly construed, making a Lie instead of an ambiguity; because Custom, which is the Master of Language, determines them to another sense, and consequently makes them disagreeable to the conceptions of the Speaker. In the mean time, though I say that the Truth may innocently enough be either suppressed or concealed, by such Artifices as have been before described; yet both the one and the other are to be understood, where they are no way prejudicial either to God, or our Superiors, or our Neighbours; for where the honour of God, the reverence we own to our Superiors, or our Neighbours just profit is concerned, there no doubt it shall not only not be lawful for us to suppress any part of the Truth, but incumbent upon us to deliver it in the most clear and expressive terms, that our invention can suggest. The result of which observation will be, among many other things, that there ought to be no equivocation either in Contracts or Judicial Proceed: As by the former whereof our Neighbours Rights may be impaired; by the latter moreover an injury offered both to God and our Superiors, whose those Judgements are, which ambiguous speeches endeavour to elude.   

PART IU.  
The Account of Extrajudicial Falsities resumed, and particularly of Pernicious ones. These last divided into such as strike more directly at our Neighbour's Reputation, as Calumnies or Slanders; or at his Estate, as breach of Promises or Compacts. Of the several sorts of Calumnies; and wherein the criminalness thereof consisteth: which is shown to be, 1. In that they bring Grief to the Party that lies under them. 2. That they are a bar to his Preferment and Advantage. 3. That they obstruct him in doing good both to the Souls and Bodies of other Men. To which is added as a cumulus of their guilt, that the inconveniences they draw after them are in a manner irremediable. An Address to the Explication of such Falsities as strike more directly at our Neighbour's Estate; such as is the breach of Promises or Compacts. In order whereunto, enquiry is made what is, or is not, to be looked upon as a valid Promise or Compact; and the breach of such as are valid declared to be criminal, upon the account of that Grief which it brings upon the Party that is disappointed, of that injury it doth to Humane Society, as which cannot subsist without a religious observation of them, and (because the Oath of God is usually affixed to them) of Perjury also.  
TO return now (from whence I have been for some time diverted by a Discourse of the nature of Truth and Falsehood) to the consideration of Extrajudicial Falsities, which I have said to be of three sorts, Pernicious, Officious, and Jesting ones. The first whereof I have already shown to come within the compass of the Prohibition, and shall therefore need only to inquire, what the several species thereof are, what their nature is, and wherein criminal.  
Now Pernicious Falsities, or Lies, may be reduced to two heads, according as was before insinuated, such as strike more directly at our Neighbour's Reputation, and have the name of Calumnies or Slanders; or at his Estate, as breach of Promises or Compacts.  
I begin with the former of these, even Calumnies, or Slanders, which may be committed these two ways; by denying our Neighbour to have those either Parts, or Virtues, or Endowments, which he really hath; or, by ascribing to him such Defects or Vices whereof he is no way guilty: the former whereof hath the name of Detraction; the latter, of Calumny or Slander properly so called. As for other the divisions of Slander, they are either of no great moment, or easily apprehended; and therefore it shall suffice me to note, That they may be either secretly whispered, and have the name of Whisper and Backbitings; or, more openly, and in the very face of the Party concerned, and may for distinction sake be termed open Slanders. If there be any thing farther to be remarked, concerning the nature of those particular species, it will fall in more pertinently, after I have described to you the criminalness of Slanders in the general: To which therefore I shall now betake myself, as being both the next thing in order to be discoursed of, and the most material part of our Enquiry.  
I have before observed, that Slanders in the nature of them strike at the Reputation of him who is the Object of them: From whence as it will follow, that the criminalness thereof is founded in that prejudice which they bring to men's Reputation; so, to attain the due importance of it, we must inquire into the evil Consequences which do naturally arise from that prejudice: which are these three especially.  

1. That they bring Grief to the Party that lies under them.  
2. That they are a bar to his Preferment and Advantage in the World.  
3. And lastly, That they obstruct him in the doing of good, both to the Souls and Bodies of other Men.   
1. It is Solomon's Observation, and more than once inculcated, though under several modes of speech, that a good name is better than the most desirable of outward blessings; whether they be such as do more immediately gratify our Senses, as precious Ointments 
* Eccl. 7.1.  do, or procure those things that gratify them, as Riches 
‖ Prov. 22.1. . What ground Solomon had so to affirm, needs not to be enquired into, when every Man's own Experience can attest the Truth thereof to him; as neither, after that Experience, what ground there is to affirm, that the loss of a good name will bring Grief to the Party that sustains it; it being easy to collect, that the loss of that cannot be without Grief, the presence whereof we do so passionately desire, and so carefully cherish when we have it. Agreeably whereunto, as there is nothing more usual, than to see Men who labour under any Reproach to pine away in their Calamity, and even refuse to enjoy those other blessings they are possessed of; so oftentimes the smart of it hath been such, that to deliver themselves from the sense of it, they have thought it worth their while to leave the World, and die. For thus, when one Petrus Ossunius 
* Thuan. Hist. sui Temporis. Tom. 2. l. 34. pag. 220.  a Man of approved Valour, had by the surprise of some panic Fear lost his Courage, and looking upon his Party as desperate, retired himself from the Battle; he contracted so great a Grief of Mind from that shameful withdrawing of himself, that all the exhortations of his Friends and Commanders could not hinder him from ending of that life by a wilful abstinence, which the shame of retiring himself made him think himself utterly unworthy of. It is true indeed, there is some difference between that Grief which ariseth from a just reproach, and that which ariseth from a falsely imputed one; because under the latter a Man hath the comfort of his own Conscience to support him, which is wanting under the imputation of the other. But as the weakness of Humane Nature suffers not Men oftentimes to make the most of that advantage, which the comfort of a Man's own Conscience gives; so it matters not, as to that good opinion which we seek, whether the Reproach we lie under be deserved or no, provided it be but believed so to be: He who is unjustly reproached, provided it be also credibly, suffering equally the loss of Men's good opinion, with those who are not undeservedly Reproached. Forasmuch therefore, as loss of Reputation cannot but bring great Grief to the Party that sustains it; forasmuch as that loss is or may be occasioned by Slanders as well as by the most just Reproaches: he who is guilty of affixing them must be looked upon as an Offender, because procuring that undeserved Evil to his Neighbour.  
2. But beside the Grief which ariseth from that, whether loss or prejudice of Reputation, which Calumnies or Slanders give; it would also be observed, that it may no less prejudice a Man in his Estate, and so offend against the Eighth Commandment as well as the Ninth. For the evidencing whereof, we shall need only to consider of those Qualifications, which either advantage or disadvantage Men, in the acquisition of this world's Conveniences: For doth it not contribute very much towards that to be accounted wise and knowing, and so fitted for the management of those Affairs, which Wealth and Advantage wait upon, and without which they are not ordinarily to be attained? Doth it not contribute alike, or more to it, to be esteemed faithful and diligent, and sincere in all we undertake? Lastly, Is it not a bar, and that justly, to have the fame of being ignorant and unfaithful? As by means of the former whereof Men are incapacitated to manage Affairs, no less than by the latter rendered unfit to be trusted with them. But how then can the Slanderer acquit himself from injuriousness, yea from robbing the Party slandered, no less of his Livelihood, than of his Reputation? For though his Slanders strike immediately at the others Reputation, yet they wound his Subsistence through the side of it, as which doth in a great measure depend upon the other.  
3. But of all the inconveniences which arise from that loss of Reputation which Calumnies or Slanders give, there is certainly none more considerable, than that they obstruct men in doing good, either to the temporal or eternal being of their Neighbour. For though men ought not so much to consider, who it is that speaks, as what is spoken; as without which men shall be chargeable with having the Faith of our Lord Jesus Christ with respect of Persons: yet experience shows, the contrary method hath prevailed, and men consider not so much what, as who; rejecting even wholesome advice, for the ill opinion they have of the party that gives it, and admitting as readily of pernicious ones, if proceeding from one that is better thought of. Of the former whereof, as the Lacedæmonians were so sensible, that when at any time a bad Man happened to give good advice, they caused it, before it was followed, to be spoken over again by a good (and it is all one as to this affair, whether a Man be really bad, or reputed such); so he must be a stranger to the World, and to the several Transactions of it, who hath not seen enough to confirm him in the latter. For what is there that gains Disciples to the Extravagances of this latter Age, but the repute of those that propugn them, for the piety and orderliness of their lives? Now forasmuch as Men are more influenced by the Reputation of their Instructors, than by the Reasonableness of their Doctrines; forasmuch as even the most wholesome advice suffers by the ill Fame of those that give it, as well as pernicious ones gain upon the world, by the good opinion is had of the Propugners; he who falsely brings up an ill Report upon any Person, shall be as injurious to that Truth, whatsoever it is, which he recommendeth, as to the Fame of the Person that disseminateth it. The Consequence whereof, though it be visible enough in the Things of the World, and particularly in matters of Public Concern (for thus we have known a most excellent Prince, not only brought into contempt with his People, by the slanderous insinuations of ambitious Men, but his most salutary Admonitions slighted and rejected, though to the ruin of those that did so, and of the State) yet is it no where more apparent than in things of Religion, and in those who have the management thereof: For let those once suffer in their good names by a slanderous tongue, and though they themselves speak with that of the most eloquent Man, or of an Angel; yet all they say shall be little regarded, and those crimes, wherewith they are, though unjustly, charged, thought a sufficient confutation of it.  
Now though what hath been said may be enough to show the Criminalness of that Falsehood we have before us; yet I must not forget to add, that it becomes not more pernicious as to those evil Consequences it produceth, than as to the irremediableness thereof. For whereas other Losses may not only be repaired, but made up with advantage, to those who have had the ill Fortune to sustain them; the loss of Reputation is such, as though it may be in some measure salved, yet can rarely, if ever, be perfectly cured: Men being apt to believe, even after the Confutation of the Slander, that it was not altogether without ground, however it might be improved by the malice of him that raised it. For beside that men are naturally inclinable to think evil of other persons, because by that means they may be encouraged to entertain a better opinion of themselves, or at least not obliged to entertain so severe a one; even they, who would not otherwise be overforward to think ill, find themselves in a manner constrained to do so, through the fear of thinking too much ill of the Reporter. For who can lightly think Men so desperately wicked, as to raise any gross Calumny, for which there is not some ground in him that is aspersed with it? It is possible indeed, such a one may have represented the Crime far greater than it really was; it may also be that he might be moved to it, more out of a design of prejudicing his Neighbour, than out of any just resentment of his miscarriage: But who, that is not alike wicked, can be so strangely uncharitable, as to think any Man would so calumniate, where there were not some real cause for it? Thus, I say, well meaning Men are apt to argue, even when they have nothing to betray them to it, but the fear of thinking too much ill of the Calumniator; how much more then, when, as for the most part, there is some colour in the calumniated persons Actions, for that Reproach wherewith he is bespattered? For though Men may be wicked enough to raise ill Reports, without any colour at all, yet they are not generally so foolish as to do it; as knowing that if they should, they might lose their end in it, because so they would not easily be believed. To all which if we add, That the Slander oftentimes reacheth thither, whither the Confutation thereof never comes; so it will be no hard matter to believe, that a Slander is a thing which cannot easily be wiped off, and which therefore ought to be reckoned among Crimes of the highest nature. In the mean time we may see, what Reason there is for the Slanderer to do all that in him lies, whether by open confession, or otherwise, to make satisfaction to the injured Party: For well may he think himself obliged to do so, who cannot well, though he would, skin over that wound which his intemperate Tongue hath made. I will conclude this particular, when I have said, That though all Slanders of what sort soever are chargeable with those inconveniences, which I have affirmed to arise from them; yet that which chargeth Men with any Defect, or Vice, is more apparently such, than that which only detracts from their real excellencies; because whilst the latter doth only lessen men's Reputation in the world, the other makes havoc of it and destroys it. I am not well resolved to affirm the same of open calumnies, in comparison of those which are secretly whispered. For though the former may bespeak a greater boldness in him that disperseth them; yet the other may proceed from a more malicious heart, and prove more pernicious in the event: Inasmuch as they spread their poison far and wide, before it comes to the notice of the party concerned, and when it doth so, leave him ignorant of the Author. By means of the former whereof, as they make the deeper impression, and so become the more difficult to be rooted out; so the slandered persons ignorance of the Author leaves him without a possibility of easing himself of his reproach, by detecting the depravedness of his accuser. Such are the sentiments which Reason and Nature suggest concerning the criminalness of slanders, and not unlike are those which the Holy Scriptures prompt us to: St. Paul, Rom. 1.29, and 30. reckoning Whisperers, and Backbiters, or (as I should rather with Grotius render the last word even 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) open Calumniators, among the most notorious offenders of the Gentiles, and such whose offences were both the product of a reprobate mind 
* See vers. 28. , and made the Committers thereof worthy of death 
† vers. 30. ib.  itself. The consideration whereof, as it ought in reason to deter us from the sin; so from partaking in any measure in it: which we shall do, if either we listen easily to slanderous reports, or lightly give credit to them, or propagate the notice of them to others: He who lends an Ear to such, encouraging the Slanderer in his practice, whilst he who lends him his Faith and Tongue goes along with him in it, because robbing the party slandered of his own good opinion first, and after that of other men's.  
Of such Falsities or Lies as strike more directly at men's Reputation, what hath been said may suffice; proceed we therefore to those which strike at their Estates, which are no other than breach of Promises or Compacts. Give me leave only (because otherwise what is to be looked upon as such cannot well appear) to premise something concerning the nature and qualifications of a Promise, and show what is or is not to be accounted a valid one. Now a Promise is nothing else than a declaration of our consent to that which is the matter of a Promise; and is either without any engagement on the part of him to whom the Promise is made, and hath the name of a Promise more particularly; or with one, and is styled a Compact. Both the one and the other of these is a part of our Enquiry, but especially the latter, as which is both of more use and necessity. In describing therefore the due qualifications of them, which is the next thing to be considered, though I will have respect to both, yet to the latter more particularly; which said, I will now go on to the indagation of them. And here in the first place I shall desire it may be considered, that forasmuch as a Promise is nothing else than a declaration of our consent; that only is to be looked upon as a valid one, which is made by those who are of sufficient capacity to understand what they consent to, and make a sensible declaration of it. By which means, the affirmations or stipulations of those who are not arrived to years of understanding, as those of Children, or such as are crazed in them, as those of Madmen, must be excluded from the number of valid ones. For Madmen and Children having not the free use of that reason, which is necessary both to the right determination of their Wills, and the due declaration of that determination unto others; neither can they be thought to be in a capacity to make any valid Promise or Compact, which requires the presence of both. I observe Secondly, That forasmuch as a Promise is nothing else than a declaration of our consent; that and that only is to looked upon as a valid one, where the matter of it is such as we have a power to determine our Wills to. By which means neither are those affirmations or stipulations to be looked upon as such, the matter whereof is contrary to the declared will of God, or the Magistrate, or other our Superiors, to all whom we are before obliged. For there being no place for the determination of the Will, where it is before determined by a Superior power: neither is there any place for Consent, which is nothing else than such a determination, and consequently neither for a Promise or Compact. It is to be observed Thirdly, and upon the score of the former definition, that neither is that to be looked upon as a valid Promise or Compact, which was founded in the error of the party that made it. For there being nothing more contrary to consent than error, because rather surprising the Will than leaving it to itself, in the free determination whereof Consent consisteth; neither is he to be looked upon as consenting to what he declares, who is drawn so to do by his own mistake, and would not have done so if he had not fallen into it. This only would be added, That when we say that that is not to be looked upon as a valid Promise or Compact, which was founded in the error of the party that made it: we understand it of such an error, as it was not in his power to have prevented. For though (as the Civil Law 
* L. Si per errorem. Dig. de Jurisdictione.  speaks) they who err do not seem to consent; yet cannot that in reason have any other interpretation, than where the error could not have been prevented: there being no doubt a man may determine his Will precipitately as well as considerately, and therefore to be looked upon as having so determined it, where he was not careful to prevent it, and having so determined it, to abide by it: An error, though it oblige not where it's perfectly involuntary, yet being of force where it is otherwise, because the subject of the erring persons choice. But as where the Promise or Compact was founded in the error of the party that made it, and such an error also as was unavoidable, I see not with what reason it can be looked upon as such, and much less as obligatory to the maker; so having said so much, I shall proceed in the fourth place to those Declarations which are extorted from us by threats and violence, and which may therefore seem to have less of the nature or obligation of Promises, than those which are drawn from us by deceit. For how can he be said to consent, who is put upon the Declaration by such a fear as may fall upon a constant man? Or what reason is there that Robbers and Pirates should reap any advantage by our promises, who break their own Faith both to God and Man? But neither will the one or other of these Considerations make the Promises to be improperly such, or of no force and obligation. Not the former, because though he who hath violence offered him, may seem not to consent, yet he really doth: as because the violence that is offered cannot reach unto his Will, which deceit and error does; so because his consent is full and absolute, the present state of things considered. For though, if the party set upon were free from his fears, he would not make a promise of paying a sum of money to him that did so; yet he would not, if he were wise, considering the danger he is in, but make such a promise to him; it being more eligible undoubtedly to redeem a man's life from danger than refuse to bind himself by a Promise, which is only disadvantageous to his Estate. But neither is it of any force as to the nulling of such a Promise, that the party that exacts it, hath by his course of life violated his own Faith both to God and Man. For though by so doing he makes himself unworthy of any benefit; yet nothing hinders but we may bestow one on him, and consequently but that having promised it we actually should. Beside, though as a Malefactor he might be spoiled of what he is already possessed of, as having forfeited those rights he sometime had; yet inasmuch as the party promising deals not with him as such, 
Vid. Grot. de Jure Belli ac pacis, li. 2. c. 11. & li. 3. c. 19  but as a Contractor bonae fidei, he doth thereby both remit of that advantage which he might otherwise have taken of him, and obliges himself to perform his own promise to him. Very apposite to this purpose is that of Nabis in 
* Livi. Hist. li. 34. pag. 36. Edit. Lugd.  Livy, when Quinctius Flaminius objected Tyranny to him, and by that means thought to free himself from the consequence of that League which he had made with him. Concerning the name of Tyrant (saith he) this I can answer, that whatever I now am, I am the same that I was when thou O Titus Quinctius enteredst into a confederation with me. Then I remember you called me King, now I see I am called a Tyrant. If therefore I had changed the name of the Government, I ought to have been accountable for my inconstancy, when you change [both my name and your own behaviour to me] there is the same reason you should give an account of yours.  
It being thus evident what is or is not to be looked upon as a valid Promise or Compact, which I have insisted so much the longer on, lest that, which is no breach of any valid Promise, should either fall under the same censure with that which is, or give countenance to the admission of it; proceed we to show wherein the criminalness of that which is the breach of a valid Promise consisteth, which the grounds before 
* See Explic. of this Commandment. Part 3.  laid down will easily discover. For a simple Promise becoming obligatory, by the hopes it gives to the party concerned of enjoying what is promised; the disappointment whereof cannot be received without grief of mind to the party disappointed, and it may be too not without prejudice to his Affairs, through the neglect the Promise may occasion in him of supplying himself some other way: the breach of such a Promise will consequently become criminal, by that grief and prejudice which a disappointment doth naturally produce. Again, Forasmuch as Humane Society cannot be maintained without a Commerce of Benefits, nor that Commerce often pass but by Promises and Compacts; because the benefits we desire of each other are not always in our present power to bestow, or not needful at the present time to the party that craves them: he that violates such Promises or Compacts shall destroy that necessary means of Commerce, and consequently also make a breach upon Humane Society, which cannot well be maintained without it. Whence it is, that though other falsities have sometime met with excuse or patronage, yet breach of Faith hath been always so exploded, that it hath not been allowed of even towards an Enemy, and from whom men were like to receive but a very ill requital for observing it. For thus when Regulus had plighted his Faith to the Carthaginians, 
Tull. de Offic. li. 3.  that he would return to them again, if he did not obtain from the Senate of Rome the deliverance of their Captives: he not only dissuaded the Senate from delivering them up, as conceiving the detaining of them to be of more advantage to his Country, than his own release, who by reason of his old age was become unuseful to it; but readily returned himself, though he could not well promise himself any other usage than he afterwards met with. And though there was not the like Faith in those Ten Roman Gentleman, who after the Battle at Cannae were sent by Hannibal to Rome, to procure the redemption of some Captives of his own; yet as it appears by the Story (though delivered with some variety) that several of them returned to the Camp of the Carthaginians, according as they had promised to do; so he of them who thought to have freed himself from that Obligation by returning back immediately after his departure, as if he had forgotten something, was by the Decree of the Senate (as Tully 
* Tull. de Officiis loco citato, & etiam li. 1. ej. tractat.  tells the Story out of Polybius) remanded back to Hannibal bound. So hateful a thing was it always adjudged, either to violate the Faith men have once given, or use any collusion in it; and not without cause, if we consider the destructiveness of it to Humane Society, or the Oath of God which is commonly affixed to it: He who violateth a Faith which is so sealed, offering no less despite to that God whom he invokes, than injury to those men whom he deceives. I will shut up this Discourse with a passage of St. Paul, which I allege to show the agreement there is in this particular as well as in all others, between the Scripture, and the light of Reason and Nature. 'Tis in the First to the Romans and the 31. where among other the gross Offenders of the Gentiles, and such whom he afterwards pronounceth worthy of death, he reckons 
* Rom. 1.31. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (i. e. exponente Hesychio) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Covenant-breakers, or such as abide not by those Compacts they have made.   

PART V.  
Concerning Officious Falsities, and that merely as such they are not allowable; because, however they may be profitable to those persons for whose advantage they are told, yet they may be pernicious to Humane Society, by rendering those external marks uncertain, whereby we are to communicate our Thoughts each to other. An enquiry thereupon, whether there be any case in which they do not render those external marks uncertain. This resolved, by pointing at some particular cases; such as are, 1. Where Officious Falsehood is allowed of by the same general consent, by which words are agreed upon as the declarers of Men's Minds. Of which number are those Falsities that are told to Children, Madmen, and sick Persons. 2. Where the Falsehood is both made use of to insinuate an useful Truth, and detected by the Vtterer, as soon as he finds it hath made way for the other. Evidences of the lawfulness of this out of Ecclesiastical Story, and from more authentic Examples in the Scripture. 3. Where the Officious Falsehood is made use of to save the life of an innocent Person. All other cases condemned as utterly unlawful; and particularly where the Falsity that is told is prejudicial to any Man: as those that are allowed, allowed only where a kind of necessity doth prompt Men to it. An objection out of Job 13.7. against Officious Falsities answered; together with a brief censure of Equivocations and mental Reservations. Those Falsities which have the name of Jesting ones more universally condemned. A Conclusion of the whole; with a short account of the Affirmative part of the Commandment.  
BEING now to give an account of the nature of Officious Falsities, the second sort of those, which I have termed Extrajudicial ones; I must desire you to call to mind, what hath been heretofore said concerning our Obligation to that Truth, which consists in the agreement of our Words, and other such like notes, with those Thoughts of ours which they were intended to express. Now that Obligation (as you may remember) I founded in that more known one, which is incumbent upon all Men, to profit each other in those several ways, whereby they are capacitated to contribute to it. For as from thence it may be easily inferred, that they are to communicate of their Conceptions each to other; because both a remedy of Solitude, which is extremely prejudicial to Humane Society, and of necessary use to direct those they have to do with in their Lives and Actions: so it will also follow, that they are both to agree of certain external marks to make known their Conceptions by; and, having so agreed of them, that they should abide by them, as without which what they speak would be uncertain to the Hearers, and consequently, neither delight nor profit them. Which one thing, if diligently heeded, will void all that difficulty, which does or may occur in the nature of Officious Falsities. For from hence it will appear, First, That the bare officiousness of a Lie can be no just pretence for the deeming of it to be lawful: Because though Officious Lies are not only not pernicious but profitable, if considered with respect to those Persons for whose advantage they are told; yet they may be pernicious to Humane Society, by rendering those external marks uncertain, by which we are to communicate our Thoughts unto each other. If therefore such Falsities, or Lies, as have the name of Officious, be in any case allowable, it must be where they do not render those external marks uncertain: which in what cases it may happen, I come now to declare. And here,  
1. In the first place, I shall no way doubt to represent as one, the telling of an Officious Falsehood, where it is allowed of by the same general consent, by which Words have been agreed upon as the declarers of men's minds; partly because an exception so founded must be looked upon as a just abatement to that of which it is so; and partly, because if any Officious Falsities be so allowed of, no Man can thence take any just occasion to call in question the meaning of those who utter them, when they speak upon other perfectly unlike occasions (which is one way of rendering those external marks uncertain) or think it any just Warrant to himself to confound those external marks, when he is called to deliver his own mind in other matters. By which account we must first separate from the number of Criminal Falsities, those that are told to Children and Madmen, to bring them to that peace and quiet, which is not for the most part otherwise to be attained. For it being allowed of by a general consent, thus to impose upon Children and Madmen for their good, I see not how it can derogate aught from the credit of those that do so, where they speak of other matters, or encourage other persons to falsify in them, which alone can render those external marks uncertain. The same is to be said of Physicians, and other Persons, who have to do with sick and peevish people, and whom therefore they must beguile into their own good, whether it be by alleviating of the Distemper they lie under, or representing the Medicament they give under some other notion than appertains to it; or lastly, (than which nothing is more common among Physicians) when they have to do with Hypochondriacal persons, by complying with their Patient's Fancies, and pretending a belief of those very Whimsies, wherewith they find their Patients overrun; for the telling of such kind of Falsities, and to such persons, being indulged by the same common consent, by which Words, and other such like notes, have been agreed upon for the declarers of men's minds, neither can the use of such Falsities be thought to invalidate their Authority in other matters, and where there is no such consent for the use of any collusion in them. Not unlike I should also think (for I will not be positive in things of this nature) is the case of those false Stories, that are commonly given out in War, to encourage our own Party, and discourage the adverse one; such as is, for Example, that a Wing of the Enemy's Army flies; or that a part of our own, on this or that side of the main Body, hath had that success which they really have not: Because as such Stories may be of use to those Parties for whose advantage they are told; so they may seem to have been allowed of by the same general consent, by which Words, and other such like external notes, have been appointed declarers of our minds.  
2. But beside that an Officious Falsity, or Lie, cannot be thought to render those marks uncertain, by which our Thoughts are to be declared, where the Falsity is allowed of by the same general consent by which those external marks, and particularly Words, have been agreed upon for the declarers of men's minds: neither can they be thought to prejudice them, secondly, where the Falsity is both made use of to insinuate an useful Truth, and detected by the Vtterer, as soon as he finds it hath made way for the other. An Instance hereof we have in Ecclesiastical Story, and one or more in the Sacred Scriptures; and in such Persons moreover, and about such Affairs, as will make the lawfulness unquestionable. The purport of the former 
* See Jer Taylor's Ductor Dubit. Book 3. Chapt. 2. Rule 5.  is, That when two Eutychian Bishops, who, believing the two Natures in Christ made but one, did consequently believe, that the Divinity or Godhead did die as well as his Humane Nature; when these, I say, came to the Court of a Sarazen Prince, he, to undeceive them of their Error, pretended great sorrow at the receipt of some Letters: Into the contents whereof when they had with some curiosity enquired, the Prince with a seeming great sorrow told them, that he had received certain intelligence, that the Archangel Gabriel was dead. They to comfort him told him, that certainly it could not be true, and for their parts they did believe it to be impossible. O Fathers, replied the Prince, can you think it to be impossible for an Archangel to die, when you affirm the Godhead of Christ did? By that Fiction of his plainly convincing them of that Error, which they had taken up concerning the Nature of our Saviour. But why do we look into Ecclesiastical History, which is less known, and less approved, when the like Instance occurs in the Sacred Scriptures, and that too both in divinely inspired Men, and in the delivery of their Message? That I mean, which it acquaints us with, concerning Nathan's address to David; and the address of one of the Sons of the Prophets to King Ahab. For though a Parable, when delivered as such, that is to say, as an Emblem of some concealed Truth, have not the nature of a Falsity; because it delivers nothing disagreeable to the mind of him that useth it, nor yet with the Custom of the World by which such forms of expression are agreed upon as declarers of it, no less than simple and natural ones; yet the like cannot be said of a Parable, when it is represented as a thing really acted, and as such endeavoured to be imposed upon the hearers: He, who so doth, speaking dissonantly both to Truth and his own Thoughts, because convinced that that was not real which he suggests as such. Which notwithstanding we shall find, that even such have been used, and upon such occasions also, as will put the lawfulness thereof past all question. For did not Nathan, when sent to David to make him sensible of his sin in the matter of Vriah's Wife; did not he (I say) upon that occasion begin a Story to David of two Men in one City, the one rich and the other poor? The former whereof, when a Traveller came to him, spared to take of his own Flocks, but took the others only Ewe-lamb, which lay in his bosom, and was unto him as a Daughter, and dressed it for the way-faring Man that was come unto him. Nay did he not all along deliver it rather as a thing really acted, than as a Parable, and so that he convinced King David of the truth of it? he immediately subjoining, in agreement with Nathan's Story, that the Person, who had so done, should restore the Lamb fourfold, according to a Provision made in that behalf by the Levitical Law. And indeed otherwise the Prophet Nathan's design might have been frustrated, in making David so sensible of his guilt: For if he had delivered it to him as a Parable, the guilty conscience of David might have been more shy in condemning the action of the rich Person, whom Nathan spoke of, lest, as it after happened, he should be forced to condemn himself. But of all the instances, which either Sacred or Profane Story suggest, concerning the telling of Falsities, to insinuate thereby some useful Truth, there is certainly none more plain, than that Story which was told by a young Prophet to Ahab, upon occasion of letting go Benhadad King of Syria; the sum of which, in short, is this: One of the Sons of the Prophets, being so instructed by God, puts on the person and guise of a Man that had been engaged in the Battle, and that he might the better appear so (for that in my opinion is the best account of that action) commands first one, and then another, by the word of the Lord to smite him, which accordingly that second did, and wounded him, as you may see 1 King. 20.35. That done (as the Story doth farther instruct us) the Prophet departeth, and having disguised himself farther, with ashes upon his face, waits for the King by the way. At length the King comes, and this concealed Prophet cries out to him, and tells him that when he went into the midst of the Battle, behold a man turned aside, and brought a Prisoner to him, and said, keep this man: if by any means he be missing, then shall thy life be for his life, or else thou shalt pay a Talon of Silver. But it happened afterwards (saith he) that whilst I was busy here and there, the man was gone, and I thereby liable to the Penalty. Than which what more apparent instance can we desire of the telling of a Falsity, thereby to insinuate some useful Truth? It appearing both from the Antecedents and Consequents, that this whole Story was not only a Fiction of the Prophets, which all Parables are; but, which makes it a perfect Falsity, represented not as the cover of some concealed Truth, but as a Truth in itself, and all the art imaginable used to make it appear so to be. Neither will it avail to say, as I find it is by some Learned Men, that it ought not to be looked upon as such, or at least not as a Lie; because the intention thereof was not to deceive, but to teach with the more elegancy and effectualness. For beside that it is to me pretty apparent from a former Discourse of the nature of Truth and Falsehood, that to deceive is no essential part of the definition of a Lie, though it be an inseparable accident of it; even this Fiction of the Prophets can no more be acquitted from the design of deceiving, than any other Officious Falsities: For though the ultimate design of it was to bring the King to the sense of his sin, in letting Benhadad go, contrary to the Command of God; yet the intermediate design of it was to deceive the King, and make him believe what he told him to be a real Truth; as without which he could not so easily have brought him to condemn his own action, in that supposed action of the Prophet. But what shall we then say, to acquit this and the like actions from being to be looked upon as a sin? Even that which was before said to acquit some others, to wit, That it was neither pernicious to the party to whom it was told, which is one ground of the Prohibition of Falsities, nor any way destructive of the significancy of those external marks, which are agreed upon as the declarers of men's minds. All pretence of that being taken away, by the Prophets immediately discovering it to be a Story, and that he had no other end in it, than to convince the King of his miscarriage: He, who not only detects the falseness of his own Story, but gives an account of the Reason he made use of it, leaving no pretence to Men to doubt of his sincere speaking in matters of another nature, nor giving any countenance to the insincerity of theirs.  
3. Lastly, As an Officious Falsity cannot be thought to prejudice the Authority and significancy of words, where it is both made use of to insinuate an useful Truth, and detected almost as soon as delivered; so I should think also, that neither will it, where it is made use of to save the life of an innocent Person: Partly because the weightiness of the occasion may both plead its excuse, and take away all pretence of violating the Truth upon less occasions; and partly, because I find the Egyptian Midwives and Rahab both commended and rewarded for that good which they procured by an untruth. For though much account be not to be made of one of Egypt or Jericho, if considered merely as such; yet are they not to be despised where they have the commendation of the Almighty, and particularly where one of them, even Rahab, is magnified both for her Faith and Works.  
These three things only seem necessary to be added, to prevent all misinterpretation of what we have said concerning some Officious Falsities. First, That we are to understand it of such Falsities as are purely Officious, and no way prejudicial to any Man: For though a Man may be allowed to advantage himself or Relations; yet not with the hurt or injury of another. By which means all those Falsities will necessarily be condemned, which are committed in Commerce between Man and Man; whether it be that of private Men between one another, as in Contracts and Bargains; or of Princes and States in Leagues. He, who useth any Falsity in that, at the same time he advantageth himself, doing an injury to him he dealeth with. Upon which account, though in that sense, wherein Sir Henry Wotton used it, it was a very allowable definition of an Ambassador, that he was a Person sent abroad to lie for the benefit of his Prince; yet is there certainly nothing, which is more unbecoming their Employment, or more scandalous to their respective Princes and Religion. I admonish secondly, That when I say there may be cases wherein an Officious Falsehood may be lawful, it will equally follow, and therefore alike to be observed, that out of those cases all Falsehoods, how officious soever, must be concluded to be unlawful. And indeed as those cases are not many, wherein an Officious Falsehood can be supposed to be lawful, so neither can they give Men any pretence to falsify in other matters; the only cases wherein they are lawful, being (as hath been at large declared) where they are allowed of by general consent, where they are made use of to insinuate some useful Truth, and detected as soon as it is; or to save the life of an innocent person. Lastly, I shall desire it may be considered, That as those, who have spoken the most favourably of Officious Falsities, have represented them as such things as have something of Hellebore in them; so like that, and other things of the same dangerous nature, they ought, even in the most allowed instances, to be used sparingly, and with discretion; and rather where there is a kind of necessity to prompt men to it, than when they may be avoided; especially considering the severe and general condemnation of Falsities in the Doctrine of the 
* See Prov. 13.5.— 30.8. Psal. 5.6. Col. 3.9.  Scripture, and the prejudice that may thereby accrue unto Religion, and particularly to sincerity and Truth: For though all Falsities are not criminal, yet they look so like those that really are, that they may tempt unwary Men, either to make a mock of Truth, or run upon any Falsity of what nature soever, which may be of any advantage to themselves.  
I will conclude this head, when I have returned an answer to that which is objected out of Job chap. 13.7. Will you speak wickedly for God, or talk deceitfully for him? An Exception indeed specious enough, and so much the more, for the Inference that seems naturally to flow from it: For if we may not talk deceitfully for God, and his Glory, as that Question doth manifestly import; then certainly not for any inferior end, and much less for the saving of a life. But beside that he who shall consider that Speech of Zophar's, to which this is an Answer, will find the deceitful speaking here meant to be no other, than the robbing of Job of his integrity, that so God might be justified in his proceed against him, which is in the number of those Pernicious Lies, which I have shown to be universally unlawful; though nothing else should be meant thereby than an Officious Falsity, yet will it not thence follow, that because we may not talk deceitfully for God, and for his Glory, therefore neither may we for the saving of an innocent person: He who talks deceitfully for any thing, tacitly insinuating that it may stand in need of it; which though a Reproach to the Almighty (because arguing something of weakness in him) yet none at all to Man, because naturally weak, and made much more so by the fall of our first Parents. These things indeed (as Grotius 
* De jure belli ac pacis. l. 3. c. 1.  observes) do not please the School of latter Ages, as which hath chosen S. Augustine of all the Ancients to be followed by them in all things. But the same School hath admitted  Interpretations and Reservations, so abhorring from all common sense, that it may very well be doubted, whether it were not much better to admit of speaking falsely in the cases before mentioned, than so indiscriminately to exempt them from it; as when they say I know not, understanding in their mind, so as to tell you; or I have not such a thing, meaning to give or lend to you; and other such like Reservations, which common sense rejects, and which if they be admitted, nothing hinders, but he, who affirms any thing, may be said to deny it, and he who denys, to affirm it. The result of which Discourse is, That by whatever softer name the Masters of that Art may call those their Equivocations, they are no other than Falsities, or Lies, as expressing that in Words, which is no way agreeable to the Speakers Thoughts, and which therefore they are forced to piece out with interpretations in their minds. Neither will it avail to say, as it is by the Masters of that Art, That an Address to God may be no less true, which is made up in part by the expressions of the Tongue, and in part with the conceptions of the Mind; as for Example, if a rich Man should say in any private Address of his, Thou knowest, O God, how poor and miserable I am, and understand in his mind, as to the qualifications of his Soul. For though in our Addresses to God it be all one as to Truth or Falsehood, whether we speak out the whole, or a part only, because our Thoughts are no less knowable to him than our Words; yet among Men, to whom the Thoughts of our hearts cannot be known, but as they are manifested by our Words, or other such like notes, the Truth or Falsehood 
* Sanderson De Juramenti Obligatione. Praelect. 6. Sect. 6.  of them is in Reason to be estimated by those things only, which can declare our conceptions to the Hearers. Which since those Reservations, which are in the Mind, cannot do; in judging of the Truth of any Speech, account is to be made of those things only that are expressed, and not of mental Reservations.  
Of Pernicious and Officious Falsities, what hath been said may suffice; proceed we therefore to such as have the name of Jesting ones: By which Title I mean not all Fictions of the brain, which are devised to delight; for so all Parables of the Scripture are, and though not invented for delight only, yet to delight as well as profit. But I mean such Fictions, as are represented as real Truths, contrary to the mind and knowledge of the Utterer. Now concerning these much need not be said, to show them to be generally unlawful, and as such to be eschewed and avoided; as because the observation of Truth is of much more concernment, than our delight; so because the Scriptures of the New Testament have not only imposed upon us the simplicity of the Dove 
* Matt. 10.16. , that guileless Creature, but moreover forbidden to us the speaking of a vain 
‖ Matt. 12.36.  or idle word. If there be any case wherein these kind of Falsities are allowable, it must be where they are in a manner detected as soon as told, and neither our own sincerity made liable thereby to exception, nor the signification of those external marks, by which we are to communicate our Thoughts to each other, brought into uncertainty with the World. That of S. Paul shall put an end to this Argument, and the Negative part of the Commandment, Ephes. 4.25. Wherefore putting away Lying, speak every man Truth with his Neighbour, for we are members one of another. All Pernicious Lies being simply and universally unlawful; all Officious ones, unless in those few cases before excepted; and all Jesting one's, unless in the case but now mentioned, if yet that may be excepted out of the number.  
And here a fair opportunity is ministered to me, 
Affirmative part of the Commandment.  of entering upon the Affirmative part of the Commandment, which I shall gladly embrace, though in the close, as you see, of this Discourse; because I have in a great measure dispatched it already, as knowing not well how to entreat of the other without it. Where, first of all, I shall represent, because Judicial Matters are principally referred to, the doing what in us lies to advantage a just Cause; which that love, in which our Saviour sums up this and other the Precepts of the Second Table, doth manifestly require. Now this a Witness will do, yea cannot otherwise discharge himself of the tye of love, if he voluntarily present himself to attest his knowledge, where either the matter in debate requires it, or he can think it will be acceptable to the party concerned: If when thus presenting himself, or called to it by others, he shall duly recollect himself, that so he may omit no material part of his Evidence. Lastly, if, having thus recollected himself, he clearly and fully declare it, and speak the truth, and the whole truth, as well as nothing contrary to it. The Plaintiff shall do his duty, if he shall prefer only such Enditements as are true and material, and prosecute them with candour and moderation; as the Defendant his, if he shall own justly imputed Crimes (particularly in matter of Estate) and fence only against such as he is falsely aspersed with. The Advocate shall fulfil his part, if he espouse just, or at least probable Causes, and prosecute them with that fairness and civility, which becomes men and Christians, and particularly that awful Assembly before which he speaks. As the Judge his, if he lend a patiented ear to the Evidence that is given, help out and encourage weak but honest Witnesses, and narrowly sift crafty and reserved one's: if, having so done, he shall duly weigh all circumstances, and, if that be all he hath to do (as in our Common-Law Courts it is) recapitulate the whole, and deliver his own sense clearly and impartially. The Jury shall do their part, if, after a like serious consideration of the matter in debate, they shall guide themselves in their Verdict by the opinion of the Judge in matter of Law, and by the Evidence that is given as to matter of Fact. In fine, those, to whom the power of Registering is committed, theirs, if they shall faithfully record the Sentence, that is passed upon the whole by the Judge; as they, and all others to whom the power of the execution of it belongs, if they set their helping hand to a speedy, and faithful, and full execution of it. All which Duties I have thus shortly laid together, without the addition of their respective Proofs; partly because they carry their own conviction in their foreheads; and partly because those that seem to stand in need of any, have already had them in the foregoing Discourses; to which therefore it is but reasonable to refer you.  
From Judicial Matters pass we to Extrajudicial ones, where agreeably to those several Falsities, which I have shown to be forbidden in the Negative, our Duty, as well as the Affirmative part of the Commandment, must be to prosecute those Truths that are contrary to them; particularly, that whereas Pernicious Lies strike at our Neighbour's Reputation or Estate, we, on the contrary, in compliance with that Truth which is opposite to them, should endeavour to advantage him in both, as the Precept of Love doth manifestly enjoin. To advantage him in his Reputation, by giving him his due commendation, by ascribing to him those Parts, or Virtues, or Endowments, which he is really possessed of; and remembering them, where ere we come, with all the expressions of respect and honour. To advantage him again in his Reputation, by taking off those Calumnies wherewith he is aspersed, and showing the either falseness or improbability thereof. To advantage him in his Estate, by a religious observation of our own Promises or Compacts; or, by causing those of others to be strictly and faithfully observed. To have a regard to Truth in our Discourses with our Neighbour, even when the contrary thereof may be advantageous to ourselves and others, unless it be in such cases, where the common consent of mankind, the saving of an innocent persons life, or a speedy detection of the falsehood licenseth a departure from it. But above all, that we intent the prosecution of Truth above our own mere delight, and against the temptation of those baits, which the pleasure of imposing upon others giveth. Truth, as it is a Duty which is owing to our Neighbour's Understanding, no less than  is to his Will from ours; so being the foundation of all pleasurable and useful Commerce, the band of Societies, and of those several Compacts by which they are confederated, and in fine, the fulfilling of this Commandment.    

THE TENTH COMMANDMENT.  
THE TENTH COMMANDMENT.  
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife, nor his servant, nor his maid, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is his.  

PART I.  
The Contents.  
That the Commandment we have now before us is not two but one, as also that it strikes not at those first stir or motions of Sin which we call Concupiscence, but at the coveting of that which is the property of another. By which account the Negative part of the Commandment is resolved to be, The not coveting of that which is another, as the Affirmative, The contenting ourselves with that which is our own. An address to a general explication of the former, where is shown that the thing forbidden to be coveted, is any thing of our Neighbours, how small or inconsiderable soever; as also that the Covetousness which is prohibited, is not such an one as includes in it a desire or resolution to use unlawful means to compass the object of it, but such as abideth in the Mind, or at least doth not prompt it to the other. An Objection out of Mark 10.19. answered. A more particular explication of the Negative part of the Commandment, where is shown that all coveting of that which is another's  not forbidden, but either 1. Such as is peccant in the Object; of which nature are the coveting of such things as are not lawful for the Proprietor to part with, as his Wife; or cannot be quitted by him without disadvantage; or are the object of his affection no less than of ours. Or 2. Such covet as are peccant in their quality. Of which number are those Covet that are not with submission to the will both of God and the Proprietor, that are not accompanied with a like desire of gratifying our Neighbour, or breed perturbation in us. The criminalness of these and such like Covet their implying a dissatisfaction with the Divine Providence which hath bestowed what we covet upon another.  
IT being sufficiently known, that, to blend the Second Commandment with the First, the Patrons of Image-worship have divided this Commandment into two; I made it my business, in my entrance upon the Second, to show the unreasonableness of this Division, as well as of that conjunction or confusion. To which therefore all I shall now add is, that as they who divide this Commandment into two, might with as much reason divide it into more, even into as many as there are things which are forbidden in it to covet; the formal reason of the prohibition being one and the same in all, even the propriety thereof being vested in another: so St. Paul in two places of his Epistle 
* Rom. 7.7.— 13.9.  to the Romans sets it down in those general terms of, Thou shalt not covet, and so makes it but one Commandment. If there be any force in the repeating of the word covet, which some it seems, though unadvisedly enough, have laid some stress upon; it might be rather to show the earnestness of the Lawgiver in forbidding them, than to prompt men to look upon the covetousness there decried, as distinct prohibitions of the Almighty.  
The way being thus cleared to the Explication of the Commandment, proceed we to the subject matter of it; the purport whereof is commonly conceived to be the prohibition of those first motions or stir of sin, which we call Concupiscence, arising in the sensual appetite (corrupted by Adam 's Fall, as all other the faculties of the Soul are) before any actual deliberation of the Understanding thereabout, or actual consent of the Will thereunto. But beside, that there is no necessity (as Dr. Sanderson 
* Serm. on Phil. 4.11. Part. 1.  hath well observed) for the affixing of such a sense to it, because those motions or stir, supposing them sinful, are aptly enough referrable, according to their respective objects, to those several Commandments wherein they are forbidden; the general reason of the Commandment, and the place it hath in the Decalogue, oblige rather to understand it of the not coveting of that, the property whereof is vested in another. For the Commandment being in the number of those which regard our duty to our Neighbour, and moreover, as appears both by the whole contexture of it, and the last clause in it, desinged by the Giver of it, to take men off from the desire of that which is another's; it is in reason to be construed of such irregular desires, as become so rather upon the Object upon which they are fixed, than by that corrupt Fountain from which they flow. Upon which account (as the same Learned Man 
† Sanderson. ibid.  hath observed) the words of the Author to the Hebrews, chap. 13. 5. may serve for a short, but full Commentary upon this last Commandment, both in the Negative and affirmative part thereof. Let your conversation be without covetousness, the Negative, and be content with such things as you have, the Affirmative. In the mean time, though I thus departed from the received explication of the Commandment, in obedience to a greater Authority, even that of Reason as well as of our own Church, which delivers 
* Church Catechism Answer to— What is thy duty towards thy Neighbour— Not to covet or desire other men's goods, but to learn, etc.  the selfsame explication; yet I shall not fail to consider of the thing itself, when I come to entreat of Original sin, which will fall in pertinently enough in the Discourse of that Sacrament, which was intended for its expiation and its cure.  
Now there are two things in the Negative part of the Commandment, 
Negative part.  which will require a general explication before I descend to a more particular one; the due importance of the object which the Commandment forbids us to covet, and the general nature of that Covetousness which it condemns. Of the first of these much need not be said, if we consider either that general clause in the end of the Commandment, or that account which is given of it in the parallel place of Deuteronomy. For though the Commandment we have now before us specify only our Neighbour's House, Wife, Servant, Maid, Ox and Ass; yet, as that parallel place in Deuteronomy adds also the coveting of his Field, as well as of those other things before mentioned; so both the one and the other annex the coveting of any thing that is our Neighbours, which will comprehend within the compass of it, the coveting of his Farm, his Office, his Honour, yea of the most inconsiderable things which appertain to him: Whether it be (as the Ellipsis 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Intelligendum enim 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ut maneat eadem constructio per Accusativum— Grot. in Decalog.  in the Septuagint version of this Commandment intimates) any portion of his Ox, Ass, or other , or that which is yet more inconsiderable than they, according to that of the Greek Poet, 
— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,  Let not thy desires extend themselves even to the Needle of another; or as it is in the Greek Comedy, to that thread which is in it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Grot. ibid.  The greatness or smallness of the thing coveted, making no more difference as to the nature of the desire, than the same greatness or smallness of the thing stolen doth in the nature of the theft, but only as to the aggravation and punishment of it. Which last piece of Morality, as many others, is thus excellently expressed by Horace 
* Epist. li. 1. ep. 16. , 
Nam de mille fabae modiis, cum surripis unum,  
Damnum est, non facinus, mihi pacto lenius isto.  From the Object which we are here forbidden to covet, pass we to the consideration of the general nature of that Covetousness which we are under an obligation to avoid. By which may be meant, either such a Covetousness as includes in it a desire, and resolution to get from another that which is his by any fraudulent or unjust courses; or such an one as proceeds no farther than a bare desire, without any actual intention to make it ours by unlawful means. But as I have already shown the former of these to appertain to the Eighth Commandment, by the same reason that Anger and a lustful look or desire are by our Saviour reduced to those, wherein Murder and Adultery are forbidden, and consequently have determined the Covetousness which is here forbidden, to be no other than that which abideth in the mind, or at least doth not prompt the party to any violent or fraudulent courses; so I know nothing which can render that sense in any measure questionable, unless it be that of St. Mark, chap. 10. 19 where bringing in our Saviour repeating the Commandments of the Second Table, after the mention of Do not commit Adultery, do not kill, do not steal, do not bear false witness; he adds, Defraud not or deprive not, as if that, or at least the purpose of it, were the genuine sense of the Tenth Commandment in whose place it seems to be fixed. But beside that a single expression, so different from what this Commandment is commonly conceived in, ought not lightly to give Law to more usual expressions, and such as are agreed upon to be more suitable to the sense of the Commandment; beside that the words we render, Defraud not, are wanting in some Greek Copies, as is evident from the various readings in the end of the Biblia Polyglotta; I am apt to believe that the words Defraud not, however subjoined to the Ninth Commandment, were not intended as an account of the Tenth, but rather as an additionary explication of the Ninth, or to comprehend within the compass of it all injuries not before expressed, but which are elsewhere plainly enough forbidden. And this I am the rather induced to think, first, because St. Matthew 
* chap. 19 16. , who repeats the same passage of our Saviour, takes no notice at all of the Tenth Commandment, and secondly, because that passage of St. Mark is no proper explication of it, as which is agreed upon both by Jews and Christians to strike at the desires of the heart, which may be inordinate enough, where no actual defrauding of our Neighbour follows. Neither will it avail to say, That he, who hath a desire and purpose to defraud, is in the construction of Christianity a Defrauder; by the same rule that he who looks upon a Woman to lust after her, is by our Saviour reputed an Adulterer. For the Question is not what is the Construction of Christianity, but what was the clear and declared purport of the Law, concerning which our Saviour is there speaking, and what is the most probable notion of the words, Defraud not, here. Now forasmuch as it doth not appear, that the Law, though it condemned inordinate desires, yet represented those inordinate desires under the same title with the act that commonly follows them, as it is plain Christianity doth; forasmuch as the most probable notion of the words Defraud not, is, do not actually do so; because both the proper notion of the words, and most agreeable with those other Prohibitions before mentioned, which strike only at inordinate actions: I conclude, that the words Defraud not, are not to be looked upon as an account of the Tenth Commandment, but either as an additionary Explication of the Ninth (Defrauding being one principal end of bearing False Witness,) or to comprehend within the compass of it, all Injuries not before expressed, but which are elsewhere plainly enough forbidden. Which notion will be rendered yet more probable, if (as Grotius observes in his Notes on Mat. 19.16.) the Greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 comprehend all those Injustices, which come not properly under the names of Adultery, Murder, Stealing, and bearing False Witness: Even (as the same Grotius doth there remark) all those Crimes, which among the Latins have no proper name, are comprehended under the title of Stellionatus and dolus malus. All which things I have insisted so much the longer on, because that Text, to which they are intended as an Answer, seems to me to require one; and because I have not had the fortune, to see any thing satisfactory returned to it, by the many Commentators of S. Mark. The result of the Premises is this, That though the Coveting of another's Goods, with an intention of compassing them by unlawful means, be also a sin, and much greater than that which rests in the mind, or at least doth not prompt the covetous person to the taking of any unlawful courses; yet the latter of these is the thing forbidden by this Commandment, and therefore alone to be particularly considered by us.  
For my more advantageous performance whereof, I will inquire, 

1. Whether all Coveting, or Desiring, of that which is another's, is here forbidden. Or,  
2. If not, what Coveting or Desiring is: And,  
3. Lastly, Wherein the Criminalness thereof consisteth.    
1. That all coveting, or desiring of that which is another Man's is not here forbidden, will appear, if we consider, first, the consequences of such a supposition, if it should be indiscriminately admitted. For is not all Commerce between Man and Man founded in the desire of that which is another's? And if so, must not all Commerce between Man and Man cease, if all desire of that which is another's were forbidden? But how then can any Man in Reason think all Coveting forbidden, though it be of that which is the Property of another? For take away all Commerce, and neither shall he, who enjoys the desired benefit, have wherewithal to make his life comfortable; nor he who desires it his: No Man being generally so happy as to have all that his necessities require; that I say not, no Company of Men or Nation. The great Lord of the World having for the most part so ordered it, that that Land which abounds in some sorts of useful things, should be as much straitened as to others; thereby both to engage them to seek each others profit, and give them an opportunity to procure it. Now forasmuch as without Commerce, no Person or Nation could be happy, even by the disposition of the Almighty; to exclude all desire of that which is another's, upon which all Commerce is founded, must needs be looked upon as very incongruous, and therefore much less forbidden by that God, who hath made Commerce necessary, and consequently that desire upon which it is founded. But neither, secondly, will the inconvenience be less, if we consider this desire with respect to those Commands, which God hath laid upon us, to earn our living by the sweat of our brows, or the exercise of our several more noble parts and abiliments. For are all Men who are thus enjoined to labour, furnished with such a proportion of Ground, as will, if duly cultivated, afford them a subsistence? Or are even those that are, furnished with all those Instruments, which are necessary for the cultivation of it? But how then can they procure their own happiness, without endeavouring to procure the things of others? Or how endeavour that, without desiring them? All endeavours arising from the desire and hope of that, which Men employ their endeavours to procure. In fine, take away all desire of that which is another's, and you must also take away, I do not say only, all desire or endeavour to raise a Man's self a Fortune (which yet no Man hath ever esteemed unlawful) but all desire or endeavour to do things noble and honourable; because as the Rewards of these are those which spur Men on to them, so they are for the most part in the Property of another. But beside the inconveniences that attend such a supposition, as makes all desire of that which is another's here forbidden; it would also be considered, that all desire of that which is another's, is no way destructive of that advantage of our Neighbour, which this, as well as the other Commandments of the second Table, oblige us to procure: For what if I desire that of him, which however advantageous to myself, yet is, it may be, not only of no use to him, but prejudicial to him to retain? As if, for example, I should desire of him some of those Fish, wherewith I find his Ponds to be overstockt. Then certainly I shall be so far from desiring the prejudice of my Neighbour, that on the contrary I may do him a signal pleasure in it, were it only by giving him an opportunity of doing a beneficent action, and so advantaging him in the other World, even without any loss to him as to this. Again, what if I desire that, which, though not without all use to him, yet is it may be not of so much use, as the thing which I propose in exchange for it? Nay, what if I desire that of him, which is not only less useful to, but less desirable by him, than that boon which I propose in exchange for it? Here certainly, there is not only no shadow of prejudice in my desire, but the manifest footsteps of benevolence and advantage; and I do no less gratify his desires, than satiate my own. And indeed, as Tertullian 
* Ad Martyras. c. 2. Et si aliqua amisistis vitae gaudia, negotiatio est aliquid amittere, ut majora lucreris.  spoke not amiss, when, to comfort Men against the loss of this World's Conveniences, he told them, that it was not so much a misfortune, as a traffic, when they only parted with this World's conveniences, to procure to themselves more noble and lasting ones; so he did at the same time show both the lawfulness and usefulness of Commerce, and of those desires of each others Properties, whereupon all Commerce is founded. For whilst Men do thus covet the Goods of each other, they procure each others happiness, and though both Losers in some sort, yet are both equally Gainers; and, which is more, with the goodwill of each other.  
2. It being thus evident, That all desire of that which is another's, is not only not unlawful, but sometimes allowable, and consequently not within the compass of the Prohibition; proceed we to inquire what coveting or desiring is, which I shall judge of both by the Object and the Desire itself. In respect of the former whereof, that Covetousness or Desire must be looked upon as unlawful,  
1. Which extends itself to such things, as by the Laws of God or Man, are not permitted to the Proprietor to part with. I instance for the former of these, in the Desire of another Man's Wife, which is one of those things which are expressly forbidden in this Commandment. For Man and Wife being bound to each other, not only by mutual Compact, but by the Institution of the Almighty, which hath so joined them together, as not to be divided, even with their own consent; there will arise from thence both an unlawfulness in the married parties, to part with their mutual right, and a like unlawfulness in another to desire it: He who so desires, either desiring the death of the other parry, which is contradictory to the Law of Love; or the reversing of the Divine Institution, which is a direct opposition to the Almighty. In like manner, if any should Covet or Desire that House, or Land, which the Proprietor thereof, either by his Parents, or other Superiors is forbidden to part withal, he shall thereby fall into an inordinate Desire; because consequently desiring the violation of those Commands, whereby he is forbidden to enjoy it.  
2. But because though the things before mentioned cannot lawfully be quitted by the Owners, and therefore neither reasonably desired, yet there are other things that may be; therefore I shall add in the second place, That our Desire of that which is another's may also become unlawful, if, though it extend not itself to such things as are unlawful to be parted with, yet it extend itself to such, as cannot be quitted by the owner, without disadvantage: He, who desires any thing of that nature, consequently desiring the prejudice of his Neighbour, which is destructive of that love, which we are by the Laws of Nature, no less than those of God, obliged to have for him. By which rule all those desires must be concluded to be unlawful, which are not attended with a desire and resolution of making a full compensation for the object of them, unless it be in the matter of Alms; to which, as I have before shown the necessitous person to have a right, so the giving thereof is not disadvantageous, because by the Divine Promise, both to the temporal and eternal advantage of the Giver. But neither,  
3. Thirdly shall I stick to affirm, That all those Covet or Desires are to be looked upon as alike unlawful, which settle themselves upon such Properties of our Neighbour; as, however not disadvantageous to the owners thereof to part with, yet are the object of his affection, and it may be too more than of our own. For beside that the Covetous person himself would not easily be induced to part with that which is the object of his own, of which he gives no slight indication in desiring that which is thus the object of another's: he, who desires any thing which is thus the Object of his Neighbour's affection, desires the prejudice of the Owner; because desiring that, which he cannot part with without a prejudice to his content. And though I know the Owners themselves may be peccant this way, in refusing to procure a great and real advantage to their Neighbour, with the loss of a fanciful one to themselves; yet that hinders not the covetous person from being inordinate in his Desires, by suffering them to six themselves upon it: As because the thing he desires is the Property of his Neighbour, so which being so cannot be transferred to him without the free consent of the present Proprietor, which is not likely to be had where such an affection precedes.  
From those Desires which are peccant in the Object, pass we to those which are peccant in themselves; such as are,  
1. First, All those that are not with submission to the Will both of God and the Proprietor. The former, because they are a direct opposition to his Will, to whom all created Being's ought to be subject, by virtue of that Being which they receive from him: The latter, because an entrenchment upon our Neighbour's Property, so far as the Desire of Man can be one. For that, which is the Property of our Neighbour, being so his as not to be transferred, without the Will of the Party in whom it is vested; he who desires any thing of his, without submission to his Will, must consequently entrench upon it in his Desires.  
2. I place in the same rank, even of such Desires as are peccant in themselves, those that are not accompanied with a like Desire of gratifying our Neighbour, if he should desire the same or a like favour from us; such a Desire being apparently contrary to that most equitable Rule, which commands us to do to others as we would be done by ourselves. But so also do I reckon,  
3. Such Desires of our Neighbour's Goods, as breed perturbation in us, and will not suffer us to intent, as we ought, the Duties of Religion, or of our own Profession, nor enjoy that repose and quiet which is necessary for us; these, beside the prejudice they bring both to our spiritual and eternal welfare, arguing a dissatisfaction with the Divine Providence for bestowing those blessings upon others, which we but in vain desire. I place not under the same head, though Desires far more inordinate, those that prompt Men to make use of unlawful means to compass them; partly because they are breaches of the Eighth Commandment; and partly because I have there accounted for them already. This only would be added, That though inordinate Desires may contain themselves within, or at least may not presently put Men upon the use of unlawful means to compass them; yet they seldom fail, where they are cherished, to spur the party on to use fraud or violence to compass them. Of which, if we wanted other Instances, that of Ahab might suffice, after he had taken a fancy to Naboth's Vineyard: For though at first that fancy of his put him only upon Entreaties and Proposals, and such as were not only very reasonable in themselves, but in all probability would have prevailed, if they had met with a Man less obstinate than Naboth; though after that, and Naboths flat denial of his Request, they went no further than a sullen and melancholy behaviour, which however taken up to gratify a discontented mind, yet serves only to add more affliction to the party that espouseth it: yet when a malicious Jezebel had put him in mind of being a King, and of that liberty or licentiousness which that glorious Name seems to challenge; then, I say, he could so far gratify his own inordinate Desires and Jezebels malicious mind, as to permit her to seal Letters in his Name, to the Elders of Naboth's City, to accuse him first of Blasphemy against God and himself, and after that to stone him to death, that so his Vineyard might escheat to the Crown. All which whosoever shall consider, will see Reason enough to set bounds to his Desires, though at first they proceed no farther; because, as all Vice stands upon a precipice, so the inordinate Desires of Men more particularly do seldom fail to hurry them into the use of the most unlawful means, to compass the Object of them. Which said, nothing remains to do, but to show,  
3. In the third place, The Criminalness of those Desires, which I have affirmed to be forbidden by the Commandment. But as I knew not well how to point out those inordinate Desires, without showing also wherein that inordinacy consisteth, by which means I have upon the matter prevented myself in that Argument, which comes now in order to be discoursed of; so having so done, I shall only add, That the Criminalness thereof may be easily collected from what I have before said, concerning the Criminalness of Stealth, and other the like ways of encroaching upon our Neighbour's Property. For though he, who only Covets his Neighbour's Property, do not actually encroach upon it, nor disturb that order which I have shown God to have instituted at first, and ever since to have approved both by his Providence and his Laws; yet he bewrays a manifest dissatisfaction with it, and a Will no less opposite to it, than the Actions of the injurious person are. Which however in Humane Judicatories without the imputation of a crime, because the motions of the Will are neither prejudicial to that outward policy which they are to maintain, nor knowable by them though they were; yet at the Bar of God and Nature they are alike, or more criminal than our outward Actions, if they are also alike opposite to the Laws of God. For whilst the thieving Hand moves only as it is guided by the Will, and is rather the Instrument of another's malice, than the Executioner of its own; the Will determines itself to those unlawful objects upon which it fixeth, and chooseth those inordinacies into which it falleth.   

PART II.  
The Affirmative part of the Commandment, The contenting ourselves with that which is our own; upon occasion whereof enquiry is made into the nature of Contentment, which is defined to be an Acquiescency of the Mind in that portion of outward things we are possessed of upon a persuasion of its being sufficient for us. This definition allotted both a general and a particular explication, and evidenced to be true in every branch of it. An account of the grounds of our obligation to Contentment, which are shown to be 1. The Will of the Almighty declared by the disposition of his Providence. 2. God's both knowing better than we ourselves what condition is fittest for us, and his readiness to allot it. 3. The sufficiency of our own portion. The means whereby this excellent virtue may be attained. A sober use of abundance at all times, and sometimes a voluntary abstinence. The consideration of our own Vileness, and particularly of our past Excesses, as in like manner of our own portions being better than many others who are not otherwise inferior to us. An enumeration of several other means which are alike conducible to it, and particularly of such as are purely Religious. Of which nature are, The assurances God hath given us of supporting us under our condition, or delivering us out of it, or making it advantageous to us. The promises of a better life, and Prayer. The Conclusion.  
OF the negative part of the Commandment, what hath been said may suffice; 
Affirmative part.  proceed we now to the Affirmative one, said by us (and not without reason) to be no other than what the Author to the Hebrews adviseth, chap. 13.15. And be content with such things as ye have: This as it is directly opposite to the coveting of our Neighbour's Goods, so being manifestly employed in the prohibition of it; he who is forbidden to covet another's goods, being eo ipso obliged to be contented with his own, because there is no Medium between them. Taking it therefore for granted, that to be contented with such things as we have, is the thing enjoined in this Commandment, I will make it my business to show, 

1. Wherein the nature of Contentment doth consist.  
2. What the grounds of its obligation are. And  
3. Lastly, By what means it is to be attained.    
1. Now though what Contentment is, be not difficult to define, even from the common acceptation of it in the world; though being so, it might therefore suffice to dispatch our account of it in a few words, as which to men not willing to be deceived would serve to unfold the nature of it: Yet because I have observed that they who seem well enough informed about the nature of it in Thesi, do yet in Hypothesi, and when they come to make application of it to themselves, willingly err in the apprehension of it; I purpose to be more particular in the unfolding of its nature, than otherwise I should think myself obliged. In order whereunto I will first give you a short definition of it, and when I have done so, both explain it and draw it down to particulars.  
Now Contentment is nothing else than an acquiescency of the Mind in that portion of outward things we are possessed of, upon a persuasion of its being sufficient for us. I call it an acquiescency of the Mind, because experience shows it so to be, both as to that Mind to which we have attributed it, and that acquiescency thereof, which we have affirmed it to import; Content by whatsoever it be occasioned, yet having its seat in the Mind, and quieting the desires of it. I call it an acquiescency of the Mind in that portion of outward things we are possessed of, partly to intimate that there must be generally some portion of outward things to beget it, and partly to show that whatsoever that portion is, whether high or low, it is equally the object of it. For the proof of the former whereof we shall need to go no farther than that of St. Paul, 1 Tim. 6.8. for exhorting men to contentment, though they have no other than Food and Raiment, he giveth us thereby to understand, 
* Hooker Eccl. Pol. li. 1. sect. 10.  that those are generally necessary to the procuring of it; that destitution in them is such an evil as, till it be removed, suffereth not the mind of man to be at quiet. Again, though some portion of outward things be absolutely necessary to beget it, or at least is generally so; yet whether high or low is not material, because both are the object of it: As is evident, both from the former Text which commands us having Food and Raiment therewith to be content: and another place of the same Apostle, Phil. 4.11, 12. where he not only affirms himself to have learned in whatsoever state he was therewith to be content; but adds moreover, as a proof and illustration of the former, that he knew both how to be abased, as well as how to abound, to be hungry, as well as to be full, and in fine, to suffer need, as well as to enjoy the contrary affluence. I know not whether I should add, because sufficiently employed in the former considerations; that Contentment, about whatsoever it is conversant, is still about that which is present; St. Paul's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the place before quoted, and the Author to the Hebrews exhorting to be content, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 chap. 13. 5. being an abundant evidence thereof. Though were neither the one nor the other convictive, the necessity of being contented with our own, would infer the being contented also with the present, because nothing can be truly said to be our own but that which is so. Lastly, as Contentment is an acquiescency in that portion of outward things which is present to us; so it doth also include in it as the ground of that acquiescency, a persuasion of its being sufficient for us: this being manifestly implied in those phrases 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Hesy. Idem sensus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quod alibi usurpatur.  of the New Testament, whereby Contentment is expressed.  
But because, even thus we cannot satisfy ourselves perfectly concerning the nature of Contentment, there being place for enquiry how far that acquiescency we speak of is to be extended, and wherein limited; I will once more run over the definition of Contentment, and draw it down to more particular considerations. For be it that Contentment is an acquiescency of the Mind, according as was before defined; yet is it such an acquiescency as excludes all desires or endeavours of mending that mean condition we are in? If so, farewel to all Industry and Providence, which yet no man hath ever esteemed unlawful; yea farewel to those Divine Promises, which, to encourage men to be content with the present, give them hopes of Gods bringing them out of their straits: He who gives hopes of amending our Condition, forbidding us not to desire it, but on the contrary rather encouraging us both to desire and endeavour it. And yet if there be place for such desires and endeavours, how can the contented man of whom we speak, be said to acquiesce or rest in his present portion? for how can he be said to quiet his desires in the present, who is ever extending them beyond it? Both which Horns of this Dilemma are thus excellently expressed by Horace 
* Epist. li. 1. Epist. 17.  in the person of the Cynic Philosopher, 
Si pranderet olus patienter, regibus uti  
Nollet Aristippus. Si sciret regibus uti,  
Fastidiret olus—  If (saith he) Aristippus could content himself with a dinner of Herbs, he would not certainly endeavour to ingratiate himself with Princes, and thereby to amend his fortune: And if he could compass his ends upon them, no doubt he would despise his former fare, which shows he was not before very well satisfied with it. For the reconciling of which two together, and thereby the discovering yet more fully the nature of Contentment, I shall desire it may be considered, first, that inasmuch as Contentedness is nothing else than an Acquiescency in the present; nothing hinders but a man may be at the same time contented with the present, and yet desire an enlargement for the future, because that Acquiescency and Desire have respect to different times, which takes away all contradiction between them. The contented man of whom we speak, doth indeed desire an enlargement of his condition for the future; he prays to God for it, and is not wanting in his endeavours to procure it; but in the mean time he quiets himself with what he hath, and repines not in the least at the smallness of it. But because the present time in strictness of Speech reacherh no farther than the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or present moment, within which to confine the duty of Contentment were to pen it up in a narrower room than I conceive Christianity and Nature intended it; and because the same Will of God which obligeth us to be content with the portion of the present minute, will equally oblige us to continue our Contentment to the next, if God be pleased to continue the other: for these Reasons, I say, as I deem it but just to understand by the present time, all that time, of what continuance soever, to which God shall be pleased to annex the same humble Fortune; so I conceive it alike necessary to show, that those Desires and Endeavours, which we spoke of, are no way inconsistent with that acquiescency which is commensurate to it. Now that so they are not, or at least need not to be, will appear, if these two Conditions be admitted, which not contented Man either did or can refuse. 1. That whilst the Will of God is yet unknown, he submit his Desires to it, and resolve to abide by the determination of it. And 2. That he lay aside all Desires of an enlargement, after it shall appear to him that it is the Will of God he should abide in that mean condition wherein he is. For acquiescency not so much importing an exclusion of our Desires, as the quieting of them, and bringing them into subjection to the Will of the Divine Majesty, which, as I shall afterwards show, is the principal ground of Contentment; he may very well be said to acquiesce in his present Fortune, who submits his Desires to the Will of God, whilst it is yet uncertain; and causeth them to cease utterly, where that Will of God is made known. The only difficulty in my opinion, (which though of no concernment as to the present Dispute to resolve, is yet to the understanding of the nature of Contentment) the only difficulty, I say, in my opinion, is how to come to understand whether it be the Will of God we should abide in that condition we are in. Now though nothing herein can certainly be defined without a Revelation from Heaven, partly because the Scripture (which is one way of knowing Gods Will) is silent in this particular; and partly because his Providence (which is the only one beside) is a mysterious Book, and not very easy to be unriddled: yet I think we may probably conjecture it to be his Will that we should so abide, or at least that we should do so till we have a very fair invitation from his Providence to stir; if, after many and various attempts to amend our condition, we do yet prove unsuccessful in it: It being not lightly to be thought (especially where our Desires are moderate, and Attempts honest) that God, by whose Providence they are frustrated, would so often do so, if it were not his Will we should at least for some time abide in the condition we are in. The result of the Premises is this; The contented Man, as such, acquiesceth in his present Fortune, and is willing, because it is God's Will, to be what he is: He is moreover as willing to continue so to be, so long as it shall please God to have him so. In conformity whereto, though he do desire, and it may be endeavour an amendment; yet as he doth not do so, even when the Will of God is uncertain, without a submission of his Will to God's, and a resolvedness to acquiesce in the determination of it; so those Desires and Endeavours of his cease altogether, where it either certainly, or probably, appears to him to be the Will of God, that he should abide in that condition wherein he is. I say nothing at all at present, of the entertaining of immoderate or anxious Desires, or using any unlawful means to compass them; these being so apparently inconsistent with that acquiescency of mind whereof we speak, and that Will of God which I shall afterwards show to be the ground of it, that it may suffice to have mentioned them, without either Proof or Explication. For how can he be said to acquiesce in his present Portion, and much more in the Will of God concerning it; whose mind is not only like the troubled Sea in that it cannot rest, but is ever casting out mire and dirt, both in its speeches and actions; neither knowing how to express itself without murmuring and complaining, nor to prosecute the Object of its Desires, without violent or fraudulent actions, which that God, in whose Will they ought to acquiesce, hath distinctly and severely forbidden?  
From that acquiescency, wherein we have said contentedness to consist, pass we to that in which it obligeth us to acquiesce; which I have said to be that Portion of outward things we are possessed of: Where again, we are to consider it, as it imports the presence of some portion of outward things; and as it imports that portion which we have, as well low as high, to be equally the Object of it. Now though (to begin with the first) it be generally necessary to Contentment, that a Man be furnished with such things as are ordinarily necessary for his support, and particularly with Food and Raiment; upon which account I have shown it 
* See Explic. of the Eighth Com. Part 3.  to be lawful, in the case of extreme necessity, to withdraw so much from other Men as will serve to supply it; yet I must also add, that we both may and aught to be content, even when we are without those necessary things, where it appears to be God's Will that so we should be; because though Food and Raiment be generally necessary to Contentment, yet they are not absolutely nor universally such, Man, as our Saviour argues out of the Law, living not by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God. The only difficulty is, how we may discover that Will of God, which I suppose may be these two ways. 1. When he giveth us any assurance of an extraordinary support: and 2. When he placeth us in such a condition as we cannot compass an ordinary one. After either of which to repine or murmur, were as manifest a violation of the Duty of Contentment, as to do so when we have Food and Raiment. For contentedness (as I shall afterwards show) having for the ground of its Obligation the Will of that God who is the framer of our Fortunes; if it be his Will (as certainly the cases before spoken of are no obscure indications of it) that we should acquiesce in no Fortune as well as in a small one, there is no doubt that alike ought to be the Object of it, and we to acquiesce or rest in it. There is but little difficulty (and therefore I shall not insist on the Explication of it) as to what I have before said concerning low and high being alike the Object of Contentment; there being no Truth of which we have a greater Experience, than what is said to have fallen from the mouth of Epicurus 
* Vid. Aelian. Vari. hist. l. 4. c. 13. , that to whom little is not enough, nothing how great soever is so; Men's Desires for the most part enlarging with their Fortunes, and creating to them those wants which God and Nature never made.  
Lastly, As contentedness is an acquiescency of the Mind, and an acquiescency in that portion of outward things we are possessed of; so such an acquiescency in it, as ariseth from, and includeth in it a firm belief of that portion's being sufficient for us. This as it is the natural importance of those Phrases, whereby we have shown the New Testament to express it, so being essential to contentedness; it being impossible for the Will to quiet itself, in that which the Understanding doth not apprehend to be sufficient. The Will may indeed, by the impossibility of attaining more, be beaten off from desiring it; it may be taken off from any perfect and efficacious volitions of it: but as some velleities will ever remain, and, what naturally flows from them, a repining at our portion; so it may rather be said to be quieted, or to speak more properly, to be mortified by, than to quiet itself in it.  
2. Of the nature of Contentment I have discoursed hitherto, proceed we in the next place to the grounds of its obligation. Amongst which I reckon first, the Will of Almighty God, declared by the disposition of his Providence. For inasmuch as God, and not we ourselves, is the framer of our Fortunes, inasmuch as it is he that maketh poor as well as maketh rich; it is but a just compliance with his Will, by whose disposition the several Conditions of Men are shaped, to acquiesce in it whatsoever it is, and bring our Minds to an approbation of it. Excellent to this purpose is that of Epictetus in his Enchiridion, or at least may be easily adapted to it. Remember (saith he 
* c. 23. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ) that thou art the Actor of a part in a Play, and such an one as it pleaseth thy great Master to impose upon thee. If it be a short one, that thou art the Actor of a short; if a long one, of a long. If he will have thee to act the part of a poor man, remember that thou do handsomely discharge it: if a Lame Man, a Ruler, or a Private Person, that thou accordingly behave thyself. To thee it belongs to represent as thou oughtest the person which is given thee to act, to another to make choice of it. It is true indeed, if we were or might be choosers of our own Fortunes; if, as we are willing enough to be, so we were actually exempted from subjection to any superior Power: so I could not with the same reasonableness press upon you the being contented with that portion of outward things which ye are possessed of. For why should I be contented with a mean and despicable Fortune, when there is no restraint upon me from prosecuting a better? But when we are not our own, but his by whom we were created and redeemed, when our Will is no less his servant, than any of our other Faculties or Powers; how unreasonable must it be not to acquiesce in his, and that portion of outward things which he allots us? Especially, if we add in the second place, which may pass for another ground of our obligation to it, that God doth both know better than we ourselves what condition is fittest for us; and, 

Permits ipsis expendere numinibus, quid  
Conveniat nobis, rebúsque sit utile nostris;  
Nam pro jucundis aptissima quaeque dabunt dii,  
Charior est illis homo quàm sibi.—  Juv. Sat. 10. v. 347. etc.  because he is also a merciful Father, will be sure to allot us that which is. Discontentedness in this case being not only undutifulness, but ingratitude, and a resisting of his love, as well as of his Authority. Add hereunto, thirdly, (which may pass for another ground of our obligation) the sufficiency of that portion which it hath pleased the Divine Majesty to assign us. For what can be more reasonable, especially when God imposeth it on us, than to be contented with that which is sufficient? The only difficulty is, how to make it appear that all allotments of the Divine Providence are such, especially when many of them are attended with great necessities, and such as press upon the most importunate, as well as most reasonable desires of Nature. But as men's Fortunes do more often become insufficient by the exorbitancies of their desires, than by the disproportionableness thereof to just and moderate ones; so those which are insufficient in themselves, may become sufficient through the Divine Grace, yea undoubtedly shall to all those that truly love and fear him: For God having distinctly promised, that, together with the temptation, whatsoever it is, he will make a way for us to escape, that we may be able to bear it, he hath thereby obliged himself, where he affords not the ordinary means of support, to furnish out an extraordinary and supernatural one. Less than that in the failure of ordinary means sufficing not to bear the temptation, but being more than sufficient for it where it is afforded; not only the infinity of God and his creating out of nothing the ordinary supports of Humane life so persuading, but the assurance he hath given us of an eternal life after this, where Food and Raiment, and other such like means of our support, shall neither be wanted nor desired.  
3. From the grounds of our obligation to Contentment, pass we to the means whereby it may be acquired, the third thing proposed to be discoursed of. I do not mean to mention all, which were too large a task, and may with more Reason be expected from such as entreat de industriâ of that Argument, but to select such of them as seem to me to be most efficacious to produce that Contentment which I inculcate. In the number of which I reckon, first, A sober use of abundance at all times, and sometimes a voluntary abstinence. For were Men careful, as they ought, to keep themselves always within the bounds of temperance, and sometimes also (which yet were no hard task) to abstain wholly from the enjoyment of their plenty; they would not then find it so uneasy to content themselves with a more moderate Fortune, or repine and murmur at it when it befalls them: he who can be without these external things even when he hath them, being much more likely to bear the want of them when they are not to be had, and bring his mind to acquiesce in it. But when Men will not only not abstain at any time from lawful Delights, but allow themselves in such as are exorbitant; when, instead of denying and mortifying their appetites, they will afford them the utmost satisfaction they are capable of, though with the hazard of their health, and, which is of much more consideration, of their eternal welfare: then no wonder if a meaner Fortune appear strange and irksome, and the inconveniences wherewith it is attended insupportable; the difference between their former enjoyments and their present straits appearing so vastly great, that it may well stagger a resolved Understanding, and make Men sink under their Calamity, though they were otherwise well enough disposed to bear it, and made use of all their Reason to reconcile themselves to the undergoing of it. Whence it is, that where such a change hath sometime happened, they, who have been the unhappy subjects thereof, have needed no other Malady to oblige them to quit the World, and exchange this miserable life, I will not say for a better, but what may reasonably enough be feared, for one that exceeds it as much in sadness, as it doth in the duration of it.  
But let us suppose (as God knows that opportunity of learning Contentment doth often pass by us unobserved,) let us suppose, I say, that we have not been careful to use our affluence with sobriety, and much less to abridge ourselves in the lawful use of it; yet even so there will not want means to bring us to a contented mind, if we will but be so wise as to make use of them. Such as is in the next place the consideration of our own vileness, and, what our former plenty may well suggest to us, our past riots and intemperances': For how can he think much to stoop to a mean Fortune, who hath made so ill use of a more splendid one? yea who it may be hath been the Author of his own pressures, and brought himself to penury by a prodigal wasting of his former Fortunes? It being but reasonable, that every Man should acquiesce in that, which hath been rather his choice than his misfortune. And though it be true, that all, who have thus fallen, are not conscious to themselves of the like Prodigality, nor it may be of any Crimes which may be looked upon as equal to them; yet is there none who will not find enough in himself to make him acknowledge his Calamity to have been deserved, and accordingly to prompt him, rather to thank God for what he hath, than to repine that it is no greater than it is; especially if he do also consider, that there are many in the world who are more necessitous than himself, and, it may be too, who have in all things more approved themselves to the Divine Majesty, than he himself, if he judge impartially, will think himself to have done. And though it were but an odd consideration which Diogenes 
* Aelian. Var. hist. l. 13. c. 26.  solaced himself with in the extremity of his poverty, that the Mice which played about him, pleased themselves with those crumbs, that did either fall from, or were wiped off by him; yet it may suggest to us another which is more likely to be attended to, and, where it is so, to induce Men to Contentment. For certainly, notwithstanding the murmur of discontented Men, there are some in the world, who do not yet repine, whose Fortunes are as disproportionable to those of the discontented person, as those of the Mice were to the condition of the Cynic.  
What should I tell you, what Experience no less than the Scripture assures us, That our life consisteth not in the abundance of the things that we possess? That Contentment is as rarely, yea more rarely, to be found in a splendid Fortune, than in a moderate or humble one? That those gaieties, which we so much desire, and without which it is so hard for us to be contented, are attended with a proportionable number of inconveniences? That more cares, and fears, and dangers wait upon the Sceptre than upon the Spade? That those pleasures, which are the Concomitants of greater Fortunes, appear more amiable at a distance, than when they come to be enjoyed; which no Man who hath ever tasted any earthly pleasure, but will find himself obliged to confess? That they are of no certain continuance, even when we think ourselves most sure of them? That we ourselves may be taken from them, as well as they from us? In fine, That we may be taken from them even whilst we continue in and with them? It being no rare thing for Men to lose the sense of them, by stupidity or an exquisite pain, and want them, even when they are possessed of them. All which things, whosoever shall duly ponder in his mind, and allow them that weight which they deserve, will, I doubt not, be easily induced to content himself with an humble Fortune, and not only suffer but embrace it.  
But of all the means whereby Contentment may be procured, and which therefore it will concern us to make use of, because there can be no happiness without it; there are certainly none more efficacious, than such as are purely Religious, and for which we are beholden rather to the Book of God than that of Nature. In the number of which I reckon, first, Those many assurances the Scripture hath given us of Gods supporting us under our humble Fortunes, or delivering us out of them, or making them advantageous to us. Such as are those that inform us, that God will never leave us nor forsake us (for so what was spoken to Joshua in particular, is by the Author to the Hebrews extended unto all) that his eyes are upon them that fear him, 
Psal. 33.18.19,— 34.10 Rom. 8.28. Heb. 13.5.  to deliver their souls from death, and to feed them in the time of dearth; that though the Lions do lack and suffer hunger, yet they which seek the Lord shall want no manner of thing that is good; and in fine, that all things shall work together for good to them that love God, to them who are called according to his purpose. For who can well be discontented with his outward condition, which he is assured shall be made supportable, or mended, and (which is more) rendered advantageous to him? The like is to be said, yea with much more reason, of the Promises of a better life, of being satisfied, however we may now hunger, when we awake with God's likeness, of being advanced to an abiding City, and an incorruptible Crown, to the tasting of, or rather immersing ourselves in Rivers of pleasures, and such Rivers, as, because they are supplied out of the Ocean of the Divine Goodness, shall run for evermore. For what peevishness must it be, during the short time of our continuing here, not to content ourselves with a mean allotment; when he, by whom we are allotted it, hath assured us of so large a portion in that better and more enduring world? To all which, if we add our Prayers to God, who is the giver of every good and perfect gift, and particularly of that Contentment whereof we speak, it being he and he alone who giveth his beloved rest of body and mind, whilst others rise up early and sit up late, and eat the bread of cares and sorrows; so (I say) we shall want nothing (because he hath styled himself a God hearing Prayer, as well as giving success to our endeavours) which may both oblige and enable us, to content ourselves with our allotment, as well as not to extend our Desires to those of others.  
Such are the Laws of the Jewish Code, or at least of that part of it, which contains the precepts of a virtuous life; such too, because transcribed, and confirmed, and enlarged, by our Blessed Saviour, are the Laws of the Christian one. I wish I could also add, such are the lives of his Disciples; of those who have been baptised into his Faith and service, and particularly into the obedience of this Royal Law. But the carelessness of the better, and the debauchedness of the worse sort make the contrary too evident to be either disbelieved or denied. In consideration whereof, as it was not without great reason, that that Church, whose Catechism I have chosen to explain, hath taught us to subjoin, both to the whole and every precept of it, an acknowledgement of our own Errors, and a Prayer both for mercy and a better mind; so I shall conclude my Explication of it with praying in like manner, that God would be merciful in the pardoning of our several transgressions of these his most Holy Laws, and for the time to come write them in our minds and in our hearts, and incline us both more diligently and faithfully to keep them.     
FINIS.   

ERRATA.  
In the Title over the Pages. Pag. 25. and 27. for add to and confirm, read fulfil and add to.  

In the Text.  
Pag. 8. lin. 45. after consequently add that. p. 9 l. 30. read 1 Tim. 2. p. 10. l. penult. for to r. so. p. 12. l. 32. for he has r. having. p. 23. l. 18. entrance. p. 29. l. 40. extent. p. 39 l. 5 measures. p. 44. l. 17. For inasmuch. p. 46. l. 37. spiritual. p. 55. l. 4. for that r. the. p. 64. l. 2. incentive. p. 70. l. 36 for lower r. low or. p. 88 l. 33. for him r. them. p. 123. l. 2. for 4. r. 2. p. 132. l. 47. for 1. r. 12. p. 155. l. 13. for 12. r. 21. ib. l. ult. for 50. r. 15. p. 166. l. 7. for guiltiness r. guiltless. ib. l. penult. for 23 r. 24. p. 175. l. 18. for in r. of. p. 196. l 48. for would r. may. p. 202. l. 31. for 32. r. 31. p. 209. l. antep. for 72. r. 73. p. 222. l. 4. for and obedience r. or obedience. p. 226. l. 10. for exalt the r. exact. p. 233. l. 15. after forbids add the. p. 241. l. 44. for some r. a. p. 251. l. 21. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ib. l. 37. for themselves r. ourselves. p. 256. l. 13. those several. ib. l. 35. for to r. so. p. 258. l. 4. strongly. p. 271. l. 32. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 275. l. 12. for doth r. do. ib. 37. for power in r. power of. p. 276. l. 32. decreed. p. 278. l. 7. Example. p. 279 l. 25. and 44. for God r Good. p. 281. l. 7. after defend add it. p. 288. l. 8. to be appointed. p. 299. l. 27. for difference, there r. difference there, p. 301. l. 42. in things. p. 304. l. 8. for to r. so. p. 305. l 25. for and. r. And. p. 315. l. 21. for so r. to. ib. l. 42. r. half of. p. 318. l. 38. for 6. r. 16. p. 323 l. 2. for happiness r. unhappiness. ib. l. 12. after a add great. p. 324. l. 34. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 334. l. 42. for conceal r. cancel. p. 362. l 32. Haereses p. 364 l. 20. deal as. p. 366. l. 43. after forbid add it. p. 368. l. 35. proscribes. p. 369. l. 23. all calling. p. 370. l. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 384. l. 25. Contracts a. p. 392. l. 46. Amiableness. p. 393. l. 44 others. p. 394. l. 22. for 15. r. 35. p. 395. l. 21. for 17. r. 7. p. 401. l. 40. express. p. 402. l. 1. for 33. r. 39 p. 410. l. 25. for 30. r. 13. p. 413. l. 11. for 18. r. 9 ib. l. 16. r. Whoremongers. p. 416. l. antep. unwary. p. 423. l. 21. for proportion r. properties. p. 428. l. 6. r. Act. 5.4. p. 429. l. 22. true Grace. p 432. l. 17. for who r. which. p. 435. l. 33. deal as. p. 471. l. 16. after own add or. p. 477. l. 8. proscribing. p. 488. l. 20. after also add to. p. 499. l. 46. r. For. p. 503. l. 17. for too r. to. p. 519. l. 12. Gentlemen. p. 520. l. 8. after where add the. p. 532. l 20. covetousnesses. ib. l. 40. for upon r. by. p. 533. l. 27. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ib. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉   

In the Margin.  
Pag. 36. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉—  Verba sunt, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. p. 49. for 27. r. 37. p. 71. for Isa. r. Eze. p. 116. l. 4. after verba deal 1. p. 203 l. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 205. l. 23. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ib. l. 24. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 236. l. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. l. 11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 21. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p 237. l. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 265. l. ult. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 267. l. antep. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 273. l. 1. for 2.3. r. 23. l. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 278. l. antep. castella. ib. l. ult. sect. 7. p. 303. l. pen. clavum. p. 331. l. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 332. l. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ib. l. 16. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ib. l. 18. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 361. l. 1. c. 2. p. 365. l. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ib. l. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 369. l. 7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 374. l. 2. for 14. r. 1.4. p. 399. l. 2. Col. p. 406. l. 20. vitiis. p. 411. l. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ib. l. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 451. for 8. r. 3. p. 460. for natural use r. nature and use. p. 464. contendant. p. 516. l. 2. r. 32.   

ADDEND.  
Pag. 267. in margin. Post illud Strabonis, add aliud illustre testimonium ex Dionis Hist. Rom. l. 53. p. 519. quod haud ita pridem inter legendum observavi— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉—  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [Augustum nempe de quo ante dicta commemorat] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ΝΟΜΩ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Addit autem idem Dion, quod sententiam nostram magis confirmat, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ΚΟΛΑΚΕΙΑΣ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑΣ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.